'O^lTO-riO- ^Wy^^iULLT.;^ '^Mw. ^^UBRAf: ^ ^. .nrrrcr,'^''^- %n^nMV faCLl //TUJA.!' v^£UBRARYa ^ojm I30NV-SOT ^v)r uuii-u/;: VIKi//-^ ^oxm^m'^' w^mrmv Miimm. ^m^im-i iBRARYft. %OdlW ^>7}-[?'!Vli?ir ^E-UNIVER& ^:e> .uruyaruii. STATEMENT OF A PROPER MILITARY POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES PREPARED BY THE WAR COLLEGE DIVISION, GENERAL STAFF CORPS IN COMPLIANCE WITH INSTRUCTIONS OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR MARCH, 1915 W. C. D. 9053 90 ARMY WAR COLLEGE SEPTEMBER 1915 WASHINGTON GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1916 AS /f/6 i t ^ War Department, s- Office of the Chief of Staff, War College Division, Washington^ Septemher 11, 1915. Memorandum for the Chief of Staff: Subject: Military policy. 1. Memorandums from your office, dated March 11 and March IT, 1915, directed the War College Division to make a complete and ex- haustive study of a proper military policy for the United States, and to prepare a clearly and succinctly expressed statement of the policy, basing it, in a general way, upon the " Eeport on the Organization of the Land Forces of the United States, 1912," " eliminating every- thing that is not necessary for the easy and quick comprehension of the military policy, and adding anything which may be necessary to afford such comprehension." 2. The following extract from the memorandum of March 17, 1915, gives the subjects which the " statement " was to cover, viz : The substance of this policy will, therefore, be a clearly and succinctly ex- pressed statement, with the reasons therefor, of the recommended strength and organization of — I. («) The Regular Army; (6) The Organized Militia. This should be followed by — II. A careful study of the question of a reserve for both the Regular Army and the Organized Militia and, if possible to agree upon it, a plan for the forma- Q)tion of such reserves. ^ III. The Volunteers : Their organization and relation to the Regular Army J and the Organized Militia. S^ IV. Reserve material and supplies which should be available and which can ;^ not be promptly obtained if delayed till the outbreak of war. w The Secretary of War is of the opinion that a statement which shall contain ^^ everything that is pertinent to the foregoing subjects will inform Congress of ^ all the essential things that the best judgment of the War Department thinks it , is justified in asking Congress to provide in peace and to be prepared to provide in war. These things, being such as commend themselves to the general mili- tary intelligence (if they do not so commend themselves there can be no policy such as is now aimed at), may be assumed to be those that will be asked for by succeeding administrations of the War Department — at least, they will indicate the general line of development to be pursued. Such a statement will constitute what he has in mind as a comprehensive military policy. There are many other things that will from time to time be asked of Congress or, when authority exists for it, that will be done without asking legislation. Such things may be requests for appropriations to build new posts in view of the abandoning of others; the concentration of the Army in a smaller number of posts in definite areas of the country ; projects for promotion, retirement, etc. ; lans for training the Army and the militia, etc. uch things have no part in the statement of a general military policy which Secretary of War now desires to have prepared, and in order to save time IV A PEOPER MILITARY POLICY FOE THE UNITED STATES. aud labor and to concentrate attention upon that which is essential, he desires any such extraneous matter to be eliminated from the study which he has directed. 3. Following these lines the accompanying " Statement of a Proper Military Policy for the United States " was prepared. 4. It is proposed to supplement this statement later with brochures on such subjects as require more detailed discussion than would be appropriate herein. M. M. Macomb, BHgadier General^ Chief of "War College Division. CONTENTS, Page. Memorandum for the Chief of Staff • in Introduction 1 The Military Problem Confronting the United States 1 The evolution of national military policies 1 Our abiding national policies 2 Coordinote relationship of Army and Navy 2 Coordinate relationship of statesman and soldier 3 Preparedness of the world powers for oversea expeditions 3 Statement of the militarj^ problem 5 I. The Regular Armv 5 General Functions of the Regular Army 5 Mobile and Coast Artillery Troops and Their Functions... 6 Relation between Home and Oversea Garrisons 7 General Requirements of Oversea Service 7 The Philippines 7 Oahu , Hawaiian Islands 8 The Panama Canal 8 Guantajiamo 9 Alaska 9 Porto Rico 9 G ENERAL Requirements of Home Service 9 Genera! distribution of Coast Artillery troops in fortifiea areas. . . 9 General distribution of mobile troops in strategic areas 9 Puget Sound area 10 California area 10 Atlantic area 10 Middle West area • 11 Necessary Strength of Mobile Troops for Oversea Service. 11 The Philippines 11 Oahu 11 Panama 11 Guantnnamo 11 Alaska 12 Porto Rico 12 Tabular statement 12 Necessary Strength of Mobile Troops for Home' Service 12 Tabular statement showing distribution of administrative units of mobile troops m strategic areas 12 Formation of higher tactical units and their distribution in stra- tegic areas 13 Necessary Strength of Coast Artillery Troops Required for Service Overseas and at Home 13 Total Strength of the Regular Troops Reouired for all Servici^s 13 Organ ization 14 II. The Organized Militia 15 Constitutional functions 15 Some uses a? a Federal force 15 Limitations 15 Recommendations 16 III. Reserves 16 The Regular Reserve 16 Citizen soldiers 17 Reserve ofhcers 17 IV. The Volunteers 17 V. Reserve Materiel and Supplies 18 List of Brochxnes 22 A PROPER MILITARY POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES. INTRODUCTION. THE MILITAKY PROBLEM CONFRONTING THE UNITED STATES. 1. The evolution of national military policies. — National policies are evolved and are expanded as the Nation groM s. They reflect the national sense of responsibility and also the national ambitions. They constitute the doctrine underlying acts of statesnumship and diplomacy. A nation's military policy is the national doctrine of self-preservation. The world is never without virile, capable, and progressive nations, the circumstances of whose development have imbued thefti with the belief that their vital interests demand an active aggressive policy. They are forced to resort to universal service in the effort to fulfill, at any cost, wdiat they conceive to be their destiny. In the United States the development of the Nation has proceeded under an euA^ironment so favorable that there is no Avell-defined public opinion in regard to wdiat constitutes an ade- quate military policy. Heretofore isolation, combined with the neces- sity of preserving the balance of power, has been a sufficient guaranty against strong hostile expeditions from Europe or Asia. The safe- guard of isolation no longer exists. The oceans, once barriers, are now easy avenues of approach by reason of the number, speed, and carrying capacity of ocean-going vessels. The increasing raclii of action of the submarine, the aeroplane, and Avireless telegraphy all supplement ocean transport in placing both our Atlantic and Pacific coasts Avithin the sphere of hostile activities of oversea nations. The great mass of the public does not yet realize the effect of these changed conditions upon our scheme of defense. Another thing that militates against the evolution of a sound military i)olicy for our country is the erroneous conclusion drawn by the people from our past experiences in war. In develoi:>ing such a policy victory is often a less trustworthy guide than defeat. We have been plunged into many wars and have ultimately emerged successfully from each of them. The general public points to these experiences as an indication that our military policy has been and still continues to be sound. That this is not really the belief of those in authority is shown by the fact that each Avar of importance has been folloAved by an official investigation of our military system and the policy under Avhich it operated. The reports of these investiga- tions give a startling picture of faulty leadership, needless Avaste of lives and property, costly overhead charges augumented by payment 2 A PROPER MILITARY POLICY POR THE UNITED STATES. of bounties to kee}) up voluntary enlistments, undue prolong-ations of all these wars, and linally reclvless expenditure of public funds for continuing- pensions. These documents supply convincing proofs that all such shortcomings have been due entirely to a lack of ade- quate preparation for war in time of peace. But we have not yet learned our lesson. It has never been driven home by the bittei-ness of defeat. AVe liave never known a Jena or a Sedan. At no stage of our national life have we been brought face to face with the armed strength of a great world power free to land sufficient forces to gain a foothold at any desired portion of our coasts. Tliat we have to some extent felt this danger is evidenced by our efforts to provide a navy as a first line of defense and to supplement it with the necessary harbor fortifications; but we have not yet realized tluit our ultimate safeguard is an adequate and well-organized mobile land force. Experience in war has shown the need of these three elements but the public has not yet demanded that they be perfected, coordinated, and combined in one harmonious system of national defence. Not until this has heen- accotnplhhcd irill a proper military polic}/ for the United States he adopted. 2. Our ahiding national polieies. — The majority of our i)eople have always believed in asserting their own rights and in respecting those of others. They desire that the cause of right should prevail and that laAvlessness should be crushed out. To live up to these high ideals imposes upon us new duties as a world power; duties that require something more positive than a policy of mere passive defense. In addition, there are two underlying and abiding national policies whose maintenance we must consider as necessary to our national life. These are the '" Monroe doctrine " and the policy of avoiding " entan- gling alliances." They are distinctive and affect our international relations in a definite manner. In addition, policies may develop in the future as a result of international relations with respect to trade conditions. A general consideration of our responsibilities as a nation and of our geographical position indicates that the maintenance of oui- abiding policies and interests at home and abroad involves problems of defense measures both on land and on sea. The solution of the general problem of national defense nuist be sought in the provision of adequate land and sea forces and a consideration of their co- ordinate relationship. 3. Coordinate relation^shi/) of Arm;/ and Nari/. — Upon the Navy devolves the solution of the problem of securing and maintaining control of the sea. To accomi)lish this it must be free to take the offensive promptly — that is. to seek out and defeat the enemy fleet. The use of any part of the high-sea fleet for local defense defeats the chief object of the Navy and is a misuse of naval power. A fleet de- feated at sea and undefended by an adequate army is powerless either to prevent invasion or even its own idtimate destruction by combined hostile land and naval forces. In illustration comi)are the cases of the Spanish fleet at Santiago and the Eussian fleet at Port Arthur with the present exam|)le of the German, Aiistiian, and Turkish fleets luuler the protection of land forces. Upon the Army devolves the task of gaining and maintaining on shore the ascendency over hostile land and naval operations. To A PBOPER MILITARY POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES. 3 accomplish this it must be able to seek out promptly and to defeat, capture, or destroy the invader wherever he may attempt either to secure a footing upon our territory' or to enter the waters of our har- bors with the object of threatening the destruction of the seaport or of a fleet driven to seek refuge or repair therein. The problems involved in operations against hostile land forces are complex and include only as an incident the protection of harbor defenses on the land side. The problems of harbor defense against attack from the sea are simple and passive in their nature. 4. Coordinate relationship of statesman and soldier. — In our coun- try public opinion estimates the situation, statecraft shapes the policy, while the duty of executing it devolves upon the military and naval departments. Such a doctrine is sound in direct proportion to its success in pro- ducing a military system capable of developing fighting power suffi- cient to meet any given national emergency, at the proper time, sup- ported by all the resources, technical and economic, of the country, in a word — preparedness. All the other world powers of to-day have realized the necessity of maintaining highl}" trained and organized military and naval forces in time of peace, and all, or nearly all, are allied in powerful coalitions. Without superiority on the sea or an adequate land force there is nothing to prevent any hostile power or coalition of powers from landing on our shores such part of its trained and disciplined troops as its available transports can carry. The time required is limited only by the average speed of its vessels and the delay necessarily consumed in embarking and disembarking. In order that the American people can intelligently decide on a doctrine of preparedness which shall constitute the military policy of the United States, and that Congress and the Executive may be able to carry out their decision, information concerning the military strength of other great nations and shipping available for transport purposes must be clearly set forth. The work of the statesman and of the soldier and sailor are there- fore coordinate; where the first leaves off the others take hold. 5. Preparedness of the icorld powers for oversea expeditions. — Control of the sea having been once gained by our adversary or adversaries, there is nothing to prevent them from dispatching an oversea expedition against us. In order to form an idea of the mobile force we should have ready to resist it an estimate must first be made of the approximate number of troops that other nations might reasonably be expected to transport and of the time required to land them on our coasts. The number of thoroughly trained and organized troops an enemy can bring in the first and succeeding expeditions under such an assumption is a function of — ( California North Atlantic States Middle West Mexican border Total 36 20 15 10 7 6 • Each Cavalry brigade to have 1 battalion horse artillery; 1 company mounted Engineers; 1 company Signal Corps. Approximate total, 121,000 otTicers and men. A PROPER MILITARY POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES. 13 These troops should be organized in higher tactical units and dis- tributed in strategic areas substantially as follows : Puget Sound area One division (less divisional Cavalry) and one Cavalry brigade ( of 3 regiments ) . ' California One division and one Cavalry brigade. North Atlantic States__.One division and one Cavalry brigade. Middle West One division (less divisional Cavalry) and one Cavalry brigade. Mexican border — West of El Paso One Cavalry brigade. East of El Paso One Cavalry brigade. NECESSARY STRENGTH OF COAST ARTILLERY TROOPS REQUIRED FOR SERVICE OVERSEAS AND AT HOME. 32. The strength of the Coast Artillery depends upon the number of guns and mine fields installed and projected and upon the assist- ance to be received from Organized Militia units. An estimate pre- pared in the Office of the Chief of Coast Artillery ^ gives the follow- ing strength, in companies, required under the supposition that all mine fields and all oversea guns and one-half the guns at home are manned from the Regular Army : Companies. Philippines 26 Oahu 14 Panama 21 United States 228 Total 289 Total companies (gun and mine) 289 Officers and men 34,413 TOTAL STRENGTH OF THE REGULAR TROOPS REQUIRED FOR ALL SERVICES. 33. Combining all previous estimates of Coast Artillery and mobile troops required for service in oversea garrisons and at home, the fol- lowing tabular statement of the required strength of the Regular Army in units appropriate to each arm, results, viz : Localities. Philippines 2 Oahu Canal Zone Alaska Porto Rico , Puget Sound area California North Atlantic States. Middle West Mexican border United States Total required. Infantry regi- ments. 65 Cavalry regi- ments. 25 Field Artillery regi- ments. Coast Engi- Artillery 1 neer com- bat- panies. talions. 228 289 m Signal Corps, Battal- ions. nj Aero squads. ' This estimate can only be verified by an inspection of all the harbors in question, for which inspection there has not been sufficient time since this estimate was received. 2 Nine regiments Infantry, 2 regiments Field Artillery, 2 battalions Engineers. Filipinos to be added, 21,000 officers and men. 14 A PEOPER MILITARY POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES. These figures may be summarized as follows : Oversea : Mobile (combatant) 74,500 Coast Artillery Corps 7, 500 In United States : Mobile (combatant) 121.000 Coast Artillery Corps 27, 000 Total : Mobile (combatant) 195,500 Coast Artillery Corps 34, 500 82,000 148. 000 230, 000 To this total should be added officers and men for the Sanitary; Quartermaster. Ordnance Department, etc.. appropriate to a force of this strength, amounting approximately to 30,000 officers and men. Including Philippine Scouts. 21,000, the grand total becomes 281,000. 34. Organization. — The Tables of Organization, approved and published on Februar}'^ 25, 1914, for the information and government of. the Regular Army and Organized Militia of the United States have been taken as the guide in estimating the numerical strength of the personnel of the various tactical and administrative units men- tioned in this report. This was done as a matter of convenience and because the service generally is familiar with these tables, which are the latest official publication of the War Department on this subject. They conform to the Field Service Regulations and are the best that can be devised under the limitation of the present laws governing the Army, but it can not be too emphatically stated that they are for emergency vse only and contain certain undesirable and unscientific features which should be corrected as soon as the necessary legisla- tion can be obtained. For example, the war organization shown in the tables is provisional only, while the peace strength is arranged so as not to exceed the total enlisted strength of about 93,000 men now permitted by existing appropriations. This limitation falls heaviest upon the Infantry, whose organiza- tions on home service are maintained at only 43 per cent of full statu- tory strength, while the Cavalry organizations are maintained at 75 ?er cent and those of Field Artillery at Y7 per cent of such strength, t is generally conceded that our Infantry companies should each have the full statutory strength of 150 men in order to permit proper training of the officers in time of peace and supply efficient fighting strength in time of war. In consequence of the greatly reduced strength of these Infantry organizations, their efficiency is unduly decreased and overhead charges correspondingly increased. The requirements of modern war demand that a machine-gun unit, a supply unit, and certain mounted men be attached to each regiment, and that units of various strengths be assigned to brigade and divi- sion headnuarters. None of these units is authorized by law, vet all are essential. Tables of Organization, 1914, represent an effort to adapt an archaic statutory ovwanization to modern requirements by organizing the necessary additional units, 'provisionally. This has been done by detaching from statutory organizations the personnel required. An examination of the tables will show that more than 5 per cent of the Infantry personnel authorized by Congress have A PEOPEE MILITAEY POLICY FOE THE UNITED STATES. 15 been diverted from their legitimate duty as members of statutory organizations and have been assigned to provisional units which, while necessary and essential, have only the sanction of departmental authorit3\ and lack the efficiency Avhich can only be given by statute. In the Cavah V more than 9 per cent are similarly diverted. Recognizing these facts, the War College Division of the General Staff has prepared a plan for organizing on modern lines an army of the strength just shown to be necessary for the national needs. Should this plan be approved, the organization of the Regular Army, the militia, and whatever reserves are formed would proceed along the ncAv lines. II. THE ORGANIZED MILITIA. 35. The act of Congress approved April 25, 1914, commonly know^n as the volunteer hiAv, defines the land forces of the United States as " the Regular Army, the organized land militia while in the service of the United States, and such volunteer forces as Congress may authorize." The Organized Militia, in addition to its use as a State force, is available for use by the Federal Government, as provided in the Constitution. 36. Constitutional functions of the Organized Militia. — Its consti- tutional functions are the following: {a) A State force to preserve order within the State limits, in order to avoid calling upon the Regular Army or the Organized Militia of other States to discharge such function. (b) A Federal force when called forth by the President, and duly mustered as prescribed by Congress, for any of the three purposes authorized by the Constitution. 37. Some uses of the Organized Militia as a Federal force. — Hav- ing been called forth as militia, they may be used as follows : {a) As Coast Artillery supports and reserves. (b) To guard and protect certain bridges, canal locks, arsenals, depots of supplies, docks, navy yards, and other vulnerable points in the home territory. ((?) To guard lines of communication within the limits of the United States. 38. Limitations. — It is stated later in this report that 12 months at 150 hours per month, " is considered the minimum length of time of actual training considered necessary to prepare troops for war service." Due to constitutional limitations. Congress has not the power to fix and require such an amount of training for the Organ- ized Militia. No force can be considered a portion of our first line whose control and training is so little subject to Federal authority in peace. No force should be con.sidered a portion of our first line in war unless it be maintained fully organized and equipped in peace at practically war strength. This would exclude the Organized Militia from consideration for service in the first line mainly because of the impossibility of giving it in peace the training required for such function. It may be necessary to continue Federal support of the Organized Militia in order that some organized force may be imme- diately available for the purposes set forth in paragraphs 36 and 37. 16 A PROPER MILITARY POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES. 39. Recominendations. — In the preparation of plans for the na- tional defense and for the prese^^'ation of the honor and dignit}'' of the United States, the number of troops that are deemed necessary are largely in excess of the total Regular and Militia forces available in the United States. It is only during the existence of war, or when war is imminent, that any other forces may be raised under existing law. When Con- gress so authorizes the President, he may call forth volunteers. Section 3 of the volunteer law provides that under certain con- ditions organizations of the Organized Militia may be received into the Volunteer Service in advance of any other organizations of the same arm or class from the same State, Territory, or District; and section 4 of the act of May 27, 1908, amending the militia law, pro- vides that the Militia shall be called into the service in advance of any volunteer force that may be raised. It is evident that it can not be known prior to the existence of the imminence of war what organizations, if any, of the Organized Militia will enter the volunteer service, and that no definite plans can be prepared providing for the use of such organizations, either as militia or as volunteers, until war is actually upon us. No legislation affecting the Organized Militia is recommended beyond the repeal of all provisions of laws now in effect whereby militia or militia organizations may or must be received into the Federal service in advance of any other forces. This recommendation is not to be construed as advocating express repeal of certain sections of existing laws relating to the Organized Militia, but as suggesting that any legislation hereafter proposed for the organization of a Federal reserve force shall contain the usual concluding section repealing all laws and parts of laws incon- sistent therewith, and that such legislation be so framed as to render inconsistent with it the provisions of law just referred to. III. RESERVES. 40. Reserves include: {a) Well-instructed soldiers of the Regular Army furloughed to what is herein termed the regular reserve, (6) citizen soldiers, (c) reserve officers. 41. The regular reserve. — As the United States should have a mobile force of 500,000 soldiers available at home at the outbreak of war, the Army, with the regidar reserve, should amount to this strength. In order to develop the necessary regular reserve with the Army at the strength advocated in this policy, enlistments would have to be for about eight years — two with the colors and six in reserve. That would, in eight years, result in approximately the following mobile forces at home available at the outbreak of war: (1) Mobile regular troops (combatant) with the colors 121,000 (2) The regular reserve 379,000 Total 500,000 During the first weeks of war in this country the military situation will probably be critical. At that time every fully trained soldier should be put in the field. To do that with the small military estab- lishment herein advocated it is necessary that during peace the Army A PKOPEK MILITARl POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES. 17 be kept at war strength, and that the regidar reserve be organized and not kept back to replace losses expected during war. Such losses should be replaced from depot units. 42. Citizen soldiers. — In addition to the 500,000 fully trained mobile troops mentioned above, at least 500,000 more — a total of 1,000,000 men- — should be prepared to take the field immediately on the outbreak of war and should have had sufficient previous military training to enable them to meet a trained enemy within three months. Twelve months' intensive training is the minimum that will prepare troops for war service. Therefore the 500,000 partly trained troops above referred to require nine months' militar}^ training before war begins. Military efficiency of reserves requires that Regular Army officers be assigned thereto for training purposes — at least one to every 400 men — and that organizations and specially designated non- commissioned officers of the Army be utilized in instructing reserves as far as practicable. Based upon exjoerience with Tables of Organization. 1914, the War College Division has recently prepared a new plan of organiza- tion for the Army. The Regular Army and the reserves should be organized according to this plan. Organizations should be formed of men from the districts to which their respective organizations are assigned for recruiting. For this purpose, each organization should be assigned to a district from which recruits most suitable for the service required of the organization may be obtained — mounted units to horse-raising districts, technical troops to manufacturing districts, etc. As a rule the size of districts should be about in proportion to population of the qualifications— age, etc. — required. Organizations in war should be kept at full strength from the depot units which they should have in their respective recruiting districts. 43. Reserve officers. — Officers for staff and organizations of re- serves, and officers for temporary appointment in the Regular Army as provided for in section 8 of the volunteer law (act of Congress approved Apr. 25, 1914), should be selected and trained in time of peace. The President should be authorized to issue, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, commissions as reserve officers to citizens of the United States who, upon examination prescribed by the Secretary of War, demonstrate their phj'^sical, mental, moral, and professional fitness therefor, and who duly obligate themselves to render military service to the United States while their commis- sions are valid. Such commissions should be valid five years, and renewable under such regulations regarding examinations and quali- fications as the Secretary of War may from time to time prescribe. IV. VOLUNTEERS. 44. In addition to any forces that may be maintained and trained in time of peace, provision must be made for vastly increasing such forces in time of war. These must come from the untrained body of citizens and provisions for raising them is contained in the act of Congress approved April 25. 1914. 45. This act meets the military needs for raising volunteer troops as far as concerns the enlisted personnel, except in two particulars, which are : First, that under the existing laws certain organizations 18 A PROPER MILITARY POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES. of the militia, with numbers far below the full strength, can enter the volunteer force in advance of other similar volunteer organizations from the same State ; and second, no volunteers of any arm or branch can be raised until all the militia of that particular arm or branch have been called into the service of the United States. The changes necessary to remedy these defects have been set forth in paragraph 39 under the subject of the Organized Militia. V. RESERVE MATERIEL. 46. Of all the features disclosed by the war in Europe none stands more clearly revealed than the power to be derived from national economic organization behind the armed forces of a nation. 47. In a war of gigantic proportions the chances of success are immeasurably lessened by wastage, abuse, and confusion. Steps should be taken looking toAvard a national organization of our eco- nomic and industrial resources as well as our resources in fighting men. 48. In its report the commission appointed by the President to investigate the conduct of the War Department in the War with Spain used the following language : One of the lessons taught bj tlie war is that the country shouhl hereafter be in a l)etter state of preparation for war. Testimony lias been talven on this sub- ject and suggestions have been made that large supplies of all the materiel not liable to deterioration should be kept on hand, to be continuously issued and renewed, so that in any emergency they might be available. Especially should this be the case with such supplies, equipment, and ordnance stores as are not in general use in the United States and which can not be rapidly obtained in open market. 49. The lack of such articles as shoes, wagons, harness, rifles, saddles, medical chests, and so on, will render ineffective an army just as certainly as will the lack of ammunition. 50. For the purposes of storage military supplies may be divided into four classes : (a) Supplies that can be obtained in great quantities in the open market at any time. (b) Those that can be obtained in sufficient quantities on 15 days' notice. (c) Those that can be obtained on three months' notice. (d) Those that can not be obtained within three months. 51. The War College Division of the General Staff is of the opin- ion that for purposes of defense we should maintain the troops enu- merated in Parts I and III of this report. 52. A fully trained force, to be effective during the critical period when war is imminent and during the first few weeks of a war, must not be hampered by lack of necessary supplies and equipment. For this reason, supplies of all kinds Avhich can not be obtained in the open market at any time must be kept on hand, in use and in store, at home and oversea, sufficient to equip without delay all troops whose training warrants sending them promptly into the field. 53. It is probable that as soon as war becomes imminent, the Conti- nental Army — 500,000 mobile troops — will also be called out. As this partially trained force can not be expected to take the field within three months' time, it is })racticable to refrain, after the third year, from keeping on hand or ''a store for it any articles of equipment A PROPER MILITARY POLICY FOR THE UXITED STATES. 19 oxcept those necessaiy to complete its training and those which can not be procured within three months. 54. The total number of harbor defense troops necessary is al)Out 50,000. Due to conditions of service, it is believed that ultimately supplies of all kinds for 60.000 should be kept on hand. 55. In any g"eat war, volunteers must be called out in addition to the troops above ciramerated. 56. It would be unwise to have on hand at the beginning of a war merely the supplies sufficient to place in the field our first contingent of troops and tc xmpleto the training of the Continental Army, and to be unprepar d to supply to even a limited extent the Volunteer Army we shoukl have to raise, not to mention replacements of arms, ammunition clothing and equipment of all kinds for those already in the field ; but on account of the great sum of money w hich will be necessary in entering upon a program for collecting and storing mili- tary supplies it is believed that the subject of equipment for a Volun- teer Army and replacements for the Regular and Continental Armies should be provided for by obtaining options with domestic manufac- turers to furnish the required supplies, all of domestic manufacture, in accordance with tentative contracts to be made by the supply de- partments w ith such manufacturers in time of peace. By so doing we will be taking the initial steps toward organizing the industrial and economic resources of the country as well as its resources in fighting men. 57. Referring to Part III, approximately the following troops will be available at the close of the successive years : Fully- trained mobile troops. Partiallv- trained Conti- nental Army. Harbor- defense troops. Total. First year Second year. Third year . . Fourth year.. Fifth year .Sixth year.., Seventh year Eighth year.. 160,000 219,000 320,000 383,000 439,000 489,000 534,000 574,000 185,000 351,000 500, 000 500,000 500,000 500,000 500,000 500,000 30,000 40,000 50,000 52,000 54,000 56,000 58,000 60,000 375,000 610,000 870,000 935, 000 993,000 1,045,000 1,092,000 1,134,000 A study of these figures and of the difficulties we have experienced in the past in the matter of supplies lead to the conclusion that the program adopted for procuring reserve supplies should be such that at the close of each year we should have in use and in store, at home and oversea, supplies of all kinds necessary to equip : Cavalrv tt„,.k-^, divisions ^„^rbor- of 9 reei- o -^ c O ^ ■* Ol O CO CO O 00 lo - i t^ o t-: c<; o t!< c ■sepGjS .^q sjajjcnb JOJ noii^inunnoo 'sit;;ox c =; o c o a; o o c; C(MC-)-_0-* O OO '-C c^ O T-^" O Tl5 o o V ^f-T^oT^ co" -^ -^ o «© CO O ■«• CO 00 •sje^icnb aoj noijin -uramoo JO sajcj AjJuaA ^CIOC-^OO CI 00-^ c; »o o --^ c-i t^ CO 00 TT C-l^OOOt-lO ■* M-H •sopBiS Aq Avd it;;ox |S|§S 1 8 3 K ccaTcTirrcr -T lo" i-^ co «& 't* CO t^ Ci CO C^ 00 32 s •.tBd JO se^Bj j£[Jt!a^\ 8S88S § 8 g § S — OOO 1-1 Ttl 00 CO oo-~£irir^-^ CO cT ^ •(parans -SB) seiSoj JO J9qnin>i . . tH Til -.ll CO ) GC !N CO CO C> O 1-H •S9PBJ3 i£q siciox rt OJ CI t^ X O O O -H ^^^ 0-. - -. 5^ •uotssiuiraoo • rH ^ • edoina m y[iojA jeRaa " -^ CI •uoijis -odxg; ogioBj-cmBnc,! o) c) CO ; t^ •acaoH .sjatpiog S9JTJ1S ps^ran. ■^ CI CO ■SSOJQ p9>j TTBoparav TOAV ' " •asnoH 91tq.ii n' | " " ■ia9p 1 -tSgid 9m OJ J9d993[IOOCI 1 '' '^ ■1^0130 BtncoBj; ■ o CO •;u9muJ9 1 -Aoo oniddniqj mi.vv 1 CO 1 ro IcnoiiBN 9uo:)SAion9A d Cl C) t^ .aaa 03 O O O CUOOO .£ .5 .3 .3 .5 o ;' -C1 C3 C3 C3 C3 C3 ^^ O O O O « » g^« u-, fc- (-, J- w fc- Rai w^ Pt « _ ^ » -Cjl-5 n< M m M m m > _ o ^£^^^£^ ^ § fl o b 5 S o-§'^ > 'So '3 '3 '3^ c^' -o o o o o[3:.2c; o o o o o ^ ^ (C o o o o'r: t^rt ooooo'Sc^ ^4J*J*J*^ « O S c c c c a "-Tirt « (Voa>a:jcpar2c1 30669°— No. 507— IG- 26 War Department, War College Division, Office of the Chief of Staff, Washington^ October 1, 1915. Memorandum for The Adjutant General of the Army : Subject: Table showing authorized strength of the Military Estab- lishment on July 1, 1915. The Secretary of War directs that, if the data are available, the following table be filled out and returned to the Chief of the War College Division. This information is necessary for use in preparing a study by order of the Secretary of War. Table No. 4. — Actual strength of the MUitnry Establishment on July 1, 1915. Branches of service. Officers. Enlisted men. Aggre- gate. General officers Adjutant General's Department Inspector General's Department Judge Advocate General's Department Quartermaster Corps Medical Department Corps of Engineers Ordnance Department Signal Corps Bureau of Insular Affairs Professors, United States Military Academy. Chaplains Cavalry . Field Artillery Coast Artillery Corps . Infantry. Porto Rico Regiment of Infantry United States Military Academy detachments Recruiting parties, recruit depots, and unassigned recruits. United States military prison guards Service-school detachments With disciplinary organizations Indian scouts Philippine Scouts 25 23 17 12 185 !553 207 85 63 3 7 64 778 262 728 ,572 31 »404 1,948 740 1,371 Total, Army Hospital Corps (Medical Department)^ , Quartermaster Corps (Quartermaster Department)!*. Total, military establishment. 14,646 5,664 19, 185 35,537 586 623 5,757 317 582 (In arm of service 24 182 5, 430 25 23 17 12 589 553 2,155 825 1,434 3 7 64 15, 424 5,926 19,913 37,109 617 623 5,757 317 582 4,797 92,814 3,993 4,388 101,195 24 5,612 97,611 3,993 4,388 105,992 ' Quartermaster sergeants. . . ^ , 2 Includes 97 officers of the Medical Reserve Corps assigned to active duty under the provisions of the act of Congress approved Apr. 23, 1908 (35 Stat. L., 66). 3 Not included in the enlisted strength of the Army. M. M. Macomb, Brigadier General, Chief of War College Division, Assistant to the Chief of Staff. 507 I 27 Table No. 5. — Average rates of pay and allotcances of comparahle grades of commissioned officers of the armies of the United States and Great Britain United States Army. Lieutenant general ' $11, 000. 00 Major general i S.OOO.OO Brigadier general i 6, 000. 00 Surgeon General (major general) 9, 566. 00 Colonel 5, 232. 64 Lieutenant colonel 4, 549. 76 Major 3,882.00 Captain 3,009.92 First lieutenant 2, 550. 80 Second lieutenant 2, 072. 24 Chaplain with rank of major 3, 882. 00 Chaplain with rank of major, after 5 years' service 4, 182. 00 Cnaplata with rank of captain 3, 009. 92 Chaplain with rank of first lieutenant . . 2, 550. 80 Veterinarian (pay, etc. of second lieu- enant) 2, 072. 24 First lieutenant, Medical Reserve Corps 2, 550. 80 Additional to captain while adjutant Additional to first lieutenant while ad- jutant , British Army. f i$12, 604. 80 Field marshal i to { 19,392.00 General i 7, 756. 80 Lieutenant general i 6, 302. 40 Major general i 4, 848. 00 Brigadier general Surgeon general 7, 019. 00 Colonel 4, 535. 79 Lieutenant colonel 3, 224. 05 Major 2, 167. 81 Captain 1, 640. 17 First lieutenant 1, 197. 73 Second lieutenant 895. 53 Chaplain, first class 2, 479. 71 Chaplain, first class, after 5 years as such 2,700.90 Chaplain, second class 2,443.02 Chaplain, third class 1, 877. 59 Veterinary officer, pay, etc., of first lieu- tenant 1, 929. 62 First lieutenant, medical department, on probation 1, 725. 70 Additional to captain while adjutant 294. 92 Additional to first lieutenant while ad- jutant 331.78 507 1 Represents only base pay. 28 Average pay, etc., by grades or positions. U12,604.80 / 19,392.00 7,756.80 6,302.40 4,848.00 7,019.00 4, 535. 79 3,224.05 3.870.20 3,448.04 2, 167. 81 1,975.68 3,049.90 2, 872. 95 3.049.90 3,403.80 88.48 1,640.17 1,710.79 2. 356. S6 2,290.50 294. 92 1,197.73 1,131.62 1.725.70 00 CO cox General offi- cers '— Table 5 {$12, 604. 80 to 19,392.00 7,756.80 0,302.40 4,848.00 -: Chap- lains — Table 5 (o) m. Military Hying wing- Table 5 (a) I. Ordnance depart- ment— Talile 5 (a) k. ray depart- ment- Table 5 Medical officers — Table 5 S3 O 30 3,870.20 3,448.04 2, 828. 71 s X CO Veteri- nary officers- Table 5 « CI IT en OS CO >o CO cf i Army service corps- Table 5 (a)<7. «s o cc (NCO g Infantry of the line- Table 5 (a)/. C35 S2 CC Q lO 00 X ci SS8 •*X05 X CO 5S Engi- neers — Table 5 3 8 i2§ So 2§fe Garrison artil- lery- Table 5 o 1 ■^ 00 t^ rr oi 2S5: Oi 1.0 T-l OS ^•00 CI CI 35 Field artil- lery- Table 5 05 o oo ■* :0 X CO en MO — 0-* rtiO CO ITorse artil- lery- Table 5 (a) 6. CO o si 3 0; r^'* rigs r-Ti-T 01 U5 Cavalry of the line — Table 5 (.a) a. ft o oc -* t~ CO — X •*cn03 XX cod go 5 X Rank or class. B Si 1 c i c S. I 1 c ■« IS c 1 bi 1 = i c "c ? c .5 go >>a 00 o 1-1 Is -IB !l c o It D C xn C3 o iN t.. c '? u c ^'? IS c t. o >> c "ec c ■'? IS c o li- u Is o ? > ;.^ a ■? -.£ IS CdOl § C m 03 o £ lis 13 ■5 B c "o •t •c c u c -I 0* > e c 'r 0. ■g ■J c > "c 'c -1 u ".s.p ft i 3 > 1' 1 .c ■c CS e c- c p c "a n || c3 a CD 3 •n 507 29 ec (^ oj o o CO O c^i r-» CO r^ oi o '* "^ 05 oi cN o O »o t~^ ci CO O 05 O ■»*« '^ (N -X) r^ o -^ o "^ Oi ■^ OS O CO X lO 00 »-J o oi c^ -^ t-^ .-H CO C^ uo Oi ^ -^ to - CC CO -^ X (n" i-T ^^ i-T^** ^ c^ Ci — . C-1 <— < OS »0 t-^ 00 OS OS C-l »0 CO 05 00 i£3 O CO O CO Ci t^ t^ 8CO OCN ^ CO C^ to 00 (N CO rH 00 «^ OiO »oco o o «t2 •2SSS :2 M M « 507 30 Average pay, etc., by grades or positions. •o in-* CJ -^ I> oi -^ 05 o t^ t^ 2,700.90 2,143.02 1,877.59 1.317.26 lO 00 General offi- cers" — Table 5 (a) 71. Chap- lains — Table 5 (0)TO. $2,479.71 2,700.90 2,143.02 1,877.59 1,317.26 1,538.45 878. 76 Military flying wing — Table 6 mo o t^ O 1- Ordnance depart- ment — Table 5 Pay depart- ment — Table 5 Medical officers- Table 5 (a) i. Veteri- nary officers- Table 6 (a) ft. Army service corps- Table 5 (a) 9. Infantry of the line- Table 5 (a)/. Engi- neers- Table 5 ia)e. Garrison artil- lery- Table 5 Field artil- lery- Table 5 Horse artil- lery- Table 5 (a) 6. Cavalry of the line- Table 5 (a) a. u o 1 c t. c c < 1- "5 s 1 1 1 C c c c c J „ t c 1 \ .£ 2 o .2 - •a! .a '' o .c 1 C c c c •X. 507 31 4J . d^ >> 40 CO ic -^1* cDcoi* cr. c^ o* ^ lo ^ o I- OO "5 OO --^ 00 -^ ^^ OD *<« »-H .-< rt ^H CO o ajco ■^ lo ■* 05 o •* w c« cc c^ 00 C O w ^ ^ a !^ CJ CO . ^ S 5:2 ■ u (OCXS C.1 c g rj 3 ^.-o o a-oi o 2 ° 507 r- cccoo-H^oiNNOOoooixc-. CC rCCC»0 OC XiCO lOtCIO to oo o cc -^roo^oc^Ciooocit^-^r^-^i- o CON e^co riN .-HNcceac-J ^ o coco ^ o oo o — co-: CO »o cc c^i ca c-i c^i cjt~iA^- t. 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O lO tH O 1-< F-( iC CD O CO ?0 CO > .2^ a% •fi ® a> VI .23 >> —cO! 3 ©S OS 3:2 c o MS t^ S O lO « •>t' t~ t>- o -v t^ i-« CO r^ TJH t^ 1-H 00 CO IC 00 ^OtJIOOCOOiO ^ 0> N O lO ■* O O 1-1 r>. (N t^ i-( t- 53 :+)^io->o S'S'o 03 ■w fe O^ b b Pi £^ 15.2.2 g .9.S.3.S.S.S-S 3 — '— SSSS o< o< &< o< P. O- P< c8 C3 C3 C3 03 C3 C3 507 41 Table No. 5a (n). [P. 102 (vote 13), Army estimates, Great Britain, 1913-14.] Pay in United States currency. Field marshal General Lieutenant general Major general £2,600 to 4,000 1,600 1,300 1,000 $12,604.80 to 19,392.00 7, 756. SO 6, 302. 40 4,848.00 Table No. 56. — Pay and allowances of commissioned officers, United States Army. ;Authority: Army Regulations, Army Register, General Orders War Department, and Military Laws of United States.] Commu- Commu- Commu- Pay.i tation for tation for tation for quarters. Ught. hoat.2 SI 1,000 SI, 440 S50. 40 S252. 00 8,000 1,296 45.00 225.00 6,000 1,152 42.12 210. 60 4,000 1,008 37.44 187. 20 4,400 1,008 37.44 187.20 4,800 1,008 37.44 187. 20 5,000 1,008 37.44 187. 20 5,000 1,008 37.44 187.20 3,500 864 30.96 154. 80 3,850 864 30.96 154. SO 4,200 864 30.96 154. SO 4,500 864 20.96 154. 80 4,500 864 20.96 154. 80 3,000 720 27.00 135.00 3,300 720 27.00 135. 00 3,600 720 27.00 135.00 3,900 720 27.00 135.00 4,000 720 27.00 135.00 2,400 576 22.32 111.60 2,640 576 22.32 111.60 2,880 576 22.32 111.60 3,120 576 22.32 111.60 3,360 576 22.32 111.60 2,000 432 19.80 99.00 2,200 432 19.80 99.00 2,400 432 19.80 99.00 2,600 432 19.80 99.00 2,800 432 19.80 99.00 1,700 288 14.04 70.20 1,870 288 14.04 70.20 2,040 288 14.04 70.20 2,210 288 14.04 70.20 2,:^80 288 14.04 70.20 2,000 432 19.80 99.00 2,200 432 19.80 99.00 2,400 432 19.80 99.00 2,600 432 19.80 99.00 2,800 432 19.80 99.00 2,000 432 19.80 99.00 2,200 432 19.80 99.00 2,400 432 19.80 99.00 2,600 432 19.80 99.00 2,800 432 19.80 99.00 720 1,800 432 (') 99.00 1,700 288 14.04 70.20 1,870 288 14.04 70.20 2,040 288 14.04 70.20 2,210 288 14.04 70.20 2,380 288 14.04 70.20 Total. Lieutenant general Major general Brigadier general Colonel After 5 years After 10 years After 15 years After 20 years Lieutenant colonel After 5 years After lO" years After 15 years After 20 years Major After 5 years After 10 years After 15 years After 20 years Captain After 5 years After 10 years After 15 years After 20 years First lieutenant After 5 years After 10 years After 15 years After 20 years Second lieutenant After 5 years After 10 years After 15 years After 20 years 1' irst lieutenant. Medical Reserve Corps After 5 years After 10 years After 15 years After 20 years Dental surgeon After 5 years After 10 years After 15 years After 20 years WhOe on examining board, additional .. Acting dental surgeon Veterinarians After 5 years Aftei 10 years After 15 years After 20 years S12, 742. 40 9, 566. 00 7, 404. 72 5, 232. 64 5, 632. 64 6, 032. 64 6, 232. 64 6, 232. 64 4,549.76 4,899.76 5, 249. 76 5, 549. 76 5,549.76 3, 882. 00 4,182.00 4, 482. 00 4,782.00 4,882.00 3,009.92 3,249.92 3, 489. 92 3,729.92 3,969.92 2, 550. 80 2, 750. 80 2, 950. 80 3,150.80 3, 350. 80 2,072.24 2,242.24 2,412.24 2,582.24 2,752.24 2, 550. 80 2,750.80 2,950.80 3,150.80 3, 350. 80 2, 550. 80 2, 750. 80 2, 950. 80 3, 150. 80 3, 350. 80 720.00 2,331.00 2, 072. 24 2, 242. 24 2,412.24 2,582.24 2, 752. 24 • Entitled to 10 per cent additional for foreign service, except in Hawaiian Islands, Porto Rico, Alaska, and Canal Zone. ' Not practicable to ascertain accurately; assumed as 5 times light allowance. ' No authority found for payment of light allowance to acting dental surgeons. 507 42 Tabie No. 6. — Average rates of minimum pay of comparable grades of enUsted men of the armies of the United States and Great Britain. United States Army. Regimental sergeant (battalion sergeant major, engineers) 8540. 00 Quartermaster sergeant, Quartermaster Corps 540.00 Stable sergeant, Field Artillery 360. 00 First sergeant 540. 00 Chief trumpeter 480.00 Sergeant 390. 86 Trumpeter or musician 180. 00 Corporal 253.14 Saddler 252.00 Private 180. 00 British Army. Regimental sergeant major (warrant officer) $500. 86 Quartermaster sergeant 375. 94 Farrier quartermaster sergeant (warrant officer, cavalry) 374. 50 Squadron, battery, and company sergeants major and infantry color sergeant 358. 23 Sergeant trumpeter 298. 57 Sergeants 257. 41 Trumpeter or bugler 114. 97 Corporal 199. 42 Saddler 175. 10 Private 102. 72 Table No. 6a. — Minimum pay of British warrant officers and enlisted men serv- ing at home. [Army Estimates, 1913-14; pp. 128-147.] Cavalry of the line. Horse artil- lery. Field artil- lery. Garri- son ar- tillery. Engi- neers. Infan- try of the line. Army service corps. Regimental sergeant major (warrant officer) Quartermaster sergeant Farrier, quartermaster sergeant i Squadron, battery, and company ser- geants major ana infantry color ser- geant Sergeant trumpeter Sergeants Trumpeter or bugler Corporal Saddler Private S471. 95 383. 25 354. 05 383.25 237. 25 237. 25 118.62 173. 20 156. 95 102.20 $528. 25 383. 25 390. 55 383.25 295. 65 295. 65 175. 20 237. 25 193. 45 113. 15 $514. 65 368. 65 354. 05 368. 65 281. 05 281. 05 105. 85 222. 65 175. 20 105. 85 $514. 65 368. 65 354. 05 281. 05 281. 05 105.85 222. 65 175. 20 105. 85 $528. 25 397. 85 397.85 332. 15 397. 85 288. 45 102. 20 219. 00 $461. 65 353. 90 310. 25 $486. 62 376. 02 376. 02 376. 02 208. 05 94.90 146.00 102. 20 87. 60 210. 38 102. 20 175. 20 175. 20 102. 20 $500.86 375. 94 374.50 358.23 298. 57 257. 41 114.97 199. 42 175. 10 102. 72 1 Warrant officer of cavalry. Table No. 6&. — Minimum pay of enlisted men, United States Army. [Authority: Army Regulations, Army Register, and Military Laws of United States.] Cav- alry. Field Artil- lery. Coast Artil- lery Corps. In- fantry. Engi- neers. Quar- termas- ter Corps. Signal Corps. Regimental sergeant major (and bat- talion sergeant major, engineers)... Quartermaster sergeant. Quartermas- ter Corps Stable sergeant. Field Artillery First sergeant Chief trumpeter Sergeant Corporal Trumpeter or musician Private Saddler or farrier 540 540 640 640 540 540 540 480 360 252 180 180 252 360 640 480 360 252 180 180 640 540 360 252 180 180 360 252 180 180 640 '432' 180 180 640 432 288 180 180 432 288 180 $540.00 540.00 360.00 640.00 480.00 390. 86 253.14 180. 00 180.00 252.00 Note. — Pay is increased 20 per cent for foreign service except in Hawaiian Islands, Porto Rico, Alaska, and Canal Zone. Additional pay granted for excellence in marksmanship and gunnery. 507 48 Table No. 7. — Items of expenses relating solely to coast defense, United States. Appropria- tion. Mainte- nance. Permanent works, etc. Savings. OFFICE, CHIEF COAST ARTILLERY. Construction of fire-control stations, insular posses- sions $55,000.00 122,790.32 43, 454. 04 10, 800. 00 23, 270. 40 160, 283. 47 42,682.75 11, 288. 74 12,000.00 250,000.00 100, 000. 00 50,000.00 100,000.00 165,000.00 5,000.00 40,000.00 25,000.00 20,000.00 300, 000. 00 1,000.00 3,000.00 $55,000.00 91,755.99 43,454.04 10, 800. 00 21,928.22 OFFICE, CHIEF SIGNAL OFFICEE. $31,034.33 Fire control at fortifications, Panama Canal Do '. 1,342.18 5, 327. 23 Maintenance, torpedo control, seacoast defenses $154,956.24 Fire-control installation, insular possessions Maintenance of fire control, insular possessions. . . . 16,932.62 25, 750. 13 1, 244. 13 10,044.61 12,000.00 Signal equipment, Coast Artillery posts ENGINEER DEPARTMENT. Construction of gun and mortar battery 250,000.00 100,000.00 50,000.00 100,000.00 Modernizing emplacements Electric, steam, and power plants, seacoast defense. Protection of fortifications 165, 000. 00 5,000.00 40, 000. 00 9, 878. 41 20,000.00 Plans for fortifications Maintenance for searchlights, etc Sea walls and embankments 15,121.59 Seacoast batteries, Philippine Islands 300,000.00 Protection fortifications, Hawaiian Islands 1,000.00 3,000.00 Protection torpedo defenses, Hawaiian and Philip- pine Islands ORDNANCE DEPARTMENT. 1,540,569.72 221,413.71 49,989.70 1,118,069.46 6, 723, 083. 70 463, 143. 89 763,000.00 48,871.70 460,772.73 57,882.29 420,879.26 1,054,992.46 189,610.26 38,554.21 931,649.48 3, 250, 076. 05 338,038.61 709,080.93 34,177.66 150,749.47 40,153.76 64,698.00 31, 803. 45 Fire control at fortifications, insular possessions Fortifications, insular possessions 11,435.49 80,682.68 1,736,263.79 25, 595. 90 15,282.69 2,938.39 82,144.03 11,185.65 105,737.30 Armament of fortifications 1,736,741.86 99, 509. 38 Armnmrnt. nf fiirtifirat.inns Pannmq. Can^l , 38,636.38 Submarine mines, Panama Canal 11 755.65 Submarine mines'. 227, 879. 23 Suhmfvriiifi mineSj insnlw po SSeSSions 6, 542. 88 11,446,796.90 2,374,974.39 6,737,082.89 2,334,739.62 It will be noted that this table does not include any expenditures for barracks and quarters or other expenses connected with the maintenance of Coast Artillery posts and fortifications, as such data can not be accurately computed. Table No. 8. — Percentage of enlisted strength of infantry, cavalry, and artillery to total enlisted strength of Military Establishment. Great Britain. United States. Infantry Coast artillery Cavalrv Field artillery. 507 Per cent. 50.51 8.20 7.36 8.92 Per cent. 41.06 18.95 14.47 5.59 44 Table No. 9. — Number of enlisted men per officer in the various arms of the service. Arm. Great Britain (Army esti- mates of effec- tive and non- effective services for 1913-14). United States (Tables of Organization, 1914). Infantry Ck)ast artllery Cavalry Field artillery Engineers, signal corps and flying corps Ordnance 29.84 23.10 27.40 25.58 15.90 9.50 24.55 27.00 20.28 23.08 30.21 8.70 Number of enlisted men per officer, considering total officers, are enlisted men, actually in service on July 1, 1915: Great Britaui 17.5 United States 21.07 1 In Great Britain the duties performed by oiu- signal corps (exclusive of aviation) are performed by the engineers. In the United States the duties performed by the British Flying Corps are performed by our Signal Corps. For purposes of comparison, therefore, it was necessary to construe these various corps. Table No. 10. — Officers and enlisted men of the British Army {depots and depot organizations not included) serving at home and abroad except in India. [Army estimation of eflective and noneffective services for 1913-14.] Officers. Enlisted men. Cavalry (includes household cavalry) Horse and field artillery Garrison artillery Engineers (includes signal organizations). Flying corps Infantry (includes guards) Army service corps Ordnance department Medical corps Veterinary corps Pay corps Chaplains 461 598 609 468 112 2,904 458 232 751 113 12,637 15, 303 14,082 8,334 893 86,666 6,005 2,207 3,820 248 565 Totals in British service, includ ing general staff officers, depot organizations, etc . ,800 507 45 Table No. 11. — Great Britain. [Authority — Appropriation account, 1912-13, with report of the comptroller and auditor general.] Total expenditures, military establishment .f 114, 264, 512. 57 Pay, mileage, etc 39,967,066.82 Subsistence 8, 260, 721. 66 Transportation 4, 733, 304. 84 Clothing 5, 848, 651. 48 Percentages to total expenditures : Pay, mileage, etc 34. 10 Subsistence 7.22 Transportation 4. 14 Clothing 5. 11 Total $666. 01 Per capita cost, enlisted men only : Total 666. 01 Pay, mileage, etc 232.95 Subsistence 48. 14 Transportation 27. 58 Clothing 34. 91 Per capita cost, officers and enlisted men : Total 630.03 Pay, mileage, etc 214. 30 Subsistence 45. 54 Transportation 26. 09 Clothing 32. 24 Total officers, 9,800 (World's Almanac). Total enlisted men, 171,563 (appropriation account, 1912-13, with the report of the comptroller and auditor general). Table No. 12. — United States. Total usual expenditures for Military Establishment (table) $113,248,541.52 Pay, mileage, etc. (memorandum Quartermaster General) 49,722,369.91 Subsistence (memorandum Quartermaster General) 9,802,141.39 Transportation (memorandum Quartermaster General) 10,680,546.69 Clothing (memorandum Quartermaster General) 4,623,272.94 Percentage to total : Pay, mileage, etc 43.90 Subsistence 8. 65 Transportation 9. 43 Clothing, etc 4. 08 Per capita cost, enlisted men only : Total $1, 119. 11 Pay, mileage, etc 491. 35 Subsistence 96. 86 Transportation 105. 54 Clothing 45. 68 Per capita cost, officers and enlisted men : Total 1,068.46 Pay, mileage, etc 469.11 Subsistence 92. 48 Transportation 100.76 Clothing 43. 61 Total officers, 4,797 (memorandum The Adjutant General). Total enlisted men, 101,195 (memorandum The Adjutant General). 507 46 Table No. 13. — Ration components. Great Britain (par. 35, royal warrants for the allowances of the army, 1914). Field rations (issued whenever practicable in garrison and field): Ounces. Fresh meat 20 Or preserved meat 16 Bacon 4 Or butter, lard, or margarine 4 Or sweet oil ' .^ Bread 20 Or biscuit 16 Or oatmeal (for each 4 ounces of liread or biscuit), 4. Or rice (for each 4 ounces of bread or biscuit), 4. Cheese 3 Peas , beans , or dried potatoes 2 Or fresh vegetables 8 United States (par. 1205, Army Ilegulations, 1913). Tea 625 Or chocolate (for each i ounce of tea) 5 Jam 4 Or dried fruit 4 Sugar 3 Salt 5 Pepper 027 Mustard 05 Lime juice ' • 1 Rum (at discretion of commanding officer ' . 5 when recommended by surgeon). Or porter '1 ToDacco (for those who smoke) , per week . 2 I GUI. Garrison rations (issued whenever practi- cable in garrison and field): Ounces Fresh meat 20 Or canned meat 16 Or bacon 12 Or dried fish 14 Or pickled fish 18 Or canned fish 16 Or turkey (Thanksgiving and Christ- mas) 16 Lard or lard substitute 64 Butter or oleomargarine 5 Soft bread 18 Or hard bread 16 Or flour 18 Or corn meal 20 Bakingpowder 08 Potatoes 20 Or canned j)Otatoes 15 Or onions, in lieu of equal quantity of potatoes, but not exceeding 20 per cent of total issue. Or tomatoes, canned, in lieu of eaual quantity of potatoes, but not exceed- ing 20 per cent of total issue. Or other fresh vegetaliles (not canned) in lieu of equal quantity of potatoes. but not exceeding 30 per cent of total issue. Beans 2.4 Or rice or hominy 1.6 Coflee, roasted and ground 1. 12 Or coflee, green 1.4 Or tea, black or green 32 Prunes 1 . 28 Or apples, dried or evaporated 1. 28 Or peaches, dried or evaporated 1. 28 Or jam, in lieu of equal quantity of prunes, but not exceeding 50 per cent of total issue. Sugar 3.2 Milk , evaporated, unsweetened 5 Salt 64 Pepper, black 04 Cinnamon, nutmeg, cloves, or ginger. . . . 014 Vinegar '.16 Or pickles, cucumbers, in lieu of equal quantity of vinegar, but not exceed- ing 50 per cent of total issue. Sirup 1 . 32 Flavoring extract, lemon or vanilla 014 >Pint. I 507 I 47 _r » (NO CO r^ N S o S o-v eO" ss NW coei s Ui >- <£ 03-^0 8 c< •.J. ^sS 2 fl o OO OOO t- OO lOOO lO r^NiOO >o S g O (M C/j O CO O 3 0 05 l-OOOOO CO 3'- >o COiOON 00 OS 1-.^ o'c-i (NCO * N --J 00 OO o e-i »g «« CO-H .-1 r- -.J. NN o INO coco ^ Sm s o ■* co-r LO 00 ^ Tji I— ( cc CD - £ •va ION t^ '^'^'^ S ^CO •^ oi o ^l? N OO ^11 G e© i g go ggg {;; t^ ^ CO O CO O .CIO o .o o of^ oSfo 05 .o CO CO t~ ai tea lO OC^Nl>- •«r fe t^ o'cD ■o'co ■ cs N ON CO 00 3 t^ ■o^ OC CO -^ ^^ N 6 NO >OIO N O^ CD 00 o ^H 01 C3 S_S 00 0*5 •rr a.c-) 1-iiO t- 's lo OO OOO CO CON wo w m OO lOOO c lO C3 CO O CO c3 CO -.J. 00 M. -r ?^ 0O.-I t^lO -H cc .O t~ t^ N "O 03.2 t^^' -jJci ■ cc .OrH CO-^I^ OS a 5 " - CO.O.-H OT g C^O U5 t- 'rt ^ o-w N CO C3 00-* -rf £ ■-; ■-; S T-H CO CO P (N OO 00 -00 o OOO t^»Of-t cc COWNO rl p-i~~'S a -; 00 i>co ' ci c-it^r -oi'N * cc r^r^dtfi ui a S w ^oi -^r M * «c ■<1I *r r>I l^ a rf i-HCCt-I ,-ic^ — 00 00 N O «© '"' -H ,-. ® o o gl5 C3 £ o -1. « & oi ■-ag ^■ge ® 00 (N OOCD ■^ OO OOO cc •^ a>"^o lo o OO lOOO ir mS O S ^ lo t^m '^ OO t^cooo u- oootmco ^ 43 w » CO OO 030 o lO O ..J. o ^ .- CO -.1. GOtH c^ < O IH ® 03 03 ftp. S 2v--3 c o>2 f5 ? g ^ .°.2.2 is,* 0) s 03 n ci OOO n o Q S e22E o a> © t e iz; :z; 1- c £| "a 1 PC c fff- o: > ■I IS 1 c a V 5 1.'? pi pi ca C Ph >. 507 4a )0OGOC ICN -* C -- - I— C^ l>- CO lO Ci o " CC O C^ 00 lO "500^ 1::^ OS o 'y-i 'loio ' r-; r-l ^ ^ O ' 05 00 ' ^^* -OtJIi-I-^OOIO a a a g-a g a a g^ •Sh ^ .^ '^ .S2 "^ .2S .^ "^ ® © ®-^ ;t. GBEAT BRITAIN. [Table CI.] The following information was obtained from a British Govern- ment publication entitled " Report of an Inquiry by the Board of Trade into Working-Class Rents and Retail Prices, Together with the Rates of Wages in Certain Occupations in Industrial Towns in the United Kingdom in 1912." Predominant weekly rents of working-class dwellings in London (middle zone) in 1912 : Number of rooms : Price per week. Two $1. 32 Three 1. 74 Four 2.10 Five 2. 52 Six 3.00 507 52 Predominant weekly rents of working-class dwellings in cities other than London in 1912 : Number of rooms : Price per week. Two $0. 75 Three 1. 05 Four 1.23 Five 1.44 Six 1. 77 In round numbers the total population of the United Kingdom is 45,000,000. The population of London is 7,000,000. The average rent, therefore, for Great Britain, including London, would be approximately as follows : Number of rooms : Price per week. Two $0. 839 Tliree 1. 157 Four 1.365 Five 1. 608 Six 1.961 The figures all include the " local rates " (tax rates) and charges for rates. It is assumed that four is about the average number of rooms the workingman's family of two adults and three or four children in the United States will occupy and that number has been selected for comparison. Average rent per week $1. 365 Average rent per year 70. 98 UNITED STATES. [Table C2.] The following information was obtained from a United States Government publication entitled "United States Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Monthly Review of the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics, Vol. 1, October, 1915, No. 4." In this report we find that the Bureau of Standards of New York City " reached the conclusion that it is impossible for an unskilled laborer's family of five, consisting of husband, wife, and three chil- dren under 14 years of age, to live in New York City on less than $840 a year and maintain a standard of living consistent with American ideals. * * * This is apportioned as follows: Housing, $168 * * *." The following is from a publication by Mr. Scott Nearing, Ph. D., entitled " Financing the Wage-earner's Family." In this publica- tion we find reports of investigations in 1912 on the actual cost of living in four localities: Manhattan Island; Fall River, Mass.; 507 i I 53 Georgia and North Carolina; and Homestead, Pa. The items for rent in these localities were as follows: Manhattan Island $168. 00 Fall River, Mass 131.00 Georgia and North Carolina 44. 81 Homestead, Pa 200. 