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 e+
 
 MILITARY NEEDS AND MILITARY POLICY
 
 BY THE SAME AUTHOR 
 
 ENGLISH SOCIALISM OF TO-DAY 
 
 3rd Edition 
 London : SMITH, ELDER & CO., 15 Waterloo Place 
 
 THE ARMY IN 1906 
 
 London : JOHN MURRAY, 50A Albemarle Street 
 
 THE CITIZEN READER 
 
 411th Thousand 
 
 THE LAWS OF EVERY-DAY LIFE 
 
 67th Thousand 
 
 A HISTORY OF ENGLAND 
 33rd Thousand 
 
 THINGS NEW AND OLD 
 
 283rd Thousand 
 THIS WORLD OF OURS 
 
 20th Thousand 
 
 THE COMING OF THE KILOGRAM 
 llth Thousand 
 
 OUR GREAT CITY 
 
 llth Thousand 
 
 IN A CONNING TOWER 
 
 32nd Thousand 
 
 CASSELL & CO., LTD.. 
 London, Paris, and Melbourne
 
 MILITARY NEEDS 
 
 AND 
 
 MILITARY POLICY 
 
 BY THE RIGHT HONOURABLE 
 
 H. O.(ARNOLD-FORSTER, M.P. 
 
 WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY 
 
 FIELD-MARSHAL EARL ROBERTS, V.C., K.G., etc. 
 
 LONDON 
 SMITH, ELDER & CO., 15 WATERLOO PLACE, S.W. 
 
 1909 
 
 [All rights reserved]
 
 PRINTED BY 
 
 SPOTTISWOODE AND CO. LTD., LONDON 
 COLCHESTER AND KTON
 
 tf 
 
 INTRODUCTION 
 
 j^iTHE request to say a few words of introduction 
 40 to Mr. Arnold- Forster's latest work on the all- 
 g important question of our military preparations is one 
 2 to which I respond with pleasure. The greatest source 
 
 ^j 
 
 of danger to this country lies in the extraordinary 
 indifference of the rulers, in other words, the general 
 public, to the problems of national defence. The 
 tendency to forget the lessons of past events, as 
 soon as those events are over, seems to be almost 
 I irresistible. Nothing apparently but absolute disaster 
 & is likely to cure us of the inveterate belief that some- 
 how or other we are exempt from all the laws which 
 Oi have governed the rise and fall of nations, and can 
 always rely upon some miraculous interposition of 
 Providence to see us through the hour of danger. 
 The whole mechanism of our public life tends, even 
 in the case of those interested in military affairs, to 
 an unconscious acquiescence in the plausible self- 
 
 ^ri 
 
 ^ deception which persuades us that, if we can success- 
 
 f^ 
 
 fully carry out this or that particular scheme, 
 u devised with no regard to our strategical needs, we 
 
 v b 
 
 388569
 
 vi INTRODUCTION 
 
 have solved the problem of national defence and 
 exorcised all dangers from our path. 
 
 It is these tendencies which Mr. Arnold-Forster 
 has set himself to combat in the present work. Into 
 the purely controversial issues raised in it I do not 
 propose to enter. But I can wholly echo Mr. 
 Arnold-Forster's insistence on the supreme im- 
 portance of maintaining at the very highest standard 
 both the strength and efficiency of our Regular Army. 
 England may be an island, but the Empire is a 
 Continental power with vast land frontiers in India 
 and in Canada which have to be defended, and for 
 the defence of which we must in the main look to 
 the Regular Army. That the Regular Army should 
 be strong in numbers and efficient in training, that 
 it should be wholly available for its over-sea duties, 
 and that it should be capable of great expansion in 
 war, these, to my mind, are primary conditions the 
 necessity for which cannot be too strongly insisted 
 upon. 
 
 As to the question of the possibilty of an invasion 
 of this country, Mr. Arnold-Forster and I must 
 agree to differ. But I am entirely at one with him in 
 holding that an invading army of picked Continental 
 troops cannot be repelled by a scratch force 
 whose training and organisation are based, not on 
 the principle of efficiency, but on that of individual 
 convenience. Invasion must be met by a force 
 systematically and adequately trained in all arms,
 
 INTRODUCTION vii 
 
 and led by officers in whom both their subordinates 
 and their superiors can place implicit confidence. 
 The question at issue is not whether the Territorial 
 Army will attain the standard which Mr. Haldane 
 has set before it, but whether it will fall short of the 
 standard by which it will be measured on the field 
 of battle. Amateur artillerymen may make remark- 
 able progress in a fortnight, but the enemy's shrapnel 
 makes no allowances. This, I apprehend, is the 
 whole gist of Mr. Arnold-Forster's criticism, and for 
 that reason this book is deserving of the careful 
 consideration of all who are interested in the vital 
 problem of national defence. 
 
 ROBERTS, P.M. 
 
 19th December 1908.
 
 PREFACE 
 
 IN submitting the present work to the judgment 
 of the Public, some explanation of its purpose and 
 arrangement is necessary. 
 
 Its purpose is to hasten, if may be, the awaken- 
 ing of the Nation from the hypnotic trance in 
 which, as Lord Roberts has truly declared, it has 
 been sunk during the last three years. Such a 
 task is neither easy nor popular. The people of 
 this country, as Lord Cromer has well said, have 
 an almost infinite capacity for believing that to be 
 true which they wish to be true ; and anyone who 
 endeavours to disturb the calm which is the natural 
 and appropriate reward of indulgence in this habit, 
 does so at his peril. 
 
 At the present time the majority of the people 
 of this country have allowed themselves to be 
 persuaded into the belief that the time and effort 
 necessary to make a soldier, correspond exactly 
 with the time and effort which an individual who 
 has adopted some other vocation is able or disposed 
 to give to military exercises, and to learning the
 
 x PREFACE 
 
 profession of arms. The belief, of course, is 
 utterly absurd, and contrary to all reason and experi- 
 ence. Its absurdity would be recognised at once, if 
 the theory which its acceptance involves were to be 
 applied to the knowledge and practice of any pro- 
 fession in the world except that of soldiering. But 
 on the acceptance of this gross and palpable fallacy 
 the whole of our new military system depends. 
 Considerable experience, however, has convinced the 
 writer that anyone who ventures to call attention 
 to this self-evident truth stands in danger of being 
 regarded as a disturber of the peace, and a public 
 enemy. Now, as in the days of Jeremiah, ' The 
 prophets prophesy falsely . . . and the people love 
 to have it so. And what shall be the end thereof ? ' 
 There lies the peril. 'The people love to have it so.' 
 But the duty of telling the truth, nevertheless, 
 remains clear and certain. It is because I feel 
 that the duty is paramount that this book has been 
 written. 
 
 Whatever defects the work may have, and they 
 are doubtless many and obvious, it, at any rate, has 
 the merit of being sincere. For thirty years the 
 author has been trying to understand what war 
 means, and above all to realise what is the price which 
 a nation has to pay for defeat. The study has been 
 long, patient, and thorough, and the student has 
 enjoyed, perhaps, some special advantages in pursuing 
 it. It is what he has learnt that has nerved him to
 
 PREFACE xi 
 
 protest against the policy of military make-believe 
 which at this moment reigns with almost undisputed 
 sway in this country. 
 
 For the individual who has had the temerity to 
 challenge a policy which has been recommended 
 with immense ability, and which has been received 
 with almost universal acclamation, no consideration 
 is asked. But for the arguments used and the 
 facts cited by him I do ask very careful considera- 
 tion. It matters little, indeed, it matters not at all, 
 who says these things provided they be true. If 
 they be true, beyond all shadow of doubt, they 
 matter. I would, therefore, beg my readers to 
 dissociate the merits or demerits of the writer 
 from the merits or demerits of that which he has 
 written. 
 
 I have endeavoured to make my propositions 
 quite clear. They are either true or untrue, and it 
 is the question of their truth or their untruth that I 
 desire to submit to the judgment of my readers. If, 
 after examining the evidence produced, they should 
 come to the conclusion that the case is proved, their 
 verdict must be of the highest importance. 
 
 For instance ; if it be true that untrained troops 
 have never held their own permanently against 
 a Regular Army, the fact is of vital importance 
 to us, who have decided to entrust our safety 
 to untrained troops, and who have, at the same 
 time, greatly diminished our Regular Army.
 
 xii PREFACE 
 
 If it be true that for nearly a thousand years 
 past all our righting has been done across the sea, 
 and never on our own soil, the fact is important, and 
 the wisdom of the policy of spending many millions 
 upon an untrained army tied to the soil of this 
 country must be in doubt. 
 
 If, on the other hand, it be true that this country 
 is liable to be invaded by a great military Power, the 
 fact is important, and the argument that in order to 
 resist such an invasion we must make the same kind of 
 sacrifices which other nations have been compelled 
 to make for a similar purpose, is entitled to great 
 weight. 
 
 And the same observations apply to every one of 
 the categorical propositions that are to be found in 
 these pages. If the statements made be untrue, and 
 if the evidence adduced in support of them be of no 
 value, the propositions themselves are not worth a 
 moment's consideration. But if the statements be 
 true and the evidence unimpeachable, then the 
 propositions advanced are undoubtedly important. 
 I beg, therefore, that my readers will examine the 
 statements, and sift the evidence with strict im- 
 partiality. But if they find the case proven, then I 
 would most respectfully urge them to make their 
 action correspond with their judgment. 
 
 In Part I of the book I have made some 
 reference to what I have always believed to be an alter- 
 native policy to that which we have now adopted.
 
 PREFACE xiii 
 
 I have done so because I am confident that in some 
 form or other that alternative policy must eventually 
 be adopted. It may, indeed, be supplemented by 
 the addition of a policy of compulsory service ; but 
 be that as it may, the question of the Regular Army, 
 its Reserves and its Officers, must always remain 
 paramount. It may be objected that the suggestion 
 that there can ever be a return to the policy which 
 was reversed in 1906 is presumptuous in view of the 
 military support which we are told has been accorded 
 with practical unanimity to the present system. On 
 this question of military opinion, however, I must 
 remain a sceptic. I am absolutely unable to believe 
 that within the short space of six months the whole 
 professional opinion of this country underwent a 
 fundamental change ; that it suddenly parted com- 
 pany with the military opinion of every other nation ; 
 and accepted as correct, and indeed as axiomatic, 
 the exact contradictory of all that it had held to be 
 essential up to the end of 1905. My own solution 
 of the apparent anomaly does not involve the accep- 
 tance of a belief in this strange and sudden conversion. 
 In the first place, I do not for a moment believe that 
 military opinion in this country is in fact unanimous, 
 or anything like unanimous, in its approval of the 
 present military policy. Indeed, I imagine that, outside 
 a small official coterie, it is not even considered 
 necessary to express such a belief. But this is not all. 
 There can be little doubt that most of the approval
 
 xiv PREFACE 
 
 that has been given by soldiers to the new policy, 
 has been given subject to a very important reserva- 
 tion. Soldiers approve the policy not because they 
 believe it is producing, or is capable of producing an 
 effective war army ; but because they believe that it 
 can be made the stepping-stone to another and a 
 very different policy, namely, Conscription, or 
 Conscription under an alias. This attitude can 
 scarcely be regarded as particularly honest, or 
 particularly wise. It is not honest to mislead the 
 people of this country by telling them that a certain 
 set of measures is likely to render them secure 
 in the event of war, when it would seem that many of 
 those who use their great influence and high position 
 to create this impression really mean something 
 quite different from what their words and their 
 conduct naturally imply, and are, in fact, doing their 
 best to lead their country into an impasse from 
 which, in their belief, there is only one exit. That 
 the policy is unwise is evident. We are most 
 successfully 'off with the old love,' but are so 
 far from being 'on with the new,' that it is only 
 with bated breath that we venture as yet to give any 
 indication of the true state of our affections. Those 
 soldiers who have used their influence to reduce and 
 injure the Regular Army, to diminish the number of 
 the Volunteers and to call them by another name, 
 may, in the long run, get what they hope for, and 
 what to do them justice most of them frankly
 
 PREFACE xv 
 
 admit that they long for. But we have not got 
 Conscription yet, and we have lost or are in the 
 process of losing some 30,000 trained soldiers, and 
 the whole of the Militia. 
 
 In Part III of the book I have dealt with what 
 appears to me a very serious matter. Attention is 
 there called to a number of instances in which 
 Parliament and the public have undoubtedly been 
 misled by the Secretary of State, or by those who 
 have spoken on his behalf. These instances are 
 cited, not in any spirit of foolish recrimination, nor 
 with the object of raking up old errors made in good 
 faith, but admitted and apologised for, and therefore 
 best forgotten. As a matter of fact, the statements, 
 whether made in good faith or not, have not been 
 apologised for; and are not, and ought not to be 
 forgotten. It is indeed an important part of the case 
 which I wish to present to my readers, that during 
 the last three years the public has constantly been 
 misled with regard to matters of the gravest im- 
 portance, that statements made by the Secretary of 
 State were inaccurate and misleading, and did in fact 
 mislead many ; and that, in consequence, acts have 
 been permitted, approved, or condoned, which would 
 never have been tolerated had they been seen in the 
 clear white light of truth. This may seem a hard 
 saying, but I will ask my readers to be the judges as 
 to whether or not it be justified. Nay, more, I will 
 ask whether there are not some among them who
 
 xvi PREFACE 
 
 have themselves been misled. When the country 
 was told that the Liberal Government had increased 
 the Regular Army by 90,000 men, did no one believe 
 it ? And yet the statement was absolutely untrue. 
 When the House of Commons was informed that 
 the dismantling of the London forts was due to the 
 enlightened perspicacity of the Secretary of State for 
 War, did no one believe it ? But the statement was 
 untrue. When Parliament was informed that the 
 Secretary of State had no intention of destroying 
 Battalions of the Regular Army, and that he regarded 
 such an idea as a preposterous folly, did no one 
 believe him ? And yet he did contemplate, and did 
 perform, the very act which he disavowed. When the 
 Secretary of State held up the performances of the 
 Citizen Armies of France as furnishing an example 
 for our imitation and guidance, did everyone realise 
 that it was an example which could only be cited in 
 order that we might the more carefully avoid follow- 
 ing it ? But it is unnecessary to multiply instances. 
 These and many similar examples of the same evils 
 are fully examined in Part III of this book. All I ask 
 is that the case I have there endeavoured to establish 
 may be fairly and impartially judged. If that case be 
 proved, as I believe it to be, then indeed it is time 
 that we should emerge from our hypnotic trance, 
 that we should look facts in the face, and that we 
 should at last begin to see things as they really 
 are.
 
 PREFACE xvii 
 
 In conclusion, I desire to express my gratitude to 
 Lord Roberts, who has done me the honour of 
 contributing an introduction to this book. Lord 
 Roberts has correctly interpreted and anticipated 
 my earnest desire that he should not make himself 
 responsible for the controversial portions of this 
 work. That is a burden which must fall on my 
 shoulders alone, and I am content now, as always, to 
 bear it. But it is a great encouragement and 
 stimulus to me to be able to print these kindly 
 words from the Field Marshal. Lord Roberts has 
 done more than any living man to make the people 
 of this country realise that there is a danger, and 
 that all is not well. His great name and fame have 
 given weight to his words, and have made millions 
 of men who never gave a thought to these matters 
 before think about our military problem, and about 
 the peril in which we stand. As one who shares to 
 the full Lord Roberts's belief, and who, though far 
 less competent to commend it to others, is not less 
 sincere in his desire to impress his countrymen with 
 the gravity of the situation, the author ventured to 
 ask Lord Roberts for his assistance. The introduc- 
 tion to this volume is the kind and generous response 
 to this request. 
 
 H. O. A.-F. 
 
 January 1909,
 
 CONTENTS 
 
 PAGE 
 
 INTRODUCTION v 
 
 PREFACE ix 
 
 PART I 
 
 1905 AND 1909 
 
 CHAPTER 
 
 i. INTRODUCTORY . J . . . 3 
 
 ii. THE ARMY IN 1905 . . . .10 
 
 in. THE POLICY OF 1905 AND OF 1906 COMPARED 15 
 
 PART II 
 
 OUR MILITARY NEEDS AND OUR MILITARY SYSTEM 
 
 iv. PREPARATIONS FOR WAR BRITISH AND 
 
 FOREIGN .-.'.. . .29 
 
 v. THE TERRITORIAL FORCE . . . 38 
 
 vi. THE TERRITORIAL FORCE (continued) . 43 
 
 VH. THE MILITARY NEEDS OF THE NATION . 49 
 
 viii. THE PROTECTION OF THE DOCKYARDS . 57 
 
 ix. THE PROTECTION OF THE DOCKYARDS 
 
 (continued) ...... 67 
 
 x. THE QUESTION OF INVASION ... 71 
 XL THE VALUE OF UNTRAINED TROOPS IN WAR 76 
 xii. BLIND LEADERS OF THE BLIND . . 81 
 xm. SOME SOLDIERS ON THE TRAINING OF 
 
 THE SOLDIER 88 
 
 xiv. RAIDS . . . . . .96 
 
 xv. THE ARMY WE REQUIRE . . .106 
 
 xvi. THE ATTACK ON THE REGULAR ARMY . 110
 
 xx CONTENTS 
 
 CHAPTER PAGE 
 
 xvn. THE ARMY, THE WORKHOUSE, AND 
 
 THE ROYAL NAVY . . . .120 
 xviii. UNIVERSAL TRAINING, UNIVERSAL SER- 
 VICE, AND CONSCRIPTION . . 129 
 xix. CONSCRIPTION : REAL AND SHAM . . 141 
 xx. FURTHER REFLEXIONS UPON COM- 
 PULSORY SERVICE . . . .149 
 
 PART III 
 
 THE WAR OFFICE, PARLIAMENT, AND THE NATION 
 
 xxi. How PARLIAMENT is DECEIVED . . 161 
 
 xxii. Mr. HALDANE'S CHOSEN EXAMPLE . 166 
 
 xxiii. THE ARMY OF A DREAM . . .173 
 
 xxiv. THE 'RESERVE' MYTH . . .182 
 
 xxv. THE WORD OF A MINISTER . . .188 
 
 xxvi. THE MYTH OF THE GENERAL STAFF 
 
 ORDER 192 
 
 xxvii. THE NEW STRIKING FORCE ' . . 209 
 
 xxvin. THE HORSE AND FIELD ARTILLERY MYTH 219 
 xxix. MILITARY OPINION ON THE TERRITORIAL 
 
 ARTILLERY . . . . . 229 
 
 APPENDIX I. A NAVAL TERRITORIAL FORCE 239 
 APPENDIX II. THE OFFICIAL RETURN ON THE 
 
 STRENGTH OF THE ARMY IN 1905-08 246 
 APPENDIX III. WAR OFFICE CIRCULAR TO THE 
 
 UNEMPLOYED 254 
 
 APPENDIX IV. CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN 
 THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND THE 
 AUTHOR WITH RESPECT TO THE 
 
 TERRITORIAL ARTILLERY . . . 257 
 
 INDEX . 263
 
 MILITARY NEEDS AND 
 MILITARY POLICY 
 
 CHAPTER I 
 INTRODUCTORY 
 
 ' It really would appear that all classes, in their desire to give 
 Mr. Haldane fair play, and help him in the arduous task he has 
 undertaken, have become hypnotised.' Lord Roberts (House of 
 
 Lords, 23-11 -OS). 
 
 THE OBJECT OF THIS BOOK 
 
 A FEW words of introduction are necessary to 
 explain the origin and intention of the present work. 
 A considerable portion of the book is composed of 
 articles which appeared in the ' Standard ' in October 
 1908. But large additions have been made to the 
 original articles, some new subjects have been 
 introduced, and others have received a fuller 
 treatment than before. 
 
 It is the hope of the author that in the work 
 as now revised and supplemented, the public may 
 find a trustworthy and simple guide to the study 
 of the all-important question of our military 
 organisation. 
 
 No one is more fully aware than the writer that 
 
 B 2
 
 4 INTRODUCTORY 
 
 the book must be, in one sense, ephemeral in 
 character. It is not, and does not purport to be, 
 a work dealing only with abstract propositions, 
 propositions applicable with equal correctness to all 
 military problems at all times. If it has any value, 
 it is emphatically as a book of the hour. It 
 would indeed be a calamity if it were to serve 
 any other purpose. It is, and has been throughout, 
 the contention of the author that our existing 
 military system is not in conformity either with 
 general military principles, or with the special military 
 needs of this nation. The chapters which follow 
 are intended to establish these propositions, and to 
 make their truth apparent to non-professional readers. 
 If the existing system is not, indeed, to be ephemeral, 
 ' Heaven help the country.' But there is no need to 
 take a gloomy view ; on the contrary, there is much 
 reason to believe that even now the public is be- 
 ginning to recover from the hypnotic trance into 
 which, as Lord Roberts has well said, it has been 
 thrown by the deluge of eloquence to which it 
 has been subjected by the Secretary of State for 
 War. 
 
 It is in the hope that the facts stated and 
 the arguments submitted in these pages may 
 hasten the inevitable end that this book has been 
 written. As soon as that end comes its work will 
 have been completed, and its purpose fulfilled.
 
 POLICY OF ' LETTING WELL ALONE ' 5 
 
 THE POLICY OF ' LETTING WELL ALONE ' 
 CONSIDERED 
 
 That there is a real danger of the hypnotised 
 condition being continued long enough to involve 
 the country in grave peril, is, alas ! beyond dispute. 
 Mr. Haldane is continually appealing to the public 
 to leave things as they are, to refrain from criticism 
 or interference, and to rest assured that time alone is 
 needed to bring the seed which he has planted to 
 maturity. The appeal is one which naturally com- 
 mands the sympathy, if not the approval, of very 
 many persons. It does seem hard to pull up the 
 young plant to see how it is growing. But what if 
 the plant be in truth a noxious weed ? If that be 
 so, then the old maxim that ' ill weeds grow apace ' 
 should stimulate our exertions, and nerve us to act 
 while there is yet time. For, indeed, we have had 
 some startling object-lessons in this country of the 
 unwisdom of allowing plants to take root and to 
 spread before we have made quite sure that they are 
 likely to serve any beneficent purpose. The Volunteer 
 Force was planted in 1859. It was not till 1903 
 that the Duke of Norfolk's Commission reported, 
 without a dissentient voice, that the Volunteer 
 Force was absolutely unfit to perform the only 
 duty for which it could be supposed to exist, 
 namely, that of meeting an enemy in the field. 
 It is not well to make the same mistake twice.
 
 6 INTRODUCTORY 
 
 Providence has been very good to us, but the old 
 belief that it is not wise to ' tempt Providence ' has 
 been too often justified in the history of nations to 
 permit us to disregard it. It is, therefore, the 
 earnest hope of the author that this book may 
 contribute in some degree towards the destruction 
 of the present military policy of the War Office. 
 Until that policy is frankly recognised as wrong and 
 dangerous in the extreme, it will be impossible for 
 the country to make a fresh start on more rational 
 lines. 
 
 THE WORK OF 1904-5 
 
 It may be said that an attitude of merely destruc- 
 tive criticism is, and always must be, sterile and 
 reprehensible. A general statement of this kind, 
 however, requires to be received with many qualifica- 
 tions. Responsibility rests with those who have 
 power in a much greater degree than with those 
 who have neither office nor authority. It is not 
 incumbent upon every critic to become a creator, 
 nor does the expression of a desire to destroy that 
 which is obviously evil, impose the duty of finding 
 a remedy for the evil. 
 
 But whatever may be the ethics of the abstract 
 question, it is certain that in the particular instance 
 now under consideration no such censure as that 
 suggested above can justly be laid upon the author. 
 That the system which has now been adopted is
 
 THE WORK OF 1904-5 7 
 
 mischievous and dangerous, he has always believed, 
 and has in these pages endeavoured to prove. 
 That there is another system which in its main 
 principles is right, and applicable to the difficulties 
 of our military situation, he has always maintained, 
 and during the two short years when he himself 
 possessed some power and responsibility, he did his 
 best to explain the nature of that system, and to 
 take the initial steps towards its establishment. 
 What the author believed in 1905 he believes now. 
 If any of his present readers desire to learn what was 
 the nature of that system, and what were the reasons 
 which underlay it, what were the objects sought, 
 and how it was hoped to attain them, they will 
 find the information set out in full detail in a work 
 entitled 'The Army in 1906' (John Murray). In 
 that book there is only one controversial chapter; 
 and though every passage in that chapter which bore 
 the character of a forecast or anticipation has been 
 amply justified by what has since taken place, the 
 reader to whom controversy of any kind is unwel- 
 come may omit it without detriment to the 
 arguments contained in the remainder of the work. 
 Such as it is, the book can, at any rate, claim to 
 be the outcome of many years' close study of a 
 difficult problem, by a very diligent student whose 
 opportunities have been in some respects excep- 
 tional. 
 
 At the time when the work appeared, much
 
 8 INTRODUCTORY 
 
 prejudice was, perhaps not unnaturally, imported into 
 the discussion of proposals which were at variance 
 with a scheme which had just been introduced under 
 the most favourable auspices, and which had been 
 guaranteed by its author to be a transcendent 
 embodiment of wisdom and originality. Time has 
 slightly diminished this first impression, and it is 
 possible that the mood for impartial examination 
 may ere long return. 
 
 It would naturally be gratifying to the author if 
 such an examination were to be undertaken. It is 
 no exaggeration to say that not one person out of 
 a thousand who has condemned the policy of 1904-5 
 possesses, or has ever made the slightest attempt to 
 acquire, any idea as to what that policy really was. 
 It has always been part of the pose of the authors 
 of our present policy, to represent themselves in 
 the light of the ' saviours of society.' Whatever 
 might be the merit of their proposals and they 
 occasionally went so far as to admit that they might 
 possess some of those defects to which the works 
 of mortals are liable their acceptance, they declared, 
 was a mere matter of duty in face of the fact that 
 the Army was in a state of chaos, and our military 
 system in a parlous condition. Now, it cannot be too 
 clearly realised that this description of the Army 
 in 1905 was supported on no basis of fact what- 
 ever, and was notoriously at variance with the 
 plainest evidence.
 
 THE WORK OF 1904-5 9 
 
 When Mr. Haldane declared in 1906 that 
 
 ' Never before this time have we had such good 
 material in the Army. The moral both of officers and 
 men is higher than it was. The Army is in a condition 
 in which I do not think it has been before, both in point 
 of quantity and quality,' 
 
 he was speaking the plain truth, and it is to be 
 regretted that he has so often since that time lent his 
 authority to the opposite contention, which had no 
 merit save that it was necessary to the task of 
 ' forming public opinion ' and preparing the way for 
 a policy of reversal and destruction. The facts are 
 simple enough, and may be recapitulated in a single 
 chapter.
 
 10 THE ARMY IN 1905 
 
 CHAPTER II 
 
 THE ARMY IN 1905 
 
 MENENIUS. But reason with the fellow, 
 
 Before you punish him, where he heard this : 
 Lest you shall chance to whip your information, 
 And beat the messenger who bids beware 
 Of what is to be dreaded.' 
 
 Coriolanus, Act iv. sc. vi. 
 
 THE WORK OF Two YEARS 
 
 IN October 1905 the Regular Army on the British 
 Establishment numbered 186,02s. 1 
 
 The difficulty caused by the three years' enlist- 
 ments had been got over, and more than 200,000 
 Long Service men were in the ranks. 
 
 The shortage of officers in the Guards had been 
 made up, and that in the Cavalry very nearly so. Con- 
 current Long and Short Service enlistment had been 
 begun, and, despite the most persistent and melan- 
 choly prophecies of its certain failure, had proved 
 an extraordinary success. The Cavalry had been 
 remounted, and remount farms had been established. 
 
 The rearmament of the Artillery had been 
 undertaken and the manufacture of a thousand new 
 guns with limbers, wagons, and harness was nearing 
 completion. 
 
 1 It has now been reduced to 167,370.
 
 THE WORK OF TWO YEARS 11 
 
 A new and greatly improved type of barrack had 
 been devised and approved ; and arrangements had 
 been made for erecting a building of the new type at 
 Norwich on land generously presented by the 
 citizens. 1 
 
 Arrangements had been made, and money was 
 available, for doubling the accommodation at Sand- 
 hurst. 
 
 The new medical establishment at Millbank had 
 been designed and approved, and money appropriated 
 to its construction. 
 
 The Reserve had greatly increased, and was 
 increasing. The recommendations of the Esher 
 Committee had, after immense labour, been trans- 
 lated into action, and the administrative arrange- 
 ments of the Army remodelled in accordance with 
 them. 2 
 
 The Militia had not been dealt with, but if time 
 had allowed, it would have been dealt with in the 
 only way in which its existence could have been 
 assured consistently with the welfare of the nation. 
 
 1 This scheme has been knocked on the head, and the old 
 insanitary barracks at Norwich, which were condemned in 1905, 
 still remain. 
 
 2 The author was not responsible for these recommendations, 
 but only for seeing that they were faithfully carried out. The 
 practical upshot of the Committee's work has been very small. It 
 is probably true, however, to say that the interference of this out- 
 side Committee has not done any serious harm, and that in one or 
 two particulars the changes recommended may have done some 
 good. But generally speaking, it may be said, save for the changing 
 of a great many names, the result is pretty much ' as you were. '
 
 12 THE ARMY IN 1905 
 
 The Militia in November 1905 numbered 85,814 
 rank and file, or 15,000 more than the entire 
 establishment of the Special Reserve which it is 
 hoped may some day take its place. 
 
 The Yeomanry had increased to an unprecedented 
 total in respect of numbers, 1 and was reported by 
 every inspecting officer to be more efficient than at 
 any previous date. 
 
 The Volunteers numbered 249,611 all ranks, or 
 nearly 20,000 more than in the year preceding the 
 war. The falling off in the number of officers, which 
 had been continuous since the war, had practically 
 ceased. Arrangements had been made with the 
 Treasury, and publicly announced, whereby the sums 
 payable for efficient Volunteers would have been 
 increased ; and the privilege of attending a fifteen 
 days' camp, hitherto confined to certain special corps, 
 extended to the whole Force. 
 
 175,000 men had attended camp within the 
 year. 
 
 It will be admitted that this was not an unsatis- 
 factory record for two years' work. The principal 
 points of attack were : 
 
 1. The alleged intention to reduce the Volunteers. 
 (There was no such intention, but that did not 
 prevent the accusation being made.) 
 
 2. The alleged intention to destroy the Militia 
 and to turn them into 'sham Regulars,' with a 
 
 1 In peace time.
 
 THE WORK OF TWO YEARS 13 
 
 period of training (two years) which was declared to 
 be utterly inadequate for the formation of a British 
 soldier. 
 
 3. The insult to the Volunteers involved in a 
 Medical Inspection, designed to ascertain whether 
 men drawing pay for service were fit to serve. 
 
 4. The introduction of concurrent long and short 
 service. 
 
 5. The fact that the Army Estimates, though 
 greatly reduced, still reached 27,000,000.! 
 
 The irony of events is worth noticing. Since the 
 new policy of ' Clear Thinking ' was introduced 
 amidst the acclamations of an admiring but bewildered 
 public, ample opportunity has been given for a 
 repudiation of the heresies of 1905. But what has 
 happened ? 
 
 1. The Volunteers have been reduced by 100,000 
 men. 
 
 2. The Militia has been wiped out of existence 
 by statute, and the remnants of the Force have 
 been deliberately turned into ' sham Regulars ' with 
 none of the attributes of the Regular soldier except 
 the name. Six months' training has taken the place 
 of two years'. 
 
 3. Medical inspection has and most properly 
 been made a necessary incident of all enlistments 
 into and transfers in the Territorial Army. 
 
 4. Concurrent enlistment for long and short 
 
 1 Apart from non-recurrent expenditure.
 
 14 THE ARMY IN 1905 
 
 service has been adopted at every depot throughout 
 the United Kingdom. 
 
 5. The Army Estimates have not fallen below 
 27,000,000. But it must be admitted that if we 
 do not spend less, we are at any rate getting a good 
 deal less for what we spend. 
 
 It will be seen, therefore, that all the statements 
 as to the unsatisfactory condition of the Army, and 
 the alarm supposed to be caused by the dangerous 
 intentions of the then Secretary of State, were pure 
 inventions, created and repeated by politicians for 
 political purposes, and which had no relation what- 
 ever to the facts. It must be admitted that they 
 served their purpose at the time, but now that their 
 crude falsity has been exposed, they need not further 
 trouble us.
 
 POLICY OF 1905 AND 1906 COMPARED 15 
 
 CHAPTER III 
 THE POLICY OF 1905 AND OF 1906 COMPARED 
 
 'Pyrrus answered one, who rejoiced with him for the victory they 
 had wonne : " If we winne an other of the price," quod he, "we are 
 utterly undone." For in dede then had he lost the most parte of his 
 army he brought with him out of his realme : . . . and besides 
 that, he had nomeanesto supplie them with other. North's 'Plutarch.' 
 
 The victory of the new policy has already cost the country 140,000 
 soldiers. ' 
 
 THE ORIGIN OF THE POLICY OF 1904-5 
 
 DESPITE the progress which was achieved during 
 1904-5, it would be absurd to pretend that the 
 work which was initiated in 1904 was completed in 
 1905. It was, in fact, barely begun. In so far as 
 can be judged by results, it stands the test well 
 enough. But in 1906 everything that was sown in 
 1904-5 was torn up and trodden under foot in a 
 craze for destruction. 
 
 And yet if anyone cares to examine the principles 
 of the policy of 1904-5, he will see that they were 
 
 1 Regular Army . . . 18,653 
 
 Militia (net) . . . . 28,280 
 
 Volunteers . . ... ' ... 93,723 
 
 140,656
 
 16 POLICY OF 1905 AND 1906 COMPARED 
 
 reasonable, carefully thought out, and calculated to 
 achieve their purpose. It is not surprising that this 
 should have been so. It has been the fashion to 
 represent those principles, and the methods by which 
 it was sought to apply them, as the immature outcome 
 of a hasty and wayward imagination ; a sort of fantasy 
 sprung from the brain of an over-ambitious and ill- 
 informed individual. Nothing, of course, can be 
 further from the truth than this grotesque picture. 
 Before the proposals of 1904 saw the light, the 
 principal officers of the Army at home and abroad 
 had been consulted and had replied in careful detail 
 to a long series of questions addressed to them with the 
 object of ascertaining their views as to the needs and 
 deficiencies of the Army, and as to the character of the 
 remedy required to supply those needs and to remove 
 those deficiencies. The replies were practically 
 unanimous, and it was on them that the policy of 
 1904-5 was based. That policy was directed towards 
 the attainment of certain definite ends. Those ends 
 are not the ends to which the policy of to-day is 
 directed. Nevertheless, I believe that they still are 
 the ends which we ought to seek ; nay more, I 
 believe that ninety-nine soldiers out of a hundred 
 hold that opinion. 
 
 THE OBJECTS AIMED AT 
 
 The policy of 1904-5 was intended to achieve the 
 following objects :
 
 THE OBJECTS AIMED AT 17 
 
 1. The establishment of a Long Service Army 
 for the purpose of providing the garrison of India 
 and performing the peace duties of the Empire ; 
 coupled with the establishment of a Short Service 
 Army remaining at home in time of peace, and 
 furnishing a great Reserve for the expansion of the 
 Army in time of war. The men composing the 
 Short Service Army to have a Colour Service of two 
 years, i.e. the term of service advised by the soldiers 
 and corresponding with that adopted by nearly all 
 the great Military Powers. 
 
 2. The abolition of the Cardwell System in so 
 far as it involved an equality in the number of 
 battalions at home and abroad respectively. 
 
 3. The restoration of a solid nucleus of Long 
 Service men. 
 
 4. The multiplication of Units, with its necessary 
 consequence, a great increase in the number of 
 Officers and N.C.O.'s, and an increased power of 
 expansion in war. 
 
 5. The retention of the Militia with their 
 Officers and Units, but with the added obligation of 
 two years' Colour Service and liability for foreign 
 service in time of war. 
 
 6. The employment as a matter of right, and in 
 congenial work, of all Long Service soldiers discharged 
 with a good character. 
 
 7. The expansion and localisation of the Army
 
 18 POLICY OF 1905 AND 1906 COMPARED 
 
 through the existing Territorial organisation of the 
 Line and Militia. 
 
 8. An extension of the principle of the enlist- 
 ment ' of selected Volunteers into the First Class 
 Army Reserve. 
 
 9. The creation of a real Striking Force of all 
 arms, ready to take the field ; complete at a moment's 
 notice and without waiting for mobilisation. 1 
 
 Now, it is beyond dispute that all these things 
 must be accomplished if we are ever to have the 
 kind of Army which this country needs. Nor will 
 the necessity be diminished when and if the nation 
 decides that in addition to its Voluntary Regular 
 Army, available for service abroad as well as at 
 home, it must also have a conscript Army for home 
 defence only. It is also to be noted, and the fact is 
 very important, that while all the objects named 
 above would naturally and inevitably have been 
 achieved if the policy of 1904-5 had been adhered 
 to; they cannot, save to a very limited degree, be 
 accomplished under our present system. 
 
 WHAT THE PRESENT POLICY WILL NOT 
 ACHIEVE 
 
 The present system does not, and never can, pro- 
 duce a large trained Reserve. It depends for its 
 
 1 There were many subsidiary points in the scheme, and there 
 were also some points of great importance, which, however, dealt 
 with a temporary emergency only.
 
 PRESENT POLICY WILL NOT ACHIEVE 19 
 
 existence upon the maintenance of the Cardwell 
 System in its most extreme and least useful form. 
 An organisation which postulates a perpetual equi- 
 librium between the number of battalions at home 
 and abroad respectively, stands self-condemned. 
 There never has been such an equilibrium save by 
 an accident ; there is no reason in the world why 
 there should be ; there are very many obvious 
 reasons why there should not be ; and if by some 
 administrative trick an equilibrium be for a moment 
 established, it is certain to be upset by the inevit- 
 able vicissitudes of our national policy. 1 
 
 The present system does not and cannot produce 
 an increased number of cadres. On the contrary, it 
 has already destroyed nine battalions of Infantry, has 
 placed thirty-three batteries of Artillery upon an estab- 
 lishment which will prevent their taking the field as 
 units ; and though the squads of recruits who are 
 continually succeeding each other at the depots, and 
 which are known as the ' Special Reserve,' are, by a 
 polite fiction, invented like so many others to please 
 the House of Commons, sometimes called 'Units,' 
 
 1 The utter absurdity of the system can best be illustrated by 
 an example. The 3rd Coldstream is at present in Egypt ; when it 
 is withdrawn, as in due course it must be, another battalion must 
 take its place, thus destroying the equilibrium. The system will 
 then demand that an additional battalion should be created at 
 home ; but no such battalion will be created. Again, if four more 
 battalions are withdrawn from South Africa, it will be neces- 
 sary, according to the system, to destroy them and four others, 
 or eight battalions in all, to 'make the balance true.' 
 
 C2
 
 20 POLICY OF 1905 AND 1906 COMPARED 
 
 every soldier knows that they are not and never can 
 be anything of the kind. A mob of boys half of 
 whom on the outbreak of war are to be transferred to 
 a strange battalion and placed under the command 
 of officers and N.C.O.'s they have never seen, and 
 the remainder of whom are to be turned into a sort of 
 provisional battalion made up of the incapables of 
 the Line battalion plus the incapables of the depot, 
 a battalion commanded by a Lieutenant-Colonel of 
 whom the men know nothing, and practically with- 
 out officers can, by no stretch of imagination, be 
 described as a ' Unit.' It is nothing of the kind. 
 
 RESERVE OFFICERS BRITISH AND GERMAN 
 
 The new system will not increase the number of 
 trained officers. Already it has greatly diminished 
 the number, and, what is scarcely less important, has 
 reduced the number of trained N.C.O.'s by hundreds. 
 It is true that the Secretary of State has devoted 
 much energy and eloquence to a scheme which is 
 eventually to provide us with a number of officers to 
 be drawn from the Universities and Public Schools. 
 The number of the Reserve officers who will be obtained 
 from these sources will never be large, and there is a 
 real danger lest the attractions of this amateur soldier- 
 ing may divert good men from the commissioned 
 ranks of the Regular Army. But I have no desire 
 to say a word against the policy of retaining the 
 services of young men of the right sort who will be
 
 OFFICERS BRITISH AND GERMAN 21 
 
 available in time of war. It is a step in the right 
 direction, but it is not a very long step. If, however, 
 the public be led to believe that the attached amateur 
 officer ever is, or ever can be, a substitute for or the 
 equivalent of the professional officer who has served 
 in peace time with the men whom he will lead in time 
 of war, great mischief will be done. It is unlucky 
 that in this matter, as in so many others, Mr. Haldane's 
 passion for dragging Germany into his speeches 
 has been purely mischievous. When the Secretary 
 of State for War, in commending his amateur officers 
 to the favourable attention of Parliament, thought it 
 necessary to refer to the German practice as furnishing 
 an analogy which encouraged him to proceed, he was 
 either speaking of what he did not know, or was with- 
 holding from his hearers knowledge which he 
 possessed. It may be a good thing to give com- 
 missions to young gentlemen who, after belonging to 
 their School and University Corps, have been 
 attached for three months to a Regular battalion to 
 which they do not belong ; but it is not a good 
 thing to suggest to Parliament that the plan deserves 
 commendation because it resembles the German 
 practice. 
 
 What really happens in Germany is this : A 
 young man, having passed his school leaving-exami- 
 nation with merit, and having been certified as 
 physically and socially fit, is permitted to join the 
 Army as a ' One Year Volunteer.' As such, he goes
 
 22 POLICY OF 1905 AND 1906 COMPARED 
 
 through the tremendous discipline of the German 
 Army as a private soldier for one year. He has no 
 privileges save that he is permitted to live out of 
 barracks and to wear a white braid on his collar. 
 At the end of the first year, if again reported upon 
 favourably, he is permitted to serve twelve months 
 as a junior officer in a German regiment. He is 
 then finally transferred to the Reserve as a subaltern, 
 and is called out every year for training and 
 manosuvres with his regiment. And at the present 
 moment complaints are to be found in the German 
 military papers to the effect that officers so trained 
 are not up to the required level. 
 
 It will be observed that whatever merit our 
 system of creating amateur officers may possess, it 
 is not due to its similarity to the German system ; 
 and it is a thousand pities that advantage was taken 
 of the ignorance of the House of Commons to make 
 such a suggestion. 
 
 THE LACK OF A STRIKING FORCE 
 
 The present system does not and cannot provide 
 a real striking force of all arms ready to take the 
 field without waiting for mobilisation. This is a 
 great defect. There is no reason whatever why the 
 misfortunes of 1899 should not be repeated to- 
 morrow. In 1899, when the invasion of Natal was 
 imminent, and nothing but prompt action could save 
 South Africa, we were unable to dispatch a single
 
 DISCHARGED SOLDIERS 23 
 
 Brigade from this country for several weeks. If 
 there was one lesson which the war ought to have 
 taught us with peculiar distinctness, it was the 
 wisdom of creating a real Striking Force in time of 
 peace. We have no such force ; we are taking no 
 practical steps to create one. 
 
 DISCHARGED SOLDIERS. ENLISTMENTS INTO 
 THE RESERVE 
 
 The present system makes no provision whatever 
 for the employment of discharged Long Service 
 soldiers of good character. The omission is a 
 grave one. 
 
 The present system does, happily, continue the 
 practice of enlisting men of the Territorial Force 
 directly into the First Class Army Reserve. 
 
 CONCURRENT LONG AND SHORT SERVICE 
 
 The present system also recognises the truth for 
 which the author contended so long, and for enunci- 
 ating which he was so vigorously attacked namely, 
 that there must be two Armies, one composed of 
 Long Service men, and charged with the performance 
 of the garrison and police work of the Empire in time 
 of peace; the other composed of Short Service men, 
 serving at home in time of peace, but liable to 
 serve abroad in time of war, and charged with 
 the duty of creating a Reserve.
 
 24 POLICY OF 1905 AND 1906 COMPARED 
 
 It is well that this essential principle should have 
 received recognition, however tardy. 
 
 THE SPECIAL RESERVE 
 
 The Special Reserve is, of course, nothing more 
 nor less than a Short Service Home Army, based 
 upon the old Militia organisation, and is therefore, 
 in theory, a correct and logical development of our 
 military situation. Unluckily, in the form in which 
 it actually exists, it is of little or no value. 
 
 In the first place, the period of Colour Service is 
 too short. Nothing except a turn in the political 
 machine has taken place since 1905 to alter the view 
 unanimously expressed by every soldier in favour of 
 two years' Colour Service as a minimum. Six 
 months is not enough, as every soldier at the War 
 Office knows perfectly well, and it is deplorable that, 
 as Lord Roberts says, soldiers should 
 
 'apparently forget their well-founded and strongly- 
 expressed convictions of only a few years ago, and should 
 now seem prepared to trust the same stamp of soldier, 
 whose unfitness for service in the field they then pointed 
 out in no unmeasured terms.' 
 
