THE THE LIBRARY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA RIVERSIDE /y STATE AID STATE INTEKFEKENCE. :rp Z33<&vs STATE AID STATE INTEKEEKENCE. ILLUSTRATED BY RESULTS IN COMMERCE '-4N-D INDUSTRY.]'/ BY GEOKGE BADEN-POWELL, M.A., F.R.A.S., F.S.S. LONDON : CHAPMAN AND HALL, Limited, HENRIETTA STREET, W.C. 1882. All Bights Reserved. HP/7/5 33'/ London : R. Clay, Sons, and Taylor, BREAD STREET HILL, E.C. PREFACE. There come upon nations epochs when, rising superior to all experience, a blind dash is made in some unlooked-for direction. This is an infatuation of the national brain which destroys, in the brief period of its rage, the hard-won results of centuries of toil and progress. A nation comes into being and grows with sur- prising rapidity till it attains to great stature : it puts on and uses the strength of a Samson. But, in those days it not unfrequently happens that the nation suddenly sets itself to sap all the foundations of its greatness : to permit the cutting off of the seven locks of its mightiness. And the Delilah of its destruction is Government Interference. Has England, in these latter days, fallen under the glamour of such an influence ? Government Inter- ference can only enter where pr ivate judgment has vi Preface. been beguiled to place itself in the embrace of Authority. And in England, in recent years, Authority in Matters of Politics has striven, and striven with some effect, to supplant in the affections of the people that far more wholesome and beneficial faith which rested upon the teachings of Political Economy because these were based upon the sure and certain warranty of experience. But if Rationalism in Politics is thus flat heresy in the eyes of this Authority, is it so in the eyes of the great intelligent portion of the nation ? The answer is to be found in the fast-growing public appreciation of statistical information, and the wide- spread study of this science legislators are called upon to ignore. One of the most important of the problems dealt with by Political Economy is the question of the effect of State action. And it is by the analysis of achieved results that we can best tell whether, as a matter of fact, the State assists most or injures most ; whether its action is best described by the term Aid or the term Interference. The State, by direct action, influences the working of land and labour and education, and other matters of the first moment to Ireland and to Scotland and t< England, as well as to all the world. But in this Preface. vii volume I limit myself to results that have been recorded of State action in regard to industries and to commerce. In the first chapter I summarise the general conclusions to which the details of the succeeding chapters lead. Some of these detailed results I had already- published in the Nineteenth Century for July, 1881, and Fraser's Magazine for the same month ; and in the Fortnightly Review and the Westminster Review. The Editors of these various reviews have very kindly granted me permission to republish these articles in this book, and I take this opportunity of recording my thanks for such permission. G. B. P. 8, St. George's Place, London. CONTENTS. CHAPTEE I. PAGE State Aid and State Interference 1 1. Political Economy and Ignorance 1 2. The Duty of the State 6 3. The Results of Protection 9 4. Bounties 11 5. High Tariffs for Colonies 14 6. Free Trade within the British Empire 15 7. Freedom for British Agriculture 18 8. Freedom for British Manufactures 22 9. State Interference with other States 25 CHAPTER II. The Failure of Protection in the United States . . 30 1. The case of the United States Important 30 2. The Causes of their Prosperity 32 3. American Manufactures 37 4. Revenue from Customs Duties 48 5. Protection in each Case Hostile to Advance. Its Future 53 1) Contents. CHAPTER III. PAGE Bounties 64 1. Bounties not likely to Sncceed 64 2. The Shipping Industries of the United States . . 66 3. French Shipping Bounties 69 CHAPTER IV. Sugar Bounties 73 1 . Cane-growing in the Colonies continually Advancing 73 2. Beet-growing not due to Bounties 88 3. Beet-growing and Refining do not flourish in Bounty-giving Countries 94 4. How to do away with Bounties 102 5. British Sugar Industries more Prosperous than any others 109 CHAPTER V. Protection in Young Communities 112 1. Parallel Cases of Victoria and New South Wales . 112 2. The Promotion of Manufactures 121 3. The Raising of Revenue 124 4. The Promotion of General Prosperity 127 5. Value of this Test Case 135 CHAPTER VI. One-sided Free Trade 138 1. Supposed necessity for Customs Duties 138 2. Hong Kong advancing and prosperous with no Customs Duties 139 3. People Increasingly Employed in Arts of Civiliza- tion 141 4. Ample Revenue Raised 144 Contents. xi CHAPTER VII. PAGE Low Tariffs fob the British Empire 147 1. Growth of our Trade with our Colonies 147 2. Need for England to recognise this 153 3. Most Nations maintain Free Trade within their own Frontiers 156 4. All Colonies would Profit by Intra-National Free Trade 160 5. Spontaneous Agreement of Colonies Necessary . . 168 6. Low Tariffs secure the Highest Prosperity of all . . 171 CHAPTER VIII. Foreign Competition in Agriculture 177 1. The British Isles are becoming more Manufacturing, more "Well-to-do, and less purely Agricultural . . 177 2. American Prairie Cropping must in a few years work itself out 182 3. The Price of American "Wheat must Rise 186 4. America becomes rapidly Populated 194 5. Americans chiefly Compete with our other Foreign Purveyors 198 6. Canadian "Wheat will not Permanently Lower Prices 203 7. English "Wheat Growing has many Intrinsic and Local Advantages 205 8. Foreign Competition has roused English Agriculture to Improve itself 207 CHAPTER IX. Foreign Competition in Manufactures 213 1. What Foreigners are Doing and what they are asserted to be Doing 213 2. Modern Tendencies of Foreign Tariffs 214 3. Modern Tendencies of Colonial Tariffs 221 4. Pauperising Effects of High Tariffs 224 5. Foreign Exporters of Manufactures 230 xii Contents. CHAPTER X. PAOK Foreign Competition in Manufactures 236 1. What we are Doing in England : our Home Market and Foreign Purveyors 236 2. Percentage of Manufactures to other Imports . . . 240 3. Particular Examples : Hardware, Silk, Woollens . 241 4. English Labour Cheaper and Better 250 5. Failure of Foreign Competition 255 CHAPTER XI. Interference with other Nations 258 1. Four General Principles of Foreign Commercial Policy 258 2. Lowering Tariffs 263 3. Fighting Bounties 267 4. Commercial Treaties 273 Index 279 STATE AID AND STATE INTEBFEBENCE. CHAPTER I. ' STATE AID AND STATE INTERFERENCE. SI. Political Economy and Ignorance. 2. The Duty of the State. 3. Protection in the United States, 4. Bounties. 5. High Tariffs for Young Communities. 6. Free Trade for the British Empire. 7. Freedom for British Agriculture. 8. Freedom for British Manufactures. 9. State Inter- ference with the Commerce and Industries of other States. 1. In these latter days signs are not wanting of the reappearance of an influence that has before now destroyed civilizations. It may be that in England the people are endowed with strength sufficient to combat and throw off this influence ; but the struggle bids fair to be severe, even if there be no doubt as to the final result. B 2 State Aid and State Interference. Authority, in these latter days, is attempting, with daily increase of force, to usurp the sovereignty of liberty. And in England the evidence of this is seen in the growing tendency to set up individual men or individual ideas in the seats of power that should be occupied by the cultivated national opinion, or by personal knowledge of facts. In England at the present moment the principles and creeds of sections of the community, that claim to be not .the least advanced, degenerate in reality on the one hand into an unquestioning acceptance and worship of mere words, and on the other into an equally unquestioning and unthinking servitude to men who are blindly supposed to embody some idea. There is evidence that an appreciable portion of the educated intellect of the nation may fall into this bondage of hero worship. If the result be of sufficient power to enable a Government to ride roughshod over all principles and experiences that would otherwise check some particular political move, there is at once risk of an undoing of all that has been done; of a loosening of the whole national fabric. The turning into the road to ruin is made immediately Government undertakes to do what is, and has been, best left to private initiative. Popery in politics is the resource of nations or State Aid and State Interference. 3 of individuals, of low intellectual calibre. Un- questioning surrender of the political conscience to some human high priest, is the refuge of the incapable and the ignorant. Authority, in the matter of politics, only becomes personal with those who lack power or energy to think for themselves. Authority may be well defined as "the allowing some one else to think for you." And in this sense it would appear, in these latter days, Division of Labour has been carried to a pernicious extreme. For instance, if Political Economy is banished by Authority to Saturn, many there are, and these passing for intellectual men, who have been found to bring their lips to say, " So much the worse for political economy." There is but one silver lining to this cloud of dependence on others. The cloud itself is some check on that yet more baneful tendency of the times the tendency of educated ignorance to assert itself. Argument, snatched hurriedly from the skurry of modern life, is mistaken for fact ; second-hand and often interested explanations are mistaken for the occurrences they would explain ; and this half-knowledge, which is altogether worse than no knowledge, is only too ready to pose before the world as knowledge, and to usurp the place of B 2 4 State Aid and State Interference. teacher that of right belongs to experience. In reality, all this misleading mass of assumptions and vain theorisings is after all only formulated ignorance. It is thus possible even to welcome Authority in politics if only it prove to be some antidote to this other great political evil. But this welcome is altogether soured when we find the High Priest of this Authority himself suddenly discarding knowledge and experience, ridiculing the teachings of history, and telling us that the science which collects and explains all that is known of the results of human action, is no longer of any service in mundane affairs. Such ideas can only flourish where there prevails actual ignorance of the true nature of the science of political economy. The abstract principles of Political Economy are nothing more nor less than logical explanations of successful human work. The science is thus an exact science in so far as it collates the recorded results of such work. It can describe by analysis and abstraction each of the conditions which when co-existent make up necessarily a certain effect. It can tell us, with all the certainty of mathematics, that certain defined conditions existing together are a certain total or effect, for this effect is merely a bundle of conditions. State Aid and State Interference. 5 Ask Political Economy, " what is the cause of manufacturing prosperity ? " It will reply : Take any case of manufacturing prosperity and you will find you have a community enjoying, as much as, or more than, its possible rivals, a favourable climate, skill in the people, energy in the people, an adequate command of capital, an adequate command of raw material, and liberty to utilise all these conditions. Free Trade does not cause it : Protection does not cause it : for it is nothing more nor less than the realised co-existence of several conditions, each one of which can be seen by analysis to exist in all cases of manufacturing prosperity. Political Economy unties for inspection the bundle of conditions that, in its entirety, is some definite effect or fact. It describes each of these conditions, and it explains once and for all that if you take these several conditions and make them up together into a bundle you will have such and such a par- ticular effect. It is a necessary truth. It is this analysis of results which is the main function of the Political Economist. His chief duty is to explain economic experience. His " principles " are the constants he finds in circumstances ; the sub stantial conditions which underlie circumstantial varieties. He does not explain on hypothesis ; he 6 State Aid and State Interference. simply draws up a list of the actual, conditions which must *be present together if Ave are to have any given effect. 2. So far as private acts go Political Economy has less to say than in the case of public acts ; and there is no more important problem to be explained by Political Economy than the question how far the common body politic the State is to do the thinking for the community, and interpose in the regulation of private acts. If we look to history we find that all prosperity is generated in freedom. Anything and everything that interferes with freedom generates a negation of prosperit} 7 . And the State, the expression of the unity of any community of men, has the one whole duty of securing the freedom of the indivi- duals who make up the community. But it is a community ; and the true freedom of the individual is liberty for the full play of his own energies limited by the precisely similar liberty for every one of his fellow-citizens. The guardianship of these liberties is the prime function of Government the one great final cause of its existence. The State has to hold the true and just balance between the individual and collective liberties; and in the economic quite as much as in the moral or religious State Aid and State Interference. 7 affairs of mankind, the State can do harm by letting alone, but it also can do harm by not letting alone. In other words, there can be State Aid as well as State Interference. It might be said that it is the duty of Govern- ment to bring all previous experience of the human race to bear directly upon the particular con- ditions in which a nation may find itself, and so forestall much lengthy trial and consequent waste of energy. But it is often the case that Government itself is in error, and is more liable to act on wrong judgment than the private individual. And this is specially the case in industry and commerce, because these thrive best under the impulses, sacrifices, and knowledge of the individual. Before now, States, in their endeavour to promote some industry, have choked out of it all its life ; States have succeeded in setting up unprofitable industries ; States, in their endeavour to hasten industrial development, have been known to foster industries by no means profit- able to the community at the sacrifice of those that were in reality the most profitable. All this is never possible if such development be left to in- dividual initiative. The individual best discovers what is profitable and what not : the individual best bears the losses incident to failure. It is of 8 State Aid and State Interference. the first importance that every individual be left free, and neither encouraged to take up unprofitable nor hampered in the prosecution of profitable industries. It is folly to encourage a man to make hats when he might be more profitably employed growing wheat. It is folly to check his making hats when it no longer pays him to grow wheat. It is held to be an open question whether in actual life a man's ' acts are governed by reason as often as they are directed by unreason. This latter this unreason is the arch enemy of pro- gress the subtle destroyer of systems of civilization. And as reason is founded on experience, so is un- reason founded on ignoring experience. And this experience is a knowledge of the several conditions that make up the bundle that is known as the effect. Unreason is the negation of experience, and thrives only under the supremacy of ignorance. Luckily at the present day ignorance has acquired the habit of formulating itself with as much exact- ness as knowledge ; and we can cull from the popular arguments of the day the definite conten- tions advanced by this formulated ignorance, and compare them with actual fact. In analysing results it is right to go into detail ; to separate the sticks of each bundle ; to enter at State Aid and State Interference. 9 length into the description of the many conditions we find combined into each result. And I sum- marise in this chapter the analysis of the bundles or effects which are analysed in detail in the succeeding chapters. In Industry and Commerce there is one great lever to State Interference, known to the world as " Protection." It is the interference by Govern- ment with what is imported into a country for the avowed purpose of securing certain ends for the home industries and commerce. It is thus that in- vestigations naturally group themselves round the problem Is Protection, in the popular sense of the term, State Interference or State Aid ? Does it assist or impede wholesome natural development ? 3. Among the formulas that have become the stock-in-trade of this Ignorance none is more fre- quently met with than the pointing to the United Slates as an example contradictory of all that is credited to Free Trade. We are told, How is it, if all this be true about Free Trade, that the United States, with their stringent Protection, develop so fast, manufacture so much, and are generally so prosperous 1 ? The sum total of the answer is that in every point in which the United States do flourish and prosper it is in spite of, and not 10 State Aid and State Interference. because of Protection. The chief sources of wealth over the vast interior the foods and the raw materials are being worked under the stimulating aegis of absolute Free Trade. By the constitution of the United States it is strictly forbidden for any one of the States to levy customs duties on goods entering from any other State. And the United States are as large as Europe and as rich in all natural wealth. The high tariff can affect this community in two ways. In the first place it affects alone by imports ; and the popula- tion of the United States imports but 21. per head as compared with the 101. per head imported in the United Kingdom. In the second place, the high tariff is supposed to yield revenue, and so relieve the nation of other taxes. But if we look to records, we see that within the last ten years the customs revenue, from yielding 19s. per head of population, has fallen to yield only lis. and that the actual bulk of the annual yield has decreased 25 per cent. Thus the high tariff fails to relievo the country of other taxation ; and at the same time it presses comparatively lightly on a population that buys so little abroad. The question remains, What of the positive effects? Protection was instituted to develop State Aid and State Interference. 