Ifnhrmttg REFERENCE. No. Division Range Shelf Received _ .187 37TH CONGRESS, ) HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, j REPORT 2d Session. ) ( No. 86. PERMANENT FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. [To accompany bill H. R. No. 416.] APRIL 23, 1862. Ordered to be printed. APRIL 25, 1862 Resolved, That extra copies, two thousand bound and eight thousand in pamphlet form, of the report (No. 86) relating to fortifications and sea-coast defences, be printed for the use of the members of the House. Mr. F. P. BLAIR, jr., from the Committee on Military Affairs, made the following REPORT. The Committee on Military Affairs, in obedience to a resolution of the House of Representatives, directing them to * ' examine the whole system of permanent defences of the country, for the purpose of ascertaining tvhat modifications of the old plans, if any, are required to repel the improved means of attack, and to report by bill or otherwise," have given this subject a careful consideration, and instructed me to submit the following report and accompanying biU : Invulnerability to all attacks, except those of an extraordinary character, is the most perfect insurance attainable by a powerful and peaceful nation against the calamity of war. An attack upon a great military nation, to be dangerous, requires time for preparation, and thus affords time for preparing large means of defence. Hence it has ever been the aim of military engineers to construct frontier defences competent only to resist the greatest efforts which could be made suddenly by the forces ordinarily at the command of powerful rival nations, taking care that the fortifications should be capable of en- largement to any desirable extent. The making of extraordinary defences is usually left to the occasions which demand them. It is not safe, however, for a nation to forget that, as the science, wealth, population, and power of leading governments increase, so, part passu, must the strength of the ordinary defences be increased; nor must it be forgotten that works incapable of being carried by sudden assault one year, may, by new applications of science and of mechanical arts, be quite vulnerable the next. To aid the House in forming an intelligent judgment upon the merits of our present system of frontier defences, the committee have collected and appended hereto several leading reports of army engineers and naval officers, and also that of Secretary Cass upon this subject. As these reports elaborately discuss the subject of frontier defences in all its varied bearings with distinguished ability, and as they are scarce and difficult to obtain, the printing of an extra number 2 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. of them is strongly recommended. They are worthy of the attentive consideration of every military man in the republic, and such consid- eration may lead to profitable suggestions. FIRST DEFENCES. Of the few sea-coast fortifications built prior to and during the revolutionary war, few remain, and all are useless. Most of the harbors on the Atlantic and Gulf frontiers were sup- plied with small protective works after the breaking out of the French revolution of 1789; this is denominated by the engineers as the first system of coast defences. SECOND SYSTEM OF DEFENCES. Prior to the war of 1812 appropriations were made for fortifica- tions, ' ' and there was not a town of any magnitude upon the coast not provided with one or more batteries. ' 7 These works are called "the defences of the second system/ 7 and (though much better than the first) were, says General Totten, "small and weak/ 7 "Being built, for the sake of present economy, of cheap materials and work- manship, were very perishable.'' "The government, aware of this weakness, called out to their support during the war vast bodies of militia, at enormous expense, covering these troops with extensive lines of field-works.' 7 The inadequacy of these small works, even when aided by large bodies of militia, and the large cost of life and money their weakness occasioned, demanded and received attention as soon as the war closed. THIRD SYSTEM OF DEFENCES. The creation of the present or third system of frontier defences is thus described by General Totten, chief engineer United States army : " The war with England being over, the government promptly entered upon a perma- nent system of coast defence, and to that end constituted a board of engineers, with in- structions to make examinations and plans, subject to the revision of the chief engineer and the sanction of the Secretary of War. And it Is this, the third system, that has been ever since 1816 in the course of execution, and is now, as we shall see, well advanced. 44 Whenever the examinations of the board of engineers included positions for dock yards, naval depots, &c., naval officers of rank and experience were associated with them. "The board devoted several years uninterruptedly to the duty, presenting successive re- ports, and submitting, first, plans of the fortifications needed at the most important points. Afterward they were sufficiently in advance ot the execution of the system to apply most of their time to the duties of construction, giving in occasionally additional reports and plans. In rare cases it has happened that plans have been made under the particular direction of the chief engineer, owing to difficulty, at moments, of drawing the widely-dispersed mem- bers of the board from their individual trusts. " The board and the chief engineer arianged the defences into classes, according to their view of the relative importance of the proposed works, in the order of time. This order ha been generally well observed in the execution of the system, with the exception of gome cases in which, by the action of Congress, certain forts were advanced out of the order advised by the board. "For many years grants for fortifications were made annually by Congress, in a gross FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 3 snm, which was apportioned according to the discretion of the President. But since March 3, 1821, the appropriations have been specific, the grants for each work being particularly stated. For many years every new fortification has, before being made the object of appro- priations, been sanctioned by a special act of Congress, upon recommendation of the Mili- tary Committee." MEANS AND MODE OF THE DEFENSIVE SYSTEM. The committee cannot better set forth the means and mode recom- mended by the board of engineers for the defence of the maritime frontiers of the United States, and adopted, than by employing the following extract from a report made in 1826 by General Bernard and Colonel Totten, members of the board : " We proceed to consider the means and the mode of the defensive system which it is for the interest of the United States to adopt. The means of defence for the seaboard of the United States, constituting a system, may be classed as follows : First, a navy ; second, fortification ; third, interior communications by land and water ; and, fourth, a regular army and well-organized militia. " The navy must be provided with suitable establishments for construction and repair, stations, harbors of rendezvous, and ports of refuge, all secured by fortifications, defended by regular troops and militia, and supplied with men and materials by the lines of intercom- munication. Being the only species of offensive force compatible with our political institu- tions, it will then be prepared to act the great part which its early achievements have promised, and to which its high destiny will lead. ""Fortifications must close all important harbors against an enemy, and secure them to our military and commercial marine. Second, must deprive an enemy of all strong positions where, protected by naval superiority, he might fix permanent quarters in our territory, maintain himself during the war, and keep the whole frontier in perpetual alarm. Third, must cover the great cities from attack. Fourth, must prevent, as far as practicable, the great avenues of interior navigation from being blockaded at their entrance into the ocean. Fifth, must cover the coastwise and interior navigation by closing the harbors and the several inlets from the sea which intersect the lines of communication, and thereby further aid the navy in protecting the navigation of the country ; and. sixth, must protect the great naval establishments. "Interior communications will conduct with certainty the necessary supplies of all sorts to the stations, harbors of refuge, and rendezvous, and the establishments for construction and repair, for the use both of the fortifications and the navy, will greatly facilitate and expedite the concentration of military force and the transfer of troops from one point to another ; insure to these also unfailing supplies of every description, and will preserve un- impaired the interchange of domestic commerce even during periods of the most active external warfare. "The army and militia, together with the marine, constitute the vital principle of the system. " From this sketch it is apparent that our system of defence is composed of elements whose numerous reciprocal relations with each other and with the whole constitute its ex- cellence ; one element is scarcely more dependent on another than the whole system is on any one. Withdraw the navy, and the defence becomes merely passive ; withdraw interior communications from the system, and the navy must cease, in a measure, to be active, for want of supplies ; and the fortifications can offer but a feeble resistance for want of timely re-enforcements ; withdraw fortifications, and there remains only a scattered and naked navy." With war experiences of the disadvantages of feebly-protected frontiers, the United States, though laboring under the burden of a heavy debt, commenced the above-described system immediately after the close of the war. The board of engineers who planned the present system was constituted for that purpose at the very first session of Congress after peace was proclaimed. Lists of the fortifications proposed to be constructed under the new system, together with estimates of cost, peace and war garrisons, &c. , 4 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. will be found attached to the reports of the engineers printed with this. The interior communications desired by government were macadam- ized roads j. one from Washington city, along the Atlantic coast to New Orleans ; another between the same' points, but running by the way of Knoxville ; another from New Orleans, by the way of Tennessee and Kentucky, to Buffalo and Lake Erie ; and a fourth from Cum- berland to St. Louis. These, with the ordinary roads of the country, it was supposed, would greatly facilitate the movement of troops and supplies in the event of war to the fortifications and naval depots on the several water frontiers. Neither of the four was ever built, though large sums of money were expended on the last named before it was finally abandoned. In the detailed plans some errors were made which occasioned some injudicious expenditures on the fortifications. These are indi- cated in the following remarks made in a report of one of the engineers in 1851 : ' ' In planning the new works it seems to have been taken for granted, in many instances, that each work must depend on itself, without chance of succor from forces operating on the rear and flanks. Works were thus constructed to sustain a siege from ten to fifty days, in the midst of a population from which relief to the invested work could be drawn in twenty-four hours. The expensive arrangement of these land defences have greatly in- creased the cost of the works, already from their nature very costly ; and at this day ex- cite the surprise of the professional examiner acquainted with the vast means of collateral defence possessed by the United States, that anything more should have been required for mcst of the works than security against assault by escalade." But, on the whole, there seems to be little to regret. On the con- trary, the engineers seem to have shown remarkable competence and aptitude for their extensive and most responsible duties. Since the initiation of the third system of frontier defences, forty- six years have passed away. In that period the condition of the country has been greatly changed steamboats, railroads, canals, telegraphs, steamships, and iron ships, increased wealth, and increased population give new elements for the consideration of the engineer. The old works of defence on our coasts, with their old armaments, are not equal to the new means of attack. Judging from the ability of our unarmored ships to destroy the fine granite forts of the Chinese, it seems unlikely that any considerable number of our fortifications could long resist the concentrated fire of many fifteen-inch guns of a fleet of heavy ships thoroughly iron-clad. If inadequate to such re- sistance, our nation in all its increased strength is measurably as defenceless as in 1816. What is necessary, then, to make our defences satisfactory invul- nerable to the attacks of a fleet composed of as many iron-clad vessels as any nation, without extraordinary effort, could readily concentrate against them ? 1. The creation of adequate means to exclude from our harbors hostile ships, armored vessels included. 2. The providing of suitable means to detain invading armies on shipboard, when near important ports, a sufficient time to enable an army of the United States to be transported to the point assaulted. 3. The construction of channels in which to convey gunboats from FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA- COAST DEFENCES. 5 the Gulf of Mexico up the Mississippi and Illinois rivers, and from the Atlantic ocean up the Hudson river into the lakes ; and from one lake into any other. 4. The creation of a fortress on the river St. Lawrence, or at the foot of Lake Ontario, of a capacity and power fully equal to or su- perior to that at Kingston, on the opposite shore ; also, fortifications on the Niagara or at the foot of Lake Erie, of equal capacity. 5. The construction, for the protection of the Pacific ocean frontier, of a first-class military communication between the river Missouri and the bay of San Francisco. 6. A decided increase in our means of building ami repairing vessels- of- war ; of manufacturing, testing, and repairing ordnance and small arms of all grades ; and of making and testing projectiles of all kinds and for every branch of the service. 7. The duplication or enlargement of the Military and Naval Acad- emies immediately after the extinction of the rebellion and the re-establishment of peace. And, 8. The constitution and permanent maintenance of an army and navy sufficient in numbers and excellence to command respect both at home and abroad a respect based on reasonable assurance of our physical ability to promptly repress domestic insurrection and to repel foreign aggression. Your committee invite special attention to each of these points. They will be considered in their order. In 1851, after a careful survey of what had been done, one of the engineers declared in an official report that an examination proved "that the United States, at this time, possess the best fortified sea- coast in the world. 77 This, probably, no longer remains true; but if still true, it is none the less important to us to know whether our fortifications have sufficient strength to endure the modern tests to which, in the event of a war with a first-class maritime power, they would be instantly subjected? Whether, in addition to protecting themselves, they can shield from the assaults of iron-clad vessels the cities in the adjacent harbors? And this brings us to the considera- tion of the most important point in a system of defences constructed for the protection of a water frontier. STRENGTH OF THE PRESENT FORTIFICATIONS. 1. Will the fortifications constructed by the United States on our Atlantic, Pacific, Gulf, and Lake frontiers certainly exclude a large and well-organized fleet of armored ships-of-war from our harbors? Could the forts, even if well garrisoned and heavily armed with the best ordnance hitherto in the service, prevent, by day and by night, the entrance of iron-clad steam- vessels (such as are now maintained on Europeon peace establishments) into either one of our harbors, and from shelling the city located within it ? FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. IRON-CLAD STEAMSHIPS OF WAR MAY RUN BY FORTS. It was very clearly shown by Lieutenant Dahlgren, of the navy, (in a report made by him in 1851,) that a skilful naval commander of a powerful fleet of steamships of the line could pass into the inner harbor of New York itself, in despite of the utmost opposition that could be made by the forts located at the Narrows. Your committee do not believe that the increased weight and range since given to ordnance placed in our more important forts has increased the effec- tiveness of the forts to a greater degree than the armoring of steam- ships has increased their power of resistance. Hence it is consid- ered in the highest degree probable that if, in 1851, a fleet of iron-clad steamships of the line could force a passage into New York harbor, especially if their commander was willing to sacrifice a few of them to effect the passage, a fleet of armored steamships, by a similar sacri- fice, (and probably single ones without sacrifice,) can achieve a simi- lar result in 1862. PRESENT SYSTEM OF DEFENCES DEFECTIVE. Here, then, is the first defect in our present system of frontier de- fence. It is vulnerable. The fortifications cannot shield the cities they were built to protect; they cannot protect the objects they were specially designed to shelter against the assaults of even a few ves- sels perhaps, not against one or two. So far as can now be discerned, we cannot rely on our fortifications for reasonable protection; if they cannot be sufficiently strengthened to be effective, then they must be superseded by what can be shown to be adequate. A remedy for this defect should be found without unnecessary delay; our cities cannot be left open to sudden incursions from every petty principality which has money or credit enough to build or buy an iron-clad ship. We cannot fail to perceive that here- after leading maritime nations will maintain, at least as a part of their ordinary peace establishments, a fleet of vessels not only able to pass our forts uninjured, but, armed with the fifteen or twenty-inch guns now likely to be introduced, able, probably, to demolish the forts. In all ages of the world ambition and rapacity have found occasion to plunder defenceless cities. To be able to maintain our independence, to live in safety, and to preserve peace, our military defences' must be adequate to afford protection against all attacks, except those of unusual and extraordinary power. ADDITIONAL DEFENCES. Probably the remedying of the defects of our present system of defences, which recent events have revealed to us, will not, necessa- rily, be very expensive. The remedy may possibly be found in a few additional forts, in armoring with iron both the old and the new ones, and arming them with the heaviest ordnance attainable by art. Be- sides these changes, it may be found necessary to add iron-clad float- FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 7 ing batteries and steam-rams in aid of the forts; and also, in times of danger, to anchor rafts entirely across the channels leading into the harbors, or close them with chain cables. The rafts, properly placed, would arrest the progress of hostile vessels when in front of the forts under the direct fire of their guns. Thus detained, the ships mst retire or consent to be destroyed ; for it is not at all likely that a ship can be constructed possessing as much power as can be given to a first- class fortification. (See extract of report of engineers on means of obstructing harbors, hereto annexed.) Possibly an entirely new system of defences may be found best; this, however, is scarcely to be expected, even in this age of won- derful mechanical contrivances. Being purely a question of engineer- ing, and the United States having a corps of engineers and of naval officers eminently worthy of confidence, the committee recommend the reference of the subject to them, with directions to devise a plan which, when fully executed, will enable the United States to exclude hostile fleets from all important harbors on our several water frontiers. The committee will not withhold an expression of opinion that powerful, perhaps entirely adequate, means of defence, original in character and simple in application, may be found to repel the most powerful fleets and armaments. We have reason to believe that this will be found to be true, though an allusion even to the nature and character of these plans, some of which are now under examination, would be premature. IMPORTANCE OF SUITABLE DEFENCEfc. Said Secretary Poinsett: "We must bear in mind that the destruction of some of the important points on the frontier would alone cost more to the nation than the expense of fortifying the whole lino would amount to ; while the temporary occupation of others would drive us into expenses far surpassing those of the projected defences." These reflections of this eminent man being sound, we cannot dis- pense with defensive works merely because of their expense. The only question really open to discussion is, what system of defences will be adequate to the end in view ? PRACTICABILITY OF CONSTRUCTING ADEQUATE NATIONAL DEFENCES. It is ^objected that it is quite impracticable for thirty millions of people to provide defences which are truly invulnerable for frontiers so extensive as those of the United States. To objections of this class, Mr. Secretary Poinsett replied that "It would appear, on a superficial view, to be a acigantic and almost impracticable pro- ject to fortify such an immense extent of coast as that of the United States, and difficult, if not impossible, to provide a sufficient force to garrison and defend the works necessary for that purpose." But, said Mr. Poinsett: "The coast of the United States, throughout its vast extent, has but few points which require to be defended against a regular and powerful attack. A considerable portion of it is inaccessible to large vessels, and only exposed to the depredations of parties in boats and small vessels-of-war ; against which inferior works and a combination of the same means, and a well-organized local militia, will afford sufficient protection. 8 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. "The only portions which require to be defended by permanent works of some strength are the avenues to the great commercial cities, and to naval and military establishments, the destruction of which would be a serious loss to the country, and be regarded by an enemy as an equivalent for the expense of a great armament. "It is shown, also, that the number of men required, on the largest scale, for the de- fence of the forts when compared with the movable force that would be necessary without thfm is inconsiderable. The local militia, aided by a few regulars, and directed by en- gineer and artillery officers, may, with previous training, be safely intrusted with their defence in time of war. "It cannot be too earnestly urged that a much smaller number of troops will be required to defend a fortified frontier than to cover one that is entirely unprotected ; and that such a system will enable us, according to the spirit of our institutions, to employ the militia effectually for the defence of the country." From three causes the number of important points open to attack has increased during the twenty-two years which have elapsed since the foregoing cogent reasons were presented; but, as our wealth and population have proportionably increased, his reply is as complete to-day as it was then. The points of attack have increased, first, by the springing up of new marts of commerce; second, by the acquisi- tion of Texas and California; and third, cities in shallow harbors now need strong defences in consequence of the recent adaptation of ves- sels of light draught to the work of the largest ships-of-war. The iron-clad Monitor, though of light draught, can carry as heavy a gun as the Warrior, and can as safely run by any fort in her Majesty's dominions, anchor in the harbor beyond, and, in defiance of ancient means of prevention, commence the work of destruction. But though this altered condition of affairs lays open to attack sev- eral important points not heretofore considered exposed, still, as just remarked, our increased means fully equal the increased demands upon them. Our country is competent to the task of placing the frontier in a complete state of defence without being at all distressed by the performance of it. The sum of our present expenses would, probably in one month, far more than suffice to place our frontiers in a perfectly defensible condition. The Pacific frontier is, of course, excepted in the above remark. But if, on scientific investigation, the engineers and naval officers shall ascertain that adequate national defences cannot be constructed except at great cost, the works will yet have to be built, however unwelcome the burden; unless, indeed, the nation is prepared to renounce its time-honored maxims, and con- sent to owe the security of its frontier cities, and the security of a commerce which has become as wide-spread as the world, to the mercy and forbearance of its maritime neighbors. . Having shown that the first step to take to secure our water fron- tiers from the casualities of unexpected assault is to construct de- fences, permanent and floating, which are competent to resist any sudden attack that can readily be made with such means as are ordi- narily in the possession of an enemy, your committee believe that the next step, in importance is : 2. To provide such means of defence of the coast near the import- ant harbors as will compel hostile vessels to seek for a point at some distance from the harbors at which to disembark troops; thus afford- ing to us time to convey our troops to the point threatened in advance of the arrival of the enemy. FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 9 When our roads were few and bad the importance of compelling an enemy to land a day's journey from important points was not so striking as now, when troops can be placed in that space of time in large numbers between the point threatened and an invading army. Informed by the telegraph, and aided by the railroads, a commander defending a country possessing so many soldiers as ours can, in a brief period of time, confront with a superior force more armies than the entire fleets of any nation can transport in one voyage across a wide ocean. This is an advantage in the defence of a country of very great moment. To achieve it, a nation situated at a great distance from warlike and ambitious governments, would be justified in making very large expenditures. If, in addition to this, we maintain respect- able fleets and armies, carefully drill a well-organized militia, and take care to keep on hand abundant munitions of war, the United States would be, practically, invulnerable. The exceptions to the general remark, that an invading army, land- ing at any important point in the United States, could be confronted in a few hours with a superior force, are few, and can be found only in the Gulf and Pacific States, and in those bordering on Lakes Huron and Superior. These exceptions are rapidly lessening in num- ber, and in a few years will disappear. It is a matter of just pride and great national consequence that no country of the size of one of our largest States has such facile and as extensive lines of water and railroad communications as the United States. No system of defence, therefore, would be perfect which is not so planned as to render available, to its greatest extent, this power of concentrating forces rapidly upon any assailable point a power which our country pos- sesses in so extraordinary a degree. No large country, either in ancient or modern times, ever possessed such ample and reliable means for rapidly transferring large bodies of men from one distant State to another as our own; and because the great power of such means has never been effectively exhibited in a great war of a defen- sive character is not a reason for us to disregard it. Its inherent value and power in a country where, as all nations well know, the sudden seizure of a few places, however valuable, cannot endanger its integrity or seriously cripple its movements, are obvious to the humblest understanding. Seizures, achieved at great risk, and promising no decisive results, are rarely attempted by able leaders. Thorough defences, constructed with direct reference to a full develop- ment of the usefulness of our interior communications, will go far to insure our country even against attempts to invade it, and such a result is the highest aim of a system of military defences. The location and character of the works necessary to prevent the landing of a hostile force on the coast near important harbors can only be determined by engineers, and to them it should be referred, with instructions to erect them. DEFENCES OF THE NORTHERN FRONTIER. 3 and 4. How can the northern or lake frontier be successfully defended, especially as the United States are prohibited, by treaty 10 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. from building war vessels on the lakes? On the shores of these lakes the United States have many cities and villages, and upon their waters an immense commerce; these are unsheltered by any defences worthy of special notice, but they are as open to incursion as was Mexico when invaded by Cortez. A small fleet of light- draught, heavily- armed, iron-clad gunboats could, in one short month, in despite of any opposition that could be made by extemporized batteries, pass up the St. Lawrence into the lakes, and shell every city and village from Ogdensburg to Chicago. At one blow it could sweep our com- merce from that entire chain of waters. Such a fleet wouM have it in its power to inflict a loss to be reckoned only by hundreds of millions of dollars, so vast is the wealth thus exposed to the depredations of a maritime enemy. To be able to strike a blow so Effective, Great Britain constructed a canal around the great Falls of Niagara. By this single work the entire chain of lakes was opened to the entrance of all British light-draught ocean vessels. Perceiving our ability to erect fortifications on the St. Lawrence that might command its channel, and thus neutralize all they had done, Great Britain dug a canal from the foot of Lake 'Ontario, on a line parallel to the river, but beyond the reach of American guns, to a point on the St. Law- rence below, beyond American jurisdiction, thus securing a channel to and from the lakes out of our reach. Occupied by our own vast commercial enterprises and by violent party conflicts, our people failed to notice, at the time, that the safety of our entire northern frontier had been destroyed by the dig- ging of two short canals. Near the head of the St. Lawrence, (at the foot of Lake Ontario,) the British, to complete their supremacy on the lakes, have built a large naval depot for the construction and repair of vessels, and a very strong fortress to protect the depot and the outlet of the lake a fort which cannot be reduced, it is sup- posed by them, except by regular approaches. They have also strong defences of the St. Lawrence at Montreal, Quebec, \vii miles above the town of Portsmouth. Between this point and Shooting Point is a branch of the river communicating with Great Bay. This branch, which is one-third of a mile wide, presents, for two miles in length, an excellent cover for all sorts of vessels. This situation is sufficiently commodious for a secondary depot, designed to repair such vessels-of-war as may be constrained to seek an asylum in this river ; it is too near the sea, however, for a great naval depot, and in other respects does not possess the advantage of Boston, as was ^hovm in the report of 1820. Nevertheless, as Portsmouth is an excellent sta- tion, and as it is indispensable that some at least of these stations be provided with the necessary establishments for reparation, the depot in this river should bi' maintained. It is to be regretted that the bay to the south of Fox Point was not chosen as the site for the navy yard instead of Fernal's island. Being where it is it will be necessary in time of war to make such dispositions as will protect the yard from an attack from the north shore of the river. All attacks by water may be effectually prevented by defensive works at the mouth of the river. The position of Fort Constitution must certainly and that of Fort McCleary may possibly be occupied by those defences, though the works themselves, especially the former, must give place to such as will be better adapted to fulfil the object. The other positions for forts are Gerrish's Point, Fishing island, and Clarke's island, some if not all of which must be occupied. The final sur- veys of this harbor though completed, not having been before the board, the projects and estimates have not been made. t Newburyport Harbor. This is the next port south of Portsmouth. The Merrimack river, the mouth of which forms the harbor, is obstructed at its junc- tion with the sea by a bar on which there is at low tide but six or seven feet water. This obstruction to the use of this harbor by vessels of much draught, i\i\(\ the circumstance of a portion of the trade of the Merrimack being diverted to Boston by the Middlesex canal, induce the board to consider it inexpedient to fortify the harbor by permanent works. Gloucester harbor. The board are unprepared to state to what extent and at what cost this harbor should be fortified. Its position near the extremity of Cape Ann, and in close relation to the navigation of Massachusetts bay indicates clearly that it is of an importance beyond what would be assigned to the value of its existing establishments. Until the necessary surveys are made the board cannot state in what degree the present fort may be made useful in the future defence of this harbor. YBevcrly harbor. Beverly is in some sort a dependency of Salem, as the channel, which is serpentine and narrow, passes within 200 yards of Salem Neck. It may be defended by temporary batteries erected thereon, and rendered utterly impassable by flowing obstructions. | Salem. The port of Salem is distant from Marblehead harbor only two miles, being separated therefrom by a peninsula. The occupation, of the ex- tremity of Winter island (where are the ruins of Fort Pickering) on the one ; Sec reports of 1820 and 1821. f See report of 1821. J See report of 1821 and memoir on the defence of Salem, 1823, H. Rep. Com. 86 3 34 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCE. side and of Naugus Head on the other, will effectually cover this harbor. The cost of the works projected with that view by the board is estimated at $151,000. * Marblettead Harbor. Besides, covering in some measure the establishment * at Boston, the harbors of Marblehead and Salem possess an important com- merce of their own, and also afford a shelter for vessels prevented by certain winds from pursuing their course eastward, or from entering the first named port. The mode of defending Marblehead harbor proposed by the board consists in occupying on the north side the hillock which commands the present Fort Se- wall (which will be superseded by the new work) and on the south the position of Jack's Point, The two works will cost $212,000. t Boston Harbor. We come now to the most important harbor in the eastern section of the coast, and, considering its relations to general commerce and to the interests of the navy, to one of the most important in the Union. After a careful examination of all the necessary conditions of such a problem, the naval com- missioners and board of engineers, in their joint report of 1820, gave this har- bor the preference of all other positions to the east, and, inclusive of New Yftrk bay and the Hudson, as the seat of the great northern naval depot; for the reasons at large of this selection reference is made to the report of 1820, But even should the recommendation therein contained remain unsanctioned, Boston is still a city of great wealth, possesses an extensive and active commerce, and contains already within its harbor an establishment on which great reliance is placed to give growth and energy to our navy. Excepting Boston, indeed, and its establishments, the eastern coast presents no objects, to an enemy of such im- portance as to induce him to direct against them any operations which would very materially influence the results of a war. The principal towns and the mouths of the great communications with the interior being fortified, the coun- try woody and hilly, abounding in defiles, cut up by enclosures, and defended by a brave, vigorous, and enterprising people, presents so many obstacles that no attempts, not merely predatory, can be anticipated. On the contrary, the people, undisturbed by apprehensions for their homes, having numerous and excellent sailors, a great number of safe anchorages along their coast, and a great cl/epot of wealth at Boston to animate and sustain every species of enterprise on the ocean, may well be expected to take an active offensive part in any future war. The present forts in Boston harbor defend merely the interior basin from at- tacks by water. But, as it often happens that vessels enter Nantasket Roads with a wind too scant to pass the Narrows, or are detained in President Roads by light winds or an adverse tide ; as the former, especially, is a very conve- nient anchorage from whence to proceed to sea ; and above all, as Nantasket Roads affords the best possible station for a blockading squadron, it is deemed indispensable to place permanent defences at the mouth of the harbor. The project of defence proposed by the board contemplates leaving the existing works as a second barrier, placing a permanent fort on George's island, another at Nantasket Head, having two advanced works on the Head, and one on Hog island, reducing the altitude of Gallop island to destroy its command over George's island, and filling up the Broad Sound channel so as to leave no pas- sage for ships-of-war. These works will cost $1,279,429 51. Besides the works of a permanent character, it will be necessary on the beginning of a war to erect temporary works upon Point Aldaton, Peddock's island, LovelPs island, Apple island, Noddle island, the heights near the north end of Chelsea bridge, aiid the neck near the termination of Middlesex canal. For the particular ob- jects of the several works enumerated above the board refer to the memoir on the defence of Boston harbor of 1823. ^Plymouth and Provincetown harbors. These are the only harbors on the See report of 1821, and memoir of defence of Marblebead. 1823. f See reports of 1820 and 1821, and memoir on the defence of Boston harbor, 1823. J See report of 1821. FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 35 eastern coast south of Boston. They have a commerce of some consequence of their own, but they are particularly interesting in reference to the port of Boston and to the transition from the middle to the eastern section of the coast, in which respects they would become still more important should the proposed canal from Buzzard's to Barnstable bay ever be executed. While these harbors are unde- fended, an enemy's squadron blockading Massachusetts bay has ports of refuge under his lee, of which he would not fail to avail himself to maintain his block- ade throughout the most stormy seasons, knowing that the winds which would - compel him to seek shelter would be adverse to outward bound, and fatal, should they venture near the coast, to inward bound vessels. In possession of these harbors the enemy Avould have, in fine, constantly under his eye the harbor of Boston, the passage outside of Cape Cod, and that through the canal. To these considerations, going to establish the necessity of securing them by proper defences, we must not omit to add that without the shelter now afforded by these ports an enemy would be unable to enforce a rigorous investment. In the first place, lie would be often deterred from taking a station near the land, lest he might be caught embayed by the violent easterly winds prevailing at certain seasons ; in the next place, he would always seek a good offing on every indica- tion of these winds, thereby leaving a clear coast, to be improved by our vessels at the first instant of a change of weather ; and, lastly, our vessels being cut off from Boston by the position of the enemy, or constrained by adverse winds to deviate from their course, would find to the south a shelter equivalent to that provided at the north by the defence of Marblehead, Salem, Gloucester, and Portsmouth. The board have not been able to make projects for the defence of these har- bors, the surveys not being completed. Should the proposed canal above mentioned be executed, it will be necessary to place a small work near each of its outlets to prevent the destruction of the means by which the transit of vessels in and out of the canal must be accom- plished. The coast between Cape Cod and Cape Hatteras differs from the northeastern section in possessing fewer harbors, in having but little rocky and a great pro- portion of sandy shore, in which it resembles the southern section in its milder climate and in its clearer atmosphere, and it differs from all the other portions in the depth and magnitude of its interior seas and sounds, and in the distance to which deep tide navigation extends up its numerous large rivers. The circuit of the coast, not including the shores of the great bays, measures 650 miles, while a straight line from one of the above-named capes to the other, measures about 520 miles. Martha's Vineyard sound. A little to the south of Barnstable (a part of the projection which we designate as Cape Cod) lie the islands of Nantucket and Martha's Vineyard, which, with several smaller islands on the south and the pro- jection of Cape Malabar on the east, enclose Martha's Vineyard sound. The channels through this sound being sufficient for merchant vessels, and one even allowing the passage of small frigates, are not only the constant track of coast- ing vessels, but owing to the relative situation of Narragansett roads and the existence of two tolerable sate harbors to the east of Gay Head, namely, Tar- paulin Cove and Holmes's^Hole, this sound is generally aimed at by all eastern vessels bound home in the tempestous seasons. -There are certain difficulties, * See report of 1820. 36 FORTIFICATIONS AM) SKA-COAST DEFENCK>. however, attending the navigation of this sound, resulting from want of a har- bor near the eastern extremity, which have given, rise to a project now in a course of investigation for forming an artificial harbor at the northeast point of Nantucket island. In the present state of things, therefore, although the board are fully impressed with the necessity of providing security for the very valuable portion of com- merce frequenting this sound, it is deemed premature to enter into particulars as to the most suitable mode of defence. We only add, in reference to the value of this commerce, that from fifty to eighty vessels, engaged chiefly in the whale fishery, are owned at Nantucket alone; and that forty or fifty vessels, not be- longing to the sound, and many of them containing the richest cargoes, are often seen in the harbors, waiting a favorable change of weather to complete their voyage. Buzzard's bay* Interposed between the island of Martha's Vineyard and the main are the Elizabeth islands, bounding Buzzard's bay on the south. This bay, although of importance as leading to the proposed canal to Bamstable bay, as covering the flourishing town of New Bedford, and as being one of the natural harbors to be used by an enemy in enforcing the blockade of Narragansett roads, cannot be defended by fortifications owing to its breadth. Should the canal be constructed, it must be defended by one or more works near its mouth. (See page 28.) New Bedford harbor. No survey having been made of this harbor, the board are unable to state how far the present; fort answers the necessary conditions, or, if any, what new works are required to afford due protection to the valuable commerce of this town. Narragansett bay. Referring to previous reportsf for more minute informa- tion, the board will advert briefly to some of the military and naval properties of this important roadstead. First. It is the only port on the coast accessible with a northwest wind, which is the direction of the most violent winter storms ; and as the same winds serve for entering both Boston and New York harbors, viz : N.NW. to S.SW. round by the east, while this harbor can be entered with all winds from NW. to E. round by the west, it follows that this harbor being secured vessels may be certain of making a harbor on this part of the coast with all winds excepting those between NW. and N.NW. Second. From this position the navigation of Long Island sound, and especially the communication between that sound and Buzzard's bay or Martha's Vineyard sound, may be well pro- tected. Third. The blockade of the excellent harbor and naval station of New London will be rendered difficult. Fourth. From this station the navy will com- mand from N. to S., as from Hampton Roads it will from S. to N., the great in- ward curve of the coast between Cape Cod and Cape Hatteras ; the influence of which command over the blockading operations ot an enemy will be apparent when it is considered that the only harbors of refuge he will have will be Dela- ware, Gardiner's, and Buzzard's bays. Fifth. This harbor is the connecting link of the coast to the south with that to the north of Cape Cod. If Narragansett bay were left in its existing state as to defence an enemy would seize it without difficulty, and by the aid of naval superiority form an establishment in Rhode Island for the war. Occupying this island, and the position of Tiverton heights opposite its northern extremity, which is of narrow front, easy to secure and impossible to turn, he might defy all the forces of the eastern States, drive the United States to vast expense of blood and treasure, and while this position of his troops would keep in alarm and motion all the population of the east, feigned expeditions against New York through Long See report of 1820. f Keo reports .of 1820 and 1821, and memoir on the defence of Connanicut island, 1822. FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 37 Island sound or against more southern cities, would equally alarm the country in that direction. If, in short, he merely contented himself with menacing the coast, it is difficult to estimate the embarrassment and expense into which he would drive the government. Of tlio existing forts, viz : Fort Adams, Dumpling Tower, fort on Rose island, Fort Wolcott* and Fort Green, the two latter are the only ones retained in the projected system of defence, Fort Adams, besides being entirely unsuited to the important position it occupies, is in ruins, and the Dumpling Tower, and fort on Hose island, also very inconsiderable works, were never more than par- tially completed. The project of defence proposed by the board contemplates for the middle channel a strong fort with outworks on Brenton's Point, another on the Dump- lings, a smaller fort on Rose island, and the preservation of Fort Wolcott and and Fort Green. The eastern passage is already shut by the permanent bridge at Rowland's ferry. As to the western passage, three modes present themselves. First Reducing the depth of water by an artificial ledge, so as to prevent the passage of ships-of-war. Second. Relying on fortifications alone to close the passage ; or third. Resorting in part to one and in part to other means just mentioned. Being the least expensive and most certain, the board have founded the estimate on the first. The total expense of Narragansett defences will be $1,817,578 26. Stonington harbor, Connecticut, and Sag Harbor, New York. These harbors have not been surveyed, and the board are therefore unable to give any infor- mation as to the kind of defences they require or their probable cost. Gardiner's bay. The most valuable harbor to an enemy investing this part of the coast is probably not defensible by fortifications. It has not, however, been surveyed; and at some future day it may be a very interesting question whether by steam batteries, under the protection of and aided by fortifications, its defence may not be accomplished. New London harbor* New London harbor is very important to the com- merce of Long Island sound, and as a port of easy access, having a great depth of water, never freezing and being easily defended, it is an excellent station for the navy. It is also valuable as a shelter for vessels bound out or home and desirous of avoiding a blockading squadron off Sandy Hook. In the plan of defence the present forts, Trumbull and Griswold, give place to more efficient works, whereof the expense is estimated at $209,675 63. New Haven harbor.] It is proposed to defend this harbor by improving and enlarging Fort Hale, and substituting a new work for the slight redoubt erected during the late war, called Fort Wooster. The expense of both will be $59,609 18. New York harbor.\ The object for the projected works for the vicinity of New York are to cover the city against an attack by land or sea, to protect its numerous shipping, to prevent as much as possible the blockade of this great port, which will soon have, added to the immense wealth of its own rivers, the productions of the boundless regions on the northern and western lakes, and to cover the interior communication projected to unite the Raritan with the Dela- ware. In the present condition of that harbor as regards defence an enemy would meet but little opposition, whether his attempt were made by land or water. Coming by the sound he might land within ten miles of the city, upon the main or upon Long Island or both ; and coming into the lower harbor he might either force the passage of the channel, anchoring in the Hudson or East river, or he '.See report of 1821. fSee report of 1820. jSce reports of 1820 am! 1821. 38 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. might land in Gravesend bay, eight milts from the city, and march directly to Brook- lyn, where he would find the navy yard, and whence lie might levy a contribution or destroy the city. The only mode of resistance would be the hamming, ex- pensive, and uncertain one, of arraying a large body of militia upon Harlem and Brooklyn heights, and this could be resorted to only in the event, \iot to be anticipated, of having received timely intelligence of his design. If we fortify Throgg's Neck and Wilkins's Point, on the east river, and if we complete the works at the Narrow**, making them all too strong to be carried by a coup de main, we shall secure the means of transferring the neighboring militia upon the flanks and rear of an enemy should he march upon Brooklyn, while we shall secure the same adA r antage should he pursue the route by Harlem, besides in- creasing the length of his march through an intersected country to twenty miles. This arrangement of defensive works, necessary as it is, still leaves the lower harbor open to an enemy's vessels, where, safe at all seasons, he can enforce a strict blockade, cut off the line of interior communication by the Raritan, and where he has a landing place in somewhat dangerous proximity to the city. In view of these considerations, the board projected the additional works on the east bank and middle ground, which will completely protect the harbor, compel an enemy on tin's side to land upon a dangerous coast near thirty miles from his object, and to enforce his blockade by riding on the open sea with a dangerous coast on either hand. Of the permanent works heretofore erected Castle Clinton ha-s been already ceded to the city. The others should be maintained as constituting a last bar- rier, as. affording convenient places of deposit for stores and munitions of all kinds, and of rendezvous for recruits and good positions for military hospitals. The total cost of all the works projected by the board is estimated at $5,201,834 28. Delaware bay and city of Philadelphia* The coast, from the mouth of the Hudson to the Chesapeake, as well as that on the south side of Long Island, is low, sandy, covered by numerous sandy islands, lying near and parallel to the coast, and haA'ing, besides the Delaware, many inlets and interior basins, but none, with this exception, 'affording water enough for sea-going vessels. The Delaware bay itself being wide and full of shoals, having an intricate channel, and being much obstructed by ice at certain seasons, affords no very good har- bor within a reasonable distance of the sea. It is, however, of great conse- quence that the deficiency in this respect should be remedied by artificial means, not only on account of the value of the commerce of the upper part of the bay, which is hazarded by the peculiar dangers of the lower, but also on account of the dangers to which the exterior commerce is exposed for want of a harbor for so great an extent of coast, and of the means which will thereby be attained of depriving an enemy of one of the shelters of the coast not othenvdse defensible, and of rendering the blockade of this and the neighboring parts of the coast more difficult. Should the proposed breakwater near Cape Henlopen be constructed, it will be necessary to provide works for its defence. The board is not, however, pre- pared to present a plan or an estimate of such as would be required. The lowest point at which Philadelphia is defensible is at Pea Patch island, about forty-five miles below that city. Fort Delaware, on that island, now almost completed, together with a permanent work on the Delaware shore, oppo- site a temporary work on the Jersey shore, to be thrown up at the commence- ment of a war, and floating obstructions in the channel, will effectually cover Philadelphia, the other important places on the river, and the outlet of the canal connecting the Delaware and Chesapeake. The expense of the permanent works will be $817,025 45. 9 See report of 1817 on the defence of the Delaware ; report of 1820, and a report on a pro- jected breakwater of 1821. FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 39 Chesapeake tiay* The naval commissioners and board of engineers en- trusted with the selection of sites for great northern and southern naval depots recommended, in their joint reports of 1819 and 1820, BurwelFs bay, on James river, for the one, and Charlestown, near Boston, for the other ; they also re- commended Boston harbor andNarragansett bay at the north, and Hampton Roads at the south, as chief naval rendezvous. In these reports the commission en- tered at large into the consideration of all the matters relating to these import- ant subjects. The board, now referring to those reports for details which would too much encumber this more condensed communication, will first briefly advert to the objects to be secured by defensive works in the Chesapeake, and next state, in their order, the positions to be occupied and the mode of defence pro- posed, so far at least as these have been determined. The immediate object of the defence of Hampton Roads, near the mouth of the Chesapeake, is to shut this roadstead against an enemy, and secure it to our- selves ; to cover the interior navigation between the Chesapeake and the south- ern States ; to secure, as a naval place of arms, a point serving as the connect- ing link between the middle and southern coast, whence the navy may protect the exterior trade as well as the trade of the bay ; to defend the public estab- lishments at Norfolk and such as may be made at James river, and to prevent an enemy from making a permanent lodgement at Norfolk. Another very im- portant object, but more remote, as requiring all great temptations to be placed out of the reach of an enemy, is to cover the coast and the minor settlements of the bay from predatory attacks ; for no trifling expeditions would ever venture up the Chesapeake while a portion of our naval force occupied the road at Hampton. The object of other fortifications in these waters is, therefore, to cover the valu- able harbors, cities, and trade of the upper part of the Chesapeake. Hampton Roads, James river, and Norfolk* In the present state of things an enemy may land in Lynnhaven bay, and in one or two days' march reach the narrow position which lies to the east of Suffolk. Bounded on one side by the Dismal Swamp, and on the other by Bennet's creek, near the mouth of the Nansemond, this position cannot be turned, and may be easily fortified. Here he might defy all the forces of Virginia and North Carolina. Secure of a re- treat so long as his fleet occupied Hampton Roads, he could only be driven out by efforts on the part of the United States, involving great sacrifices both of men and money. But when these roads are fortified, he will be able to anchor only in Lynnhaven bay ; his march then upon Suffolk will be taken in flank and rear by our forces crossing Hampton Roads, and he will therefore find it impossible to take permanent quarters in the country. The works projected for the defence of Hampton Roads, James river, and Norfolk, are : First, a fort and advanced lanette at Old Point Comfort ; second, a casemated battery on the Rip Rap shoals ; and, third, a line of floating ob- structions extending across the channel between these works. In the event of a great naval depot being fixed on James river, it might ultimately be advisable to provide additional strength by adding works at the positions of Newport News, Naseway Shoal, and Craney Island flats. Exclusive of these the cost of the projected works is estimated at $2,164,147 69. The existing forts, viz : Fort Nelson and Fort Norfolk serve for the defence of Norfolk and the navy yard. They are small and inefficient works, but may be made useful as accessories to general defensive operations. Harbor of St. Mary's.\ The central situation of this fine basin as regards the Chesapeake, its relation to the Potomac, its depth of water, and the facility * See reports of 1819 and 1820. f See reports of 1819 and 1821. \ See report of 1819. 40 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. wherewith it may be defended, indicate its fitness as a harbor' of refuge for the commerce of the bay, and as an occasional, if not constant station during war. of a portion of our naval forces. A survey of the harbor and the surrounding country has been made. The maps are, however, not yet complete, and the board are unprepared to state the cost of the defences. Patuxent river.