 WEAK UNITS 
 
 That the actual Colour Strength of the Unit at the 
 depot which averages under a hundred men is far 
 too low admits of no dispute. When the Colour 
 Service has been increased to at least a year, and 
 when the number of men with the Colours has been
 
 THE POLICY OF THE FUTURE 25 
 
 raised to at least 500, the Special Reserve will 
 become, what it is capable of becoming, a very 
 valuable branch of the Army. At present it is a 
 sham, and worse than useless. 
 
 This change will come in time, as will many 
 others, all of which will be in the direction of a 
 return to the policy of 1904-5. 
 
 THE POLICY OF THE FUTURE 
 
 To effect this change will be the work of some 
 future War Minister, who, if he be wise, will find new 
 names for old things. The old principles will have to 
 be adopted, not because they were at one time formu- 
 lated by A, B, or C, but because they are essential 
 and inevitable. It is to be hoped that the Minister to 
 whom the duty falls will disarm prejudice and avoid 
 criticism by such adjustments and modifications 
 of forms and titles as will permit him to produce 
 his scheme as an entirely new and original creation. 
 The writer has seen enough of so-called military 
 criticism in this country to feel assured that by so 
 doing the Minister may secure the warmest approval 
 for the very things which, under another name, were 
 anathema. 
 
 Enough has now been said to clear the ground 
 of some fallacies which tend to make a reason- 
 able discussion of Army questions impossible. 
 It has been shown that the impression which 
 many interested persons have been diligently
 
 26 POLICY OF 1905 AND 1906 COMPARED 
 
 occupied in creating, to the effect that all military 
 policy up to November 1905 was wrong and 
 ineffectual, and that since that date we have been 
 living under a new and almost inspired dispensation, 
 cannot be accepted as an axiomatic truth. Having 
 established this point we shall proceed to Part II 
 of this book to examine in some detail the military 
 policy to which the country has been committed, 
 and to inquire whether that policy is, or ever 
 can be, suited to the peculiar military needs of this 
 country. 
 
 It is curious to observe that the military correspondent to the 
 Times, who has been such a powerful defender of the new system, 
 has now reconsidered his position, and has on many important 
 points recommended a return to the position of 1905. He is now 
 of opinion that 
 
 1. Concurrent Long and Short Service enlistment (six years 
 
 and three years) should be adopted, at any rate for the 
 Artillery. 
 
 2. That the experiment of using 13,000 partially trained Militia- 
 
 men in place of trained Artillerymen should be limited, 
 with a view to its early abandonment. 
 
 3. That the 10,000 Infantrymen whom Mr. Haldane has got 
 
 rid of should be replaced by 12,000 fresh men. 
 
 4. That the reduction of Artillerymen has been wrong, and 
 
 that 5,000 men should be added to the Artillery. In other 
 words, that Mr. Haldane's policy should be directly 
 reversed. 
 
 5. That the period of training approved for the Territorial 
 
 Force is altogether inadequate, and that any attempt to 
 increase the training will destroy the Force. 
 
 The author naturally welcomes this valuable reinforcement of 
 the views which he has attempted to express in the present work. 
 
 (See Col. A'Court Repington's lecture, delivered before 
 the Aldershot Military Society, Jan. 27, 1909.)
 
 PART II 
 
 OUR MILITARY NEEDS AND OUR 
 MILITARY SYSTEM
 
 PREPARATIONS FOR WAR 29 
 
 CHAPTER IV 
 
 PREPARATIONS FOR WAR BRITISH AND 
 FOREIGN 
 
 ' Or the right way, or the wrong way, to its triumph or undoing.' 
 
 Browning. 
 
 A LESSON FROM THE CONTINENT 
 
 IN the summer of 1908, following a practice which I 
 have pursued almost without intermission for thirty 
 years, I devoted a portion of my holiday to seeing 
 something of the work of one of the great armies of 
 the Continent. What I learnt in that year was but 
 a continuation and a confirmation of the lessons 
 which many previous years had taught me. 
 
 The lessons to be learned are numerous and 
 varied. I shall not attempt to recapitulate them 
 here. But the sum of all my observations leads me 
 to one main conclusion, which is so definite and 
 alarming that I desire to submit it to the earnest 
 consideration of my countrymen. My conclusion 
 is this : 
 
 Every country in Europe, save our own, to the 
 best of its ability, and according to its lights, is 
 preparing for the kind of war in which it has reason
 
 30 PREPARATIONS FOR WAR 
 
 to fear that it may some day be engaged. How 
 complete, how scientific, how tremendous these 
 preparations are, many Englishmen know very well ; 
 but the majority of the people of this country are not 
 so well informed. Happily for ourselves, we in 
 England know nothing whatever of war as it really 
 is ; and, as a natural consequence, we are unable to 
 understand the frame of mind in which those who 
 possess this sinister experience approach the problem 
 of national defence. The result of our ignorance is 
 curious ; at least, so it seems to one who has enjoyed 
 somewhat special opportunities of studying both 
 Continental methods and our own. It appears to 
 me to be a fact beyond contradiction that, while 
 foreign nations, without exception, are preparing for 
 the wars in which they are likely to be engaged, we 
 alone are doing nothing of the kind. Not only are 
 we making no preparation for the kind of war in 
 which all our experience tells us we are likely to be 
 involved, but, with great diligence and an immense 
 amount of talk, we are making what we are pleased 
 to call preparations for a war in which in all human 
 probability we never shall be engaged. 
 
 TRUTH AND ITS ENEMIES 
 
 The result is very serious ; so serious that, at 
 the risk of incurring great disfavour on the part of 
 those who hate to look unpleasant facts in the face, 
 I shall do my best to tell the truth, and the whole
 
 TRUTH AND ITS ENEMIES 31 
 
 truth, about the military policy to which this country 
 is being committed. 
 
 The task is not easy. It is difficult at the present 
 time for any person to examine, still more to criticise, 
 our military arrangements. For four years past an 
 organised campaign has been in progress, the apparent 
 object of which has been to befog and confuse the 
 public, and to divert men's minds from the problem 
 of defence, as a whole, to the contemplation of one 
 subsidiary and not very important part of it. The 
 praises of that excellent institution, the Territorial 
 Army, have been sung in every key, the subject of 
 the Regular Army has been systematically and 
 effectively burked in Parliament and out of it. But 
 this is by no means all. The mot cTordre seems to 
 have been given that every one who refuses to find 
 merit in the official policy shall be denounced and 
 attacked as a public enemy. Solemn wiggings have 
 been administered by important personages to all and 
 sundry who shall dare to criticise or even to question. 
 Exalted names have been dragged into the service of 
 the promoters, and it has been stated, almost in so 
 many words, that for a civilian to doubt the virtue 
 of the new scheme is to be guilty of Use-majeste, and 
 is a sign of malevolence and want of patriotism. A 
 similar offence on the part of an officer is to be 
 punished with expulsion from the Army. Our 
 soldiers have been definitely told that praise and 
 approval will be welcomed and rewarded. Those
 
 32 PREPARATIONS FOR WAR 
 
 whose conscience or whose military experience for- 
 bids them to offer this tribute have been bluntly told 
 to hold their tongues or to take the consequences. 
 And the outcome of this process is described as 
 ' military opinion.' l 
 
 1 It is not as widely known as it ought to be that during the last 
 three years there has existed what, for want of a better name, may 
 be called a ' Press Bureau ' in connexion with the War Office. 
 The individuals who compose it are well known to those who 
 have been compelled to follow this curious campaign from its 
 inception. They all alike draw their inspiration and their ' matter ' 
 from the War Office, or from some member of the Committee of 
 Defence. While the methods of all of these gentlemen are much 
 the same, they do not all bring the same skill to the task. To use 
 a phrase which I believe is attributed to Douglas Jerrold, they 
 ' all row in the same boat, but not with the same skulls." 
 
 The existence of an ' officious ' Press of this kind is of course 
 much to be deprecated. A bad precedent has been created, and 
 one which it is permissible to hope may not be followed. But to 
 those who know something of the persons engaged, and of the 
 methods employed, this strange campaign is not without its 
 amusing side. If the public only knew the real origin of the 
 innumerable panegyrics upon the new system which have appeared 
 anonymously, or over some alias, in all sorts of strange places, they 
 would smile at the trick that was being played upon them. If all 
 these moving statements as to ' What the Army thinks, ' ' What the 
 soldier feels,' 'What universal experience teaches, 1 and so on, 
 could appear over the signatures of A, B, C, D, or E, their true 
 authors, they would receive, no doubt, the consideration to which 
 the opinions of those gentlemen are entitled ; but it would be an 
 exaggeration to suggest that they would carry great weight. The 
 manoeuvres of a stage Army are familiar to us all, but a similar 
 manoeuvre in the literary world is not quite so easily recognised. 
 When, therefore, a gentleman, anonymously or under an alias, 
 contributes no less than five articles to as many different news- 
 papers in a fortnight, each of them tempered to suit the style of 
 the medium in which it appears, and all of them singing the 
 praises of the latest War Office production, the public is naturally 
 rather impressed by the strange agreement among so many different
 
 TRUTH AND ITS ENEMIES 33 
 
 But extravagances of this kind must in the long 
 run defeat their own object. No self-respecting 
 civilian is likely to be affected by menaces, and the 
 Army suffers too much from the continuance of a 
 sham to allow of its voice being permanently silenced. 
 Officers who may expect to find themselves con- 
 fronted with a real Army composed of men, and of 
 trained men, will be the first to suffer from a system 
 which will send them into action at the head of a 
 tiny contingent largely composed of untrained boys. 
 That much harm has been done by the system of 
 
 journals. Indeed, as Mr. Puff says in the Critic, ' When they do 
 agree, their unanimity is wonderful.' But the wonder is slightly 
 diminished when the facts are known. It is indeed almost pathetic 
 to observe the industry and devotion with which the members of 
 the band to which I have referred toil after their patrons ; for 
 during the last three years the War Office has had not one, but 
 many plans, and many variants of each of those plans. All alike 
 have won the enthusiastic admiration of these friendly commen- 
 tators. The original proposition, its contrary and its contradictory, 
 have all in turn been exhibited as masterpieces of originality and 
 clear thinking. Indeed, the lightning changes of the War Office 
 have sometimes been justified in advance of their publication by 
 these intelligent critics. The War Office, like Mr. Vincent 
 Crummies, must often have wondered ' how these things get into 
 print.' But they do. 
 
 The upshot of all of which is that, while there is no reason what- 
 ever why gentlemen who take an interest in military matters should 
 not obtain their information where they can, and make use of it as 
 they please, there is a very strong public reason why a great 
 Department should not enter into a journalistic campaign with the 
 aid of a number of anonymous journalists however honourable and 
 competent. And, lastly, it is of the greatest possible importance 
 that the public should realise that a very great deal of what it 
 reads with regard to the War Office is suspect, because it is the 
 outcome of a systematic expression of official opinions through the 
 illegitimate channels of anonymous journalism.
 
 34 PREPARATIONS FOR WAR 
 
 menace and cajolery which has been pursued cannot 
 be denied, but its success will not be permanent. 
 In the long run it will be found impossible to stifle 
 free discussion and to prevent the plain statement of 
 plain truths. 
 
 FOREIGN METHODS 
 
 It is now time to return from our necessary 
 digression to the main thesis of this chapter ; that 
 thesis can be best illustrated by concrete examples 
 which everyone can understand and appreciate. Let 
 me then be perfectly explicit. I have said that foreign 
 nations are preparing for wars in which they think that 
 they may some day be engaged ; and that they are taking 
 the most effective steps of which they are capable to 
 ensure success in such wars should they, unhappily, 
 take place. The French War Office has to contemplate 
 the possibility of another German invasion ; and the 
 French frontier from Verdun to Belfort is elaborately 
 defended and organised with the object of making 
 such an invasion impossible. The preparation may 
 prove to be inadequate ; but it is in accordance with 
 a consistent theory, it is scientific, it is appropriate. 
 For its purpose it is the very best thing that French 
 intelligence and French wealth combined can 
 produce. 
 
 In the same way the German Army and Navy are 
 perfectly organised for a great aggressive war. Very
 
 BRITISH METHODS 35 
 
 likely no such war is in contemplation, but aggressive 
 wars have always formed part of the Prussian system ; 
 and when undertaken have always, hitherto, been 
 successful, because the means were deliberately 
 calculated to produce the ends desired. 
 
 BRITISH METHODS NAVAL AND MILITARY 
 
 But when we come to our own country, what do 
 we find ? We find, at least so far as one great branch 
 of our defensive service is concerned, nothing even 
 remotely resembling the German or the French 
 method. The Navy, happily, is still organised with 
 reasonable regard to the work it may have to do. 
 The Admiralty, to my certain knowledge, have a 
 theory, and a perfectly definite one, as to the functions 
 which the Fleet ought to perform in time of war. 
 Their whole efforts are devoted to the task of enab- 
 ling the Fleet to perform that function successfully. 
 I am aware that in the opinion of some critics the 
 Admiralty are not doing enough to enable them to 
 carry out their purpose. If the critics are right, the 
 Admiralty are open to censure, and it is their plain 
 duty to increase the Fleet until its power to achieve 
 that purpose is beyond dispute. But no one even 
 pretends that the Navy has not a definite r&le and a 
 definite object. The stronger the Navy becomes, the 
 more easily and the more certainly will it do what 
 the country expects from it. 
 
 Now let us turn to the Army. How different is 
 
 D 2
 
 36 PREPARATIONS FOR WAR 
 
 the situation. Unless all the teaching of history be 
 wrong and of no account, unless all military experience 
 is to be disregarded as meaningless, we are not pre- 
 paring for war at all. This allegation may seem at 
 first sight to be an exaggeration. But a brief exam- 
 ination of our military position will suffice to show 
 that it is a reasonable and moderate statement of an 
 incontrovertible fact. Indeed, were it not that the 
 British public is rarely willing to pay attention to 
 two subjects at the same time, such an obvious truth 
 would never have escaped attention. Unluckily the 
 skilful manoeuvres which have been resorted to with 
 the object of diverting public attention from the 
 Regular Army and concentrating it upon the Terri- 
 torial Force have been successful. Parliament and 
 the Press have been full of the Territorial Force. 
 All the world has been writing about it, and making 
 speeches about it. The sporting element, so dear to 
 Englishmen, has entered into the discussion of the 
 question. Sides have been formed. Half the Press 
 and half the critics have declared that the required 
 numbers will never be raised, and that the scheme 
 will therefore be a failure. The other half have 
 asserted with equal conviction that the numbers will 
 be raised, and that when and because they have been 
 raised, the success of the scheme will become there- 
 by self-evident. Nobody has ever paused to ask 
 whether, if the whole force were to be completed 
 to-morrow down to the last drummer-boy, it would
 
 BRITISH METHODS 37 
 
 be of any use whatever for the sole purpose for 
 which it exists, namely, to win a victory for this 
 country in any war in which the nation is likely to 
 be engaged. There are hundreds of thousands of 
 persons in this country who, if the Territorial Force 
 reaches its establishment, will pronounce it a success, 
 and who, if it falls short of that establishment, will, 
 with equal confidence, pronounce it a failure. And 
 yet, as will be demonstrated, the Force may be com- 
 plete in every detail and still be an absolute and 
 dangerous failure from the point of view of the 
 national needs. 
 
 388569
 
 38 THE TERRITORIAL FORCE 
 
 CHAPTER V 
 
 THE TERRITORIAL FORCE 
 
 'The Old dog in a new doublet.' Lord Lansdowne (House of Lords, 
 26-6-07). 
 
 'First he were a Greyhound and his name were " Fly " ; and then 
 we docked his ears and tail and made a Mastiff on him, and now 
 his name's "LION."' Punch. 
 
 THE FORCE AND ITS FLATTERERS 
 
 IT is desirable to pause at this stage to say a 
 word which ought not to be necessary, but which 
 is necessary in view of the prejudice which the 
 promoters of the Territorial Army scheme have 
 endeavoured to create against all those who do not 
 fall down and worship. I write as a well-wisher of 
 the Territorial Army. That Force, which, of course, 
 is only the Volunteers under another name, has many 
 admirable qualities, and fulfils some useful purposes. 
 There has been, and there always will be, an immense 
 amount of exaggeration with regard to it ; and the 
 Force has, undoubtedly, suffered a good deal from the 
 indiscriminating eulogy which some of its friends 
 have thought fit to bestow upon it. We read glowing 
 accounts of the performances of the troops at
 
 THE FORCE AND ITS FLATTERERS 39 
 
 manoeuvres ; we are invited to admire and wonder 
 at the intelligence, discipline, and physique of officers 
 and men. A great many of the things that are said 
 are true, not of the Force as a whole, but of certain 
 portions of it ; and it is unfortunate that many 
 commentators and eulogists fail to discriminate. 
 Moreover, it is well to remember that what we are 
 reading in 1909 is merely a reproduction of what 
 we might have read, and what many of us did 
 read, in every succeeding year since 1860. The 
 address of the inspecting officer, informing the 
 officers and men of a Volunteer battalion that 
 their corps is the best he has ever seen, is a formula 
 which has marked, and, be it said, disgraced, Volunteer 
 inspections, ever since the creation of the Force. 
 The flaming newspaper articles which have been 
 inspired by each succeeding Volunteer review or 
 Easter excursion for fifty years past are almost word 
 for word the same as the accounts of the Territorial 
 Force which we have all been reading during the 
 past few months. There have, of course, been some 
 very valuable and discriminating criticisms, in which 
 full justice has been done to the many good qualities 
 of the Force, but from which the ridiculous exaggera- 
 tion which the public is supposed to like has been 
 absent. 
 
 But enough of the inflated and ill-considered 
 language to which reference has been made has 
 found its way into the speeches of persons in
 
 40 THE TERRITORIAL FORCE 
 
 authority, and into the columns of the newspapers, 
 to mislead many persons, and to induce the belief 
 that some great and beneficial change has come over 
 the Volunteer Force, which has entirely changed its 
 character. There has been a change, and a change 
 for the better. The creation of a brigade and 
 divisional organisation, the addition of subsidiary 
 services, such as the transport and ammunition 
 columns, and, perhaps, more important than all, 
 the abolition of the capitation grant, are all real 
 reforms for which the Secretary of State and the 
 Army Council are entitled to great credit. But no 
 miracles have been performed, and there is no valid 
 ground for supposing that the statement made by 
 the Norfolk Commission with regard to the Volun- 
 teers, to the effect that 
 
 ' taking the Force as a whole, neither the military nor the 
 tactical training of the rank and file would enable it to 
 face, with a prospect of success, the troops of a Conti- 
 nental Army,' and that, ' in view of the unequal military 
 education of the officers, the limited training of the men, 
 and the defects of equipment and organisation, the 
 Volunteer Force is not qualified to take the field against 
 a Regular Army,' 
 
 is susceptible of any serious modification at the 
 present time. It is well, therefore, to keep cool when 
 reading the glowing descriptions of to-day. They 
 may be true and deserved, but they differ neither in 
 form nor in degree ^from many other descriptions
 
 THE FORCE AND ITS FLATTERERS 41 
 
 which have preceded them, and which, beyond all 
 doubt, were not true and were not deserved. Nothing 
 but harm is done by these exaggerations. 
 
 When the public is told, as it was told not long 
 ago, that the field batteries of the Territorial Force, 
 after a period of drill averaging less than ten days 
 for each man, had attained a condition of efficiency 
 equal to that attained by batteries of Regular 
 Artillery at the end of a year's continuous instruction, 
 the result is purely mischievous. The actual state- 
 ment was that 
 
 ' in the opinion of a thoroughly competent observer, the 
 London field batteries at the end of a fortnight reached 
 about the same standard as the Regular batteries, formed 
 at home during our last war, obtained after a year's 
 work.' 
 
 To nine people out of ten such a statement could 
 only have the meaning assigned to it above. It is 
 possible, however, that the writer of the passage 
 referred to may have intended to convey another 
 meaning and to prove that hastily raised units cannot 
 be made efficient. It is probably quite true to say 
 that the new batteries raised in a hurry in 1900-1 
 were still below the mark at the end of a year, though 
 it is probably a great exaggeration to say that they 
 were no better than the Territorial batteries after ten 
 days' instruction. But, if the contention be true, 
 what is the moral ? The moral is that, even with 
 all the appliances available in a Regular'battery, with
 
 42 THE TERRITORIAL FORCE 
 
 skilled professional officers and continuous work, a 
 battery cannot be made efficient in a year. If that 
 is the conclusion which it is sought to establish, it 
 need only be said that it coincides exactly with the 
 conclusion which has long since been arrived at by 
 artillery officers in every army in the world, including 
 our own; but as an argument in favour of creating 180 
 batteries, with a minimum training of fifteen days 
 every second year, its relevance is not obvious. 
 
 If it be true that the work of one year's continuous 
 training can be accomplished in a week, it is obvious 
 that we are wasting enormous sums upon the Regular 
 Army which ought instantly to be devoted to some 
 other purpose. Soldiers do not take statements of 
 the kind to which we have referred seriously; but 
 civilians, who are entirely dependent upon the judg- 
 ment of others, do believe what they are told, and 
 are quite justified in doing so. 1 
 
 1 Lord Lucas, at present Under-Secretary of State for War, and 
 official head of the Territorial Force, has declared in the presence, 
 and apparently with the approval, of the Secretary of State for 
 War, that he could create an efficient Horse Artillery battery in a 
 fortnight. But this is an exceptional case. Very few of our older 
 officers are as highly gifted as the Under-Secretary of State. The 
 country is fortunate in possessing such an accomplished official 
 and such an admirable organiser.
 
 THE LIMITATIONS OF THE FORCE 43 
 
 CHAPTER VI 
 
 THE TERRITORIAL FORCE (continued) 
 
 'The proposed National Army will be neither National nor an 
 Army.' Manifesto of National Service League. (President, Lord 
 Roberts, 8-4-07.) 
 
 THE LIMITATIONS OF THE FORCE 
 
 I AM well aware that in certain quarters the state- 
 ment of the plain truth about the Territorial Army 
 is greatly resented, and any one who ventures to tell 
 it is in danger of being held up for condemnation as 
 a narrow-minded and unsympathetic person, whose 
 views are partly the outcome of prejudice and partly 
 of ignorance. I do not think, however, that the 
 party referred to includes the most sensible officers 
 and men of the Force. It is composed, for the 
 most part, of politicians and public speakers, who 
 regard the Army as they do everything else : simply 
 as the raw material from which the weapon of party 
 polemics may be forged. It is necessary to point 
 out what are the limitations of the Territorial Force, 
 because these limitations are constantly ignored. 
 War admits of no shams, and, if the truth be not
 
 44 THE TERRITORIAL FORCE 
 
 told in time of peace, it will be too late to discover 
 it in time of war. 
 
 But it would be a grievous mistake to ignore or to 
 fail to do justice to the real merits and the great 
 qualities which the Volunteer Force possessed, 
 and which it has retained under its new name. 
 The Force undoubtedly contains within it the best 
 military material which the nation possesses. On 
 the whole, the personnel of the Force is not remark- 
 able, but if it were possible to select from it at will, 
 some thirty or forty thousand men could, in all 
 probability, be found who, in the matter of intelli- 
 gence and physique, would equal, if they did not 
 excel, the best troops in Europe. 
 
 What is true of the Force as a whole is true also 
 of the officers. The officers of the Territorial Force 
 are at present, perhaps, its weakest point. It is 
 inevitable that this should be so. A man who is 
 compelled to devote the greater part of his time and 
 energy to some civil calling must always be an 
 amateur in regard to the military calling to which he 
 can only devote his leisure. Nevertheless, the busi- 
 ness training, the intelligence, and the zeal of many 
 of the Volunteer officers are so great that hundreds 
 of them have achieved a very high degree of pro- 
 ficiency. Given some experience of leading men, 
 these officers would in a very short time become 
 equal, if not superior, to the average officer of the 
 Regular Army. It would be idle to pretend, how-
 
 THE LIMITATIONS OF THE FORCE 45 
 
 ever, that the majority of the officers of the Force 
 possess these high qualifications. It is impossible 
 that they should do so. The willingness of the men 
 who compose the Territorial Force is remarkable and 
 satisfactory. Within the limits of what is possible 
 and compatible with their civil occupations, they are 
 always prepared to perform their work with cheer- 
 fulness and good temper. It is true that in some 
 respects the Force is very sensitive, and that appar- 
 ently small causes will cause individuals or large 
 bodies of men to withhold their attendance or even 
 to leave the ranks. The consequent uncertainty is a 
 great disadvantage from the military point of view, 
 but it is a perfectly natural outcome of the conditions 
 under which the Force serves. In the main, a 
 Civilian Army must be governed by the affairs of 
 civil life. That may be bad for the Army viewed as 
 an instrument of war, but it is inevitable ; and to 
 blame the members of the Territorial Force for being 
 what they are and must be, would be arrogant and 
 unreasonable. 
 
 HONOUR WHERE HONOUR is DUE 
 
 Of the excellent spirit which has been shown by 
 the public bodies and individuals who have been 
 called upon to create and administer the Territorial 
 Army it is impossible to speak too highly. The work 
 done or attempted by the Lords Lieutenant and by 
 the county associations has been an example of
 
 46 THE TERRITORIAL FORCE 
 
 unselfish patriotism. The zeal which has been dis- 
 played is almost pathetic to witness. Despite the 
 assurances of Ministers, despite the harangues of 
 Mr. Murray Macdonald, M.P., and his friends, the 
 conviction that all is not well, and that ' the country 
 is in danger,' has become deeply rooted in the mind 
 of almost every serious man and woman in this 
 country. Everywhere there is a desire to help. The 
 Government of the country, with great pomp and 
 ceremony, has formulated a plan which it has 
 declared to be essential to the safety and welfare of 
 the State. It has invited the public to come for- 
 ward and assist it in carrying out this plan. What 
 can be more natural, what can be more creditable, 
 than that every patriotic man and woman should 
 respond to the appeal ? There are at this moment 
 thousands of men who are doing their very best to 
 support the Territorial Force, not because they are 
 convinced that it is the best and most scientific 
 instrument for defending the country in time of war, 
 but because a responsible Minister has told them that 
 he requires their aid in the service of the nation. 
 Most of those who have responded to the invitation 
 have taken the word of the Minister as a sufficient 
 guarantee for the value of the service. And who 
 shall blame them ? In any country in which 
 preparation for war was the subject of scientific 
 method, the judgment of the War Department would 
 be accepted without demur, and rightly accepted.
 
 FALSE GUIDES 47 
 
 Some there are, however, who are giving their ser- 
 vice in doubt and with much misgiving. They know 
 something of war, they know something of what 
 real armies are, and their knowledge alarms them. 
 Their case is truly a hard one. But, again, who 
 shall blame them if, with doubting hearts, they 
 perform the only service which it is open to them to 
 render ? 
 
 FALSE GUIDES 
 
 But if nothing but honour and gratitude be due 
 to those who, with no reward, and meeting with 
 little encouragement, are doing what they believe to 
 be the nation's work, what are we to say of those 
 who have demanded their services and have framed 
 their tasks ? The answer must depend entirely upon 
 the view we take of the value of the work which all 
 these loyal and worthy helpers have been set to do. 
 If the Territorial Army be the true solution of our 
 military problem, if the safety of the country will 
 really be secured when the Territorial Army realises 
 the expectations of its creators, if all the energy and 
 good will that are so lavishly offered bear fruit, then, 
 indeed, no praise can be too great for a Minister and 
 a Department who have thus utilised the best 
 qualities of our people for the highest service of the 
 State. 
 
 But what if the solution be no solution at all, 
 what if the weapon we are forging with so much
 
 48 THE TERRITORIAL FORCE 
 
 care be one which will either rust for ever in its 
 sheath, or which, if it be submitted to the clash of 
 arms, will be shattered in our hand? In other words, 
 what if all this zeal and good will have been diverted 
 from the true service of the country in order to give 
 a semblance of success to a scheme which has been 
 framed without any regard for war, which conforms 
 to no scientific principle, and which can produce no 
 satisfactory result ? To this last question the reader 
 must supply his own answer. My part is simply 
 to explain, and to provide the material for a judg- 
 ment. 
 
 My own study of our problem of national 
 defence has led me to the conclusion that our military 
 needs are perfectly clear and definite; and that, under 
 no conceivable circumstances, can the Territorial 
 Force, as at present designed, satisfy those needs. 
 I propose to set forth as clearly as I can the grounds 
 for my belief. It will be for my readers to decide 
 whether or not I have reason on my side.
 
 MILITARY NEEDS OF THE NATION 49 
 
 CHAPTER VII 
 
 THE MILITARY NEEDS OF THE NATION 
 ' Who shall decide when doctors disagree ? ' 
 
 AGREEMENTS AND DIVERGENCES 
 
 LET us see what our needs are. When we are 
 quite clear upon this point, it will be comparatively 
 easy to form an opinion as to whether our present 
 organisation is the one best fitted to meet those 
 needs. It would be incorrect to say that there is 
 absolute agreement as to what the real military needs 
 of the nation are. On some points, indeed, there is 
 practically no difference of opinion. Certain ground 
 is common to all parties in the controversy which 
 undoubtedly and unhappily exists; but outside this 
 limited sphere of agreement there is much divergence 
 of opinion ; and of this divergence it will be necessary 
 to say something. 
 
 It is a curious fact, however, that although there 
 is a considerable difference of opinion as to the nature 
 and extent of the dangers to be guarded against, 
 there is, as far as I am aware, no party, no section 
 which really favours the view that the dangers which
 
 50 MILITARY NEEDS OF THE NATION 
 
 threaten us can be effectively guarded against by the 
 means which we have chosen to adopt. This is a 
 singular and disconcerting reflexion ; but anyone 
 who will examine the situation dispassionately will 
 be compelled to admit that it is just. 
 
 All parties are agreed in believing that this country 
 may be involved in war oversea. Since the Battle 
 of Hastings we have been almost continuously at 
 war, and not once have we had to engage in a serious 
 conflict on our own soil. (Civil wars, of course, do 
 not come into the question.) If experience teaches 
 us anything, it teaches us that in the future, as in 
 the past, the fighting of the British Army will be 
 done across the sea. We have had to save India 
 once ; we may have to do so again. We have had 
 to reinforce the action of the Fleet by military opera- 
 tions on the Continent of Europe, and we may have 
 to do so again. We are bound by more than one 
 Treaty to safeguard the neutrality of certain portions 
 of Europe; it is not inconceivable that we may be 
 called upon to make good our obligations by force of 
 arms. For any one of these purposes we must rely in 
 the future, as we have done in the past, upon the 
 Regular Army acting in conjunction with the Navy. 
 On this point we are all agreed. 
 
 But directly we go one step farther we find our- 
 selves face to face with a great difference of opinion. 
 Some persons believe and I admit that I am of the 
 number that, provided the Navy be maintained in
 
 AGREEMENTS AND DIVERGENCES 51 
 
 a proper state of efficiency, the danger of invasion is 
 not one which need be contemplated; and that, if 
 the Navy be not sufficient and efficient, no military 
 precautions will prevail to preserve the country from 
 a crushing disaster. 
 
 This view was expressed with great force by the late 
 Under- Secretary of State for War, Lord Portsmouth. 
 
 ' He himself,' he told his hearers, ' had never said, 
 nor would anyone outside a lunatic asylum suppose, that 
 the Territorial Army would be equal to meeting unaided 
 the trained and picked troops of the Great Powers of the 
 Continent. If, however, we lost command of the sea, it 
 would be quite unnecessary for any foreign Power with 
 whom we were in conflict to invade us, for a people depending 
 upon food supplies from abroad would very speedily be 
 starved into a condition of submission.' l 
 
 There are others who hold that, although 
 what is called an ' invasion in force ' is not to be 
 anticipated, attacks by a limited number of selected 
 troops, arriving in ships which will have eluded the 
 vigilance of the Fleet, may succeed in landing on 
 our shores and doing great mischief. The party 
 which believes in ' raids ' of this kind is a consider- 
 able one, and the theory has at times received official 
 recognition. It should be said, however, that there 
 are also many persons who believe that the same 
 considerations which apply to the case of invasion 
 
 1 Speech at Lewes, 28th February 1908. 
 
 E 2
 
 52 MILITARY NEEDS OF THE NATION 
 
 apply to the case of a raid, and who think that the 
 true and only protection against a landing of any 
 kind is the Navy. They do not all assume that the 
 Navy is at the present moment adequate to afford 
 the necessary protection, but they take the view that, 
 if it be not strong enough, the proper course is to 
 make it stronger, and not to spend money and energy 
 upon the multiplication of land forces which will be 
 more costly and less effective than destroyers and 
 submarines. 
 
 It is not necessary for the purposes of the present 
 argument to combat, or even to question, the correct- 
 ness of the views of those who believe in invasion, 
 or of those who limit their belief to the possibility of 
 raids. It is not my object to take part in what bids 
 fair to be an endless controversy, but to demonstrate 
 that, while we at present fail to provide against the 
 one danger as to the existence of which all parties 
 are agreed, and are permitting incalculable injury to 
 be inflicted upon the Regular Army, we are doing 
 nothing whatever to cope with either of the two 
 perils, about the existence of which there is, indeed, 
 some doubt, but which a very large section of the 
 community believes to be real and pressing. 
 
 THE POLICY OF THE ADMIRALTY 
 
 While, however, I propose to accept for the pur- 
 poses of my argument two propositions which I 
 believe to be unsustainable, and to assume that an
 
 THE POLICY OF THE ADMIRALTY 53 
 
 invasion of this country is possible, and that a raid 
 is not only possible but probable, I think it just to 
 point out that there is no evidence whatever that 
 these views are accepted by the Government or by 
 the Committee of Imperial Defence. 
 
 It is, of course, impossible for a private individual 
 to speak with certainty upon either of these points, 
 and the extraordinary want of harmony between the 
 two great military departments makes it difficult to 
 draw inferences based upon the action of either of 
 them. It is, perhaps, not fully realised that, at the 
 present moment, the Admiralty and the War Office 
 are pursuing fundamentally different and contra- 
 dictory policies. On the theory that no port will 
 ever be attacked, that no troops will ever be landed, 
 that no hostile shot will ever be fired upon British 
 soil, the Admiralty have deliberately destroyed the 
 elaborate and perfect system of mine defences con- 
 structed with admirable skill by the Royal Engineers. 
 They have wholly or partially dismantled the few 
 forts we possessed ; they have allowed the land 
 defences of the great naval ports to be abandoned. 
 Many people still believe that Portsmouth, Plymouth, 
 and Chatham are fortresses. It is a matter of every- 
 day occurrence to see them so described in the news- 
 papers. But they are nothing of the kind. There 
 is not a gun or a round of ammunition in the whole 
 of the landward forts, and the less said about some 
 of the seaward forts the better. In other words, the
 
 54 MILITARY NEEDS OF THE NATION 
 
 Navy has definitely committed itself to the view that 
 no landing is possible ; that by naval means, and 
 naval means alone, can an enemy be prevented from 
 setting foot upon our shores. To do the Admiralty 
 justice, they have been thorough and logical in the 
 application of their theory. There have been no 
 half-measures. The naval authorities have com- 
 mitted themselves absolutely to the proposition that 
 no force can land. Their action makes this certain. 
 If in the opinion of the Board of Admiralty there 
 were the remotest chance of an armed force landing 
 in the neighbourhood of our great naval ports, the 
 policy they have followed and the attitude they have 
 adopted towards General Owen's Committee would 
 be almost criminal. If such a chance existed, the 
 dismantling of the works which protect the naval 
 ports was an act of insanity. But the Admiralty do 
 not, it seems, believe in the possibility of a landing, 
 and are acting in accordance with their belief. 
 
 THE POLICY OF THE ARMY COUNCIL 
 
 Meanwhile, the Army Council, so far as they Qan 
 be said to be proceeding on any definite line at all, 
 are acting on the hypothesis that the Admiralty are 
 entirely in the wrong. Our military policy not only 
 does not harmonise with our naval policy, but is the 
 direct contradiction of that policy. The Admiralty 
 are positive that there will be no landing, and act 
 accordingly. The Army Council are so certair^'there
 
 POLICY OF THE ARMY COUNCIL 55 
 
 will be a landing that they are spending 4,000,000 
 a year not to prevent it, but to neutralise its effect 
 after it has taken place. On this point there is no 
 room for doubt. To enlist 300,000 men and boys 
 who, in the event of war, are by the terms of their 
 engagement, and by the law of the land, tied to the 
 soil of these islands, would be a crazy performance if 
 its authors did not assume that fighting in this 
 country was not only possible, but probable. Evi- 
 dently, therefore, the War Office believe the Admiralty 
 to be wrong. 
 
 It cannot be said that the Army Council are as 
 logical in giving effect to their opinion as the Board 
 of Admiralty. On the contrary, beyond just doing 
 enough to prove that they do believe in the need for a 
 home-keeping Army, they are acting exactly as if they 
 were in entire agreement with the naval authorities. 
 This very important and interesting fact is as yet very 
 little understood by the public. It is worth while 
 making some attempt to make it clear and its signi- 
 ficance apparent. The Army Council undoubtedly 
 do believe in invasion, and do not believe that 
 the Navy can protect our shores ; but, despite their 
 belief, they are taking no rational steps to safeguard 
 the nation against the danger by which, in their 
 opinion, it is threatened. For it should be clearly 
 understood that, given the object in view, the steps 
 which the Army Council are now taking are not 
 rational at all ; they correspond with no theory ;
 
 56 MILITARY NEEDS OF THE NATION 
 
 they satisfy no need; they furnish no guarantiee 
 whatever against defeat in war. 
 
 It is not to be wondered at that when those in 
 authority act without principle, method, or consis- 
 tency, the public, which naturally looks to its military 
 officials for guidance, should be confused and be- 
 wildered. That the public is at the present time 
 confused and bewildered is proved beyond all doubt 
 by the fact that interest is entirely centred upon the 
 Territorial Force, and that the official stratagem by 
 which the attack on the Army and the destruction of 
 the Militia have been concealed has been perfectly 
 successful.
 
 PROTECTION OF THE DOCKYARDS 57 
 
 CHAPTER VIII 
 
 THE PROTECTION OF THE DOCKYARDS 
 
 'Populus volt decipi et decipitur!' 
 
 'The British House of Commons is infinitely unintelligent on 
 points of detail of little or no difficulty. Men are like sheep, 
 
 gregarious in their fallacies.' The Right Hon. R. B. Haldane (' Life 
 of Adam Smith '). 
 
 THE FACTS 
 
 IT is curious to note how uninstructed the public 
 and a portion of the Press seem to be with respect to 
 the question of the fortification of our great dock- 
 yards. The matter is one of much importance, and 
 it is worth while devoting a chapter to the task of 
 making it quite clear. This is the more necessary 
 because the Secretary of State for War has done 
 everything in his power to confuse and mislead the 
 public and the House of Commons by the answers 
 which he has thought fit to give to questions asked 
 in Parliament. 
 
 At the present time Portsmouth, Plymouth, and 
 Chatham are open towns. They have been so for 
 several years past, but the fact does not seem to 
 
 1 ' The public wants to be fooled and gets what it wants. '
 
 58 PROTECTION OF THE DOCKYARDS 
 
 have been understood by the public. As stated by 
 Mr. Haldane, in answer to a question put to him by 
 Mr. W. Ashley, M.P., on the 26th October 1908, the 
 fixed armaments of the landward forts surrounding 
 the great dockyard towns have been removed. It is 
 several years since the work of removal began. For 
 a long time past the forts have been simply 
 grass-covered inclosures, with nothing of a military 
 character about them. As stated above, this fact 
 does not seem to have dawned upon the public, for 
 nothing is more common than to read in the 
 newspapers references to the great fortresses of 
 Portsmouth, Plymouth, and Chatham ; or to the fact 
 that the Volunteers, or the Territorials, as the case 
 may be, have been told off to defend them in time 
 of war. 
 
 PRINCIPLES AND POLICY 
 
 Now it will be seen in a moment that the neces- 
 sity for permanent works round a great dockyard 
 depends solely upon the question of whether or not 
 an attack upon the dockyard by a land force is 
 anticipated. If no land attack is contemplated, the 
 works are useless ; if, on the other hand, it is believed 
 that a serious land attack is possible, the need for 
 fortifications of some kind becomes apparent. The 
 last Administration was of opinion that the Navy 
 could be relied upon to prevent a landing ; and that 
 being so, it was reasonable and logical not to rearm
 
 PRINCIPLES AND POLICY 59 
 
 or to modernise the forts. That the late Govern- 
 ment did hold this view appears from the following 
 question and answer : 
 
 c Mr. Cox (L. Preston) asked the Secretary to the 
 Admiralty whether his attention had been called to the 
 evidence given before the Royal Commission on the Militia 
 and Volunteers by the Director-General of Mobilisation 
 and Military Intelligence, to the effect that it was the 
 view of the Admiralty that the Navy could guarantee 
 the complete protection of the United Kingdom against 
 the danger of invasion by any larger force than 5,000 to 
 10,000 men; 1 whether this opinion attributed to the 
 Admiralty by the Director-General of Mobilisation and 
 Intelligence correctly expressed the views then held by the 
 Admiralty ; and whether the same views were still held ? 
 
 ' Mr. E. Robertson (Dundee). The answer to the first 
 two questions is in the affirmative, and as regards the 
 third question, it is now being reconsidered by the light 
 of the most recent information.' 
 
 It was in accordance with this policy that the 
 Regular Army was strengthened, and its Reserve- 
 making power increased ; that a Bill was introduced 
 rendering the Militia liable for foreign service in 
 time of war ; and that the offers made by Volunteer 
 Officers to enlist their men for the Army Reserve 
 were accepted. 
 
 But the present Government does not accept this 
 policy. On the contrary, it has reduced the 
 Regular Army, and has diminished its Reserve- 
 
 1 The actual number was 5,000.
 
 60 PROTECTION OF THE DOCKYARDS 
 
 making power. It has decided to devote four or 
 five millions a year to an Army whose sole duty is 
 to fight in this country; and it has adopted the 
 view that invasion is a danger which must be guarded 
 against. 
 
 But if that be so, the present condition of the 
 great dockyard towns is intolerable. It is admitted 
 that they are open to attack, and no reasonable 
 measures are being taken to defend them. 
 
 QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 
 
 The answers given by the Secretary of State to 
 questions bearing upon this subject deserve close 
 attention, for they show the deliberate manner in 
 which the House of Commons and the public are 
 trifled with and misled. On the 18th February 1908 
 the following question was addressed to Mr. Haldane 
 by the present writer : 
 
 'Whether any, and if so, what, portion of the Terri- 
 torial Force has been told off for the defence of the land- 
 ward forts which formerly protected the dockyards at 
 Portsmouth, Devonport, and Chatham ; whether the 
 troops so detailed comprise a force of Garrison Artillery ; 
 what is the strength of the Garrison Artillery to be 
 employed; and whether he can state in what way the 
 troops assigned to the defence of the forts are to perform 
 their duty now that the whole of the guns and ammuni- 
 tion have been removed from the forts ? ' 
 
 The official answer was as follows : 
 
 ' I am unable to furnish this information. The Right
 
 QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 61 
 
 Hon. gentleman must be aware that it is neither customary 
 nor to the public interest to publish detailed information 
 in regard to the works, armaments, and garrisons of the 
 defended ports or fortresses at home or abroad.' 
 
 A further question and answer then followed which 
 are thus reported : 
 
 Mr. Arnold- Forster asked 
 
 ' Whether, in the opinion of the Army Council, a hostile 
 landing in the neighbourhood of Chatham, Portsmouth, or 
 Devonport is a contingency which must be contemplated 
 and provided against ; whether, in the opinion of the Army 
 Council, the danger to our great dockyards likely to 
 result from such a landing has been diminished or in- 
 creased by the removal of the whole of the guns and 
 ammunition from the land defences of the ports in ques- 
 tion ; and whether any other power which contemplates 
 the landing of troops upon its shores, has added 
 to the strength of its defences by removing their 
 armaments ? ' 
 
 Mr. Haldane 
 
 ' The present policy in regard to the landward defences 
 of our naval ports was deliberately adopted, after full con- 
 sideration, by the Government in power in 1900. The 
 present Government does not propose in this respect to 
 depart from the decision of its predecessors. It concurs 
 in the policy adopted in 1900 and followed by every Sec- 
 retary of State since then. The defence of our principal 
 naval ports has been greatly strengthened by the substi- 
 tution of modern movable armament for the obsolete guns 
 which were discarded as a result of the report of Sir 
 Robert Grant's Committee in 1900.'
 