00 Average, $135.95. COMPABATIVE WAGES — GeEAT BRITAIN AND UNITED STATES — BUILDING, ENGI- NEERING, AND Printing Trades. [Tables D, E, F, G.] Building Trades. [Tables Dl and D2.] • WAGES PER HOUR. Bricklayers Masons Carpenters Plumbers Plasterers Painters Bricklayer's laborers Plasterer's laborers Engineeeing Trades. [Tables Dl and D2.] wages per week. Fitters Pattern makers Iron molders Laborers PRrNTTNG Trades. [Tables Dl and D2.] WAGES PER week. Compositors Letter Carriers. [Tables El and E2.] average yearly pay. Letter carriers School Teachers. [Tables Fl and F2.] AVERAGE yearly PAY. School teachers Policemen. [Tables Gl and G2.] average YEARLY SALARY. PoUcemen 507 Great Britain. United States. $0, IS 80.6549 .5861 .4974 .5782 .6416 .4397 .3577 .4096 175 175 175 175 160 115 120 8.64 9.30 9.36 4.98 25. 72 22.83 19.88 12.12 7.80 23.15 318.17 1,017. .54 661.55 837. 66 392. 91 1,094. 78 363 335 284 330 366 274 311 341 297 245 212 243 319 54 BUILDING, ENGINEERING, AND PRINTING TRADES. GEEAT BRITAIN. [Table Dl.] The following information was obtained from a British Govern- ment publication entitled, " Report of an Inquiry by the Board of Trade into Working Class Rents and Retail Prices, Together with the Rates of Wages in Certain Occupations in Industrial Towns in the United Kingdom in 1912." Occupations : Building trades (average wage per iiour) — Bricklayers $0. 18 Masons . 175 Carpenters . 175 Plumbers . 175 Plasterers •. . 175 Painters . 16 Bricklayers' laborers . 115 Masons' laborers . 115 Plasterers' laborers . 12 Engineering trades (average wage per week) — Fitters 8. 64 Tinners 8. 64 Pattern makers 9.30 Iron molders 9.36 Laborers 4.98 Printing trades (average wage per week) — Compositors 7. 80 In the case of the building trades the number of hours of employ- ment per week and the number of weeks per year is not given, nor is the number of weeks per year for the engineering and printing trades. The rates for the building trades in the United States are given in the same form, so the comparison can be made without further computation. The rates of wages for the engineering and printing trades are given by the week. UNITED STATES. [Table D2.] The following information was obtained from a United States Government publication entitled, " Bulletin of the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics (whole number 143)." The average wage ("union") per hour in 1912 for localities cov- ering the entire United States was as follows. Only those occupa- tions are here given on which figures for Great Britain were avail- able: 507 I I 55 Building trades: Bricklayers Masons Carpenters Plumbers and gas fitters Plasterers Painters Bricklayers' laborers (hod carriers) Plasterers' laborers Engineering trades: Steam fitters Pattern makers Iron molders Laborers Printing trades: Compositors Average per hour. .6549 .5864 .4974 .5782 .6416 .4397 .3577 .4096 .5567 .4390 .3654 .2636 .4978 Average hours per week. 46.2 52.0 54.4 46.0 46.5 As the figm-es for the engineering and printing trades for Great Britain are given as weekly wage, it is necessary to compute the weekly wage for those trades in the United States. Assuming that the employment for the week is constant, we have : Engineering trades (average per week): Steam fitters 125.72 Pattern makers 22. 83 Iron moulders 19.88 Laborers 12.12 Printing trades (average per week) 23. 15 POSTMEN (LETTER CARRIERS). GREAT BRITAIN. [Table El.] The following information was obtained from a United States Government publication entitled, " Bureau of Manufactures, Special Agents, Series 37-43, 1909-1915." The following figures are for 1910 : Cities (rate per week) : London .$5.10 to $8.51. Dublin 6.32 (average) ($328.67 per year). Sheffield 5.57 (average). Manchester 5.57. Birmingham 4.37 to 7.29. Glasgow 6.66 (average). No figures are given as to the number of postmen in each city, so it is only possible to average the rate of pay for the six cities. This gives the average yearly pay as $318.24. UNITED STATES. [Table E2.] The following information was obtained from the published report of the Postmaster General for 1910: Number of city letter carriers 28, 715 Amount paid to city letter carriers $29, 178,655.97 Average pay of carrier $1, 016. 14 507 56 The above does not take into account the amounts paid as follows, because it was not definitely known whether or not the numbers of these carriers was included in the item " city carriers " : Carriers, second-class offices $93,589.03 Substitute carriers 1, 056, 916. 83 Carriers for new offices 63,416.81 SCHOOL TEACHERS. GREAT BRITAIN. [Table Fl.] The following information was obtained from a United States Government publication entitled, " Senate Document, Vol. 46, Sixty- first Congress, second session, 1909-1910." The following figures are for 1910 : Cities. Class of teachers. Pay per year. Manchaster . Birmingham . Liverpool. Glasgow . Dublin. Masters . Mistresses. Assistant teachers (men): Class A Class B ClassC ClassD Assistant teachers (women) : Class A Class B ClassC ClassD Average for the 4 classes Average for all teachers Masters (mixed schools) Mistresses (girls' schools) Mistresses (infants' schools) Assistant mistresses Chief assistant master (secondary schools). Assistant master (secondary schools) . . Assistant mistresses(second"aryschools) Average, all teachers First master (mixed schools) Assistant masters (mixed schools) Headmasters, class A Headmasters, infant department Mistresses, infant department First masters Assistant masters Average, all teachers Headmasters Second masters Assistant masters Mistresses Average, all teachers Principal teachers do Assistant teachers do Average, all teachers for first 4 years, for second" 4 years. for third 1 years. for over 5 years. for first 4 years, for second 4 years, for third 4 years. for over 5 years, average per year. $583.98 S656.97 $759.17 $851.63 ?389.32 $437.98 $486.65 $535.31 $587.62 8778.64. $729.97. $535.31. $389.32. $583.98. $535.31. $413.65. $316.32. $535.32. $561.47. $1,333.42 (average maximum salary). $815.14 (average maximum salary). $859.75 (average maximum salary). $419.72 (average maximum salary). $875.97 (average maximum salary). $632. $510. $632, $267, $462 )2 i8, '0, $488.65 to $827.30. $851. S577. $456. $866. $710. $583. $423. $355. $518. (average maximum salary), (average maximum salary). to $9"3.30. to $""29.97. to $9"3.30. to $875.97. (average), (average), (average), (average). (men), (women), (men), (women). Average salary for the 5 cities, $658.63. 507 57 This is, of course, not the true average of salaries paid, as no fig- ures are obtainable showing the actual number of teachers em- ploj^ed in the various grades. The above is the best approximation we can make. As there are a greater number of teachers employed in the lower grades than in the higher, our result is, of course, higher than would be the case were complete figures available. UNITED STATES. [Table F2.] The following information was obtained from a United States Government publication entitled " United States Bureau of Educa- tion, Bulletin No. 31, 1915 (whole number 658)." This publication gives salaries of school-teachers for 58 cities. However, as data for Great Britain are only available for five cities, and as all of these are over 100,000 population, only those of the United States having a population of over 100,000 were taken from the list. These were as follows : Average per year. San Francisco, Cal $1,124.00 Denver, Colo 552. 00 Washington, D. C 982.00 Atlanta, Ga 623. 00 Indianapolis, Ind 761. 00 Baltimore, Md 692. 00 Boston, Mass 1, 001. 00 Fall River, Mass 642. 00 Minneapolis, Minn 9o7. 00 New York City 1, 197. 00 Cleveland, Ohio 791. 00 Dayton, Ohio 654. 00 Portland, Greg 1, 006. 00 Richmond, Va 578. 00 Seattle, Wash 1, 021. 00 Average for the 15 cities above, $837.66. POLICEMEN. GREAT BRITAIN. [Tabled.] The following information was obtained from a United States Government publication entitled " Bureau of Manufactures, Special Agents, Series 37^3, 1909-1910." 507 58 The following figures are for 1910 : Cities. Class. Pay per week. Average pay per week. London Sheffield Nottingham . Manchester.. Birmingham City Metropolitan Reserves Average all policemen . . Average per year, S435.76. City County Average all policemen. . Average per year, S366.60. City Average per year, S385.32. City County Average all policemen. . Average per year, $366.60. City Average per year, $379.60. S6. 56 to $10. 23 6. 19 to 8. 51 9.24 6. 33 to 8. 52 5. 84 to 7. 54 6. 33 to 8. 52 5. 84 to 7. 54 6. 10 to 8. 51 $8.44 7.35 9.34 8.38 7.42 6.69 7.05 7.41 7.42 6.69 7.05 7.30 As the figures available for the United States consider only city policemen, only city policemen are taken for Great Britain. We find the average yearly pay of policemen in the five cities above to be $394.47. UNITED STATES. [Table G2.] The following information was obtained from a United States Government publication entitled, "United States Bureau of Educa- tion, Bulletin, 1915, No. 31 (whole number 658)." This publication gives pay of policemen in 57 cities. However, as data for Great Britain are only available for 5 cities, and as all of those are over 100,000 population, only those of the United States having a population of over 100,000 were taken from the list. These were as follows: Average per year. San Francisco, Cal .$1,464.00 Denver. Colo 1, 050. 00 Washington,- D. C 1, 165. 00 Atlanta, Ga 990. 00 Indianapolis, Ind 1. 080. 00 Baltimore, Md 900.00 Boston, Mass 1, 316.00 Fall River, Mass 945.00 Minneapolis, Minn 980. 00 Cleveland, Ohio 1, 177. 00 Dayton, Ohio 960. 00 Portland, Greg 1, 080. 00 Richmond, Va 1, 080. 00 Seattle, Wash 1, 140. 00 Average for the 14 cities. .fl,094.78. 507 o THE COORDINATION OF THE MOBILE AND COAST ARTILLERY UNITS OF THE ARMY IN THE NATIONAL DEFENSE PREPARED BY THE WAR COLLEGE DIVISION, GENERAL STAFF CORPS AS A SUPPLEMENT TO THE STATEMENT OF A PROPER MILITARY POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES WCD 8911-9 ARMY WAR COLLEGE : WASHINGTON NOVEMBER, 1915 508 WASHINGTON GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1916 War Department, Document No. 508. Office of the Chief of Staff. SYNOPSIS. I. Introduction. Page. 1. Relation between statecraft and war 5 2. Defense against over-sea invasion 5 3. Function of the Navy 5 4. Function of the Army 6 II. Functions of the Mobile and Coast Artillery Troops. 5. Two classes of troops required : 6 6. Mobile troops 6 7. Coast Artillery 6 III. Mutual Dependence of Mobile and Coast Artillery Troops. 8. Cooperation of mobile and Coast Artillery units 7 9. Landings at unfortified points 8 10. Role of movable Coast Artillery 8 11. Development of heavy movable armament in the European war 9 12. Adequate mobile troops necessary 10 13. Land defense of seacoast fortifications 10 30669°— No. 508 16 (3) THE COORDINATION OF THE MOBILE AND COAST AR- TILLERY UNITS OF THE ARMY IN THE NATIONAL DEFENSE. I. INTRODUCTION. 1. RELATION BETWEEN STATECRAFT AND WAR. In our country public opinion estimates the situation, statecraft shapes the policy, while the duty of executing it devolves upon the military and naval departments. In settling disputes under our foreign policies, the weapons of our statesmen are, first, diplomacy and, second, war; when diplomacy fails to settle the matter in dis- pute, it may be necessary to resort to war. Should such a contin- gency arise, we must be prepared to meet the enemy on sea and land. This preparation should be adequate at all times or else our national policies will be aborted or frustrated. Such preparation includes as its most vital element the development of our land and sea forces. 2. DEFENSE AGAINST OVER-SEA INVASION. The object of this study is to treat primarily of operations which will come in one way or another from the sea and to which we are most vulnerable. Consideration is therefore limited to operations possible along our seacoast, and an attempt is made to show clearly the correlative functions of the Army and the Navy and the result- ant necessity of the cooperation of the mobile and coast artillery units of our land forces so as to best utilize our means of defense, in conjunction with our Navy. 3. FUNCTION OF THE NAVY. Upon the Navy devolves the solution of the problem of securing and maintaining control of the sea. To accomplish this it must be free to take the offensive promptly, that is, to seek out and defeat the enemy fleet. The use of any part of the high-sea fleet for local defense defeats the chief object of the Navy, and is a misuse of naval power. A fleet defeated at sea and undefended by an adequate army is powerless either to prevent invasion or even its own ultimate destruction by combined hostile land and naval forces. 508 (5) 4. FUNCTION OF THE ARMY. Upon the Army devolves the task of gaining and maintaining on shore the ascendency over hostile land and naval operations. To accomplish this it must be able to seek out promptly and to defeat, capture, or destroy the invader wherever he may attempt either to secure a footing upon our territory or to enter the waters of our harbors with the object of threatening the destruction of the seaport or of a fleet driven to seek refuge or repair therein. II. FUNCTION OF THE MOBILE AND COAST ARTILLERY TROOPS. 5. TWO CLASSES OF TROOPS REQUIRED. Experience has shown that our Army must consist of two distinct classes of troops — that is, mohile troo])s and coast artillery troops. Broadly speaking, the principal function of our mobile troops is to oppose an invading army., while that of our coast artillery is to oppose direct naval attacks. 6. MOBILE TROOPS. The best defense can be accomplished only by the ability to resort to offensive operations. Our mobile troops are organized on the basis of being able to resort to offensive as well as defensive opera- tions. Some of the functions of the mobile troops are : (a) To furnish detachments of mobile forces sufficient for the protection of harbor defenses and naval bases against landing par- ties during naval raids which, under modern conditions, may pre- cede a declaration of war. (h) To oppose an invading army and to* operate in any possible theater of war. (c) To furnish adequate mobile forces to protect our principal cities by preventing the landing of hostile expeditions for their cap- ture in the intervals between our fortified harbors or near such cities. The only reasonable Avay in which these localities not covered by fixed defenses can be defended is : (1) By providing a mobile land force of sufficient strength, so located that it may be thrown in at threatened points at the proper time. (2) By supplying in "addition modern movable coast defense ar- mament of heavy types to resist the direct naval attack of the cover- ing fleet. 7. COAST ARTILLERY. Our coast artillery is primarily organized for defensive operations. Some of its functions are : (a) To prevent naval occupation of important strategic and com- mercial harbors. 508 (b) To prevent naval bombardment of such cities and military and naval bases as are protected by seacoast fortifications. (c) To furnish a strong, fortified base from which submarines and other naval vessels, acting on the offensive, may operate. (d) To repel a fleet supporting a landing in force within range of the guns of a fortified harbor. (e) To cooperate with the mobile troops in the landward defense of seacoast fortifications. "With the development of modern movable artillery of large cali- ber and long range, the functions of the coast artillery will be ex- tended to repelling direct naval attack at certain unfortified harbors and favorable landing beaches in the intervals between the present fortified harbors, under the commanders of the mobile forces. III. MUTUAL DEPENDENCE OF MOBILE AND COAST ARTILLERY TROOPS. % COOPERATION OF MOBILE AND COAST ARTILLERY UNITS. f While our Xavy retains command of the sea, the only invasion , possible would come from raiding parties, limited in numbers, which an enemy fleet might land. In addition, therefore, to the coast artillery troops required to man the emplaced batteries and the mine defense of our fortified harbors, sufficient mobile troops should be provided to repel local raiding parties that might land to attack the fortifications. The personnel of the Army assigned to the fixed-gun defense, the mine defense, and the land defense in the immediate vicinity of the fortifications, may be classed while on this duty as immobile to the extent that their duties are local and pertain par- ticularly to the harbors' to Avhich they are assigned. Thus it is manifest that a portion of our mobile troops must be used at times as fortress troops, while the development of modern high-power movable coast-defense armament of heavy types will render a portion of our coast artillery troops more or less mobile. Should our Navy lose command of the sea, the fleet will seek ref- uge in our fortified harbors, under the protection of their guns. Here they may repair and refit, and they may be able to render valuable assistance in opposing the landing of an invading army. Assuming that our preparations are sufficient to prevent the enemy fleet from capturing the armament of our fortified harbors, running by the forts, or from resorting to distant bombardment of the cities thereon, he will be forced to attempt any landing (his only other means of inflicting damage) in the intervals between the fortified harbors. This effort can be frustrated only by adequate mobile forces held at strategic centers near the coast and rushed to the threatened points at the proper time. This force should be sufficient 508 8 in numbers, training, armament, and equipment to accamplish its purpose. In defenaing the intervals between our fortified harbors, the mov- able coast artillery becomes one of the auxiliary elements of the mobile force; mutual dependence of the two kinds of troops along our coast line and frontier makes their cooperation imperative ; movable heavy coasjt artillery armament renders such cooperation more effective. 9. LANDINGS AT UNFORTIFIED POINTS. History shows that landings at unfortified points have always been effected when backed up by the fire of a fleet. This is well illustrated in the recent landings on the Gallipoli Peninsula, where the allied fleet, after being defeated in the attempt to run by or reduce the Dar- J danelles batteries, supported the allied army on Gallipoli and en- abled it to land, despite the vigorous defense' of the Turkish mob^e forces. 10. ROLE OF MOVABLE COAST ARTILLERY. With the development and employment of large caliber movable coast artillery, it is confidently believed that at points near our coastal railroads the covering fleet may be held off at such a distance as to prevent the use of the secondary batteries in supporting the landing, which is therefore liable to be defeated by the fire of field artillery and small arms before reaching the shore. Thus it is manifest that the development of heavy movable artillery will greajtly strengthen our coast defense. This type of ordnance may be concentrated at points under attack, and when no longer required there can be rapidly shifted to other threatened points on the coast, where- its effect would be the greater in that it would be in the nature of a surprise to the enemy, thus enabling the coast artillery and heavy field artillery to cooperate wath the other mobile troops in the protection of the inter- vals between the fortified harbors. The development of a heavy type of movable artillery forms another link between the coast and field artillery and between our present coast artillery and mobile troops. Unfortified anchorages and favorable landing beaches near our coastal railroads may be protected against direct naval attack; the enemy fleet may be driven out of range of the coast artillery, and the invading army deprived of the support of the fleet during the land- ing. The transports will, of course, be compelled to lower their boats out of range of these batteries, and an excellent opportunity will be given to our mobile troops to defeat the invaders before they can set foot on the shore. 508 . 11. DEVELOPMENT OF HEAVY MOVABLE ARMAMENT IN EUROPEAN WAR. All information from the European armies shows that the develop- ment and employment of heavy movable artillery is one of tlie most prominent features of the present European war. It has been suc- cessfully employed there in demolishing fortifications and in blasting the enemy out of his trenches. While the general character of roads and bridges in the United States will undoubtedly operate to restrict the use of the large-caliber guns and howitzers in field warfare, there is no question of the feasibilit}^ of their employment as movable coast artillery along our coastal railroads. Descriptions given in the news- papers and illustrated periodicals and the moving pictures of war scenes and implements shown at our theaters illustrate how this heavy movable ordnance may be thus employed. Successful tests have been made with the 12-incli Navy gun mounted on specially constructed railroad car. This gun as mounted has a range of about 13 miles, and fires a projectile weighing about 800 pounds with over 200 pounds bursting charge ; it is transported on and fired from its specially designed railroad car. On account of their mobility these guns can be moved rapidly to the menaced points of the coast, be immediately prepared for action, and when threatened by the enemy's superior artillery can retreat or change position in a minimum time. In fact, this uniting of a certain num- ber of pieces of artillery constitutes a mobile fort, powerful and economical. In addition to these heavy gun batteries, lieav}^ Iioav- itzers have been similarly mounted on specially constructed railroad trucks, from which they are fired without having to construct plat- forms to i-eceive them ; the trucks are braced before firing to support the shock of discharge. In line with the above, our Ordnance Department has prepared estimates for a 14-inch gun to be transported on and fired from a specially designed railroad truck. This gun is to have a range of 30,000 yards (17 miles) and to fire a shell weighing 1,600 pounds. The 30.5 centimeter (12-inch) Austrian Skoda mortar is practi- cally our 12-inch seacoast mortar, while the 12 centimeter (16.5-inch) mortar (Krupp-) is larger than any now emplaced in our fortifica- tions; it fires a shell weighing about 1,800 pounds. Both of these types of mortars are readily transported by railroad, or over ex- ceptionally good roads and bridges by motor tractors. From photo- graphs and descriptions of these mortars and carriages it is appar- ent that heavy ordnance of this type can be effiectually employed as an adjunct to our seaicoast fortifications. These developments abroad suggest the tremendous gain the em- ployment of heavy movable artillery will give us in the defense of 508 10 our coast. In addition to the fixed defense of our fortified harbors, the employment of heavy movable artillery will make it possible to defend not only our important strategic fortified harbors and naval bases, but also to repel a hostile fleet supporting a landing in force at points on our coastal railroads. It is understood that the War Department's estimates to Congress will include 14-inch seacoast guns mounted on specially designed railroad trucks, and 16-inch mortars mounted on movable carriages. If these are provided the area of operations of our coast artillery will be materially extended. Certain unfortified anchorages and beaches favorable for landing, as well as the present fortified harbors, may be successfully defended against direct naval attack. 12. ADEQUATE MOBILE TROOPS NECESSARY. It should be understood, however, that the employment of movable coast artillery is principally against a direct naval attack, as is the emplojanent of fixed gims in our fortified harbors and naval bases. In landing troops for an attack against a fortified harbor an enemy would naturally select a landing place out of range of its guns. Mobile troops would be necessary to defend and support the heavy guns, whether fixed, as in our fortifications, or movable, as along our railroads. The employment of heavy artillery alone could not prevent an en- terprising enemy from landing troops. Heavy movable ordnance may indeed render valuable assistance to our mobile troops in re- pelling a landing in force in the intervals between our fortified harbors, but trained mobile troops can be successfully opposed only by the employment of trained mobile troops against them. It should be borne in mind that our coast line consists almost entirely of " in- tervals." The fortified harbors are few in number and far apart. Even with the addition to our armament of heavy movable artillery along our coastal railways, there would still remain numerous long stretches of our coast line and anchorages affording facilities for landing operations which could only be opposed by mobile troops acting without the cooperation of the Coast Artillery. The United States should therefore have sufficient trained, organized, and equipped mobile troops to defeat at the coast line or frontier the army that any over-sea power could bring against us. 13. LAND DEFENSE OF SEACOAST FORTIFICATIONS. The defense of the fortified harbors on the land side must be in the hands of the mobile troops. From the time of actual investment by the enemy's army it is essential that all of the fixed armament in the seacoast fortifications capable of being used in the land de- 508 11 fense be so mounted that it may be fired landward as an adjunct of the Field Artillery as well as seaward against the hostile navy. Generally speaking, the seacoast mortars (which have all-around fire) are the only parts of the heavy fixed armament now so em- placed that they can be used in the land defense, but at all forts sus- ceptible to land attack, other elements of the fixed armament should be mounted in the future for all-around fire, where practicable, with- out sacrificing range and adequate protection against naval attack. Such as are susceptible of being mounted on movable carriages should be so mounted, with the largest calibers and longest ranges pos- sible of development for such mounting. To make the fire of the sea- coast armament effective against the enemy's land batteries and trenches it is essential that suitable annnunition and fuses be pro- vided, that an effective means of range and position finding be adopted ; that accurate maps of the land area Avithin the range of the fixed armament be provided, and that ample aero equipment be furnished for reconnoissance work and for correction of fire. The heavy artillery can, by the adoption of these means, use its trained personnel to the best advantage to assist the mobile troops in the defense of the fortifications. 508 o STUDY ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF LARGE CALIBER, MOBILE ARTILLERY, AND MACHINE GUNS IN THE PRESENT EUROPEAN WAR PREPARED BY THE WAR COLLEGE DIVISION, GENERAL STAFF CORPS AS A SUPPLEMENT TO THE STATEMENT OF A PROPER MILITARY POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES WCD 9239-1 ARMY WAR COLLEGE : WASHINGTON NOVEMBER, 1915 509 WASHINGTON GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1916 War Department, Document No. 509. Office of the Chief of Staff. STUDY ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF LARGE-CALIBER MOBILE ARTILLERY AND MACHINE GUNS IN THE PRESENT EUROPEAN WAR. 1. ARTILLERY. At the outbreak of the present European war two schools of artillery thought had gradually developed among the European nations. One school, fostered by the French, believed in the low- power, rapid-fire field gun of about 3-inch caliber, and contended that with a reasonable supply of ammunition it was possible to render heavy field or siege artillery powerless with such a gun; the second school, headed by the Germans, although believing in the low-power, small-caliber, rapid-fire fieldpiece, believed that they must be reenforced by a considei-able number of heavier howitzers or field gims, which were to be used to combat the ordinary field- pieces as well as such entrenchments as could be constructed by armies in the field and for long-range firing when necessary. In general, Germany and Austria were the only European coun- tries that had developed efficient large-caliber mobile artillery at the outbreak of the present European war, but this war has devel- oped the use of the large-caliber artillery by all of the belligerent countries. This development of heavy mobile artillery in Germany, Austria, and France is shown in attached "Notes on development of large-caliber mobile artillery." How the thoughts of the majority of the field-artillery officers influenced the artillery organization of France and Germany is best shown by their army organization as it existed at the outbreak of war, as shown by the following table : Country. Number of of 3-inch field guns per 1,060 rifles. Number of light field howitzers per 1,000 rifles. Number of heavy field howitzers per 1,000 rifles. Total. France . 4.66 4.12 0.206 .61 4 S7 Germany 1.37 6 1 This table shows that at the outbreak of war Germany had about one-half of a light field gun (about 3-inch) less than France per 1,000 combatants. Germany, on the other hand, had 1.37 light field howitzers per 1,000 combatants more than France had, and had 3 30669°— No. 509 16 (3) heavy field howitzers of about 6-inch caliber for every 1 possessed by France. The proportion of heavy field howitzers was in reality much more than the table indicates, for, as is well know^n, France only had a total of twenty-four 4-gun batteries of 6-inch howitzers when the war opened, whereas Germany had more than one hundred and ninety 4-gun batteries of 6-inch howitzers. We may say that the results of the war have justified not the French but the German organization, and that as a result the French have taken up the German idea and are now doing, and have been doing for many months past, everything they can to meet the Ger- man preparedness in heavy field artillery material by equipping their army with heavy field guns and howitzers. It is of interest to note that the French 6-inch howitzer had a maximum range of about 6,600 yards, whereas the corresponding German, gun, although older in years, had a maximum range of 7,700 yards. In other words, the French were not only outclassed in number but also in the power of the individual gun. In addition to this 16-Gentimeter (6-inch) howitzer, which was assigned at the rate of 4 batteries of 4 gims each to each army corps, Germany had a certain number of heavy gun batteries of 10-centi- meter (3.94-inch) and 13-centimeter (5.12-inch) caliber and a field 28-centimeter (11.3-inch) mortar battery. The exact number of these batteries is unknown. The successes of the German army for the first four months of the war can be attributed, in a gi'eat measure, to the heavy field artillery with which they were equipped, and to its proper handling. Our observers all state that the moral actual effect produced on the French in the opening battles of the war by the heavy German field artillery was tremendous, and came to most of the Frenchmen, who had been taught and had believed that the 75-millimeter gun was the ruler of the artillery w^orld, as a terrific shock. At the commence- ment of the war the French did not take the trouble to entrench nor conceal their artillery the way they do now ; the result was that the heavy German batteries, when used as counterbatteries and assisted by aeroplanes, had a clear field and managed to destroy whole bat- talions of the light 75-millimeter French guns without the latter being able to do them any harm. After the opening battles of the war the French realized that they must have heavy field artillery, and made every effort to obtain it as soon as possible. The result was that between August, 1914, and March, 1915, they had sent a number of 4-gun batteries of 10.5-centimeter guns to the front and had adopted and issued to the service a considerable number of new 15-centimeter rapid-fire howitzers, and had started to construct 14- inch mortars. In other words, a few months after the war started 509 the French school of artillery thought had completely veered around and adopted the German artillery idea> From the artillery point of view, tliQ lesson to be learned from the war is the same" lesson that has been taught by every war since the discovery of cannon, namely, that everything being equal, the side having the heaviest gun and the best ammunition-supply sys- tem is the one that i^ best able to give the proper support to its infantry, and therefore has the. greatest chance of success. Before the present war started most of our artillery officers be- lieved that the heaviest field gim or howitzer which would be needed by an army was the G-inch howitzer firing a 120-pound projectile, and in justice to. them it must be stated that, with the exception of the German and Austrian Armies, this belief was general. They also believed that the function of the heavy field guns of more than 6-inch caliber, which it was known Germany and Austria possessed, was to destroy field forts of steel and concrete, and that it would not be possible to transport either of these guns or the ammunition they required with the field armies. How M'rong this assumption was is shown by the present war in which the Germans and Aus- trians have actually transported with their field armies 11-inch howitzers, 12-inch howitzers, 16-inch howitzers, and 17.7-inch how- itzers and used them, not for the purpose of destroying works of steel and concrete, but for the purpose of destroying field fortifi- cations, supply depots in rear of the line, villages in which troops are quartered, wire entanglements and other obstacles. All reports now indicate that the great successes obtained by the German and Austrian Armies on the eastern front were due in no small measure to the use of these enonnous fieldpieces, which must hereafter be considered as essential to success in war. The lesson to be learned as to, the amouint of artillery to be assigned to the different units has been taken advantage o-f by the General Staff, who, in the organization recommended in their mili- tary policy, have increased the number of Field Artillery regiments with each Infantry division from tw^o to three, and in the report of a board of officers which recently recommended that the heavy field artillery with each field army be increased from one to three regi- ments. These recommendations, if carried into effect, will result in the following proportion of guns per 1,000 combatants: Field giin. Light fleUl howitzer. Heavy field gim and howitzer. Total. Fnited states 2.70 4.12 1.35 1.37 1.12 .61 5 17 6 10 509 The percentage of guns provided by Germany for her army is shown above for the purpose of comparison. It shows that before the war Germany had 1.42 more field guns per thousand combatants, about the same number of light field howitzers, and 0.51 of a heavy field gun less than we now contemplate. The number of heavy field guns given in the above table for Germany does not include any guns heavier than the 16 centimeter (6-inch howitzer), whereas for us it included the heavier contemplated fieldpieces. The proposed con- templated scheme for procuring enough guns, ammunition, and other necessary field artillery material to equip 1,000,000 men will involve the expenditure of about $470,000,000 over a period of 8 years, and, when completed, will only provide for about twice the number of guns used by Marshal Mackensen's army in the Galician campaign. In other words, if the scheme is approved by Congress, in eight years from now we will have about enough gims and ammunition and other necessary stores to supply two German field armies. 2. ARTILLERY AMMUNITION. Before the present war no one ever dreamed of the amount of am- munition that would be required to keep the armies supplied, and if he did dream of it he kept his dream to himself for fear of being called crazy. It was known that at the beginning of the war both France and Germany had a reserve supply of small-caliber field-gun ammunition of about 2,500 rounds per gun, and a corresponding amount for the larger fieldpieces on hand, and were splendidly equipped with facilities for manufacturing ammunition of all kinds in large quantities. Notwithstanding their reserve supply, which was considered immense at that time, and their facilities of manu- facture, both these nations found themselves confronted with a most serious shortage of ammunition before the war had been going on very long, and in the case of France at least forced her to practically suspend operations for a protracted period. At the present time the reserve supply of ammunition to be kept on hand per gun is considered as that necessary to wear out the gun ; in other words, during peace a suiRcient amount of ammunition should be accumulated for each gun to permit it to fire as long as it is capable of doing so. For a 3-inch field gun this amounts to about 5,000 rounds per gun. The question of ammunition supply has become such an important one that France and England have both placed cabinet ministers in charge of it ; and England, so far as we know, has not solved the problem to date. 509 3. AERO SERVICE FOR FIELD ARTILLERY. Aeroplanes are now recognized as indispensable adjuncts of the Field Artillery. The following will illustrate some of the service performed by the Aviation Corps: (1) General reconnoissance work. (2) To discover exposed batteries of the enemy. (3) To test concealment of their own batteries. (4) To direct artillery fire on enemy's batteries and trenches. Observation captive balloons are employed, as shown by the fol- lowing report: The officers who conduct the fire of these guns are well up in the trenches, connected with their guns or batteries by telephone wires, which are usually run along the walls of the communication trenches and held in place by staples. In one second-line trench I counted 11 different telephone wires running out to different observation trenches. In addition to the observation posts in the advance trenches there is another method employed by both sides during the day ; it is the Drachen, or sausage-shaped captive balloon which is sent up at daylight and remains all day until dark, at altitudes varying, I should estimate, from four to eight hundred yards, and far enough in rear of the lines to escape artillery fire, if directed against it. The observer in this balloon is equipped with telephonic communication and powerful glasses. This silent sentinel remains up rain or shine, and both sides have the greatest respect for its power of observation. "We were not allowed to assemble in groups in view of them at the front. These observers are on the alert at all times, and we were informed that where groups of 5 or 10 appeared in the open, a shell was usually sent in their direction as a warning that nothing escaped their observation. These balloons are so generally used by both sides that during a clear day tliey can be seen up and down the lines as far as the eye can reach. I counted eight along the front — Notre Dame de Lorette — St. Eloi. They are used also, I was informed, very often in directing the fire of heavy artillery. The steadiness of this shape of balloon, even in a strong wind, is quite remarkable. The War College Division has not made recommendation as to aviation equipment needed, as tests are now^ being made under direc- tion of the Field Artillery Board at Fort Sill, Okla. 4. CONCLUSION. In general, the opinion of foreign officers and all of our observers abroad is that the largest calibers are the most effective and have done the work in this war with high-explosive shell. The large-caliber howitzers and mortars with high-explosive shells are employed not only to reduce concrete forts, but are generally used now against fieldworks and entrenchments of all kinds. Every effort should be made to provide our Army with large- caliber mobile artillery and ample aero equipment. 509 5. MACHINE GUNS. Machine guns have phiyed a most importjint part in the present war, and have been extensively used by all sides, under all condi- tions, and have proven their worth. The following table shows the number of machine guns per 1,000 men of Infantry or Cavalry provided for by the organizations of the European armies at the opening of the war, and also the proposed proportion contemplated for our Army in the tables of organization : Army Corps. Infantry Division. Reserve Infantry Division. Cavalry Division. Infantry. Cavalry. Infantry. Cavalry. Infantry. Cavalry. Cavalry. 2 2 2 2 2 2 2.12 2 1.32 1.67 2.2 2.2 1.67 2.20 3.24 3.24 Since the war started it is positively known that all the warring nations have greatly increased the number of machine guns with their armies. Exactly what this increase has been is. however, unlaiown. Reports received from our observers indicate that there is about one machine gun for every 30 yards on the western front. At the commencement of the war the Germans had 64 and the _ French 66 guns per army corps. m 6. CONCLUSION. It is believed that machine guns at the rate of 6 per battalion of Infantry or squadron of Cavalry should be provided for our Army, or 18 machine guns per regiment of Infantry. NOTES ON DEVELOPMENT OF LARGE-CALIBER MOBILE ARTIL- LERY IN EUROPEAN WAR. GERMANY. The Germans had 42-centimeter (16.r)-inch) mortars, 28-centimeter (11.023-inch) Krupp siege howitzers, and 21-centimeter (8.4-inch) howitzers at the outbreak of war. These mortars and howitzers were employed in the reduction of the Belgian fortifications. The 4^ -centimeter {16. 5-inch) mortars are transported by rail, and spur tracks are run directly to the edge of the pits in which they are emplaced. It is probnble that a derrick car is used to mount the parts of the carriage :uid the mortar and also to handle the slioll, which weighs about 2,000 pounds. In the recent German-Austrian oflfensive in Galicia, May 2 to June 25, 1915, large-caliber howitzers and mortars were used with marked success against field intrenchments and field works. In addition to tlie regulation quota of artillery pertaining to the divisional orgunizution, there was assigned to the army for the special mission a large quantity of heavy artillery, including certain 21-centimetor howitzers, 28-cen- timeter seacoast mortars, 80..")-centimeter mortar batteries, and probably some 42-centimeter mortars, as these were used later in the campaign at Przemysl. Tlie present war has shown that we must revise our views as to what constitutes " field " artillery. With ordnance having calibers as large as 30.5 centimeters, moving steadily along with the troops, the artillery features of present-day combats have received a marked development. Thanks to this heavy ordnance, the German-Austrians were enabled to break down the mate- rial and moral resistance of the Russians at all their strongly prepared posi- tions, and to prepare the way for assault of the infantry, which found its task relatively easy. At the had a ring trench about 200 feet in di- ameter on the summit of a low knoll forming a closed work about 2.50 yards in rear of a long rifle trench lower down a gentle slope. Within this ring trench were seven craters made by 30..5-centimeter (12-inch) mortar shells, some of the craters intersecting and sections of the trench having been obliter- ated. At Hill on the position in front of the Russians had a strong fieldwork consisting of a double tier of trenches with overhead cover, traverses and splinter proofs. This was assaulted and carried by a division after about 2 hours" artillery preparation by 21-centimeter (8.25-inch) howit- zers and 30.5-centimeter (12-inch) mortars, with almost negligible losses. This work was inspected before the field had been cleared, and it was easy to understand how demoralized and shaken its defenders must have been in consequence of the effective artillery fire. About 100 corpses lay in or close to the trenches, most of them terribly mangled, even with clothes torn from the body by the blast which occasionally blew them out of the trenches on the gi'ound in the rear. Whole sections of the parapet were obliterated and splinter proofs were wrecked. This work was built along the edge of a pine gi'oove which was almost leveled to the gi'ound by the artillery fire. Again at , the work on knoll , to the west of , a very strongly built fieldwork with strong, wide wire entanglements, was bombarded for an hour with heavy artillery with similar effects to those described above. The at- tack of field fortifications by 12-incli ordnance is a novel feature in war, but in no other way can the strongly built positions, which an enemy can build in a few days, be prepared for assault by infantry. The transport of such heavy field ordnance, and, more particularly of the needful annnunition supply, of course, presents tremendous difficulties, and, without fairly good roads, is impracticable * * *^ During long trips, on four different days, over practically all the roads be- tween the and , military transportation of every kind, from the light, native country wagon, hauled by two diminutive horses, to the heavy motors, hauling 28 and 30.5 centimeter mortai-s, where encountered moving steadily to the front without any serious difficulties * * *_ In their previously prepared positions, the showed some fine examples of technical work, their fire trenches being invariably provided with overhead cover, and with plenty of splinter proofs close at hand. It was only because of their free use of the heaviest artillery that the German-Austrians were able to break the lines. 509 10 The Germans have, on several occasions, fired 38-eentimeter (15-inch) shells into from a distance, it is estimated, of 30 liilometers (18.7 miles) ; where these shells have fallen they have caused great destruction. The success of the 42-centimeter mortar and the excellent results secured from this weapon have steadily spurred the Krupp Co. on to developing even larger and better calibers of guns. It is claimed that the Krupp Co. has novr perfected the 54-centimeter (21.26-inch) gun with a range of about 38 miles. AUSTRIA. The Austrian army infantry division had, at the outbreak of the war, about 42 field guns and howitzers per division of 12,000 rifles. This percentage is exclusive of the corps artillery which is composed of 8 heavy howitzers. As the war went on the number of batteries has been increased in various ways until there are now probably 50 field guns per division. The corps artil- lery remains as at the beginning, but the field army artillery, composed of 24, 30.5 and 45 centimeter (17.7-inch) mortars, is being constantly increased and is used as field artillery. The Austrians are using their large guns up to 45 centimeter (17.7-inch) against fieldworks, field guns, storage depots, railway stations and villages, where troops are quartered, and to tear up barbed wire and other entangle- ments. These uses are made because the guns are available. The writer visited three forts of shortly after the fortress was cap- tured. The Germans had used 42-centimeter mortars to prepare the forts, but what part of the destruction of the concrete work was done by the German shells or what part by the when they surrendered the fortress to the is not known, but it may be stated that the moral elfect of the bombard- ment was very great, for the defense was weak when the infantry assault took place. The had very few guns of position in and the mobile artillery was reduced as much as possible to provide field artillery for the field army. In one artillery position were found two 8-centimeter field guns and a 5-inch gun stood on the road nearby, showing that it had been in use in the vicinity. In one of the forts there was a rapid-fire gun pedestal mount of 8-inch caliber. These were the only guns seen. The writer has seen the effect of fire of the 30.5 centimeter (12-inch) and 45 centimeter (17.7-inch) mortars on semipermanent earthworks. The craters on the hill in rear of the line of works were 20 feet deep and 30 feet in diameter, and the blast from the explosion of the shells must have been tremendous. The usual killing radius mentioned by officers was 200 meters, but it is scarcely that great, but it is great enough to cause the to have a profound respect for the " ammunition wagons," as the soldiers called them. Artillery fire is very effective when the target is suitable; for instance, en- filading artillery fire is feared. It is to be doubted whether the 3-inch gun produces the effect on moving lines in the open which might be expected ; but the heavy shell fire from field howitzers is very effective as a morale destroying agent. 509 11 FRANCE. At the outbreak of war, the mobile artillery consisted of substan- tially the following calibers : 65-millimeter (2.56-inch) mountain. 75-millimeter (2.92-inch) field guns. 155-millimeter (6.1-inch) rapid-fire Rimailho gun. The following artillery, considered as obsolete at outbreak of war, was put in action as soon as possible after the superiority of the Ger- man heavy artillery was demonstrated: Old material : 120-millimeter (4.73-inch) long and short gun. 155-millimeter (6.107-inch) long and short gun. 220-millimeter (8.66-inch) mortar. 270-millimeter (10.66-inch) mortar. About one month before the outbreak of war, 6 regiments of 105- millimeter (4.14-inch) guns were authorized, but the guns were not ready for issue at the outbreak of the war. Since the outbreak of war these regiments have been furnished with the 105-millimeter (4.14-inch) guns, and the following other calibers have been in- troduced : 1.50-millimeter (6-inch) Schneider rapid-fire howitzers. 260-millimeter (10.5-inch) howitzers. 305-millimeter (12-inch) navy gun, mounted on railway carriage. 340-millimeter (13.8-inch) navy gun, mounted on railway carriage. The French have been making a new 370-millimeter (14.6-inch) mortar. Sis or eight have been completed and are to be sent into the field immediately This piece was under study when the war bi'oke out, and is comparatively simple in construction ; the trials have given most satisfactory results. The 75-millimeter field gun is now seldom used by the French in bombarding field entrenchments. 509 o I STUDY ON EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS GIVING MILITARY TRAINING AS A SOURCE FOR A SUPPLY OF OFFICERS FOR A NATIONAL ARMY PREPARED BY THE WAR COLLEGE DIVISION. GENERAL STAFF CORPS AS A SUPPLEMENT TO THE STATEMENT OF A PROPER MILITARY POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES WCD 9053-121 ARMY WAR COLLEGE : WASHINGTON NOVEMBER, 1915 510 WASHINGTON GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1916 War Department, Document No. 510. Office of the Chief of Staff . SCHOOLS AND COLLEGES AS A SOURCE FOR THE SUPPLY OF OFFICERS FOR A NATIONAL ARMY. 1. The organization of any fighting force, after its framework has been determined, must be supplemented by providing an efficient, sure, and continuous supply of material for trained officers. The present war in Europe gives a graphic picture of the effects of this deficiency in the difficulties experienced by the British in the western, and the Russians in the eastern, theater of operations, in assuring either a proper degree of training for the troops at the front or of providing them with capable leaders. The proof is con- clusive that in our day and generation such a defect may spell irreparable disaster. 2. The history of the organization of the Federal Armies at the beginning of the Civil War supplies us with an even more striking example than the one above of a total lack of military preparedness in providing, at the outbreak of war, a sufficiency of trained officers. This deficiency alone explains to a considerable degree the lack of decisive results for the Union Armies before 1863. With these evident defects in our system, brought before us through bitter ex- perience, we should not fail to organize our resources of dependable personnel and insure a continuous flow of an ample supply of trained officers, from well-known and established reservoirs. In no other way can we provide enough officers for the Regular Army, the Regular Army Reserve, and the Volunteers on mobilization, or later replace the wastage incident to war. 3. The laws now on the statute books provide the following sources for officers for the Regular Army : (a) United States Military Academy. — Number at present gradu- ated yearly, more than sufficient to fill all vacancies occurring. (h) Selected enlisted men. — None have been appointed for two years on account of the lack of vacancies. {c) Selected graduates of colleges at which officers are detailed 08 professors of military science and tactics. — None have been ap- pointed lately, as there have been no vacancies. {d) Other civilians. — There will be no shortage of officers for the Regular Army so long as its strength does not exceed 100,000 and its organization remains as it stands to-day. The number of 80669°— No. 610 U (3) graduates can always be increased by reenacting the present law authorizing the appointment and entrance of a cadet's successor one year before he is graduated. This is now ejffective until 1923, having been extended by the Act of Congress approved March 4, 1915. 4. With an increase in strength in the Regular Army, the organi- zation of the Regular Army Reserve, the need for providing reserve officers for the Regular Army, for reserve units, and for instructors with the second line army and educational institutions, the follow- ing sources offer means for solving this problem : (a) The United States Military Academy. — To be enlarged. (&) Selected enlisted men. — This number will be limited and no data exist upon which we can estimate the number which we can obtain. (c) Ex-volunteer officers and National Guard oflcers. — It is im- possible to estimate the number of officers who can be obtained from the first class mentioned, for the reason that some time has elapsed since these officers left the military service, and they have undoubt- edly not continued their training during the interim. This number, of course, will be limited. There will be a number of National Guard officers who will make good officers, but it is impossible to form an estimate of the total number which can be obtained. There is no doubt, however, that there are many who will be glad to come into the reserve units and thus assure themselves of the opportunity for future service at the front. {d) Graduates of colleges and universities., at which there is a standard course of instruction.^ and at which an officer of the Army is detailed for the purpose of giving military instruction. — The fol- lowing is the number of students who have been under military in- struction, and graduated from institutions having military depart- ments, in the past 10 years: 1905. 1906. 1907. 1908. 1909. 1910. Students under military instruction. 17,835 18, 138 21,616 24, 101 25,222 27, 122 Military students graduated. 2,441 2,890 3,073 3,441 3,789 4,215 1911.. 1912.. 19J3 1. 1914'. 1915 1. Students under military Instruction. 28,843 29, 979 30,872 31,911 32,313 Military students, graduated. 4,700 4,757 5,153 4,970 5,200 • About 1,100 of these are now listed as suitabl'^ for commissions Only a small percentage of the total number graduated, 44,529, will be "trained officers," as the words are understood to-day, but all will have pursued a course, both practical and theoretical, in- suring a working knowledge of rudiments. Since 1912 the training 510 has become more intensive, and 1,100 out of 15,323 have been recom- mended for commissions in the Regular Army and Volunteer forces. Previous to 1912 nearly all have, no doubt, lost all touch with things military, and have consequently forgotten what little they learned before their graduation. The possibilities may be better understood when it is realized that 44,529 students have been graduated from the military departments of these institutions since 1905. If close cooperation between the War Department and authorities of these institutions had been the rule and not the exception prior to 1912, a much greater proportion of graduate military students would now be available. Notwith- standing the fact that a complete standardization of the military course has not yet been effected, the authorities of a majority of colleges are, nevertheless, sufficiently interested to agree to practi- cally the same course for their institutions. They do not all agree as to time to be devoted to the course, but the subjects studied and the practical field work accomplished are to all intents and purposes identical. 5. In this connection it is thought best to give a short description of the institutions under consideration and to explain their classifi- cation. Broadly speaking, all educational institutions have been consid- ered as divided into two general classes — the university and college, and the preparatory type. The selection of officers should, as a rule, be made from institutions of the university and college type. We will thus obtain a more mature and better educated man, more capable of fulfilling the functions of an officer. The military schools — for example. Culver Military Academy, Indiana; St. John's, Manlius, N. Y. — are of the preparatory type, and their output as a rule is too young and immature to make the best officers. Exceptions to this rule will be found when the emer- gency exists, and there will be no trouble in deciding the different cases as they arise. Among the university and college type are a number of institu- tions known as military colleges. For example, St. John's College, Annapolis, Md. ; the South Carolina Military Academy, Charleston, S. C. ; the Agricultural and Mechanical College of Texas; Norwich University, Northfield, Vt. ; and the Virginia Military Institute, Lex- ington, Va. In these colleges the student is continually in uniform and through- out the entire day subject to military discipline. The academic cur- riculum is that of a college, the graduate usually receiving a B. S. or M. E. upon graduation. His training has been patterned largely upon that of the West Point cadet, and the material coming from 510 6 these colleges could supplement, in a very simple and easy way, the material coming from the United States Military Academy. The patriotic endeavors of these institutions should be recognized and selected graduates, without examination other than physical, be appointed annually to fill vacancies in the Regular Army not taken by the graduates from the Military Academy and by selected enlisted men. At present each of these institutions, by the authority of the President, can select one man each year for appointment, under the above-mentioned conditions, to the Regular Army. This number should be increased to 10 annually, and in this way foster the pride and efficiency of these useful institutions. 6. The appointment of officers of the Army as professors of mili- tary science and tactics at the several institutions and the issue of equipment is regulated by the provisions of section 1225, Revised Statutes. This is quoted at length, as it is the basis of all subsequent legislation relating to the relations existing between the War De- partment and these institutions: Sec. 1225. The President may, upon the application of any established mili- tary institute, seminary or academy, college or university, within the United States, having capacity to educate at the same time not less than one hundred and fifty male students, detail an officer of the Army or Navy to act as super- intendent or professor thereof; but the number of officers so detailed shall not exceed fifty from the Army and ten from the Navy, being a maximum of sixty at any time, and they shall be apportioned throughout the United States, first, to those State institutions applying for such detail that are required to pro- vide instruction in military tactics under the provisions of the act of Congress of July second, eighteen hundred and sixty-two, donating lands for the estab- lishment of colleges where the leading object shall be the practical instruction of the industrial classes in agriculture and the mechanic arts, including mili- tary tactics ; and after that said details to be distributed, as nearly as may be practicable, according to population. The Secretary of War is authorized to issue, at his discretion and under proper regulations to be prescribed by him, out of ordnance and ordnance stores belonging to the Government and which can be spared for that purpose, such number of the same as may appear to be required for military instruction and practice by the students of any college or university under the provisions of this section, and the Secretary shall require a bond in each case, in double the value of the property, for the care and safe-keeping thereof, and for the return of the same when required : Provided, That nothing in this act shall be so construed as to prevent the detail of officers of the Engi- neer Corps of the Navy as professors in scientific schools or colleges as now provided by act of Congress approved February twenty-sixth, eighteen hundred and seventy-nine, entitled "An act to promote a knowledge of steam engineer- ing and iron shipbuilding among the students of scientific schools or colleges in the United States " ; and the Secretary of War is hereby authorized to issue ordnance and ordnance stores belonging to the Government on the terms and conditions hereinbefore provided to any college or university at which a retired officer of the Army may be assigned as provided by section twelve hundred and sixty of the Revised Statutes. 510 The main points of dispute between the War Department and the authorities of the institutions are : (a) The indifference of the constituted authorities to the military department and a misunderstanding of the benefits which may be obtained by carrying out this training, as indicated by the law. This is ordinarily shown by the wholesale excusing of students from this work because of athletics, etc. (b) By not providing sufficient funds for the upkeep of the mili- tary department to insure its efficiency. () France. — Bonds, national defense, 5 per cent (6 to 12 months) $1, 2.30, 000, 000 Bonds, Treasury, 5 per cent (a term of years) 450,000,000 ((?) Russia. — Bonds 5 per cent $515, 000, 000 Bonds 5J per cent 515, 000, 000 Bonds 4 per cent 309, 000, 000 Treasury bills at home and in England and France 1, 252, 000, 000 {d) Italy. — Bonds 5J per cent $200, 000, 000 Bonds 41 per cent 200,000,000 {e) Belgium. — No data available. (/) Serbia. — No data available. {g) Japan. — No data available. 