THE MILITAEY HEROES or THE WAR OF 1812: WITH A NABRATTVE OF THE WAE, BY CHARLES J. PETERSON. TENTH EDITION. PHILADELPHIA: PUBLISHED BY JAS. B. SMITH A CO., NO. 610 CHESTNUT ST. 1858. E.35J EUTDIED according to Act of Congress, In the year 1852, fry J. A J. L. GIHON, to the Clerk's Office of the District Court of the Eastern District of PennsylTMiia. & TO MAJOR-GENERAL WINFIELD SCOTT THIS WORK 19 RESPECTFULLY DEDICATED BY THE ATJTHOR PREFACE. THE war of 1812 furnishes little to gratify the military annalist until he approaches its close. The imbecility of the Generals and the number of their defeats, naturally dispirit an author. He feels the subject continually checking him ; and is delighted, when the campaign of 1814 opening, affords him something beside disgrace and disaster to record. The un- promising nature of the subject has prevented any writer of ability from taking it up : and hence a good history of the War of 1812 is as yet unknown to the language. There is no attempt in the following pages to supply this deficiency. Indeed such an endeavor would be foreign to the purpose of this work. The narrative of the war is but sub- ordinate to the main design of the volume, and hence the author has contented himself with a mere outline sketch, tho only merit of which, if he has succeeded in his aim, is in be VI PREFACE. ing authentic and comprehensive. The details of the picture are left to be filled up from the Biographies. The nature of the theme has forced the author to depart, in a measure, from the plan of his work. There are several Generals noticed who have no pretensions to be Heroes ; but the story would be incomplete without them. The author has not hesitated, however, to express his opinion as to the merits of each officer ; and, so far forth, has carried out his original design. Whether his opinions are correct must be left for impartial criticism to decide. CONTENTS. PREFACE, PAGES THE WAR OF 1812. PRELIMINARY CHAPTER, ... BOOK I. ORIGIN OF THE WAR, BOOK II. To THE SPRING OF THE YEAB 1814, BOOK III. To THE CLOSE OF THE CONTEST, - THE HEROES OF THE WAR OF 1812. WILLIAM HULL, - - . JAMES WINCHESTER, .... ZEBULON MONTGOMERT PIKE, HENRT DEARBORN, .... JAMES WILKINSON, - JOHN ARMSTRONG, .... - 13 17 . 29 91 73 81 87 93 97 107 CONTENTS. CROOHAW, p AM m WILLIAM HKWRT HAHHISOW, . . . . . . -119 RICHARD M. JoHwsoir, . . . . . . 133 ISAAC SHELBT, ---.-_. 139 JACOB Bnowx, ...... 141 ELEAZKR W. RIPLBT, -... 159 JAMES MILLER, -*._. 157 NATHAX Towsoir, -......._ m THOMAS S. JESSUF, -.*.. 175 EDMUND PENDLETOW GAIXM, ...... - 177 PETER B. PORTER, ---..., .3 ALEXANDER MACOMB, -...._. 155 SAMUEL SMITH, --..... 191 ANDREW JACKSON, -....... 197 ' HE war of 1812 was the sequel to the war of independence. It was the offspring of an old hatred, nurtured into life by the arrogance of England. Those who declaim against the war because begun to punish wrongs perpetrated Great Britain, when outrages nearly as g reat on t h e p art O f France were overlooked, do not understand the question they assume to discuss. Nations, as well as men, will endure that from a friend which they will never submit to frorn a foe. England had been hated by the people of the U 13 14 PRELIMINARY CHAPTER. United States, since the period of the Revolution; while France, notwithstanding all her injustice, still possessed their gratitude and sympathy. The wonder is, not that the war. took place, but that it did not happen before. The acknowledgment of our independence had been made with a bad grace by Great Britain in 1783, and, as if her ill humor was never to be appeased, she continued to treat us with an insolence that galled our national pride. The war of 1812 was not the work of the President, nor even of his party ; but was forced on an unwilling cabinet by the popular will. It was a war of the people. Dangerous as the war seemed to many at the time, a single gene- ration has established its necessity and wisdom. It is true that, at the peace of Ghent, no acknowledgment was obtained from England of the injustice of her system of impressment, which was the apparent cause for embarking in the contest. But nevertheless all the substantial benefits were on our side. We had proved that we were not a power to be despised, either on land or sea ; and that nothing was to be gained, but everything lost, by persisting in the struggle. For the first two years of the strife, our armies had been defeated almost universally. This so elated the Prince Regent, that the offer to compromise our difficulties, which he would have been glad to have accepted in the beginning, he now rejected ; and having just closed the protracted struggle with Napoleon, he resolved to inundate this country with the veterans of the Peninsula, and chastise us for having declared war against England, when she was surrounded \v ith foes. Accordingly the campaign of 1814 was opened by the appear- ance of a most imposing force in America. The British officers boasted that they would conquer and hold a portion of our territory at least ; and even some of our own citizens, arguing from former defeats, despaired of the country. Two causes conspired to frustrate the calculations of the enemy, and make him eager to secure peace on the terms he had rejected. The first was that the nation, now seriously alarmed, began to rally in earnest for its defence. That spirit of enthusiasm, which had burned so brightly in 1 776, again blazed up ; and the whole Union was suddenly turned into an armed camp, resounding with the din of preparation. The second cause was this, the Generals to whom the command of our armies had been committed, during the preceding campaigns, had been old revolutionary officers, of respectable standing when young, but now utterly exhausted by indolence and age. By the close of 1813, however, the army had been thoroughly purged of these imbecile leaders. A new race of Generals, composed of men of spirit, genius and enterprise, had arisen. At the head of these PRELIMINARY CHAPTER. 15 stood Brown. He was one of those individuals who are born war- riors. What he wanted in knowledge, he made up in energy, and the latter qualification was, just then, of more importance than the former. The nation, at this crisis, required a bold man for its leader, one not afraid of hard blows, and who, believing that the American fur- nished as good material for a soldier as the Englishman, would never decline a combat. Brown was even more than this. He was not only willing to meet the British, when his forces were equal to theirs, but even when hisnumber were decidedly inferior. He was admirably seconded by his subordinates, especially by Scott, who had in a measure formed the army, introducing into it the French discipline, and changing by constant drilling, raw recruits into good soldiers. The result of the battles of Chippewa, Lundy's Lane and Erie, was to convince Great Britain that, in the United States, she had found an enemy who would grow more formidable every year. As there was nothing to be gained by a contest with such a foe, but on the contrary, much blood and treasure to be lost, she became suddenly as eager for a peace, as, six months before, she had been indifferent to it. These victories taught our own people the existence of a latent aptitude for war among themselves, of which they had never dreamed. That the American furnished the best material for the soldier, because as robust as others, and more intelligent, was thenceforth no longer a heresy to assert. Discipline in the men, and ability in the com- mander, was all that was necessary, it was seen, to render victory probable, if not certain. Since the war of 18 12, the United States have held a better position among nations than before. Our naval successes over a power that was deemed invincible at sea, suddenly awakened the attention of Europe to this young giant of the west. The single victory of the Constitution over the Guerriere, gained us more respect abroad, than could have been attained by a long career of the most brilliant successes in the arts of peace. The manner in which that triumph was followed up, made a profound impression on the public mind on the continent. Since the treaty of Ghent, our flag has been treated with marked deference in foreign ports. The dazzling exploits on jand, with which we closed the contest, had their effect also in revo- lutionizing opinions abroad. Prior to the war of 1812, we ranked in Europe, as a fourth-rate power only ; but since then, the position of a second-rate one has been freely conceded to us. We have, it is true, aspired to be considered one of the first powers in the world ; and though this is not pretence in 1848, it was so, perhaps, in 1815. We advance, indeed, with steps that find no parallel in history. Within 16 PRELIMINARY CHAPTER. the last thirty years, we have passed from youth to manhood, as in the thirty preceding years we grew from infancy to adolescence. What was exaggeration for our fathers to assert, becomes, therefore, less than the truth in us. It shall be our purpose to narrate, in a rapid manner, the events of the war of 1812, which exercised such an influence on the charac- ter, genius and development of this nation. BOOK I. ORIGIN OF THE WAR. HE war of 1812 naturally divides itself into three great periods. The