11 manufactures, and yet the percentage of manu- factures to the rest of the commodities exported is not only insignificant in amount, but dwindling year by year. Imported manufactures still hold their own in the American market ; and all that can be said in the summing up is that Protection has fostered the growth in America of manufactures that are a dead loss to the community at large, and has stifled some industries that would have been of the highest national advantage. 4. Formulated ignorance sometimes shifts its ground. " It may be true, all this about Free Trade and Protection ; but Bounties, at all events, must be fought by direct action." To understand this problem aright it is well to have before us the whole details of some typical case ; and there is no case more distinct, more recent, and more fully recorded than that of the Sugar Bounties. If we look into such details we at once find that Bounties in the result do more actual harm to the nations that give them than to the rivals they attempt to overthrow. A Bounty is a portion of the national wealth handed over by the State to an individual. It is a tax on the nation in favour of some individual. It is presented to the indi- vidual for carrying through some industry. If that 12 State Aid and State Interference. industry be profitable in itself the Bounty is an entirely gratuitous gift. If that industry be unpro- fitable in itself the Bounty is merely a bonus on pursuing an industry which decreases the national wealth. A Bounty is thus a tax on the people, which is at best an altogether unnecessary drain on their resources, and which may be, and in many cases is, a direct encouragement of a waste of the nation's resources. A Bounty is indeed a political sop that many a dishonest Government has thrown with great " politician " effect. But in the end it brings ruin and loss. It either encourages an in- dustry that needs no encouraging, or it encourages an industry that should never be encouraged. In regard to Sugar Bounties we find that those countries which give no Bounties possess the most flourishing sugar industries. It is usually found that where one industry or country receives a Bounty other industries and other countries clamour for them. The movement, like other Protective measures, tends more and more towards a drain on the popular wealth for the sake of a few individuals. It is distinctly against the general prosperity, and subversive of the conditions best for the particular industry itself. If the Shipping Bounty in France, for instance, proves a "success," it will be a new burden State Aid and State Interference. 13 of taxation on the French people equivalent to an additional 4f more than one-third. (iv.1 The intelligent American citizen puts up with Failure of Protection in United States. 63 Protection because it affects him but little in his absorbing occupation of opening up the vast interior. The assured success of this internal development, coupled with the ebb of foreign capital, will gradually overcome both the heedless vis inertice of manhood suffrage and the knowing vis moliva of vested interests. 64 State Aid and State Interference. CHAPTER III. BOUNTIES. 1. Bounties never likely to succeed. 2. Attempts to revive Shipping Trade in the United States. 3. Similar attempts in France. 1. In Bounties, above all other schemes and policies, State interference assumes most cunningly and most successfully the trappings and outside semblance of State aid. Under the guise of assist- ance to the native and discouragement to the foreign producer of a given article, many a Government has won popularity for itself from an ignorant and thoughtless people by the simple device of insti. tuting a Bounty system. And the more their ignorance of their own trades, the more their innocence of their own true interests, the more these fostered classes admire and support a Govern- ment which promises to protect them by Bounties against foreign competition. Bounties. 65 Happily in England most of us feel strongly that Bounty-giving is nothing more nor less than taking- money from the great body of taxpayers and handing it over to a few privileged individuals, in order that these latter may carry on industries that might not otherwise pay. Even supposing that Bounties give artificial advantage to any special industry, yet this artificial advantage all comes out of the pockets of the people at large. Bounties may for a time give an artificial and temporary stimulus to a trade, but such stimulus seems invariably to suck the life out of the community, and to leave the field eventually in possession of those foreign rivals who have preferred the wholesome food of free enterprise and the bracing air of open competition. Bounties are pleasing to the sense of self-interest, to the selfishness of the class in whose favour they are imposed. But this means, that if once you allow or adopt the principle of Bounty-giving, the oTanting a Bounty to one trade or industry simply provokes other trades and industries to claim similar treatment. The State which grants Bounties to sugar-refiners soon finds itself compelled in very fairness to grant Bounties to shipbuilders. And the future looms dark with the forms of all other F OG State Aid and State Interference. industries, possible and impossible, hovering round to claim their share in the generous distribution of the public moneys. And for similar reasons such a policy adopted by one State provokes other States to similar action. States are very apt to follow one another's blind leadings. Sugar Bounties have been instituted now in several European countries, simply by reason of the strange idea that if Bounties are given to foreigners Bounties must be given to natives as a protection. And when this plea of "fairness" >nce steps in, nothing more is heard of the fact that Bounties do more harm than good to the trade and to the country which the Government seeks by their agency to aid. People forget that Bounties come eventually out of the pockets of the taxpayers; and tbey forget what is of yet more direct importance, that Bounties have never yet succeeded in winning a victory against those commu- nities which refuse to have anything to do with their suspicious aid. In this and the following chapter I wish briefly to collect certain recorded results of two illustrative classes of Bounties those given to promote shipping and sugar industries respectively. $ 2. It is probable that in few States have more stringent measures been taken to foster a shipping Bounties. 67 trade than in the United States. It is certain that in no States has there ever been a greater collapse of the shipping trade than in the United States. The facts of this collapse are the " common- places" of all literature dealing with such subjects. Here again there crops in and acts as a chief element the necessary evil of all such State inter- ference. With shipping, as with sugar and all other industries, there are two distinct industrial phases or divisions ; and they are, in their very nature, antagonistic to one another if once they are to be " fostered " out of any common funds. These two phases are those of production and of use. If you protect the production of ships, in so far you limit their use; and if you protect the use of ships, in so far you limit their production. In the United States it was sought to encourage shipbuilding in the country by prohibiting the importation of ships and by encouraging the native building of ships. Immediately the shipowners found they were hampered in the supply of ships. Ships cost American more than thev cost English owners. American ships were no longer purchased, and then, as a consequence, they were no longer built. At the same time the shipbuilders had been pro- tected, and so could nut object that other industries F 2 68 State Aid and State Interference. should be protected likewise. And shipbuilders found, to their cost, that they had to pay for their material and for their labour far more than ship- builders in other countries that had no protection- And now all the American seaboard is crying out for the remission of all duties on the materials employed in shipbuilding, and for the removal of all the burdens that Protection imposes on the industry. Meanwhile American shipowning has died down, and shrunk to comparatively nothing from its former dimensions. The Great War no doubt had consider- able effect, but that effect should be past and gone before now ; and the Americans must often sit down and look at the flags flying thick in New York harbour, and ask themselves how it is that they are nearly all those of a nation which makes every endeavour to free all its industries of all State trammels, of all so-called State support. Xo doubt England has unrivalled capacity for production in her readily available stores of coal and iron, but America also yields large quantities of coal and iron, and her woods arc at least as good and as plentiful as those of the British Isles. Her sea- board is long, her harbours numerous, and her population much given to maritime pursuits; and Bounties. 69 yet her shipping industries cannot do more than struggle to maintain a precarious existence, clogged and handicapped by vigorous State support, and altogether unable to compete against the free and altogether private enterprise of the shipping- industries of the United Kingdom. 3. With this clear example before her we find France, already with a very respectable marine, never- theless deliberately devising a new scheme of bounty protection to her shipping trades. As with all such State interference so with this ; so great is the number of technical and legal formalities, that the effective operation of the law is seriously impaired. However, after overcoming these, the French Go- vernment offers definite money Bounties to those who build vessels in France or to those Frenchmen who own seagoing vessels. The Bounties are not given to Lines otherwise subsidised by Government. They are given on tonnage built in France and on the number of miles run at sea by French-owned vessels. It is at once evident there is considerable contradiction involved. France pays nearly 1,000,000/. per annum in subsidies to steamers for carrying mails. By this new law a steamer, provided she does not carry mails, becomes entitled to a subsidy or Bounty. And then again a Bounty is given for 70 State Aid and State Interference. making long and numerous voyages. This bounty is If. 50c. per ton per 1,000 miles. For a trip across the Atlantic and back a French-built steamer of 3,000 tons receives 1,000/., provided she carry no mails. If she be English-built she receives 500/. It becomes a question of relative cost of English-built and French-built ships. If the Bounty on building fail to make good this difference, then the French ship- owner may profit most by using English -built ships. But suppose that this act succeeds to the full in its purpose. Suppose it doubles the French mer- cantile marine by adding one million tons of French- built shipping, and sends this million tons voyaging over the seas, at average voyaging pace. Suppose this continues for five years. Then the French taxpayers will have to provide say 15,000,000/., or, in other words, pay to French shipbuilders and shipowners 3,000,000/. per annum for doing nothing but mind their ow r n business. And this payment includes measures for defeating its own end, because it includes the enabling French owners to purchase foreign-built ships even when these are dearer than French-built ships. As we have seen in the Atlantic trade, an owner may run an English-built steamer for a year against French-built mail steamers on equal terms, because he will obtain a Bounty which Bounties. 71 they will not obtain. If this Bounty-law were to raise French shipping to anything equalling that of English shipping a't the present moment, the French taxpayer would find himself at least one hundred and fifty millions sterling out of pocket. The question remains, would there be any possibility of recouping this sum out of any trade that could be developed ? The chances are that the question will never be put to the test, because there will be severe foreign competition. France need not fear the kind of competition threatened by Prince Bismarck a competition in kind a retaliatory imposition of countervailing Bounties by Germany. But France will find competition very severe and hopeless with England. It is. not by making the nation as a whole pay for national shortcomings that any par- ticular industry can be made successfully to compete with countries enjoying greater natural facilities. Shipbuilding has grown to be a great industry in the British Isles, partly because of a natural wealth in coal and iron ; partly because of a maritime genius fostered both by geographical position and by great and world-wide trading propensities ; partly because of the policy of Free Trade, which enables the shipbuilder to obtain all the materials he uses at the lowest possible cost. Other countries cut 72 State Aid and State Interference. themselves off from those of these advantages that can be acquired, and they are thus the less able duly to utilise such of those advantages as they may enjoy by the bounty of nature. If the French or the United States wish to develop a profitable mercantile marine, the only road is to reduce and simplify their tariffs, and then see whether in the consequent free course of commerce and industry the shipping trade arise of itself or not. In other ways they may give artificial fillips, but to the nation at large the balance will be on the wrong side ; the industry will be fostered at the expense of the community ; money will be transferred from the pockets of the people to those of a few individuals ; French shipowners may buy more of English ship- builders, and English shipbuilders may start yards in France and gather in a harvest of French Bounties ; but in the long run the French people will find the millions they may spend disappear into the pockets of builders and owners, and leave France with no greater increase in her mercantile marine than has come of all the strenuous efforts to increase that of the United States. Sugar Bounties. 73 CHAPTER IV. SUGAR BOUNTIES. 1. Cane-growing in the Colonies continually advancing. 2. Beet- growing not due to Bounties. 3. Neither Beet-growing nor Refining flourish in Bounty-giving countries. 4. How to do away with Bounties. 5. Britisli Sugar Industries more prosperous than any others. 1. The most remarkable case in regard to Bounties is that of the Sugar Bounties. It is a case which has all the advantages of having been well ventilated. Its details have in every respect been worked out and tabulated : and its value and im- portance are best attested by the virulence of the controversy to which it has given rise. There are few results recorded in economic history that yield such distinct and clear lessons. It may be well to quote these results as I sum- 74 State Aid and State Interference. marized them in a recent article in the Westminster Review : " Mr. Kitchie's Committee was appointed ' to in- quire into the effects upon the Home and Colonial Sugar Industries of this country by the system of taxations, drawbacks, and bounties on the exportation of sugar now in force in various foreign countries.' It is our present purpose to deal specially with the second of these two provinces of inquiry. But there seems to be some strange fatality that appears to haunt the very term ' Colonies.' No sooner is this term used than the affairs treated of fail of just appreciation, not only here in England, but even in the Colonies themselves. The very men who should know most, are often misled themselves into statements that are hard to reconcile with the records upon which they themselves found these statements. In the records of this particular committee there occur instances of this ; and instances, moreover, directly compromising the most important points involved. For instance, in his answer to question 3,858, one of our most trusted authorities on West Indian matters tells us that the ' diminished pro- duction (of sugar in the West Indies) commenced in 1872.' But the figures of sugar exported recorded Sugar Bounties. 75 in the tables provided by this same authority are as follows : Sugar Exported trom the British West Indies in Tons. British Guiana West India) Totals... 1871. 1872. 1873. 1874. 1875. 1876. 1877. 89,000 211,000 300, COO 76.000 173,000 84,000 195,000 84,000 1SS.000 80,000 1 102,000 237,000 j 214,000 96,000 181,000 249,000 ! 279,000 272.000 1 317,000 ; 316,000 i 1 ! 277,000 The ' diminished production that commenced in 1872' did not continue even till the following year. Again, the same high authority tells us (3,960) ' I think that in, say, ten years, half the pro- duction of the West Indies would be knocked on the head altogether ; in fact it has begun already. I do not think I should be outside the mark if I stated that nearly fifty estates are in course of abandonment now (1879). I think about fifty have come under my own knowledge, principally in Jamaica; about six or eight months ago, so far as my recollection goes, twenty-six estates were advertised for sale without any buyer.' This latter sentence somewhat qualifies the former ; but if we turn to the Jamaica Bluebook 76 State Aid and State Interference. itself, we find recorded in dry and hard official columns that only four estates were abandoned during the year 1879. And it is further to be noticed that these four were of very small size, making altogether only 323 hogsheads of sugar, in an island which exports annually over 30,000 hogsheads. Moreover, there is, in the opposite column, the very significant entry of one ' abandoned ' estate brought back into culti- vation. It is indeed high time that more attention was paid to the actual condition and the actual prospects of this sugar growing in the West Indies. We shall here briefly lay out the facts of the case, collating all by the aid of recent personal experience in almost every West Indian island. We shall confine our exposition, in the main, to these islands ; they yield us three-quarters of our own colonial supply. Sugar that is grown in the Mauritius and the East Indies, in Natal and in Queensland, finds its chief market in the Eastern Hemisphere. It may be noticed incidentally that the local demand in South Africa and in Australia is increasing rapidly, but it is increasing out of all proportion to the increase of sugar planting in these large colonies. In Australia, at the beginning of this century, there was no market for sugar. Now, in the Australias there Sugar Bounties. 