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 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA 
 AT LOS ANGELES 
 
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 «
 
 OUTLINES 
 
 O F A N 
 
 ANSWER 
 
 T O 
 
 Dr. Prieftley's Difquifitions 
 
 RELATING TO 
 
 MATTER AND SPIRIT. 
 
 fi y 
 
 The Rev. RICHARD GIFFORD,B.A. 
 
 Rector of North Okendon, Essex, 
 
 J^ea fuit femper hac In hac re voluntas et fententia, 
 quemvis ut hoc mallem de its qui ejfent idonei, fufcipere, 
 quam me ; me ut mallem, quam neminem. 
 
 Cicero. 
 
 L O N D ON: 
 
 Printed for T. C a p e l, in the Strand. 
 M.DCC.LXXXI. 
 
 9 S 3 S 13
 
 
 ii 
 
 '*,i 
 
 i. .:
 
 t i" 1 
 
 
 N 
 
 ADVERTISEMENT. 
 
 en, 
 
 >- 
 
 'ABOUT a Year ago Dr. 
 X A Pirlejlley s Difquijitions came 
 into the Hands of the Writer of 
 thefe Outlines^ in the Courfe of 
 Circulation in a ^Reading Society* 
 To preferve the Traiii of Reafon- 
 ing, that occurred in going over 
 the DifquiJitionSy he committed 
 his Refledions to Paper ; and h,e 
 tranfmitted them to a Friend, to 
 whom he fometimes communi- 
 cates his Ideas, in Hopes of being 
 ^told frankly, whether he had mif- 
 Q taken the Dodlor's Arg-umerits, dr 
 ^ on any Point had reafoned weak-
 
 ly ; and it was from that Friend 
 that the Defign originated of giv- 
 ,ing them to the Public. 
 
 The Author knew not that any 
 Anfwer had been publiflied. Even 
 Dr. Price s Correfpondence with 
 Dr. Priejlley did not come in his 
 Way till fbme Weeks after the 
 Outlines were written. This is 
 mentioned, to explain the Paffage 
 from Cicero y that ftands in the 
 Title-Page. 
 
 Dr. Priejlley has told us, that 
 he fliall reply to his Antagonifts 
 according to the Mood, in which 
 he finds himfelf. It is hoped, 
 he will meet with little here to 
 put him out of Humour : If the 
 Reafoning is ftrong, Candour will 
 
 oblige
 
 t V ] 
 
 oblige him to acknowledge it ; if 
 it is weak, it will be eafy to fliew, 
 that it is fo. 
 
 The Author of the Outlines is, 
 now and, then, warm and earneft ; 
 but he flatters himfelf, that he has 
 not pafled the Line of Decency; 
 and therefore apprehends, he has 
 a fair Claim to an equal Portion 
 of Civility and good Temper. It 
 {hould, he thinks, be a conftant 
 Maxim with Difputants, et refel- 
 lere fine perttnacid^ ^ refelli fine 
 iracundid, Cicero. 
 
 " CAN
 
 [ vii ] 
 
 f<Y^AN you really think. Sir, that it 
 ** is a Thing of no ill Confequence 
 
 ^* in Pradice, to raife new Difputcs, to 
 « fill the Minds of weak and unftable 
 *^ Men with endlefs Doubts and Scruples, 
 *« and the Mouths of the Profane with 
 •" new Topics of Scepticifm and Raillery, 
 '' againft the mbft important and funda- 
 ^* mental Dodrines of all Religion ? Or 
 '* can you be perfuaded, that fuch Men, 
 '* as are pleafed with fome of your No- 
 ^^ tions, will as readily admit all the reft 
 *' alfo ?" *' Is it not very obvious to 
 ** perceive, that profane Men will very 
 f gladly and with great Advantage make 
 ^* Ufe of all your Arguments for the na- 
 .<* tural Mortality of the Soul, and drop 
 ** the following Parts xDf your Hypo- 
 ** thefis ? &;c. &;c." ^* I cannot but 
 <* earneftly recommend it to your moft: 
 ** ferious Conlideration ; whether the 
 ** new and inconfiderate Notions, you 
 ** have advanced, and (the Arguments, I 
 ^* will not fay, becaufe, I think, you have 
 X ** not
 
 viii ] 
 
 " not offered any, that are of any real 
 <• Force, but) the Pretences of Reafon 
 ?' and Authority, which you have put 
 *« into the Hands of fceptical and profane 
 <* Men, to confirm them in their Preju- 
 *f dices againft the Belief of the Immor- 
 f* tality of the Soul ; are not likely to 
 «« be of great Differvice to Religion : 
 i« And whether you ought not (as all 
 *' good Men are of Opinion you ought) 
 ** to think of fome Means of making 
 " Satisfadlion to the Church, to whom 
 ^* -you have given fo great Offence ; and 
 ** of preventing the Effedt of that En- 
 ^« couragement, which your Notions in 
 *' this Matter (tho' nobody doubts but 
 *' it is contrary to your Intention) have 
 *• given to Immorality and Contempt of 
 •* Religion." 
 
 Dr, ClarkeV Letter to Mr, Dodwell, 
 
 OUT-
 
 OUTLINES 
 
 OF AN 
 
 ANSWER, &fc. 
 
 THE learned Dr. Cudworth, in nis 
 Intellediual Syftem, fpeaks of Per- 
 fons (I will not mention the Name he 
 gives them), ** that are pofTefTed with a 
 ** certain Kind of Madnefs, that may ht 
 " called Fneumdtophobidy that makes them 
 '* have an irrational, but defperate ab- 
 ** horrence from Spirits, or incorporeal 
 *'* Subflances, they being aded alfo, at 
 ** the fame Time, with an Hylomania^ 
 ** whereby they madly dote upon Matter, 
 ^'^ and devoutly worfhip it as the only 
 *■* Numen *." A Philofopher, who la* 
 
 * Page 135; 
 
 fi bours
 
 t * 1 
 
 fcours under this dreadful Diforder, has 
 lately made an Attack upon the good 
 People of this Country ; and it therefore 
 behoves every Man, who thinks he can 
 make up an Antidote to this Poifon, to 
 lofe no Time in preparing it. Utinam 
 tarn facile vera invenire poflem, quam 
 fulfa eonvincere ! Cicer. 
 
 Philofophers of all Ages have inferred 
 the Impenetrability of Matter, from the 
 Refiftanee they found in it -, but Dr. 
 Priejlley aflures us, that ** if there be 
 ** any Truth in late Difcoveries in Phi- 
 ** lofophy, Refiftance is, in moft Cafes,- 
 ** caufed by Something of a quite diiFe- 
 ** rent Nature from any Thing material 
 " ov /olid', viz. by 2i Power of Repulfion 
 ** adting at a Diftancefrom the Body, to 
 " which it has been fuppofed to belongs 
 ** and that in no Cafe can it be proved, 
 3 '« that
 
 C 3 ] 
 
 ^that Refiftance is occafioned by any 
 *«f Thing elfe *." 
 
 But admitting the Fadt, v/hich in fome 
 Cafes cannot be denied, I am inclined to 
 think, that this Power ofRepulfion mufl 
 be the Power of Something — and not an 
 immaterial Something ; for, according to 
 Dr. Priejiley, That would be the Power 
 df Nothing, But will it follow from 
 this Something's being furrounded by a 
 repuliive Power, that if the repulfive 
 Power were withdrawn. Bodies, that 
 might then, without Difficulty, be 
 brought into aBual ContaB, would pe- 
 netrate t2ic\i other^ and occupy the fame 
 Space, that either of them occupied be- 
 fore ; and that the Bodies, thus mutually 
 
 * Difquifitions relating to Matter and Spirit, p. 1 1. 
 ** A Power of Repulfion always adling at a real^ 
 *' and, in general, an affignable Diftance from what 
 ** we call the Body itfelf." Difquifitions^ p. 4. 
 
 B 2 f^ene^
 
 t 4 ] 
 
 penetrating and penetrated, woUld have 
 no greater Degree of Solidity and Specific 
 Gravity, than either of them had before 
 this Penetration f Let the Parts, of 
 which Bodies are compofed, be ever fo 
 few, they muft, how^ever, occupy fome 
 Degree of Space, even w^hen deprived of 
 the Repulfive Power; and it is totally 
 inconceivable, that That identical Space 
 fhould be occupied by any other Parti- 
 cles, without joftling them out of it», 
 And if no other Particles can occupy that, 
 Space, before the abfolute Removal of 
 thefe Particles, it undeniably follows, 
 that thefe Particles have an inherent 
 Power of Rejijiance clearly diftindl from 
 the repulfive Power that furrounds the 
 Matter, of which they are compounded. 
 
 The Dodlor allows Matter to have 
 Extenjon -, that is. Length, Breadth, and 
 Thicknefs -, and from this Extenjton 
 
 3 "
 
 [ 5 ] 
 
 it plainly follows, that it fills up a Space 
 equal to its Parts, and the repulfive Power 
 that attends them : withdraw the repul- 
 five Power, and force the Particles into 
 Contad:, and in this Cafe, the Space, the 
 Body occupies, will neceffarily lefTen ; 
 but leflen it with all the Force that can 
 poffibly be applied to Matter, and yet, 
 while it continues to have Extenfiorif and 
 confequently Parts, not even Annihilation 
 could poffibly t^Q&iy that other Parts 
 Ihould poiTefs the Space they occupy, at 
 the fame Time that they poffefs it ; for 
 Annihilation could do no more than to- 
 tally remove thofe Parts to make Room 
 for others. 
 
 Speaking of Extenjion, the Doctor al- 
 lows, that ** by Means of it. Matter 
 ** occupies a certain Portion of Space * ;" 
 
 * Difquifitions, page •25, 
 
 B 3 and
 
 [ 6 ] 
 
 and while he allows This, he muft of 
 Neceffity allow, that no other Matter 
 can at the fame Time occupy that iden- 
 tical Portion. Suppofe, if you pleafe, 
 that all the folid Matter in the Solar 
 Syftem might be contained in a Nut- 
 fhell, yet this Nutfhell mufl necefTarily 
 be impenetrable 'y that is^ no frefh Matter, 
 introduced into the Syftem, could poffi- 
 bly be made to occupy the Space of ^that 
 Nutfhell, without annihilating it, or re- 
 pioving it from the Space then occupied 
 by it : And all the Parts, of which this 
 Nutfhell of Matter confifled, mufl be 
 jufl as impenetrable as the whole of it. 
 
 When one Body is made to occupy 
 the void Space between the Parts of 
 another Body, it is not only unphilofophi- 
 caly but indeed ridiculous to imagine, 
 that thefe two Bodies have mutually 
 
 penetrated
 
 C[7. 3 
 
 fsenetrated one another ^. Light, which 
 is Matter, palTes th/ough tranfparent 
 Subftances, becaufe thofe Subflances have 
 Pores, tliat fuffer it to pafs without In- 
 terruption : But does it follow, from a 
 Body's having Pores, that it has no Parts? 
 I am trujy afliamed of fuch Philofophy. 
 
 It might be fafely admitted, that there 
 is not in Nature any fuch Thing as abfo^ 
 lute Solidity j that is, that there is no 
 Body, v/hofe Parts cannot be feparated 
 by feme Force or other -, or whofe Parts 
 cannot, by proper Force, be made to 
 occupy lefs Space : But the Separation of 
 the Parts of Bodies by adual Force, or 
 
 * " By what Criterion can that Pcrfon judge of 
 *' true or falfe, and why will he refufe his AfTent 
 *' to any Abfurdity, that can be propofed to him, 
 f who finds no Difficulty in conceiving, that two 
 *' Bodies may penetrate one another? &c."— Dr. Price's 
 Revicv; of the principal Queftions and Difficulties 
 \T\ Morals, p. 49. 
 
 B 4 by
 
 t 8 ] 
 
 by a rcpulfive Power, or the forcing them 
 into a narrower Compafs, will never 
 prove, that the Parts of Bodies do not 
 occupy a Space, that cannot at the fame 
 Time be occupied by any other Parts, .. 
 
 There is not iimply a Difficulty in the 
 Penetrability of Matter, but an abfolute 
 Impojjibility ; and if there were nothing 
 elfe to be faid againft the Doctor's Sy- 
 ilem, it would be enough, that he 
 thought t6e Penetrability of Matter ne- 
 ceffary to fupport it. Nefcio quomodo 
 nihil tarn abfurde dici poteft, quod non 
 dicatur ab aliquo philofophorum -f*. 
 
 t CiCER. 
 
 *' Have not fome denied any fuch Thing as 
 " Motion in the Univerfe ? fome made us mere 
 '* Machines j fome denied the Exiftence of all im- 
 ** material Subftances ; and fome again, the Poflibi- 
 " lity of the Exiftence of Matter itfelf ? I verily 
 
 " believe,
 
 [ 9 ] 
 
 . '* It will, perhaps, fays Dr. Priellley, 
 '^ be faid, that the Particles, of which 
 '* any folid Atom confifts, may be con- 
 «* ceived to be placed clofe together 
 'f without any mutual Attradion be^. 
 *^ iween themi. But then this Atom 
 'f will be entirely deftitute of Compaft- 
 *f nefs and Hardnefs, wh'c& is requijite to 
 *-* its being impenetrable'^.'' I apprehend, 
 tjiat nothing more is requifite to a Bo- 
 dy's being impenetrable, though ever fo 
 
 ** believe^ they have left nothing undenied, that 
 f can be a Proof of Natural Theology." 
 
 Baxter's Enquiry into the Nature of the Hvtmaa 
 Soul, Vol. I. p. 121. 
 
 ** lis veulent etre les Inventeurs de quelque Opi- 
 <* nion nouvelle, afin d'acquerir par la quelque Re- 
 ** putation dans le Monde j & ils s'aflurent qu'en 
 ** difant quelque chofe qui n'ait point encore etQ 
 4* dit, ils ne manqueront pas d'Admirateurs." 
 
 Mai branche, Recherche de la Verite, Liv. II. ch. S. 
 
 f Difquifitions, p. 6, • 
 
 foft.
 
 foft, thari that it fhould occUpy, Space ; 
 for whatever does fo, can never have 'its* 
 Place occupied by any Thing elfe, with- 
 out being renloved out of it. The Dodor 
 acknowledges, that ** a Subftance may' 
 *f be adted upon by one, that is foft, 
 ^* which, in fad:, is only relatively lefs* 
 '^''•hard*." The Pores of any Subftance' 
 may be more or lefs filled by other Mat-- 
 ter, and its fpecific Gravity be increafed^; 
 or diminifhed, by that Means ; but it* 
 would be grofsly abfurd to think, that in 
 this Cafe the fame identical Space was 
 occupied by different Parts of Matter. 
 Though Attradion and Repullxon are 
 conftant Concomitants of Matter, or, as 
 he calls them. Powers of Matter, yet fup- 
 pofe the different Parts of Matter to be 
 held together by any other Powers, and 
 their Hardnefs and Rejijiance might be 
 
 * Difquifitions, p. 6i. 
 
 juft
 
 •[ - '] 
 
 juft the fame it is now : Nay, even the 
 juxta-pofition of Parts^ fuppofing no 
 Power of any Kind to feparate the Par- 
 ticles of Matter, would be fufficient ^o 
 conflitute Hardnefs, At all Events, Im- 
 ' fenetrability muft remain, in every ima- 
 ginable Circumftance and Situation, fo 
 long as the Particles of Matter continue 
 to occupy any Portion of Space. 
 
 It is one of the Axioms of Sir Ifaac 
 Newton, that every Body will continue 
 in the State of Reft or Motion it is in, 
 unlefs fomething produces an Alteration 
 of that State; confequently, if the re- 
 pulfive Power of Matter were withdrawn, 
 the juxta-pofition of Parts would ilill 
 continue. 
 
 But Dr. Prieftley farther fays, that 
 ?** no figured Thing can exift, unlefs the 
 ^* Parts, of which it confifts, have a 
 
 ♦* mutual
 
 *' mutual Attra^ion, fo as either to keep 
 *' contiguous to, or to preferve a certain 
 ** Diftance from each other *." But 
 fuppofe them once contiguous to each 
 other, and it is the plain Dictate of 
 Common-Senfe, as well as of the New- 
 tonian Dodrine, that they muft continue 
 to be fo, till fome Force produces an 
 Alteration of their prefent State. So 
 that neither Attradlion nor Repulfion are 
 abfolutely neceflary to form Hardnefs, 
 Refijiance, Solidity, Impenetrability, 
 
 Yet he fays, that if the Parts of Mat- 
 ter are not held together by Attradlion 
 or fome ** foreign Power, every Particle 
 *' would fall from each other, and be 
 ** difperfed -j-." But the Truth certainly 
 is, that the Particles mufl remain juft as 
 they now are, if no foreign Power is 
 
 * Difquifitions, p. 5. f Ibid, p. 6. 
 
 intro-
 
 f '3 J 
 
 Introduced to feparate and difperfe thefti 
 Jf there are fuch Things as intuitive 
 Truths, This is one. 
 
 Still he adds, that " whatever Solidity 
 " any Body has. it is pofl-effed of only in 
 « confequence of being endued with 
 " certain Powers ; and together with 
 " this Caufe. Solidity being „„ „,ore 
 " than an Effeft. muft ceafe. if there 
 " ^^ ^"y Foundation for the pkineft 
 •■ and beft-eftabliihed Rules of reafon- 
 " ing in Philofophy *." We have feen 
 above, that this cannot poffibly be the 
 Cafe, if there is any Truth in one of 
 the plaineft Axioms of the Newtonian 
 Philofophy. That the plaineft and beft 
 eftablifhed Rules of reafoning ftould be 
 contrary to this Axiom, would be ftrange 
 indeed ! ^ 
 
 * DUquifitions, p. 7. 
 
 Dr.
 
 [ H i 
 
 Dr. Prieilley fuppofes Refrftance id 
 arife " from a Power of Repulfion al-. 
 ** ways ading at a Diftance from the 
 *' Body, to which it belongs *." He 
 owns, however, that ** a confiderable 
 *' Weight will bring together the Links 
 " of a Chain hanging freely in the 
 ** Air -J-;" and he will not deny, that* 
 there is Refiilance, when the repullive' 
 Power is overcome; and he muft there- 
 fore admit, that the Refiftance of Matter 
 is not barely owing to a repulfive Power' 
 aSiing at a Dijiance from the Body, 
 
 He fays, *' that the component Particles 
 ** of the hardeft Bodies do not adually 
 ** touch one another, is demonftrable 
 ** from their being brought nearer toge- 
 ** ther by Cold, and by their being re- 
 ** moved further from each other by 
 
 * Difquifitions, p. 4 and ii. f Ibid, p. I2*
 
 t 15 J 
 
 ** Heat *.- But furely this proves m 
 more, than that all the Particles of Body 
 are not in adual Contadj and who ever 
 fuppofed, that we were acquainted with 
 any Kind of Matter, that was abfolutely 
 void of Pores ? The Particles are brought 
 together by the Pores becoming lefs, and 
 they are removed further from each other 
 ty the Pores being enlarged. 
 
 If Matter fhould confi/t only of PhyJ^ 
 ca/ Points f, yet I fhould fliU hope, that 
 they would not turn out to be mere 
 Mathematical Points. Allow them to be 
 material, that is, to have Length, Breadth, 
 and nicknefs, and you may reduce their 
 Dimenfions, as you pleafe, without affed- 
 ing my Argument. For, upon the Appli. 
 cation of an adequate Force, thefe Phyjical 
 Points would only approximate upon the 
 
 *DirquiiItions,p. 13. t Ibid, p. 19, 
 
 Kemoval
 
 [ .6 ] 
 
 Removal of the repulfive Power, that 
 keeps them now afunder^ and nothing 
 can poffibly introduce other Phyjical 
 Points into the identical Place thefe 
 ^ Points occupy, Without removing them 
 out of it. If this is not the Cafe with 
 Matter, it is felf-evident, that there 
 cxifteth nothing but Poivers -, which, it 
 will be abfurd to call the Powers of 
 Matter '^o^ a Subftance, that occupies' 
 Space^-=*becaufe, if thefe Phyjical Points 
 are not fuch a SubftancBj the Powers 
 will have nothing to fupport them. 
 