first embraces the origin of the war. This will necessarily con- tain a review of the conduct of Great Britain towards the United States, from the peace of 1783, to the declaration of hostilities on the 19th of June, 1812 ; comprise an account of the celebrated Berlin and Milan decrees, and of the Bri- tish orders in council ; and furnish a narrative of the origin, exercise, and perversion of the claim of England to impress seamen. The second opens with the surrender of Detroit ; records the failure of Harrison's winter and autumnal campaigns in 1812 ; and explains she miscarriages of Dearborn, Wilkinson and Hampton, on the Lakes and St. Lawrence, during the spring, summer and autumn of 1813. This was a period of almost universal defeat for the armies of tho II* 2 17 18 ORIGIN OF THE WAR. United States. Inefficient Generals and undisciplined troops united to cover the nation with disgrace. During this interval the Creek war in the south occurred. But for some brilliant successes at sea, and for the victory of the Thames in October, 1 SI 3, these first twenty months of the contest would have presented only unmitigated disas- ter. The third and last period opened in the spring of 1814, with the most gloomy anticipations. The subjugation of Napoleon had left England free to employ all her strength against the United States. The veteran troops of Wellington were accordingly poured into Ca- nada. Boasts of permanently annexing a portion of New York, or of New England, to the British dominions were publicly made by the English officers. But suddenly the scene changed. These splen- did veterans were defeated in every contest, by our comparatively raw troops. Instead of gaining a foothold in the United States the enemy was everywhere beaten on his own soil. These results pro- ceeded from placing bolder and younger men in command of the army ; from disciplining the troops thoroughly ; and from the spirit of patriotism which was now fully aroused to meet the impending crisis. From this hour the arms of the United States were in the ascendant. Success had at first receded from us further and still fur- ther, like a wave withdrawing from a beach ; but suddenly the tide turned, it rolled in, and towering higher and prouder, broke over us in triumphs. The peace of 1783 had been extorted by the necessities rather than obtained by the good wiU of England. Though, by a formal treaty, the United States were declared free and independent, they were still hated in Great Britain as rebellious colonies. That such was the general opinion is manifest from the letters of John Adams, our first minister to the court of St. James, and from other authentic cotem- porary accounts. Of course there were a few men of sufficiently en- larged and comprehensive minds to forget the past, and urge, even in parliament, that the trade of America would be more valuable as an ally than a dependent. But the number of these was small in- deed. The common sentiment in England towards the young repub- lic was one of scornful detestation. We were despised as provin- cials, we were hated as rebels. In the permanency of our institutions there was scarcely a believer in all Britain. This was especially the case prior to the adoption of the Federal Constitution. Both in par- liament and out, it was publicly boasted that the Union would soon fall to pieces, and that, finding their inability to govern themselves, the different states would, one by one, supplicate to be received back as colonies. This vain and empty expectation long lingered in the ORIGIN OP THE WAR. 19 popular mind, and was not wholly eradicated until after the war of 1812. Hence the new republic was treated with arrogant contempt. One of the first acts of John Adams, as minister to England, had been to propose placing the navigation and trade between the dominions of Great Britain and the territories of the United States, on a basis of complete reciprocity. By acceding to such a measure England might have gained much, and could have lost but little. The propo- sal was rejected almost with terms of insult, and Mr. Adams told " that no other would be entertained." The consequences were that the free negroes of Jamaica, and others of the poorer inhabitants of the British West India Islands, were reduced to starvation by be- ing deprived of their usual supplies from the United States. This policy on the part of England naturally exasperated the Americans, and one of the first acts of the Federal government in 1789, was to adopt retaliatory measures. A navigation law was passed, which has since been the foundation of all our treaties of reciprocity with England. A tariff was also adopted as another means of retaliation. We have lived to see Great Britain become the first to tire of re- strictive measures, and, by a repeal on her part, invite a repeal on ours. In another way Great Britain exasperated the popular feeling hero against her, and even forced the American government, once or twice, to the verge of war. By the treaty of peace, all military posts held by England within the limits of the United States, were to be given up ; yet no less than six of this character, Michilimackinac, Detroit, Oswegotche, Point au Fer, and Dutchman's Point, were long held in defiance of the compact. These posts were made the centres of intrigue among the savages of the northwest. Arms were here dis- tributed to the Indians, and disturbances on our frontier fomented. The war on the Miami, which was brought to a bloody close by Wayne's victory, was the result principally of such secret machina- tions. In short, England regarded the treaty of 1783 as a truce, rather than a pacification, and long held to the hope of being able yet to punish the revolted colonies for their rebellion. In two celebra- ted letters written by John Adams from Great Britain, he uses the fol- io wing decided language in reference to the secret designs of England : " If she can bind Holland in her shackles, and France from internal dissensions is unable to interfere, she will make war immediately against us." This was in 1787. Two years before, he had expresed the same ideas. " Their present system, as far as I can penetrate it," he wrote, is Jto maintain a determined peace with all Europe, in 20 ORIGIN OP THE WAR. order tnat they may war singly against America, if they should think it necessary." A sentiment of such relentless hostility, which no at- tempt was made to disguise, but which was even arrogantly paraded on every occasion, could not fail to exasperate those feelings of dis- like on the part of America, which protracted war had engendered. This mutual hatred between the two nations arose from the enmity of the people father than of the cabinets. " There is too much reason to believe," wrote our minister, " that if the nation had another hundred million to spend, they would soon force the ministry into a war against us." On the side of the United States it required all the pru- dence of Washington, sustained by his hold on the affections of the people, to restrain them from a war with England, after that power had refused to surrender the military posts. A third element 1 of discord arose when England joined the coali- tion against France in 1793. The course which the former had pur- sued for the preceding ten years, had, as we have seen, tended to alienate the people of America from her, and nourish sentiments of hostility in their bosoms. On the other hand, France, with that ad- dress for which she is eminent, had labored to heighten the good feel- iogs already existing between herself and the United States. A treaty of alliance and commerce bound the two countries ; but the courteous demeanor of France cemented us to her by still stronger ties, those of the popular will. When, therefore, the revolution broke out in Paris, the enthusiasm of America towards France could scarcely be controlled. There can be no doubt that, if the subsequent excesses had not alarmed all prudent friends of liberty, the people of this country could not have been restrained from engaging in the strug- gle between France and England. But the Reign of Terror, backed by the insolence of Genet, the minister of the French republic, and afterwards by the exactions of the Directory, checked the headlong enthusiasm that otherwise would have embroiled us in the terrible wars of that period. A course of strict neutrality had been selected by Washington, as that which was most proper for the still weak con- federacy ; and every day produced events which showed the wis- dom of this decision. Neither Great Britain nor France, however, was gratified by this neutrality. Each nation wished to embark us on their side ; and both grew arrogant and insulting as they found our resolution was not to be broken. Napoleon, on the part of France, saw the impolicy of such treatment, and when he became First Consul, hastened to abandon it. But England relaxed nothing, or little. Circumstances, moreover, made her conduct practically more irritating than that of France ; and hence prolonged and in- ORIGIN OF THE WAR. 21 creased the exasperation felt toward her in America. We allude to the restrictions attempted to be placed on our commerce, and to the practice of impressing seamen found on board vessels sailing under the flag of the