Ifnhrmttg
REFERENCE.
No.
Division
Range
Shelf
Received _ .187
37TH CONGRESS, ) HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, j REPORT
2d Session. ) ( No. 86.
PERMANENT FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
[To accompany bill H. R. No. 416.]
APRIL 23, 1862. Ordered to be printed.
APRIL 25, 1862 Resolved, That extra copies, two thousand bound and eight thousand in
pamphlet form, of the report (No. 86) relating to fortifications and sea-coast defences,
be printed for the use of the members of the House.
Mr. F. P. BLAIR, jr., from the Committee on Military Affairs, made
the following
REPORT.
The Committee on Military Affairs, in obedience to a resolution of the
House of Representatives, directing them to * ' examine the whole system
of permanent defences of the country, for the purpose of ascertaining
tvhat modifications of the old plans, if any, are required to repel the
improved means of attack, and to report by bill or otherwise," have
given this subject a careful consideration, and instructed me to submit
the following report and accompanying biU :
Invulnerability to all attacks, except those of an extraordinary
character, is the most perfect insurance attainable by a powerful and
peaceful nation against the calamity of war. An attack upon a great
military nation, to be dangerous, requires time for preparation, and
thus affords time for preparing large means of defence. Hence it has
ever been the aim of military engineers to construct frontier defences
competent only to resist the greatest efforts which could be made
suddenly by the forces ordinarily at the command of powerful rival
nations, taking care that the fortifications should be capable of en-
largement to any desirable extent. The making of extraordinary
defences is usually left to the occasions which demand them. It is
not safe, however, for a nation to forget that, as the science, wealth,
population, and power of leading governments increase, so, part passu,
must the strength of the ordinary defences be increased; nor must it
be forgotten that works incapable of being carried by sudden assault
one year, may, by new applications of science and of mechanical arts,
be quite vulnerable the next.
To aid the House in forming an intelligent judgment upon the
merits of our present system of frontier defences, the committee
have collected and appended hereto several leading reports of army
engineers and naval officers, and also that of Secretary Cass upon this
subject. As these reports elaborately discuss the subject of frontier
defences in all its varied bearings with distinguished ability, and as
they are scarce and difficult to obtain, the printing of an extra number
2 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
of them is strongly recommended. They are worthy of the attentive
consideration of every military man in the republic, and such consid-
eration may lead to profitable suggestions.
FIRST DEFENCES.
Of the few sea-coast fortifications built prior to and during the
revolutionary war, few remain, and all are useless.
Most of the harbors on the Atlantic and Gulf frontiers were sup-
plied with small protective works after the breaking out of the French
revolution of 1789; this is denominated by the engineers as the first
system of coast defences.
SECOND SYSTEM OF DEFENCES.
Prior to the war of 1812 appropriations were made for fortifica-
tions, ' ' and there was not a town of any magnitude upon the coast
not provided with one or more batteries. ' 7 These works are called
"the defences of the second system/ 7 and (though much better than
the first) were, says General Totten, "small and weak/ 7 "Being
built, for the sake of present economy, of cheap materials and work-
manship, were very perishable.'' "The government, aware of this
weakness, called out to their support during the war vast bodies of
militia, at enormous expense, covering these troops with extensive
lines of field-works.' 7
The inadequacy of these small works, even when aided by large
bodies of militia, and the large cost of life and money their weakness
occasioned, demanded and received attention as soon as the war
closed.
THIRD SYSTEM OF DEFENCES.
The creation of the present or third system of frontier defences is
thus described by General Totten, chief engineer United States
army :
" The war with England being over, the government promptly entered upon a perma-
nent system of coast defence, and to that end constituted a board of engineers, with in-
structions to make examinations and plans, subject to the revision of the chief engineer
and the sanction of the Secretary of War. And it Is this, the third system, that has been
ever since 1816 in the course of execution, and is now, as we shall see, well advanced.
44 Whenever the examinations of the board of engineers included positions for dock yards,
naval depots, &c., naval officers of rank and experience were associated with them.
"The board devoted several years uninterruptedly to the duty, presenting successive re-
ports, and submitting, first, plans of the fortifications needed at the most important points.
Afterward they were sufficiently in advance ot the execution of the system to apply most of
their time to the duties of construction, giving in occasionally additional reports and plans.
In rare cases it has happened that plans have been made under the particular direction of
the chief engineer, owing to difficulty, at moments, of drawing the widely-dispersed mem-
bers of the board from their individual trusts.
" The board and the chief engineer arianged the defences into classes, according to their
view of the relative importance of the proposed works, in the order of time. This order
ha been generally well observed in the execution of the system, with the exception of
gome cases in which, by the action of Congress, certain forts were advanced out of the order
advised by the board.
"For many years grants for fortifications were made annually by Congress, in a gross
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 3
snm, which was apportioned according to the discretion of the President. But since March
3, 1821, the appropriations have been specific, the grants for each work being particularly
stated. For many years every new fortification has, before being made the object of appro-
priations, been sanctioned by a special act of Congress, upon recommendation of the Mili-
tary Committee."
MEANS AND MODE OF THE DEFENSIVE SYSTEM.
The committee cannot better set forth the means and mode recom-
mended by the board of engineers for the defence of the maritime
frontiers of the United States, and adopted, than by employing the
following extract from a report made in 1826 by General Bernard and
Colonel Totten, members of the board :
" We proceed to consider the means and the mode of the defensive system which it is for
the interest of the United States to adopt. The means of defence for the seaboard of the
United States, constituting a system, may be classed as follows : First, a navy ; second,
fortification ; third, interior communications by land and water ; and, fourth, a regular
army and well-organized militia.
" The navy must be provided with suitable establishments for construction and repair,
stations, harbors of rendezvous, and ports of refuge, all secured by fortifications, defended by
regular troops and militia, and supplied with men and materials by the lines of intercom-
munication. Being the only species of offensive force compatible with our political institu-
tions, it will then be prepared to act the great part which its early achievements have
promised, and to which its high destiny will lead.
""Fortifications must close all important harbors against an enemy, and secure them to
our military and commercial marine. Second, must deprive an enemy of all strong positions
where, protected by naval superiority, he might fix permanent quarters in our territory,
maintain himself during the war, and keep the whole frontier in perpetual alarm. Third,
must cover the great cities from attack. Fourth, must prevent, as far as practicable, the
great avenues of interior navigation from being blockaded at their entrance into the ocean.
Fifth, must cover the coastwise and interior navigation by closing the harbors and the
several inlets from the sea which intersect the lines of communication, and thereby further
aid the navy in protecting the navigation of the country ; and. sixth, must protect the great
naval establishments.
"Interior communications will conduct with certainty the necessary supplies of all sorts
to the stations, harbors of refuge, and rendezvous, and the establishments for construction
and repair, for the use both of the fortifications and the navy, will greatly facilitate and
expedite the concentration of military force and the transfer of troops from one point to
another ; insure to these also unfailing supplies of every description, and will preserve un-
impaired the interchange of domestic commerce even during periods of the most active
external warfare.
"The army and militia, together with the marine, constitute the vital principle of the
system.
" From this sketch it is apparent that our system of defence is composed of elements
whose numerous reciprocal relations with each other and with the whole constitute its ex-
cellence ; one element is scarcely more dependent on another than the whole system is on
any one. Withdraw the navy, and the defence becomes merely passive ; withdraw interior
communications from the system, and the navy must cease, in a measure, to be active, for
want of supplies ; and the fortifications can offer but a feeble resistance for want of timely
re-enforcements ; withdraw fortifications, and there remains only a scattered and naked
navy."
With war experiences of the disadvantages of feebly-protected
frontiers, the United States, though laboring under the burden of a
heavy debt, commenced the above-described system immediately
after the close of the war. The board of engineers who planned the
present system was constituted for that purpose at the very first
session of Congress after peace was proclaimed.
Lists of the fortifications proposed to be constructed under the new
system, together with estimates of cost, peace and war garrisons, &c. ,
4 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
will be found attached to the reports of the engineers printed with
this.
The interior communications desired by government were macadam-
ized roads j. one from Washington city, along the Atlantic coast to New
Orleans ; another between the same' points, but running by the way
of Knoxville ; another from New Orleans, by the way of Tennessee
and Kentucky, to Buffalo and Lake Erie ; and a fourth from Cum-
berland to St. Louis. These, with the ordinary roads of the country,
it was supposed, would greatly facilitate the movement of troops and
supplies in the event of war to the fortifications and naval depots on
the several water frontiers. Neither of the four was ever built,
though large sums of money were expended on the last named before
it was finally abandoned.
In the detailed plans some errors were made which occasioned
some injudicious expenditures on the fortifications. These are indi-
cated in the following remarks made in a report of one of the
engineers in 1851 :
' ' In planning the new works it seems to have been taken for granted, in many instances,
that each work must depend on itself, without chance of succor from forces operating on
the rear and flanks. Works were thus constructed to sustain a siege from ten to fifty days,
in the midst of a population from which relief to the invested work could be drawn in
twenty-four hours. The expensive arrangement of these land defences have greatly in-
creased the cost of the works, already from their nature very costly ; and at this day ex-
cite the surprise of the professional examiner acquainted with the vast means of collateral
defence possessed by the United States, that anything more should have been required for
mcst of the works than security against assault by escalade."
But, on the whole, there seems to be little to regret. On the con-
trary, the engineers seem to have shown remarkable competence and
aptitude for their extensive and most responsible duties.
Since the initiation of the third system of frontier defences, forty-
six years have passed away. In that period the condition of the
country has been greatly changed steamboats, railroads, canals,
telegraphs, steamships, and iron ships, increased wealth, and increased
population give new elements for the consideration of the engineer.
The old works of defence on our coasts, with their old armaments,
are not equal to the new means of attack. Judging from the ability
of our unarmored ships to destroy the fine granite forts of the Chinese,
it seems unlikely that any considerable number of our fortifications
could long resist the concentrated fire of many fifteen-inch guns of a
fleet of heavy ships thoroughly iron-clad. If inadequate to such re-
sistance, our nation in all its increased strength is measurably as
defenceless as in 1816.
What is necessary, then, to make our defences satisfactory invul-
nerable to the attacks of a fleet composed of as many iron-clad vessels
as any nation, without extraordinary effort, could readily concentrate
against them ?
1. The creation of adequate means to exclude from our harbors
hostile ships, armored vessels included.
2. The providing of suitable means to detain invading armies on
shipboard, when near important ports, a sufficient time to enable an
army of the United States to be transported to the point assaulted.
3. The construction of channels in which to convey gunboats from
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA- COAST DEFENCES. 5
the Gulf of Mexico up the Mississippi and Illinois rivers, and from
the Atlantic ocean up the Hudson river into the lakes ; and from one
lake into any other.
4. The creation of a fortress on the river St. Lawrence, or at the
foot of Lake Ontario, of a capacity and power fully equal to or su-
perior to that at Kingston, on the opposite shore ; also, fortifications
on the Niagara or at the foot of Lake Erie, of equal capacity.
5. The construction, for the protection of the Pacific ocean frontier,
of a first-class military communication between the river Missouri and
the bay of San Francisco.
6. A decided increase in our means of building ami repairing
vessels- of- war ; of manufacturing, testing, and repairing ordnance
and small arms of all grades ; and of making and testing projectiles
of all kinds and for every branch of the service.
7. The duplication or enlargement of the Military and Naval Acad-
emies immediately after the extinction of the rebellion and the
re-establishment of peace. And,
8. The constitution and permanent maintenance of an army and
navy sufficient in numbers and excellence to command respect both at
home and abroad a respect based on reasonable assurance of our
physical ability to promptly repress domestic insurrection and to
repel foreign aggression.
Your committee invite special attention to each of these points.
They will be considered in their order.
In 1851, after a careful survey of what had been done, one of the
engineers declared in an official report that an examination proved
"that the United States, at this time, possess the best fortified sea-
coast in the world. 77 This, probably, no longer remains true; but if
still true, it is none the less important to us to know whether our
fortifications have sufficient strength to endure the modern tests to
which, in the event of a war with a first-class maritime power, they
would be instantly subjected? Whether, in addition to protecting
themselves, they can shield from the assaults of iron-clad vessels the
cities in the adjacent harbors? And this brings us to the considera-
tion of the most important point in a system of defences constructed
for the protection of a water frontier.
STRENGTH OF THE PRESENT FORTIFICATIONS.
1. Will the fortifications constructed by the United States on our
Atlantic, Pacific, Gulf, and Lake frontiers certainly exclude a large
and well-organized fleet of armored ships-of-war from our harbors?
Could the forts, even if well garrisoned and heavily armed with the
best ordnance hitherto in the service, prevent, by day and by night,
the entrance of iron-clad steam- vessels (such as are now maintained
on Europeon peace establishments) into either one of our harbors,
and from shelling the city located within it ?
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
IRON-CLAD STEAMSHIPS OF WAR MAY RUN BY FORTS.
It was very clearly shown by Lieutenant Dahlgren, of the navy,
(in a report made by him in 1851,) that a skilful naval commander of
a powerful fleet of steamships of the line could pass into the inner
harbor of New York itself, in despite of the utmost opposition that
could be made by the forts located at the Narrows. Your committee
do not believe that the increased weight and range since given to
ordnance placed in our more important forts has increased the effec-
tiveness of the forts to a greater degree than the armoring of steam-
ships has increased their power of resistance. Hence it is consid-
ered in the highest degree probable that if, in 1851, a fleet of iron-clad
steamships of the line could force a passage into New York harbor,
especially if their commander was willing to sacrifice a few of them to
effect the passage, a fleet of armored steamships, by a similar sacri-
fice, (and probably single ones without sacrifice,) can achieve a simi-
lar result in 1862.
PRESENT SYSTEM OF DEFENCES DEFECTIVE.
Here, then, is the first defect in our present system of frontier de-
fence. It is vulnerable. The fortifications cannot shield the cities
they were built to protect; they cannot protect the objects they were
specially designed to shelter against the assaults of even a few ves-
sels perhaps, not against one or two.
So far as can now be discerned, we cannot rely on our fortifications
for reasonable protection; if they cannot be sufficiently strengthened
to be effective, then they must be superseded by what can be shown
to be adequate. A remedy for this defect should be found without
unnecessary delay; our cities cannot be left open to sudden incursions
from every petty principality which has money or credit enough to
build or buy an iron-clad ship. We cannot fail to perceive that here-
after leading maritime nations will maintain, at least as a part of their
ordinary peace establishments, a fleet of vessels not only able to pass
our forts uninjured, but, armed with the fifteen or twenty-inch guns
now likely to be introduced, able, probably, to demolish the forts.
In all ages of the world ambition and rapacity have found occasion to
plunder defenceless cities. To be able to maintain our independence,
to live in safety, and to preserve peace, our military defences' must
be adequate to afford protection against all attacks, except those of
unusual and extraordinary power.
ADDITIONAL DEFENCES.
Probably the remedying of the defects of our present system of
defences, which recent events have revealed to us, will not, necessa-
rily, be very expensive. The remedy may possibly be found in a few
additional forts, in armoring with iron both the old and the new ones,
and arming them with the heaviest ordnance attainable by art. Be-
sides these changes, it may be found necessary to add iron-clad float-
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 7
ing batteries and steam-rams in aid of the forts; and also, in times of
danger, to anchor rafts entirely across the channels leading into the
harbors, or close them with chain cables. The rafts, properly placed,
would arrest the progress of hostile vessels when in front of the forts
under the direct fire of their guns. Thus detained, the ships mst
retire or consent to be destroyed ; for it is not at all likely that a ship
can be constructed possessing as much power as can be given to a
first- class fortification. (See extract of report of engineers on means
of obstructing harbors, hereto annexed.)
Possibly an entirely new system of defences may be found best;
this, however, is scarcely to be expected, even in this age of won-
derful mechanical contrivances. Being purely a question of engineer-
ing, and the United States having a corps of engineers and of naval
officers eminently worthy of confidence, the committee recommend
the reference of the subject to them, with directions to devise a plan
which, when fully executed, will enable the United States to exclude
hostile fleets from all important harbors on our several water frontiers.
The committee will not withhold an expression of opinion that
powerful, perhaps entirely adequate, means of defence, original in
character and simple in application, may be found to repel the most
powerful fleets and armaments. We have reason to believe that this
will be found to be true, though an allusion even to the nature and
character of these plans, some of which are now under examination,
would be premature.
IMPORTANCE OF SUITABLE DEFENCEfc.
Said Secretary Poinsett:
"We must bear in mind that the destruction of some of the important points on the
frontier would alone cost more to the nation than the expense of fortifying the whole lino
would amount to ; while the temporary occupation of others would drive us into expenses
far surpassing those of the projected defences."
These reflections of this eminent man being sound, we cannot dis-
pense with defensive works merely because of their expense. The
only question really open to discussion is, what system of defences
will be adequate to the end in view ?
PRACTICABILITY OF CONSTRUCTING ADEQUATE NATIONAL DEFENCES.
It is ^objected that it is quite impracticable for thirty millions of
people to provide defences which are truly invulnerable for frontiers
so extensive as those of the United States. To objections of this
class, Mr. Secretary Poinsett replied that
"It would appear, on a superficial view, to be a acigantic and almost impracticable pro-
ject to fortify such an immense extent of coast as that of the United States, and difficult,
if not impossible, to provide a sufficient force to garrison and defend the works necessary
for that purpose."
But, said Mr. Poinsett:
"The coast of the United States, throughout its vast extent, has but few points which
require to be defended against a regular and powerful attack. A considerable portion of
it is inaccessible to large vessels, and only exposed to the depredations of parties in boats
and small vessels-of-war ; against which inferior works and a combination of the same
means, and a well-organized local militia, will afford sufficient protection.
8 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
"The only portions which require to be defended by permanent works of some strength
are the avenues to the great commercial cities, and to naval and military establishments,
the destruction of which would be a serious loss to the country, and be regarded by an
enemy as an equivalent for the expense of a great armament.
"It is shown, also, that the number of men required, on the largest scale, for the de-
fence of the forts when compared with the movable force that would be necessary without
thfm is inconsiderable. The local militia, aided by a few regulars, and directed by en-
gineer and artillery officers, may, with previous training, be safely intrusted with their
defence in time of war.
"It cannot be too earnestly urged that a much smaller number of troops will be required
to defend a fortified frontier than to cover one that is entirely unprotected ; and that such
a system will enable us, according to the spirit of our institutions, to employ the militia
effectually for the defence of the country."
From three causes the number of important points open to attack
has increased during the twenty-two years which have elapsed since
the foregoing cogent reasons were presented; but, as our wealth and
population have proportionably increased, his reply is as complete
to-day as it was then. The points of attack have increased, first, by
the springing up of new marts of commerce; second, by the acquisi-
tion of Texas and California; and third, cities in shallow harbors now
need strong defences in consequence of the recent adaptation of ves-
sels of light draught to the work of the largest ships-of-war.
The iron-clad Monitor, though of light draught, can carry as
heavy a gun as the Warrior, and can as safely run by any fort in her
Majesty's dominions, anchor in the harbor beyond, and, in defiance
of ancient means of prevention, commence the work of destruction.
But though this altered condition of affairs lays open to attack sev-
eral important points not heretofore considered exposed, still, as just
remarked, our increased means fully equal the increased demands
upon them. Our country is competent to the task of placing the
frontier in a complete state of defence without being at all distressed
by the performance of it. The sum of our present expenses would,
probably in one month, far more than suffice to place our frontiers in
a perfectly defensible condition. The Pacific frontier is, of course,
excepted in the above remark. But if, on scientific investigation,
the engineers and naval officers shall ascertain that adequate national
defences cannot be constructed except at great cost, the works will
yet have to be built, however unwelcome the burden; unless, indeed,
the nation is prepared to renounce its time-honored maxims, and con-
sent to owe the security of its frontier cities, and the security of a
commerce which has become as wide-spread as the world, to the
mercy and forbearance of its maritime neighbors. .
Having shown that the first step to take to secure our water fron-
tiers from the casualities of unexpected assault is to construct de-
fences, permanent and floating, which are competent to resist any
sudden attack that can readily be made with such means as are ordi-
narily in the possession of an enemy, your committee believe that
the next step, in importance is :
2. To provide such means of defence of the coast near the import-
ant harbors as will compel hostile vessels to seek for a point at some
distance from the harbors at which to disembark troops; thus afford-
ing to us time to convey our troops to the point threatened in advance
of the arrival of the enemy.
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 9
When our roads were few and bad the importance of compelling
an enemy to land a day's journey from important points was not so
striking as now, when troops can be placed in that space of time in
large numbers between the point threatened and an invading army.
Informed by the telegraph, and aided by the railroads, a commander
defending a country possessing so many soldiers as ours can, in a brief
period of time, confront with a superior force more armies than the
entire fleets of any nation can transport in one voyage across a wide
ocean. This is an advantage in the defence of a country of very
great moment. To achieve it, a nation situated at a great distance
from warlike and ambitious governments, would be justified in making
very large expenditures. If, in addition to this, we maintain respect-
able fleets and armies, carefully drill a well-organized militia, and
take care to keep on hand abundant munitions of war, the United
States would be, practically, invulnerable.
The exceptions to the general remark, that an invading army, land-
ing at any important point in the United States, could be confronted
in a few hours with a superior force, are few, and can be found only
in the Gulf and Pacific States, and in those bordering on Lakes
Huron and Superior. These exceptions are rapidly lessening in num-
ber, and in a few years will disappear. It is a matter of just pride
and great national consequence that no country of the size of one of
our largest States has such facile and as extensive lines of water and
railroad communications as the United States. No system of defence,
therefore, would be perfect which is not so planned as to render
available, to its greatest extent, this power of concentrating forces
rapidly upon any assailable point a power which our country pos-
sesses in so extraordinary a degree. No large country, either in
ancient or modern times, ever possessed such ample and reliable
means for rapidly transferring large bodies of men from one distant
State to another as our own; and because the great power of such
means has never been effectively exhibited in a great war of a defen-
sive character is not a reason for us to disregard it. Its inherent
value and power in a country where, as all nations well know, the
sudden seizure of a few places, however valuable, cannot endanger
its integrity or seriously cripple its movements, are obvious to the
humblest understanding. Seizures, achieved at great risk, and
promising no decisive results, are rarely attempted by able leaders.
Thorough defences, constructed with direct reference to a full develop-
ment of the usefulness of our interior communications, will go far to
insure our country even against attempts to invade it, and such a
result is the highest aim of a system of military defences.
The location and character of the works necessary to prevent the
landing of a hostile force on the coast near important harbors can
only be determined by engineers, and to them it should be referred,
with instructions to erect them.
DEFENCES OF THE NORTHERN FRONTIER.
3 and 4. How can the northern or lake frontier be successfully
defended, especially as the United States are prohibited, by treaty
10 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
from building war vessels on the lakes? On the shores of these lakes
the United States have many cities and villages, and upon their waters
an immense commerce; these are unsheltered by any defences worthy
of special notice, but they are as open to incursion as was Mexico
when invaded by Cortez. A small fleet of light- draught, heavily-
armed, iron-clad gunboats could, in one short month, in despite of
any opposition that could be made by extemporized batteries, pass
up the St. Lawrence into the lakes, and shell every city and village
from Ogdensburg to Chicago. At one blow it could sweep our com-
merce from that entire chain of waters. Such a fleet wouM have it in
its power to inflict a loss to be reckoned only by hundreds of millions of
dollars, so vast is the wealth thus exposed to the depredations of a
maritime enemy. To be able to strike a blow so Effective, Great
Britain constructed a canal around the great Falls of Niagara. By
this single work the entire chain of lakes was opened to the entrance
of all British light-draught ocean vessels. Perceiving our ability to
erect fortifications on the St. Lawrence that might command its
channel, and thus neutralize all they had done, Great Britain dug a
canal from the foot of Lake 'Ontario, on a line parallel to the river,
but beyond the reach of American guns, to a point on the St. Law-
rence below, beyond American jurisdiction, thus securing a channel
to and from the lakes out of our reach.
Occupied by our own vast commercial enterprises and by violent
party conflicts, our people failed to notice, at the time, that the
safety of our entire northern frontier had been destroyed by the dig-
ging of two short canals. Near the head of the St. Lawrence, (at
the foot of Lake Ontario,) the British, to complete their supremacy
on the lakes, have built a large naval depot for the construction and
repair of vessels, and a very strong fortress to protect the depot and
the outlet of the lake a fort which cannot be reduced, it is sup-
posed by them, except by regular approaches. They have also
strong defences of the St. Lawrence at Montreal, Quebec, <fec., to
make the all-important channel as safe as possible to the ingress and
egress of their fleets. As things now are, a British fleet could sail
from the ocean into the lakes, devastate the cities upon the shores,
seize the commercial vessels on their waters, and then, in a few days,
appear off Boston, New York, or New Orleans, to aid in operations
against us on the ocean frontier. To place our frontier in like good
condition, the United States must possess as good an inlet to the
lakes, and must possess the means to follow an enemy's fleet from one
lake to another with like ease and certainty. We must have a naval
depot of corresponding extent, as well secured, and as judiciously
located for commercial as well as warlike purposes. In addition to
these we should have defences at the entrance of each lake which
will effectually command them. On the St. Lawrence should be
fortifications (aided by 'floating batteries if necessary) competent to
control the channel, however numerous the hostile fleet.
To defend the northern frontier, the United States should be able
to place a strong fleet on the lakes as soon as an opponent. We
should have adequate means of transportation at command to be able
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 11
to speedily concentrate on the .St. Lawrence a force of acknowledged
competency to take possession of the canal and of Montreal, and hold
them. The possession by the United States of the outlets of Lake
Ontario, and of Montreal and its communications, would cut off all
supplies from the Canadians, and leave them to an unsupported and
hopeless conflict with all our forces. Such a conflict could be neither
protracted nor dangerous.
MILITARY CANALS.
Can the United States have a navigable channel from the ocean to
the lakes of an equal value with that possessed by Great Britain?
Undoubtedly; and a better one. The Erie and Hudson canal can
readily be so enlarged as to allow of the passage of a vessel of fifteen
hundred or even of two thousand tons burden. When completed, a
vessel could enter Lake Erie sooner from New York harbor than from
the mouth of the St. Lawrence, and without the delay and danger
arising from rapids, rocks, and ice. The Illinois river and Lake
Michigan canal can be still more readily and cheaply enlarged than
the Hudson and Erie, and would allow an ocean vessel from New Or-
leans to enter the lakes a month earlier in the spring than one entering
by the way of the Gulf of St. Lawrence. A canal around Niagara
falls can be readily built of any desirable capacity. Neither of these
channels would be within reach of British guns, whereas a right to
plant American guns upon the banks of the St. Lawrence, the only
British channel to the lakes, belongs to the United States.
MILITARY ADVANTAGES OF CANALS FROM THE LAKES TO THE GULF OF MEXICO,
AND TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC.
In the absence of ships-of-war on the lakes, and of all means to con-
vey them there from the ocean, the United States, upon the breaking
out of war, would, without navy yards and suitable docks, have to
commence the building of a fleet upon Lake Ontario, and another on
the upper lakes, one British fleet answering for both. The United
States could not leave the valuable cities and commerce of the upper
lakes undefended, nor could it allow the British war vessels to domi-
nate Lake Ontario, where the bulk of the British commerce, wealth,
and military and naval resources are to be found. Hence, two fleets
would be indispensable. So long as the British can hold Lake Ontario
and its outlets to the ocean, so long is Canada invulnerable, and so
long can land expeditions be sent against our cities from Buffalo to
Utica, and naval ones to every port on the upper as well as lower
lakes. And so long as the British ocean fleet can, alone, enter the
lakes, by what means could ship yards on our shores be so protected
from their gunboats as to make it safe to build vessels within them ?
"Would not the cost and defects of hasty building, and of thorough
protection of ship yards from the attacks of iron- clad fleets, and the
loss of towns, and of commercial vessels, and the pay and support of
extra bodies of troops along the whole frontier, greatly exceed, in
three months, the entire cost of three canals?
12 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
The first advantage of these canals to the United States would be,
then, the avoidance of those otherwise unavoidable evils. A second
advantage would be found in our ability to make one fleet answer for
two. A third advantage would be, that we could build vessels on
the Ohio, Mississippi, Missouri, Illinois, Hudson, and along the lines
of the canals, free from all danger of attacks, and where labor and
materials would be abundant and cheap. A fourth advantage would
be equally decided ; instead of being useless to the United States,
except upon the lakes where built, the digging of the canals would
enable our war vessels on the lakes, in ten days after the receipt of
orders, to make their appearance at New Orleans or Mobile for naval
movements in the West Indies, or at New York to operate in the North
Atlantic, two thousand miles further to the northeast. The possession
of the power to transfer a blockaded fleet by a safe inland route from
New York to New Orleans, or from New Orleans to New York, is, of
itself, an incalculable advantage in times of war with a strong mari-
time power. A fifth advantage might arise in this wise : should the
British fleet winter at the naval depot, under the protection of the
fortress, as its safety and convenience would dictate, our fleet, long
after the British fleet was ice-bound, could pass down the Mississippi
and aid our forces in the Gulf of Mexico and Caribbean sea a third
of the year, and yet be back to its station before the enemy could
sail from its ice-bound harbor.
The last advantage which your committee will name at this time
is the facilities the canals would afford, in times of peace, to agricul-
ture, commerce, manufactures, and the mechanic arts. Practically
the navigable channel of the Hudson is extended to the Mississippi.
The steamship loaded at St. Paul, Omaha, St. Louis, Louisville,
Memphis, or Chicago, would transport its thousand, fifteen hundred,
or two thousand tons of produce to New York, Boston, or Philadel-
phia, or any other point on the entire coast, at the pleasure of its
owners, and exchange it for every fabric known to the merchant and
the artisan. This would infuse new vigor into all industrial pursuits,
and benefit all portions of this great country. It is believed that if
eighty-ton horse boats can afford to pay tolls high enough to support
shallow canals, two thousand-ton steamboats, being subjected to less
expense per ton, can afford to pay enough higher tolls to support
deeper canals of greater cost ; especially, considered in connexion
with the far larger amount of business the deep canal could transact.
They ought, within a reasonable time, to reimburse their first cost.
Hence no reason is perceived, from the money point of view, why
these exceedingly important military channels should not be dug.
These and other considerations which need not be enumerated,
most of which relate directly to the military value of these avenues,
induce your committee to urge the construction of the canal from the
foot of Lake Michigan- to the Mississippi river and around the Falls
of Niagara, connecting the upper and the lower lakes. It is not
doubted that the great resources of the State of New York, and the
interest of that State and its commercial capital, (which is also the
commercial capital of the nation,) will supply the means and a motive
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 13
for the enlargement of the Erie canal on a scale equal to the other
works, and as soon as they can be completed by the general govern-
ment.
This chain of interior water communications, which can so easily
be established from the bay of New York and of the St. Lawrence,
stretching through the lakes, and by their union with the Mississippi
river, to New Orleans, to St. Paul, Pittsburg, and the foothills of the
Rocky mountains, discloses a remarkable feature in the geographical
formation of our country, and brings to mind another equally singular
and important fact often referred to by our engineers, and worthy of
consideration in this connexion. It is what might be called a second
coast-line, created by making a navigable channel near to and par-
allel with the coasts on the Atlantic and Gulf, and having numerous
connexions with those waters. Such channel would possess two very
valuable properties ; it would enable the United States to transfer
our ships-of-war, by a safe and speedy route, in the presence of a
superior naval force, from any one point on our coast to any other, and
it would preserve our vast coasting trade in unimpaired activity
throughout the war. The military value of this measure was urged
by the engineers more than forty years ago, but of late years Con-
gress seems to have forgotten its importance. Now that the coasting
trade has an annual value of more than three hundred millions of dollars,
and it has come to be well understood that unless a belligerent power
can maintain its trade and commerce, money to carry on the war will
be found scarce and dear, it is to be hoped earnest consideration will
be bestowed upon the importance of an intra-coast channel. An in-
terior channel, beginning in the Mississippi river, above New Or-
leans, opening up the bed of the Ibberville river, (closed by General
Jackson in 1812-' 15, and not since opened,) may be continued along
the coast between the islands and the main land, via Mobile and
Pensacola, (crossing Florida with a ship canal, ) Savannah, Charleston,
Beaufort, Norfolk, near Baltimore, Philadelphia, New Brunswick,
and New York, (through Long Island sound, Narraganset and Buz-
zard's bays, and by a short canal,) to Massachusetts bay. Such is the
opinion of the engineers.
Without, at this time, entering into the details of the feasibility
and cost of this valuable means of defence, your committee will be
content to call attention to a practical point or two. There is at this
time in operation, between the lower waters of New York harbor
and the Delaware river, a canal Delaware and Raritan forty-three
miles long and seven feet deep. It is navigated by small propellers and
sloops. The Chesapeake and Delaware canal connects Philadelphia,
on the Delaware, and Baltimore, on the Chesapeake. It is only thir-
teen and a half miles long, and is ten feet deep. The Dismal Swamp
canal is twenty-two miles long, and connects Chesapeake bay with
Albemarle sound.
Here, then, is an interior channel which, when the coasts have
been put into a defensible condition, will be a safe one along an ex-
tensive and exceedingly important part of our coast, from New Lon-
don to Beaufort, directly communicating with several of our largest
States and cities. To make this extensive channel available both in
14 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
peace and in war requires an enlargement of three short and inexpen-
sive canals, of an aggregate length of but seventy-eight and a half
miles.
Another interior channel of similar importance can be had (by
means of the Ibberville river and Lakes Mauripas, Pontchartrain, and
Borgne) from the Mississippi river to Pensacola. This would connect
all of the cities of the west with all of the cities of the Gulf by an inte-
rior and protected channel. The cost of this would be even less than the
other, and both might ultimately be extended so as to become one.
Thus, with a few slight interruptions where it might be necessary
to venture upon the open sea, an interior line of water communications
can be established from New Orleans to New York and to Boston.
These interruptions, even, could be protected by powerful floating bat-
teries, and our commerce in time of war, even with the most powerful
maritime nations, could make a secure and peaceful circuit around
the country.
The enterprise of individuals has provided us with this almost
complete water line along the coast we can safely look to the same
source for the accomplishment of much more where nature has done
so great a share. The government may never be called to do more
than sanction by its authority, in order to insure the completion of
this grand design ; and yet the very struggle which we are now en-
during against the disseverance of the Union, marks the conviction
of the mass of our countrymen of the essential unity of our country,
and the dependence of the whole upon every part; and the same en-
ergy, inspired by the same sentiment, will some day bind this new
ligament of strength around the nation to make its Union perpetual.
DEFENCE OF THE PACIFIC COAST.
5. In addition to good harbor and other defences upon the Pacific
coast, the Pacific States and Territory, to be defensible against the
attack of a powerful nation, must be connected with the States lying
to the east of their mountains by a good military road by a first-
class, faithfully-constructed railroad, competent to the ready trans-
portation of the heaviest ordnance, as well as large bodies of troops
and their indispensable supplies. The present population is too
small, and too much scattered, to be able to defend so extensive a
frontier against the attacks of a well-organized naval and land force.
Their frontier extends from the thirty- second to the forty-ninth par-
allel of latitude, seventeen degrees, excluding the indentations and
windings of the coast. To defend it is not within the physical power
of so few persons. Many years hence things will be much changed.
The war of 1812-' 15 called forth considerable effort; yet we then had
eight millions of people. A powerful nation could easily detail for
an attack upon the Pacific States a much larger force than was em-
ployed against us in 1812.
It is not wise, therefore, to stake the safety and independence of
the Pacific States and Territory upon their infant resources; nor
is it prudent for us to rely upon our ability to send them troops
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 15
and supplies by sea, around Cape Horn, or across the Isthmus
through the territory of a foreign nation. Such a reliance would
subject us to too much delay and expense, and expose our re-enforce-
ments to too many casualties, of all kinds. A good road would be
self-sustaining, and ultimately might, under judicious management,
reimburse a portion of its first cost. It is reassuring to reflect that,
if its great cost is evident, so the numerous benefits which would
flow from the road are equally indisputable. Instead of repining at
the necessity which demands the construction of three canals and a
railroad to render our national defences efficient, the nation has great
cause for self-gratulation at having occasion to construct so few has
great reason to be proud of that individual enterprise and energy,
which, without national aid, has created so many thousand miles of
commercial communications .of the first order of completeness and effi-
ciency, not only for the purposes of commerce, but also so admirably
adapted for the military purposes of the government. The unstim-
ulated efforts of peaceful citizens for peaceful ends have created for
the United States a greater and more complete system of communi-
cations, well located and well suited for military purposes, than any
created by the mightiest military nations led and stimulated by the
mightiest warriors of any age of the world.
While so much has been done for the government by its citizens,
and so much more is likely hereafter to be done by them, directly
available for military purposes, the government has abundant cause
of thankfulness that so little of consequence remains to be done by
itself, and should proceed to the execution of its task with unhesita-
ting alacrity.
The building of a great road from St. Louis to San Francisco con-
solidates the power of the United States; it mobilizes the power of
the United States. Not only so, but it would speedily cause to be
populated those numerous fertile valleys existing amid those wonder-
ful mountain ranges which our maps erroneously represent as one
vast area of desolation; it would thus seriously aid in providing hardy
mountaineers not likely to assist at a surrender of the keys of the
Golden Gate. From every reason that can be properly urged in
favor of placing a country in a state of defence, your committee
urge the early construction of a good and reliable road from the
Missouri river to the bay of San Francisco.
It may be proper to say, before leaving the subject of coast defences
on the Pacific, that your committee consider good defensive works on
Puget sound and its tributary waters, and on the Rio Colorado, at
the head of the Gulf of California, as indispensable to a successful de-
fence of the immediate Pacific coast. Judicious measures calculated
to secure permanent settlements in the fertile valleys of the Colorado
of the west, and upon the waters of Puget sound, are also impera-
tively demanded by the military interests of this interesting ocean
frontier. Those flank defences, supported by populations of respect-
able numbers, would, in the event of a large war, possess great value
to the defenders of the coast on the Pacific ocean. Of similar value
would be a railroad from Los Angelos, via the Tulare and San Joaquin
valleys, to San Francisco, with a branch from a point a few miles east
16 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
of San Francisco, along the banks of the Sacramento, and northerly
as far as the configuration of the country will allow, and business and
population would justify; such a road would greatly increase the de-
fensive ability of California, by conferring on it the power to quickly
assemble and transfer its forces to repel assaults; it would be second
in importance only to the road to the Missouri river, and is well
worthy of government aid should the people of that State decide to
build it.
INCREASE OP ARMS.
6. The events of the late Russian and Austrian wars, as well as
those of our own, reveal to us in a striking light the necessity of a
decided increase of the capacity of the several navy yards, and the
establishment of one upon the lakes; the establishment of a few first-
class arsenals of construction at points as safe from hostile approach
as is the arsenal at Watervliet, and yet accessible by both boats and
railroad alike from the interior, and from each of the several frontiers;
a good national foundery, as securely located and as accessible as the
arsenals of construction; another national armory, located as above
described; a large increase in the number, quality, weight, and range
of ordnance for arming- forts and vessels; a large increase in the
number, quality, and range of our rifles, muskets, carbines, and pis-
tols; an increased capacity of arsenals of repair and of deposit. A
marked increase in the weight and range of ordnance made for use
in fortifications and on shipboard is particularly desirable, and, it is
thought by many who have given the subject much attention, is easily
attainable. If good twenty-inch guns can be fabricated, it is seriously
doubted whether ships can be built which could sustain, for any con-
siderable time, the concentrated fire of a large fort armed with them.
Balls of a half ton weight, thrown with the proper velocity, several
striking at the same moment, would probably soon destroy any vessel
hitherto devised. Special experiments with this class of ordnance,
and with improved projectiles, should be authorized by Congress.
The knowledge which our officers on land and sea are now gaining
relative to the power and value of the several classes of improved
ordnance, specially qualifies them to pass upon the merits of rival
guns and projectiles very intelligently. They have passed from the
theories of the closet to the practical tests of the battle-field, and
will return with matured opinions as to the actual value of the several
leading features which distinguish the best of the new inventions.
Solid progress has been made, and we must avail ourselves of it in all
that we do hereafter. Not a gun should be made, nor a ship nor a
fortification built, but in strict accordance with the rules of the mili-
tary art, as modified by the recent revelations of experience. All
else is waste.
MILITARY AND NAVAL OFFICERS.
7. In addition to the construction of fortifications and ships and
the accumulation of approved arms and of munitions of war, we
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 17
must, to insure successful defence, secure an unfailing supply of
scientific and thoroughly trained officers. In this respect it would
be neither creditable nor safe to fall behind any other nation. The
advantages flowing from placing fleets and armies under an intelligent
direction need not be enumerated to an American Congress nor to
the American people. The only question is, how large a number
ought to be educated in the best manner for the naval and military
service ? This is a difficult question to answer. It may, however,
safely be affirmed, in general terms, that twice as many as we have
heretofore educated will be wanted hereafter. The casualties have
to be taken into account. They cannot be avoided. We deplore
the deaths and injuries and regret the resignations of accomplished
and useful officers: the loss by resignation is, however, partially com-
pensated by the consequent benefits to manufactures and commerce
and by the formation of a valuable reserve. Nearly all officers who
resign do so to enter the service of railroad and steamship companies
or other important concerns, which enrich and strengthen the gov-
ernment. In these resigned officers the United States possess a
valuable reserve or surplus, from which to draw supplies of educated
officers in times of war. The availability and military value of this
reserve was demonstrated in the Mexican as well as in the present
war. The moment their country needed their services, large numbers
of these resigned officers came forward with alacrity to serve the
country which had educated them for its military purposes. In their
retirement many had organized and trained volunteer corps ; when
the war broke out they had acquired an influence which enabled them
to easily organize large volunteer forces, which they promptly led to
the field. As in the past it has ever been thus, it is reasonable to
believe it will be so in the future. The frequency of resignation
should not, therefore,, deter us from adhering to our system, though
this evil may call for preventives in certain possible contingencies.
Before leaving this subject of securing for the United States edu-
cated naval and military talent for the direction of our forces by sea
and land, your committee will take occasion to remark that the grow-
ing opinion in favor of allowing parents and guardians to educate
young men of promising talents at the United States Military and
Naval Academies, at their own expense, seems to be worthy of con-
sideration. As now constituted, no citizen is permitted to educate
his son or ward at these academies, however willing he may be to de-
fray the entire expense, and that the pupil shall in all respects con-
form to all their rules and requirements, unless so fortunate as to ob-
tain for him one of the few appointments allowed by law. An able
corps of officers, of all grades, and of both arms of the service, is
now being practically educated in the military art ; their schooling is
conducted in the field and on the sea in the actual presence of the
enemy ; their lessons are explained and demonstrated by frequent
practical examples of the most varied and instructive character, well
calculated to fit them to cope, should it ever become necessary, with
the leaders of the armies of any nations. But, in the course of na-
ture, these in a few years will have passed away, and year by year
H. Rep. Com. 86 2
18 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
should be succeeded by young men well qualified by a thorough pre-
paratory training to take their places ; as now constituted, the two
academies are unable to prepare the number which will be required
by the future exigencies of the army and navy. They will be unable,
inasmuch as commercial men. manufacturers, mechanical establish-
ments, and railroads, as the business and wealth of the country ex-
pand, will make increasing demands upon educated talent ; and the
better we prepare cadets for duty the sharper will be the competi-
tion against the government ; the abler our officers the more attrac-
tive will be the inducements held out to them to exchange the public
for private employment.
Severe legislative enactments will not remedy the evil, but an in-
creased supply will. To this latter remedy must we resort if we
would maintain the present high character of our officers for scientific
military attainments. The committee, therefore, recommend that
another military academy be established, to ' be located in the west,
and another naval academy be established, to be located in the north-
east, or that the capacity of the present establishments be enlarged,
and that the President be directed to submit to the next Congress
the best plans for the duplication or the enlargement of such institu-
tions, together with estimates of cost ; and also that the President
further report as to the expediency of opening to both classes of ca-
dets, as well those who shall be appointed under the present sys-
tem and those who may be educated at those institutions at the ex-
pense of their parents and guardians, the opportunity of obtaining
commissions in the army and navy at the end of their academical ca-
reer by requiring a certain standard of merit to entitle either to enter
the service as officers.
8. To place the United States in a good condition of defence we
must also constitute and maintain an army and navy entirely sufficient
in numbers and excellence, in personnel and materiel, to command the
respect of other nations a respect based upon a consciousness of our
being prepared to promptly punish wanton aggression.
Hitherto, instead of having an army respectable for its size, it had
been made so unpopular (by artful appeals to our national dislike to
maintain large fleets and armies) as to resist all efforts to increase our
military strength to an extent equal to our actual wants, that traitors
were able to commence, and actually did commence a rebellion at a
time when the government had scarcely one thousand soldiers east of
the Mississippi river, amid a population of more than twenty-five
millions. Forts seemed to have been built for ornamental rather
than useful purposes. The idea that one of the chief objects of
establishing the Union was to ' 'insure domestic tranquility, ' ' had come
to be considered a "glittering generality," quite inconsistent with
State rights. The stirring events and trials of the past twelve
months have, at a cost of rivers of blood and a thousand millions of
dollars, thoroughly dispelled these wretched but once popular delu-
sions. We now clearly see how wise were the earnest recommenda-
tions of our military authorities. Had they been heeded in 1836,
when the* treasury was so full that Congress deemed it proper to di-
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 19"
vide a considerable portion of the public moneys among the several
States, the present rebellion probably had not occurred. We should
have had two forts where we now have one ; the cost of all would
have been but about thirty-one million five hundred thousand dollars 5
their peace garrisons would have been five thousand nine hundred'
and forty soldiers ; their war garrisons sixty-three thousand three'
hundred and ninety-one. With our forts garrisoned, traitors would
have forborne from engaging in war ; but if otherwise, how readily
could they have been seized. How small the cost of the defences;
how small the cost of maintaining the garrisons, compared with our
present expenditures.
To protect our immense interior territories against the numerous
Indian tribes who roam over them is a work equal to the utmost
efforts of our present regular forces, and more than they have hitherto
been able properly to perform. An increase of the regular army to
an extent adequate to the proper garrisoning of our frontier defences,
under the revised estimates which have become necessary, is there-
fore a military necessity which cannot be prudently overlooked nor
neglected by Congress. On this point a careful estimate should be
required from an able board of engineers of more than usual experi-
ence. The preservation of peace with foreign nations is not a greater
blessing than the maintenance of domestic tranquillity ; and the main-
tenance of a well appointed army and navy, suitable to our necessi-
ties and our means, will powerfully aid us in the preservation of both.
Similar views naturally present themselves in relation to a judicious
increase of the navy, and a report thereon should be provided for at
an early day; much of its present force is entirely temporary, and
will disappear with the occasion which demanded its accumulation,
leaving the nation with a navy quite inadequate to our wants.
Your committee have endeavored to show, at some length, that our
frontier defences are defective, and should therefore be either im-
proved or superseded, so as to afford protection of a character upon
which we can rely. It has been urged that as our defences, com-
pared with those of other nations, are respectable, and the great
mass of our people ardently love peace, and therefore in this age of
rapidly advancing civilization not likely to provoke enmities in the
breasts of reasonable people to the extent of hostilities, why, in this
time of heavy taxation, insist upon entering upon the work of con-
structing extensive and costly defences ? Why insist upon our acting
as though other nations were actuated only by a spirit of rapine and
conquest ?
Your committee are not insensible to the ameliorating influences
which advancing Christianity and civilization are steadily and bene-
ficently working among the leading nations of our age. But prudence
forbids us to be blind to the influences which ambition and com-
mercial and manufacturing rivalry still exert upon the minds of those
who control the great governments of the earth. What is the ex-
ample set us by the enterprising and highly enlightened neighbor
upon whose border we have recommended expensive works of de-
fence ? What mean the extensive and costly naval depots at Bermuda
20 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
and Halifax the opening of an expensive and fortified channel for
her iron-clad vessels into the lakes upon our defenceless northern
frontier ? If in the history of Great Britain nothing can be found to
justify the supposition that she is likely to make Canada an inde-
pendency, and thus give us a weak neighbor against the possible ag-
gressions of whom it would not be seemly to strongly guard, it might
be proper to disregard the wise maxims of ages and leave our north-
ern frontier in its present defenceless and exposed condition. But if,
on the contrary, the whole world believes Great Britian seeks to in-
crease instead of lessening her dominions, and, in the event of war,
would vigorously defend them, then it becomes us, like other nations,
to put our frontiers into a condition of security more in accordance
with the dictates of good sense and a sound military policy.
The friendship existing between England and France has been
more intimate and co-operative during the past ten years than proba-
bly it has been before in several centuries. They have united in
levying war against Russia, against China, and against Mexico; and
to increase their intimacy have even changed the tariff systems of the
respective countries. Yet never, in ten centuries, had the channel
between them been so carefully studded with fortifications, located
and built so regardful of military science, so regardless of cost, as
during the past ten years. Each has also vied with the other in
building improved and novel ships-of-war, more formidable than the
world ever saw before; and each has maintained armies at home and
abroad, the soldiers of which are enumerated only by hundreds of
thousands. Such is friendship among the most highly civilized na-
tions of this age, even when it assumes the form of intimacy. As in
the event of a martial contest between other nations each of these
allies would unhesitatingly pursue the path indicated by its national
interest, wheresoever that might chance to lead, they may be said to
be never out of danger of collision. Hence, like their ships, they
are ever clad in armor; and each of them seems to be of opinion that
the more complete the armor of both the more likely is peace to be
maintained, and the more likely is their friendship to continue inti-
mate and cordial. To keep the peace, each of these intimate friends,
instead of relying on the civilization and Christianity which so em-
inently distinguish their people, has constructed powerful fortifica-
tions, built many ships, and raised and maintained many soldiers,
ready to fight at a moment's notice. How amazing the capacity arid
completeness of the French arsenals of construction ! The 'British
navy yards are bewildering in their immensity ! The mere barracks,
hospitals, and storehouses of these nations have been erected at a
cost equal to that of all our fortifications on five thousand miles of
coast.
Such is the practice among the wisest nations of our times, and
your committee consider that it would be exceedingly dangerous to
disregard it, and weakly allow a powerful and litigious neighbor ad-
vantages against which good sense revolts. We must make available,
at an early day, advantages of a corresponding value. Instead of in-
dolently repining at that enterprise which has opened to British fleets
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 21'
an exclusive and a fortified channel into the entire chain of the great
North American lakes, thus uncovering our extended northern fron-
tier, the United States must unhesitatingly imitate the spirited exam-
ple. So, also, if a revolution in the art of protecting ships against
the effect of shot renders our forts inadequate to the duty for which
they were designed, instead of sitting down to bewail our misfortune,
or halting to consider whether nations have not become so good and
so just as to be hereafter incapable of doing us a wrong, we must en-
large and strengthen our works, and face them with iron. Good
armor and upright dealing united are well calculated to make nations
friends. It was well said, at an early day, by our engineers, that
" Neither our geographical position, nor our forbearance, nor the equity of our policy,
can always avail under the relation in which it is our destiny to stand to the rest of the
world. We are admonished by history to bear in mind that war cannot at all times be
avoided, however specific and forbearing our policy ; and that nothing will conduce more
to an uninterrupted peace than that state of preparation which exposes no weak point to
the hostility, and offers no gratification to the cupidity, of the other nations of the earth."
Credulity, procrastination, and helplessness, have ruined many na-
tions as well as individuals. We must not only perceive and recog-
nize what is proper and judicious to place our system of frontier de-
fences in a condition calculated to insure our safety and independence,
but must seriously and perseveringly act in earnest accordance with
our matured opinions. Congress must not only make appropriations,
but make them at the suitable times, and in sufficient amounts; to be
most effective, appropriations must be not only adequate, but also
timely and consecutive; else, idle hands and waste of materials will
result, as heretofore, in unnecessary losses. In the construction of
sjnps and fortifications delays increase their cost. Forethought and
promptitude, faithfulness and integrity, will, at an early day, at a
reasonable cost, call into existence admirable defences, of the excel-
lence of which our nation will be proud.
The committee report herewith several bills intended to carry out
such of their recommendations as have not already been brought be-
fore the House by this and its other committees, and ask for their
recommendations such consideration as the importance of the subject
demands.
22 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
APPENDIX.
No. 1.
EXTRACT FROM A REPORT MADE IN 1840 TO THE SECRETARY OF WAR BY
THE BOARD OF ENGINEERS OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY.
" Means of obstructing entrances to harbors.
" This brings us to consider a third class, consisting of establishments of
importance situated at a distance up some river or bay, there being intermediate
space too wide to be commanded from the shores. In such cases the defence
must be concentrated upon the narrow passes, and must, of course, be apportioned
in armament to the value of the objects covered. When the value is not very
great, a stout array of batteries at the best positions would deter an enemy from
an attempt to force the passage, since his advantage, in case of success, would
not be commensurate with any imminent risk. But with the more valuable
establishments it might be otherwise ; the consequence of success might justify
all the risk to be encountered in rapidly passing in face of batteries, however
powerful. This condition of things requires peculiar precaution under any system
of defence. If after having occupied the shores, in the narrow places, in the
best manner, with batteries, we are of opinion that the temptation may induce
the enemy, notwithstanding, to run tlie gauntlet, the obstruction of the channel
must be resorted to. By this is not meant the permanent obstruction of the
passage; such a resort, besides the great expense, might entail the ruin of the
channel. The obstruction is meant to be the temporary closing by heavy
floating masses.
"There is no doubt that a double line of rafts, each raft being of large size,
and anchored with strong chains, would make it impossible to pass without first
removing some of the obstructions, and it might clearly be made impossible to
effect this removal under the fire of the batteries. Such obstructions need not
be resorted to until the breaking out of a war, as they could then be speedily
formed, should the preparation of the enemy be of a threatening nature.
" There would be nothing in these obstructions inconsistent with our use of
part of the channel, since two or three of the rafts might be kept out of line,
ready to move into their places at an hour's notice.
"The greatest danger to which these obstructions would be exposed would
be from explosive vessels, and from these they might be protected by a boom
or a line of smaller rafts in front.
"From what has just been said it will be perceived that, when the induce-
ments are such as to bring the enemy forward in great power, and efficient
batteries can be established only at certain points, we are not then to rely on
them exclusively. In such a case, the enemy should be stopped by some
physical impediments ; and the batteries must be strong enough to prevent his
removing these impediments, and also to prevail in a cannonade, should the
enemy undertake to silence the works.
"The conditions these obstructions have to fulfil are these:
" 1st. They must be of a nature to be fixed readily, and to be speedily re-"
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 23
moved when there is no longer occasion for them, and to this end they must be
afloat.
"2d. They must have adequate inertia to resist,. or rather not to be destroyed
or displaced by the shock of the heaviest ship ; and in order to this they must
be held by the heaviest and strongest cables and anchors.
" 3d. They must be secure from the effects of explosive vessels ; and, if in
danger from this source, must be covered as above mentioned. We don't say
what are the exact circumstances in which all these conditions will be fulfilled,
though we think the idea long ago presented by the board of engineers will,
with modifications, embrace them all.
" The idea is this : Suppose a line (extending across the channel) of rafts,
separated from each other by a space less than the breadth of a ship-of-war,
each raft being about 90 feet long, 30 feet wide and 6 feet deep, formed of
strong timbers, crossed and braced in all directions, and fastened together in the
strongest manner. A long-scope chain cable is to proceed from each of the
four corners, two obliquely up stream, and two obliquely down stream, to very
heavy anchors ; and there should also be a very strong chain cable passing from
one raft to another. Suppose a ship striking one of the rafts to break the
chains leading down the stream ; in doing this, she must lose much of her mo-
mentum. She has then * under her forefoot' the raft, connected by a strong
chain with the rafts to the right and left ; on being tightened, this chain will
throw the strain upon the down-stream cable of that adjoining raft towards
which the ship happens to tend. If we suppose it possible for these chains also
to be parted by the power still remaining in the ship or by impulses received
from succeeding vessels, there will be other chains still to break in the same
way. After the down- stream chains are all parted, the rafts will ' bring up' in
anew position (higher up the channel) by the anchors that, in the first instance,
were pointed up stream. Here a resistance, precisely like that just overcome, is
to be encountered by vessels that have lost more of their force in breaking the
successive chains, and in pushing these great masses of timber before them
through the water. Should there exist a doubt as to the sufficiency of these
remaining anchors and chains, or should it be deemed most prudent to leave
nothing uncertain, a second similar line may be placed a short distance above
the first.
" The best proportions and dimensions of the rafts remain to be determined,
but as there is scarcely a limit to the strength that may be given to the rafts
themselves, and to the means by which they are to be held to their position
and to each other, the success of a well-arranged obstruction of this sort can
hardly be doubted.
" The expense would not be great in the first instance, and all the materials
would be available for other purposes when no longer needed for this."
No. 2.
[Ho. REPS., Ex. Doc. No. 153, 19iH CONGRESS, Isr SESSION.]
REVISED REPORT OF THE BOARD OF ENGINEERS ON THE DEFENCE OF THE
SEABOARD.
WASHINGTON, March 24, 1826.
SIR : In the report now respectfully submitted, in compliance with the order
of the engineer department of the 25th ultimo, the board of engineers have at-
tempted to enforce all those leading principles which relate to the defence of the
maritime frontier of the United States. In doing this, in describing briefly the
several sections of the coast, and in applying those principles to the local pecu-
24 FORTI ICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
liarities thus developed, the board have been unavoidably led to a repetition of
much that is contained in their previous reports. The tenor of the order under
which this report has been drawn will, however, cover this objection, if it be
one, while the report will have the decided advantage of presenting the promi-
nent features of the whole subject from a single point of view, and serving at
the same time as an index to the minute details comprehended in previous com-
munications.
The following is a copy of the order above referred to :
" ENGINEER DEPARTMENT,
" Washington, February 25, 1826.
" GENTLEMEN : As much information with regard to the maritime frontier
has been obtained since the report of the board of February 7, 1821, was made,
it is the desire of the Secretary of War that a revision of that report and a new
examination of the subject of the defence of the seaboard, including the Floridas r
which have since been added to the Union, should be undertaken, with a view
to the classification of the several works, including those which have been con-
structed and those which will probably be necessary to be constructed, and also-
stating what works may be included in the general system which were con-
structed before the formation of the board.
" It is desirable that the report be as full and explicit as possible, setting forth
the size, number of guns, garrisons for peace and war, cost, objects to be de-
fended, and the advantages to be derived from their position in a military and
commercial point of view ; the militia that may be assembled within a reason-
able time for assisting in the defence of the several positions, and including, in
general, everything that is worthy of consideration in the general estimate of the
defence of the seaboard and country adjacent or dependent thereon.
" I have the honor to be, gentlemen, &c.,
"ALEX. MACOMB,
"Major General, Chief Engineer.
"To General BERNARD and Colonel TOTTEN,
" Board of Engineers"
The United States, separated from the rest of the world by an ocean on one
hand and a vast wilderness on the other, pursuing towards all nations a policy
strikingly characterized by its pacific tendency, its impartiality and justice ;
contracting no political alliances ; confining her intercourse with the rest of the
world rigidly to the letter of such temporary arrangements as are dictated by
reciprocal commercial interests, might at first view be regarded as too remote
physically, and as politically too insulated, to be endangered by the convulsions
which from time to time disturb the nations of the earth.
Neither our geographical position, however, nor our forbearance, nor the equity
of our policy, can always avail us under the relation in which it is our destiny
to starkl to the rest of the world. .
The experience of the last quarter of a century has shown that even the in-
tercourse of traffic, much as it conduces to our prosperity, and which we might
expect would cease altogether so soon as it ceased to be mutually advantageous,
can be indulged only at the risk of obliging the nation occasionally to assume a
belligerent attitude, and of surrendering to the spirit of contention which seems
to govern nations as it does the natural man a portion of its fruits. The cer-
tainty of the return of periods of embarrassment and strife, similar in their origin
to that which not long since visited the nation, affords a sufficient reason of
itself for securing ourselves in the best manner against the more serious evils of
these unavoidable collisions.
But the relation in which this nation stands, a s agreat and flourishing republic,
to the monarchies of the transatlantic world, is in fact the hostile array of liberty
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 25
against despotism. A separating ocean, while it has hitherto prevented a warfare
in which we must necessarily have been one of the parties, has not prevented the
conflict of sentiment, nor retarded the march of liberal principles. The gov-
ernments of Europe contend with each other no longer. The personal ambition
of kings ; the desire of territorial aggrandizement, of augmenting national wealth ;
the gratification of national vanity ; in short, every motive which would once
suffice to deluge the earth with blood, is now effectually restrained under the
conviction of impending danger, common and imminent. The obvious interest
the coalesced governments have in destroying or poisoning the source whence
all those principles adverse to their supremacy have flowed, and in demonstra-
ting, by our disasters, or our ruin, the inefficiency of a popular government, af-
fords good ground for an argument in favor of our assuming a defensive attitude,,
not only precautionary with reference to our security, but as the most certain
prevention to hostile intention.
The progress of illumination abroad, depending, as it must, on the actual state
of preparation of the public mind, and on the character of the people on both
of which the several nations of Europe differ more even than in their language *
must be irregular and unequal. Hence the contest for freedom will be raging
with violence in one quarter, before the people of another shall have fully com-
prehended the subject of contention, much less have understood its necessity.
These partial contests attended by vacillating success protracted because
they are partial producing a complication of interests and alliances, diversify-
ing and adding new excitements to our commercial engagements enlisting on
one side all our sympathies causing us to be regarded by the other with a sus-
picion even provoking to hostility can only produce a state of things more em-
barrassing than any this nation has yet witnessed.
And while a participation, more or less intimate, in the activity of that pro-
tracted struggle, cannot be avoided, it becomes us to be prepared, as far as pos-
sible, both to avert the calamities and improve the blessings which may result.
The subject of our relations with other countries in reference to the cause
of war which may grow out of them, is full of interest to the people of this
country, and deserves a more profound and detailed examination. With the
preceding brief remarks, however, naturally suggesting themselves on ap-
proaching the subject of the defence of the country, and bearing in mind that
war cannot at all times be avoided, however pacific and forebearing our policy,
and that nothing will conduce more to an uninterrupted peace than that state
of preparation which exposes no weak point to the hostility, and offers no grati-
fication to the cupidity, of the other nations of the earth, we proceed to consider
the means and the mode of the defensive system which it is for the interest of
the United States to adopt.
The means of defence for the seaboard of the United States constituting a
system may be classed as follows : first, a navy ; second, fortification ; third,,
interior communications by land and water ; and, fourth, a regular army and
well-organized militia.
The navy must be provided with suitable establishments for construction and
repair, stations, harbors of rendezvous, and ports. of refuge all secured by forti-
fications, defended by regular troops and militia, and supplied with men and
materials by the lines of intercommunication. Being the only species of offen-
sive force compatible with our political institutions, it will then be prepared to
act the great part which its early achievements have promised, and to which its
high destiny will lead.
Fortifications must close all important harbors against an enemy, and secure
them to our military and commercial marine ; second, must deprive an enemy
of all strong positions where, protected by naval superiority, he might fix per-
manent quarters in our territory, maintain himself during the war, and keep the
whole frontier in perpetual alarm ; third, must cover the great cities from at-
26 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
tack ; fourth, must prevent, as far as practicable, the great avenues of interior
navigation from being blockaded at their entrances into the ocean ; fifth, must
cover the coastwise and interior navigation by closing the harbors and the several
inlets from the sea which intersect the lines of communication, and thereby
further aid the navy in protecting the navigation of the country ; and, sixth,
must protect the great naval establishments.
Interior communications will conduct with certainty the necessary supplies of
all sorts to the stations, harbors of refuge, and rendezvous, and the establish-
ments for construction and repair for the use both of the fortifications and the
navy ; will greatly facilitate and expedite the concentration of military force and
the transfer of troops from one point to another ; insure to these also unfailing
supplies of every description, and will preserve unimpaired the interchange of
domestic commerce even during periods of the most active external warfare.
The army and militia, together with the marine, constitute the vital principle
of the system.
From this sketch it is apparent that our system of defence is composed of
elements whose numerous reciprocal relations with each other and with the
whole constitute its excellence ; one element is scarcely more dependent on an-
other than the whole system is on any one. Withdraw the navy, and the de-
fence becomes merely passive ; withdraw interior communications from the
system, and the navy must cease in a measure to be active for want of supplies,
and the fortifications can offer but a feeble resistance for want of timely rein-
forcements ; withdraw fortifications, and there remains only a scattered and
naked navy.
That element in the system of defence to which it is the more immediate duty
of the board to direct their attention in this report is the fortification of the
coast. It may not, therefore, be unprofitable, while on this part of the subject,
to go something more into detail as to the relation of this with the other members
of the system ; the rather, as the reasons for some conclusions hereafter to be
announced by the board will be more apparent.
It is necessary to observe, in the first place, that the relation of fortifications
to the navy in a defensive system is that of a sheltering, succoring power, while
the relation of the latter to the former is that of an active and powerful auxiliary ;
-and that the latter ceases to be efficient as a member of the system the moment
it becomes passive, and should in no case (we allude to the navy proper) be re-
lied on as a substitute for fortifications. This position may be easily established.
If our navy be inferior to that of the enemy, it can afford, of course, unaided
by fortifications, but a feeble resistance single ships being assailed by whole
fleets : if it be equal, or superior, having numerous points along an extended
frontier to protect, and being unable to concentrate, because ignorartf of the se-
lected point of attack, every point must be simultaneously guarded ; our sepa-
rate squadrons may therefore be captured in detail by the concentrated fleet of
the attacking power. If we attempt to concentrate under an idea that a favor-
ite object of the enemy is foreseen, he will not fail to push his forces upon the
places thus left without protection. This mode of defence is liable to the fur-
ther objections of being exposed to fatal disasters, although not engaged with
an enemy ; and of leaving the issue of conflict often to be determined by acci-
dent, in spite of all the efforts of courage and skill. If it were attempted to
improve upon this mode, by adding temporary batteries and field works, it would be
found that, because being weak and inadequate from their nature, the most suitable
positions for these works 'must often be neglected under a necessary condition of
the plan that the ships themselves be defended ; otherwise they must either take
no part in the contest or be destroyed by the superior adversary.
We pass over the great comparative expense of such a mode of defence, ren-
dered clearly apparent by a little reflection, with these brief remarks, viz : that
the defensive expenditures by this system will, in the first instance, greatly ex-
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 27
ceed the offensive ; and that these defences, being perishable in their nature, will
require frequent renewal and repairs.
The proper fortification of the coast preventing the possibility of a blockade
so strict as not to offer frequent opportunities for our vessels to leave the har-
bors, the navy, no longer needed for passive defence, will move out upon its
proper theatre of action, though inferior to the enemy, with confidence ; know-
ing that, whether victorious, whether suffering under the violence of tempests,
or whether endangered by the vicinity or the pursuit of a superior force, they
can strike the extended coast of their country, (avoiding the harbors and im-
portant outlets of the country where alone a blockading force may be supposed
to lie,) at numerous points where succor and protection await them. Hover-
ing around the flanks and rear of blockading fleets, and recapturing their
prizes, falling upon portions of these fleets, separated for minor objects, or by
stress of weather; watching the movements of convoys, to capture strag-
gling vessels ; breaking up or restraining the enemy's commerce in distant seas;
meeting, by concert, at distant points, and falling in mass upon his smaller
squadrons or upon his colonial possessions, and even levying contributions in
the unprotected ports ; blockading for a time the narrow seas, and harassing
the coasting commerce of the enemy's home ; these are objects which our own
history shows may be accomplished although contending against a nation
whose marine has never been paralleled as to force and efficiency, with a navy
apparently, as to numbers, insignificant. Our own "history shows, besides, that
the reason why our infant navy did not accomplish still more, was that the
enemy being able to occupy unfortified harbors, was enabled to enforce a block-
ade so strict as to confine a portion within our waters. That this portion, in-
deed that all, was not captured, is to be attributed solely to a respect, so misplaced
that it could only have been the fruit of ignorance, for the then existing fortifi-
cations ; a result, notwithstanding, amply compensating the nation for the cost
of these works.
It would be difficult, nay impossible, to estimate the full value of the results
following the career of our navy, when it shall have attained its state of man-
hood, under the favorable conditions heretofore indicated. The blockade of
many and distant parts of our coast will then be impossible, or rather can then
only be effected at enormous cost, and the risk of the several squadrons being
successively captured or dispersed ; the commerce of our adversary must be
nearly withdrawn from the ocean, or it must be convoyed, not by a few vessels,
but by powerful fleets. In fine, the war, instead of resulting in the conflagra-
tion or pillage of our cities and towns, in the destruction of our scattered and
embayed navy, and the expensive establishments pertaining to it, in the inter-
ruption of all commercial intercourse between the several sections of the fron-
tier; in the frequent harassing and expensive assemblage of the militia forces,
thereby greatly lessening the products of industry, and infusing amongst this
most valuable portion of our population the fatal diseases and the demoralizing
habits of a camp life ; in the copious flow of blood which a war raging at the
doors of freemen must cause ; and in a natural despondency, unavoidably con-
sequent, and leading, perhaps, as a lesser evil, to the relinquishment of national
rights: instead of these, and the innumerable other evils attendant upon a con-
flict within our borders, we shall find the war and all its terrors shut out from our
territory by our fortresses, and transferred by our navy to the bosom of the
ocean, or even to the country of the enemy, should he, relying on a different
system, have neglected to fortify the avenues by which he is assailable. Our
wars thus becoming maritime, will be less costly in men and money, and more in
unison with our institutions, leaving untouched our domestic relations, our in-
dustry, and our internal financial resources.
It is truly an axiom in military science and one fully illustrated by military
history, that the worst mode of waging war, although strictly defensive, is to
allow its field of action to be within the borders, and that the best is that which
28 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
most frequently assumes an offensive attitude. In our case war can only be ex-
cluded from our territory by fortifications ; and we can only assume the offen-
sive through our navy. The construction of the former secures the means of
creating, equipping, and repairing the latter, and leaves it unencumbered with
duties which it imperfectly performs, to the full exercise of its important and
appropriate functions.
Since the great improvement in the implements and the tactics of armies, war
has cost less in men and more in money than it did in earlier times. But though
it is less profuse of blood nowadays, losses of this sort are more severely felt,
because of the great multiplication of the branches of productive industry, which,
affording employment for a greater proportion of the population, leaves a lesser
disposable for war ; and on the other hand, if it is more expensive in money,
the existing system of finance, founded on the resources afforded by the creation
of new wants and the development of new species of industry, produce more
ample means than were possessed by the people of the earlier ages. That na-
tion, therefore, which consumes the smallest portion of its disposable population,
and which is the least liable to have the regular operations of its laboring classes
disturbed by its quarrels, will enjoy a decided superiority over every other ;
and as the art of war is now carried among all civilized nations to the same
degree of perfection, that nation must triumph which can longest keep the field
possessed of these means of warfare. And as the destruction of men will thereby
be always less, and the resources derived from industry always greater, the ad-
vantage must always rest, everything else being equal, with the country which,
from its geographical situation and its natural and artificial strength, is most
secure from invasion.
Should France ever regain for boundaries the Alps, the Pyrenees, the sea,
the marshes of Holland and the Rhine, for which she has so continually labored
accessions of great value to her in her relations with Italy, with Spain, and with
the powers of Germany, (countries then entirely open to offensive operations on
her part) still her situation would be greatly inferior, under this point of view,
to the insular situation of Great Britain.
Since the union, which put an end to all invasion except by sea, England has
effectually guarded herself by perseverance in the augmentation of her navy
and in the maintenance and increase of her coast defences ; and it is to this
system, more perhaps than to her institutions, that England owes her present
elevated rank. Securely relying for protection on the defence the government
had wisely provided, her population, although surrounded by enemies, calmly
directed its genius, its enterprise, and its industry to the accumulation of indi-
vidual wealth ; giving in return for this protection ample means for its continu-
ance, and enabling the government, by disbursements beyond all parallel in
actual expenses and in subsidies, to ward off from their territory, and to termi-
nate favorably in the capital of their enemy, a war which had threatened the
existence of the nation
Another advantage, resulting from such a geographical position as Warrants
confiding the defence to coast fortification and to a navy, is, that the destruc-
tion of men in naval contests being much less than in those between armies, a
greater number is left to carry on the ordinary and profitable pursuits of civil
life. Actions on the ocean are short and decisive, and a few months are often
sufficient to decide the superiority for the rest of the war. Besides that, it is
rather the injury sustained by the vessels than the loss of life which closes the
conflict ; privations among sailors are not often severe, and diseases are rare.
In armies, on the contrary, the loss of men is immense ; skirmishes happen
daily, battles are frequent ; soldiers are exposed to wants of every kind ; to the
inclemencies of weather, the variety of climate, and to the ravages of epidemics
more fatal titan the swords of the enemy.
The terminations of the many struggles which for a century and a half have
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
29
taken place between France and England, furnish so many striking proofs of
the truth of the principle just advanced. In their long and bloody contests, the
ratio of expense of men by France and England was as four to one ; and when, in
consequence of these losses, the French armies were driven back into their own
territory, the discouraged people, seeing their sources of finance exhausted and
their own employments suspended, paralyzed, by their loud demands for peace
at this critical juncture, the last efforts of the government, which more than once
was obligeoj to subscribe to the hardest conditions.
It is this property of inaccessibility by land at which the United States should
aim, and which it may attain by well-contrived permanent works, and by the
gradual increase of the navy.
Conceiving that we have enlarged sufficiently on this part of our subject, we
shall now advert briefly to the correlative influence of fortifications and interior
communications.
The most important of these communications in reference to a system of de-
fences are, first, such as serve to sustain, in all its activity, that portion of our
domestic commerce which, without their aid, would be interrupted by a state of
war ; and, second, such as serve, besides their great original purposes, to conduct
from the interior to the scene of war necessary supplies and timely relief. The
first, which are amongst the most important national concerns of this nature, lie
parallel to, and not distant from, the sea-coast ; the second, which, whenever
they cross the great natural partition wall between the east and the west, are
equally important, lie more remote from the coast, and sometimes nearly or (juite
parallel to it, but generally fall nearly at right angles to the line of the seaboard
into the great estuaries, where in some cases their products are arrested, or
whence in others they 'flow on unmingled with those of the first. To fulfil the
object of the first-mentioned lines of communication it is obviously necessary to
prevent an enemy from reaching them through any of the numerous inlets from
the sea which they traverse, including, of course, the great inlets wherein these
unite with the more interior communications. The security of these lines, there-
fore, involves the security of the other, and is in a great measure necessary to it.
From what has been before stated we infer that for the security here required
we must, as in the case of cities, harbors, naval establishments, &c., look to
fortifications. But it fortunately happens, as will appear in the sequel, that
wherever both objects exist the works necessary for the one may easily be made
to accomplish both. We will only add, in reference to the necessity of a system
of defence for the protection of these lines of communication, that from the
facility with which they may be broken up, and the serious evils consequent
thereon, they offer great inducements to enterprises with that object on the part
of the enemy. An aqueduct, an embankment, a tide-lock, or a dam blown up
is the work of an hour, and yet would interrupt navigation for months.
The reciprocal value of interior communication to fortifications has been al-
ready distinctly stated, and is too apparent to need elucidation.
The necessity of a regular army, even in time of peace, is a principle well
established by our legislation. The importance of a well-organized militia is
incident to the nature of our institutions, well understood by the people, and
duly appreciated by the government. The board have, therefore, nothing to re-
mark on these subjects, considered as general principles. They may, however,
find it their duty, in a succeeding part of this report, to venture a suggestion or
two touching the expediency of a peculiar local organization of the latter.
Before quitting the subject which has hitherto occupied their attention, the board
find it convenient to be more explicit as to the sense in which they have used the
terms " navy" and " fortifications." By the first they allude to that portion
only of our military marine which is capable of moving in safety upon the ocean,
and transferring itself speedily to distant points. Floating batteries, gunboats
and steam batteries they consider as pertaining to fortifications, being always useful
30 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
and sometimes indispensable, as well as powerful auxiliaries. Under the term
"fortifications," used as expressive of security afforded thereby to the seaboard,
have been included permanent and temporary fortifications the auxiliaries just
mentioned, and both fixed and floating obstructions to channels.
The board now proceed to a concise description of the maritime frontier, con-
sidered as a whole, after which they will examine the several sections separately,
applying as they go to the defensible positions the works projected for general
arid local security. In this part of their report it will be necessary to refer fre-
quently to preceding reports for details.
*The sea-coast of the United States is comprised within the 24th and 46th
degrees of north latitude, and spreads over 27 degrees of longitude. The general
direction of that part which lies on the Atlantic north of the peninsula of Flor-
ida is N.NE. and S.SW.; this peninsula stretches out from the continent ia
a direction a little east of south ; while that part of the coast which lies on the
Gulf of Mexico, corresponds nearly with the 30th parallel of north latitude. With-
out estimating any of the indentations not properly belonging to it, and carry-
ing our measures from point to point, wherever these breaks are at all abrupt,
the line of coast may be stated to be 3,300 miles in length.
Nearly parallel with the Atlantic coast extends a chain of mountains separa-
ting the sources of rivers flowing on the one hand directly into the ocean from
those which run into the Gulf of St. Lawrence or Gulf of Mexico. In the most
lofty portions of this chain numerous gaps afford facilities for crossing it by
roads or railed ways. Occasional expansions at high elevations or depressions
of the summit present sufficient surface to collect the water necessary for crossing
by canals, and in other places the rivers themselves have severed the chain,
leaving no impediments to communications of either kind. On both sides of
these mountains the country presents numerous natural means of intercommu-
nications, and facilities and inducements for the creation of artificial ones in end-
less combinations.
From this description it appears that notwithstanding the great extent of our
seaboard, the safety of each section of it is a matter not devoid of interest to-
every portion of the people however remote geographically, at least so long as
the nation shall continue her commercial relations with the rest of the world ;
and indeed until she shall find it her interest to interdict the circulation of do-
mestic commerce through the avenues which nature or art may have created
a commerce of inestimable value at all times, and becoming more necessary as
well as more valuable on every interruption of foreign traffic.
As being in close connexion with the coast it will be convenient to describe,
briefly, in this place the line of interior communication on which, in time of war,
reliance must be placed as the substitute for the exterior coasting navigation.
Beginning in the great bay to the north of Cape Cod it passes over land
either into Narraganset Roads or Buzzard's bay ; thence through Long Island
sound to the harbor of New York ; thence up the Raritan overland to the Del-
aware ; down this river some distance ; overland to the Chesapeake ; down the
Chesapeake, up Hampton Roads and Elizabeth river ; through the Dismal
Swamp to Albemarle sound ; thence through the low lauds, swamps, or sounds
of the Carolinas and Georgia to the head of the peninsula of Florida ; overland
to the Gulf of Mexico ; and thence through interior sounds and bays to New
Orleans. Some of the few and brief natural impediments to this extensive line
have already been removed ; some are rapidly disappearing before the energy
of local or State enterprises ; and to the residue the public attention is directed
with an earnestness which leaves no reason to fear that they will not ere long
be overcome.
* See report of 1819.
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 31
* Proceeding now to a minute examination of the coast, we find it, naturally
divided into four distinct parts, namely : The Northeastern, extending from
Nova Scotia to Cape Cod ; the Middle, from Cape Cod to Cape Hatteras ; the
Southern, from Cape Hatteras to Cape Sable; and the Gulf of Mexico frontier*
from Cape Sable to the mouth of the Sabine river.
We will now take them in the order in which they stand above.
TBE NORTHEASTERN SECTION OF THE COAST.
The northeastern section is characterized by its serrated coast and its nu-
merous harbors; and though differing in these respects entirely from the
other sections, is no less distinguished in its climate by the prevalence, at cer-
tain seasons, of dense and lasting fogs. The extent of this section, measuring,
where the breaks in the coast are abrupt, from point to point, is about 500 miles ;
while a straight line from Cape Cod to Quoddy Head is hardly half that dis-
tance. The eastern half of this coast is singularly indented by deep bays, the
shores being universally rocky, and having numerous islands, surrounded by
deep water, which not only add to the number of harbors but afford an interior
navigation perfectly understood by the hardy sailors of the country, and meas-
urably secured by its intricacies and the other dangers of this foggy and boister-
ous region from interruption by an enemy. The western half, though it has two-
very prominent capes and a few deep bays, is much less broken in its outline
than the eastern. It is covered by few islands in comparison, but contains^
nevertheless, several excellent harbors.
t Considering the sparseness of the population in the eastern part of the State
of Maine, the little comparative value of any existing establishment there, the
proximity of a province of another power, within which is situated an import-
ant post of naval rendezvous, the board think it would be inexpedient to un-
dertake, under present circumstances at least, the defence by permanent works
of any position to the east of Mount Desert island ; especially as the capture
of any work there, whereof the strength would be proportionate to the import-
ance of the place covered, might, owing to its destitution of succor, be easily
achieved by an enemy, who would not fail to profit of its situation to harass
both our commercial and naval operations.
t Mount Desert island, situated between Frenchman's and Penobscot bays r
and centrally as respects the Kennebeck and St. Croix rivers, having a capa-
cious and safe roadstead, affording anchorage for first rate vessels, easily accessi-
ble from the sea, and being easily defended by batteries, offers a station superior
to all others on this portion of the coast for a navy of an enemy. From this
point his cruisers can act with great effect against the navigation of the eastern
coast, especially that of Maine ; and his enterprises of every kind can be con-
ducted, with little loss of time, against any point he may select. These consid-
erations, added to the advantages which would result from possessing ourselves
of a naval station which would enable us to assume the offensive, should our po-
litical relations again make it necessary, in the immediate vicinity of a formida-
ble provincial establishment of another power ; together with the necessity of
providing places of succor on a part of the coast where vessels are so frequently
perplexed in their navigation by the prevailing fogs ; lead the board to the con-
clusion that the fortification of this roadstead in a strong manner is indispensable.
From the incomplete state of the surveys, however, they are not at present,
able to state the particular modes nor the expense of the defences.
| Penobscot bay. The next important part of this coast, proceeding westward,.
*See reports of 1820 and 1821. f Report of 1821.
% See report of 1821, and the memoir on the defences of the narrows of the Penobscot, 1825.
32 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
is Penobscot bay. Upon this bay, and upon the river of the same name flowing
into it, are situated several flourishing towns and villages. Of the many bays
which intersect this coast, the Penobscot is the one which presents the greatest
number of safe and extensive anchorages ; their number, indeed, is such as to
render it inexpedient to attempt, under present circumstances, the defence of any
of them. Unless all were fortified, which would involve an expense out of all
proportion to the objects secured thereby, an enemy would find all the shelter
he could desire in either of the neglected harbors, while the local interests which
would be covered by the defence of either are not regarded as being yet of suffi-
cient amount to excite the cupidity of an enemy, especially considering the pro-
tection afforded by an establishment at Mount Desert island against all minor
enterprises.
It is necessary, however, to protect the valuable commerce of the bay and
river, and to afford a secure retreat for such vessels as, endangered by an enemy,
may be enabled to place themselves under the protection of the works to the
right or left of the bay. The lowest point at which this object can be accom-
plished without great expense is at the narrows of the river opposite Bucksport ;
and the board have accordingly presented a project for a fort at that position
accompanied by a memoir and estimate. The expense is estimated at $101,000.
* The Sheep's Cut. About thirty-five miles west of the Penobscot is the
Sheep's Cut, a deep and capacious indentation of the coast, on which, fourteen
miles from the ocean, and near the head of deep water, stands the town of Wis-
casset. This town is of considerable importance to the commerce of Maine, and
should be fortified ; the rather, as the works (placed in their proper situation
from four to seven miles below the town) will cover a very excellent harbor of
refuge for ships-of-war as well as merchantmen. The works heretofore erected,
namely, Fort Edgecombe and a battery opposite, are too weak, and are placed
too near the town to fulfil their object. The surveys here not being completed,
no projects have yet been made by the board.
* The Kennebeck river This river, which is one of the largest in the eastern
states, enters the sea nearly midway between Cape Cod and the mouth of the St.
Croix. It rises near the sources of the Chaudier, a tributary of the St. Law-
rence, and may one day serve as a line of operations against Quebec. The situ-
ation and extent of this river, the value of its products, and the active commerce
of the flourishing town of Bath, lying about twelve miles from the sea, as w^*
as the excellence of the harbor within its mouth, will not permit us to neglect its
defence ; the surveys, however, as in the case of the Sheep's Cut and Mount
Desert island, being in an unfinished state, no projects have as yet been made.
The present fort, which is on the west bank near the mouth, is very small, and
is commanded by a ridge within pistol shot.
t Portland. A little to the northwest of Cape Elizabeth, and at the mouth
of Fore river, is the town of Portland. The protection of the town, of the
merchantmen, and of the ships-of-war which may be stationed there to guard
the coast, or which may enter for safety all of them important objects may
be secured, as an inspection of the map of the town and harbor will show, by
occupying Fort Preble Point, House island, Hog Island ledge, and Fish Point.
At the same time, if the two channels to the west and east of Hog Island ledge,
can be obstructed at small expense, which is hardly a matter of doubt, although
some final surveys are wanting to decide this point, there will be no necessity
for a battery on the ledge ; and Fish Point need only be occupied by such works
as may be thrown up in -time of war.
The projects of the board contemplate the preservation of Fort Preble and
* See report of 1821.
t See reports of 1820 and 1821, and memoir on the defence of Portland, 1825.
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.. 33
Fort Scammi'l, and the erection of new works, having proper relations of de-
fence with these.
The expense of the new works is stated in their estimates at $135,000, not
including the defence of the Hog Island channel, the mode of which is yet unde-
termined.
* Portsmouth Harbor. The only good roadstead, or good harbor, between
(Jape Elizabeth and Cape Ann, is Portsmouth harbor, within the mouth of Pis-
cataqua river. Line-of-battle-ships can ascend this river as high as Fox Point,
s<>\vii miles above the town of Portsmouth. Between this point and Shooting
Point is a branch of the river communicating with Great Bay. This branch,
which is one-third of a mile wide, presents, for two miles in length, an excellent
cover for all sorts of vessels. This situation is sufficiently commodious for a
secondary depot, designed to repair such vessels-of-war as may be constrained to
seek an asylum in this river ; it is too near the sea, however, for a great naval
depot, and in other respects does not possess the advantage of Boston, as was
^hovm in the report of 1820. Nevertheless, as Portsmouth is an excellent sta-
tion, and as it is indispensable that some at least of these stations be provided
with the necessary establishments for reparation, the depot in this river should
bi' maintained.
It is to be regretted that the bay to the south of Fox Point was not chosen
as the site for the navy yard instead of Fernal's island. Being where it is it
will be necessary in time of war to make such dispositions as will protect the
yard from an attack from the north shore of the river. All attacks by water
may be effectually prevented by defensive works at the mouth of the river.
The position of Fort Constitution must certainly and that of Fort McCleary
may possibly be occupied by those defences, though the works themselves,
especially the former, must give place to such as will be better adapted to fulfil
the object. The other positions for forts are Gerrish's Point, Fishing island,
and Clarke's island, some if not all of which must be occupied. The final sur-
veys of this harbor though completed, not having been before the board, the
projects and estimates have not been made.
t Newburyport Harbor. This is the next port south of Portsmouth. The
Merrimack river, the mouth of which forms the harbor, is obstructed at its junc-
tion with the sea by a bar on which there is at low tide but six or seven feet
water. This obstruction to the use of this harbor by vessels of much draught,
i\i\(\ the circumstance of a portion of the trade of the Merrimack being diverted
to Boston by the Middlesex canal, induce the board to consider it inexpedient
to fortify the harbor by permanent works.
Gloucester harbor. The board are unprepared to state to what extent and at
what cost this harbor should be fortified. Its position near the extremity of
Cape Ann, and in close relation to the navigation of Massachusetts bay indicates
clearly that it is of an importance beyond what would be assigned to the value
of its existing establishments. Until the necessary surveys are made the board
cannot state in what degree the present fort may be made useful in the future
defence of this harbor.
YBevcrly harbor. Beverly is in some sort a dependency of Salem, as the
channel, which is serpentine and narrow, passes within 200 yards of Salem Neck.
It may be defended by temporary batteries erected thereon, and rendered utterly
impassable by flowing obstructions.
| Salem. The port of Salem is distant from Marblehead harbor only two
miles, being separated therefrom by a peninsula. The occupation, of the ex-
tremity of Winter island (where are the ruins of Fort Pickering) on the one
; Sec reports of 1820 and 1821. f See report of 1821.
J See report of 1821 and memoir on the defence of Salem, 1823,
H. Rep. Com. 86 3
34 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCE.
side and of Naugus Head on the other, will effectually cover this harbor. The
cost of the works projected with that view by the board is estimated at $151,000.
* Marblettead Harbor. Besides, covering in some measure the establishment *
at Boston, the harbors of Marblehead and Salem possess an important com-
merce of their own, and also afford a shelter for vessels prevented by certain
winds from pursuing their course eastward, or from entering the first named port.
The mode of defending Marblehead harbor proposed by the board consists in
occupying on the north side the hillock which commands the present Fort Se-
wall (which will be superseded by the new work) and on the south the position
of Jack's Point, The two works will cost $212,000.
t Boston Harbor. We come now to the most important harbor in the eastern
section of the coast, and, considering its relations to general commerce and to the
interests of the navy, to one of the most important in the Union. After a careful
examination of all the necessary conditions of such a problem, the naval com-
missioners and board of engineers, in their joint report of 1820, gave this har-
bor the preference of all other positions to the east, and, inclusive of New Yftrk
bay and the Hudson, as the seat of the great northern naval depot; for the
reasons at large of this selection reference is made to the report of 1820, But
even should the recommendation therein contained remain unsanctioned, Boston
is still a city of great wealth, possesses an extensive and active commerce, and
contains already within its harbor an establishment on which great reliance is
placed to give growth and energy to our navy. Excepting Boston, indeed, and
its establishments, the eastern coast presents no objects, to an enemy of such im-
portance as to induce him to direct against them any operations which would
very materially influence the results of a war. The principal towns and the
mouths of the great communications with the interior being fortified, the coun-
try woody and hilly, abounding in defiles, cut up by enclosures, and defended
by a brave, vigorous, and enterprising people, presents so many obstacles that no
attempts, not merely predatory, can be anticipated. On the contrary, the people,
undisturbed by apprehensions for their homes, having numerous and excellent
sailors, a great number of safe anchorages along their coast, and a great cl/epot
of wealth at Boston to animate and sustain every species of enterprise on the
ocean, may well be expected to take an active offensive part in any future war.
The present forts in Boston harbor defend merely the interior basin from at-
tacks by water. But, as it often happens that vessels enter Nantasket Roads
with a wind too scant to pass the Narrows, or are detained in President Roads
by light winds or an adverse tide ; as the former, especially, is a very conve-
nient anchorage from whence to proceed to sea ; and above all, as Nantasket
Roads affords the best possible station for a blockading squadron, it is deemed
indispensable to place permanent defences at the mouth of the harbor. The
project of defence proposed by the board contemplates leaving the existing
works as a second barrier, placing a permanent fort on George's island, another
at Nantasket Head, having two advanced works on the Head, and one on Hog
island, reducing the altitude of Gallop island to destroy its command over
George's island, and filling up the Broad Sound channel so as to leave no pas-
sage for ships-of-war. These works will cost $1,279,429 51. Besides the
works of a permanent character, it will be necessary on the beginning of a war
to erect temporary works upon Point Aldaton, Peddock's island, LovelPs island,
Apple island, Noddle island, the heights near the north end of Chelsea bridge,
aiid the neck near the termination of Middlesex canal. For the particular ob-
jects of the several works enumerated above the board refer to the memoir on
the defence of Boston harbor of 1823.
^Plymouth and Provincetown harbors. These are the only harbors on the
See report of 1821, and memoir of defence of Marblebead. 1823.
f See reports of 1820 and 1821, and memoir on the defence of Boston harbor, 1823.
J See report of 1821.
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 35
eastern coast south of Boston. They have a commerce of some consequence of
their own, but they are particularly interesting in reference to the port of Boston
and to the transition from the middle to the eastern section of the coast, in which
respects they would become still more important should the proposed canal from
Buzzard's to Barnstable bay ever be executed. While these harbors are unde-
fended, an enemy's squadron blockading Massachusetts bay has ports of refuge
under his lee, of which he would not fail to avail himself to maintain his block-
ade throughout the most stormy seasons, knowing that the winds which would -
compel him to seek shelter would be adverse to outward bound, and fatal,
should they venture near the coast, to inward bound vessels.
In possession of these harbors the enemy Avould have, in fine, constantly under
his eye the harbor of Boston, the passage outside of Cape Cod, and that through
the canal.
To these considerations, going to establish the necessity of securing them by
proper defences, we must not omit to add that without the shelter now afforded
by these ports an enemy would be unable to enforce a rigorous investment. In
the first place, lie would be often deterred from taking a station near the land, lest
he might be caught embayed by the violent easterly winds prevailing at certain
seasons ; in the next place, he would always seek a good offing on every indica-
tion of these winds, thereby leaving a clear coast, to be improved by our vessels
at the first instant of a change of weather ; and, lastly, our vessels being cut off
from Boston by the position of the enemy, or constrained by adverse winds to
deviate from their course, would find to the south a shelter equivalent to that
provided at the north by the defence of Marblehead, Salem, Gloucester, and
Portsmouth.
The board have not been able to make projects for the defence of these har-
bors, the surveys not being completed.
Should the proposed canal above mentioned be executed, it will be necessary
to place a small work near each of its outlets to prevent the destruction of the
means by which the transit of vessels in and out of the canal must be accom-
plished.
The coast between Cape Cod and Cape Hatteras differs from the northeastern
section in possessing fewer harbors, in having but little rocky and a great pro-
portion of sandy shore, in which it resembles the southern section in its milder
climate and in its clearer atmosphere, and it differs from all the other portions in
the depth and magnitude of its interior seas and sounds, and in the distance to
which deep tide navigation extends up its numerous large rivers.
The circuit of the coast, not including the shores of the great bays, measures
650 miles, while a straight line from one of the above-named capes to the other,
measures about 520 miles.
Martha's Vineyard sound. A little to the south of Barnstable (a part of the
projection which we designate as Cape Cod) lie the islands of Nantucket and
Martha's Vineyard, which, with several smaller islands on the south and the pro-
jection of Cape Malabar on the east, enclose Martha's Vineyard sound. The
channels through this sound being sufficient for merchant vessels, and one even
allowing the passage of small frigates, are not only the constant track of coast-
ing vessels, but owing to the relative situation of Narragansett roads and the
existence of two tolerable sate harbors to the east of Gay Head, namely, Tar-
paulin Cove and Holmes's^Hole, this sound is generally aimed at by all eastern
vessels bound home in the tempestous seasons. -There are certain difficulties,
* See report of 1820.
36 FORTIFICATIONS AM) SKA-COAST DEFENCK>.
however, attending the navigation of this sound, resulting from want of a har-
bor near the eastern extremity, which have given, rise to a project now in a
course of investigation for forming an artificial harbor at the northeast point of
Nantucket island.
In the present state of things, therefore, although the board are fully impressed
with the necessity of providing security for the very valuable portion of com-
merce frequenting this sound, it is deemed premature to enter into particulars as
to the most suitable mode of defence. We only add, in reference to the value
of this commerce, that from fifty to eighty vessels, engaged chiefly in the whale
fishery, are owned at Nantucket alone; and that forty or fifty vessels, not be-
longing to the sound, and many of them containing the richest cargoes, are often
seen in the harbors, waiting a favorable change of weather to complete their
voyage.
Buzzard's bay* Interposed between the island of Martha's Vineyard and
the main are the Elizabeth islands, bounding Buzzard's bay on the south. This
bay, although of importance as leading to the proposed canal to Bamstable bay,
as covering the flourishing town of New Bedford, and as being one of the natural
harbors to be used by an enemy in enforcing the blockade of Narragansett roads,
cannot be defended by fortifications owing to its breadth. Should the canal be
constructed, it must be defended by one or more works near its mouth. (See
page 28.)
New Bedford harbor. No survey having been made of this harbor, the board
are unable to state how far the present; fort answers the necessary conditions,
or, if any, what new works are required to afford due protection to the valuable
commerce of this town.
Narragansett bay. Referring to previous reportsf for more minute informa-
tion, the board will advert briefly to some of the military and naval properties
of this important roadstead. First. It is the only port on the coast accessible
with a northwest wind, which is the direction of the most violent winter storms ;
and as the same winds serve for entering both Boston and New York harbors,
viz : N.NW. to S.SW. round by the east, while this harbor can be entered with
all winds from NW. to E. round by the west, it follows that this harbor being
secured vessels may be certain of making a harbor on this part of the coast with
all winds excepting those between NW. and N.NW. Second. From this position
the navigation of Long Island sound, and especially the communication between
that sound and Buzzard's bay or Martha's Vineyard sound, may be well pro-
tected. Third. The blockade of the excellent harbor and naval station of New
London will be rendered difficult. Fourth. From this station the navy will com-
mand from N. to S., as from Hampton Roads it will from S. to N., the great in-
ward curve of the coast between Cape Cod and Cape Hatteras ; the influence of
which command over the blockading operations ot an enemy will be apparent
when it is considered that the only harbors of refuge he will have will be Dela-
ware, Gardiner's, and Buzzard's bays. Fifth. This harbor is the connecting link
of the coast to the south with that to the north of Cape Cod.
If Narragansett bay were left in its existing state as to defence an enemy
would seize it without difficulty, and by the aid of naval superiority form an
establishment in Rhode Island for the war. Occupying this island, and the
position of Tiverton heights opposite its northern extremity, which is of narrow
front, easy to secure and impossible to turn, he might defy all the forces of the
eastern States, drive the United States to vast expense of blood and treasure,
and while this position of his troops would keep in alarm and motion all the
population of the east, feigned expeditions against New York through Long
See report of 1820.
f Keo reports .of 1820 and 1821, and memoir on the defence of Connanicut island, 1822.
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 37
Island sound or against more southern cities, would equally alarm the country
in that direction. If, in short, he merely contented himself with menacing the
coast, it is difficult to estimate the embarrassment and expense into which he
would drive the government.
Of tlio existing forts, viz : Fort Adams, Dumpling Tower, fort on Rose
island, Fort Wolcott* and Fort Green, the two latter are the only ones retained
in the projected system of defence, Fort Adams, besides being entirely unsuited
to the important position it occupies, is in ruins, and the Dumpling Tower, and
fort on Hose island, also very inconsiderable works, were never more than par-
tially completed.
The project of defence proposed by the board contemplates for the middle
channel a strong fort with outworks on Brenton's Point, another on the Dump-
lings, a smaller fort on Rose island, and the preservation of Fort Wolcott and
and Fort Green. The eastern passage is already shut by the permanent bridge
at Rowland's ferry. As to the western passage, three modes present themselves.
First Reducing the depth of water by an artificial ledge, so as to prevent the
passage of ships-of-war. Second. Relying on fortifications alone to close the
passage ; or third. Resorting in part to one and in part to other means just
mentioned. Being the least expensive and most certain, the board have founded
the estimate on the first. The total expense of Narragansett defences will be
$1,817,578 26.
Stonington harbor, Connecticut, and Sag Harbor, New York. These harbors
have not been surveyed, and the board are therefore unable to give any infor-
mation as to the kind of defences they require or their probable cost.
Gardiner's bay. The most valuable harbor to an enemy investing this part
of the coast is probably not defensible by fortifications. It has not, however,
been surveyed; and at some future day it may be a very interesting question
whether by steam batteries, under the protection of and aided by fortifications,
its defence may not be accomplished.
New London harbor* New London harbor is very important to the com-
merce of Long Island sound, and as a port of easy access, having a great depth
of water, never freezing and being easily defended, it is an excellent station for
the navy. It is also valuable as a shelter for vessels bound out or home and
desirous of avoiding a blockading squadron off Sandy Hook.
In the plan of defence the present forts, Trumbull and Griswold, give place
to more efficient works, whereof the expense is estimated at $209,675 63.
New Haven harbor.] It is proposed to defend this harbor by improving and
enlarging Fort Hale, and substituting a new work for the slight redoubt erected
during the late war, called Fort Wooster. The expense of both will be
$59,609 18.
New York harbor.\ The object for the projected works for the vicinity of
New York are to cover the city against an attack by land or sea, to protect its
numerous shipping, to prevent as much as possible the blockade of this great
port, which will soon have, added to the immense wealth of its own rivers, the
productions of the boundless regions on the northern and western lakes, and to
cover the interior communication projected to unite the Raritan with the Dela-
ware.
In the present condition of that harbor as regards defence an enemy would
meet but little opposition, whether his attempt were made by land or water.
Coming by the sound he might land within ten miles of the city, upon the main
or upon Long Island or both ; and coming into the lower harbor he might either
force the passage of the channel, anchoring in the Hudson or East river, or he
'.See report of 1821. fSee report of 1820.
jSce reports of 1820 am! 1821.
38 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
might land in Gravesend bay, eight milts from the city, and march directly to Brook-
lyn, where he would find the navy yard, and whence lie might levy a contribution
or destroy the city. The only mode of resistance would be the hamming, ex-
pensive, and uncertain one, of arraying a large body of militia upon Harlem and
Brooklyn heights, and this could be resorted to only in the event, \iot to be
anticipated, of having received timely intelligence of his design. If we fortify
Throgg's Neck and Wilkins's Point, on the east river, and if we complete the
works at the Narrow**, making them all too strong to be carried by a coup de
main, we shall secure the means of transferring the neighboring militia upon
the flanks and rear of an enemy should he march upon Brooklyn, while we shall
secure the same adA r antage should he pursue the route by Harlem, besides in-
creasing the length of his march through an intersected country to twenty miles.
This arrangement of defensive works, necessary as it is, still leaves the lower
harbor open to an enemy's vessels, where, safe at all seasons, he can enforce a
strict blockade, cut off the line of interior communication by the Raritan, and
where he has a landing place in somewhat dangerous proximity to the city. In
view of these considerations, the board projected the additional works on the
east bank and middle ground, which will completely protect the harbor, compel
an enemy on tin's side to land upon a dangerous coast near thirty miles from his
object, and to enforce his blockade by riding on the open sea with a dangerous
coast on either hand.
Of the permanent works heretofore erected Castle Clinton ha-s been already
ceded to the city. The others should be maintained as constituting a last bar-
rier, as. affording convenient places of deposit for stores and munitions of all
kinds, and of rendezvous for recruits and good positions for military hospitals.
The total cost of all the works projected by the board is estimated at
$5,201,834 28.
Delaware bay and city of Philadelphia* The coast, from the mouth of the
Hudson to the Chesapeake, as well as that on the south side of Long Island, is
low, sandy, covered by numerous sandy islands, lying near and parallel to the
coast, and haA'ing, besides the Delaware, many inlets and interior basins, but
none, with this exception, 'affording water enough for sea-going vessels. The
Delaware bay itself being wide and full of shoals, having an intricate channel,
and being much obstructed by ice at certain seasons, affords no very good har-
bor within a reasonable distance of the sea. It is, however, of great conse-
quence that the deficiency in this respect should be remedied by artificial means,
not only on account of the value of the commerce of the upper part of the bay,
which is hazarded by the peculiar dangers of the lower, but also on account of
the dangers to which the exterior commerce is exposed for want of a harbor for
so great an extent of coast, and of the means which will thereby be attained of
depriving an enemy of one of the shelters of the coast not othenvdse defensible,
and of rendering the blockade of this and the neighboring parts of the coast
more difficult.
Should the proposed breakwater near Cape Henlopen be constructed, it will
be necessary to provide works for its defence. The board is not, however, pre-
pared to present a plan or an estimate of such as would be required.
The lowest point at which Philadelphia is defensible is at Pea Patch island,
about forty-five miles below that city. Fort Delaware, on that island, now
almost completed, together with a permanent work on the Delaware shore, oppo-
site a temporary work on the Jersey shore, to be thrown up at the commence-
ment of a war, and floating obstructions in the channel, will effectually cover
Philadelphia, the other important places on the river, and the outlet of the canal
connecting the Delaware and Chesapeake. The expense of the permanent
works will be $817,025 45.
9 See report of 1817 on the defence of the Delaware ; report of 1820, and a report on a pro-
jected breakwater of 1821.
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 39
Chesapeake tiay* The naval commissioners and board of engineers en-
trusted with the selection of sites for great northern and southern naval depots
recommended, in their joint reports of 1819 and 1820, BurwelFs bay, on James
river, for the one, and Charlestown, near Boston, for the other ; they also re-
commended Boston harbor andNarragansett bay at the north, and Hampton Roads
at the south, as chief naval rendezvous. In these reports the commission en-
tered at large into the consideration of all the matters relating to these import-
ant subjects. The board, now referring to those reports for details which would
too much encumber this more condensed communication, will first briefly advert
to the objects to be secured by defensive works in the Chesapeake, and next
state, in their order, the positions to be occupied and the mode of defence pro-
posed, so far at least as these have been determined.
The immediate object of the defence of Hampton Roads, near the mouth of
the Chesapeake, is to shut this roadstead against an enemy, and secure it to our-
selves ; to cover the interior navigation between the Chesapeake and the south-
ern States ; to secure, as a naval place of arms, a point serving as the connect-
ing link between the middle and southern coast, whence the navy may protect
the exterior trade as well as the trade of the bay ; to defend the public estab-
lishments at Norfolk and such as may be made at James river, and to prevent
an enemy from making a permanent lodgement at Norfolk. Another very im-
portant object, but more remote, as requiring all great temptations to be placed
out of the reach of an enemy, is to cover the coast and the minor settlements of
the bay from predatory attacks ; for no trifling expeditions would ever venture
up the Chesapeake while a portion of our naval force occupied the road at
Hampton.
The object of other fortifications in these waters is, therefore, to cover the valu-
able harbors, cities, and trade of the upper part of the Chesapeake.
Hampton Roads, James river, and Norfolk* In the present state of things
an enemy may land in Lynnhaven bay, and in one or two days' march reach
the narrow position which lies to the east of Suffolk. Bounded on one side by
the Dismal Swamp, and on the other by Bennet's creek, near the mouth of the
Nansemond, this position cannot be turned, and may be easily fortified. Here
he might defy all the forces of Virginia and North Carolina. Secure of a re-
treat so long as his fleet occupied Hampton Roads, he could only be driven out
by efforts on the part of the United States, involving great sacrifices both of men
and money. But when these roads are fortified, he will be able to anchor only
in Lynnhaven bay ; his march then upon Suffolk will be taken in flank and rear
by our forces crossing Hampton Roads, and he will therefore find it impossible
to take permanent quarters in the country.
The works projected for the defence of Hampton Roads, James river, and
Norfolk, are : First, a fort and advanced lanette at Old Point Comfort ; second,
a casemated battery on the Rip Rap shoals ; and, third, a line of floating ob-
structions extending across the channel between these works. In the event of
a great naval depot being fixed on James river, it might ultimately be advisable
to provide additional strength by adding works at the positions of Newport
News, Naseway Shoal, and Craney Island flats. Exclusive of these the cost of
the projected works is estimated at $2,164,147 69.
The existing forts, viz : Fort Nelson and Fort Norfolk serve for the defence
of Norfolk and the navy yard. They are small and inefficient works, but may
be made useful as accessories to general defensive operations.
Harbor of St. Mary's.\ The central situation of this fine basin as regards
the Chesapeake, its relation to the Potomac, its depth of water, and the facility
* See reports of 1819 and 1820.
f See reports of 1819 and 1821. \ See report of 1819.
40 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
wherewith it may be defended, indicate its fitness as a harbor' of refuge for the
commerce of the bay, and as an occasional, if not constant station during war.
of a portion of our naval forces. A survey of the harbor and the surrounding
country has been made. The maps are, however, not yet complete, and the
board are unprepared to state the cost of the defences.
Patuxent river.* The more effectually to protect the city of Washington
from a sudden attack by troops landed at the head of navigation of the Patuxent,
and to provide an additional shelter for vessels, a fort has been projected to
occupy Point Patience, and another Thomas's Point, about six miles from the
Chesapeake. Their expense will be $337,000.
Annapolis harbor.] From not having as yet been able to consider the par-
ticular subject of the defences of this harbor, or to obtain preliminarv surveys,
the board are unable to state whether new works will be required.
Harbor of Baltimore.] The proximity of Baltimore to the bay places that
city in a dangerous situation. In the present state of things an enemy can, in
a few hours' march, without being exposed to a separation from his fleet, after
an easy landing, make himself master of that great commercial depot.
. Baltimore requires for its security two forts in the Patapsco, one at Haw-
kins's Point and the other at the extreme end of the flat on Sollers's Point. Be-
sides the advantages which will result of obliging the enemy to land at a greater
distance, thereby delaying his inarch, gaining time for the arrival of militia, and
preventing his turning the defensive position our forces might occupy, it will be
impossible for him to endanger the city or its shipping by a direct attack by
water. The present Fort McHenry, Redoubt Wood, and Covington battery
should be retained as a second barrier.
The expense of the fort on Sollers's Point flat is estimated at. . . S673, 205 44
A preliminary estimate of fort at Hawkins's Point (to be corrected
by applying the project with more accuracy to the ground than
could heretofore be done) gives 244, 337 14
Total 917, 542 58
Mouth of Elk river. The construction of the Delaware and Chesapeake
canal will make it necessary to place a small work somewhere near the mouth of
the Elk, to prevent an enemy by a sudden enterprise destroying the works
which connect that canal with the river. Some surveys must be made before
the most suitable location, or the form, or the cost of this work can be deter-
mined.
City of Washington, Alexandria, and Georgetown.] Fort Washington, a
work recently completed, covers these cities from any attack by water, and will
oblige an enemy to land at some fifteen or eighteen miles from Alexandria,
should that city be his object. It will also serve the very valuable purpose of
covering the troops crossing from Virginia with a view to fall upon the flanks of
an enemy moving against the metropolis. All these objects would have been
better fulfilled had the work been placed at Lower Cedar Point ; as. it is, however,
the works in the Patuxent being constructed, and the militia of the surrounding
country being in a due state of preparation, an enterprise against these cities
would be one of great hazard. The cost of Fort Washington was $446,467 37 ;
a small work should nevertheless be placed on Lower Cedar Point.
:s See report of 1819, and memoir on the defence of the Patuxent, 1825.
t See report of 1819.
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA- COAST DEFENCES. 41
From the mouth of the Chesapeake to Cape Hatteras there occurs no inlet
navigable by sea-going' vessels, and we therefore proceed at once to the
SOUTHERN SECTION OF THE ATLANTIC COAST.*
This coast is invariably low, and for the greater part sandy, much resembling
that from Cape Hatteras to Montauk Point. A ridge of sand, occasionally in-
terrupted by the alluvion of the rivers, extends throughout its whole length ;
this ridge lies in certain portions on the main land, while in others it is divided
therefrom by basins or sounds of varying width and depth, and is cut into
islands by numerous channels of greater or less depth connecting these interior
waters with the sea. Wherever this ridge is broken, its place is supplied by
low and marshy grounds, bordering the principal and the many lesser outlets of
the rivers.
The nature of the country through which the rivers of this coast flow after
leaving the mountains is such that the banks being easily abraded by the cur-
rent the waters are always turbid, and are continually transporting new supplies
for the formation of alluvion and the maintenance of extensive submarine banks,
shoals, and bars ; that these last do not rapidly increase is owing to the
force of the current, the action of the sea, and the mobility of the particles of
matter. It is to this cause, viz : the wearing away of the shores of the rivers,
that is to be attributed the want of harbors on this coast unobstructed by bars,
and which as a coast particularly distinguishes this and the Gulf of Mexico
frontier (where similar operations have been going on) from the more northern
and eastern portions.
The board have not , examined the coast of East Florida ; their description,
therefore, of the southern coast will extend no further than Amelia island or
mouth of St. Mary's, while that of the Gulf of Mexico frontier will begin at
Pensacola.
Ocracoke Inlet, Albemarle and Pamlico Sounds.* In their report of 1821 t
the board adverted to a project then if not now in agitation to open a navigable,
direct communication from Albemarle sound to the sea, and they also indicated,
as probably a less expensive and a less dangerous mode of transporting the
produce of the Roanoke, Tar, and Neuse rivers to the ocean, a canal from river
to river, and terminating in the harbor of Beaufort, North Carolina. If the first
of these projects be executed, defensive works would be necessary at the new
inlet ; if not, no others will be needed than such as are indispensable in any
event to cover the important harbor of refuge at Beaufort. The sjiallowness
of the water on the bars at Ocracoke effectually excludes all vessels-of-war from
the harbors within. But as this, in the present state of things, is the outlet of
an extensive commerce, and as through this opening attempts might be made in
small vessels or in boats to interrupt the interior line of communication whereon
so much would depend in time of war, it would be proper in the beginning of a
war to throw up a temporary work as a defence against all minor enterprises.
Beaufort harbor, N. C.f Beaufort harbor and the mouths of Cape Fear river
are the only issues navigable by vessels of more than a light draught of water,
by which the interior of North Carolina communicates with the ocean. They
are important points in the line of interior navigation to be sooner or later opened
from the Chesapeake southwardly, and they are besides the only harbors of
refuge on an extent of coast of more than 400 miles.
The fort projected for the defence of Beaufort harbor will take the place of
the ruins of Fort Hampton. Its estimated expense is $175,000.
Mouths of Cape Fear river, N. C.f It is proposed to defend the main chan-
* See report of 1821.
f See report of 1821, and memoir on the defence of Beaufort, 1824.
j See report of 1821, and memoir on the defence of Cape Pear river, of 1824.
42 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
iiel of Gape Fear river by a fort on Oak island and another on Bald Head, and
the smaller channel by a redoubt on Federal Point. The battery, magazine,
block-house, quarters, &c., &c., at Smithville, may remain as accessories ; the
cost of the new works will be $251,000.
As the board have not hitherto given in any report of that part of the south-
ern coast which lies between Cape Fear river and Amelia island, it is a matter
of regret that they cannot at once give the full and accurate account of the in-
teresting points of the coast, and their relation to each other and to the country
behind them, which is necessary to a perfect understanding of the suitableness
of any proposed system of defence. This cannot be done, however, until many
surveys, a part only of which are in progress, have been made. The board will,
nevertheless, be able (from their personal examinations of the coast,) to point
out distinctly most, if not all, of the points requiring defence. Especially as
they have a principle to guide them which may be regarded as imperative,
namely, that on a coast possessing few harbors like this it is at the same time
the more necessary to preserve them all for our own use, and the more easy to
deprive an enemy of that shelter, which is nearly indispensable to a continuous
and close blockade.
Georgetown harbor. The first inlet of any consequence south of Cape Fear
river is at the united mouths of the Waccamaw, Pedee, and Black rivers, forming
Georgetown harbor. The two latter rivers first join a few miles above George-
town, (which lies at the mouth of Sampit creek, fifteen miles from the sea,) and
their united waters mingle with those of the Waccamaw, opposite that town.
Below this junction the waters spread out to a considerable width, affording a
commodious and capacious bay, having sufficient depth of water within and
upon the bar near the mouth for merchant vessels and small vessels-of-war.
It is probable this harbor may be well defended by a work placed near the
mouth of Moschito creek, a little within the chaps of the harbor, or perhaps upon
WinyaAv Point. The present fort, situated near the town at the mouth of
' Sampit creek, can be of no avail, except to defend the approach by water to the
town. It has long been neglected, and is in ruins.
Santec river and Bull's lay. About ten miles southwest from Georgetown
. entrance are the mouths of the Santce, the largest river in South Carolina.
Whether the two mouths of this river have sufficient water on their bars to
permit the passage of vessels of any draught, the board are not informed ; should
there, as is believed, be too little water for sea-going vessels, there can be little
advantage in fortifying them, especially as the greatest proportion of the valu-
able products of this river are now, or will soon be, diverted from the channel
of the lower part of the river by canals to Charleston. As to Bull's bay, the
board are in the same uncertainty as regards the depth of Avater with which it
is accessible, and they are as yet doubtful of its defensibility if accessible.
Charleston, S. C. The city, situated at the junction of Ashley and Cooper
rivers, is about five miles in a direct line from the sea. Between ^it and the
ocean is a wide and safe roadstead for vessels of any draught. Upon the bar,
however, lying three or four miles outside of the chaps of the harbor, there is
only water enough for large sloops-of-war. On the southwest side of the harbor
is James's island, through which are several serpentine passages more or less
navigable for boats or barges ; some of these communicate directly with the sea,
and some with Stono river. Whappoo cut, the most northerly passage from
Stono to Charleston harbor, enters the latter directly opposite the city.
Interior natural water communications also exist to the southwest of Stono
river, connecting this with North Edisto river, the latter with South Edisto and
St. Helena sound, this again with Broad river, and finally this last with Savan-
nah river. On the north side of the mouth of the harbor lies Sullivan's island,
separated from the main by a channel navigable to small craft. To the north-
east of Sullivan's island an interior water communication extends to Bull's bay
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES, 43
and even beyond to the harbor of Georgetown. From this sketch it is apparent
that it will not suffice to defend the principal entrance to the harbor "alone. The
lateral avenues must also be shut. Arid it is probable that accurate surveys
will show that the best mode of defending these latter is by works at or near
the mouths of the inlets, as the enemy will thereby be kept at a greater distance
from the city, the lesser harbors formed by these inlets will be secured, and the
line of interior communication will be inaccessible from the sea.
No position for the defence of the principal entrance and roadstead can be
formed nearer the ocean than the western extremity of Sullivan's island. This
'is at present occupied by Fort Moultrie, a work of some strength but by no
means adequate to its object, its battery being weak and the scarp so low as to
oppose no serious obstacle to escalade. How far this work, by modifications of
its plan and relief, may be made to contribute to a better defence of the harbor,
cannot now be determined. The northeast point of James's island, projecting
into the harbor about midway between Sullivan's island and the city, is the site
of the few remains of old Fort Johnson ; this point is too remote from Fort
Moultrie and from the channel to be occupied by a new work if a better posi-
tion can be found. The probability is that the shoal opposite the last named
fort may be occupied permanently ; and if so the fortification of the harbor may
be considered as an easy and simple problem. Castle Pinckney, which stands
upon a small island a little below the city, should be maintained as an auxiliary
in the defence of the harbor, and as serving as a sort of citadel in case of inter-
nal commotion.
St. Helena sound. The board must wait for surveys before they can point
out the defences which this sound should receive. Although there is supposed
to be no great depth of water on the bar at the mouth, it is known to be navi-
gable by the smaller class of merchantmen and'to have a navigable communica-
tion with the head of Broad river, or Port Royal. Intersecting, as it does, the
interior navigation between Charleston and Savannah, this sound will require de-
fence, even should it not be of much use as a harbor of refuge for exterior commerce.
Broad river, or Port Royal roads. The value of this capacious roadstead
as a 1) arbor of refuge depends on the depth which can be carried over the bar,
the distance of this bar outside the line of coast, and the means which may be
practicable of lessening the danger of crossing it. This is supposed to be the
deepest bar of the southern coast. Should there prove to be water enough for
small frigates, and by the aid of light-houses 011 the shore and lights, or other
distinct guides on the bar, should the passage be capable of being rendered easy
and safe, this road, situated as it is within sixty miles of Charleston and twenty
miles of Savannah harbor, and intersecting, as it does, the interior navigation
between these great cities, thereby securing the arrival of supplies of every kind,
would possess a very high degree of importance as a naval station as well as a
harbor of refuge.
The survey of the exterior shoals, constituting the bar, should be made with
the greatest care and all possible minuteness. It is only when this shall have
been done that the true relation of this inlet to the rest of the coast can be
known, and on this relation the position and magnitude of the required defences
will depend.
Savannah and mouth of Savannah river. Mention has already been made
of the natural interior water communication existing along the coast of South
Carolina. A similar communication extends south from Savannah river as far
as the St. John's, in East Florida. Owing to these passages the city of Savan-
nah, like Charleston, is liable to be approached by other avenues than the harbor
or river, and its defences must, consequently, have relation to these lesser as well
as to the principal channels.
The distance from the mouth of Warsaw sound or even of Ossabaw sound
(both to the southwest of the river) to the city is not much greater than from
44 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
the mouth of the river, and an enterprise may be conducted the whole distance
by water, or part of the way by water and part by land from either or both.
As in the case of the like channels in the neighborhood of Charleston, it cannot
now be determined where they can be defended most advantageously.
It is to be hoped, however, that the localities may prove such as to permit
the defences to be placed near the outlets of these sounds, where they will
serve the double purpose of protecting the city and covering harbors which, in
time of war, cannot but be very useful.
The defence of Savannah river is by no means difficult. A fort on Cockspur
island, lying just within the mouth, and for additional security perhaps another
on Tybee island, which forms the southern cape at the junction of the river with
the ocean, would effectually prevent the passage of vessels up the channel, and
cover the anchorage between Tybee and Cockspur. The present Fort Jackson,
situated about four miles below the city, should be maintained as a second bar-
rier, both as respects the main channel and the passages which come in from the
south, which latter would not be at all controlled by works at Cockspur or
Tybee.
The surveys required preliminary to forming a system of defence for Savan-
nah are so far completed as to enable the board to make the projects and esti-
mates for the defence of the main channel whenever they shall be ordered to
direct then- attention to them.
A few months, it is presumed, will suffice to complete all the necessary sur-
veys from Georgetown to Ossabaw sound inclusive, excepting the bar off Port
Royal and Bull's bay and its vicinity. No surveys have been commenced south
of Ossabaw sound.
South of Ossabaw sound on the coast of Georgia are, first, St. Catherine's
sound, at the mouth of the Medway river; second, Sapelo sound; third, Doboy
inlet; fourth, Alatamaha sound, at the mouth of the great river of the same
name ; fifth, St. Simon's sound, at the mouth of Buffalo creek ; sixth, St. An-
drew's sound, at the united mouths of the Scilla and Santilla rivers ; and, seventh,
Cumberland sound, at the mouth of the St. Mary's river. All these communi-
cations with the ocean are highly important in reference to the interior naviga-
tion,, and several of them as affording access to excellent harbors. The latter
especially is known to be navigable by the largest sloops-of-war and merchant-
men, and two or three of the others are believed to be little if at all inferior
either as regards depth of bar or safety of anchorage.
Some of these inlets are probably easily defended by forts, others may re-
quire floating defences, and some possibly the use of both these means.
The principle to* which we have before adverted as governing, in a measure,
the defensive system of the whole southern coast, is enforced in relation to this
particular part by two weighty considerations, namely: its remoteness from the
nearest naval rendezvous, the Chesapeake, which is on a mean six hundred miles
distant, and to leeward, both as to wind and current ; and its being close upon
the larboard hand as they enter the Atlantic, of the great concourse of vessels
passing at all seasons through the Florida channel. While, therefore, this part
of the coast, from the concentration of vessels here, is in great need of protection
of some sort, naval aid can be extended to it only with difficulty, and at the risk
of being cut off from all retreat by a superior enemy.
Accurate and minute surveys, which will enable our vessels, whether driven
by an enemy or by stress of weather, to shun the dangers which beset the nav-
igation of these harbors,- and properly arranged defences to cover them when
arrived, seem to be indispensable. It is worthy of remark, besides, that on these
harbors being fortified, the operation of investing the coast and watching the
great outlet of commerce through the Florida gulf would be a difficult and haz-
ardous one to an enemy, on whose part no perseverance or skill could avail to
maintain an uninterrupted blockade, or to avoid the occasional shipwreck of his
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 45
*
cruisers; while on the part of our small vessels-of-war and privateers, it would
at all times be easy and safe.
Important as the harbors of Georgia' now are, their value would be much en-
hanced by the execution of the projected canal across the head of the peninsula
of Florida.
That part of the southern coast which extends from the St. Mary's to the
southern extremity of East Florida is said not to possess a single harbor for com-
mon merchantmen.
This brings us to the
GULF OF MEXICO FRONTIER.*
The resemblance of this portion of the coast to that which we have denomi-
nated the southern section is striking, and has already been mentioned. We
may, in fact, refer to the description we have given of the principal features of
the latter as a true delineation of this. In respect to the relation of the coast
with the interior there is, however, the greatest difference between these two fea-
tures of the maritime frontier. For Avhile, in the case we are now to consider,
about eight-tenths of the whole territory of the United States is, in one sense,
tributary to the coast, in the other not more than one-tenth is connected with
the seaboard by any natural ties.
This fact, which goes to show the very deep interest which a large propor-
tion of the people and the government have in the security of this frontier, is
related to others, which hardly have an alternative as to the mode of attaining
that security.
From the relative geographical position of the coast and the country interested
in its safety ; from the unhealthiness of its climate, the nature of the adjacent
country, the mixed character and diversity of interests of its inhabitants, it will
be long if ever before that portion of the population within supporting distance,
whose welfare may be endangered by an enemy, will be competent of itself to
sustain the assaults of an exterior foe, and at the same time suppress the ener-
gies of a more powerful and vindictive enemy within. Upon the Atlantic sea-
board the Alleghanies crowd the people upon the coast, and surround every
alarm post of the frontier with a more and more dense population, and the ocean
and the interior parallel navigation enable even the extremities to afford mutually
support and protection, while the coast of the Gulf, although weak in itself and
remote from succor from behind, is shut out by its peculiar situation and its dis-
tance from every hope of lateral assistance.
Those reasons, therefore, which tend to establish the necessity of an organized,
a permanent, and timely system of defence for the whole seaboard of the United
States, (some of which were advanced in the commencement of this report,)
apply to this portion with peculiar force, especially if we consider its compara-
tive feebleness in connexion with its comparative importance.
The interesting and vital points of the coast and the mode of guarding them
will be pointed out as we proceed.
It has already been observed that no examination had been made by the
board of the shore between the southern extremity of ^ast Florida and Pensa-
cola. There are, however, along this shore and in the Florida reef several har-
bors which deserve to be accurately surveyed. The description of this part of
the coast, as well as that on the east side of the peninsula of Florida, and that
along Georgia and the Carolinas, accompanied by plans of defence, must be the
subject of future reports.
Pensacola lay. The upper arms of this considerable bay receive the Yellow-
See report of 1817.
46 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.'
water or Pea river, Middle river, and Escambia river, the tributaries of which
latter, interlocking with branches of the Alabama and the Chattahoochie, indi-
cate the causes whereby at some future day canals may convey a part of the
products of these rivers to Pensacola.
Santa Rosa sound extends eastward from the lower part of this bay into Santa
Rosa bay, whence a communication, partly natural, partly artificial, may possibly
be continued eastward to the Atlantic. On the west the lagoons of Pensacola,
Perdido, and Mobile bays respectively interlock in such a manner as to require
but a few miles of cutting to complete a navigable channel from the first to the
last-named bay, and thence through an existing interior water communication to
the city of New Orleans.
The contiguity of the headwaters of the large rivers emptying into this part
of the Gulf to the upper part of the Tennessee induces the belief that some facile
means of connecting them will ere long be discovered and applied.
Thus situated, as Pensacola bay is, with respect to the country on either hand,
and the immense regions behind, its rare properties as a harbor become of inap-
preciable value. Some of these properties we will enumerate : first, it is ac-
cessible at low water to the largest class of sloops-of-war and small frigates, and
as the bar is narrow may, perhaps, be made to admit still larger vessels ; second,
its bar is near the coast and the channel over it is straight and easily hit ; third,
it is perfectly land-locked, and has a very capacious roadstead ; fourth, it has
excellent positions for repairing, building, and launching vessels, and for docks
and dock-yards, in healthy situations ; fifth, it has abundance of good water for
the supply of vessels ; and 6th, it is perfectly defensible.
As these and other properties, in conjunction with its situation as respects the
coast and the interior, have induced the government to fix upon it as a naval
station and place of rendezvous and repairs, we shall for the future consider it
in that character, both in its relations to the commerce of the Gulf and its own
proper defences.
Although a naval station nearer the extremity of East Florida might possibly
enable our vessels-of-war the better to watch over our commerce in the Florida
stream, still no deep harbor exists to the south of Pensacola, in which the cir-
cumstance of an entire separation from all relief and supplies does not greatly
outweigh this advantage, if indeed it be more than imaginary.
It is, however, far from certain that the Florida stream is always to be the'
channel of communication from the Gulf to the Atlantic. The great embarrass-
ments and losses to which we must be exposed while that continues to be the
course of our Gulf trade, so long at least as we have not the mastery on the
ocean, and in fact, so long as the island of Cuba is in the possession of another
power, to say nothing of the natural dangers of that navigation, have directed
the public attention seriously to the project of opening a shorter and safer pas-
sage through the head of the Florida peninsula. No obstacle not insuperable,
it is presumed, will prevent the execution of this grand design ; and considered
in reference to such an outlet Pensacola is most happily situated.
But the object of a naval force in this quarter is not alone to watch the tran-
sit of commerce to and from the Gulf, it has the coasting trade of the Gulf to pro-
tect, it has piracies to suppress, which confine themselves to no particular strait,
and above all, it has to keep an uninterrupted and watchful guard over the place
of .deposit as well as the issues of the disposable productions of a region with-
out parallel as to extent and fertility.
Projecting as the delta of the Mississippi does into the Gulf, the position of
Pensacola enables it to direct naval operations upon the rear of any force in-
vesting or moving along the avenues to the city of New Orleans ; and at the
same time that it can, almost to the last, with the help of a fortified line of in-
terior navigation, preserve its communication with that city unbroken ; it will be
at no moment entirely dependent upon that line for the supply of its means of
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 47
defence or annoyance, unless, indeed, the proposed artificial connexions with the
interior, before pointed out, should be found impracticable.
A very exact survey has been made of the bay of Pensacola, which would
suffice for forming a scheme of defence, if no other object were in view than the
security of the town and harbor.. Considered, however, as a naval station and
a place of rendezvous and repairs, further surveys, extending a greater distance
from the shores, delineating accurately the face of the country, and showing the
several avenues by land and water, are found to be necessary.
The western extremity of Santa Rosa island is nevertheless so situated in re-
spect to the mouth of the bay as to require in part the same works in either
case, and the board can, therefore, whenever ordered, project a fort for this posi-
tion which in either case should be the first occupied.
> Per dido lay.* This bay is intimately related to Pensacola and Mobile bays
both as regards security and intercommunication, and should be surveyed care-
fully with a view to these objects.
Mobile iay.trAs the subject of the fortification of Mobile bay has been
treated at some length in the report on the Gulf of Mexico defences made in
1817, and still more in detail in a special report of 1822, the board referring to
these communications, especially the latter, will confine themselves here to a few
general observations.
This bay receives at its head the two rivers Alabama and Tombeckbe, which
water almost the whole State of Alabama a State the fifth in the Union as to
extent of territory, inferior to none in the quality of its soil, and hitherto doubling
its population every four years since its admission into the confederacy.
The probable union at no distant day of the rivers discharging into Mobile
bay with the Tennessee, whereby this bay will become a new outlet for a part
at least of the productions of the western States, independently of the natural
one, the great distance to which these rivers are even now navigable with steam-
boats, the fertility of soil, rapid growth of population and trade, the close lateral
connexion which exists with New Orleans and the Mississippi on the one hand,
and Pensacola bay on the other, serve to give great and increasing importance
to this communication with the Gulf.
Referring for the mode of defence adopted by the board again to the same .
reports wherein the subject will be found treated at large, we now only add that
the forts on Mobile Point and Dauphin island and the tower at the Pass au
Heron, designed to defend the three passages into the bay and the important
anchorage between Dauphin 'and Pelican islands, will cost $1,142,056 83.
New Orleans and the delta of the. Mississippi^ It is altogether unnecessary
for the board to say anything in this report with a view to illustrate either the
amount of benefits to result from applying a well-adapted system of defence to
this part of the coast of the Gulf, or the direful consequences flowing from leaving
it in an unprepared and defenceless condition. The value of the stake is now
too great, is too rapidly augmenting, and is too justly appreciated, for the nation
to suffer its safety ever again to hang on the doubtful issue of a battle.
We pass on, therefore, to the task of noticing briefly the avenues requiring
defence and the works projected to attain that end, refering to the report of 1817,
as embracing all the relations of the subject, both general and local.
The most northern water communication between the Mississippi and the Gulf
is by the passage called the Rigolets, connecting Lake Borgne and Lake Pont-
chartrain; the next is by the pass of Chef Menteur, (divided from the former
by Isle aux Pine,) also uniting the same lakes. Through these passages an
enemy entering Lake Pontchartrain would, at the same time that he intercepted
all water communication with Mobile and Pensacola, be able to reach New Orleans
See report of 1812. f See reports of 1817 and 1822. J See report of 1817.
48 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
from its southern shore, or he might continue onward through Lake Mair.
Amite river, and Iberville river, thereby reaching the head of the delta, a posi-
tion which he could easily maintain ; or landing within the mouths of Chef
Menteur he' might move against the city along the ridge of the Geritilly road.
The fort for the defence of the first named pass is completed and that for
Chef Menteur is in a state of forwardness.
To the southwest of the latter pass and at the head of Lake Borgne is Bayou
Bienvenu, a navigable channel (the one pursued by the English army in the late
war) not running into the Mississippi, but having shores of such a nature as to
enable troops to march from the point of debarkation to the city. A little to the
south of this is Bayou Dupre, also affording easy access to the city. The few
natural difficulties and the shortness of these lines of operation make it necessary
to place a fort near the mouth of the first, and a tower at the outlet of the other.
The defences of the Mississippi itself are placed at Plaquemine turn, the low-
est position which can be occupied.
Fort Jackson, now building, is on the right shore, a little above old Fort St.
Philip. This last work it was intended originally to improve, and an estimate
was made with that view; from a recent inspection, however, it appears to be
falling too rapidly to ruins to justify such an undertaking. It is nevertheli
believed that that estimate will suffice for a new work, well adapted to the posi-
tion.
The only permanent work required to the west of the Mississippi is a fort to
occupy Grand Terre island, for the purpose of defending the entrance to Barra-
taria bay, an excellent harbor for a floating force guarding the coasting trade on
that side, and whence there are several passages leading to the .Mississippi near
NCAV Orleans.
The whole cost of the system of defence for New Orleans and the delta of
the Mississippi is estimated at $1,566,515 42.
None of the old forts or batteries are embraced in the system.
' Before leaving this part of our subject it is necessary to advert to the import-
ant uses which may be made of movable floating defences in aid of fortifications.
The applications of this auxiliary force along the coast of the United States
might be numerous, and, as has been before remarked, would in certain cases_ be
requisite to attain full security for all the objects needing protection. In 'the
instance before us, for example, fortifications will enable us to protect the city
of New Orleans even from the most serious and determined efforts of an enemy ;
but owing to the great width of the passages we cannot by them alone deprive
an enemy of good exterior anchorages, especially the very excellent one west
of Chandeleur island, nor ^cover entirely the natural interior water communication
between the Rigolets and 'Mobile.
We must therefore either quietly resign those powerful means of annoying
and distressing us to the occupancy of an adversary, or seek their preservation
in a timely preparation of a floating force adapted to this peculiar navigation,
and capable, under favor of the shelter afforded by the forts, of being Always on
the alert, and of assuming alternately an offensive or defensive attitude accord-
ing to the designs, the conduct, or situation of the enemy.
As these means of defence are, however, secondary to fortifications in every
sense, as the extent to which they may be needed must depend on the relation
of our naval force to that of other powers, a relation continually varying ; and
as the characteristics of this species of 'force may be expected to be modified or
even radically changed in this age of rapid advancement in all the arts, it is
considered premature to go now into any details in reference to its application
here or elsewhere.
From the preceding sketch of the system projected for the defence of the
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 49
-seaboard of the United States,* it will appear that all the fortifications proposed
.are not of the same pressing necessity, nor of like importance ; that some are
required immediately, while the commencement of others may be postponed.
In proceeding to class them, we must observe that the works of the most urgent
necessity are those destined to prevent an enemy from forming a permanent or
even momentary establishment in the country those which will defend our great
naval arsenals, and those which will cover our chief commercial cities.
In the second class we will place such as defend those naval stations and
cities of a secondary rank, which, either from natural or artificial defences, ex-
isting works, &c., are not entirely without protection, and can wait at least
until the more important points are secured against a first attack.
Finally, in the third class we will arrange the works which will complete the
defensive system in all its parts, but whose construction may, without great
danger, be deferred until the frontier shall have received all the successive de-
grees of strength resulting from the gradual erection of the forts of the first and
second classes.
A fourth class is added, containing such works as will be necessary, only con-
ditionally.
Table A, joined to this report, has been drawn up on these principles, and
shows :
First. That the works to be erected during the first period will cost
$9,686,160 59, will require 2,610 men, at most, to garrison them in time of peace,
and 20,517 in case of siege.
Second. That the works of the second class will cost $2,314,309 47,^11 re-
quire 666 men, at most, to garrison them in peace, and 6,841 in case of siege.
Third. That the expense of the works belonging to the third class will
amount to $4,536,984 62 ; their garrisons in time of peace to 635 men, and in
case of siege to 6,071 men.
Fourth. That the total expense of completely fortifying the maritime frontier
will amount to $16,537,454 68; the troops necessary to guard these fortifications
in peace to 3,911 men, at most, and 33,482 men in time of war, supposing them
all, which cannot happen, besieged at once.
The time required to construct the whole system must depend entirely upon
the annual appropriations which the nation may grant to this branch of the pub-
lic service. All that can be said upon the subject is, that in an undertaking of
such vital importance to the safety, prosperity, and greatness of the Union,
there should be no relaxation of effort and perseverance. A work of such mag-
nitude must, with every effort, be the work of years ; and however long it may be
before any sensible effects are produced, the final result is not the less certain.
And should no danger threaten the republic in our own days, future generations
may owe the preservation of their country to the precaution of their forefathers.
France was at least fifty years completing her maritime and interior defences,
but France, on more than one occasion since the reign of Louis XIV, has been
saved by the fortifications erected by the power of that monarch and the genius
of Vauban.
However slow the progress of the system may be, from the necessity of a
sparing application of the public funds to this purpose, it is essential to disburse
something in this way each year, so as to give to the frontier an annual increase
of strength. We must, therefore, insist 011 the advantage of dividing the course
of construction into several periods, according to the greater or lesser urgency ;
of beginning the works successively, agreeably to the order designated, and of
rigidly adhering to it. By this mode satisfactory results will be obtained as
*See report of 1821.
H. Rep. Com. 86 4
50 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
early as practicable, while, if we were to begin all at once, it would be long be-
fore we should be capable of defending ourselves anywhere.
We shall now enter upon the subject of the expense of erecting these works
and garrisoning them for war, and compare it with the expense of defending the
coast in its present state. To clear the subject as much as possible we shall
only examine it with respect to Boston, Narraganset bay, New York, Phila-
delphia, Baltimore, Norfolk, and New Orleans. Charleston, South Carolina.,
and Savannah, Georgia, would also be included if we knew the cost of the de-
fences and the amount of garrison necessary.
Supposing an enemy had concentrated twenty thousand men at Halifax or
Bermuda, the government must, on hearing of this force, at once prepare to re-
sist it at all the points mentioned above ; as it will be impossible to foresee on
which the first blow will be struck, it will be necessary to have troops encamped
at each. And to meet the attack with a force not less, numerically, than that
of the assailant, the troops kept constantly under arms in each of these camp^
must at least equal one-half of the hostile expedition, while as many more are
kept in readiness within call. These points are so immediately accessible in
some cases and so remote from succor in others, that, after the point of attack is
announced by the appearance of the enemy before it, there will remain no time
for re-enforcements to come from the interior.
By manoeuvring in front of any of these places he would induce us to con-
centrate our forces there, when, suddenly profiting of a favorable breeze, he
would sail to another, which he would reach in a few hours, and would not fail
to seize if a force were not stationed there likewise equal to his own. No re-en-
forcements can in this case arrive from the interior in time, for all the troops-
under march would have taken up a direction upon the point he had just quitted.
Our whole coast from Maine to Louisiana would thus be kept in alarm by a
single expedition, and such is the extent and exposure of the seaboard that an
enemy would ruin us by a war of mere threatenings. If the cities are not gar-
risoned they will become his prey at once ; and if they are, the treasury will
be gradually emptied, the credit of the government exhausted, the wearied and
starving militia will desert to their homes, and nothing can avert the direful
consummation of tribute, pillage, and conflagration.
The table C joined to this report shows that to be in readiness on ^ach of
these vulnerable points it will be requisite to maintain 77,000 men, encamped
and under arms at the seven places mentioned, and 63,000 ready to inarch and
within call.
This number is in fact below that which would be required, for these points
being exposed, according to our hypothesis, to an attack from 20,000 regular
and disciplined troops, 20,000 militia would not be able to repel them unless
aided by intrenchments, requiring a time to construct them which would not be
allowed us, and involving expenses which we do not comprise in our estimate.
Besides, to have 20,000 men, especially new levies, under arms, it will be neces-
sary, considering the epidemics which always assail such troops, to 'cany the
formation of these corps to at least 25,000 men.
The State of Louisiana being remote from succor requires a larger force under
arms than the other points ; we have fixed this force at 17,000, considering that
the State might furnish 3,000 within call.
Considering all expenses, 1,000 regular troops, including officers, cost $300,000
per annum and $150 per man for a campaign of six months ; 1,000 militia, in-
cluding officers, cost $400,000 per annum, $200 per man for a six months*
campaign.
But taking into consideration the diseases which invariably attack men unac-
customed to a military life, and the consequent expense of hospital establish-
ments ; the frequent movement of detachments from the camp to their homes and
from the interior to the camp, and the cost of camping furniture, utensils, accou-
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 51
trements, &c.,. which is the same for a short campaign as for a year ; the cost of
a militiaman cannot be reckoned at less than $250 per man for six months.
The seventy-seven thousand militiamen necessary to guard the above men-
tioned points, in the present situation of the maritime frontier, will therefore cost,
in a campaign of six months, $19,250,000.
In strict justice there should be added to the expense, which is, we believe,
much undervalued, amongst other things, the loss of time and diminution of
valuable products resulting from draining off so considerable a portion of efficient
labor from its most profitable occupation. This, besides being a heavy tax on
individuals, is a real loss to the nation. It would be utterly vain to attempt an
estimate of the loss to the nation, from the dreadful mortality which rages in the
camps, of men suddenly exposed to the fatigues and privations of military life,
or to compare the respective values in society of the citizen and the soldier.
The total expense of constructing the works at Boston, Narraganset bay,
New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Norfolk, and New Orleans, will amount to
$13,764,073 08, (see table B, and previous reports.) Their garrisons may con-
sist of the same number of regular troops in time of war as in time of peace,
the remainder being furnished by the militia, held in readiness to throw them-
selves into the forts on the first appearance of an enemy. By this arrangement
2,980 regulars and 24,000 militia, either in the works or in small corps on ad-
vantageous positions, making 26,980 men, would suffice after the erection of the
works ; 43,020 being kept in readiness to march when called upon.
We should, therefore, have only 26,980 to pay and support, instead of 77,000;
and the expense would be $6,447,000, instead of $19,250,000. The difference,
$12,803,000, being only $961,073 08 less than the whole cost of the fortifications,
it follows that the expense of their erection will be nearly compensated by the
saving they will cause in a single campaign of six months.
It is proper to add, that though the expense of these works will be great, that
expense is never to be renewed ; while with troops, on the contrary, the expense
is annually repeated, if not increased, until the end of the war. Besides, the
disbursements for fortifications are made in time of peace, slowly, and to an ex-
tent exactly correspondent with the financial resources of the country. Armies
are, however, most wanted, and must be paid in periods of great emergency,
when the ordinary sources of revenue are dried up and when the treasury can
only be supplied by a resort to means the most disagreeable and burdensome to
the people.
The defence of our maritime frontier by permanent fortifications, and even the
disbursements for their construction, will thus tend to a real and positive econ-
omy. The vulnerable points being reduced to a small number, instead of wait-
ing an attack on every point, and holding ourselves everywhere in readiness to
repel it, we shall force an enemy to direct his assaults against those few, which,
being well understood by us, will of course have received a timely preparation.
There can be no doubt that such a state of things will make an adversary
more reluctant to risk his expeditions, and that we shall not only therefore be
better able to resist but also be less frequently menaced with invasion.