* The more effectually to protect the city of Washington from a sudden attack by troops landed at the head of navigation of the Patuxent, and to provide an additional shelter for vessels, a fort has been projected to occupy Point Patience, and another Thomas's Point, about six miles from the Chesapeake. Their expense will be $337,000. Annapolis harbor.] From not having as yet been able to consider the par- ticular subject of the defences of this harbor, or to obtain preliminarv surveys, the board are unable to state whether new works will be required. Harbor of Baltimore.] The proximity of Baltimore to the bay places that city in a dangerous situation. In the present state of things an enemy can, in a few hours' march, without being exposed to a separation from his fleet, after an easy landing, make himself master of that great commercial depot. . Baltimore requires for its security two forts in the Patapsco, one at Haw- kins's Point and the other at the extreme end of the flat on Sollers's Point. Be- sides the advantages which will result of obliging the enemy to land at a greater distance, thereby delaying his inarch, gaining time for the arrival of militia, and preventing his turning the defensive position our forces might occupy, it will be impossible for him to endanger the city or its shipping by a direct attack by water. The present Fort McHenry, Redoubt Wood, and Covington battery should be retained as a second barrier. The expense of the fort on Sollers's Point flat is estimated at. . . S673, 205 44 A preliminary estimate of fort at Hawkins's Point (to be corrected by applying the project with more accuracy to the ground than could heretofore be done) gives 244, 337 14 Total 917, 542 58 Mouth of Elk river. The construction of the Delaware and Chesapeake canal will make it necessary to place a small work somewhere near the mouth of the Elk, to prevent an enemy by a sudden enterprise destroying the works which connect that canal with the river. Some surveys must be made before the most suitable location, or the form, or the cost of this work can be deter- mined. City of Washington, Alexandria, and Georgetown.] Fort Washington, a work recently completed, covers these cities from any attack by water, and will oblige an enemy to land at some fifteen or eighteen miles from Alexandria, should that city be his object. It will also serve the very valuable purpose of covering the troops crossing from Virginia with a view to fall upon the flanks of an enemy moving against the metropolis. All these objects would have been better fulfilled had the work been placed at Lower Cedar Point ; as. it is, however, the works in the Patuxent being constructed, and the militia of the surrounding country being in a due state of preparation, an enterprise against these cities would be one of great hazard. The cost of Fort Washington was $446,467 37 ; a small work should nevertheless be placed on Lower Cedar Point. :s See report of 1819, and memoir on the defence of the Patuxent, 1825. t See report of 1819. FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA- COAST DEFENCES. 41 From the mouth of the Chesapeake to Cape Hatteras there occurs no inlet navigable by sea-going' vessels, and we therefore proceed at once to the SOUTHERN SECTION OF THE ATLANTIC COAST.* This coast is invariably low, and for the greater part sandy, much resembling that from Cape Hatteras to Montauk Point. A ridge of sand, occasionally in- terrupted by the alluvion of the rivers, extends throughout its whole length ; this ridge lies in certain portions on the main land, while in others it is divided therefrom by basins or sounds of varying width and depth, and is cut into islands by numerous channels of greater or less depth connecting these interior waters with the sea. Wherever this ridge is broken, its place is supplied by low and marshy grounds, bordering the principal and the many lesser outlets of the rivers. The nature of the country through which the rivers of this coast flow after leaving the mountains is such that the banks being easily abraded by the cur- rent the waters are always turbid, and are continually transporting new supplies for the formation of alluvion and the maintenance of extensive submarine banks, shoals, and bars ; that these last do not rapidly increase is owing to the force of the current, the action of the sea, and the mobility of the particles of matter. It is to this cause, viz : the wearing away of the shores of the rivers, that is to be attributed the want of harbors on this coast unobstructed by bars, and which as a coast particularly distinguishes this and the Gulf of Mexico frontier (where similar operations have been going on) from the more northern and eastern portions. The board have not , examined the coast of East Florida ; their description, therefore, of the southern coast will extend no further than Amelia island or mouth of St. Mary's, while that of the Gulf of Mexico frontier will begin at Pensacola. Ocracoke Inlet, Albemarle and Pamlico Sounds.* In their report of 1821 t the board adverted to a project then if not now in agitation to open a navigable, direct communication from Albemarle sound to the sea, and they also indicated, as probably a less expensive and a less dangerous mode of transporting the produce of the Roanoke, Tar, and Neuse rivers to the ocean, a canal from river to river, and terminating in the harbor of Beaufort, North Carolina. If the first of these projects be executed, defensive works would be necessary at the new inlet ; if not, no others will be needed than such as are indispensable in any event to cover the important harbor of refuge at Beaufort. The sjiallowness of the water on the bars at Ocracoke effectually excludes all vessels-of-war from the harbors within. But as this, in the present state of things, is the outlet of an extensive commerce, and as through this opening attempts might be made in small vessels or in boats to interrupt the interior line of communication whereon so much would depend in time of war, it would be proper in the beginning of a war to throw up a temporary work as a defence against all minor enterprises. Beaufort harbor, N. C.f Beaufort harbor and the mouths of Cape Fear river are the only issues navigable by vessels of more than a light draught of water, by which the interior of North Carolina communicates with the ocean. They are important points in the line of interior navigation to be sooner or later opened from the Chesapeake southwardly, and they are besides the only harbors of refuge on an extent of coast of more than 400 miles. The fort projected for the defence of Beaufort harbor will take the place of the ruins of Fort Hampton. Its estimated expense is $175,000. Mouths of Cape Fear river, N. C.f It is proposed to defend the main chan- * See report of 1821. f See report of 1821, and memoir on the defence of Beaufort, 1824. j See report of 1821, and memoir on the defence of Cape Pear river, of 1824. 42 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. iiel of Gape Fear river by a fort on Oak island and another on Bald Head, and the smaller channel by a redoubt on Federal Point. The battery, magazine, block-house, quarters, &c., &c., at Smithville, may remain as accessories ; the cost of the new works will be $251,000. As the board have not hitherto given in any report of that part of the south- ern coast which lies between Cape Fear river and Amelia island, it is a matter of regret that they cannot at once give the full and accurate account of the in- teresting points of the coast, and their relation to each other and to the country behind them, which is necessary to a perfect understanding of the suitableness of any proposed system of defence. This cannot be done, however, until many surveys, a part only of which are in progress, have been made. The board will, nevertheless, be able (from their personal examinations of the coast,) to point out distinctly most, if not all, of the points requiring defence. Especially as they have a principle to guide them which may be regarded as imperative, namely, that on a coast possessing few harbors like this it is at the same time the more necessary to preserve them all for our own use, and the more easy to deprive an enemy of that shelter, which is nearly indispensable to a continuous and close blockade. Georgetown harbor. The first inlet of any consequence south of Cape Fear river is at the united mouths of the Waccamaw, Pedee, and Black rivers, forming Georgetown harbor. The two latter rivers first join a few miles above George- town, (which lies at the mouth of Sampit creek, fifteen miles from the sea,) and their united waters mingle with those of the Waccamaw, opposite that town. Below this junction the waters spread out to a considerable width, affording a commodious and capacious bay, having sufficient depth of water within and upon the bar near the mouth for merchant vessels and small vessels-of-war. It is probable this harbor may be well defended by a work placed near the mouth of Moschito creek, a little within the chaps of the harbor, or perhaps upon WinyaAv Point. The present fort, situated near the town at the mouth of ' Sampit creek, can be of no avail, except to defend the approach by water to the town. It has long been neglected, and is in ruins. Santec river and Bull's lay. About ten miles southwest from Georgetown . entrance are the mouths of the Santce, the largest river in South Carolina. Whether the two mouths of this river have sufficient water on their bars to permit the passage of vessels of any draught, the board are not informed ; should there, as is believed, be too little water for sea-going vessels, there can be little advantage in fortifying them, especially as the greatest proportion of the valu- able products of this river are now, or will soon be, diverted from the channel of the lower part of the river by canals to Charleston. As to Bull's bay, the board are in the same uncertainty as regards the depth of Avater with which it is accessible, and they are as yet doubtful of its defensibility if accessible. Charleston, S. C. The city, situated at the junction of Ashley and Cooper rivers, is about five miles in a direct line from the sea. Between ^it and the ocean is a wide and safe roadstead for vessels of any draught. Upon the bar, however, lying three or four miles outside of the chaps of the harbor, there is only water enough for large sloops-of-war. On the southwest side of the harbor is James's island, through which are several serpentine passages more or less navigable for boats or barges ; some of these communicate directly with the sea, and some with Stono river. Whappoo cut, the most northerly passage from Stono to Charleston harbor, enters the latter directly opposite the city. Interior natural water communications also exist to the southwest of Stono river, connecting this with North Edisto river, the latter with South Edisto and St. Helena sound, this again with Broad river, and finally this last with Savan- nah river. On the north side of the mouth of the harbor lies Sullivan's island, separated from the main by a channel navigable to small craft. To the north- east of Sullivan's island an interior water communication extends to Bull's bay FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES, 43 and even beyond to the harbor of Georgetown. From this sketch it is apparent that it will not suffice to defend the principal entrance to the harbor "alone. The lateral avenues must also be shut. Arid it is probable that accurate surveys will show that the best mode of defending these latter is by works at or near the mouths of the inlets, as the enemy will thereby be kept at a greater distance from the city, the lesser harbors formed by these inlets will be secured, and the line of interior communication will be inaccessible from the sea. No position for the defence of the principal entrance and roadstead can be formed nearer the ocean than the western extremity of Sullivan's island. This 'is at present occupied by Fort Moultrie, a work of some strength but by no means adequate to its object, its battery being weak and the scarp so low as to oppose no serious obstacle to escalade. How far this work, by modifications of its plan and relief, may be made to contribute to a better defence of the harbor, cannot now be determined. The northeast point of James's island, projecting into the harbor about midway between Sullivan's island and the city, is the site of the few remains of old Fort Johnson ; this point is too remote from Fort Moultrie and from the channel to be occupied by a new work if a better posi- tion can be found. The probability is that the shoal opposite the last named fort may be occupied permanently ; and if so the fortification of the harbor may be considered as an easy and simple problem. Castle Pinckney, which stands upon a small island a little below the city, should be maintained as an auxiliary in the defence of the harbor, and as serving as a sort of citadel in case of inter- nal commotion. St. Helena sound. The board must wait for surveys before they can point out the defences which this sound should receive. Although there is supposed to be no great depth of water on the bar at the mouth, it is known to be navi- gable by the smaller class of merchantmen and'to have a navigable communica- tion with the head of Broad river, or Port Royal. Intersecting, as it does, the interior navigation between Charleston and Savannah, this sound will require de- fence, even should it not be of much use as a harbor of refuge for exterior commerce. Broad river, or Port Royal roads. The value of this capacious roadstead as a 1) arbor of refuge depends on the depth which can be carried over the bar, the distance of this bar outside the line of coast, and the means which may be practicable of lessening the danger of crossing it. This is supposed to be the deepest bar of the southern coast. Should there prove to be water enough for small frigates, and by the aid of light-houses 011 the shore and lights, or other distinct guides on the bar, should the passage be capable of being rendered easy and safe, this road, situated as it is within sixty miles of Charleston and twenty miles of Savannah harbor, and intersecting, as it does, the interior navigation between these great cities, thereby securing the arrival of supplies of every kind, would possess a very high degree of importance as a naval station as well as a harbor of refuge. The survey of the exterior shoals, constituting the bar, should be made with the greatest care and all possible minuteness. It is only when this shall have been done that the true relation of this inlet to the rest of the coast can be known, and on this relation the position and magnitude of the required defences will depend. Savannah and mouth of Savannah river. Mention has already been made of the natural interior water communication existing along the coast of South Carolina. A similar communication extends south from Savannah river as far as the St. John's, in East Florida. Owing to these passages the city of Savan- nah, like Charleston, is liable to be approached by other avenues than the harbor or river, and its defences must, consequently, have relation to these lesser as well as to the principal channels. The distance from the mouth of Warsaw sound or even of Ossabaw sound (both to the southwest of the river) to the city is not much greater than from 44 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. the mouth of the river, and an enterprise may be conducted the whole distance by water, or part of the way by water and part by land from either or both. As in the case of the like channels in the neighborhood of Charleston, it cannot now be determined where they can be defended most advantageously. It is to be hoped, however, that the localities may prove such as to permit the defences to be placed near the outlets of these sounds, where they will serve the double purpose of protecting the city and covering harbors which, in time of war, cannot but be very useful. The defence of Savannah river is by no means difficult. A fort on Cockspur island, lying just within the mouth, and for additional security perhaps another on Tybee island, which forms the southern cape at the junction of the river with the ocean, would effectually prevent the passage of vessels up the channel, and cover the anchorage between Tybee and Cockspur. The present Fort Jackson, situated about four miles below the city, should be maintained as a second bar- rier, both as respects the main channel and the passages which come in from the south, which latter would not be at all controlled by works at Cockspur or Tybee. The surveys required preliminary to forming a system of defence for Savan- nah are so far completed as to enable the board to make the projects and esti- mates for the defence of the main channel whenever they shall be ordered to direct then- attention to them. A few months, it is presumed, will suffice to complete all the necessary sur- veys from Georgetown to Ossabaw sound inclusive, excepting the bar off Port Royal and Bull's bay and its vicinity. No surveys have been commenced south of Ossabaw sound. South of Ossabaw sound on the coast of Georgia are, first, St. Catherine's sound, at the mouth of the Medway river; second, Sapelo sound; third, Doboy inlet; fourth, Alatamaha sound, at the mouth of the great river of the same name ; fifth, St. Simon's sound, at the mouth of Buffalo creek ; sixth, St. An- drew's sound, at the united mouths of the Scilla and Santilla rivers ; and, seventh, Cumberland sound, at the mouth of the St. Mary's river. All these communi- cations with the ocean are highly important in reference to the interior naviga- tion,, and several of them as affording access to excellent harbors. The latter especially is known to be navigable by the largest sloops-of-war and merchant- men, and two or three of the others are believed to be little if at all inferior either as regards depth of bar or safety of anchorage. Some of these inlets are probably easily defended by forts, others may re- quire floating defences, and some possibly the use of both these means. The principle to* which we have before adverted as governing, in a measure, the defensive system of the whole southern coast, is enforced in relation to this particular part by two weighty considerations, namely: its remoteness from the nearest naval rendezvous, the Chesapeake, which is on a mean six hundred miles distant, and to leeward, both as to wind and current ; and its being close upon the larboard hand as they enter the Atlantic, of the great concourse of vessels passing at all seasons through the Florida channel. While, therefore, this part of the coast, from the concentration of vessels here, is in great need of protection of some sort, naval aid can be extended to it only with difficulty, and at the risk of being cut off from all retreat by a superior enemy. Accurate and minute surveys, which will enable our vessels, whether driven by an enemy or by stress of weather, to shun the dangers which beset the nav- igation of these harbors,- and properly arranged defences to cover them when arrived, seem to be indispensable. It is worthy of remark, besides, that on these harbors being fortified, the operation of investing the coast and watching the great outlet of commerce through the Florida gulf would be a difficult and haz- ardous one to an enemy, on whose part no perseverance or skill could avail to maintain an uninterrupted blockade, or to avoid the occasional shipwreck of his FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 45 * cruisers; while on the part of our small vessels-of-war and privateers, it would at all times be easy and safe. Important as the harbors of Georgia' now are, their value would be much en- hanced by the execution of the projected canal across the head of the peninsula of Florida. That part of the southern coast which extends from the St. Mary's to the southern extremity of East Florida is said not to possess a single harbor for com- mon merchantmen. This brings us to the GULF OF MEXICO FRONTIER.* The resemblance of this portion of the coast to that which we have denomi- nated the southern section is striking, and has already been mentioned. We may, in fact, refer to the description we have given of the principal features of the latter as a true delineation of this. In respect to the relation of the coast with the interior there is, however, the greatest difference between these two fea- tures of the maritime frontier. For Avhile, in the case we are now to consider, about eight-tenths of the whole territory of the United States is, in one sense, tributary to the coast, in the other not more than one-tenth is connected with the seaboard by any natural ties. This fact, which goes to show the very deep interest which a large propor- tion of the people and the government have in the security of this frontier, is related to others, which hardly have an alternative as to the mode of attaining that security. From the relative geographical position of the coast and the country interested in its safety ; from the unhealthiness of its climate, the nature of the adjacent country, the mixed character and diversity of interests of its inhabitants, it will be long if ever before that portion of the population within supporting distance, whose welfare may be endangered by an enemy, will be competent of itself to sustain the assaults of an exterior foe, and at the same time suppress the ener- gies of a more powerful and vindictive enemy within. Upon the Atlantic sea- board the Alleghanies crowd the people upon the coast, and surround every alarm post of the frontier with a more and more dense population, and the ocean and the interior parallel navigation enable even the extremities to afford mutually support and protection, while the coast of the Gulf, although weak in itself and remote from succor from behind, is shut out by its peculiar situation and its dis- tance from every hope of lateral assistance. Those reasons, therefore, which tend to establish the necessity of an organized, a permanent, and timely system of defence for the whole seaboard of the United States, (some of which were advanced in the commencement of this report,) apply to this portion with peculiar force, especially if we consider its compara- tive feebleness in connexion with its comparative importance. The interesting and vital points of the coast and the mode of guarding them will be pointed out as we proceed. It has already been observed that no examination had been made by the board of the shore between the southern extremity of ^ast Florida and Pensa- cola. There are, however, along this shore and in the Florida reef several har- bors which deserve to be accurately surveyed. The description of this part of the coast, as well as that on the east side of the peninsula of Florida, and that along Georgia and the Carolinas, accompanied by plans of defence, must be the subject of future reports. Pensacola lay. The upper arms of this considerable bay receive the Yellow- See report of 1817. 46 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.' water or Pea river, Middle river, and Escambia river, the tributaries of which latter, interlocking with branches of the Alabama and the Chattahoochie, indi- cate the causes whereby at some future day canals may convey a part of the products of these rivers to Pensacola. Santa Rosa sound extends eastward from the lower part of this bay into Santa Rosa bay, whence a communication, partly natural, partly artificial, may possibly be continued eastward to the Atlantic. On the west the lagoons of Pensacola, Perdido, and Mobile bays respectively interlock in such a manner as to require but a few miles of cutting to complete a navigable channel from the first to the last-named bay, and thence through an existing interior water communication to the city of New Orleans. The contiguity of the headwaters of the large rivers emptying into this part of the Gulf to the upper part of the Tennessee induces the belief that some facile means of connecting them will ere long be discovered and applied. Thus situated, as Pensacola bay is, with respect to the country on either hand, and the immense regions behind, its rare properties as a harbor become of inap- preciable value. Some of these properties we will enumerate : first, it is ac- cessible at low water to the largest class of sloops-of-war and small frigates, and as the bar is narrow may, perhaps, be made to admit still larger vessels ; second, its bar is near the coast and the channel over it is straight and easily hit ; third, it is perfectly land-locked, and has a very capacious roadstead ; fourth, it has excellent positions for repairing, building, and launching vessels, and for docks and dock-yards, in healthy situations ; fifth, it has abundance of good water for the supply of vessels ; and 6th, it is perfectly defensible. As these and other properties, in conjunction with its situation as respects the coast and the interior, have induced the government to fix upon it as a naval station and place of rendezvous and repairs, we shall for the future consider it in that character, both in its relations to the commerce of the Gulf and its own proper defences. Although a naval station nearer the extremity of East Florida might possibly enable our vessels-of-war the better to watch over our commerce in the Florida stream, still no deep harbor exists to the south of Pensacola, in which the cir- cumstance of an entire separation from all relief and supplies does not greatly outweigh this advantage, if indeed it be more than imaginary. It is, however, far from certain that the Florida stream is always to be the' channel of communication from the Gulf to the Atlantic. The great embarrass- ments and losses to which we must be exposed while that continues to be the course of our Gulf trade, so long at least as we have not the mastery on the ocean, and in fact, so long as the island of Cuba is in the possession of another power, to say nothing of the natural dangers of that navigation, have directed the public attention seriously to the project of opening a shorter and safer pas- sage through the head of the Florida peninsula. No obstacle not insuperable, it is presumed, will prevent the execution of this grand design ; and considered in reference to such an outlet Pensacola is most happily situated. But the object of a naval force in this quarter is not alone to watch the tran- sit of commerce to and from the Gulf, it has the coasting trade of the Gulf to pro- tect, it has piracies to suppress, which confine themselves to no particular strait, and above all, it has to keep an uninterrupted and watchful guard over the place of .deposit as well as the issues of the disposable productions of a region with- out parallel as to extent and fertility. Projecting as the delta of the Mississippi does into the Gulf, the position of Pensacola enables it to direct naval operations upon the rear of any force in- vesting or moving along the avenues to the city of New Orleans ; and at the same time that it can, almost to the last, with the help of a fortified line of in- terior navigation, preserve its communication with that city unbroken ; it will be at no moment entirely dependent upon that line for the supply of its means of FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 47 defence or annoyance, unless, indeed, the proposed artificial connexions with the interior, before pointed out, should be found impracticable. A very exact survey has been made of the bay of Pensacola, which would suffice for forming a scheme of defence, if no other object were in view than the security of the town and harbor.. Considered, however, as a naval station and a place of rendezvous and repairs, further surveys, extending a greater distance from the shores, delineating accurately the face of the country, and showing the several avenues by land and water, are found to be necessary. The western extremity of Santa Rosa island is nevertheless so situated in re- spect to the mouth of the bay as to require in part the same works in either case, and the board can, therefore, whenever ordered, project a fort for this posi- tion which in either case should be the first occupied. > Per dido lay.* This bay is intimately related to Pensacola and Mobile bays both as regards security and intercommunication, and should be surveyed care- fully with a view to these objects. Mobile iay.trAs the subject of the fortification of Mobile bay has been treated at some length in the report on the Gulf of Mexico defences made in 1817, and still more in detail in a special report of 1822, the board referring to these communications, especially the latter, will confine themselves here to a few general observations. This bay receives at its head the two rivers Alabama and Tombeckbe, which water almost the whole State of Alabama a State the fifth in the Union as to extent of territory, inferior to none in the quality of its soil, and hitherto doubling its population every four years since its admission into the confederacy. The probable union at no distant day of the rivers discharging into Mobile bay with the Tennessee, whereby this bay will become a new outlet for a part at least of the productions of the western States, independently of the natural one, the great distance to which these rivers are even now navigable with steam- boats, the fertility of soil, rapid growth of population and trade, the close lateral connexion which exists with New Orleans and the Mississippi on the one hand, and Pensacola bay on the other, serve to give great and increasing importance to this communication with the Gulf. Referring for the mode of defence adopted by the board again to the same . reports wherein the subject will be found treated at large, we now only add that the forts on Mobile Point and Dauphin island and the tower at the Pass au Heron, designed to defend the three passages into the bay and the important anchorage between Dauphin 'and Pelican islands, will cost $1,142,056 83. New Orleans and the delta of the. Mississippi^ It is altogether unnecessary for the board to say anything in this report with a view to illustrate either the amount of benefits to result from applying a well-adapted system of defence to this part of the coast of the Gulf, or the direful consequences flowing from leaving it in an unprepared and defenceless condition. The value of the stake is now too great, is too rapidly augmenting, and is too justly appreciated, for the nation to suffer its safety ever again to hang on the doubtful issue of a battle. We pass on, therefore, to the task of noticing briefly the avenues requiring defence and the works projected to attain that end, refering to the report of 1817, as embracing all the relations of the subject, both general and local. The most northern water communication between the Mississippi and the Gulf is by the passage called the Rigolets, connecting Lake Borgne and Lake Pont- chartrain; the next is by the pass of Chef Menteur, (divided from the former by Isle aux Pine,) also uniting the same lakes. Through these passages an enemy entering Lake Pontchartrain would, at the same time that he intercepted all water communication with Mobile and Pensacola, be able to reach New Orleans See report of 1812. f See reports of 1817 and 1822. J See report of 1817. 48 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. from its southern shore, or he might continue onward through Lake Mair. Amite river, and Iberville river, thereby reaching the head of the delta, a posi- tion which he could easily maintain ; or landing within the mouths of Chef Menteur he' might move against the city along the ridge of the Geritilly road. The fort for the defence of the first named pass is completed and that for Chef Menteur is in a state of forwardness. To the southwest of the latter pass and at the head of Lake Borgne is Bayou Bienvenu, a navigable channel (the one pursued by the English army in the late war) not running into the Mississippi, but having shores of such a nature as to enable troops to march from the point of debarkation to the city. A little to the south of this is Bayou Dupre, also affording easy access to the city. The few natural difficulties and the shortness of these lines of operation make it necessary to place a fort near the mouth of the first, and a tower at the outlet of the other. The defences of the Mississippi itself are placed at Plaquemine turn, the low- est position which can be occupied. Fort Jackson, now building, is on the right shore, a little above old Fort St. Philip. This last work it was intended originally to improve, and an estimate was made with that view; from a recent inspection, however, it appears to be falling too rapidly to ruins to justify such an undertaking. It is nevertheli believed that that estimate will suffice for a new work, well adapted to the posi- tion. The only permanent work required to the west of the Mississippi is a fort to occupy Grand Terre island, for the purpose of defending the entrance to Barra- taria bay, an excellent harbor for a floating force guarding the coasting trade on that side, and whence there are several passages leading to the .Mississippi near NCAV Orleans. The whole cost of the system of defence for New Orleans and the delta of the Mississippi is estimated at $1,566,515 42. None of the old forts or batteries are embraced in the system. ' Before leaving this part of our subject it is necessary to advert to the import- ant uses which may be made of movable floating defences in aid of fortifications. The applications of this auxiliary force along the coast of the United States might be numerous, and, as has been before remarked, would in certain cases_ be requisite to attain full security for all the objects needing protection. In 'the instance before us, for example, fortifications will enable us to protect the city of New Orleans even from the most serious and determined efforts of an enemy ; but owing to the great width of the passages we cannot by them alone deprive an enemy of good exterior anchorages, especially the very excellent one west of Chandeleur island, nor ^cover entirely the natural interior water communication between the Rigolets and 'Mobile. We must therefore either quietly resign those powerful means of annoying and distressing us to the occupancy of an adversary, or seek their preservation in a timely preparation of a floating force adapted to this peculiar navigation, and capable, under favor of the shelter afforded by the forts, of being Always on the alert, and of assuming alternately an offensive or defensive attitude accord- ing to the designs, the conduct, or situation of the enemy. As these means of defence are, however, secondary to fortifications in every sense, as the extent to which they may be needed must depend on the relation of our naval force to that of other powers, a relation continually varying ; and as the characteristics of this species of 'force may be expected to be modified or even radically changed in this age of rapid advancement in all the arts, it is considered premature to go now into any details in reference to its application here or elsewhere. From the preceding sketch of the system projected for the defence of the FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 49 -seaboard of the United States,* it will appear that all the fortifications proposed .are not of the same pressing necessity, nor of like importance ; that some are required immediately, while the commencement of others may be postponed. In proceeding to class them, we must observe that the works of the most urgent necessity are those destined to prevent an enemy from forming a permanent or even momentary establishment in the country those which will defend our great naval arsenals, and those which will cover our chief commercial cities. In the second class we will place such as defend those naval stations and cities of a secondary rank, which, either from natural or artificial defences, ex- isting works, &c., are not entirely without protection, and can wait at least until the more important points are secured against a first attack. Finally, in the third class we will arrange the works which will complete the defensive system in all its parts, but whose construction may, without great danger, be deferred until the frontier shall have received all the successive de- grees of strength resulting from the gradual erection of the forts of the first and second classes. A fourth class is added, containing such works as will be necessary, only con- ditionally. Table A, joined to this report, has been drawn up on these principles, and shows : First. That the works to be erected during the first period will cost $9,686,160 59, will require 2,610 men, at most, to garrison them in time of peace, and 20,517 in case of siege. Second. That the works of the second class will cost $2,314,309 47,^11 re- quire 666 men, at most, to garrison them in peace, and 6,841 in case of siege. Third. That the expense of the works belonging to the third class will amount to $4,536,984 62 ; their garrisons in time of peace to 635 men, and in case of siege to 6,071 men. Fourth. That the total expense of completely fortifying the maritime frontier will amount to $16,537,454 68; the troops necessary to guard these fortifications in peace to 3,911 men, at most, and 33,482 men in time of war, supposing them all, which cannot happen, besieged at once. The time required to construct the whole system must depend entirely upon the annual appropriations which the nation may grant to this branch of the pub- lic service. All that can be said upon the subject is, that in an undertaking of such vital importance to the safety, prosperity, and greatness of the Union, there should be no relaxation of effort and perseverance. A work of such mag- nitude must, with every effort, be the work of years ; and however long it may be before any sensible effects are produced, the final result is not the less certain. And should no danger threaten the republic in our own days, future generations may owe the preservation of their country to the precaution of their forefathers. France was at least fifty years completing her maritime and interior defences, but France, on more than one occasion since the reign of Louis XIV, has been saved by the fortifications erected by the power of that monarch and the genius of Vauban. However slow the progress of the system may be, from the necessity of a sparing application of the public funds to this purpose, it is essential to disburse something in this way each year, so as to give to the frontier an annual increase of strength. We must, therefore, insist 011 the advantage of dividing the course of construction into several periods, according to the greater or lesser urgency ; of beginning the works successively, agreeably to the order designated, and of rigidly adhering to it. By this mode satisfactory results will be obtained as *See report of 1821. H. Rep. Com. 86 4 50 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. early as practicable, while, if we were to begin all at once, it would be long be- fore we should be capable of defending ourselves anywhere. We shall now enter upon the subject of the expense of erecting these works and garrisoning them for war, and compare it with the expense of defending the coast in its present state. To clear the subject as much as possible we shall only examine it with respect to Boston, Narraganset bay, New York, Phila- delphia, Baltimore, Norfolk, and New Orleans. Charleston, South Carolina., and Savannah, Georgia, would also be included if we knew the cost of the de- fences and the amount of garrison necessary. Supposing an enemy had concentrated twenty thousand men at Halifax or Bermuda, the government must, on hearing of this force, at once prepare to re- sist it at all the points mentioned above ; as it will be impossible to foresee on which the first blow will be struck, it will be necessary to have troops encamped at each. And to meet the attack with a force not less, numerically, than that of the assailant, the troops kept constantly under arms in each of these camp^ must at least equal one-half of the hostile expedition, while as many more are kept in readiness within call. These points are so immediately accessible in some cases and so remote from succor in others, that, after the point of attack is announced by the appearance of the enemy before it, there will remain no time for re-enforcements to come from the interior. By manoeuvring in front of any of these places he would induce us to con- centrate our forces there, when, suddenly profiting of a favorable breeze, he would sail to another, which he would reach in a few hours, and would not fail to seize if a force were not stationed there likewise equal to his own. No re-en- forcements can in this case arrive from the interior in time, for all the troops- under march would have taken up a direction upon the point he had just quitted. Our whole coast from Maine to Louisiana would thus be kept in alarm by a single expedition, and such is the extent and exposure of the seaboard that an enemy would ruin us by a war of mere threatenings. If the cities are not gar- risoned they will become his prey at once ; and if they are, the treasury will be gradually emptied, the credit of the government exhausted, the wearied and starving militia will desert to their homes, and nothing can avert the direful consummation of tribute, pillage, and conflagration. The table C joined to this report shows that to be in readiness on ^ach of these vulnerable points it will be requisite to maintain 77,000 men, encamped and under arms at the seven places mentioned, and 63,000 ready to inarch and within call. This number is in fact below that which would be required, for these points being exposed, according to our hypothesis, to an attack from 20,000 regular and disciplined troops, 20,000 militia would not be able to repel them unless aided by intrenchments, requiring a time to construct them which would not be allowed us, and involving expenses which we do not comprise in our estimate. Besides, to have 20,000 men, especially new levies, under arms, it will be neces- sary, considering the epidemics which always assail such troops, to 'cany the formation of these corps to at least 25,000 men. The State of Louisiana being remote from succor requires a larger force under arms than the other points ; we have fixed this force at 17,000, considering that the State might furnish 3,000 within call. Considering all expenses, 1,000 regular troops, including officers, cost $300,000 per annum and $150 per man for a campaign of six months ; 1,000 militia, in- cluding officers, cost $400,000 per annum, $200 per man for a six months* campaign. But taking into consideration the diseases which invariably attack men unac- customed to a military life, and the consequent expense of hospital establish- ments ; the frequent movement of detachments from the camp to their homes and from the interior to the camp, and the cost of camping furniture, utensils, accou- FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 51 trements, &c.,. which is the same for a short campaign as for a year ; the cost of a militiaman cannot be reckoned at less than $250 per man for six months. The seventy-seven thousand militiamen necessary to guard the above men- tioned points, in the present situation of the maritime frontier, will therefore cost, in a campaign of six months, $19,250,000. In strict justice there should be added to the expense, which is, we believe, much undervalued, amongst other things, the loss of time and diminution of valuable products resulting from draining off so considerable a portion of efficient labor from its most profitable occupation. This, besides being a heavy tax on individuals, is a real loss to the nation. It would be utterly vain to attempt an estimate of the loss to the nation, from the dreadful mortality which rages in the camps, of men suddenly exposed to the fatigues and privations of military life, or to compare the respective values in society of the citizen and the soldier. The total expense of constructing the works at Boston, Narraganset bay, New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Norfolk, and New Orleans, will amount to $13,764,073 08, (see table B, and previous reports.) Their garrisons may con- sist of the same number of regular troops in time of war as in time of peace, the remainder being furnished by the militia, held in readiness to throw them- selves into the forts on the first appearance of an enemy. By this arrangement 2,980 regulars and 24,000 militia, either in the works or in small corps on ad- vantageous positions, making 26,980 men, would suffice after the erection of the works ; 43,020 being kept in readiness to march when called upon. We should, therefore, have only 26,980 to pay and support, instead of 77,000; and the expense would be $6,447,000, instead of $19,250,000. The difference, $12,803,000, being only $961,073 08 less than the whole cost of the fortifications, it follows that the expense of their erection will be nearly compensated by the saving they will cause in a single campaign of six months. It is proper to add, that though the expense of these works will be great, that expense is never to be renewed ; while with troops, on the contrary, the expense is annually repeated, if not increased, until the end of the war. Besides, the disbursements for fortifications are made in time of peace, slowly, and to an ex- tent exactly correspondent with the financial resources of the country. Armies are, however, most wanted, and must be paid in periods of great emergency, when the ordinary sources of revenue are dried up and when the treasury can only be supplied by a resort to means the most disagreeable and burdensome to the people. The defence of our maritime frontier by permanent fortifications, and even the disbursements for their construction, will thus tend to a real and positive econ- omy. The vulnerable points being reduced to a small number, instead of wait- ing an attack on every point, and holding ourselves everywhere in readiness to repel it, we shall force an enemy to direct his assaults against those few, which, being well understood by us, will of course have received a timely preparation. There can be no doubt that such a state of things will make an adversary more reluctant to risk his expeditions, and that we shall not only therefore be better able to resist but also be less frequently menaced with invasion. Some prominent military writers have opposed the principle of fortifying an extensive land frontier, but none have ever disputed the necessity of fortifying a maritime frontier. The practice of every nation, ancient and modern, has been the same in this respect. On a land frontier a good, experienced, and nu- merous infantry may in some cases dispense with fortifications ; but though dis- ciplined troops may cover a frontier without their aid, Undisciplined troops cannot. On a maritime frontier, however, no description of troops can supply the place of strong batteries disposed upon the vulnerable points. The uncer- tainty of the point on which an enemy may direct his attack, the suddenness with which he may reach it, and the powerful masses which he can concentrate at a distance out of our reach and knowledge, or suddenly, and at the very mo- 52 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES ment of attack, require that every important point be duly prepared to repel his attempt or retard it until re-enforcements can arrive and adequate means of re- sistance be organized. By land we are acquainted with the motions of an enemy, with the movements and direction of its columns ; we know the roads by which he must pass, but the ocean is a vast plain without obstacle ; there his movements are made out of our sight, and we know nothing of his approach until he is already within the range of the eye. In a word, unless the vulnerable points of a sea-coast frontier are covered by permanent fortifications, their only chance of safety must depend on the issue of a battle, always uncertain, even when disciplined and well-appointed troops inured to danger have made all pos- sible preparation for the combat. As for the garrisons which these forts will require in time of war, a small portion equal in number to the peace garrisons should be of regular troops : the surplus of militia, practiced in the manoeuvres and drill of great guns ; it being necessary that the greatest part of the troops required for the defence and ser- vice of the sea-coast fortifications should be artillery. This brings us to a suggestion or two in relation to the organization of the militia forces. Instead of the present small proportion of artillery the States might with advantage increase the amount of that force in the vicinity of each of the exposed parts of the coast, so as to be equivalent to the exigencies and armament of the works ; substituting for the usual field exercises as infantry, actual drill and practice in the batteries. As soon as a movement on the part of the enemy would threaten the frontier of the State this force should throw itself into the forts and there remain as long as the precise point of attack should re- main uncertain. In most parts of the seaboard it would also be advisable to have a considerable body of militia horse artillery, as being an useful arm in all cases, and as affording a defence, always applicable, against minor and pre- datory enterprises. This force might, in part, be drawn from the common pro- portion of cavalry. In the report we have taken no account of the interior and land frontiers of the Union ; they have not yet been sufficiently reconnoitred to enable us to give an exact idea of the system of defensive works they may require. All that we can say by anticipation is, that from their general topographical features, these fron- tiers-can be covered at a very moderate expense so effectually that no enemy will be able to invade them without exposing himself to disasters, nearly inevi- table ; and that the troops of the United States, supposing all her warlike pre- parations well arranged beforehand, will be able, at the opening of the first campaign, to carry the theatre of war beyond her own territory. If to our general system of permanent fortifications and naval establishments we connect a system of interior communications by land and water, adapted both to the defence and to the commercial relations of the country ; if to these we add a well constituted regular army, and perfect the organization of our mi- litia, the nation will not only completely secure its territory, but preserve its in- stitutions from those violent shocks and revolutions which, in every age and in every country, have been so often incident to a state of war. Table A, following, contains the works constituting the proposed defensive system for the maritime frontier, divided into four classes. Table B contains a list of such existing works as it is contemplated to retain as accessaries to the system. Table C exhibits a comparison of the cost of defending certain important parts of the coast, in their present condition, and with the aid of the projected works. Table D shows a possible concentration of militia forces, in eleven days, at Boston, Massachusetts; Newport, Rhode Island; New York, New York; Phil. FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 53 adelphia, Pennsylvania; Baltimore, Maryland; Norfolk, Virginia; Charleston,. South Carolina; Savannah, Georgia; and New Orleans, Louisiana. All which is respectfully submitted. BERNARD, Brigadier General, JOSEPH G. TOTTEN, Major Engineers, Brevet Lieutenant Colonel, Members of the Board of Engineer s- Brevet Major General ALEX. MACOMB, Colonel Commanding United States Engineers. 54 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. s 5 EH <- ^s -a . V ^ iUi 2 " ^ ^ ^ s ^ -s ^l & \tx* Of the numbers as progressively enlarged by the annual addition. 1 ojismho( i.tqmuu (Buonippv o ; - JBSOd -sip )B jaqiunj^ co- For 1830, three added; whole number, 41. aiismbaj jaqmnu |uoiJ!PPV Cl - i |BSOd , * TJ- Hi iii jaqinnu [Buonippy -.- " * -. i |BSOd -sip JB Jquin\[ n *-, For 18-28, three added ; whole number, 35. jaquinu [v.uoiiippy * : _ - : - : fwod -sip IM jaquin^ - : CO * co o ... For 1827, three added ; whole number, 32. ajismbsj (Bsod -sip JB jaqranjij :::::: CT -co -d *- ll! a^ 3 ajisinbai IBsod Of the numbers now in service. [ = ||a *"' aiismbai jaquinu [Buoijippy : : : : : : : : : : : :::::: : : : : : : ' 5^3 3 |BSOd -sip JB laquin^ ::::::::::::: :2 : : : ::::.:::::::::::: 02 I j ? H i j:i Ij'i j] ?| j 1 i ::::::::::::::=:;: Biynlllifni ijj ll^lilllil:!? rf|i!--ii*il=WJi FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES, 55 Hfrajir!j!2iii3i2f 56 "8 *, I t* < '"TS ification of the p FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. JO SJOZJIMOJJ COOOCOOGO1>OO<>}U7) GO 00 00 CO <> M OOOO -OCOCQO OJi IrH^'T-l ^-1 CO (M CO ooo^ooooo-^o OOOOOOOOiOO OOOOOOOGOGOCvJO cs X" co co o iO **" O 1-1 O O *O O 00 00 O O -* I-H 7D I CO 00 OOOOOOC'O O5 O O CO r-1 !M o o IO i COOiOiOOOO 000^100 rH^HCOrH i-t CO O CO O OOOOOO OOOOQOO > . 3 2 ' * ,J le'i , ill! . l * B s * 1 ! * ^ L psj--- if* - 1 S 3 C . J4 -Q Ig-g &.S & S illiiifalrtlllilfi J Sj Sp5ggQ^^ SHaQO^P^ | ^Wplo^^mi^.l^gggg^H ts-e-s-e-fi-stS'S^-s.s g t: -s -e ts -s t: ooooooooooC oooooo FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. CM rH IO O J>- O S I O rH J> O ^ J> O O rH O -^ .<* O rH o o o o o o o o S Q i> O 1^ O rH O IO O W3 O CM O o CO rH ^ CM O l> rH O CO CO o o o 1> CO O J> CM O CO 000 o o o o o o o o rH CO CM rH CO CO CO 00 CO rH CO CO O rH 00 rH IO Oi rH rH CO iO -^ rH CO CM CO CO CM rH O CO rH rH iO CO CO Oi CO <* rH CO Oi 0} CO O O OO 0} rH CO CO CM CO iO CO CO CO *O i> CO Oi *O Oi Oi Oi co ^ co CO CO rH rH CM CM 1> CO CO CO CO CO rH : : : CO 3 Oi ' 2 S : ' rH . 1 CO rH 00 co ^o o co rH IO S rH rH rH CO *o o^ o^ CM rH IO CO CO 00 IO ,, o rH CO 10 CO CO Oi ^O O} 00 (7} i-H H rH rH O rH rH Oi 00 CO CM rH O Oi CO 10 CO ^ o 10 CO iO 00 00 Oi rH* 0000 o 10 co o -* CM J> CO rH CM CO O CO O O Oi o CO o o 10 CO *O "^ CO iO^ 00 000 co o co CM CO CO CM rH rH 000 co o 10 CO CO CO 02 V ap < 1111 PH w rt rt 4 % ' ^ ' 5 rj^ S O S *-9 '^rr! j C f^\ +* 4). TO -OS SECOND CLASS. 'ort at narrows of the Penobscot, Maine ^wer at Bayou Dupre, near New Orleans, Louisian 'ort on Dauphin island, mouth of Mobile bay, Alab ort near Provincetown, Massachusetts, fort near St cipal fort near Portsmouth, New Hampshire, and fo ort on Oak island, mouth of Cape Fear river, Nort ort near Plymouth, Massachusettst ort Griswold, near New London, Connecticut .... ort on Nantasket Head, Boston harbor, Massachu ort on Hawkins's Point, near Baltimore, Maryland econdary works near Pensacola, Fla., Savannah, Ga. ort Sewall, Marblehead harbor, Massachusetts ort Preble, Portland harbor, Maine 'ort on House island, Portland harbor, Maine 'ort near the mouth of Kennebec river, Mainet - 'ort on Naugus Head, Salem harbor, Massachusetts 'ort on Jack's Point, Marblehead harbor, Massachu 'ort on Cedar Point, Potomac river, Marylandt 'ort on Rose island, Narraganset roads, Rhode Isla 1 HH -H, ,-H HH ^^^^^^HHHHHHWr^HHHHhH FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 6 ^ = en a . OOrH O rH CO -* CO CO OOUO O CMQOCOCOCO OOCi O lO^OCOrHrH O O CM O ^rHCirHrH o o o 000 000 o o o o o o G"i O CM *O l> rH l> rH rH CM'* O i> CO CM 00 00 m= rH CM CO CO rH rH ^ CO 10 rH rH 11 ^inoip Jto aa^stnuacl 1 . CO 00 rH GO CM i> CM CO CM Tt< CM GO ^f id iO CM rH CO CM *O O , 8 pm,o 0ireo . CM 00 CM CO 00 T < 'SJU^JOCU ^ .10 8JOZJIAVOJJ *"^ suno SS8 '9^9}S ^ CO CM rH rH 'i. eo^a Designation of works. THIRD CLASS. Works for Mount, Desert island and Sheen's Cut river. Maine* . . Cv * 1 P* ' 2 ^ ' !K 42 -|5 j* 2 W ' ' ' Works near Annapolis, Chesapeake bay, Maryland* Fort on Point Patience, Patuxent river, Maryland . Fort on Thomas's Point, Patuxent river, Maryland. Fort near Beaufort, North Carolina Secondary works at Portland, Maine, Portsmouth, Gloucester harbor, Massachusetts* Redoubt for Hog island, Boston harbor, Massachw Closing Broad Sound passage, Boston harbor, Mas Reducing altitude of Gallop island, Boston harbor, Works for New Bedford harbor, Massachusetts* . . Closing west passage of Narraganset roads, Mass Works for Stonington harbor, Connecticut, and Sf Fort Trumbull, New London harbor, Connecticut Fort Hale, New Haven harbor, Connecticut Fort Wooster, New Haven harbor, Connecticut . . Fort on Middle Ground, New York harbor, New 1 Fort on East Bank, New York harbor, New York Works near St. Marv's. Potomac river. Marvin ml* FOETIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 59 o o o o o o o o o o of cT rH CSJ 00 CO CO OJ 10 ^ CO GO J> O CO i> o o o o I o o S w ^3 '1 5 ll s l1 I *-s !" I ,5 E- ; f-i rd C c > fl o o o 02 1 s 1 J I _. s j^ cc c^ cc cc ^ I i g SH 60 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. Ci ^ CM lO rt* CO CO CO I O Oi ''t 1 CO O CO rH CO Oi 3 1 co" ^ co" 00 rH CO CO CO lO CO 10 gJV CO" rH "a ,ep_ ffO rH 00 Oi 00 -^ CM i ,5^ -^ CO CM O ^O CM rH CO 1> CO CO "# OS CO O5 O O CO CM r-T r-T Q oSai S rH rH kO CO O 00 ULATION. 1 o" co" co" co" CO 90T59J O CO lO rH CO CO ^O CO CO rH rH 05 k CO RECAPIT 3 1 -d a s OS Is 1 5 I^TSJJ g H ~ 2 a - 'g 1 1 = 3S -3 S I I I *> * cS ^ fcb , .1 II Ira Il|| O >>!! c a? B G> | 1 5 ? - 1- 1 Hi IS ' ^ 38 J %'Z *.S S isJ^ll^ll FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 61 TABLE B, Containing a list of the existing works on the seaboard which it is advisable to preserve and retain as accessories to the proposed system of defence DESIGNATION OF WORKS. Fort at WiscassetJ Maine. Fort Preble, Portland harbor Maine. Fort Scammel, Portland harbor Maine. Fort McCleary, Portsmouth harbor J New Hampshire. Fort on GloucesterJ Massachusetts. Fort Independence, Boston harbor Massachusetts. Fort Warren and dependencies, Boston harbor Massachusetts. Fort at New Bedford J Massachusetts. 'Fort Wolcott, Narraganset roads Rhode Island. Fort Green, Narraganset roads Rhode Island. Fort at Sag HarborJ New York. Fort Hale, New Haven harbor , . . Connecticut. Fort Columbus, Governor's island, New York harbor New York. Castle Williams, Governor's island, New York harbor New York. South Battery, Governor's island, New York harbor New York. Fort Wood, Bedloe's island, New York harbor New York. Fort Gibson, Ellis's island, New York harbor New York. Fort Gansevoort, City of New York New York. Battery, Hubert island, City of New York New York. Fort Lafayette, narrows of New York harbor New York. Fort Mifflin, Delaware river Pennsylvania. Fort McHenry , Baltimore harbor Maryland. Fort Madison, Annapolis harbor J Maryland. Fort Severn, Annapolis harbor J Maryland. Fort Washington, Potomac river Maryland. Fort Norfolk, Hampton roads Virginia. Fort Neilson, Hampton roads Virginia. Fort Moultrie, Charleston harbor^ South Carolina. Castle Pinckney , Charleston harbor South Carolina. Fort Jackson, Savannah river Georgia. Fort St. Philip, Mississippi river J Louisiana. REMARKS. Some of these will be modified by the new system, and some, on further examination, may have to give place to new works ; these last are marked thus J It is probable that several works, deserving a place in this list, have been omitted. All existing works on the eoa*t, without exception, should be maintained until the new system is applied to the ground they occupy, or to the neighboring coast. FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. L ;j *$ f^ 1 I 1 If .I'i G . || 1 1 S 8 1^ i &3 Expense of the troops kept under pay with the proposed works. PUB s-iBinShu jo asiiiuJxg ti| Number of troops necessary with the existing works 140, 000 Number of troops lequircd with the projected works, under pay and within call 70,000 Expense of defending the above-mentioned points during a campaign of six months with the existing works $19,250,000 Expense of defending the above-mentioned points during a campaign of six months with the projected works 6,447,000 Difference... 