77 has come to exist a rapidly increasing population of nearly 3,000,000, and all great consumers of sugar. Over the vast interior of the ' island con- tinent ' sugar is among the most important of the 'rations,' which form part of the pay of shepherds, stockmen, and others ; and in the cities, that are appearing with such rapidity, well-to-do communi- ties of Englishmen are vying with the mother country in their large consumption of sugar per head. But these West Indies these 'tropical farms of the British Isles,' as they have been termed are the English sugar colonies in most direct con- nection with the English market, and therefore the group of colonies most typical of our colonial sugar industries, so far as they are influenced by European Bounties. At the very threshold we must notice that there is one great fact persistent throughout the history of West Indian sugar-planting, and that is the fact of the perpetual plaint that all is going wrong. The ' groans of the planters,' that made so great a stir in 1670, have never ceased since then to burden the atmosphere. This is, indeed, fresh evidence in support of the plausible theory that the secret of Englishmen's success is their native propensity to grumble. West Indian planters, like 78 State Aid and State Interference. their fellow-agriculturists in England, are never satisfied ; and it is well they are not. They will have it that what they attempt is done better elsewhere, and the consequence is that they do things better than they are done elsewhere. They grumble that the French have tramways in Guada- loupe, and with this grumbling they introduce better trams on their own estates. The outrageous assertions of the present evil effect of the Bounties do not surpass the frantic anticipations of evil which centred, in days gone by, respectively rouud the abolition of slave labour, the competition of slave versus free-grown sugar, and, more lately, the extinction of the sugar duties in England. Forebodings just as dismal, arrays of figures just as curious, arguments just as little founded on fact, cropped up in these episodes, and with the same urgency and the same need of ex- planation as in this last. But the sugar-growing industry has managed to survive. It may be it has changed ; it may be it is destined to yet further change ; but its destruction would seem to be as far off as ever The English public that abolished slavery and the sugar duties, offered speedy compensation in the greatly increased consumption of sugar in Eng- Sugar Bounties. 79 land that followed on each of these high-principled acts. In 1840 the total sugar consumed in Eng- land was 4,500,000 cwt., its value was about 10,000,000, and the consumption at the rate of 15 lbs. per head. In 1873 the consumption had risen to 51 lbs. per head. The duties were finally abolished in 1874, and for the year 1879 the total of consumption was at the rate of 65 lbs. per head, representing a total of 20,000,000 cwt., for which no less than 27,000,000 was paid. We are now face to face with the latest phase of these complaints. We are told that the abolition of these duties injured West India sugar-growing by allowing unbridled play to the baneful effects of Bounties that are given in sundry foreign countries on the export of sugar. Incidentally, however, it will be remarked that these very Bounties them- selves only exist in countries where sugar duties continue to be levied ; and the abolition of these duties in England set up England herself as a most successful example of a country thriving in an atmosphere where Bounties are impossibilities, and where the market for cane sugar is free of access. That this example has not been without effect we see in the fact that the French and other Bounty- yielding countries, are already exclaiming they can 80 State Aid and State Interference. no longer compete with English refiners, or with colonial growers of sugar. Thus this much-com- plained of abolition of sugar duties has in itself come to be one of the most powerful arguments towards the destruction of these very Bounties that are regarded with such pious and unfeigned horror. Before considering the Bounties themselves, the real measure of their effect, and the best means to their removal, it is well briefly to examine, by the light of recent local knowledge, the present condition of the industry of sugar growing in our West Indian colonies. We shall at once find that these colonies have, during the present century, passed through three periods the one, of corruption and collapse culminating in the abolition of slavery in 1838 ; the second, of mismanagement and uncertainty, lasting up to some ten or twelve years ago, when matters became more settled ; the third period that has since set in is of steady progress, and of a far more healthy and hopeful tone generally of enterprise and man- agement. The most significant feature of the middle or transition period was the odd reluctance with which those most concerned came to recognise the dawn of new and more favourable conditions. It has alwavs been common to confine causes to the Sugar Bounties. 81 single influence of slavery and emancipation. And this common error is rarely rectified by the alto- gether necessary, if forgotten addition of the fact, that prices of sugar have seen as great changes as this labour question. In the world's market, from causes quite extrinsic to the West Indies, the price of sugar has since the period of emancipation fallen from 50/. to 20/. a ton. It is true, that here again the vast increase in consumption which England's free trade policy has enabled her to enter upon, has in great measure compensated this enormous fall in prices. Prices may have fallen to one-third of what they were, but the Englishman consumes just three times as much as he used to do. This would be very palpable compensation, but for the fact that the West Indian growers do not provide him with the extra supply he now consumes. And this is in great measure the fault of the West Indian grower him- self: but it is a fault he is fast remedying. His chief obstacle has, hitherto, been his being trammelled at every step by the traditions and the arrangements created by and for a state of affairs that has passed away. And the dying voice of this old dispensation is the present persistent outcry that Bounties are creating much loss, suffering, and injury to our West Indian su war-growers. G 82 State Aid and State Interference. As a matter of fact the West Indian colonies, even under present arrangements, seem capable of producing sugar cheaper than it can be produced elsewhere, or from other plants. Mr. Quintin Hogg pointed out (Ques. 3871) : ' You get in saccharine matter four times as much to the acre in Demerara as you would get in France/ Any one conversant with the West Indies will acknowledge that the actual cost of growing and manufacturing sugar ranges from 91. to 121. per hogshead. The cost of putting this sugar in the English market ought not to exceed SI. or 41. a hogshead. European beet-root growers and manufacturers universally declare that a price of 181. a ton is a price that will, if per- manent, destroy their industry altogether. The limit that will destroy beet-growing will only curtail profit in cane-growing as at present carried on in the West Indies. This fact should suffice to show Bounty-giving countries the prompt necessity of a reform of their ways. The boasted effect of these Bounties is to lower prices in the great English market ; but this, in the end, is to abolish Bounties, by rendering impossible the industry they were insti- tuted to support. The 'bounty-fed' refiners already cry out. M. Leon Say himself complains: ' Ce qui est certain, dans tous les cas, e'est qu'a l'inverse de Sugar Bounties. 83 ce qui existe pour les raffineurs Francois, les raffi- neurs Anglais peuvent obtenir leur matiere premiere a un prix inferieur a ce qui devrait etre son prix norma].' Growers are also discovering their error. In his Report for Mr. Ritchie's Committee on the sugar industry in Germany, our Secretary to the Embassy tells us, 'the average cost of manufacturing raw sugar from beet would be about thirty marks (30s.) a cwt.' And at the present, whatever the actual cost of production on the spot, the governments of these countries allow the general public to sub- scribe to make good any losses the refiners and growers may become subject to, owing to the low prices forced upon the market. How far, and for how long, a confiding public will thus continue this thankless and baneful charity time only can prove. It is well worth putting on record the figures supplied to Mr. Ritchie's Committee by Mr. Hogg of the export of sugar from the British West Indies. They exhibit a marked, sustained, and definite in- crease. They, of course, vary from year to year. There are few crops more variable than the cane crop. It will therefore be well to record the totals for four-year periods, and so eliminate this element g 2 84 State Aid and State Interference. Years. 1841-47 184851 185255 185659 186063 186467 186871 187275 187679 of uncertainty, and better fit the figures for general perusal Export of Sugar from the British West Indies. Totals per four-year periods, in Tods. 554,000 544,000 608,000 649,000 754,000 797,000 903,000 900,000 975,000 From 1844 to 1865 for twenty-one years the actual annual total never reached 200,000. Since 1865 for sixteen years the annual total has never been below 200,000, except in the two years 1869 and 1872. It will be observed, also, that in the period 1872-75 there is a falling off, slight indeed, but still not an increase. This is worth noticing, in spite of the more than compensating increase in the next period, 1876-79; this latter great increase, it will be remembered, comes immediately after the abolition of sugar duties when Bounties were said to be of most effect. That this abnormal decrease was the effect of seasons alone, we know when we see that the crops of 1872 and 1873 were very much below the average (amounting but to 400.000 for the Sugar Bounties. 85 two years) ; and there is further proof in the fact that for those two years the prices of sugar were, in the words of the Report of the Committee, ' abnormally high.' It is well to notice parenthetically, that, though the present condition of the industry of sugar growing in our West Indian colonies is in a con- dition which enables it to contemplate without anxiety the competition of beet-root in the future, it is in a condition, nevertheless, which is itself capable of vast improvement. Those concerned with the West Indian industries themselves give palpable proof of this in the vast sums annually expended in machinery, and the introduction of improved methods of cultivation and manufacture. In Bar- bados, for instance, sugar land fetches nearly 100/. an acre at this day. These prices would not be maintained in a despairing community. It has been remarked that the sight, not uncom- mon in Jamaica, of a ruined windmill or watermill is a welcome sight, inasmuch as it tells a tale, not of relapse, but of advance ; a tale of the fertilizing introduction of steam power and fresh skill and fresh capital ; and, in a similar sense, it is true that of late years the records of estates abandoned, and of estates sold for what they would fetch, are signs, not of 86 State Aid and State Interference. demise, but of fresh life. In the days of slavery and of high prices estates were started over large areas ; in the coarse of years most of these became encumbered with jointures and charges. In the days of collapse that ensued, both in regard to* the labour question and in regard to price, the absentee proprietors of these charges and encum- brances let matters ' drift ' in the hope of better times ; they looked to the future to solve both the labour and the price troubles. In most cases these estates were owned in groups, and the very favour- ably situated paid sufficient profit to cover, for the time, the losses on the badly situated. By degrees that were altogether too slow, estates were one by one put out of cultivation or sold ; and it is one great advantage of low prices that they considerably accelerate this salutary process. There were many estates continued io working that had yielded profits when sugar was at 50/., but which had no chance of doing so with sugar at 20/. There were many estates that could well yield profits sufficient for one or two incomes, even when prices had so fallen ; but such estates only too often remained charged with the supply of the five or six private incomes that had of old easily been yielded by the higher prices. It is, then, a gain to all to find the one class of estate Sugar Bounties. 87 absolutely put out of cultivation, and to find the other sold for what it will fetch ; and sold, moreover, to new owners who, no longer burdened with the old charges and jointures, may proceed forthwith to make excellent commercial profit out of the legiti- mate advantages the West Indies undoubtedly possess over most other countries in this matter of sugar growing. These high prices also helped to maintain among many planters a proud abstention from attempting to remedy the losses and difficulties that had come of the abolition of slavery. There arose, not unnatu- rally, a bitter class feeling, brooding over the fact that in order to achieve a national object the indi- vidual had been made to suffer ; there had been an apparent breach of justice, and the injured class sat down on their estates, and when things went wrong, enjoyed an uncouth and baneful satisfaction in proving to the world that the injury done was material. These ideas are not yet completely eradicated, and they are partly to blame for a slowness, apparent most in Jamaica, among planters to improve their cultivation. Already, however, sufficient has been done to prove at once the actual value of these improvements and spread the know- ledge that they are possible. Ploughing, weeding, 88 State Aid and State Interference. manuring, and irrigation, have been proved to greatly increase the quantity of cane to the acre. Better breeding, better care, and better handling of the ' working oxen,' have curtailed largely the expenses of ' hauling ' or taking the cane to the mill. Tramways, and ' wire railways ' for ravines, have been introduced with similar effect. The ' Usine ' system will probably pay in certain dis- tricts when introduced. The railway extensions, and new coastwise steamers, will largely relieve many districts of their heavy expenditure in the matter of the carriage of the sugar to the port of shipment. Altogether, there are many prospects of considerably cheapening the present cost of production. It will be seen then, that, so far as facts go, the West Indian sugar industry is in a far better and far healthier plight than it has ever been before. This industry has, indeed, suffered from two causes natural and 'human.' Adverse seasons in the one case, and our own widespread commercial de- pression in the other, have acted most deleteriously on production and on consumption. 2. These two -classes of causes have, however, in recent investigations, been ignored in favour of one small species of a third genus the political. And yet it is difficult eminently difficult to trace any Sugar Bounties. 89 real effect of any magnitude directly to this parti- cular division. The centre of the argument, at which we have now arrived, is the fact that certain foreign countries give Bounties, on the export of sugar. We pass, then, to ascertain the real measure of this effect, and the best means for the removal of these Bounties. The battle waged round these Bounties may be well likened to some mediaeval struggle for a standard, wherein leading knights find themselves suddenly the cynosure of all eyes ; and when the real contests and material combats of the rest of the field are forthwith hushed and suspended, as if by mutual consent, in order that all eyes may feast on an intrinsically insignificant incident that has now become the centre and point of all effort. The possession of the standard in itself is of little value so much wood and linen, or, it may be, silk. So with these Bounties; all other arguments seem suspended, and the contest centres itself on a some- thing, which, the more we look into it, the less does it prove to be of material value or influence. As with the military standard, so these Bounties are fought over with such fierce excitement that all inquiry is for the time ignored as to the intrinsic value of the Bounty itself. Many men rush to the 90 State Aid and State Interference. attack with the battle-cry, ' Bounties lower prices ; ' they heed not, neither do they require proof of the measure of this asserted influence, or of the con- nection of the result with the asserted cause. The whole influence of these Bounties needs to be set out clearly. Many of those interested in the trade have of late years sought to impress the outside public with the idea that Bounties are the cause of all these ills. The instinct of the outside public has, as yet, refused to credit all this ; and it is well, in the interests both of those concerned in the trade as well as of the general consuming public, to seek out the grounds on which this instinctive reasoning is based. The Bounties, in the first place, are supposed greatly to encourage the production of sugar from beet-root. Granting that this be so, it is obvious the cane-grower cannot complain, unless this action lowers prices. From some of the Tables in the Appendix to this Report we can cull most apposite figures, even though we regret that these tables fail to bring results further than the year 1874. Years 1664. 1S05. I860. 1867. 1808. 18ti:>. s. (I. s. d. s. d. s. d. s. d. s. d. Triers uf cane sugar ... 28 11 ... 23 S ... 22 2 ... J-J 5 ... LM 1 ... 25 10 Hundreds of ( of bee M * 5 .; 7 7 thousands of "* { tons grown I '^'^ j 11 M 15 I! 10 10 Sugar Bounties. 91 YeaYs (continued) 1870. 1871. 1872. 1873. 1874. s. d. . d. s. d. s. d. s. d. Prices of cane sugar ... 24 1 . .. 26 3 ., .. 26 11 . .. 23 2 ., .. 22 4 Hundreds of f of beet ) 9 thousands of s , u ar { 9 11 11 10 tons grown [ ot c j e j 16 16 18 18 17 We see there is a sustained increase, year by year, in both crops till 1874, in which year there is a slight falling off in both largest proportionately in the beet crop. We see also that beet increases far faster than cane ; and, in the ten years under review, beet, from monopolizing in the first year about 2-9 ths of the supply, comes in the last year to monopolize over 3-9ths. But it will be noticed that prices show no tendency whatever of Icing affected by the alterations in the proportions of beet and cane supplies. Commencing at a high figure, prices fall rapidly ; but only to rise again nearly to the same height, and then again to fall. And this relation of price to this beet v. cane argument is further illustrated by a table supplied by Mr. Lubbock. In this Mr. Lubbock gives most interesting data in regard to the effect of the detailed growth of the beet crop on detailed prices of cane sugar, and the results are most sig- nificant. 