United States. As a great naval power, the policy of England has been to main- tain certain maritime laws, which her jurists claim to be part of the code of nations, and enforce in her admiralty courts. One principle of these laws is this, that warlike munitions become contraband in war; in other words that a neutral vessel cannot carry such into the ene- my's ports. Hence, if a vessel, sailing under the flag of the United States, should be captured on the high seas, bound for France, dur- ing the prevalence of a war between that power and England, and be found to be laden with ship-timber, gunpowder, or other manufac- tured or unmanufactured articles for warlike purposes, the vessel would, by the law of nations, become a prize to the captors. The right to condemn a ship carrying such contraband goods, has always been recognized by civilized nations, and indeed is founded in com- mon justice. But England having supreme control at sea, and being tempted by the hope of destroying the sinews of her adversa- ry's strength, resolved to stretch this rule so as to embrace provisions, as well as munitions of war. She proceeded, however, gradually to her point. She first issued an order, on the 8th of June, 1793, for capturing and bringing into port " all vessels laden, wholly or in part, with corn, flour, or meal, and destined to France, or to other coun- tries, if occupied by the arms of that nation." Such vessels indeed were not to be condemned, nor their cargoes seized ; but the latter were to be purchased on behalf of the English government ; or if not, then the vessels, on giving due security, were to be allowed to proceed to any neutral port. Of course the price of provisions in France and in England was materially different, and a lucrative traffic for the United States was, in this way, destroyed. Moreover, this proceeding was a comparative novelty in the law of nations, and however it might suit the purposes of Great Britain, was a gross outrage on America. In November of the same year it was follow- ed by a still more glaring iufraction of the rights of neutrals, in an order, condemning to " capture and adjudication all vessels laden with the produce of any French colony, or with supplies for such co- lony." The fermentation in consequence of this order rose to such a height in America that it required all the skill of Washington to avert a war. The President, however, determining to preserve jjeace if possible, despatched Jay to London as a Minister Plenipo- tentiary, by \srhose frank explanations redress was obtained in a mea 22 ORIGIN OP THE WAR. sure for the past, and a treaty negotiated ; not indeed adequate to jus tice, but better than could be obtained again, when it expired in 1S06. But the relaxation in the rigor of the order of November, 1793. soon proved to be more nominal than real ; and from 1794 until the peace of Amiens in 1802, the commerce of the United States conti- nued to be the prey of British cruizers and privateers. After the re- newal of the war, the fury of the belligerants increased, and with it the stringent measures adopted by Napoleon and Great Britain. The French Emperor, boldly avowing his intention to crush England, forbade by a series of decrees, issued from Berlin, Milan, and Ram- bouiliet, the importation of her commodities into any port of Europe under his control ; and England, equally sweeping in her acts, de- clared all such ports in a state of blockade, thus rendering any neu- tral vessel liable to capture, which should attempt to enter them. The legality of a blockade where there is not a naval power off the coast competent to maintain such blockade, has always been de- nied by the lesser maritime powers. Its effect, in the present in- stance, was virtually to exclude the United States from foreign com- merce. In these extreme measures Napoleon and England were equally to be censured ; but the policy of the former did not affect us, while that of the latter did. Hence the exasperation against the one was extreme, and pervaded the whole community ; that against the other was slighter, and confined only to the more intelligent. In point of time, Napoleon was the first to begin these outrages on the rights of neutrals; but his injustice was practically felt only on land ; while England was the first to introduce the paper blockade, a measure ruinous to American merchants. This was done finally on the 16th of May, 1806, when Great Britain announced a "block- ade of the coast, rivers and ports, from the river Elbe to the port of Brest, inclusive." On the 21st of November, of the same year, Na- poleon, in retaliation, issued a decree from Berlin, placing the British islands in a state of blockade. This decree was followed by a still more stringent order in council on the part of England. It now became necessary for the United States, either to embark in a war or to withdraw her commerce altogether from the ocean. The popular voice demanded the former course. Though France, in the abstract, was as unjust as England, her oppressive measures did not, as we have said, affect America, and hence the indignation of the people was directed principally against Great Britain. But with the President it was different. Though the sympathies of Jef- ferson were all with France, his judgment was against her as well as ORIGIN OP THE WAR. 23 England. Besides he was determined to preserve peace at all hazards, for it was his favorite maxim that the best war is more fatal than the worst peace. A further reason led him to refuse the alternative of war. He was not without hope that one or both of the bellige- rants would return to reason, and repeal their obnoxious acts, if the conduct of the United States, instead of being aggressive, should be patient. Actuated by these views, the President recommended to Congress the passage of an embargo act. This law passed in Decem- ber, 1807. By it ail American vessels abroad were called home, and those in the United States prohibited from leaving port. In con- sequence of this measure, the commerce of the country was annihi- lated in an hour ; and harbors, once flourishing, became soon only receptacles for rotting ships. There can be no question now that the embargo was a fatal blunder. It crippled our resources for the war that ensued ; made the eastern states bitterly hostile to Jefferson's, as well as to his successor's administration ; and tended to foster in the minds of the populace at large, an idea that we shrank from a con- test with Great Britain in consequence of inherent weakness. But there was a fourth and last source of exasperation against England, which assisted, more than all the rest, to produce the war of 1812. We allude to the British claim of the right of impressment. In the terrible struggles in which England found herself engaged with France, her maritime force was her chief dependence, and accordingly she increased the number of her ships unprecedent- edly. But it soon became difficult to man all these vessels. The thriving commerce pursued by the United States, as early as 1793, drew large numbers of English seamen into our mercantile marine, where they obtained higher wages than in the navy at home. Great Britain saw this, and resolved to apply a remedy. By the fiction of her law, a man born an English subject can never throw off his al- legiance. She determined accordingly to seize her seamen wherever found, and force them to serve their native flag. In consequence her cruizers stopped every American vessel they met, and searched the crew in order to reclaim the English, Scotch, or Irish on board. Fre- quently it happened that persons born in America were taken as British subjects ; for where the boarding officer was the judge of a man's nationality, there was little chance of justice, especially if the seaman was a promising one, or the officer's ship was short-handed. In nine months, during parts of the years 1796 and 1797, the Ame. rican minister at the court of London had made application for the discharge of two hundred and seventy-one native born Americans, proved to haye been v Jius impressed. These outrages against personal 24 ORIGIN OF THE WAR. independence were regarded among the people of America with the utmost indignation. There was something in such injuries to exas- perate every sentiment of the soul. That an innocent man, peaca- bly pursuing an honorable vocation, should be forcibly carried on board a British man-of-war, and there compelled to remain, shut out from all hope of ever seeing his family, seemed, to the robust sense of justice in the popular breast, little better than Algerine bondage. The rage of the people was increased by tales of horror and aggres- sion that occasionally reached their ears from these prison ships. Stories were told of men who had escaped, and being captured and taken back, were whipped until they died. In one instance, it waa said that a sailor, goaded to madness, had seized the captain, and springing overboard, been drowned with his oppressor. Whether true or not, this and other narratives as horrible, were freely dissem- inated, and tended, at last, to raise the popular feeling to a pitch of inconceivable exasperation. Every attempt to arrange this difficulty with England had signal- ly failed. The United States offered that all