512 11 {h) Germany. — First war loan js $1,115,000,000 Second war loan 5's 2,265,000,000 Third war loan 5's 3,025,000,000 {i) Austria- Hungary. — Austrian bonds 5* per cent $433, 000, 000 Hungarian bonds 6 per cent 237,000,000 War loans, credits, etc 1,161,000,000 {k) Turkey. — Xo data available. Table 4. — Foreign loans. r Except when otherwise noted, the figures for this table were taken from the Literary Digest, Nov. 20, 1915, p. 1198, quoting New York Times Annalist.] {a) Great Britain. — One-half of Anglo-French credit in New York 5 per cent bonds ^_ .$250, 000, 000 (5) France. — One-year 5 per cent notes in London L $50, 000, 000 One-year 5 per cent notes in New Y'ork 25, 000, 000 Credits and collateral loan in New York 73, 000, 000 One-half Anglo-French loan in New York 250,000,000 (c) Russia. — See "Treasury bills,"' etc., under (c) Eussia, table 3. {d) Italy. — Loan now being placed in New York, $25,000,000. {e) Belgium. — $50,000,000 loaned by British Government during the war without interest. (/) Serbia. — $4,000,000 loaned by British Government during the war without interest. {g) Japan. — No data available. {h) Germany. — Notes in United States__^ $10, 000, 000 (/) Austria-Hungary. — No data available. (/i) Turkey. — Loan in Germany $250,000,000 Table 5. (o) Great Britain (6) France , (c) Russia (d) Italy (f) Belgium (/) Serbia National Per capita wealth at be- wealth at be- ginning of war. ginning of war. $85,000,000,000 50, 000, 000, 000 40, 000, 000, 000 20, 000, 000, 000 9,000,000,000 500,000,000 (?) (7) $1,777 1,625 250 588 National wealth at be- ginning of war. Per capita wealth at be- ginning of war. (o) Japan i . . (ft) Germany S80, 000, 000, 000 (t) Austria- Him- garv (fc) Turkey 25,000,000,000 3,000,000,000 (?) S923 NATIONAL DEBT. (o) Great Britain. (6) France (c) Russia (d) Italy (f) Belgium (/) Serbia 1916 S3, 485, 000, 000 6,345,000,000 4, 540, 000, 000 2, 850, 000, 000 825, 000, 000 125, 000, 000 $11,000,000,000 9, 500, 000, 000 6,500,000,000 3,000,000,000 825, 000, 000 125, 000, 000 (o) Japani ; (ft) Germany $3, 735, 000, 0(Xt (i) Austria- Hun- ■ ■ gary 1,050,000,000 (fc) Turkey 675,000,000 1916 $9,985,000,000 2,000,000,000 675,000,000 512 • No data available. o FORTIFICATIONS PREPARED BY THE WAR COLLEGE DIVISION, GENERAL STAFF CORPS AS A SUPPLEMENT TO THE STATEMENT OF A PROPER MILITARY POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES WCD 4896-4 ARMY WAR COLLEGE : WASHINGTON NOVEMBER, 1915 513 WASHINGTON GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFIOE 1916 War Department, Document No. 513. Office of the Chief of Staff . I I SYNOPSIS. I. Introduction. Page. 1. Influence of forta and fortified cities, as distinguished from intrenched areas, upon operations on land 5 Fortifications of Liege 5 Fortifications of Namur and along the French frontier 6 Antwerp ^ Verdun 7 Przemysl and the Russian fortifications 7 The fortified city of the futiu-e 8 2. Influence of seacoast fortifications with particular reference to the attack by allied fleet on Dardanelles fortifications 10 Description of the Dardanelles 10 Fortifications of the Dardanelles 10 (a) Power of the guns 11 (6) Character of the batteries 12 Reduction of the forts at the entrance 12 Operations against the forts at the narrows 13 Final attack of March 18 13 Efficiency of seacoast fortifications 14 Requisites for successful defense 15 Necessity for mobile troops 15 3. Summary of attempt to take Dardanelles fortifications by mobile troops 16 Initial delay 16 Terrain 17 Strength of forces 17 Allies' plan 17 Landings at south end of peninsula 18 Landing by the Australian-New Zealand corps 19 Diversion by the French 19 Attempts to advance 19 Landing at Suvla Bay and subsequent operations 20 Necessity for heavy mobile guns 21 The value of mobile troops in coast defense 21 513 (3) i FORTIFICATIONS. I. INTRODUCTION. In a memorandum from the Chief of Staff dated November 15, 1915, directions were given for the preparation of a brochure upon the subject of "Fortifications," with sole reference to the present European war, giving especial attention to the following points: (a) What influence forts and fortified cities, as distinguished from intrenched areas, have exerted on the operations on land. (b) Influence of seacoast fortifications with particular reference to the attack of the allied fleet against the fortifications of the Dar- danelles. Give in detail the total armament, with calibers of arms of the fleet as well as of the land forts, and the losses in personnel and material suffered by both fleets and forts. (c) A brief summary of the attempt to take these forts by the operation of the mobile troops ; the number of mobile troops, as near as can be determined, used to date, both in the attack and in the defense, with total losses. This has been done as far as practicable with the data now avail- able, and the results are noted in the following paragraphs : 1. INFLUENCE OF FORTS AND FORTIFIED CITIES, AS DISTIN- GUISHED FROM INTRENCHED AREAS, UPON OPERATIONS ON LAND. FGRTin CATIONS OF LIEGE. At the outbreak of the present European war the Germans, in their march through Belgium, were, on the evening of August 4, 1914, closing in on Liege, which lies astride the Meuse River near the eastern boundary of Belgium. The fortifications of Liege had been constructed by Brialment, a Belgian officer, who also designed the fortifications of Namur and Antwerp. They were completed in 1892, and consisted of a circle of forts commanding the main ap- proaches to the city and about 4 miles therefrom. There were six main forts of the pentagonal type and six smaller, triangular in shape; the greatest distance between forts was 7,000 yards, and the average less than 4,000 yards. Each fort had a garrison of about 80 men and an armament of two 6-inch guns, four 4.7-inch guns, two 8-inch mortars, and three or four quick-fire guns, the total number of guns in the 12 forts being about 400. It was intended to construct 513 (5) between the forts lines of trenches and redoubts for infantry and gun pits for artillery, but this had not been done. The fort itself consisted of a low mound of concrete or masonry, roofed with concrete and covered with earth; a deep ditch sur- rounded the mound, the top of the latter barely showing above the margin of the ditch. The top was pierced with circular pits, in which " cupolas " or gun turrets moved up and down. Within the mound there were quarters, machinery, stores, etc. When the Germans appeared the Belgian mobilization was still in progress, and it is probable that the garrison, instead of being 30,000 as was intended, was only 20,000. The Germans, numbering about 30,000, concentrated the attack on the four forts at the southeast sector and opened up with field gims on the night of August 4—5. One of the forts was silenced by this fire on the 5th, and on the 6th the Germans brought up their 8.4-inch howitzers and probably some 11-inch mortars, outranging the Belgian gims. Shells are said to have gone through 12 feet of concrete. The accurate firing of the Germans showed that the forts could not long withstand, and in the afternoon of the 6th the Belgian field force was withdrawn from the city and all the forts abandoned except the northern ones. The Ger- mans left the remaining forts in peace until the 13th, when the 11-inch mortars opened on them, and by the 15th all had been cap- tured. The cupplas had been smashed and shells had penetrated the roofs and exploded the magazines. FORTIFICATIONS OF NAMUR AND ALONG THE FRENCH FRONTIER. Namur was defended by a ring of nine forts, 2| miles from the city, with an armament similar to that in the Liege forts. The garrison of 26,000 had prepared the defense of the interA^als by in- trenchments and wire entanglements, and a vigorous defense was intended, as French help was expected. The Germans brought up 32 modern siege pieces, including the 42-centimeter howitzer, its first appearance, and the Austrian 12-inch mortar, and placed them 3 miles from the Belgian lines. The attack began August 20. On the next day the Belgians had to withdraw from the advanced trenches owing to their inability to reply to the German fire; two forts fell; three others were silenced after an attack of two hours. On the 23d Namur was occupied, and on the 25th the last fort had fallen. One fort had fired only 10 times and was itself struck by 1,200 shells fired at the rate of 20 per minute. The speedy fall of Namur came near playing havoc with the allies' plans, as with the delay caused by its resistance they had intended to complete the concentration along the Belgian frontier. 513 Other fortified places, such as Lille, Laon, La Fere, and Rheims, along the northeastern French boundary fell before the advancing Germans without striking a blow. The advance was on such a broad front that an attempt at defense would have endangered the safety of the garrisons, and it was imperative that the garrisons join the field army. By August 28 Mauberge of all the northern strong- holds alone held out. The defenses had been brought to a high state of efficiency, the intervals well prepared with an armored train running on a track encircling the main line of defenses. The German infantry invested the place August 27, but the siege guns did not go into action until September 3. The place fell September 8 with a loss of 40,000 men. ANTWERP. Antwerp, said to be the second most strongly fortified city of Europe, encircled by a girdle of 20 permanent forts and 12 earthen redoubts, was in similar manner quickly reduced by the heavy siege guns. The garrison, beginning to profit by the lessons learned at Liege and Namur, attempted to keep the enemy's big howitzers beyond range of the forts, but were driven back by the superior numbers of the Germans, whose siege gims were then brought up and quickly demolished the masonry forts. Thus the garrison: was deprived of any further assistance from its larger guns and, being but poorly entrenched and unable to withstand the overwhelm- ing artillery fire, was forced back to the inner line, thereby per- mitting the siege guns to come within range of the city, which had therefore to be abandoned promptly in order to prevent its destruc- tion by bombardment. VERDUN. Verdun, however, on the eastern French frontier, with a ring of forts 5 miles from the city, is still in the hands of the French, because with a field army employing earthworks the fortified zone has been largely extended and the German howitzers have been kept 6 miles from the forts. The unfortified city of Nancy has withstood several heavy attacks, being protected by a field army on the hills forming the " Grand Crown." PRZEMYSL AND THE RUSSIAN FORTIFICATIONS. The Russians invested the fortress of Przemysl on September 22, 1914, but later the siege was raised and on November 12 it was invested a second time. As the Russians had no heavy siege gims, the siege resulted in an attempt to starve out the garrison, which suc- 513 8 ceeded March 22, 1915. With the return of the Teutonic allies in May, 20 days was sufficient to recapture the place. The Russians stated that their ammunition supply was low, but it is safe to assume that the presence of the heavy siege guns with the Germans had a great deal to do with the recapture. The fortresses guarding Warsaw and the Russian frontier on the west were quickly taken during the advance of the Teutonic allies in the summer of 1915, either by maneuvering the defenders out of them or by bringing up the heavy guns and shattering the fortifi- cations, as at Novo Georgievsk. The fortress of Ossowetz on the line Niemen-Bobr-Narew had a different history. In February, 1915, the Russians fell back across the Bobr River to the protection of, Ossowetz, which stood on the east bank along a long ridge covered with woods, affording good artillery positions, and commanding the opposite bank, where artillery positions were poor. There were ex- tensive marshes along the river, but at this time of the year they were frozen. The Germans at first tried to turn the position, but failing, brought up their heavy mortars, even the 42-centimeter howitzer. The Russian batteries were so well concealed that the Germans could not locate them and their big guns did no damage. The Russians silenced several batteries without suffering from their fire. As the warm weather advanced, the marshes made it difficult to emplace the heavy guns. Ossowetz did not fall until August 22 in the general Russian retreat after the capture of Warsaw. THE FORTIFIED CITY OF THE FUTURE. The failure of the forts in the present war is due to several causes : First. Being built some years before the war, their position was accurately known to the enemy, thus losing the advantage of conceal- ment ; also, the details of their construction leaked out and guns .were especially designed to destroy them. Second. Their armament had not been kept up to date and was entirely overpowered by guns of recent construction and of a type unknown to the defense. Third. The garrisons permitted the enemy to emplace his guns within their effective range, but beyond range of the forts' guns. The favorable effect of concealment, as a defensive measure, is illustrated by the operations against Ossowetz, and that of keeping the enemy at a distance by the operations against Verdun. The experiences of this war confirm the conclusion reached during the siege of Port Arthur in 1904, '' that the mounting of large-caliber guns in a fort for use against the siege guns of the enemy is a fatal 513 error." It would therefore seem preferable to place the fixed heavy guns in emplacements located in rear of the line of forts, depending for protection upon concealment rather than masonry or other cover. The forts themselves, whether permanent or improvised after the outbreak of war, should be designed for an infantry garrison only, and the main line of defense should consist of a continuous system of infantry entrenchments (including machine-gun emplacements), lo- cated in advance of the line of forts. These latter would serve mainly as supporting points for organizing a counter attack in case the front were penetrated. To check the enemy's advance before his heaviest guns have reached points within effective range of the city, naval base, or other vital object to be protected, a garrison sufficiently strong to operate well in advance of the forts, is indispensable, and its action should be assisted by long-range fire from the fixed armament, which should be superior in caliber and range to the guns usually supplied to an army in the field. The guns of the fortress, both fixed and mobile, should be dis- tributed over a large area and advantage taken of the terrain to secure concealment, which must be had at any price. It is important to bear in mind that the number of guns permanently emplaced should be comparatively small compared with the total heavy arma- ment of the fortress, or, in other words, the main reliance will be placed on the mobile guns, some of which should be at least as pow- erful as any the enemy can bring against them. The fortress of the future should consist of a large area so organized as to insure extreme mobility both to troops and guns. There will be no conspicuous forts of masonry and armor. Per- manent gun emplacements should be constructed only at important points with the primary intention of compelling the enemy to lose time in bringing up his heaviest siege guns. The mobile guns would be located in earthen emplacements well concealed from the enemy's observers who might endeavor to direct fire on them. The point to be emphasized is that unless the garrison be strong enough in both mobile troops and mobile guns to keep the enemy from breaking through the line or coming within effective range of the city proper or other vital point or object to be protected, then there is no hope of offering a prolonged resistance. In view of the foregoing it is apparent that intrenched areas with mobile troops and guns are a more dependable protection than a stereotyped system of permanent forts. 30669°— No. 513—16 2 10 2. INFLUENCE OF SEACOAST FORTIFICATIONS, WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO THE ATTACK BY ALLIED FLEET ON DARDA- NELLES FORTIFICATIONS. DESCRIPTION OF THE DARDANELLES. The western approach to the city of Constantinople from the Aegean Sea is through the Dardanelles and the Sea of Marmora. The Dardanelles (ancient Hellespont) is a long winding channel, 47 miles in length, but the really narrow portion, extending from the Aegean Sea to the town of Gallipoli, represents a sea passage of about 33 miles. The passage is at no point wider than 7,000 yards, and at one point, the Narrows, 14 miles from the entrance, it con- tracts to 1,400 yards. The surface current flows westward into the Aegean at an average speed of 1^ knots, which is sometimes trebled in the Narrows after strong northerly winds. The depth in mid- channel varies from 25 to 55 fathoms, and there are shallows at some of the bays in the wider sections. Owing to the narrowness, the strong current, and the cross currents set up at some of the bays, maneuvering of large vessels is difficult. The weather is treacherous and uncertain; the prevailing winds for nine months of the year are northeasterly, but south winds spring up quickly, and blows last from three to five days. Unfavorable weather and frequent haze and mist were encountered during the earlier stages of the naval operations. The long narrow tongue of land to the north is the Gallipoli Peninsula. It has its greatest width, 12 miles, just above the Nar- rows or opposite Suvla Bay; it is narrowest at Bulair, 3 miles; at the Narrows the width is 5 miles. Ships can therefore lie in the Gulf of Saros and fire across the peninsula. The Asiatic shore of the Dardanelles is lower than the European. The hills are low and wooded, while on the peninsula they are bare and rocky cliffs. On both shores there are heights which give advantage to defensive artillery and at the Narrows both shores tower above the ships. FORTIFICATIONS OF THE DARDANELLES. The original fortifications were the " Dardanelles Castles " ; the two inner, the " Old Castles," at the Narrows, were built by the Sultan Mohammed II, the conqueror of Constantinople, in 1462; the two at the entrance, the " New Castles," were built in 1659. At the instigation of Great Britain new fortifications were built in the Narrows between 1864 and 1877. After the peace of San Stefano in 1878 the Germans designed new fortifications and all the new fortifi- cations were armed with Krupp guns. 513 I 11 From the best obtainable information, in the spring of 1915 the armament was as follows: xVt the entrance between the towns of Seddel-Bahr near Cape Helles on the Europeon side, and Kum Kale on the Asiatic side, there were four forts or batteries, two on each side, with an armament of ten 10.2-inch guns, four 9.2-inch guns, and two 6-inch guns. Proceeding towards the Narrows, there were on the Asiatic side fortifications on Dardanes Hill, 4 miles south of the Narrows, and two forts at the Narrows near the town of Chanak — the whole mounting an armament of four ll-inch guns, six 10.2-inch guns, one 8.3-inch howitzer, and nine 6-inch guns. On the European side there were three batteries south of the town of Kilid Bahr at the Narrows, and a number of batteries on the hills around Kilid Bahr, the total armament being four 14-inch guns, one 11-inch gun, eight 10.2-inch guns, fourteen 9.2-inch guns, fifteen 8.3-inch howitzers, and twenty- four 6-inch guns. The armament between the entrance and the Nar- rows thus amounted to eight l-t-inch guns, one 11-inch gun, fourteen 10.2-inch guns, fourteen 9.2-inch guns, fourteen 8.3-inch howitzers, and thirty-three 6-inch guns. The fortifications extended 4 miles farther north to the line through Nagara, beyond which the Dardanelles turns to the north- east and broadens out. The armament on both sides amounted to two 14-inch guns, five 10.2-inch guns, five 9.2-inch guns, eight 8.3- inch howitzers, and fifteen 6-mch guns, all except six 6-inch gims being on the Asiatic side. In addition to the above there were smaller guns to protect mine fields. From an examination of the chart, it seems that a hostile fleet, after silencing the guns at the entrance and proceeding towards tlie Narrows, would be subject to the fire of the following guns when it had reached a point 4 miles from the Narrows: ten 14-inch guns, eighteen 10.2-inch guns, eight 9.2-inch guns, twenty-one 8.3-inch howitzers, and thirty-seven 6-inch guns. (a) Power of the guns : The guns in the batteries vary greatly ; alongside old guns are guns of very great power. The heaviest gun, of which there were 10, the 14-inch Krupp, with a projectile ' weighing 1,365 pounds, appears superior to our 14-ihch seacoast gun with its 1,600-pound projectile, as it has a reported penetration in Krupp hardened steel armor at 8,000 meters of 20 inches, while our gun has 16.3 inches. Its life, however, is limited to 80 or 90 rounds, and hence it is probably not as accurate as ours after firing a number of shots. The next heaviest gun is the 11-inch, but there was only one of that caliber. Then comes the 10.2-inch, of which there were 29, a 513 12 gun manufactured some years ago by the Krupps. It is not as power- ful as our 10-inch gun; its projectile weighs 450 pounds, as against our 575 pounds, and its penetration at 3,000 meters is 6 inches, while our gun penetrates 9.3 inches at 8,000 meters. The other heavy- caliber gun is 9.2 inches, of which there were 25, with a projectile weighing 420 pounds, and still more inferior to our 10-inch gun. It is believed that Krupp guns of later pattern were mounted after the outbreak of hostilities in 1914, and it seems to be" certain that heavy mobile howitzers or mortars were used against the allies. (6) Character of the batteries : The batteries were built with great care, but groups w^ere formed of different calibers and types, which rendered serving them difficult and slow in action. The emplacements are of concrete and steel with earthen cover, with guns in embrasures rather than in turrets. There was a mc?dern system of searchlights, telephones, and range finders, and good communication by roads. They were generally invisible from the sea, but their positions were detected by the stone barracks, which were usually close behind them and in full view of passing ships. One of the batteries was manned entirely by Germans, but the others had Turkish crews that had been drilled by German- officers. The movable howitzer batteries appeared- to have had German coast artillerymen with German naval officers in command. REDUCTION OF THE FORTS AT THE ENTRANCE:. On November 3, 1914, the allied fleet bombarded the forts at the entrance, but the real operations began February 19, 1915, with a fleet of British battleships and cruisers, aided by a strong French squadron. The attack was at first at long range, to which the forts could not reply, being outranged. In the afternoon the ships closed in and opened fire with the secondary batteries; the forts returned the fire. The forts on the European side were apparently silenced ; one on the Asiatic side continued firing. The damage was subse- quently found to be comparatively small and many of the gims were still intact. Eight battleships were engaged with a total of 46 guns of major caliber, 30 being 12-inch, and 58 guns of minor caliber from 7.5-inch to 4-inch. The shore guns were ten 10.2-inch, six 9.2-inch, and two 6-inch. No ship was hit. In general the guns were mounted in open works near the old masonry castles, with the sea faces pro- tected by earth. Action against these forts continued until February 2|^ when the reduction of all four was completed. In the meantime the new bat- tleship, the Queen Elizabeth^ with eight* 15-inch guns and twelve 6-inch guns, had arrived, giving the allies 16 armored ships of 513 13 the line, 12 British and 4 French. The British casualties had been three killed and five wounded. Landing jjarties had been sent ashore as quickly as possible to complete the work of destruction, but were driven back by the Turks before completing the job. It was reported by the British that all forts were completely demolished with the exception of one at Kum Kale. OPERATIONS AGAINST THE FORTS AT THE NARROWS. Sweeping operations to clear the channel of mines and obstructions began February 25, and on March 1 three ships entered the strait and attacked Fort Dardanes with its five 6-inch guns in rectangular turrets on the military crest of a hill 350 feet high ; these were said to be the only Turkish guns with telescopic sights. Sweeping opera- tions and the attack on Fort Dardanes with its outlying smaller bat'- teries continued until March 5, the French division and the Queen Elizabeth using indirect fire from the Gulf of Saros on the forts at Kilid Bahr at the Narrows. An aeroplane ship with sea planes and aeroplanes accompanied the fleet. But not a shot hit the forts dur- ing the indirect bombardment; according to the Turks, the aero- planes did not remain long enough in the air to direct the fire. On ^ March 8 the Queen Elizabeth entered the strait and fired on Kilid , Bahr at 21,000 yards range. This long-range bombardment of the forts at the Narrows and closer action by the other ships against the batteries south of the Narrows, together with mine sweeping, con- tinued until March 18. The ships were hit several times, including the Queen Elizabeth^ which was stnick by field guns, but no material damage was done and the casualties were slight. Fort Dardanes and other concealed batteries near by were almost daily under the fire of frorti four or five ships, sixteen 12-inch guns and forty-eight 6-inch guns being used against five 6-inch guns. No battery on the Turkish side was put permanently out of action. The Turkish casualties, omitting those in the forts at the entrance, which were heavy, were 23 killed and 10 wounded. FINAL ATTACK OF MARCH 18. On March 18 there was a general attack on the Narrows, partici- pated in by 12 British and 4 French ships, mounting a total of 82 major caliber guns from 15-inch to 9.2-inch, and 178 minor caliber guns from 7.5-inch to 4-inch. As stated in paragraph 2, subpara- graph 2, " Fortifications of the Dardanelles," pages 4 and 5, the number of guns that the Turks could bring into action against this fleet was 36 major caliber direct-fire guns and 21 howitzers, a total of 57, and 37 minor caliber guns. In addition there were fieldpieces 513 14 and movable heavy howitzers, the number being indeterminate. In the forenoon the Queen Elizabeth^ just inside the entrance, 10 1 miles from the Narrows, and three older British ships bombarded the forts at the Narrows, while two other British ships at closer range at- tacked Dardanes and the batteries south of the Narrows. Shortly after noon the French division of four ships advanced to the sup- port of these two ships, taking up a position near Kephez Point, 3 miles south of the Narrows.' A heavy fire was now returned by the forts, but as the ships were maneuvering in circles, few hits were made. The 10 ships that were engaged at this time mounted 58 major caliber guns. At 1.25 p. m*. the forts ceased firing. A fresh British squadron of six ships now arrived to relieve* a correspond- ing number of ships well within the strait. As this squadron neared Kephez Point, the other ships turned to withdraw when the French ship, Bouvet, was struck several times and blew up, the cause of the explosion probably being a drifting mine. The new squadron con- tinued the advance, attacking in line; the ships just within the en- trance continued the bombardment, but it was manifest that the forts had not been silenced. Mine sweeping operations continued, but drifting mines sunk the British ships Irresistible and Ocean^ and a mine and gunfire so badly damaged the In-jiexiblc that it with difficulty reached the harbor of Mudros, 40 miles away. The French ship Gaulois was also badly damaged by gunfire. The attack ceased when darkness fell. The attack had been badly repulsed and was not again renewed. The British casualties were slight, 61 all told, practically all the crew from the Irresistible and Ocean being saved; but the French lost nearl}^ the entire crew of the Bouvet. The Turks lost 23 killed and 60 wounded. The 6-inch guns in the turrets at Dardanes, which had received such a heavy fire, were not damaged; the turrets were hit only three times. On the European side three 10-inch guns were put out of action, but three weeks later all were ready again. The stone barracks in rear of the batteries were destroyed; 86 shells fell in a space 300 feet deep in rear of one battery, but the battery was untouched. The shells easily penetrated earth, but not one passed through sand parapets. After March 18, the Turks substi- tuted sand for earth to a large degree in the parapets and divided up the large interior rooms of the batteries into smaller ones by hollow walls filled with sand. EFFICIEXCY OF SEACOAST FORTIFICATIONS. The operations in the Dardanelles have been the only instance in this war of a naval attack on seacoast fortifications, except the minor attack of the Japanese Navy against the German fortifications at Tsingtau. Elsewhere, by virtue of their exis-tence, they have per- 513 15 formed their functions of protecting harbors, fleets, and naval bases. The German fleet, under the protection of the shore guns, has main- tained its existence in spite of the proximity of the superior British fleet. These operations have emphasized the fact that has been thor- oughly demonstrated by history that a purely naval attack can not succeed against seacoast fortifications adequately armed and manned, and that in such actions the proper function of the navy is to convoy the army, which -will make the attack by land, and to protect its line of communications. REQUISITES FOR SUCCESSFUL DEFENSE. The forts at the entrance fell and those in the Narrows were scarcely damaged, though in both cases there was an overwhelming fire from the ships. The difference in the two cases is this: At the entrance the gims were outranged and the ships had plenty of sea room in which to maneuver and bring the heavy guns to bear, free from danger of mines; in the narrow^ mined channel of the Narrows, with both shores lined with guns, some of them equal or nearly so to the heaviest ship gun, the ships had to c(«ne within range and could attack with only a portion of the force. In such a position, a fleet, exposed to fixed and floating mines, shore torpedoes and sub- marines, will fail. The slight damage sustained by the shore bat- teries is illustrated by Fort Dardanes, which withstood the fire from the British ships, admittedly inferior to none in marksmanship. An interior city, with its approach channel protected with well- placed and concealed guns, equal in range to the enemy's, and pro- vided with the accessory means of defense, need not fear capture by bombardment or a run by the forts. A fort on the seacoast proper, exposed to the fire from ships at sea, must have guns of greater range than the ships' guns; otherwise the sliips could silence the guns on shore at their pleasure, and under their fire could land troops to complete the destruction of the forts. Concealment and dispersion are also necessary. The aeroplane observation of fire by the allies does not seem to have been very effi- cient, but this can not always be relied on, and concealment from aerial observation should be obtained. Without such observation, long-range indirect bombardment is worthless. By taking advantage of the terrain and resorting to dispersion, the amount of concrete might be reduced, and the money thus saved put into more guns. NECESSITY FOR MOBILE TROOPS. The power of coast fortifications, to repel a direct attack by an enemy fleet, is limited to the area within range of their guns, but their influence is extended considerably further whenever they cover 513 16 a base from which submarines operate. These fortifications must therefore be recognized as of supreme importance within the scope of their proper functions, and this is especially true of a country possessing an enormous frontage on two oceans. Their paramount value is that they relieve the navy of the local defense of important harbors or other strategic points and thus release our seagoing fleet for operations against the enemy on the high seas, and furnish a refuge for it in the face of overpowering odds. But beyond the sphere of influence of our seacoast forts, enemy ships may approach the shore with impunity and, under the cover of their guns, may land troops that can then proceed against the important places de- fended by the forts or even against the forts themselves, since they are vulnerable from the land side. With our long coast lines, the guarding of every possible landing place by seacoast fortifications is out of the question, and, although the development and employ- ment of heavy mobile seacoast armament along our coastal railroads will further restrict the landing places open to an enemy, there will still remain many places afi^ording facilities for landing operations which can only be opposed by mobile troops acting without the cooperation of Coast Artillery. For these reasons it is evident that there must also be available a mobile force properly trained, organ- ized and equipped, to send against the enemy at the landing and defeat them there, or at least prevent his advance toward his objec- tive, should a landing be effected. Until we have adequately pro- vided for this dual defense of our coasts, having full regard to both fixed defenses and mobile troops, our Navy will never be free to perform its primary function, but will be frittered away in response to clamor for protection from our coast population. An illustration of the value of mobile troops in coast defense is afforded by the operations at the Dardanelles, described in the last subhead under paragraph 3, page 12, of this study. SUMMARY OF ATTEMPT TO TAKE DARDANELLES FORTIFICA TIONS BY MOBILE TROOPS. INITIAL DELAY. i Before the attack of March 18 it had been decided to undertake operations by land at the Dardanelles. An official French note stated on the 12th that a force was on its way to the Levant, and Gen. lam Hamilton was appointed commander of the British force and arrived in time to witness the action of the 18th. Both the French and British forces had arrived in the harbor of Mudros on the island of Lemnos, west of the Dardanelles; but as the British transports had not been loaded with a view to make a landing in force on a hostile shore and the lack of facilities in Mudros made 513 17 redistribution impossible there, they had to be sent back to Alex- andria for reloading. A month was lost, which it is safe to say was well employed by the Turks. TERRAIN. The Gallipoli Peninsula is covered by hills which rise to a height of 1,000 feet; on the southern end Achi Baba, 600 feet high, domi- nates the end of the peninsula; just west of the Narrows, Kilid Bahr, 700 feet high, covers the forts from an attack from the Aegean ; and northwest of the Narrows, Sari Bair Mountain reaches a height of 970 feet. These hills must be taken before an advance can be made to the shores of the Narrows. The hills do not run in a regular or well-defined direction, and between the hills there are a confusing number of valleys. The area is practically roadless and most of it covered with prickly scrub. The sides of the hills are almost vertical. At the water's edge there is generally a narrow beach with a steep bank 10 feet high, and then the rolling hills with their crests 1,000 yards from the beach. Every trail leading to the beach was covered with one or more machine guns in screened pits, and the roads were covered with field guns in groups of from three to six. STRENGTH OF FORCES. The British force consisted of the Twenty-ninth (Regular) Divi- sion, the East Lancashire (Territorial) Division, a- naval division of bluejackets and marines, some Indian troops, and the Australian and New Zealand Corps, wnth 20 battalions of infantry, together with artillery and engineei-s. The strength was approximately 100,000. The territorials and colonial troops had been wintering in Egypt. The French force was about 35,000. The Turks were in greater force and better posted than was expected; the number on the European side has been given as over 150,000. Besides, they were supported by the Germans. allies' plan. The coast being precipitous, landing places few, and trenches and entanglements being visible on shipboard at most of them. Gen. Hamilton decided to throw the whole of his troops very rapidly ashore at a number of places, and selected five beaches at the tip of the peninsula and two on the west coast, near Sari Bair Mountain, as landing places. He could thus advance up the peninsula or cross it where it was about five miles wide, and obtaining possession of the high hills, secure observation points whereby the navy could assist in the reduction of the forts. 513 18 LANDINGS AT SOUTH END OP PENINSULA. April 25 was the date of the landing. The Twenty-ninth Divi- sion, 20,000 men, was to land at the end of the peninsula at the five beaches, the three at the tip, near Sedd-el-Bahr, being the main ones. At the other two places, the landing was to take place at dawn, while at the main places the landings were to be simultaneously at 5.30 a. m., after half an hour's bombardment by the fleet. The landing parties, covering the advance of the division, were placed on naval vessels the previous day and before dawn on the 25th were in the small boats in which they were to be towed ashore. The accompanying squadron of four battleships and four cruisers began the preliminary bombardment. At S beach, in Morto Bay, the farthest to the east, three companies (750 men) made a successful landing, with a loss of 50 men, and kept the position. On Y beach, the westernmost landing, two battalions (2,000 men) landed on an undefended beach, but were subsequently attacked and driven to the boats with heavy losses. On X beach, 3 miles south of Y beach, 1 battalion (1,000 men) made a successful landing, under cover of the fire of the Imploicahle^ which stood close inshore, firing with every possible gun, thus preparing the way for a subsequent force of 2,000 men, which joined hands with the force landing at W beach, the next to the south. On W beach, 1 battalion (1,000 men) landed on a beach 350 yards long and 15 to 40 yards wide, well protected with intrenchments and entanglements, the latter extend- ing under water. The Turks reserved their fire until the first boat- load of soldiers grounded, and under this fire the assailants had to make their way through the entanglement. A foothold was gained and, more infantry following, connection was made with X beach. At V beach, west of Sedd-el-Bahr, the site of the seacoast forts that had previously been reduced by the navy, a force of about 3,000 attempted to land on a beach 350 yards long by 10 yards wide, over- looked by a natural amphitheater rising back from the beach, with concave slopes. On the very margin of the beach ran a wire entangle- ment and up the slopes were two other lines, the whole covered with fire of rifles, machine guns, and pom-poms. Three companies (750 men), landing in small boats, were almost annihilated, the survivors obtaining shelter under the lee of a low sandy bank 4 feet high, at the inner edge of the beach; the boat crews were all killed. It was intended to land 2,000 men from a collier, the Clyde^ which was to be run ashore, and lighters used to form a gangway between ship and shore. The attempt failed; of 1,000 men who left the colliers, 50 per cent were kill or wounded. Nothing could be done until night, when the remainder of the infantry from the Clyde went ashore. On the 26th, under cover of the fire from the 513 19 ships, the troops established themselves on the crests of the sur- rounding hills. During the night of the 25th, the disembarkation of the remainder of the Twenty-ninth Division was proceeding on W and X beaches. LANDING BY THE AUSTRALIAN-NEW ZEALAND CORPS. This corps of 35,000 men landed north of Gaba Tepe, near the foot of Sari Bair Mountain. This rugged and difficult part of the coast was chosen because it was believed it would be undefended. The landing was to be a surprise and the preliminary bombardment was omitted. The covering force of 4,000 men in ships' boats was towed by destroyers to within 500 yards from the beach, which was 1,000 yards long, when the destroyers dropped behind and steam launches towed the boats in. In the darkness the boats were close to the shore before they wejre discovered. About a battalion of Turks disputed the landing, but they were driven back. The main body, came up in the transports and by 2 p. m. 12,000 men and two batteries of mountain artillery were ashore. The Turks promptly rallied and reinforced to 20,000 by 11 a. m., made counter attacks. These counter attacks continued for several days, but with the assistance of the ships' fire the British maintained their position. On this first day — April 25 — 29,000 men were landed. DIVERSION BY THE FRENCH. As a diversion to draw the fire of the Asiatic guns from Sedd-el- Bahr, a regiment of the French corps landed at Kum Kale on the Asiatic shore on the 25th, but on the 26th they reembarke«d, aft^r a loss of 754, one- fourth of its effective strength, and the French corps began landing at V Beach. ATTEMPTS TO ADVAKCE. On April 28 the allies held a line across the peninsula, three miles north of Sedd-el-Bahr, and an attempt was made to capture the hill of Achi Baba, which failed. The troops landing on the west coast also tried to advance, but were held to a semicircle 1,100 yards in diameter from the beach. Here they were holding open a door to the vital point of the Turkish p,osition and were keeping 24,000 of the best Turldsh troops out of the main action around Sedd-el- Bahr. By May 5 the landing of the allies was completed. The British official report gives the losses among the British at this time as 602 officers and 13,377 men, which is about 13.5 per cent of the total estimated force of 100,000. It is estimated that the Turks lost 18,000 in the operations of April 25-27. 513 I 20 May 5 a general advance was attempted against the town of Krithia and the hill of Achi Baba, but the attack was imsuccessfiil. May 18 the Turks, estimated at 30,000, attacked the force at Anzac Cove (the name given to the landing place of the Australian-New Zealand Corps, themselves termed " Anzacs"), and were repulsed with a loss of 7,000, the Anzacs losing 500. To May 31 the British losses were 38,636 (1,722 being officers), the French about 5,000, and the Turkish estimated at 60,000. The total battle losses of the British in the three years of the Boer War were 38,156. According to a Turkish report at this date the number of British and French troops amounted to 90,000. The Turks had received 60,000 reenf orcements. June 4 there was another general attack by the allies from Sedd- el-Bahr ; on the right there were two French divisions, the rest of the line, 4,000 yards, being held by 24,000 British infantry. The net result was a gain of 200 to 400 yards along a front of three miles. The line then held extended from south of Krithia southeast across the peninsula, about 4 miles from Sedd-el-Bahr. The appearance of German submarines caused the withdrawal to Mudros Harbor of the transports and the sending of supplies in small boats. The Turks under Enver Pasha made a general attack in the vicinity of Krithia Ju«ie 30-Ju«ly 2, but accomplished little, with a loss of 5,150 killed and 15,000 wounded. To July 18, the British losses were 49,283, 2,144 being officers. LANDING AT 8UVLA BAY AND SUBSEQUENT OPERATIONS. August 7 another landing was made at Suvla Bay, 4 miles north of Anzac Cove. The landing began at 2 a. m. on three beaches and by day a force of two divisions was firmly established. The Anzac force joined in the attack, the intention being to connect the two forces and capture the Sari Bair Ridge. The attack from Anzac was carried to the summit of the ridge, but as the Turks had been heavily reenforced, the attack from Suvla Bay did not make the expected progress, and the line had to fall back. The two forces were finally joined on a line 12 miles long. The number of men land- ing at Suvla Bay is not known; the British speak of it as a fresh army and the Turks estimated it as 70,000. The British losses were heavy ; according to the Turks, 30,000. According to a German estimate, on August 30 the allies had from 20,000 to 25,000 troops at Sedd-el-Bahr, of whom 9,000 were French, all that was left of the original 35,000; 9,000 at Anzac Cove, and 70,000 at Suvla Bay. These numbers were not materially increased after that date, though tlie losses in the trench warfare since then had brought the casualties on November 9 to 106,610 among the British. The Turkish losses are unknown. On December 20 it was 513 21 announced that the troops at Suvla Bay and Anzac Cove, about 100,000, had been withdrawn from the peninsuhi for service else- where; the troops at Sedd-el-Bahr were left there until January 9, 1916, when they, too, were withdrawn. NECESSITY FOR HEAVY MOBILE GUNS. Although the Turks had ample warning of the impending attack, with an abundance of men to draw upon, and had giuirded the most probable landing places with intrenchments and entanglements, the allies succeeded in getting ashore. With the limited number of beaches suitable for landing, the Turks apparently had sufficient force to guard every one ; but some were overlooked and the success of the allies is due partly to that fact. The main reason for the success, though, is due to the fire of the covering ships, which could come in close enough to use all their guns and thus keep down the fire of the Turks. If the Turks had employed guns heavy enough to stand the ships off, the landing Avould not have taken place, for experience has shown that even the most powerful naval guns at long range are im- able to put well concealed shore gims out of action. Even chance hits have little effect upon the sand or earthen parapets. It may be accepted then as a fact, that to prevent a hostile force from landing there must be in addition to the usual infantry defense at all the possible landings, guns of sufficient power to keep the naval vessels at such a distance that their secondary batteries can not be used. Thus the landing of troops or supplies from ships at so great a distance from the shore can readily be prevented by the infantry and field guns. In the case of a landing on our coast, the stretch to be covered is so long that it is impracticable to implace in prepared positions enough of these guns to cover all the possible landing places. It will there- fore be necessary to use mobile guns that can be quickly transported to the point threatened. The quickest method of transportation appears to be a railroad paralleling the beach, from which spurs could be run to points near enough to the front to keep ships at about 8,000 yards from the shore. The railroad, spur tracks, and gun locations should be prepared in time of peace. THE VALUE OF MOBILE TROOPS IN COAST DEFENSE. After the allies had succeeded in the landing operations and had assembled on the peninsula the entire expeditionary force, their fur- ther advance was small, and after maintaining a position near the water's edge for over nine months, the force was withdrawn. The reason for the failure appears to be threefold : First, the size of the 513 22 Turkish force was underestimated and an insufficient number of troops was sent at first, and these troops were not sufficiently reinforced; second, the terrain was favorable to the Truks ; third, most important of all, the Turks had sufficient troops to prevent the allies from advancing. Considering our own requirements, it should be noted that the ter- rain along our Atlantic Coast is not so favorable to the defense as that of the Gallipoli Peninsula, as the landing beaches are nu- merous and extensive and the ground in rear is generally favorable for an advance. Moreover, our coast is too extended to permit the preparation of defenses in advance at all possible landing places. There is consequently the more necessity for mobile troops. With a well-trained and equipped force equal or superior to the force that had succeeded in landing, the operations on the Gallipoli Peninsula lead us to believe that an advance from the beach away from the cover of the ships, can be prevented; but without such a force, once the outer line of defense at the beach has been penetrated, the forces must be withdrawn to some thoroughly prepared position covering the objective of the enemy. Unless such a position of suit- able extent has been prepared in advance, further resistance is hope- less. 513 o THE GENERAL STAFFS OF CERTAIN BELLIGERENT POWERS PREPARED BY THE WAR COLLEGE DIVISION, GENERAL STAFF CORPS AS A SUPPLEMENT TO THE STATEMENT OF A PROPER MILITARY POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES WCD 9286-2 ARMY WAR COLLEGE : WASHINGTON NOVEMBER, 1915 WASHINGTON GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1&16 514 War Department, Document No. 514. Office of the Chief of Staff . SYNOPSIS. I. Introduction'. Page. 1. The general staff of the Austro-Hungarian Army 5 2. The general staff of France 6 3. The general staff of Germany 8 4. The general staff of Great Britain 8 5. The general staff of Italy 9 6. The general staff of Japan 9 7. The general staff of Russia 10 8. The general staff of Servia 11 II. Conclusion. soeeg'-No. su — le (3) THE GENERAL STAFFS OF CERTAIN BELLIGERENT POWERS. I. INTRODUCTION. The object of this study is to give a concise account of the general staffs of certain belligerent powers taking part in the present European war, showing their personnel and duties under peace con- ditions, and also any increases or changes that have been made neces- sary during the progress of the present war, so far as data are at present available. It is proposed to supplement this paper wdth full information as to any further changes in general staff organizations resulting from the experiences of the present war, when the necessary data have been supplied. 1. THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN ARMY. The work of the general staff of this army, 1911, included: (1) Service in the offices of the general staff; (2) with troops; (3) in special scientific military employment; and (4) for missions abroad. "The chief of the general staff for all the armed forces" was the head of the general staff, and w-as under the immediate orders of the Emperor, and was also an auxiliary organ of the war minister. All work relating to operations and to preparation for the employ- ment of the entire armed force in war was incumbent upon him. He kept in touch with the commander of the navy regarding operations of the fleet. He was assisted in his work by the " deputy chief of the general staff." The general staff worked in seven sections. The first section transacted personal and economic affairs and did the correspondence between the sections of the general staff and with outside quarters. The section for operations worked at all operative affairs, the measures in connection with mobilization, plans for strategic move- ments, opinions and proposals regarding fortifications, organization and training of the army, regulations and instructions of a tactical and operative nature, programs for maneuvers and matters con- nected therewith. The section of instruction attended to the instruction and training of general staff officers. 514 (5) The topographical section was employed in the military geographi- cal description of the monarchy and other countries. The intelligence section collected and recorded data concerning for- eign armies and fortifications. The railway section attended to all railway and steamship matters, The telegraph section attended to the telegraph and signal service. The general staff attended to the war school, the Military Geo- graphical Institute, and the war archives. The general staff officers serving with troops performed duties corresponding to the combined duties of chiefs of staff and adju- tants general in the United States Army. The normal strength of the general staff in time of peace, 1911, was: One general, chief of staff; 2 lieutenant field marshals — one the deputy chief of staff, the other the chief of the military geographical institute; 2 major generals — one chief of the war archives and the other the chief of the war school ; 41 colonels, 77 lieutenant colonels, 85 majors, and 209 captains; total, 417. After completing studies at the war school 209 additional officers were attached to the general staff for duty and try out, with a view to their possible appointment on the general staff. In addition there were 46 other officers for clerical work on the general staff, but not with a view to being ap- pointed members of the general staff. Total performing general- staff work, 672. In time of war the chief of staff takes full .control of military mat- ters. According to information on file in the War College, 1914, the Austrian general staff was as follows: One chief of staff, 1 adjutant to the chief of staff, 2 assistant chiefs of staff — one in charge of lines of communication. The part of the general staff corresponding to our War Department General Staff was divided into eight bureaus: Bureau of direction, bureau of operations, bureau of communication and supplies, bureau of in- structions, bureau of monographs, bureau of evidence, bureau of transportation, bureau of telegraphy, and was charged also with the war college, war archives, and military geographical institute. The number of general-staff officers allowed by law was 508; 249 officers were assigned and 71 attached to the general staff: and 101 line offic^ers were detailed on general-staff work, making a total of 929 officers performing general-staff work. 2. THE GENERAL STAFF OF FRANCE. The general staff of the French Army is one of the seven main divisions of the war department. Military matters, unless they con- cern more than one department of the National Government, are 514 directed by the superior military council, which consists of the minister of war, the chief of staff, and 10 major generals. The superior military council exercises control OA^er the general staff. One of the major generals of the superior military council is assistant chief of staff; others are assigned in time of peace to command armies in time of war, and have with them the three general-staff officers to be on their staffs in the field. These prospective army commanders have, in time of peace, supervision of the troops that would be under their command in war. They prepare and direct the maneuvers and staff rides for the training of these troops and generally see to their preparation for war. They are army in- spectors. The chief of staff is the head of the war department general staff, and deals with the larger questions. Other general-staff matters are under the assistant chief of staff. The work of the war department general staff is performed by three groups, each under a general officer. FIRST GROUP. 1. The bureau of military operations and general training of the army. 2. The bureau charged with the study of the organization and tactics of foreign armies. 3. The bureau of railways and lines of communication. SECOND GROUP. 1. Bureau of organization and mobilization of the army. 2. The African section. 3. The historical section. THIRD GROUP. 1. The section of the personnel of the general staff. 2. Routine service section of the general staff. 3. The administrative section. The chief of staff, assistant chief of staff, and the chief of the first group are major generals. The chiefs of the second and third groups are brigadier generals. In addition the following general staff offi- cers were authorized by law before the present war : Thirty colonels, 40 lieutenant colonels, 170 majors, and 400 captains ; total 640. General staff officers were assigned as folloAvs: War Department general staff, 132; staff with troops, 480; additional staff officers with the war department general staff, 47 ; with troops, 216. The general staff is larger now. 514 3. THE GENERAL STAFF OF GERMANY. The general staff of Germany consists of the war department gen- eral staff (called the great general staff) and the general staff officers on duty with the troops. The officers of the war department general staff performed, in peace, the following duties: One general, chief of staff, directly under the Emperor, and has charge of the war academy and the land survey ; 1 lieutenant general, assistant chief of staff, chief of division; 4 major generals, heads of four divisions; 11 colonels, chiefs of sections; 6 lieutenant colonels, four of them are chiefs of sections; 37 majors, duty with sections and committees; 52 captains and 1 lieutenant performing various general staff duties; total 113. This part of the general staff is organized into 9 sections and the historical and geographical departments. It has complete charge of the mapping of the country and of the maps of Germany and other countries. The general staff officers on duty with the troops are under the orders of their commanders, but special work may be assigned to them by the chief of staff. Before the present war the general staff of Germany consisted of 1 general, 2 lieutenant generals, 6 major generals, 23 colonels, 21 lieutenant colonels, 116 majors, 139 captains, and 1 lieutenant, total 309. Additional officers performing general staff duties were: Three colonels, 13 lieutenant colonels. 44 majors, 36 captains, and 132 lieu- tenants; total attached officers 228, total number of officers perform- ing general staff duties 537. 4. THE GENERAL STAFF OF GREAT BRITAIN. The general staff at the war office has the following duties: To advise on the strategical distribution of the army; to supervise the education of the officers and the training and preparation of the army for war; to stud}^ military plans for offense and defense; to collect military information, and to direct the general policy in army matters. The general staff with troops has the following duties: To assist the officers on whose staffs they serve in promoting military effi- ciency, and to aid them in carrying out the general policy in army matters. The general staff at the war office, known as department of chief of general staff at army headquarters, was divided into three branches: Military operations, staff duties, and military training. A major general was in charge of each. General staff officers in this 514 department: Three major generals, G colonels, 21 lieutenant colonels and majors, and 27 captains. Total, 57. The general staff officers with troops were: One major general, 6 brigadier generals, 16 colonels, 54 lieutenant colonels and majors, 12 captains, and 25 brigade majors. Total, 114. Besides the 171 general staff officers other officers were attached to the general staff to perform general-staff duties. Great Britain was short of officers, and the general staff was some- what depleted at the beginning of the present war. The British press has attributed grave errors of the war to this lack of an ade- quate general staff. Influential Englishmen are advocating a gen- eral staff on the German plan. 5. THE GENERAL STAFF OF ITALY. The latest information found at the war college shows the chief of the general staff of Italy was intrusted with the preparation, in time of peace, and execution, in time of war, of all military opera- tions, but under the minister of war; and that the general staff consisted of 260 officers. The war department general staff, called the great general staff, consisted of three sections : The central section, the section for mili- tary operations, and the section for railways and communications. The central section supervised the work of the others. The section for military operations Avas divided into five subsections, and the section for railways and communications w^as divided into three subsections. The general staff officers on duty with troops performed duties that are performed in the United States by General Staff officers and by adjutants general. 6. THE GENERAL STAFF OF JAPAN. The general staff has charge of the national defense and the em- ployment of the military forces of the Empire. The chief of staff is directly under the Emperor and assists in the business of the imperial personal staff. All things relating to national defense and strategy are in his province. Furthermore, he has under his supervision all staff officers of the army and their training. Directly under his jurisdiction are: (1) General staff headquarters; (2) the land survey department; (3) the army staff college; and (4) the military attaches at embassies and legations. A vice chief of staff assists the chief and supervises the business of general staff headquarters. 514 10 The subjects dealt with by the general staff are : 1. Defense of the Empire and plans of mobilization. 2. Statistics of foreign armies. 3. Communications and transportation of troops. 4. Geodesy and topography. 