92 State Aid and State Interference. Years : -1865. 1866. 1867. 1868. 1869. 1870. s. rf. *. d. s. d. s. d. s. d. *. d. Prices of cane (Trinidad) 21 6 . .. 18 8 ... 20 10 ... 22 5 ... 22 11 , ... 19 8 Beet crop ; increase or \ decrease per cent. | over previous year's j crop. J + 34 + 22 + 4 + li + 27 + 11 Years (continued) :- -1871. 1872. 1873. 1874. 1S75. s. d s. d. s.d. s. d. s. d. Prices of cane (Trinidad) 23 4 ... 24 10 ... 20 1 ... 19 7 ... 18 4 Beet crop ; increase or > decrease p 000 " ^> 000 = " HS,000to n , "' TonfFranfe^.!} 47 ' 000 " 31 > 000 ~ 2S.000 = - 19,000 m * R fro"rL s gund E !!!} 197 ' 000 - 167 ' 000 - 203 ' 000 = + 6 > 000 French refiners in these respects are stationary, and Dutch and Belgian actually retrogressing. Our West Indian producers also continue to increase their output ; and these facts give the lie to the supposition that Bounty-fed beet-growing is or can be in any way successful in supplanting the cane- growing of the tropics. It is in these facts that England has her most powerful argument her one great lever. We could even contemplate the substitution for the troublesome penal clause, in a convention of this example, of the pre-eminent success of England's freed production of sugar, both raw r and refined. So may England, in years to come, bring the Bounty-giving States to see that, while they dis- cover that Bounties injure their own native indus- tries, and become a terrible drag on their own exchequers, yet that these Bounties are quite incapable of making anything like a ' disastrous Sugar Bounties. Ill impression ' on the ' Home and Colonial Sugar In- dustries of this Country/ for the reason that these industries in the British Empire are free of the baneful incubus of the Bounty system. With these facts in our pockets we may safely face negotia- tions for a new convention ; we may trust, even if with hope rather than with confidence, that other Governments will in due course pay heed to their experience in their own exchequers, and to the unanimous opinions of their own sugar growers and refiners, as to the deleterious influence of the Bounty system, and that they will follow the successful lead of England in removing all that in any way directs or restricts industrial energy and deprives it of its essential liberty to follow its natural bent. 112 State Aid and State Interference. CHAPTER V. PROTECTION IN YOUNG COMMUNITIES. 1. Parallel cases of Victoria and New South Wales. 2. The Promotion of Manufactures. 3. The Raising of Revenue. 4. The Promotion of General Prosperity. 5. Value of this test case. 1. John Stuart Mill has told us that Protec- tion, altogether demolished as a general principle, might be found under certain conditions economically defensible in a young community. This hypothetical concession on Mill's part has had a direct and practical effect on the commercial policies adopted in some States notably in one or two of our own Colonies and in the United States. But Mill in this argument expressly declares he is only dealing with what might be, ami that the whole argument only applies, provided certain conditions come to be realized. Professor Sumner, of Yale, one of the Protection in Young Communities. 113 ablest economists in the United States, well sums up the point in the words, " In these, as in other matters, we cannot argue with certainty from what might have been." Both he and Mill regret the absence of recorded facts on this point of Protection in Young Communities. Recent experiences enable me in some measure to make good this deficiency, and to fill up this gap in the experiential foundations of Political Economy, with what, for all practical purposes, is a test case. For this purpose I simply summarise facts recorded in authoritative official records. The history for the past ten years of our two great Colonies of Victoria and New South Wales provides us with the necessary records. This is the first time in history that we meet with the story, told in the details of actual fact, of two young communities growing up side by side with practically similar eco- nomic environments and opportunities, but pursuing the one a Free Trade and the other a Protectionist policy. In Victoria, in the year 1865, Sir J. Mac- Culloch introduced a modified form of Protection, and since 1871 there has prevailed that very inten- sified form of which the late Premier, Mr. Graham Berry, has been the persistent advocate. Over this same period, and more especially since 1874, New I 114 State Aid and State Interference. South Wales has followed an essentially Free Trade course. It may be added that I had the good fortune to sojourn in these Colonies in the year 1870, and again in the year 1878. This implies the advantage of personal and local experience of the two Colonies, and of the two Colonies at two periods separated by an appropriate interval of eight years. So far as the purpose in hand is concerned, these two Colonies were in the year 1870 sufficient counterparts of each other in regard to economic environments and opportunities. Either community may be described as a pioneer band of the great English nation, engaged in opening up virgin lands rich in all natural wealth. Our fellow-countrymen in Victoria and in New South Wales had provided for themselves all the aids and advantages our present civilisation offers. Eoads, railways, telegraphs, postal arrangements, sea communications, education, and so forth, were all in a high state of perfection. All the facilities of life under the care of energetic adminis- trations had developed with marked rapidity. At the same time these two Colonies yield to no country in the world in the richness of their natural endow- ments. Both above and below ground the soil is pregnant with wealth ; and the climate is all Protection in Young Communities. 115 Englishmen can desire for the due exertion of their productive energies. Thus in these two Colonies the scientific industry of this nineteenth century had found its most favourable opportunities. In the nature of things, these two Colonies are, for the present, producers mainly of raw material which they exchange for the manufactured products of more populous centres. Thus we find the inhabitants of these Colonies import twice as much value per head as the inhabitants of the British Islands. This is a fact of much value to our present purpose. The United States have been perpetually put forward in the Free Trade controversy. But the United States only import a value of 21. per head of population per annum. We in these British Islands import, say, 10/. per head. But in these two Colonies the imports are, in value, 20/. per head of population per annum. Consequently, the direct effect of high or low tariffs is ten times as great in these instances as in that of the United States, and the value of these instances ten times as great to the economist. The necessary starting-point of the comparison is the determination that at the beginning of the decade these two young communities were the sufficient counterparts of each other in regard to economic environments and opportunities. The I 2 116 State Aid and State Interference. Protectionists of Victoria offer justification or apology for their swerving from the straight course pursued by New South Wales on the three pleas of lesser extent of territory, larger population, and absence of coal. In regard to this lesser extent of territory, we find that Victoria has sold 11,000,000 acres, and has 45,000,000 still unsold ; and that New South Wales has sold 33,000,000 acres, and has still 165,000,000 acres unsold. In each case the State has sold, or in other words has settled, from one-fourth to one- fifth of its area. In each case there remain over three-fourths of the area open for settlement. At present the population to the square mile in Victoria is ten persons, and in New South Wales three persons. In the United Kingdom the proportion is 270. Both Colonies are thus only on the threshold of their career as populated and developed countries. There is the real difference that the future capabilities of New South Wales are greater. But the present case refers solely to the past ten years. And during that decade the extent of the unoccupied lands is not so much to the point as the fact that in either case there are three-fourths of the soil of the Colony still open for settlement. In each Colony men are pushing on with their Protection in Young Communities. 117 flocks and their herds to occupy new areas of virgin soil, and the plough follows in their track to pioneer agricultural settlement. In neither case has this operation as yet advanced over the whole. That is the condition at the present ; and we are dealing with the past, and not with the future. In regard to the larger population of Victoria, that also is a relative matter. Each Colony is but sparsely populated. Victoria, the size of England, Wales, and Scotland combined, is at the present peopled by a population equalling that of Kent only. New South Wales is about three times the size of Victoria, with a somewhat smaller population. In either case, after deducting the quarter of the population that congregates in the capital of each Colony, we have but a very sparse and scattered population over the interior. It must be conceded, however, that in so far as the population of Victoria is relatively denser than that of New South Wales, in so far manufactures, or revenue, or prosperity, or growth should develop with greater natural speed in Victoria than in New South Wales ; in so far as Victoria had a larger or a denser population than New South Wales, in so far Victoria started with superior natural or inherent advantages in those 118 State Aid and State Interference. very objects to foster which Victorians instituted their policy of Protection. In regard to the great superiority of New South Wales in the production of coal, it is well to re- member that this coal is produced on the Hunter River, and has to be earned thence by sea to Sydney, which is the centre of manufacturing enterprise. It is well known that when once coal has to be shipped the difference in length of voyage of one day to Sydney or three days to Melbourne makes but little difference in actual cost. So that in the question of fuel for manufacturers there is little practical difference in regard to coal supply in the two Colonies. As a wealth-yielding force against the coal of New South Wales must be set off the great superiority of Victoria in the produc- tion of gold. It is true that the gold industry has declined rapidly in Victoria in output, and in number of men employed. But we must remember there is also a gold-mining industry in New South Wales which has also declined. This decline is due to the fact that gold was first dis- covered in alluvial soil, disintegrated from the quartz by the action of nature. Alluvial diggings provided a rich harvest ; but they soon became exhausted, and miners had to turn to extracting the gold from Protection in Young Communities. 119 the primeval envelope of quartz. This led to a complete revolution in the mining industry. The falling off of the output in gold consequent on this revolution was not the annihilation of capital, nor was it the forcing labour to leave the Colony in search of employment. The city of Ballarat survived and continued to thrive as the great centre of the investment of capital in mining, which had super- seded 'digging.' Quartz reefs had to be attacked instead of alluvial plains, and this change involved investment of more capital : powerful engines, colossal stamping machinery, and miles of tunnelled galleries and shafts had become necessary, and gold mining needed and absorbed a far greater amount of capital than in the old days when picks and shovels and wooden cradles were all the plant and imple- ments requisite. Much of the very capital that the rich gold ' diggings ' had yielded was at once in- vested in these new works. But there remained over much capital so accumulated which was not thus utilised, and which was there ready to start or promote any new industries. Labour, too, was set free. In 1871 there were over 57,0U0 gold-miners in Victoria, By the year 1878 the number had dwindled to 37,000. This had set free in Victoria some 20,000 men of the artisan and 120 State Aid and State Interference. mechanic class of a class, too, which was originally recruited very largely from the manufacturing dis- tricts of the Old Country. There was thus provided during this decade, labour of a very applicable type for those very manufactories which were now to be fostered by Protection. Thus in this respect, in this very failure of the gold industry, Victoria gained over New South Wales in this supply of capital and of appropriate labour for those purposes for which the high tariff was imposed. Besides this, the greater amount of gold obtained in Victoria had attracted at once a far larger popula- tion, and yielded forthwith much capital. This led to the fact that in Victoria, at the beginning of the decade under review, the railway system, and indeed all the facilities of life, had reached a higher stage of development than those of New South Wales. In every respect, then, we see that if there was any difference between the two Colonies ten years ago, it was a difference in favour of Victoria, so far as the starting manfactories, the affording revenue, or the promoting the general growth of prosperity were concerned. And these were the objects fur which the high tariff was imposed. In 1870, then, such were the relative economic positions of Victoria and New South Wales. What Protection in Young Communities. 121 happened during the succeeding decade is set out in a variety of official documents and records, in greater part issued by the Victorian Government. These results range themselves conveniently under the heads Manufactures, Revenue, General Prosperity and Growth. 2. Manufactures. When Protection speaks of fostering manufactures it speaks of fostering those industries which result in the production of commo- dities other than food and raw materials. And the plea is that, except for such fostering, these industries will be slow to arise in the community. Do we find justification of this in fact ? The evidences are to be seen in the employments of the people and of capital ; in the output of manufactured articles ; and in the number and kind of manufactures developed. In regard to the employment of the people, we find that at the end of the decade there were 25,000 persons making their living in manufactories in New South Wales, equivalent to 37 per cent, of the total population. In Victoria there were 28,000 persons so employed, equivalent to 3*2 per cent, of the larger population of that Colony. This so far disposes of the argument so often advanced that Protection pro- motes civilisation by providing civilised employment for the people in a new community. 122 State Aid and State Interference. Again, in Victoria during the decade, population had increased by one-eighth ; but the number of hands employed in manufactures had increased one-third. Side by side with this we remember the very pertinent fact that the greater falling off in gold-mining had set free a large body of appropriate labour. There was this transference from one congenial occupation to another, but no development of any new class of operatives. By this transference of forces Victorian manufactures received an impetus totally uncon- nected with any fiscal or commercial policy. Unfortunately the official records are in number of manufactories, and they afford no evidence of the size of the units so recorded. The number of foundries, clothing manufactories, agricultural implement and other works, has largely increased in both Colonies. So far as kind goes we find that as great a variety of manufactures has come into being under the low as under the high tariff. In either case the development as compared with the great natural industries of the country is insignificant. In one or two instances such industries have as- sumed larger dimensions in Victoria than in New South Wales. There are now, for instance, 750 hands employed in woollen manufacture in Victoria as compared with the 300 in New South Protection in Young Communities. 123 Wales. But then, to counterbalance this, we find one manufacturing industry which has grown up in the Free Trade and dwindled in the Protectionist Colony, and that is the important industry of shipbuilding. Ten years ago Victoria built 800 tons of shipping, and New South Wales built 1,800 tons. Now the annual output is only 400 tons for Victoria, while it has risen to 3,000 in New South Wales. Under the low tariff this important industry has doubled itself; under the high tariff it has diminished by one-half. As an example of what is at present proceeding we have a report of its committee to the Association of the protected bootmakers at Melbourne, in which the following passage occurs : " Our travellers report to us that they find very great difficulty in placing our goods on the neighbouring markets, -principally through the ' competition of Sydney with their own manufacture, and European imported, sold suffi- ciently low to secure the custom. It must be remembered that Sydney has always had a steady export of her own manufactures, and that her manufacturers are giving inducements to our best workpeople to remove there. It also must be re- membered that all leathers the boot manufacturer's raw material are admitted free into the port of Sydney, while an import duty of 7^-, 10, and 20 per 124 State Aid and State Interference. cent, is enforced in Victoria, thereby placing the Sydney manufacturer at an advantage." It is not easy, in the absence of definite records, to estimate the actual output from these manufac- tories, and in neither Colony is there any appreciable export of commodities locally manufactured. But if we compare the articles which are imported into Victoria under a heavy duty, and which enter New South Wales free, we shall find that, in spite of the increase in price, Victoria still is forced to supply herself with these ' prohibited ' or ' weighted ' foreign articles ; and imports of these classes, on an annual average, about as much as the unprotected New South Wales. Consequently, in regard to the development of manufactures in these new communities, we find there is not much difference in results between the Free Trade and the Protectionist policy if we look at the employment of people, output of manufactured articles, and number and kind of manufactures actually developed. $ 3. Revenue. Protection, especially for young communities, is over and over again defended on the plea that revenue must be raised. This plea is common with statesmen not only in one or two of our own Colonies, but in the United States. It is Protection in Young Communities. 