Some prominent military writers have opposed the principle of fortifying an
extensive land frontier, but none have ever disputed the necessity of fortifying
a maritime frontier. The practice of every nation, ancient and modern, has
been the same in this respect. On a land frontier a good, experienced, and nu-
merous infantry may in some cases dispense with fortifications ; but though dis-
ciplined troops may cover a frontier without their aid, Undisciplined troops
cannot. On a maritime frontier, however, no description of troops can supply
the place of strong batteries disposed upon the vulnerable points. The uncer-
tainty of the point on which an enemy may direct his attack, the suddenness
with which he may reach it, and the powerful masses which he can concentrate
at a distance out of our reach and knowledge, or suddenly, and at the very mo-
52 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES
ment of attack, require that every important point be duly prepared to repel his
attempt or retard it until re-enforcements can arrive and adequate means of re-
sistance be organized. By land we are acquainted with the motions of an
enemy, with the movements and direction of its columns ; we know the roads
by which he must pass, but the ocean is a vast plain without obstacle ; there
his movements are made out of our sight, and we know nothing of his approach
until he is already within the range of the eye. In a word, unless the vulnerable
points of a sea-coast frontier are covered by permanent fortifications, their only
chance of safety must depend on the issue of a battle, always uncertain, even
when disciplined and well-appointed troops inured to danger have made all pos-
sible preparation for the combat.
As for the garrisons which these forts will require in time of war, a small
portion equal in number to the peace garrisons should be of regular troops : the
surplus of militia, practiced in the manoeuvres and drill of great guns ; it being
necessary that the greatest part of the troops required for the defence and ser-
vice of the sea-coast fortifications should be artillery.
This brings us to a suggestion or two in relation to the organization of the
militia forces. Instead of the present small proportion of artillery the States
might with advantage increase the amount of that force in the vicinity of each
of the exposed parts of the coast, so as to be equivalent to the exigencies and
armament of the works ; substituting for the usual field exercises as infantry,
actual drill and practice in the batteries. As soon as a movement on the part of
the enemy would threaten the frontier of the State this force should throw itself
into the forts and there remain as long as the precise point of attack should re-
main uncertain. In most parts of the seaboard it would also be advisable to
have a considerable body of militia horse artillery, as being an useful arm in
all cases, and as affording a defence, always applicable, against minor and pre-
datory enterprises. This force might, in part, be drawn from the common pro-
portion of cavalry.
In the report we have taken no account of the interior and land frontiers of
the Union ; they have not yet been sufficiently reconnoitred to enable us to give
an exact idea of the system of defensive works they may require. All that we can
say by anticipation is, that from their general topographical features, these fron-
tiers-can be covered at a very moderate expense so effectually that no enemy
will be able to invade them without exposing himself to disasters, nearly inevi-
table ; and that the troops of the United States, supposing all her warlike pre-
parations well arranged beforehand, will be able, at the opening of the first
campaign, to carry the theatre of war beyond her own territory.
If to our general system of permanent fortifications and naval establishments
we connect a system of interior communications by land and water, adapted
both to the defence and to the commercial relations of the country ; if to these
we add a well constituted regular army, and perfect the organization of our mi-
litia, the nation will not only completely secure its territory, but preserve its in-
stitutions from those violent shocks and revolutions which, in every age and in
every country, have been so often incident to a state of war.
Table A, following, contains the works constituting the proposed defensive
system for the maritime frontier, divided into four classes.
Table B contains a list of such existing works as it is contemplated to retain
as accessaries to the system.
Table C exhibits a comparison of the cost of defending certain important
parts of the coast, in their present condition, and with the aid of the projected
works.
Table D shows a possible concentration of militia forces, in eleven days, at
Boston, Massachusetts; Newport, Rhode Island; New York, New York; Phil.
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 53
adelphia, Pennsylvania; Baltimore, Maryland; Norfolk, Virginia; Charleston,.
South Carolina; Savannah, Georgia; and New Orleans, Louisiana.
All which is respectfully submitted.
BERNARD,
Brigadier General,
JOSEPH G. TOTTEN,
Major Engineers, Brevet Lieutenant Colonel,
Members of the Board of Engineer s-
Brevet Major General ALEX. MACOMB,
Colonel Commanding United States Engineers.
54
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'ort at narrows of the Penobscot, Maine
^wer at Bayou Dupre, near New Orleans, Louisian
'ort on Dauphin island, mouth of Mobile bay, Alab
ort near Provincetown, Massachusetts, fort near St
cipal fort near Portsmouth, New Hampshire, and fo
ort on Oak island, mouth of Cape Fear river, Nort
ort near Plymouth, Massachusettst
ort Griswold, near New London, Connecticut ....
ort on Nantasket Head, Boston harbor, Massachu
ort on Hawkins's Point, near Baltimore, Maryland
econdary works near Pensacola, Fla., Savannah, Ga.
ort Sewall, Marblehead harbor, Massachusetts
ort Preble, Portland harbor, Maine
'ort on House island, Portland harbor, Maine
'ort near the mouth of Kennebec river, Mainet -
'ort on Naugus Head, Salem harbor, Massachusetts
'ort on Jack's Point, Marblehead harbor, Massachu
'ort on Cedar Point, Potomac river, Marylandt
'ort on Rose island, Narraganset roads, Rhode Isla
1
HH -H, ,-H HH ^^^^^^HHHHHHWr^HHHHhH
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
6
^ =
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a .
OOrH O rH CO -* CO CO
OOUO O CMQOCOCOCO
OOCi O lO^OCOrHrH
O O CM O ^rHCirHrH
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Designation of works.
THIRD CLASS.
Works for Mount, Desert island and Sheen's Cut river. Maine* . .
Cv
*
1
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' 2 ^ ' !K
42 -|5 j* 2 W ' ' '
Works near Annapolis, Chesapeake bay, Maryland*
Fort on Point Patience, Patuxent river, Maryland .
Fort on Thomas's Point, Patuxent river, Maryland.
Fort near Beaufort, North Carolina
Secondary works at Portland, Maine, Portsmouth,
Gloucester harbor, Massachusetts*
Redoubt for Hog island, Boston harbor, Massachw
Closing Broad Sound passage, Boston harbor, Mas
Reducing altitude of Gallop island, Boston harbor,
Works for New Bedford harbor, Massachusetts* . .
Closing west passage of Narraganset roads, Mass
Works for Stonington harbor, Connecticut, and Sf
Fort Trumbull, New London harbor, Connecticut
Fort Hale, New Haven harbor, Connecticut
Fort Wooster, New Haven harbor, Connecticut . .
Fort on Middle Ground, New York harbor, New 1
Fort on East Bank, New York harbor, New York
Works near St. Marv's. Potomac river. Marvin ml*
FOETIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
59
o o
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60
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
Ci ^ CM
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FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 61
TABLE B,
Containing a list of the existing works on the seaboard which it is advisable
to preserve and retain as accessories to the proposed system of defence
DESIGNATION OF WORKS.
Fort at WiscassetJ Maine.
Fort Preble, Portland harbor Maine.
Fort Scammel, Portland harbor Maine.
Fort McCleary, Portsmouth harbor J New Hampshire.
Fort on GloucesterJ Massachusetts.
Fort Independence, Boston harbor Massachusetts.
Fort Warren and dependencies, Boston harbor Massachusetts.
Fort at New Bedford J Massachusetts.
'Fort Wolcott, Narraganset roads Rhode Island.
Fort Green, Narraganset roads Rhode Island.
Fort at Sag HarborJ New York.
Fort Hale, New Haven harbor , . . Connecticut.
Fort Columbus, Governor's island, New York harbor New York.
Castle Williams, Governor's island, New York harbor New York.
South Battery, Governor's island, New York harbor New York.
Fort Wood, Bedloe's island, New York harbor New York.
Fort Gibson, Ellis's island, New York harbor New York.
Fort Gansevoort, City of New York New York.
Battery, Hubert island, City of New York New York.
Fort Lafayette, narrows of New York harbor New York.
Fort Mifflin, Delaware river Pennsylvania.
Fort McHenry , Baltimore harbor Maryland.
Fort Madison, Annapolis harbor J Maryland.
Fort Severn, Annapolis harbor J Maryland.
Fort Washington, Potomac river Maryland.
Fort Norfolk, Hampton roads Virginia.
Fort Neilson, Hampton roads Virginia.
Fort Moultrie, Charleston harbor^ South Carolina.
Castle Pinckney , Charleston harbor South Carolina.
Fort Jackson, Savannah river Georgia.
Fort St. Philip, Mississippi river J Louisiana.
REMARKS.
Some of these will be modified by the new system, and some, on further examination,
may have to give place to new works ; these last are marked thus J
It is probable that several works, deserving a place in this list, have been omitted.
All existing works on the eoa*t, without exception, should be maintained until the new
system is applied to the ground they occupy, or to the neighboring coast.
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
L
;j
*$ f^
1 I 1
If
.I'i
G .
||
1 1
S 8
1^
i
&3
Expense of the troops kept under pay
with the proposed works.
PUB s-iBinShu jo asiiiuJxg
ti|
Number of troops necessary with the existing works 140, 000
Number of troops lequircd with the projected works, under pay and within call 70,000
Expense of defending the above-mentioned points during a campaign of six months with the existing works $19,250,000
Expense of defending the above-mentioned points during a campaign of six months with the projected works 6,447,000
Difference... 12,803,000
)f expense between the two systems will amount to within $961,073 08 of the whole cost of the projected works. The expense
ch gives for the cost of a regular soldier $300 per annum, and for the cost of a militia soldier $500 per annum, the expense of
he made of the enormous contingent expenses in assembling, organizing, and providing militia forces, of hospitals, waste of
>elow the truth. The forces under pay necessary for defence, with the proposed works, consist of pence garrisons, increased by
stationed upon the lines of approach of an enemy.
osiii| all militia serving six mouths and costing on an average $250 per in (in,
mini jad
OQS8> W 'sqjuoui xis jo>
>:ni|iiu aqj jo asuadxg
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o
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SJB.nSaa aqj jo asuadxg ^ 2 n * 5 *
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^'sjfJOM Surjstxa aqi qj[/vv .ted
Japan jdajf siloojj aqjjo asuadxg
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3)
Comparison of the force necessary to defend them without, and
with, the projected works.
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13,764,073 08
CN 00 <N 03 S " >rt
J-Trf -
N. B. In one campaign of six months the difference <
of the troops, above stated, results from a calculation wh
officers being in both cases included. No estimate can
property, loss of time, &c. This estimate is undoubtedly 1
a portion of militia, the residue of militia under pay being
# Supp
i
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FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA COAST DEFENCES.
63
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64 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
No. 3.
[Ho. HEPS., Ex. Doc. No. 243, 24TH CONGRESS, IST SESSION]
MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES TO THE SENATE OF
THE UNITED STATES, ACCOMPANIED WITH REPORTS FROM THE SECRETA-
RIES OF WAR AND NAVY, RELATIVE TO THE MILITARY AND NAVAL DE-
FENCES OF THE COUNTRY.
To the Senate:
I transmit herewith reports from the Secretaries of the War and Navy
Departments, to whom were referred the resolutions adopted by the Senate on
the 18th of February last, requesting information of the probable amount of
appropriations that would be necessary to place the land and naval defences of
the country upon a proper footing of strength and respectability.
In respect to that branch of the subject which falls more particularly under
the notice of the Secretaiy of War, and in the consideration of which he has
arrived at conclusions different from those contained in the report from the
Engineer bureau, I think it proper to add my concurrence in the views expressed
by the Secretary.
ANDREW JACKSON.
WASHINGTON, April 8, 1836.
DEPARTMENT OF WAR, April 7, 1836.
SIR : In conformity with your instructions, I have the honor to transmit reports
from the engineer and ordnance departments, furnishing so much of the informa-
tion required by the resolution of the Senate of February 18, 1836, as relates to
the fortifications of the country, and to a supply of the munitions of war. The
former branch of this subject has required laborious investigations on the part
of the officers charged with this duty, and their report has therefore been longer
delayed than, under other circumstances, would have been proper; but the whole
matter was too important to have the interests involved in it sacrificed to undue
precipitancy.
The engineer report was received at the department on Friday last, and I
have embraced such portions of the intervening time as other official calls and
a slight indisposition would allow me to devote to its examination. I did not
consider that any suggestions I could make would justify a further delay at this
advanced stage of the session, while at the same time, I am aware that this
letter will need all the allowance which these circumstances can claim for it.
It is obvious that, in the consideration of any general and permanent system
of national defence, comprehensive views are not only necessary, but professional
experience and a knowledge of practical details ; such information, in fact, as
must be obtained by long and careful attention to the various subjects which
form the elements of this inquiry. Although, therefore, I do not concur in all
the suggestions contained in these reports, and more particularly in those which
relate to the nature and extent of some of our preparations, still I have thought
it proper to lay them before you, rather than to substitute any peculiar views of
my own for them. Both furnish facts highly interesting to the community, and
if they anticipate dangers which it may be thought are not likely to happen,
and suggest preparations which future exigencies will not probably require, they
are still valuable documents, presenting the necessary materials for the action
of the legislature. The report from the engineer department, in particular
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 65
evinces an accurate knowledge of the whole subject, while, at the same time,
its general views are sound and comprehensive. I consider it a very able
document.
Under these circumstances, I have thought it proper to submit some general
remarks, explanatory of my own views, concerning a practical system of defence,
and which will show how far the plans and details are in conformity with my
opinion. I feel that this course is due to myself.
I shall confine my observations to the maritime frontier. Our inland border
rests, in the southwest and northeast, upon the possessions of civilized nations,
and requires defensive preparations to meet those contingencies only which, in
the present state of society, we may reasonably anticipate. In the existing
intercourse of nations, hostilities can scarcely overtake us so suddenly as not to
leave time to move the necessary force to any point upon these frontiers threatened
with attack. I am not aware of any peculiar position upon either of these lines
of separation which commands the approaches to the country, or whose posses-
sion would give much superiority to an invading or defensive force. In fact,
the division is, in bpth cases, an artificial line through much of its extent, and a
portion of the natural boundary offers scarcely any impediment to military opera-
tions. Under such circumstances, it seems altogether inexpedient to construct
expensive fortifications, which would do little more than protect the space under
cover of their guns; which are not required as places of depot; which guard
no avenue of communication, and which would leave the surrounding country
penetrable in. all directions. Without indulging in any improper speculations
concerning the ultimate destiny of any portion of the country in juxtaposition
with us, or looking for security to any political change, we may safely anticipate
that our own advance in all the elements of power will be at lea'st equal
to that of the people who adjoin us ; nor does the most prudent forecast dictate
any precautions, founded upon the opinion that our relative strength will de-
crease and theirs increase. The lake frontier, indeed, presents some peculiar
consideration; and I think the views submitted by the engineer department,
respecting Lake Ohamplain, are entitled to much weight. This long, narrow
sheet of navigable water opens a direct communication into the States of New
York and Vermont, while its outlet is in a foreign country, and is commanded
by a position of great natural strength. It is also within a few miles of the
most powerful and populous portion of Canada, and open to all its resources
and energies. With a view, perhaps, to possible rather than to probable events,
it may be deemed expedient to construct a work at some proper site within our
boundary which shall close the entrance of the lake to all vessels ascending its
outlet. As such a work, however, would be an advanced post, and, from cir-
cumstances, peculiarly liable to attack, its extent and defences should be in
proportion to its exposure.
There is already a considerable commercial marine upon the four great lakes,
Ontario, Erie, Huron, and Michigan, which are open to the enterprise of our
citizens. And this will increase with the augmenting population which is flowing
in upon the regions washed by these internal seas. It is obvious that, from
natural causes, the physical superiority will be found upon the southern shores
of these lakes. The resolution of the Senate embraces the inquiry into the
expediency of constructing permanent fortifications in this quarter. And this
inquiry properly divides itself into two branches :
1st. The policy of fortifying the harbors on the lakes ; and,
2d. The policy of commanding, by permanent works, the communications
between them.
Both of these measures presuppose that the naval superiority upon tl*se
waters may be doubtful. But it is difficult to foresee the probable existence of
any circumstances which would give this ascendency to the other party. It is
H. Rep. Com. 86 5
66 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
unnecessary to investigate the considerations wliicli bear upon this subject, as
they are too obvious to require examination. They are to be seen and felt in
all those wonderful evidences of increase and improvement which are now in'
such active operation. A victorious fleet upon these lakes could disembark an
army at almost any point. If a harbor were closed by fortifications they would
only have to seek the nearest beach, and land their men from boats, so that no
defences we could construct would secure us against invasion ; and temporary
block-houses and batteries would probably be found sufficiently powerful to
repel the attacks of any vessels seeking to enter the narrow harbors upon the
lakes, if we could foresee the existence of any circumstances which would
induce an enemy to endeavor to force an entrance into them.
As to the communication between the lakes, the inquiry, from geographical
causes, is necessarily restricted to that from Lake Erie to Lake Huron, and to
the straits of Michilimackinac. Of the former, almost sixty miles consist of two
rivers, completely commanded from their opposite banks, while the entrance into
one of these, the river St. Glair, is impeded by a bar, over which there are but
about eight feet of water. No armed vessels could force their way up these
rivers while the shores were in an enemy's possession, who might construct bat-
teries at every projecting point, and who, in fact, might in many places sweep
the decks with musketry. As to the straits of Michilimackinac, they are too
broad to be commanded by stationary fortifications, even if any circumstances
should lead to the construction and equipment of a hostile fleet upon the bleak
and remote shores of Matchedask bay, in the northeastern extremity of Lake
Huron.
I am therefore of opinion that our lake frontier requires no permanent defences,
and that we may safely rely for its security upon those resources, both in the
personnel and materiel, which the extent and other advantages our country
insures to us, and which must give us the superiority in that quarter.
It may, perhaps, be deemed expedient to establish a depot for the reception of
munitions of war in some part of the peninsula of Michigan, and to strengthen
it by such defences as will enable it to resist any coup de main which may be
attempted. From the' geographical features of the country, our possessions here
recede from their natural points of support, and are placed in immediate contact
with a fertile and populous part of the neighboring colony. In the event of
disturbances, the ordinary communications might be interrupted, and it would
probably be advisable to have in deposit a supply of all the necessary means for
offensive or defensive operations, and to place these beyond the reach of any
enterprising officer who might be disposed, by a sudden movement, to gain pos-
session of them. The expenditure for such an object would be comparatively
unimportant, even should the contingency be judged sufficiently probable to
justify precautionary measures.
I had the honor, in a communication to the chairman of the Committee on
Military Affairs of the Senate, dated February 19, 1836, a copy of which was
sent to the chairman of the Committee on Military Affairs of the House of Rep-
resentatives, to suggest the mode best adapted, in my opinion, to secure our
frontier against the depredations of the Indians. The basis of the plan was the
establishment of a road from some point upon the upper Mississippi to Red
river, passing west of Missouri and Arkansas, and the construction of posts in
proper situations along it. I think the ordinary mode of construction ought not
to be departed from. Stockaded forts, with log block-houses, have been found
fully sufficient for all the purposes of defence against Indians. They may be
built speedily, with little expense, and, when necessary, by the labor of the
troops. Our Indian boundary has heretofore been a receding, not a stationary
one, and much of it is yet of this character. And even where we have planted
the Indians who have been removed, and guaranteed their permanent occupation
of the possessions assigned to them, we may find it necessary, in the redemption
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 67
of the pledge we have given to protect them, to establish posts upon their exte-
rior boundary, and thus prevent collisions between them and the ruder indige-
nous tribes of that region. I think, therefore, tlfat no works of a more permanent
character than these should be constructed upon our Indian frontier. A cordon
established at proper distances upon such a road, with the requisite means of
operation deposited in the posts, and with competent garrisons to occupy them,
would probably afford greater security to the advanced settlements than any
other measures in our power. The dragoons should be kept in motion along it
during the open season of the year, when Indian disturbances are most to be
apprehended, and their presence and facility of movement would tend power-
fully to restrain the predatory disposition of the Indians ; and if any sudden
impulse should operate or drive them into hostilities, the means of assembling a
strong force, with all necessary supplies, would be at hand, and, as circumstances
permit, the posts in the Indian country now in the rear of this proposed line of
operations should be abandoned and the garrisons transferred to it.
But it is upon our maritime frontier that we are most exposed. Our coast
for three thousand miles is washed by the ocean, which separates us from those
nations who have made the highest advances in all the arts, and particularly
in those which minister to the operations of war, and with whom, from our in-
tercourse and political relations, we are most liable to be drawn into collision.
If this great medium of communication, the element at the same time of sepa-
ration and of union, interposes peculiar obstacles to the progress of hostile demon-
strations, it also offers advantages which are not less obvious, and which, to be
successfully resisted, require corresponding arrangements and exertions. These
advantages depend on the economy and facility of transportation, on the celerity
of movement, and on the power of an enemy to threaten the whole shore
spread out before him, and to select his point of attack at pleasure. A powerful
hostile fleet upon the coast of the United States presents some of the features
of a war, where a heavy mass is brought to act against detachments which may
be cut up in detail, although their combined force would exceed the assailing
foe. Our points of exposure are so numerous and distant that it would be im-
practicable to keep, at each of them, a force competent to resist the attack of
an enemy, prepared by his naval ascendency, and his other arrangements, to
make a sudden and vigorous inroad upon our shores. It becomes us, therefore,
to inquire how the consequences of this state of things are to be best met and
averted.
The first and most obvious, and in every point of view the most proper,
method of defence is an augmentation of our naval means to an extent propor-
tioned to the resources and the necessities of the nation. I do not mean the
actual construction and equipment of vessels only. The number of those in
service must depend on the state of the country at a given period ; but I mean
the collection of all such materials as may be preserved without injury, and a
due encouragement of those branches of interest essential to the growth: of a
navy, and which may be properly nurtured by the government ; so that, on the
approach of danger, a fleet may put to sea, without delay, sufficiently powerful
to meet any force which will probably be sent to our coast.
Our great battle upon the ocean is yet to be fought, and we shall gain nothing
by shutting our eyes to the nature of the struggle, or to the exertions we- shall
find it necessary to make. All our institutions are essentially pacific, and every
citizen feels that his share of the common interest is affected by the derange-
ment of business, by the enormous expense, and by the uncertain result, of a
war. This feeling presses upon the community and the government and is< a
sure guarantee that we shall never be precipitated into a contest, nor embark in
one, unless imperiously required by those considerations which leave no alterna-
tive between resistance and dishonor. Accordingly, all our history shows that
we are more disposed to bear, while evils ought to be borne, than, to seek re-
68 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
dress by appeals to arms ; still, however, a contest must come, and it behooves
us, while we have the means and the opportunity, to look forward to its attend-
ant circumstances, and to preparfc for the consequences.
It is no part of my object to enter into the details of a naval establishment.
That duty will be much more appropriately and ably performed by the proper
department ; but as some of the views I shall present on the subject of our
system of fortifications must be materially affected by any general plan of naval
operations which, in the event of hostilities, might be adopted, I am necessarily
led to submit a few remarks, not professional, but general, upon the extent and
employment of our military marine.
There is as little need of inquiry now into our moral as into our physical
capacity tq maintain a navy, and to meet upon equal terms the ships and sea-
men of any other nation. Our extended commerce, creating and created by
those resources which are essential to the building and equipment of fleets, re-
moves all doubt upon the one point, and the history of our naval enterprise,
from the moment when the colors were first hoisted upon the hastily-prepared
vessels at the commencement of our revolutionary struggle to the last contest
in which any of our ships have been engaged, is equally satisfactory upon the
other. The achievements of our navy have stamped its character with the
country and the world. The simple recital of its exploits is the highest eulo-
gium which can be pronounced upon it.
With ample means, therefore, to meet upon the ocean, by which they must
approach us, any armaments that may be destined for our shores, we are called
upon by every prudential consideration to do so. In the first place, though all
wars in which we may be engaged will probably be defensive in their character,
undertaken to repel or resent some injury, or to assert some right, and rendered
necessary by the conduct of other nations, still the objects of the war can be
best attained by its rigorous prosecution. Defensive in its causes, it should be
offensive in its character. The greater injury we can inflict upon our opponent
the sooner and the more satisfactory will be the redress we seek. Our principal
belligerent measures should have for their aim to attack our antagonist where
he is most vulnerable. If we are to receive his assaults, we abandon the van-
tage ground, and endeavor, in effect, to compel him to do us justice by inviting
his descent upon our shores, and by all those consequences which mark the
progress of an invading force, whether for depredation or for conquest. By the
ocean only can we be seriously assailed, and by the ocean ^>nly can we seriously
assail any power with which we are likely to be brought into collision.
But, independently of the policy of making an adversary feel the calamities
of war, it is obvious that, even in a defensive point of view alone, the ocean
should be our great field of operations. No one would advocate the project of
endeavoring to make our coast impervious to attack. Such a scheme would be
utterly impracticable. A superior fleet, conveying the necessary troops, could
effect a landing at numerous points upon our shores, even if the best devised
plan of fortifying them were consummated ; and, from the nature of maritime
operations, such a fleet could bring its whole strength to bear upon any particu-
lar position, and by threatening or assailing various portions of the coast, either
anticipate the tardy movements of troops upon land, and effect the object before
their concentration, or render it necessary to keep in service a force far superior
to that of the enemy, but so divided as to be inferior to it upon any given point.
These dangers and difficulties would be averted or avoided by the maintenance
of a fleet competent to meet any hostile squadrons which might be detached to
our seas. Our coast would thus be defeRded on the ocean, and the calamities
of war would be as little felt as the circumstances of such a conflict would
permit.
As to the other advantages of a navy, in the protection of commerce, they
do not come within the scope of my inquiries, and are not, therefore, adverted
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 69
to ; nor is it necessary, or indeed proper, that I should present those considera-
tions of distance, of exposure, and of station, which would render a fleet nu-
merically inferior in the aggregate to that of the enemy, yet still sufficiently
powerful, upon our own coasts, to meet and overcome any armament which
could probably be sent here.
It seems to me, therefore, that our first and best fortification is the navy. Nor
do I see any limit to our naval preparations, except that imposed by a due re-
gard to the public revenues from time to time, and by the probable condition of
other maritime nations. Much of the materiel employed in the construction
and equipment of vessels is almost indestructible, or, at any rate, may be pre-
served for a long series of years ; and if ships can be thus kept without injury
upon the stocks, by being built under cover, I do not see what should restrain
us from proceeding to build as many as may be deemed necessary, and as fast
as a due regard to their economical and substantial construction will permit, and
to collect and prepare for immediate use all the munitions of war, and other arti-
cles of equipment not liable to injury or decay by the lapse of time. Nor do I
see that these preparations should be strictly graduated by the number of sea-
men who would probably enter the service at this time, or within any short
period. To build and equip vessels properly requires much time, as well with
reference to the execution of the work as* to the proper condition of the ma-
terials employed. And the costly experiment made by England, when she too
hastily increased her fleet, about thirty years ago, by building ships with im-
proper materials and bad workmanship, ought to furnish us with a profitable
lesson. These vessels soon decayed, after rendering very little service. Naval
means should therefore be provided at a period of leisure, to be ready for im-
mediate employment in a period of exigency ; and a due regard to prudence
dictates that these means should so far exceed the estimated demands of the
service as to supply, in the shortest time, any loss occasioned by the hazards of
the ocean and the accidents of war. We may safely calculate that the number
of seamen in the United States will increase in proportion to that rapid augmen-
tation which is going on in all the other branches of national interest. If we
assume that at a given period we may expect to embark in war, our capacity to
man a fleet will exceed our present means by a ratio not difficult to ascertain.
And even then, by greater exertions and perhaps higher wages, a larger portion
may be induced to enter the naval service, while no exertions can make a cor-
responding addition to the navy itself, but at a loss of time and expense, and a
sacrifice of its permanent interest.
But whatever arrangements we may make to overcome any naval armaments
sent out 'to assail us, we are liable to be defeated and to be exposed to all the
consequences resulting from the ascendency of an enemy. And the practical
question is, what shall be done with a view to such a state of things ] As I
have already remarked, any attempt by fortifications to shut up our coast, so
that an enterprising foe, with a victorious fleet, conveying a competent force, and
disposed to encounter all the risk of such an expedition, could not make his
descent upon the shore, would be useless in itself, and would expose to just cen-
sure those who should project such a scheme. And, on the other hand, the
government would, if possible, be still more censurable were our important mari-
time places left without any defensive works. Between these extremes is a
practical medium, and to ascertain where it lies we must briefly look at the vari-
ous considerations affecting the subject.
What have we to apprehend in the event of a war ? Is it within the limits
of a reasonable cilculation that any enemy will be able and disposed to debark
upon our coast an army sufficiently powerful to lay siege to our fortifications
and to endeavor, by this slow and uncertain process, to obtain possession of
them ? I put out of view the enormous expense attending such a plan ; the
distance of the scene of operations from the points of supply and support, with
70 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
the consequent difficulties and dangers, and the possibility that the convoying
fleet might be overpowered by a superior force, and the whole expedition cap-
tured or destroyed. All these are considerations which no prudent statesman,
directing such an enterprise, will overlook. But beyond these is a question
bearing still more directly upon the point under examination. Is there any ob-
ject to be attained sufficiently important to justify the risk of placing a body of
land troops before one of these works, too strong to be carried by a coup de
main, and endeavoring to destroy the defence by a regular investment ? I think
there can be none.
I take it for granted that no nation would embark in the quixotic enterprise
of conquering this country. Any army, therefore, thrown upon our coast would
push forward with some definite object to be attained by a prompt movement
and by vigorous exertions. Our experience, more than half a century ago, de-
monstrated that an invading force could command little more than the position
it actually occupied. The system of fortifications adopted in Europe is not ap-
plicable to our condition. There military movements must be made upon great
avenues of communication, natural or artificial, and these are closed or defended
by fortresses constructed with all the skill that science and experience can sup-
ply, and with all the means that wealth and power can command. An invading
army must carry these positions by escalade or by siege, or leave sufficient de-
tachments to blockade them, or must turn them and move on with all the diffi-
culties attending the interruption of their communication, and with the dangers
which such a force in their rear must necessarily occasion. Works of this
character are keys to many of the European states, whose political safety de-
pends upon their preservation. Their possession enables their governments to
meet the first shock of war, and to prepare their arrangements, political or mili-
tary, to resist or avert the coming storm. And although, during some of the
wars which arose out of the French revolution, when, from causes which history
is now developing, the armies of France set at defiance the received maxims of
military experience, and justifying their apparent rashness by success, reduced,
with unexampled facility, or carried on their operations almost in contempt of
the strongest fortifications, the subjugation of each of which had been till then
the work of a campaign, still the opinion is yet entertained by many that this
system of defence is best adapted to the condition of the European community.
There is also a striking difference between the political situation of those
countries and that of ours, which give to these defensive preparations a character
of importance which can never apply to the United States. The possession of
a capital in the eastern hemisphere is too often jthe possession of the kingdom.
Habits of feeling and opinion, political associations, and other causes, combine
to give the metropolis an undue ascendency. Internal parties, contending
for superiority, and external enemies, aiming at conquest, equally seek to gain
possession of the seat of government. And the most careless observer of the
events of the last half century must be struck with the fact that the fate of the
capitals and the kingdoms of modern Europe are closely connected together.
Under such circumstances, it may be prudent, by powerful fortresses, to bar the
approaches to these favored places, and frequently to construct works to defend
them from external attack, or to maintain their occupation against internal
violence.
But there is nothing like this in our country, nor can there be till there is a
total change in our institutions. Our seats of government are merely the places
where the business of the proper departments is conducted, and have not them-
selves the slightest influence upon any course of measures, except what is due
to public opinion and to their just share of it. If the machine itself were itiner-
ant, the result would be precisely the same. Or, if by any of the accidents of
war or pestilence, the proper authorities were compelled to change their place of
convocation, the change would be wholly unobserved, except by the few whose
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 71
personal convenience would be affected by the measure. Nor have our com-
mercial capitals any more preponderating influence than our political ones. And
although their capture by an enemy, and the probable loss of property, and
derangement of business, which would be the result, might seriously affect the
community, yet it would not produce the slightest effect upon the social or
political systems of the country. The power belongs to all, and is exercised
by all.
It follows, therefore, that an enemy could have no inducement to hazard an
expedition against any of our cities, under the expectation that their capture
and possession would lead to political results favorable to them. Washington
may indeed be taken again, and its fall would produce the same emotion which
was everywhere felt when its former capture was known. But an enemy would
retire from it with as few advantages as marked its first abondonment, and if
his course were the same, with as few laurels as he won by its possession. I
make these remarks, because it seems to me that some of the principles of the
European system of fortifications may possibly be transferred to this country,
without sufficient attention having been given to those circumstances, both geo-
graphical and political, which require a plan exclusively adapted to our own
condition.
I consider some of the existing and projected works larger than are now
necessary, and calculated for exigencies we ought not, with the prospects before
us, to anticipate. If such is the fact, the objection is not only to the expense
of their construction and preservation, but also to the greater difficulty of
defending them, and the increased garrisons which must be provided and main-
tained. The hypothesis upon which their extent has been determined is, that
they may be exposed to investment, both seaward and landward, and that they
ought to be capable of resisting a combined attack, or, in other words, that their
water batteries should be sufficient to repel an assailing squadron, and that their
land defences should be sufficient to resist a besieging army.
It is certain that whatever works we erect should be so constructed as to be
beyond the reach of any coup de main that would probably be attempted against
them ; and this capacity must depend upon their exposure and upon the facility
with which they can be relieved. But this proposition is far different from, one
to construct them upon a scale of magnitude which presupposes they are to be
formally invested by a powerful land force, and which provides for their ability
to make a successful resistance. A dashing military or naval officer may be
willing to risk something to get possession of an insulated post by a prompt
movement, expecting to accomplish his enterprise before his adversary can be
prepared, or succor obtained; and this, even when he looks to no other advan-
tage than the capture of the garrison, and the effect which a brilliant exploit is
calculated to produce, and when he is aware that he must abandon his conquest
with as much celerity as he attained it. But formal investments of fortified
places, with all their difficulties, and expense, and uncertainty, are only under-
taken when there is some object of corresponding importance to be expected.
We have works constructed which it would require armies to reduce. Have
we any reason to anticipate that they will be assailed by a force proportioned
to their magnitude]
I have already remarked that a European power cannot expect to retain
permanent possession of any part of this country. If, therefore, he succeed in
overcoming or eluding our fleets, and is prepared with a respectable land force,
and ready to risk its employment upon our territory, he* can land at many points
which we cannot close against him. His debarkation is not a question of
practicability, but of expediency. If a safe harbor or roadstead offers itself, and
there is no defensive work to prevent his approach, he will, of course, land at
the nearest point to the object of his marauding exterprise. If there is such a
work, it will be a question of calculation whether it is better to attack and carry
72 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
it, or to seek another, though more distant, point of debarkation. I think there
can be little doubt but there are few, if any, positions in our country which an
enemy would not under such circumstances avoid. He would be aware of the'
facility of communication which our rivers, canals, and railroads afford, of the
powerful use we should be prepared to make of steam in its various forms of
application, and of the immense force which in a short time could be concentrated
upon a given point; and it is scarcely within the limits of possibility that he
would venture formally to besiege one of our forts, or if he did, that he would
not repent his rashness. Neither the co-operation of his fleet, nor the nearer
proximity of the place of landing to the object of attack, would induce him to
seek these advantages at the cost which must attend the slow process of besieg-
ing a fort, when, by removing to another position, he would land in safety, and
save in time, in promptness of movement, and in his escape from the perils of a
doubtful contest, more than he would lose by the difference in distance.
I am aware it may be objected that the weakness of a work might tempt an
enemy to attack it, and that it may be supposed the power of some of our forti-
fications to resist a siege may hereafter furnish the true reason why they may
not be compelled to encounter one. Certainly the stronger a work is, the less
will it be exposed to danger. But this would not furnish a sufficient reason for
making its defences out of reasonable proportion to its exposure. The true
inquiry is, What circumstances will probably induce and enable an enemy to
assail a given point, and with what force ; and how can we best meet and repel
him ? And I believe a just consideration of this proposition will lead to the
conclusion that there are scarcely any positions in our country where an enemy
would venture to set down before a work too strong to resist a coup de main.
In the view, therefore, which I take of this whole subject, it will be perceived
that I do not merely suppose an enemy will not invest our larger works, but
that they would not do so were these works much inferior to what they are,
both in their dimensions and construction.
What object would justify an enemy in attempting to land an army upon our
coast ? He would not expect to lay waste the country, for such a mode of war-
fare is not to be anticipated in the present state of society. All that, under the
most favorable circumstances, he could accomplish, would be to gain sudden
possession of a town and levy contributions, or to destroy a naval establishment,
commercial or military, and precipitately retire to his ships before his operations
could be prevented, or his retreat intercepted. I cannot, therefore, concur in the
suggestion made in the engineer report, that the first of the three great objects
to be attained by the fortifications of -the first class should be to "prevent an
enemy from forming a permanent or even a momentary establishment in the
country." It is not suited to the present and prospective situation of the United
States. I understand the establishments herein contemplated are not the tem-
porary occupation of naval arsenals and cities for the purpose of destruction or
plunder, because these objects are specially enumerated, but are lodgements
where armies may be stationed, and whence they may issue to commit inroads
into the country.
I refer, in these remarks, to our maritime coast generally. There are, no
doubt, certain points less equal to self-defence than others, and where the prep-
aration must be greater. Of this class is the delta of the Mississippi, not only
in consequence of its many avenues of approach, but because its great natural
highway does not at present allow those lateral supplies of the personnel, which,
from geographical formation, and from the state of the .settlements, can be
speedily thrown upon most other points of the country. This region, however,
is admirably adapted to the use of steam batteries, and they will form its prin-
cipal means of defence.
To apply these remarks to the plan of fortifications partly completed and
partly projected. Fort Monroe, at Old Point Comfort, covers about sixty-three
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 73
acres of ground, and requires, by the estimates of the engineer department, two
thousand seven hundred men to garrison it in time of war. Its full armament
consists of 412 pieces of different descriptions and calibre. I have been desirous
of comparing its superficial extent with some of the European fortresses ; but
the necessary information could not be obtained within the short time that could
be allowed for the inquiry. I understand from General Gratiot, however, that
it is probably larger than almost any of the single works in Europe which do
not enclose towns within their circuit. Drinkwater, in his history of the siege
of Gibraltar, states that 572 guns were mounted upon that fortress.
The object to be attained by Fort Monroe, in conjunction with Fort Calhoun,
intended to mount 232 guns, is to prevent an enemy from entering Hampton
roads, a safe and convenient roadstead. This object is important, because this
bay is perfectly landlocked, and has sufficient depth of water for the largest
vessels, and is, withal, so near the capes of the Chesapeake that it furnishes the
best station which an enemy could occupy for annoying our commerce, and for
committing depredations upon the shores of that extensive estuary. But these
works do not command the entrance into the Chesapeake; nor is Hampton
roads the only safe anchorage for a hostile fleet. Their possession, therefore,
does not exclude an enemy from these waters, though they will compel him to
resort to less convenient positions from whence to cany on his enterprises. A
hostile squadron reaching the Chesapeake, and finding the entrance into
Hampton roads guarded by sufficient works, though much less extensive than
those at Fort Monroe, would necessarily consider whether the possession of that
roadstead is so important as to justify the debarkation of a large body of land
troops, and to attempt to carry the works by regular approaches, and this in
the face of the strenuous efforts which would be made to relieve it by all the
aids afforded by the most improved facilities of communication, and by the light
and heavy steam batteries which, upon the approach of war, would be launched
upon the Chesapeake, and which, during periods of calm, or in certain winds,
could approach the hostile ships and drive them from their anchorage, or compel
them to surrender, and most of which, from their draught of water, could take
refuge in the inlets that other armed vessels could not enter. And even if the
works were carried, they could not be maintained without the most enormous
expense, nor, in fact, without efforts which no government three thousand miles
off could well make, and all this, while Lynnhaven bay, York bay, the Rappa-
hannock, Tangier island, the mouth of the Potomac, and many other places,
furnish secure anchorage, and are positions from which an enemy, having the
superiority, could not be excluded, and while, in fact, a great part of the Ches-
apeake may be considered as affording good anchorage ground for large ships.
Neither of them is equal to Hampton roads, but most or all of them furnish
stations for occupation and observation which would render it unnecessary to
purchase the superior advantages of Hampton roads by the sacrifice and hazard
which would attend the effort. The occlusion of this roadstead does not secure
Norfolk, important as it is from its commerce and navy yard. It only prevents
the access of ships-of-war to it. And against these there is an interior line of
defence, which may be considered as accessory to, and, if necessary, independent
of, the other. And a land force, deeming the destruction of the navy yard at
Norfolk a sufficient object to justify such an expedition, would not sit down be-
fore Fort Monroe, if its scale of defence were far inferior to what it now is, but
would debark at Lynnhaven bay, where there is no impediment, and march in
five or six hours through an open country to Norfolk.
New York is, in every point of view, our most important harbor, and its de-
fences should provide for every reasonable contingency. The engineer report
recommends three classes of works : an interior one for the protection of the
harbor ; an exterior one to shut up Raritan bay ; and a third to prevent a hos-
tile fleet from approaching the city through the sound nearer than the vicinity
74 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES
of Throg's Point. The importance of the first class cannot be doubted. That
of the second depends on the value of Raritan bay to an enemy as an anchorage
ground, and on the utility of excluding him from a landing at Gravesend bay,
upon Long Island, whence an army could march, without obstruction, to Brook-
lyn and New York. The third is proposed to be erected in order to bar his
access to the lower part of the sound, or, more accurately speaking, to prevent
his reaching Hell Gate, a natural barrier which no fleet could pass, and which
is within ten miles of the city. Here, if his aim were New York, he would
land, and would find no works to prevent his approach. The two forts proposed
to be erected at Throg's Neck and Wilkin's Point, eight miles further up the
sound, would compel him to debark beyond the reach of their guns, and would
thus add that distance to his march, while on the north shore Harlaem river
would be interposed between him and the city. On the Long Island side there
would be no difference but that occasioned by the distance.
It is obvious then that, in the consideration of this plan involving an esti-
mated expenditure in the aggregate of $5,807,969, and efficient garrisons in
time of war of nine thousand men, a close investigation should be made into all
the circumstances likely to influence the operations of an enemy. Is the an-
chorage ground between the Narrows and Sandy Hook of sufficient value to an
enemy, looking to the risk of his occupation of the coast and to the doubts that
may be reasonably entertained of the result of so great an experiment to be
carried on, in fact, in the sea, to authorize the commencement of these works
without a new examination ] Or is the probability of the disembarkation of an
army at Gravesend bay in preference to some other point upon the coast of
Long Island, if a convenient one exists, so great as to require these preparations ?
The same questions may be asked respecting Wilkin's Point. The work at
Throg's Point is in the process of construction, and as the river is only about
three-fourths of a mile wide at this place I think its completion would be suffi-
cient for this line of defence till the proposed general examination can take
place.
The situation of New York affords a fine theatre for the operation of floating
batteries, and whether a sufficient number of them would secure it from the de-
signs of an enemy better than the full completion of the extensive system of
permanent fortifications recommended is a question deserving investigation.
Such an investigation I recommend, and after all the necessary facts and con-
siderations are presented the government should proceed to place this commercial
metropolis of the country in a state of security.
The works at Newport cover about twenty acres and will mount four hundred
and sixty-eight guns, and will need for their defence about two thousand four
hundred men. I cannot myself foresee the existence of any circumstances which
now call for a fortress of this magnitude in the very heart of New England ;
constructed not merely to command the harbor of Newport, but to resist a siege
which would probably require nearly twenty thousand men to carry it on. I
am at a loss to conjecture what adequate motive could induce a foreign govern-
ment to detach a fleet and army upon this enterprise. The expense would be
enormous. The French army that invaded Egypt was less than forty thousand
men, and required for its protection and transportation between five and six
hundred vessels. The army that conquered Algiers was about equal in force,
and required, it is said, about four hundred transports besides the ships-of-war.
This scale of preparation for enterprises against the shores of the Mediterranean
may enable us to form some conception of the arrangements that would be
necessary to send across the ocean to this country, in the present day of its
power, an expedition strong enough to form an establishment upon our shores,
and to furnish it with supplies necessary to its subsistence and operations.
It has been supposed, indeed, by the board of engineers, that an enemy would
find sufficient reason for the occupation of Rhode Island in the consideration
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 75
that it would afford a secure lodgement, whence expeditions could be sent to
every part of our coast. But it is to be observed that no part of Narraganset
bay is necessary for the safety of a hostile fleet watching that part of our coast.
Gardiner's bay in that vicinity is a most safe and convenient station, which was
occupied by the British during almost the whole of the late war, and it is pretty
clear that it cannot be defended by any stationary fortifications that can be
constructed. If it can by floating batteries, so may Narraganset bay, and the
enemy thus prevented from occupying the latter also without these extensive
arrangements, requiring, after Fort Adams shall have been completed at an ex-
pense of one million three hundred and twelve thousand dollars, four other forts
and a sea-wall to be constructed, and eleven hundred and fifty-seven thousand
dollars to be expended.
I do not think that the most prudent forecast ought to lead to the apprehen-
sion that a force competent to seize such a position would be sent to our country,
or that any circumstances could enable them to maintain it in the face of the
vigorous efforts that would be made to recover it, and in the midst of a country
abounding in all the means to give effect to their exertions. But perhaps the
most striking objection to the completion of this extensive plan is, that under
no possible circumstance can it effect the desired object. That object, if I
understand it, is not the mere exclusion of an enemy from Rhode Island, but it
is to prevent him from taking possession of a safe and convenient position,
whence he could detach his forces by means of his naval superiority to any other
part of the coast which would thus be exposed to his depredations.
The value of Gardiner's bay as a place of naval renclezvous I have already
described. Block island, in its neighborhood, could be occupied by troops de-
siring only a lodgement, and so could Nantucket island and Martha's Vineyard,
and these are only a few hours' sail from Narraganset bay. Buzzard's bay is
also a safe and capacious harbor which cannot be defended, and Martha's Vine-
yard sound affords commodious places of anchorage. A fleet riding in these
moorings would have under its command all the islands in this group, and could
secure its communications with its land forces encamped upon them, which
would thus be enabled, at any proper time, to throw itself upon other parts of
the coast. It may be doubted, if there were not a cannon mounted upon Rhode
Isfand, whether an enemy acquainted with the topography and resources of this
country would select it as his place of arms, if I may so term it, when there are
islands in the neighborhood which would answer this purpose nearly as well,
and where he would be in perfect safety as long as he could maintain his naval
ascendency; and longer than that he could not, under any circumstances, occupy
Rhode Island. And if I rightly appreciate the strength and spirit of that part
of the country, his tenure, in any event, would be short and difficult. I do not
mean to convey the idea that Rhode Island should not be defended. I think it
should be ; but I do not think that precautions should be taken against events
which are not likely to happen. As there is no naval establishment here, it is
not necessary to enter into any question concerning defensive arrangements
exclusively connected with that object.
It will be perceived also that it is proposed to fortify Mount Desert island,
on the coast of Maine, and that the expense is estimated at five hundred thou-
sand dollars, and the number of the garrison competent to maintain it at -one
thousand men. This proposition is founded, not on the value of this harbor to
us, for it possesses little, and is, in effect, unoccupied, but on account of its im-
portance to the enemy. Were there no other secure position they could occupy
in that quarter, and which could not be defended, I should think the views
submitted upon this branch of the subject entitled to great weight. But there
are many indentations upon this coast, affording safe anchorage, and which are
either not capable of being defended, or from their great number would involve
an enormous expense, which no sound views of the subject could justify. An
76 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
enemy, therefore, cannot be deprived of the means of stationing himself upon
this coast. And before this expenditure at Mount Desert island is encountered,
it ought to be clearly ascertained that the difference, in its practical advantages
to an enemy, between the occupation of Mount Desert island and that of some
of the other roadsteads iii this quarter, incapable of defence, would be sufficiently
great to warrant this measure. My present impression is that it would not.
And on the subject of roadsteads generally, with a few exceptions, depending
on their local positions, I am inclined to the opinion that any attempt to fortify
them would be injudicious. I do not speak of harbors and inlets which are
occupied by cities and towns, but of mere anchorage grounds, deriving their
value from the shelter they afford. If all could be defended, and an enemy
excluded from them, the advantages would justify any reasonable expenditure.
But this is impracticable, and I doubt whether the circumstances, in which most
of them differ, give such marked superiority to those we can defend over those
we cannot, as to lead to any attempt to fortify them, in the first instance, and
to maintain garrisons in them during a war.
I have adverted to these particular cases in order to present my views more
distinctly than I could do by mere general observations. Certainly not from
the remotest design of criticising the reports and the labors of the able profes-
sional men to whom the subject has been referred, nor of pursuing the investi-
gation into any further detail.
I consider the duty of the government to afford adequate protection to the
sea-coast a subject of paramount obligation ; and I believe we are called upon
by every consideration of policy to push the necessary arrangements as rapidly
as the circumstances of the country and the proper execution of the work will
allow. I think every town large enough to tempt the cupidity of an enemy
should be defended by works, fixed or floating, suited to its local position, and
sufficiently extensive to resist such attempts as would probably be made against
it. There will, of course, after laying down such a general rule, be much latitude
of discretion in its application. Upon this branch of the subject I would give
to the opinion of the engineer officers great and almost controlling weight, after
the proper limitations are established. These relate principally to the mag-
nitude of the works, and if I am correct in the views I have taken of this
branch of the subject, a change in the system proposed is necessary. Works
should not be projected upon the presumption that they are to be exposed to
and must be capable of resisting the attacks of an European army, with its
battering train, and all its preparations for a regular siege. Neither our relative
circumstances, nor those of any nation with which we shall probably be brought
into conflict, can justify us in such an anticipation. All the defences should be
projected upon a scale proportioned to the importance of the place, and should
be calculated to resist any naval attack, and any sudden assault that a body of
land troops might make upon them. But further than this it appears to me we
ought not to go. The results at Stonington, at Mobile Point,, at Fort Jackson,
and at Baltimore, during the late war, show that formidable armaments may be
successfully resisted with apparently inferior means. These, indeed, do not
furnish examples to be followed as to the scale of our preparations, but they
show what stationary batteries have done in our country against ships-of-war.
It is to be observed that the great object of our fortifications is to exclude a
naval force from our harbors. This end they ought fully to answer, and in this
problem there are two conditions to be fulfilled :
1. That they be able to resist any naval batteries that will probably be
placed against them ; and
2. That they be also able to resist any coup de main or escalade which might
be attempted by land.
An open battery, under many circumstances, might fulfil the first condition
but not the second, and therefore these works should be closed and regularly
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 77
constructed. It is not to be denied that the proper boundary between the mag-
nitude and nature of the works necessary to attain the objects indicated, and
those required to resist successfully a formal investment, will sometimes
become a matter of doubt ; nor that circumstances may not be stated which
might induce an enemy to open his trenches against one of these works, because
its capacity for defence was not greater. That capacity, however, with relation
to the question under consideration, has a far more intimate connexion with the
magnitude than with the form of the works, because, if unnecessarily large,
they entail upon the country a serious evil in the increased means for their
defence, independently of the additional expense in their construction. It is
principally, therefore, in the latter point of view that I have presented the
doubts which I have expressed upon this point.
Among the hypothetical cases heretofore stated by the board of engineers
was one which supposed that an army of twenty thousand men might be
assembled upon one of the flanks of our coast, and that we ought to be pre-
pared, at every important point, to resist the first shock of such a force. I have
already glanced at the reasons, geographical, political, financial, and prudential,
which, in my opinion, leave little room to expect that any enemy will, hereafter,
project an enterprise of this magnitude, so certain in its expense, so uncertain
in its result, and so disproportioned to any object which could probably be at-
tained. And the suggestion which was made by the board, of defending the
city of Washington by works erected near the mouth of the Patuxent, proceeds
upon similar views. Our navy, our floating batteries, our means of communi-
cation and concentration, seem to me far better adapted to the defence of this
city than forts at the distance of nearly fifty miles, whose principal effect, if an
enemy were resolved upon the enterprise, would be to compel him to make a
detour in his expedition, or which would send him to some part of the coast of
the bay between Patuxent and Annapolis, or into the Potomac, where his
descent would be uninterrupted, and where he would be but little, if any, further
from Washington than at the head of navigation of the Patuxent.
Even during the last war, when the navy of Great Britain rode triumphant
upon the ocean, but one serious attempt was made to force an entrance into a
fortified harbor, and that was unsuccessful. The greatest possible force which
can be brought, and the greatest possible resistance which can be applied, do
not constitute a practical rule for the construction of our fixed defences. Moral
considerations must also have weight. Probabilities must be examined. The
power of the permanent batteries is one of the elements of security. So are the
dangers of dispersion and shipwreck, and all the hazards of a distant expedi-
tion, as these must operate on the councils of any country meditating such an
enterprise, the efforts of our navy, the co-operation of the floating defences, and
the troops which may be ready to meet the enemy upon his debarkation or
march.
In submitting these reflections, I am desirous only of discharging the duty
confided to me. I am gratified that the whole subject will be presented for the
consideration of Congress in a systematic form, and that the principles of its
future prosecution can now be settled. The plan originally devised was recom-
mended upon great consideration, and, at the time its initiatory measures were
adopted, was calculated for the state of the country. We had just come out of
a severe struggle, and had felt the want of adequate preparation, and, above all,
we had seen and deplored the circumstances which gave the enemy undisturbed
possession of the Chesapeake, and its disastrous consequences. And it was to
be expected that our arrangements for future defence should be planned upon
the then existing state of things. I imagine there were few who- did not concur
in this sentiment. Because, therefore, some of our works, from the wonderful
advancement of the country in all the elements of power, and from the develop-
ment of new means of annoyance, are larger than are found necessary at this
78 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
time, still this does not bring into question the wisdom of the original measure.
And, as it is, they are most valuable and useful ; but the experience we have
acquired may be profitably employed in re-examining the plans proposed for the
prosecution of the system, and in inquiring whether the change which has taken
place in the condition of the country will not justify a corresponding change in
the nature of our preparations, and whether we may not depend more upon
floating, and less upon stationary defences.
During the period which has intervened since the last war, we have nearly
doubled in our population, and all our other resources have probably increased
in a still greater ratio. Certainly, some of the facilities and means of defence
are augmented beyond any rational expectations. The power of transporting
troops and munitions of war has already opened new views upon this subject,
and such is the progress and probable extent of the new system of intercom-
munication that the time will soon come when almost any amount of physical
force may be thrown upon any point threatened by an enemy. Nashville may
succor New Orleans in sixty hours ; Cincinnati may aid Charleston in about the
same time ; Pittsburg will require but twenty-four hours to relieve Baltimore,
and troops from that city and from Boston may leave each place in the morn-
ing, and meet in New York in the evening. This wonderful capacity for move-
ment increases, in effect, some of the most important elements of national power
It neutralizes one of the great advantages of an assailing force, choosing its
point of attack, and possessing the necessary means of reaching it. Detach-
ments liable, under former circumstances? to be cut off in detail, may now be
concentrated without delay, and most of the garrisons upon the seaboard may
be brought together, and, after accomplishing the object of their concentration,
be returned to their stations in time to repel any attack meditated against them.
The improvements which are making in the application of steam have fur-
nished another most important agent in the work of national protection. There
can be but little doubt that floating batteries, propelled by this agent, will be
among the most efficient means of coast defence. In our large estuaries, such
as the bays of New York, of the Delaware, and of the Chesapeake, they will
be found indispensable ; and one of the most important advantages to be antici-
pated from the works at Old Point Comfort is the security they will afford to
the floating batteries co-operating with them, and which will find a secure shel-
ter in Hampton roads. A hostile fleet about to enter the Chesapeake would cer-
tainly calculate the means of annoyance to which it would be exposed by these
formidable vessels. During a calm they would take a distant position, insuring
their own safety, while, with their heavy guns, they might cripple and destroy
the enemy ; and their power of motion would enable them, under almost all cir-
cumstances, to approach the fleet, and to retire, when necesary, where they
could not be pursued. I think it doubtful whether a squadron would anchor in
the Chesapeake, or proceed up it, if a competent number of these batteries were
maintained and placed in proper positions.
These considerations may well lead us to doubt the necessity of such* extensive
permanent works, while their non-existence at the time the system was adopted,
justifies the views which then prevailed; and without advancing any rash con-
jecture, we may anticipate such improvements in this branch of the public ser-
vice as will make it the most efficient means of coast defence. These vessels,
properly constructed, may become floating forts almost equal to permanent forti-
fications in their power of annoyance and defence, and in other advantages far
superior to them. Being transferable defences, they can.be united upon any
point, and a few of them be thus enabled to protect various places. We
have been brought by circumstances to a more rigid investigation of our
means of defence, and to a re-examination of the whole subject. After an in-
terval of twenty years of tranquillity, public sentiment and the attention of the
government were, by unexpected circumstances, more forcibly directed to this
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 79
matter. The result cannot fail to be advantageous. The whole subject can be
now re-examined by Congress, with all the benefits which much experience has
brought, and with the advantage of adapting a system to the advanced state of
the country.
There are two bills for fortifications now pending before Congress. One be-
fore the House, amounting to $2,180,000, and intended to prosecute works actu-
ally already commenced. The estimates for this bill may therefore be considered
necessary in themselves, under any view of the general subject, and not unrea-
sonable in amount for the present year, because they include the operations of
two years. The incidental expenses, however, may be safely reduced one-half,
as it will not be necessary to make such extensive repairs as were considered
requisite when the estimates were prepared.
The bill pending before the Senate contains appropriations for nineteen new
works, and for the sum of $600,000 to be expended for steam batteries. The
estimates on which this bill was founded were prepared at a time when prudence
required that arrangements should be made for a different state of things from
that which now exists. An examination of the general system of defence was
not then expedient; and the means of protecting the most exposed points,
agreeably to information previously collected, were asked of Congress. It was
no time then to stop, and instead of prosecuting established plans vigorously,
to lose the period of action by surveys, examinations, and discussions. But the
opportunity is now afforded, without danger to the public interest, of applying
the principles suggested to the works under consideration.
It cannot be doubted but that fortifications at the following places enumerated
in this bill will be necessary :
At Penobscot bay, for Jhe protection of Bangor, &c.
At Kennebec river.
At Portland.
At Portsmouth.
At Salem.
At New Bedford.
At New London.
Upon Staten Island.
At Sollers's Flats.
A redoubt on Federal Point.
For the Barrancas.
For Fort St. Philip.
These proposed works all command the approach to places sufliciently im-
portant to justify their construction under any circumstances that will probably
exist. I think, therefore, that the public interest would be promoted by the
passage of the necessary appropriations for them. As soon as these are made,
such of these positions as may appear to require it can be examined, and the
form and extent of the works adapted to existing circumstances, if any change
be desirable. The construction of those not needing examination can commence
immediately, and that of the others as soon as the plans are determined upon.
By this proceeding, therefore, a season may be saved in the operations.
The other works contained in this bill are :
For Provincetown. And this proposition may be safely submitted to another
inquiry, as the practicability of excluding an enemy from any shelter in Massa-
chusetts bay, a matter of deep interest, and as a work at Provincetown, are
closely connected.
For Rhode Island, Narraganset bay. This work may await the result of
the views that may be eventually taken on the subject of fortifying this bay.
For a work at the Delaivare outlet of the Chesapeake and Delaware canal.
This may be postponed without injury till next season; and in the meantime a
80 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
project for the floating defences of the Delaware considered, and perhaps the
size of the proposed work reduced.
For a work at the Breakwater. Until the effect of the deposits which are
going on in this important artificial harbor are fully ascertained, I consider it
injudicious to erect a permanent work for its defence. Another year will, per-
haps, settle the question, and if the result is favorable, an adequate fortification
should be constructed here without delay.
For a fort on the Patuxent river, and a fort at Cedar Point. Both of these
works are liable to some of the objections stated, and I think they had better be
postponed for more mature consideration.
For fortifications at the mouth of the St. Mary's, Georgia. This proposition
may also be safely submitted to examination.
The estimate for steam batteries may be reduced to $100,000. That sum can
be profitably employed.
If these appropriations are early made, most if not all of these works can be
put in operation this season, and the money usefully applied,' as fast as their
progress will justify. And I think the measure would be expedient. But it is
to be remembered that the power of the department to push them, during the
present year, will depend on the reorganization of the corps of engineers. If
that corps is not increased, it will be unnecessary to make th'e appropriations in
the bill before the Senate, as the objects contained in the other bill will be suffi-
cient to occupy the time of the present officers of the corps.
Should it be deemed proper to re-examine the subject of the proposed fortifi-
cations generally, I would then recommend that an appropriation of $30,000 be
made to defray the expenses of a board, including surveyors, &c.
My reflections upon the whole subject lead to the Allowing practical sugges-
tions on the great subject of the measures for the defence of the country :
1. An augmentation of the navy, upon the principles before stated.
2. The adoption of an efficient plan for the organization of the militia.
Having already, in two of the annual reports I have had the honor to make
to you, expressed my sentiments upon this subject, I have nothing new to lay
before you, either with relation to its general importance, or to the necessary
practical details. I consider it one of the most momentous topics that can en-
gage the attention of Congress ; and the day that sees a plan of organization
adopted, suited to the habits of our people and the nature of our institutions, and
fitted to bring into action the physical strength of the country, with a competent
knowledge of their duty, and just ideas of discipline and subordination, will see
us the strongest nation, for the purposes of self-defence, on the face of the globe.
Certainly such an object is worthy the attention of the legislature.
3. The cultivation of military science, that we may keep pace with the im-
provements which are made in Europe, and not be compelled to enter into a
contest with an adversary whose superior knowledge would give him pre-eminent
advantages. War is an advancing science. Many an original genius and many
an acute intellect are at all times at work upon it ; and the European communi-
ties have such a relation to one another that the profession of anus is peculiarly
encouraged, and every effort made to place their military establishments, not at
the highest numerical point, but in the best condition for efficient service, both
with respect to its morale and materiel. It is not by the mere reading of pro-
fessional authors that the necessary instruction in this branch of knowledge can
be obtained; there must be study and practice; a union of principles and details,
which can best be obtained by a course of education directed to this object.
This, I think, is one of the greatest advantages of the Military Academy. It
cannot have escaped the recollection of those who were upon the theatre of action
at the commencement of the last war, that the first year was almost spent in a
series of disasters, which, however, brought their advantages. We were com-
paratively ignorant of the state of military science, and we did not fully recover
FORTIFICATIONS AND SE^- COAST DEFENCES. 81
our true position till we had received many severe lessons : at what an expense
of life and treasure need not be stated.
4. The skeleton of a regular establishment, to which any necessary additions
may be made, securing, at the same time, economy, with a due power of expan-
sion, and the means of meeting a war with all the benefit of a regularly organized
force. This object is attained by our present army.
5. The preparation and proper distribution of all the munitions of war, agree-
ably to the views hereinafter submitted.
6. I think all the defensive works now in the process of construction should
be finished, agreeably to the plans upon which they have been projected.
7. All the harbors and inlets upon the coast, where there are cities or towns
whose situation and importance create just apprehension of attack, and particu-
larly where we have public naval establishments, should be defended by works
proportioned to any exigency that may probably arise.
Having already presented my general views upon this branch of the inquiry,
I need not repeat the practical limitations which I propose for adoption. But
before any expenditure is incurred for new works, I think an examination should
be made, in every case, in order to apply these principles to the proposed plan
of operations, and thus reduce the expense of construction where this can prop-
erly be done, and, also, the eventual expense of maintaining garrisons required
to defend works disproportioued to the objects sought to be attained. I would
organize a board for this object, with special instructions for its government.
8. Provision should be made for the necessary experiments, to test the supe-
riority of the various plans that may be offered for the construction and use of
steam batteries; I mean batteries to be employed as accessories in the defence
of the harbors and inlets, and in aid of the permanent fortifications.
The progressive improvement in the application of the power of steam renders
it inexpedient, at any given time, to make extensive arrangements, connected
with this class of works, with a view to their future employment. The improve-
ment of to-day may be superseded by the experience of to-morrow ; and modes
of application may be discovered before any exigency arises rendering a resort
to these defences necessary, which may introduce an entire revolution into this
department of art and industry. * Still, however, experiments should be made,
aiid a small number of these vessels constructed. Their proper draught of water,
their form and equipment, the situation and security of their machinery, the
number, calibre, and management of their guns, and the best form of the engines
to be used, are questions requiring much consideration, and which can only be
determined by experience. And there can be little doubt that suitable rewards
would soon put in operation the inventive faculties of some of our countrymen,
and lead to the tender of plans practically suited to the circumstances. As we
acquire confidence by our experience, arrangements could be made for collecting
and preparing the indestructible materials for the construction and equipment of
these vessels, as far as such a measure may not interfere with any probable
change, which at the time may be anticipated in the application of the power of
steam.
9. I recommend a reconsideration of the project for fortifying the roadsteads
or open anchorage grounds, and its better adaptation to the probable future cir-
cumstances of the country.
And I would suggest that the works which are determined on be pushed with
all reasonable vigor, that our whole coast may be placed beyond the reach of
injury or insult as soon as a just regard to circumstances will permit. No
objections can arise to this procedure on the ground of expense, because, whatever
system may be approved by the legislature, nothing will be gained by delaying
ipletioii beyond the time
, the cost will be greater
H. Rep. Com. 86 6
~j ^ *, ""',/ - * sr JL j v v <j
its completion beyond the time necessary to the proper execution of the work.
In fact, the cost will be greater the longer we are employed in it, not only for
82 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
obvious reasons, arising out of general superintendence and other contingencies,
but because accidents are liable to happen to unfinished works, and the business
upon them is deranged by the winter, when they must be properly secured ; and
the season for resuming labor always finds some preparations necessary, which
would not have been required had no interruption happened.
But the political considerations which urge forward this great object are enti-
tled to much more weight. When once completed we should feel secure. There
is probably not a man in the country who did not look with some solicitude
during the past season at our comparatively defenceless condition, when the
issue of our discussions with France was uncertain, and who did not regret that
our preparations, during the long interval of peace we had enjoyed, had not
kept pace with our growth and importance. We have now this lesson to add to
our other experience. Adequate security is not only due from the government
to the country, and the conviction of it is not only satisfactory, but the knowl-
edge of its existence cannot fail to produce an influence upon other nations, as
well in the advent of war itself, as in the mode of conducting it. If we ere
prepared to attack and resist, the chances of being compelled to embark in hos-
tilities will be diminished much in proportion to our preparation. An unprotected
commerce, a defenceless coast, and a military marine wholly inadequate to the
wants of our service, would indeed hold out strong inducements to other nations
to convert trifling pretexts into serious causes of quarrel.
There are two suggestions connected with the prosecution of our works which
I venture to make :
First. That the corps of engineers should be increased. The reasons for this
measure have been heretofore submitted, and the proposition has been recom-
mended by you to Congress. I will merely add, upon the present occasion, that
the officers of this corps are not sufficiently numerous for the performance of the
duties committed to them ; and that if an augmentation does not take place, the
public interest will suffer in a degree far beyond the value of any pecuniary
consideration connected with this increase ; and,
Secondly. I think that when the plan of a work has been approved by Con-
gress, and its construction authorized, the whole appropriation should be made
at once, to be drawn from the treasury in annual instalments, to be fixed by the
law. This mode of appropriation would remedy much of the inconvenience
which has been felt for years in this branch of the public service. The uncer-
tainty respecting the appropriations annually deranges the business, and the
delay which biennially takes place in the passage of the necessary law reduces
the alternate season of operations to a comparatively short period. An exact
inquiry into the effect which the present system of making the appropriations
has had upon the expense of the works would probably exhibit an amount far
greater than is generally anticipated.
The report from the ordnance department shows the quantity and nature of
the munitions of war, estimated to be eventually necessary, and their probable
cost, including new establishments necessary for their fabrication and preserva-
tion. The conjectural amount is $29,955,537.
Believing it is not expedient at present to make any preparations upon a
scale of this magnitude, I have deemed it proper to accompany this report with
a, brief statement of my own views, where I depart from the suggestions that
are presented in this document.
As our fortifications- are constructed, their armaments . should be provided ;
and the amount in depot should at all times exceed the anticipated demand, to
meet the casualties of the service. We have now on hand 1,818 new cannon
for sea-coast defence ; and about 1,000 others, most of which are either useless
or of doubtful character. The works actually finished, or so far completed as
to admit of a part of their armament being placed in them, require about 2,000
guns. They are calculated ultimately to mount about 600 more. Others in
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 83
the process of construction will require about 1,400. So far we have certain
data for our estimates ; unless, indeed, which I am inclined to believe, it should
not be found necessary ever to provide the full complement destined for the
'largest of these works. Beyond this, the subject is conjectural. And the
quantity needed must depend upon the principles that may be adopted in the
further progress of the system of fortifications. There are four private foun-
deries at which the public cannon are cast. These, if their whole attention
were devoted to the object, could manufacture from 1,200 to 1,500 annually.
As to carriages and other supplies, the amount that could be procured within a
reasonable period is almost indefinite. Iron carriages are now made for all the
casemate batteries, and they have not only the advantage of indestructibility
from the atmosphere, but, requiring no seasoned materials, they may be supplied
by the founderies through the country to almost any extent.
We have two armories for the manufacture of small arms, and there are seven
private establishments which fabricate arms for the government. All these sup-
plies are of the best description, and are submitted to a rigid inspection, which
prevents imposition. The armories can at present turn out about 27,000 arms
annually, and probably 11,000 or 12,000 could be made at existing private
establishments. Should any exigency require larger supplies, the quantity can
be much increased. We have now on hand about 700,000 small arms, and
there must have been issued to the States about 180,000 muskets, 25,000 rifles,
30,000 pistols, and 378 field cannon and carriages, under the act for arming the
militia. If 100,000 of these muskets and rifles are preserved, there are in the
country 800,000 of those species of arms belonging to the general or State
governments.
What may be considered a proper supply is a question admitting much dif-
ference of opinion. It will be seen that the ordnance department fixes the
amount at about 600,000, in addition to. what are now on hand, and including
the number necessary to arm the militia. We had, at the commencement of
the last war, 240,000 muskets, and during its progress 60,000 more were made
and purchased. At its termination there were but 20,000 at the various arsenals.
The residue were in the hands of the troops, or had been lost in the service.
This consumption was greater, I think, than was necessary, or than would
probably again take place. A plan of accountability has been introduced, by
which the men are charged with the arms they receive, and if these are im-
properly lost or injured, the value is deducted from their pay. The paymasters
cannot settle with them till this matter is adjusted.
The stock of small arms in Great Britain, in depot, in 1817, was. . 818,282
In the public service 200,974
Total 1,019,256
. The number in depot in France, in 1811, was 60,000, not including the great
number in service.
My own impression, is that 1,000,000 small arms may be considered a com-
petent supply for the United States ; and if so, a large deduction may be made
from the estimate of the ordnance department under this head of expenditure.
Although the component materials of these arms are almost imperishable, still
it is not expedient to keep a stock unnecessarily large on hand ; because there
is not only some risk and expense in their preservation, but because, like every
other article manufactured by man, they are no doubt susceptible of great im-
provement. And it may be that those now made may be superseded by an
improved model, which, once introduced, must be adopted, at whatever expense
or inconvenience, by all nations. And the ingenious invention lately exhibited
in this city, by which a series of balls, in separate charges, are brought by a
84 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
rotary motion to a common place of discharge, suggests the possibility of a
revolution in the form of our fire-arms.
On the subject of depots for these arms, I accord with the general suggestions
made by the colonel of ordnance. I think the number should be increased, and
arms placed in every part of the country, ready to be used as circumstances may
require.
It will be observed that, in the estimate I have made, I confine myself to the
armament for the public service, connected with the actual defence of the coun-
try, whether to be used by the army or militia in time of war, but 1 do not
extend my views to a supply for arming the militia, in order to discipline them
in time of peace. The extent of this policy is a question not necessary in the
consideration of the subject before me.
As the arms in depot approach whatever number may be assumed as the
proper maximum, the necessity for additional armories becomes less. When our
stock is once completed, the present armories, without any aid from the private
establishments, will be able to supply the annual consumption. I think, there-
fore, that two additional armories, as suggested by the ordnance department,
are not wanted. And, indeed, although there are considerations attending the
transportation of the rude and the manufactured article, and other circumstances
which would justify the establishment of a new armory upon the western waters
at present, yet if the measure is not carried into effect soon its importance will
annually diminish.
But a national foundery for cannon, both for the military and naval service,
and perhaps two in different sections of the country, should be erected without
delay. The best interests of the public require it. But I have nothing to add
to the suggestions made upon this subject in my last annual report.
As to field artillery, the extent to which it shall be provided must depend
upon the views of the legislature concerning the expediency of issuing it to the
militia. If a more efficient organization does not take place I think the ex-
penditure on this account may well be saved to the public treasury. I consider
all attempts to improve the condition of the militia upon the present plan as so
nearly useless that the whole system has become a burden upon the public
without .any corresponding advantage. The principal benefit which results
from the existing state of things is the power to call into service such portions
of the population as may be wanted. But this may be attained by a simple
classification without the cumbrous machinery which at present creates expense
and trouble, and which, while it promises little, performs still less.
Very respectfully, sir, I have the honor to be, &c.,
LEWIS CASS.
The PRESIDENT of the United States.
ENGINEER DEPARTMENT,
Washington, March 30, 1836.
SIR : In compliance with your instructions, I have the honor to submit here-
with the copy of a report prepared in fulfilment of the requirement of the first
inquiry contained in the resolution of the Senate of the 18th of February last.
The views presented by Colonel Totten on the subject are full and explicit, and
are consonant with the principles heretofore advocated by this department.
The report is therefore respectfully submitted without any further comments.
Very respectfully, sir, your most obedient servant,
C. GRATIOT,
Chief Engineer.
Hon. LEWIS CASS, Secretary of War.
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 85
WASHINGTON, March 29, 1836.
SIR: In compliance with your request, I have the honor to hand in some
remarks on the fortification of the frontier of the United States.
And am, sir, very respectfully, your most obedient,
JOS. G. TOTTEN,
Lieut. Col. Eng. Brevet Colonel.
Brig. Gen. CH. GRATIOT,
Chief Engineer, Washington.
In presenting a summary statement of the general system of defence of the
country by fortifications, as proposed and in- part executed, it is proper to refer
for much information as to localities, as to particular projects, and for statements
and arguments somewhat elaborate, to communications made at different times
by the board of engineers for fortifications.
These communications, of a nature forbidding too great publicity, are to be
found in the records of the War Department in the shape of reports of the
board of engineers of 1817, 1819, 1820, 1821, 1822, 1823, 1824, and 1325.
Reference may also be made with advantage to the revised report of the board
of engineers presented in 1826, and published as document No. 153 of the
state papers of the first session of the nineteenth Congress. The report of
1826, just referred to, was drawn up by the undersigned, and was the work of
much research and of mature deliberation ; and in giving it now a careful peru-
sal, he thinks that the information now called for by the Senate cannot be better
afforded, at least by him, than by again presenting that report, occasionally
condensing, curtailing, or omitting portions of the argument and certain descrip-
tions, and adding such new facts as may have been developed by further re-
search, or made more prominent and interesting by the progress of improvement
in the country.
The elements going to make up the general system of maritime defence are a
navy, fortifications, interior communications by land and water, and a regular
army, and well organized militia.
The navy must be provided with suitable establishments for construction and
repair, stations, harbors of rendezvous, and ports of refuge. All these must
be covered by fortifications having garrisons of regular troops and militia, and
being supplied with men and materials through the lines of interior communi-
cations. Not being required to remain in the harbors for their defence, the
navy, pre-eminent as an offensive arm, will be prepared to transfer the war to
distant oceans and to the shores of the enemy, and to act the great part which
its early achievements have foretold, and to which its high destiny will lead.
Fortifications should, 1st, close all important harbors against an enemy, and
secure them to our military and commercial marine ;
2d. Should deprive an enemy of all strong positions where, protected by naval
superiority, he might maintain himself during the war, keeping the whole fron-
tier in constant alarm ;
3d. Must cover the great naval establishments from attack ;
4th. Must protect the great cities ;
5th. Must prevent, as far as possible, the great avenues of interior navigation
from being blockaded at their entrances to the ocean ;
6th. Must cover the coastwise and interior navigation, by closing the harbors
and the several inlets which intersect the lines of interior communication, thereby
further aiding the navy in protecting the navigation of the country ; and
7th. Must shelter the smaller towns along the coast, and also all their com-
86 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
mercial and manufacturing establishments which are of a nature to invite the
enterprise or cupidity of an enemy.
Interior communications will conduct, with certainty, the necessary supplies-
of all sorts to the stations, harbors of rendezvous and refuge, and the establish-
ments of construction and repair for the use both of the fortifications and of the
navy ; will greatly facilitate and expedite the concentration of military force,
and the transfer of troops from one point to another ; will insure to these troops
supplies of every description, and will preserve, unimpaired, the interchange of
domestic commerce, even during periods of the most active external warfare.
The army and militia, together with the personnel of the marine, constitute
the vital principle of the system.
It is important to notice the reciprocal relation of these elements of national
defence ; one element is scarcely more dependent on another, than the whole
system is on each one. Withdraw the navy, and the defence becomes merely
passive ; we expose ourselves the more to suffer the evils of war, at the time
that we deprive ourselves of all means of inflicting them. Withdraw interior
communication, and the navy will often be greatly embarrassed for want of
supplies, while the fortifications will be unable to offer full resistance for want
of timely re-enforcements. Withdraw fortifications, and the interior communi-
cations are broken up, and the navy is left entirely without collateral aid.
That element in the system of defence, which is now to be attended to, is the
fortification of the frontier. It may not be unprofitable here to go somewhat
more into detail, as to the relation of this with the other members of the system ;
the rather, as the reasons for some conclusions hereafter to be announced will
be the more apparent.
In considering the relation of fortifications, and of the navy, to the defence of
the country, it will appear that the functions of the latter are not less appropri-
ately offensive than those of the former are necessarily defensive ; the latter
loses much of its efficiency as a member of the system the moment it becomes
passive, and should in no case (referring now to the navy proper) be relied on
as a substitute for fortifications.
The position, it is thought may be easily established.
If our navy be inferior to that of the enemy, it can offer, of course, without
collateral aids, but a feeble resistance, single ships being assailed by fleets or
squadrons. Having numerous points along our extended frontier to protect, all
of which must be simultaneously guarded, because ignorant of the selected
points of attack, the separate squadrons or vessels may be captured in detail,
although the naval force be, in the aggregate, equal or superior to the enemy's.
Should we in such a case venture to concentrate, under the idea that the partic-
ular object of the adversary was foreseen, he could not fail to push his forces
upon the places thus left without protection. This mode of defence is liable to
the further objection of being exposed to fatal disasters, independent of assaults
of an enemy, and of leaving the issue of conflicts to be determined sometimes
by accident, in spite of all the efforts of courage and skill. If it were. attempted
to improve upon this mode, by combining with it temporary batteries and field-
works, it would be found that, besides being weak and inadequate from their
nature, the most suitable positions for these works must often be neglected, un-
der the unavoidable condition of security to the ships themselves. If the ships
take no part in the contest, the defence is of course relinquished to the tempo-
rary batteries ; if the ships unite in the defence, the batteries must be at hand
to sustain them, or the .ships must strike to the superior adversary. Placing
these batteries in better position, and giving them greater strength, is at once
resorting to defence by fortifications ; and the resort will be the more effectual,
as the positions are better chosen, and the works better adapted to the circum-
stances.
On the great comparative expense of such a mode of defence, which will be
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 87
quite apparent after a little reflection, only one or two very brief remarks will
be made, viz. : The expense incurred by the nation defending itself on this plan
will, from the first, greatly exceed that incurred by the attacking party ; because,
to resist a single fleet threatening the coast, there must be provided as many
equal fleets as there are important objects inviting the attack of the enemy, and
even with this costly preparation, all lesser objects are thrown upon his forbear-
ance. These defences, moreover, being perishable in their nature, will need
frequent removal and repair.
On the other hand, the proper fortification of the coast, preventing the possi-
bility of a blockade so strict as not to afford frequent opportunities for our navy
to leave the harbors, our ships, no longer needed, for passive defence, will move
out upon their proper theatre of action, though inferior to the enemy, with con-
fidence ; knowing that, whether victorious, whether suffering from the violence
of tempests, or whether endangered by the vicinity or the pursuit of a superior
force, they can strike the extended coast of their country (avoiding the more
important outlets, where alone a considerable blockading force may be supposed
to lie) at numerous points where shelter and relief await them ; hovering around
the flanks and in the rear of blockading fleets, and recapturing their prizes ;
falling upon portions of these fleets, separated for minor objects, or by stress of
weather ; watching the movements of convoys, in order to pick up straggling
vessels ; breaking up or restraining the enemy's commerce in distant seas ;
meeting by concert at remote points and falling in mass upon his smaller squad-
rons, or upon his colonial possessions, and even levying contributions in his un-
protected ports ; blockading for a time the narrow seas, and harassing the
coasting commerce of the enemy's own shores. These are objects which our
own history shows may be accomplished, although contending by means of a
navy as to numbers apparently insignificant, against a marine whose force and
efficiency have never been paralleled. Our own history shows, besides, that .the
reason why our infant navy did not accomplish still more, was that the enemy
possessing himself of unfortified harbors, was enabled to enforce a blockade so
strict as to confine a portion of it within our waters. That this portion, how-
ever, indeed, that all was not captured, can be attributed only to respect so
misplaced that it could be the result of ignorance only for the then existing
fortifications ; a result amply compensating the nation for the cost of those im-
perfect works. It would be difficult, nay, impossible, to estimate the full value
of the results following the career of our navy, when it shall have attained its
state of manhood, under the favorable conditions heretofore indicated. The
blockade of many and distant parts of our coast will then be impossible, or,
rather, can then be effected only at enormous cost, and under the risk of the
several squadrons being successively captured or dispersed ; the commerce of
our adversary must be nearly withdrawn from the ocean, or it must be convoyed,
not by a few vessels, but by powerful fleets. In fine, the war, instead of result-
ing in the pillage and conflagration of our cities and towns, in the destruction
of our scattered and embayed navy, and of the expensive establishments per-
taining to it, in the interruption of all commercial intercourse between the sev-
eral portions of the maritime frontier, in the frequent harassing, and expensive
assemblage of militia forces, thereby greatly lessening the products of industry,
and infusing among this most valuable portion of our population the fatal dis-
eases and the demoralizing habits of a camp life ; instead of these and innumer-
able other evils attendant upon a conflict along and within our borders, we should
find the war and all its more serious evils shut out from our territory by our
fortresses, and transferred by our navy to the bosom of the ocean, or even to
the country of the enemy, should he, relying on a different system, have neg-
lected to defend the avenues by which he is assailable.
Our wars, thus becoming maritime, will be less costly in men and money, and
at the same time more in unison with our institutions forging no weapon for
88 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
defence capable of being turned, under other circumstances, against the life of
the State ; and keeping our domestic industry and relations, under our internal
financial resources, beyond the reach of assault from without.
It is an incontestible principle in military science, and one fully illustrated
by military history, that the worst mode of waging war, although strictly a de-
fensive one in its origin and its object, is to permit its field of action to lie within
our own borders ; and that the best mode is that which longest sustains an
offensive attitude. In our own case, war can be excluded from our territory
only by fortifications ; and we can assume the offensive, with the greatest por-
tion of mankind, only through our navy. The construction of the former secures
the means of creating, equipping, and repairing the latter, and leaves it unen-
cumbered with duties which it imperfectly performs, to the full exercise of its
great and appropriate functions. In accordance with these principles, what, in
general terms, is the extent to which the government may be called on to pre-
pare itself in fortifying the coast and in building up the navy ]
It is not in human forecast to decide upon the station of the latter a genera-
tion hence. Political events may force the nation to place herself more nearly
on a level with some of the greatest of maritime powers, or the prevalence of
peaceful relations may restrict the growth of the navy to that demanded by the
increase, rapid and extensive, of our commercial interests. But whatever may
be the amount of enlargement of the naval force, whether greater or less ; or
whatever the mode, whether progressive and regular, or by sudden expansion,
its increase will involve no corresponding extension in the number or strength
of the fortifications, because these must be adequate to their object of them-
selves, and must consequently be, with some exceptions, as numerous and as
strong while the navy is small, as when the navy shall have attained its maxi-
mum. A considerable enlargement of the naval force might build up new naval
establishments, thereby, in raising the importance of certain positions calling
for stronger defences.
The growth of the country in wealth and numbers will convert certain places,
now presenting no inducements to the enterprise of an enemy, into rich and
populous cities. But, with the exception of these cases, and such as these, it
may be assumed that a good system of fortifications applied now to the mari-
time frontier will be equal to its object in all future times.
Conceiving it unnecessary to enlarge further on this part of the subject, a
few remarks will be offered on the correlative influence of fortifications and in-
terior communications.
The most important of these communications, in reference to a system of de-
fence, are, first, such as serve to sustain, in all its activity, that portion of do-
mestic commerce which, without their aid. would be interrupted by a state of
war ; and second, such as serve, besides their great original purposes, to conduct
from the interior to the theatre of war necessary supplies and timely relief.
The first, which are among the most important national concerns of this nature,
lie parallel to, and not far from, the coast ; the second, which, when 'they cross
the great natural partition- wall between the east and the west, are equally im-
portant, lie more remote from the coast, and sometimes nearly or quite parallel
to it, but generally fall, nearly at right angles to the line of the seaboard, into
the great estuaries, where, in some cases, their products are arrested, or whence,
in others, they flow and mingle with those of the first. To fulfil the object of
the first-mentioned lines of communication, it is obviously necessary to prevent
an enemy from reaching them through any of the numerous inlets from the sea
which they traverse, including, of course, the great inlets wherein these unite
with the communications coming from the interior. The security of the coast-
wise line, therefore, involves the security of the other, and is, in a great measure,
indispensable to it. From such considerations as have been already presented,
it is inferred that, for the security here required, we must, as in the case of
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 89
cities, harbors, naval establishments, &c., look to fortifications. But it fortu-
nately happens, as will appear in the sequel, that wherever both objects exist,
the works necessary for the one may often, if not always, be made to accomplish
both. In reference to a system of defence for the protection of these lines of
communication, it must be observed that, from the facility with which they may
be broken up, and the serious evils consequent thereon, they offer to the enemy
great inducements to enterprises of that nature. An aqueduct, an inclined
plane, a tide-lock, a dam, an embankment blown up, is the work of an hour,
and yet would interrupt the navigation perhaps for months.
The necessity of a regular army, even in time of peace, is a principle well
established by our legislation. The importance of a well-organized militia is
incident to the nature of our institutions, well understood by the people, duly
appreciated by the government, and finely illustrated in our history. Nothing,
therefore, need be said on these subjects, considered as general principles. It
may, however, in a succeeding part of this communication, be deemed proper to
hazard a conjecture or two touching the expediency of a peculiar organization
of the latter.
Before going further, it is proper to be more explicit as to the sense in which
the terms "navy" and "fortifications" have been employed.
By the term navy, only that portion of our military marine which is capable
of moving in safety upon the ocean, and transferring itself speedily to distant
points, is meant. Floating batteries, gunboats, steam batteries, &c., these, and
indeed, all other modes of defence which are restricted in their sphere of action,
tied down to local defence, and are produced chiefly in cases where the localities
deny to fortifications their best action, are regarded as auxiliary to fortifications,
and as falling within the same category. Under the term "fortifications," used
as expressive of security afforded thereby to the seaboard, have been included
permanent and temporary fortifications, the auxiliaries just mentioned, and both
fixed and floating obstructions to channels.
The circumstances which must govern in framing a system of fortifications
are
1st. The importance of the objects to be defended. Great naval establish-
ments, great cities, &c., invite to greater preparation on the part of an enemy,
and demand corresponding means of resistance.
2d. The natural advantages or disadvantages of the position to be fortified.
It will often happen that the defence of a position of great consequence can be
effected with smaller works, and at less expense, than a place of much less value.
It will not follow, therefore, that the expense of fortifications will be proportion-
ate to the importance of the object, though it is indispensable that the strength
should be.
3d. The species of attack to which the place is liable. Some places will be
exposed only to capture by assault; others by siege; others to reduction by
cannonade, bombardment, or blockade ; and some to a combination of any or all
these modes. If the enemy against which we fortify be unprovided with artil
lery, the mode of fortifying becomes peculiar.
4th. Whatever may be the circumstances, it is of vital importance that all the
works should be fully adequate to the object, and that they should, even with a
small garrison, be perfectly safe from a coup de main.
Proceeding now to a concise description of the maritime frontier, considered
as a whole, the several sections will be afterwards separately examined, apply-
ing as we go to the several positions the works already projected, and pointing
out as far as practicable such as remain to be planned. The sea-coast of the
United States is comprised within the 24th and 46th degrees of north latitude,
and spreads over 27 degrees of longitude. The general direction of that part
which lies on the Atlantic, north of the peninsula of Florida, is N.NE. and
S.SW. This peninsula stretches out from the continent in a direction a little
90 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA- COAST DEFENCES.
east of south; while that part which lies on the Gulf of Mexico corresponds
nearly with the 30th parallel of north latitude.
Without estimating any of its indentations not properly belonging to its out-
line, and carrying our measure from point to point wherever the breaks are at
all abrupt, the line of coast may be stated to be 3,300 miles in length.
Nearly parallel with the Atlantic coast extends a chain of mountains separa-
ting the sources of rivers flowing, on the one hand, directly into the ocean from
those which run into the Gulf of St. Lawrence or the Gulf of Mexico. Even
in the most lofty portion of this chain numerous gaps afford facilities for crossing
by roads or railways.
Occasional expansions, at high elevations, present sufficient surface to afford
the water required for crossing by canals; and, in other places, the rivers them-
selves have severed the chain, leaving no impediments to communications of
either kind. On both sides of these mountains the country offers numerous
natural means of intercommunication, and facilities and inducements for the
creation of artificial ones in endless combination.
From this general description it may be deduced that, notwithstanding the
great extent of our seaboard, the safety of each section of it is a matter not de-
void of interest to every portion of the people, however remote geographically,
at least so long as the nation shall continue her commercial relations with the
rest of the world ; and, indeed, until she shall find it her interest to interdict the
circulation of domestic commerce through the avenues which nature or art may
have created a commerce of inestimable value at all times, and becoming more
necessary, as well as more valuable, on every interruption of foreign traffic.
As lying closely connected with the coast, it will be convenient to describe
briefly in this place that line of interior communication on which, in time of war,
reliance must be placed as a substitute, in part, for the exterior coasting naviga-
tion of peace.
Beginning in the great bay to the north of Cape Cod, it passes overland either
into Narraganset roads or Buzzard's bay ; thence through Long Island sound to
the harbor of New York; thence up the Raritan, overland to the Delaware,
down this river some distance, overland to the Chesapeake, down the Chesa-
peake, up Hampton roads and Elizabeth river, through the Dismal swamp to
Albemarle sound; thence through the low lands, swamps, or sounds of the
Carolinas and Georgia to the head of the peninsula of Florida; thence overland
to the Gulf of Mexico ; thence through the interior sounds and bays to New
Orleans, and thence through low lands, swamps, and bayous to the western
boundary. Some of the few and brief natural interruptions of this extensive
line have already been removed; some are rapidly disappearing before the
energy of local or State enterprise, and to the residue the public attention is
directed with an earnestness which leaves no reason to fear that they will not
in due time be overcome. In all cases where this line becomes much exposed
to an enemy from the difficulty of fortifying broad waters, communications more
inland are even now afforded, or are in progress by. canals or railroads, which
will be perfectly safe.
Proceeding now to a more minute examination of the coast, it will be conve-
nient to divide it into four distinct parts, namely : the northeastern, extending
from the English province of New Brunswick to Cape Cod; the middle, from
Cape Cod to Cape Hatteras ; the southern, from Cape Hatteras to Cape Sable ;
and the Gulf of Mexico frontier from Cape Sable to the Mexican borders. They
will be taken up in the order in which they stand above.
THE NORTHEASTERN SECTION OF THE COAST.
The northeastern section is characterized by its serrated outline and its nu-
merous harbors ; and, though differing in these respects entirely from the other
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 91
sections, is not less distinguished in its climate than by the prevalence, at certain
seasons, of-dense and lasting fogs. The extent of this section, measuring from
point to point wherever the breaks of the coast are abrupt, is about five hundred
miles, while a straight line from Cape Cod to Quoddy Head is hardly half that
distance. The eastern half of this coast is singularly indented by deep bays,
the shores being universally rocky, and having numerous islands surrounded by
deep water, which not only add to the number of harbors, but afford, besides,
an interior navigation well understood by the hardy coasters of this section, and
measurably secured by its intricacies and the other dangers of this foggy and
boisterous region from interruption by an enemy. The western half, though it
has two very prominent capes and a few deep bays, is much less broken in its
outline than the eastern. It is covered by few islands, in comparison, but con-
tains, nevertheless, several excellent harbors.
The eastern harbors of Maine are exposed in a peculiar manner. They are
not only on the flank of our line, but they are also quite near to public estab-
lishments of the greatest maritime powers ; they are, moreover, as yet, backed
by a sparse population only, and are consequently both weak and exposed. The
time cannot be very distant, however, when, becoming wealthy and populous,
they will be the objects of a full portion of the public solicitude. Works de-
signed for these harbors must therefore be calculated for the future must be
founded on the principle that they are to defend places much more important
than any now existing there ; that, being very near the possessions of a foreign
power, they will be, in a particular manner, liable to sudden and to repeated
attacks ; and that, lying at the extremity of the coast, they can be only tardily
succored. The works erected on this part of the coast should be so strong as
to resist escalade, and to hold out long 'enough for the arrival of relief. Feebler
works than these might be more injurious than beneficial ; their weakness would,
in the first place, invite attack, and it being a great advantage to occupy fortified
places in an adversary's territory, the enemy would prepare himself to remedy
the military deficiencies of these forts by adding temporary works, by the force
of his garrisons and the aid of his vessels.
No surveys have been made of these harbors and no plans formed for their
defence. It may be well to observe here, once for all, that much confidence is
not asked for the mere conjectures presented below as to the number and cost of
the works assigned for the protection of the harbors which have not yet been
surveyed. In some cases there will be mistakes as to the number of forts
needed, and in others the errors will be in the estimated cost, but the errors will
probably as often lie on one side as on the other, so that the sum total may be a
sufficient approximation to the truth.
This is the place to state, also, that the early estimates furnished for the pro-
jected works require considerable augmentation. The explanation of this is
easy. In preparing those estimates the board of engineers obtained lists of
prices from different sections of the country, and adopted them as accurate.
Whether the lists thus furnished referred to materials and workmanship of in-
ferior quality, or because they were drawn up at a period of unusually low
prices, it has been found by experience that these prices were almost all too low.
The board calculated with great care and labor, and with perfect honesty of pur-
pose, applying the prices just mentioned to all the quantities susceptible of mea-
surement and calculation ; and they applied themselves with no less diligence
and good faith to the estimate of expenses of a contingent nature, and, for the
greater part, not to be foreseen with accuracy, either as to amount or kind.
Having no experience in large constructions, these last were at least but conjec-
tures ; and, as the history of constructions on several parts of the coast has since
shown, they were much too small. In consideration of these deficiencies, of the
present great elevation of prices, and of the liability to great increase of cost
from occasional interruptions of progress and breaking up of systems of opera-
92 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
tions, it is thought that about fifty per centum should be added to tho amounts
given in the estimates.
Eastport and Machias may be brought forward as places that will unques--
tionably be thought to need defensive works by the time, in the order of relative
importance, the execution of them can be undertaken by the government. There
are several small towns eastward of Mount Desert island that may, at that pe-
riod, deserve equal attention. At present, however, the places named above will
be the only ones estimated for, and $100,000 will be assumed as the cost of
each.
Mount Desert island, situated a little east of Penobscot bay, and centrally as
regards the Kennebec and St. Croix rivers, having a capacious and safe road-
stead, affording anchorage for the highest "class of vessels, and easily accessible
from sea, offers a station for the navy of an enemy superior to any other on this
portion of the coast. From this point his cruisers might act with great effect
against the navigation of the eastern coast, especially that of Maine, and his en-
terprises of every kind could be conducted with great rapidity against any point
he might select. These considerations, added to the advantages which would
result in certain political events from our occupying so advanced a station, whence
we might act offensively, together with the propriety of providing places of
succor on a part of the coast where vessels are so frequently perplexed in their
navigation by the prevailing fogs, lead to the conclusion that the fortification, in
a strong manner, of this roadstead, is highly necessary. A survey of this island
was begun many years ago, but the party being called off to other duties, it was
never completed ; the project of defensive works has not been formed. The
entire cost may be, as assumed by the engineer department, $500,000.
Castine. It would seem to be impossible on this coast to deprive an enemy,
enjoying naval superiority, of harbors, or to prevent his using them as stations
during the war, insular situations, which his vessels would render unapproach-
able, being so numerous ; but it seems proper that those positions of this nature,
which are at the same time the sites of toAvns, should be secured against his
visitations. During the last war the English held the position of Castine for
some time, and left it at their own pleasure. It is probable that a work costing
about $50,000 would deter an enemy from again making choice of this position.
Penobscot bay. Upon this bay, and upon the river of the same name flowing
into it, are several flourishing towns and villages. Of the many bays which in-
tersect this coast, the Penobscot is the one which presents the greatest number
of safe and capacious anchorages. As before observed, a large portion of these
harbors must, for the present, be left without defences, but the valuable com-
merce of the bay and river must be covered, and to afford a secure retreat for
such vessels as may be unable to place themselves under protection of the works
to the east or west of the bay, the passage of the river must be defended. The
lowest point at which this can be done, without great expense, is at the narrows
opposite Bucksport. A project has been given in for a fort at that position, now
estimated at $150,000.
West of the Penobscot comes St. George's bay, Broad bay, Damariscotta,
and Sheepscot, all deep indentations, and leading to towns, villages, and various
establishments of industry and enterprise of greater or less present value and
future promise. These have not been surveyed, and, of course, no plans have
been formed for their defence; $400,000 are assigned to the fortification of these
waters. The Sheepscot is an excellent harbor of refuge for vessels of every
class.
Kennebec river. This river, one of the largest in the eastern States, enters
the sea nearly midway between Cape Cod and the mouth of the St. Croix. It
rises near the source of the Chaudierre, a tributary of the St. Lawrence, and
has once served as a line of operations against Quebec. The situation and ex-
tent of this river, the value of its products, and the active commerce of several
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 93
very flourishing towns upon its banks, together with the excellence of the har-
bor within its mouth, will not permit its defence to be neglected. Surveys
incomplete estimated cost of defences, as formed by the engineer department,
$300,000.
Portland harbor. A little to the northwest of Cape Elizabeth is the harbor
of Portland. The protection of the town, of the merchantmen, and of the ships-
of-war that may be stationed there to guard the coast or that may enter for
shelter, all of them important objects, may be secured, as an inspection of the
map of the town and harbor will show, by occupying Fort Preble Point, House
island, Hog Island ledge, and Fish Point. At the same time, if the two channels
to the west and east of Hog Island ledge can be obstructed at small expense,
which is hardly a matter of doubt, although some final surveys are necessary
to decide this point, there will be no necessity for a battery on the ledge ; and
Fish Point need be occupied only by such works as may be thrown up in time
of war. The expense, as now estimated, of the works planned for the defence
not including the defence of Hog Island channel, of which the mode has not
been settled will be $155,000 for Fort Preble, and $48,000 for House island.
For Hog Island channel, say $135,000.
The mouths of the Saco, Kennebunk, and York. Comparatively small works
will, it is thought, adequately cover these places, and $75,000 is assumed as
their aggregate cost.
Portsmouth harbor. The only good roadstead, or good harbor, between Cape
Elizabeth and Cape Ann, is Portsmouth- harbor, within the mouth of Piscataqua
river. Line-of-battle ships can ascend this river as high as Fox Point, seven
miles above the town of Portsmouth. Between this point and Shooting Point
is a branch of the river communicating with Great bay. This branch, which is
one-third of a mile wide, presents, for two miles in length, an excellent cover
for all sorts of vessels. This situation, sufficiently commodious for a secondary
depot, designed to repair vessels-of-war seeking an asylum in this river, is too
near the sea for a great naval depot ; and, in other respects, does not possess the
advantages of Boston, as was shown in the report of the board of engineers,
1820. Still, as Portsmouth is an excellent harbor and station, and as it is indis-
pensable that some, at least, of these stations be provided with the necessary
establishments for repairs, the depot in this river should b? maintained. It is to
be regretted that the bay to the south of Fox Point was'&ot chosen as the site
of the navy yard instead of Fernal's island. Being where it is, it will be neces-
sary, in time of war, to make some particular dispositions for the protection of
the yard from an attack from the north shore of the river.
The position of Fort Constitution must certainly, and that of Fort McCleary
may possibly, be occupied by these defences ; though the works themselves,
especially the first named, must give place to such as will better fulfil the ob-
ject. The other positions for forts are Gerrish's Point, island, and Clark's
island; some, if not all, of which must be occupied. Some final surveys must
be made before the necessary works can be accurately determined on, and be-
fore estimates can be made ; but there is reason for believing that the entire ex-
pense of fortifying this harbor will not fall short of $500,000.
Newburyport harbor. This is the next port south of Portsmouth. The
Merrimack river, the mouth of which forms this harbor, is obstructed at its junc-
tion with the sea by a bar, on which there was formerly but six or seven feet of
water at low tide. This entrance has since, however, been thought to be essen-
tially important, and, at any rate, it leads to a beautiful, prosperous, and wealthy
city. The points forming the mouth of the river are continually changing their
form and position; near the middle of the present channel is said to be the spot
once occupied by a fort. Under such circumstances, it seems advisable to rely,
for the defence of this harbor, on forts to be thrown up on the approach of war,
unless the works of harbor improvement now in progress shall be found to give
94 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
stability to the points in question. It is thought that $100,000 would defend
this entrance adequately.
Gloucester harbor. The position of this harbor, near the extremity of Cape
Ann, places it in close relation with the navigation of all Massachusetts bay,
and gives it an importance beyond what would be assigned to it on account of
its local interests. No surveys have yet been made, but it is believed that suffi-
cient defences may be provided for $200,000.
Beverly harbor. This harbor will be defended chiefly by a portion of the
works designed for Salem; $50,000, in addition, will secure it.
Salem harbor. The port of Salem is distant from Marblehead two miles
being separated therefrom by a peninsula. The occupation of the extremity of
Winter island, (where are the ruins of Fort Pickering,) on one side, and of Nau-
gus Head on the other, will effectually secure this harbor. Projects have been
presented for this defence, now estimated at $225,000.
Marblehead harbor. Besides covering, in some measure, the establishment
at Boston, the harbors of Marblehead and Salem possess an important commerce
of their own, and also afford shelter for vessels prevented by certain winds from
entering Boston or pursuing their course eastward. The mode of defending
Marblehead harbor, proposed by the board of engineers, consists in occupying,
on the north side, the hillock which commands the present Fort Sewall, (which
will be superseded by the new work,) and on the south, the position of Jack's
Point. The two works will cost $318,000.
Boston harbor. We come now to the most important harbor in the eastern
section of the coast, and, considering its relation to general commerce and the
interests of the navy, one of the most important in the Union, After a careful
examination of all the necessary conditions of such a problem, the board of
naval officers and engineers, in their joint report of 1820, gave this harbor a
preference over all other positions to the east, and, inclusive of New York bay
and the Hudson, as the seat of the great northern naval depot. For reasons, at
large, for this selection, reference is made to the report of 1820. But, even
should the recommendation therein contained remain unsanctioned, still Boston
is a city of great wealth, possesses an extensive and active commerce, and con-
tains already within its harbor an establishment on which great reliance is
placed to give growth and energy to our navy. The present forts in Boston
harbor defend merely the interior basin from attacks by water, but as it often
happens that vessels enter Nantasket roads with a wind too scant to pass the
narrows, or are detained in President roads by light winds or an adverse tide ;
as the former, especially, is a very convenient anchorage, from whence to pro-
ceed to sea; and above all, as Nantasket roads afford the best possible station
for a blockading squadron, it was deemed indispensable to place permanent de-
fences at the mouth of the harbor. The project of the defence regards the ex-
isting works, with the necessary repairs and modifications, as constituting a sec-
ond barrier ; contemplates placing a permanent fort on George's island ;
another at Nantasket Head, having two advanced'works on the head and one on
Hog island; reducing the latitude of Gallop island, in order to destroy its com-
mand over George's island ; and filling up the Broad Sound channel, so as to
leave no passage, in that direction, for ships-of-war. These are estimated to
cost $2,337,000. Besides the works of a permanent character, it will be neces-
sary, in the beginning of a war, to erect several temporary works in the lower
part of the harbor, in order to make that defence more perfect, and also on cer-
tain lateral approaches to the navy yard.
Plymouth and Provincetoivn harbors. These are the only harbors on the
northeastern section of the coast south of Boston. They have a commerce of
some consequence of their own ; but they are particularly interesting in refer-
ence to the port of Boston, and to the transition from the middle to the eastern
section of the coast, in which respect they would become stil more important
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 95
should the proposed canal from Buzzard's to Barnstable bay ever be executed.
While these harbors are undefended, an enemy's squadron blockading Massa-
chusetts bay will have ports of refuge under his lee of which he would not fail
to avail himself to maintain his blockade, even throughout the most stormy sea-
sons, knowing that the wind which would compel him to seek shelter would be
adverse to outward-bound, and fatal, should they venture near the cape, to in-
ward-bound vessels. While in possession of these harbors, an enemy would
have constantly under his eye the harbor of Boston, the passage round Cape
Cod, and that through the canal. To these considerations, going to establish
the necessity of securing these harbors by proper defences, it must be added
that, being thus deprived of the shelter afforded by these ports, an enemy would
be unable to enforce a rigorous investment. In the first place, he would be often
deterred from taking a station near the land, lest he should be caught embayed
by the violent easterly winds prevailing at certain seasons ; in the next place, he
would always take a good offing on every distinct indication of these winds,
thereby leaving a clear coast to be profited of by our own vessels at the first
instant of a change of weather. Our own vessels, coming in from sea, and find-
ing an enemy interposed between them and Boston, or being turned from their
course by adverse winds, would, in case of the defence of these harbors, find to
the south of Boston a shelter equivalent to that provided to the north by the
fortifications of Marblehead, Salem, Gloucester, and Portsmouth.
The surveys of these harbors have not been handed in, and no plans have
been formed for their defence. Plymouth harbor may be suitably defended, it
is thought, by the occupation of Gurnet Point, and at no great expense ; while
it is thought that, to fortify Provincetown harbor in such a way as to cover ves-
sels taking shelter therein, and at the same time to deprive an enemy of all safe
anchorages, will involve considerable expense, probably no nearer estimate can
be formed at present than that offered by the engineer department, which gave
$100,000 to Plymouth and $600,000 to Provincetown.
Should the canal above-mentioned be executed, it will be necessary to place
a small work at each of its outlets, to prevent the destruction of the means by
which the transit of vessels in and out of the canal must be accomplished.
MIDDLE SECTION OF THE COAST.
The coast between Cape Cod and Cape Hatteras differs from the northeastern
section in possessing fewer harbors, in having but little rocky and a great por-
tion of sandy shore, wherein it resembles the southern section; in its milder
climate and its clearer atmosphere; and it differs from all the other portions in
the depth and magnitude of its interior seas and sounds, and in the distance to
which deep tide navigation extends up its numerous large rivers.
The circuit of the coast, not including the shores of the great bays, measures
650 miles, while a straight line from one of the above-named capes to the other
measures about 520 miles.
Martha 's Vineyard sound. To the south of Cape Cod lie the islands of
Nantucket and Martha's Vineyard, which with several smaller islands on the
south, and the projection of Cape Malabar on the east, enclose Martha's Vine-
yard sound. The channels through this sound being sufficient for merchant
vessels, and one of them allowing the passage even of small frigates, are not
only the constant track of coasting vessels, but owing to the relative situation of
Long Island sound and Narraganset roads, and to the existence of two tolerably
safe harbors at convenient -distances east of Gay head, namely, Tarpaulin sound
and Holmes's Hole, the sound is generally aimed at by all eastern vessels
arriving from foreign voyages in the tempestuous months. There are certain
difficulties, however, attending the navigation of this sound, arising from the
want of a harbor near the eastern extremity, which have suggested the project
96 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
of an artificial harbor at the northeast point of Nantucket island. Besides these
harbors on the direct route through the sound, there are the harbors of Nantucket,
Edgartown, and Falmouth.
In addition to the many thousand vessels which pass this water annually, of
which there are sometimes forty or fifty, a portion containing the most valuable
cargoes, to be seen in the harbors awaiting a change of wind, there is supposed
to be at least 40,000 tons of shipping owned in the towns of this sound, and
employed in the whale fishery. If this portion of the coast is to be defended
at all, it must be by fortifications, for there is no population scarcely, except that
of the towns, and this is believed to be entirely without military organization.
A privateer might run into either of these harbors and capture, destroy, or
levy contributions at pleasure; $250,000 may perhaps suffice for the defence of
all these places against the kind of enterprises to which they are exposed.
Buzzard's bay. Interposed between the island of Martha's Vineyard and
the main are the Elizabeth islands, bounding Buzzard's bay on the south. This
bay, although of importance as leading to the proposed canal to Barnstable bay,
as covering the flourishing town of New Bedford, and as being one of the
natural harbors to be used by an enemy in forcing the blockade of Narraganset
roads, cannot be defended by fortifications, owing to its great breadth.
New Bedford and Fairkaven harbor. No survey has been made of this
harbor, which covers two of the most flourishing towns. It is certainly defensi-
ble, and probably for the amount assumed by the engineer department, namely,
$300,000.
Narraganset bay. The properties of this great roadstead will be here
adverted to very briefly ; more minute information may be obtained by reference
to reports of 1820 and 1821.
It is the only harbor on the coast accessible with a northwest wind, which is
the most common and violent of the most inclement season ; and as winds from
N.NW. to S.SW. round by the east serve for entering both Boston and New
York harbors, while this harbor can be entered with all winds from northwest
to east round by the west, it follows that, while we possess this harbor, vessels
may be certain of making shelter on this part of the coast with any wind that
can blow, excepting only between N.NW. and NW. From this station the
navigation of Long Island sound, and especially the communication between that
sound and Buzzard's bay or Martha's Vineyard sound, may be well protected.
The blockade of the excellent harbor and naval station of JS"ew London will be
rendered difficult. From this station the navy will command southwardly, as
from Hampton roads northwardly, the great inward curve of the coast between
Cape Cod and Cape Hatteras; the influence of which command over the block-
ading operations of an enemy will be apparent, when it is considered that the
only harbors of refuge he can have will be the Delaware, Gardiner's, and Bliz-
zard's bays, and that it is far from certain that improvements in the auxiliaries
of fortifications may not deprive him of these also.
If Narraganset bay were without defence, an enemy would occupy* it without
difficulty, and, by the aid of naval superiority, form a lodgement in Rhode Island
for the war. Occupying the island alone, or connecting therewith the position
of Tiverton Heights, opposite the northern extremity of the island, a position
which is of narrow front, easy to secure, and impossible to turn, he might defy
all the forces of the eastern States, drive the United States to vast expense of
blood and treasure, and while this position of his troops would keep in alarm
and motion all the population of the east, feigned expeditions against New York,
through Long Island sound, or against more southern cities, would equally alarm
the country in that direction; and thus, although he might do no more than
menace, it is difficult to estimate the embarrassment and expense into which he
would drive the government.
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 97
Of old forts, some of which were never finished, Fort Wolcott and Fort Green
are the only ones retained in the projected system of defence.
The project of defence proposed by the board of engineers contemplates for
the middle channel, on Brenton's Point, a strong fort, (now well advanced,) with
outworks ; another strong fort and outworks on the Dumplings ; a smaller fort
on Rose island, and the repair and modification of Fort Wolcott and Fort Green.
The eastern passage is already shut by the permanent bridge at Howland's
Ferry. As to the western passage, three modes present themselves : 1st, re-
ducing the depth of water by an artificial ledge, so as, while the passage shall
be as free as now for merchant vessels, to prevent the passage of ships-of-war ;
2d, relying on fortifications alone to close the channel; or, 3d, resorting in part
to one and in part to the other mode just mentioned. Being the least expensive
and most certain, the estimate was founded on the first.
The total cost of the Narraganset defences are estimated at $2,500,000.
Gardiner's bay. This most valuable harbor to an enemy investing this part
of the coast is probably not defensible by fortifications alone. It has not been
surveyed however, and at no distant day it will be an interesting question,
whether by steam batteries, or some similar means, under the protection of and
aided by fortifications, its defence may not be accomplished. The necessity for
fortifying this bay will be more evident, should the railroad through Long Island,
in contemplation, (perhaps in progress,) be constructed.
The engineer department has assumed the probable cost of the works at
$400,000.
Sag harbor, New York, and Stonington, Connecticut. Neither of these have
been surveyed with reference to defence. The first is possessed of a considerable
tonnage ; and the second, besides being largely engaged in commerce, is about
to be the termination of a railroad from Boston. $100,000 may be assigned to
the first, and $200,000 to the other.
New London harbor is very important to the commerce of Long Island sound;
and as a port of easy access, having great depth of water, very rarely freezing,
and being easily defended, it is an excellent station for the navy. It is also
valuable as a shelter for vessels bound out or home, and desirous of avoiding a
blockading squadron off Sandy Hook. In the plan of defence, the present
Forts Trumbull and Griswold give place to more efficient works, whereof the
expense is estimated at $314,515.
Mouth of Connecticut river. This river has been shown to be subject to the
expeditions of an enemy. It has not been surveyed in order to determine on
the mode of defending it ; and $100,000 is introduced here as the conjectural
cost.
New Haven harbor. It is proposed to defend this harbor by improving and
enlarging Fort Hale, and substituting a new work for the slight redoubt erected
during the last war, called Fort Wooster. The expense of both may be stated
at $90,000.
There are several towns between New Haven and New York, on both sides
of the sound ; none of them are very large as yet, though most, if not all, are
prosperous and rapidly increasing. Although in their present condition, con-
sidering their local situation, it might not be deemed necessary to apply any
money to permanent defences, yet, as part of the present object is to ascertain
as near as may be, the ultimate cost of completely fortifying the coast, it seems
proper to look forward to the time, perhaps not remote, when some of these
towns may become objects of considerable predatory enterprise. Bearing in
mind the increase of population in the mean time, and the manner in which the
places generally are situated, it is thought that $200,000 will be enough to de-
fend them all.
New York harbor. The object of the projected works for the vicinity of
H. Eep. Com. 86 7
98 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
New York are to cover the city against an attack by land or sea ; to protect its
numerous shipping ; to prevent, as much as possible, the blockade of this great
port, which will have progressively added to the immense wealth of its own
rivers, greater and greater amounts of the productions of the boundless regions
on the lakes ; and to cover the interior communication uniting the Raritan with
the Delaware. In the present condition of the defences of this harbor, an
enemy would encounter no great opposition, whether his attack was made by
land or water. Coming by the sound, he might land within ten miles of the
city, upon the main, upon Long Island, or upon both ; and, coming into the
lower harbor, he might, while the works on Staten Island are in their present
condition, risk forcing the passage of the Narrows, as well as the upper works,
anchoring in the Hudson or in the East river ; or he might land in Gravesend
bay, eight miles from the city, and march directly to Brooklyn, where he would
find the navy yard lying at his mercy, and whence he might levy a contribution
or destroy half the city. The only mode of resistance would be the expensive,
harassing and uncertain one of arraying a large body of militia upon Harlem
and Brooklyn Heights, and this could be resorted to only in the event, by no
means certain, of receiving timely intelligence of his design.
If we fortify T/irog's Neck and WilMns's Point, on the East river, and if we
complete the works at the narrows, making them all too strong to be carried by
a c<,up de main, we shall secure the means of transferring the neighboring
militia upon the flanks and rear of an enemy should he march upon Brooklyn ;
while we shall secure the same advantage should he pursue the route by Har-
lem, besides increasing the length of his march to twenty miles through an in-
tersected country.
This arrangement of defensive works, necessary as it is, still leaves the lower
harbor open to an enemy's vessels, in which harbor, safe at all seasons, he could
enforce the strictest blockade ; cut off the lines of interior communication by the
Raritan, and avail himself at any moment of a landing place in dangerous prox-
imity to the city and navy yard. In view of these considerations, the board of
engineers projected additional works : one for the East Bank, and another for
the Middle Ground, which would perfect the defences of the harbor, compelling
an enemy attacking on this side to land upon a dangerous coast, near thirty miles
from his object, and to enforce his blockade by riding on the open sea, with a
dangerous coast on either hand. Before determining on the works last men-
tioned, the board, went into much research in order to ascertain whether the
sand banks mentioned were unchangeable ; and it was thought to have been
very fully proved that there had been no material change in more than sixty
years. This apparent stability of the shoals encouraged them to devise the
projects referred to.
Recent surveys, it has been said, have discovered a new channel. If this be so, it
may not be prudent to resort to the project, and it may become necessary to de-
vise other means ; but whatever they may be, they must, from the nature of the
case, be very expensive ; and there will be no great error, probably, in taking
the estimated cost of the projected batteries as the cost of such mode of defence
as may be finally resolved on. The cost of the complete defence of New York
remaining to be incurred is, according to the estimates, $5,369,824.
Delaware bay and city of Philadelphia. The coast, from the mouth of the
Hudson to the Chesapeake, as well as that on the south side of Long Island, is
low, sandy, covered by numerous sandy islands lying near and parallel to the
coast, and having, be'sides the Delaware, many inlets and interior basins, but
none, excepting the one named, affording water enough for sea-going vessels.
The Delaware bay itself being wide and full of shoals, having an intricate
channel, and being much obstructed by ice at certain seasons, affords no very
good natural harbor within a reasonable distance of the sea. The artificial
harbor now in course of construction near Cape Henlopen will, it is hoped, fully
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 99
realize the expectations of its projectors, in which event it must be securely for-
tified. No plans have, however, as yet been made with that object ; and as to
the probable cost, nothing better can now be done than to assume the conjectural
estimate of the engineer department, namely, $600,000.
The lowest point at which Philadelphia is defensible is at Pea Patch island,
about forty-five miles below that city. A fort on that island to replace the one
destroyed by fire ; a fort opposite the Pea Patch, on the Delaware shore ; a tem-
porary work on the Jersey shore, to be thrown up at the commencement of war,
and floating obstructions placed in the channel, under the fire of these works,
will effectually cover Philadelphia, the other important places on the river, and
the outlet of the canal connecting the Delaware and Chesapeake bays. The
plans and estimates for a fort to replace Fort Delaware are not completed.
Taking the expense thereof at $600,000, the expense of the system, inclusive
of temporary works, will be $1,121,000.
Chesapeake bay. The board of naval officers and engineers intrusted with
the selection of sites for great northern and southern naval depots, recommended
in their joint reports of 1819 and 1820, Burwell's bay, on James river, for the
one, and Charles town, near Boston, for the other. They also recommended
Boston harbor and Narraganset bay at the north, and Hampton roads, at the
south, as chief naval rendezvous. In those reports the commission entered at
large into the consideration of all the matters of the.se important objects ; and
reference is now made to those reports for many very interesting details.
Hampton roads, James river, and Norfolk. The works projected for the
defence of these are, 1st, a fort and advanced lunette at Old Point Comfort ; 2d,
a casemated battery on the Rip Rap shoals ; and 3d, a line of floating obstruc-
tions extending across the channel, between these works. In the event of a
great naval depot being fixed on James river, it might ultimately be desirable
to provide additional strength, by adding works on the positions of Newport
News, Nasaway shoals, and Craney Island flats. Exclusive of these, the cost
of completing the works is estimated at $723,188.
The existing fort, viz : Fort Norfolk, will aid in the defence of the city of
Norfolk and of the navy yard. It is a small and inefficient work, but may
be made useful as an accessory to the general defensive operations.
Harbor of St. Mary's. The central situation, as regards the Chesapeake, .
of this fine basin ; its relation to the Potomac ; its depth of water, and the
facility with which it may be defended, indicates its fitness as a harbor of refuge
for the commerce of the bay, and as an occasional if not constant station during:
war, for a portion of the naval force. A survey has been made, but no projects
have been formed. The engineer department has conjectured that the cost may
be 8300,000.
Patuxent river. The more effectually to protect the city of Washington from
a sudden attack by troops landed at the head of navigation of the Patuxent, and
to provide an additional shelter for vessels, a fort has been planned to occupy
, Point Patience, and another to occupy Thomas's Point, both about six miles
from the Chesapeake. Their expense will be $505,000.
Annapolis harbor. No surveys or plans of defence have been made. The
existing works are very inefficient. The estimate made by the engineer depart-
ment, viz : $250,000, is adopted.
Harbor of Baltimore. The proximity of Baltimore to the bay places that
city in a dangerous situation. In the present state of things, an enemy, in a
few hours' march, after an easy landing, without being exposed to a separation,
from his fleet, can make himself master of that great commercial emporium.
Baltimore requires for its security two forts in the Patapsco : one at Hawkin's-
Point, and the other at the extreme end of the flat, off Soller's Point. Besides
the advantages which will result of obliging the enemy to land at a greater
distance, thereby delaying his march, gaining time for the arrival of militia, and
100 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
preventing his turning the defensive positions our troops might occupy, it will
be impossible for him to endanger the city or its shipping by a direct attack by
water. The present Fort McHenry, Redoubt Wood, and Covington battery,
should be retained as a second barrier. Allowing $150,000 for putting these
in a more efficient state, the expense will be $1,517,000.
Mouth of Elk river. The completion of the line of communication from the
Delaware to the waters of the Chesapeake makes it necessary to place a fort
somewhere near the mouth of the Elk, in order to prevent an enemy from
destroying, by a sudden enterprise, the works connecting these communications
with the river. There have been no surveys made with a view to establish such
protection, but the engineer department estimates the cost of a suitable fort at
$300,000.
City of Washington, Georgetown, and Alexandria. Fort Washington covers
these cities from any attack by water, and will oblige an enemy to land at some
fifteen or eighteen miles from Alexandria, should that city be his object. It
will also serve the very important purpose of covering the troops crossing from
Virginia, with a view to fall on the flanks of an enemy moving against the
capital. All these objects would have been better fulfilled had the work been
placed at lower Cedar Point. As it is, however, the forts in the Patuxent being
constructed, and the militia of the surrounding country in a due state of prepa-
ration, an enterprise against these cities would be one of great hazard. Still, a
work on Cedar Point should on no account be omitted. The department esti-
mates its cost at $300,000.
From the mouth of the Chesapeake to Cape Hatteras there occurs no inlet
.navigable by sea-going vessels.
SOUTHERN SECTION OF THE ATLANTIC COAST.
This coast is invariably low, and, for the greater part, sandy, much resembling
tfche coast from Cape Hatteras to Montaug Point. A ridge of sand, here and
inhere interrupted by the alluvion of the rivers, extends through its whole length;
ithie ridge, in certain portions, lies on the main land, while in others it is divided
itherefrom by basins or sounds of various width and depth, and is cut up into
islands by numerous channels of greater or less depth, connecting these interior
-waters with the sea. Wherever this sand ridge is broken, its place is occupied
,by low and marshy grounds, bordering the principal and the many lesser outlets
of the rivers.
The nature of the country through which the rivers of this coast flow, aftei
leaving the mountains, is such that the banks being easily abraded by the cur-
rent, the waters are always turbid, and are continually transporting new supplies
for the formation of alluvion and the maintenance of extensive submarine banks
shoals, and bars ; that these do not rapidly increase is owing to the force of the
current, the action of the sea, and the mobility of the particles of matter. Il
.is to the same cause, namely, the wearing away of the shores of the rivers, thai
,is to be attributed the want, on this coast, of harbors unobstructed by bars, and
which, as a coast, particularly distinguish this and the Gulf of Mexico frontiei
(where similar operations have been going on) from the more northern and easterr
portions.
Ocracock inlet. The shallowness of the water on the bars at Ocracocfe
effectually excludes all vessels-of-war from the harbor within. But as this is
.now an outlet of an - extensive commerce, and through this opening attempts
might be made iu small vessels, or in boats, to interrupt the line of interioi
.communication, whereon so much might depend in time of war, timely prepa-
.ration must be made of temporary works equal to defence of it against all sucl:
. minor enterprises.
Beaufort harbor, North Carolina. Work completed.
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA- COAST DEFENCES. 101
Mouth of Cape Fear river. The defence of the main channel of Cape Fear
river requires, in addition to the work nearly completed on Oak island, another
fort on Baldhead, and the defence of the smaller channel will require a redoubt
on Federal Point. The battery, magazine, block-house, quarters, &c., at Smith-
ville, should remain as accessories. The cost is set down at $258,000.
Georgetown harbor. The first inlet of any consequence south of Cape Fear
river is at the united mouths of the Waccamaw, Pedee, and Black rivers, forming
Georgetown harbor, which is a commodious and capacious bay, having suf-
ficient water within and upon the bar, near the mouth, for merchant vessels and
small vessels-of-war. A survey of this harbor, begun many years ago, has
never been completed, and no projects of defence have been made. It is prob-
able that a work placed near Moscheto creek or on Winyaw Point would give
adequate strength, at the cost of about $250,000.
Santee river and Bull's bay. About ten miles south from Georgetown
entrance are the mouths of the Santee, the largest river in South Carolina. It
is not known whether the bars at the mouths of this river have sufficient water
for sea-going vessels ; the same uncertainty exists as to the depth into Bull's
bay. It may be well, however, to consider them, and the other inlets between
Georgetown and Charleston, as calling for small works capable of resisting
boat enterprises, and to assign to them $100,000. Should they prove to be
navigable for privateers they will need a larger expenditure.
Charleston, South Carolina. The city, situated at the junction of Ashley
and Cooper rivers, is about five miles, in a direct line, from the sea. Between
it and the ocean is a wide and safe roadstead for vessels of any draught. Upon
the bar, lying three or four miles outside of the harbor, there is, however, only
water enough for the smaller frigates and for large sloops-of-war. On the south-
west side of the harbor is James's island, through which are several serpentine
passages, more or less navigable for boats and barges ; some of them commu-
nicate directly with the sea and Stono river. Whappoo cut, the most northerly
passage from Stono to Charleston harbor, enters Ashley river opposite the
middle of the city. Interior natural water communications exist also to the
southwest of Stono river, connecting this with North Edisto river, the latter
with South Edisto and St. Helena sound; this again with Broad river, and,
finally, this last with Savannah river. On the north side of the harbor of
Charleston lies Sullivan's island, separated from the main by a channel navi-
gable to small craft. To the northeast of Sullivan's island an interior water
communication extends to Bull's bay, and even beyond, to the harbor of George-
town.
From this sketch, it is apparent that it will not do to restrict the defences to
the principal entrance to the harbor. The lateral avenues must also be shut.
And it is probable that accurate surveys of all these avenues will show that the
best mode of defending the latter will be by works at or near the mouths of the
inlets, as the enemy will be kept thereby at a greater distance from the city;
. the lesser harbors formed by these inlets will be secured, and the line of interior
communication will be inaccessible from the sea.
No position for the defence of the principal entrance to Charleston harbor can
be found nearer to the ocean than the western extremity of Sullivan's island.
This is at present occupied by Fort Moultrie, a work of some strength, but by
no means adequate to its object, its battery being weak, and the scarp so low as
to oppose no serious obstacle to escalade. How far this work, by modification
of its plan and relief, may be made to contribute to a better defence of the harbor,
cannot now be determined.
On a shoal nearly opposite Fort Moultrie the foundation of a fort has been
begun, which will have a powerful cross-fire with Fort Moultrie. It is presumed
that about $800,000 would put these works in a complete state.
Stono, North Edisto, and South Edisto. All these must be fortified, at least
102 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
in such a manner as to secure them from enterprises in boats or small vessels.
To that end $50,000 may be assigned to each.
St. Helena sound. The proper defences cannot be pointed out till this sound
shall have been surveyed.
Although there is supposed to be no great depth of water on the bar, it is
known to be navigable by the smaller class of merchantmen, and to have a navi-
gable communication with the head of Broad river OF Port Royal, intersecting
the interior navigation between Charleston and Savannah. This sound will
require defence, even should it not be of much use as a harbor of refuge for ex-
terior commerce. $150,000 may be the cost of the defences.
Broad river or Port Royal roads. The value of this capacious roadstead,
as a harbor of refuge, depends on the depth which can be carried over the bar,
on the distance of this bar outside of the line of coast, and on the means which
may be applicable of lessening the danger of crossing it. This is supposed to
be the deepest bar of the southern coast. Should there prove to be water
enough for frigates, and by light-houses on the shore, and lights, or other distinct
guides, on the bar, should it be practicable to make the passage of the bar safe
and easy, this road, situated within sixty miles of Charleston and twenty of
Savannah river, intersecting the interior navigation between these great cities,
thereby securing the arrival of supplies of every kind, would possess a very high
degree of importance, not only as a harbor of refuge, but as a naval station also.
The survey of the exterior shoals, constituting the bar, should be made with
the greatest care, and all possible minuteness. It is only when this shall have
been done that the true relation of this inlet to the rest of the coast can be known,
and on this relation the position and magnitude of the required defences will
depend. For the present, the estimate made by the engineer department is
adopted, namely, $300,000.
Savannah and mouth of Savannah river. Mention has been made of the
natural interior water communication along the coast of South Carolina. A sim-
ilar communication extends south from the Savannah river, as far as St. John's,
in East Florida. Owing to these passages, the city of Savannah, like Charles-
ton, is liable to be approached by other avenues than the harbor or river ; and
its defences must consequently have relation to these lesser as well as the prin-
cipal channels.
The distance from the mouth of Wassaw sound, or even Ossabaw sound, (both
to the southwest of Savannah river,) to the city, is not much greater than from
the mouth of the river; and an enterprise may be conducted the whole distance
by water, or part of the way by water and part by land, from either or both.
As in the case of like channels in the neighborhood of Charleston, it cannot now
be determined where they can be defended most advantageously. It is to be
hoped, however, that the localities will permit the defences to be placed near the
outlets of the sound; because the defences thus placed will serve the double
purpose of guarding the city of Savannah and covering these harbors, which, in
time of war, cannot but be very useful.
The defence of Savannah river is by no means difficult. A fort on Cockspur
island, lying just within the mouth, and perhaps, for additional security, another
on Tybee island, which forms the southern cape at the junction of the river with
the ocean, would effectually prevent the passage of vessels up the channel, and
cover the anchorage lying between Tybee and Cockspur. The existing Fort
Jackson, standing about four miles below the city, should be maintained as a
second barrier, both as respects the main channel and the passages which come
into the river from the south ; which last would not at all be controlled by works
on Cockspur or Tybee. A fort projected for Cockspur island is estimated at
$470,000. To defend Tybee island may require $150,000, and $50,000 would
put Fort Jackson in an efficient state, making a total of $670,000. South of the
Savannah are Wassaw sound, Ossabaw sound, St. Catharine's sound, at the
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 103
mouth of the Medway river ; Sapelo sound, Doboy inlet, Altamaha sound, at the
mouth of the great river of the same name ; St. Simon's sound, at the mouth of
Buffalo creek ; St. Andrew's sound, at the united mouths of the Scilla and Santilla
rivers; and Cumberland sound, at the mouth of the St. Mary's river All these
communications with the ocean are highly important, as regards the line of inte-
rior navigation, and several of them as affording access to excellent harbors.
The last, especially, is known to be navigable by the largest sloops-of-war and
merchantmen ; and two or three of the others are believed to be but little, if at
all inferior, either as regards depth of bar or safety of anchorage.
All these inlets are yet to be surveyed. Some of them are probably easily
defensible by forts, and other may require the aid of floating defences. An
important principle in relation to the defensive system of the whole southern coast,
namely, that, on a coast possessing a few harbors, it is at the same time the more
necessary to preserve them all for our own use, and the more easy to deprive an
enemy of that shelter which is nearly indispensable to a continuous and close
blockade. This principle is enforced as touching this particular part of the
southern coast by the two following weighty considerations: its remoteness
from the nearest naval rendezvous, the Chesapeake, which is on a mean 600
miles distant, and to leeward, both as to wind and current; and its being close
upon the larboard hand, as they enter the Atlantic, of the great concourse of
vessels passing at all seasons through the Florida channel.
While, therefore, this part of the coast, from the concentration of vessels here,
is in great need of protection of some sort, naval aid can be extended to it only
with difficulty, and at the risk of being cut off from all retreat by a superior
enemy.
Accurate and minute surveys which will enable our vessels, whether driven
by an enemy or by stress of weather, to shun the dangers which beset the navi-
gation of these harbors, and properly arranged defences to cover them when
arrived, seem to be indispensable. It is worthy of remark, besides, that when
these harbors shall be fortified the operation of visiting the coast and watch-
ing the great outlet of commerce through Florida passage will .be a difficult and
hazardous one to an enemy, on whose part no perseverance or skill can avail to
maintain an uninterrupted blockade, or to avoid the occasional shipwreck of his
cruisers ; while on the part of our small vessels-of-war and privateers the same
sort of supervision will at all times be easy and safe.
Nothing better can be now done than to assume $200,000 as the average cost
of defending each of the nine entrances, giving a total of $1,800,000.
The board of engineers have not examined the coast from the mouth of the
St. Mary's to Pensacola, but in order that the chain of defence for the coast
may be here exhibited unbroken, the estimates of the engineer department for
the places and positions intermediate between Cumberland sound and Pensacola
will be inserted. St. Augustine, $50,000 ; Key West and Tortugas, $3,000,000 ;
Charlotte harbor, Espiritu Santa bay, Apalachicola, Apalache bay, St. Joseph's
. bay, St. Rosa bay, together, $1,000,000.
GULF OF MEXICO FRONTIER.
The resemblance of this part of the coast to that which we have denominated
the southern section is striking. We may, indeed, refer to the description herein
given of the principal features of the latter as a true delineation of this. In
respect to the relation of the coast to the interior, there is, however, the greatest
difference between these two portions of the maritime frontier ; for while about
eight-tenths of the whole territory of the United States is in one sense tributary
to a part only of the Gulf of Mexico portion, in the southern section of the
coast not more than one-tenth is connected with the seaboard by any natural
ties. This fact, which shows the very deep interest which a large portion of
104 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
the people and the government have in the security of this portion, is related to
other facts which hardly leave an alternative as to the mode of attaining that
security.
From the relative geographical position of this part of the coast, and the
country interested in its safety ; from the unhealthiness of the climate, nature
of the adjacent country, and mixed character of the inhabitants, it will be some
time before that portion, within supporting distance, whose welfare may be en-
'dangered by an enemy will, from peculiar circumstances, be competent of itself
to sustain the assaults of an exterior foe. Upon the Atlantic seaboard the
Alleghanies crowd the people upon the coast, and surround every alarm post of
the frontier with a more and more dense population ; and the ocean and the
interior parallel communication transmit rapid aid to the right and left, while
the coast of the Gulf, weak in itself and remote from succor from behind, is
almost inaccessible to lateral assistance.
Those reasons, therefore, which tend to establish the necessity of an organized,
a permanent, and a timely system of defence for the whole seaboard of the
United States (some of which were advanced in the commencement of this com-
munication) will apply to this part of it with a peculiar force so long as any
portion of its system of defence is incomplete.
It has already been observed that the board of engineers have made no
examination between Cumberland sound, in Georgia, and Pensacola. There
are, however, along that shore and in the Florida reef several very important
harbors which must be accurately surveyed.
Pensacola bay. The upper arms of this considerable bay receive the Yellow-
water or Pea river, Middle river, and Escambia river ; and while the tributaries
of the last, interlocking with branches of the Alabama and the Chattahoochie,
seem to mark the courses whereby, at some future day, canals will convey a
part of the products of these rivers to Pensacola, the face of the whole region
is remarkably adapted to the application of railroads.
Santa Rosa sound extends eastward from the lower part of this bay into
Santa Rosa bay. On the west the lagoons of Pensacola, Perdido, and Mobile
bays, respectively, interlock in such a manner as to require but a few miles of
cutting to complete a navigable channel from the first to the last-named bay,
and thence through an existing interior water communication to the city of New
Orleans.
Pensacola bay has rare properties as a harbor. It is accessible to the largest
class of sloops-of-war and to small frigates, and under favorable circumstances
will admit even large frigates ; and there is reason to hope that the bar may be
permanently deepened.
The bar is near the coast, and the channel through it is straight and easily hit.
The harbor is perfectly land-locked, and the roadstead very capacious. There
are excellent positions within it for repairing, building, and launching vessels,
and for docks and dock-yards, in healthy situations. The supply of good water
is abundant. It is perfectly defensible. These properties, in connexion with
the position of the harbor as regards the coast, have induced the government to
fix upon it as a naval station and place of rendezvous and repairs.
An excellent survey has been made of the bay of Pensacola, sufficing to
form the scheme of defence, while no other objects were sought than the security
of the town and harbor. Regarded, however, as a naval station and place of
rendezvous and repairs, further surveys, extending a greater distance from the
shores, delineating accurately the face of the country and showing the several
avenues by land and water are found to be necessary.
The defences of the water passage, as projected, are nearly completed, 8210,000
being asked to finish them. A further water defence at the position of the
Barrancas, and the works that are indispensable to cover the navy yard from a
lateral attack through the western bays the latter requiring the further surveys
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA- CO AST DEFENCES. 105
above mentioned are not yet planned. The Barrancas work may be taken at
$100,000, and the others at $300,000, making a total for Pensacola of $610,000.
Perdido bay. This bay is intimately related to Pensacola and to Mobile
bays, both as regards security and intercommunication, and should be carefully
surveyed, with a view to these objects. It must be forfeited, and the cost may
be $200,000.
Mobile bay. The plan of defence for this bay comprised a fort at Mobile
Point, which has been finished ; another on Dauphin island, and a tower at the
Pass au Heron. The estimates for the two last named amount to $905,000.
New Orleans and the delta of the Mississippi. The most northern water
communication between the Mississippi and the Gulf is by the passage called
the Rigolets, connecting Lake Borgne and Lake Pontchartrain. The next is by
the pass of Chef Menteur, also connecting these lakes. Through these passages
an enemy entering Lake Pontchartrain would, at the same time that he inter-
cepted all water communication with Mobile and Pensacola, be able to reach
New Orleans from the southern shore of the lake, or might continue onward
through Lake Maurepas, Amite river, and Iberville river, thereby reaching the
Mississippi at the head of the delta ; or, landing within the mouths of Chef
Menteur, he might move against the city along the ridge of the Gentilly road.
To the southwest of Chef Menteur, and at the head of Lake Borgne, is Bayou
Bienvenu, a navigable channel, (the one pursued by the English army in the
last war,) not running into the Mississippi, but possessing shores of such a nature
as to enable troops to march from the point of debarkation to the city. A little
to the south of this is Bayou Dupre, also affording easy access to the city. The
avenues just named are defended by a fort at the Rigolets ; another at Chef
Menteur ; another at Bayou Bienvenu, and a tower at Bayou Dupre.
The defences of the river are placed at the Plaquemine turn, the lowest posi-
tion which can be occupied. Fort Jackson is on the right shore, and Fort St.
Philip a little lower down, on the left: this last work must be repaired or renewed.
The expense is estimated at $117,000.
The only permanent work required at present, west of the Mississippi, is a
fort to occupy Grand Terre island, for the purpose of defending the entrance to
Barrataria bay, an excellent harbor for a floating force guarding the coasting
trade on that side, and whence there are several passages leading to the Missis-
sippi, near New Orleans. The estimate for this work is $400,000.
Before leaving this part of the subject, it is necessary to advert to the import-
ant uses which may be made of movable floating defences in aid of fortifications.
The applications of this auxiliary force along the coast of the United States
may be very numerous, and, as has been before remarked, would, in certain
cases, be requisite to attain full security for all the objects needing protection.
In the case we have just been considering, for example, fortifications will enable
us to protect New Orleans, even from the most serious and determined efforts of
an enemy ; but, owing to the great width of the passages, we cannot, by fortifi-
cations alone, deprive an enemy of good exterior anchorages, especially the very
excellent one west of Chandeleur island, nor entirely cover the interior water
communications between the Rigolets and Mobile. We must, therefore, either
quietly submit to all the annoyance and injury which an enemy in possession of
these passages may inflict, or avert them by the timely preparation of a floating
force, adapted to their peculiar navigation, and capable, under the favorable
shelter of the forts, of being always on the alert, and of assuming an offensive
or defensive attitude, according to the designs, conduct, or situation of the enemy.
As these means of defence are, however, secondary to fortifications, in every
sense ; as the extent to which they may be needed must depend on the relation
of our naval force to that of other powers a relation continually varying as the
shapes which these auxiliaries are to assume the materials of which they are
to be formed, the weapons they are to use, the agent which is to give them
106 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
power, are points on which every ten years of this age of rapid improvement in
the arts may effect complete revolutions, it is considered premature to go into
details,* and premature to go into expense.
From the preceding sketch of the system projected for the defence of the
seaboard of the United States, it appears that all the fortifications proposed are
not of the same pressing necessity, nor of like importance. Some are required
immediately, while the commencement of others may be postponed. In pro-
ceeding to class them, it must be observed that the works of the first class are
those destined to prevent an enemy from forming a permanent or even a mo-
mentary establishment in the country, those which will defend the great naval
arsenals, and those which will cover the chief cities and towns.
In the second class will be placed the works which are to defend those naval
stations and those cities of a secondary rank, which, either from natural or
artificial defences, existing works, &c., are not entirely without protection, and
may, therefore, wait until the more important points are secured against a first
attack ; and in the third class will we arrayed the works which complete the
defensive system in all its parts, but of which the construction may, without
great danger, be deferred until the frontier shall have received all the successive
degrees of strength resulting from a gradual erection of the forts of the first and
second classes. A fourth class is added, containing such works as will be
necessary only conditionally.
Table A, joined to this report, contains the first class, and shows that the
works of this class will cost $11,609,444; will require 2,585 men to garrison
them in time of peace, and 30,966 in case of siege.
Table B contains the works of the second class, showing that they will cost
$5,873,000; will require 975 men to garrison them in time of peace, and 10,680
in case of siege.
Table contains works belonging to the third class, showing that their cost
will be $14,078,824; that their garrisons in time of peace will amount to 2,380
men, and in time of siege to 21,745 men; showing, also, that the total future
expense of fortifying the maritime frontier will amount to $31,561,268; the
troops necessary to guard these fortifications in time of peace to 5,940 men, and
63,391 men in time of war, supposing them all (which cannot happen) besieged
at once.
The time required to construct the whole system must depend upon the annual
appropriation which the nation may grant to this branch of the public service.
All that need be said on the subject is, that in an undertaking necessarily in-
volving so much time, and of such vital importance to the safety, prosperity, and
greatness of the Union, there should be no relaxation of effort and persever-
ance. An undertaking of such magnitude must, with every effort, be the work
of years. But it may be too much hurried as well as too much delayed. There
is a rate of progress at which it will be executed in the best manner and at the
minimum cost. If more hurried, it will be defective in quality and more costly
if delayed. .
France was, at least, fifty years completing her maritime and interior defences.
Some remarks will now be offered on the subject of the expense of erecting
a system of defensive works, and garrisoning them for war, comparing it with
the expense of defending the coast without fortifications. To simplify the
proposition, the defence of Portsmouth, Boston, Narragauset roads, New York,
Philadelphia, Baltimore, Norfolk, Charleston, Savannah, and New Orleans, only,
will be taken.
Supposing an enemy had concentrated 20,000 men at Halifax or Bermuda ;
the government must, on hearing of this force, at once prepare to resist it at all
the points mentioned above. As it will be impossible to foresee on which the
first blow will be struck, it will be necessary to have troops encamped at each ;
and to meet the attack with a force not less numerically than that of the assail-
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 107
ant, the troops kept constantly under arms must, at least, equal one-half of the
hostile expedition, while as many more, ready for instant service, must be
within call. These points are so immediately accessible in some cases, and so
remote from succor in others, that, after the point of attack is announced by the
appearance of the enemy before it, there will be no time for reinforcements to
come from the interior.