5. Historical work. The work of the war department general staff, designated the great general staff, is performed in 5 divisions divided into 10 sections. One of the divisions is designated " general affairs "" ; the others are numbered 1, 2, 3, and 4. The chief of staff is a general ; the vice chief of staff, a lieutenant general; the chief of each division is a major general, and the chief of each section is a colonel. The general staff office at Tokj^o consists of 1 general, 1 lieutenant general, 5 major generals, 10 colonels, 8 lieutenant colonels, 21 majors, and 33 captains. Total, 79, In connection with these are 72 other officers, making a total of 151 ofiicers performing war de- partment general staff duties May 1, 1915. They were assisted by 44 warrant and noncommissioned officers and 5 civilians. Under the chief of staff, the land survey department consists of 35 officers, 161 warrant and noncommissioned officers, and 135 civilians; the army staff college consists of 58 officers, 15 warrant and noncom- missioned officers, and 14 civilians. The exact number of general staff officers serving with troops in the Japanese Army is not stated in the reports received at the War College. It is understood that the strength, organization, and duties of the Japanese general staff are about the same as in other good, modern armies. The organization of the Japanese general staff is not fixed by law. It depends on the orders of the Emperor and usually changes slightly from year to year. 7. THE GENERAL STAFF OF RUSSIA. The latest figures on this organization, found at the War College, show the general staff of Russia consisted of 734 officers. The general staff of that country was organized on modern lines in 1906. The chief of the general staff was part of the war ministry. In 1914 the headquarters directorate of the general staff consisted of the following six branches: The quartermaster general's branch, consisting of seven sections; organization and administrative branch, seven sections and two sub- sections; mobilization branch, four sections; military communica- tions branch, eight sections; topographical branch, three sections; aviation branch, two sections. The Russian Army, like other modern armies, has general staff officers serving with troops. 514 11 8. THE GENERAL STAFF OF SERBIA. In Serbia the general staff is included in the ministry of war. Part of the general staff' officers serve with troops, as in the United States. The chief of staff and the assistant chief of staff had head- quarters at Belgi'ade. The general staff is divided into three sec- tions: (1) The operative section, divided in three parts, {a) per- sonnel and materiel on campaign, (h) intelligence, (r) communica- tions; (2) historical section, including (a) archives, (h) library; (3) geographical section, which includes four subsections, (a) trigo- nometrical, (b) topographical, (r) supplies, (<:/) mapping. II. Conclusion. In regard to our own General Staff', the act of Congress approved February 14, 1903, creating it established its status and duties on lines entirely in accord with the appro'ved practice in European armies, and, so far as known, the experiences of the present war have proved the soundness of this action. Actual experience, however, has shown conclusively that the per- sonnel originally provided for our General Staff was too limited for the comprehensive duties required of it, even for our small Army. A further bar to progress was imposed by the act of Congress ap- proved August 24, 1912, whereby the already meager personnel was reduced by one general officer and eight captains. Under the present law it consists of 2 general officers, one of whom is Chief of Staff, 4 colonels, 6 lieutenant colonels, 12 majors, and 12 captains (or first lieutenants) ; total, 36. In addition, the Chief of Coast Artillery and the Chief of the Division of Militia Affairs are also members of the General Staff, eoo officio. The permanent station of these latter officers is in Washington, but the specific duties for which their offices were created to perform occupy their full attention and, prop- erly speaking, are not duties pertaining to the General Staff any more than are those of the Chief of Engineers, Chief Signal Officer, or other bureau chiefs. As a matter of fact, they only do General Staff work when temporarily acting for the Chief of Staff' and his senior assistant during the absence of those officers, and this duty is in addition to their normal functions. At the present time the War Department General Staff consists of 2 general officers, 2 colonels, 5 lieutenant colonels, 9 majors, and 11 captains, total 29, leaving for service with troops 2 colonels, 1 lieutenant colonel, 3 majors, and 1 captain, total 7. Because of this insufficient personnel the General Staff has been unable to undertake some of its most important functions. For ex- ample, no historical section can be established, and until this is done 514 12 the scientific military history of our various wars can not be written. Our lack of a definite military policy was largely due to the fact that we are without such histories and have consequently not learned the lessons to be derived from our own experience in war. We can not utilize to its full extent the important information gathered abroad, because we can not assign officers to the exclusive duty of reading and digesting these reports, due to the require- ments of the daily routine General Staff work pertaining to the Army, which must be first attended to. For the same reasons we can not properly attend to the work of preparing monographs and maps pertaining to foreign countries, matters which should be always kept up to date. One thing which prevents even our meager General Staff from rendering such efficient service as it might is the continual change of status of General Staff officers before the full detail of four years has expired. This is partly due to the fact that the present law does not provide for the retention of officers who are promoted. This defect could be remedied by providing that an officer promoted should serve out the balance of his detail in the next higher grade, the vacancy in the grade from which he was promoted not being filled until the completion of his term. This would not change the total number of officers on the General Staff detail and would greatly benefit the service by permitting continuity of work by men thor- oughly trained to it. A careful consideration of this matter shows that our War Depart- ment General Staff should consist of 94 officers of all grades, and that at the present time there should be available for service with' troops not less than 27. This has been shown in detail in special studies (WCD 639-103, Nov. 15, 1915, " Eeorganization of the General Staff," and WCD 9054-5, Jan. 3, 1916, " Report on the Chamberlain bill in connection with number of General Staff officers"). 514 o MILITARY AVIATION PREPARED BY THE WAR COLLEGE DIVISION, GENERAL STAFF CORPS AS A SUPPLEMENT TO THE STATEMENT OF A PROPER MILITARY POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES WCD 9311-1 ARMY WAR COLLEGE : WASHINGTON NOVEMBER, 1915 WASHINGTON GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1916 516 War Department, Document No. 515. Office of the Chief of Staff. SYNOPSIS. I I. Introduction. Page. 1. Relation of aviation to the military service 6 2. Use of aircraft on our coast and with our mobile land forces 5 3. Use of aircraft at over-sea stations 6 II. General Types of Aircraft. 4. Captive balloons 7 6. Dirigibles 8 6. Aeroplanes 10 7. Types of aeroplanes 10 8. Requirements of various types of machines 10 9. Aeroplane engines 12 III. Functions op Aircraft. 10. Height at which aeroplanes must fly 12 11. Strategical reconnaissance 12 12. Photography from aeroplanes 13 13. Aeroplanes and artillery 13 14. Control of the air 13 15. Surprise movements 14 16. Bomb dropping 14 IV. Organization op Aeroplane Units. 17. Tactics of aeroplanes 15 18. Development diu-ing European war ^ 15 19. Assignment of aeroplanes to Artillery 16 V. Development of Aeronautical Personnel. 20. General line of development in Europe 16 21. Officer-observers and noncommissioned officer-pilots 16 22. Losses to aero personnel in war 16 23. Development of aeronautic personnel in the United States 17 24. Scope of needed legislation 18 516 (3) MILITARY AVIATION. I. INTRODUCTION. 1. RELATION OF AVIATION TO THE INIILITARY SERVICE. In this paper it is proposed to consider various aeronautical appli- ances in regard to their practical value in campaign, as shown by such data as are now available from the theater of war in Europe. In its relation to the military service, aviation to-day may be regarded as embracing all aerial appliances, such as heavier-than-air craft, dirigibles lighter-than-air craft, and nondirigibles or captive lighter-than-air balloons, together with the personnel necessary for their operation and management. 2. USE OF AIRCRAFT ON OUR COAST AND WITH OUR MOBILE LAND FORCES. In considering this subject account should be taken, first, of the use of aircraft of various types along and beyond the coasts and frontiers of the United States upon the outbreak of war; second, the use of aircraft in the Army by the mobile forces; third, the use of aircraft by our over-sea garrisons. In addition to the battle fleet and units of the Navy designed to take the offensive on the high seas, the waters contiguous to the coast line of the United States are organized into naval defense dis- tricts. These cover certain sections of the coast line and contain patrol vessels, both surface and subsurface, and aircraft for recon- noissance purposes. These are essentially for the purpose of finding out and locating hostile vessels which are approaching the coast and of determining their strength, dispositions, and probable intentions. Added to the strictly naval formations included in the naval defense districts, in time of war the United States Coast Guard (in peace under the Treasury Department) passes to the control of the Navy. The Coast Guard, in addition to its boats and revenue cutters which will be utilized as patrol vessels, embraces the Life-Saving Service. The latter has stations more or less regularly distributed along the coasts which are connected by telephone lines. They are also equipped with visual signaling appliances to communicate from shore to ships. The Navy maintains a chain of radio stations along our coasts and over-sea possessions. 515 l5) 6 The naval defense districts become of great importance in case that the main battle fleets are defeated or in case they are operating at a great distance. Therefore, when an enemy expedition breaks through the naval defense and approaches the coast Avith a view to forcing a landing the resistance to such an expedition becomes pri- marily a function of the Army. The defensive formations of the Army consist of the harbor defenses and accessories and the mobile units. The harbor defenses consist of fixed and mobile gun defenses and mine defenses; also obstacles both on land and in the waters. The aircraft required in connection with the harbor defenses should consist of machines used for one or more of the following purposes: (a) For reconnaissance — that is, to determine the strength, dis- positions, and probable intentions of the enemy. (b) For preventing hostile aerial reconnaissance. (c) For destroying hostile aircraft and for offensive work against enemy submarines and other vessels, including the interruption of enemy mining or coimtermining operations. (d) For aiding in spotting the fire of Coast Artillery, both against ships and against any invading force that may invest the seacoast fortifications. The number and character of the aircraft required depends on the locality, number of harbor defenses, their organization, strength, and positions. Each harbor-defense area, therefore, needs to bo studied with this specific end in view, and should have radio appa- ratus not only for communicating with the Navy but also for com- municating with its aircraft and with the units of our mobile forces. In addition to the aircraft required with the harbor defenses them- selves, aircraft are required Avith modern movable coast-defense armament employed as an auxiliary element of the mobile forces in defending the intervals between our fortified harbors and with units of the mobile forces. The use of aircraft with the mobile units is a definite matter; each division requires one squadron of 12 aeroplanes. These are divided into three companies of four aeroplanes each, two companies having reconnaissance and artillery observation machines and one company having two high-speed machines especially constructed for long-distance reconnaissance and for combating the enemy's aerial craft; two battle machines for the purpose of bomb dropping and offensive work against enemy material of all sorts. This is in keep- ing with the best practice that has been developed in the European war. 3. USE OF AIRCRAFT AT OVER-SEA STATIONS. The use of aircraft with the Army in the over-sea possessions is analogous to that mentioned above with the harbor defenses; and in 616 addition, -wherever mobile units of the Army happen to be, they must be provided with suitable aircraft. The defense of over-sea I)ossessions constitutes a problem in itself, and these garrisons must be equipped not only with machines capable of reconnaissance over land but also with those capable of operations over water, with the power to alight in water — that is, hydroaeroplanes. The type of machine to be used necessarily depends on the locality: for instance, in Hawaii practically all of the military machines would need to be hydroaeroplanes; in the Philippines and Panama a great proportion of them. To the Coast Artillery troops in the United States proper and in the districts around the Great Lakes the same considerations apply. It is believed that the main prmci- ples enunciated above should be followed, and that an estimate of actual machines and material, both heavier and lighter than air, fchould be made for all places. II. GENERAL TYPES OF AIRCRAFT. 4. CAPTIVE BALLOONS. For over a century captive balloons have been used by the armies of all the leading military nations. Their function has been one of observation; that is, to see what those on the ground Avere unable to see. They have therefore proved a useful means of observing and reporting the effects of artillery fire. Electrical means of communi- cation greatly enhanced the utility of captive balloons, as it made communication instantaneous from car to ground instead of by the older way of raising and lowering written messages by ropes. In clear weather and on favorable terrain captive balloons are able to distinguish different branches of the service at a distance of 1G,000 yards or about 9 miles. "With the best glasses at the present time the field of observatirn is said to extend to 20,000 yards. In general, captive balloons of the "Sausage" or " Drachen " type are used by all the armies of the great nations. Along the French-German front in northern France these balh^ons are used in great numbers all along the lines. Their function is to observe t!ie fire of artillery and keep watch of all movements of hostile parties within their field of view. They are connected by telephone directly with the batteries whose fire thc}^ are observing and with the headquarters to Avhich they are attached. In many cases the ca])tive balloons work in con- junction with aeroplanes. The aeroplanes by flying over the terrain where the hostile targets are located find out the exact position of those which the captive balloons have been unable to locate by them- selves. "When by means of signals the locations of the targets have been indicated to the observer in the captive balloon, the aeroplanes proceed to other duty. Aside from the use of the captive balloons 615 8 in conjunction with aeroplanes, their duties are practically the same as they have been for many years or were in our own Civil War. Free balloons such as were used from Paris, for instance, in 1870 are now a thing of the past, their place having been taken by the aeroplane or the dirigible airship. All military captive balloons are now so constructed that their undersurface acts like a kite, thereby making them steady in a strong wind. To keep the envelope dis- tended properly in the face of the wind, a wind sail is provided so as to transmit pressure to the rear part of the envelope by means of the wind itself. Captive balloons are used not only with the field forces, but also are especially useful in fortress warfare. The organizations which handle these balloons consist ordinarily of some 4 officers, 72 men for each balloon section. 5. DIRIGIBLES. The term dirigible, as applied to aeronautical appliances, signifies a lighter-than-air craft, which is equipped with engines and pro- pellers capable of moving it from place to place. Dirigibles may be roughly divided into three classes: Nonrigid, or those whose enve- lope can be entirely packed into a small space when deflated, and that have no rigid framework of any kind; semirigid, or those that have a stiffening for a part of their length in order to enable the envelopes to maintain their shape to better advantage than the non- rigid; the rigid, which have a framework for the whole envelope that maintains itself continuously. All have been tried for the last 15 years. The nonrigid types have not given very good results, as they are too much dependent on the weather, due to distortion of the envelopes; the semirigid have given some satisfaction and have been largely employed. The advantage of the semirigid types is that they may be packed for shipment and reassembled much more easily than the rigid types; they can be deflated quickly and, con- sequently, are not so subject to complete destruction as the rigid types when anchored to the earth. On the other hand, they are not able to develop the speed that the rigid types, such as the " Zeppelin," are capable of. Dirigibles and aeroplanes are frequently compared with each other as to their utility in general. As a matter of fact, they are two entirely different military accessories and are as different in many ways as is a captive balloon from an aeroplane. Dirigibles are able to stay in the air at any height for long periods of time. They are capable of running at reduced speed, can hover over localities for minute observation and to take photographs. They are able to carry several tons weight in addition to their passengers and crew. From the fact that they are able to remain stationary over a given place 515 9 they are able to launch their projectiles with greater accuracy. Dirig- ibles in the present war have been used both over land and sea. At sea th^y have carried out reconnaissance, have acted offensively against hostile submarines, have accompanied transports in order to observe the approach of hostile craft, have been used in mine laying, stopping and examining hostile merchant vessels at sea, and for bombarding hostile localities. The airships which have made the longest trips and developed the greatest efficiency thus far are the German " Zeppelin ■' rigid-frame type. These have repeatedly flown over England at a distance of at least ^0 miles from their base, and have nearly always returned in safety. Some have been lost, how- ever. Aeroplanes appear to be unable to cope with them at night. While dirigibles have not proved themselves to be a determining factor in combat, either on land or sea, they are being developed to the greatest extent possible, especially by the Germans, who have dirigibles of very great size. The principal features of this type are a rigid framework of aluminum, a number of drum-shaped gas bags, and a thin outer cover. Although the details of construction are not definitely known up to date, their length is about 485 feet, their volume about 900,000 cubic feet, their total lift over 20 tons, and their useful lift about 5 tons. They are driven by four motors of a total horsepower of about 800, which is applied to four pro- pellers. Their speed is from 50 to 60 or more miles per hour and a full-speed endurance of over 100 hours, or more than 4 days. It is therefore evident that in good weather these airships have a radius of action of from 5,000 to 6,000 miles. Moreover, they are being constantly improved, and are probably capable of crossing the Atlan- tic Ocean. Crews of from 10 to 20 men are required for their opera- tion; they are armed with bombs of various sorts, light guns, and are equipped with searchlights. They carry very efficient radio ap- parati, which have equipments for determining the directions from which radio impulses are being sent. In this way they are able to locate themselves at night or in foggy weather when the ground is invisible. They require very large and expensive hangars, gas plants, and equipments for their operation. When forced to make landings outside of their hangars, on account of their bulk, they are very diffi- cult to handle in hard winds, and are liable to destruction thereby. The best of the nonrigid and semirigid airships have a capacit}^ f)f more than 800,000 cubic feet, a maximum speed of 50 miles per liour or less, and a full speed endurance of about 24 hours. As men- tioned above, their great asset is extreme portability and cheapness as compared with the rigid type. 30669°— No. 515—16 2 10 6. AEROPLANES. Heavier- than- air craft made their appearance as military agencies in 1908, when the Wright brothers demonstrated thoroughlj' their possibilities in this respect. While many of the salient features of heavier-than-air machines had been worked out years before, it re- mained for the internal-combustion engine to really make mechanical flight possible. The military possibilities of aircraft of this descrip- tion were appreciated immediately by the great nations. Large ap- propriations were made at once, notably by France and Germany, 1'or their development. At first England was slow to take up the matter, but in 1912 had gone at it thoroughly and was spending large amounts of money for their development. Italy, Russia, Japan, and the smaller nations of Europe and South America made liberal appropriations for obtaining the material and developing the person- nel. Aeroplanes were used in a small way during the Italian cam- paign in Africa during the Balkan-Turkish War, and during the Balkan War. These nations had very little equipment and very few trained flj^ers. Wherever the aeroplanes were given the opportunity, under average conditions they rendered efficient service in recon- naissance. 7. TYPES OF AEROPLANES. We now find aeroplanes consisting of three principal classes: (a) Scout or speed machines; (b) reconnaissance aeroplanes; (c) battle machines. The first are used for distant reconnaissance and com- bating the enemy's aircraft, the second for ordinary reconnaissance and the observation of fire of artillery, and the third for the de- struction of enemy's material, personnel, or equipment. 8. REQUIREMENTS OF VARIOUS TYPES OF MACHINES. Great advances have been made since the war began in all these machines, all the details of which are not yet available. The fol- lowing table, which appeared in the London Times of February 19, 1914, gives the approximate requirements of each type of machine at the beginning of the war. These general characteristics are still desired, but the radius of action and the speed have been con- siderably increased: 616 11 8 E?5 1 rt a,<; >, § 3 : fea "S : mS : s o =i§ ^ do ■^ 1 tuD *-• 4> "O ■^w _Q S :S M -3 d ° ^ _« s "i llissi^i £ S2<; 1 3 a* S£^5g£' 5* ^1 1 I&gli^-a 1 OS •St- S O "in (fl fl ." 1 O O ^ „ £ c3 ^ c3^ a? ■dm '3 ® ^ ■= «5 2 tn-S g 1 £ SSh ©■ §.i. a en 3 d 3 O* o ■as 5 fl s sg ft .2 °S .-2 ■d w '3 m M Ct3 ."2 o P5 1 c c c • >. :^ . u c ;^9 3 •a :".a o fe • bc« o '^ ;-s1 fl S :^-s M a .v-^ 3 : >> a goo ( 5 d .« -»^ ® ":5 1 1 3 5 SgSft 3 -S o-SaS i Ph Su3Q 3 3 •»■ 1 i 3 ;.si ( i •■g'-i ■ a 3 > ' ® o 3 UO < : S-«i ' 3 <3 o « O'SS f S 6- p hE iS 3 1 616 12 9. AEROPLANE ENGINES. As to material, the most important consideration in aeroplane con- struction has been the engine. Without excellent engines the best aeroplanes otherwise are of no service; in fact, may be a source of danger. In the countries where aeroplane development has made the most progress large prizes have been given for the development of suitable engines. At the same time, research and experimentation have gone on along this line at Government plants. Engines re- quire frequent replacement. In fact, it is reported that after 100 hours in the air engines are " scrapped " and new ones installed. The plan found to give excellent results for the development of material is for the Government to have stations where experimenta- tion along all lines is carried on. On the data furnished by these establishments specifications are made up for the construction of aircraft by private individuals and civil manufactories. If any parts, such as the engines mentioned above, need additional develop- ment, prizes are offered to stimulate construction and progress. ni. FUNCTIONS OF AIRCRAFT. 10. HEIGHT AT WHICH AEROPLANES MUST FLY. It was soon found out that to escape the fire of small arms a height of about 4,000 feet above the ground had to be maintained. As soon as balloon guns were created this height had to be increased to 6,000 feet, at which height it is now necessary to fly in order to be reasonably safe from being hit by hostile projectiles sufficient to bring the machine down. At this height, 6,000 feet, small details of the terrain and small detachments of troops or material are very difficult to distinguish. On the other hand, large columns of troops, trains, raihvays, bridges, artillery firing, and sometimes in position, defensive positions of large extent, and things of that nature can be readily distinguished. Whenever it becomes necessary for the air- craft to fly at a lower altitude than 6,000 feet the chance of destruc- tion by gunfire must be considered. 11. STRATEGICAL RECONNAISSANCE. 1 Reconnaissance of this kind is strategical in its nature, the tactical reconnaissance of particular localities is still carried out by troops or captive balloons. In fact, it may be said that all strategical recon- naissance is now carried on by aircraft. The reconnaissance is car- ried out by an officer who requires considerable experience in order to be able to distinguish objects on the earth and assign to them their true military value. The pilot is either an officer or noncommissioned officer. The observer is always a trained tactical officer, because in reconnaissance of this nature an untrained person can not interpret the military significance of what he sees. 515 13 12. PHOTOGRAPHY FROM AEROPLANES. Photography is utilized to the greatest extent possible in aerial reconnaissance. The devices are so arranged that they are capable of taking one or a series ofvie"STs of a particular locality. The plates or films thus made are rapidly developed and are thrown on a screen by means of a stereopticon, when all details are magnified to any extent desired and details invisible to the naked eye are brought out plainly. These details are then entered on the maps of the officers concerned. As the height at which an aeroplane is flying can be taken from the barograph, and as the focal angle of the lens of the camera is known, a scale can easily be worked out and the views form good maps of the terrain photographed. 13. AEROPLANES AND ARTILLERY. In addition to reconnaissance in general, aeroplanes have taken their place as a fixture for observing the fire of artillery. Due to the degree of concealment which artillery is now given, it is im- possible to determine its location from the ground. The aeroplanes first pick up the targets, report their location to the field artillery, and then observe the fire of the batteries. By means of prearranged visual signals or radiotelegraphy the aeroplanes are able to indicate to the artillery where their fire is making itself felt. If artillery is insufficiently provided with aeroplanes, it is well established that an enemy so provided has an overwhelming advantage. 14. CONTROL OF THE AIR. For this reason, among others, attempts to gain " control of the air" are made by belligerents at the inception of hostilities. This takes the form of offensive action by aeroplane against aeroplane. For this purpose machines known as "speed scouts" and "battle aeroplanes " have been developed. All the great European nations are now equipped with them. The only way in which enemy aero- planes can be effectively dealt with is by aeroplanes, because they are difficult targets for gunfire from the ground. To gain control of the air a great preponderance in number and efficiency of air- craft is necessary. So far in the European war, unless one side had a greatly preponderating number and quality of aeroplanes, they have been unable to obtain and keep control of the air. An excellent instance of obtaining control of the air seems to be furnished by the Austro-Germans when they initiated the campaign against the Rus- sians in May, 1915. In this instance complete control of the air appears to have been obtained. The results to the Russians were disastrous because the Austro-Germans were able to fly at will wher- ever they wanted to, could pick up the location of the Russian 516 14 masses, and make their movements accordingly, entirely unobserved by the Russians. In the fire of their artillery they had the advantage of being able to locate the Russian guns and observe their own fire, •while the Russians were powerless to do so. In an article on " Recent progress in military aeronautics," pub- lished in the Journal of the Franklin Institute for October, 1915, Lieut. Col. Samuel Reber, Signal Corps, United States Army, sums up the question of machines for control of the air as follows: Experience has developed three types of aeroplanes for military purposes: The first, the speed scout, for strategical reconnaissance, a one seater, with a speed up to 85 miles per hour and radius of action of 300 miles and a fast climber, about 700 feet per minute; the second for general reconnaissance pur- poses with the same radius of action, carrying both pilot and observer and equipped with radiotelegraphy, slower in speed, about 70 miles per hour, and climbing about 500 feet per minute, and in some cases protected by armor ; the third, or fighting craft, armored, and carries in addition to the pilot a rapid- fire gun and ammunition and so arranged as to have a clear field of view and fire in either direction up to 30 degrees from the line of flight, the speed to run from 45 to G5 miles per hour, and the machine to climb about 350 feet per minute. 15. SURPRISE MOVEMENTS. It is often said that due to the use of aeroplanes surprises are no longer possible. Generally speaking, this is so, providing both sides are equally well equipped with machines and weather con- ditions are favorable. If, however, complete "command of the air" is obtained by one side, the chances of surprising the enemy are greater than they have ever been before. 16. BOMB DROPPING. In addition to their functions of reconnaissance, the observation of the fire of artillery, and the combat of hostile machines, both heavier and lighter than air, much time, thought, and ingenuity have been given to the subject of dropping projectiles. Bombs of various sorts weighing from a couple of pounds to 50 pounds have been tried. The most common ones weigh from 15 to 35 pounds. At the height at which aeroplanes are required to fly it is extremely diffi- cult to hit an object with any certainty. Various devices have been used and tried for this purpose. The factors of height, speed, and wind, are almost impossible to compensate for entirely, up to the present time, so that consequently bomb dropping in general or the launching of projectiles of all kinds from aeroplanes has not at- tained great results in so far as the actual destruction of material or personnel is concerned. Advances along this line are constantly being made, however, but progress is slow. A special type of aero- plane has been developed for dropping bombs and battle purposes. 515 15 For bomb attacks on any locality these machines are sent in flotillas of from 30 to 60 machines, each of which is provided with from 5 to 10 bombs. They go to the locality and circle over it, dropping their projectiles. Against railways, roads, bridges, and hostile parks of various kinds, this method of attack has given considerable success. IV. ORGANIZATION OF AEROPLANE UNITS. 17. TACTICS OF AEROPLANES. As to tactical use aeroplanes seem to be approaching methods simi- lar to those used by a navy. That is, first the speed machines re- connoiter to the front; they are followed by the battle machines, which in their turn clear the way for the reconnaissance aeroplanes; those assigned to the artillery stay right with their guns. Fortresses, harbor-defense works, and naval formations require special organi- zations of aeroplanes, some or all of which may be operated from the water. The organization, kind, and number of the machines and personnel required for this particular service depend on the special locality and mission of whatever formation the aircraft are to be attached to. 18. DEVELOPMENT DURING EUROPEAN WAR, The use of aeroplanes is gradually being developed from expe- rience in the European war. Organization has been found to be one of the most important considerations; in general the organization has been into squadrons. The squadron is a tactical and adminis- trative unit. It has a personnel consisting of pilots, observers, bomb droppers, mechanicians, chauffeurs, and drivers. Flying per- sonnel has to be developed in the military service. Unlike chauffeurs, for instance, there are few in the civil population w^ho can be drawn on. The few who fly are demonstrators, exhibition flyers, or sports- men. They are very few in number and scarcely a military asset. In France the squadrons usually have six machines and two spares. They have the same organization of depots of resupply that other units of the armies possess. The squadrons usually consist of com- plete units of one kind of machine; that is, speed, reconnaissance, or fighting. These squadrons are usually assigned to an army, or more if the machines and personnel are available. In general an aeroplane requires for its operation a personnel of 1 pilot, 1 observer, and 2 enlisted men, mechanicians, chauffeurs, etc. In England 12 machines of different classes are assigned to a squadron. 615 16 19. ASSIGNMENT OF AEROPLANES TO ARTILLERY. Many are of the opinion that machines with the personnel to op- erate them should be assigned permanently to artillery regiments, so that they would be immediately available whenever action is re- quired by the artillery. If they have to be obtained from a higher headquarters valuable time is often lost. It is believed that before long aeroplanes will be assigned permanently to regiments of artil- lery. V. DEVELOPMENT OF AERONAUTIC PERSONNEL. 20. GENERAL LINE OF DEVELOPMENT IN EUROPE. In the development of their aeronautical personnel all nations have worked more or less along similar lines. At first these detach- ments were attached to the engineers. All the pilots and observers were officers, while the mechanicians and others were enlisted men. As the science developed and more and more machines becames nec- essary the importance of this branch constantly increased until even- tually it formed a separate arm of the service. Instead of officers only being employed in the flying of the ma- chines noncommissioned officers began to be used as the pilots. 21. OFFICER-OBSERVERS AND NONCOMMISSIONED OFFICER- PILOTS. The observers were either trained staff officers or officers of par- ticular branches when the reconnaissance being made especially con- cerned a certain branch. For instance, in the observation of artil- lery fire an artillery officer, for the inspection of a demolished bridge over a great river an engineer officer, or for the observation of the tactical or strategical dispositions of an enemy's troops a staff officer. Noncommissioned officers are now very generally used as pilots. All countries now at war have found that they have places for all the trained pilots they can possibly obtain. In general the units are commanded by officers and a certain number of the pilots are officers, but the bulk of the piloting is done by enlisted men while the officers are carried as observers. 22. LOSSES TO AERO PERSONNEL IN WAR. The losses to the flying personnel in war, when equipped with proper machines, seems to be less than that of infantry, cavalry, and artillery in the order named. 615 17 23. DEVELOPMENT OF AERONAUTIC PERSONNEL IN THE UNITED STATES. In the United States the development has been along similar lines to those employed in Europe, with the difference that here a branch of the service existed that did not formerly exist in the European armies. It was a development of the Civil War, i. e., the Signal Corps. This corps is charged with the transmission of information between the various units of an army; the captive balloons had formerly been assigned to it, and when the aeroplanes made their appearance they naturally fitted in. In this way all the agencies for the transmission of information are kept under one head, which should give not only the maximum amount of efficiency in such trans- mission but also obviate the necessity of creating a new arm of the service. The development of aero units in the United States has been slow for various reasons: First, on account of the fact that very little money has been appropriated compared to the sums appropri- ated in Europe. Second, the selection of the flying personnel has been limited to lieutenants of the Regular Army, unmarried, and below 30 years of age. This reduces the number of eligibles to a very small compass and does not give the results that are necessary. In the development of a flying personnel it is thought that, in addi- tion to a certain number of officers obtained from the Eegular Army as now provided for by law, pilots should be obtained both from among the enlisted men and from suitable civilians who enlist for that pur- pose. When they have proved their ability to be efficient pilots they should be placed in a special grade to be designated by a suitable name, such as " aero pilot. Signal Corps," for instance. This grade should be analogous to the grade of warrant officer in the Navy. When such men leave the service for any cause which does not inter- fere with the performance of the duties of pilot, arrangements should be made to obtain their services at once at the outbreak of war. The observers should be tactical officers who have received training. The present organization authorized for the aero squadrons in the United States provides that each one have 12 aeroplanes — 8 of the reconnaissance type, 2 of the speed type, and 2 of the battle type. The personnel numbers 20 officers, 18 of whom are pilots. It is intended that staff and Artillery officers be used as observers. The United States squadron appears to be a well-balanced unit for work in this country, judging by the experiences obtained in Europe. It should be perfected as soon as possible and every effort made to give our Army the aircraft of all types needed for its use. Lieut. Col. Reber, in this connection, says: We who in the beginning started the movement are now at the tail of the pro- cession. We have no dirigibles, but very few trained men, and fewer macliines. 516 18 The manufacturing industry is moribund from tlie lack of business, and there is no future for it. We have no aerodj^namical laboratories in which to study tlie problems, and no engineering courses, except one, in which to develop our constructors. The Government has not stimulated any advance in the design of machines or motors by competition for substantial reward. We have no national league, as in France and Germany, to assist the Government by pri- vate subscription and by public demand for the development of air power. The interest of our people in aeronautics at large is dead, and has been per- haps so lulled by a sense of false security and the belief that war will not come to such a vast and powerful Nation as ours ; that it will not heed an oft-quoted maxim of the Father of our Country, " In time of peace prepare for war." In no particular is it more impossible to make up deficiencies after the outbreak of hostilities than in aeronautics. What is to be done? Evidently a strong appeal should be made to Congress for suitable legislation. 24. SCOPE OF NEEDED LEGISLATION. What is needed is legislation that will give means of obtaining a sufficient personnel of pilots, enough money to buy suitable ma- chines including excellent engines, and the training of a suitable number of officer-observers. Provision should be made for the cre- ation of captive-balloon units, and dirigibles of various types should be developed. 615 o I THE MILITIA AS ORGANIZED UNDER THE CONSTI- TUTION AND ITS VALUE TO THE NATION AS A MILITARY ASSET I f PREPARED BY THE WAR COLLEGE DIVISION, GENERAL STAFF CORPS AS A SUPPLEMENT TO THE STATEMENT OF A PROPER MILITARY POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES WCD 7835-9 I ARMY WAR COLLEGE : WASHINGTON NOVEMBER, 1915 516 WASHINGTON GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1916 War Department, Document No. 516. OjSke of the Chief of Staff, SYNOPSIS, Page. 1. Constitutional provisions relating to power of Congress to raise troops 5 2. Militia law of 1792 5 3. Militia laws of 1808 and 1820 5 4. Failure of the system 6 5. Worthlessness of militia 6 6. Act of 1898 6 7. The Organized Militia as an asset in preparing war plans 7 8. Failure or refusal of troops to serve 7 9. Lack of physical fitness 8 10. Time for concentrating 9 11. Character of force assembled 9 12. Time this force may be held for service 10 13. How this force may be used 10 14. Wastefulness of the system 10 15. As cause for delay in raising a volunteer force 11 16. Number of Organized Militia and amount of training of those secured by the call 11 17. The organizations of Organized Militia and training of personnel as an asset. 11 18. How present Organized Militia has improved 12 19. Conclusions 12 30669°— No. 516—16 (3) THE MILITIA AS ORGANIZED UNDER THE CONSTITU- TION AND ITS VALUE TO THE NATION AS A MILITARY ASSET. 1. UNDER THE CONSTITUTION THERE ARE lAVO WAYS OF RAISING TROOPS. (a) Directly under the power of Congress " to raise and support armies." (Art. 1, sec. 8, par. 11.) (5) Indirectly under (art. 1, sec. 8, par. 14) the power "to pro- vide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions." (A. W. C. Serial 25, Part I, p. 45) But for the valuelessness of the militia (and other short-term troops), the provision of the Constitu- tion which authorizes the Federal Government " to raise and support armies" w^ould probably never have been adopted, because of the traditional fear of a standing army. As it was, this provision was bitterly opposed and barely received enough votes to be carried. The omission of the clause would have resulted in a dependence upon militia alone. 2. THE FIRST IMPORTANT MILITIA ACT WAS THAT OF 1792. This act provided for compulsory enlistment and the performance of military duty by every able-bodied male between 18 and 45, and required their enrollment as State militia; hence, for the United States to raise Regulars or Volunteers under this act w ould be an en- croachment upon a body already subject to the State as militia. As this act carried no appropriation for arms, equipment, enroll- ment, etc., and as there was no penalty for failure to carry out its provisions, and as there was no way to coerce the governors of States, it resulted that the States gradually assumed the power of legislating for the militia — the war power was practically turned over to the governors. 3. MILITIA LAWS OF 1808 (1661) AND 1820. In 1808 Congress appropriated an annual sum for arms and equip- ment ; in 1820 it passed an act requiring that field exercises and dis- cipline in the militia should be as observed in the Regular Army. 516 (5) 6 4. FAILURE OF THE SYSTEM. The failure of the system in use during the Revolution and subse- quently was largely due to short enlistments, method of securing officers, and lack of control by the Federal Government. The system was a failure during the Revolution and in every suc- ceeding war. This \\as particularly true of militia (and it was true for other classes of troops where the Federal Government failed to assert its power or relinquished it) . 5. WORTHLESSNESS OF THE MILITIA. To show its lack of value as a military asset the following state- ments are quoted from the writings of George Washington : (A. W. C. Serial 25, Part I, p. 42) Certain I am that it would be cheaper to keep 50,000 or 100,000 in constant pay than to depend upon one half the number and supply the other half occasionally by militia. The time the latter are in pay before and after they are in camp, assembling and marching, the waste of ammunition, the consumption of stores which * * * they must be furnished with or sent home, added to the other inci- dental expenses consequent upon their coming and conduct in camp, surpass all idea and destroy every kind of regularity and economy which you could establish among fixed and settled troops and will in my opinion prove, if the scheme is adhered to, the ruin of our cause * ♦ *. For if I was called upon to declare upon oath whether the militia have been more serviceable or hurtful, I should subscribe to the latter * * *. (A. W. C. Serial 25, Part I, p. 43) That an annual army raised on the spur of the occasion, besides being unqualified for the end designed, is * * * ten times more expensive * * *. (A. W. C. Serial 25, Part I, p. 44) The only things that counted for efficiency were length of service and military experience of the officers. The above quotations are just as true to-day as they were nearly 140 years ago. 6. VOLUNTEER ACT OF 1898 AND LATER MILITIA ACTS. The volunteer act of 1898 was based on the Constitution. It pro- vided for a force that could be used at home or abroad and for gen- eral military purposes, and did not attempt to use a force that the Constitution restricted to three specific purposes. Legislation since then has gone backward and makes the attempt to use what the ex- perience of 140 years has shown to be not a dependable force on account of constitutional limitations. The latest militia laws are those of January 21, 1903, May 27, 1908, April 21, 1910, and April 25, 1914 (volunteer law). These laws do not correct known defects in the militia, even those that, the Constitution not preventing, might be corrected. 616 " The laws governing the transition from the service orf the State to the service of the United States are more indefinite and more liable to lead to confusion and embarrassment than they ever were before." (3702 Congressional Record, 1911.) 7. THE MILITIA AS AN ASSET IN CARRYING OUT PLANS FOR THE NATIONAL DEFENSE. To be of real value as an asset in preparing war plans it should be possible to answer the question, What percentage of the present personnel of the Organized Militia, or as it would be at the time the President issues his call, will be available ? This question can not be answered even approximately. The last report of the Chief of Staff (1911) gave the strength of the Organized Militia (mobile) as 113,929, but this does not repre- sent the number available in preparing war plans. In the first place there is a dual responsibility, the governor and the President, and there may be conflict. The President would issue his call through the governors of States. (Sec. 4, act of 1908.) He can not issue the call directly to the Organized Militia officers as was possible before (under the act of 1903). If certain governors were not in sympathy with the war. (In 1812 the governors of Massachusetts and Connecticut and later the governors of Vermont, Virginia, North Carolina, Kentucky, Ten- nessee, Arkansas, and Missouri refused to call forth the militia in response to the President's call.) If their c6nstituents fear their own section will be attacked; If great political pressure is exerted to prevent militia of certain States being sent to the place designated by the President ; If certain governors should disband the Organized Militia in their States (West Virginia, South Carolina, Nevada, and Kansas gov- ernors have done this) ; then the President's action would be in part nullified, and from this cause alone the resultant force might easily be considerably less than the existing Organized Militia. 8. FAILURE OR REFUSAL OF TROOPS TO SERVE. (A. W. C. Serial 25, Part IV, p. 37) " The response to the call for volunteers under the act of April 22, 1898, at once illustrated the worthlessness of the existing militia as an auxiliary to the Regular Army. * * * " " Of the militia borne on the company rolls, many refused to vol- unteer upon reasonable grounds, 25 per cent were rejected prior to muster, and 25 per cent were rejected on physical examination after muster." 616 8 The Organized Militia is better trained, officered, equipped, and disciplined than in 1898, but men are about the same now as always, and if they are not inclined to serve in war they will find a way to avoid service. Section 7, act of 1908, provides : That any officer or enlisted man of the Organized Militia who shall refuse or neglect to present himself for such muster, upon being called forth as herein prescribed, shall be subject to trial by court-martial and shall be punished as such court-martial may direct. Under this provision it is not believed to be practicable to try and punish such offenders. It might be used as a threat, but it is not believed that it will deter many who do not wish to serve. 9. LACK OF PHYSICAL FITNESS. Section 7 of act of 1908 further provides : And without further medical examination previous to such muster, except for those States and Territories which have not adopted the standard of medi- cal examination prescribed for the Regular Army. Because the standard for medical examination prescribed for the Regular Army has been adopted by the States it does not follow that they conform. Those who have inspected the Organized Militia know this, and men not qualified physically would shortly have to be discharged and might later become unworthy pension claimants. (457 A. E. (b).) The Report of the Chief of Militia Division, page 33 (1914), under the column headed " Not apparently conforming, etc., * * *" a total of 3,218 is shown ; the last column of table on page 33 shows 720 discharged for physical unfitness. If the necessarily superficial examination showed 3,218 unfit, it is believed a searching examination would reveal several times such number unfit. Page 206 of the report above mentioned shows that the Organized Militia is 16,000 short of the (old) minimum, and further states: In no State is the prescribed peace strength of all organizations of the Organ- ized Militia maintained and that in many instances the deficiency has reached such a figure as to leave the corresponding organizations such in name only — organizations of no value as a military asset to the Federal Government. It is believed that many organization commanders are very lax as to physical qualifications in order to secure the prescribed mini- mum. If all of the organizations of the Organized Militia could be kept up to the prescribed minimum with men qualified physically, the situation would not be so bad, but it seems to have been demonstrated that, due to (a) labor opposition, (b) objections of employers to 616 absence of employees, (; 1 l5 "-^ ^.w.*.' 30669° C^ART •SMO^/A/i:? O/ZG'A/^/ZAT'/OA/ OF" THEi .or/=-/C£: or the surgeon GENERAL 1 ■St//?G^OAf GElNEiRAL 1 1 1 1 1 , 1 , , 1 1 ' \f?ECORDCORR£SPOND£:NC£\ \SaPPLY DfY/S'0'j\ \ ■SA.^/'TAKY O'V/3/Of^ \ \P£RSO^NCL 0IVISIOn\ \Ml/5£Uf^ AND i^lBRA'^y \ \ 1 1 1 1 1 1 5 1" $_ J8 *0 i 1 j 1 1 1 1 i 4-. 1 J) 5 11 ^1 ^5 II II si Is 1 \ _jr 1 pU Is m c 1 Jim iiiigpii |iii|i|io i n liiiliBi D BlNwaffll RR 15 APPENDIX D. A,G.O. 2338208-H. W.C.D. 9262-10. War Department, Office of the Quartermaster General of the .\j{my, Washington, November 13, 1915. No.: 022.1-Ad. From : Quartermaster General. To: The Adjutant General of the Army. Subject: War Department organization and administration. 1. Referring to letter from The Adjutant General of November 3, 1915 (No. 233S208), on subject as above, the following report is submitted: (a) Graphic chart submitted herewith shows organization of the Office of the Quartermaster General in detail. (6) The organization as shown in the chart is the present organization and would remain the same, except that in the event of war it would be necessary to assign additional officers as assistants to officers in charge of the Supplies and Transportation Divisions of the office to handle the work of these divi- sions, which would of necessity be materially increased. It would also be necessary, in the event of hostilities, to increase the clerical force of the office. 2. With the exception of the addition of a limited number of officers and an increase of the clerical force as set forth above, the organization as shown in the accompanying chart is, in the judgment of the undersigned, adapted to both peace and war conditions. J. B. Alseshire, Quarterma.ster General. APPENDIX E. 145136, 4a. W.C.D. 9262-9. A.G.O. 233820S-a. War Department, Office of the Surgeon General, Washington, November 13, 1915. From : Surgeon General. To: The Adjutant General. Subject : War Department organization and administration. 1. Replying to your call of the 3d instant for information as to organi^-atiou and administration of the War Department adapted to a change from peace conditions to a state of war, I would report as follows : (c) A chart is inclosed showing the present organization and administration in this bureau. The clerical force of the office, at this time consisting of chief clerk, law clerk, and 93 clerks of classes IV, III, II, I, $1,000 and $900, are distributed among the several divisions as conditions of business require. (In the event of an increase in the authorized strength of the Army, the present clerical force will not be sufficient to efficiently and expeditiously handle the increased business consequent thereupon, and while the present organization of the office need not be changed, it is estimated that the clerical force will have to be increased 25 per cent to insure accuracy and promptness in the dispatch of business.) (b) The present organization and administration of the bureau is well adapted to a change from peace conditions to a state of war, and no change 620 16 therein can now be foreseen ; all that would seem to be necessary in the event of war would be to increase the number of officers and employees eventually to about double the number provided for when the changed conditions occur. H. C Fisher, Lieutenant Colonel, Medical Corps, Acting Surgeon General. APPENDIX F. 99380 AGO 2338208-J WCD 9262-12 War Department, Office of the Chief of Engineers, Washington, November 13, 1915. From : The Chief of Engineers. To : Tlie Adjutant General. Subject : War Department organization and administration. 1. In compliance with letter from The Adjutant General, dated November 3, 1915, upon the above subject (A. G. O. 233S208), I submit herewith a state- ment of the present organization of the Engineer Bureau, witli suggested clianges to prepare it better for war conditions. It is assumed that the inquiry relates not only to the organization of the Engineer Bureau. in the War De- partment proper, but is intended to include also the Engineer Department at Large, which is an essential portion of the Engineer Bureau in war as well as in peace. 2. Table 1 gives the organization of the Engineer Bureau of the War Depart- ment proper, including the Board of Engineers for Rivers and Harbors, which by law is a part of the Office of the Chief of Engineers, but which has offices elsewhere in Washington than in the War Department Building. 3. Table 2 gives in a brief outline the organization of the Engineer Depart- ment at Large, which carries on fortification construction work, river and harbor work, and other miscellaneous civil work. 4. Table 3 gives the organization of certain matters connected with military affairs or furnishing military supplies under the jurisdiction of the Chief of Engineers, outside the War Department proper, and yet not connected with the construction or supervisory work of the Engineer Department at Large. 5. There is omitted from these tables all reference to Engineer troops and to the Department of Engineers, the control of which comes within the juris- diction of the commanding generals of the military departments. 6. It is believed that in general, and except for the minor changes noted below, the organization above referred to is fairly well suited to a state of war or a transition from a state of peace to a state of war. 7. As far as the organization of the Engineer Bureau within the War Department is concerned, no change is suggested as necessary to prepare for a state of war other than the probable necessity of an increase in personnel in the Office of the Chief of Engineers in the division connected with military affairs. The services of an additional officer and additional clerical assistants would be absolutely necessary during the stages of war or immediately pre- ceding, and will not improbably become necessary in any event in case of the adoption by Congress of the proposed reorganization of the Army, involving an increase in the number of Engineer troops and, more important still, a large increase in the amount of Engineer material to be supplied to troops of the line and to be kept in reserve. This increase in personnel will require additional office space. 520 17 8. In so far as concerns the orsanlzation of the Engineer Department at Large, no change is considered desirable or advisable. In time of war or in the period immediately preceding it is probable that a considerable portion of the trained oflice and field forces now engaged in the construction of river and harbor and other civil works could and would be, with more or less complete organizations, transferred to work of a military character where needed, such as seacoast and land fortifications and purchase and inspection of engineer equipment and supplies for mobile and seacoast purposes. The availability for such military work in time of war of such a trained construction force already organized and at work under the jurisdiction of the Chief of Engineers is con- sidered of inestimable value. 9. As I have stated above, I consider no change necessary in the organiza- tion of the Engineer Department at Large in so far as it relates to duties per- formed under the Chief of Engineers, but all division Engineers and district Engineer officers are for certain purposes placed l)y Army Regulations or War Department instructions under the jurisdiction of the department commanders, and for most of these purposes it is believed that such regulations are just, right, and proper. However, amongst the subjects placed within the jurisdic- tion of the department commanders is that of the preparation of plans for tlie construction of land foritfications and the complete control of the preparation for the construction of such land defenses. 10. It is understood that the district Engineer officers are expected to have in their offices complete plans of all these defensive works, with the detailed scheme for carrying them out, and that this arrangement is to be carried to the extent of providing a separate envelope for each foreman or overseer, con- taining plans of the work to be done by him and directions for carrying out these plans. The district Engineer officers are supposed to Iceep in touch with the question of local supply of labor and materials, etc., all outside of the juris- diction of the Chief of Engineers and without any coordination with tlieir pri- mary duties or with other Engineer districts. 11. It is believed that the above arrangement, in so far as it separates the construction end of such work from the observation and supervision of the Chief of Engineers, is a serious mistake. The amount of work of this character to be done in the early stages of war is, according to existing plans, enormous. The length of time in which it is supposed to be done is very small, and any attempt to accomplish this requires the most complete organization. At such times the district Engineer officers having charge of these land fortifications would probably in every case have charge also of emergency seacoast fortifica- tion work, made possible by sudden availability of long-needed funds, and the capacity of their offices, both as regards the office and field forces, would be overtaxed and the local labor markets would probably, in some cases at least, be exhausted. 12. On the other hand there are a number of inland Engineer offices engaged entirely in civil work, and it would be entirely practicable, in the early part of a war, to transfer portions of the trained office and field forces of such inland offices to the works of seacoast fortifications and land fortification of the sea- cast liarbors. Such transfers are considered absolutely es.sential to pi"event sea- coast Engineer districts being swamped with work. 13. Were all matters connected with the construction of such land fortifica- tions for the protection of seacoast forts within the jurisdiction of the Chief of Engineers, as is the case with all other construction work of a civil or military character, the office of the Chief of Engineers would be able in time of peace to make definite plans and arrangements for the transfer of sucli working forces and for the coordination of all work under the Engineer Department. 520 18 14. It is therefore considered essential to a proper preparation for such emer- gency work that the Chief of Engineers should have jurisdiction over tlie con- struction of sucli land-fortification worlv, and that not only should he be per- mitted but he should be required to lieep in his office copies of all plans con- nected with the construction of the land defense of seacoast fortifications, and that all communications from the War Department to district engineer officers on such matters should pass through his hands. It is considered advisable also that he be furnished with copies at least of papers passing between department commanders and the local district officers. 