 The bodor fays, that " the Objec- 
 ** tion to two Subftances being in the 
 ** fame Place, without excluding each 
 •* other> is only derived from the Rc- 
 ** fiftance, we meet with, to the Touch **" 
 But I will take upon me to affert, that 
 
 * Difquifuiooe, p* 22* 
 
 1 have
 
 [17:]- 
 
 1 have one Objection to it, that is de- 
 rived from quite another Quarter j and 
 that is, that the Buiinefs is in rcfum na- 
 tura abfdutely hnpoffibk, 
 
 •Mr..' Locke (v^^hofe fentimehts the 
 Doctor is fond of quotings whenever they 
 feem to make the leaft for him) fays, that 
 ** Solidity^ of all others, feems the Idea 
 ** nioft intimately connetSted with and 
 *' effentlal to Body, fo as no where elfe 
 " to be found, or imagined, but only iil 
 *' Matter; and though our Senfe$ take 
 ** no Notice of it, but in MafTes of Mat- 
 ** ter, of a Bulk fufHcient to caufe a 
 *' Senfation in usj yet the Mind, having 
 ** once got this Idea from fuch groffer, 
 '' fenfible Bodies, traces it farther, and 
 ** confidefs it, as well as Figure, in the 
 ** minutefl: Particle of Matter, that can 
 ** exift, and finds it infeparably inherent 
 C '* in
 
 [ iS I 
 
 '* in body, wherever, or however rnfo-^ 
 ^' dified *" *' This is the Idea belongs 
 " to Body, whereby we conceive it to 
 " fill Space. The Idea of which filling 
 ** of Space is, that where we imagine 
 ** any Space taken up by a folid Sub- 
 ** fiance, we conceive it fo to pofTefs it^ 
 
 * that it excludes all other folid Sub- 
 
 * fiances, and will for ever hinder any 
 
 * two olher Bodies, that move towards 
 
 * one another in a flrait Line, froia 
 ' coming to touch one another, unlefs 
 < it removes from between them in a 
 
 * Line not parallel to That, which they 
 
 * move in -f." He fays, " We have the 
 
 * Ideas but of three Sorts of Subftanccs ; 
 
 * I.God. 2. Finite Litelligencies. 3. J5a- 
 
 * dies J." And that " though thefe 
 
 * three Sorts of Subflances, as we 
 
 * Eflay, Book II. Chap. IV. i. 
 t Eflay, Book II. Chap. IV. 2. 
 X EfTay, Book 11. Chap. XXVII. 2. 
 
 ** terju
 
 [ It) ] 
 
 •* term them, do not exclude one aho- 
 '* ther out of the fame Place, yet we 
 •* cannot conceive, but that they mufl 
 " neceffarily each of them exclude any 
 ** of the fame Kind out of the fame 
 ** Place : or elfe the Notions and Names 
 ** of ide?jtity and Diverjity would be ia 
 ** vain, and there could be no fuch Dif- 
 *' tinxflion of Subftances, or any Thing 
 ■** elfe, from one another. For Example: 
 •* Could two Bodies be in the fame Place 
 *'. at the fame Time, then thofe two Par- 
 " eels of Matter mufl be one and the 
 " fame, take therii great or little -, nay, 
 " all Bodies muft be one and the fame. 
 '* For by the fame Reafon, that tvvo 
 *' Particles of Matter may be in one 
 " Place, all Bodies may be in one Plate ; 
 ** which, when it may be fuppofed, takes 
 ^' away the Diftinclion of Identity and 
 ** Diverjity, of one and more, and ren-* 
 *' ders it ridiculous." 
 
 C 2 Dr.
 
 2<* J 
 
 Dr. Prieftley obfeFvesi, that Mr. Bax-« 
 ter, though he ack-ipiawledged, that />6<? 
 » Powers of Bxjijianee and Cobejion are effen- 
 tial to Matter, yet thought, that thefe 
 Powers are the immediate Agency of the 
 Deity '.himfelf* ', — and This the Do(5lor 
 is pleafed to call ^' afrange Opinion-, as^ 
 ** in this Cafe, there is not in Nature 
 ^* any .fuch Thing as Matter, diilindt 
 ** from the Deity and his Operations -f-." 
 
 Upan 
 
 * Difquifitioiis, p. 8^. 
 
 f " I admit an intelli"gcrrt sni a-6^ive Caufe m 
 *' Nature; and have no Objcdlion to fuppofing, that 
 ** this intelligent Caufe ha's even more to do in the ext" 
 " eutim of the Laws- of .Nature y than. Dr. Price i$ 
 " willins: to allow." — Dr. Priefllcy's Free Dif- 
 cuffion of tlie Do&ines of Materialifm/Sic. p. 8. 
 
 '" As to real jfgency, a Neceflarian can allow of 
 " only one proper &eQt or Sviiree of it.'" — Ibid, p. 37. 
 
 " As a Neceflarian, I, in fa6l, afcribe every Thing 
 " to Gcd^ and whether mediately or immediately, 
 ^'"makes- very little DiiFcrenee." — Ibid. p. 233". 
 
 Upoi*=
 
 ■1 21 ] 
 
 -Upon the Dodor's Syftem, there is not 
 in Nature any fuch Thing as Matter, 
 diftincfl from Attradlion and Repul- 
 fion. « The Suppoiition 5o£.. Matter's 
 ".having m other Properties, heftdes 
 " thofe of Attra^on and Refulfion, he 
 ... , .. •, \ , 
 
 " Upon no Syftem Whatever is the great Author of 
 ** Nature more diftrnft from his Produftions, or his 
 *' Prefence mhh thejn, and Jgei^y u^n them, more 
 " neceffary.'* — Ibid. p. 238.. 
 
 " Striaiy fpeaking, there is but one Caufe, but on€ 
 *' file Ageniin univerfal Nature." — Ibid, p. 306. 
 
 And in another Work Dr. Prieftley fays, *' The 
 " Spirit of Devotion muft be greatly promoted by 
 *' the Perfuafion, that Qod Is the proper and file Cauft 
 « of all Things. Upon this Scheme we fee God in 
 *« emry Things and may be fajd to fee every Thing 
 in God ; becaufe we cantifluany view ftvtxy Thino- 
 *' as in Connexion ivitb him^ the Author of it." 
 
 Do61rine of Philofophical Neceffity iiluftrated, 
 being an Appendix to the Difquifitions re- 
 lating to Matter and Spirit, p. 108. 
 
 Heave it to the very ingenious Do^or to reconcile 
 tfie Jppendlx and his Free Difiufton^ with the 
 
 Pifqiiiftions. 
 
 C 3 ** fays
 
 [ 22 ] 
 
 '( fays, (p. 1 8.) greatly relieves the DifK-- 
 <* culty, &c." " The Power of Attrac- 
 «* tion muft be efTential to the actual 
 ** Exiilence of all Matter. For every 
 *' Body muft have fome particular Form ^ 
 ** and no Subftance can. retain a Forra 
 *' without Attrat^lion. Ta^e away At^ 
 " traSfion, which is a Power, and Solidity 
 ** itfelf "oanifies *," 
 
 Which of thefe two is the firanger 
 Opinion, it will be no difficult Matter 
 to determine. For my own P-art, I am, 
 far from thinking the firft 2.Jirange one ; 
 nor can the Dodtor think it fo, and be 
 confiflent with himfelf. For he iays, 
 <* the Idea, which the Scriptures give us 
 ** of the Divine Nature, is that cf a Be- 
 ** /«^, properly fpeaking, every where, 
 *' frefent, conjlantly fupporting, and at 
 
 f Difquifitionsj p. 5, 6, 7. 
 
 ** Pkafure
 
 [ 23 ] 
 
 ** Pieafzire controlling the Laws of Na- 
 
 ** ture *." Now, can the Dodtor poffi- 
 
 bly annex any Idea to the Words, con- 
 
 jlantly fupporting the Laws of Nature, 
 
 that will not imply the immediate 
 
 Agency of the Deity himfelf? Th« 
 
 Doctor juflly fays, ** He fillet h all in all-, 
 
 *^ and He is all in alL In him, faith St. 
 
 ** Paul, we lime and move, and ha'ue our 
 
 *' Being -f-." He, who made, and con- 
 
 tinually f up ports all things, muft equally 
 
 attend to all Things at the fame Time; 
 
 ** which is a mofl: alionifhing and necef- 
 
 ** fary Attribute of the one fupreme 
 
 ^* God J." " ^ 
 
 God faith, by his Prophet Ifaiah, 
 V"ij<n yp-1 nn''? d^quj r\m ^3 ntv mn^ o:^< 
 : "inj^ ^12 — Ego fumDominus,y^aV;zx omnia, 
 cxtendens caelos folus, 6? nullus mecum. 
 
 * Difquifitions, p. 113. | Ibid, p. Ip8. 
 
 J Ibid, p. 106. 
 
 C 4 Vulg.
 
 *> 
 
 [ 24 ] 
 
 Vulg. *. He is not far frojji any of us* 
 — Who quickeneth all Things. — By him 
 all Things confifi \, Ti5 w t>j5 v.iymioi'i 
 enQ'Xyi ^y "^^ ■^'^/C'^J AnAoi/ cT^j ooaTrep EN TQ.i 
 OADz 0EO2, xai nAN EN EKEINOt. 
 ^(girgi T^ap TTdos riANTA TO gj' w/>tiv ^eiov* 
 AoQ/8 ^ap app^^y a Ao^os, ccAAa to x^enrof' t< 
 eK xpeiTTGV 'jccci e7ri<^ny~'iii eiwoi, irXnv 0EO2 4] j 
 'O S'i ccuTos e<^i ^ici, em'^ycov TA IIANTA 
 EN nA2I §. Ipfehumano generi mi- 
 niilrat, Ubique & omnibus prasfto eft. 
 Quocunque te flexeris, ibi ilium videbis. 
 pccurrendum t^bi, Nihil ab iljq vacate 
 
 * Chap. xliv. 24. 
 
 •j- A6ls xvii. 27. I Tlrn. vi. 13. Colof. i. 17. 
 % Ariftot. Moral. Eadem. Lib. vii. c. 14. 
 § I Cor. xii. 6. 
 
 Xsia Xc/jjv TO riAN ss-tv a'JTOi' Sapient. Sirach. 
 xliii. 29. Multa dicemus, & deficiemus in verbis : 
 ponruinmatio autem Sermonumj ipfe eji In omnibus. 
 Vulg. 
 
 Opus
 
 E 25 ] 
 
 apus funm ip/e implet % ©aAw5 (avi^r\ irxvTa, 
 TrXmn S-gwv iivoii. -f- Sunt autem & alii 
 philofophi, & hi quidem magni & no- 
 biles, qui Deorum niente & ratione 
 Mundum adminijirari ^ regi fentiunt -, 
 neque vero id folum, fed etiam ab iifdem 
 ,vitaB hominum confuli & providm ; nam 
 et fruges, & reliqua, que terra pariat, & 
 tempeftates, ac temporuni var^etates, cje- 
 lique mutationes, quibus omnia, quas terra 
 gignat, maturata pubefcant, a Diis im- 
 piortalibus tribui hiimano generi put ant J. 
 See Dr. Price's EiTay on Providence, 
 p. 29, &c. and Bp. Berkley's Siris, Sed:. 
 
 * Senec. de Bcnef. I/ib. iv. 8. Quid aliud eft 
 Nature, quam Deus, & divina Ratio toti mundo 
 inferta. Ibid. cap. 7. 
 
 f Ariftot. de Anima, Lib. i. cap. 5. 
 
 X Cicer. de Natura Deor. Lib. i. 
 
 Per quae declaratur baud dubie Naturre potgntis, 
 idque effe quod Deum yocamuS: — Plin. Nat. Hiflor. 
 J-(ib. ii. 7.
 
 f 26 ] 
 
 T^he Powers of AttraSilon and Repulfiott^ 
 Dr. Prieftley tells us, are necejfary to the 
 very Being of Matter^ But, I apprehend, 
 the utmoft a cautious Reafoner will take 
 upon him to aflert, is, that thefe Powers 
 feem neceffary to Matter, as it now ap- 
 pears to us. I fay, feem 5 becaufe I 
 think, that all the Phaenomena of thq 
 material World prove, is the probable 
 ConjunBion of Extenfion, Attra(5tion, and 
 Repulfion ; but that they by no Means 
 prove their neceffary Connexion. Attrac- 
 tion and Repulfion are Terms that Philo- 
 fophers have, for fome Time, made ufe 
 of in accounting for certain Fa(5ls before 
 thern. It has been the Fafhion of the 
 Times to make ufe of thefe Terms. The 
 next Age may poffibly invent others. It 
 is certain, that Sir Ifaac Newton thought 
 it not impoflible, that all the Phaeno- 
 mena, we now account for by Attradi9n 
 and Repulfion, might be accounted for 
 1 ia
 
 I 27 ] 
 
 in another Way. Dr. Prieftley afferts^ 
 that the Particles of all Bodies are held 
 together by the Powers of AttraBion and 
 ^epulfion * ', but Dr. Leslie is inclined to 
 think, that the grand Cementer of the 
 particles of Matter is not a mere Power 
 (an occult Quality !) but Phlogijioii, For 
 \^ all Nature bears Teilimony not only 
 
 * " Dr. Hales was of opinion, that Alr^ in its 
 *' fixed and inert State, gives Union, IVeight, and 
 ** Firmnefs, to all natural Bodies. By his Experi- 
 *' ments we are informed, that fixed Air conftitutes 
 *' near one Third Part of the folid Contents of the 
 " Heart of Oak. It Is found to bear near the fame 
 f* Proportion in Peas, Beans, and other Vegetable 
 *' Subflances. Heat and Fermentation render it 
 f* elaftic. It is again capable of being abforbed and 
 *' fixed. Was the whole Air of the Univerfe brought 
 " at once into an elaflic, repulfive State, every Thing 
 *' would fufrer a fudden Difl'olution. Was it intirely 
 *' fixed, then all Things would be reduced to an 
 inert Lump. Almighty Providence has provided againfl 
 *' thefe Extremes, and in the mod wonderful Man- 
 ** x\cx -^refervcs. the Balance.-' — Dr. Hunter's Gcor- 
 gical Efiays, p. 84, 
 
 '* to
 
 I 28 ] 
 
 *f . to the Exigence of the phlogijlic Fluids 
 *' but likewife to its incelTant, a<5live 
 ** energy. It appears, from innumer- 
 *' able Phaenomena, to pervade all Na- 
 ** ture, and by its various Modifications 
 ** to conflitute the peculiar diftinguifh- 
 
 J' ing Properties of Bodies ; Light and 
 ** Fire confifl in it ; and whatever In- 
 ^* fluence they have in generating and 
 *' fupporting Animal and Vegetable Life, 
 ^* is folely to be afcribed to it. It is to 
 *' the 'Ethereal Fluid y that Metals owe 
 ^'^ their Splendour ^ Dudiilityi and Elaji:^ 
 
 ' ** city j Magnets their Polarity, and all 
 <* Bodies their Ele^ricity." ** It is ealier 
 " to conceive, that one Agent fhould 
 " produce many Eifedts, than that many 
 ** Agents fhould, without Confufion, 
 ** exert at the fune Time, and on the 
 ** fame Body, their refpedive Powers, as 
 ** of Ek^ricity, Gravity y Magnetifm, 
 ** ElaJIicity, &c. Befides, have we not 
 3 *' innu-
 
 [ 29 } 
 
 '* innumerable Inftances in the H'lAotf 
 *' of Nature> of the fame Agent produc* 
 ** ing various Eifedts ? Dath not Fi'r^ 
 ** excite Heat, caufe Light, "Extenjion^ 
 <« Elajikity? Doth n©t the EleSfric 
 *' Fluid produce the EfFe<fts oi Attrac^^ 
 *' tion, Repuljion, Magnetifm, &c. ? *'• 
 Let us then hear no more of the Powers 
 ^f AttraBion and RepiilJiDn ', Powers, the 
 Abfence of which annihilates the very 
 Subftance, to which they belong ! It ij 
 
 * Philolophical Enquiry into tli€ Caufe of Anu 
 mal Heat, p. 270, i, 3, 4. 
 
 *' Magnetifm and Electricity are not new Quali* 
 ** ties, refulting from different and unknown Powers, 
 •' but merely Emiflions of certain Streams of Mat- 
 *' ter, which produce certain, determinate Motions*" 
 Dr. Clarke's Second Defence cf his Letter to Mr. 
 Dodwell. 
 
 " Electricity, as it is one of the moft powerful,, is 
 ** alfo one of the moft important Agents in Nature." 
 • Mr. Henley in Phil. Tranf. 1777, Part I. p. 97, &c. 
 See Bp. Berkeley's Siris, Se(5t, 189, 190. 
 
 Matter
 
 [ 33 I 
 
 Matter in Motion, that Caufes the phise^ 
 Romena of Attraction and Repullion * 
 and this Motion can only be produced 
 and continued by the great Firft Caufe, 
 who, as Dr. PrielHey juftly obferves, con-^ 
 fiantly Jupports the Laws of Nature, Na^ 
 
 eiitivyiiov VTTo ccxivyitb xivSKT^cci' iro^ev Hv Tca 
 ccofJiccTi TO xweio-^cti, €L f/.n euro T>?5 \^*XJ^'i J 
 8 yoLp aCVT0X.lV7)T0V i<rt- to (TCfif/.OC "f*. H S's vhvt 
 
 jj Ja»> TToc^miycov J* T)j5 fjcev JAws to irocax^^y 
 Sq-'i %cLi xiveiaSrcct' to cTg Kiveiv, koci to iroiSiVy 
 irepvi S'vvocfAeooi §. 
 
 * *' Anaxagoras, apud Diog. Laert. 
 Jlkry af)-)/r\'J y« rev N»v ri^irai {Ava^aycpaf) 
 u.aki<^ct TravTOjy. Movov yap ^ncriv a'jrov tcov cvtojv 
 
 cTwci </•' a/ji(pa) T)j auT/i ap;;j;)j, tots yjvwo-HSJv, xat 
 TO xivstv, Xsywv N»v y.ivifio-at rovrav. — Ariftot. de 
 Anima, Lib. I. Cap. 2. 
 
 f Nemefius, de Natura Hominis, p. 69. 
 
 ■^ Ariftot. de Generatione & Corruptione, Lib. I, 
 
 cap. 7. 
 § Ariftot. de Gen. & Gorrupt. Lib. IL cap. 9. 
 