American seamen should be registered and provided with a certificate of citizenship ; that the number of a crew should be limited by the tonnage of the ship, and that if this number was exceeded, British subjects enlisted should be liable to impressment ; that deserters should be given up ; and that a prohibition should be issued by each party against clandestinely secreting and carrying off the seamen of the other. In 1800, and again in 1806, it was attempted to form treaties in reference to this subject ; but the pertinacity with which England adhered to her claim frustrated these efforts. In 1S03 the difficulty had nearly been adjusted by a convention, for Great Britain offered to abandon her claim to impressment on the high seas, if allowed to retain it on the narrow seas, or those immediately surrounding her island. But, this being rejected as inadmissible by the United States, all subsequent efforts at an arrangement proved abortive. The impressment of seamen continued, and was the source of daily increasing abuse. Not only Americans, but Danes, Swedes, Germans, Russians, French- men, Spaniards and Portuguese were seized and forcibly carried off by British men-of-war. There are even well attested instances of Asiatics and Africans being thus impressed. In short, as the war in Europe approached its climax, seamen became more scarce in the British navy, and all decency being thrown off, crews were filled up under color of this claim, regardless even of the shew of justice. In 1811, it was computed that the number of men impressed from the American marine amounted to not less than six thousand. ORIGIN OP THE WAR. 25 At last the arrogance of the British naval officers rose to such an extreme, that one of our national vessels, the frigate Chesapeake, was forcibly boarded and several men impressed from her decks. The circumstances were these. In the spring of 1807. the British Consul at Norfolk sent to Captain Decatur, requiring him to surren- der three seamen who had deserted from the English ship Melam- pus, and enlisted in the navy of the United States. The demand was refused, the men being found, on enquiry, to be citizens of the Uni- ted States. Subsequently, the American frigate Chesapeake sailed with these men on board, but was pursued by the British ship Leo- pard, fired into, and when she hauled down her flag, boarded, and the three men, together with another, taken from her deck. The Chesapeake was in no condition to resist, having gone to sea with- out suitable preparation, and the only gun discharged from her was fired by a coal brought from the galley. Before she struck, three of her men were killed and eighteen wounded. The news of this out- THB CHESA.FEAKK AITD LEOPAKD. rage excited universal resentment in the United States. The Presi dent issued a proclamation forbidding all communication with Bri ish armed vessels, unless in distress, or bearing despatches ; and in terdicting Britjch vessels from the harbors and waters of the United in 26 ORIGIN OF THE WAR. States. One hundred thousand men were ordered to hold themselves in readiness for war, and a special session of Congress was called to meet on the 26th of October. Meantime, however, the outrage was disavowed by the British government, and here the difficulty was allowed to rest. But it was subsequently noticed that the offenders, instead of being censured in England, were treated with undiminish- ed favor by their government ; and this, sinking deep into the po- pular mind in America, created general exasperation, and increased the prevailing distrust in Great Britain. Already the people were prepared for war ; it was only the government that held back. There was no period, from 1807 to 1812, when a declaration of war would not have been received with favor by the community at large ; and there were moments during that interval, when such a declaration would, perhaps, have been more generally popular than it was in 1812. This is especially true of the period between the outrage on the Chesapeake and the passage of the embargo act. Having thus traced the growth of that popular sentiment which rendered war, sooner or later inevitable, let us proceed to enquire into the manner in which it was at last brought about. For there is a wide distinction between the real and ostensible causes of a war, it being a rare thing for national contests to be undertaken without deeper reasons than are apparent on the surface. Thus, the peace of Amiens was broken, for the pretext that the British refused to evacuate Malta ; the war was, in truth, renewed because Napoleon and England were filled with mutual distrust. So, the usual reasons given for the war of 1812, are comparatively weak, far weaker than those which could have been urged in favor of a war in 1807. The real secret was, that the people wanted a war, and would not longer be denied. In 1815, when the popular indignation had vented itself, peace was as welcome as war had been three years before. It has been thought strange that the treaty of Ghent over- looked some of the points, to obtain which the war was expressly undertaken ; but this view of the case explains the mystery. The practical result of the contest had been to teach England respect for the United States ; to break the charm of her naval invincibility ; and virtually to protect our seamen, in future, from impressment. The popular will was satisfied by the victories of Hull, Decatur and Stew- art, at sea ; and by those of Chippewa, the Thames and New Orleans, on land. The people looked less at the treaty, than at these triumphs. Meantime, we return to the thread of events. In December, 1807, as already stated, the embargo act was passed. But the pressure of this law was found to be so severe on all classes of the community, that, in March, 1809, it was repealed, and a non-importation act as ORIGIN OP THE WAR. 2" to England and France, substituted. By this new law, all voyages to the French arid British dominions were prohibited, and all trade in articles of British and French product or manufacture : and power was vested in the President, in case either or both of the belligerants should revoke their edicts, so as no longer to violate the neutral com- merce of the United States, to issue a proclamation repealing the pro- visions of the new importation act as to one, or both. In conse- quence of this, France on the 1st of November, 1810, exempted the United States from the operation of the Berlin and Milan decrees. England, however, still refused to repeal her orders in council, alle- ging that France must first revoke her edicts absolutely. To this the American government replied that it had no right to dictate to Na- poleon what his conduct to other nations should be, and that, since he had offered justice to the United States, there was no further cause of complaint against him on her part. The 3rd of March, 1811, had been fixed as the limit of time, at which the beliigerants were to re- voke their aggressive laws, or take the chances of a war ; but anxious to preserve peace, Mr. Madison procured the passage of an act, by which Great Britain was allowed a further period of delay. This last act of conciliation proved as useless as preceding ones, and the American government began finally to despair. Had its patience, however, continued for a few months longer, the war might have been averted, at least for a time. But an incident occurred at this crisis, which, by giving a new impetus to the popular rage, hurried the cabinet into hostilities, at the very moment when England was about to relax her orders. We allude to the discovery of an intrigue for the separation of the New England States from the Union, car- ried on by an Englishman, named John Henry, professing to be a secret agent of Great Britain. This individual had been employed in 1809, by Sir James Craig, Governor-General of Canada. He had visited Boston, where he moved in the best circles, and was known for his quiet and gentle- manly, but reserved demeanor. In February, 1812, he communi- cated to the President of the United States the nature of his mission, in consideration of receiving for the disclosure, the sum of fifty thousand dollars, from the secret service fund. The money was paid, the papers received by Mr. Madison, and then Henry, before the documents were published, sailed for Europe. His papers proved that the Governor-General of Canada, misled by the opposi- tion of a portion of the New England States to the measures of the general government, had conceived that a dissolution of the Union was at hand f'and had sent Henry to Boston to aspertain how far, in such an event, England would be looked to for aid, and to what ex- *8 ORIGIN OF THE WAR. tent the withdrawing states would enter into connexion with her This idea of a dissolution, regarded as so visionary in the United States, had, as we have seen, long been a favorite one in England, Henry soon found, however, that a separation from the Union was not the intention of New England. On his return to Canada, Sir James Craig refused to remunerate him. Henry accordingly be- trayed his employers, and sold his information to Mr. Madison. It has been urged that his conduct destroyed the validity of his testi- mony ; and there is some force in the argument ; but, on the