15. It is not intended by these suggestions to interfere with the initiative of the department commanders, either in designing or in modifying plans for these defenses, but merely to suggest that on account of the great magnitude of the worli required in the early stages of a war and of the rapidity with which it must be done a complete cooperation between all branches of the Engineer Department is essential and can not be assured unless the Cliief of Engineers is given jurisdiction over such matters as recommended above. 16. In so far as it relates to the organization of the Engineer School and Engineer depots, no general modifications are suggested for preparation in time of war, except that, if the new scheme of Army reorganization is accepted by Congress, the purchase and storage of the large stocli of reserve material con- templated thereby maizes essential an increase in the number of Engineer officers now engaged in Engineer depot worlj, and that such of these officers as are now performing other functions in addition to depot worli will probably have to be relieved of those other functions by other ofl[icers. 17. No change is proposed in the organization of the Engineer School, as it is not improbable that, at least in the early stages of the war, the functions of the Engineer School will practically cease, and the instructors and student officers pertaining to the school will be available for other details. Dan C. Kingman, Cliief of Engineers, United States Army. Table I. — Organization of the Engineer Bureau of the War Department. Commis- sioned per- sonnel. Assist- ant engi- . neers. Blue- print opera- tors. Draft- men. Junior engi- neers. Law officer. Cler- ical force. Mes- sengers and labor- ers. Chief of Engineers 1 1. General administration, Office Chief of Engi- neers: 1. Chief clerk 40 11 9 5 21 1 2 18 2. Military section (including per- 2 2 1 2 1 2 1 8. Rivers and harbors 6 4. Miscellaneous civil 1 6. Accounts and con- 1 1 2 2 1 2 7, Board of Engineers for Rivers and Harbors (com- prises 7 officers of the Corps of En- gineers, of whom all but 1 are ac- counted for else- 1 1 Total 9 6 2 9 2 1 89 14 620 19 Table II. — Organisation of the Engineer Department at Large. Fortifications, rivers and harbors, and miscellaneous civil works : Engineer Department at Large — 9 divisions (5 of the division engineers have also district duties). 57 districts, 49 district officers (3 of whom now have 2 districts each). 25 military assistants. Civilian employees, approximately 25,000. Table HI. — Engineer School, Engineer depots, etc. Commissioned force. Civilian employ- ees. In charge. Assist- ants. 2 1 10 2. Engineer depots: 45 2. Fort LeavenwortJi (oIHcer in charge also director Army Field En- 2 3. Vancouver Barracks (officer in charge also in command of Com- 45 6. Manila (officer in charge also department Engineer Philippine 48 Total under "Miscellaneous duties exclusively military" 5 3 150 APPENDIX G. AGO 2338208 WCD 9262-11 Wab Department, Office of the Chief of Ordnance, Washington, November 12, 1915. From: The Ordnance Office. To : The Adjutant General of the Army. Subject : War Department organization and administration. 1. Replying to your letter of November 3, 1915, A. G. O. 2338208 (O. O. 321.8-1), concerning the War Department organization and administration of the Ordnance Department, the following is submitted : 2. The present War Department organization and administration of the Ordnance Office is as follows: I. Administration : (c) General correspondence. (b) Arsenal administration and personnel. (c) Civil-service matters; appointments and changes of status of em- ployees. II. Finance and property division: (o) Financial transactions affecting the entire department, and also the militia in so far as ordnance supplies are concerned, (b) Property accountability. (Note. — Supply is handled by the divisions enumerated below, each con- trolling the material whose manufacture it directs.) III. Small arms and equipment division: (a) Small arms. (b) Personal and horse equipment. (c) Small-arms and machine-gun target practice. (d) Supply of rifle clubs and schools. •80 20 IV. Gun division: (a) Seacoast cannon. (6) Mobile artillery cannon. (c) Ammunition — 1. Powder. 2. Primers. 3. Fuses. 4. Projectiles. 5. High explosives. id) Grenades, serial bombs. (e) Miscellaneous cannon and projectiles for special uses. (/) Seacoast artillery target practice. (g) Mobile artillery target practice. V. Carriage division : (a) Seacoast gun carriages and the optical and fire-control instruments pertaining thereto. (b) Mobile artillery carriages and vehicles, and the optical and fire- control iustriTments pertaining thereto. (c) Machine guns. (d) Pack outfits — mountain and machine. (e) Tractors and armored automobiles. (/) Maintenance of installed and mobile artillery material. 3. The organization given in the preceding paragraph is considered satis- factory for the peace organization and administration of this office, and best adapted to pass from peace to war conditions. No change in this organization would be required to pass from peace to war conditions, it being simply a question of expansion. William Crozier, Brigadier General, Chief of Ordnance, United States Army. i APPENDIX H. 40726. [First indorsement.] War Department, Office of Chief Signal Officer, Washington, November 6, 1915. To The Adjutant General, United States Army : Inclosing diagram showing present organization and administration of this bureau. This organization and administration is considered adapted to a change from peace conditions to a state of war by the addition of one division to handle matters of personnel and a reasonable increase of the clerical force, depending on the size of the military forces to be organized. Charles S. Wallace. Captain, Signal Corps, in charge of Office. 620 Engineering Division Duties e, Inspection, and Issue of Supplies ;Esti- horities, and Requisitions for Funds ;Mon- ts ;De sign, Construction, and Installation _cal Equipment {Supply Depots, Lab orator- hone and Telegraph Systems ;Cableship8 ; on of Kteinuals, Printing Requisitions and 1718, 3066J ef eignQi orri AdBlnUtimtlon SItIbIo Duties Personnel ;Insulnr Possessions cuid Panama ;Mobile Army Unite ;Service Schools ; Compilation of Coiies ; Distribution, Accounting, Codes and ManuRla ;Exami- ncition Property Returiia lExtuninations ,Nonconmle- eioned OfficerBjPhotographlc Experimental Work. Duties Purchase, Inspection, and Issue of Supplies jEsti- matea, Authorities, and Requisitions for Funds ; Mon- ey A':counts;DeElgn, Construction, 8ind Installation of Technical Equipment ;Supply Depots, Laborator- ies, Telephone and Teleernph Systems jCableshlpB ; Preparation of Hanutils, Printing Reciuleitions and Blank Forms. c 21 APPENDIX I. AGO 2338208. WCD 9262-7. Was Depabtment, BuKEAtr OF Insulab Affairs, Washington, November 12, 1915. B'rom : Bureau of Insular Affairs. To : The Adjutant General of the Army. Subject : War Department organization and administration. 1. In compliance with the request contained in letter from your oflice of the 3d instant (No. 233S20S), the following information is submitted: (a) As at present organized, the Bureau of Insular Affairs consists of the Correspondence and Administrative Division ; Purchasing, Disbursing, and Ac- counts Division ; Record Division ; Miscellaneous Division ; and Statistical Divi- sion. The chief clerk of the bureau, under the immediate direction of the chief and assistants to the chief of bureau, has direct supervision over the Cor- respondence and Administrative Division, which handles all current business and correspondence. Through the Purchasing, Disbursing, and Accounts Divi- sion all supplies bought in the United States for the governments of the Philippine Islands and Porto Rico are purchased, and accounts therefor audited and paid. The Record Division is the depository of the official records and cor- respondence of the bureau. The IMiscellaneous Division collects and compiles information of all kinds obtainable relating to matters under the supervision of the bureau. The Statistical Division collects and prepares for publication commercial and trade statistics of the insular possessions whose affairs are ad- ministered under the supervision of the bureau. (b) The present organization and administration of the bureau is fully adapted to a change from peace conditions to a state of war. Frank McIntyre, Chief of Bureau. APPENDIX J. C A 5871 /568-A. WCD 9262-8. AGO 2338208-F. War Department, Office of Chief of Staff, Washington, November 12, 1915. From : Acting Chief of Coast Artillery. To: The Adjutant General. Subject : Organization of the Coast Artillery Division. 1. The following diagrammatic statement shows the organization and ad- ministration of this division : Chief of Coast Artillery — senior assistant — charged with supervision and co- ordination of office, administration, mine material, boats, general subjects: 1. Assistant (1) : Subjects relating to fire control, fortifications, light and power, and searchlights. 2. Assistant (1) : Subjects relating to personnel, barracks and quarters, miscellaneous. 620 22 3. Assistant (1) : Subjects relating to target practice, ammunition, instruc- tion, inspection reports. 4. Assistants (2) : Subjects pertaining to estimates, expenditures, requisi- tions, new fortifioation projects, armament materiel data. 2. The present organization of this division is considered well adapted for the accomplishment of the functions of this division under both peace and war conditions. Richmond P. Davis, Colonel, Coast Artillery Corps, Assistant to Chief of Coast Artillery, In charge Coast Artillery Division APPENDIX K. WCD 9262-6. AGO 2338208-D. Wab Depaetment, Office of the Chief of Staff, Division of Militia Affairs, Washington, November J2, 1915. From : The Acting Chief, Division of Militia Affairs. To: The Adjutant General. Subject : War Department organization and administration. 1. Referring to communication of the 6th instant, the following is submitted : "(o) A statement of tlie present War Department organization and admin- istration of your bureau." There is attached a diagram showing the organization and administration of the Division of Militia Affairs existing at this date. The normal organization, however, provides for three additional clerlis and provision therefor is made in the estimates for the fiscal year 1917. "(&) A statement of the peace organization and administration of your bureau, considered best adapted to a change from peace conditions to a state of war." The peace organization of the ofhce is that shown in the diagram under (a), witli the following additional officers which it is contemplated will be required as the divisional organization of the Organized Militia is perfected, and the 12 divisions are completely organized : One officer (captain. Field Artillei'y), as assistant to the officer in charge of matters pertaining to the organization and instruction of the Field Artillery personnel of the Organized Militia. One officer (captain of Infantry), in charge of matters pertaining to the organization and instruction of machine-gun units of the Organized Militia. It is not contemplated that the peace organization and administration will be changed in the event of war except that 12 additional stenographers would be required. 2. The following is submitted in this connection : On the outbreak of war the office will be flooded and business interfered with by a stream of applicants for commissions. Numerous telegrams, letters, and personal inquiries will be received concern- ing the actual procedure in connection with mobilization. These communica- tions can be greatly reduced in number, if not anticipated entirely, by the issue beforehand of comprehensive instructions for mobilization, and the solving 520 11 f coisps Dns of jlatlene, the on be- rtalolng Assietnn t to the Chie^ of Division Lieut en.-jit Color.el, Infantry, In chnrge of masters portainihg to the or- c- ganiiation (vnd ins", rue tion of the Infantry personnel of the Orr^anized i'dlitia. AoBistant to the Chief of Divieion Captain, Infantry (Signol Corps.) In charge of matters pertaining to the or- SPJiization and instruc- tion of signal corps emd' nachane-gun organi-a- tions of the Organized 1'j.lltia and matters of personnel relating to sergeant-Instructors . Assistant to the Chief of Division First Lieutenant, In^^ far.try. Assistant to the offi- cer In oha-rge of matters pertaining to the organ- isation and instruction of the Infantry personnel and in charge of matters pertaining to target practice of the Organized lilitia. I Cor £ iS. ^^°^^ Section One chiP^ section and five Chief CI? examine reports of perform a °^ BnaH-arms firing the busiif*"™^ "^ strength; nr.nd unda statistical tnattar chief of ?-^ "P"""* °^ '^^^ ^^'■^^• Lon on the Organized 5 requiEitions for the Division, and ex- ; on survey proceedings accounts and returns. 30669°- Blasik Roo:-, One clerk ejid one raessencer, who *ail mp.ke distribution of , general orders, bul- letins, circul?rs, blo.nk for.-Tis, etc., to the Organized i-lili- tia. 23 of mobilization problems In each State as a part of the armory course of instruction. Circular No. 19, this office, 1914, provides a normal organization of the Organized Militia called into the United States service. As each special emer- gency for which troops are needed will present its own special features, con- stituting in itself a new problem, it is practically certain that the normal organization will have to be extensively raodilied. In addition to the actual making out of a modified organization schedule, it will be necessary to consider the political claims of applicants for commissions as well as their just claims in view of their efficiency records. The activities referred to above will furnish employment at first for 12 additional stenographers. After the first month the amount of work should fall off rapidly. At the end of the second month the work should be reduced to about that handled in time of peace. Subsequent to this period, while the woi-k of this division will not entirely cease, nevertheless, assuming that the status of the greater part of the Organ- ized Militia will have been changed to that of United States Volunteers, all matters relating to the organization, instruction, training, and equipment of the organizations so converted which are now the principal peace activities of this division will be handled by the General Staff and the several supply bureaus of the War Department concerned. Under this assumption it is thought that the division could then be administered by a chief of division and three assistants, and 50 per cent of the number of clerks required for the peace-time administration. The assistants could very well be officers detailed from the retired list of the Army. The clerks rendered surplus by the i-educ- tion in the volume of work would be available for transfer to other bureaus of the War Department. G. W. Mcl\ Jtu, Colonel, Infantry. 520 24 APPENDIX L. Proposed organization of the General Staff on duty at tire War Department. "3 a •Si to 1 a 1 2 1 § 5" a ex '-3 "3 1 o 1 "3 O "S 03 ® 3 o "S '3 "ca o Chief of Staff 1 1 1 Secretary to Chief of Staff 1 Assistant Chief of Staff, chief of division 2 2 Secretary of division 4 4 First division: I. Section on operations 1 1 2 1 Total for section 1 1 2 1 5 n. Section on organization and equipment- Chief of section 1 Infantry committee 1 1 1 1 ...... Field Artillery committee Cavalry comrhittee Coast Artillery committee 2 Technical troops committee 1 Conimimication and supply \ Total for section 1 5 5 in. Section on mobilization- Chief of section 1 1 Re^lar Army committee 1 ...... 1 2 2 Citizen soldiery committee . 3 Total for section 1 1 1 3 6 . IV. Section on training- Chief of section 1 1 Infantry committee 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 Field Artillery committee 2 Cavalry committee 2 Coast Artillery committee 2 Technical troops committee 2 Total for section 1 5 5 11 V. Information section- Chief of section 1 1 Committee on France, Italy, Switzerland, Spain, Portugal, and Belgium 1 1 1 ...... 1 1 Committee on Germany, Austria, Holland, Turkey, and Balkan States 1 Committee on Russia, Norway, Sweden, and Deimiark 1 Committee on China and Japan 1 1 Committee on South America 1 Committee on England and her colonies 1 Total for section 1 1 5 7 Total for first division 3 4 14 19 40 Second division: VI. Financial section- Chief of section 1 1 Regular Army committee 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 Citizen soldiery 2 Reserve supplies •. . 2 Total for section 1 3 3 7 VII. Section on transportation- Chief of section 1 1 Atlantic coast committee 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 Mexican border committee 2 Pacific coast committee 2 Central States committee 2 Over-sea transportation 2 Total for section 1 5 5 11 Total for second division 2 8 8 18 520 25 Proposed organization of the General Staff on duty at the War Department — Continued. 1 1 1 3 o 3 1 a o '5" a § '-3 to n "3 1 "o "3 s "3 o a a 2 1 1-1 o ■3" a B 3 Eh Third division: VIII. Section— Survey— 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 1 4 4 9 IX. Section on printing and issue — Map-printing committee 1 1 1 1 Total for section 2 2 X. Section on foreign maps 1 1 1 2 i Total for section 1 1 2 1 5 7 13 Fourth division: XI. Section— Educational- Education of general staff officers 2 2 1 4 4 Military schools, colleges, and universities 5 Total for section 2 3 4 9 Xn. Section — Historical 1 2 3 Total for section 1 2 3 Total for fourth division ■. 2 4 6 12 Total General Staff (War Department) 1 2 2 ...... 2 1 1 4 ...... 4 14 8 5 4 "'ig' 8 7 6 10 First di vLsion 40 Second division 18 Third division 13 Fourth division 12 Total War Department General Staff 1 2 2 6 7 35 40 93 General Staff with troops: For each Infantrv division, Regtilar Army 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 3 For each Cavalry division, Regular Army 3 For each Infantrv division, continental army 1 1 3 For each Calvalrv division, continental army 3 For each geographical department ". 1 For the Philippine department 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 4 For the Hawaiian department 4 For Panama 4 Obganization of the General Staff as Listed in Appendix L. This organization contemplates that five general officers, namely, one Chief of Staff and four Assistant Chiefs of Staff, be assigned to duty with the General StalT in Washington. The Assistant Chiefs of Staff are respectively in charge of the first, second, third, and fourth divisions into which the General Staff is divided. The Chief of Staff and the four Assistant Chiefs of Staff to form a board of direction for the General Staff. FIRST division. The First Division consists of five sections, namely, section of operations (war plans), section of organization and equipment, section of mobilization, 520 26 section of training, and section of military information (study of foreign armies). Tlie section on operations would talie the place of the present war-plans committee of the General Staff and would have general charge of preparing plans of offense and plans of defense to be used in event of hostilities. It would also be charged with determining the number of troops required to properly defend the United States from foreign invasion. The second section — section on organization and equipment — would have general supervision and the drawing up of plans for the organization and equipment of the armies found necessary by the section on operations for the proper defense of this coiuitry. This section is divided up into subconnnittees. each one of which is to handle the questions affecting the organization and equipment of their respective arms. The committee on communication ami supply would handle all questions pertaining to organization and equipujent of the troops of the lines of communication and supply. The third section — section on mobilization — is divided into two committees, one of which would have charge of drawing up the plans of mobilization in accordance with the general principles enunciated by the section on operations of the Regular Army or first-line troops ; another committee would have charge of the details of mobilization of the citizen soldiery (continental army ami militia), or second-line troops. The fourth section — section on training — would consider all questions affect- ing the training of the individual arms of the service independently, as well as of joint training. It would also have general supervision over the drill regu- lations and other pamphlets of instruction pertaining to the general training of the Army. The fifth section — section on military information — will study organization, tactics, drill regulations, equipment, and everything pertaining to foreign armies and should be in position at all times to give any information needed by any of the other sections of tlie General Staff on foreign armies. Owing to shortage of General Staff officers it is at the present time practi- cally impossible to compile the mass of information that has been sent to the AVar College Division by om* observers abroad, so that we are not in a position to take full advantage of the lessons to be derived from tlie present European war, and the reason for this is lack of personnel. SECOND DIVISION. The Second Division consists of the finance section and the transportation section. Finance section. Based upon a preliminary general investigation of the ad- ministration and methods of estimating for funds of the several departments of the Government the President in a message to Congress, dated March 3, 1911. said: ^|c 4: !t: * if t * " Estimates of departmental needs have not been the subject of thorough analysis and revision before submission ; budgets of receipts and expenditures have been prepared and presented for consideration of Congress in aa unscien- tific and unsystematic manner; appropriation bills have been without uniform- ity or common principle governing them; * * * uppropriatio)is httvc been ovorencumhered loithout the facts hcing knotrn; * * * functions and estab- lishments have been duplicated, even multiplied, causing conflict and unneces- sary expense: * * *." The finance section will be the means by which the Chief of Staff will exer- cise intelligent supervision over the preparation of the annual estimates. This 620 27 section will analyze and systematize the estimates of the bui-eau and depart- ments, thus enabling the Chief of Staff to submit to the Secretary of War well- balanced estimates, calculated to secure the maximum military efficiency at the least possible expenditure of public funds. In the i>erformance of this duty the section will eliminate from the estimates any items not essential for military effectiveness, and will incorporate therein any additional items neces- sary to effect the desired results. This analysis and revision will insure against duplication of either funds or functions and will result in estimates being sub- mitted for only those articles which, with parts on hand or provided for in the same estimates, will constitute complete units of equipment or armament. When, as is usually the case, the amount that will be appropriated is less than the total of the estimates, this section will be prepared to indicate where the necessary reductions can be made with the least loss of efficiency. The personnel indicated in Appendix L for this section is the mininuini that can perform the work efficiently. Transportation section. It will be the duty of the transportation section to prepare plans for the orderly transportation in the least possible time of troops and supplies from mobilization points to all possible theaters of operation. The section will have to prepare accurate data with respect to all transi)orta- tion systems in, or having a terminus in the United States, that is at all likely to be used in war and must take measures to insure that this data are at all t.lv\es kept up to date. The section must at all times be prepared to state just how long it will take to concentrate any given number of troops at any critical point, the transporta- tion equipment necessary for the movement, and the routing that should be adopted to accomplish the movement most efficiently and with the least amount of hardship to the troops concerned. Most of the work of this section will of necessity have to be performed in time of peace when opportunity for careful and intensive study is present, but its activities would continue in time of war when the rapidly changing con- ditions would render its services indi-spensable. The general staff of practically every nation of Europe contains such a section and the relatively larger terri- torial extent of the United States renders the section of even greater importance in our Army. The number of officers indicated in Appendix L is believed to be the minimum that can perform the duties of the section in a satisfactory manner. THIRD DIVISION. Survey and Map Division. This division is divided into three committees. At the present time we have not on file up-to-date maps of a great portion of this country, and in fact a great deal of it has not been mapped at all. We are dependent for our war maps more or less upon the Coast and Geodetic Survey and the Geological Survey. From a military point of view the.se maps are not as accurate and efficient as they should be, and the method of determining what areas shall be mapped has never been made to accord with any set military policy. At the present time if a State does not choose to appropriate money for the purpose of paying part of the expense of having its area mapped, the Geological Survey will not map it. In other words, the question of whether or not an area shall be mapped is determined by financial considerations and not from any military necessity. Not to have efficient maps is an extremely great handicap to any army, and although a State may not appropriate money to enable its area to be mapped, still, from a military point of view, It may be essential for us to have good maps 020 28 of that State not only for the salvation of that State its^f but also for the protection of the States whicli surround it. rOUKTH DIVISION. This division broadly corresponds to the present War College and the educa- tional section of the General Staff as they exist at present. It is divided into two committees, one of wliicli is charged with the super- vision of the policy to be followed in the education of General Staff officers, the other committee has general supervision and determination of the policy to be followed in the military schools, colleges, and universities of the country. The historical section of the General Staff is also attached to this division. APPENDIX M. [OflBcers not at)ove grade of colonel to be attached as necessary. The attached ofllcers are not to be members of the General Stafl Corps.] General Staff Corps. The committees of Section I, First Division, might be: Chief of section Infantry committee Cavalry committee Fif'ld .\rtill('ry committee Coast Arlillrry committee Technic al troops committee Communication and supply committee. Colonel. Lieuten- ' ant i Majors, colonels, i Captains. 2 These figures are in accord with the tables of organization. ' There is and should be the additional General Stalf officer included here for the information bureau in each foreign command. During peace, General Stall officers serving with troops should be utilized, as far as they can be spared, to assist in organizing and training citizen soldiers. 520 o 1. ORGANIZATION, TRAINING, AND MOBILIZATION OF A FORCE OF CITIZEN SOLDIERY 2. METHOD OF TRAINING A CITIZEN ARMY ON THE OUTBREAK OF WAR TO INSURE ITS PREPARED- NESS FOR FIELD SERVICE PREPARED BY THE WAR COLLEGE DIVISION. GENERAL STAFF CORPS AS A SUPPLEMENT TO THE STATEMENT OF A PROPER MILITARY POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES WCD 7541-12 ARMY WAR COLLEGE : WASHINGTON NOVEMBER, 1915 521 WASHINGTON GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1916 War Department, Document No. 521. Office of the Chief of Stuff. SYNOPSIS. Page. 1 . Relation of the two subjects 5 2. Guide for the study of the subjects 5 3. Organization 6 4. Table A — Estimates of numbers 6 5. Table B — Organizations for first three years 7 6. Table C — Officers for first three years 8 7. Table D— Officers and enlisted men fourth to eighth years 9 8. Piinciples governing distribution 10 9. Di\'isional areas 10 10. Table E — Organizations in Infantry divisional areas 12 11 . Table F — Organizations in Cavalry divisional areas 14 12. Training 15 13. Training of officers 17 14. Mobilization 18 15. Method of training a citizen army on the outbreak of war to insure its pre- paredness for field ser\dce 19 Sketch map showing divisional areas Face p. 20 521 (3) 1. ORGANIZATION, TRAINING, AND MOBILIZATION OF A FORCE OF CITIZEN SOLDIERY.— 2. METHOD OF TRAIN- ING A CITIZEN ARMY ON THE OUTBREAK OF WAR TO INSURE ITS PREPAREDNESS FOR FIELD SERVICE. 1. RELATION OF THE TWO SUBJECTS. In the Statement of a Proper Military Policy for the United States, prei^ared in the War College Division of the General Staff (par. 42), it is asserted that the force of citizen soldiers "should be prepared to take the field immediately on the outbreak of war, and should have had sufficient previous military training to enable it to meet a trained enemy within three months. Twelve months* inten- sive training is the minimum that will prepare troops for war service. Therefore, the 500,000 partly trained troops require nine months' military training before war begins." The first subject covers the organization, the nine months' training and the mobiliza- tion of these troops prior to the outbreak of war. The second sub- ject refers to the continuation of this training for three months after the outbreak of war to fit the partially trained troops to meet a trained enemy. The two subjects are so closely related that it is thought best to consider them together in one paper. 2. GUIDE FOR THE STUDY OF THE SUBJECTS. The Statement of Military Policy, dated September, 1915, has been taken as a guide in considering length of enlistment, numbers, organization by years, etc. Modifications made in other reports to the Secretary of W^ar have been disregarded. The enlistment period has therefore been taken as eight years, three with the colors and five on furlough, and the enlisted strength required as 500,000 men. If it should be considered desirable to reduce the enlistment period to six years, it would only be necessary to cut the time on furlough from five to three years. If it should be decided to have but 400,000 men in this force, a 20 per cent reduction in numbers will be neces- sary. The war strength of units, as given in the Tables of Organization, 1914, has been used in all calculations, except that for the first year the legal maximum of 150 men for Infantry companies and 100 men for Cavalry troops has been allowed to provide for the men later taken for machine-gun and headquarters companies. It is recog- nized that changes in the Tables of Organization are desirable, and will probably be made as a result of legislation recommended. For instance, the War College Division has recommended, and the Sec- retary of War, it is understood, has approved the addition of a machine-gun company to each regiment of Infantry and Cavalry, a headquarters company, and a supply company to each regiment of Infantry, Cavalry, and Field Artillery, and three regiments of 521 (5) Field Artillery, a regiment of Engineers, and an aero squadron for a division ; but, as these changes have not yet been confirmed by law, or the issue of orders, it is thought best at present to base calcula- tions on the only authoritative publication we have, the Tables of Organization. When the continental army is authorized by law, the figures will have to be changed to conform to the numbers and organization therein prescribed. 3. ORGANIZATION. In the study of the organization of this force, the numbers given in the table in the Epitome, Military Policy, dated July 10, 1915, have been taken as a basis, viz, 185,000 recruits required each year; strength of continental army, 185,000 the first year, 351,500 the second year, 500,000 the third and subsequent years. In deciding on the apportionment of the given strength each year among the dillerent branches of the service, a field army consisting of three Infantry divisions, one Cavalry division, one brigade (two regiments) of Heavy Field Artillery, one pontoon battalion of Engi- neers, and one aero squadron of the Signal Corps was taken as a basis. In such a force the percentage of different arms of the sei'vice are nearly as follows : Infantry, 63 ; Cavalry, 14 ; Field Artillery, 13 (divided proportionally into light, horse, and heavy field artillery) ; Engineers, 3 ; Signal Corps, 1 ; Quartermaster Corps, 2 ; Hospital Corps, 4. As recommended in the Statement of a Proper Military Policy, companies only have been organized the first year, battalions the second year, and regiments the third year. No attempt has been made to organize the part of the continental army on furlough. This can easily be done later, if a law authoriz- ing a continental army is passed, and the experiment proves a success during its first three years of trial. The result of the study on organization is shown in Tables A, B, C, D, which with their notes are believed to be self-explanatory. 4. Table A. — Estimates of numbers. Recruits required. First year Second year.. Third year . . . Fourth year.. Fifth year Sixth year... Seventh year. Eighth year.. 1 185, 000 185, 000 185,000 185,000 185,000 185,000 185,000 185,000 Number organized at begin- ning of training season. 185,000 351, 500 500, 000 500,000 500, 000 500,000 500,000 500,000 Number on fur- lough at beginning of year. 134,865 256, 244 365.485 464,802 553, 287 Reserve officers with con- tinental army. 2 4,625 < 9, 842 6 16, 000 6 18,000 18.000 18.000 18,000 18, 000 Extra Reg- ular offi- cers for continental army. 3 462 879 1,250 1,250 1,250 1,250 1,250 1,250 Total re- serve offi- cers if men on fur- lough are organized. 4,625 9,842 16,000 3 22, 855 27,225 30,077 34, 733 37,918 521 1 Allows for a loss of 10 per cent each year. ' 2.5 per cent of enlisted strength for company officers. 'Taken from table in Epitome of Military Policy. « 2.8 per cent of enlisted strength for battalion oliicers. ■''3.2 per cent of enlisted strength for regimental officers. 6 3.6 p«ir cent of enlisted strength for organization Into divisions, etc. 5. Table B. — Orffanization far first three yean. Recruits required for continental army Numbers in contmental army beginning training First year. 185,000 185,000 Second year. 185,000 351.500 Infantry, 63 per cent of total strength. Infantry companies ' Infantry battalions ' Infantry regiments 116,550 793 221,445 395 Cavalry, 14 per cent of total strength . Cavalry troops ' Cavalry squadrons ' Cavalry regiments 25,900 265 49,210 *""'i36 Field Artillery, 13 percent total strength. Light artillery batteries ' Horse artillery batteries Heavy field artillery batteries Light artillery battalions Horse artillery battalions Heavy field artillery battalions Light artillery reeiments 2 Horse artillery ret'iments Heavy field artillery regiments 23,050 45,695 Endneers, 3 percent of total Pioneer companies Pioneer companies, mounted Ponton companies, light equipment.. Ponton companies, heavy equipment. Pioneer battalions 2 Pioneer battalions, mounted Pontoon battalions 5,550 22 10,545 Signal Corps. 1 percent of total Wire companies Radio companies Headquarters companies (Cavalry Signal battalion). Radio companies (Cavalry Signal battalion) Aero companies Field battalions » Field battalions, cavalry , Aero squadrons 1,860 3,515 Hospital Corps, 4 per cent of total . . . . Instruction companies, 74 men each 3. On duty with other troops Ambulance companies Field Hospital companies 7,400 100 14,060 121 5,071 Quartermaster Corps, 2 per cent of total i . A&sipned to duty with organizations Under instruction in quartermaster work. 7,030 ' For the first two jrears the allowance of Quartermaster Corps men are trained as additional infantry, cavalry, and field artillery units, with a view to haviui; men with some trainin,' and disciplme for transfer to the"Quarterma.ster Corps when they are needed for attaching to larger organizations. * In the third year the numbers of res-iments of field artillery and battalions'of engineers and signal corps are apportioned with a view to assignment to infantry and cavalry divisions and field armies. 3 In the apportionment of the Hospital Corps, the "allowance is divided the first year into instruction companies: the second year, proportional parts of regimental allowances are attached to battalions and the remainder divided into instruction companies: in the tliird year the number of ambulance companies and field hospital companies needed for future divisions are organized, 521 6. Table C— Officers first three years. a "o O c 03 K ■>-' o 3 O 13 a '3 o 3 S & o 1 3 . .2 " ~ p 3 o FIRST TEAB. 793 265 793 265 793 265 2,379 795 89 178 28 50 178 28 50 445 14 25 70 25 batteries heavy field artillery 125 Total field artillery 128 256 256 640 Engineers: 22 8 3 6 44 8 6 12 22 8 3 6 88 24 12 6 ponton companies, heavy equipment 24 Total engineers 39 70 39 148 Signal Corps: 8 8 3 3 15 16 16 6 6 30 24 24 9 9 45 37 74 111 Medical Corps: 100 92 200 300 Quartermaster Corps: 92 Total 1,454 1,654 1,353 4,461 SECOND YEAE. 395 136 1,580 544 1,580 544 1,580 680 4,135 1,904 57 9 25 228 36 75 342 54 100 399 63 125 1,026 325 91 14 5 5 339 496 587 1,513 56 25 20 98 20 35 42 15 15 Engineers: 210 65 6 ponton battalions 75 Total Engineers. 24 101 153 72 350 Signal Corps: 14 5 5 28 10 30 70 25 65 112 100 Total Signal Corps 24 68 160 252 121 214 242 93 363 With troops Total Medical Corps 335 ! 335 | 670 Total 1 1 670 2,967 3,268 2,919 9,824 THIRD YEAR. . 171 . 56 171 56 171 56 513 2,565 2,565 2,565 168 1 840 i 840 840 8,721 2,856 56 Cavalry Regiments . 38 6 12 38 6 12 38 6 12 76 12 36 418 494 66 78 144 156 494 78 168 1,596 252 540 12 Regiments Heavy Field Artillery Total Field Artillery . 56 56 1 56 124 628 728 1 740 2,388 521 6. Table C. — Officers first three years — Continued. 1 "3 o a .2<3 ft o 1 'c8 a o 3 .2 ^ a 3 •2 li s o THIRD YEAR— continued. Engineers: 19 pioneer battalions 19 6 8 76 30 32 133 24 56 60 18 24 288 6 pioneer battalions, mounted 78 8 ponton battalions 1 120 1 Total Engineers 1 33 138 213 102 486 Signal Corps: 19 field battalions 19 6 10 38 12 60 95 30 130 152 6 field battalions, cavalry ' 1 48 10 aero squadrons 1 200 Total Signal Corps 35 110 255 400 Medical Corps: Duty with other troops 283 343 461 1 087 Total 283 283 283 1,156 4,651 5,116 4,247 16,019 Medical Corps for duty with Divisional Troops— 94 Ambulance Companies and 63 Field Hospital Com- panies 107 220 565 Note.— Quartermaster Corps officers under instruction not counted in totals in second and third years. 7. Table D. — Fourth to eighth years. Organizations. 19 Infantry divisions 6 Cavalry divisions Available for field armies: 1 regiment Cavahy 12 regiments Heavy Field Artillery.. 8 ponton battalijns, Engineers 10 aero squadrons. Signal Corps Total Officers. Combat- ant. 11,780 2,898 50 528 120 200 15,576 Medical. 1,786 306 10 2,149 Chap- lains. 228 42 283 Totals. 13, 794 3,246 54 576 128 210 18, 008 Enlisted men. Infantry. Cavalry 313,956 313, 956 23, 484 44, 496 1,236 69. 216 Organizations. Enlisted men. Field Ar- tillery. Engi- neers. Signal Corps. Hospital Corps. Quarter- master Corps. Totals. 19 Infantry divisions 6 Cavalry divisiins Available for field armies: 1 regiment Cavalry 12 regiments Heavy Field Artillery... 8 pontan battali ins. Engineers 10 aero squadrons. Signal Corps 42,864 6,768 9,386 1,620 3,097 14,640 3,952 15, 694 2, 688 16 228 32 30 10, 602 ■ 1,998 32 300 72 10 Total. 64, 272 14,958 4,975 18, 688 13, 014 419,08:j 58, 548 1,284 15, 168 4,056 940 499, 079 Note 1.— With full allowance of Quartermaster Corps men with orgnuizations its numbers amount to 2.6 per cent of total, while for other arms the numbers are a little below the percentages heretofore given. 30669°— No. 521—16 2 10 8. PRINCIPLES GOVERNING DISTRIBUTION. Being closely connected with organization and a necessary prelimi- nary to recruiting, training, and mobilization, the distribution of the force must be decided upon. The distribution here recommended is made in accordance with the following principles : 1. The units of each Infantry and Cavalry division should, in order to facilitate mobilization and supervision of training, be located in contiguous territory. This idea is carried out by dividing the coun- try into 25 divisional areas, of which 19 are assigned for Infantry divisions and 6 for Cavalry divisions. 2. The troops should be distributed approximately in proportion to poulation. The only political or geographical subdivisions within the United States made on the basis of population are congressional districts. These districts can, therefore, be used as a convenient unit in forming divisional areas. There are 414 such districts in the United States, an average of between 16 and 17 districts per area. In the following grouping all areas are given 16 or 17 districts, except one each of 15, 18, and 19. 3. The population within each divisional area should be of such a character as to furnish suitable men for the different branches of the service. This is accomplished by having within each area urban sections, rural sections, colleges with technical courses, and by assign- ing to the Cavalry divisions sections where horses can be obtained and the population is accustomed to their use. 9. DIVISIONAL AREAS. First Infantry divisional area. — All of Maine, New Hampshire, and Vermont and the sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth, tenth, eleventh, twelfth, and fourteenth congressional districts of Massachusetts. Total, 16 districts. Headquarters, Boston, Mass. Second Infantry divisional area. — The first, second, third, fourth, fifth, thirteenth, fifteenth, and sixteenth congressional districts of Massachusetts; all of Rhode Island and Connecticut. Total, 16 dis- tricts. Headquarters, Providence, R. I. Third Infantry divisional area. — The first to seventeenth congres- sional districts of New York. Total, 17 districts. Headquarters, New York City. Fourth Infantry divisional area. — The eighteenth to thirty-fourth congressional districts of New York. Total, 17 districts. Headquar- ters, Albany, N. Y. Fifth Infantry divisional area. — The thirty-fifth to forty-third dis- tricts of New York and the tenth, eleventh, fourteenth, fifteenth, six- teenth, twenty-first, twenty-sixth, and twenty-eighth districts of Pennsylvania. Total, 17 districts. Headquarters, Buffalo, N. Y. 521 11 Sixth Infantry divisional area. — The sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth, twelfth, thirteenth, seventeenth, eighteenth, nineteenth, twentieth, twenty-second, twenty-third, twenty-seventh, twentj'^-ninth, thirtieth, thirty-first, and thirty-second districts of Pennsylvania. Total, 17 districts. Headquarters, Pittsburg, Pa. Seventh Infantry divisional area. — The first to fifth districts of Pennsylvania ; all of New Jersey. Total, 17 districts. Headquarters, Philadelphia, Pa. Eighth Infantry divisional area. — All of North Carolina and South Carolina. Total, 17 districts. Headquarters, Charleston, S. C Ninth Infantry divisional area. — All of Florida, Georgia, and the third district of Tennessee. Total, 16 districts. Headquarters, At- lanta, Ga. Tenth Infantry divisional area. — All of Alabama and Mississippi. Total, 17 districts. Headquarters, Birmingham, Ala. Eleventh Infantry divisional area. — The twenty-fourth and twenty-fifth districts of Pennsylvania ; the seventh, eighth, tenth to twenty-first districts of Ohio. Total, 16 districts. Headquarters, Cleveland, Ohio. Tioelfth Infantry divisional area. — The first to sixth and the ninth districts of Ohio ; the first to ninth districts of Indiana. Total, 16 districts. Headquarters, Cincinnati, Ohio. Thirteenth Infantry divisional area. — The tenth to thirteenth dis- tricts of Indiana; all of Michigan. Total, 16 districts. Head- quarters, Detroit, Mich. Fourteenth Infantry divisional area. — All of Wisconsin and the first, tenth, eleventh, twelfth, and thirteenth districts of Illinois. Total, 16 districts. Headquarters, Milwaukee, Wis. Fifteenth Infantry divisional area. — The first to sixth, eighth, nratb, seventeenth, eighteenth, nineteenth, twenty-second to twenty- fifth districts of Illinois. Total, 15 districts. Headquarters, Chi- cago, 111. Sixteenth Infantry divisional area. — All of Minnesota, North Da- kota, South Dakota, and Montana. Total, 17 districts. Head- quarters, Minneapolis, Minn. Seventeenth Infantry divisional area. — All of Louisiana, Okla- homa, and the first, second, third, and fourth districts of Texas. Total, 17 districts. Headquarters, New Orleans, La. Eighteenth Infantry divisional area. — The fifth to sixteenth dis- tricts of Texas, all of New Mexico, Arizona, Utah, and Nevada. Total, 17 districts. Headquarters, San Antonio, Tex. Nineteenth Infantry divisional area. — All of California, Oregon, Idaho, and Washington. Total, 19 districts. Headquarters, San Francisco, Cal. 521 12 First Cavalry divisional area. — All of Delaware, Maryland, and Virginia. Total, 17 districts. Headquarters, Baltimore, Md. Second Cavalry divisional area. — All of West Virginia and Ken- tucky. Total, 16 districts. Headquarters, Louisville, Ky. Third Cavalry divisional area. — All of Tennessee, except the third district; all of Arkansas. Total, 16 districts. Headquarters, Mem- phis, Tenn. Fourth Cavalry divisional area. — All of Iowa, the fourteenth, fifteenth, sixteenth, twentieth, and twenty-first districts of Illinois. Total, 16 districts. Headquarters, Des Moines, Iowa. Fifth Cavalry divisional area. — All of Missouri. Total, 16 dis- tricts. Headquarters, St. Louis, Mo. Sixth Cavalry divisional area. — All of Kansas, Nebraska, Colo- rado, and Wyoming. Total, 17 districts. Headquarters, Omaha, Nebr. 10. Table E. Organisations in Infantry divisional areas. First Infantry divi- sional area. First year, com- panies. Second year, battal- ions. Third year, regi- ments. Second Infantry divi- sional area. First year, com- panies. Second year, battal- ions. Third year, regi- ments. Third Infantry divi- sional area. First year, com- panies. Second year, battal- ions. Third year, regi- ments. In fan try Cavalry Artillery: Light Heavy Engineers: Pioneer Ponton Signal ( orps: Field Aero Hospital Corps: Instruction companies. . . Ambulance companies. . . Field-hospital companies Organizations in Infantry divisional areas. Fourth Infantry divi- sional area. First year, com- panies. Second year, battal- ions. Third year, regi- ments. Fifth Infantry divi- sional area. First year, com- panies. Second year, battal- ions. Third year, regi- ments. Sixth Infantry divi- sional area. First year, com- panies. Second year, battal- ions. Third year, regi- ments. Infantry Cavalry Artillery: Light Heavy Engineers: Pioneer Ponton Signal Corps: Field Aero Hospital Corps: Instruction companies. . . Ambulance companies... Field-hospital companies 521 13 10. Table E — Continued. Organizations in Infantry divisional areas. Seventh Infantry divi- sioniil area. First year, com- panies. Second year. battal- ions. Third year, resi- raents. Eighth Infantry divi- sional area. First year, com- panies. Second year, battal- Third year, regi- ments. Ninth Infantry divi- sional area. First year, com- panies. Second year, battal- ions. Third year, regi- ments. Infantry Cavalry Artilleny: Light Heavy Engineers: Pioneer Ponton Signal c orps: Field Aero Hospital Corps: Instruction companies. . . Ambulance companies. . . Field-hospital companies Tenth Infantry di\Tsional area. Ele-enth Infantry divisional area. Twelfth Infantry divisional area. Organizations in Infantry divisional areas. First year, com- panies. Second rear, bat- taUons. Third year, regi- ment*. First year, com- panies. Second year, bat- talions. Third year, regi- ments. First year, com- panies. Stecond vear, bat- talions. Third year, regi- ments. 44 5 5 2 21 3 3 2 9 1 2 1 1 41 5 5 20 3 3 9 1 2 42 5 5 21 3 3 9 1 Artillery: Light 2 Heavy Engineers: 2 1 1 2 1 1 Pontcn Signal Corps: Field 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Aero Hospital Corps: Instruction companies . . . Ambulance companies.. . 4 5 1 4 3 4 5 1 4 3 4 5 1 4 Field Hospital companies 3 Thirteenth Infantry di\ isional area. Fourteenth Infantry divisional area. Fifteenth Infantry divisional area. Organizations in Infantry divisional areas. First jeai, com- panies. Second year, bat- talions. Third year, re','i- ments. First year, com- panies. Second year, bat- talions. Third year, regi- ments. First year, com- panies. Second vear, bat- talions. Third year, regi- ments. Infantry 42 6 4 21 3 3 9 1 2 42 5 4 21 3 3 9 1 2 41 5 4 21 2 3 9 Cavalry 1 Artillery: Light 2 Heavy Engineers: Pioneer 2 1 1 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 Ponton Signal Corps: Field 1 1 1 1 1 1 Aero Hospital Corps: Instruction companies . . . Ambulance companies. . . 4 S 1 4 3 4 5 1 4 3 4 5 Field Hospital companies 3 521 14 10. Table E— Continued. Sixteenth Infantry divisional area. Seventeenth Infantry divisional area. Organizations in Infantry divisional areas. First year, com- panies. Second year, battal- ions. Third year, regi- ments. First year, com- panies. Second vear, battal- ions. Third year, regi- ments. Infantry 42 5 4 2 21 2 3 2 9 1 2 1 1 42 6 4 2 21 3 3 2 9 Cavalry 1 Artillerv: Light 2 1 Engineers: Pioneer 1 Pon ton 2 1 1 Signal ("orps: Field 1 1 1 4 3 1 Aero Hospital Corps: 4 5 4 6 1 Ambulance companies 4 Field Hospital companies 3 Organizations in Infantry divisional areas. Eighteenth Infantry divisional area. First year, com- panies. Second year, battal- ions. Third year, regi- ments. Nineteenth Infantry divisional area. First year, com- panies. Second year, battal- Third year, regi- ments. Infantry Cavalry Artillery: Light Heavy Engineers: Pioneer Ponton Signal Corps: Field Aero Hospital Corps: Instruction companies Ambulance companies Field Hospital companies. 11. Table F. — Organizations in Cavalry divisional areas. First Cavalry divisional area. Second Cavalry divi- sional area. Third Cavalry divisional area. Organizations in Cavalry divisional areas. First year, troops. Second year, squad- rons. Third year, regi- ments. First year, troops. Second year, squad- rons. Third year, regi- ments. First year, troops. Second year, squad- rons. Third year, regi- ments. 29 3 1 15 2 1 6 1 1 1 1 1 3' 1 28 2 2 14 1 1 6 1 1 28 2 14 1 6 1 Engineers: Pioneer, mounted 1 2 1 1 Signal Corps: 2 1 1 1 1 1 Hospital Corps: Instruction companies... 4 5 4 4 3' 1 4 4 3 1 621 15 11. Table F. — Organizations in Cavalry divisional areas — Continued. Fourth Cavalry divi- sional area. Fifth Cavalry divisional area. Sixth Cavalry divisional area. Organizations in Cavalry divisional areas. First year, troops. Second year, squad- rons. Third year , regi- ments. First year, troops. Second year, squad- rons. Third year, regi- ments. First year, troops. Second year, squad- rons. Third year, regi- ments. 28 2 2 14 2 1 6 1 1 28 2 2 15 1 1 6 1 1 29 3 1 15 2 1 6 1 Engineers: Pioneer, mounted 1 Signal Corps: I 1 1 1 3' 1 1 1 1 1 1 4 1 1 4 1 Aero companies 1 Hospital Corps: Instruction companies... 4 4 4 4 3" 1 3 Field hospital companies . 1 12. TRAINING. The War College Division of the General Staff has recommended that the nine months' training of the continental army be given in three yearly periods of three months each. It has also recommended that companies only be organized the first year, battalions the second year, and regiments the third 5^ear. Following these ideas the following apportionment of time is suggested : First month. Second month. Third month. First year Recruit training Company training Company and battal- ion training. Company training Battalion training do Company training. Second year Battalion training. Regimental trainmg. This division is based on these considerations : Training of troops, like all other training, consists of two elements — instruction and practice. Generally speaking, the instruction takes comparatively little time. Practice to the point of proficiency takes much longer. In part of the troop training, such as drill, the instruction consists in teaching certain mechanical movements, and the practice is but a repetition of such movements, either individually or collectively. In other training, such as field work, the instruction consists in the demonstration of the best methods to accomplish certain ends, and the practice consists of exercises which illustrate the application of these methods under varying conditions. The recruit period is de- voted to instruction and some practice in the duties of individuals and small units. In the company period individual and small unit instruction are continued to some extent, and their practice is kept up throughout the company training. In like manner, in battalion and regimental movements, while the instruction is largely for offi- cers, the practice of what has previously been learned by indi^^duals, 521 16 squads, and companies continues throughout. The time allotted to each kind of training, therefore, is not to be taken as a measure of its importance. Individual training, for instance, is considered of the greatest importance, and, as pointed out above, it is not con- fined to the month allotted to recruit training, but continuous throughout the entire period. During the first two years — that is, during the periods of com- pany and battalion training — it is not essential that large bodies of troops should be assembled in one place. The extent of concentration should depend on getting suitable grounds for camping and train- ing, transportation costs, and the number of regular officers avail- able to take charge. Military reservations, either National or State, should be used where available. To reduce the number of regular officers required organizations equal at least to the strength of a regiment should be assembled in each place the first two years. Each one would not be required to travel a great distance, and the transportation cost could be kept within reasonable limits. The third year, in order to have proper supervision and let regiments have the benefit of contact and association with others, several regi- ments should be ordered to the same place. The time to be devoted to training each day is a subject that re- quires careful consideration. On the one hand we realize that the period available is all too short for the desired end to be accom- plished, and that no time should be wasted. On the other, experi- enced officers know that when kept at a given task too long men lose interest in their work and become stale. A recent report by Capt. J. W. Barker, Third Infantry, now in France, quotes a circu- lar on intensive infantry training in the French Army. There the schedules provide for a course of 3 hours in the morning, divided into 6 periods of 25 minutes each, and of 4 hours in the afternoon. The latter time is devoted to the different phases of field training. This is believed to be a very good allotment of time. In the morn- ing the drills are so short that interest can be maintained; there is a short rest between the periods ; there is a space of about two hours which can be used for theoretical instruction of officers and neces- sary administrative work. The evenings are left free for rest, recreation, or social intercourse. In this paper it is not considered practicable to go into the details of training — that is, to prepare programs and schedules of instruc- tion. These should be prepared for each arm of the service by com- petent officers of that arm. While an exact uniformity of training of the units of the continental army can not be expected from troops scattered all over the United States, with its great variety of terrain and climate, as great a degree of uniformity as possible should be attempted. To this end programs of instruction should be issued by 621 17 a central authority, setting forth the subjects in which training is to be given and the approximate time to be devoted to each. The weekly and daily schedules based on these programs should be prepared bj' the Regular officers detailed as instructors in each locality, and will necessarily be varied, within the prescribed limits, according to local conditions. These programs and schedules should keep in view the end for which these men are being trained — to prepare them for field service in war. Too much time should not be devoted to close- order drills, though these should not be neglected. They are valuable in teaching men instant and unquestioned obedience to the orders of their superiors, and their frequent practice will tend to make this a habit. For this reason they are an important auxiliary in inculcating discipline. After a reasonable degree of proficiency — not the preci- sion approaching perfection — is attained these drills should be held for only a short period each day, but to prevent the accjuisition of loose habits there should be some close-order drill every day during the period of company, battalion, and regimental training. The greater portion of the time should be devoted to training in the duties pertaining to fieldwork, including target practice and combat firing. In the third year all troops should have their full equipment. The proper training of regiments requires that they should take the field with their allowance of transportation, etc., and the training of engineer, signal, and sanitary troops will be ineffective if not prop- erly equipped. 13. TRAINING OF OFFICERS. The selection of officers does not come within the scope of this paper. It is assumed that they will be chosen, after examination, from persons who have had some military training, such as former officers of the Regular Army and the militia, noncommissioned officers of the Regular Army and the militia, graduates of schools with a military department having a Regular officer as instructor, etc. The first year it will be necessary to appoint company officers only. The previous training of these men will necessarily be somewhat varied, but the examination before appointment should set a standard of military knowledge on which to base courses of theoretical and prac- tical instruction. The officers should be appointed at least six months before the time set for the training season of troops. During this period the best method of training them would be to attach them to organizations of Regular troops, when they could receive both the- oretical instruction in garrison schools and practical instruction in administration, garrison, and fieldwork. This practical course should include opportunity to act as instructors and to exercise com- mand. (Many schemes of instruction minimize the importance of 621 18 administration and provide for the least possible time being given to work of that character, but for a company officer especially a thorough knowledge of such duties is essential to proper command. Upon it depend largely the discipline, proper equipment, and feeding of his company.) If it is found not to be practicable to attach officers to Regular organizations as recommended, the next best thing is a theoretical course conducted by the correspondence method. This would necessarily defer the practical instruction of officers to the period of training of troops, and would increase very materially the work of the Regular officers during that period. The reserve officers will have such a knowledge of close and extended order drill and target practice that their services can be utilized under super- vision in the instruction of their men in these respects up to include the school of the company. The instruction in care of equipment and men and in all matters pertaining to fieldwork will be given by the Regular officers to officers and men together. This should be supplemented for the officers by lectures before the exercises and by conferences afterwards. As the officers, either from previous train- ing or special aptitude, show proficiency, they should be selected and utilized as instructors. In the second and third years the theoretical instruction of officers should be continued outside the training period, and during this period the exercises will be devised to give both instruction and practice in the duties of officers in battalions and regiments. 14. MOBILIZATION. During the first three years there will be ample time for a careful examination of the terrain and transportation facilities of each divisional area, with a view to the selection of the most suitable places for the assembly of divisions in subsequent years. The selec- tion of such sites should be determined by their accessibility, facili- ties for camping and supply, and suitable terrain for the training of all the elements of the division and the field army troops tempo- rarily attached thereto and for exercises involving the movements of the entire division. It is probable that in the more thickly settled portions of the country it will be necessary to make use of private property and in many cases of land which is ordinarily under cul- tivation. By having the mobilization in the fall after crops are gathered, arrangements with property owners can be made which will throw open for military use much land of the character desired. General and staff officers for brigades and divisions should be selected and assigned during the first three years. They should be utilized in selecting the divisional mobilization places, and in study- ing out, within their respective spheres, all matters pertaining to the 521 19 mobilization of the organizations to which they belong. This would include arrangements for transportation and supply, preparation of orders for movements and a program of duties and exercises cover- ing the entire period of the encampment. The assembly of divisions gives the only opportunity for general officers and the higher staff officers to practice some of the duties they would be called on to perform in war. It is also of value to other officers and men in showing them the relation of their own smaller units to others in the general scheme of organization and in teach- ing the necessity for teamwork in any exercises involving the use of large numbers of troops. The mobilization should take place at least every third year in order that the officers should have the necessary practice, and all men should have the experience of association with troops of all branches of the service during the period of their train- ing. The mobilization of the division gives an opportunity for in- spections which will show the results of the training in smaller camps and the fitness and sufficiency of all kinds of equipment. Based on these inspections, measures can be taken to correct defects, or, if found necessary, to change plans and policies. 