 The
 
 [ 31 1 
 
 The Newtoiilan Rule, not to admit 
 
 more Caufes of Things, than are fufii- 
 
 cient to explain Appearances — is what I 
 
 am very willing to abide by in confider- 
 
 ing this Subje(5t ; and yet, while Exfe?z- 
 
 y?5« makes any Part of the Definition of 
 
 Matter, I fhall, I apprehend, find myfelf 
 
 under a Neceffity of looking farther than 
 
 the material Syftem, in order to account 
 
 for that Confcioufnefsy I pofTefs ; which 
 
 being ONE, I cannot but pronounce, 
 
 that the Subftance, to which it belongs, 
 
 is not extended^. Dr. Prieftley fays, that 
 
 •• thofe who have written about Con- 
 
 *' fcioufnefs, have given him no clear 
 
 ** Idea of the Subject ■f*.*' For my own 
 
 *' Part, I think, nothing can be clearer 
 
 * " Confcloufnefs fignifies the reflex A(Sl, by 
 *' which 1 know, that I think^ and that my Thoughts 
 ** and A6lions are my own and not another''s"'— Dr. 
 Clarke's Second Defence of his Letter to Mr. Dod- 
 lyell. 
 
 i Difquifitions, p. 86, 
 
 than
 
 i 32 i 
 
 Aaii what Dr. Clarke has writtefl dri 
 this Subjedtj in his Letter to Mr. Dod- 
 i/tl\ *, and at the Conclufidn of his Se- 
 cond Defence of that Letter -f. If 
 Thought arifei from the" Vibration of i 
 certain Sy fie m of Matter, then every Par- 
 ticle ojf that vibrating Syilem milft have 
 
 >«' > _ 4^ t J- 
 
 '""*' gJiV." 8vo. p.'a'i^v ' 
 
 ■ ' f " If Souls be eximdtd Suhjl^^mfes, confifting cif 
 
 **,nsere Points, one without another, dil Concurring 
 
 ^S irt. every Senfation j- then muft every one of thofc 
 
 *' Points either- perceive a Point and Part of the Ob- 
 
 "^' je£i: only, or elfe the //'7;^/((?. Now, [(every Point 
 
 ** of the extended Soul perceive only a Point of the 
 
 -"■0bjdi9;, then is there no one Thing in.us,.tlM 
 
 .*' perceives the fF^oky'ox which can compare one 
 
 " Part v^ith another., laut if every Point of the 
 
 ** extended Soul perceive the zvhole Objc6l at once, 
 
 " Confifting of many Parts, then would there be in- 
 
 *' numerable Perceptions of the fame Objedl in every 
 
 " ^enfation ; as many, as there are Psints in the 
 
 *' extended Soul. And from both thofe Suppofitions 
 
 *' it would alike follow, that no Man is ofie fmgk 
 
 '' Percipient cr Perjon^ but that there are innunur- 
 
 *' able diJlinSl Pircipients and Perfons in every Man." 
 
 Bf. Cudworth's IntelletSlual Syftcm, p. 826. 
 
 a diJimS}
 
 [ 33 ] 
 
 a dtfilnB Confcioufnefs ; for every Particle 
 of that Syftem is difiindly and the Vibra- 
 tion of the whole Syftem is nothing more 
 than the Sum of the Vibrations of its 
 diftin(ft Parts. The whole cannot con- 
 tain more than its Parts ; and therefore, 
 if the Parts of a vibrating Syftem have 
 not diftin(9: Cogitation (which muft be 
 fclf-evident to every man, who refleds _ 
 upon his Confcioufnefs and Individuality^ 
 neither can Thought arife from the Vi- 
 bration of the whole Syftem. " The ^ 
 ** Power of the Whole, being but the 
 •* Sum or Mixture of the Powers of the 
 ** Parts, cannot poflibly be of a different 
 ** Kind or Species from all the feveral 
 ** Powers of the Parts ; thinking is, of 
 ** of Neceflity, fpeciiically different from 
 " all and every one of the Powers, 
 ** known or unknown, of Particles, 
 D '* which
 
 [ 34 ] 
 
 <* which are confefled to be void of 
 ** Thought *." 
 
 A Syflem of Matter, according to Dr, 
 Prieftlej, has the Powers of AttraSiton 
 and Repuljion y and fo has every Particle, 
 of vi^hich that Syflem is compounded^ 
 And the Cafe cannot but be the fame 
 with a Syflem of Matter^ that has a per* 
 eipient, or fentient Tower, ** Refiding 
 ** in the whole, and not refiding in the 
 " Parts, is refiding, arid not refiding in 
 " it, at the fame Time f." " Un- 
 ** thinking Particles of Matter, however 
 *' put together, can have nothing thereby 
 ** added to them, but a new Relation of 
 *^' Polition, which, 'tis impoflible, fhould 
 
 * Dr. Clarke's Second Defence, p. io6. 
 Kvayy.ii apa, i'mi vravrx von, ajuiyr) sivar, oocTTrE^ 
 ^ftcriv Ava^ayopaSi iva. Kparri' raro cf^^ friv, tvd 
 yvwpi^ij. — Ariftot. de Anima, Lib. III. cap. 4. 
 
 t Dr. Clarke's Second Defence, p. 123. 
 
 ** give
 
 [ 35 ] 
 
 '*^ givQ TjhQVight 2ind Knowledge to 
 -** thein-V: I ... ■> • 
 
 i4 percipient i fentient Power, fuper- 
 added to a vibrating Syftem, made up of 
 unthinking Parts, mufh either refult from 
 the- whole vibrating Syftem, without re- 
 fiding in its feveral Parts j which is ab- 
 furd ; or it is a Quality or Power fub- 
 (iiling without a Subftance ; which is, if 
 pofliblci ftill more abfurd. If it cannot 
 be the Power of the feveral Parts of the 
 vibrating Syiliem, which Parts, it is ad- 
 mitted, are without Thought, it muft 
 neceflarily be the Faculty of a diftin(5t 
 
 Subftance •f'. 
 
 Dr. 
 
 * Locke's Effay, Book IV. Chap. X. 15. 
 
 t " Parts of any Subftance muft be of the fame 
 *' Subftance by the Terms, and of the fame Nature 
 ** with the Whole, of which they are Parts j difFer- 
 *' ing only from the Whole in more or lefs, but not 
 ** in Nature and fundamental Properties; otherwife 
 D 2 "the
 
 t 36 ] 
 
 Dr: Prieftley is pleafed to fay *, '^« If 
 ** one Kind of Subftance be capable of 
 " fupporting all the known Properties 
 *' of Man ; that is, if thcfe Properties 
 ** have nothing in them, that is abfo- 
 «* lately incompatible with one another, 
 ** we fhall be obliged to conclude, that 
 ** no other Kind of Subftance enters into 
 ** his Compolition." 
 
 The Do(5tor will not, I prefume, deny 
 that the feparate Particles of Matter, of 
 
 ** the Subftance of thefe Parts would not be the fame 
 ** with that of the Whole ; 01* they would be Part3 
 *• of the fame Subftance, and not of the fame Sub- 
 ** ftance, which is contradidory." — Baxter's En- 
 quiry into the Nature of the Human Soul, p. 232. 
 See alfo p. 234, 5, 6, 7. 
 
 Mr. Locke, who is often quoted by Infidel Writers 
 ort this Subject J exprefly fays, that " the more pro- 
 *' bable Opinion is, that Confcioufnefs is annexed to 
 " the Affe^'ion of an individual ^ immaterial Subjianctf** 
 — Effay, Book II. Chap. XXVII. 25. 
 
 * Difquifitions, p. 25.. 
 
 which
 
 [ VJ ] 
 
 p 
 
 which a- vibrating Syflem is compounded^ 
 $ire devoid of Thought > or indeed, that 
 a vibrating, material Syftem cannot be 
 made up of any other Particles \ and it 
 has been, I think, demonftrated, that no 
 poffible Organization of thefe Particles 
 can produce an individual y confcious Being, 
 It is not, in Fa(5t, conceivable, that an 
 individual, percipient Power fhould be 
 fuperadded to a material Syftem ; and to 
 fay, that the Divine Being can, if He 
 pleafes, fuperadd fuch a Power, is to fay, 
 that He can make a Subftance to be Mat^ 
 ter, and not Matter, at the fame Time ; 
 which is one of thofe Things one may 
 affert, without the leaft Impiety, to be 
 impoflible to God himfelf *. We have 
 not, therefore, in Matter a Subjiance 
 
 capabU 
 
 * " It is perfe£lly abfurd to fay, infinite Power 
 f* may fuperadd a Property to a Subftance in* 
 *' capable of receiving it." — Baxter's Enquiry, &c. 
 Vol. I. p. 370. 
 
 D 3 "To 
 
 301260
 
 [ 38 ] 
 
 capable of fuf porting all the knoimi Pro- 
 perties of Man, For, whatever conlifts 
 of feparate, diftin<ft Parts, we have feen 
 is incompatible with Thought. Divi- 
 duality and Individuality cannot poflibly 
 belong to one and the fame Subflance. 
 
 The Do(ftor fays, ^* we have no pro^, 
 ** per Idea of any EfTence whatfoever -f*." 
 
 *' To affign the Power of God^ inftead of a natural 
 ** Reafon, or to fly to the Power of God againft clear 
 *' Reafon, appear to me equally unphilofophical, 
 ** And indeed, confidering that we can take- ouf 
 *' Meafure of Things only by thofe Ideas which we 
 ** have of them, if after we have duly compared thofe 
 *^ Ideas, and determined of the Natures and Diffe- 
 ** rences of Things according to them, it fhall be 
 *' thought a fufficient Anfwer to have Recourfe to 
 ^*' the Power of God^ then we fhall never be able to 
 ** know how to judge of any Thing, or when we 
 *' have concluded any Thing. And Tranfubjianti^ 
 " atiori itfelf may be good found Do£irine^ notwithfland- 
 " ing all that Philofphy Jhall demonfrate to the contrary^ 
 ^' from the Idea we have of Body." — Norris's Theory 
 of the Ideal World, Vol. II. p. 4S. 
 
 t Difquifitions, p. 1 04. 
 
 But
 
 I 3? } 
 
 Put if we have an Idea of the Properties 
 of any Eflence or Subllance, we have, I 
 apprehend, a proper Idea of \.t ; for we 
 Jiave all the Idea it is poflible we (hould 
 have. The internal Conftitution, from 
 which the Powers or Properties of any 
 Subftance flow, it muft be confeiTed is, 
 and perhaps for ever will be, out of our 
 Reach *. Hpwever, we 'know well 
 
 enough, 
 
 ^ *' Les Pbilofopfees tombent affea d'accord, 
 f qu'on doit regarder comme I'EJfence d'une Chofe ce 
 *' que Ton reconnoit de .premier dans cette chofe, ce 
 ?* qui en eft infeparable, & d'ou dependent toutes les 
 ^' proprietez qui lui eonviennent, ou qui font ren- 
 5* fermees da.ns I'ldee qu'on en a ; comme la J)urete^, 
 f' la Mollejfe^ la Fluidjte, le Mouvement^ le Repos^ la 
 ^ * Figure^ la Divijibilite^ /' Impenetrabilite, ^ rEtendiief 
 ** & confiderer d'abord lequel de tous fes Attributs 
 *' en eft infeparable. Ainfi la Fluidite^ la Durete^ la 
 *' MoUeJfe^ la Mouvement, & le RepoSy fe pouvant fe- 
 *' parer de la Matiere^ puifque il y a plufieurs Corps 
 " qui font fans DureUy ou fans Fluiditt\ ou fans 
 *^ Mollejfe^ qui ne font point en Mouvement, ou en- 
 V fin qui ne font point en repos ) il s'enfuit claire- 
 D 4 " ment,
 
 [ 40 ] 
 
 enough, that a Subftance, which has 
 Powers and Properties incompatible with 
 thofe of another Subftance, muft be a 
 different Subftance. It is from their 
 Properties, that we know Subflances. 
 Indeed the Word, Property, is relative, 
 and implies Subflance. It is by their 
 Properties that we diftinguifh Subflances 
 from one another. We call Gpld a ma-r 
 terial Subftance ; and we fay, that Silver 
 
 ** ment, que tout ces Attributs ne lui font point Ef- 
 ** fentieh. Mais il en refte quatre, que nous couce- 
 ** vons infeparables de la matiere ; f(favoir la Figurey 
 *' la D'ivifth'ilite^ T Impeneirah'tlite^ & VEUndue, De 
 *' forte que pourvoir quel eft TAttribut qu'on doit 
 •^ prendre pour VEJfence, il ne faut plus fongera les 
 ♦' feparcr, mais feulement examiner, lequel eft le 
 ^' premier, & qui n'en fuppofe point d'autrc. On 
 ** reconnoit faciiement, que la Figure^ la DivlfiblUtey 
 ^* & r Impenetrabilitej fuppofe rEtendue^ & que V Eten- 
 '* due ne fuppofe rien ; mais des qu'elle eft donnee, 
 *' /<2 Dtvifibjlitey rimpenetrabilite, id la Figure font 
 " donnees. Ainfi on doit conclure, que tEtcn- 
 " due ejl VEJjence de la Matured — Malbraqthe, Re- 
 cherche de Ja Verite, Liv. Ill, Chap. 8. 
 
 differs
 
 [ 41 ] 
 
 differs from Gold m Colour and fpecjfic 
 Gravity; but we flill include it in the 
 Clafs of material Subjlances -, becaufe it 
 ^as many Things in common with Go/d, 
 and other Metals J ^s Extenjon, Figure, 
 Fufibility, and Impenetrability. But if it 
 had no one Property e/Tential to Gold or 
 other material Subftance, we fhould juflly 
 conclude it to be abfclutely of a different 
 Nature. And this is the Cafe with Mind. 
 Senfation, Thought, Memory, Volition r 
 What have they fimilar to Solidity, JSx^ 
 ten/ton. Figure F Can there be fuch a 
 Thing as indivifible Matter ? Or fuch a 
 Thing as divifible Senfation, Thought, 
 Volition f There is but one Thing, that 
 Mind and Matter can be conceived to 
 have in common ;- and that is Motion. 
 But here again the Difference is immenfe; 
 for a Capability of being moved ab extra, 
 has not even the moft diflant Similarity 
 to the Power of moving oijrfelves or 
 3 other
 
 f : 4? i 
 
 Qther Things. Mind has the Power of 
 Motion in itfelf j which, if we know 
 any Thing, we are certain, is not the 
 Cafe with Matter *, 
 
 We 
 
 * Differentia vero mutua oppofitiorie fe Invicem 
 illuftr^nt ; ita ut impoflibile fit ut quis intelligat, quid 
 Tit ma'terialis fuhjiantia quin eo ipfo ftatim intelligat, 
 quid ^\t fuhjiantia immaterialis -, aut quid fit vitam 
 motumve ex fe non haberey quin continuo percipiat 
 quid fit utraque in fe habere, vel communicare poffe, 
 aliis. — Mori Encliirid, A'letaphyfic. p. 380. 
 
 AsJTTsrai cfs rot vsv /utovcv ^upa^sv iTntriViiai, 
 HAi^iiov EJVvtJ [xovoV ac^s yu^ auTHTr^iVipyna. xoi- 
 iajv?{ a'j)iJiariy.n ivipyna. — Ariilot. de Generat. 
 Animal. Lib. II. Cap. 3. 
 
 To ptfv aia^f\riy.ov »x avsu coifXCLroi* 6 cAs NT^r 
 y'jipi^cs- — Ariftot. de Anima, Lib. IIL Cap. 4. 
 
 'O cTs Nsf toiy.iv cyyjvscr^a.', «o-;a ri; ac-ct, x«t 
 » (f^upicr^at. — Ibid. Lib. I. Cap. 4. 
 
 'O (J^i Nsr icrwr ^iianocv ri y.a.i a7ra.^i? «?iv*— 
 Ibid. 
 
 ^n? Tn y"ifij cov iv«py£ta* a?t yap ri/jtrcorfpov t© 
 ^ciiv T» T^a.vyotro-^ y.xi n <*p;t1 "^Jis" u>v.nf.— •
 
 [ 43 3 
 
 We have no Idea of Subftances but 
 from their Properties ; but we cannot 
 but be convinced, that all Properties muft 
 have a Subftance iuited to theni to in^ 
 here in. We fuppofe fuch a Subftance 
 for Solidity i ExtenfioUy Divijibility; which 
 we term Matter : And muft we not con- 
 clude, that there is a Subftance equally 
 proper for Senfation, Thought , Recallec- 
 tion. Volition ? But though we knovy 
 ^othing of Subftances, but from their 
 Properties, or rather the Eifecl thefe Pro- 
 perties have on us ; will it follow, that 
 Properties, fo eifentially different, are not 
 the Properties of didintft Subftances ? 
 Juft reafoning will certainly lead us to 
 
 XcopicrS'JK ti'i i^i [jLcvov Ti:^' otteo ss"', xar rarO 
 ^'.c'jov a^avarcv %a.i aid^icv. — Ibid. Lib. II. 
 Cap. 5. 
 
 Eotxs •yy^il? ysvof Inpov nvai' y.at raro iJ.ovo^ 
 ^^apTSf. — Ibid. Lib. II. Cap. 2. 
 
 the
 
 H 44 ]• 
 
 die direSi contrary Conclirfion.. Speak-, 
 i«g of the Divine Nature the Doctor 
 frankly acknowledges,, that *•*' t)le Pro- 
 *^ perties or Powers being different, the 
 "' Subftance or Eflence muft be different 
 « alfo *." 
 
 As ** many of the Objeds of our 
 ** Ideas are divifible," Dr.. Prieflley is 
 confident to fay, *' it neceffarily follows,^ 
 ** that the Ideas themfelves are divifible 
 i ** alfo -f*." He inflances in the Idea of 
 a Man, of his Head, Arms, Trunk, Legs^ 
 &c. But. this is a mere Sophifm. The 
 Idea of a Leg is not Part of an Idea ', it 
 is as compleat an Idea of itfelf, as the 
 Idea of Man is. The Idea of Qne is 
 ONE Idea ; the Idea of a Million is no 
 more. 
 
 Yet Dr. Prieflley fays, ** Ideas, which 
 ** have Parts, as moft of our Idea5 
 
 * DiYxjuirrtiBhs, p. f67. t Ibid. p. 37. 
 
 ** mani-
 
 ** manifeftly have, cannot exlft in a SouTj 
 '** that has no Parts*/* I have the Idea 
 of a Cot-d, which confifts of many 
 iThreads -, I can, in Imagination, untwift 
 this Cord, and by fo doing have feveral 
 diflilK^ Ideas ; but one of thefe Threads 
 is not a Part of an Idea, but as compleat 
 an Idea as that of the Cord is. The Idea 
 of every Subflance is complex *, it is a 
 Combination of many fimple Ideas. Let 
 us inftance in the Sun. I can, at plea- 
 fure, analyfe this Idea into Heat, Bright- 
 nefs, Roundnefsy &c. &c. Yet my Idea 
 of the Sun is but one Idea. And my be- 
 ing able to refolve this Idea into all the 
 fimple Ideas, of v^hich it is an Aggregate, 
 no more proves the Mind, that does This, 
 to be made of Parts, than niy being able 
 to form the Ideas of Heat, Bright nefs^ 
 zndi Roundnefsy on any other Occalion, 
 • does. " As limple Ideas are bbferved to 
 
 * Dlfqulfitions, p. i02. 
 
 . " exift
 
 r 46 i 
 
 *^ cxifl in feveral Gombinations united 
 
 * together ; fo the Mind has a Power 
 
 * to confidcr feveral of theni united to- 
 
 * gether> as one Idea*." **.We can 
 
 * not only conceive 'ExtenJio7i without 
 
 * Cogitation, and again Cogitation with- 
 
 * out Extenjion , from whence maj^ be 
 « inferred, that they are Entities really 
 
 * diltincSj and feparable from one ano- 
 
 * ther (we having no other Rule to 
 
 * judge of the real Diftinftion and Se- 
 
 * parability of Things than from our 
 « Conceptions) but alfo are not able td 
 
 * conceive Cogitation with Extenjion. 
 