12,803,000 )f expense between the two systems will amount to within $961,073 08 of the whole cost of the projected works. The expense ch gives for the cost of a regular soldier $300 per annum, and for the cost of a militia soldier $500 per annum, the expense of he made of the enormous contingent expenses in assembling, organizing, and providing militia forces, of hospitals, waste of >elow the truth. The forces under pay necessary for defence, with the proposed works, consist of pence garrisons, increased by stationed upon the lines of approach of an enemy. osiii| all militia serving six mouths and costing on an average $250 per in (in, mini jad OQS8> W 'sqjuoui xis jo> >:ni|iiu aqj jo asuadxg o o o o o o o 1 (O OCi$ in 'sqiuoui xis joj oT^ 5 WVTo'V SJB.nSaa aqj jo asuadxg ^ 2 n * 5 * 1 ^'sjfJOM Surjstxa aqi qj[/vv .ted Japan jdajf siloojj aqjjo asuadxg | %" 3) Comparison of the force necessary to defend them without, and with, the projected works. i 1= i i *" i II!!!!! 1 ~ * _: /: 3 ** & sl i 8 II | .2 ggooooo 2 1 s o I i I I sT II s. %* jfs *|l ! rf CO o o = o o o n ill ^ m ** II O -r; II & 13,764,073 08 CN 00 rt J-Trf - N. B. In one campaign of six months the difference < of the troops, above stated, results from a calculation wh officers being in both cases included. No estimate can property, loss of time, &c. This estimate is undoubtedly 1 a portion of militia, the residue of militia under pay being # Supp i B . . ; ::.:::: ' ' : : : i : 3 ::::::: *::::: 111 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA COAST DEFENCES. 63 5 ^ * ^ ^l 1 ^ ^ ^ "5^ C^}iO}>rH'*t>QOf>}CiCO ^!g rHrHrHrHCQCQCO i^ * w : j | q I ^ ^ IS i l ** rHOJ^^OOCOQOOCiWO 5 .1.2*3 -> s ^H^^^^co S ^ : ^ li i ^ * ^) s *v -s ^ *C T3 COt^^C^GOCO^OT-HCTs) CO a*> I "* |S ^ . ^^ ^O O-^COOiOCO^COQOt^rH t^ OCOt'-OOG^OOCO^fiOiO X ^ rHrHCVJCOrtCiOrHCO ^,^OJ2; ^ rH rH W > ^ 11| | GB Q 64 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. No. 3. [Ho. HEPS., Ex. Doc. No. 243, 24TH CONGRESS, IST SESSION] MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES TO THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, ACCOMPANIED WITH REPORTS FROM THE SECRETA- RIES OF WAR AND NAVY, RELATIVE TO THE MILITARY AND NAVAL DE- FENCES OF THE COUNTRY. To the Senate: I transmit herewith reports from the Secretaries of the War and Navy Departments, to whom were referred the resolutions adopted by the Senate on the 18th of February last, requesting information of the probable amount of appropriations that would be necessary to place the land and naval defences of the country upon a proper footing of strength and respectability. In respect to that branch of the subject which falls more particularly under the notice of the Secretaiy of War, and in the consideration of which he has arrived at conclusions different from those contained in the report from the Engineer bureau, I think it proper to add my concurrence in the views expressed by the Secretary. ANDREW JACKSON. WASHINGTON, April 8, 1836. DEPARTMENT OF WAR, April 7, 1836. SIR : In conformity with your instructions, I have the honor to transmit reports from the engineer and ordnance departments, furnishing so much of the informa- tion required by the resolution of the Senate of February 18, 1836, as relates to the fortifications of the country, and to a supply of the munitions of war. The former branch of this subject has required laborious investigations on the part of the officers charged with this duty, and their report has therefore been longer delayed than, under other circumstances, would have been proper; but the whole matter was too important to have the interests involved in it sacrificed to undue precipitancy. The engineer report was received at the department on Friday last, and I have embraced such portions of the intervening time as other official calls and a slight indisposition would allow me to devote to its examination. I did not consider that any suggestions I could make would justify a further delay at this advanced stage of the session, while at the same time, I am aware that this letter will need all the allowance which these circumstances can claim for it. It is obvious that, in the consideration of any general and permanent system of national defence, comprehensive views are not only necessary, but professional experience and a knowledge of practical details ; such information, in fact, as must be obtained by long and careful attention to the various subjects which form the elements of this inquiry. Although, therefore, I do not concur in all the suggestions contained in these reports, and more particularly in those which relate to the nature and extent of some of our preparations, still I have thought it proper to lay them before you, rather than to substitute any peculiar views of my own for them. Both furnish facts highly interesting to the community, and if they anticipate dangers which it may be thought are not likely to happen, and suggest preparations which future exigencies will not probably require, they are still valuable documents, presenting the necessary materials for the action of the legislature. The report from the engineer department, in particular FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 65 evinces an accurate knowledge of the whole subject, while, at the same time, its general views are sound and comprehensive. I consider it a very able document. Under these circumstances, I have thought it proper to submit some general remarks, explanatory of my own views, concerning a practical system of defence, and which will show how far the plans and details are in conformity with my opinion. I feel that this course is due to myself. I shall confine my observations to the maritime frontier. Our inland border rests, in the southwest and northeast, upon the possessions of civilized nations, and requires defensive preparations to meet those contingencies only which, in the present state of society, we may reasonably anticipate. In the existing intercourse of nations, hostilities can scarcely overtake us so suddenly as not to leave time to move the necessary force to any point upon these frontiers threatened with attack. I am not aware of any peculiar position upon either of these lines of separation which commands the approaches to the country, or whose posses- sion would give much superiority to an invading or defensive force. In fact, the division is, in bpth cases, an artificial line through much of its extent, and a portion of the natural boundary offers scarcely any impediment to military opera- tions. Under such circumstances, it seems altogether inexpedient to construct expensive fortifications, which would do little more than protect the space under cover of their guns; which are not required as places of depot; which guard no avenue of communication, and which would leave the surrounding country penetrable in. all directions. Without indulging in any improper speculations concerning the ultimate destiny of any portion of the country in juxtaposition with us, or looking for security to any political change, we may safely anticipate that our own advance in all the elements of power will be at lea'st equal to that of the people who adjoin us ; nor does the most prudent forecast dictate any precautions, founded upon the opinion that our relative strength will de- crease and theirs increase. The lake frontier, indeed, presents some peculiar consideration; and I think the views submitted by the engineer department, respecting Lake Ohamplain, are entitled to much weight. This long, narrow sheet of navigable water opens a direct communication into the States of New York and Vermont, while its outlet is in a foreign country, and is commanded by a position of great natural strength. It is also within a few miles of the most powerful and populous portion of Canada, and open to all its resources and energies. With a view, perhaps, to possible rather than to probable events, it may be deemed expedient to construct a work at some proper site within our boundary which shall close the entrance of the lake to all vessels ascending its outlet. As such a work, however, would be an advanced post, and, from cir- cumstances, peculiarly liable to attack, its extent and defences should be in proportion to its exposure. There is already a considerable commercial marine upon the four great lakes, Ontario, Erie, Huron, and Michigan, which are open to the enterprise of our citizens. And this will increase with the augmenting population which is flowing in upon the regions washed by these internal seas. It is obvious that, from natural causes, the physical superiority will be found upon the southern shores of these lakes. The resolution of the Senate embraces the inquiry into the expediency of constructing permanent fortifications in this quarter. And this inquiry properly divides itself into two branches : 1st. The policy of fortifying the harbors on the lakes ; and, 2d. The policy of commanding, by permanent works, the communications between them. Both of these measures presuppose that the naval superiority upon tl*se waters may be doubtful. But it is difficult to foresee the probable existence of any circumstances which would give this ascendency to the other party. It is H. Rep. Com. 86 5 66 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. unnecessary to investigate the considerations wliicli bear upon this subject, as they are too obvious to require examination. They are to be seen and felt in all those wonderful evidences of increase and improvement which are now in' such active operation. A victorious fleet upon these lakes could disembark an army at almost any point. If a harbor were closed by fortifications they would only have to seek the nearest beach, and land their men from boats, so that no defences we could construct would secure us against invasion ; and temporary block-houses and batteries would probably be found sufficiently powerful to repel the attacks of any vessels seeking to enter the narrow harbors upon the lakes, if we could foresee the existence of any circumstances which would induce an enemy to endeavor to force an entrance into them. As to the communication between the lakes, the inquiry, from geographical causes, is necessarily restricted to that from Lake Erie to Lake Huron, and to the straits of Michilimackinac. Of the former, almost sixty miles consist of two rivers, completely commanded from their opposite banks, while the entrance into one of these, the river St. Glair, is impeded by a bar, over which there are but about eight feet of water. No armed vessels could force their way up these rivers while the shores were in an enemy's possession, who might construct bat- teries at every projecting point, and who, in fact, might in many places sweep the decks with musketry. As to the straits of Michilimackinac, they are too broad to be commanded by stationary fortifications, even if any circumstances should lead to the construction and equipment of a hostile fleet upon the bleak and remote shores of Matchedask bay, in the northeastern extremity of Lake Huron. I am therefore of opinion that our lake frontier requires no permanent defences, and that we may safely rely for its security upon those resources, both in the personnel and materiel, which the extent and other advantages our country insures to us, and which must give us the superiority in that quarter. It may, perhaps, be deemed expedient to establish a depot for the reception of munitions of war in some part of the peninsula of Michigan, and to strengthen it by such defences as will enable it to resist any coup de main which may be attempted. From the' geographical features of the country, our possessions here recede from their natural points of support, and are placed in immediate contact with a fertile and populous part of the neighboring colony. In the event of disturbances, the ordinary communications might be interrupted, and it would probably be advisable to have in deposit a supply of all the necessary means for offensive or defensive operations, and to place these beyond the reach of any enterprising officer who might be disposed, by a sudden movement, to gain pos- session of them. The expenditure for such an object would be comparatively unimportant, even should the contingency be judged sufficiently probable to justify precautionary measures. I had the honor, in a communication to the chairman of the Committee on Military Affairs of the Senate, dated February 19, 1836, a copy of which was sent to the chairman of the Committee on Military Affairs of the House of Rep- resentatives, to suggest the mode best adapted, in my opinion, to secure our frontier against the depredations of the Indians. The basis of the plan was the establishment of a road from some point upon the upper Mississippi to Red river, passing west of Missouri and Arkansas, and the construction of posts in proper situations along it. I think the ordinary mode of construction ought not to be departed from. Stockaded forts, with log block-houses, have been found fully sufficient for all the purposes of defence against Indians. They may be built speedily, with little expense, and, when necessary, by the labor of the troops. Our Indian boundary has heretofore been a receding, not a stationary one, and much of it is yet of this character. And even where we have planted the Indians who have been removed, and guaranteed their permanent occupation of the possessions assigned to them, we may find it necessary, in the redemption FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 67 of the pledge we have given to protect them, to establish posts upon their exte- rior boundary, and thus prevent collisions between them and the ruder indige- nous tribes of that region. I think, therefore, tlfat no works of a more permanent character than these should be constructed upon our Indian frontier. A cordon established at proper distances upon such a road, with the requisite means of operation deposited in the posts, and with competent garrisons to occupy them, would probably afford greater security to the advanced settlements than any other measures in our power. The dragoons should be kept in motion along it during the open season of the year, when Indian disturbances are most to be apprehended, and their presence and facility of movement would tend power- fully to restrain the predatory disposition of the Indians ; and if any sudden impulse should operate or drive them into hostilities, the means of assembling a strong force, with all necessary supplies, would be at hand, and, as circumstances permit, the posts in the Indian country now in the rear of this proposed line of operations should be abandoned and the garrisons transferred to it. But it is upon our maritime frontier that we are most exposed. Our coast for three thousand miles is washed by the ocean, which separates us from those nations who have made the highest advances in all the arts, and particularly in those which minister to the operations of war, and with whom, from our in- tercourse and political relations, we are most liable to be drawn into collision. If this great medium of communication, the element at the same time of sepa- ration and of union, interposes peculiar obstacles to the progress of hostile demon- strations, it also offers advantages which are not less obvious, and which, to be successfully resisted, require corresponding arrangements and exertions. These advantages depend on the economy and facility of transportation, on the celerity of movement, and on the power of an enemy to threaten the whole shore spread out before him, and to select his point of attack at pleasure. A powerful hostile fleet upon the coast of the United States presents some of the features of a war, where a heavy mass is brought to act against detachments which may be cut up in detail, although their combined force would exceed the assailing foe. Our points of exposure are so numerous and distant that it would be im- practicable to keep, at each of them, a force competent to resist the attack of an enemy, prepared by his naval ascendency, and his other arrangements, to make a sudden and vigorous inroad upon our shores. It becomes us, therefore, to inquire how the consequences of this state of things are to be best met and averted. The first and most obvious, and in every point of view the most proper, method of defence is an augmentation of our naval means to an extent propor- tioned to the resources and the necessities of the nation. I do not mean the actual construction and equipment of vessels only. The number of those in service must depend on the state of the country at a given period ; but I mean the collection of all such materials as may be preserved without injury, and a due encouragement of those branches of interest essential to the growth: of a navy, and which may be properly nurtured by the government ; so that, on the approach of danger, a fleet may put to sea, without delay, sufficiently powerful to meet any force which will probably be sent to our coast. Our great battle upon the ocean is yet to be fought, and we shall gain nothing by shutting our eyes to the nature of the struggle, or to the exertions we- shall find it necessary to make. All our institutions are essentially pacific, and every citizen feels that his share of the common interest is affected by the derange- ment of business, by the enormous expense, and by the uncertain result, of a war. This feeling presses upon the community and the government and is< a sure guarantee that we shall never be precipitated into a contest, nor embark in one, unless imperiously required by those considerations which leave no alterna- tive between resistance and dishonor. Accordingly, all our history shows that we are more disposed to bear, while evils ought to be borne, than, to seek re- 68 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. dress by appeals to arms ; still, however, a contest must come, and it behooves us, while we have the means and the opportunity, to look forward to its attend- ant circumstances, and to preparfc for the consequences. It is no part of my object to enter into the details of a naval establishment. That duty will be much more appropriately and ably performed by the proper department ; but as some of the views I shall present on the subject of our system of fortifications must be materially affected by any general plan of naval operations which, in the event of hostilities, might be adopted, I am necessarily led to submit a few remarks, not professional, but general, upon the extent and employment of our military marine. There is as little need of inquiry now into our moral as into our physical capacity tq maintain a navy, and to meet upon equal terms the ships and sea- men of any other nation. Our extended commerce, creating and created by those resources which are essential to the building and equipment of fleets, re- moves all doubt upon the one point, and the history of our naval enterprise, from the moment when the colors were first hoisted upon the hastily-prepared vessels at the commencement of our revolutionary struggle to the last contest in which any of our ships have been engaged, is equally satisfactory upon the other. The achievements of our navy have stamped its character with the country and the world. The simple recital of its exploits is the highest eulo- gium which can be pronounced upon it. With ample means, therefore, to meet upon the ocean, by which they must approach us, any armaments that may be destined for our shores, we are called upon by every prudential consideration to do so. In the first place, though all wars in which we may be engaged will probably be defensive in their character, undertaken to repel or resent some injury, or to assert some right, and rendered necessary by the conduct of other nations, still the objects of the war can be best attained by its rigorous prosecution. Defensive in its causes, it should be offensive in its character. The greater injury we can inflict upon our opponent the sooner and the more satisfactory will be the redress we seek. Our principal belligerent measures should have for their aim to attack our antagonist where he is most vulnerable. If we are to receive his assaults, we abandon the van- tage ground, and endeavor, in effect, to compel him to do us justice by inviting his descent upon our shores, and by all those consequences which mark the progress of an invading force, whether for depredation or for conquest. By the ocean only can we be seriously assailed, and by the ocean ^>nly can we seriously assail any power with which we are likely to be brought into collision. But, independently of the policy of making an adversary feel the calamities of war, it is obvious that, even in a defensive point of view alone, the ocean should be our great field of operations. No one would advocate the project of endeavoring to make our coast impervious to attack. Such a scheme would be utterly impracticable. A superior fleet, conveying the necessary troops, could effect a landing at numerous points upon our shores, even if the best devised plan of fortifying them were consummated ; and, from the nature of maritime operations, such a fleet could bring its whole strength to bear upon any particu- lar position, and by threatening or assailing various portions of the coast, either anticipate the tardy movements of troops upon land, and effect the object before their concentration, or render it necessary to keep in service a force far superior to that of the enemy, but so divided as to be inferior to it upon any given point. These dangers and difficulties would be averted or avoided by the maintenance of a fleet competent to meet any hostile squadrons which might be detached to our seas. Our coast would thus be defeRded on the ocean, and the calamities of war would be as little felt as the circumstances of such a conflict would permit. As to the other advantages of a navy, in the protection of commerce, they do not come within the scope of my inquiries, and are not, therefore, adverted FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 69 to ; nor is it necessary, or indeed proper, that I should present those considera- tions of distance, of exposure, and of station, which would render a fleet nu- merically inferior in the aggregate to that of the enemy, yet still sufficiently powerful, upon our own coasts, to meet and overcome any armament which could probably be sent here. It seems to me, therefore, that our first and best fortification is the navy. Nor do I see any limit to our naval preparations, except that imposed by a due re- gard to the public revenues from time to time, and by the probable condition of other maritime nations. Much of the materiel employed in the construction and equipment of vessels is almost indestructible, or, at any rate, may be pre- served for a long series of years ; and if ships can be thus kept without injury upon the stocks, by being built under cover, I do not see what should restrain us from proceeding to build as many as may be deemed necessary, and as fast as a due regard to their economical and substantial construction will permit, and to collect and prepare for immediate use all the munitions of war, and other arti- cles of equipment not liable to injury or decay by the lapse of time. Nor do I see that these preparations should be strictly graduated by the number of sea- men who would probably enter the service at this time, or within any short period. To build and equip vessels properly requires much time, as well with reference to the execution of the work as* to the proper condition of the ma- terials employed. And the costly experiment made by England, when she too hastily increased her fleet, about thirty years ago, by building ships with im- proper materials and bad workmanship, ought to furnish us with a profitable lesson. These vessels soon decayed, after rendering very little service. Naval means should therefore be provided at a period of leisure, to be ready for im- mediate employment in a period of exigency ; and a due regard to prudence dictates that these means should so far exceed the estimated demands of the service as to supply, in the shortest time, any loss occasioned by the hazards of the ocean and the accidents of war. We may safely calculate that the number of seamen in the United States will increase in proportion to that rapid augmen- tation which is going on in all the other branches of national interest. If we assume that at a given period we may expect to embark in war, our capacity to man a fleet will exceed our present means by a ratio not difficult to ascertain. And even then, by greater exertions and perhaps higher wages, a larger portion may be induced to enter the naval service, while no exertions can make a cor- responding addition to the navy itself, but at a loss of time and expense, and a sacrifice of its permanent interest. But whatever arrangements we may make to overcome any naval armaments sent out 'to assail us, we are liable to be defeated and to be exposed to all the consequences resulting from the ascendency of an enemy. And the practical question is, what shall be done with a view to such a state of things ] As I have already remarked, any attempt by fortifications to shut up our coast, so that an enterprising foe, with a victorious fleet, conveying a competent force, and disposed to encounter all the risk of such an expedition, could not make his descent upon the shore, would be useless in itself, and would expose to just cen- sure those who should project such a scheme. And, on the other hand, the government would, if possible, be still more censurable were our important mari- time places left without any defensive works. Between these extremes is a practical medium, and to ascertain where it lies we must briefly look at the vari- ous considerations affecting the subject. What have we to apprehend in the event of a war ? Is it within the limits of a reasonable cilculation that any enemy will be able and disposed to debark upon our coast an army sufficiently powerful to lay siege to our fortifications and to endeavor, by this slow and uncertain process, to obtain possession of them ? I put out of view the enormous expense attending such a plan ; the distance of the scene of operations from the points of supply and support, with 70 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. the consequent difficulties and dangers, and the possibility that the convoying fleet might be overpowered by a superior force, and the whole expedition cap- tured or destroyed. All these are considerations which no prudent statesman, directing such an enterprise, will overlook. But beyond these is a question bearing still more directly upon the point under examination. Is there any ob- ject to be attained sufficiently important to justify the risk of placing a body of land troops before one of these works, too strong to be carried by a coup de main, and endeavoring to destroy the defence by a regular investment ? I think there can be none. I take it for granted that no nation would embark in the quixotic enterprise of conquering this country. Any army, therefore, thrown upon our coast would push forward with some definite object to be attained by a prompt movement and by vigorous exertions. Our experience, more than half a century ago, de- monstrated that an invading force could command little more than the position it actually occupied. The system of fortifications adopted in Europe is not ap- plicable to our condition. There military movements must be made upon great avenues of communication, natural or artificial, and these are closed or defended by fortresses constructed with all the skill that science and experience can sup- ply, and with all the means that wealth and power can command. An invading army must carry these positions by escalade or by siege, or leave sufficient de- tachments to blockade them, or must turn them and move on with all the diffi- culties attending the interruption of their communication, and with the dangers which such a force in their rear must necessarily occasion. Works of this character are keys to many of the European states, whose political safety de- pends upon their preservation. Their possession enables their governments to meet the first shock of war, and to prepare their arrangements, political or mili- tary, to resist or avert the coming storm. And although, during some of the wars which arose out of the French revolution, when, from causes which history is now developing, the armies of France set at defiance the received maxims of military experience, and justifying their apparent rashness by success, reduced, with unexampled facility, or carried on their operations almost in contempt of the strongest fortifications, the subjugation of each of which had been till then the work of a campaign, still the opinion is yet entertained by many that this system of defence is best adapted to the condition of the European community. There is also a striking difference between the political situation of those countries and that of ours, which give to these defensive preparations a character of importance which can never apply to the United States. The possession of a capital in the eastern hemisphere is too often jthe possession of the kingdom. Habits of feeling and opinion, political associations, and other causes, combine to give the metropolis an undue ascendency. Internal parties, contending for superiority, and external enemies, aiming at conquest, equally seek to gain possession of the seat of government. And the most careless observer of the events of the last half century must be struck with the fact that the fate of the capitals and the kingdoms of modern Europe are closely connected together. Under such circumstances, it may be prudent, by powerful fortresses, to bar the approaches to these favored places, and frequently to construct works to defend them from external attack, or to maintain their occupation against internal violence. But there is nothing like this in our country, nor can there be till there is a total change in our institutions. Our seats of government are merely the places where the business of the proper departments is conducted, and have not them- selves the slightest influence upon any course of measures, except what is due to public opinion and to their just share of it. If the machine itself were itiner- ant, the result would be precisely the same. Or, if by any of the accidents of war or pestilence, the proper authorities were compelled to change their place of convocation, the change would be wholly unobserved, except by the few whose FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 71 personal convenience would be affected by the measure. Nor have our com- mercial capitals any more preponderating influence than our political ones. And although their capture by an enemy, and the probable loss of property, and derangement of business, which would be the result, might seriously affect the community, yet it would not produce the slightest effect upon the social or political systems of the country. The power belongs to all, and is exercised by all. It follows, therefore, that an enemy could have no inducement to hazard an expedition against any of our cities, under the expectation that their capture and possession would lead to political results favorable to them. Washington may indeed be taken again, and its fall would produce the same emotion which was everywhere felt when its former capture was known. But an enemy would retire from it with as few advantages as marked its first abondonment, and if his course were the same, with as few laurels as he won by its possession. I make these remarks, because it seems to me that some of the principles of the European system of fortifications may possibly be transferred to this country, without sufficient attention having been given to those circumstances, both geo- graphical and political, which require a plan exclusively adapted to our own condition. I consider some of the existing and projected works larger than are now necessary, and calculated for exigencies we ought not, with the prospects before us, to anticipate. If such is the fact, the objection is not only to the expense of their construction and preservation, but also to the greater difficulty of defending them, and the increased garrisons which must be provided and main- tained. The hypothesis upon which their extent has been determined is, that they may be exposed to investment, both seaward and landward, and that they ought to be capable of resisting a combined attack, or, in other words, that their water batteries should be sufficient to repel an assailing squadron, and that their land defences should be sufficient to resist a besieging army. It is certain that whatever works we erect should be so constructed as to be beyond the reach of any coup de main that would probably be attempted against them ; and this capacity must depend upon their exposure and upon the facility with which they can be relieved. But this proposition is far different from, one to construct them upon a scale of magnitude which presupposes they are to be formally invested by a powerful land force, and which provides for their ability to make a successful resistance. A dashing military or naval officer may be willing to risk something to get possession of an insulated post by a prompt movement, expecting to accomplish his enterprise before his adversary can be prepared, or succor obtained; and this, even when he looks to no other advan- tage than the capture of the garrison, and the effect which a brilliant exploit is calculated to produce, and when he is aware that he must abandon his conquest with as much celerity as he attained it. But formal investments of fortified places, with all their difficulties, and expense, and uncertainty, are only under- taken when there is some object of corresponding importance to be expected. We have works constructed which it would require armies to reduce. Have we any reason to anticipate that they will be assailed by a force proportioned to their magnitude] I have already remarked that a European power cannot expect to retain permanent possession of any part of this country. If, therefore, he succeed in overcoming or eluding our fleets, and is prepared with a respectable land force, and ready to risk its employment upon our territory, he* can land at many points which we cannot close against him. His debarkation is not a question of practicability, but of expediency. If a safe harbor or roadstead offers itself, and there is no defensive work to prevent his approach, he will, of course, land at the nearest point to the object of his marauding exterprise. If there is such a work, it will be a question of calculation whether it is better to attack and carry 72 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. it, or to seek another, though more distant, point of debarkation. I think there can be little doubt but there are few, if any, positions in our country which an enemy would not under such circumstances avoid. He would be aware of the' facility of communication which our rivers, canals, and railroads afford, of the powerful use we should be prepared to make of steam in its various forms of application, and of the immense force which in a short time could be concentrated upon a given point; and it is scarcely within the limits of possibility that he would venture formally to besiege one of our forts, or if he did, that he would not repent his rashness. Neither the co-operation of his fleet, nor the nearer proximity of the place of landing to the object of attack, would induce him to seek these advantages at the cost which must attend the slow process of besieg- ing a fort, when, by removing to another position, he would land in safety, and save in time, in promptness of movement, and in his escape from the perils of a doubtful contest, more than he would lose by the difference in distance. I am aware it may be objected that the weakness of a work might tempt an enemy to attack it, and that it may be supposed the power of some of our forti- fications to resist a siege may hereafter furnish the true reason why they may not be compelled to encounter one. Certainly the stronger a work is, the less will it be exposed to danger. But this would not furnish a sufficient reason for making its defences out of reasonable proportion to its exposure. The true inquiry is, What circumstances will probably induce and enable an enemy to assail a given point, and with what force ; and how can we best meet and repel him ? And I believe a just consideration of this proposition will lead to the conclusion that there are scarcely any positions in our country where an enemy would venture to set down before a work too strong to resist a coup de main. In the view, therefore, which I take of this whole subject, it will be perceived that I do not merely suppose an enemy will not invest our larger works, but that they would not do so were these works much inferior to what they are, both in their dimensions and construction. What object would justify an enemy in attempting to land an army upon our coast ? He would not expect to lay waste the country, for such a mode of war- fare is not to be anticipated in the present state of society. All that, under the most favorable circumstances, he could accomplish, would be to gain sudden possession of a town and levy contributions, or to destroy a naval establishment, commercial or military, and precipitately retire to his ships before his operations could be prevented, or his retreat intercepted. I cannot, therefore, concur in the suggestion made in the engineer report, that the first of the three great objects to be attained by the fortifications of -the first class should be to "prevent an enemy from forming a permanent or even a momentary establishment in the country." It is not suited to the present and prospective situation of the United States. I understand the establishments herein contemplated are not the tem- porary occupation of naval arsenals and cities for the purpose of destruction or plunder, because these objects are specially enumerated, but are lodgements where armies may be stationed, and whence they may issue to commit inroads into the country. I refer, in these remarks, to our maritime coast generally. There are, no doubt, certain points less equal to self-defence than others, and where the prep- aration must be greater. Of this class is the delta of the Mississippi, not only in consequence of its many avenues of approach, but because its great natural highway does not at present allow those lateral supplies of the personnel, which, from geographical formation, and from the state of the .settlements, can be speedily thrown upon most other points of the country. This region, however, is admirably adapted to the use of steam batteries, and they will form its prin- cipal means of defence. To apply these remarks to the plan of fortifications partly completed and partly projected. Fort Monroe, at Old Point Comfort, covers about sixty-three FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 73 acres of ground, and requires, by the estimates of the engineer department, two thousand seven hundred men to garrison it in time of war. Its full armament consists of 412 pieces of different descriptions and calibre. I have been desirous of comparing its superficial extent with some of the European fortresses ; but the necessary information could not be obtained within the short time that could be allowed for the inquiry. I understand from General Gratiot, however, that it is probably larger than almost any of the single works in Europe which do not enclose towns within their circuit. Drinkwater, in his history of the siege of Gibraltar, states that 572 guns were mounted upon that fortress. The object to be attained by Fort Monroe, in conjunction with Fort Calhoun, intended to mount 232 guns, is to prevent an enemy from entering Hampton roads, a safe and convenient roadstead. This object is important, because this bay is perfectly landlocked, and has sufficient depth of water for the largest vessels, and is, withal, so near the capes of the Chesapeake that it furnishes the best station which an enemy could occupy for annoying our commerce, and for committing depredations upon the shores of that extensive estuary. But these works do not command the entrance into the Chesapeake; nor is Hampton roads the only safe anchorage for a hostile fleet. Their possession, therefore, does not exclude an enemy from these waters, though they will compel him to resort to less convenient positions from whence to cany on his enterprises. A hostile squadron reaching the Chesapeake, and finding the entrance into Hampton roads guarded by sufficient works, though much less extensive than those at Fort Monroe, would necessarily consider whether the possession of that roadstead is so important as to justify the debarkation of a large body of land troops, and to attempt to carry the works by regular approaches, and this in the face of the strenuous efforts which would be made to relieve it by all the aids afforded by the most improved facilities of communication, and by the light and heavy steam batteries which, upon the approach of war, would be launched upon the Chesapeake, and which, during periods of calm, or in certain winds, could approach the hostile ships and drive them from their anchorage, or compel them to surrender, and most of which, from their draught of water, could take refuge in the inlets that other armed vessels could not enter. And even if the works were carried, they could not be maintained without the most enormous expense, nor, in fact, without efforts which no government three thousand miles off could well make, and all this, while Lynnhaven bay, York bay, the Rappa- hannock, Tangier island, the mouth of the Potomac, and many other places, furnish secure anchorage, and are positions from which an enemy, having the superiority, could not be excluded, and while, in fact, a great part of the Ches- apeake may be considered as affording good anchorage ground for large ships. Neither of them is equal to Hampton roads, but most or all of them furnish stations for occupation and observation which would render it unnecessary to purchase the superior advantages of Hampton roads by the sacrifice and hazard which would attend the effort. The occlusion of this roadstead does not secure Norfolk, important as it is from its commerce and navy yard. It only prevents the access of ships-of-war to it. And against these there is an interior line of defence, which may be considered as accessory to, and, if necessary, independent of, the other. And a land force, deeming the destruction of the navy yard at Norfolk a sufficient object to justify such an expedition, would not sit down be- fore Fort Monroe, if its scale of defence were far inferior to what it now is, but would debark at Lynnhaven bay, where there is no impediment, and march in five or six hours through an open country to Norfolk. New York is, in every point of view, our most important harbor, and its de- fences should provide for every reasonable contingency. The engineer report recommends three classes of works : an interior one for the protection of the harbor ; an exterior one to shut up Raritan bay ; and a third to prevent a hos- tile fleet from approaching the city through the sound nearer than the vicinity 74 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES of Throg's Point. The importance of the first class cannot be doubted. That of the second depends on the value of Raritan bay to an enemy as an anchorage ground, and on the utility of excluding him from a landing at Gravesend bay, upon Long Island, whence an army could march, without obstruction, to Brook- lyn and New York. The third is proposed to be erected in order to bar his access to the lower part of the sound, or, more accurately speaking, to prevent his reaching Hell Gate, a natural barrier which no fleet could pass, and which is within ten miles of the city. Here, if his aim were New York, he would land, and would find no works to prevent his approach. The two forts proposed to be erected at Throg's Neck and Wilkin's Point, eight miles further up the sound, would compel him to debark beyond the reach of their guns, and would thus add that distance to his march, while on the north shore Harlaem river would be interposed between him and the city. On the Long Island side there would be no difference but that occasioned by the distance. It is obvious then that, in the consideration of this plan involving an esti- mated expenditure in the aggregate of $5,807,969, and efficient garrisons in time of war of nine thousand men, a close investigation should be made into all the circumstances likely to influence the operations of an enemy. Is the an- chorage ground between the Narrows and Sandy Hook of sufficient value to an enemy, looking to the risk of his occupation of the coast and to the doubts that may be reasonably entertained of the result of so great an experiment to be carried on, in fact, in the sea, to authorize the commencement of these works without a new examination ] Or is the probability of the disembarkation of an army at Gravesend bay in preference to some other point upon the coast of Long Island, if a convenient one exists, so great as to require these preparations ? The same questions may be asked respecting Wilkin's Point. The work at Throg's Point is in the process of construction, and as the river is only about three-fourths of a mile wide at this place I think its completion would be suffi- cient for this line of defence till the proposed general examination can take place. The situation of New York affords a fine theatre for the operation of floating batteries, and whether a sufficient number of them would secure it from the de- signs of an enemy better than the full completion of the extensive system of permanent fortifications recommended is a question deserving investigation. Such an investigation I recommend, and after all the necessary facts and con- siderations are presented the government should proceed to place this commercial metropolis of the country in a state of security. The works at Newport cover about twenty acres and will mount four hundred and sixty-eight guns, and will need for their defence about two thousand four hundred men. I cannot myself foresee the existence of any circumstances which now call for a fortress of this magnitude in the very heart of New England ; constructed not merely to command the harbor of Newport, but to resist a siege which would probably require nearly twenty thousand men to carry it on. I am at a loss to conjecture what adequate motive could induce a foreign govern- ment to detach a fleet and army upon this enterprise. The expense would be enormous. The French army that invaded Egypt was less than forty thousand men, and required for its protection and transportation between five and six hundred vessels. The army that conquered Algiers was about equal in force, and required, it is said, about four hundred transports besides the ships-of-war. This scale of preparation for enterprises against the shores of the Mediterranean may enable us to form some conception of the arrangements that would be necessary to send across the ocean to this country, in the present day of its power, an expedition strong enough to form an establishment upon our shores, and to furnish it with supplies necessary to its subsistence and operations. It has been supposed, indeed, by the board of engineers, that an enemy would find sufficient reason for the occupation of Rhode Island in the consideration FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 75 that it would afford a secure lodgement, whence expeditions could be sent to every part of our coast. But it is to be observed that no part of Narraganset bay is necessary for the safety of a hostile fleet watching that part of our coast. Gardiner's bay in that vicinity is a most safe and convenient station, which was occupied by the British during almost the whole of the late war, and it is pretty clear that it cannot be defended by any stationary fortifications that can be constructed. If it can by floating batteries, so may Narraganset bay, and the enemy thus prevented from occupying the latter also without these extensive arrangements, requiring, after Fort Adams shall have been completed at an ex- pense of one million three hundred and twelve thousand dollars, four other forts and a sea-wall to be constructed, and eleven hundred and fifty-seven thousand dollars to be expended. I do not think that the most prudent forecast ought to lead to the apprehen- sion that a force competent to seize such a position would be sent to our country, or that any circumstances could enable them to maintain it in the face of the vigorous efforts that would be made to recover it, and in the midst of a country abounding in all the means to give effect to their exertions. But perhaps the most striking objection to the completion of this extensive plan is, that under no possible circumstance can it effect the desired object. That object, if I understand it, is not the mere exclusion of an enemy from Rhode Island, but it is to prevent him from taking possession of a safe and convenient position, whence he could detach his forces by means of his naval superiority to any other part of the coast which would thus be exposed to his depredations. The value of Gardiner's bay as a place of naval renclezvous I have already described. Block island, in its neighborhood, could be occupied by troops de- siring only a lodgement, and so could Nantucket island and Martha's Vineyard, and these are only a few hours' sail from Narraganset bay. Buzzard's bay is also a safe and capacious harbor which cannot be defended, and Martha's Vine- yard sound affords commodious places of anchorage. A fleet riding in these moorings would have under its command all the islands in this group, and could secure its communications with its land forces encamped upon them, which would thus be enabled, at any proper time, to throw itself upon other parts of the coast. It may be doubted, if there were not a cannon mounted upon Rhode Isfand, whether an enemy acquainted with the topography and resources of this country would select it as his place of arms, if I may so term it, when there are islands in the neighborhood which would answer this purpose nearly as well, and where he would be in perfect safety as long as he could maintain his naval ascendency; and longer than that he could not, under any circumstances, occupy Rhode Island. And if I rightly appreciate the strength and spirit of that part of the country, his tenure, in any event, would be short and difficult. I do not mean to convey the idea that Rhode Island should not be defended. I think it should be ; but I do not think that precautions should be taken against events which are not likely to happen. As there is no naval establishment here, it is not necessary to enter into any question concerning defensive arrangements exclusively connected with that object. It will be perceived also that it is proposed to fortify Mount Desert island, on the coast of Maine, and that the expense is estimated at five hundred thou- sand dollars, and the number of the garrison competent to maintain it at -one thousand men. This proposition is founded, not on the value of this harbor to us, for it possesses little, and is, in effect, unoccupied, but on account of its im- portance to the enemy. Were there no other secure position they could occupy in that quarter, and which could not be defended, I should think the views submitted upon this branch of the subject entitled to great weight. But there are many indentations upon this coast, affording safe anchorage, and which are either not capable of being defended, or from their great number would involve an enormous expense, which no sound views of the subject could justify. An 76 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. enemy, therefore, cannot be deprived of the means of stationing himself upon this coast. And before this expenditure at Mount Desert island is encountered, it ought to be clearly ascertained that the difference, in its practical advantages to an enemy, between the occupation of Mount Desert island and that of some of the other roadsteads iii this quarter, incapable of defence, would be sufficiently great to warrant this measure. My present impression is that it would not. And on the subject of roadsteads generally, with a few exceptions, depending on their local positions, I am inclined to the opinion that any attempt to fortify them would be injudicious. I do not speak of harbors and inlets which are occupied by cities and towns, but of mere anchorage grounds, deriving their value from the shelter they afford. If all could be defended, and an enemy excluded from them, the advantages would justify any reasonable expenditure. But this is impracticable, and I doubt whether the circumstances, in which most of them differ, give such marked superiority to those we can defend over those we cannot, as to lead to any attempt to fortify them, in the first instance, and to maintain garrisons in them during a war. I have adverted to these particular cases in order to present my views more distinctly than I could do by mere general observations. Certainly not from the remotest design of criticising the reports and the labors of the able profes- sional men to whom the subject has been referred, nor of pursuing the investi- gation into any further detail. I consider the duty of the government to afford adequate protection to the sea-coast a subject of paramount obligation ; and I believe we are called upon by every consideration of policy to push the necessary arrangements as rapidly as the circumstances of the country and the proper execution of the work will allow. I think every town large enough to tempt the cupidity of an enemy should be defended by works, fixed or floating, suited to its local position, and sufficiently extensive to resist such attempts as would probably be made against it. There will, of course, after laying down such a general rule, be much latitude of discretion in its application. Upon this branch of the subject I would give to the opinion of the engineer officers great and almost controlling weight, after the proper limitations are established. These relate principally to the mag- nitude of the works, and if I am correct in the views I have taken of this branch of the subject, a change in the system proposed is necessary. Works should not be projected upon the presumption that they are to be exposed to and must be capable of resisting the attacks of an European army, with its battering train, and all its preparations for a regular siege. Neither our relative circumstances, nor those of any nation with which we shall probably be brought into conflict, can justify us in such an anticipation. All the defences should be projected upon a scale proportioned to the importance of the place, and should be calculated to resist any naval attack, and any sudden assault that a body of land troops might make upon them. But further than this it appears to me we ought not to go. The results at Stonington, at Mobile Point,, at Fort Jackson, and at Baltimore, during the late war, show that formidable armaments may be successfully resisted with apparently inferior means. These, indeed, do not furnish examples to be followed as to the scale of our preparations, but they show what stationary batteries have done in our country against ships-of-war. It is to be observed that the great object of our fortifications is to exclude a naval force from our harbors. This end they ought fully to answer, and in this problem there are two conditions to be fulfilled : 1. That they be able to resist any naval batteries that will probably be placed against them ; and 2. That they be also able to resist any coup de main or escalade which might be attempted by land. An open battery, under many circumstances, might fulfil the first condition but not the second, and therefore these works should be closed and regularly FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 77 constructed. It is not to be denied that the proper boundary between the mag- nitude and nature of the works necessary to attain the objects indicated, and those required to resist successfully a formal investment, will sometimes become a matter of doubt ; nor that circumstances may not be stated which might induce an enemy to open his trenches against one of these works, because its capacity for defence was not greater. That capacity, however, with relation to the question under consideration, has a far more intimate connexion with the magnitude than with the form of the works, because, if unnecessarily large, they entail upon the country a serious evil in the increased means for their defence, independently of the additional expense in their construction. It is principally, therefore, in the latter point of view that I have presented the doubts which I have expressed upon this point. Among the hypothetical cases heretofore stated by the board of engineers was one which supposed that an army of twenty thousand men might be assembled upon one of the flanks of our coast, and that we ought to be pre- pared, at every important point, to resist the first shock of such a force. I have already glanced at the reasons, geographical, political, financial, and prudential, which, in my opinion, leave little room to expect that any enemy will, hereafter, project an enterprise of this magnitude, so certain in its expense, so uncertain in its result, and so disproportioned to any object which could probably be at- tained. And the suggestion which was made by the board, of defending the city of Washington by works erected near the mouth of the Patuxent, proceeds upon similar views. Our navy, our floating batteries, our means of communi- cation and concentration, seem to me far better adapted to the defence of this city than forts at the distance of nearly fifty miles, whose principal effect, if an enemy were resolved upon the enterprise, would be to compel him to make a detour in his expedition, or which would send him to some part of the coast of the bay between Patuxent and Annapolis, or into the Potomac, where his descent would be uninterrupted, and where he would be but little, if any, further from Washington than at the head of navigation of the Patuxent. Even during the last war, when the navy of Great Britain rode triumphant upon the ocean, but one serious attempt was made to force an entrance into a fortified harbor, and that was unsuccessful. The greatest possible force which can be brought, and the greatest possible resistance which can be applied, do not constitute a practical rule for the construction of our fixed defences. Moral considerations must also have weight. Probabilities must be examined. The power of the permanent batteries is one of the elements of security. So are the dangers of dispersion and shipwreck, and all the hazards of a distant expedi- tion, as these must operate on the councils of any country meditating such an enterprise, the efforts of our navy, the co-operation of the floating defences, and the troops which may be ready to meet the enemy upon his debarkation or march. In submitting these reflections, I am desirous only of discharging the duty confided to me. I am gratified that the whole subject will be presented for the consideration of Congress in a systematic form, and that the