15. METHOD OF TRAINING A CITIZEN ARMY ON THE OUTBREAK OF WAR TO INSURE ITS PREPAREDNESS FOR FIELD SERVICE. In the preceding portion of this paper there has been no provision made for the organization of field armies, because their composition will depend on the particular work they may be called on to do. This will be determined by the war plans. In consequence they will not be organized until war is imminent and mobilization ordered. The war plans will also decide the question of the numbers of the continental army on furlough to be called into active service. Unless the full force available is required it may be assumed that they will be called according to their nearness to active training— that is, those last furloughed to be called first. They will be organized according to their previous training and to the needs of the Gov- ernment. When mobilization is ordered the units of the continental army, both those then with the colors and those organized from furloughed men, may be ordered to their divisional places of assembly to get their three months' training in whole or in part before proceeding to the field army concentration camps, or the exigencies of the occasion may require the concentration of field armies without delay, in which case troops will be ordered direct from their home stations to such concentration camps. In either event the character of the ad- ditional training should be the same. As soon as the troops are assembled, a thorough field inspection should be made by brigade 521 20 commanders of Infantry, Cavalry and Field Artillery, and by the heads of the engineer, signal, quartermaster, and medical depart- ments to ascertain first the condition and adequacy of all equipment and second any defects of previous training that need special cor- rection. Such an inspection will take at least a week, but the time will be well spent. After it is finished, a course of training can be laid out. It will consist of a series of exercises, beginning with as small units as companies and progressing through the larger units and the combination of different arms until all the troops are used. One important purpose and result of these exercises will be the physical training of the men. The object should not be, as in athletic contests, to prepare men for a supreme effort — a condition which can not be sustained — but to bring them up to a state of physical hardness and power of endurance which can be retained for an indefinite period. Special exercises for this purpose will not in general be needed — they may be for some individuals — but the out- ilitic'S and by reason of the large percentage of claims filed considering their short service and the al)sence of battle-field casualties as compared with the Civil War. Only a little over three years have passed since hostilities l)Ogan. and yet claims amounting to about 20 per cent of the number of men enlisted for the Spanish War have been filed. It is believed that the percentage given by the Commissioner of Pensions is too large. Apparently he has considered only the 1898 Volunteers, Avhich would give a percentage of 19.3, which is, he says, nearly 20 per cent. There were, however, a large number of men in addition to the 1898 Volunteers who were in a position to file applica- tions which the commissioner does not take into account. However, that the percentage of claims filed for pensions was much larger than it should have been there is no doubt. The Bureau of Pensions has roughly tabulated the number of ap- plications filed from 10 of the 1898 Volunteer regiments up to June 30, 1900. Table 4 shows this, together with other data, with respect to these regiments. The total number of claims filed from these or- ganizations was, roughly, 6,000, or 19.9 per cent of the total number of applications filed for the War with Spain up to that date. The percentage of the strength of these 10 regiments to the strength of the 1898 Volunteers was 5.8 per cent. By reference to Tables 4 and 5 w^e find that these 10 regiments filed a total of 6,000 applications up to June 30, 1900, out of a total number of applications credited to the War with Spain to that date of 30,025. The total number of individuals enlisted in these 10 regi- ments was 13,076, or about 4 per cent of the number of individuals employed in the War with Spain up to that date. That is, with a strength of only about 4 per cent these regiments filed applications amounting to 19.9 per cent of the total number of applications filed up to June 30, 1900. Only three of these regiments saw any active service, and of these only 9.6 per cent of their total strength acquired a possible pensionable status by reason of death or discharge for dis- ability. Yet their percentage of applications filed to their strength was 47.4 per cent. In the seven regiments which saw no active serv- ice, 4.3 per cent had acquired a pensionable status by date of dis- charge and are credited w'ith 45.2 per cent of the total number of applications filed by the 10 regiments. That is, while 5.3 per cent more per total strength in those regiments which had had active service acquired an actual pensionable status by date of muster out, their actual applications for pensions amounted to only 2.2 per cent more than those regiments which had seen no active service at all. It is evident, then, that so far as these particular regiments are con- cerned, the number of killed, died of wounds, and wounded had little, if any, bearing on the number of applications for pensions filed. Nor is it believed that these particular regiments differed materially 625 14 from other regiments of the 1898 Volunteers. It seems impossible then, to escape the conclusion that the 1898 Volunteers were very prompt to file applications for pensions, and that an unusually large percentage of them to total strength did file them. To those who were familiar with the conditions obtaining at the time of muster- in and muster-out of these organizations, as the Commissioner of Pensions remarks in the above-mentioned report, the cause for this state of affairs is not difficult to find. Before the Volunteers were mustered in, they were examined physically, and it was explained that one of the reasons for the examination was to prevent the sol- dier from filing a claim for pension for a disability supposed to have been contracted in service when he really had the disability before he entered the service. The impression left on the mind of most men was, undoubtedly, that the Government expected them to make an application for pension eventually, else why this care to safe- guard itself against false claims. In addition to this they were all, of course, familiar with the fact that a large percentage of the soldiers of the Civil War were drawing pensions. But what brought the ap- plications in so promptly was this : At every camp where Volunteers were mustered out, a great swarm of agents lay in wait and, in many instances, actually fought with each other for the privilege of han- dling the application for a pension, which they used every endeavor to persuade each discharged soldier to make. These agents received, at this period, $25 for each pension claim which was allowed. As the soldier knew that the law provided that he should receive a pen- sion should he have contracted any disability in service, and believ- ing that the Government expected him to make an application should he be entitled to it, it was probably not a very difficult matter for these agents to persuade many of the discharged men to try for a pension whether he was suffering from a disability or not. The wonder is that more men did not apply for pensions than actually did. That thousands applied without proper grounds is evidenced by the fact that the percentage of Army disahility pensions granted to claims filed for the period to June 30, 1905, credited to the War with Spain, was only 26.5 per cent, while the percentage of pensions granted to claims filed for all other classes for the period above cited was 91.5 per cent. 7. NUMBER OF PENSIONERS ON THE ROLLS. Table 6 shows the total number of pensioners on the rolls credited to all wars for each year from June 30, 1899, to June 30, 1914, and the number of pensioners on the roll for the same period credited to the War with Spain. The total number of pensioners of all classes and for all wars onj the rolls on June 30, 1914, was 785,239. The total number creditec 626 15 to the War with Spain on this date was 28,910. The number of invalid pensioners credited to the War with Spain was 24,250, The number of invalid pensioners credited to the Army alone for the War with Spain was 23,511 and of dependents 4,403. For this period the highest number of invalid Army pensioners was in 1914, 23,416. The highest number of dependent Army pensioners was in 1909, 4,845. The greatest annual increase for pensioners for the War with Spain was in 1901, 4,658. The yearly gain for total pensioners, War with Spain, has continuously decreased since 1908. In 1914 there were 87 less pensioners on the rolls for the War with Spain than in 1913. There is a continuous increase in the number of invalid pensioners for this war from 1899 to 1915. The increase in 1915, however, was only 124. After giving this brief resume of the condition of the Spanish War pension rolls it will be necessary to see if we can make some sort of comparison of the proportion of pensioners on the rolls to the number of individuals employed in the last two years. 8. PERCENTAGE OF PENSIONERS ON THE ROLLS 16 YEARS- AFTER THE BEGINNING OF HOSTILITIES FOR (a) WAR OF THE RE- BELLION AND (b) WAR WITH SPAIN. To a greater degree than we found it to be in the War with Spain is the number of individuals employed in the War of the Rebellion a matter of estimate. Many estimates have been made, some of them differing very widely. That made in the report of the Commissioner of Pensions for 1882 is probably as reliable as any of them, and we will use the figure deduced in that report for the purposes of the following computations. The report gives the number of individuals employed as 2,046,969. To this figure is added the 16,442 men in service in the Regular Army and Navy at the outbreak of the war, giving a total of individuals employed of 2,063,391. This figure, of course, includes the Navy, but as there are no data available which will give us the number of individuals employed in the Navy, the total figure will have to be employed in the following computation. For the War with Spain we will use the figure deduced in section 4 of this paper, 381,531. This, of course, includes only the Army, but as we have no data on the Navy this figure will have to be used. In order that the comparison may be as fair as possible, a period has been selected which is the same number of years after the begin- ning of hostilities for each war. The number of years selected is 16, which will give us the year 1877 for the War of the Rebellion and 1914 for the War with Spain. As no " service " pension laws had been passed up to 1877, the laws under which pensions were granted for both wars were practically the same at the period selected for each war. 16 {a) War of the Eebellion. The total number of pensioners borne on the roll on June J^O, 1877, was 211,693. This includes all pensioners on the rolls except the pensioners for the War of 1812. A certain number must be de- ducted, therefore, for the War with Mexico and the Indian wars. In no place in the report of the Commissioner of Pensions for 1877 does this number appear. In House Report No. 64, Forty-fifth Con- gress, second session (1878), an estimate of the number of pensioners for the War with Mexico is given as 11,000. In the report of the Commissioner of Pensions for June 30. 1914, the number of sur- vivors for the War with Mexico and for the Indian wars is given as practically the same. It is probable, therefore, that there were about the same number for each of these wars on the roll in 1877. If, then, we deduct 20,000 from the total of 214,693 as given above, we will prohahly come very near the number of pensioners for the War of the Rebellion borne on the rolls on June 30, 1877. This will give us a figure of 194,693. | Using this figure will give us a percentage of pensioners to num- " ber of individuals employed of 9.5 at a period of 16 years after the beginning of hostilities. (b) War with Spain. The total number of pensioners on the rolls for the War with Spain on June 30, 1914, was 27,915. This would give us a percentage of pen- sioners to the number of individuals employed of 7.3 at a period 16 years after the beginning of hostilities- It would appear, then, that, in proportion to the number of indi- viduals employed (as nearly as this number can be estimated), the number of pensioners on the roll for the War with Spain 16 years after the beginning of hostilities was less than that for the AVar of the Rebellion at the same length of time after the beginning of hostilities for the war, the percentages standing 9.5 for the War of the Rebellion and 7.3 for the War with Spain. 9. AMOUNTS DISBURSED FOR PENSIONS. 1 The amount disbursed for pensions for the War of the Rebellion for the year ending June 30, 1914, was $163,377,551.53. The amount disbursed for pensions for the War with Spain for this year was $3,907,510.53. The total amount disbursed for pensions proper for all wars up to June 30, 1914, was $4,633,511,926.71, and the total cost of adminis- tration was $127,938,472.79, or a total cost to the Government for our pension system of $4,761,450,399.50. (Report, Commissioner of Pensions, 1914.) 625 17 10. PROBABLE FUTURE COST OF THE PENSION LIST FOR THE WAR WITH SPAIN. It only remains to endeavor to make some estimate as to what the future cost of the pension system for the War with Spain is likely to be. In the nature of things this must be a very rough sort of a guess. By the use of the " mortuary tables " in common use by life insurance companies we can ascertain the approximate date when the last survivor will have died, since we know the average age at which they entered the service. But we have no such information with regard to the ages of the dependents. Again, no one can forecast the action of Congress in regard to pensions. Up to this date no "service" law has been passed for the War with Spain, and it is possible that none will be. If we judge the future action of Congress by what its action has been in the past, however, we are justified in expecting that such action will eventually be taken. For the wars prior to the War with Spain service-pension provi- sions were passed as follows: War of 1812 (14 days' service), on March 9, 1878; War with Mexico (60 days' service), on January 29, 1887; War of the Kebellion (90 days' service), on May 11, 1912. That is, in the case of these three wars service-pension provisions were passed an average of 50 years after the ending of hostilities. The sentiments of our people with respect to the pension system and political methods remaining the same, we may, then, reasonably expect a service-pension bill for the survivors of the War with Spain to be passed about, say, 1950. If we grant that this will occur, we can make at least a rough estimate of the number of survivors who will still be living on that date and the approximate amount that the pension list will cost. The total number of individuals estimated to have been employed in the War with Spain was 381,531. From this number we must deduct the number of those who deserted during the war, since neither they nor their dependents are entitled to pensions. This number was 17,599. This will leave at the end of the war 363,532 possible pen- sioners. By the use of our " mortuary tables " we will find that there should be living in 1950, 124,692 survivors, since 238,840 will have died. However, it is possible, though not probable, that all of these survivors (less a percentage to be deducted later) will leave surviving pensionable dependents. A calculation made by the Com- missioner of Pensions in 1882 in connection with the War of the Rebellion shows that 36 per cent of those dying do not leave pen- sionable dependents. In order, then, to ascertain the number of pensionable individuals living in 1950 we must deduct 85,982 from this total. We will then find that we may have in 1950, 277,550 pos- sible pensioners still living. However, all of these wiU not apply for pensions, nor will they all be living. 525 18 The largest amount paid out for pensions for the War of the Re- bellion in any one year was in the year 1913. So that 52 years after the beginning of hostilities the " high tide " of pension disbursements was reached for the War of the Rebellion. In that year the total number of pensioners on the roll for all wars was 820,200, of which number 762,331 were credited to the War of the Rebellion, which would be 36.9 per cent of the total number of individuals employed in that war. The amount disbursed for pensions proper for the War of the Rebellion for the year 1913 was $164,897,872.48, which would make the average annual value of a pension amount to $216.30. The total cost for administration and maintenance of the pension system for the year 1913 was $2,543,246.39. This would make the per capita cost per pensioner amount to $3.10 for that year. With the above data as a basis we can roughly calculate the cost of the War with Spain pension roll 52 years after the beginning of hostilities in that war, bearing in mind that we are supposing that the same conditions as to longevity and laws will obtain as have been found to exist for the War of Rebellion pensioners. In 1950, then, we would have 140,785 pensioners of the War wit Spain still on the rolls. To them would be paid a total of $30,451 795.50 in pensions. The cost of administration and maintenance for the War with Spain for this year would amount to $436,433.50, making a total disbursement for the year 1950 for this war of $30,888,229. On the same basis, then, the total amount disbursed for pensions for the War with Spain, up to and including the year 1950, would be $677,832,376.82, and for administration and maintenance, $10,242,- 457.98, which would make a total cost to the Government, for this waFj to and including 1950, of $688,074,834.80. Table 1. — All wars. Table showing the total number of applications for pensions filedjj total number of pensions granted, total number of pensioners on the roll, and the total amount paid for pensions proper on June 30 oi each year from 1899 to 1914, inclusive (from reports of the Bureau of Pensions) : I Year. Applica- tions filed. Pensions granted. Total pensioners. Amount paid for pensions. 1899 53,881 51,946 58,373 47, 965 52, 325 65, 794 52,841 (1) 37,077 40,645 44, 868 40, 173 40,136 44, 296 50,027 ('^ (V 991,519 993, 529 997, 735 999, 446 969, 545 994, 762 998, 441 985,971 967,371 951,687 946, 194 921,083 892, 098 860,294 820, 200 785,239 $138,355,052.95 1900 138, 462, 130. 65 1901 138,531,483.34 1902 137,504,267.99 1903 137, 759, 663. 71 1904 141,093,571.49 1905 141,142,861.33 1906 139, 000, 288. 25 1907 138,155,412.46 1908 153,093,086.27 1909 161,973,703.77 lijlO 159,974,056.08 1911 157,325,160.35 1912 152,986,433.72 1913 174,171,660.80 1914 172,417,646.26 525 * No data. 19 Table 2. — War loith Spain. Table showing applications for pensions filed, pensions granted, and number of pensioners on roll on June 30 of each year from 1899 to 1914, inclusive, for the Army for the War with Spain (from reports of Bureau of Pensions) : Year. Applica- tions filed. Pensions granted. Number pension- ers. Paid for pen- sions. 1899: Invalids Widows, etc. 1900: Invalids "Widows, etc. 1901: Invalids Widows, etc. 1902: Invalids Widows, etc . 1903: Invalids Widows, etc. 1901: Invalids Widows, etc. 1905: Invalids Widows, etc . 1906: Invalids AVidows, etc. 1907: Invalids Widows, etc . 1908: Invalids Widows, etc. 1909: Invalids Widows, etc . 1910: Invalids Widows, etc. 1911: Invalids Widows, etc . 1912: Invalids Widows, etc. 1913: Invalids Widows, etc. 1914: Invalids Widows, etc.. 15,009 2,551 12,038 1,383 12,814 1,834 10,210 1,395 7,728 1,282 6,152 938 5,736 865 ?! (') (') (>) (') ('^ (') (') (') (') (') 0) (') (') 125 178 801 710 2,795 1,240 3,441 884 3,415 936 4,013 885 3,920 583 (') (') u (') 117 165 822 845 3,344 1,981 6,282 2,727 8,798 3,488 11,946 4,187 15, 138 4,540 17,038 4,715 18,393 4,775 19,857 4,840 21,264 4,845 22,063 4,817 22,644 4,817 23,097 4,734 23,416 4,586 23,512 4,403 S8, 16, 145, 170, 644, 476, 1,121, 536, 1,468, 634, 2, 147, 825, 2, 457, 806, 2,508, 787, 2,533, 789, 2,698, 797, 852.41 972. 06 460.54 562. 64 315.04 914. 68 499.79 452.50 368. 56 126. 10 332.08 983. 17 638. 71 604.92 428.09 952.60 410.75 997. 06 394.73 024.38 V 3, 820, 169.80 js 3, 807, 919. 91 2,999, 787, 3,021, 789, 3, 130, 780, 3,019, 726, 776. 96 431.05 362. 75 612.03 866. 45 066. 43 167.05 829. 98 ' No data. * Amounts p%Id for pensions for these years show only as total for Army and Navy combined. Table 3. — War with Spain. Table showing the number of applications for pensions filed on June 30 of each year credited to both Army and Navy for the War with Spain, from 1899 to 1913 (from data furnished by the Bureau of Pensions) : Year. Applica- tions filed. Year. Applica- tions filed. 1899 16,986 13,039 14, 157 11,055 8,546 6,774 6,309 6,302 1907 4,170 1900 1908 4,472 1901 1909 4,207 3,372 2,878 1902 1910 1903 1911 1904 1912 2,710 1905 1913 2,465 1906 525 20 •90IAI9S \V%0% JO S^Bp 99B13AV ' : : : 5 M •80IAJ3S nSiajoj jo s^Bp 33bi8a y s CO • jno ja;snin jo aj'ep jb ^^Unq^srp qjiM pnnoj }nao jaj; CD •}no jg^snra jo ajcp CO 00 ■:>no J3isnm jo aicp ib q^Suajjs o^ suosjad aiqenoisuad jo juao joj ■fl" •si33}nniOA 8681 'qjSnaJis IBjo} 0^ qiSnaiis JO luao ja CC C^ GO 1- •q:;2najis 0} snoi^Boiidde jo !jnao iq^ 60.6 56.2 56.2 43.8 48 32 37.2 36.3 42.3 48.7 X •qiSnans oj suosjad ajq^noisnad jo inao jaj I^t^C^ to COM -VC^tO oi X to .-; m « (N ■<>' "O 't C-. ■006T 01 suois -nad joj suofiBonddB jo jaquinj^ 8SS § gggggS coi^t^ CO b--^OTiot^ o o o CO •qjSnajjs oj iiiniQ -Bsip JOJ pa3jBqosip j6 ^uao laj N N (N •qiSnaj^s i^jo^ oj asBasip JO paip jo inao jaj CC X CD ■ .-J ■ i-i rt rt M CO CO •qiSuaJis 1^101 01 spunoAi JO paip puE paiitii JO inaa aaj C5 • 00 •aoiAjas JO siBp i^^ox X- as o CD c^ ic (N X r^ -r r^a;^ cs cr. -rco^-^co X CO •ooiAjas nSiaiojjo syCea X o -r^"or i-T irf oT .-TtN" iC O ■— • 0> "«»' 00 »-* ^J* o .-1 CSC* CO ^ r-« •• M 8QQQOOOQOO QOOOOOOOO OOOOOOOOOO o o o^o o'o'o'o o o" £000000000 <^ooooooooo 2 -'"crco'cr ™OQOiCicsoo^ osr- _J^^ ^"' "* OOOOOOOOOO OOOOOOOOOO OOOOOOOOOO o"q" Q O" O" O g o'q' O" OOOOOOOOOO ■^Ot^CD'^'^iOVtOO lO^cDcoior- M* o ^ :::::: :a i a :::::::£ : 3 I I ; • ; I "o c 'S W j >> ; i :.« «i2m •2 ® § • • OS'S fc-OT) s 2 fe'ta £-3 s'S'5'a I o ow 681 STRATEGIC LOCATION OF MILITARY DEPOTS, ARSENALS, AND MANUFACTURING PLANTS IN THE UNITED STATES PREPARED BY THE WAR COLLEGE DIVISION. GENERAL STAFF CORPS AS A SUPPLEMENT TO THE STATEMENT OF A PROPER MILITARY POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES WCD 8121-42 ARMY WAR COLLEGE : WASHINGTON NOVEMBER, 1915 I 582 WASHINGTON GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1916 War Department, Docmnent No. 532. Offic« of the Chief of Staff. 'i' 1 STRATEGIC LOCATION OF MILITARY DEPOTS, ARSENALS, AND MANUFACTURING PLANTS IN THE UNITED STATES. 1. Paragraph 60 of the Statement of a Proper Military Policy for the United States, prepared by the War College Division, Gen- eral Staff Corps, in compliance with instructions of the Secretary of War and submitted September 11, 1915, is as follows: 60. As a general military principle, no supply depot, arsenal, nor manufac- turing plant of any considerable size, supported by War Department appropri- ations for military purposes, should be established or maintained east of the Appalachian Mountains, west of the Cascade or Sierra Nevada Mountains, nor within 200 miles of our Canadian or Mexican borders, and steps should be taken gradually to cause to be moved depots and manufacturing plants already established in violation of this military principle. 2. The soundness of the general principle of establishing perma- nent Government arsenals and supply depots at a safe distance from national frontiers seems so clear that no lengthy discussion or ex- planation of paragraph 60, just quoted, seems necessary. It may be of service, however, to illustrate graphically the trouble liable to arise from violation of this cardinal principle. First, take the case of France in 1870, during the war with Ger- many, and note the handicap imposed upon her by the capture of a number of her arsenals, clue to their faulty location. Plate I tells the story at a glance. It shows the positions of the principal arsenals and depots as they existed at the outbreak of hostilities. The shaded portion indicates the territory eventually occupied by the invader. Attention is especially invited to the prox- imity to the frontier of Douai, La Fere, Metz, Mutzig, Strasbourg, and Besancon. All were captured except the first two, and these were cut off from the French armies. 3. Next take our own case to-day, which is even worse, from a military standpoint, than that of France in 1870. Plate II shows the present locations of the principal Government arsenals and sup- ply depots as they exist to-day in the United States. The shaded portions indicate reasonable and probable objectives for an invader, due to our present state of unpreparedness. Attention is especially invited to the proximity to the frontiers of all our arsenals and sup- ply depots except Rock Island, Omaha, Fort Leavenworth, St. Louis, 30669°— No. 632—16 (3) and Jeffersonville. Our handicap, if these places were captured, can not be overestimated. 4. Plate III shoTvs the locations of some of our more important privately owned manufactories of war munitions, such as cartridge cases, fuses, shells, explosives, ammunition, binoculars, pistols, wag- ons, rifles, and bayonets. ■^ 100 zecfltiLEs •13 •A ^Q \' • 'Paris .•/4 •a *Z •7 •5 •/ PLATE I. France in 1870. notes sho"n"ing general character cf stores at the places indicated. 1. Toulouse : Cannon foundry, artillery forges, powder mills, arsenal, military magaBines.J 2. Chateauroux : Carriages of the military train. 3. Chatellerault : Manufactory of small arms. 4. Rennes : Arsenal. 5. St. Etienne : Manufactory of small arms. 6. Versailles : Large park of artillery, camp equipment. 7. Lyons : Arsenal. 8. Tulle : Manufactory of small arms. 9. Vernon : Manufactory of the equipages of the military train. 10. Besancon : Foundries, artillery arsenal. 11. Mutzlg : Manufactory of small arms. 12. Metz : Arsenal, cannon foundry, powder mills, engineer equipment. 13. Douai : Arsenal, cannon foundry. 14. La Fere : Artillery arsenal. 15. Strasbourg : Artillery arsenal. 532 PLATE II. NOTES SHOWING GENERAL CHAKACTEK OF STOKES AT THE PLACES INDICATED. Augusta : Arsenal. NYashington : Engineer depot, medical depot. Philadelphia : Quartermaster depot, arsenal. Picatinny : Powder manufactory. New York : Arsenal, signal corps depot, medical depot, quartermaster depot. Springfield : Arsenal. Watervliet : Arsenal. Jeffersonville : Quartermaster depot. St. Louis : Quartermaster depot, medical depot, engineer depot. Chicago : Quartermaster depot. Rock Island : Arsenal. Fort Leavenworth : Engineer depot. Omaha : Signal corps depot. San Antonio : Arsenal. Vancouver Barracks : Engineer depot. San Francisco and vicinity : Arsenal, quartermaster depot, signal corps depot, medical depot. 632 PLATE III. The following placea are indicated on this plate ; Watertown, N. Y. Ilion, N. Y. Chicago, 111. Allentown, Pa. Giesboro, D. C. Worcester, Mass, Bridgeport, Conn. New Haven, Conn. Alton, 111. Lowell, Mass. 532 liochester, N. Y. Cleveland, Ohio. Detroit, Mich. Cincinnati, Ohio Eddystone, Pa. Schenectady, N. Y. Richmond, Va. Boston, Mass. Philadelphia, Pa. South Bethlehem, Pa. Brooklyn, N. Y. Pittsburgh, Pa. Wilmington, Del. Parlin, N. J. Pompton Lakes, N. J. Lynn, Mass. Harrison, N. J. Harrisburg, Pa. o I I SANITARY TROOPS IN FOREIGN ARMIES ( PREPARED BY THE WAR COLLEGE DIVISION, GENERAL STAFF CORPS AS A SUPPLEMENT TO THE STATEMENT OF A PROPER MILITARY POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES WCD 9319-1 ARMY WAR COLLEGE : WASHINGTON NOVEMBER, 1915 533 WASHINGTON GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFIOE 1916 War Department, Document No. 533. Office of the Chief of Staff. \ SYNOPSIS. Introduction. Page. Duties of Banitary troopa 7 General scheme of distribution 7 (a) The zone of advance 7 (6) The zone of the lines of communication 7 (c) The zone of the interior or home territory 7 Utilization of reserve forces 9 Organization and administration adopted by leading powers 10 I. England. Peace establishment 10 Regular Army 10 Territorial force (military service) 10 Indian force 10 Colonial forces 10 Organization of the medical services 11 Royal Army Medical Corps 11 Distribution of personnel (Royal Army Medical Corps) 11 The Indian Medical Service 11 Territorial force (medical corps) 12 Distribution of personnel (territorial force) 12 Royal Army Reserve Corps 12 War organization 12 Service with combatant units 13 Mobile medical units 13 Motor workshop section 14 Lines of communication 14 Casualty clearing stations 14 Sanitary section 14 Stationary hospitals and base hospitals '. 15 Hospital trains 15 Hospital ships 15 Home territory 15 ■ II. France. Peace establishment 15 Organization of the medical services 16 Service de sante de I'armie de terre 16 Corps de sante militaire (commissioned medical oflicers and pharmacists) 16 Officers d 'administration 17 Section d'infirmiere (hospital corps) 17 Sanitary soldiers belonging to combatant units 17 Administration and distribution of personnel 18 533 (3) II. France — Coutiuued. Page. The colonial medical service 18 Enlisted personnel 19 War organization 19 Regimental service 19 Mobile field units 19 Ambulance sections 20 Sections D 'hospitalization 20 Divisional bearer companies 20 Cavalry ambulances 20 Corps bearer companies. 20 Lines of communication 21 Evacuation hospitals 21 Auxiliary convoys 21 Motor ambulance sections 21 Reserve medical personnel 21 Hospital trains 22 Zone of the interior 22 111 Germany. Military service 22 The standing army 23 General organization of the medical service 23 The sanitats korps 23 The sanitats offizier korps 23 The sanitats offizier diensttuer 23 The stanitats mannschat 24 The militar krankenwarter 24 The krankentrager 24 Apothecaries and quartermasters 25 Administration and distribution of personnel 25 War organization 26 Medical personnel with combatant organizations 26 Sanitats bataillon 26 Field hospitals 27 Lines of communication 27 Hospital trains 29 Home territory 29 IV. Austria-Hungary. Military' service 29 Organization of the medical service 30 The militar arzliches offizers' korp 30 The sanitats truppe 30 Sanitats hilfspersonal bei den truppen 31 Medical assistants 31 Litter bearers 32 Carriers of equipment 32 Pharmacists and supply officials 32 Isursing sisters 32 Administration and distribution of personnel 32 Regimental hospitals 33 Garrison hospitals 33 533 5 IV. Austria-Hungary — Continued. Page. War organization 33 Medical service in the zone of advance 34 Regimental medical service 34 The divisional medical unit 35 Other medical units 35 Field Hospitals 35 Lines of communication 36 Mobile reserve hospitals 36 Field depots for slightly sick 36 Rest stations 36 Field medical supply depot 36 Hospital trains 36 Mobile laboratories 37 Surgical detachments 37 Zone of the interior 37 V. Italy. Peace establishment 37 General organization of the medical service 38 Ufficiali medici di corps sanitario (officers of the medical corps) 38 Pharmacists 39 Administration officers 39 Enlisted personnel 39 Nursing sisters 40 General distribution of personnel 40 War organization 41 Medical service with combatant units 42 Medical field units 42 Ambulance companies 42 Field hospitals 43 Lines of communication 43 Home territory 43 VL Russia. Peace establishment 44 Organization of the medical service 45 Administration and distribution of personnel 46 Feldshers 47 Nadzirateli 47 War organization 48 Medical service with combatant units 48 Mobile medical units 48 The divisional lazaret 49 Field hospitals 49 Lines of communication — Transport column 49 Hospital trains 50 Sanitary detachments 50 Evacuation hospitals 50 Home territory 50 533 VII. Japan, Page. Peace establishment 51 Gueneki (the active army) 51 Yobi (first reserve) 51 Kobi (second reserve) 51 Hoju (replacement troops, reserve of recruitment) 51 Kakurnin, first part (the national army, first part) 51 Kakurnin, second part (the national army, second part) 51 Organization of the medical department 51 Commissioned officers 51 Reserve medical ofiicers 52 Pharmacists 52 Enlisted personnel 52 Administration and distribution of personnel 53 War organization 53 Divisional medical service 54 Medical service with combatant units 54 Enlisted personnel 54 Field medical units 54 Bearer battalions 55 Field hospitals 55 Lines of communication 55 Reserve medical personnel 55 Sick and wounded transport detachments 56 Base hospitals 56 Home territory 56 SUMATAUY. The percentage of medical ofiicers in permanent peace establishments 57 The percentage of medical personnel for duty directly with troops as taken from tables of organization 57 633 1 SANITARY TROOPS IN FOREIGN ARMIES. INTRODUCTION. DUTIES OF SANITARY TROOPS. A study of the sanitary troops in foreign armies shows that all the great powers have adopted practically the same principles govern- ing the employment of these troops. The organization and distribu- tion of the various units is to some extent governed by the military conditions affecting the various countries, but it is generally recog- nized that the duties of sanitary troops are (a) the care and treat- ment of sick and wounded; (b) their prompt removal out of the zone, of combat; (c) the maintenance of the health of troops by the insti- gation of proper sanitary measures; {d) the maintenance of an adequate supply of medical and surgical materiel; (e) the prepara- tion and preservation of records of sick and wounded. GENERAL SCHEME OF DISTRIBUTION. For the proper performance of these duties all countries make a more or less uniform distribution of their medical personnel in (a) the zone of advance; (b) the zone of the lines of communication; (c) the zone of the interior or home territory. The general scheme of medical service in the zone of advance is to provide a medical detachment for each regiment or similar unit to render service directly to that unit, and to provide mobile medical units for service with divisions, corps, and field armies. The service on lines of communication is organized so as to provide means for (a) evacuation of sick and wounded; (h) the replenish- ing of supplies expended at the front by the mobile field units; {c) the transportation of wounded to those points where definite and complete care and treatment can be given them; (d) the care of such wounded during transportation. In the present war extensive use has been made of motor transport to convey wounded from the dressing stations to the rail head, and of hospital trains and hospital ships to conve}^ them to the zone of the interior or home territory. Qearmg stations or evacuation hospitals (7) 633 8 have been established at the advanced bases for the temporary care of patients until they could be transferred to hospital trains, and large semipermanent hospitals established at the base of the lines of communimation for the treatment of all wounded until permanent disposition could be made of them. Because of the limited territory in each country, the greater part of the wounded have been returned to home territory as quickly as possible. The number necessarily retained on lines of communica- tion, however, has been large. The English Army, after the first six months of war, had established at Boulogne-Sur-Mer, their port of embarkation, 22 hospitals, where an average of some 11.000 pa- tients were daily under treatment. For bringing patients to these hospitals they were employing 12 hospital trains, with an average capacity of 400 patients each. And for transporting to England such patients as it was necessary to invalid home there was a fleet of 14 hospital ships, with an average capacity of 500 patients. The French Government has maintained on its railways 90 hos- pital trains, with a carrying capacity of 36,000 patients, and recently recommendations have been made to increase this capacity to 100,000 patients. In accordance with these recommendations 250 hospital trains have now been provided. In the zone of the interior provision is made for the final disposi- tion of all sick and wounded and the preparation and shipment of all necessary sanitary material. The extent of preparation necessary in this zone can be realized when the extent of casualties is considered. The following shows the number of wounded reported in the present war up to July 1, 1915: France, 700,000; Great Britain, 229,000; Russia, 1,982,000; Germany, 852,000; Austria-Hungary, 711,000; Bel- gium, 100,000; Serbia, 112,600; Turkey, 40,000; Japan, 910; total, 4,837,510 in one year of war. Of these wounded at least 60 per cent, or approximately 3,000,000 were sent to the hospitals in home terri- tory. Recent reports from France show that she is now maintaining 5,000 territorial hospitals, wnth a total capacity of 600,000 beds. For the performance of their medical service, both in peace and war, all armies have maintained a permanent medical personnel, both commissioned and enlisted. In no army, however, has this perma- nent personnel been sufficient to perform all the duties required of it in the present war. A study of the war tables of foreign armies shows that an average proportion of 4 officers and 52 enlisted men of the sanitary forces per thousand of total strength are prescribed for duty directly with troops in the zone of advance. The proportion for duty in the other two zones is not prescribed definitely, but a general outline is given of the personnel required for each of the several units. Experience has shown, however, that a slightly smaller proportion is required 533 9 for duty on lines of communications than for duty in the zone of advance and a much greater proportion for duty in the zone of the interior. UTILIZATION OF RESERVE FORCES. All countries have therefore been obliged to utilize in large measure medical assistance from sources outside of the army. In countries having universal military service nearly eveiy medical man has had a certain amount of military training, and there is, in consequence, a large force of partially trained medical officers available both in the reserves and in volunteer aid societies. In 1913 Germany had 34,136, France 20,809, and Austria 13,734 men so available. These men have been utilized largely on service in hospitals and with units on lines of communication and the zone of the interior and, while there has been some shortage of men for medical service in those countries, practically the whole medical profession was able to render satis- factorily some service. In England, however, where no appreciable number of reserves were available, the shortage in medical personnel has been keenly felt. Urgent appeals have been made to the entire medical profession in the United Kingdom to give some part of their time to service with the army. A statement by the war office, September 4, 1915, was to the effect that there were at that time m army medical service 6,265 officers, and that there were residing in England, Wales, and Ireland 6,555 medical men of military age not then engaged in war service ; and that of these latter one-third were immediately required. Owing to her inability to secure from her own population a suffi- cient number of medical m-^n for army service, England has been compelled to draw men from Canada, Australia, and New Zealand and to make request of various medical colleges in this country to send over as many doctors as could be induced to accept commissions. B}^ utilizing to the utmost all available medical material she has been able to secure, approximately, 8,000 men for service as medical officers. Of this number, however, only 1,100 are men trained in medico-military duties. Because of the great similarity between our military ser\ice and that of England this shortage of trained medical officers and the difficulty being experienced in getting even untrained medical officers should be instructive to us. In all countries considerable reliance has been placed in volunteer aid societies to supplement the permanent personnel. In Austria- Hungary particularly the war plans contemplated association of the Red Cross Society with the medical service even in the zone of ad- vance. The assistance rendered by these societies has been of con- siderable value in establishments on lines of communication and the 30669°— No. 533—16 2 10 zone of the interior in positions not requiring military training; but they have not been of much value in actual field service nor in administrative positions. For these latter men thoroughly trained in medico-military matters have been found essential. ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION ADOPTED BY LEADING POWERS. The organization, administration, and distribution of sanitary personnel adopted by the leading powers both in peace and in war are shown in the following pages. I. ENGLAND. PEACE ESTABLISHMENT. The military services in England comprise (a) the regular army; (b) the territorial forces; (c) the Indian force; (d) militia forces in various colonies. REGULAR ARMY. The Regular Army is organized into an expeditionary force, serv- ing in the British Isles, and a colonial force, serving in the various colonies and India. The peace strength of this army is : British Isles 134. 339 Colonies (other than India) 45,215 India 75,884 Total 255, 438 TERRITORIAL FORCE. The Territorial Force corresponds to our militia and is organized into divisions in the same proportion of arms but in smaller num- bers than the regular army. It has a strength on paper of 315,408, but probably the actual strength does not exceed 250,000 men. INDIAN FORCE. The Indian Force is composed of native troops with English offi- cers. It is a distinct service from that part of the regular army which also serves in India. It has a strength of approximately 162,000 men. COLONIAL FORCES. All colonies maintain bodies of native troops, officered by English- men. Canada, Australia, and New Zealand maintain considerable bodies of militia. Their organization is similar to that of the reg- ular army. 533 1 11 ORGANIZATION OF THK ^MKHICAL SERVICES. The medical personnel for the various forces is organized along the same general lines, bnt there is a distinct medical force for each of the distinct combatant forces. These various medical forces are (a) the Royal Army Medical Corps; (7)) the Indian Medical Service; (c) the Medical Corps of the Territorial Forces; (d) the Royal Army Medical Reserve Corps. ROYAL ARMY MEDICAL CORPS, This corps comprises both a commissioned and enlisted personnel. At the head of this corps is the Director General of Medical Serv- ices, with rank of lieutenant general. The other officers are 11 major generals, 29 colonels, 130 lieutenant colonels, 331 majors, 418 cap- tains, 128 lieutenants, and 42 quartermasters; total commissioned, 1,090. In addition to these officers there were on duty before the outbreak of the present war 65 medical officers from the retired list and 182 officers from the reserve corps, making a total in peace of fifty-three one-hundredths of 1 per cent of the total strength of the regular army. The enlisted personnel is composed of warrant officers, staff ser- geants, sergeants, corporals, and privates. It has a total strength of approximately 4,000, DISTRIBUTION OF PERSONNEL. Officers of the corps serve both at home and abroad. The enlisted personnel serves only in the military hospitals at home stations. In India the subordinate duties of the medical department are performed by noncommissioned officers and privates belonging to combatant units who volunteer for and are detailed to medical work. The pay of enlisted men in the Royal Army Medical Corps is slightly higher than for those of similar rank in the line. In addi- tion to their base pay all men below the rank of staff sergeant are also granted "corps pay " (extra duty pay) while on duty. This " corps pay " is further increased by Gd, per day for those men who have taken a course in and been graduated from the " Queen Alex- andria's Nursing Service." THE INDIAN MEDICAL SERVICE. Medical service for the Indian force is provided by a separate corps of British medical officers with native assistants detailed from the line for subordinate duties. The Indian Medical Corps has 4 major generals, 15 colonels, 147 lieutenant colonels, 227 majors, 318 captains, 533 12 and 75 lieutenants; total, 786. Percentage of medical officers to total strength of Indian forces, forty-eight one-hundredths of 1 per cent. TERRITORIAL FORCE. The Medical Corps for the Territorial Force is similar to that of the Royal Army Medical Corps. It comprises 14 colonels, 62 lieu- tenant colonels, 140 majors, 836 captains and lieutenants, 80 quarter- masters, and 57 transport officers; total commissioned, 1,189. Pro- portion to total strength fortj'-seven one-hundredths of 1 per cent. DISTRIBUTION OF PERSONNEL. The Territorial Force is divided into 14 divisions, and the medical service of each division is under the direction of a colonel of the Ter- ritorial Medical Corps. The other medical officers for the division are organized into either field ambulance detachments or general hos- pital detachments. With each division there are 3 field ambulances, with a staff con- sisting of 1 lieutenant colonel in command, 2 majors, 6 captains or lieutenants, 1 quartermaster, and 1 transport officer. In addition to the 42 field ambulances assigned to the infantry divisions there are 14 mounted brigade field ambulances, with a staff of 1 lieutenant colonel in command, 1 major, 4 captains or lieutenants, 1 quartermas- ter, and 1 transport officer. Twenty-three general hospitals are organized and distributed throughout the divisions. Each general hospital is under the com- mand of 1 lieutenant colonel, with 1 captain and 1 quartermaster as assistants. The medical staff consists of 4 lieutenant colonels, 8 majors, and 2 captains or lieutenants. In addition to the general hospitals and field ambulances thus pro- vided for there are two sanitary companies and a corps of special sanitary officers numbering 106. ROYAL ARMY RESERVE CORPS. There is no definite number of officers in this corps. WAR ORGANIZATION. The administrative unit in time of war is the infantry division (19,558 officers and men). The medical service of the division is under the direction of a Principal Medical Officer (colonel), with 1 captain as assistant and 5 enlisted men as clerks and messengers. 533 13 SERVICE WITH COMBATANT UNITS. In time of war each batallion of infantry, regiment of cavalry, brij^ade of field artillery, etc., has attached to it 1 medical officer. The enlisted personnel for sanitary duty with these units is not derived from the Royal Army Medical Corps, but from the units themselves. In each unit 30 men are specially trained in sanitary duties: 1 noncommissioned officer and 8 privates are detailed to act as sanitary police; 1 noncommissioned officer and 4 privates are detailed to insure purity of the water supply; IG privates are de- tailed as litter bearers; and 1 lance corporal and 1 private are detailed as orderlies to the medical officer. The latter also drives the cart or pack animal carrying medical supplies with which each unit is equipped. MOBILE MEDICAL UNITS. In general the medical units prescribed in the British field-service regulations for both the zone of advance and lines of communication r,re fewer in number and more limited in capacity than those pre- scribed by other armies. The only mobile units are the field ambu- lances with the divisions, three of which are assigned to each division. These units are analogous to a combination of ambulance companies and field hospitals in our service. Each field ambulance is under the command of a major. Royal Army Medical Corps, and is made up of a bearer division and a tent division. The capacity of the tent division is 150 patients, and the entire ambulance is capable of being subdivided into three complete sections. The personnel of the bearer division comprises 3 medical officers, 6 noncommissioned officers, and 118 privates. Royal Army Medical Corps. That of the tent division comprises 6 medical officers, 1 warrant officer, 16 noncommissioned officers, and -11 privates, Royal Army Medical Corps. In addition to this personnel from the Royal Arm}'^ Medical Corps there are 4 sergeants, 2 artificers, and 48 privates of the army service corps attached. Of the medical personnel, 3 officers ma}^ be civilian physicians specially employed, and 90 litter bearers may be recruits specially enlisted. The total personnel of each field ambulance is 10 officers and 23G men. Recently a change has been made in the transportation for field ambulances, motor ambulances being largely substituted for horse- drawn vehicles. 533 14 The present allowance of transportation consists of 4 carts, 11 wagons, 3 horse-drawn ambulances and 7 motor ambulances, 14 riding horses and 39 draft animals. MOTOR WORKSHOP SECTION. Attached to the division for service with the field ambulances is one "workshop" (army service corps). The function of this unit is to keep in repair the motor ambulances. Its personnel consists of 1 officer, 12 artificers, and 8 privates, army service corps, and 7 drivers from the transport troops. Its transportation is 3 motor trucks for stores and 1 motor car for personnel. The total sanitary personnel provided for each division in war is — commissioned, 52; enlisted, 1,244. Of the enlisted personnel 556 are drawn from the Royal Army Medical Corps, 506 from line organizations, and 182 from the army service corps. LINES OF COMMUNICATION. The fixed establishments in the British service are casualty clear- ing stations, sanitary sections, stationary hospitals, base hospitals, hospital trains and hospital ships, and motor-transport convoys, the latter having been recently introduced. CASUALTY CLEARING STATIONS. These stations are located at the head of the lines of communica- tion, and are simply temporary stopping places for wounded until they can be evacuated farther to the rear by hospital trains. No beds or other conveniences are provided, as patients are usually passed through these stations in 24 hours. Their personnel com- prises 7 medical officers (4 of whom may be civilian phj^sicians specially engaged), 1 quartermaster, 1 warrant officer, 8 noncommis- sioned officers, and 69 privates, royal army medical corps. (Of the latter 20 may be specially enlisted.) Recently motor-ambulance convoys have been organized and used very successfully in bringing the wounded from the dressing sta- tions to the clearing stations. These convoys have a varying number of ambulances and each ambulance has a driver and orderly from the royal army medical corps. SANITARY SECTION. A sanitary section includes 1 medical officer, 2 noncommissioned officers, and 25 privates, royal army medical corps. Transporta- tion for this unit is provided from the advanced mechanical trans- port depot, and consists of 1 motor truck with 2 drivers. Its duties are confined exclusively to sanitary work. 533 i i 15 STATIOXAKV HOSPITALS AND BASE HOSPITALS. These hospitals are arranged at tlie base section of the line of connnunications. At present 22 of these hospitals arc established at Boulogne-siir-Mer. Stationary hospitals have a capacity of 200 beds and a staff of 8 officers and 86 men. Royal Army Medical Corps. General hospitals have a capacity of 500 beds and a staff of 21 officers and 143 men of the Royal Army Medical Corps, supplemented by 43 nursing sisters. HOSPITAL TRAINS. As in other armies in the present war, the hospital train is largely utilized in the English service. A number of these trains have been provided, with an average carrying capacity of 396 cases. The med- ical personnel consists of 2 officers and 45 men, and their e(|uipment includes operating cars, kitchen cars, and every convenience to make them practically rolling hospitals. HOSPITAL SHIPS. Because of the necessity of sea transport to return wounded to home territory, England has equipped a number of hospital ships. Details as to the personnel and equipment of these ships are not available. HOME TERRITORY. The large military hospital at Xetley has been greatly increased in capacity and is the main military hospital in England. Every other available military and civil hospital hag been utilized, how- ever, and new pavilion hospitals constructed. Recent reports from the Dardanelles campaign show 112,000 wounded and 78.000 sick in that campaign alone. These men nearly all returned to England. An idea as to the amount of hospital capacity required in home territory may be gained from these figures. As mentioned in the preface of this study, England has made every effort to utilize her entire medical population and has even sought medical assistance abroad. II. FRANCE. PEACE ESTABLISHMENT. Tlie military service in Erance are — (a) the Metropolitan Army; (h) the Colonial Forces; (c) the Territorial Army. Service in the Metropolitan Army is compulsory. That in the Colonial Forces by voluntary enlistment. All males between the ages of 18 and 45 are liable to military service. This service is divided 16 into (a) that with the colors (3 years) ; (6) that in the Metropolitan Army Eeserve (10 years) ; (c) that in the Territorial Army (5 years) ; and that (final service) in the Territorial Army Reserve (9 years). The Metropolitan Army is organized into the Army of the In- terior, comprising 19 army corps (472,946 officers and men), and the Algerian-Tunisian Army, comprising four infantry divisions (68,620 officers and men). The colonial forces (49,500 officers and men) are partly French and partly native troops. The portion serving in France forms a colonial army corps of three divisions of infantry and one brigade of artillery. ORGANIZATION OF THE MEDICAL SERVICES. The Metropolican Army and the Colonial Forces have separate medical services. That for the Metropolitan Army is the " Service de sante de I'armie de terre" (army medical service). That for the Colonial Forces is the " Service de sante des troops coloniales" (colo- nial military medical service). SERVICE DE SANTE DE l'aRMIE DE TERRE. This service comprises — (a) the Corps de Sante Militaire; (&) Offi- ciers d'administration ; (c) Sections d'infirmieres. CORPS DE SANTE MILITAIRE. (Commissioned medical officers and pharmacists.) The titles, rank, and number of medical officers and pharmacists ii this corps are: MEDICAL OFFICERS. Title. Rank. Number. M6decin inspecteur general M^decin inspectenr Mt^decin principal de premiere classe . . . M^decin principal de deuxi6.me classe . . M6de,cin major de premiere classe Medecin major de deuxieme classe Medecin aide-major de premiere classe. . Medecin aide-major de deuxieme classe. IJeutenant general Maj or general Colonel Lieutenant colonel . . . Major Captain Lieutenant Second lieutenant 5 20 50 95 370 580 .570 Total. 1,710 PHARMACISTS. Pharmacien, Pharmacien, PharmacieTi, Pharmacien, I'harmacien, I'harmacien, I'harmacien, Total.. inspeclpur principal, premiere classe. . principal, deuxieme classe. major, premiere classe major, oeuxieme classe aide-major, premiere classe. aide-major, deuxieme classe Major general Colonel Lieutenant colonel . Major Captain Lieutenant Second lieutenant.. 5;i3 17 OFFICIERS d'aDMINISTRATION". These officers f<;i-ni one of the four sections into which the French Quartermaster Corps is divided. Their service is, however, exclu- sively with the Medical Department, and they are under the com- mand of the senior medical officer of the command with which they are stationed. In addition to administrative duties in the matter of supply, etc., the}^ act as company officers for the sections d'in- firmieres. Their titles, rank, and numbers are: Title. Rank. Number. Offieier d'admiiiistration, principal IS Officier d'administration, premiere elasse... Captain 175 Offieier d'administration, deuxifeme elasse \ 157 OiTicier d'administration, troisi^me elasse Second lieutenant Total 350 SECTION d'iNFIRMIERE (HOSPITAL CORPS). The army hospital corps is organized into 25 sections under regu- lations as regards discipline and interior economy similar to infantry units. One section is usually assigned to each corps. The strength of each of these sections varies according to requirements and is fixed by the minister of war. They vary in peace from GO to 800 men. Recruits are received direct into these sections, or men may be transferred from combatant units. After a period of preliminary drill and instruction they are distributed to the various hospitals in the army corps to which their section is attached for duty as hos- pital attendants. SANITARY SOLDIERS BELONGING TO C0:MBATANT UNITS. In addition to the soldiers of the sections d'infirmieres whose services are confined to military hospitals, there are three classes of men belonging to combatant units, but performing medical service under the medical officers attached to those units. These sanitary soldiers are (a) soldat infirmieres (hospital attendants), {h) soldat brancardiers (litter bearers), (c) brancardiers d'ambulance (litter bearers obtained from bandsmen, mechanics, and others), (d) mede- cine auxiliares (doctors or medical students in second year of serv- ice; these men hold W' arrant rank). In peace two men (soldat infirmieres) are detailed from each battalion of infantry, artillery, or engineers, and four from each 30669°— No. 533—16 -3 18 regiment of cavalry or artillery for service under the medical officers attached to the organization. Their duties are assisting in caring for the sick of the organization who do not require extensive hospital treatment. Four men in each company of infantry or engineers and in each battery of field or foot artillery are designated soldat brancardieres and are trained while serving with their organization in the work of litter bearers. Their services are not utilized as litter bearers in time of peace (except during maneuvers), but upon mobilization they take up these duties. Any bandsmen, mechanics, etc., in excess of the number required as litter bearers for the regimental units are also trained in duties of litter bearers. They are designated brancardiers d'ambulance, and on mobilization they, together with reservists and unattached men from the sections d'infirmieres militaire, form the litter squads for bearer companies. ADMINISTRATION AND DISTRIBUTION OF PERSONNEIj. Each corps or district has a Principal Medical Officer with rank, of major general (or colonel), with one. major (corps de sante) and two officiers d'administration as assistants. The duties of these officei's comprise not only the general administration and inspection of the medical service of the standing army, but that of the reserves and territorial army also. A large proportion of the junior medical officers are assigned to regiments and smaller units for service directly with those units. Other medical officers are distributed to the large militar_y hos- pitals and to duty with civil hospitals in which army patients are treated. THE COLONIAL MEDICAL SERVICE. This service is similar in organization to that for the Metropolitan Army. The commissioned personnel comprises: MEDICAL OFFICERS. Title. M(^decin-inspecteur general M^decin-inspecteiir Mtklecin-principal premiere cla?se . , M(5decin-principal deuxifeme classe . Mpdecin-major premiere classe Medecin-major deuxiSme classe Aide-major, premiere classe Aide-major, deuxi&me classe Total. Rank. Lieutenant general Major general , Colonel , Lieutenant colonel Major Captain Lieutenant Second lieutenant Number. ^ 1 1 12 IS ss 175 533 19 PHARMACISTS. Pharmacien principal, premiere classe Pharmacien principal, deuxieme classe... Pharmacien major, premiere classe Pharmacien major, deuxieme classe Pharmacien aide-major, premise classe . . Pharmacien aide-major, deuxieme classe . Total. \ Colonel Lieutenant colonel Major Captain Lieutenant Second lieutenant ENLISTED PERSONNEL. The enlisted personnel comprises 1 section d'infirmieres and the personnel supplied by combatant units. Men for the section d'in- firmieres are enlisted in France and sent to the colonies after a period of instruction in the home depots. The regimental medical personnel is native. WAR ORGANIZATION. With the headquarters staff of each field army is a "Medical In- spector General " (lieutenant general) or " Medical Inspector " (major general) with a staff of 1 medical major, 1 supply officer, and 3 cooks. With each corps is a "Medical Inspector" (major general) or "Principal Medical Officer, first class" (colonel) with a staff of 1 lieutenant, medical corps; 1 supply officer and 4 enlisted men, hos- pital corps (including 1 cyclist). With each division headquarters is a "Principal Medical Officer, second class" (lieutenant colonel). His staff consists of 2 privates, hospital corps (1 being a cyclist). REGIjMENTAL SERVICE. In time of war this service is increased by the incorporation of reserve officers, regimental hospital attendants, and regimental litter bearers from the reserves. The war personnel consists of 7 medical officers (3 from the reserve), 12 attendants, and 92 litter bearers (40 from the band). MOBILE FIELD UNITS. The field hospitals formerly forming part of the medical service for each corps have recently been abolished, and wounded are now removed directly from the dressing stations to the evacuation hos- ])ita]s at the rail head. The mobile medical units attached to each division are noAv 4 field ambulance sections, 3 sections d'hospitaliza- tion, and 1 bearer company. Those attached to each corps are 1 cavalry ambulance section and 1 corps bearer company. 