125 the great plea set up in Germany by the Bismarck party. This plea proceeds on the assumption that the higher the tariff the greater must be the revenue derived from the customs duties. Theoretical econo- mists point out that " to tax your trade is to destroy your trade ; " that " where Protection begins there Revenue ends ; " that " to hamper the entry of goods into your market by heavy duties is to starve even unto death the goose that is to lay your golden eggs of Revenue." More practical economists hold that it is a mere question of balances, and that it is conceivable so cunningly to adjust the duties that, while inevitably destroying some of the trade existing under a lower tariff, this higher tariff yet sucks more revenue in the aggregate out of the lesser trade that remains. The question is really solved only by appeal to experience. And ex- perience tells us that a low Customs' tariff yields most actual revenue. It appears, if we look to the records, that the annual revenue derived from the high tariff in the United States has fallen steadily during the last decade from thirty-seven to twenty-seven millions sterling. During the same period the English low tariff steadily contributed and still contributes an annual contribution to the revenue of twenty millions sterling. During the 126 State Aid and State Interference. decade the population of the United States has been increased by ten millions of people, that of the United Kingdom by only four millions. So the English people, with all the acknowledged advantages of a low tariff, contribute, pro rata, actually more revenue by the means of customs duties than the citizens of the United States, who are hampered by all the acknowledged evils of a high, a very high tariff. The recorded results over the same decade in Victoria and New South Wales corroborate in a striking manner this matter-of-fact conclusion. During the decade the amount derived from customs duties in New South Wales has gradually risen from 950,000/. to 1,300,000/. Over the same period the high tariff' has provided to the Victoria revenue annual contributions which, if they have fluctuated at all, have shown a downward tendency, and now yield annually 1,400,000/. It will be observed that the smaller population of New South Wales con- tributes as much to the revenue by the means of its low tariff as the larger population of Victoria con- tributes by means of its high tariff. These are facts and not fancies, and it is only by ignoring them or being ignorant of them that any responsible authority can put forward this revenue argument. Protection in Young Communities. 127 4. General Prosperity and Growth. I have said that Victoria and New South Wales each imports twice as much per head of population as we do in these islands. It is obvious that any policy which affects their imports must affect their general life and well-being to a degree unknown even in these commercial islands. And I pass to compare the two Colonies in regard to general prosperity and growth. The signs of this are external and internal; the signs are to be seen in their dealings with the out- side world and also in their domestic condition. Firstly, then, as regards their dealings with the outside world. This is a most significant index of their actual welfare, seeing that their external trade is double in value per head of population to what it is even in England. This trade is a sure indicator of prosperity, inasmuch as it is a sure indicator of any increase or decrease in consumption and pro- duction, the two visible factors of prosperity. Ten years ago New South Wales was doing an external trade of the annual value of 19,000,000/. A decade of steady increase brought this total up to 29,500,000/. in 1880. Ten years ago Victoria was doing an annual external trade of 27,600,009/. In the succeeding decade a wavering line of rise and fall brings us to an annual total of 128 State Aid and State Interference. 30,500,000/. for 1880. Under the high tariff external trade increased during the decade by one-ninth only. Under the low tariff external trade increased by more than one-half of its previous annual total The full significance of this is seen when we find New South Wales, at the end of the decade, doing 10,000,000/. more annual trade than at the begin- ning, while Victoria was only doing some 3,000,000/. more. Ten per cent, profit on such trade would mean an addition to the annual national income of New South Wales of 1,000,000/., and to that of Victoria only some 300,000/. Incidentally it is worthy of note that the German Government, perhaps the best informed Government at present in existence, has chosen for the head- quarters of its Consul-General for Australasia the capital of the low tariff Colony, although the high tariff Colony is at the present moment ahead in number of population and in value of external trade. The Germans evidently judge of the certain future by means of the recorded past. Further instruction follows on further analysis of this external trade. If we turn to the exports we find that ten years ago the value of articles, the produce or manufacture of the Colony itself, was exactly 77 per cent, of the total value exported from Protection in Young Communities. 129 each Colony. At the end of the decade we find the amount of this native produce exported had risen to 83 per cent, in New South Wales, but had fallen to 68 in Victoria. In other words, under the low tariff there had been increase, and under the high tariff decrease, in the exportable surplus of native products, a most important sign of prosperity and growth. If we turn to the imports we find that ten years ago there entered New "South Wales goods to the value of 9,000,000/. At the end of the decade this annual value had mounted to 14,000,000/., an increase of 60 per cent. Ten years ago the imports into Victoria were of the value of 12,500,000/. At the end of the decade this 'annual value had mounted to 14,600,000/., an increase of 20 per cent. only. In other words, not only the power but the using of the power to purchase foreign produce (and there was profit accruing to each purchase made) increased by about three times the speed under the low tariff to what it did under the high tariff. There is another point in this external trade of much significance. In New South Wales there has been an increase in the tonnage of the shipping- visiting the Colony during the decade, from 1,500,000 to 2,600,000 tons. In Victoria the increase has been from 1,300,000 to 2,200,000. It may be said that K 130 State Aid and State Interference. this difference in growth is inevitable under a low as opposed to a high tariff, but it none the less repre- sents a fountain of popular well-being, drawn upon in the one case to a much more profitable extent than in the other. In connection with this shipping there are the very important records of ballast. There came to New South Wales during the decade 3,000,000 tons of shipping in ballast. There left New South Wales during the decade 117,000 tons of shipping in ballast. There came to Victoria during the decade 113,000 tons in ballast. There left Victoria 2,500,000 tons, the greater proportion of which proceeded to New South Wales. Empty ships arriving in New South Wales have increased from an annual tonnage of 220,000 in 1870 to a tonnage of 320,000 in 1880. Empty ships leaving Victoria have increased from an annual tonnage of 198,000 tons in 1870 to a tonnage of 250,000 in 1880. 1 It will be observed that the con- ditions are exactly reversed in favour of the growth of the low-tariff colony. 1 The Sydney Morning Herald, in an able loader on my article, very properly suggests that some of this ballasting may be tine to the fact that vessels freighted to Melbourne afterwards come on to New South Wall's for coal. But the Herald p lints out that hesides this Sydney is rapidly becoming the one mercantile centre of tin- Australian seas. Protection in Young Communities. 131 The domestic or internal condition and progress of these two Colonies will complete the illustrations we would give of their growth and prosperity. In the first place, in regard to poipidation, we find that that of New South Wales has increased from 520,000 in 1870 to 740,000 in 1880, an increase of 48 per cent. The population of Victoria has in- creased from 730,000 in 1870 to 860,000 in 1880, an increase of only 17 per cent. In the second place, in regard to wealth, already we have seen in every point we have touched upon the far greater rapidity with which wealth-producing developments have been proceeding in New South Wales than in Victoria. From this we infer the fact that wealth is being produced in similar ratio. And when we read that the value of rateable property has doubled in New South Wales in the decade, and only increased by one-half in Victoria, we have our inference signally verified by recorded facts. Singular evidence is afforded, also, by the statistics of the Savings Banks. In New South Wales the deposits have increased from 930,000/. to 1,500,000/. ; and the number of the depositors from 21,000 to 32,000. In Victoria the deposits have increased from 1,100,000/. to 1,000,000/.; but the depositors have increased in number from 38,000 to 70,000. k 2 l:>2 State Aid and State Interference. In other words, the average amount deposited has risen in New South Wales steadily from 44/. per head to 47/. In Victoria the average deposited per head has fallen from 29/. to 15/. This is evidence corroborating the fact so commonly asserted that in democratic Victoria wealth is accumulating in the hands of the few. This is a result generally asso- ciated with a high tariff by all writers on political economy. It is a result which, in its direct an- tagonism to the wholesome principle of equable distribution of wealth, stamps it as one of the most injurious results of a high tariff. Illustrative of this tendency is the fact that the average wages of skilled labour grew in New South Wales, during the decade, from being lower to being higher than similar waJ .510 27 17-0 50 -o 26-0 lit -8 Total 54-2 126,003 127, S-5 100 100 Germany. Food Amount. Percentage. 1S69. 1S79. 1S09. 1 79. 1S69. 1879. Marks. 567,126 767,060 677,277 Marks. 758.970 945,660 1,071,020 28, 350 38,383 43,864 37,948 47. 2-3 53,551 25 -6 34 7 39-7 27-3 34-0 38-7 Raw Materials. Manufactured Articles ... Total 2,212,003' 2,775.050 110.603* 138,782 100 100 The values tor 1S0O are estimated onlv. It will be observed that the percentage of manu- factures to total exports decreases in proportion as the tariff is higher and more avowedly protective. It is well to compare particular points. We are frequently warned that in textile manu- factures our day of supremacy is past and gone. And we are told France is wise in her generation Foreign Competition in Manufactures. 233 in keeping to an elaborate scale of duties. If we look to results we find that in supplying the markets of the world, we are not only at the present doing nearly five times the foreign business that France is doing, but within the last 20 years , while our export of textiles has increased 50 per cent, that of France has decreased 10 per cent. The figures are worthy of record : Export3 of Textile Manufactures. (Cotton, linen, silk, and woollen.) 1S59. 1869. 1S79. 1880. France 32,000,000 ... 35,000,000 ... 28,000,000 ... 29,000,000 England 73,000,000 ... 107,000,000 ... 94,000,000 ... 109,000,000 Perhaps there is no State in the world that has set to work so determinedly to foster manufactures by the means of a high customs tariff as the United States. Mr. Mulhall in his valuable work The Balance Sheet of Nations gives some very remark- able figures. He tells us that in 1870 the inha- bitants of these islands manufactured 408 shillings per head, but that in 1880 the value of the manu- factures was 440 shillings per head an increase of 8 per cent. In the same two years the value of manufactures per head of population in the United States was 354 and 355 shillings respectively. In other words, the population of the United Kingdom was becoming' more and more a manufacturing 234 State Aid and State Interference. people, while the population of the United States was remaining stationary in that very respect. And it is not only with us that all this is so. The Swiss exports to the United States tell the same tale. There is increase in the watches exported, a very significant item. Again If we ask for the export of a manufactured commodity for which any country is famous, and if we also look to its tariff, we shall notice some curious facts. On the continent of Europe France is the great silk manufacturing country, Switzerland fol- lowing next. In all European countries there are heavy import duties on silk, excepting only Switzer- land, where there is a light duty, and France, where there is no duty at all. Again fire-arms enter Belgium and Norway free, and all other continental States place import duties on them. Belgium, at all events, is the great continental manufactory of fire-arms, and the only one whose competition is actually felt by England. Again it will be held that Switzerland is the head-quarters of European watch and clock making. And yet Switzerland of all continental countries alone refrains from taxing the imported watches and clocks, and is content with a merely nominal duty. Foreign Competition in Manufactures. 235 It may be that a country does not import in any quantity those commodities it chiefly manufactures ; and that therefore the duty is useless ; but the fact none the less remains that in each instance these manufactures flourish most when ' unprotected.' On the whole, then, so far as Foreign competition is actually affecting British manufactures, we find that gradually the latter are obtaining easier access to the chief foreign markets. Any nation that still clings to the idea of a high tariff clings to an idea that has a pauperising effect : and in so far its powers are curtailed for purchasing English manufactures ; in so far, its powers are curtailed of successfully competing in manufacture with those nations that enjoy all the industrial advantages of free intercourse with the rest of the world. 236 State Aid and State Interference. CHAPTER X. FOREIGN COMPETITION IN MANUFACTURES. 1. What we are doing in England Our Home Market and Foreign Purveyors. 2. Percentage of Manufactures to other Imports. 3. Particular examples Hardware Silk Wool- lens. 4. English Labour cheaper and better. 5. Failure of Foreign Competition. 1. One of the commonest assertions on which is founded an appeal to the State to do something for English manufactures is that the English home marJcct is heing flooded by foreign manufactures. We must therefore form some idea of what this home market really is, and of the place taken in it by imported manufactures. The British Association for the Advancement of Science recently appointed a Committee to inquire into the manner in which incomes were spent in England. Abundant statistics of all kinds were collected and collated. From the elaborate calcula- tions of the Report of this Committee, it appears that Foreign Competition in Manufactures. 237 we probably spend each year in England on various manufactured commodities a sum approaching to 500,000,000/. Of these commodities we obtain only one seventeenth, or 30,000,000/. worth, from abroad. This amount of foreign goods is roughly distributed as follows, and I add for comparison the values of our export of similar articles : Imports. Exports. Silks and Gloves 15,000,000 Cottons and Woollens 10,000,000 Iron, Steel, and Glass 4,000,000 Miscellaneous 1,000,000 Total of these Manufactures 30,000,000 3,000,000 80,000,000 34,000,000 100,000,000 217,000,000 The silks and gloves are distinctly luxuries, and could only be purchased by well-to-do people. A. large portion of the ' woollens ' is to be credited to the influence of fashion. The chief feature, however, is the utter insignificance of the total sums as compared with the values of what we export. We probably send abroad ten times the value of the manufactured commodities we import. There is, however, a fact of much importance in connection with this home market which largely regulates our dealings with foreigners. And this fact is the curious effect of fashion in the matter of clothing. Things have altogether changed in 238 State Aid and State Interference. this respect within the last fifty years Wear was then the great attribute of good clothing ; but now it is so no longer. There may be compensation in all this. It may be that a working man spends no more on dress in buying a 11. suit each year than in paying 101. for a suit that lasted him ten years ; or that his wife should buy a new 11. costume each year instead of a new 10/. gown every ten years. But all this has a great effect on manufacture. Districts and classes were formerly most conserva- tive in the matter of dress, but now fashions penetrate all over the country and through all classes. There is much more frequent change. And where in old days this change of fashion affected 1,000 people it now affects 100,000. The sewing-machine ' the printing-press ' of fashion in dress has been the great and indis- pensable ally of this revolution. A notable example of this effect of fashion has been felt in the woollen trade. The English woollen manufacturers were slow to recognise this new invasion of fashion. The point was well if familiarly put in the remark that women at one time made balloons of themselves, and at another time mops. At one time they were all for stiff, spreading, stand- ing-out skirts, and at another all for limp, clinging, Foreign Competition in Manufactures. 239 close-fitting skirts. And as fashion had come to rule, not only in Hyde Park, but in every country town and village, this change in the material used for dresses had a most powerful effect on the trade. In this case in particular English manufacturers were slow to believe that fashion had so great an influence on the trade. But now that the lesson has been learnt, a more watchful eye will follow or anticipate the vagaries of fashion. A change of fashion has. all this widespread effect; but it must be mistaken neither for our industries being defeated in competition with those of foreign nations, nor for effects of depression among consumers. Fashion is a factor in our in- dustrial and commercial life that has put on a new power lately, and one we must seek to understand and to acknowledge. And it has nowhere so great an effect as in the English home market. What with lowering of /prices and raising of wages the great bulk of the people in England have now more to spend on dress and the accessories of life than any people have ever had elsewhere or in any other age. This fact not only widens the domain .of fashion, but also gives to the English home market an importance in the national economy that makes it paramount to all other elements. 240 State Aid and State Interference. 