principles of its future prosecution can now be settled. The plan originally devised was recom- mended upon great consideration, and, at the time its initiatory measures were adopted, was calculated for the state of the country. We had just come out of a severe struggle, and had felt the want of adequate preparation, and, above all, we had seen and deplored the circumstances which gave the enemy undisturbed possession of the Chesapeake, and its disastrous consequences. And it was to be expected that our arrangements for future defence should be planned upon the then existing state of things. I imagine there were few who- did not concur in this sentiment. Because, therefore, some of our works, from the wonderful advancement of the country in all the elements of power, and from the develop- ment of new means of annoyance, are larger than are found necessary at this 78 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. time, still this does not bring into question the wisdom of the original measure. And, as it is, they are most valuable and useful ; but the experience we have acquired may be profitably employed in re-examining the plans proposed for the prosecution of the system, and in inquiring whether the change which has taken place in the condition of the country will not justify a corresponding change in the nature of our preparations, and whether we may not depend more upon floating, and less upon stationary defences. During the period which has intervened since the last war, we have nearly doubled in our population, and all our other resources have probably increased in a still greater ratio. Certainly, some of the facilities and means of defence are augmented beyond any rational expectations. The power of transporting troops and munitions of war has already opened new views upon this subject, and such is the progress and probable extent of the new system of intercom- munication that the time will soon come when almost any amount of physical force may be thrown upon any point threatened by an enemy. Nashville may succor New Orleans in sixty hours ; Cincinnati may aid Charleston in about the same time ; Pittsburg will require but twenty-four hours to relieve Baltimore, and troops from that city and from Boston may leave each place in the morn- ing, and meet in New York in the evening. This wonderful capacity for move- ment increases, in effect, some of the most important elements of national power It neutralizes one of the great advantages of an assailing force, choosing its point of attack, and possessing the necessary means of reaching it. Detach- ments liable, under former circumstances? to be cut off in detail, may now be concentrated without delay, and most of the garrisons upon the seaboard may be brought together, and, after accomplishing the object of their concentration, be returned to their stations in time to repel any attack meditated against them. The improvements which are making in the application of steam have fur- nished another most important agent in the work of national protection. There can be but little doubt that floating batteries, propelled by this agent, will be among the most efficient means of coast defence. In our large estuaries, such as the bays of New York, of the Delaware, and of the Chesapeake, they will be found indispensable ; and one of the most important advantages to be antici- pated from the works at Old Point Comfort is the security they will afford to the floating batteries co-operating with them, and which will find a secure shel- ter in Hampton roads. A hostile fleet about to enter the Chesapeake would cer- tainly calculate the means of annoyance to which it would be exposed by these formidable vessels. During a calm they would take a distant position, insuring their own safety, while, with their heavy guns, they might cripple and destroy the enemy ; and their power of motion would enable them, under almost all cir- cumstances, to approach the fleet, and to retire, when necesary, where they could not be pursued. I think it doubtful whether a squadron would anchor in the Chesapeake, or proceed up it, if a competent number of these batteries were maintained and placed in proper positions. These considerations may well lead us to doubt the necessity of such* extensive permanent works, while their non-existence at the time the system was adopted, justifies the views which then prevailed; and without advancing any rash con- jecture, we may anticipate such improvements in this branch of the public ser- vice as will make it the most efficient means of coast defence. These vessels, properly constructed, may become floating forts almost equal to permanent forti- fications in their power of annoyance and defence, and in other advantages far superior to them. Being transferable defences, they can.be united upon any point, and a few of them be thus enabled to protect various places. We have been brought by circumstances to a more rigid investigation of our means of defence, and to a re-examination of the whole subject. After an in- terval of twenty years of tranquillity, public sentiment and the attention of the government were, by unexpected circumstances, more forcibly directed to this FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 79 matter. The result cannot fail to be advantageous. The whole subject can be now re-examined by Congress, with all the benefits which much experience has brought, and with the advantage of adapting a system to the advanced state of the country. There are two bills for fortifications now pending before Congress. One be- fore the House, amounting to $2,180,000, and intended to prosecute works actu- ally already commenced. The estimates for this bill may therefore be considered necessary in themselves, under any view of the general subject, and not unrea- sonable in amount for the present year, because they include the operations of two years. The incidental expenses, however, may be safely reduced one-half, as it will not be necessary to make such extensive repairs as were considered requisite when the estimates were prepared. The bill pending before the Senate contains appropriations for nineteen new works, and for the sum of $600,000 to be expended for steam batteries. The estimates on which this bill was founded were prepared at a time when prudence required that arrangements should be made for a different state of things from that which now exists. An examination of the general system of defence was not then expedient; and the means of protecting the most exposed points, agreeably to information previously collected, were asked of Congress. It was no time then to stop, and instead of prosecuting established plans vigorously, to lose the period of action by surveys, examinations, and discussions. But the opportunity is now afforded, without danger to the public interest, of applying the principles suggested to the works under consideration. It cannot be doubted but that fortifications at the following places enumerated in this bill will be necessary : At Penobscot bay, for Jhe protection of Bangor, &c. At Kennebec river. At Portland. At Portsmouth. At Salem. At New Bedford. At New London. Upon Staten Island. At Sollers's Flats. A redoubt on Federal Point. For the Barrancas. For Fort St. Philip. These proposed works all command the approach to places sufliciently im- portant to justify their construction under any circumstances that will probably exist. I think, therefore, that the public interest would be promoted by the passage of the necessary appropriations for them. As soon as these are made, such of these positions as may appear to require it can be examined, and the form and extent of the works adapted to existing circumstances, if any change be desirable. The construction of those not needing examination can commence immediately, and that of the others as soon as the plans are determined upon. By this proceeding, therefore, a season may be saved in the operations. The other works contained in this bill are : For Provincetown. And this proposition may be safely submitted to another inquiry, as the practicability of excluding an enemy from any shelter in Massa- chusetts bay, a matter of deep interest, and as a work at Provincetown, are closely connected. For Rhode Island, Narraganset bay. This work may await the result of the views that may be eventually taken on the subject of fortifying this bay. For a work at the Delaivare outlet of the Chesapeake and Delaware canal. This may be postponed without injury till next season; and in the meantime a 80 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. project for the floating defences of the Delaware considered, and perhaps the size of the proposed work reduced. For a work at the Breakwater. Until the effect of the deposits which are going on in this important artificial harbor are fully ascertained, I consider it injudicious to erect a permanent work for its defence. Another year will, per- haps, settle the question, and if the result is favorable, an adequate fortification should be constructed here without delay. For a fort on the Patuxent river, and a fort at Cedar Point. Both of these works are liable to some of the objections stated, and I think they had better be postponed for more mature consideration. For fortifications at the mouth of the St. Mary's, Georgia. This proposition may also be safely submitted to examination. The estimate for steam batteries may be reduced to $100,000. That sum can be profitably employed. If these appropriations are early made, most if not all of these works can be put in operation this season, and the money usefully applied,' as fast as their progress will justify. And I think the measure would be expedient. But it is to be remembered that the power of the department to push them, during the present year, will depend on the reorganization of the corps of engineers. If that corps is not increased, it will be unnecessary to make th'e appropriations in the bill before the Senate, as the objects contained in the other bill will be suffi- cient to occupy the time of the present officers of the corps. Should it be deemed proper to re-examine the subject of the proposed fortifi- cations generally, I would then recommend that an appropriation of $30,000 be made to defray the expenses of a board, including surveyors, &c. My reflections upon the whole subject lead to the Allowing practical sugges- tions on the great subject of the measures for the defence of the country : 1. An augmentation of the navy, upon the principles before stated. 2. The adoption of an efficient plan for the organization of the militia. Having already, in two of the annual reports I have had the honor to make to you, expressed my sentiments upon this subject, I have nothing new to lay before you, either with relation to its general importance, or to the necessary practical details. I consider it one of the most momentous topics that can en- gage the attention of Congress ; and the day that sees a plan of organization adopted, suited to the habits of our people and the nature of our institutions, and fitted to bring into action the physical strength of the country, with a competent knowledge of their duty, and just ideas of discipline and subordination, will see us the strongest nation, for the purposes of self-defence, on the face of the globe. Certainly such an object is worthy the attention of the legislature. 3. The cultivation of military science, that we may keep pace with the im- provements which are made in Europe, and not be compelled to enter into a contest with an adversary whose superior knowledge would give him pre-eminent advantages. War is an advancing science. Many an original genius and many an acute intellect are at all times at work upon it ; and the European communi- ties have such a relation to one another that the profession of anus is peculiarly encouraged, and every effort made to place their military establishments, not at the highest numerical point, but in the best condition for efficient service, both with respect to its morale and materiel. It is not by the mere reading of pro- fessional authors that the necessary instruction in this branch of knowledge can be obtained; there must be study and practice; a union of principles and details, which can best be obtained by a course of education directed to this object. This, I think, is one of the greatest advantages of the Military Academy. It cannot have escaped the recollection of those who were upon the theatre of action at the commencement of the last war, that the first year was almost spent in a series of disasters, which, however, brought their advantages. We were com- paratively ignorant of the state of military science, and we did not fully recover FORTIFICATIONS AND SE^- COAST DEFENCES. 81 our true position till we had received many severe lessons : at what an expense of life and treasure need not be stated. 4. The skeleton of a regular establishment, to which any necessary additions may be made, securing, at the same time, economy, with a due power of expan- sion, and the means of meeting a war with all the benefit of a regularly organized force. This object is attained by our present army. 5. The preparation and proper distribution of all the munitions of war, agree- ably to the views hereinafter submitted. 6. I think all the defensive works now in the process of construction should be finished, agreeably to the plans upon which they have been projected. 7. All the harbors and inlets upon the coast, where there are cities or towns whose situation and importance create just apprehension of attack, and particu- larly where we have public naval establishments, should be defended by works proportioned to any exigency that may probably arise. Having already presented my general views upon this branch of the inquiry, I need not repeat the practical limitations which I propose for adoption. But before any expenditure is incurred for new works, I think an examination should be made, in every case, in order to apply these principles to the proposed plan of operations, and thus reduce the expense of construction where this can prop- erly be done, and, also, the eventual expense of maintaining garrisons required to defend works disproportioued to the objects sought to be attained. I would organize a board for this object, with special instructions for its government. 8. Provision should be made for the necessary experiments, to test the supe- riority of the various plans that may be offered for the construction and use of steam batteries; I mean batteries to be employed as accessories in the defence of the harbors and inlets, and in aid of the permanent fortifications. The progressive improvement in the application of the power of steam renders it inexpedient, at any given time, to make extensive arrangements, connected with this class of works, with a view to their future employment. The improve- ment of to-day may be superseded by the experience of to-morrow ; and modes of application may be discovered before any exigency arises rendering a resort to these defences necessary, which may introduce an entire revolution into this department of art and industry. * Still, however, experiments should be made, aiid a small number of these vessels constructed. Their proper draught of water, their form and equipment, the situation and security of their machinery, the number, calibre, and management of their guns, and the best form of the engines to be used, are questions requiring much consideration, and which can only be determined by experience. And there can be little doubt that suitable rewards would soon put in operation the inventive faculties of some of our countrymen, and lead to the tender of plans practically suited to the circumstances. As we acquire confidence by our experience, arrangements could be made for collecting and preparing the indestructible materials for the construction and equipment of these vessels, as far as such a measure may not interfere with any probable change, which at the time may be anticipated in the application of the power of steam. 9. I recommend a reconsideration of the project for fortifying the roadsteads or open anchorage grounds, and its better adaptation to the probable future cir- cumstances of the country. And I would suggest that the works which are determined on be pushed with all reasonable vigor, that our whole coast may be placed beyond the reach of injury or insult as soon as a just regard to circumstances will permit. No objections can arise to this procedure on the ground of expense, because, whatever system may be approved by the legislature, nothing will be gained by delaying ipletioii beyond the time , the cost will be greater H. Rep. Com. 86 6 ~j ^ *, ""',/ - * sr JL j v v OOOO OOO 000 O O OOO OOO OOO ^ ^ fi *i s c ' 5 * 2 N * " S w kO o o *o iO O >O rH C C o 10 000 lO lO U7> *** s "1 1 90U9J w |4j 1 n :::::::: ^ z *" ^ a tc 11 rC i || fi "S o P THESE WO t Independence, Boston harbor t Warren, Boston harbor t Adams, Narraganset roads . . t Schuyler, New York harbor . t Columbus, New York harbor, t Delaware, Delaware bay t Monroe, Hampton roads t Calhoun, Hampton roads . t Caswell, Cape Fear river. . . . t in Charleston harbor, South C t Pulasjd, Savannah river t Pickens, Pensacola harbor t on Foster's bank, Pensacola L t at the narrows of Penobscot . t at the mouth of the Kennebe t Preble, Portland harbor 6 1 ^o r o r o o r o- o r o ^o r r r r OOO FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA- COAST DEFENCES. na 0000 o o o o o o o o = o~ o" o 1> IO O O i-H O CO o o o 10 o CO OJ. o>. 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S 3 ,* * li jo esuadxg^ 052$ 'sq^uora xis q^ jo osuadxg; aad 051$ loj 'sq^uora xis eq^ jo osuadxg ispun sdooi 1 } is ps No. of tr sary wi fication posodoid SAIGAS. jo is oooooooooo lOOOOOiOOOOiO O >O OOOOOOO ooooooooo t^-OOS-^l^-^OO' 1 COOlMOOOQOlM^OS ooooooooo OOOOCOOOO05 i t'?ht^-' IT^F GOlOO oiomooooooo o US ooooo oocccoooo-^coo . C O ' Oi j>(>} l oocyi'-i ,_! rH rH rH (M a 124 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. ORDNANCE OFFICE, Washington, Marvh 8, 1836. SIR : The resolution of the Senate referred, on the 25th ultimo, to this offici has been duly considered, and, in answer, I have the honor to transmit the fol lowing report : 1. IN RELATION TO ARMORIES. For reasons fully set forth in the letter to you from this office of Decembe 28, 1832, (and as will also appear on reference to the report of Hon. R. M Johnson, chairman of the military committee, of March 18, 1834,) it is th< opinion of this department that, with a view to keep pace in some measure witl the rapid increase of the militia, and the consequent demand for arms, ther< should be established at least one additional armory, to be located at the mos eligible point west of the Alleghany mountains. In a country like the United States, where the population is spread over i territory of great extent, the delay necessarily attending the transportation o arms to distant sections may at times materially affect the public interest; it ii therefore suggested that, if two additional armories are deemed necessary t( meet the exigencies of the country, one should be provided in the west and om in the south Atlantic States. Including those now at Springfield and Harper's Ferry, there would then be four national armories, two for the Atlantic States and two for the west ; that is, if Harper's Ferry may be considered sufficiently near the western States to furnish their supplies by means of the proposed extension of the Chesapeake and Ohio canal. Two additional armories are therefore estimated for, at $525,000 each $1,050,000. This estimate is based on the report of the commissioners, dated January 12 1825, who were appointed under the authority of an act of Congress, passec March 3, 1823, entitled "An act to establish a national armory on the westerr waters," and directed to explore the western country with a view to the selectior of a suitable site. 2. IN RELATION TO ARSENALS. It has been urged upon the department by many whose opinions demand consideration, that every state should have an arsenal or depot of arms and munitions within its territorial limits. Should this opinion prevail and be carried into effect by legislative authority, it would be necessary to construct fourteen arsenals or depots, including the one proposed for the State of North Carolina, for which a bill has been reported by the military committee of the House of Representatives . A prominent advantage to the public interest in the establishing of these depots consists in their use for the safe-keeping of arms issued to the States, under the law of Congress, passed in 1808, "for arming the whole body of the* militia," to be held subject to the orders of their several governors, which would insure their being always available in any emergency. Some additions may be required, from time to time, at the arsenals already established, which, with the cost of the fourteen above mentioned, are estimated at $1,746,000. This estimate is founded on the supposition that the new arsenals are to be, on an average, of a medium extent, when considered in relation to those already established, which are divided into four classes, as may be seen by refenence to a tabular exhibit presented herewith. It would be proper to arrange every new depot in such manner as to admit of its increase or extension in case the public service should require it. It could then be passed from one class to a higher by the addition of such buildings, tools, or machinery as the case might demand. FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 125 3. IN RELATION TO FIELD VRTILLERY. It is estimated that an adequate supply of field artillery for arming the militia and for troops in service, to be provided within ten years, will amount to 926 pieces, which, with their carriages, implements, and equipments, will cost about $576,175. This estimate is based on the principle stated in the report before mentioned, and contemplates a supply proportionate to the ratio of the increase of the militia, one piece of artillery being allotted to every 2,000 men. 4. IN RELATION TO ORDNANCE AND ORDNAMCE STORES REQUIRED FOR ARMING THE FORTIFICATIONS. Agreeably to data derived from two statements received from the engineer department on the llth of January and 27th of February last, it is estimated that the expense of procuring the necessary ordnance and ordnance stores for the full and entire armament of the forts which are erected, together with those now building, and others which are contemplated to be built hereafter, embracing cannon, carriages, implements, and equipments complete, and ammunition, after deducting therefrom the quantity of similar munitions now on hand, will amount to about $17,840,249. This estimate is founded on the supposition that 12,116 pieces of cannon, with 200 rounds of ammunition for each gun, will be ultimately required when all the forts projected shall have been completed. It should be stated, however, that this sum may be considered partly conjec- tural, the plans for the defence of many of the harbors being not yet matured by the board of engineers, as it appears by a letter from the chief of that depart- ment, dated February 27 last. There are likewise many other points along the coast which may require defences, the cost of the armament for which has not been embraced in this estimate, nor does it contain any item for the defence of the Mexican frontier. 5. IN RELATION TO SMALL ARMS. To progress with the arming of the militia to a reasonable extent, in accord- ance with the settled policy of the country and its civil institutions, a consider- able addition should be made to the number of arms on hand. Having reference to the annual increase of citizens who may be called to bear arms, there will be required for the next ten years an expenditure of $7,721,233 for muskets, rifles, and pistols, and $321,880 for swords total, $8,043,113. This last sum is found by allotting five swords to every one hundred muskets, or their equivalent in other fire-arms. 6. IN RELATION TO ACCOUTREMENTS FOR SMALL ARMS. Fifty thousand sets of accoutrements would cost $200,000. This number distributed among the several arsenals would afford an adequate supply for any emergency ; and being in some degree perishable, it is not con- sidered advisable to provide a greater quantity, as they can be made at short notice, or as occasion may require. 7. IN RELATION TO FIELD AMMUNITION OF ALL KINDS. The expense of providing a supply of gunpowder, cartridge paper, and other materials for field service, is estimated at $200,000. This amount would afford at all times a supply of ammunition for 30,000 men in each of the principal divisions of the country. 126 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. The foregoing statements comprise all the estimates for the ordnance depart- ment, except for a national foundery. The amount required for such an estab- lishment will not exceed $300,000, which sum includes the cost of materials to be consumed in casting guns during the first year after commencing operations. The period of ten years is taken as a suitable time within which the foregoing expenditures may be completed. The disbursements for the various objects embraced in the resolution which pertain to the ordnance department are now, annually, little short of $1,000,000. If a period of fifteen years is assumed for the accomplishment of these purposes, the annual expenditure will be only double what it is at present, and it is believed that such an increase could be made with much advantage to the service. Indeed, that portion of expense which pertains to the manufacture of cannon and projec- tiles could annually be more than quadrupled with safety and a due regard to economy. Recapitulation. 2 national armories $1, 050, 000 14 arsenals 1, 746, 000 926 pieces of field artillery, with carriages, &c 576, 175 Ordnance and ordnance stores, and ammunition for fortifications . . 17, 840, 249 Small arms and accoutrements 8, 243, 113 Ammunition for field service 200, 000 A national foundery 300, 000 29, 955, 537 The resolution of the Senate is returned herewith. I have the honor to be, sir, &c., GEO. BOMFORD, Colonel of Ordnance. Hon. LEWIS CASS, Secretary of War. FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 127 I i O O O O O CD O O O O O CO O O O O | ? O CM 00 CO CO CM rH ^ , I rH 4ft rH T 1 00 i CO O O O O iO CO tO o o o o o -^ i> CM 00 CO CO CM CM i-l rH ** ' ' 1 :::::: ,...,, ' S3 c O "^ c e ^ ~S --? ^ -fj" -*j" ^ ^ o ,S C * H *o o ^^ ^^ TJ4 c3 CO CO . -g -^ . . CM CM f >f^> CM r5 CO O O O O r- 1 t^ ^ rH rH CO Estimated at $40 per acre 8 6 ^1 : : : : : f : ^^ a 3 _)S 02 rt C S* 2 ^ Pfl ^ S SC3 fl ' Land 25 acres at 1 Graduating and leve J: l * * 1 2 f 1 j ^ i 3 128 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. s w I ! i a * <> '.2^ g'gii s PScEO^cB FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 129 H. Kep. Com. 86 9 130 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. OOOOOOOOOOOOOOiOiO !> t^ CO *O O O OO OOOO^OCv}iOCOO > ^O C ^ > ^'o' :+H ^ <: * H ' : * H +^<^-.>-M<-. ^ ^2 .^' ^co^^^^^^oiS SSo5 - t^ >^ " >^^ ^*i ^> I ^i . . * g _ __ -QXJ \JX p- _, w-y -^^ s_ / v/ s^^ ^/ \/ ^/ >/ Sw*- ^^ ^^ *.*; 4.j ^^ \^t __ O fl' CQt-ICOrHCOrHCO o2 BB o g . i OD ; ^ ; ; Tl i '- i ! . p i s ; ^ ^ fe 1 1 : -I : : 'I PH g ^ ^ fc g ; 1 s ^ g 5 s ,' - ^ g-rg ^ g^r s^g-l^ '| ^ 1 1 *| O Q FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 131 1 I A t I .a jS 3 I .2 1 l IS S3 I* S- I "3 II e s 1 -k3 ^3 s 1 5^ 1 o Bi & fl o S U ^ rt O 3 *s *s :S- *0 *a H a> a .2 >> 1 .3 w a 3 H a S s S-B = 1 ^-!l 1 ^-a|: I I I ! & s s -s I o a I I i I S .3 5 HS 1 U O ^ .Z a o^ -%% " lillJj ^^'Slfj 4 . -s a |~.3J3ll.fi~- 8 s g-*" g 2a2 I * a .^l^ils - SS^?5*liS I S J.21r^I|5 CO I ? leiiMis i fi i*j * - ;i i 1 G3 !^ ! -?5 g DO Q S S o 132 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. REPORT FROM THE NAVY DEPARTMENT. NAVY DEPARTMENT, March 31, 1836. SIR : In answer to so much of the resolutions of the Senate of the United States, of the 18th ultimo, as required information as to the probable amount of appropriations that may be necessary to supply the United States with ord- nance, arms, and munitions of war, which a proper regard to self-defence would require to be always on hand, and the probable amount that would be necessary to place the naval defences of the United States (including the increase of the navy, navy yards, dock yards, and steam or floating batteries) upon the footing of strength and respectability which is due to the security and welfare of the Union, I have the honor to lay before you a report of the board of navy com- missioners, of the 2d instant, which contains the best information upon the sub- jects referred to in possession of this department, which is respectfully sub- mitted. MAHLON DIOKERSON. The PRESIDENT of the United States. IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES. January 21, 1836. The following resolutions were ordered to be postponed to Monday next : Resolved, That so much of the revenue of the United States, and the divi- dends of stock receivable from the Bank of the United States, as may be neces- sary for the purpose, ought to be set apart and applied to the general defence and permanent security of the country. Resolved, That the President be requested to cause the Senate to be informed 1. The probable amount that would be necessary for fortifying the lake, marl time, and Gulf frontier of the United States, and such points of the land frontiei as may require permanent fortifications. 2. The probable amount that would be necessary to construct an adequate number of armories and arsenals in the United State?, and to supply the States with field artillery (especially brass field pieces) for their militia, and with side arms and pistols for their cavalry. 3. The probable amount that would be necessary to supply the United State; with the ordnance, arms, and munitions of war, which a proper regard to self defence would require to be always on hand. 4. The probable amount that would be necessary to place the naval defence: of the United States (including the increase of the navy, navy yards, docl yards, and steam or floating batteries) upon the footing of strength and respect ability which is due to the security and to the welfare of the Union. Passed February 18, 1836. NAVY COMMISSIONER'S OFFICE, March 2, 1836. SIR : The board of navy commissioners have the honor to acknowledge tin receipt of your letter of the 26th ultimo, requesting a " report on the probabL amount that would be necessary to supply the United States with the ordnance arms, and munitions of war (so far as may be wanted for the purposes of th navy) which a proper regard to self-defence would require to be always on hand and on the probable amount that would be necessary to place the naval defence FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 133 of the United States (including the increase of the navy, navy yards, dock yards, and steam or floating batteries) upon the footing of strength and respectability which is due to the security and welfare of the Union." In conformity to these instructions the board respectfully state, with respect to the ordnance for the navy, that after a careful examination of the subject, taking into considertion the ordnance and ordnance stores now on hand, and the extent of force for which it may be expedient to make early provision, they are qf opinion that the sum of one million eight hundred thousand two hundred and fifty dollars will be required to supply the ordnance, arms, and munitions of war which may be wanted for the use of the navy, and which a proper regard to self-defence would require to have prepared ready for use. (See paper A annexed for the detail.) The board beg leave respectfully to observe, that for the vessels which are now built, or have been specially authorized, armaments may be provided, with some partial exceptions, from the cannon and cannonades already provided, and the deficient ordnance, arms, and other ordnance stores will be principally required for the vessels which are yet to be authorized or built. It is therefore respect- fully recommended that any appropriation for this purpose, instead of being special or separate, should be included in an appropriation for " building and repairing vessels, and for the purchase of materials and stores for the navy." The second object of inquiry, as to " the probable amount that would be neces- sary to place the naval defences of the United States (including the increase of the navy, navy yards, dock yards, and steam or floating batteries) upon the footing of strength and respectability which is due to the security and welfare of the Union," embraces a wide range, requires an examination of several sub- jects of great importance, and the expression of opinions upon which differences of opinion may and probably will exist. Before any estimate can be formed of the probable amount that would be necessary for the purposes proposed an examination must be had, and an opionion formed of the nature and extent of the naval force which is " necessary to place the naval defences of the United States upon the footing of strength and respectability which is due to the security and welfare of the Union," and the time within which it ought to be, or might be, advantageously prepared. Taking into view the geographical position of the United States, with reference to other nations with whom we are most likely to be brought into future collision ; the great extent of our maritime frontier, and the extreme importance of securing the communications of the whole valley of the Mississippi, through the Gulf of Mexico, and the intercourse between all parts of the coast ; the efficient protection of our widely extended and extremely valuable commerce, under all circumstances ; and the great naval and fiscal resources of the country, the board consider the proper limit for the extent of the naval force to be that which can be properly manned when the country may be involved in a maritime war. In estimating this extent it is assumed that about ninety thousand seamen . are employed in the foreign and coasting trade and fisheries, As the navigation has been generally increasing, there is little reason to apprehend any immediate diminution during peace. In any war which would require the employment of all our naval force, it is believed that such interruptions would occur to our commerce as would enable the navy to obtain without difficulty at least thirty thousand seamen and ordinary seamen ; and if it should continue long, it is prob- able that a larger number might be engaged. The number of thirty thousand, with the landsmen who may be safely combined with them, will therefore be assumed as the number for which vessels ought to be prepared for the com- mencement of a state of hostilities. With respect to the nature of the force which it would be most advantageous to prepare, there will undoubtedly be differences of opinion. The materials for the larger vessels, as ships-of-the-line and frigates, would be obtained with great 134 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. difficulty, under circumstances which would interfere with our coasting trade, whilst sloop-of-war and smaller vessels could be built with greater comparative facility under such circumstances. The preparation of a considerable number of steam vessels, ready to defend our great estuaries, to aid in the operations of our other naval force, and in the concentration or movements of the military force, as circumstances might re- quire, is believed to demand serious and early attention. Having due regard to these and other considerations, the board propose that the force to be prepared, ready for use when circumstances may require it, shall consist of fifteen ships-of-the-line, 25 frigates, 25 sloops-of-war, 25 steamers, and 25 smaller vessels, and that the frames and other timber, the copper, ordnance, tanks, and chain cables shall also be prepared for 10 ships-of-the-line arid 10 frigates. The force proposed to be prepared, ready for use, will employ and can be manned by the 30,000 seamen and others which have been considered available in a state of war. The materials for the ten ships-of-the-line and ten frigates will constitute a necessary reserve for increasing the number of those vessels should they be required, or for supplying losses from decay or casualties. To estimate the amount necessary to prepare this force it is proposed to ascer- tain the whole probable cost, including ordnance, by the average cost of similai vessels already built, (steam vessels excepted,) and of materials already procured and then to deduct the value of the present force, and all other present availa- ble means. Total cost of 15 ships-of-the-line $8, 250, OOC 25 frigates 8, 750, OOC 55 sloops 3, 125, OOC 25 steamers 5, 625, OOC 25 smaller vessels . . 1, 250, OOC Total for vessels 27, 000, OOC For the proposed materials, as a reserve 3, 315, OOC Total amount required 30, 315, OOC Deduct from this sum the value of the present force and avail- able means, as follows : In vessels afloat, valued at $*$ of original value, about ' $4, 440, 000 In vessels building, at actual cost 2, 455, 000 In materials collected for building do 2, 945, 000 In treasury for these purposes, October 1, 1835 1, 215, 000 For three years' appropriation, " gradual improve- ment," when due 1, 500, 000 Total of present value and available means 12, 555, OOC Leaves still to be provided for vessels 17, 760, OOC In presenting any estimate for the amounts which may be necessary to place the different navy yards in a proper situation, the board can do no more thac give very general opinions, as the objects of expenditure are foreign to theii own professional pursuits, and they have no civil engineer to whom they cai] refer for the necessary detailed information. From a knowledge of the cost of works hitherto completed or in progress and of the wants at the respective yards for the proper peservation of materials; and for extending the means for building, preserving, repairing, and equipping FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 135 vessels, they are satisfied, however, that the public interests would be greatly promoted, and, in fact, absolutely require an average annual expenditure of $500,000 for years to come upon the different yards. In New York the necessity for a dry dock is severely felt already, and Hs importance will increase with any increase of the navy. This, with its de- pendencies, will require nearly a million of dollars. At Pensacola, which nature has designated as one of the naval keys of the Gulf of Mexico, and of the im- mense commerce of the valley of the Mississippi, large expenditures will be necessary to secure adequate means for repairing and subsisting a naval force upon that station, and thus prevent the many evils which would be severely felt in a state of war, if the vessels were obliged to resort to the Atlantic ports for ordinary repairs or supplies of any kind. In other yards there are objects of great and urgent importance. Generally the proposed arrangements for. the preservation of all materials and vessels should precede their collection or construction. Whilst, therefore, the board propose $500,000 as the average annual appropriation, until the yards should be placed in proper order, they would also state that appropriations of $700,000, annually, for the next four or five years, and a less sum than $500,000 afterwards, would, in their opinion, be most judicious. The next subject for consideration is the nature and extent of force proper to be kept employed in a time of peace for the protection of our commercial in- terests, and to prepare the officers and others for the efficient management of the force proposed for a state of war: Our commerce is spread over every ocean ; our tonnage is second only to that of Great Britain, and the value of articles embarked is believed by many to be fully equal to those transported by the ships of that nation. In the safety and prosperity of this commerce all the other interests of the United States are deeply interested. It is liable to be disturbed and injured in various modes, unless the power of the country, exerted through its naval force, is ready to protect it. It is therefore proposed that small squadrons should be employed upon different stations, subject at all times, however, to such modifications as circumstances may require. Of these squadrons, one might be employed in the Mediterranean, and attend to our interests on the west coasts of Spain and Portugal, and southward to the western coast of Morocco and Madeira. One in the Indian ocean to visit, successively, the most important commercial points east of the Cape of Good Hope, to China, then to cross the Pacific, visit the northern whaling stations and islands, cruise some time upon the west coast of America, and return by way of Cape Horn, the coast of Brazil, and the Windward West India islands. One in the Pacific, ocean to attend to our interests upon the west coast of America ; keeping one or more vessels at or near the Sandwich and other islands which are frequented by our whale ships and other vessels, and, in succession, cross the Pacific, visiting the islands and southern whaling stations, China, and other commercial places, and return, by the way of the Cape of Good Hope, to the United States. A squadron upon the coast of Brazil, or east coast of South America, might be charged with attention to our interests on the whole of that coast, and upon the north coast so far as to include the Orinoco. If a ship-of-the-line should be employed on this station, it might be occasionally sent round to the Pacific. A squadron in the West Indies and Gulf of Mexico will be necessary for, an-CE AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF NATIONAL FOUN- DERIES. WAR DEPARTMENT, May 12, 1840. SIR : In reply to so much of the resolution of the House of Representatives of the 9th ultimo, requesting the Department of War "to lay before this House, as soon as practicable, a report of a full and connected system of national de- fence, embracing steam and other vessels-of-war, and 'floating batteries' for coast and harbor defence, and national founderies, and the internal means, aux- iliary to these, for transportation and other warlike uses, by land, and that he be requested to furnish this House with the reports submitted to his department at any time by Major General Edmund P. Gaines, or other person or persons of professional experience, of their 'plans of defence,' if any such have been submitted, with the views of the Secretary of War thereon; and that the Secretary furnish an estimate of the expenses of his own and other plans he may report, distinguishing such parts of plans as ought to be immediately adopted and prosecuted, with the probable cost and time of their prosecution and completion :" I have the honor to transmit the accompanying reports of a board of officers, assembled to examine the subject, and to present a connected plan of defence for the maritime and inland frontiers of the United States. On submitting these reports, I should have considered my duty discharged, had not the resolution required me to give an opinion with regard to the several plans of national defence presented to the department, and to furnish a compar- ative statement of the cost of each. The plan presented to Congress by Major General Gaines, which will be found in the accompanying printed document, and that now submitted from the board of officers, are the only ones that have been brought to the notice of the department. On the subject of the former, I 140 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA- COAST DEFENCES. beg leave to state that, with every respect for the experience of the gallant author, I am constrained to differ from him when he proposes to abandon the system of permaneni defences as obsolete, and to rely entirely upon the expe- dients of vast floating batteries and extensive lines of railroads. The accom- panying reports of the board of navy commissioners and the chief topographical engineer exhibit the probable cost of carrying out the general's plans, which far exceeds that of constructing permanent works of defence, without being in any manner so well calculated to protect the country. After a careful and anxious investigation of a subject involving in so high a degree the safety and honor of the country, I fully concur in the opinions ex- pressed by the board of the superiority of permanent works of defence over all other expedients that have yet been devised, and of their absolute necessity if we would avoid the danger of defeat and disgrace a necessity rather increased than diminished by the introduction of steam batteries and the use of hollow shot. It would, in my opinion, prove a most fatal error to dispense with them, and to rely upon our navy alone, aided by the number, strength, and valor of the people to protect the country against the attacks of an enemy possessing great naval means. To defend a line of coast of three thousand miles in extent, and effectually to guard all the avenues to our great commercial cities and im-' portant naval depots, the navy of the United States must be very superior to the means of attack of the most powerful naval power in the world, which will occasion an annual expense this country is not now able to bear ; and this large naval armament, instead of performing its proper function as the sword of the state in time of war, and sweeping the enemy's commerce from the seas, must be chained to the coast or kept within the harbors. It has been clearly demonstrated that the expense of employing a sufficient body of troops, either regulars or militia, for a period of even six months, for the purpose of defending the coast against attacks and feints that might be made by an enemy's fleet, would exceed the cost of erecting all the permanent works deemed necessary for the defence of the coast. One hundred thousand men divided into four columns, would not be more than sufficient to guard the vul- nerable points of our maritime frontier, if not covered by fortifications. An amount of force against an expedition of 20,000 men, which, if composed of regulars would cost the nation $30,000,000 per annum, and if militia, about $40,000,000 ; and, supposing only one-half the force to be required to defend the coast with the aid of forts properly situated and judiciously constructed, the difference of expense for six months would enable the government to erect all the most necessary works. This calculation is independent of the loss to the nation by abstracting so large an umount of labor from the productive industry of the country, and the fearful waste of life likely to result from such a costly, hazardous, and harassing system of defence. It must be recollected, too, that we are not called upon to try a new system, but to persevere in the execution of one that has been adopted after mature de- liberation, and that is still practiced in Europe on a much more axten'sive scale than is deemed necessary here ; so much more so, that there exist there single fortresses, each of which comprises more extensive and stronger works than is here proposed for the whole line of our maritime frontier. We must bear in mind, also, that the destruction of some of the important points on that frontier would alone cost more to the nation than the expense of fortifying the whole line would amount to, while the temporary occupation of others would drive us into expenses far surpassing those of the projected works of defence. The organization of permanent defences proposed by the board for cur fron- tiers is not upon military and naval considerations alone, but is calculated to protect the internal navigation of the country. The fortifications proposed, at the same time that they protect our coast from the danger of invasion, and de- fend the principal commercial avenues and naval establishments, cover the FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 141 whole line of internal navigation, which, in time of war, will contribute in so essential a manner to the defence of the country by furnishing prompt and economical means of transportation ; so that, while the main arteries which con- duct our produce to the ocean are defended at their outlets, the interior naviga- tion, parallel to the coast, is protected, and a free communication kept up be- tween every part of the Union. Although this department is fully aware of the importance of affording per- manent and as perfect protection as may be possible to the whole coast, it regards that section embraced by the shores of the Gulf of Mexico as the most exposed and the most important. It is true that the coast to the eastward of Cape Hatteras possesses points that may attract the attention of an enemy, and that, in the present state of things, the chances of success would justify a hostile enterprise, and are much greater than a wise provision would allow to exist. It is equally so, that, however difficult of access the coast may be from Cape Hat- teras to Florida, the nature of a part of its population, and the facility afforded to an enemy by its present neglected condition to blockade and annoy the prin cipal outlets of the valuable exports of .that important portion of our country, require our early attention ; still, the means of defence from Maine to Florida may be united together, and the parts may afford mutual succor to each other. But the coast of the Gulf of Mexico, on the contrary, is insulated and apart, and must depend altogether upon its own resources. It constitutes the maritime frontier not only of Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, and of West Florida, but of Arkansas, Tennessee, Kentucky, Ohio, Missouri, Indiana, and Illinois, and the Territories of Wisconsin and Iowa, embracing nearly three-fourths of the territory of the United States ; and it must be borne in mind that the evils which would result from the temporary occupation of the delta of the Missis- sippi, or from a successful blockade of the coast of the Gulf of Mexico, would not only injure the prosperity of these States, but would deeply affect the in- terests of the whole Union ; and no reasonable expense, therefore, ought to be spared to guard against such a casualty. Although it would appear on a superficial view, to be a gigantic and almost impracticable project to fortify such an immense extent of coast as that of the United States, and difficult, if not impossible, to provide a sufficient force to garrison and defend the works necessary for that purpose, yet the statements contained in the reports of the board remove these objections entirely. The coast of the United States throughout its vast extent has but few points which require to be defended against a regular and powerful attack. A considerable portion of it is inaccessible to large vessels, and only exposed to the depreda- tions of parties in boats and small vessels-of-war ; against which inferior works and the combination of the same means and a well-organized local militia will afford sufficient protection. The only portions which require to be defended by permanent works of some strength are the avenues to the great commercial cities arid naval and military establishments, the destruction of which would prove a serious loss to the country, and be regarded by an enemy as an equiva- lent for the expense of a great armament. It is shown, also, that the number of men required, on the largest scale, for the defence of these forts, when com- pared with the movable force that would be necessary without them, is incon- siderable. The local militia, aided by a few regulars, and directed by engineer and artillery officers, may, with previous training, be safely intrusted with their defence in time of war. It cannot be too earnestly urged that a much smaller number of troops will be required to defend a fortified frontier than to cover one that is entirely un- protected, and that such a system will enable us, according to the spirit of our institutions, to employ the militia effectually for the defence of the country. It is no reproach to this description of force, and no imputation on their courage, to state what the experience of two wars has demonstrated that they cannot 142 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. stand the steady charge of regular forces, and are disorded by their mano3uvres in the open field ; whereas, their fire is more deadly from behind ramparts. The principles of defence recommended by the board for the maritime fron- ' tier of the United States are applicable to the northern or lake frontier and to that of the west. Some few sites are recommended to be occupied by fortifica- tions, both to afford protection to places fast growing up into important cities, and to furnish a refuge and rallying point for our naval and land forces. Very respectfully, your most obedient servant. J. R. POINSETT. Hon. R. M. T. HUNTER, Speaker of the House of Representatives. WASHINGTON, May 10, 1840. SIR : The board of officers to whom the subject of the military defences of the country was committed have the honor to submit the following report, viz : 1st. Report on the defence of the Atlantic frontier, from Passamaquoddy to the Sabine. This is divided into two distinct portions, viz : the coast from Pas- samaquoddy to Cape Florida, and the coast from Cape Florida to the Sabine bay. 2d. Report on the defence of the northern frontier, from Lake Superior to Passamaquoddy bay. 3d. Report on the western frontier, from the Sabine bay to Lake Superior. Connected with these reports are tabular statements, showing the " permanent defence commenced, completed, projected, or deemed necessary;" with conjectu- ral estimates of " the probable expense of constructing or completing such works as may not yet have been completed or commenced," 4th. Reports "on the armories, arsenals, magazines, and founderies, either constructed or deemed necessary; with a conjectural estimate of the expense of constructing such of said establishments as may not yet be completed or com- menced, but which may be deemed necessary." Hon. J. R. POINSETT, Secretary of War. Report on the defence of the Atlantic frontier, from Passamaquoddy to the Sabine. So entirely does this board concur in the views presented on several occasions, within the last twenty years, by joint commissions of naval and military officers, by the board of engineers for fortifications, and by individual officers who have at various times been called on to treat the same subject, that in quoting their opinions we should, for the greater part, express our own. But though these reports are, some of them, comprehensive and elabprate, we suppose that an explicit statement of our views, at least as to the great principles on which the system of defence should be erected, is expected from us, especially as the system now in progress has been the subject of a criticism which, considering the high official source whence it emanated, may be supposed to have disturbed the confidence of the public therein. The nature and source of that criticism, attacking as it does fundamental principles, and inculcating doctrines which we believe to be highly dangerous, will lead us at times into amplifications that we fear may prove tedious This, however, we must risk, trusting to the importance of the subject for excuse, if not for justification. FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 143 The principal errors, as we conceive, in the document* referred to are 1. That for the defence of the coast the chief reliance should be on the navy. 2. That, in preference to fortifications, floating batteries should be introduced wherever they can be used. 3. That we are not in danger from large expeditions ; and, consequently, 4. That the system of the board of engineers comprises works which are un-' necessarily large for the purposes they have to fulfil. On these topics, together with other errors of the same nature, we shall feel constrained to enlarge. The first question that presents itself is this : What, in general terms, shall be the means of defence ? We have a sea-coast line of more than three thousand miles in extent, along which lie scattered.all the great cities, all the depots of commerce, all the estab- lishments of naval construction, outfit, and repair, and towns, villages, and es- tablishments of private enterprise without number. From this line of sea-coast navigable bays, estuaries, and rivers, the shores of which are similarly occupied, penetrate deep into the heart of the country. How are the important points along this extended line to be secured from hostile expeditions, especially since one of the prominent causes of the prosperity of these various establishments, namely, facility of access from the ocean, is, as regards danger from an enemy, the chief cause of weakness 1 Shall the defence be by a navy exclusively ? The opinion that the navy is the true defence of the country is so acceptable and popular, and is sustained by such high authority, that it demands a careful examination. Before going into this examination we will premise that by the term "navy" is here meant, we suppose, line-of-battle-ships, frigates, smaller sailing vessels, and armed steamships, omitting vessels constructed for local uses merely, such as floating batteries. For the purpose of first considering this proposition in its simplest terms, we will begin by supposing the nation to possess but a single seaport, and that this is to be defended by a fleet alone. By remaining constantly within this port our fleet would be certain of meeting the enemy, should he assail it. But if inferior to the enemy, there would be no reason to look for a successful defence ; and as there could be no escape for the defeated vessels, the presence of the fleet, instead of averting the issue, would only render it the more calamitous. Should our fleet be equal to the enemy's, the defence might be complete, and it probably would be so. Still, hazard some of the many mishaps liable to attend contests of this nature might decide against us ; and, in that event, the consequences would be even more disastrous than on the preceding supposition. In this case the chances of victory to the two parties would be equal, but the consequences very unequal. It might be the enemy's fate to lose his whole fleet, but he could lose nothing more; while we, in a similar attempt, would lose not only the whole fleet, but also the object that the fleet was designed to protect. If superior to the enemy, the defence of the port would in all respects be complete. But, instead of making an attack, the enemy would, in such case, employ himself in cutting up our commerce on the ocean ; and nothing could be done to protect this commerce without leaving the port in a condition to be suc- cessfully assailed. In either of the above cases the fleet might await the enemy in front of the harbor, instead of lying within. But no advantage is apparent from such an *See Senate document No. 293, vol. 4, p. 1, 24th Congress, 1st session. 