By manoeuvring in front of any of these places the enemy would induce us
to concentrate forces there; when, suddenly profiting of a favorable breeze, he
would sail to another, which he would reach in a few hours, and would not fail
to seize if a force were not stationed there likewise, at least, equal to his own.
No reinforcement can, in this case, arrive from the interior in time, for all the
troops under march would have taken up a direction upon the point he has just
quitted.
Our whole coast from Maine to Louisiana would thus be kept in alarm by a
single expedition ; and such is the extent and exposure of the seaboard that an
enemy might ruin us by a war of mere threatenings. If the cities and other
great establishments are not garrisoned, they will become a prey at once; and if
they are garrisoned, the treasury will be gradually emptied ; the credit of the
government exhausted ; the weary and starving militia will desert to their homes ;
nor will it be easy to avert the consummation of tribute, pillage, and conflagra-
tion.
The table E, joined to this report, shows that, to be in readiness on each of
these vulnerable points, it will be requisite to maintain 107,000 men encamped
and under arms at the ten places mentioned, and 93,000 men ready to march
and within call.
This number is, in fact, below that which would be required ; for these points
being, according to our hypothesis, exposed to an attack from 20,000 regular
and disciplined troops, 20,000 militia would not be able to repel them, unless
aided by entrenchments, requiring a time to construct them which might not be
allowed, and involving expenses which are not included in the estimate. Be-
sides, to have 20,000 men, especially new levies, under arms, it will be necessary,
considering the epidemics that always assail such troops, to carry the formation
of these corps to at least 25,000 men.
The State of Louisiana, being remote from succor, requires a larger force
under arms than the other points ; this force is fixed at 17,000, supposing that
the State may supply 3,000 within call.
All expenses being reckoned, 1,000 regular troops, including officers, cost
$300,000 per annum, or $150 per man, for a campaign of six months. 1,000
militia, including officers, cost $400,000 per annum, or $200 per man, for a six
months' campaign. But, taking into consideration the diseases which invariably
attack men unaccustomed to military life, and the consequent expense of
hospital establishments ; the frequent movement of detachments from the camp
to their homes, and from the interior to the camp ; and the cost of camping
furniture, utensils, accoutrements, &c., which is the same for a short campaign
as for a year; regarding all these things, the cost of militiamen cannot be
reckoned at less than $250 per man for six months.
The 107,000 militiamen necessary to guard the above-mentioned points, the
maritime frontier being without defence, will therefore cost, in a campaign of
six months, $26,750,000. In strict justice, there should be added to this ex-
pense, which is believed to be much understated, amongst other things, the loss
of time and the diminution of valuable products resulting from drawing off so
considerable a portion of efficient labor from its most profitable pursuits. This,
besides being a heavy tax on individuals, is a real loss to the nation.
It would be utterly vain to attempt an estimate of the loss to the nation from
the dreadful mortality which rages in the camps of men suddenly exposed to the
fatigues and privations of a military We.
108 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
The total expense of constructing the fortifications at the ten places before
mentioned will amount to $21,767,656. (See table E.)
The garrisons of these fortifications may consist of the same number of regu-
lar troops in time of war as in time of peace, the remainder being furnished by
the militia held in readiness to throw themselves into the forts on the first
appearance of an enemy. By this arrangement 3,010 regulars and 32,076
militia, either within the works or in small corps on advantageous positions,
making in all 35,086 men, would suffice, 64,914 men being kept in readiness to
march when called upon.
We should, therefore, have only 35,086 to pay and support instead of 107,000,
and the expense would be $8,430,500 instead of $26,750,000. The difference,
namely, $18,319,500, being only $3,448,156 less than the whole cost of these
defences. It follows that the expense of their erection would be nearly com-
pensated by the saving they would cause in a single campaign of six months.
It is proper to add that, although the expense of these works will be great,
that expense is never to be renewed ; while with troops, on the contrary, the
expense is annually repeated, if not increased, until the end of the war. Besides,
the disbursements for fortifications are made in time of peace, slowly and to
an extent exactly correspondent with the financial resources of the country.
Armies are most wanted, and must be paid, in periods of the greatest emer-
gency, when the ordinary sources of revenue are dried up, and when the
treasury can only be supplied by a resort to means the most burdensome and
disagreeable to the people.
The defence of the maritime frontier by permanent fortifications, and the dis-
bursements for their construction, will thus tend to a real and positive economy.
The vulnerable points being reduced to a small number, instead of waiting
an attack on every point, and holding ourselves everywhere in readiness to
repel it, we shall force an enemy to direct his assaults against those few which,
being well understood by us, will, of course, have received timely preparation.
There can be no doubt that such a state of things will make an adversary more
reluctant to risk his expeditions, and, therefore, that we shall not only be better
able to resist, but also less frequently called on to do so.
Some prominent military writers have opposed the principle of fortifying an
extensive land frontier, but none have ever disputed the necessity of fortifying
a maritime border ; the practice of every nation, ancient and modern, has been
the same in this respect. On a land frontier a good, experienced, and numerous
infantry may, in some cases, dispense with fortifications ; but though disciplined
troops may cover a frontier without the aid of fortifications, undisciplined troops
cannot. On a maritime fronti;-r, however, no description of troops can supply
the place of strong batteries d Isposed upon the vulnerable points. The uncer-
tainty of the point on which an enemy may direct his attack, the suddenness
with which he may reach it, and the powerful masses which he can concentrate
at a distance out of our reach and knowledge, or suddenly, and at ^the very
moment of attack require that every important post be prepared to 'repel his
attempt, or retard it until reinforcements can arrive and adequate means of
resistance be organized. By land we are acquainted with the motions of an
enemy ; but the ocean is a vast plain, without obstacle, where his movements are
made out of our sight, where no trace is left of his path, and where we know
nothing of his approach until he is within reach of the eye. In a word, unless
the vulnerable points of a seaboard are covered by fortifications their only chance
of safety must depend upon the issue of a battle, always uncertain, even when
the best disciplined, most experienced, and best appointed troops have made all
possible preparation for the combat.
As for the garrisons which these forts will require in time of war, a small
portion, about equal in number to the peace garrisons, should be of regular troops,
the remainder of militia, practiced in the manoeuvres and drill of great guns, it
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA COAST DEFENCES. 109
being indispensable that the greatest part of the troops required for the defence
and service of the sea-coast fortifications should be of artillery.
This brings us to a suggestion or two in relation to the organization of the
militia forces. Instead of the present small proportion of artillery allowed in
th e militia organization, the States might, with great advantage, increase the
proportion of that force in the vicinity of each of the exposed parts of the coast,
so as to be equivalent to the exigencies and armament of the works, substituting
for the usual field exercises as infantry actual drill and practice in the batteries.
The number of militia artillery in each case would be determined by the number
of guns applied to the defence of that particular place. As soon as a movement
on the part of the enemy should threaten the frontier of the State this force
should throw itself into the forts, and there remain so long as the precise point
of attack should be undetermined. In most parts of the seaboard it would be
advisable to have also a considerable body of militia horse artillery, as being
a very useful arm in all cases, and as affording a defence always applicable
against minor and predatory enterprises. This force might, in part, be drawn
from the ordinary proportion of cavalry.
If with our general system of permanent fortifications and naval establish-
ments we connect a system of interior communication by land and water, adapted
both to the defence and to the commercial relations of the country ; if to these
we add a well constituted regular army, and a militia perfect in its organization,
the nation will not only secure its territory from invasion and insult, but will
preserve its institutions from those violent shocks and revolutions which have so
frequently, in every age and in every country, been incident to a state of war.
Tables A, B, C, and D, following, contain the works constituting the proposed
defensive system for the maritime frontier, arranged in four classes.
Table E exhibits a comparison of the cost of defending certain important
parts of the coast without fortifications, and with the aid of the projected works.
Table F shows a possible concentration of militia force in eleven days at
Boston, Newport, R. I., New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Norfolk, Charles-
ton, S. C., Savannah, Georgia, and New Orleans.
NORTHERN FRONTIER.
Not having been the subject of particular care and study, it is with diffidence
that a few words are thrown out on the subject of the defence of the frontier
which separates the United States from the English possessions.
The first questions that arise are these : Is the political condition of the coun-
try lying on the other side of the country in question, viz : the condition of
colonies of a trans-Atlantic power to remain altered? Or are these colonies to
become independent nations 'I Or is any other important change to be wrought
in their political relations 1 These questions bear directly upon the matter in
hand. A generation hence and there may be no more room for jealousy and
watchfulness along that line than there now is along the imaginary lines which
separate our contiguous States. Within the same period the Canadas may have
assumed the attitude of independent and separate States; and, although the
United States may recognize in these northern neighbors a youth of much
promise and vigor, the period when the relative increase shall have been such
as to make their proximity a source of much precaution and solicitude will not,
probably, be near at hand. But though it may be possible that the colonial
relations may be thrown off within the period for which it is our duty now to
provide ; and although in any other relation the United States might rely for
security, at any moment, on the greater power which she might at any moment
develop, can it be distinctly foreseen that the existing political connexion is to
be soon dissolved ? If not if there be uncertainty on this point, does it become
the duty of the United States to proceed at once to the task of securing herself
110 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
on this frontier, regarding it as separating her from one of the most powerful em-
pires of the earth ? Or, finally, may she wait and watch, relying on her sagacity
to give due notice of impending danger, and on her resources to supply her, in
time, with appropriate armor ? If it be, indeed, possible to apply, within a brief
state of time, all the defences that can be needed on this frontier, the course last
suggested would appear to be the best. What, therefore, is like to be the nature
of the danger, and what the nature of the defence 1
Along the St. Croix river only local establishments could require to be cov-
ered, as there are no objects of consequence to be reached by an enemy pene-
trating our interior from that border. Then comes the disputed territory and
the great unsettled regions along the northern margins of New Hampshire and
Vermont.
Upon all this extent of frontier the exact location of future establishments, of
consequence, cannot be foreseen with the certainty warranting their being now
provided for by permanent defensive works. This region is to become populous
and wealthy ; the natural means of communication are to be improved, and nu-
merous artificial means of communication are to be opened by roads, canals, and
railways ; but while this growth in wealth may invite aggression, the growth in
numbers, and the increased facilities of intercommunication, the increased power
of rendering mutual succor, and of drawing aid from the interior, would, in a still
greater degree, make aggression difficult and improper.
Lake Champlain penetrates the territory in such a way that an enemy, having
the naval mastery, might make a deep inroad and greatly harass the country
along the shores, although no enterprise, even in the present state of population,
could be carried far into the interior. Were it only to relieve a long line of
frontier from predatory incursions, access to this lake from the north should be
denied. But there are other very strong reasons for this exclusion. By closing
the lake at its northern extremity an expensive and uncertain strife for naval
superiority on this lake would be avoided, and the whole lake would remain in
our possession, serving as the best possible military line of communication in
case the United States should assume offensive operations against the weakest
point of the Canadian frontier.
From the northern end of this lake the forces of the United States should
march into Canada and intercept the communication by the St. Lawrence, either
at or near the mouth of the Richelieu river, as Montreal island, at some point ,
where the ship channel of the river could be commanded, intermediate between
these places, or at any two or at all these places, according to circumstances.
Maintaining any or all these positions would limit the defence in the province
above to the consumption of the means then in store, and would completely
paralyze its offensive power. Although no other object were in view than the
defence of the frontier upon the upper lakes, no effort necessary to secure and
maintain this position should be spared, because it is only thus that the contest
for naval superiority on the lakes, which, if once suffered to begin, is both
exhausting and interminable, can be avoided.
Without aid from abroad, Canada cannot contest such a question with the
United States ; and, so long as the United States possess that superiority, the
defence of the upper portion of the frontier Avill be complete.
From being the most expensive of all modes of defence, naval superiority in
our hands may thus become the cheapest : two or three small armed vessels on
each lake, employed as convoys to the ordinary navigation, and to the transports
bearing troops and munitions, being all that would be needed.
Military enterprises would, in this way, be warded off from the numerous rich
and populous cities and towns now embellishing our border, which it would not
be easy to protect from the calamities of war by mere military works, without
running into great expense, were the enemy's naval means to allow his approach-
ing them at his pleasure.
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. Ill
In the case of the offensive movement supposed above, the fortified position
of Isle Aux Noix, and any other upon the Richelieu, should be at first left in
rear, being reached or mastered by suitable bodies of troops, and should be sub-
jected to immediate investment and vigorous attack, so as to be speedily reduced,
and to open the navigable water communication within twenty miles of Montreal.
If the preceding remarks be well founded, it would appear that the peace and
safety of the parts of the frontier extending along the river St. Lawrence, Lakes
Ontario, Erie, Huron, and Superior, might be made to flow from military opera-
tions carried on against Canada, by the line of Lake Champlain and the river
Richelieu; and in order to this military operation being always practical, and to
be taken up at pleasure, nothing more is necessary than the fortification of the
outlet of Lake Champlain. It might have been before remarked that the offen-
sive movement in question is not deemed to be difficult or hazardous, nor would
it be necessarily restricted to holding positions on the St. Lawrence ; active op-
erations against Quebec, to which this is the most convenient road, following as
a matter of course upon these first successes.
The security, therefore, that may be obtained for the upper frontier by mili-
tary operations on the lower, may at least justify these upper portions in wait-
ing the progress of events.
The unexampled increase of population upon these very borders, the hundred
new ways already finished or in hand, of connecting these borders with the heart
of the country, may so elevate the military resources of the region that, in the
event of war, it will matter little in which of the political conditions first sup-
posed the opposite territory may be found a resistless torrent sweeping it from
end to end ; and, although it might not be prudent to rely in such a matter on
the mere spread of wealth and numbers, we may be certain that there will exist
ample resources to create all such artificial military aids as the circumstances
may call for, and we may infer that the application of these aids would now be
premature.
The military consequences of the occupation of the outlet of Lake Champlain
are so obvious that it must not be supposed they are not perfectly understood
by our neighbor across the border. As it would consequently be a great object
with him to avert the consequences alluded to, he would, in the event of Avar,
(often breaking out suddenly,) be first, if possible, in taking such a position as
would prevent our commanding the issue of the lake ; and hence it is that, in
the preparation of the only permanent military work now recommended for the
northern frontier, it seems advisable to admit no unnecessary delay.
A position for closing the lake, selected during the last war, and of which the
fortification was begun soon after the peace, was found, after some progress had
been made, not to lie within our territory, and was abandoned. There is, how-
ever, a position equally good close at hand, and in all respects admirably adapted
to the object in view.
The fortification of this outlet will probably cost about $600,000.
All of which is respectfully submitted.
112
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122 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
TABLE E, exhibiting the cost of certain projected fortifications, Sfc. Conti nue.d
Expense of defending the above-mentioned points during a cam-
dgn of six months without fortifications $26, 750, 000
r ith the projected forts 8, 430, 500
Difference 18, 319, 500
Total cost of the projected works 21, 767, 656
Difference 3, 448, 156
N. B. In one campaign of six months the difference of expense between the
two systems will amount to within $3,448,156 of the whole cost of the projected
works. The expense of the troops as above supposes the regular soldier to cost
$300 per annum and the militia soldier $500, officers included in both. No
estimate can be made of the enormous contingent expenses in assembling, or-
ganizing, and providing militia forces, of hospitals, waste of property, loss of
time, &c. This estimate is undoubtedly below the truth. The forces under
pay necessary for defence, with the proposed works, consist of peace garrisons,
increased by a proportion of militia, the residue of militia under pay being
stationed upon the line of approach of the enemy.
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
123
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124 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
ORDNANCE OFFICE, Washington, Marvh 8, 1836.
SIR : The resolution of the Senate referred, on the 25th ultimo, to this offici
has been duly considered, and, in answer, I have the honor to transmit the fol
lowing report :
1. IN RELATION TO ARMORIES.
For reasons fully set forth in the letter to you from this office of Decembe
28, 1832, (and as will also appear on reference to the report of Hon. R. M
Johnson, chairman of the military committee, of March 18, 1834,) it is th<
opinion of this department that, with a view to keep pace in some measure witl
the rapid increase of the militia, and the consequent demand for arms, ther<
should be established at least one additional armory, to be located at the mos
eligible point west of the Alleghany mountains.
In a country like the United States, where the population is spread over i
territory of great extent, the delay necessarily attending the transportation o
arms to distant sections may at times materially affect the public interest; it ii
therefore suggested that, if two additional armories are deemed necessary t(
meet the exigencies of the country, one should be provided in the west and om
in the south Atlantic States. Including those now at Springfield and Harper's
Ferry, there would then be four national armories, two for the Atlantic States
and two for the west ; that is, if Harper's Ferry may be considered sufficiently
near the western States to furnish their supplies by means of the proposed
extension of the Chesapeake and Ohio canal.
Two additional armories are therefore estimated for, at $525,000 each
$1,050,000.
This estimate is based on the report of the commissioners, dated January 12
1825, who were appointed under the authority of an act of Congress, passec
March 3, 1823, entitled "An act to establish a national armory on the westerr
waters," and directed to explore the western country with a view to the selectior
of a suitable site.
2. IN RELATION TO ARSENALS.
It has been urged upon the department by many whose opinions demand
consideration, that every state should have an arsenal or depot of arms and
munitions within its territorial limits. Should this opinion prevail and be carried
into effect by legislative authority, it would be necessary to construct fourteen
arsenals or depots, including the one proposed for the State of North Carolina,
for which a bill has been reported by the military committee of the House of
Representatives .
A prominent advantage to the public interest in the establishing of these depots
consists in their use for the safe-keeping of arms issued to the States, under the
law of Congress, passed in 1808, "for arming the whole body of the* militia," to
be held subject to the orders of their several governors, which would insure their
being always available in any emergency.
Some additions may be required, from time to time, at the arsenals already
established, which, with the cost of the fourteen above mentioned, are estimated
at $1,746,000.
This estimate is founded on the supposition that the new arsenals are to be,
on an average, of a medium extent, when considered in relation to those already
established, which are divided into four classes, as may be seen by refenence to a
tabular exhibit presented herewith. It would be proper to arrange every new
depot in such manner as to admit of its increase or extension in case the public
service should require it. It could then be passed from one class to a higher by
the addition of such buildings, tools, or machinery as the case might demand.
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 125
3. IN RELATION TO FIELD VRTILLERY.
It is estimated that an adequate supply of field artillery for arming the militia
and for troops in service, to be provided within ten years, will amount to 926
pieces, which, with their carriages, implements, and equipments, will cost about
$576,175.
This estimate is based on the principle stated in the report before mentioned,
and contemplates a supply proportionate to the ratio of the increase of the militia,
one piece of artillery being allotted to every 2,000 men.
4. IN RELATION TO ORDNANCE AND ORDNAMCE STORES REQUIRED FOR ARMING
THE FORTIFICATIONS.
Agreeably to data derived from two statements received from the engineer
department on the llth of January and 27th of February last, it is estimated
that the expense of procuring the necessary ordnance and ordnance stores for
the full and entire armament of the forts which are erected, together with those
now building, and others which are contemplated to be built hereafter, embracing
cannon, carriages, implements, and equipments complete, and ammunition, after
deducting therefrom the quantity of similar munitions now on hand, will amount
to about $17,840,249.
This estimate is founded on the supposition that 12,116 pieces of cannon, with
200 rounds of ammunition for each gun, will be ultimately required when all the
forts projected shall have been completed.
It should be stated, however, that this sum may be considered partly conjec-
tural, the plans for the defence of many of the harbors being not yet matured by
the board of engineers, as it appears by a letter from the chief of that depart-
ment, dated February 27 last. There are likewise many other points along the
coast which may require defences, the cost of the armament for which has not
been embraced in this estimate, nor does it contain any item for the defence of
the Mexican frontier.
5. IN RELATION TO SMALL ARMS.
To progress with the arming of the militia to a reasonable extent, in accord-
ance with the settled policy of the country and its civil institutions, a consider-
able addition should be made to the number of arms on hand. Having reference
to the annual increase of citizens who may be called to bear arms, there will be
required for the next ten years an expenditure of $7,721,233 for muskets, rifles,
and pistols, and $321,880 for swords total, $8,043,113.
This last sum is found by allotting five swords to every one hundred muskets,
or their equivalent in other fire-arms.
6. IN RELATION TO ACCOUTREMENTS FOR SMALL ARMS.
Fifty thousand sets of accoutrements would cost $200,000.
This number distributed among the several arsenals would afford an adequate
supply for any emergency ; and being in some degree perishable, it is not con-
sidered advisable to provide a greater quantity, as they can be made at short
notice, or as occasion may require.
7. IN RELATION TO FIELD AMMUNITION OF ALL KINDS.
The expense of providing a supply of gunpowder, cartridge paper, and other
materials for field service, is estimated at $200,000.
This amount would afford at all times a supply of ammunition for 30,000 men
in each of the principal divisions of the country.
126 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
The foregoing statements comprise all the estimates for the ordnance depart-
ment, except for a national foundery. The amount required for such an estab-
lishment will not exceed $300,000, which sum includes the cost of materials to
be consumed in casting guns during the first year after commencing operations.
The period of ten years is taken as a suitable time within which the foregoing
expenditures may be completed.
The disbursements for the various objects embraced in the resolution which
pertain to the ordnance department are now, annually, little short of $1,000,000.
If a period of fifteen years is assumed for the accomplishment of these purposes,
the annual expenditure will be only double what it is at present, and it is believed
that such an increase could be made with much advantage to the service. Indeed,
that portion of expense which pertains to the manufacture of cannon and projec-
tiles could annually be more than quadrupled with safety and a due regard to
economy.
Recapitulation.
2 national armories $1, 050, 000
14 arsenals 1, 746, 000
926 pieces of field artillery, with carriages, &c 576, 175
Ordnance and ordnance stores, and ammunition for fortifications . . 17, 840, 249
Small arms and accoutrements 8, 243, 113
Ammunition for field service 200, 000
A national foundery 300, 000
29, 955, 537
The resolution of the Senate is returned herewith.
I have the honor to be, sir, &c.,
GEO. BOMFORD, Colonel of Ordnance.
Hon. LEWIS CASS, Secretary of War.
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
127
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132 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
REPORT FROM THE NAVY DEPARTMENT.
NAVY DEPARTMENT, March 31, 1836.
SIR : In answer to so much of the resolutions of the Senate of the United
States, of the 18th ultimo, as required information as to the probable amount of
appropriations that may be necessary to supply the United States with ord-
nance, arms, and munitions of war, which a proper regard to self-defence would
require to be always on hand, and the probable amount that would be necessary
to place the naval defences of the United States (including the increase of the
navy, navy yards, dock yards, and steam or floating batteries) upon the footing
of strength and respectability which is due to the security and welfare of the
Union, I have the honor to lay before you a report of the board of navy com-
missioners, of the 2d instant, which contains the best information upon the sub-
jects referred to in possession of this department, which is respectfully sub-
mitted.
MAHLON DIOKERSON.
The PRESIDENT of the United States.
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES.
January 21, 1836.
The following resolutions were ordered to be postponed to Monday next :
Resolved, That so much of the revenue of the United States, and the divi-
dends of stock receivable from the Bank of the United States, as may be neces-
sary for the purpose, ought to be set apart and applied to the general defence
and permanent security of the country.
Resolved, That the President be requested to cause the Senate to be informed
1. The probable amount that would be necessary for fortifying the lake, marl
time, and Gulf frontier of the United States, and such points of the land frontiei
as may require permanent fortifications.
2. The probable amount that would be necessary to construct an adequate
number of armories and arsenals in the United State?, and to supply the States
with field artillery (especially brass field pieces) for their militia, and with side
arms and pistols for their cavalry.
3. The probable amount that would be necessary to supply the United State;
with the ordnance, arms, and munitions of war, which a proper regard to self
defence would require to be always on hand.
4. The probable amount that would be necessary to place the naval defence:
of the United States (including the increase of the navy, navy yards, docl
yards, and steam or floating batteries) upon the footing of strength and respect
ability which is due to the security and to the welfare of the Union.
Passed February 18, 1836.
NAVY COMMISSIONER'S OFFICE, March 2, 1836.
SIR : The board of navy commissioners have the honor to acknowledge tin
receipt of your letter of the 26th ultimo, requesting a " report on the probabL
amount that would be necessary to supply the United States with the ordnance
arms, and munitions of war (so far as may be wanted for the purposes of th
navy) which a proper regard to self-defence would require to be always on hand
and on the probable amount that would be necessary to place the naval defence
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 133
of the United States (including the increase of the navy, navy yards, dock yards,
and steam or floating batteries) upon the footing of strength and respectability
which is due to the security and welfare of the Union."
In conformity to these instructions the board respectfully state, with respect
to the ordnance for the navy, that after a careful examination of the subject,
taking into considertion the ordnance and ordnance stores now on hand, and
the extent of force for which it may be expedient to make early provision, they
are qf opinion that the sum of one million eight hundred thousand two hundred
and fifty dollars will be required to supply the ordnance, arms, and munitions of
war which may be wanted for the use of the navy, and which a proper regard
to self-defence would require to have prepared ready for use. (See paper A
annexed for the detail.)
The board beg leave respectfully to observe, that for the vessels which are
now built, or have been specially authorized, armaments may be provided, with
some partial exceptions, from the cannon and cannonades already provided, and
the deficient ordnance, arms, and other ordnance stores will be principally required
for the vessels which are yet to be authorized or built. It is therefore respect-
fully recommended that any appropriation for this purpose, instead of being
special or separate, should be included in an appropriation for " building and
repairing vessels, and for the purchase of materials and stores for the navy."
The second object of inquiry, as to " the probable amount that would be neces-
sary to place the naval defences of the United States (including the increase of
the navy, navy yards, dock yards, and steam or floating batteries) upon the
footing of strength and respectability which is due to the security and welfare
of the Union," embraces a wide range, requires an examination of several sub-
jects of great importance, and the expression of opinions upon which differences
of opinion may and probably will exist. Before any estimate can be formed of
the probable amount that would be necessary for the purposes proposed an
examination must be had, and an opionion formed of the nature and extent of the
naval force which is " necessary to place the naval defences of the United States
upon the footing of strength and respectability which is due to the security and
welfare of the Union," and the time within which it ought to be, or might be,
advantageously prepared.
Taking into view the geographical position of the United States, with reference
to other nations with whom we are most likely to be brought into future collision ;
the great extent of our maritime frontier, and the extreme importance of securing
the communications of the whole valley of the Mississippi, through the Gulf of
Mexico, and the intercourse between all parts of the coast ; the efficient protection
of our widely extended and extremely valuable commerce, under all circumstances ;
and the great naval and fiscal resources of the country, the board consider the
proper limit for the extent of the naval force to be that which can be properly
manned when the country may be involved in a maritime war.
In estimating this extent it is assumed that about ninety thousand seamen
. are employed in the foreign and coasting trade and fisheries, As the navigation
has been generally increasing, there is little reason to apprehend any immediate
diminution during peace. In any war which would require the employment of
all our naval force, it is believed that such interruptions would occur to our
commerce as would enable the navy to obtain without difficulty at least thirty
thousand seamen and ordinary seamen ; and if it should continue long, it is prob-
able that a larger number might be engaged. The number of thirty thousand,
with the landsmen who may be safely combined with them, will therefore be
assumed as the number for which vessels ought to be prepared for the com-
mencement of a state of hostilities.
With respect to the nature of the force which it would be most advantageous
to prepare, there will undoubtedly be differences of opinion. The materials for
the larger vessels, as ships-of-the-line and frigates, would be obtained with great
134 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
difficulty, under circumstances which would interfere with our coasting trade,
whilst sloop-of-war and smaller vessels could be built with greater comparative
facility under such circumstances.
The preparation of a considerable number of steam vessels, ready to defend
our great estuaries, to aid in the operations of our other naval force, and in the
concentration or movements of the military force, as circumstances might re-
quire, is believed to demand serious and early attention.
Having due regard to these and other considerations, the board propose that
the force to be prepared, ready for use when circumstances may require it, shall
consist of fifteen ships-of-the-line, 25 frigates, 25 sloops-of-war, 25 steamers, and
25 smaller vessels, and that the frames and other timber, the copper, ordnance,
tanks, and chain cables shall also be prepared for 10 ships-of-the-line arid 10
frigates.
The force proposed to be prepared, ready for use, will employ and can be
manned by the 30,000 seamen and others which have been considered available
in a state of war. The materials for the ten ships-of-the-line and ten frigates
will constitute a necessary reserve for increasing the number of those vessels
should they be required, or for supplying losses from decay or casualties.
To estimate the amount necessary to prepare this force it is proposed to ascer-
tain the whole probable cost, including ordnance, by the average cost of similai
vessels already built, (steam vessels excepted,) and of materials already procured
and then to deduct the value of the present force, and all other present availa-
ble means.
Total cost of 15 ships-of-the-line $8, 250, OOC
25 frigates 8, 750, OOC
55 sloops 3, 125, OOC
25 steamers 5, 625, OOC
25 smaller vessels . . 1, 250, OOC
Total for vessels 27, 000, OOC
For the proposed materials, as a reserve 3, 315, OOC
Total amount required 30, 315, OOC
Deduct from this sum the value of the present force and avail-
able means, as follows :
In vessels afloat, valued at $*$ of original value,
about ' $4, 440, 000
In vessels building, at actual cost 2, 455, 000
In materials collected for building do 2, 945, 000
In treasury for these purposes, October 1, 1835 1, 215, 000
For three years' appropriation, " gradual improve-
ment," when due 1, 500, 000
Total of present value and available means 12, 555, OOC
Leaves still to be provided for vessels 17, 760, OOC
In presenting any estimate for the amounts which may be necessary to place
the different navy yards in a proper situation, the board can do no more thac
give very general opinions, as the objects of expenditure are foreign to theii
own professional pursuits, and they have no civil engineer to whom they cai]
refer for the necessary detailed information.
From a knowledge of the cost of works hitherto completed or in progress
and of the wants at the respective yards for the proper peservation of materials;
and for extending the means for building, preserving, repairing, and equipping
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 135
vessels, they are satisfied, however, that the public interests would be greatly
promoted, and, in fact, absolutely require an average annual expenditure of
$500,000 for years to come upon the different yards.
In New York the necessity for a dry dock is severely felt already, and Hs
importance will increase with any increase of the navy. This, with its de-
pendencies, will require nearly a million of dollars. At Pensacola, which nature
has designated as one of the naval keys of the Gulf of Mexico, and of the im-
mense commerce of the valley of the Mississippi, large expenditures will be
necessary to secure adequate means for repairing and subsisting a naval force
upon that station, and thus prevent the many evils which would be severely
felt in a state of war, if the vessels were obliged to resort to the Atlantic ports
for ordinary repairs or supplies of any kind. In other yards there are objects
of great and urgent importance.
Generally the proposed arrangements for. the preservation of all materials
and vessels should precede their collection or construction. Whilst, therefore,
the board propose $500,000 as the average annual appropriation, until the yards
should be placed in proper order, they would also state that appropriations of
$700,000, annually, for the next four or five years, and a less sum than $500,000
afterwards, would, in their opinion, be most judicious.
The next subject for consideration is the nature and extent of force proper to
be kept employed in a time of peace for the protection of our commercial in-
terests, and to prepare the officers and others for the efficient management of the
force proposed for a state of war:
Our commerce is spread over every ocean ; our tonnage is second only to that
of Great Britain, and the value of articles embarked is believed by many to be
fully equal to those transported by the ships of that nation. In the safety and
prosperity of this commerce all the other interests of the United States are
deeply interested. It is liable to be disturbed and injured in various modes,
unless the power of the country, exerted through its naval force, is ready to
protect it. It is therefore proposed that small squadrons should be employed
upon different stations, subject at all times, however, to such modifications as
circumstances may require.
Of these squadrons, one might be employed in the Mediterranean, and attend
to our interests on the west coasts of Spain and Portugal, and southward to the
western coast of Morocco and Madeira.
One in the Indian ocean to visit, successively, the most important commercial
points east of the Cape of Good Hope, to China, then to cross the Pacific, visit
the northern whaling stations and islands, cruise some time upon the west coast
of America, and return by way of Cape Horn, the coast of Brazil, and the
Windward West India islands.
One in the Pacific, ocean to attend to our interests upon the west coast of
America ; keeping one or more vessels at or near the Sandwich and other islands
which are frequented by our whale ships and other vessels, and, in succession,
cross the Pacific, visiting the islands and southern whaling stations, China, and
other commercial places, and return, by the way of the Cape of Good Hope, to
the United States.
A squadron upon the coast of Brazil, or east coast of South America, might
be charged with attention to our interests on the whole of that coast, and upon
the north coast so far as to include the Orinoco. If a ship-of-the-line should
be employed on this station, it might be occasionally sent round to the Pacific.
A squadron in the West Indies and Gulf of Mexico will be necessary for,
an<J may be charged with, attention to the protection of our commerce amongst
the West India islands and along the coast of South America, from the Orinoco
round to the Gulf of Mexico.
A small coast squadron upon our Atlantic coast might be very advantageously
employed in making our officers familiarly and thoroughly acquainted with all
136
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
our ports and harbors, which would be very useful in a state of war. The ves-
sels would also be ready for any unexpected service, either to transmit informa-
tion or orders ; to reinforce other squadrons, or to visit our eastern fisheries.
Besides this cruising force, it is recommended that a ship-of-the-line be kept in
a state of readiness for service, men excepted, at Boston, New York, and Norfolk,
and used as receiving ships for the recruits as they are collected ; this would
give the means of furnishing a considerable increase of force with a very small
addition to the current expense.
For the nature and distribution of this force, the following is proposed :
Line.
Frigates.
Sloops.
Steamers
Smaller.
Total.
Mediterranean
1
2
2
2
7
Indian ocean
1
2
1
4
Pacific
2
3
2
7
Brazil
1
1
2
2
6
"\Vest Indies
1
4
1
2
8
Home
*3
1
2
3
1
10
Total
5
8
15
4
10
42
As receiving ships.
Considering this force with reference to its power of giving experience to the
officers, and qualifying them for the management of the force proposed for war,
it appears that for the force proposed to be actually employed at sea, in peace
and in war, the peace force will require and employ about two-thirds the number
of commanders of squadrons ; about one-third of the captains and forty one-hun-
dredths of the commanders and lieutenants and masters, which the proposed war
force would demand, and midshipmen sufficient to supply the additional number
of these last classes which a change to a state of war would require.
Supposing the foregoing force to be that which is to be kept in commission,
the next question is, what force will be necessary to keep afloat, to provide the
necessary reliefs ? The board believe that this force should be the least which
will answer the object proposed, as every vessel when launched is exposed to a
decay which is much more rapid than when left under the cover of a tight ship-
house.
We have already six ships-of-the-line afloat, which will be fully equal to our
present wants, when they are repaired. A reserve of three frigates may be re-
quired, but only to be launched when the necessity for it shall arise ; for the
sloops-of-war and smaller vessels, it will probably be sufficient to merely keep
up the cruising force as proposed, except some extraordinary demand should
The force of steam vessels proposed, when distributed at Boston, New
arise.
York, Norfolk, and Pensacola, would probably meet all the demands of a state
of peace, and furnish useful schools for officers, to prepare them for the proper
management of others, when they are required. The force to be kept afloat,
then, will be assumed at six ships-of-the-line, eleven frigates, fifteen sloops-of-
war, four steamers, and ten smaller vessels. The annual amount necessary to
keep this force in a state of repair, and to supply the wear and tear of stores of
cruising vessels, is estimated at $950.000.
The estimated expense of the force which is proposed to be kept in commis-
sion, exclusive of the repairs as above stated, and for the pay of officers at navy
yards, rendezvous, receiving vessels, of superintendents, and civil officers at all
the shore establishments, and at the present cost of those establishments, is :
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 137
For pay of officers and seameii in commission, superintendents and
civil officers, and all others, at all the establishments, about. . $2, 500, 000
For provisions 750, 000
For medicines and hospital stores 60, 000
For ordnance stores, powder, &c 120, 000
For contingencies of all kinds 390, 000
Total for the navy branch 3, 850, 000
If the marines are continued as a part of the naval establishment, instead of
substituting ordinary seamen and landsmen for them in vessels, and watchmen
in navy yards, and transferring the marines to the army as artillery, as has
sometimes been suggested, the sum of about $400,000 annually will be required
for that corps.
To determine the annual amount which it may be necessary to appropriate to
prepare the vessels and reserve frames and other materials which have been
proposed, some time must be assumed within which they shall be prepared.
Believing that reference to the ability of the treasury to meet the probable de-
mands upon it, for all the purposes of the government, must necessarily be con-
sidered in determining what amount may be allotted to the navy, the board have
examined the reports of the Secretary of the Treasury, and respectfully propose
to establish the ordinary annual appropriation for the navy, including the ord-
nance, at seven millions of dollars.
The operation of such annual appropriations may be seen by the following
recapitulation of the proposed heads of expenditure :
For the force in commission and its dependencies, as before stated $3, 850, 000
The average appropriation for navy yards 500, 000
For the repairs and wear and tear of vessels 950, 000
For building vessels and purchase of materials 1, 300, 000
Total for the navy proper 6, 600, 000
For the marine corps 400, 000
7, 000, 000
By the adoption of this gross sum for the navy and its dependencies, and the
other items as proposed, $1,300,000 would be annually applied to increasing the
number of our vessels and the purchase of materials ; and, with this annual ex-
penditure, the deficiency of $17,760,000 would not be supplied sooner than
between thirteen and fourteen years, or at about the year 1850. The board
consider this as the most remote period at which the proposed force ought to be
ready, and are of opinion that it might be prepared much sooner, should Con-
gress deem it necessary or advisable to make larger appropriations than have
been suggested.
The board have expressed the opinion that no more vessels should be launched
than are absolutely necessary to meet the demands for the force to be kept in
commission ; but, as a necessary consequence, they recommend that the other
additional force should be in such a state of readiness that it may be launched
and equipped by the time that men could be obtained for it. This arrangement
renders an early attention to the completion of all the building-slips, ship-houses,
and launching ways at the different yards, so that the ships may be built, and
that our docks, wharves, workshops, and storehouses should be finished ; that
our ships may be equipped with the greatest economy and despatch whenever
they may be required.
138 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
Before concluding this report the board would respectfully offer some re-
marks upon the form of the appropriations, and suggest some attention to ex-
isting acts of Congress.
By the separate acts for the gradual increase of the navy ; for the gradual
improvement of the navy ; for building and rebuilding different vessels, alto-
gether seven in number ; each appropriation is rendered separate and distinct,
although the general object is the same, and requires the use of the same kinds
of materials. It is necessary, in conformity to the law of the 3d of March,
1809, that the vouchers, receipts, expenditures, and accounts of each should be
kept separately ; and, in strictness, no article purchased for one can be applied
to the use of another, however desirable or economical such use may be.
It is suggested, therefore, for consideration, whether it might not be very ad-
vantageous for Congress to determine, by some general act or resolution, the
number and classes of vessels which the President might be authorized to have
built, or for which materials might be procured, and then appropriate specially
the amounts which might be devoted to those objects, and for keeping the force
afloat in repair, under the general head of " For building and repairing vessels,
and for purchase of materials and stores."
The adoption of some such plan, and removing the special restrictions which
now exist, and requiring, as at present, detailed estimates for the current repairs
and reports of proceedings in building vessels and for purchase of materials,
would, it is believed, greatly simplify and diminish the number of accounts at
the Treasury Department and in all the navy yards, without infringing in any
degree the principle of special appropriations ; would furnish to Congress all
the information they now receive, and would enable us at all times to use those
materials which are best prepared and most appropriate for the different objects
for which they might be wanted.
The board beg leave, also, respectfully to state their opinion of the necessity
for the services of a competent civil engineer for the navy to furnish plans and
estimates for all hydraulic and civil -objects, and to have a general superintend-
ence of their construction under the direction of the department. The particular
character of these works requires the supervision of such a person, not less from
motives of economy in the ordinary expenditures than from the more important
consideration of their proper arrangement, solidity of construction, and dura-
bility.
All which is respectfully submitted.
JNO. RODGERS.
Hon. M. DICKERSON,
Secretary of the Navy.
A.
Upon the supposition that the naval force to be so prepared that it' might be
equipped for sea at short notice shall consist of 15 ships-of-tlie-line, 25 frigates,
25 sloops-of-war, 25 steamers, and 25 smaller vessels ; and that the frames and
other durable materials shall be provided for 10 ships-of-the-line and 10 frigates
as a reserve. The following statement shows the total number and character of
the armaments which the whole force will require, the number which can be
furnished from the ordnance on hand, and the number which will be still re-
quired :
For ships of line. Frigates. Sloops. Steamers. S. V.
Total number required 25 35 25 25 25
Onhandfor 11 22 16 00
Deficient. .14 13 9 25 13.
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 139
Besides the bomb-cannon, guns, and carronades for these armaments, there
would be required shot, shells, small arms, pistols, and cutlasses, and a supply
of powder sufficient for equipping a strong force in case of a sudden emergency.
The cost of these objects may be estimated as follows :
Armaments for 14 ships-of-the-line, at $45,000 each $630, 000
Armaments for 13 frigates, at $16,500 each 214, 500
Armaments for 9 sloops, at $6,000 each 54, 000
Armaments for 25 steamers, at $3,000 each 75,000
Armaments for 13 smaller vessels, at $1,500 each 19, 500
. 993, 000
For guns, bomb-cannon, and carronades, 100 shot to each gun, and
200 shells to each bomb-cannon, and shells for guns 427, 000
8,000 muskets 100, 000
3,500 pairs of pistols 43, 750
8,000 cutlasses 34, 000
9,000 barrels of powder. 202, 500
1, 800, 250
No. 4.
[Ho. REPS., Ex. Doc. No. 206, 26TH CONGRESS, IST SESSION.]
LETTER FROM THE SECRETARY OF WAR, TRANSMITTING, IN COMPLIANCE
WITH THE RESOLUTION OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, A SYSTEM
OF NATIONAL DEFE>-CE AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF NATIONAL FOUN-
DERIES.
WAR DEPARTMENT, May 12, 1840.
SIR : In reply to so much of the resolution of the House of Representatives
of the 9th ultimo, requesting the Department of War "to lay before this House,
as soon as practicable, a report of a full and connected system of national de-
fence, embracing steam and other vessels-of-war, and 'floating batteries' for
coast and harbor defence, and national founderies, and the internal means, aux-
iliary to these, for transportation and other warlike uses, by land, and that he
be requested to furnish this House with the reports submitted to his department
at any time by Major General Edmund P. Gaines, or other person or persons
of professional experience, of their 'plans of defence,' if any such have been
submitted, with the views of the Secretary of War thereon; and that the
Secretary furnish an estimate of the expenses of his own and other plans he
may report, distinguishing such parts of plans as ought to be immediately
adopted and prosecuted, with the probable cost and time of their prosecution
and completion :" I have the honor to transmit the accompanying reports of a
board of officers, assembled to examine the subject, and to present a connected
plan of defence for the maritime and inland frontiers of the United States.
On submitting these reports, I should have considered my duty discharged,
had not the resolution required me to give an opinion with regard to the several
plans of national defence presented to the department, and to furnish a compar-
ative statement of the cost of each. The plan presented to Congress by Major
General Gaines, which will be found in the accompanying printed document,
and that now submitted from the board of officers, are the only ones that have
been brought to the notice of the department. On the subject of the former, I
140 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA- COAST DEFENCES.
beg leave to state that, with every respect for the experience of the gallant
author, I am constrained to differ from him when he proposes to abandon the
system of permaneni defences as obsolete, and to rely entirely upon the expe-
dients of vast floating batteries and extensive lines of railroads. The accom-
panying reports of the board of navy commissioners and the chief topographical
engineer exhibit the probable cost of carrying out the general's plans, which far
exceeds that of constructing permanent works of defence, without being in any
manner so well calculated to protect the country.
After a careful and anxious investigation of a subject involving in so high a
degree the safety and honor of the country, I fully concur in the opinions ex-
pressed by the board of the superiority of permanent works of defence over all
other expedients that have yet been devised, and of their absolute necessity if
we would avoid the danger of defeat and disgrace a necessity rather increased
than diminished by the introduction of steam batteries and the use of hollow
shot. It would, in my opinion, prove a most fatal error to dispense with them,
and to rely upon our navy alone, aided by the number, strength, and valor of
the people to protect the country against the attacks of an enemy possessing
great naval means. To defend a line of coast of three thousand miles in extent,
and effectually to guard all the avenues to our great commercial cities and im-'
portant naval depots, the navy of the United States must be very superior to
the means of attack of the most powerful naval power in the world, which will
occasion an annual expense this country is not now able to bear ; and this large
naval armament, instead of performing its proper function as the sword of the
state in time of war, and sweeping the enemy's commerce from the seas, must
be chained to the coast or kept within the harbors.
It has been clearly demonstrated that the expense of employing a sufficient
body of troops, either regulars or militia, for a period of even six months, for the
purpose of defending the coast against attacks and feints that might be made by
an enemy's fleet, would exceed the cost of erecting all the permanent works
deemed necessary for the defence of the coast. One hundred thousand men
divided into four columns, would not be more than sufficient to guard the vul-
nerable points of our maritime frontier, if not covered by fortifications. An
amount of force against an expedition of 20,000 men, which, if composed of
regulars would cost the nation $30,000,000 per annum, and if militia, about
$40,000,000 ; and, supposing only one-half the force to be required to defend
the coast with the aid of forts properly situated and judiciously constructed, the
difference of expense for six months would enable the government to erect all
the most necessary works. This calculation is independent of the loss to the
nation by abstracting so large an umount of labor from the productive industry
of the country, and the fearful waste of life likely to result from such a costly,
hazardous, and harassing system of defence.
It must be recollected, too, that we are not called upon to try a new system,
but to persevere in the execution of one that has been adopted after mature de-
liberation, and that is still practiced in Europe on a much more axten'sive scale
than is deemed necessary here ; so much more so, that there exist there single
fortresses, each of which comprises more extensive and stronger works than is
here proposed for the whole line of our maritime frontier. We must bear in
mind, also, that the destruction of some of the important points on that frontier
would alone cost more to the nation than the expense of fortifying the whole
line would amount to, while the temporary occupation of others would drive us
into expenses far surpassing those of the projected works of defence.
The organization of permanent defences proposed by the board for cur fron-
tiers is not upon military and naval considerations alone, but is calculated to
protect the internal navigation of the country. The fortifications proposed, at
the same time that they protect our coast from the danger of invasion, and de-
fend the principal commercial avenues and naval establishments, cover the
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 141
whole line of internal navigation, which, in time of war, will contribute in so
essential a manner to the defence of the country by furnishing prompt and
economical means of transportation ; so that, while the main arteries which con-
duct our produce to the ocean are defended at their outlets, the interior naviga-
tion, parallel to the coast, is protected, and a free communication kept up be-
tween every part of the Union.
Although this department is fully aware of the importance of affording per-
manent and as perfect protection as may be possible to the whole coast, it
regards that section embraced by the shores of the Gulf of Mexico as the most
exposed and the most important. It is true that the coast to the eastward of
Cape Hatteras possesses points that may attract the attention of an enemy, and
that, in the present state of things, the chances of success would justify a hostile
enterprise, and are much greater than a wise provision would allow to exist. It
is equally so, that, however difficult of access the coast may be from Cape Hat-
teras to Florida, the nature of a part of its population, and the facility afforded
to an enemy by its present neglected condition to blockade and annoy the prin
cipal outlets of the valuable exports of .that important portion of our country,
require our early attention ; still, the means of defence from Maine to Florida
may be united together, and the parts may afford mutual succor to each other.
But the coast of the Gulf of Mexico, on the contrary, is insulated and apart, and
must depend altogether upon its own resources. It constitutes the maritime
frontier not only of Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, and of West Florida, but
of Arkansas, Tennessee, Kentucky, Ohio, Missouri, Indiana, and Illinois, and
the Territories of Wisconsin and Iowa, embracing nearly three-fourths of the
territory of the United States ; and it must be borne in mind that the evils
which would result from the temporary occupation of the delta of the Missis-
sippi, or from a successful blockade of the coast of the Gulf of Mexico, would
not only injure the prosperity of these States, but would deeply affect the in-
terests of the whole Union ; and no reasonable expense, therefore, ought to be
spared to guard against such a casualty.
Although it would appear on a superficial view, to be a gigantic and almost
impracticable project to fortify such an immense extent of coast as that of the
United States, and difficult, if not impossible, to provide a sufficient force to
garrison and defend the works necessary for that purpose, yet the statements
contained in the reports of the board remove these objections entirely. The
coast of the United States throughout its vast extent has but few points which
require to be defended against a regular and powerful attack. A considerable
portion of it is inaccessible to large vessels, and only exposed to the depreda-
tions of parties in boats and small vessels-of-war ; against which inferior works
and the combination of the same means and a well-organized local militia will
afford sufficient protection. The only portions which require to be defended by
permanent works of some strength are the avenues to the great commercial
cities arid naval and military establishments, the destruction of which would
prove a serious loss to the country, and be regarded by an enemy as an equiva-
lent for the expense of a great armament. It is shown, also, that the number
of men required, on the largest scale, for the defence of these forts, when com-
pared with the movable force that would be necessary without them, is incon-
siderable. The local militia, aided by a few regulars, and directed by engineer
and artillery officers, may, with previous training, be safely intrusted with their
defence in time of war.
It cannot be too earnestly urged that a much smaller number of troops will
be required to defend a fortified frontier than to cover one that is entirely un-
protected, and that such a system will enable us, according to the spirit of our
institutions, to employ the militia effectually for the defence of the country. It
is no reproach to this description of force, and no imputation on their courage, to
state what the experience of two wars has demonstrated that they cannot
142 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
stand the steady charge of regular forces, and are disorded by their mano3uvres
in the open field ; whereas, their fire is more deadly from behind ramparts.
The principles of defence recommended by the board for the maritime fron- '
tier of the United States are applicable to the northern or lake frontier and to
that of the west. Some few sites are recommended to be occupied by fortifica-
tions, both to afford protection to places fast growing up into important cities,
and to furnish a refuge and rallying point for our naval and land forces.
Very respectfully, your most obedient servant.
J. R. POINSETT.
Hon. R. M. T. HUNTER,
Speaker of the House of Representatives.
WASHINGTON, May 10, 1840.
SIR : The board of officers to whom the subject of the military defences of
the country was committed have the honor to submit the following report, viz :
1st. Report on the defence of the Atlantic frontier, from Passamaquoddy to
the Sabine. This is divided into two distinct portions, viz : the coast from Pas-
samaquoddy to Cape Florida, and the coast from Cape Florida to the Sabine bay.
2d. Report on the defence of the northern frontier, from Lake Superior to
Passamaquoddy bay.
3d. Report on the western frontier, from the Sabine bay to Lake Superior.
Connected with these reports are tabular statements, showing the " permanent
defence commenced, completed, projected, or deemed necessary;" with conjectu-
ral estimates of " the probable expense of constructing or completing such works
as may not yet have been completed or commenced,"
4th. Reports "on the armories, arsenals, magazines, and founderies, either
constructed or deemed necessary; with a conjectural estimate of the expense of
constructing such of said establishments as may not yet be completed or com-
menced, but which may be deemed necessary."
Hon. J. R. POINSETT,
Secretary of War.
Report on the defence of the Atlantic frontier, from Passamaquoddy to the
Sabine.
So entirely does this board concur in the views presented on several occasions,
within the last twenty years, by joint commissions of naval and military officers,
by the board of engineers for fortifications, and by individual officers who have
at various times been called on to treat the same subject, that in quoting their
opinions we should, for the greater part, express our own. But though these
reports are, some of them, comprehensive and elabprate, we suppose that an
explicit statement of our views, at least as to the great principles on which the
system of defence should be erected, is expected from us, especially as the
system now in progress has been the subject of a criticism which, considering
the high official source whence it emanated, may be supposed to have disturbed
the confidence of the public therein.
The nature and source of that criticism, attacking as it does fundamental
principles, and inculcating doctrines which we believe to be highly dangerous,
will lead us at times into amplifications that we fear may prove tedious This,
however, we must risk, trusting to the importance of the subject for excuse, if
not for justification.
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 143
The principal errors, as we conceive, in the document* referred to are
1. That for the defence of the coast the chief reliance should be on the navy.
2. That, in preference to fortifications, floating batteries should be introduced
wherever they can be used.
3. That we are not in danger from large expeditions ; and, consequently,
4. That the system of the board of engineers comprises works which are un-'
necessarily large for the purposes they have to fulfil.
On these topics, together with other errors of the same nature, we shall feel
constrained to enlarge.
The first question that presents itself is this : What, in general terms, shall
be the means of defence ?
We have a sea-coast line of more than three thousand miles in extent, along
which lie scattered.all the great cities, all the depots of commerce, all the estab-
lishments of naval construction, outfit, and repair, and towns, villages, and es-
tablishments of private enterprise without number. From this line of sea-coast
navigable bays, estuaries, and rivers, the shores of which are similarly occupied,
penetrate deep into the heart of the country.
How are the important points along this extended line to be secured from
hostile expeditions, especially since one of the prominent causes of the prosperity
of these various establishments, namely, facility of access from the ocean, is, as
regards danger from an enemy, the chief cause of weakness 1
Shall the defence be by a navy exclusively ?
The opinion that the navy is the true defence of the country is so acceptable
and popular, and is sustained by such high authority, that it demands a careful
examination.
Before going into this examination we will premise that by the term "navy"
is here meant, we suppose, line-of-battle-ships, frigates, smaller sailing vessels,
and armed steamships, omitting vessels constructed for local uses merely, such as
floating batteries.
For the purpose of first considering this proposition in its simplest terms, we
will begin by supposing the nation to possess but a single seaport, and that this
is to be defended by a fleet alone.
By remaining constantly within this port our fleet would be certain of meeting
the enemy, should he assail it. But if inferior to the enemy, there would be no
reason to look for a successful defence ; and as there could be no escape for the
defeated vessels, the presence of the fleet, instead of averting the issue, would
only render it the more calamitous.
Should our fleet be equal to the enemy's, the defence might be complete, and
it probably would be so. Still, hazard some of the many mishaps liable to
attend contests of this nature might decide against us ; and, in that event, the
consequences would be even more disastrous than on the preceding supposition.
In this case the chances of victory to the two parties would be equal, but the
consequences very unequal. It might be the enemy's fate to lose his whole
fleet, but he could lose nothing more; while we, in a similar attempt, would lose
not only the whole fleet, but also the object that the fleet was designed to
protect.
If superior to the enemy, the defence of the port would in all respects be
complete. But, instead of making an attack, the enemy would, in such case,
employ himself in cutting up our commerce on the ocean ; and nothing could be
done to protect this commerce without leaving the port in a condition to be suc-
cessfully assailed.
In either of the above cases the fleet might await the enemy in front of the
harbor, instead of lying within. But no advantage is apparent from such an
*See Senate document No. 293, vol. 4, p. 1, 24th Congress, 1st session.
144 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
arrangement, and there would be superadded the risk of being injured by tem-
pests, and thereby disqualified for the duty of defence, or of being driven off
the coast by gales of wind; thus, for a time, removing all opposition.
In the same cases, also, especially when equal or superior to the enemy, our
fleet, depending on having correct and timely notice as to the position and state
of preparation of the enemy's forces, might think proper to meet him at the
outlet of his own port, or intercept him on the way, instead of awaiting him
within or off our own harbor. Here it must be noticed that the enemy, like
ourselves, is supposed to possess a single harbor only ; but having protected it
by other means, that his navy is disposable for offensive operations. If it were
attempted thus to shut him within his own port, he, in any case but that of de-
cided inferiority, would not hesitate to come out and risk a battle ; because, if
defeated, he could retire, under shelter of his defences, to refit, and, i successful,
he could proceed with a small portion of his force even a single vessel would
suffice to the capture of our port, now defenceless ; while, with the remainder,
he would follow up his advantage over our defeated vessels, not failing to pursue
them into their harbor, should they return thither.
Actual superiority on our part would keep the enemy from volunteering a
battle ; but it would be indispensable that the superiority be steadily maintained,
and that the superior fleet be constantly present. If driven off by tempests, or
absent from any other cause, the blockaded fleet would escape, when it would
be necessary for our fleet to fly back to the defence of its own port. Experience
abundantly proves, moreover, that it is in vain to attempt to shut a hostile
squadron in port for any length of time. It seems, then, that whether we de-
fend by remaining at home, or by shutting the enemy's fleet within his own
harbor, actual superiorty in vessels is indispensable to the security of our port.
With this superiority the defence will be complete, provided our fleet remain
within its harbor. But then all the commerce of the country upon the ocean
must be left to its fate ; and no attempt can be made to react offensively upon
the foe, unless we can control the chances of finding the enemy's fleet within
his port, and the still more uncertain chance of keeping him there ; the escape
of a single vessel being sufficient to cause the loss of our harbor.
Let as next see what will be the state of the question on the supposition of
numerous important ports on either side, instead of a single one ; relying, on
our part, still, exclusively on a navy.
In order to examine this question, we will suppose our adversary to be forti-
fied in all his harbors, and possessed of available naval means equal to our own.
This is certainly a fair supposition ; because what is assumed as regards his
harbors is true of all maritime nations, except the United States ; and as re-
gards naval means, it is elevating our own strength considerably above its pre-
sent measure, and above that it is likely to attain for years.
Being thus relatively situated, the first difference that strikes us is that the
enemy, believing all his ports to be safe, without the presence of his vessels,
sets at once about making our seas and shores the theatre of operations, while
we are left without choice in the matter; for if he think proper to come, and
we are not present, he attains his object without resistance.
The next difference is, that while the enemy (saving only the opposition of
Providence) is certain to fall upon the single point, or the many points he may
have selected, there will exist no previous indications of his particular choice,
and, consequently, no reason for preparing our defence on one point rather than
another ; so that the chances of not being present and ready on his arrival are
directly in proportion to the number of our ports, that is to say, the greater the
number of ports the greater the chances that he will meet no opposition whatever.
Another difference is, that the enemy can choose the mode of warfare, as well
as the plan of operations, leaving as little option to us in the one case as in the
other. It will be necessary for us to act, in the first instance, on the supposition
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 145
that an assault will be made with his entire fleet ; because, should we act other-
wise, his coming in that array would involve both fleet and coast in inevitable
defeat and ruin. Being in this state of concentration, then, should the enemy
have any apprehensions as to the result of a general engagement ; should he be
unwilling to put any thing at hazard ; or should he, for any -other reason, prefer
acting by detachments, he can, on approaching the coast, disperse his force into
small squadrons and single ships, and make simultaneous attacks on numerous
points. These enterprises would be speedily consummated; because, as the
single point occupied by our fleet would be avoided, all the detachments would
be unopposed ; and after a few hours devoted to burning shipping, or public
establishments, and taking in spoil, the several expeditions would leave the
coast for some convenient rendezvous, whence they might return, either in fleet
or in detachments, to visit other portions with the scourge.
Is it insisted that our fleet might, notwithstanding, be so arranged as to meet
these enterprises 1
As it cannot be denied that the enemy may select his point of attack out of
the whole extent of coast, where is the prescience that can indicate the spot ?
And if it cannot be foretold, how is that ubiquity to be imparted that shall
always place our fleet in the path of the advancing foe 1 Suppose we attempt to
cover the coast by cruising in front of it, shall we sweep its whole length ?
a distance scarcely less than that which the enemy must traverse in passing from
his coast to ours. Must the Griilf of Mexico be swept, as well as the Atlantic ?
or shall we give up the Gulf to the enemy 1 Shall we cover the southern cities,
or give them up also ? We must, unquestionably, do one of two things : either
relinquish a great extent of coast, confining our cruisers to a small portion only,
or include so much that the chances of intercepting an enemy would seem to be
out of the question.
On the practicability of covering even a small extent of coast by cruising in
front of it or, in other words, the possibility of anticipating an enemy's opera-
tions ; discovering the object of movements of which we get no glimpse, and
hear no tidings ; and seeing the impress of his footsteps on the surface of the
ocean it may be well to consult experience.
The Toulon fleet, in 1798, consisting of about twenty sail of line-of-battle
ships and frigates, about twenty smaller vessels-of-war, and nearly two hundred
transports, conveying the army of Egypt, slipped out of port and surprised
Malta. It was followed by Nelson, who, thinking correctly that they were
bound for Egypt, shaped his course direct for Alexandria.
The French, steering toAvards Canclia, took the more circuitous passage, so
that Nelson arrived at Alexandria before them ; and, not finding them there, re-
turned, by the way of Garamania and Candia, to Sicily, missing his adversary
in both passages. Sailing again for Alexandria, he found the French fleet at
anchor in Aboukir bay ; and, attacking them, achieved the memorable victory
of the Nile.
When we consider the narrowness of this sea ; the very numerous vessels in
the French fleet ; the actual crossing of the two fleets on a certain night ; and
that Nelson, notwithstanding, could see nothing of the enemy himself, and hear
nothing of them from merchant vessels, we may judge of* the probability of
waylaying our adversary on the broad Atlantic.
The escape of another Toulon fleet in 1805 ; the long search for them in the
Mediterranean by the same able officer ; the pursuit in the West Indies ; their
evasion of him amongst the islands ; the return to Europe ; his vain efforts, sub-
sequently, along the coast of Portugal, in the Bay of Biscay, and off the English
channel ; and the meeting at last at Trafalgar brought about only because the
combined fleets, trusting to the superiority that the accession of several re-en-
forcements had given, were willing to try the issue of battle : these are instances
H. Rep. Com. 86 10
146 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
of many that might be cited, to show how small is the probability of encounter-
ing, on the ocean, an enemy who desires to avoid a meeting ; and how little the
most untiring zeal, the most restless activity, the most exalted professional skill
and judgment, can do to lessen the adverse chances. For more than a year
Nelson most closely watched his enemy, who seems to have got -out of port as
soon as he was fully prepared to do so, and without attracting the notice of any
of the blockading squadron. When out, Nelson, perfectly in the dark as to the
course Villeneuve had taken, sought for him in vain on the coast of Egypt.
Scattered by tempests, the French fleet again took refuge in Toulon ; whence it
again put to sea, when refitted and ready, joining the Spanish fleet at Cadiz.
On the courage, skill, vigilance, and judgment acceded on all hands to belong,
in a pre-eminent degree, to the naval profession in this country, this system of
defence relies to accomplish, against a string of chances, objects of importance
so great that not a doubt or misgiving as to the result is admissible. It demands
of the navy to do perfectly, and without fail, that which to do at all seems
impossible. The navy is required to know the secret purposes of the enemy, in
spite of distance and the broken intercourse of a state of Avar, even before these
purposes are known to the leader who is to execute them ; nay, more, before the
purpose itself is formed. On an element where man is but the sport of storms,
the navy is required to lie in wait for the foe at the exact spot and moment, in
spite of weather and seasons ; to see him in spite of fogs and darkness. Finally,
after all the devices and reliances of the system are satisfactorily accomplished,
and all difficulties subdued, it submits to the issue of a single battle, on equal
terms, the fate of the war, having no resource or hope beyond.
It may here be alleged that the term navy, as applied to the defence of the
country, means more than the sea-going vessels we have enumerated ; that it
means, also, gunboats, floating batteries, and steam batteries ; and that the true
system of defence for the coast requires us to provide all our harbors with some
or all of these vessels, according to local circumstances ; leaving to the sea-going
vessels the duty of destroying the enemy's commerce, carrying the war into the
enemy's seas, and contending for the mastery of the ocean.
But such a proposition is totally distinct from that we have been considering.
This is one that we regard as, in part, perfectly sound ; as containing, though
not true throughout, the great principle on which the present glory of the navy
proper has been built, and its future glory will depend.
We are aware that some of our ships have been blockaded within our harbors,
but we are not aware that any of the high distinction achieved by that service
has been gained in these blockaded ships.
On the other hand, we know that, instead of lying in harbor and contenting
themselves with keeping a few more of the enemy's vessels in watch over them
than their own number instead of leaving the enemy's commerce in undisturbed
enjoyment of the sea, and our own commerce without countenance or aid they
scattered themselves over the wide surface of the ocean, penetrated to the most
remote seas, everywhere acting with the most brilliant success against the ene-
my's navigation. And we believe, moreover, that in the amount of enemy's
property thus destroyed, of American property protected or recovered, and in
the number of hostile ships kept in pursuit of our scattered vessels ships,
evaded if superior, and beaten if equal they rendered benefits a thousand fold
greater, to say nothing of the glory they acquired for the nation and the char-
acter they imparted to it, than any that would have resulted from a state of
passiveiiess within the 'harbors.
Confident that this is the true policy as regards the employment of the navy
proper, we doubt not that it will, in the future, be acted on as it has been in the
past, and that the results, as regards both honor and advantage, will be expanded
commensurately with its own enlargement.
In order, however, that the navy may always assume and maintain that active
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 147
and energetic deportment in offensive operations, which is at the same time so
consistent with its functions and so consonant with its spirit, we have shown
that it must not be occupied with mere coast defence.
But if the navy is to be relieved from this home duty some other reliance
must be substituted ; the navy itself requiring, for its own establishments, not
less than the towns and harbors, that the defence be complete. And this brings
us to consider whether the floating defences mentioned above, namely, gunboats,
floating batteries, and steam batteries, constitute the best reliance.
After considering these defensive means, we will examine the properties of
forts and land batteries, these being the only other well-tried resort ; and that a
comparison may be instituted, we will confine ourselves to cases where the latter
are properly applicable.
There are doubtlesss, situations where it may be necessary for us to present a
defensive array, at the same time that to do so by fortifications alone would be
impracticable ; and it is not, therefore, prejudging the question we are about to
examine ; it is neither underrating fortifications, nor overrating these floating
defences, to say that these last are, some or all of them, indispensable in such
positions.
Any very broad water, where deep soundings may be carried at a distance
from the shores greater than effective gun range, and where no insular spot,
natural or artificial, can be found or formed nearer the track of ships, will present
such a situation ; and we may take some of our great bays as examples.
Broad sounds and wide roadsteads, affording secure anchorage beyond good
gun range from the shores, will afford examples of another sort ; and harbors
with very wide entrances and large surface exhibit examples of still another
kind.
As, in all such cases, fortifications alone will be ineffectual, and, nevertheless,
recourse to defences of some sort may be unavoidable, it has not failed to be a
recommendation in the several reports on the defence of the coast, since 1818,
that there should be a suitable and timely provision of appropriate floating
defences. And until the invention of man shall have caused an entire revolution
in the nature of maritime attack and defence, these or kindred means must be
resorted to ; not, however, because they are means intrinsically good, or suitable
under other circumstances, but because they are the only means applicable.
In the circumstances just referred to there is no alternative, and therefore no
point to be discussed. The remaining question is, whether these floating defences
are to be relied on in cases that admit of defence by fortifications.
And, first, as to gunboats. Although of undoubted use in peculiar circum-
stances, it will hardly be contended that gunboats afford a safe reliance in
harbors that can be entered by vessels of magnitude. Ships becalmed or
aground might be sorely harassed, if not destroyed, by a spirited attack from
this force, and there are other situations wherein it would be very effective.
But harbors defended by gunboats will not be attacked in calms nor with ad-
verse winds ; and it is not easy to believe that any probable array of these craft
would impede or hinder for a moment the advance of a hostile fleet. Nelson,
at Trafalgar, bore down in two divisions upon the combined fleet, each division
being exposed to a raking fire ; and, although suffering considerably from that
fire, he was able, notwithstanding, to break the hostile line and defeat his supe-
rior adversary. What, comparatively with the raking fire of the combined
fleet, would be the fire of a fleet of gunboats ? Opposing no effectual obstacle
to approach or entrance, these small vessels, scattered and driven upon the
shoals, would be kept, by the broadside of a few active vessels, at too great a
distance to produce any serious effect upon the main attack by their desultory-
fire.
Although they might afford useful means of annoyance during a protracted
occupation by the enemy of harbors that contained extensive shoal grounds and
148 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
shallow bays and inlets, they would be nearly useless in resisting the first
assault, and in preventing the brief operation of levying contributions, or burning
or spoiling national establishments.
The true reason of this feeble defence must not, however, be misunderstood.
It is not that the boats do not carry guns enough or men enough for the object,
but it is because, from the comparative weakness of the vessels, the guns and the
men cannot be kept in an effective position.
There are, moreover, many harbors requiring defence in which there are no
shoals whereon these boats could take refuge, and in such their capture or de-
struction would be inevitable should there be, at the same time, no river up
which they might fly, or lateral issue through which they could escape to a safe
distance.
Floating batteries, of which good use might be sometimes made in peculiar
situations, would, we suppose, differ from gunboats in being larger, containing
many guns, and in being stronger that is to say, having thicker sides or bul-
warks ; and it has sometimes even been proposed to construct them with ball
proof parapets, and with platforms open above, like, in these respects, batteries
upon the shore. But, in whatever way formed, it is necessarily a part of the
idea that they be strong and massive ; and, consequently, that they be unwieldy,
incapable of sudden change of place, and incapacitated either to advance upon
a defeated foe or to evade a victorious one. We are not, of course, now speak-
ing of batteries moved by steam.
Being denied the power of locomotion, at least for any purpose of mancEuvring
in face of the enemy, we are to consider these batteries as moored in position
and awaiting his advance. Should the batteries be large, requiring deep water
to float them, or should they be placed across or near the channel for the sake
of proximity to the track of ships, the enemy would engage them at close
quarters. All advantages of mobility of concentrating his whole fleet upon
one or two points, to which, under these circumstances, no relief can be sent
of greater elevation and command, would be on the side of the assailant, with
no countervailing advantage to the batteries, but greater thickness of bulwarks,
Whether this excess of thickness should be considered a material advantage,
since the introduction of large bomb-cannon into the armament of ships, is a
doubtful matter. The batteries, if anchored across the channel, would have the
further advantage of a raking fire : but we have seen that the raking fire of one
squadron of ships upon another advancing is by no means decisive. The
power of throwing the whole assailing force upon one or two points, of pouring
upon the decks of the batteries a greatly superior force of boarders, would, of
themselves, seem to leave little room to doubt as to the issue.
If now we suppose these floating batteries to be smaller, so that, having a
lighter draught, they might be placed near the shores or upon the shoals, they
might certainly be thereby saved from the kind of attack which would prove so
fatal if anchored more boldly in deep water ; but they would, at the same time,
lose much of their efficiency from their remoteness, and positions wherein they
would be secure from being laid alongside, while they would be in a proper at-
titude to contribute materially to the defence of the harbor, are afforded but
rarely. It is doubtful whether, as a general rule, these smaller floating batter-
ies, notwithstanding their greater capability of endurance, would afford a better
defence, gun for gun, than gunboats ; or, in other words, whether this capability
of endurance in the one would be more than a compensation for the power of
locomotion in the other.
But whether near the shore or in the channel, whether large or small, this
description of defence, owing to its fixedness, connected with the destructibility
of the material of which it must be made, will be exposed to attacks analagous
to those made by gunboats on ships aground. The enemy, knowing of what
the. defensive arrangements consist, will come provided with the requisite mini-.
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 149
ber of sailing or steam vessels, armed with bomb-cannon, against which the
thicker bulwarks of the floating batteries would avail nothing. He would, be-
sides, hardly fail to provide himself with bomb-ketches armed with heavy sea-
mortars ; and as there could be no guarding against the effects of the long ranges
of these, a few such vessels would, with great certainty, constrain the floating
batteries to quit their position, abandoning every disposition approaching to a
concentrated array. Not to mention other modes of attack which would seem
to leave the chances of success with the enemy, it will be noticed that this kind
of defence, whether by gunboats or floating batteries, has the same intrinsic
fault that an inactive defence by the navy proper has ; that is to say, the enemy
has it in his power to bring to the attack a force of the same nature, and at least
as efficacious as that relied on for defence ; hence the necessity not of mere
equality, but of superiority, on the part of the defence at every point liable to
be attacked ; and hence, also, the necessity of having an aggregate force as
many times larger than that disposable by the enemy as we have important
places to guard. Should we, for example, have ten such places, and the enemy
threaten us with twenty ships-of-the-line, we must have in all these places an
aggregate of gunboats and floating batteries more than equivalent to two hun-
dred ships-of-the-line ; for it will be hardly contended that these defences can be
transported from one place to another as they may be respectively in danger.
But what will be the relative state of the parties if, instead of gunboats or
floating batteries, we resort to steam batteries ? Although much has been said
of late of the great advantage that defence is to derive from this description of
force, we have not been able to discover the advantages ; nor do we see that
sea-coast defence has been benefitted in any particular by the recent improve-
ment in steam vessels, except that, in the case before adverted to, where, from
the breadth of the waters, defence from the shore would be unavailing, a more
active and formidable defence than by gunboats and floating batteries is pro-
vided. It must be remembered that by far the greatest improvement in steam
vessels consists in having adapted them to ocean navigation ; and one inevitable
consequence of this improvement will be that, if the defence of harbors by
steam batteries be regarded as securing them from the attacks of ships of the
line and frigates, or, at least, of placing the defence quite above that kind of
attack, they will no longer be attacked by sailing vessels, but by steam vessels,
similar in all warlike properties to those relied on for defence.
Not only is there no impediment to transferring these vessels across the ocean,
but the rapidity and certainty of these transfers are such as to enjoin a state of
the most perfect readiness everywhere and at all times, and also a complete in-
dependence of arrangement at each particular point ; both the state of prepara-
tion and the independence of arrangement being much more important than
when the enemy's motions were governed by the uncertain favor of winds and
weather.
It is not easy to conceive of any important properties belonging to steam
batteries acting defensively that the attacking steam vessels may not bring with
them, or, at least, may not have imparted to them on their arrival upon the
coast, unless it should be thought proper to give to the former a greater thick-
ness of bulwark than would be admissible in sea-going vessels.
But the peculiar advantage conferred by steam lies in the facility of moving
with promptitude and rapidity ; and any attempts to strengthen the harbor ves-
sels by thickening their bulwarks considerably would unavoidably lessen their
mobility, thereby partially neutralizing the advantage sought. At the same
time, it is extremely doubtful whether any benefit would be derived from the
thicker sides. It is probable that the best kind of bulwark for these vessels
and all others is that which will be just proof against grape and canister shot
fired from moderate distances ; because, with such bulwarks, a shell fired from a
bomb-cannon within a reasonable distance would pierce both sides ; that is to
150 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
say, would go in at one side of the ship and out at the opposite, producing no
greater effect than a solid shot of the same calibre, while, with thickened sides,
every shell would lodge in the timbers, and produce terrible ravages by bursting.
In the practice with these missiles in this country it has been found difficult
to lodge a shell in thin targets, ev^n when the load of the gun was so reduced
as to increase materially the uncertainty of aim. As it is probable, therefore,
that the protection from solid shot afforded by massive bulwarks would be more
than counterbalanced by the greater injury horizontal shells would inflict by
means of these bulwarks, we'may conclude that the harbor steam battery will
not differ in this respect materially from the attacking steamships, and, if they
do differ in having more solid and impervious bulwarks, that no advantage over
the enemy will result therefrom. We come, therefore, to the same result as
when considering the application of the other kinds of floating force to the de-
fence of harbors ; and this result is, that there is no way of placing the coast in
a condition of reasonable security but by having at any point the enemy may
happen to select a force in perfect readiness which shall be superior to that
brought to the attack.
The reason of this coincidence of result is, that no peculiarity in form or de-
tails can disguise the difficulties or essentially modify the conditions inseparable
from the nature of a floating force.
Buoyancy is a condition necessary to every variety of the force, and to ob-
serve this condition a common material must be used in each a material that is
combustible, weak, and penetrable to missiles. If the weakness and penetra-
bility be in part remedied by an increase of the quantity of the material, it
must be at the sacrifice of buoyancy, activity, and speed properties of great
value. If a small draught of water be desired, it can only be obtained at the
expense of that concentration of power which is a great and almost character-
istic quality of naval armament.
It might not be strictly true to say that as much would be lost in one respect
as would be gained in another ; but, though modifications of this floating force,
made with a view to adapt it to .peculiar services, will somewhat disturb the
equilibrium of the several kinds, there will still be no great disparity when
acting in their appropriate way, and a little superadded force to the weaker
party will restore the balance. None of these modifications, it should be ob-
served, touch, on the one hand, the means whereby injury is inflicted, nor, on
the other, the susceptibility to injury. All are still timber structures, carrying
a common armament.
The necessity of having at each point a force at least equal to the attacking
force will require large preparations on any supposition. With the navy proper,
however, with gunboats and floating batteries, something has already been
done ; the existing navy will be an important contribution. Small vessels sup-
plied by commerce would afford tolerable substitutes for gunboats, and from the
class of merchant ships many vessels might be drawn for service as floating
batteries; still there will remain great efforts to be made and great amounts to
be expended to complete the defensive array. But a reliance on steam batteries
would lead to expenditure vastly greater, because with them all has yet to be
provided. Having at present no force of this kind on hand, (or next to none,)
the preparation by the enemy of (say) twenty steam frigates would require the
construction of two hundred of equal force on our part, supposing that we de-
sign to cover but ten of our principal harbors, leaving all others at his mercy.
Having shown that steam batteries cannot be substituted for shore defences,
we will here add that they will, on the other hand, in certain cases necessarily
increase the number of these defences, and in other cases augment their force.
Channels which admitted only small vessels-of-war would, in peculiar positions,
need no defence; in other positions their defence might be safely trusted to
works of moderate force. The introduction of these vessels of small draught
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 151
and great power requires, however, that these passages should be defended and
defended adequately.
We should not have gone so much at length into a branch of our subject
wherein the general conclusions appear to be so obvious and incontrovertible,
but for the prevalence of opinions which we consider not erroneous merely, but
highly dangerous, and which, we think, must give way before a full exhibition
of the truth. We do not anticipate any formidable objections to the positions
assumed nor to the illustrations ; but even should all these, in the form we have
presented them, be objected to, we may still challenge opposition to the follow-
ing broad propositions, namely :
1st. If the sea-coast is to be defended by naval means exclusively, the defen-
sive force at each point deemed worthy of protection must be at least equal in
power to the attacking force.
2d. As, from the nature of the case, there can be no reason for expecting an
attack on one 'of these points rather than on another, and no time for transferring
our state of preparation from one to another after an attack has been declared,
each of them must have assigned to it the requisite means ; and,
3d. Consequently this system demands a power in the defence as many times
greater than that in the attack as there are points to be covered.
Believing that a well-digested system of fortifications will save the country
from the danger attending every form of defence by naval means, and the in-
tolerable expense of a full provision of those means, we will now endeavor to
show that such a system is worthy of all reliance.
There has been but one practice among nations as to the defence of ports and
harbors ; and that has been a resort to fortifications. All the experience that
history exhibits is on one side only ; it is the opposition of forts, or other works
comprehended by the term fortification, to attack by vessels ; and although
history affords some instances wherein this defence has not availed, we see that
the resort is still the same. No nation omits covering the exposed points upon
her seaboard with fortifications, nor hesitates in confiding in them.
In opposition to this mode of defence much stress is laid on certain successful
attacks that have been made by ships on works deemed strong. We have no
doubt that all such results might be accounted for by circumstances independent
of the naked question of relative strength ; but at any rate, when carefully con-
sidered, how little do these results prove, in comparison with numerous other
instances, in which there was an immense disparity of force in favor of vessels
that have been signally defeated. These latter instances are those that should
be received as a test of the actual relation between the two kinds of force ; not
certainly because they were successful, but because the smaller the work, its
armament, its garrison, the less the probability that any extraneous influence
has been in operation. A single gun behind a parapet, provided its position be
a fair one, and the parapet be proof, need, as regards its contest with ships, owe
nothing else to the art of fortification ; and its effect will be the same whether
the battery were fresh from the hands of the ablest engineer of the age, or were
erected at the dawn of the art. The gun is in a position to be used with effect ;
the men are as fully protected by the parapet as the service of the gun will
allow ; they are brave and skilful, and there is nothing to prevent their doing
their duty to the utmost. These are all conditions easily fulfilled, and therefore
likely to be so. The state of things is not less just and fair toward the vessel ;
she chooses her time and opportunity ; the battery goes not to the ship, but the
ship to the battery ; taking the wind, the tide, the sea all, as she would have
them ; her condition and discipline are perfect, and her crew courageous and
adroit. Nothing, under such circumstances, can prevent the just issue of battle
but some extraordinary accident possible, indeed, to either party, but easily
recognized when occurring.
The contest between larger works and heavy squadrons may be much more
152 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES
complicated affairs, the cause of disaster to tlie former being often traceable to
potent, though not always obvious, influences. The fortifications may have
been absurdly planned originally or badly executed, for there has at all times
been in this profession, as in others, much scope given to quackery ; they may
have been erected at a time when the ships-of-war, against which they were
provided, were very different things from the lofty line-of-battle-ships of modern
times ; a long peace or long impunity may have left them hi a state wholly un-
prepared for the sudden use of their strength ; the command may have been
intrusted to persons ignorant alike of the amount of power in their hands and
of the mode of exercising it ; the garrison may have been undisciplined or mu-
tinous the populace discontented or disloyal ; the clamor of frightened citizens
may have caused a premature surrender : all these, or any of them, may have
produced the issue, leaving the question of relative power untouched.
While there can be no doubt that these and other deteriorating influences
may have occasionally operated to the prejudice of fortifications, and that these
were likely to be more numerous and more controlling as the works were more
extensive, it is certain that there can be no influence acting in a reverse direction
upon them ; that is to say, none making them stronger and more efficient than
they ought to be. There can be no favorable influence of such a nature, for
example, as to make the simple one-gun battery before mentioned equivalent to
a battery (say) ten times as large.
It must not be supposed, from what we have said in relation to larger fortifi-
cations, that their magnitude necessarily involves imperfection or weakness ;
nor, because we have considered small and simple works as affording the best
solution to the question of relative force, must it be inferred that small works
are suited to all circumstances. We speak here in reference merely to the
judgment we are entitled to form of the relative power of these antagonist
forces from their contests as exhibited in history. In instances of the latter
sort there cannot, from the nature of the case, be any important influence
operating of which we are ignorant, or for which we cannot make due allow-
ances ; while, in examples of the former kind, we may be in the dark as to many
vital matters.
These observations have been deemed necessary because, in judging of this
matter, it might not be so obvious that certain brilliant and striking results
should not be adopted as affording the true test of relative power. It would be
more natural to turn to Copenhagen and Algiers, as indicating where the power
lies, than to Charleston and Stoningtou ; and yet these latter, as indices, would
be true, and the former false.
We will now turn to certain examples :
"The name of Martello tower was adopted in consequence of the good de-
fence made by a small round tower in the Bay of Martello, in Corsica, in the
year 1794, which, although armed with one heavy gun only, beat off one or two
British ships-of-war without sustaining any material injury from their fire. But
this circumstance ought merely to have proved the superiority which guns on
shore must always, in certain situations, possess over those of shipping, no
matter whether the former are mounted on a tower or not. That this is a just
decision will, perhaps, be readily allowed by all who are acquainted with the
following equally remarkable, but less generally known fact, which occurred
about twelve years afterwards in the same part of the world."*
" Sir Sidney Smith, in the Poinpe'e, an eighty-gun ship, the Hydra, of thirty-
eight guns, Captain Manby, and another frigate, anchored about eight hundred
yards from a battery of two guns, situated on the extremity of Cape Licosa, and
protected from assault by a tower in which were five and twenty French soldiers,
commanded by a lieutenan .
* Parley's Course, vol. iii.
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 153
" The line-of-battle-sliip and the frigates fired successive broadsides till their
ammunition was nearly expended ; the battery continually replying with a slow
but destructive effect. The Pompee, at which ship alone it directed its fire had
forty shot in her hull ; her mizen topmast carried away ; a lieutenant, midship-
man, and five men killed, and thirty men wounded. At length, force proving
ineffectual, negotiation was resorted to, and after some hours' parley, the officer*
a Corsican, and relative of Napoleon, capitulated. It then appeared that the
carriage of one of the two guns had failed on the second shot, and the gun had
subsequently been fired lying on the sill of the embrazure ; so that in fact the
attack of an eighty-gun ship and two frigates had been resisted by a single
piece of ordnance." (Journal of Sieges, by Colonel John T. Jones.)
The Corsican tower above mentioned, which had, in like manner, completely
baffled a naval cannonade, was very soon found to surrender when attacked by
land ; not, however, before a small battery had been made [erected] to reduce
it." (Paslei/s Course, vol. iii.)
Here are two examples :
1st. A single heavy gun, mounted on a tower, beat off one or two British ships.
2d. A barbette battery, containing two guns, beat off a British eighty-gun ship
supported by two frigates.
It would seem that no exception can possibly be taken to either instance, as
trials of relative power. There is no complication of circumstances on one side
or the other ; nothing to confuse or mislead ; all is perfectly simple and plain.
A small body of artillery, judiciously posted on the shore, is attacked by armed
vessels bearing forty or fifty times as many guns; and the ships, unable to pro-
duce any effect in consequence, are beaten off with loss.
The cases present no peculiar advantage on the side of the batteries either as
regards position or quality ; for both works were immediately reduced by a land
attack ; that which the eighty-gun ship and two frigates were unable to effect,
being immediately accomplished by landing two field-pieces, with a very small
portion of the crew of one of the vessels.
On the other hand, there was no peculiar disadvantage on the part of the
ships, as the time and mode of attack were of their own choice.
In order that there might be no unjust disparagement of the vessels, in the
manner of representing the affairs, the language of British military writers (the
ships being British) had been exactly quoted. (See Pasley's Course of Elemen-
tary Fortifications, vol. ii, and Journal of Sieges, by Colonel John T. Jones.)
Had the representation of these actions been taken from the victorious party,
the result would have appeared still more to the disadvantage of the ships.
The circumstances attending the attack and defence of Copenhagen, in April,
1801, seem to have been the following :
On the northeast side of the city (the only side exposed to attack from heavy
ships) there lies a shoal spreading outward from the walls, about three-quarters
of a mile in the narrowest part. Through this shoal there runs, in a northeast
and by north direction, a narrow channel connecting the basin, in the heart of
the city, with deep water. Were it not for this shoal, vessels might approach
even to the walls of the city, on a length of about one and a half mile ; as it is,
they can get no nearer, in any place, than about three-quarters of a mile, with-
out following the channel just mentioned. As the edge of the shoal lies nearly
north and south, and the channel passes through it in a northeast-by-north
direction, the great mass of the shoal is to the southward, or on the right hand
side of the channel. We will call this the southern shoal. The " Three-crown
battery " is situated upon this southern shoal and near the channel.
The Danish defences consisted
1st. Of the fortifications on this side of the city, including the Three-crown
battery; Nelson estimated the batteries supporting the Danish vessels at about
ninety guns.
154 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
2d. Of four sail of the line, mounting 282 guns, and one frigate and two sloops,
mounting 76 guns; making 358 guns. All these vessels lying in the channel
before -mentioned, and some of them near its mouth ; they constituted the left of
the Danish floating defences, and were thus posted to defend the entrance to the
inner harbor or basin.
3d. Of a line of floating defences, of various kinds, moored near the edge of the
southern shoal. They were eighteen in number, as follows, counting from the
right or southern extremity: 1st, a block-ship of 56 guns; 2d, a block-ship of
48 guns; 3d, a praam of 20 gun; 4th, a praam of 20 guns; 5th, a block-ship of
48 guns; 6th, a raft of 20 guns; 7th, a block-ship of 22 guns; 8th, a raft of 20
guns ; 9th, a block-ship of 62 guns ; 10th, a small vessel of 6 guns; llth, a raft
of 24 guns; 12, a praam of 20 guns; 13th, a ship-of-the-line of 74 guns; 14th,
a block-ship of 26 guns; 15th, a raft of 18 guns; 16th, a ship of the line of 60
guns; 17th, a block-ship of 64 guns; 18th, a "frigate" of 20 guns; total in
this line 628 guns. These vessels were moored in a line extending south from
a point outside and a little to the southward of the Three-crown battery ; and
the part of the line nearest the walls was not less than three-quarters of a mile
distant.
Lord Nelson carried to the attack the Elephant, 74 guns; Defiance, 74;
Monarch, 74; Bellona, 74; Edgar, 74; Eussell, 74; Ganges, 74; Glutton, 54;
Isis, 50; Agamemnon, 64; Polyphemus, 74; Ardent, 64; Amazon, 38; De-
siree, 38; Blanche, 36; Alcmene, 32; Dart, 30; Arrow, 18; Cruiser, 18;
Harpy, 18; Zephyr, 14; Otter, 14; Discovery, 16; Sulphur, 10; Hecla, 10;
Explosion, 8; Zebra, 16; Terror, 10; Volcano, 8; making a total of 1,074
guns, besides a few in gunboats. The Agamemnon did not get into action;
which reduces the force employed to 1,010 guns. The Bellona and Russell
grounded ; but Lord Nelson says, " although not in the situation assigned them,
yet they were so placed as to be of good service."
With this force Lord Nelson engaged the line of floating defences that was
moored near the edge of the southern shoal. He approached from the south
with a fair wind ; and as his leading vessel got abreast of the most southern of
the Danish line she anchored by the stern. The second English vessel passed
on until she had reached the next position, when she anchored, also, in the same
way; and thus, inverting his line as he extended it, he brought his whole force
against the outer and southern part of the Danish force. His line did not reach
as far northward as the Three-crown battery, and mouth of the channel ; for, he
says, in speaking of the grounding of the Bellona, Russell, and Agamemnon :
" These accidents prevented the extension of our line by the three ships before
mentioned, who would, I am confident, have silenced the Crown islands, (Three-
crown battery,) the outer ships in the harbor's mouth, and prevented the heavy
loss in the Defiance and Monarch."
Concentrating, as he did, the force of 1,010 guns upon a portion of the Danish
array, not only inferior to him by 382 guns, but so situated as to be beyond the
scope of succor, and without a chance of escape, Lord Nelson had no reason to
doubt that signal success would crown his able arrangement. Every vessel in
this outer Danish line was taken or destroyed, except one or two smaller vessels,
which cut and ran in under shelter of the fortifications.
The vessels lying in the narrow channel could participate in no material
degree in the action, l^cause the British line did not reach abreast of them ; and
because, not being advanced beyond the general direction of the Danish line,
but, on the contrary, retired behind it, they could not act upon any of the
British vessels, except, perhaps, obliquely upon two or three of the most northern
ships. But had all the Danish vessels that were lying in the narrow channel
been mingled, from the first, with the line that was destroyed, the result would
probably have been still more to the advantage of the assailants ; that is to say,
these vessels, also, would have been captured or destroyed; because, not only -
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 155
would the aggregate Danish force of 986 gnns have been inferior to the 1,010
guns of the British, but it would also have been without the ability to counter-
act the power of concentration possessed by the latter, whereby the whole force
would have acted on parts of the Danish line in succession.
For the same reason that the squadron which lay in the narrow channel could
not materially aid in resisting the attack made on the line of floating defences
anchored along the edge of the shoal, the action of the Three-crown battery, and
the guns on the shore must have been greatly restricted. Situated upon the
shoal, the Three-crown battery was behind the Danish line, which consequently
masked it, and also the shore batteries, from a view of the English line. Under
such circumstances it is not conceivable that the batteries could be used with
effect ; and the commander of the Danish forces says expressly that the Three-
crown battery "did not come at all into action;" and a chronicler of the times
states that the fortifications of the town "were of no service while the action
lasted ; they began to fire when the enemy took possession of the abandoned ships,
but it was" at the same time that the parley appeared" In proportion as the
Danish vessels passed into the hands of the English, as some were burnt, and
others blown up, the scope of the batteries would enlarge, and their power be
felt ; but just as all impediment of this sort had been removed, Lord Nelson
himself proposed the cessation of hostilities, and the action ceased. It might be
profitable to discuss the probable consequences of a continuance of the action ;
to inquire why it was that Lord Nelson, after he had conquered two-thirds of
the 986 floating guns opposed to him, did not pursue his advantage, and concen-
trate his 1,010 guns upon the 358 guns, which were all that remained of the
floating defences of the Danes, especially as the wind was in favor of such a
manoeuvre. But having already devoted too much space to this peculiar con-
test, we will suppose some dictate of policy, perhaps of humanity, induced him
to close the contest, relying on the severe blow he had already inflicted, and the
commanding tone it enabled him to assume for such a termination of the pending
negotiation as the interest or policy of Great Britain demanded.
It is important, however, yet to notice that, as soon as the negotiation opened,
Lord Nelson's vessels passed out of the reach of the Three-crown battery as fast
as they could be withdrawn. Lord Nelson himself states that this battery was
not silenced.
A British writer, speaking of this crisis, says : "It must not, however, be con-
cealed that Lord Nelson, at the time he dictated this note to the Dane, was
placed in rather awkward and difficult circumstances ; the principal batteries, as
well as the ships which were stationed at the mouth of the harbor, were still
unconquered; two of his own vessels were aground, and exposed to a heavy
fire; others, if the battle continued, might be exposed to a similar fate; while
he found it would be scarcely practicable to bring off the prizes under the fire
of the batteries. These considerations, undoubtedly, influenced him in resolving
to endeavor to put a stop to hostilities, in addition to the instructions he had to
spare the Danes, and the respect he might have felt for their brave defence."
(Campbell's Naval History, vol. vii, p. 203.)
The circumstances above detailed show clearly :
1st. That the battle of Copenhagen was fought between an English fleet,
mounting 1,010 guns, and a Danish line of floating defences, mounting 628 guns;
and that all the latter were conquered. e
2d. That the Danish line wab attacked in such a manner that none of the
fixed batteries in the system of defence could participate in the contest, which
was carried on up to the surrender of the Danish line, almost exclusively between
vessels. It appears that a few of the smaller vessels, under Captain Riou,
occupying the northern extremity of the English line, were under the fire of the
Three-crown battery. The loss being very severe, he was obliged to retreat.
156 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
3d. That as soon as the batteries were unmasked and began to act the battle
was closed, by Nelson opening a parley.
4th. That, consequently, it was in no sense a contest between ships and
batteries, or a triumph of ships over batteries, and affords no ground for judging
of their relative power.
5th. That it illustrates, strikingly, the advantage that a fleet possesses over
a stationary line of floating defences. Lord Nelson was superior to the whole of
his adversary's floating force ; but not being disposed to run any unnecessary
hazard he directed all his force upon a part of the Danish line, which was, of
course, defeated ; and had there been no other than a floating force present, so
of course would have been the remainder; had it been of twice the strength it
was. This example fully confirms what we have before urged on this topic.
In estimating the respective forces above, we have set down the vessels of
both parties at their rate : that is to say, a ship called seventy-four we have
reckoned at 74 guns.
We now proceed to examine a great instance of naval success, in which there
is no room to cjoubt the extent to which fortifications were engaged; this instance
is the attack on Algiers in 1816.
The attack was made by the combined English and Dutch fleets, mounting
about one thousand guns, under the command of Lord Exmouth.
In the fortifications that looked towards the water, there are enumerated in a
plan, supposed to be authentic, 320 guns; but not more than 200 of these could
act upon the fleet as it lay. The ratio of the forces engaged, therefore, as ex-
pressed by the numder of guns, (saying nothing of the calibres, of which we
know nothing,) was about as 5 to 2. The action continued from a quarter before
three until nine, without intermission, and did not cease altogether until half-
past eleven.
It is very certain that the effects of the fire upon the Algerine shipping and
town were very severe, because we know that all the shipping was destroyed
excepting some small vessels ; and we know also that Lord Exmouth dictated
the terms of the treaty that followed.
Honorable as this result was to the combined fleets, and happy as it was foi
the cause of humanity, there are, nevertheless, technical circumstances connected
with it that excite doubts as to how much of the final result was due to physi-
cal chastisement, to moral effect, to inherent defects in the defences, and to
ignorance in the use of these defences, such as they were. That the loss ir
killed and wounded in the city and works was great is probable, because w(
are informed that a very great addition had been made to the garrison, in pre
paration for the attack, under some impression, no doubt, that a landing woulc
be attempted. For the service of the guns there were needed but 3,000 or 4,00(
men, at the utmost. An accumulation beyond that number would add nothing
to the vigor of defence, while, by causing an increase of the casualties, it woulc
heighten the terrors of the combat. The depressing effect of this loss of life ir
the batteries, and of the burning of buildings within the town and about th(
mole, was of course increased by the entire destruction of the Algerine fleet, an
chored within the mole.
We have no means of judging of the actual condition of the works ; nor o:
their fitness for the task of contending with the heavy ships of modern times.
The forts and batteries on the shore were probably too elevated to be com
manded even by the largest of the assailing ships ; and, provided these gun;
were covered with a proof parapet, they may be regarded as being well situated
But more than half of the guus engaged were in the Mole-head battery ; anc
the mode ojP attack adopted, especially by the Queen Charlotte, of 110 guns, wai
calculated to test, in the severest manner, the principles on which this work hac
been planned. She so placed herself within "fifty yards" of the extremity o
this battery, that she could either rake or take in reverse every part of it. I
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 157
slie, at the same time, commanded the battery that is to say, if, from her spar
deck, she could look down upon its platform then she must at once, with her
grape and canister, have driven the garrison from that platform, leaving only
the lower and covered tier of guns, if there were such a tier, for service. With
our imperfect knowledge of the fortifications, all this must however, be left to
conjecture.
But there are matters connected with the service of the batteries which are
not conjecture. Not a shot was fired until the Queen Charlotte had anchored.
What a different vessel, when she anchored, might not this ship have been,
if the Mole-head battery had employed its fire of more than 100 guns in raking
her, from the time she arrived within a mile and a half until she had anchored
within fifty yards 1 How different might have been the condition of the fleet,
generally, if they had been subjected, during the approach, and while assuming
their stations, to the raking fire of all the 200 guns ?
It does not appear that a single hot shot was fired from the batteries.
We might also rest on this fact, and assert that a defence which had failed
to provide itself with this auxiliary means, .must have been carried on in disre-
gard, if not in violation, of all rules, all knowledge, and all experience ; that it
was probably without plan or combination, and, not less probable, without
preparation in other particulars of importance scarcely inferior.
Before leaving this example it may be well to inquire what, after all, was the
effect of these batteries upon the ships, compared with the effect of ships upon
ships.
In the battle of the Nile, the French fleet, rated at 1,190 guns, caused a loss
in Nelson's fleet of 895 killed and wounded ; which is in the proportion of ten
French guns to less than eight Englishmen killed and wounded. In the battle
of Trafalgar the French fleet carried not less than 3,000 guns, and they caused
a loss to the English of 1,587 killed and wounded ; which is in the proportion
of ten guns to less than six killed and wounded. In this affair of Algiers, with
a force not ex Ceding 200 guns, the batteries caused a loss of 883 killed and
wounded, beinf^n the proportion of 10 guns to 44 men; and, if we take into
account every * or that was pointed upon the bay, (say 350 guns,) the propor-
tion will be ir. a ^ oa ^ to 25 men ; being an effect more than three times as great
as that produ v ^ a sni jhe French ,ships at the battle of the Nile, and more than
four times a? v T^lv. t j ia {. p ro ^ uce d by the ships of the same nation at Tra-
falgar. .ced^ ' ^o
While ref ' circumstances of this battle the mind is not satisfied
with any rea^ c ^^.^"p resent themselves for the withdrawal of Lord Exmouth,
the moment the land wind enabled him to do so. On the supposition of entire
success on his part, it is not understood why he should feel the great anxiety
he states himself to have been under that this wind should spring up. "Provi-
dence at this interval," (between 10 and 11 at night,) "gave to my anxious
wishes the usual land wind, common in this bay ; and my expectations were
completed. We were all hands employed in warping and towing off, and, by the
help of the light air, the whole were under sail, and came to anchor out of the
reach of shells about two in the morning, after twelve hours incessant labor."
Now, if anything had been decided by the action, it must have been one of
two things : either the ships were victorious, or the batteries were so. If the
ships were completely victorious, it would seem to have been judicious for them
to remain where they were, in order, if there was to be any more fighting, to be
ready to press their advantage; and, especially, in order to maintain the
ascendency, by preventing the remounting of guns, repairing of batteries, and
resupplying them munitions, &c.
Had the people possessed the inflexibility report ascribed to the Dey, and had
they set zealously about the work of preparation for a new contest, it might not
have been easy for Lord Exmouth, in the condition to which his ships are ac-
158 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
knowledged, by authentic accounts, to have been reduced, to enforce his demands.
It is not understood, therefore, why, if he had been so successful as to be certain
that his end was attained, he should be so anxious to get out of gunshot, when,
by so doing, he involved the issue in more or less doubt and hazard.
He relied on the effects produced on the people by his dreadful cannonade,
and the result proves that he was right ; but his anxiety to clear the vessels
from the contest shows that there was a power still unconquered, which he
thought it better to leave to be restrained by the suffering population of the city,
than keep in a state of exasperation and activity by his presence. What was
this power but an unsubdued energy in the batteries ]
The true solution of the question is, then, not so much the amount of injury
done on the one side or the other particularly as there was, on the one side, a
city to suffer, as well as the batteries as the relative efficiency of the parties
when the battle closed at about eleven o'clock. All political agitation and pop-
ular clamor aside, what would have been the result had the fight been continued,
or even had Lord Exmouth renewed it next morning ?
These are questions that can be answered only on conjecture ; but the manner
the battle ended certainly leaves room for many doubts whether, had the subse-
quent demands of Lord Exmouth been rejected, he had it in his power to enforce
them by his ships : whether, indeed, if he had renewed the fight, he would not
have been signally defeated.
On the whole, we do not think that this battle, although it stands pre-eminent
as an example of naval success over batteries, presents any arguments to shake
the confidence which fortifications, well situated, well planned, and well fought,
deserve, as the defences of a seaboard.
GIBRALTAR.
The attack on the water batteries of Gibraltar in September, 1782, by the
French and Spanish floating batteries, is a well known instanc^of the power of
guns on shore.
These floating batteries had been rendered, as was suppchapj ^ot-proof and
shell-proof, by several additional thicknesses of timber tumst " e .des, and by
covering the decks with a roof of sloping timbers. csultj
They mounted 142 guns on the engaged side, with "in * *& ve to replace
any that might be dismounted. They were anchored 'o { n lince cf about
1,000 yards from the walls, and were opposed by aV " at the Sfsf-
After a protracted cannonade, nine of the floating'?&L85 guns. C *kurnt by hot
shot from the shore, and the tenth, having been taken pos&vL .on of by the
victors, was set on fire by them.
No material injury was done to the works of the town by their fire; and only
eighty-five men and officers were killed and wounded by the fire from these
vessels, together with a very violent cannonade and bombardment, from the
siege batteries.
BATTLE OF ALGESIRAS.
On the 6th July, 1801, the French Admiral Lenois was lying at anchor off
the town of Algesiras with two ships of 80 guns, one of 74 guns, and one frigate.
To the south of him, on a small island, was a battery called the Green Island
battery, mounting seven 18 and 24-pounders; and to the north of him, on the
main, another battery called St Jaques's battery, mounting five 18-pounders.
There were, besides, fourteen Spanish gunboats anchored near, making a total
of 306 guns afloat and 12 guns in battery altogether, 318 guns.
Sir James Saumarez, hearing that Lenois was in this position, advanced
against him from Cadiz with two ships of 80 guns, four of 74 guns, one frigate,
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 159
and a lugger in all, 502 guns. On his approach, Lenois, who was anchored in
a line nearly north and south, at some distance from the shore, cut his cables
and ran into shoal water, to prevent being doubled upon by the British line ;
this manoeuvre, at the same time, entirely unmasked the fire of the batteries.
The Hannibal, one of the British 74's, in attempting to close with the French
admiral, touched the ground and could not be floated off. She, however, con-
tinued the fight with great obstinacy, even for a considerable time after she was
deserted by her consorts. Not being able to double upon the French line, an
attempt was made to assault the Green Isle battery, which, being badly served
by the Spaniards, had nearly ceased firing. But this attempt was anticipated
by the arrival at the island of a party sent from the French frigate lying near,
and the assault was defeated, with the loss to the English of one boat sunk and
another taken, the Frenchmen renewing with vigor the fire of the battery. At
the north end of the line the French admiral was aided by seven gunboats,
which took so active a part in the fight that five of them were sunk or rendered
unserviceable. The St. Jaques battery being, however, served sluggishly by
the Spaniards, the French sent a party from the Dessaix to impart greater
activity and effect.
After the combat had continued about six hours, the British squadron drew
off greatly damaged, leaving the Hannibal 74 alone and aground; and she, after
suffering great loss, was obliged to strike. The French insist that the Pompee,
an English ship of 80 guns, had struck her colors, but, as they could not take
possession, she drifted off and was then towed away ; it is believed she was
entirely dismasted.
We do not know the loss in the French squadron, but the killed, wounded,
and missing in the English fleet amounted to 375 men, being more than twelve
men for every ten guns against them, and being twice as great, in proportion, as
the English loss in the battle of Trafalgar.
In this battle of Algesiras there were 502 English guns afloat, acting against
306 French guns afloat. As the English chose their own time for the attack,
and had the wind, it is only reasonable to suppose that 306 of the English guns
were a match for the 306 guns in the French vessels. This will leave 196
English guns afloat opposed to the 12 guns in the batteries, or, reckoning one
side only of each ship, it shows 98 guns in the British fleet to have been over-
matched by the twelve guns in the batteries.
There never was a more signal and complete discomfiture ; and it will admit
of no other explanation than that just given, namely, that the two small batteries,
one of 5 and the other of 7 guns, partly 18 and partly 24-pounders, more than
compensated for the difference in favor of the British fleet of 196 guns.
The Hannibal got aground, it is true, but she continued to use her guns with
the best effect until she surrendered ; and, even on the supposition that this ship
was useless after she grounded, the British had still an excess of 122 guns over
the French fleet and batteries.
These batteries were well placed, and probably well planned and constructed,
but there was nothing extraordinary about them ; their condition before the fight
was complained of by Admiral Lenois ; and they were badly fought in the early
part of the action; still the 12 guns on shore were found to be more than equiva-
lent for two seventy-fours and one frigate.
BATTLE OF FUENTERABIA.
This recent affair introduces steam batteries to our notice.
On the llth July, 1836, six armed steamers, together with two British and
several Spanish gunboats, attacked the little town of Fuenterabia. The place
is surrounded only by an old wall ; and two guns of small calibre, to which, on
the evening of the attack, a third gun of larger calibre was added, formed the
160 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
entire of its artillery. The squadron cannonaded this place during a whole day,
and effected absolutely nothing beyond unroofing and demolishing a few poor
and paltry houses, not worth perhaps the ammunition wasted in the attack.
What may have been the number of guns and weight of metal which the assail-
ants brought is unknown; though the superiority, independent of the superior
weight of metal, must have been at least ten to one ; but not the slightest mili-
tary result was obtained. (See United Service Journal, August, 1836, page
531.)
We will now turn to affairs of a similar character on our own coast.
In June, 1776, Sir Peter Parker, commanding a squadron of two ships of 50
guns, four of 28 guns, two of 20 guns, and a bomb-ketch in all (according to
their rate) 252 guns attacked Fort Moultrie, in Charleston harbor, South
Carolina.
It is stated that the fort mounted " about thirty pieces of heavy artillery."
Three of the smaller vessels were aground for a time during the action ; and one
of them could not be floated off, and was, in consequence, burnt by the English.
Deducting this vessel as not contributing to the attack, and supposing that the
other two were engaged but half the time, the English force may be estimated
at 200 guns ; or, reckoning on broadside only, at 100 guns against 30 guns.
The English were defeated with great loss of life, and injury to the vessels ;
while the fort suffered in no material degree, and lost but 30 men. The killed
and wounded in the squadron were reported by the commodore to be 205, being
for every ten guns employed against them more than 68 men killed and wounded,
a loss more than eleven times as great, in proportion to the opposing force, as
the loss at the battle of Trafalgar.
In September, 1814, a squadron of small vessels, consisting of two ships and
two brigs, mounting about 90 guns, attacked Fort Boyer, at the mouth of Mo-
bile bay. A false attack was at the same time made by a party of marines,
artillery, and Indians, on the land side. The fort was very small, and could
not have mounted more than twenty guns on all sides, nor more than fifteen guns
on the water fronts. The action continued between two and three hours, when
one of the ships being so injured as to be unmanageable, drifted ashore under
the guns, and was abandoned and burnt by the English ; the other vessels re-
treated after suffering severely. There were ten men killed and wounded in the
fort ; the loss on the other part is not known.
The affair of Stonmgton during the last war affords another instance of suc-
cessful defence by a battery. In this case there were only two guns, (eighteen-
pounders,) in a battery which was only three feet high and without embrasures.
The battery, being manned exclusively by citizen volunteers from the town,
repelled a persevering attack of a sloop-of-war, causing serious loss and damage,
but suffering none.
The only other instance we will adduce is that of the late attack on the castle
of St. Juan de Ulloa. Having before us a plan of this work, made on the spot
after the surrender, by a French engineer officer who was one of the expedition ;
having also his official account of the affair, as well as narratives by several eye-
witnesses, we can fully understand the circumstances attending the operations,
and are liable to no material errors.
On the 27th of November, 1838, Admiral Baudin anchored at the distance of
about seven-eighths of a mile in a northeast direction from the castle, with the
frigates La Nureide, of 52 guns, La Glorie, of 52 guns, and L'Iphigenie, of 60
guns, and, after being a short time in action, he was joined by La Creole, of 24
guns ; in all, 188 guns, according to the rate of the ships. In a position nearly
north from the castle, and at a distance of more than a mile, two bomb-ketches,
carrying each two large mortars, were anchored. The wind being adverse, all
the vessels were towed into position by two armed steamboats belonging to the
squadron. " It was lucky for us," says the reporter, " that the Mexicans did
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 161
not disturb this operation, which lasted near two hours, and that they permitted
us to commence the fire." He further says : " We were exposed to the fire of
one 24-pounder, five 16-pounders, seven 12-pounders, one 8-pounder, and five
18-pounder carronades in all, 19 pieces only" In order the better to judge
of these batteries, we will convert them, in proportion to the weight of balls, into
24-pounders ; and we find these 19 guns equivalent to less than 12 guns of that
calibre. But we must remark that, although this simplifies the expression of
force, it presents it greatly exaggerated; it represents, for example, three
8-pounders as equivalent to one 24-pounder ; whereas, at the distance the parties
were engaged, (an efficient distance for a 24-pounder,) the 8-pounders would be
nearly harmless. It represents also the 18-pounder carronades as possessing
each three-fourths the power of a long 24-pounder ; whereas at that distance
they would not be better than the 8-pounders, if so good. Although the above
estimate of the force of the batteries is too great by full one-third, we will,
nevertheless, let it stand as representing that force.
There were, then, twelve 24-pounders engaged against 94 guns, (estimating
for one broadside only of each ship) and 4 sea-mortars. During the action a
shell caused the magazine in the cavalier to explode, whereby three of the nine-
teen guns were destroyed, reducing the force to about ten 24-pounders.
Considering the manner in which this work was defended, it would not have
been surprising if the ships had prevailed by mere dint of their guns ; but our
author states, expressly, that though the accident just mentioned completely ex-
tinguished the fire of the cavalier, still " the greater part of the other pieces
which could see the ships, to the number of sixteen, continued to fire till tlpe
end of the action." They were not dismounted, therefore, and the loss of life
at them could not have been great. What, then, was the cause of the surrender
of the castle ?
Much has been said of the great use made by the ships of horizontal shells,
or shells fired at low angles from large guns ; and it is a prevailing idea that the
work was torn to pieces, or greatly dilapidated by these missiles. This engineer
officer states that, on visiting the castle after the cannonade, he found " it had
been more injured by the French balls and shells than he had expected ; still
the casemates in the curtains, serving as barracks for the troops, were intact."
"Of 187 guns found in the fort, 102 were still serviceable; 29 only had been
dismounted by the French fire. The heaviest injury was sustained by the
cavalier" (where a magazine exploded) "in bastion No. 2 ; in battery No. 5,"
(where another magazine was blown up,) " and the officers' quarters." They
found in the castle twenty-five men whose wounds were too severe to permit
their removal with the rest of the garrison.
Of the twenty-nine guns dismounted, five were thrown down with the cava-
lier ; the remaining twenty-four guns were no doubt situated in parts of the work
opposite to the attack, being pointed in other directions, and were struck by
shots or shells that had passed over the walls facing the ships. There is reason
to suppose that of the remaining sixteen guns pointed at the French none were
dismounted ; and we know that most of them continued to fire till the end of
the action.
The two explosions may certainly have been caused by shells fired at low
angles from Paixhan guns. But it is much more likely they were caused by
shells from the sea-mortars, because these last were much larger, and therefore
more likely to break through the masonry ; because, being fired at high angles,
they would fall vertically upon the magazines, which were less protected on the
top than on the sides ; and because there were more of these large shells fired
than of the small ones, in the ratio of 302 to 117.
But considering that the cannonade and bombardment lasted about six hours,
and that 8,250 shot and shells were fixed by the French, it is extraordinary
that there were no more than two explosions of magazines, and that no greater
H. Rep. Com. 86 11
162 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
injury was done the fort, since it is certain that there were no less than six
other similar magazines situated on the rampart, in different parts of the work,
not one of which was shell-proof. The surrender, after these explosions, was '
a very natural event, with a governor and garrison who seem to have known as
little about the proper preparation for such contests as about the mode of con-
ducting them. The second explosion must have satisfied them, if the first did
not, that they had introduced within their own precincts much more formidable
means of destruction than any it was in the power of the French to send from
gun or mortar.
The important points to be noticed in this contest are these :
1. The French took such a position that their 94 guns were opposed by the
equivalent of 10 or 12 guns only.
2. In proof of the inefficiency of the Mexican guns generally, it may be stated
that although the three French frigates were struck in their hulls about three
hundred times, they lost but thirty-three men in killed and wounded. The
Iphigenie was hulled 160 times, and yet had but thirteen men hurt. Very few,
therefore, of these 160 balls could have passed through her sides.
3. It appears that very few, if any, of the guns exposed to the direct action
of the French broadsides were dismounted or silenced by their fire.
4. The narratives of the day contain exaggerated statements of injury inflicted
on the walls by shells fired from guns ; the professional report, above quoted,
of the chief engineer of the expedition, neither speaks of nor alludes to any
such injury. After deducting from the parts of the work said to be most
injured the cavalier and also battery No. 5, in each of which a magazine
exploded there remain, as having suffered most, the quarters of the officers and
bastion No. 2. As to the first, if it was elevated above the walls, as is probable,
it would of course suffer severely, because the walls of mere barracks or quarters
are never made of a thickness to resist shot or shells of any kind ; and if not
elevated above the walls, but covered by them, the injury resulted, most proba-
bly, from shells fired at high angles from the sea-mortars, and not from shells
fired nearly horizontally from the Paixhan guns. Whether the injury sustained
by bastion No. 2 was the effect of shot and shells upon the face of the walls, or
of shells falling vertically within the bastion, is not stated. It was probably
due in part to both. If there had been any extraordinary damage done by the
horizontal shells, we may reasonably suppose special mention would have been
made of it, because it was the first time that this missile^ had been tried, in a
large way, in actual warfare. That anything like a breach could have been
effected with solid shot, at that distance and in that time, we know to be im-
possible; but it is neither unreasonable to suppose, nor unlikely, that many of
the heavy vertical shells may have fallen in the bastion and caused much injury.
Whatever may have been the cause of the damage, or its amount, it did not, we
have reason to believe, extinguish the fire of any of the five 16-pounders that
were pointed from the bastion against the ships.
5. So far as effects were produced by the direct action of the Fre'nch arma-
ment, whether guns, bomb-cannon, or sea-mortars, it does not appear that there
was the slightest reason for the submission of the fort. There is little doubt
that the 8,250 shot and shells fired at the castle must have greatly marred the
surface of the walls, and it is not unlikely that three or four striking near each
other may have made deep indentations, especially as the stone is soft, beyond
any material applied to building in any part of the United States. But these
are not injuries of material consequence, however they may appear to the inex-
perienced eye, and we should risk little in asserting that, abstracting the effects
of the explosion, the castle was as inaccessible to assault after the cannonade
as before it ; that, so far as regards the levelling of obstacles lying in the way
of a sword in hand attack, the 8,250 shot and shells might as well have been
fired in the opposite direction.
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 163
6. The explosion, however, of two deposits of powder in the castle, one of
which is reported to have buried sixty men in its ruins, showed the defenders
that, although they might evade the vertical fire, and their works might cover
them from the horizontal fire of the French, there was no protection against, no
evasion of, the dreadful ravages of exploding magazines. With this ruin around
them, and a sixfold greater ruin likely, at every moment, to burst upon their
heads, it is not surprising that a garrison, found in circumstances so unmilitary,
doubted their power of protracted resistance.
7. It must be borne in mind that these explosions have nothing to do either
with the question of relative strength or with the peculiarities of the French
attack. No defences, with such management, can be effective, and no attack
can fail. The French, not dreaming of such culpable, such inconceivable
negligence on a point always receiving the most careful attention, entered upon
the cannonade with no other purpose, as is avowed, than that of somewhat
weakening the defences and dispiriting and fatiguing the garrison, before pro-
ceeding to an assault, which was to have followed at night, and for which all
preparations had been made. Had the Mexicans thrown all the powder of
these eight magazines into the sea, or had they transported it to their barracks,
and every man, making a pillow of a keg, slept through the whole cannonade,
as might have been done safely, in their quarters in the curtain casemates, the
castle of St. Juan de Ulloa would, we doubt not, have been as competent to
resist the projected assault as it was when the French first arrived before it
8. The number of killed and wounded in the French vessels, in proportion
to the guns acting against them was, for ten guns, more than twenty-seven
men, being upwards of four times as great as the loss sustained by the English
at the battle of Trafalgar.
In concluding this reference to facts in military history, we will add that we
do not see how it is possible to avoid making the following deduction, namely :
that fixed batteries upon the shore are capable of resisting the attacks of ships,
even when the armament of the latter is by far the most numerous and heavy.
There are several reasons for this capacity in batteries, of which the principal
may be thus stated; and these reasons apply to vessels of every size and every
sort, to small or large, to vessels moved by wind or steam. This ship is every-
where equally vulnerable, and, large as is her hull, the men and the guns are
very much concentrated within her; on the other hand, in the properly con-
structed battery it is only the gun itself, a small part of the carnage, and now
and then a head or an arm raised above the parapet that can be hurt, the ratio
of the exposed surfaces being not less than fifteen or twenty to one. Next,
there is always more or less motion in the water, so that the ship-gun, although
it may have been pointed accurately at one moment, at the next will be thrown
entirely away from the object, even when the motion in the vessel is too small
to be otherwise noticed ; whereas, in the battery the gun will be fired just as it
is pointed, and the motion of the ship will merely vary to the extent of a few
inches, or at most two or three feet, the spot in which the shot is to be received.
In the ship there are, besides, many points exposed that may be called vital
points; by losing her rudder, or portions of her rigging, or of her spars, she
may become unmanageable and unable to use her strength; she may receive
shots under water and be liable to sink ; she may receive hot shot and be set on
fire ; and these damages are in addition to those of having her guns dismounted
and her people killed by the shot which pierce her sides and scatter splinters
from her timbers, while the risks of the battery are confined to those mentioned
above, namely, the risk that the gun, the carnage, or the men may be struck.
That the magazines should be exposed, as were those of the castle St. Juan de
Ulloa, must never be anticipated as possible.
While on this part of our subject, it is proper to advert to the use of horizontal
shells, or hollow shot, or Paixhan's shells, (as they are variously called,) it
164 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
having been argued that the introduction of these missiles is seriously to impair
the utility of fortifications as a defence of the sea-coast.
We fully believe that the free use of these shells will have an influence of
some importance on the relative force of ship and battery, but that influence
must be the very reverse of such predictions. How are the batteries to be
affected by them ? It can be but in two ways : first, the ship-gun having been
pointed so as to strike a vital point that is to say, a gun or a carnage the
shell may explode at the instant of contact. This explosion may possibly hap-
pen thus opportunely, but it would happen against all chances, and if happen-
ing, would probably do no more than add a few men to the list of killed and
wounded. For reasons that will soon appear, it is to be doubted whether the
probability of dismounting the gun would be so great as if the missile were a
solid 32-pounder shot. Secondly, if it be not by dismounting the guns or killing
the garrison, the effect anticipated from these missiles must result from the in-
jury they do the battery itself. Now, we are perfectly informed by military ex-
perience as to the effects of these shells upon forts and batteries, for the shells
are not new, although the guns may be so the 8-inch and the 10-inch shells
having always been supplied in abundance to every siege-train, and being per-
fectly understood, both as to their effects and the mode of using them.
Were it a thing easily done, the blowing away of the parapets of a work, (a
very desirable result to the attacking party,) would be a common incident in the
attacks of fortifications ; but the history of attacks by land or water affords no
such instance. The only practicable way yet discovered of demolishing a forti-
fication being by attaching a miner to the foot of the wall, or by dint of solid
shot and heavy charges fired unremittingly during a long succession of hours
upon the same part of the wall, in order not only to break through it, but to
break through in such a manner that the weight and pressure of the incumbent
mass may throw large portions of the wall prostrate. This, the shortest and
best way of breaching a wall, requires, in the first place, perfect accuracy of
direction, because the same number of shots that, being distributed over the
expanse of wall, would merely peel off the face, would, if concentrated in a
single deep cut, cause the wall to fall ; and it requires, moreover, great power of
penetration in the missile the charge of a breaching gun being for that reason
one-third greater than the common service charges. Now, the requisite pre-
cision of firing for this effect is wholly unattainable in vessels, whether the shot
be solid or hollow ; and if it were attainable, hollow shot would be entirely use-
less for the purpose, because every one of them would, break to pieces against
the wall, even when fired with a charge much less than the common service charge.
This is no newly discovered fact ; it is neither new nor doubtful. Every hollow
shot thrown against the wall of fort or battery if fired with a velocity affording
any penetration, will unquestionably be broken into fragments by the shock.
After so much had been said about the effect of these shells upon the castle
of St. Juan de Ulloa, it was deemed advisable, although the result of European
experiments were perfectly well known, to repeat in our own service sonle trials
touching this point. A target was therefore constructed, having one-third part
of the length formed of granite, one-third of bricks, and the remaining third of
freestone. This was fired at by a Paixhan gun and by a 32-pounder from the
distance of half a mile, and the anticipated results were obtained, namely :
1st. Whether it was the granite, the brick, or the freestone that was struck,
the solid 32-pounder shot penetrated much deeper into the wall, and did much
more damage than the 8-inch hollow shot; and
2d. These last broke against the wall in every instance that the charge of the
gun was sufficient to give them any penetration.
The rupture of the shell may often cause the explosion of the powder it con^
tains, because the shell, the burning fuse, and the powder are all crushed up
together ; but the shell having no penetration, no greater injury will be done to
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 165
the wall by the explosion than would be caused by the bursting of a shell that
had been placed against it.
From all this it appears, incontrovertibly, that, as regards the effects to be
produced upon batteries by ships, solid shot are decidedly preferable to hollow
shot ; and the ship that, contemplating the destruction of batteries, should change
any of her long 24 or 32-pounder guns for Paixhan guns would certainly
weaken her armament. Her best missiles, at ordinary distances, are solid shot;
and, if she can get near, grape shot to fire into the embrasures and over the
walls. The best shells against batteries are the sea-mortar shells, fired at high
elevations ; which, being of great weight and falling from a great height, pene-
trate deeply, and containing a considerable quantity of powder cause material
ravage by their explosion. Such shells, however, can only be fired by vessels
appropriately fitted.
The use of these same hollow shot by batteries against vessels is, however,
an affair of different character. The shells do not break against timber, but
penetrating the bulwarks they, in the first place, would do greater damage than
hollow shot, by making a larger hole and dispersing more splinters ; and having,.
as shot, effected all this injury, they would then augment it many fold by ex-
ploding.
In all cases of close action between ship and battery, the shells will pass
through the nearer side, and if not arrested by some object on the deck, will
probably lodge and explode in the further side ; causing, by the explosion, a
much greater loss among the crew, and greater injury to the vessel, than by their
mere transit across the vessel. As before suggested, the vessel would suffer
less injury were her sides made so thin as not to retain the shell, permitting it
to pass through both sides, unless fired with a small velocity. It is not impos-
sible that an extensive use of these horizontal shells may lead to a reduction in
the thickness of ships' bulwarks.
In the facts quoted above, there is no illustration of the effects of hot shot,
except in the case of Gibraltar. In that attack the floating batteries were made
proof against cold shot, and, as was thought by the constructor, proof against
hot shot also ; and so, indeed, for a time, it seemed. It was conceived that the
hot shot, when buried deep in the closely-jointed timbers, would scarcely com-
municate flame ; and that it would not be difficult, by the use of the fire-engines
provided, to subdue so stifled a combustion.
By making these floating batteries impenetrable to shot, it was supposed they
had been rendered equal, in perfectly smooth Avater, to land batteries, gun for
gun ; and so they might then have been, nearly, had the incumbustibility of the
latter been imparted to them. But now resistance to fire would not suffice ;
these floating batteries must either repel these horizontal shells from their bul-
warks, or, if that be impossible, permit them to pass through both sides. Noth-
ing can be better calculated to exhibit the tremendous effects of these shells
than a vessel so thick-sided as to stop every shell, allowing it to burst when
surrounded by several feet of timber ; and there can be no greater mistake than
supposing that by thickening the bulwarks of vessels-of-war, or fitting up steam
batteries with shot-proof sides, the effects of land batteries are to be annulled,
or in any material degree modified.
We will sum up this branch of our subject with the remark that the facts of
history, and the practice of all warlike nations, are in perfect accordance with
the conclusions of theory. The results that reason anticipated have occurred
again and again. And so long as, on the one side, batteries are formed of earth
and stone ; and, on the other, ships are liable to be swallowed up by the element
on which they float, or to be deprived of the means by which they move ; so
long as they can be penetrated by solid shot, set on fire or blown up by hot shot,
or torn piecemeal by shells, the same results must, inevitably, be repeated at
each succeeding trial.
166 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
But, after all, it may be urged that the general principle herein contended for,
namely, the superiority of batteries in a contest with ships, might be admitted ;
and still it would remain to show that batteries constitute the kind of defence
best adapted to our peculiar wants. This is true ; and we will now proceed to
consider, severally, the cases to which defence must be applied.
It may be well, however, first to recall the general scope of the preceding
argument. It has been contended that floating defences should not be relied
on, not because they are actually incompetent to the duty, but because they
cannot fulfil this duty unless provided in inordinate numbers, and at a boundless
expense; and we have endeavored to show that this remark is generally true,
whether the defensive fleet be made up of sea-going vessels of floating batteries,
or of steam batteries. We have next urged the point that properly planned and
constructed batteries are an overmatch for vessels-of-war, even when greatly
inferior to them in armament sustaining our opinion by many striking exam-
ples, and explaining satisfactorily the only instances that have cast any doubt
on such contests. If the facts and reasonings we have presented do not convey
the same strong convictions that sway our own minds, it must be because we
have obscured rather than illustrated them ; for it would seem to be impossible
that facts could be more unexceptionable, or reasons more beyond the reach of
cavil. However that may be, we now leave them to candid and dispassionate
revisal, and proceed to examine the mode of applying these defences to our own
coast.
It may be well to divide these into several distinct classes :
1. There will be all the smaller towns upon the coast, constituting a very
numerous class.
At the same time that no one of these, of itself, would provoke an enterprise of
magnitude, it is still necessary to guard each and all against the lesser attacks.
A small vessel might suffice to guard against single vessels that would other-
wise be tempted by facility to burn the shipping and exact a contribution ; but
something more than this is necessary, since the amount of temptation held out
by a number of these towns would be apt to induce operations on a larger scale.
It might often happen, moreover, that our own vessels-of-war would be con-
strained to take refuge in these harbors, and they should find cover from the
pursuer.
Although the harbors of which we now speak afford every variety of form
and dimension, there are few, or none, wherein one or two small forts and
batteries cannot be so placed as to command all the water that a ship-of-war
can lie in, as well as the channel by which she must enter. While the circum-
stances of no two of them are so nearly alike as not to modify the defences to
be applied to them severally, all should fulfil certain common conditions, namely :
the passage into the harbors should be strongly commanded ; the enemy should
find no place, after passing, wherein he would be safe from shot and shells ; and
the works should be inaccessible to sudden escalade that is to say, -a small
garrison should be able to repel such an assault. With works answering to
these conditions, and of degrees of strength in accordance with the value of
their respective trusts, this class of harbors may be regarded as secure. We
cannot, however, here avoid asking what would be the mode of defence, if
purely naval, of these harbors? Suppose the circumstances are deemed to
require the presence of a frigate, or a steam frigate, or an equivalent in gun-
boats ; would not two hostile frigates, or two steam frigates, infallibly arrive in
quest ? Could there be devised a system more certain to result in the capture
of our vessels, and the submission of our towns 1
2. Another class will consist of great establishments, such as large cities,
naval depots, &c., situated in harbors not of too great extent to admit of good
defence at the entrance, and also at every successive point; so that an enemy
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 167
could find no spot within in which he could safely prepare for operations ulte-
rior to the mere forcing an entrance.
In this class are to be found objects that are, in every sense, of the highest
value. On the one hand, accumulations of military and naval material, and
structures for naval accommodation, that could not be replaced during a war,
which are of indispensable necessity, and of great cost ; and, on the other hand,
the untold wealth of great cities. As these objects must be great in the eyes of
the enemy great for him to gain, and for us to lose corresponding efforts on
his part must be looked for and guarded against. If he come at all, it will be
in power ; and the preparations on our part must be commensurate.
The entrance to the harbor, and all the narrow passes within it, must be
occupied with heavy batteries ; and if nature does not afford all the positions
deemed requisite, some must, if practicable, be formed artificially. Batteries
should succeed each other, along the channel, so that the enemy may nowhere
find shelter from effective range of shot and shells while within the harbor, even
should he succeed in passing the first batteries.
Provided the shores admit this disposition, and the defences be supplied with
an armanent, numerous, heavy, and selected with reference to the effects on
shipping, the facts we have quoted from history show that these defences may
be relied on.
If the mere passing under sail, with a leading wind and tide, one, or even
two sets of batteries, and then carrying on operations out of the reach of these,
or any other, were all, the enemy might perhaps accomplish it; but our present
supposition is, that with this class his ulterior proceedings, and finally his return,
are to be subject to the incessant action of the defences.
3. This brings us to consider a third class, consisting of establishments of
importance situated at a distance up some river or bay, there being intermediate
space too wide to be commanded from the shores. In such cases the defence
must be concentrated upon the narrow passes, and must, of course, be appor-
tioned in armament to the value of the objects covered. When the value is not
very great, a stout array of batteries at the best positions would deter an enemy
from an attempt to force the passage, since his advantage, in case of success,
would not be commensurate with any imminent risk. But with the more valua-
ble establishments it might be otherwise; the consequence of success might
justify all the risk to be encountered in rapidly passing in face of batteries,
however powerful. This condition of things requires peculiar precautions,
under any system of defence. If, after having occupied the shores, in the nar-
row places, in the best manner, with batteries, we are of opinion that the temp-
tation may induce the enemy, notwithstanding, to run the gauntlet, the obstruc-
tion of the passage must be resorted to. By this is not meant the permanent
obstruction of the passage; such a resort, besides the great expense, might
entail the ruin of the channel. The obstruction is meant to be the temporary
closing by heavy floating masses.
There is no doubt that a double line of rafts, each raft being of large size
and anchored with strong chains, would make it impossible to pass without
first removing some of the obstructions, and it might clearly be made impossible
to effect this removal under the fire of the batteries. Such obstructions need
not be resorted to until the breaking out of a war, as they could then be speedily
formed, should the preparation of the enemy be of a threatening nature.
There would be nothing in these obstructions inconsistent with our use of
part of the channel, since two or three of the rafts might be kept out of line,
ready to move into their places at an hour's notice.
The greatest danger to which these obstructions would be exposed would be
from explosion vessels ; and from those they might be protected by a boom, or
a line of smaller rafts in front.
From what has just been said, it will be perceived that, when the inducements
168 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
are such as to bring the enemy forward in great power, and efficient batteries
can be established only at certain points, we are not then to rely on them 'ex-
clusively. In such a case, the enemy should be stopped by some physical im-
pediments ; and the batteries must be strong enough to prevent his removing
these impediments, and also to prevail in a cannonade should the enemy under-
take to silence the works.
The conditions these obstructions have to fulfil are these :
1st. They must be of a nature to be fixed readily, and to be speedily re-
moved when there is no longer occasion for them ; and, to this end, they must
be afloat.
2d. They must have adequate inertia to resist, or rather not to be destroyed
or displaced by, the shock of the heaviest ship ; and, in order to this, they must
be held by the heaviest and strongest cables and anchors.
3d. They must be secure from the effects of explosive vessels ; and, if in
danger from this source, must be covered as above mentioned.
We do not say what are the exact circumstances in which all these conditions
will be fulfilled, though we think the idea long ago presented by the board of
engineers will, with modifications, embrace them all.
The idea is this : Suppose a line (extending across the channel) of rafts, sep-
arated from each other by a space less than the breadth of a ship-of-war, each
raft being about 90 feet long, 30 feet wide, and 6 feet deep, formed of strong
timbers, crossed and braced in all directions, and fastened together in the strong-
est manner. A long-scope chain cable is to proceed from each of the four cor-
ners, two obliquely up stream and two obliquely down stream, to very heavy
anchors ; and there should also be a very strong chain cable passing from one
raft to another. Suppose a ship, striking one of the rafts, to break the chains
leading down the stream : in doing this, she must lose much of her momentum.
She has, then, "under her fore foot," the raft connected by a strong chain with
the rafts to the right and left ; on being tightened, this chain will throw the
strain upon the down stream cable of that adjoining raft towards which the ship
happens to tend. If we suppose it possible for these chains also to be parted by
the power still remaining in the ship, or by impulses received from succeeding
vessels, there will be other chains still to break in the same way. After the
down stream chains are all parted, the rafts will " bring up " in a new position,
(higher up the channel,) by the anchors that, in the first instance, were pointed
up stream. Here a resistance, precisely like that first overcome, is to be en-
countered by vessels that have lost most of their force in breaking the successive
chains, and in pushing these great masses of timber before them through the
water. Should there exist a doubt as to the sufficiency of these remaining
anchors and chains, or should it be deemed most prudent to leave nothing un-
certain, a second similar line may be placed a short distance above the first.
The best proportions and dimensions of the rafts remain to be determined ;
but as there is scarcely a limit to the strength that may be given to, the rafts
themselves, and to the means by which they are to be held to their positions,
and to each other, the success of a well arranged obstruction of this sort can
hardly be doubted.
The expense would not be great in the first instance, and all the materials
would be available for other purposes, when no longer needed for this.
It may be repeated here, that such expedients need not be resorted to, except
to cover objects of the highest importance and value, such as would induce an
enemy to risk a large expedition. For objects of less importance, batteries
would afford ample protection. It will be remembered that this last power is,
when once established in any position, a constant quantity ; and, although it
should be incompetent to effect decisive results when diffused over a large fleet,
may be an overmatch for any small force upon which it should be concentrated.
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 169
At the same time, therefore, that there is the less liability to heavy attacks,
there will be, iu the batteries, the greater capacity of resistance to others.
It must not be urged, as a reproach to fortifications, that, in the case we are
considering, they are obliged to call in aid from other sources, so long as these
aids are cheap, efficient, and of easy resort. By the mode we have suggested,
the defence will undoubtedly be complete, every chance of success being on the
side of the defence ; that is to say, if any confidence is to be placed in the les-
sons of experience. How, on the other hand, will the same security be attained
by naval means ? Only, as before shown, by keeping within the harbor a fleet
or squadron, or whatever it may be, which shall be at all times superior to the
enemy.
In a naval defence there will be no advantage in obstructions of any sort, for
there can be no lessening of the array of guns in consequence of such obstruc-
tions ; because, if these obstructions are under the fire of the floating defences,
the enemy will first subdue that fire, and then remove the obstructions at his
leisure. If this fire prove too powerful for the enemy, the obstructions will
have been unnecessary, and will serve only to shut up our own fleet, preventing
the prompt pursuit of a beaten foe.
4. There is a fourth class, consisting of harbors, or rather bays or estuaries,
of such expanse that batteries cannot be made to control the passage. These
have been before spoken of. If the occupation of, or passage through these
must be defended, it must be by other means than batteries upon the shore.
The reliance must, from the nature of the case, be a floating defence, of magni-
tude at least equal to the force the enemy may bring. The complete defence
of each of these bays would, therefore, involve very great expense ; certainly,
in most cases, greater than the advantages gained. The Chesapeake bay can-
not, for instance, be shut against a fleet by fortifications ; and if the entrance
of the enemy is to be interdicted, it must be by the presence of a not inferior
fleet of our own. Instead of such a system, it will be better to give up the bay
to the enemy, confining our defences to the more important harbors and rivers
that discharge into the bay. By this system, not only will these harbors be
secure, but the defences will react upon the bay itself, and, at any rate, secure
it from predatory incursions ; because while Hampton roads and the navy yard
at Norfolk are well protected, no enemy would proceed up the bay with any
less force than that which could be sent out from the navy yard.
In certain cases of broad waters, wherein an enemy's cruisers might desire
to rendezvous in order to prosecute a blockade, or as a shelter in tempestuous
weather, there may be positions from which sea-mortars can reach the whole
anchorage, although nothing could be done with guns. A battery of sea-mor-
tars, well secured from escalade, would, in such a case, afford a good defence,
because no fleet will lie at anchor within the range of shells.
In thus distributing the various exposed points of the sea-coast into general
classes, according to the most appropriate modes of defence, we do not find that
anything can be substituted for fortifications, where fortifications are applicable,
and we find them applicable in all the classes but the last ; and in the last we
shall find them indispensable as auxiliaries. In this last class there are, no
doubt, some cases where naval means must constitute the active and operative
force ; and it is probable that steam batteries may, of all floating defences, be
the most suitable.
It must not be forgotten, however, that the very qualities which recommend
this particular kind of force will equally characterize the steam vessel of the
enemy ; nor must it be forgotten that, whether steam vessels or sailing vessels,
or both, are relied on, unless there are well-secured points on the shore, under
which they can take refuge, they will themselves constitute an object inviting
the superior force of an enemy.
If, for example, we were to deem one of the open harbors of such importance
170 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
as to assign eight or ten steam batteries for its protection, we should thereby
place within reach of the enemy an object worthy of the efforts of a squadron,
or twelve or fifteen vessels of the same description. Even, therefore, in the
cases where naval means must be resorted to for defence upon the water, there
should be works upon the shore behind which, if overpowered, they can retire.
It has been before remarked that the steam batteries are in no way more for-
midable to shore batteries than sailing vessels are : armed with Paixhan guns
they would be less so. And they would be less formidable, also, on account of
their comparatively small number of guns ; for there is no reason why the firing
should be more accurate than from ships; and the chances of inflicting injury
would be in proportion to the number of missiles.
The only material effect the introduction of this description of vessel can
have upon a system of defence by fortifications is, that owing to their less
draught of water, it will be necessary to secure channels that, not being navi-
gable by vessels of the line and frigates, might otherwise be left unguarded.
Some of these channels may have the draught of water lessened by an artificial
ridge of stones, so as to be impracticable even to steam vessels; and this may
often be done at small expense, and without detriment to the harbors ; others
will need additional fortifications. But the instances are not numerous where
any such shallow channels exist.
In opposition to an opinion not uncommon, that modern improvements in
steam vessels will tend to lessen the necessity for fortifications, we here see that
the tendency is rather to increase their number.
Throughout this whole discussion the argument has turned on the relative
efficiency of fixed and floating defences. The great relative economy of the
former, we suppose, will be conceded. If not, we would ask, as conclusive, or
at least as leading to calculation entirely satisfactory, that the following infor-
mation be obtained from authentic sources, namely : the first cost, when com-
plete in all respects, of the frigates United States, Constitution, and Congress,
and also the entire expense of each of said vessels up to this time; specifying,
as to each, the year of the several expenditures and the amounts thereof, under
the heads, as far as practicable, of first cost, repairs or rebuilding, and improve-
ments and alterations ; and distinguishing 1st. The expense bestowed upon
the hull. 2d. The expense bestowed upon the masts, spars, sails, anchors,
cables, and rigging. 3d. The expense bestowed upon the armament; and 4th.
The expense bestowed upon all other matters, (as boats, ballast, tanks, paint,
&c.,) necessarily connected with the preservation or the ordinary service of the
vessel.
Before we proceed to describe the several positions on the coast requiring for-
tifications, we have something still to say on the general subject, though on
another branch. We now refer to the kind of fortifications, or rather to their
magnitude and strength. That this particular topic should be embraced by our
remarks is the more necessary since views hostile to the system of works now
in progress have been urged from a high source.
The present system is founded on this principle, to wit : that the fortifications
should be strong in proportion to the value of the objects to be secured. The
principle will not, we suppose, be controverted, but only the mode of apply-
ing it.
There will hardly be a difference of opinion as to the mode of guarding the
less important points. There being no great attraction to an enemy, works
simple in their features, requiring small garrisons only, containing a moderate
armament, but at the same time inaccessible to the dashing enterprises that ships
can so easily land, and which can be persevered in for a few hours with much
vigor, will suffice. Circumstances must, however, materially modify the proper-
ties of these works, even when the points to be guarded are of equal value. In
one, the disadvantage of position must be compensated by greater power ; in.
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 171
another, natural strength may need little aid from art ; in another, greater width
in the guarded channel may demand a larger armament ; and in a fourth, peculiar
exposure to land attack may exact more than usual inaccessibility. But all
these varieties lie within limits that will probably be conceded.
As to the larger objects, it has been contended that there has been exaggera-
tion in devising works to cover these, the works having been calculated for more
formidable attacks than they will be exposed to. It is easy to utter vague
criticisms of this nature, and it is not easy to rebut them without going into an
examination as minute as if the criticism were ever so precise and pertinent.
But let us look a little at the material facts. What is the object of an enemy?
What are his means 1 What should be the nature of our defences ?
The object may be to lay a great city under contribution, or to destroy one
of our naval depots, or to take possession of one of our great harbors, &c. It
was estimated that in the great fire in the city of New York, in the year 1835,
the property destroyed within a few hours was worth upwards of seventeen
millions of "dollars, although the fire was confined to a very small part of the
city, and did not touch the shipping. Is it easy, then, to estimate the loss that
would accrue from the fires that a victorious enemy could kindle upon the
circuit of that great city when no friendly hand could be raised to extinguish
them ? or is it easy to overrate the tribute such a city would pay for exemption
from that calamity 1 Can we value too highly the pecuniary losses that the
destruction of one of the great navy yards would involve, and the loss, beyond
all pecuniary value, of stores and accommodations indispensable in a state of
war, and that a state of war can hardly replace ?
But what are the enemy's means ? They consist of his whole sea-going
force, which he concentrates for the sake of inflicting the blow. In the language
of the critic: "From the nature of maritime operations, such a fleet could bring
its whole strength to bear upon any particular position, and, by threatening or
assailing various portions of the coast, either anticipate the tardy movements of
troops upon land, and effect the object before their concentration, or render it
necessary to keep in service a force far superior to that of the enemy, but so
divided as to be inferior to it on any one point."
We have, then, objects of sufficient magnitude, and the means of the enemy
consist in the concentration of his whole force upon one of these objects.
With the highest notion of the efficiency of fortifications against shipping,
these are not cases where any stint in the defensive means are admissible.
Having, therefore, under a full sense of the imminent danger to which the great
objects upon the coast are exposed, applied to the approaches by water an array
of obstacles worthy of confidence, we must carefully explore all the avenues by
land, in order to guard against approaches that might be made on that side in
order to evade or capture the works guarding the channels. But before deciding
on the defences necessary to resist these land attacks, it will be proper to esti-
mate more particularly the means that an enemy may be expected to bring for-
ward with a view to such land operations.
History furnishes many examples, and the expedition to Flushing, commonly
called the Walcheren expedition, may be cited as peculiarly instructive.