2. If it be true that the English home market is now being flooded with foreign manufactures to the detriment of home manufactures, we shall find necessarily that the percentage of manufactured articles to the rest of our imports is increasing. It is thus well worth tabulating the actual facts of the case. TABLE. Percentage of Manufactured Articles to the Total op Imports and Exports of the United Kingdom for the Last Fifteen Years. Imports. Exports. Percent- Percent- age of age of Year Manufac- Manu- Manufac- Manu- tures. Total. factures to Total. tures. Total. factures to Total. 1^7 17,600,000 27.200,000 7 175,700,1 00 181.000,000 07 lscis 19.900,000 204,700,000 7 174,300,000 180,000,000 1S60 20,700.000 295,500.000 7 ls.VOO,000 190,000,1 I IsTO 27,200,000 30.'!. 300,000 104.100,000 200,000,000 07-'. 1.-71 20,. r >00,( 331,000,000 6 217,403,000 223,000,000 97* 1n7l> 22.200,000 354,700.000 6 240,300,000 256.000,000 07 j 1673 23,500,000 371.300,1 00 6 247,800.000 255, "i 1-74 2.5,600,000 370,100,000 7 233,000,000 240,0* 07 1-75 27,100.1100 373,000.000 7 - 15.3i 223,000,000 96J W, 27,700,000 375.200.1 7 104, 700,000 201,000.000 <" 1-77 28,M>0, I 304.400.0 <> s 102.71 109,000,000 965 l-7s 20.600,000 30S.I-U0.00J S IsH. 900,000 193.00 1 90S 1.-70 110,000 363.0(1 s !-<;.i 122J ' ", - ls-o 33,200,000 411,201 - J15,U00, . Uu.UOO 06|? From this table it is situ, once and for all, that tor the past fifteen years our foreign trade in manufactured commodities lias maintained a steady Foreign Competition in Manufactures. 241 relative level ; and that there has been no appreci- able decrease in our relative exports nor increase in our relative imports of manufactured to other commodities. As our population increases in num- bers and in wealth, it would be a very suspicious sign indeed if we did not spend some of our increased gains in the purchase of greater values of foreign manufactured commodities. But that at the same time we increase in equal ratio our purchases of raw material and of food is clear irrefragable evidence that our manufacturing ability is not in the least impaired. In short, these records distinctly show that to say that our home market is being flooded by foreign manufactures is to reverse the truth. As a matter of fact we continue to flood foreign markets, and we continue to spend more and more in our home market, but the proportion of foreign manu- factures to native purchased in that home market does not increase in like ratio. 3. It will not be altogether unprofitable to in- vestigate one or two particular instances as to our foreign trade in certain specific manufactures. The most frequent public complaints have been in regard to hardware, silk, and woollens. We are frequently informed that American cutlery and tools are driving those of English manufacture R 242 State Aid and State Interference. out of the shop windows. We are frequently in- formed that continental, and especially American, competition is altogether upsetting our hardware trade. The following tabulated record of what is actually happening will assist us to a correct judgment : TABLE. Imports and Exports of Hardware and Manufactured Metals betwekn the United Kingdom and the Four Countries we principally deal with. 1S80. Exports to Imports from 1,240,000 06i",000 1,667,000 5.075,000 228,000 860,000 190,000 2S1.000 Total 8,551,000 16.597,ii00 1,559,000 1,745,000 Total to all 25,148.000 3,304,000 If French and German and American cutlery and tools and machines are flooding the English market, what shall be said of English goods of the same kind in those markets ? at all events we are returning the compliment fiftyfold. And if we look into the silk trade we find similar evidence ; and yet we not unfrequently hear that the silk trade at all events has been ruined. Even Free Trade orators have comforted the Coventry Foreign Competition in Manufactures. 243 mill-hands by pointing out that though the one industry of silk manufacture has slipped from their grasp, its place has been occupied by the manu- facture of bicycles. The following details as to our annual exports of ' silk manufactures ' may be interesting : France ... . . . Germany United States . Belgium . . . . Canada . . . . India Australia . . . Other Countries Exports of Silk Manufactures Imports of Silk ) Manufactures ) 1869. 1880. 114,000 steady rise to 577,000 77,000 >> > > , 110,000 279,000 uneven fall , , 218,000 Nil. steady rise , 56,000 22,000 > j > ? 84,000 10,000 >> >> > 355,000 66,000 S ?) J 205,000 542,000 uneven fall , 425,000 ^1,110,000 steady rise to 2,030,000 1869. 1880. 1,110,000 rise to 2,030,000 increase 90 per cent. 11,800,000 13,100,000 11 The tendency here again is to turn the tables on foreigners so far as flooding markets is concerned. Another instance is that of the woollen trade. The facts of the case I condensed in a letter to the Times, which I will here reprint, as it contains evidence very much to the point : " At this meeting at the Mansion-house it was explicitly stated by the speakers, with the tacit 244 State Aid ami State Interference. acquiescence of the audience, that the English woollen trade was being overwhelmed by foreign competition, and that that mysterious despot Fashion marshalled and directed this new invasion. The leaders of the movement that is to oppose this con- jectural invasion seem content to depend on mere allegations, and to be presumably not aware of the figures of their own trade. They may, therefore, be interested to know that transactions were as follows in the year 1880 : Of woollen manufactures, in round numbers of value, we made and consumed in England 63,000,000/. ; we made and exported from England 17,000,000/. ; and we imported and consumed from abroad 7,000,000/ In other words, Fashion, marshalling to her sup- port all the varieties and excellencies of foreign endeavour and skill, manages to supply us with one-tenth only of what we annually consume in woollen manufactures ; and, on the other hand, we supply foreigners with nearly three times the value of woollen manufactures that we obtain from them. The foreigner must be mightily unfashionable ; and it seems that his eagerness to possess himself of goods that are pronounced at the Mansion-house to be unfashionable enables the ladies of England, out of the profits of the trade, to wear whatever Foreign Competition in Manufactures. 245 they may consider most suitable to their position, their person, or their purse. It may also be interesting to the leaders of this new movement to know that we are year by year using more and more ' raw ' wool in England. The following figures testify to this : 1870. 1S75. 18S0. Lb. Lb Lb. 1. Of Foreign Wools we Imported.. 263,300,000 ... 365,100,000 ... 463,500,000 2. Of Foreign Wools we Exported.. 92,500,000 ... 171,100.000 ... 237,400,000 "' f fo/use" T? 1S .. W ?.. re !! ill ?. d } 1"0,SOO,000 ... 193,000,000 ... 226,100,000 It is also to be remembered that as a nation we are taking from foreigners more and more yarn for weaving and other manufacturing purposes. The figures are : 1870. 1S75. 1S80. Lb. Lb. Lb. Yarns Exported ... 35,500,000 .. . 31,700,000 .. . 26,500,000 Yarns Imported ... 10,300,000 . .. 12.400,000 . .. 14.900,000 Excess of Exports ... ... 25,200,000 . .. 19,300,000 ., ,. 11,600,000 In other words, so far as the foreign trade in yarns is concerned, we are supplying less and less to foreigners, and taking more anil more from them ; and, as yarns are only used for manufacture, these facts do not exactly prove that foreigners are manu- facturing more and we manufacturing less. I would allude briefly to the other point the alleged effects on British agriculture. Here, again, 246 State Aid and State Interference. it is often better to know what is actually proceeding than to ignore such knowledge, and allow the kindly impulses of generosity to be led astray by the imagi- nation. It seems to have been tacitly assumed that both prices and quantity of English-grown wool have fallen solely because fashion has for the time being deserted lustre and long wool for dulness and short wool. But the magnitude of this asserted influence is limited by the fact that of the 150 million lbs. of wool annually grown in these islands, 55 millions at the least are short wool. A.nd, again, those familiar with agriculture know very well that for years past farmers have bred for the carcase and not for the fleece; they have found it more profitable over since the beginning of the century to supply the butcher rather than the manufacturer; and the consequent fall in the value of the fleece has been more than compensated by the increased bulk and general character of the carcase ; and meat is one of the few commodities that seem always to remain high in price. The number of sheep in England varies but little taking one year with another. The averages for the last four triennial periods have been 32.}, 33, 32}, and 31} millions. The figures always fall off in wet years. Fluke and other diseases incidental to excessive moisture are known to have Foreign Competition in Manufactures. 247 almost decimated flocks in certain districts of late. The fashion for these dull wools, on the showing of the authors of this new movement, did not enter upon the scene till 1874. But in 1868 there were 35 millions of sheep in these islands, and in 1871 only 31 millions, in spite of the absence of all interference on the part of fashion. It is also worth while noting that the increase has been continuous in the export of English-grown wool, from 9,000,000 lbs. in 1870 to 11,000,000 lbs. in 1875 and 17,000,000 lbs. in 1880. Foreigners are taking more and more of our home-grown wool. The results on fashion may be disastrous, but we have no cause to complain. When we meet with an appeal to English ladies to employ English labour in preference to foreign, we find ourselves face to face with an appeal altogether out of tune with the intelligence and tendency of the times. If education has achieved anything, English women will know they cannot spend a penny on French or any other fashions unless the penny has been earned first ; English labour provides the English nation with the where- withal for these foreign purchases. On this question of fashion the ladies of England will do well to follow the ' statesmanlike ' lead of her Royal Highness the Princess of Wales, and not be led astray to imagine that by purchasing what they 248 State Aid ami State Interference. do not want they can in any way assist those whose economic function it is to supply what is wanted. British industries, as a rule, are quite capable of taking care of themselves ; they require no patron- ising, and least of all would they brook any grandmotherly protection from foreign competition. England manufactures nearly one-third of the wool that is manufactured in all Europe. The English system is doubtless capable of improvement, but it is not trembling in its shoes because the general prosperity enables the nation to make a few pur- chases abroad. As long as we in England wisely and determinedly allow as little as possible to inter- fere with the free course of industrial transactions, fashion can but assist in giving spice and stimulus to industrial exertions. To attempt to fight natural tendencies is a beating of the air that is vain, if it be nut indeed actively injurious to the interests involved. And it is a fight which the wise will wage only when they are ignorant. A generous but purblind imagination has before now led good people to lay the lance in rest, even against innocent windmills." By thus gathering together facts we see that even these three classes of manufacture, classes to which popular rumour has specially credited most ruinous Foreign Competition in Manufactures. 249 effect from foreign competition, retains nevertheless all the outward signs of vitality, and of most success- ful competition against the dreaded foreigner. In short, there is not apparently any single instance of manufacture in England that is not doing at the least as well as those in foreign lands. And it is probable that the majority of these are prospering better, especially in regard to the export trade they can and do command. It may be well to append to these particular in- stances an analysis of our exports to France during the last few years : Table of Exports to France from the United Kingdom. Apparel and Hosiery.... ... Cotton Textiles Silk Woollen 1869. 1874. 1880. 99,000 987,000 114,000 551,000 1,337,000 28,000 3,277,000 116,000 1,040,000 290,000 1,128,000 1,860,000 45,000 2,765,000 162,000 1,070,000 577,000 1,441,000 1,377,000 92,000 2,927,000 Worsted Earthenware Other Manufactures Total Manufactures ... Coal Alkali Metals Un wrought Wool 5,793,000 7,264,000 7,546,000 879.000 63,000 941,000 380,000 1,876,000 75,000 857,000 242,000 1,552,000 89,000 905,000 63,000 Total Raw Materials ... 2,663,000 3,050,000 2,609,000 250 State Aid and State Interference. From these records it will be seen at once that so far as the French market is concerned we are in- creasing our hold upon it in regard to manufactures, but that we find the French require of us less and less of the raw materials which manufacturers make use of. 4. If we look to England itself we shall learn much. The prosperity of the people, and more especially of those whose incomes are small, depends intimately on the purchasing power of money. A high tariff' is always opposed to increasing this power. Its effect, if it has any, must be to raise local prices. Indeed a high tariff has no influence of a protective kind unless it raises prices above what they are in other countries. Even American au- thorities have to allow that the labourer in America, if this purchasing power of money be taken into con- sideration, is not so well off as tHe labourer in Eng- land. And the United States is only to a moderate degree affected by its high tariff, because all over its vast interior it upholds Free Trade. In the United States, for instance, the growth of corn and wheat and meat is practically unlimited ; in England we can only grow half uf that we consume, and yet in England the prices of food are not higher than the ] trices of the same in the United States. This is all proof of the maxim "If cheap food is not brought Foreign Competition in Manufactures. 251 to the people the people will go to cheap food." We have had in England a series of seven very lean years, and yet prices of wheat and agricultural pro- duce have not risen. The farmer as a producer has consequently suffered : there has been no compensa- ting rise in price for shortness in quantity of wheat he produces. But as consumer, not only of food, but of manures, implements, clothing, labour, and all else, he feels the benefit of no rise in prices. And above all, he has enjoyed the reflex action of living on in a community where dearth of harvests has not ruined the general prosperity. There have been no famine prices to check industrial prosperity. And another remarkable feature is the great advance in steadiness of prices : not only has wheat not risen but meat has not fallen. We open our markets to all the world, and we are rapidly discover- ing a steady uniform price for our own chief com- modities. This is of special value to the farmer, because he can tell surely what he is working for. When he knows that prices will not alter very greatly he can tell beforehand what it will pay him to pro- duce ; and he will not devote a year's energies and a year of his farm and all its belongings to the pro- duction of something which in the outside vagaries of market prices he may find valueless when he has 252 State Aid and State Interference. produced it. This steadiness of price, consequent on worldwide supply, is a main element in the steady prosperity of agriculture. It has been calculated that the wage-earning classes of England win a quarter of wheat now at an expenditure of exactly half the amount of labour they had to give for the same quantity thirty years ago. This represents a very great advance. It accounts for the fact of the shortened hours of labour we in England can institute and yet compete with all other nations successfully. Our labour is more profitable, and one chief reason of this is that we have no high tariff taxing the ordinary commodities of life and transferring money from the pockets of the labouring classes to the pockets of the capitalists. It is not remembered so often as it should be that a protective tariff raises a revenue over and above that which finds its way into the coffers of the State. The tariff raises prices. In many protective States every hardware article, every yard of cloth, or piece of clothing or furniture, costs more because of the tariff. Every labouring man has to pay this increase of price and a great part of this increase rinds its way into the pockets of the manufacturer and distributor. This does nut occur in England, and as a consequence the wase-earner is better off. Foreign Competition in Manufactures. 253 But there is another point we have to see to. If labour is nominally cheaper in England than in other countries, is it really as good ? We may answer de- cidedly in the affirmative. We shall do so if we go into details ; we shall do so if we only look to the fact that competition is free not only to goods but to men ; and the English artisans and mechanics not only completely hold their own against all foreign invasion in England, but are to be found in almost every manufacturing centre in the whole world. And in each of these they are found holding prominent positions. We are told on the one hand that we cannot compete with France, for instance, because our Factory Acts limit us to fifty-six hours, while manufacturers in France obtain seventy hours work a week from their ' hands.' The answer to this is that we do compete. And if we do compete at so much less expenditure of time, we find at once we must be doing our work far more economically. This must not blind us, however, to the danger that State Interference, as embodied in the Factory Act, might at any moment cause serious injury to English industry if it prevented a natural change in the hours of labour due to any new change in the comparative efficiency of our labour and of foreign labour that was working under freer conditions. 