144 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. arrangement, and there would be superadded the risk of being injured by tem- pests, and thereby disqualified for the duty of defence, or of being driven off the coast by gales of wind; thus, for a time, removing all opposition. In the same cases, also, especially when equal or superior to the enemy, our fleet, depending on having correct and timely notice as to the position and state of preparation of the enemy's forces, might think proper to meet him at the outlet of his own port, or intercept him on the way, instead of awaiting him within or off our own harbor. Here it must be noticed that the enemy, like ourselves, is supposed to possess a single harbor only ; but having protected it by other means, that his navy is disposable for offensive operations. If it were attempted thus to shut him within his own port, he, in any case but that of de- cided inferiority, would not hesitate to come out and risk a battle ; because, if defeated, he could retire, under shelter of his defences, to refit, and, i successful, he could proceed with a small portion of his force even a single vessel would suffice to the capture of our port, now defenceless ; while, with the remainder, he would follow up his advantage over our defeated vessels, not failing to pursue them into their harbor, should they return thither. Actual superiority on our part would keep the enemy from volunteering a battle ; but it would be indispensable that the superiority be steadily maintained, and that the superior fleet be constantly present. If driven off by tempests, or absent from any other cause, the blockaded fleet would escape, when it would be necessary for our fleet to fly back to the defence of its own port. Experience abundantly proves, moreover, that it is in vain to attempt to shut a hostile squadron in port for any length of time. It seems, then, that whether we de- fend by remaining at home, or by shutting the enemy's fleet within his own harbor, actual superiorty in vessels is indispensable to the security of our port. With this superiority the defence will be complete, provided our fleet remain within its harbor. But then all the commerce of the country upon the ocean must be left to its fate ; and no attempt can be made to react offensively upon the foe, unless we can control the chances of finding the enemy's fleet within his port, and the still more uncertain chance of keeping him there ; the escape of a single vessel being sufficient to cause the loss of our harbor. Let as next see what will be the state of the question on the supposition of numerous important ports on either side, instead of a single one ; relying, on our part, still, exclusively on a navy. In order to examine this question, we will suppose our adversary to be forti- fied in all his harbors, and possessed of available naval means equal to our own. This is certainly a fair supposition ; because what is assumed as regards his harbors is true of all maritime nations, except the United States ; and as re- gards naval means, it is elevating our own strength considerably above its pre- sent measure, and above that it is likely to attain for years. Being thus relatively situated, the first difference that strikes us is that the enemy, believing all his ports to be safe, without the presence of his vessels, sets at once about making our seas and shores the theatre of operations, while we are left without choice in the matter; for if he think proper to come, and we are not present, he attains his object without resistance. The next difference is, that while the enemy (saving only the opposition of Providence) is certain to fall upon the single point, or the many points he may have selected, there will exist no previous indications of his particular choice, and, consequently, no reason for preparing our defence on one point rather than another ; so that the chances of not being present and ready on his arrival are directly in proportion to the number of our ports, that is to say, the greater the number of ports the greater the chances that he will meet no opposition whatever. Another difference is, that the enemy can choose the mode of warfare, as well as the plan of operations, leaving as little option to us in the one case as in the other. It will be necessary for us to act, in the first instance, on the supposition FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 145 that an assault will be made with his entire fleet ; because, should we act other- wise, his coming in that array would involve both fleet and coast in inevitable defeat and ruin. Being in this state of concentration, then, should the enemy have any apprehensions as to the result of a general engagement ; should he be unwilling to put any thing at hazard ; or should he, for any -other reason, prefer acting by detachments, he can, on approaching the coast, disperse his force into small squadrons and single ships, and make simultaneous attacks on numerous points. These enterprises would be speedily consummated; because, as the single point occupied by our fleet would be avoided, all the detachments would be unopposed ; and after a few hours devoted to burning shipping, or public establishments, and taking in spoil, the several expeditions would leave the coast for some convenient rendezvous, whence they might return, either in fleet or in detachments, to visit other portions with the scourge. Is it insisted that our fleet might, notwithstanding, be so arranged as to meet these enterprises 1 As it cannot be denied that the enemy may select his point of attack out of the whole extent of coast, where is the prescience that can indicate the spot ? And if it cannot be foretold, how is that ubiquity to be imparted that shall always place our fleet in the path of the advancing foe 1 Suppose we attempt to cover the coast by cruising in front of it, shall we sweep its whole length ? a distance scarcely less than that which the enemy must traverse in passing from his coast to ours. Must the Griilf of Mexico be swept, as well as the Atlantic ? or shall we give up the Gulf to the enemy 1 Shall we cover the southern cities, or give them up also ? We must, unquestionably, do one of two things : either relinquish a great extent of coast, confining our cruisers to a small portion only, or include so much that the chances of intercepting an enemy would seem to be out of the question. On the practicability of covering even a small extent of coast by cruising in front of it or, in other words, the possibility of anticipating an enemy's opera- tions ; discovering the object of movements of which we get no glimpse, and hear no tidings ; and seeing the impress of his footsteps on the surface of the ocean it may be well to consult experience. The Toulon fleet, in 1798, consisting of about twenty sail of line-of-battle ships and frigates, about twenty smaller vessels-of-war, and nearly two hundred transports, conveying the army of Egypt, slipped out of port and surprised Malta. It was followed by Nelson, who, thinking correctly that they were bound for Egypt, shaped his course direct for Alexandria. The French, steering toAvards Canclia, took the more circuitous passage, so that Nelson arrived at Alexandria before them ; and, not finding them there, re- turned, by the way of Garamania and Candia, to Sicily, missing his adversary in both passages. Sailing again for Alexandria, he found the French fleet at anchor in Aboukir bay ; and, attacking them, achieved the memorable victory of the Nile. When we consider the narrowness of this sea ; the very numerous vessels in the French fleet ; the actual crossing of the two fleets on a certain night ; and that Nelson, notwithstanding, could see nothing of the enemy himself, and hear nothing of them from merchant vessels, we may judge of* the probability of waylaying our adversary on the broad Atlantic. The escape of another Toulon fleet in 1805 ; the long search for them in the Mediterranean by the same able officer ; the pursuit in the West Indies ; their evasion of him amongst the islands ; the return to Europe ; his vain efforts, sub- sequently, along the coast of Portugal, in the Bay of Biscay, and off the English channel ; and the meeting at last at Trafalgar brought about only because the combined fleets, trusting to the superiority that the accession of several re-en- forcements had given, were willing to try the issue of battle : these are instances H. Rep. Com. 86 10 146 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. of many that might be cited, to show how small is the probability of encounter- ing, on the ocean, an enemy who desires to avoid a meeting ; and how little the most untiring zeal, the most restless activity, the most exalted professional skill and judgment, can do to lessen the adverse chances. For more than a year Nelson most closely watched his enemy, who seems to have got -out of port as soon as he was fully prepared to do so, and without attracting the notice of any of the blockading squadron. When out, Nelson, perfectly in the dark as to the course Villeneuve had taken, sought for him in vain on the coast of Egypt. Scattered by tempests, the French fleet again took refuge in Toulon ; whence it again put to sea, when refitted and ready, joining the Spanish fleet at Cadiz. On the courage, skill, vigilance, and judgment acceded on all hands to belong, in a pre-eminent degree, to the naval profession in this country, this system of defence relies to accomplish, against a string of chances, objects of importance so great that not a doubt or misgiving as to the result is admissible. It demands of the navy to do perfectly, and without fail, that which to do at all seems impossible. The navy is required to know the secret purposes of the enemy, in spite of distance and the broken intercourse of a state of Avar, even before these purposes are known to the leader who is to execute them ; nay, more, before the purpose itself is formed. On an element where man is but the sport of storms, the navy is required to lie in wait for the foe at the exact spot and moment, in spite of weather and seasons ; to see him in spite of fogs and darkness. Finally, after all the devices and reliances of the system are satisfactorily accomplished, and all difficulties subdued, it submits to the issue of a single battle, on equal terms, the fate of the war, having no resource or hope beyond. It may here be alleged that the term navy, as applied to the defence of the country, means more than the sea-going vessels we have enumerated ; that it means, also, gunboats, floating batteries, and steam batteries ; and that the true system of defence for the coast requires us to provide all our harbors with some or all of these vessels, according to local circumstances ; leaving to the sea-going vessels the duty of destroying the enemy's commerce, carrying the war into the enemy's seas, and contending for the mastery of the ocean. But such a proposition is totally distinct from that we have been considering. This is one that we regard as, in part, perfectly sound ; as containing, though not true throughout, the great principle on which the present glory of the navy proper has been built, and its future glory will depend. We are aware that some of our ships have been blockaded within our harbors, but we are not aware that any of the high distinction achieved by that service has been gained in these blockaded ships. On the other hand, we know that, instead of lying in harbor and contenting themselves with keeping a few more of the enemy's vessels in watch over them than their own number instead of leaving the enemy's commerce in undisturbed enjoyment of the sea, and our own commerce without countenance or aid they scattered themselves over the wide surface of the ocean, penetrated to the most remote seas, everywhere acting with the most brilliant success against the ene- my's navigation. And we believe, moreover, that in the amount of enemy's property thus destroyed, of American property protected or recovered, and in the number of hostile ships kept in pursuit of our scattered vessels ships, evaded if superior, and beaten if equal they rendered benefits a thousand fold greater, to say nothing of the glory they acquired for the nation and the char- acter they imparted to it, than any that would have resulted from a state of passiveiiess within the 'harbors. Confident that this is the true policy as regards the employment of the navy proper, we doubt not that it will, in the future, be acted on as it has been in the past, and that the results, as regards both honor and advantage, will be expanded commensurately with its own enlargement. In order, however, that the navy may always assume and maintain that active FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 147 and energetic deportment in offensive operations, which is at the same time so consistent with its functions and so consonant with its spirit, we have shown that it must not be occupied with mere coast defence. But if the navy is to be relieved from this home duty some other reliance must be substituted ; the navy itself requiring, for its own establishments, not less than the towns and harbors, that the defence be complete. And this brings us to consider whether the floating defences mentioned above, namely, gunboats, floating batteries, and steam batteries, constitute the best reliance. After considering these defensive means, we will examine the properties of forts and land batteries, these being the only other well-tried resort ; and that a comparison may be instituted, we will confine ourselves to cases where the latter are properly applicable. There are doubtlesss, situations where it may be necessary for us to present a defensive array, at the same time that to do so by fortifications alone would be impracticable ; and it is not, therefore, prejudging the question we are about to examine ; it is neither underrating fortifications, nor overrating these floating defences, to say that these last are, some or all of them, indispensable in such positions. Any very broad water, where deep soundings may be carried at a distance from the shores greater than effective gun range, and where no insular spot, natural or artificial, can be found or formed nearer the track of ships, will present such a situation ; and we may take some of our great bays as examples. Broad sounds and wide roadsteads, affording secure anchorage beyond good gun range from the shores, will afford examples of another sort ; and harbors with very wide entrances and large surface exhibit examples of still another kind. As, in all such cases, fortifications alone will be ineffectual, and, nevertheless, recourse to defences of some sort may be unavoidable, it has not failed to be a recommendation in the several reports on the defence of the coast, since 1818, that there should be a suitable and timely provision of appropriate floating defences. And until the invention of man shall have caused an entire revolution in the nature of maritime attack and defence, these or kindred means must be resorted to ; not, however, because they are means intrinsically good, or suitable under other circumstances, but because they are the only means applicable. In the circumstances just referred to there is no alternative, and therefore no point to be discussed. The remaining question is, whether these floating defences are to be relied on in cases that admit of defence by fortifications. And, first, as to gunboats. Although of undoubted use in peculiar circum- stances, it will hardly be contended that gunboats afford a safe reliance in harbors that can be entered by vessels of magnitude. Ships becalmed or aground might be sorely harassed, if not destroyed, by a spirited attack from this force, and there are other situations wherein it would be very effective. But harbors defended by gunboats will not be attacked in calms nor with ad- verse winds ; and it is not easy to believe that any probable array of these craft would impede or hinder for a moment the advance of a hostile fleet. Nelson, at Trafalgar, bore down in two divisions upon the combined fleet, each division being exposed to a raking fire ; and, although suffering considerably from that fire, he was able, notwithstanding, to break the hostile line and defeat his supe- rior adversary. What, comparatively with the raking fire of the combined fleet, would be the fire of a fleet of gunboats ? Opposing no effectual obstacle to approach or entrance, these small vessels, scattered and driven upon the shoals, would be kept, by the broadside of a few active vessels, at too great a distance to produce any serious effect upon the main attack by their desultory- fire. Although they might afford useful means of annoyance during a protracted occupation by the enemy of harbors that contained extensive shoal grounds and 148 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. shallow bays and inlets, they would be nearly useless in resisting the first assault, and in preventing the brief operation of levying contributions, or burning or spoiling national establishments. The true reason of this feeble defence must not, however, be misunderstood. It is not that the boats do not carry guns enough or men enough for the object, but it is because, from the comparative weakness of the vessels, the guns and the men cannot be kept in an effective position. There are, moreover, many harbors requiring defence in which there are no shoals whereon these boats could take refuge, and in such their capture or de- struction would be inevitable should there be, at the same time, no river up which they might fly, or lateral issue through which they could escape to a safe distance. Floating batteries, of which good use might be sometimes made in peculiar situations, would, we suppose, differ from gunboats in being larger, containing many guns, and in being stronger that is to say, having thicker sides or bul- warks ; and it has sometimes even been proposed to construct them with ball proof parapets, and with platforms open above, like, in these respects, batteries upon the shore. But, in whatever way formed, it is necessarily a part of the idea that they be strong and massive ; and, consequently, that they be unwieldy, incapable of sudden change of place, and incapacitated either to advance upon a defeated foe or to evade a victorious one. We are not, of course, now speak- ing of batteries moved by steam. Being denied the power of locomotion, at least for any purpose of mancEuvring in face of the enemy, we are to consider these batteries as moored in position and awaiting his advance. Should the batteries be large, requiring deep water to float them, or should they be placed across or near the channel for the sake of proximity to the track of ships, the enemy would engage them at close quarters. All advantages of mobility of concentrating his whole fleet upon one or two points, to which, under these circumstances, no relief can be sent of greater elevation and command, would be on the side of the assailant, with no countervailing advantage to the batteries, but greater thickness of bulwarks, Whether this excess of thickness should be considered a material advantage, since the introduction of large bomb-cannon into the armament of ships, is a doubtful matter. The batteries, if anchored across the channel, would have the further advantage of a raking fire : but we have seen that the raking fire of one squadron of ships upon another advancing is by no means decisive. The power of throwing the whole assailing force upon one or two points, of pouring upon the decks of the batteries a greatly superior force of boarders, would, of themselves, seem to leave little room to doubt as to the issue. If now we suppose these floating batteries to be smaller, so that, having a lighter draught, they might be placed near the shores or upon the shoals, they might certainly be thereby saved from the kind of attack which would prove so fatal if anchored more boldly in deep water ; but they would, at the same time, lose much of their efficiency from their remoteness, and positions wherein they would be secure from being laid alongside, while they would be in a proper at- titude to contribute materially to the defence of the harbor, are afforded but rarely. It is doubtful whether, as a general rule, these smaller floating batter- ies, notwithstanding their greater capability of endurance, would afford a better defence, gun for gun, than gunboats ; or, in other words, whether this capability of endurance in the one would be more than a compensation for the power of locomotion in the other. But whether near the shore or in the channel, whether large or small, this description of defence, owing to its fixedness, connected with the destructibility of the material of which it must be made, will be exposed to attacks analagous to those made by gunboats on ships aground. The enemy, knowing of what the. defensive arrangements consist, will come provided with the requisite mini-. FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 149 ber of sailing or steam vessels, armed with bomb-cannon, against which the thicker bulwarks of the floating batteries would avail nothing. He would, be- sides, hardly fail to provide himself with bomb-ketches armed with heavy sea- mortars ; and as there could be no guarding against the effects of the long ranges of these, a few such vessels would, with great certainty, constrain the floating batteries to quit their position, abandoning every disposition approaching to a concentrated array. Not to mention other modes of attack which would seem to leave the chances of success with the enemy, it will be noticed that this kind of defence, whether by gunboats or floating batteries, has the same intrinsic fault that an inactive defence by the navy proper has ; that is to say, the enemy has it in his power to bring to the attack a force of the same nature, and at least as efficacious as that relied on for defence ; hence the necessity not of mere equality, but of superiority, on the part of the defence at every point liable to be attacked ; and hence, also, the necessity of having an aggregate force as many times larger than that disposable by the enemy as we have important places to guard. Should we, for example, have ten such places, and the enemy threaten us with twenty ships-of-the-line, we must have in all these places an aggregate of gunboats and floating batteries more than equivalent to two hun- dred ships-of-the-line ; for it will be hardly contended that these defences can be transported from one place to another as they may be respectively in danger. But what will be the relative state of the parties if, instead of gunboats or floating batteries, we resort to steam batteries ? Although much has been said of late of the great advantage that defence is to derive from this description of force, we have not been able to discover the advantages ; nor do we see that sea-coast defence has been benefitted in any particular by the recent improve- ment in steam vessels, except that, in the case before adverted to, where, from the breadth of the waters, defence from the shore would be unavailing, a more active and formidable defence than by gunboats and floating batteries is pro- vided. It must be remembered that by far the greatest improvement in steam vessels consists in having adapted them to ocean navigation ; and one inevitable consequence of this improvement will be that, if the defence of harbors by steam batteries be regarded as securing them from the attacks of ships of the line and frigates, or, at least, of placing the defence quite above that kind of attack, they will no longer be attacked by sailing vessels, but by steam vessels, similar in all warlike properties to those relied on for defence. Not only is there no impediment to transferring these vessels across the ocean, but the rapidity and certainty of these transfers are such as to enjoin a state of the most perfect readiness everywhere and at all times, and also a complete in- dependence of arrangement at each particular point ; both the state of prepara- tion and the independence of arrangement being much more important than when the enemy's motions were governed by the uncertain favor of winds and weather. It is not easy to conceive of any important properties belonging to steam batteries acting defensively that the attacking steam vessels may not bring with them, or, at least, may not have imparted to them on their arrival upon the coast, unless it should be thought proper to give to the former a greater thick- ness of bulwark than would be admissible in sea-going vessels. But the peculiar advantage conferred by steam lies in the facility of moving with promptitude and rapidity ; and any attempts to strengthen the harbor ves- sels by thickening their bulwarks considerably would unavoidably lessen their mobility, thereby partially neutralizing the advantage sought. At the same time, it is extremely doubtful whether any benefit would be derived from the thicker sides. It is probable that the best kind of bulwark for these vessels and all others is that which will be just proof against grape and canister shot fired from moderate distances ; because, with such bulwarks, a shell fired from a bomb-cannon within a reasonable distance would pierce both sides ; that is to 150 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. say, would go in at one side of the ship and out at the opposite, producing no greater effect than a solid shot of the same calibre, while, with thickened sides, every shell would lodge in the timbers, and produce terrible ravages by bursting. In the practice with these missiles in this country it has been found difficult to lodge a shell in thin targets, ev^n when the load of the gun was so reduced as to increase materially the uncertainty of aim. As it is probable, therefore, that the protection from solid shot afforded by massive bulwarks would be more than counterbalanced by the greater injury horizontal shells would inflict by means of these bulwarks, we'may conclude that the harbor steam battery will not differ in this respect materially from the attacking steamships, and, if they do differ in having more solid and impervious bulwarks, that no advantage over the enemy will result therefrom. We come, therefore, to the same result as when considering the application of the other kinds of floating force to the de- fence of harbors ; and this result is, that there is no way of placing the coast in a condition of reasonable security but by having at any point the enemy may happen to select a force in perfect readiness which shall be superior to that brought to the attack. The reason of this coincidence of result is, that no peculiarity in form or de- tails can disguise the difficulties or essentially modify the conditions inseparable from the nature of a floating force. Buoyancy is a condition necessary to every variety of the force, and to ob- serve this condition a common material must be used in each a material that is combustible, weak, and penetrable to missiles. If the weakness and penetra- bility be in part remedied by an increase of the quantity of the material, it must be at the sacrifice of buoyancy, activity, and speed properties of great value. If a small draught of water be desired, it can only be obtained at the expense of that concentration of power which is a great and almost character- istic quality of naval armament. It might not be strictly true to say that as much would be lost in one respect as would be gained in another ; but, though modifications of this floating force, made with a view to adapt it to .peculiar services, will somewhat disturb the equilibrium of the several kinds, there will still be no great disparity when acting in their appropriate way, and a little superadded force to the weaker party will restore the balance. None of these modifications, it should be ob- served, touch, on the one hand, the means whereby injury is inflicted, nor, on the other, the susceptibility to injury. All are still timber structures, carrying a common armament. The necessity of having at each point a force at least equal to the attacking force will require large preparations on any supposition. With the navy proper, however, with gunboats and floating batteries, something has already been done ; the existing navy will be an important contribution. Small vessels sup- plied by commerce would afford tolerable substitutes for gunboats, and from the class of merchant ships many vessels might be drawn for service as floating batteries; still there will remain great efforts to be made and great amounts to be expended to complete the defensive array. But a reliance on steam batteries would lead to expenditure vastly greater, because with them all has yet to be provided. Having at present no force of this kind on hand, (or next to none,) the preparation by the enemy of (say) twenty steam frigates would require the construction of two hundred of equal force on our part, supposing that we de- sign to cover but ten of our principal harbors, leaving all others at his mercy. Having shown that steam batteries cannot be substituted for shore defences, we will here add that they will, on the other hand, in certain cases necessarily increase the number of these defences, and in other cases augment their force. Channels which admitted only small vessels-of-war would, in peculiar positions, need no defence; in other positions their defence might be safely trusted to works of moderate force. The introduction of these vessels of small draught FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 151 and great power requires, however, that these passages should be defended and defended adequately. We should not have gone so much at length into a branch of our subject wherein the general conclusions appear to be so obvious and incontrovertible, but for the prevalence of opinions which we consider not erroneous merely, but highly dangerous, and which, we think, must give way before a full exhibition of the truth. We do not anticipate any formidable objections to the positions assumed nor to the illustrations ; but even should all these, in the form we have presented them, be objected to, we may still challenge opposition to the follow- ing broad propositions, namely : 1st. If the sea-coast is to be defended by naval means exclusively, the defen- sive force at each point deemed worthy of protection must be at least equal in power to the attacking force. 2d. As, from the nature of the case, there can be no reason for expecting an attack on one 'of these points rather than on another, and no time for transferring our state of preparation from one to another after an attack has been declared, each of them must have assigned to it the requisite means ; and, 3d. Consequently this system demands a power in the defence as many times greater than that in the attack as there are points to be covered. Believing that a well-digested system of fortifications will save the country from the danger attending every form of defence by naval means, and the in- tolerable expense of a full provision of those means, we will now endeavor to show that such a system is worthy of all reliance. There has been but one practice among nations as to the defence of ports and harbors ; and that has been a resort to fortifications. All the experience that history exhibits is on one side only ; it is the opposition of forts, or other works comprehended by the term fortification, to attack by vessels ; and although history affords some instances wherein this defence has not availed, we see that the resort is still the same. No nation omits covering the exposed points upon her seaboard with fortifications, nor hesitates in confiding in them. In opposition to this mode of defence much stress is laid on certain successful attacks that have been made by ships on works deemed strong. We have no doubt that all such results might be accounted for by circumstances independent of the naked question of relative strength ; but at any rate, when carefully con- sidered, how little do these results prove, in comparison with numerous other instances, in which there was an immense disparity of force in favor of vessels that have been signally defeated. These latter instances are those that should be received as a test of the actual relation between the two kinds of force ; not certainly because they were successful, but because the smaller the work, its armament, its garrison, the less the probability that any extraneous influence has been in operation. A single gun behind a parapet, provided its position be a fair one, and the parapet be proof, need, as regards its contest with ships, owe nothing else to the art of fortification ; and its effect will be the same whether the battery were fresh from the hands of the ablest engineer of the age, or were erected at the dawn of the art. The gun is in a position to be used with effect ; the men are as fully protected by the parapet as the service of the gun will allow ; they are brave and skilful, and there is nothing to prevent their doing their duty to the utmost. These are all conditions easily fulfilled, and therefore likely to be so. The state of things is not less just and fair toward the vessel ; she chooses her time and opportunity ; the battery goes not to the ship, but the ship to the battery ; taking the wind, the tide, the sea all, as she would have them ; her condition and discipline are perfect, and her crew courageous and adroit. Nothing, under such circumstances, can prevent the just issue of battle but some extraordinary accident possible, indeed, to either party, but easily recognized when occurring. The contest between larger works and heavy squadrons may be much more 152 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES complicated affairs, the cause of disaster to tlie former being often traceable to potent, though not always obvious, influences. The fortifications may have been absurdly planned originally or badly executed, for there has at all times been in this profession, as in others, much scope given to quackery ; they may have been erected at a time when the ships-of-war, against which they were provided, were very different things from the lofty line-of-battle-ships of modern times ; a long peace or long impunity may have left them hi a state wholly un- prepared for the sudden use of their strength ; the command may have been intrusted to persons ignorant alike of the amount of power in their hands and of the mode of exercising it ; the garrison may have been undisciplined or mu- tinous the populace discontented or disloyal ; the clamor of frightened citizens may have caused a premature surrender : all these, or any of them, may have produced the issue, leaving the question of relative power untouched. While there can be no doubt that these and other deteriorating influences may have occasionally operated to the prejudice of fortifications, and that these were likely to be more numerous and more controlling as the works were more extensive, it is certain that there can be no influence acting in a reverse direction upon them ; that is to say, none making them stronger and more efficient than they ought to be. There can be no favorable influence of such a nature, for example, as to make the simple one-gun battery before mentioned equivalent to a battery (say) ten times as large. It must not be supposed, from what we have said in relation to larger fortifi- cations, that their magnitude necessarily involves imperfection or weakness ; nor, because we have considered small and simple works as affording the best solution to the question of relative force, must it be inferred that small works are suited to all circumstances. We speak here in reference merely to the judgment we are entitled to form of the relative power of these antagonist forces from their contests as exhibited in history. In instances of the latter sort there cannot, from the nature of the case, be any important influence operating of which we are ignorant, or for which we cannot make due allow- ances ; while, in examples of the former kind, we may be in the dark as to many vital matters. These observations have been deemed necessary because, in judging of this matter, it might not be so obvious that certain brilliant and striking results should not be adopted as affording the true test of relative power. It would be more natural to turn to Copenhagen and Algiers, as indicating where the power lies, than to Charleston and Stoningtou ; and yet these latter, as indices, would be true, and the former false. We will now turn to certain examples : "The name of Martello tower was adopted in consequence of the good de- fence made by a small round tower in the Bay of Martello, in Corsica, in the year 1794, which, although armed with one heavy gun only, beat off one or two British ships-of-war without sustaining any material injury from their fire. But this circumstance ought merely to have proved the superiority which guns on shore must always, in certain situations, possess over those of shipping, no matter whether the former are mounted on a tower or not. That this is a just decision will, perhaps, be readily allowed by all who are acquainted with the following equally remarkable, but less generally known fact, which occurred about twelve years afterwards in the same part of the world."* " Sir Sidney Smith, in the Poinpe'e, an eighty-gun ship, the Hydra, of thirty- eight guns, Captain Manby, and another frigate, anchored about eight hundred yards from a battery of two guns, situated on the extremity of Cape Licosa, and protected from assault by a tower in which were five and twenty French soldiers, commanded by a lieutenan . * Parley's Course, vol. iii. FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 153 " The line-of-battle-sliip and the frigates fired successive broadsides till their ammunition was nearly expended ; the battery continually replying with a slow but destructive effect. The Pompee, at which ship alone it directed its fire had forty shot in her hull ; her mizen topmast carried away ; a lieutenant, midship- man, and five men killed, and thirty men wounded. At length, force proving ineffectual, negotiation was resorted to, and after some hours' parley, the officer* a Corsican, and relative of Napoleon, capitulated. It then appeared that the carriage of one of the two guns had failed on the second shot, and the gun had subsequently been fired lying on the sill of the embrazure ; so that in fact the attack of an eighty-gun ship and two frigates had been resisted by a single piece of ordnance." (Journal of Sieges, by Colonel John T. Jones.) The Corsican tower above mentioned, which had, in like manner, completely baffled a naval cannonade, was very soon found to surrender when attacked by land ; not, however, before a small battery had been made [erected] to reduce it." (Paslei/s Course, vol. iii.) Here are two examples : 1st. A single heavy gun, mounted on a tower, beat off one or two British ships. 2d. A barbette battery, containing two guns, beat off a British eighty-gun ship supported by two frigates. It would seem that no exception can possibly be taken to either instance, as trials of relative power. There is no complication of circumstances on one side or the other ; nothing to confuse or mislead ; all is perfectly simple and plain. A small body of artillery, judiciously posted on the shore, is attacked by armed vessels bearing forty or fifty times as many guns; and the ships, unable to pro- duce any effect in consequence, are beaten off with loss. The cases present no peculiar advantage on the side of the batteries either as regards position or quality ; for both works were immediately reduced by a land attack ; that which the eighty-gun ship and two frigates were unable to effect, being immediately accomplished by landing two field-pieces, with a very small portion of the crew of one of the vessels. On the other hand, there was no peculiar disadvantage on the part of the ships, as the time and mode of attack were of their own choice. In order that there might be no unjust disparagement of the vessels, in the manner of representing the affairs, the language of British military writers (the ships being British) had been exactly quoted. (See Pasley's Course of Elemen- tary Fortifications, vol. ii, and Journal of Sieges, by Colonel John T. Jones.) Had the representation of these actions been taken from the victorious party, the result would have appeared still more to the disadvantage of the ships. The circumstances attending the attack and defence of Copenhagen, in April, 1801, seem to have been the following : On the northeast side of the city (the only side exposed to attack from heavy ships) there lies a shoal spreading outward from the walls, about three-quarters of a mile in the narrowest part. Through this shoal there runs, in a northeast and by north direction, a narrow channel connecting the basin, in the heart of the city, with deep water. Were it not for this shoal, vessels might approach even to the walls of the city, on a length of about one and a half mile ; as it is, they can get no nearer, in any place, than about three-quarters of a mile, with- out following the channel just mentioned. As the edge of the shoal lies nearly north and south, and the channel passes through it in a northeast-by-north direction, the great mass of the shoal is to the southward, or on the right hand side of the channel. We will call this the southern shoal. The " Three-crown battery " is situated upon this southern shoal and near the channel. The Danish defences consisted 1st. Of the fortifications on this side of the city, including the Three-crown battery; Nelson estimated the batteries supporting the Danish vessels at about ninety guns. 154 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 2d. Of four sail of the line, mounting 282 guns, and one frigate and two sloops, mounting 76 guns; making 358 guns. All these vessels lying in the channel before -mentioned, and some of them near its mouth ; they constituted the left of the Danish floating defences, and were thus posted to defend the entrance to the inner harbor or basin. 3d. Of a line of floating defences, of various kinds, moored near the edge of the southern shoal. They were eighteen in number, as follows, counting from the right or southern extremity: 1st, a block-ship of 56 guns; 2d, a block-ship of 48 guns; 3d, a praam of 20 gun; 4th, a praam of 20 guns; 5th, a block-ship of 48 guns; 6th, a raft of 20 guns; 7th, a block-ship of 22 guns; 8th, a raft of 20 guns ; 9th, a block-ship of 62 guns ; 10th, a small vessel of 6 guns; llth, a raft of 24 guns; 12, a praam of 20 guns; 13th, a ship-of-the-line of 74 guns; 14th, a block-ship of 26 guns; 15th, a raft of 18 guns; 16th, a ship of the line of 60 guns; 17th, a block-ship of 64 guns; 18th, a "frigate" of 20 guns; total in this line 628 guns. These vessels were moored in a line extending south from a point outside and a little to the southward of the Three-crown battery ; and the part of the line nearest the walls was not less than three-quarters of a mile distant. Lord Nelson carried to the attack the Elephant, 74 guns; Defiance, 74; Monarch, 74; Bellona, 74; Edgar, 74; Eussell, 74; Ganges, 74; Glutton, 54; Isis, 50; Agamemnon, 64; Polyphemus, 74; Ardent, 64; Amazon, 38; De- siree, 38; Blanche, 36; Alcmene, 32; Dart, 30; Arrow, 18; Cruiser, 18; Harpy, 18; Zephyr, 14; Otter, 14; Discovery, 16; Sulphur, 10; Hecla, 10; Explosion, 8; Zebra, 16; Terror, 10; Volcano, 8; making a total of 1,074 guns, besides a few in gunboats. The Agamemnon did not get into action; which reduces the force employed to 1,010 guns. The Bellona and Russell grounded ; but Lord Nelson says, " although not in the situation assigned them, yet they were so placed as to be of good service." With this force Lord Nelson engaged the line of floating defences that was moored near the edge of the southern shoal. He approached from the south with a fair wind ; and as his leading vessel got abreast of the most southern of the Danish line she anchored by the stern. The second English vessel passed on until she had reached the next position, when she anchored, also, in the same way; and thus, inverting his line as he extended it, he brought his whole force against the outer and southern part of the Danish force. His line did not reach as far northward as the Three-crown battery, and mouth of the channel ; for, he says, in speaking of the grounding of the Bellona, Russell, and Agamemnon : " These accidents prevented the extension of our line by the three ships before mentioned, who would, I am confident, have silenced the Crown islands, (Three- crown battery,) the outer ships in the harbor's mouth, and prevented the heavy loss in the Defiance and Monarch." Concentrating, as he did, the force of 1,010 guns upon a portion of the Danish array, not only inferior to him by 382 guns, but so situated as to be beyond the scope of succor, and without a chance of escape, Lord Nelson had no reason to doubt that signal success would crown his able arrangement. Every vessel in this outer Danish line was taken or destroyed, except one or two smaller vessels, which cut and ran in under shelter of the fortifications. The vessels lying in the narrow channel could participate in no material degree in the action, l^cause the British line did not reach abreast of them ; and because, not being advanced beyond the general direction of the Danish line, but, on the contrary, retired behind it, they could not act upon any of the British vessels, except, perhaps, obliquely upon two or three of the most northern ships. But had all the Danish vessels that were lying in the narrow channel been mingled, from the first, with the line that was destroyed, the result would probably have been still more to the advantage of the assailants ; that is to say, these vessels, also, would have been captured or destroyed; because, not only - FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 155 would the aggregate Danish force of 986 gnns have been inferior to the 1,010 guns of the British, but it would also have been without the ability to counter- act the power of concentration possessed by the latter, whereby the whole force would have acted on parts of the Danish line in succession. For the same reason that the squadron which lay in the narrow channel could not materially aid in resisting the attack made on the line of floating defences anchored along the edge of the shoal, the action of the Three-crown battery, and the guns on the shore must have been greatly restricted. Situated upon the shoal, the Three-crown battery was behind the Danish line, which consequently masked it, and also the shore batteries, from a view of the English line. Under such circumstances it is not conceivable that the batteries could be used with effect ; and the commander of the Danish forces says expressly that the Three- crown battery "did not come at all into action;" and a chronicler of the times states that the fortifications of the town "were of no service while the action lasted ; they began to fire when the enemy took possession of the abandoned ships, but it was" at the same time that the parley appeared" In proportion as the Danish vessels passed into the hands of the English, as some were burnt, and others blown up, the scope of the batteries would enlarge, and their power be felt ; but just as all impediment of this sort had been removed, Lord Nelson himself proposed the cessation of hostilities, and the action ceased. It might be profitable to discuss the probable consequences of a continuance of the action ; to inquire why it was that Lord Nelson, after he had conquered two-thirds of the 986 floating guns opposed to him, did not pursue his advantage, and concen- trate his 1,010 guns upon the 358 guns, which were all that remained of the floating defences of the Danes, especially as the wind was in favor of such a manoeuvre. But having already devoted too much space to this peculiar con- test, we will suppose some dictate of policy, perhaps of humanity, induced him to close the contest, relying on the severe blow he had already inflicted, and the commanding tone it enabled him to assume for such a termination of the pending negotiation as the interest or policy of Great Britain demanded. It is important, however, yet to notice that, as soon as the negotiation opened, Lord Nelson's vessels passed out of the reach of the Three-crown battery as fast as they could be withdrawn. Lord Nelson himself states that this battery was not silenced. A British writer, speaking of this crisis, says : "It must not, however, be con- cealed that Lord Nelson, at the time he dictated this note to the Dane, was placed in rather awkward and difficult circumstances ; the principal batteries, as well as the ships which were stationed at the mouth of the harbor, were still unconquered; two of his own vessels were aground, and exposed to a heavy fire; others, if the battle continued, might be exposed to a similar fate; while he found it would be scarcely practicable to bring off the prizes under the fire of the batteries. These considerations, undoubtedly, influenced him in resolving to endeavor to put a stop to hostilities, in addition to the instructions he had to spare the Danes, and the respect he might have felt for their brave defence." (Campbell's Naval History, vol. vii, p. 203.) The circumstances above detailed show clearly : 1st. That the battle of Copenhagen was fought between an English fleet, mounting 1,010 guns, and a Danish line of floating defences, mounting 628 guns; and that all the latter were conquered. e 2d. That the Danish line wab attacked in such a manner that none of the fixed batteries in the system of defence could participate in the contest, which was carried on up to the surrender of the Danish line, almost exclusively between vessels. It appears that a few of the smaller vessels, under Captain Riou, occupying the northern extremity of the English line, were under the fire of the Three-crown battery. The loss being very severe, he was obliged to retreat. 156 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 3d. That as soon as the batteries were unmasked and began to act the battle was closed, by Nelson opening a parley. 4th. That, consequently, it was in no sense a contest between ships and batteries, or a triumph of ships over batteries, and affords no ground for judging of their relative power. 5th. That it illustrates, strikingly, the advantage that a fleet possesses over a stationary line of floating defences. Lord Nelson was superior to the whole of his adversary's floating force ; but not being disposed to run any unnecessary hazard he directed all his force upon a part of the Danish line, which was, of course, defeated ; and had there been no other than a floating force present, so of course would have been the remainder; had it been of twice the strength it was. This example fully confirms what we have before urged on this topic. In estimating the respective forces above, we have set down the vessels of both parties at their rate : that is to say, a ship called seventy-four we have reckoned at 74 guns. We now proceed to examine a great instance of naval success, in which there is no room to cjoubt the extent to which fortifications were engaged; this instance is the attack on Algiers in 1816. The attack was made by the combined English and Dutch fleets, mounting about one thousand guns, under the command of Lord Exmouth. In the fortifications that looked towards the water, there are enumerated in a plan, supposed to be authentic, 320 guns; but not more than 200 of these could act upon the fleet as it lay. The ratio of the forces engaged, therefore, as ex- pressed by the numder of guns, (saying nothing of the calibres, of which we know nothing,) was about as 5 to 2. The action continued from a quarter before three until nine, without intermission, and did not cease altogether until half- past eleven. It is very certain that the effects of the fire upon the Algerine shipping and town were very severe, because we know that all the shipping was destroyed excepting some small vessels ; and we know also that Lord Exmouth dictated the terms of the treaty that followed. Honorable as this result was to the combined fleets, and happy as it was foi the cause of humanity, there are, nevertheless, technical circumstances connected with it that excite doubts as to how much of the final result was due to physi- cal chastisement, to moral effect, to inherent defects in the defences, and to ignorance in the use of these defences, such as they were. That the loss ir killed and wounded in the city and works was great is probable, because w( are informed that a very great addition had been made to the garrison, in pre paration for the attack, under some impression, no doubt, that a landing woulc be attempted. For the service of the guns there were needed but 3,000 or 4,00( men, at the utmost. An accumulation beyond that number would add nothing to the vigor of defence, while, by causing an increase of the casualties, it woulc heighten the terrors of the combat. The depressing effect of this loss of life ir the batteries, and of the burning of buildings within the town and about th( mole, was of course increased by the entire destruction of the Algerine fleet, an chored within the mole. We have no means of judging of the actual condition of the works ; nor o: their fitness for the task of contending with the heavy ships of modern times. The forts and batteries on the shore were probably too elevated to be com manded even by the largest of the assailing ships ; and, provided these gun; were covered with a proof parapet, they may be regarded as being well situated But more than half of the guus engaged were in the Mole-head battery ; anc the mode ojP attack adopted, especially by the Queen Charlotte, of 110 guns, wai calculated to test, in the severest manner, the principles on which this work hac been planned. She so placed herself within "fifty yards" of the extremity o this battery, that she could either rake or take in reverse every part of it. I FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 157 slie, at the same time, commanded the battery that is to say, if, from her spar deck, she could look down upon its platform then she must at once, with her grape and canister, have driven the garrison from that platform, leaving only the lower and covered tier of guns, if there were such a tier, for service. With our imperfect knowledge of the fortifications, all this must however, be left to conjecture. But there are matters connected with the service of the batteries which are not conjecture. Not a shot was fired until the Queen Charlotte had anchored. What a different vessel, when she anchored, might not this ship have been, if the Mole-head battery had employed its fire of more than 100 guns in raking her, from the time she arrived within a mile and a half until she had anchored within fifty yards 1 How different might have been the condition of the fleet, generally, if they had been subjected, during the approach, and while assuming their stations, to the raking fire of all the 200 guns ? It does not appear that a single hot shot was fired from the batteries. We might also rest on this fact, and assert that a defence which had failed to provide itself with this auxiliary means, .must have been carried on in disre- gard, if not in violation, of all rules, all knowledge, and all experience ; that it was probably without plan or combination, and, not less probable, without preparation in other particulars of importance scarcely inferior. Before leaving this example it may be well to inquire what, after all, was the effect of these batteries upon the ships, compared with the effect of ships upon ships. In the battle of the Nile, the French fleet, rated at 1,190 guns, caused a loss in Nelson's fleet of 895 killed and wounded ; which is in the proportion of ten French guns to less than eight Englishmen killed and wounded. In the battle of Trafalgar the French fleet carried not less than 3,000 guns, and they caused a loss to the English of 1,587 killed and wounded ; which is in the proportion of ten guns to less than six killed and wounded. In this affair of Algiers, with a force not ex Ceding 200 guns, the batteries caused a loss of 883 killed and wounded, beinf^n the proportion of 10 guns to 44 men; and, if we take into account every * or that was pointed upon the bay, (say 350 guns,) the propor- tion will be ir. a ^ oa ^ to 25 men ; being an effect more than three times as great as that produ v ^ a sni jhe French ,ships at the battle of the Nile, and more than four times a? v T^lv. t j ia {. p ro ^ uce d by the ships of the same nation at Tra- falgar. .ced^ ' ^o While ref ' circumstances of this battle the mind is not satisfied with any rea^ c ^^.^"p resent themselves for the withdrawal of Lord Exmouth, the moment the land wind enabled him to do so. On the supposition of entire success on his part, it is not understood why he should feel the great anxiety he states himself to have been under that this wind should spring up. "Provi- dence at this interval," (between 10 and 11 at night,) "gave to my anxious wishes the usual land wind, common in this bay ; and my expectations were completed. We were all hands employed in warping and towing off, and, by the help of the light air, the whole were under sail, and came to anchor out of the reach of shells about two in the morning, after twelve hours incessant labor." Now, if anything had been decided by the action, it must have been one of two things : either the ships were victorious, or the batteries were so. If the ships were completely victorious, it would seem to have been judicious for them to remain where they were, in order, if there was to be any more fighting, to be ready to press their advantage; and, especially, in order to maintain the ascendency, by preventing the remounting of guns, repairing of batteries, and resupplying them munitions, &c. Had the people possessed the inflexibility report ascribed to the Dey, and had they set zealously about the work of preparation for a new contest, it might not have been easy for Lord Exmouth, in the condition to which his ships are ac- 158 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. knowledged, by authentic accounts, to have been reduced, to enforce his demands. It is not understood, therefore, why, if he had been so successful as to be certain that his end was attained, he should be so anxious to get out of gunshot, when, by so doing, he involved the issue in more or less doubt and hazard. He relied on the effects produced on the people by his dreadful cannonade, and the result proves that he was right ; but his anxiety to clear the vessels from the contest shows that there was a power still unconquered, which he thought it better to leave to be restrained by the suffering population of the city, than keep in a state of exasperation and activity by his presence. What was this power but an unsubdued energy in the batteries ] The true solution of the question is, then, not so much the amount of injury done on the one side or the other particularly as there was, on the one side, a city to suffer, as well as the batteries as the relative efficiency of the parties when the battle closed at about eleven o'clock. All political agitation and pop- ular clamor aside, what would have been the result had the fight been continued, or even had Lord Exmouth renewed it next morning ? These are questions that can be answered only on conjecture ; but the manner the battle ended certainly leaves room for many doubts whether, had the subse- quent demands of Lord Exmouth been rejected, he had it in his power to enforce them by his ships : whether, indeed, if he had renewed the fight, he would not have been signally defeated. On the whole, we do not think that this battle, although it stands pre-eminent as an example of naval success over batteries, presents any arguments to shake the confidence which fortifications, well situated, well planned, and well fought, deserve, as the defences of a seaboard. GIBRALTAR. The attack on the water batteries of Gibraltar in September, 1782, by the French and Spanish floating batteries, is a well known instanc^of the power of guns on shore. These floating batteries had been rendered, as was suppchapj ^ot-proof and shell-proof, by several additional thicknesses of timber tumst " e .des, and by covering the decks with a roof of sloping timbers. csultj They mounted 142 guns on the engaged side, with "in * *& ve to replace any that might be dismounted. They were anchored 'o { n lince cf about 1,000 yards from the walls, and were opposed by aV " at the Sfsf- After a protracted cannonade, nine of the floating'?