 * We cannot conceive a 'Thought to be 
 
 * of fuch a certain Length, Breadth, and 
 ' Thickncfs, meafurable by- Inches and 
 
 * Feet, and by folid Meafures. We 
 
 * cannot conceive Half, or a Third Parti 
 « or a Twentieth Part of a Though ti 
 
 * much lefs of the Thought of an in- 
 
 * Locke's E%, Book II. Chap. XIl. i. 
 
 o ** divifible
 
 [ 47 1 
 
 " divifible Thing ; Neither can we con- 
 ** ceive every Thought to be of fome 
 ** certain, determinate Figure^ either 
 ** round or angular ; fpherical^ cubical, or 
 ** cylindrical', or the like *.'* 
 
 But the Dodor flill urgesj ** if the 
 ** Archetypes of our Ideas have Exten- 
 ** iion, the Ideas muft have it likewifej 
 ** and therefore the Mind, whether ma- 
 *• terial or immaterial, mufl have Exten- 
 ** iion alfo -f-." If it were true, that a 
 fentient Subftance, extended or non- 
 extended, could not have an Idea diffi- 
 milar to itfelf, as to Extenfion or Non- 
 Extenlion, the Ideas of fuch a Subftance 
 would be few indeed ! In the Idea of 
 Extenfion, I have only the Idea of the 
 Parts of Matter in a State of Contiguity* 
 Let the Expanfion of Space, occupied 
 
 * Dr. Cudworth's Intelkaual Syftenii p. 828. 
 f Difquifitions, p. 38. 
 
 by
 
 " rt 48 ] 
 
 by this Matter, be ever fo large, thd 
 - Idea of it is but one Idea. The Idea of 
 , Extenjion is the Mind's Cdnclufion from 
 its Senfations and Perceptions. Upon 
 touching the Table, on which I write^ I 
 have the Idea of Refijiance : When I lay 
 my Hand on the Table, I perceive it is 
 not a fingle Particle of Matter that re- 
 fifts, but many Particles clofely united. 
 By the Addition of thofe Particles to 
 that I firil touched, the Mind concludes, 
 that the Body, in which thofe Particles 
 are united, is extended. Is it necefTary, 
 that the fentient Subllance fhould be ex- 
 tended, to form an Idea of the Juxta- 
 polition of the Parts of which Bodies 
 are compofed ? If I place a Ball between 
 my Hands, I have no Senfation but that 
 oi Rejijiance ', yet the Mind unavoidably 
 concludes, that the two Sides of the 
 Ball are at a Diftance from one another, 
 and that the Matter of it is extended. 
 
 As
 
 t 49 ] 
 
 As to njifible Exfenjion, be it obferved, 
 that though there is an Image formed on 
 the Retina, that has generally fome Re- 
 femblance of the Objedt, yet it is not fo 
 much as pretended, that there is any 
 fuch Image in the Optic Nerve, or ill 
 the Brain. It is an undoubted Truth, 
 that Perfons, born blind, may have an 
 Idea of Extefifion ; but the l^ouch, from 
 which they derived this Idea, gave them 
 nothing but the Senfation of Hardnefs 
 and Rejiflance, which has not the leaft 
 
 Refemblance to Extenjion *. ^n ex- 
 tended 
 
 * ** Some Ideas are found accompanying the moft 
 ** difFerent Senfations, which yet are not to be per- 
 " ceived feparately from fome fenfible Quality; fuch 
 *' are Extenfion, Figure^ Motion, and Reji^ which 
 ** accompany the Ideas of Sight or Colours, and yet 
 *' may be perceived without them, as in the Ideas of 
 '* Touch, at leaft if we move our Organs along the 
 *' Parts of the Body touched. Extenfion, Figure, 
 *' Jlfotion, or Re/i, feem therefore to be more pro- 
 *' perly called Ideas accompanying the Senfations of 
 E " Sighf
 
 [ 50 ] 
 
 tended Image is indeed painted on the 
 Bottom of the Eye ; but the Gafe, I 
 have jufl mentioned, proves, that the 
 Sight of this Image is not neceflary to 
 the acquiring the Idea oi Extenfion, And 
 indeed, if it were neceflary, it is moft 
 certain, that we fhould never have the 
 Idea; for it is acknowledged, that the 
 Mind does not fee it there. The feat of 
 the fentient Power the Dodlor admits 
 
 *' Sight and Touch, than the Senfations of either of 
 " thofe Senfes,"— Hutchefon's EiTay on the Nature 
 and Condu6l of the Paffions, Se6l. I. 
 
 ** It is true, we have Feelings of Touch, which 
 *' every Moment prefent Extenfton to the Mind ; but 
 *' how they come to do fo is the Queftion ; for thefe 
 " Feelings do no mor6 refemble Extenfion, than they 
 *' refemble Juftice or Courage j nor can theExiftence 
 ** of extended Things be inferred from thefe Feel-' 
 •* ings l^ any Rules of Reafoning." — Reid on Hu- 
 man Mind, p. 134. 
 
 ♦' There is here a Feeling and a Conclufion drawn 
 *' from it, cr fome Way fuggefted by it."— —Ibid, 
 p. 136. 
 
 Se? alio Locke*s Eflay, Book I. Chap. IX. 9. 
 
 to
 
 f ^ 1 
 
 iohein'f&eBraWi and t\6 one has evef 
 furppofed, that ^riy Image is painted in^ 
 the Brain. The #ho}e Bufinefs,- accord-i> 
 ing to DK Pdcftley, is performed by 
 Vibrations ', and a Vibration can be no 
 more than a VilSratioh, let the Object, 
 that made the Imprefliori, whith' "excited 
 (his Vib ratio n> be tx tended, or non-ex -^ 
 tended. 
 
 How often mufi it' be proved, that 
 Senfatiorrs and Ideas haVe no Refemblance 
 of the S-nbftances^ that are the Occafions 
 of their being fuggeiled to us ? I fhall 
 as foon believe, that the percipient Power 
 Within one is a %latk Cat, becaufe I have 
 at this Inftant the Idea of one, that fits at 
 my Elbow, as that this Power is extended, 
 becaufe I have the Idea of Extenjiori, 
 
 An extended, percipient Power ! What 
 
 Vvonderful Things has modern Philofo- 
 
 E 2 phy
 
 [ 5^ ] ' • 
 
 phy produced ! ** An extended SouI{eQm$ 
 juft fuch another Phrafc as a green Sounds 
 an Ell of Confcioufnefs, a Cube of Vir^ 
 tue *." " Thefe Qualities (Extenfion 
 ** and Figure) are in the Mind only as 
 ** they are perceived by it, that is, not 
 ** by Way of Mode or Attribute, but 
 ** by Way of Idea % and it no more fol- 
 *' lows, that the Soul or Mind is ex- 
 " tended, becaufe Extenfion exifls in it 
 ** alone, than it does, that it is red or 
 '* blue, becaufe thefe Colours are on all 
 ** Hands acknowledged to exift in it, 
 " and no where elfe -f.'* I truft, that 
 my quoting this Paffage will not lead any 
 one, who fhall chance to read thefe Pa- 
 pers, to fufpedl, that I believe Extenfon 
 to exiji in the Mind alone, 
 
 * Bp. Law's Notes to Archbifhop King's Origin 
 of Evil, p. 34. 
 
 t Bp. Berkeley's Principles of Human Knowledge, 
 Se«5l. 49. 
 
 The
 
 i S-z -3 
 
 -"""'The fen dent Power, extended or not, 
 has Ideas, that are not extended ; for it 
 ■ has Ideas of Hardnefs, Softnefs, Attract 
 tion, Repulfion, Motion, Rejiy &c. &c. ; 
 which, though Affedions of Matter, cer- 
 tainly ftand clear of all Extenfion. And 
 is there not juft as much Difficulty in 
 conceiving, that an extended percipient 
 Power (hould have Ideas without Exten-^ 
 Jion, as that an unextended percipient 
 Subftance (hould have the Idea oi Ext^n^ 
 Jion F If ^n extended, percipient Power 
 may have Ideas, that have no natural 
 Conned:ion with Extenjion, it feems but 
 reafonable to admit the Poffibili^y, that 
 an unextended, intelligent Subftance may 
 have Ideas, that have no natural Con- 
 nection with Non-Extenjion. If the Soql 
 muft be extended, merely becaufe it has 
 the Idea oiExtenJion, it feems a neceffary 
 Conclulion, that its Extenjion muft be 
 proportioned to that of the extended 
 E 3 Body,
 
 1: 54 I 
 
 Body, of which it has an Idea ; and 
 therefore, as my Mind takes in perfe(5lly 
 the Idea of a Field, which is now be- 
 fore my Eyes,^ and which, I apprehend, 
 contains about forty Acres, it fhoul.d 
 follow, that my Mind has the Length 
 and Breadth of forty Acres. In a Mo- 
 ment my Mind forms the Idea of a Pin's 
 Point i and it ihould follow likewife, 
 that its Dimenfions are inflantaneoufly 
 rediijced to the . Size pf the Point of a 
 Pin *. If the ilf/W muft be exterJed.^ 
 
 becaufe 
 
 * " Were That, which perceiveth in us, a Mag- 
 *' nttude^ then could it not be {jrov Travrt a.i<j^r,T ui., 
 " equal to every fenjibhy and alike perceive both leJJ'cr 
 ** andgr^aUr Magnitude fhanitfelFj but Icafl- of" all 
 *' could it perceive Cugh 7?hings as have ho A'lagni- 
 « tude'zt all."— Dr. Cudworth's Intelkaual Syf. 
 tern, p. 827. 
 
 xcn d^u-jccixii iy.iiva. Ariilot. de Anima, Lib. II. 
 Cap. XII. 
 
 *' The Soul conceives extended Things then-.TcIvcs, 
 f* mextfnded!y and ind'iv'tfibly 3 fot as the Diftance 
 
 *^ of
 
 t ,55 ] 
 
 b^eaHte' the iJeas'^^te, and the IJeas muft 
 be txhnded, becaufe the Archetypes are 
 fO| it can only be, becaufe tliQ Mmd, 
 the lideasy and the Archetypes mufl" be 
 iexaftry firhildr ^-^nd this Similarity muft 
 ext^nki to Size-as weH as Figure. 
 
 ^' of a whofe Hemifphere \s eontrafted into a narrow 
 *' Compafs in the Pupil of the Eye, fo are all the 
 *' JDiftances yet more contrafted in the Soul itfelf, 
 *^ and there underftood indljiantly. For the Thought 
 ♦* of a Mile'^ Diftanee, or of ten Thoufand Miles, 
 " or Semidiametcrs of the Earth, takes up no more 
 ** Room in the Soul, nor ftretches it any more, 
 *' than does the Thought of a Foot or an Inch^ or 
 *' indeed of a Mathematical Point." — Dr. Cudworth, 
 in the Place quoted above. 
 
 *' Quis quaifo unquam concepit mediam, aut 
 " quartam partem animae ? An magnas animas plus 
 *' fpatii quam parvas occupare videmus, fpiritufque 
 *' nofter, cum multa conclpimus, num grandior fit 
 '* mole, quam cum pauciora intclligimus ? " Tratflat. 
 de Mente humana (Autore Ludovic. de la Forge, 
 Medlcinae apud Salmurienfes Dodlore) Csp. V. 
 Amftelodami apud Dan. Elzevir, i66g. 
 
 E 4 There
 
 [ 56 3 
 
 There was fomething like the Appear- 
 ance of Argument in this Way of Rea- 
 foning, (though indeed there was no7 
 thing but the Appearance) while Philo- 
 fophy reiled itfelf on the Images of vi- 
 fible Objedts painted on the Retina; but, 
 upon the Syjiem of Vibrations^ the poor 
 Appearance of Reafoning vanifhes. For 
 what Refemblance has a Vibration to 
 Extenjion f If you perceive any fuch ; 
 then I afk, what Refemblance has a Vi^ 
 bration to Senfation f Are Senfatioi^s ex- 
 tended? Can Vibrations equally well re- 
 femble Extenjion and Non-Extenfion f 
 The Brain, which is extended, vibrates 
 in Confequence of an Imprefiion, that 
 produced an unext ended Senfation j it vi- 
 brates, differently it may be fuppofed, 
 in Confequence of an ImprefTion made 
 by an extended ObjeEi ; but it is not the 
 extended, vibrating Brain, that perceives, 
 according to Dr. Prieflley, but a perci- 
 2 pient
 
 I 57 ] 
 
 pent Power' fuperadded to this vibrating 
 ^r^;«. I >vill not fay, it is ridiculous tp 
 talk of an extended Power -, no ! let it 
 be Philofophy to do fo. But fure, I may 
 be permitted to alk, where is the Ner 
 pellity of the Power s being extended^ 
 when the Bulinefs only is to judge of 
 the different Vibrations of the Brain, 
 that aiFed: it; all which, as it feems, 
 this imaginary, fuperadded, percipient 
 Power may do full as well without Ex- 
 tenjiony as with it. 
 
 V Dr. Prieftley, having told us, that ** it 
 
 f ' is fuppo.fed, that the Brain, befides 
 
 ^f^ its vibratory Power, hath fuperadded 
 
 V to it a. percipient, or fentient Power 
 
 ** likewife," adds, " there is no Rea- 
 
 ** fon, that we know of, why this Power 
 
 ** might not be imparted to it *." But 
 gs a vibratory Power will communicate 
 
 * Difquiiitions, page 91. 
 
 nothing
 
 r 58 ] 
 
 nothing but • Vibrations j and he ^flureg 
 U^y that-*-«'/y^^ 'Mr<tin itfelfis ^he-ftrci^ 
 f'^ pien^ ^-Fow^'fy ar welt' -^ the ^^ubjedl 
 V (^ tbefe Vibpations^^ •^'- ii'caiinot tmt 
 ■feehi IxJin^thlng-'flr^age,^ that' the ^Bri/« 
 ftiould vibrate^ in ofScf to-infG^ni;itfelf 
 of what paiTes wi'thiaitfeli?; '-and* that 
 it^fhould get Info hiiaHbn df -any 'Thing 
 hj vibrations i^iXi of the Vibrations' fbehi' 
 '^lves/"And all this will appear yet more 
 ilran'gie,- when we coniider,- that, ac- 
 cording to the Dodof, thong^h 'tbe Vi-^ 
 brations of the Brain produce Ideas, and 
 the brain is the percipient Power, as well 
 as tbe SubjeSt of thefe Vibrations-, yet, 
 ** it is eafy to form an Idea of there 
 ** being [Vibrations without any Percept 
 ^* //ij^j- accompanying them;" — that the 
 Motion of the percipient Syftem pro^ 
 duces Perception, and yet the percipient 
 Syftem may be in Motion without any 
 
 * Difquifitlons, p. 90. 
 
 Per^
 
 ft 59 II 
 
 perception ! *. We fee every Thing i^ 
 done which the Dodor thinks necelTarY, 
 to generate a Senfatio^, or an Idea. An 
 Imprejfion mufl produce a Vibration ; for 
 ihe Brain h Matter, and muft vibrate 
 under arf. ImpreJ/ioni ^^nd .the acknow^ 
 ledged Bufi.nef§ pf ^ Vibration is to proi- 
 ^\XQQ Perception. It. cannot he faid, .that 
 the percipient Ppvyer' is abfent;, for the 
 Podor affures us, that the Brain is the 
 percipient. Power, as ;Well as the Subjed 
 .of thefe Vibrations.' There may Aill, 
 however, be no Perception, What is the 
 Caufe ? Has the percipient Power fome 
 
 * Dr, Prieftley fays, " Whatever may be the 
 *^ EfFea of any Senfation or Idea upon the Brain, the 
 " Impreffipn may be io ftrong as to overpo^^^r all 
 " other Imprefllons." (p. icoj That is, ip a fevy 
 Words, the Brain, when labouring under one Vibra- 
 tion, is incapable of having another at the fame 
 Timej or if it is vibrated, the percipient Power ca.^- 
 not take in more than one Vibration at a Time. 
 Compare this with the PafTage quoted below from the 
 ^Oth Page of the Doapr's Work. 
 
 Other
 
 X do ] 
 
 ■other Objedt, that takes up its Atten-? 
 .tibn ? That cannot be the Cafe ; for 
 'the Dodtor affures us, that " the Brain ^ 
 ** mufl feel the EfFedl of every particu- 
 ff. lar Impreffion made upon it *." Be*- 
 fides, the percipient Power is confcious 
 of -nothing without Vibrations. We 
 want to account for the Brain's not per- 
 ceiving, when it has Vibrations. And 
 the Impoffibility of doing this, upon the 
 Dodor's Syftcm, is a plain Proof, that 
 his Syftem is ill founded ; and that the 
 Author of Nature has not fuperadded to 
 the vibratory Power of the Brain, a per- 
 cipient and fentient Power fo ill fitted 
 for the Bufinefs, that it is, upon this Hy- 
 pothefis, impoffible to account for one 
 of the moil common Phaenomena in 
 Nature. Lodge an immaterial^ intelli- 
 gent Subjiance in the Brain, and this 
 Difficulty vanifhes. The Mind never 
 
 * Difquifition?, p. 90. 
 
 fail^
 
 [ 6i ] 
 
 fails to attend to the Impreflions made 
 on the Organs of Senfe, if ihe is not 
 occupied with her own Ideas -, and even 
 when flie is thus engaged, her Attention 
 is to be recalled by a flrong Impreffion. 
 
 That Motion cannot produce Thought^ 
 is ftridly demonftrable ; for Motion is 
 fuccejivey both as to Flace and Time^ 
 being from Point to Point. Let the 
 Point A be the terminus a quo ; the 
 Point B the terminus ad quern ; but when 
 Matter is in A, it is not in Motion ; and 
 therefore can have no Pretenlion to the 
 Power of producing Thought; for Mo-, 
 tion is then in futuro ; and when the 
 Matter has arrived at B, the Motion from 
 ^ to B is pafl. And is it poffible, that 
 Motion fhould produce Thought, which 
 is individual, when no Points of it are, 
 even in Imagination, co-exijient, either 
 as to Place or Time? Subdivide the Time 
 
 an4
 
 and the Space as long as- you pleafe, arid 
 the Imp'oiTibility of the Co-exijienee of 
 Motion in any two PointSi will be equally 
 felf-evidenti 
 
 The only Idea we have, or cari havd^ 
 oi Matter in Motion, is, that it changes 
 Place-, that is, that it is fucceffivel/ 
 united to different Parts of Space. • And . 
 if this be, as, I am perfuaded, it is^ the 
 whole of the Buiinefs, we have a freih 
 Demonftration, that Thought cannot arife 
 from the Motion of Matter, For our 
 Thoughts are capable of an infinite D/- 
 *i)erfity ; but what Diverlity can arife 
 from the fucceiTive Application of the 
 fame Matter to different Parts of Space f 
 Begin with A, and fuppcle different 
 Parts of Space to the End of the Alpha- 
 bet ', and if the Motion from A to B 
 could poflibly produce an Idea, that Idea 
 muft neceffarily continue the fame to the 
 
 End
 
 f 63 3 
 
 End of the imagined Sp<^^,.. a^ the Pa«s 
 of this 5^,7^^ are undoubtedly ^«,^,^,^ 
 •«/. and therefore could produce no 
 Change in the Motion, nor confequently 
 in the Idea. 
 
 We muft not, however, forget, that' 
 It u not,/4. Motion of Matter in general 
 that is fuppofed to produce /^.^,. but 
 the Motion of a certain Syftem of Matter. ' 
 But ,s the Matter of this Syflem in any 
 Refpea different from other Matter ? Or 
 does the Motion of this Matter differ 
 from the Motion of any other Matter > 
 One. or both of thefe Things muft cer- 
 tainly be true, or all Matter in Motion 
 
 muilthinkalike. But, that either of then 
 '= true, I apprehend. Dr. Prieftley will not 
 undertake to prove, becaufe the contrary 
 
 may undeniably be Ihewn upon his Hy- 
 
 pothefis. For the FleA of a dead Ani- 
 
 •nal has all the Doclor thinks effential to 
 
 ■^ Matter :
 
 [64 i 
 
 Matter j Extenfiony AttraBion, Repuljion: 
 It has yet more -, it has a Capability of 
 Motion ; for a Football may be thrown 
 in any Direction, and with any Degree 
 of Velocity. 
 