From an early day Napoleon had applied himself to the creation of a maritime
force in the Scheldt, and, in 1809, he had provided extensive dock yards and
naval arsenals at Flushing and at Antwerp. On his invasion of Austria this
year, he had drawn off the mass of his troops that had before kept jealous
watch over these naval preparations, relying now on forts and batteries, and on
the fortifications of Flushing and Antwerp for the protection of the naval estab-
lishments, and of a fleet containing several line-of-battle-ships and frigates, and
a numerous flotilla of smaller vessels.
The great naval establishment at Flushing, near the mouth of the Scheldt,
and of Antwerp, some sixty or seventy miles up the river, with the vessels
172 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
afloat on the river or in progress in the yards, presented an object to England
worthy of one of her great efforts.
The troops embarked on this expedition consisted of upwards of 33,000 in-
fantry, 3,000 cavalry, more than 3,000 artillery, and some hundreds of sappers
and miners constituting an army of about 40,000 men. The naval portion
consisted of 35 sail of the line, 23 frigates, 33 sloop s-of- war, 28 gun, mortar,
and bomb vessels, 36 smaller vessels, and 82 gunboats ; making a total of 155
ships and other armed vessels and 82 gunboats. The guns, mortars, &c., pro-
vided for such bombardments and sieges as the troops might have to conduct
amounted to 158 pieces, with the suitable supplies of ammunition and stores of
every kind.
The idea of sailing right up to their object, in spite of the forts and batteries,
seems not to have found favor, notwithstanding the power of the fleet. The
plan of operations, therefore, contemplated the landing a portion of the army on
the island of Walcheren, to carry on the siege of Flushing, while another
portion proceeded up the Scheldt as high as Fort Bartz, which was to be taken,
after which the army would push on by land about twenty miles further, and
lay siege to Antwerp ; all which, it was thought might be accomplished hi
eighteen or twenty days from the first landing.
The execution did not accord with the design. Flushing, it is true, was
reduced within fifteen days, and in less than a week from the debarcation (which
was on the 31st of July) Fort Bartz. was in possession of the English, having
been abandoned by the garrison. But it was twenty-five days before the main
body, with all necessary supplies for a siege, were assembled at this point and
ready to take up the line of march against Antwerp. Since the first descent of
the British matters had, however, greatly changed. The French were now in
force; they had put their remaining defences in good condition; they had
spread inundations over the face of the country ; and not only would there be
little chance of further success, but the safety of the expedition, formidable as
it was, might have been compromised by a further advance. It was therefore
decided in council to abandon the movement against Antwerp. The troops ac-
cordingly returned to the island of Walcheren, which they did not finally leave
till the end of December.
The failure in the ultimate object of the expedition is to be ascribed to the
omission to seize, in the first instance, the south shore of the river, and capture
the batteries there, as was originally designed, and which was prevented by the
difficulty of landing enough troops at any one debarcation, in the bad weather
then prevailing. The capture of these batteries would have enabled the expe-
dition to have reached Fort Bartz during the first week ; and, in the then unpre-
pared state of the French, the issue of a dash upon Antwerp can hardly be
doubted.
The dreadful mortality that assailed the British army is wholly unconnected
with the plans, conduct, or issue of the enterprise, as a military ^movement ;
unless, indeed, it may have frustrated a scheme for occupying the island of
Walcheren as a position during the war.
Possession was held of the island for five months ; and it was finally aban-
doned from no pressure upon it by the French, although, after the first six
weeks, the British force consisted, in the aggregate, of less than 17,000 men ;
of which, for the greater part of the time, more than half were sick effectives
being often reduced below 5,000 men.
We see, therefore, that an effective force of less than 10,000 men maintained
possession of the island, in the face of, and in close proximity to, the most for-
midable military power in Europe, for more than three months ; and no reason
can be perceived why it might not have remained an indefinite period, while
possessed of naval superiority.
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 173
The proximity of England undoubtedly lessened the expense of the expedi-
tion, but it influenced the result in no other way material to the argument.
We will allude to no other instances of large expeditions sent by the English
to distant countries, than the two expeditions, each of about 10,000 men, sent in
the year 1814 against this country : one by the way of Canada, the other to the
Gulf of Mexico. United in a single force of 20,000 men against our sea-coast,
the expense would have been less, and the results more certain.
The French, notwithstanding their constant naval inferiority, have found
opportunities to embark in great undertakings of the same nature. In 1802,
Leclerc proceeded to St. Domingo with 34 line-of-battle ships and large frigates,
more than 20 small frigates and sloops, and upwards of 20,000 men.
We learn from these points in history what constitutes an object worthy of
vast preparations ; and it is impossible to resist the fact, that our own coast, and
rivers, and bays, possess many establishments not lees inviting to an enemy than
Flushing and Antwerp.
We are taught, moreover, what constitutes a great expedition ; in other words,
what is the amount of force we must prepare to meet ; and, more than all, we are
taught that such an expedition, seizing a favorable moment, when the military
arrangements of a country are incomplete when the armies are absent, or im-
perfect in their organization or discipline does not hesitate to land in the face
of the most populous districts, and, availing of the local peculiarities, and covered
and supplied by a fleet, to undertake operations which penetrate deep into the
country, and consume considerable time.
It seems, therefore, that whenever the object we are to cover possesses a value
likely to provoke the cupidity of an enemy, or to stimulate his desire to inflict a
serious blow, it is not enough that the approaches by water are guarded against
his ships ; it will be indispensable to place safeguards against attacks by
land also. A force considerable enough for very vigorous attacks against the
land side of the fortifications may be thrown upon the shore ; and if these yield,
a way is opened for the ships, and the enemy carries his object.
In certain positions, the local circumstances would favor the land operations
of an enemy ; permitting him, while operating against the fortifications, to be
aided by the fleet, and covered from the reaction of the general force of the
country. In other positions, the extreme thinness of the population in the
neighborhood would require the forts to rely, for a considerable time, on their
own strength. In all such cases a much greater power of resistance would be
requisite than in circumstances of an opposite nature. In all such circumstances
the works should be of a strength adequate to resist an attack, although perse-
vered in vigorously for several days. But when these land operations lead away
from the shipping, or when the surrounding population is considerable, or the
enemy is unable to shelter his movements by local peculiarities, then it will
suffice if the works be competent to resist attacks, vigorous also, of a few hours
only.
. The magnitude and strength of the works will depend, therefore, on the joint
influence of the value of the object covered, the natural strength of the position,
and the succor to be drawn from the neighborhood. We may introduce, as
instances, New York and Pensacola. The former is as attackable as the latter :
that is to say, it equally requires artificial defences ; and, owing to its capacious
harbor and easy entrance, it is not easy to place it in a satisfactory condition as
to the approaches by water. But while an enemy, in approaching any of the
principal works by land, could not well cover himself from the attacks of the
concentrated population of the vicinity, the rapid means of communication from
the interior would daily bring great accessions to the defence. A land attack
against the city must, consequently, be restricted to a few days ; and the works
will fulfil their object, if impregnable to a coup de main.
Pensacola, an object, in many respects, of the highest importance, and growing
174 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
in consequence every day, is capable of being defended as perfectly as the city
just mentioned. The principal defences lie on a long sandy island, which closes
in the harbor from the sea. An enemy landed on this island (Santa Rosa) would
be in uninterrupted communication with his fleet ; could, owing to the sparseness
of the population, have nothing to apprehend, for some time, from any re-enforce-
ments arriving at the place ; and would be well protected, by position, from the
effects of this succor, when it should arrive. While in possession of naval supe-
riority, he might, therefore, not unreasonably calculate on being able to press a
siege of many days of the work which occupies the extremity of the island, and
guards the entrance to the harbor. And even before coming into possession of
this work his gun and mortar batteries, on the same island, would destroy every
thing not bomb-proof and incombustible at the navy yard. An attack not less
persevering, and with equal chances of success, might be made from the other
side of the harbor also.
If, therefore, the power to resist a coup de main be all that is conferred on
the works at Pensacola, their object will be obtained only through the forbear-
ance of the enemy ; it being obviously indispensable that the principal of these
works be competent to resist a short siege. If this liability resulted from the
thinness of the neighboring population, it would still be many years before this
state of things would be materially altered. But it does not depend on this
alone ; the peculiar topographical features will continue this liability in spite of
increasing numbers, and ever so easy and rapid communication with the interior;
it having been proved that a fleet may lie broad off this shore and hold daily
communication therewith during the most tempestuous season. The English
fleet of men-of-war and transports lay, during the last war, from the 7th of
February to the 15th of March, 1814, anchored abreast of Dauphin island and
Mobile Point, where the exposure is the same as that off Pensacola.
Between the cases cited, which may be regarded as of the class of extreme
cases, (a class comprising, however, many important positions,) almost every
conceivable modification of the defence will be called for, to suit the various
conditions of the several points.
The fortifications of the coast must therefore be competent to the double task
of interdicting the passage of ships and resisting land attacks two distinct and
independent qualities. The first demands merely an array in suitable numbers
and in proper proportions of heavy guns, covered by parapets proof against shot
and shells; the second demands inacessibility. As there is nothing in the
first quality neceessarily involving the last, it has often happened, either from
.the little value of the position, or from the supposed improbability of a land
attack, or from the want of time to construct proper works, that this property
of inaccessibility has been neglected.
Whenever we have an object of sufficient value to be covered by a battery,
we should bear in mind that the enemy will know the value of the object as
well as ourselves. That it is a very easy thing for him to land a party of men
for an expedition of an hour or two ; and, unless we take the necessary pre-
ventive measures, his party will be sure to take the battery first ; after which
nothing will prevent his vessels consummating the design it was the purpose of
the battery to prevent.
In general, the same fortifications that guard the water approaches will pro-
tect the avenues by land also, but in certain cases a force may be so landed as
to evade the channel defences, reaching the object by a route entirely inland.
Of course this danger must be guarded against by suitable works.
After the preceding exposition of our views on the general subject of the de-
fences of the coast, it may not be out of place here to indicate the mode by
which the system of fortifications on which we could rely can be manned and
served without an augmentation for that particular purpose of the regular army.
The force that should be employed for this service in time of war is the militia,
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 175
(using the term in a comprehensive sense;) the probability being that, in most
of the defended points on the seaboard, the uniformed and volunteer companies
will supply the garrisons needed. And it may be shown that it is a service to
which militia are better adapted than any other.
The prominent defect of a militia force results from the impossibility of so
training the men to field movements in the brief period of their service as to
give them any confidence in themselves as manoeuvrers in the face of regular
troops ; the little they learn merely suffices to show them that it is but little ;
every attempt of the kind proving, by the disorder that they know not how to
avoid, how much greater would be the disorder if in face of an enemy and
under fire.
Without the knowledge to be obtained only by long and laborious practice,
the militiaman knows that he is no match in the field for the regular soldier,
and it is not surprising that he should desire to avoid an encounter. But there
is no such difficulty in the service of fixed batteries. The militiaman has to be
taught merely the service of a single gun, than which nothing can be more
simple. He must learn to use the rammer and the sponge, the handspike and
the linstock, to load, and to run to battery, to trail and to fire ; these are all.
Each of these operations is of the utmost simplicity, depending on individual
action and not on concert, and they may all be taught in a very short time.
There is no manoeuvring, no marching, no wheeling. The squad of one gun
may be marched to another, but the service of both is the same. Even the art
of pointing cannon is, to an American militiaman, an art of easy attainment,
from the skill that all our countrymen acquire in the use of fire-arms "drawing
sight, or aiming," being the same art, modified only by the difference in the gun.
The mode of applying this force may be illustrated by the case of any of our
cities on the seaboard. The forts and batteries, being put in perfect condition,
should be garrisoned, (at least the more important ones) by a small body of
regular artillery, such as our present militrry force could supply, and sufficient
for the preservation of the public property, and to afford indispensable daily
guards ; to these should be added two or three men of the ordnance department,
especially charged with the condition of the armament and ammunition, and
two or three engineer soldiers, whose sole duty it would be to attend to the con-
dition of the fortifications; keeping every part in a state of perfect repair. In
certain important works, however, that would be exposed to siege, or to analo-
gous operations, it would be prudent, especially in the beginning of a war, to
keep up a more considerable body of regular troops.
The volunteer force of the city should then be divided into detachments
without disturbing their company organization, and should be assigned to the
several works, according to the war garrisons required at each ; from four to six
men, according to circumstances, being allowed to each gun.
The larger works might require ten, fifteen, or even twenty companies ; the
smaller, one, two, three, or more companies ; and, in some cases, even a platoon
might suffice. Being thus assigned, each portion of the city force would have
its definite alarm-post, and should be often taken to it, and there exercised in all
the duties of its garrison, and more especially in the service of its batteries and
in its defence against assault. The multiplicity of steamboats in all the cities
would enable the volunteers to reach even the most distant alarm-posts in a
short time.
In order that all these troops may become expert in their duty, one of the
works most convenient to the city, besides being the alarm-post of some partic-
ular portion of the volunteers, should, during peace, be the ordinary school of
drill for all ; and in this the detachments should, in turn, assemble and exercise.
Besides the mere manual of the gun and battery, there should be frequent
target practice, as being not only necessary to the proper use of the battery,
but as imparting interest and excitement to the service.
176 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
It might be necessary for a time to submit the volunteers to the drill of a
competent officer or non-commissioned officer of the regular artillery ; and, in
particular, to conduct the practice with shot and shells under such instruction.
The portion of the military force of the city not stationed in the fixed bat-
teries would constitute, under an impending attack, a reserve, posted either in
one or several bodies, according to circumstances, ready to cover exposed points,
to co-operate in offensive movements, or to relieve exhausted garrisons : this
portion having connected with it the mounted force, the field artillery, and the
heavy movable guns.
This appropriation of the volunteer force to the immediate defence of the city
would operate in the most favorable way upon that force, superadding to the
impulses of patriotism every feeling connected with family, property, and social
and civil relations, and, while making military service the first of duties, reliev-
ing it of hardship and privation. It would be a peculiar feature in this kind
of service that the governing motive in the choice of officers would be favorable
to the condition of the troops, every man feeling that the safety of his dearest
concerns depended on the efficiency and courage of his officers. The same
motive would prompt him, moreover, to desire, and contribute to, the highest
state of efficiency in the corps.
The organization of volunteer force here contemplated may comprehend the
whole maritime frontier; and be applicable, also, at the more populous points
upon the inland borders.
This arrangement, while it might be an enduring one, would be the least
expensive by far of any that would be efficient.
The days of exercise, drill, and encampment should be fixed and invariable,
in order that they may the less interfere with the private occupations of the
volunteers. During an impending attack, greater or less portions should be
constantly at these posts ; but still the service would comprise but a very small
portion of the year.
According to the value of the interest to be defended, and the extent of the
works to be occupied, would be the rank of the chief command ; which should
be intrusted to an officer of the regular army, whose control might often be
extended, advantageously, over a certain extent of seaboard to the right and
left, constituting a maritime department.
In the tables to be presented at the end of this report, we shall give .the
whole number of men required for the complete defence of each of the works.
We now proceed to examine the coast in detail ; and, in order to conform to
the Senate's resolution, we shall divide the whole sea-coast of the United States
into two great portions : the first portion extending from Passamaquoddy bay
to Cape Florida; the second from Cape Florida to the mouth of the Sabine.
In our description we shall, without any other than this general acknowledg-
ment, quote largely from a report presented to Congress in April, 1836, and to
be found in the Senate documents of the 1st session 24th Congress, No. 293,
vol. 4. This report contains an argument on the general subject, embodying
many important considerations, which we have thought best not to repeat in this
lengthened report, but to refer to as worthy of perusal.
We will conduct the examination geographically beginning at the northeastern
extremity, and referring in every case to accompanying tables which exhibit
the several works in the order of relative importance as to time.
COAST FROM PASSAMAQUODDY BAY TO CAPE FLORIDA.
The extreme northeastern section of this coast, extending from Quoddy Head
to Cape Cod, is characterized by its serrated outline and its numerous harbors,
and, at certain seasons, by its foggy atmosphere. The extent of this section,
measuring from point to point wherever the breaks of the coast are abrupt, is
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 177
about 500 miles ; while a straight line from one of the above-mentioned capes to
the other is hardly half that distance. The eastern half is singularly indented
by deep bays; the coast being universally rocky and possessing numerous
islands surrounded by deep water, which islands not only increase the number
of harbors, but cover, besides, an interior navigation well understood by the
hardy coasters and measurably secured by its intricacies, and the other dangers
of this boisterous and foggy region, from interruption by an enemy. The western
half is much less broken ; it is covered by few islands in comparison, but con-
tains several excellent harbors.
The eastern harbors of Maine are exposed in a peculiar manner. They are
not only on the flank of our line, but they are also quite near the public estab-
lishments of the greatest maritime power. They are, moreover, as yet backed
by only a thin population; and are,' consequently, weak as well as exposed.
The time may not, however, be very distant when, becoming wealthy and
populous, they will be objects of a full portion of the national solicitude. Works
designed for these harbors must therefore be calculated for the future ; must be
founded on the principle that they must defend places much more important than
any now existing there ; that, being near the possessions of a foreign power,
they will be in a particular manner liable to sudden and repeated attacks ; and
that, lying at the extremity of the coast, they are liable to be tardily succored.
The works must consequently be competent to resist escalade, and to hold out
for a few days. Feebler works might be more injurious than beneficial ; their
weakness would in the first place invite attack; and it being often a great
advantage to occupy fortified places in an adversary's territory, the enemy could
prepare himself to remedy the deficiencies of the forts after they should fall into
his hands, by adding temporary works, by providing strong garrisons, and by
aiding the defence with his vessels.
No surveys have been made of these harbors, and no plans formed for their
defence. It may be well to observe here, once for all, that much confidence is
not asked for the mere conjectures presented below, as to the number and cost
of the works assigned for the protection of the harbors which have not yet been
surveyed : in some cases there may be mistakes as to the number of forts and
batteries needed ; in others, errors will exist in the estimated cost.
Eastport and Mackias may be mentioned as places that will unquestionably
be thought to need defensive works by the time, in the order of relative im-
portance, the execution of them can be undertaken by the government. There
are several small towns eastward of Mount Desert island that may, at that period,
deserve equal attention ; at present, however, the places mentioned will be the
only ones estimated for; and $100,000 will be assumed as the cost at each.
(Statement 1, table F.)
Mount Desert island, situated a little east of Penobscot bay, having a capa-
cious and close harbor, affording anchorage for the highest class of vessels, and
. easily accessible from sea, offers a station for the navy of an enemy superior to
any other on this part of the coast. From this point his cruisers might act with
great effect against the navigation of the eastern coast, especially that of Maine ;
and his enterprises could be conducted with great rapidity against any points he
might select. These considerations, added to the very great advantage in certain
political events, of our occupying a naval station thus advanced, whence we
might act offensively, together with the expediency of providing places of suc-
cor on a part of the coast where vessels are so frequently perplexed in their
navigation by the prevailing fogs, lead to the conclusion that the fortification, in
a strong manner, of this roadstead may before long be necessary. A survey of
this island was begun many years ago ; but the party being called off to other
duties it was never completed. The project of defensive works has not been
H. Kep. Com. 86 12
178 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
made. The entire cost may be, as assumed by the engineer department some
years ago, $500,000.-- (Statement 1, table F.)
Castinc. It would seem to be impossible, on this coast, to deprive an enemy
enjoying naval superiority of harbors, or prevent his using them as stations
during a war insular situations, which his vessels would render unapproach-
able, being so numerous ; but it seems proper that such of these positions as are
the sites of towns should be secured. During the last war the English held the
position of Oastine for some time, and left it at their pleasure. It is probable a
work costing about $50,000 would deter an enemy from again making choice of
this position. Statement 1, table F.)
Penobscot bay. Upon this bay, and upon the river of the same name flowing
into it, are several flourishing towns and villages. Of the many bays which
intersect the coast the Penobscot is the one which presents the greatest number
of safe and capacious anchorages. As before observed a large portion of these
harbors must, for the present, be left without defences, but the valuable com-
merce of the bay and river must be covered ; and to afford a secure retreat for
such vessels as may be unable to place themselves under the protection of the
works to the east or west of the bay, the passage of the river must be defended.
The lowest point at which this can be done without great expense is opposite
Bucksport at the "narrows." A project has been given in for a fort at that
position estimated at $150,000. (Statement 1, table D.)
St. George's bay, Broad bay, Damariscotta, and Sheepscut. West of the
.Penobscot occur the above-mentioned bays, all being deep indentations leading
to towns, villages, and various establishments of industry, and enterprise. The
bays have not been surveyed, and of course no plans have been formed for their
defence. $400,000 are assigned to the defence of these waters. The Sheeps-
cut is an excellent harbor of refuge for vessels of every size. (Statement 1,
table F.)
Kcnnebcck river. This river (one of the largest in the eastern States) enters
the sea nearly midway between Cape Cod and the mouth of the St. Croix. It
rises near the source of the Chaudiere, which is a tributary of the St. Lowrence,
and has once served as a line of operations against Quebec. The situation and
extent of this river, the value of its products, and the active commerce of sev-
eral very flourishing towns upon its banks, together with the excellence of the
harbor within its mouth, will not permit its defence to be neglected. The sur-
veys begun many years ago were never finished. The estimated cost of de-
fences, as formerly reported by the engineer department, was $300,000. Posi-
tions near the mouth will permit a secure defence. (Statement 1, table D.)
Portland harbor. The protection of the town, of the merchantmen belong-
ing to it, and of the ships-of-war that may be stationed in this harbor to watch
over this part of the coast, or that may enter for shelter, (all of them important
objects,) may be secured, as an inspection of the map of the harbor will shore,
by occupying Fort Preble Point, House island, Hog Island ledge, and Fish
Point,
If the two channels to the west and east of Hog island can be obstructed at
small expense (to decide which some surveys are yet necessary) there will be
no necessity for 'a battery on the ledge, and Fish Point need be occupied only
by such works as may be thrown up in time of war. The expense, as now
estimated, of the works planned for this defence, will be $155,000 for Fort
Preble, and $48,000 for House island; for Hog Island channel say, $135,000.
(Statement 1, tables A, D, E, and F.) In addition there must be repairs im-
mediately applied to the old works at an expense of $6,600.
Saco, Kcnnebunk and York. Small works comparatively will cover these
places; $75,000 is assumed as the aggregrate cost. (Statement 1, table F.)
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 179
"Portsmouth harbor and navy yard. The only good roadstead or harbor
between Cape Elizabeth and Cape Ann is Portsmouth harbor, within the mouth
of Piscataqua river. Line-of-battle ships can ascend as high as Fox Point,
seven miles above the town. This situation, sufficiently commodious for a sec-
ondary naval depot designed to repair vessels of war, should be maintained ; but
it is to be regretted that the bay to the south of Fox Point was not chosen as
the site of the navy yard instead of Fernald's island. Being where it is, it will
be necessary, in time of war, to make some particular dispositions for the pro-
tection of the navy yard from an attack from the north shore of the river.
The position of Fort Constitution will certainly, and that of Fort McCleary
vill probably, be occupied by the defences, though the works themselves should
ive place to those that will better fulfil the object. The other positions for
iorts or batteries are Gerrishe's Point, Fishing island, and Clark's island, some,
if not all, of which must be occupied. Surveys are required before the projects
can be formed, or before estimates can be made ; but there is reason for believing
that the entire cost of fortifying this harbor will not fall short of $300,000.
(Statement 1, table D.)
Ncwburyport harbor. The points forming the mouth of the harbor are con-
tinually changing, and it seems necessary, therefore, to rely, for the defence of
the harbor, on works to be thrown up during a war. There is only a shoal
draught of water. It is thought $100,000 will defend this harbor adequately.
(Statement 1, table F.)
Gloucester harbor. The position of this harbor, near the extremity of Cape
Ann, places it in close relation with the navigation of all Massachusetts bay and
imparts to it considerable importance. No surveys have yet been made, but it
is believed that sufficient defence may be provided for $200,000. (Statement 1,
table E.) Should there be any occasion for defensive works before the proposed
new works can be commenced, an expenditure of $10,000 in repairs of the old
fort will be required. (table A.)
Beverly harbor. This harbor will be defended chiefly by a portion of the
works designed for Salem. $50,000 in addition will secure it. (Statement 1,
table F.)
Salem harbor. The port of Salem is distant from Marblehead two miles, and
separated therefrom by a peninsula. The occupation of the extremity of Win-
ter island (where are the ruins of Fort Pickering) on one side, and Naugus
Head on the other, will effectually secure this harbor. Projects have been pre-
sented for this defence, estimated to cost $225,000. (Statement 1, tables D and
F.) On a sudden emergency, old Fort Lee may be put in an effective state for
$2,000. (table A.)
Marblehead harbor. Besides covering, in some measure, the harbor of Bos-
ton, Salem and Marblehead harbors possess an important commerce of their
own, and also afford shelter for vessels prevented, by certain winds, from enter-
ing Boston, or pursuing their course eastward. The proposed mode of defend-
ing Marblehead harbor consists in occupying, on the north side, the hillock
which commands the present Fort Sewall, (which will be superseded by the
new work,) and, on the south, the position of Jack's Point. The two works
will cost $318,000. (Statement 1, tables D and F.
To repair old Fort Sewall, which may be necessary, if the, new works are not
soon begun, will require $10,000. (Table A.)
Boston harbor. We come now to the most important harbor in the eastern
section of the coast; and, considering the relation to general commerce, and the
interests of the navy, one of the most important in the whole Union.
180 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES
After a careful examination of all the necessary conditions of such a problem,
the board of naval officers and engineers, in their joint report of 1820, gave this
harbor a preference over all other positions to the east and inclusive of New
York bay and the Hudson, as the seat of the great northern naval depot; and
the government, by the great additions and improvements that have from year
to year been since made to the navy yard on the Charlestown side, have virtually
sanctioned the recommendation of the board. But, independent of the navy
yard, Boston is a city of great wealth, and possesses an extensive and active
commerce.
The old works defended merely the interior basin from attacks by water;
but, as it often happens that vessels enter Nantasket roads with a wind too scant
to take them to the city, or are detained in President roads by light winds or an
adverse tide ; as the former, especially, is a very convenient anchorage whence
to proceed to sea ; and, above all, as Nantasket roads affords the best possible
station for a blockading squadron, it was deemed indispensable to place perma-
nent defences at the mouth of the harbor. The project of defence regards the
existing works, with the necessary repairs and modifications, as constituting a
second barrier.
Besides a permanent work, now well advanced, on George's island, it contem-
plates permanent works on Nantasket Head; filling up the Broad Sound chan-
nel, so as to leave no passage in that direction for ships-of-war.
Until the best draught for steam vessels of war shall be well ascertained, it
will not be safe to say to what depth the Broad Sound channel should be re-
stricted ; nor, indeed, can it be positively asserted that this description of vessel
can be conveniently excluded by such means. Other vessels can, however, be
thus excluded; and steam vessels passing this channel would still have to pass
the inner barrier. The estimated cost of the works for this harbor is $2,040,000.
Besides the works of a permanent character, it will be necessary, in the be-
ginning of a war, to erect several temporary works on certain positions in the
harbor, and on the lateral approaches to the navy yard.- (Statement 1, tables
A, E, and F.)
Plymouth and Provincetown harbors. These harbors have a commerce of
some consequence of their own, but they are particularly interesting in reference
to the port of Boston. While these are undefended, an enemy's squadron block-
ading Massachusetts bay will have ports of refuge under his lea, which would
enable him to maintain his blockade, even throughout the most stormy seasons
knowing that the winds which would force him to seek shelter would be adverse
to outward-bound, and fatal to such inward vessels as should venture near the
Cape. Were the enemy deprived of these harbors, he would be unable to enforce
a rigorous investment, as he would be constrained to take an offing on every
approach of foul weather. Our own vessels coming in from sea, and finding an
enemy interposed between them and Boston, or, being turned from their course
by adverse winds, would, in case of the defence of these ports, find to the south
of Boston shelters equivalent to those provided in the east, at Marblehead, Salem,
Gloucester, and Portsmouth. Plymouth harbor has not been fully surveyed.
Provincetown harbor has been surveyed, but the projects of defence have not
been formed. The former, it is thought, may be suitably covered by a work of
no great cost on Garnett Point ; while, to fortify Provincetown harbor in such a
way as to cover vessels taking shelter therein, and at the same time deprive an
enemy of safe anchorages, will involve considerable expense. Probably no
nearer estimate can be formed at present than that offered by the engineer de-
partment some years ago, which gave $100,000 for Plymouth, and $600,000 for
Provincetown. (Statement 1, tables D and E.)
The coast between Cape Cod and Cape Hatteras differs from the northeastern
f section in possessing fewer harbors, in having but little rocky and a great portion
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 181
of sandy shore, in its milder climate and clearer atmosphere; and it differs from
all the other portions in the depth and magnitude of its interior seas and sounds,
and in the distance to which deep tide navigation extends up its numerous large
rivers. The circuit of the coast, not including the shores of the great bays,
measures 650 miles, while a straight line from one of the above-named capes to
the other measures about 520 miles.
Martha's Vineyard sound. To the south of Cape Cod lie the islands of Nan-
tucket and Martha's Vineyard, which, with several smaller islands on the south,
and the projection of Cape Malabar on the east, enclose the above-named sound.
The channels through this sound, being sufficient for merchant vessels, and one
of the channels permitting the passage even of small frigates, are not only the
constant track of coasting vessels, but also of large numbers of vessels arriving
in the tempestuous months from foreign voyages. There are within the sound
the harbors of Tarpaulin Cove, Holmes' s Hole, Edgartown, Falmouth, Hyan-
nis, and Nantucket, besides small anchorages.
In addition to the many thousand vessels passing this water annually, (of
which there are sometimes forty or fifty,) a portion containing very valuable
cargoes, to be seen in the harbors awaiting a change of wind, there is supposed
to be at least 40,000 tons of whaling vessels owned in the towns of this sound.
If the harbors just named are to be defended at all, it must be by fortifications.
There is little or no population except in the towns, and even this is believed to
be entirely without military organization. A privateer might run into either of
these harbors, and capture, destroy, or levy contributions at pleasure. The use
of the sound itself, as an anchorage for vessels-of-war, cannot be prevented by
fortifications alone. $250,000 may, perhaps, suffice for the defence of all the
harbors against the kind of enterprise to which they are exposed. (Statement
1, table F.)
New Bedford and Fairhaven harbor. No survey has been made of this
harbor, on which lie two of the most flourishing towns. It is easily defensible,
and the amount formerly assumed by the engineer department will probably
suffice, namely, $300,000. (Statement 1, table D.)
Buzzard's ~bay. Interposed between the main and the island of Martha's
Vineyard, are the Elizabeth islands, which bound Buzzard's bay on the south.
This bay covers the harbor of New Bedford, and might be used as an anchorage
by an enemy's fleet; but it is too wide to be defended by fortifications.
Narraganset bay. The properties of this great roadstead will be here briefly
adverted to. More minute information may be obtained by reference to reports
of 1820 and 1821.
As a harbor, this is acknowledged by all to be the best on the whole coast of
the United States ; and it is the only close man-of-war harbor that is accessible
with a northwest wind, the prevailing and most violent wind of the inclement
season. Numerous boards and commissions, sometimes composed of naval
officers, sometimes of army officers, sometimes of officers of both services, have,
at different times, had the subject of this roadstead under consideration; and all
have concurred in recommending, in strong terms, that it be made a place of
naval rendezvous and repair, if not a great naval depot ; one or more of these
commissions preferring it, for the latter purpose, to all other positions. These
recommendations have not been acted on ; but it is next to certain that a war
would force their adoption upon the government.
With the opening of this anchorage properly defended, hardly a vessel-of-war
would come, either singly or in small squadrons, upon the coast, in the boisterous
season, without aiming at this port, on account of the comparative certainty of
an immediate entrance. And this would be particularly the case with vessels
182 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
injured by heavy weather, or in conflict with an enemy; with vessels bringing
in prizes, or pursued by a superior force.
This use of the port would almost necessarily bring with it the demand for
the means of repairing and refitting; and the concentration of these upon some
suitable spot would be the beginning of a permanent dock yard.
For the same reason that ships-of-war would collect here, it would be a favorite
point of rendezvous for privateers and their prizes, and a common place of refuge
for merchantmen.
From this, as a naval station, the navigation of Long Island sound, and the
communication between this and Martha's Vineyard sound, or Buzzard's bay,
might be well protected ; New London harbor would be covered ; the navy yard
would command southwardly, as from Hampton roads northwardly, the great
inward curve of the coast between Cape Cod and Cape Hatteras ; the influence
of which command over the blockading operations of an enemy will be apparent,
when it is considered that the only harbors of refuge left to him will be the
Delaware, Gardiner's, and Buzzard's bays, and Martha's Vineyard sound.
The bays first mentioned belong to the class before alluded to, which, being
too wide for complete defence by batteries, must call in such auxiliary defences
as the navy may supply ; and in reference to their defence by these means,
nothing can be more important than the fortification of Narraganset roads, be-
cause all but the first of the bays just named (including an anchorage for ships-
of-war under Block island) would be commanded by a single squadron of those
floating defences lying in these roads. To a squadron of steam batteries, for
instance, lying under the fortifications, it would be a matter of little consequence
into which of the above anchorages an enemy should go all being within reach in
three or four hours, and some within sight. We will here observe, by the way,
that this use of floating defences is in accordance with the principle before in-
sisted on ; they are not expected to close the entrance into these several bays,
that would require a squadron for each at least equal to the enemy's ; but as the
enemy goes in merely for rest or shelter, and there is no object that he can in-
jure, he may be permitted to enter, and our squadron will assail him only when
the circumstances of wind, weather, &c., give all the advantages to the attack.
The fortification of Narraganset roads is therefore, in effect, a most important
contribution toward the defence of all the neighboring anchorages.
But the same properties that make Narraganset roads so precious to us would
recommend them to the enemy also ; and their natural advantages will be en-
hanced in his eyes by the value of all the objects these advantages may have
accumulated therein.
If this roadstead were without defence an enemy could occupy it without op-
position, and, by the aid of naval superiority, form a lodgement on the island of
Rhode Island for the war. Occupying this island with his troops, and with his
fleets the channels on either side, he might defy all the forces of the eastern
States ; and while, from this position, his troops would keep in alarm and motion
the population of the east, feigned expeditions against New York, or- against
more southern cities, would equally alarm the country in that direction ; and
thus, though he might do no more than menace, it is difficult to estimate the em-
barrassment and expense into which he would drive the government.
It has been alleged that similar consequences would flow from the occupation
of other positions, (such, for instance, as are afforded in the bays just mentioned,)
and that, therefore, the defence in a strong manner of Narraganset roads is use-
less.
Even allowing that there are other advantageous and inaccessible positions
whereon an enemy might place himself, is it a reason because the foe can in
spite of us, possess himself of comparatively unsafe and open harbors, that we
should not apply to our own uses, but yield up to him the very best harbor on
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 183
the coast; that we should submit to capture and destruction the valuable objects
that accumulate in consequence of the properties of the harbor 1
But it is believed that none of the outer and wider harbors will answer for
such an establishment as we have supposed, nor for any other purpose than an
occasional anchorage of ships-of-war; and for these reasons, amongst others:
that although ships-of-war might possibly ride in these broad waters at all sea-
sons, it would seem to be a measure of great temerity for transports to attempt
it, except in the mildest seasons ; and there can be but little doubt that a hostile
expedition would resort to no harbor as a place of rendezvous, unless it afforded
sure protection to its transports ; these being the only means by which ulterior
purposes could be executed, or final retreat from the country effected.
If, moreover, Narraganset roads be fortified and become a naval station, or at
least the station of a floating force designed to act against these outer waters,
such an establishment by any enemy would at once be put upon the defensive,
and require the constant presence of a superior fleet, thus measurably losing the
object of the establishment.
Independent of the qualities of the harbor, however, none of these bays would
answer our purpose : 1st. Because they cannot be securely defended ; and, 2d.
Because they are difficult of access from the main the communication with them
being liable to interruption by bad weather, and liable to be cut off by the enemy.
The defence adopted for Narraganset roads must be formidable on the impor-
tant points, because they will be exposed to powerful expeditions. Although
the possession of this harbor, the destruction of the naval establishment, the
capture of the floating defences, and the possession of the island as a place of
debarkation and refreshment should not be considered as constituting, of them-
selves, objects worthy a great expedition, they might very well be the prelimi-
nary steps of such expedition; and defences weak in their character might
tempt, rather than deter it; for, although unable to resist his enterprise* they
might be fully competent, after being captured and strengthened by such means
as he would have at hand, to protect him from offensive demonstrations on our
part.
There are, besides, in the local circumstances, some reasons why the works
should be strong. The channel on the eastern side of the island being perma-
nently closed by a solid bridge, requires no defensive works; but this bridge
being at the upper end of the island, the channel is open to an enemy all along
the eastern shore of the island. Works erected for the defence of the channel
on the west side of the island cannot, therefore, prevent, nor even oppose, a
landing on the eastern side. The enemy, consequently, may take possession,
and bend his whole force to the reduction of the forts on the island, which can-
not be relieved until a force has been organized, brought from a distance, con-
veyed by water to the points attacked, and landed in the face of his batteries ;
all this obviously requiring several days, during which the forts should be capa-
ble of holding out. To do this against an expedition of 10,000 or 20,000
men demands something more than the strength to resist a single assault.
Unless the main works be competent to withstand a siege of a few days, they
will not therefore fulfil their trust, and will be worse than useless.
It must here be noticed that, although the works do not prevent the landing
of an enemy on Rhode Island, they will, if capable of resisting his efforts for a
few days, make his residence on the island for any length of time impossible ;
since forces in any number may be brought from the main and lauded under the
cover of the fire of the works.
To come now to the particular defences proposed for this roadstead. It must
be stated that there are three entrances into Narraganset roads :
1st. The eastern channel, which passes up on the east side of the island of
Rhode Island. This, as before stated, being shut by a solid bridge, needs
184 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
no defence by fortifications, other than a field-work or two, which may b thrown
up at the opening of a war.
2d. The central channel, which enters from sea by passing between Rhode
Island and Canonicut island. This is by far the best entrance, and leads to the
best anchorage ; and this it is proposed to defend by a fort on the east side of
the entrance, designed to be the principal work in the system. This work,
called Fort Adams, is nearly completed. On the west side of the entrance it is
proposed to place another work ; and on an island, called Rose island, facing the
entrance, a third Avork. It is also proposed to repair the old fort on Goat island,
just within the mouth ; and also old Fort Green, which is a little higher up, and
on the island of Rhode Island.
3d. As to the western passage, three modes present themselves ; first, by re-
ducing the depth of water by an artificial ledge, so as while the passage shall
be as free as it is now for the coasting trade, it shall be shut as to the vessels of
war, including steam vessels; second, by relying on fortifications alone to close
the channel ; or, third, by resorting in part to one and in part to the other mode
just mentioned. Either is practicable ; but being the least expensive and most
certain, the estimates are founded on the first.
The total cost of the Narraganset defences is estimated at $1,817,482.
(Statement 1, tables A. B, D, E, and F.)
Gardiner's bay. It is uncertain whether this harbor, which would be a very
valuable one to an enemy investing this part of the coast, is defensible by forti-
fications alone. After it shall have been surveyed, it may appear that from one
or more positions the whole anchorage may be controlled by heavy sea mortars.
In such a case, the defensive works would not be costly. If it be found expe-
dient to fortify some particular portion of the bay, as an anchorage for steam
batteries, (which, however, is not anticipated,) the expense would probably be
as great as was anticipated some years since by the engineer department, viz :
$400,000. (Statement 1, table F.)
Sag harbor, New York, and Stonington, Connecticut. Neither of these har-
bors has been surveyed with reference to defence. The first is possessed of
considerable tonnage ; and the second, besides being engaged in commerce, is
the terminus of a railroad from Boston. $100,000 may be assigned to the first,
and $200,000 to the other. (Statement 1, tables E and F.)
New London harbor is very important to the commerce of Long Island sound ;
and, as a port of easy access, having great depth of water, rarely freezing, and
being easily defended, it is an exellent station for the navy. It is also valuable
as a shelter for vessels bound out or home, and desirous of avoiding a blockading
squadron off Sandy Hook.
In the plan of defence, the present forts (Trumbull and Griswold) give place
to more efficient works, whereof the expense is estimated at $441,000. (State-
ment 1, tables C and F.)
Mouth of Connecticut river. This river has been shown to be subject to the
expeditions of an enemy. No survey has been made with a view to its de-
fences ; $100,000 is introduced here as the conjectural cost. (Statement 1,
table F,)
New Haven harbor. It is proposed to defend this harbor by improving and
enlarging Fort Hale, and substituting a new work for the slight redoubt erected
during the last war, called Fort "Wooster. The expense of both may be set
down at $90,000, exclusive of $5,000 for immediate repairs of old Fort Hale.
(Statement 1, table F.)
There are several towns between New Haven and New York, on both sides
of the sound ; none of them are very large as yet, still, most, if not all, are pros-
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 185
porous and increasing. Although, in their present condition, it might not be
deemed necessary to apply any money to permanent defences, yet, as part of
the present object is to ascertain, as near as may be, the ultimate cost of com-
pletely fortifying the coast, it seems proper to look forward to the time when
some of these towns may become objects of predatory enterprises of some mag-
nitude. Bearing in mind the probable increase of population in the mean time,
and the situation of the places generally, it is thought that $200,000 will be
enough to provide defences for all. (Statement 1, table F.)
New York harbor. The objects of the projected works for the security of
New York are to cover the city from an attack by land or sea ; to protect its
numerous shipping ; to prevent, as far as possible, the blockade of this great
port ; and to cover the interior communication uniting this harbor with the Del-
aware. In the present condition of the defences an enemy would encounter no
great opposition, whether his attack were made by land or water.
There are two avenues to the city, namely : one by the main channel, direct
from sea, and one by the sound. If an enemy come by the way of the sound,
he may now land his forces on the New York side, at Hell Grate, within less than
ten miles of New York, and the next day, at the latest, be in the city ; or he
may land on the Long island side at the same distance, and in the same time be
master of the navy yard and of Brooklyn heights, whence the city of New York
is perfectly commanded ; or he may divide his forces and reach both objects at
the same moment.
The projected system of defence closes this avenue at the greatest distance
possible from the city, namely, at Throg's Point. The occupation of this point
will force the enemy to land more than twenty miles from the city on one side,
and still further from the navy yard on the other.
A work now in progress at Throg's Point will probably prevent any attempt
to force this passage. It will, as we have seen, oblige an enemy to land at a
considerable distance from the object ; and, as he will then be unable to turn the
strong position afforded by Harlem river, the cover on the New York side will
be sufficient. ,
But should he land on the Long Island side he might, by leaving parties on
suitable positions with a view to prevent our crossing the river and falling on
his rear, make a dash at the navy yard, having no obstacle in his front. To
prevent this effectually, and also to accomplish other objects, a work should be
erected on Wilkins's Point, opposite Throg's Point. This work, besides com-
pleting the defence of the channel, would involve a march against the navy yard
from this quarter in great danger ; since all the forces that could be collected on
the New York shore might, under cover of this work, be crossed over to Long
Island, and fall on the rear of the enemy, cutting off his communication with
the fleet. The two works on Throg's and Wilkins's Points may, therefore, be
regarded as perfectly protecting, on that side, the city and navy yard.
Against an attack by the main channel there are
1st. The works in the vicinity of the city, which would act upon an enemy's
squadron only after its arrival before the place. They consist of Fort Colum-
bus, Castle Williams, and South Battery, on Governor's island ; Fort Wood, on
Bedlow's island ; and Fort Gibson, on Ellis's island.
It is necessary that these works be maintained, because, in the event of the
lower barrier being forced, these would still afford a resource. It is a disad-
vantage of their positions, however, that the destruction of the city might be
going on simultaneously with the contest between these forts and the fleet.
They cannot, however, be dispensed with, until the outer barriers are entirely
completed, if even then.
2d. At the NaiTows, about seven miles below the city, the passage becomes
so contracted as to permit good disposition to be made for defence. On the Long
186 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
Island side of the Narrows is Fort Lafayette, which is a strong water-battery
standing on a reef at some distance from the shore ; and immediately behind it,
011 the top of the bank, is a small but strong work, called Fort Hamilton. Some '
repairs being applied to these works this position may be regarded as well
occupied.
On the west side, or Staten island side of the Narrows, are the following works
belonging to the State of New York, viz : Fort Richmond, which is a water-
battery ; Battery Hudson, which is at some height above the water ; Battery
Morton, which is a small battery on the top of the hill ; and Fort Tomkins,
which is also on the top of the hill, and is the principal work. All these need
great repairs ; but, being once in proper order, would afford a very important
contribution to the defence- of the passage ; nothing further, indeed, being con-
templated for this position, except the construction of a small redoubt on a com-
manding hill, a little to the southwest. The repairs of these works cannot too
soon be taken in hand ; and it is hoped some arrangement may soon be made
with the State authorities to that end.
With the Narrows thus defended, and the works near the city in perfect order,
New York might be regarded as pretty well protected against an attack by water
through this passage.
But there lies below the Narrows a capacious bay, affording good anchorage
for any number of vessels-of-war and transports. An enemy's squadron being
in that bay, into which entrance is very easy, would set a seal upon this outlet
of the harbor. Not a vessel could enter or depart at any season of the year.
And it would also intercept the water communication, by the way of the Raritan,
between New York and Philadelphia.
The same squadron could land a force on the beach of Gravesend bay, (the
place of the landing of the British, which brought on the battle of Long Island
in the revolutionary war,) within seven miles of the city of Brooklyn, of its
commanding height, and of the navy yard, with no intervening obstacle of any
sort.
This danger is imminent, and it would not fail, in the event of war, to be as
fully realized as it was during the last war, when, on the rumor of an expedition
being in preparation in England, 27,000 militia were assembled to cover the city
from an attack of this sort. It is apparent that the defences near the city, and
those at the Narrows, indispensable as they are for other purposes, cannot be
made to prevent this enterprise, which can be thoroughly guarded against
only by
3d. An outer barrier at the very mouth of the harbor. This would accom-
plish two objects of great consequence, namely, rendering a close blockade of
the harbor impossible ; and obliging an enemy, who should design to move
troops against the navy yard, to land at a distance of more than twenty miles
from his object, upon a dangerous beach ; leaving, during the absence of the
troops, the transports at anchor in the ocean, and entirely without shelter. The
hazards of such a land expedition would, moreover, be greatly enhanced by the
fact that our own troops, by passing over to Long Island under cover of the fort
at Wilkins's Point, could cut off the return of the enemy to his fleet, which must
lie at or somewhere near Rockaway ; time, distance, and the direction of the
respective marches, would make, very naturally, such a manoeuvre a part of the
plan of defence. Against an enemy landing in Gravesend bay, no such ma-
noeuvre could be effectual, on account of the shortness of his line of march, as
well as of its direction. .
In view of these considerations, the board of engineers projected additional
works one for the east bank and another for the middle ground ; these posi-
tions being on shoals on either hand of the bar, outside of Sandy Hook. Before
determining on the works last mentioned, the board went into much research in
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 187
order to ascertain whether these shoals were unchangeable, and it was thought
to have been fully proved that there had been no material alteration in more
than sixty years. This apparent stability of the shoals encouraged the board
to devise the project referred to.
Recent surveys have, however, discovered a new or rather another channel.
If it be indeed a new channel, it shows a want of stability in the shoals that
forbids any such structures as. the contemplated batteries, and it may be neces-
sary to resort to other means. Suitable means exist, unquestionably, though it
may not be best to decide on them until all doubt as to the fixed or changing
nature of the channel shall be removed, especially as it must necessarily be
some time before the completion of more indispensable works will allow the
commencement of these. This may, however, be said with certainty, namely :
that all other means failing, works may be erected on Sandy Hook which will
have a good action upon the channel, and under cover of which bomb ketches
or steam batteries, or both, -may lie. With such an arrangement there would Jbe
little probability of the lower bay being occupied as a blockading station.
To recapitulate : The security of the city of New York and the navy yard
requires, first, defences on the passage from the sound, namely, the completion
of Fort Schuyler on Throg's Point, and the erection of a fort on Wilkins's
Point cost of both $976,000 ; second, the repair of works on Governor's
island, on Bedloe's island, and on Ellis's island estimated .cost $170,897 ;
third, the repair of the works at the Narrows, including the works belonging to
the State cost, 8475,000 ; and, fourth, the erection of outer defences on or
near Sandy Hook estimated by the board of engineers to cost $3,362,824.
The total cost, exclusive of these last, will therefore be $1,621,897, or, in-
cluding these, $4,984,721. (Statement 1, tables A, C, and F.)
Delaware bay, Fort Delaware, Fort Mifflin, Delaware breakwater. The
coast from the mouth of the Hudson to the Chesapeake, as well as that on the
south side of Long Island, is low and sandy, and is penetrated by several inlets ;
but not one besides the Delaware is navigable by sea-going vessels. The Dela-
ware bay itself, being wide and full of shoals, having an intricate channel, and
being much obstructed by ice in the winter, affords no very good natural harbor
within a reasonable distance of the sea.
The artificial harbor now in course of construction near Cape Henlopen will,
it is hoped, fully supply this need, in which event it must be securely fortified.
No plans have, however, as yet been made with that object, and as to the pro-
bable cost, nothing better can now be done than to assume the conjectural esti-
mate made some years since in the engineer department, namely, $600,000.
(Statement 1, table F.)
The lowest point at which the bay is defensible is at Pea Patch island, about
forty-five miles below the city of Philadelphia. A fort on that island, to re-
place the one destroyed by fire ; a fort opposite the Pea Patch, on the Delaware
shore, to assist in commanding the Delaware channel, and at the same time pro-
tect the mouth of the Delaware and Chesapeake canal ; a temporary work on
the Jersey shore, to be thrown up at the commencement of a war, to assist in
closing the channel on that side ; together with floating obstructions, to be put
down in moments of peril, will effectually cover all above this position in-
cluding Philadelphia and its navy yard, Wilmington, Newcastle, the canal be-
fore mentioned, and the Philadelphia and Baltimore railroad.
The commencement of the rebuilding of Fort Delaware being delayed by
difficulties attending the settlement of new claims to the island on which it is
to stand, Fort Mifflin, which is an old work about seven miles below the city of
Philadelphia, has been put in good order. This work is ready to receive its
armament and its garrison.
188 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
The expense of the work on Fort Delaware may be estimated at $491,000,
and of the fort opposite, $521,000. (Statement 1, tables C and F.)
Chesapeake bay. The board of naval officers and engineers intrusted with
the selection of sites for a great northern and a great southern naval depot,
recommended in their joint reports of 1819 and 1820 Burwell's bay, on James
river, for the one, and Charlestown, in Boston harbor, for the other. They also
recommended Boston harbor and Narraganset bay, at the north, and Hampton
roads, at the south, as chief naval rendezvous. In those reports the commis-
sioners entered at large into the consideration of all the matters relating to these
important objects, and reference is now made to those reports for -many interest-
ing details.
Hampton roads, James river, Norfolk, and the navy yard. The works pro-
jected for the defence of these are, 1st, a fort at Old Point Comfort this is
called Fort Monroe ; 2d, a casemated battery, called Fort Calhoun, on the Rip
Rap shoals, opposite Old Point Comfort ; and 3d, a line of floating obstruc-
tions extending across the channel from one of these works to the other. It
was the opinion of the commission above mentioned that, in the event of a great
naval depot being fixed on James river, it might ultimately be proper to provide
additional strength by placing works on the positions of Newport News, Was-
saw shoals, and Craney Island flats. Such an expansion has, however, since
then been given to the present navy yard at Gosport, (opposite Norfolk,) that
there is little probability of any other position on these waters being occupied
for such purposes.
The great importance of retaining Hampton roads during a war, and of cover-
ing the navy yard, is conceded on all hands. The bearing of this harbor upon
the general defence of the Chesapeake bay is, perhaps, equally well understood,
it being very evident that a small hostile force would reluctantly venture up the
bay, or into York river, or the Rappahannock, or any of the upper harbors,
leaving behind them a great naval station, and the common rendezvous of the
southern coast a station seldom in time of war without the presence of a num-
ber of vessels just ready for, or just returned from, sea.
A very important bearing upon the security of Norfolk and the navy yard,
independent of the closing the channel to those places, is, however, not generally
understood, and has been entirely overlooked in the oflicial animadversions
(before mentioned) on the system of defence of the board of engineers.
If we suppose no defences at the mouth of the roadstead, or only such as can
be disregarded or easily silenced, an enemy might debark his troops in Lynn-
haven bay, and despatch them against Norfolk, while his fleet would pass up
the harbor to the vicinity of the town, not only covering the flank of his troops,
but landing parties to turn any position that might be taken by the army at-
tempting to defend the place ; or, instead of landing in the bay, he might at his
option land the main body quite near to Norfolk ; and, having possession of
James river, he would prevent the arrival of any succor in steamboats or other-
wise by that channel.
There are two or three defiles on the route from Lynnhaven bay to Norfolk,
caused by the interlocking of streams, that, with the aid of field-works, would
possess great strength ; and being occupied in succession, would undoubtedly
delay, if not repulse, an enemy assailing them in front. Since the naval depot
seems fixed at Gosport, these must, indeed, be chiefly relied on for its security
from land attacks ; and timely attention must be given, on the breaking out of a
war, to the occupying of these defiles with appropriate defences. These posi-
tions possess no value whatever if they can be turned, and without adequate
fortifications at the outlet of Hampton roads, there would seem to be no security
for Norfolk or the navy yard, except in the presence of a large military force.
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 189
On the completion of the projected defences, the circumstances will be very
different. Then, those denies must be attacked in front, because no part of the
enemy's force can be landed above the mouth of the roads. But this is not all.
The moment an enemy advances towards Norfolk from this point of debarka-
tion, his communication with his fleet will be jeoparded, because, as the denies
do not require a large body to defend them against an attack in front, the greater
part of the reinforcements arriving from above, by way of the river, may be
lauded upon his flanks, or in his rear. An offensive land movement by the
enemy, under such circumstances, could be justified only in the case of his
finding an entire want of preparation, caused by the unexpected commencement
of hostilities. In connexion with this disposition for defence, it may be expe-
dient on the opening of a war, to throw up a field-work on the shore opposite
the position of Fort Calhoun, which would, besides, contribute to the exclusion
from the roadstead of vessels of small draught.
The above remarks show that the fortifications in progress are not less neces-
sary to the security of the navy yard and the city of Norfolk from a land at-
tack than from an attack by water, and that both these important functions are
superadded to the task of defending the only good roadstead of the southern
coast, and of contributing, in a very important degree, towards the defence of
the Chesapeake bay.
As in the case of Narraganset roads, it has been objected to this system of
defence that, although it may shut up this anchorage it leaves others in this
region open. May we suppose, then, that if there were no other than this har-
bor, its defence would be justifiable? If so, it would seem that the objection
rests on the principle that in proportion as nature has been bountiful to us, we
must be niggard to ourselves ; that, having little, we may cherish it, but, having
much, we must throw all away. I
The same criticism complains of the unreasonable magnitude of one of these
works, (Fort Monroe,) and we concede that there is justice in the criticism.
But it has long been too late to remedy the evil. It may not, however, be im-
proper to avail of this opportunity to remove from the country the professional
reproach attached to this error. When the system of coast defence was about
to be taken up, it was thought best by the government and Congress, to call
from abroad a portion of that skill and science which a long course of active
warfare was supposed to have supplied. Fort Monroe is one of the results of
that determination. It was not easy, probably, to come down from the exag-
gerated scale of warfare to which Europe was then accustomed ; nor for those
who had been brought up where wars were often produced, and always magni-
fied by juxtaposition or proximity, to realize to what degree remoteness from
belligerent nations would diminish military means and qualify military objects.
Certain it is, that this experiment, costly as it was in the case of Fort Monroe,
would have been much more so but for the opposition of some whose more
moderate opinions had been moulded by no other circumstances than those pe-
.culiar to our own country.
The mistake is one relating to magnitude, however, not to strength. Magni-
tude in fortifications is often a measure of strength ; fcut not always, nor in this
instance. Fort Monroe might have been as strong as it is now against a water
attack, or an assault, or a siege, with one-third its present capacity, and per-
haps at no more than half its cost. We do not think this work too strong for
its position, nor too heavily armed ; and as the force of the garrison will depend
mainly on the extent of the armament, the error has caused an excess in the
first outlay chiefly, but will not involve much useless expense after completion.
Although there is much important work to be done to complete the fort, it is
even now in a state to contribute largely to the defence of the roadstead, and
there is no doubt that in a very short time all the casemated parts may be per-
ctly ready to recieve the armament.
190 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
This work will be found in statement 1, table C ; $223,367 being required to
complete it.
Fort Calhoun cannot yet be carried forward for want of stability in the foun-
dation. The artificial mass on which it is to stand having been raised out of
the water, the walls of the battery were begun some years since, but it was soon
found that their weight caused considerable subsidence. On an inspection by
engineer officers, it was then decided to keep the foundations loaded with more
than the whole weight of the finished work until all subsidence had ceased.
The load had hardly been put on, however, before it was injudiciously deter-
mined to take it off and begin to build, although the settling was still going on.
Happily a better policy prevailed before the construction was resumed, but not
before the very considerable expense of removing the load had been incurred,
and the further expense of replacing it rendered necessary. It is hoped the
whole load will be replaced early the present year. (Statement 1, table C.)
Required to complete the work $416,000.
It may be expedient, in time of war, by way of providing interior barriers,
to erect batteries on Craney island, at the mouth of Elizabeth river, and to pu1
in condition and arm old Fort Norfolk, which is just below the city.
Harbor of St. Mary's. The central situation (as regards the Chesapeake) o:
this fine basin, its relation to the Potomac, its depth of water, and the facility
with which it may be defended, indicate its fitness as a harbor of refuge for tht
commerce of the Chesapeake bay, and as an occasional, if not constant, statioi
during war of a portion of the naval force. A survey has been made, but n<
project has been formed. The engineer department, some years ago, conjee
tured that the cost of defences in this harbor might amount to $300,000.
(Statement 1, table F.)
Annapolis harbor. No surveys or plans of defence have been made. Th<
existing works are inefficient and quite out of repair. A former estimate mad<
by the engineer department, amounting to $250,000, is adopted here. (Statemen
1, table F.)
Harbor of Baltimore. The proximity of the city to Chesapeake bay greath
endangers the city of Baltimore. In the present state of things, an enemy in i
few hours' march, after an easy landing,, and without having his communicatio]
with his fleet seriously endangered, can make himself master of that great em
porium of commerce. There are required for its security two forts on the Pa
tapsco one at Hawkins's Point, and the other opposite that point, at the extrem
end of the flat that runs off from Sollers's Point ; these being the lowest posi
tions at which the passage of the Patapsco can be defended. Besides the ad
vantages that will result, of obliging the enemy to land at a greater distance-
thereby gaining time, by delaying his march, for the arrival of succor, and prc
venting his turning the defensive positions which our troops might occupy i
will be impossible for him to endanger the city by a direct attack by water.
The present Fort McHenry, Redoubt TVood, and Covington battery should b
retained as a second barrier. The first mentioned is now in good condition, an
the repairs required for the others may be applied at the beginning of a war.
The fort on Sollers's Point flats, which should be first commenced, is estimate
to cost $1,000,000. (Statement 1, table D.)
The fort on Hawkins's Point, (to be found in statement 1, table F,) will cos
it is supposed, $376,000.
Mouth of Elk river. The completion of the line of water communicatio
from the Delaware to the waters of the Chesapeake makes it proper to place
fort somewhere near the mouth of Elk river, in order to prevent an enemy froi
destroying, by a sudden enterprise, the works forming this outlet of the cana
There have been no surveys made with a view to establish such protectioi
which are estimated at $50,000. (Statement 1, table F.)
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 191
Cities of Washington, Geogetown, and Alexandria. Fort Washington'
covers these cities from any attack by water, and will oblige an enemy to land
at some eight or ten miles below Alexandria, should that city be his object, and
about twice as far below Washington. It will also serve the very important
purpose of covering troops crossing from Virginia with a view to fall on the
flanks of an enemy moving against the capital from the Patuxent or the Chesa-
peake. To put the necessary repairs on Fort Washington will cost about
$20,000. (See statement 1, table A.)
Cedar Point, Potomac river. But all these objects would have been better
fulfilled had the work been placed at Lower Cedar Point. As it is, however,
the contemplated works being constructed in the Patuxent, and the militia of
the surrounding country in a due state of preparation, an enterprise against
Washington would be a hazardous one.
As giving complete security to the towns in the District, covering more than
sixty miles in length of the Potomac, and a large tract of country lying between
the Potomac and the Patuxent, the work on Cedar Point should not be omitted.
There have been no surveys made of the ground, nor projects of the fort, which,
in a conjectural estimate of the engineer department, was set down at $300,000.
(Statement 1, table E.) f
Patuxent river. The more effectually to protect the city of Washington from
a sudden attack by troops landed at the head of navigation in the Patuxent,
and to provide additional shelter for vessels in the Chesapeake, a fort has been
planned to occupy Point Patience, and another to occupy Thomas's Point, both
a short distance up the river. The work on Thomas's Point is (in statement 1,
table D) estimated to cost $250,000; and the work on Point Patience, (in state-
ment 1, table F,) estimated to cost $246,000.
It will be perceived that the system of defence for Washington contemplates,
first, defending the Potomac on Cedar Point and maintaining a second barrier at
Fort Washington ; second, defending flie mouth of the Patuxent. This system
is criticised in the document before referred to in a way to induce the suspicion
that it was not understood.
During the last war there was no fort in the Patuxent ; and the consequence
was, that the British approached by that avenue and occupied the whole river
as high as Pig Point nearly fifty miles from its mouth, and less than twenty
miles from the capital ; while, in consequence of there being no forts in the Po-
tomac, they occupied thatr iver as high as Alexandria, inclusive; by this latter
occupation perfectly protecting the left flank of the movement during its whole
advance and retreat. Both flanks being safe, the British had nothing to fear
except from a force in front ; and that this risk was not great, in the short march
of less than twenty miles from his boats, was proved by the issue.
On the ninth day from that on which the fleet entered the Chesapeake the
English army was in possession of the capital, having penetrated near fifty miles
beyond the point of debarkation. On the twelfth day from the time of landing,
the troops were again on shipboard near the mouth of the river. This attack,
exceedingly well conceived and very gallantly executed, owed its success en-
tirely to the want of defences, such as are now proposed.
Let us suppose both rivers fortified as recommended, and an enemy landed at
the mouth of the Patuxent. If now he attempt this enterprise his march will
be prolonged by at least four days ; that is to say, it will require more than six-
teen days, during which time he will be out of communication with his fleet, as
regards supplies and assistance.
The opposition to his invasion will begin at the landing, because our troops,
having now nothing to fear as to their flank, either from the Potomac or Pa-
tuxent, will dispute every foot of territory; and although he should continue to
advance, it must be at a slower rate.
192 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
While he is thus pursuing his route towards Washington, the forces of Vir-
ginia will be crossing the Potomac and concentrating at Port Tobacco, or some .
position between that place and Fort Washington, preparatory to falling on his
flank and rear. This would seem to be conclusive; for it is difficult to conceive
of troops persevering in an expedition when every moment will not only place
them further from succor, but greatly increase their need of it. Railroads reach
from near the crossing places of the Potomac to the very heart of the country
south; and a very few days would bring forward a large force, all of which
would arrive upon the rear of the enemy.
It is said in the criticism that, if shut out of the Patuxent, the enemy might
land between the mouth of that river and Annapolis, and thence proceed against
Washington. But the same difficulties belong to this project, and a new diffi-
culty is added. The Virginia forces arrive, as before, and assail his flank either
between the Potomac and Patuxent, or between the Patuxent and the Chesa-
peake ; and there is, besides, the Patuxent for the enemy to cross both in going
and returning itself a formidable military obstacle.
It is said, also, that the landing may be made in the Potomac ; but this only
proves that the system animadverted on had not been studied, it being a fun-
damental principle of the system that such landing must be prevented by forti-
fying the rivers as low down as possible
The southern coast, stretching from Cape Hatteras to the southern point of
Florida, is invariably low, and for the greater part sandy; much resembling^
the coast from the above-mentioned cape to Montauk Point, on the east end of
Long Island.
A ridge of sand, here and there interrupted by the alluvion of the rivers, ex-
tends through its whole length. This ridge, in certain portions, lies on the
main land, while in others it is divided therefrom by basins or "sounds" of
various width and depth, and is cut up into islands by numerous channels which
connect these interior waters with the sea. Wherever this sand ridge is inter-
rupted its place is occupied by low and marshy grounds, bordering the principal
and the many lesser outlets of the rivers.
Ocracock inlet, N. C. The shallowness of the water on the bars at this inlet
effectually excudes all vessels-of-war at least, all moved by sails. But as
this is an outlet of an extensive commerce, and as, through this opening, attempts
might be made in small vessels, barges, or the smaller class Df steam vessels, to
destroy this commerce, or to interrupt the line of interior water communication,
timely preparation must be made of temporary works equal to defence against
all such minor enterprises.
Beaufort 7iarbor, N. C. A work called Fort Macon has been erected for the
defence of this harbor, which will require some repairs. Some operations are
also called for to protect the site from the wearing action of the sea. (State-
ment 1, table A.) Estimate, $10,000.
Mouths of Cape Fear river, N. C. The defence of the main channel of
Cape Fear requires, in addition to Fort Caswell, (now nearly completed,) on
Oak island, another fort on Bald Head. And the defence of the smaller channel
will require a redoubt on Federal Point. The battery magazine, block-house,
&c., at Smith ville, should remain as accessories. Fort Caswell, Oak island,
(statement 1, table C,) requires $6,000 to complete it ; the fort on Bald Head
(statement 1, table F) will require $180,000; the redoubt on Federal Point
(statement 1, table F) will require $18,000 ; and the battery, &c., called Fort
Johnston, at Smithville, (statement 1, table A,) $5,000.
Georgetown harbor, S. C. The first inlet of any consequence south of Cape
Fear river is at the united mouths of the Waccamaw, Pedee, and Black rivers,
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 193
forming Georgetown harbor ; which is a commodious and capacious bay, having
sufficient water within, and also upon the bar near the mouth, for merchant
vessels and small vessels-of-war. A survey of this harbor was begun many
years ago, but never completed, and no projects for defence have been
made. It is probable that a work placed near Moscheto creek, or on Winyaw
Point, would give adequate strength, at the cost of about $250,000. (Statement
1, table E.)
Santee river and Bull's bay. About ten miles south from Georgetown are
the mouths of the Santee, the largest river in South Carolina. It is not known
whether the bars at the mouths of this river have sufficient water for sea-going
vessels. The same uncertainty exists as to the depth into Bull's bay. It may be
sufficient to consider these and the other inlets between Georgetown and Charles-
ton as calling for small works capable of resisting boat enterprise, and to
assign as the cost $100,000. Should they prove to be navigable for privateers
they will require a larger expenditure. (Statement 1, table F.)
Charleston S. C. This city, situated at the junction of Ashley and Cooper
rivers, is about five miles, in a direct line from the sea. Between it and the
ocean there is a wide and safe roadstead for vessels of any draught. Upon the bar,
lying three or four miles outside of the harbor, there is, however, only water
enough for smaller frigates and sloops-of-war. On the southwest side of the
harbor is James's island, in which are several serpentine passages, more or less
navigable for boats, barges, and small steam vessels ; some of them communi-
cate directly with the sea and Stono river. Whappoo cut, the most northerly
passage from the Stono to Charleston harbor, enters Ashley river opposite the
middle of the city.
Interior natural water communications exist, also, to the southwest of Stono
river, connecting this with North Edisto river ; the latter with South Edisto
and St. Helena sound ; this again, with broad river ; and, finally, this last with
Savannah river.
On the north side of the harbor of Charleston lies Sullivan's island, sepa-
rated from the main by a channel navigable only by small craft. On the north-
west side of this island is an interior water communication, which extends to
Bull's bay, and even beyond, to the harbor of Georgetown.
From this sketch it is apparent that it will not do to restrict the defences to
the principal entrance of the harbor. The lateral avenues must also be shut.
And it is probable that accurate surveys of all these avenues will show that the
best mode of defending them will be by works at or near the mouths of the
inlets, as the enemy will be kept thereby at a greater distance from the city;,
the lesser harbors formed by these inlets will be protected, and the line of interior
water communication will be inaccessible from the sea.
No position for the defence of the principal entrance to Charleston harbor
can be found nearer to the ocean than the western extremity of Sullivan's
island. This is, at present, occupied by Fort Moultrie a work of some strength,
but by no means adequate to its object, its battery being weak, and the scarp
so low as to oppose no serious obstacle to escalade. How far this work, by a
modification of its plan and relief, may be made to contribute to a full defence
of the harbor, has not yet been determined. But so long as it is the only work
at this the principal point of defence, it must be kept in good condition for ser-
vice ; and no alterations that will disturb this efficiency should be undertaken.
The repairs now indispensable will cost $10,000. (Statement 1, table A.)
On a shoal nearly opposite to Fort Moultrie the foundation of a fort has
been begun, which will have a powerful cross-fire with Fort Moultrie. This- is
called Fort Sumter. (Statement 1, table C.) To complete this work will re-
quire, it is estimated, $286,000.
H. Rep. Com. 86 13
194 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
In the upper part of the harbor is Castle Pinckney, on Shuter's Folly island.
This requires some repairs, estimated at $7,000. (Statement 1, table A.)
Stono, North. Edisto, and South Edisto. All these must be fortified, at least
in such a manner as to protect these inlets from enterprises in boats or small ves-
sels. To that end, $50,000 may be assigned to each. (Statement 1, table F.)
St. Helena sound. The proper defences cannot be pointed out till the sound
shall have been surveyed. Although there is supposed to be no great depth of
water on the bar, it is known to be navigable for the smaller class of merchant-
men and for steamboats, and to have a navigable communication with the head
of Broad river, or Port Royal, intersecting the interior navigation between
Charleston and Savannah. The estimate is $150,000. (Statement 1, table F.)
Broad river, or Port Royal roads. The value of this capacious roadstead
as a harbor of refuge depends on the depth that can be carried over the bar ; on
the distance of this bar beyond the line of coast, and on the means that may be
applicable of lessening the danger of crossing it. This is supposed to be the
deepest bar on the southern coast. Should there prove to be water enough for
frigates, and should it be practicable to make the passage over the bar safe and
easy, by the erection of light-houses on the shore and lights, or other distinct
guides on the bar, this harbor, situated within sixty miles of the city of Charles-
ton and twenty of Savannah river, intersecting the interior water commu-
nication between these cities, thereby securing the arrival of supplies of
every kind, would possess a high degree of importance, not only as a harbor of
refuge, but also as a naval station.
The survey of the exterior shoals, constituting the bar, should be made with
the greatest care and all possible minuteness. Only when this shall have been
done can the true relation of this inlet to the rest of the coast be known, and
on this relation the position and magnitude of the required defences well depend.
For the present, the estimate made some years ago by the engineer department
is adopted, namely, $300,000. (Statement 1, table E.)
Savannah, and mouth of Savannah river, Georgia. Mention has been made
of the natural interior water communication along the coast of South Carolina.
A similar communication extends south from the Savannah river as far as the
St. John's, in Florida. Owing to these passages the city of Savannah, like
Charleston, is liable to be approached by other avenues than the harbor or river,
and accordingly its defences must have relation to these lesser as well as great
channels.
The distance from the mouth of Wassaw sound, or even Ossabaw sound,
(both to the southward of Savannah river,) to the city is not much greater than
from the mouth of the river, and an enterprise may proceed the whole distance
by water, or part of the way by water and part by land, from either inlet or
from both. As in the case of like channels in the neighborhood of .Charleston,
it cannot now be determined where they can be defended most advantageously.
It is hoped, however, that the localities will permit the defences to be placed
near the inlets, because thus placed they will serve the double purpose of guard-
ing the city of Savannah and covering these harbors, which, in time of war,
cannot but be very useful.
The defence of Savannah river is not difficult. A fort on Cockspur island,
lying just within the mouth, and perhaps for additional security another on
Tybee island, which forms the southern cape at the mouth of the river, would
prevent the passage of vessels up the channel and cover the anchorage between
Tybee and Cockspur.
Old Fort Jackson, standing about four miles below the city, should be main-
tained as a second barrier, both as respects the main channel and the passages
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 195
which come into the river from the south, which last would not at all be controlled
by works on Cockspur or Tybee. Fort Pulaski, on Cockspur island, is well ad-
vanced, and to a certain extent is even now efficient, measures being now in
hand for mounting the lower tier of guns ; $215,000 are required to complete
the works and the outworks and appendages. (Statement 1, table C.) To
fortify Tybee island may require $120,000, (statement 1, table E,) and to re-
pair Fort Jackson $50,000. (Statement 1, table A.)
Wassaw sound, Ossabaw sound, St. Catherine's sound, at the mouth of Med-
way river ; Sapelo sound, Doby inlet, Altamaha sound, at the moutli of Alta-
maha river ; St. Simon's sound, at the mouth of Buffalo creek ; St. Andrew's
sound, at the united mouths of the Scilla and Santilla rivers ; and Cumberland
sound, at the mouth of St. Mary's river. All these communications with the
ocean are highly important as regards the line of interior navigation, and several
of them as affording access to excellent harbors. The last, and one or two
others, are known to be navigable to the largest sloops-of-war and merchant-
men, and some of the others are but little inferior, as regards depth of entrance
or safety of anchorage.
All these openings have yet to be surveyed ; some of them are probably easily
defensible by forts and batteries, while others may require the aid of floating
defences.
It is an important principle, bearing peculiarly on the defence of the whole
southern coast, that on a shore possessing few harbors it is at the same time
more necessary to preserve them all for our own use, and more easy to deprive
an enemy of that shelter without which a close blockade cannot be maintained.
This principle is enforced in the instance of our southern coast by the two fol-
lowing weighty considerations, namely : first, its remoteness from the nearest
naval rendezvous, the Chesapeake, which is on a mean 600 miles distant, and
to leeward both as to wind and current ; and second, its being close upon the
larboard hand as they enter the Atlantic of the great concourse of vessels pass-
ing at all seasons through the Florida channel. While, therefore, this part of
the coast, from the concentration of vessels here, is in great need of protection
of some sort, naval aid can be extended to it only with difficulty, and at the risk
of being cut off from all retreat by a superior enemy.
Accurate and minute surveys, which will enable our vessels, whether pursued
by an enemy or suffering by stress of weather, to shun the dangers which beset
the navigation of these harbors, and properly arranged defences to cover them
when arrived, seem to be indispensable.
When these harbors shall be fortified, the operation of investing the coast
and watching the great outlet of commerce through the Florida passage will be
a difficult and hazardous one to an enemy, to whom no perseverance or skill can
avail to maintain a continuous blockade, while, on the part of our small vessels-
of-war, steam frigates, and privateers, the same sort of supervision will be at all
times easy and safe.
Nothing better can now be done than to assume $200,000 as the average cost
of defending each of the nine entrances ; giving a total of $1,800,000. (State-
ment 1, tables E and F.)
St. Augustine, Florida. This, the most southern of the harbors on the
Atlantic, and the key to the eastern portion of Florida, is accessible to the
smaller class of merchantmen, to privateers, and to steam vessels, and requires
a certain amount of protection from attacks by war. It is, therefore, proposed
to put that part of the old Spanish fort (Fort Marion) that commands the harbor
in a serviceable state, which will require $50,000. (Statement 1, table A.)
Having now passed along the whole Atlantic coast, from Passamaquoddy to
Cape Florida, pointed out every harbor of any consequence, and specified every
196 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
work that a thorough system of defence will require, we will, in order to give a
comprehensive view of the number, cost, armament, and garrisons of the works,
refer to statement 1, accompanying this report. In that statement the works
are divided into tables, showing separately, 1st, (table A,) the old works already
repaired and those proposed to be repaired and retained in the system of de-
fence ; 2d, (table B,) new works completed ; 3d, (table C,) works under con-
struction ; 4th, (table D,) works to be first commenced ; 5th, (table E,) works
to be commenced next after those in table D ; 6th, (table F,) works to be last
commenced.
The most essential works on the Atlantic coast are included in the first five
tables, and, it appears from the recapitulation, that for these there will be re-
quired, for garrisons, in time of war, 28,720 men; for the armament, 5,748
pieces of ordnance of every kind; and for the expense yet to be incurred,
$9,476,767.
We consider it to be our duty to estimate for the last class of works also,
(table F,) although it must be a long time before permanent works for these
positions can be commenced. For these there will be required, in addition, for
war garrisons, 25,545 men ; for armament, 4,790 pieces of ordnance ; and for
the expense of erection, $14,241,824.
It must be here stated that, as to a few of the works in table F, fuller infor-
mation may require them to be elevated into some of the earlier classes.
SEA-COAST FROM CAPE FLORIDA TO THE MOUTH OF THE SABINE.
The first positions that present themselves, on doubling around Cape Florida
into the Gulf of Mexico, are Key West and the Dry Tortugas.
This board concur in the opinions heretofore expressed in favor of these fine
harbors, and they beg leave to refer, for very interesting statements, in relation
to the latter harbor especially, to a letter from Commodore Eodgers to the Sec-
retary of the Navy, July 3, 1829, (Senate documents, 1st session 21st Congress,
vol. 1, No. 1, page 236,) and letter from the Secretary of the Navy, March 25,
1830, (Senate documents, 1st session 21st Congress, vol 2, No. Ill, page 1.)
A naval force, designed to control the navigation of the Gulf, could desire no
better position than Key West or the Tortugas. Upon the very wayside of
the only path through the Gulf, it is at the same time well situated as to all the
great points therein. It overlooks Havana, Pensacola, Mobile, the mouths of
the Mississippi, and both the inlet and outlet of the Gulf.
The Tortugas harbors in particular are said to afford perfect shelter for vessels
of every class, with the greatest facility of ingress and egress. And there can
be no doubt that an adversary in possession of large naval means would, with
great advantage, make these harbors his habitual resort and his point of gen-
eral rendezvous and concentration for all operations on this sea. With an
enemy thus posted, the navigation of the Gulf by us would be imminently
hazardous, if not impossible, and nothing but absolute naval superiority would
avail anything against him. Mere military means could approach no nearer
than the nearest shore of the continent.
It is believed that there are no harbors in the Gulf at all comparable with
these that an enemy could resort to with his larger vessels. To deprive him
of these would therefore be interfering materially with any organized system of
naval operations in this sea. The defence of these harbors would, however, do
much more than this. It would transfer to our own squadron, even should it
be inferior, these most valuable positions, and it would afford a point of refuge
to our navy and our commerce at the very spot where it would be most neces-
sary and useful.
In this report, already too much extended, we forbear to enlarge on this topic,
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 197
merely adding that the complete and certain defence will not be difficult. By
occupying two, or at most three, small "islands, the harbors of the Dry Tortugas
(there being an inner and an outer harbor) may be thoroughly protected. The
works must be adequate to resist escalade, bombardment, and cannonade from
vessels, and to sustain a protracted investment; but as they will not be exposed
to any operation resembling a siege, there can be no difficulty in fulfilling the
conditions. They must have capacious store-rooms, be thoroughly bomb-proof,
and be heavily armed.
The fortification of Key West should be of a similar character.
No details can be given until all these positions have been minutely surveyed
with reference to defence.
The sum of $3,000,000 was, some years ago, assumed by the engineer de-
partment as necessary to provide defences for the Tortugas and for Key West,
and this estimate may now be taken as ample. (Statement 2, table F.)
Turning now to the shore of the Gulf, we find a portion, namely, from Cape
Florida to Pensacola, that has never been examined with particular reference
to the defence of the harbors. Within this space there are Charlotte harbor,
Espiritu Santo bay, Apalachicola bay, Apalacliie bay, St. Joseph's bay, and
Santa Rosa bay. Nothing better can now be done than to assume for these
the estimate formerly presented by the engineer department, viz : $1,000,000
for all. (Statement 2, table F.)
It may be remarked, as applying to the whole Gulf coast, that, from the
relative geographical position of this part of the seaboard, and the country in-
terested in its safety, from the unhealthiness of the climate, nature of the adjacent
country, and mixed character of the inhabitants, it will be some time before
that portion within supporting distance, whose welfare may be endangered by
an enemy, will be competent, of itself, to sustain a serious attack from without.
Upon the Atlantic seaboard the Alleghanies crowd the people down upon the
shore, every important point on the coast being surrounded by a population
dense now and every day rapidly increasing in numbers, while the ocean and
the interior parallel communications transmit rapid aid to the right and left.
The coast of the Gulf, however, is thinly peopled in itself, is remote from succor
from behind, and is almost inaccessible to lateral assistance. Those reasons,
therefore, which tend to establish the necessity of an organized, permanent,
and timely system of defence for the whole seaboard of the United States,
apply to this part of it with peculiar force.
We now pass on to the remaining points of defence on the Gulf.
Pensacola bay. The upper arms of this considerable bay receive the Yellow
Water or Pea river, Middle river, and Escambia river. The. tributaries of the
last, interlocking with the Alabama and the Chattahoochie, seem to mark the
routes whereby, at some future day, canals will convey a part of the products
of these rivers to Pensacola, while the qualities and position of the harbor and
the favorable nature of the country have already marked out lines of railroad
communication with a vast interior region.
Santa Rosa sound extends eastward, from the lower part of the bay, into
Santa Rosa bay. On the west the lagoons of Pensacola, Perdido, and Mobile
bays, respectively, interlock in such a manner as to require but a few miles of
cutting to complete a navigable channel from the first to the last named bay,
and thence, through an existing interior water communication, to the city of
New Orleans.
. Pensacola bay has rare properties as a harbor. It is now accessible to
frigates, and there is reason to hope that the bar may be permanently deepened.
The bar is near the coast, and the channel across it straight and easily hit.
The harbor is perfectly landlocked, and the roadstead very capacious. There
are excellent positions within for repairing, building, and launching vessels,
and for docks and dock yards in healthy situations. The supply of good water
198 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
is abundant. The harbor is perfectly defensible. These properties, in con-
nexion with the position of the harbor as regards the coast, have induced the
government to select it as a naval station and place of rendezvous and repair.
An excellent survey has been made of the bay of Pensacola, sufficing to
form the scheme of defence for the town and harbor. Regarded, however, as
an important naval station and place of rendezvous and repair, which it now is,
further surveys, extending a greater distance back from the shores, delineating
accurately the face of the country and showing the several avenues by land
and water, are found to be necessary.
The defences of the water passage, as projected, are nearly complete, $22,000
being asked to finish them. A work is just begun at the position of the Bar-
rancas. It is indispensable, in connexion with one or two other small works
designed to cover the navy yard from a lateral attack through the western
bays. The Barrancas work may require $100,000, and the others $200,000 ;
making a total for Pensacola of $322,000. (Statement 2, tables A, C, and F.)
Perdido lay. This bay is intimately related to Pensacola and Mobile bays,
both as regards security and intercommunication, and should be carefully sur-
veyed with a view to these objects. It must be fortified, and the cost may be
$200,000. (Statement 2, table F.)
Mobile bay. The plan of defence for this bay comprises a fort (now needing
some repairs) for Mobile Point. Another fort is projected for Dauphin island,
and a tower for the defence of Pass-au-Heron. The estimates for all require
$915,000. (Statement 2, tables A, E, and F.)
New Orleans and the delta of the Mississippi. The most northern water
communication between the Mississippi and the Gulf is by the passage called
the Rigolets, connecting Lake Borgne and Lake Pontchartrain. The next is
the pass of Chef Menteur, also connecting these lakes. Through these passages
an enemy, entering Lake Pontchartrain, would, at the same time that he inter-
cepted all water communication with Mobile and Pensacola, be able to reach
New Orleans from the southern shore of the lake ; or he might continue onward
through Lake Maurepas, Amite river, and Iberville river, thereby reaching the
Mississippi at the very head of the delta; or, landing within the mouths of the
Chef Menteur, he might move against the city along the ridge of the G-entilly
road.
To the southwest of Chef Menteur, and at the head of Lake Borgne, is Bayou
Bienvenue, a navigable channel, (the one followed by the English army in the
last war,) not running quite to the Mississippi, but bounded by shores of such
a nature as to enable troops to march from the point of debarkation to the city.
These avenues are defended by Fort Pike at the Eigolets ; by Fort Wood at
Chef Menteur; by a small fort at Bayou Bienvenue, and by a tower at Bayou
Dupre.
The defences of the Mississippi are placed at the Plaquemine turn, about
seventy miles below New Orleans the lowest position that can be occupied.
Fort Jackson is on the right bank, and Fort St. Philip, a little lower down, on
the left.
All these forts have been abandoned for several years, and, having received
no attention in the way of timely repairs, now require repairs somewhat exten-
sive, especially Forts Jackson and St. Philip, on the Mississippi. The follow-
ing sums, it is believed, will be required to place all these works in perfect
order, viz : Fort Pike, $5,000 ; Fort Wood, $3,580 ; fort on Bayou Bienvenue,
$2,500 ; Tower Dupre, $400 ; Fort Jackson, $20,000, and Fort St. Philip,
$3,300. (Statement 2, table A.)
The most western avenue by which New Orleans is approachable from the
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 199
sea passes on the west side of the island of Grand Terre into Barrataria bay,
which is an excellent harbor for a floating force guarding the coasting trade on
that side of the Mississippi. From this bay there are several passages leading
to New Orleans. The estimate for a work which is now about to be begun on
Grand Terre island is $325,000. (Statement 2, table C.)
Several times in this report we have alluded to circumstances which would
demand the employment of floating defences, in addition to fixed defences upon
the shore. We have here an instance in which that kind of defence would be
very useful. Fortifications will enable us to protect New Orleans even from the
most serious and determined efforts of an enemy ; but owing to the great width
of some of the exterior passages, we cannot, by fortification alone, deprive an
enemy of anchorages, (especially that of Chandeleur island,) nor cover entirely
the exterior water communication between the Kigolets and Mobile. We must,
therefore, either quietly submit to the annoyance and injury that an enemy in
possession of these passages may inflict, or avert them by a timely preparation
of a floating force adapted to their peculiar navigation, and capable, under the
shelter of the forts, of being always on the alert, and of assuming an offensive
or defensive attitude, according to the designs, conduct, or situation of the
enemy.
Our examination of the coast from Cape Florida to the Sabine having now
been completed, we will, as in the case of the Atlantic coast, refer, for a com-
prehensive view of the number, cost, armament, and garrison of the works, to
statement 2, wherein the works are divided into tables similar to those of state-
ment 1.
The more essential works on the Gulf coast, included in the first five tables,
will require for garrison, in time of war, 4,420 men ; for the armament, 794
pieces of ordnance of every kind ; and for the expense yet to be incurred,
$516,780.
The works comprised in the last table (F) are generally such as may be post-
poned to a late day. But among them have been placed some (as, for example,
those for Tortugas and Key West) as to which the examination has not been
sufficiently minute to decide to what class they really appertain.
In this age of great improvements in the means of locomotion, it would be
unwise to decide, without pressing need, on the details of the floating force
required at certain points on the Atlantic and Gulf of Mexico coasts perhaps
even on the nature of the moving power. Although the probability undoubtedly
is, that the power will be steam, genius may, in the interim, devise something
still better than steam.
And we may here remark, in relation to the preparation of steam vessels for
warlike purposes generally, that wisdom would seem to direct a very cautious
and deliberate progress. Every new vessel may be expected to surpass, in im-
portant particulars, all that had preceded ; and, to surpass the more, as each
succeeding vessel should be the result of careful study and trial of the pre-
ceding.
It may be considered unreasonable to expect that steam itself will give way
to some agent still more potent, and at the same time not less safe and manage-
able. But it certainly is no more than probable that steam vessels now under
construction may be regarded almost as incumbrances within ten years.
A deliberate advance in this branch ot naval construction is recommended the
more by our ability to construct these vessels in large numbers when needed,
the timber being collected in the meantime.
Referring now to the statements which accompany this report :
Statement I includes all works from Passamaquoddy to Cape Florida ; state-
ment 2, all works from Cape Florida to the mouth of the Sabine ; each state-
ment comprising six tables, as before mentioned.
200 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
In relation to every work executed, in progress, or merely projected, the
tables show the garrison, the ordnance of every description, the sums already
expended, and the final cost.
As to works not yet planned, a portion of the same particulars are exhibited,
founded on conjecture merely ; of course, without laying claim to accuracy, but
still as approximations, affording some indication of the final result.
It may be well to give here a summary of all these tables.
The works which are likely to be erected on the Atlantic, within a reasonable
time, and which are regarded as necessary to a good system of defence, will
require war garrisons, amounting to 28,720 men ; and they will require a further
expenditure of $9,176,767. Works called for in like manner upon the Gulf of
Mexico coast will need 4,420 men to garrison them, and a further expenditure
of $516,780. Of the whole coast, therefore, the garrisons will amount to
33,140 men, and the expenditures to $9,993,547.
The remaining works comprised in table F, of both statements, will require
30,695 men, and cost $19,521,824.
Making the grand total for the whole sea-coast of the United States in gar-
risons for the works 63,835 men, and in cost $29,515,371.
In addition to these statements as to the fortifications, there are two corre-
sponding statements of the cost of the ordnance, of the carnages, and of a certain
supply of powder and shot or shells for each piece, one statement relating to
the Atlantic coast, and the other to the Gulf of Mexico coast. From these it
appears that for the works likely to be erected on the Atlantic coast within a
reasonable time, (that is to say, for the works comprised in the first five tables,
A, B, C, D, and E,) there will be needed 2,483 pieces of ordnance and 4,511
carriages, which will cost $2,252,290.
For similar works on the Gulf of Mexico coast, there will be needed 296
pieces of ordnance, and 495 carriages, at a cost of $240,720.
The remaining works named in tables F, of both statements, will require, in
addition, 5,447 guns and 5,554 carnages, which will cost $3,735,330.
Making the grand total required for the whole sea-coast 8,226' guns and
10,560 carriages, at a cost of $6,228,340.
The time required to construct and put in order the whole system must depend
on the amount of the annual appropriation. All that need now be said on the
subject is, that in an undertaking necessarily involving so much time, and of
such vital importance, there should be no relaxation of diligence. With all
diligence, many years must necessarily be consumed. But the work may be
too much hurried, as well as too much delayed. There is a rate of progress at
which it will be executed in the best manner, and at the minimum cost. If
more hurried it will be defective in quality, and more costly if delayed.
France was at least fifty years completing her maritime and interior defences.
In the report presented by the engineer department, in March, 1836, (Senate
document, 1st session 24th Congress, vol. 4, No. 293,) there is a demonstration
of the actual economy that will result from an efficient system of 'sea-coast
defence, which is to the following effect, referring to the document itself for
details.
There is first supposed to be an expedition of 20,000 men at Bermuda or
Halifax ready to fall upon the coast. This will make it necessary, if there be
no fortifications, to have ready a force at least equal at each of the following
points, namely : 1st. Portsmouth and navy yard. 2d. Boston and navy yard.
3d. Narraganset roads. - 4th. New York and navy yard. 5th. Philadelphia
and navy yard. 6th. Baltimore. 7th. Norfolk and navy yard. 8th. Charleston,
South Carolina. 9th. Savannah; and 10th. New Orleans; to say nothing of
other important places.
At each of these places, except the last, 10,000 men drawn from the interior,
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 201
and kept under pay, will suffice, the vicinity being relied on to supply the
remainder. At New Orleans, 17,000 men must be drawn from a distance. In
a campaign of six months, the whole force will cost at least $26,750,000.
The garrisons necessary to be kept under pay for the fortifications in these
places will cost for the same time $8,430,500. The difference ($18,319,500)
will then be only $3,448,156 less than the whole expense of building these
defences, viz : $21,767,656. Whence it follows that the expense of these
erections would be nearly compensated by the saving they would cause in a
single campaign.
All which is respectfully submitted.
For the board :
JOS. G. TOTTEN,
Colonel of Engineers.
202
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Fort Pickering, Salem, Mass
Fort on Jack's Point, Marblehead, Mass
Works at Provincetown, Cape Cod, Mass. ...
Works at New Bedford, Mass
Fort on Rose island, Narraganset roads, R. I.
Fort on Sollers's Point flats, Md
Fort on Thomas's Point, Patuxent river, Md.
Deduct garrison and guns of Nos. 4, 7, 8, and
a : :1 : : : : :<g
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E. JFbrfcs <o be commenced next after those
Fort Preble, Portland harbor, Me
Works at Gloucester, Mass.
Closing Broad Sound Pass, Boston harbor, B
Works at Gurnet Point, Plymouth, Mass.
Works at Stonington Point, Conn
Fort on Cedar Point, Potomac river, Md.
Works in Port Royal roads, S. C
Works on Tybee island, Savannah river,
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C. Fortificatio
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Table C.
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Fortifications to be last constructed.
Table F.
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H. Rep. Com. 86 14
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A. Old works repaired and those proposed to be.
repaired, with the amounts expended, and the
amounts required to put them in a serviceable
condition.
Fort Barrancas, Pensacola, Fla 250 11 10 5 3 3 8
Fort St. Philip, Mississippi, La 100 16
Fort Pickens, Pensacola harbor, Fla ....
Fort Morgan, Mobile Point, Ala
Fort Pike, Rinolets, La
Fort Wood, Chef Menteur, La
Battery Bienvenue, La
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Fort Pickens, Pensacola, Fla 1,260 63 17 49 5 13 6 28
Port Morgan, Mobile Point, Ala 700 14 52 34 6 26
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Fort Wood, Chef Menteur, La 300 28 3 6 .... 9
Battery Bienvenue, La : 100 8 ... 3
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Fort on Foster's bank, Pensaco
Fort Livingston, Barrataria isl?
E. Works to be constructed aftt
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Tower at Pass-au-Heron, Mobi
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Works at Charlotte harbor, Fla
Works at Espiritu Santo bay, F
Works at Apalachicola bay, FIf
Works at Apalachie, Fla
Works at St.. Joseph's bay, Fla
Works at Santa Rosa bay, Fla.
Works to cover navy yard at P
Works at Perdido bay, Ala ...
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FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
215
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216
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218 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
REPORT ON THE NORTHERN FRONTIER.
This frontier extends, as described by the terms of the resolution, from
Lake Superior to Passamaquoddy bay, a distance of somewhat more than two
thousand miles, binding all the way on the British American Provinces.
Whether we regard the strongly marked geographical features of this frontier,
presenting, as it does, for the most part, a chain of great lakes or inland seas,
stretching along the border, the common property of both nations, and affording
facilities for an extensive commerce, almost rivalling that of the ocean itself; or
whether we look to the growing strength of our colonial neighbors, fostered by
the immense power and resources of the mother country; its vast importance
cannot fail to impress us with the necessity of being prepared, not only for de-
fence along that line, but also to act offensively, with decisive effect, in the
event of our being involved in a conflict.
From the peculiar character of this frontier, its defence must necessarily par-
take somewhat of the system applicable to the seacoast; for, although it is de-
nominated inland, in contradistinction to the latter, it is, nevertheless, maritime
in many of its features, and must be treated accordingly for purposes of defence.
So important is the mastery on the lakes, in any military operations in that
quarter, that it is scarcely to be doubted that, in the event of war, there will be
some naval preparations on both sides, and a struggle for the ascendancy on
those waters. Whichever power shall acquire that, even temporarily, will have
the means of assailing his adversary with great effect along the shores of the
lakes, in the absence of fortifications, by occupying the harbors, destroying the
towns, (some of which are fast advancing to the rank of cities,) and controlling
the commercial operations of which those lakes constitute the principal channel.
These considerations render it highly expedient indeed, necessary to fortify
the larger harbors on the lakes, as well as the more important passes on the
straits and rivers by which they are connected.
Without entering fully into the military details of the subject, which might
be deemed somewhat out of place here, regarding the object of the resolution,
which seems to look rather to the expense involved, the board will proceed to
enumerate the works of defence deemed necessary on the northern frontier,
beginning at Lake Superior; merely glancing at the effects and advantages
which are likely to result from the establishment of those works.
1. Fort at Falls of St. Mary, A fort here will control the communication
between Lake Huron and Lake Superior, and, at least, prevent an enemy from
availing itself of it for purposes of communication and for the transportation of
supplies, if it does not secure those important advantages to us, which it would
do, unless counteracted by a work on the British side of the line. In that event,
almost certain to occur, it would be neutralized, but would still serve to cover
and protect our settlements along the St. Mary, and form a rallying point for
local defence in times of alarm.
Estimated expense of fort, barracks, &c ' $75,000
2. Fort at Mickilimackinac. Although this position is some-
what interior, it is regarded of high importance from its geographi-
cal relations. A fort here, in conjunction with floating batteries,
may be made to command, effectually, the approach to Lake
Michigan, and shut out an enemy who might possess a naval
ascendancy on Lake Huron ; thus protecting the entire circumfer-
ence of Lake Michigan from attacks to which it would otherwise
be exposed, even from a small force, and securing it to ourselves
as a safe channel of communication with the rich and productive
States in the rear, whose shores it washes.
Estimated expense 50,000
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 219
3. Fort at thejoot of Lake Huron. A work here will control
the outlet of Lake Huron, and interrupt the navigation between
that and Lake St. Clair and the river Detroit. It will serve also
to cover the settlements on that part of the frontier, and form a
rallying point for the neigeboring militia for local defence.
Estimated expense $50, 000
4. Fort and barrack establishment at Detroit. In the event
of war, Detroit would undoubtedly be a point of considerable con-
centration of troops, not merely for the defence of that portion of
the frontier, but for such offensive operations as might be deemed
expedient in that quarter. It may be regarded as the centre of
the upper section of the northern frontier, and has important
relations, both geographical and military. Although true policy
would, in such a case, dictate that our chief efforts should be
directed against the vital points of the enemy's possessions as low
down the line as practicable, still it might become expedient, with
a view to distract his attention and divide his forces, to menace
him above ; and this is one of .the points from which he might be
assailed by minor expeditions, especially if he should relax his
measures of defence in looking to his safety elsewhere.
Estimated expense of barracks for one regiment, including
site $150, 000
Estimated expense of fort at Spring Wells, including
site 100, 000
250, 000
5. Field-work and barrack establishment at or near Buffalo.
The wealth and commercial importance of Buffalo, and its close
proximity to the Britsh line, will make it an object of attack in
time of war, unless it be protected by the presence of a respecta-
ble force there. It may also become a point of concentration of
troops for minor offensive movements, by way of diverson ; and
is thus, in every view, entitled to seasonable attention. An ex-
tensive barrack establishment, defended by field-works, would be
sufficient for all necessary objects.
Estimated expense 150, 000
6. Fort Niagara to be rebuilt. A fort at this position is
important, on the assumption (admitting, it is believed, of but
little doubt) that in time of war there would be some naval prepa-
rations on Lake Ontario. It commands the entrance into the
Niagara river ; and a work here will shut the enemy's vessels out
from that harbor, while it will afford protection under which ours
may take shelter in case of need.
Estimated expense of completing the work now in pro-
gress .' $27, 500
For repairs of buildings and new barracks there 37, 500
65, 000
7. Fort at Oswego. The growing importance of Oswego, the
relation it bears to the great line of internal communication to the
west, and its exposed situation, directly on the shore of the lake,
from whence it might be assailed by armed vessels without the
co-operation of a land attack, call for works of defence to protect
the harbor, and thus secure a safe retreat for our vessels in case
of need, while we shut out those of the enemy. Besides, this
220 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
place possesses many advantages for naval preparations for vessels
of light draught of water, and would probably be made a subordi-
nate depot in time of war.
Estimated expense of completing the works now in pro-
gress $20, 000
For barracks, quarters, storehouses, and magazine 25, 000
8. Fort at Sackett's Harbor. In the event of naval arma-
ments of any considerable extent being resorted to on Lake
Ontario, Sackett's Harbor, from its bold water, and its excellency
as a harbor, would at once become a depot of great importance ;
the safety of which should be insured against the enterprises
of the enemy by the timely construction of appropriate works of
defence. Situated directly opposite to the strong post of Kings-
ton, on the Canadian side, and adjacent to the head of the St.
Lawrence, it is one of the points at which a concentration of
troops may become expedient for the defence of that portion of
the frontier and the protection of the naval depot. The barrack
accommodations already established there are deemed sufficient,
and it remains to fortify the approach to the harbor.
Estimated expense of fort and barracks within
9. Fort at the narrows of the St. Lawrence, below Og dens-
burg. The chief object of a work here would be to cut off the
enemy's communication by the river, between Montreal and
Kingston, and thus prevent him from availing himself of that
channel for the transportation of troops and supplies if we cannot
entirely secure it to ourselves. By this obstruction on the St.
Lawrence he would be thrown altogether upon his back line of
communication by the Ottawa, which, although it has the merit
of being more secure from interruption, is longer and more diffi-
cult, especially in seasons of drought. This would also be
another point from which the enemy might be menaced, and
from which auxiliary movements might be made in aid of the
chief attack.
Estimated expense of fort and barracks '
10. Fort near the line on Lake Champlain. A work here
may be made to command the pass of the lake, and is considered
by far the most important of any proposed on the whole line of
frontier.
The position of Lake Champlain is somewhat peculiar. "While
Ontario, Erie, Huron, and Superior stretch their whole length
directly along the border, (forming, in fact, the boundary,) Cham-
plain extends deeply into our territory, at right angles with, the
line of the frontier; and, while its southern extremity reaches
almost to the Hudson, it finds its outlet, to the north, in the St.
Lawrence, nearly midway between Montreal and Quebec, the two
great objects of attack.
This is undoubtedly the avenue by which the British posses-
sions may be most effectually assailed ; while, at the same time,
it would afford to the enemy possessing a naval ascendancy equal
facilities for bringing the war within our own borders if it be left
unfortified. It therefore becomes important to fortify a point as
near the line as practicable, so as to shut out the enemy's vessels,
and thus effect the double object of protecting the interior shores
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 221
of the lake from the predatory attacks to which they would other-
wise be exposed, and of securing it to ourselves as the great
channel by which our troops and supplies may be rapidly thrown
forward to the points of attack or defence.
For a permanent work on Stony Point, (N. Y.,) including pur-
chase of site $300,000
For a permanent work on Windmill Point, (Vt.,) inclu-
ding purchase of site 300,000
$600, 000
11. Barrack establishment and depot at Plattsburg. In the
event of war, Plattsburg will become the great depot for the
operations on the Champlain frontier, the point of concentration
of troops preparatory to any offensive movements, and the station
of the reserve to sustain those movements, and the posts that
may be established in advance. Even in time of peace a respect-
able force should be posted here, especially during the continuance
of the boundary question and border disturbances. Barracks for
a regiment, at least, with suitable storehouses, are recommended
to be erected, on a plan admitting of extension, if required, and
also of suitable defensive arrangements.
Estimated expense of completing the works in progress on the
scale here suggested 150, 000
12. From Lake Champlain, eastward, the geographical features
of the frontier materially change character, and require a corres-
ponding modification of the means of defence. The line no longer
intersects great lakes, admitting of naval preparations, nor binds
on straits and rivers, the navigation of which may be controlled
or interrupted by fortifications. It is altogether inland until it
reaches the St. Oroix, where the principles that have been applied
to other portions of the frontier similarly situated will again be-
come applicable. Running on a parallel of latitude to the Con-
necticut river, and thence along a chain of highlands, not yet
clearly defined, to the Province of New Brunswick, the board are
not aware that there are any points immediately on the frontier
sufficiently commanding, of themselves, to call for the establish-
ment and maintenance of fortifications or works of defence.
Should it ever become necessary to sustain by force our title to
the territory now in dispute, it must be done, not by isolated forts
along the frontier, commanding, probably, nothing beyond the
range of their own guns, but by an active army, competent not
only to occupy the country and hold it, but also to assume the
offensive, if necessary, and carry the war beyond our borders.
But while it is not deemed expedient to construct a chain of
forts along this portion of the frontier, the board consider it a
proper measure of precaution, in the present state of our relations
with the British provinces, that positions should be selected and
preparatory arrangements made for the establishment of depots
of supplies at the head of navigation on the Kennebunk and
Penobscot. In the event of movements in that quarter, these
would be proper points for the concentration of troops, and would
serve as a base of operations, whether these should be offensive
or defensive in their character.
Estimated expense of storehouses and other accommodations. . 150, 000
222 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
13. Fort at Calais, on tlie St. Croix river. A work here,
while it will serve to cover that part of the State of Maine from
the attacks to which it would otherwise be exposed, may, from its
advanced position, be made to act an important though indirect
part in the defence of the more northern portion of the frontier.
Calais appears to be a very eligible point for the concentration of
troops with reference to existing circumstances. A strong force
stationed here, threatening the enemy's posts on the lower St.
John's, and held ready to strike in that direction in case of move-
ments from New Brunswick towards the disputed territory, could
not fail to have a decisive influence on such movements; since it
is obvious that they could not be made with safety while exposed
to attack in flank and rear, and to have their line of communica-
tion intercepted and their depots seized, by a prompt movement
on our part from the St. Croix.
Estimated expense of fort and barracks
14. In reference to the northern frontier generally, it is the de-
cided opinion of the board that, besides the defences which have
been suggested along the border, chiefly for purposes of local
protection, there should be a great central station at some position
in the interior at which troops might be assembled for instruction,
and where they would still be within supporting distance of the
more exposed parts of the frontier.
Turning our views inland in search of some single position at
which preparations might be made for extended operations on this
frontier, and from which aid and succor could always be speedily
derived, some position which, while it shall be equally near to
many important points of the enemy's possessions, shall afford at
no time any indication of the direction in which our efforts are to
be made ; which will, if it be possible, unite the opposite qualities
of being at the same time remote and proximate far as to distance,
but near as to time ; which, while it brings a portion of the mili-
tary resources of the country to the support of the inland frontier,
and places them in the best attitude for operations in that quarter,
whether defensive or offensive, at the same time takes them not
away from the sea-coast. Looking for these various properties,
we find them all united in a remarkable degree in the position of
Albany.
From this place, by steamboat, canal boat, or railroad car, troops
and munitions could be transported in a short time to Buffalo, or
onward to Detroit, to Oswego, to Sackett's Harbor, to Plattsburg,
to Boston, and along the coast of New England; to New York
by steamboat now, and soon by railroad also ; and thence onward
to Philadelphia, Baltimore, Washington, and the heart of the
southern country if necessary. In a word, Albany is a great
central position, from which radiate the principal lines of com-
munication to the north, to the south, to the east, and to the west ;
arid combines so many advantages for a military depot that the
expediency of occupying it and thus availing ourselves of those
advantages would seem to be manifest.
Estimated expense of the purchase of land, and the construc-
tion of barracks and other buildings
Total for northern frontier 2, 160, 000
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 223
The board beg leave to observe, in conclusion, that, in the preparation of the
estimates submitted, they have not attempted to aim at precision. Hence the
amounts stated for the various objects are to be regarded only as approximations.
They could not be anything more, on the data used, which, for want of minute
surveys and reconnoissances, were necessarily vague. It is believed, however,
that the results presented will be found sufficiently accurate for the general
purposes contemplated by the resolution under which this report has been pre-
pared.
For the board,
JOS. G. TOTTEN,
Colonel of Engineers.
224
FOETIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
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FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
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WASHINGTON, April 23,
H. Rep. Com. 86 15
226 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
REPORT ON THE WESTERN FRONTIER, FROM THE SABINE BAY TO LAKE
SUPERIOR.
The principles which should govern in fortifying the seaboard are not con-
sidered applicable to our inland frontier, which will very rarely be found to call
for regular fortifications. Hence, in relation to that portion of the frontier now
under consideration, the duty of the board will be performed by indicating the
military positions or stations which should, in their opinion, be occupied by
troops, in order to accomplish the objects in view, and in presenting estimates
of the probable cost of constructing the necessary barracks, quarters, and store-
houses, combined with such works of defence as circumstances may appear to
require, to insure their protection against the attacks to which they may be ex-
posed.
The want of personal knowledge, on the part of the board, of our extensive
western frontier, and the very limited surveys which have been made in that
quarter, have somewhat embarrassed them in the selection of positions; but
they desire to be understood as merely designating places in a geographical
sense, leaving the particular sites on which the works should be erected to be
determined hereafter, by minute examinations of the country at and around
those positions; which become the more important, inasmuch as the original
locations of some of the places that will be recommended to be retained have
been considered faulty.
The southern section of this frontier, extending from the Sabine bay to the
Red river, borders all the way on Texas, and has, it is believed, little or nothing
to apprehend from Indian aggressions. The Comanches, the only tribe of any
power in that quarter, are represented as gradually receding to the westward,
and the progress of the Texan settlements will tend to push them further from
our border. But our relations with the Texan republic, however amicable they
may be at present, would seem to require that some military force should be
stationed on or near the boundary line; and the board therefore recommend
the establishment of two small posts on the Sabine river, suppressing Fort
Jesup, which is considered too far within the frontier, or retaining it merely as
a healthy cantonment.
As these wonld be posts of observation, having reference to national police
more than to military defence, they ought to be established on the river where
the principal roads cross it, by which we should be enabled to supervise the
chief intercourse with our neighbors by land, and, at the same time, control the
navigation of the Sabine. The points where the Opelousas and Natchitoches
roads, leading to Texas, strike the river, are therefore recommended as the po-
sitions which should be occupied, and at which barracks for two or three com-
panies, defended by light works, should be constructed.
The middle section, which extends from the Red river to the Missouri, is by
far the most important portion of the whole of our western frontier. It is along
this line that the numerous tribes of Indians who have emigrated from the east
have been located; thus adding to the indigenous force already in that region
an immense mass of emigrants, some of whom have been sent thither by coer-
cion, with smothered feelings of hostility rankling in their bosom, which, proba-
bly, waits but for an occasion to burst forth in all its savage fury. These con-
siderations alone would seem to call for strong precautionary measures ; but an
additional motive will be found in our peculiar relations with those Indians.
We are bound, by solemn treaty stipulations, to interpose force, if necessary,
to prevent domestic strife among them, preserve peace between the several tribes,
and to protect them against any disturbances at their new homes by the wild
Indians who inhabit the country beyond. The government has thus contracted
the two-fold obligation of intervention among, and protection of, the emigrant
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 227
tribes, m addition to the duty which it owes to its own citizens of providing for
their safety.
It appears to the board that this obligation can only be properly fulfilled by
maintaining advanced positions in the Indian country with an adequate re-
straining military force, and that the duty of protecting our own citizens will
be best discharged by establishing an interior line of posts along the western
border of the States of Arkansas and Missouri as auxiliaries to the advanced
positions, and to restrain the intercourse between the whites and the Indians,
and serve as rallying points for the neighboring militia in times of alarm.
With these views, they would recommend the maintenance of Fort Towson,
on Red river, and Fort Gibson, on the Arkansas, and the establishment of a
post at the head of navigation on the Kansas, and one at Table creek, on the
Missouri, below the mouth of the Big Platte, as constituting the advanced
positions on this portion of the frontier.
For the secondary line intended for the protection of the border settlements
the board would adopt the positions which have been selected by a commission
of experienced officers along the western boundary of Arkansas and Missouri,
at some of which, it is understood, works are already in progress, namely: Fort
Smith, on the Arkansas river ; Fort Wayne, on the Illinois; Spring river and
Marais de Cygne ; terminating to the north at Fort Leavenworth, on the Mis-
vsouri. They would also recommend the establishment of one or two intermediate
posts between the Arkansas and Red rivers, if, on further examination of the
country, suitable positions can be selected near the State line. It is not deemed
advisable to establish those posts on the route of the road lately surveyed, which
(especially the southern portion) is considered too far in advance of the border
settlements to accomplish the object in view ; but if eligible positions cannot be
found along the line, then a post on the road where it crosses the Poteau river,
which is not very remote from the settlements, might have a salutary influence.
On the northern portion of this frontier, extending from the Missouri river to
Lake Superior, the board would recommend the establishment of a post near
the upper forks of , the Des Moines river, the maintenance of Fort Snelling, on
the Mississippi, and the ultimate establishment of a post at the western ex-
tremity of Lake Superior. The last is suggested with some qualification for
want of the necessary information by which to determine the channel of commu-
nication to that remote position. Whether it shall be through Lake Superior
or by the Mississippi and its tributaries, it would in either case be difficult in
peace and next to impracticable in time of war. As the position has, however,
important geographical relations, and would enable us to extend our influence
and control over the Indians in our territory, and afford protection to our traders
in that remote region, it would seem to be worthy of early occupation if its
maintenance can be rendered secure a point which can only be determined by
a careful examination of the country.
It is, nevertheless, recommended to retain Fort Crawford, at Prairie du Chien,
Fort Winnebago, at the portage of the Fox and Wisconsin rivers, and Fort
Howard, at Green bay. These posts are deemed necessary to protect that por-
tion of our frontier, while at the same time they serve to cover an important line
of intercommunication between the northern lakes and the western waters.
It has not been thought expedient to continue the interior line of defence
suggested for the middle section of this frontier across from the Missouri to the
Mississippi river. Our Indian relations in that quarter assume a different aspect.
There is no special guarantee of perpetual occupation of that country by the
tribes who now inhabit it, nor can it be doubted that they will ultimately be
pushed by the advance of our population to the west of the Missouri river.
Under those circumstances, it is believed that the intermediate post recommended
to be established on the Des Moines river, co-operating with the posts on the
Missouri and those on the Upper Mississippi, will afford adequate protection to
228 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
the border settlements against any attacks to which they are likely to be ex-
posed.
The board have not felt called upon by the terms of the resolution under
which they act to project a plan of operations for the western frontier, nor to
go into an estimate of the military force that will be required there, further than
was necessary to determine the extent of accommodations to be erected and the
expense which these will involve. They would, however, observe that the
positions which have been designated will not of themselves have the desired
influence in restraining the Indian tribes and protecting our border settlements
without the aid of a respectable force, of which a full proportion should be
mounted and held disposable at all times for active service in the field. To
effect this the works should be so constructed that, while they will afford ade-
quate accommodations for all the troops when they are not actively employed,
their defence may be safely intrusted to a small force. With these precautionary
measures, and the co-operation of small but effective reserves posted within
sustaining distances of the several sections of the frontier, it is believed that
peace may be preserved and the first onset of war met until the militia of the
neighboring country could be embodied and brought into the field.
It only remains to recapitulate the positions which have been recommended
to be occupied, apportion the requisite force, and present a conjectural estimate
of the cost of erecting the accommodations and defences deemed necessary at
each.
1. For quarters for 100 men at the post on the Sabine where the
Opelousas road crosses that river, including defences $20, 000
2. For quarters for 100 men at the post on the Sabine where the
Natchitoches road crosses, including defences 20, 000
3. For permanent quarters and other accommodations for 500 men
at Fort Towson, including defences 100, 000
4. For permanent quarters and other accommodations for 1,000 men
at Fort Gibson, including defences 180, 000
5. For quarters for 300 men at the post on the Kansas river, in-
cluding defences 60, 000
6. For quarters and other accommodations for 500 men at the post
at Table creek, near the mouth, of the Platte, on the Missouri,
including defences 75, 000
7. For quarters and other accommodations for 400 men at the post
on the Des Moines river, including defences 60, 000
8. For the enlargement and repair of Fort Snelling, to fit it for the
accommodation of 300 men, including defences 30, 000
9. For quarters for 400 men at the post at the western extremity of
Lake Superior, including defences 50, 000
INTERIOR LINE.
10. For quarters for 200 men at the post between the Red and
Arkansas rivers, including defences 50, 000
11. For completing quarters and other accommodations for 200 men
at Fort Smith, including defences 50, 000
12. For completing quarters and other accommodations for 200 men
at Fort Wayne, including defences 50, 000
13. For quarters and other accommodations for 200 men at the post
at Spring river, including defences 50, 000
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 229
14. For quarters and other accommodations for 200 men at the post
at Marais de Cygne, including defences ..,...,, , . . . $50,000
15. For completing quarters and other accommodations in progress
for 400 men at Fort Leavenworth, including defences, , , F . . , . 50,000
Total for western frontier , , , ,..,,, 895,000
All which is respectfully submitted.
For the board,
JOS, a. TOTTEN,
Colonel of Engineers,
230 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES,
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 231
REPORT ON THE ARMORIES, ARSENALS, MAGAZINES, AND FOUNDERIES, WHICH
ARE MENTIONED IN THE THIRD SECTION OF THE RESOLUTION OF THE
SENATE IN THE FOLLOWING WORDS, VIZ :
"The armories, arsenals, magazines, and founderies, either constructed or
deemed necessary, with a conjectural estimate of the expense of constructing
such of said establishments as may not yet be completed or commenced, but
which may be deemed necessary."
The necessary arsenals and magazines will be first considered, as armories
and founderies, being manufactories of arms destined for general distribution,
do not pertain exclusively to any particular frontier. Arsenals and ordnance
depots will be understood to include magazines in the general sense of the term;
and these establishments will be rated, according to their relative importance or
magnitude, in three classes :
I. Arsenals of construction, which embrace also repairs, and for deposit.
II. Arsenal for repairs arid for deposit.
III. Depots, or places for deposit and safe-keeping of arms, and other ord-
nance stores.
I. On tlie nothern frontier, from Lake Superior to Passamaquoddy Imy.
An arsenal or ordnance depot will be required at some suitable point on the
Upper Mississippi ; and Fort Crawford, at Prairie Du Chien, offers a good posi-
tion, particularly with reference to supplying the line or tract of country extend-
ding southwesterly from Fort Snelling, through the Territory of Iowa, towards
the Des Moines river, as well as northwardly toward Lake Superior, and east-
wardly through the Territory of Wisconsin to Lake Michigan. The expense
of constructing this depot, on a scale commensurate with the probable import-
ance that must be given to it, will be not less than $70, 000
forming an arsenal of the third class.
The Detroit arsenal, on the river Rouge, twelve miles from De-
troit, now nearly finished, is an arsenal of the second class, des-
tined to supply the lake frontier from the Sault de St. Marie, the
outlet of Lake Superior, to Lake Michigan and Lake Erie 20, 000
will effect the completion of this arsenal.
Allegheny arsenal, at Pittsburg, an establishment of the first
class, is also available for the supply of the lake frontier, as well
as the western frontier, through the western arsenals.
Rome arsenal, of the third class, is the place for deposit for
stores required at the posts on Lake Ontario.
Champlain arsenal, at Vergennes, Vermont, also of the third
class, will supply the posts on Lake Champlain and the northern
part of Vermont. But the whole lake frontier, and the arsenals
in that region, may be supplied from the Watervliet arsenal, near
Albany, which is an establishment of the first class, and admira-
bly located for the preparation and sending forth of ordnance
stores, not only to the northern, but likewise to the maritime'
frontier. The periods of free navigation of the New York canals
and the Hudson river are used for the distribution from Water-
vliet of such supplies as may be required in the winter season.
The Kennebec arsenal, at Augusta, Maine, of the second class,
is designed to supply the northern and eastern frontiers of that
State, and part of New Hampshire ; but arms would be furnished
to the frontier of the latter State from Springfield armory, and
232 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
ordnance stores would be passed up the valley of the Connecticut
from arsenals either east or west of that river.
It may become necessary to establish a depot on the Penob-
scot, at Bangor. But this point is only sixty miles from Augusta ;
and no estimate of the cost is furnished, as the deposit would
probably be temporary.
II. The maritime frontier from Passamaquoddy bay to Cape
Florida. The Kennebec arsenal is the place of deposit for the
' greater part of the sea-coast of Maine ; the sum of $30, 000
will finish the additions required.
The Watertown arsenal, five miles in the rear of Boston, also
of the second class, will supply the westerly part of Maine, the
sea-coast of New Hampshire, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island ;
and 25, 000
will be required for additional buildings and enclosures.
Both the Kennebec and Watertown arsenals are of considerable
extent, with every facility for being converted into arsenals of the
first class ; and the construction of gun-carnages, necessary for
arming the forts and batteries within the limits above stated, may
be effected at both or either. The Watervliet arsenal, before
mentioned, is, however, the principal one relied on for supplies re-
quired, not only from Cape Cod to the capes of Delaware bay,
but for much of the maritime as well as the lake frontier. Addi-
tional quarters and storehouses at this post will cost 50, 000
A depot in the harbor of New York receives articles from Wa-
tervliet, during the season of navigation, which are transhipped,
in time of peace, to all parts of the coast and to the Mississippi.
During a war, supplies would be furnished from arsenals in the
more immediate vicinity of the sea-coast defences, viz : Frankford
arsenal, six miles above Philadelphia, is of the second class, and
will supply works on Delaware bay and river ; Pikesville arsenal,
of the third class, four miles from Baltimore ; Washington arsenal
and Fort Monroe arsenal, both of the first class, will furnish what
may be required for the sea-coast defences of Chesapeake bay and
Potomac river. The last mentioned was established with special
reference to the construction of the gun-carriages required at that
post and at Fort Calhoun. It has been found advantageous, how-
ever, to construct there carriages for other southern forts; but it can-
not be considered as a permanent establishment of the first class, to
be kept up after the occasion which called for it shall have passed
by-
The North Carolina arsenal, at Fayetteville, on Cape Fear
river, is under construction, and was originally intended to be
made one of the first class. Doubts have been entertained
whether it ought to exceed those of the second class ; but the
plan is such that it can at any time be extended according to the
original design. The sum of eighty thousand dollars will be re-
quired to finish it as one of the second class 80, 000
Charleston depot is at present of diminutive capacity. It is
proper to enlarge it, and 'thirty thousand dollars will make it use-
ful as a place of deposit 30, 000
Augusta arsenal, at Augusta, Georgia, is of the second class, and
with the two last mentioned will furnish supplies required from
Chesapeake bay to Cape Florida.
The Augusta arsenal has its powder magazine detached and
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 233
located at an inconvenient distance, beyond the control of the force
at the post. For the construction of a new magazine, and other
necessary additions to this establishment, sixty thousand dollars
will be required $60, 000
Several of the arsenals have been built upwards of 20 years,
and require extensive repairs and additions, which it is supposed
may be effected, from time to time, by the aid of annual appropri-
ations, amounting in all to about 180, 000
III. " The Gulf frontier, from Cape Florida to Saline bay"
Appalachicola arsenal, at Chattahoochee, just below the junction
of the Chattahoochee and Flint rivers ; Mount Vernon arsenal, on
the Mobile river ; and Baton Rouge arsenal, on the Mississippi,
are all establishments of the second class, and destined to supply the
whole Gulf frontier, and the forts below New Orleans, on the Mis-
sippi. About sixty thousand dollars will be required to com-
plete them, and erect some additional buildings at Baton Rouge 60, 000
IV. " The western frontier, from Saline bay to Lake Supe-
rior. Baton Rouge arsenal, already mentioned, will furnish
supplies for posts on the Sabine and Red rivers.
Little Rock arsenal, just commenced, will be the source of sup-
plies for posts on the Arkansas, and along the western border of
that State. It will necessarily become at first an arsenal of the
second class, with the depot at Memphis as subsidiary, and will
require one hundred thousand dollars to complete it 100, 000
St. Louis arsenal is a large establishment of the second class, but,
with very little expense can be raised to the first class ; with the
subsidiary depot at Liberty, on the Missouri, it wil} supply the
posts on that river, the western border of the State, the posts on
the Des Moines, and the Upper Mississippi.
A depot at Prairie du Chien, mentioned in relation to supplies
required in the direction of Lake Superior, and southwesterly,
through the Territory of Iowa, would be sustained by the St.
Louis arsenal, and completes the chain upon the several frontiers
embraced in the resolution.
Total amount required for constructions, additions, and repairs
to arsenals and depots 705, 000
Armories.
The two national armories at Springfield, Massachusetts, and Harper's Ferry,
Virginia, are the only public establishments for the manufacture of small arms.
They furnish about twenty-five thousand stand of arms yearly. This number
might be extended ; but it has been an object of solicitude with the government
for nearly twenty years past to establish an armory west of the Alleghanies.
Commissioners were employed in 1823 to examine the western waters, with a
view to the location of an armory. Many sites were surveyed, and careful epti-
mates made of the cost of an armory at each, with an exhibit of their several
advantages and disadvantages. The result of their investigations may be found
at large in Gales & Seaton's reprint of American State Papers, folios 729 -to 790
inclusive, volume 2, Military Affairs.
It is perhaps fortunate that the place then selected was not adopted by Con-
gress ; for, since that period, the immense increase, not only of population and
the general resources of the western region, but of the particular articles required
for the manufacture of arms, by the discovery of masses of coal, and the exten-
234 FORTIFICATIONS AXD SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
sive working of iron mines, where nothing of the kind was then found, has
shown that an armory should be located much further west.
The data collected by the commissioners in 1823 may be usefully applied in
estimating the probable cost of an armory at the present day, making suitable
allowances for the increased price of everything connected with such an estab-
lishment. This cost will be found to vary, according to localities of positions,
from $280,000 to $500,000 for an armory capable of furnishing twelve thousand
muskets per year. It will therefore be stated at the mean of $390,000, to which
twenty per cent, should be added ; making the sum of $468, 000
Another mode of proceeding proposed consists of forming an
establishment complete in itself, of limited extent, and having the
great mass of component parts of arms manufactured by the piece
in private workshops, and only the inspecting, assembling, and
finishing be done at the public works. This course would mate-
rially reduce the first cost, or necessary expenditure for buildings
and tools. It also admits of extension to a great amount of fab-
rication, with but little additional cost of permanent fixtures.
But, whichever mode is followed, or whatever site may be
selected for its location, there can be no question of the necessity
for an armory on the western waters ; and as regards a proper
location, it may be observed, that, to consider the relations of an
armory in the same light as that of an arsenal or magazine, would
be an error ; the means of production being the principal requisite
for the one, and those of transportation or distribution for the
others.
Total required for an armory on the western waters 468, 000
Founderies.
The United States own no cannon foundery. Although possessing some ore
beds, from which iron of approved quality for casting cannon has long been made,
yet artillery of every description is procured from private founderies. This
subject has been so recently before Congress, and so ably treated, that nothing
will be said further than to state the probable cost of such an establishment ;
and, here again, so much depends upon the location, that only an approximation
will be attempted. A report from the War Department made to the 24th Con-
gress, 1st session, Doc. No. 106, states the cost of a foundery, to be located at
Georgetown, in the District of Columbia, at $312,000. If this estimate is cor-
rect, (and it is known that great care was bestowed on its preparation,) it may
be assumed that about $300, 000
will be required for a foundery when favorably located for the use
of water power. Should steam power be adopted, the first cost
of the establishment would be less, while the annual expenditure
would be greater than for water power.
As regards a suitable location for a foundery, the great weight
and bulk of the raw materials used in the manufacture of cannon,
and the weight of heavy guns, which are required for use only on
the seaboard, would seem to demand that particular attention
should be given to the means of transportation both to and from
the foundery.
Total amount required for a foundery 300, 000
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 235
Recapitulation.
Total amount required for constructions, additions, and repairs to
arsenals and depots $705, 000
Total amount required to establish an armory on the western
waters 468, 000
Total amount required to establish a national foundery 300, 000
Total.. 1,473,000
All which is respectfully submitted.
By order of the board,
JOS. G, TOTTEN,
Colonel of Engineers.
MEMORIAL OF EDMUND P. GAINES.
To the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America
in Congress assembled:
The memorial of Edmund Pendleton Gaines, a major general in the army of
the United States, commanding the western division, respectfully sliowetli :
That, believing the federal and State constitutions guarantee and consecrate to
every free citizen capable of bearing arms the right and duty of participating
alike in the civil and military trusts of trie republic, solemnly requiring the
soldier to exert his every faculty " in peace to prepare for war" so that
on the recurrence of war he may be well qualified to fight the battles of his
country in the greatest possible triumph, and at the least possible cost of blood
and treasure ; requiring him, moreover, to study and respect her political and
social institutions ; and requiring the statesman to discipline his mind for the
state and national defence, by adapting his civil acts and occasional military
studies to the purposes of the national defence and protection, as well against
foreign enemies in war as against the home incendiary and other criminal offenders
in peace ; thus rendering the statesman and soldier equally familiarized with
their common kindred duties of self-government and self-defence : by a knowl-
edge of which our independence was achieved, and without which this inestima-
ble blessing cannot be preserved ; your memorialist, a native Virginian, a citi-
zen of Tennessee, schooled in her cabins and her camps to the profession of
arms, has, within the last seventeen years, matured a system of national defence,
to which he now respectfully solicits your attention and support : a system of
national defence which the late giant strides of invention and improvement in
the arts have rendered indispensable to the preservation of the Union; a system
of national defence which recommends itself peculiarly to the central, southern,
and Atlantic States, as well as to those of the north and west ; as it assures to
our isolated central States of Tennessee and Kentucky, and to all the western
States of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Missouri, and Arkansas, in peace, commercial
advantages equal to those enjoyed by the most favored eastern, Atlantic, or
southern States ; and in war, giving to the disposable fighting men of these cen-
tral and western States the inestimable privilege of flying with unprecedented
certainty, celerity, and comfort to any of our vulnerable seaports, to aid our
brethren of the border States to repel the invading foe ; and to accomplish this
essential duty in one-tenth part of the time, and one-tenth part of the expense
236 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
that would attend such an operation over our present bad roads. But, above
all, to accomplish these great and good objects, by means that will more than
double the value of our State and national domain, and without expending a
dollar that may not be insured to be replaced in the public coffers in from seven
to ten years after the completion of the work here recommended.
Your memorialist is admonished by the universal employment of steam power,
and its applicability to every description of armament hitherto moved upon the
sea by wind and canvas, or upon the land by animal power, that an epoch is
at hand in which the art of war, in whatever regards the attack and defence of
seaports, has undergone an unparalleled revolution.
Hitherto the transition from peace to war between neighboring nations,
though sometimes sudden and unexpected, was usually preceded by some sig-
nificant note of preparation not easily mistaken ; and after the actual commence-
ment of hostilities there were frequent opportunities and ample time for the
belligerents, and more particularly for the nation acting upon the unerring
principle of self-defence, to complete the work of preparation for war before the
work of destruction upon her principal seaport towns had been begun by the
invading foe. Hitherto the enemy's fleets were to be seen for weeks, often,
indeed, for months in succession, " standing off and on," waiting for suitable
winds and weather to enable them to enter and attack the destined port, and
then, in case of accident, to carry them safely out again winds such as could
never be calculated on with anything like certainty. Hence the great and
unavoidable delay in the attack by fleets propelled by wind and sails has often
enabled the people of the threatened seaports to throw up works of defence ;
and after slowly marching their interior volunteers and other forces at the rate
of twenty miles a day, they would in time be so well prepared for action that
the menacing invaders have but seldom ventured to attack places of much im-
portance, but have usually condescended to vent their prowess in a petty border
war against villages and private habitations, as upon the Chesapeake bay and
the Georgia sea-coast in the war of 1812, 1813, and 1814.
If the obvious effect of steam power, in the rapid movement of everything
to which it has been applied around us, has not been sufficient to convince us of
the expediency and transcendent advantages in war and in peace of the pro-
posed immediate work of preparation, by steam power, to guard against the
incalculable disasters that must otherwise attend the sudden outbreak of war
with any of the great nations of Europe able to send against us even a small
fleet propelled by steam power, it would seem obvious that the late naval and
military operations in the harbor of Vera Cruz were sufficient to prove clearly,
that to bring a hostile fleet inside the breakers of a seaport of the country in-
vaded, and within the desired range of the best of cannon and mortars for
red-hot shot and shells of one of the strongest castles in America, was the work
of but two hours ; and that the utter destruction of that castle by three small
ships-ofrwar required but four hours more.
To provide for the defence of our seaports, and thus effectually to obviate
the possibility of a sudden calamity like that which has befallen the castle of
San Juan de Ulloa, and to enable us to repel by the agency of steam power
every invasion suddenly forced upon us by fleets propelled by steam power,
I now submit for the consideration of the national legislature the project and
explanatory views which follow :
ART. I. Floating batteries for the defence of the seaports and harbors of the
United States.
1. Your memorialist proposes the immediate construction of from two to four
large floating batteries for the defence of each navigable pass into the Mississippi
river, and from two to five others for the defence of every other navigable inlet
leading into any of the principal seaports of the United States. Each floating
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 237
battery to be from 200 to 300 feet long, and from 90 to 150 feet wide the
bottom to be as nearly flat as the best tested principles of naval architecture
will allow, consistently with the great weight of timber and metal to be pro-
vided for, with the requisite facility of the movement that will be required over
shoal water. Each floating battery to be secured in the bottom and sides with
copper sheeting, and copper or iron bolts ; and on the upper parts, exposed to
the enemy's shot and shells, with the thickest sheet iron, and iron bolts ; and
otherwise made capable of sustaining a heavier broadside than the largest of
our ships-of-war is capable of sustaining ; to carry from one hundred and twenty
to two hundred heavy cannon say long 24 and 32-pounders, with some 80-
pounders for carrying hollow shot, together with some mortars for throwing
shells; with a furnace for heating red-hot shot for illuminating the enemy's
fleets and transports. Each floating battery to have state-rooms for the com-
fortable accommodation of from 600 to 1,000 men, with storerooms for all the
munitions of war, requisite for that force for six to eight months' service. Each
floating battery to be attended and propelled by such number of tow-boats as
the exigencies of the service shall from time to time demand to be permanently
stationed in each harbor in time of peace, and in war as many tow-boats to be
chartered as the commanding officer may deem .necessary to render the floating
batteries in the highest degree efficient. As in war tow-boats will seldom be
needed for the merchant service, an ample supply of them, particularly in our
large seaports, may be chartered on moderate terms : for example, in the harbor
of New Orleans it is believed that twelve tow-boats, with several steamboats
having the best of engines to be converted into tow-boats, would be thrown out
of employment during a state of war. These could be usefully employed in
the United States service, in aid of the public tow-boats and floating batteries.
But should this reliance be deemed unsafe, we can readily adopt the obvious
alternative of having each floating battery supplied with two tow-boats of great
power, as in war they would be needed near the batteries, ready to wield them
in the event of an attack, and at other times to act as tenders in supplying them
with men and munitions of war. In a state of peace the floating batteries, it
is believed, would require but one tow-boat each, excepting when employed in
deepening the ship channels a work which may be accomplished with the
most perfect ease and to any desirable extent, wherever the bottom of the chan-
nel consists of mud and sand, as in all the outlets of the Mississippi. This
important work will be done by attaching to the bottom of each floating battery
a framework of ploughs and scrapers of iron, made to let down and raise up at
pleasure, according to the hardness or softness of the clay and sand, or mud, of
which the bar or bottom of the channel may be composed. If very hard or
tough, the ploughs and scrapers might not break up and take off more than two
to four inches in depth at one movement; but where the bar is composed entirely
of soft mud, as that at Balize and the Northeast and Southwest passes have
often been, from four to six inches in depth, it is believed, may be earned off at
once wherever the bar is very narrow, and in the immediate vicinity of very
deep water, which would be the reservoir or place of deposit to which the mud
and sand would be removed. But in a state of peace, when the batteries should
not be employed in deepening the ship channels, their extra tow-boats might be
advantageously employed in the merchant service.
2. Floating batteries such as are here proposed, constitute, as your memorialist
verily believes, the only sure means of defence of the passes into our seaports
against ships-of-war propelled by steam power means of defence without which
it is in the power of any nation, or community of men, or pirates, capable of
fitting out ten or even five such steamship s-of- war as those employed in the
destruction of the castle of San Juan de Ulloa, to destroy the city of New
York or New Orlans by fire, with the newly invented 80-pound cannon shot
and shells, in a single day, at any season of the year; approaching them in the
238 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
night, and taking them by surprise: as with such a fleet, well manned and
supplied, either city could be fired in five hundred places in one hour; and in a
few hours more thousands of the most splendid edifices, by which these mag-
nificent cities are embellished, would be reduced to ruin and desolation.
3. This opinion has not been formed without a full knowledge of the fact that
both New York and New Orleans number among their citizens many men and
volunteer corps of military science, patriotism, and unsurpassed chivalry. But
these fine volunteer corps, attacked by means and by weapons hitherto unknown
to them, or unprovided for, and thus taken by surprise, may share the fate of
the heroic Danes at Copenhagen, when attacked by Nelson ; with this striking
difference in their favor, and against us, the Danes were not taken by surprise.
A protracted negotiation with England preceded the attack ; and after the British
fleet had made its appearance on the coast of Denmark, and in sight of their
harbor, they had some three or four days for preparation ; they had a fleet nearly
equal to that brought into action against them by Nelson, together with an army
of some thousands of men, seamen, soldiers, and volunteers, with several fortifi-
cations on land, aided by some floating batteries presenting altogether an arma-
ment of upwards of 1,000 cannon, with an immense supply of small arms and
every requisite munition of waj. In this state of preparation the harbor of
Copenhagen was entered in open day by twelve ships of the line three of which
were rendered nearly useless by having got aground ; with nine ships of the line,
therefore, Nelson sustained a close action for four hours, during which time his
loss was less than one thousand, while the loss of the Danes was near six thousand
men, together with their fleet to say nothing of the losses sustained by the
inhabitants of the city. This was the result of an attack with nine ships of the
line, propelled by wind and sails, upon the seaport of Copenhagen, when strongly
fortified and defended by large naval and land forces. What then must be the
fate of such a city as New York or New Orleans, without any effective means
of defence, attacked by ten, or even five ships-of-war, armed with the newly
invented 80-pounders, and propelled by steam power ? We know that a fleet
consisting of this description of ships-of-war may cross the Atlantic from a
European port to New York in the short space of fourteen day's time, and that
it may enter our harbors in the night, and be seen at our wharves, with matches
lighted ready for action, at daylight in the morning ready to take or destroy
money or property amounting to ten times as much as all the floating batteries
and railroads embraced in the proposed system of national defence would cost.
In the outrageous attack on Copenhagen, England was fighting for the dominion
of the sea. Denmark and Sweden, with Russia and France, were then nobly
opposing that lawless pretension, as we, the United States, have long opposed it.
Nelson, on embarking in the expedition, is reported to have said to his com-
mander, Admiral Parker, "I hope we shall give our northern enemies that hail-
storm of bullets, which gives our dear country the dominion of the sea ; we have
it, and all the devils in the north cannot take it from us if our wooden walls have
fair play." This is the language of a truehearted British seaman and soldier.
Such was the noble bearing of our own Decatur, when he exclaimed, "Our
country ! in her intercourse with foreign nations may she always be right ; but
in war may she always triumph right or wrong !"
In the memorable attack on Copenhagen, it is worthy of remark here that
the experienced Admiral Nelson, who had won more great naval victories than
any other commander had, previous to the action stated to the commander-in-
chief the following opinion : "If the wind is fair, and you determine to attack
the ships and Crown islands, you must expect the natural issue of such a battle
ships crippled, and perhaps one or two lost ; for the wind which carries you in
will most probably not bring out a crippled ship" Nelson, however, had the
good fortune, after taking and destroying a fleet nearly equal to his own, and
killing six times as many men as he lost in action, to sail out of the harbor, which
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 239
he had filled with wrecks, without the loss of a single British vessel, though he
had several greatly damaged.
4. With floating batteries, such as are here proposed, it is more than probable
that the brave Banes would have destroyed the whole of Nelson's fleet without
sustaining the loss of a vessel, a battery, or one hundred men. The floating
batteries of the Danes, like those of the French and Spaniards at the siege of
Gibraltar in the year 1783, were inefficient, simply because they were unwieldy.
No effective means for wielding floating batteries, when large enough to be for-
midable, had ever been discovered previous to the discovery by Robert Fulton
of that development of steam power applicable to ships and all other floating
structures. With regard to the ten great floating batteries, especially con-
structed for the memorable siege against Gibraltar, it is obvious to every man
of military mind that, however formidable such batteries might have been, even
without tow-boats, or steam power in any other form, employed in the defence
of a high rock fort like that of Gibraltar, such floating batteries could never be
relied on as effective means of attack upon a high rock fort of that description,
as the immense strength of the position and of the. work, with the great eleva-
tion of the cannon of the work attacked, would insure the destruction of float-
ing batteries, or render an attack by them unavailing. It is a well ascertained
fact, however, not generally known, as but few historians have noticed it, that
the floating batteries employed in the siege of Gibraltar were manned princi-
pally with convicts. This fact may be considered as the most conclusive among
the principal causes of their failure, as well as of the opinion entertained and
expressed by the French and Spanish commanders, that most of these batteries
were set on fire by the men on board, whose duty it was to defend them. Be
this as it may, a minute examination of the military history of the terrible
siege of Gibraltar is respectfully referred to by your memorialist as evidence in
favor of his proposition for the immediate construction of floating batteries for
the defence of our ports and harbors ; inasmuch as it is obvious that, if the
commander of Gibraltar had been supplied with ten floating batteries, such as
are here proposed, with our present means of tow-boats, with steam power to
wield them, he would have destroyed the whole of the combined fleets employed
against him, or at least have kept them out of the bay or harbor of Gibraltar.
To the siege of Gibraltar and the attack on Copenhagen, two of the most terrible
and extraordinary events known to modern history, in reference to the attack
and defence of seaports, an event known to your memorialist and many other
officers now in service will be added, to show the utter impracticability of locking
up a navigable river or inlet, or of arresting the movement of a fleet thereon,
by fortifications with cannon placed on the banks of such river or inlet. On
the night of the 6th of November, 1813, the flotilla, under the command of
Major General Wilkinson, consisting of nearly 300 boats, sloops and schooners,
passed the fort of Prescott, upon the Canada side of the river St. Lawrence,
under a constant fire of the cannon of the fort, manned by the best of British
artillerists, without the loss of a boat or other vessel, and with the loss of but
one man killed and two wounded; notwithstanding the flotilla was nearly one
hour in the act of passing the fort, during the whole of which time the fire of
the enemy's cannon was incessant, and the line formed by the flotilla in its
movement was deemed to be within pointblank shot of the fort say from 600
to 800 yards' distance ! This fact was proven by the whistling of the enemy's
shot, many, probably hundreds, of which passed apparently from 20 to 50 feet
above our heads, while on board the boats in their slow passage, for they were
propelled by oars, upon a gentle current, which enabled us to move at the rate
of not more than three miles an hour. This movement was effected in the
night, tolerably clear, but without moonlight. With the history of these three
events before us, it would seem to be the height of imprudence in us to perse-
240 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
vere in the construction of costly forts, with the vain hope of protecting our
seaports against fleets propelled by steam power, without the employment of
floating batteries, such as are here recommended, with railroads to sustain them
by timely reinforcements. %
5. But it has been contended by men of high pretensions in theory, if not in
the practical science of war, that, in place of the floating batteries here proposed
as means of harbor defence, we should direct our attention mainly to the con-
struction of steamships of war. In reply to this theoretical suggestion, it is
only necessary to say that we must, indeed, ultimately have steamships of war,
or we must give up the whole of our foreign commerce ; but, if we desire to
preserve our seaports and commercial emporiums, we must have for their pro-
tection floating batteries, which constitute, in the present state of the arts, the
natural link in the great chain of national defence between the land and naval
means of service ; and, as these floating batteries are not designed for going to
sea, (excepting near our ports and harbors in calm weather,) they properly be-
long to the land service. The fact that our seaports are rendered more than
ever liable to sudden and unlocked for attacks by fleets propelled by steam
power, renders it all-important to their security that our means of harbor defence
should never, even for a single day, be left exposed to an assault, when that
assault may, in all human probability, result in "the destruction of one of our
most vital points of military and commercial operations. If, however, steam-
ships of war should be preferred to the proposed floating batteries, a solemn act
of Congress should be passed, forbidding any officer from removing them beyond
the immediate vicinity of the harbor to which they may be assigned; as it must
be obvious that our seaports cannot be protected without every requisite means
of protection is held ready for action within our harbors, respectively. The
floating batteries, it is believed, will cost but little more than the timber, iron,
copper, and other materials for their construction, if they are built, as they
should be, by the troops intended to defend them, aided by some ship-carpenters
to give them tight bottoms.