 62 PROTECTION OF THE DOCKYARDS 
 
 Mr. Arnold- Forster 
 
 ' May I infer that no question of invasion is antici- 
 pated by the present Government ? ' 
 
 Mr. Haldane 
 'Nothing of the sort.' 
 
 ' QUI TROMPE T'ON ? ' 
 
 Now it must be clearly understood that in giving 
 these answers the Secretary of State was taking ad- 
 vantage of the ignorance of the House of Commons. 
 A very brief examination will suffice to show that 
 they are a compound of inaccuracy and absurdity 
 which ought never to have been put into the mouth 
 of a responsible Minister. 
 
 Let us take the first answer. The questioner is 
 told with great solemnity that it ' is neither customary 
 nor to the public interest to publish detailed in- 
 formation in regard to the works, armaments, and 
 garrisons of the defended ports or fortresses at home 
 or abroad.' 
 
 As a matter of fact, no information about the works 
 or armaments was asked for. As to the works, they 
 are all marked on the Ordnance Map ; and as to the 
 armaments, Mr. Haldane only two or three days 
 before had told the House that these do not exist. 
 Indeed, this endeavour to make a mystery of the busi- 
 ness is absurd. Everything concerning these forts 
 has long been public property. Thousands of people
 
 ' QUI TROMPE T'ON ? ' 63 
 
 have lived in them, Volunteers, Cadet Corps, the 
 Garrison Regiment. Anybody and everybody has 
 been into them, and tens of thousands of people 
 have seen them lying as destitute of defence 
 as Battersea Park. To speak of Portsmouth, 
 Plymouth, and Chatham as defended fortresses 
 is a pure misdescription : they are nothing of the 
 kind. 
 
 The attempt to make a mystery in respect to the 
 garrisons is equally absurd. As Mr. Haldane himself 
 was compelled to admit a few moments later, there 
 is no secrecy at all about the troops who are told 
 off to these particular places. Why the House of 
 Commons should not be told that which is common 
 knowledge to thousands of persons, it is not easy to 
 understand. It is, however, most important that the 
 House of Commons should realise that large numbers 
 of Garrison Artillerymen are being assigned to so-called 
 fortresses which have no guns and no ammunition. 
 But perhaps the most serious part of the whole 
 business is the statement put into Mr. Haldane's 
 mouth, apparently by some soldier, that 
 
 ' The defence of our principal naval ports has been 
 greatly strengthened by the substitution of modern 
 movable armament for the obsolete guns which were 
 removed as a result of Sir Robert Grant's Committee in 
 1900.' 
 
 One is tempted to ask, ' Qui trompe t'on ? ' Whom 
 is it intended to deceive ?
 
 64 PROTECTION OF THE DOCKYARDS 
 
 How TO ' STRENGTHEN ' A FORTRESS 
 
 I will say nothing about this so-called ' movable 
 armament,' though, as a matter of fact, there is not 
 the slightest mystery about it. The description of it 
 as ' modern ' is rather a romantic one. I will content 
 myself with expressing the hope that Mr. Haldane 
 will invite members of the House of Commons to go 
 down and see this armament for themselves, and to 
 see it horsed and manned. They will then be able 
 to form some idea as to the value of this particular 
 equipment. But when Mr. Haldane asks us to 
 believe that a fortress is greatly strengthened by 
 the removal of its permanent armament, and the 
 substitution of a movable armament, he is taking too 
 great a liberty with his hearers. 
 
 Kiel, Wilhelmshaven, Cherbourg, and Toulon 
 are all great naval arsenals; they are all great 
 fortresses ; they are all prepared to resist attack on 
 the land side. I know all of these fortresses. 
 I know that hundreds of thousands of pounds, 
 probably millions, have been spent on the creation of a 
 great cordon of forts and entrenched positions on the 
 landward side of every one of them. I know that from 
 time to time the design of the works and the guns 
 mounted in the works have become obsolete. When 
 this has taken place, the works have been improved 
 and modernised, and the guns have been replaced by 
 better ones. I know that in every one of these
 
 HOW TO 'STRENGTHEN' A FORTRESS 65 
 
 fortresses, as in every real fortress, the fixed arma- 
 ment has been supplemented by a movable armament ; 
 but I know of no fortress in the world outside Crazy- 
 land or the United Kingdom where the movable 
 armament has been substituted for the fixed arma- 
 ment, or which has been greatly strengthened by 
 taking out every heavy gun and every round of 
 ammunition, and stabling a few dozen howitzers 
 and field guns in the dismantled works. 
 
 The fact is that, in this, as in so many other 
 instances, the present Army Council are proceeding 
 without any method or principle at all. If it be 
 assumed, as the present writer has always assumed, 
 and as he was justified by the advice he received in 
 assuming, that the Navy can prevent the landing of 
 any serious force, the fortification of our great naval 
 ports is superfluous, and therefore unnecessary. If, 
 on the other hand, it be assumed that a landing is 
 not only possible, but probable, then it is a crime to 
 leave our great naval arsenals unprotected. There 
 seems to be no limit to the demands which the 
 Secretary of State is prepared to make upon the 
 credulity of the House of Commons, but it would 
 be interesting to hear some of the soldiers who, 
 presumably, have advised him, defend the proposition 
 which he has laid down. It is not true that a great 
 fortress is strengthened by removing its armament. 
 It is not true that a movable armament can be used 
 as a substitute for a fixed one. It is not true that
 
 66 PROTECTION OF THE DOCKYARDS 
 
 the movable armaments which are stored in the 
 vicinity of our great naval dockyards are sufficient to 
 guarantee them against a serious attack. And 
 finally, it is not true that a partially trained Citizen 
 Army, armed with a small number of moderately 
 effective field guns and howitzers, can be relied 
 upon to defend the perimeter of a great position 
 against a resolute enemy, or to do, unaided, that 
 which a regular garrison of trained troops in a 
 scientifically fortified and entrenched position can 
 barely accomplish. 
 
 In a word, if the Territorial Army is really to be 
 used against an invading force on the soil of this 
 country, we must reconsider the whole of our policy, 
 and our great naval arsenals must be protected on 
 the land side with all the appliances of modern 
 science.
 
 FORTIFICATION: ITS USE AND ABUSE 67 
 
 CHAPTER IX 
 
 THE PROTECTION OF THE DOCKYARDS 
 
 (continued) 
 
 ALWAYS USEFUL, SOMETIMES INDISPENSABLE 
 
 'Ceux qui proscrivent lea lignes de circonvallaticn et tous les 
 secours que 1'art de 1'ingeuieur peut dormer, se privent gratuitement 
 d'une force et d'un moyen auxiliare que ne sont jamais nuisibles, 
 presque toujoura utiles, et souvent indispensables.' Napoleon : 
 ' Maximes ' 
 
 FORTIFICATION : ITS USE AND ABUSE 
 
 'A LITTLE learning is a dangerous thing,' and the 
 proof of the adage is frequently to be found in 
 discussions on the question of the protection of our 
 great dockyards. Nothing is more common than to 
 read fine passages in which the inability of fortified 
 positions to arrest invasion or to decide the fate of a 
 campaign is demonstrated, and many learned writers 
 are laid under contribution in order to establish this 
 somewhat doubtful point. But a moment's reflexion 
 will show that all this learning is misplaced and 
 misapplied. No one pretends that Portsmouth, 
 Plymouth, and Chatham should be regarded as 
 border fortresses, or as entrenched camps designed 
 
 F2
 
 68 PROTECTION OF THE DOCKYARDS 
 
 to delay or frustrate an invasion. No one pretends 
 that the successful defence of these places will protect 
 the rest of the country in any direct fashion. All the 
 theories as to the small value of fortresses in war 
 may be true, and yet it may be necessary to protect 
 the dockyards against a 'coup de main.' Spandau is 
 fortified, not to prevent an enemy from penetrating 
 into Prussia, but to protect the treasure which is 
 stored in the fortress. We have an infinitely greater 
 treasure stored in the dockyards at Chatham, 
 Portsmouth, and Devonport. 
 
 If fifteen thousand trained troops could really be 
 landed as a surprise on Hayling Island, at the back 
 of Mount Batten, or between Reculvers and Garrison 
 Point, humanly speaking nothing could save the 
 dockyards at Portsmouth, Devonport, and Chatham 
 respectively. I have seen such landings effected in 
 the neighbourhood of Portsmouth with the greatest 
 ease, and there is no doubt they can always be 
 effected, if there be no naval opposition an un- 
 thinkable contingency, but one which is postulated 
 by the whole of our existing military arrangements. 
 
 It is idle to tell us, as a professional journal has 
 lately done, that 
 
 'in the considered opinion of the naval and military 
 authorities, the present mobile defences are adequate' 
 
 to resist an attack in force, pressed home. No such 
 hypothesis as the possibility of an attack of the kind
 
 FORTIFICATION: ITS USE AND ABUSE 69 
 
 was admitted when the present conditions were 
 established. It is suggested in the journal referred 
 to that the Committee which dismantled the defences 
 of our great dockyards was inspired by the recollec- 
 tion of a phrase attributed to Marshal Villars, who 
 is supposed to have informed Louis XIV that 
 
 'it was not with the stones of his fortresses, nor the 
 guns that crowned their ramparts, but with the hearts of 
 his brave grenadiers, that he would protect the frontiers 
 of France.' 
 
 Probably no General who ever commanded an 
 Army was less entitled to make such a remark than 
 Marshal Villars; and whatever may have been his 
 promises, he proved singularly incapable of giving 
 effect to them. But that by the way. It is, 
 however, an injustice to the members of Sir Robert 
 Grant's Committee to suggest that they were animated 
 by a motive so foolish and so irrelevant as that 
 suggested. In all probability they adopted the 
 common sense view that it is unnecessary to defend 
 a place which cannot be attacked. 
 
 If, however, the members of Committee laid down 
 the principle that an important and vulnerable 
 position can be best defended against a serious attack 
 by a small and imperfectly trained field force, and 
 that permanent and armed entrenchments are of no 
 value as a support to that Army, they were absolutely 
 ignoring the opinion and the practice of every other 
 military nation in the world.
 
 70 PROTECTION OF THE DOCKYARDS 
 
 THE DILEMMA 
 
 One word must be said in conclusion with respect 
 to this matter. The writer is sufficiently well 
 acquainted with the careless methods of controversy 
 and criticism which are considered legitimate in the 
 discussion of military questions in this country, to be 
 prepared for any kind of misconstruction. It would 
 be in accordance with precedent that what has been 
 said in this and the preceding chapter should be 
 taken as the text for demonstrating that the author 
 is a firm believer in invasion. It need hardly be said 
 that nothing is farther from the truth. I do not 
 believe, and never have believed, in invasion ; I 
 believe, as I always have done, that the true protection 
 against a so-called raid is a strong Navy, and a highly 
 organised system of maritime defence. But these are 
 only personal opinions, shared, I know, by many, but 
 not accepted by all. What I desire to demonstrate is, 
 that to halt between two policies is folly. If we can 
 be invaded we must accept the conclusion with all 
 its consequences; we must as men of common sense 
 place first and foremost the revision of our policy 
 with respect to the defence of the dockyards, and 
 we must effectively protect those national treasures 
 from the danger by which in our opinion they are 
 threatened.
 
 THE QUESTION OF INVASION 71 
 
 CHAPTER X 
 
 THE QUESTION OF INVASION 
 
 BED-ROCK FACT 
 
 'Let us start on the assumption that we are in earnest with this 
 principle (that the Navy itself at its present strength is capable of 
 defending us from invasion), and that it is now a continuous principle. 
 It is the principle of the late Government ; it is the principle of the 
 Defence Committee ; it is the principle of the Navy ; it is the principle 
 of the War Office and the Army Council ; it is the principle of the 
 present Government, Just as it was the principle of the late Govern- 
 ment. It is the accepted principle, and one in which the rule of 
 clear thinking should apply. We have bed-rock fact here for the 
 organisation of our defences.' Mr Haldane (House of Commons. 
 8-3-06). 
 
 THE TRUTH, THE WHOLE TRUTH, AND NOTHING BUT 
 THE TRUTH 
 
 'If our Navy defends our shores against invasion in strength, it 
 follows that we do not require a vast array for home defence. If it 
 does not, then the dissolution of the Empire is accomplished, no matter 
 how many hundreds of thousands of men we may arm, nor how many 
 guns of position may be trundling their slow length through "Peper 
 Harow" i on their way to the Surrey Hills.' 1 Imperial Strategy,' by the 
 Military Correspondent of the ' Times.' 
 
 1 Peper Harow is the residence of Lord Midleton. Inasmuch as 
 Lord Midleton has never given the slightest countenance to the 
 policy of reducing the Regular Army, and creating an untrained 
 force tied to the soil of this country to take its place, and has 
 expressed his strong disapproval of such a policy, it would appear 
 that this sarcasm has been posted to the wrong address. The rest 
 of the sentiment, however, is unimpeachable, and might with 
 advantage be inscribed in letters of gold in the Army Council 
 Chamber.
 
 72 THE QUESTION OF INVASION 
 
 'COMPLETELY DEFENDED BY THE FLEET' 
 
 ' The British Army is unlike those of the Continent. We live on an 
 island, and our coasts are completely defended by the Fleet.' Mr. 
 
 Haldane (House of Commons, 8-3-06). 
 
 THE TERRITORIAL FORCE AS A PROTECTION 
 AGAINST INVASION 
 
 LET us now examine the various dangers against 
 which the nation is called upon to provide. 
 
 The country may be invaded. It has already 
 been pointed out that such is not the official view ; 
 but it is undoubtedly the view of the majority 
 of the people of this country. It is against an 
 invasion that the Territorial Force is, in the opinion 
 of many persons, intended to protect us. It 
 is curious, however, to note that if this statement 
 be categorically made, nine persons out of ten will 
 promptly disavow it. Those who do so will admit 
 at once that the Territorial Force cannot protect us 
 from invasion. No one has spoken more strongly on 
 this subject than the Secretary of State for War, who 
 has told us that one-third of the so-called expedition- 
 ary force must be kept at home in the event of an 
 oversea war, because the Territorial Force cannot 
 be supposed to be ready for war, or competent to 
 defeat a foreign army. The Secretary of State might, 
 of course, have gone a great deal farther, and have 
 confessed that if the Navy fails, neither the Regular 
 Army nor the Territorial Force can save us. But it 
 must be remembered that the Regular Army has a
 
 TERRITORIAL FORCE AND INVASION 73 
 
 great function to perform quite apart from the duty 
 of resisting an invasion ; the Territorial Force has 
 none. If it does not exist for this purpose ; or if, 
 existing for this purpose, it is incapable of fulfilling 
 it, it is obviously of no value whatever, and if we 
 accept the view that the function of the Territorial 
 Force is to protect us against invasion by a Conti- 
 nental army, that is the only conclusion at which 
 it is possible to arrive. If this country cannot be 
 invaded, a force whose sole function is to resist an 
 invasion on the soil of the United Kingdom is abso- 
 lutely useless, and the money spent on it is a sheer 
 waste. If, on the other hand, an invasion be possible, 
 how do we stand ? If it be granted that one of the 
 great military Powers of Europe Germany, for in- 
 stance really can land its armies on these islands, 
 it is not by means of such a force as the Territorial 
 Army that we shall defeat the invaders. Germany 
 has four million soldiers, grown men, who have 
 practically all received a minimum training of two 
 years under the most competent and scientific officers 
 in the world. To defeat such a force as this we 
 must do as other people do who have a similar object 
 in view. We must make great sacrifices ; we must 
 enrol and train our entire population ; we must 
 increase tenfold the number of our professional 
 officers; we must add to our materiel; we must create 
 fortresses and prepare positions. But we are not 
 doing any of these things ; we have not the slightest
 
 74 THE QUESTION OF INVASION 
 
 intention of doing any of them. On the contrary, 
 we are contenting ourselves with a force which may 
 some day reach, but is forbidden to exceed, 300,000 
 men, and which is at present more than 100,000 
 short of that number ; l a force largely composed of 
 boys, and which, compared with a Continental army, 
 has had no training at all. 
 
 Assuming that this little force can ever take the 
 field, its numbers, after providing for the garrison of 
 Ireland and the protection of certain fixed points, and 
 after it has discarded all men who are disqualified by 
 age, youth, infirmity, or occupation, will be insignifi- 
 cant. Nor, despite what some soldiers, who seem to 
 have a passion for winning popularity by saying smooth 
 things, are in the habit of telling us, will good 
 intentions and patriotic zeal make up for all the other 
 qualities which are necessary to secure success in the 
 day of battle. Of course, I am well aware that there 
 are a great many people in this country who cannot, 
 and will not, believe this. They do not study mili- 
 tary history, they are unacquainted with the military 
 preparations of other nations, and they are pleased 
 and inspirited by all the bustle and movement which 
 have accompanied the operation of changing the 
 name of the Volunteers. 
 
 Pages of the ' Gazette ' are given up to record- 
 ing the issue of new commissions, sonorous titles are 
 conferred, decorations are invented and distributed 
 1 In December 1908.
 
 TERRITORIAL FORCE AND INVASION 75 
 
 with a lavish hand, and everywhere we hear of 
 divisions, brigades, batteries, regiments. It is all 
 very splendid and very inspiring, but it is not war, 
 nor, unless all the nations of Europe except ourselves 
 are mad, is it anything like it. The sorrowful part 
 of the business is that those who ought to be the 
 foremost in telling the truth are in many cases the 
 most ardent in encouraging the delusion. There are 
 many soldiers in this country who know the truth 
 perfectly well. Nay, more, there are many who, 
 both officially and privately, have stated those truths 
 with a force and conviction which are beyond criti- 
 cism. But how rarely do we see any one of these 
 experienced officers giving to the public the inestim- 
 able advantage of his knowledge ? It need hardly be 
 said that this reticence, whatever its cause, is greatly 
 to be regretted, because it encourages and strength- 
 ens the belief of an uninstructed public in certain 
 propositions, which are as unfounded as they are 
 dangerous.
 
 76 THE VALUE OF UNTRAINED TROOPS 
 
 CHAPTER XI 
 
 THE VALUE OF UNTRAINED TROOPS IN WAR 
 
 'Avec les masses e"normes qu'on met aujourd'hui en mouvement, 
 1'improvisation ne donnera que des troupeaus d 'homines, et non pas 
 des troupes. L'amateurisme sera toujours et for cement vaincu. 
 Pour vaincre il faut une preparation longue et complete, et par 
 consequent des sacrifices.' Lt.-Colonel Frigue, de I'artillerie fran^aise, 
 brevet^ d'Etat Major. 
 
 AN ARMY FIGHTING IN ITS OWN COUNTRY 
 
 A VERY large number of persons in this country 
 believe as an absolute matter of faith that untrained 
 troops, provided they are animated by a proper 
 spirit, can be relied upon to meet and defeat Regular 
 troops ; and that an army fighting in its own country 
 fights at a special advantage. There is no founda- 
 tion for either of these beliefs. On the contrary, 
 they are opposed to all military teaching and experi- 
 ence. These two fallacies are so widely prevalent, 
 and their acceptance as true is so great a danger to 
 this country, that they deserve special notice. 
 
 It is not true that an army fighting in its own 
 country fights at an advantage. As a matter of fact, 
 it fights at a great and obvious disadvantage. A 
 little reflexion will show that this must be so.
 
 FIGHTING IN THEIR OWN COUNTRY 77 
 
 A British Army fighting on British soil must have 
 lost one of the greatest assets an army can possess 
 before it goes into action. It must fight as the army 
 of a Power which has already suffered a humiliating 
 defeat. The Navy must have been rendered impotent 
 before invasion is possible. As Sir John French has 
 well said 
 
 ' Among the considerations which must greatly favour 
 the invader from a moral point of view is the loss of the 
 command of the sea, to which we have so long been 
 accustomed, and the consequent consternation caused by 
 the knowledge that invasion, which was always thought 
 to be impossible, is, in reality, a fait accompli' 
 
 But this is not all. Men fighting in their own 
 country are necessarily embarrassed at every turn by 
 the fear of injuring their own people and their own 
 possessions. A foreign commander need have no 
 scruple in burning villages, destroying bridges, and 
 breaking up railways, The loss is not his. But 
 with the native army matters are quite different. 
 Those who command and compose it must naturally 
 be reluctant to add to the miseries of the civil 
 population, to destroy national and private property, 
 and to inflict damage which will aggravate the 
 penalties of defeat. It is evident, therefore, that the 
 popular belief is unfounded, and that it is untrue to 
 say that an army which fights in its own country 
 fights at an advantage. The moral of which is that 
 if we are really going to be invaded, the army on
 
 78 THE VALUE OF UNTRAINED TROOPS 
 
 which we must rely to resist invasion must be of a 
 particularly high quality, in order to overcome the 
 immense disadvantages under which it will take the 
 field. 
 
 CITIZEN SOLDIERS THE BOERS IN WAR 
 
 Still more widespread and more dangerous than the 
 delusion which has just been referred to is that other 
 delusion upon which the whole basis of the Territorial 
 Force rests, namely, the belief that untrained citizen 
 troops can compensate for their want of military 
 training by the excellence of their intentions and the 
 warmth of their patriotic feelings. Unluckily, there 
 exists a modern instance which is supposed to support 
 this conclusion. The belief that the Boer War in 
 some way contradicted the teaching of all military 
 history in all time is firmly rooted in the minds of 
 tens of thousands of the people of this country. It 
 would be hard to find a more complete error in 
 reasoning. 
 
 That in one sense the Boers were citizen soldiers, 
 not fully trained in accordance with ordinary military 
 practice, is true. But that they were untrained in 
 respect of the work they had to do is not true. On 
 the contrary, for that work they were, in many 
 respects, specially qualified by the occupations of 
 their lives. They had, for the most part, been 
 accustomed from their youth upwards to ride, to
 
 CITIZEN SOLDIERS THE BOERS 79 
 
 shoot at moving objects, to practise concealment, to 
 bear exposure, to study country. All this experience 
 was undoubtedly of great value to them in the field. 
 When our citizen soldiers can claim to start with an 
 equal measure of experience, they will be formidable 
 foes by reason of it, But this fitness for war was 
 not due to the fact that the Boers were citizen 
 soldiers, but to the fact that, despite their being 
 citizen soldiers, they had studied and practised many 
 of those things which a trained soldier should know. 
 As it was, they were still devoid of many qualities 
 which a trained soldier should possess. Hence it 
 came about that, as a rule, the Boers clung to the 
 defensive ; and that in resolute fighting, such as that 
 which took place during the advance on Ladysmith, 
 they were compelled to give way. But the main 
 fact to remember is that the Boer plan of campaign 
 would be absolutely impossible in a populous country. 
 If we can imagine that, after the invader had occupied 
 London, Manchester, Birmingham, Liverpool, and 
 Glasgow, had taken possession of all our roads and 
 railways, and was feeding all our wives and children 
 in camps on Salisbury Plain, the Territorial Army 
 was carrying on a dogged resistance in Caithness 
 and Sligo, we should have a parallel to what took 
 place in South Africa. But to draw the picture is 
 to demonstrate the absurdity of the comparison. 
 
 The Germans had even greater difficulties with 
 the Herreros than we experienced with our much
 
 80 THE VALUE OF UNTRAINED TROOPS 
 
 more formidable adversaries the Boers, but the 
 German army marched to Paris in three months, 
 and absolutely crushed every one of the citizen 
 armies of France with a precision and rapidity which 
 might teach us a lesson if we cared to learn. 
 
 The fact is, that patriotism and good intentions 
 have never proved an adequate substitute for dis- 
 cipline, training, and organisation. Citizen armies 
 have always gone down before regular trained troops. 
 Every War Office in Europe knows this ; and that 
 is why each of them prepares for war in a manner as 
 different from ours as it is possible to conceive. 
 From all which it seems reasonable to conclude that, 
 if this country be ever called upon to meet an 
 invasion in force by a modern trained army, the 
 Territorial Force cannot be relied upon to resist such 
 an invasion with success.
 
 BLIND LEADERS OF THE BLIND 81 
 
 CHAPTER XII 
 
 BLIND LEADERS OF THE BLIND 
 
 ' It is impossible to estimate the value of Red Territorial Troops 
 (Three Divisions) as compared with Blue Regulars, but it is not too 
 much to assume that the military value of the whole of such troops 
 employed in the Northern Theatre of War does not equal that of one 
 Regular Division.' General Sir John French's Address to the Officers 
 attending the Manoeuvres in the Autumn of 1907. 
 
 HERZEGOVINA, SARAGOSSA 
 
 IT is not surprising that the unprofessional public 
 should form incorrect ideas as to the value of un- 
 trained troops in war, for they are sometimes 
 cruelly misled and deceived by those on whom they 
 are entitled to rely for instruction and guidance. 
 There lies before me the letter of a soldier who has 
 not only served long in the Army, but who has 
 held a high office in connexion with its administra- 
 tion. 1 The letter appeared in an important and 
 widely-read newspaper. The object of the writer 
 is to encourage the people of this country in 
 the belief that untrained, or partially trained troops, 
 fighting in their own country, have held their own 
 
 1 General Sir Alfred Turner, K.C.B., formerly Director of 
 Auxiliary Forces at the War Office. 
 
 G
 
 82 BLIND LEADERS OF THE BLIND 
 
 in the past against the trained troops of a regular 
 army, and may therefore be relied upon to do so 
 in the future. The case, which is typical of the 
 methods of a whole class of teachers who are ready 
 to subordinate the lessons of history and the ele- 
 mentary truths of military science to the political 
 exigencies of the hour, is worth quoting. As a 
 proof of the correctness of his thesis, the writer of 
 the statement referred to cites, in the first instance, 
 the example of the Boer War, which has already 
 been dealt with ; he mentions the case of Bosnia and 
 Herzegovina, and the Siege of Saragossa. With re- 
 gard to the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, it is 
 only necessary to point out that it is entirely irrevelant 
 to the issue. The Austro-Hungarian troops had to 
 contend with no army, regular or irregular. Their 
 task was to effect the civil and military occupation 
 of a mountainous country, nearly twenty thousand 
 square miles in extent, against the wishes of a large 
 part of the population. The process naturally took 
 some time, and led to a number of small conflicts ; 
 but the issue was never in doubt for a moment, and 
 the work was carried out completely and effectually. 
 The reference to Saragossa is a still more marked 
 case of ignoring elementary facts. Saragossa was 
 not defended by citizen soldiers at all, but by the 
 inhabitants, men and women alike, who barricaded 
 the narrow streets and shot the French soldiers 
 out of the windows and from behind barricades,
 
 THE BATTLES OF 1871 83 
 
 There was, it is true, a force of ' half -trained levies ' 
 concerned in the operations. Under the command 
 of Palafox this force left the city, attacked the 
 French, and was promptly routed with great loss. 
 The gallant defence of Saragossa by its civilian 
 population had no influence whatever upon the 
 course of the war. The siege was raised, but shortly 
 afterwards the town was again invested and taken. 
 
 LOIGNY POUPRY AND BEAUNE LA ROLANDE 
 
 Finally, this would-be teacher cites an example 
 which he appears to think is conclusive : 
 
 ' I totally disagree,' says he, ' with Mr. Arnold- 
 Forster and his views as to the value of a partially 
 trained force. One has only to refer to the second 
 portion of the Franco-German War, when raw levies, 
 Artillery included, who had had but a few weeks' train- 
 ing and were to a great extent led by recruit officers, 
 fought battles, such as those of Loigny Poupry and 
 Beaune la Rolande. In fact, the situation of the Ger- 
 mans, who had the finest, best trained, and most 
 victorious army of history, became highly critical more 
 than once in consequence of these half-trained levies. 
 Our Territorial Army would be a far higher trained force 
 than the French army of 1871, after nearly the whole of 
 the regular troops of France were captured or besieged.' 
 
 Now it cannot be denied that examples taken 
 from the Franco-German War are relevant. In the 
 later phases of that war large masses of partially 
 trained troops, whose length of service at the time 
 
 G2
 
 84 BLIND LEADERS OF THE BLIND 
 
 when they came in contact with the enemy was for 
 the most part greatly in excess of that which is 
 demanded from our Territorial Army, were engaged 
 in operations on a large scale. And what happened ? 
 At the battle of Beaune la Rolande the German Xth 
 Corps numbered 9,000 men with 70 guns. The 
 French XVIIth and XXth Corps had a strength of 
 60,000 men with 138 guns. The result of the action 
 was as follows : the 9,000 Germans not only held 
 their own, but drove the French off the battlefield 
 with a loss to the latter of from eight to ten thousand 
 men. At the battle of Loigny Poupry a German 
 force of 34,000 men with 196 guns completely routed 
 a French army of 93,000 men with 264 guns, the 
 French losing 18,000 men and nine guns. 
 
 Such are the examples which this would-be 
 teacher has selected for our encouragement. Com- 
 ment is unnecessary. The whole story is told in a 
 few words by the German General von Heinleth. 
 Summing up the achievements of the gallant men 
 who were sacrificed in a vain attempt to accomplish 
 the impossible, that officer writes as follows : 
 
 ' In these days the utmost was accomplished that can 
 be expected from a popular rising of men who have 
 received no military training. The road by which the 
 result was arrived at was strewn with a hideous number 
 of victims, who paid with their lives for the lack of poli- 
 tical foresight of the rulers of France, and for their own 
 opposition to universal military discipline in time of 
 peace.'
 
 THE TRUE TERRITORIAL FORCE 85 
 
 I am not one of those who believe that the fate 
 of this country will ever be decided upon the soil of 
 this country; but to those who do believe it and 
 they are probably the majority of the people of these 
 islands the words above quoted convey a warning 
 which cannot be misunderstood. 
 
 But one word more remains to be said before we 
 leave the subject of citizen soldiers and their value 
 in war. I have spoken of the South African cam- 
 paign, and have endeavoured to explain why, in my 
 opinion, the part played by the Boers offers no en- 
 couragement to the view that we can safely rely 
 upon an untrained though well-intentioned force in a 
 life and death struggle with a Continental army. It 
 is curious, however, that the one and obvious outlet 
 for the volunteering spirit in this country which 
 would give us a fighting force of immense value has 
 never yet received the slightest attention from the 
 authorities. We have in the United Kingdom an 
 immense number of persons trained to the sea, who 
 either for pleasure or profit have become ' profes- 
 sionals ' of the highest order. The services of these 
 men rightly utilised might be invaluable in time of 
 war. For the Territorial soldier enlistment for ser- 
 vice means the abandonment of the profession in 
 which he has always been engaged, and from which
 
 86 BLIND LEADERS OF THE BLIND 
 
 he can be ill spared ; in order to enter upon another 
 calling in which he must inevitably be but an 
 amateur. 
 
 Very different is the position of the man trained 
 to the sea. In the event of war with Germany, 
 thousands of highly trained men pilots, fishermen, 
 yachtsmen, the officers and crews of cross-Channel 
 packets, and longshoremen of every description 
 will be out of work till the war is over. Their 
 ' opposite numbers ' will, as a matter of course, be at 
 the service of the German Admiralty. What can be 
 more reasonable than to utilise this great weapon 
 which lies ready to our hands ? In destroyers, sub- 
 marines, mine launches, and in the signalling and 
 examination service these men, with a little training, 
 would be invaluable. They know the coast, and 
 they know the sea far better than the majority of 
 the officers and seamen of the Navy. I have every 
 reason to hope, I have some reason to believe, that 
 ere long the Admiralty will take in hand the task of 
 organising these men, and will for the first time 
 create a ' Territorial Force,' not only admirable in 
 quality, but perfectly adapted to serve the need of 
 the nation in time of war. 1 
 
 IF WE ARE INVADED 
 
 But, apart from this, if we turn from the ques- 
 tion of how an invasion may be prevented, to the 
 1 See Appendix, page 239.
 
 IF WE ARE INVADED 87 
 
 question of how an invasion once effected may be 
 defeated, there is only one conclusion at which 
 reasonable men can arrive. If we are really going 
 to be invaded, we must do what other nations which 
 are confronted by the same danger, are compelled to 
 do. No miracles will be performed for the special 
 benefit of this country. The nonsensical arrange- 
 ment by which a time limit is imposed upon our 
 enemies, and by which they are forbidden to attack 
 for six calendar months, must be discarded. We 
 must arm, we must train, we must prepare, and we 
 must pay like other people. The man who believes 
 in invasion believes in conscription ; and if he be a 
 man capable of thinking and reasoning he does not, 
 and he cannot, believe in the policy which is destroy- 
 ing the Regular Army in order to create the 
 Territorial Force.
 
 THE TRAINING OF THE SOLDIER 
 
 CHAPTER XIII 
 
 SOME SOLDIERS ON THE TRAINING OF THE 
 SOLDIER 
 
 'Soldiers, apparently forgetting their well-founded and strongly 
 expressed convictions of only a few years ago, seem now prepared to 
 trust the same stamp of soldier whose unfltness for service in the 
 field they then pointed out in no measured terms.' Field-Marshal 
 Lord Roberts (House of Lords, 23-11-OS). 
 
 A STRANGE CASE OF MILITARY CONVERSION 
 
 I PROPOSE to devote the following chapter to 
 recalling the publicly expressed opinions of some 
 of our most experienced officers with respect to the 
 period of training which is necessary to enable a 
 soldier to take the field. The extracts are taken 
 from the Report of the Royal Commission on the 
 Auxiliary Forces, which sat in 1903. It will be 
 observed that on one point every officer is agreed, 
 namely, that two years' training is the minimum 
 necessary to form the soldiers of an army which is 
 to meet and to defeat foreign troops. It is only just 
 to say that, until the commencement of the year 1906, 
 every officer whose opinion was asked for or volunteered 
 was consistent in upholding these views. It was on
 
 A CASE OF MILITARY CONVERSION 89 
 
 the basis of the evidence given, and quoted below, 
 and upon the advice of every one of his professional 
 advisers, without distinction, that the present writer 
 accepted two years as the minimum period for all 
 troops likely to be engaged in war. What has taken 
 place since 1906 to change the opinion of some 
 British soldiers in high office is a secret which has 
 never yet been revealed to the public. It is 
 evident that the reason for the change is local and 
 not general ; otherwise soldiers in other countries 
 would have hastened to adopt a principle which 
 would more than treble the numbers of their 
 armies and would relieve the individuals composing 
 them of many months of distasteful and unnecessary 
 soldiering. 
 
 It is sufficient to note here that the present 
 members of the Army Council hold that those who 
 gave evidence in 1903 were altogether wrong. Nay, 
 more ; it would seem that they condemn with equal 
 unanimity the opinions which they themselves held 
 and expressed as lately as 1905. The conversion 
 is curious and interesting ; it certainly had one 
 advantage : it happened to coincide exactly with the 
 official adoption of the political view which is 
 always so popular, and which is, at the present 
 moment, triumphant, namely, that the amount of 
 military service an individual is able or disposed to 
 give is the exact amount which is required to make 
 him fit to serve his country in time of war.
 
 90 THE TRAINING OF THE SOLDIER 
 
 What Soldiers thought in 1903 
 
 EVIDENCE OF LT.-GEN. SIR T. KELLY-KENNY 
 (Adjutant-General of the Army) 
 
 621 Q. (Mr. Spenser Wilkinson). And you think that 
 in order that the Militia and Volunteers should be 
 up to concert pitch I think that was the expression 
 used and be fit to meet trained troops abroad they 
 should have two years' continuous service ? 
 
 A. (Sir T. Kelly-Kenny). Yes; to meet European 
 troops in the field, two years' training. 
 
 EVIDENCE OF FIELD-MARSHAL VISCOUNT 
 WOLSELEY 
 
 1.529 Q. (Sir Coleridge Grove). I asked you to assume 
 all through that the Auxiliary Forces have to fight 
 without any substantial aid from the Regular troops ? 
 
 A. (Lord Wolseley). Then I think you had 
 better make peace. 
 
 1.530 Q. (Sir Coleridge Grove). Might it not be possible 
 to bring them up into a condition in which they will 
 be able to fight with reasonable prospect of success ? 
 
 A. (Lord Wolseley). Certainly, but then you 
 would have to give them a corresponding 
 amount of training to make them equal to the 
 Regular soldier. 
 
 1.531 Q. (Sir Coleridge Grove). That is exactly what I 
 want to get at. 
 
 A. (Lord Wolseley). In other words, how long 
 does it take to make a Regular soldier ?
 
 WHAT SOLDIERS THOUGHT IN 1903 91 
 
 1,532 Q. (Sir Coleridge Grove). That is your way of 
 putting it ; I am asking you how long would it take 
 to make 300,000 Auxiliary Forces equal to coping 
 with 200,000 highly trained Regulars ? 
 
 A. (Lord Wolseley). I think the best answer I 
 can give you is the answer that a German officer 
 would give you what the Germans exact from 
 their men before they turn them into the 
 Reserve : // you wish to have men capable of 
 fighting as Regular soldiers, you have to train 
 them as the Germans do, and keep them for 
 eighteen months or two years and then turn 
 them away, and have them up for periodical 
 trainings annually. I look upon the German 
 Army as very much in the condition to which 
 you refer. The great bulk of the German 
 soldiers live in the Reserve, but before a man is 
 discharged into the Reserve as an efficient 
 soldier, he is kept permanently with the Colours 
 for two years, and afterwards he comes up 
 periodically for some small training. I cannot 
 take a better illustration than what the German 
 considers necessary. 
 
 EVIDENCE OF GENERAL SIR JOHN FRENCH 
 (At present Inspector-General of the Army) 
 
 2,497 Q. (Sir Coleridge Grove). Now, I want to put this 
 case to you it is a contingency we have had placed 
 before us namely, that circumstances may arise 
 under which the greater part of our Regular Army is 
 absent from Great Britain, and that during that 
 time we may be invaded, or may expect invasion. 
 Of course, any foreign Power that did invade us,
 
 92 THE TRAINING OF THE SOLDIER 
 
 would invade us with its very best troops ; it would 
 be sure to select these, you may take it for certain ? 
 
 A. (Sir John French). Yes. 
 
 2,498 Q. (Sir Coleridge Grove). Would you be satisfied 
 to meet those troops with our Auxiliary Forces after 
 a year's training ; do you think that would be enough, 
 or do you think it ought to be longer ? 
 
 A. (Sir John French). I should think it would 
 be very risky. 
 
 Q. (Sir Coleridge Grove). You would prefer not? 
 
 A. (Sir John French). / should prefer not. I 
 think it would be very risky. 
 
 2.500 Q. (Sir Coleridge Grove). After what period do 
 you think you would be satisfied to do so ? 
 
 A. (Sir John French). A period that would 
 make them equal to Regular troops. 
 
 2.501 Q. (Sir Coleridge Grove). Do you or do you not 
 think that the deficiency in training might be to some 
 extent compensated for by superiority of numbers ; 
 I mean, that if our Auxiliary Forces considerably 
 outnumbered the invading Force, that (would make) 
 up for their having a shorter period of training ? 
 
 A. (Sir John French). Not under a year, I think. 
 
 2.502 Q. (Sir Coleridge Grove). No, but allowing them 
 a year's training ? 
 
 A. (Sir John French). Allowing them a year, 
 then probably superiority in numbers might tell. 
 But there is no doubt about it that the factor 
 of efficiency is far greater than that of 
 numbers.
 
 WHAT SOLDIERS THOUGHT IN 1903 93 
 
 EVIDENCE OF FIELD-MARSHAL H.R.H. THE 
 DUKE OF CONNAUGHT 
 
 3.587 Q. (Earl of March). Supposing we had got into 
 any other complications, and there had been any 
 attempt to land troops in Ireland, what amount of 
 confidence would your Royal Highness have felt at 
 going into the field with Militiamen and Volunteers 
 within four months after they had been embodied ? 
 
 A. (Duke of Connaught). Not very much, I am 
 afraid ; I had a few Regulars and no Volunteers. 
 
 3.588 Q. (Earl of March). You would have felt very 
 uncomfortable. 
 
 A. (Duke of Connaught). Very. 
 
 3.589 Q. (Earl of March). And after six months' em- 
 bodiment you would have seen a great improvement ? 
 
 A. (Duke of Connaught). Very great improve- 
 ment ; when I had regiments under me for a 
 year or a year and a half, I gradually was train- 
 ing them up to the level of a Line battalion. 
 
 3.590 Q. (Earl of March). I suppose before the end of 
 the longer training some of the regiments 
 went through, you had Militia battalions very little 
 inferior to Line ones ? 
 
 A. (Duke of Connaught). Yes, very little, and I 
 gave them exactly the same training as the 
 Line battalions. I went through the whole 
 thing from the company training and the 
 battalion training, and I got them out in 
 brigades; I had my signallers, and I taught 
 them everything just the same as a Line
 
 94 THE TRAINING OF THE SOLDIER 
 
 battalion. That was after a year and a half, 
 and we did all sorts of field practice and field 
 firing. 
 
 EVIDENCE OF GENERAL LORD METHUEN 
 
 22,151 Q. (Sir Coleridge Grove). Looking at it from 
 that point of view, assuming that the nation would 
 decide upon some form of compulsory military train- 
 ing, or compulsory service, do you still think that 
 the difficulty of getting what I call these Home 
 Defence troops up to a fairly good standard would 
 be as great as you seem to consider it in your 
 answers just now ? 
 
 A. (Lord Methuen). That entirely depends upon 
 the amount of training you give them. For 
 instance, if you were to take a certain number 
 of men and train them steadily for two years 
 and call them Militia, of course your Militia 
 would be efficient ; but I say, with existing cir- 
 cumstances, unless you give your Militiaman 
 far more training than you do at present, and 
 far more facility for shooting, he will not be 
 able to face a Regular army. Of course, if you 
 say I am going to take him for a whole year 
 and give him just the same chance as the 
 Regular troops will have, then you are making 
 your Militia into Regular troops. 
 
 EVIDENCE OF GENERAL SIR IAN HAMILTON 
 
 1,213 Q. (Sir R. Knox). But supposing they (the 
 Militia) were trained on enlistment as recruits prac- 
 tically for five or six months, and then underwent 
 subsequently their month's training in subsequent 
 years, with their shooting training as well, do you
 
 think they would want very much more to get them 
 into condition for meeting a foreign army ? 
 
 A. (Sir Ian Hamilton). You propose to call them 
 out for six months first of all, and then to give 
 them their annual training ? 
 
 Q. (Sir R. Knox). Yes, I say six months, because 
 six months is the utmost limit now put down in the 
 Act of Parliament which governs them. A recruit 
 on enlisting may be trained for six months; his 
 period of annual training is limited to two months ? 
 
 A. (Sir Ian Hamilton). It can only be a matter 
 of opinion, but I would prefer to use them 
 to relieve Regular troops in garrisons and 
 coaling stations, rather than to rely upon them 
 to take the field.
 
 96 RAIDS 
 
 CHAPTER XIV 
 
 RAIDS 
 
 AN 'UNSHAKEN DOCTRINE' 
 
 'The Right Hon. gentleman, the member for the City of London 
 (Mr. Balfour), in a most powerful and instructive speech last summer 
 laid down the doctrine that the Navy was adequate to protect these 
 coasts except against raids, which could not, in his opinion, exceed 10,000 
 men, and were only to be feared at certain points. I do not thinir with 
 my hon. and gallant friend, the member for Sheffield (Sir Howard 
 Vincent), that anything has occurred in the recent manoeuvres to 
 shake our confidence in that principle. The doctrine was the result of 
 the most careful and scientific consideration to which the late Govern- 
 ment devoted itself with the assistance of the most skilled experts, 
 and it is a doctrine which, I believe, remains unshaken to-day ; it is the 
 foundation of our policy, and such raids must be met with good 
 mobilisation schemes.' Mr. Haldane (House of Commons. 12-7-06). 
 
 THE ADMIRALTY VIEW 
 
 IT may be contended that if the Territorial 
 Force cannot be relied upon to protect us against 
 an invasion in force, it will guarantee us against 
 raids. 
 
 Such is the statement which is often made, and 
 often accepted by those who have not time or inclina- 
 tion to reason or to think. 
 
 The Territorial Force will guarantee us against 
 raids. Will it ? If this be so, it is curious that on
 
 THE ADMIRALTY VIEW 97 
 
 one has ever yet told us how it is to achieve that 
 object. All the official statements with regard to the 
 Territorial Force have been so loose and careless 
 that it is difficult to define a ' raid ' with any 
 certainty that the definition will be accepted. We 
 may take it, however, that by a ' raid ' is meant a 
 sudden and unexpected descent upon this country 
 by a body of trained soldiers numbering from 5,000 
 to 25,000 men. Let us, at any rate, accept this 
 definition, and see whither its acceptance leads us. 
 It must be noted in passing that the Admiralty do 
 not believe in the possibility of raids any more 
 than they believe in the possibility of invasion. 1 The 
 officials responsible for the Navy are convinced that 
 the landing of 5,000 men can be prevented as surely 
 as the landing of 500,000, and that it can be pre- 
 vented by the Fleet and its auxiliaries on or under the 
 water. It is well known that this is the view 
 actually held and expressed by the Naval Intel- 
 ligence Department. If it were not accepted, no 
 condemnation could be too strong for that depart- 
 ment. For there is not the slightest doubt that ever 
 since the Admiralty forced the hand of General Owen's 
 Committee, and insisted upon the dismantling of our 
 
 1 There is some reason to believe that at the present instant 
 (January 1909) the naval authorities incline to the view that one 
 or more raiding expeditions not exceeding 10,000 men each may 
 possibly, and under certain conditions, elude the vigilance of the 
 Fleet. If this view be correct, the conclusions arrived at in this 
 chapter are greatly strengthened. 
 