&L85 guns. C *kurnt by hot shot from the shore, and the tenth, having been taken pos&vL .on of by the victors, was set on fire by them. No material injury was done to the works of the town by their fire; and only eighty-five men and officers were killed and wounded by the fire from these vessels, together with a very violent cannonade and bombardment, from the siege batteries. BATTLE OF ALGESIRAS. On the 6th July, 1801, the French Admiral Lenois was lying at anchor off the town of Algesiras with two ships of 80 guns, one of 74 guns, and one frigate. To the south of him, on a small island, was a battery called the Green Island battery, mounting seven 18 and 24-pounders; and to the north of him, on the main, another battery called St Jaques's battery, mounting five 18-pounders. There were, besides, fourteen Spanish gunboats anchored near, making a total of 306 guns afloat and 12 guns in battery altogether, 318 guns. Sir James Saumarez, hearing that Lenois was in this position, advanced against him from Cadiz with two ships of 80 guns, four of 74 guns, one frigate, FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 159 and a lugger in all, 502 guns. On his approach, Lenois, who was anchored in a line nearly north and south, at some distance from the shore, cut his cables and ran into shoal water, to prevent being doubled upon by the British line ; this manoeuvre, at the same time, entirely unmasked the fire of the batteries. The Hannibal, one of the British 74's, in attempting to close with the French admiral, touched the ground and could not be floated off. She, however, con- tinued the fight with great obstinacy, even for a considerable time after she was deserted by her consorts. Not being able to double upon the French line, an attempt was made to assault the Green Isle battery, which, being badly served by the Spaniards, had nearly ceased firing. But this attempt was anticipated by the arrival at the island of a party sent from the French frigate lying near, and the assault was defeated, with the loss to the English of one boat sunk and another taken, the Frenchmen renewing with vigor the fire of the battery. At the north end of the line the French admiral was aided by seven gunboats, which took so active a part in the fight that five of them were sunk or rendered unserviceable. The St. Jaques battery being, however, served sluggishly by the Spaniards, the French sent a party from the Dessaix to impart greater activity and effect. After the combat had continued about six hours, the British squadron drew off greatly damaged, leaving the Hannibal 74 alone and aground; and she, after suffering great loss, was obliged to strike. The French insist that the Pompee, an English ship of 80 guns, had struck her colors, but, as they could not take possession, she drifted off and was then towed away ; it is believed she was entirely dismasted. We do not know the loss in the French squadron, but the killed, wounded, and missing in the English fleet amounted to 375 men, being more than twelve men for every ten guns against them, and being twice as great, in proportion, as the English loss in the battle of Trafalgar. In this battle of Algesiras there were 502 English guns afloat, acting against 306 French guns afloat. As the English chose their own time for the attack, and had the wind, it is only reasonable to suppose that 306 of the English guns were a match for the 306 guns in the French vessels. This will leave 196 English guns afloat opposed to the 12 guns in the batteries, or, reckoning one side only of each ship, it shows 98 guns in the British fleet to have been over- matched by the twelve guns in the batteries. There never was a more signal and complete discomfiture ; and it will admit of no other explanation than that just given, namely, that the two small batteries, one of 5 and the other of 7 guns, partly 18 and partly 24-pounders, more than compensated for the difference in favor of the British fleet of 196 guns. The Hannibal got aground, it is true, but she continued to use her guns with the best effect until she surrendered ; and, even on the supposition that this ship was useless after she grounded, the British had still an excess of 122 guns over the French fleet and batteries. These batteries were well placed, and probably well planned and constructed, but there was nothing extraordinary about them ; their condition before the fight was complained of by Admiral Lenois ; and they were badly fought in the early part of the action; still the 12 guns on shore were found to be more than equiva- lent for two seventy-fours and one frigate. BATTLE OF FUENTERABIA. This recent affair introduces steam batteries to our notice. On the llth July, 1836, six armed steamers, together with two British and several Spanish gunboats, attacked the little town of Fuenterabia. The place is surrounded only by an old wall ; and two guns of small calibre, to which, on the evening of the attack, a third gun of larger calibre was added, formed the 160 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. entire of its artillery. The squadron cannonaded this place during a whole day, and effected absolutely nothing beyond unroofing and demolishing a few poor and paltry houses, not worth perhaps the ammunition wasted in the attack. What may have been the number of guns and weight of metal which the assail- ants brought is unknown; though the superiority, independent of the superior weight of metal, must have been at least ten to one ; but not the slightest mili- tary result was obtained. (See United Service Journal, August, 1836, page 531.) We will now turn to affairs of a similar character on our own coast. In June, 1776, Sir Peter Parker, commanding a squadron of two ships of 50 guns, four of 28 guns, two of 20 guns, and a bomb-ketch in all (according to their rate) 252 guns attacked Fort Moultrie, in Charleston harbor, South Carolina. It is stated that the fort mounted " about thirty pieces of heavy artillery." Three of the smaller vessels were aground for a time during the action ; and one of them could not be floated off, and was, in consequence, burnt by the English. Deducting this vessel as not contributing to the attack, and supposing that the other two were engaged but half the time, the English force may be estimated at 200 guns ; or, reckoning on broadside only, at 100 guns against 30 guns. The English were defeated with great loss of life, and injury to the vessels ; while the fort suffered in no material degree, and lost but 30 men. The killed and wounded in the squadron were reported by the commodore to be 205, being for every ten guns employed against them more than 68 men killed and wounded, a loss more than eleven times as great, in proportion to the opposing force, as the loss at the battle of Trafalgar. In September, 1814, a squadron of small vessels, consisting of two ships and two brigs, mounting about 90 guns, attacked Fort Boyer, at the mouth of Mo- bile bay. A false attack was at the same time made by a party of marines, artillery, and Indians, on the land side. The fort was very small, and could not have mounted more than twenty guns on all sides, nor more than fifteen guns on the water fronts. The action continued between two and three hours, when one of the ships being so injured as to be unmanageable, drifted ashore under the guns, and was abandoned and burnt by the English ; the other vessels re- treated after suffering severely. There were ten men killed and wounded in the fort ; the loss on the other part is not known. The affair of Stonmgton during the last war affords another instance of suc- cessful defence by a battery. In this case there were only two guns, (eighteen- pounders,) in a battery which was only three feet high and without embrasures. The battery, being manned exclusively by citizen volunteers from the town, repelled a persevering attack of a sloop-of-war, causing serious loss and damage, but suffering none. The only other instance we will adduce is that of the late attack on the castle of St. Juan de Ulloa. Having before us a plan of this work, made on the spot after the surrender, by a French engineer officer who was one of the expedition ; having also his official account of the affair, as well as narratives by several eye- witnesses, we can fully understand the circumstances attending the operations, and are liable to no material errors. On the 27th of November, 1838, Admiral Baudin anchored at the distance of about seven-eighths of a mile in a northeast direction from the castle, with the frigates La Nureide, of 52 guns, La Glorie, of 52 guns, and L'Iphigenie, of 60 guns, and, after being a short time in action, he was joined by La Creole, of 24 guns ; in all, 188 guns, according to the rate of the ships. In a position nearly north from the castle, and at a distance of more than a mile, two bomb-ketches, carrying each two large mortars, were anchored. The wind being adverse, all the vessels were towed into position by two armed steamboats belonging to the squadron. " It was lucky for us," says the reporter, " that the Mexicans did FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 161 not disturb this operation, which lasted near two hours, and that they permitted us to commence the fire." He further says : " We were exposed to the fire of one 24-pounder, five 16-pounders, seven 12-pounders, one 8-pounder, and five 18-pounder carronades in all, 19 pieces only" In order the better to judge of these batteries, we will convert them, in proportion to the weight of balls, into 24-pounders ; and we find these 19 guns equivalent to less than 12 guns of that calibre. But we must remark that, although this simplifies the expression of force, it presents it greatly exaggerated; it represents, for example, three 8-pounders as equivalent to one 24-pounder ; whereas, at the distance the parties were engaged, (an efficient distance for a 24-pounder,) the 8-pounders would be nearly harmless. It represents also the 18-pounder carronades as possessing each three-fourths the power of a long 24-pounder ; whereas at that distance they would not be better than the 8-pounders, if so good. Although the above estimate of the force of the batteries is too great by full one-third, we will, nevertheless, let it stand as representing that force. There were, then, twelve 24-pounders engaged against 94 guns, (estimating for one broadside only of each ship) and 4 sea-mortars. During the action a shell caused the magazine in the cavalier to explode, whereby three of the nine- teen guns were destroyed, reducing the force to about ten 24-pounders. Considering the manner in which this work was defended, it would not have been surprising if the ships had prevailed by mere dint of their guns ; but our author states, expressly, that though the accident just mentioned completely ex- tinguished the fire of the cavalier, still " the greater part of the other pieces which could see the ships, to the number of sixteen, continued to fire till tlpe end of the action." They were not dismounted, therefore, and the loss of life at them could not have been great. What, then, was the cause of the surrender of the castle ? Much has been said of the great use made by the ships of horizontal shells, or shells fired at low angles from large guns ; and it is a prevailing idea that the work was torn to pieces, or greatly dilapidated by these missiles. This engineer officer states that, on visiting the castle after the cannonade, he found " it had been more injured by the French balls and shells than he had expected ; still the casemates in the curtains, serving as barracks for the troops, were intact." "Of 187 guns found in the fort, 102 were still serviceable; 29 only had been dismounted by the French fire. The heaviest injury was sustained by the cavalier" (where a magazine exploded) "in bastion No. 2 ; in battery No. 5," (where another magazine was blown up,) " and the officers' quarters." They found in the castle twenty-five men whose wounds were too severe to permit their removal with the rest of the garrison. Of the twenty-nine guns dismounted, five were thrown down with the cava- lier ; the remaining twenty-four guns were no doubt situated in parts of the work opposite to the attack, being pointed in other directions, and were struck by shots or shells that had passed over the walls facing the ships. There is reason to suppose that of the remaining sixteen guns pointed at the French none were dismounted ; and we know that most of them continued to fire till the end of the action. The two explosions may certainly have been caused by shells fired at low angles from Paixhan guns. But it is much more likely they were caused by shells from the sea-mortars, because these last were much larger, and therefore more likely to break through the masonry ; because, being fired at high angles, they would fall vertically upon the magazines, which were less protected on the top than on the sides ; and because there were more of these large shells fired than of the small ones, in the ratio of 302 to 117. But considering that the cannonade and bombardment lasted about six hours, and that 8,250 shot and shells were fixed by the French, it is extraordinary that there were no more than two explosions of magazines, and that no greater H. Rep. Com. 86 11 162 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. injury was done the fort, since it is certain that there were no less than six other similar magazines situated on the rampart, in different parts of the work, not one of which was shell-proof. The surrender, after these explosions, was ' a very natural event, with a governor and garrison who seem to have known as little about the proper preparation for such contests as about the mode of con- ducting them. The second explosion must have satisfied them, if the first did not, that they had introduced within their own precincts much more formidable means of destruction than any it was in the power of the French to send from gun or mortar. The important points to be noticed in this contest are these : 1. The French took such a position that their 94 guns were opposed by the equivalent of 10 or 12 guns only. 2. In proof of the inefficiency of the Mexican guns generally, it may be stated that although the three French frigates were struck in their hulls about three hundred times, they lost but thirty-three men in killed and wounded. The Iphigenie was hulled 160 times, and yet had but thirteen men hurt. Very few, therefore, of these 160 balls could have passed through her sides. 3. It appears that very few, if any, of the guns exposed to the direct action of the French broadsides were dismounted or silenced by their fire. 4. The narratives of the day contain exaggerated statements of injury inflicted on the walls by shells fired from guns ; the professional report, above quoted, of the chief engineer of the expedition, neither speaks of nor alludes to any such injury. After deducting from the parts of the work said to be most injured the cavalier and also battery No. 5, in each of which a magazine exploded there remain, as having suffered most, the quarters of the officers and bastion No. 2. As to the first, if it was elevated above the walls, as is probable, it would of course suffer severely, because the walls of mere barracks or quarters are never made of a thickness to resist shot or shells of any kind ; and if not elevated above the walls, but covered by them, the injury resulted, most proba- bly, from shells fired at high angles from the sea-mortars, and not from shells fired nearly horizontally from the Paixhan guns. Whether the injury sustained by bastion No. 2 was the effect of shot and shells upon the face of the walls, or of shells falling vertically within the bastion, is not stated. It was probably due in part to both. If there had been any extraordinary damage done by the horizontal shells, we may reasonably suppose special mention would have been made of it, because it was the first time that this missile^ had been tried, in a large way, in actual warfare. That anything like a breach could have been effected with solid shot, at that distance and in that time, we know to be im- possible; but it is neither unreasonable to suppose, nor unlikely, that many of the heavy vertical shells may have fallen in the bastion and caused much injury. Whatever may have been the cause of the damage, or its amount, it did not, we have reason to believe, extinguish the fire of any of the five 16-pounders that were pointed from the bastion against the ships. 5. So far as effects were produced by the direct action of the Fre'nch arma- ment, whether guns, bomb-cannon, or sea-mortars, it does not appear that there was the slightest reason for the submission of the fort. There is little doubt that the 8,250 shot and shells fired at the castle must have greatly marred the surface of the walls, and it is not unlikely that three or four striking near each other may have made deep indentations, especially as the stone is soft, beyond any material applied to building in any part of the United States. But these are not injuries of material consequence, however they may appear to the inex- perienced eye, and we should risk little in asserting that, abstracting the effects of the explosion, the castle was as inaccessible to assault after the cannonade as before it ; that, so far as regards the levelling of obstacles lying in the way of a sword in hand attack, the 8,250 shot and shells might as well have been fired in the opposite direction. FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 163 6. The explosion, however, of two deposits of powder in the castle, one of which is reported to have buried sixty men in its ruins, showed the defenders that, although they might evade the vertical fire, and their works might cover them from the horizontal fire of the French, there was no protection against, no evasion of, the dreadful ravages of exploding magazines. With this ruin around them, and a sixfold greater ruin likely, at every moment, to burst upon their heads, it is not surprising that a garrison, found in circumstances so unmilitary, doubted their power of protracted resistance. 7. It must be borne in mind that these explosions have nothing to do either with the question of relative strength or with the peculiarities of the French attack. No defences, with such management, can be effective, and no attack can fail. The French, not dreaming of such culpable, such inconceivable negligence on a point always receiving the most careful attention, entered upon the cannonade with no other purpose, as is avowed, than that of somewhat weakening the defences and dispiriting and fatiguing the garrison, before pro- ceeding to an assault, which was to have followed at night, and for which all preparations had been made. Had the Mexicans thrown all the powder of these eight magazines into the sea, or had they transported it to their barracks, and every man, making a pillow of a keg, slept through the whole cannonade, as might have been done safely, in their quarters in the curtain casemates, the castle of St. Juan de Ulloa would, we doubt not, have been as competent to resist the projected assault as it was when the French first arrived before it 8. The number of killed and wounded in the French vessels, in proportion to the guns acting against them was, for ten guns, more than twenty-seven men, being upwards of four times as great as the loss sustained by the English at the battle of Trafalgar. In concluding this reference to facts in military history, we will add that we do not see how it is possible to avoid making the following deduction, namely : that fixed batteries upon the shore are capable of resisting the attacks of ships, even when the armament of the latter is by far the most numerous and heavy. There are several reasons for this capacity in batteries, of which the principal may be thus stated; and these reasons apply to vessels of every size and every sort, to small or large, to vessels moved by wind or steam. This ship is every- where equally vulnerable, and, large as is her hull, the men and the guns are very much concentrated within her; on the other hand, in the properly con- structed battery it is only the gun itself, a small part of the carnage, and now and then a head or an arm raised above the parapet that can be hurt, the ratio of the exposed surfaces being not less than fifteen or twenty to one. Next, there is always more or less motion in the water, so that the ship-gun, although it may have been pointed accurately at one moment, at the next will be thrown entirely away from the object, even when the motion in the vessel is too small to be otherwise noticed ; whereas, in the battery the gun will be fired just as it is pointed, and the motion of the ship will merely vary to the extent of a few inches, or at most two or three feet, the spot in which the shot is to be received. In the ship there are, besides, many points exposed that may be called vital points; by losing her rudder, or portions of her rigging, or of her spars, she may become unmanageable and unable to use her strength; she may receive shots under water and be liable to sink ; she may receive hot shot and be set on fire ; and these damages are in addition to those of having her guns dismounted and her people killed by the shot which pierce her sides and scatter splinters from her timbers, while the risks of the battery are confined to those mentioned above, namely, the risk that the gun, the carnage, or the men may be struck. That the magazines should be exposed, as were those of the castle St. Juan de Ulloa, must never be anticipated as possible. While on this part of our subject, it is proper to advert to the use of horizontal shells, or hollow shot, or Paixhan's shells, (as they are variously called,) it 164 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. having been argued that the introduction of these missiles is seriously to impair the utility of fortifications as a defence of the sea-coast. We fully believe that the free use of these shells will have an influence of some importance on the relative force of ship and battery, but that influence must be the very reverse of such predictions. How are the batteries to be affected by them ? It can be but in two ways : first, the ship-gun having been pointed so as to strike a vital point that is to say, a gun or a carnage the shell may explode at the instant of contact. This explosion may possibly hap- pen thus opportunely, but it would happen against all chances, and if happen- ing, would probably do no more than add a few men to the list of killed and wounded. For reasons that will soon appear, it is to be doubted whether the probability of dismounting the gun would be so great as if the missile were a solid 32-pounder shot. Secondly, if it be not by dismounting the guns or killing the garrison, the effect anticipated from these missiles must result from the in- jury they do the battery itself. Now, we are perfectly informed by military ex- perience as to the effects of these shells upon forts and batteries, for the shells are not new, although the guns may be so the 8-inch and the 10-inch shells having always been supplied in abundance to every siege-train, and being per- fectly understood, both as to their effects and the mode of using them. Were it a thing easily done, the blowing away of the parapets of a work, (a very desirable result to the attacking party,) would be a common incident in the attacks of fortifications ; but the history of attacks by land or water affords no such instance. The only practicable way yet discovered of demolishing a forti- fication being by attaching a miner to the foot of the wall, or by dint of solid shot and heavy charges fired unremittingly during a long succession of hours upon the same part of the wall, in order not only to break through it, but to break through in such a manner that the weight and pressure of the incumbent mass may throw large portions of the wall prostrate. This, the shortest and best way of breaching a wall, requires, in the first place, perfect accuracy of direction, because the same number of shots that, being distributed over the expanse of wall, would merely peel off the face, would, if concentrated in a single deep cut, cause the wall to fall ; and it requires, moreover, great power of penetration in the missile the charge of a breaching gun being for that reason one-third greater than the common service charges. Now, the requisite pre- cision of firing for this effect is wholly unattainable in vessels, whether the shot be solid or hollow ; and if it were attainable, hollow shot would be entirely use- less for the purpose, because every one of them would, break to pieces against the wall, even when fired with a charge much less than the common service charge. This is no newly discovered fact ; it is neither new nor doubtful. Every hollow shot thrown against the wall of fort or battery if fired with a velocity affording any penetration, will unquestionably be broken into fragments by the shock. After so much had been said about the effect of these shells upon the castle of St. Juan de Ulloa, it was deemed advisable, although the result of European experiments were perfectly well known, to repeat in our own service sonle trials touching this point. A target was therefore constructed, having one-third part of the length formed of granite, one-third of bricks, and the remaining third of freestone. This was fired at by a Paixhan gun and by a 32-pounder from the distance of half a mile, and the anticipated results were obtained, namely : 1st. Whether it was the granite, the brick, or the freestone that was struck, the solid 32-pounder shot penetrated much deeper into the wall, and did much more damage than the 8-inch hollow shot; and 2d. These last broke against the wall in every instance that the charge of the gun was sufficient to give them any penetration. The rupture of the shell may often cause the explosion of the powder it con^ tains, because the shell, the burning fuse, and the powder are all crushed up together ; but the shell having no penetration, no greater injury will be done to FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 165 the wall by the explosion than would be caused by the bursting of a shell that had been placed against it. From all this it appears, incontrovertibly, that, as regards the effects to be produced upon batteries by ships, solid shot are decidedly preferable to hollow shot ; and the ship that, contemplating the destruction of batteries, should change any of her long 24 or 32-pounder guns for Paixhan guns would certainly weaken her armament. Her best missiles, at ordinary distances, are solid shot; and, if she can get near, grape shot to fire into the embrasures and over the walls. The best shells against batteries are the sea-mortar shells, fired at high elevations ; which, being of great weight and falling from a great height, pene- trate deeply, and containing a considerable quantity of powder cause material ravage by their explosion. Such shells, however, can only be fired by vessels appropriately fitted. The use of these same hollow shot by batteries against vessels is, however, an affair of different character. The shells do not break against timber, but penetrating the bulwarks they, in the first place, would do greater damage than hollow shot, by making a larger hole and dispersing more splinters ; and having,. as shot, effected all this injury, they would then augment it many fold by ex- ploding. In all cases of close action between ship and battery, the shells will pass through the nearer side, and if not arrested by some object on the deck, will probably lodge and explode in the further side ; causing, by the explosion, a much greater loss among the crew, and greater injury to the vessel, than by their mere transit across the vessel. As before suggested, the vessel would suffer less injury were her sides made so thin as not to retain the shell, permitting it to pass through both sides, unless fired with a small velocity. It is not impos- sible that an extensive use of these horizontal shells may lead to a reduction in the thickness of ships' bulwarks. In the facts quoted above, there is no illustration of the effects of hot shot, except in the case of Gibraltar. In that attack the floating batteries were made proof against cold shot, and, as was thought by the constructor, proof against hot shot also ; and so, indeed, for a time, it seemed. It was conceived that the hot shot, when buried deep in the closely-jointed timbers, would scarcely com- municate flame ; and that it would not be difficult, by the use of the fire-engines provided, to subdue so stifled a combustion. By making these floating batteries impenetrable to shot, it was supposed they had been rendered equal, in perfectly smooth Avater, to land batteries, gun for gun ; and so they might then have been, nearly, had the incumbustibility of the latter been imparted to them. But now resistance to fire would not suffice ; these floating batteries must either repel these horizontal shells from their bul- warks, or, if that be impossible, permit them to pass through both sides. Noth- ing can be better calculated to exhibit the tremendous effects of these shells than a vessel so thick-sided as to stop every shell, allowing it to burst when surrounded by several feet of timber ; and there can be no greater mistake than supposing that by thickening the bulwarks of vessels-of-war, or fitting up steam batteries with shot-proof sides, the effects of land batteries are to be annulled, or in any material degree modified. We will sum up this branch of our subject with the remark that the facts of history, and the practice of all warlike nations, are in perfect accordance with the conclusions of theory. The results that reason anticipated have occurred again and again. And so long as, on the one side, batteries are formed of earth and stone ; and, on the other, ships are liable to be swallowed up by the element on which they float, or to be deprived of the means by which they move ; so long as they can be penetrated by solid shot, set on fire or blown up by hot shot, or torn piecemeal by shells, the same results must, inevitably, be repeated at each succeeding trial. 166 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. But, after all, it may be urged that the general principle herein contended for, namely, the superiority of batteries in a contest with ships, might be admitted ; and still it would remain to show that batteries constitute the kind of defence best adapted to our peculiar wants. This is true ; and we will now proceed to consider, severally, the cases to which defence must be applied. It may be well, however, first to recall the general scope of the preceding argument. It has been contended that floating defences should not be relied on, not because they are actually incompetent to the duty, but because they cannot fulfil this duty unless provided in inordinate numbers, and at a boundless expense; and we have endeavored to show that this remark is generally true, whether the defensive fleet be made up of sea-going vessels of floating batteries, or of steam batteries. We have next urged the point that properly planned and constructed batteries are an overmatch for vessels-of-war, even when greatly inferior to them in armament sustaining our opinion by many striking exam- ples, and explaining satisfactorily the only instances that have cast any doubt on such contests. If the facts and reasonings we have presented do not convey the same strong convictions that sway our own minds, it must be because we have obscured rather than illustrated them ; for it would seem to be impossible that facts could be more unexceptionable, or reasons more beyond the reach of cavil. However that may be, we now leave them to candid and dispassionate revisal, and proceed to examine the mode of applying these defences to our own coast. It may be well to divide these into several distinct classes : 1. There will be all the smaller towns upon the coast, constituting a very numerous class. At the same time that no one of these, of itself, would provoke an enterprise of magnitude, it is still necessary to guard each and all against the lesser attacks. A small vessel might suffice to guard against single vessels that would other- wise be tempted by facility to burn the shipping and exact a contribution ; but something more than this is necessary, since the amount of temptation held out by a number of these towns would be apt to induce operations on a larger scale. It might often happen, moreover, that our own vessels-of-war would be con- strained to take refuge in these harbors, and they should find cover from the pursuer. Although the harbors of which we now speak afford every variety of form and dimension, there are few, or none, wherein one or two small forts and batteries cannot be so placed as to command all the water that a ship-of-war can lie in, as well as the channel by which she must enter. While the circum- stances of no two of them are so nearly alike as not to modify the defences to be applied to them severally, all should fulfil certain common conditions, namely : the passage into the harbors should be strongly commanded ; the enemy should find no place, after passing, wherein he would be safe from shot and shells ; and the works should be inaccessible to sudden escalade that is to say, -a small garrison should be able to repel such an assault. With works answering to these conditions, and of degrees of strength in accordance with the value of their respective trusts, this class of harbors may be regarded as secure. We cannot, however, here avoid asking what would be the mode of defence, if purely naval, of these harbors? Suppose the circumstances are deemed to require the presence of a frigate, or a steam frigate, or an equivalent in gun- boats ; would not two hostile frigates, or two steam frigates, infallibly arrive in quest ? Could there be devised a system more certain to result in the capture of our vessels, and the submission of our towns 1 2. Another class will consist of great establishments, such as large cities, naval depots, &c., situated in harbors not of too great extent to admit of good defence at the entrance, and also at every successive point; so that an enemy FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 167 could find no spot within in which he could safely prepare for operations ulte- rior to the mere forcing an entrance. In this class are to be found objects that are, in every sense, of the highest value. On the one hand, accumulations of military and naval material, and structures for naval accommodation, that could not be replaced during a war, which are of indispensable necessity, and of great cost ; and, on the other hand, the untold wealth of great cities. As these objects must be great in the eyes of the enemy great for him to gain, and for us to lose corresponding efforts on his part must be looked for and guarded against. If he come at all, it will be in power ; and the preparations on our part must be commensurate. The entrance to the harbor, and all the narrow passes within it, must be occupied with heavy batteries ; and if nature does not afford all the positions deemed requisite, some must, if practicable, be formed artificially. Batteries should succeed each other, along the channel, so that the enemy may nowhere find shelter from effective range of shot and shells while within the harbor, even should he succeed in passing the first batteries. Provided the shores admit this disposition, and the defences be supplied with an armanent, numerous, heavy, and selected with reference to the effects on shipping, the facts we have quoted from history show that these defences may be relied on. If the mere passing under sail, with a leading wind and tide, one, or even two sets of batteries, and then carrying on operations out of the reach of these, or any other, were all, the enemy might perhaps accomplish it; but our present supposition is, that with this class his ulterior proceedings, and finally his return, are to be subject to the incessant action of the defences. 3. This brings us to consider a third class, consisting of establishments of importance situated at a distance up some river or bay, there being intermediate space too wide to be commanded from the shores. In such cases the defence must be concentrated upon the narrow passes, and must, of course, be appor- tioned in armament to the value of the objects covered. When the value is not very great, a stout array of batteries at the best positions would deter an enemy from an attempt to force the passage, since his advantage, in case of success, would not be commensurate with any imminent risk. But with the more valua- ble establishments it might be otherwise; the consequence of success might justify all the risk to be encountered in rapidly passing in face of batteries, however powerful. This condition of things requires peculiar precautions, under any system of defence. If, after having occupied the shores, in the nar- row places, in the best manner, with batteries, we are of opinion that the temp- tation may induce the enemy, notwithstanding, to run the gauntlet, the obstruc- tion of the passage must be resorted to. By this is not meant the permanent obstruction of the passage; such a resort, besides the great expense, might entail the ruin of the channel. The obstruction is meant to be the temporary closing by heavy floating masses. There is no doubt that a double line of rafts, each raft being of large size and anchored with strong chains, would make it impossible to pass without first removing some of the obstructions, and it might clearly be made impossible to effect this removal under the fire of the batteries. Such obstructions need not be resorted to until the breaking out of a war, as they could then be speedily formed, should the preparation of the enemy be of a threatening nature. There would be nothing in these obstructions inconsistent with our use of part of the channel, since two or three of the rafts might be kept out of line, ready to move into their places at an hour's notice. The greatest danger to which these obstructions would be exposed would be from explosion vessels ; and from those they might be protected by a boom, or a line of smaller rafts in front. From what has just been said, it will be perceived that, when the inducements 168 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. are such as to bring the enemy forward in great power, and efficient batteries can be established only at certain points, we are not then to rely on them 'ex- clusively. In such a case, the enemy should be stopped by some physical im- pediments ; and the batteries must be strong enough to prevent his removing these impediments, and also to prevail in a cannonade should the enemy under- take to silence the works. The conditions these obstructions have to fulfil are these : 1st. They must be of a nature to be fixed readily, and to be speedily re- moved when there is no longer occasion for them ; and, to this end, they must be afloat. 2d. They must have adequate inertia to resist, or rather not to be destroyed or displaced by, the shock of the heaviest ship ; and, in order to this, they must be held by the heaviest and strongest cables and anchors. 3d. They must be secure from the effects of explosive vessels ; and, if in danger from this source, must be covered as above mentioned. We do not say what are the exact circumstances in which all these conditions will be fulfilled, though we think the idea long ago presented by the board of engineers will, with modifications, embrace them all. The idea is this : Suppose a line (extending across the channel) of rafts, sep- arated from each other by a space less than the breadth of a ship-of-war, each raft being about 90 feet long, 30 feet wide, and 6 feet deep, formed of strong timbers, crossed and braced in all directions, and fastened together in the strong- est manner. A long-scope chain cable is to proceed from each of the four cor- ners, two obliquely up stream and two obliquely down stream, to very heavy anchors ; and there should also be a very strong chain cable passing from one raft to another. Suppose a ship, striking one of the rafts, to break the chains leading down the stream : in doing this, she must lose much of her momentum. She has, then, "under her fore foot," the raft connected by a strong chain with the rafts to the right and left ; on being tightened, this chain will throw the strain upon the down stream cable of that adjoining raft towards which the ship happens to tend. If we suppose it possible for these chains also to be parted by the power still remaining in the ship, or by impulses received from succeeding vessels, there will be other chains still to break in the same way. After the down stream chains are all parted, the rafts will " bring up " in a new position, (higher up the channel,) by the anchors that, in the first instance, were pointed up stream. Here a resistance, precisely like that first overcome, is to be en- countered by vessels that have lost most of their force in breaking the successive chains, and in pushing these great masses of timber before them through the water. Should there exist a doubt as to the sufficiency of these remaining anchors and chains, or should it be deemed most prudent to leave nothing un- certain, a second similar line may be placed a short distance above the first. The best proportions and dimensions of the rafts remain to be determined ; but as there is scarcely a limit to the strength that may be given to, the rafts themselves, and to the means by which they are to be held to their positions, and to each other, the success of a well arranged obstruction of this sort can hardly be doubted. The expense would not be great in the first instance, and all the materials would be available for other purposes, when no longer needed for this. It may be repeated here, that such expedients need not be resorted to, except to cover objects of the highest importance and value, such as would induce an enemy to risk a large expedition. For objects of less importance, batteries would afford ample protection. It will be remembered that this last power is, when once established in any position, a constant quantity ; and, although it should be incompetent to effect decisive results when diffused over a large fleet, may be an overmatch for any small force upon which it should be concentrated. FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 169 At the same time, therefore, that there is the less liability to heavy attacks, there will be, iu the batteries, the greater capacity of resistance to others. It must not be urged, as a reproach to fortifications, that, in the case we are considering, they are obliged to call in aid from other sources, so long as these aids are cheap, efficient, and of easy resort. By the mode we have suggested, the defence will undoubtedly be complete, every chance of success being on the side of the defence ; that is to say, if any confidence is to be placed in the les- sons of experience. How, on the other hand, will the same security be attained by naval means ? Only, as before shown, by keeping within the harbor a fleet or squadron, or whatever it may be, which shall be at all times superior to the enemy. In a naval defence there will be no advantage in obstructions of any sort, for there can be no lessening of the array of guns in consequence of such obstruc- tions ; because, if these obstructions are under the fire of the floating defences, the enemy will first subdue that fire, and then remove the obstructions at his leisure. If this fire prove too powerful for the enemy, the obstructions will have been unnecessary, and will serve only to shut up our own fleet, preventing the prompt pursuit of a beaten foe. 4. There is a fourth class, consisting of harbors, or rather bays or estuaries, of such expanse that batteries cannot be made to control the passage. These have been before spoken of. If the occupation of, or passage through these must be defended, it must be by other means than batteries upon the shore. The reliance must, from the nature of the case, be a floating defence, of magni- tude at least equal to the force the enemy may bring. The complete defence of each of these bays would, therefore, involve very great expense ; certainly, in most cases, greater than the advantages gained. The Chesapeake bay can- not, for instance, be shut against a fleet by fortifications ; and if the entrance of the enemy is to be interdicted, it must be by the presence of a not inferior fleet of our own. Instead of such a system, it will be better to give up the bay to the enemy, confining our defences to the more important harbors and rivers that discharge into the bay. By this system, not only will these harbors be secure, but the defences will react upon the bay itself, and, at any rate, secure it from predatory incursions ; because while Hampton roads and the navy yard at Norfolk are well protected, no enemy would proceed up the bay with any less force than that which could be sent out from the navy yard. In certain cases of broad waters, wherein an enemy's cruisers might desire to rendezvous in order to prosecute a blockade, or as a shelter in tempestuous weather, there may be positions from which sea-mortars can reach the whole anchorage, although nothing could be done with guns. A battery of sea-mor- tars, well secured from escalade, would, in such a case, afford a good defence, because no fleet will lie at anchor within the range of shells. In thus distributing the various exposed points of the sea-coast into general classes, according to the most appropriate modes of defence, we do not find that anything can be substituted for fortifications, where fortifications are applicable, and we find them applicable in all the classes but the last ; and in the last we shall find them indispensable as auxiliaries. In this last class there are, no doubt, some cases where naval means must constitute the active and operative force ; and it is probable that steam batteries may, of all floating defences, be the most suitable. It must not be forgotten, however, that the very qualities which recommend this particular kind of force will equally characterize the steam vessel of the enemy ; nor must it be forgotten that, whether steam vessels or sailing vessels, or both, are relied on, unless there are well-secured points on the shore, under which they can take refuge, they will themselves constitute an object inviting the superior force of an enemy. If, for example, we were to deem one of the open harbors of such importance 170 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. as to assign eight or ten steam batteries for its protection, we should thereby place within reach of the enemy an object worthy of the efforts of a squadron, or twelve or fifteen vessels of the same description. Even, therefore, in the cases where naval means must be resorted to for defence upon the water, there should be works upon the shore behind which, if overpowered, they can retire. It has been before remarked that the steam batteries are in no way more for- midable to shore batteries than sailing vessels are : armed with Paixhan guns they would be less so. And they would be less formidable, also, on account of their comparatively small number of guns ; for there is no reason why the firing should be more accurate than from ships; and the chances of inflicting injury would be in proportion to the number of missiles. The only material effect the introduction of this description of vessel can have upon a system of defence by fortifications is, that owing to their less draught of water, it will be necessary to secure channels that, not being navi- gable by vessels of the line and frigates, might otherwise be left unguarded. Some of these channels may have the draught of water lessened by an artificial ridge of stones, so as to be impracticable even to steam vessels; and this may often be done at small expense, and without detriment to the harbors ; others will need additional fortifications. But the instances are not numerous where any such shallow channels exist. In opposition to an opinion not uncommon, that modern improvements in steam vessels will tend to lessen the necessity for fortifications, we here see that the tendency is rather to increase their number. Throughout this whole discussion the argument has turned on the relative efficiency of fixed and floating defences. The great relative economy of the former, we suppose, will be conceded. If not, we would ask, as conclusive, or at least as leading to calculation entirely satisfactory, that the following infor- mation be obtained from authentic sources, namely : the first cost, when com- plete in all respects, of the frigates United States, Constitution, and Congress, and also the entire expense of each of said vessels up to this time; specifying, as to each, the year of the several expenditures and the amounts thereof, under the heads, as far as practicable, of first cost, repairs or rebuilding, and improve- ments and alterations ; and distinguishing 1st. The expense bestowed upon the hull. 2d. The expense bestowed upon the masts, spars, sails, anchors, cables, and rigging. 3d. The expense bestowed upon the armament; and 4th. The expense bestowed upon all other matters, (as boats, ballast, tanks, paint, &c.,) necessarily connected with the preservation or the ordinary service of the vessel. Before we proceed to describe the several positions on the coast requiring for- tifications, we have something still to say on the general subject, though on another branch. We now refer to the kind of fortifications, or rather to their magnitude and strength. That this particular topic should be embraced by our remarks is the more necessary since views hostile to the system of works now in progress have been urged from a high source. The present system is founded on this principle, to wit : that the fortifications should be strong in proportion to the value of the objects to be secured. The principle will not, we suppose, be controverted, but only the mode of apply- ing it. There will hardly be a difference of opinion as to the mode of guarding the less important points. There being no great attraction to an enemy, works simple in their features, requiring small garrisons only, containing a moderate armament, but at the same time inaccessible to the dashing enterprises that ships can so easily land, and which can be persevered in for a few hours with much vigor, will suffice. Circumstances must, however, materially modify the proper- ties of these works, even when the points to be guarded are of equal value. In one, the disadvantage of position must be compensated by greater power ; in. FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 171 another, natural strength may need little aid from art ; in another, greater width in the guarded channel may demand a larger armament ; and in a fourth, peculiar exposure to land attack may exact more than usual inaccessibility. But all these varieties lie within limits that will probably be conceded. As to the larger objects, it has been contended that there has been exaggera- tion in devising works to cover these, the works having been calculated for more formidable attacks than they will be exposed to. It is easy to utter vague criticisms of this nature, and it is not easy to rebut them without going into an examination as minute as if the criticism were ever so precise and pertinent. But let us look a little at the material facts. What is the object of an enemy? What are his means 1 What should be the nature of our defences ? The object may be to lay a great city under contribution, or to destroy one of our naval depots, or to take possession of one of our great harbors, &c. It was estimated that in the great fire in the city of New York, in the year 1835, the property destroyed within a few hours was worth upwards of seventeen millions of "dollars, although the fire was confined to a very small part of the city, and did not touch the shipping. Is it easy, then, to estimate the loss that would accrue from the fires that a victorious enemy could kindle upon the circuit of that great city when no friendly hand could be raised to extinguish them ? or is it easy to overrate the tribute such a city would pay for exemption from that calamity 1 Can we value too highly the pecuniary losses that the destruction of one of the great navy yards would involve, and the loss, beyond all pecuniary value, of stores and accommodations indispensable in a state of war, and that a state of war can hardly replace ? But what are the enemy's means ? They consist of his whole sea-going force, which he concentrates for the sake of inflicting the blow. In the language of the critic: "From the nature of maritime operations, such a fleet could bring its whole strength to bear upon any particular position, and, by threatening or assailing various portions of the coast, either anticipate the tardy movements of troops upon land, and effect the object before their concentration, or render it necessary to keep in service a force far superior to that of the enemy, but so divided as to be inferior to it on any one point." We have, then, objects of sufficient magnitude, and the means of the enemy consist in the concentration of his whole force upon one of these objects. With the highest notion of the efficiency of fortifications against shipping, these are not cases where any stint in the defensive means are admissible. Having, therefore, under a full sense of the imminent danger to which the great objects upon the coast are exposed, applied to the approaches by water an array of obstacles worthy of confidence, we must carefully explore all the avenues by land, in order to guard against approaches that might be made on that side in order to evade or capture the works guarding the channels. But before deciding on the defences necessary to resist these land attacks, it will be proper to esti- mate more particularly the means that an enemy may be expected to bring for- ward with a view to such land operations. History furnishes many examples, and the expedition to Flushing, commonly called the Walcheren expedition, may be cited as peculiarly instructive. From an early day Napoleon had applied himself to the creation of a maritime force in the Scheldt, and, in 1809, he had provided extensive dock yards and naval arsenals at Flushing and at Antwerp. On his invasion of Austria this year, he had drawn off the mass of his troops that had before kept jealous watch over these naval preparations, relying now on forts and batteries, and on the fortifications of Flushing and Antwerp for the protection of the naval estab- lishments, and of a fleet containing several line-of-battle-ships and frigates, and a numerous flotilla of smaller vessels. The great naval establishment at Flushing, near the mouth of the Scheldt, and of Antwerp, some sixty or seventy miles up the river, with the vessels 172 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. afloat on the river or in progress in the yards, presented an object to England worthy of one of her great efforts. The troops embarked on this expedition consisted of upwards of 33,000 in- fantry, 3,000 cavalry, more than 3,000 artillery, and some hundreds of sappers and miners constituting an army of about 40,000 men. The naval portion consisted of 35 sail of the line, 23 frigates, 33 sloop s-of- war, 28 gun, mortar, and bomb vessels, 36 smaller vessels, and 82 gunboats ; making a total of 155 ships and other armed vessels and 82 gunboats. The guns, mortars, &c., pro- vided for such bombardments and sieges as the troops might have to conduct amounted to 158 pieces, with the suitable supplies of ammunition and stores of every kind. The idea of sailing right up to their object, in spite of the forts and batteries, seems not to have found favor, notwithstanding the power of the fleet. The plan of operations, therefore, contemplated the landing a portion of the army on the island of Walcheren, to carry on the siege of Flushing, while another portion proceeded up the Scheldt as high as Fort Bartz, which was to be taken, after which the army would push on by land about twenty miles further, and lay siege to Antwerp ; all which, it was thought might be accomplished hi eighteen or twenty days from the first landing. The execution did not accord with the design. Flushing, it is true, was reduced within fifteen days, and in less than a week from the debarcation (which was on the 31st of July) Fort Bartz. was in possession of the English, having been abandoned by the garrison. But it was twenty-five days before the main body, with all necessary supplies for a siege, were assembled at this point and ready to take up the line of march against Antwerp. Since the first descent of the British matters had, however, greatly changed. The French were now in force; they had put their remaining defences in good condition; they had spread inundations over the face of the country ; and not only would there be little chance of further success, but the safety of the expedition, formidable as it was, might have been compromised by a further advance. It was therefore decided in council to abandon the movement against Antwerp. The troops ac- cordingly returned to the island of Walcheren, which they did not finally leave till the end of December. The failure in the ultimate object of the expedition is to be ascribed to the omission to seize, in the first instance, the south shore of the river, and capture the batteries there, as was originally designed, and which was prevented by the difficulty of landing enough troops at any one debarcation, in the bad weather then prevailing. The capture of these batteries would have enabled the expe- dition to have reached Fort Bartz during the first week ; and, in the then unpre- pared state of the French, the issue of a dash upon Antwerp can hardly be doubted. The dreadful mortality that assailed the British army is wholly unconnected with the plans, conduct, or issue of the enterprise, as a military ^movement ; unless, indeed, it may have frustrated a scheme for occupying the island of Walcheren as a position during the war. Possession was held of the island for five months ; and it was finally aban- doned from no pressure upon it by the French, although, after the first six weeks, the British force consisted, in the aggregate, of less than 17,000 men ; of which, for the greater part of the time, more than half were sick effectives being often reduced below 5,000 men. We see, therefore, that an effective force of less than 10,000 men maintained possession of the island, in the face