6. With three to five of the proposed floating batteries placed in the form of
a crescent across the Mississippi river, with the concave side of the crescent
down the river, and this curved line of floating batteries flanked by a small
temporary fort on each bank of the river, so as to bring the cannon of each fort
or battery to bear on any fleet or vessel ascending the river from the sea, we
should be certain thus to give each of the enemy's leading vessels a double
cross-fire raking them in front and on each side at one and the same time, with
several of our heavy guns from each one of our floating batteries and adjacent
forts, with red-hot shot a description of defence Avhich would to a certainty, in
99 cases out of 100, be fatal to any fleet that could possibly be brought against
our line of batteries. But, "to make assurance doubly sure," we could have
our floating batteries occasionally connected together by chain cables and
chevaux-defrise, which might sometimes bring us in close contact with a daring
foe, as Nelson or our own Decatur and Perry were in the mode of attack which
characterized those chivalric naval commanders. But the contact thus produced
would insure to us the moral and physical effect of our efforts being in self-
defence, with the superior strength of our batteries, bulwarks, and weight of
me tal advantages which we should enjoy from the moment the invading foe
comes within the range of our long and heavy cannon, until he finds himself
entangled in, and arrested by, our chevaux-de-frise, where the contact would be so
close as to enable us to' throw into his ships hand grenades and incendiary
shells, with an occasional supply of heated steam ; while our own batteries
would be preserved from a similar annoyance by their superior width, strength,
and peculiar structure of their upper works, which are proposed to be secured
by sheet-iron of immense thickness ; a description of work which it is believed
could not be so effectually applied to vessels of anything like the ordinary
model of ships-of-war designed for sea service.
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 241
But again: "to make assurance doubly sure," we should not risk sucli places
as New York and New Orleans by far the most vital, and in a civil and (the
latter more especially) in a military point of view, the most important seaports
in America without at least two curved lines of defence one at or near the
entrance of the harbor, and the other at the next narrow, strong, interior point,
fortified as above suggested, with the curved line of floating batteries flanked by
a fort on each side of the river or channel ; for example, for the harbor of New
York, the Narrows ; and for the Mississippi, Forts Jackson and St. Philip.
7. Floating batteries, such as are here proposed, constitute the only effective
means of defence against fleets propelled by steam power, in a nation situated
as the United States are, covering a large extent of country, bordered by a sea-
board of near 4,000 miles in extent, indented by many fine seaports, with great
cities filled with the wealth of a lucrative commerce with every quarter of the
globe, together with our own agricultural products, fully capable of sustaining
our expansive commerce, until it surpasses that of any other part of the globe :
provided we take care to maintain an attitude of honest defiance towards the
licensed as well as the unlicensed pirates of every quarter of the world, by
which they will clearly understand that we desire to be at peace, to do equal
and impartial justice to all nations, and to engage in entangling alliances with
none ; and above all, if we are attacked, we should be prepared speedily to con-
centrate at the point of attack sufficient force and supplies to overwhelm the in-
vader with irretrievable defeat before he will have it in his power to destroy any
of our means of defence, or our seaport towns. Our lawless neighbors will thus
be taught that if they attack us they do it at their peril, and at the risk of
leaving their armies to enrich our plantations,
8. So much for their uses in a state of war ; then, on the return of peace,
when the most expensive fixed fortifications are absolutely useless, and, more-
over, a heavy burden to the country to keep them in repair, floating batteries
will be usefully employed as barracks and hospitals, and in deepening the chan-
nels, liable to be filled up by clay, and loam, and sand, as those at the mouth of
the Mississippi river are often filled up. As floating barracks and hospitals, the
proposed batteries would be of essential benefit to the service everywhere, inas-
much as the outlets of our rivers and seaports are generally healthy positions ;
and they will form the most appropriate asylums for our convalescent or slightly
disabled soldiers or seamen, most of whom will render essential service in pre-
paring fixed ammunition, and in the instruction of the young and inexperienced,
and in holding them ready for action. Above all, in a state of peace the pro-
posed floating batteries will be of immense utility to the service for all purposes
of military schools, to which the aspiring youth of our country of the commu-
nity will gladly repair, for the attainment of military knowledge, where it can
be acquired both in theory and in practice, and where its study and practice
will be rendered most delightful and praiseworthy by the simple process of the
students rendering immediate and important public service in return for the pub-
lic instruction received by them. The military education of our youth should
commence at the age of sixteen, and be completed at the age of twenty-one or
twenty-two. If our youth are educated upon floating batteries at the entrance
of our harbors, near the Balize, Sandy Hook, or the Narrows; otherwise, if the
youth of each Atlantic or southern State are educated at the entrance of the
principal seaport of such State, the graduate, after finishing his education, would
have the proud satisfaction of exhibiting to his parents or guardian, on his re-
turn home, the gratifying evidence of his having performed five years' honorable
service, while acquiring attainments qualifying him for a high, perhaps the
highest, command in the army; attainments, too, tending to qualify him in no
small degree for the highest stations recognized by the free institutions of our
country, and exonerating him forever after from any other than mere voluntary
service.
H. Rep. Com. 86 16
242 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
9. Shall we bo told by the advocates of our obsolete systems of national de-
fence that the risk of health and comfort is too great to have the youth of our
country educated upon our floating batteries at the entrance of our harbors, or
at the mouths of our rivers, where the swell of the sea and the turbid waters of
our overflowing Mississippi and other rivers may too sensibly affect the nerves
and disturb the meditations of the students on whom the defence and fate of the
republic must soon depend? Will our opponents point to the United States
Military Academy, and contend that the graduates of that institution are the
better for the serene stillness, quiet, and comfort of the interior position of that
institution? We may answer, no! no! The only great defect to be found in
that institution consists in the quiet and almost exclusively sedentary mode of
living which has long marked the character of that otherwise admirable institu-
tion ; a mode of living which contributes too much to sacrifice the vigor of con-
stitution necessary to a real hard-duty soldier, to the attainment of that litera-
ture and science, with the social habits and enjoyments more befitting a country
gentleman of affluent fortune, than a thoroughbred soldier, statesman, or man of
business :
"The life of fame is ACTION understood ;
That action must be virtuous, great and good."
Habits of action, of mind and body, should be formed in childhood, or at
least before the seal of manhood is fixed upon the student. Why is the seaman
placed on duty on board the ship-of-war at the age of twelve to sixteen, and
required to perform his practical labors from the moment he takes his first les-
sons in the theoretical duties of his profession? It is to facilitate his attain-
ments of both in the shortest possible time, and to the greatest possible extent
of perfection. His health and habits are perfected upon the precise element,
and in exposures to the climates and weather, to which his duties will call him,
and often confine him during a state of war. Why is the law student required to
attend the courts, and the medical student the hospitals, while attending to the
theory of the profession? It is because, even in these learned professions,
where much more depends upon books, or theory, than in the profession of arms,
all experienced men unite in the opinion that great benefit to the student results
from combining practice with theory. The watchmaker, shoemaker, carpenter,
and blacksmith, always put their students or apprentices to work at the earliest
possible period of their instruction; often, indeed, before they are able to wield
many of the tools of their trade. With these facts before our eyes, added to
the custom which has obtained in many of the enlightened States of Europe,
and which we are apparently disposed to rivet upon our own land of freedom
and invention, it would seem impossible to resist the conviction that the science
of war is indeed in its infancy. Of all the sciences and arts, there are none
where the union of theory and practice, in all the duties of preparation for the
great dernier results, are so much altogether necessary and proper, as in the sci-
ence of war and the duties of an army ; and yet, wonderful to tell, there is no
trade or profession, reduced to separate and distinct rules of science and art, in
which theory is so much relied on, or practice so much neglected, as in the art
of war, as it regards military operations on land, or in the attack and defence of
seaports.
ART. II. So much for floating batteries, and their uses in peace and in war.
Let us now proceed to consider the all-important kindred measure of railroads
for co-operating with the proposed floating batteries, and perfecting the promised
system of national defence.
10. We propose the immediate location and construction of seven railroads,
to extend from the two central States of Tennessee and Kentucky to the seven
grand divisions of the national frontier, as suggested by a plan embraced in the
accompanying diagram, viz :
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 243
{
First. One principal railroad from Lexington, Kentucky, to Buffalo or Platts-
burg, New York, with branches to Detroit, Albany, and Boston.
Second. One principal railroad from Knoxville, Tennessee, to Norfolk, Virginia,
or Baltimore, Maryland, with branches to Richmond, Virginia, and Newbern,
North Carolina.
Third. One principal railroad from Memphis, Tennessee, to Charleston, South
Carolina, or Savannah, ' Georgia, with branches to Milledgeville, Georgia, and
East Florida.
Fourth. One principal railroad from Louisville, Kentucky, to Mobile, Alabama,
with a branch to Pensaeola, Florida.
Fifth. One principal railroad from Lexington, Kentucky, via Nashville, to
New Orleans.
Sixth. One principal railroad from Memphis, Tennessee, to the Sabine ridge,
with branches to Fort Towson and Fort Gibson, Arkansas.
Seventh. One principal railroad from Louisville, Kentucky, or Albany, In-
diana, to St. Louis, Missouri, and thence to the Missouri river, north of the mouth
of the Big Platte; with branches from Albany, Indiana, to Chicago, and from
the northwest angle of the State of Missouri to the upper crossing of the river
Des Moines.
11. These seven great arteries or principal railroads here enumerated will each
be from 500 to 700 miles in length, (averaging 600 miles,) making altogether a
distance of 4,200 miles; and the average cost of locating and constructing
them is estimated at $15,000 per mile; amounting, altogether, to the sum of
$64,000,000, provided they are located and constructed by the army of the
United States the railroads to be of the most substantial kind, each having a
double track. The whole work to be completed by the authority and at the
expense of the United States; provided that, on its final completion, it shall
revert to the States, in their sovereign and individual capacity; each State to
retain forever the right of property in and to all of such section or sections of the
said railroads, with all their appurtenances, lying or being within the territorial
limits of such States, respectively, upon the simple condition that all troops,
whether regulars or volunteers, in the service of the United States, with their
munitions of war, together with the mail, shall be transported forever upon these
railroads free of expense to the United States.
12. Without attempting to enumerate all the benefits to be derived from the
proposed railroads in peace as well as in war benefits which are for the most
part too generally known to require any particular notice here, (and others, cer-
tainly of very great value, can only be conjectured, inasmuch as they are to
some extent invisible, and to be developed, principally, it is believed, by the
excavations necessary to complete the graduation of the basis of the work
through the vast regions of mineral wealth over which its various lines will
extend, where accident has hitherto led to the discovery of a sprinkling of gold,
with millions of acres of the richest iron and lead ore and coal, together with
copper and other valuable minerals,) your memorialist will here concisely advert
to the principal benefits which the military aspect of the proposed work promises,
and conclude with a notice of such advantages as must immediately result to the
army, to the several States, and the UNION, from the organization and employ-
ment of the national regulars and volunteers as operatives upon the work.
13. The prin^ml advantages to be derived from the proposed railroads in
a military point of view.
In a state of war they will enable us to transport the military men and mu-
nitions of war of the two central States of the Union, and of all the interior
districts of the twenty-four border States, to the seven grand divisions of the
national frontier, without animal power, in one-tenth part of the time, and at
one-tenth part of the expense that the movement would cost in the present state
244 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
of our bad roads. The proposed railroads would thus enable us to obtain more
useful service in war from ten thousand men, by the increased rapidity and
safety of their movement to the point of attack chosen by the invading foe,
than without railroads we could obtain from an army of one hundred thousand
men marched upon our common roads ; as, in addition to the saving of time,
which in war is power, and health, and life, and money, we shall save our citizen
soldiers from what they usually deem the most irksome and insupportable afflic-
tions and privations attending their tours of military service; AVC shall save them
from long and tedious marches, and from the still more trying scenes of a long-
continued delay in camp, and the consequent painful separation from wife,
children, friends, and business. On the contrary, after being assembled and
prepared for action, we shall fly to meet the invading foe at the rate of 250 or
300 miles in 24 hours taking with us every desirable necessary of life for the
preservation of health, activity, and personal prowess, so that when we meet
the enemy we shall enjoy every desirable advantage in every conflict, in most of
which we cannot but be successful; and in place of the usual campaign of three,
six, or twelve months of distressing service, we may reasonably calculate on
being conveyed, with every desirable supply from the central States to the fron-
tier, in the short space of fifty or sb ty hours' time, and of meeting and beating
the invading foe, and returning to our homes in a few days, or at most a few
weeks more. Hence the great utility of the proposed railroads in a state of
war ; and then, on the return of peace, when our sixty millions of dollars worth
of fortifications, and armories, and arsenals, and ships-of-war, are worse than
useless for any of the purposes of peace, and a great and constant expense to
repair and replenish them in order to hold them ready for another war ; then
our railroads, taking, as they must take, precisely the direction that the com-
merce of our country takes, from the seaboard to the central western States,
will, when turned to commercial purposes, produce a revenue to the States that
own them that will be more than sufficient to replace, in seven years' time,
every dollar expended in their construction, and forever thereafter produce a
revenue sufficient for the support of all the State governments, and to pay for
the education of every orphan child in America. The proposed railroads will
do more they will form ligaments of union more powerful than bulwarks of
adamant, or chains of iron or gold, to bind the States together in perpetual
union. In designating the military men of the central States of Tennessee and
Kentucky as the disposable force of the nation, we have reference to the fact
that this force is rendered disposable by the central position of these two States
they having no frontier to defend ; while the forces of all the other twenty-
four States are rendered local forces, and not disposable, by reason of their
being all border States the boundary of each extending to the frontier ; and,
therefore, having no frontier of their own to defend, they are thus rendered local,
not disposable.
14. Organization of the regular forces and operatives to be intrusted with
the location and construction of the ivork.
One major general; one adjutant general, with seven assistants; two brigadier
generals; seven surgeons, with twenty-eight assistant surgeons; and twenty-
eight chief artificers or scientific mechanics; seven regiments, each regiment to
consist of one colonel, two lieutenant colonels, four majors, one adjutant, and
one quartermaster, two sergeant majors, and two quartermaster sergeants, with
ten companies ; each company to consist of one captain, two first lieutenants,
two second lieutenants, and two cadets, with one quartermaster sergeant, one
orderly sergeant, four sergeants, four corporals, two musicians, ten artificers, and
eighty private soldiers. The general, field, and staff officers, with the captains
and first lieutenants, to be taken from the officers of the engineers, topographical
engineers, artillery, and infantry now in service; officers of established reputa-
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 245
i
tion for professional talents, experience, industry, economy, and exemplary
habits, and to have the pay and emoluments of mounted dragoons, with 50 per
cent, additional pay, while actually employed as engineers, superintendents, or
operatives, upon the location or construction of the work.
15. Location of the proposed railroads.
The location must embace the nearest and best routes, commencing within the
two central States of Tennessee and Kentucky, and extending to the seven
grand divisions of the seaboard and northern frontier, as above suggested ; to
be ascertained, particularly through the mountainous regions, by a series of to-
pographical surveys, and finally decided on and established by a b'oard to con-
sist of a general and four to six field officers, upon whose decision the major
general commanding upon this service should have power to act : to approve or
disapprove the decision of the board, upon the same principles that the President
is authorized by the Constitution of the United States to approve or disapprove
an act of Congress.
These surveys will produce an immense mass of mineral, geological, and topo-
graphical information, of great value to the States and the Union, and of indis-
pensable utility to every member of the army and militia of the nation who
aspires to that employment in the national defence which leads to the true fame
of a citizen soldier information tending to develop the military and physical
resources of every State and district preparatory to a state of war, and of essen-
tial benefit to the people of every class during a state of peace.
16. Operations in the final construction of the work.
Each one of the proposed routes to be placed in charge of a colonel, who
will superintend the construction of the work ; and for the prompt and con-
venient accomplishment of every part of the work, each route will be subdivided
into ten sections, and each section placed under the immediate superintendence
of a captain, to be assisted by the whole of the subaltern officers, non-commis-
sioned officers, artificers, and privates of the company, with as many volunteer
artificers and other operatives as will be sufficient to insure the completion of
each section in from four to five years after the location of the work, which may
be accomplished in one year; so that when one section of sixty miles in extent
is completed, the whole work will be quite or nearly finished, with the exception
of that Avhich is unavoidably located over a mountainous country. The com-
pletion of the mountainous sections may be hastened by such increased means
as the exigencies of the service shall demand. The simple process of carrying
on such a work necessarily increases the means and facilities of its progress
and speedy accomplishment. Thousands of our young men, ignorant of every
operation upon tke work, will soon become able operatives. To the regular
army we should have the power to add every scientific mechanic, artificer, and
able-bodied willing laborer, to be employed as volunteers, principally within the
limits of the States where the sections of the railroads* on which they are to be
employed, respectively, are located and constructed, so that the services of all
may be near their places of residence. We shall thus call into action and use-
fulness that class of American genius which would otherwise, to a great extern,
languish and fall into the whirlpools of vice or imbecility for want of employ-
ment and judicious direction that genius which is found in the learned profes-
sions, in all the walks of fashionable life, in the pursuits of agriculture, commerce,
and the mechanic arts, as well as in the haunts of dissipation and idleness ;
whose votaries may indeed often too truly say, " We are idle because no man
hath given us employment." By these idlers, whose amployment would save
them from misery and ruin, and render them valuable citizens, and enable them
to render their country invulnerable in war and enrich it in peace aided by the
enterprising young men which every section of the republic is capable of afford-
ing for the proposed great work, and arming with the irresistible weapons of
246 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
industry and enterprise necessary to enable them, in obedience to the sublime
mandate of Holy Writ, " to replenish the earth and subdue it," and render it
fruitful, that it may multiply the benefits and blessings which it is capable of
yielding to man the proposed work will be speedily accomplished.
17. The hidden wealth which the progress of the work will disclose, added
to the vast supplies of materials for construction, for transportation, and for food
and raiment for the operatives upon the work, and for commerce supplies, a
considerable part of which every year waste away among the interior sections
of the western and middle States for want of a cheap conveyance to good mar-
kets, such as the proposed railroad will afford will contribute much towards the
completion and final profitable employment of the work ; supplies that would
every year be augmented by new improvements and by encouraged industry,
until they would far surpass the immediate wants of the great and increasing
influx of population and operatives upon the public works and frontier ; and, on
the completion of the work, these constantly increasing supplies would be poured
into the improved channels of cheap transportation and profitable commerce,
gradually swelling the profits of both, as the millions of tributary rills and rivu-
lets expand the mighty river into whose bosom they pour their liquid treasures.
It is believed, moreover, that the construction of the proposed railroad through
the southern, western, and Atlantic States would not fail to create the means for
the speedy completion of all the lateral branches required for every State and
seaport, by multiplying among us experienced engineers and scientific mechanics,
with habits of industry and enterprise; giving to all classes of the community
profitable employment, calculated to render them independent in their domestic
affairs, respectable and happy in peace, and formidable in war, while the money
expended would be kept in a healtful state of circulation among the farmers,
merchants, and mechanics of our interior settlements, in place of its being car-
ried off to enrich foreign merchants, or to form every year at home a new bone
of contention between the votaries of the spirit of party, such as go all lengths
for party men, regardless of the true interests and honor of the republic. And
when, during a state of war with nations surpassing us in naval strength, we
find ourselves compelled to abandon the ocean, and be deprived of our foreign
commerce the inevitable consequence of a war with any of the strong powers
of Europe, without first supplying ourselves with a fleet of steamships of war,
as well as floating batteries and the proposed railroads these roads, even while
occasionally employed in the transportation of troops from the central Stages to
the south, will take return cargoes of southern products, such as sugar, cotton,
oranges, and lemons, from the southern to the middle and northern States, from
whence they will bring return cargoes of the numerous products and manufac-
tured articles of the northern and central States needed in the south an in-
terior commercial intercourse by which the privations of our foreign commerce
would be remedied, and many of the evils of war removed, and all others greatly
mitigated. Indeed, the completion of the proposed railroads and floating bat-
terries your memorialist believes would soon effectually prevent the recurrence
of war, so long as the United States shall see fit to confine their views and
national policy to the magnanimous principle of defensive war ; as the proposed
means of national defence would give a degree of available strength, both physi-
cal .and moral, that would render the peril of an attack a perpetual source of
terror to our evil-disposed neighbors, and consequently mdral strength and secu-
rity to our beloved country.
18. It is proper in a state of peace to prepare for war. The wisest statesmen
in all civilized nations have acted upon the principle here suggested. It is time
for us to inquire what would be the consequence of our receiving the unexpected
visit of a large fleet of steamships, armed as the French fleet lately in the har-
bor of Vera Cruz were, bringing in the mouths of their cannon an unexpected
declaration of war. Much as we may rely on the unsurpassed chivalry of
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 247
our volunteer corps, such a visit could not but be attended with incalculable
mischief, without the means of defence here proposed means of defence which
will enable us to march by land from Tennessee and Kentucky to Buffalo, New
York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Norfolk, Charleston, Savannah, St. Augustine,
Pensacola, Mobile, New Orleans, or Texas, from 200,000 to 500,000 men in the
short period of three days' time ! This rapid movement would have been very
desirable, as it would have saved millions of money and thousands of valuable
lives in our former wars, and would have been very essential to our security
against a land and naval attack when we had no reason to apprehend an invasion
by fleets propelled by steam power. But now that we know many of the most
warlike nations of Europe are busily occupied in the work of preparing steam-
ships of war, we have no longer a choice in the issue whether we must or must
not prepare the means here proposed for defence against the improved elements
of destruction which we know our neighbors hold in readiness to employ against
us. We must lay aside our old obsolete military books of the last century,
such as we have borrowed from England and France, and we must profit by
the lights by which the present age, the present year is illuminated, and prepare
to defend ourselves by the agency of this mighty power, by which the invading
foe will inevitably attack us*.
19. Ancient and modern history is replete with evidences of the wisest of
governments having promptly availed themselves of the use of every description
of weapon deemed to be most formidable in war, as well as of every kind of
power applicable to the purposes of rapidly wielding armies and munitions of
war, as soon as practicable after their discovery. We need only advert here to
some few discoveries which, trifling as th$ first and third may seem, were
deemed sufficient at the time of their discovery to merit the attention of men
and monarchs of profound wisdom and genius.
1st. When the commanders of the armies of King David reported to that
veteran monarch that they had sustained heavy losses in their operations against
the Philistines, in consequence of their having employed in battle the bow and
arrow, David promptly gave orders to his commanders to avail themselves of
the discovery of this then formidable weapon, and make themselves and their
men acquainted with the use of it, "so as to place them on an equal footing
with their enemy." (See the " History of the Bible.")
2d. When in the fourteenth century an obscure monk of Germany discov-
ered gunpowder, with some of its uses in war, all the other nations of Europe
that were blessed with wise rulers hastened to avail themselves of the discovery
a discovery w^hich ere long induced all the civilized world to change their un-
wieldly weapons of war for fire-arms ; gradually laying aside their war chariots
armed with scythes, their battering-rams, with their coat of mail, and most of
their personal armor.
3d. The use of wheel carriages on improved roads added more than twenty-
five per cent, to the efficiency of an army, by enabling it to march one-fourth
further in a given time, and by carrying with it a more ample supply of artil-
lery, ammunition, and subsistence, prolonging the period of active operations,
and occasionally taking the enemy by surprise, as, by the increased celerity of
his movements, Napoleon took the enemies of France by surprise in his first
campaign into Italy.
4th. All civilized nations speedily availed themselves of the discovery of the
magnetic needle, with the inventions and improvements in ship-building, tlie
use of sails, &c. Many of the discoveries here alluded to, however, though
they contributed to facilitate the movement of troops and munitions of war,
excited little or no interest at the time of their discovery compared with that of
the application of steam power to ships and other vessels, and to vehicles of
land transportation on railroads. In these last discoveries we may well be allowed
to speak in the language of poetry, and say that
" Steam power was almighty in its birth ;"
248 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
while gunpowder, fire-arms, wheel carriages, and all former improvements in
marine structures, though partially known and in use for centuries past, have
exhibited little or nothing beyond their now apparent state of infancy until
within the last and present century. Even now no civilized nation can boast of
any discovery or improvement in fire-arms, gun-carriages, or in naval architec-
ture in anywise calculated to be of any peculiar advantage to any one nation
over another nation; while these developments of steam, with floating batteries
and railroads, are calculated to render a nation, in the position which we occupy,
at least ten times more formidable in a war of self-defence than in an offensive
war against nations of equal numerical strength, and provided with the means
here proposed. All the discoveries above referred to in the science of war have,
however, contributed much to ameliorate the condition of nations and of armies
in their conflicts and controversies, and greatly to lessen the evils of war. The
greater the improvement in this awful and sublime science, the less calamitous
and the more humane have been the results of military operations, wherever the
contending parties were equally acquainted with the progressive improvements,
and 1 had equal or nearly equal means of profiting by them. If these proposi-
tions are correct, (and history proves them to be strictly true,) where, it may be
asked, where must our improvements in the science of war, dependent on steam
power, terminate ? The wise and the good who have long cherished the pros-
pect of a blessed millenium will readily answer the question.
20. Your memorialist had long cherished the hope that some patriotic states-
man of military mind would be found at the head of the War Department, able
and willing to bring the subject of his system of national defence before the
President of the United States and the national legislature ; and in this hope
he has freely and frankly submitted to several of the heads of that department
his views upon the subject at different periods during nearly seventeen years
past, until he received from Mr. Secretary Cass the most irrefragable evidence
that the official communications and reports of your memorialist were either
misunderstood, disregarded, or disapproved. Nevertheless, assured as he has
constantly been of the practicability, propriety, and necessity of such a system
of national defence, and deeming it to be a matter of discovery, invention, and
improvement in the art of war, which should be discussed with the same freedom
as any other discovery in the useful arts, your memorialist, as the author and
inventor of the proposed system, has addressed himself freely to private as well
as public men of several different nations and of all parties, and has received in
return, from men of the highest attainments and unimpeached and unimpeach-
able patriotism, full and cordial concurrence in his every view hitherto presented
in favor of his system of national defence here set forth and explained. Far
from being discouraged at the opposition of three honorable Secretaries for ten
years in succession, he has learned from that opposition that the War Depart-
ment of the United States republic is rather a theatre of executive actions upon
political matters already settled, enacted, or ordered, than upon new discoveries,
inventions, or improvements in any branch of the art of war. He could not but
persevere, therefore, in his humble efforts to render his country some good ser-
vice in peace, as he had done in war; convinced as he is that his system soars
above the pestilential atmosphere of the evil spirit of party, as it is a system of
national defence designed to impart benefits and diffuse blessings alike through-
out every State and Territory of the republic and upon all parties.
'The oath of office taken by your memorialist, requiring him to serve the
"United States, (not a party,) requires him to act and speak in accordance with
the rules and articles of war. He has always held himself ready to risk his
life, his bread, and his fortune, for his country ; and he has the happiness of
knowing that he has risked his life for her often hundreds of times. His oath
of office does not restrain him from speaking frankly and truly in the vindication
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 249
of his motives, his conduct, his honor, and his system of national defence. To
withhold his views upon an occasion of this kind, indeed, would be virtually a
violation of his oath of office, which requires him, as a primary duty to serve
the United States honestly and faithfully against their enemies or opposers
whomsoever ; and he could not conscientiously comply with this oath, without
submitting to the national legislature every section and every paragraph con-
tained in this memorial. He feels conscious that he is right. His enemies will
not hesitate to admit that he is either right or wrong. If any member of the
national legislature believes him to be wrong, he entreats that member to insti-
tute any, the most rigid, scrutiny into the whole of the views here presented by
your memorialist. He thus respectfully solicits his friends, and fearlessly chal-
lenges his enemies, to put him in the wrong, by proving his system of national
defence to be either unnecessary or impracticable. But if he is deemed to be
right in the foregoing views, showing that his system is indispensably necessary,
and that its accomplishment is practicable, at the expense and within the period
of time here suggested, surely no time should be lost in carrying into execution
this system of national defence. As it regards the treatment he has received
from the last three heads of the department of war, personally, he has nothing
to say ; having, ever since he entered the public service, acted upon the princi-
ple that
"The real patriot bears his private wrongs
Bather than right them at the public cost."
Your memorialist desires no greater triumph over his weak or wicked calum-
niators, nor any other atonement for past injuries, than the triumph of truth
that must result from a full and perfect examination of his past life and services ;
and more especially a critical comparative review of his services in Canada
(approved by a M.adison) and his services in Florida (condemned by a Jack-
son) and more especially of his system of national defence, approved by a
Seward, a Cannon, a White, and a Lumpkin, compared with the services and
system of the party men opposed to your memorialist.
21. The discovery, by Oliver Evans, of that development of steam power by
which the locomotive and other vehicles of land transportation are propelled
upon the railroad, and by which the movement of large armies, which may be
hastened from twenty-six miles, (the day's march of Napoleon,) to three hundred
miles in one day ; and the discovery, by Robert Fulton, of that kindred develop-
ment of steam power, by which our rivers and lakes have been covered with
floating palaces and warehouses, surpassing in the velocity of their movement
anything before seen upon our waters making an easy conquest of the pre-
viously unsubdued current of the mighty Mississippi, and now proudly encoun-
tering in triumph the mountain wave of ocean ; as these discoveries were the
result of previously known developments of steam power, in its application to
mill and other labor-saving machinery, suggesting to Evans and Fulton the great
principle upon which their success was known to depend'; so it must be obvious
to every man of military mind, and to every scientific mechanic, that the dis-
coveries of these two great public benefactors must necessarily form the basis of
the system of national defence which your memorialist here offers to Congress.
Oliver Evans and Robert Fulton were, until a few years before their death, de-
nounced by thousands of learned theorists as eccentric visionary men. T^he
same class of censors have honored your memorialist with similar epithets. He
has had the satisfaction, however, to learn from some of those who thus de-
nounced him that they have since seen their error, and are now among the true
believers in the feasibility, value, and importance of his system. He adverts to
this fact, here, only to justify or excuse what he deems it to be his duty to say
ip. his own vindication, and in reference to his own past public services ; because
250 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
he can refer to no historical work or biographical memoir containing; any account
of his public services in the war of 1814, excepting such as have been distorted
by malignity or by ignorance. He is therefore constrained to say, as an act of
justice to himself, that he is the only general officer now living, who, as com-
mander-in-chief of a division, or separate army, or detached corps, ever achieved
a victory over any British army, upon any part of the Niagara frontier, in the
war of 1814 ; that he had the good fortune to command the division from which
his beloved Major General (Brown) had been taken, by reason of a severe
wound, on that frontier, in August, 1814, during twenty -three days of which
time your memorialist was actively engaged in battle, and in a brisk cannonade
and bombardment, and other severe conflicts with the British army under Lieu-
tenant General Drumrnond. In the principal battle, the lieutenant general ac-
knowledged a loss of nine hundred and five officers and men killed, wounded,
and missing, with a similar loss of nearly six hundred in the several other con-
flicts. During twenty-two days of the time, there were but few hours, from day-
light in the morning until dark in the evening, in which the British cannon shot
and shells did not present to your memorialist the most instructive exhibition of
every variety of effect of which a well-directed cannonade and bombardment
upon a very slightly and partially fortified camp, of which an unfinished bastion
and block-house formed the only tolerably fortified angle, could possibly present.
In that long conflict in which .the British forces were reported to amount to
4,200, principally regulars, and the United States forces to 2,500, near one-
fourth of which were New York and Pennsylvania volunteers under General
Peter B. Porter your memorialist is convinced he had a better opportunity
than any other general officer of the United States army ever had during the
war of being thoroughly acquainted with the effect of the enemy's shells and
cannon shot upon our stone-masonry, earthen traverses, embankments, or breast-
works. He had previously witnessed at Fort Meigs, and on the river St. Law-
rence, as well as upon Lake Erie, in the British and United States ships-of-war,
three days after Perry's glorious triumph, the effect of the enemy's and our own
cannon shot upon block-houses, ships-of-war, and other vessels, as well as on
other means of defence. The investigation of these results of some of the most
important conflicts between the United States and British troops, in the war of
1813 and 1814, added to a careful attention to the theory and practice of gun-
nery for several years prior to the war, with much attention to the subject since,
warrants your memorialist in speaking somewhat confidently, as he has, upon
the various bearings and tendencies of cannon shot and shells on floating bat-
teries, steamships of war, forts, and other means of attack and defence of sea-
ports ; and of railroads for the prompt movement of re-enforcements, as embraced
in his system of national defence here set forth and explained. For further
particulars in reference to the various conflicts referred to in this article, your
memorialist respectfully refers to the officers whom he had the honor to command
in those conflicts : among the most meritorious of whom are Paymaster General
Towson and Adjutant General Jones, now on duty at Washington city. The
names of all others will be found by referring to the Adjutant General's office.
And to show in what estimation his conduct was held by the Executive and
national legislature, your memorialist takes leave to refer to the joint resolution
of December, 1814, by which he and the officers and men of his command were
honored with a vote of thanks, and the President authorized to present to him
a gold medal. He received also from the legislatures of the great and patriotic
States of New York, Virginia, and Tennessee, similar resolutions of thanks, and
from each a gold-hilted sword of honor. With these magnificent tokens of high
approbation of his conduct, your memorialist could not but feel himself in honor
and in duty bound to exert his best faculties to serve his country faithfally in
war and in peace. With these impressions, he respectfully offers to Congress
his present system of national defence.
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 251
22. Your memorialist is convinced that the proposed means of protection con-
stitute the first and only discovery known to man, whereby a nation situated as
we arc, and acting upon the magnanimous principle of self-defence, can, without
any doubt, at a moderate expense, and by means that will in a few years of
peace repay all the expense of the work, hold in their own hands, forever, the
incontestable issue of any possible war upon her seaboard or domain, waged by
any nation, or by any such combination of empires or kingdoms as have once
dared to assume the appellation of "holy alliance;" and that any nation of our
numerical strength and military resources availing herself of the discovery,
may, if she be just and true to herself, safely assume the attitude of honest de-
fiance towards the armies of Europe, if not of every quarter of the globe ; while
the most warlike nations, neglecting the use of steam power, with railroads and
floating batteries, will be found wholly unable to maintain their independence.
In this view of the subject, it presses itself upon our attention not as a matter
of choice, but as a work of absolute necessity as a measure of self-preservation.
23. The constitutionality of the proposed system of national defence would
be left untouched by your memorialist, but for the veneration he entertains for
that sublime and sacred instrument bequeathed to us by our 'fathers of the
revolution, added to the oath he has taken to support that inestimable charter
of our free institutions. He would not willingly be deemed capable of urging
or soliciting the adoption of any measure not in accordance with the Constitution
of the United States ; and having, in common with each one of his fellow-citi-
zens, an indubitable right to judge for himself upon all questions arising upon
the different provisions of that most perfect charter of human freedom and self-
government, without confiding too much in the opinions of statesmen laboring
under the despotic influence of party discipline a despotism ever operating
upon the hopes and fears of all who tamely submit to the tyranny of such a
discipline the views which follow are respectfully submitted. The 8th section
of the 1st article of the Constitution of the United States authorizes Congress
to " declare war" and "to raise and support armies," and "to provide for call-
ing forth the militia to execute the laAvs of the Union, to suppress insurrections,
and repel invasions;" and also "to provide for organizing, arming, and dis-
ciplining the militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed
in the service of the United States, reserving to the States, respectively, the
appointment of the officers, and the authority of training the militia according
to the discipline prescribed by Congress."
Inasmuch as these important provisions of the Constitution cannot be carried
into effect without roads, and the effective defence of the republic is a work
upon which our national existence depends, the transcendent importance of this
work calls aloud for the very best roads ; and railroads being immeasurably the
best for all military purposes, they are deemed to be as fully authorized by the
Constitution of the United States as the best of rifles, or the best of cannon, or
gunpowder, or flints, or forts, are authorized, as will be seen by the last para-
graph of the above-mentioned 8th section of the Constitution, which, after par-
ticularizing the specific powers granted to Congress, as enumerated in that sec-
tion, concludes with the words which follow: "To make all laws which shall
be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers,
vested by this Constitution in the government of the United States, or in any
department or officer thereof."
A wise people, with the experience which the framers of the federal Consti-
tution had acquired in the triumphant revolutionary conflicts through which
they had then recently passed, could never have authorized a declaration of
war "to repel invasion," without making provision for the best of means for
insuring a successful and glorious termination of the war : that provision was
accordingly made in the above-recited authority given to Congress, to make all
laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution " the fore-
252 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
going powers, vested by this Constitution in the government of the United States,
or in any department or officer thereof." By this comprehensive grant of power
the national legislature has passed laws for supplying the land and naval
forces with many things not expressly named in the Constitution. Hundreds
of military roads have been made by the troops and otherwise at the expense of
the United States ; first, for the purpose of facilitating the march of the troops
to and from the places of their destination, at the rate of twenty to twenty-six
miles a day, when, without such roads, they could not have marched a quarter
of the distance without leaving behind them their cannon and baggage-train ;
and, secondly, for the use of the constantly -moving families and other travellers
to the continually-expanding border of the republic, by which simple process
thirteen new States and near thirteen millions of inhabitants have been added
to the old thirteen States of the revolution in the last sixty years. Who ever
pronounced these miserable roads to be unconstitutional 1 These roads seldom
cost more than at the rate of from fifty to one hundred dollars per mile ; and
yet these poor roads contributed more to the immediate benefit of the commu-
nity at large, during a period of peace, than any of our fortifications, which cost
from one to two millions of dollars each. Your memorialist is unable to perceive
upon what ground a military road, upon which our troops can be marched three
hundred miles in one day, can be unconstitutional, when roads upon which they
could march but twenty-six miles in a day were constitutional and proper,
(more especially when all are made by the troops themselves,) notwithstanding
the great difference in the cost of the two kinds of military roads here alluded
to. As it is obvious that the military railroads will enable our young warriors
of the central and western States to fly at the rate of three hundred miles in a
day to meet the invading foe, the constitutionality of such roads, as " necessary
and proper means for repelling invasion," cannot but be admitted by all parties,
convinced, as they must be, that we are destined in another war with any
European nation to be attacked by fleets propelled by steam power. But if, as
your memorialist respectfully asserts, our seaports cannot be defended against
an attack by foreign armies, with the co-operation of fleets propelled by steam
power, who can doubt the absolute necessity of the proposed railroads and
floating batteries ? If, indeed, then, they are indispensable, and our country
cannot be defended without them, they are strictly constitutional, as the most
rigid constructionist will admit. To make use of our common bad roads for
marching our volunteers and other troops from the central and western States
to our seaports in a state of war, or to continue the use of sails, without steam
power, to meet an invading foe with large fleets of steamships of war, would be
as unavailing and as unwise as it would be to attempt to extinguish by water
carried in a nutshell the flames by which thousands of our houses are doomed
to be enveloped in the course of a war when destitute of the proposed means
of defence, while possessing the power to obtain the best of fire-engines.
24. The apprehended expense of the proposed work constitutes the principal
objection advanced by any statesman, or by any man of military mind, whose
opinions have come to the knowledge of your memorialist. To this objection it
may be answered :
First. That the apprehended appropriations to meet the expense will be no
more than eleven millions of dollars a year for a period of six years, provided
the work is done by the army of the United States, as heretofore suggested.
Second. The employment of the army upon the work will be to the officers
and men, and to the youth' of every State and district through which the work will
extend, the best of all possible schools to prepare them for the defence of their
country ; as the officers and men so employed will have the proud satisfaction
of knowing that eveiy day's labor in this essential work of preparation will
contribute to increase their moral and physical capacities for usefulness and
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 253
domestic happiness in peace, and for a glorious triumph over the invading foe in
war.
Third. In exhibiting the cost of this system of defence, it is gratifying to
find that of the $66,000,000, which is the estimated amount required for the
seven railroads from the central States to the seaboard and northern frontier,
with five floating batteries for th^ Mississippi river at the passes, and below
New Orleans, and five others for the defence of the harbor of New York, more
than sixty-three millions of that sum will be expended for materials and work
which the interior of the United States will afford.
Fourth. The most costly material required for the work will be bar-iron for
the railways, and sheeting for the sides and tops of the floating batteries ; of
this article, not less than 500,000,000 pounds will be needed. This quantity, at
four cents, will amount to twenty millions of dollars.
Fifth. For supplying the whole of the iron, it is proposed to erect at conve-
nient places near the site of each one of the seven great railroads a foundery
and a rolling mill, for the manufacture of the iron required, upon the same
principle that armories are established by the United States for supplying the
army and navy and the militia with cannon and small arms. By these works
ample supplies of the best of iron may be obtained in season to complete the
railroads and floating batteries in the time here suggested.
We shall, in this way, lay open to the individual enterprise of the people of
the United States rich mines of wealth hitherto but little known ; and we shall
moreover relieve ourselves of the reproach to which we have for many years
been subjected the reproach of sending to Europe and expending there many
millions of dollars for iron, whilst most of our States abound with inexhaustible
supplies of this valuable metal equal to any in Europe.
25. The great revolution which steam power has produced in its application
to everything that is wafted upon the sea and that rolls upon the land, applica-
ble to the attack and defence of seaports, leaves our country absolutely desti-
tute of 'the means of defence indispensably necessary to the protection of our sea-
ports against any nation or community of men, or pirates capable of attacking
us with a respectable fleet of steamships of war, armed with the improved bat-
tering cannon of the largest calibre, without floating batteries of sufficient
strength and number to enable us to lock up our seaports and railroads extend-
ing from the central arid western States to the principal seaports, for marching
our disposable force and munitions of war of the central and western States, at
one-tenth part the expense and one-tenth part of the time that their movement
on our present bad roads would cost.
26. The floating batteries here recommended constitute the most sure and
economical means for the immediate defence of our seaports in war; and when
aided by the proposed railroads, in the rapid transportation of troops and muni-
tions of war from the central and western States to the principal seaports of
the Atlantic, southern, and northern States, aided at sea by steamships of war,
we shall thus render our means of defence complete and impregnable in war.
And on the return of peace, when all other expensive means of defence, such as
fortifications, armories, and fleets propelled by wind and sails are useless, then
our floating batteries and railroads, turned to commercial purposes, will con-
tribute to deepen our ship channels and to the improvement of our seaports, and
afford facilities to our interior commercial intercourse, which it is believed will
replace every dollar expended in carrying into effect this system of national de-
fence in from seven to ten years.
27. The floating batteries and railroads, embracing the system of national
defence here recommended, which will cost not more than eleven millions of dol-
lars a year for six years, will, it is confidently believed, by the simple process
of its construction, contribute more to qualify the army, and the young men of the
United States employed upon the proposed floating batteries and railroads, for
254 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
active military service in the national defence, than they could possibly be
qualified by the expenditure of double the estimated amount of the work paid
for giving each one of them a complete military education, according to the
system pursued at the Military Academy at West Point ; as in that system the
theory of the art of war alone is acquired, and much of that mere theory is
rendered useless by the revolution which steam power has produced in all that
relates to the movement of armies and fleets, and the attack and defence of sea-
ports; whilst in the system here recommended, the young student upon the
floating battery, as well as upon the railroad, is enabled, from the first moment
he takes in hand his book to study the theory, at once to combine with it
the practical science and manual labor of his profession; and when, at the end
of four or five years, he graduates and obtains his discharge, his mind, limbs,
and body would be alike improved and invigorated by his having learned how
to make and how to wield, and having actually assisted in making and wield-
ing floa.ing batteries and vehicles of land transportation on railroads, with
every other preparatory means for rendering them formidable in war and profita-
ble in peace. This will afford him the happiness of knowing that he has ren-
dered his country much useful public service for the public instruction which
will enable him ever after to be in the highest degree useful to his country and
his family, in war and in peace.
28. With the floating batteries and railroads here recommended, we can fear-
lessly and truly say to all Europe, and to all the world, " We ask of you nothing
but what is right, and we will submit to nothing that is wrong;" whilst, with-
out the proposed or some such system of national defence, such a declaration
might be considered as pure gasconade ; as, without floating batteries and rail-
roads to lock up and promptly re-enforce our seaports when menaced by an en-
emy, it would be in the power of any one or two of the great nations of Europe
(with two of whom we have boundary questions to settle) to enter any one or
more of our principal seaports, and destroy the richest of our cities in the course
of any day or night in the year; and in doing so, to damage our commercial
establishments to the amount of more money and property than would thrice
defray all the" cost of the proposed system of defence.
29. The opinion has been expressed that these railroads will, during a state
of peace, produce a revenue that will replace the money to be expended in
their construction in the course of seven years after their completion. But
should it be twenty, or even forty years, betore their annual revenue is found
adequate to reimburse the money expended in the construction of the work,
this delay will tend to do no wrong or injustice to our immediate or remote pos-
terity. They cannot fail to enjoy, as much -we can enjoy, the benefit of our
labor for our and their protection and prosperity. But the great question upon
which we are now to act is, not whether we have., or have not a right to tax our
posterity with a heavy debt for a work that will certainly be of great value to
us, and which is destined to be, in all human probability, still more valuable
to them; but the true question is, whether it is not our imperative duty to do
whatever is obviously necessary and proper to secure to ourselves, and also to
our posterity, the means of preserving to each and all so deeply interested
the blessings of that liberty and independence secured to us by our fathers of
the revolution, in the achivement of which a great national debt was contracted
for us to pay a debt which we have most gladly and gratefully paid. And
have we not good reason to believe that our immediate posterity will as grate-
fully pay any such debt which we may deem prudent to contract, to provide
for their use and protection, as well as our own, a system of national defence,
without which our and their liberty and independence would be left at the mercy
of whatever nations of Europe may see fit to hold in their own hands " the do-
minion of the sea?" This will be attempted, without doubt, by the great mar-
itime nation who first provides for herself a fleet of some fifty or a hundred
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 255
steamsliips-of-war, with floating batteries and railroads for securing her own sea-
ports and her interior. This is a measure, however, more likely to be under-
taken by some future combination of empires, arrogating to themselves, as the
enemies of France did in the years 1814-'15, the title of " Holy Alliance,"
than by any one nation.
30. Our unnatural mother, England, who has had the address to subsidize
most of her neighbors, and to force others to ^anction her pretension to the
dominion of the sea; and for half a century past to hold in her own hands, amid
professions of peace and good will towards us, near a third part of our greatest
eastern border State, and to hold several of their and our border savage nations
ready to take the scalps of our frontier citizens ; that enlightened nation, who
has shed more blood than any other, if not more than all other nations, to secure
to herself the dominion of the sea, has, it is believed, at this moment, among us
organized bands of spies and pioneers, assuming to themselves the plausible
character and vocation of "advocates of human freedom," more familiarly called
"abolitionists." That this same England will, in due season, avail herself of
her newborn abolitionism to secure to herself some favorite scheme of a foothold
near us, to the northeast or south of us, or to pay us for our having twice
beaten her, and more especially having, with our little giant navy, taken from
her the glory of her long contested dominion of the sea, we can have no doubt.
Without railroads and floating batteries, such as are here reccommended, with
steamships-of-war, England's banner of abolitionism may ere long be planted
in Louisiana, and in every other border State upon our seaboard, from Sabine
bay to Eastport, Maine. Thus may we soon behold England openly attempting
by force to accomplish what her spies and pioneers have long been secretly em-
ployed in preparing and hastening, a tragedy of blood and desolation, the
elements of which were principally provided and brought hither from Africa,
within the last two centuries, by the outrages and avarice of this same
England, in her efforts to monopolize the freedom of the seas. The incendiary
fires have already been lighted up at Charleston, South Carolina, and Mobile,
Alabama, and perhaps some other cities of our southern and eastern border can
testify. The system of national defence here recommended will enable us
effectually to guard against the apprehended catastrophe, It will do more. It
will, when the proper time arrives, enable us effectually to fulfil the apparent
destiny by which an overruling Providence has decreed that the African
savages should, by the simple though often abused process of the slave trade,
with a long continued pilgrimage of slavery which they are undergoing, (a sla-
very marked as it has been here, ever since the reign of England ceased among
us, with a high degree of humanity and benevolence,) when the proper time
arrives, namely, whenever, in the next century, our own caste and color shall
have increased so as to amount to two hundred millions of free white inhabitants,
then it is beleived that our statesmen will see clearly the propriety of preserving
every acre of the national domain for the support of our own caste and color;
then shall we plainly see, and cheerfully do what we can to fulfil, that apparent
destiny a destiny by which the supposed evils of the slave trade, and of the
slavery of the Africans in America, shall eventually contribute to cover that be-
nighted quarter of the globe with all the blessings of civilization and freedom.
A consummation not more devoutly to be wished, than it is certainly to be ac-
complished within the coming century ; unless, indeed, the great work is delayed
by the lawless interference of the blind votaries of abolitionism, or by the appre-
hended incapacity of the African blacks for self-government. Be this as it may,
our own United States republic of the coming century will, in all human proba-
bility before the middle of that century say 80 or 90 years hence have it in
their power to make, for the first time since our political existence, a fair experi-
ment towards the solution of the long contested problem, involving the question of
the utility of Africans when left alone as members of a free civilized community
256 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
the question upon which their possible capacity for self-government necessarily
depends ; for we shall then be able to spare from our two hundred millions of
free white population a fleet of steam ship s-of- war, with an army of missionaries
and United States volunteers, for the instruction and protection of the numerous
savages of Africa : the terms protection and instruction are here employed in
connexion with each other, because these two great engines of civilization have
always gone side by side, wherever the work of civilization has succeeded best.
That complete instruction necessary to all the purposes of civilization and self-
government, as we understand it, never was, nor ever can be perfected without
military protection.
This navy and army of protection and instruction may be accompanied and
followed by such detailed corps of the instructed blacks of our country as may
be qualified to assist in the great work : these detailed corps to continue, with the
consent of their owners, until every black in America shall find a comfortable
and a safe home in the land of his fathers. Any other system of abolition would
inevitably delay though it might not defeat the accomplishment of the great
work of giving civilization and self-government to Africa, and of giving to the
United States republic the glory of the achievement of giving civilization and
self-government to two quarters of the globe; first to America, and next to Africa.
To secure to ourselves the happiness, the imperishable glory, of giving to America
and Africa all the blessings of civilization and self-government, we have only to
do that which we are now admonished by every dictate of the first law of nature
to do quickly for our own preservation that which we possess more ample
means of accomplishing before the year 1864, than the patriotic people of New
York posessed to enable them to complete their magnificent canal before the
year 1826 namely, to locate and construct the proposed railroads and floating
batteries ; as by the simple operation of the execution of this work, we shall
insure the instruction of all the young men of our country that may be necessary
or desirable as engineers or scientific mechanics to teach millions of the youth of
South America and Africa the art of covering their country, as we shall have
covered our country, with these essential means of national defence and national
wealth. The missionary, whose sacred duty it is to extend to every people the
blessings of the Christian religion, may with perfect propriety himself learn to
be a scientific mechanic and a practical engineer. He may thus add the attracive
power of practice to theory ; and to the sublime precepts of Holy Writ, and in
teaching men how to live and how to die, teach them also how to preserve unio
their country the things that belong to their country ; and how to defend and
2Jrotcct the helpless women and little ones conjided to their care, in obedience
to the solemn mandate which should apply alike to each social and political
union most dear to us, namely : " Those ^v7tom God hath joined together, let no
man put asunder" Such will be and must be a portion of the glorious
results of our carrying into effect the proposed system of national defence. But
if we negelct it until the crowned heads of Europe shall have leisure to prepare
another holy alliance, with fifty to one hundred first-rate ships-of- war 'adapted
to the action of steam power, we may, possibly in the next ten years, see our
foreign commerce under the control of that holy alliance ; and if we resist and
who will have the hardihood to say we will not resist ? we may be told by the
vain diplomatists of that imperial combinatoin of pirates " Yankees ! the holy
alliance is graciously pleased to permit you, with your wives and children, to
seek an asylum beyond the Rocky mountains." Otherwise we must submit to
the degredation of seeing all our seaports in the possession of the invading foe;
or, of seeing our commercial cities battered down, without the possibility of our
bringing to their succor sufficient force in time for their protection.
31. To obviate any such calamity as the foregoing views suggest as possible,
your memorialist prays Congress to provide for the construction of the proposed
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 257
works. Or, should some previous experiment be desirable, lie prays that he
may be authorized by law to select and employ, under the authority of the Presi-
dent of the United States, such engineers and other officers, scientific mechanics,
artificers, ship-carpenters, and laborers, as may be necessary to enable him forth-
with to locate and construct, upon the principles and in the manner here stated,
one of the proposed principal railroads say that from Lexington, Kentucky,
to Nashville, and thence to New Orleans ; or the one from Louisville, Kentucky,
via Nashville, to Mobile ; or that from Memphis, Tennessee, to meet the one
already completed from Charleston, South Carolina, and Augusta, Georgia, to
Tennessee river. And also to construct three of the proposed floating batteries,
viz : two for the harbor of New Orleans, and one for the harbor of Mobile ; to be
constructed under his direction, in accordance with the project here recommended,
and under the immediate superintendence of such officers as he may select. And
when the floating batteries and railroads here recommended are completed, armed,
equipped, and manned, the said floating batteries and railroads to be subjected to
a scrupulous inspection by such committee of Congress, and by such other public
functionaries as may be authorized by Congress, or by the President of the
United States : provided that no military or naval officer be selected for any
such inspection, but suck as shall have been in battle and witnessed the effect of
the enemy's cannon shot upon our works of defence ; to the end that by such
inspection the precise character, value, and utility of these works of internal
improvement as means of national defence and national wealth, taken in connex-
ion with each other, may be f ally ascertained and certified. Under such author-
ity, with two regiments such as the foregoing organization contemplates, sustained
by an appropriation of three millions of dollars a year, for three years, your me-
morialist pledges himself to complete in this period of time the proposed railroad
and three floating batteries ; which will serve as an experiment upon which the
residue of the works here recommended may be safely undertaken.
32. Your memorialist having, at different times during the last seventeen
years, submitted to the proper authorities of the War Department most of his
views contained in the foregoing 30 sections, as will more fully appear from his
official reports, (which he prays may be called for and taken as a part of this
memorial,) he has thus repeatedly appealed to the War Department, but he
deeply regrets to say that his appeals have been wholly unavailing. He now
respectfully calls on every member of the national legislature who loves his
country and her institutions to sustain his efforts in preparing for her a system
of defence worthy of their fathers of the revolution, worthy of the Union, and
of the Constitution which we all stand pledged to support. Your memorialist
did not enter the service of his country for the mere selfish enjoyment of the
pomp and ephemeral honors of the field, of battle, (though he would not shrink
from a comparison of his services in battle with those of any other United
States commander now living;) his anticipated glory and great object have been
to employ her means of defence, ample as they must ever be, so effectually as
to convince her neighbors that honesty is the best policy, and that defeat must
attend their every act of invasion; and thus to direct the dements of war to the
attainment of "peace on earth and good will towards men." With these im-
pressions he deems it to be an act of common justice to himself, his wife, chil-
dren, and friends, that he should solicit the only relief to which a United States
general officer, honored as he has long been with one of the highest commands
in the army, and whose best efforts are ever due to his country's service, can
with propriety claim. He claims to be the author and inventor of the system
of national defence herein set forth and explained; he therefore prays Congress
to confirm his claim by such act or joint resolution as in their wisdom shall
seem just and right. And your memorialist, as in duty bound, will ever pray.
EDMUND P. GAINES.
NASHVILLE, December 31, 1839.
H. Rep. Com. 86 17
258 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
BUREAU OF TOPOGRAPHICAL ENGINEERS,
Washington, April 24, 1840.
SIR : I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 17th
instant, referring to this bureau a memorial of Major General Gaines, proposing
a system of national defence, of which he enumerates, as an essential part, an
extensive series of railroads. Upon these last, your directions are that I should
submit an estimate of the probable cost.
The various routes enumerated by the general will be found in the 10th
page of his memorial. According to his computation, they would embrace
about 4,200 miles; are to be laid in double track; and would cost, on an
average, $15,000 the mile.
The routes are
1st. One principal railroad from Lexington, Kentucky, to Buffalo or Platts-
burg, New York, with branches to Detroit, Albany, and Boston.
2d. One principal railroad from Knoxville, Tennessee, to Norfolk, Virginia,
or Baltimore Maryland, with branches to Richmond, Virginia, and Newbern,
North Carolina.
3d. One principal railroad from Memphis, Tennessee, to Charleston, South
Carolina, or Savannah, Georgia, with branches to Milledgeville, Georgia, and
East Florida.
4th. One principal railroad from Louisville, Kentucky, to Mobile, Alabama,
with a branch to Pensacola, Florida.
5th. One principal railroad from Lexington, Kentucky, via Nashville, to
New Orleans.
6th. One principal railroad from Memphis, Tennessee, to the Sabine ridge,
with branches to Fort Towson and Fort Gibson, Arkansas.
7th. One principal railroad from Louisville, Kentucky, or Albany, Indiana,
to St. Louis, Missouri ; and thence to the Missouri river, north of the mouth of
the Big Platte, with branches from Albany, Indiana, to Chicago, and from the
northwest angle of the State of Missouri to the upper crossing of the river
Des Moines.
As the general has given no precise indication of the courses which these
routes would pursue, or of that of their branches, I find it difficult to determine
the method by which he has ascertained the whole distance. But, taking Tan-
ner's map of the United States as a basis, drawing straight lines from po^nt to
point, without reference to the physical peculiarities of the country, and involv-
ing but once in the consideration those parts which may be common to more
than one principal route or branch, I make the distance of the whole system
equal to 5,260 miles.
This is a distance of air lines, and of course is much less than what would
be the actual distance of the roads. Their windings and sinuosities would
much increase that length, to an extent which I think may, with propriety, be
assumed as equal to 20 per cent, and which would make the entire length of
roads and branches equal to 6,310 miles.
Until surveys are made and the roads located, it is impossible to make an
accurate estimate of the cost. But, in the absence of these, by reasoning from
probabilities and from experience in cases somewhat similar, one may arrive at
a result which may be considered as a probable minimum. The general reasons
upon the supposition of a double track throughout ; but I doubt if this be
necessary. A single track, with suitable turnouts, and double lines of some
extent in particular localities, will probably be found adequate to all the objects
of the roads. As the roads are intended for great speed as well as great
weights, and are to be national roads, they must be made of great strength as
well as of durable materials ; and as they will cross the country in so many
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 259
directions, they will no doubt encounter all the causes of great expenses in such
structures rock excavation, deep-cuts, tunnels, heavy embankments, extensive
bridges, &c.
Under these considerations, and after having, in addition to my own inves-
tigations and observations, consulted some of the most experienced and most
eminent railroad engineers of our country, I find myself obliged to differ
with the general in reference to probable cost. He states the average, on the
supposition of a double track, at $15,000 per mile. I cannot, consistently with
my own views, state it at less than $20,000 the mile, for a single track and its
requisite accessories ; and this amount I desire also to be understood as my
opinion of a probable minimum.
Six thousand three hundred and ten miles, at $20,000 the mile, will amount
to $126,200,000.
There is no doubt that many advantages may be taken of the railroads
already made and being made by States and incorporated companies, in adopting
them as parts of the major general's system, but one cannot say to what extent,
until the same shall be shown by the surveys. If we suppose it, however, to
be equal to 1,000 miles, it will reduce the cost before stated to $106,200,000.
The objects of these various roads being to transport masses of troops and
munitions of war with great speed and to great distances, means of transporting
will have to be provided, and will also have to be under the exclusive control of
the government, which last condition makes it necessary that these means should
be owned by the government ; they become, then, an essential part of govern-
ment expense belonging to the system.
These means are locomotives and cars. A car that would properly accom-
modate 50 men, with their arms and necessary baggage, would probably not cost
less then $500. To transport 10,000 men, then, would require 200 cars. We
will now suppose that to move these cars with the anticipated speed will require
one locomotive to each train of ten cars ; there must, then, be twenty locomo-
tives, which, with the requisite tender to each, will not cost less than $8,000
apiece. It will, therefore, be necessary for the transportation of 10,000 men to
have 20 locomotives and tenders and 200 cars. This may be considered as an
equipment for one of the principal lines ; but as there are seven principal line? ,
and as each should be supplied with an equipment adequate to the transporta-
tion of 10,000 men, there will have to be, for the whole system of roads, not less
than 140 locomotives and tenders and 1,400 cars. Applying to these the prices
which we have stated, it will make the cost of the means of transportation equal
to $1,820,000
To which add the cost of the roads.. 106,200,000
And the whole will be 108, 020, 000
I have, in the foregoing, supposed the plan to be practicable that is, that
railroads may be made in the several directions as required by the system ; but
it is proper to add that this is a point which cannot be determined except by
accurate surveys.
Very respectfully, sir, your obedient servant,
J. J. ABERT,
Colonel Topographical Engineers.
Hon. J. R. POINSETT,
Secretary of War.
260 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
NAVY COMMISSIONERS' OFFICE, April 25, 1840.
SIR : The board of navy commissioners have the honor to acknowledge the
receipt of the letter from the honorable Secretary of War to you, of the 16th
instant, requesting your reference to them of the memorial of General E. P.
Gaines to Congress, submitting a system of national defence, "for a report as to
the practicability, expediency, and expense of the plan, so far as relates to float-
ing batteries and other naval defences;" and, in compliance with your indorse-
ment, respectfully state :
That in relation to the "expense," the board called upon the chief naval con-
structor for the probable cost of one of the floating batteries and a tow-boat, as de-
scribed in the memorial, a copy of whose report is herewith enclosed. These
estimates form the best data which the commissioners can furnish for ascertain-
ing the aggregate expense which might be necessary to carry into effect the
recommendations of General Gaines. No definite number is specified in the
memorial, nor any other information given by which that number can be ascer-
tained with any probable certainty ; and no attempt has been made to supply
the want of this information by conjecture.
There appears to be no cause for doubting that the approaches of an enemy
by water to any of our cities and seaports might be prevented by the employ-
ment of a sufficient number of floating batteries and tow-boats, prepared, armed,
and manned, as are proposed by General Gaines ; and, consequently, that the
plan is "practicable," provided the expense can be met, and a sufficient number
of men be obtained.
In considering the "expediency" of adopting the floating batteries which are
proposed in the memorial, it is necessary to estimate their comparative efficiency
with other means which may be provided, manned, and supported with an equal
expenditure of money and an equal number of troops or other persons.
The board of navy commissioners, when presenting their views upon the
general defences of the country upon former occasions, have expressed the
opinion that, upon a subject so important and evidently requiring the best com-
binations of military and naval force, it was very desirable, if not indispensable,
that it should be considered and reported upon by a board which should com-
prise officers of both branches of the service. This belief has not been changed
by any subsequent information or reflection upon the subject, and consequently
they can only offer opinions upon the relative advantages and disadvantages of
the floating batteries and fixed fortifications, which are based upon facts that
appear to be too well established, or so obvious as not to be questioned.
The system presented in the memorial is intended "to provide for the defence
of our seaports," and "to enable us to repel, by the agency of steam power,
every invasion suddenly forced upon us by fleets propelled by steam power."
To effect this object, the memorialist proposes floating batteries and attendant
tow-boats, which he has described in very general terms, and considers them
preferable to fortifications with cannon placed on the banks of rivers or inlets ;
because with such fortifications only it would be utterly impracticable to lock
up a navigable river or inlet, or to arrest the movement of a fleet thereon. He
also prefers the floating batteries to steamships-of-war, unless such ships should
be prohibited from leaving the vicinity of the ports or harbors to which they
may be assigned, From these general views it appears to be the intention of
the memorialist that each and every port or harbor shall have at all times all
the means for defence against a naval force which may be necessary to resist
attacks until re-enforcements can be obtained from the interior; and that no re-
liance, is to be placed upon the concentration of these separate floating defences
fiom contiguous ports for temporary purposes.
There can be no doubt that such a perfect system of defence would be very
desirable, if it could be obtained with a proper regard to its cost and its de-
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 261
mands upon the population of the country. But if the probable expense of the
construction and maintenance of the floating batteries and tow-boats which
would be required, and the number of persons necessary for their advantageous
use, are considered and compared with the resources of the country, reasonable
doubts n%ay be entertained whether an attempt to obtain complete security in
this manner would be expedient.
That floating batteries of some kind will be necessary as component parts of
the defences for several of our harbors is generally admitted, and it is believed
formed a part of the plan of defence as proposed by the board which had that
subject under examination shortly after the close of the last war for those pas-
sages to important points which could not be well and thoroughly commanded
by the fortifications on the land.
One of the strongest objections which is usually made to fixed fortifications
is, that there must of necessity await an attack, and leave the choice of time and
circumstances to an enemy. The greatest advantage of a floating force over
fixed fortifications consists in the greater power which they possess of choice of
position, with facility and promptitude to meet in the best manner any form of
attack with which any point may be threatened. All varieties of floating force
are liable to greater danger from shells and hot shot, and require much larger
amounts, in proportion to their original cost, to keep them in repair than fixed
fortifications.
In considering the defence of a coast so extensive as that of the United States,
and upon which there are so many positions which are important either for their
commercial, military, or political relations, the board of navy commissioners,
when they refer to the probable nature and force of the attacks which may be
expected from a naval enemy, and the physical, fiscal, and personal resources
of the country to meet them, are led to the conclusion that many points must
be left more or less exposed for many years ; and that, while permanent arrange-
ments are made for giving security to others in proportion to their importance,
the best policy for the whole country will be to extend those movable defences
which can advantageously meet an enemy at the greatest distance from his
meditated points of attack, or be soonest concentrated to retard his progress, or
to repel him from our shores.
This force, if composed of steam and ordinary ships-of-war, employed sepa-
rately, or in combination, as circumstances may require, might, it is believed, be
used (except at some few points) with at least equal advantage as the floating
batteries which are proposed in the memorial, and would possess the further
advantage of being able to meet and annoy an enemy in his progress, to con-
centrate where it should be most required, to retire, if necessary, before a supe-
rior force, and be held ready to take advantage of any accidents to the enemy,
or of any mistakes which he might commit. Its pOAvers would be active
aggressive if necessary, whilst that of the batteries proposed must necessarily
be almost wholly passive and strictly defensive.
Without entering more particularly into the general subject of national de-
fence, after a careful consideration of the employment of such floating batteries x
as are proposed in the memorial, the board are of opinion that, although a few
such or similar batteries might perhaps be useful in particular places, it would
not be expedient to adopt them generally as substitutes for fixed fortifications,
or for a floating force which should be adapted to more extensive use and capa-
ble of quicker and more rapid combinations.
The papers are herewith respectfully returned.
I have the honor to be, sir, with great respect, your obedient servant,
0. MORELS,
For the Board of Navy Commissioners
Hon. JAMES K. PAULDING,
Secretary of the Navy.
262 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
WASHINGTON, April 22, 1840.
SIR : I have read the memorial presented by Major General Gaines to Con-
gress on the defence of the coast. A part of the system proposed by the
general is the construction of heavy floating batteries, the probable cosfrof which
with their tow-boats, you require me to state. It is difficult to form an opinion
on the cost of vessels of such unusual dimensions as those proposed by General
Gaines ; and, in addition to this difficulty, there are no data given on which to
ground an estimate, excepting length and breadth, but it is believed that the
largest, battery with her tow-boats, will cost about $1,400,000, and the smallest
about $700,000. This estimate includes copper-fastening and coppering, cables,
anchors, boats, and water-casks, but does not embrace masts, spars, sails, arma-
ment, nor stores of any description.
I am, sir, respectfully, &c.,
SAMUEL HUMPHREYS.
Com. CHARLES MORRIS,
President of the Navy Board.
No. 5.
[SENATE, Ex. Doc. No. 85, 28iH CONGRESS, 2o SESSION.]
MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, COMMUNICATING
(IN COMPLIANCE WITH A RESOLUTION OF THE SENATE) A COPY OF THE
REPORT ON NATIONAL DEFENCE, MADE TO THE ENGINEER DEPARTMENT,
BY LIEUTENANT HALLECK, OF THE CORPS OF ENGINEERS.
To the Senate of the United States:
I transmit herewith the report requested by the resolution of the Senate of
the 2d of January last.
JOHN TYLER.
WASHINGTON, February 7, 1845.
WAR DEPARTMENT, February 6, 1845.
SIR: In answer to a resolution of the Senate of the United States of the 2d
ultimo, requesting the President to communicate to the Senate "a cop'y of the
report made to the engineer department on military defences of the country, by
Lieutenant Halleck, of the corps of engineers," I respectfully lay before you a
letter of the chief engineer, with a copy of the report referred to in the resolution.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
WILLIAM WILKINS,
Secretary of War.
The PRESIDENT of the United States.
FOETIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 263
ENGINEER DEPARTMENT,
Washington, February 6, 1845.
SIR : I have the honor, in compliance with the call of the Senate of the 2d
ultimo, to transmit herewith a copy of the report on national defence, made to
this department by Lieutenant H. Wager Halleck, of the corps of engineers.
Very respectfully, your most obedient,
JOSEPH G. TOTTEN,
Colonel and Chief Engineer.
Hon. WILLIAM WILKINS,
Secretary of War.
NEW YORK HARBOR, October 20, 1843.
SIR: Agreeably to your request, I transmit herewith a copy of remarks,
submitted by me some months since, to an officer of high rank in another de-
partment of the army, on "the means of national defence." These remarks are
based upon the following congressional documents :
I. Letter of the Secretary of War, (Mr. Poinsett,) transmitting a report on
national defence, &c., May 12, 1840. (House Document 206, 26th Congress,
2d session.)
II. Report on the survey of the coast, from Apalachicola to the mouth of
the Mississippi, December 17, 1841. (House Document 220, 27th Congress, 2d
session.)
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
H. WAGER HALLECK,
Lieutenant of Engineers.
Colonel J. G. TOTTEN,
Chief Engineer j Washington, D. C.
REPORT ON THE MEANS OF NATIONAL DEFENCE.
General Washington, in his annual address at the opening of Congress in
1796, dwelt on the vast importance of maintaining the country in an attitude of
defence, as the most effectual means of averting the calamities of war, adding
" that if we desire to secure peace one of the most powerful instruments of our
rising prosperity it must be known that we are AT ALL TIMES ready for war."
This precept is too valuable to be forgotten; and the fact that since it was
uttered we have once been plunged, without preparation, into a costly and
desolating war, and thrice .upon the very brink of hostilities with two of the
most powerful nations of Europe, ought to awaken us to a sense of its importance.
Washington has pointed out the best way to avoid the calamity, and the
experience of other nations has most abundantly proved the correctness of his
instruction.
Let us, then, "in peace prepare for war;" and even should this state of
preparation fail to preserve peace, it will, nevertheless, be vastly influential in
bringing the war to an early and successful conclusion. There is a great moral
effect produced by the initiation, and by a few brilliant achievements at the
outset of a campaign. Had the battles of Chippewa and Bridgewater, and the
gallant defence and sortie of Eort Erie, occurred in 1812, this disastrous and
almost disgraceful war would never have lingered till 1815.
264 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
To postpone the making of military defences till such time as they are actually
required in defence, is to waste the public money and endanger the public safety.
The closing of an avenue of approach, the security of a single road or river, or
even the strategic movement of a small body of troops, often effects in the
beginning what afterwards cannot be accomplished by large fortifications and
the most formidable armies. Had a small army in 1812, with a well fortified
depot on Lake Champlain, penetrated into Canada and cut off all re-enforcements
and supplies by way of Quebec, that country would have fallen into our posses-
sion.
In the winter of 1807 Napoleon crossed the Vistula, and advanced even to
the walls of Konigsberg, with the Austrians in his rear and the whole power of
Russia before him. If Austria had pushed forward 100,000 men from Bohemia,
on the Oder, she would, in all probability, says the best of military judges,
(Jomini,) have struck a fatal blow to the operations of Napoleon, and his army
must have been exceedingly fortunate even to regain the Rhine. But Austria
preferred remaining neutral till she could increase her army to 400,000 men.
She then took the offensive, and was beaten; whereas, with 100,000 men,
brought into action at the favorable moment, she might, most probably, have
decided the fate of Europe.
"Defensive war," says Napoleon, "does not preclude attack, any more than
offensive war is necessarily exclusive of defence ; " for frequently the best way
to counteract the enemy's operations and prevent his conquests is first to invade
and cripple him. But this can never be attempted with raw troops, ill supplied
with the munitions of war and unsupported by fortifications. Such invasions
must necessarily fail. Experience in the errors of the French revolution dem-
onstrated this. Even our own short history is not without its proof. In 1812
the conquest of Canada was determined on long before the declaration of war ;
an undisciplined army, without preparation or apparent plan, was actually put
in motion eighteen days previous to this declaration, for Detroit and the Cana-
dian peninsula ; the disastrous and disgraceful result is but too well known.
Military power may be regarded as absolute or relative the absolute force
of a nation depending on the number of its inhabitants and extent of its rev-
enues ; the relative force on its geographical and political position, the character
of its people, the nature of its government, its military organization, &c. Its
military preparations must evidently be in proportion to its resources. Wealth
constitutes both the apprehension and the incentive to invasion. Where two or
more states have equal means of war, with incentives very unequal, an equi-
librium cannot exist ; for danger and temptation are no longer opposed to each
other. The preparation of states may therefore be equal without being equiv-
alent, and the smaller of two may be most liable to be drawn into a war without
the means of sustaining it.
The geographical position of a country greatly influences the degree and
character of its military preparation. It may be bordered on one or more sides
by mountains and other obstacles calculated to diminish the probability of inva-
sion, or tne whole frontier may be wide open to attack ; the interior may be of
such a nature as to furnish security to its own army, and yet be fatal to the
enemy, should he occupy it ; or it may furnish him advantages far superior to
his own country. It may be an island in the sea, and consequently exposed
only to maritime descents events of rare occurrence in modern times.
Again : a nation may be placed between others who are interested in its secu-
rity, their mutual jealousy preventing the molestation of the weaker neighbor.
On the other hand, its political institutions may be such as to compel the others
to unite in its destruction in order to secure themselves. The republics of
Switzerland could remain unmolested in the midst of powerful monarchies ; but
revolutionary France brought upon herself the armies of all Europe.
Climate also has, undoubtedly, some influence upon military character, but it
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 265
is far less than that of education and discipline. Northern nations are said to
be naturally more phlegmatic and sluggish than those of warmer climates ; and
yet the armies of Gustavus Adolphus, Charles XII, and Suwarrow have shown
themselves sufficiently active and impetuous, while the Greeks, Romans, and
Spaniards, in the times of their glory, were patient, disciplined, and indefatigable,
notwithstanding the reputed fickleness of ardent temperaments.
While, therefore, the -permanent military defences of a nation must be sub-
ordinate to its resources, position, and character, they can in no case be dispensed
with. No matter how extensive or important the temporary means that may be
developed as necessity requires, there must be some force kept in a constant
state of efficiency, in order to impart life and stability to the system. The one
can never properly replace the other ; for while the former constitutes the basis,
the latter must form the main body of the military edifice which, by its strength
and durability, will offer shelter and protection to the nation, or, if the archi-
tecture and materials be defective, crush and destroy in its fall.
The temporary means of defence may be classed as follows :
1st. An increase of the regular army and regular marine.
2d. The employment of irregular or militia forces, and the authorization of
privateering, or a resort to "marque and reprisal."
3d. An increase of military munitions ana " logistique," and the use of tem-
porary fortifications.
I. Much energy and enterprise will always be imparted to an army by the
addition of new troops. The strength thus acquired is sometimes in a far
greater ratio than the increase of numbers. But these new elements are of
3iemselves far inferior to the old ones in discipline and steady courage and per-
severance. No general can rely on the accuracy of their movements in the ope-
rations of a campaign, and they are exceedingly apt to fail him at the most
critical moment on the field of battle. The same holds true with respect to
sailors inexperienced in the discipline and duties of a man-of-war. There is
this difference, however : an army obtains its recruits from men totally unac-
quainted with military life, while a navy, in case of sudden increase, is mainly
supplied from the merchant marine with professional sailors, who, though unac-
quainted with the use of artillery, &c., on shipboard, are familiar with all the
other duties of sea life, and not unused to discipline. Moreover, raw seamen
and mariners, from being under the immediate eye of their officers in time of
action, and without the possibility of escape, fight much better than troops of
the same character on land. If years are requisite to make a good sailor, surely
an equal length of time is necessary to perfect the soldier ; and no less skill,
practice, and professional study, are required for the proper direction of armies
than for the management of fleets. The relative hardships and dangers encoun-
tered by these two arms of defence are thus described by Napoleon, in his own
memoirs : " War by land destroys a greater number of men than maritime war,
being more perilous. The sailor, in a squadron, fights only once in a campaign ;
the soldier fights daily. The sailor, whatever may be the fatigues and dan-
gers attached to his element, suffers much less than the soldier ; he never en-
dures hunger and thirst ; he has always with him his lodging, his kitchen, his
hospital, and his medical stores. The naval forces in the service of France and
England, where cleanliness is preserved by discipline, and where experience has
taught all the measures to be adopted for the preservation of health, are less
subject to sickness than land forces. Besides the dangers of battles, the sailor
has to encounter those of storms ; but art has so materially diminished the lat-
ter that they cannot be compared to those which occur upon land, and the pop-
ular insurrections, assassinations, and surprises by the enemy's light troops, to
which the soldier is always exposed."
Again, in the council of state, in 1802, to a remark of M. Thurguet, that
" much longer time is required to form a sailor than a soldier; the latter may be
266 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
trained to all his duties in six months" Napoleon replied: "There never was
a greater mistake ; nothing can be more dangerous than to propagate such opin-
ions ; if acted upon, they would speedily lead to the dissolution of our army.
At Jemappe there were 50,000 French against 9,000 Austrians ; during the first
four years of the war, all the hostile operations were conducted in the most
ridiculous manner. It was neither the volunteers nor the recruits who saved
the republic; it was the 180,000 old troops of the monarchy, and the discharged
veterans whom the revolution impelled to the frontiers. Part of the recruits
deserted, part died ; a small portion only remained, who, in process of time,
formed good soldiers. Why have the Romans done such great things 1 Because
six years' instruction were, with them, required to make a soldier. A legion,
composed of 3,000 such men, was worth 30,000 ordinary troops. With 15,000
men, such as the guards, I would anywhere beat 40,000."
II. While all confess the value and importance of a militia force as an aux-
iliary and temporary means of defence, there are some who think it capable of
competing with regulars in the open field, and others who, for the purpose of
making political capital, loudly proclaim all other means of security to be super-
fluous, nay, dangerous and unconstitutional !
There are instances where disorganized and frantic mobs, animated by patriotic
enthusiasm, have gained the most brilliant victories. Here, however, extraor-
dinary circumstances supplied the place of order, and produced an equilibrium
between forces that otherwise would have been very unequal; but, in almost
every instance of this kind, the loss of the undisciplined army has been unneces-
sarily great, human life being substituted for skill and order. But victory, even
with such a drawback, cannot often attend the banners of newly-raised and dis-
orderly forces. If the captain and crew of a' steamship knew nothing of navi-
gation, and had never been at sea, and the engineer were totally unacquainted
with his profession, could we expect the ship to cross the Atlantic in safety, and
reach accurately her destined port? Would we trust our lives and the honor of
our country to their care ? Would we not say to them : first make yourself ac-
quainted with the principles of your profession ; the use of the compass, and the
means of determining whether you direct your course upon a ledge of rocks or
into a safe harbor? War is not, as some seem to suppose, a mere game of chance.
Its principles constitute one of the subliinest of modern sciences ; and the gen-
eral who understands the art of rightly applying its rules, and possesses the
means of carrying out its precepts, may be morally certain of success.
History furnishes abundant proofs of the impolicy of relying upon undisci-
plined forces in the open field. Almost every page of Napier's classic History
of the Peninsular War contains striking examples of the useless waste of life
and property by the Spanish militia, while with one-quarter as many regulars,
at a small fractional part of the actual expense, the French might have been
repelled at the outset, or have been driven, at any time afterwards, from the
peninsula. At the beginning of the French revolution the regular army was
abolished, and the citizen soldiery, who were established throughout the kingdom
on the 14th of July, 1789, relied upon, exclusively, for the national defence.
"But these 3,000,000 of national guards," says Jomini, the great historian of
the revolution, "though good supporters of the decrees of the assembly, were,
nevertheless, useless for re-enforcing the army beyond the frontiers, and utterly
incapable of defending their own firesides." Yet no one can ever question their
individual bravery and patriotism ; for, when reorganized, disciplined, and prop-
erly directed, they put to flight the best troops in Europe. At the first outbreak
of this revolution, the privileged classes of other countries, upholding crumbling
institutions and rotten dynasties, rushed forth against the maddened hordes of
French democracy. The popular power, springing upward by its own elasticity
when the weight of political oppression was removed, soon became too wild and
reckless to establish itself on any sure basis, or even to provide for its own pro-
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 267
tection. If the attacks of the enervated enemies of France were weak, so also
feeble were her own efforts to resist these attacks. The republican armies re-
pelled the ill-planned and ill-conducted invasion by the Duke of Brunswick
but it was by the substitution of human life for preparation, system, and skill ;
enthusiasm supplied the place of discipline ; robbery produced military stores ;
and the dead bodies of her citizens formed epaulements against the enemy. Yet
this was but the strength of weakness, the aimless struggle of a broken and
disjointed government; and the new revolutionary power was fast sinking away
before the combined opposition of Europe, when the great genius of Napoleon,
with a strong arm and iron rule, seizing upon the scattered fragments, and bind-
ing them together in one consolidated mass, made France victorious, and seated
himself on the throne of empire.
No people in the world ever exhibited a more general and enthusiastic patriot-
ism than the Americans during the war of our own revolution; and yet our
army received, even at that time, little or no support from the militia. The
letters and reports of Washington, and his highest officers, are filled with proofs
of this. The following brief extracts are from Washington's letters to the
President of Congress, December, 1776:
"The saving in the article of stores, provisions, and in a thousand other
things, by having nothing to do with the militia, unless in cases of extraordinary
exigency, and such as could not be expected in the common course of events,
would amply support a large army, which, well officered, would be daily im-
proving, instead of continuing a destructive, expensive, and disorderly mob."
" In my opinion, if any dependence is placed on the militia another year, Con-
gress will be deceived. When danger is a little removed from them, they will
not turn out at all. When it comes home to them, the well-affected, instead of
flying to arms to defend themselves, are busily employed in removing their fami-
lies and effects ; whilst the disaffected are concerting measures to make their
submission, and spread terror and dismay all around, to induce others to follow
their example. Daily experience and abundant proofs warrant this information."
"Short enlistments, and a mistaken dependence upon the militia, have been
the origin of all our misfortunes and the great accumulation of our debt."
" The militia come in, you cannot tell how ; go, you cannot tell when ; and act,
you cannot tell where ; consume your provisions, exhaust your stores, and leave
you at last at a critical moment."
These remarks of Washington will not be found too severe, if we remember
the conduct of our militia in many an open field of the revolutionary war and
of that of 1812.
But there is another side to this picture. We can point to the defence of
Charleston, Mobile, New Orleans, Fort McHenry, Stonington, Niagara, and
Plattsburg, in proof of what may be accomplished by militia, in connexion with
fortifications. These examples most fully demonstrate the great value of a
militia, when properly employed, as a defence against invasion. With fortifica-
tions, they constitute a grand military reserve, upon which we must always fall
back in cases of pressing emergency. But we must not forget that, to call this
force into the open field to take the mechanic from his shop, the merchant from his
counter, and the farmer from his plough, will necessarily be attended with an im-
mense sacrifice of human life. The lives lost on the battle-field are not the only
ones ; militia, being unaccustomed to exposure, and unable to supply their own
wants with certainty and regularity, contract diseases, which occasion, in every
campaign, a most frightful mortality.
There is a vast difference in the cost of supporting regulars and a militia, as
ours is now organized. The late Secretary of War, in a report to Congress,
says that the expenses of the latter "invariably exceed those of the regular
forces at least three hundred per cent.;" and that 55,000 militia were called
into service during the Black Hawk and Florida wars, and that " 30,000,000 of
268 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
dollars have been expended in these conjlicfsf" Facts -like these should awaken
us to the necessity of reorganizing and disciplining this arm of defence.
Privateers bear to the regular navy somewhat the same relation that the
militia do to the regular army. In the war of 1812 they were of considerable
advantage in capturing enemy vessels and destroying their commerce.
III. In reference to the influence of field fortifications, railroads, canals, &c.,
on the operations of a campaign, we will only remark that the vast changes
which have been made since our last war, in the facilities of locomotion, render
doubly imperative the duty of military preparation. Surrounded as our country
is by disciplined forces, capable of striking at any moment a deadly blow at the
prosperity of our large cities, our government cannot, but with the deepest
guilt, neglect the means of averting such a calamity.
We may regard as permanent means of defence
1st. The army.
2d. The navy.
3d. Fortifications.
The first two of these could hardly be called permanent, if we were to regard
merely their personnel or materiel; but, looking upon them as institutions or
organizations, they present all the characteristics of durability. They are
sometimes subjected to very great and radical changes. By the hot-house
nursing of designing ambition or rash legislation, they may become overgrown
and dangerous ; or the storms of popular delusion may overthrow and apparently
sweep them away ; but they will immediately spring up again in some form or
other, so deeply are they rooted in the organization of political institutions.
I. The importance of maintaining a permanent military force has 'already
been alluded to in speaking of the equilibrium of national power. An army
should always be kept within the limits of the nation's wants ; but pity for a
country which reduces it in numbers or support, so as to degrade its character
or endanger its organization. "A government," says one of the best historians
of the age, "which neglects its army, under whatsoever pretext, is a govern-
ment culpable in the eyes of posterity ; for it is preparing humiliations for its
flag and its country, instead of laying the foundation for its glory."
On this point, Mr. B. F. Butler, formerly Acting Secretary of War, remarks :
" Our experience, as an independent state, has clearly shown that a permanent
force, large enough to keep in check our savage neighbors, to fulfil towards
them our treaty stipulations, and to garrison our more important fortifications,
and capable of furnishing a considerable body of instructed officers qualified to
organize, in case of need, an efficient army, is indispensable to the preservation
of peace on our borders and with other nations. The history of our relations
with the Indian tribes, from its beginning to the present hour, is one continued
proof of this remark ; and for a long series of years the treatment we received
from European powers was a most humiliating illustration of its truth. Twice
we were compelled to maintain, by open war, our quarrel with the principal
aggressors ; and the last of these conflicts, from the causes which provo*ked it,
as well as from its severity and length, well deserves the appellation sometimes
given to it of a second war of independence. After many years of forbearance
and negotiation, our claims in other cases were at length amicably settled ; but,
in one of the most noted of these cases, it was not without much delay and im-
minent hazard of war that the execution of the treaty was finally enforced.
No one acquainted with these portions of our history can hesitate to ascribe
much of the wantonness and duration of the wrongs we endured to a knowl-
edge on the part of our assailants of the scantiness and inefficiency of our mili-
tary and naval force."
In a report on this subject, Mr. Calhoun says : " The organization of the
army ought to be such as to enable the government, at the commencement of
hostilities, to obtain a regular force, adequate to the emergencies of the country,
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 269
f.
properly organized and prepared for actual service. It is thus only that we
can be in the condition to meet the first shocks of hostilities with unyielding
firmness, and to press on an enemy while our resources are yet unexhausted.
But if, on the other hand, disregarding the sound dictates of reason and experi-
ence, we should in peace neglect our military establishment , we must, with a
powerful and skilful enemy, be exposed to the most distressing calamities"
In another able report to Congress, in 1818, Mr. Calhoun demonstrated that
great danger would result from reducing the then existing military establishment,
which was in all near 13,000 men. Nevertheless, this reduction took place in
1821, and we were soon made to suffer the consequences. It is stated, on high
authority, "that if there had been two regiments in position at Jefferson Bar-
racks, near St. Louis, in 1832, the war with Black Hawk, which cost the country
$3,000,000, would have been easily avoided; and it cannot be doubted that the
scenes of devastation and savage warfare, which overspread the Floridas for
nearly seven years, would have been avoided, and millions saved, if two regi-
ments had been available."
Congress, though late, became convinced of the impolicy of departing from
the organization recommended by Mr. Calhoun, and in the successive acts of
1833, 1836, and 1838, restored the number to about 12,000. But the Congress of
1842-'43 have again reduced the aggregate number to between 7,000 and 8,000.
A singular feature of this reduction was, that while it discharged, without
the power of re-enlisting them, the veteran non-commissioned officers and pri-
vates of the last war, the raw recruits had to be retained thus depriving the
army of its very best material.
II. Our remarks on the duty of government to support an army are equally
applicable to the support of the navy. It, too, has important duties both in
peace and in war, and its healthful organization should be attended to with
zealous care. But it also has had its vicissitudes within the last few years.
The personnel of the navy, however, has escaped much more fortunately
than that of the army. Its organization has been somewhat improved, and its
numbers and support left untouched.
The pay proper of the navy (including marines) for the fiscal year of 1843
is $2,917,280 15; that of the army, for the same period, is $1,313,370. The
appropriations made for the support of the navy (including marines) for the
fiscal year of 1843, including pay, provisions, arms, fuel, clothing, commutation,
hospital stores, transportation, increase, repairs, &c., of ships, repairs and im-
provement of docks, navy yards, and arsenals, instruments, clerks, printing, and
other contingencies, amount in all to $5,586,757. The whole appropriation for
the army, for the same period, including pay, provisions, arms, clothing, fuel,
quarters, commutation, transportation of troops and supplies, forage, horses,
building and repairs of quarters, parade grounds, camps, armories, arsenals, the
manufacture of cannon for the army and fortifications, and arms for the militia,
the collection of materials for powder, &c., clerks, instruments, printing, postage,
and other contingencies, amount in all to $3,965,768 60.
III. Permanent fortifications differ in many of their features from either of
the two preceding elements of defence. They are passive in their nature, yet
possess all the conservative properties of an army or navy, and, through these
two, contribute largely to the active operations of a campaign. When once con-
structed they require but little expenditure for their support. In time of peace
they withdraw no valuable citizens from the useful occupations of life. Of
themselves they can never exert an influence dangerous to public liberty ; but
as the means of preserving peace, and as obstacles to an invader, their influence
and power are immense. While contributing to the economical support of a
peace establishment by furnishing drill grounds, parades, quarters, &c., and to
its efficiency still more by affording facilities both to the regulars and militia for
that species of artillery practice so necessary in the defence of water frontiers,
270 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
they also serve as safe depots of arms, and the immense quantity of material
and military munitions so indispensable in modern warfare. These munitions
usually require much time, skill, and expense in their construction, and it is of
vast importance that they be preserved with the utmost care.
Maritime arsenals and depots of naval and military stores on the sea-coast
are more particularly exposed to capture and destruction. Here an enemy can
approach by stealth, striking some sudden and fatal blow before any effectual
resistance can be organized. But, in addition to the security afforded by harbor
fortifications to public property of the highest military value, they also serve to
protect the merchant shipping and the vast amount of private wealth which a
commercial people always collect at these points. They furnish safe retreats
and means of repair for public vessels injured in battle or by storms, and to
merchantmen a refuge from the dangers of the sea or the threats of hostile
fleets. Moreover, they greatly facilitate our naval attacks upon the enemy's
shipping; and if he attempt a descent, their well-directed fire will repel his
squadrons from our harbors, and force his troops to land at some distant and
unfavorable position.
The three means of permanent defence which we have mentioned are of
course intended to accomplish the same general object; but each has its distinct
and proper sphere of action, and neither can be regarded as antagonistical to the
others. Any undue increase of one, at the expense of the other two, must
necessarily be followed by a corresponding diminution of national strength. It
does not follow, however, that all must be maintained upon the same footing.
The position of the country and the character of the people must determine
this. England, from her insular position, and the extent of her commerce,
must maintain a large navy ; a large army is also necessary for the defence of
her own sea-coasts and the protection of her colonial possessions. Her men-of-
war secure a safe passage for her merchant vessels, and they transport her
troops in safety through all seas, and thus contribute much to the acquisition
and security of colonial territory. France has less commerce, and but few
colonial possessions. She has a great extent of sea-coast, but her fortifications
secure it from maritime descents ; her only accessible points are on the land
frontiers. Her army and fortifications, therefore, constitute her principal means
of defence. The United States possess no colonies; but they have a sea-coast
of 3,000 miles, with numerous bays, estuaries, and navigable rivers, which ex-
pose our most populous cities to maritime attacks. The northern land frontier
is 2,000 miles in extent ; and in the west our territory borders on foreign posses-
sions for some two or three thousand miles more.
The principal attacks we have had to sustain, either as colonies or States, from
civilized foes, have come from Canada. As colonies, we were continually en-
countering difficulties and dangers from the French possessions. In the war of
the revolution, it being one of national emancipation, the military operations
were more general throughout the several States; but, in the war of 1812, the
attacks were confined to the northern frontier, and a few exposed points along
the coast. In these two contests with Great Britain, Boston, New York, Phila-
delphia, Baltimore, Washington, Charleston, Savannah, Mobile, and New Or-
leans, being within reach of British naval power, and offering the dazzling at-
traction of rich booty, have each been subjected to powerful assaults.
Similar attacks will undoubtedly be made in any future war with England.
An attempt at permanent lodgement would be based either on Canada or a
servile insurrection in the southern States. The former project, in a military
point of view, offers the greatest advantages, and probably the latter would be
resorted to merely for effecting a diversion. But, for inflicting upon us a sudden
and severe injury by the destruction of large amounts of public and private
roperty, our seaport towns offer inducements not likely to be disregarded.
" is mode of warfare, barbarous though it is, will certainly attend a conflict
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 271
with any maritime power. How can we best prepare, in time of peace, to repel
these attacks]
To furnish an answer to this question, a joint commission, of our most dis-
tinguished military and naval officers, was formed soon after the war of 1812.
To the labors of this board, whose investigations were continued for several
years, we owe our present system of sea-coast defence. The details of this
system received some additions and alterations by a board of officers appointed
by President Van Buren in 1839. Their report constitutes one of the docu-
ments which form the basis of these remarks.
This system has received the approbation of the several Presidents, and,
(with one apparent exception,*) of all the Secretaries of War, and the highest
military authorities of the land. The fluctuating state of the public finances,
however, has much delayed the completion of the project. When the treasury
was full to overflowing, Mr. Benton strongly advocated the appropriation of a
sum sufficient for the gradual construction of these works of permanent defence.
But Congress preferred turning this stream into the already swollen channels of
trade and speculation. We know the consequences. For a part of two years
the public works were mostly suspended. Mechanics and laborers on our forti-
fications were discharged. The works themselves, suspended in the middle of
their construction, were much injured by exposure, and the total cost of their
construction nearly doubled.
Some persons, from a partial or superficial view of the subject, from self-inter-
est, or from entire ignorance of the principles of the military art, have pro-
claimed opinions, in public speeches and through the newspapers of the day,
decrying all works of defence as inexpedient and useless. Their objections to
the use of permanent works of national defence may be summed up as follows :
1. That fortifications are useless as a defence of the sea-coast, inasmuch as
our maritime cities and arsenals can be better and more economically secured
by a home squadron; land batteries being unable to cope, gun for gun, with a
naval force.
2. That, on a land frontier, they are not only useless, but actually injurious,
inasmuch as their garrisons must weaken the active army, and fetter its move-
ments. That the fundamental principle of modern military science, as developed
by Napoleon, celerity of movement, is wholly .incompatible with the use of forti-
fications.
Let us examine each of these objections separately.
1. To prove the absurdity of relying exclusively upon naval means for sea-
coast defence, it might be sufficient to refer to the written opinions of our high-
est naval officers themselves ; but, as their reports are not within reach of easy
reference, we shall proceed to discuss the general principles upon which these
opinions were founded.
We have already alluded to the impossibility of substituting one means of
defence for another. The efficiency of the bayonet can in no way enable us to
dispense with artillery, nor the value of engineer troops in the passage of rivers
and the attack and defence of forts render cavalry the less necessary in other
operations of a campaign. To the navy alone must we look for the defence of
our shipping upon the high seas ; but it cannot replace fortifications in the pro-
tection of our harbors, bays, rivers, arsenals, and commercial towns.
Let us take a case in point. For the defence of New York city it is deemed
highly important that the East river should be closed to the approach of a hos-
tile fleet at least fifteen or twenty miles from the city, jo that an army landed
there would have to cross the Westchester creek, the Bronx, Harlem river, and
The apparent exception to which we allude is the report of 1836, in which the system
is approved, bat objections made to the extent of its application.
272 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
the defiles of Harlem heights obstacles of great importance in a judicious de-
fence. Throg's Neck is the position selected for this purpose ; cannon placed
there not only command the channel, but, from the windings of the river, sweep
it for a great distance above and below. No other position, even in the channel
itself, possesses equal advantages. Hence, if we had only naval means of de-
fence, it would be best, were such a thing possible, to place the floating defences
themselves on this point. Leaving entirely out of consideration the question of
relative power, position alone would give the superior efficiency to the fort.
But there are other considerations no less important than that of position. Fort
Schuyler can be garrisoned and defended in part by the same militia force which
will be employed to prevent the march of the enemy's army on the city. On
the other hand, the crews of the floating defences must be seamen ; they will
consequently be of less value in the subsequent land operations. Moreover,
forts, situated as this is, can be so planned as to bring to bear upon any part of
the channel a greater number of guns than can be presented by any hostile
squadron against the corresponding portion of the fort. This result can be ob-
tained with little difficulty in narrow channels, and an approximation to it is not
incompatible with the defence of the broader estuaries.
We will suppose that there are no such points of land in the inlets to our
harbor, and that we rely for defence upon a naval force exclusively. Let us
leave out of consideration the security of all our other harbors and our com-
merce on the high seas, and also the importance of having at command the
means of attacking the enemy's coast in the absence of his fleet. We take the
single case of the attack being made here where our fleet is assembled. Now,
if this fleet be equal in number to the enemy, the chances of success may be
regarded as equal; if inferior, the chances are against us for an attacking force
would probably be of picked men, and of the best material. But here the con-
sequences of victory are very unequal ; the enemy can lose his squadron only,
while we put in peril both our squadron and the objects it is intended to defend.
If we suppose our own naval force superior to that of the enemy, the defence of
this harbor would, in all respects, be complete, provided this force never left the
harbor. "But, then, all the commerce of the country, upon the ocean, must be
left to its fate ; and no attempt can be made to react offensively upon the foe,
unless we can control the chances of finding the enemy's fleet within his ports,
and the still more uncertain chance of keeping him there; the escape of a single
vessel being sufficient to cause the loss of our harbor."
These remarks are based upon the supposition that we have but a single harbor,
whereas we have many of them, and all must be equally defended, for we know
not to which the enemy will direct his assaults. If he come to one in our ab-
sence, his object is attained without resistance; or, if his whole force be concen-
trated upon one but feebly defended, we involve both fleet and harbor in inevi-
table defeat and ruin. Could our fleet be so arranged as to meet these enter-
prises ? " As it cannot be denied that the enemy can select the point of attack
out of the whole extent of coast, where is the prescience that can indicate the
spot ? And if it cannot be foretold, how is that ubiquity to be imparted that
shall always place our fleet in the path of the advancing foe 1 Suppose we at-
tempt to cover the coast by cruising in front of it, shall we sweep its whole
length a distance scarcely less than that which the enemy must traverse in
passing from his coast to ours? Must the Gulf of Mexico be swept as well as
the Atlantic, or shall we give up the Gulf to the enemy 1 Shall we cover the
southern cities, or give them up also 1 We must unquestionably do one of two
things either relinquish a great extent of coast, confining our cruisers to a small
portion only, or include so much that the chances of intercepting an enemy
would seem to be out of the question."
" On the practicability of covering even a small extent of coast by cruising
in front of it or, in other words, the possibility of anticipating an enemy's
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 273
operations, discovering the object of movements of which we get no glimpse
and hear no tidings, and seeing the impress of his footsteps on the surface of
the ocean it may be well to consult experience."
The naval power of Spain under Philip II was almost unlimited. With the
treasures of India and America at his command, the fitting out of a fleet of 150
or 200 sail to invade another country was no very gigantic operation. Never-
theless, this naval force was of but little avail as a coast defence. Its efficiency
for this purpose was well tested in 1596. England and Holland attacked Cadiz
with a combined fleet of 170 ships, which entered the bay of Cadiz without, on
its approach to their coast, being once seen by the Spanish navy. This same
squadron, on its return to England, passed along a great portion of the Spanish
coast without ever meeting the slightest opposition from the innumerable Spanish
floating defences.
In 1744, a French fleet of twenty ships, and a land force of 22,000 men,
sailed from Brest to the English coast, without meeting with any opposition
from the superior British fleet which had been sent out, under Sir John Norris,
on purpose to intercept them. The landing of the troops was prevented by a
storm, which drove the fleet back upon the coast of France to seek shelter.
In 1755, a French fleet of twenty-five sail of the line, and many smaller
vessels, sailed from Brest for America. Nine of these soon afterwards returned
to France, and the others proceeded to the Gulf of St. Lawrence. An English
fleet of seventeen sail of the line and some frigates had been sent out to intercept
them ; but the two fleets passed each other in a thick fog, and all the French
vessels except two reached Quebec in safety.
In 1759, a French fleet, blockaded in the port of Dunkirk by a British force
under Commodore Bags, seizing upon a favorable opportunity, escaped from the
enemy, attacked the coast of Scotland, made a descent upon Carrickfergus, and
cruised about till February, 1760, without meeting a single British vessel,
although sixty-one ships-of the-line were then stationed upon the coasts of
England and France, and several of these were actually in pursuit.
In 1796, when the French attempted to throw the army of Hoche into Ireland,
the most strenuous efforts were made by the British navy to intercept the French
fleet in its passage. The channel fleet, of near thirty sail of the line, under
Lord Bridgeport, was stationed at Spithead; Sir Roger Curtis, with a smaller
force, was cruising to the westward; Vice- Admiral Colpoys was stationed off
Brest, with thirteen sail of the line; and Sir Edward Pellew (afterwards Lord
Exmouth) watched the harbor, with a small squadron of frigates. Notwith-
standing this triple floating bulwark, as it was called one fleet on the enemy's
coast, a second in the Downs, and a third close on their own shores the French
fleet of forty-four vessels, carrying a land force of 25,000 men, reached Bantry
bay in safety! This fleet was eight days on the passage, and three more in
landing the troops ; and most of the vessels might have returned to Brest in
safety, had it not been for the disasters by storms ; for only one of their whole
number was intercepted by the vast naval force which England had assembled
for that express object. "The result of this expedition," says Alison, in his
history of Europe, "was pregnant with important instructions to the rulers of
both countries. To the French, as demonstrating the extraordinary risks which
attend a maritime expedition, in comparison with a land campaign ; the small
number of forces which can be embarked on board even a great fleet; and the
unforeseen disasters which frequently, on that element, defeat the best concerted
enterprises. To the English, as showing that the empire of the seas does not
always afford security against invasion; that, in the face of superior maritime
forces, her possessions were for sixteen days at the mercy of the enemy; and
that neither the skill of her sailors, nor the valor of her armies, but the fury of
the elements, saved them from danger in the most vulnerable part of their
dominions.
H. Rep. Com. 86 18
274 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
"While these considerations are fitted to abate the confidence in invasion,
they are calculated, at the same time, to weaken an overweening confidence in
naval superiority, and to demonstrate that the only base on which certain reli-
ance can be placed, even by an insular power, is a well-disciplined army and
the patriotism of its own subjects."
Subsequent events still further demonstrated the truth of these remarks. In
the following year, a French squadron of two frigates and two sloops passed
the British fleets with perfect impunity, destroyed the shipping in the port of
Ilpacombe, and safely landed their troops on the coast of Wales. Again : in
1798, the immense British naval force failed to prevent the landing of General
Humbert's army in the bay of Killala; and, in the latter part of the same year,
a French squadron of nine vessels and 3,000 men escaped Sir J. B. Warren's
squadron, and safely reached the coast of Ireland. As a further illustration,
we quote from the report of the board on national defence, in 1839.
The Toulon fleet, in 1798, consisting of about twenty sail of the line and
twenty smaller vessels-of-war, and numerous transports, making, in all, 300 sail
and 40,000 troops, slipped out of port and sailed to Malta. " It was followed
by Nelson, who, thinking correctly that they were bound for Egypt, shaped his
course direct for Alexandria. The French, steering towards Caudia, took the
more circuitous passage ; so that Nelson arrived at Alexandria before them, and,
not finding them there, returned by way of Caramania and Candia, to Sicily,
missing his adversary in both passages. Sailing again for Alexandria, he found
the French fleet at anchor in Aboukir bay, and, attacking them there, achieved
the memorable victory of the Nile. When we consider the narrowness of this
sea ; the numerous vessels in the French fleet ; the actual crossing of the two
fleets on a certain night; and that Nelson, notwithstanding, could see nothing
of the enemy himself, and hear nothing of them from merchant vessels, we may
judge of the probability of waylaying our adversary on the broad Atlantic.
"The escape of another Toulon fleet in 1805; the long search for them in
the Mediterranean by the same able officer; the pursuit in the West Indies;
their evasion of him amongst the islands ; the return to Europe ; his vain efforts
subsequently, along the coast of Portugal, in the bay of Biscay, and off the
English channel; and the meeting at last at Trafalgar, brought about only
because the combined fleets, trusting to the superiority that the accession of
several re-enforcements had given, were willing to try the issue of a battle
these are instances, of many that might be cited, to show how small is the
probability of encountering upon the ocean an enemy who desires to avoid a
meeting, and how little the most untiring zeal, the most restless activity, the
most exalted professional skill and judgment, can do to lessen the adverse
chances. For more than a year, Nelson most closely watched his enemy, who
seems to have got out of port as soon as he was prepared to do so, and without
attracting the notice of any of the blockading squadron. When out, Nelson,
perfectly in the dark as to the course Villeneuve had taken, sought for him in
vain on the coast of Egypt. Scattered by tempests, the French fleet again took
refuge in Toulon; whence it again put to sea, when refitted and ready, joining
the Spanish fleet at Cadiz.
" On the courage, skill, vigilance, and judgment, acceded on all hands to belong
in a pre-eminent degree to the naval profession in this country, this system of
defence relies to accomplish, against a string of chances, objects of importance
so great that not a doubt of misgiving as to the result is admissible. It de-
mands of the navy to do perfectly, and without fail, that which, to do at all,
seems impossible. The navy is required to know the secret purposes of the
enemy, in spite of distance, and the broken intercourse of a state of war, even
before these purposes are known to the leader who is to execute them ; nay,
more, before the purpose itself is formed. On an element where man is but the
sport of storms, the navy is required to lie in wait for the foe at the exact spot
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 275
and moment, in spite of weather and seasons ; to see him in spite of fogs and
darkness.
"Finally, after all the devices and reliances of the system are satisfactorily
accomplished, and all difficulties subdued, it submits to the issue of a single
battle, on equal terms, the fate of the war, having no hope or resource beyond.
" The proper duty of our navy is, not coast or river defence ; it has a more
glorious sphere that of the offensive. In our last war, instead of lying in har-
bor and contenting themselves with keeping a few more of the enemy's vessels
in watch over them than their own number instead of leaving the enemy's
commerce in undisturbed enjoyment of the sea, and our commerce without coun-
tenance or aid they scattered themselves over the wide surface of the ocean,
penetrated to the most remote seas, everywhere acting with the most brilliant
success against the enemy's navigation. And we believe, moreover, that in the
amount of enemy's property thus destroyed, of American property protected or
recovered, and in the number of hostile ships kept in pursuit of our scattered
vessels, ships evaded if superior, and beaten if equal they rendered benefits
a thousand-fold greater, to say nothing of the glory they acquired for the na-
tion, and the character they imparted to it, than any that would have resulted
from a state of passiveness within the harbors.
" Confident that this is the true policy as regards the employment of the
navy proper, we doubt not that it will in the future be acted on, as it has been
in the past ; and that the results, as regards both honor and advantage, will be
expanded commeusurately with its own enlargement.
" In order, however, that the navy may always assume and maintain that
active and energetic deportment, in offensive operations, which is at the same
time so consistent with its functions, and so consonant with its spirit, we have
shown that it must not be occupied with mere coast defence."
As there is but little probability that our naval power, no matter how great
that power may be, will meet the enemy at sea in sufficient force to destroy any
large and well-concerted expedition, we must prepare to meet him on the shore,
and repel his attacks. To determine the best means of accomplishing this, let
us consult past experience. We shall quote exclusively from English history,
during the wars of the French revolution, inasmuch as the British navy was then
the most powerful in the world, and their maritime descents are almost the only
ones which have ever been attended with the least shadow of success.
In 1795, a maritime expedition was fitted out against Quiberon, at an expense
of $8,000,000. This part of the coast had then a naval defence of near thirty
sail, carrying about 1,600 guns. Lord Bridgeport attacked it with fourteen saili
of the line, five frigates, and some smaller vessels, about 1,500 guns in all, cap-
tured a portion of the fleet, and forced the remainder to seek shelter under the
guns of F Orient. The naval defence being destroyed, the British entered Qui-
beron without opposition. This bay is said by Brenton, in his British Naval
History, to be " the finest on the coast of France, or perhaps in the world, for
landing an army."
Besides the natural advantages of naval supplies, the inhabitants of the sur-
rounding country were in open insurrection, ready to receive the invaders with
open arms. The Chouans and Vendeans offered their co-operation, and a large
body of royalists in the south of France were favorable to the enterprise. A
body of 10,000 troops were landed, and arms and clothing furnished to as many
more Chouan troops ; but they failed in their attack upon St. Barbe ; and Gen-
eral Hoche, from his intrenchments, with 7,000 men, held in check a body of
18,000, penned up without defences in the narrow peninsula. Re-enforced by a
new debarkation, the allies again attempted to advance, but were soon defeated
and nearly destroyed.
In 1799, the English and Russians made a descent upon Holland, with a fleet
276 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
of fourteen ships of the line and ten frigates, carrying about 1,100 guns, and a
great number of transports, with an army of 36,000 men. The first division
was detained some two weeks off the coast by tempestuous weather, and the
whole force landed in detachments at some days' interval. A considerable
party of Orangemen favored the landing, and the Prince of Orange himself made
a demonstration on the frontiers of Frise. The Dutch naval defences consisted
of eight ships-of-the-line, three fifty-four gun ships, eight forty-eight, and eight
smaller frigates, carrying in all about 1,200 guns ; but this force contributed little
or nothing to the defence, and soon hoisted the hostile flag. The defensive army
was at first only 12,000 men, but the Republicans afterwards increased it to 22,000,
and finally to 28,000 men. Several undecisive battles were fought, but the allies
failed to get possession of a single -strong place, and, after a loss of 6,000 men,
were compelled to capitulate. " Such," says Alison, " was the disastrous issue
of the greatest expedition which had yet sailed from the British harbors during
the war."-
In 1801, Nelson, with three ships-of-the-line, two frigates, and thirty-five
smaller vessels and bombs, made a desperate attack upon the harbor of Bou-
longe, but was repulsed with severe loss.
Passing over some unimportant attacks, we come to the descent upon the
Scheldt, or, as it is commonly called, the Walcheren expedition, in 1809. This
expedition, though a failure, has often been referred to as proving the expedi-
ency of maritime descents, and the ease with which naval forces can sail past
fortifications, or reduce them to silence. The following is a brief narrative of
the expedition :
Napoleon had planned, for the protection of a maritime force in the Scheldt,
the construction of vast fortifications, dock yards, and naval arsenals at Flushing
and Antwerp the former at the mouth of the Scheldt, and the latter sixty or
seventy miles further up the river. The plan was scarcely commenced, when
the English attempted to seize upon the defences and capture or destroy the
naval force. Flushing was but ill secured, and Antwerp was at this time entirely
defenceless. The rampart was unarmed with cannon, dilapidated, and tottering,
and its garrison consisted of only about 200 invalids and recruits. Napoleon's
regular army was employed on the Danube and in the Peninsula. The attacking
force consisted of 37 ships-of-the-line, 23 frigates, 33 sloops of war, 28 gun,
mortar, and bomb vessels, 36 smaller vessels, and 87 gunboats, and innumerable
transports, with over 40,000 troops, and an immense artillery train ; making in
all, says Alison, " an hundred thousand combatants." The land force alone was
dearly equal to the army of Wellington at Waterloo. A landing was made upon
the island of Walcheren, and siege laid to Flushing, which surrendered eighteen
days after the landing, and two days after the opening of the siege batteries.
These batteries were armed with fifty-two heavy guns ; the attack upon the
water front was made by seven or eight ships-of-the-line and a large flotilla of
bomb vessels. The channel at the mouth of the river was too broad to be de-
fended by Flushing, and the main portion of the fleet passed out of reach of the
guns, and ascended the Scheldt. Twenty-eight days after the first disembarka-
tion the headquarters had advanced about half way to Antwerp ; but this place
was now repaired ; the French and Dutch fleets (which, on the arrival of the
English, were off the mouth of the river as a home squadron) had been removed
above the city for safety, and a land army assembled in large numbers. The
English gradually retired, and finally evacuated their entire conquest. The cost
of the expedition was immense, both in treasure and in life. It was certainly
very poorly managed ; but we cannot help here noticing the superior value of
fortifications as a defence against such descents. They did much to retard the
operations of the enemy till a defensive army could be raised ; the works of
Flushing were never intended to close up the channel of the Scheldt, and of
course could not intercept the passage of shipping. But they were not reduced
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 277
by a naval force as has sometimes been alleged. Colonel Mitchel says, that the
fleet " kept tip so tremendous a fire upon the batteries that the French officers,
who had been present at Austerlitz and Jena, declared, que la cannonade in
these battles had been a mere jeu d'enfans in comparison. Yet, what was the
effect produced on the defences of the place by this fire, so formidable, to judge
by the sound alone ? The writer can answer the question with some accuracy,
for he went along the entire sea line the very day after the capitulation and
found no part of the parapet injured so as to be of the slightest consequence, and
only one solitary gun dismounted, evidently by the bursting of a shell, and which
could not, of course, have been thrown from the line-of-battle-ships, but must
have been thrown from the land batteries."
We have now shown that a naval force cannot be relied on as the sole means
of securing a coast from naval attacks ; that maritime descents must in general
be limited to striking some sudden blow upon an unprotected point*; and that
fortifications and land forces are the best means of warding off these descents.
Before examining the questionof relative cost of forts and ships, we will pass
to the consideration of the question of their relative power, gun for gun, when
actually brought into contact.
It must be remembered that this question does not at all involve the expe-
diency of supporting navies and batteries. Both must be supported ; for neither
can perform the duties of the other, no matter how strong it may be.
Let us suppose a fair trial of this relative strength. The fort is to be properly
constructed and in good repair ; its guns in a position to be used with effect ; its
garrison skilful and efficient ; its commander capable and brave. The ship is of
the very best character; and in perfect order ; the crew disciplined and cour-
ageous ; its commander skilful and adroit ; the wind, tide, and sea, all as could
be desired.* The numbers of the garrison and crew are to be no more than
requisite, with no unnecessary exposure of human life to swell the list of the
slain. The issue of this contest, unlesss attended with extraordinary and easily
distinguishable circumstances, would be a fair test of their relative strength.
What result should we anticipate, from the nature of the contending forces ?
The ship, under the circumstances we have supposed, can choose her point of
attack, selecting the one she may deem the most vulnerable ; but she herself is
everywhere vulnerable ; her men and guns are much concentrated, and conse-
quently much exposed.
But in the fort, " it is only the gun, a small part of the carriage, and now or
then a head or an arm raised above the parapet, that can be hurt ; the ratio of
the exposed surfaces being not less than Jiftcen or twenty to one. Next, there
is always more or less motion in the water, so that the ship's gun, although it
may have been pointed accurately at one moment, at the next will be thrown
entirely away from its object, even when the .motion of the ship is too small to
be otherwise noticed ; whereas in the battery the gun will be fired just as it is
pointed, and the motion of the ship will merely vary to the extent of a few inches,
or at most two or three feet, from the spot in which the shot is to be received.
In the ship, there are, besides, many points exposed that may be called vital
points. By losing her rudder, or portions of her rigging, or of her spars, she
may become unmanageable and unable to use her strength ; she may receive
shots under water and be liable to sink ; she may receive hot shot and be set on
fire. These damages are in addition to those of having her guns dismounted
and her people killed by the shots that pierce her sides, and scatter splinters
from her timbers while the risks of the battery are confined to those mentioned
above, namely, the risk that the gun, the carriage, or the men may be struck."
The opinions of military writers and the facts of history fully accord with
These conditions for the battery are easily satisfied ; but for the ship, are partly depend-
ent on the elements, and seldom to be wholly obtained.
278 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
these deductions of theory. Some few individuals, mistaking or misstating the
facts of a few recent trials, assert that modern improvements in the naval service
have so far outstripped the progress in the art of land defence that a floating
force is now abundantly able to cope, upon equal terms, with a land battery.
Ignorant and superficial persons, hearing merely that certain forts had recently
yielded to a naval force, and taking no trouble to learn the real facts of the case,
have paraded them before the public as proofs positive of a new era in military
science. This conclusion, however groundless and absurd, has received credit
with us merely from its novelty. The Americans are often attracted by what
is new and plausible ; old theories and established principles are frequently
regarded so much the less for their antiquity, notwithstanding the proofs and
arguments which time has thrown around them.
In the Apalachicola document are embodied many crudities long since repu-
diated in *the theories and banished from the practice of the old world.
The report consists of three or four pages of a survey of the bays of Apa-
lachicola, St. Joseph's, St. Andrew's, Ship island, and Tampa, and 30 pages
of an attempt to prove the worthlessness of fortifications and the superior effi-
ciency of naval defences. We shall comment only upon the propositions con-
tained in this portion of the document, viz : " That whatever policy we adopt
must and ought to be nearly exclusive in its application ; " " that our defensive
policy should be by naval means ; " " that the system of fortifications recom-
mended by Mr. Poinsett in 1839, and by Mr. Bell and Mr. Spencer in 1841, is
intended to lay the foundation of a great military power, to cover the country
with castles, ' dangerous to freedom, ' but utterly worthless in defence ; " " that
fortifications are useless, nay, dangerous without an army educated to defend
them, and of competent numbers ; " " that for the true interests of the country,
it had been better that we had never known this system, and that the further
prosecution of it should be abandoned ; " " that we had better blow into air
and leave in ruins, citadels which command our cities with their guns and con-
trol our harbors, that might and probably would be seized upon by an excited
populace for lawless purposes ; " " that fortifications do not and cannot success-
fully resist the attacks of ships ; " and that " they must henceforth be con-
structed beyond the reach of fleets to be even secure."
This report further says there is scarcely a port in the old or new world
which has not been forcibly entered by hostile fleets and fallen before their
broadsides ! In support of these broad assertions the following successful naval
attacks are adduced, viz :
Jamaica in Cromwell's time, Rio Janeiro, Carthagena in 1565, [1585 1 ]
1697, 1706, and 1741; Porto Bello in 1740, Guadaloupe in 1759 and 1794,
Martinique, Havana, the Cape of Good Hope, Malta, Curacoa, Chagres in 1841,
Senegal and Mocha, Java, Sumatra, and " the rich city or Manilla," Madras,
Calcutta, Pondicherry and Ceylon, Gibraltar, Copenhagen, Constantinople, Al-
giers, San Juan d'Ulloa, St. Jean d'Acre, Louisburg, Quebec, Bed Hook,
Washington and Baltimore, Charleston and Mobile.
Let us now examine these cases, and see if they authorize the inferences
drawn from them by the report.
" Jamaica, by a British fleet, in Cromwell's time" In the reduction of Ja-
maica in 1655, no trial of strength was made between the ships and forts ; it
was effected almost wholly by the army of General Venobles, which amounted
to about 5,000 men. The defensive army was forced to capitulate and the
principal place surrendered by treaty. So little assistance was rendered to the
army by the fleet that one of the commissioners openly declared, " he suspected
they were betrayed." And this same naval force of 30 ships, under Admire!
Penn, also made an attack on Hispaniola, but after a contest of some two weeks,
was repulsed with great loss.
" Rio Janeiro, taken by Duguy Truin, with a small fleet" fyc. Truin did
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 279
really sail into the harbor of Rio Janeiro in 1711, in spite of the little defences
at the entrance, but that passage cost him the loss of 300 men out of his small
fleet. He did not stop to test the question of strength, but sailed past with all
possible speed. His troops were landed and batteries erected on shore,
but neither soldiers nor inhabitants remained to fight, they had fled to the
mountains.
CarthageTia. The taking of this place in 1585 was effected entirely by land
troops. The fleet merely acted as transports and took no part in the contest.
The conquest of this place by the French in 1697 was also effected by land
forces, the ships again acting merely as transports. The heavy train of land
artilery made a breach in the walls of the town, through which the assault was
made. The Carthagena taken in 1706 was the place of that name in old Spain,
but this was an operation purely political, no defence whatever being made. In
the words of Dr. Campbell, " information being received that the inhabitants of
Carthagena wished only for the presence of the [English] fleet and an opportu-
nity of declaring for King Charles III, it was determined to steer thither."
" The fleet arrived on the 1st of June, and the conditions of surrender were
finally settled on the following day."
The attack in 1741 was a total failure, though made with 30 ships-of-the-
line and numerous smaller vessels 124 sail in all, carrying 2,682 guns, 16,000
seamen and 12,000 troops. The defences of Carthagena consisted of 10 forts
and batteries, 9 of which (the armament of the 10th not known) carried 222
guns of all calibres ; but a part of this number of guns were too small to reach
the ships at any considerable distance. Of these 9 forts, one (of 85 guns) was
unfinished, two (together 71 guns) were blown up before attacked, and only a
part of the guns were mounted in one of fascine batteries (of 15 guns.) Car-
thagena itself was armed with 160 guns, but the only attack made upon it was
an experimental one by a floating battery. The several garrisons of these forts
amounted to only 4,000 men. The siege continued forty days, when the British
re-embarked their troops and retired with a severe loss. In the single attempt
to take fort St. Lazar the loss amounted to over 600 men.
Carthagena had been bombarded in 1740, for three days, by a fleet of nine
sail-of-the-line, carrying between five and six hundred guns, and near 4,000
men, but the forts were unharmed, and the bombardment " had no other effect
than that of terrifying the inhabitants and injuring some churches and con-
vents." The ships, however, were so much injured as to render it necessary
for them to return to Porto Bello for repairs.
" Porto Bello taken by Admiral Vernon in 1740." Vernon's fleet here con-
sisted of six sail of the line, carrying 380 guns and 2,495 men, and a small land
force. The attack was first made upon Fort Iron, which carried 78 guns and
a lower battery of 22 guns ; the garrison amounted to less than 300 men in all.
It was begun by the Hampton Court, of 70 guns and 495 men, firing 400 balls
in the first 25 minutes. The other ships st>on followed, but their united efforts
being unable to effect a breach in the walls of the fort, a body of sailors and,
soldiers were directed to attack it on the land side. These soldiers climbed'
into the embrasures on each other's shoulders, and reduced the garrison by a fire
of musketry; those who capitulated being only 40 in number* including botl* ;
officers and privates; the remainder had fled. Gloria Castle and the other bat-
tery in the further part of the harbor were neither of them attacked ; together
they carried 120 guns in all and a garrison of 400 men. Dr. Campbell, in his.
British Naval History, says : " It must be confessed that the easy conquest oi
Admiral Vernon and his command is to be in part attributed to the cowardice
of the Spaniards in surrendering the first fort before a breach was made, and
the other two before they were attacked. Gloria Castle might have sustained a.
long siege, and the batteries in that and St, Jeronimo, if properly served, would
have rendered the entrance into the harbor exceedingly dangerous, if not im
280 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
practicable." Another English writer of equal authority says : " The Span-
iards deserted their forts, and such was their pusillanimity that they suffered
them to be taken without bloodshed. Vernon found more difficulty in demol-
ishing the fortifications of the place than in taking them."
An attempt had previously been made by Admiral Hosier, with a large
English squadron, to reduce this place; but, says Dr. Campbell, "after a siege
of six months or more, he weighed anchor, and sailed for Jamaica, after such a
loss of men, and in so wretched a condition, that- 1 cannot prevail on myself to
enter into the particulars of a disaster which I heartily wish could be blotted
out of the annals and of the remembrance of this nation." So much for the
naval attacks on Porto Bello.
" Among the rest, the island of Guadeloupe is remarkably in point" 8fc.
The attacks quoted in the report are those of 1759 and 1794. The first was
made by Commodore Moore, with 10 ships-of-the-line, some frigates and gun
vessels, carrying about 1,000 guns, and 60 transports, with 800 marines, and a
land force of six regiments of the line, a detachment of engineers and artiller-
ists, and a large number of volunteers from the English islands in all, about
6,000 men. The defences consisted of a citadel and several open water batter-
ies, carrying in all, about 100 guns. The several garrisons were composed of
"five companies of regular troops, scarce making 100 men in the whole island."
The ships and batteries were here actually brought into contact, and the follow-
ing is the order of the engagement, so far as given by the English writers
themselves :
British ships. No. guns. Batteries. No. guns.
The Leon ................. 60 engaged with ........ 1st battery 9
Berwick .............. 74 engaged with ........ 4th battery 7
Rippon ............... 60 engaged with ........ 5th battery 6
St. George ............ 90 }
Cambridge ............ SO > engaged with ........ Citadel 47
Norfolk.... ........... 74)
How the other ships and batteries were engaged, or whether engaged at all,
is not stated. Some of the English writers state the armament of the citadel
at 43 guns, and that of the Berwick ship at 66 an unimportant difference; all
agree upon the other points.
Here was a naval force of 7 to 1, (we count both broadsides of the engaged
ships, and also all the guns of the engaged forts, both those for the land and
water defences,) and what was the result ? Some of the batteries were injured;
but the citadel, though attacked by a force of more than 5 to 1, had, according
to Beatson, neither its walls injured nor its guns dismounted. The garrison
was driven out by the bravery of the British forces on land; the town was
taken, and the whole island finally subdued, after a contest of a little over three
months. All this is well known ; and it is also well known, to those who have
taken the trouble to examine the facts of the case, that there is nothing in it to
justify a single inference in favor of the superiority of guns afloat over those on
shore.
The reduction of Guadaloupe, in 1794, was almost wholly effected upon land.
The force sent out upon this expedition consisted of 18 vessels-of-war, carrying
between 700 and 800 guns, and nearly 7,000 troops. A part of these troops
were landed near some small batteries, under the fire of the Winchelsea; but
the principal defences of the place being almost entirely without garrisons, were
carried by the enemy's land forces. The English left a large squadron for the
defence of the island; but, notwithstanding this, the French found the means of
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 281
evading them, and reorganizing their forts, which, being now properly defended,
repelled the combined attacks of Admiral Jervis and General Grey.
Martinique. The same combined sea and land forces, under Commodore
Moore, which attacked Guadaloupe in 1759, also made an attack upon Mar-
tinique in the same year. Notwithstanding the great superiority of the attack-
ing force over the land forces of Port Royal, the several attempts of the British to
silence the batteries, and effect a lodgement by land, were altogether ineffectual,
and the enemy was at last compelled to re-embark his troops, and retire from the
contest, with several of his vessels seriously injured, and many of his men killed
and wounded. The fleet afterwards sailed to St. Pierre, for the purpose of at-
tempting that part of the island; but, after a reconnoissance of the place, the
commodore decided against it, because, said he, "the ships may be so much in-
jured in the attack as to prevent them from availing themselves of their success,
and from undertaking any other expedition during the season."
While the French population of Martinique, in 1793, were distracted by the
same political differences which were then deluging the mother country in blood,
England attempted to capture the island, through the assistance of the royalist
party. The British attacking force consisted of five ships-of-the-line and three
smaller vessels, 496 guns in all, and a land force of 3,000 men, of which 1,100
were regulars; (some writers estimate this land force at only 2,000 men.) Gen-
eral Rochambeau, it is said, had "only a few hundred troops" for the defence of
the batteries ; nevertheless, he most signally repulsed the enemy, and compelled
him to abandon the island.
But the English returned again in 1794, with a superior force; their fleet now
consisted of eighteen vessels-of-war, carrying between 700 and 800 guns, and
a number of transports with near 7,000 troops. General Rochambeau's army
amounted to only 600 men, of whom 400 were militia. The British naval force,
notwithstanding its immense superiority, did not attempt to force its way into
the harbor, and attack the forts. On the contrary, the troops were first landed
upon other parts of the island, and took possession of Point Solomon, Pigeon
island, Casnavire, and several other batteries; thus "opening," says an English
writer, "a way for the British fleet to advance." The other forts were regularly
besieged on the land side ; siege batteries were erected within 200 yards of Fort
Louis, and others within 500 yards of Fort Bourbon. When Fort Louis had
been fired upon for 48 hours by these siege batteries, and bombarded by the gun
boats, the Asia, of 64 guns, and the Zebra, of 16 guns, advanced to take a part
in the attack. The former was twice driven back by the fire of the fort ; the
latter ran aground near by ; her crew landed and assisted in the capture of the
fort, Captain de Rouvignee coming up at the same time on the opposite side
with a body of infantry and some field pieces. The other forts were taken in
the regular operations of a land siege, being reduced mainly by the "heavy
British batteries in the second parallel." This siege lasted seven weeks, and
the entire loss of the British in killed and wounded was 318 equal to one-half
of the defensive army.
The Apalachicola report, apparently forgetting the previous unsuccessful
naval attacks upon Martinique, adduces this attack of 1794 as an example of
the superiority of guns afloat. "The joint attack upon St. Louis," he says,
" was anticipated by Captain Faulkner, of the Zebra, who laid his ship along-
side the fort, and carried it at the head of his crew."
This is an error. Captain Faulkner was assisted by a land force, and was
himself anticipated, even in the attack, by the crews of the boats. It was at
first supposed that he preceded these, and it was so stated in Sir John Jervis's
despatches ; but the error was afterwards corrected. James, in his Naval His-
tory, gives the corrected version of the affair, and says : " The boats commanded
by Captains Nugent and Riou, containing as many as 1,200 men, pushed across
the Carenage before the Zebra could get in, and stormed and took possession of
282 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
Fort Royal." The correction, however, is of little importance to this discussion.
The contest was in no way one between ships and batteries. The defences of
the island were taken by an overwhelming land force. Rochambeau, although
his army was much inferior in numbers, made a defence which was far from
being satisfactory to the republican government. Being regarded as a traitor to
his country, he never ventured to return to France.
Political animosities run so high that the French generals would not act in
concert ; and, on the retreat, the forces of General Bellegarde were refused ad-
mittance into the fort. Dr. Campbell expressly states, that the conquest was
attempted " in consequence of the disputes which existed between the royalists
and republicans."
" Havana, attacked and taken in 1763 by Admiral Pocock ; " the " castle on
the beach was Jirst silenced by Captain Harvey, in the Dragon," fyc. The
taking of Havana, mentioned above, was effected almost entirely by land forces,
under Lord Albemarle, the ships acting as transports. The following details of
this attack are taken from the British reports and histories of the affair : The
attacking force consisted of 22 or 23 ships-of-the-line, carrying near 1,600 guns;
20 frigates, carrying about 600 guns ; a large number of sloops-of-war, bomb
vessels, artillery ships, and transports 203 sail in all with a land force of
12,000 efficient men, and a considerable body of negroes. The Havana was
defended by 4,610 regulars, and some militia, mulattoes, and negroes number
not known. The naval defences consisted of 12 ships-of-the-line, carrying 784
guns, and 5 smaller vessels, making in all 908 guns. But little or no use was
made of this home squadron in the defence, and it was surrendered to the enemy
on the capitulation. " So little confidence," says the British account, " had
they (the Spaniards) in their shipping, for resisting the efforts of the English
armament, that the only use they made of it was to sink three of their largest
vessels behind a boom, which they had thrown across the mouth of the harbor."
The defences against a water attack consisted of the Governor's battery of 22
guns, the Apostles and Shepherds' batteries of 14 guns, the Moro of 40 guns,
and the Punta, a small work opposite. The works of Havana against a land
attack were large, but not strong. The principal defence both by land and
water was the Moro, which was a small work, armed with only 40 guns of all
descriptions, and garrisoned by 280 regulars, 300 marines, and 94 negroes.
The British troops were landed several miles from the Moro, to which they
laid formal siege, and, forty-four days after the opening of the trenches, forced
it to capitulate. The town of Havana also capitulated after a siege of "two
months and eight days." The " castle on the beach," said to have been
" silenced by Captain Harvey, in the Dragon," was a small unimportant work,
some six miles from the Havana, and used merely to harass the English while
crossing the Coximar. Little or no defence was made, and the English them-
selves have never thought of claiming the slightest credit for its capture. No
loss is mentioned as having been sustained on either side ; but " Captain Har-
vey, in the Dragon," and two other shpis-of-the-line, carrying in all 3-22 guns,
did, during the land siege of the Moro, make an attack upon its water front.
" They began," says the official report of Admiral Pocock, " to cannonade about
8 o'clock ; and after keeping up a constant fire till 2 p. m., the Cambridge was
so much damaged in her hull, masts, yards, sails, and rigging, with the loss of
so many men killed and wounded, that it was thought proper to order her off;
and soon after, the Dragon, which had likewise suffered a loss of men, and
damage in her hull ; and, it being found that the Marlborough could be of no
longer service, she was ordered off likewise. The numbers in killed and
wounded are as follows: Dragon 16 killed, 37 wounded; Cambridge 24
killed, 95 wounded ; Marlborough 2 killed, 8 wounded." The castle, on the
contrary, received no injury worth mentioning from this water attack, which
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 283
was the last and only important trial of strength between the ships and forts
made during the siege.
" The Cape of Good Hope taken by the British fleet, and the commerce of
tlic States ruined in those seas." The conquest here alluded to was probably
that of 1795 ; but this was effected wholly by troops landed at a distance from
any defensive works ; and the ships, after effecting this landing, were anchored
in Simon's bay, six miles from the encampment of Muysenburg, and at a con-
siderable distance from Cape Town. The British fleet carried about 600 guns,
and the only forts that could have been engaged with it were two small bat-
teries one armed with two guns, and the other with one gun and a mortar.
That the naval forces assisted indirectly in this conquest cannot be denied,
for they trsnsported the troops which effected it, and also met at sea and de-
feated a Dutch squadron of eight men-of-war, 342 guns, which had been sent
out to join in the defence ; but it is well known that these forces were never
immediately engaged in the attack. This has been so decided by judicial
authority ; for, when the admiralty put in a claim for a share in the profits of
the capture, it was rejected by Sir William Scott, because no ships of a military
character had assisted the army in this valuable capture.
The expedition of 1806 consisted of nine ships-of-war, carrying above 270
guns, and 5,000 troops. But here, again, the conquest was effected entirely by
land forces. A detachment of sailors and marines served with the troops on
shore, under the designation of marine battalion; but the fleet itself acted
merely in the capacity of protecting transports, and no trial of strength was
made between them and land batteries.
"Malta was taken by the French fleet, which sailed into the harbor, and car-
ried the city during the panic.'" This statement of the conquest of Malta in
1798 certainly furnishes no argument for the position in support of which it has
been adduced ; for, if the island was lost through panic, it could not have been
taken merely by the superiority of guns afloat over those on shore. But, in
reality, panic was not the cause of no defence being made by the Maltese. It
has been generally understood that, preferring the French to the English, the
grand master and knight had previously agreed with Napoleon for its surrender.
This is positively asserted by the English historians, and not contradicted by the
other parties. The grand master retired from the island on its capture, for the
sum of 1,000,000 livres, and the promise of an annual pension for life, of 3,000
more from the French treasury. Napoleon himself confesses that, although he
then commanded forty vessels-of-war, and4 0,000 troops, he would have found
it very difficult to reduce the fortifications of Malta, if the moral strength had
been any ways equal to the capability of physical resistance.
Malta was attacked by the Turks in 1565 with 200 sail and above 40,000 troops,
mostly Janissaries and Sophis, who were the bravest troops in the Ottoman
Empire. The island was defended by 700 knights and 8,500 soldiers. The
siege was continued for four months, and scarcely a day elapsed without some
attempt to batter down or storm the fortifications ; but the Turks were at last
compelled to raise the siege and retire with the loss of a considerable portion of
their shipping and more than a quarter of their men or, in other words, the
number of their losses was more than equal to the garrison of the island !
"Curacoa was stormed and taken by Sir Charles Brisbane with four small
ships, boarding the castle at the entrance from his boats. 1 ' The following is the
account of this capture, as given by the English historians : Captain Brisbane
was directed " to watch the island of Curacoa, and interrupt the trade of the
enemy. While employed on this service, he learnt that the Dutch had a cus-
tom of drinking out the old year and drinking in the new one ; he therefore con-
ceived the possibility of taking it by a coup- de-main.' 1 Accordingly, about the
dawn of day on the 1st of January, 1807, with a squadron of four frigates, car-
rying 176 guns and 1,200 men, he entered the harbor of Amsterdam, and
284 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
anchored; the governor and his garrison were at this time in bed, made by the
revels of the night utterly unconscious of all danger. The harbor was well
secured by fortifications ; but the only resistance made by these was the firing
of five shot from Fort Republique. All of these shot took effect, killing and
wounding fifteen men, which was the only loss the British sustained. Captain
Brenton, in his Naval History, says that this fort alone might have sunk every
one of the enemy's frigates in half an hour, without any comparative injury.
But, instead of defending his fortifications, the drunken governor, under pre-
tence of fearing a negro insurrection, but in reality not yet being awoke from
his revels, forbid any resistance to be made to the English, because, he said,
they had come merely as friends ! The forts were therefore given up, and the
squadron of Dutch ships then lying in the harbor, with a number of guns al-
most equal to the British fleet, also surrendered without opposition, the prinei*
pal portion of the crews being yet asleep. The English themselves say that
scarcely the slightest resistance was made by the drunken crews and garrisons.
The argument attempted to be drawn by the Apalachicola report from this
attack would be equally conclusive of the general superiority of guns afloat over
each other ; for the Dutch forts and ship were overcome in the same way a
conquest due to Bacchus rather than Mars. No case could possibly be ad-
duced more inconclusive and inapplicable to the argument.
"Chagres taken in [1740?] 1741, by Admiral Vernon" The British fleet,
at the taking of Chagres, consisted of three sixty-gun ships, three fifty-gun ships,
three bomb-ketches, two fire ships, and two tenders, carrying in all, 374 guns
and 2,500 men ; while the works of defence were armed with only eleven brass
cannon and eleven pateroes, or small stone mortars an inequality of fifteen or
twenty to one. Of the eleven guns in the fort, only six or eight could be brought
to bear on the shipping ; but, notwithstanding the small armament of the castle
of St. Lorenzo, " it sustained a furious bombardment (from the bomb-ketches) and
a continued cannonade from three of the largest ships in the fleet" for thirty-six
hours. Is there anything in this capture to authorize an inference of naval su-
periority, gun for gun 1
" Senegal taken from the English by a small French squadron.' 11 This cap-
ture was made in 1799. The French fleet consisted of two ships-of-the-line,
two frigates, and three smaller vessels, with a considerable body of troops, un-
der the Duke de Lauzun. The English garrison was too small to sustain an
attack. They therefore determined to make no defence, and the fort was sur-
rendered without resistance. In the same year, the English attempted to retake
it with a fleet of six ships-of-the-line and one smaller vessel, carrying in all over
400 guns.; but their efforts were of no avail. In the first attack, there was no
trial of strength between the ships and fort ; in the second, there was such a
trial, and the forts were victorious.
"Mocha, in Arabia, bombarded and taken by Captain Lumly with one
frigate." We give the English the benefit of their own account of this affair.
The defence consisted of a small work, armed with only twelve guns, and garri-
soned by about 300 Arabs. The character of the work may be drawn from the
following remark of the British officer : " With a few spades and pick-axes we
would have levelled the walls and effected a breach." But they had no min-
ing tools, and were obliged to-attempt a breach with their guns. The attacking
force consisted of a fifty-gun frigate, a brig, two cruisers, and a mortar boat,
with a land force of one company of artillery. In the evening, " the ships
anchored as close as possible to the fort," and about 10 o'clock the next day,
after a long and " brisk cannonade," the English landed and attempted to carry
the little work by assault : but, " to their surprise and mortification, found there
was no breach ; the wall had been a little injured by their shot, but remained as
firm and inaccessible as ever;" they were consequently repelled with a loss of
thirty men. On the second morning they renewed the assault, but found no
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 285
one in the fort the Arabs had deserted. The ships were not once fired upon
by the fort, and we suppose there was no means of doing it, for the cold shot
thrown over the walls at the storming party were the same the ships had fired
into the work. The fort, when taken, was but slightly injured, and the garri-
son unharmed as long as they remained inside.
"Sumatra, Java, and the rich city of Manilla" A battle was fought by the
English and Dutch fleets, in the harbor of Java, in 1807, but the land batteries
took little or no part in the contest. The English had eight ships-of-war, car-
rying four hundred guns ; and the Dutch only nine small vessels, carrying one
hundred and forty guns. The Dutch shipping, including twenty merchant ves-
sels, were destroyed. This place was again attacked in 1811, by an army fitted out
at Madras, numbering a little more than twelve thousand men, one-half of whom
were Europeans. The naval force consisted of four ships-of-the-line, fourteen
frigates, and seven sloops, carrying nine hundred and twenty-two guns ; besides
eight cruisers, fifty-seven transports, and some gunboats making in all a fleet
of one hundred sail. The defence consisted of the combined French and Dutch
forces of Generals Jansens and Daendels, numbering in all between eight and
ten thousand men ; but the latter were too disaffected with the French to be of
any service in the defence, and indeed a portion of them soon deserted to the
new invaders. The British troops and a party of seamen and marines landed
upon an undefended part of the island, twelve miles from Batavia, attacked
General Jansens, and, after an obstinate contest of two months, forced him to
surrender. The contest was wholly upon land ; the ships were not once brought
into action against the forts, and in no way whatever could it be regarded as a
naval attack. The capture of Manilla, alluded to in the report, was that, we
suppose, of 1762 ; but this capture was effected entirely by land forces, ships
not entering into the contest at all. All that was required of the navy, says
Dr. Campbell, was a light frigate to transport Colonel Draper and his command.
This force amounted to two thousand three hundred effective land troops, and
a body of seamen and marines, arranged into companies like soldiers. The de-
fences of Manilla were small, incomplete, and garrisoned by only eight hundred
Spaniards, and defended by some thirty pieces of brass cannon ; they had also
two pieces of field artillery ! The Indians, being undiciplined and entirely un-
acquainted with the use of Jire-arms, could be of little value in the defence.
The English writers say that the garrison were wholly unprepared for an at-
tack, not even knowing of the declaration of war. The place was besieged in
form ; its guns being silenced by the land batteries, it was carried by a storm-
ing party of three thousand men, issuing from the second parallel.
"Madras, Calcutta, Pondicherry, Ceylon, were all taken by the British
fleets" The bare fact of some town having been reduced by some certain
fleet would hardly seem decisive of the general question of comparative strength ;
yet such is the purpose for which the above is adduced. There is not one single
feature in the East India conquests that can be regarded as confirming, in any
degree, the positions of the Apalachicola report. These conquests were made
from the rude natives of the country, or from Europeans while distracted by
political broils. Ceylon, for instance, was summoned to surrender to the crown
of England, to be held in trust for the stadtholder. Columbo, the seat of gov-
ernment, obeyed without the least resistance, and ordered the other towns to do
the same. The governor of Trincomalle " merely required the formation of a
camp and the firing of a few shot as a justification of his conduct in surren-
dering the fort intrusted to his command. The fort of Osnaburg, standing on
a hill, and commanding the entrance to the harbor, surrendered without firing a
shot." When Pondicherry was reduced by Colonel Floyd, in 1793, the fleet
merely acted as a blockading force, cutting off all supplies and reinforcements
from France. The only breaches in the fort were made by the land batteries ;
these had considerably injured it ; " still, however," says the English historian,
286 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
"its strength, both by nature and art was such that the conquest might have
required a considerable length of time, and been attended with no small diffi-
culty and loss, had not disputes between the royalist and republican parties
taken place in the garrison, in consequence of which it was compelled to sur-
render." This place had been previoualy attacked (in 1748) by 5,000 Eu-
ropeans and 2,000 native troops, and a fleet of five ships, carrying six hundred
and sixty-six guns, under Admiral Boscawen. The water defences of Pondi-
cherry could carry only one hundred guns in all ; and yet, although the block-
ade was continued for several months, the attempt at conquest was entirely
unsuccessful. Again, in 1760-'61, when garrisoned by only 1,487 men, includ-
ing volunteers, it was besieged by an army of near 4,000 men, under Colonel
Coote, and blockaded by a fleet of nineteen sail, carrying one thousand and
fifty-two guns, under Commodore Stevens. There was no engagement what-
ever between the ships and forts ; but all supplies being cut off by the siege
and blockade, the provisions became exhausted, and, after a siege of seven or
eight months, the inhabitants were forced to surrender, to avoid starvation.