whole, there appears no good reason to doubt the fact of his mission, or its purport. The nation, on learning this intrigue, became doubly exasperated against England ; and loudly demanded war. The great commer- cial cities, the Middle States, and the West, were foremost in this burst of mingled enthusiasm, passion and patriotism. The New England States, however, resisted the torrent. But the majority of the people were no longer to be denied the revenge for which they had so long thirsted. Beyond the Alleghanies the sentiment in favor of the war was universal. This was, in part, the result of the threatening aspect of the Indians, who were believed to have been secretly instigated to hostility by the British. While the public feel- ing was in this excited condition, despatches were received from Europe, announcing the continued refusal of England to revoke her edicts. The President immediately acquainted Congress with this fact, and that body, after an animated debate, declared war against the united kingdoms of Great Britain and Ireland. The bill, declar- ing war, passed the House of Representatives, on the 4th of June, 1812, by a majority of thirty in one hundred and twenty-eight votes. In the Senate nineteen voted for it, and thirteen against it. On the 18th of June, it was signed by the President ; and on the 19th pub- licly proclaimed. Four days later, the British ministry withdrew conditionally their objectionable orders in council, of January, 1807, and April, 1809. But, when the news of this event reached America, hostilities had already begun. The peace offering had come too late. The army with which Congress proposed to begin this war, amounted, on paper, to thirty-five thousand men : but as twenty-five thousand of this number had been authorized only in January, the real force enrolled was probably less than fifteen thousand. The services of fifty thousand volunteers, in addition, however, were or- dered to be accepted ; and the President was empowered to call on the States for militia to the number of one hundred thousand, if necessary. In all these preparations the force was more apparent than real : and sagacious minds foresaw that, until a large disciplined army was in the field, defeat would probably be our portion ! BA.TTLB OF TIPPECANOB. BOOK II. TO THE SPRING OT THE TEAR 1814. HE war of 1812 was preceded by an ominous demonstration on the north-western frontier. Se- cretly instigated by the English, the savages, as early as 1811, conceived the idea of forming an exten- sive league to crush the power of the United States. The existence of some such hostile movement became suspected by the admin- istration, in consequence of the murders and other outrages perpetrated by the Indians ; and accordingly General William Henry Harrison, at that time Governor of the territory of Indiana, was ordered, at the head of a competent force of regulars and militia, to enter the hostile country and obtain redress for these injuries. Harrjson arrived at the chief town of the enemy, on the in* 29 30 BATTLE OF TIPPECANOE. 6th November, 1811. Tecumseh, the leader in the conspiracy, was absent, but his brother, the Prophet, who was possessed of equal, if not superior influence, sent messengers to meet the American Gene- ral, and promise that, on the ensuing morning, an amicable adjust- ment of all difficulties should be made. Harrison, in consequence, encamped peaceably for the night ; but aware of the treachery of the Indian character, chose the strongest position afforded by the neigh- borhood, and ordered his men to rest upon their arms. These pre- cautions alone saved him from massacre ; for in the night the sav- ages assailed him. The contest was long and bloody. But finally, discipline triumphed, and the Indians were repulsed. The loss on both sides was severe. The Americans suffered, in killed and wounded, one hundred and eighty-eight ; the enemy one hundred and fifty. On the 9th of November, Harrison burned the village, and devastated the surrounding country, after which he returned home. This battle is known as that of Tippecanoe, from the name of the Prophet's town. It produced such a wholesome fear of the American arms that the Indians in the vicinity generally sued for peace. In order to follow up this blow if necessary, the government raised an army and placed it under the command of General William Hull, Governor of Michigan territory. The probability of a war was also considered in enlisting this force, for in case of such an event, the presence of an army in the north-west, would give the United States the opportunity of striking the first blow. Accordingly, in the month of April, 1812, the Governor of Ohio was ordered by the President, to call out twelve hundred men. The success at Tippecanoe, and the general enthusiasm for a war promptly filled the requisition. This temporary force assembled at Dayton, Ohio, on the 25th of April, 1812. Uniting with the fourth United States infantry, and por- tions of other regular regiments, the whole marched upon Detroit. The little army was compelled to traverse a dense wilderness for nearly two hundred miles, and consequently did not reach its desti- nation until the 5th of July. Meantime, war had been declared. But by some unaccountable mistake in the department at Washing- ton, the intelligence was allowed to reach the British posts in the north-west, before it was transmitted to the American commander. This oversight led to the capture of a portion of Hull's baggage, which he had sent by water to Detroit, without a sufficient guard. On the 12th of July the army crossed into the British territory, dis- cretionary powers having been vested in Hull to invade Canada in the event of a war. A vaunting proclamation was issued, addressed THE FALL OP MACKINAW. 31 to the inhabitants, many of whom, in consequence, joined the inva- ders. Parties were now sent out into the country, which was found to be fertile and well cultivated. A detachment, under Colonels Cass and Miller, marched towards Maiden, a British post, situated at the confluence of the Detroit river and lake Erie, about thirteen miles from Sandwich, where Hull was encamped. The enemy was met at a bridge over the Canard river and driven in confusion back on Maiden. Had Cass and Miller been supported, the fortress must have fallen, for it was in no condition to resist a vigorous assault ; but Hull refused to sustain his subordinates, and the reconnoitering party was withdrawn to the camp. In fact Hull, from indecision of character, was unfitfor his command. After he had made his first vigorous effort, and once entered Canada, he sunk into idleness. The intelligence of the fall of Mackinaw, which was surprised by the er ^my on the 17th of July, filled him with vague apprehensions, which were increased when he came to reflect on the distance that his supplies had to be brought from Ohio, and the dif- ficulty of transportation. A detachment of hostile Indians, in a few days, crossing the Detroit, cut off the communications ; and a small force sent out to open the route, was surprised and defeated by the savages. This event increased the alarm of Hull. Stimulated by his younger officers, he had at last begun his preparations for an ad- vance ; but now, abandoning all present thought of reducing Mai- den, he retreated across the river, and established himself at Detroit. This WLS on the Sth of August. On the same day a detachment, six hundred strong, commanded by Colonel Miller, was sent to open the communications. This force met and conquered a combined body of British and Indians, with a loss to the Americans of seventy, that of the enemy being probably a hundred. A severe storm of rain and the care of the wounded compelled Colonel Miller, however, to re- turn subsequently to Detroit. A third attempt to open the commu- nications was made on the 14th of August, by a body of three hun- dred picked men, under the command of Colonels Cass and M'Ar- thur ; but this effort proving as unsuccessful as the former ones, the detachment returned to camp, two days later, where it found, to the inconceivable chagrin of its officers and men, that Hull had surren- dered, and that it was included in the capitulation. On the day that Cass and M' Arthur had left Detroit, the British, who had advanced as Hull retreated, began to erect batteries on the shore at Sandwich, opposite the American camp. General BrocK, who commanded the enemy's forces, was as remarkable for energy as Hull for inefficiency. He had gained a thorough insight, moreover, 32 SURRENDER OF DETROIT. into the character of his adversary, and knew the American leader to be possessed with a secret fear of the British invincibility. Ac- cordingly, on the 15th of of August, Brock summoned Hull to sur- render, intimating that, in the event of a refusal, he should assault Detroit, when he would not be answerable for the conduct of the In- dians. Hull at first rejected the proposal of a capitulation with scorn. Brock proceeded, in consequence, to open his batteries. The bombardment was continued until towards midnight, and resumed on the following'morning, when the British, with their savage allies, were seen advancing to the assault, having crossed during the night. At this spectacle, Hull's resolution deserted him. He ordered