533 I 20 AMBTTLANCE SECTIONS. Ambulance sections establish dressing stations. Each section has a personnel of 6 medical officers, 1 pharmacist, 2 supply officers, 2 noncommissioned officers, and 36 privates, hospital corps, and 1 non- commissioned officer and 9 privates, train troops. Three enlisted men are also provided as officers' orderlies. The transportation con- fl sists of 5 riding horses, 14 draft animals, and 6 wagons (1 for per- sonnel and 5 for supplies). SECTIONS d'hOSPITALIZATION. These sections furnish additional personnel and supplies to ambu- S lance sections temporarily immobilized. The personnel of each sec- I tion is 1 medical officer, 3 noncommissioned officers, and 1 private, I hospital corps, and 1 noncommissioned officer and 3 privates, train troops. The transportation is 1 riding horse, 6 draft animals, and 3 wagons. 1 DIVISIONAL BEARER COMPANIES. These sections work in conjunction with the ambulance sections. The personnel consists of 6 medical officers (4 of whom are warrant officers from the reserve), 2 supply officers, 1 transport officer, 1 chaplain, 6 noncommissioned officers, and 132 privates, hospital corps; and 4 noncommissioned officers and 58 privates, train troops; total, 10 officers and 194 enlisted men. Transportation comprises 14 riding horses, 59 draft animals, 11 ambulances, 9 wagons, and 1 rolling kitchen. CAVALRY AMBULANCES. Personnel : 3 medical officers, 1 supply officer, 1 chaplain, 8 pri- vates, hospital corps; 9 privates, train troops; 4 officers' orderlies. Transportation: 5 riding horses, 14 draft animals, 2 carts, and ambulances. CORPS BEARER COMPANIES. These companies are similar to division bearer companies but arc larger. Their personnel comprises 9 medical officers (G being war-j rant officers from the reserve), 2 supply officers, 1 transport officer, ij veterinarian, 4 chaplains, 14 noncommissioned officers, and 205 pri- vates, hospital corps; 5 noncommissioned officers and 73 privates,! train troops; and 5 ollicers' orderlies; total, 17 officers and 298 en-J listed men. Transportation consists of 19 riding horses, 79 draft animals, llj ambulances and 17 wagons, and 1 rolling kitchen. 533 21 LINES OF COMMUNICATION. The French system of medical service contemplates rapid evacua- tion of wounded from the zone of combat to the zone of the interior. For this reason temporary hospitals (evacuation hospitals) are estab- lished at the head of the lines of communication and wounded evac- uated directly from the front into these hospitals. EVACUATION HOSPITALS. These hospitals are established at the railhead in the proportion of one to each corps. Their personnel comprises 8 medical officers, 2 pharmacists, 2 quartermasters, 12 noncommissioned officers, and 40 privates, hospital corps. Their equipment consists of 200 litters which are used as beds. Medical and surgical supplies and cookery utensils are secured from the medical advanced supply depot. AUXILIARY CONVOYS. When occasion demands all wagons and personnel of the train troops under the commander of the line of communications are, upon request of the principal medical officer, organized into an auxiliary convoy and placed vmder his direction for use in quickly evacuating the wounded from the field units. These convoys consist of 720 wagons in four sections of 180 wagons each. MOTOR AMBULANCE SECTIONS. Recently motor ambulance sections have been organized in the pro- portion of one to each corps. They are employed in the daily evacua- tion of the sick from the front to the railhead and in taking up sani- tary materiel to replace that expended at the front. These sections are composed of from 18 to 24 motor cars, one of which is a repair car. Recommendation has recently been made that the number of these motor ambulances be increased to 60. The carrying capacity is about 120 patients, 40 recumbent and 80 sitting up. ft RESERVE MEDICAL PERSONNEL. Detachments of reserve medical personnel for the purpose of estab- lishing improvised hospitals are maintained in the proportion of 4 to each corps. These detachments consist of 1 medical officer phar- macist, 1 quartermaster, 1 warrant medical officer, 5 noncommissioned officers, and 39 privates of the hospital corps. Recent recommenda- tions of a committee appointed to investigate the French medical 533 22 service include one to the effect that special surgical units similar to the surgical units in the Austrian service be organized in the propor- tion of one to each corps, their duties being to perform the most serious surgical work. HOSPITAL TRAINS. Hospital trains are largely used for carrying patients direct from the zone of advance to the zone of the interior, and in this latter the permanent hospitals are established. Five of these trains were main- tained in time of peace. They were prepared by the railway com- panies who maintain and use them for ordinary traffic. The cars were specially constructed for conversion into hospital cars whenever the order for mobilization is given. The railway companies keep ready all the necessary fittings for the conversion of these cars, while the army medical department keeps ready in its storehouses addi- tional materiel necessary for forming complete rolling hospitals. Two hundred and fifty such hospital trains, with a carrying capacity of 100,000 patients, are at present in use in France. ZONE or THE INTERIOR. France has in time of peace 40 military hospitals with a capacity of 10,192 patients, and there are many large civil hospitals available for military use. In addition to these, however, France has found it necessary to establish 5,000 territorial hospitals with a total bed capa- city of 000,000 patients. The j^ersonnel of all these permanent hos- pitals and for most of the work on lines of communication has been obtained from the reserves and from voluntary aid societies. III. GERMANY. There are two main divisions of the military service in Germany- (a) regular service; (6) service in the "Landsturm." All males between the ages of 17 and 45 are required to perform service in one or the other of these main divisions. Men selected for the regular service serve 7 years with the stand- ing army (3 with the colors and 4 in the reserve) , and are then passed into the " Landwehr," where they continue service until their thirty- ninth year. Service from the thirty-ninth to the forty-fifth year is in the "Landsturm." Men who for any reason are not required to serve in the standing army are placed in the " Ersatz " reserve (special reserve) for 12 years, and then passed to the Landsturm. Men of good education who clothe and feed themselves during their service are known as" Einjahrige Freiwillige " (one-year volunteers), 588 23 and are passed into the reserve of the standing army after one year of service with the colors. The Landsturm is composed of (a) men between the ages of 17 and 20; (6) those between the ages of 39 and 45; (c) men from the Ersatz reserve; and (d) men who are for some reason exempt from regular service. THE STANDING ARMY. The standing army, as organized in peace, consists of 25 army corps and 1 cavalry division, besides special troops, schools, etc. (Total strength, budget, 1912, 644,267 officers and men.) These corps are distributed, 19 in Prussia, 2 in Saxony, 1 in Wurt- temberg, and 3 in Bavaria. Each of these independent kingdoms has its own war office and administers its oAvn army, but, combined, they form the army of the German Empire. GENERAL ORGANIZATION OF THE MEDICAL SERVICE. The Sanitats Korps. — The army medical department is called the Sanitats Korps and is composed of the following elements: {a) "The Sanitats offizier korps" or corps of medical officers (Prussia, Saxony, and Bavaria each have a separate corps of this character) ; (5) the "Sanitats offizier diensttuer"; (c) the "Sanitats mannschaft"; {d) the " Militarkranenwarter " ; (e) " Krankentrager " ; (/) apothecary officials; {g) quartermaster officials ; {h) army nursing sisters. The Sanitats Oifizier Korps. — This is a corps of commissioned medical officers. The titles, rank, and number of these officers are ; Title. Rank. Number. General stabsarzt Lieutenant general 1 General arzt and sanitats inspecteur 4 General arzt Colonel 25 General ober arzt Lieutenant colonel 60 Oberstabsarzt 494 Stabsarzt 640 Assistenarzt 1,143 Total 2,367 THE SANITATS OFFIZIER DIENSTTUER. This is an auxiliary corps to the corps of permanent medical officers and is a most important element in the German medical service. It is composed of {a) medical men who are doing their service with the colors as one-year volunteers and who are appointed to junior positions in the medical corps (Oberarzt or Assistenarzt) and (5) medical students who have practically completed their medical studies and are doing their regular military service. These latter serve with the medical corps as warrant officers (TJnterarzte) . 633 24 The presence of these men in subordinate positions permits the maintenance of a permanent commissioned medical personnel very much smaller than would otherwise be required and provides a large supply of reserve medical officers for war. THE SANITATS MANNSCHAFT. The Sanitats Mannschaft is recruited entirely from men in the combatant units of all arms who have completed one year of service with their unit. They may be either men who have volunteered for service in the medical corps or men who have been transferred to that corps by command. After being transferred these men are sent for a six months' tour of instruction to the largest garrison hospital in the district where they are serving. While serving at these hos- pitals they are given a graded course of instruction in all the duties of sanitary soldiers. Upon completion of the course each man is examined and if found proficient is returned to his original organi- zation for duty with the medical service thereof. Noncommissioned officers of the Sanitats Mannschaft are not all returned to their units but many continue their service in various military hospitals. The various ranks in the Sanitats Mannschaft are : Sanitats Feld- webel (sergeant major), Sanitats Yize Feldwebel (quartermaster sergeant), Sanitats Sergeant (sergeant), Sanitats Unteroffizier (corporal), Sanitats Gefreiter (lance corporal), Sanitats Soldat (private). THE MILITAR KRANKENWARTER. These men are enlisted directly into the medical corps and perform the whole of their service with the colors as hospital attendants in the larger military hospitals. The number of men in this class is determined by the hospital requirements of each army corps accord- ing to estimates prepared yearly by the principal medical officer thereof. THE KRANKENTRAGER (lITTER BEARERS ). Litter bearers for the army are not incorporated into the army medical service. Every combatant unit trains a certain number of its personnel in the duties of litter bearers. Each company of infantry, cavalry, foot artillery, and engineers trains annually four men, and each machine-gun battery and field artillery battery trains annually two men in these duties. Upon mobilization men so trained are assigned exclusively to bearer duty with their organizations, and men so trained who have passed into the reserve are, upon mobiliza- tion, assigned to duty with bearer companies in the medical battalion. 633 25 APOTHECARIES AND QUARTERMASTERS. The duties required of apothecaries and quartermasters are per- formed by men belonging to the class known as military officials. They are not commissioned officers, although those in the higher grades have military titles. ADMINISTItATION AND DISTRIBUTION OF PERSONNEL. The general administration of the medical department is under the Director General of Medical Services, with rank of Lieutenant General and stationed in the war office in Berlin. His personal staff consists of 1 colonel, 3 majors, and 3 captains, medical corps. Directly under him are 4 " General Arzte und Sanitats Inspecteurs," with rank of major general. One of these officers is assigned to duty with each of the four military districts into which the Prussian Army is divided. Their duties are the general inspection of medical and sanitary matters in their districts. Each has one captain, medi- cal corps, as assistant. At each army corps headquarters is a "Korps Arzt," with rank of colonel. He is in charge of all medical matters pertaining not only to the active army but also to the reserve, Landwehr, Landsturm, and voluntary aid societies within his corps. His assistants are 1 captain, 1 apothecary, and 2 clerks, medical corps. Each division has a "Division Arzt," with rank of lieutenant colonel as principal medical officer of the division. Medical officers are distributed in each corps for duty with troops or at garrison hospitals. Forty-five medical officers are on duty as professors and instructors in the army medical school in Berlin. Medical service is provided in regimental infirmaries and garrison hospitals. A garrison hospital is established in all garrisons having a strength of 600 or more men. Each combatant unit has a fixed medical personnel. A major, medical corps, is attached to the staff of each regiment and a captain, medical corps, to each battalion. In addition to the regular officers there are also attached a number of subaltern officers from the Diensttner. In many garrisons a retired medical oflicer is on duty as garrison surgeon for attendance on officers' families and officials not belonging to combatant units. The enlisted medical personnel comprises one noncommissioned officer and one private of the Sanitatsmannschaft with each company and the litter bearers mentioned above. The junior medical officers for duty wdth garrison hospitals are derived from those detailed for such service from the regiment to which they are attached. Such details are for a period of one year. 30669°— No. 533—16— 26 The enlisted personnel for hospitals is derived from members of the Sanitatsmannschaft and from Militar Krankenwarter. WAR ORGANIZATION. The general direction of the medical services in time of war is under a " Chef des Feld — Sanitiits wesens," with rank of lieutenant general, who belongs to the staff of the Imperial Headquarters. On the headquarters staff of each field army is the " Armee-arzt" with rank of major general. His personal staff consists of two Ober arzt and one Stabsarzt. On the staff of each army corps commander is a "Korpsarzt" (colonel), with two assistants (one as major and sanitary officer). In addition to the regular medical officers at army corps head- quarters there is one " consulting surgeon " with the rank of colonel, lieutenant colonel, or major. This consulting surgeon is appointed by the Emperor, on the recommendation of the Director General of Medical Services, from amongst civil surgeons of eminence. On the staff of each division commander is the "Division arzt" (lieutenant colonel), with one assistant. The Director of the Medical Services on lines of communication is an important position in the German service. There is one such official to each field army, and he is known as the " Etappenarzt," with rank of colonel. Under his direction are the " Krieglazaretten directoren" (directors of hospitals), one to each corps of which the field army is composed, and a " consulting sanitary officer," appointed from among eminent civilian physicians in the same manner as the consulting surgeon is appointed at corps headquarters. MEDICAL PERSONNEL WITH COMBATANT ORGANIZATIONS. There are 2 medical officers, 4 men from the Sanitatsmannschaft, and 16 litter bearers with each battalion of infantry or similar units. The litter bears, while belonging to the combatant units, are carried on the rolls of their organizations as noncombatants and therefore wear the Red Cross crosses. They are, to all intents and purposes, a part of the medical organization. SANITATS BATAILLON. One " sanitiits bataillon " is attached to each corps. This unit is analogous to the sanitary train in our service and comprises 3 bearer companies and 12 field hospitals. It is commanded by a major of the line, with an adjutant and a detachment of enlisted men, also from the line. The commanding officer of the battalion directs its movement and the movement of the units of which it is 533 27 composed. He does not, however, control the administration of the field hospitals belonging to the battalion ; these being under the direction of the senior medical officer. Similarly, too, a divided authority exists in the bearer companies. These organizations are commanded by line officers and their enlisted personnel is obtained from reserve soldiers of the line, but accompany- ing each bearer company is a dressing-station section composed of eight medical officers who, while nominally attached to the bearer com- panies, are not under the authority of its commander. They are, however, dependent upon him for the enlisted personnel necessary to assist in the work of the dressing station. This divided authority in the German field medical units somewhat impairs their efficiency and has proven a frequent source of friction. The personnel of each bearer company is 4 officers, 36 noncom- missioned officers, and 208 privates from the line ; 4 noncommisioned officers and 28 privates from train troops; and 1 officer, 9 noncom- missioned officers, and 8 privates from the medical corps, composing the bearer company proper; and 8 medical officers composing the dressing-station section. Total, 13 officers, 49 noncommissioned offi- cers, and 244 privates. The transportation consists of 21 riding horses, 26 draft animals, 8 ambulances, and 5 wagons. FIELD HOSPITALS. The general direction of field hospitals is under the Korps Arzt, who controls their disposition by orders issued through the corps commander. Each field hospital has a capacity of 200 patients and is capable of expansion. Its personnel comprises 6 medical officers, 1 apothecary, 2 quartermasters, 11 noncommissioned officers, and 17 privates, medical corps; and 2 noncommissioned officers and 19 privates, train troops. Total, 6 officers, 3 officials, 13 noncommis- sioned officers, and 36 privates. The transportation consists of 9 riding horses, 18 draft animals, 1 ambulance, and 8 wagons. LINES OF COMMUNICATION. The service at the head of a line of communication is slightly dif- ferent from that in other armies. For the care of wounded two dis- tinct units are organized in the proportion of 1 of each to each corps. These units are a " war hospital detachment " and a " wounde dtrans- port detachment." These two units combined perform the work of the evacuation hospitals in our service, but they are more mobile and operate independently. I ess 28 The function of the war hospital detachments is to take over from the field hospitals such wounded as can not bear further transporta- tion. In other words, they become immobilized field hospitals. Their personnel consists of 19 medical officers, 1 dentist, 3 apothe- caries, and 6 quartermaster officials, 3 clerks, 3 cooks, 27 noncom- missioned officers, and 36 privates, medical corps ; and 26 privates of train troop. Total, 19 officers, 10 officials, and 95 enlisted men. These units have no authorized equipment, but obtain it from the field hospitals they relieve (which in turn are replenished from the advanced medical-supply depot) or from local resources. The wounded transport detachment also has no fixed equipment, but obtains it as needed from local sources or from the medical- supply depot. Its personnel comf)rises 7 medical officers, 6 noncom- missioned officers, and 6 privates, medical corps ; and 8 privates from train troops. The duties of these detachments are to establish dressing and re- freshment stations at the railhead or other points where large num- bers of wounded are being brought for disposition. At the dressing or collecting station the wounded are classified, and those able to bear transportation are turned over to the hospital trains. Those not able to bear railroad transportation are sent to the nearest hos- pital. For this latter purpose all available transportation in the vicinity, including army transportation, is utilized by these detach- ments. Both the war hospital detachments and the wounded transport detachments are under the direction of the Etappenarzt and form freely movable units of personnel, which can be utilized to establish hospitals and collecting stations at the most convenient places. Like the other European nations, Germany has largely employed motor ambulances for evacuating wounded from the front. No de- tails of the organization of this service are available. Outside of the zone of advance Germany makes free use of her civilian population and voluntary aid societies. At frequent inter- vals along the line she establishes base hospitals. The command of these hospitals is always given to a regular medical officer of the active or retired list, but the routine hospital work is done by local civil practitioners. If no regular medical officer is available to command such a hos- pital, the control is placed under a " hospital committee " consisting of a line officer and a civil surgeon. A similar arrangement is in effect in the home territory, where each garrison hospital is sup- plemented and used as a "reserve hospital" (general hospital). Eminent physicians and surgeons from civil life are employed in these hospitals. 533 29 HOSPITAL TRAINS. Germam^ has in service 150 regularly equipped hospital trains. The capacity of these trains is about 250 patients each, and they are complete rolling hospitals with a fixed medical personnel. In addition to these hospital trains she uses ambulance trains consisting of cars returning from the front and temporarily equipped for patients by supplies kept for that purpose at the advanced supply depots. These trains have no fixed personnel, hut as a rule are pro- vided with two medical officers, two noncommissioned officers, and 12 attendants for each 100 patients. Ordinary passenger coaches are also utilized for carrying wounded not requiring more elaborate transportation. Medical officers do not accompany these trains, but they supervise the loading and unloading. Attendance en route is furnished by voluntary aid societies. HOME TERRITORY. All garrison hospitals in time of war become " reserve hospitals " (general hospitals). The capacity of these hospitals is increased by erecting additional buildings and by utilizing other buildings as branch hospitals. Regular army medical officers are always in com- mand of these hospitals, but civil surgeons are largely utilized for the personnel. As with other European nations the greater part of Germany's wounded are promptly transported to well-equipped hospitals in home territory. IV. AUSTRIA-HUNGARY. The military service of the Austro-Hungarian Empire is divided into — (a) the Landwehr, or national army of Austria; (b) the Honved, or national army of Hungary ; (c) the Gemeinsames Heer, or common army of both countries; (d) the Landsturm, or second reserve of xVustria and Hungary. All males betAveen the ages of 19 and 42 are liable to military service, and it is decided by lot whether such service will be in a national army or in the common army. Actual service begins at the age of 21 and lasts for 12 years. Men drawing assignment to the common arm}' serve three years with the colors and seven years in the reserve of that army. They then serve an additional two years in the reserve of a national army, and at the expiration of this service pass to the Landsturm, where they are available to call until they reach the age of 45. Men drawing assignment to a national army serve two years with the colors of that army and ten years in its reserve. They then pass to the Landsturm. 533 30 Men not required to keep up the standing armies to required strength are given eight weeks' training and then passed into the Ersatz reserve. All men between the ages of 19 and 21 and those men who have completed service in one or the other of the armies form until their forty-second year the Landsturm or second reserve. The peace strength of the three armies is : Officers and men: Common army 370, 725 Austrian Army 55, 195 Hungarian Army 42, 800 Total 468, 720 ORGANIZATION OF THE MEDICAL SERVICE. The medical service is composed of the following elements: (a) The Militar arzliches Offiziers Korp (medical officers' corps) (6) the Sanitiits triippe (hospital corps, officers and men) ; (c) the " Sanitiits hilf personnel bei den triippen " (men belonging to com- batant units but employed in the medical service with those units) ; {d) medicamenten beamte (medical officials, pharmacists, and supply officers); (e) nursing sisters; (/) voluntary aid personnel. THE MILITAR ARZLICHES OFFICERS' KORP. Each army has a separate corps of commissioned medical officers. The titles, rank, and numbers in these corps are : Rank. Number. Common Army. Land- wehr. Honved. Total. Lieutenant General Major General 1 8 50 75 154 711 229 1 1 6 15 19 152 10 1 8 10 22 122 15 10 Colonel . 64 Oberstabsarzt, second klasse Lieutenant colonel 100 195 985 Oberarzt Lieutenant 254 Total 1,228 203 178 1,609 THE SANITATS TRUPPE. This corps, while organized as a distinct corps, is in fact a sub- ordinate part of the medical officers' corps, being somewhat similar to the Hospital Corps in our service. The officers are not medical men and have no medical training. They are line officers and are commissioned directly into the corps in the same way that officers 31 are commissioned into the combatant branches of the army. They may subsequently exchange with officers of combatant units, and officers of combatant units may exchange with officers of this corps, especially if they are unfit, for medical reasons, for combatant duties. The officers of this corps are in direct command of the detachments of enlisted personnel and have the relative position of company officers. Their duties consist in regulating the discipline and internal economy of the detachment and training its members in military duties. They are, however, under the command of the senior medical officer of the hospital to which they are attached. In other words, the senior medical officer of the hospital commands the whole unit, including all personnel, medical or otherwise, who are on duty with it, and all officers and men who are patients in it; while the sanitats truppe detachment commander commands the detachment only. The enlisted personnel consists of warrant officers, noncommis- sioned officers and privates. They are recruited directly into the corps on the levying of each annual contingent and are organized into companies or detachments, one for each garrison hospital. There are 27 of these detachments, varying in strength according to the size and importance of the garrison hospital to which assigned. The largest detachment consists of 5 officers and 270 men, and the smallest of 3 officers and 58 men. The total peace strength of the corps is 85 officers and 3,062 men. The duties of these detachments are those of the subordinate personnel of military hospitals, e. g., w^ard masters, nursing, cooking, and general duties. None of the officers and men of the " sanitats truppe " do duty with combatant units, but in the event of war they are distributed among the field sanitary units. SANITATS HHiFSPERSONAL BEI DEN TRUPPEN. This division of the medical service consists of noncommissioned officers and men who belong to combatant units and who Avear the uniform of their organizations. They are, however, permanently under the command of medical officers and perform only medical duties. They are of three classes: (a) Medical assistants (Sanitats unter offizieres) ; (b) litter bearers (Blassierten trager) ;. (c) carriers, for medical and surgical equipment (Bandagentrager). MedicaZ assistants are noncommissioned officers and number, in peace, 1 per battalion, and, in time of war, 1 per company, or similar unit. They perform the duties of ward masters in regi- mental hospitals. 533 L 32 Litter hearers (4 to each compajiy) are trained in time of peace as such, and in addition perform all the medical duties which, in garrison hospitals, are performed b}^ men in the sanitats truppe. Carriers of equipment (2 to each battalion or similar unit). — These men have general charge of the regimental medical equipment and carry it when on the march. PHARMACISTS AND SUPPLY OFFICIALS. These men form a special branch of the medical service, both in the common army and the Hungarian Army. They have charge of all the medical and surgical stores in time of peace, and are assisted by a small technical personnel as well as by men of the medical corps. The number of pharmacist officials in time of peace is 108, with relative rank varying from lieutenant colonel to second lieutenant. NURSING SISTERS. There is no corps of female nurses provided in peace, but sisters of the order of St. Vincent de Paul are employed in the larger gar- rison hospitals, while in officers' wards lay nurses may be employed as required. ADMINISTRATION AND DISTRIBUTION OF PERSONNEL. All general administration of the medical service in the common army is performed in the war office in Vienna by the fourteenth division of that office. This division is under tlie direction of a chief (lieutenant general or major general, medical officers' corps) with 9 medical officers, 1 supply officer, and 1 pharmacist as assistants. In connection with this bureau are two auxiliary bureaus, one under the direction of a colonel of the line, for the administration of the affairs of the " sanitats truppe," and one under the direction of the senior medical officer, for administration of the medical officers' corps. The Landwehr and Honved each have separate administrative officers. That for the landwehr is under the direction of a major gen- eral, medical officers' corps, at Vienna, and that for the Honved is in charge of a similar officer at Budapest. Both, however, are subordi- nate to the kriegs ministerium. Each army corps has an administrative medical officer called thej " Sanitats chef." His rank is either that of major general or colonel. (There are no brigadier generals in the Austro-Hungarian Army.) He has permanently one major and several captains as assistants. In each division a lieutenant colonel, usually the commanding officer of the garrison hospital, is appointed to carry on the administratiA^e medical duties within the division. Each Austrian and Hungarian 533 33 territorial command has a colonel or lieutenant colonel as Chief Sur- geon (Sanitats Chef). The remaining officers of the medical officers' corps are distributed among the various garrison hospitals and other establishments or are attached to regiments for regimental medical duties. As a rule junior medical officers serve one or two years in a garrison hospital and then are assigned to regimental duty, where they remain until they reach the rank of major, when they are returned to duty in garrison hospitals in charge of the various departments in those hospitals. There are no specialist sanitary officers as there are in the British and German Armies. All sanitary services are carried out regi- mentally under the supervision of the reghnental surgeon. The sick are cared for in regimental infirmaries, regimental hospi- tals, and garrison hospitals. At the regimental infirmary dispensary treatment only is given. Regimental hospitals correspond to post hospitals and their personnel is supplied from the regiment. Garrison hospitals are, in effect, large general hospitals. Their personnel is supplied by the medical officers' corps, and the sanitats truppe. There are 27 of these hospitals for the " common army." The Landwehr possesses no garrison hospitals, but there is one for the Honved in Budapest. Garrison hospitals not only care for the sick but serve as training schools for one-year volunteer medical students and the men of the sanitats truppe. In addition, they maintain a reserve store of medi- cal and surgical supplies and act as mobilization centers for the field juedical units. Each garrison hospital is commanded by a medical officer Avith rank of colonel or lieutenant colonel, with a large staff of medical officers. In addition, there is also 1 supply officer, 1 pay- master, 1 pharmacist, and a detachment of the sanitats truppe. AVAR ORGANIZATIONS. The Austro-Hungarian Army in war time is not divided into three forces as in peace, but forms one army composed of all three ele- ments. The administrative unit is the field army, consisting of from two to four corps, and these in turn of usually three divisions. Two of these divisions are drawn from the common army, and the third from the Landwehr or Honved, or from the reserves of the first line. In the field each Headquarters Staff of each field army, corps, division, and independent brigade has attached to it a Chief Medical Officer with one or more assistants. These officers are administrative officers for the medical service of their respective commands and receive their orders and instructions from the general officer com- manding either direct or through his chief of staff'. They are era- 533 34 powered to issue orders direct to the medical units of their command ; but orders directing a change of position on the march or in combat must be concurred in by the chief of staff. The Chief Medical Officer of a field army is the " Armee-Chef- Arzt," with rank of major general. He has one regiments- arzt as assistant. There is an administrative medical officer also on the staff of the general commanding the lines of communication. His official title is " Sanitats Chef beim armee etappen-kommands." He has a staff of assistants consisting of 1 regiments- arzt, and 4 delegates, 4 assistant delegates, and 1 clerk from the Red Cross Society. (In the Austro-Hungarian Army, volunteer aid is intimately associated with the army medical service.) Each army corps has a Korps- Chef -Arzt with rank of colonel. He has a regiments- arzt as assistant, and a delegate from the Red Cross Society is also with him in the field. The chief medical officer of the division is the " Division-Chef- Arzt" with rank of major. He has no commissioned assistant, but four mounted orderlies are assigned to him for duty. MEDICAL SERVICE IN THE ZONE OF ADVANCE. Medical service in the zone of advance is performed by the regi- mental medical service, the divisional medical unit and such other medical units, e. g., field hospitals, field depots for slightly sick, mobile reserve hospitals, and mobile rest stations, as may be assigned from the line of communications to the various divisions and corps. The service of these latter medical field units differs from the service of similar units in other armies, inasmuch as they are not permanently attached to divisions and corps, but are field army units, and the Armee- Chef -Arzt of the field army determines the time, occasion, and maimer of their being brought up and distributed to the various corps. REGIMENTAL MEDICAL SERVICE. jfl The regimental medical personnel consists of officers of the medi- cal officers' corps and a subordinate personnel consisting of noncom- - missioned officers and privates detailed from the regiment itself. ^ The general principle is to attach one medical officer to each bat- talion or similar unit and to have two or more in addition with regimental headquarters. The total personnel for an infantry regi- ment consists of 7 medical officers, 16 medical assistants, 48 litter bearers and 6 pack carriers for medical supplies; total, 7 officers and 70 men. 533 35 THE DIVISIONAL MEDICAL TTNIT. One of these units is a part of each division. It is complex in character and has no counterpart in the medical service of other armies. It is intended to combine the functions of reserve medical supply, ambulance transport and the dressing-station service. It takes the place of the divisional sanitary train of our army, except there are no field hospitals and no litter-bearer sections. The personnel of the infantry divisional unit consists of 6 officers of the medical officers' corps, 2 officers and 125 men of the sanitats truppe, and 77 men of the train troops. Its transportation consists of 145 horses and 38 vehicles. Each unit is divided into the follow- ing elements: (a) A supply section, for replenishing supplies ex- pended by regimental detachments; (&) a slightly wounded section, to establish stations for slightly wounded; (c) a dressing-station sec- tion, to establish dressing stations; (d) an ambulance section, con- sisting of 15 ambulances, 4 of which are furnished by the Teutonic Order of Knighthood. "' [visional units for cavalry and for mountain warfare are gener- ally similar to infantry division units, but with less personnel and transportation. OTHER MEDICAL UNITS. In support of the regimental detachments and the divisional med- ical units there are the mobile units belonging to the field army and assigned to divisions and corps as the need may arise. These units are field hospitals, field depots for slightly sick, mobile reserve hos- pitals, and depots of medical supplies. Materiel and units are also provided for field armies by volunteer aid societies and are distrib- uted in a manner peculiar to Austria-Hungary. To nearly every medical unit of the regular army there is attached a supplemental unit furnished by organized volunteer aid. FIELD HOSPITALS. These are army units, but are mobilized in the proportion of three to each division of which the army is composed. Each field hospital has a capacity of 200 bed patients. Its personnel consists of 3 medical officers, 1 chaplain, 1 pharmacist, 1 officer and about 60 men of the hospital corps, and about 40 men of the train troops. It has 17 vehicles, including 1 rolling kitchen. Attached to each field hospital is a wounded transport column of the Red Cross Society. This column is equipped with five two-horse ambulances and is commanded by a Red Cross Society's delegate. 533 36 LINES OF COMMUNICATION MOBILE RESERVE HOSPITALS. These hospitals are similar in purpose to the evacuation hospitals of the French and of our own service. They are provided in the proportion of six to each corps, and each accommodates 200 patients, with possible expansion. They are similar in equipment to field hos- pitals, but have no transport assigned them, being required to obtain locally vehicles necessary for transportation of their equipment. Three of these hospitals for each corps are organized on mobilization and the others held in storage in the advance depot until needed. The personnel for these hospitals is obtained from the reserve medical personnel held on lines of communication and is similar to that of field hospitals. FIELD DEPOTS FOR SLIGHTLY SICK. Field depots for slightly sick are provided in the proportion of three to each corps ; one is usually mobilized and two held in storage. The personnel consists of 2 medical officers and 1 officer and 30 men of the army medical corps. They usually take care of about 500 slightly sick and wounded. REST STATIONS. These stations are either mobile or stationary, and are located where required on lines of travel. They are usually under the charge of civilian personnel. FIELD MEDICAL SUPPLY DEPOT. One supply depot is organized for each field army, but it is com- posed of a number of army corps units, each with personnel and materiel enabling it to be attached to an army corps and act as an independent unit. These corps units, in addition to stores for re- plenishing medical materiel expended in the field, contain reserve materiel for three mobile reserve hospitals, two field depots for slightly sick, two mobile rest stations, and materiel for improvising two hospital trains. HOSPITAL TRAINS. Hospital trains are constructed out of ordinary freight trains on mobilization. The personnel of a hospital train is 2 medical officers, 1 pharmacist, and 34 noncommissioned officers and men of the medi- 633 r 37 cal corps. Six specially built hospital trains were maintained in time of peace by the Knights of the Sovereign Order of Malta. MOBILE LABORATORIES. Twenty complete laboratories, capable of being moved from place to place, have been organized and are in use in the sanitary service on lines of communication. SURGICAL DETACHMENTS. Some 50 " surgical detachments " have been organized to furnish the operating staff of corps hospitals. Each detachment consists of two or three eminent civilian surgeons and four specially tramed surgical nurses and is furnished with adequate surgical instruments and supplies. The function of these detachments is to provide a freely movable unit of expert surgeons which may be readily assigned to hospitals on lines of communication or home territory when their services are needed. ZONE or THE INTERIOR. There are no distinctive features of the medical service in this zone. Austria utilizes her material and her medical personnel in the same way as other countries in Europe. V. ITALY. PEACE ESTABLISHMENT. Military service in Italy comprises (a) that in the standing array; (h) that in the mobile militia; and (c) that in the territorial militia. Every adult male between the ages of 20 and 39 years is liable to service in one of these branches. Examinations are made annually of all men reaching military age, and as the result of these examinations men are assigned as follows: (a) A sufficient number of men are assigned to the standing army to maintain it at peace strength. Men so assigned serve two years with the colors and are then placed on furlough for six years. At the end of the furlough period they pass into the mobile militia, or first reserve, where they serve for four years. At the end of this service they pass to the territorial militia, or second reserve, where they remain until their thirty-ninth year. (h) Men physically fit but in excess of the number required to fill the ranks of the standing army are not required to do service with the colors, but are placed immediately upon furlough for eight years, 533 38 at the end of which period they pass to the mobile militia and terri- torial militia in the same way as do men who have served with the colors. (c) Men who are exempt by law for family reasons from serving with the active army are enlisted directly into the territorial militia, where they remain until their thirty-ninth year. (d) Men specially qualified by reason of education and position and who volunteer for service are allowed to serve one year with the colors and are then placed on permanent furlough as underofficers, or reserve officers. From this class a number of medical officers are drawn in time of war. The standing army is divided into 12 army corps, each with a definite territorial area. The total strength of this army (budget 1912) was 252,340. GENERAL ORGANIZATION OF MEDICAL SERVICE. The medical service is composed of the following elements: (a) Officers of the army medical corps; (h) pharmacist officials; (c) ad- ministration and other officers and officials; (d) enlisted men belong- ing to combatant units; (e) enlisted men in the medical corps; (/) nursing sisters. UFFICIALI MEDICI DI CORPS SANITARIO (OFFICERS OF THE MEDICAL CORPS). Officers of the medical corps are divided into two classes : (a) Those on continuous active service (ufficiali medici di carriera) ; (6) those on permanent furlough (ufficiali medici in congedo). The latter are in turn subdivided into four classes : (a) Uffieicdi medici di convplemento. — These are a kind of special reserve. According to their years of service, they may be on per- manent furlough from the standing army or on the lists of the mobile militia. ( h ) Ufficiali medici di mUizia territorials. — These are medical men who have completed their service in the mobile militia or who have been passed directly into the territorial militia. {c) Auxiliary mediccd officers. — These are medical officers who have been relieved from the active army but are capable of perform- ing special duties. {d) Reserve medical officers. — These are officers di complemento who have passed the age of 39 years. In these four classes of the ufficiali medici in congedo Italy is able! practically to have her whole medical profession enrolled for wax service. 533 39 The titles, rank, and number of medical officers in active service are: Title. Rank. Number. Tenente generale medico Lieutenant general 1 Maggiare generale medico 3 Colonells medico 26 Tenente colonells medico I-ieutcnant colonel 36 Maggiare medico 113 Capitano medico 314 Tenente medico . 274 Total 767 PHARMACISTS. Pharmacists are appointed from university graduates in pharmacy. They have relative but not actual rank. The grades and titles of those in permanent service are: Grade and title. Relative rank. Number. Chiniico Carniacista inspectore , Chimico farmacista directore Farmacista capo di prima classe... Farmacista capo di seconda classe Farmacista di prima classe Farmacista di prima classe Total . Colonel Lieutenant colonel . Major Captain do Lieutenant 96 In addition to the above permanent personnel there are on duty at all times with the standing army about 30 " Farmacista di comple- mento di 3a classe." Men in this grade (relative rank of second lieutenant) are obtained from students of pharmacy who are doing their period of service Avith the colors and who have passed an exami- nation entitling them to this grade. After passing into the reserve these men form a large body of men available for pharmacist ser\ ice in war. ADMINISTRATION OFFICERS. Officers and officials belonging to the services of administration, pay, and accounts are detailed for service in the medical department. Their services are similar to those of administration and supply services in other continental armies. ENLISTED PERSONNEL. The enlisted personnel for the medical service consists of two parts — (a) the regimental medical service (derived from combatant units) ; (h) the hospital medical service (men enlisted directly into the army medical corps). The regimental medical service consists of noncommissioned officers called " medical assistants " and litter bearers recruited from amongst the soldiers of the unit with which they do duty. Medical assistants 533 40 go through a course of two months' instruction in the military hos- pital of the division to which their regiment belongs and are then employed as assistants to the medical officer in the regimental in- firmary. There is one " medical assistant " to each regiment in time of peace, but the number is increased to six in time of war by utilizing men who have passed into the reserve. Each year two men per company of nonmounted units are selected to go through a course of three months' instruction as litter bearers under the medical officer of the unit. They do general duty in the regimental infirmary in peace and, after passing into the reserve, sup- ply, on mobilization, the litter bearers of field medical units in time of war. The hospital medical service is performed by the subordinate ranks of the medical corps. Its personnel consists of warrant offi- cers, noncommissioned officers, and men recruited directly into the corps at the time of the annual levies. The strength of enlisted personnel, medical corps, 1912, was 3,729. These men are organized into 12 companies, one for each army corps. The headquarters of each company is at the military hospital at army corps headquar- ters, detachments being distributed to other hospitals and medical establishments within the command. There is no fixed establish- ment for each company, the establishment depending upon the num- ber of medical units in the army corps. The number is restricted, however, as much of the general work in hospitals is done by men attached to the medical companies from combatant units. These attached men are called " aggregati." They do not remain perma- nently with the companies but are replaced by others from time to time. NURSING SISTERS. There is no recognized service of nursing sisters in the Italian Army, but sisters of the order of St. Vincent de Paul are employed in the larger military hospitals. GENERAL DISTRIBUTION OF PERSONNEL. The technical administration of the medical service is vested in an Inspectorate of Medical Services at the war office in Rome. This body has no administrative power but acts as a consultative or ad- visory medical board. The details of army medical organization as a whole are in the hands of a medical officer attached to the general staff at army headquarters, while the more direct administration and command are vested in the general officers commanding army corps and their principal medical officers. At each corps headquarters there is a Principal Medical Officer (colonel), with one captain and one official of administration as assistants. The remainder of the 533 41 medical oflBcers are distributed to military hospitals and other estab- lishments and to regiments. The senior medical officer of the larger hospitals is a colonel or lieutenant colonel, and under him there are usually one or two lieutenant colonels, six majors, and seven or eight captains. Pharmacist officials are distributed to the various hospitals, the larger hospitals having usually three. Each regiment in peace has a regimental infirmary under charge of the regimental surgeon and one assistant. The enlisted personnel consists of a "medical assistant" and litter bearers from the regi- ment. Where several regiments together form a small garrison a " gar- rison hospital " is established. These hospitals correspond to the post hospitals at our larger posts. A major, medical corps, is in command, with the medical officers of the regiments as assistants. The enlisted personnel is derived from the regiments and supple- mented by men of the army medical corps. Principal hospitals, corresponding to our general hospitals, are established at each corps headquarters and with one division head- quarters, so that there are two general hospitals to each corps. The personnel for these hospitals is supplied from the medical corps and the " aggregati." A chaplain is appointed to each general hospital. WAR ORGANIZATION. The field army is the grand unit of organization in the Italian service. Each field army is composed of three corps, one division of cavalry and auxiliary troops. At each field army headquarters is a Director of Medical Services (surgeon general). For military pur- poses he belongs to the administrative staff. He has direct military as well as technical command of all medical units in the zone of field operations and lines of communication. As assistants he has 4 captains and 4 lieutenants, medical corps, 4 pharmacists, 2 clerks, 2 orderlies, and 11 servants. He has also a transport detachment of 3 noncommissioned officers and 15 men of the artillery train. He is responsible for keeping the medical service in the advance supplied with personnel and materiel and for the transportatiofi and distri- bution of the sick and wounded. He cooperates for this purpose with the Director of transport and the Director of lines of communication. Each corps has a Principal Medical Officer (colonel) with one assistant (captain), a clerk, orderly, and two servants. He coordi- nates the medical services and directs the movements of the corps medical units. Each division has a Principal Medical Otlicer, with one lieutenant as assistant, and one enlisted clerk. He is directly under the chief of staff of the division. 633 42 MEDICAL SERVICE WITH COMBATANT UNITS. The medical personnel for each combatant unit is augmented in time of war by officers from the " complement " and men from the reserve. That for an infantry regiment is 7 medical officers (1 cap- tain, 6 lieutenants) and 30 enlisted men from the regiment (6 medi- cal assistants and 24 litter bearers) . That for a cavalry regiment consists of 3 medical officers and 2 enlisted " assistants." Smaller units, such as engineer companies, batteries of artillery, etc., have 1 medical officer and 1 enlisted man. MEDICAL FIELD UNITS. The medical field units consist of ambulance companies, assigned to both divisions and corps; and field hospitals, assigned to corps. There are also reserve field hospitals, assigned to the field armies. AMBULANCE COMPANIES. Ambulance companies establish dressing stations and send out litter squads to evacuate wounded from the combatant units. Their organization is in general the same, with slight modifications to fit them for service with infantry, with cavalry, and with mountain troops. The personnel of an ambulance company for duty with infantry is 6 medical officers, a quartermaster, chaplain, and 228 noncommissioned officers and privates, medical corps, with a trans- port personnel attached from the artillery train of 1 officer and 31 noncommissioned officers and privates. Its transportation consists of 3 carts, 2 wagons, and 8 ambulances. The mountain ambulance company has the same medical per- sonnel, with 1 officer and 60 enlisted men for transport. It has 30 puck mules in addition to the transportation provided for the in- fantry ambulance company. The cavalry ambulance company is a smaller unit, with only 3 medical officers, a quartermaster, chaplain, 32 noncommissioned officers and privates, medical corps, and 13 enlisted men for trans- port. Its transportation consists of 1 cart, 1 wagon, and 4 ambu- lances. Ambulance companies are not organized in peace. Materiel for them is kept in storage at each corps headquarters, and in time of war they are mobilized under the direction of the Principal Medical Officer of the corps. Officers are secured from the various classes of officers, and enlisted men for these units are drawn from those avail- able within the corps. One infantry ambulance company is organ- ized for each division, and one reserve infantry ambulance company for each corps. A cavalry ambulance company is assigned to each 533 43 cavalry division, and a mountain ambulance company to each moun- tain force (7 Alpine battalions). riELD HOSPITALS. Field hospitals are of three kinds : (a) ^O-bed hospitals on wheeled transport; (b) 50-bed hospitals on pack transport; (c) lOO-bed hos- pitals. Fifty-bed hospitals are army corps units in the proportion of 8 to each corps. One hundred-bed hospitals are fiehl army units. Each field army has 12 hospitals. The personnel of a 50-bed hospital con- sists of 3 medical officers, 1 quartermaster, 1 pharmacist, 1 chaplain, 29 noncommissioned officers and privates, medical corps, and 1 non- commissioned officer and 6 privates for transport personnel. Its transportation consists of 3 wagons. The 50-bed liosj^itals with ]iack transportation have an additional sergeant and 35 additional privates in the transport section. Its transportaion is 30 pack mules. The personnel of the field army hospital (100 beds) consists of G medical officers, 1 quartermaster, 1 pharmacist, 1 chaplain, 26 enlisted men, medical corps, and 7 enlisted men for transport. Its transportation consists of 4 carts and 1 wagon. LINES OF CO.^IMUNICATIOX. The medical service on lines of communication is under the direc- tion of the Director of Medical Services for the field army. There is no Principal Medical Officer for lines of communication as in other armies. Aside from the medical supply depots and the field hos- l)itals belonging to the field army, there are no fixed medical for- mations, the general scheme being to establish hospitals and rest stations as occasion demands. For the evacuation hospitals or clear- ing stations at the railhead common toother armies, the Italian medi- cal service utilizes the field hospitals held in reserve. There is also no definite transport unit for evacuation of the wounded to the rail- head. This work is done by the intendence department as required. Nearly all medical work on lines of communication and in home terri- tory is performed by personnel from the territorial militia and from that furnished by volunteer aid societies. Of these latter, two are otKcially recognized as part of the Italian Army. They are the Italian Ecu Cress Society and the Military Sov,ireign Order of Malta. These societies, and especially the Red Cross, are organized to supply an appreciable part of the medical personnel and supplies required bv war. The Eed Cross keeps ready and is prepared to furnish 64 mountain ambulance companies, 47 \?ar hospitals, 14 hospital trains, 2 equipmonts for hospital ships, and 65 rest stations. In addition 533 44 to these units on hand, similar units may be organized in unlimited numbers, and it is upon these units that entire dependence is placed in time of war for service on the line of communication. They all come under the control of the field army Medical Director, but each unit is commanded and operated by Red Cross personnel. HOME TERRITORY. For patients sent to home territory, the military hospitals and con- valescent depots maintained in peace are utilized, and, if necessary, enlarged. Many convalescent patients are also sent to their homes and paid 20 cents daily in lieu of rations. In addition to the regular military hospitals, civil hospitals are placed at the disposal of the militaiy authorities and new hospitals are organized by voluntary aid societies. VI. RUSSIA. PEACE ESTABLISHMENT. All male Russian subjects, with the exception of the Mohammedan native Caucasian population and the population of a few Provinces, are liable to military service from the twenty-first to the forty-fourth year of age. This service is divided into (a) that in the standing army and reserves, and (h) that in the Imperial Militia. At the annual levy the class of service to which a man is assigned is determined by lot. Service in the standing army comprises 3 years with the colors and 15 years in the reserve for the infantry, and 4 years with the colors and 13 years in the reserve for the other arms. The reserve is divided into two classes. Service in the first class is for 7 years, and that in the second class for the remaining period of reserve serv- ice. Upon completion of service in the reserve men pass to the Im- perial Militia, wdiere they remain until they reach the age of 44. All men not required in the standing army, and men who have completed their service in that army, form the Imperial Militia. Men engaged in certain occupations are exempt from service with the colors in time of peace and may, if they draw a number for the standing army, be passed immediately into the reserve. Medical men are so exempt. Men may also volunteer for service with the colors, in which case they serve for one year and then pass to the reserve. INTedical men, pharmacists, and veterinarians who so volunteer, if accepted, are allowed to serve as such. The standing army is divided into 37 corps located in 13 military! districts. The total peace strength of this army in 1912 was 1,284,000] officers and men. 533 45 ORGANIZATION OF THE MP:DICAL SERVICE. The medical oriranization for the Russian Army, while following the same general lines, differs materially from those of other armies. From top to bottom there exists a system of dual control, tlie duties of medical officers being of a purely technical character, while the administrative duties are in the hands of line officers. In her field medical units, too. lUissia, while providing a large enlisted pei-sonnel. has a connnissioned personnel much smaller in proportion than tliat provided for similar units in other armies. Apparently this system of dual control and di\aded responsibility, together with an insuffi- cient number of medical officers, has not proved satisfactory. A committee was appointed r.fter the Russo-Japanese War, under the presidency of Gen, Trekov, of the line, who was Director of Hospitals in Kuropatkinls arm3\ to consider questions of improving the medi- cal service, and as a result of the recommendations of that committee, more authority has now been given medical officers in the matter of command, but there is still a great portion of the medical service in which this complicated system exists and the medical field units are still underofficered. Another improvement in the medical service resulting from the recommendations of this committee was the passing of a law in 1913 giving military rank to medical officers. Heretofore they had been merely military officials in various grades, but without actual rank. The actual rank they now hold is the same as that of officers of the line. There are no brigadier generals and no majors in the Russian Army, and hence medical officers are commissioned in the medical corps in the various grades of lieutenant general, major general, colonel, lieutenant colonel, captain, and lieutenant. The law authorizing the giving of commissioned rank is verv broad and does not specify any definite numbers for each rank nor for the whole corps. It provides generally that certain positions shall carry with them certain ranks and that medical officers occupy- ing these positions shall be given rank commensurate Avith the posi- tion irrespective of the number of medical officers holding similar rank. Promotion is entirely by selection and is largely in the hands of the Director General of the army medical department. Appoint- ments of officers to positions carrying with them the higher ranks are made by the Minister of War upon the recommendation of the Director General, but in positions carrying with them lower rank, the Director General has the power to appoint or transfer officers. He also has the authority to retire at will officers occupying such positions. 