 H
 
 98 RAIDS 
 
 coast fortifications, it has done everything in its 
 power to deprive the Army of the means of defending 
 our ports and estuaries. 
 
 THE WAR OFFICE VIEW 
 
 But assuming once more that the Board of Ad- 
 miralty are altogether wrong, and that the policy 
 which has been accepted and acted upon by the 
 Committee of Defence is a foolish and dangerous 
 one, we come back again to the question of raids, the 
 need for defining them, and the proper military 
 means of guarding against them. Whatever else 
 may be in doubt as to the exact meaning of a 'raid,' 
 it is obvious that it must have certain attributes. 
 A raid must be sudden, and must be wholly un- 
 expected. However poor an opinion its military 
 critics may have of the competence of the Admiralty, 
 they will hardly allege that with adequate notice and 
 time for preparation the British Navy cannot prevent 
 the landing of 20,000 men upon our shores. 
 
 Being sudden and unexpected, a raid, to be 
 successful, must take place during the very first 
 phase of a war. If we are ' surprised ' after we 
 have been engaged in hostilities for six months it can 
 only be said that we shall deserve to be. A raid 
 must inevitably be undertaken by a specially selected 
 body of officers and men who will represent the 
 flower of the army from which they are chosen. 
 The most skilful and accomplished officers, the most
 
 THE WAR OFFICE VIEW 99 
 
 highly trained and most efficient men, will be chosen. 
 The moment selected for landing will be that which is 
 most inconvenient to ourselves and the most convenient 
 to the enemy. The objective of the raiding expedi- 
 tion must be important, and must be reached with 
 great rapidity. 
 
 Such are the conditions under which the force 
 by which we are supposed to be threatened must 
 inevitably act. What is the proper military reply to 
 a threat of this kind ? Is it the Territorial Force or 
 anything remotely resembling it ? Common sense 
 and the military authority of every nation in the 
 world except our own combine to enforce an unhesi- 
 tating negative. 
 
 LESSONS FROM THE CONTINENT 
 
 Much maybe learnt from the practice of the great 
 military Powers, who are undoubtedly exposed to the 
 dangers which so greatly alarm some people in this 
 country. It is impossible to fortify a long land fron- 
 tier so closely as to make a surprise attack physically 
 impossible. Between Russian Poland and Galicia 
 there is no physical boundary at all. The crests of 
 most of the passes in the Vosges are in the hands of 
 the Germans. The principal German fortresses are 
 on the eastern and not on the western side of Alsace- 
 Lorraine. Hence Austria, France, and Germany 
 have all taken special precautions to guard against 
 raids. Those precautions have no resemblance 
 
 H 2
 
 100 RAIDS 
 
 whatever to the precautions which our own War Office 
 has approved. Galicia forms, as it were, a great 
 glacis in front of the Carpathians. The Austro- Hun- 
 garian War Office does not rely for the protection of 
 the frontier upon a small territorial militia trained for 
 a couple of weeks annually, and scattered all over the 
 empire from Bregenz to Hermanstadt. It has quite 
 another system. It maintains in Galicia an immense 
 mobilised force, chiefly composed of cavalry, and 
 backed by the great entrenched camp of Cracow. I 
 have seen these regiments. I believe that on mobili- 
 sation they require only one horse per regiment to 
 enable them to take the field. 
 
 Not long ago I was permitted to visit the barracks 
 of one of the French cavalry regiments which is kept 
 mobilised in connexion with the defence of the 
 eastern frontier of France. This regiment is nearly 
 a thousand strong. Officers, men, and horses are all 
 there, on the spot, and ready to march at a few 
 hours' notice. 
 
 The Germans possess the strongest army in the 
 world. In war time they can mobilise 4,000,000 
 soldiers ; but, in view of their extended land frontier, 
 they have thought it necessary to keep a certain por- 
 tion of their army on what is practically a war footing 
 in time of peace. At the present moment they are 
 spending a million on one alone of their great border 
 fortresses ; and the troops in the Reichsland, drawn 
 as they are from all parts of the empire, are specially
 
 LESSONS FROM THE CONTINENT 101 
 
 organised for the purpose of making any sudden 
 incursion impossible. These troops are among the 
 best and most highly trained which Germany 
 possesses. They are provided with a complete and 
 scientific organisation, and they are commanded by 
 officers of the highest military experience. 
 
 It is possible that Germany, France, and Austria 
 are all of them absolutely wrong ; that the pre- 
 cautions they have taken against the danger which 
 they apprehend are absurd and unnecessary. If 
 they are wrong, then we may possibly be right, 
 but not otherwise. But it must be quite clearly 
 understood that our preparations against a raid, if 
 they can be said to exist at all, differ toto coelo from 
 those adopted by other nations. If the Territorial 
 Army be really intended to protect us against raids, 
 it is the most curiously unfit instrument which has 
 ever been devised for such purpose ; how unfit, the 
 public of this country seems as yet hardly to have 
 realised. It is, in truth, no exaggeration to say that, 
 given the problem, there is no military man in the world, 
 outside our own War Office, who would propound a 
 solution even remotely resembling that which Lord 
 Esher and Mr. Haldane have induced or compelled 
 the nation to adopt. 
 
 THE REAL WEAPON AGAINST A RAID 
 
 Let us consider for a moment what the problem is. 
 The problem is to defeat a force of highly trained,
 
 102 RAIDS 
 
 well -organised, and well-equipped regular troops, 
 who, as the result of a surprise, have been landed 
 upon our shores. The time chosen is the one most 
 inconvenient to ourselves and most advantageous to 
 our enemies. The objective is one of great import- 
 ance, which must be reached without delay, and the 
 attainment of which will inflict a deadly blow upon 
 the Empire. If we once assume that a raid is to 
 take place at all, such must be its inevitable character- 
 istics. By what means can such an attack be met ? 
 What are the methods most appropriate to our end, 
 which is the immediate defeat of the enemy? Com- 
 mon sense tells us quite plainly what should be their 
 nature. The attack is sudden and unexpected ; 
 clearly, therefore, the force which is to resist it must 
 be one that can move instantly, which need not wait 
 for mobilisation, but is ready to take the field at 
 twelve hours' notice. The hostile force being com- 
 posed of picked men, very highly trained, and under 
 carefully selected officers, the force which is to meet 
 and beat it must be superior to it in numbers and at 
 least equal to it in physique, discipline, and training. 
 The whole purpose of the enemy being to strike a 
 very heavy blow in a short time, the force which is 
 to prevent it from striking that blow must be effective 
 directly it takes the field ; and, if possible, must be at 
 or near the point at which the enemy is likely to 
 strike. 
 
 With which of these necessary conditions does
 
 TRIED AND FOUND WANTING 103 
 
 the Territorial Force comply ? The answer is that 
 it complies with none of them. 
 
 TRIED AND FOUND WANTING 
 
 The Territorial Force is not ready, and, by the 
 very conditions of its existence, never can be ready 
 in case of a surprise. Mr. Haldane has told us over 
 and over again that the Territorial Force is to have, 
 and must have, six months' continuous training before 
 it has a chance of contending successfully with a dis- 
 ciplined army. He has never yet gone so far as to 
 declare that at the end of six months it will be ready. 
 But the essence of a raid is surprise, and, if we are 
 surprised, how much training will our Territorial 
 Force have had ? The answer is : None at all. The 
 force which is to meet and defeat the enemy must be 
 able to march at twelve hours' notice. Yet every- 
 body knows that there is not a regiment or a battery 
 of the Territorial Army which can do anything of the 
 kind. How long will it take to mobilise a brigade of 
 artillery whose batteries are dispersed over a county, 
 whose guns are distributed in half a dozen places, 
 and which has no horses and no ammunition ? As a 
 precaution against a surprise attack such as that 
 under consideration, the batteries of the Territorial 
 Force may be regarded as non-existent. 
 
 The force which is required must be more numer- 
 ous than that of the enemy, and it must be of at 
 least equal quality. Nobody has the slightest idea as
 
 104 RAIDS 
 
 to what the numbers of the Territorial Force are 
 going to be, or what proportion of the nominal total 
 will ever be available at any given time or place. 
 But, assuming that enough persons can be got 
 together to give us a superiority in numbers, what 
 are we to say with regard to the other requirements : 
 equality in training, in organisation, in physique, 
 and in command ? There can be only one answer 
 to such a question, namely, that in respect to 
 all these qualities the force which we can get 
 together must inevitably be inferior to that of the 
 enemy. 
 
 Lastly, the force required ought to be available at 
 or near the point which is likely to be threatened. Is 
 it likely that an army which is scattered over the 
 whole of the United Kingdom, from John o' Groats to 
 the Land's End, can comply with this important con- 
 dition ? The new organisation of the Volunteers is 
 an undoubted improvement upon the old, but it is 
 useless for the purpose of securing rapid mobilisation 
 and immediate fitness for war. 
 
 In a world in which reason and method took the 
 place of sentimentality and good intentions, the idea 
 of creating such a force for the purpose of repelling 
 raids would stand self-condemned by its own inherent 
 absurdity. In this country, in which the sentimental 
 and well-intentioned amateur rules unchecked, the 
 plan appears to commend itself as sane and reason- 
 able. But delusions of this kind perish at the first
 
 TRIED AND FOUND WANTING 105 
 
 touch of reality, and a week's war would teach us 
 some terrible home truths. 
 
 It was in order to provide the weapon we really 
 need that in 1904-5 provision was made for the 
 creation of a mobilised force at Aldershot con- 
 sisting of a division and a half (twelve battalions) 
 of Infantry, with a corresponding force of other 
 Arms. When completed this force would have 
 numbered over 16,000 men, would have been com- 
 plete in every detail, and ready to take the field 
 without mobilisation at a moment's notice. The 
 force would have been amply sufficient for the task 
 which at that time the Committee of Imperial 
 Defence was of opinion it might be called upon to 
 perform. This plan, however, was, like nearly every 
 other proposed by his predecessor, knocked on the 
 head by Mr. Haldane, and no substitute whatever 
 has been suggested. The need for such a force, 
 which was painfully demonstrated in 1899, when it 
 was found impossible to send a single brigade from 
 home to Natal at the most critical moment of the 
 war, still exists; the danger to which we were 
 exposed in 1899 is certain to recur. But nothing 
 whatever has been done to satisfy the need, or to 
 guard against the danger.
 
 106 THE ARMY WE REQUIRE 
 
 CHAPTER XV 
 
 THE ARMY WE REQUIRE 
 
 ' We mean business.' Mr. Haldane, Secretary of State for War. 1906. 
 
 'There is no hard and fast compulsory attendance at camp for 
 fifteen days. ... No one will be fined for not attending for fifteen 
 days, or even for not attending for a week, if he can show that it was 
 not possible to do so without losing his employment, or for some 
 equally good reason.' Mr. F. D. Acland, M.P., Financial Secretary to 
 the War Office, June 1908. 
 
 PERIOD OF SERVICE IN THE PRINCIPAL 
 FOREIGN ARMIES 
 
 
 WITH THE 
 COLOURS 
 
 NUMBER OF 
 SUBSEQUENT 
 TRAININGS 
 
 TOTAL TERM OF 
 SERVICE 
 
 Germany . 
 
 2 to 3 years 
 
 4 trainings 
 
 Up to the age 
 of 45 
 
 France 
 
 2 years 
 
 Strainings 
 
 25 years from 
 date of en- 
 listment 
 
 Japan . 
 
 3 years 
 
 2 trainings 
 
 Up to 40 years 
 of age 
 
 Is IT THE TERRITORIAL FORCE ? 
 
 IF, then, it be the case that the Territorial Force 
 cannot protect us against invasion, and is the worst 
 possible instrument for protecting us against raids, 
 we are brought face to face once more with the 
 question which few have sufficient courage to ask,
 
 IS IT THE TERRITORIAL FORCE? 107 
 
 and which no responsible person, apparently, has the 
 courage to answer namely, ' For what purpose does 
 the Territorial Force exist ? ' It is indeed a difficult 
 question to answer. The amazing half answers that 
 are sometimes vouchsafed by those who have not 
 time to think, or inclination to look facts in the face, 
 do not really help us. Let all that is said in praise of 
 the Territorial Force be frankly accepted accepted 
 in its most exaggerated form and the true question 
 still remains unanswered. Let it be frankly admitted 
 that much admirable public spirit has been shown 
 by everyone connected with the Force; by the 
 Secretary of State, who has been so courageous and 
 indefatigable in advocating its claims and in address- 
 ing its members ; by the Lords Lieutenant and 
 members of County Associations, who, in spite of 
 inadequate funds and innumerable difficulties, have 
 thrown themselves into the work with admirable 
 energy and patriotism; by the officers, N.C.O.'s and 
 men, who, in many instances, have made considerable 
 sacrifices in order to comply with the requirements 
 of the War Office. Let it be admitted that, although 
 the Force contains tens of thousands of immature 
 boys, it also contains some of the best military 
 material which the country can produce. Let it be 
 admitted that a week or ten days in camp furnishes 
 an opportunity for healthy and pleasant exercise ; 
 and that drilling and manoeuvring under some sort 
 of discipline are incomparably better occupations
 
 108 THE ARMY WE REQUIRE 
 
 than looking on at football or loafing round a cricket- 
 field. Let us admit that some day the Force may reach 
 the same numbers as it had attained before its name 
 was changed. Admitting all these things, how much 
 nearer have we got to the real thing ? Have we got 
 an army which will be capable of gaining the victory 
 in any war in which this country is likely to be 
 engaged ? The answer is that we have not ; but 
 that, on the contrary, we are spending 4,000,000 a 
 year upon a Force which, despite the good will and 
 the admirable intentions of all those who have to do 
 with it, is not the force which this country needs, 
 and is not the force which will save it from the 
 dangers which undoubtedly threaten it. 
 
 ' THE CONFIDENCE TRICK ' 
 
 But it would be wrong to leave this branch of 
 the subject without some reference to a view which, 
 amazing as it may seem, is very widely held in this 
 country, and which is frequently expressed by persons 
 of intelligence, occupying responsible and important 
 positions in society. There are many who, while 
 they concede all that has been said in the preceding 
 paragraphs, still approve of the policy which is being 
 pursued by the War Office, because, in their opinion, 
 the existence of the Territorial Force ' creates a 
 feeling of confidence,' and gives people a sense of 
 security which they would not otherwise possess. It 
 may seem somewhat ridiculous to spend time upon
 
 'THE CONFIDENCE TRICK' 109 
 
 criticism of such a view as this. It would be 
 ridiculous if it were not that the view is, in fact, 
 entertained and acted upon by persons whom the 
 public is accustomed to trust. It is sufficient to say 
 that there is no essential difference whatever between 
 the policy which is based upon this hypothesis and 
 that which furnished the Chinese braves with devilish 
 masks calculated to strike terror into the hearts of 
 the enemy and to reassure the timid, who felt secure 
 when guarded by such terrific champions. In war 
 the only confidence which is of value is that which 
 a General feels in the known excellence of the troops 
 under his command, and that which soldiers repose 
 in a leader whom they have learnt to trust. This 
 confidence comes of knowledge, and if it does not it 
 is misplaced and leads to disaster. Any man who 
 consciously contributes to the deception of the public 
 in regard to naval and military matters is committing 
 a crime which nothing can palliate. If the people 
 of this country are really lulled into a sense of 
 security by their belief in the efficiency of defences 
 which those who instruct them know to be inade- 
 quate, it is the duty of every honest man to take his 
 share in the task of destroying the illusion and stating 
 the plain, naked, unpalatable truth.
 
 110 ATTACK ON THE REGULAR ARMY 
 
 CHAPTER XVI 
 
 THE ATTACK ON THE REGULAR ARMY 
 
 THE FIRST THING IS TO CUT DOWN THE REGULAB6 
 
 The first step towards doing something effective for developing 
 the national basis of the Army is to cut something off superfluous 
 Regular Forces.' Mr. Haldane (Newcastle Liberal Club, 16-9-Oft. 
 
 THE REGULAR ARMY : ITS WORK AND ITS 
 ENEMIES 
 
 IT will be observed that a considerable portion cf 
 what has been said with regard to the Territorial 
 Force is a matter of controversy. It must be 
 remembered that, while for the purposes of argument 
 it has been assumed that the United Kingdom is 
 exposed to the danger of an invasion in force, or of a 
 raid, many persons do not accept either of these 
 assumptions. There has been, and probably there 
 will be for many years to come, a sharp difference 
 of opinion upon this subject. 
 
 COMMON GROUND 
 
 There is, however, one portion of our complicated 
 military problem with regard to which there is 
 practical unanimity. No party, no individual,
 
 THE ARMY: WORK AND ENEMIES 111 
 
 pretends that we can at present dispense with the 
 Regular Army. A contention to that effect would, 
 indeed, be absurd, for every page of our long history 
 teaches us how dependent we are upon that valuable 
 weapon. There is no need to embark on an 
 historical disquisition in order to establish a fact 
 which no serious man disputes. It would, neverthe- 
 less, be a great advantage if some of those who write 
 in haste about our military needs could make a 
 patient and impartial study of what the Regular 
 Army has really done for us. In the course of that 
 study they would learn that, save in civil wars, the 
 work of the Army has always been done across the 
 seas, and that the history of the Army, so far from 
 being an unchequered record of success, displays, 
 side by side, the record of splendid victories won 
 against great odds, and of crushing and disastrous 
 defeats which brought no glory to our arms, and 
 which often gravely endangered the safety of the 
 nation. 
 
 THE HOUSE OF COMMONS AND THE ARMY 
 
 The seeker after truth will also learn that, 
 whereas the successes of the British Army have in 
 the main been due to the skill of its commanders, or 
 more often to the valour of its regimental officers 
 and the men whom they led, the failures of the 
 Army have been in almost every instance traceable
 
 112 ATTACK ON THE REGULAR ARMY 
 
 to the culpable neglect, ignorance, or stupidity of the 
 authorities at home. Above all have they been due 
 to the House of Commons, the persistent enemy of 
 the Regular soldier, an enemy which has at all times 
 proved more formidable than plague, pestilence and 
 famine, and the bullets of a foreign foe combined. 
 
 It is important that these facts should be appre- 
 ciated, for at this moment we are once more face to 
 face with a violent Parliamentary attack upon the 
 Army in time of peace. The blood-stained pages of 
 our military history are before us to show what is 
 likely to be the result in war of the policy of 
 destruction carried on in peace. 
 
 THE ONLY ARMY WORTH MAINTAINING 
 
 It is to the policy of destroying the Regular Army 
 that I desire to draw attention. It has been said that 
 everybody is agreed that there must be a Regular 
 Army. Everybody is also agreed in believing that 
 that Army must, in so far as it is intended to serve 
 abroad, be recruited by voluntary enlistment. I was 
 about to add that everyone was agreed in thinking 
 that the Regular Army must be of such a quality, 
 and of such a numerical strength, that its success 
 in any war in which it is likely to be engaged shall 
 be reasonably probable. But this would be going 
 farther than the facts warrant. It is a curious and 
 disconcerting feature of the situation that many
 
 ONLY ARMY WORTH MAINTAINING 113 
 
 persons seem to regard the Regular Army not merely 
 as a necessary evil, which must be tolerated pro 
 forma, but as an institution which may be maintained 
 without the slightest reference to the work it has to 
 do. This party is largely represented in the present 
 House of Commons ; its existence is a national 
 danger, and those who compose it ought to be 
 regarded as public enemies. To maintain no Army 
 at all is, from the point of view of those who believe 
 that there will be no more war, reasonable. But to 
 maintain an Army which, on grounds of economy, is 
 cut down to a point at which it ceases to be efficient, 
 is to connive at the death of many brave men, and 
 to imperil in the most direct fashion the existence of 
 the Empire. 
 
 But if we are all agreed in thinking that the 
 maintenance of the Regular Army is an imperative 
 duty, it seems most unfortunate that public interest 
 and attention should be diverted as they have been 
 diverted from a subject the importance of which 
 everybody recognises, to minor issues, which are not 
 only highly controversial, but which are of infinitely 
 less consequence to the nation. 
 
 It is possible that the expenditure of 4,000,000 
 a year upon a small localised Force may be a wise 
 proceeding ; but no one will deny that there is a 
 great division of opinion as to the need for such a 
 Force, as to its value in time of war, and as to the 
 wisdom of spending so large a sum of money upon it.
 
 114 ATTACK ON THE REGULAR ARMY 
 
 But as to the necessity for maintaining the Regular 
 Army in a condition of absolute efficiency there is, in 
 theory, at any rate, very little difference of opinion. 
 It is greatly to be regretted, therefore, that all those 
 who desire to see the nation protected against a 
 defeat in war cannot, or will not, combine to make 
 the Regular Army as perfect as possible. 
 
 THE POLICY OF DESTRUCTION 
 
 It is high time there was some such common 
 action, for the Regular Army is going through deep 
 waters. The South African War had many lessons for 
 us, none of which do we appear to have learnt. The 
 fact is all the more to be regretted because these 
 lessons are also those which the study of modern 
 war in every part of the world would have taught us 
 equally well. 
 
 I have already pointed out that the principal 
 lessons of the war were the need for a great trained 
 Reserve for the Regular Army, and the danger of 
 improvisation in the presence of the enemy. For 
 the last three years we have been steadily destroying 
 the Reserve-making power of the Army ; and we 
 have made it absolutely certain that, in the event of 
 any serious conflict oversea, we shall have to set to 
 work to improvise all over again. 
 
 But this is not all. A Return was issued in 
 November 1908, on the motion of Lord Midleton,
 
 THE POLICY OF DESTRUCTION 115 
 
 which sets out in black and white the havoc which 
 the Secretary of State for War has wrought in the 
 ranks of our land forces. 1 
 
 The Regular Army with the Colours has been 
 reduced by 18,653 officers and men. 2 With the 
 
 1 See Appendix, p. 246. 
 
 2 It is very important, however, to observe that this Report is 
 absolutely wrong and misleading. The facts are not as stated, and 
 the figures given are calculated to deceive. The tables show a 
 reduction of the Regular Army by 18,653. This is correct, though, 
 as has been pointed out, the reduction will eventually become 
 greater than this. But the figures with regard to the Militia 
 and the Volunteers have been falsified. The true figures were given 
 by the Secretary of State himself as late as the 4th February 1908, 
 in answer to questions by Captain Morrison Bell and Mr. Pease. 
 Captain Morrison Bell asked the number of officers, non- 
 commissioned officers, and men of the Volunteers on 1st October 
 1905, and of the Territorial Army in 1908, respectively. 
 
 Mr. Pease asked a similar question with regard to the Militia. 
 The following table sets out the figures as given in the House of 
 Commons and those contained in the Return : 
 
 Figures given by Figures appear- 
 
 Mr. Haldane in the House ing in the Difference 
 
 of Commons Return 
 
 Militia 85,814 82,883 2,931 
 
 Volunteers 241/347 219,351 21,996 
 
 In both cases the figures refer to N.C.O.'s and men only. The 
 total error amounts to 24,927. In other words, the Special Reserve 
 is not 23,349 less than the Militia, as the public has been informed, 
 but 26,280 less, and this takes no account of a reduction of 5,336 
 men in the Reserve Division of the Militia. 
 
 Again, the true difference between the Volunteers in 1905 and 
 1908 respectively is not, as stated in the Return, 76,726, but 93, 722. 
 
 It will be asked how it has come about that such a misstatement 
 should have been made in a Return issued to Parliament and 
 vouched for by the Under- Secretary of State. The only possible 
 explanation seems to be that in order to make the actual reduction 
 of our available troops appear smaller than it is, and thereby to 
 conceal to some extent the breakdown of the new policy, an entire 
 
 12
 
 116 ATTACK ON THE REGULAR ARMY 
 
 consequent loss of Reservists, this will eventually 
 mean a net loss of something like 30,000 men in time 
 of war. Mr. Haldane told the House of Commons 
 that he intended to destroy nothing save that which 
 was useless for war. He has kept faith by destroying 
 7,253 of the Royal Artillery, including 1,811 of 
 the Horse and Field Artillery, a battalion of the 
 Guards with its large reserve, 1,331 of the Royal 
 Engineers, and eight excellent battalions of the Line. 
 There has been a temporary increase in the Reserve. 
 It will be observed that up to the 1st October 
 1908, the net result of the great reforms, of which 
 the country has heard so much, is to reduce the 
 number of men available in time of war by more 
 than 100,000. The shortage would be far greater 
 were it not for the increase of the Army Reserve. 
 This increase, which is of great advantage to the 
 
 Arm namely, the Engineers has been deliberately dropped out of 
 the account without any sort of notice or explanation. The tables 
 in the Return are headed ' Strength of the Militia ' and 
 ' Strength of the Volunteers ' respectively in 1905. These figures 
 have been quoted throughout the length and breadth of the land, 
 and probably not one person in a hundred thousand has detected 
 the trick by which the truth has been concealed. It is true that 
 the Engineers have been abolished ; destruction is the forte of the 
 present Administration ; but the fact remains that in 1905 there 
 were 3,385 men serving in the Engineer Militia and R.A.M.C. ; 
 and 23,139 men in the Volunteers who did not belong to the 
 Artillery or Infantry, and to whom no reference whatever is made 
 in the Report supplied to the House of Lords. It will be observed, 
 that, as has been so frequently pointed out, much caution is needed 
 in dealing with the Returns which are nowadays presented to 
 Parliament by the War Office.
 
 THE POLICY OF DESTRUCTION 117 
 
 Army, is in no sense due to the present policy 
 of the War Office. On the contrary, it has taken 
 place despite that policy. The increase is the result 
 of the enlistment of a large number of men for three 
 years' Colour Service between 1900 and 1904. These 
 enlistments were sanctioned by Mr. Brodrick, now 
 Lord Midleton. For reasons which have often 
 been stated, and which are conclusive, three years' 
 enlistment for the whole Army could not safely be 
 continued. But it is to these enlistments that the 
 great strength of the Army Reserve at the present 
 time is wholly due. The policy now being pursued 
 by the War Office must inevitably lead to a great 
 and permanent decrease of the Reserve. In a very 
 short time the Reserve will begin to shrink. The 
 following table shows the number of men now in the 
 Reserve who will complete their service in the named 
 years. 
 
 Reservists leaving the Colours in the years 1908 
 
 to 1911 inclusive . v .. . . 51,435 
 
 Reservists leaving the Colours in the years 1911 
 
 to 1914 inclusive . 4 , . > v . . 24,139 
 
 Reservists leaving the Colours in the years 1915 
 
 to 1916 inclusive . . . . . 16,492 
 
 Total . , . . . 92.066 
 
 It will not escape the observation of the careful 
 reader, that in addition to the very heavy reduction 
 of our admirable Garrison Artillery, the Royal Horse
 
 118 ATTACK ON THE REGULAR ARMY 
 
 and Field Artillery have been reduced by no less than 
 1,811 men already, and this despite the frequently 
 repeated declarations of the Secretary of State for 
 War that not a man of the Horse and Field Artillery 
 had been reduced. 
 
 THE MILITIA AND SPECIAL RESERVE 
 
 The Militia, which, with all its imperfections, 
 could fight, and did fight, which had its own officers 
 and N.C.O.'s, its ancient prestige and its organised 
 units, has been destroyed. In its place we have that 
 wretched imposture, the ' Special Reserve,' which, 
 even if it ever attains its statutory maximum, will be 
 15,000 men fewer than the Militia it is supposed to 
 replace. Scarcely 50 per cent, of the Force will be 
 even nominally available in time of war. But far more 
 serious than the lack of numbers is the lack of quality. 
 It cannot be too clearly understood that Mr. Haldane 
 has deliberately, and in time of peace, done that which 
 Bonaparte, after fifteen years of war, was reluctantly 
 compelled to sanction under pressure of continuous 
 disaster, and of the absolute exhaustion of France. 
 In 1813-14 the Emperor was forced to anticipate 
 the conscription by three years, and to take boys of 
 seventeen years of age into the ranks of his army. 
 Mr. Haldane is at this moment doing exactly the same 
 thing, and children are being taken from the streets 
 to fill our battalions, and to become the first class
 
 MILITIA AND SPECIAL RESERVE 119 
 
 Reserve of the British Army. The whole question of 
 the physique of the Army, especially of the Infantry, 
 is indeed a very serious one. It must never be for- 
 gotten that whereas we enlist boys, all other nations 
 enlist men. Those who have seen and compared the 
 results of the two systems must sometimes tremble 
 when they think what the consequences of our 
 practice may be in time of war. In the Mutiny the 
 Highlanders marched to Lucknow in their feather 
 bonnets and stormed the Alumbagh when they got 
 there. Is it quite certain that we have regiments 
 which could do the same thing in our day ? Possibly 
 there are a few. It is to be hoped so, for the need 
 for them may easily rise again. But the way to 
 make such regiments is not to announce openly that 
 the British Army is to be regarded as an annexe to 
 the workhouse, into which boys of seventeen are to 
 be invited 'during the winter months,' on the express 
 assurance of the Army Council that they may ' buy 
 themselves out ' as soon as trade mends, and they 
 can scrape together sixty shillings.
 
 120 ARMY, WORKHOUSE, AND NAVY 
 
 CHAPTER XVII 
 
 THE ARMY, THE WORKHOUSE, AND THE 
 ROYAL NAVY 
 
 'People are beginning to see that the career of the man who 
 undertakes to die for his country if called on is a noble career, a 
 career with high ideals, and one which if it is appreciated and if it is 
 but given fair support and a fair chance, will raise him who has 
 entered on it to a high position in the estimation of his fellow- 
 countrymen.' Right Hon. R. B. Haldane (5-1-09). 
 
 ' The question is whether the newly organised Special Reserve can 
 be made use of to provide temporary employment during the winter 
 months. . . .'War Office Advertisement for Recruits for the Regular 
 Army, October 1908. 
 
 A WAR OFFICE CIRCULAR 
 
 IT is desirable that the people of this country 
 should realise quite clearly what is being done in 
 their name with regard to the matter referred to at 
 the close of the last chapter, namely, the utilisation 
 of the Army as a branch of the workhouse. The 
 relevant facts are contained in a letter which the 
 author contributed to the Press in October 1 908. That 
 letter is here reproduced, in the first place because it 
 states the case with precision and accuracy ; and in 
 the second place because it has elicited from soldiers 
 and sailors a measure of approval and acquiescence 
 which has not surprised, but which has greatly 
 gratified the writer.
 
 A WAR OFFICE CIRCULAR 121 
 
 LETTER CONTRIBUTED BY THE AUTHOR TO 
 The Standard AND The Morning Post OF THE 
 28TH OCTOBER 1908 
 
 THE UNEMPLOYED AND THE SPECIAL 
 ARMY RESERVE 
 
 SIR, Owing to the late hour at which I was com- 
 pelled to speak last night it was quite impossible that 
 any full report of what I said should have appeared in 
 your columns. But the matter to which I referred is one 
 of such great importance that, with your leave, I should 
 like to say a word with regard to it in a form in which 
 the facts are certain to reach the public. The matter to 
 which I sought to call attention was the degrading 
 advertisement setting out the advantages of the ' Special 
 Reserve ' which has just been issued by the Army 
 Council. 1 At a time when the Regular Army is in course 
 of reduction by 40,000 of its very best men, and in a year 
 in which the Militia has been wantonly destroyed by Act 
 of Parliament, it is most important that the prestige of 
 the remnant which Mr. Haldane has left us should be 
 preserved, and, if possible, enhanced. How ill this 
 unfortunate circular is calculated to achieve this result 
 will be evident as soon as its terms are examined. 
 
 In the bluntest terms the Army Council now announces 
 that the British Army must be regarded as an annexe to 
 the workhouse, a new 'casual ward' in which unem- 
 ployed boys can find board and lodging during the winter 
 months. That the Army is an institution whose sole 
 purpose is to win the victory in war against a foreign 
 enemy seems to have wholly escaped the attention of the 
 Army Council. Recruits are now told that in every 
 
 1 The circular will be found in the Appendix, page 254.
 
 122 ARMY, WORKHOUSE, AND NAVY 
 
 military depot throughout the country a bureau has 
 been opened in which relief will be given to young men 
 of seventeen who are suffering from the present trade 
 depression or are likely to be out of work during the 
 winter months owing to slackness of trade. To use the 
 official phrase, ' The question is whether the newly 
 organised Special Reserve can be made use of to provide 
 temporary employment during the winter months.' 
 Any pretence that the invitation is given for the 
 benefit of the Army is frankly abandoned. It is feared 
 that the unemployed boy may be deterred from apply- 
 ing for relief by the prospect of having to serve his 
 country as a condition of so doing. The War Office is 
 careful to remove his natural doubts. ' The question 
 will be asked,' so runs the advertisement, ' for how long 
 the recruit who takes advantage of these terms will be 
 committed. The answer is for six years. . . . But a 
 recruit in ordinary circumstances is allowed to purchase 
 his discharge at any time for ^"3.' In other words, 
 ' ne'er-do-weels ' are implored to apply for Government 
 relief at our military depots, with the positive assurance 
 that as soon as they have scraped together 3 they will 
 be free from the degrading incidence of military service, 
 and will be able to go back to their own calling. The 
 'workhouse,' or I suppose I should say the regimental 
 depot, is to feed, clothe, and house them until they have 
 got together 60s., and then they can go. 
 
 Nor are the susceptibilities of the employer neglected. 
 The employer may naturally think that if he allows a boy 
 in his service to join the British Army he may possibly 
 lose his services. But for him, too, the Army Council 
 finds comfort. The boys are not going to be real 
 soldiers at all. ' Employers of labour,' says the adver- 
 tisement, 'may be afraid that their men may be taken 
 away from them at a busy time and be called out for
 
 A WAR OFFICE CIRCULAR 123 
 
 annual training. This annual training, however, in the 
 case of the Infantry lasts only for 21 days, while in the 
 case of other corps it is only 15 days.' This is full of 
 comfort. The employer who is foolish enough to suppose 
 that the soldiers who are to meet the trained grown men 
 of Continental armies who, beginning at the age of 
 twenty, have received a minimum training of two years, 
 with a subsequent period of from 15 to 20 years in the 
 Reserve might possibly require to learn a little about 
 their business, and even to see the officers and non-com- 
 missioned officers under whom they are to serve, has no 
 idea of what the British War Office is capable. He need 
 have no fear whatever; the whole thing is to be the 
 merest playing at soldiers, and no human being is 
 intended to take it seriously at any stage of the 
 proceedings. 
 
 I submit that the whole of this circular is a grievous 
 mistake. The War Office has no business whatever to 
 come to the assistance of the Poor Law authorities in 
 this manner. Already great mischief has been done in 
 the direction of lowering the prestige and diminishing the 
 popularity of the Regular Army, which, since the aboli- 
 tion of the Militia, is the only branch of our land forces 
 which is likely to fire a shot in war. Batteries of the 
 Royal Artillery have been sent on provincial tours, and 
 instructed to 'perform' in our towns and villages, not 
 for the purpose of adding a man to our Regular Artillery, 
 but in order to strengthen that well-intentioned but 
 perfectly useless force, the Artillery of the Territorial 
 Army. And now we have the Special Reserve annexed 
 for purely political purposes. Let it be remembered that 
 the Special Reserve is an integral part of the Regular 
 Army, and that the boys who compose it will, at the very 
 outbreak of war, be drafted into the ranks of our fighting 
 regiments, to bear the full brunt of the attack of a modern
 
 124 ARMY, WORKHOUSE, AND NAVY 
 
 Continental army. I have seen a great deal of Continental 
 armies, and though I believe that British troops properly 
 led, properly trained, and properly organised are capable of 
 holding their own against any soldiers in the world, I 
 absolutely decline to believe that we are giving our Army 
 a fair chance if we treat it as Mr. Haldane is now treat- 
 ing it. Every officer and man in the British Army ought 
 to be made to feel that when he puts on the uniform he 
 is entering an honourable and distinguished profession. 
 As the result of a policy which to me seems deplorable, 
 we are now seeking to divert all popular interest, all 
 popular enthusiasm, from the Army which fights, and 
 has always fought, to the Army which, with all respect, 
 never has fought, and in all human probability never will 
 fight. And now we have this circular, which ought to 
 have come from the Local Government Board, and not 
 from the War Office, telling the world that the barracks 
 of a British regiment are henceforward to be looked upon 
 as a sort of enlargement of a stone-breaking yard, which 
 a boy is advised to enter if he cannot find work on a 
 crossing, but from which Mr. Haldane is careful to 
 inform him he will be able to escape as soon as he 
 has scraped together a sufficient number of shillings. 
 This is not the way in which armies are made, and 
 those who try to make them in this fashion deserve ill 
 of their country. 
 
 Let me mention, in conclusion, that the suggestion 
 that anything special is being done for the unemployed is 
 a delusion and an imposture. Not a single man is to be 
 raised or a farthing spent in excess of the Estimates 
 voted for the year. Yours, &c., 
 
 H. O. ARNOLD-FORSTER. 
 HOUSE OF COMMONS, Oct. 27, 1908.
 
 NOT GOOD ENOUGH FOR THE NAVY 125 
 
 GOOD ENOUGH FOR THE ARMY, NOT GOOD 
 ENOUGH FOR THE NAVY 
 
 Mr. Haldane's plan of utilising the Army as a 
 machine for giving outdoor relief is a profound 
 mistake from every point of view. In the first place 
 it undoes with a rude hand all that has been accom- 
 plished by those who sought to raise the prestige of 
 the Army, and thereby to improve the quality of the 
 private soldier. It is no exaggeration to say than if 
 the First Lord of the Admiralty had dared to use 
 the Royal Navy as an adjunct to the workhouse 
 there would have been universal indignation through- 
 out the Fleet. Nothing could exhibit the folly of the 
 policy pursued by the Army Council in a more 
 striking light than the actual practice of the Navy. 
 
 The Army Council will not get a boy more 
 by 'cadging' round the workhouse gates than 
 they would have got in the ordinary way. Anyone 
 who knows anything of this country is aware 
 that the way to make a privilege valued and 
 sought after, is not to make it cheap. Every club, 
 every society, every institution throughout the land 
 will supply ample proof of this proposition. The 
 Navy supplies it. The Navy is shut to all but the 
 best. What is the result ? Recruiting for the Navy 
 was closed for last year, because all the recruits who 
 were required had been obtained. It was not necessary 
 to send invitations to the unemployed asking them to
 
 126 ARMY, WORKHOUSE, AND NAVY 
 
 help the Admiralty for six months by consuming 
 rations at the public expense, and then leaving the 
 Service. On the average, out of four candidates 
 three are rejected. The best only are taken, and 
 consequently the best are found to compete for what 
 they know to be a privilege. 
 
 It is grievous to think that officers to whom the 
 honour of the uniform and the credit of the Service 
 are, and must be dear, should have thought it 
 consistent with their duty to approve of the un- 
 fortunate advertisement which has been issued on 
 behalf of the Poor Law authorities. 
 
 The advertisement is a mistake from another 
 point of view. It is possible to get recruits after the 
 fashion which has commended itself to the War 
 Office ; but it is by no means certain that it is possible 
 to get soldiers. A soldier, if he is to be of any value 
 to his country, must be a man who is ready to face 
 death, and to face it often in very terrible forms. 
 The power to do this does not come with the putting 
 on of a uniform. Men will face death for various 
 motives. Probably the number who will face it solely 
 because they are brave, and love fighting, is very 
 small indeed. The power of discipline and of the 
 habit which it begets is probably the most potent 
 stimulus of all. Devotion to officers, perfect con- 
 fidence in comrades, the fear of public opinion, the 
 opinion of the regiment, of the Army, of men and 
 women at home ; these too are influences which make
 
 GOOD ENOUGH FOR THE ARMY 127 
 
 men stand still or go forward under fire. A highly 
 exalted patriotism sometimes. Despair occasionally, 
 anger occasionally, and very rarely want all these 
 again are powers that compel. 
 
 But on which of all these powers are we to rely 
 in the case of boys or men who come into the Army 
 for a few brief months, not because they want the 
 Army, or because the Army wants them, but because 
 they are told by a politician in a difficulty that if 
 they come in for six months they will be fed and 
 lodged, and that at the end of the six months they 
 can pay ' smart money ' and go on their way 
 rejoicing, free of the taint of the King's Service? 
 
 That is not how soldiers are made. 
 
 Lastly, it is open to doubt whether anything in 
 the nature of a trick is likely in the long run to help 
 the Army. The Secretary of State, in words which 
 admit of no misconstruction, tells intending recruits 
 that they can get board and lodging free for six 
 months, and that at the end of that time they can 
 go free on payment of 60s. 1 
 
 A TRAP TO CATCH A PAUPER 
 
 But it seems that this is after all only a trap to 
 catch the unwary. A zealous but not overwise 
 
 1 It is interesting to observe that it will pay any benefit society 
 to send its members into the Special Reserve for six months, and to 
 lay by half-a-crown a week during that time. The society will save 
 greatly by non-payment of full benefits, and the 60s. thus set aside 
 will buy the member out handsomely at the end of the term.
 
 128 ARMY, WORKHOUSE, AND NAVY 
 
 apologist of the War Office has thought it necessary 
 to rush into the field and to explain what the War 
 Office really had up its sleeve. 
 
 'A recruit in ordinary circumstances is allowed to 
 purchase his discharge at any time for ^"3.' 
 
 So runs the official advertisement. 
 
 ' Oh, but,' says the War Office apologist, ' the 
 Army Council does not really mean that ; it means 
 something quite different.' 
 
 Let the writer speak for himself. 
 
 'The further point that Mr. Arnold- Forster has 
 attempted to score is that anyone of the Special Reserve 
 will be able to buy out by " paying a few shillings." 1 
 This entirely ignores the fact that none of the Reservists 
 buy out, because if they did so they would lose the 4 
 paid to them in bounty, and would therefore be 7 out 
 of pocket.' 
 
 And so it appears that every one of the men and 
 boys who have enlisted on the faith of the War 
 Office advertisement has been misled. If the ad- 
 vertisement had run 
 
 ' A Reservist may buy his discharge at any time for 
 3, but he will be 7 out of pocket if he does so,' z 
 
 the statement, it seems, would have been true. It is 
 a pity it was not made. 
 
 1 This so-called quotation is not a quotation. The phrase used 
 was ' until they have got together 60s.' 
 
 8 Westminster Gazette, 9th October 1908.
 
 UNIVERSAL TRAINING 129 
 
 CHAPTER XVIII 
 
 UNIVERSAL TRAINING ; UNIVERSAL SERVICE J 
 AND CONSCRIPTION 
 
 IS IT NECESSARY? 
 
 'For home service, no doubt, compulsion is admirable ; but is it 
 necessary ? It certainly should not be necessary with the minimum 
 of foresight and care on the part of the Government.' ' imperial 
 
 Strategy,' by the Military Correspondent of ' The Times.' 
 
 AN IMPORTANT PROBLEM 
 
 I TRUST I have made it apparent that in my judg- 
 ment the strengthening of the Regular Army, the 
 enhancement of its prestige, and the increase of its 
 Reserves are the paramount military needs of this 
 country; and that the distinguished critic quoted 
 above is perfectly right. But it would be foolish to 
 ignore the fact that many persons who realise the 
 danger in which the country stands, and whose 
 opinions are entitled to the greatest possible respect, 
 entertain the view that something more than the 
 maintenance of a great Navy and of a highly efficient 
 Regular Army capable of expansion in time of war, is 
 necessary to safeguard the nation from defeat. As to 
 the exact form which the supplementary organisation
 
 130 UNIVERSAL TRAINING 
 
 should take there is no absolute agreement. Universal 
 training, universal service, conscription, all have 
 their advocates. It is true that the advocates of con- 
 scription under that name are not numerous. But 
 though considerable ingenuity has been displayed in 
 the endeavour to distinguish them, the essential 
 difference between universal service under com- 
 pulsion of law, and conscription, is not very apparent. 
 But be that as it may, the advocates of one or other 
 of the schemes referred to are influential, and, what 
 is much more important, are thoroughly in earnest, 
 and are seriously alarmed by the policy of military 
 make-believe to which the country is now committed. 
 