of, and in close proximity to, the most for- midable military power in Europe, for more than three months ; and no reason can be perceived why it might not have remained an indefinite period, while possessed of naval superiority. FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 173 The proximity of England undoubtedly lessened the expense of the expedi- tion, but it influenced the result in no other way material to the argument. We will allude to no other instances of large expeditions sent by the English to distant countries, than the two expeditions, each of about 10,000 men, sent in the year 1814 against this country : one by the way of Canada, the other to the Gulf of Mexico. United in a single force of 20,000 men against our sea-coast, the expense would have been less, and the results more certain. The French, notwithstanding their constant naval inferiority, have found opportunities to embark in great undertakings of the same nature. In 1802, Leclerc proceeded to St. Domingo with 34 line-of-battle ships and large frigates, more than 20 small frigates and sloops, and upwards of 20,000 men. We learn from these points in history what constitutes an object worthy of vast preparations ; and it is impossible to resist the fact, that our own coast, and rivers, and bays, possess many establishments not lees inviting to an enemy than Flushing and Antwerp. We are taught, moreover, what constitutes a great expedition ; in other words, what is the amount of force we must prepare to meet ; and, more than all, we are taught that such an expedition, seizing a favorable moment, when the military arrangements of a country are incomplete when the armies are absent, or im- perfect in their organization or discipline does not hesitate to land in the face of the most populous districts, and, availing of the local peculiarities, and covered and supplied by a fleet, to undertake operations which penetrate deep into the country, and consume considerable time. It seems, therefore, that whenever the object we are to cover possesses a value likely to provoke the cupidity of an enemy, or to stimulate his desire to inflict a serious blow, it is not enough that the approaches by water are guarded against his ships ; it will be indispensable to place safeguards against attacks by land also. A force considerable enough for very vigorous attacks against the land side of the fortifications may be thrown upon the shore ; and if these yield, a way is opened for the ships, and the enemy carries his object. In certain positions, the local circumstances would favor the land operations of an enemy ; permitting him, while operating against the fortifications, to be aided by the fleet, and covered from the reaction of the general force of the country. In other positions, the extreme thinness of the population in the neighborhood would require the forts to rely, for a considerable time, on their own strength. In all such cases a much greater power of resistance would be requisite than in circumstances of an opposite nature. In all such circumstances the works should be of a strength adequate to resist an attack, although perse- vered in vigorously for several days. But when these land operations lead away from the shipping, or when the surrounding population is considerable, or the enemy is unable to shelter his movements by local peculiarities, then it will suffice if the works be competent to resist attacks, vigorous also, of a few hours only. . The magnitude and strength of the works will depend, therefore, on the joint influence of the value of the object covered, the natural strength of the position, and the succor to be drawn from the neighborhood. We may introduce, as instances, New York and Pensacola. The former is as attackable as the latter : that is to say, it equally requires artificial defences ; and, owing to its capacious harbor and easy entrance, it is not easy to place it in a satisfactory condition as to the approaches by water. But while an enemy, in approaching any of the principal works by land, could not well cover himself from the attacks of the concentrated population of the vicinity, the rapid means of communication from the interior would daily bring great accessions to the defence. A land attack against the city must, consequently, be restricted to a few days ; and the works will fulfil their object, if impregnable to a coup de main. Pensacola, an object, in many respects, of the highest importance, and growing 174 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. in consequence every day, is capable of being defended as perfectly as the city just mentioned. The principal defences lie on a long sandy island, which closes in the harbor from the sea. An enemy landed on this island (Santa Rosa) would be in uninterrupted communication with his fleet ; could, owing to the sparseness of the population, have nothing to apprehend, for some time, from any re-enforce- ments arriving at the place ; and would be well protected, by position, from the effects of this succor, when it should arrive. While in possession of naval supe- riority, he might, therefore, not unreasonably calculate on being able to press a siege of many days of the work which occupies the extremity of the island, and guards the entrance to the harbor. And even before coming into possession of this work his gun and mortar batteries, on the same island, would destroy every thing not bomb-proof and incombustible at the navy yard. An attack not less persevering, and with equal chances of success, might be made from the other side of the harbor also. If, therefore, the power to resist a coup de main be all that is conferred on the works at Pensacola, their object will be obtained only through the forbear- ance of the enemy ; it being obviously indispensable that the principal of these works be competent to resist a short siege. If this liability resulted from the thinness of the neighboring population, it would still be many years before this state of things would be materially altered. But it does not depend on this alone ; the peculiar topographical features will continue this liability in spite of increasing numbers, and ever so easy and rapid communication with the interior; it having been proved that a fleet may lie broad off this shore and hold daily communication therewith during the most tempestuous season. The English fleet of men-of-war and transports lay, during the last war, from the 7th of February to the 15th of March, 1814, anchored abreast of Dauphin island and Mobile Point, where the exposure is the same as that off Pensacola. Between the cases cited, which may be regarded as of the class of extreme cases, (a class comprising, however, many important positions,) almost every conceivable modification of the defence will be called for, to suit the various conditions of the several points. The fortifications of the coast must therefore be competent to the double task of interdicting the passage of ships and resisting land attacks two distinct and independent qualities. The first demands merely an array in suitable numbers and in proper proportions of heavy guns, covered by parapets proof against shot and shells; the second demands inacessibility. As there is nothing in the first quality neceessarily involving the last, it has often happened, either from .the little value of the position, or from the supposed improbability of a land attack, or from the want of time to construct proper works, that this property of inaccessibility has been neglected. Whenever we have an object of sufficient value to be covered by a battery, we should bear in mind that the enemy will know the value of the object as well as ourselves. That it is a very easy thing for him to land a party of men for an expedition of an hour or two ; and, unless we take the necessary pre- ventive measures, his party will be sure to take the battery first ; after which nothing will prevent his vessels consummating the design it was the purpose of the battery to prevent. In general, the same fortifications that guard the water approaches will pro- tect the avenues by land also, but in certain cases a force may be so landed as to evade the channel defences, reaching the object by a route entirely inland. Of course this danger must be guarded against by suitable works. After the preceding exposition of our views on the general subject of the de- fences of the coast, it may not be out of place here to indicate the mode by which the system of fortifications on which we could rely can be manned and served without an augmentation for that particular purpose of the regular army. The force that should be employed for this service in time of war is the militia, FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 175 (using the term in a comprehensive sense;) the probability being that, in most of the defended points on the seaboard, the uniformed and volunteer companies will supply the garrisons needed. And it may be shown that it is a service to which militia are better adapted than any other. The prominent defect of a militia force results from the impossibility of so training the men to field movements in the brief period of their service as to give them any confidence in themselves as manoeuvrers in the face of regular troops ; the little they learn merely suffices to show them that it is but little ; every attempt of the kind proving, by the disorder that they know not how to avoid, how much greater would be the disorder if in face of an enemy and under fire. Without the knowledge to be obtained only by long and laborious practice, the militiaman knows that he is no match in the field for the regular soldier, and it is not surprising that he should desire to avoid an encounter. But there is no such difficulty in the service of fixed batteries. The militiaman has to be taught merely the service of a single gun, than which nothing can be more simple. He must learn to use the rammer and the sponge, the handspike and the linstock, to load, and to run to battery, to trail and to fire ; these are all. Each of these operations is of the utmost simplicity, depending on individual action and not on concert, and they may all be taught in a very short time. There is no manoeuvring, no marching, no wheeling. The squad of one gun may be marched to another, but the service of both is the same. Even the art of pointing cannon is, to an American militiaman, an art of easy attainment, from the skill that all our countrymen acquire in the use of fire-arms "drawing sight, or aiming," being the same art, modified only by the difference in the gun. The mode of applying this force may be illustrated by the case of any of our cities on the seaboard. The forts and batteries, being put in perfect condition, should be garrisoned, (at least the more important ones) by a small body of regular artillery, such as our present militrry force could supply, and sufficient for the preservation of the public property, and to afford indispensable daily guards ; to these should be added two or three men of the ordnance department, especially charged with the condition of the armament and ammunition, and two or three engineer soldiers, whose sole duty it would be to attend to the con- dition of the fortifications; keeping every part in a state of perfect repair. In certain important works, however, that would be exposed to siege, or to analo- gous operations, it would be prudent, especially in the beginning of a war, to keep up a more considerable body of regular troops. The volunteer force of the city should then be divided into detachments without disturbing their company organization, and should be assigned to the several works, according to the war garrisons required at each ; from four to six men, according to circumstances, being allowed to each gun. The larger works might require ten, fifteen, or even twenty companies ; the smaller, one, two, three, or more companies ; and, in some cases, even a platoon might suffice. Being thus assigned, each portion of the city force would have its definite alarm-post, and should be often taken to it, and there exercised in all the duties of its garrison, and more especially in the service of its batteries and in its defence against assault. The multiplicity of steamboats in all the cities would enable the volunteers to reach even the most distant alarm-posts in a short time. In order that all these troops may become expert in their duty, one of the works most convenient to the city, besides being the alarm-post of some partic- ular portion of the volunteers, should, during peace, be the ordinary school of drill for all ; and in this the detachments should, in turn, assemble and exercise. Besides the mere manual of the gun and battery, there should be frequent target practice, as being not only necessary to the proper use of the battery, but as imparting interest and excitement to the service. 176 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. It might be necessary for a time to submit the volunteers to the drill of a competent officer or non-commissioned officer of the regular artillery ; and, in particular, to conduct the practice with shot and shells under such instruction. The portion of the military force of the city not stationed in the fixed bat- teries would constitute, under an impending attack, a reserve, posted either in one or several bodies, according to circumstances, ready to cover exposed points, to co-operate in offensive movements, or to relieve exhausted garrisons : this portion having connected with it the mounted force, the field artillery, and the heavy movable guns. This appropriation of the volunteer force to the immediate defence of the city would operate in the most favorable way upon that force, superadding to the impulses of patriotism every feeling connected with family, property, and social and civil relations, and, while making military service the first of duties, reliev- ing it of hardship and privation. It would be a peculiar feature in this kind of service that the governing motive in the choice of officers would be favorable to the condition of the troops, every man feeling that the safety of his dearest concerns depended on the efficiency and courage of his officers. The same motive would prompt him, moreover, to desire, and contribute to, the highest state of efficiency in the corps. The organization of volunteer force here contemplated may comprehend the whole maritime frontier; and be applicable, also, at the more populous points upon the inland borders. This arrangement, while it might be an enduring one, would be the least expensive by far of any that would be efficient. The days of exercise, drill, and encampment should be fixed and invariable, in order that they may the less interfere with the private occupations of the volunteers. During an impending attack, greater or less portions should be constantly at these posts ; but still the service would comprise but a very small portion of the year. According to the value of the interest to be defended, and the extent of the works to be occupied, would be the rank of the chief command ; which should be intrusted to an officer of the regular army, whose control might often be extended, advantageously, over a certain extent of seaboard to the right and left, constituting a maritime department. In the tables to be presented at the end of this report, we shall give .the whole number of men required for the complete defence of each of the works. We now proceed to examine the coast in detail ; and, in order to conform to the Senate's resolution, we shall divide the whole sea-coast of the United States into two great portions : the first portion extending from Passamaquoddy bay to Cape Florida; the second from Cape Florida to the mouth of the Sabine. In our description we shall, without any other than this general acknowledg- ment, quote largely from a report presented to Congress in April, 1836, and to be found in the Senate documents of the 1st session 24th Congress, No. 293, vol. 4. This report contains an argument on the general subject, embodying many important considerations, which we have thought best not to repeat in this lengthened report, but to refer to as worthy of perusal. We will conduct the examination geographically beginning at the northeastern extremity, and referring in every case to accompanying tables which exhibit the several works in the order of relative importance as to time. COAST FROM PASSAMAQUODDY BAY TO CAPE FLORIDA. The extreme northeastern section of this coast, extending from Quoddy Head to Cape Cod, is characterized by its serrated outline and its numerous harbors, and, at certain seasons, by its foggy atmosphere. The extent of this section, measuring from point to point wherever the breaks of the coast are abrupt, is FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 177 about 500 miles ; while a straight line from one of the above-mentioned capes to the other is hardly half that distance. The eastern half is singularly indented by deep bays; the coast being universally rocky and possessing numerous islands surrounded by deep water, which islands not only increase the number of harbors, but cover, besides, an interior navigation well understood by the hardy coasters and measurably secured by its intricacies, and the other dangers of this boisterous and foggy region, from interruption by an enemy. The western half is much less broken ; it is covered by few islands in comparison, but con- tains several excellent harbors. The eastern harbors of Maine are exposed in a peculiar manner. They are not only on the flank of our line, but they are also quite near the public estab- lishments of the greatest maritime power. They are, moreover, as yet backed by only a thin population; and are,' consequently, weak as well as exposed. The time may not, however, be very distant when, becoming wealthy and populous, they will be objects of a full portion of the national solicitude. Works designed for these harbors must therefore be calculated for the future ; must be founded on the principle that they must defend places much more important than any now existing there ; that, being near the possessions of a foreign power, they will be in a particular manner liable to sudden and repeated attacks ; and that, lying at the extremity of the coast, they are liable to be tardily succored. The works must consequently be competent to resist escalade, and to hold out for a few days. Feebler works might be more injurious than beneficial ; their weakness would in the first place invite attack; and it being often a great advantage to occupy fortified places in an adversary's territory, the enemy could prepare himself to remedy the deficiencies of the forts after they should fall into his hands, by adding temporary works, by providing strong garrisons, and by aiding the defence with his vessels. No surveys have been made of these harbors, and no plans formed for their defence. It may be well to observe here, once for all, that much confidence is not asked for the mere conjectures presented below, as to the number and cost of the works assigned for the protection of the harbors which have not yet been surveyed : in some cases there may be mistakes as to the number of forts and batteries needed ; in others, errors will exist in the estimated cost. Eastport and Mackias may be mentioned as places that will unquestionably be thought to need defensive works by the time, in the order of relative im- portance, the execution of them can be undertaken by the government. There are several small towns eastward of Mount Desert island that may, at that period, deserve equal attention ; at present, however, the places mentioned will be the only ones estimated for; and $100,000 will be assumed as the cost at each. (Statement 1, table F.) Mount Desert island, situated a little east of Penobscot bay, having a capa- cious and close harbor, affording anchorage for the highest class of vessels, and . easily accessible from sea, offers a station for the navy of an enemy superior to any other on this part of the coast. From this point his cruisers might act with great effect against the navigation of the eastern coast, especially that of Maine ; and his enterprises could be conducted with great rapidity against any points he might select. These considerations, added to the very great advantage in certain political events, of our occupying a naval station thus advanced, whence we might act offensively, together with the expediency of providing places of suc- cor on a part of the coast where vessels are so frequently perplexed in their navigation by the prevailing fogs, lead to the conclusion that the fortification, in a strong manner, of this roadstead may before long be necessary. A survey of this island was begun many years ago ; but the party being called off to other duties it was never completed. The project of defensive works has not been H. Kep. Com. 86 12 178 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. made. The entire cost may be, as assumed by the engineer department some years ago, $500,000.-- (Statement 1, table F.) Castinc. It would seem to be impossible, on this coast, to deprive an enemy enjoying naval superiority of harbors, or prevent his using them as stations during a war insular situations, which his vessels would render unapproach- able, being so numerous ; but it seems proper that such of these positions as are the sites of towns should be secured. During the last war the English held the position of Oastine for some time, and left it at their pleasure. It is probable a work costing about $50,000 would deter an enemy from again making choice of this position. Statement 1, table F.) Penobscot bay. Upon this bay, and upon the river of the same name flowing into it, are several flourishing towns and villages. Of the many bays which intersect the coast the Penobscot is the one which presents the greatest number of safe and capacious anchorages. As before observed a large portion of these harbors must, for the present, be left without defences, but the valuable com- merce of the bay and river must be covered ; and to afford a secure retreat for such vessels as may be unable to place themselves under the protection of the works to the east or west of the bay, the passage of the river must be defended. The lowest point at which this can be done without great expense is opposite Bucksport at the "narrows." A project has been given in for a fort at that position estimated at $150,000. (Statement 1, table D.) St. George's bay, Broad bay, Damariscotta, and Sheepscut. West of the .Penobscot occur the above-mentioned bays, all being deep indentations leading to towns, villages, and various establishments of industry, and enterprise. The bays have not been surveyed, and of course no plans have been formed for their defence. $400,000 are assigned to the defence of these waters. The Sheeps- cut is an excellent harbor of refuge for vessels of every size. (Statement 1, table F.) Kcnnebcck river. This river (one of the largest in the eastern States) enters the sea nearly midway between Cape Cod and the mouth of the St. Croix. It rises near the source of the Chaudiere, which is a tributary of the St. Lowrence, and has once served as a line of operations against Quebec. The situation and extent of this river, the value of its products, and the active commerce of sev- eral very flourishing towns upon its banks, together with the excellence of the harbor within its mouth, will not permit its defence to be neglected. The sur- veys begun many years ago were never finished. The estimated cost of de- fences, as formerly reported by the engineer department, was $300,000. Posi- tions near the mouth will permit a secure defence. (Statement 1, table D.) Portland harbor. The protection of the town, of the merchantmen belong- ing to it, and of the ships-of-war that may be stationed in this harbor to watch over this part of the coast, or that may enter for shelter, (all of them important objects,) may be secured, as an inspection of the map of the harbor will shore, by occupying Fort Preble Point, House island, Hog Island ledge, and Fish Point, If the two channels to the west and east of Hog island can be obstructed at small expense (to decide which some surveys are yet necessary) there will be no necessity for 'a battery on the ledge, and Fish Point need be occupied only by such works as may be thrown up in time of war. The expense, as now estimated, of the works planned for this defence, will be $155,000 for Fort Preble, and $48,000 for House island; for Hog Island channel say, $135,000. (Statement 1, tables A, D, E, and F.) In addition there must be repairs im- mediately applied to the old works at an expense of $6,600. Saco, Kcnnebunk and York. Small works comparatively will cover these places; $75,000 is assumed as the aggregrate cost. (Statement 1, table F.) FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 179 "Portsmouth harbor and navy yard. The only good roadstead or harbor between Cape Elizabeth and Cape Ann is Portsmouth harbor, within the mouth of Piscataqua river. Line-of-battle ships can ascend as high as Fox Point, seven miles above the town. This situation, sufficiently commodious for a sec- ondary naval depot designed to repair vessels of war, should be maintained ; but it is to be regretted that the bay to the south of Fox Point was not chosen as the site of the navy yard instead of Fernald's island. Being where it is, it will be necessary, in time of war, to make some particular dispositions for the pro- tection of the navy yard from an attack from the north shore of the river. The position of Fort Constitution will certainly, and that of Fort McCleary vill probably, be occupied by the defences, though the works themselves should ive place to those that will better fulfil the object. The other positions for iorts or batteries are Gerrishe's Point, Fishing island, and Clark's island, some, if not all, of which must be occupied. Surveys are required before the projects can be formed, or before estimates can be made ; but there is reason for believing that the entire cost of fortifying this harbor will not fall short of $300,000. (Statement 1, table D.) Ncwburyport harbor. The points forming the mouth of the harbor are con- tinually changing, and it seems necessary, therefore, to rely, for the defence of the harbor, on works to be thrown up during a war. There is only a shoal draught of water. It is thought $100,000 will defend this harbor adequately. (Statement 1, table F.) Gloucester harbor. The position of this harbor, near the extremity of Cape Ann, places it in close relation with the navigation of all Massachusetts bay and imparts to it considerable importance. No surveys have yet been made, but it is believed that sufficient defence may be provided for $200,000. (Statement 1, table E.) Should there be any occasion for defensive works before the proposed new works can be commenced, an expenditure of $10,000 in repairs of the old fort will be required. (table A.) Beverly harbor. This harbor will be defended chiefly by a portion of the works designed for Salem. $50,000 in addition will secure it. (Statement 1, table F.) Salem harbor. The port of Salem is distant from Marblehead two miles, and separated therefrom by a peninsula. The occupation of the extremity of Win- ter island (where are the ruins of Fort Pickering) on one side, and Naugus Head on the other, will effectually secure this harbor. Projects have been pre- sented for this defence, estimated to cost $225,000. (Statement 1, tables D and F.) On a sudden emergency, old Fort Lee may be put in an effective state for $2,000. (table A.) Marblehead harbor. Besides covering, in some measure, the harbor of Bos- ton, Salem and Marblehead harbors possess an important commerce of their own, and also afford shelter for vessels prevented, by certain winds, from enter- ing Boston, or pursuing their course eastward. The proposed mode of defend- ing Marblehead harbor consists in occupying, on the north side, the hillock which commands the present Fort Sewall, (which will be superseded by the new work,) and, on the south, the position of Jack's Point. The two works will cost $318,000. (Statement 1, tables D and F. To repair old Fort Sewall, which may be necessary, if the, new works are not soon begun, will require $10,000. (Table A.) Boston harbor. We come now to the most important harbor in the eastern section of the coast; and, considering the relation to general commerce, and the interests of the navy, one of the most important in the whole Union. 180 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES After a careful examination of all the necessary conditions of such a problem, the board of naval officers and engineers, in their joint report of 1820, gave this harbor a preference over all other positions to the east and inclusive of New York bay and the Hudson, as the seat of the great northern naval depot; and the government, by the great additions and improvements that have from year to year been since made to the navy yard on the Charlestown side, have virtually sanctioned the recommendation of the board. But, independent of the navy yard, Boston is a city of great wealth, and possesses an extensive and active commerce. The old works defended merely the interior basin from attacks by water; but, as it often happens that vessels enter Nantasket roads with a wind too scant to take them to the city, or are detained in President roads by light winds or an adverse tide ; as the former, especially, is a very convenient anchorage whence to proceed to sea ; and, above all, as Nantasket roads affords the best possible station for a blockading squadron, it was deemed indispensable to place perma- nent defences at the mouth of the harbor. The project of defence regards the existing works, with the necessary repairs and modifications, as constituting a second barrier. Besides a permanent work, now well advanced, on George's island, it contem- plates permanent works on Nantasket Head; filling up the Broad Sound chan- nel, so as to leave no passage in that direction for ships-of-war. Until the best draught for steam vessels of war shall be well ascertained, it will not be safe to say to what depth the Broad Sound channel should be re- stricted ; nor, indeed, can it be positively asserted that this description of vessel can be conveniently excluded by such means. Other vessels can, however, be thus excluded; and steam vessels passing this channel would still have to pass the inner barrier. The estimated cost of the works for this harbor is $2,040,000. Besides the works of a permanent character, it will be necessary, in the be- ginning of a war, to erect several temporary works on certain positions in the harbor, and on the lateral approaches to the navy yard.- (Statement 1, tables A, E, and F.) Plymouth and Provincetown harbors. These harbors have a commerce of some consequence of their own, but they are particularly interesting in reference to the port of Boston. While these are undefended, an enemy's squadron block- ading Massachusetts bay will have ports of refuge under his lea, which would enable him to maintain his blockade, even throughout the most stormy seasons knowing that the winds which would force him to seek shelter would be adverse to outward-bound, and fatal to such inward vessels as should venture near the Cape. Were the enemy deprived of these harbors, he would be unable to enforce a rigorous investment, as he would be constrained to take an offing on every approach of foul weather. Our own vessels coming in from sea, and finding an enemy interposed between them and Boston, or, being turned from their course by adverse winds, would, in case of the defence of these ports, find to the south of Boston shelters equivalent to those provided in the east, at Marblehead, Salem, Gloucester, and Portsmouth. Plymouth harbor has not been fully surveyed. Provincetown harbor has been surveyed, but the projects of defence have not been formed. The former, it is thought, may be suitably covered by a work of no great cost on Garnett Point ; while, to fortify Provincetown harbor in such a way as to cover vessels taking shelter therein, and at the same time deprive an enemy of safe anchorages, will involve considerable expense. Probably no nearer estimate can be formed at present than that offered by the engineer de- partment some years ago, which gave $100,000 for Plymouth, and $600,000 for Provincetown. (Statement 1, tables D and E.) The coast between Cape Cod and Cape Hatteras differs from the northeastern f section in possessing fewer harbors, in having but little rocky and a great portion FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 181 of sandy shore, in its milder climate and clearer atmosphere; and it differs from all the other portions in the depth and magnitude of its interior seas and sounds, and in the distance to which deep tide navigation extends up its numerous large rivers. The circuit of the coast, not including the shores of the great bays, measures 650 miles, while a straight line from one of the above-named capes to the other measures about 520 miles. Martha's Vineyard sound. To the south of Cape Cod lie the islands of Nan- tucket and Martha's Vineyard, which, with several smaller islands on the south, and the projection of Cape Malabar on the east, enclose the above-named sound. The channels through this sound, being sufficient for merchant vessels, and one of the channels permitting the passage even of small frigates, are not only the constant track of coasting vessels, but also of large numbers of vessels arriving in the tempestuous months from foreign voyages. There are within the sound the harbors of Tarpaulin Cove, Holmes' s Hole, Edgartown, Falmouth, Hyan- nis, and Nantucket, besides small anchorages. In addition to the many thousand vessels passing this water annually, (of which there are sometimes forty or fifty,) a portion containing very valuable cargoes, to be seen in the harbors awaiting a change of wind, there is supposed to be at least 40,000 tons of whaling vessels owned in the towns of this sound. If the harbors just named are to be defended at all, it must be by fortifications. There is little or no population except in the towns, and even this is believed to be entirely without military organization. A privateer might run into either of these harbors, and capture, destroy, or levy contributions at pleasure. The use of the sound itself, as an anchorage for vessels-of-war, cannot be prevented by fortifications alone. $250,000 may, perhaps, suffice for the defence of all the harbors against the kind of enterprise to which they are exposed. (Statement 1, table F.) New Bedford and Fairhaven harbor. No survey has been made of this harbor, on which lie two of the most flourishing towns. It is easily defensible, and the amount formerly assumed by the engineer department will probably suffice, namely, $300,000. (Statement 1, table D.) Buzzard's ~bay. Interposed between the main and the island of Martha's Vineyard, are the Elizabeth islands, which bound Buzzard's bay on the south. This bay covers the harbor of New Bedford, and might be used as an anchorage by an enemy's fleet; but it is too wide to be defended by fortifications. Narraganset bay. The properties of this great roadstead will be here briefly adverted to. More minute information may be obtained by reference to reports of 1820 and 1821. As a harbor, this is acknowledged by all to be the best on the whole coast of the United States ; and it is the only close man-of-war harbor that is accessible with a northwest wind, the prevailing and most violent wind of the inclement season. Numerous boards and commissions, sometimes composed of naval officers, sometimes of army officers, sometimes of officers of both services, have, at different times, had the subject of this roadstead under consideration; and all have concurred in recommending, in strong terms, that it be made a place of naval rendezvous and repair, if not a great naval depot ; one or more of these commissions preferring it, for the latter purpose, to all other positions. These recommendations have not been acted on ; but it is next to certain that a war would force their adoption upon the government. With the opening of this anchorage properly defended, hardly a vessel-of-war would come, either singly or in small squadrons, upon the coast, in the boisterous season, without aiming at this port, on account of the comparative certainty of an immediate entrance. And this would be particularly the case with vessels 182 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. injured by heavy weather, or in conflict with an enemy; with vessels bringing in prizes, or pursued by a superior force. This use of the port would almost necessarily bring with it the demand for the means of repairing and refitting; and the concentration of these upon some suitable spot would be the beginning of a permanent dock yard. For the same reason that ships-of-war would collect here, it would be a favorite point of rendezvous for privateers and their prizes, and a common place of refuge for merchantmen. From this, as a naval station, the navigation of Long Island sound, and the communication between this and Martha's Vineyard sound, or Buzzard's bay, might be well protected ; New London harbor would be covered ; the navy yard would command southwardly, as from Hampton roads northwardly, the great inward curve of the coast between Cape Cod and Cape Hatteras ; the influence of which command over the blockading operations of an enemy will be apparent, when it is considered that the only harbors of refuge left to him will be the Delaware, Gardiner's, and Buzzard's bays, and Martha's Vineyard sound. The bays first mentioned belong to the class before alluded to, which, being too wide for complete defence by batteries, must call in such auxiliary defences as the navy may supply ; and in reference to their defence by these means, nothing can be more important than the fortification of Narraganset roads, be- cause all but the first of the bays just named (including an anchorage for ships- of-war under Block island) would be commanded by a single squadron of those floating defences lying in these roads. To a squadron of steam batteries, for instance, lying under the fortifications, it would be a matter of little consequence into which of the above anchorages an enemy should go all being within reach in three or four hours, and some within sight. We will here observe, by the way, that this use of floating defences is in accordance with the principle before in- sisted on ; they are not expected to close the entrance into these several bays, that would require a squadron for each at least equal to the enemy's ; but as the enemy goes in merely for rest or shelter, and there is no object that he can in- jure, he may be permitted to enter, and our squadron will assail him only when the circumstances of wind, weather, &c., give all the advantages to the attack. The fortification of Narraganset roads is therefore, in effect, a most important contribution toward the defence of all the neighboring anchorages. But the same properties that make Narraganset roads so precious to us would recommend them to the enemy also ; and their natural advantages will be en- hanced in his eyes by the value of all the objects these advantages may have accumulated therein. If this roadstead were without defence an enemy could occupy it without op- position, and, by the aid of naval superiority, form a lodgement on the island of Rhode Island for the war. Occupying this island with his troops, and with his fleets the channels on either side, he might defy all the forces of the eastern States ; and while, from this position, his troops would keep in alarm and motion the population of the east, feigned expeditions against New York, or- against more southern cities, would equally alarm the country in that direction ; and thus, though he might do no more than menace, it is difficult to estimate the em- barrassment and expense into which he would drive the government. It has been alleged that similar consequences would flow from the occupation of other positions, (such, for instance, as are afforded in the bays just mentioned,) and that, therefore, the defence in a strong manner of Narraganset roads is use- less. Even allowing that there are other advantageous and inaccessible positions whereon an enemy might place himself, is it a reason because the foe can in spite of us, possess himself of comparatively unsafe and open harbors, that we should not apply to our own uses, but yield up to him the very best harbor on FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 183 the coast; that we should submit to capture and destruction the valuable objects that accumulate in consequence of the properties of the harbor 1 But it is believed that none of the outer and wider harbors will answer for such an establishment as we have supposed, nor for any other purpose than an occasional anchorage of ships-of-war; and for these reasons, amongst others: that although ships-of-war might possibly ride in these broad waters at all sea- sons, it would seem to be a measure of great temerity for transports to attempt it, except in the mildest seasons ; and there can be but little doubt that a hostile expedition would resort to no harbor as a place of rendezvous, unless it afforded sure protection to its transports ; these being the only means by which ulterior purposes could be executed, or final retreat from the country effected. If, moreover, Narraganset roads be fortified and become a naval station, or at least the station of a floating force designed to act against these outer waters, such an establishment by any enemy would at once be put upon the defensive, and require the constant presence of a superior fleet, thus measurably losing the object of the establishment. Independent of the qualities of the harbor, however, none of these bays would answer our purpose : 1st. Because they cannot be securely defended ; and, 2d. Because they are difficult of access from the main the communication with them being liable to interruption by bad weather, and liable to be cut off by the enemy. The defence adopted for Narraganset roads must be formidable on the impor- tant points, because they will be exposed to powerful expeditions. Although the possession of this harbor, the destruction of the naval establishment, the capture of the floating defences, and the possession of the island as a place of debarkation and refreshment should not be considered as constituting, of them- selves, objects worthy a great expedition, they might very well be the prelimi- nary steps of such expedition; and defences weak in their character might tempt, rather than deter it; for, although unable to resist his enterprise* they might be fully competent, after being captured and strengthened by such means as he would have at hand, to protect him from offensive demonstrations on our part. There are, besides, in the local circumstances, some reasons why the works should be strong. The channel on the eastern side of the island being perma- nently closed by a solid bridge, requires no defensive works; but this bridge being at the upper end of the island, the channel is open to an enemy all along the eastern shore of the island. Works erected for the defence of the channel on the west side of the island cannot, therefore, prevent, nor even oppose, a landing on the eastern side. The enemy, consequently, may take possession, and bend his whole force to the reduction of the forts on the island, which can- not be relieved until a force has been organized, brought from a distance, con- veyed by water to the points attacked, and landed in the face of his batteries ; all this obviously requiring several days, during which the forts should be capa- ble of holding out. To do this against an expedition of 10,000 or 20,000 men demands something more than the strength to resist a single assault. Unless the main works be competent to withstand a siege of a few days, they will not therefore fulfil their trust, and will be worse than useless. It must here be noticed that, although the works do not prevent the landing of an enemy on Rhode Island, they will, if capable of resisting his efforts for a few days, make his residence on the island for any length of time impossible ; since forces in any number may be brought from the main and lauded under the cover of the fire of the works. To come now to the particular defences proposed for this roadstead. It must be stated that there are three entrances into Narraganset roads : 1st. The eastern channel, which passes up on the east side of the island of Rhode Island. This, as before stated, being shut by a solid bridge, needs 184 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. no defence by fortifications, other than a field-work or two, which may b thrown up at the opening of a war. 2d. The central channel, which enters from sea by passing between Rhode Island and Canonicut island. This is by far the best entrance, and leads to the best anchorage ; and this it is proposed to defend by a fort on the east side of the entrance, designed to be the principal work in the system. This work, called Fort Adams, is nearly completed. On the west side of the entrance it is proposed to place another work ; and on an island, called Rose island, facing the entrance, a third Avork. It is also proposed to repair the old fort on Goat island, just within the mouth ; and also old Fort Green, which is a little higher up, and on the island of Rhode Island. 3d. As to the western passage, three modes present themselves ; first, by re- ducing the depth of water by an artificial ledge, so as while the passage shall be as free as it is now for the coasting trade, it shall be shut as to the vessels of war, including steam vessels; second, by relying on fortifications alone to close the channel ; or, third, by resorting in part to one and in part to the other mode just mentioned. Either is practicable ; but being the least expensive and most certain, the estimates are founded on the first. The total cost of the Narraganset defences is estimated at $1,817,482. (Statement 1, tables A. B, D, E, and F.) Gardiner's bay. It is uncertain whether this harbor, which would be a very valuable one to an enemy investing this part of the coast, is defensible by forti- fications alone. After it shall have been surveyed, it may appear that from one or more positions the whole anchorage may be controlled by heavy sea mortars. In such a case, the defensive works would not be costly. If it be found expe- dient to fortify some particular portion of the bay, as an anchorage for steam batteries, (which, however, is not anticipated,) the expense would probably be as great as was anticipated some years since by the engineer department, viz : $400,000. (Statement 1, table F.) Sag harbor, New York, and Stonington, Connecticut. Neither of these har- bors has been surveyed with reference to defence. The first is possessed of considerable tonnage ; and the second, besides being engaged in commerce, is the terminus of a railroad from Boston. $100,000 may be assigned to the first, and $200,000 to the other. (Statement 1, tables E and F.) New London harbor is very important to the commerce of Long Island sound ; and, as a port of easy access, having great depth of water, rarely freezing, and being easily defended, it is an exellent station for the navy. It is also valuable as a shelter for vessels bound out or home, and desirous of avoiding a blockading squadron off Sandy Hook. In the plan of defence, the present forts (Trumbull and Griswold) give place to more efficient works, whereof the expense is estimated at $441,000. (State- ment 1, tables C and F.) Mouth of Connecticut river. This river has been shown to be subject to the expeditions of an enemy. No survey has been made with a view to its de- fences ; $100,000 is introduced here as the conjectural cost. (Statement 1, table F,) New Haven harbor. It is proposed to defend this harbor by improving and enlarging Fort Hale, and substituting a new work for the slight redoubt erected during the last war, called Fort "Wooster. The expense of both may be set down at $90,000, exclusive of $5,000 for immediate repairs of old Fort Hale. (Statement 1, table F.) There are several towns between New Haven and New York, on both sides of the sound ; none of them are very large as yet, still, most, if not all, are pros- FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 185 porous and increasing. Although, in their present condition, it might not be deemed necessary to apply any money to permanent defences, yet, as part of the present object is to ascertain, as near as may be, the ultimate cost of com- pletely fortifying the coast, it seems proper to look forward to the time when some of these towns may become objects of predatory enterprises of some mag- nitude. Bearing in mind the probable increase of population in the mean time, and the situation of the places generally, it is thought that $200,000 will be enough to provide defences for all. (Statement 1, table F.) New York harbor. The objects of the projected works for the security of New York are to cover the city from an attack by land or sea ; to protect its numerous shipping ; to prevent, as far as possible, the blockade of this great port ; and to cover the interior communication uniting this harbor with the Del- aware. In the present condition of the defences an enemy would encounter no great opposition, whether his attack were made by land or water. There are two avenues to the city, namely : one by the main channel, direct from sea, and one by the sound. If an enemy come by the way of the sound, he may now land his forces on the New York side, at Hell Grate, within less than ten miles of New York, and the next day, at the latest, be in the city ; or he may land on the Long island side at the same distance, and in the same time be master of the navy yard and of Brooklyn heights, whence the city of New York is perfectly commanded ; or he may divide his forces and reach both objects at the same moment. The projected system of defence closes this avenue at the greatest distance possible from the city, namely, at Throg's Point. The occupation of this point will force the enemy to land more than twenty miles from the city on one side, and still further from the navy yard on the other. A work now in progress at Throg's Point will probably prevent any attempt to force this passage. It will, as we have seen, oblige an enemy to land at a considerable distance from the object ; and, as he will then be unable to turn the strong position afforded by Harlem river, the cover on the New York side will be sufficient. , But should he land on the Long Island side he might, by leaving parties on suitable positions with a view to prevent our crossing the river and falling on his rear, make a dash at the navy yard, having no obstacle in his front. To prevent this effectually, and also to accomplish other objects, a work should be erected on Wilkins's Point, opposite Throg's Point. This work, besides com- pleting the defence of the channel, would involve a march against the navy yard from this quarter in great danger ; since all the forces that could be collected on the New York shore might, under cover of this work, be crossed over to Long Island, and fall on the rear of the enemy, cutting off his communication with the fleet. The two works on Throg's and Wilkins's Points may, therefore, be regarded as perfectly protecting, on that side, the city and navy yard. Against an attack by the main channel there are 1st. The works in the vicinity of the city, which would act upon an enemy's squadron only after its arrival before the place. They consist of Fort Colum- bus, Castle Williams, and South Battery, on Governor's island ; Fort Wood, on Bedlow's island ; and Fort Gibson, on Ellis's island. It is necessary that these works be maintained, because, in the event of the lower barrier being forced, these would still afford a resource. It is a disad- vantage of their positions, however, that the destruction of the city might be going on simultaneously with the contest between these forts and the fleet. They cannot, however, be dispensed with, until the outer barriers are entirely completed, if even then. 2d. At the NaiTows, about seven miles below the city, the passage becomes so contracted as to permit good disposition to be made for defence. On the Long 186 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. Island side of the Narrows is Fort Lafayette, which is a strong water-battery standing on a reef at some distance from the shore ; and immediately behind it, 011 the top of the bank, is a small but strong work, called Fort Hamilton. Some ' repairs being applied to these works this position may be regarded as well occupied. On the west side, or Staten island side of the Narrows, are the following works belonging to the State of New York, viz : Fort Richmond, which is a water- battery ; Battery Hudson, which is at some height above the water ; Battery Morton, which is a small battery on the top of the hill ; and Fort Tomkins, which is also on the top of the hill, and is the principal work. All these need great repairs ; but, being once in proper order, would afford a very important contribution to the defence- of the passage ; nothing further, indeed, being con- templated for this position, except the construction of a small redoubt on a com- manding hill, a little to the southwest. The repairs of these works cannot too soon be taken in hand ; and it is hoped some arrangement may soon be made with the State authorities to that end. With the Narrows thus defended, and the works near the city in perfect order, New York might be regarded as pretty well protected against an attack by water through this passage. But there lies below the Narrows a capacious bay, affording good anchorage for any number of vessels-of-war and transports. An enemy's squadron being in that bay, into which entrance is very easy, would set a seal upon this outlet of the harbor. Not a vessel could enter or depart at any season of the year. And it would also intercept the water communication, by the way of the Raritan, between New York and Philadelphia. The same squadron could land a force on the beach of Gravesend bay, (the place of the landing of the British, which brought on the battle of Long Island in the revolutionary war,) within seven miles of the city of Brooklyn, of its commanding height, and of the navy yard, with no intervening obstacle of any sort. This danger is imminent, and it would not fail, in the event of war, to be as fully realized as it was during the last war, when, on the rumor of an expedition being in preparation in England, 27,000 militia were assembled to cover the city from an attack of this sort. It is apparent that the defences near the city, and those at the Narrows, indispensable as they are for other purposes, cannot be made to prevent this enterprise, which can be thoroughly guarded against only by 3d. An outer barrier at the very mouth of the harbor. This would accom- plish two objects of great consequence, namely, rendering a close blockade of the harbor impossible ; and obliging an enemy, who should design to move troops against the navy yard, to land at a distance of more than twenty miles from his object, upon a dangerous beach ; leaving, during the absence of the troops, the transports at anchor in the ocean, and entirely without shelter. The hazards of such a land expedition would, moreover, be greatly enhanced by the fact that our own troops, by passing over to Long Island under cover of the fort at Wilkins's Point, could cut off the return of the enemy to his fleet, which must lie at or somewhere near Rockaway ; time, distance, and the direction of the respective marches, would make, very naturally, such a manoeuvre a part of the plan of defence. Against an enemy landing in Gravesend bay, no such ma- noeuvre could be effectual, on account of the shortness of his line of march, as well as of its direction. . In view of these considerations, the board of engineers projected additional works one for the east bank and another for the middle ground ; these posi- tions being on shoals on either hand of the bar, outside of Sandy Hook. Before determining on the works last mentioned, the board went into much research in FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 187 order to ascertain whether these shoals were unchangeable, and it was thought to have been fully proved that there had been no material alteration in more than sixty years. This apparent stability of the shoals encouraged the board to devise the project referred to. Recent surveys have, however, discovered a new or rather another channel. If it be indeed a new channel, it shows a want of stability in the shoals that forbids any such structures as. the contemplated batteries, and it may be neces- sary to resort to other means. Suitable means exist, unquestionably, though it may not be best to decide on them until all doubt as to the fixed or changing nature of the channel shall be removed, especially as it must necessarily be some time before the completion of more indispensable works will allow the commencement of these. This may, however, be said with certainty, namely : that all other means failing, works may be erected on Sandy Hook which will have a good action upon the channel, and under cover of which bomb ketches or steam batteries, or both, -may lie. With such an arrangement there would Jbe little probability of the lower bay being occupied as a blockading station. To recapitulate : The security of the city of New York and the navy yard requires, first, defences on the passage from the sound, namely, the completion of Fort Schuyler on Throg's Point, and the erection of a fort on Wilkins's Point cost of both $976,000 ; second, the repair of works on Governor's island, on Bedloe's island, and on Ellis's island estimated .cost $170,897 ; third, the repair of the works at the Narrows, including the works belonging to the State cost, 8475,000 ; and, fourth, the erection of outer defences on or near Sandy Hook estimated by the board of engineers to cost $3,362,824. The total cost, exclusive of these last, will therefore be $1,621,897, or, in- cluding these, $4,984,721. (Statement 1, tables A, C, and F.) Delaware bay, Fort Delaware, Fort Mifflin, Delaware breakwater. The coast from the mouth of the Hudson to the Chesapeake, as well as that on the south side of Long Island, is low and sandy, and is penetrated by several inlets ; but not one besides the Delaware is navigable by sea-going vessels. The Dela- ware bay itself, being wide and full of shoals, having an intricate channel, and being much obstructed by ice in the winter, affords no very good natural harbor within a reasonable distance of the sea. The artificial harbor now in course of construction near Cape Henlopen will, it is hoped, fully supply this need, in which event it must be securely fortified. No plans have, however, as yet been made with that object, and as to the pro- bable cost, nothing better can now be done than to assume the conjectural esti- mate made some years since in the engineer department, namely, $600,000. (Statement 1, table F.) The lowest point at which the bay is defensible is at Pea Patch island, about forty-five miles below the city of Philadelphia. A fort on that island, to re- place the one destroyed by fire ; a fort opposite the Pea Patch, on the Delaware shore, to assist in commanding the Delaware channel, and at the same time pro- tect the mouth of the Delaware and Chesapeake canal ; a temporary work on the Jersey shore, to be thrown up at the commencement of a war, to assist in closing the channel on that side ; together with floating obstructions, to be put down in moments of peril, will effectually cover all above this position in- cluding Philadelphia and its navy yard, Wilmington, Newcastle, the canal be- fore mentioned, and the Philadelphia and Baltimore railroad. The commencement of the rebuilding of Fort Delaware being delayed by difficulties attending the settlement of new claims to the island on which it is to stand, Fort Mifflin, which is an old work about seven miles below the city of Philadelphia, has been put in good order. This work is ready to receive its armament and its garrison. 