 Mere Motion can do no more td the 
 Whole, than it can to the Parts fepa- 
 rately. Suppofe, if you pleafe. Millions 
 of Millions of Particles, and give to the 
 Mafs, compofed of thefe Particles, Mil- 
 lions of Millions of Times as much 
 Velocity, as could be conceived to be- 
 long to a lingle Atom ; yet ftiU there 
 would ht nothing but Matter and Mo- 
 tion. Take a Million of Figures, and 
 add, fubtrad, multiply, and divide, as 
 long as you pleafe ; [the Products, the 
 Remainders, the Quotients will ftill be, 
 as they were at firft, mere Figures.
 
 t 65 3 
 
 *jthe Comparifon of Ideas having been , 
 objected to Dr. Prieftley's Theory of 
 Vibrations," he fays in Anfwer, that 
 ** the Brain, being the percipient Power, 
 *' as well as the Subjedl of thefe Vibra- 
 ** tions, muft feel, not only every par- 
 " ticular Impreffion made upon it, but 
 " alfo all, that can refult from the Com- 
 ** bination of ever fo many Impreflions 
 " at the fame Time *." And be it ad- 
 mitted, that the Brain may feel a Com- 
 bination of Impreffions at the fame 
 Time j but can it alike feel a prefent Im^ 
 prejjion, and the Idea or Copy of one 
 made upon it feveral Years pall ? The 
 Idea or Copy of an Imprejjion, Mr. Hume 
 obferves, is fainter than the Impreilion. 
 And if the percipient Power cannot feel 
 a prefent Impreffion, and the Copy of a 
 paft one with equal Force and Energy j 
 as the Vibratory Power can, in this 
 
 * Dlfquifitlons, p. 90. 
 
 F Cafe,
 
 [ 66 ] 
 
 Cafe, convey nothing to the percipient 
 Power, but one Jirong Vibration and 
 another weak one; the percipient Power 
 can by no Means judge of Ideas, fo 
 altogether inadequate to the Truth 
 of Things, with any Exa(5lnefs. In- 
 deed nothing can be conceived to be 
 flored up in a Power, that is merely 
 percipient in coiifcquence of Vibrations, ^ 
 that is. In confecuence of immediate 
 ImpreJJions, Whatever fuch a Power 
 may perceive, when irritated to Percep- 
 tion by ad:ual Vibrations, muft for ever 
 ftand alone, and uncompared with any 
 Thing paji or future. For, upon this 
 Syftem, Ideas are nothing more than a 
 SucceJJion of ImpreJJions , whofe Fate mufl 
 be to die away with the Vibrations, and 
 be forgotten. An Impreffion is made on 
 the Brain, which vibrates in Obedience j 
 and perhaps a Perception is produced ; 
 but when the Brain ceafes to vibrate, the 
 5 Perception
 
 i 67 J 
 
 ■^- 1 
 
 Peteptiori vanifhes. And what can pof- 
 iibly regenerate it, but a limilar Vibra- 
 tion ? And what can caufe that Vibra- 
 tion, but a Timilar Impreflion from the 
 very Objedt, that firft made it ? It feems 
 not only abfolutely impoffible, in this 
 Way, to bring a paft Perception, and one 
 arifing from an immediate Impreffion, 
 fairly before the percipient Power, in 
 Order for Comparifon -, but there feems 
 a very great Difficulty in conceiving, 
 how any two immediate Impreffions, un- 
 lefs made on different Parts of the Brain, 
 and by that Means exciting diftind: Vi^ 
 brations in the fame Moment, {hould 
 ever be compared. For the Vibration 
 of the whole Brain can produce but one 
 diftind Perception'; the Moment that 
 Vibration ceafes, the Perception ceafes 
 likewife. The Brain may indeed imme- 
 diately have a new Vibration, and a new 
 Perception -, but the former is vanifhed ; 
 F 2 and
 
 t 68 ] 
 
 and there is no Poflibility of comparing 
 two PerceptionvS, that are not co-exiftent* 
 
 Man, without Mmd, would be, as 
 Mr. Hume reprefents him, ** a mere 
 ** Bundle, or ColleBion of different Per- 
 ** ceptions, which fucceed each other 
 *' with inconceivable Rapidity, and arc 
 ** in a perpetual Flux and Movement, 
 ** There could be properly no Simplicity 
 ** in him at one Time, nor Identity at 
 ** different Times*;" or rather, in HiiGc 
 Propriety, Man could not be faid to con- 
 fifl even of a Bundle of Perceptions -, for a 
 Bundle muft have fomething, that holds 
 the feveral Parts together. But, without 
 Mind, Ideas could not be fo much as 
 bundled. They could have no Connexion -, 
 nor could it be faid that they belonged 
 to one Perfon, rather than to another, 
 or that there was fuch a Thing as Per- 
 
 * Treatife of Hunj^n Nature, Vol. I. p. 439. 
 5 >^>
 
 [ 69 ] 
 
 fin-, nor could it be ever known, that 
 the various Senfations, excited by one 
 Objea, belong to one SubjeB', for per- 
 fedtly diflindare the Reports, which the 
 Organs of Senfe make of what paiTes 
 without ; and, without Mitid, diftind 
 and unconnecfled would they for ever re- 
 main, rbe Figure of a Flower and its 
 Colours might make an ImprefTion on the 
 Retina, and its Effluvia on the olfaaory ^ 
 Nerves-, but it is Intelligence that unites 
 the Senfations, and fays, it is the Figure, 
 the Colour, and Smell of a Rofe *. E/ 
 'Ti f^e?^ii ccia^avea^oci wo?, EN auro S'n 
 
 SlVCCl, KCtl rep CtVTCf) TTCCPTOS CtPTl?lCCfJLCcCr€(T^cCl, 
 
 ic.T, A. To (Tg EN 7roL8P tbto o vbs sxaq-av -f. 
 
 If 
 
 * Plotinus, as quoted in the Intelleaual Syftem 
 P- 324- ' 
 
 t Ariftot. de Anima, Lib. III. cap. 6. 
 
 See alfo Bp. Berkeley's Sirls, Se^. 356, 357. 
 
 *' ^ne Senfe cannot judge of the Objeds of ano- 
 
 " ther." " That which views and compares the 
 
 " Objeas of all the Senfes, and judges of them, 
 
 ^3 " cannot
 
 [ 70 ] 
 
 If Senfatiom and Ideas do not belong 
 to a Sentient, whofe Senfations and Ideas 
 are they ? I may have a round Dozen 
 of them at the fame Time ; but how 
 comes it, that thefe diflincl Senfationg 
 and Ideas do not form fo many diftindt 
 Perfons ? What have they to do with 
 one another ? How come they to con- 
 fpire to form Vnity ? Sure Man, on the 
 material Hypothefis, mufl be as many 
 diJiinSi Beings, as he has dijlinci Senfa- 
 tions, Senfations without a Sentient t 
 Thought without a Thinker ! An AB 
 without an Agent ! A Crime without a 
 Criminal ! Thefe, O Philofophy, are 
 
 " cannot be Senfe, or any Power, that has any AfR- 
 *' nity to It." — Dr. Price's Review, &c. p. 21. 
 
 *' Qn'xA quod eddem mente res diflimillimas com- 
 *' prehendimus, ut colorem^ fapovem^ calorem, odorem^ 
 '* fonufn ? quas nunquam quinque nuntiis animus 
 ** cognofceret, nifi ad eum omnia referrentur, & is 
 " oihnium judex folus eJ/k."—Ckcr. Tufcul. Queft. 
 Lib. I. 
 
 the
 
 [ 71 ] 
 
 ' the Wonders thou haft wrought ! But, 
 
 in Fadl, thefe are not the thoufandth 
 
 Part of the Miracles modern Philofophy 
 
 has brought forth. 
 
 Senfations and Ideas, which are Days, 
 nay Years, afunder, in a Manner diilant 
 and unconnedled as Saturn and Mercury, 
 haft thou coupled and chained together 
 to form Identify I My Figurations and 
 Ideas of to-day rejoice in t/oe Vibrations 
 and Ideas of my Youth , my Vibrations 
 and Ideas of to-morrow — my wife Vibra- 
 tions and Ideas of to-morrow — may 
 grieve for the>/^ Vibrations and Ideas 
 of my Youth. My Vibrations and Ideas 
 are communicated to a diftant Friend ; 
 and, as foon as he receives them, they 
 generate in his Brain fmilar Vibrations 
 and Ideas. And will thefe Vibrations 
 and Ideas, the Moment they become his, 
 form Identity alfo ? And ftiall my Friend 
 ■^ 4 and
 
 [ 72 ] 
 
 and I be in F erf on, as in T^ bought, the 
 fame f This certainly fhould be the 
 Cafe upon this Syftem. — And yet it is 
 not. — But it is no Wonder. Contradic- 
 tions are nothing to this Philofophy -, it 
 is her Glory to triumph over them, to 
 be believed in fpite of them. But I, 
 who am not her Votary, beg leave to 
 think, that the Faculty of tajiing is 
 fomcthing different from the Tajie -, for 
 the Faculty may fubfift, v^^hen I have not 
 this Senfation, And I beg leave alfo to 
 think, that the Mind, which now pof- 
 feffes this Faculty, is diftindt from the 
 Faculty j for it is conceivable, that the 
 Mind may be without it. Yes ! the 
 thinker muft be fomething diftindt from 
 his Senfations and Ideas — fomething, 
 whofe Identity fubfifls, while his Senfa^ 
 tions and Ideas are perpetually in Flux, 
 Ta yoLp ayx^a Tetyx^op S^ictirovuv, y,oLi savrs 
 
 ami
 
 [ 73 ] 
 
 eiva.1 S^oxei *. /^o^eie <^' ccv to vow BTcae^os 
 6ivcci'\'. Mens cujufque is eft quifque J. 
 
 Dr, Prieftley aflerts, that " the Notion 
 ** of two Subftances, that have no com- 
 " mon Property, and yet are capable of 
 " an intimate Connexion, is abfurd— 
 ^ " and that it is impoffible to be con- 
 ** ceived §," For my own part, I can 
 cafily conceive the Poffibility of fuch 
 Connection ', for I can conceive, that 
 the one may be capable of receiving 
 what the other may be capable of giving. 
 Matter, we know, may be put in Mo- 
 tion ; and we have only to fuppofe, that 
 an intelligent Subftance may have the 
 Power of communicating Motion -, and 
 
 * Ariftot. Ethic. Nichom. Lib. IX. 4, 
 
 f Ibid. Vide etiam, Lib. X. cap. 7. 
 
 ^ Cicero. 
 
 ^ Difquifitions, Introdu«5lion, p. 38, and p. 61. 
 
 we
 
 [ 74 ] 
 
 we have one plain Inftance of the Poffi- 
 bility of connecting Matter and Mind. 
 The Do6tor, though he makes Attrac- 
 tion and Repulfion ejfential to Matter, yet 
 by no Means fuppofes, that they zxtfelf- 
 exifientin it-\. But thefe Powers, which 
 zr^ not felf-exijient in M.2i.itQ.r J and have 
 no common Property v/ith it (for they 
 have ntiihtv Length, Breadth, nor Thick- 
 nejs) affedt Matter ; and I find no more 
 difficulty in conceiving, that Matter may 
 be afFedted by the Powers of a diJiinSi 
 Subjlance, than that they may be affeded 
 by Powers, that are not felf-exijlent 
 in it, 
 
 " A Subftance, that is hard, may ad: 
 ** u,pon, and be aded upon by, another 
 " hard Subftance, or even one that is 
 *' foft ; which in fad is only relatively 
 " lefs hardj but it is certainly impoffible, 
 
 f Difquifitions, p. 7. 
 
 *' that
 
 [ 75 ] , 
 
 '« that it fhould affect, or be afFeded by, 
 *' a Subftance, that can make no Relift- 
 ** ance at all" — fays Dr. Prieftley *. 
 And yet a Subftance, hard or foft, is 
 a(5led upon by Powers, which are neither 
 hard nor foft. " Powers, or jLaws, are 
 '* not real Beings; they are nothing but 
 ** mere Words or Notions -, and can nei- 
 *« ther a(fl in any Senfe, nor move Mat- 
 ** ter, either by Contadl or without it. 
 '* I conceive an ordinary Reader may 
 ♦* be able to difcern the Difference, be- 
 *' tween affirming, that an immaterial 
 ** Subftance, a real Being, though not 
 ^* hard and folid, may move Matter -, 
 " and afiirming, that a Law or Power, 
 *' a mere Word or Term of Art, which 
 ** is really nothing, and has not truly 
 ** any Being or Exiftence, fave only in 
 *•*, the Imagination, can caufe Matter to 
 
 ■* Dirquifitions, p. 6i. 
 
 ** move."
 
 [ 76 ] 
 
 ** move *." " If God cannot join 
 ** Things together by Connexions in- 
 ** conceivable to us, we muft deny even 
 ** the Coniiftency and Being of Matter 
 ** itfelf 5 fince every Particle of it hav- 
 ** ing fome Bulk, has its Parts conneded 
 ** by ways inconceivable to us •f-." 
 ** Tell me, how Matter adts upon Mai- 
 ** ter without Contact, and I will un- 
 ** dertake to tell you, how Matter adls 
 ** upon an immaterial Subjiance ;};." 
 " What is faid of Forces refiding in 
 •* Bodies, whether attracting or repel- 
 ** ling, is to be regarded only as a ma- 
 ** thematical Hypothecs, and not as any 
 •* Thing really exifting in Nature §." 
 
 * Dr. Clarke's Third Defence of his Letter to 
 Mr. Dodwell.— — See alfo Dr. Price on Providence, 
 
 P 73» ^c- 
 
 t Locke's EfTay, Book IV. Chap. IlL 6. Note. 
 
 :}: Dr. Clarke's Fourth Defence of his Letter to 
 Mr. Dodwell. 
 
 § Bp. Berkeley's Siris, Sedl. 234. 
 
 «* At-'
 
 [ 77 1 
 
 *' AftraBion cannot produce, and in 
 ** that Senfe account for, the Phasno- 
 ** mena, being itfelf one of the Phasno- 
 ** mena produced, and to be accounted 
 « for *." 
 
 Mr. Locke fays, ** // // certain, there 
 ^ ** is afpiritual, immaterial Subflance, the 
 *' great Creator -f*." This indeed he 
 has demonftrated JJ Now, this fpiri- 
 tual, immaterial Subflance has aSled upon 
 Matter ; and Dr. Prieftley allows, that 
 he conjiantly fiipports, and at Pleafure 
 controlls the Laws of Nature. It is 
 therefore out of Queftion, that Matter 
 may be adted upon by what is immaterial. 
 Even, according to Dr. Prieftley, " the 
 ** divine Eflence is nothing, that was 
 ** ever called Matter, but fomethinir 
 
 * Bp. Berkeley's Siris, Se6l. 243. 
 
 t E%, Book IV. Chap. Ill, 6. *Note. 
 
 + Book IV. Chap. X. 
 
 ** efTen-
 
 [ 78 ]■ 
 
 " eflfentially different from it *." " Me 
 *' can produce Powers — change them, 
 ** as he pleafes, or take them all away ; 
 *' he can produce Subflance, or anni- 
 " hilate it ; he acfls every where ; he 
 *« muft be every where -f-." 
 
 1 muft here qbferve, that Mr. Locke 
 has proved, that Matter cannot produce 
 Motion — nor Matter and Motion pro- 
 
 * Dlfquifitions, p. 152. 
 
 If there is one Subftance, that was never called 
 Matter, but is eJj'entiaUy different from it, there can 
 be no Difficulty in conceiving, there may be any 
 Number of fuch Subftances. A Subilance, acknoW' 
 ledged not to be Alatter, not only has a6ted, but con- 
 ftantly a6ls, upon Matter ; and as Matter has not, 
 we are fenfible, the Power of moving itfejf — and 
 all Creatures, which have Life, have fuch a Power 
 — it is rational to conclude, that an immaterial 
 Subjlance is vitally united with all fuch material Sub' 
 fiances. 
 
 \ Difquifitions, p. 106, 7, 
 
 duce
 
 I 79 ] 
 
 duce Thought *. The Inference is 
 plain ; we thinky we move. There ig,» 
 confequently, an immaterialMoverwithiH 
 US', or we are conflantly aded upon' 
 from without by fomething immaterial. 
 It is moft wonderful that Mr. Locke 
 fhould fuppofe itimpoiTible, we fhould 
 know, whether any mere material Being 
 thinks "f-. 
 
 I have already obferved, that Dr. 
 Prieftley has affirmed, that '' we have 
 
 ♦ E%, Book, IV. Chap. X. 10. 
 
 t E%, Book IV. Chap. III. 6. 
 
 " Si dicerem non magis concepta diiHcile eiTe, 
 " quomodo mens humana, qu^ non eft extenfa! 
 " poffit movere corpus, & quomodo corpus, quod 
 - non eft res fpiritualis, agere pofKt in mentcm, 
 " quam quomodo corpus aliquod vim habeat fe mo- 
 " vendi, motumque fuum communicandi alteri cor- 
 " pori, non puto me fidem inventurum apud animos 
 « multorum hominum : cum tamen nihil verius dici 
 " Poffit.»-Traaat. de Menta humana (Autore 
 Ludov. de la Forge) Cap. XVI. 
 
 no
 
 r 80 r 
 
 ** no proper Idea of any EfTence what^ 
 *' foever *." He adds, " we cannot 
 ** fpeak of Attradion and Repullion, 
 *' but as Powers belonging to, and re- 
 " fiding in, foine Thing, Subftance, or 
 ** EiTence -, but our Ideas do not go 
 ** beyond thefe Powers -f*.'* Now, I 
 thought, we had an Idea of Rxtenfion, 
 I am fure, he has aflerted, that what- 
 ever it is within us, that has a percipient 
 Power, muft be extended, becaufe ive 
 have an Idea of Extenjion. 
 
 *' The Term, Immateriality ^ he is 
 ** confident, never did, or could, fug- 
 ** geft any Idea whatfoever J." Not, 
 
 indeed, 
 
 * Difquifitions, p. 104. 
 f Difquifitions, p. 105. 
 
 X Difquifitions, p. 105. 
 
 Dr. Prieftley fays, (p. 59) " It is impofllble, 
 " even in Idea, to fuppofe the Annihilation of Space." 
 Now, if it cannot be annihilated even in Idea^ we ' 
 
 muft
 
 Indeed, according to his Syftem ; in 
 Which the Mind is fuppofed to perceive 
 nothing but ImpreJJions , and Ideas^ that 
 are the Copies of thofe ImpreJJions ; for it 
 is certain, that the Soul never had an 
 Impreffion of Immateriality. But if Mr. 
 Locke had a juft Notion of an Idea, and 
 It is, whatever the Mind is employed about 
 whilft thinking *'— -then we may have an 
 Idea of Immateriality ; for if we can rea-- 
 Ton about it, we can certainly think of 
 It ; or we can reafon without thinking. 
 
 rnuft certainly have an Idea of it. But furely one may 
 fay o(Spa<:t what he fays of Immateriality j for the Term 
 iSpai-e^ never having made any other Impreffion on the 
 Organs of Senfe, than the Term Immateriality makes, 
 never did, upon the Doctor's Scheme, fuggeft any Idea 
 whatfoever. There is certainly no more Difficulty in 
 the Idea of Immateriality, than there is in the Idea of 
 Spaa, 
 
 * E%— Introduaion, Seft. 8. and Book II. 
 Chap. I. I, 
 
 G Talk
 
 [ 82 ]' 
 
 Talk without thinking, and wfitd 
 without thinking ! alas ! it is but too 
 certain we all can. The Dodtor would 
 not, I fuppofe, deny, that we have an 
 Idea of Attradiion and Repulfion -, but we 
 have no Idea of them, but from their 
 EfFedis i and we have an Idea of a think- 
 ing, immaterial Principle in the fame 
 Way. The Subjlance, or EJfencey that 
 fupports Attraction and Repulfion, i&, 
 according to the Do(flor, as much un- 
 known to us, as the Subjiance or EJfenc-e 
 of the Immaterial Principle, We have, 
 therefore, upon the Do(5tor's own Prin- 
 ciples, as juft an Idea of Immateriality, 
 as we have of Matter, 
 
 *' So ftrange an Idea is Matter, and 
 ** (o little comprehenfible to common 
 ** Ideas, that the Greeks had no name 
 ** for it, till TAH came to be adopted 
 ** as the proper Word ; which was at 
 
 •* firft
 
 [ 83 ] 
 
 *^ firfl only affumed by way of Meta- 
 ** phor, from fignifying 'J'tmher or Wood^ 
 ** the common Materials in any Work 
 ''^ of Art *." The fame nlay be faid of 
 the Latin Materia, and Matenes, front 
 which the Engliih Word Matter is de-* 
 rived. ** It is evident, that having no 
 •* other Idea or Notion of Matter, but 
 ** fomething wherein thofe many fen- 
 ** lible Qualities, which afFedt Our Senfes, 
 " do fubfift ', by fuppofing a Subftance, 
 *' wherein thinking, khoiving, doubting, 
 ^* and a Power of moving, &c. do fubfift, 
 ** we have as clear a Notion df the Sub^ 
 *' fiance of Spirit, as we have of Body ; 
 ** the one being fuppofed to be (without 
 " knowing what it is) the Subflratum to 
 ** thofe fimple Ideas we have from with- 
 '* out j and the other fuppofed (with a 
 *« like Ignorance of what it is) to be the 
 
 * Harris's Philofophical Arrangements, p. 75. 
 