 It would be a misfortune if every advantage were 
 not taken of this zeal and public spirit. It is neces- 
 sary to examine the proposals which have been made, 
 and the examination may reveal unexpected diffi- 
 culties which cannot be ignored. But, for the 
 present writer at any rate, it is impossible to enter 
 on such an examination save in the most sympathetic 
 spirit, and with the earnest desire to find oppor- 
 tunities for agreement, rather than occasions for 
 difference. 
 
 It is obvious, in the first place, that between 
 those whose chief desire is to see the Regular Army 
 rendered strong and efficient and those who desire 
 universal training or universal service there is an 
 intimate bond of union. Lord Roberts has said 
 with perfect truth that neither universal training nor
 
 AN IMPORTANT PROBLEM 131 
 
 universal service will absolve us from the need for 
 maintaining an efficient Regular Army raised by 
 voluntary enlistment. The fact is obvious, but it is 
 too often forgotten or ignored. It is clear, therefore, 
 that those who are advocating the claims of the 
 Regular Army may look with confidence to the 
 friends of compulsory training or compulsory service 
 for their support. The institution of universal train- 
 ing may be important and urgent, but it cannot be as 
 important and as urgent as the rescue of the Regular 
 Army from the perils which at this moment sur- 
 round it. 
 
 Can it be said with equal certainty that those 
 who desire to see the Regular Army strengthened are 
 bound in their turn to desire compulsory training, 
 compulsory service, or conscription ? That is a 
 difficult question to answer. Much must, of course, 
 depend upon what is really involved in the adoption 
 of the various schemes referred to. Unfortunately 
 there is still much obscurity upon this point. 
 
 UNIVERSAL TRAINING 
 
 Let us see exactly how we stand. Universal 
 training has many influential advocates. Lord 
 Roberts, the most experienced and the most justly 
 respected of these advocates, has gone some way 
 towards formulating his demand by stating that he 
 requires at least a million men trained to the use of 
 the rifle. It is obvious, however, that the attainment 
 
 K2
 
 132 UNIVERSAL TRAINING 
 
 of this ideal cannot be regarded as furnishing a final 
 solution of our difficulties. It is a fact that admits 
 of no dispute, but which is not as widely known as it 
 ought to be, that at the present moment over 900,000 
 inhabitants of the United Kingdom are receiving pay 
 from the State in time of peace, in consideration of 
 their receiving instruction in the use of arms under 
 official regulations. It is also beyond doubt that 
 there are, in this country, over 3,000,000 persons 
 within the military age who are receiving or have 
 received military instruction at the expense of the 
 State. And yet it is in the face of this fact that all 
 competent observers are agreed in thinking that our 
 existing military preparations are utterly inadequate. 
 Clearly, something more than a million men trained 
 to the use of the rifle is required. Indeed, it is per- 
 missible to doubt whether compulsory training, as 
 apart from compulsory service in time of war, can 
 ever be of much value. It is sometimes supposed 
 that the fact of a man having received a certain 
 amount of military training will make him more 
 anxious to take the field than if he had not received 
 such training ; but, unfortunately, experience does 
 not confirm this view. Moreover, the history of the 
 Civil War in the United States and of our own 
 campaign in South Africa are before us to point the 
 moral that in order to retain men in the fighting line 
 compulsion is necessary. 
 
 It is not suggested that any blame attaches to
 
 VOLUNTEERING FOR WAR 133 
 
 those who do not fulfil an obligation which they have 
 never undertaken. We have no reason to expect 
 that persons who have not contracted to fight, and 
 who in many instances have occupations which they 
 cannot possibly abandon without great loss and 
 inconvenience, will with one accord sacrifice 
 themselves as and when the exigencies of military 
 service require. 
 
 VOLUNTEERING FOR WAR 
 
 Mr. Haldane has on many occasions stated that 
 the Territorial Army is to be regarded as a great 
 reservoir from which the deficiencies of the Regular 
 Army may be made good in time of war. 
 
 ' Some of them (the Volunteers or Territorial Army) 
 . . . would have to form that big National Reserve out 
 of which our Army must be fed and expanded when 
 the great emergencies come in a national crisis.' 1 
 And again : ' If the mind of the nation is concentrated 
 on the defence of its own interest, it will, if it is made 
 possible for it by adequate preparation to do so, pour out, 
 in case of necessity, very substantial numbers, to the 
 expansion as well as to the support of the Expeditionary 
 Army.' 2 
 
 Those who are familiar with the numerous 
 speeches which have been made on this subject, and 
 with the opinions expressed by a large section of the 
 Press, are aware that many persons have taken this 
 
 1 July 22, 1906. 
 
 Memorandum on Army Scheme, July 30, 1906.
 
 134 UNIVERSAL TRAINING 
 
 declaration of the Secretary of State seriously, and 
 really believe that the needs of the Regular Army 
 in a prolonged war can and will be met by 
 casual volunteering from the Territorial Force. 
 
 There is, however, no reason whatever for be- 
 lieving that we are justified in relying upon the 
 Territorial Force to do the work of a real Reserve. 
 On the contrary, all experience in our own country 
 and in every other, supports the view that if we rely 
 upon such a support we are destined to be rudely 
 disillusioned. 
 
 The statement that the officers and men of the 
 Territorial Force will not volunteer in adequate 
 numbers in the event of a foreign war, is sometimes 
 resented by the self-constituted champions of that 
 Force. 
 
 But such resentment is altogether unreasonable. 
 The contention that, generally speaking, men who 
 have enlisted solely for service at home, and who by 
 every conceivable tie and interest are bound to remain 
 at home, will not, as a rule, go abroad except under 
 compulsion, is not one that justifies either blame 
 or surprise. 
 
 It would, indeed, be very surprising if any large 
 number of the ' Territorials ' did undertake a service 
 so unlike that for which they enlisted, and so incom- 
 patible with their ordinary pursuits. But if there 
 were any doubt about the matter it would be dis- 
 sipated by an examination of what has actually taken
 
 VOLUNTEERING FOR WAR 135 
 
 place at home and abroad under similar circum- 
 stances. A study of what has occurred in time of 
 war justifies the general statement that men who do 
 not undertake a particular obligation in time of 
 peace cannot be relied upon to assume that obligation 
 in time of war. There have alway been exceptions, 
 and they have been numerous enough to prove 
 the rule. They have not proved numerous enough 
 to justify us in disregarding it. 
 
 A short time ago a statement appeared in a jour- 
 nal which brings to the discussion of military subjects 
 more zeal than wisdom, that this country would de- 
 servedly perish if in the event of a serious war its 
 sons were not prepared to come forward in their 
 thousands to fight its battles. 
 
 If this be so, the outlook for this country is 
 undoubtedly gloomy; for, as a matter of fact, the 
 country's sons have not, as a rule, come forward 
 to any very remarkable extent. 
 
 A LESSON FROM THE CRIMEAN WAR 
 
 During the Crimean War the country was white 
 hot with patriotism, and there was scarcely a 
 man at home who was not prepared to capture 
 Sebastopol, or see some one else perish in the 
 attempt. But the cold fact remains that we never 
 did and never could put 30,000 men into line ; 
 that despite heavy bounties we could not induce 
 men to enlist; that the boys whom we did enlist
 
 136 UNIVERSAL TRAINING 
 
 could not be induced to leave their trenches before 
 the Redan ; and that this great nation was actually 
 paying Swiss and Germans to defend it ; and that a 
 Foreign Legion composed of Germans and Swiss 
 was encamped at Chobham. 
 
 WHAT HAPPENED IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
 In 1900 a certain number of Volunteers went 
 out to South Africa, and great credit is due to those 
 who did so. But it would be a grave mistake to 
 over-rate the value of this contribution, or to suppose 
 for a moment that it was on a scale which would 
 meet our needs in the event of our being engaged 
 in a European war, or a war for the defence 
 of India. 
 
 The facts are short and simple. 
 
 Sixty-four companies were raised in the first 
 instance ; their establishment was 7,424, the num- 
 ber embarked 7,337. A 'Waiting Company' was 
 to have been formed for each of the companies 
 sent abroad, but for these companies only 2,983 
 men enlisted, and from these 1,074 men went out to 
 reinforce the Service Companies. By the time the 
 second contingent was formed a large number of the 
 men in the ' Waiting Companies ' had cancelled 
 their engagements, and were not available. A second 
 contingent ultimately went out, not to reinforce, 
 but to relieve the first. This second contingent 
 numbered 5,363. Eight companies came to an
 
 WHAT HAPPENED IN SOUTH AFRICA 137 
 
 end. In January 1902 a third contingent was 
 raised, but, as before, not to reinforce but to replace 
 those who had already gone. This contingent num- 
 bered 2,410. Of the original sixty-four companies, 
 sixteen had practically died out, and only eight were 
 kept up to strength. Meanwhile the Volunteer Force 
 had increased by nearly 50,000 men. It is necessary 
 to recite these plain facts, not, as over-sensitive 
 champions of the Volunteer Force are in the habit 
 of suggesting, with any sinister intention, but simply 
 because they illustrate a well-known truth, the truth, 
 namely, that if men are required to perform the 
 onerous duties of a soldier in war they must be 
 retained either by contract or by compulsion. It is a 
 grim truth, but it is a truth. And in this connexion 
 it is very curious to observe that those who most 
 indignantly resent the suggestion that the Volunteers 
 or the Territorials cannot be relied upon to serve in 
 the only kind of war in which this country has ever 
 been engaged, are the most resolute in objecting to 
 any inquiry being made in time of peace as to how 
 many of the Local Force are prepared to serve 
 abroad in time of war; and how many of those 
 willing to serve are fit to serve. It is difficult to 
 understand the position of those who take this 
 objection, and at the same time contend that 
 the Volunteers or the Territorials will be of great 
 service in time of war. 
 
 Before leaving this subject altogether, it is
 
 138 UNIVERSAL TRAINING 
 
 desirable to give yet one more illustration of the 
 carelessness with which those who advocate a ' go- 
 as-you-please ' army, study the open book of History 
 which has been written for their instruction. It 
 might be said that if ever there was a case in which 
 men under no obligation to serve would volunteer to 
 go to the front, and to stay at the front, it would be 
 when the national soil was invaded, and when 
 the homes and hearths of the people were threatened. 
 It would also be quite in accordance with the 
 extraordinarily high estimate which we always 
 form of our own military qualities to say that the 
 Anglo-Saxon would be the most alert of all people in 
 his passion for self-sacrifice in so good a cause. And 
 yet we have staring us in the face the plain facts as 
 to what took place during the American Civil War. 
 The flag on Fort Sumter had been fired on, the 
 national soil had been invaded, the homes and liberties 
 of the North were menaced by an active and 
 victorious enemy. What happened ? Did volun- 
 teering furnish the number required to fill the ranks 
 of the Federal Army, was the love of fighting or 
 even the love of country sufficient to send men to 
 the front and to keep them there ? 
 
 A LESSON FROM THE UNITED STATES 
 
 Let us see what History has to tell us. At the 
 outbreak of the war volunteering took place on a 
 large scale, the war was popular, and it was hoped
 
 LESSON FROM THE UNITED STATES 139 
 
 and generally believed that it would be brief. The 
 first volunteers engaged for three years, and we are 
 told that it was the presence of these men in the 
 ranks which alone enabled the Army to withstand 
 the drain that was made upon it. 
 
 But the war went on, it did not come to an end, 
 and it ceased to be a popular novelty. 
 
 ' The efforts of popular leaders had ceased, and 
 patriotic enthusiasm had been damped to such a degree 
 that for a while it only feebly responded to the renewed 
 efforts of the authorities. 
 
 1 The total failure of McClelland's Richmond campaign, 
 and the second battle of Bull Run, greatly deepened 
 further despondency. Under this accumulation of dis- 
 couragements, the need of speedy reinforcements became 
 so great that a resort to a mere temporary expedient be- 
 came necessary, and an order of the President called 
 upon the Governor of the loyal States for a draft of 
 300,000 men from the State Militia to serve for a term of 
 nine months. This system of drafting, however, proved 
 totally ineffective ; and ... it became evident that a 
 more regular and general system of recruiting must be 
 adopted. Accordingly on March 3rd, 1863, Congress 
 passed a General Conscription Law, requiring all 
 citizens between the ages of twenty and forty-five to 
 be enrolled in military service, and called out by drafts.' 1 
 
 It was time. Already in July of the previous 
 year (1862) the Secretary for War had been com- 
 pelled to issue an order which, after stating that 
 
 'The absence of officers and privates from their duty 
 
 under various pretexts while receiving pay at great 
 
 1 The Cambridge Modern History, vol. vii.
 
 140 UNIVERSAL TRAINING 
 
 expense and burden to the Government made it necessary 
 that efficient measures should be taken to compel their 
 return to duty,' l 
 
 commanded the immediate return of the absentees 
 to the Colours. 
 
 I am not presuming to blame either those citizens 
 of the United States who failed to volunteer, or 
 those who, having volunteered, turned back from the 
 work they had undertaken. But the point I desire 
 to make clear is that, even when their own homes 
 were in danger, mere zeal and a love of fighting 
 were not sufficient to keep them in the ranks. Some- 
 thing more was required, and something more was 
 supplied. In the end, these conscripts became the 
 formidable soldiers who, under Grant and Sherman, 
 fought the war to a finish, and compelled the sur- 
 render of the heroic Lee. But for us the lesson 
 remains, and the lesson is this : Those who think 
 that we can depend upon a purely voluntary home- 
 keeping force to maintain the British Army in the 
 field in any war in which the British Army is likely 
 to be engaged, are deceiving themselves, and are 
 deceiving others. 
 
 1 Ubi supra.
 
 CONSCRIPTION REAL AND SHAM 141 
 
 CHAPTER XIX 
 
 CONSCRIPTION REAL AND SHAM 
 ' On ne badine pas avec la Guerre.' 
 
 COMPULSORY TRAINING MEANS COMPULSORY 
 SERVICE 
 
 IT seems apparent, from what has been said 
 in the preceding chapter, that the corollary to 
 compulsory training is compulsory service, and 
 this corollary many earnest and capable men have 
 accepted as inevitable. 
 
 Let us, therefore, examine the question of com- 
 pulsory service by the light of what has gone before. 
 If it be true that this country may have to resist an 
 invasion in force, then compulsory service is not only 
 reasonable, it is inevitable. 
 
 Those who think that no invasion need be 
 apprehended will naturally be reluctant to accept an 
 exceedingly costly and inconvenient arrangement 
 whose only justification can be its absolute necessity. 
 But to those, on the other hand, who entertain a 
 contrary belief, there can be only one course open. 
 They are bound to advocate conscription. For let
 
 142 CONSCRIPTION REAL AND SHAM 
 
 there be no mistake about it ; no phrases, however 
 attractive, will alter facts. If we are to be exposed 
 to the dangers which threaten Continental nations 
 we must take the same precautions as other nations 
 have adopted. There must be no playing at soldiers. 
 To begin with we must have an immense corps of 
 officers and N.C.O.'s. We must have grown men in 
 the ranks, and those men must receive an amount of 
 training which will enable them to meet and defeat 
 the enemy, whoever he may be. There may be 
 many opinions as to what the character of this training 
 ought to be. But unless the military authorities of 
 every other country in the world are wrong, and 
 we alone are right, it ought to bear no resemblance 
 whatever to that which we think sufficient for our 
 Special Reserve and our Territorial Force. To 
 begin with, we must enlist men, not boys. In the 
 rout which followed the Battle of Waterloo boys 
 from the French schools endeavoured to defend the 
 heights of Montmartre. It was gallant, but it was 
 not war. The heights of Montmartre were not held. 
 It is only the manhood of this country that can hold 
 the field against the manhood of another nation. The 
 period of initial training must greatly exceed that which 
 is considered sufficient under the make-believe system. 
 
 MEN, NOT BOYS 
 
 The Swiss, who take their soldiers at twenty and 
 keep them till they are fifty, have recently extended
 
 FOREIGN CONSCRIPTION 143 
 
 their minimum term of service to a period which is 
 nearly three times that of the ordinary Territorial. 
 Sweden, which has probably less to fear than any 
 European Power, has extended her period of infantry 
 training with the colours to one year. Germany and 
 France demand two years ; but they consider this 
 so inadequate that both Powers are holding out 
 special inducements to men to re-engage, especially 
 in the artillery and cavalry. There are probably 
 more long service soldiers in the German service than 
 in the whole of our Regular Army at home. 
 
 It is said that Belgium is about to reduce her 
 initial period of service to fifteen months. The 
 object of the Belgian authorities appears to be to 
 increase the number of men available, rather than 
 to add to the military efficiency of the individuals 
 called out for training. It is noteworthy, however, 
 that the term of fifteen months is precisely that 
 which was proposed for the infantry of the Home 
 Army by the present writer when occupying the post 
 of Secretary of State for War in 1904. The proposal 
 was abandoned because the military authorities both 
 inside and outside the War Office, with one single 
 exception, agreed in declaring that fifteen months 
 was quite inadequate, and that two years' training 
 with the colours was the minimum which could be 
 accepted. It was for this reason that the two years' 
 term was adopted. It is also worthy of note that 
 the very same military authorities who in 1904 were
 
 144 CONSCRIPTION REAL AND SHAM 
 
 unanimously of opinion that two years' training 
 with the colours was the minimum which could be 
 accepted with safety, are now, we are told, equally 
 unanimous in support of the view that six months' 
 training at a depot is sufficient to qualify boys of seven- 
 teen and upwards to take the field as efficient soldiers. 
 
 PHYSICAL TRAINING 
 
 Then, again, the physical training must be a 
 serious one. In our passion for make-believe we 
 have persuaded ourselves that the training of the 
 Territorial Force is so effective that it is likely to 
 improve the national physique. A moment's con- 
 sideration will show the absurdity of this idea. 
 Thousands of Territorials are addicted to physical 
 exercises and outdoor amusements, and would indulge 
 these healthy tastes if the Territorial Force had never 
 existed. But attendance at a dozen drills in a 
 twelvemonth, with a week or ten days spent in camp, 
 including two Sundays, an inspection, and possibly 
 one ' off day,' do not leave a very conspicuous 
 mark upon a man. Those who have seen the kind 
 of training which is obligatory in the German 
 barrack-yards, who have marked the recruits leading 
 that unpleasant but effective accomplishment the 
 parade-schritt, who have marked both German and 
 French troops carrying 401b. to 501b. on their backs 
 day after day for many miles, will understand why 
 it is that the improved physique of the Continental
 
 THE COST OF CONSCRIPTION 145 
 
 populations strikes the eye of every observant 
 traveller. 
 
 THE COST OF CONSCRIPTION 
 
 It is a training of this kind that we shall have to 
 adopt if we are going to accept conscription, and to 
 accept it seriously. Far be it from me to suggest that 
 if we do undertake to bear the burden we shall not, 
 in some respects, be the gainers. Anything which 
 improves the physique of a people, which inculcates 
 habits of discipline and order, which exhibits 
 obedience to lawful orders and self-sacrifice for a 
 common ideal as virtues, must be good for a nation. 
 And all these things conscription, if it be real and 
 thorough, does encourage. That it can also produce 
 some very great evils can scarcely be denied. 
 Opinions will always differ. My own, after some 
 study of the problem, is to the effect that gold may 
 be bought too dear ; and that unless conscription be 
 absolutely necessary for the safety of the nation, we 
 are, on the whole, better without it. But the main 
 point to bear in mind is, that while the real thing 
 may conceivably be of value in more ways than 
 one, the make-believe variety must always be an 
 unmitigated curse. 
 
 For, be it remembered that compulsory service, 
 under whatever form it is adopted, must involve an 
 enormous expenditure. Unlike other countries, we 
 must have two armies : the Regular Army, for 
 
 L
 
 146 CONSCRIPTION REAL AND SHAM 
 
 oversea service, with the Royal Navy maintained as 
 at present ; and, in addition, a vast conscript host 
 tied to the soil of this country. 
 
 Exception has sometimes been taken to a return 
 published by the War Office in 1904, in which the 
 cost of a conscript army was given at what some 
 critics consider to be too high a figure. The return 
 was, in fact, a mere actuarial calculation, based upon 
 the only serious proposals for conscription which 
 were available at the time. It is possible, however, 
 that the thing might be done for less ; but if it were, 
 it would certainly be ill done. An army raised by 
 conscription will, beyond all doubt, be a very costly 
 one in time of peace if it is to be a real one. If, on 
 the other hand, it is to be a play-about army, it will 
 be a very costly one in war. 
 
 A WORKING PLAN 
 
 One other important point remains to be con- 
 sidered. By universal admission our principal 
 military need is the power of expanding the Regular 
 Army for service oversea. Compulsory service, as 
 it is generally understood, and as it is explained by 
 its principal advocates, will give us no help towards 
 the attainment of this object. 
 
 General Mackinnon told the Royal Commission 
 that out of the 35,000 Volunteers of London we 
 could not expect to get more than two regiments 
 if we were in need of units for a foreign war.
 
 A WORKING PLAN 147 
 
 Conscription for oversea service is not possible. One 
 suggestion, and, so far as I know, one only, has been 
 made by the advocates of compulsory service. Mr. 
 L. S. Amery, who knows the Army and the work the 
 Army has to do as well as any man in this country, 
 has seen the difficulty, and has made a proposal 
 which does, in fact, meet it. He proposes that while 
 service should be made compulsory, only those men 
 who engage to serve abroad in time of war should 
 receive pay. The plan has the merits of being 
 simple and of doing what is wanted. Whether the 
 British public is likely to accept it is another 
 question. 
 
 But, after all, we do not as yet know what the 
 advocates of compulsory training or the advocates of 
 compulsory service really want. It is greatly to be 
 desired that some of those who are working at these 
 problems should be more definite than they have 
 hitherto been. The public would like to know 
 exactly what is proposed. What is to be the term 
 of service ? At what age are recruits to be enlisted ? 
 How much training is the soldier to have ? What 
 steps are to be taken to raise and train the officers. 
 Where are ranges and manoeuvre grounds to be 
 found ? They would like to know under what con- 
 ditions the new troops are to serve. Whether they 
 are to serve abroad, and, if so, under what conditions ? 
 Is the new law to be applied to the Navy ; and, if 
 not, why not ? And, lastly, they will desire to know 
 
 L2
 
 148 CONSCRIPTION REAL AND SHAM 
 
 what is to be the cost of the new Army for pay, 
 equipment, stores, armaments, barracks, &c. When 
 these points have been made perfectly clear it will 
 be much easier than it is at present to come to a 
 conclusion with regard to the desirability of universal 
 training or compulsory service. 
 
 THE TERRITORIAL ARMY AND CONSCRIPTION 
 
 I think I have made it clear that while I am 
 thoroughly in sympathy with the spirit in which the 
 advocates of the two systems approach the questions 
 of national duty and national danger, I am not at 
 present convinced that the actual remedies proposed 
 are necessary, or that they are appropriate to the 
 needs of the Empire. 
 
 But I cannot shut my eyes to the fact that every 
 day during which the existing system of pure make- 
 believe is continued must strengthen the hands of 
 those who advocate a change. I believe that I 
 express the opinion of many earnest and reasonable 
 men when I say that unnecessary and even undesir- 
 able as a conscript army may be, it would be infinitely 
 better to create one than to prolong the dangerous 
 sham to which the nation has been condemned by 
 those who at present control its military administration.
 
 COMPULSORY SERVICE 149 
 
 CHAPTER XX 
 
 FURTHER REFLEXIONS UPON COMPULSORY 
 SERVICE 
 
 WHAT THE HISTORY OF ALL WAR TEACHES 
 
 'The history of all war shows that our country can be defended 
 by means of a sea-going Navy and a mobile Field Army, superior to 
 that of the enemy, and consequently able to carry the war into his 
 waters and territory, protecting our own from the ravages of war 
 and inflicting them upon the people opposed.' The Military Corre- 
 spondent of the ' Times ' : ' Imperial Strategy.' 
 
 THE NAVY THE TRUE DEFENCE 
 
 IT is impossible to forecast the direction in which 
 public opinion with regard to the question of compul- 
 sory service will ultimately move. It would be idle 
 to ignore the fact that at the present time there 
 is a growing tendency to accept the view that the 
 Navy cannot protect us from an invasion, and that 
 a great conscript army can. That this is a reasoned 
 conclusion I am not prepared to admit. I believe 
 that nothing has occurred which really vitiates the 
 conclusion at which the Committee of Defence and 
 the Secretary of State had arrived, and which they still 
 held to be valid until a few weeks, or at most until 
 a few months ago. Nay more, I am not aware that
 
 150 COMPULSORY SERVICE 
 
 the Committee of Defence and the Secretary of State 
 have actually changed their opinions. Of this I am 
 certain, namely, that those who allege that the facts 
 which have recently been laid before the Committee 
 of Defence, and which are supposed by some persons 
 to have invalidated the conclusions previously arrived 
 at, do not really affect the question. I am certain, 
 on the contrary, that almost everything that has 
 taken place in connexion with the development of 
 naval warfare during the last ten years has enor- 
 mously strengthened the naval position. It is deeply 
 to be regretted that the naval side of the position 
 has never been publicly examined. I am convinced 
 that if it were so examined, it would become apparent 
 that, so far from being easier than in the past, the 
 task of an invader endeavouring to land in the face of 
 a serious naval opposition is more hopeless at the 
 present day than it has ever been. But unluckily 
 the realities of naval warfare are little understood by 
 the people of this country; and indeed the same 
 thing may be said of some of our most eminent and 
 accomplished military writers. Tomorrow a phrase 
 from Admiral Mahan, it would almost seem to be 
 true of them as it was of Bonaparte, that, irresistible 
 on land, their power ceases directly they come in 
 contact with the salt water. The ineptitudes that 
 are spoken and written about the Navy and its work 
 in war are indeed extraordinary. 
 
 I do not hesitate to admit that in my own opinion
 
 THE NAVY THE TRUE DEFENCE 151 
 
 it would be far better to take the four or five millions 
 which are now annually spent upon a necessarily 
 ineffective Army tied to the soil, and to spend half of 
 it upon the Navy, and the other half upon increasing 
 the prestige, adding to the Reserves, increasing the 
 pay of the officers, and assuring the future of the 
 soldiers of the Regular Army. 
 
 These, I am aware, are personal opinions which 
 are not popular, and are not at present shared by 
 many. I am not sanguine enough to expect that 
 they will be accepted. On the contrary, I cannot 
 fail to observe the rapid growth of an opinion favour- 
 able to a great addition to our Home Army. I have 
 already said that, provided neither the Navy nor 
 the Regular Army suffers from the development of 
 this policy, some good and no great harm may 
 possibly result from its adoption; provided always 
 that the new compulsory army, on which so many 
 people have apparently set their hearts, be a real and 
 not a sham army. I would nevertheless most 
 earnestly beg those who are utilising their power and 
 influence to further the cause of compulsory training 
 or compulsory service, to consider whither their 
 advocacy is leading us. 
 
 THE QUESTION OF COST 
 
 At the present moment this country, with its 
 population of some forty-three millions, is paying 
 annually 32,000,000 for its Navy, and nearly
 
 152 COMPULSORY SERVICE 
 
 28,000,000 for its Army, which includes some 
 4,000,000 for its Territorial Force. That the 
 cost of the Army must increase is certain. That 
 unless the Territorial Force is to be an absolute 
 failure, even from the point of view of those who 
 believe that it has some military value, an additional 
 million at the very least must be spent upon it is 
 certain. If the present wrecking policy with regard 
 to the Regular Army be continued, it is quite possible 
 that there may be no serious increase on that head ; 
 though, as long as the Cardwell System is maintained, 
 there will be no reduction. It is hardly necessary to 
 point out that these gigantic figures take no account 
 of the expenditure on the British Army in India, or 
 on the Indian Army. 
 
 Sixty millions is a heavy burden for even the 
 richest nation to bear ; and it is a lamentable 
 reflexion that although the taxpayer provides this 
 gigantic sum almost without a murmur, he is told 
 by all those who have a right to instruct him, that 
 from the military point of view the condition of this 
 country is still profoundly unsatisfactory. 
 
 Now let us see what comfort is offered him by 
 the advocates of compulsory service. If com- 
 pulsory service were to be the law of the land 
 to-morrow, how should we stand ? Out of the three 
 demands which are now made upon the taxpayer 
 two would remain as they are to-day, or rather 
 would increase. Expenditure_on the Navy is rising,
 
 THE QUESTION OF COST 153 
 
 and must continue to rise. Nor can a saving be 
 effected in the cost of the Regular Army. However 
 many millions of men we may raise for the defence 
 of this country, the necessity for maintaining the 
 Regular Army and its Reserves will, as Lord Roberts 
 has justly observed, remain unaltered. The Regular 
 Army has now been pared down to the quick, and its 
 cost is much more likely to increase than to diminish. If 
 it is to be made adequate to our needs it must increase. 
 There remain for our consideration the four millions 
 which are at present spent, or will shortly be spent, 
 upon the Territorial Force. Does any reasonable person 
 suppose that the substitution of a force of a million 
 men, raised by compulsion, will diminish this cost ? 
 It is of course obvious that it will greatly increase it. 
 Even if we assume that the new host is to be a 
 ' play-about ' army of the most childish description, 
 it will cost many millions. 1 Arms, uniforms, stores, 
 ammunition, buildings, manoeuvring grounds, must 
 be provided. Thousands of officers and N.C.O.'s 
 must be instructed and paid. But it would be an 
 insult to the intelligence of those who advocate the 
 creation of this great force to suggest that they do 
 not intend it to be a real force capable of holding its 
 own against a highly trained enemy. For, be it 
 remembered, that the need for the force depends 
 
 1 The official estimate of the annual cost of a million home-keeping 
 soldiers trained for six months only was stated by Mr. Haldane to 
 be 20,000,000 (House of Commons, 14th December 1908).
 
 154 COMPULSORY SERVICE 
 
 upon the acceptance of invasion as a possibility. If 
 that be the case, all idea of a ' play-about ' army 
 may be dismissed. We require the real article or 
 nothing. But if that be so, who shall measure the 
 result in cost ? Barracks, ranges, manoeuvring 
 grounds on a large scale must be provided. An 
 army must be created which, when mobilised, will be 
 equal in every respect to the armies of the Continent. 
 What is more, we shall find out, as other nations 
 have found out to their cost, that though fortifica- 
 tions cannot take the place of a field army, a field 
 army must be supported by entrenched positions. 
 The Franco- German frontier is not 200 miles in 
 length, and the French have already spent more 
 than a hundred million sterling in fortifying it since 
 the war. If the invasion theory be accepted, our 
 frontier will be nearly 8,000 miles. 
 
 PUBLIC OPINION AND COMPULSORY SERVICE 
 
 These facts undoubtedly afford food for reflexion. 
 Is it reasonably probable that the people of this 
 country, with their ever-growing burdens, will accept 
 an addition of some fifteen or twenty millions 
 annually to its Military Budget ? Is it certain that 
 even the great wealth of this country can provide 
 this gigantic sum ? For my own part, I am by no 
 means as certain as are some of my friends that the 
 people of this country will accept the principle of 
 compulsory service. I think their reluctance to do
 
 PUBLIC OPINION 155 
 
 so is not in the least admirable because it is for the 
 most part due to considerations which have nothing 
 to do with the military question involved ; and all my 
 sympathies are with those who declare that if the 
 nation demands the services of all its sons, those ser- 
 vices should be rendered as a matter of absolute duty. 
 But that in a country in which Passive Resisters, 
 Suffragettes, Anti-Vaccinators, and other anti-social 
 persons are not only tolerated but are held by many 
 to be entitled to special exemption from the penalties 
 inflicted upon other law-breakers, the prospect of 
 enforcing compulsory service, unless and until the 
 nation itself is convinced of its absolute necessity, 
 seems to me somewhat remote. Those who advocate 
 compulsory service are bound to take these things 
 into account. If they have counted the cost, if 
 they know what their demand really involves, and 
 are satisfied that the country can and will meet that 
 demand in money and men, it is not for me to 
 criticise them ; but it is fair to say that up to the 
 present time they have given no evidence whatever 
 that they have looked facts in the face, and have 
 realised what is the true meaning of that for which 
 they ask with so much persistency. 
 
 Meanwhile, who can doubt that these well- 
 meaning advocates are running the risk of seeing 
 that which is undeniably good destroyed, without 
 any certainty whatever of being able to replace it by 
 something better ? I do not myself believe that this
 
 156 COMPULSORY SERVICE 
 
 country can or will bear the cost of an adequate 
 Navy, an adequate Regular Army, and an efficient 
 Conscript Army. I greatly fear that in the attempt 
 to obtain these three objects, we may find ourselves 
 left with an inadequate Navy, an insufficient Regular 
 Army, and a totally inefficient and useless Conscript 
 Army. 
 
 THE REAL NEED 
 
 Who can doubt that if we possessed a really 
 overwhelming sea-going Navy, coupled with an 
 efficient system of maritime coast defence, and a 
 Regular Army equal in quality to our best troops, 
 such as the Royal Marines, the Guards, and the 
 Royal Artillery, an Army capable of instant mobilisa- 
 tion, and with a Reserve of 300,000 trained officers 
 and men, we should be in a position of almost 
 impregnable security ? These things we can have, 
 and can have at a cost exceeding very slightly, if at 
 all, that which our present unsatisfactory establish- 
 ments cost us. But if we want the end, we must 
 also want the means. We must concentrate our 
 efforts upon the army which will fight and can 
 fight, we must raise the prestige, we must improve 
 the prospects, and we must ensure the quality of 
 the officers and men of whom that army is com- 
 posed. If, and when we have done all this, we have 
 time, money, and inclination to create an organisa- 
 tion by which the whole manhood of the country
 
 THE REAL NEED 157 
 
 may be made available for service in the ranks of 
 the existing cadres in case of need, that will, 
 doubtless, be well. But our first duty is to 
 strengthen the Navy, our second duty is to 
 strengthen the Army. The rest will wait. 1 
 
 1 An advertisement for recruits has recently been issued under 
 the rather pompous title of ' A Proclamation to the Men of London. ' 
 The document seems neither better nor worse than a good many 
 others which have been issued for the same purpose, but it contains 
 one passage which ought not to have been inserted in it. It is true that 
 Lord Esher, who is one of the ' Proclaimers, ' has in all probability 
 done more than any other living man to land us in our present 
 difficulties, and it is quite right that he should do all in his 
 power to get us out of them. But Lord Esher, though he speaks 
 with all the influence which membership of the Committee of 
 Defence may give him, has no right whatever to threaten this 
 country with conscription merely because his plans have failed. 
 He speaks with no authority on this subject, and he is powerless 
 to enforce his threat. Moreover, it is not correct to say that con- 
 scription is the only alternative to our present arrangements. If 
 the public is led to believe that the only substitute for the Territorial 
 Force is a great conscript army, infinite mischief may result. If, 
 for any reason, the Territorial Army fails or becomes discredited, 
 and if the country, as is exceedingly likely, refuses to adopt con- 
 scription, men will be inclined to despair because they have been 
 told that apart from the two remedies, of which one has been 
 discarded and the other rejected, there is no means by which it 
 can be defended. It would be a misfortune if such an utterly 
 erroneous conclusion as this were to be accepted. There is 
 not the slightest doubt that the military needs of this country 
 can be supplied by a system which involves neither reliance 
 on the Territorial Army, nor the adoption of conscription.
 
 PART III 
 
 THE WAR OFFICE, PARLIAMENT 
 AND THE NATION
 
 HOW PARLIAMENT IS DECEIVED 161 
 
 CHAPTER XXI 
 
 HOW PARLIAMENT IS DECEIVED 
 
 ' It ia well known that George IV laboured under the delusion that 
 he was present, and played an important part, at the Battle of 
 Waterloo. It is related that, on one occasion, he appealed to the 
 Duke of Wellington to confirm his statement that he had been on the 
 field. " I hath often heard your Majesty say so," replied the Duke.' 
 
 Anecdote. 
 
 How THE HOUSE OF COMMONS is TREATED 
 
 ON more than one occasion in the course of this 
 work it has been necessary to refer to statements 
 made in the House of Commons, on behalf of the 
 War Office, which have called for criticism and 
 examination. It is unfortunately the fact that not 
 once, but many times, advantage has been taken of 
 the apathy or ignorance of the House of Commons, 
 to make statements which would not be tolerated by 
 a professional assembly, or by any audience which 
 had a real acquaintance with military history, or 
 military administration. A single misstatement 
 of this kind is, perhaps, not very mischievous. 
 The House of Commons cares very little about 
 military matters, and members exhibit their 
 indifference by their almost ostentatious absence
 
 162 HOW PARLIAMENT IS DECEIVED 
 
 whenever questions concerning the Army are under 
 discussion. 
 
 But the cumulative effect of many erroneous 
 statements is serious. The constant repetition of 
 error, the adjustment of facts to suit the exigencies 
 of a political move, tend to create an incorrect and 
 consequently a dangerous public opinion upon great 
 and important matters of principle. 
 
 It would be a hopeless and unprofitable task to 
 attempt to recall and to correct all the erroneous 
 statements with regard to Army matters which have 
 been made during the last three years. The number 
 has been large, and much mischief has been done. 
 If, however, it be impossible to undo the harm, it is 
 perhaps possible to prevent more mischief resulting 
 from a similar cause. It is with this object in view 
 that I have thought it worth while to set forth in 
 the following chapters a few examples of the manner 
 in which the House of Commons is misled on 
 questions of real importance. 
 
 It is, of course, difficult to persuade the public 
 that statements made with such an immense parade 
 of authority, and arrayed in such eloquent and 
 elaborate forms as those to which Parliament has 
 become accustomed, can be open to criticism, much 
 less to contradiction. The national tendency to 
 believe anything which is said at great length and 
 with an air of immense authority is almost irresistible. 
 It is for this reason that in each of the examples
 
 HOW THE COMMONS IS TREATED 163 
 
 selected the actual facts have been stated in a very 
 plain and simple fashion, so that all who read them 
 may understand exactly what is the point at issue. 
 All that I beg of my readers is that they will 
 constitute themselves the judges in this matter, and 
 that they will ask themselves on which side the truth 
 lies in each case. The evidence is before them, I wish 
 for no better jury than one composed of impartial 
 readers who, discarding any question as to the merits 
 or demerits of the advocates on either side, will give 
 their verdict according to the evidence. Only one 
 thing further I would ask, namely, that if any of my 
 readers are convinced that, in the instances to which 
 I have drawn their attention, the House of Commons 
 and the public at large have really been misled, they 
 will be cautious in the future when asked to accept 
 statements which have no better authority behind 
 them than that which they have condemned. 
 
 A ' NIDUS EQUINUS,' OR CLEAR THINKING 
 IN ACTION 
 
 The first example which I propose to submit, 
 throws an interesting light upon the value of that 
 claim to the monopoly of ' clear thinking ' which 
 has been so often asserted by the Secretary of State 
 for War, and to which many amiable and uninformed 
 persons have paid ready homage. 
 
 On the 8th March 1906 the Secretary of State 
 for War, anxious, apparently, to demonstrate the 
 
 M2
 
 164 HOW PARLIAMENT IS DECEIVED 
 
 value of ' clear thinking,' informed the House that 
 during the course of one of his excursions he had 
 made a great discovery. The simple tale runs as 
 follows : 
 
 ' I stumbled across one of these structures (the 
 Surrey forts) the other day, when taking one of my 
 reflective walks abroad, and going in, I found 3,300 
 rounds of ammunition, cordite, lyddite, shrapnel, the 
 latest pattern of gloves for people working with unbend- 
 ing body, and the latest pattern of the No. 3 Axe. . . . 
 I estimated, with an eye not wholly unpractised in these 
 matters, that there was no less than ^"25,000 worth of 
 stores there, and I afterwards ascertained that I was 
 nearly right. . . . 
 
 ' What an advantage it is when you can get rid of 
 these things root and branch, by the aid of the given 
 principle. Those things were carefully considered, and 
 in great detail; and now, with the consent of the Govern- 
 ment and of the Defence Committee, and as the result of 
 acting on a belief in the principle which we have inherited 
 from our predecessors, they are going to disappear root 
 and branch as fast as they can be made to disappear.' l 
 
 In other words, Mr. Haldane's quick eye and 
 ready wit discovered what had been hidden from all 
 who had gone before him, namely, that the main- 
 tenance of the ring of forts round London was in- 
 consistent with the existing scheme of defence ; and 
 that they ought to be abandoned and dismantled. 
 
 Had he spoken with a little less haste, however, 
 Mr. Haldane would have ascertained that his dis- 
 covery was, in his own selected phrase, a 'nidus 
 
 1 Mr. Haldane, 8th March 1906.
 
 A 'NIDUS EQUINUS' 165 
 
 equinus.' He would have found, on reference to 
 the pages of Hansard, that more than a year before 
 his predecessor had been attacked by Mr. Winston 
 Churchill for having carried out the precise policy 
 the necessity for which was revealed to Mr. Haldane 
 in 1906. 1 He would also have discovered, if he had 
 had time to ask his own Quarter-Master General, 
 that the tools and stores which were worth so much 
 money formed part of the general reserve stores 
 of the Army, and were merely kept in the forts for 
 convenience of storage, there being no room for them 
 elsewhere. The stores remained in situ for many 
 months after Mr. Haldane's promenade, not as part 
 of the equipment of the forts, but because they were 
 in a dry and convenient store-house. Very likely 
 they are there still. As a matter of fact, not a single 
 brass farthing was saved to the country by the 
 discovery related with so much solemnity. No 
 change of policy followed it. Beyond the cheer 
 which the recital of such an example of perspicuity 
 elicited, no result of any kind followed. 
 
 The incident of itself is not of importance, but it 
 is worth recording, because it is typical of many 
 others of the same kind. 
 
 1 ' Perhaps in the right hon. gentleman's heart of hearts the 
 spectacle of this vast unfortified capital, the greatest, the wealthiest 
 city in the world, the depository of half the title deeds of civilisation, 
 within sixty miles of a score of landing-places for the enemy, filled him 
 with some feeling of disquietude.' Mr. Winston Churchill, M. P., 
 3-4-05.
 
 166 MR. HALDANE'S CHOSEN EXAMPLE 
 
 CHAPTER XXII 
 
 MR. HALDANE'S CHOSEN EXAMPLE 
 
 'But what good came of it at last?' 
 
 Quoth little Peterkin. 
 ' Why, that I cannot tell,' said he ; 
 
 'But 'twas a famous victory.' 
 
 Southey 
 
 THE ARMY OF THE LOIRE 
 
 As far as I am aware, there is no authenticated 
 instance in history of an untrained Citizen Army 
 holding its own permanently against a fully trained 
 Regular Force. Military opinion in every country in 
 the world except our own recognises this truth and 
 acts upon it. Military opinion in our own country 
 also recognises the truth, but does not act upon it. 
 
 In view of this rather ominous combination of 
 historical teaching, and scientific opinion, it was 
 reasonable to anticipate that there might be some 
 difficulty in persuading the Parliament and people of 
 this country that a policy which had for its cardinal 
 principles a great and permanent weakening of our 
 small Regular Army, and the creation of a Citizen 
 Force whose members were to receive an average 
 training of some ten days in the year, and who were 
 guaranteed by the War Minister to be unfit to face
 
 THE ARMY OF THE LOIRE 167 
 
 an enemy for six months after embodiment, was a 
 wise and a safe policy to adopt. 
 
 But the House of Commons and the general 
 public are very ill-informed with regard to the 
 military history of this country, or of any other. 
 They could be relied upon to swallow statements 
 which would be laughed at in any country which 
 had had the misfortune to know what war meant. 
 The House of Commons was about to be asked to 
 approve of a policy which, though it had no relation 
 whatever to war, or to the preparation for war, 
 could be made exceedingly ' popular.' What could 
 be more simple than for the responsible Minister, 
 speaking with all the authority which his high 
 position, his great attainments, and his ample 
 sources of information combined to confer 
 upon him, to declare that the popular policy 
 was also the true policy, and to prove the 
 correctness of his statement by an appropriate 
 instance ? 
 
 The Minister of War rose to the occasion. With 
 perfect deliberation he told the House of Commons* 
 and through them the country, in words which 
 could not be misunderstood, that an untrained 
 Citizen Army was not only a match for trained 
 Regular troops, but was actually of greater value in 
 the field than a Regular Army. With all history 
 before him he selected his example of this con- 
 venient but astonishing truth. As an encouragement
 
 168 MR. HALDANE'S CHOSEN EXAMPLE 
 
 to the people of England to entrust their fortunes 
 to a partially trained Citizen Army, he cited the 
 case of General Chanzy and the Army of the Loire. 
 It would be unjust to Mr. Haldane not to quote his 
 actual words. 
 
 MR. HALDANE ON GENERAL CHANZY'S ARMY 
 
 ' In the Franco-German War, after the defeat of the 
 main part of the Regular Army of France, Gambetta, a 
 civilian, made a People's Army, which, in conjunction 
 with the Army of the Loire, gave infinitely more trouble 
 to the German strategists than the Regular Army had 
 given.' ! 
 