188 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. The expense of the work on Fort Delaware may be estimated at $491,000, and of the fort opposite, $521,000. (Statement 1, tables C and F.) Chesapeake bay. The board of naval officers and engineers intrusted with the selection of sites for a great northern and a great southern naval depot, recommended in their joint reports of 1819 and 1820 Burwell's bay, on James river, for the one, and Charlestown, in Boston harbor, for the other. They also recommended Boston harbor and Narraganset bay, at the north, and Hampton roads, at the south, as chief naval rendezvous. In those reports the commis- sioners entered at large into the consideration of all the matters relating to these important objects, and reference is now made to those reports for -many interest- ing details. Hampton roads, James river, Norfolk, and the navy yard. The works pro- jected for the defence of these are, 1st, a fort at Old Point Comfort this is called Fort Monroe ; 2d, a casemated battery, called Fort Calhoun, on the Rip Rap shoals, opposite Old Point Comfort ; and 3d, a line of floating obstruc- tions extending across the channel from one of these works to the other. It was the opinion of the commission above mentioned that, in the event of a great naval depot being fixed on James river, it might ultimately be proper to provide additional strength by placing works on the positions of Newport News, Was- saw shoals, and Craney Island flats. Such an expansion has, however, since then been given to the present navy yard at Gosport, (opposite Norfolk,) that there is little probability of any other position on these waters being occupied for such purposes. The great importance of retaining Hampton roads during a war, and of cover- ing the navy yard, is conceded on all hands. The bearing of this harbor upon the general defence of the Chesapeake bay is, perhaps, equally well understood, it being very evident that a small hostile force would reluctantly venture up the bay, or into York river, or the Rappahannock, or any of the upper harbors, leaving behind them a great naval station, and the common rendezvous of the southern coast a station seldom in time of war without the presence of a num- ber of vessels just ready for, or just returned from, sea. A very important bearing upon the security of Norfolk and the navy yard, independent of the closing the channel to those places, is, however, not generally understood, and has been entirely overlooked in the oflicial animadversions (before mentioned) on the system of defence of the board of engineers. If we suppose no defences at the mouth of the roadstead, or only such as can be disregarded or easily silenced, an enemy might debark his troops in Lynn- haven bay, and despatch them against Norfolk, while his fleet would pass up the harbor to the vicinity of the town, not only covering the flank of his troops, but landing parties to turn any position that might be taken by the army at- tempting to defend the place ; or, instead of landing in the bay, he might at his option land the main body quite near to Norfolk ; and, having possession of James river, he would prevent the arrival of any succor in steamboats or other- wise by that channel. There are two or three defiles on the route from Lynnhaven bay to Norfolk, caused by the interlocking of streams, that, with the aid of field-works, would possess great strength ; and being occupied in succession, would undoubtedly delay, if not repulse, an enemy assailing them in front. Since the naval depot seems fixed at Gosport, these must, indeed, be chiefly relied on for its security from land attacks ; and timely attention must be given, on the breaking out of a war, to the occupying of these defiles with appropriate defences. These posi- tions possess no value whatever if they can be turned, and without adequate fortifications at the outlet of Hampton roads, there would seem to be no security for Norfolk or the navy yard, except in the presence of a large military force. FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 189 On the completion of the projected defences, the circumstances will be very different. Then, those denies must be attacked in front, because no part of the enemy's force can be landed above the mouth of the roads. But this is not all. The moment an enemy advances towards Norfolk from this point of debarka- tion, his communication with his fleet will be jeoparded, because, as the denies do not require a large body to defend them against an attack in front, the greater part of the reinforcements arriving from above, by way of the river, may be lauded upon his flanks, or in his rear. An offensive land movement by the enemy, under such circumstances, could be justified only in the case of his finding an entire want of preparation, caused by the unexpected commencement of hostilities. In connexion with this disposition for defence, it may be expe- dient on the opening of a war, to throw up a field-work on the shore opposite the position of Fort Calhoun, which would, besides, contribute to the exclusion from the roadstead of vessels of small draught. The above remarks show that the fortifications in progress are not less neces- sary to the security of the navy yard and the city of Norfolk from a land at- tack than from an attack by water, and that both these important functions are superadded to the task of defending the only good roadstead of the southern coast, and of contributing, in a very important degree, towards the defence of the Chesapeake bay. As in the case of Narraganset roads, it has been objected to this system of defence that, although it may shut up this anchorage it leaves others in this region open. May we suppose, then, that if there were no other than this har- bor, its defence would be justifiable? If so, it would seem that the objection rests on the principle that in proportion as nature has been bountiful to us, we must be niggard to ourselves ; that, having little, we may cherish it, but, having much, we must throw all away. I The same criticism complains of the unreasonable magnitude of one of these works, (Fort Monroe,) and we concede that there is justice in the criticism. But it has long been too late to remedy the evil. It may not, however, be im- proper to avail of this opportunity to remove from the country the professional reproach attached to this error. When the system of coast defence was about to be taken up, it was thought best by the government and Congress, to call from abroad a portion of that skill and science which a long course of active warfare was supposed to have supplied. Fort Monroe is one of the results of that determination. It was not easy, probably, to come down from the exag- gerated scale of warfare to which Europe was then accustomed ; nor for those who had been brought up where wars were often produced, and always magni- fied by juxtaposition or proximity, to realize to what degree remoteness from belligerent nations would diminish military means and qualify military objects. Certain it is, that this experiment, costly as it was in the case of Fort Monroe, would have been much more so but for the opposition of some whose more moderate opinions had been moulded by no other circumstances than those pe- .culiar to our own country. The mistake is one relating to magnitude, however, not to strength. Magni- tude in fortifications is often a measure of strength ; fcut not always, nor in this instance. Fort Monroe might have been as strong as it is now against a water attack, or an assault, or a siege, with one-third its present capacity, and per- haps at no more than half its cost. We do not think this work too strong for its position, nor too heavily armed ; and as the force of the garrison will depend mainly on the extent of the armament, the error has caused an excess in the first outlay chiefly, but will not involve much useless expense after completion. Although there is much important work to be done to complete the fort, it is even now in a state to contribute largely to the defence of the roadstead, and there is no doubt that in a very short time all the casemated parts may be per- ctly ready to recieve the armament. 190 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. This work will be found in statement 1, table C ; $223,367 being required to complete it. Fort Calhoun cannot yet be carried forward for want of stability in the foun- dation. The artificial mass on which it is to stand having been raised out of the water, the walls of the battery were begun some years since, but it was soon found that their weight caused considerable subsidence. On an inspection by engineer officers, it was then decided to keep the foundations loaded with more than the whole weight of the finished work until all subsidence had ceased. The load had hardly been put on, however, before it was injudiciously deter- mined to take it off and begin to build, although the settling was still going on. Happily a better policy prevailed before the construction was resumed, but not before the very considerable expense of removing the load had been incurred, and the further expense of replacing it rendered necessary. It is hoped the whole load will be replaced early the present year. (Statement 1, table C.) Required to complete the work $416,000. It may be expedient, in time of war, by way of providing interior barriers, to erect batteries on Craney island, at the mouth of Elizabeth river, and to pu1 in condition and arm old Fort Norfolk, which is just below the city. Harbor of St. Mary's. The central situation (as regards the Chesapeake) o: this fine basin, its relation to the Potomac, its depth of water, and the facility with which it may be defended, indicate its fitness as a harbor of refuge for tht commerce of the Chesapeake bay, and as an occasional, if not constant, statioi during war of a portion of the naval force. A survey has been made, but n< project has been formed. The engineer department, some years ago, conjee tured that the cost of defences in this harbor might amount to $300,000. (Statement 1, table F.) Annapolis harbor. No surveys or plans of defence have been made. Th< existing works are inefficient and quite out of repair. A former estimate mad< by the engineer department, amounting to $250,000, is adopted here. (Statemen 1, table F.) Harbor of Baltimore. The proximity of the city to Chesapeake bay greath endangers the city of Baltimore. In the present state of things, an enemy in i few hours' march, after an easy landing,, and without having his communicatio] with his fleet seriously endangered, can make himself master of that great em porium of commerce. There are required for its security two forts on the Pa tapsco one at Hawkins's Point, and the other opposite that point, at the extrem end of the flat that runs off from Sollers's Point ; these being the lowest posi tions at which the passage of the Patapsco can be defended. Besides the ad vantages that will result, of obliging the enemy to land at a greater distance- thereby gaining time, by delaying his march, for the arrival of succor, and prc venting his turning the defensive positions which our troops might occupy i will be impossible for him to endanger the city by a direct attack by water. The present Fort McHenry, Redoubt TVood, and Covington battery should b retained as a second barrier. The first mentioned is now in good condition, an the repairs required for the others may be applied at the beginning of a war. The fort on Sollers's Point flats, which should be first commenced, is estimate to cost $1,000,000. (Statement 1, table D.) The fort on Hawkins's Point, (to be found in statement 1, table F,) will cos it is supposed, $376,000. Mouth of Elk river. The completion of the line of water communicatio from the Delaware to the waters of the Chesapeake makes it proper to place fort somewhere near the mouth of Elk river, in order to prevent an enemy froi destroying, by a sudden enterprise, the works forming this outlet of the cana There have been no surveys made with a view to establish such protectioi which are estimated at $50,000. (Statement 1, table F.) FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 191 Cities of Washington, Geogetown, and Alexandria. Fort Washington' covers these cities from any attack by water, and will oblige an enemy to land at some eight or ten miles below Alexandria, should that city be his object, and about twice as far below Washington. It will also serve the very important purpose of covering troops crossing from Virginia with a view to fall on the flanks of an enemy moving against the capital from the Patuxent or the Chesa- peake. To put the necessary repairs on Fort Washington will cost about $20,000. (See statement 1, table A.) Cedar Point, Potomac river. But all these objects would have been better fulfilled had the work been placed at Lower Cedar Point. As it is, however, the contemplated works being constructed in the Patuxent, and the militia of the surrounding country in a due state of preparation, an enterprise against Washington would be a hazardous one. As giving complete security to the towns in the District, covering more than sixty miles in length of the Potomac, and a large tract of country lying between the Potomac and the Patuxent, the work on Cedar Point should not be omitted. There have been no surveys made of the ground, nor projects of the fort, which, in a conjectural estimate of the engineer department, was set down at $300,000. (Statement 1, table E.) f Patuxent river. The more effectually to protect the city of Washington from a sudden attack by troops landed at the head of navigation in the Patuxent, and to provide additional shelter for vessels in the Chesapeake, a fort has been planned to occupy Point Patience, and another to occupy Thomas's Point, both a short distance up the river. The work on Thomas's Point is (in statement 1, table D) estimated to cost $250,000; and the work on Point Patience, (in state- ment 1, table F,) estimated to cost $246,000. It will be perceived that the system of defence for Washington contemplates, first, defending the Potomac on Cedar Point and maintaining a second barrier at Fort Washington ; second, defending flie mouth of the Patuxent. This system is criticised in the document before referred to in a way to induce the suspicion that it was not understood. During the last war there was no fort in the Patuxent ; and the consequence was, that the British approached by that avenue and occupied the whole river as high as Pig Point nearly fifty miles from its mouth, and less than twenty miles from the capital ; while, in consequence of there being no forts in the Po- tomac, they occupied thatr iver as high as Alexandria, inclusive; by this latter occupation perfectly protecting the left flank of the movement during its whole advance and retreat. Both flanks being safe, the British had nothing to fear except from a force in front ; and that this risk was not great, in the short march of less than twenty miles from his boats, was proved by the issue. On the ninth day from that on which the fleet entered the Chesapeake the English army was in possession of the capital, having penetrated near fifty miles beyond the point of debarkation. On the twelfth day from the time of landing, the troops were again on shipboard near the mouth of the river. This attack, exceedingly well conceived and very gallantly executed, owed its success en- tirely to the want of defences, such as are now proposed. Let us suppose both rivers fortified as recommended, and an enemy landed at the mouth of the Patuxent. If now he attempt this enterprise his march will be prolonged by at least four days ; that is to say, it will require more than six- teen days, during which time he will be out of communication with his fleet, as regards supplies and assistance. The opposition to his invasion will begin at the landing, because our troops, having now nothing to fear as to their flank, either from the Potomac or Pa- tuxent, will dispute every foot of territory; and although he should continue to advance, it must be at a slower rate. 192 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. While he is thus pursuing his route towards Washington, the forces of Vir- ginia will be crossing the Potomac and concentrating at Port Tobacco, or some . position between that place and Fort Washington, preparatory to falling on his flank and rear. This would seem to be conclusive; for it is difficult to conceive of troops persevering in an expedition when every moment will not only place them further from succor, but greatly increase their need of it. Railroads reach from near the crossing places of the Potomac to the very heart of the country south; and a very few days would bring forward a large force, all of which would arrive upon the rear of the enemy. It is said in the criticism that, if shut out of the Patuxent, the enemy might land between the mouth of that river and Annapolis, and thence proceed against Washington. But the same difficulties belong to this project, and a new diffi- culty is added. The Virginia forces arrive, as before, and assail his flank either between the Potomac and Patuxent, or between the Patuxent and the Chesa- peake ; and there is, besides, the Patuxent for the enemy to cross both in going and returning itself a formidable military obstacle. It is said, also, that the landing may be made in the Potomac ; but this only proves that the system animadverted on had not been studied, it being a fun- damental principle of the system that such landing must be prevented by forti- fying the rivers as low down as possible The southern coast, stretching from Cape Hatteras to the southern point of Florida, is invariably low, and for the greater part sandy; much resembling^ the coast from the above-mentioned cape to Montauk Point, on the east end of Long Island. A ridge of sand, here and there interrupted by the alluvion of the rivers, ex- tends through its whole length. This ridge, in certain portions, lies on the main land, while in others it is divided therefrom by basins or "sounds" of various width and depth, and is cut up into islands by numerous channels which connect these interior waters with the sea. Wherever this sand ridge is inter- rupted its place is occupied by low and marshy grounds, bordering the principal and the many lesser outlets of the rivers. Ocracock inlet, N. C. The shallowness of the water on the bars at this inlet effectually excudes all vessels-of-war at least, all moved by sails. But as this is an outlet of an extensive commerce, and as, through this opening, attempts might be made in small vessels, barges, or the smaller class Df steam vessels, to destroy this commerce, or to interrupt the line of interior water communication, timely preparation must be made of temporary works equal to defence against all such minor enterprises. Beaufort 7iarbor, N. C. A work called Fort Macon has been erected for the defence of this harbor, which will require some repairs. Some operations are also called for to protect the site from the wearing action of the sea. (State- ment 1, table A.) Estimate, $10,000. Mouths of Cape Fear river, N. C. The defence of the main channel of Cape Fear requires, in addition to Fort Caswell, (now nearly completed,) on Oak island, another fort on Bald Head. And the defence of the smaller channel will require a redoubt on Federal Point. The battery magazine, block-house, &c., at Smith ville, should remain as accessories. Fort Caswell, Oak island, (statement 1, table C,) requires $6,000 to complete it ; the fort on Bald Head (statement 1, table F) will require $180,000; the redoubt on Federal Point (statement 1, table F) will require $18,000 ; and the battery, &c., called Fort Johnston, at Smithville, (statement 1, table A,) $5,000. Georgetown harbor, S. C. The first inlet of any consequence south of Cape Fear river is at the united mouths of the Waccamaw, Pedee, and Black rivers, FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 193 forming Georgetown harbor ; which is a commodious and capacious bay, having sufficient water within, and also upon the bar near the mouth, for merchant vessels and small vessels-of-war. A survey of this harbor was begun many years ago, but never completed, and no projects for defence have been made. It is probable that a work placed near Moscheto creek, or on Winyaw Point, would give adequate strength, at the cost of about $250,000. (Statement 1, table E.) Santee river and Bull's bay. About ten miles south from Georgetown are the mouths of the Santee, the largest river in South Carolina. It is not known whether the bars at the mouths of this river have sufficient water for sea-going vessels. The same uncertainty exists as to the depth into Bull's bay. It may be sufficient to consider these and the other inlets between Georgetown and Charles- ton as calling for small works capable of resisting boat enterprise, and to assign as the cost $100,000. Should they prove to be navigable for privateers they will require a larger expenditure. (Statement 1, table F.) Charleston S. C. This city, situated at the junction of Ashley and Cooper rivers, is about five miles, in a direct line from the sea. Between it and the ocean there is a wide and safe roadstead for vessels of any draught. Upon the bar, lying three or four miles outside of the harbor, there is, however, only water enough for smaller frigates and sloops-of-war. On the southwest side of the harbor is James's island, in which are several serpentine passages, more or less navigable for boats, barges, and small steam vessels ; some of them communi- cate directly with the sea and Stono river. Whappoo cut, the most northerly passage from the Stono to Charleston harbor, enters Ashley river opposite the middle of the city. Interior natural water communications exist, also, to the southwest of Stono river, connecting this with North Edisto river ; the latter with South Edisto and St. Helena sound ; this again, with broad river ; and, finally, this last with Savannah river. On the north side of the harbor of Charleston lies Sullivan's island, sepa- rated from the main by a channel navigable only by small craft. On the north- west side of this island is an interior water communication, which extends to Bull's bay, and even beyond, to the harbor of Georgetown. From this sketch it is apparent that it will not do to restrict the defences to the principal entrance of the harbor. The lateral avenues must also be shut. And it is probable that accurate surveys of all these avenues will show that the best mode of defending them will be by works at or near the mouths of the inlets, as the enemy will be kept thereby at a greater distance from the city;, the lesser harbors formed by these inlets will be protected, and the line of interior water communication will be inaccessible from the sea. No position for the defence of the principal entrance to Charleston harbor can be found nearer to the ocean than the western extremity of Sullivan's island. This is, at present, occupied by Fort Moultrie a work of some strength, but by no means adequate to its object, its battery being weak, and the scarp so low as to oppose no serious obstacle to escalade. How far this work, by a modification of its plan and relief, may be made to contribute to a full defence of the harbor, has not yet been determined. But so long as it is the only work at this the principal point of defence, it must be kept in good condition for ser- vice ; and no alterations that will disturb this efficiency should be undertaken. The repairs now indispensable will cost $10,000. (Statement 1, table A.) On a shoal nearly opposite to Fort Moultrie the foundation of a fort has been begun, which will have a powerful cross-fire with Fort Moultrie. This- is called Fort Sumter. (Statement 1, table C.) To complete this work will re- quire, it is estimated, $286,000. H. Rep. Com. 86 13 194 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. In the upper part of the harbor is Castle Pinckney, on Shuter's Folly island. This requires some repairs, estimated at $7,000. (Statement 1, table A.) Stono, North. Edisto, and South Edisto. All these must be fortified, at least in such a manner as to protect these inlets from enterprises in boats or small ves- sels. To that end, $50,000 may be assigned to each. (Statement 1, table F.) St. Helena sound. The proper defences cannot be pointed out till the sound shall have been surveyed. Although there is supposed to be no great depth of water on the bar, it is known to be navigable for the smaller class of merchant- men and for steamboats, and to have a navigable communication with the head of Broad river, or Port Royal, intersecting the interior navigation between Charleston and Savannah. The estimate is $150,000. (Statement 1, table F.) Broad river, or Port Royal roads. The value of this capacious roadstead as a harbor of refuge depends on the depth that can be carried over the bar ; on the distance of this bar beyond the line of coast, and on the means that may be applicable of lessening the danger of crossing it. This is supposed to be the deepest bar on the southern coast. Should there prove to be water enough for frigates, and should it be practicable to make the passage over the bar safe and easy, by the erection of light-houses on the shore and lights, or other distinct guides on the bar, this harbor, situated within sixty miles of the city of Charles- ton and twenty of Savannah river, intersecting the interior water commu- nication between these cities, thereby securing the arrival of supplies of every kind, would possess a high degree of importance, not only as a harbor of refuge, but also as a naval station. The survey of the exterior shoals, constituting the bar, should be made with the greatest care and all possible minuteness. Only when this shall have been done can the true relation of this inlet to the rest of the coast be known, and on this relation the position and magnitude of the required defences well depend. For the present, the estimate made some years ago by the engineer department is adopted, namely, $300,000. (Statement 1, table E.) Savannah, and mouth of Savannah river, Georgia. Mention has been made of the natural interior water communication along the coast of South Carolina. A similar communication extends south from the Savannah river as far as the St. John's, in Florida. Owing to these passages the city of Savannah, like Charleston, is liable to be approached by other avenues than the harbor or river, and accordingly its defences must have relation to these lesser as well as great channels. The distance from the mouth of Wassaw sound, or even Ossabaw sound, (both to the southward of Savannah river,) to the city is not much greater than from the mouth of the river, and an enterprise may proceed the whole distance by water, or part of the way by water and part by land, from either inlet or from both. As in the case of like channels in the neighborhood of .Charleston, it cannot now be determined where they can be defended most advantageously. It is hoped, however, that the localities will permit the defences to be placed near the inlets, because thus placed they will serve the double purpose of guard- ing the city of Savannah and covering these harbors, which, in time of war, cannot but be very useful. The defence of Savannah river is not difficult. A fort on Cockspur island, lying just within the mouth, and perhaps for additional security another on Tybee island, which forms the southern cape at the mouth of the river, would prevent the passage of vessels up the channel and cover the anchorage between Tybee and Cockspur. Old Fort Jackson, standing about four miles below the city, should be main- tained as a second barrier, both as respects the main channel and the passages FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 195 which come into the river from the south, which last would not at all be controlled by works on Cockspur or Tybee. Fort Pulaski, on Cockspur island, is well ad- vanced, and to a certain extent is even now efficient, measures being now in hand for mounting the lower tier of guns ; $215,000 are required to complete the works and the outworks and appendages. (Statement 1, table C.) To fortify Tybee island may require $120,000, (statement 1, table E,) and to re- pair Fort Jackson $50,000. (Statement 1, table A.) Wassaw sound, Ossabaw sound, St. Catherine's sound, at the mouth of Med- way river ; Sapelo sound, Doby inlet, Altamaha sound, at the moutli of Alta- maha river ; St. Simon's sound, at the mouth of Buffalo creek ; St. Andrew's sound, at the united mouths of the Scilla and Santilla rivers ; and Cumberland sound, at the mouth of St. Mary's river. All these communications with the ocean are highly important as regards the line of interior navigation, and several of them as affording access to excellent harbors. The last, and one or two others, are known to be navigable to the largest sloops-of-war and merchant- men, and some of the others are but little inferior, as regards depth of entrance or safety of anchorage. All these openings have yet to be surveyed ; some of them are probably easily defensible by forts and batteries, while others may require the aid of floating defences. It is an important principle, bearing peculiarly on the defence of the whole southern coast, that on a shore possessing few harbors it is at the same time more necessary to preserve them all for our own use, and more easy to deprive an enemy of that shelter without which a close blockade cannot be maintained. This principle is enforced in the instance of our southern coast by the two fol- lowing weighty considerations, namely : first, its remoteness from the nearest naval rendezvous, the Chesapeake, which is on a mean 600 miles distant, and to leeward both as to wind and current ; and second, its being close upon the larboard hand as they enter the Atlantic of the great concourse of vessels pass- ing at all seasons through the Florida channel. While, therefore, this part of the coast, from the concentration of vessels here, is in great need of protection of some sort, naval aid can be extended to it only with difficulty, and at the risk of being cut off from all retreat by a superior enemy. Accurate and minute surveys, which will enable our vessels, whether pursued by an enemy or suffering by stress of weather, to shun the dangers which beset the navigation of these harbors, and properly arranged defences to cover them when arrived, seem to be indispensable. When these harbors shall be fortified, the operation of investing the coast and watching the great outlet of commerce through the Florida passage will be a difficult and hazardous one to an enemy, to whom no perseverance or skill can avail to maintain a continuous blockade, while, on the part of our small vessels- of-war, steam frigates, and privateers, the same sort of supervision will be at all times easy and safe. Nothing better can now be done than to assume $200,000 as the average cost of defending each of the nine entrances ; giving a total of $1,800,000. (State- ment 1, tables E and F.) St. Augustine, Florida. This, the most southern of the harbors on the Atlantic, and the key to the eastern portion of Florida, is accessible to the smaller class of merchantmen, to privateers, and to steam vessels, and requires a certain amount of protection from attacks by war. It is, therefore, proposed to put that part of the old Spanish fort (Fort Marion) that commands the harbor in a serviceable state, which will require $50,000. (Statement 1, table A.) Having now passed along the whole Atlantic coast, from Passamaquoddy to Cape Florida, pointed out every harbor of any consequence, and specified every 196 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. work that a thorough system of defence will require, we will, in order to give a comprehensive view of the number, cost, armament, and garrisons of the works, refer to statement 1, accompanying this report. In that statement the works are divided into tables, showing separately, 1st, (table A,) the old works already repaired and those proposed to be repaired and retained in the system of de- fence ; 2d, (table B,) new works completed ; 3d, (table C,) works under con- struction ; 4th, (table D,) works to be first commenced ; 5th, (table E,) works to be commenced next after those in table D ; 6th, (table F,) works to be last commenced. The most essential works on the Atlantic coast are included in the first five tables, and, it appears from the recapitulation, that for these there will be re- quired, for garrisons, in time of war, 28,720 men; for the armament, 5,748 pieces of ordnance of every kind; and for the expense yet to be incurred, $9,476,767. We consider it to be our duty to estimate for the last class of works also, (table F,) although it must be a long time before permanent works for these positions can be commenced. For these there will be required, in addition, for war garrisons, 25,545 men ; for armament, 4,790 pieces of ordnance ; and for the expense of erection, $14,241,824. It must be here stated that, as to a few of the works in table F, fuller infor- mation may require them to be elevated into some of the earlier classes. SEA-COAST FROM CAPE FLORIDA TO THE MOUTH OF THE SABINE. The first positions that present themselves, on doubling around Cape Florida into the Gulf of Mexico, are Key West and the Dry Tortugas. This board concur in the opinions heretofore expressed in favor of these fine harbors, and they beg leave to refer, for very interesting statements, in relation to the latter harbor especially, to a letter from Commodore Eodgers to the Sec- retary of the Navy, July 3, 1829, (Senate documents, 1st session 21st Congress, vol. 1, No. 1, page 236,) and letter from the Secretary of the Navy, March 25, 1830, (Senate documents, 1st session 21st Congress, vol 2, No. Ill, page 1.) A naval force, designed to control the navigation of the Gulf, could desire no better position than Key West or the Tortugas. Upon the very wayside of the only path through the Gulf, it is at the same time well situated as to all the great points therein. It overlooks Havana, Pensacola, Mobile, the mouths of the Mississippi, and both the inlet and outlet of the Gulf. The Tortugas harbors in particular are said to afford perfect shelter for vessels of every class, with the greatest facility of ingress and egress. And there can be no doubt that an adversary in possession of large naval means would, with great advantage, make these harbors his habitual resort and his point of gen- eral rendezvous and concentration for all operations on this sea. With an enemy thus posted, the navigation of the Gulf by us would be imminently hazardous, if not impossible, and nothing but absolute naval superiority would avail anything against him. Mere military means could approach no nearer than the nearest shore of the continent. It is believed that there are no harbors in the Gulf at all comparable with these that an enemy could resort to with his larger vessels. To deprive him of these would therefore be interfering materially with any organized system of naval operations in this sea. The defence of these harbors would, however, do much more than this. It would transfer to our own squadron, even should it be inferior, these most valuable positions, and it would afford a point of refuge to our navy and our commerce at the very spot where it would be most neces- sary and useful. In this report, already too much extended, we forbear to enlarge on this topic, FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 197 merely adding that the complete and certain defence will not be difficult. By occupying two, or at most three, small "islands, the harbors of the Dry Tortugas (there being an inner and an outer harbor) may be thoroughly protected. The works must be adequate to resist escalade, bombardment, and cannonade from vessels, and to sustain a protracted investment; but as they will not be exposed to any operation resembling a siege, there can be no difficulty in fulfilling the conditions. They must have capacious store-rooms, be thoroughly bomb-proof, and be heavily armed. The fortification of Key West should be of a similar character. No details can be given until all these positions have been minutely surveyed with reference to defence. The sum of $3,000,000 was, some years ago, assumed by the engineer de- partment as necessary to provide defences for the Tortugas and for Key West, and this estimate may now be taken as ample. (Statement 2, table F.) Turning now to the shore of the Gulf, we find a portion, namely, from Cape Florida to Pensacola, that has never been examined with particular reference to the defence of the harbors. Within this space there are Charlotte harbor, Espiritu Santo bay, Apalachicola bay, Apalacliie bay, St. Joseph's bay, and Santa Rosa bay. Nothing better can now be done than to assume for these the estimate formerly presented by the engineer department, viz : $1,000,000 for all. (Statement 2, table F.) It may be remarked, as applying to the whole Gulf coast, that, from the relative geographical position of this part of the seaboard, and the country in- terested in its safety, from the unhealthiness of the climate, nature of the adjacent country, and mixed character of the inhabitants, it will be some time before that portion within supporting distance, whose welfare may be endangered by an enemy, will be competent, of itself, to sustain a serious attack from without. Upon the Atlantic seaboard the Alleghanies crowd the people down upon the shore, every important point on the coast being surrounded by a population dense now and every day rapidly increasing in numbers, while the ocean and the interior parallel communications transmit rapid aid to the right and left. The coast of the Gulf, however, is thinly peopled in itself, is remote from succor from behind, and is almost inaccessible to lateral assistance. Those reasons, therefore, which tend to establish the necessity of an organized, permanent, and timely system of defence for the whole seaboard of the United States, apply to this part of it with peculiar force. We now pass on to the remaining points of defence on the Gulf. Pensacola bay. The upper arms of this considerable bay receive the Yellow Water or Pea river, Middle river, and Escambia river. The. tributaries of the last, interlocking with the Alabama and the Chattahoochie, seem to mark the routes whereby, at some future day, canals will convey a part of the products of these rivers to Pensacola, while the qualities and position of the harbor and the favorable nature of the country have already marked out lines of railroad communication with a vast interior region. Santa Rosa sound extends eastward, from the lower part of the bay, into Santa Rosa bay. On the west the lagoons of Pensacola, Perdido, and Mobile bays, respectively, interlock in such a manner as to require but a few miles of cutting to complete a navigable channel from the first to the last named bay, and thence, through an existing interior water communication, to the city of New Orleans. . Pensacola bay has rare properties as a harbor. It is now accessible to frigates, and there is reason to hope that the bar may be permanently deepened. The bar is near the coast, and the channel across it straight and easily hit. The harbor is perfectly landlocked, and the roadstead very capacious. There are excellent positions within for repairing, building, and launching vessels, and for docks and dock yards in healthy situations. The supply of good water 198 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. is abundant. The harbor is perfectly defensible. These properties, in con- nexion with the position of the harbor as regards the coast, have induced the government to select it as a naval station and place of rendezvous and repair. An excellent survey has been made of the bay of Pensacola, sufficing to form the scheme of defence for the town and harbor. Regarded, however, as an important naval station and place of rendezvous and repair, which it now is, further surveys, extending a greater distance back from the shores, delineating accurately the face of the country and showing the several avenues by land and water, are found to be necessary. The defences of the water passage, as projected, are nearly complete, $22,000 being asked to finish them. A work is just begun at the position of the Bar- rancas. It is indispensable, in connexion with one or two other small works designed to cover the navy yard from a lateral attack through the western bays. The Barrancas work may require $100,000, and the others $200,000 ; making a total for Pensacola of $322,000. (Statement 2, tables A, C, and F.) Perdido lay. This bay is intimately related to Pensacola and Mobile bays, both as regards security and intercommunication, and should be carefully sur- veyed with a view to these objects. It must be fortified, and the cost may be $200,000. (Statement 2, table F.) Mobile bay. The plan of defence for this bay comprises a fort (now needing some repairs) for Mobile Point. Another fort is projected for Dauphin island, and a tower for the defence of Pass-au-Heron. The estimates for all require $915,000. (Statement 2, tables A, E, and F.) New Orleans and the delta of the Mississippi. The most northern water communication between the Mississippi and the Gulf is by the passage called the Rigolets, connecting Lake Borgne and Lake Pontchartrain. The next is the pass of Chef Menteur, also connecting these lakes. Through these passages an enemy, entering Lake Pontchartrain, would, at the same time that he inter- cepted all water communication with Mobile and Pensacola, be able to reach New Orleans from the southern shore of the lake ; or he might continue onward through Lake Maurepas, Amite river, and Iberville river, thereby reaching the Mississippi at the very head of the delta; or, landing within the mouths of the Chef Menteur, he might move against the city along the ridge of the G-entilly road. To the southwest of Chef Menteur, and at the head of Lake Borgne, is Bayou Bienvenue, a navigable channel, (the one followed by the English army in the last war,) not running quite to the Mississippi, but bounded by shores of such a nature as to enable troops to march from the point of debarkation to the city. These avenues are defended by Fort Pike at the Eigolets ; by Fort Wood at Chef Menteur; by a small fort at Bayou Bienvenue, and by a tower at Bayou Dupre. The defences of the Mississippi are placed at the Plaquemine turn, about seventy miles below New Orleans the lowest position that can be occupied. Fort Jackson is on the right bank, and Fort St. Philip, a little lower down, on the left. All these forts have been abandoned for several years, and, having received no attention in the way of timely repairs, now require repairs somewhat exten- sive, especially Forts Jackson and St. Philip, on the Mississippi. The follow- ing sums, it is believed, will be required to place all these works in perfect order, viz : Fort Pike, $5,000 ; Fort Wood, $3,580 ; fort on Bayou Bienvenue, $2,500 ; Tower Dupre, $400 ; Fort Jackson, $20,000, and Fort St. Philip, $3,300. (Statement 2, table A.) The most western avenue by which New Orleans is approachable from the FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 199 sea passes on the west side of the island of Grand Terre into Barrataria bay, which is an excellent harbor for a floating force guarding the coasting trade on that side of the Mississippi. From this bay there are several passages leading to New Orleans. The estimate for a work which is now about to be begun on Grand Terre island is $325,000. (Statement 2, table C.) Several times in this report we have alluded to circumstances which would demand the employment of floating defences, in addition to fixed defences upon the shore. We have here an instance in which that kind of defence would be very useful. Fortifications will enable us to protect New Orleans even from the most serious and determined efforts of an enemy ; but owing to the great width of some of the exterior passages, we cannot, by fortification alone, deprive an enemy of anchorages, (especially that of Chandeleur island,) nor cover entirely the exterior water communication between the Kigolets and Mobile. We must, therefore, either quietly submit to the annoyance and injury that an enemy in possession of these passages may inflict, or avert them by a timely preparation of a floating force adapted to their peculiar navigation, and capable, under the shelter of the forts, of being always on the alert, and of assuming an offensive or defensive attitude, according to the designs, conduct, or situation of the enemy. Our examination of the coast from Cape Florida to the Sabine having now been completed, we will, as in the case of the Atlantic coast, refer, for a com- prehensive view of the number, cost, armament, and garrison of the works, to statement 2, wherein the works are divided into tables similar to those of state- ment 1. The more essential works on the Gulf coast, included in the first five tables, will require for garrison, in time of war, 4,420 men ; for the armament, 794 pieces of ordnance of every kind ; and for the expense yet to be incurred, $516,780. The works comprised in the last table (F) are generally such as may be post- poned to a late day. But among them have been placed some (as, for example, those for Tortugas and Key West) as to which the examination has not been sufficiently minute to decide to what class they really appertain. In this age of great improvements in the means of locomotion, it would be unwise to decide, without pressing need, on the details of the floating force required at certain points on the Atlantic and Gulf of Mexico coasts perhaps even on the nature of the moving power. Although the probability undoubtedly is, that the power will be steam, genius may, in the interim, devise something still better than steam. And we may here remark, in relation to the preparation of steam vessels for warlike purposes generally, that wisdom would seem to direct a very cautious and deliberate progress. Every new vessel may be expected to surpass, in im- portant particulars, all that had preceded ; and, to surpass the more, as each succeeding vessel should be the result of careful study and trial of the pre- ceding. It may be considered unreasonable to expect that steam itself will give way to some agent still more potent, and at the same time not less safe and manage- able. But it certainly is no more than probable that steam vessels now under construction may be regarded almost as incumbrances within ten years. A deliberate advance in this branch ot naval construction is recommended the more by our ability to construct these vessels in large numbers when needed, the timber being collected in the meantime. Referring now to the statements which accompany this report : Statement I includes all works from Passamaquoddy to Cape Florida ; state- ment 2, all works from Cape Florida to the mouth of the Sabine ; each state- ment comprising six tables, as before mentioned. 200 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. In relation to every work executed, in progress, or merely projected, the tables show the garrison, the ordnance of every description, the sums already expended, and the final cost. As to works not yet planned, a portion of the same particulars are exhibited, founded on conjecture merely ; of course, without laying claim to accuracy, but still as approximations, affording some indication of the final result. It may be well to give here a summary of all these tables. The works which are likely to be erected on the Atlantic, within a reasonable time, and which are regarded as necessary to a good system of defence, will require war garrisons, amounting to 28,720 men ; and they will require a further expenditure of $9,176,767. Works called for in like manner upon the Gulf of Mexico coast will need 4,420 men to garrison them, and a further expenditure of $516,780. Of the whole coast, therefore, the garrisons will amount to 33,140 men, and the expenditures to $9,993,547. The remaining works comprised in table F, of both statements, will require 30,695 men, and cost $19,521,824. Making the grand total for the whole sea-coast of the United States in gar- risons for the works 63,835 men, and in cost $29,515,371. In addition to these statements as to the fortifications, there are two corre- sponding statements of the cost of the ordnance, of the carnages, and of a certain supply of powder and shot or shells for each piece, one statement relating to the Atlantic coast, and the other to the Gulf of Mexico coast. From these it appears that for the works likely to be erected on the Atlantic coast within a reasonable time, (that is to say, for the works comprised in the first five tables, A, B, C, D, and E,) there will be needed 2,483 pieces of ordnance and 4,511 carriages, which will cost $2,252,290. For similar works on the Gulf of Mexico coast, there will be needed 296 pieces of ordnance, and 495 carriages, at a cost of $240,720. The remaining works named in tables F, of both statements, will require, in addition, 5,447 guns and 5,554 carnages, which will cost $3,735,330. Making the grand total required for the whole sea-coast 8,226' guns and 10,560 carriages, at a cost of $6,228,340. The time required to construct and put in order the whole system must depend on the amount of the annual appropriation. All that need now be said on the subject is, that in an undertaking necessarily involving so much time, and of such vital importance, there should be no relaxation of diligence. With all diligence, many years must necessarily be consumed. But the work may be too much hurried, as well as too much delayed. There is a rate of progress at which it will be executed in the best manner, and at the minimum cost. If more hurried it will be defective in quality, and more costly if delayed. France was at least fifty years completing her maritime and interior defences. In the report presented by the engineer department, in March, 1836, (Senate document, 1st session 24th Congress, vol. 4, No. 293,) there is a demonstration of the actual economy that will result from an efficient system of 'sea-coast defence, which is to the following effect, referring to the document itself for details. There is first supposed to be an expedition of 20,000 men at Bermuda or Halifax ready to fall upon the coast. This will make it necessary, if there be no fortifications, to have ready a force at least equal at each of the following points, namely : 1st. Portsmouth and navy yard. 2d. Boston and navy yard. 3d. Narraganset roads. - 4th. New York and navy yard. 5th. Philadelphia and navy yard. 6th. Baltimore. 7th. Norfolk and navy yard. 8th. Charleston, South Carolina. 9th. Savannah; and 10th. New Orleans; to say nothing of other important places. At each of these places, except the last, 10,000 men drawn from the interior, FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 201 and kept under pay, will suffice, the vicinity being relied on to supply the remainder. At New Orleans, 17,000 men must be drawn from a distance. In a campaign of six months, the whole force will cost at least $26,750,000. The garrisons necessary to be kept under pay for the fortifications in these places will cost for the same time $8,430,500. The difference ($18,319,500) will then be only $3,448,156 less than the whole expense of building these defences, viz : $21,767,656. Whence it follows that the expense of these erections would be nearly compensated by the saving they would cause in a single campaign. All which is respectfully submitted. For the board : JOS. G. TOTTEN, Colonel of Engineers. 202 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. cc ?^, H *- M fc H ^ H W II g^ ** ^3 %*^. a ss uoij -omjsuoo jo sjiudoj jo jsoo IBJOJ, ^**#*j-l* ^AO * ,_| 4 opidtuoo o) pajinbaji ! iSJIili papuadxa iii ilg ;;;:;*; M stuoqoo SJBWOUI ouojs qoui-gx "^ t^^MOOCOgX^ jq8;i 'SJBJJOOI qoui-g jqSn 'siBWora qom-oi A~ABaq 'SJBJJOOI qoui-ot nmnnm; JCMOI | ; SJBWOUI qoui-gi ^ M^, . ;rH :3 r TT PSr-COOl r-i -H n m -01 i- io-9oi jo 01 - OOt^'VCN 204 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. tiori -onjjsaoo ao sjitdai jo jsoo IBJOJ, IllilSli I rf iiiiiilii C? i | ??S y ajaidmoo oj pajjnbag iiiiiiii ! .. 3,425,000 1 i CO^rH r- 5 : O^OJ 1 papuadxjj ARMAMENT. ,ox SM |S' M P I - SSg . g s sujoqoo ^^^ : : j co CO : : : : * . : . : : SJBJJOUI auojs qoui-gj ^ :^ .^ : : : 10 10 -< jqSij 'sJBUom qoui-g o o ; ; : 00 ^Ai29ij 'gjBiioui qout-or ICN W^i CO Si .saBWooiqoui-et : r 'r co n c, : r^ h If jqH 'saazjiMoq qoui-g > : ei : : S 2 : : : M co . A ABaq" S aa ZJ? Moqqoui- 8 CO l> t- CO CD 0* OJ CO 1 - 1 to oo ^f 00 00 00 nmn rH *S & ::::::: 8 : : : : : : : : : : jltntfif 1_:^ o :::::::: 2 ''* O O O lO C , ' S ^ K * *^~ ^ i 1 " - -\ IH8I HIB '-T-I.-I 3 E : ::: :J :s :.::<: *J 1 i " :*r ::*:*: 1^$ :M ,,;::::: : "5" : : : j^ ' : S : riswold, New London, Conn 3 at the mouth of Connecticut riv i... Ija.'g i : -| : ^ : : :'l " 5| ig :! g. i| w - 1 ^n Iw) "tco '- -o" Q S *1 _=: '^^2 rt^aT ^ ~3 S* ISlii 4s =i ilLrif 1 sil tiijj Hit! f Jlgi^ !|.^i ilfilli ^ 1 , | | |l .M! JJfeef! 00000 206 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. noil -orujsuoo 10 BJiBdaJ jo jsoo IBJO j, } 1 i aiaidraoo 01 pajmba^ } 1 i ^T .2 1 i 1 ^ 60 1 1 1 1 6 papuadxg : : : : ; : : : : : ARMAMENT. O l> O O iO ^5 O n* M 1 sujoqoo CO t~ 12 . S ,Byoui9UO lS qout-9t s 2 jqSit 'SJBWOUI qoui-g :::::: : R R jqSfl 'S4BUOUI qaui-QL * . - 5 : : : : : A\&B9q 'SJBUOUI qauj-Qt : : : : : ^ n swora qoui-gl : : : : : 5? % iqSfl 'sjazjiMOq qoui-9 1 i: : i i i : R -* OJ R 01 : . . : : i 1 saoaid piatj :::':: ^ 1 siapanod-g]; : : : : : s I sjapunod-gi : : : : : B B sjapunod-j-K I s 5 : : : : : sJapunod-gg : : : : : o oo ! . S ,apunod- 5 > S : g . JBAV UI U08UJB9 II iJ^_j[_ 1 1 & 3 f Designation of the works. -> '66 ' ' :::::::::: Deduct garrison and guns of Nos. 9, J 18,ofA . 3p?f; ji||i|Iffii|Ji| I|a o !jlIl|llIilIIII So02;oooooococo = ooo tWW*B "** -----^---ssss FOKTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 207 *-* O O /5 I-H rl ,-< o N sunS punod-gt- 11 82 a i i 1 1 s s 1 a S IS o i j : : 1 cu B B a Required : ? s CU 2 g To be provided . . 13 rto To be provided . . Required On hand To be provided,. On hand To be provided.. Required from A to E To be provided,. Grand total required Grand total on hand. Grand total to be provi Fortifications. -< J & \ i 1 2 T3 C I New fortifications completed. Table B.. Fortifications under construction. Table C. Fortifications to be first commenced. Table D. Fortifications to be next constructed. Table E. Fortifications to be last constructed. Table F. FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST D SUMOUOO CO ro " s * to to ^ " 38 B S 3 S SIBJJOUI auoig rt ^ ao 00 r-H rt 2 91 2 S saeyotu * " 2 2 3 00 oo 9 SI ! s B SJBVOUI S S 2 *H : Jl ^ L n w JlSi[ qoui-oi : : : ; SJBJJOUI XABaq qoui-Ql TI* co to 00 00 s s s s 2 05 1 i (N 55 1 sjBWOUl qoui-gi K a 91 - 2S 88 i a : i IS j CO ? : sun8 -punod-51 S tf a a S s - s s s at i i i sunS -punod-pi n M 0> 05 S s? si s to to 2 g 1 sun2 -punod-frg coco S3 8 6 5 5 1 i to CJ 1 53S 05-* of to eT sun3 -punod-gc II SS Ii 1 CO CO 1 i 1 1 O CO O '~ i 1-1 1-1 ~ at of sunS 'punod-gi? |S ao as *! i 1 1 s as g i i s f co S3 : 1 1 1 1 a, o c. T; provided. 1 w S S provided. required, on hand. o> fl 6 i-s 33 MO 1 g 11 l f i'l J2 g Required . On hand... e fl HO ji g Required ft Required . On hand.. & Grand total Grand tota Grand tota Fortifications. CQ _ V s. c ! upre, La. 50 4 2 t> 1 uouBoyissBJO 1-1 cj co TJ< m o c~ oo as ri W co T in tc r- FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 213 ooo too 1 1 o o ooo O O O tfS CN 1 i|9'i S I! : : S ^2 S s 13 ; i i j <* o OS * : : i : oo r-ico oo 2 S e : : * to t- CO - 00 : GN S S 8 8 V * o> c : : : : . . ... . g* 12 o "7 e j S; 2 CO 3 o sun3 piaij co n =22 coco i SJ sa * sunS anpunod-5i coco 88 050 CM s s s 8 ss s sunS japunod-g[ o o = = ': : ~ 5? ss 1 sunS japunod-^g '** 55S ss CO > g i i gs 1 sun9 japunod-gg Z2 ^5^ ss; : \ a CO 3 28 CO ,un g japunod^ : - " i j \ 00 50 a o Ordnance. ii sss o* c To be provided Required i* CIS i K 1 1 1 s 1 I 11 Grand total required. ... Grand total on hand. ... Grand total to be provide ' Old forts and batteries. Table A c5 _ 2 1 a c B 1 u - I Works to be constructed after those in table D, state- ment 1, aru completed. Table E. Works to be last commenced. Table F FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 215 SJBJ * to : : CO t i- 2 00 SJBl -join A"ABaq qoui-oi (N s rs [ n n n : : : oo 55 55 S % f tn o O) 3) sja'/ii ' . j 1 SJaZllAIOq jsBoo-Bas qoui-g 00 00 9 2 lO G* <* s B 2 >rs 0! i sapauoajBO oo oo S O) OS i i & w C1 55 55 o nn (MCT co to - coco a t6 sunS piaij : j : *< O sunS japiinod-5i n n 3 e o (n CJ 8 s 8 1 1 sunS jopnnod-gi o a s i j (N 01 00 55 55 ^ ft sunS japunod-^5 SS 55 55 s< 38 SO CO s I i si 1 sun3 japunod-gg zz r^ t>- s^ r* i i s CO e S 8 8 sunS japunod-gj, i J: : * i s i i o 00 oo C3 55 35 55 | MIOHUBO jo jaquinu aioqM s & o ao S?w 5! oo n io W(N 2 i 8* 1 S5 r- o g u. Si as 5 B -^ ^ CO CO ~ 00 X in 10 o SJEJJOUI jqSii qoui-g : : 1 1 Ordnance. To be provided . . . On hand . To be provided... To be provided... On hand To be provided . . Required from A to E. ll Ii To be provided ... Grand total requirec Grand total on hand Grand tctal to be pr Fortifications. Old forts and batteries. Table A CQ j a CJ s (C k V & 6 V ! s o 1 a i Works to be constructed after those in table D, state- ment 1, are completed. Table E. FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 217 s i ie i- R C-) CO f-* O 8 g 88 S o> o 2 2 t-~ gg ii i Si I r- junouiB IBJOX 1" * ^! t" C* 1 gg o o> en 8* 1 foo g CO J^ uapMoj 88 8 Is S S i 8 1 o s i 8 8 i 88 s? 8 H ^ S2 s? i 3 ^ ""* 3 2 g| a* g g ^ S < saijioafoij II i CO Si Si. 1 O C3 5 OJ ss si 8 2 88 *s i 88 SS 8 1 i * ^j % g a= CT ^^ V s E S i S e B8SBIJJBO Si 460 00 g^ 8 S8 31 (? 8 i o >n 88 8 88 g O3 I 2 2* S S 50 g e CO * S 1^ S CT S CQ uouuuo s S g o>n ss i 88 CO O O i 88 SI o o S 88 |g 88 SS 3> 8 S i- V n* * co o S S5 31 ro pi 1 r; 1 C^QD S2 i 1C. it O W 11 ss iO r^ 1 1 8 r~ 1 i 1 O iO ^O 00 CO CO i z a n spunoj ^^ s i 8 CO CO 1 s g s 1 a SJIiJJOHI ^ 1 1 i 1 1 i i H stuns joj saSjBqo ; u Bjiaqs qoui-Qi 11 II 11 1 i 1 11 1 P- ~*~* CJ O) 6N CN CM N CO CM (M (M l-H i-( rH COOiO CO O i 1 CO 00 10 00 iO C<1 OS CO OO O COOOOTf(-*l^*l N CO ''luuoui't} l^ojj . rH i-H CO CO C* (M (MINr-lrHrH . 3 w I 88 Souio i-> OS -H 05 rH Ttl -.0 r-H 05 CO CO 05 t~ t- t- CO i ~ & co co 5O 3 o Q aapaod o o o 00 lOOOOOO I o 1 s aouaiio jo spunoj MCOC^ COGOM'C^ CO C -H r-( ^H O O OS * & 8[pqsj9punod-2X o OOOO OO0 co" st[8qs aaptmod-f-g OOOOO OOOOO oo" 1 st[9qs qoui-QT OOO O O