254 State Aid and State Interference. A great deal has been said of our sad lack of tech- nical education. "We are in a transitional state. We abolished that State Interference which was em- bodied in all the old apprenticeship and other close trade regulations and traditions, but we put forward no substitute. Indeed, the State forced on the nation an altogether different commodity on the plea that it was a fair substitute. Reading, writing, and arithmetic were made the substitutes for technical education. We do not yet understand the full effect of the great error that was made when the nation, in its proper determined enthusiasm to educate itself, was altogether led astray by rashly assuming that the three R's represented education. The farmer has all along protested ; and now, at last, the manu- facturer is protesting likewise. And we must hope shortly to see a reform in our education policy, which will, at last, begin with some adequate definition of the term education. Farmers have long pointed out that children who are probably destined to become agricultural la- bourers are practically better educated by being taught the technicalities and practical operations of agriculture than by being hurried through courses of reading, writing, and arithmetic. Both branches of education are good, but if you substitute the one Foreign Competition in Manufactures. 255 for the other you will oftentimes obtain an adult 'educated,' but ignorant of all knowledge that can serve him honestly for his life's work. And so it is with manufacture. The dead level of the three It's is to be imposed on all children alike at the sacrifice of all other training. This unforeseen tendency of the nation's first grasp on the great idea of a thoroughly national education policy will soon be checked, and we shall have some real and efficient substitute for those means of technical education of acquiring training and knowledge in their real work of life which close guilds and apprenticeship systems sought, however badly, to provide. It is well for English labour that it can still com- pete with the world, even though it has been so hampered by a partial attempt at national education. It is one sure hope of the future that in this direc- tion at all events, in the direction of technical education, considerable improvement is yet possible and probable. 5. On the whole we see that foreign competition in manufactures is at the present a non-existent element in our position. We open our doors to the foreign competitor in every sense of the term ; and by our national prosperity, we, so to speak, invite him to do his w T orst. In spite of all this, the amount 256 State Aid and State Interference. of manufactures he supplies to us is altogether in- significant if compared either with the amount of manufactures we supply to him or with the amount we supply to ourselves. We remain, after what has been called ' forty years of disastrous one-sided Free Trade,' the one great exporting country of manufactures. We also note, that of the other countries, those export the greatest percentage of manufactures that have the lowest tariffs ; and we are driven, if we look to ex- perience, to adopt the maxim that " the export of manufactures proceeds in inverse ratio to the height of the customs tariff." This is not a theoretic idea, but merely a plain matter-of-fact account of what has actually occurred among nations. One-sided Free Trade has, at all events, enabled us as a nation to pay the lowest prices for everything we use or consume. The consequence is that, flourishing thus as consumers, we can, as producers, in the long run undersell all foreigners who attempt to compete with us, and who do not enj<>y similar advantages. It is for this reason we have been able to make so much of our coal and our iron and our climate. What a country ran best produce is not confined to what its soil or its climate yield, but to what the whole of the conditions of its existence yield. Foreign Competition in Manufactures. 257 Character, skill, perseverance, and even traditions in the people are often quite as important as latitude, or mineral resources, or rainfall. Forty years of free traffic with all the world, so far as we could make it free, have enabled us to develop many invaluable national qualities and attributes. In addition to this, on the one hand we have been checked from wasting our energies on the production of com- modities more cheaply produced elsewhere ; and, on the other, we have been enabled to establish and to obtain a good start in various other industries for which we have equal, but not superior, natural facilities to other nations, but of which other nations have deprived themselves by a variety of artificial restrictions. As a matter of fact, nature is more bountiful in regard to particular products in some districts of the earth's surface than in others. A high tariff prevents, and a low tariff allows, a nation to profit by this fact. And a government which would aid its citizens in industry or commerce by interfering with their natural advantages, and obstructing free intercourse, must, in the long run, injure and impede, not only the commercial, but the manufacturing prosperity and advance of the people. 2")8 State Aid and State Interference. CHAPTER XI. INTERFERENCE WITH OTHER NATIONS. 1. Four General Principles. 2. Lowering Tariffs. 3. Fighting Bounties. 4. Commercial Treaties. 1. The Government of any one country is not infrequently urged, proprio motu or from without, to extend the active influence of its own commercial policy so far as to interfere with the private and public policies of other nations. I wish in this chapter first of all to summarise the principles that should lie at the base of all international commercial policy ; and then to apply these general principles to the particular modes in which such interference may be embodied. I will formulate four general principles, and then pass on to apply those general principles to these modes: to tariffs, bounties, and treaties. I ven- ture to think it is no exaggeration to say that the problem we here deal with is one of the most vital Interference with other Nations. 259 importance to our national future. We in England have again arrived, as it were, at cross roads in our. commercial progress. We had done so before when we took the right road in 1846, and again when we took a wrong turning in 1860. If we review generally the principles that ought to regulate our dealings with other nations in re- gard to commercial policy, we see at once that we have two concurrent duties to perform. There is our duty to ourselves, and there is our duty to foreign nations. It is not only just as wrong, but it is just as foolish, to forego the one duty as to forego the other. In regard to our duty to our- selves we light upon a first principle which I need not dilate upon It is a principle more generally accepted than any other. It is the promotion of our own prosperity. In regard tp our duty to other nations, ideas are more mixed. In the first place, there must be international as well as national freedom. In short, the liberty of each nation is only confined within the limits of like liberties in other nations. Our liberty does not authorise us to do anything that robs other nations of a similar liberty, and we must resent any such attempt on the part of a foreign nation. We must neither interfere nor suffer interference with this liberty. S 2 2G0 State Aid and State Interference. With this proviso in mind we come upon a second general principle the promotion of the prosperity of other nations. It is often forgotten of what very great importance to our individual prosperity is the prosperity of other nations. Many of us know the bad effect of a famine in India or China on English trade. But there is more than this. In the late heated discussion in newspapers and elsewhere on the free trade question one point seems to me to have been altogether overlooked. Stated broadly, this point is that much of the falling off in particu- lar cases in our export of manufactures, and certainly a most serious drag on any increased consumption of our manufactures in certain countries, is, not that they are supplying themselves ; not that protection has fostered and developed in their midst rival manufactories to ours but that they heavily tax each native in his capacity as consumer, and so discourage and weigh down his efforts as a pro- ducer; they pauperise the nation, and render it less able to buy from other nations. This is a fact strangely overlooked. I do not, of course, say that it is the case everywhere, but it is the case in certain countries whose natural and virgin resources do not assist the population to rcsisl ami overcome the pauperising effects of commercial restrictions. Interference with other Nations. 261 A third general principle that should regulate international commercial policy is the removal of all restrictions or obstacles to the free current of com- mercial and industrial life. Freedom to industries is the mainspring of industrial prosperity. Of course this freedom is like international freedom, a mere relation. It means freedom to do all that does not interfere with the same freedom in others. The chief function of Government is to watch over this essential condition to the existence of freedom. That is the final cause of the State's existence. The State which busies itself with other matters is likely to busy itself to the detriment of its subjects. The main condition of commercial success also is that the will, whether of the individuals or of the State, be left as free and as untrammelled as possible. The contravention of this principle leads to endless conflicts of interests and to strange breaches of justice. To say that commmercial intercourse must be as unrestricted by State interference as possible ought to appear to many to be a needless truism, and yet it is a principle more commonly violated than any other. Indeed, the true value of com- mercial intercourse is not commonly appreciated. Many have forgotten how Mill proved commerce to be ' a mode of cheapening production.' Commerce 262 State Aid and State Interference. is certainly a means to that end. The more we import and export the cheaper we can produce. Interchange of commodities implies saving in the cost of production. It is this saving of price in all the nation consumes that makes commerce a source of national wealth. Each commodity imported re- presents normally so much labour saved in its production. The more the nation imports the more it saves in the cost of production. Unrestricted commerce will regulate itself according to the actual profits accruing to the community. Anything that interferes with commerce is simply a curtailment of these profits. There is an important corollary to this principle which most people overlook. It is true we must never seek to compete against greater natural superiorities in other nations. But, at the same time, we must never forget to compete against equal or lesser natural superiorities. It is by not attending to this latter wholesome rule that we have allowed the silk industries of France to steal a march upon us in the matter of better technical education and a higher standard of taste. This rule specially affects Ireland. There are many industries in which other countries have no natural superiority to Ire- land; and some industries in which Ireland and Irish people have actual natural superiority. Yet these Interference with other Nations. 263 industries do not now flourish in Ireland. Lately, however, an altogether wholesome private movement is on foot which will, we all hope, be pre-eminently successful in reviving in Ireland those industries for which Ireland and the Irish have natural facilities greater than, or at all events equal to, those possessed by other nations. These three foregoing principles apply to our commercial policy in so far as it affects our industrial and national prosperity. But our commercial policy is also largely controlled by the need of enabling the State to perform its duties. In most civilized countries the commercial policy adopted has close connection with the question of raising State Revenue. This we are compelled to recognise in regulating our commercial policy. And the best general principle to act upon is to see that the collection of Revenue does not hamper commercial and industrial life. 2. If we apply these four principles to tariffs, we must come to these conclusions. We have our own tariff and we have the tariffs of other nations. Low tariffs are everywhere desirable if we would realize our four principles of prosperity. A low tariff, by interfering as little as possible with the ordinary free current of commerce, does not in practice restrict 264 State Aid and State Interference. or direct production or exchange. There is con- sequently no waste of labour or of capital on the production of commodities that can be produced cheaper elsewhere, or on the importation of commo- dities that can be produced cheaper in the country itself. A low tariff incidentally promotes commerce, and so increases the profit or saving of labour accruing from all exchange. It thus promotes the prosperity of all nations. And besides this, so far as the object of raising revenue is concerned, a low tariff is right, a high tariff wrong that is, if we judge by results. A low tariff may practically not interfere with the free current of commercial life if we see to it carefully that it neither oppresses nor relieves of oppression home as compared with foreign or foreign as compared with home products. For instance, we not unfrequently meet with the argument that some home industry should be relieved of taxation. This contention has reason in it only if a like industry in a country trading with us in that particular commodity is free of similar burdens. But we are apt to forget that foreigners pay rates and taxes as well as ourselves. It is not so generally acknowledged as it should be that a low tariff in the course of years yields more actual revenue than a high tariff. We have Interference with other Nations. 265 our two colonies in Australia Victoria and New South Wales. They are very similarly circum- stanced. Victoria for the past ten years has had a high tariff, and New South Wales a low tariff. In Victoria the income from customs duties during these ten years has remained about the same per annum : in New South Wales it has steadily increased. Another example is that of the United States as compared with the United Kingdom. During the past twelve years the English customs revenue has maintained a steady level of 20,000,000/. per annum, though the tariff has been low, and even reduced during the decade. During the past ten years, with a high tariff, the United States customs revenue has fallen from 37,000,000/. in 1869 to 27,000,000/. in 1880. And we must remem- ber that during this decade the population of the United States has increased by 10,000,000 while our own has increased only by 4,000,000. If we add this direct result to the indirect result of largely increased imports, each item of which brings profit to the nation, we shall see that a low tariff brings a vast balance of material benefits which would overwhelm even the most extravagant pre- tensions in the way of industrial benefit set up by the advocates of a protectionist tariff. If w r e only 266 State Aid ami State Interference. remember that we profit by imports even more than we do by exports, we shall not go wrong. We must keep our own tariff low ; that promotes our own prosperity ; but is it also our desire to promote the prosperity of other countries ? For both reasons, then, we wish other nations to have low tariffs. How are we to accomplish this ? We are told to put on an equivalent tariff so long as they maintain theirs. But such a retaliatory tariff is an act of war. There must be economic loss. Such a tariff can only be justified by success. Where have we experience or reasons to prove that such a tariff ever reduced any other tariff? The cost of such an act of war would forestal much of any ensuing profits. Such an act would breed many evil indirect influences, which last for a long time and which, in the everchanging arena of 'practical politics,' may well outlast any succeeding period of low tariffs, even assuming such a period ever came. It is instructive also to regard the practical possibili- ties of retaliatory duties in England to-day. In the first place, were we to impose them, the opinion must gain ground among other nations that we have abandoned low tariffs. All might not think so; but some would; and in so far the imposition of retaliatory duties to force some nations to low Interference with other Nations. 267 tariffs would increase the tendency of other nations to retain high tariffs. In the second place, we must either impose them for a term of years or until their object be accomplished. A term of years will be taken, especially by the more obstinate opponents, to be merely a term of waiting. No term of years puts us to the risk of pursuing a hurtful policy for ever, or, at all events, for long. We should bind ourselves, in self-contradiction, to that very policy which we were seeking to overthrow. In the third place, more than 90 per cent, of what we import is food and raw material, and to put duties on these is simply to commit industrial suicide. In the present political state of the world, the remedy for high tariffs is to keep our own low and free from all foreign interference. This is the surest means eventually to outlive the action of high or hostile tariffs. We must hold up to the world the example of successful fact. This is a remedy which has not yet been tried. In the case of England, we began it in 1846 ; but we left off in 1860, when we made the French Treaty. 3. In determining on the principles that should regulate our conduct towards countries that give Bounties, we must above all keep our attention fixed on actual experience. Mr. Gladstone has said, in 268 State Aid and State Interference. regard to the notorious Sugar Bounties, " We do not regard with any satisfaction the system under which an artificial advantage is given in our markets to the products of foreign labour." But this idea is applicable only in the event of their products being sold in our market at less than their cost of production. This would deprive our own industry of legitimate employment ; but only when and if it takes place. The question remains, What Bounties do actually give an artificial advantage in our market to the products of foreign labour? A great many people will name at once the Sugar Bounties. Well, firstly, let us look to facts. In regard to the countries that give these Bounties, it is, of course, evident that the artificial advantage comes from the pockets of the people at large. Consequently all profits of this artificial advantage is merely returning to a few of the people what all the people have paid out. But there is the further question, Are there any extra profits created by these Sugar Bounties ? If we turn tu reasous we shall light upon an explanation which no one seems to notice. These bounties are drawbacks on export. In other words, the ' bounty-fed produce ' is produce which has escaped contributing to the revenue, and which yields in addition certain Interference with other Nations. 