 Now this passage can have but one meaning, and 
 one meaning only. It was a plain instruction to the 
 House of Commons that inasmuch as General 
 Chanzy, with a partially trained Citizen Army under 
 his command, had proved a brilliant success in 1871, 
 the House of Commons would be well advised to 
 entrust the fortunes of this country to a similar force 
 in time of war. 
 
 It is difficult to imagine who could have done 
 the Secretary of State the disservice of supplying 
 him with this amazing example. Not only is the 
 result of General Chanzy's gallant struggle an almost 
 classical example of the powerlessness of untrained 
 troops, even in very superior numbers, to hold their 
 own against a trained Regular Army; but there 
 happen to be available for our guidance two 
 1 Mr. Haldane, H. of C., 8-3-06.
 
 GENERAL CHANZY'S ARMY 169 
 
 absolutely conclusive reports upon the subject, the 
 one written by Prince Frederick Charles, the other 
 by General Chanzy himself; reports with which 
 every officer in the Intelligence branch of the War 
 Office must have been perfectly familiar. Let us 
 give the victor precedence. Here in a few words is 
 the substance of Prince Frederick Charles's report: 
 
 PRINCE FREDERICK CHARLES ON GENERAL 
 CHANZY'S ARMY 
 
 ' In November 1870 the small German force was 
 compelled to evacuate Orleans. On the 16th January 
 1871, Prince Frederick Charles reported that since the 
 6th January he and the Grand Duke had taken more 
 than 22,000 unwounded prisoners, 2 colours, 19 guns, 
 more than a thousand ammunition wagons, and a large 
 quantity of war material. The Army of the Loire was 
 broken up, and with it Paris had lost its best hope of 
 relief.' l 
 
 So much for the German side. Now let us see 
 what General Chanzy himself has to say. 
 
 Describing the retreat from the Loire, General 
 Chanzy writes : 
 
 ' It was necessary to send a detachment of Gen- 
 darmerie in advance by the principal roads to stop the 
 fugitives. But they could not exercise any surveillance 
 over the paths which intersect the country in every 
 direction, and Le Mans was soon choked with a 
 1 Hozier.
 
 170 MR. HALDANE'S CHOSEN EXAMPLE 
 
 disorganised mob who, deprived of their organisation and 
 absolutely without discipline, presented an aspect at once 
 miserable and shameful to any army. It was, however, a 
 consolation to be able to say that if such examples were 
 only too frequent, the true men who remained in the 
 ranks, and these were the majority, by the order of their 
 march and the vigour of their resistance, concealed from 
 the enemy a breakdown which can only be explained by 
 the youth and military inexperience of those troops who 
 failed.* 
 
 'The first news that reached me was that General 
 Lalande, who had been posted on the plateau of La 
 Tuilerie in the centre of the line with his Breton Mobiles 
 and Artillery, had during the night spontaneously 
 evacuated this magnificent position without defending it, 
 and in the face of a very inferior force. The Mobiles of 
 Ile-et-Vilaine took to flight on the discharge of the first 
 shell ; the enemy occupied La Tuilerie without firing a 
 shot. 
 
 ' At two o'clock in the morning the Admiral reported 
 that the troops, who had been with great difficulty 
 assembled for this attack, fled and broke up at the first 
 shot fired, and that it was impossible to retake the 
 position ; that the Division posted on his left had 
 disbanded during the night, and abandoned its positions, 
 which were at once occupied by the Prussians, and 
 that with the exception of Roquebrune's Division, the 
 troops, carried away by panic and an incomprehensible 
 demoralisation, had for the most part deserted, that it 
 was impossible to count on them, and retreat became 
 inevitable.' 2 
 
 1 A considerable number of regular troops, principally Artillery- 
 men, and a number of sailors from the Fleet were included in 
 General Chanzy's command. 
 
 3 Chanzy's Report to Gambetta, 13-1-71.
 
 SOME REFLEXIONS AND A MORAL 171 
 
 SOME REFLEXIONS AND A MORAL 
 
 A well-known military writer 1 has commented 
 upon these reports in words which every soldier 
 knows to be absolutely justified 
 
 'The disadvantages of depending on untrained 
 Volunteers, or half-drilled Militia, or Levees-en-masse, or 
 anything of the kind, became painfully apparent to the 
 French Commander-in-Chief, and through him to every 
 nation in the world, except perhaps our own. 
 
 'The military virtues of Chanzy and some of his 
 subordinates were remarkable, but the evils of want of 
 discipline and training, and the necessity for making war. 
 a serious business, were very clearly demonstrated. 
 
 ' What is the lesson ? The lesson is that in modern 
 Europe it is utterly useless to trifle with the art of war. 
 . . . That if a nation wishes to exist, no amount of 
 money will save it. The French had money without any 
 limit . . . their numbers were legion ; it is hard to tell 
 how many Chanzy had; he probably had 150,000; in 
 these positions he had at any rate 1 1 8,000, perhaps more ; 
 he was in his own country, with the world to supply him, 
 with patriotism at his back, and with a brilliant orator to 
 kindle enthusiasm. Yet in the worst possible weather he 
 was beaten by half his number, and many of these could 
 not be engaged in the battle.' 
 
 But it must not be forgotten that Mr. Haldane 
 spoke not only of General Chanzy's Army, but of 
 those other armies which Gambetta, in his heroic 
 but ineffectual zeal called into existence in the hope 
 of retrieving the mischief which the military policy 
 
 1 Dr. Miller Maguire.
 
 172 MR. HALDANE'S CHOSEN EXAMPLE 
 
 of the French Radicals in 1869 a policy closely 
 resembling that of our own Radicals of to-day 
 had made inevitable. Let those who desire to learn 
 the fate of those unhappy legions study the sombre 
 history of their failures, their defeats, and their 
 ultimate annihilation, as it is written in the terrible 
 pages of M.M. Margueritte's ' Tron9ons du glaive.' 
 
 Such is the example which the Secretary of State 
 for War, speaking with all the authority of his great 
 office, thought fit to bring before the House of 
 Commons as a justification for his policy. Such an 
 act requires no comment.
 
 THE ARMY OF A DREAM 173 
 
 CHAPTER XXIII 
 
 THE ARMY OF A DREAM 
 
 P. HENRY. Let him alone, we shall have more anon. 
 
 FALSTAFF. Dost thou hear me, Hal ? 
 
 P. HENRY. Ay, and mark thee too, Jack. 
 
 FAL. Do so, for it is worth the listening to. 
 
 These nine men in buckram that I told thee of ... 
 P. HEN. So, two more already. 
 FAL. Their points being broken . . . 
 
 Began to give me ground ; but I followed me close, cam 
 in fast and hard ; and, with a thought, seven of th 
 eleven I pay'd. 
 
 P. HEN. monstrous ! eleven buckram men grown out of two. 
 
 Shakespeare, 'Hen. IV.' 
 
 THE CLAIM 
 
 SPEAKING to a large audience at Guildford at the 
 end of November 1908, Mr. Haldane used the 
 following words : 
 
 ' I read occasionally in the papers, and I hear it 
 boldly stated, that the Liberal Government has cut down 
 the Regular Army. I am going to give you a few plain 
 facts about that. (Cheers.) And what I have to state 
 to you is that, so far from the Regular Army having been 
 cut down, we are to-day 90,000 stronger than we were 
 three years ago, and yet the Army costs two and a half 
 millions less.' (Loud cheers.)
 
 174 THE ARMY OF A DREAM 
 
 If it were possible to divide the value of the 
 statement just quoted into a hundred parts, it would 
 probably not be a very great exaggeration to say that 
 two parts represented the truth, or something approxi- 
 mating to it. The remaining ninety-eight parts are 
 undoubtedly, and beyond all controversy, untrue. 
 For all intents and purposes the entire statement is 
 untrue ; it conveys an impression which is the exact 
 opposite of the truth. Lord Midleton was well 
 within his rights when he declared in the House of 
 Lords, 1 that the Secretary of State's claim to have 
 increased the Regular Army by 90,000 men was ' a 
 delusion ' ; and his statement that he had reduced 
 the cost by two and a half millions was ' absolutely 
 incorrect.' And Lord Midleton's conclusion was 
 equally justified. ' The danger of making such 
 statements without qualification is extreme.' It is, 
 indeed, a real and a great danger. When a Minister 
 high in office uses his great position to influence his 
 countrymen, the responsibility which lies upon him 
 is heavy. To mislead or deceive the public on any 
 point is wrong, and may be dangerous; but who 
 shall measure the error, or exaggerate the danger 
 when the public is misled upon a matter which 
 concerns the life and death of the nation, a matter 
 about which it trusts, and is entitled to trust 
 those in authority, and with regard to which 
 private persons possess, and can possess, no certain 
 
 1 December 3, 1908.
 
 THE CLAIM 175 
 
 knowledge. Already it has been stated, in millions of 
 newspapers, that while the cost of the British Army 
 has been diminished by two and a half millions, its 
 strength has been increased by 90,000 men, and 
 that both these things are due to the wise policy 
 of the Liberal Government. If these things were 
 true, if indeed we had added some three Army 
 Corps to our available military strength within three 
 years, and had saved two and a half millions in the 
 process, then beyond doubt every Englishman would 
 have reason to be grateful to the Government and to 
 the Minister to whom the country owed these admini- 
 strative triumphs. And at this moment millions of 
 people probably do believe these things to be true, 
 and are justified in believing them to be so because 
 they have been said by a Minister whom they have 
 been led to trust. 
 
 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE INCREASE OF MEN 
 
 Let us see what are the facts. First of all 
 let us deal with the modicum of truth which a 
 generous interpretation may be able to import into 
 the Secretary of State's declaration. It is true that 
 since 1905 the Army Reserve has increased by 
 39,289 men. It is true also that by a book entry 
 a number of men who were formerly included in the 
 Army List under the heading ' Militia ' are now 
 included under the heading ' Special Reserve.' 
 Now let us inquire what is the meaning of these
 
 176 THE ARMY OF A DREAM 
 
 facts, and how far they support the contention of 
 the Secretary of State that the British Army has 
 been strengthened for war; for that is what the 
 public was intended to believe ; that is what it did 
 believe, and was justified in believing; and that is 
 the only point which is of the slightest interest to 
 the nation. The British Army has not been 
 strengthened for war : on the contrary, it has been 
 very greatly weakened. Such addition as there has 
 been, has been no more due to the Liberal Govern- 
 ment than it has been due to the Emperor of China. 
 The cost of the Army has not been diminished by 
 two and a half millions, or at all. 
 
 As has already been pointed out in this work, the 
 whole policy of the present Administration has been 
 to reduce the Regular Army, and to reduce precisely 
 those parts of it which were most efficient and likely 
 to be of most value in time of war. Between 
 October 1, 1905, and October 1, 1908, Mr. Haldane 
 has reduced the Regular Army with the Colours by 
 no less than 18,653 men. The Horse and Field 
 Artillery have lost 1,811 officers and men. The 
 Garrison Artillery have lost 5,442. The Royal 
 Engineers have lost 1,331. The Guards have lost 
 one battalion, and the Line eight battalions. The 
 Army Reserve has increased, it is true, and why ? 
 Principally because it has been swollen by thousands 
 of short service men, enlisted when Lord Midleton 
 was Secretary of State for War, and who are
 
 ABOUT THE INCREASE OF MEN 177 
 
 still available for service. To a small extent it 
 has been increased, because, in order to effect the 
 hasty and unwise reductions which have been 
 referred to above, a certain number of men have 
 been discharged to the Reserve, who ought still 
 to be in the ranks. But so far from this 
 increase in the Army Reserve being due, as the 
 Secretary of State told his audience, to ' the 
 Liberal Government,' it has notoriously taken place 
 despite the policy of that Government and not 
 because of it. The whole policy of the Govern- 
 ment has been directed towards reducing the Army 
 Reserve, and the longer that policy is pursued, the 
 greater will the reduction be. 
 
 We now come to the question of the Special 
 Reserve. Let us examine the nature of the trick 
 which has been played upon the public. In 1905 
 the actual strength of the Militia was 85,814. It 
 had its own units, its officers, and its non-commis- 
 sioned officers. In 1908 the Militia was abolished, 
 and by a stroke of the pen those men actually 
 serving in it, who were willing to continue their 
 services for a year or more, were entered under a 
 new heading and were called ' Special Reservists.' 
 To these were added a number of recruits who, 
 with the Militiamen above referred to, are expected 
 some day to number 70,000. It is to be observed 
 that if and when the whole of the Special Reservists 
 have been obtained, the Special Reserve will still be
 
 178 THE ARMY OF A DREAM 
 
 15,000 less than the Militia which it has super- 
 seded. The Militia had its own officers, who served 
 with the units in time of war. The Special Reserve 
 has none. Nobody knows to what units the officers 
 and men composing it will be attached in time of war. 
 The Militia produced its own non-commissioned 
 officers. The Special Reserve can and will produce 
 none. Twenty thousand men of thirty years of age 
 and upwards were serving in the Militia when it 
 was destroyed. Men of thirty years of age are not 
 permitted to serve in the Special Reserve. The 
 personnel and training of the Militia were notoriously 
 inadequate. The personnel of the Special Reserve 
 is inferior to that of the Militia because it has lost 
 all its N.C.O.'s and all its grown men. As to the value 
 of the Militia we have an official statement of the 
 first importance. The following is an extract from the 
 Report of the Royal Commission on the Auxiliary 
 Forces : 
 
 ' The evidence which we have received satisfies us thaL 
 the drill and training at present undergone by this fore 
 is insufficient to fit its units at short notice to oppos 
 trained troops in the field. 
 
 1 As regards the Infantry, there is a consensus 
 opinion, both among Militia officers and those Reguls 
 officers who have had special opportunities of observe 
 tion, that the average Militia battalion would not be fit t| 
 take the field except after several months' continuouj 
 embodiment. . . .' 
 
 ' We are forced to the conclusion that the Militia ii 
 its existing condition is unfit to take the field for th
 
 ABOUT THE INCREASE OF MEN 179 
 
 defence of this country. We think, however, that its 
 defects arise from causes beyond the control of its officers 
 and men.' 
 
 Nothing whatever has been done to render the 
 Special Reserve more fit for war than the Militia. 
 The Special Reserve is supposed to exist for the 
 purpose of supplying drafts to the Regular Army 
 in time of war. In case of war abroad, no man under 
 twenty is allowed to serve. It is interesting to note 
 that of the Special Reserve no less than 16,244, 
 or 27 per cent., of the existing strength are under 
 twenty, and consequently unable to serve. 1 It will, 
 therefore, be seen that the Special Reserve is simply 
 the Militia reduced in numbers, deteriorated in 
 quality, and with a reduced period of training. It 
 is true that the Militia were not bound by law to 
 serve abroad in time of war, though as a matter of 
 fact they did so serve. The Special Reservists are 
 bound by law to serve abroad in time of war, and 
 possibly some of them will be fit to do so, and this 
 is the whole foundation of Mr. Haldane's claim as 
 far as it refers to the Special Reserve. 
 
 s< THE TRUTH ABOUT THE DECREASE OF COST 
 Lastly, we must examine the statement that the 
 Liberal Government has reduced the cost of the 
 Army by two and a half millions. 
 
 1 As soon as the old Militiamen who have joined the Special 
 Reserve have completed their term of service, the proportion of 
 men under twenty will be much greater. 
 
 N2
 
 180 THE ARMY OF A DREAM 
 
 As a matter of plain fact the Liberal Government 
 has done nothing of the kind, and to prove the 
 untruth of the statement it is only necessary to call 
 Mr. Haldane himself as a witness. 
 
 On May 11, 1908, the Secretary of State, in 
 reply to Mr. Harold Cox, the member for Preston, 
 informed the House of Commons that, apart from 
 the cost of rearming the Artillery, a non-recurrent 
 charge which came into the Estimates in 1905 and 
 not in 1908, 'the actual expenditure in 1905-06 
 was 458,000 less than the Estimates for 1908-09.' 
 If, however, we accept the point which Mr. Haldane 
 seemed anxious to raise, to the effect that sums 
 charged to loan in 1905 were placed on Estimates in 
 1908, and add to the earlier figure the amount 
 expended on loan, the total expenditure of 1905 
 shows an excess over the Estimates of 1908, 
 not of two and a half millions, but of 429,000., 
 a very different figure. Putting the case, therefore, 
 in the most extreme way, it will be seen that to set 
 against a net reduction in the personnel of our land 
 forces of over 100,000 men, we have saved rather 
 less than half a million. It should be clearly 
 understood, however, that at the present moment 
 every branch of the Service is below establishment. 
 Long before the establishment figures are reached 
 this paltry saving of 429,000 will have vanished. 
 
 Nor must it be forgotten that while in theory 
 expenditure has been transferred from loan to
 
 ABOUT THE DECREASE OF COST 181 
 
 Estimates, nothing of the kind has actually taken 
 place. What has really happened is that the 
 Government, being pledged not to place expenditure 
 upon loan, and being afraid to put it upon Estimates, 
 money which ought to have been spent has not been 
 spent, and absolutely necessary barrack building 
 and barrack repairs have been left undone, to the 
 great disadvantage of our soldiers. 
 
 Enough has been said to show how utterly 
 unjustifiable was the statement made by the Secre- 
 tary of State at Guildford ; and how thoroughly 
 justified Lord Midleton was in declaring that 
 statements of such a kind, made without qualifi- 
 cation, are most dangerous. They are, indeed, 
 dangerous ; they are altogether unpardonable. 
 
 ' On ne badine pas avec la Guerre.' Shams 
 which may pass muster in peace time will be 
 ruthlessly exposed in war. The Minister who, in 
 order to reconcile public opinion to a doubtful 
 political scheme, thinks it proper to tell his hearers 
 that he has strengthened the Army by three Army 
 Corps, when in fact he has greatly reduced it, and 
 gravely injured it, has a very heavy responsibility 
 to bear.
 
 182 THE 'RESERVE' MYTH 
 
 CHAPTER XXIV 
 
 THE ' RESERVE ' MYTH 
 
 ' I maintain that it is absolutely inconceivable that if you diminish 
 the number of your units, and also diminish the strength of each unit, 
 you will not in the result have a much smaller Reserve than you 
 would have with a greater number of units and a higher strength.' 
 Lord Lansdowne (House of Lords, 26-6-07). 
 
 WAR OFFICE ARITHMETIC 
 
 To the ordinary human being it would appear 
 that an increase in the length of the Colour Service 
 of the soldier, coupled with a reduction of the 
 number of units in the Army and a reduction of 
 the number of men serving in each of those units, 
 would necessarily, and as a matter of course, tend 
 to reduce the Reserve of the Army. The proposition 
 is indeed of the same order as the commonly 
 accepted statement that ' two and two make four,' and 
 would seem to require as little proof. But it was 
 necessary to convince the House of Commons and 
 the public, that those who declared that the policy of 
 1906 would reduce both the Regular Army with the 
 Colours and the Reserve, were factious persons and 
 not entitled to credence. It was not a case for half 
 measures : it had been asserted that the reduction of 
 the number of cadres, and of the establishments 
 of the cadres which remained, would necessarily
 
 WAR OFFICE ARITHMETIC 183 
 
 decrease the Reserve. The Secretary of State was 
 equal to the occasion. The House of Commons 
 was informed that so far from reducing the 
 Reserve, the contemplated changes would increase 
 it. But something more was required. A spoken 
 assurance might be regarded as insufficient by the 
 sceptical. Arithmetical proof was required, and 
 arithmetical proof was promptly furnished. A 
 War Office Return, certified by the War Office 
 actuary, was promptly produced and laid before 
 Parliament. It was quite convincing, and it 
 showed a most satisfactory increase in the Reserve. 
 Unluckily there happened to be another War Office 
 Return, drawn up not many months previously and 
 purporting to be signed by the same actuary, in 
 which precisely the same problem was treated. 
 The two Returns are here given side by side. They 
 are worth careful examination. 
 
 WAR OFFICE CALCULA- WAR OFFICE CALCULA- 
 TION OF RESERVE TION OF RESERVE 
 PRODUCED BY 156 BAT- PRODUCED BY 148 BAT- 
 TALIONS. TALIONS. 
 
 1905. 1907. 
 
 Establishment: 750. Establishment: 720. 
 
 Sections A & B . . 40,622 Sections A & B. . . 45,970 
 
 Section D 15,023 Section D 17,400 
 
 Total . . 55,645 Total . . 63,370 
 
 Excess of product of the smaller number of units 
 and of the smaller establishment over the larger, 7,725 
 men.
 
 184 THE 'RESERVE' MYTH 
 
 'FIVE MINUS Two EQUALS EIGHT' 
 
 From which it will be seen that according to 
 the amazing arithmetic which is now in fashion at 
 the War Office, it is demonstrated that the larger 
 number of battalions with the larger establishment 
 will produce the smaller Reserve. The utter absurdity 
 of this conclusion was made even more marked by 
 the explanation which the Secretary of State gave 
 in haste when challenged to explain this droll 
 arithmetic. ' The discrepancy,' he explained, was 
 due to the fact that the Returns were calculated 
 upon different data. It was suggested that in 
 compiling the earlier Return the number of men 
 extending their service in each year was taken at a 
 higher figure than in the case of the Return for 1907. 
 It is obvious that the more men who extend their 
 Colour Service the smaller will be the numbers of 
 the Reserve, and if it had been true that the 
 average number of men extending had fallen 
 during the years preceding the last Return, there 
 would undoubtedly be a small addition to the Reserve, 
 traceable to that cause. The increase, however, 
 would have been infinitesimal and quite insufficient 
 to account for the extraordinary discrepancy between 
 the two Returns. But unluckily the facts were 
 altogether the other way. The explanation was 
 necessary and therefore it was invented ; but the most 
 casual reference to the Returns would have shown
 
 WAR OFFICE ARITHMETIC 185 
 
 that so far from the number of extensions having 
 decreased, the number of extensions for 1906 was 
 by far the highest that had been reached for ten 
 years previously. But in this case, as in so many 
 others, it was evidently supposed that ' anything 
 is good enough for the House of Commons.' 
 
 Fortunately, it is probable that the percentage of 
 men passing to the Reserve will be somewhat higher 
 in the future than it has been in the past ; but this 
 will be solely due to the policy inaugurated in 1904, 
 of exercising extreme severity in the matter of the 
 rejection of recruits. The least laxity in this respect 
 will send the Reserve down again. In justice to the 
 War Office, I believe that the Return of 1907, and 
 the explanation which was invented to account for 
 it, are now regarded as blunders to be regretted. But 
 it is unlucky that the country has never been officially 
 informed of the truth. 1 
 
 THE EXPORT OF RESERVISTS 
 
 Another curious illustration of the manner in 
 which the House of Commons is misled is to be 
 found in the answer given by the Secretary of 
 State for War to those members who questioned 
 him with regard to the permission which has been 
 
 1 Those who are interested in this matter will find it fully 
 discussed in a pamphlet entitled The New Army Scheme and the 
 Reserve of the Regular Army, published by the Liberal-Unionist 
 Asiociation, 6 Great George Street, Westminster.
 
 186 THE 'RESERVE' MYTH 
 
 given to 10,000 men of the Army Reserve to reside 
 abroad. 
 
 Mr. Haldane defended the policy on its merits. 
 It is not proposed to challenge that defence here, 
 though the plan of making special efforts to increase 
 the Reserve at home by 10,000 men, while a similar 
 number are allowed to leave the country, is so 
 remarkable as to require some explanation. It 
 reminds one not a little of another great military 
 authority who 
 
 "... had ten thousand men ; 
 He marched them up to the top of a hill, 
 And he marched them down again ' ! 
 
 But Mr. Haldane went farther. He declared that 
 the policy was merely a continuation of that of his 
 predecessors. This statement was inexact. No 
 such policy was ever framed or even contemplated 
 by Mr. Haldane's predecessors. It was only in 1906 
 that the Act, in pursuance of which the Secretary of 
 State has allowed the equivalent of twelve battalions 
 of trained soldiers to leave the country, became law. 
 The Act in the form of a Bill was submitted to Mr. 
 Haldane's predecessor by the military authorities, 
 and was declared by them to be expedient on the 
 ground that a certain number of Reservists, whose 
 services on the spot might be useful in time of war, 
 were resident in India and in some of the Crown 
 Colonies and Dependencies. The case of Sierra 
 Leone was specially cited. It is not possible to keep
 
 THE EXPORT OF RESERVISTS 187 
 
 a full garrison in that Colony in time of peace, and it 
 was obviously reasonable that if there were trained 
 soldiers resident on the spot, their presence could 
 only be an advantage to the military authorities. 
 But the Bill did not, in fact, become law until 1906, 
 and for the action taken under it Mr. Haldane is 
 solely responsible. It may or may not be a wise 
 thing to exercise the discretion conferred by the Act 
 in such a way as to permit 10,000 Reservists to 
 reside abroad, chiefly in the self-governing Colonies ; 
 but the individual who exercises the discretion is 
 alone responsible for the policy. 
 
 That the policy adopted is not without its dangers 
 is certain. There can be little doubt that if any of 
 the great self-governing Colonies considers itself in 
 peril, it will put in a first claim for the services of 
 all trained men resident within its jurisdiction. If 
 our Army Reservists are ever, in fact, retained for 
 Colonial defence, there is no method by which we 
 can compel them to return.
 
 188 THE WORD OF A MINISTER 
 
 CHAPTER XXV 
 
 THE WORD OF A MINISTER 
 'Tantamount to insanity. 'Right Hon. R. B. Haldane. 
 
 THE STORY OF THE ' MARE'S NEST ' AND THE 
 TEN BATTALIONS 
 
 WHEN the policy of reducing the Regular Army 
 was first introduced it was viewed with considerable 
 mistrust by many persons. For Parliamentary pur- 
 poses it was necessary to remove this mistrust, and 
 to reconcile the public to the view that it was ' wise 
 to be off with the old love before we were on with 
 the new,' on the ground that, after all, we were not 
 really going to be ' off with the old love ' at all, and 
 were going to have the new one as a charming 
 addition to our existing establishment. 
 
 On the 8th March 1906 the Secretary of State 
 for War made a statement which was admirably 
 calculated, and was evidently intended, to create the 
 required impression. 
 
 1 There was a rumour the other day in the papers,' 
 said Mr. Haldane, addressing the House of Commons,
 
 189 
 
 ' that I had decided to recommend the abolition of ten 
 Battalions of the Line, and I tried to describe that 
 rumour correctly as a " nidus equinus," which is a polite 
 and classic way of calling it a " mare's nest." If I had 
 decided to do anything of that kind it would have been in 
 military eyes tantamount to insanity.' 
 
 Let it be noted in passing that the rumour 
 was that ten Battalions, not necessarily Battalions 
 of the Line, were to be destroyed. 
 
 Now let us observe the sequel. The statement 
 made was plain and unequivocal. Parliament and 
 the public were meant to understand, and did under- 
 stand, that there was no ground for their fears, and 
 that ten Battalions were not to be destroyed. They 
 did not understand, and the misapprehension is 
 pardonable, that what the Secretary of State really 
 meant was that he did intend to destroy ten Bat- 
 talions, and that eight of these Battalions were to be 
 Battalions of the Line. But this is, in fact, exactly 
 what he meant, and this is what he actually did 
 within a few months of this categorical declaration. 
 Eight Battalions of the Lint and one Battalion of 
 the Guards were blotted out of the Army List, and 
 a second Battalion of the Guards was ' irrevocably ' 
 condemned to destruction. 
 
 A subsequent phase of the episode is curious. 
 In correcting his speech for the Parliamentary 
 Reports, Mr. Haldane interpolated the word ' home,' 
 making the passage run ' the abolition of ten Home
 
 190 THE WORD OF A MINISTER 
 
 Battalions.' The word was not, in fact, used by 
 him, nor does its interpolation alter the case one jot. 
 There is no distinction between ' Home Battalions ' 
 
 STATIONS OF THE CONDEMNED BATTALIONS ON 
 THE STH MARCH 1906, AND AT THE DATE OF 
 THEIR DISSOLUTION, RESPECTIVELY 
 
 Battalion 
 
 Where quartered 
 in March 1906 
 
 Where quartered 
 when dissolved 
 
 3rd Coldstreams 
 
 (Not yet destroyed) 
 
 (Not yet destroyed) 
 
 
 London 
 
 
 3rd Scots Guards 
 
 London 
 
 London 
 
 3rd Battn. Northum- 
 
 Bloemfontein, 
 
 Bordon Camp (Mar. 
 
 berland Fus. 
 
 O. R. C. 
 
 1907) 
 
 4thBattn. Northum- 
 
 Limerick 
 
 Limerick (Nov. 1906) 
 
 berland Fus. 
 
 
 
 3rd Battn. R. War- 
 
 Standerton, Trans- 
 
 Wynberg C. C. for 
 
 wickshire Regt. 
 
 vaal 
 
 Aldershot (Mar. 
 
 
 
 1907 
 
 4th Battn. R. War- 
 
 Curragh Camp 
 
 Curragh Camp (Nov. 
 
 wickshire Regt. 
 
 
 1906) 
 
 3rd Battn. Lanca- 
 
 Pretoria, Transvaal 
 
 Fermoy (Nov. 1906) 
 
 shire Fus. 
 
 
 
 4th Battn. Lanca- 
 
 Tipperary 
 
 Tipperary (Nov. 
 
 shire Fus. 
 
 
 1906) 
 
 3rd Battn. Manches- 
 
 Middleburg, Trans- 
 
 Guernsey (Nov. 
 
 ter Regt. 
 
 vaal 
 
 1906) 
 
 4th Battn. Manches- 
 
 Aldershot 
 
 Aldershot (Nov. 
 
 ter Regt. 
 
 
 1906) 
 
 and ' Foreign Battalions ' in the British Army. The 
 number of Battalions at home and abroad respect- 
 ively constantly varies, and will always vary. A
 
 THE STORY OF THE ' MARE'S NEST ' 191 
 
 Battalion is as much lost to the Army if it happens 
 to be quartered at Cape Town at the time of its 
 destruction, as if it is quartered at Colchester. 
 The qualification added by Mr. Haldane was a 
 4 distinction without a difference.' But this is not 
 all. So utterly careless were the persons who 
 instructed the Secretary of State, so utterly con- 
 temptuous is the War Office nowadays of the 
 House of Commons, that nobody seems to have 
 taken the trouble to find out where the doomed 
 Battalions actually were quartered when the word 
 ' home ' was interpolated as an afterthought in the 
 report. The facts are tabulated on the previous 
 page. They speak for themselves. 
 
 It will be seen that six out of the ten Battalions 
 were at home when Mr. Haldane gave his pledge, 
 and nine out of the ten were at home when the 
 actual disbandment took place. But this is a small 
 matter compared with the grave question of the 
 violation of a pledge. 
 
 The House of Commons was told in terms which 
 admit of no misapprehension that ten Battalions 
 were not going to be destroyed. The House of 
 Commons believed that what they were told was 
 true, and that ten Battalions were not going to be 
 destroyed. Within a few months, by order of the 
 Secretary of State, nine Battalions were destroyed.
 
 192 THE MYTH OF THE STAFF ORDER 
 
 CHAPTER XXVI 
 
 THE MYTH OF THE GENERAL STAFF ORDER 
 
 ' DeutscMand, Deutschiand iiber alles ! ' 
 
 THE MEMORANDUM AND THE ORDER 
 
 THE myth of the General Staff Order and the 
 myth of the Horse and Field Artillery are so curious 
 and instructive that they deserve and will receive 
 special chapters. I propose to deal first with the 
 characteristic myth of the General Staff Order. 
 The story is as follows : 
 
 On the llth November 1905 a Memorandum, 
 dealing with the question of the creation of a General 
 Staff for the Army, was issued from the War Office. 
 It was signed by the Secretary of State for War (Mr. 
 Arnold- Forster) and addressed to the Chief of the 
 General Staff (General Sir Neville Lyttelton, K.C.B.). 
 
 On the 12th September 1906 an Army Order on 
 the same subject was issued by the then Secretary of 
 State (Mr. Haldane). Addressing a gathering of 
 Volunteers at Newcastle on the 15th September 1906, 
 Mr. Haldane referred to this Order in the following 
 terms :
 
 THE MEMORANDUM AND THE ORDER 193 
 
 ' He thought too much had been made of the Order by 
 the Press. It was no new conception. The original 
 idea he was afraid must be labelled " Made in Germany." 
 . . . He did not deny that it might have in it some- 
 thing of its origin from recent investigations on the other 
 side of the German Ocean. It had many things that 
 would not have been there unless we had had repeated 
 and frequent conversations with the German General 
 Staff.' i 
 
 Now all this is a pure myth. Mr. Haldane is 
 evidently of opinion that nothing pleases the British 
 public better than to be told that the War Office 
 under its present rulers is ' run ' by Germany. Pos- 
 sibly the satisfaction is not as deep and universal as 
 the Secretary of State imagines. 
 
 But this particular Order has no more to do with 
 the German General Staff than it has with the Lower 
 House of Convocation. 
 
 The facts, which are perfectly simple, are as 
 follows: The Memorandum of the llth November 
 1905 was written by the author at the War Office, 
 and without reference to or consultation with the 
 German General Staff. In the ordinary course the 
 Memorandum was transmitted to the Department of 
 the Chief of the General Staff for translation into the 
 form of an Order; and was so translated within a 
 very few weeks of the issue of the original document. 
 The Order was kept in the Office till September 1906, 
 not because it required modification, but apparently 
 
 1 Times Report.
 
 194 THE MYTH OF THE STAFF ORDER 
 
 because some difference of opinion had arisen between 
 two Departments in the War Office with regard to 
 the question of who should make appointments, a 
 difference which it took a long time to adjust. 
 
 In September the Order as drafted in December 
 and January was issued. Not only is it not true to 
 say that it was modified after reference to the 
 German Staff, but as a matter of fact, save in one 
 particular hereinafter noted, it was not modified 
 at all. 
 
 So careless indeed was the statement of the 
 Secretary of State that he failed to observe that the 
 Order as issued actually contained a reference to 
 the 'Welsh and Midland Command,' a Command 
 which existed when the Order was drawn up, but 
 had long ceased to exist when it was issued. 1 
 
 But that there may be no room for doubt or con- 
 troversy upon this matter, the two documents in 
 question, viz. the Memorandum of November 1905 
 and the Order of September 1906, are here printed 
 in parallel columns. It will be apparent at a glance 
 that the Order is simply an official reproduction of 
 the Memorandum, and that nothing whatever is 
 due to any consultation between Mr. Haldane and 
 his friends in Berlin, 2 and that the statement to that 
 effect quoted above has no relation whatever to the 
 facts. 
 
 1 It appeared in the Army List for the last time in April 1906. 
 
 2 Mr. Haldane visited Berlin in the summer of 1906.
 
 THE MEMORANDUM AND THE ORDER 195 
 
 MEMORANDUM BY 
 THE SECRETARY OF 
 STATE FOR WAR 
 ADDRESSED TO THE 
 CHIEF OF THE GENE- 
 RAL STAFF, HTH 
 NOVEMBER 1905 
 
 1. At the meeting of the 
 Army Council held on the 
 9th August 1905, certain 
 general conclusions with 
 regard to the formation of 
 the General Staff were 
 arrived at. These con- 
 clusions were as follows : 
 
 2. Officers of the General 
 Staff should be selected on 
 their own individual quali- 
 fications, and not on ac- 
 count of any appointment 
 which they are holding, or 
 for which they may be 
 selected. l 
 
 3. The list of Officers 
 should at present be small. 
 
 4. (c) Appointments 
 should be for four years. 
 
 5. (d) At the end of every 
 four years from the date of 
 
 ARMY ORDER ISSUED 
 12TH SEPTEMBER 
 1906 
 
 All appointments to the 
 General Staff will be for 
 four years. 
 
 When an Officer vacates 
 a General Staff appoint- 
 
 1 Officers at present occupying posts specified in Appendix B. 
 
 o 2
 
 196 THE MYTH OF THE STAFF ORDER 
 
 his first appointment to the 
 General Staff, the desira- 
 bility of the retention of an 
 Officer's name on the 
 General Staff List should 
 be considered. 
 
 6. (e) The general princi- 
 ple of accelerated promotion 
 should be accepted, the 
 question of the extent and 
 nature of this promotion to 
 be deferred for further con- 
 sideration. 
 
 7. (/) The list of duties of 
 the General Staff, as de- 
 tailed in Appendices E and 
 F of Army Order 30 of 
 1905, should be further 
 amplified. 
 
 8. (g) There should not 
 be a separate General Staff 
 Corps. 
 
 9. (h) The possession of 
 a Staff College Certificate, 
 though most desirable, 
 should not be an absolute 
 sine qua non for being 
 placed on the General Staff 
 List. 
 
 ment his retention on the 
 General Staff List will be 
 subject to the decision of 
 the Secretary of State 
 advised by the Chief of the 
 General Staff or the Com- 
 mander-in-Chief in India 
 as the case may be. 
 
 Approved service on the 
 General Staff will be recog- 
 nised by accelerated pro- 
 motion. 
 
 See Appendix A, which 
 sets out these duties. 
 
 As a general rule an 
 Officer will not be eligible 
 to have his name placed on 
 the General StaffList unless 
 he holds a Staff College 
 Certificate, and unless he 
 has at least eight years' 
 service. But the guiding 
 principle in the selection of 
 Officers for this list will be
 
 THE MEMORANDUM AND THE ORDER 197 
 
 the possession of those 
 qualifications which render 
 them fitted for the per- 
 formance of the duties of 
 the General Staff. 
 
 10. The principles ap- 
 proved by the Council must 
 now be regarded as govern- 
 ing the composition and 
 duties of the General Staff, 
 and the time has come for 
 taking action in accordance 
 with these decisions. It is 
 desirable that in carrying 
 out the work entrusted to 
 you by the Army Council 
 you should have before you 
 a clear statement of the 
 objects for which the 
 General Staff is to be 
 formed and the duties 
 which it is to perform. 
 
 11. It is impossible to 
 secure continuity of policy 
 in Army administration 
 without reasoned and well- 
 ordered thought, and it is 
 with a view to securing 
 this desideratum that the 
 formation of a General 
 Staff has been undertaken 
 by the Army Council. At 
 present, as in the past, 
 every Officer in the Army 
 has his own opinion on
 
 198 THE MYTH OF THE STAFF ORDER 
 
 every military subject, the 
 net result being that there 
 are almost as many opinions 
 as there are Officers. Hence 
 the advice tendered to the 
 Secretary of State by his 
 responsible Military Ad- 
 viser is the individual advice 
 and opinion of the Officer 
 tendering it, and it is not 
 the carefully balanced 
 opinion, after mature 
 thought and deliberation, 
 of a collective body of 
 experts. Thus, continuity 
 of thought, of purpose and 
 of action are wholly im- 
 possible, and in their place 
 we find disjointed and 
 unconnected plans. No 
 true ' military opinion ' 
 does or can exist. 
 
 12. There are, moreover, 
 many duties which are now 
 not performed at all, or 
 which are insufficiently per- 
 formed, and which ought 
 in the future to be carried 
 out by Officers of the 
 General Staff. 
 
 The objects to be kept 
 in view in forming such a 
 Staff are as follows : 
 
 13. (1) To gather the 
 ablest men in the Army
 
 THE MEMORANDUM AND THE ORDER 199 
 
 together, and by some 
 system of advance- 
 ment and promotion 
 to make sure that the 
 fortunes of the Army 
 are always in their 
 hands. 
 
 14. (2) By means of these 
 men, to form a school 
 of military thought, 
 which shall be abreast, 
 or ahead of that of 
 any other Army. 
 
 15. From this it follows 
 that the Officers of the 
 General Staff should be 
 the ablest and most ener- 
 getic Officers of the Army, 
 and should be in the prime 
 of life. Their duties may 
 be defined as the duties of 
 war and training for war. 
 
 16. The possession of a 
 Staff College Certificate, 
 though most desirable, will 
 not be an absolute sine qua 
 non for selection. 
 
 17. In an Army such as 
 ours there must be excep- 
 tional cases in which Officers 
 who have not obtained the 
 certificate should clearly be 
 
 With these objects in 
 view the General Staff will 
 be drawn from the Officers 
 of the Army who may be 
 considered most likely to 
 prove capable of forming 
 a school of progressive 
 military thought. 
 
 See No. 9 above.
 
 200 THE MYTH OF THE STAFF ORDER 
 
 placed on the General Staff 
 List. 
 
 18. So, also, adminis- 
 trative experience will be a 
 valuable but not an indis- 
 pensable qualification for 
 admission to the General 
 Staff. 
 
 19. The eligibility of an 
 Officer for the General Staff 
 should not be affected by 
 his Army rank. In one 
 regiment an Officer with 
 eleven years' service may 
 be still a subaltern, in 
 another an Officer of four 
 years' service may have 
 attained the rank of captain. 
 Some limitation is neces- 
 sary, but it will be based 
 upon length of service and 
 not upon Army rank. 
 
 20. The following are the 
 general lines on which the 
 formation of the General 
 Staff will proceed : 
 
 21. The General Staff 
 will not form a separate 
 corps. 
 
 Of these qualifications 
 experience on the Adminis- 
 trative Staff, though not 
 indispensable, will not be 
 disregarded. 
 
 Appointments to the 
 posts specified in Appendix 
 B will be made from a 
 special list of Officers con- 
 sidered well qualified for 
 such employment, termed 
 1 A General Staff List.'
 
 THE MEMORANDUM AND THE ORDER 201 
 
 22. Officers will be 
 selected on their own in- 
 dividual qualification, and 
 not on account of any 
 appointment which they 
 are holding, or for which 
 they may be selected. The 
 list of selected Officers will 
 at present be small. 
 
 23. Appointments will 
 be for four years. At the 
 end of every four years 
 from the date of his first 
 appointment to the General 
 Staff, the desirability of the 
 retention of an Officer's 
 name on the General Staff 
 List will be considered. 
 
 24. It is clear that the 
 organisation of the General 
 Staff should proceed with 
 care, and a probationary 
 period will be desirable in 
 all cases. This period, in 
 the case of those to be im- 
 mediately selected, should 
 not be less than one year. 
 
 25. Subject to a first 
 list being drawn up and 
 approved by the Army 
 Council generally, all future 
 selections for, and pro- 
 motions in, the General 
 Staff will be recommended 
 
 Officers at present occu- 
 pying posts specified in 
 Appendix B will not 
 necessarily be selected for 
 the General Staff List. 
 
 All appointments to the 
 General Staff will be for 
 four years, after which an 
 Officer, if below the rank of 
 substantive Lieutenant- 
 Colonel, will return to regi- 
 mental duty for a period of 
 not less than one year. 
 
 The General Staff List 
 will be drawn up from time 
 to time, revised by the 
 Army Council, in consulta- 
 tion with the Selection 
 Board, and with the Com- 
 mander-in-Chief in India.
 
 202 THE MYTH OF THE STAFF ORDER 
 
 by the Chief of the General 
 Staff alone, without the 
 intervention of the Selection 
 Board or of the Army 
 Council. In no other man- 
 ner can the Staff be made 
 homogeneous and its action 
 inspired by a single pur- 
 pose. 
 
 This paragraph in the Order of 1906 is certainly 
 not taken from the Memorandum of 1905. On the 
 contrary, it is in direct conflict with it. Wherever 
 it came from, it certainly did not come from Germany. 
 It would almost seem as if it were the outcome of a 
 prolonged difference of opinion between two depart- 
 ments of the War Office, in which the stronger but 
 less enlightened was triumphant. It will be observed 
 that the point at issue is whether the Chief of the 
 General Staff shall or shall not be master in his own 
 house. That he ought to be if the General Staff is 
 to be more than a name, is certain. It seems probable 
 that the paragraph in its present form was inserted 
 to relieve the apprehensions of those heads of 
 departments who feared that officers serving 
 under them might not receive their due share of 
 nominations to the General Staff. 
 
 26. It is evident that the 
 Chief of the General Staff 
 must have absolute power 
 over all the Officers of the
 
 THE MEMORANDUM AND THE ORDER 203 
 
 General Staff. He will be 
 as free as possible from or- 
 dinary office routine work, 
 but must be the sole adviser 
 of the Secretary of State 
 on all matters of strategy 
 or of military operations. 
 He will, of course, remain a 
 member of the Committee 
 of Imperial Defence. He 
 will also be charged, as I 
 have already indicated, with 
 the selection and personal 
 supervision and training of 
 the Officers of the General 
 Staff. 
 
 27. There is little doubt 
 that ultimately the position 
 of the Chief of the General 
 Staff will become so impor- 
 tant that, in order to secure 
 continuity of action and 
 ideas, it may be necessary 
 to extend his tenure of 
 office beyond that laid down 
 in the present regulations. 
 