The garrison, however, refused to capitulate, although the town had been
given up by the starving inhabitants. The fortifications of Calcutta, when at-
tacked by the fleet of Admiral Watson, were not worth mentioning, and the
town surrendered as soon as the British had prepared to open their batteries.
Madras was attacked on the 14th of September, 1746, by a British fleet of
nine ships, and an army of 1,500 Europeans, and 800 " well-armed, well-trained
and discipline^" sepoys and negroes. This place, says the British chronicler
of the siege, was defended by only " one weak battalion of four hundred men,
Its fortifications were likeAvise of the most contemptible order, consisting, for
the most part, of a common wall, which might at any moment be escaladed
should the process of breaching be deemed too expensive ; indeed, out of the
three divisions into which it was parted, only one (called Fort St George, in
which the chief functionaries resided) could boast either of bastion or rampart,
far less of cannon or mortars. Against this open and ill-provided place, a heavy
fire was opened by both sea and land, and the confusion within the walls soon
became fearful. * * * This siege, if such it deserves to be called, lasted
five days, and ended in the surrender of the place."
These several conquests were made by the land troops, and there was no trial,
except in the unequal contest just mentioned, of strength between the ships and
forts. The navy was of vast service in transporting troops and supplies, block-
ading the enemy's bastions, and cutting him off from all resources ; but nothing
occurred to justify the inferences drawn in the report above alluded to.
" Gibraltar" says the ApalachicoJa reporter, " was only once in its history
attacked by a fleet, when it was taken by a squadron under Admiral Rooke"
To any one who has ever read of Gibralter, this assertion will be received with
unmingled surprise. The following are the principal facts of the conquest by
Admiral Rooke, in 1704 :
The attacking squadron consisted of forty-one ships-of-the-line and many
smaller vessels, carrying 2,935 guns, and near 20,000 men. The fort was gar-
risoned by only 150 men, and armed with one hundred guns, all included.*
The attack was made simultaneously by land and water; 1,800 men being
landed for this purpose. The outworks were soon reduced, and the town forced
to capitulate, but not till after the English had sustained a loss of 267 men.
We know of but one inference that can be drawn from this conquest. It is :
that a fort may be taken' by a combined land and naval force more than a hun-
dred times greater than itself! Surely,. no one could object to such an inference.
Aware of the importance of Gibraltar, the Spaniards immediately attempted
* The French accounts state the strength of .the garrison even less than this, but we
give the English version of the affair.
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 287
its recovery, sending out for this purpose a fleet of 92 sail, carrying over 4,000
guns and 25,000 men. A battle was fought with the British off Malaga, but
without any decided result, the victory being claimed by both sides. In the
latter part of this year and the beginning of 1705, the French and Spaniards
besieged Gibraltar both by sea and land. 8,000 bombs and 70,000 cannon balls
were fired at the work without materially injuring it, and the besiegers were at
last forced to retire with a loss of near 10,000 men, while the loss of the garri-
son amounted to only 400.
This place was again besieged by the Spaniards in 1720 with a considerable
fleet; the garrison at that time "consisted of only three weak battalions;" never-
theless, the naval attack proved abortive. Another attack in 1726 was mostly
by land forces; the loss of the besiegers 3,000, of the garrison 300.
Although the Spaniards had been thrice defeated in their attempts to recover
Gibraltar, the siege was renewed at the commencement of the war in 1779.
The garrison now numbered 5,382 men. The blockade was begun about the
middle of the summer with a considerable fleet, but it was soon afterwards sus-
pended till the winter of 1780. This blockade was raised in 1781 by the
arrival of a large British naval force, but the shipping on both sides was much
annoyed by the land batteries which the two parties had erected. So vigor-
ously was the land attack continued, that, on the 4th of May, 1782, not a single
day had elapsed without firing from these batteries "for a space of nearly 13
months!"
The following is Dr. Campbell's account of the general attack in September
of the same year : According to his authority the combined forces consisted of
"40,000 land troops, 47 sail of the line besides floating batteries, frigates, and
other vessels-of-war." A simultaneous attack by land and sea was first
planned, in which a loss of 20 ships-of-war and a proportional number of troops
was expected by the besiegers ; and " there can be little doubt that the Spanish
monarch, in his extreme eagerness to obtain possession of Gibraltar, would not
have hesitated to make this enormous sacrifice, provided there was a reasonable
chance of success; but, to all who knew the strength of the fortress, * * *
the scheme was regarded as wild and impracticable. Another was therefore
proposed." This was, to besiege the works at the same time by land and sea
the sea attack to be made by ships and a large number of floating batteries,
constructed in such a manner as to be bomb proof, and to contain within them-
selves the means of extinguishing the fires caused by red hot shot. This was
supposed to be effected by means of water pipes and tamping with wet sand.
The hanging roofs were contrived in such a manner that they could be raised
and let down with the greatest facility, at the pleasure of those on bpard the
vessels.
These battering ships were armed with 154 pieces of heavy ordnance on the
attacking side, with 58 in reserve, to be used in case of accident. " The whole
number of men on board could not be less than 6,000 or 7,000." As the effect
of these vessels would " depend in a great measure on the rapidity and con-
stancy with which they were fired, a kind of match was contrived by which
they were all to go off together, as it had Keen by a single shot." The roofs
and sides of the ships were so thick that, for a long time, says Drinkwater, the
balls could not be made to penetrate them. Another English writer says, "their
powers of resistance to projectiles of artillery were certainly greater than that
afforded by the [British] squadron at Algiers."
The attack was commenced on the 8th of September by the troops and the
ships then present. For the land siege they employed J,200 pieces of heavy
ordnance, and more than 83,000 barrels of powder ! For several days the
besiegers "fired at the rate of 6,500 cannon shot and 1,080 shells in every 24
hours." On the 9th the combined fleets of France and Spain in the bay
amounted to 48 sail of the line, 10 battering ships, a large number of frigates,
288 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
gun and mortar boats, bomb ketches, &c. The new battering ships joined in
the attack about 8 o'clock on the morning of the 13th, anchoring about 900 yards
from the works. They seemed for a long time, says Campbell, " completely
invulnerable to all attempts made by the garrison to destroy them; while they
continued through the greatest part of the day to maintain a heavy and destruc-
tive cannonade, they resisted the combined powers of fire and artillery to such a
degree that the incessant showers of shells and the red hot shot with which they
were assailed made no visible impression upon them. About 2 o'clock, however,
there were evident symptoms of their approaching destruction;" and during the
night a large portion of them were either burnt or torn in pieces. "It is impos-
sible to ascertain the loss of the Spaniards on this memorable day; that it was
enormous is certain, both from the nature and effect of the fire from the garri-
son, and from the very circumstance that they published only a vague and con-
tradictory account respecting it. Such admirable measures had been taken for
the security of the garrison, that their loss was comparatively light. In the
course of about nine weeks the whole number of slain amounted only to 65, and
the wounded to 388. How little chance the Spaniards had of succeeding in
their attack, even if their battering ships had not taken fire, may be* judged
from this circumstance that the works of the fortress were scarcely damaged."
" As the enemy now had most melancholy proof that Gibraltar could not be
taken by any means that human power could bring against it, the only chance
that remained to them was by famine." .A blockade and the land siege were
therefore kept up for some time, but were unsuccessful.
Drinkwater gives nearly the same account as above. The number of men in
the garrison, when attacked, was 7,000. Neither the whole number of guns in the
fort nor in the ships could be brought into action; but, according to Drinkwater,
the number of guns afloat, which were actually brought to bear on the fortifica-
tions, was 300, while this fire was returned by only 80 cannon, 7 mortars, and
7 howitzers. The loss of the garrison during this engagement was 16 killed
and 67 wounded, while the enemy's loss during the same time was estimated at
2,000.
We add a third account from the British Naval Chronicle, coinciding with
those already given: "47 sail of the line, 10 invincible battering ships, carrying
212 guns, numerous frigates, xebecs, bomb ketches, cutters, and gun and mortar
boats, with small craft, for the purpose of disembarkation, were assembled in the
bay. On the land side were stupendous batteries and works, mounting 200
pieces of ordnance, and protected by an army of 40,000 men, commanded by a
victorious and active general, and animated by the presence of two princes of
the blood, a number of officers of the first distinction, and the general expecta-
tion of the world. To this prodigious force was opposed a garrison of 7,000
effective men, including the marine brigade, with only 80 cannon, 7 mortars, and
9 howitzers." " The loss of the enemy in killed and prisoners was calculated
at 2,000, while the garrison, in so furious an attack, had only 1 officer, 2 sub-
alterns, and 13 privates killed, and 5 officers and 63 privates wounded. The
damage sustained by the fortress itself was so small that the whole sea line was
put in order before night."
Copenhagen. The passage of the Cattegat by the British fleet in 1801, and
their attack on Copenhagen, have often been alluded to in discussions on the
power of ships and batteries ; and although the facts and circumstances are all
well authenticated, they have sometimes been most singularly perverted, and
the most unwarrantable inferences drawn from them. The following are the
main features and facts of the case, as drawn from the official returns and
authentic records : The British fleet of fifty -two sail, eighteen of them line-of-
battle-ships, four frigates, &c., sailed from Yarmouth roads on the 12th of March,
passed the sound on the 30th, and attacked and defeated the Danish line on the
2d of April.
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 289
The sound between Cronenberg and the Swedish coast is about' two and one-
half miles wide. The batteries of Cronenberg and Elsinore were lined with 100
pieces of cannon and mortars ; but the Swedish battery had been much neglected,
and then mounted only six guns. Nevertheless, the British admiral, to avoid
the damage his squadron would have to sustain in the passage of this wide
channel, defended by a force scarcely superior to a single one of his ships, pre-
ferred to attempt the difficult passage of the Belt ; but after a few of his light
vessels, acting as scouts, had run on the rocks, he returned to the sound.
He then tried to negotiate a peaceful passage, threatening a declaration of war
if his vessels should be fired upon. It must be remembered that England was
at peace with both Denmark and Sweden, and that no just cause of war existed.
Hence, the admiral inferred that the commanders of these batteries would be
loth to involve their countries in a war with so formidable a power as England,
by commencing hostilities, when only a free passage was asked. The Danish
commander replied, that he should not permit a fleet to pass his post, whose
object and destination were unknown to him. He fired upon them, as bound to
do by long-existing commercial regulations, and not as an act of hostility against
the English. The Swedes, on the contrary, remained neutral, and allowed the
British vessels to lie near by for several days without firing upon them. Seeing
this friendly disposition of the Swedes, the fleet neared their coast, and passed
out of the reach of the Danish batteries, which opened a fire of balls and shells ;
but all of "them fell more than two hundred yards short of the fleet, which
escaped without the loss of a single man.
The Swedes excused their treachery by the plea that it would have been
impossible to construct batteries at that season, and, even had it been possible,
Denmark would not have consented to their doing so, for fear that Sweden
would renew her old claim to one-half of the rich duties levied by Denmark on
all ships passing the strait. There may have been some grounds for the last
excuse; but the true reason for their conduct was the fear of getting involved
in a war with England. Napoleon says that, even at that season, a few days
only would have been sufficient for placing one hundred guns in battery; and
that Sweden had much more time than was requisite. And with one hundred
guns on each side of the channel, served with skill and energy, the fleet must
necessarily have sustained so much damage as to render it unfit to attack
Copenhagen.
On this passage, we remark: 1st. The whole number of guns and mortars in
the forts of the sound amounted to only 106, while the fleet carried over 1,700
guns; and yet, with this immense superiority of more than sixteen to one, the
British admiral preferred the dangerous passage of the Belt to encountering the
fire of these land batteries. 2d. By negotiations and threatening the vengeance
of England, he persuaded the small Swedish battery to remain silent, and allow
the fleet to pass near that shore, out of reach of the guns of Cronenberg and
Elsinore. 3d. It is the opinion of Napoleon and the best English writers, that
if the Swedish battery had been put in order, and acted in concert with the
Danish works, they might have so damaged the fleet as to render it incapable
of any serious attempt on ^Copenhagen.
This passage of the Cattegat is quoted by the Apalachicola report as a case
settling the naked question of relative strength of guns afloat and guns ashore,
and as decisive of the perfect inability of our fortifications to stop the transit of
a fleet!
We now proceed to consider the circumstances attending the attack and de-
fence of Copenhagen itself. The only side of the town exposed to the attack
of heavy shipping is the northern, where there lies a shoal extending out a con-
siderable distance, leaving only a very narrow approach to the heart of the city.
On the most advanced part^of this shoal are the crown batteries, carrying in all
H. Rep. Com. 86 19
290 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
eighty-eight guns.* The entrance into the Baltic, between Copenhagen and
Salthorn, is divided into two channels by a bank, called the Middle Ground,
which is situated directly opposite Copenhagen. To defend the entrance on the
left of the crown batteries, they placed near the mouth of the channel four ships-
of-the-line, one frigate, and two sloops, carrying, in all, 358 guns. To secure
the port and city from bombardment from the King's channel, (that between the
Middle Ground and town,) a line of floating defences were moored near the
edge of the shoal, and manned principally by volunteers. This line consisted
of old hulls of vessels, block ships, praams, sloops, rafts, &c., carrying, in all,
628 guns a force strong enough to prevent the approach of bomb vessels and
gunboats, (the purpose for which it was intended,) but utterly incapable of con-
tending with first-rate ships-of-war; but these the Danes thought would be
deterred from approaching by the difficulties of navigation. These difficulties
were certainly very great; and Nelson said, beforehand, that "the wind which
might carry him in would most probably not bring out a crippled ship." Had
the Danes supposed it possible for Nelson to approach with his large vessels,
the line of floating defences would have been formed nearer Copenhagen, the
right supported by batteries raised on the isle of Amack. "In that case," says
Napoleon, "it is probable that Nelson would have failed in his attack; for it
would have been impossible .for him to pass between the line and shore thus
lined with cannon." As it was, the line was too extended for strength, and its
right too far advanced to receive assistance from the battery of Amack. A part
of the fleet remained as a reserve, under Admiral Parker, while the others, under
Nelson, advanced to the King's channel. This attacking force consisted of eight
ships-of-the-line and thirty-six smaller vessels, carrying, in all, 1,100 guns,
without including those in the six gun-brigs, whose armament is not given. One
of the seventy-fours could not be brought into action, and two others grounded ;
but Lord Nelson says, "although not in the situation assigned them, yet they
were so placed as to be of great service." This force was concentrated upon a
part of the Danish line of floating defences, the whole of which was not only
inferior to it by 382 guns, but so situated as to be beyond the reach of succor,
and without a chance of escape. The result was what might have been ex-
pected. Every vessel of the right and centre of this outer Danish line was
taken or destroyed, except one or two small ones, which cut and run under pro-
tection of the fortifications. The left of the line, being supported by the crown
batiery, remained unbroken. A division of frigates, in hopes of proving an
adequate substitute for the ships intended to attack the batteries, ventured to
engage them, but "it suffered considerable loss, and, in spite of all its efforts,
was obliged to relinquish this enterprise and sheer off."
The Danish vessels lying in the entrance of the channel to the city were not
attacked, and took no material part in the contest. They are to be reckoned in
the defence on the same grounds that the British ships of the reserve should be
included in the attacking force. Nor was any use made of the guns on shore,
for the enemy did not advance far enough to be within their range.
The crown battery was behind the Danish line, and mainly masked by it.
A part only of its guns could be used in support of the left of this line, and in
repelling the direct attack of the frigates, which it did most effectually. But
we now come to a new feature in this battle. As the Danish line of floating de-
fences fell into the hands of the English, the range of the crown battery en-
larged and its power was felt. Nelson saw the danger to which his fleet was
exposed, and, being at last convinced of the prudence of the admiral's signal for
retreat, " made up his mind to weigh anchor and retire from the engagement."
*Some writers say only sixty-eight or seventy; but the English writers generally say
eighty-eight. A few, apparently to increase the brilliancy of the victory, make this num-
ber .-till greater.
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 291
To retreat, however, from his present position was exceedingly difficult and
dangerous. He therefore determined to endeavor to effect an armistice, and
despatched the following letter to the Prince Regent :
" Lord Nelson has directions to spare Denmark, when no longer resisting ;
but if the firing is continued on the part of Denmark, Lord Nelson must be
obliged to set on fire all the floating batteries he has taken, without the power
to save the brave Danes who have defended them."
This produced an armistice, and hostilities had hardly ceased when three of
the English ships, including that in which Nelson himself was, struck upon the
bank. " They were in the jaws of destruction, and could never have escaped
if the batteries had continued their fire. They therefore owed their safety to
this armistice." A convention was soon signed, by which everything was left
in statu quo, and the fleet of Admiral Parker allowed to proceed into the Baltic.
The Rev. Edward Baines, the able English historian of the wars of the
French revolution, in speaking of Nelson's request for an armistice, says :
" This letter, which exhibited a happy union of policy and courage, was written
at a moment when Lord Nelson perceived that in consequence of the unfavor-
able state of the wind, the admiral was not likely to get up to aid the enter-
prise ; that the principal batteries of the enemy, and the ships at the mouth of
the harbor, were yet untouched; that two of his own division had grounded,
and others were likely to share the same fate." Campbell says these batteries
and ships " were still unconyuered. Two of his own (Nelson's) vessels were
grounded and exposed to a heavy fire ; others, if the battle continued, might be
exposed to a similar fate, while he found it would be scarcely practicable to
bring off the prizes under the fire of the batteries."
With respect to the fortifications of the toAvn, a chronicler of the times says
they were of no service while the action lasted. " They began to fire when the
enemy took possession of the abandoned ships, but it was at the same time the
parley appeared." The Danish commander, speaking of the general contest
between the two lines says : " The crown battery did not come at all into
action." An English writer says distinctly : " The works (fortifications) of Co-
penhagen were absolutely untouched at the close of the action." Colonel
Mitchell, the English historian, says : " Lord Nelson never fired a shot at the
town or fortifications of Copenhagen. He destroyed a line of block ships,
praams, and floating batteries that defended the sea approach to the town ; and
the Crown Prince, seeing his capital exposed, was Avilling to finish by armistice
a war the object of which was neither very popular nor well understood.
What the result of the action between the defences of Copenhagen and the
British fleet might ultimately have been is therefore uncertain. The BOMBARD-
MENT OF COPENHAGEN BY NELSON, as it is generally styled, is, therefore,
like most other oracular phrases of the day, a mere combination of words with-
out the slightest meaning."
The British lost in killed and wounded 943 men, and the loss of the Danes,
according to their own account, which is confirmed by the French, was but very
little higher. The English, however, say it amounted to 1,600 or 1,800 ; but
let the loss be what it may, it was almost exclusively confined to the floating
defences, and can in no way determine the relative accuracy of aim of the guns
ashore and guns afloat.
The facts and testimony we have adduced prove incontestably :
1st. That of the fleet of 52 sail and 1,700 guns sent by the English to the
attack upon Copenhagen, two ships of 148 guns were grounded or wrecked;
seven ships- of- the-line and 36 smaller vessels, carrying over 1,000 guns, wQre
actually brought into the action ; while the remainder were held as a reserve,
to act upon the first favorable opportunity.
2d. That the Danish line of floating defences, consisting mostly of old hulls,
sloops, rafts, &c., carried only 628 guns of all descriptions ; that the fixed bat-
292 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
teries supporting this line did not carry over SO or 90 guns at most ; and that
both these land and fljating batteries were mostly manned and the guns served
by volunteers.
3d. That the fixed batteries in the system of defence were either so com-
pletely masked or so far distant, as to be useless during the contest between the
fleet and floating force.
4th. That the few guns of these batteries which were rendered available by
the position of the floating defences repelled with little or no loss to themselves,
and some injury to the enemy, a vastly superior force of frigates which had at-
tacked them.
5th. That the line of floating defences was conquered and mostly destroyed,
while the fixed batteries were uninjured.
6th. That the fortifications of the city and of Amack island were not attacked,
and had no part in the contest.
7th. That as soon as the batteries were unmasked, and began to act, Nelson
prepared to retreat; but, on account of the difficulty of doing so, he opened a
parley, threatening, with a cruelty unworthy the most barbarous ages, that un-
less the batteries ceased their Jire upon his ships, he would burn all the Danish
prisoners in his possession ; and that this armistice was concluded just in time
to save his own ships from destruction.
8th. That, consequently, the battle of Copenhagen cannot properly be re-
garded as a contest between ships and forts, or a triumph of ships over forts ;
that so far as the guns on shore were engaged they showed a vast superiority
over those afloat a superiority known and confessed by the English.
And yet, hi the face of all these facts, and in opposition to the accumulated
testimony of English, French, and Danish historians, the Apalachicola reporter
persists in regarding this as a contest between ships and batteries, in which the
latter gained the victory ; nay, he goes so far as to rank all the old rotten hulks
and rafts of the Danish line as fortifications, for he says; "The British fleet
fought only 468 guns afloat against those 986 guns on Amack and crown batte-
ries; yet in four hours they were silenced, and the object gained." A strange
inaccuracy of vision, while looking at well-known and undisputed historical
events !
Constantinople. " Sir John Duckforth forced the passage of the Dardanelles
with six ships-of-the-line, and was rebuked because he had not continued on to
Constantinople, and with, his small force assaulted the city." The channel of
the Dardanelles is about 12 leagues long, 3 miles wide at its entrance, and about
three-quarters of a mile at its narrowest point. Its principal defences are the
outer and inner castles of Europe and Asia, and the castles of Sestos and
Abydos. Constantinople stands about 100 miles from its entrance into the sea of
Marmora, and at nearly the opposite extremity of this sea. The defences of the
channel had been allowed to go to decay ; but few guns were mounted, and the
forts were but partially garrisoned. In Constantinople, not a gun was mounted,
and no preparations for defence were made ; indeed, previous to tfre approach
of the fleet, the Turks had not determined whether to side with the English or
French, and even then the French ambassador had the greatest difficulty in
persuading them to resist the demands of Duckforth.
The British fleet consisted of six sail of the line, two .frigates, two sloops, and
several bomb vessels, carrying 818 guns, beside those in the bomb ships. Admiral
Duckforth sailed through the Dardanelles on the 19th February, 1807, with
little or no opposition. This being a Turkish festival day, the soldiers of the
scanty garrison were enjoying the festivities of the occasion, and none were
left to serve the few guns of the forts which had been prepared for defence.
But while the admiral was waiting in the sea of Marmora for the result of nego-
tiations, or for a favorable wind to make the attack upon Constantinople, the
fortifications of this city were put in order, and the Turks actively employed,
under French engineers and artillery officers, in repairing the defences of the
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 293
straits. Campbell, in his Naval History, says: "Admiral Duckforth now fully
perceived the critical situation in which he was placed. He might, indeed, suc-
ceed, should the weather become favorable, in bombarding Constantinople; but,
unless the bombardment should prove completely successful in forcing the Turks
to pacific terms, the injury he might do to the city would not compensate for the
damage which his fleet must necessarily sustain. With this damaged and
crippled fleet, he must repass the Dardanelles, now rendered infinitely stronger
than they were when he came through them."
Under these circumstances, the admiral determined to retreat ; and on the 3d
of April escaped through the Dardanelles, steering midway of the channel, with
a favorable and strong current. "This escape, however," says Baines, "was
only from destruction, but by no means from serious loss and injury. * * *
In what instance, in the whole course of our naval warfare, have ships received
equal damage in so short a time as in this extraordinary enterprise ?" In de-
tailing the extent of this damage, we will take the ships in the order they de-
scended.
The first had her wheel carrried away, and her hull much damaged, but es-
caped with the loss of only three men. A stone shot penetrated the second between
the poop and quarter deck, badly injured the mizzen mast, carried away the
wheel, and did other serious damage; killing and wounding 20. Two shot
struck the third, carrying away her shrouds and injuring her masts ; loss in
killed and wounded, 30. The fourth had her mainmast destroyed, with a loss
of 16. The fifth had a large shot, six feet eight inches in circumferaitce enter
her lower deck ; loss 55. The sixth not injured. The seventh a good deal
damaged, with a loss of 17. The eighth had no loss. The ninth was so much
injured that "had there been a necessity for hauling the wind on the opposite
tack she must have gone down;" her loss was 8. The tenth lost 12. The
eleventh was much injured, with a loss of 8 making a total loss in repassing
the Dardanelles of 167, and in the whole expedition 281, exclusive of 250 men
who perished in the burning of the Ajax.
Such was the effect produced on the British fleet, sailing with a favorable
wind and strong current past the half-manned and half-armed forts of the Dar-
danelles. Duckforth himself says that, had he remained before Constantinople
much longer, till the forts had been completely put in order, no return would
have been open to him, and " the unavoidable sacrifice of the squadron must
have been the consequence." Scarcely had the fleet cleared the straits before
it (the fleet) was re-enforced with eight sail of the line ; but, even with this vast in-
crease of strength, they did not venture to renew the contest. They had ef-
fected a most fortunate escape. General Jomini says, that if the defence had
been conducted by a more enterprising and experienced people the expedition
would have cost the English their whole squadron.
Great as was the damage done to the fleet, the forts themselves were uninjured.
The English say their own fire did no execution, the shot in all probability not
even striking their objects "the rapid change of position, occasioned by a fair
wind and current, preventing the certainty of aim." The state of the batteries
when the fleet first passed in is thus described in James's Naval History:
" Some of them were dilapidated, and others but partially mounted and poorly
manned." And Alison says: " They had been allowed to fall into disrepair.
The castles of Europe and Asia, indeed, stood in frowning majesty, to assert
the dominion of the Crescent at the narrowest part of the passage, but their
ramparts were antiquated, their guns in part dismounted, and such as remained,,
though of enormous calibre, little calculated to answer the rapidity and precision
of an English broadside."
With respect to the "rebuke" mentioned in the Apalachicola report, we have
been unable to ascertain by whom it was given. We can find no account of it
in the several histories of the British navy. The House of Commons rejected
294 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
a motion to call for the papers ; the hoard of admiralty made no charges or com-
plaints; and, in the public estimation, says James, "Sir John rather gained than
lost credit for the discomfiture he had experienced." Much has been said
because the fortifications of the Dardanelles did not hermetically seal that chan-
nel, (an object they were never expected to accomplish, even had they been
well armed and well served;) but it is forgotten, or entirely overlooked, that
twelve Turkish line-qf-battle -ships, two of them three-deckers, with nine frigates ',
were, with their sails bent and in apparent readiness, filed with troops," and
lying within the line of fortifications ; and yet this naval force effected little or
nothing against the invaders. It is scarcely ever mentioned, being regarded of
little consequence as a means of defence; and yet the number of their guns,
and the expense of their construction and support, could hardly have fallen
short of the incomplete and half-garrisoned forts, some of which were as ancient
as the reign of Amurath.
Algiers. The attack upon Algiers, in 1816, has been frequently alluded to
as a great instance of naval success, and is discussed at considerable length by
the board of officers appointed by Mr. Poinsett, on the subject of national defence.
But this board confessed themselves uninformed on several important facts;
and their report, on this account, is less satisfactory than it otherwise would
have been. The Apalachicola reporter has paraded this attack as entirely
decisive of the superiority of guns afloat ; but we cannot find that his account is
sustained by any authority whatever.
The following narrative is drawn from the reports of the English and Dutch
admirals, and other official and authentic English papers :
The attack was made by the combined fleets, consisting of five sail of the
line, eighteen or twenty frigates and smaller vessels, besides five bomb vessels
and smaller rocket boats, mounting in all about 1,000 guns. The armament of
some of the smaller vessels is not given, but the guns of those whose armaments
are known amount to over 900. The harbor and defences of Algiers had been
previously surveyed by Captain Warde, royal navy, under Lord Exrnouth's
direction; and the number of the combined fleet was arranged according to the
information given in this survey just so many ships, and no more, being taken,
as could be employed to advantage against the city, without being needlessly
exposed. Moreover, the men and officers had been selected and exercised with
reference to this particular attack.
From the survey of Captain Warde, and the accompanying map, it appears
that the armament of all the fortifications of Algiers and the vicinity, counting
the water fronts and parts that could flank the shore, was only 284 guns of
various sizes and descriptions, including mortars. But not near all of these
could act upon the fleet as it lay. Other English accounts state the number of
guns actually opposed to the fleet at from 220 to 230. Some of these were in
small and distant batteries, whereas nearly all the fleet was concentrated on the
mole-head works. Supposing only one broadside of the ships to have been
engaged, the ratio of forces, as expressed by the number of guns, imist have
been about five to two. This is a favorable supposition for the ships; for we
know that several of them, from their position and a change of anchorage,
brought both broadsides to bear. The Algerine shipping in the harbor was
considerable, including several vessels-of-war, but no use of them was made in
the defence, and nearly all were burnt. The attacking ships commanded some
of the batteries, and almost immediately dismounted their guns. The walls of
the casemated works were so thin as to be very soon battered down. Most of
the Algeriue guns were badly mounted, and many of them were useless after
the first fire. They had no furnaces for heating shot, and, as " they loaded
their guns with loose powder, put in with a ladle," they could not possibly have
used hot shot, even had they constructed furnaces. The ships approached the
forts, and many of them anchored in their intended positions, without a shot
FOKTIFICATTONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 295
being fired from the batteries. The action commenced at a quarter before three,
and did not entirely cease till half-past eleven. The ships now took advantage
of the land breeze, and, by warping and towing off, were able to get under sail
and come to anchor beyond reach of the land batteries. Negotiations were
again opened, and the Dey surrendered the Christian slaves, and yielded to the
terms of the treaty.
During the contest, the fleet "fired nearly 118 tons of powder and 50,000
shot, (weighing more than 500 tons of iron,) besides 960 thirteen and ten inch
shells, (thrown by the bomb vessels,) and the shells and rockets from the
flotilla." The vessels were considerably crippled, and their loss in killed and
wounded amounted to 883. The land batteries were much injured, and a large
part of their guns dismounted. Their loss is not known ; the English confess
.they could obtain no account of it, but suppose it to have been very great.
This seems more than probable ; for, besides those actually employed in the
defence, large numbers of people crowded into the forts to witness the contest.
So great was this curiosity, that, when the action commenced, the parapets
were covered with the multitude, gazing at the manoeuvres of the ships. To
avoid so unnecessary and indiscrimite a slaughter, Lord Exmouth (showing
humanity that does him great credit) motioned with his hand to the ignorant
wretches to retire to some place of safety. This loss of life in the batteries, the
burning of the buildings within the town and about the mole, the entire de-
struction of their fleet and merchant vessels anchored within the mole and in
the harbor, had a depressing effect upon the inhabitants, and probably did more
than the injuries received by the batteries in securing an honorable conclusion
to the treaty. We know very well that these batteries, though much injured,
were not silenced when Lord Exmouth took advantage of the land breeze, and
sailed beyond their reach. The ships retired : first, because they had become
much injured, and their ammunition nearly exhausted; second, in order to escape
from a position so hazardous, in case of a storm; and third, to get beyond the
reach of the Algerine batteries. Lord Exmouth himself gives these as his
reasons for the retreat, and says: "The land wind saved me many a gallant
fellow." And Vice- Admiral Von de Capellan, in his report of the battle, gives
the same opinion: " In this retreat" says he, "which, from want of wind and
the damage suffered in the rigging, was very slow, the ships had still to suffer
much from the new opened and redoubled Jire of the enemy's batteries; at last,
the land breeze springing up," &c.
An English officer, who took part in this affair, says : " It was well for us
that the land wind came off, or we should never have got out; and God knows
what would have been our fate, had we remained all night."
The motives of the retreat cannot, therefore, be doubted. Had the Arabs set
themselves zealously at work during the night to prepare for a new contest, by
remounting their gnns, and placing others behind the ruins of those batteries
which had fallen in other words, had the works now been placed in hands as
skilful and experienced as the English, the contest would have been far from
ended. "But, in the words of the board of defence, " Loud Exmouth relied on
the effects produced on the people by his dreadful cannonade, and the result
proves that he was right. His anxiety to clear the vessels from the contest
shows that there was a power still unconquered, which he thought it better to
leave to be restrained by the suffering population of the city than to keep in a
state of exasperation and activity by his presence. What was this power but
an unsubdued energy in the batteries 1
" The true solution of the question is, then, not so much the amount of injury
done on the one side or the other, particularly as there was on the one side a
city to suffer as well as the batteries, as the relative efficiency of the parties
when the battle closed. All political agitation and popular clamor aside, what
would have been the result had the fight been continued, or even had Lord Ex-
296 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
mouth renewed it next morning ] These are questions that can be answered
only on conjecture; but the manner the battle ended certainly leaves room for
many doubts whether, had the subsequent demands of Lord Exmouth been re-
jected, he had it in his power to enforce them by his ships ; whether, indeed,
if he had renewed the fight, he would not have been signally defeated.
" On the whole, we do not think that this battle, although it stands pre-
eminent as an example of naval success over batteries, presents an argument to
shake the confidence which fortifications, well situated, well planned, and well
fought, deserve, as the defences of a seabord."
We cannot help regarding these conclusions just when we reflect upon all the
circumstances of the case. The high character, skill, and bravery of the attack-
ing force ; their immense siiperiority in number of guns, with no surplus human
life to be exposed ; the antiquated and ill-managed works of defence ; the entire .
want of skill of the Algerine artillerists and the neglect of the ordinary means
of preparation ; the severe execution which these ill-served guns did upon the
enemy's ships, an execution far more dreadful than that effected by the French
or Dutch fleets in their best contested naval battles with the ships of the game
foe from these facts we must think that those who are so ready to draw from
this case conclusions unfavorable to the use of land batteries as a means of
defence against shipping know but little of the nature of the contest.
An English historian of some note, in speaking of this attack, says : " It is
but little to the purpose, unless to prove what may be accomplished by fleets
against towns exactly so circumstanced, placed, and governed. Algiers is situ-
ated on an amphitheatre of hills sloping down towards the sea, and presenting,
therefore, the fairest mark to the fire of hostile ships. But where is the capital
exactly so situated that we are ever likely to attack ? And as to the destruction
of a few second-rate towns, even when practicable, it is a mean, unworthy
species of warfare, by which nothing was ever gained. The severe loss sustained
before Algiers must also be taken into account, because it was inflicted by mere
Algerine artillery, and was much inferior to what may be expected from a con-
test maintained against batteries manned with soldiers instructed by officers of
skill and science, not only in working the guns, but in the endless duties of de-
tail necessary for keeping the whole of an artillery material in a proper state of
formidable efficiency."
San Juan d' Ulloa, "falling before a small French squadron after a few
hours' cannonading'' Ti-e following facts relative to this attack are drawn
principally from the report of the French engineer officer, who was one of the
expedition. The French fleet consisted of four ships carrying 188 guns, two
armed steamboats, and two bomb ketches, with four large mortars. The whole
number of guns found in the fort was 187 ; a considerable portion of these, how-
ever, were for land defence. When the French vessels were towed into the
position selected for the attack " it was lucky for us," says their reporter, " that
the Mexicans did not disturb this operation, which lasted nearly two hours, and
that they permitted us to commence the fire." " We were exposed to 'the fire
of one 24-pounder, fiv$ 16-pounders, seven 12-pounders, one 8-pounder, and five
18-pounder carronades in all nineteen pieces only." If these be converted into
equivalent 24-pounders, in proportion to the weight of balls, the whole 19 guns
will be less than 12 2^-pounders ! This estimate is much too great, for it allows
three 8-pounders to be equal to one 24-pounder, and each of the 18-pounder
carronades to be three-quarters the power of a long 24-pounder; whereas, at the
distance at which the parties were engaged, these small pieces were nearly harm-
less. Two of the powder magazines, not being bomb-proof, were blown up
during the engagement, by which three of the 19 guns on the water front of the
castle were dismounted, thus reducing the land force to an equivalent of ten
24-pounders. The other 17 guns were still effective when abandoned by the
Mexicans.
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 297
It appears from the above-mentioned report that the number of guns actually
brought into action by the floating force amounted to 94, besides four heavy sea
mortars ; that the whole number so employed in the fort was only 19 ; that
these were generally so small and inefficient that their balls would not enter the
sides of the ordinary attacking frigates ; that the principal injury sustained by
the castle was produced by the explosion of powder magazines, which were in-
judiciously placed and improperly secured ; that the castle, though built of poor
materials, was but slightly injured by the French fire; that the Mexicans proved
themselves ignorant of the ordinary means of defence, and abandoned their works
when only a few of their guns had been dismounted ; that, notwithstanding all
the circumstances in favor of the French, their killed and wounded, in proportion
to the guns acting against them, was upwards of jour times as great as the loss
of the English at the battle of Trafalgar !
" St. Jean d* Acre reduced in a Jew hours by a British fleet, and taken pos-
session of by the seamen and marines" Fortunately, the principal facts con-
nected with this attack are now fully authenticated. For the armament of the
fleet we quote from the British official papers, and for that of the fort from the
pamphlet of Lieutenant Colonel Matuszewiez.
The fortifications were built of poor materials, antiquated in their plans, and
much decayed. Their entire armament amounted to only 200 guns, some of
which were merely field-pieces. The water fronts were armed with 100 cannon
and 16 mortars, those of the smaller calibre included. When approached by the
British fleet the works were undergoing repairs, and, says Commodore Napier,
" were fast getting into a state of preparation against attack."
The British fleet consisted of eight ships-of-the-line, carrying 646 guns ; six
frigates, carrying 236 guns; four steamers, carrying eighteen guns ; and two or
three other vessels whose force is not given. " Only a few guns," says Napier,
"defended the approach from the northward," and most of the ships came in
from that direction. The western front was armed with about forty cannon ;
but opposed to this were six ships and two steamers, carrying about 500 guns.
Their fire was tremendous during the engagement, but no breach was made in
the walls. The south front was armed in part by heavy artillery, and in part by
field pieces. This front was attacked by six ships and two steamers, carrying
over 200 guns. The eastern front was armed only with light artillery ; against
this was concentrated the remainder of the fleet, carrying 240 guns. The guns
of the works were so poorly mounted that but few could be used at all ; and
these, on account of the construction of the fort, could not reach the ships, though
anchored close by the walls. "Only five of their guns," says Napier, " placed
in a flanking battery, were well served and never missed ; but they were pointed
too high, and damaged our spars and rigging only." The stone *was of so poor
a quality, says the narrative of Colonel Matuszewiez, that the walls fired upon
presented on the exterior a shattered appearance, but they were nowhere seriously
injured. In the words of Napier, " they were not breached, and a determined
enemy might have remained secure under the breastworks, or in the numerous
casemates without suffering much loss" The explosion of a magazine within
the fort, containing 6,000 casks of powder, laid in ruins a space of 60,000 square
yards, opened a large breach in the walls of the fortification, partially destroyed
the prisons, and killed and wounded 1,000 men of the garrison. This frightful
disaster, says the French account, hastened the triumph of the fleet. The pris-
oners and malefactors, thus released from confinement, rushed upon the garrison
at the same time with the mountaineers, who had besieged the place on the land
side. The uselessness of the artillery, the breaches in the fort, the attacks of
the English all combined to force the retreat of the garrison, " in the midst of
scenes of blood and atrocious murders." We will close this account with the
following extract from a speech of the Duke of Wellington, in the House of
Lords, February 4, 1841 : " He had had," he said, " a little experience in services
298 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
of this nature, and he thought it his duty to warn their lordships on this occa-
sion that they must not always expect that ships, however well commanded, or
however gallant their seamen might be, were capable of commonly engaging
successfully with stone walls. He had no recollection in all his experience,
except the recent instance on the coast of Syria, of any fort being taken by ships,
excepting two or three years ago, when the Fort of San Juan d'Ulloa was cap-
tured by the French fleet. This was, he thought, the single instance that he
recollected, though he believed that something of the sort had occurred at the
siege of Havana in 1763. The present achievement he considered one of the
greatest of modern times. This was his opinion, and he gave the highest credit
to those who had performed such a service. It was, altogether, a most skilful
proceeding. He was greatly surprised at the small number of men that was lost
on board the fleet ; and, on inquiring how it happened, he discovered that it was
because the vessels were moored within one-third of the ordinary distance. The
guns of the fortress were intended to strike objects at a greater distance ; and
the consequence was, that the shot went over the ships that were anchored at
one-third the usual distance. By that means they sustained not more than one-
tenth of the loss which they would otherwise have experienced. Not less than
500 pieces of ordnance were directed against the walls, and the precision with
which the fire was kept up, the position of the vessels, and, lastly, the blowing
up of the large magazine all aided in achieving this great victory in so short a
time. He had thought it right to say thus much, because he wished to warn
the public against supposing that such deeds as this could be effected every day.
He would repeat that this was a singular instance, in the achievement of which
great skill was undoubtedly manifested, but which was also connected with
peculiar circumstances, which they could not hope always to occur. It must
not, therefore, be expected as a matter of course that all such attempts must
necessarily succeed."
We have now discussed the several instances, in other countries, of British
naval prowess, so highly lauded by the Apalachicola report, except the taking
of "Constantinople by the Venetian fleet " and the English conquest of "Canton,
but just now" With respect to the former conquest, it will be sufficient to re-
mark, that it was made before the invention of gunpowder. The utter inefficiency
of the Chinese to carry on war with modern Europeans, with anything like
equality of forces, is too well known to require comment. Their land batteries
were constructed in violation of all rules of the art ; and they attempted to
frighten away the English by the sound of their gongs, and the turning of som-
ersets by their troops ! Ten Englishmen were anywhere more than equal to
one hundred natives !
We now turn to the examples of British naval superiority, said by the report
to have been exhibited in their several attacks upon the fortifications of our own
country. The only refutation we shall offer is the following brief account of the
facts. They are collected from the best English and American authorities.
"Louisbwg was attached and taken by a naval force" So says tne Ap-
alachicola report; but we confidently affirm that, although several times attacked,
it never was taken by a naval force alone, no matter how superior that force
might be. This place was first reduced in 1745. For this attack the colonies
raised about 4,000 men and 100 small vessels and transports, carrying between
160 and 200 guns. They were afterwards joined by ten other ships, carrying
near 500 guns. This attacking force now, according to some of the English
writers, consisted of 6,000 "provincials, 800 seamen, and a naval force of near
700 guns. The troops landed and laid siege to the town. The garrisons of
of these works consisted of 600 regulars and 1,000 Breton militia, or, according
to some writers, of only 1,200 men in all. The armament of Louisburg was
101 cannon, 76 swivels, and six mortars. Auxiliary to the main works, was an
island battery of thirty 22-pounders, and a battery on the main land armed with
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 299
thirty large cannon. Frequent attempts were made to storm the place, but the
most persevering efforts were of no avail many of the New Englanders being
killed and wounded, and their boats destroyed, while the garrison remained
unharmed. At length, after a siege of 49 days, want of provisions, and the
general dissatisfaction of the inhabitants, caused the garrison to surrender.
When the New Englanders saw the strength of the works, and the little im-
pression which their efforts had produced, they were not only greatly elated but
astonished at their success. It should be noticed that, in the above attack, the
number of guns in the fleet was almost three times as great as that of all the
forts combined ; and yet the naval part of the attack was unsuccessful. The
besieging army was four times as great as all the garrisons combined; and yet
the place held out forty-nine days, and at last was surrendered through the
want of provisions and the disaffection of the citizens.
A formidable effort was now made by the French to recover this place. For
this purpose, a large fleet was sent from France, consisting of near forty ships-
of-war, two artillery ships, and fifty-six transports, carrying about 3,500 men
and 40,000 stand of small arms for the use of the Canadians ; but this formida-
ble armament was scattered by storms, and the project abandoned. The place
was afterwards surrendered by treaty.
In 1757 a British fleet of fifteen ships-of-the-line, eighteen frigates, and many
smaller vessels, and a land force of 12,000 effective men, were sent to attempt
the reduction^ of this fortress ; but, being now defended by seventeen ships-of-
the-line and a garrison of 6,000 regulars, its reduction was declared by the British
to be impossible. The forces sent against this place in 1758, consisted of twenty
ships-of-the-line and eighteen frigates, with an army of 14,000 men. The harbor
was defended by only five ships-of-the-line, one fifty gun ship, and five frigates,
three of which were sunk across the mouth of the basin. The fortifications of
the town had been much neglected, and in general had fallen into ruins. The
garrison consisted of only 2,500 regulars and 600 militia. Notwithstanding the
number of guns of the British fleet exceeded both the armaments of the French
ships and all the forts, it did not risk an attack, but merely acted as transports
and as a blockading squadron. Even the French ships and the outer works
commanding the harbor were reduced by the land batteries erected by Wolfe ;
and the main work, although besieged by an inequality of forces of nearly five
to one, held out for two months, and even then surrendered through the peti-
tions and fears of the non-combatant inhabitants, and not because it had received
any material injury from the besiegers. The defence, however, had been con-
tinued long enough to prevent, for that campaign, any further operations against
Canada.
"Quebec was taken from the French by Admiral Saunders, ivho, with twenty-
one sail of the line, entered the St. Lawrence in 1759." This is certainly a
remarkable discovery, for we are sure that no one ever before heard of Quebec
being taken by Admiral Saunders. This discovery opens a new era in military
history; for, hereafter, the fleet which transports an army, though it may not
have a gun of its own on board, is entitled to the credit of all the conquests
which that army may achieve. The battle of the Pyramids was not fought by
Napoleon, but by Admiral Brueix, who conveyed the army to Egypt ! The
defence of Portugal was not made by Wellington, but by the ships which landed
him on the peninsula!
The several naval attacks on Quebec are matters of interest, and we shall
notice them briefly, not, however, for the purpose of refuting the inferences of
the above-mentioned report. In 1690, Massachusetts fitted out a fleet of thirty-
four ships, the largest carrying forty-four guns and about 200 men. The whole
command consisted of about 2,000 men. This force, under the command of Sir
William Phipps, ascended the St. Lawrence and laid siege to Quebec, whose
defences were then of the slightest character, and armed with only twenty-three
300 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
guns. The attack was kept up for some time ; but, at length, the fleet, receiv-
ing more injuries from the batteries than it inflicted on them, withdrew from the
contest, and hastened home with precipitation. In 1693, a considerable fleet
was sent out from England, to attempt the reduction of Quebec ; but a portion
of the crews being destroyed by the yellow fever, the project was abandoned.
In 1709, a combined attack by sea and land was planned against Quebec and
Montreal ; the army advanced as far as Wood creek, but the fleet never ascended
as far as Quebec, and the expedition was abandoned. In 1711, an English
fleet of fifteen ships-of-war, carrying over 800 guns, forty transports, and six
storeships, with over 5,000 seamen and a large land force, attempted the con-
quest of this place; they failed, however, to reach their destination, and, after
losing in the St. Lawrence a part of the ships and more than 1,000 men, aban-
doned the project. In the latter part of 1745, the English colonial fleet of some
600 guns, at Louisburg, was directed to attack Quebec ; but, not receiving the
promised reinforcements from the Duke of Newcastle, they did not venture to
ascend the St. Lawrence. The fleets of Admiral Saunders and Holmes con-
sisted of "twenty-two ships-of-the-line, and an equal number of frigates and
small armed vessels." The ships-of-the-line alone carried 1,500 guns. Wolfe's
army amounted to about 8,000 men. The works of Quebec were armed with
ninety-four guns and five mortars, and only a part of these could be brought to
bear upon the shipping. The fleet ascended the St. Lawrence without difficulty,
and arrived at the Isle of Orleans in the latter part of June, birt did not ap-
proach the city until after Wolfe had " secured the posts, without the command
of which, the fleet could not have lain in safety in the harbor." Admiral
Holmes's division first ascended the St. Lawrence above Quebec, but was soon
withdrawn, to cover the landing of the troops at the falls of Montmorenci, where
an unsuccessful attack was made upon the intrenchments of Montcalm. Several
attempts with the combined sea and land forces were made to carry the works,
but they proved equally unsuccessful. Although the ships carried fifteen or
twenty times as many guns as the forts, their inability to reduce these works
was acknowledged. The siege had continued for two months, and still the forti-
fications were uninjured. General Wolfe himself distinctly stated, that in any
further attempt to carry the place, the "guns of the shipping could not be of
much use;" and the chief engineer of the expedition gave it as his opinion, that
" the ships would receive great damage from the shot and bombs of the upper
batteries, without making the least impression upon them." Under these cir-
cumstances, it was finally determined to endeavor to decoy Montcalm from his
works, and make him risk a battle in the open field. In an evil hour, the
French consented to forego the advantages of their fortifications, and the contest
was finally decided upon the plains of Abraham, with forces nearly equal in
number, but greatly dissimilar in character the English being disciplined and
chosen troops, while nearly one-half of their opponents were militia and Indians,
who gave but a weak support to the regulars. Both Wolfe and Montcalm fell
in this battle, but the former on x the field of victory ; and five days afterwards
the inhabitants, weakened and dispirited by their losses, surrendered the town,
although its fortifications were still unharmed.
"The frigate Roebuck silenced the efficient batteries at Red Hook," fyc. The
little batteries of Red Hook and Governor's Island, however much ridiculed by
the Apalachicola report, were really of great importance to the security of
Washington's army, which was then intrenched in the lines of Brooklyn, with
its right resting upon the small field works of a few guns at Red Hook. This
little work, and the corresponding one on Governor's Island, prevented the
British shipping from passing into the East river, where they could have as-
sailed the Americans in rear, and cut off their retreat. The former of these bat-
teris was never very seriously engaged ; and we cannot find, either in American
or English histories, any notice of its being silenced by the Roebuck. We
FORTIFICATIONS AND ^EA-COAST DEFENCES. 301
know that it was not abandoned till Washingion had effected his retreat across
the East river. Beatson says, the Roebuck exchanged only a few random shots
with it.
The entire English attacking force consisted of 103 ships, carrying over 2,600
guns, and a veteran army of 30,000 men. The fleet lay some days at the Nar-
rows before landing the troops, and seven days more elapsed previous to Wash-
ington's retreat.
Baltimore and Washington. The attacks upon these two places by the
British, in the war 1812, are referred to in the Apalachicola report; the first
as proof of the inefficiency of a "fortress, well situated, having a good garri-
son nay, where all the requisite conditions are fulfilled " to withstand the fire
of shipping ; for it " was evacuated by the fire of the two hostile frigates ;" and
the second as being defended without the use of fortifications, inasmuch as the
" attacking fleet could not approach the works erected for the defence of the
city, and therefore neither received nor inflicted much injury."
We cbny the correctness of these assertions. The fort on the Potomac was
not a fortress, was not well situated, was not well garrisioned, nor were the re-
quisite conditions of defence fulfilled. It was a small inefficient work, incor-
rectly planned by an incompetent French engineer, and has not yet been com-
pleted. The portion constructed was never, until very recently, properly pre-
pared for receiving its armament, and at the time of attack could not possibly
have held out a very long time. But no defence whatever was made. Captain
Gordon, with a squadron of eight sail, carrying 173 guns, under orders to
" ascend the river as high as Fort Washington, and try upon it the experiment
of a bombardment," approached that fort, and, upon firing a single shell, which
did no injury to either the fort or the garrison, the latter deserted the works,
and rapidly retreated. The commanding officer was immediately dismissed for
his cowardice. The fleet ascended the river to Alexandria ; but learning, soon
afterwards, that batteries were preparing at the White House and Indian Head,
to cut off his retreat, it retired in much haste, but not without injury.
The whole fleet sent to the attack of Baltimore consisted of forty sail, the
largest of which were ships-of-the-line, carrying an army of over six thousand
combatants. The troops were landed at North Point, while sixteen of the bomb
vessels and frigates approached within reach of Fort McHenry, and commenced
a bombardment which lasted twenty-five hours. During this attack, the enemy
" threw 1,500 shells, four hundred of which exploded within the walls of the
fort, but without making any unfavorable impression on either the strength of
the work or the spirit of the garrison." The forts labored under the disadvan-
tage of being armed with guns of too small a calibre to reach the shipping ; but
a fleet of barges sent to storm one of the batteries was repulsed with loss, and
both fleet and army soon withdrew from the contest. We thought it was a fact
too well known to need re-assertion at the present day, that the gallant resist-
ance of Colonel Armistead in Fort McHenry, and of General Smith upon the
enemy's line of approach per North Point, saved that beautiful city from being
destroyed by the ruthless foe.
" Charleston was taken, notwithstanding the attack on Fort Moultrie
failed." When this second attack was made on Charleston, Marshall says that
Fort Moultrie was out of repair, and Fort Johnson in ruins. There was, how-
ever, some time before this attack, a full trial of strength, before Charleston, be-
tween the American batteries and British ships. The fort mounted only 26
guns, while the fleet carried 270 guns. In this contest the British were entirely
defeated, and lost, in killed and wounded, more than seventy men to every ten
guns brought against them, while their whole 270 guns killed and wounded only
thirty-two men in the fort. Of this trial of strength, which was certainly a fair
one, Cooper, in his Naval History, says : " It goes fully to 'prove the important
military position, that ships cannot withstand forts, when the latter are properly
302 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
armed, constructed, and garrisoned. General Moultrie says, only thirty rounds
from the battery were fired, and was of opinion that the want of powder alone
prevented the Americans from destroying the men-of-war."
" Mobile fort fell without resistance, yielding up near Jive hundred regular
troops, officers and men, and a full supply of the necessaries for a vigorous de-
fence" In 1814, a British fleet of four vessels, carrying 92 guns, attacked Fort
Boyer, a small redoubt, located on a point of land commanding the passage from
the Gulf into the bay of Mobile. This redoubt was garrisoned by only one
hundred and twenty combatants, officers included, and its armament was but
twenty small pieces of cannon, some of which were almost entirely useless, and most
of them poorly mounted, " in batteries hastily thrown up, and leaving the gunners
uncovered from the knee upwards j" while the enemy's land force, acting in con-
cert with the ships, consisted of twenty artillerists, with a battery of one twelve-
pounder and a howitzer, one hundred and thirty marines, and six hundred In-
dians and negroes. His ships carried five hundred and ninety men in all. This
immense disparity of numbers and strength did not allow to the British- military
and naval commanders the slightest apprehension that four British ships, carry-
ing 92 guns, and a land force somewhat exceeding seven hundred combatants,
could hardly fail in reducing a small work, mounting only twenty short carro-
nades, and defended by a little more than one hundred men, unprovided alike
with furnaces for heating shot or casemates to cover themselves from rockets and
shells." Nevertheless, the enemy was completely repulsed ; one of his largest
ships was entirely destroyed ; his entire loss in killed and wounded could have
fallen but a little short of one hundred, while ours was only eight or nin. Here
was a fair trial of strength, with a result most flattering to the American pride ;
but the Apalachicola report passes it by in silence, and quotes, as proof of the
superiority of British ships over American batteries, the land attack of General
Lambert, in February, 1815, in which not a single ship was in the remotest de-
gree concerned.
We have now disposed of the several examples adduced in the Apalachicola
report to prove the superiority of British naval armaments, gun for gun, over
both American and European batteries. There are a few other trials of strength
between ships and forts, which are not mentioned in that report trials too well
known to admit of any doubt or difference of opinion respecting their results.
Why does the report pass over in silence the attacks upon Stonington, Cagliari,
Martello, Santa Cruz, Marcou, &c., and offer such examples as " Constanti-
nople by a Venetian fleet," "Mocha, in Arabia," "Senegal," "Canton?" &c.
We will in part supply this omission, limiting ourselves, however, to the period
of the French revolution.
On the 21st of January, 1792, a considerable French squadron attacked
Cagliari, in Sardinia, but after a bombardment of three days, (during which
they attempted to land,) they were most signally defeated and obliged to retire.
In 1794, in the bay of Martello, Corsica, a small tower armed with one gun
in barbette, was attacked by two English ships, " the Fortitude of seventy-four
and the Juno frigate of thirty-two guns. After having engaged it for two hours
and a half, they were obliged to haul off with considerable damage. The For-
titude lost seven men, and was three or four times set on fire by heated shot ;
once in the cock pit and state room. There were about thirty men in the tower,
though three were sufficient to work the gun." The garrison does not appear
to have sustained any loss. Colonel Pasley, an English officer of high stand-
ing, says that this attack " proved the superiority which guns on shore must
always, in certain positions, possess over shipping, no matter whether the former
are mounted on a tower or not."
In July, 1797, Nelson, with a squadron of eight ships of his own choosing,
carrying near four hundred guns, entered the bay of Santa Croix, Teneriffe,
and attacked the town. The ships fired upon the small land batteries without
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 303
producing any effect, and a force of one thousand men was several times landed
in boats, but as often driven back with great loss ; a single ball striking the
side of the Fox cutter instantly sunk her, with near one hundred seamen and
marines. After many desperate attempts by the dauntless Nelson to cany the
works, the British were compelled to retire with a loss of two hundred and fifty
killed and wounded, while the garrison received little or no damage.
In the early wars of the French revolution the English took possession of
the islands of Marcou and fortified them, in order to command the coast trade
between Cherbourg and Havre. In 1798 the French attempted to retake these
little islands, and attacked the English redoubt with fifty-two brigs and gun-
boats, carrying 80 long 36's and 18-pounders and six or seven thousand men.
The redoubt was armed with two 32-pounders, two 6-pounders, four 4-pound ers,
and two carronades ; its garrison consisted of only 250 seamen and marines.
Notwithstanding this great disparity of numbers, the little redoubt sunk seven
of the enemy's brigs and boats, captured another, and forced the remainder to
retreat with great loss. The loss of the garrison was only one man killed and
three wounded.
In July, 1801, Porto Ferrairo was garrisoned by 300 British, 800 Tuscans,
and 400 Corsicans. The French army which besieged this motley garrison first
consisted of 1,500 men, but was afterwards increased to 6,000 land forces and
three frigates. The siege was continued for five months, during which time
the place was, several times bombarded and assaulted without success, and was
at last surrendered by the treaty of Amiens.
In July, 1801, Admiral Saumarez attacked the defences of Algesiras with a
fleet of one 80-gun ship, five 74's, one frigate, and a lugger, carrying in all 502
guns. The land defences consisted of Green island battery of seven 18 and
24-pounders, and St. Jaques battery of five 18-pounders. The floating defences
consisted of two 80-gun ships, one of 74, one of 44, and some gun-boats ; in
all 306 guns. The English here chose their time and mode of attack, had the
wind in their favor, and a naval superiority of 196 guns ; and yet they were
most signally defeated, and compelled to retire with the entire loss of one ship
and with the others much injured. Can this be attributed to the superior skill
and bravery of the French and Spanish ships and crews ? Such a supposition
would be in contradiction to the whole history of the war, and we must there-
fore attribute it to the fire of the land batteries. An examination of the details
of this battle will prove clearly that these 12 guns ashore more than compen-
sated for the 196 extra guns of the English. The Hannibal, 74 guns, ran
aground near the land battery, and thus became exposed to its fire. Her posi-
tion was such, however, that she continued to return the fire even after the
other ships had retired. An attempt was made by the Audacious, 74 guns, and
the Caesar, 80 guns, to cut out the Hannibal, but the fire of the little battery
was so severe that the admiral says in his despatches, he was obliged to make
sail and leave her to her fate. The whole loss of the English in killed and
wounded was 375. All the ships were much injured. The Caesar and Pompe'e
were so much shattered as to preclude the hope of their being ready in any
seasonable time to proceed to sea, but by working night and day, the former
was got ready for the first battle of Trafalgar, but the latter was reduced almost
to a wreck.
Shortly after this battle, the French and Spaniards, encouraged by their suc-
cess at Algesiras, proceeded to attack the English at sea. The combined fleet
now carried 1,012 guns, and the English only 422 ; the former, nevertheless,
were most completely beaten shoAving, as did every naval contest during the
war, that on the water the English were far superior to their opponents.
In 1803 the English, under Commander Hood, constructed a small battery
304 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
of some 15* guns upon Diamond rock, about six miles from Port Royal bay.
It was garrisoned with about 100 men. This little work was found so much
to annoy the French shipping going to and from Martinique that in 1805 they
determined to destroy it. The force sent to accomplish this consisted of two
74-gun ships, one frigate, and a brig, with a detachment of 200 troops. Sev-
eral ineffectual attempts were made to silence its fire or carry it by storm, and
on the fourth day of the siege the little garrison, though still unharmed in their
works, capitulated, for want of both ammunition and provisions. There was
not a single man killed or wounded in the redoubt, while the French lost 50 men.
In 1808 a French army of 5,000 men laid siege to Fort Trinidad, then gar-
risoned by less than 100 Spaniards and British marines. An English seventy-
four and a bomb vessel attempted to annoy the besiegers, but were soon driven
off by a French land battery of three guns. During the progress of the siege
an additional force of 50 seamen and 30 marines were thrown into the fort,
making in all about 180 men ; and this little force not only successfully sus-
tained the siege but most bravely repulsed a storming party of 1,000 picked
men, capturing the storming equipage and killing the commanding officer and
all who attempted to mount the breach.
In 1806 the British ship Pompee, 80 guns, the Hydra, 38 guns, and
another frigate, force not given, " anchored about 800 yards from a battery
of two guns situated on the extremity of Cape Licosa, and protected from as-
sault by a tower, in which were five and twenty French soldiers commanded
by a lieutenant. The line-of-battle-ship and the frigates fired successive
broadsides till their ammunition was nearly expended, the battery continually
replying with a slow but destructive effect. The Pompee, at which ship alone
it directed its fire, had 40 shot in her hull, her mizzen topmast carried away, a
lieutenant, midshipman, and 5 men killed, and 30 men wounded. At length,
force proving ineffectual, negotiation was resorted to, and, after some hours'
parley, the officer capitulated. It then appeared that the carriage of one of the
two guns had failed on the second shot, and the gun had subsequently been
fired lying on the sill of the embrasure; so that in fact the attack of an 80-gun
ship and two frigates had been resisted by a single* piece of ordnance." In the
latter wars of the French revolution the British partially fortified the island of
Anhault as a depot and point of communication between England and the
continent. This place was attacked by the Danes in 1811 with twelve gunboats
carrying 72 guns and howitzers and 800 men and several transports, with a land
force whose number has been variously stated from 1,000 to 3,000. The whole
Danish attacking force is estimated by several English writers at 4,000. The
only fortification of importance on the island was a small redoubt, called Light-
house fort, and the garrison consisted of only 381 men. The Danes, under
cover of darkness and a thick fog, succeeded in effecting a landing ; but on
their approach to the batteries a well directed and destructive fire of grape and
musketry was opened upon them. They were most signally defeated, w r ith a
loss of forty killed and five or six hundred wounded and prisoners. The remainder
re-embarked in their boats, but were pursued by two small English vessels that
had opportunely arrived and the greater part of them taken or destroyed.
Leghorn, during the absence of the army in 1813, was attacked by an English
squadron of six ships, carrying over 300 guns and 1,000 troops. "This attack
failed owing to the strength of the fortifications," and the troops and seamen
were re-embarked during a temporary suspension of hostilities.
When Lord Lynedock advanced against Antwerp in 1814, says Colonel
Mitchell, " Fort Frederick, a small work of only two guns, one at right angles
and the other looking diagonally up the stream, was established in a bend of the
<*The armament is said to be "that of a sloop-of-war." Sloops-of-war then carried from
10 to 15 guns.
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 305"
Polder Dyke at some distance below Lillo; the armament was a long 18-pounder
and a 5j-inch howitzer. From this post the French determined to dislodge us,
[the English,] and, on a very fine and calm morning, an 80-gnn ship dropped
down with the tide and anchored near the Flanders shore about 600 yards from
the British battery; by her position she was secured from the fire of the 18-
pounder and exposed to that of the howitzer only. As soon as everything was
made tight her broadside was opened; and if noise and smoke were alone
sufficient to insure success in war, as so many of the moderns seem to think,
the result of this strange contest would not have been long doubtful, for the
thunder of the French artillery actually made the earth to shake again ; but
though the earth shook, the single British howitzer was neither dismounted nor
silenced; and though the artillerymen could not, perfectly exposed as they were,
stand to their gun whilst the iron hail was striking thick and fast around, yet no
sooner did the enemy's fire slacken for a moment than they sprang to tTieir post
ready to return at least one shot for eighty. This extraordinary combat lasted
from seven o'clock in the morning till near twelve at noon, when the French
ship, having had forty-one men killed and wounded, her commander being in
the list of the latter, and having besides sustained serious damage in her hull
and rigging, returned to Antwerp without effecting anything whatever. The
howitzer was not dismounted, the fort was not injured there being, in fact,
nothing to injure and the British had only one man killed and two wounded."
But we will not specify examples ; the whole history of the wars of the French
revolution is one continued proof of the superiority of fortifications as a maritime
frontier defence. The sea-coast of France is almost within a stone's throw* of
the principal British naval depots. Here were large towns and harbors, filled
with the rich commerce of the world, offering the most dazzling attractions to
the brave and enterprising enemy. The French navy was at this time utterly
incompetent to their defence, while England supported a maritime force at an
annual expense of near ninety millions of dollars. Her largest fleets were
continually cruising within sight of these seaports, and not unfrequently attempting
to cut out their shipping. At this period, says one of her naval historians, " the
naval force of Britain, so multiplied and so expert from long practice, had
acquired an intimate knowledge of their [the French] harbors, their bays, and
creeks ; her officers knew the depth of water and the resistance likely to be met
with in every situation." On the other hand, these harbors and towns were
frequently stripped of their garrisons by the necessities of distant wars, being
left with no other defence than their fortifications and militia. And yet, not-
withstanding all this, they escaped unharmed during the entire contest. They
were frequently attacked, and, in some instances, the most desperate efforts were
made to effect a permanent lodgement; but in no case was the success at all
commensurate with the expense of life and treasure sacrificed, and no permanent
hold was made on either the maritime frontiers of France or her allies. , This
certainly was owing to no inferiority of skill and bravery on the part of the
British navy, as the battles of Aboukir and Trafalgar, and the almost annihila-
tion of the French marine, have but too plainly proven. Why, then, did these
places escape 1 We know of no other reason than that they were fortified, and
that the French knew how to defend their fortifications. The British maritime
expeditions to Quebec, the Scheldt, Constantinople, Buenos Ayres, &c., sufficiently
prove the ill success and the waste of life and treasure with which they must
always be attended. But when her naval power Avas applied to the destruction
of the enemy's marine, and in transporting her land forces to solid bases of
operations on the soil of her allies in Portugal and Belgium, the fall of Napoleon
crowned the glory of their achievements.
* Only 18 miles across the British channel at the narrowest place.
H. Rep. Com. 86 20
306 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
We shall close our remarks upon this part of the subject of maritime defence
by quotations from the reports of Mr. Poinsett, Mr. Bell, and Mr. Spencer* and
from the military work of Colonel Mitchell, of the British army. The latter, in
his remarks on military organization, &c., says : " The numerous and splendid
victories achieved by British fleets over forts and batteries have not only tended
to make naval attacks popular, but have also led to the very general belief that
ships can contend successfully against batteries on shore, wherever the latter are
fairly accessible, and as often as there is anything like a fair proportion as to the
numerical force of guns between the contending parties. None of the many
theories that have resulted from the modern chance games of war can possibly
be more erroneous or more dangerous, because the public voice may, at some
moment of general excitement, induce the government to fit out naval armaments
for the attainment of objects totally beyond the reach of naval power. Under
the mischievous belief that wooden walls can stand battering as long as stone
walls, the lives of British seamen, the fame of the navy, and the honor of the
country may be risked in enterprises in which skill and courage can effect nothing,
and in which success can be anticipated only from the folly or cowardice of the
enemy always precarious foundations on which to trust for victory.
"To strike even a pretty large object with a ball fired from a piece of artillery,
at a moderate range, is no very easy matter; and the difficulty is, of course,
much increased when the gun is placed, as on board a ship, on a moving or at
least a very unsteady platform, and where those whose business it is to take
aim are, after the first fire, completely enveloped in smoke. And though towns
and fortresses are not exactly small, or even moderately small objects, they
nevertheless, when situated on a level, present but a very narrow horizontal line
to the shipping ; and of this line a still narrower part is vulnerable. To unroof
the houses of a few harmless citizens, or te throw shells into a second-rate town,
is a mode of warfare as unworthy as inefiicient, and will never induce a com-
mander of ordinary firmness to relinquish his post or give up the contest. To
breach a rampart where there are no troops for debarkation, and when, as in
such maritime expeditious generally, there is no intention to storm the works,
is of course useless ; so that the only remaining alternative is to dismount or to
silence the artillery. This can be effected only by striking the guns themselves,
or by so completely demolishing the parapet as to prevent the men from work-
ing them. The first is difficult, for a gun presents but a very small mark ; and
the second is not easy, because it requires time, and a great many well-directed
shots."
"To batter down even an ordinary rampart with the floating artillery of a
fleet seems to us next to an impossibility, when we recollect the long and well-
directed fire, constantly striking from a short range on the same spot, that was
required to breach even the rickety walls of some of the Spanish fortresses.
A ship-of-war brings, as we have said, a much greater body of fire to bear upon
a single point than a land battery can return from an equal front; yet is the
loss which a ship is liable to experience from the fire of the small number of
battery guns far greater than any that can be inflicted by its own superior ar-
tillery. Every shot that strikes a ship occasions some mischief, whereas one
hundred guns may strike a battery without producing any effect whatever." "A
ship of any force is a large object, easily struck by the fixed artillery of forts.
The vulnerable part of a battery is, on the contrary, a small object, which it is
difficult to strike with the floating artillery of ships."
"How, then, it may be asked, are the many victories gained by our fleets over
land defences to be accounted for ? By circumstances, and by the conduct of
our seamen, whose bravery naturally commanded success whenever it was within
their reach, and not uufrequeritly wrung it, by mere excess of daring, from the
fears of their astonished and intimidated adversaries. Naval and military oper-
ations present but too many occasions where both sailors and soldiers are forced
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 307
to set the ordinary calmness of probability at defiance, and trust to daring and
to fortune for success ; but for government to fit out expeditions on such a prin-
ciple would be the height of reprehensible folly criminal as an avowed game
of hazard played with ' dice of human bones.' It would be doubly criminal in
the government of this country, [England,] so amply provided with the power
of placing the fair means of success at the disposal of efficient armaments. But
naval armaments alone cannot contend successfully against well-constructed and
well-defended land batteries; nor is there anything in naval history to justify
the dangerous and erroneous opinion now entertained on the subject."
Mr. Poinsett says: "After a careful and anxious investigation of a subject
involving in so high a degree the safety and honor of the country, I fully con-
cur in the opinions expressed by the board [of officers on national defence] of
the superiority of permanent works of defence over all other expedients that
have yet been devised, and of their absolute necessity, if we would avoid the
danger of defeat and disgrace; a necessity rather increased than diminished by
the introduction of steam batteries and the use of hollow shot. It would, in
my opinion, prove a most fatal error to dispense with them, and to rely upon
our navy alone, aided by the number, strength, and valor of the people, to pro-
tect the country against the attacks of an enemy possessing great naval means.
To defend a line of coast of three thousand miles in extent, and effectually to
guard all the avenues to our great commercial cities and important naval depots,
the navy of the United States must be very superior to the means of attack of
the most powerful naval power in the world, which will occasion an annual
expense this country is not now able to bear; and this large naval armament,
instead of performing its proper function as the sword of the State, in time of
war, and sweeping the enemy's commerce from the seas, must be chained to the
coast or kept within the harbors.
" It has been clearly demonstrated that the expense of employing a sufficient
body of troops, either regulars or militia, for a period of even six months, for
the purpose of defending the coast against attacks and feints that might be
made by an enemy's fleet, would exceed the cost of erecting all the permanent
works deemed necessary for the coast. One hundred thousand men, divided
into four columns, would not be more than sufficient to guard the vulnerable
points of our maritime frontier, if not covered by fortifications. This amount
of force, which would be necessary against an expedition of twenty thousand
men, if composed of regulars, would cost the nation $30,000,000 per annum;
and if militia, about $40,000,000 ; and supposing only one-half the force to be
required to defend -the coast, with the aid of forts properly situated and judi-
ciously constructed, the difference of expense for six months would enable the
government to erect all the necessary works. This calculation is independent
of the loss the nation would suffer by so large an amount of labor being ab-
stracted from the productive industry of the country, and the fearful waste of
life likely to result from such a costly, hazardous, and harassing system of
defence.
"It must be recollected, too, that we are not called to try a new system, but
to persevere in the execution of one that has been adopted after mature delibe-
ration, and that is still practiced in Europe on a much more extensive scale than
is deemed necessary here ; so much so, that there exist three single fortresses,
each of which comprises more extensive and stronger works than is here pro-
posed for the whole line of our maritime frontier. We must bear in mind, also,
that the destruction of some of the important points on our frontier would alone
cost more to the nation than the expense of fortifying the whole line would
amount to; while the temporary occupation of the others would drive us into
expenses to recover them, far surpassing those of the projected works of defence.
" The organization of the permanent defences proposed for our frontiers is not
based upon military and naval considerations alone, but is calculated to protect
308 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
the internal navigation of the country. The fortifications proposed, at the same
time that they protect our coast from the danger of invasion, and defend the
principal avenues and naval establishments, cover the whole line of internal
navigation, which, in time of war, will contribute, in an essential manner, to the
defence of the country by furnishing prompt and economical means of transpor-
tation; so that, while the main arteries which conduct our produce to the ocean
are defended at their outlets, the interior navigation parallel to the coast will be
protected, and a free communication kept up between every part of the Union."
" Although it would appear on a superficial view to be a gigantic and almost
impracticable project to fortify such an immense extent of coast as the United
States, and difficult, if not impossible, to provide a sufficient force to garrison and
defend the works necessary for the purpose, yet the statements contained in the
reports of the board remove these objections entirely. The coast of the United
States, throughout its vast extent, has but few points which require to be de-
fended against a regular arid powerful attack. A considerable portion of it is
inaccessible to large vessels, and only exposed to the depredations of parties in
boats and small vessels-of-war ; against which inferior works, and the combina-
tion of the same means, and a well-organized local militia, will afford sufficient
protection. The only portions which require to be defended by permanent
works of some strength are the avenues to the great commercial cities and naval
and military establishments, the destruction of which, would prove a serious loss
to the country, and be regarded by an enemy as an equivalent for the expense
of a great armament. It is shown, also, that the number of men required on the
largest scale, for the defence of these forts, when compared with the movable
force that would be necessary without them, is inconsiderable. The local militia,
aided by a few regulars, and directed by engineers and artillery officers, may,
with previous training, be safely intrusted with their defence in time of war.
" It canno.t be too earnestly urged, that a much smaller number of troops will
be required to defend a fortified frontier than to cover one that is entirely unpro-
tected ; and that such a system will enable us, according to the spirit of our
institutions, to employ the militia effectually for the defence of the country. It
is no reproach to this description of force, and no imputation on their courage,
to state, what the experience of two wars has demonstrated, that they cannot
stand the steady charge of regular forces, and are disordered by their manoeuvres
in the open field; whereas their fire is more deadly from behind ramparts."
Mr. Bell says : " Since the recent and successful experiments in the navigation
of the Atlantic by steam, and the consequent changes anticipated in maritime
warfare, it is not an uncommon impression that fortifications, and all other land
defences, may be dispensed with altogether; and that the navy, improved and
strengthened by war steamers and floating batteries, may be safely and exclusively
relied upon for the defence of our extensive sea-coast. Another error, not less
to be regretted, has obtained some hold upon the public mind since the extension
of steam navigation already adverted to, and the improvements suggested in the
means of defending the seaboard. It is, that the defence of our numerous inlets,
harbors, and naval depots, will, by their improvements, be rendered not only
more certain, but less expensive than heretofore, and therefore of diminished
importance in every point of view. The very reverse of these conclusions, it
may be justly apprehended, will be realized in the experience of the future. The
increased facilities which tfte late extension of steam navigation will give to any
great maritime power, holding possession of one or more naval depots on this
side of the Atlantic, in -concentrating a large naval or military force upon any
one of .the numerous assailable points upon our extensive sea-coast; the celerity
of movement, and tHe greater certainty and precision which will thereby be
secured in the .execution of all the details of an attack enabling an enemy to
make it, in every instance, a surprise will probably create a necessity for in-
creasing .our defences in some form, at an expense far exceeding anything here-
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 309
tofore deemed important or necessary to reasonable security. But the prospect
of successful defence by the navy alone vanishes altogether when we reflect that
it is only in infancy, and that for a long time it must be inferior to the naval
armaments of several of the powers of Europe. Whether the United States will
be able, at any time, to contend with them upon the ocean, it is obvious, will
depend upon the successful development of our naval resources after the com-
mencement of a war; but how could this development take 'place in the face of a
much more powerful enemy, if our depots and navy yards are suffered to remain
without protection by fortifications, and there are no harbors in which our ships-
of-iuar may take refuge and remain in safety when pursued by superior squad-
rons ? It would be fatal to the national honor to neglect to fortify sufficiently
and amply those passes, by land and water, by which an enemy could approach
the depositories of our naval supplies, and also the principal harbors of easy
access to our oion vessels"
" The necessary quality of buoyancy in war steamers and ffoating batteries
requires that they should be constituted mainly of wood ; and whether of wood
or iron, their destructibility, by the usual missiles employed in war, will be
neither greater nor less than that of the war steamers and floating batteries with
which an enemy may attack them. It is clear, then, that nothing will be gained
by their exclusive employment in this point of view. It is equally clear that an
enemy is able to concentrate a much superior force upon any one of our great
harbors and naval depots than is provided for its defence ; he must, without
some extraordinary casuality, be successful. To .guard, therefore, against the
capture or destruction of all our opulent cities and great naval depots upon the
seaboard, the government must provide a greater number of war steamers and
floating batteries, for the defence of each of them, than any foreign nation will
probably be able to assemble upon our own coast, and thus have it in his power,
by uniting his whole force in an attack upon one point at a time, to lay under
contribution or destroy the whole.
"But suppose each of our great harbors or depots should be thus defended,
and that all the channels or passes by water could be so guarded and blocked
up by floating batteries, or with the advantages of position, to set at defiance
any naval force which could be brought to the attack, without fortifications to
guard the passes or avenues over which an enemy could reach his object by
land, what would prevent him from disembarking a sufficient land force at some
other, but not distant point upon the coast, and effecting all his purposes of
spoliation and destruction ? It is manifest that something more will be wanting
than war steamers and floating batteries to give even a tolerable security to our
cities and naval depots. If fortifications are to be dispensed with, it is clear,
that to afford them adequate protection and security against the sudden assaults
of an enemy approaching by sea, will require not only such a preparation of
war steamers and floating batteries as already described, but a stationary land
force sufficient in numbers and discipline to resist any number of veteran troops
the enemy might have it in his power to employ as an auxiliary force in his
enterprises upon our shares.
" Supposing the defences of a harbor, by fortifications, to be complete, and
the attacking ships or war steamers of an enemy shall have succeeded in pass-
ing the outer channels leading to it, without material damage from the forts
designed to guard them ; or if they shall have taken advantage of the darkness
of the night, and passed them unobserved, they will have gained but little by
that success. They will be exposed at every point within to the fire of one or
more land batteries. They will be able to find no anchorage or resting place
where they will not be liable to be disabled, burnt, or blown up by the shells
and hot shot discharged under protection of walls impenetrable to the shot of an
enemy, except at the gun ports. Not so, however, when floating defences are
exclusively relied upon. They will have no advantage in the fight over the
310 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES
attacking force they will be equally exposed and combustible; and when
overcome, all resistance ceases, and the success of the enemy will be complete."
Mr. Spencer says : " While fortifications are more effectual for defence, in
certain positions, than floating forces, they are less expensive in construction,
more durable, and requiring an outlay in repairs utterly insignificant when com-
pared with the expense of maintaining ships and renewing them. They are
indispensable for the purposes of covering the military and naval depots, and
all other public or private establishments which would incite the enterprise or
the cupidity of a foe, and excluding him from strong positions, where his naval
superiority might enable him to maintain himself, and from which he might
make incursions into the interior, or assail an extensive line of coast."
We have already alluded to the remarks of the Apalachicola report on the
relative cost of ships and forts, and the economy of their support. We do not
regard this question of relative cost a matter of any great importance/for it can
seldom be decisive in the choice of these two means of defence. No matter
what their relative cost may be, the one cannot often be substituted for the other.
There are some few cases, however, where this might be taken into considera-
tion, and would be decisive. Let us endeavor to illustrate our meaning. For
the defence of New York city, the Narrows and East river must be secured by
forts ; ships cannot, in this case, be substituted. But let us suppose that the
outer harbor of New York furnishes no favorable place for the debarkation of
troops, or that the place of debarkation is so far distant that the troops cannot
reach the city before the defensive forces can be prepared to repel them. This
harbor would be of great importance to the enemy as a shelter from storms, and
as a place of debarkation or of rendezvous preparatory to a forcible passage of
the Narrows ; while to us its possession would not be absolutely essential,
though very important. A strong fortification on Sandy Hook might probably
be so constructed as to furnish a pretty sure barrier to the entrance of this outer
harbor ; on the other hand, a naval force stationed within the inner harbor, and
acting under the protection of forts at the Narrows, might also furnish a good
though perhaps less certain protection for this outer roadstead. Here, then,
we might well consider the question of relative cost and economy of support of
the proposed fortification on Sandy Hook, and of a home squadron large enough
to effect the same object and to be kept continually at home for that special
purpose. If we were to allow it to go to sea for the protection of our commerce
its character and efficiency as a harbor defence would be lost. We can therefore
regard it only as a local force fixed within the limits of the defence of this
particular place and our estimates must be made accordingly.
The average durability of ships-of-war in the British navy has been variously
stated at 7 and 8 years in time of war, and from 10 to 12 and 14 years in time
of peace. Mr. Perring, in his " Brief Inquiry," published in 1812, estimates
this average durability at about 8 years. His calculations seem based upon
authentic information. A distinguished English writer has more recently ar-
rived at the same result from estimates based upon the returns o'f the Board of
Admiralty during the period of the wars of the French revolution. The data
in our own possession are less complete, the appropriations for building and
repairing having heen so expended as to render it impossible to 'draw an accu-
rate line of distinction. But in the returns now before us there are generally
separate and distinct accounts of the timbers used fx>r these two purposes;, and
consequently, so far as this (the main item of expense) is concerned, we may
form pretty accurate comparisons.
According to Edge, (pp. 20, 21,) the average cost of timber for hulls, masts,
and yards in building an English 74-gun ship is d61,382. Let us now com-
pare this cost of timber for building with that of the same item in repairs for
the following 15 ships, between 1800 and 1820. The list would have been still
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
311
further enlarged, but the returns for other ships during some portion of the
above period are imperfect :
Name of ship.
No. of guns.
When built.
Repaired from
Cost.
Vengeance
74
1800 to 1807
84,720
Ildefouso . ........
74
1807 to 1808
85, 195
Scipio . ....
74
1807 to 1809
60,785
Tremendous
74
1807 to 1810
135,397
Elephant ..
74
1808 to-1811
67,007
Spencer ...
74
1800
1809 to 1813
124,186
Romulus . ..._.._..__
74
1810 to 1812
73,141
Albion
74
1802
1810 to 1813
102,295
Donegal
74
1812 to 1815
101,367
Implacable . .
74
1813 to 1815
59,865
Illustrious
74
1803
1814 to 1816
74, 184
Northumberland
74
1814 to 1815
59,795
Kent
74
1814 to 1818
88,357
Sultan
74
1807
1816 to 1818
61,518
Sterling Castle
74
1816 to 1818
65,280
This table, although incomplete, gives for the above 15 ships, during a period
of less than 20 years, the cost of timber alone, used in tlisir repair, an average
of about $400,000 each. More timber than this was used, in all probability,
upon the same vessels, and paid for out of the funds appropriated " for such
ships as may be ordered in the course of the year to be repaired." But the
amount specifically appropriated for timber for these 15 ships would, in every 12
or 15 years, equal the entire first cost of the same items. If we were to add to
this amount the cost of labor required in the application of the timber to the
operations of repair, and take into consideration the expense of other materials
and labor, and the decayed condition of many of the ships at the end of this period,
we should not be surprised to find the whole sum expended under these heads
to equal the first cost, even within the minimum estimate of seven years. The
whole cost of timber used for hulls, masts, and yards, in building, between 1800 and
1820, was eei8,727,551 ; in repairs and "ordinary wear and tear," 6617,449,780;
making an annual average of $45,601,589 for building timber, and $42,733,714
for that used in repairs. A large portion of the vessels built were intended to
replace others which had been lost, or were so decayed as to be broken up.
But it may be well to add here the actual supplies voted for the sea service,
and for the wear and tear, and the extraordinary expenses in building and
repairing of ships from 1800 to 1815:
Year
For the wear and
tear of ships.
Extraordinary ex-
penses in building,
repairing, &c.
For entire sea ser-
vice.
1800
4 350 000
772 140
^13 619 079
1801
5 850 000
933 900
16 577 037
1802
3 684 000
773 500
11 833 571
1803
3 120 000
901 140
10 211 378
1804
3 900 000
948 520
12 350,606
1805
4 680,000
1 553 690
15 035, 630
1806
4, 680 000
1 980 830
18,864,341
1807
5,070 000
2 134 903
17,400. 337
1808
5 070 000
2 351 188
18 087 544
1809
3 295 500
2 296 030
19 578 467
1810
3 295 500
1 841 107
18 975 120
1811
3 675 750
2 046 200
19 822 000
1812 .. ^ .
3 675 750
1 696 621
19 305 759
1813 .
3 549 000
2 822 031
20 096 709
1814
3 268 000
2 086 274
19 312 070
1815
2,386,500
2,116,710
19,032,700
312
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES
It appears from this table that the appropriations for the sea service during
the first 15 years of the present century amounted to a little less than ninety
millions of dollars per annum, and for the wear and tear of ships and " the
extraordinary expenses in building and repairing of ships, &c.," the annual appro-
priations amounted to thirty millions of dollars.
Our own naval returns are also so imperfect that it is impossible to form any
very accurate estimate of the relative cost of construction and repairs of our
men-of-war. The following table, compiled from a report of the Secretary of
the Navy in 1841, (Senate Document No. 223, 26th Congress,) will afford data
for an approximate calculation :
Name of ship.
Number of guns.
Total cost of build-
ing, exclusive of
armament, stores,
&c.
I
"P*
1
E
|^
a
o .
*{*
*l
fli
8 * a
Repaired between
Delaware - - ......
74
$543,368 00
1820
$354, 132 56
1827 and 1838
North Carolina
74
431,852 00
1825
317,628 92
1824 and 1P36
Constitution . ...... .
44
302,718 84
1797
266,878 34
1833 and 1839
United States ..
44
299,336 56
1797
571,972 77
1821 and 1841
Brandy wine
44
299,218 12
1825
-377,665 95
1826 and 1838
Potomac _
44
231, Ol3 02
1822
82,597 03
1829 and 1835
Concord
20
115 325 80
1828
72 796 22
1832 and 1840
Falmouth
2Q
94,093 27
1827
130,015 43
1828 and 1837
John Adams
?0
110,670 69
1829
119,641 93
1834 and 1837
Boston
20
91 973 19
1825
189 264 37
1826 and 1840
St Louis
20
102 461 95
1828
135,458 75
1834 and 1839
"Viucennes
20
111,512 79
1826
178,094 81
1830 and 1838
"Vandalia
20
90,977 88
1828
59, 181 34
1832 and 1834
Lexington ..
20?
114,622 35
1826
83,386 52
1827 and 1837
Warren
20 ?
99,410 01
1826
152,596 03
1830 and 1838
Fairfield .
20
100,490 35
1826
65,918 26
1831 and 1837
Natchez f
20?
106,232 19
1827
129,969 80
1829 and 1836
Boxer . _ ............
10
30,697 88
1831
28,780 48
1834 and 1840
Enterprise .........
10
27,938 63
1831
20,716 59
1834 and 1840
Grampus... ... . -
10
23,627 42
1821
96,086 36
1825 and 1840
Dolphin
10
38,522 62
1836
15,013 35
1839 and 1840
Shark
10
23,627 42
1821
93,395 84
1824 and 1839
It appears from the above table that the cost of constructing ships-of-the-line
is about $6,600 per gun; of frigates, $6,500 per gun; of smaller vessels-of-war,
a little less than $5,000 per gun. The cost of our war steamers (the Fulton, 4
guns, built in 1838-'39, cost $333,770 77; the Mississippi and Missouri, 10
guns each, built in 1841, cost about $600,000 apiecef) is over $60,000 per gun !
It is obvious, from the nature of the materials of which forts are constructed,
that the cost of the support must be inconsiderable. It is true that for some
years past a large item in annual expenditures for fortifications has been under
the. head of "repairs." Much of this sum is for alterations and enlargements
of temporary and inefficient works, erected interior to and during the war of
Returns incomplete.
f Broken up in 1840.
JBy the returns in the Navy Department up to December 31, 1841, $553,850 32 had
been expended on the Mississippi, and $519,032 57 on the Missouri ; but all the returns
bad not then come in. r lhe entire cost of construction and modification of these steamers,
to fit them for service, differs but little from their estimated cost of $600,000 apiece.
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 313
1812. Some of it, however, lias been for actual repairs of decayed or injured
portions of the forts; these injuries resulting from the nature of the climate, the
foundations, the use of poor materials and poor workmanship, and from neglect
and abandonment. But if we include the risk of abandonment at times, it is
estimated, ivjxm data drawn from past experience, that one-third of one per
cent, per annum of the first cost will keep in perfect repair any of our forts that
have been constructed since the last war ; whereas the cost of repairs for our
men-of-war is Hfcore than seven per cent, per annum on the first cost of the ships.
The cost of steamships will be still more ; but we have not yet had sufficient
experience to determine the exact amount. But the cost of running them is so
great that the Secretary of the Navy, in his last annual report, says : " Their
engines consume so much fuel as to add enormously to their expenses ; and the
necessity that they should return to port after short intervals of time for fresh
supplies renders it impossible to send them on any distant service. They cannot
be relied on as cruisers, and are altogether too expensive for service in time of
peace. I have therefore determined to take them put of commission and sub-
stitute for them other and less expensive vessels."
On this question of relative cost, we add the following extract from the re-
port of Mr. Bell in 1841 :
" The relative expense of guns in forts and on board ships-of-war or floating
batteries is strikingly disproportionate. The most favorable estimate will show
that guns afloat will cost, upon an average, a third more than the cost of guns
in forts. Well-constructed forts, bearing any number of guns, may be erected
at less than half the amount required to build good steam batteries bearing the
same number of guns. The steamships now on the stocks at New York and
Philadelphia, 1,700 tons burden, and designed to carry only eight guns each, it
is estimated will cost $600,000 each. A floating battery of the largest class
contemplated by a distinguished advocate for that mode of harbor defence, car-
rying two hundred guns, with its tow-boats, it is estimated cannot cost less than
$1,400,000; and the smallest, carrying one hundred and twenty guns, not less
than $700,000. A ship-of-the-line carrying eighty guns it is estimated will cost,
without her armament, $500,000. Fort Adams is constructed for four hundred
and fifty-eight guns ; when finished will have cost $1,400,000. Forts are built
of solid and of the most part of imperishable materials. By proper care and a
small annual expenditure for repairs they will last and be available for cen-
turies ; while the cost of the repairs that ships-of-war and floating batteries will
require in every twelve or fifteen years will equal the cost of the original con-
struction. In other words, in respect to the expense, vessels-of-war and floating
batteries will require to be reconstructed every twelve or fifteen years. The in-
jury done to fortifications in the most serious engagements can usually be re-
paired in a few days, or at most in a few weeks, while the damages to ships-of-
war and floating batteries in a similar engagement would require extensive
repairs in* every instance, and often render them unworthy of repair.
" Upon this data a satisfactory estimate may be made of the relative expense
of the two modes of defending our principal harbors and naval depots. In pre-
senting these views, I would not be understood by any means as disparaging
the value and efficiency of war steamers and floating batteries when employed
as an auxiliary force in any system of coast or harbor defence that may be
adopted : nor is any idea entertained that they ought or can be altogether dis-
pensed with."
It should be noticed that in the above report Mr. Bell not only attributes to
our navy the entire defence of our shipping at sea, but also attaches importance
to war steamers and floating batteries as an auxiliary force in any system of
coast or harbor defence that may be adopted. We regret that the friendly feel-
ings shown towards the naval service in the reports of Messrs. Poinsett, Bell,
and Spencer, and of the board of officers on national defence, have not been re-
314 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
ciprocated by the author of the Apalachicola report. That report is filled with
sneers at the intelligence of the distinguished military officers of the board, and
at the defensive system of the honorable Secretaries of War. It not only as-
serts that our defensive policy should be nearly exclusively by naval tncans, but
it charges upon one branch of our military service the secret design of foisting
upon the country a large standing army and laying the foundation upon which a
great military policy will be erected; it endeavors to prejudice this service in
the public estimation by calling upon the country to be on its guard against
these covert designs. It moreover charges that fortifications, in furnishing gar-
risons to the army, have, by their "corrupting influences," so enervated that
army and enfeebled its physical strength that it has perished " and melted away
before the hardships of the first campaign within the boundaries of our own
country."
This is not the place to enter upon the defence of the Florida army, if such
defence be now necessary; but we affirm that no body of men ever exhibited
more universal bravery, courage, and constancy than was shown by our soldiers
during the tedious and harassing operations of that war. Wherever the foe
could be found he was met and conquered, no matter what his superiority in
position or numbers. They showed no signs of being "enervated in spirit or
enfeebled in physical strength," but they fought, and bled, and conquered, offi-
cers and men, side by side.
II. The Apalachicola report, after denouncing fortifications as utterly worth-
less as water defences, remarks that the sphere in which they can be of any use
is in retarding the enemy's operations upon an inland frontier. " But even here"
it says, "they have been assailed by the contempt of experienced soldiers ; " "this
system of fortifications is not the true defence of the country, and the further
prosecution of it should be abandoned;" " our country should be relieved from the
intolerable burden of defences by fortifications," &c. It moreover indorses the
opinion that we should " confine our preparations (for defence) to the maritime
frontier, as the inland border needs none, and the lake shores under all circum-
stances would be under the dominion of the strongest fleet."
From the middle ages down to the period of the French revolution Avars were
carried on mainly by the system of positions one party confining their opera-
tions to the security of certain important places while the other directed their
attention to their siege and capture. But Carnot and Napoleon changed this
system, at the same time with the system of tactics,, or rather returned to the
old and true principle of strategic operations. Some men, looking merely at the
fact that a change was made, but without examining the character of that change,
have rushed headlong to the conclusion that fortified places are now utterly use-
less in warfare, military success depending entirely upon a good system of
marches. On this subject Jomini remarks that "we should depend entirely
upon neither organized masses nor upon material obstacles, whether natural or
artificial. To follow exclusively either of these systems would be equally
absurd. The true science of war consists in choosing a just medium between
the two extremes. The wars of Napoleon demonstrated the great truth that
distance can protect no country from invasion ; but that a state to be secure
must have a good system of fortresses and a good system of military reserves
and military institutions." "Fortifications fulfil two objects of capital importance :
first, the protection of frontiers; and, second, assisting the operations of the
army in the field;" "every part of the frontiers of a state should be secured by
one or two great places of- refuge, secondary places, and even small posts for
facilitating the active operations of the armies. Cities girt with walls and slight
ditches may often be of great utility in the interior of a country as places of
deposit where stores, magazines, hospitals, &c., may be sheltered from the in-
cursions of the enemy's light troops. These works are more especially valuable
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 315
where such stores, in order not to weaken the regular army by detachments, are
intrusted to the care of raw and militia forces."
"Fortifications," says Napoleon, "are useful both in offensive and defensive
wars ; for although they cannot alone arrest the progress of an army, yet they
are an excellent means of retarding, fettering, enfeebling, and disquieting a
conquering foe." (Maxim 40.) In all military operations time is of vast im-
portance. If the advance of a single division of the army be retarded for a
few hours only, it not unfrequently decides the fate of a campaign. Had the
approach of Blucher been delayed for a few hours, Napoleon must have been
victorious at the battle of Waterloo. An equilibrium can seldom be sustained
for more than six or seven hours between forces on the field of battle; Ifut in
this instance the state of the ground rendered the movements so slow as to
prolong the battle for more than thirteen hours thus enabling the allies to
effect a concentration in time to save Wellington. Many of Napoleon's brilliant
victories resulted from merely bringing troops to bear suddenly upon some
decisive point. This concentration of forces, even with a regular army, cannot
be calculated on by the general with any degree of certainty unless his commu-
nications are perfectly secure. But this difficulty is much increased where the
troops are new and undisciplined. When a country like ours is invaded, a large
number of such troops must suddenly be called into the field. Not knowing
the designs of the invaders, much time will be lost in marches and counter-
marches ; and if there be no safe places of resort, the operations must be indeci-
sive and insecure. To a defensive army, fortifications are valuable as points of
repose upon which troops, if beaten, may fall back and shelter their sick and
wounded, collect their scattered forces, repair their materiel, and draw together
a new supply of stores and provisions ; and as rallying points where new troops
may be assembled with safety, and the army in a few days be prepared to again
meet the enemy in the open field. Without these 1 defences, undisciplined and
inexperienced armies, when once routed, can seldom be rallied again without
great losses. But when supported by forts they can select their opportunity for
fighting, and offer or refuse battle according to the probability of success ; and,
having a safe place of retreat, they are far less influenced by fear in the actual
conflict. It is not supposed that any system of fortifications can hermetically
close a frontier. "But," says Jomini, "although they of themselves can rarely
present an absolute obstacle to the advance of the hostile army, yet it is indis-
putable that they straiten its movements, change the direction of its marches,
and force it into detachments ; while, on the contrary, they afford all the oppo-
site advantages to, the defensive army; they protect its marches, favor its de-
bouches, cover its magazines, its flanks, and its movements; and, finally, furnish
it with a place of refuge in time of need." "If the enemy should venture to pass
the line of these places without attacking them, he could not dispense with be-
sieging, or, at least, observing them; and if they be numerous, an entire corps
with its chief must be detached to invest or observe them, as circumstances
might require." His army would thus be separated from its magazines, its
strength and efficiency diminished by detachments, and his whole force exposed
to the horrors of partisan warfare. It has therefore been estimated, by the best
French military writers, that an army supported by a judicious system of forti-
fications can repel a land force six times as large as itself.
On the use of fortifications as inland defences, we quote from the writings of
the Archduke Charles, who as a general knew no rival but Napoleon, and whose
military writings are equalled by none, save the works of General Jomini.
"The possession of strategic points," says the archduke, "is decisive in military
operations. The most efficacious means should therefore be employed to defend
points whose preservation is the country's safeguard. This object is accom-
plished by fortifications ; for fortified places resist for a given time, with a small
number of troops, every effort of a much larger force; fortifications should
316 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
therefore be regarded as the bases of a good system of defence." " I advise the
construction of permanent works as the most efficacious method of securing
strategic points." " It should be a maxim of state policy, in every country to for-
tify in time of peace all such points, and to arrange them with great care, so that
they can be defended by a small number of troops ; for the enemy, knowing the
difficulty of getting possession of these works, will look twice before he involves
himself in war." " Establishments which can secure strategic advantages are not
the works of a moment; they require time and labor. He who has the direc-
tion of the military forces of a state should in time of peace prepare for war;
whatever he does should have reference to the rules of strategic; the military
organization of the state, the construction of fortifications, -the direction of
roads and canals, the positions of depots and magazines, all should be attended
to. The proper application or neglect of these principles will decide the safety
or the ruin of the state. Fortifications arrest the enemy in the pursuit of his
object, and direct his movements upon less important points; he must either
force these fortified lines, or else hazard enterprises upon lines which offer only
disadvantages. In fine, a country secured by a system of defence truly strategic
has no cause to fear either the invasion or the yoke of the enemy, for he can
advance to the interior of the country only through great trouble and by ruinous
efforts. Of course, lines of fortifications thus arranged cannot shelter a state
against all reverses ; but these reverses will not, in this case, be attended by
total ruin, for they cannot take from the state the means nor the time of collect-
ing new forces, nor can they ever reduce it to the cruel alternative of submission
or destruction."
We know of no better illustration of these remarks of the archduke and
General Jomini, (both of whom it should be borne in mind are warm admirers
of Napoleon's system of strategic warfare, and both of whom have written
since the period at which modern military quacks date the downfall of fortifica-
tions as defences,) than the military histories of Germany and France.
For a long period previous to the thirty years' war, its strong castles and
fortified cities secured the German empire from attacks from abroad, except on
its extensive frontier, which was frequently attacked ; but no enemy could pene-
trate to the interior till a want of union among its own princes opened its
strongholds to the Swedish conqueror; nor then did the cautious Gustavus
Adolphus venture far into its territories till he had obtained possession of all
the military works that might endanger his retreat. Again : in the seven years'
war, when the French neglected to secure their foothold in Germany, by placing
in a state of defence the fortifications that fell into their power, the first defeat
rendered their ground untenable, and threw them from the Elbe back upon the
Rhine and Mayne. They afterwards took the precaution to fortify their posi-
tions and to secure their magazines under shelter of strong places, and conse-
quently were enabled to maintain themselves in the hostile country till the end
of the war, notwithstanding the inefficiency of their generals, the great reverses
they sustained in the field, the skill and perseverance of the enemy tliey were
contending with, and the weak and vacillating character of the cabinet that
directed them.
But this system of defence was not so carefully maintained in the latter part
of the eighteenth century ; for -at the beginning of the wars of the French revo-
lution, says Jomini, " Germany had too few fortifications ; they were generally
of a poor character and improperly located." France, on the contrary, was well
fortified; "and although without armies, and torn to pieces by factions," (we
here . use the language of the archduke,) " she sustained herself against all
Europe; and this was because her government, since the reign of Louis XIII,
hod continually labored to put her frontiers into a defensive condition, agreeably
to the principles of strategic. Starting from such a system for a basis, she sub-
dued every country on the continent that was not thus fortified ; and this reason
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 317
alone will explain how her generals sometimes succeeded in destroying an army,
and even an entire state, merely .by a strategic success."
But we will endeavor to illustrate this by particular campaigns. In 1792,
when the Duke of Brunswick invaded France, she had no armies competent to
her defence. Their numbers upon paper were somewhat formidable, it is true,
but the license of the revolution had so loosened the bands of discipline as to
effect an almost complete disorganization. " It seemed at this period," says the
historian, "as if the operations of the French generals were dependent upon the
absence of their enemies ; the moment they appeared they were precipitately
abandoned." But France had on her eastern frontier a triple line of good
fortresses, although her miserable soldiery were incapable of defending them.
The several works of the first and second line fell one after another before the
slow operations of a Prussian siege, and the Duke of Brunswick was already
advancing upon the third when Dumourier, with only 25,000 men, threw him-
self into it, and, by a well-conducted war of positions, placing his raw and
unsteady forces behind inassailable intrenchments, succeeded in repelling a disci-
plined army nearly four times as numerous as his own. Had no other obstacle
than the French troops been interposed between Paris and the Prussians all
agree that France must have fallen.
In the campaign of 1793 the French army of Flanders were beaten in almost
every engagement, and their forces reduced to less than one-half the number of
the allies. The French general turned traitoi* to his country, and the national
guards deserted their colors and returned to France. The only hope of the re-
publicans at this crisis was Vauban's line of Flemish fortresses. These alone
saved France. The strongholds of Lille, Conde, Valenciennes, Quesnoy, Lan-
drecies, &c., held the Austrians in check till the French could raise new forces
and reorganize their army. " The important breathing time which the sieges of
these fortresses," says the English historian, " afforded to the French, and the
immense advantage which they derived from the new levies which they received,
and fresh organization which they acquired during that important period, is a
signal proof of the vital importance of fortresses in contributing to national
defence. Napoleon had not hesitated to ascribe to the three months thus gained
the salvation of France. It is to be constantly recollected that the republican
armies were then totally unable to keep the field ; that behind the frontier
fortresses there was neither a defensive position nor a corps to re-enforce them ; .
and' that, if driven from their vicinity, the .capital was taken and the war con-
cluded. The fortifications on the Rhine played a similar part in the campaign
on that frontier, and there also her fortresses checked the advance of the enemy
till France could raise and discipline armies capable of meeting him in the open
field.
In the following year, (1794,) when the republic had completed her vast
armaments, and, in her turn, had become the invading power, the enemy had no
fortified towns to check the progress of the French armies. Based on strong
works of defence, these in a few weeks overran Flanders, and drove the allies
beyond the Rhine.
Napoleon's remarks on the influence of the fortifications on the Flemish fron-
tier are ny>st striking and conclusive : " Vauban's system of frontier fortresses,"
said he, " is intended to protect an inferior against a superior army ; to afford to
the former a more favorable field of operations for maintaining itself, and. for
preventing the hostile army from advancing, and advantageous opportunities of
attacking it ; in short, means of gaining time to allow its succors to come up.
At the time of the reverses of Louis XIV this system of fortresses saved the
capital. Prince Eugene, of Savoy, lost a campaign in taking Lille ; the siege of
Landrecies gave Villars an opportunity of changing the fortune of the war. A
hundred years afterwards, at the time of Dun^urier's treachery, the fortresses
of Flanders once more saved Paris ; the combined forces lost a campaign in
318 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
taking Condc, Valenciennes, Quesnoy, and Landrecies. This line of fortresses
was equally useful in 1814. The allies, having^ violated the territory of Switzer-
land, engaged themselves in the denies of Jura, to avoid the fortresses ; and,
even while turning them in this manner, they were obliged to weaken their force
by detaching a considerable number of men, superior to the total of the gar-
risons. When Napoleon passed the Marne, and manoeuvred in the rear of the
enemy's army, if treason had not opened the gates of Paris the fortresses of the
frontier would have played an important part ; Swaitzenberg's army would have
been obliged to throw itself amongst them, which would have produced great
events. In 1815 they would likewise have been of grea't value. The Anglo-
Prussian army would not have dared to .pass the Somme before the arrival of
the Austro-Russian armies on the Marne had it not been for the political events
of that capital ; and it is certain that those fortresses which remained faithful
influenced the allies and the conduct of the allied kings in 1814 and 1815."
The German campaign of 1796 is another admirable illustration of the value
of fortifications in military operations, and as such is particularly noticed by both
Jomini and the archduke. Previous to this campaign Austria had shamefully
neglected the defences of the Rhine, leaving, says the archduke, the principal
communications open to the very heart of the country. " The French," says an
English historian, " were in possession of the fortresses of Luxemburg, Thion-
nelle, Mentz, and Saare-Louis, which rendered the centre of their position
almost unassailable ; their right was covered by Hunningen, New Brisack, and
the fortresses f Alsace, and their left by Maestricht, Juliers, and the iron
barrier of the Netherlands, while the Austrians had no fortified point whatever
to support either of their wings. This want in a war ' of invasion is of incal-
culable importance, and the fortresses of the Rhine are as valuable as a base for
offensive as a barrier to support defensive operations." Moreau, taking the
powerful fortress of Strasburg for his point of departure, and surprising the
negligently guarded fortress of Kehl on the opposite bank, effected a safe pas-
sage of the Rhine, and thus forced the Austrians to fall back upon the distant
and ill-secured line of the Danube. The French, passing the line of their own
frontier, " were enabled to leave their fortresses defenceless, and swell by their
garrisons the invading force, which soon proved so perilous to the Austrian
monarchy." Afterwards, when the archduke, by his admirable strategic opera-
tions, forced the French to retreat, he derived considerable advantage from the
Austrian garrisons of Phillipsburg, Manheim, and Mayence. But the Fre'nch
line of defence on the opposite side of the Rhine arrested his pursuit, and obliged
him to resort to the tedious operations of sieges and the reduction of their ad-
vanced posts alone. Kehl and Hunningen, poorly as they were defended, em-
ployed all the resources of his army and the skill of his engineers from early in
October till late in February. Kehl was at first assaulted by a force four times
as large as the garrison; if they had succeeded they would have cutoff Moreau's
retreat and destroyed his army. Fortunately, the place was strong enough to
resist all assaults.
In the Italian campaign of the same year the general was directed " to seize
the forts of Savona ; compel the senate to furnish him with pecuniary supplies ;
and surrender the keys of Gavi, a fortress perched on a rocky height (jommand-
ing the pass of the Bouhetta." While Napoleon was advancing to execute this
plan, the Austrians endeavored to cut off his army at Montenotte, and would
have succeeded had not the brave Rampon, with only 1,200 men, in the redoubt
of Monte Legino, repeatedly repulsed the furious assaults of 10,000 Austrians.
If this fort had been carried, says the historian, "the fate of the campaign and
of the world might have changed." After this unsuccessful attack, the Austrians
found it necessary to support themselves by a defensive line of fortifications,
and insisted upon the fortresses of Tortona, Alexandria, &c., being put into
their possession by the Sardinian government. But jealousy of Austria would
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 319
not permit this; and Sardinia preferred surrendering them to the French, who
were at this time in very critical circumstances, having neither heavy cannon
nor a siege equipage to reduce Turin, Alexandria, or the other numerous for-
tresses of Piedmont, without the possession of which it would have been ex-
tremely hazardous to have penetrated further into the country. "The King of
Sardinia," says Napoleon* "had still a great number of fortresses left, and, in
spite of the victories which had been gained, the slightest check, one caprice of
fortune, would have undone everything." So fully persuaded was he of the
importance of the works which Sardinia had yielded to him in order to save
them from the Austrians, that he said he would not relinquish them, even if
directed so to do by his own government. "Coni, Oena, and Alexandria," he
wrote to the directory, "are now in the hands of our army; and even if you do
not ratify the convention, 1 will still keep these fortresses" "The King of
Sardinia is placed at the mercy of the republic, having no other fortified points
than Turin and Fort Bard." To the remark that these defences were unneces-
sary to the French, he replied: "That the first duty of the army was to secure
a firm base for future operations ; that it was impossible to advance without
being secured in the rear, and that the Sardinian fortresses at once put the
rejmblicans in possession of the keys of the peninsula" "From the solid basis
of the Piedmontese fortresses he was enabled to turn his undivided attention to
the destruction of the Austrians, and thus commence, with some security, that
great career of conquest which he already meditated in the imperial dominions."
Indeed, these conquests were but the legitimate results of his present strategic
position.
Afterwards, when the Austrians had nearly wrested Italy from the weak
hold of Napoleon's successors, the French saved their army in the fortress of
Genoa, and behind the line of the Var, which had been fortified with care in
1794 and 1795. Numerous attempts were made to force the line, the advanced
posts of Fort Montauban being several times assaulted by numerous forces.
But the Austrian columns recoiled from its murderous fire of grape and musketry,
which swept off great numbers at every discharge. Again the assault was
renewed with avast superiority of numbers, and again "the brave men who
headed the columns almost all perished at the foot of the intrenchments ; and,
after sustaining a heavy loss, they were compelled to abandon their enterprise."
While the forces on the Var thus stayed the waves of Austrian success, Mas-
sena, in the fortifications of Genoa, sustained a blockade of 60 and a siege of 40
days against an army five times as large as his own ; and, when forced to yield
to the stern demands of famine, he almost dictated to the enemy the terms of a
treaty. These two defences held in check the elite of the Austrian army, while
the French reserve crossed the Alps, and seized upon the important points of
tke country.
But while the French were deriving so much assistance from their own works,
they were also made to feel the importance of fortifications in the enemy's
hands. In the passage of the Alps, the little fortress of Bard, with its two-
and-twenty cannon, arrested for some time the entire army of Napoleon, and
had well nigh proved fatal to the campaign. The most desperate efforts were
made to carry the place, but all were of no avail. " In this extremity, the
genius of the French engineers surmounted the difficulty. The infantry and
cavalry of Lannes's division traversed, one by one, the path on the Monte
Albaredo, and re-formed lower down the valley, while the artillerymen suc-
ceeded in drawing their cannon, in the dark, through the town, close under the
guns of the fort, by spreading straw and dung upon the streets, and wrapping
the wheels up, so as to- prevent the slightest sound being heard. In this manner
forty-eight pieces and a hundred caissons were drawn through during the night,
while the Austrians, in unconscious security, slumbered above, beside their
loaded camion, direcetd straight into the street where the passage was going
320 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
forward. During the succeeding night the same hazardous operation was
repeated with equal successes; and while the Austrian commander was writing
to Melas that he had seen thirty-five thousand men and four thousand horse
cross the path of the Albaredo, but that not one piece of artillery or caisson
should pass beneath the guns of his fortress, the whole cannon and ammunition
of the army Avere safely proceeding on the road to Ivrea." The fort of Bard
itself held out till the 5th of June; and we have the authority of Napoleon for
the assertion that if the passage of the artillery had been delayed to its fall, (in
other words, if the guards of the fort had not neglected their duty,) all hope of
success in the campaign was at an end. Napoleon says, moreover, that "this
fort was a more considerable obstacle to his army than the Great St. Bernard
itself," and that the enemy's being left in possession of it in his rear fettered
his operations and modified his plans; and \veknowthatliisdispositionsfor
the battle of Marengo were not made till he heard that its reduction had opened
to him a secure line of retreat in case of disaster. When this battle had shat-
tered the main force of the Austrian?, these, again yielding to sectional pre-
judices, instead of taking advantage of the works in their rear to impede the
advance of the French, declared it was better to save the lives of their men by
armistice "than to preserve towns for the King of Sardinia." Accordingly, the
fortresses of Piedmont again fell into the hands of Napoleon without opposition,
and he was not slow to understand their utility. He directed his chief engineer,
Chasseloup de Laubat, whose admirable arrangement of defensive works had
already been of vast assistance to the army of Italy, (and for which he was
promoted from colonel of engineers to brigadier general, then general of division,
and afterwards count of the French empire, with an ample hereditary endow-
ment,) to revise this system of fortifications, with particular reference to Austrian
aggression. By demolishing a part of the old works, and repairing those of
Genoa, Roco d'Aiifo, Vienna, Legnago, Mantua, Alexandria, and the defences
of the Adda, Chasseloup formed two good lines of fortifications, which were of
great service to the French in 1805, enabling Massena, with only 50,000 men,
to hold in check the Archduke Charles with more than 90,000 men, while
Napoleon's grand army traversed Germany, and approached the capital of
Austria.
In the German campaign of 1800, Moreau derived the same advantages from
his fortified base on the Rhine as in the preceding years, while the Austrians
were soon driven back with great loss upon the Danube, where, without de-
fences, their whole army would have been exposed to. destruction. But retiring
into the fortifications of Ulm, " the Austrian general not only preserved entire
his OAvn communications and line of retreat by Donawert and Ratisbon, but
threatened those of his adversary, who, if he attempted to pass either on the
north or south, exposed himself to the attack of a powerful army in flank.
Securely posted in this central point, the imperialists daily received accessions
of strength from Bohemia and the hereditary states ; while the French, weak-
ened by detachments necessary to preserve their communications and- observe
the Prince of Reuss in the Tyrol, soon began to lose that superiority which, by
the skilful concentration of their force, they had hitherto enjoyed in the cam-
paign. The Austrians soon reaped the benefits of this admirably chosen strong-
hold ; the soldiers, lodged in excellent quarters, rapidly recovered their strength ;
while the morale of the army, which had been extremely weakened by the
rapid disasters of the campaign, as- quickly rose when they perceived that a
stop was at length put to the progress of the enemy." Moreau, on the contrary,
" found himself extremely embarrassed, and six weeks were employed in the
vain attempt to dislodge a defeated army from their stronghold; a striking proof
of the prophetic wisdom of the Archduke Charles in its formation, and the
importance of central fortifications in arresting the progress of an invading
enemy."
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 321
When the great victories of Napoleon, in the campaign of 1806, had over-
thrown the Prussian armies in the open field, there was still a dormant power
in the fortresses sufficient to hold in check the French till the new organized
forces, acting in concert with the Russian army, could have re-established the
Prussian monarchy in its ancient greatness. The works on the three great
lines of the Oder, the Elbe, and the Weser, were fully capable of doing this,
had they been properly repaired, garrisoned, and defended. But it seemed, say
the historians of that period, that fate or treason had utterly blinded the intel-
lect and paralyzed the energy of the entire Prussian army. Stettin, Custrin,
Glogau, Magdebourg, Spandau, Hameln, Nienbourg, &c., were, to the joy and
astonishment of Napoleon and his generals, surrendered without waiting, in most
cases, even the form of a siege. "Spandau," said he, in the 19th bulletin, "is
an inestimable acquisition. In our hands, it could sustain two months of opera-
tions. But such was the general confusion, that the Prussians had not armed
the batteries." The possession of these fortifications was of immense value to
the French in their ensuing operations against the Russians. All the historians
of the war notice their influence on the campaigns of Friedland and Tilsit. We
quote the words of Alison as peculiarly appropriate: "The Polish winter cam-
paign demonstrates, in the most striking manner, the ruinous effects to the
common cause, and in a special manner the interests of their own monarchy,
which resulted from the disgraceful capitulation of the Prussian fortresses in
the preceding autumn. When the balance quivered at Eylau, the arrival of
Lestoq would have given the Russians a decisive victory, had it not been for
the great successes of Davoust on the left, and the tardy appearance of Ney on
the right ; yet, if the governors of the Prussian fortresses on the Elbe and Oder
had done their duty, these corps would have been engaged far in the rear Ney
around the walls of Magdebourg, Davoust before Stettin, Custrin, and Glogau.
Saragossa, with no defence but an old wall and the heroism of its inhabitants,
held out fifty days of open trenches. Tarragona fell after as many. If the
French marshals had, in like manner, been detained two months, or even six
weeks, before each of the great fortresses of Prussia, time would have been
gained to organize the resources of the eastern provinces of the monarchy, and
Russia would have gained a decisive victory at Eylau, or driven Napoleon to a
disastrous retreat from the Vistula."
At the treaty of Tilsit, Napoleon, notwithstanding the protests and entreaties
of the king and queen, insisted upon retaining possession of the Prussian for-
tresses, as a pledge of peace. "The campaign of 1809," said he, afterwards,
"proved the prudence of my policy." They then effectually prevented Prussia
from joining Austria in kindling again the flames of war. But these were not
the only fortresses from which Napoleon derived assistance in this war. His
garrisons on the now vastly extended frontiers of the empire served as so many
safe rallying points around which the several contingents were collected, before
converging to the general rendezvous at the fortresses of Ingolstadt or of Dona-
werth. Davoust was to concentrate his immense corps at Bamberg and Wurtz-
burg; Massena at Strasburg and Ulm; Oudinot at Ausburg; Bernadotte at
Dresden; the Poles upon Gallicia; and the troops of the Rhenish confederacy
were to concentrate upon the strongholds of the Danube. "Thus from all
quarters of Europe, from the mountains of Austria to the plains of Poland,
armed men were converging in all directions to the valley of the Danube, where
a hundred and fifty thousand soldiers would ere long be collected ; while the
provident care of the Emperor was not less actively exerted in collecting maga-
zines upon the projected line of operations for the stupendous multitude, and
providing, in the arming and replenishing of the fortresses, both as a base for
offensive operations, and a refuge in the probable events of disaster" This
concentration of his vast army, secured by his fortifications, soon produced the
retreat of the Austrian army, and Napoleon's advance to Vienna.
H. Rep. Com. 86 21
322 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
Again, in 1813, the French garrisons of Stettin, Custrin, Glogau, Hamburg,
Wettenberg, and Magdebourg, would have had a fatal influence upon the Prus-
sians, had not the political perfidy of Austria, and the treason of his own gen-
erals, prevented Napoleon from profiting by the advantages of his own position.
If, after the disasters of this campaign, the fortresses of France failed to save
the nation, the cause must be sought for in the peculiar features of the invasion
itself, rather than in any lack of military influence in the French defences. A
million of disciplined men, under consummate leaders, were here assailing a single
State, impoverished by the fatal war in Russia, torn in pieces by political fac-
tions, deserted by its sworn allies, its fortresses basely betrayed into the enemy's
hands, and its military power paralyzed by the treason of generals, with their
entire armies. Its only hope was in the fortresses which had remained faithful ;
and Napoleon said at St. Helena, that if he had collected together the garrisons
of these fortresses, and retired to the Rhine, he could have crushed the allies,
even after their entrance into Paris. But political considerations prevented the
operation.
Again, in 1815, Napoleon, even after his defeat at Waterloo, possessed lines
of defence sufficiently strong to resist all attempts at invasion. But, again, the
want of co-operation on the part of the government at Paris, and treason of his
own generals, forced his second abdication. If he had retained the command of
the army, and the nation had seconded his efforts, the allies could never have
reached Paris. But the new government presented the disgraceful spectacle of
opening the way for the enemies of their country. "France," said Napoleon,
at St. Helena, "will eternally reproach the ministry with having forced her
whole people to pass under the caudine-forks, by ordering the disbanding of an
army tliat had for twenty-five years been its country's glory, and by giving up
to our astonished enemy s our still invincible fortresses."
History fully supports Napoleon's opinion of the great danger of penetrating
far into a hostile country to attack the capital, even though that capital may be
unfortified. The fatal effects of such an advance, without properly securing
the means of retreat, is exemplified by his own campaign in Russia in 1812. If,
after the fall of Smolensky, he had fortified that place and Vitepsh, which by
their position closed the narrow passage comprised between the Dnieper and the
Dwina, he might, in all probability, on the following spring, have been able to
seize upon Moscow and St. Petersburg. But leaving the hostile army of Tsch-
kakoff cantoned in his rear, he pushed on to Moscow; and when the conflagra-
tion of that city cut off his hopes of winter quarters there, and the premature
rigor of the season destroyed the horses of his artillery and provision trains,
retreat became impossible, and the awful fate of his immense army was closed
by scenes of horror to which scarcely a parallel can be found in history. We
might further illustrate this point by the Russian campaign of Charles XII, in
1708-'9, the advance of the French army on Lisbon in the Peninsular war,
and others of the same nature.
Even single works sometimes effect the object of lines of fortifications, and
frustrate the operations of an entire army. Thus Lille suspended for a whole
year the operations of Prince Eugene and Marlborough, Metz arrested the entire
power of Charles V, and Strasbourg was often the bulwark of the French.
Napoleon said to-0'Meara, that, if Vienna had been fortified in 1805, the battle
of Ulm would not have decided the event of the war. General Kutusoff 's army
could there have awaited the return of the other Russian corps and of the army
of Prince Charles, then approaching from Italy. Again, in 1809, Prince Charles,
defeated at Eckmulh, and forced to retreat by the left bank of the Danube, would
have had time to reach Vienna, and form a junction with the forces of General
Heller and Archduke John. If Berlin had been fortified in 1806, the army routed
at Jena would have rallied there, and been joined by the Russians. If Madrid had
been strongly fortified in 1805, the French army, after the victories of Espinosa.
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 323
Tudella, Burgos, and Sammosiera, would not have marched towards that capital,
leaving in the rear of Salamauea and Valladolid both the English army of Gen-
eral Moore and the Spanish army of Romana. These two would, under the
fortifications of Madrid, have united with the armies of Arragon and Valencia.
If Moscow had been fortified in 1812, its conflagration would have been avoided;
for, with strong works, and the army of KutusofF encamped on its ramparts, its
investment would have been impossible. Had not Constantinople been well
fortified, the empire of Constantine must have terminated in 700, whereas the
standard of the Prophet was not planted there until 1440. This capital was
therefore indebted to its walls for 800 years of existence. During this period it
was besieged 53 times, but only one of these sieges was successful. The
French and Venetians took it, but not without a very severe contest. Paris
often owed its safety to its walls. In 885, the Normans besieged it two years
without effect. In 1358, the Dauphin besieged it in vain. In 1359, Edward,
King of England, encamped at Montrouge, devastated the country to its
walls, but recoiled from before its works, and retired to Chatres. In 1429,
it repulsed the attack of Charles VII. In 1464, the Count of Charolois
surrounded the city, but was unsuccessful in his attacks. In 1472, it
repulsed the army of the Duke of Bourgone, who had already ravaged its pre-
cincts. In 1536, when attacked by Charles V, it again owed its safety to its
walls. In 1589, it repulsed the armies of Henry III and Henry IV. In
1636, the inhabitants of Paris for several years owed their safety to its walls.
If this capital had been strongly fortified in 1814 or 1815, the allied armies
would not have dared to attempt its investment.
We had intended to enter into an analysis of the Peninsular war, and point
out the influence of fortifications upon military operations in Spain and Portu-
gal; but further illustrations would seem unnecessary; for the usefulness of for-
tifications in the defence of inland frontiers is too evident in itself, and, as we
have already shown, is too well supported by historical facts, and the recorded
opinions of the best military men of modern ages, to be overthrown by a mere
assertion of their worthlessness, no matter by whom such assertion is made.
While there exists this great unanimity among military men upon the vast
importance of fortifications as land defences, there is an equal diversity of opin-
ion respecting the best manner of arranging them. We shall mention three gen-
eral systems of arranging forts for the defence of an open country, each of
which has been advocated at different times, and afterwards received various
modifications and additions. These three systems are the most important, and,
in fact, comprise the main features of all others worthy of much consideration.
They are :
1st. Montalembert's system of continuous lines.
2d. A system of *three lines of detached works, strongly recommended by
D'Arcon.
3d. A system proposed by Vauban, and advocated by Rogniat, consisting of
lines of very strong works placed at considerable distances from each other, and
covering large intrenched camps.
The first was proposed in 1790, and for a time attracted considerable notice
in France, but has long since been exploded, as utterly incompatible with the
principles of military art. A writer, however, of some pretension in this country,
recommends its adoption for the defence of Baltimore and the Chesapeake. The
same author would dispense entirely with our present system of fortifications on
the sea-coast, and substitute in their place wooden martello towers !
In the second system the works of the first line are to be about one day's
march apart, those of the second line opposite the intervals of the first and at
the same distance, and those of the third line having the same relation to the
second. Works of different sizes are recommended by some writers for each of
these three lines.
324 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
In the system first recommended by Vauban, and more recently by Rogniat r
the works of the advanced line are to be thirty leagues apart, and the other lines
at the same distance from each other, with their works opposite the intervals in
front. Under the guns of each is established a large intrenched camp.
These systems were designed for an open country, and either of them would
be greatly modified in its application ; for, in practice, the frontier to be defended
will always be of a broken character. The proper application of forts in the
defence of such frontiers is a question of no easy solution. The principle laid
down by Jomini, " that fortifications should always be constructed on important
strategic points," is undoubtedly the correct one ; but how to determine these
points involves questions which often perplex the patience and try the skill of
the engineer ; yet determine them he must, or his fortifications will be worse
than useless. A fort improperly placed, like a cannon with its fire reversed
upon its own artillerists, will be sure to effect the destruction of the very forces
it was designed to protect.
The system of fortifications adopted by the board of 1840 for the defence of
our northern frontier a system whose extravagance is so much spoken of in
the Apalachicola report consists of a single line of forts placed at different
points along the extreme frontier, and one large military station and depot oppo-
site about the middle of this line, and some two hundred miles back in the interior
of the country. This great central station it is proposed to locate at Albany or
in that vicinity ; and the line of forts to be as follows : First, a fort at the falls
of St. Mary ; second, at Michilimackinac ; third, at the foot of Lake Huron ;
fourth, at Detroit ; fifth, at Buffalo ; sixth, at the mouth of Niagara river ; seventh,
at Oswego ; eighth, at Sackett's harbor ; ninth, at the Narrows of the St. Law-
rence, below Ogdensburg; tenth, at Rouses's Point; elventh, arrangements for
depots at Plattsburg, and at the head waters of the Kennebeck and Penobscot ;
and, twelfth, a fort at Calais, on the St. Croix river.
This system has been considerably commented on by military men, and va-
rious opinions have been advanced recpecting its merits. Some are of opinion
that more and larger works should have been planned for the western extremity
of the line, while others regard the eastern portion as far the most important.
This difference results from a diversity of opinion respecting the most feasible
line of operations against Canada. According to the views of the one party
we should concentrate our forces at the single point of Augusta, and advance
from thence against Quebec, a distance of some two hundred and fifty miles
along the isolated carriage road through the valley of the Chaudiere ; while the
other party would draw their military munitions from Pittsburg, and their troops
from the States bordering on the Ohio river, and then ascend the Detroit and
St. Clair rivers, and Lake Huron ; get in the rear of the enemy by way of the
Georgian bay and Lake Simcoe, or still further north, by Lake Nipissing and
the Ottowa river thus leaving him between us and our true base. This subject
is worthy of examination.
The selection of positions for fortifications on this frontier must have reference
to three distinct classes of objects, viz : The security, fast, of the larger frontier
towns, where much public or private property is exposed to sudden dashing
expeditions of the foe, made either on land or by water ; second, of lake harbors,
important as places of refuge and security to our own ships, or as shelters to the
enemy's fleet while engaged in landing troops or furnishing supplies to an invading
army ; third, of all the strategic points on the probable lines of offensive or defensive
operations. These objects are distinct in their nature, and would seem to require
separate and distinct means for their accomplishment ; nevertheless, it will gen-
erally be found that positions selected with reference to one of these objects
equally fulfil the others, so intimately are they all connected. To determine
the strategic points of a probable line of military operations is therefore the main
thing to be attended to in locating the fortifications. That such points of max-
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 325
imuin importance are actually marked out by the peaceful or hostile intercourse
of nations cannot be doubted.
The relative importance of cities and towns is less varied by the fluctuations
of commerce on a land frontier than on the sea-coast. The ever changing system
of " internal improvements," by furnishing new highways and thoroughfares for
the transportation of products of manufactures and agriculture, either continually
varies the relative standing as the seaports already opened, or else opens new
ones for the exportation of their products arid importation of foreign articles
received in exchange. But these "internal improvements" are seldom carried
so far as to connect together two separate and distinct countries ; and conse-
quently the principal places on the dividing line usually retain their relative
importance, no matter how often they may have declined during times of hos-
tility, or again flourished with the increased commercial intercourse which results
from peace. The principal European places of traffic near the frontiers have
remained the same for ages, and in all probability ages hence the great frontier
marts will be nearly the same as at present. This stability of rank among the
border towns is not confined to commercial influence ; the same holds true with
respect to that established by iutercourse of a hostile character. Military his-
tory teaches us that lines of hostile operations, and the fields upon which the
principal battles between any two countries have been fought, are nearly the
same, no matter how remote the periods of comparison. These points and lines,
so important in commerce as well as in war, result from the natural features of
the ground, and we ought therefore to expect that they would be as little liable
to sudden changes as the character of the earth itself. From these remarks it
will readily be perceived that there are three distinct methods of determining the
strategic points between this country and Canada : first, by an examination of
the topography of the two countries ; second, by tracing out the main channels
of commercial intercourse ; third, by reviewing the lines of their military opera-
rations. The last method is the least liable to error, and perhaps is the most
easily understood, inasmuch as it is sometimes difficult to point the precise
degree of connexion between prospective military lines and the channels of com-
merce, or to show why these two have a fixed relation to the physical features
of the country. In the present instance, moreover, this method furnishes us
ample data for the formation of our decision, inasmuch as the campaigns between
this country and Canada have been neither few in number, nor unimportant in
their character and results.
By tracing out the history of the earlier of these campaigns, it will be seen
that the English were vastly superior in strength and numbers, yet the result of
the several campaigns was decidedly in favor of the French, who not only re-
tained their possessions in the north, but extended their jurisdiction to the mouth
of the Mississippi, and laid claim to the whole country west of the Allegany
mountains. This success must be attributed not to any superiority of the Cana-
dians in bravery, but to the higher military character of their governors, and
more especially to their fortifications, which were constructed in situations most
judiciously selected to influence the Indians and facilitate incursions into the
English colonies. The disparity of numbers was always very great. At the
middle of the eighteenth century the white population of the colonies amounted
to upwards of one million of souls, while that of both Canada and Louisiana
did not exceed fifty-two thousand. But the French possessions, though situated
at the extremities of a continent and separated by an almost boundless wilder-
ness, were nevertheless connected by a line of military posts strong enough to
resist the small arms that could there be brought against them. This fort-
building propensity of the French became a matter of serious alarm to the
colonies, and, in 1710, the legislature of New York especially protested against
it in an address to the crown. While the military art was stationary in Eng-
land, France had produced her four great engineers Errard, Pagan, Vauban,
326 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
and Cormontaingne ; and nowhere has the influence of their system of military
defence been more strikingly exhibited than in the security it afforded to the
Canadian colony when assailed by such vastly superior forces. Still further
accessions were now made to these forces by large re-enforcements from the
mother country, while the Canadians received little or no assistance from France;
nevertheless they prolonged the war till 1760, forcing the English to adopt the
slow and expensive process of reducing all their fortifications.
The history of the northern wars of the revolution and of 1812 still further
proves the importance of fortifications in defence. From this history it will also
be seen that positions for defence selected by the board are really important
ones ; and, moreover, that while the proposed eastern and western routes have
been used as auxiliary to the main attack, the line of Lake Champlain has been
the field of strife and blood for fifteen campaigns. Nature has marked this out
as one line of intercourse with Canada ; for, besides being the shortest and
easiest line of communication, it possesses many other advantages. Military
stores, &c., can easily be transported by water, while the roads on each side of
this line offer good routes to the troops. These roads generally converge to the
northern extremity of the lake, thus enabling us to concentrate forces at that
point while the enemy's invading forces would be obliged to pursue diverging
routes. The line of the Kennebec, on the contrary, is only a single road, but
little travelled, and penetrating a wide and almost uninhabited wilderness.
General Jomini says, emphatically, that a line of operations should always offer
two or three roads for the movement of an army in the sphere of its enterprises
an insuperable objection to the Kennebec, except as a diversion to the main
attack. But there are still stronger objections to this route than its want of
feasibility for the transportation of the main army ; for, even if that army should
succeed in reaching Quebec in safety, the expedition would be entirely without
military results, unless that fortress could be immediately reduced. It would
be precipitating our entire force upon the strongest position of the enemy, and
making both the success and safety of our army entirely dependent upon the
reduction of that fortress a contingency which would be extremely doubtful,
under the most favorable circumstances ; and, should we be ever so fortunate in
our operations, its siege woulcl occupy a considerable length of time. What
principle of military science would justify such a disposition of our force 1 We
are fully aware of the great advantages which we should derive from the reduc-
tion of Quebec ; but we are also aware of the great difficulties to be encountered
in any attempt to accomplish that object. We believe it can and will bo made
to surrender to our arms ; but at the same time we conceive it to be utter folly
to base our military operations on the contingency of a short and successful
siege. By advancing upon Montreal by the Champlain route, we would cut off
the Canadian forces in the west from all re-enforcements ; and then, as circum-
stances might direct, could besiege Quebec or attack the enemy in the field; or,
perhaps, manoeuvring as the French did at the siege of Mantua, accomplish both
objects at the same time.
If the Champlain line is, as we believe, the most important line in the north,
its security by fortifications is a matter of great interest. The works recom-
mended by the board for this purpose deserve the earliest attention of Congress.
But are these works alone sufficient to accomplish the object ? They consist of
a single fort, costing $600,000, on Lake Champlain, near the extreme frontier,
and depots at Plattsburg and Albany. But what is to retard the advance of a
hostile army if it should pass this extreme frontier barrier ? or what defensive
works are to protect the debouche of the northern canal, or even to save the
great central depot 1 We know of no foreign engineer who has recommended
less than three lines of fortifications for the security of a land frontier ; and
Napoleon, the Archduke Charles, and General Jomini agree in recommending
at least this number of lines. There may be circumstances that render it un-
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 327
necessary to resort to a threefold defence throughout the whole extent of the
northern frontier ; but upon our main line of communication with Canada, a
line of maximum importance both to us and the enemy, we know of no reason
for violating the positive rules of the art rules which have been established
for ages, and sanctioned by the best engineers and greatest generals of modern
times.
Ticonderoga has more than once stayed the waves of northern invasion;
and we know of no change in the art of war, or the condition of the coun-
try, that renders less important than formely the advantages of an intermediate
point of support between Albany and the Canadian lines. Indeed, we should think
that the connexion of the Hudson with the lake, by the Northern canal, had
even increased the value of such a point. Moreover, we should think that the
great value of a central depot near Albany would warrant a resort to the best
means of security which can be afforded by defensive works. Here we already
have one of our largest arsenals of construction ; here are to be located maga-
zines for the collection and deposit, in time of peace, of gunpowder ; and here,
in war, is to be formed the grand military depot for our whole northern armies.
Such a place should never be left exposed to the coup-de-main of an enemy. The
chance operations of a defensive army are never sufficient for the security of
so important a position. We do not pretend to say what its defences should
be. Perhaps strong bridge-heads on the Mohawk and Hudson rivers, and de-
tached forts on the several lines of communication, may accomplish the desired
object ; perhaps more central and compact works may be found necessary. We
only wish to insist on the importance of securing the position by some efficient
means. The remarks of Napoleon (quoted before) on the advantages to be de-
rived from fortifying such a central place, where the military wealth of the
state can be secured, are strikingly applicable to this case. The views of
Alison on this subject, though of little authority when compared with those of
Napoleon already given, are very eloquently and forcibly expressed. We
add in conclusion, the following extract :
"From the important consequences which followed the occupation of
Vienna," says he, "and the seizure of its immense military resources by the
French, may be derived one conclusion of lasting value to every independent
state. This is the incalculable importance of every metropolis either being
adequately fortified, or possessing in its immediate vicinity a citadel of approved
strength, capable of containing twenty or thirty thousand soldiers, and of ser-
ving as a place of secure deposit for the national archives, stores, wealth, and
government, till the national strength can be fairly roused for their rescue.
Had Austria prepared such a fortress, in or near adjoining to Vienna, the inva-
sions o*f 1805 and 1809 would have terminated in the invader's ruin. Had the
heights of Belleville Montmartre been strongly fortified, the invasions of 1814
and 1815 would have been attended with nothing but disaster to the allied
armies. Had Berlin been of as great strength as Dantzic, the French armies,
after the disaster of Jena, would have been detained round its walls till the
Russian hosts advanced, and six years of bondage saved to the Prussian
monarchy. Had the Kremlin been a citadel capable of holding out six weeks,
the terrible sacrifice of Moscow would not have been required. Had Vienna
not been impregnable to the Mussulman arms, the monarchy would have sunk
in the dust before the standard of Sobieski gleamed on the Bisemberg. Had
the lines of Torres Vedras not formed an impassable barrier to Massena, the
germ of patriotic resistance in the Peninsula would have been extinguished in
the bud. Had the walls of Rome not deterred the Carthagenian hero from a
siege, the fortunes of the republic would have sunk after the disaster of Cannae.
It is by no means necessary for these important ends that the whole metropolis
should be confined by fortifications ; it is enough that a citadel of great strength.
328 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
is at hand, to contain all the warlike and civil resources of the kingdom. Let
no nation imagine that the magnitude of its resources relieves it from this neces-
sity, or that the effulgence of its glory will secure it from ultimate danger. It
was after the battle of Austerlitz that Naploleon first felt the necessity of
fortifying Paris ; and it was in five short years afterwards that the bitter conse-
quences of national vanity, which prevented his design form being carried into
effect, were experienced by the Parisians."
H. WAGER HALLECK,
Lieutenant of Engineers.
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 329
No. 6.
[Ho. REPS., Ex. Doc. No. 5, 32D CONGRESS, Isr SESSION.]
REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR OF DECEMBER 8, 1851, ON THE SUBJECT
OF FORTIFICATIONS, IN ANSWER TO A RESOLUTION OF THE HOUSE OF REP-
RESENTATIVES OF MARCH 3, 1851.
List of Documents.
A. Statement of fortifications on the Atlantic coast and Gulf of Mexico, the
amount expended on each, and the estimated cost of completion and
armament.
B. Statement of fortifications on the northern frontier.
C. Statement of cannon and carriages at the forts and arsenals.
D. Report of General J. G. Totten, chief engineer.
E. Letter to the Secretary of the Navy requesting the views of naval officers
on certain points stated, and their reports, viz :
1. Report of Commodore C. Morris.
2. Report of Commodore M. C. Perry.
3. Report of Commander R. B. Cunningham.
4. Report of Commander S. F. Dupont.
5. Report of Lieutenant J. Lanman.
6. Report of Lieutenant M. F. Maury.
7. Report of Lieutenant J. A. Dahlgren.
F. Order to the chief engineer, requiring the views of engineer officers en cer-"
tain points stated, and their reports, viz :
8. Report of Lieutenant Colonel R. E. De Russey.
9. Report of Major W. H. Chase.
10. Report of Major R. Delafield.
330
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
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FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
331
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332
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
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FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
333
UOIl
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CLASS C- Works n
and more or less
1. Fort Knox, opposite Bu
2. Fort Delaware, Delawa
3. Fort Carroll, Soller's Po
4. Fort Calhoun, Hampton Ro
5. Fort Sumter, Charleston harb
6. Fort Clinch, Cumberland So
7. Fort Taylor, Key West, Fla*
8. Fort Jefferson, Garden Key, T
Fla*
9. Redoubt of Fort Barrancas,
10. Fort Gaines, Dauphin island,
334
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
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FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
335
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class D.
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336
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FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
337
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338 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
GENERAL REMARKS.
In estimating for peace garrisons, it is considered disadvantageous to discipline to break up the companies
when it can be avoided. Several works are reckoned as requiring peace garrisons, though they will not, at
our present rate of progress, be prepared for troops for some years. Some of these garrisons nii<r!it, on an
emergency, be reduced for a time ; but the force proposed should be regarded generally as the minimum proper
to secure our ports from insult and keep watch over the military property. The garrisons, as stated, amount
to forty-seven and a half companies for the Atlantic and Gulf seaboard, independent of Tampa Bay and the
city of New Orleans.
The works that have been under repair of class A, and those of class B, may all be regarded as completed as
respects efficiency. The expenditures still required have relation, most generally, to matters of accommodation
of troops, to storehouses, sea walls, wharves, and roads ; to repairs of perishable portions; to the substitution
of permanent for certain decaying materials ; to preservation of sites from the action of the sea, &c.
The amounts given in the column under the head of expended for construction or repair, include all the appro-
priations heretofore made. In some cases balances of these appropriations remain, and are in course of
expenditure.
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
339
<M O >O O CO
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Classes and description of works.
Class A. Old works repaired
Class B. New works completed or nearly completed
Class C. Works now under construction
Class D. Works the first to be commenced ....
Class E. Works to be commenced after those in class D ....
Deduct value of ordnance and ammunition now on har
Amount still required for armament of the first five cla
Class F. Works to be commenced last of all
Grand total
340
FOKTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
ss ^
s u
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&$ z $
}
ARMAMENT, INCLUDING 100 ROUNDS OF AMMUNITION FOR EACH PIECE.
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1 . Fort Brady, Michigan*
2. Fort Mackinac, Michigan*
3. Fort Gratiot, Michigan*
4. New Fort Barracks, nr. Detroit, Mich
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ter, New York*
fi. Repair of old Fort Niagara, New Yorh
7. Repair of old Fort Ontario, New York
8. Fort at the outlet of Lake Chainplain
New York*
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
341
CASEMATE CARRIAGES.
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Fort Washington, Maryland
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Fort Niagara, New York
342 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
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Names of forts.
Castle Williams, New York
Fort Columbus, New York
Fort Mifflin, Pennsylvania
Fort McHenry , Maryland
Fort Monroe, Virginia ..
Fort Moultrie, South Carolina
Castle Pinckney, South Carolina . .
Fort Sumter, South Carolina
FortMcRae, Florida
Fort, Ontario NRW York
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345
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Fort Sclmyler, New York
Fort Marion, Florida
Total at the forts
Total at the arsenals
Jn California, not known whether
in forts. .
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346 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
P.
Report of General J. G. Totten.
WASHINGTON, November 1, 1851.
SIR : In obedience to your orders of April 17, I have the honor to present
my views and opinions on the subject embraced in the first of the resolutions
adopted by the House of Representatives on the 3d March last in relation to
the permanent fortifications of the country.