a white flag to be displayed, and a parley ensuing, terms of capitula- tion were speedily arranged. By this disgraceful compact, Fort De- troit, with its garrison and all the public stores and arms were sur- rendered. Even the detachment of M' Arthur and Cass was included in the arrangement. The volunteers and militia were allowed to re- turn home, on condition of not serving again until exchanged. Thir- ty-three pieces of artillery were surrendered on this occasion ; among them, several brass pieces captured from Burgoyne in the war of In- dependence. Twenty-five hundred muskets and rifles likewise fell into the hands of the enemy. This capitulation was received with rage when announced to the troops. The consternation and anger which it awakened in the United States was unparalleled. Hull was everywhere accused of cowardice, and, in some quarters, even of treason. On his exchange, he was tried by a court-martial, found guilty of cowardice and conduct unbecoming an officer, and sentenced to be shot. But in consequence of his age, and his services in the Revolution, he was recommended to the mercy of the President, who, remitting the capital punishment, contented himself with striking the offender's name from the army roll. The weakness of Hull had been penetrated by his officers long be- fore the surrender, and letters were, in consequence, despatched to Governor Meigs, of Ohio, informing him of the suspicions of the wri- ters, and soliciting reinforcements to open the communications. A force of volunteers was promptly called out. In a few days the in- telligence of the loss of Detroit arrived. The departure of the troop ,s was now hastened, and Harrison, created for the purpose a Major- General of the Kentucky militia, was entrusted with the command. His troops marched from Cincinnati, on the 29th of August, their first destination being the relief of the frontier posts. The numbers of his army were about twenty-five hundred. Halting at Piqua, he proceeded to Fort Wayne, the siege of which by the Indians was BURNING OF THE INDIAN VILLAGES. 33 raised on his approach. He already, however, began to feel the want of supplies, which, having to be transported from the settled country and Cincinnati, arrived in small quantities and after great delays. Hence, he found it impossible to march at once on Detroit, as had been originally intended. He contented himself, therefore, with sending out two expeditions, one against the Miami towns on the Wabash, the other against the Potawatamie villages on the river St. Joseph. Both incursions were successful. Nine villages were burned, and all the standing corn destroyed ; a rigorous, but neces- sary measure, since, without it, the hostile Indians could not have been driven from a neighborhood so dangerous to the American army. Towards the close of September, General Winchester, a Brigadier in the army of the United States, arrived at Fort Wayne with rein- forcements, and superseded Harrison. The latter was on his return to his government in Indiana, when he was overtaken by an express from Washington, assigning to him the chief command of the army. On the 23d of September he reached Fort Wayne again, but found that Winchester had marched to Fort Defiance, the preceding day, with two thousand men. The progress of Winchester was slow, for his route lay through swamps, or impenetrable thickets; while he was compelled to move with great caution, clouds of hostile Indians hang- ing on his front. In fact, a detachment of four hundred British re- gulars, attended by artillery, arid accompanied by more than a thou- sand savages had been advancing to attack Fort Wayne, when, learning Winchester's approach, it thought it most prudent to fall back towards the Miami. The Americans soon began to feel the want of provisions ; for a supply despatched down the river Au Glaize by Harrison, could not reach Fort Defiance in consequence of the vicinity of the enemy. At last the sufferings of his army became so extreme that Winchester sent back an escort, who succeeded in bringing up supplies on pack horses. On the 30th of September, his troops reached Fort Defiance, which the enemy abandoned on his approach. Three days afterwards, Harrison arrived; but remained only twenty-four hours, returning to bring up the residue of his troops. He now proceeded to arrange them according to the following dispo- sition. General Tupper, with a regiment of regulars, and the Ohio volunteers and militia, was placed at Fort M'Arthur. This force constituted the centre of the army. The left wing was left at Fort Defiance, under Winchester. The right wing, composed of two bri- gades of militia, one from Pennsylvania, and one from Virginia, was S 5 34 DEFENCE OP FORT HARRISON. stationed at Sandusky. The army had left Cincinnati, fully expect ing to strike a decisive blow before winter, but this the want of sup plies had prevented. With the exception of an incursion of five days, undertaken by General Tupper against the Rapids of the Mi- ami, and which proved eminently successful, no further movement was made during the fall. Tupper, after defeating the savages and British, returned to Fort M'Arthur ; and thus ended what is called Harrison's first autumnal campaign. Meantime, while these events had been transacting on Lake Erie, the war had not languished in Indiana and Illinois. The policy of England was to let her battles be fought by the savages, whom she had accordingly supplied with arms, and instigated to take up the hatchet. Hence the necessity, during the first two campaigns, of so many expeditions against the Indians. A body of Kentucky volun- teers, under General Hookins, and a detachment of rangers, under Colonel Russell, had been despatched to chastise the tribes in these two territories by destroying their towns. Their first destination, however, was the relief of Fort Harrison, a post at that time invest- ed by the savages. The commander of this place was General Tay- lor, then a young officer, holding the rank of Captain ; but his con- duct, in the emergency, evinced all those heroic traits which have since shone forth, on a grander scale, at Palo Alto, Monterey and Buena Vista. Expecting an attack, he held himself hourly in readi- ness. On the night of the 4th of September the anticipated assault took place. The Indians succeeded in firing a block-house contigu- ous to the barracks ; and it was with great difficulty the latter were preserved from the flames. Sending a detachment to the roof of the barracks to tear off the portion adjoining the block-house, while a galling fire was maintained on the Indians from other parts of the fort, the gallant young officer finally succeeded in preventing the spreading of the flames. The block-house, however, was consumed, arid thus a gap, six or eight feet wide, opened into the fort. But this interval was speedily barricaded, and the savages repulsed in an at- tempt to enter. When the attack had continued seven hours, and day had broken, the Indians retired. The Americans lost but three killed and three wounded. During this contest, there were only fif- teen effective men in the garrison, the rest being sick or convales- cent. In a few days the place was relieved by the approach of Ge- neral Hopkins at the head of four thousand men. Preparations were now begun to fulfil the second object of the ex- pedition, an attack on the Peoria villages. But, after a march of four days in the direction of the enemy, the spirit of insubordination MASSACRE OF THE RIVER RAISIN. 35 among the volunteers grew to such a pitch that the General thought it advisable not to proceed. He offered, however, to pursue the en- terprise if five hundred persons could be found to attend him. But the volunteers, either from the exhausted state of their horses, their own fears, or their want of confidence in Hopkins, decided almost unanimously to return. Accordingly the authority of the General was set aside, and the army began to retrace its steps. Meantime, however, Colonel Russel had marched by a different route against the savages and defeated them. Having burned their towns and destroyed their corn, he returned to the settlements. Another de- tachment, led by Captain Craig,penetrated twenty miles further than even Russel. In November, Hopkins, at the head of twelve hun- dred and fifty men, undertook a more successful enterprise against the .villages on the Wabash. Colonel Campbell, in December, led a similar expedition, and with like success, against the towns on the Mississinewa river. Harrison having failed in his autumnal campaign, determined to resume operations in the winter. Accordingly he directed the three divisions of his army to rendezvous at the rapids of the Miami ; there collect provisions ; and making a feint on Detroit, cross the strait on the ice and invest Maiden. General Winchester was the first to ar- rive at the rendezvous, which he did after incredible privations on the part of his men. But he had scarcely reached the rapids, when, yielding to the entreaties of the citizens of Frenchtown for protection, he detached Colonel Lewis with seven hundred and fifty men to their relief. Lewis met and defeated a body of British and their savage allies. The news of this success transported those who had been left behind ; all were anxious