 28. It is necessary to 
 define in some way the 
 duties of the General Staff, 
 and in the Army Order of 
 1st Jan. 1905, which gave 
 effect to the recommenda- 
 tions of the War Office 
 Reconstitution Committee, 
 certain duties are assigned 
 
 These duties are also 
 defined in the Appendix to 
 the Order of 1906.
 
 204 THE MYTH OF THE STAFF ORDER 
 
 to that Department both 
 in peace and war in Ap- 
 pendices E and F. No 
 definition of those duties, 
 however, can pretend to be 
 exhaustive, and some elas- 
 ticity of interpretation must 
 be allowed. It is evident 
 that, though certain posts 
 may be reserved for Officers 
 who are members of the 
 General Staff, it will (apart 
 from these exceptions) be 
 altogether wrong to asso- 
 ciate the Officers of the 
 General Staff with par- 
 ticular posts. It would, 
 moreover, be easy to draw 
 a definition of Staff duties 
 which would deprive the 
 Chief of the General Staff 
 of the very wide liberty in 
 dealing with his Officers 
 which he ought to possess. 
 
 29. The Chief of the 
 General Staff ought to be 
 able to prepare Officers 
 for special work months, 
 it may be years, ahead. 
 For instance, an Officer 
 having the requisite qualifi- 
 cation for a particular 
 class of work should 
 be instructed to acquaint 
 himself with the language
 
 THE MEMORANDUM AND THE ORDER 205 
 
 necessary to carry out that 
 work, or with any other 
 special branch of knowledge 
 which will enable him to 
 serve efficiently in the post 
 to which he is ultimately 
 appointed. 
 
 30. The reward for good 
 service on the General Staff 
 will be accelerated promo- 
 tion. Such promotion will 
 be given as a matter of 
 course to all Officers who, 
 having been placed on the 
 General Staff List, have 
 completed a term of em- 
 ployment and are con- 
 sidered sufficiently meri- 
 torious to be retained upon 
 the List for further employ- 
 ment. First appointment 
 to the List will confer no 
 claim to promotion, which 
 should be a reward for suc- 
 cessful service, and not a 
 preliminary to such service. 
 The principle of accelerated 
 promotion being accepted, 
 the question of the form in 
 which it should be given 
 remains to be determined. 
 
 31. This question is not 
 without difficulty. The 
 strict regimental system of 
 our Army interposes ob- 
 
 Approved service on 
 the General Staff will be 
 recognised by accelerated 
 promotion. 
 
 Such accelerated pro- 
 motion will be bestowed 
 in ordinary cases in the form 
 of a ' Brevet ' up to the
 
 206 THE MYTH OF THE STAFF ORDER 
 
 stacles in the case of Cavalry 
 and Infantry, which do not 
 arise in the case of other 
 branches of the Service or 
 in foreign Armies. These 
 obstacles cannot be ignored. 
 There can be little doubt 
 that substantive promotion 
 without any conditions as 
 to whether or not an Officer 
 shall go back to his regi- 
 ment is, in theory, by far 
 the best and most logical 
 proceeding ; but the objec- 
 tions which may be taken 
 from the regimental point 
 of view are apparent. 
 
 32. On the whole it would 
 seem that the system of 
 ' Brevet,' up to the rank 
 of Lieut. -Colonel, and sub- 
 stantive promotion above 
 that rank, is likely to be 
 the best solution of this 
 difficult problem. 
 
 It is not impossible that 
 in the future a time may 
 come when there will be 
 an interchange of Officers 
 between Cavalry and In- 
 fantry, Engineers and Ar- 
 tillery, &c. Hitherto the 
 whole tendency of our 
 military education has been 
 to segregate Officers of the 
 various arms. I cannot 
 
 rank of Lieut. -Colonel, and 
 above that rank by selec- 
 tion for the rank of sub- 
 stantive Colonel.
 
 THE MEMORANDUM AND THE ORDER 207 
 
 help hoping that progress 
 may eventually be made 
 in the direction of inter- 
 changeability. 
 
 The above are the main 
 points by which you should 
 be guided in initiating the 
 formation of the General 
 Staff, and you will now, 
 therefore, take the neces- 
 sary steps for giving effect 
 to the decision of the Army 
 Council in accordance with 
 the terms of this minute. 
 H. O. A.-F. 
 
 11-11-05. 
 
 It will be seen that the passages which we have 
 quoted from the Order of September 1906 are simply, 
 with one exception, mere paraphrases and repetitions 
 of portions of the Memorandum of 1905. They 
 certainly were not ' Made in Germany,' and they 
 would have been exactly where they are even though 
 those ' repeated and frequent conversations with the 
 German General Staff ' had never taken place. 
 
 It is obvious, therefore, that the Teutonic wisdom 
 must be contained in those portions of the Order 
 which have not been quoted. Let us see what they are. 
 They are as follows : 
 
 1. The General Staff of the Army falls into two 
 principal divisions, viz. 
 
 (a) The General Staff at Army Headquarters. 
 
 (6) The General Staff in Commands and Districts.
 
 208 THE MYTH OF THE STAFF ORDER 
 
 2. The functions of the former are to advise on the 
 strategical distribution of the Army, to supervise the 
 education of Officers, and the training and preparation of 
 the Army for war, to study military schemes, offensive 
 and defensive, to collect and collate military intelligence, 
 to direct the general policy in Army matters and to secure 
 continuity of action in the execution of that policy. 
 
 3. The functions of the latter are to assist the Officers 
 on whose staffs they are serving in promoting military 
 efficiency, especially in regard to the education of Officers 
 and the training of the troops, and to aid them in carrying 
 out the policy prescribed by Army Headquarters. 
 
 This statement of functions is common to both 
 documents and is taken from a common source. 
 There is clearly no mystery about these obvious 
 definitions. 
 
 Para. 6. The establishment of the General Staff, 
 exclusive of India, i.e. the detailed list of those posts 
 which will constitute the General Staff appointments of 
 the Army, is given in Appendix B. 
 
 Evidently the German mystery does not lurk 
 here. Q.E.D. 
 
 This is all. In other words the introduction of 
 Germany and the German General Staff in this 
 matter is absolutely unnecessary and unwarranted. 
 The point is not of great importance, save as showing 
 how necessary it is to receive statements made by 
 the War Office under the present regime with 
 caution, and how desirable it is not to render too 
 great homage to a ' pose ' however confident and 
 authoritative.
 
 THE NEW STRIKING FORCE 209 
 
 CHAPTER XXVII 
 
 THE NEW STRIKING FORCE 
 ' Much ado about nothing.' 
 
 THE AUTHORS OF THE INCREASE 
 
 THE country has on many occasions during the last 
 three years been surprised and gratified to learn that 
 for the first time it possesses a real Expeditionary 
 Force of nearly 160,000 men, ready ' to go 
 anywhere and do anything ' on the pressing of a 
 button. The creation of this powerful Army has 
 naturally given great satisfaction, though the satis- 
 faction has not been universal. The very magnitude 
 of the Force has been sufficient to condemn it in the 
 eyes of those who think that our military preparations 
 err on the side of excess. Sir Charles Dilke has 
 boldly declared that if the Force existed, it would be 
 too great, and should be reduced. But he has derived 
 comfort from the reflexion that, except on paper, it 
 does not exist. 
 
 As there is evidently a good deal of misconception 
 with regard to what this Striking Force or Expedi- 
 tionary Force really is, a few words of explanation
 
 210 THE NEW STRIKING FORCE 
 
 will not be out of place. Mr. Haldane has over and 
 over again declared that the number of troops avail- 
 able for oversea service is greater now than it has 
 ever been ; and he has left it to be inferred that this 
 result is due to the policy which he has adopted. 
 This is an error, as will appear when we come to 
 examine the origin of the Force. 
 
 It would, however, be a crying scandal if more 
 men were not available in 1909 than on the occasion 
 of our last mobilisation in 1899. Between 1899, when 
 Lord Lansdowne commenced the task of strengthen- 
 ing the Army, and November 1905, when the present 
 Government took office, there were added to the 
 Regular Army 18 Battalions and 64 Batteries of 
 Horse and Field Artillery. The total addition of 
 numbers between January 1, 1889, and January 1, 
 1906, was as follows : 
 
 Increase. 
 
 Household Cavalry .... 93 
 
 Cavalry of the Line . . . . 2,115 
 
 Horse and Field Artillery . . . 12,201 
 
 Garrison Artillery .... 1,093 
 
 Royal Engineers .... 2,922 
 
 Foot Guards 771 
 
 Infantry of the Line .... 2,939 
 
 Army Service Corps . . . 3,376 
 
 R.A. Medical Corps . . . . 1,721 
 
 Army Ordnance Corps . . . 1,115 
 
 28,346
 
 AUTHORS OF THE DECREASE 211 
 
 THE AUTHORS OF THE DECREASE 
 
 But not only was this large addition made to the 
 Colour Strength, the Reserve was increased to an 
 unprecedented figure. Owing partly to the increase 
 of the Colour Strength, but principally to the Short 
 Service enlistments introduced by Mr. Brodrick, the 
 Reserve is now 39,000 stronger than it was in 1899. It 
 would indeed be curious if, with the addition of no less 
 than 67,000, no more troops were available now than 
 ten years ago. If such were not the case, the fact would 
 indicate that some very sinister influence must have 
 intervened to stultify the good work of years of patient 
 effort. Such an influence has intervened, but it has not 
 yet been at work long enough to sterilise and stultify 
 entirely the work of the past. We have already 
 seen that the Army with the Colours has lost 18,363 
 officers and men ; that 9 Battalions have been 
 destroyed ; that 32 Field Batteries have been per- 
 manently immobilised ; that the Artillery has lost over 
 7,000 officers and men, and the Royal Engineers 
 over 1,300. The inevitable reduction of the Reserve 
 has not yet begun : the duty of facing the situation 
 which will arise when that reduction begins will be 
 left, like so many other unpleasant tasks, to a future 
 Administration. But it is obvious that it is not the 
 reduction of the Regular Army by over 18,000 men 
 that has made it stronger than it was before. Up 
 to the present time the reductions due to the new 
 
 2P
 
 212 THE NEW STRIKING FORCE 
 
 policy have not quite overtaken the increase due 
 to the policy which has been abandoned. We 
 ought therefore, as a matter of course, to be able 
 to put more men into the field than in 1899; but the 
 reduction of units has already taken effect, and may 
 prove very serious. In 1902 there were but 8 
 Line Battalions left in Great Britain. But since 
 that date, 8 Line Battalions have been destroyed. 
 One of the clearest lessons which the war ought 
 to have taught us has been disregarded. 
 
 THE STRENGTH OF THE STRIKING FORCE 
 
 It is obvious from the facts which have been 
 above recited that there ought to be a very large 
 increase in the number of Regular troops available 
 for service abroad, and that if there is not, the fact 
 is solely due to the policy of the present Administra- 
 tion. 
 
 And now let us examine the so-called ' Striking 
 Force,' for the creation of which so much merit has 
 been claimed. Speaking in the House of Commons 
 on the 30th July 1906, the Secretary of State for 
 War explained the character of the Force which he 
 proposed to create. 
 
 'As a result of the Government's proposals,' [said 
 he,] 'we should be in a position to readily mobilise 
 for service oversea a Force consisting of 4 Cavalry 
 Brigades, and 6 Divisions (each of 3 Brigades), with
 
 STRENGTH OF THE FORCE 213 
 
 the necessary troops for lines of communication, or 
 roughly, 150,000 officers and men. 
 
 1 Of this total, 50,000 will be Regulars serving with the 
 Colours, about 70,000 will be Reservists, and about 30,000 
 men employed and trained on a militia basis. . . . An 
 army so organised would be, in point of numbers, avail- 
 able for taking the field oversea, nearly 50 per cent, 
 stronger than any Expeditionary Force which we have 
 hitherto attempted to organise.' 
 
 A Return giving the composition of the proposed 
 Force was issued by the War Office, the total 
 number of officers and men there shown being 
 159,620. 
 
 An examination of this Return suggests some 
 curious reflexions. As has been pointed out, if we 
 were not able to dispatch a much larger force in 
 1906 or 1909 than was possible in 1899, we ought 
 to be very much ashamed of ourselves, and the fact 
 must be due to the mischievous undoing of the good 
 work of past years. But the speech of the Secretary 
 of State and the figures given in the Return render 
 it very doubtful whether, after all, we can do much 
 better in 1909 than we did in 1899. It is certain 
 that the boast that we are in a position to dispatch 
 an Expeditionary Force 50 per cent, stronger than 
 any we have hitherto attempted to organise, must be 
 accepted with a great deal of caution. Facts are 
 stubborn things, and the following facts are set out 
 in the Report of the War Commission, where any- 
 one who desires may verify them.
 
 214 THE NEW STRIKING FORCE 
 
 WHAT HAPPENED IN 1899 
 
 In the autumn of 1899 the garrison of South 
 Africa numbered 9,940 officers and men. By the 
 llth October of the same year reinforcements to the 
 number of 12,456 had been dispatched from the 
 United Kingdom. Between November 1899 and the 
 end of July 1900, no less than 155,535 officers and 
 men were sent from the British establishment alone. 
 22,987 were dispatched from the same source between 
 the 1st August 1900 and April 1901. An additional 
 22,746 left during the remainder of 1901, and in 1902 
 a final contingent of 20,260 officers and men was 
 dispatched, making a total of 228,171 Regular 
 troops from the British establishment alone. 
 
 It is significant and important to note that by the 
 end of July 1900, no less than 167,991 Regular 
 troops had been dispatched, exclusive of reinforce- 
 ments from India. And be it observed that in 
 addition we had the whole of the Militia, of which 
 the greater part actually served in South Africa. 
 Mr. Haldane has now destroyed the Militia, and 
 the total of the Expeditionary Force includes its 
 remains. 
 
 THE COMPOSITION OF THE STRIKING FORCE 
 
 Now let us see what is to be the composition of 
 the great Expeditionary Force which we owe to 
 ' clear thinking.' It appears from the speech of the 
 Secretary of State that out of the total of 159,620
 
 COMPOSITION OF THE FORCE 215 
 
 officers and men, only 50,000 are to be furnished by 
 the Regular Army with the Colours. 70,000 are to 
 be Reservists, an extraordinary and, in the opinion 
 of many officers, an unsafe proportion. 30,000 are 
 to be ' on a militia basis,' that is to say, men without 
 any serious military training, or wholly untrained 
 men, whose qualifications and whose duties have 
 been described by the Secretary of State as being 
 similar to those of Messrs. Pickfords' drivers. These 
 may be very good men, but they will not be soldiers ; 
 moreover, it does not appear that at the present 
 time they exist. When it is remembered that out 
 of the total Regular Force dispatched to South 
 Africa only 80,000, or 35 per cent., were Reservists, 
 whereas in the new Force the number of Reservists 
 and casuals together is to be no less than 69 per cent., 
 it is difficult to perceive where the great gain has taken 
 place. Be it remembered also that in 1899-1900 the 
 Reservists were real soldiers. Whether they will be 
 so on the occasion of our next mobilisation is exceed- 
 ingly doubtful. As long as the present great Reserve 
 lasts, it will be possible to mobilise the Infantry 
 Battalions from that source, but, as has been fre- 
 quently pointed out in these pages, the present great 
 Reserve is the outcome of a policy which has been 
 abandoned, and as soon as that Reserve disappears, 
 and we have at our disposal only the natural product 
 of a reduced Long Service Army, we shall have to 
 resort to the Special Reservists, who, in the opinion
 
 216 THE NEW STRIKING FORCE 
 
 of the military authorities at any rate, will not be 
 real soldiers at all. 
 
 AN ARGUMENT A FORTIORI 
 
 On this point there is no room for doubt. 
 Among the many foolish and ill-considered state- 
 ments which have been made in a hurry by those 
 who in their zeal to support the new system have 
 thought it necessary to destroy that which preceded 
 it, is that which represents Short Service soldiers of 
 two years' Colour service as unfit to take the field. 
 The opinion is singularly inept in view of the fact 
 that two years' Colour service is the term prescribed 
 for nearly every army in the world except our own, 
 and that to condemn men who have had no longer 
 period of training is to declare that nearly half of 
 the Brigade of Guards will be unfit for war on 
 mobilisation, a statement which is refuted by its 
 own inherent absurdity. But inherent absurdity is 
 no bar to those who must at any cost provide an 
 opinion which will fit the situation. Thus it is that we 
 find the following curious passage in the Memorandum 
 of the Secretary of State for War which appeared on 
 the 30th July 1906. Defending the Cardwell System 
 and attacking the Short Service Battalions which 
 were to be composed in part of men of two years' 
 Colour Service, Mr. Haldane informed us that 
 
 ' In the opinion of the great majority of the military 
 advisers of the Government, Battalions mobilised in
 
 AN ARGUMENT A FORTIORI 217 
 
 accordance with the Cardwell System that is, containing 
 Reservists of seven years' Colour Service are greatly to be 
 preferred to Battalions composed largely of inexperienced 
 and partially trained Reservists, who must necessarily be 
 quite inferior to seasoned men who have already gone 
 through a substantial period of service abroad.' 
 
 Now let us see where this important and unani- 
 mous military opinion lands us. Reservists who 
 have served two years with the Colours in a full 
 Battalion, under their own officers and their own 
 non-commissioned officers, and who have sub- 
 sequently been called out for training with their 
 units, must be regarded as ' inexperienced,' ' partially 
 trained,' and necessarily ' quite inferior ' to the 
 ordinary first-class Reservist. But if that be so, if, 
 as one of the War Office apologists has told us, men 
 who have served with the Colours for two years are 
 'unworthy of the name of a British soldier,' what 
 are we to say of the men who are to take their place ? 
 What value do the ' expert military advisers iof the 
 Government ' place upon Reservists whose maximum 
 period of training with the Colours (if service in little 
 squads in a desolate depot can be dignified by that 
 name) will have been six months, who will have 
 never seen their officers or their non-commissioned 
 officers, who will form no part of a real unit, and 
 have never gone through ' a substantial period of 
 service' abroad or anywhere else? Of course, the 
 fact is that when the military authorities unanimously 
 laid down two years' Colour Service as the minimum
 
 218 THE NEW STRIKING FORCE 
 
 training for the soldier, they were expressing military 
 opinion : when they were recommending, or what is 
 perhaps worse, countenancing, the introduction into 
 our Field Army of thousands of boys of six months' 
 training given under the worst possible conditions, 
 they were not expressing military opinion at all, but 
 were falling in with a political scheme which has 
 nothing whatever to do with war. 
 
 Enough has been said in this chapter to show 
 that, like every other statement that has been made 
 with regard to the new system, the official declaration 
 that the system has supplied us, or can ever supply 
 us with an Expeditionary Force of unparalleled 
 strength and exceptional quality, requires to be 
 examined with great care. That we ought to be able 
 to provide an Expeditionary Force of 160,000 men 
 is obvious; that if we are able to do so, we owe 
 our ability wholly to the Administrations of Lord 
 Lansdowne and Lord Midleton is equally obvious, 
 and that if we are not able to do so, our inability 
 is the direct outcome of the destructive policy of 
 the last three years.
 
 THE ARTILLERY MYTH 219 
 
 CHAPTER XXVIII 
 
 THE HORSE AND FIELD ARTILLERY MYTH 
 
 'A bad workman finds fault with his tools.' 
 GOOD ENOUGH FOR THE HOUSE OF COMMONS 
 
 IT is only those who have some special acquaint- 
 ance with Army organisation who can realise how 
 frequently and completely the House of Commons 
 has been misled during the last three years by the 
 official statements which have been made by the 
 Secretary of State or on his behalf. It is evidently 
 the opinion of those who furnish the material 
 for those statements that the House of Commons 
 being as a rule singularly ill-informed with regard 
 to military matters, it is desirable and legiti- 
 mate to take full advantage of that ignorance. On 
 no other hypothesis is it possible to account for 
 many of the statements which they put into 
 the mouth of the Secretary of State. A remark- 
 able example of this undesirable practice is to be 
 found in the declaration with regard to the Horse 
 and Field Artillery first made by Mr. Haldane in
 
 220 THE ARTILLERY MYTH 
 
 1906, and subsequently repeated by him on various 
 occasions when the necessities of a speech seemed 
 to require the introduction of a strong statement. 
 According to Mr. Haldane such was the condition of 
 the Artillery in 1905 that in January 1906 he could 
 only mobilise 42 Field Batteries. 
 
 Now let us see what are the facts. To begin with, 
 the Return issued on the motion of Lord Midleton in 
 November 1908 shows that between October 1905 
 and October 1908, the strength of the Horse and 
 Field Artillery, instead of increasing was diminished 
 by 1,811 officers and men; in other words, by the 
 strength of 2 Brigades of Royal Field Artillery with 
 their Ammunition Columns complete. That is Mr. 
 Haldane's contribution to the actual strengthening of 
 the Horse and Field Artillery. It must not be for- 
 gotten, however, that his activities have not ended 
 here, and that during the period referred to he has 
 also deprived the country of the services of no less 
 than 5,442 officers and men of the Royal Garrison 
 Artillery. In other words, we have lost since 
 ' clear thinking ' came into operation 7,253 trained 
 Artillerymen. 
 
 THE ARTILLERY BETWEEN 1899 AND 1906 
 
 Now let us see what was the action of the Admin- 
 istration on which Mr. Haldane has pronounced his 
 censure. What is the truth with regard to the 
 condition of the Artillery in 1905, and who is
 
 THE ARTILLERY : 1899 AND 1906 221 
 
 responsible for any improvement which may have 
 taken place since that date? 
 
 We have seen that Mr. Haldane has got rid of 
 1,811 officers and men of the Horse and Field 
 Artillery. Let us now inquire what was done by 
 the predecessors whom he so hastily condemns. As 
 early as 1899 Lord Lansdowne, knowing that the 
 Artillery was insufficient, sanctioned the addition 
 of 15 Batteries. His policy was continued and ex- 
 tended by his successors. Between 1899 and 1906, 
 6 Batteries of Horse Artillery, 58 Batteries of Field 
 Artillery, and 5 depots were added to the strength 
 of the Army. So much for the question of addition 
 or reduction. Whatever addition there has been it 
 is due solely to Mr. Haldane's predecessors. The 
 reduction is as purely his own work. 
 
 Now let us examine the statement that in January 
 1906 only 42 Field Batteries could be mobilised. 
 During the war in South Africa, there were actually 
 serving in the field 10 Batteries of Royal Horse 
 Artillery, 45 Batteries of Royal Field Artillery, and 
 12 Ammunition Columns. Of the Royal Horse Artil- 
 lery Batteries two, and of the Field Batteries three, 
 came from India. In January 1899 the strength of 
 the Horse and Field Artillery was 19,053, the 
 Reserve 5.320. 1 In January 1906 the strength of 
 
 1 The Reserve of Garrison and Field Artillery is not distinguished 
 4n the Return for 1899. The number given above is proportionate 
 to the strength.
 
 222 THE ARTILLERY MYTH 
 
 the Horse and Field Artillery was 31,254, and of the 
 Reserve 7,286. A total of 38,540, and an increase of 
 14,257 over the numbers available in 1899. If we 
 deduct from the total personnel in 1906 the numbers 
 on the Indian Establishment, viz. 10,852, we have 
 27,688 men remaining on the British Establishment. 
 
 According to the answer given by Mr. Haldane 
 on July 6, 1908, a Battery of Horse Artillery, omit- 
 ting details from other branches of the service, 
 requires 214 officers and men. 
 
 The Ammunition Column for a Battery R.H.A. 
 requires 120 all ranks, less 7 drivers A.S.C., or 113 
 net, making the total personnel for the Battery and 
 Ammunition Column 
 
 214 
 113 
 
 327 net. 
 
 The 17 R.H.A. Batteries on the British Establish- 
 ment will therefore require 5,559 all ranks. 
 
 There will thus remain available for the R.F.A. 
 
 27,668 
 5,559 
 
 22,109 
 
 A Brigade R.F.A., including Ammunition Column, 
 requires 964 all ranks, from which we must deduct 
 details from other branches 33, leaving net 931.
 
 THE ARTILLERY: 1899 AND 1906 223 
 
 The 50 Brigades on the British Establishment will 
 require 46,541, showing a deficit of 24,421. 
 
 But the 22,009 will suffice for 23 Brigades com- 
 plete with Ammunition Columns or for 69 Batteries, 
 leaving 81 Batteries unprovided for. 
 
 But between the 1st January 1906 and 1st 
 October 1908, there was an addition of 5,695 men 
 to the Reserve, sufficient to man 6 more Brigades, 
 or 18 Batteries, making the total available Batteries 
 87, and Batteries not available 62. 
 
 It will be seen, therefore, that the statement made 
 by the Secretary of State to the effect that, in January 
 1906, he could only mobilise 42 Batteries, is absurd. 
 In 1899, the number of Horse and Field Batteries on 
 the British Establishment actually serving in Africa 
 was 50. Since that date, as has been shown, 19,952 
 officers and men have been added to the Horse and 
 Field Artillery up to 1st October 1908, or up to 
 January 1906, 14,257. 
 
 The number added between 1899 and January 
 1906 was enough to mobilise 3 Batteries Royal 
 Horse Artillery with their Ammunition Columns and 
 14 Brigades, or 42 Batteries Royal Field Artillery 
 with Ammunition Columns. 
 
 It must be remembered that these figures have 
 been taken on the assumption that all the Batteries 
 and Ammunition Columns are manned on the highest 
 scale made necessary by the introduction of the 
 quick-firing gun. But, as a matter of fact, there
 
 224 THE ARTILLERY MYTH 
 
 were no Batteries so armed in 1906, and the strength 
 of both Batteries and Ammunition Columns would 
 have been much less than that which has been 
 assumed in the above calculations. 
 
 It is not suggested that either in 1906 or at the 
 present time every man on the rolls would be avail- 
 able for foreign service; large deductions must be 
 made on this account, and the figures given above 
 must be accepted subject to this modification ; 
 but deductions on this account are a constant 
 which must be reckoned with at all times, and 
 which, therefore, does not affect the comparison. 
 The fact remains that between 1899 and 1906, 
 14,257 men were added to the Horse and Field 
 Artillery, that since that date there has been an 
 addition of over 4,000 men to the Reserve, and the 
 whole of this addition has been made in spite of and 
 not because of the policy of ' clear thinking ' of 
 which Mr. Haldane has so often claimed the 
 monopoly. 
 
 THE ARTILLERY SECTION OF THE SPECIAL 
 RESERVE 
 
 I am well aware that something has been done 
 to increase the strength of the Horse and Field 
 Artillery on mobilisation by the institution of the 
 Artillery Section of the Special Reserve. As I have 
 often pointed out, this plan of utilising a part of the 
 redundant personnel of the Artillery Militia for the
 
 ARTILLERY: SPECIAL RESERVE 225 
 
 purpose of making up deficiencies in the Ammunition 
 Columns in time of war, is one of the very few 
 proposals of his predecessor which Mr Haldane has 
 not repudiated. The plan is on the whole a good 
 one, provided it be regarded as a make-shift only. 
 If it had been possible for the great master of ' clear 
 thinking ' to let anything alone, the process of trans- 
 ferring men from the Militia and Volunteer Artillery 
 to the Army Reserve would have begun in 1906 
 instead of 1908. 
 
 It must be clearly understood, however, that the 
 practice of reinforcing the Batteries and making up 
 the Ammunition Columns with partially trained and 
 inferior soldiers is not a sound one. Despite state- 
 ments to the contrary which have been made in the 
 House of Commons and elsewhere, the practice has 
 not been adopted, and would on no account be 
 tolerated, save as an emergency measure, in any of the 
 great armies of the world. It is from the drivers and 
 from the Ammunition Columns that the casualties 
 in the Batteries must be made good. The skilled 
 personnel will be the first to suffer in action, and if 
 it cannot be replaced, the Batteries will rapidly 
 deteriorate, and will soon cease to have any military 
 value. 1 
 
 1 It is interesting and curious to note that the military 
 correspondent of the Times, who was for so long an ardent 
 supporter of the official plan, has now adopted the view of the 
 author. He recommends the reduction of the number of Special 
 Reservists from 13,000 to 6,000, and the enlistment of a certain
 
 226 THE ARTILLERY MYTH 
 
 FRENCH FOUR-GUN BATTERIES AND BRITISH 
 TWO-GUN BATTERIES 
 
 We have not yet quite exhausted the subject of 
 the Artillery. The following is a remarkable 
 example of the danger of half truths. 
 
 The announcement in 1906 that the personnel of 
 the Royal Artillery was to be reduced by nearly 8,000 
 officers and men, and that Field Batteries were to 
 be reduced to a two-gun establishment, naturally 
 caused some alarm and provoked some criticism 
 in Parliament. It was desirable to dissipate this 
 alarm, and to meet this criticism. Accordingly, 
 on the 12th July 1906, Mr. Haldane informed the 
 House of Commons that the French War Office 
 had decided to reduce the whole of the Batteries of 
 the French Field Artillery to four guns. Here, 
 indeed, was a very relevant and important statement 
 eminently calculated to remove the fears and to 
 meet the objections of those who saw with regret 
 so large a proportion of our scanty Artillery Force 
 reduced to impotence. 
 
 But if the whole story, which is the true story, 
 had been told, a very different effect would have 
 been produced. It is true that the French have 
 reduced their Batteries from six guns to four. But 
 
 number of men for three years with the Colours. This frank 
 acceptance of a principle for which he has so long contended is 
 very gratifying to the author. (See Col. A'Conrt Repington's 
 address to the Aldershot Military Society, 27th January 1909.)
 
 FRENCH AND BRITISH BATTERIES 227 
 
 why ? Because they thought they were too strong ? 
 Because they desired to turn one-third of their 
 Batteries into training schools for Volunteers ? Not 
 at all. The French know better. Their one great 
 fear is lest they should be outclassed and overborne 
 by the German Artillery. The reduction was made, 
 as any soldier in the War Office could have told Mr. 
 Haldane, with the sole object of making the French 
 Artillery stronger. For that reason, and for that 
 reason alone, was the reduction sanctioned. The 
 French Artillerymen believe that, in view of the 
 increased number of wagons necessitated by the 
 introduction of the quick-firing gun, it is better to 
 reduce the length of the unit, thus rendering it more 
 mobile, and reducing the space occupied by it in 
 column of route. 
 
 It is true that this change has led to a temporary 
 diminution of the number of guns per thousand 
 men ; and anyone who is familiar with the French 
 military literature is aware that this shortage is a 
 matter of the greatest concern to the French authori- 
 ties. The only question at issue is as to how 
 completely and how quickly the shortage may be 
 made good. It will be seen, therefore, that the 
 action of the French War Office furnishes no analogy 
 whatever for that of our own. It was dictated by 
 wholly different considerations ; it was carried out in 
 a wholly different manner ; and it was adopted, not 
 with the view of reducing any French Batteries to
 
 228 THE ARTILLERY MYTH 
 
 impotence, but of making all the French Batteries 
 more effective. 
 
 It is obvious that if the true story had been told 
 to the House of Commons the words used by the 
 Secretary of State for War would have been perfectly 
 meaningless, or at least would have had a meaning 
 very different from that which they conveyed, and 
 were intended to convey. But it seems a pity that 
 the truth was not told, even at the cost of abandoning 
 an effective Parliamentary statement.
 
 THE TERRITORIAL ARTILLERY 229 
 
 CHAPTER XXIX 
 
 MILITARY OPINION ON THE TERRITORIAL 
 ARTILLERY 
 
 'Learn from expert inquirers after truth; 
 Whose only care, might truth presume to speak, 
 Is not to find what they profess to seek.' 
 
 Cowper, ' Tirocinium.' 
 
 WHAT SOLDIERS REALLY THINK 
 
 IT would be impossible to close this list of 
 instances in which Parliament and the public have 
 been deceived and misled without a reference to 
 the correspondence which took place between the 
 Secretary of State for War and the author in 
 March 1908. The correspondence is reprinted in 
 the Appendix (p. 257). It will be seen that it refers 
 to a very important matter, namely, the value in 
 war time of the new Territorial Horse and Field 
 Artillery. 
 
 It was natural enough that when it was first 
 announced by Mr. Haldane that it was proposed to 
 reduce no less than 33 Batteries of Regular Artillery 
 to a two-gun training establishment in other words, 
 to make over 30 per cent, of the Field Artillery on the 
 British Establishment useless for war considerable
 
 230 THE TERRITORIAL ARTILLERY 
 
 surprise and alarm was felt by those who know how 
 insufficient our Regular Artillery is, and how essential 
 it is that it should be largely increased instead of 
 being diminished. The surprise and alarm created 
 by the announcement of this policy of destruction 
 were by no means diminished when it was further 
 announced that as a compensation for the Regular 
 Batteries which were to be rendered useless, 172 
 Territorial Batteries of Horse and Field Artillery 
 were to be created, and were to be tied by law to the 
 one place where they were least likely to be wanted, 
 namely, the soil of the United Kingdom. 
 
 But the most alarming feature of the whole 
 scheme was, undoubtedly, the fact that the training 
 of these new Batteries was to be of an entirely 
 illusory character, that they were to have no regular 
 officers, and were to remain without horses on the 
 outbreak of war. 
 
 The opinions expressed as to the folly of the 
 proceeding were numerous and emphatic^ Lord 
 Roberts, with a lifetime's experience as a gunner, 
 spoke out boldly and bluntly in his place in the House 
 of Lords as follows: 
 
 I cannot alter by one iota the opinion I expressed in 
 this House two months ago, that the Territorial A rtillery, 
 on such a scale as is proposed, would entail vast expense 
 to this country in peace, without the hope of any corre- 
 sponding return in war. I repeat that I consider that 
 it would be not only valueless, but a source of danger both 
 in peace and war in peace, because the fact of its existence
 
 WHAT SOLDIERS REALLY THINK 231 
 
 would lull the public into a false sense of security ; 
 in war, because of its inability to afford the necessary 
 support to the other arms, or to cope with the trained 
 artillery by which it would be opposed. . . . Know- 
 ing as I do that it is hopeless even to expect them to 
 become efficient enough to be trusted in the field, and as 
 I have shown that by the scheme they would be the only 
 artillery available for home defence, I consider it my 
 duty to use every effort to prevent the wholesale adoption 
 of a measure which I regard as fraught with possible 
 disaster to this country. 1 
 
 The military correspondent of the Times was 
 even more emphatic in his condemnation of the new 
 Force. He spoke with weight, in the first place 
 because he had just had before him an object lesson 
 in the matter of Artillery Training ; and in the second 
 place because he voiced the opinion of every Artillery 
 officer at home and abroad up to the time of his 
 pronouncement. 
 
 It was on his return from witnessing the practice 
 of the Royal Artillery with the new Q.F. 18-pounder 
 gun that he was moved to write as follows : 
 
 ' // any politician believes he is going to obtain 
 officers fit to command modern quick-firing batteries 
 from among people who do not give up their whole time 
 to the study and practice of the science of artillery, the 
 first battle in which these persons are engaged will dis- 
 abuse him of his belief. Half -trained officers and half- 
 trained men have no business to touch these guns. They 
 will not get half the results obtained by the trained 
 hands ; they will get no useful result at all. Better far 
 1 House of Lords, 18th May 1908. '
 
 232 THE TERRITORIAL ARTILLERY 
 
 to arm them with ancient smooth bores and the simple 
 contrivances of museum artillery, for then, at least, their 
 efforts would not be entirely wasted' 
 
 It must be borne in mind that the 15 -pounder 
 which has been placed in the hands of the Territorial 
 Artillery is both more complicated and less effective 
 than the 18-pounder. Sir Ian Hamilton, fresh 
 from observing artillery in action in Manchuria, 
 publicly announced that in his opinion three Batteries 
 of the new Artillery could barely be expected to hold 
 their own against one Regular Battery, and there is 
 probably not an Artillery officer in the Service who 
 knows anything of his trade who does not regard 
 this estimate on the part of a distinguished Infantry 
 officer as almost absurdly sanguine. These frank 
 expressions of opinion were obviously most un- 
 palatable to the Army Council. Public opinion was 
 naturally moved by such a unanimity of condemna- 
 tion, and it became necessary to remove the un- 
 favourable impression at all costs. The Secretary of 
 State threw himself into the task with characteristic 
 energy. He declared that military opinion was in 
 fact strongly in favour of the experiment ; he cited 
 by name two officers of distinction actually serving 
 in the War Office, who, he declared, were advocates 
 of the creation of Volunteer Field Artillery, and he 
 instructed or permitted his representative in the 
 House of Lords to declare that he could not produce 
 any Official Minute or Report recommending the
 
 SUPPRESSIO VERI 233 
 
 creation of Volunteer Field Artillery solely because 
 the question had not been officially considered, and 
 consequently no such report existed. 
 
 SUPPRESSIO VERI 
 
 Now let us see what are the facts. When Lord 
 Portsmouth declared that no Committee had recom- 
 mended the course pursued, and that consequently 
 there were no records to produce, he was technically 
 correct. No War Office Committee ever did any- 
 thing so foolish and unsoldierly as to recommend the 
 practical destruction of 33 Regular Batteries, and 
 the creation of a great force of partially trained 
 gunners in its place. 
 
 But when the Under-Secretary of State made, and 
 the Secretary of State approved, this declaration, these 
 Ministers were well aware that a War Office Com- 
 mittee had been appointed to deal with this very 
 subject, that it had reported only a few weeks before 
 the answer was given to the House of Lords; and 
 that, after very full inquiry, it had unanimously con- 
 demned such a scheme. It is greatly to be regretted 
 that, possessing this knowledge, the two Ministers in 
 question combined to withhold what they knew 
 from Parliament, for the knowledge was very relevant 
 to the question asked. 
 
 Again, it is to be regretted that when, in order to 
 find some sort of military backing for his unfortunate 
 scheme, Mr. Haldane cited two distinguished officers
 
 234 THE TERRITORIAL ARTILLERY 
 
 whose names were entitled to carry weight, he 
 omitted to add that he had under his hand the 
 printed opinions of those very officers given only a 
 few weeks before in most elaborate form, and to 
 mention that these printed opinions which he 
 possessed then and possesses now, were in direct 
 contradiction of those which he had attributed to the 
 officers in question. 1 
 
 A STATEMENT AND A CHALLENGE 
 
 It was my opinion when I raised this question in 
 Parliament, and it is my opinion still, that the public 
 was deliberately and unjustifiably misled in this 
 matter. The proof of my assertion lies in Mr. 
 Haldane's hands. It is to be found in the official 
 documents which I have named before, and which, in 
 order that there may be no mistake, I will name again. 
 
 The true opinions of the principal military 
 authorities at the War Office with regard to the 
 question of Volunteer Field Artillery are to be found 
 in the following official papers now in the War 
 Office 
 
 (l) Minute by the Secretary of State addressed to 
 the Chief of the General Staff, and dated September 
 29th, 1905. 
 
 1 It is, of course, impossible for me to assert that within three 
 months these distinguished officers, with no new facts to guide 
 them, did not entirely change their opinions, and were ardent 
 advocates in February 1906 of that which they had so unsparingly 
 and so scientifically condemned in 1905. But that in November 
 1905 they did hold, and did express, those opinions, is a fact which 
 is altogether beyond dispute.
 
 A STATEMENT AND A CHALLENGE 235 
 
 (2) Minute by the Director of Military Training to 
 the Chief of the General Staff, dated October 6th, 
 1908. 
 
 (3) Minute by the Chief of the General Staff to 
 the Master-General of the Ordnance, dated October 7th, 
 1905. 
 
 (4) A Minute by the Master-General of the Ord- 
 nance to the Chief of the General Staff, dated October 
 12th, 1905. 
 
 (5) Proceedings of a Conference held on November 
 9th, 1905, under the presidency of General MacKinnon, 
 Director of Auxiliary Forces. 
 
 (6) Minute by Col. May, Assistant Director of 
 Military Training, to the Chief of the General Staff, 
 dated November 10th, 1905. 
 
 (7) Minute by the Chief of the General Staff to the 
 Secretary of State, dated November 13th, 1905. 
 
 (8) Minute by the Secretary of State, dated Novem- 
 ber 15th, 1905. 
 
 (9) Precis No. 264, laid before the Army Council. 
 
 The opinions contained in these papers do not 
 coincide with those attributed by Mr. Haldane to 
 his military advisers. On the contrary, they are in 
 direct conflict with those opinions, but they do 
 coincide with the views of sane Artillery officers in 
 every army in the world. 
 
 Mr. Haldane has refused to produce, or to allow 
 me to produce, these documents, on the ground that 
 their production would be ' undesirable in the public 
 interest.'
 
 236 THE TERRITORIAL ARTILLERY 
 
 THE DANGER OF BEING IN A HURRY 
 
 I decline to accept this reason, and I do not 
 regard it as the true one. Mr. Haldane has never 
 had the slightest scruple about producing official 
 papers. He has himself cited officers by name, while 
 prohibiting the quotation of their views. He has 
 actually gone so far as to obtain from officers serving, 
 papers prepared in hot haste for special use in 
 Parliament. 
 
 But all this haste, all this zeal to prove that 
 which will never be proved, can avail nothing. There 
 is not an army in the world in which the underlying 
 principle of Mr. Haldane's artillery reform would 
 not be scouted as midsummer madness. 
 
 I decline to believe that it is in the interests of 
 the Army, or in the interests of the Artillery in war, 
 that the truth has been withheld. On the contrary, 
 I believe that it has been withheld, and is still 
 withheld, because its publication would render a 
 continuance of the new policy impossible. I once 
 more ask that the prohibition under which I have 
 been laid may be withdrawn, so that the truth 
 may appear. 
 
 CONCLUSION 
 
 Many more instances might be cited of in- 
 accurate and misleading statements such as those 
 which have already been described, but enough has
 
 CONCLUSION 237 
 
 been said to demonstrate the correctness of the 
 proposition which the last three chapters in this 
 book are intended to enforce. At the risk of 
 reiteration it may be well to restate that proposition. 
 It is this : 
 
 During the last three years many statements 
 have been made by, or on behalf of, the War Office, 
 which have been calculated to mislead, and have 
 misled, a very large number of persons. That the 
 tendency of all these misrepresentations and mis- 
 statements has been to withdraw public attention 
 from the most important aspects of our military 
 policy, and to induce Parliament and the public to 
 acquiesce in a series of changes which they would 
 never have accepted or tolerated had the true facts 
 been put before them.
 
 APPENDICES 
 
 APPENDIX I 
 
 VOLUNTEER CREWS FOR DESTROYERS AND 
 TORPEDO-BOATS l 
 
 Memorandum by the Author 
 
 VIS-A-VIS Germany, this country is at a great disadvantage 
 in case of war in certain respects. Germany possesses an 
 unrivalled army, practically unlimited in numbers, highly 
 trained, and under the most skilful direction. A declara- 
 tion of war, as a matter of policy, has been accepted by 
 Prussia as legitimate and necessary for over two hundred 
 years. War having been decided on as a matter of 
 policy, preparations are made for the successful conduct 
 of that war, and for its declaration at the most favourable 
 moment. At the present time, moreover, Germany has 
 the advantage of possessing a number of very completely 
 equipped ports, which, for the most part, are inaccessible 
 from the sea. All preparations exist in Hamburg, 
 Brunsbuttel, Bremerhaven, and elsewhere, for the rapid 
 embarkation of troops, and ample transport is always 
 available. 
 
 While Germany possesses these undoubted advan- 
 tages, this country also possesses advantages which 
 should not be overlooked. In the first place, the United 
 Kingdom lies in the direct path of German shipping ; all 
 
 1 The First Lord of the Admiralty was good enough to accept 
 a copy of this memorandum. 
 
 239
 
 240 APPENDICES 
 
 German vessels must either pass down the Channel, in 
 which case for nearly two hundred miles they are within 
 fifty miles of our coast, or they must expend time and 
 coal in passing round the North of Scotland into the 
 Atlantic. 
 
 In the second place, inasmuch as this country 
 cherishes no aggressive designs against Germany, and 
 would be altogether unable to carry such designs into 
 effect if they existed, the conflict between the countries 
 must take the form of an attack upon the United King- 
 dom by Germany. In other words, the Germans must 
 come to us, and, by doing so, must expose themselves to 
 the full action of the Navy. 
 
 Lastly, the United Kingdom has an advantage due to 
 the fact that it possesses, in a higher degree than any other 
 country in the world, a population trained to the sea and 
 following the sea for the love of it. This population is 
 composed of yachtsmen, boat-sailors, &c., and, as will be 
 shown, in time of war there will be added to it a very large 
 number of persons professionally connected with the sea, 
 but who will be out of employment in time of war. At 
 the present time we take practically no advantage of the 
 superiority which the existence of this population may be 
 made to confer. It is suggested that the time has come 
 for taking advantage of it. 
 
 The Volunteer movement on land has already attained 
 large proportions. It is not proposed here to discuss the 
 military value of Volunteers raised for military purposes, 
 and whose services are absolutely limited to the soil of 
 the United Kingdom ; but one or two observations with 
 regard to the Volunteers are necessary to illustrate the 
 argument. 
 