533 46 ADMINISTRATION AND DISTRIBUTION OF PERSONNEL. The whole of the strictly medical service is under the direction of the Director General of the medical department, which is a bureau of the war department. He has the rank of lieutenant general and is ex officio a member of the chief military sanitary committee of the war office. This committee, besides the Director General of the medical services, consists of the Chief of Staff, Chief of Engineers, and Chief of the Intendance. The committee supervises the entire operation of the medical department. To each military district there is assigned a District Medical In- spector with rank of lieutenant general and an Assistant District Medical Inspector with rank of major general. When troops in the district are mobilized the District Medical Inspector becomes the Principal Medical Officer of the field army formed from the troops in the district and the Assistant District Inspector takes over his duties in the district. On the headquarters staff of each corps, division, or separate brigade there is a Chief Surgeon. The new law provides that one- third of the total number of Corps Surgeons shall have the rank of lieutenant general and two-thirds of those surgeons shall have the rank of major general. It also provides that one-third of the Divi- sion Surgeons shall be major generals and two-thirds colonels. The rank of the Chief Surgeon of a separate brigade is also that of colonel. Fortress troops are distinct from troops of the mobile army, and with each fortress there is also a Chief Surgeon with rank of major general or colonel. With each infantry regiment there is one regimental surgeon, and with each infantry battalion or similar unit there is one junior medi- cal officer. The new law provides that one-third of the senior regi- mental surgeons shall have the rank of colonel and that two-thirds of them shffll have the rank of lieutenant colonel. The junior regi- mental medical officers rank as captains or lieutenants. The total number of medical officers of all ranks holding permanent commis- sions in the standing army is 3,758. (Budget, 1913.) The subordinate medical personnel is divided into two main classes: (a) That belonging directly to the medical department and (b) that belonging to combatant units, but doing duty with the medical department. The subordinate personnel belonging directly to the medical de- partment comprises (a) feldshers, (h) nad zirateli. 533 I 47 FELDSHERS. Feldshers are a peculiar element in the medical service. They are, in effect, partially trained medical men who have not received a de- gree in medicine, and correspond practically to the " Practicante " in Spanish countries. They are divided into two classes: (a) Those who have received their medical training before entering the army and (b) those who have been trained in the army. The first are permitted to practice medicine in civil life after com- pleting their army service, but the second are not so permitted. Feldshers of both classes serve as assistants to medical officers in military hospitals and with combatant units. NADZIRATELI, The nadzirateli are men specially trained in nursing and other hospital duties, and serve in both the large general hospitals and regimental hospitals. Those serving in the general hospitals usually rank as noncommissioned officers. In addition to these two classes belonging directly to the medical department, noncommissioned officers and men belonging to the line are detached from combatant units for duty as hospital atendants and litter bearers. Hospital attendants from combatant units are detailed for duty under the medical department in regimental hos- pitals. Litter bearers are not detached from their units, but are classed as combatants. The number of men trained in the duties of litter bearers is sufficient to not only supply the numbers of bearers required by the regiment in war, but also to furnish the cadres for divisional bearer companies. In addition to the enlisted personnel, officials corresponding to our civil-service men are employed for quartermaster duties, clerical duties, etc. Each regiment is provided with a regimental hospital (lazaret) for use of the regimental sick. It is operated by the regimental medical personnel if no permanent hospital is available. If, how- ever, a permanent military hospital is available, the regimental lazaret is not established, but is kept in storage and the regimental sick are treated in the "regimental receiving rooms" (infirmaries), the seriously sick being sent to the permanent hospitals. When regiments are mobilized for field service their lazarets al- ways accompany them and become part of the medical mobile units in the field army. Distributed among the military districts are large permanent hos- pitals, varying in capacity from 150 to 800 beds. At the outbreak 533 I 48 of the present war there were 27 of these hospitals in Russia, with a total bed capacity of 15,221 beds. The general administration of permanent hospitals is under the direction of a line officer, and he commands all the personnel of the hospital. The strictly technical service is under the direction of a chief surgeon, with rank of colonel or lieutenant colonel, with a staff consisting of two or more senior medical officers with rank of lieutenant colonel and a number of junior medical officers with rank of captain and lieutenant. The enlisted personnel consists of feldshirs and nadzirateli from the regular medical service. WAR ORGANIZATION. The medical service of field armies is under the direction of either the Adjutant General of the field army or of a " Director of Medical Services," who is a lieutenant general of the line. Assisting him in the general administration of his office is an office director, also a line officer, whose duties are similar to those of a chief of staff. The administration of this office is divided into (a) the field military hos- pital department, (h) the field military medical department, (c) the field veterinary department, and (d) the department of volun- tary aid. At the head of the field military hospital department is the Field Inspector of Hospitals, a combatant officer with rank of lieutenant general. He is in command of all the medical units in the army except for their technical service. This latter is under the direction of the Field Medical Inspector with rank of lieutenant general in the medical corps. The department of voluntary aid has at its head a Commissioner of the Red Cross Society, At each army corps headquarters there is also a line officer in charge of the general police, upon whom rests the responsibility of evacuating the wounded from the field units. For this purpose he arranges the necessary transportation and for additional men to be detached from combatant units when necessary to assist in collecting the wounded. MEDICAL SERVICE WITH COMBATANT UNITS. Each regiment is accompanied by its lazaret, and this forms the basis of the regimental service. Its personnel consists of 5 medical officers (1 lieutenant colonel in command), 21 feldshers, 1 nadziratel of the medical corps, and 128 litter bearers from the line. m The transportation consists of 1 wagon, 4 carts, and 4 ambulances. MOBILE MEDICAL UNITS. The mobile medical units assigned to each division are one divi- sional lazaret and two field hospitals. 533 49 THE DIVISIONAL LAZARET. The nnit is directly under the command of the Division Surgeon. Under him is one medical officer in charge of the dressing-station section and a line officer in charge of the bearer section and wheeled transportation. The function of the divisional lazaret is to form a main dressing station as a link between the regimental stations and the field hospitals. The personnel of the dressing-station section comprises 4 medical officers, 1 officer of administration, 7 noncommissioned officers and 20 privates (medical corps), and 2 clerks.- The personnel of the bearer section comprises 1 officer of administration, 1 clerk, 17 non- commissioned officers and 200 privates from line troops, and 2 non- commissioned officers and 37 drivers from transport troops; total, 6 officers, 3 clerks, 26 noncommissioned officers, and 257 privates. The transportation consists of 8 ambulances, 16 wagons, and 3 carts. FIELD HOSPITALS. Field hospitals are provided in the proportion of eight to each division. Four of these are mobile hospitals and the other four are held in reserve on the line of communications. Of the four mobile hospitals two only are assigned to the divisional sanitary train and the other two are field-army units. Each field hospital has a ca- pacity of 200 beds. The total number of beds in the eight field hospitals allowed for each division is sufficient to provide for lA per cent of the total strength of the division. This is in addition to the beds in the regimental and divisional lazarets. The personnel of a mobile field hospital comprises 4 medical officers, 1 pharmacist, 1 officer of administration, 1 chaplain, 16 noncommis- sioned officers, and 59 privates (medical corps), and 2 noncommis- sioned officers and 26 drivers, transport troops. In addition to the enlisted personnel, there are 4 clerks and 4 Sisters of Mercy. Total, 7 officers, 18 noncommissioned officers, and 85 privates, and 8 civilians. The transportation consists of 20 wagons, 4 carts, and 1 ambulance. « LINES or COMMUNICATION — TRANSPORT COLUMNS. For evacuating wounded from the front to the railhead, sick and wounded transport columns are organized as definite units in the proportion of 1 to each corps. The movements of these units is controlled by the Director of Medical Services for the field army and each hospital is commanded by an officer of the line. The personnel consists of 2 medical officers, 1 quartermaster, 7 noncommissioned 533 50 officers and 17 privates (medical corps), 3 noncommissioned officers and 68 drivers transport troops, 2 clerks, and 2 Sisters of Mercy. Total, 3 officers, 10 noncommissioned officers, 85 privates, and 4 civil- ians. The transportation consists of 27 ambulances, 7 wagons, 1 cart, and 1 rolling kitchen. HOSPITAL TRAINS. Hospital trains are made up from third-class passenger coaches and have a capacity of 250 patients. They are commanded by line officers and have a medical personnel of 2 officers and 45 attendants. SANITARY DETACHMENTS. Special sanitary detachments are organized in the proportion of 1 to each division and 1 to each corps. They are divided into (a) bacteriological columns and (b) disinfecting columns. They are under the command of the Director of Medical Services and are util- ized where needed for special sanitary work. The personnel of a bacteriological column is 3 medical officers, 3 noncommissioned offi- cers and 6 privates (medical corps), and 5 drivers (transport troops). For transportation it has 5 wagons. The personnel of a disinfection column is 1 medical officer, 3 non- commissioned officers, 6 privates (medical corps), and 4 drivers (transj)ort troops). Transportation, 4 wagons. EVACUATION HOSPITALS. There are no distinct evacuation hospitals or clearing stations at the head of the line of communications in the Kussian service, but in each area where field armies are operating an " evacuation com- mission " is appointed, whose duty it is to arrange a classifjdng sta- tion, where wounded can be collected and their disposition deter- mined, and to arrange rest stations, stationary hospitals, etc., on the line. This commission is a cumbersome body and is composed of a president (general officer), 1 assistant (line officer), 1 medical officer, and a delegate of the Reci Cross Society. HOME TERRITORY. The general provisions for final disposition of sick and wounded in home teritory are on similar lines to those of other nations, ex- cept that this disposition is under the direction of commissions simi- lar in character to the commissions for evacuating the wounded on lines of communication. The commissions in home territory arrange hospital accommodations and distribute sick and wounded accord- ingly- 533 51 VII. JAPAN. PEACE ESTABLISHMENT. The military survice is divided into — (a) the active army (Gue- neki) ; (b) first reserve (Yobi) ; (c) second reserve (Kobi) ; (d) re- placement troops (reserve of recruitment) (Hoju) ; (e) the na- tional arm}^, first and second parts (Kakiirnin). Service is obligatory on all males between the ages of 17 and 40. The period of service is regulated as follows : Gueneki. — Three years, save for the infantry, where men pass the third year under the status of furlough, and in the train troops, where the service is but six months. Yohi. — Comprising men coming from Gueneki; 4 years and 4 months. Kobi. — Men from Kobi; 10 years. Hoju. — Comprising men in excess of the needs of Gueneki; 12 years and 4 months. Kakumin, first part. — Two years and 8 months for men coming from Kobi and 7 years and 8 months for men coming from Hoju. Kakurnin, second part. — All men between 17 and 40 not comprised in the preceding categories. The active army is divided into 19 divisions and 19 reserve divi- sions. It is contemplated to gradually increase this army to 25 divisions, with a similar number of reserve divisions. Each of these divisions occupies a military district and is com- plete in itself, not only as regards combatant troops, but as regards auxiliary troops, including the medical department. The total peace strength of the active army is 235,500. ORGANIZATION OF THE MEDICAL DEPARTMENT. The medical department, both in peace and war, is organized largely along the lines of the German medical service. CXDMMISSIONED OFFICERS. The commissioned officers in the medical service consist of medical officers and apothecaries. The titles, ranks, and numbers of medical officers are: Title. Rank. Number. Director general (pun-i-cho) Surgeon general (gun-i-kan) Senior surgeon, first class (itto-gun-i-sei; . . . . Senior surgeon, second class (nito-gun-i-sei; . Senior surgeon, third class (santo-gun-i-sei). Surgeon, first class (itto-gun-i; Surgeon, second class (nito-gun-i) Surgeon, third class (santo-gun-i) Lieutenant general. Major general Colonel Lieutenant colonel . Major Captain First lieutenant Second lieutenant.. Total. 533 23 39 12.5 473 279 2S1 1,231 52 EESERVE MEDICAL OFFICERS. In addition to the medical officers on permanent duty with the active army, there are always a large number of reserve medical officers available for service. These reserve medical officers are formed out of several elements. (a) Medical officers retired from active service but who are able to perform certain services. (b) Medical officers who were "one-year volunteers." These are men who, while medical students, were drafted to the colors, and whose service was limited to one year on condition that they enter the reserve as medical officers upon receiving their qualification. ((?) Reserve medical officers maintained by the Red Cross Society. PHARMACISTS. Pharmacists hold commissioned rank and comprise those serving with the active army and those serving in the reserve in the same way as medical officers. With the active army there are chief phar- macists (yaku-zai sei) to the number of 10 and pharmacist officers (yaku-zai kwan) to the number of 112 ; total in active service, 122. ENLISTED PERSONNEL. The enlisted personnel for medical service is selected from men who have passed the first year of their service in line organizations. These men, in the proportion of two per company, are detailed for medical service with their organization and receive training in their duties from medical officers serving with the organization. After a period of such training they are transferred to the garrison hospital at the headquarters of the division in which they are serving, and are there given a course in hospital training. When their hospital train- ing is completed, they may be returned to their organizations as non- commissioned officers of the medical service or they may continue on duty as ward masters, clerks, etc., in hospitals. Eventualh^ they pass to the reserve as reserves of the army medical service, and wpon mobilization they are utilized to form the various medical field imits. The duties of nurses and hospital attendants in military hospitals are not performed by enlisted men. Such duties are performed by men who were not of sufficient physique to be enlisted. They are civil employees and are used largely in time of war in hospitals on lines of communication and in home territory. 533 I 53 ADMINISTRATION AND DISTRIBUTION OF PERSONNEL. The general administration of the medical department is vested in a Director General, with the rank of lieutenant general, who is the head of the medical bureau of the war department. In matters of general administration, decentralization is the key- note of the Japanese Army, and each division is almost autonomous. It is maintained complete in all its branches in time of peace so that it can be moved in its entirety in time of war and its place im- mediately taken by a reserve division. The medical department is no exception to this general rule. At the headquarters of each division district there is a Chief Medi- cal Officer, with rank of colonel, who is in direct charge of the medical personnel, hospitals, supply depots, etc., within his division. There is also at each division district headquarters a garrison hos- pital to which all of the seriously sick of the division are sent. This hospital is under a Hospital Director, with rank of colonel or lieu- tenant colonel, and a considerable staff of medical officers. Attached to each division hospital is one pharmacist and one officer of the " in- tendance" in charge of supplies other than medical. In time of war these garrison hospitals become the principal hos- pital of the division and all other hospitals, convalescent camps, etc., which are established within the division, become its branches and are under the control of the Hospital Director. No hospitals are maintained by individual regiments. Dispensary treatment is given in those units and all sick requiring hospital treat- ment are sent to the garrison hospital. There is, however, a regi- mental medical service consisting of medical officers belonging to the medical corps and an enlisted personnel belonging to the regiment itself. Japan is the only nation which maintains in peace a commissioned medical personnel with regiments and other combatant units larger than that provided for similar units in war. The regulation allow- ance for medical officers in peace is 10 to each regiment, Avhile in war it is only 6 to each regiment. This unusual provision is made so as to have available medical officers trained in military duties for use in time of war with field medical units. WAR ORGANIZATION. In time of war two or more divisions (usually 3) are mobilized to form field armies. At the head of the medical services of all field armies is a Principal Medical Officer of field forces, with the rank of lieutenant general. His station is with the g-eneral staff at headquar- ters in Tokyo. 533 54 Each field army has a Principal Medical Officer, with rank of major general, on the staff of the field army commander, and there is a Principal Medical Officer, with rank of colonel, on the staff of the in- spector general of lines of communication for each field army. Each division has a Principal Medical Officer, with rank of colonel. All Principal Medical Officers, including those of divisions, have two medical officers as assistants and several enlisted men of the medical service as clerks. DIVISIONAL MEDICAL SERVICE. When a division is mobilized and joins a field army, the whole of its peace staff accompanies it into the field, and their place in the depot division is taken by officers of the reserve or from the retired list. The medical personnel accompanying the division is rearranged and augmented by personnel obtained from the reserve in order to form the field medical units authorized for each division in time of war. MEDICAL SERVICE WITH COMBATANT UNITS. Medical officers on duty with regiments have rank of captain or lieutenant. Each battalion of infantry has two medical officers, and similar units, such as a battery of artillery, have one medical officer. Thus a regiment of infantry (three battalions) has six medical officers; a regiment of artillery (three batteries) has three medical officers; a regiment of cavalry (two squadrons) has two medical officers; etc. ENLISTED PERSONNEL. In each regiment of infantry there is one senior noncommissioned officer and junior noncommissioned officers in the proportion of one to each company. In addition to these men who have been trained in the medical service, four men from each company are detailed as litter bearers. The total enlisted personnel for medical service in a regiment is 15 noncommissioned officers as medical assistants and 48 privates as litter bearers. In the smaller units, such as a battery of artillery, company of engineers, etc., there are no litter bearers, but one noncommissioned officer of the medical service is on duty with each medical officer. FIELD MEDICAL UNITS. The medical units with each division are one bearer battalion and six field hospitals. 533 55 BEARER BATTALIONS. Bearer battalions are under the command of a major of the line, with an intendance officer attached. Each bearer battalion consists of — (a) two litter bearer companies; (&) a dressing station section. Each litter bearer company is commanded by a captain of the line and is composed of 40 litter squads or 160 bearers, with an additional personnel for auxiliary services, such as drivers, cooks, etc. The dressing station section consists of eight medical officers (two captains and six lieutenants), one apothecary, and senior and junior noncommissioned officers of the medical service as assistants to the medical officers. The exact number of such noncommissioned officers can not be ascertained. FIELD HOSPITALS. Field hospitals have a capacity of 200 bed cases each. During the Russo-Japanese War, however, field hospitals were frequently called on to take care of as many as 600 serious cases. Each field hospital is under command of a major surgeon, with five medical officers as assistants. Its personnel comprises, in addition, one apothecary, one intendance officer, 18 noncommissioned officers, and 90 privates. LINES or COMMUNICATION. The medical establishments usual to lines of communication are maintained by the Japanese Army. The personnel for these estab- lishments is largely derived from that furnished by the Red Cross Society and that procurable from among the civilian population. It is a fixed rule, however, that all of these establishments shall be un- der the command of a regular medical officer of experience. The organization of several units on the lines of communication is peculiar to Japan. The usual evacuation or clearing hospitals at the head of lines of communication are replaced by " the reserve medical personnel." RESERVE MEDICAL PERSONNEL. These units are organized in the proportion of one to each division, to follow up the field hospitals during an action and establish sta- tionary field hospitals at suitable points to relieve them. They also establish rest stations along the route of evacuation. Each unit is under command of a major, medical corps, with 12 other medical officers, 3 apothecaries and an enlisted personnel approximately three times that of a field hospital. 633 56 SICK AND WOUNDED TRANSPORT DETACHMENT. One of these units is organized for each division. Its duty is to evacuate wounded from the field hospitals to the stationary field hospitals or to the railhead. Each unit is commanded by a major from the retired or reserve list of the line. It has three medical officers and a small staff of noncommissioned officers and privates of the medical department. No provision is made for transport materiel or bearer personnel. The former is improvised or requisitioned and the latter organized out of local resources. BASE HOSPITALS. Base hospitals are established as necessary on lines of communi- cation. There is no definite schedule for their personnel and equip- ment, but they are supplied from local resources or from the per- sonnel of the Red Cross Society. Regular medical officers are in command of these hospitals, however. In conducting the medical service on lines of communication, it is the policy of Japan to utilize voluntary aid to the greatest extent. It is a fixed rule that all medical units, however, such as hospitals, hospital trains, hospital ships, etc., shall at all times be under the command or regular medical officers of experience. HOME TERRITORY. All of the sick and wounded that are sent to the home territory are treated in reserve hospitals. These reserve hospitals are simply the peace garrison hospitals at the headquarters of each division enlarged as the occasion demands. During the Russo-Japanese War many of these garrison hospitals were expanded to accommodate from 10,000 to 15,000 patients. These hospitals are under the command of the Hospital Director (colonel or lieutenant colonel) of the division district. Through subordinate commanders he directs the operations of all subsidiary hospitals, convalescent camps, etc. The necessary personnel for these reserve hospitals is derived from the depot divi- sional medical service, from the reserves, from the Red Cross Society and from available civilian sources. 533 57 SUMMARY. Pcrcentof/c of medical officcrti i)i pennnncnt peace establishments. Nation. Remarks. Japan United States England France Austria Germany Italy Russia In addition to permanent personnel, there are on duty 96 officers from the raserve corps and 15 contract surgeons, makmg a total peace percentage of 0.54. In addition to permanent personnel, there are on duty 65 officers from the retired list and 182 from the reserve Ust, making a total peace percentage of 0.53. All these countries having compulsory service, augment their permanent peace personnel by medical men domg their service with the colors. Percentage of medical personnel for duty directly with troops as taken from tables of organization. Nation. 1. Japan. . . 2. France. . 3. Germany 4. Austria.. Commis- sioned. 0.52 .49 .44 .42 Enlisted. 5.10 6.30 4.70 5.30 Nation. 5. United Stat 6. Italy 7. Russia 8. England.... Commis- sioned. 0.42 .40 .33 .26 Enlisted. 3.80 3.20 7.00 6.50 A study of these figures shows that the percentage of medical per- sonnel maintained by the United States is about the same as that of England, less than that of Japan and greater than that of continental countries where compulsory service exists. It also shows that upon mobilization for war the entire medical personnel of the continental armies was not sufficient to complete the sanitary quota of the field armies; and that of Japan and the United States would be just sufficient, while England, by reason of the fact that she does not make such ample provision for her field forces as do other armies, had a slight surplus of medical personnel available for duty in administrative positions with volunteer forces and on lines of communications and home territory. Experience has shown that the total number of sanitary personnel required for the various hospitals and other establishments on lines of communication and in the zone of the interior is even greater than that required for service directly with troops; and it has also shown that the higher administrative positions in these establishments, as well as with field arms composed of raw troops, should be under the direction of trained military surgeons. In countries having compulsoiy service, and, consequently, a large reserve, it is the custom to detail regular medical officers from the 533 58 standing army for such administrative positions and to supply the de- ficiency so caused from the reserves. In countries not having large reserves instantly available, it is necessary to maintain in time of peace a medical personnel sufficiently large to be capable of proper expansion and the proper absorption of untrained volunteer aid in time of war. ■ 533 o \ TRAINING OF FORCES OF BELLIGERENT NATIONS OF EUROPE PREPARED BY THE WAR COLLEGE DIVISION, GENERAL STAFF CORPS AS A SUPPLEMENT TO THE STATEMENT OF A PROPER MILITARY POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES WCD 9289-1 ARMY WAR COLLEGE : WASHINGTON NOVEMBER, 1915 i 534 WASHINGTON GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFIOB 1916 War Department, Document No. C34. Office of the Chief of Staff. SYNOPSIS. Pago. 1. Information desired 5 2. Nations involved 5 3. Information available is incomplete and indefinite 5 4. Training in countries having compulsorj'- service 6 5. British Regular Army 7 6. British Territorial Army (established in IOCS') 8 7. British "New Army" 8 8. Training extended to six months 9 9 Additional training during the war 9 10. Additional training, German troops 9 11. Additional training, French troops 10 12. Additional training, Canadian troops 11 13. British cadet school in the field 11 14. British machine-gun school in the field 12 15. Practical experience for higher unit commanders 12 16. British central training camp at Havre 12 17. Deductions 13 18. Application to situation in the United States 14 30669°— No. 534—16 (3) I TRAINING OF FORCES OF BELLIGERENT NATIONS OF EUROPE. 1. INFORMATION DESIRED. In a memorandum dated November 15, 1915, the Chief of Staff directs tliat a brochure be submitted giving the following informa- tion: The amount of training stated in terms of total number of hours given in time of peace for each arm and the technical troops of all the belligerent nations of Europe involved in the war, stating what additional training has been given during the progress of the war : (c) To troops that had previously' been trained; (&) to troops that had received no previous training. The brochure should show, in case of the latter, the period of training ex- perience in this war has shown to be necessary to obtain satisfactory results. Particular attention will be given to England's attempted solution of the prob- lem of training volunteers after war had been declared, as their condition more nearly approximates our own than any other belligerent. 2. NATIONS INVOLVED. The belligerent nations of Europe thus far (December, 1915) in- volved in the war are: Austria-Hungary. Belgium. Bulgaria. France. Germany. Great Britain, Italy. Montenegro. Russia. Servia. Turkey. 3. INFORMATION AVAILABLE IS INCOMPLETE AND INDEFINITE. The total number of hours of training prescribed or given in peace in the various arms of the armies of all the belligerent nations now at war is not a matter of record in the War College Division, (5) 634 I nor is such information available without correspondence. Train- ing in the armies of the above countries, except that of Great Britain, is compulsory and is prescribed in years rather than hours. Such countries in this brochure will be treated separately from Great Britain. In some it is possible to ascertain the customary period of training each day during the six months devoted as a rule to train- ing individuals and smaller units. The daily periods devoted to training during regimental, brigade, division, and grand maneuvers varies with the customs of each country, its climate, etc. In some reports troops of a certain arm are said to drill from — o'clock to — o'clock a. m., and — o'clock to — o'clock p. m., but such reported periods do not agree for the same arm of service and country in all reports, and it seems possible that they are not uniform for all organizations of the same arm, if, indeed, prescribed at all from army headquarters. For example, the military attache, Paris, France, reporting on French cavalry, once wrote: The matter of drill hours is left largely in the hands of subordinate com- manding officers, except, of course, when the whole regiment drills together on days and at hours designated by the colonel commanding. Later, an officer on duty with a French cavalry regiment reported that from October 1 to April 1 training was given daily, except Sundays and holidays, from 6 to 10 a. m. and 12.15 to 5 p. m., or 8f hours. He did not report hours employed during maneuvers of regiments, brigades, etc., April-September each year. 4. TRAINING IN COUNTRIES HAVING COMPULSORY SERVICE. The following table, showing number of years' service in active army, approximate number of hours' training per year (assuming that all time available is utilized) for various arms and total train- ing required of members of variously termed reserves, is as close an estimate of training in peace as can be made. While service is compulsory for all citizens, within certain ages and subject to cer- tain exemptions, it is known that some enlisted men detailed on various duties of administration are excused from a portion or all training in certain countries. The approximate training represents that received by soldiers not thus detailed and excused: 634 Belligerent nations of Europe. Years with active army. Hours per day, except Sundays and holidays. Total hours active army. Reserve training. Appre- pate hours. Austria-Hungary: Cavalry Horse artillery Other artillery Infantry Encineers Belgium: Cavalry Field artillery Other artillery Infantry Engineers Bulparia: Cavalry Field artillery Other artillery Infantry Enc-ineers France: Cavalry Fi"ld artillery Other artillery Infantry Eneineers Germany: Cavalry , Horse artillery , Othi^r artillery , Infantry Engineers Italy: Cavalry Field artillery Oth^r artillery Infantry , Eneineers MontenofTo (militia system, 18 to 62 years of age): Artillery, recruit service , Other arms, recruit service , Russia: Cavalry and Cossacks , Horse artillery Other artillery Infantry , Engineers Servla: Cavalry A rtillery Infantry Turkey: Cavalry Artillery Infantry Engineers 0) (') (') (') (') (') 0) (') (') (•) (') (') (') 7,200 5,R50 3,900 4,SO0 4,800 (•) (') (') (') (') (') (') (') (■) (') 7,6,50 7,6.tO 7,6.50 7,650 7,650 8,100 8,100 5,400 5,400 5,400 (') (') (>) (') (') 1,200 . 800 4,800 4,800 3,600 3,600 3,600 (') (') (') (') (') (') (') 11 weeks ...do 14 weeks ...do ...do 8 weeks. 6 weeks. 4 weeks. ...do ..do 48 weeks ..do ..do 54 weeks 48 weeks 7 weeks. ..do ..do ..do ..do 8 weeks. ..do ..do ..do ..do , (') 0) ( ( ( 330 days ..do 0) (') (') (') (') (') (') (') 0) (') (') (') 7,728 6,279 4,446 5,472 5,472 0) (') (') 0) (') ('^ (') 0) 8,014 8,014 8,014 8,014 8,014 8,532 8,532 5,832 5,832 5,832 (') (') 0) ('^ (0 3,300 2,900 (1) (') (') 0) 8 1 No report. Hours shown above represent the possible aggregate, not the aver- age duration, of training. For reasons given in paragraph 3, the total hours are founded partially on estimates and, while approxi- mately correct for some forces, are not reliable indices of training given to an entire army of any nation. 5. BRITISH REGULAR ARMY. The land forces of the United Kingdom consisted (in peace) of the regular army and territorial army. Enlistment in each is still volun- tary. Service in the regular army was for 12 years, with permission 634 8 to extend to 21 years. Of the original 12, the majority of men served 7 years with the colors and 5 in the army reserve. The regular army included a special reserve consisting of troops not permanently em- bodied in units of the regular army. As to training in the regular army — The battalion commander is responsible that the company commanders are thoroughly instructed, and he supervises, but does not lay down, the methods which they employ to train their companies. The company commanders as- sisted by their subalterns and noncommissioned officers are directly responsible for the efficiency of the rank and file, and their advancement in the service de- pends On their success. Recruits after a course of three months' training at a depot should be sufficiently trained to take their places in the ranks of the company. * * * No record is found of total hours' training prescribed for any branch of the regular army. 6. BRITISH TERRITORIAL ARMY (ESTABLISHED IN 1908). Service in the territorial army was for four years. Such men re- ceived as training a fortnight in camp and a certain number of drills per year and a musketry course according to branch of the service. Terri- Schedule torial of train- army T^otal Anns of the service. ing (pre- (subse- liminary cjuent hours). annual hours). 40 10 50 45 20 65 40-45 45 10-15 15 50-60 Signal service 60 40 10 50 Service corps 28 15 43 42 10 52 In addition: Recruits' course of musketry (preliminary) and an- nual course of musketry, and from 8 to 15 days of annual training in camp for each corps. Six hours per day devoted to training in camp. 7. BRITISH " NEW ARMY." Between August and November, 1914, Parliament authorized an increase of the army of 2,000,000. As the territorial army is not obliged to serve abroad, this force is called the " new army." In September, 1914, army orders prescribed for " trained sol- diers;^'' i. e., those who had qualified in a recruit course of musketry, the course being fired after two months' service, the following training : 534 Same as recruits' fourth, fifth, and eighth weeks, at 36 hours each week individual, and also 20 hours' company and 16 hours' battalion training during first month. Later, these men were to have five weeks' company, two weeks' battalion, and two weeks' brigade train- ing. In addition, a lecture (one hour 7 to 8 p. m.) daily. Trained soldiers for home service were to receive the same train- ing, utilizing 18 weeks instead of 13 weeks. Recruits for service abroad were to have prescribed individual training in three months, and those for home service, in four months. 8. TRAINING EXTENDED TO SIX MONTHS. Army orders of October, 1914, prescribed the following periods of training for the arms of service shown : British new army. Weel<'s of recruit training. Hours per week. Section, training. Com- pany or battery training. Battalion or brigade training Division training. Total hours. Artillery Engineers: Mounted . . . Dismounted Infantry 4S 1,248 1,248 1,248 1,248 In addition lectures from two hours weekly to one hour daily were given on subjects such as the following: Discipline ; organization of expeditionary force ; causes and history of the war ; characteristics of hostile and allied armies ; special duties of the arm receiving lectures; sanitation and health; the German Army, etc. 9. ADDITIONAL TRAINING DURING THE WAR. Due to lack of authority for representatives of the United States Army to remain at the front with armies of belligerent nations, reports of steps taken to provide additional training during the war are few and incomplete. 10. ADDITIONAL TRAINING, GERMAN TROOPS. A camp for recruit training was established at Beverloo, Belgium, for a course of eight weeks' training, especially in firing and combat exercises, following preliminary training at home stations. Capacity of camp, 2,500 animals, 25,000 men. Similar depots for increased training in essentials of the character of warfare experienced were established throughout Germany, the course at each being eight weeks. Men were trained to fire from trenches and trees, practicing concealment. They were trained in construction of types of trenches. 634 10 Cavalry of the German Army was trained to endure long marches rather than to charge, and to accustom horses to bivouac in the open rather than rely upon stabling. Field artillery were trained in construction of trenches and con- cealment from aerial observation. Aviators were taught better cooperation with field artillery. Candidates for appointment as second lieutenant are given prac- tical training at the recruit depots above referred to. 11. ADDITIONAL TRAINING, FRENCH TROOPS. Independently of the student reserve officers, 200 noncommissioned officers of the active army were given special courses of training, April 6-May 31, 1915, at St. Cyr, Maixent, Joinville, and Fon- tainebleau, to qualify for appointment as second lieutenants. It is impracticable to ascertain how much training during the war is given men forwarded from regimental depots to replace casualties, but most if not all such received training in former years. This number is very large. The Seventy-ninth and One hundred and thirty-first Infantry to June, 1915 (10 months of war), each received 13,000 men in all to maintain its effective strength of 3,000. Imagine the result if such proportion of untrained volunteers join an American regiment in war ! It was soon developed that the reconnoissance service of cavalry was badly performed, infantry being surprised, as no warning was received from cavalry screen. The marksmanship of infantry was poor, too little ammunition being allowed for instruction of recruits (120 rounds instead of 200 allowed in peace). In September, 1915, the class, due in October, 1916, for compulsory service, assembled at depots for training. During service at the front a French regiment of infantry or cav- alry in the first line spends 3 days in trenches, 3 days in canton- ment exposed to bombardment, and 6 days in quiet cantonment; then 12 days in the second line (reserve). Thus it has 3 days on the alert, 3 days in danger, and 18 days in security. Artillery, less tried by fire, are continually in action and not withdrawn to the rear for rest. Rest given infantry and cavalry is moral rather than physical. While in second line (12 days) a 15-kilometer march is had each day, and company, battalion, or regimental maneuvers. Bayonet fencing, throwing petards, reversing parapets of trenches, crawling, running, target practice, machine-gun practice, etc., utilize entire period in second line. One half the French Army drills while the other half guards the trenches. French infantry is trained to organize and carry out the assault of three lines of trenches constructed in rear of their positions to 634 11 resemble the German trenches in their front and on terrain similar to that in their front. Men are trained to rush 100 kilometers and lunge at figures dressed as German soldiers in the trenches used for assault training. 12. ADDITIONAL TRAINING, CANADIAN TROOPS. Although the Canadian contingent had had some training before sailing, the first expedition (31,250 men) was sent to camp at Salis- bury Plain for six months' additional training. One regiment (Princess Patricia's) was given only two months in England and two months in France before being placed in the trenches in Feb- ruary, 1915. It was composed largely of men with previous service in the regular army or South Africa. Other than this regiment the personnel and training of the Cana- dians is said to have been inferior to the territorial force. The First Canadian Division was sent to France after four and one-half months' training at Salisbury Plain. The second division was not sent to France until September, 1915. These two divisions, with authorized strength of 40,000 men, have met heavy casualties, and as selected men are transferred to them to replace losses, it lepresents the strength which Canada can maintain in the field in view of preliminary training given in Canada and supplementary training in England and France before troops with no previous training can be safely employed at the front. Such strength was not reached at the front until after 14 months' of war. 13. BRITISH CADET SCHOOL IN THE FIELD. In January, 1915, to replenish the corps of officers, sadly depleted since August, 1914, Field Marshal Sir John French, commander in chief of the British forces in the field, established a school for train- ing officers at Blendecques near St. Omer, France. Cadets are selected from enlisted men of educational, physical, and moral qualities, who have been tested as good field soldiers in actual cam- paign. The course, which lasts one month, is one of demonstration and practice coupled with a minimum of theory. Each cadet passes 48 hours in the trenches and visits observation posts of a battery or group of batteries, submitting report of his tour. Machine-gun tactics is an important subject of instruction. Among others are range finding, siting and construction of trenches, sapping, sketch- ing, night operations, use of rifle and hand grenades, cooperation of infantry, artillery, and engineers, etc. The capacity is 105 cadets, that number being graduated each month. Graduates have been favorably reported by divisional and corps commanders. The Artists' Eifles (twenty-eighth battalion, London regiment) was utilized as the basis for this training corps for officers in the field. 6ii4t 12 14. BRITISH MACHINE-GUN SCHOOL IN THE FIELD. A school for training the increased personnel employed with ma- chine guns, the number of which guns with field units was doubled, was established at Wisques, near St. Omer, France, under an enthusi- astic musketry officer. The course, which lasts two weeks, consists of improvising positions and gun shelter, oblique or enfilade fire, firing from behind houses through openings in walls, or from within houses and cellars through openings in the roofs, firing from armored motor cars and aeroplanes, etc. 15. PRACTICAL EXPERIENCE FOR HIGHER UNIT COMMANDERS. It is reported that regimental and battalion commanders of the ex- peditionary forces still training in Great Britain were sent to France in relays for a week's experience and training at the front, that on returning they might make the training of their proper com- mands more practical and appropriate to the service anticipated when such commands reach the front. 16. BRITISH CENTRAL TRAINING CAMP AT HAVRE. In the summer of 1915 a camp was established near the base at Havre for the supplementary training of men arriving from Eng- land and considered deficient in the essentials of infantry training. All men passing the camp were subjected to " tests," and not per- mitted to go to the front until found proficient by the commandant, Maj. H. F. Whinney, Eoyal Fusiliers. Instructors are experienced officers and noncommissioned officers recently returned from active service in the trenches, some of them recuperating from wounds or sickness. In addition a very good officer is selected from each division at the front and detailed for a tour of two months as in- structor. This maintains instruction in pace with the evolution of the peculiar conditions of warfare which characterize the struggle in France. The course includes musketry, entrenching, first aid, pack-saddlery, bayonet fencing, bombing, revetting, construction of obstacles, particularly barbed-wire entanglements, machine-gun prac- tice, the disabling of guns, and conduct of artillery fire. Lectures and practical instruction are given groups of officers and men, at times to as many as 300 in a group or class. All are impressed with the idea that their lives may depend upon following the advice given. Subjects are so practical, and the necessity for knowledge is so vital, the hour so solemn, and lecturers men who have learned by wounds and bitter experience in action what to avoid, that there is no lack of interest or attention. In musketry targets represent German helmets barely visible over a parapet, bobbing up over a 634 13 front of several hundred yards. Men are taught the character of trees and houses in the landscape, so as readily to recognize aiming points and division lines between sectors. They are taught the dis- tinction between cover from view and. cover from fire. Trenches of patterns found best at the front are built, faced by trenches similar to those used by the Germans. Men under instruction occupy these trenches 24 hours to test their knowledge of what they have been taught in lectures. Men are taught to throw dummy bombs from a narrow fire trench into trenches in front and to advance in specified formations of small groups or squads, clearing " pockets " between traverses of any hostile occupants by " lobbing " bombs into such pockets. They are taught to hurl live bombs and shown how to avoid accidents, relieving men in fire trenches, form- ations for assault, bringing up supports, attacking " hostile " trenches occupied by dummy " Germans " which must be bayoneted or bombed, use of respirators to avoid effects of gas, positions taken in trenches when aeroplanes are sighted, use of trench sprayers to nega- tive effects of gas that has been thrown by " Germans," are inter- esting and practical exercises undertaken. They represent the last word in practical infantry training for the character of warfare peculiar to the situation in northeastern France. 17. DEDUCTIONS. (a) The time devoted in peace to training in all other countries exceeds that given all British forces, excepting possibly the British Regular Army, which constituted at the outbreak of the war the only British force fit for service on the Continent, and compared with strength of the new army was very small. It included many men of several years' training, reenlisted and professional soldiers, and its service in August and September, 1914, demonstrated the value of troops thoroughly trained and habituated to discipline. But its casualties, fighting against odds, were very heavy. (h) All other British troops, excepting possibly those from Aus- tralia, required from six to nine months' training after organization, regardless of previous training, before they were considered fit for service at the front. No reports have been received to indicate whether Australian troops required more training than had been received under the compulsory training required by the defense act. It is probable that such additional training was necessary and was given in camps in Egypt before such troops were sent to the Dar- danelles in the spring of 1915. (c) Casualties in the ranks of units from countries having com- pulsory training were replaced by men of reserve forces, variously designated, who had had training in peace. Casualties in British 634 14 and Canadian units had to be replaced by men with no training in peace, and the preparation of such men required at least six months' intensive training in Great Britain, after which many were found unfit and were given supplementary training in France before join- ing units at the front. (d) The proportion of the British regular and territorial forces to the population of Great Britain and Canada being greater than that of the Regular Army and Organized Militia of the United States to the population of the United States, a greater percentage of British citizens than of United States citizens had received some military training before the war commenced, and the amount of such training in the territorial forces was greater than in the Organ- ized Militia of the United States. 18. APPLICATION TO SITUATION IN THE UNITED STATES. (a) If imminence of war should warrant mobilization of the United States land forces, it is obvious that only the Regular Army and such of the Army reserve as have very recently served in the Regular Army can be considered ready at once for active field serv- ice against a force from any country now at war, including the British New Army thus far sent to the Continent. (b) The United States has now no adequate method of supply- ing properly trained men to replace casualties in the ranks of the Regular Army or to compose the ranks of the large number of combatant units required in addition to the existing mobile regular troops to resist invasion. (c) The experience of the British with the new army confirms the estimate in paragraph 42 of A Statement of a Proper Military Policy (W C D 9053-90) that— Twelve months' intensive training is the minimum that will prepare troops for war service. Therefore the 500,000 partly trained troops above referred to require nine months' military training before war begins. (d) Conditions of modern war do not afford time to train an army after war becomes imminent. Not only must material be secured, but personnel must be trained before military operations can be undertaken with any hope of success. 634 o STUDY ON THE UTILIZATION OF OUR RESOURCES IN VARIOUS MEANS OF TRANSPORTATION AND OF THE SERVICES OF TRAINED SPECIALISTS PREPARED BY THE WAR COLLEGE DIVISION, GENERAL STAFF CORPS AS A SUPPLEMENT TO THE STATEMENT OF A PROPER MILITARY POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES WCD 9053-111 ARMY WAR COLLEGE : WASHINGTON NOVEMBER, 1915 WASHINGTON GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1916 535 War Department, Document No. 535. Office of the Chief of Staff. STUDY ON THE UTILIZATION OF OUR RESOURCES IN VARIOUS MEANS OF TRANSPORTATION AND OF THE SERVICES OF TRAINED SPECIALISTS. PRESENT STATUS. 1. Motor transport. — Automobiles can now be manufactured in the United States at the rate of over 50,000 per month, motor trucks at the rate of about 5,000 per month, and motorcycles at the rate of about 4,000 per month. There are now about 1,500,000 motor cars, 140,000 motor trucks, and 100,000 motorcycles in the United States. An army of 1,000,000 men might need about 4,000 motor cars, 4,000 motorcycles, and 24,000 motor trucks. 2. Only a small proportion of existing motor vehicles are suitable for military service, and in view of the small number of such vehicles required and the rapidity with which they can be manu- factured, it would be neither economical nor wise to plan upon using any and all kinds of motors offered for service. Accepting and using old motor vehicles of many different models when new ones of a few good models can be obtained as soon as needed would result in poor transportation and great cost for the United States. It is, therefore, not planned to use every vehicle that may be presented, but rather to accept individuals as chauffeurs and mechanicians, and only such vehicles as may be of an approved type and serviceable. A bonus might encourage the accumulation of suitable types of motor vehicles, but it is not thought to be necessary. 3. The type of motor ambulance best suited for military use in this country is now under consideration by a board of Army medical officers. Few automobile ambulances suitable for military purposes are available at present, and most of them will probably continue to be needed by the cities, hospitals, etc., now using them. Types of motor trucks and tractors for use in the other depart- ments of the Army are under trial and study at the present time. 4. Aircraft. — No private aircraft suitable for military purposes are known to be available to the Federal Government at present. It is estimated that military aeroplanes can be manufactured in this country at the rate of about 200 per month. The few civilian aero pilots or mechanicians available in this country will be commissioned 30669°— No. 536—16 (3) or enlisted, but only machines of approved types should be taken over ; all others should be purchased new. 5. Medical personnel. — Civilian physicians, trained nurses, hos- pital attendants, pharmacists, laboratory workers, etc., who volunteer for military service may be utilized in certain positions in the Medi- cal Department, which is attempting to improve the Medical Reserve Corps and to perfect organizations comprising all the necessary personnel of complete sanitary units in various localities. These units will be listed, kept track of, and used as far as possible in time of war. 6. Ordnance personnel. — Civilians suitable for employment in the Ordnance Department who volunteer for military service are to be utilized as officers, etc.. in that department according to their qualifi- cations. Information regarding this is contained in General Orders, No. 3, Office of the Chief of Ordnance, United States Army, August 25, 1913, and in War Department General Orders, No. 57, 1909, and No. 26, 1911. 7. Signed Corps personnel. — Civilian telegraphers, telephone op- eratives, aviators, etc., to be employed with the military forces are to be organized and used in that corps as men of similar qualifications are organized and employed in the regular Signal Corps, field and telegraph battalions, and aero squadrons. Other telegraph and tele- phone operatives working for military forces are to be organized, employed, and controlled about as they habitually are for their work in civil life. 8. Engineer personnel. — Volunteer civilian railroad builders and operators, bridge builders, civil, mechanical, and other engineers can now have their names placed on an eligible list (G. O., 57, 1909, as amended), and in time of war will be offered commissions as engineer staff officers or in engineer organizations. These organizations will be pioneer, ponton, or railway battalions or regiments wherein will be found need for specialists in all branches of engineering, in the various building trades and mechanic arts, and in the construction, operation, and maintenance of railways. 9. QuarterTrmster personnel. — Volimteer civilians having special tiaining in handling transportation or knowledge of other quarter- master duties are to be organized and employed in the Quartermaster (]orps in a manner similar to that described for the other depart- ments. Individual experts can have their names placed on the eli- gible list. When volunteers are authorized, motor-truck companies, wagon companies, bakery companies, etc., will be organized, and the necessary number and class of experts will be commissioned in the Quartermaster Corps. 10. The foregoing are the plans of the various departments of the Army, but aside from the laws providing for the Medical Reserve 536 Corps and for the list of persons eligible for volunteer commissions there are no provisions of law that authorize any measures of pre- paredness along the lines indicated. Neither in the Medical Reserve Corps nor in the "List of eligibles" is there a dependable source of officers, for there is absolutely no assurance that any of them will respond when their services are required, nor is there any provision in the laws compelling them to do so. WAR COLLEGE PLANS. 11. The War College Division recommends utilizing these great resources of the Nation in men and materiel in two ways : First, by forming the various units that make up divisions, and lines of com- munications, etc.; and, second, by commissioning individuals whose personal abilities make them desirable for planning in time of peace and for execution in time of war. These two methods which require legislation are to be put into operation as follows: (a) Organizations such as motor-truck companies, motor-cycle companies, motor-ambulance companies, etc., are to be provided for in a civilian force, organized and trained in time of peace, and for convenience called the continental army. They can be formed in such numbers as the law may authorize and the Secretary of War may direct. (b) Individual experts will be provided for in an officers' reserve corps. It is proposed, in time of peace, to commission as reserve officers all kinds of experts from civil life in such numbers and pro- portions as the law may authorize and the Secretary of War may direct. 12. In connection with this subject it is submitted that without legislation authorizing this civilian army and the officers' reserve corps nothing can be done that is of the least value. Peace-time volunteer organizations, unsanctioned by law, can not be relied upon for use in time of war ; they can be of value only when their mem- bers are legally bound to render military service to the United States for a fixed period and to serve in the armies in any war that may occur during that period if legally called upon to do so. 13. Methods suggested. — The following is an outline of how the War College Division plans to utilize the national resources hereto- fore discussed, if authority therefor can be obtained from Congress : A. In the Continental Army. (1) Motor truck companies. Organized and trained under the Quarter- master Corps. These will include chauffeurs, drivers, mechan- icians, etc. (2) General hospital units; (3) Base hospital units; 635 (4) Field hospital companies; and (5) Ambulance companies. Organized and trained under the Medical Corps. These will include physicians, surgeons, pharmacists, hospital assistants, nurses, laboratory assistants, chauffeurs, drivers, mechanicians, etc. (6) Field battalions, Signal Corps; (7) Telegraph battalions, Signal Corps; and (8) Aero squadrons. These will be organized and trained under the Signal Corps and will include telephone and telegraph engineers, wireless ex- perts, and aero pilots, telephone, telegraph, and wireless opera- tors, and mechanics, mechanicians, chauffeurs, motorcycle men, etc. (9) Railway regiments. (10) Engineer regiments. These will be organized and trained under the Corps of Engi- neers and will include railway officials and engineers, civil, mechanical, electrical, and other engineers; enginemen, firemen, conductors, brakemen, train dispatchers, signalmen, bridgemen, trackmen, machinists, and all other railway operatives. They will also include carpenters, blacksmiths, mechanics, draftsmen, surveyors, lithographers, etc. B. In the Officees' Reserve Corps. (A reserve of officers to replace casual- ties in organizations of the Regular, Continental, and Volunteer Armies.) (1) Quartermaster Corps. Automobile engineers and experts, wagon and other vehicle experts, railway transportation experts. (2) Medical Corps. Physicians, surgeons, chemists, dentists, hospital superintendents, laboratory experts, sanitary experts, etc. (3) Signal Corps. Telephone, telegraph, and wireless engineers, aero pilots. (4) Corps of Engineers. Civil, mechanical, electrical, and other engi- neers ; railway officials, including experts in the operating, mainte- nance of way, bridges and buildings, signal, motive power, car building, car repairing, and other departments LEGISLATION. 14. The draft of a proposed bill to authorize a civilian force, called herein the Continental Army, will be submitted in the near future, if desired. It is now under preparation. 15. The draft of a proposed bill to authorize the officers' reserve corps was submitted in War College Division memorandum No. 9153-2, 1915. 635 o i I I UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LIBRARY Los Angeles This book is DUE on the last date stamped below. J^f^ 2 01984 REC'D LO APR URL 1991 Form L9-100m-9.'52(A3105)444 «]\ri..!r> 3 1158 00916 7072 UC SOUTHERN REGIONAL LIBRARY FACILITY AA 001 191 752 3