to press forward and secure a portion of the glory ; and accordingly, Winchester, with the remain- der, pushing on to Frenchtown, arrived and took post at that place on the 20th of January, 1813. The fatal error of thus placing him- self beyond sustaining distance from the main army, was exemplified the next day, when Proctor, at the head of fifteen hundred British and savages, attacked and defeated the Americans. Winchester was taken prisoner early in the action. A portion of his troops held out for some time longer, but finally capitulated. Now ensued a tragedy the remembrance of which will never be effaced from the popular mind. The uninjured Americans were im- mediately marched towards Maiden by their captors. The wounded, however, were left on the field, but with the understanding that they should be sent for the next day. But the following morning the In dians broke in on these helpless men, and after murdering them, set 36 BATTLE OP QT7EENSTOWN. fire to the houses where they lay. This atrocious act which the Bri tish might easily have prevented, has been justly called the massacre o the River Raisin. Harrison, who had arrived at the rapids, hearing of the capture of Winchester, deemed it advisable to retreat. He accordingly fell back to Carrying River, about midway between the Miami and Sandusky. The next month, however, finding that Proc- tor made no attempt at pursuit, he advanced again to the rapids, where he began the construction of Fort Meigs, destined to be subsequently celebrated for its two sieges. Thus ended what is called Harrison's winter campaign. It was quite as unfortunate as his autumnal one, and did little or nothing towards obliterating the disgrace of Hull's surrender. While these events had been transacting on the north-west frontier, others of scarcely less importance had been occurring on Lake Onta- rio. Here the population was comparatively dense. The govern- ment accordingly looked to this point as one where a decisive blow could be struck against the enemy. It was evidently to the advan- tage of the United States that the war should be waged on the soil of Canada, and hence the resolution was early taken to invade that territory. The American forces, guarding the northern frontier, were stationed at Plattsburgh, Buffalo, Sackett's Harbor, Black Rock, and Ogdensburg, the whole under the supreme command of Major-Gen- eral Dearborn. In addition to the regular army, however, thus dis- posed, the militia of New York, thirty-five hundred in number, were in the field, commanded by Major-General Van Rensselaer. These were posted at Lewistown. General Dearborn was ordered early in the season to assail the British, if for no other purpose than to pre- vent their sending succor to Maiden. The summer, however, passed in inactivity, Dearborn having, notwithstanding the orders from Washington, concluded an armistice with the Governor-General of Canada, based on a mutual belief that peace was at hand, in conse- quence of the repeal of the English orders in council. General Van Rensselaer, however, was disposed to be more active. A detach- ment of Americans having, on the 21st of September, captured a small village on the Canadian side, the enemy endeavored to reta- liate by an unsuccessful expedition against Ogdensburg. General Van Rensselaer, on this resolved to attack Queenstown. The enter- prise was undertaken on the 13th of October, and but for the cow- ardice of the militia would have resulted in a brilliant victory. It was on this occasion that General, then Colonel Scott, first distin guished himself. The plan of the attack was as follows : a corps of six hundred BATTLE OP QT7EENSTOWN. 37 infantry, half of which were militia and half regulars, was, undef cover of night, to cross the Niagara and carry the batteries by assault. The boats collected to transport the men proved insufficient, how- ever, and only a portion of the force was carried over to the British shore in time. One detachment, attempting to cross, was forced by the current under the guns of the enemy, and most of it captured. Meantime, however, Colonel Van Rensselaer, who led the pioneers, gallantly advanced on the foe with what forces he had ; but being BATTLE OF QUEKNSTOWN. soon wounded, was forced to leave the field. The Americans dash- ed forward, nevertheless, and seized a Height called the Mountain, whither they dragged an eighteen pounder and two mortars. The Bri- tish now fled to Queenstown. Here the fugitives were met and ral- lied by General Brock, who led them back to dispossess the Ameri- cans of the height. But Brock being mortally wounded, the British again fled. Some accessions of force, chiefly militia, under General Wadsworth, finally made their appearance. At this crisis Colonel Scott reached the field of battle and took command of the United States troops, now reduced to about two hundred^and fifty. Expecting to be reinforced from Lewistown, he tv 3S THE CONSTITUTION AND THE GUERRIERE. drew up his men close to the ferry, in order to cover that important point. Here he manfully" stood his ground, twice repulsing the Bri- tish and their Indian allies. At last, Major-General Sheaffe, at the head of the neighboring garrison of Fort George, which had been aroused by the firing, arrived at the scene of contest. His forces numbered eight hundred and fifty. All hope of succor from the American side had meantime departed, for the militia, beholding the numbers of the British, were seized with alarm and refused to cross. Retreat was impossible, the boats all being on the American side. In consequence, after some desperate efforts at resistance, which proved unavailing, Scott was compelled to capitulate. The Ameri- cans suffered in killed, wounded and prisoners, one thousand men, a half of whom were regulars. The British loss is not known, though it was considerable. General Van Rensselaer, in consequence of this failure, shortly after resigned. In the death of Brock, the ene- my experienced a blow for which even victory could afford no com- pensation. Brock enjoyed one of the best reputations in the English army, and had been Wellington's competitor, a few years before, for the command in the peninsula. A sentiment of chivalrous respect in- duced the Americans to fire minute-guns from Fort Niagara during the funeral ceremonies of this hero. What more delightful than to record acts of courtesy like this, amid the forbidding incidents of a sanguinary war ! Other attempts were subsequently made to invade Canada by Ge- neral Smyth, the successor of Van Rensselaer. But the want of boats led to the failure of these projected expeditions. , General Dearborn, whose head-quarters were at Greenbush, was not more successful ; and, though in command of a respectable force of regulars, suffered the autumn to pass in inactivity. In short, so complete had been the failure of our arms on land in this campaign, that but for the bril- liant success that attended us at sea, the spirit of the people would, perhaps, have given way. But, in the darkest hour of disaster, when the surrender of Detroit buried the nation in gloom, the victory of the Constitution over the Guerriere, suddenly blazed across the fir- mament, and inspired hope and exultation in every bosom. On the declaration of war, the prowess of England at sea was re- garded as so invincible, that the administration hesitated whether to send the national vessels from port. The American navy, in 1 8 1 2, con- sisted of ten frigates, of which five were laid up in ordinary ; ten sloops and smaller vessels ; and one hundred and sixty-five useless gun boats. The representations of a few officers, however, who were confident of success, induced the President to allow a portion oi THE CONSTITUTION AND THE GTJERRIERE. 39 this little navy to sail. One of the first of our frigates to leave port was the Constitution. This vessel, commanded by Captain Isaac Hull, put to sea from Annapolis, on the 12th of July, 1812, bound to New York. On her voyage, however, she fell in with a British fleet, from which she only escaped by incredible exertions of seamanship and skill. Being chased from her route, she went into Boston har- bor. By this accident Hull was prevented receiving an order that had been despatched to New York, directing him to give up the command of his ship. In a few days he sailed on a new cruise. On the 19th of August he met the Guerriere, Captain Dacres, an English frigate of slightly inferior force, and, after a sharp conflict of half an hour, compelled her to surrender. The loss of the Americans in this action was seven killed and seven wounded ; that of the British fifteen killed, sixty -two wounded, and twenty-four missing. The Guerriere was injured so materially that it was found impossible to carry her into port, and accordingly she was burned. This victory is attribu- ted in part to the heavier metal of the Constitution, but chiefly to the superior gunnery of her crew. Its effect on the public mind was electric. The triumph was regarded almost as a miracle. In the general exultation, the surrender of Detroit was almost forgotten j CONSTITUTION AND THE GUERPJERE. and the spirits of the people were rallied, when otherwise they migh nave sunk into despair. The insane confidence of the British in their naval superiority had