I shall successively take up the points which you have made particular subjects
of inquiry, though I foresee that I may need your indulgence for some time, using
a rather broad license in connecting them with collateral topics. I hope, also,
to have your indulgence for occasionally quoting from a report on national de-
fence, made by a board of oincers to the Secretary of War on the 10th of May,
1840. I have the less hesitation in thus quoting, since that report was written
by myself, and its statements and opinions have been confirmed by all my sub-
sequent meditation on the subject. As I shall, however, repeat herein a part
only of what is therein set forth, and as that report goes into a pretty full dis-
eussiofc of the whole subject, and was concurred in by several experienced
officers, whose countenance and support gives to it, indeed, all its authority, I
would respectfully urge the whole report upon your attention. It is to be found
in House Document No. 206, 1st session 26th Congress.
The remarks made by Mr. Secretary Poinsett, when laying the report before
Congress, as given in the same document, seem to me worthy of full considera-
tion.
I do not consider it necessary to urge the point that wars may again visit us,
and wars moreover with powerful nations. All the questions of the Secretary
assume this as possibility at least, as do the resolutions of Congress calling
for this inquiry. How much soever a nation may love peace, and however well
disposed to preserve it by moderation, justice, and impartiality, it is not less true
now than it ever has been that the interests and honor of nations cannot always
be made to run in parallel courses, and that jostling and interference are the
more apt to occur where there is the closer proximity by position or by the re-
lations of trade and business.
Within the last fifteen years four or five times has this country, owing to
some question suddenly rising into importance, been surprised to find itself on
the very verge of war with the most powerful nations of the earth. And the
latent spirit, not to say belligerent aptitude, on either side, has not always been
quite satisfied that the concessions made for peace have not purchased it at too
high a price. The point of honor will always, when really touched, as it ever
has done, keep with nations as with men the point of interest in subjection.
And a hackneyed adage shows that it is ever deemed not less important with
nations than with men that there should at all times be obvious preparation and
readiness to defend both honor and interest. It is, therefore, notwithstanding
certain theories of the day and public declarations that the age of strife and
warfare has passed away, only reasonable and prudent to assume that a state
of war may exist, and to inquire in what way a powerful enemy may wage it
against us. He may do so
1. By attacking our commerce and navigation upon the ocean. As, how-
ever, no military preparation on the shores can avert this danger, and the means
of meeting it must be purely naval, these means do not now fall under consid-
eration; or,
2. By assailing some one or more important point or points of the coast with
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 347
a large military and naval force,-with a view to immediate damage or more or less
protracted occupation; or,
3. By suddenly appearing with a large squadron of vessels before our prin-
cipal commerciarcities, laying them under contribution, and burning or carrying
off the shipping, and by making powerful attacks upon our navy yards in order
to destroy those establishments ; or,
4. By attacks upon smaller towns and establishments of the coast with small
squadrons or single vessels, or with privateers, capturing the shipping therein,
and levying contributions, and by like meant intercepting the interior commerce
within the bays, sounds, and estuaries of the coast ; these lesser enterprises being
often conducted under the countenance and support of considerable fleets.
The danger may take any of these forms, or all of them. And against any
or all of these a naval force of equal or greater strength, if it could with any
certainty be found at hand, might be an adequate resort, though it would not be
the most economical. But, in the first place, we are yet and shall be for years
inferior in our naval preparation to nations with which we are likely to be in
conflict ; and next, if we were even far superior, it would be impossible to have,
at each of the points to be guarded, a naval force sufficient to secure it, because
a hostile squadron of twenty or thirty sail of the line and war steamers would
fall with equal ease on either of the important points, and could with no more
certainty be expected at one than at another ; so that, to resist successfully, we
must be ready at each and all, with a force not less than that of the enemy ; if
less, an unavailing resistance would but augment the calamitous consequences.
An enemy's squadron, assembled at Halifax or Bermuda, must be equally
looked for at every important point from the Penobscot to New Orleans, inclu-
sive, for it could with equal ease fall upon either. The same would be true,
moreover, of such a force assembled in any Atlantic port of Europe.
Having seen the modes in which we may be assailed, and that no navy we
'are likely to possess can supply the requisite guarantees, the first question of
the Secretary of War leads us to inquire, to what extent we may be aided by
our numerous and multiplying railroads. This question is in the following
words :
Hoicfar the invention and extension of railroads have sujterseded or dimin-
ished the necessity of fortifications on the seaboard ?
If there are cases in which fortifications will be aided 'by these roads cases
in which works of less strength and efficiency may be relied on, because such
aid can be afforded in moments of need there are many others in which any
such aid as they could supply would be useless, and many also to which rail-
roads can have no application.
In very rare cases, a fort lying near existing or probable railroads may also
occupy a position exposing it to a besieging army. In such a case, undoubt-
edly, a railroad would have a direct influence; and the strength and cost of the
fort would of course be materially lessened, in consequence of the rapidity with
which the railroad would bring succor.
In most cases, however, forts are not liable to a siege, nor to any attack that
will keep an enemy more than a few hours before them; they are required, by
sudden action, to defend the passage of a river or a channel leading to important
objects, or to prevent an enemy's squadron from seizing, or cannonading, or
bombarding ships, navy yards, cities, &c. duties to be accomplished only by
heavy artillery in its various forms. The question whether the various forms
of heavy artillery will be better placed for this purpose within forts or vessels
wih 1 be examined hereafter; but that this artillery, however arranged, is the
only effectual instrument of defence, admits no doubt. This artillery being in
adequate numbers, properly placed, sufficiently maimed, out of the reach of
seizure by the enemy, and too powerful to be silenced by him all conditions
indispensable, whether in communication with railroads or not is prepared with
348 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
all useful accessories and ready for its great functions, independent of any aid
to be supplied from without.
It happens, moreover, that few of the points necessarily occupied for this
defence are so situated as to he benefited by railroads, unless the latter be con-
structed with the exclusive purpose of communicating with them ; and some are
wholly unapproachable by such means, were they ever so necessary.
As it is undoubtedly true that these communications, even as they now exist,
may bring with much rapidity militia and volunteers from the interior, and from
lateral sources, to many points of tfte coast, it may be worth while to examine a
little more in detail, whether such use could be made of these superadded num-
bers as to justify dependence on them for defence against a powerful enemy.
Suppose a hostile fleet to be in front of the city of New .York, which nothing
would prevent if the channels of approach were not fortified, in what way could
the 100,000 or 200,000 new men poured into the city and environs by railroads,
although armed with muskets and field-pieces, aid the half million of people
already there? It seems to me very clear that these additional forces would,
like the population proper of the city, be utterly powerless in the way of resist-
ance, with any means at their command ; and if resistance were attempted by
the city would but serve to swell the list of casualties unless they should at
once retreat beyond the range of fire. If the enemy's expedition were intended,
according to the second supposed mode of attack, for invasion or occupation for
some time of a portion of the country, then in many places this resource of rail-
roads would be of value ; because then the duty of defence would fall upon the
army and militia of the country, and these communications would swell their
numbers.
But of all the circumstances of danger to the coast this chance of an attempt
by an enemy to land and march any distance into a populous district is least to
be regarded, whether there be or be not such speedy mode of receiving rein-
forcements, and our system of fortifications has little to do with any such danger.
In preparing against maritime assaults the security of the points to be covered
is considered to be greatly augmented whenever the defence can be so arranged
as to oblige an enemy to land at some distance : for the reason that opportunity
is thereby allowed, in the only possible way, for the spirit and enterprise of the
people to come into play.
Instead of being designed to prevent a landing upon any part of the coast, as
many seem to suppose, and some to allege in proof of extravagant views on the
part of the system of defence, the system often leaves this landing as an open
alternative to the enemy, and aims so to cover the really important and dangerous
points as to necessitate a distant landing and a march towards the object through
the people. It is because the expedition would otherwise easily accomplish its
object, without landing and without allowing the population to partake in the
defence, that the fortifications are resorted to. For instance, without Fort Del-
aware, or some other fort low down in Delaware bay, an enemy could place his
fleet of steamers in front of Philadelphia by the time his appearance on the
coast had been well announced throughout the city. And in spite of all New
Jersey, Delaware, and lower Pennsylvania he could levy his contributions and
burn the navy yard shipping, and be away in a few hours. But being obliged,
by the fort above mentioned, to land full forty miles below the city, the resist-
ance to his march may be safely left to the courage and patriotism that will find
ample time to array themselves in opposition.
A distant landing is deemed to be a great advantage to the defence in all
cases ; and in populous districts, if the forts be sufficient for this particular duty,
it makes the security complete.
It is no part of the task assumed by the system of fortifications to guard
against the invasion and protracted occupation of a well-peopled district, or of
a point around which the forces of the country could be soon rallied. In such
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 349
attempts railroads would accelerate the issues ; but even the common modes of
conveyance would soon bring forces enough to overwhelm them.
But there are places important in themselves, or necessary to the general
welfare, that have not the advantage of a large population at hand or within
call, and which may nevertheless be very tempting objects to an enterprising
enemy. The navy yard at Pensacola will, for instance, in time of war, be of
infinite value in reference to the commerce of the Gulf of Mexico. Its destruc-
tion would therefore be a great object with a maritime enemy, and it has accord-
ingly been so fortified as to be safe from a coup de main, or, at any rate, will be
so when the little remaining to do is complete. A hostile expedition adequate
to the reduction of these defences would, however, be able to exclude all relief
approaching laterally from the Mississippi, and there is no help to be supplied
from the neighborhood, and none but very tardy succor to come from the inte-
rior ; so that an enemy would find time to reduce the forts established on the
islands at the mouth of the bay.
This case illustrates one aspect of the influence of railroads on the coast de-
fence of the United States. While there is no such road by which succor can
come from the interior, the security of the harbor and navy yard of Pensacola
must depend wholly on the strength and state of readiness of the defences, naval
and military, at the mouth of the harbor, there being no neighboring population ;
and these defences will be liable to a somewhat prolonged as well as powerful
attack, giving time for sieges of several days duration.
With a railroad extending into the interior of Alabama, an attacking force,
though large, would have to confine itself to comparatively brief and hurried
operations, even though a short siege may be considered out of the question.
But although such a railroad were made, a sudden onslaught would suffice for
the destruction of the naval establishments (if there were no fortification) when-
ever the attacking naval force were larger than that which might be present for
defence ; that is to say, whenever we had not a large squadron present. As
before said, the railroad can supply none of the means of resisting such attacks.
Without fortifications no existing or projected railroad would do anything
towards the protection of New Orleans against a squadron of a med steamers;
and not more could such communications do for Mobile or for the hundreds of
large vessels that lie in the mouth of Mobile bay awaiting cargoes. There are,
moreover, very great points in our system of sea-coast defence that derive their
importance much more from their general relation to and bearing on general
commerce and the security of large portions of the coast than from local inter-
ests. Narraganset road, Delaware Breakwater harbor, Hampton roads, Cum-
berland sound, (Georgia,) Key West, and the Tortugas, are points of this
character; and neither of these would derive material aid from any existing or
probable railroad communications. It is proper here to say something of these
relations.
Narraganset bay. As a harbor this is acknowledged by all to be the best
on the whole coast of the United States, and it is the only close man-of-war
harbor that is accessible with a northwest wind, the prevailing and most violent
wind of the inclement season. Numerous boards and commissions sometimes
composed of naval officers, sometimes of army officers, sometimes of officers of
both services have at different times had the subject of this roadstead under
consideration, and all have concurred in recommending in strong terms that it
be made a place of naval rendezvous and repair, if not a great naval depot
one or more of these commissions preferring it for the latter purpose to all other
positions. These recommendations have not been acted on, but it is next to
certain that a war would force their adoption upon the government. With the
opening of this anchorage properly defendedv hardly a vessel-of-war of ours
could come, either singly or in small squadrons, upon the coast in the boisterous
season without arming at this port, on account of the comparative certainty of
350 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
an immediate entrance ; and this would be particularly the case with vessels
injured by heavy weather, or in conflict with the enemy with vessels bringing
in prizes, or pursued by a superior force.
The use of the port would almost necessarily bring with it the demand for
the means of repairing and refitting; and the concentration of these upon some
suitable spot would be the beginning of a permanent dock yard.
For the same reason that ships-of-war would collect here, it would be a favorite
point of rendezvous for privateers and their prizes, and a common place of refuge
for merchantmen.
From this, as a naval station, the navigation of Lpng Island sound and the
communication between this and Martha's Vineyard sound or Buzzard's bay
might be well protected; New London harbor would be covered; this navy
yard would command southwardly, as that from Hampton roads northwardly,
the great inward curve of the coast between Cape Cod and Cape Hatteras, the
influence of which command over the blockading operations of an enemy will
be apparent when it is considered that the only harbors of refuge left to him
will be the Delaware, Gardiner's and Buzzard's bays, and Martha's Vineyard
sound.
The bays just mentioned belong to the class which, being too wide for com-
plete defence by batteries, must call in such auxiliary defence as the navy may
supply ; and, in reference to their defence by these means, nothing can be more
important than the fortifications of Narraganset roads, because all but Delaware
bay, including an anchorage for ships-of-war under Block island, would be com-
manded by a single squadron of those floating defences lying in these roads.
To a squadron of steam batteries, for instance, lying under the fortifications, it
would be a matter of little consequence into which of the above anchorages an
enemy should go, all being within reach of three or four hours, and. some within
sight. We will here observe, by the way, that this use of floating defences is
in accordance with the principle before insisted on They are not expected to
close the entrance into these several bays that would require a squadron for
each at least equal to the enemy's ; but as the enemy goes in merely for rest or
shelter, and there is no object that he can injure, he may toe permitted to enter,
and our squadrons will assail him only when the circumstances of wind, weather.
&c., give all the advantages to the attack. The fortification of Narraganset
roads is, therefore, in effect, a most important contribution towards the defence
of all the neighboring anchorages. But the same properties that make Narra-
ganset roads so precious to us would recommend them to the enemy also, and
their natural advantages will be enhanced in his eyes by the value of all the
objects these advantages may have accumulated therein.
If this roadstead were without defence, an enemy could occupy it without
opposition, and by the aid of naval superiority form a lodgement on the island
of Rhode Island for the war. Occupying this island with his troops, and with
his fleets the channels on either side, he might defy all the forces of the eastern
States ; and while from this position his troops would keep in alarm ad motion
the population of the east, feigned expeditions against New York or against more
southern cities would equally alarm the country in that direction; and thus,
though he might do no more than menace, it is difficult to estimate the embar-
rassment and expense into which he would drive the government.
It has been alleged that similar consequences would flow from the occupation
of other positions, (such for instance as are afforded in the bays just mentioned,)
and that therefore the defence, in a strong manner, of Narraganset roads is use-
less. Even allowing that there are other inaccessible positions whereon an
enemy might place himself, is it a reason, because the foe can, in spite of us,
possess himself of comparatively unsafe and open harbors, that we should not
apply to our own iises, but yield up to him the very best harbor on the coast ;
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 351
that we should submit to capture and destruction the valuable objects that accu-
. mulate in consequence of the properties of the harbor 1
But it is believed that none of the outer and wider harbors will answer for
such an establishment as we have supposed, nor for any other purpose than an
occasional anchorage for ships-of-war, and for these reasons, among others : that
although ships-of-war might possibly ride in these broad waters at all seasons,
it would seem to be a measure of great temerity for transports to attempt it,
except in the mildest seasons ; and there can be but little doubt that a hostile
expedition would resort to no harbor as a place of rendezvous, unless it afforded
sure protection to its transports, these being the only means by which ulterior
purposes could be executed, or final retreat from the country effected.
If, moreover, Narraganset roads became a naval station, or at least the station
of a floating force designed to act against these outer waters, such an establish-
ment by an enemy on other positions would at once be put upon the defensive
and require the constant presence of a superior fleet, thus measurably losing the
object of the establishment. Independent of deficient qualities as harbors, how-
ever, none of these bays would answer our purposes : First, because they can-
not be securely defended ; and second, because they are difficult of access from
the main, the communication with them being liable to interruption by bad
weather, and liable to be cut off by the enemy.
It seems quite evident that the circumstances involved in the occupation and
defence of Narraganset roads will not be materially changed by the facilities of
railroad communications ; so far as numbers can aid in defensive arrangements,
they could be supplied in due time and to the extent needed by the surrounding
district and common modes of conveyance.
Delaware Breakwater harbor. In the long stretch of coast between New
York bay and the Chesapeake, a distance of about three hundred miles, there is
no other entrance from the ocean (except for small vessels) than that at the
mouth of the Delaware bay. This circumstance led the commercial men of the
country to call, with great unanimity and earnestness, for the creation at this
place, which was without a safe anchorage and was full of dangerous shoals, of
an artificial harbor. This call had reference mainly, it is true, to protection in
stress of weather ; but for the same reason, namely, the great distance on either
hand to any place of shelter, it must become a place of refuge from an enemy.
Vessels near that coast, whether bound north or south, will be liable to be cut
off from other refuge and forced into this only entrance ; and vessels bound up
the Delaware must seek it, of course ; so that as this artificial harbor provided
by the government must be resorted to in time of war for security of both
kinds, thereby becoming a place of rendezvous, it will be an attractive point for
an enemy. It would, moreover, since it now yields a safe anchorage, most cer-
tainly become the habitual resort of an enemy's vessel cruising on this coast, in
order to command the great channel of commerce that sweeps in near these capes.
These considerations show the necessity of defending this harbor, and its
secure defence would afford the further great advantage of providing a port
whence our cruisers, whether steam or sail vessels, might keep watch over this
same channel of commerce whenever they were not confined within the defences
by the actual presence of a superior enemy.
This case also is one in which the objects in view do not depend on the use
of railroads ; they can all be achieved without such aid. And it is also a case
in which railroads of themselves would do nothing, and in which nothing could
be dispensed with because of their existence. If the enemy landing an army
were to lay siege to a fort on the shore side of the harbor, then a railroad would
certainly be useful in expediting the arrival of succor. But though an enemy
would certainly use this harbor for the purposes above stated, if it were not de-
fended, it is not to be supposed that for the conquest of these advantages he
would bring a great land expedition that would find much richer booty else-
352 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
where. Forts capable of resisting a coup de main would no doubt, therefore,
fulfil their purpose and be respected; and accordingly no siege is to be antici-
pated, and any auxiliary force that great caution might demand could be easily
and speedily forwarded by the numerous and fast steamers on the bay.
Hampton roads and Chesapeake bay. The board of naval officers and
engineers intrusted with the selection of sites for a great northern and a great
southern naval depot, recommended, in their joint reports of 1819 and 1820,
Burwell's bay, on James river, for the one, and Charlestown, in Boston harbor,
for the other. They also recommended Boston harbor and Narraganset bay at
the north, and Hampton roads at the south, as chief naval rendezvous. In these
reports the commissioners entered at large into the consideration of all the mat-
ters relating to these important objects, and reference is now made to those
reports for many interesting details.
Such an expansion has, however, since then been given to the present navy
yard at Gosport, (opposite Norfolk,) that there is little probability of any other
position on these waters being occupied for such purposes.
The great importance of retaining Hampton roads during a war, and of cov-
ering the navy yard, is conceded on all hands. But the bearing of this harbor
upon the general defence of Chesapeake bay is not generally understood.
Being the great naval depot station and rendezvous of the southern coast, it
may be safely assumed that this harbor, during war, will never be without a
number of ships-of-war, some ready for sea, others just returned from sea, and
others held in condition to be suddenly despatched. This being so, should an
enemy with a small or moderate force venture up Chesapeake bay, with designs
upon any of the rivers, harbors, or towns, his capture would be inevitable by the
squadrons of sailing and steaming vessels issuing from his rear from Hampton
roads. This certain result would keep back any enemy from any such preda-
tory venture. If, then, we provide adequate defences for the more important
places upon the bay and its tributaries, there will remain no temptation to large
expeditions, and the peace of this wide-spread navigable water and the safety
of the great amount of business and commerce traversing it in all directions
will be secured. Thus, by covering the anchorage of our squadron, the defences
of Hampton roads become to a most important extent the defences of all the
upper waters.
The following very important relation existing between the defences of Hamp-
ton roads and the security of both Norfolk and the navy yard, independent of
closing the channel to those* places, is also not generally understood, and has
been overlooked by cities.
If we suppose no defences at the mouth of the roadstead, or only such as can
be disregarded or easily silenced, an enemy might debark his troops in Lynn-
haven bay and despatch them against Norfolk, while his fleet would pass up the
harbor to the vicinity of the town, not only covering the flank of his troops,
but landing parties to turn any position that might be taken by an army at-
tempting to defend the place ; or, instead of landing in the bay, he might, at his
option, land the main body quite near to Norfolk, and having possession of James
river, he would prevent the arrival of any succor in steamboats or otherwise by
that channel.
There are two or three defiles on the route from Lynnhaven bay to Norfolk,
caused by the interlocking of streams, that with the aid of field-works would
possess great strength ; and being occupied in succession, would undoubtedly
delay, if not repulse, an- enemy assailing them in front. Since the naval depot
seems fixed at Gosport, these must indeed be chiefly relied on for its security
from land attacks, and timely attention must be given on the breaking out of a
war, to the occupying of these defiles with appropriate defences. These posi-
tions, however, possess no value whatever if they can be turned ; and without
adequate fortifications at the outlet of Hampton roads, there would seem to be
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 353
no security for Norfolk or the navy yard, except in the presence of a large
^military force.
On the completion of the defences at the mouth of Hampton roads the cir-
cumstances will be very different. Then those denies must be attacked in front,
because no part of the enemy's force can be landed above the mouth of the
roads. But this is not all. The moment an enemy advances towards Norfolk
from this point of debarkation, his communication with his fleet will be jeop-
arded; because as the defiles do not require a large body to defend them
against an attack in front, the greater part of the re-enforcements arriving from
above by way of the river may be landed upon his flanks or in his rear. An
offensive land movement by the enemy, under such circumstances, could be jus-
tified only in the case of his finding an entire want of preparation caused by
the unexpected commencement of hostilities. In connexion with this disposition
for defence, it may be expedient, on the breaking out of a war, to throw up a
field-work on the shore opposite the position of Fort Calhoun, which would,
besides, contribute to the exclusion from the roadstead of vessels of small draught.
The above remarks show that the fortifications in progress are not less neces-
sary to the security of the navy yard and the city of Norfolk from a land attack
than from an attack by water ; and that both these important functions are su-
perseded to the task of defending the only good roadstead of the southern coast,
and of contributing in a very important degree towards the defence of the
Chesapeake bay.
As in the case of Narraganset roads, it has been objected to this system of
defence, that, although it may shut up this anchorage, it leaves others in this
region open. May we suppose, then, that if there were no other than this har-
bor, its defence -would be justifiable ? If so, it would seem that the objection
rests on the principle that, in proportion as nature has been bountiful to us, we
must be niggardly to ourselves ; that having little, we may cherish it ; but having
much, we must throw all away.
The same criticism complains of the unreasonable magnitude of one of these
works, (Fort Monroe,) and it is conceded that there is justice in the criticism.
But it has long been too late to remedy the evil. It may not, however, be im-
proper to avail of this opportunity to remove from the country the professional
reproach attached to this error. When the system of coast defence was about
to be taken up, it was thought best by the government and Congress to call
from abroad a portion of that skill and science which a long course of active
warfare was supposed to have supplied. Fort Monroe is one of the results of
that determination. It was not easy, probably, to come down from the exag-
gerated scale of warfare to which Europe was then accustomed; nor for those
who had been brought up where wars were often produced and always magni-
fied by juxtaposition or proximity, to realize to what degree remoteness from
belligerent nations might diminish military means and qualify military objects.
Certain it is, that this experiment, costly as it was in the case ot Fort Monroe,
would have been much more so but for the opposition of some whose more
moderate opinions had been moulded by the circumstances and wants of our own
country.
The mistake is one relating to magnitude, however, not to strength. Magni-
tude in fortification is often a measure of strength, but not always, nor in this
instance. Fort Monroe might have been as strong as it is now against a water
attack, or an assult, or a siege, with one-third its present capacity, and perhaps
at not more than half its cost. I do not think this work too strong for its posi-
tion, nor too heavily armed ; and as the force of the garrison will depend mainly
on the extent of the armament, the error which has caused an excess in the first
outlay will not involve much useless expense after completion.
The railroad coming down from the interior of the country to Norfolk navy
yard might unquestionably render service in bringing forward troops in the
H. Rep. Com. 86 23
354 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
event of a powerful and persevering land attack on the defences of Norfolk and
the navy yard, and in like manner useful re-enforcements might arrive rapidly in
the steamers of James river. But we have seen that without the defences at
the mouth of the roads there would be no time nor opportunity for any such
force to arrive, or to act when arrived. The enemy would proceed from sea
directly up to his object, and need not necessarily lose a tide nor land a man.
If a sudden attack with a large squadron of armed steamers for this great
naval depot presents an object worthy of a great expedition is to be repelled,
it will not be by crowds of volunteers rushing in from the country with muskets
and rifles on their soulders, but by fortifications of some sort, or by naval
means; and if by the latter, by a force not materially less than the enemy's.
Cumberland sound, at the mouth of St. Mary's river. It is an important
principle, bearing peculiarly on the defence of the whole southern coast, that
on a shore possessing few harbors it is at the same time more necessary to pre-
serve them all for our own use and more easy to deprive an enemy of that
shelter without which a close blockade cannot be maintained. This principle
is enforced in the instance of our southern coast by the two following weighty
considerations, viz : first, its remoteness from the naval rendezvous, the Chesa-
peake, which is, on a mean, six hundred miles distant, and to leeward both as
to wind and current; and second, its being close upon the larboard hand as they
enter the Atlantic of the great concourse of vessels passing at all seasons
through the Florida channel. While, therefore, this part of the coast, from the
concentration of vessels here, is in great need of protection of some sort, naval
aid can be extended to it only with difficulty, and at the risk of being cut off
from all retreat by a superior enemy.
All the harbors accessible to vessels-of-war on this part of the coast will
sooner or later need defences, because otherwise they will be seized by an
enemy, in order, for one thing, to paralyze the valuable commerce that circu-
lates within the rivers, sounds, and internal lateral communications. The pro-
ducts of a considerable portion of Georgia find outlet only by these channels.
Perhaps it may require a war to demonstrate the necessity and advantage of
such protection ; but there are reasons already alluded to, and of much weight,
for securing the mouth of Cumberland sound at any rate, independent of those
just mentioned. One of these is particularly important, namely, the situation of
this point with respect to the commerce flowing through the Gulf of Mexico.
Every vessel bound northward from the Gulf must pass close up by Cape Canav-
eral before she can bear away clear of the Matinilla reef, and hence two or
three cruisers may take such positions at this outlet that all passing vessels will
be seen. While we occupy Cumberland sound our own steaming or sailing
cruisers can hold these posts permanently and fearlessly, assured of a place of
refuge from a superior enemy.
When the best and deepest of these Georgia entrances shall be fortified, the
operation of investing the coast and watching the great outlet of commerce
through the Florida passage will be a difficult and hazardous one to aii enemy,
to whom no perseverance or skill can avail to maintain a continuous blockade,
while on the part of our small vessels-of-war, steam frigates, and privateers, the
same sort of supervision will be at all times easy and safe. In the meantime
the fortifications of Cumberland sound alone will enable us, with the help of a
floating force, to protect the whole of this part of the coast from all small expe-
ditions, and to harass and disturb the operations of larger ones, without endan-
gering the safety of our own cruisers.
This sound was occupied by the British during the war of 1812, and Cum-
berland island made headquaters, a great collateral purpose being, as it would
again be, to excite the slaves to insurrection, if possible, at least to desertion.
No railroads now exist to influence in any way the security of this harbor,
but both railroads and canals have been talked of, which would greatly enhance
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 355
the value of defences on the Georgia coast, and especially those of Cumberland
.sound.
Key West and the Tortugas. These are the first important positions that
present themselves on doubling round Cape Florida into the Gulf of Mexico.
Strong opinions have been several times expressed in favor of these fine har-
bors, and I beg leave particularly to refer to a letter from Commodore Rodgers
to the Secretary of the Navy, July 3, 1829, (Senate documents, 1st session
21st Congress, vol I, No. 1, page 236,) and letter from the Secretary of the
Navy, March 25, 1830, (Senate documents, 1st session 21st Congress, vol. II,
No. Ill, page 1.)
A naval force designed to control the navigation of the Gulf could desire no
better position than Key West or the Tortugas. Upon the very wayside of
the only path through the Gulf, it is at the same time well 'situated as to all the
great points therein. It overlooks Havana, Pensacola, Mobile, the mouths of
the Mississippi, and both the inlet and the outlet of the Gulf.
The Tortugas harbor and that of Key West affords perfect shelter for vessels
of every class, with the greatest facility of ingress and egress. And there can
be no doubt that an adversary in possession of large naval means would with
great advantage make them his habitual resort and his point of general rendez-
vous and concentration for all operations on this sea. With an enemy thus
posted, the navigation of the Gulf by us would be eminently hazardous, if not
impossible, and nothing but absolute naval superiority would avail anything
against him. Mere military means could approach no nearer than the nearest
shore of the continent. There are no harbors in the Gulf at all comparable
with these that an enemy could resort to with his large vessels. To deprive
him of these would, therefore, be interfering materially with any organized sys-
tem of naval operations in this sea. The defence of these harbors would, how-
ever, do much more than this. It would secure to our own squadron, even
should it be inferior, the use of these most valuable positions, and would afford
a point of refuge to our navy and our commerce at the very spot where it would
be most necessary and useful.
I forbear to enlarge on this point, merely adding that certain and complete
defence will be easily secured, and that we shall thereby possess ports of refuge
in the middle of the Gulf whenever we have to fly, and points of rendezvous
and refreshment in the very midst of all passing vessels whenever we hold the
mastery. Every vessel that crosses the Gulf of Mexico passes within sight of
the two forts commenced under the sanction of Congress and now in progress,
one at Tortugas, and one at Key West.
It is needless to say that with the possession of these advanced posts, and
with the control of the commerce of the Gulf thereby insured, no railroads upon
the main can have any relation. The forts must rely solely on their own effi-
ciency and power of resistance. Happily the local circumstances allow these
conditions to be easily secured.
I could adduce many other illustrations of the truth of the assertions made in
the commencement of these remarks, that though occasional benefit will result
to the system of fortification on the seaboard from the construction of railroads,
they in general will have little or no bearing on the immediate means of defence.
These, whether they be forts or ships, must be put in a state of preparation and
kept so by the use of means that railroads do not supply, or at least that can be
well supplied without them.
Numerous and facile communications, whether by railroad or steamers, 01
common roads, are important undoubtedly to the general activity and vigor of
war, whether offensive or defensive ; but it is as communications that they are use
ful, not as being of themselves instruments of warfare, or as supplying any that
can be substituted for ships or forts.
356 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
I ought here to advert to the idea often announced, though always vaguely
and in general terms, namely, that by the help of these railroads large bodies of
men may be thrown from the interior of the country upon the exposed points of
the coast, and there erect, and arm, and serve temporary batteries adequate to
repel any maritime attack.
If we have waited for the opening of a war to do this, our enemy, who knows
the fact as well as we, will surely not allow time for the completion even of such
works as these. And in adopting this policy, we undertake to afford a protec-
tion to the country in the first days and weeks of the war, that nations experi-
enced in warlike affairs have considered as hardly accomplished after years and
years of labor during peace.
In many important cases, the contemplated batteries could not be erected
hastily, because they would have to be supported by piling and grillage ; and in
others, even the very sites would have to be raised out of the water. The in-
feriority in efficacy and equipment of such batteries, when erected, would have
to be compensated by an increased number of guns ; but in many instances, a
good defence could only be made in positions where there is not room for the
requisite number of guns, except by placing them tier above tier, an arrange-
ment wholly inconsistent with sudden preparation.
But even if the sudden arrival of a number of men brought by railroad could
supply the want of duly-prepared batteries, there are important defensive points
to which railroads do not approach, and are not likely to approach. And it also
happens that wherever such railroads reach the coast, it is already peopled be-
yond all probable wants for laborers upon sea-coast batteries. If such batteries
were required to be erected as speedily as possible at Boston, New York, Phila-
delphia, Baltimore, Charleston, Savannah, &c., they could be much sooner and
better executed by calling in the laborers and mechanics of these cities, than by
relying on the heterogeneous aid of regiments of volunteers and drafted militia.
The second question of the honorable Secretary is in these words : " In what
manner and to what extent the navigation of the ocean by steam, and particu-
larly the application of steam to vessels-of-war and recent improvements in ar-
tillery and other military inventions and discoveries, affect the question ?"
And the third question, which it will be convenient to consider in connexion
with the second, is in these words, namely : " How far vessels-of-war, steam
batteries, and ordinary merchant ships and steamers, and other temporary ex-
pedients, can be relied upon as a substitute for permanent fortifications for the
defence of our large seaports V
The application of steam to vessels-of-war acts upon the question of sea-coast
defence, both beneficially and injuriously. It acts injuriously in several ways;
but chiefly, first, by the suddenness and surprise with which vessels may fall
upon their object, and pass from one object to another in spite of distance, cli-
mate, and season; and secondly, by their ability to navigate shallow waters.
The first property, by which squadrons may run into our harbors, outstrip-
ping all warnings of their approach, affords no chance for impromptu* prepara-
tions ; accordingly, whatever our preparations are to be, they should precede the
war. It seems past all belief that a nation having in commission as France
and England always have a large number of war steamers ready for distant
service in twenty-four hours, receiving their orders by telegraph, capable of
uniting in squadrons, and in two or three days at most speeding on their several
paths to fall upon undefended ports it is not to be expected, I say, that they
should delay such enterprises until temporary resorts could be got ready to re-
ceive them. And yet there are those who insist that we should leave defensive
measures to a state of war that we should let the day supply the need.
Inadequate as all such measures must prove, there would not be time to ar-
range even these. By the second property, due to their light draught of water,
these vessels will oblige the defence to be extended in some form to passages,
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 357
or channels, or shoals, that before were adequately guarded by their shallowness.
The bars at the mouth of the Mississippi formerly excluded all but small ves-
sels-of-war, and the strong current of the river made the ascent of sailing vessels
exceedingly uncertain and tedious. Now these bars and currents are impedi-
ments no longer; and all the armed steamers of Great Britain and France might
be formed in array in face of the city of New Orleans before a rumor of their
approach had been heard.
Had the English expedition of 1814, attended by a squadron of large armed
steamers, arrived at the mouth of the Mississippi, a few transports might have
been taken in tow, and in a few hours the whole army would have been before
the city ; or twelve or fifteen such steamers could have carried the whole army
up in half a day, without the delay of transports. Will it be contended that
the attack in that form would have been repulsed with the means then in Gen-
eral Jackson's hands ? Would the landing, or even the presence on board these
steamships, of the British troops have been necessary to burn the city or put it
under contribution 1 ? Is there anything now but the existence of forts on the
river to prevent the success of such an attack by fifteen or twenty steamers-of-
war, allured thither by the vastly increased magnitude of the spoil 1
But there would have been, even then and with those means, one reason with
the enemy for avoiding the channel of the river, namely, the existence, seventy
miles below New Orleans, of old Fort St. Philip. I will not venture to say
that in the then condition of that fort it could have repelled such an expedition,
though it did very manfully resist a protracted bombardment ; but I do not
doubt that the existence of even that feeble work would have had weight in
settling the mode and channel of approach, and in turning off the attack into
circuitous and tedious avenues, and thereby gaining some time for preparation.
I am confident, however, that on the completion of the repairs to that work,
now well advanced, and on the completion of the exterior battery of Fort Jack-
son, (a new fort opposite,) no attack of that nature, even of twice the force,
could penetrate by that avenue to the city of New Orleans.
The use of war steamers against New Orleans may take another phase. If
deterred by the forts above mentioned from an attack by the river, an enemy
might again take the anchorage off Ship island, and transport his army, either
on board steamers of light draught or in boats towed by such steamers, to the
foot of Lake Borgne, whence his march to the city (a distance of twenty-eight
miles through an unpeopled district) would be over one of the best roads in
Louisiana.
There is nothing in the shallowness of Lake Borgne to prevent this, nor are
there now any defences on the way, though it is to be hoped that the erection
of a tower and battery at Proctor's Landing, which has been strongly urged for
some years, and which would effectually close this aperture, will at once be
ordered by Congress.
If, as during the war of 1812, it were now necessary to pass the troops from
the ships to the shore by means of tow-boats, we might, perhaps, considering
the augmented population of the city and environs, trust for sufficient notice
and preparation to the time that must elapse before a considerable number could
be landed; but with ten or fifteen light-draught war steamers, fifteen thousand
men could be landed and on their march towards the city within twenty-four
hours of dropping anchor.
All other avenues to New Orleans from that quarter have, since the war of
1812, been well closed by permanent forts and batteries.
We have another illustration on the Gulf of this action of hostile steamers
through shallow channels, and that may be worth adducing. Fort Morgan, at
Mobile Point, defends very well the main channel into Mobile bay, and there
is no other entrance for sailing vessels-of-war. But the smaller class of war
steamers would find water enough near the end of Dauphin island, and, keeping
358 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
out of reach of the guns of Fort Morgan, could pass up into the bay. They
could without difficulty ascend as high as the city of Mobile, and reach that
place moreover in three hours. A dozen such vessels could in that short time
carry up, if they were needed, five thousand soldiers. It is surely not too much
to say, therefore, that Mobile, one of our greatest depots of cotton, is by this
new inlet for an enemy's cruisers much exposed. But this is not all the dan-
ger. The large fleet of ships, often one hundred in number, and of the largest
class of merchantmen, that lie for months awaiting their cargoes in the lower
part of the bay, are within an hoar's run of such steamers from the open Gulf,
and might be destroyed either by the same expedition that ascends to Mobile,
or by one sent for that particular purpose.
For this and other serious consequences of leaving open this entrance to Mo-
bile bay, the sure and the cheap remedy is the placing of a small fort at the
east end of Dauphin island, a work already wisely ordered by Congress.
When it is said in general that the light draught of these vessels opens avenues
of attack before defended by nature, it must not be supposed that therefore it
is part of the system of defence to fortify all shallow channels. Whether shal
low passages will require defences or not, will depend entirely on the importance
of the objects to which they give access and the power of the attack that may
be directed through them, and not all on the circumstance that an enemy's
steamers may enter them without difficulty.
There are a great many entrances and harbors on the coast, not shoal harbors
merely, but many affording water enough for the largest vessels, that will re-
quire, if any, no other defences than such as can be prepared in time of war,
because there are no objects upon these waters of a nature to provoke the
cupidity of hostile cruisers : having nothing to lose in this way, they will have
nothing to fear. The shallow and difficult avenues to great and valuable objects
are those for which we have to provide defences in addition to defences that
were necessary before the introduction of war steamers. The danger of the
Hell Gate passage to New York sufficed to keep any man-of-war from attempting
to sail through, but it proves to be no impediment to steamers. The "Broad
Sound" channel and also the " Gut" channel into Boston harbor are easy tracks
for large steamers, though next to impracticable to line-of-battle ships and
frigates ; and so with other channels and other places.
In considering to what extent the introduction of steamers into war service
may help the coast defence of the country, should we assume that we ought to
rely upon them to repel the enemy's steamers, so dangerous in coming without
warning and penetrating promptly through all natural obstacles up to the vital
points of the coast, WG should commit a very great error, though it is perhaps a
natural one on a cursory examination, as it certainly is a frequent one. It would
be a fatal error if practiced upon by a nation having more than one or two im-
portant ports, and even with such nation it would be the most expensive of all
resorts.
This cannot be a safe reliance with war steamers any more than with sailing
vessels-of-war, and a few words may make this clear.
I do not assert that armed vessels would not be useful in coast defence. Such
an idea would be absurd. I shall even have occasion to show a necessity for
this kind of force in certain exceptional cases. It is the general proposition,
viz : that armed vessels and not fortifications are the proper defences for our
vulnerable points a proposition the more dangerous because seemingly in such
accordance with the well-tried prowess and heroic achievements of the navy
that we have now to controvert.
Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Charleston, and New Orleans
are, we will suppose, to be guarded, not by forts, but by those vessels, on the
occurrence of a war with a nation possessing large naval means. We know
that it is no effort for such nations to despatch a fleet of twenty line-of-battle
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 359
ships and frigates, or an equal number of war steamers, or even the combined
mass, both fleets in one.
The United Service Journal shows that in the month of August last Great
Britain had actually in commission in their navy, in a time of profound peace,
thirty-eight line-of-battle ships and frigates, thirteen sloops-of-war, and upwards
of fifty smaller armed sailing vessels, together with forty-eight armed war
steamers and near forty unarmed steamers.
What, then, shall we do at the above-named ports severally ? Each is justly
felt to be an object worthy of an enemy's efforts, and each would be culpable
in sending elsewhere any part of the force required for its own defence. Each,
therefore, maintains a naval force equal at least to that the enemy is judged to
be able to send promptly against it. Omitting any provision for other places
scarcely less important, what is the result ? It is, that we maintain within the
harbors of, or at the entrance to, these places, chained down to this passive de-
fence, a force at least six times as large as that of the enemy.
He does not hesitate to leave his port, because it will be protected in his ab-
sence by its fortifications, which also will afford him a sure refuge on his return.
He sails about the ocean depredating upon our commerce with his privateers
and small cruisers, putting our small places to ransom, and in other ways follow-
ing up appropriate duties, all which is accomplished without risk, because our
fleet, although of enormous magnitude, must cling to ports which have no other
defence than that afforded by their presence. They cannot combine against
him nor attack him singly, for they cannot know where he is, and must not,
moreover, abandon the objects which they were provided expressly to guard.
It would really seem that there could not be a more impolitic, inefficient, and
dangerous system, as there certainly could not be a more expensive one.
A navy, whether of war steamers or sailing vessels, should be aggressive in
its action. It should, by carrying the war into the seas and upon the coast of
the enemy, direct its calamities from our coast and commerce ; but the system
we are now considering involves the absurdity of relinquishing all the incalcu-
lable advantages of mastery upon the ocean to an enemy who nevertheless may
possess but a sixth of our naval power.
To bring other means even in partial substitution for this defence by ships
and steamers, or to give it local auxiliary aid, by way of reducing its inordinate
magnitude, would be to confess its inappropriateness for harbor defence. We
know that other comparatively cheap means may be substituted, but this is just
what the proposition denied. Naval means would be useful undoubtedly. The
question is, whether they would be sufficient ; and we see some of the conse-
quences of making them sufficient. We come thus to examine the defensive
arrangements that can be made in aid of or substituted for armed sea-going
vessels.
These arrangements may be of two classes, namely : first, fixed forts and
batteries on the land, and in some cases movable batteries of heavy guns : and
second, upon the water-floating batteries of all kinds, gunboats, &c., fixed or
movable.
There are doubtless situations where it may be necessary for us to present a
defensive array, at the same time that to do so by fortifications alone would be
impracticable ; and it is not therefore prejudging the question we are about to
examine. It is neither underrating fortifications nor overrating floating defences
to say that these last are some or all of them indispensable in such positions.
Any very broad water, where deep soundings may be earned at a distance
from the shores, greater than effective gun range, and where no insular spot,
natural or artificial, can be found or formed nearer the track of ships, will pre-
sent such a situation ; and we may take some of our great bays as examples.
Broad sounds and wide roadsteads affording secure anchorage beyond good
360 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
gun range from the shores will afford examples of another sort, and harbors with
very wide entrances and large surface exhibit examples of still another kind.
As in all such cases fortifications alone will be ineffectual, and nevertheless
recourse to defences of some sort may be unavoidable, it has not failed to be a
recommendation in the several reports on the defence of the coast since 1818
that there should be a suitable and timely provision of appropriate floating de-
fences. And until the invention of man shall have caused an entire revolution
in the nature of maritime attack and defence, these or kindred means must be
resorted to, not, however, because they are means intrinsically good or suitable
under like circumstances, but because they are the only means applicable to such
cases. In the circumstances just referred to there is no alternative, and there-
fore no point to be discussed. The remaining question is, whether these floating
defences are to be relied on in cases that admit of defence by fortifications.
And, first, as to gunboats. Although of undoubted use in peculiar circum-
stances, it will hardly be contended that gunboats afford a safe reliance in har-
bors that can be entered by vessels of magnitude. Ships becalmed or aground
might be sorely harassed, if not destroyed, by a spirited attack from this force,
and there are other situations wherein it would be very effective. But harbors
defended by gunboats will not be attacked in calms nor in adverse winds, and
it is not easy to believe that any probable array of these crafts would impede or
hinder for a moment the advance of a hostile fleet. Nelson, at Trafalgar, bore
down in two divisions upon the combined fleet, each division being exposed to a
raking fire ; and although suffering considerably from that fire, he was able, not-
withstanding, to break the hostile line and defeat his superior adversary. What,
comparatively, with the raking fire of the combined fleet, would be the fire of a
fleet of gunboats ? Opposing no effectual obstacle to approach or entrance, these
small vessels, scattered and driven upon the shoals, could be kept by the broad-
side of a few active vessels at too great a distance to produce any serious effect
upon the main attack by their desultory fire.
Although they might afford useful means of annoyance during a protracted
occupation by the enemy of harbors containing extensive shoal grounds and
shallow bays and inlets, they would be nearly useless in resisting the first assault
and in preventing the brief operation of levying contributions, or burning or
spoiling national establishments.
The true reason of this defence must not, however, be misunderstood. It is
not that the boats do not carry guns enough or men enough for the object, but
it is because, from the comparative weakness of the vessels, the guns and the
men cannot be kept in an effective position.
There are, moreover, many harbors requiring defence, in which there are no
shoals whereon the boats could take refuge ; and in such their capture or de-
struction would be inevitable should there be, at the same time, no river up
which they might fly, or lateral issue through which they could escape to a safe
distance.
Floating batteries, of which, a good use might be sometimes made in peculiar
situations, would, I suppose, differ from gunboats, in being larger, containing
many guns each, and in being stronger ; that is to say, having thicker sides or
bulwarks ; and it has sometimes even been proposed to construct them with
ball-proof parapets, and with platforms open above like, in these respects,
batteries upon the shore. But in whatever way formed, it is necessarily a part
of the idea that they be strong and massive ; and, consequently, that they be
unwieldy, incapable of sudden change of place, and incapacitated either to ad-
vance upon a defeated foe or to evade a victorious one. We are now, of course,
speaking of batteries moved by steam, Being denied the power of locomotion,
at least for any purpose of manoeuvring in face of the enemy, we are to consider
these batteries as moored in position, and awaiting his advance. Should the
batterries be large, requiring deep water to float them, or should they be placed
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 361
across or near the channel, for the sake of proximity to the track of ships, the
enemy would engage them at close quarters. All advantages of mobility of
' concentrating his whole fleet upon one or two points, to which, under these cir-
cumstances, no relief can be sent of greater elevation and command, would be
on the side of the assailant, with no counteracting advantage to the batteries,
but greater thickness of bulwarks. Whether this excess of thickness should be
considered a material advantage, since the introduction of large bomb-cannon
into the armament of ships is a very doubtful matter. The batteries if anchored
across the channel would have the further advantage of a raking fire ; but we
have seen that the raking fire of one squadron of ships upon another advancing
is by no means decisive. The power of throwing the whole assailing force upon
one or two points, of pouring upon the decks of the batteries a greatly superior
force of boarders, would of themselves seem to leave little room to doubt as to
the issue.
If, now, we suppose these floating batteries to be smaller, so that having a
lighter draught they might be placed near the shores or upon the shoals, they
might certainly be thereby saved from the kind of attack which would prove so
fatal if anchored more boldhr in deep water; but they would at the same time
lose much of their efficiency from their remoteness; and positions wherein they
would be secure from being laid alongside, while they would be in a proper
attitude to contribute materially to the defence of the harbor, are afforded but
rarely. It is doubtful whether, as a general rule, these smaller floating batteries,
notwithstanding their greater capacity of endurance, would afford a better
defence, gun for gun, than gunboats ; or, in other words, whether this capability
of endurance in the one would be more than a compensation for the power of
locomotion in the other. But whether near the shore or in the channel, whether
large or small, this description of defence, owing to its fixedness connected with
the destructibility of the material of which it must be made, will be exposed to
attacks analogous to those made by gunboats on ships aground. The enemy
knowing of what the defensive arrangements consist, will come provided with
the requisite number of sailing or steam vessels armed with bomb- cannon,
against which the thicker bulwarks of the floating batteries would avail nothing.
He would, besides, hardly fail to provide himself with bomb-ketches armed with
heavy sea mortars ; and as there could be no guarding against the effects of the
long ranges of these, a few such vessels would, with great certainty, constrain
the floating batteries to quit their position, abandoning every disposition ap-
proaching to a concentrated array. Not to mention other modes of attack, which
would seem to leave the chances of success with the enemy, it will be noticed
that this kind of defence, whether by gunboats or floating batteries, has the
same intrinsic fault that an inactive defence by the navy proper has ; that is to
say, the enemy has it in his power to bring to the attack a force of the same
nature and at least as efficacious as that relied on for defence ; hence the neces-
sity not of mere quality, but of superiority on the part of the defence at every
point liable to be attacked; and hence also the necessity of having an aggregate
force as many times larger than that disposable by the enemy, as we have im-
portant places to guard. Should we, for example, have ten -such places, and the
enemy threaten us with twenty ships-of-the-line, we must have, in all these
places, an aggregate of gunboats and floating batteries more than equivalent to
two hundred ships-of-the-line ; for it will hardly be contended that these defences
can be transported from one place to another as they may be respectively in
danger.
But what will be the relative state of the parties if, instead of gunboats or
floating batteries, we resort to steam batteries ?
Although much has been said of late of the great advantage that defence is to
derive from this description of force, I have not been able to discover the advan-
tages ; nor do I see that sea-coast defence has been benefited in any particular
362 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
by the recent improvements in steam vessels, except that in the case before ad-
verted to, where from the breadth of the waters defence from the shore would
be unavailing, a more active and formidable floating defence than by gunboats
and floating batteries is provided.
It must be remembered that by far the greatest improvement in steam vessels
consists in having adapted them to ocean navigation ; and one inevitable con-
sequence of this improvement will be, that if the defence of harbors by steam
batteries be regarded as securing them from the attacks of ships-of-the-line and
frigates, or at least of placing the defence quite above that kind of attack, they
will no longer be attacked by sailing vessels, but by steam vessels similar in all
warlike properties to those relied on for defence.
Not only are there no impediments to transferring these vessels across the
ocean, but the rapidity and certainty of these transfers are such as to enjoin a
state of the most perfect readiness everywhere and at all times ; and also a com-
plete independence of arrangement at each particular point, both the state of
preparation and the independence of arrangement being much more important
than when the enemy's motions were governed by the uncertain favor of winds
and weather. ^
It is not easy to conceive of any important properties belonging to steam
batteries acting defensively, that the attacking steam vessels may not bring with
them, or at least may not have imparted to them on their arrival upon the coast,
unless it should be thought proper to give to the former a greater thickness of
bulwark than would be admissible in sea-going vessels.
But the peculiar advantage conferred by steam lies in the faculty of moving
with promptitude and rapidity, and any attempts to strengthen the harbor vessels
by thickening their bulwarks considerably would unavoidably lessen their mo-
bility, thereby partially neutralizing the advantage sought. At the same time
it is extremely doubtful whether any benefit would be derived from the thicker
sides. It is probable that the best kind of bulwarks for these vessels and all
others, is that which Avill be just proof against grape and canister-shot fired from
moderate distances, because with such bulwarks a shell fired from a bomb-cannon,
within a reasonable distance would pierce both sides, that is to say, would go in
one side of the ship and out at the opposite side, producing no greater effect than
a solid shot of the same calibre, while with thickened sides every shell would
lodge in the timbers and produce terrible ravages by bursting.
In the practice with these missiles in this country it has been found difficult
to lodge a shell in thin targets, even when the load of the gun w T as so reduced
as to increase materially the uncertainty of aim. As it is probable, therefore,
that the protection from solid shot afforded by massive bulwarks would be more
than counterbalanced by the greater injury horizontal shells would inflict by
means of these bulwarks, we may conclude that the harbor steam battery will
not differ in this respect materially from the attacking steamships ; and if they
do differ in having more solid and impervious bulwarks, that no advantage over
the enemy will result therefrom.
We come, therefore, to the same result as when considering the application of
the other kinds of floating force to the defence of harbors ; and this result is,
that there is no way of placing the coast in a condition of reasonable security
but by having at any point the enemy may happen to select a force in perfect
readiness, which shall be superior to that brought to the attack.
There not only prevails the idea that we ought to rely upon these floating
defences, but also the idea that we may postpone the fitting them for service
till the commencement of war. Turning again to the six ports before mentioned,
our whole peace navy that may happen to be in port and ready for use, being
appropriated to local defence in its several stations, immense additions would
have to be made at each port; and whether these additions were to be supplied
from the ship-yards or by conversion of merchant vessels and service steamers
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA- COAST DEFENCES, 363
into floating batteries, a considerable time must necessarily elapse before there
could be anything like readiness. In the meantime the enemy, sending a small
squadron of war steamers against each nothing being ready, large squadrons
would not be needed would nip all preparations in the bud. We have to keep
in mind a fundamental principle of this system, which is, not to incur the ex-
pense of preparation till the certainty of war has arrived, or, as it might be
phrased, till there will no longer be time to prepare.
I should not have gone so much at length into a branch of one subject wherein
the general conclusion appears to be so obvious and incontrovertible but for the
prevalence of opinions which I consider not erroneous merely, but highly
dangerous, and which, I think, must give way before a full exhibition of the
truth. I do not anticipate any formidable objections to the positions assumed*
nor to the illustrations ; but even should all these, in the form presented, be ob-
jected to, I may still challenge opposition to the following broad propositions,
namely :
1st. If the sea-coast is to be defended by naval means exclusively, the de-
fensive force at each point deemed worthy of protection must be at least equal
in power to the attacking force.
2d. As, from the nature of the case, there can be no reason for expecting an
attack on one of these points rather than on another, and no time for transferring
our state of preparation from one to another after an attack has been declared,
each of them must have assigned to it the requisite means ; and,
3d. Consequently, this system demands a power in the defence as many times
greater than that in the attack as there are points to be covered.
Believing that a well-digested system of fortification will save the country
from the danger attending every form of defence by naval means, and the in-
tolerable expense of a full provision of these means, I will now endeavor to show
that such a system is worthy of all reliance.
There has been but one practice among nations as to the defence of ports and
harbors, and that has been a resort to fortifications. All the experience that
history exhibits is on one side only ; it is the opposition of forts or other works
comprehended by the term fortification to attacks by vessels ; and although
history affords some instances wherein this defence has not availed, we see that
the resort is still the same. No nation omits covering the exposed points upon
her seaboard with fortifications, nor hesitates in confiding in them.
But it has been asserted, in a way to convey incorrect and hurtful impressions
to the country, that fortifications for such purposes are obsolete resorts ; that the
improvements in the instruments and appliances of war within late years have
caused the abandonment of such reliances. This, however, is far from being-
true ; and it is quite important in respect to the quarters whence such assertions
have sometimes proceeded not only to sustain, but to enforce this denial.
If considerable additions have not been made lately to the defences of many
well-known European harbors, it is because they were fully fortified long ago.
And it might here be asked, in passing, what would have happened to the
seaports of France during the long wars between her and Great Britain, and
with such naval supremacy in the hands of the latter, if the French ports had not
been well fortified % Can it be supposed that anything but these fortifications
kept the English out of the great ports and naval depots of France, and per-
mitted large fleets to grow, great expeditions to mature, flotillas to manoeuvre,
under the eyes of the blockading squadron, and almost within reach of its guns ?
But it happens that even in well-fortified France any improvement or change
in a harbor that affords opportunity and place for new defences is sure to pro-
duce them ; the Cherbourg breakwater, a work of late years, is supplied with
formidable batteries, perhaps even now not quite finished.
It happens, moreover, that in Great Britain, which of all the nations of the
364 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
earth lias most reason to rely for defence on naval power, fortifications are the
reliance for harbor defence, and of late years particularly.
The application of steam to ocean navigation has done much, and is likely to
do more, to lessen the naval ascendency of that power, and the ports which
formerly found security in rather indifferent fortifications under the overwhelm-
ing numbers of her men-of-war, have, in the present liability to be surprised by
fleets of war steamers, received and are at this moment receiving large additions
of strength in forts and batteries, and new " harbors of refuge " are being formed
and strongly fortified, in order the better to protect her coast and her commerce
under this change of naval relations.
Great Britain sees that she cannot effectually guard her coast and her ports
from this particular danger by the number of her war vessels, great as this
number is, and greatly as it may be augmented from her vast commercial
marine. She does not run into the folly of posting at every dock yard a
squadron of steamers as large as any that can be brought against it ; but she im-
proves and adds to her old fortifications to make them adequate of themselves,
and she creates new (artificial) harbors for the sake of having fortified shelter
near the probable field of activity of her navy in its various forms.
Instead, therefore, of lessening the utility of fortifications, we see that, in the
opinion of the high military authorities of that government, the late changes and
improvements have made the increase and improvement of fortifications indis-
pensable. There are some particulars of her late course in this respect.
Referring to parliamentary estimates for 1S47-'4S, 1848-' 49, and 1849-'50,
I find that for fortification alone, including new works and repairs of old works
upon the coast of Grjeat Britain and Ireland, (chiefly along the English channel,)
and excluding estimates for barracks, quarters, storehouses, fyc., there was de-
manded for those years, severally, $578,766, $282,892, and $439,036, being
$1,300,694 for the last three years.
I find that important colonial ports have received accessions of strength in the
same way lately, and that, for example, on the water front of the redoubtable
Gibraltar the same batteries that repelled and destroyed the formidable floating
batteries of France and Spain in 1782, expenditures exceeding six hundred
thousand dollars have been made within four or five years, and $367,887 more
-are estimated to be necessary to put them in equilibrium with new means of
attack.
At Malta, already possessed of very strong fortifications, about $180,000
have already been voted, and $696,000 is called for in addition, to be applied
to harbor defences particularly.
The same nation is meanwhile placing in her new coast batteries eight-inch
and fifty-six pounders, and thirty-two pound guns ; and, at a great expense, is
substituting this heaviest kind of ordnance for twenty-four pounders and eighteen
pounders in the old batteries. Between the years 1839 and 1849 she has sup-
plied, or has issued orders to supply, to sea-coast fortifications at least two
thousand new pieces of the largest calibre. The increase of heavy ordnance in
.the batteries of Gibraltar within that period was eighty-two pieces, and at Ports-
mouth and vicinity it was two hundred and eighty-seven pieces.
Sir Thomas Hastings, of the Royal Navy, under examination before a com-
mittee of the House of Commons, said : " I was asked just now whether the
guns at Portsmouth or other places had been fired in anger. I should be glad
to bring under the consideration of the committee that the introduction of steam
makes it much more possible now to make attacks upon any certain points.
From the different points all along the channel a concentration may be made of
a very large body of steamers, and under such circumstances an equipment"
(he is speaking of sea-coast batteries) " which would have answered very well
when you had only incidental attacks to contemplate from sailing vessels might
be insufficient when you could bring twenty-five or thirty vessels carrying the
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 365
heaviest possible guns to bear upon your works. I will take, for example, if
you will permit me, the port of Falmouth. In the event of any war occurring
with this country the probability is, being the most western port, it would be-
come the refuge of our merchantmen running into the channel to avoid privateers
and steamships. If that port were left in its present state it is clear that ten
powerful steamers might destroy everything in it, without any material injury
to the assailants."
In answer to the question whether, in his opinion, the merchant steamers
would be as available for the defence of the coasts as war steamers, he said t
" Certainly not ; I think this country (England) would derive an immense power
from her merchant marine ; but I look upon it to propose to contend with mer-
chant steamers against the powerful vessels which are in existence in France
would be a very unwise thing."
In April, 1850, the Hon. Colonel Anson, in explaining the ordnance estimate
to the House of Commons, said, in reference to the estimates for " works, build-
ings, and repairs : " " The whole of this vote had been most carefully considered
by the master general of the ordnance and her Majesty's government; and
though large in amount, the House would see how small a sum was asked for new
works, such as fortifications, &c., either at home or abroad. That reduction
was, however, attributable to the large amount that had been spent on those
works in previous years. It was needless for him now to point out to how low
a state he might say, indeed, to what a state of degradation our works of de-
fence had fallen till within the last few years, and in what condition the means
we possessed of protecting our shores from aggression and insult were in 1835,
It was enough to say they were totally inadequate for the purpose. They
remained nearly in the same state till 1845, and were in the very lowest possible
condition in that year. But, in the meantime, the state of things had not escaped
the observation of those who turned their attention to our relations with foreign
powers, and many honorable gentlemen found fault with the government for
not providing more effectually for the defence of the country. In 1845 the
aspect of affairs became threatening; the few fortifications we had to rely upon
dismantled, dilapidated, and decayed. If a squadron of steamers had chosen
to nlake their way to any of our principal naval stations, either Portsmouth,
Plymouth, or Pembroke, or up the Thames, they were completely open to attack,
and an enemy might have committed any act of aggression he pleased. There
was nothing to prevent his vessel coming up the Thames and insulting her
Majesty in the very heart of her dominions. These considerations pressed
themselves so seriously at the time that the attention of the right honorable
member for Tamworth and the existing government were called to it, and they
at once set to work to remedy the neglect. They proposed that a sum of money
should be set apart to improve our defences, and their example had been fol-
lowed by the present government to a very considerable extent. The result
was, that very much had been accomplished during those four years, and he
was happy to say the country might be proud of it. At Portsmouth the sea
defences had been completed and made very powerful ; at Plymouth they were
equally complete, and he believed great improvements had taken place at
Sheerness, asid in the defences on the Thames. They had commenced similar
works at Pembroke, which was one of the finest dock yards and harbors in the
world, and he was sure the house would be prepared to meet any reasonable
demand upon them for its defence. It was impossible to say what might come
to pass in a few years, and though the expense might appear to be large now,
when the House considered the ultimate advantage to the country from the state
and the feeling of security against aggression, they would, he was certain, agree
with him that it far outbalanced any temporary inconvenience from the grant
of so much money."
An English officer of rank and distinction discussing, in 1849, the system of
366 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
defence necessary to Great Britain, after recommending large inland fortifica-
tions to be erected against the possible march of an enemy's army upon London,
estimates that it will require 661,500,000 ($6,600,000) to complete existing
fortifications upon the coast, including new batteries to be constructed there, and
to supply them with artillery and stores; that is to say, in his opinion, the
sum of $6,600,000, in addition to what had within these few years been ex-
pended, was necessary to be applied to the coast defences of that country, in
consequence of the changes lately introduced into the means of carrying on war
from the ocean.
When I had advanced thus far in this report, and was still seeking facts in
illustration of the course pursued by Great Britain, I met the following summary
of remarks made in relation to fortifications by Mr. Pitt, sixty-five years ago,
(1786.) The principles for which he then contended are now and ever must be
as sound and as applicable as when he pressed them on the consideration of
Parliament with so much earnestness. The only change is one of degree. And
we have just seen that the statesmen and military men of that country, at the
present day, take the same view and press the same policy. During the wars
of the French revolution the vast naval superiority of England enabled her to
hold the closest blockade of all the ports of her adversary. This crippled
French naval enterprise in a twofold manner by shutting up the commerce
which alone could supply seamen, and by shutting up the few war vessels that
they were able to man. But even then, with such little apparent cause to fear
.anything from that navy, large sums were expended by England upon new sea-
coast ports, towers, and batteries. Now, when France can suddenly send out
large squadrons of steam war vessels in spite of the strictest blockade, Great
Britain feels the need of still greater strength at home. But it is, we see, always
on fortifications that England relies for the safety of her ports ; in no case do
we see her resorting to a parade of war vessels within or at the entrance to her
ports. Where her largest assemblages of men-of-war of all sorts take place,
and where there must at all times be a considerable number, there she places,
not small batteries and insignificant forts and towers, but her strongest and
heaviest fortifications. Her history demonstrates that she knows how to employ
her fleets better than keeping them moored within her harbors and roadsteads.
In urging upon the House of Commons, in 1786, certain propositions in
relation to fortifications, Mr. Pitt, " to prove the utility of fortifications, appealed
to the unfortunate and calamitous situation in which we were placed in the late
war. A considerable part of our fleet was confined to our ports in order to pro-
tect our dock yards, and thus we were obliged to do what Great Britain had
never done before to carry on a defensive war, a war in which we were under
the necessity of wasting our resources and impairing our strength, without any
prospect of any possible benefit by which to mitigate our distress. Mr. Pitt
felt the question to be a portion of that momentous system which challenged,
from its nature, the vigilance and support of every administration."
" W^as the House ready to stand responsible to posterity for a repe-
tition of similar misfortunes and disgrace ? Were they willing to take upon
themselves the hazard of transmitting the dangers and calamities which they
themselves so bitterly experienced ? " " Mr. Pitt observed
that there was a consideration which ought to have more weight than others,
and this was, that fortifications, being calculated to afford complete security to
dock yards, would enable our fleets to go on remote services and carry on the
operations of war at a- distance, without exposing the materials and seed of
future navies to destruction by the invasion of an enemy."
" But it was not only by foreign expeditions that we might lose the aid of our
fleet ; in case of invasions it might so happen that the ships, though in the
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 367
very channel, might be prevented by contrary winds, tides, and other contin-
gencies, from arriving to the assistance and relief of the dock yards."
"Were it to be asked why the sum to be required by these fortifications had
not been demanded for strengthening the navy, he would fairly answer that the
money which would prove sufficient to accomplish these works would not build
so many ships as would serve for the defence of our most valuable harbors.
There was, besides, a certain degree beyond which we could neither build nor
man any more. The true limit he could not, nor would it be prudent for him to
assign, yet in the nature of things such a limit must exist; but there could
never be any line drawn to restrain the security which we ought to provide for
our dock yards."
"Mr. Pitt called upon the House to beware how they suffered themselves
lightly to be drawn into a line of conduct which might involve their posterity
in accumulated evils ; and he suggested to their recollection the remorse which
they must feel if they should hereafter find that they had, by an ill-timed per-
tinacity upon the present occasion, brought upon the country calamity and
ruin."
I regret that I have not time to find and adduce a few pertinent facts from the
practice of the French nation in this respect, and especially within the last few
years. We know well, however, the general result, namely, that France has
always kept herself well guarded by sea-coast fortifications ; and, as before said,
that she owes her exemption from many heavy calamities to a steady adherence
to that policy.
Believing that the statements just presented must conclusively show that
nations having experience in war have made fortifications their main reliance for
the defence of their ports, reserving their navies for offensive purposes, and that
the greater energy and activity imparted to the latter by modern improvements
have compelled a still more powerful preparation of such defences, I turn again
to the particular point of our present inquiry, namely, the use and influence of
steamers in coast defences. I have to add, that steamers as substitutes for
fortifications would be inferior to other armed vessels, because the efficiency of
the defence must depend, other things equal, on the number of guns ; that is, as a
large number will be brought to the attack, a large number must be employed in
defence, and steamers carry very few in comparison. The power of rapid loco-
motion characteristic of steamers, is for this purpose nothing in itself, nor the
power of transporting quickly bodies of armed men; there must be the power
of heavy and numerous guns, whether moving or anchored. Though very use-
ful in reconnoitring an advancing enemy, in carrying orders, in conveying relief
to batteries, in transporting quickly large bodies of men, and in such like duties,
steamers could not constitute a good defensive array except against steamers
only; and, accordingly, against such an array the enemy's fleet of steamers
would bring in tow a few line-of-battle ships or frigates.
Even, therefore, should there be time after a war shall have been opened to pre-
pare in each of the great harbors a hurried display of this kind out of the light
river and bay steamers, it would be no match for sea-going steamers and heavy
armed vessels brought into the attack ; indeed, it would not be easy to say what
excess of numbers, in favor of the defence, could establish an equilibrium. As
just said above, there could be no resistance of moment made, except by
many heavy guns ; and to supply these a great multitude of steamers or of
merchant ships would have to be converted into floating batteries. What the
result of such a resort would be may be learned from the battle of Copenhagen.
This was in no sense a contest between ships and fortifications, as is generally
supposed; it was the attack of a fleet of sailing ships upon a line of floating
batteries of one kind or another. The Danes had anchored on the edge of a
shoal a line of these batteries, parallel nearly with the wall of the city, and at
the distance of at least three-fourths of a mile. This line could be attacked
368 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
only on the outside, and, when attacked, was interposed between the enemy and 1
the walls, and consequently for the time entirely extinguished the fire from the
fortifications.
The line consisted of block-ships and praams by which are understood to
be meant vessels converted into mere floating batteries and more or less strength-
ened for the purpose ; and rafts, supposed to be floats of timber with a timber
parapet towards the enemy in all, eighteen batteries. A squadron of four sails
of the line, one frigate and two sloops-of-war, were anchored higher up the
harbor where there was also the " three-crown " battery. Lord Nelson carried
to the attack twelve line-of-battle ships, twelve frigates, and a number of smaller
armed vessels. All this force he concentrated upon the line of floating batteries ;
every vessel of which was taken or destroyed, except one or two smaller vessels,
which cut their moorings and ran in under shelter of the fortification. This
concentration excluded the Danish squadron above mentioned, and also the
"three-crown" battery, from any material participation in the action. Some
English frigates within reach of the latter were greatly injured and obliged
to retreat.
This faculty of concentration (applied with success on several memorable oc-
casions by that great naval commander) is an inherent one in an attacking
squadron, and is not to be evaded by a line at anchor especially not by a
line of floating batteries.
If, however, we should allow batteries of this sort, whether aided by steam
or not to be equal, gun for gun, to the attacking squadron, and that they can
be got ready in time, we nevertheless should thereby throw an enormous expen-
diture of money upon the country at a moment of great fiscal difficulty. Let
us make a rough estimate of that expenditure.
Lord Nelson's fleet, just mentioned, was rated at 1,158 guns, and it is only
reasonable to assume that we should be liable to a visit from a force as great.
Assuming that the merchant vessels taken for conversion into floating batteries,
would, on the average, carry ten guns on a broadside, which will be assuming
that they are as large as sloops-of-war, we should need fifty-eight such vessels ;
and estimating these at fifty thousand dollars each, which, including purchase,
armament, alteration, &c., is a moderate allowance, we shall have a total first
cost of two million nine hundred thousand dollars for one port, and for the six
ports before mentioned, a grand total of seventeen million four hundred thousand
dollars a sum much greater than has been expended in preparing for more
than four thousand of the heaviest guns in permanent fortifications upon the
great points of the coast.
If we attempt to supply the requisite force in guns by the use of river and
bay steamers, instead of sailing vessels, we cannot allow more than five guns,
in the average, to a broadside ; so that we shall require one hundred and sixteen-
steamers, which, at thirty thousand dollars for purchase, armament and altera-
tion, will give three million four hundred and eighty thousand dollars for the
first cost in a single harbor, and for the six ports, twenty million eight- hundred
and eighty thousand dollars.
I do not give these estimates as exact, though I believe them to be below the
cost that would have to be incurred, but as affording hints of the costliness of
provisions of that nature. An expenditure for this purpose, equally great*
would have to be repeated, moreover, at the commencement of every war, or
still greater outlays would be incurred in keeping up this perishable armament
during peace.
What conclusions follow from the preceding considerations ? Why, that in
adopting this expedient, we should involve ourselves, at the opening of every
war, in a vast outlay for the defence of these ports ; that there would be great
probability that the preparations, although involving that enormous expense,
could not be made in time ; that, even if prepared in time, everything would be
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 369
put at the hazard of a single battle, with most important advantages on the side
of the enemy, and consequently few probabilities of successful resistance ; or if,
by more extended preparations, we should endeavor to turn these probabilities
the other way, it would be at the greater risk of not being ready, and with the
certainty of greatly enhanced cost.
It has been deemed necessary above all things, considering impressions that
have been made on the public mind as to the influence of steam vessels upon
sea-coast defence, to show at large that while the introduction of the vessels
into naval equipment has greatly facilitated attacks, either by steamers alone or
in conjunction with sailing vessels, it has done more to avert or repel them,
leaving fortifications, which these vessels can in no case replace but at great dis-
advantage, more indispensable than ever.
In my desire to convey my own strong convictions, I am conscious that I
have tediously prolonged this part of the report.
Although what has been said above is undoubtedly true in reference to steam-
ers or other floating defences as substitutes for fortifications, there remain import-
ant functions in defence which must be committed to floating defences of some
kind, as has before been fully set forth ; and in some of these cases it is quite
certain that steam batteries may, of all floating defences, be the most suitable.
It must not be forgotten, however, that the very qualities which recommend
this particular kind of force will equally characterize the steam vessel of the
enemy, a,nd that whether steam vessels or sailing vessels, or both, are relied on,
unless there are well-secured points on the shore under which they can take
refuge, they will themselves constitute an inviting object to a superior force of
the enemy.
If, for example, we were to deem one of our open waters of such importance
as to assign eight or ten steam batteries for its protection, we should thereby
place within the reach of the enemy an object worthy of the efforts of a squad-
ron of twelve or fifteen vessels of the same description. Even, therefore, in-
stances where these naval means must be resorted to for defence upon the water,
there must be Works at hand upon the shore, to the shelter of which, if likely to
be overpowered, they can retire.
A branch of the second question, namely, that portion which inquires, "In
what manner recent improvements in artillery and other military inventions and
discoveries affect this question," require some separate remarks.
The only invention and discovery, so far as I am aware, that can affect this
question, one way or the other, is that which has introduced the practice of firing
shells from guns; and which has involved the use of guns of comparatively
large calibre, so that guns which discharge missiles of eight-inch and ten-inch
diameter, are rather extensively used, especially eight-inch guns. Even guns of
twelve-inch bore have been made in this country, and I believe also in other
countries.
It is, of course, understood that even larger shells than these were long ago
thrown in the attack and defence of fortified places, from the mortars of land
batteries and bomb ketches. The shells now spoken about, instead of being
projected under a high angle, as from mortars, are discharged from guns at low
angles, or nearly horizontally, like solid shot; these guns of large calibre being
often called Paixhan guns, after the French officer who first succeeded in secur-
ing the favor of the military authorities for the idea the idea having been
suggested long before, and even successfully tried.
These shell-guns are now introduced by maritime nations in all vessels-of-war,
whether sailing vessels or steamers. Those latter vessels, which carry but few
guns in number, are much augmented in power by their introduction, but not
more so than sailing vessels, to which these guns are equally appropriate; and I
have no doubt that their numbers will be every day increased, until perhaps
there will be few or no armed sailing or steaming ships of which the guns will
H. Rep. Com. 86 24
370 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
not be modified in their calibre for this purpose, and provided with shells as
well as shot.
As to the injury sustained from an enemy's shells, that will undoubtedly be
more serious in steamers than in sailing vessels, because, in addition to all the
liabilities to injury that belong, inherently, to vessels of all kinds, there are
several superadded by the machinery, the wheels, the boilers, &c., of steamers.
In contests between vessels, whether sailing or steam vessels, the effects of shell-
guns will no doubt be very destructive on both sides; but between forts and
ships, the peculiar injury inflicted by shells will be suffered by the vessel exclu-
sively. The fort will suffer less from hollow shot than from solid shot. This,
though true beyond all question or cavilling, may need a few words of explanation.
How are the batteries to be affected by them 1 It can be but in two ways :
first, the ship's gun having been pointed so as to strike a vital point that is to
say, a gun or a carriage the shell may explode at the instant of contact. This
explosion may possibly happen thus opportunely, but it would happen against
all chances ; and if happening, would probably do no more than add a few men
to the list of killed and wounded. For reasons that will soon appear, it is to be
doubted whether the probability of dismounting the gun would be so great as if
the missile were a solid thirty-two pound shot. Secondly, if it be not by dis-
mounting the guns or killing the garrison, the effect anticipated from these mis-
siles must result from the injury they do the battery itself. Now we are per-
fectly informed by military experience as to the effects of these shells upon forts
and batteries ; for the shells are not new, although the guns may be so ; the
eight-inch and the ten-inch shells having always been supplied in abundance to
every siege train, and being perfectly understood, both as to their effects and the
mode of using them. Were it a thing easily done, the blowing away of the
parapets of a work (a very desirable result to the attacking party) would be a
common incident in the attacks of fortifications ; but the history of attacks by
land or water affords no such instance. The only practicable way yet discov-
ered of demolishing a fortification being by attaching a mine to the foot of the
wall ; or by dint of solid shot and heavy charges fired intennittingly, during a
long succession of hours, upon the same part of the wall, in order not only to
break through it, but to break through it in such a manner that the weight and
pressure of the incumbent mass may throw large portions of the wall prostrate.
This, the shortest and best way of breaking a wall, requires, in the first place,
perfect accuracy of direction; because the same number of shots that being dis-
tributed over the expanse of a wall would merely peel off the face, would, if
concentrated in a single deep cut, cause the wall to fall ; and it requires, more-
over, great power of penetration in the missile the charge of a breeching gun
being, for that reason, one-third greater than the common service charge. Now
the requisite precision of firing for this effect is wholly unattainable in vessels,
whether shot be solid or hollow ; and if it were attainable, hollow shot would be
entirely useless for the purpose, because every one of them would break to pieces
against the wall, even when fired with a charge much less than th$ common
service charge. This is no newly discovered fact ; it is neither new nor doubtful.
Every hollow shot thrown against the wall of a fort or battery, if fired with a
velocity affording any penetration, will unquestionably be broken into fragments
by the shock.
After so much had been erroneously said about the effect of these shells upon
the castle of San Juan d'Ulloa, it was deemed advisable, although the result of
European experiments were perfectly well known, to repeat, in our own service,
some trials touching this point. A target was therefore constructed, having one-
third part of the length formed of granite, one-third of bricks, and the remaining
third of freestone. This was fired at by a Paixhan gun and by a thirty-two
pounder, from the distance of half a mile, and the anticipated results were ob-
tained, namely :
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 371
1st. Whether it was the granite, the brick, or the freestone that was struck,
the solid thirty-two pound shot penetrated much deeper into the wall, and did
much more damage than the eight-inch hollow shot; and, 2d. These last broke
against the wall in every instance that the charge of the gun was sufficient to
give them any penetration.
The rupture of the shell may often cause the explosion of the powder it con-
tains, because the shell, the burning fuse, and the powder are all crushed up
together ; but the shell having no penetration, no greater injury will be done to
the wall by the explosion than would be caused by the bursting of a shell that
had been placed by the hand against it.
From all this it appears incontrovertible that, as regards the effects to be pro-
duced upon batteries by ships, solid shot are decidedly preferable to hollow
shot; and the ship that, contemplating the destruction of batteries, should
change any of her long twenty -four or thirty -two pound guns for Paixhan
guns would certainly weaken her armament. Her best missiles, at ordinary
distances, are solid shot ; and, if she can get near, grape shot to fire into em-
brasures and over the walls. The best shells against the batteries are the sea-
mortar shells, fired at high elevations; which, being of great weight and falling
from a great height, penetrate deeply ; and, containing a considerable quantity
of powder, cause material ravage by their explosion. Such shells, however, can
only be fired by vessels appropriately fitted ; namely, by bomb ketches.
The use of these same hollowed shot or shells, by batteries against vessels, is,
however, an affair of a different character. The shells do not break against
timber; but, penetrating the bulwarks, they, in the first place, would do greater
damage than solid shot, by making a large hole and dispersing more splinters ;
and having, as shot, effected all this injury, they would then augment it many
fold by exploding.
In all cases of close action between ship and battery the shells will pass
through the nearer side; and, if not arrested by some object on the deck, will
probably lodge and explode in the further side, causing by the explosions a
much greater loss among the crew, and greater injury to the vessel, than by
the mere transit across the vessel ; as before suggested, the vessel would suffer
less injury were her sides made so thin as not to retain the shell, permitting it
to pass through both sides, unless fired with a small velocity. It is not impos-
sible that an extensive use of these horizontal shells may lead to a reduction in
the thickness of ship's bulwarks. It is unquestionably true, therefore, that the
advantage of this invention or improvement stands, as between forts and vessels,
wholly on the side of fortifications ; as between sailing vessels and steamers, it
i,s believed to be, as they are now prepared, on the side of sailing vessels; but
this last is a point with which we are not now particularly concerned.
Another invention or improvement of modern days was for a time thought to
offer important advantages to vessels in contest with forts; not as making the
fort more valuable, but the vessel less so. It was the substitution of iron for
wood as the material of vessels' hulls. Experience thus far, however, is un-
favorable. To make the sides of a thickness to repel shot demands great cost
and involves a material loss of buoyancy, and shot passing through the sides of
iron 'vessels are apt not merely to make a hole of about their diameter, as through
wood, but to tear whole plates of iron from their rivets. There is good reason
to suppose that the use of this material for war vessels has or will be abandoned ;
if adhered to, to say the least, it will not lessen the advantages possessed by
fortification.
The course of the preceding remarks in discussing the effects upon sea-coast
defence, of numerous railroads, and of the use of steamers as war vessels led
to so many incidental observations on the relative influence of fortifications, that
the particular point of this influence has already, perhaps, been sufficiently
elucidated. Though the relative superiority of fortifications over any other
372 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
suggested means has been often enough asserted in these observations, some-
thing more must be said as to their sufficiency for the security of the great in-
terests on our coast. If willing to trust for their sufficiency to the example of
other nations, we should find abundant proof in the practice of all that have
taken part in or been exposed to the hazards of war. All have resorted to forti-
fications, and many have, for long periods of time, owed to them alone exemp-
tion from some of the worst of its calamities. The example of other nations at
the present moment, as has before been stated, shows, moreover, that they find
no other satisfactory reliance under the increased energy now given to the instru-
ments of warfare than an increase of the number and an augmentation of the
force of fortifications.
In opposition to this mode of defence much stress is laid on certain successful
attacks that have been made by ships on works deemed strong. I have no
doubt that all such results might be accounted for by circumstances independent
of the naked question of relative strength, but at any rate, when carefully con-
sidered, how little do these results prove in comparison with numerous other
instances in which there was an immense disparity of force in favor of vessels
that have been signally defeated. These latter instances are those that should
be received as a test of the actual relation between the two kinds of force; not
certainly because they were successful, but because the smaller the works, its
armament, its garrison, the less the probability that any extraneous influence
has been in operation. A single gun behind a parapet, provided its position be
a fair one and the parapet be proof, need, as regards its contest with ships, owe
nothing else to the art of fortification; and its effect will be the same whether
the battery were fresh from the hands of the ablest engineer of the age or were
erected at the dawn of the art. The gun is in a position to be used with effect ;
the men are as fully protected by the parapet as the service of the gun will
allow; they are brave and skilful, and there is nothing to prevent them from
doing their duty to the utmost. These are all conditions easily fulfilled, and
therefore likely to be so. The state of things is not less just and fair towards
the vessel ; she chooses her time and opportunity. The battery goes not to the
ship, but the ship to the battery, taking the wind, the tide; the sea all as she
would have them ; her condition and discipline are perfect, and her crew cour-
ageous and adroit. Nothing, under such circumstances, can prevent the just
issue of battle but some extraordinary accident, possible indeed to either party,
but easily recognized when occurring.
The contest between larger works and heavy squadrons may be much more
complicated affairs ; the cause of disaster to the former being often traceable to
potent, though not always obvious influences. The fortifications may have been
absurdly planned originally, or badly executed, for there has at all times been
in this profession, as in others, much scope given to quackery ; they may have
been erected at a time when ships-of-war, against which they were provided,
were very different things from the lofty line-of-battle ships of modern times a
long peace or long impunity may have left them in a state wholly unprepared
for the sudden use of their strength ; the command may have been intrusted to
persons ignorant alike of the amount of power in their hands, and of the mode
of exercising it; the garrison may have been undisciplined or mutinous; the
populace discontented or disloyal ; the clamor of frightened citizens may have
caused a premature surrender ; all these, or any of them may have produced the
issue, leaving the question of relative power untouched.
While there can be no doubt that these and other deteriorating influences may
have occasionally operated to the prejudice of fortifications, and that these were
likely to be more numerous and more controlling as the works were more exten-
sive, it is certain that there can be no influence acting in a reverse direction upon
them, that is to say, none making them stronger and more efficient than they
ought to be. There can be no favorable influence of such a nature, for example,
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 373
as to make the simple one-gun battery, before mentioned, equivalent to a battery
(say) ten times as large.
It must not be supposed from wbat is said in relation to larger fortifications
that their magnitude necessarily involves imperfection or weakness, nor because
I have considered small and simple works as affording the best solution to the
question of relative force must it be inferred that small works are suited to all
circumstances. I speak here in reference merely to the judgment we are en-
titled to form of the relative power of these antagonist forces from their contests
as exhibited in history. In instances of the latter sort there cannot, from the
nature of the cases, be any important influence operating of which we are igno-
rant, or for which we cannot make due allowances, while in examples of the
former kind we may be in the dark as to many vital matters.
These observations have been deemed necessary because, in judging of this
matter, it might not be so obvious that certain brilliant and striking results
should not be adopted as affording the true test of relative power. It would be
more natural to turn to Copenhagen and Algiers as indicating where the power
lies, than to Charleston or Stonington, and yet these latter as indices would be
true and the former false.
We will now turn to certain examples.
" The name of Martello tower was adopted in consequence of the good de-
fence made by a small round tower in the Bay of Martello, in Corsica, in the
year 1794, which although armed with one heavy gun only, beat off one or two
British ships-of-war without sustaining any material injury from their fire. But
this circumstance ought merely to have proved the superiority which guns on
shore must always in certain situations possess over those of shipping, no matter
whether the former are mounted in a tower or not. That this is a just decision
will perhaps be readily allowed by all who are acquainted with the following
equally remarkable, but less generally known fact, which occurred about twelve
years afterward in the same part of the world.
" Sir Sidney Smith, in the Pompee, an eighty-gun ship, the Hydra, of thirty-
eight guns, Captain Manby, and another frigate, anchored about eight hundred
yards from a battery of two guns situated on the extremity of Cape Lecosa, and
protected from assault by a tower in which were five-and-twenty French soldiers,
commanded by a lieutenant.
" The line-of-battle ship and the frigate fired successive broadsides till their
ammunition was nearly expended, the battery continually replying with a slow
but destructive effect. The Pompee (at which ship alone it directed its fire) had
forty shot in her hull, her mizzen topmast carried away, a lieutenant, midship-
man, and fireman killed, and thirty men wounded. At length, force proving in-
effectual, negotiations were resorted to ; and, after some hours parley, the officer,
a Corsican and relative of Napoleon, capitulated. It then appeared that the
carriage of one of the two guns had failed on the second shot and the gun had
subsequently been fired lying on the sill of the embrasure ; so that, in fact, the
attack of an eighty-gun ship and two frigates had been resisted by a single
piece of ordnance." (Journal of Sieges, by Colonel John T. Jones.)
" The Corsican tower above mentioned, which had in like manner completely
baffled a naval cannonade, was very soon found to surrender when attacked by
land ; not, however, before a small battery had been made (erected) to reduce
it." (Paisley 's Course, vol. iii.)
Here are two examples : 1st. A single heavy gun mounted on a tower beat
off one or two British ships ; 2d. A barbette battery, containing two guns, beat
off a British eighty-gun ship, supported by two frigates.
It would seem that no exception can possibly be taken to either instance as
trials of relative power. There is no complication of circumstances on one side
or the other ; nothing to confuse or mislead ; all is perfectly simple and plain.
A small body of artillery judiciously posted on the shore is attacked by armed
374 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
vessels bearing forty or fifty times as many guns, and the ships, unable to pro-
duce any effect of consequence, are beaten off with loss.
The cases present no peculiar advantage on the side of the batteries, either as
regards position or quality, for both works were immediately reduced by a land
attack that which the eighty-gun ship and two frigates were unable to effect
being immediately accomplished by landing two field-pieces with a very small
portion of the crew of one of the vessels. On the other hand, there was no
peculiar disadvantage on the part of the ships, as the time and mode of attack
were of their own choice.
In order that there might be no unjust disparagement of the vessels in the
manner of representing the affairs, the language of British military writers (the
ships being British) has been exactly quoted. (See Paisley's Course of Ele-
mentary Fortification, vol. ii, and Journal of Sieges, by Colonel John T. Jones.)
Had the representation of these actions been taken from the victorious party,
the result, probably, would have appeared still more to the disadvantage of the
ships.
The circumstances attending the attack and defence of Copenhagen, in April,
1801, have already been briefly stated. A more minute description will be
found in House document No. 206, 1st session, 26th Congress.
I now proceed to examine a great instance of naval success, in which there is
no room to doubt the extent to which fortifications were engaged. This instance
is the attack on Algiers, in 1816. The attack was made by the combined Eng-
lish and Dutch fleets, mounting about one thousand guns, under the command
of Lord Exrnouth.
In the fortifications that looked towards the water there are enumerated, in a
plan supposed to be authentic, three hundred and twenty guns ; but not more
than two hundred of these could act upon the fleet as it lay. The ratio of the
forces engaged, therefore, as expressed by the number of guns, (saying nothing
of the calibres, of which we know nothing,) was about as five to two. The ac-
tion continued from a quarter before three until nine, without intermission, and
did not cease altogether until half past eleven.
It is very certain that the effect of the fire upon the Algerine shipping and
town was very severe, because we know that all the shipping was destroyed
except some small vessels ; and we know, also, that Lord Exmouth dictated the
the terms of the treaty that followed.
Honorable as this result was to the combined fleets, and happy as it was for
the cause of humanity, there are, nevertheless, technical circumstances con-
nected with it that excite doubts as to how much of the final result was due to
physical chastisement, to moral effect, to inherent defects in the defences, and to
ignorance in the use of these defences, such as they were. That the loss in
killed and wounded in the city and works was great is probable, because we are
informed that a very great addition had been made to the garrison, in prepara-
tion for the attack, under some impression, no doubt, that a landing would be
attempted. For the service of the guns there were needed but three or four
thousand men at the utmost. An accumulation beyond that number would add
nothing to the vigor of defence, while, by causing an increase of the casualties,
it would heighten the terrors of the combat. The depressing effect of this loss
of life in the batteries and of the burning of buildings within the town and
about the mole was, of course, increased by the entire destruction of the Algerine
fleet anchored within the mole.
We have no means of judging of the actual condition of the works; nor of
their fitness for the task of contending with the heavy ships of modern times.
The forts and batteries on the shore were probably too elevated to be com-
manded even by the largest of the sailing ships ; and provided these guns were
covered with a proof parapet, they may be regarded as being well situated.
But more than half the guns engaged were in the Molehead battery, and the
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA- COAST DEFENCES. 375
mode of attack adopted, especially by the Queen Charlotte, of one hundred and
ten guns, was calculated to test, in the severest manner, the principles on which
this work had been planned. She so placed herself within " fifty yards" of the
extremity of this battery, that she could either rake or take in reverse every
part of it. If she at the same time commanded the battery that is to say, if
from her spar-deck she could look down upon its platform then she must at
once, with her grape and canister, have driven the garrison from that platform,
leaving only the lower and covered tier of guns, if there were such a tier, for
service. With our imperfect knowledge of the fortifications, all this must,
however, be left to conjecture.
But there are matters connected with the service of batteries which are not
conjecture. Not a shot was fired until the Queen Charlotte had anchored.
What a different vessel, when she anchored, might not this ship have been if
the Molehead battery had employed its fire of more than one hundred guns, in
raking her from the time she arrived within a mile and a half until she had an-
chored within fifty yards ! How different might have been the condition of the
fleet, generally, if they had been subjected during the approach, and while as-
suming their stations, to the raking fire of all the two hundred guns !
It does not appear that a single red-hot shot was fired from the batteries.
We might almost rest on this fact, and assert that a defence which had failed
to provide itself with this auxiliary means must have been carried on in disre-
gard if not in violation of all rules, all knowledge, and all experience ; that it
was probably without plan or combination, and not less probably without prepa-
ration in other particulars of importance scarcely inferior.
Before leaving this example it may be well to inquire what, after all, was the
effect of these batteries upon the ships, compared with the effect of ships upon
ships.
In the battle of the Nile the French fleet, rated at one thousand one hundred
and ninety guns, caused a loss in Nelson's fleet of eight hundred and ninety-
five killed and wounded, which is in the proportion of ten French guns to less
than eight Englishmen killed and wounded. In the battle of Trafalgar the
French fleet carried not less than three thousand guns, and they caused a loss
to the English of one thousand five hundred and eighty-seven killed and
wounded, which is in the proportion of ten guns to less than six killed and
wounded. In this affair of Algiers, with a force not exceeding two hundred
guns, the batteries caused a loss of eight hundred and eighty-three killed and
wounded, being in the proportion of ten guns to forty-four men ; and if we take
into account every gun that was pointed over the bay, (say three hundred and
fifty guns,) the proportion will be ten guns to twenty-five men; being an effect
more than three times as great as that produced by the French ships at the
battle of the Nile, and more than four times as great as that produced by the
same nation at Trafalgar.
While reflecting on the circumstances of this battle the mind is not satisfied
with any reasons that present themselves for the withdrawal of Lord Exmouth, the
moment the land wind enabled him to do so, on the supposition of entire success
on his part. It is not understood why he should feel the great anxiety he states
himself to have been under that this wind should spring up. " Providence at
this interval," (between ten and eleven o'clock at night,) " gave to my anxious
wishes the usual land wind common in this bay, and my expectations were
completed. We were all hands employed in warping and towing off, and, by
the help of the light air, the whole were under sail and came to anchor out of
the reach of shells about two in the morning, after twelve hours of incessant
labor."
Now if anything had been decided by the action, it must have been one of
two things : either the ships were victorious or the batteries were so. If the
ships were completely victorious it would seem to have been judicious for them
376 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
to remain where they were, in order, if there was to be any more fighting, to be
ready to press their advantage, and especially in order to maintain the ascend-
ency, by preventing the remounting of guns, repairing batteries, and re-supply-
ing them with munitions, &c.
Had the people possessed the inflexibility report ascribed to the Dey,and had
they set zealously about the work of preparation for a new contest, it might not
have been easy for Lord Exmouth, in the condition to which his ships are ac-
knowledged by authentic accounts to have been reduced, to enforce his de-
mands. It is not understood, therefore, why, if he had been so successful as to
be certain that his end was attained, he should be so anxious to get out of gun-
shot, when by so doing he involved the issue in more or less doubt and hazard.
He relied on the effect produced on the people by his dreadful cannonade,
and the result proves that he was right ; but his anxiety to clear the vessels
from the contest shows that there was a power still unconquered, which he
thought it best to leave to be restrained by the suffering population of the city
than to keep in a state of exasperation and activity by his presence. What was
this power but an unsubdued energy in the batteries?
The true solution of the question is, then, not so much the amount of injury
done on the one side or the other particularly as there was, on the one side, a
city to suffer as well as the batteries as the relative efficiency of the parties
when the battle closed at about eleven o'clock. All political agitation and
popular clamor aside, what would have been the result had the fight been con-
tinued, or even had Lord Exmouth renewed it next morning?
These are questions that can be answered only on conjecture ; but the manner
the battle ended certainly leaves room for many doubts whether, had the sub-
sequent demands of Lord Exmouth been rejected, he had it in his power to en-
force them by his ships ; whether, indeed, if he had renewed the fight, he would
not have been signally defeated.
On the whole, this battle, although it stands pre-eminent as an example of
naval success over batteries, presents no argument to shake the confidence
which fortifications, well situated, well planned and well fought, deserve as the
defences of a seaboard.
Gibraltar. The attack on the water batteries of Gibraltar, in September,
1782, by the French and Spanish floating batteries, is a well known instance of
the power of guns on shore.
These floating batteries had been rendered, as was supposed, shot proof and
shell proof, by several additional thicknesses of timber to the sides, and by
covering the decks with a roof of sloping timbers.
They mounted one hundred and forty-two guns on the engaged side, with
seventy in reserve to replace any that might be dismounted. They were an-
chored at the distance of about one thousand yards from the walls, and were op-
posed by about eighty-five guns.
After a protracted cannonade nine of the floating batteries were burnt by hot
shot from the shore, and the tenth, having been taken possession of by the vic-
tors, was set on fire by them.
No material injury was done to the works of the town by their fire, and only
eighty -five men and officers were killed and wounded by the fire from these
vessels, together with a very violent cannonade and bombardment from the siege
batteries.
Battle of Algesiras. On the 6th of July, 1801, the French admiral Lenois
was lying at anchor off the town of Algesiras with two ships of eighty guns,
one of seventy -four guns, and one frigate. To the south of him, on a small
island, was a battery, called the Green island battery, mounting seven eighteen
and twenty-four pounders ; and to the north of him, on the main, another bat-
tery, called St. Jacques's battery, mounting five eighteen-pounders. There were,
besides, fourteen Spanish gunboats anchored near, making a total of three
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 377
hundred and six guns afloat and twelve guns in battery altogether three hundred
and eighteen guns.
Sir James Saumarez hearing that Lenois was in this position, advanced
against him from Cadiz with two ships of eighty guns, four of seventy-four
guns, one frigate, and a lugger in all five hundred and two guns. On his ap-
proach, Lenois, who was anchored in a line nearly north and south at some dis-
tance from the shore, cut his cables, and ran into shoal water to prevent being
doubled upon by the British line : this manoeuvre at the same time entirely un-
masked the fire of the batteries.
The Hannibal, one of the British seventy-fours, in attempting to close with
the French admiral, touched the ground and could not be floated off. She, how-
ever, continued the fight with great obstinacy, even for a considerable time after
she was deserted by her consorts. Not being able to double upon the French
line, an attempt was made to assault the Green island battery, which, being
badly served by the Spaniards, had nearly ceased firing.
But this attempt was anticipated by the arrival at the island of a party sent
from the French frigate lying near ; and the assault was defeated with the loss
to the English of one boat sunk and another taken the Frenchmen renewing
with vigor the fire of the battery. At the north end of the line the French admi-
ral was aided by seven gunboats, which took so active a part in the fight that
five of them were sunk or rendered unserviceable. The St. Jacques battery being,
however, served sluggishly by the Spaniards, the French sent a party from the
Dessaix to impart greater activity and effect.
After the combat had continued about six hours, the British squadron drew off
greatly damaged, leaving the Hannibal seventy-four alone and aground ; and she,
after suffering great loss, was obliged to strike. The French insist that the
Pompde, an English ship of eighty guns, had struck her colors ; but as they
could not take possession, she drifted off and was towed away : it is believed she
was entirely dismasted.
We do not know the loss in the French squadron, but the killed, wounded,
and missing in the English fleet amounted to three hundred and seventy -five
men ; being more than twelve men for every ten guns against them, and being
twice as great in proportion as the English loss in the battle of Trafalgar.
In this battle of Algesiras there were five hundred and two English guns
afloat acting against three hundred and six French guns afloat. As the English
chose their own time for the attack and had the wind, it is only reasonable to
suppose that three hundred and six of the English guns were a match for the
three hundred and six guns of the French vessels. This will leave one hundred
and ninety-six English guns afloat, opposed to the twelve guns in the batteries ;
or, reckoning one side only of each ship, it shows ninety-eight guns in the Brit-
ish fleet to have been overmatched by the twelve guns in the batteries.
There never was a more signal and complete discomfiture, and it will admit of
no other explanation than that just given ; namely, that the two small batteries,
one of five and the other of seven guns, partly eighteen and partly twenty-four
pounders, more than compensated for the difference in favor of the British fleet
of one hundred and ninety-six guns.
The Hannibal got aground, it is true ; but she continued to use her guns with
the best effect until she surrendered ; and even on the supposition that this ship
was useless after she grounded, the British had still an excess of one hundred
and twenty-two guns over the French fleet and batteries.
These batteries were well placed, and probably well planned and constructed,
but there was nothing extraordinary about them ; their condition before the fight
was complained of by Admiral Lenois, and they were badly fought in the early
part of the action ; still the twelve guns on shore were found to be more than
equivalent to two seventy-fours and one frigate.
378 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
Battle of Fuenterabia. This recent affair introduces steam batteries to our
notice.
On the llth of July, 1836, six armed steamers, together with two British and
several Spanish gunboats, attacked the little town of Fuenterabia. The place
is surrounded only by an old wall, and two guns of small calibre, to which, on
the evening of the attack, a third gun of larger calibre was added, formed the
entire of its artillery. The squadron cannonaded this place during a whole day,
and effected absolutely nothing beyond unroofing and demolishing a few poor
and paltry houses, not worth, perhaps, the ammunition wasted in the attack.
What may have been the number of guns and weight of metal which the assail-
ants brought is unknown; though the superiority, independent of the superior
weight of metal, must have been at least ten to one ; but not the slightest military
result was obtained. (See United Service Journal, August, 1836, p. 531.)
We will now turn to affairs of a similar character on our own coast.
In June, 1776, Sir Peter Parker, commanding a squadron of two ships of fifty
guns, four of twenty-eight guns, two of twenty guns, and a bomb ketch in all
(according to their rate) two hundred and fifty -two guns attacked Fort Moultrie,
in Charleston harbor, South Carolina.
It is stated that the fort mounted " about thirty pieces of heavy artillery."
Three of the smaller vessels were aground for a time during the action, and one
of them could not be floated off, and was in consequence burned by the English.
Deducting this vessel as not contributing to the attack, and supposing the other
two were engaged but half the time, the English force may be estimated at two
hundred guns ; or reckoning one broadside only, at one hundred guns against
thirty guns.
The English were defeated with great loss of life and injury to the vessels ;
while the fort suffered in no material degree, and lost but thirty men. The killed
and wounded in the squadron were reported by the commodore to be two hun-
dred and five ; being for every ten guns employed against them more than
sixty-eight men killed and wounded a loss more than eleven times as great, in
proportion to the opposing force, as the loss at the battle of Trafalgar.
In September, 1814, a squadron of small vessels, consisting of two ships and
two brigs, mounting about ninety guns, attacked Fort Boyer, at the mouth
of Mobile bay. A false attack was at the same time made by a party of marines,
artillery, and Indians, on the land side. The fort was very small, and could
not have mounted more than twenty guns on all sides, nor more than fifteen guns
on the water fronts. The action continued between two and three houiv-i, when
one of the ships, being so injured as to be unmanageable, drifted ashore under
the guns, and was abandoned and burned by the English; the other vessels re-
treated, after suffering severely.
There were ten men killed and wounded in the fort ; the loss on the other part
is not known.
The affair of Stonington, during the last war, affords another instance of suc-
cessful defence by a battery. In this case there were only two guns* (eigh teen-
pounders) in a battery which was only three feet high, and without embrasures.
The battery, being manned exclusively by citizen volunteers from the town,
repelled a persevering attack from a sloop-of-war, causing serious loss and damage,
but suffering none.
In order not to extend this branch of the report further, I beg leave to refer
for a detailed account of the attack of the French, in 1838, on the castle of St.
Juan d'Ulloa, to the document above referred to. (House Doc. 206, 1st session,
26th Congress, p. 25.) For the same reason I abstain from introducing several
other instances, which, though interesting and instructive, would not sensibly
affect the argument.
In the fact quoted above there is no illustration of the effect of hot shot,
except in the case of Gibraltar. Iii that attack the floating batteries were
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 379
made proof against cold shot, and, as was thought by the constructor, proof
against hot shot also ; and so, indeed, for a time, it seemed. It was conceived
that the hot shot, when buried deep in the closely jointed timbers, would scarcely
communicate flame, and that it would not be difficult, by the use of the fire-
engines provided, to subdue so stifled a combustion.
By making these floating batteries impenetrable to shot, it was supposed they
had been rendered equal in perfectly smooth water to land batteries, gun for gun.
And so they might then have been, nearly, had the incombustibility of the lat-
ter been imparted to them. But now resistance to fire would not suffice ; these
floating batteries must either repel these horizontal shells from their bulwarks,
or, if that be impossible, permit them to pass through both sides. Nothing can
be better calculated to exhibit the tremendous effect of these shells than a ves-
sel so thicksided as to stop every shell, allowing it to burst when surrounded
by several feet of timber ; and there can be no greater mistake than supposing
that, by thickening the bulwarks of vessels-of-war, or fitting up steam-batteries
with shot-proof sides, the effects of land batteries are to be annulled or in any
material degree modified.
This branch of the subject will be summed up with the remark that the facts
of history and the practice of all warlike nations are in perfect accordance with
the conclusions of theory. The results that reason anticipated have occurred
again and again. And so long as on the one side batteries are formed of earth
and stone, and on the other, ships are liable to be swallowed up by the element
on which they float, or to be deprived of the means by which they move so
long as they can be penetrated by solid shot, set on fire or blown up by hot shot,
or torn piecemeal by shells, the same results must inevitably be repeated at each
succeeding trial.
But after all, it may be urged that the general principle herein contended for,
namely, the superiority of batteries in a contest with ships, might be admitted,
and still it would remain to show that batteries constitute the kind of defence
best adapted to our peculiar wants. This is true ; and I will now proceed to
consider, severally, the cases to which defence must be applied. It may be well,
however, first to recall the general scope of the preceding argument. It has
been contended that floating defences should not be relied on not because
they are actually incompetent to the duty, but because they cannot fulfil this
duty unless provided in inordinate numbers, and at a boundless expense ; and I
have endeavored to show that this remark is generally true, whether the defen-
sive fleet be made up of sea-going vessels, of floating batteries, or of steam bat-
teries. I have next urged the point that properly planned and constructed bat-
teries are an overmatch for vessels-of-war, even when greatly inferior to them
in armament sustaining the opinion by many striking examples, and explain-
ing satisfactorily instances that have cast any doubt on such contests.
If the facts and reasoning presented do not convey the same strong convic-
tions that sway my own mind, it must be because I have obscured rather than
illustrated them ; for it would seem to be impossible that facts could be more
unexceptionable or reasons more beyond the reach of cavil. However that may
be, I now leave them to candid and dispassionate revisal, and proceed to exam-
ine the mode of applying these defences to our own coasts.
It may be well to divide these into several distinct classes.
1. There will be all the smaller towns upon the coast, constituting a very nu-
merous class.
At the same time that no one of these, of itself, would provoke an enterprise
of magnitude, it is still necessary to guard each and all against the lesser
attacks. A small vessel might suffice to guard against single vessels that would
otherwise be tempted by the facility to bum the shipping and exact a contribu-
tion ; but something more than this is necessary, since the amount of temptation
held out by a number of these towns would be apt to induce operations on a
380 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
larger scale. It might often happen, moreover, that our own vessels-of-war
would be constrained to take refuge in these harbors, and they should find cover
from the pursuer.
Although the harbors of which we now speak afford every variety of form
and dimension, there are few, or none, wherein one or two small forts and bat-
teries cannot be so placed as to command all the water that a ship-of-war can lie
in, as well as the channel by which she must enter. While the circumstances of
no two of them are so nearly alike as not to modify the defences to be applied
to them severally, all should fulfil certain common conditions, namely : the pas-
sage into the harbors should be strongly commanded ; the enemy should find nc
place after passing wherein he would be safe from shot and shells ; and the
works should be inaccessible to sudden escalade that is to say, a small garri-
son should be able to repel such an assault. With works answering to these
conditions, and of degrees of strength in accordance with the value of their re-
spective trusts, this class of harbors may be regarded as secure. I cannot,
however, here avoid asking what would be the mode of defence, if purely naval
of these harbors 1 Suppose the circumstances are deemed to require the pres-
ence of a frigate, or a steam frigate, or an equivalent in gunboats ; would noi
two hostile frigates or two steam frigates infallibly arrive in quest ? Could then
be devised a system more certain to result in the capture of our vessels and th<
submission of our towns 1
2. Another class will consist of great establishments, such as larger cities
naval depots, &c., situated in harbors not of too great extent to admit of gooc
defence at the entrance, and also at every successive point, so that an enemj
could find no spot within which he could safely prepare for operations ulterioi
to the mere forcing an entrance.
In this class are to be found objects that are in every sense of the highes
value. On the one hand, accumulations of military and naval material, anc
structure for naval accommodation that could not be replaced during a war
which are of indispensable necessity and of great cost ; and on the other hand
the untold wealth of great cities. As these objects must be great in the eyes o
the enemy great for him to gain and for us to lose corresponding efforts 01
his part must be looked for and guarded against. If he come at all, it will b<
in power ; and the preparations on our part must be commensurate.
The entrance to the harbor and all the narrow passes within it must be occu
pied with heavy batteries ; and if nature does not afford all the positions deemec
requisite, some must, if practicable, be formed artificially. Batteries shouh
succeed each other along the channel, so that the enemy may nowhere fine
shelter from effective range of shot and shells while within the harbor, evei
should he succeed in passing the first batteries. Provided the shores admit thi
disposition, and the defence be supplied with an armament numerous, heavy
and selected with reference to the effect on shipping, the facts quoted fron
history show that the defences may be relied on.
If the mere passing under sail with a leading wind and tide oneor even tw<
sets of batteries, and then carrying on operations out of the reach of these o
any other, were all, the enemy might perhaps accomplish it ; but the presen
supposition is, that with this class his ulterior proceedings, and finally his return
are to be subject to the incessant action of the defences.
. 3. This brings us to consider a third class, consisting of establishments o
importance situated at a distance up some river or bay, there being intermediat
space too wide to be jcommanded from the shores. In such cases the defenc
must be concentrated upon the narrow passes, and must, of course, be appoi
tioned in armament to the value of the objects covered. When the value is no
very great, a stout array of batteries at the best positions would deter an enenr
from an attempt to force the passage, since his advantage, in case of success
would not be commensurate with any imminent risk. But with the more valu
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA- COAST DEFENCES. .381
able establishments it might be otherwise. The consequence of success might
justify all the risk to be encountered in rapidly passing in face of batteries, how-
ever powerful. This condition of things requires peculiar precautions under any
system of defence. If, after having occupied the shores in the narrow places in
the best manner with batteries, we are of opinion that the temptation may induce
the enemy, notwithstanding, to run the gauntlet, the obstruction of the passage
must be resorted to. By this is not meant the permanent obstruction of the
passage; such a resort, besides the great expense, might entail the ruin of the
channel. The obstruction is meant to be the temporary closing by heavy float-
ing masses.
There is no doubt that a double line of rafts, each raft being of large size and
anchored with strong chains, would make it impossible to pass without first
removing some of the obstructions ; and it might clearly be made impossible to
effect this removal under the fire of batteries. Such obstructions need not be
resorted to until the breaking out of a war, as they could then be speedily formed
should the preparation of the enemy be of a threatening nature.
There would be nothing in these obstructions inconsistent with our use of part
of the channel, since two or three of the rafts might be kept out of line, ready to
move into their places at an hour's notice.
The greatest danger to which these obstructions would be exposed would be
from explosive vessels, and from these they might be protected by a boom or a
line of smaller rafts in front.
From what has just been said, it will be perceived that when the inducements
are such as to bring the enemy forward in great power, and efficient batteries can
be established only at a few points, we are not then to rely on them exclusively.
In such a case the enemy should be stopped by some physical impediments, and
the batteries must be strong enough to prevent his removing these impediments ;
and also to prevail in a cannonade, should the enemy undertake to silence the
works. Not to encumber this report with details in relation to these channel
obstructions, I beg leave to refer for them to the same document 206, page 34.
It may be repeated here that such expedients need not be resorted to, except
to cover objects of the highest importance and value, such as would induce an
enemy to risk a large expedition. For objects of less importance batteries would
afford ample protection. It will be remembered that this last power is, when once
established in any position, a constant quantity, and although it should be incom-
petent to effect decisive results when diffused over a large fleet, may be an over-
match for any small force upon which it should be concentrated. At the same
time, therefore, that there is the less liability to heavy attack, there will be in
the batteries the greater capacity of resistance to others.
It must not be urged, as a reproach to fortifications, that in the case we are
considering they are obliged to call in aid from other sources, so long as these
aids are cheap, efficient, and of easy resort. By the mode suggested the defence
will undoubtedly be complete, every chance of success being on the side of the
defence ; that is to say, if any confidence is to be placed in the lessons of experi-
' ence. How, on the other hand, will the same security be attained by naval
means ? Only, as before shown, by keeping within the harbor a fleet or squadron,
or whatever it may be, which shall be at all times superior to the enemy in
number of guns.
In a naval defence there will be no advantage in obstructions of any sort, for
there can be no lessening of the array of guns in consequence of such obstruction,
because if these obstructions are under the fire of the floating defences, the enemy
will first subdue that fire and then remove the obstructions at his leisure. If
this fire proves too powerful for the enemy, the obstructions will have been un-
necessary, and will serve only to shut up our own fleet, preventing the prompt
pursuit of a beaten foe.
4. There is a fourth class, consisting of harbors, or rather bays or estuaries, of
382 ^ FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
such expanse that batteries cannot be made to control the passage. These have
been before spoken of. If the occupation of or passage through these rnu,st be
defended, it must be by other means than batteries upon the shore. The reliance
must, from the nature of the case, be a floating defence of magnitude at least
equal to the force the enemy may bring. The complete defence of each of these
bays would, therefore, involve very great expense certainly, in most cases,
greater than the advantages gained. The Chesapeake bay cannot, for instance,
be shut against a fleet by fortifications ; and if the entrance of the enemy is to be
interdicted, it must be by the presence of a not inferior fleet to his own. Instead
of such a system, it will be better to give up the bay to the enemy, confining our
defence to the more important harbors and rivers that discharge into the bay.
By this system not only will these harbors be secured, but the defences will
react upon the bay itself, and at any rate secure it from predatory incursions,
because, as before shown, while Hampton roads and the navy yard at Norfolk
are well protected, no enemy would proceed up the bay with any less force than
that which could be sent out from the navy yard. In certain cases of broad
waters, wherein an enemy's cruisers might desire to rendezvous in order to pro-
secute a blockade or as a shelter in tempestuous weather, there may be positions
from which sea-mortars can reach the whole anchorage, although nothing could
be done with guns. A battery of sea-mortars, well secured from escalade, would
in such a case afford a good defence, because no fleet will lie at anchor within
4he range of shells.
In thus distributing the various exposed points of the sea-coast into general
classes, according to the most appropriate modes of defence, we do not find that
anything can be substituted for fortifications, where fortifications are applicable,
and we find them applicable in all the classes but the last, and in the last we
shall find them indispensable as auxiliaries. In this last class there are, no doubt,
some cases where naval means must constitute the active and operative force ; and
it is probable that steam batteries may, of all floating defences, be most suitable,
as before stated.
Before proceeding to a specification of the positions on our coast requiring
fortifications, something more should be said on the general subject, though on
another branch, namely : the proper magnitude and strength to be given to
these fortifications.
The present system is founded on this principle, to wit : That the fortifica-
tions should be strong in proportion to the value of the objects to be secured.
The principle will not, I suppose, be controverted, although the mode of apply-
ing it may be.
There will hardly be a difference of opinion as to the mode of guarding the
less important points. There being no great attraction to an enemy, works
simple in their features, requiring small garrisons only, containing a moderate
armament, but at the same time inaccessible to the dashing enterprises that
ships can so easily land, and which can be persevered in for a few hours with
much vigor, will suffice. Circumstances must, however, materially modify the
properties of these works, even when the points to be guarded are of equal value.
In one, the disadvantage of position must be compensated by greater power ; in
another, natural strength may need little aid from art ; in another, greater width
in the guarded channel may demand a larger armament; and in a fourth,
peculiar exposure to a land attack may exact more than usual inaccessibility ; but
all these varieties lie within limits that will probably be conceded.
As to the larger objects, it has been contended that there has been exaggera-
tion in devising works to cover these, the works having been calculated for more
formidable attacks than they will be exposed to.
It is easy to utter vague criticisms of this nature, and it is not easy to rebut
them without going into an examination as minute aa if the criticisms were eve*
so precise and pertinent.
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 383
Bnt let us look a little at the material facts. What is the object of an enemy?
What are his means 1 What should be the nature of our defences'?
The object may be to lay a great city under contribution, or to destroy one
of our naval depots, or to take possession of one of our great harbors, &c.
It was estimated that in the great fire in the city of New York in the
year 1835, the property destroyed within a few hours was worth upward of
$17,000,000, although the fire Was confined to a very small part of the city, and
did not touch the shipping. Is it easy, then, to estimate the loss that would
accrue from the fires that a victorious enemy could kindle upon the circuit of
that great city, when no friendly hand could be raised to extinguish them ? or
is it easy to overrate the tribute such a city would pay for exemption from that
calamity ? Can we value too highly the pecuniary losses that the destruction
of one of the great navy yards would invoke 1 and the loss beyond all pecuniary
value of stores and accommodations indispensable in a state of war, and that a
state of war could hardly replace ?
But what are the enemy's means? They consist of his whole sea-going
force, which he concentrates for the sake of inflicting the blow.
" From the nature of maritime operations, suck a fleet could bring its whole
strength to bear upon any particular position, and by threatening or assailing
various portions of the coast, either anticipate the tardy movements of troops
upon land and effect the object before their concentration, or render it necessary
to keep in service a force far superior to that of the enemy, but so divided as to
be inferior to it on any one point"*
We have, then, objects of sufficient magnitude, and the means of the enemy
consist in the concentration of his whole force upon one of these objects.
With the highest notion of the efficiency of fortifications against shipping,
these are not cases where any stint in the defensive means are admissible.
Having, therefore, under a full sense of the imminent danger to which the great
objects upon the coast are exposed, applied to the approaches by water an array
of obstacles worthy of confidence, we must carefully explore all the avenues by
land, in order to guard against approaches that might be made on that side in
order to evade or to capture the works guarding the channels.
But before deciding on the defences necessary to resist these land attacks, it
will be proper to estimate more particularly the means that an enemy may be
expected to bring forward, with a view to such land operations.
History furnishes many examples, and the expedition to Flushing, commonly
called the Walcheren expedition, may be cited as peculiarly instructive.
From an early day Napoleon had applied himself to the creation of a maritime
force in the Scheldt; and in 1809 he had provided extensive dockyards and
naval arsenals at Flushing and at Antwerp. On his invasion of Austria that
year he had drawn off the masses of his troops that had before kept zealous
watch over these naval preparations, relying now on forts and batteries, and on
the fortifications of Flushing and Antwerp for the protection of the naval
establishments and of a fleet containing several line-of-battle ships and frigates
and a numerous flotilla of smaller vessels.
The great naval establishment at Flushing, near the mouth of the Scheldt,
and of Antwerp, some sixty or seventy miles up the river, with the vessels
afloat on the river or in progress in the yards, presented an object to England
worthy of one of her great efforts.
The troops embarked in this expedition consisted of upwards of thirty-three
thousand infantry, three thousand cavalry, more than three thousand artillery,
and some hundred of sappers and miners, constituting an army of about forty
thousand men.
Mr. Secretary Cass.
384 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
The naval portion consisted of thirty-five sail of the line, twenty-three frigates,
thirty-three sloops-of-war, twenty-eight gun, mortar, and bomb vessels, thirty-
six smaller vessels, and eighty-two gunboats, making a total of one hundred
and fifty-five ships and other armed vessels, and eighty-two gunboats. The
guns, mortars, &c., provided for such bombardments and sieges as the troops
might have to conduct, amounted to one hundred and fifty-eight pieces, with
suitable supplies of ammunition and stores of every kind.
>,; The idea of sailing right up to their object, in spite of the forts and batteries,
seems not to have found favor, notwithstanding the power of the fleet. The
plan of operations, therefore, contemplated the landing a portion of the army on
the island of Walcheren, to carry on the siege of Flushing, while another portion
proceeded up the Scheldt, as high as Fort Bartz, which was to be taken; after
which the army would push on by land about twenty miles further and lay
siege to Antwerp, all of which it was thought might be accomplished in eighteen
or twenty days from the first landing.
The execution did not accord with the design. Flushing, it is true, was re-
duced within fifteen days ; and in less than a week from the debarkation (which
was on the 31st of July) Fort Bartz was in possession of the English, having
been abandoned by the garrison. But it was twenty-five days before the main
body, with all necessary supplies for a siege, were assembled at this point and
ready to take up the line of march against Antwerp. Since the first descent of
the British matters had, however, greatly changed.
The French were now in force; they had put their remaining defences in
good condition ; they had spread inundations over the face of the country ; and
not only would there be little chance of further success, but the safety of the
expedition, formidable as it was, might have been compromised by a further
advance; it was therefore decided in council to abandon the movement against
Antwerp ; the troops accordingly returned to the island of Walcheren, which
they did not finally leave till the end of December.
The failure in the ultimate object of the expedition is to be ascribed to the
omission to seize, in the first instance, the south shore of the river and capture
the batteries there, as was originally designed, and which was prevented by the
difficulty of landing enough troops at any one debarkation in the bad weather
then prevailing. The capture of these batteries would have enabled the expe-
dition to have reached Fort Bartz during the first week ; and, in the then unpre-
pared state of the French, the issue of a dash upon Antwerp can hardly be
doubted.
The dreadful mortality that assailed the British army is wholly unconnected
with the plan, conduct, or issue of the enterprise as a military movement; unless,
indeed, it may have frustrated a scheme for occupying the island of Walcheren
as a position during the war.
Possession was held of the island for five months ; and it was finally aban-
doned, from no pressure upon it by the French; although, after the first six
weeks, the British force consisted, in the aggregate, of less than- seventeen
thousand men, of which, for the greater part of the time, more than half were
sick effectives being often reduced below five thousand men.
We see, therefore, that an effective force of less than ten thousand men main-
tained possession of the island in the face of, and in close proximity to, the most
formidable military power in Europe, for more than three months. And no
reason can be perceived why it might not have remained an indefinite period
while possessed of naval superiority.
The proximity of England undoubtedly lessened the expense of the expedition ;
but it influenced the result in no other way material to the argument.
I will allude to no other instances of large expeditious sent by the English to
distant countries than the two expeditions, each of about ten thousand men,
sent, in the year 1814, against this country one by the way of Canada, the
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 385
other to the Gulf of Mexico. United, in a single force of twenty thousand men
against our sea-coast, the expense would have been less and the result more
certain.
The French, notwithstanding their constant naval inferiority, have found
opportunities to embark in great undertakings of the same nature. In 1802
Leclerc proceeded to St. Domingo with thirty-four line-of-battle-ships and large
frigates, more than twenty small frigates and sloops, and upwards of twenty
thousand men. We- learn from these points in history what constitutes an object
worthy of vast preparations, and it is impossible to resist the fact that our own
coast and rivers and bays possess many establishments not less inviting to an
enemy than Flushing and Antwerp.
We are taught, moreover, what constitutes a great expedition ; in other words,
what is the amount of force we must prepare to meet. And, more than all, we
are taught that such an expedition, seizing a favorable moment when the military
arrangements of a country are incomplete, when the armies a*re absent or imper-
fect in their organization or discipline, does not hesitate to land in the face of
the most populous districts ; and availing of the local peculiarities, and covered
and supplied by a fleet, to undertake operations which penetrate into the country
and consume considerable time.
It seems, therefore, that whenever the object we are to cover possesses a value
likely to provoke the cupidity of an enemy, or to stimulate his desire to inflict a
serious blow, it is not enough that the approaches by water arc guarded against
his ships; it will be indispensable to place safeguards against attacks by land
also. A force considerable enough for very vigorous attacks against the land
tildes of the fortifications may be thrown upon the shore; and, if these yield, a
way is opened for the ships, and the enemy carries his object.
In certain positions the local circumstances would favor the land operations
of an enemy, permitting him, while operating against the fortifications, to be
aided by the fleet and covered from the reaction of the general force of the
country. In other positions the extreme thinness of the population in the
neighborhood would require the forts to rely for a considerable time solely on
their own strength. In all such cases a much greater power of resistance would
be requisite than in circumstances of an opposite nature. In all such circum-
stances the works should be of a strength adequate to resist an attack, although
persevered in vigorously for several days. But when these land operations lead
away from the shipping, or when the surrounding population is considerable, or
when considerable numbers of volunteers or regulars can be speedily drawn in
by steamers or railroads, or the enemy is unable to shelter his movements by
local peculiarities, then it will suffice if the work can withstand vigorous attacks
for a lew hours only.
The magnitude and strength of the work will depend, therefore, on the joint
influence of the value of the objects covered, the natural strength of the position,
and the succor to be drawn from the country. We may introduce, as instances,
New York and Pensacola. The former is as attackable as the latter; that is to
say, it equally requires artificial defences; and, owing to its capacious harbor
and easy entrance, it is not easy to place it in a satisfactory condition as to the
approaches by water. But, while an enemy in approaching any of the principal
works by land could not well cover himself from the attacks of the concentrated
population of the vicinity, the rapid means of communication from the interior
would daily bring great accession to the defence. A land attack against the
city must consequently be restricted to a day or two, and the works will fulfil
their object if impregnable to a coup de main.
Pensacola, an object in many respects of the highest importance, and growing
in consequence every day, is capable of being defended as perfectly as the city
just mentioned. The principal defences lie on a long sandy island which closes
in the harbor from the sea. An enemy landed on this island (Santa liosa) would
H. Rep. Com. 86 25
386 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
be in uninterrupted communication with his fleet, could, owing to the spars* -nos.s
of its population, have nothing to apprehend for some lime from ;my re-oiiforre-
ments arriving at the place, and would be well protected by position from the
effects of this succor when it should arrive
While in possession of naval superiority, he might, therefore, not unreason-
ably calculate on being able to press a siege of many days of the work which
occupies the extremity of the island and guards the entrance; to the harbor. And
even before coming into possession of this work, his gun and. mortar batteries on
the same island could destroy everything not bomb-proof and incombustible at
the navy yard.
An attack not less persevering, and with equal chances of success, might be
made from the other side of the harbor also.
If, therefore, the power to resist a coup de main be all that is conferred on
the works at Pensacola, their object will be attained only through the forbear-
ance of the enemy, -it being obviously indispensable that the principal of these
works be competent to resist a short siege. If this liability resulted from the
thinness of the neighboring population, it would still be many years before this
state of things would be materially altered.
But it does not depend on this alone : the peculiar topographical features will
continue this liability in spite of increasing numbers and ever so easy and rapid
communication with the interior, it having been proved that a fleet may lie broad
off this shore and hold daily communication therewith during the most tempes-
tuous season. The English fleet of men-of-war and transports lay, during the
last war, from February 7 to March 15, 1814, anchored abreast of Dauphin
island and Mobile Point, where the exposure is the same as that off Pensacola.
Between the cases cited, which may be regarded as the class of extreme cases,
(a class comprising, however, many important positions,) almost every conceivable
modification of the defence will be called for to suit the various conditions of the
several points.
The fortifications of the coast must therefore be competent to the double task
of interdicting the passage of ships and resisting land attacks two distinct and
independent qualities. The first demands merely an array, in suitable numbers
and in proper proportions, of heavy guns covered by parapets proof against shot
and shells; the second demands inaccessibility. As there is nothing in the first
quality necessarily involving the last, it has often happened, either from the
little value of the position or from the supposed improbability of a land attack,
or from the want of time to construct proper works, that this property of inaccessi-
bility has been neglected.
Whenever we have an object of sufficient value to be covered by a battery,
we should bear in mind that the enemy will know the value of the object as
well as ourselves; that it is a very easy thing for him to land a party of men
for an expedition of an hour or two ; and unless we take the necessary preventive
measures his party will be sure to take the battery first, after which nothing
will prevent his vessels consummating the design it was the puruqse of the
battery to prevent. In general, the same fortifications that guard the water
approaches will protect the avenues by land also ; but in certain cases a force
may be so landed as to evade the channel defences, reaching the object by a
route entirely inland. Of course this danger must be guarded against by suita-
ble works whenever the people cannot come promptly to the rescue.
After the preceding exposition of views on the general subject of the defences
of the coast, it may not be out of place here to indicate the mode by which the
system of fortifications can be manned and served without an augmentation, for
that particular purpose, of the regular army.
The force that should be employed for this service in time of war is the militia,
(using the, term in a comprehensive sense,) the probability being that, in most
of the defended points on the seaboard, the uniformed and volunteer companies
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 387
will supply the garrisons needed ; and it may be slioAvn that it is a service to
which militia are better adapted than to any other. The prominent defect of a
militia force results from the impossibility of so training the men to field move-
ments in the brief period of their service, as to give them any confidence in
themselves as manoeuvrers in the face of regular troops. The little they learn
merely suffices to show them that it is -but little ; every attempt of the kind
proving, by the disorders that they know not how to avoid, how much greater
would be the disorder if in the face of an enemy and under fire.
Without the knowledge to be obtained only by long and laborious practice,
the militiaman feels that he is no match, in the field, for the regular soldier, and
it would not be surprising should he desire to avoid an encounter. But there is
no such difficulty in the service of fixed batteries ; the militiaman lias there to
be taught merely the service of a single gun, than which nothing can be more
simple. He must learn to use the rammer and the sponge, the handspike and
the linstock ; to load and to run to battery, to trail and to fire ; these are all.
Each of these operations is of the utmost simplicity, depending on individual
action and not on concert, and they may all be taught in a very short time.
There is no manoeuvring, no marching, no wheeling. The squad of one gun
may be marched to another, but the service of both is the same. Even the art
of pointing cannon is to an American militiaman an art of easy attainment, from
the skill that all our countrymen acquire in the use of fire-arms, "drawing sight"
or "aiming" being the same art, modified only by the difference in the gun.
The mode of applying this force may be illustrated by the case of any of our
cities on the seaboard. The forts and batteries being put in perfect condition,
should be garrisoned by a small body of regular artillery, such as a moderate
military force could supply, and sufficient for the preservation of the public
property, and to afford indispensable daily guards. To these should be added
two or three men of the ordnance department, especially charged with the con-
dition of the armament and ammunition, and two or three engineer soldiers,
whose sole duty it would be to attend to the condition of the fortifications, keep-
ing every part in a state of perfect repair. In certain important works, however,
that would be liable to a violent assault, or exposed to siege, or to analogous
operations, it would be necessary, especially on the approach of a war, to keep
up a more considerable body of regular troops. The volunteer force of the city
should then be divided into detachments, if possible, without disturbing their
company organization, and should be assigned to the several works according to
the war garrisons required at each from four to six men, according to circum-
stances, being allowed to each gun. The larger works might require ten, fifteen,
or even twenty companies; the smaller ones, two, three, or more companies; and
in some cases even a platoon might suffice. Being thus occupied, each por-
tion of the city force would have its definite alarm post, and should be often
taken to it and there exercised in all the duties of its garrison, and more
especially in the service of its batteries, and in its defence against assault. The
multiplicity of steamboats in all the cities would enable the volunteers to reach
even the most distant alarm posts in a short time. In order that all these troops
may become expert in their duty, one of the works most convenient to the city,
beside being the alarm post of some particular portion of the volunteers, should,
during peace, be the ordinary school of drill for all ; and in this the detachments
should in turns assemble and exercise.
Beside the mere manual of the gun and battery, there should be frequent
target practice, as being not only necessary in teaching the proper use of the
battery, but as imparting interest and excitement to the service.
It might be necessary for a time to submit the volunteers to the drill of a
competent officer or non-commissioned officer of the regular artillery ; and in
particular, to conduct the practice with shot and shells under such inspection.
388 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
The portion of the military force of the city not stationed in the fixed Lat-
teries would constitute, under an impending attack, a reserve posted either in
one or several bodies, according* to circumstances, ready to cover exposed points.
to co-operate in offensive movements, or to relieve exhausted garrisons this
portion having connected with it the mounted force, the field artillery, and the
heavy movable guns.
This appropriation of the volunteer force to the immediate defence of the city
would operate in the most favorable way upon that force, superadding to the
impulses of patriotism every feeling connected with family property and social
and civil relations ; and, while making military service the first of duties, re-
lieving it of hardship and privation.
The organization of volunteer force here contemplated may comprehend the
whole maritime frontier, and be applicable, also, at the more populous points
upon the inland borders.
This arrangement, while it might be an enduring one, would be the least
expensive by far of .any that would be efficient.
The days of exercise drill and encampment should be fixed and invariable,
in order that they may the less interfere with the private occupations of the
volunteers. During an impending attack, greater or less portions should be
constantly at their posts ; but still the service in the batteries would comprise
but a very small portion of the year.
According to the value of the interests to be defended, and the extent of the
works to be occupied, would be the rank of the chief command, which should
be intrusted to an officer of the regular army, whose control might often be ex-
tended, advantageously, over a certain extent of seaboard to the right and left,
constituting a maritime department.
The existing fortifications of the sea-coast including a few useless remains
of the revolutionary works, are due to three distinct epochs, namely : 1. Those
that grow out of the political agitations attending the French revolution of 1789,
and the wars consequent thereon. As all the principal harbors had to be pro-
tected at once, the contracted fiscal means of the country required that the
works should be small, and they were also generally of a temporary character ;
but they proved sufficient. France, then a weak naval power, was moreover
fully occupied at home, and in pressing her continental campaign.
2. On the approach of the war of 1812, the obvious inadequacy of existing
forts led to large appropriations for fortifications, so that when the war broke
out there was not a town of any magnitude upon the coast not provided with
one or more batteries. Every place within the reach of an enemy's marauding
expeditions called for this kind of protection ; and there is no doubt that the
defences supplied saved the country from great losses. These defences of the
second system were also small and weak, and, being built for the sake of present
economy, of cheap materials and workmanship, were very perishable. The
government, aware of this weakness, called out to their support, during the war,
vast bodies of militia at enormous expense covering these troops with exten-
sive lines of field-works.
3. The war with England being over, the government promptly entered upon
a permanent system of coast defence, and to that end constituted a board of
engineers, with instructions to make examinations and plans, subject to the
revision of the chief engineer, and the sanction of the Secretary of War. And
it is this, the third system, that has been ever since 1816 in the course of
execution, and is now, as we shall see, well advanced.
Whenever the examinations of the board of engineers included positions for
dock yards, naval depots, &c., naval officers of rank and experience were asso-
ciated with them.
The board devoted several years uninterruptedly to the duty presenting
successive reports, and submitting, first, plans of the fortifications needed at the
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 389
most important points. Afterward, they Avere sufficiently in advance of the
execution of the system to apply most of their time to the duties of construction,
giving in occasionally additional reports and plans. In rare cases it has happened
that plans have boon, made under the particular direction of the chief engineer,
owing to the difficulty, at moments, of drawing the widely dispersed members
of the board from their individual trusts.
The board and the chief engineer arranged the defences into classes, according
to their view of the relative importance of the proposed works, in the order of
time. This order has been generally well observed in the execution of the
system, with the exception of some cases in which, by the action of Congress,
certain forts were advanced out of the order advised by the board.
For many years grants for fortifications were made, annually, by Congress in
a gross sum, which was apportioned according to the discretion of the President.
But since March 3, 1821, the appropriations have been specific, the grants for
each work being particularly stated. For many years every new fortification
has, before being made the object of appropriations, been sanctioned by a special
act of Congress upon recommendation of the military committee.
The classes are as follows, giving now merely the names of forts and places :
the cost, armament, &c., of the several works executed or projected will be
given at the end in proper tables.
Class A includes certain old works of the first and second systems. Some
of these are already repaired, some undergoing repairs, and some subject to
repair, should a war impend before better works shall have been substituted.
Fort Sullivan Eastport, Maine.
Edgecomb Wiscasset, Maine.
Preble Portland, Maine.
Scammel Portland, Maine.
McClary Portsmouth, New Hampshire.
Constitution Portsmouth, New Hampshire.
Gloucester, Massachusetts.
Pickering Salem, Massachusetts.
Lee Salem, Massachusetts.
Sewall Marblehead, Massachusetts.
Independence Boston harbor, Massachusetts.
Winthrop Boston harbor, Massachusetts.
West Head battery Governor's Island, Massachusetts.
Southeast battery Governor's Island, Massachusetts.
New Bedford, Massachusetts.
Wolcott Newport, Rhode Island.
Greene Newport, Rhode Island.
Trumbull New London, Connecticut.
Hale New Haven, Connecticut.
Columbus Governor's Island, New York.
Castle Williams Governor's Island, New York.
South battery Governor's Island, New York.
Gibson Ellis's Island, New York.
Wood Bedlow's Island, New York.
Richmond Staten Island, New York.
Tompkins Staten Island, New York.
Battery Hudson Staten Island, New York.
Morton Staten Island, New York.
Fort Lafayette Narrows, New York harbor.
Miffiin Delaware river, Pennsylvania.
McHenry Baltimore harbor, Maryland.
Madison Annapolis, Maryland.
390 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA- COAST DEFENCES.
Fort Severn Annapolis, Maryland.
Washington Potomac river, Maryland.
Johnson Cape Fear river, North Corolina.
Castle Pinckney Charleston harbor, South Carolina.
^Fort Monltrie Charleston harbor, South Carolina.
Battery Beaufort, South Carolina.
Fort Jackson Savannah river, Georgia.
Marion St. Augustine, Florida.
Barrancas Pensacola, Florida.
St. Philip Mississippi river, Louisiana.
Class B includes new Avorks (third system) completed, or so nearly com-
pleted as to be able to use all or nearly all their batteries, viz :
Fort Warren Boston harbor, Massachusetts.
Adams Newport, Rhode Island.
Sclmyler Throg's Neck, New York harbor.
Hamilton New York harbor, New York.
Monroe Old Point Comfort, Virginia.
Macon Beaufort, North Carolina.
Caswell Oak Island, North Carolina.
Pulaski .Cockspur Island, Georgia.
Pickens Pensacola, Florida.
McRce Foster's Bank, Florida.
Morgan Mobile Point, Alabama.
Pike Rigolets, Louisiana.
Macomb (formerly Wood) Chef Menteur, Louisiana.
Battery Bienvenue, Bayou Bienveuue, Louisiana.
Tower Dupre, Bayou Dupre, Louisiana.
Fort Jackson Mississippi river, Louisiana.
Livingston Barrataria bay, Louisiana.
Class C includes works now under construction, and more or less advanced,
viz:
Fort Knox Bucksport, Maine.
Delaware Delaware river, Delaware.
Carroll Seller's Point, Maryland.
Calhoun Hampton roads, Virginia.
Sumter Charleston harbor, South Carolina.
Clinch Cumberland sound, Georgia.
Taylor Key West, Florida. '
Jefferson Garden Key, Tortugas, Florida.
Redoubt of Fort Barrancas Pensacola, Florida.
Fort Games Dauphin Island, Alabama.
C/ass D includi'S works, the first to be commenced, arranged in geographical
order, viz
Fort at mouth of Kemiebec river, and Fort Scammel, (new,) Portland harbor
Maine.
Fort , (new,) Portsmouth, New Hampshire.
Fort Pickering, (new,) Salem; Fort , (new,) Jack's Point, Marblejiead;
works at Provincetown, and New Bedford, Massachusetts.
Fort on Rose island, Narraganset roads, Rhode Island.
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 391
Fort on Sandy Hook Point, New York.
Fort on Thomas's Point, Patuxent river, Maryland.
Fort at Proctor's Landing, Louisiana.
Works at G-alveston bay, and Brazos Santiago, Texas.
Class E includes works to be commenced after those in Class D, in geo-
graphical order, viz :
New Fort Preble, Portland harbor, Maine.
Works at Gloucester ; Closing Broad Sound Pass, Boston harbor ; works at
Gurnet Point, Plymouth, Massachusetts.
Works at Cedar Point, Potomac river, Maryland.
Works at Georgetown, and in Port Royal roads, South Carolina.
Works on Tybee island, Savannah river, Georgia.
Tower at Pass an Heron, Alabama.
Fort at Ship island, Mississippi.
Works at Passa Cavallo, Matagorda bay, Texas.
Class F includes works to be commenced last of all, also in geographical
order, viz :
Works at Eastport harbor, Machias, Mount Desert island, Castine, St.
George's bay, Damariscotta bay, Broad bay, Sheepscot bay, Hog Island chan-
nel, (Portland harbor,) mouth of Saco river, mouth of Kennebunk river, York,
Maine.
Works at Newburyport, Beverly, Naugus Head, (Salem,) Fort Sewall, (Mar-
blehead,) Nantasket Head, (Boston harbor,) redoubt on Hog island, (Boston
harbor,) Nantucket, Edgartown, Falmouth, Holmes's Hole, Tarpaulin Cove, Mas-
sachusetts.
Works at Conanicut island, and works closing west passage of Narraganset
roads, Rhode Island.
Fort Griswold, (New London,) works at mouth of Connecticut river, Fort
Hale and Fort Wooster, (New Haven,) Connecticut.
Works for harbors and towns between New Haven and New York ; works in
Gardiner's bay, Long Island sound; works in Sag Harbor; fort on Wilkins's
Point, Long Island ; redoubt in advance of Fort Tompkins, Staten island, New
York.
Fort at Delaware breakwater, Lewes ; fort opposite Fort Delaware, Delaware
river, Delaware.
Fort on Elk river ; works on Hawkins's Point, below Baltimore; fort on Point
Patience, Patuxent river; works at St. Mary's, Potomac river, Maryland.
Works at Bald Head and Federal Point, Cape Fear river, North Carolina.
Works at mouth of Sautee river, Bull's bay and other inlets, Stono sound,
North Edisto sound, South Edisto sound, St. Helena sound, South Carolina.
Works at Wassaw sound, Ossabam sound, St. Catherine's sound, Sapelo
sound, Doley inlet, Altamaha sound, St. Simon's- sound, St. Andrew's sound,
Georgia.
Works at Charlotte harbor, Tampa bay, Apalachicola bay, Apalachic bay,
St. Joseph's bay, Santa Rosa bay, Florida.
Works at Perdido bay, Alabama.
Being arranged in the preceding classes, on the principles before stated, it
will be seen that those places which are deemed to be least important in the
system, and Avhich may be postponed till all others are executed, constitute by
far the most numerous class. Within this class (F) there are, no doubt, great
differences as to the claim for defences, and in the .course of years likely to
elapse before any of them can be taken in hand, several may rise in the scale
of relative importance.
There are also in class E differences of the same sort, and it is not unlikely
392 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
that before they can be commenced, at the rate the system has heretofore ad-
vanced, there may be interchanges between this and class F.
In class D, however, it is less probable that there will be a material change,
as all the positions are important now, being designed to cover large towns or
cities, or national establishments, or the outlets of valuable commerce or impor-
tant roadsteads.
I proceed now to examine the coast in detail, proceeding geographically,
beginning at the northeastern extremely and referring to accompanying tables.
It may be well to observe here, once for all, that much confidence is not asked
for the mere conjectures presented below as to the number and cost of the
works assigned for the protection of the harbors which have not yet been sur-
veyed. In some cases there may be mistakes as to the number of forts and
batteries needed ; in others errors will exist in the estimated cost.
Eastport and Macliias may be mentioned as places that will unquestionably
be thought to need defensive works by the time, in the order of relative impor-
tance, the execution of them can be undertaken by the government. There
are several small towns eastward of mount Desert island that may, at that
period, deserve equal attention ; at present, however, the places mentioned will
be the only ones estimated for, and $100,000 will be assumed as the cost of
each.
Class F Mount Desert island, situated a little east of Penobscot bay,
having a capacious and close harbor, affording anchorage for the highest class
of vessels, and easily accessible from sea, offers a station for the navy of an
enemy superior to any other on this part of the coast. From this point his
cruisers might act with great effect against the navigation of the eastern coast,
especially that of Maine, and his enterprises could be conducted with great
rapidity against any points he might select. These considerations, added to the
very great advantage, in certain political events, of our occupying a naval
station thus advanced, whence we might act offensively, together with the
expedience of providing places of succor on a part of the- coast where vessels
are so frequently perplexed in their navigation by the prevailing fogs, lead to
the conclusion that the fortification, in a strong manner, of this roadstead may,
before long, be necessary. A survey of this island was begun many years ago,
but the party being called off to other duties it was never completed. The
project of defensive works has not been made. The entire cost may be, as as-
sumed by the engineer department some years ago, $500,000.
Class F Castme. It would seem to be impossible on this coast to deprive
an enemy enjoying naval superiority of harbors, or prevent him using them as-
stations during a war, insular situations, which his vessels would render unap-
proachable, being so numerous ; but it seems proper that such of these positions
as are the sites of towns should be secured. During the last war, the English
held the position of Castine for some time, and left it at their pleasure. It is
probable a work costing about $50,000 would deter an enemy from again making
choice of this position.