 G 2 " Sub-
 
 [ U 1 
 
 ^' Subflratum to thofe Operatfons, \v%kh 
 '* we experiment in ouFfelves wiriiin.' 
 ^*« It is plain tli^n, that the Idea of eor^ 
 ** poreal Subftance in Matter, is as remote 
 *' from our Conceptions and Apprehen- 
 ** fions> as that of spiritual Subjlaneef or 
 '* Spirit, And therefore, from oar not 
 " havtng any Notion of the Subjlance of 
 '* Spirit, we can no more Gonclude its- 
 ^' Non-exiftertce, thart we can, fo^ thtf 
 ** fame Reafon, deny tli« Exifteoce of 
 *' Body : It being as rational to affirniy 
 ** there is no Body, beeaufe we have na 
 *' clear and diilind Idea of tbe^ Suhflanct 
 **■ of Matter, as to j£iy, there is no Spi^ 
 ** rit, becaufe we have no clear and di-» 
 *' ftind: Idea of the Suhjiame of a Spi" 
 " rit *.'" 
 
 Dr. Frreflfey indeed obferves,. that 
 '* Metaphyficians affirm, that we have 
 
 * Locke's E%, Book ir. Chap. XXIII. 5. See 
 alfo Sed. 15, &c, &€,
 
 ( ^s ] 
 
 '* as clear an Idea of Spirit, as we have 
 ** of Matter, each being equally the un- 
 *' known Support of known Properties; 
 ** MattertO^Extenfion ^ndi Solidity I Sp- 
 ** rity Qi Senjatiott and Thought *" But 
 ililU he adds^ ^* jC>nce the Subflance is 
 ■** unknown to us, it mufl alfo be un~ 
 ■** known to us, what Properties it is 
 ** capable of fupporting." A Dodrine 
 this, I apprehend^ that will make it al- 
 togeth^* uncertain, whether there is any 
 fuch Thing as Matter pr Sprit. For 
 he fays truly, that " it will hardly be 
 ** pretended, that we have any proper 
 ** Idea of Matter^ coniidered as divelled 
 ** of all its Properties •^." And if this 
 be not a folid Objection to the Exiftence 
 of Matter^ it certainly can be none to 
 theExiftence of Spirit-, for it lies equally 
 ;againft both, Ths. Dodor adds, " Un- 
 
 * Difquifitions, page yz, 
 -^ Difquifitions, p. 104. 
 
 G 3 •*« lefs
 
 [ 86 ] 
 
 ** lefs there be a real Inconfiftency in 
 ** the Properties themfelves, thofe, which 
 " have hitherto been afcribed to both 
 " Subflances, may belong to either of 
 ** them *." But it has, in my Judg-, 
 ment, been proved, by Dr. Clarke, in 
 the fulleft Manner, that Confcioufnefs 
 cannot refide in a jubilance, that confifls 
 of a Multitude of feparate, diftind; Parts, 
 Thought, the Property of Mind, is abfo- 
 lutely inconiiftent with Divifibility,\N\nch 
 is a Property of Matter, MctXi<roc S'e souey 
 ihov TO NOEIN -f . To e^JL^v^ov J^n t» 
 
 * Difquifitions, p. 104. 
 
 f Ariftpt. de Anima, Lib. I. r. 
 
 E( /jcsv ay £71 r: tjj? •\''J'x,^i tpy^v ») xaS^jj/jcaTCiiV 
 ft/'cov, ivc^i^oiT ov auTflv ^(^pi^icr^ai. I-Je fays, 
 juft before —{^<ov TO NOEiN. 
 
 t Ibid. Cap. II. 
 
 Ar^Xov on 8-^ ciov ts tivcti a(i^iJ.a, tjjv scnav avrr\s 
 (•]/u;^»]f.) '— Ariftot. de Juvent. & Senedtate, Cap. I. 
 
 Mr.
 
 [ 87 ] 
 
 Mr. Wollafton having faid, that could 
 Matter refleft upon what pafles within 
 itfelf, it could poffibly find there no- 
 thing but material, particular Impref-* 
 fions ; abftraSfy metaphyfical Ideas could 
 not be found upon it 5 Dr. Prieftley an- 
 fwers, that ** Locke and others have ob- 
 ^ ferved, that all actual Ideas are, in 
 ** fa<ft, particular, and that Abftradion 
 *' is nothing more than leaving out of 
 ** a Number of referpbljng Idegs, what 
 *' is peculiar to each, and confidering 
 ** only what is common to them all *." 
 But this does pot, I apprehend, alter 
 the Cafe in the leaft^ I have juft now 
 faid, that an Idea is whatever the Mind 
 is employed about in thinking, The 
 Mind nev^r received from Matter any 
 other than particular Impreflions ', and 
 therefore, if, in thinking, it can leave 
 put of a number of refembling Ideas 
 
 * Difquifitions, p. 84. 
 
 G 4 what
 
 C. 88 ] 
 
 what IS peculiar to each, and confider 
 only what is commpa to them allj— ^ 
 whenever it does this, it has an Idea, 
 th$t is not particular ^'2.t}d which of collet 
 Sequence does not correfpond tq any Im^ 
 frejion made upon it by Matter *. How 
 -Ja ':»vf 'is V;;''!*».v L*fi^ '»>!';> the 
 
 ;^ {• 3p. Berkeley, the declared Enemy of abftraft 
 Xdeas, acknowledges, " th^t we have feme Notion of 
 .** Soul^ Spirit, and the Operations of the Mind, fuch as, 
 •* willing, loving, hating', in "as much as we^now, or 
 •*' under/land the Meaning of thofe Words." — Prin- 
 ciples of Human KnoNyledge, Seft. 27, ^' We few-, 
 *' -prehend our own Exigence by iiiw^rd Feeling or 
 ** Refle(^ion, and that of other Spirits by Reafon. 
 ** We may be faid to have fonie KnowUdge or Notion 
 *' of »ur own Minds, of Spirits and aSlive Beings, 
 !<' whereof in a ftridt Senfe we have not Ideas. \i\ 
 <* like Manner, we know and have a Notion of the 
 ♦' TLelqtions between Things or Ideas, "whrch Relor 
 '* tions are diJlinSf frotn the Jde/is or Thifigs related, ii» 
 ** as much as the latter may be perceived by us with-: 
 f' out perceiving the former." — Ihid, Seel. 89. " In 
 ^' a large Seufe we may be faid to have an Jd^^a, or 
 <* rather a Notion of Spirit ; that is, we underfland the 
 t' ^^eaning of the Word, otherv.ife we could not
 
 [ 89 ] 
 
 iht Brain, that perceives hy Vibrattcns, an 4 
 vibrates , \ij'Iw^re^ons^~''C[i^X never per-« 
 
 ** afiirtn or <leny any Thing of it.'^— It»id. Sed. i^o, 
 
 f*. Words, which denote an b£iwe Principle ar Spirit^ 
 
 ^* do .nojt^ in. a ftrift and proper Senfe, ftand jfof 
 
 ^* Ideas; and yet they are not ihfignificant neither; 
 
 ■^' fince I undtrjiand what is^ irgrrified by the Term /, 
 
 -«* 9r ntyjelf^ or iw«; what if means, although it. be 
 
 ^' no Idea^ nor like an /^^«, but that, which thinks, 
 
 *' wills, and apprehends Ideas, and operates abouf: 
 
 ^« them."--Minute Philofopher, Dial. VII. Sed. 8, 
 
 If we can know Things without Ideai^ then there is 
 
 gn End of all Reafoning about them j *' for every 
 
 •* Man's Reafoning and Kncxuhdge is only about the 
 
 f' Ideas exifting in his own Mind." — Locke's Eflay, 
 
 Book IV. Chap. Xyil. 8. " Knowledge confifts in 
 
 *' the Perception of the Agreement or Difagreement 
 
 ** of the immediate Objects of the Mind in thinkings 
 
 ^* which I pall Ideas. -^l( others diflike the Term, 
 
 ?' they may call them Notions or Conceptions, or how 
 
 ** they pleafe ; it matters not, if they ufe them fo 
 
 f as to avoid Obfcurity and Confufion."—- Eflay, 
 
 Book IV. Chap. 1. 2, Note. '' Univerfal Objeas of 
 
 ?' the Mifid, though they exift not as fuch any where 
 
 ' ^' without it, yet are they not therefore nothing;, but 
 
 f' have an intelligible Entity j for this very Rcafon, 
 
 " becaufe
 
 r r- ■ 
 
 I 90 ] 
 
 edves biit when it vibrates (and not ai- 
 rways then) nor vibrates but from Impref- 
 ^d?;//— fhould be able to leave out of a 
 Number of refembling Ideas what is pe- 
 culiar to each, and to conlider only what 
 is comrnon to them all — is, in my judg- 
 ment, beyond the Power of Man to con- 
 ceive. No Imprejfion to this Purpofe can 
 
 ** becaufe they are conceivable ; for fince Non-entity 
 
 " is not conceivable, whatever is conceivable, and an 
 
 *' Objeci of the Mind, is therefore fomething. And 
 
 V*'. as for axiomatical Truths, in which fomething is 
 
 -** affirmed or denied, as thcfe are not all Paflions from 
 
 *' Bodies without us (for what local Motions could 
 
 r ^' imprefs this common Notion upon our Minds, th4it 
 
 ■ '* Things y which agree in one Tbirdy agree amongjl them- 
 
 ** felviSy or any other r) fo neither are thefe Things 
 
 *' only gathered by Jndudlion from repeated and re- 
 
 *'' iterated Senfatiojis, we clearly apprehending at 
 
 , " once, that it is impoilible, they Ihould be other- 
 
 " wife."-r-lntel]edual Syftem, p. 73. 
 
 See alfo Dr. Cudworth's Treatife of Eternal apd 
 Immutable Morality, p. 223 ; and Dr. Price's Review 
 of the Principal Queftions and Difficultips in Morals, 
 
 p. 42j 43- 
 
 pofTibly
 
 [ 9' ] 
 
 poflibly be made by external Objeds^* 
 there can therefore be no Vibration pur-i 
 porting all this — nor, of confequence,' 
 any fuch Perception or Idea^ ^ • ^ ' ''^'^ * ^^ ^ 
 
 The Dodor is pleafed to affert, that 
 ** to fay, that Reafons and Ideas are not 
 " Things material y or th^ Affedlions of a 
 ** material Subfiancey\% to take for granted 
 *' the very Thing to be proved," (p. 86.) 
 Apd indeed as Reafons coniift of Words ; 
 2Xidi Words, oi Sound', and Sound, oi Air 
 in Motion ; a ^alf-thinker may inadver- 
 tently be led to conclude, that v^^hen 
 Matter is moved by Words, it is i^ioved 
 by the Affections of a material Subjiance, 
 But when it is felf-evident, that it is the 
 Serfe of Words, and not the $ound, that 
 fnoves a Man, it will be to no Purpofe 
 to reafon with one, who will not admit, 
 that \}[\zSenfe of Words is uot material. 
 3 Hag
 
 I 9? 1 
 
 Has the Meanings fuggefted to the Mind 
 by particular Sounds, any Thing in com- 
 mon .with Matter? Has it Extenfion^ 
 AttraBion, Repuifion? Or is Senfe one 
 of /y6^ Powers of Matter f * 
 
 3,,« The PofTibility of thinking in Man, 
 f^iwithout an organized Body, Dr.Prieft- 
 f* ley confidently maintains, is deftitute 
 
 ^ * The Stoicks, who, like the Do£lor, loved a Pa- 
 radox, went a little farther, and gravely aflerted in the 
 Face of the World, that the Virtues and the Arts, and 
 pmnia qua cogitamusy quaque mente comple£iimur, were 
 real, diftinc^ Animals. They did not, however, reft 
 "the Paradox, as the Do£lor has done, upon bare Af- 
 lertion, but with unblufhing Face fupported it with 
 Arguments ; which I fhould certainly quote, if I 
 ^ound myfelf difpofed, with Seneca, ludos mihi ex his 
 fubtilibus ineptiis facere, (Ep.Chap. CXIII.) It is ra,- 
 ther, I think, humiliating to refleA, that fuch Whim- 
 fies fhould ever have been maintained even in the In- 
 fancy of Science j but it is doubly fo to find Para- 
 doxes, not inferior in Abfurdity, ferioufly aflerted ia 
 this enlightened Age, 
 
 '* of
 
 { 93 5 
 
 *♦* arice * *• And he thinks, that " i£ 
 *« the Mind was capable of fubfifting by 
 ** itfelf, it might be expefted to difcover 
 ** fome Signs of Independence before 
 *« Death -f-." And who is there, that 
 has not, fonae Time or other, been en- 
 gaged, during Sleepjf in Converfation 
 with Friends— endeavoured to entertain 
 them — and been entertained by them ? 
 There is not perhaps a Perfon in the 
 World, who has not beheld in his 
 JDreanis the moil romantic and delight- 
 ful Scenery, and heard Miific fuperior to 
 any, he ever enjoyed in his waking 
 Hours. But did his own, or any other 
 Tongue, form the Sentences, that were 
 then heard ? Did his Eye convey to his 
 Mind the Scenes, he beheld, or his Ear 
 
 * Difquifitipns, p. 34. 
 f Difquifitions, p. 35* 
 
 the
 
 C 94 1 
 
 the Sounds, that delighted him ? *. Every 
 Man therefore, who has ever experienced 
 any Thing fimilar to this, muft be fa- 
 tisfied, that there is fomething within 
 him, that is not 'Bye, or Ear ; and 
 that it is poffible, he may Jee and 
 J[)ear without the Affiftance of thofe 
 Organs -f-. Dreams, it cannot be de- 
 nied, are generally very imperfe^fl ; but 
 
 they 
 
 ♦ —*-^ Molli fomno cufti dedita membra, 
 
 ** Effufumque jacet fine fenfu corpus onuftum : 
 *' Eft aliud tamen in nobis, quod tempore in illo 
 ** Multimodls agitatur ; & omrieis accipit in fe 
 ** La^titiae motus, & curas cordis inaneis.'* 
 
 Lucret. Lib. I. U3. 
 
 f XenopHon, in the Perfon of Cyrus, reafohs 
 thus : " You ought not to cbnclude from your 
 ** feeing me no longer, that I fhall Ceafe to be, when 
 *' this Life is terminated \ for even now you do not 
 ** fee my Soul. The Body is fenfelefs and ina£live ; 
 ** it is the Soul that gives Life, Senfe, and Vigour 
 •* to it. I cannot therefore perfuade myfelf, that the 
 « Soul will lofe all Senfe, when it has left this fenfe- 
 
 « lefs
 
 i 95 ] 
 
 they are fometimes very far from be-* 
 ing fo. I have often enjoyed, in Sleep* 
 
 fuch 
 
 ** lefsBody. Rkther muft I think, that its Powfers will 
 ** be increafed5 as it will be no longer clogged with 
 *« fenfelefs Matter. At Death, the Body of Man, 
 •* we fee, refolves into its original Principles : But 
 *« this cannot be faid of the Soul ; for the Soul con- 
 ** tinues invifible." 
 
 Oy yap c/^n7r» t8to ys cr«(pa)r c'ov.ixri mJ^ivaty t^s 
 ii(^iv KTOixai syw $t(, fmid^av t» av^^oiTiva Cm 
 riKiurri<roi' ad^i yap vuv rci rnv y'sjuyiv "^v^riv ioipart, 
 aW* oif (^{67rgaTT€To, rarois aurjjv w; aaav xan- 
 (fcopars. — OuToi sycoys, w vraio^i^, acf'i raro Troixon 
 tTTiic^nV', wr »i '4/u;j^>1, SCO? jusv av sv S^vhtw c(»ixari 
 yij ^^* orav c/^s t»t8 [aTraXXayij, ri^VYir.iy. 'Opw 
 yap, on xat ra S'Vyjra o-w/yiaTa, ccrov av tv aurorc 
 j^^povcv « ri 4'^;j;i1j ^oovra Trapj^^srat. Ouc/'s ys, 
 cTTWf a^pcov £S"aj »j ^^u^)!} sTrsic/^av t» a;ppovof croo/aa- 
 TOf c^i;^;a y€V»]Tar, sc^s rsro 7rs7rsro-/xar* aXX' ora» 
 ay-paros xai xaS^ag^? o V8f SHHpi.S^ii, tote xai (ppovr- 
 [xorarcv sixes' aurov sivat. AtaXuo/jievs (/s av^p&J7r«, 
 c/^nXa f?iv sHas-a aTrtovra Trpc? to o/jicipuXcv, ttXyiv 
 Ty]f •4'U;;j;rif* aurn c/*e /uovii 8T£ Trapscra sts a7ri»cr« 
 ©parat. — De Cyri Inftitut. Lib. Vill. 47. 
 
 Nolite arbitrari, O ! niihi cariflimi filii, me cum 
 a vobis difceflero, nufquam aut nullum fore : nee 
 
 enim
 
 t 96 1 
 
 fuck Converfations, as have put my Fa« 
 culties to the Stretch, more than Con« 
 verfetion, when I am awake, generally 
 does ; and I do not imagine, that I am 
 particular in this ** " Though front 
 ; , " out 
 
 fcnim dum eram votlfchim, animum mfeiim vWeba- 
 tis, fed cum eflet in hoc eorpore, «x lis rebus, quas 
 gerebaiTij intelligebatis : eundem igitur efle creditote, 
 ctiamfl nullum videbitis. — Mihi quidem nunquani 
 perfuaderi potuit, animos, dum in corporibus eflcnt 
 mortalibus vivere; cum exiilTent ex iis, emori : nee 
 Vero turn animum efle infipientemj cum ex infipienti 
 eorpore evafiflet j fed, cum, omni admixtione cor* 
 poris liberatus, purus & integer efle csepifTet, turn 
 efle fapientera. Aque etiam cum hominis natura 
 morte diflblvitur j caeterarum rerum perfpicuum eft 
 quo quasque difcedant ; abeunt enim illic omniaj 
 Unde orta funt j animus autem folus nee cum adeft, 
 nee cum difcedit, apparet. — Cicer. de Sene£lute. 
 