been exhibited a few days before, when Captain Porter, in the Ame- 40 AMERICAN NAVAL VICTORIES rican frigate Essex had been attacked by the British sloop of war Alert, a vessel of very inferior force. For her temerity, however, the Alert, in eight minutes had suffered so much from the fire of her enemy as to have seven feet of water in her hold. She surrendered of necessity, and was sent into New York. Other victories followed in rapid succession. On the 8th of October, the British sloop Fro- THE CA.PTTES OF THE FROLIC BY THB WASP. lie, of twenty -two guns, was captured by the American sloop Wasp, Captain Jones, of eighteen guns. Seven days afterwards the frigate llnited States, Captain Decatur, being off the Western Islands, met the British frigate Macedonian, Captain Garden, and forced her to sur- render. The loss of the Macedonian was thirty-six killed and sixty- eight wounded ; that of the United States only four killed and seven wounded. Decatur carried the Macedonian into New York. On the 29th of December, the Constitution, now commanded by Captain Bainbridge, fell in with, and captured the British :igate Java, Cap* tain Lambert, off the coast of Brazil ; the Java losing sixty killed and more than one hundred wounded, while the less on board the Constitution was but nine killed and twenty-five wounded. These series of successes had been attended with but few reverses. Only three national vessels had been lost, the Wasp, Vixen and Nautilus, CAPTURE OF YORKTOWN. 41 of which the first, a sloop of war, was the largest. All of these ships, moreover, had surrendered to vastly superior forces. In addition to the victories of the regular marine, almost daily triumphs were achieved by the American privateers. It was computed, when Con- gress met in November, that two hundred and fifty British vessels had already fallen a prey to private cruizers. These successes determined the government to decline the offer of an armistice, tendered by Great Britain, unless that power would abandon her claim to impressment. The English Cabinet, however, refused to yield this point, and preparations were in consequence made to open the year 1813 with renewed activity. Twenty addi- tional regiments of infantry were ordered to be raised, and ten regi- ments of rangers ; while the greatest inducements were held out to enlist. It was resolved also to increase the navy. In a word, though our armies on land had met with almost universal defeat in 1812, it was hoped that in 1813 they would be attended by a better fortune : and accordingly, a new plan for the invasion of Canada was pro- jected, under the especial direction of General Armstrong, the succes- sor of Dr. Eustis, as Secretary at War. The army on Lake Ontario was still commanded by General Dear- born. The plan of General Armstrong, as communicated to this General early in 1813, was to attack the British posts of Kingston, York, and Fort George, in succession the reduction of the first being considered the most important, and therefore to be under- taken as a preliminary. General Dearborn, however, after consult- ing Commodore Chauncey, who commanded the fleet on Lake On- tario, resolved to begin with York. Accordingly, on the 27th of April, the fleet arrived off that place, and the troops being landed, the town was captured. Owing however to the explosion of the British fort, General Pike, who led the Americans, was killed, while two hundred of his men were either killed or wounded. General Dearborn having remained on board the fleet, and the officer who now succeeded to the command, being without orders, most of the fruits of the expedition were lost. The army next proceeded, though not until after various delays, to attack Fort George. On the 27th of May that place was assailed, and captured, after a spir- ited resistance. A series of operations in the open field now ensued, which were attended generally with disgrace and failure to the Americans ; and, in the end, General Dearborn recalled all his troops to the fort, which the British proceeded to invest. While this imbecile campaign was dragging along, a General born of the people blazed suddenly into notoriety. The circumstance iv*S 6 42 CAPTURE OF YORKTOWN. was this: On the 27th of May, an attack being made on the American post at Sackett's Harbor, General Brown, a militia officer of that neighborhood, placing himself at the head of the garrison, defeated the assailants. The gallantry and decision of Brown in this action, appeared the more conspicuous in contrast with the taidiness and want of ability displayed by Dearborn. The latter General was old, weak, and in bad health, and thus unfit, on many accounts, for his post. At last the public indignation rose to such a height, that he was recalled, and General Wilkinson appointed in his place. It is time now to return to the north-western frontier, where we left Harrison engaged in the construction of Fort Meigs. The cam- paign of 1813 was opened in this quarter, by the advance of Proctor against that post, in the latter part of April, at the head of two thousand British and Indians. Harrison being in hourly expectation of succor from Ohio, gallantly defended the place until the fifth of May, when General Clay arrived with the expected reinforcements. An unsuccessful attempt was now made to raise the siege. A few days later, Proctor finding the Indians dissatisfied, suddenly abandoned the enterprise, and embarking his artillery, retired towards Maiden. On the 20th of July another attempt was made on Fort Meigs, but after eight days, the siege was again given up. The enemy then sailed around to Sandusky Bay, in order to capture Fort Stephen- son, a post affording an inviting opportunity for capture, since it was garrisoned by only one hundred and fifty men. The comman- der, however, Major Croghan, was a young man of spirit, resolu- tion, and ambition. On the 1st of August, the British invested the fort, and on the second, after a heavy cannonade, advanced to as- sault it. But they were repulsed with such terrible loss, that they precipitately raised the seige, leaving behind their wounded. This gave Harrison an opportunity to contrast his humanity with that of Proctor. By the orders of the American General, the wounded Bri. tish soldiers were treated with the greatest kindness, an eloquent re- buke to the conduct of Proctor at the Raisin, where his negligence, if not his consent, led to the massacre of the Kentuckians. The brilliant defence of Fort Sandusky, in conjunction with that of Sackett's Harbor, assisted to rally the despondency of the nation, and prophetic minds saw in them, forebodings of future victories, which, in the succeeding year, were realized. From the period of his winter campaign on the Raisin, Harrison had urged upon government the necessity of a naval force on Lake Erie. He asserted that half the money expended in transporting supplies to the army as was necessary, for two hundred miles BATTLE OP LAKE ERIE. 43 through the wilderness, would build and equip a fleet which would give the United States the command of Lake Erie ; enable supplies to be procured at comparatively small expense ; rt accordingly dismantled. But, hot content the retiring Americans set fire to the Newark, alleging that otherwise it might emy during the approaching winter. By this inhuman act, four \undred women and children, deprived of their homes, were thrust\ut into the open air to endure all the hor- rors of a Canadian wintei Nor did the savage cruelty of the militia end here. Finding that tfc British sought shelter in the neighboring village of Queenstown, r hot shots were fired at that place, to deprive the enemy of a reL^e there. For these acts of Vandalism, a terrible and speedy retribtton was taken by the British. Crossing the river at the head of fivihundred men, Colonel Murray, of the 14 106 JAMES WILKINSON. English army, surprised and carried Fort Niagara, putting sixty- three of its garrison to death with the bayonet, before he woi'd grant quarter. This bold act was followed up by the burning of the villages of Lewistown and Manchester, and subsequenty by the sacking and conflagration of Black Rock and Buffalo. Ve do not pretend to defend either of these barbarities. The Britsh, in the campaign of the preceding year, had acted so ruthlessly ?s to exas- perate the Americans ; and to this, in part, is the burnirg of New- ark and Queenstown to be attributed. But the Vandalism of one party should never excuse that of another. It ought to je the proud boast of Americans, that while they make war like heroes, they conduct themselves towards defenceless women and Children, with the tenderest humanity. Such, indeed, had been thei character up to this period. It is lamentable to consider that this fair fame was lost through the instrumentality of cowards, who, Jicompetent to defend their post, set an example of barbarity th:t was fearfully retaliated in the sack of Buffalo, and subsequentl' in that of the capital of the nation. Wilkinson, having arrived at French Mills, waisd until his army was established in winter quarters, and then requested leave of absence, in order to recruit his health. He direced Hampton to be brought to a court-martial, and, in the spring, th;t General resigned. Wilkinson afterwards requested a court-marti