269 surreptitious profits on the transaction. But to accomplish all these ends there must be a duty on sugar. The greater proportion, then, of all this labour is simply to overcome an obstacle to industry which we in England have most wisely abolished when we abolished the sugar duties. It is not known so generally as it should be that no State on the Continent gives Sugar Bounties. The bounty is obtained in spite of the Govern- ment, and by reason of the difficulty of assessing a duty and an equivalent drawback on raw and refined sugar. Each Continental Government knows this, and each wishes to abolish so faulty a system. The only method that can really succeed is the doing away with all duties on sugar; and seeing that sugar is so necessary a food, this would appear to be both wise and necessary, and English experience proves the entire success of the method. But, then, there are other bounties not founded on drawbacks. The most recent instance is the insti- tution of Shipping Bounties by France. Their object is to promote a carrying trade and a ship- building trade. And they are to accomplish this by turning to these trades labour and capital from other employments. Much must be lost to the community by such forced interference with industry. 270 State Aid and State Interference. Had France population to spare to earn a livelihood on the sea ; had France more coal and iron in close proximity to harbours ; were France a mass of good harbours standing midway between the Eastern and Western civilizations ; had France committed herself to a low tariff for purposes of Revenue only ; had France 10 millions of Frenchmen and 200 millions of native races under her own rule domi- ciled in all distant parts of the world ; France would have been the natural rival of England in all ship- ping affairs. But France has none of these things, and it so happens that England has them all. It is therefore not wise of France to endeavour to rival England in a special industry due to special environments which France does not enjoy. More- over, we already see that Italy and Germany and Spain are talking of Shipping Bounties. To put on such a bounty is to invite nay, rather to incite other nations to do likewise, and thus, even if successful, it becomes more than ever a dead economic loss to the country, and the instrument of its own destruction. It may be contended that while we in England are waiting for other countries to experience by sad disaster an; 1 loss the mistakes they have made, our own particular industries may suffer from tern- Interference with other Nations. 271 porary depression, and that thus, in order to promote our own prosperity and also that of the other nations, we should endeavour to put an end to all bounties. If we take the case of England and France we shall see the difficulty in our way. If we place countervailing bounties on our own industries we at once bring the two cases more on to an equality. But then that means that we reduce the natural advantage we now possess a natural advantage which is only made the greater by the artificial arrangement adopted by France. Again, it is equally impracticable to place a duty in English ports on all shipping that receives bounties, because by so doing we at once put a premium on French ships visiting foreign and neutral ports. We have become the great carriers and builders by our natural opportunities, and in some measure by our rather unique low tariff. Nothing can even- tually deprive us of this but similar conditions arising in some other nation. If France pre- fers to take millions a year out of the pockets of her people, to make what M. Tirard himself has recently called 'great and heavy sacrifices/ in order to turn labour and capital from more profit- able to less profitable employment, and to waste the margin of labour and capital expended in this 272 State Aid and State Interference. production over and above what would be expended were things left free, we shall indeed note the ex- pense all this is to the French people. We shall also note the fact that in so far as these bounties succeed in diverting capital and labour from other industries, in so far do they open up a new gap for English industries to fill. We shall note, too, that whatever success may attend this new policy will have its first effect on those ship- building and carrying interests which exist by sufferance under peculiar local conditions. The free and healthy English industry will be the last to feel their effects. We remember that the up-keep of the ships of the French navy is nearly three times as costly as that of English men-of-war. There are not the same material facilities in France. All this dead loss of a forced industry, coupled with the direct burden of the bounty, renders it absolutely certain that in the end England must win. And this even without taking into account that for very consistency's sake the logical French mind will yet demand similar bounties for all other industries. To destroy the Bounty System we must trust to indirect influences. And among these the most powerful is the care that the natural advantages any particular industry threatened enjoys in Eng- Interference with other Nations. 273 land be not in any way hampered. As we have successfully braved the Sugar Bounties by taking away all duty on sugar, so we can successfully brave the Shipping Bounties by removing all re- strictions on the increase of our commerce, and promoting the efficiency and speed and comfort of our mercantile marine. The French bounties, in so far as they are efficacious, will greatly stimulate private skill and enterprise in England. England has still the great sources of supply of coal and iron, and she has that colder climate that is so essential to metal working. England must look to facts and let fancies alone ; put her trust in ex- perience, and keep her tariff low. Then the force of nature will overcome all those artificial restrictions placed by other nations on their own industries. 4. There remains the last of our particular inquiries What principles ought to regulate our dealings with other nations in respect to commer- cial treaties ? Commercial treaties are bargains or contracts based on a state of warfare. To have a treaty at all you must assume that the two countries are in a condition of antagonism. In so far, then, as commercial treaties are treaties of amity, in so far are they good. But in so far as they are treaties of commerce, in so far are they T 274 State Aid and State Interference. restrictions on commerce. Now, they may be re~ strictions on commerce itself being restricted, as when Japan contracts not to levy more than three per cent, on imported goods. We find that this is the usual tendency of modern treaties; they are bargains by which one nation contracts with an- other for greater facilities of commerce. But by their very nature they also bind a nation to con- fine these facilities to some one or two other nations. They only do away with restrictions on one stream of commerce by placing restrictions on other streams. They thus compel a nation to adopt a more costly mode of obtaining certain commodi- ties than it would adopt were its action free and unfettered. It would thus appear that no commer- cial treaty is correct which binds the contracting parties to any differential duties or tariff. Commercial treaties that open up trade with another country without, at the same time, restricting trade with other countries, may be beneficial. Such are the treaties by which England secures commerce with China and Japan. The French Treaty is not one of these. The treaty of 18G0 was a decided departure from Free Trade principles ; it restricted our free- dom in commercial dealings with other nations. We gained indeed by the low duties France placed on Interference with other Nations. 275 our goods ; we gained by the low duties we placed on French goods ; but we lost in other respects. For instance, other nations, Spain and Portugal, at once raised their tariffs against us, and by this French Treaty we lost our liberty of managing our own financial and commercial affairs as we might deem best. Mr. Chamberlain has told us " If the treaty negotiations with France break down, the English Government would be perfectly justified in dealing with the wine and spirit duties as they thought best for the interests of the country." In other words the treaty, if made, will deprive the English Govern- ment of its liberty to deal with duties tending to the best interests of this country. We obtain, indeed, entry into the French market, but in so doing, if we may judge by experience, we close other markets to ourselves. That is sufficient of itself to condemn the treaty. But the question remains Is this treaty the only means of gaining entry into the French market ? Now, if we declare to all the world we will make no contracts that bind ourselves, but will, from time to time, put on and take off duties as suits our own financial policy, will not such a policy afford them strong reason to open their ports to us in order to maintain commercial intercourse ? We might well tax some luxuries more than we do, and our wine 276 State Aid and State Interference. duties might well be readjusted. In these matters our hands have been hitherto tied by treaties. In the present condition of the world England would find much saving of labour could her commercial treaties be restricted to one clause that known as ' the most favoured nation ' clause. Thus we should contract to grant to all nations the fullest favours our domestic policy will allow ; we should contract to receive from these nations the fullest favours their domestic policy will be able to grant. But we should leave it to each nation to elaborate its own domestic policy. If we abide by profitable principles of conduct we shall not make commercial treaties that restrict our financial policy, or that in any way, directly or indirectly, restrict our trade with third countries. It will be better for our prosperity to have no treaties at all than treaties that in any way bind us. We are more likely to lead other nations to lower their tariffs by such action than by that vain seeking after reciprocal concessions which has been attempted now for more than sixty years, and which, whenever it meets with success in one country causes, ipso facto, an equivalent backsliding in other countries. If we have a treaty at all it would be well if it consisted of the one clause ' the most favoured nation ' clause. Even this is merely Interference with other Nations. 277 a conditional arrangement conditioned by the peculiar political relation of nations to one another at the present day. A treaty is the only means existing, with the exception of warfare, for pre- venting one nation from pressing its own liberty so far as to encroach upon a similar liberty in other nations. In thus considering what principles ought to govern our dealings with other nations as respects tariffs, bounties, and commercial treaties, I tabulate four principles : 1, We must promote our own prosperity ; 2, We must promote the prosperity of other nations ; 3, We must free from all re- straints and obstacles the courses of commerce and industry; 4, We must not allow the collection of revenue to hamper commercial or industrial require- ments. These principles are largely conditioned by the political relations of nations, but in applying them to the special objects under discussion we shall see that they lead us in regard to tariffs simply to keep our own as low as possible ; in regard to the bounties avoid them altogether ; in regard to commercial treaties, to make none that in any detailed way hamper our own liberty of financial or commercial action. These solutions proceed on the sound and 278 State Aid and State Interference. profitable principle of assuring, both to ourselves and to others, the utmost individual freedom com- patible with the like individual freedom of each other. By such courses we shall, in doing our duty to ourselves, also do our duty to other nations. And if we win in the race it will be because other nations handicap their own chances by un- necessary and hurtful restrictions on the liberty of the individual. FINIS. INDEX. INDEX. Abstract principles, 2 Abyssinia, 230 Access to soil, 19 Advertisement, 31, 44 Agriculture, 18, 177, 246 Agricultural competition, 177, 212 education, 206 Aldis, Professor, 207 American farming, 21, 188 Free-trade, 35 manufactures, 37, 242 railways, 193 _ tools, 42, 241 Apprenticeship, 254 Arts of civilization, 15, 143 Australia v. France, 150 Australia, 74, 165 Austrian bounties, 96 Authority, 2 Bad times, 39 Barbados, 85 Barley prices, 20 Beet sugar, 82 Belgian refiners, 97 Berry, Mr. Graham, 13 Bismarck, 112 Boot-makers, 123 Bounties, 11, 64, 271 Bounties and prices, 90 Brassey, Sir T., 184 Breeding, 246 Bright, Mr. J., 31 British agriculture, 31, 246 British Association, 14 constitution, 168 empire, 15, 148, 152 Burdens on farmers, 33, 184 Caret, Mr., 187 Canada, 163, 222 North-west, 19S Canadian tariff, 22, 136, 160 Cane and beet sugar, 93 Civilization, 1, 15, 143 Chamberlain, Mr., 275 China market, 45 China trade, 141 Coal, 118 Cobden, 36 Colonial growth, 120, 127 and foreign trade, 143 manufactures, 21 policy, 159 trade, 16, 127 revenues, 126, 145 Commercial policy, 25S treaties, 273 Competition, use of, 212, 257 Consumers, 38, 251, 262 Continental dislike of bounties, 102, 269 Continental tariffs, 35, 215 Corners, 194 Cost of bounties, 70 production, 82, 191 Countervailing duties, 13, 93 Coventry, 242 282 Index. Customs duties, 34, 144. revenue, 125 Delta of the Nile, 229 Differential duties, 223 Distress in United States, 39 Duff, Mr. Grant, 135 Dulness, 246 Duties, 21 Duty of the State, 6, 261 Education, 253 in agriculture, 206, 252 Educated ignorance, 3 Effect defined, 4 Efficiency of labour, 253 Employment of population, 142 Endymion, 154 English cutlery, 41, 242 estate, the, 154 exports, 240, 256 future, 155 home market, 236 grown wool, 247 manufactures, 35, 240 retaliation, 267 shipping, 58 sugar-beet, 208 superiority, 203, 253 European tariffs, 35, 215 Exchange, 226 Experience invaluable, 8 Exporting soil, 187 Exports and imports, 45, 129 Exports of manufactures, 241 Extravagance, 40 Factory Acts, 253 Facts, 12 Fairness. 56 Fair-trade empire, 16 Farmers' prices, 33, 251 Fashion, 237 Financial independence, 157 Floods of manufactures, 24, 231, 236 Food supply, 33, 250 Fouquet, M., 97, 104 Forcing foreigners, 25 Foreign competition, 64, 230 food supplies, 180, 209 ., tariffs. 22, 215 Formulated ignorance, 4 Free exchange, 36 land, 19 ports, 14 Freedom, 9 Free trade for British empire, 15, 136, 170 Free-traders and Free-traders, 30 Free trade and Protection, 113 French complaints, 94 manufactures, 232 shipping bounties, 69, 1 29 taxation, 70, 145 trade, 249 Future of American Protection, 62 Geoeges, M., 95, 103 German Government, 128 sugar, 98 Germany, 157, 232 Gladstone, Mr., 268 Gloves, 236 Gold, 118, 238 Gold diggings, 119 Government, 6 popularity, 64 Grain crops, 33, 198 Granary of America, 202 Greece, duties, 216 Grey, Lord, 169 Groans of the planters, 77 Growth of England, 179, 210 Grumbling, 78 Half-knowledge, 3 Hayter, Mr., 135 Hardware, 241 Hennessy, Sir J. P., 140 Hero-worship, 2 High tariffs pauperise. 228. 260 Hogg, Mr. Q., 83 Holland, 108 Home markets, 35, 190, 236 Hongs. 141 Hong Kong, 15, 139 Hostile tariffs, 22, 214 Ignorance, 10 Immigrants, 38 Imperial Union, 169 Import duties, 224 Imported food, 182 Index. 283 Imports, 10, 116, 262 Improvements in farming, 205 Increase of English nation, 148 India, 223 International contracts, 27 freedom, 258 Italy, 85, 217 Irish manufactures, 262 Items in tariffs, 217 Jacqtjemont, M., 100 Jamaica, 75, 227 Japan, 274 Jerningham, Mr., 99 Laboub, 43, 119, 185 in England, 252 in United States, 250 Land prices, 180 question, 19, 209 Less hostile tariffs, 220 Liberty, 2, 158 Loss by waiting, 271 Low, medium, and high tariffs, 218 Low tariffs, 39, 133, 234, 257 for Colonies, 173, 223 Lubbock, Mr. N., 91 Lustre, 246 MacCulloch, Sir J., 113 Mallet, Sir L., 94 Manufactures, 11 Manufactures from abroad, 213, 240 Manufacturing nations, 233 supremacy, 25, 41 Markets abroad, 215 Marriages, 133 Mercantile marine, 72 Misapplication of energy, 25, 38 Monopoly, 197 Mot, M. de la, 97 Most favoured nations, 220, 276 Mulhall, Mr., 233 Napoleon-, 208 National feeling, 168 Natural advantages, 273 Nature's bounty, 257 New lands, 200 New South Wales, 14, 212 North-west, 201 Oats, prices, 20 O'Loghlan, Sir B., 136 One-sided free-trade, 15, 137, 256 Opium revenue, 145 Other nations' prosperity, 260 Pacific railway, 198 Parliament, 161 Penal clauses, 105 Percentage of manufactures, 24, 240 Pine-apples, 227 Planters, 74 Political economy, 4 Popery in politics, 2 Population, 42, 117, 187, 201 Population and wheat, 189 Prairie cropping, 33, 1 84 Price, Professor Bonamy, 221 Prices of sugar, 81 of wheat, 18, 186, 196 steady, 251 Printing-press, 29 Principles, 2 Produce of the soil, 178 Production and use, 67 Profits on imports, 226 Profitable manufactures, 213 Protection, 9, 32, 214 for young countries, 16, 112, 212 Protective prices, 34 Prosperity of United States, 32, 45, 214 Prout, Mr., 204 Purchasing powers, 133, 225, 250 Bails, 42 Bailways, 18, 191 Bainfall, 185 Baw materials, 34 Baw wool, 245 Beciprocity, 26 Befined sugar, 110 Befining in bond, 103 Beforms in farming, 207 Betaliation, 266 Bevenue, 126, 144, 263 Bitchie's, Mr., Committee, 74 Boyal Agricultural Commission. 178 Bussell, Earl, 159 284 Index. Saccharimetry, 108 Sandon, Lord, 215 Savings' banks, 131 Say, M. Leon, 82 Self-government, 161 Sewing-machines, 218 Sheffield ware, 42 Sheep, 246 Ship-building, 67, 123 Shipping, 68, 129 Shipping bounties, 12, 66, 271 Silk trade, 242 Slave v. free-grown, 78 Smith, Adam, 37, 187, 207 South Africa, 166 States in error, 7 Steadiness in prices, 251 Steel, 42 Successful example, 28, 105, 110, 253 Sugar bounties, 12, 73 conference, 105 consumed, 79 growing, 80 refining, 94 Sumner, Professor, 112 Supreme Will, 160 Surplus products, 44 Tariffs, 22, 35, 234 and prices, 224, 250 and revenue, 48, 145 Taste, 262 Taxing industries, 264 Technical education, 206, 254 Tendency to low tariffs, 216 toward union, 157 Textile manufactures, 232 Theorists, 144 The three It's, 254 Tirard, M., 271 Tobacco revenue, 145 Tools, 42. 241 Town and country, 21 1 Trade channels, 174 depression, 152 Treaty of 1860, 274 Tropical farms, 77 Under-peopled countries, 33, 116, 173, 183 United States, 9, 31, 36, 231 Unity of empire, 170 Unkindly seasons, 178 Unprofitable manufactures, U.S., 11,37,43 Use and production, 67 Use of soil, 180, 209 Use of treaties, 275 Usine, 75 Value of commerce, 261 Victoria, 14, 222 Victoria and New South Wales, 113 Wages, 132, 224, 250 Wakefield, Gibbon, 184 Wales, Frincess of, 247 War of tariffs, 26, 266 Wear, 238 Weeds, 184 Welfare of wage-earners, 252 Western States, 198 West Indian sugar, 75 Wheat farmers, 18, 182, 246 in England, 181 surplus, 195 Who pays bounties, 79, 99, 271 Who pays import duties, 224, 252 Women, English, 247 Woollen trade, 238 Yarns, 245 ZOLLVEItElN, 15, 171 LONDON : R. CLAY, SONS, AND TAYLOR, PRINTERS.