 It may be conceded that the Volunteers, or Territorial 
 Army, furnish evidence of an exceedingly good spirit, and 
 that the Force probably contains the best military material
 
 VOLUNTEER CREWS 241 
 
 we possess. At the same time, it is necessary to observe 
 that the officers and men of the Territorial Army must 
 necessarily be ' amateurs.' That is to say, their military 
 exercises must form an interlude only in their ordinary 
 life, and such knowledge of military affairs as they 
 possess must be acquired in addition to, and apart from, 
 their professional work. 
 
 It should also be noted that whatever may be the 
 value of the Territorial Army, acting in the field against 
 foreign troops, its value, as long as this country possesses 
 any serious force upon the sea, must be exceedingly small. 
 It is probably true to say that while the history of war 
 affords innumerable instances of a landing being success- 
 fully accomplished in face of a military opposition only, 
 there is no recorded instance of a successful landing in 
 face of serious naval resistance. It would seem, there- 
 fore, reasonable to consider whether our power of opposing 
 naval resistance to an enemy cannot be increased. 
 
 It is suggested that it can be increased by utilising 
 that portion of the population to which reference has 
 been made. There are in this country thousands of men 
 who follow the sea for the love of the sea, who are 
 intimately acquainted with our coasts, with all the tides, 
 channels, harbours, within our territorial waters. In 
 respect of five-sixths of the work which would be required 
 from them in time of war, these men are not amateurs at 
 all. On the contrary, in all such matters as seamanship, 
 pilotage, knowledge of the local waters, freedom from 
 sea-sickness, and boat-handling, they are far ahead of 
 the average of qualification and accomplishment in the 
 Royal Navy. Moreover, these men are for the most 
 part highly intelligent and active persons, alert, enter- 
 prising, and accustomed to hardship. At present they 
 are not utilised for the purposes of National Defence. 
 It is suggested that they should be utilised.
 
 242 APPENDICES 
 
 But in addition to the yachtsmen and boat-sailors, 
 we have another great source hitherto untouched. In 
 the event of war with Germany thousands of very highly 
 trained men will at once be out of work, viz. 
 
 1. The Officers and Crews of North Sea Packets and 
 
 Cargo Steamers. 
 
 2. The Officers and Crews of all the North Sea and 
 
 Baltic Sailing Vessels. 
 
 3. The North Sea Pilots. 
 
 4. A large number of the North Sea Fishermen, 
 
 especially those frequenting the Dogger Bank. 
 
 The men following corresponding occupations in 
 Germany will all be embodied in the German Navy, 
 where their technical skill, local knowledge, combined 
 with the military training they have received, will render 
 them most valuable. Under our present organisation 
 there is no room for any of these men in our own Navy. 
 So absurd, indeed, are our arrangements, that the captain 
 of a cross-Channel mail-boat, a highly educated and 
 intelligent seaman, whose business it is to drive his 
 ship at full speed night and day throughout the year, is 
 actually debarred by the Regulations from receiving a 
 Commission in the R.N.R., because his ship, after the 
 Board of Trade deductions for passenger space have been 
 made, has less than the prescribed tonnage. The captain 
 of a Newcastle nine-knot collier can, however, obtain a 
 Commission. 
 
 It is proposed that the opportunity of volunteering 
 for the Naval Defence of the country should be offered 
 to the men comprised in the various categories above 
 named. It should be specially noted that whereas, in 
 the event of war, the vast majority of the officers and men 
 of the Territorial Army would be specially required to
 
 VOLUNTEER CREWS 243 
 
 stay at home and carry on their various businesses, the 
 persons to whom it is proposed that an appeal should 
 be made, would be automatically set free on the 
 declaration of war, and would be unable to resume their 
 ordinary occupations until the war was over. It is 
 proposed, therefore, that these men should be asked to 
 volunteer for service in time of war, but that their duties 
 should be different from those of the existing Naval 
 Volunteers. The existing Naval Volunteers, apart from 
 certain special ratings, such as signalmen, perform no very 
 useful function ; they are practically told off to do 
 bluejackets' work, and the special qualities which many 
 of them undoubtedly possess do not enable them to 
 perform this work either better or worse than an ordinary 
 bluejacket. Good material is wasted because it is 
 misapplied. 
 
 The following scheme is, therefore, proposed. As an 
 initial experiment, one or two of the maritime towns, e.g. 
 Harwich, Hull, Bristol, or Southampton, should be asked 
 to furnish two crews for a Destroyer or first-class T.B.D., 
 the Admiralty undertaking to assign a boat to the 
 selected port. The local corps would be responsible for 
 the care of the boat and for the maintenance of the 
 personnel, with the aid of such grants as the Admiralty 
 might think fit to give. A complete crew would have to 
 turn out for a fortnight for manoeuvres in each year, 
 during which time they would receive Admiralty pay and 
 rations, and, as a condition of recognition, they would have 
 to satisfy the Admiralty requirements in respect of drill, 
 signalling, engine-room and stoke-hold control, use of 
 Q.-F. gun and the Whitehead torpedo. 
 
 OFFICERS 
 
 The Commissioned Officers should, in the first instance 
 at any rate, be retired officers of the Royal Navy. 
 
 R 2
 
 244 APPENDICES 
 
 ENGINE-ROOM AND STORE-HOLD RATINGS 
 
 These can easily be supplied, and to an almost 
 unlimited extent. At Hull, Harwich, Brighton, New- 
 haven, and elsewhere there are hundreds of very com- 
 petent engineers, mechanics, and firemen ; men accustomed 
 to drive, stoke, and supervise the high-pressure engines of 
 fast mail-boats and yachts, and to do heavy repairs in 
 harbour, and who are also experts in all the delicate work of 
 locomotive factories, including the manipulation of the high- 
 pressure air or vacuum cylinders for the Westinghouse 
 brakes. 
 
 It is probable that stoke-hold and engine-room crews 
 would have to be paid, but this need present no difficulty. 
 They can be paid on special occasions, as the band of a 
 Territorial regiment is now paid. 
 
 TORPEDO RATINGS 
 
 It would probably be necessary to have a certain 
 number of skilled Torpedo men attached to the ports, for 
 the purpose of regulating and keeping in order Torpedoes, 
 but the art of discharging these weapons could 
 undoubtedly be learnt under proper instruction by the 
 men likely to be employed. 
 
 SIGNALLING 
 
 There would not be the least difficulty in obtaining 
 any number of very expert signalmen. 
 
 Provided that the initial experiment were a success, 
 it could be definitely extended, and there is no reason 
 why a boat should not be stationed in every con- 
 siderable port. The boats would, of course, be under 
 proper naval control. In the event of war they could 
 rendezvous at any point, and would undoubtedly make 
 the coast unapproachable by an enemy.
 
 VOLUNTEER CREWS 245 
 
 It may be objected that the boats would interfere 
 with naval arrangements. This is merely a question of 
 organisation, but it must be remembered that many of the 
 existing Destroyers, for the manning of which provision 
 is made, will in time of war be employed far from the 
 coast. It is certain that in this event pressure will be put 
 upon the Admiralty to furnish something in the nature 
 of coast defence. It is submitted that it could not be 
 more effectively furnished than on the lines proposed. 
 
 H. O. A.-F. 
 
 22-6-08.
 
 246 APPENDICES 
 
 APPENDIX II 
 
 STATEMENT showing the PRINCIPAL ITEMS which 
 account for the REDUCTIONS in the BRITISH 
 ESTABLISHMENTS in the INTERVAL between 1ST 
 OCTOBER 1905 and the IST OCTOBER 1908. 
 
 ESTIMATES, 1906-07 
 
 R.G.A. Reduction of four companies, and reductions 
 owing to General Slade's Committee. 
 
 Royal Engineers : 
 
 Reduction of one company and revision of establish- 
 ment of Fortress Units in connexion with the abolition 
 of Submarine Mining. 
 
 Reduction of two companies in the Colonies. 
 
 Infantry : 
 
 Reorganisation of Infantry dep&ts on the formation of 
 Record Offices. 
 
 Reduction of five battalions of the Royal Garrison 
 Regiment. 
 
 ESTIMATES 1907-08 
 
 Cavalry : 
 
 Changes in establishment owing to there being two 
 regiments fewer at Home, formation of a provisional 
 dep&t, and postponement of the scheme for the formation 
 of two large dep&ts.
 
 ARMY RETURNS 247 
 
 A rtillery : 
 
 R.H.A. Reduction of one depot. 
 
 R.F.A. Reduction of three dep6ts. 
 
 R.G.A. Reduction of three companies, two dep&ts, 
 and Regimental District Staff. 
 
 Reductions owing to the recommendations of General 
 Owen's Committee. 
 
 Royal Engineers: 
 
 Reorganisation of Royal Engineer field units at Home. 
 Reductions owing to recommendations of General 
 Owen's Committee. 
 
 Reduction of Brennan Torpedo defences. 
 
 Foot Guards : 
 
 Disbandment of 3rd Battalion Scots Guards and 
 reduction of Irish Guards by 100 men. 
 
 Infantry of the Line : 
 
 Reduction of dep6t establishments, and of 30 privates 
 from each of 71 battalions at Home. Reduction of 8 
 battalions abroad. (74 privates added to each of 25 
 battalions remaining abroad.) 
 
 A rmy Service Corps : 
 
 Disbandment of one company, and reductions at the 
 Remount Dep&t. 
 
 ESTIMATES, 1908-09 
 
 Royal Garrison Artillery : 
 
 Reduction by 1,000 non-commissioned officers and 
 men.
 
 248 
 
 APPENDICES 
 
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 APPENDICES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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 252 APPENDICES 
 
 Attention has already been called (see page 115) to 
 some very serious inaccuracies in the above Return ; but 
 the list of errors has not been exhausted. The statement 
 as to the strength of the Special Reserve, appearing as 
 it does without comment or explanation, is misleading in 
 the highest degree. It will be observed that the Special 
 Reserve on the 1st October 1908 is stated to have 
 numbered 59,534. Save in a purely technical sense, this 
 is a mere fancy, for it includes all the men who are 
 merely passing through the Special Reserve on the way 
 to the Regular Army. The officers commanding the 
 depots know perfectly well that of the men temporarily 
 under their command, a proportion varying from 40 per 
 cent, to as much as 90 per cent, have no more intention of 
 remaining in the Special Reserve than of joining the Salva- 
 tion Army, and yet every one of these men is included in 
 the official total, and will be included again in the official 
 Return as a Regular soldier with the Colours. A single 
 example out of many which have come under the notice 
 of the writer will suffice to illustrate the deception which 
 is being practised. A battalion has recently been made up 
 to full strength preparatory to departure for foreign service. 
 In order to make it up to strength, numbers of men have 
 been transferred to it from depots other than its own. 
 Of these, a considerable portion are Special Reservists 
 from a single depot. Every one of these men appears 
 in the Return as a Special Reservist, and will appear 
 again indeed, has already appeared as a Line Infantry- 
 man. And everyone who has had to do with these 
 soldiers has known from the beginning that they had no 
 intention of joining the Special Reserve, and never 
 would join it. Yet once more populus vult decipi 
 and a satisfactory total of Special Reservists had to be 
 produced. 
 
 Again, it must be remembered that the Special
 
 ARMY RETURNS 253 
 
 Reserve at present includes some thousands of Militia- 
 men, who are simply remaining in the Force to complete 
 their term of service, and to earn their bounty. No 
 one studying the Return would become aware from its 
 terms of this important fact.
 
 254 APPENDICES 
 
 APPENDIX III 
 
 CIRCULAR TO THE UNEMPLOYED ISSUED BY THE 
 WAR OFFICE, OCTOBER 1908 
 
 ' IT may be that owing to trade depression the difficulty 
 of providing work will be somewhat acute during the 
 coming winter, and employers of labour, while anxious to 
 retain their men in employment, will find considerable 
 difficulty in employing them during the winter months, 
 owing to slackness of trade. The question is whether 
 the newly-organised Special Reserve can be made use of 
 to provide temporary employment during the winter 
 months. The Militia in the past did not adequately 
 afford the assistance required, as recruits were only 
 drilled on enlistment for 49 days. The substitution of 
 the new arrangements of the Special Reserve may, how- 
 ever, meet the difficulty. The Special Reserve takes 
 recruits for the R.F.A., the R.E., and the Infantry of the 
 Line, and in Ireland for two units of Garrison Artillery. 
 Recruits for these arms are enlisted to train on enlist- 
 ment for six months, unless the musketry is to be per- 
 formed immediately prior to the annual training, in which 
 case the actual training on enlistment is reduced to five 
 months. The age for enlistment into the Special Reserve 
 is from 17 to 30 years of age. 
 
 ' The pay varies according to the arm of the Service 
 and the age of the recruit, from 7s. a week in the case of
 
 CIRCULAR TO THE UNEMPLOYED 255 
 
 Infantry to 8s. S\d. in the R.A., if the recruit is under 18 
 years of age ; and if the recruit is 18 years of age on 
 enlistment the pay is from 8s. 9d. a week in the Infantry 
 to 10s. 2\d. in the R.A. On completing the period of 
 drill on enlistment, the recruit receives a bounty of 30s. 
 Afterwards, as stated below, he receives, in addition to 
 his pay, four bounties in each year of \ each. It will 
 be seen, therefore, that employers of labour can, to a 
 certain degree, remedy the want of employment by 
 advising the younger of their employees to spend the 
 winter in the Special Reserve, and, by this means, 
 obtain the weekly pay mentioned above, in addition to 
 free food, quarters, bedding, fuel and light ; while the 
 men, as a rule, will not be so far distant from their homes 
 that it will be impossible for them to return on Saturday 
 afternoon till Sunday evening on leave. 
 
 ' The question will be asked for how long the recruit 
 who takes advantage of these terms will be committed. 
 The answer is for six years ; six months in the first year, 
 and from 15 to 21 days in each subsequent year. But a 
 recruit in ordinary circumstances is allowed to purchase 
 his discharge at any time for 3. If he remains in the 
 service he receives three non-training bounties of l 
 each, payable in October, December, and February, and 
 an annual training bounty of \. 
 
 ' Employers of labour may be afraid that their men 
 may be taken away from them at a busy time, and be 
 called out for annual training. This annual training, 
 however, in the case of the Infantry, lasts only for 21 days, 
 while in the case of other corps it is only 15 days, and, 
 as the dates of training are fixed locally by the general 
 officer commanding the district, the requirements and 
 conditions of each part of the country are studied in 
 connection with the training of its Special Reserve units. 
 Any employer of labour who desires to know more of the
 
 256 APPENDICES 
 
 conditions of service in the Special Reserve on behalf of 
 any of his employees, and also the local units in which 
 vacancies exist, can get full information by applying to 
 the nearest recruiting officer or other local military 
 authority.'
 
 TERRITORIAL ARTILLERY 257 
 
 APPENDIX IV 
 
 THE TRUTH ABOUT MILITARY OPINION AND THE 
 TERRITORIAL ARTILLERY 
 
 Correspondence between the Secretary of State for 
 War and the Author, in March 1908 
 
 2, The Abbey Garden, Westminster, 
 30th March 1908. 
 
 DEAR HALDANE, I have postponed writing to you for 
 some days, thinking that you might possibly wish to add 
 something to the answer you gave to a question put by me in 
 the House of Commons on the 18th March. As I have not 
 heard from you, I now ask leave to recur to the subject. 
 You may remember that in the question I asked you, 
 whether, in view of the great importance of the matter 
 to which the question referred (the creation of 196 
 batteries of volunteer field artillery) you would 'lay 
 upon the table the report of a Departmental Committee, 
 under the presidency of General MacKinnon, Director of 
 Auxiliary Forces, appointed in 1905 to consider the 
 advisability of creating volunteer field batteries, together 
 with the minutes referring to the same by Sir Frederick 
 Stopford, Director of Military Training; Sir Neville 
 Lyttelton, Chief of the General Staff; and the Secretary 
 of State for War, dated respectively September 29, 
 October 6, October 7, October 13, 1905.' Your reply 
 was as follows : ' As regards the last part of the ques- 
 tion, I cannot undertake to lay on the table documents, 
 
 s
 
 258 APPENDICES 
 
 which refer to discussions which took place between my 
 predecessor in office and his confidential advisers.' 
 
 But, though you declared yourself unable to produce 
 the papers asked for, you took occasion on the 19th inst. 
 to give what purported to be the tenour of the most 
 important of them. You stated that in 1905 the Chief 
 of the General Staff had objected to the proposal to 
 utilise the Lanarkshire and the Sheffield Volunteer 
 Artillery on the ground that ' No systematic training 
 on a war footing was proposed for the whole of the 
 volunteers,' leaving it to be inferred that, had such 
 training been proposed, Sir Neville Lyttelton would have 
 been prepared to waive his objection. No statement 
 warranting such a conclusion appears in any of the 
 documents, nor, as far as I am aware, was any such 
 opinion ever expressed by the Chief of the General Staff. 
 
 It appears to me that by withholding the papers, and 
 at the same time giving an account of their tenour which 
 their contents do not bear out, you have produced an 
 impression upon the public mind which is not justified 
 by the facts, and have created a situation which is unfair 
 to me. I naturally desire, therefore, to clear up the 
 obscurity which I believe to exist, and I propose, unless 
 you forbid me, to print and circulate the documents 
 referred to in my question. I do not anticipate any 
 refusal on your part. These papers are not, as I think 
 your answer might lead some people to suppose, private 
 communications between myself and the officers con- 
 cerned; they are printed minutes forming part of the 
 records of the War Office, they were written officially in 
 connection with the report of a departmental committee, 
 and they were the basis of a decision by the Army 
 Council. I note that Lord Portsmouth, when asked to 
 produce the official papers recording the adoption by the 
 Army Council of the policy of creating 196 batteries of
 
 TERRITORIAL ARTILLERY 259 
 
 volunteer field artillery, declined to produce them, not 
 because there was any official objection to doing so, but 
 because there were no such papers in existence. A 
 similar difficulty does not arise in the present case. The 
 question of creating volunteer field batteries was very 
 fully and carefully discussed at the end of 1905, and the 
 deliberate opinions of the officers who took part in the 
 discussion were placed on record, not in haste, or for 
 the purpose of being read out in Parliament, but with 
 the full responsibility of their authors, who were called 
 upon to form a decision and to act upon it. 
 
 I think that these papers should be circulated in the 
 public interest. You have very frequently cited military 
 opinion in favour of a policy which, whatever may be its 
 merits or demerits, must inevitably have very far-reaching 
 consequences. You have gone farther; you have 
 mentioned by name two of the officers by whom I had 
 the honour of being advised, and whose minutes lie 
 before me. You have actually gone so far as to suggest 
 to the House of Commons that I myself was in favour of 
 the policy which you have now adopted. I do not 
 pretend to know what the views of the distinguished 
 soldiers I have referred to may be at the present time, 
 but I do know what they thought and said as late as 
 October 1905 ; and I have no hesitation in saying that 
 they were at that time wholly opposed to the policy of 
 reducing the Royal Artillery and of creating 196 batteries 
 of volunteer field artillery. Their views, so far from 
 coinciding with those which you have so often laid before 
 the public as representative of military opinion, involved 
 in fact the exact contradictory of that opinion. As to 
 the suggestion that I myself had changed my frequently- 
 expressed views upon this matter, it is, if I may say so, 
 almost absurd. My views have been on public record at 
 every stage ; they have not changed, and certainly 
 
 s 2
 
 260 APPENDICES 
 
 nothing has taken place during the last two years which 
 has been calculated to change them. 
 
 I fully admit that as Secretary of State and head of 
 the Department you have a perfect right to forbid the 
 publication of any papers in charge of your Department, 
 and if you withhold your permission I shall act in the 
 future as I have done in the past I shall neither produce 
 nor quote from any of these minutes. But I think the 
 permission I ask for ought to be accorded, in the first 
 place, because it is desirable that the public should know 
 what military opinion was in October 1905. When this 
 is known it will be a simple process to discover what 
 were the causes which so completely changed it in 1906. 
 In the second place, though this is a much less important 
 matter, I think it is just to me that this publication 
 should take place. If it were the fact that during my 
 tenure of office military opinion had been unanimously 
 in favour of the reduction of the Royal Artillery and the 
 creation of a vast number of volunteer batteries, I might 
 fairly be blamed for not giving effect to this unanimous 
 advice, and for continuing to write and speak as if it had 
 never been tendered. As a matter of fact no such advice 
 ever was tendered, and, as I think you must be aware, it 
 was at my instance that my colleagues consented, some- 
 what reluctantly I must admit, to make a limited 
 experiment under very special conditions. 
 
 The documents which I desire should be made public 
 are the following : 1. Minute by the Secretary of State 
 addressed to the Chief of the General Staff, and dated 
 29th September 1905. 2. Minute by the Director of 
 Military Training to the C.G.S., dated 6th October 
 1905. 3. Minute by the C.G.S. to the Master-General 
 of the Ordnance, dated 7th October 1905. 4. Minute 
 by the M.G.O. to the C.G.S., dated 12th October 1905. 
 5. Proceedings of a Conference held on the 9th November
 
 TERRITORIAL ARTILLERY 261 
 
 1905, under the presidency of General MacKinnon, 
 Director of Auxilary Forces. 6. Minute by Colonel May, 
 Assistant Director of Military Training, to the C.G.S., 
 dated 10th November 1905. 7. Minute by the C.G.S. 
 to the Secretary of State, dated 13th November 1905. 
 8. Minute by the Secretary of State, dated 15th Novem- 
 ber 1906. 9. Precis No. 264, laid before the Army 
 Council. Believe me, yours truly, 
 
 H. O. ARNOLD-FORSTER. 
 
 The Right Hon. R. B. HALDANE, K.C., M.P. 
 
 War Office, Whitehall, S.W., 
 1st April 1908. 
 
 DEAR ARNOLD-FORSTER, I do not think that the 
 proposition which you make to me is one to which I ought 
 to accede. To do so would, in my considered opinion, 
 be undesirable in the public interest. Moreover, at a 
 time when the officers of the new territorial artillery are 
 just taking over their difficult work I think that there 
 had better be a truce to this campaign. Don't you agree ? 
 If not, you are at liberty to publish this correspondence. 
 Faithfully yours, R. B. HALDANE. 
 
 The Right Hon. H. O. ARNOLD-FORSTER, M.P. 
 
 2nd April 1908. 
 
 DEAR HALDANE, I am much obliged to you for your 
 letter of the 1st inst. I note that you forbid me to 
 publish the documents to which I referred in my letter of 
 the 30th March, and I confess that in view of the very 
 strong and clear expressions of opinion which they con- 
 tain I am not altogether surprised at the decision, though 
 I regret it. 
 
 You suggest that there had 'better be a truce to 
 this campaign.' If any personal question were at issue,
 
 262 APPENDICES 
 
 I would most certainly say ' Yes, by all means,' though 
 I think I should be tempted to add that it would have 
 been better if the truce had come at an earlier stage, and 
 not after all the statements to which I take strong and, 
 as I think, reasonable objection had been made. 
 
 But I assure you that to me this artillery question is 
 one of public policy only. From the very outset I have 
 opposed the plan of reducing the Royal Artillery, and 
 making an immense experiment with volunteer artillery, 
 because I believed that such a plan was fraught with 
 great danger to the country. As far as I can ascertain, 
 there is not a soldier in the army who disagrees with me. 
 I should naturally have liked to support this belief by 
 adducing in its favour the carefully considered opinion of 
 every soldier by whom I had the honour of being advised. 
 I was specially anxious to do this, because it appeared to 
 me that there was a serious danger of the public being 
 misled as to the real nature of these opinions. However, 
 you have decided that this opportunity is not to be 
 accorded to me. 
 
 But I still hope and believe that the policy to which 
 I object, and which I consider a dangerous one, may be 
 arrested, that the reduction of the Royal Artillery may 
 be stopped, and the creation of territorial field batteries 
 limited to the dimensions of a careful experiment. I 
 therefore accept your permission to publish this corre- 
 spondence in the hope that it may induce the public to 
 inquire into the real state of military opinion with regard 
 to this artillery question. If this inquiry be made, I am 
 confident that it will reveal the fact that the policy which 
 has now been approved is directly contrary to the opinion 
 and the practice of every nation which has been engaged 
 in war in modern times. Believe me, yours truly, 
 
 H. O. ARNOLD-FORSTER. 
 
 The Right Hon. R. B. HALDANE, K.C., M.P.
 
 INDEX 
 
 ACLAND, F. D., M.P., quoted, 
 106 
 
 Admiralty, policy of the, 35, 52-6 
 (see also under Navy) 
 
 Aldershot, 105 ; Military Society, 
 26n, 226n 
 
 American Civil War, 132 ; lessons 
 of, 138-40 
 
 Amery, L. S., quoted, 147 
 
 Ammunition columns, 225 
 
 Army (see also under Territorial 
 Army) 
 
 Army, organisation, 3 ; efficiency 
 of the, 9, 113-14 ; numerical 
 strength of, 10, 115-16, App. ii, 
 248 ; in 1905, 10-14 ; reduction 
 of the, 15, 26n, 110-16, 176, 188- 
 39 : training of the, 88-95 ; 
 attack on the, 110-19 ; House of 
 Commons and the, 111-13, 
 182-87 ; physique of the, 119 ; 
 and the workhouse, 120-24 ; 
 prestige of the, 125, 156 ; cost 
 of the, 152 ; alleged increase 
 of the, 173-76; General Staff 
 Order, 192 seq. ; statement of 
 reductions in the, App. ii, 246- 
 53 
 
 Army Council, 71, 235 ; policy of 
 the, 54-6 ; and invasion, 55 ; 
 and period of training, 89 ; and 
 enlistment of boys, 119 ; adver- 
 tisement for recruits, 121-25 ; 
 and General Staff Order, 207 ; 
 and the reduction of Artillery, 
 232 ; and Volunteer Artillery, 
 258-61 
 
 Army Estimates, 13, 14, 124, 152, 
 154 ; reduction of, 173 seq. 
 
 ' Army in 1906, The,' 7 
 
 Army policy, of 1905-6, 15-18, 
 182; of 1904-5, 16-18, 25; 
 defects of present, 18 seq. ; of 
 the future, 25-6 ; the present, 
 54-6 ; 173 seq. 
 
 Army systems, 6-7 ; the author's, 
 7-8 
 
 Arnold-Forster, Rt. Hon. H. O., 
 letter quoted, 121-24 ; and the 
 General Staff Order, 192 seq.; 
 correspondence with Mr. Hal- 
 dane, 229, App. iv, 257-62 
 
 Artillery (see also under Royal 
 Artillery), rearmament of, 10, 
 180; myth of the, 219-28; 
 French four-gun batteries of, 
 226-28 ; opinion of Territorial, 
 229-37, App. iv, 257-62 ; un- 
 trained, 231-32 
 
 Ashley, W., M.P., 58 
 
 Auxiliary Forces, Report of Royal 
 Commission on, 88 seq., 178-79 
 
 BALFOUR, Rt. Hon. A. J., 96 
 Barracks, improved type of, 11 ; 
 
 building and repair of, 181 
 Battalions, at home and abroad, 
 
 17-19; the abolition of ten, 
 
 188-91 
 Beaune la Rolande, battle of, 
 
 83-4 
 
 Bell, Captain Morrison, 115n 
 Benefit societies, and the Special 
 
 Reserve, 127 
 
 263
 
 264 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Bosnia, occupation of, 82 
 Brodrick, Mr. (see under Midle- 
 
 ton, Lord) 
 Buying out, 119, 122, 127-28 
 
 'CAMBRIDGE MODERN HISTORY ' 
 
 quoted, 139 
 Camp attendance, 12 
 Capitation grant, abolition of, 40 
 Cardwell System, abolition of, 17 ; 
 
 and present policy, 19, 152 ; 
 
 Mr. Haldane and the, 216-17 
 Cavalry remount farms, 10 
 Chanzy, General, 168, 171 ; 
 
 quoted, 169-70 
 Chatham defences, 53, 57-63, 
 
 67-8 
 
 Cherbourg, fortress of, 64 
 Chobham, Foreign Legion at, 
 
 136 
 
 Churchill, Winston, M.P., 165 
 Coast defence, 72, 96-8, 239 seq. 
 Colour service, period of, 17, 
 
 24, 216-17 (see also under 
 
 Training) 
 Committee of Imperial Defence, 
 
 32n, 53, 71, 98, 105, 149, 150, 
 
 157w, 164, 203 
 Compulsory service (see under 
 
 Conscription) 
 
 Connaught, Duke of, quoted, 93-4. 
 Conscription, xiv-xv, 85, 118, 
 
 129-40. 149-57; for home 
 
 defence, 18 ; and invasion, 87 ; 
 
 in American Civil War, 139- 
 
 40 ; real and sham, 141-48 ; 
 
 cost of, 145-46, 153 ; for the 
 
 Navy, 147 ; the nation and, 
 
 154-56 
 
 Courage and discipline, 126-27 
 Cox, Harold, M.P., 59, 180 
 Crimean War, lessons of the, 
 
 135-36 
 Cromer, Lord, quoted, ix 
 
 DEFENCE COMMITTEE (see 
 under Committee of Imperial 
 Defence) 
 
 Destroyers, volunteer crews for, 
 239 seq. 
 
 Devonport, defence of, 60-1, 68 
 Dilke, Sir Charles, quoted, 209 
 Discharged soldiers, employment 
 
 of, 17, 23 
 Dockyards, protection of, 58-62 ; 
 
 questions in Parliament on, 
 
 58, 60-70 
 
 EMPLOYERS of labour and the 
 Special Reserve, App. iii, 254-56 
 
 Employment of discharged 
 soldiers, 17 
 
 Enlistment, of boys, 20, 118-19, 
 142-44, 218; of discharged 
 soldiers in the Reserve, 23 ; 
 advertisement for recruits, 
 120-28, 157n ; recruiting re- 
 port, App. ii, 248 seq. 
 
 Esher Committee, Report of, 11 
 
 Esher Lord, 101, 157n. 
 
 FOREIGN Armies, period of 
 service in, 91, 106, 123, 142-43 ; 
 our employment of a foreign 
 legion, 136 ; physical training 
 of, 144-50 
 
 Forts, dismantling of, 53-68, 164 
 
 France, frontier protection of, 
 100, 154 ; period of army 
 training in, 106, 143 ; four-gun 
 batteries in, 226-28 
 
 Franco-German War, 79-80, 83, 
 168 seq. 
 
 French, Sir John, on an invader's 
 advantages, 77 ; on the ' Terri- 
 torials,' 81 ; on training, 91-2 
 
 Frique, Colonel, quoted, 76 
 
 GAMBETTA, 168, 170, 171 
 German Army, 91 ; period of 
 
 training in, 21-2, 106, 143 ; 
 
 strength of, 100 ; and our 
 
 General Staff Order, 193, 202, 
 
 207-8 
 Germany, possible invasion by, 
 
 73, App. i, 239-45 
 General Staff Order, myth of the, 
 
 192-208
 
 INDEX 
 
 265 
 
 Grant, Sir Robert, Committee 
 
 (1900). 61, 63, 69 
 Grove, Sir Coleridge, quoted, 
 
 90-4 
 
 HALDANE, Rt. Hon. R. B., 3, 4 ; 
 his Army Policy, 5, 20, 54-6, 
 101, 105-6, 173 seq. ; on ' The 
 Army in 1906,' 9; and the 
 German Army, 21 ; his ' Life of 
 Adam Smith ' quoted, 57 ; and 
 dockyard defences, 58, 60-4 ; 
 on the Navy, 71-2 ; and the 
 Territorial Force, 103, 133 ; on 
 the reduction of the Regular 
 Army, 110, 121 ; his Army 
 'Returns,' 115-16w. 183 seq. ; 
 and the enlistment of boys, 
 118-19; on the soldier's posi- 
 tion, 120 ; and the recruiting 
 advertisement, 121-25 ; on the 
 cost of compulsory service, 
 153 ; on the Surrey forts, 
 164-65 ; on an untrained citizen 
 army, 166 seq. ; his alleged 
 increase of the Army, 173 seq. ; 
 and the export of the ' Reserve, ' 
 186-87 ; and the abolition of the 
 ten battalions, 188-91 ; and 
 the General Staff Order, 192 
 seq. ; visit to Berlin, 194 ; and 
 the new striking force, 210-13 ; 
 and the Cardwell System, 216- 
 17 ; and the Artillery myth, 
 219-28 ; and ammunition 
 columns, 225 ; and French four- 
 gun batteries, 226 ; correspon- 
 dence with Mr. H. O. Arnold- 
 Forster, 229, App. iv, 257-62 ; 
 and Volunteer Artillery, 232-37 
 
 Hamilton, Sir Ian, evidence on 
 training, 94-5 ; on modern 
 artillery, 232 
 
 Hayling Island, 68 
 
 Heinleth, General von, quoted, 
 84 
 
 Herzegovina, occupation of, 82 
 
 House of Commons and the War 
 Office, 161-72, 182-87. 191, 
 219-20, 226-28, 234-37, 257-62 
 
 'IMPERIAL STRATEGY' quoted, 
 
 71, 129, 149 
 Invasion, question of, 51-6, 59, 
 
 65, 68-75, 91-2, 96-105, 110 ; 
 
 Territorial Force and, 72-5 ; 
 
 from Germany, 73, App. i, 239- 
 
 45 ; and conscription, 87, 149, 
 
 154 
 
 JAPAN, army training in, 106 
 Jerrold, Douglas, quoted, 32 
 
 KELLY-KENNY, Lt.-Gen. Sir T., 
 
 quoted, 90 
 Kiel, fortress of, 64 
 Knox, Sir R.,94-5 
 
 LALANDE, General, 170 
 
 Lansdowne, Lord, 210, 218 ; on 
 the Territorial Force, 38 ; on 
 the Reserve, 182 ; increases the 
 Artillery, 221 
 
 Liberal - Unionist Association, 
 185n 
 
 Loigny Poupry, battle of, 83-4 
 
 London, defencelessness of, 165 
 
 London Gazette, 74 
 
 Long and Short Service, con- 
 current, 10, 13, 14, 23, 26n 
 
 Long Service Army, 215 ; duties 
 of, 17 ; restoration of, 17 
 
 Lucas, Lord, quoted, 42n 
 
 Lucknow, march on, 119 
 
 Lyttelton, General Sir Neville, 
 192 ; and Volunteer Artillery, 
 257-58 
 
 MACDONALD, MURRAY, M.P., 46 
 Mackinnon, General, 235 ; on the 
 
 Volunteers for active service, 
 
 146 ; and Volunteer Artillery, 
 
 257, 261 
 
 Maguire, Dr. Miller, quoted, 171 
 Mahan, Admiral, quoted, 150 
 March, Earl of, 93 
 Margueritte, M.M., ' Tron9ons 
 
 du Glaive, 1 172
 
 266 
 
 INDEX 
 
 May, Colonel, 172, 235, 261 
 
 Medical establishment, 11 
 
 Methuen, Lord, 94 
 
 Midleton, Lord, 71, 114, 176, 
 220 ; and three-year enlist- 
 ments, 117, 211, 218 ; on the 
 alleged increase of the Army, 
 171, 181 
 
 Militia, 11 ; numerical strength 
 of the, 12, 115-16 ; App. ii, 
 249 ; abolition of the, 13, 15, 
 118-21, 177, 214; obligations 
 of, 17 ; and the Special Re- 
 serve, 118-20, 175-79, App. ii, 
 253 ; inefficiency of, 178-79 ; 
 and service abroad, 179 
 
 Millbank medical establishment, 
 11 
 
 Mine defences, destruction of, 
 53 
 
 Mobilisation, readiness for war 
 without, 17-18, 22 
 
 Morning Post quoted, 121 
 
 NAPOLEON, quoted, 67; and the 
 enlistment of boys, 118 
 
 Natal, invasion of, 22, 105 
 
 National Service League, 43 
 
 Naval Intelligence Department, 
 97 
 
 Naval warfare, 150 
 
 Navy, policy of the, 35 ; and in- 
 vasion, 51-2, 59, 65, 68-71, 97 ; 
 and coast protection, 72, 96 ; 
 Volunteer crews for the, 86, 
 App. i, 239-45 ; recruiting for 
 the, 125-26 ; and conscription, 
 147 ; the true defence, 149-51 ; 
 cost of the, 151-53 
 
 New Army Scheme and the 
 Reserve of the Regular Army, 
 The, lS5n 
 
 Norfolk Commission, the, 5; on 
 the Volunteer Force, 40 
 
 OFFICERS, shortage of, 10 ; in 
 the Volunteers, 12 ; on the 
 needs and deficiencies of the 
 
 Army, 16 ; in the Reserve, 
 20-2, supply of, 20-1 ; on 
 the training of the soldier, 
 88-95 ; remuneration of, 151 ; 
 promotion and duties of, 195 
 seq. 
 
 Owen Committee, The, 97, App. 
 ii, 247 
 
 Owen, General, 54 
 
 PALAFOX, General, 83 
 
 Pease, Mr., M.P., 115 
 
 Peper Harow, 71 
 
 Physical training, 144-45 (see also 
 
 under Training) 
 Pickford, Messrs., 215 
 Plymouth defences, 53, 57-8, 63, 
 
 67 
 Portsmouth defences, 53, 57-63, 
 
 67, 68 
 Portsmouth, Lord, quoted, 51, 
 
 233 ; and Volunteer Artillery, 
 
 258-59 
 
 RAIDS, 96-105 ; foreign precau- 
 tions against, 99-101 
 
 Recruiting Report, App. ii, 248 
 seq. 
 
 Recruits, advertisement for, 120- 
 28, 157 (see also under 
 Enlistment) 
 
 Repington, Colonel A 'Court, 
 26n, 226w 
 
 Reserve, increase of the, 11, 211 ; 
 source of the, 17, 23 ; Volun- 
 teers in the, 17 ; under present 
 policy, 18, 59, 117; officers in 
 the, 20 ; enlistment of dis- 
 charged soldiers in the, 23 ; 
 destruction of the, 114 ; tem- 
 porary increase in the, 116-17, 
 175-77, 183 ; prospective, de- 
 crease in the, 117, 182 seq., 
 211; buying out of the, 119, 122, 
 127-28 ; Territorials and the, 
 133-35; LordLansdowneonthe, 
 182 ; strength of the, 183, 215, 
 App. ii, 251; New Army Scheme
 
 INDEX 
 
 267 
 
 and the, 185 ; export of the, 
 185-87 ; efficiency of the, 217 
 
 Reserve, Special, 12, 19, 115, 
 215 ; denned, 24-51 ; and the 
 Militia, 118-20, 175-79; and 
 the unemployed, 121-24, App. 
 iii, 254-56 ; Artillery section of, 
 224-25 ; strength of the, App. ii, 
 248 seq. ; and employers of 
 labour, App. iii, 254-56 
 
 Roberts, Earl, on invasion, vi-vii ; 
 speech quoted, 3, 4, 88 ; on the 
 minimum period of Colour 
 Service, 24 ; on the National 
 Army, 43 ; on universal service, 
 130-31, 153 ; on the Territorial 
 Artillery, 230-31 
 
 Robertson, E., M.P., 59 
 
 Royal Artillery (see also under 
 Artillery), battalions on estab- 
 lishment, 19 ; militiamen in, 
 26n ; reduction of the, 26, 
 116-18, 176, 211, 221, 226, 259- 
 62 ; training in the, 41-2 ; on 
 tour, 123 ; increase of the, 210 ; 
 reinforcement of ammunition 
 columns in, 225 ; statement of 
 reduction in, App. ii, 246 seq. 
 
 Royal Commission on the Aux- 
 iliary Forces, Report of, 88 seq., 
 178-79 
 
 Royal Engineers, reduction of, 
 116n, 176, 211, App. ii, 246 
 seq. 
 
 SANDHURST, accommodation at, 
 11 
 
 Saragossa, siege of, 82-3 
 
 Short Service, and concurrent 
 Long Service, 10, 13-14. 23; 
 enlistments, 211 ; Mr. Haldane 
 and, 216 
 
 Short Service Army, duties of, 
 16-17 
 
 Sierra Leone, reservists in, 186-87 
 
 Soldier, training (see also under 
 Training) of the, 88-95; posi- 
 tion of the, 120 
 
 Soldiers, employment of dis- 
 charged, 17, 23 
 
 South African War, 82, 105 ; 
 lessons of the, 78-9, 85, 114, 
 132, 136-38, 212; Report of 
 Commission on, 213-14 ; Army 
 in the, 214-15 ; Artillery in, 
 221 seq. 
 
 Spandau, fortress of, 68 
 Staff College certificate, 196, 199 
 Standard, quoted, 121 ; articles 
 
 in the, 3 
 
 Stopford, Sir Frederick, 257 
 Striking force, necessity for, with- 
 out mobilisation, 17-18, 22 ; the 
 'new,' 209-18 
 
 TERRITORIAL Army (see also 
 under Volunteers) , medical 
 inspection of, 13 ; expansion 
 of, 17 ; the Times on the, 
 26n ; approved by the Press, 
 31-3 ; public interest in, 36-7 ; 
 eulogies of, 39 ; field batteries 
 in, 41 ; limitations of, 43-5 ; 
 inadequate for present needs, 
 48, 108 ; and invasion, 66, 72-5, 
 96, 99-104 ; Sir John French 
 on the, 81 ; in the true sense, 
 85-6 ; numerical strength of, 
 104, H5n, App. ii, 248 ; reason 
 for the existence of, 107-8 ; 
 artillery of, 123, 229-37, App. 
 iv, 257-62 ; the reserve for 
 war, 133-34 ; training of the, 
 144 ; and conscription, 148, 
 157w ; cost of the, 152-53 
 
 Times, military correspondent of, 
 225-26n ; present views of, 26n ; 
 on untrained artillery, 231-32 
 
 Times quoted, 193 
 
 Torpedo-boats, volunteer crews 
 for, 239 seq. 
 
 Torpedo defences (Brennan) , 
 App. ii, 247 
 
 Toulon, fortress of, 64 
 
 Training, minimum period of, 
 24, 88-95, 143, 216-18; in 
 foreign nations, 21, 91, 106, 
 123, 142-43 ; in the Militia, 123 ; 
 universal, 129-40 ; physical, 
 144-45 ; character of, 240-41
 
 268 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Turner, General Sir Alfred, 81 ; 
 quoted, 83 
 
 UNEMPLOYED, and the Special 
 Reserve, 121-24 ; War Office 
 circular to the, 120-28, App. iii, 
 254-56 
 
 Unit, definition of a, 19, 20 ; 
 Colour Service of a, 24 
 
 Universal service, 129-40 ; Lord 
 Roberts on, 130-31, 153 (see 
 also under Conscription) 
 
 Untrained troops, value of, xi, 
 76-85, 161 seq. ; Lord Roberts 
 on, 88 ; Mr. Haldane on, 166 
 seq., 215 ; and artillery, 231-32 
 
 VILLARS, Marshal, quoted, 69 
 
 Vincent, Sir Howard, 96 
 
 Volunteer Force (see also under 
 Territorial Army) , non-effici- 
 ency of, 5 ; numerical strength 
 of, 12, 115-16n, App. ii, 250 ; 
 camp attendance, 12 ; medical 
 inspection of, 13 ; reduction of, 
 13, 15 ; in the Reserve, 17, 18, 59; 
 as 'Territorials,' 38, 74; eulogies 
 of, 39-40, 45-7 ; Norfolk Com- 
 mission on, 40 ; for the Navy, 
 86, App. i, 239-45; in the 
 South African War, 136-38 ; 
 artillery in the, 229-37 
 
 WAR, readiness for, 17-18, 22 ; 
 preparations for, 29-37, 87 ; 
 foreign preparations for, 34-5 ; 
 in a nation's own territory, 
 76-8 ; Volunteers in, 133-35 ; 
 untrained troops in, 76-85, 161 
 seq.; available striking force 
 for, 209-18 
 
 War Office, present policy of the, 
 6-7, 53, 108-9, 212, 218 ; ' Press 
 Bureau ' at the, 32-3n ; view 
 of 'Raids,' 98-9; and the" 
 Reserve, 116-17, 120 ; adver- 
 tisement for recruits, 120-28, 
 157n ; and the House of Com- 
 mons, 161-72, 182-87, 191, 219- 
 20, 226-28, 234-37, 257-62; 
 Returns, 115-16n, 183 seq., 
 220; Reconstruction Committee, 
 203 ; Committee, 233 ; circular 
 to the unemployed, App. iii, 
 254-56 
 
 Waterloo, battle of, 142 
 Westminster Gazette, 128 
 Wilhelmshaven, fortress of, 64 
 Wilkinson, Spenser, 90 
 Wolseley, Viscount, quoted, 90-1 
 Workhouse and the Army, 
 119 seq. 
 
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