 * ** We are fomewhat more than ourfelves in our 
 ** Sleeps, and the Slumber of the Body feems to be 
 ** but the waking of the Soul. It is the Ligation of 
 <* Senfe, but, the Liberty of Reafon ; and our wak- 
 •* ing Conceptions do not match the Fancies of our 
 *' Sleeps." — ** I am no way facetious ) yet in one 
 
 " Dream
 
 [ 97 ] 
 
 ** from our prefent Conftitution and 
 ** Condition of Being, our external Or- 
 ** gans of Senfe are neceffary for con- 
 " veying any Ideas to our reflecfling 
 ** Powers, as Carriages, and Levers, and 
 " Scaffolds are in Archite<flure : Yet 
 ,** when thefe Ideas are brought in, we 
 *' are capable of reflefting in the moft 
 ** intenfe Degree, and of enjoying the 
 ** greatefl Pleafure, and feeling the 
 ** greateil Pain, by Means of that Re- 
 ** lledion, without any Affiftance from 
 ** our Scnfes ; and without any at all, 
 '* which we know of, from that Body, 
 ** which will be difTolved by death. It 
 *' does not appear then, that the Rela- 
 ** tion of this grofs Body to the reflecting 
 
 . ** Dream I can compofe. a whole Comedy, &c." — 
 *' Were my Memory as faithful, as my Reafon is 
 *' then fruitful, I would never ftudy but in my 
 " Dreams, &c." — Brown's Rcligio Medici, Part II. 
 II. — See the Story in the Annotations. 
 
 H " Being
 
 [ 98 3 
 
 f* Being is, in any Degree,, neceflary to 
 *f thinking; to our intelleftual Enjoy- 
 ** ments or Sufferings ; nor confequently 
 ** that the Diffolution, or Alienation of 
 ** the former by Death, will be the De- 
 " ftrudion of thefe preient Powers, 
 ** which^ render us capable of this State 
 *' of Refledion f ." 
 
 Dr. Prieftley affures us, that '* what- 
 *' ever Ideas are in themfelves, they are 
 ** evidently produced by external Ob- 
 ** jeds, and mufl therefore correfpond 
 
 f Bp. Butler's Analogy of Religion, natural and 
 revealed. Part I. Chap. I. 3. 
 
 *' Atque ea profeilo turn multo puriora & dilu- 
 ** cidiora cernentur, cum, quo natura fert, liber ani- 
 '* mus pervenerit. Nam nunc quidem, quamquam 
 *' foramina ilia, quae patent ad animum a corpore, 
 ** calidiflimo artificio natura fabricata eft, tamen ter- 
 *' renis concretifque corporibus funt interfepta quo* 
 ** dammodo : cum tamen nihil erit prater animum^ 
 ** nulla res objeSla impediet^ quominus percipiat, quale 
 quldque JH^-^QiCZX . Tufcul. Quzeft. Lib. I. 
 
 :: 'Mo
 
 ' [ 99 ] 
 
 ** to them *." How well they corref- 
 pond, a few Obfervations will fhew. 
 ** The Ideas of fenfible, fecondary Qua- 
 ** lities, which we have in our Minds, 
 " can, by us, be no Way deduced from 
 ** bodily Caufes, nor any Correfpondence 
 *' and Connedlion be found between 
 " them and thofe primary Qualities, 
 ** which (Experience {hews us) produce 
 " them in us -f." We have a pofitive 
 Idea of Injipidity, Silence, Darknefs, No- 
 thing, and many other Privations. " There 
 " are therefore Ideas, and fimple ones 
 
 * Dlfquifitions, p. 37. 
 
 + Locke's E%, Book IV. Chap. III. 28. See 
 Book II. Chap. VIII. 15, &c. 
 
 " 'Tis a Remark, I know not how to forbear 
 " adding here, that Jenfible ^alities being now uni- 
 ** verfally allowed not to be Qualities inherent in 
 *' Matter, it is flrange, thfe fame Thirig fhould not 
 *' be allowed to be equally evident with refpedl t'o' 
 ^' Thought and Con/douffiefs." — Dr. Price's Review, 
 p. JO. 
 -Jr. H 2 " too.
 
 [ lOO ] 
 
 <* too, which have nothing ab extra cor- 
 ** refpondent to them, no ^vo^qv Ideatum, 
 <* Archetype f or objeBive Reality *." 
 ** No Man ever faw Space vfith. his 
 <* Eyes, or heard it, or touched it. It 
 " is not an objed; of «S^/^; but a Con- 
 ** clufion drawn from Reafon -f" Will 
 Dr. Prieftley be pleafed to inform us, 
 what Correfpondence there is between the 
 Smell of a Rofe and the Matter, of which 
 it is - compofed ; its Ext efifion, Figure, 
 Colour, AttraBion, and Repulfion f What 
 Refemblance between the Sounds, I hear, 
 and the Vibration of the Matter .cpn- 
 tained in a Bell, or the Vibration of the 
 Air, that is moved by that Bell ? Has 
 thejhveet Tajle, I find upon putting Sugar 
 into my-Mouth, any Thing, that is in 
 
 * B?.' Law's Notes to Archbifhop King's Origin 
 of Evil^ ^. II. . .,< 
 
 f Baxter's E-nq«iry into the Nature of the-Hii* 
 man Soul, Vol. III. p. 132, . '; 
 
 " ^"' the
 
 the leaft like that Body ? What Refem- 
 blance between the Paiji arifing from a 
 Blowy and the Cudgdy. with which it was 
 given, or the Handy that guided the 
 Cudgel j between the Fir^ now before 
 me, and the Warmth I feel ? Is there 
 any, the mofl diftant. Similitude be- 
 tween the Matter or Texture of a Rib- 
 hand, and the Colour, that ftrikes rriy 
 Eyes, when the Ribband is before me ? 
 
 There is not a Shadow of Ground for 
 this Refemblance or Correfbondence be- 
 tween external Objed;s and Senfations 
 and Perceptions in any Cafe but that of 
 Figure j and it is well known, how im- 
 perfedt that is. **. The vifible Appear- 
 ** ance of an Object is extremely diiie- 
 ** rent from the Notion of it, which 
 " Experience teaches us to form by 
 *« Sight *." " A Man, newly made to 
 
 * Dr. Reid of the Human Mind, Chap. VJ. 
 Sea. 3. 
 
 H 3 '* fee.
 
 [ 102 ] 
 
 *' fee, could perceive little or nothing 
 " of the real Figure of Objedis j nor 
 ** could he difcern, that this was a Cube; 
 ** that a Sphere ; that this was a Cone; 
 " that a Cylinder *." 
 
 ** A plain Surface, in a certain Por 
 " fition, appears as a ftrait Line — a Cir- 
 " cle feen obliquely, an Ellipfe ; and a 
 ** Square, a Rhombus, or an oblong 
 ** Redtangle ^f." The Truth is, that 
 the Sight can in no Cafe communicate 
 any Thing to the Mind but the Surface 
 before it ; and that it does often, we 
 fee, in a very defective Manner. When 
 the Obje(ft lies diredly before the Eye, 
 the Sides of an Avenue, that are ac- 
 tually parallel, appear to meet J. 
 
 It 
 
 Dr. Reid of the Human Mind, Chap. VI. 
 
 Sea. 3. 
 
 f Ibid. Seek. 2. 
 
 J " A Globe of any uniform Colour imprints in 
 •* our Mind a flat Circle varioufly fliadowed — the 
 
 " Mind
 
 "^'''Irls' the fame 'ttfe'l^Tth 'otir fMs of 
 ReHectio'n as with our Senfations and 
 if^efceptions. They are not, in good 
 Truth, by any Means, fo much as faint 
 Copies of our Senfations. I may have 
 an Idea of Heat, when I (hiver with 
 Cold', and an Idea of Eating, when I am 
 dying o£ Hunger, &c. &c. " It is plain 
 " there comes nothing to us from Bo- 
 *' dies without us, but only local Mo- 
 ** tion and PrefTure. — Nothing can be 
 ** more true, than this of Boetius, omne 
 " quodfcitur, non ex fud vi, fed ex com- 
 *' prebendentium naturd, vi, & facultate 
 ** cognofcitur *." External Objects can 
 give nothing more than Impreffions to 
 the Organs of Senfe -j-. If thefe Im- 
 preffions 
 
 ** Mind frames to itfelf the Perception of a convex 
 
 " Figure."— Locke's EfTay, Book II. Chap. IX. 8. 
 
 * Dr. Cud worth's IntelletSlual Syftem, p. 731. 
 
 f " Quifquis re6Ve advertit, quoufque fenfus 
 
 •' noftri fe extendunt, & quidnam fit prsecise quod 
 
 H 4 *« al>
 
 [ 104 ] . 
 
 preflions are immediately followed.. by 
 certain Senfations and Perceptions ; or if 
 ; our 
 
 «' ab illis ad noftram cogitandi faciiltatem poteft; per- 
 *' venire, debeat fateri, nullarum rerurn ideas ^ quajes 
 *' eas cogltatione formamus, nobis ab illis exhiberi : 
 " adeo ut nihil fit in noftris Ideis, quod menti five 
 '* coo-itandi facultati non fuerit innatum, folis iis 
 " circumftantiis exceptis, quae ad expericntiam fpec- 
 ** tant, quod nempe judicamus, has vel illas Ideas, 
 *' quas nunc habemus, cogitation! noftrae praefentes, 
 " ad res quafdam extra nos pofitas referri, non quia 
 ** ifta res illas ipfas noftrae menti per organa fenfuufn 
 *' immiferunt ; fed quia tamen aliquid immiferunty 
 *' quod dedit occajionem ad ipfas ^ per innatum fibi fa- 
 *' cultatem, hoc tempore potius quam alio, efformandas. 
 ** Quippe nihil ab obje6tis externis ad mentem nof- 
 " tram per organa fenfuum accidit, prater motus 
 ** quofdam corporeos — fed nc quidam ipfi motus, nee 
 ** figuras ex iis ortse, a nobis concipiuntur, quales 
 ** in organis fenfuum fiunt, ut fuse in Dioptrica ex- 
 *' plicai : unde fequitur, ipfas moiuum is" fvurarum 
 " Ideas nobis efTe innatas : ac tanto magis innatae 
 ** efle debent Idees doloris, colorum, fonorumy &c iimi- 
 *' lium, ut mens noftra, poflit occafione quorundam 
 *' motuum corporeorum fibi ipfas exhibere : nullam 
 ** enim ftmilitudinem cum motibus corporeis habent. 
 
 " Quid
 
 [ '°5. ]: 
 
 our pad Senfations. and -Perceptions arc 
 at any Time revived without frefh Irp-« 
 
 preflions t 
 
 ** Quid autem magis abfurdum fingl poteft, quam 
 '* quod omnes communes noiioftes, quae menti noftrai 
 *' infunt, ab iis motibus oriantur, & fine illis efle 
 " ncn poflint ? Vellem no/fer me doceret, quifnam 
 '* ille fit corporeus motus, qui poffit in mcnte noftra 
 ** formare aliquam communem notionem^ exempli caufa, 
 *' qmd qua eadetn funt uni tertio\ Jint eadem inW fe^ 
 " vel quamvig aliam ■: omnes enim ifti motas funt 
 ** particular es^ not tones vero illie univerfales ; & niillam 
 " cum motibus aj^initatem.y nullamve ad ipfos rel^tionem 
 « hahentesr -"-^^ v..J 
 
 I fhall explain what the Author means by Innate 
 Ideas, in his own Words. ■ > cLil'J^^ Zlii'i 
 
 '' Cum adverterem, quafdam in me efle cogita- 
 ** tiones, quae non ab obje£lis externis, nee a vo- 
 *' luntatis meae determinatione procedebant, fed a 
 *' fola cogitandi facultatey qua in me eji, ut Idea's five 
 *' notiones, quae funt iftarum cogitationum formae, ab 
 *' aliis adventitiis aut factis diftinguerem, illas ihna- 
 *' tas vocavi : eodem fenfu, quo dicimus generofita- 
 *' tern efle quibufdam famlliis innatam, alios vero 
 *' quofdam morbos, ut podagram vcl calculum, non 
 *' quod ideo ijlarian f ami li arum Infantes morbis ifiis in 
 
 " utero
 
 [-106] 
 
 prefHons; the whole Bulinefs is entirely 
 the Trarrfaxaion of Mind. Our Senfa- 
 tions, Perceptions, and Ideas never were 
 in Matter ; nor can they poffibly be in 
 it, or refemble it; 
 
 *' "The Souldifcerns them hy her fro-per Light!'* 
 
 Davies. 
 
 The ImprefHons made on the Organs of 
 5enfe by material Objedls, are the In- 
 ftruments, which the God of Nature is 
 pleafed to ufe in railing certain Senfa- 
 tions and Perceptions in our Souls. And 
 this feems to be the whole of the Bufi- 
 
 *' utero mains laborent^fed quod nafcantur cum quadam 
 •' difpofitione five facultate ad illos contrahendos." 
 P flenati Des Cartes Notas ad programma quod- 
 dam, juxta finein Partis primae Epiftolarum. 
 
 ** When we reafon upon Poiver^ Life, A^ivity^ 
 " Perception, the Soul is bufied neither about Mat- 
 ** ter, nor any Affection, that can belong to Mat- 
 *' ter." — Baxter's Enquiry into the Nature of the 
 Human Soul, Vol. 1. p. 276. 
 
 5 nefs.
 
 [ 107 ] 
 
 nefs. Matter has no Ad:ivity. I knoW 
 not how to bring myfelf to believe, that 
 it fhould produce any Thing ; but that 
 it fliould produce a Senjah'on, a Percef'- 
 tion, an Idea ! Things fo totally difH- 
 milar td itfelf, is, I am confident, abfo- 
 iutely impoffible. But be this as it may; 
 nothing can be more felf-evident, thail 
 that the Ideas, I have, of external Ob- 
 jects, when no Impreflions are made by 
 them upon- -the Organs of Senfe, are not 
 produced by external Objedls. Our Ideas ^ 
 of ReJleBion are mere Creatures of the 
 Mind, and owe their Exifrence fo en- 
 tirely to its Operations, that they arc al- 
 together incomprehenfible in any other 
 Way. Suppofe it poffible, if you pleafe, 
 that a Senfation or Perception may be 
 produced by a Vibration of the Brain ; 
 yet the Brain, that perceives only by 
 Vibrations, cannot perform one rejiex A51, 
 Will you fay, that it may bring on thofe 
 
 Vibrations
 
 f io8 ] 
 
 Vibrations l fecond Time ?. But .how. 
 can that, which perceives only. ^ hy Vi- 
 brations, contrive to repeat thofe Vibra- 
 tions, or indeed know, w^hich are the Vi- 
 brations, it vi^ill be neceflary to repeat ? 
 To fuppofe, that it can do this, is to fup- 
 pofe, that it can perceive without Vi- 
 brations, and that it can di red: the Vi- 
 brations, by which it is to perceive j 
 which, I think, is an Abfurdity too great 
 to be digefted even by Infidelitj,*. _^ ,^j 
 
 it 
 
 :* *' If the Soul at any Time, while it is united 
 " to Matter, were in a State of total Ina<5t)Vity and 
 ** Imperceptivity," (as it niuft frequently be, if it 
 has no Ideas but from Vibrations, nor Vibrations, 
 but from Impreflions) " it would be in a State of 
 *' Deadnefs, as much as Matter irfelf, which never 
 '** had, and never can have thefe Powers ; and it 
 ** would be impoflible for it to recover itfeif out of 
 *' fuch a State ; juft as it is impoflible for any Thinjj, 
 *' that never had Life, to make^ itfeif living. If it 
 *' could recover itfeif, it muft be by an ASl of the 
 '* Will^ i. e. it muft will its own Recovery ; but 
 '* this is plainly contradi(Slory ; for That would infer, 
 " that it was previoufly recovered, fince it had the 
 
 ** Power
 
 It feems to be not- unimportant to 6b^ 
 ferve here, that if our Ideas of Reflec-- 
 tion are nothing more than, a Repetitidri 
 of Vibrations, no adequate Reafon feems 
 aflignable, why our Vibrations zn^L Ideas 
 iliould not conftantly return exadly in 
 their firft Order*^ And^yet, if .we know 
 any Thing, we certainly know, that the 
 dire(S contrary is perpetually ,the Cafe. 
 For the Mind can no? .or^ly compound, 
 and decompound its Perceptions and Ideas 
 at Pleaiure ; but it can raif^ into Being, 
 Forms and Exigences, which have been 
 juftly termed Creatures of t^e Imagin- 
 ation , and which never were Objeds of 
 
 *' Poiver of ivUUng^ that is, of Action. " — Baxter's 
 Enquiry, &c. Vol. I. p. 257. 
 
 We cannot fuppofe a Will to revibrate, and fo re- 
 call the Ideas, that were confequent of paft Vibra- 
 tion?, .without fuppofifig a proper Subjedt, in which 
 that IViTl may refide. This JVill muft belong to a 
 "fciiti'erit fomefbing, cr paft Ideas could never be re- 
 called but by frefn Impreiuons and Vibrations, y 
 
 ■ s the
 
 [ no ] 
 
 th6 external Senfes ; fuch' as. ihe whole 
 Order of Geniiy Sylphs, Gnomes-^ Fairies, 
 Damons^, &c. &c. 
 
 The Poet s Eye in a fine Frenzy rollmg, 
 Doth glance from Heaven to Earth, frojn 
 
 \ Earth to Heaven -, 
 An3 as Imagination bodies forth 
 "The Forrns of Things unknown, the Poet's 
 
 Pen 
 Turns them to Shape, and gives to airy 
 
 Nothings 
 A local Habitation and a Name *. 
 
 SuppofJ^an adlive, intelligent Subftance 
 lodged in the Brain, and all this is at 
 lead: clear and conlifl;ent ; but, without 
 fuch a Subflance, we are reduced to the 
 wretched NecelTity of concluding, with 
 Dr. Prieftley, that Imprefiions from ex- 
 ternal Objedls irritate the Organs of 
 
 * Shakefpear's Midrummer Night's Dream. KOt V. 
 Scene I. • 
 
 Senfe
 
 [ in ]; 
 
 Senfe — that a Vibration of the Brain i$, 
 confequent of this Irritation — and Ideas 
 not only confequent of the Vibration^ 
 but, ip/o Ja^o, generated by it in all 
 that amazing Variety, of which we are 
 capable ! But what is all this, when 
 compared with the Aftonifliment, that 
 mufl feize us, when we find ourfelves 
 obliged to conclude, that the Brain, 
 which never perceives without a Vibra- 
 tion, nor vibrates without an Impreflion, 
 moft unaccountably takes up a Refolu- 
 tion to vibrate without an Impreflion— 
 does this, when it pleafes — and as often 
 as it pleafes — and what is flill, if pofli- 
 ble, more wonderful, tranfadts the Bu- 
 finefs, at Times, much better, than it 
 did, when adting under immediate Im- 
 preilions ? 
 
 In other Places Dr. Prieflley feems ra- 
 ther more guarded in what he fays re- 
 
 fpedting
 
 [ 112 ] 
 
 fpeding Ideas. *' The Soul has not a 
 ** lingle Idea, but what it receives by 
 *- * Means of the Organs of Senfe * . " And 
 in another place ; " There is not a fingle 
 ^* Idea, but what may be proved to 
 "" come to it from the bodily Senfes, or 
 *' to have been confequent of the Fercep* 
 «* thns of Senfe -f-." We have, how- 
 ever, an Infinity of Ideas, in the Pro- 
 dudlion of which the Organs of Senfe 
 have not been fo much as infirumental ; 
 and therefore the utmoft, that can be 
 -fairly faid, is, that they 2,xq fubfequent to 
 the perceptions of Senfe ; they cannot, 
 with the lead: Appearance af Truth, be 
 -thought confequent of them. We have 
 an Idea of Right and Wrong ; the Fadls, 
 on which we formed this Idea, might 
 come to our Knowledge through the 
 Senfes, but the Idea certainly did not. 
 
 * Difquifitions, p. 96. 
 t Difquifitions, p. 33. 
 
 We
 
 [ "3 ] 
 
 "We doubt', we believe-, but what kavc 
 the Organs of Senfe to do in producing 
 thefe AfFedions of Mind ? I think the 
 Do(5lor would be puzzled to tell us, 
 through which of our Senfes the Ideas 
 oi Being or Thought paft to the percipient 
 Power. We feem to have an intuitive 
 Knowledge of our own Exijience. It is 
 indeed natural to conceive, that the Per- 
 ception of our Exiftence muft have been 
 the firil of all Perceptions ; for the Soul 
 could at no Time perceive without a 
 Confcioufnefs of its own Exiftence. 
 Quid lit animal, nefcit; animal ejje fe 
 
 fentit *. 
 
 Ante 
 
 Corpora quam fclres an fint, jam te efie fciebas. 
 Quonam argumento ? Quoniam qui cogitat, ille eft. 
 Nee tamen ulla tibi fenfum aiHciebat imago. 
 Nam cum caspifti primum fentire dolorem, 
 Nefcires licet unde dolor, ipfe profe»5t6 
 Jam tibi notus erat ; quamvis ignota tibi efiet 
 Undique materies, & adhuc tiruncula fecum 
 Mens privatim ageret, fibi confcia & obvia foli f. 
 
 • Senec. Epiftol. CXXI. f Anti-Lucret. Llb.V. 6i6. 
 
 I " If
 
 '"^m If it ii undeMable',' that We ffavcf 
 
 r^ the Ideas of Being 2Si^ of T^hought, I 
 
 -**-'a&, through what Senfes dki they 
 
 >* enter ? Are they Ideas of Light or of 
 
 ' ** Colmry to enter through the Sight'? 
 
 •* Are they of a fbrill or deep Sound, 
 
 ** to* enter through the Hearing ? Are 
 
 ** they odoriferous or noifomey to enter 
 
 •-** through the Smelting f Are they y^:- 
 
 v^ mUry or naufeous, to enter through 
 
 » ^ • the ^afle f Cold or >&5/, foft or y^^r^, 
 
 *' to enter by the Feeling ? If it is an- 
 
 ' *' fwered, that they are formed from 
 
 ** other fenfible Im^ges^ kfe them tell 
 
 ** us what thofe other fenfihle Images 
 
 -** are, from whence they pretend, the 
 
 *' Ideas of Being and of Thought were 
 
 ** formed, and how they could be formed 
 
 *' either by Compofttion, or Amplifiea- 
 
 ** tion, or by Diminution, or by Pro- 
 
 *' portion ?" &c. &c. " It is therefore 
 
 ** falfe, that all our Ideas proceed from our 
 
 Senfes;
 
 rtifs ] 
 
 ^^ Sen/es*, butitiiiay be affirmed. on the 
 £f^ contrary, that no Idea whatever, which 
 *' is in our Min4> owes its Origin to 
 f* the SenfeSj unlefs occafionallyy that is 
 f* to fayj when the Movements' made in 
 ^* our Brain (which is all oUr Senfes can 
 '*' do) give Occqfion to the Soul to form 
 ^* to itfelf diverfe Ideas, which it had 
 ** not formed without thefe Movements, 
 ^* though thefe Ideas have hardly ever any 
 •** Thing like the Images delineated in 
 ^* the Senfes, and In th.e Brain j and that 
 ■*^ there are alfo a very great Number of 
 *^ Ideas, which not having the leafl 
 'f^ Mixture of any corporeal Image, can- 
 ^' not, without manifefl Abfurdity, be 
 ^« referred to our Senfes *»" Hm S^t 
 
 * Art of Thinking, tranflated from the French, 
 jp. 39, 41. The learned Mr. Baker fuppofes it to 
 have been written by M. Arnauld\ (Refledions upon 
 Learning, p. 75.) but in the Tranflator, Mr. Ozell's 
 Dedication to Sir Jofeph Jekyll, it is faid to have 
 been compofed by M. Nicole, and revifed and im- 
 proved by M. Jrnauld. 
 
 I 1 ^acvToccriistif
 
 't "6 ] 
 
 tpctProtd-icav xar cturas (Sto/xss) ai fjLiv ttai 
 iti(T^t)Tix.ah at <f g »• Aia-^yrriy^i fiev S^t aia" 
 S'«Tw^ia, n aia^Yitvi^tm, KccfjiQaLvofAiveti' Ov)c 
 «tio-3')jTi)ca< J^g> ha. rns hccvoixi, xoc'SrctTe^ 
 frcav aerwjuaTiwj', xcci tow aAAcc^»' t»v ?ioy^ 
 
 tn Senfation and Perception the Mind 
 fnay be thought fajjive-y but it is far, 
 from being fo ; for it is notorious> that 
 it can, and often does, withhold its 
 Perception -f. It is, however, undeni- 
 ably 
 • Diogen. Laert. in Vita Zenonls* 
 
 f *' Mens enim ipfa, ques fenjuum fans ejl^ atqitt 
 «* etiam ipfa fenfus ejiy naturalem vim habet, quam 
 *« intendit ad ea quibus movetur.— Cicer. Acadera* 
 Quaeft. Lib. II. 
 
 ** Nos enim ne nunc quidem octtlis cerninius, ea qua 
 •* videmus ; neque enim ejl ullus fenfm in corpore ; fed 
 '* ut non folutii Phyfici dicunt, verum etiam medici, 
 *< qui ifta aperta & patefafta viderunt, viae quafi 
 •* qusedam funt ad oculos, ad aureis, ad nareis a kde 
 •* animi perforatae* Itaque faepe aut cogitatione aut 
 
 •* aliqua
 
 I 117 ] 
 
 ably aStive in drawing Inferences from 
 its Senfations and Perceptions ; and f 
 ihall never be made to believe, but V7e 
 have an Idea, whenever we draw an In^ 
 ference. We compare two Perceptions 
 or Senfations ; this Comparifon is the 
 Mind's Adt, and is as clearly diflind: 
 from the Senfations and Perceptions, as 
 the Conclufion, we form, is. Indeed, 
 every Perception, we have, may be the 
 Occqfion of producing nuraberlel^ Ideas, 
 entirely different from thofe we have im- 
 mediately by Means of our Senfes 5 for 
 we cannot think a Moment upon any 
 
 *' aliqua vi morbi impediri, ^pertis atque integris tjf 
 " octdis ^ auriius^ nee videmus nee audimus ; ut fa- 
 ** die intelligi poffit, animum etvidere & audire, non 
 " eas parteis, quae quafi feneftrae funt animi : quibus 
 ^ tamen fentire nihil que at mens, niji id agat ^ 
 " ^^^"— Cicer. Tufcul. Quseft. Lib. I. 
 
 Nss" Spa xaf v«s- axtr«i* r aXKa xw^a xai 
 TU|Xa. — Epicharmi. 
 
 Cjeci funt oculi, cum mens alias res aglt. — Publii 
 Syri, 
 
 I 3 Subje<ft
 
 I fl5 1 
 
 Subjecft without having new Ideas j; in 
 the Produdtiqn of which, the firft Perr 
 ception had no other concern, than the 
 having put the Mind on exercifing its; 
 amazing Powers *. ** Thefe Ideas may 
 ** be excited or]awakened by the Appulfe 
 ** of outward Objeds at the Door o£ 
 ^' our Senfes -f- ;*' but Mind is the im-- 
 ;I \d ,r:n.' ovv ,; |nediat§ 
 
 • s* " By the Power of ReflciS'lbh, it (th^ Souif)- i's' 
 ***» both the Percipient, and affords the Objeft of 
 ** Perception to itfelf, as its former Perceptions" be-, 
 *' cogne the Objedl of fublequent ones."— Baxter's 
 f nquiry, &c. Vol. I. p. 266. . 
 
 ,t Dr. Cud worth's Treatife of Eternal and Im- 
 *' mutable Morality, p. I50. 
 
 airiai aa twv xpeiTTCvojv' e{ (/s o^h xat reus syxu- 
 
 oj: TTcsnTixijVj aXX* oJr spg^^i^so-av tijv hVstepcup 
 -4''j;^wv £1? avaavif)!ny rwv xa^oX». *' 7^^ Things, 
 " ivh'ich are inferior and jecondary^ are by no meant 
 *• the PrincipUs or Caufes of the more excellent y and 
 f* tlough "jue adult the com;r.on Interpretations, and 
 
 ** allow
 
 [( CIJ9 I] 
 
 mediate Ador or ' prDdud;ive Caufe ofj 
 them* - -' . J:;:iujsq ^d iuiinji^ iioiioM 
 
 -'Wheri a MacHnc of any Kind is pre- 
 fented to the Eye, ' nothing can poffibly 
 be imagined there, but a very imp€rfe(3: 
 drawing of the Parts, of which it' is 
 compounded. There is no Image there 
 
 *^ edhw ^enji to he « Prlmlph -of "Science, tue mufiy 
 ** hoiuev^Ty. call it a Principle, not as if it was tki, 
 *' efficieifd Caufe ^ hut as it roufes our SouJj9.the ^i«n 
 ** colleSIion of general iJe as " 
 
 From a Mamilcript Commentary of the Platonic 
 OJympiodorus upon the Phaedo of P^itc^ a* 
 quoted in Mr. Harris's Hermes, p. 39^ 
 
 « Mr. Harris very juftly obferves, that ^* riiougfe 
 **■ fome may perhaps obje£l to this Parage, from in- 
 *? dining to the DocStrine of Platonic Rermnifcena, 
 ♦' yet it certainly gives a better Account how far the 
 *' Senfes aflifl: in the Aojuifition of S/:ience^ than wc 
 -** can find given by vulgar Philofophers." *' The 
 -** Mind of Man, exercifed in the clofe Gbfervations 
 *' of its own Operations and Nature, cannot but 
 ** difcover, that ihere is aa a£iive and a^ual- Know* 
 I 4 ** ledgt
 
 [ 120 1 
 
 of the Motion of any of its Parts j for 
 Motion cannot be painted. Yet froni 
 this very inadequate Figure can an inge- 
 nious Obferver infer all its different 
 Powers and Ufes. Vibrations muft be 
 owing folely to Impreffions ; but there 
 is not, even on the Retina, any but a 
 very imperfed: Impreflion of a Part of 
 the external Form of the Machine. Of 
 the internal Figure, as there is no Im^ 
 
 *• ledge in d Man^ of which outward Objedls are 
 *' rather the Reminders than the firji Begetters or Im" 
 ** planters. And when I fay, aSfual Knowledge^ I do 
 •* not mean, that there is a certain Number of Ideas 
 " flaring and fhining to the animadverfive Faculty, 
 *' like fo many Torches or Stars in the Firmament 
 *' to the outward Sight j that there are any Figures, 
 *' that take their 4iftin<5l Places, and are legibly writ 
 " there, like the red Letters, or aftronomical Cha- 
 " ra<5lers in an Almanack ; but I underftand thereby 
 *' an adlive Sagacity in the Soul, or quick Rccollec- 
 •* tion, as it were, whereby, fomq fmalj Bufmefs be- 
 •* ing hinted upon her, fhe runs out prefently into a 
 ** more clear and larger Conception."— Dr. More's 
 Antidote againft Atheifm, B, I. Chap. V. 2,
 
 prejion, there can be no Vibration, 2ind^ 
 
 confequently, according to Dr. Prieftleyi^ 
 
 no Perception, The Body's Eye receives' 
 
 nothing but Colour and Figure, and the^ 
 
 laft often in a very imperfed Manner j buV 
 
 t^e Mind's Eye can ^* fee Caufe and Ef- 
 
 *^ fe5i. Means and E;z^, Priority and Pi?- 
 
 *■* Jieriority, Equality and Inequality, Or- 
 
 '^ der' and ProportioJt^ Symmetry and- 
 
 *^ Afymm^try, Aptitude and Inaptitude, 
 
 ^* Sign ^x\^T^hing Jignifiedy Art and «Si^///, 
 
 *^ Whole and P^r/ ; in a Manner all the 
 
 ** logical and relative Notions that 
 
 ^* are *,'* 
 
 I thought 
 
 *Dr. Cudworth'sTreatife of Eternal and Immu- 
 table Morality, p. 155. 
 
 *' All which relative Ideas I (hall eafily prove to 
 " be no material ImpreJJ'es frofn without upon the Soul, 
 ** but her own adtive Conception proceeding frona 
 *' herfelf while fhe takes notice of external Objeils, 
 *' For that thefe Ideas can make no ImpreflTes upon the 
 *' outward Senfes is plain from hence, becaufe they 
 ♦* ^re i^ofenfible nor phyfical Affections of theMat- 
 
 *^ ter.
 
 [ 122 ] 
 
 I thought to have ended here ', but I" 
 recolle(Kt that Dr. Prieftley fays, that 
 *< whenever the Faculty of thinking is 
 *^ impeded, or injured, there is fufficient 
 ** Reafon to believe, that the Brain is 
 ** difordered in Proportion *." But does 
 A;iatomy confirm this ? If it does, if 
 muft be refplvcd into a Law of our Con- 
 ftitution, that the Mind fhould be afv 
 feded, whenever the Body is fb; of 
 which indeed we have daily Proofs. But 
 however this may be, I am verily per- 
 faaided, that the Phaenomena of Infanity 
 are totally inconfiftent with the vibra^' 
 tory Syftem. Is the brain of an infane 
 Perfon incapable of Vibration ? The 
 Dodtor will perhaps fay, it has wrong 
 
 *' te;-. And how can that, that is no phyfical Af- 
 ** fection of the Matter, affedl our corporeal Organs 
 " of Senfe ? " — Dr. More's Antidote againfi Atheifm, 
 B(?pkL, Chap. YIvS-^ :-•:•;. 
 
 ' ^"^ Difquifitions, p. 27, 
 
 Vibi*a-
 
 [ 1^3 J J 
 
 Yibrations. But are not the ufuaj Iho.»^ 
 preflions made on the Organs of Senfe ? 
 And are not Vibrations confequent of 
 Impreffiona? And muA they not cor- 
 jrcfpond to the lmpTc{Roj)s.l:]\2n\1r)ao'j:}ii 
 
 In Fax^, ^ if the Bullnefs of perceiving 
 -^nd thinking can be {ranfaded by Mea,p§ 
 pf yibr§tipnjs> \% ;ift apparent, that, in 
 Cafes of, Infanity, there is a general 
 Correfpondence between the ImpreJIion; 
 ^nd FibratiQns, For the Infane frequently 
 are {o ovAy qttpad ho f y^onothtr pointj 
 |heif Ideas and their ConcluHons ihall 
 te juft enough. And this proves fuffi-» 
 ciently, that •whatever is wrong, is not 
 owing to an Incapacity in the Brain tp 
 viifrate ■propevly. And if the Brain of 
 an infane Ferfon continues capable of 
 having proper Vibrations,, it undeniably 
 follows, t}iat,,the vibratory Syftem is of 
 
 very
 
 [ 124 ] 
 
 very little Service in accounting for In-^ 
 ianity. 8n*;«-0 -if r vt 
 
 1o :.3a^i?fv-ki6v- ",:■■; ;:A' 
 
 "^'^Whatever Difficulties there may be in 
 accounting for the Mind's being affeded, 
 when the Body is fo, wc ihall, on Dr. 
 Prieflley's Hypothefis, have many 'more 
 and greater in accounting for the Body's 
 fufFering in confequence of the Mind's 
 being affedled. Anger, I apprehend, is 
 painful to mofl People ; it has been fa- 
 tal to many. Grief occafions Hyfterics, 
 Confumptions, &c. Indeed, the Dodlor 
 acknow^ledges, that " the Body is liable 
 ** to be reciprocally affe<fled by the Af- 
 " fedions of the Mind *." And it may 
 truly be faid, that for one infane Perfon 
 there are Thoufands, w^hofe Bodies fuf- 
 fer, in the Extreme, in Confequence of 
 the Mind's being affeded. But nothing 
 can pofiibly be more inconceivable than 
 
 * DifquifitionSj p. 28* 
 
 all
 
 I 125 ] 
 
 all this. If we are mere Matter, and per- 
 ceive merely in confequence of the Fi-^ 
 brations oi the Brain. . Many have died 
 of Joy upon the fudden Appearance of a 
 Friend, who had been long abfent ; and 
 upon the hearing of good News. But 
 the Appearance of that Friend formed 
 no other Image upon the Retina, than 
 would have been formed, if he had been 
 feen the Day before. Confequently, no 
 other Imprejjion having been made in the 
 one Cafe than would have been in the 
 other, fimilar Vibrations and fimilar Con* 
 fequences might have been expe<fled in 
 both Cafes. The Fadt, however, has 
 often turned out juft the Reverfe. The 
 
 Cafe is exactly the fame with refpedt to 
 good News, whether received by McfTage 
 or Letter. In neither Way would it 
 have afFeded an indifferent Perfon in 
 the leafl Degree ; though that Perfon's 
 E,yes and Ears would have had the fame 
 3 Imprejiotis
 
 ImpreJJions made on them ^ and, iipdn the 
 vibratory Hypothecs, fiinilar Confe- 
 quences might have been expected. 
 
 -: And no\^^, I think, we may, with great 
 ^ruth and Confidence, affert, that this 
 laboured Syftem of Materialifm reftsi 
 I. On a glaring Ahfurdity-^xliQ Penetra-i- 
 bility of Matter;— 2. On a few Difficult 
 'ties ', which have been proved to li^ 
 equally againft the Material Syflem 5—^ 
 3. On fome palpable Mijiakesy to fpeak 
 of them in the gentleft Terms, refpedl- 
 ing the Origin and Nature of our Ideas ; 
 — -and^4. On many ft ale ObjeSliojzs, which j 
 as has been amply fhewn in the Gourfe of 
 thefe Papers, have been, again and again^ 
 refuted in Books univerfally known, and 
 Ivhich we cannot but fuppofe, that Dr. 
 Prieftley has read. And I truft, it may^ 
 with equal Truth and Confidence^ be 
 hoped, that fo wretched a Syflem will 
 
 allure
 
 [ i27 ] 
 
 allure hone to embrace it, but thofe^ 
 
 whofe wicked Lives have pre-difpofed 
 
 them to wilh for Annihilation. To Aich 
 
 Perfons the Do(ftor's Work muft prove 
 
 a delicious Morfeh Vicious Men ard 
 
 feldom difpofed to reafon, if they have 
 
 a Capacity for it. They will think, uport 
 
 reading the Difquifitions, that the Ma^ 
 
 terlality of the Soul is well proved ; and 
 
 they want nothing more to convince thern 
 
 of its Mortality, They will laugh 
 
 heartily af the remaining Part of the 
 
 Do(5tor's Scheme, as concluding, that it 
 
 was calculated only to lengthen out the 
 
 Work, and to add to the Price of the 
 
 Volume. And if the Book fells, the 
 
 grave Do(flor will laugh too. He wili 
 
 confider this Gircumftance as an egre-« 
 
 gious Proof of the Folly of the Age ; he 
 
 will regifter it in the Catalogue of his 
 
 fuccefsful Experiments, and note it doWn 
 
 as an additional Argument for his 
 
 3 Dodrine
 
 [ 128 ] 
 
 Do(!lrIne of Necejity, Nor is it indeed 
 without an Appearance favourable to his 
 HypothefiSj for it is not eaiy to con- 
 ceive, that a Creature endued with Rea- 
 fon, and at Liberty to exercife it, (hould 
 embrace fo ill-founded, and fo unpro- 
 miling a Syftem. 
 
 Pro pudor ! hcec tandem ejl dodia fa- 
 ptentia fcBce I * 
 
 ♦ Ant. Liicret. 
 
 THE END, 
 
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