Class F Penobscot bay. Upon this bay, and upon the river of the same
name flowing into it, are several flourishing towns and villages. Of the many
bays which intersect the coast, the Penobscot is the one which presents the
greatest number of safe and capacious anchorages. As before observed, a large
portion of these harbors must, for the present, be left without defences, but the
valuable commerce of the bay and river must be covered ; and to afford a secure
retreat for such vessels as may be unable to place themselves under the protec-
tion of the works to the east or west of the bay, the passage of the river must,
be defended. The lowest point at which this can be done without great expense,
is opposite Bucksport, at the Narrows. Fwrt Knox, at this position, is now un-
der construction, estimated at $500,000.
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 393
Class C *S^. George's bay, Broad Lay, Damariscotta, and ShcepscoL
West of the Penobscot occur the above-mentioned bays, all being dee]) inden-
tations leading to towns, villages, and various establishments of industry and
enterprise. The bays have not been surveyed, and of course no plans have been
formed for their defence. $400,000 are assigned to the defence of these waters. .
The Sheepscot is an excellent harbor of refuse for vessels of every size.
(Class F.)
Kcnncbcc river. This river (one of the largest in the eastern States) enters
the sea nearly midway between Cape Cod and the mouth of the St. Croix. It
rises near the source of the Chandiere, which is a tributary of the St. Lawrence,
and has once served as a line of operations against Quebec. The situation and
extent of this river, the value of its products, and the active commerce of several
very flourishing towns upon its banks, together with the excellence of the har-
bor within its mouth, will not permit its defence to be neglected. The surveys
begun many years ago, were never finished. The estimated cost of defences, as
formerly reported by the engineer department, was $300,000. Positions near
the mouth will permit a secure defence. (Class D.)
Portland harbor. The protection of the town, of the merchantmen belonging
to it, and of the ships-of-war that may be stationed in this harbor to watch over
this part of the coast, or that may enter for shelter, (all of them important ob-
jects,) may be secured, as an inspection of the map of the harbor will show, by
occupying Fort Preble Point, House island, Hog Island ledges, and Fish Point.
If the two channels to the west and east of Hog island can be obstructed at
small expense, (to decide which some surveys are yet necessary,) there will be
no necessity for a battery on the ledge, and Fish I 3 oirit need be occupied only
by such works as may be thrown up in time of war. The expense, as now esti-
mated, of the works planned for this defence, will be $155,000 for Fort Preble
and $48,000 for House island; for Hog Island channel, say $135,000. (Classes
A, I), E,F.)
In addition, there must be repairs immediately applied to the old works at
Fort Preble, including the rebuilding of a sea-wall lately overthrown, at an ex-
pense of $7,500.
Saco, Kenncbunk, and York. Small works, comparatively, will cover these
places ; $75,000 is assumed as the aggregate cost.
Class F Portsmouth harbor and navy yard. The only good roadstead or
harbor, between Cape Elizabeth and Cape Ann, is Portsmouth harbor, within
the mouth of the Piscataqua river. Line-of-battle ships can ascend as high as
Fox Point, seven miles above the town. This situation, sufficiently commodious
for a naval depot, should be maintained ; but it is to be regretted that the bay
to the south of Fox Point was not chosen as the site of the navy yard, instead
of Fernald's island. Being where it is, it will be necessary, in time of Avar, to
make some particular dispositions for the protection of the navy yard from an
attack from the north shore of the river.
The position of Fort Constitution will certainly, and that of Fort McClary
will probably, be occupied as the defence; though the Avorks themselves should
give place to those that would better fulfil the object. The other positions for
forts or batteries, are Gerrist's Point, Fishing island, and Clarke's island, some,
if not all, of Avhich must be occupied. Surveys have been made and projects
for the defence are IIOAV under the consideration of the board of engineers. The
estimates have not been furnished, but there is reason for believing that the en-
tire cost for fortifying this harbor Avill not fall short of $300,000.
Class D Newburyport harbor. The points forming the mouth of the harbor
are continually changing, and it seems necessary, therefore, to rely, for the de-
fence of the harbor, on works to be thrown up during a Avar. There is only a
shoal draught of Avater. It is thought $100,000 will defend this harbor ade-
quately.
394 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
Class F Gloucester harbor. The position of this harbor, near the extremity
of Cape Ann, places it in close relation with the navigation of all Massachusetts
bay, and imparts to it considerable importance. No surveys have yet been
made, but it is believed that sufficient defence may be provided for $200,000.
(Class E.) Should there be any occasion for defensive works before the pro-
posed new works can be commenced, an expenditure of $10,000 in repairs of
the old fort will be required. (Class A.)
Beverly harbor. This harbor will be defended chiefly by a portion of the
works designed for Salem. $50,000 in addition will secure it. (Class F.)
Salem harbor. The port of Salem is distant from Marblehead two miles, and
separated therefrom by a peninsula. The occupation of the extremity of Winter
island (where are the ruins of Fort Pickering') on one side, and Xaugus Head on
the other, w r ill effectually secure this harbor. Projects have been presented for
this defence, estimated to cost $'225,000. (Classes D and F.) On a sudden
emergency old Fort Lee may be put in an effective state for 82,000, and Fort
Pickering for $5,000. (Class A.)
Marblehead harbor. Besides covering, in some measure, the harbor of Bos-
ton, Salem and Marblehead possess an important commerce of their own, and
also afford shelter for vessels prevented by certain winds from entering Boston
or pursuing their course eastward. The proposed mode of defending Marble-
Lead harbor consists in occupying, on the north side, the hillock which com-
mands the present Fort Sewall, (which will be superseded by the new work,)
and on the south, the position of Jack's Point. The two works will cost
$318,000. (Classes D and F.)
To repair old Fort Sewall, which maybe necessary if the new works are not
soon begun, will require ten thousand dollars. (Class A.)
Boston harbor. We come, now, to the most important harbor in the eastern
section of the coast, and considering the relations to general commerce and the
interests of the navy, one of the most important in the whole Union.
After a careful examination of all the necessary conditions of such a problem,
the board of naval officers and engineers, in their joint report of 1820, gave this
harbor a preference over all other positions to the east, and inclusive of New
York bay and the Hudson, as the seat of the great northern naval depot; and
the government, by the great additions and improvements that have from year
to year been since made to the navy yard on the Charlestown side, have virtu-
ally sanctioned the recommendation of the board. But independent of the navy
yard, Boston is a city of great wealth, and possesses an extensive and active
commerce.
The old works defended merely the interior basin from attacks by water, but
as it often happens that vessels enter Nantasket roads with a wind too scant to
take them to the city, or are detained in President roads by light winds or an
adverse tide, as the former especially is a very convenient anchorage whence to
proceed to sea, and above all as Nantasket roads afford the best possible station
for a blockading squadron, it was deemed indispensable to place permanent de-
fences at the mouth of the harbor. The project of defence regards the existing
works, with the necessary repairs and modifications, as constituting a second
barrier.
Besides a permanent work now almost finished on George's island, it contem-
plates permanent works on Nantasket Head, and filling up the Broad Sound
channel, so as to leave no passage in that direction for sHips-of-war.
Until the best draught for steam vessels-of-war shall be well ascertained, it
will not be safe to say to' what depth the Broad Sound channel should be re-
stricted, nor indeed can it be positively asserted that this description of vessels
can be conveniently excluded by such means. Other vessels can, however, be
thus excluded, and steam vessels passing this channel would still have to pass
the inner barrier. The estimated cost of the works for this harbor is 1,354,573.
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 395
Besides the works of a permanent character, it will be necessary in the be-
ginning of a war to erect several temporary works on certain positions in the
harbor and on the lateral approaches to the navy yard. (Classes A, B, E, and F.)
Plymouth and Provincetown harbors. These harbors have a commerce of
some consequence of their own, but they are particularly interesting in reference
to the port of Boston. While these are undefended, an enemy's squadron
blockading Massachusetts bay will have ports of refuge under his lee, which
would enable him to maintain his blockade even throughout the most stormy
seasons, knowing that the winds which would force him to seek shelter would
be adverse to outward bound and fatal to such inward-bound vessels as should
venture near the cape. Were the enemy deprived of these harbors he would be
unable to enforce a vigorous investment, as he must be constrained to take an
offing on every approach of foul weather. Our own vessels coming in from sea,
and finding an enemy interposed between them and Boston, or being turned
from their course by adverse winds, would, in case of the defence of these ports,
find to the south of Boston shelter equivalent to those provided in the east at
Marblehead, Salem, Gloucester, and Portsmouth. Plymouth harbor has not
been fully surveyed. Provincetown harbor has been surveyed, but the projects
of defence have not been formed. The former, it is thought, may be suitably
covered by a work of no great cost on Gurnett Point, while to fortify Province-
town harbor in such a way as to cover vessels taking shelter therein, and at the
same time to deprive an enemy of safe anchorages, will involve considerable ex-
pense. Probably no nearer estimate can be formed at present than that offered
by the engineer department some years ago, which gave one hundred thousand
dollars to Plymouth and six hundred thousand dollars for Provincetown.
(Classes D and E.)
The coast between Cape Cod and Cape Hatteras differs from the northeastern
section in possessing fewer harbors, in having but little rocky and a great por-
tion of sandy shore, in its milder climate and clearer atmosphere ; and it differs
from all the other portions, in the depth and magnitude of its interior seas and
sounds, and in the distance to which deep tide navigation extends up its numer-
ous large rivers. The circuit of the coast, not including the shores of the great
bays, measures about six hundred and fifty miles.
Martha's Vineyard sound. To the south of Cape Cod lie the islands of
Nantucket and Martha's Vineyard, which, with several smaller islands on the
south, and the projection of Cape Malabar on the east, enclose the above-named
sound. The channels through this sound being sufficient for merchant vessel.-.
and one of the channels permitting the passage even of small frigates, are not
only the constant track of coasting vessels, but also of large number of vessel-
arriving in the tempestuous months from foreign voyages. There are within
the sound the harbors of Tarpaulin Cove, Holmes 's Hole, Rdgartown, Falmoutli.
Hyannis, and Nantuckct, besides small anchorages.
In addition to the many thousand vessels passing this water annually, of
which there are sometimes forty or fifty (a portion containing very valuable
cargoes) to be seen in the harbors awaiting a change of wind, there is supposed
to be at least forty thousand tons of whaling vessels owned in the towns of this
sound.
^ If the harbors just named are to be defended at all it must be by fortifications.
There is little or no population except in the towns, and even this is believed to
be entirely without military organization. A privateer might run into either of
these harbors and capture, destroy, or levy contributions at pleasure. The use
of the sound itself as an anchorage for vessels-of-war cannot be prevented by
fortifications alone. Two hundred and fifty thousand dollars may perhaps suf-
fice for the defence of all the harbors against the kind of enterprise to which
they are exposed. (Class F.)
New Bedford and Fairhaven harbor. Projects and estimates have been
396 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
made for the defence of this harbor, on which lie two of the most
towns in the eastern States, New Bedford being, as regards registered tonnage
the third harbor in the United States. Estimate 8,208,000. (Class D.)
Buzzard's bay. Interposed between tlie main and the island of Martha';
Vineyard or the Elizabeth islands, which bound Buzzard's bay on the south
This bay covers the harbor of Xew Bedford, and might be used as an anchoragi
by an enemy's fleet, but it is too wide to be defended by fortifications.
^arragansct bay. Some of the properties of this great roadstead have beei
stated in the preceding remarks.
The defence adopted for Xarraganset roads must be formidable on the im
portant points, because they will be exposed to powerful expeditions. Althoud
the possession of this harbor, the destruction of the naval establishment, th
capture of the floating defences, and the possession of the island as a place o
debarkation and refreshment, should not be considered as constituting of them
selves objects worthy a great expedition, they might very w^ell be the prelim
inary steps of such expedition; and defences, weak in their character, rnigli
tempt rather than deter it; for although unable to resist his enterprise, the;
might be fullv competent, after being captured and strengthened by such mean
as he would have at hand, to protect him from offensive demonstrations on ou
part.
There are besides, in the local circumstances, some reasons why the work
should be strong. The channel on the eastern side of the island being perms
nently closed by a solid bridge, requires no defensive works ; but this bridg
being the upper end of the island, the channel is open to an enemy all along th
eastern shore of the island. Works erected for the defence of the channel c
the west side of the island cannot, therefore, prevent nor even oppose a landin
on the eastern side. The enemy may, consequently, take possession, and ben
his whole force to the reduction of the forts on the island, which cannot be n
lieved until a force has been organized, brought from a distance, conveyed b
water to the points attacked, and landed in the face of his batteries; all thi
obviously requiring several days, during which the forts should be capable r
holding out. To do this against an expedition of ten thousand or twenty thoi
sand men demands something more than strength to resist a single assaul
Unless the main works be competent to withstand a siege of a few days, the
will not, therefore, fulfil their trust, and will be worse than useless.
It must here be noticed that, although the works do not prevent the landin
of an enemy on Rhode Island, they will, if capable of resisting his efforts for
few days, make his residence on the island for any length of time impossibh
since forces in any number may be brought from the main, and landed und<
cover of the fire of the works.
To come now to the particular defences proposed for this roadstead. It mus
be stated that there are three entrances into Narraganset roads :
1st. The eastern channel, which passes upon the east side of the island <
Rhode Island. This, as before stated, being shut by a solid bridge, needs n
defence by fortificotions, other than a field-work or two, which may be throw
up at the opening of a war.
2d. The central channel, which enters from sea by passing between Rhoc
Island and Conanicut island. This is by far the best entrance, and leads to th
.best anchorage; and this it is proposed to defend by a fort on the east side (
the entrance, designed to be the principal work in the system. This worl
called Fort Adams, is nearly completed. On the Avest side of the entrance it
proposed to place another work, and on an island, called Rose island, facing tli
entrance, a third work. It is also proposed to repair the old fort on Goat islan<
just within the mouth; and also old Fort Green, which is a little higher up o
the island of Rhode Island.
3d. As to the western passage, three modes present themselves : first, by n
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 397
ducing tlie depth of water by an artificial ledge, so as, while the passage shall
be. as free as it is now for the coasting- trade, it shall be shut as to the vessel
of-war, including steam vessels ; second, by relying on fortifications alone to
close the channel ; or, third, by resorting in part to one, and in part to the other
mode just mentioned. Either is practicable ; but, being the least expensive and
most certain, the estimates are founded on the first. The total cost of the Nar-
raganset defences is estimated at $1,699,000.: (Classes A, B, D, F.)
Gardiner's bay. It is uncertain whether this harbor, which would be a very
valuable one to an enemy investing this part of the coast, is defensible by forti-
fications alone. After it shall have been surveyed, it may appear that, from one
or more positions, the whole anchorage may be controlled by heavy sea-mortars.
In such a case, the defensive works would not be costly. If it be found expe-
dient to fortify some particular portion of the bay as an anchorage for steam
batteries, (which, however, is not anticipated,) the expense would probably be
as great as was anticipated some years since by the engineer department, viz :
$400,000. (Class F.)
Sag Harbor, New York, and Stonington, Connecticut. Neither of these
harbors has been surveyed with reference to defence. The first is possessed of
considerable tonnage ; and the second, beside being engaged in commerce, is the
terminus of a railroad from Boston. $100,000 may be assigned to the first, and
$200,000 to the other. (Classes E and F.)
New London harbor is very important to the commerce of Long Island sound ;
and, as a port of easy access, having a great depth of water, rarely freezing,
and being easily defended, it is an excellent station for the navy. It is also
valuable as a shelter for vessels bound out or home, and desirous of avoiding a
blockading squadron off Sandy Hook. The plan of defence includes the re-
building of Forts Trumbull and Griswold the former having been already done,
very nearly remaining expense estimated at $198,000. (Classes A and F.)
]\iouth of Connecticut river. This river has been shown to be subject to the
expeditious of an enemy. No survey has been made with a view to its defences.
$100,000 is introduced here as the conjectural cost. (Class F.)
New Haven harbor. It is proposed to defend this harbor by improving and
enlarging Fort Hale, and substituting a new work for the slight redoubt erected
during the last war, called Fort Wooster. The expense of both may be set
down at $90,000, exclusive of $5,000 for immediate repairs of old Fort Hale.
(Classes A and F.)
There are several towns between New Haven and New York on both sides
of the sound ; none of them are very large as yet ; still most, if not all, arc
prosperous and increasing. Although in their present condition it might not be
deemed necessary to apply any money to permanent defences, yet, as part of
the present object is to ascertain, as near as may be, the ultimate cost of com-
pletely fortifying the coast, it seems proper to look forward to the time when
some of these towns may become objects of predatory enterprises of some mag-
nitude. Bearing in mind the probable increase of population in the meantime,
and the situation of the places generally, it is thought that $200,000 will be
enough to provide defences for all. (Class F.)
New York harbor. The objects of the projected works for the security of
New York are to cover the city from an attack by land or sea ; to protect its
numerous shipping ; to prevent, as far as possible, the blockade of this great
port, and to cover the interior communication uniting this harbor with the Dela-
ware.
There are two avenues to the city, namely, one by the main channel, direct
from sea, and one by the sound.
The projected system of defence closes this last avenue at the greatest distance
possible from the city, namely, at Throg's Point. The occupation of this point
398 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCE*.
will force the enemy to land more than twenty miles from the city on one side,
and still further from the navy yard on the other.
A work now in progress and nearly finished at Throg's Point will prevent
any attempt to force this passage. It will, as we have seen, oblige an enemy to
land at a considerable distance from the object; and, as he will then be unable
to turn the strong position afforded by Harlem river, the cover on the New York
side will be sufficient,
But should he land on the Long Island side, he might, by leaving parties on
suitable positions, with a view to prevent our crossing the river and falling on
his rear, make a dash at the navy yard, having no obstacle in his front. To
prevent this effectually, and also to accomplish other objects, a work should be
erected on Wilkins's Point, opposite Throg's Point. This work, besides com-
pleting the defence of that channel, would involve a inarch against the navy
yard from this quarter in great danger, since all the forces that could be col-
lected on the New York shore might, under cover of this work, be crossed over
to Long Island, and fall on the rear of the enemy, cutting off 1iis communication
with the fleet. The two works on Throg's and Wilkins's Points may therefore
be regarded as perfectly protecting on that side the city and navy yard.
Against an attack by the main cheinnel there are :
1st. The works in the vicinity of the city, which would act upon an enemy's
squadron only after its arrival before the place. They consist of Fort Colum-
bus, Castle Williams, and South Battery, on Governor's island, Fort Wood, on
Bedlow's island, and Fort Gibson, on Ellis's island.
It is necessary that these works be maintained, because, in the event of the
lower barriers being forced, these would still afford a resource. It is a disad-
vantage of their positions, however, that the destruction of the city might be
going on simultaneously with the contest between the forts and the fleets. They
cannot, however, be dispensed with until the outer barriers are entirely com-
pleted, if even then.
2d. At the Narrows, about seven miles below the city, the passage becomes
so contracted as to permit good disposition to be made for defence. On the
Long Island side of the Narrows is Fort Lafayette, which is a strong water
battery, standing on a reef at some distance from the shore, and immediately
behind it, on the top of the bank, is a small but strong work, called Fort Ham-
ilton. Some repairs being applied to these works, this position may be regarded
as well occupied.
On the west or Staten Island side of the Narrows are the following works,
all of which were erected by the State of New York, viz : Fort Richmond,
which is a water battery ; Battery Hudson, which is at some height above the
water ; Battery Morton, which is a small battery on the top of the hill, and
Fort Tompkins, which is also 011 the hill, and is the principal work. All these
works, as well as the site common to them all, are now the property of the
United States by purchase from the State of New York.
Batteries Hudson and Morton have been put in perfect order, and afford a
formidable array of guns. Fort Richmond, which occupied the best position
within the whole harbor for channel defence, had fallen entirely to ruin ; it is
now being reconstructed, and with the appropriation asked for in the estimates
of last year might have been now ready for one tier of guns.
The nature and extent of repairs required by Fort Tomj'kins have not yet
been settled, this not being deemed so pressing as a state of readiness in the
batteries just mentioned. Besides these works, there has been projected for
Staten Island an advanced redoubt, which, however, falls within the class of
works (F) last to be erected.
With the Narrows thus defended, and the Avorks near the city in perfect
order, New York might be regarded as pretty well protected against an attack
by water through this passage.
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 399
But there lies below the Narrows a capacious bay, affording* good anchorage
for any number of vessels-of-war and transports. An enemy's squadron being-
in that bay, into which entrance is very easy, would set a seal upon this outlet
of the harbor. Not a vessel could enter or depart at any season of the year.
And it would also intercept the water communication, by way of the Raritan,
between New York and Philadelphia.
The same squadron could land a force on the beach of Gravesend bay, (the
place of the landing of the British, which brought on the battle of Long Island
in the revolutionary war,) within seven miles of the city of Brooklyn, of its-
commanding height, and of the navy yard, with no intervening obstacle of any
sort.
This danger is imminent, and it would not fail, in the event of war, to be as
fully realized as it was during the last war, when, on the rumor of an expedition
being in preparation in England, twenty-seven thousand militia were assembled
to cover the city from an attack of this sort. It is apparent that the defences
near the city and those at the Narrows, indispensable as they are for other
purposes, cannot be made to prevent this enterprise, which can be thoroughly
guarded against only by
3d. An outer barrier at the very mouth of the harbor. This would accom-
plish two objects of great consequence, namely, rendering a close blockade of
the harbor impossible, and obliging an enemy who should design to move troops
against the navy yard to land at a distance of more than twenty miles from his-
object, upon a dangerous beach, leaving, during the absence of the troops, the
transports at anchor in the ocean, and entirely without shelter.
The hazard of such a land expedition would moreover be greatly enhanced
by the fact that our own troops, by passing over Long Island under cover of
the fort at Wilkins's Point, could cut off the return of the enemy to his fleet,
which must lie at or somewhere near Rockaway. Time, distance, and the direc-
tion of the respective marches Avould make, very naturally, such a manoeuvre a
part of the plan of defence. Against an enemy landing in Gravesend bay no
such manoeuvre could be effectual, on account of the shortness of his line of
march, as well as of its direction.
In view of these considerations, the board of engineers projected additional
works, one for the east bank, and another for the middle ground, these positions
being on shoals on either hand of the bar outside of Sandy Hook. Before deter-
mining on the works last mentioned the board went into much research, in order
to ascertain whether these shoals were unchangeable, and it was thought to have
been fully proved that there had been no material alteration in more than sixty
years. This apparent stability of the shoals encourage the board to devise the
project referred to.
More recent surveys have, however, discovered new, or rather other channels..
If they, indeed, be new channels, they show a want of stability in the shoals
that forbids any such structures as the batteries formerly contemplated. And
whether new or not they would deprive these batteries of a material portion of
their efficacy. Removing, then, these defences from this outer bar, they must
occupy the position of Sandy Hook; at which they will afford a very good
defence of the main channel, and prevent the entrance to or occupation of the
lower bay for any hostile purpose whatsoever, and cover a secure anchorage-
there for our own merchantmen and privateers, and for our steam and sailing:
cruisers.
To recapitulate as to New York harbor. The security of the city of New
York, Brooklyn, &c., and the navy yard requires, first, defences on the passage-
from the sound ; namely, the completion of Fort Schuylcr on Throg's Point,,
(Class B,) and the erection of a fort on Wilkins's Point (Class F) cost of both
$711,000; second, completion of repairs on works of Governor's island, Bed-
low's island, and Ellis's island estimated cost 842,689, (Class A;) third, repairs
400 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
of the works at the Narrow*, including those formerly belonging to the State of
New York cost $326,834, (Class A and B;) and fourth, the erection of outer
defences on Sandy Hook estimated by the board of engineers to cost $1,200,000,
(Class D;) the total cost will therefore be $2,332,523. (Classes A, B, D, F.)
Delaware bay, Fort Delaware, Fort, Mifflin, Delaware Breakwater. Tin-
coast from the mouth of the Hudson to the Chesapeake, as well as that on the
south side of Long Island, is low and sandy, and is penetrated by several inlet. ;
but not one, besides the Delaware, is navigable by sea-going vessels. The
Delaware bay itself being wide and full of shoals, having an intricate channel,
and being much obstructed by ice in the winter, affords no very good natural
harbor within a reasonable distance of the sea.
The artificial harbor constructed just Avithin the mouth of Delaware bay sup-
plies this need, and must be securely fortified. No plans have, however, as yet
been made with that object; and as to the probable cost, nothing better can now
be done than to assume the conjectural estimate made some years since in the
engineer department, namely, $600,000. (Class F.)
The lowest point at which the bay is defensible is at Pea Patch island, about
forty-five miles below the city of Philadelphia. A fort on that island, to replace
the one destroyed by fire; a fort opposite the Pea Patch, on the Delaware shore,
to assist in commanding the Delaware channel, and at the same time to protect
the mouth of the Delaware and Chesapeake canal; a temporary work on the
Jersey shore, to be thrown up at the commencement of a war, to assist in closing
the channel on that side; together Avith floating obstructions, to be put down in
moments of peril, Avill effectually cover all above this position including Phila-
delphia and its navy yard, Wilmington, New Castle, the canal before mentioned,
and the Philadelphia and Baltimore railroad.
The rebuilding of Fort Delaware Avas long delayed by difficulties attending
the settlement of claims to the island (Pea Patch) on which it is to stand; these
having been adjusted, the fort is in progress the tedious and difficult process of
forming a foundation with piles and grillage being concluded. In the meantime.
Fort Mifflin, an old work, standing about seven miles below the city of Phila-
delphia had been put in good order.
The expense of Fort Delaware is, according to reA'ised estimates, $580,000.
and of the fort opposite, $521,000. (Classes C and F.)
Chesapeake boy, Hampton roads, James river, Norfolk, and the navy yard.
The Avorks projected for these are: first, a fort at Old Point Comfort this is
called Fort Monroe; second, a casemated battery called Fort Calhoun, in the
Kip llap shoals, opposite Old Point Comfort ; and, third, a line of floating ob-
structions, extending across the channel from one of these Avorks to the other.
Fort Monroe is of itself complete, but an adA~anced redoubt on the land side is
unfinished, and considerable Avork is yet necessary to secure proper ventilation
and the necessary dryness to the great powder magazines within the fort, de-
signed as a principal depot of that material. Attempts to secure good water
by an artesian Avell are still persevered in. Required to complete, $75,000.
(Class B.)
Fort Calhoun cannot yet be carried forward for want of stability in the foun-
dation. The artificial mass on which it is to stand having been raised out of
the water, the Avails of the battery were begun some years since; but it was
soon found that their weight caused considerable subsidence. On an inspection
by engineer officers it Avas then decided to keep the foundation loaded Avith more
than the Avhole weight of the finished work until all subsidence had ceased.
The load had hardly been put on, however, before it Avas injudiciously deter-
mined to take it off, and begin to build, although the settling was still going on.
Happily, a better policy prevailed before the construction Avas resumed, but not
before tlie very considerable expense of remoA'ing the load had been incurred,
and the further expense of replacing it rendered necessary. The subsidence
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 401
has now so nearly ceased that it is contemplated to resume the construction at
an early day. (Class C.) Required to complete, $729,332.
It may be expedient in time of war, by way of providing interior barriers, to
erect batteries on Craney island, at the mouth of Elizabeth river, and 'to put in
condition and arm Old Fort Norfolk, which is just below the city.
Harbor of St. Mary's. The central situation (as regards the Chesapeake) of
this fine basin, its relation to the Potomac, its depth of water, and the facility
with which it may be defended, indicate its fitness as a harbor of refuge for the
commerce of the Chesapeake bay, and as an occasional, if not constant, station
during war of a portion of the naval force. A survey has been made, but no
project has been formed. The engineer department some years ago conjectured
that the cost of defences in this harbor might amount to $300,000. (Class F.)
Annapolis harbor. Fort Severn has been put in an efficient condition, and
repairs have been advanced on Fort Madison ; these will be continued until
that work also shall afford an efficient battery. (Class A.) Estimated at
$30,000.
Harbor of Baltimore. The proximity of the city to Chesapeake bay greatly
endangers the city of Baltimore. In the present state of things an enemy, in a
few hours' march, after an easy landing, and without having his communication
with his fleet endangered, can make himself master of that great emporium of
commerce. There are required for its security two forts on the Patapsco, one
at Hawkins's Point, and the other opposite that point ; these being the lowest
positions at which the passage of the Patapsco can be defended. Besides the
advantages that will result of obliging the enemy to land at a greater distance,
thereby gaming time by delaying his march, for the arrival of succor, and pre-
venting his turning the defensive positions which our troops might occupy, it
will be impossible for him to endanger the city by a direct attack by water.
The operations on Fort Carroll the work occupying the extremity of Sollers's
flats, (opposite Hawkins's Point,) are proceeding with all the rapidity allowed
by the appropriations. Estimate, $865,000. (Class C.)
The work on Hawkins's Point belongs to class F, and is estimated to cost
$376,000.
The present Fort McHenry, Redoub't Wood, and Covington Battery should
be retained as a second barrier. The first mentioned is now in good condition,
and the repairs required for the others may be applied at the beginning of a war.
Mouth of Elk river. The completion of the line of water communication
from the l)elaware to the waters of the Chesapeake makes it proper to place a
fort somewhere near the mouth of Elk river, in order to prevent an enemy from
destroying, by a sudden enterprise, the works forming this outlet of the canal.
There have been no surveys made with a view to establish such protection,
which is estimated at $50,000. (Class F.)
Cities of Washington, Georgetown, and Alexandria. Fort Washington
covers these cities from any attack by water, and will oblige an enemy to land
at some eight or ten miles below Alexandria, should that city be his object, and
'about twice as far below Washington. It will also serve the very important
purpose of covering troops crossing from Virginia, with a view to fall on the
flanks of an enemy moving against the Capitol from the Patuxent or the Chesa-
peake. The repairs on this work have been completed. (Class A.)
Cedar Point, Potomac river. But all these objects would have been better
fulfilled had the work been placed at Lower Cedar Point. As it is, however,
the contemplated works being constructed in the Patuxent, and the militia of the
surrounding country in a due state of preparation, an enterprise against Wash-
ington would be a hazardous one. As giving complete security to the towns in
the district, covering more than sixty miles in length of the Potomac ; the river
terminus of the great railroad from the south, and a large tract of country lying
between the Potomac and the Patuxent ; the work on Cedar Point should not
H. Rep. Com. 86 26
402 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
be omitted. There have been no surveys made of the ground, nor projects of
the fort, which, in a conjectural estimate of the engineer department, was set
down at $300,000. (Class E.)
PatuXent river. The more effectually to*protect the city of "Washington
from a sudden attack by troops landed at the head of navigation in the Patux-
ent, and to provide additional shelter for vessels in the Chesapeake, a fort has
been planned to occupy Point Patience and another to occupy Thomas's Point,
both a short distance up the river. The work on Thomas's Point is estimated
at $259,000, and the work on Point Patience estimated to cost $246,000.
(Classes D and F.)
It will be perceived that the system of defence for Washington contemplates,
first, defending the Potomac on Cedar Point, and maintaining a second barrier
at Fort Washington ; second, defending the mouth of the Patuxent. This par-
ticular arrangement not having been always understood, a few words are added
in explanation.
During the last war there was no fort in the Patuxent, and the consequence
was that the British approached by that avenue and occupied the whole river as
high as Pig Point, nearly fifty miles from its mouth, and less than twenty miles
from the Capitol ; while, in consequence of there being no forts in the Potomac,
they occupied that river as high as Alexandria, inclusive ; by this latter occu-
pation perfectly protecting the left flank of the movement during its whole
advance and retreat. Both flanks being safe, the British had nothing to fear
except from a force in front ; and that this risk was not great, in the short march
of less than twenty miles from the boats, was proved by the issue.
On the ninth day from that on which the fleet entered the Chesapeake the
English army was in possession of the Capitol, having penetrated nearly fifty
miles beyond the point of debarkation. On the twelfth day from the time of
landing, the troops were again on shipboard, near the mouth of the river. This
attack, exceedingly well conceived and very gallantly executed, owed its success
entirely to the want of defences, such as are now proposed.
Let us suppose both rivers fortified as recommended, and an enemy landed at
the mouth of the Patuxent. If now he attempt this enterprise, his march would
be prolonged by at least four days that is to say, it will require more than
sixteen days, during which time he will be out of communication with his fleet
as regards supplies and assistance.
The opposition to his invasion will begin at the landing, because our troops
having now nothing to fear as to their flanks, either from the Potomac or Patux-
ent, will dispute every foot of territory ; and although he should continue to
advance it must be at a slower rate. While he is thus pursuing his route toward
Washington, the forces of Virginia, brought by railroad to the mouth of Aquia
creek, will be crossing the Potomac, and concentrating at Port Tobacco, or
some position between that place and Fort Washington, preparatory to falling
on his flank and rear. This would seem to be conclusive, for it is difficult to
conceive of troops persevering in an expedition when every moment will not
only place them further from succor but greatly increase their need of it. Rail-
roads reach from near the crossing places of the Potomac to the very heart of
the country south, and a very few days would bring forward a large force, all
of which would arrive upon the rear of the enemy.
It has been said that if shut out of the Patuxent the enemy might land
between the mouth of that river and Annapolis, and thence proceed against
Washington. But the same difficulties belong to this project, and a new difficulty
is added. The Virginia forces arrive as before, and assail his flank, either between
the Potomac and Patuxent or between the Patuxent and the Chesapeake ; and
there is, besides, the Patuxent for the enemy to cross, both in going and return-
ing itself a formidable military obstacle.
It is said, also, that the landing may be made in the Potomac ; but this only
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 403
proved that the system animadverted on had not been studied, it being a funda-
mental principle of the system that such landing must be prevented by fortify-
ing the river as low down as possible.
The southern coast, stretching from Cape Hatteras to the southern point of
Florida, is invariably low, and for the greater part sandy, much resembling the
coast from the above-mentioned cape to Montauk Point, on the east end of Long
Island. A ridge of sand, here and there interrupted by the alluvion of the
rivers, extends through its whole length. This ridge, in certain portions, lies
on the main land, while in others it is divided therefrom by basins or " sounds"
of various width and depth, and is cut up into islands by numerous channels,
which connect these interior waters with the sea. Wherever this sand ridge is
interrupted its place is occupied by low and marshy grounds, bordering the
principal and the many lesser outlets of the rivers.
Ocracoke inlet, N. C. The shallowness of the water on the bars at this inlet
effectually excludes all vessels-of-war, at least all moved by sails. But as this
is an outlet of an extensive commerce, and as, through this opening, attempts
might be made in small vessels, barges, or the smaller class of steam vessels to
destroy this commerce, or to interrupt the line of interior water communication,
timely preparation must be made of temporary works, equal to defence against
all such minor enterprises.
Beaufort harbor, N. C. A work called Fort Macon has been erected for the
defence of this harbor. It is in a very efficient condition, though some slight
additional work is needed, both for the fort itself and for the preservation of the
site, which is acted upon violently by the sea. Successful impediments to this
action have been resorted to, which require a little extension, however, and con-
tinual care. Estimate, $3,000. (Class B.)
Mouths of Gape Fear river, N. C. The defence of the main channel of
Cape Fear requires, in addition to Fort Caswell, (now completed,) on Oak island,
another fort on Bald Head. And the defence of the smaller channel will require
a redoubt on Federal Point. The battery, magazine, block-house, &c., at Smith-
ville should remain as accessories. Fort Caswell, Oak island, $7,000. (Class B.)
The fort on Bald Head (class F) will require $180,000. The redoubt on Fed-
eral Point (class F) will require Si 8,000 ; and the battery, &c., called Fort
Johnston, at Smithville, (class A,) $5,000.
Georgetown harbor, S. C. The first inlet of any consequence south of Cape
Fear river is at the united mouths .of the Waccamaw, Pedee, and Black rivers,
forming Georgetown harbor, which is a commodious and capacious bay, having
sufficient water within, and also upon the bar near the mouth, for merchant ves-
sels and small vessels-of-war. A survey of this harbor was begun many years
ago, but never completed, and no projects for defence have been made. It is
probable that a work placed near Moscheto creek, or on Winyaw Point, would
give adequate strength, at the cost of about $250,000. (Class E.)
Santee river and Bull's bay. About ten miles south from Georgetown are
the mouths of the Santee, the largest river in South Carolina. It is not known
whether the bars at the mouth of this river have sufficient water for sea-going
vessels. The same uncertainty exists as to the depth into Bull's bay. It may
be sufficient to consider these, and the other inlets between Georgetown and
Charleston, as calling for small works capable of resisting boat enterprises, and
to assign as the cost $100,000. Should they prove to be navigable for priva-
teers, they will require a larger expenditure. (Class F.) $100,000.
Charleston, S. C. This city, situated at the junction of the Ashley and
Cooper rivers, is about five miles, in a direct line, from the sea. Between it and
the ocean there is a wide and safe roadstead for vessels of any draught. Upon
the bar, lying three or four miles outside of the harbor, there is, however, only
water enough for smaller frigates and sloops-of-war. On the southwest side of
the harbor is James's island, 'in which are several serpentine passages, more or
404 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES
less navigable for boats, barges, and small steam vessels ; some of them commu-
nicate directly with, the sea and Stono river. Whappoo cut, the most northerly
passage from the Stono to Charleston harbor, enters Ashley river opposite the
middle of the city.
Interior natural water communications exist, also, to the southwest of Stono
river, connecting this with North Edisto river; the latter with South Edisto and
St. Helena sound ; this, again, with Broad river ; and, finally, this last with
Savannah river.
On the north side of the harbor of Charleston lies Sullivan's island, separated
from the main by a channel navigable only by small craft. On the northwest
side of this island is an interior water communication which extends to Bull's
bay, and even beyond, to the harbor of Georgetown.
From this sketch it is apparent that it will not do to restrict the defences to
the principal entrance of the harbor.
The lateral avenues must also be shut. And it is probable that accurate sur-
veys of all these avenues will show that the best mode of defending them will
be by works at or near the mouths of the inlets, as the enemy will be kept
thereby at a greater distance from the city ; the lesser harbors formed by these
inlets will be protected, and the line of interior water communication will be
inaccessible from the sea.
No position for the defence of the principal entrance to Charleston harbor can
be found nearer to the ocean than the western extremity of Sullivan's island.
This is, at present, occupied by Fort Moultrie, a work of some strength, but
by no means adequate to its object, its battery being weak, and the scarp so
low as to oppose no serious obstacle to escalade. How far this work, by a
modification of its plan and relief, may be made to contribute to a full defence
of the harbor has not yet been determined. But so long as it is the only work
at this, the principal point of defence, it must be kept in good condition for
service, and no alterations that will disturb this efficiency should be under-
taken. (Class A.)
On a shoal nearly opposite Fort Moultrie a new fort has been well advanced,
which will have a powerful cross-fire with Fort Moultrie. This is called Fort
Sumter. (Class C.) To complete this fort will require, it is estimated, $150,000.
In the upper part of the harbor is Castle Pinckney, on Shuter's Folly island.
This requires some repairs, estimated at $800. (Class A.)
Stono, North Edisto, and South Edisto. r All these must be fortified, at least
in such a manner as to protect these inlets from enterprises in boats or small
vessels. To that end $50,000 may be assigned to each. (Class F.)
St. Helena sound. The proper defences cannot be pointed out till the sound
shall have been surveyed. Although there is supposed to be no great depth of
water on the bar, it is known to be navigable for the smaller class of merchant-
men and for steamboats, and to have a navigable communication with the head
of Broad river, or Port Royal, intersecting the interior navigation between
Charleston and Savannah. The estimate is $150,000. (Class F.)
Broad river, or Port Royal roads. The value of this capacious roadstead,
as a harbor of refuge, depends upon the depth that can be carried over the bar,
on the distance of this bar beyond the line of coast, and on the means that
may be applicable of lessening the danger of crossing it. This is supposed to
be the deepest bar on the southern coast. Should there prove to be water
enough for frigates, and should it be practicable to make the passage over the
bar safe and easy by the erection of light-houses on the shore, and lights or other
distinct guides on the bar, this harbor, situated within sixty miles of the city of
Charleston, and twenty of Savannah river, intersecting the interior water com-
munication between these cities, thereby securing the arrival of supplies of every
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 405
kind, would possess a high degree of importance not only as a harbor of refuge,
but also as a naval station.
The survey of the exterior shoals, constituting the bar, should be made with
the greatest care and all possible minuteness. Only when this shall have been
done can the true relations of this inlet to the rest of the coast be known, and
on this relation the position and magnitude of the required defences will depend.
For the present the estimate made some years ago by the engineer department
is adopted, namely, $300,000. (Class E.)
Savannah, and mouth of the Savannah river, Georgia. Mention has been
made of the natural interior water communication along the coast of South
Carolina. A similar communication extends, south from the Savannah river, as
far as the St. John's, in Florida. Owing to these passages, the city of Savan-
nah, like Charleston, is liable to be approached by other avenues than the
harbor or river ; and, accordingly, its defence must have relation to these lesser,
as well as to the great channels.
The distance from the mouth of Wassaw, or even the Ossabaw sounds (both
to the soutliAvard of Savannah river) to the city is not much greater than from
the mouth of the river; and an enterprise may proceed the whole distance by
water, or part of the way by water and part by land, from either inlet or from
both. As in the case of like channels in the neighborhood of Charleston, it
cannot now be determined where they can be defended most advantageously.
It is hoped, however, that the localities will permit the defences to be placed
near the inlets, because, thus placed, they will serve the double purpose of
guarding the city of Savannah and covering these harbors, which, in time of
war, cannot but be very useful.
The defence of Savannah river is not difficult. A fort on Cockspur island,
lying just within the mouth, and, perhaps for additional security, another on
Tybee island, which forms the southern cape at the mouth of the river, would
prevent the passage of vessels up the channel, and cover the anchorage between
Tybee and Cockspur.
Old Fort Jackson, standing about four miles below the city, must be main-
tained as a second barrier, both as respects the main channel and the passages
which come into the river from the south, which last would not be at all con-
trolled by fortifications on Cockspur or Tybee. Fort Jackson is accordingly
undergoing the repairs and modifications necessary to give the proper strength
and efficiency. Estimated to cost $45,000. (Class A.)
Fort Pulaski, a new work situated on Cockspur island, is, in all the most
important matters, finished. Some further work has to be done, however, on
the dikes of the island, on barracks, and quarters, and storehouses, and in the
construction of an advanced battery. Estimated to cost $35,000. (Class B.)
To fortify Tybee island may require $120,000. (Class E.)
Wassaw sound, Ossabaw sound, St. Catharine's sound, at the mouth o
Medway river; Sapclo sound, Doby inlet, Altamaha sound, at the mouth of
Altamaha river; St. Simon's sound, at the mouth of Buffalo creek ; St. Andrew's
sound, at the united mouths of the Scilla and Santilla river; and Cumberland
sound, at the mouth of St. Mary's river. All these communications with the
ocean are highly important as regards the line of interior navigation, and several
of them as affording access to excellent harbors. The last and one or two
others are known to be navigable to the largest sloops-of-war and merchantmen,
and some of the others are but little inferior as regards depth of entrance or
safety of anchorage.
Fort Clinch, a work now in course of erection at the mouth of Cumberland
sound, is a most important contribution to the defence of this, the most southern
of the Georgia entrances. Estimated to cost $180,000. (Class C.)
All the above-named openings, except that into Cumberland sound, have to
406 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
be surveyed. Some of them are probably easily defensible by forts and batte-
ries, while others may need the aid of floating defences.
Nothing better can now be done than to assume $200,000 as the average
cost of defending each of the eight entrances, giving a total of $1,600,000.
(Class F.)
St. Augustine, Florida. This most southern of all the harbors of the Atlan-
tic, and the key to the eastern portion of Florida, is accessible to the smaller
classes of merchantmen, or privateers, and to steam vessels, and requires a cer-
tain amount of protection from attack by water. It is believed that adequate
protection has been given by repairs bestowed upon the water battery of the old
Spanish fort, (Fort Marion.) (Class A.)
SEA-COAST FROM CAPE FLORIDA TO THE MOUTH OF THE RIO GRANDE.
Fort Taylor, at Key West, is in a good state to be brought speedily into
efficiency ; the walls have been raised up out of the water almost to the sills of
the lower embrasures ; and with the sum asked for in the last estimates the
lower tier of embrasures might be got ready for the armament in a short time.
Estimated to cost $805,000. (Class C.)
Fort Jefferson, Garden key, Tortugas. This fort, which will perfectly
command the admirable harbor lying in the heart of this group of keys, is
advancing without the slightest impediment. The outer or counter-scarp wall
first executed, because necessary to prevent the flooding of the islan4 in gales
of wind, has been completed, and labors are now bestowed on the main scarp.
Estimated at $989,862. (Class C.)
Turning now to the shore of the Gulf, we find a portion, namely, from Cape
Florida to Pensacola, that has never been surveyed with particular reference to
the defence of the harbors. Within this space there are Charlotte harbor,
Tampa bay, ApalacMcola bay, Apalachie bay, St. Joseph's bay, and Santa
Rosa bay. Nothing better can now be done than to assume for these the esti-
mate formerly presented by the engineer department, viz: $1,000,000 for all.
(Class F.)
It may be remarked, as applying to the whole Gulf coast, that, from the rela-
tive geographical position of this part of the seaboard and the country inter-
ested in its safety, from the unhealthiness of the climate, nature of the adjacent
country, and mixed character of the inhabitants, it will be some time before that
portion within supporting distance, whose welfare may be endangered by an
enemy, will be competent of itself to sustain a serious attack from without.
Upon the Atlantic seaboard the Alleghanies crowd the people down upon the
shore, every important point on the coast being surrounded by a population dense
now, and every day rapidly increasing in numbers; while the ocean and the
interior parallel communications transmit rapid aid to the right and left. The
coast of the Gulf, however, is thinly peopled in itself, is remote from succor from
behind, and is almost inaccessible to lateral assistance. Those reasons, there-
fore, which tend to establish the necessity of an organized, permanent, and
timely system of defence for the whole seaboard of the United States, apply to
this part of it with peculiar force.
We now pass on to the remaining points of defence on the Gulf.
Pensacola bay. The upper arms of this considerable bay receive the yellow
water or Pea river, Middle river, and Escambia river. The tributaries of the
last interlocking with the Alabama and Chattahoochie, seem to mark the routes
whereby, at some future day, canals will convey a part of the products of these
rivers to Pensacola; while the qualities and position of the harbor, and the
favorable nature of the country, have already marked out lines of railroad com-
munication with a vast interior region.
Santa Rosa sound extends eastward, from the lower part of the bay, into
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 407
Santa Rosa bay. On the west the lagoons of Pensacola, Perdido, and Mobile
bays, respectively, interlock in such a manner as to require but a few miles of
cutting to complete a navigable channel from the first to the last named bay,
and thence through an existing interior water communication to the city of New
Orleans.
Pensacola bay has rare properties as a harbor. It is now accessible to
frigates, and there is reason to hope that the bar may be permanently deepened.
The bar is near the coast and the channel across it straight and easily hit.
The harbor is perfectly landlocked and the roadstead very capacious. There
are excellent positions within for repairing, building, and launching vessels, and
for docks and dock yards, in healthy situations. The supply of good water is
abundant. The harbor is perfectly defensible. These properties, in connexion
with the position of the harbor, as regards the coast, have induced the govern-
ment to select it as a naval station and place of rendezvous and repair.
An excellent survey has been made of the bay of Pensacola, sufficing to form
the scheme of defence for the town and harbor. Regarded, however, as an im-
portant naval station and place of rendezvous and repair, which it now is,
further surveys, extending a greater distance back from the shores, delineating
accurately the face of the country, and showing the several avenues by land
and water, are found to be necessary.
The defences of the water passage as projected are nearly completed.
Fort Pickens, on Santa Rosa island, is finished.
Fort *McRae, on Foster's island, is also finished ; as is Fort Barrancas, on
the site of an old Spanish fort. An old Spanish water battery has been
thoroughly repaired, and placed in connexion with the last-named fort, and con-
siderable progress has been made on a redoubt, in advance of the same fort.
Permanent barracks in the same vicinity are about half finished.
The site of Fort McRae was, a few years since, seriously threatened by the
abrasion of a new outlet from the lagoon that lies just behind it ; but this danger
has been averted, and by the erection of a low rampart exterior to the fort a
permanent security against any recurrence of the danger will be provided, and
place for a heavy additional battery acting on the channel will be prepared. At
a future day it will be proper to extend this exterior protection. At present it
is designed to execute only that part lying over or nearly over the outlet that
was lately so threatening and so difficult to close. Estimated at $204,&00.
(Classes A, B, 0.)
Perdido bay. This bay is intimately related to Pensacola and Mobile bays,
both as regards security and intercommunication, and should be carefully sur-
veyed with a view to those objects. It must be fortified, and the cost may be
$200,000. (Class F.)
Mobile bay. The plan of defence for this bay requires a fort on Mobile
Point, and another on Dauphin island. Fort Morgan, at the first-mentioned
position, is a finished work, in an efficient condition, but requiring, in the way
of barracks and quarters, storehouses, &c., for the accommodation of its garri-
son, some further expenditures. These improvements are in progress estimated
at $30,000. (Class B.)
Fort Gaines, on Dauphin island, has been authorized by Congress, and the
expenditure of the appropriation awaits only the settlement of title to the site,
as to which there are supposed to be no remaining difficulties. Estimate,
$180,000. (Class C.)
New Orleans and tlie delta of the Mississippi. The most northern water
communication between the Mississippi and the Gulf is by the passage called
the Rigolets, connecting Lake Borgne and Lake Pontchartrain. The next is
the pass of Chef Menteur, also connecting these lakes. Through these pas-
sages an enemy entering Lake Pontchartrain would, at the same time that he
intercepted all water communication with Mobile and Pensacola, be able to reach
408 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
New Orleans from the southern shore of the lake; or he might continue onward
through Lake Maurepas, Amite river, and Iberville river, thereby reaching the
Mississippi at the very head of the Delta; or, landing within the mouths of the
Chef Menteur, he might move against the city, along the edge of the Gentilly
road.
To the southwest of Chef Menteur, and towards the head of Lake Borgne,
is Bayou Bienvenue, a navigable channel, (the one followed by the English army
in the last war,) not running quite to the Mississippi, but bounded by shores of
such a nature as to enable troops to march from the point of debarkation to the
city.
These avenues are defended by Fort Pike, at the Rigolets ; by Fort Macomb,
formerly Fort Wood, at Chef Menteur; by a small fort at Bayou Bienvenue, and
by a tower at Bayou Dupre.
The defences of the Mississippi are placed at the Plaquemine turn, about
seventy miles below New Orleans the lowest position that can be occupied.
Fort Jackson is on the right bank, and Fort St. Philip a little higher up on the
left.
Forts Pike, Macomb, Battery Bienvenue, and Tower Dupre, have been put in
the most efficient state, and will perfectly accomplish the objects for which they
were designed. They will still need some small expenditures in reference to
security of site, extension of accommodations, &c. Fort Jackson is also in good
condition as to its batteries, but will be much improved in that respect on the
completion of an outwork now in hand. It needs also more barrack room.
Fort St. Philip is a very old fort, and much dilapidated. Its position is so
commanding and advantageous as to require the fort to be put in the best state,
and much has been done to that end within a few years ; still more is necessary
for the fort itself and its dependencies ; and all the barracks, quarters, and store-
houses have yet to be built. Estimated at $111,500. (Classes A and B.)
The most western avenue by which New Orleans is approachable from the
sea passes on the west side of the island of Grande Terre into Barrataria bay,
which is an excellent harbor for a floating force, guarding the coasting trade on
that side of the Mississippi. From this bay there are several passages leading
to New Orleans.
Fort Livingston has been erected on the west end of Grande Terre island.
This Tort is kept from entire completion to await the cessation of a slight sub-
sidence which has been going on for some time. It could be finished with the
means now applicable at any moment by a few weeks' work. (Class B.)
Proctor's Lake, on Lake Borgne. This position, which was overlooked in
the original project for the defences of the city of New Orleans, has been already
adverted to. A small battery, enclosing a tower, standing on the shore, would
effectually close this avenue. The tower could not be carried by assault, nor
the battery while protected by the tower. No landing could be made under its
fire, and there is no other spot for a landing, owing to the swampy nature of the
ground, but the site of the battery. Estimated at $100,000. (Class D.)
Several times in this report we have alluded to circumstances which would
demand the employment of floating defences in addition to fixed defences upon
the shore. We have here an instance in which that kind of defence would be
very useful. Fortifications will enable us to protect New Orleans even from
the most serious and determined efforts of an enemy ; but, owing to the great
width of some of the exterior passages, we cannot by fortifications alone de-
prive an enemy of anchorages, (especially that of Chandeleur island,) nor cover
entirely the exterior water communication between the Bigolets and Mobile.
We must, therefore, either quietly submit to the annoyance and injury that an
enemy in possession of these passages may inflict, or avert them by & timely
preparation of a floating force adapted to their peculiar navigation, and capable,
under the shelter of forts, of being always on the alert, and of assuming an
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 409
offensive or defensive attitude, according to the designs, conduct, or situation of
the enemy.
A floating force of this nature would be very useful in overlooking the coast
eastward of New Orleans, especially the portion just mentioned, extending from
the Rigolets (Fort Pike) to Mobile bay. And in connexion with the active ser-
vice of such a force, and as a further defence of the approaches to New Orleans
from that quarter, a fort on Ship island would be important. It would cover
an excellent anchorage for the defensive flotilla and for other cruisers. With
this refuge at one end of the base of operations, and at the other the anchorage
between Pelican island and Dauphin island, guarded by works at the eastern
end of the latter, a light steam squadron might, without being much exposed,
be very effective.
Projects have not yet been made for works on Ship island, but it may be esti-
mated that an adequate fort would cost about $200,000. (Class E.)
In this age of great improvements in the means of locomotion, it would be
unwise to decide, without pressing need, on the details of the floating force
required at certain points on the Atlantic and Gulf of Mexico coasts perhaps
even on the nature of the moving power. Although the probability undoubtedly
is that the power will be steam, genius may in the interim devise something still
better than steam.
And I may here remark, in relation to the preparation of steam vessels for
warlike purposes generally, that wisdom would seem to direct a very cautious
and deliberate progress. Every new vessel may be expected to surpass in im-
portant particulars all that had preceded, and to surpass the more, as each suc-
ceeding vessel should be the result of careful study and trial of the preceding.
It may be considered unreasonable to expect that steam itself will give way
to some agent still more potent, and at the same time not less safe and manage-
able. But it certainly is no more than probable that steam vessels now under
construction may be regarded almost as incumbrances within ten years.
A deliberate advance in this branch of naval construction is recommended
the more, by our ability to construct these vessels in large numbers, when about
to be needed, the timber being collected in the meantime.
COAST OF TEXAS.
In November, 1845, a special board of engineer officers was appointed to
examine the coast of Texas in relation to its defence. Their report, submitted
in February, 1846, was to the following effect :
The coast from the Sabine to the Rio Grande is about three hundred and
seventy-five miles in extent. It is composed, for nearly the whole distance, of
long narrow islands and peninsulas, which lie parallel to the main land, forming
several bays and lagoons, the inlets to which exhibit channels generally only
suitable to the smaller classes of vessels.
Galveston bay is the most important one on the coast. Besides a number of
bayous and small tributaries, it receives the waters of the river Trinity. This
river is said to be navigable for six hundred miles for steamers of a light class,
and, when improved, this navigation will doubtless be extended. The harbor
is represented as being undoubtedly the best on the coast, the bar at the entrance
having also the greatest depth of water. The charts submitted by that board
show a depth of nine feet at low water and twelve feet at high water.
A permanent work is proposed for the defence of this harbor, of the class of
that constructed on Grande Terre island, Barrataria bay. Its estimated cost is
three hundred thousand dollars. (Class D.) The construction of some Mar-
tello towers along the shore and across the island is deemed essential to the
defence of the " Swash " channel and to the security of the toAvn, Brazos San-
tiago. The board deem this harbor of equal importance with that of Galveston;
410 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
it has not much capacity, but is the only one in the vicinity of the Rio Grande.
The bay at the pass has eight feet water.
The trade of the Rio Grande and of its dependent country passes overland
thirty miles to Point Isabel, and from thence issues from the Brazos Santiago.
The depth of water over the bar at the mouth of the Rio Grande being only
four feet, admits the passage of very small vessels not suited to the purposes
of commerce.
With reference, then, to the trade of the Rio Grande and to a point from
which military supplies could with the greatest facility be sent to the frontier,
the defence of the Brazos Santiago is deemed by the board of equal importance
with that of Galveston, and they recommend a permanent work, of the size,
character, and cost of the one proposed for the latter place, estimated at three
hundred thousand dollars. (Class D.)
Matagorda bay. It is deemed due to the extensive country washed by the
rivers tributary to this bay, that its entrance should be defended. The diffi-
culties, however, attending that entrance, and the navigation of the bay up to
Matagorda and La Vacca, would seem to lessen, in a military point of view, the
importance of its defence as compared with that of Galveston and the Brazos
Santiago ; but as a very good harbor for vessels drawing no more than eight
feet of water is exhibited within the bay at Porto Oabello, and as it would afford
convenient rendezvous for the light flotillas of an enemy, it is considered that a
permanent work of secondary importance to those proposed for Galveston and
the Brazos Santiago should be constructed for its defence. A small work,
mounting some twenty -five guns, and estimated to cost $175,000, is accordingly
proposed. (Class E.) The remaining inlets on the coast, either from the shal-
lowness of the water, the comparatively little value of the harbors themselves,
or the nature of the country immediately depending upon them, are deemed to
require, at present, no other defence than that of a temporary character. They
would depend upon the ultimate opening of a line of inland navigation, considered
practicable between the Sabiue and the Rio Grande; and the necessary work
would be thrown up only in time of war.
GENERAL SUMMARY.
It may be of convenience to have here a summary of the principles con-
tended for in the preceding remarks, and of the essential points contained
therein.
1. Assuming that we may have wars with nations in possession of extensive
naval means, we must consider ourselves likely to be attacked wherever there
are objects tempting to an enemy, either from the spoil he might hope to gather,
or the injury that through them he might hope to inflict. We must also con-
sider that the power of the attack will be proportioned to the value of the
object, and that, consequently, the means of defence should be of corresponding
strength.
2. The mode of defence proper to our circumstances, as sustained by the
consideration presented in the preceding remarks, and others of analogous nature,
and as exemplified by the present, as well as by the former practice of all na-
tions having an exposed seaboard, is believed to be a system of permanent
fortifications, consisting of work adapted respectively in their power to the value
of the object covered, and applied, in times of peace, severally, in an order of
time also fixed by the relative importance of the objects.
3. It is just this mode of defence that has been, to a great extent, built up
in this country since the war of 1812, and that should be carried to completion
as rapidly as the means of the treasury will allow. The points that are most
valuable are already, to a very important extent, covered by these defences.
But among many points that are valuable, all are not equally so ; while, for exam-
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 411
pie, New York has had much done for it, Baltimore has had little, and New
Bedford the third city in the Union for registered tonnage almost nothing.
" More than four thousand heavy guns may, however, as has before been said,
now be mounted for the defence of places which it was necessary first to guard,
in permanent fortifications that are equal to any in the world, in their respective
grades, and placed, moreover, in the most effective positions. These are in
what are called in this report classes A and B, namely, old works repaired and
new ones completed, or nearly so, at a total cost of $16,756,708.
Then follows the class of works in progress, (class C,) of which the remain-
ing expenditures are estimated at $5,028,194.
And then the class D, next to be commenced, in which there is no work that
can be dispensed with, as must be evident on consulting the list, page 92. The
cost of class D is estimated at $4,083,000.
Then follows the class E, next in importance, of which the estimated cost is
$2,235,000.
As to those in hand, all have received the approbation of the government and
Congress, and not one of those comprised in any other class can be begun with-
out the particular sanction of both.
The last class, marked F, the most numerous of all, cannot be begun for
many years, at any rate, and then orrly as the several positions shall, in the view
of Congress, have risen to an adequate degree of importance. The estimate for
that class is $11,829,000.
4. Though facility of communication with the interior of the country, by
railroads, might be an advantage in all cases where an enemy might land and
conduct operations for two, three, or more days, there are few such positions that
now have, or are likely to have, the advantage of such communications. Gener-
ally, the points of the coast attained by railroads are not points at which the
people are deficient in numbers, but where they most abound ; and besides, the
attacks to which the coast will be liable, will be almost universally sudden
attacks attacks without warning attacks that must be settled, one way or
the other, before relief could come, even by railroad, and to which railroads could
net supply relief, even were there time men not being wanted to resist these at-
tacks, but heavy guns, whether afloat or ashore.
The use of existing railroads, or of any railroad likely to be constructed,
cannot, in general, therefore, affect materially a system of forts and batteries
upon the sea-coast. There may be particular instances of partial benefit, but
none is likely to occur wherein their use could justify the reduction of the
power of fortifications otherwise necessary, much less the dispensing with such
works altogether.
5. The application of steam to vessels-of-war is believed to act detrimentally
to the defence of the sea-coast by opening new avenues of approach, and also
by the suddenness and surprise with which attacks may fall upon any
point. The first augments the number of the defensive works, and the second
requires them to be at all times at the opening of the war as well as during
.its continuance in a state, of perfect readiness for action. With the large
steam navies now kept in commission by naval powers, there would be no state
of transition between peace and war no time for new defences to be prepared,
nor for substituting new expedients even if any such would answer.
On the other hand, the use of steam vessels as a reliance for coast defence
is attended with all the objections inherent in other modes of defence with ves-
sels, and with some of the objections exaggerated. The objections that are
inevitable are, inordinate expense and the perishable nature of the preparation ;
and to these are to be added uncertainty as to their proper state of readiness,
and as to their sufficiency when ready. Steamers should in no case, therefore,
take the place of shore batteries, when the use of the latter is not forbidden by
412 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
local peculiarities. As auxiliaries of fortifications they will always be useful,
however, and as substitutes in the cases just supposed indispensable.
6. No improvements or inventions of modern times tend in any degree to
lessen the efficiency of fortifications as means of coast defence, while the prin-
cipal one, namely, the firing of shells from guns, unquestionably augments their
relative power.
NORTHERN FRONTIER.
The Secretary of War presents another interrogatory (the fourth) in the fol-
lowing words : " How far the increase of population on the northern frontier,
and of the mercantile marine on the northern lakes, obviates or diminishes the
necessity of continuing the system of fortification on those lakes ?"
The system of defence for these lakes recommended by the joint board in
1840 (see Doc. 206, page 100) comprised the following works :
1. Fort Brady, at the straits between Lake Superior and Lake
Huron. Estimated cost of repair $75, 000
2. Fort Mackinac, at the junction of Lake Michigan with Lake
Huron. Estimated cost of repair 50, 000
3. Fort Gratiot, at the outlet of Lake Huron. Estimated cost of
repair 50, 000
Note. All these are old works, long occupied by United States troops, and
it is designed to give them further strength and means of accommodation for
garrisons.
4. A new fort and barracks near Detroit. Estimated cost of con-
struction (original) $250, 000
Amount expended 171, 755
Amount required to complete 66, 000
5. Defensive works and barracks at Buffalo. Estimated cost of
construction $150, 000
Amount expended 116, 500
Amount required to complete 33, 500
6. Repair of old Fort Niagara. Estimated cost of repair $84, 027
Amount expended 59, 027
Amount required to complete 25, 000
7. Repairs of old Fort Ontario. Estimated cost of repair $83, 013
Amount expended 78, 013
Amount required to complete 5, 000
Note. These two are old works, the former having been always garrisoned, I
believe.
8. And a fort at the outlet of Lake Champlain. Estimated cost
of construction $41 1, 497
Amount expended. * 187, 355
Amount required to complete 224, 142
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 413
These, it was thought, should be executed as soon as the means of the
treasury would allow.
And it was recommended in the above report, and in others on the same sub-
ject, that at the approach of war with England
9. Works should be placed at the mouth of the Genesee river
10. A fort should be built at Sackett's Harbor.
11. Another at a narrow part of the St. Lawrence river.
12. That a large barrack establishment should be prepared at Plattsburg.
13. Stone house, &c., at the head of the Kennebec and Penobscot.
14. A fort at Calais, on the St. Croix; and,
15. A large barrack establishment near Albany.
These last mentioned preparations for war (Nos. 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, and
15) may still be left (as was designed) to be reconsidered at any time that such
a certainty may seem to impend.
Nothing has yet been done to Forts Brady, Mackinac, or Gratiot, and
though the maintenance of these forts in a war with England would undoubtedly
be necessary, they may, with less damage than the others, be left as the last, to
receive all the additional strength their situations demand. In the meantime
the indispensable repairs that small appropriations will accomplish should be
provided for ; for instance, a part of the very old wall of Fort Mackinac having
fallen down, a small grant was asked last year for its repair, a request that is
this year repeated.
Fort Wayne, the new fort near Detroit, has, since the date of the report
above referred to, been built and is now in perfect condition, and there remains
therein only the re-erection of officers' quarters destroyed by lire just after being
completed, and the addition of some other quarters, storehouses, &c., the bar-
racks being very nearlv finished; the remaining expense being estimated at
$66,000.
Fort Ontario, at Oswcgo, has also been finished, with several entirely new
quarters, storehouses, barracks, &c., together with a long sea-wall, found to be
necessary to preserve the site. Only small grants, for slight repairs, will be
needed for this work for some time; but of which one for nine hundred dollars
is now asked. This fort is not a permanent one, and, if required to be main-
tained many years hence, may need repairs somewhat extensive.
Fort Niagara has received extensive repairs, and is in a defensible condition ;
but the expenditure having been restricted to the fortification proper and to the
magazine, the accommodations for the garrison, which are remains of the old
French work, are in a bad condition, and need repair for the health and comfort
of the troops. A new hospital was hardly finished, a year or two ago, when it
was destroyed by fire, originating in another part of the fort ; which accident,
with the similar one at Fort Wayne mentioned above, shows that economy even
exacts that buildings be made fire-proof. The effect of this fire upon some
palisading, as well as upon the hospital, and the decay of some wooden gun
platforms, make a small appropriation necessary. The old stone houses will
have to be rebuilt, though they may be kept up for a short time, and some
enlargement must be given to quarters; all which will, perhaps, involve an
expense of $25,000.
At Buffalo, Fort Porter has been built, and is finished. It is a tower
enclosed by a battery. It commands the entrance into Niagara river, and also
the shore and anchorage in front of the city of Buffalo, nearly up to the mouth
of Buffalo harbor. There is connected with the fort a good house for officers'
quarters that was purchased with the site. There will be needed, further,
another battery and tower, to be placed at or near the mouth of the harbor, at
an additional cost, beyond the means in hand, of, say, $33,500.
Such barracks as may be wanted at a future day may there be hired or hastily
erected.
414 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
Fort Montgomery, outlet of Lake Champlain. This fort is not less than half
fjnished; indeed, considering the difficulties and expense that attended the
making a foundation of piles under the whole fort, it may be said to be two-thirds
finished. ' The remaining expense may be estimated at $224,142.
We see, therefore, that of all the new works designed to be executed on the
northern frpntier, in anticipation of a war, there remains to be expended
At Fort Wayne, Detroit, for buildings $66, 500 00
At Buffalo, for tower and battery 33, 000 00
At Fort Montgomery, outlet of Lake Champlain 224, 142 00
323,642 00
On repairs of old works there is now, or soon will be, needed
At Fort Niagara, say $25, 000 00
At Fort Ontario, say 5, 000 00
At Fort Mackinac, say 20, 000 00
50, 000 00
Making a total of 373, 642 00
If we add to this sum the estimates, before given, for
Fort Brady- $75, 000 00
Fort Gratiot 50, 000 00
Fort Mackiuac, the balance after the above provision 30, 000 00
155,000 00
There will be a grand total for the northern frontier of 528, 642 00
I thought it best to show first the actual condition of things on the northern
frontier, before proceeding with a reply to the specific inquiries of the honorable
Secretary of War.
The great length to which this report has extented, notwithstanding that a
sincere desire to keep it within more reasonable limits has induced me to omit
considerations that I wished to adduce, must now restrict my remarks, referring
to some previous reports wherein the subject of our northern defences have been
specially treated I mean, particularly, first, a report of a special board of engi-
neer officers, addressed to the Secretary of War, December 27, 1838; second,
a letter from the chief engineer to the Secretary of War, of February 20,
1839; and, third, a report to the Secretary of the Navy, from a joint board,
consisting of Commodore Morris and the chief engineer, dated November 18,
1845.
It is undoubtedly true that the augmented population and extended naviga-
tion of the upper lakes will afford great resources in that quarter to the nation,
on the occurrence of a war with England, and there seems to be a feeling with
many that in such an event a great flood of armed men would sweep across the
whole surface of Canada, effacing all organized resistance, and trampling down
all opposition. That this is possible may not, I suppose, be questioned, but that
it will not be done is certain, if there remain in our councils firmness to resist all
such fruitless impulses, and wisdom to see and pursue the proper course.
All Upper Canada might be thus swept, from Lake Superior down to Mon-
treal, without a real conquest of the country, and, indeed, without gaining any
advantage of vital moment. Kingston, in all that distance, is the only place at
which anything like a serious impression would be made upon the military
means of defence ; and, as the flood should pass away, all that part of the prov-
ince, if loyal before, would not be made less so by the desolation spread around.
* FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 415
No solid resistance would be made to such an inroad, and there being no forti-
cations worth defending in a way to compromise the safety of the regular
troops, these would retreat before it, accumulating, as they receded, into the
lower province, where would be found, supported by the most formidable nat-
ural obstacles, not the force of Canada merely, but also the army and navy of
England, in daily communication with the mother country, and where would
have to be fought and won the battles which alone would secure a conquest.
Any plan of operation that contemplates overrunning Upper Canada, or making
such attacks upon it, would be costly, beyond all calculation, in life and treasure,
and unnecessary and fruitless after all. ' A country is conquered by concentrated
efforts of well appointed armies upon vital points, often a single point a levy
en masse is the great resource of defence; a well prepared and well appointed
army is the only reliable, as it is also, by far, the cheapest means of invasion.
If we send a single army into Canada by Lake Champlain and the peninsula
lying between the Richelieu and St. Lawrence, and possess ourselves of Mon-
treal, or of both shores of the St. Lawrence at any place below that city where
the channel can be commanded, all the wide extent of the British possessions
above that point will be paralyzed, being entirely cut off, not only from the
mother country, but also from all relief from Lower Canada, including Quebec,
and from the provinces of New Brunswick and Nova Scotia. To do this a
great battle must be gained probably on the peninsula just mentioned, and
being gained, must be followed up by other victories, ending in the capture of
Quebec the last barrier that can be manned by the British. The policy of the
defence will be, while keeping an eye upon any preparations for the attack just
mentioned, by every resort, device, and effort, to agitate the frontier above, and
thereby draw the attention, and, as far as possible, the means of our govern-
ment to the defence of that frontier. They will generally expose there but few
regular troops, but will collect volunteers, militia and Indians in as large num-
bers as possible. They will detach thither bodies of ship-carpenters and sail-
ors, and make great efforts to obtain and keep a naval ascendency, if not every-
where, at least wherever possible.
This was exactly the policy followed by the English during the war of 1812,
and with full success. By judgment, perseverance, and activity, they kept the
strength of this country so attenuated, by stretching along a frontier of many
hundred miles, that no great effort could be made anywhere ; and upon the true
point of attack reduced the efforts to means so feeble as to end only in discom-
fiture and disgrace. Our government had its attention always, more or less,
turned in the right direction, and several times attempted to assemble armies on
the Champlain frontier, but always withdrew these troops, giving way to clamor
raised by other frontier districts that were assailed, or believed themselves en-
dangered by British enterprises.
The British took Chicago, Mackinac, Detroit ; besieged Fort Meigs ; attacked
Fort Sandusky ; captured Black Rock and Buffalo two or three times ; they
fought the battles of Chippawa and Lundy 's Lane ; besieged and assaulted Fort
Erie ; they captured Fort Niagara and Fort Ontario ; attacked Sackett's Har-
bor; took Ogdensburg, French Mills, Malone, &c. All these certainly for no
design or hope of conquest and extended occupation, but for the purpose of
keeping up an excited state of feeling and an energetic warfare that would fully
occupy this government. When in 1814 the assemblirg of six or seven thou-
sand men at Plattsburg, under General Izard, seemed to threaten their weak
point, the English forthwith began to concentrate their best troops in opposition,
and no sooner was that general withdrawn to reinforce the Niagara frontier
than this English force dashed forward in hopes, by profiting of our weakness']
to make themselves masters of the lake, and thereby cover for an indefinite
period their vital point.
If there has been a great increase of power and reasoning in the United
416 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
States since the war of 1812, there has, on the other hand, been a great change
of the same sort in the population, and also in the military means of Canada.
The Rideau canal opens a communication between Montreal and Lake Ontario,
and the Welland canal between Lakes Erie arid Ontario ; and good roads and
canals from Toronto, on Lake Ontario to Lake Huron, all deep in the heart of
the country, and not to be intercepted except by victorious armies. All the
light draught war steamers of Great Britain can be sent fully armed, provisioned,
and manned, directly from sea up to the very head of Lake Ontario ; and we
can now do nothing whatever, and shall be unable to do anything except by the
erection of a fort at some commanding 'point on the St. Lawrence to stop this
transit. War steamers or other armed vessels, though of smaller size, may
branch off from this main line into Lake Champlain, and others into Lake Erie.
Besides, the number of British merchant steamers on Lake Ontario and the St.
Lawrence, above Montreal, is greater than of American steamers ; and between
Montreal and Quebec there are several of the largest size, so that as many
troops as they might desire to send could be transported in twenty-four hours
from Quebec to Montreal ; in two or three days to Kingston ; and in three or
four days to the head of Lake Ontario and the shores of Lake Erie. They
have, moreover, a strong new fortification at Kingston which will require a siege
to reduce, and which, with other defences, covers a large naval depot, and also
the outlet of the Rideau canal. Under these and other circumstances favorable
to the power of Canada, the relative numbers of the people of the two countries
afford no measure of relative strength for military purposes, especially at the
beginning of a war; and even as to numbers we shall find the difference less
when we call to mind that the people of the British Islands are quite as near in
time to this frontier as our most remote States, and that the help those islands
will send will consist of war steamers and regiments of disciplined troops. It
will not be with Canada alone that we shall have to contend, but with Canada
and Great Britain the latter a nation always ready with great military power,
and prepared with naval means to throw a large army upon the lake shore as
soon, at least, as we should be ready to face them with our undisciplined levies.
Our plan of operations being to move forward from the foot of Lake Cham-
plain as a base, we should not permit any demonstration nor any real attacks
from Canada upon the frontier above to direct us, although great efforts will
undoubtedly be made to that end all along the line from Montreal to Lake Su-
perior.
We have not now, and without great and costly efforts could not acquire the
naval ascendency on Lake Ontario and on the St. Lawrence. We could not
attain to it at all without putting our building establishments under cover of
fortifications.
By the time one-half dozen merchant steamers on Lake Champlain could be
prepared and armed, the English might pour into the lake through their canals
adequate naval means, supplied by Montreal, Quebec and the St. Lawrence, to
make the struggle for the mastery on that lake a doubtful one at least. If they
could think it possible that we should fail to fortify the outlet of the lake, the
contemplated enlargement of the canal from Chambly to St. John's, (about
twelve miles,) whereby Avar steamers could pass into that lake as they now may
into Lake Ontario, would undoubtedly be executed.
Upon Lakes Erie, Huron, and Michigan we unquestionably have a great su-
periority in naval preparation, which is likely, moreover, to increase from year
to year; and if timely care betaken to arm and man a suitable portion of these,
the mastery may be retained.
If there be truth and force in the foregoing statements and opinions, a war
with England will begin with the naval supremacy against us, along the whole
range of the St. Lawrence and the head of Lake Ontario ; with means in the
enemy's hands of contending for, at least, if not seizing, a like supremacy on
FOKTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 417
Lake Champlain, with the power of throwing troops, mechanics, and sailors in
a few days upon the shore of the upper lakes, and with the strongest induce-
"ments to keep up then an active warfare. The possession of a naval depot at
Penetanqueshin, on Lake Huron, which it is understood can readily be made a
strong place, and where there is now one war steamer, and the easy communi-
cation with it from Toronto would allow enterprises to be prepared and sent at
favorable moments against the establishments and commerce of the upper lakes.
But an anchorage under the defence of Fort Mackinac as a place of rendezvous
and watch for our own steam squadron, and a place of refuge in case of disaster,
would be very important in counteraction of any such project. Fort Gratiot>
when strengthened, would prevent any such hostile expedition from passing
through the strait in Lake St. Glair and endangering Detroit, while it would
cover any of our vessels retreating to that end of the lake. Fort Wayne, near
Detroit, will prevent the passing of any vessel between Lakes Huron and Erie,
while it would become the rallying point of the militia of that region assembled
to meet threatened attacks of a serious nature, or to organize expeditions into
the opposite territory, and its garrison would protect the neighborhood from all
predatory inroads.
Even on Lake Erie, where we might have the means of arming and manning
any number of steamers, we should derive important if not indispensable aid
from batteries, duly prepared at Buffalo. The English now own several good
steamers on this lake, and by the aid of the Welland canal they could bring in
others, and they could also soon build a number within harbors secure and near ;
so that we may reasonably look for vigorous efforts of that nature if we leave
our great places uncovered. The proposed battery and tower, in addition to
the one already constructed at Buffalo, will place that city out of danger of
conflagration, bombardment, or contribution, a security otherwise to be attained
only by keeping it constantly covered by a number of war steamers greater
than the enemy can bring. There can be no comparison as to the expense of
the two modes, while the naval defence will be subject to all the chances of
absence, at the moment of need, on other duty ; of being enticed away by other
real or fictitious attacks ; of being dispersed for a time by tempests, &c. Other
important places on the lake shore will be distant comparatively, not under
constant supervision from the Canada side, less valuable, and for these and other
reasons may, with less damage, be left to such defences as temporary and hastily-
prepared works may supply. The two batteries at Buffalo would cover the
whole face of the shore, so that no vessel could lie within reach of the city
without coming under their fire, and the towers would guard these guns from
being spiked in any attempts at surprise.
On Lake Ontario, with the exception of some slight repairs, all has been done
that has been proposed for the present. But we have seen that we shall here
be under the naval command of the English, and must, therefore, make timely
preparation to avert the more serious consequences.
On the St. Lawrence we should, as soon as possible after a war becomes
probable, erect a work to command its navigation ; and we ought, also, then to
do something for the protection of Ogdensburg.
The obvious advantages afforded by our occupation of the outlet of Lake
Champlain would seem to require nothing to be added to the preceding remarks.
I may say, however, that the fort now under construction, and more than half
finished, will give to us the control of the lake beyond all doubt, and retain it
in spite of the energetic efforts that its great importance might induce an enemy
to make for its capture or reduction. It will keep all the shores of the lake, as
well as its surface, free from any hostile irruption, because no expedition could
penetrate, on either side, without exposing itself to be cut off by troops landed
in its rear, and it will secure the inappreciable advantage of taking the armies
destined to the conquest of Canada, together with all their supplies, up to the
H. Rep. Com. 86 27
418 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
very frontier with all the velocity of steam ; it will bring all re-enforcements with
the same rapidity and certainty ; and, moreover, in case of reverses it will
establish a limit to retreat a place of shelter, refreshment, and a base for re-
newed operations.
It is necessary to consider that this point is so near to the point of concen-
tration of the English, in the case we have supposed, that no temporary work
could be prepared in time, or, if prepared, would be competent to resist, unless
very strong, extensive, and defended by a large body of troops.
If these defences be not earned to completion we may look with certainty to
see the English widen and deepen the Chambly canal, a trivial operation, and
at the very beginning of a war throw a squadron of war steamers into the lake,
from which they could not be driven but by infinite cost and much sacrifice of
life and loss of time.
I forbear to enlarge further on this and other important matters connected
with this frontier system of defence, again taking the liberty, if the subject be
deemed worthy of further pursuit, to refer to the special reports before men-
tioned, and also to that in document 206. In these reports will be seen views
in relation to the embodying militia forces in support of the lake frontier, and
also in support of the frontier eastward of Lake Champlain, as well as other
ideas supposed to have an important bearing on the topic.
No speculations are ventured as to a possible change in the political condition
of Canada. Until Great Britain shall willingly relinquish Tier dominion we
may be certain that all her energies will, if necessary, be exerted in its main-
tenance ; and whether this be for ten years or for a century, the defensive system
herein advocated, as dictated by forecast and prudence, should be steadily ad-
hered to ; for, up to the moment of relinquishrnent, if such moment ever arrive,
the defences may be growing more and more necessary.
The considerations detailed in the preceding remarks, and others with which
it does not seem necessary further to burden this long report, permit me to
make no other reply to the fourth inquiry of the Hon. Secretary of War than
that no change has occurred, or is likely to occur, that will justify the relin-
quishment of the system of defence for the northern frontier, of which system
the portion designed to be first prepared and to be permanent is now nearly
completed.
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
419
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Fort Brady, Michigan*
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420 FOKTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
The inquiries embodied in the resolutions of the House of Representatives, and
those specified in the letter of the Hon. Secretary of War calling for this report,
have seemed to me to require that the several topics should be gone into with
some minuteness. Certain of these, moreover, having been often of late placed
before the public mind in erroneous lights, according to my judgment, it appeared
to be a duty of my office to press such considerations as might be calculated to
satisfy the inquiries of the unprejudiced and uncommitted of the necessity of a
permanent system of defence, and of the adaptation to our wants and circum-
stances of a system of fortification.
Were it not for the length and diffusion of the preceding remarks, of which I
m fully conscious, but which I have not time to condense, I should have intro-
duced other considerations of like tendency and of much weight.
As it is, in the full knowledge of our remaining weakness at many important
points, and under a deep conviction of the grave consequence likely to flow from
tardiness in the prosecution of the system, or interruption to its progress, I feel
constrained to invoke for it, with all admissible earnestness, the prompt and
liberal support of the Executive and Congress.
At the same time, I only fulfil a further duty in warning the same authorities
against relying on means that, though inordinately expensive, will be but tem-
porarily of use, and insufficient while they last, instead of those adopted by all
enlightened, experienced nations as relatively cheap as permanent, and in all
respects adequate.
COAST OF THE PACIFIC.
Several works of defence will be required for this coast. The special board of
engineers organized for its examination, whose province it is to project the neces-
sary works, have but just commenced their sessions, and have had the time to
examine and determine on the location of a single fort only. This is on the
southern side of the entrance to San Francisco bay, where a work will undoubt-
edly be required.
For the other points of the coast no positive information as to the locality,
size, and cost of works can now be offered. The joint commission of naval and
engineer officers who recently made a reconnoissance of the coast, without the
means of minute examination, suggest several points that will probably require
defence in the course of time. These positions they designate as requiring forti-
fications to be commenced immediately, namely, San Francisco bay, San Diego
harbor, and the mouth of Columbia river; and the department is disposed to rely
confidently upon the opinion of the intelligent officers composing the commission.
Several other points they also suggest as ultimately requiring defence, submit-
ting estimates of cost. The number of these works, as well as the cost, must be
taken as conjectural until a thorough examination can be made.
The localities specified, with approximate cost of works, are as follows :
" The commission of navy and engineer officers constituted by the* President
for the purpose of making an examination of the coast of the United States lying
on the Pacific ocean, with reference co points of defence and occupation, for the
security and accommodation of trade and commerce, and for military and naval
purposes," * * * * state:
" The several works required for the defence of harbors, roadsteads, rivers,
sounds, &c., upon the coast of the United States on the Pacific will be shown in
the following tables, arranged in the order of their relative importance, in three
classes, with approximate estimates of their cost; each class being shown in a
separate table, and the heading being applicable to all the tables."
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
421
Sites of fortifications.
Their denominations.
Approximate estimate of
cost.
On the At-
lantic.
On the Pa-
cific.
FIRST CLASS. TO BE BUILT WITHOUT
DELAY.
South shore San Francisco bay, chan-
Battery
$400, 000
400,000
150,000
200,000
300, 000
400, 000
$1,600,000
1,600,000
600,000
800, 000
1,200,000
1,600,000
North shore San Francisco bay, chan-
do
Alcatrazas island San Francisco bay..
do
Cape Disappointment, mouth of Co-
Redoubt, with battery.
Fort, with battery
Battery, with coverface
Point Adams, mouth of Columbia river
Punta de Guianos San Diego....
Total
1,850,000
7,400,000
SECOND CLASS. TO BE BUILT AT A LATER
PERIOD.
Santa Catalina island.
Fort, with battery...
Redoubt and battery. .
do
$400, 000
150,000
150.000
100,000
100,000
150, 000
50,000
50,000
50, 000
50, 000
$1,600,000
600,000
600, 000
400,000
400, 000
600,000
200,000
200,000
200. 000
200^000
Entrance to Humboldt harbor. ......
Entrance to Klamet harbor
Neat island, (Scarborough harbor)....
do
San Pedro roadstead, (island)........
do..
Monterey roadstead
do
Santa Barbara roadstead
Battery and tower
do
Estero bay
Entrance of Umpqua or of Cahons....
do
Bodega roadstead, (island)..... ......
Battery
Total
1,250,000
5,000,000
THIRD CLASS. TO BE BUILT AT A REMOTE
PERIOD.
Port Lawrence, (Admiralty inlet) ....
Port Townsend, Straits of Fuca ......
Redoubt and battery.,
do
$150,000
150, 000
$644, 000
600,000
C West cape
do
Port Discovery, do. ? East cape.
do
{ Protection island.
do
Narrows of Puget's sound
do
150,000
150,000
50,000
20,000
20,000
10,000
10,000
600, 000
600,000
200,000
80, 000
80,000
40,000
40, 000
Entrance of Hood's canal
do
Gray's harbor, mouth of Chiboby river.
Point Josd, San Francisco bay ...
Battery and tower....
Temporary battery
do
Angel island, San Francisco bay
San Pedro
do
do
Total
710,000
2,840,000
3,810,000
15,240,000
422 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
In conclusion, I have to refer to a tabular statement of all the fortifications
erected, under construction, or intended to be built on the Atlantic and Gulf
frontier of the United States, said fortifications being arranged in classes, accord-
ing to the order of importance, and within each class according to the geo-
graphical order of the States hi which they are situated.
The statement exhibits the amounts expended, or to be expended for fortifica-
tions and for the armament, as also a specification of the armament.
Very respectfully, your most obedient servant,
JOSEPH G. TOTTEN,
Brevet Brig'r General and Col. of Engineers.
Hon. 0. M. CONRAD, Secretary of War.
E.
Letter to the Secretary of the Navy.
WAR DEPARTMENT, Washington, June 17, 1851.
SIR : I herewith enclose a copy of certain resolutions adopted by the House
of Representatives at the last session of Congress.
With a view to procure such information as will enable me to prepare the
repqrt called for by the House of Representatives, I have propounded to several
officers of the engineer corps certain questions, to which they are desired to give
their separate answers.
I desire also to obtain the opinions of several naval officers, combining profes-
sional science with experience and practical skill on several points connected
with the proposed inquiry.
You will, therefore, oblige me by enclosing a copy of the within resolution to
such officers as you may select, and requesting their separate opinions, hi writ-
ing, on the following points, viz :
1. To what extent, if any, ought the present system of fortifications for the
protection of our seaboard to be modified, in consequence of the application of
steam to vessels-of-war, the invention or improvement of projectiles, or other
changes that have taken place since it was adopted in the year 1816?
2. What reliance could be placed on vessels-of-war or of commerce, floating
batteries, gunboats, and other temporary substitutes for permanent fortifications 1
3. Is it necessary or expedient to continue the system of fortifications on the
shores of the northern lakes ?
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
C. M. CONRAD, Secretary of War.
Hon. WILLIAM A. GRAHAM, Secretary of the Navy.
No. 1.
Report of Commodore Morris.
WASHINGTON, My 12, 1851.
SIR : I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of a copy of your letter of
June 17, 1851, to the Secretary of the Navy, with directions from him to report
to you my opinions upon certain points connected with the present system of
FOKTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 423
fortifications for the defence of the coasts and shores of the United States, as it
has been recommended by boards of engineers and others appointed in 1816 and
.at subsequent dates.
The particular points to which my attention is directed by your letters are :
"1st. To what extent, if any, ought the present system of fortifications for the
protection of our seaboard to be modified, in consequence of the application of
steam to vessels-of-war, the invention or improvements of projectiles, or other
changes that have taken place since it was adopted in the year 1816 ?
"2d. What reliance could be placed on vessels-of war or of commerce, floating
batteries, gunboats, and other temporary substitutes for permanent fortifications ?
"3d. Is* it necessary or expedient to continue the system of fortifications on
the shores of the lakes?"
1. I have endeavored to ascertain, by an examination of some of the reports
from the boards of engineers and other officers upon this subject, what system of
defence they recommended, the bases of that system, the objects they proposed to
accomplish by it, the particular measures which they suggested to secure those
objects, and the data on which they determined the character and force of the
respective fortifications which are embraced in their general plan of defence.
2. TL bases of their system are : a navy composed of armed vessels capable
of navigating the ocean with safety and of reaching distant points speedily.
Fortifications, permanent and temporary, with the auxiliaries of floating bat-
teries, gunboats, and steam batteries, and both fixed and floating obstructions to
channels.
Interior communications by land and water, and a regular army and well,
organized militia, all to be so combined as to form a complete system.
3. The objects of the system were to leave the navy free to protect our own
commerce or to act against an enemy on the ocean or upon his unprotected
coasts ; to close all important harbors against an enemy, and secure them to our
military and commercial marine ; to deprive an enemy of all strong positions,
where, protected by naval superiority, he might maintain himself and keep our
frontier in continual alarm; to prevent, as far as practicable, the great avenues
of interior navigation from being blockaded at their entrances into the ocean ; to
cover the coastwise and interior navigation, by closing the harbors and the several
inlets from the sea which intersect the lines of communication, and thereby fur-
ther aid the navy in protecting the navigation of the country ; and to protect our
great naval establishments.
4. To secure these important objects with all practicable sound economy, and
in a manner which in time of war should require the least necessary interruption
to the ordinary pursuits of our citizens, appears to have been the controlling
motive in determining the position, character, and extent or force of the respec-
tive works which the boards have proposed.
5. Of these works permanent fortifications are mainly relied upon, and have
preference over any of their auxiliaries wherever due security can be given with-
out the aid of the latter.
6. The dimensions, form, and strength of each fortification appears to have
been determined by the local topography, the importance of the interests which
it was intended to secure, the character and amount of force by which it might
probably be assailed, and the time which would be required to concentrate upon
it a sufficient number of militia to secure it from capture by such assailing force.
7. Your first question requires an opinion of the expediency of any modifica-
tion of the present system of fortifications in consequence of two specified causes,
and of "any other changes that have taken place since it was adopted." It be-
comes necessary, therefore, to ascertain what "other changes" have thus occurred,
and which would probably have led the boards of engineers to different recommen-
dations, if the present states of things had existed when the plans were proposed.
8. Among these causes and changes the most important appear to be the dis-
424 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
covery of a channel leading from the ocean into the bay of New York, which
could not be commanded by any of the fortifications proposed by the board; the
application of steam power to armed and other vessels for ocean navigation; the
great increase in the number and the size of the mercantile and packet steamers
which are employed on our interior lakes, bays, and rivers, and the substitution
of shells for solid shot to be fired from cannon; the introduction of the electric
telegraph for communicating intelligence, and of railroads for the transportation
of persons and materials ; and a greatly increased and more dense population in
the vicinity of many of the points which were intended to be protected against
an enemy.
9. The operations of vessels which depend on the wind alone must always be
uncertain, and the best-devised plans will be greatly exposed to failure in execu-
tion by them. When used as an assailing force against batteries or other fixed
objects, the winds which are necessary to cany them to their desired positions
might frequently prevent the possibility of their retreat, if it should be desired.
The present defences were calculated to resist a force of this character, or which
depended on such vessels for its transportation.
Ships-of-the-line and armed vessels of smaller sizes are now moved by steam,
either as the only motive power or as auxiliary to sails.
These vessels, under ordinary circumstances and for special purposes, may
have their movements regulated and combined, at the will of their commander,
with almost the same precision and certainty as can be accomplished by troops
on land.
The capacity and armament of many of these vessels, connected with their
light draught of water enable them to operate with comparative ease and safety
through channels and upon positions which would be almost secure against
attacks by common sailing vessels.
10. When the present system was proposed, the use of explosive shells was
only contemplated from mortars, either for attack or defence.
Arrangements are now made for the general use of such shells from large
cannon, thus combining the superior accuracy of shot firing with the destructive
effects of explosive shells a change which greatly increases the dangers of a
floating force when opposed to permanent fortifications of earth and masonry.
11. In determining upon the character and extent of many of the fortifica-
tions which were proposed by the boards, an important element of their calcu-
lations was the facility or difficulty of concentrating troops upon the work in
case assistance should be required to repel an attack by an enemy. This
element of calculation has been greatly changed since by the increased density
and amount of available population, and at many points by the greatly
increased facilities for communicating intelligence by telegraphs and railroads,
and for receiving re-enforcements of men and supplies by railroads and steamers.
The purchase of Florida since the fortifications and defences for the Gulf of
Mexico were proposed has given to us new and important positions for strength-
ening our defences on that frontier, and for giving greater security to the
immense interests connected with the valley of the Mississippi. *0ur more
recent acquisitions, which have given us an extensive ocean frontier on the Pacific
ocean, have brought with them new interests, which require fortifications or
other adequate means for their protection and security.
12. The increased power which has been given to vessels when moved by
steam to regulate and secure their joint or separate action as may be desired,
and to reach with comparative ease and safety places which might be consid-
ered as nearly secure -against ordinary sailing vessels ; the additional power
which is given to fortifications when acting against ships or other floating force
by the substitution of explosive shells for solid shot ; the discovery of new
channels to and from some of our harbors; the facilities for more rapid concen-
tration of troops and supplies than was formerly practicable, and the acquisition
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 425
of large extents of new territory, are changes or causes which, in my opinion,
may render some "modifications" of the details of the present system more
advantageous. At least these changes appear to be of sufficient importance to
justify, if not to require, preparatory to definitive action, a re-examination of the
present system, as recommended by former boards, with the same thorough and
careful deliberation which was bestowed when it was originally proposed.
13. In reply to your second question, "What reliance could be placed on
vessels-of-war or of commerce, floating batteries, gunboats, and other temporary
substitutes for permanent fortifications'?" I respectfully state that, in my
opinion, no safe reliance could be placed on any of the kinds of force enume-
rated in your question, as "substitutes" for permanent fortifications, unless
they should be multiplied to an extent that would require an expenditure which
would be unreasonably great, and much greater than would give equal security
by a judicious combination of permanent fortifications and a floating force as
auxiliary to them. On any sudden emergency, private steamers and other
merchant vessels might be usefully employed in aid of other means which had
been previously prepared, either by having them armed to contend with an
enemy, or to bring forward re-enforcements of men, materials, or other supplies.
Little advantage could be expected, however, from the vessels, for direct assist-
ance, unless all that was necessary for their armament and equipment had been
previously prepared, and kept ready for immediate use.
14. The voluntary use of vessels-of-war, which are able to navigate the
ocean as substitutes for fixed fortifications, or even as direct auxiliaries to them,
except in extreme cases, would, in my opinion, be highly injudicious. The
proper employment of such vessels-of-war or of our navy is to afford all
possible protection to our merchant shipping, to destroy or harass an enemy's
commerce, and either by itself or in conjunction with troops to assail an
enemy's possessions at points where they would otherwise be inaccessible to us.
15. The protection which the coasts of our country may justly expect from
the navy is that which it may afford by intercepting forces which may threaten
attacks upon it ; or when unequal to that task, diminishing the means of an
enemy for such attempts, by rendering it necessary for him to protect his own
commerce or his own shores against our ships-of-war.
16. With a navy sufficiently powerful to compete fairly with that of an
enemy, great additional security would be given to our coasts by it, and still
greater if our naval force was decidedly superior. But even under these favor-
able circumstances the chances for avoiding the most vigilant watchfulness on
the ocean are so great, that so long as we expect wars with nations having a
respectable navy, sound policy and true economy, in my opinion, requires
permanent fortifications at all points necessary to defend our important national
establishments, our populous and wealthy cities, against sudden attacks, and to
keep open, as far as practicable, our coastwise navigation and other communi-
cations, which might otherwise be interrupted by any enemy who could elude
the vigilance of our navy. The navy, if employed as here suggested, would
not render it as substitute for fortifications, but would give an increased security
to our seaboard, and in proportion to its strength dimmish the necessity of inter-
rupting the ordinary pursuits of our population.
17. To the third question, "Is it necessary or expedient to continue the
system of fortification on the shores of the lakes'?" I state as my opinion that
no future attacks from the Canada shores of the lakes, of a character sufficiently
powerful to affect the final result of war, are to be apprehended; still, the
advantages which are offered by the St. Lawrence and Rideau canals for the
increase of a naval force on Lake Ontario might give to Great Britain a tempo-
rary superiority of naval force on that lake. This superiority, and the presence
of a considerable body of regular troops which are always kept in Canada,
might induce and possibly enable an enemy in Canada, by a sudden incursion,
426 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
to injure our great lines of communication by railroads and canals, on the lake
frontier, or to levy contributions on cities near it, all of which would be greatly
exposed if there were no fortifications to furnish military supplies for the sur-
rounding militia, and so aid them in repelling such attacks.
18. Under existing circumstances it would, in my opinion, be expedient to
continue the present system so far as to retain all the fortifications on the lake
frontier which have been completed, and to complete such as have been com-
menced. The expense would be comparatively inconsiderable, and would no
doubt be amply repaid by the increased security and other advantages which
would be gained at the commencement of any war in which Canada would have
the character of an enemy to us.
It has been difficult for me to confine my remarks very strictly to the precise
questions which were submitted, but it was believed that the reference to
" other changes" in the first question would be a sufficient excuse for the
latitude which has been taken.
With much respect, your obedient servant,
C. MORRIS,
Captain U. S. Navy.
Hon. C. M. CONRAD,
Secretary of War.
No. 2.
Report of Commodore C. M. Perry.
NORTH TARRYTOWN, July 25, 1852.
SIR : In obedience to your order of the 23d ultimo, covering a copy of a com-
munication with the Secretary of War, together with a copy of a resolution of
Congress, calling for information upon the expediency of modifying the system
of national fortifications established in 1816, I have the honor to report
In reply to the first inquiry, as follows :
" To what extent, if to any, ought the present system of fortifications for the
protection of our seaboard to be modified, in consequence of the application of
steam to vessels-of-war, the inventions or improvement of projectiles, or other
changes that have taken place since it was adopted in 1816?"
I may remark that, in my opinion, it is desirable that the system referred to
should be substantially modified by an entire abandonment of the plan of exterior
coast fortifications, and a confinement to the completion of the works already
commenced for the protection of our principal ports of trade and naval depots ;
and that no greater number of works should be recognized as permanent means
of defence of the more important points upon the seaboard than those that may
be suitably garrisoned and kept in constant preparation, whether in peace or
war, for repelling an enemy.
In the attempt to sustain the position which I propose to assume, being at my
residence in the country, without proper documents or other data to enable me
to enter fully into detail, I shall, with two exceptions, refrain from alluding
to the published statements and reports of others upon the subject ; and while
cheerfully according to those who may differ from me all credit for sincerity
and patriotism, I may content myself with a general expression of opinion upon
the question under investigation, calling particular attention to the report of Mr.
Cass, when Secretary of War. (See Doc. 293, 24th Congress, April 8, 1836.)
Concurring, as I most fully did at the period of its date, (1836,) and as I do
now, in the opinion set forth in that masterly state paper, I might be satisfied in
assuming the whole range of argument of that distinguished man, as exhibiting
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 427
my own views upon the great question of national defence, had not the imagina-
tion even of his prophetic foresight been outstripped by the extraordinary devel-
' opments of the few subsequent years developments which, though they have
thrown into bolder relief the more prominent features of his prophecies, have
gone far beyond the anticipations of the wildest visionary, bringing to light im-
provements in practical science utterly astounding to the theorists of yesterday,
deranging all previous plans of war, whether by sea or land, and foreshadowing
even further changes, perhaps equally remarkable ; and thus showing that if the
system, under things as they existed in 1816, was wisely devised, (a proposition
1 have never assented to,) there is no longer the remotest useful object to be
gained by persistence in the plan, but rather on the contrary. The erection of
isolated exterior works upon our seaboard would, instead of contributing to our
protection, hold out assailable points, inviting attention from an active enemy,
in the possibility of carrying them by coup de main an achievement not so
difficult* since the use of steam for naval purposes ; and when, moreover, it may
be fairly presumed that these works, however extensive and complete in them-
selves, would in fact be weak as defences, for want of adequate garrisons ; that
is, if we are to judge from past experience and the present desolate condition of
some of those already constructed, made necessary, it is true, for want of troops
to send to them.
Let us suppose, for purpose of illustration, that the two works recommended
in the original design to be erected on Sandy Hook bar,* (see report of Wai-
Department, House Doc. 206, 26th Congress, 1st session,) are completed, and
garrisoned by the estimated number of rank and file assigned to them, say 1,760
each, their isolated position would place them beyond the effective range of guns
planted upon Sandy Hook, the nearest land ; and being encircled by channels
navigable for the largest war steamers, they could not prevent the ingress of the
enemy, and unaided by a friendly naval force might be surrounded by the hos-
tile ships, who, if they did not surprise and carry them by escalade, would have
the power to cut off their communication with the laud, and consequently their
supplies.
And let us suppose, further, that in conjunctures like those growing out of the
northeastern boundary and Oregon questions, where serious difficulties with
Great Britain were anticipated by many, (and everybody knows that a similar
contingency did happen under the administration of General Jackson, with
France, and may again happen,) that these forts were completed, and armed, and
garrisoned, as they probably would be in time of peace, with a single company
or half company each, and it might be the policy of the enemy to enter suddenly
into war, and give us the first intimation of hostilities by the appearance off the
port of a powerful squadron of war steamers, not only would the forts on the
bars, inviting attack by their very weakness, be at the mercy of the enemy, but
the safety of the city itself would be compromised. For though by a delay of a
day or two the inner line of forts could be garrisoned by militia and volunteers,
and temporary steam batteries prepared in aid of the outer defences, if the oppo-
sing squadron were to be commanded by a Nelson or a Sujfren, such precaution
would be too late.
From any of the inner forts, should they perchance make a lodgement, the
enemy could soon be driven ; but once in possession of the outer line of works,
with the sea open to them, the port would 'be entirely locked up ; hence, in the
possibility of such an issue, is it not far better that they should not be erected ?
But many other solid reasons may be adduced to prove the impolicy of their
erection. The impracticability of covering the whole extent of coast by for-
1 shall apply my remarks upon the seaboard defences more particularly to the port of
New York, though they are intended to have a general bearing upon the whole coast.
428 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
tresses, commanding every port, bay, and roadstead ; the improbability of any
future attempt by an enemy to land an armed force upon our shores, except for
some marauding purposes ; and the perfect capability of the inner line of works,
assisted by floating batteries, to repel whatever force might venture an attack
upon any of our principal cities or towns, except by coup de main, in which
event, as I have before remarked, the outer line of works would prove of im-
measurable injury, if captured, as some of them might possibly be by a dashing
enemy.*
And, besides, we have the experience of history to show that extensive military
works are alike destructive of the prosperity and the liberties of the people,
saying nothing of the enormous cost of construction and the keeping them in
condition for service. I may instance the fortresses of Spain, of Portugal, and
of the former republics of Genoa and Venice, as gigantic works, now of little
use, and looked upon by the voyager only as monuments of the extravagance
and peculating spirit which, at the time of their erection, characterized the people
of those governments.
Experience, moreover, shows that while the fortifications of San Juan d'Ulloa
at Vera Cruz, the Moro of Havana, the castle protecting the harbor of Cartha-
gena upon the coast of Columbia, the Venetian fortress of Napoli de Romania, in
Greece, the castle of St. Elino, in Malta,t and many others of similar extent
and character, are considered by some impregnable. They command only a
circuit embraced within the range of their guns, and cannot irr any manner
prevent a landing of the enemy upon the coast beyond the extent of such range ;
in a word, these works are useful only to command the entrances of the ports
which they were intended to defend, and to cover with their guns vessels an-
choring in their immediate vicinity. The celebrated fortress of Gibraltar neither
commands the passage of the straits nor the anchorage on the Spanish side of
the bay of that name. They are, in truth, like chained monsters, harmless be-
yond the reach of their manacles ; not so with their steam batteries they have
the means of locomotion, and their power can be made effective at any point
upon the coast capable of being reached by an enemy's vessel.
Of all the coasts of Europe that of Great Britain is the least provided with
fortifications, and yet her soil has not been trodden by a successful enemy since
the conquest solely protecting her military and naval arsenals by perfect and
well-garrisoned works. She depends mainly for defence of her coast upon her
navy and the warlike spirit of her yeomanry ; and the very absence of fortified
works prevents a deceitful reliance upon such defences, and keeps alive the
more gallant and more certain dependence upon their own personal prowess.
And thus it should be with us, man to man. The Americans are, at least,
equal to any other race, and they are fully capable of driving back to their ships
or capturing any number of troops that might have the temerity to land upon
our soil.
Let us suppose that New York is menaced with an attack by a force much
In speaking of militia and volunteers above I may add, by way of note, that the city
of New York could alone parade, in six hours, one thousand, and in twelve hours, five thou-
sand uniformed troops, composed of men in the prime of life, who would, doubtless, do
good service before the enemy.
This body of troops is well officered and under excellent organization, and embraces fair
proportions of cavalry, artillery, and infantry, with all the requisite material and munitions.
The cities and towns in the immediate neighborhood could furnish an equal number with
the same expedition, and there can be little doubt that with the facilities of transportation
by railroad and other modes, a force sufficient for all purposes of defence could be concen-
trated in a very short space of time at any point upon our coast north and east of Texas.
f I more particularly name these, among many others, for reason of being better ac-
quainted with them by personal examination.
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA COAST DEFENCES. 429
larger than the English have ever yet been able to concentrate upon our coast.
The only assailable point which might promise any chance of success would be
"debarkation upon the south side of Long island and to advance upon the rear
of Brooklyn.
This mode of attack was contemplated during the war of 1812-'! 3, and ex-
tensive entrenchments were thrown up by the citizens upon 'a chain of hills just
beyond the town designed to hold the enemy in check until re-enforcements
could arrive from a distance;* but the rapid increase of the place has now
brought these military sites within the corporate limits of the city, and it will
be necessary, in the event of another war, to select more advanced positions on
which to construct redoubts to command the approaches referred to, and it would
be at this day a measure of wisdom for the government to take steps for select-
ing and securing the fee of suitable points for military purposes. These posi-
tions, judiciously chosen, would, at the moment of alarm, be occupied by myriads
of militia and volunteers, who, judging from what was accomplished on a
former occasion, would, in an incredible short time, throw up and man the neces-
sary works ; with these precautionary measures, and with a respectable number
of steam batteries as auxiliaries to the permanent works already constructed,
New York would be safe from any foreknown attack of the enemy.
With respect to the second inquiry
" What reliance could be placed on vessels-of-war or of commerce, floating
batteries, gunboats, or other temporary substitutes for permanent defences 1 "
I reply that much reliance could be placed on all vessels-of-war, particularly
those moved by steam, whether intended for ocean or harbor service, as auxili-
aries to the fortifications, thereby lessening the necessary number and extent of
those permanent works ; but there could be no dependence on gunboats or ves-
sels of commerce, except for the temporary conversion of the latter into public
armed ships.
But the most reliable force for harbor defence as auxiliary to the fortifications
would be steamers of war, in addition to which temporary steam batteries might
be equipped at most of our principal ports.
It may be presumed that there is at this time but one opinion among naval
men as to the utility of steamers-of-war. The strongest and most unreasonable
prejudices growing out of professional predilections must now give way to the
unmistakable evidences of their usefulness, and the absolute necessity of their
employment at the present day in all naval operations.
These vessels should all be capable of traversing the ocean, and while efficient
for ocean navigation, not the less effective for harbor or coast defence.
Steam batteries, so called in contradistinction to steamers-of-war, should be
of a temporary character, and used only for the defence of ports, or bays, or
roadsteads, and of these there would be no necessity of having many in com-
mission, excepting at times when the enemy might be expected, as they could
be prepared in a very short time the cities and towns which they may be
wanted to defend all furnishing the means of then: equipment and the requisite
, crews.
In a communication accompanied by drawings submitted to the Navy De-
partment some years ago, I demonstrated the practicability of equipping and
manning at the port of New York powerful and efficient floating batteries in less
than three days.
Wherever steam vessels can be found to furnish the moving power and small
coasters to be used for floating the guns, as both can be found as well as guns
at most of our largest ports, temporary batteries capable of attacking the largest
sail ship can be speedily equipped, care being taken to protect, by a mode pointed
out, the machinery and the entire hull of the steamer which, without being
* These works covered the rear of the navy yard, Brooklyn.
430 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
herself armed, is to furnish the power of moving the batteries from one point to
another.
Modern discoveries in the use of warlike projectiles have shown, and espe-
cially in the use of explosive shells, that wooden bulwarks, however massive
they may be, so far from giving protection to those behind them, cause by their
splinters greater havoc ; hence the inutility of such defences in the proposed
floating batteries, which, by means of the steam power attached to them, may
be easily kept at long range with the enemy and beyond grape or canister
distance.
But no one can foretell or scarcely imagine the changes in the art of war that
steam and other natural elements more recently brought into use are to produce.
On a late occasion I had the honor of suggesting to the Navy Department a
new mode of attack by steamers-of-war. The opinions then advanced have
been more and more confirmed by further reflection and consultation with intel-
ligent engineers and ship-builders, and I am now well satisfied that, besides the
use of an ordinary war steamer, as a striking body, in the manner explained in
the communication referred to, a steam vessel, to be moved by a submerged pro-
peller and capable of traversing any of our inland waters, may be constructed
and advantageously used solely as a projectile (using the term in this sense.)
This vessel should be long and narrow, and of unusual proportional depth to
accommodate the engines and boilers, and the crew, (if desirable,) below the
water line. She should be of wedge-shape forward, with the most approved
lines for speed, considering her depth and her whole construction, whether built
of wood or iron, of sufficient strength to give the requisite momentum, and the
power to withstand the most violent shocks produced by collision with other
bodies.
A vessel of this description, say of two thousand tons measurement, would
weigh, with her machinery, &c., nearly four thousand tons, and might be pro-
pelled with engines of extra proportional power at the rate of fourteen statute
miles per hour. We have thus a projectile (still using the term) of this weight
moved upon the surface of the water at the velocity of twenty feet per second.
Can any one imagine the overwhelming effect of a contact of this moving body
with anything capable of floating upon the ocean ? This is no visionary pro-
ject^ but one of simple demonstration and practicable accomplishment.
In reply to the third inquiry, as follows : " Is it necessary or expedient to
continue the system of fortifications on the shores of the northern lakes ? " I an-
swer in the negative, and for the very obvious reason that we have now the
command of the lakes so far as regards an aggregate superiority of tonnage and
seamen, and it would be strange indeed if, M r ith the well-organized militia of the
States bordering on and contiguous to these waters, and the facilities for trans-
portation to the scene of war of any number of regulars and volunteers with
the requisite munitions, we did not, at the least, preserve the integrity of the
soil, and the navy would be recreant to its former reputation did it not sweep
from these inland seas every vestige of an opposing force.
In reference, therefore, to the foregoing remarks, I respectfully submit
That no additional fortification be commenced on the Atlantic seaboard, leav-
ing it questionable whether those already commenced should be completed to
the extent originally designed.
That very great reliance can be placed upon steamers-of-war and steam bat-
teries as auxiliaries to the military work now completed or in progress of com-
pletion.
And lastly, it is altogether unnecessary and inexpedient even to progress any
further with the uncompleted works which have been commenced on the shores
of the northern lakes.
For myself, I cannot entertain the idea that we are always to act on the de-
fensive ; on the contrary, it is more reasonable to suppose that, in the event or
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 431
another war, the power of the United States will be felt beyond their own im-
mediate coasts; most certainly it ought to be, for we have the means of placing
'ourselves upon an equality of naval strength with any of the European nations.
Looking to the inexhaustible resources of the country, the warlike and adven-
turous spirit of the people, its extensive and rapidly increasing commerce, and
the acknowledged superiority of the Americans in the construction and manage-
ment of ships, whether navigated by sails or steam, is it not surprising that all
our military plans have hitherto been confined to the mere defence of our fire-
sides against an enemy, always supposed to be able, in order to reach us, to cross
with a superior force in tact a wide expanse of ocean, and knocking at our doors,
to cause the whole country to be thrown into alarm ?
Why should we barricade ourselves and wait within onr defences the coming
of the enemy 1 Why not do that which is more congenial to our national spirit
meet them beyond the threshold, and thus preserve our waters and our soil in-
violate? We possess the power; why not exercise it 1 ? In truth, the destinies
of the nation are inevitably leading to events which will sooner or later make
us superior on the ocean, and instead of tamely waiting the approach of the foe,
we shall be more apt to turn the tide of war eastward.
The great battles for national mastery are to be fought upon the ocean, and
the sooner we prepare for the struggle the better.
Hence it is evident that upon the navy the country should chiefly depend
for its protection from invasion, not under its present organization, but upon a
navy commensurate in extent to the commercial resources and wealth of the
nation ; we should have naval strength sufficient to protect our commerce in
every sea, and in time of war to assume the offensive.
Still it would be unwise to neglect a reasonable system of permanent defences
upon the coast, but not by any means to the extent contemplated by the system
of 1816.
In the opinions which I have ventured to advance upon the fortifications of
the country I have intended to allude only to the Atlantic seaboard and the
shores of the northern lakes. Believing that the seaboard on the Pacific ocean
is infinitely more exposed to successful attack from either of the great naval
powers of Europe England, France, and Russia and may require additional
defences; but not being well acquainted with that coast, I abstain from any
remarks upon the subject. In connexion with this report, however, I propose
to submit, at a future time, some remarks upon the importance of securing the
naval command of the Gulf of Mexico, with special reference to the better pro-
tection of our Pacific possessions.
With great respect, I have the honor to be your most obedient servant,
M. C. PERRY.
No. 3.
Report of Commander R. B. Cunningham.
UNITED STATES NAVY YARD,
Gosport, Virginia, September 29, 1851.
SIR : In pursuance of an order from the honorable Secretary of the Navy,
dated June 23, 1851, enclosing a copy of a letter from you to him, with a copy
of certain resolutions of the House of Representatives of the last session of
Congress, pertaining to a proposed modification of our system of defences by
means of fortifications on shore; and directing that I should give to the subject
432 FOKTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
my best reflections, and communicate the result in season to be reviewed by you
prior to your report in obedience to resolutions aforesaid in December next.
With a diffidence I have never before experienced in drawing up an official
communication, I will endeavor to give you my views on this important question
of national policy with as much brevity as its magnitude will admit of; but I
beg leave to state that, while I feel myself highly honored by the consideration
so undeservedly bestowed upon me by the honorable Secretary of the Navy in
selecting me for a duty of so much consequence, and which calls for scientific
attainments in its execution that I do not aspire to, I must claim your indul-
gence when, in all sincerity, I state to you that my remarks are drawn from my
very limited practical observation and experience only.
To the first inquiry, viz : " To what extent, if to any, ought the present
system of fortifications for the protection of our seaboard to be modified in con-
sequence of the application of steam vessels-of-war, the invention or improve-
ment of projectiles, or other changes that have taken place since it was adopted
in the year 1816?"
I would respectfuly reply that the important improvements in the application
of steam to ships-of-war and sea-going ships, and the certainty that railroads
will be continuous in a few years from Maine to Texas, and that by these
facilities troops, munitions of war, and stores of all kinds can be transported
with such expedition that in a very short space of time large bodies of men,
with the necessary artillery, can be concentrated upon any intermediate point
between permanent fortifications fully prepared to meet an invading foe before an
invader could make any material progress in the erection of fortifications for his
defence, should, in my opinion, induce the government to direct its attention
alone to those points in our seaboard where the protection of our cities and such
roadsteads as are calculated for naval depots, and where large fleets can ren-
dezvous, be sheltered and ride in safety at their anchors at all seasons of the
year.
It can hardly be supposed that any nation would be so reckless as to attempt
an invasion of our Atlantic coast at the present day ; but a large and powerful
fleet could approach within gunshot and batter down our cities if they were not
prepared with fortifications in all respects adequate for their protection and
defence.
These fortifications should be so located as to command the channel way ; and
at the inner extremity of every reach there should be a battery erected if prac-
ticable, so as to commence a raking fire upon an enemy the moment he approached
within the range of its guns.
The guns for the batteries should be of the largest calibre and of the greatest
range, as the effect of the shot would be more destructive and the enemy sooner
reached.
There has been no improvement in projectiles; nor can the application of
steam to ships-of-war do away the necessity of building permanent fortifications
at the points before enumerated; but, as a modification, I would respectfully
suggest that steam propellers of sufficient power to attain a speed of ten or twelve
miles per hour be constructed as auxiliaries to the permanent fortifications and
for the additional protection and security of our cities and harbors.
These steamers should be of peculiar construction and equipment, and one or
more, as may be deemed expedient, should be stationed at each of the permanent
fortifications.
Ships are at all times liable to accidents from various causes; and more
especialy so are steamers, as they are subject to the same injuries that other
vessels are from storms and other disasters of the sea, with the additional ones
of fire, explosion, &c.; and when in commission their expenses are fourfold
greater than sailing ships. I propose, therefore, that machinery for as many of
those ships as may be deemed expedient be constructed, put together, tried, and
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 433
then taken apart, and when carefully packed, stowed in suitable storehouses and
kept ready for use ; and that the materials for the hulls of these steamers be
procured, and the timber properly stowed in well ventilated sheds.
The steamers should be built of logs, their length not less than two hundred
and fifty feet, with sufficient breadth to admit of batteries across at each end of
six ten-inch guns, and three mortar beds between the batteries. Their bottoms
should not be perfectly flat, but formed with a slight ellipse, the bilge rounded,
and their extremities handsomely tapered, so as to enable them to pass easily
through the water.
These steamers are intended to be shot-proof, as it is designed to have iron
plates one inch and a half thick and six inches wide let into their sides from
stem to stern, and about two and a half inches apart, this to be extended from
gunwale to two feet below deep load line ; and when it is remembered that they are
to fight end on, and built of long easy lines from stem to stern, the conclusion
is irresistible that a shot touching those plates will most assuredly glance off.
In all works intended for public defence, as a system, two strong points should
always be borne in mind, viz : simplicity and economy ; and as these vessels are
to be of the simplest mode of structure, and built of the cheapest material,
while at the same time it is as durable as any other, (white pine,) and the con-
struction of them so simple, that carpenteres, joiners, and, in fact, all who can
use the broad-axe and adze, can be profitably employed in their construction
when they are needed.
Another peculiarity in these vessels is to have their sterns perpendicular, of
great thickness, and an iron cut-water firmly attached thereto, and in a width of
two and a half feet, bearded off to half its thickness at the stern, so that when
in action, and the enemy at hand with his broadside presented, the steamer, with
her greatest momentum, is to drive directly into him ; and it cannot be doubted
that this operation once performed would require no repetition, as nothing here-
tofore built in the shape of a ship could withstand the concussion.
The mortar beds are intended to be used in the event of an enemy's obtaining a
landing at a point where he could be sheltered from the operation of battery guns,
but accessible to shells from mortars ; and as these steamers will be of light
draught of water, they will be enabled to approach the shore much nearer than
other vessels of equal size if differently constructed.
It has long been my opinion that steamers are more to be feared from the
power they possess of running into an enemy than from any other cause, either
from their great weight of metal and consequent extended range, the choice
which they are enabled to make of position, or any other superiority claimed for
them, for in all these respects ships-of-war can be built to equal them ; but if
constructed as here described, and properly managed, they are not to be
resisted.
With one more remark I will close my response to the first branch of your
inquiry.
The telegraph in the event of war, will keep them constantly informed at
headquarters of the movements of our enemy's fleet on our Atlantic coast, and
the old ruse of making a demonstration at one point for the purpose of effecting
a landing at another, can no longer be practiced with the usual success, as their
movements will be anticipated, and the necessary preparations made to receive
them. This great invention offers an additional argument for the discontinuance
of intermediate fortifications.
In reference to our possession on the Pacific, a little deviation from the
course recommended to be observed on this side would be advisable. There it
will be necessary to construct the permanent fortifications, so as to enable them
to stand a siege, as invasion in that remote quarter is probable, in the event of
war with a strong maritime power ; but in ail other respects the course to be pursued
H. Rep. Com. 86 28.
434 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
should be the same as on this side, as it is to be presumed that the telegraph
will soon be extended there, and in the course of time railroads also.
To the second, viz: "What reliance could be placed on vessels-of-war, or of
commerce, floating batteries, gunboats, and other temporary substitutes for per-
manent fortifications ?"
The indispensable, and, in fact, imperative necessity of having, strong permanent
fortifications at the points before referred to, is a settled and decided conviction
of my mind ; they will admit of no substitute.
Steam batteries, such as have been recommended in my reply to your first
inteiTOgatory as a modification, would unquestionably prove an important and
powerful auxiliary, and in all probability would, in the day of battle, if properly
managed, be the more destructive of the two ; but, like all ships, the materials of
which they must necessarily be constructed are perishable ; and possibly, at the
moment their services are most required, a broken shaft, or some other of the
numerous accidents to which all such ships are liable, would render them
unavailable, if not altogether useless ; and hence the risk a nation would encounter
in adopting any substitute for permanent fortifications when there existed a
possibility of its failure.
Third. "Is it necessary or expedient to continue the system of fortifications
on the shores of the northern lakes."
To this, your last inquiry, I would state, that the unprecedented change
which the entire shores of our northern lakes has undergone since the termina-
tion of the late war with Great Britain renders it very improbable that invasion
will ever take place from the opposite shore. Certain destruction would await
an enemy who attempted it. Then the population was comparatively sparse ;
now cities and villages are to be seen in every direction, occupying places which
were then an uninterrupted wilderness, and hosts of stout hearts ready to do
battle, if needed ; besides the numerous and increasing facilities for building
ships and for transporting munitions of war forbid the idea that the northern
lakes will ever again constitute an arena for naval combats.
In the event of another war with Great Britain we would be able to build and
equip five ships to her one ; this fact alone affords a conclusive reason why the
government should run to no unnecessary expense in its preparations for war in
that quater.
Our tonnage will, as it is now, always be greater in the lakes than that of
Great Britain, which must secure to us the supremacy in the event of war, as
many of those vessels, steamers and others, could be converted into cruisers,
which would not only protect our shores from invasion, but push the war into
the enemy's country.
Ports selected for naval depots should have heavy guns ready for their protec-
tion ; and parks of artillery, composed of heavy ordnance, should be kept in readi-
ness at the diffierent military posts for immediate use or transportation. Further
than this, I think the government is not called upon to provide for defence.
In conclusion, I beg leave to state that if there should be another war with
one of the strong maritime nations of Europe, the trial of strength must be upon
the ocean, and it behooves the United States to be well upon their guard. As
to the opinion which is rife among us, that steam alone can constitute an efficient
navy, and that the nation who can command the greatest number of steamers is
to hold supremacy on the ocean, I regard as one of those visionary speculations
based entirely upon the opinions of mere theorists. Their efficiency for towing
ships into position, and for transporting munitions of war, I admit.
If we had ten ships of two hundred and forty feet in length, with a proportion-
able breadth of beam, and built to carry their mettle upon two decks, instead of
four, and their batteries throughout to be of ten-inch guns, I believe it would
take the combined steam navy of Great Britain to cope with them.
Two years' war, with a large steam navy to support and keep in constant
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES 435
service, would bring any power in Europe to bankruptcy ; and I trust our
government will not be drawn into so unwise and expensive a system of national
defence.
I have the honor to be, with great respect, your obedient servant,
R. B. CUNNINGHAM,
Commander U. S. Navy.
Hon. 0. M. CONRAD,
Secretary of War, Washington.
No. 4.
Report of Commander S. F. Dupont.
Report on the national defence, in reply to the following questions, submitted
by the Department of War.
First. " To what extent, if any, ought the present system of fortifications, for
the protection of our seaboard, to be modified, in consequence of the application
of steam to vessels-of-war, the invention or improvement of projectiles, or other
changes that have taken place since it was adopted in the year 1816 ]"
Second. " What reliance could be placed in vessels-of-war, or of commerce,
floating batteries, gunboats, and other temporary substitutes for permanent forti-
fications 1 "
Third. " Is it necessary or expedient to continue the system of fortifications
on the shores of northern lakes ?"
Whether treated distinctively or generally, these inquiries may be supposed to
amount to this : Shall we expend as much as we have hitherto done for defence
upon fortifications ? and how have these been affected by the introduction of
some new elements in war, such as steam power, and enormous projectiles of an
explosive character 1
This subject is one which involves the honor and safety of the country ; it
has been critically examined by distinguished military men and eminent states-
men, and I do not venture to think that I can throw much new light upon it.
In such an investigation one's profession and esprit du corps would naturally
lead in any scheme, for the general defence, to bring the navy prominently for-
ward. But this question is too broad and national to be viewed from any such
narrow limits, and in examining it an officer should discard from his mind to
which arm of the public service he belongs. In my apprehension, however, the
most extended system of fortifications for the defence of our seaboard will still
leave enough for the navy to do ; a navy, too, carried far beyond its present
number and strength. Indeed, this arm can only fill its special mission in war,
that of aggression, by being enabled to leave the great seaports and exposed
points of our maritime frontier to a more certain and more economical system of
protection, in order to carry the " sword of the state " upon the broad ocean,
sweep from it the enemy's commerce, capture or scatter the vessels-of-war pro-
tecting it, cover and convoy our own to its destined havens, and be ready to
meet hostile fleets ; in other words, to contend for the mastery of the seas where
alone it can be obtained, on the sea itself.
Yet it is not to be denied that theories have sprung up, assigning much less
importance than formerly to fortifications, in a system of national defence, under
the influence of opinions "which doubtless have some truth in them, but which
are liable to be carried to a dangerous extent. Various reasons might be assigned
for this change of opinion speculation, supposed economy, a mistaken desiri to
436 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
advance the interests of the navy, in short, the characteristic pursuit of theories
into the field of extravagance.
But it may be still more probable that these views mainly spring from some
misconception as to the extent proposed for a system of permanent defences.
Some would seem to believe that our seaboard and lake frontier were to be
bound by a Chinese wall, and that all the salient points on the coasts were to
be crowned by castles, the cross-fires of which would cover the intervening
space ; in other words, that the system of fortifications proposed to protect some
four thousand miles of sea-coast from the possibility of invasion or attack. But
is there any cause to apprehend such extreme views 1 And if they should exist,
is that a sufficient reason for rejecting a wise and practical system of permanent
defences vitally essential to the safety of important points, and so clearly within
the means of the country to provide 1
In treating this branch of the subject, can we do better than examine the ob-
jections presented and the modification proposed, from sources entitled to the
gravest consideration ?
Holding the first position among these is the report of a distinguished states-
man, then occupying the Department of War, and still holding a prominent place
in the public councils a gentleman, too, familiar with arms in early life, and
one of the defenders of his country in the war of 1812. His views, set forth
with great ability, received the indorsement of another distinguished personage,
President Jackson, and were submitted to the national legislature in the year
1836. (Doc. No. 243, 24th Congress, Gen. Cass's report.)
Now, it is submitted that there has been an equal misconception as to the scope
and tendency of this able report, as with the views considered extreme, on the
other side. In the one, modifications recommended in reference to special
features have been considered as objections to the whole system ; in the other,
an extended scale of defence, because we had an extended frontier, was looked
upon as a desire to cover the whole surface of the land with forts and field
works, and to rely upon these alone for defence. Whereas the only difference
related to the character and extent of the works to be constructed, based upon
the consideration that there was scarcely a possibility of these works being
called upon to repel attacks by land, as well as by water, and repeating the
hypothesis that an enemy will ever attempt to make a more or less permanent
establishment in the country. Such an establishment as would induce him tc
make a formal investment of some of these first class works, requiring a large
army with its battering trains and other preparations for siege. View? on these
points are presented in full, and with great force, yet the objections are strictly
confined to what is conceived to be the unnecessary magnitude of some of these
works, but not to the system of permanent defences, for the distinguished authoi
of the report tells us with equal explicitness :
" I consider the duty of the government to afford adequate protection of ttu
sea-coast a subject of paramount obligation, and I believe we are called upon b}
every consideration of policy to push the necessary arrangements as rapidly as
the circumstances of the country and the proper execution of the works wil
allow. I think every town large enough to tempt the cupidity of an enemj
should be defended by works, fixed or floating, suited to its local position, ant
sufficiently extensive to resist such attemps as would probably be made agains
it. There will, of course, after laying down such a general rule, be much lati
tude of. discretion as to its application. Upon this branch of the subject ]
would give to the opinion of the engineer officers almost controlling weight, afte:
proper limitations -.are established."
" All the defences should be projected upon a scale proportionate to the im
portance of the.jjlace, and should be calculated to resis*t any naval attack am
any sudden assault that a body of land troops might make upon it."
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 437
" It is to be observed that the great object of our fortifications is to exclude a
.naval force from our harbors ; this end they ought fully to answer."
In truth, it cannot be questioned that our principal seaports, naval depots, and
all important points on our seaboard, should receive commensurate protection ;
neither should there be, in our judgment, a question as to the mode in which
this protection should be given. It would seem unnecessary to set forth the ad-
vantages for such purposes of fixed defences or fortifications. These advan-
tages have been shown over and over again by our distinguished engineers, and
never controverted. To run over some of these once more, it may be said of
forts that they are the only permanent defences, and the most economical, for,
with the present science in construction and choice of material, the outlay is
there once for all, for the repairs are next to nothing. Forts offer means by
which a small force is enabled to resist a large one ; a small number of men a
large army. In the event of an attack by a competent power upon a place
liable to be put under contribution, the injury might be accomplished before suf-
ficient means of resistance could be assembled. Forts can be made impregnable
against any naval force that could be brought against them, and are needed for
the protection of our own fleets while preparing for hostilities on the ocean.
They are secure depots for munitions of war, and render defence certain and
easy, and above all, a defence which rarely involves loss of life, leaving the or-
dinary state of society undisturbed. No alarms are created ; no calling of men
from their ordinary business. In short, by rendering success impossible, they
derive immunity from attack.
It is impossible to view with favor the substitution of floating or steam bat-
teries for permanent defences, the preparation of which will be ever deferred, on
account of their perishable nature, until danger is pending ; and if ready in time,
their value ceases with the occasion which called them forth, for their decay is
certain and speedy. Their unsuitableness and want of adaptation to the altera-
tions constantly made in the means and implements of war are also elements of
insecurity in these wood and iron defences for harbors. There can never be any
certainty that some recent discovery has not lessened our effective force, without
any remissness on our part ; there can be no certainty that we may not be sud-
denly called on to renew our expenditures before our last appropriations have
been spent. For example, a well-known, and scientific, and practical gentle-
man obtained the contract, under a law of Congress, to construct for harbor de-
fence an iron floating battery, which was to be shot and shell proof in fact,
invulnerable in every respect. A target, constructed after the manner he pro-
posed for the sides of his battery, was subjected to the test of one of Commodore
Stockton's large guns. It presented little or no resistance ; the ball passed
through without difficulty, tearing out large fragments formed of seven thick-
nesses of boiler-iron, well bolted and rivetted together. There is no desire,
however, to be understood as excluding altogether these costly and un wieldly
machines ; they may serve as important auxiliaries to forts, in broad sheets of
water, or special localities not within the range of the fixed work ; though, in
' all probability, in most cases the hulls of stout merchant ships, strengthened and
prepared for mounting one or more pieces of heavy ordnance, would be sooner
got ready and answer an equally good purpose. But to leave the whole defence
of our harbors to such tempoary expedients, built of materials as vulnerable and
perishable as ships, would be expending enormous sums in order to invite at-
tack.
Throughout this report I was at first disposed to take for granted that no
idea could prevail in this country, to any extent at least, that would desire to
retain the navy proper by which is meant efficient steam and sailing ships-of-
war within the harbors, for harbor defence ; but it seems to be included in the
scope of one of the inquiries, and cannot be overlooked.
What, then, is the first object and main purpose of a navy but the defence
438 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
and protection of our commerce ? It is the only form in which that protection
can be given ; but this is essentially taken away when it has assigned to it the
defence of our seaports. It may be said that the navy will be increased to such
a size as to be able to perform this double duty. There is nothing in our past
history to authorize such a belief; and in time of peace the people of the United
States will never support such a naval force. They object to spending much
money on the personnel of military establishments. Nor does it belong to their
temper, or their position among nations, to indulge in apprehensions of war ;
their time is too much occupied with the noble arts and pursuits of peace to
feel such an interest in this subject as must be felt to bring them to such large
expenditures upon perishable materials.
If our country had to rely upon naval defences, it may well be questioned
whether any portion of the navy would be suffered to leave our coasts for the
protection and preservation of our foreign commerce, while we were under the
alarm of war. However great the naval force might be, it would not be thought
sufficient. The dangers nearest home would command our interest and sympa-
thy ; the preservation of our great emporiums of commerce from sudden devas-
tation would cause the single trading ships upon the ocean to be forgotten.
And how would a naval force, for home defence, be partitioned out to the differ-
ent cities and stations, without endless vexation, dissatisfaction, and dispute?
To employ our active navy, in whole or in part, to the entire or partial aban-
donment of our system of fortifications, would be to supplant impregnable bul-
warks by pregnable ones a fixed security by a changeable one placing perish-
able materials in lieu of those that are durable ; it would be exposing ourselves
to the chance of being suddenly left, for a time, without defence, through new
discoveries in the art of war ; it would be opening the way to expenditures of
money which no estimate could count the sums ; it would be depriving our
commerce of its legitimate protection, and would be resigning our sense of secu-
rity, peace of mind, and continuance in our pursuits without interruption, in the
event of war. But there are objections to such a plan still more fatal : it in-
volves the sacrifice of the lives of our fellow-citizens, and proposes to make their
bodies, since they are brave and willing, the walls of defence for the enemy to
fire at, instead of stone or mortar ; it is compelling the conclusions of science to
give way to mere speculations, and rejecting the experience of the world. Nor
is this all that is involved in so destructive a proposition : it would divert the
navy from its highest duty ; deprive it of its chief honor and merit, and best claim
to the respect and support of the people, that is, the vindication of the national
honor, and the maintenance of the national freedom and independence upon the
high seas. Again, if naval defences are relied on, they will either be manned
or not. If manned, what shall we say of the effects of such a life upon men'
and officers ? would it not be destructive of all those characteristics of skill,
daring, and endurance which give to the seamen his power and prestige upon
the ocean "? If not manned, then, compared to forts, they are what wooden docks
are to stone docks. In either case, more men will be required to kee*p them in
repair than forts.
On the question of economy, let us further consider the cost that would be
entailed upon the nation, by the alarm of an invasion or the appearance of a
hostile fleet on the coast.
The sudden equipment and preparation of an army, and its maintenance suf-
ficiently long to remove all apprehension, would cost more, at every principal
seaport, on one single occasion, than all the forts. Then what would be the first
thing that an army would do, belched forth by the tens of thousands from every
railroad station and terminus, but to set to work and throw up the best fortifica-
tions they could in the emergency ? Would not every musket be grounded to
take up picks and shovels ? Again : shall we dwell upon the state of the public
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 439
mind, in one of our chief cities, if its approaches were left without forts equipped
and manned?
Is there any exaggeration in the picture of an enemy's fleet of some thirty
steamers watching an opportunity, and through the ever recurring viscissitudes
on the ocean, familiar to professional men, eluding a naval force of our own,
which it would not have been willing to encounter, running up New York harbor,
anchoring from the North to the East river, in a semicircle round the battery,
hurling destruction with its new and gigantic projectiles, setting fire to the forests
of shipping, and burning the navy yard ; and retreating the moment the tempo-
rary and hurried defences began to tell against them, destroying more property
in a few hours than would cover the shores of Raritan bay, the Narrows, and
the islands of 'the Sound, with fortifications 1 Now, this is the kind of wafare
we must look to, and that we must carry on ourselves.
The greater the injury we can inflict, the more rapidly this injury is repeated,
and the sooner we will obtain redress and bring an unnatural condition of affairs
to a close. The position of Halifax, Bermuda, and the West Indies, must ever
be borne in mind, where fleets may wait for a fitting opportunity for incursions ;
to suppose that there are to be no such thing as surprises, because railroads have
been invented and hollow shot cast, seems to be taking for granted that human
life has changed. Indeed, those who indulge in such theoretical securities are
preparing for themselves surprises, perilous ones too.
Steam will be the great agent in giving to the new elements of destruction
powers of ubiquity. Wherever there is a vulnerable spot, there we must dash,
and there an active enemy will dash at us. But it must be remembered that
so far as the improvement in projectiles, specially referred to in the inquiries
under consideration, are concerned, these have, relatively to ships, strengthened
forts. Hollow shot crumble into fragments and fall harmless when directed
against stone walls. At the siege of Antwerp, under Marshal Girard, they were
thrown from heavy mortars without effect, and experiments at home have further
established the fact. It takes solid shot to batter walls and make breaches
plenty of them, and rapidly discharged, and concentrated upon or near one spot.
On the other hand, we have only to imagine a few eight or ten-inch shells
passing through the side of a line-of-battle-ship into the main or lower gun-deck,
and there exploding amidst the dense crowd at the batteries, every fragment
multiplying itself in countless splinters of wood and iron as destructive as itself,
and if it should fail to burst, still doing all the injury a solid shot could do. Or,
let one enter on the orlop deck among the passers of powder; or, lower still,
striking at the water line, tearing out large irregular fragments, and leaving
openings defying all shot-plugs. Change the scene to a steamer,' with all the
circumstances above mentioned of pervious sides and crowded decks, and con-
ceive a few exploding in the engine-room ; for truly has it been said that, com-
pared to a sailing ship, a steamer has twenty mortal parts to one ! No ! when
it comes to using hollow shot a ship will prefer engaging something similarly
constructed. No ship or ships can lay under a fort at this day; no American
fort, at least, with its furnaces for hot shot in addition to these murderous shells.
In this connexion it may be well to make a passing allusion to the past suc-
cesses of ships-of-war against forts.
They are certainly striking examples of naval prowess, and should always
cause a thrill of professional pride in the breast of every seaman, let his flag be
where it may ; and they should be remembered and studied by officers to incite
to deeds of daring, to self-reliance, and to faith in that " fortune which favors
the brave." But there is no foundation for the theory attempted to be raised
upon these successes. The attack on Algiers by Lord Exmouth, commanding
the combined English and Dutch fleets, take it all in all, is probably the greatest
naval achievement in this line.
440 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
About two hundred guns could be brought to bear against about one thousand
in the fleet, and thereof the admiral's ship, the Queen Charlotte, is considered
generally by the profession to be equal to any on record ; but she was permitted
to come in close to the mole, take up her position, swing round her broadside,
and make fast to an adjoining vessel, before a shot was fired upon her. This
fact alone gives an idea how the defence was conducted; the batteries were de-
fective and unskilfully served, yet the ships hauled off, and the batteries were
not silenced, though redress was obtained. Indeed, it is admitted by Lord
Exmouth that he could not have continued the contest.
Nearer the present day the capture of Acre is equally celebrated, and is inter-
esting, as the new elements of war, steam power and hollow projectiles, were
brought to bear.
The highest military authority in England expressed the opinion in Parliament
that this was one of the greatest achievements of modern times ; but the same
authority added it was also connected with peculiar circumstances which they
could not always hope to occur, and warned their lordships that they must not
always expect that ships, however well commanded, or however gallant their
seamen might be, were capable of commonly engaging successfully with stone
walls.
The works in question were in a bad condition and were undergoing repairs.
Their position permitted an approach through a channel where only a few guns
could be brought to bear against the fleet, most of which took this passage.
But few of the guns of the fort were heavy or effective, and only one battery
of five guns were well served. About five hundred guns brought to bear
on the fort ; the walls were not breached, but a large magazine blew up, and,
producing a panic, the fort surrendered, which, it must be remembered, was be-
sieged by land also.
We have merely alluded to these two justly celebrated attacks of ships against
forts to invite an examination into their details, and into the circumstances of
other similar achievements nearly as striking, with the conviction that few per-
sons could be found who would use these instances of success as an argument
against the necessity of permanent defences. Surely we cannot measure what
has been done in this way, when the preparations for defence and the resistance
were conducted by those whose bravery, as in the cases cited, was left unaided
by skill or science. Neither let it be supposed, where ships have attacked
forts, the results have always been the same ; far from it ; and it is only neces-
sary to allude to the affairs at Fort Moultrie, and, later, to Mobile Point, Ston-
ington, Fort McHenry, &c., from our own national experience.
Are we entirely to reject, in this question the experience and practice of the
great European powers, England and France? The former, with her gigantic
navy, according to the modern hypothesis, would seem to require no permanent
defences ; nor the latter with her increasing marine, already brought to a very
formidable condition in numbers, material, and discipline.
Yet those two nations while building, without ceasing, war steamers are con-
tinually adding to the fixed defences of their seaboard, and this, too, w'ith a view
of making their navies more efficient in their share of the national defence.
France, in consideration of the change likely to occur from the new elements in
war now under consideration, has had recently her sea-coast re-examined by a
high commission, representing all arms in her stupendous military organization ;
and the result was to order still further protection to numerous points on her
seaboard, rendered accessible by light draught steamers mounting heavy ord-
nance, their forts to be 'garrisoned in time of need by the local militia, (garde
nationale.) In England the call is for greater activity in material and permanent
means of defence, particularly in the case of refuge harbors such as Portland
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 441
and Dover, while the fortifications of her great arsenals have all recently been
strengthened.
After mature examination, I am of the opinion that in a system of national
defence forts cannot be dispensed with without entailing enormous expenditures
for uncertain results. The invention of 'cannon and their constant improvements
have changed the form of fortifications, and added to the size, durability, and
massiveness of their construction. Now the invention of cannon was a greater
change in the art of war than any that has occurred in this century, and with
regard to one of the principal improvements of the day in destructive agents
explosive shot the advantage has been given decidedly to forts.
On the other hand, if we cannot dispense with forts, can they not be modi-
fied ? Is there no middle course ? Fortifications in military science are regarded
as a temporary means of resistance, by which an enemy is kept in check until
relief is afforded.
In this view of their functions it seems probable that as, on the one hand,
they might be more effectually assailed by steamers -of- war towing in heavy
ships, both ships and steamers mounting the heavy ordnance which has been
introduced, throwing solid as well as hollow shot, so, on the other hand, relief
being more easily procured, their style of construction might be more economical.
But this is a question belonging to the engineers.
It is one, however, which may be interesting just now with reference to forti-
fying our new coast on the Pacific a work which surely ought not to be delayed.
Here we are, as it were, building up another nation, and it must be built up
with arms as well as arts ; for without arms no nation was ever safe, much less
great.
The position of Halifax, Bermudas, and the West Indies have been alluded
to above in reference to our Atlantic and Gulf coasts. In the Pacific we have
already outposts on our flanks, in the hands of first class powers. The French
have a protectorate government in the Society Islands ; they hold the Marquesas
still nearer, with its superior harbors, and have been looking for years for some
excuse for seizing the Sandwich group ; for this is the only way to account for the
manner in which they have ever countenanced the unjust and ungenerous demands
of their agents in those islands. That they have not now possession of them is
due, probably, to what has been stated of the determination of the government of
the islands to hoist the American flag, and call upon the United States for pro-
tection or incorporation. It is impossible to estimate too highly the value and
importance of the Sandwich Islands, whether in a commercial or military point
of view. Should circumstances ever place them in our hands they would prove
the most important acquisition we could make in the whole Pacific ocean an
acquisition intimately connected with our commercial and naval supremacy in
those seas. Be this as it may, these islands should never be permitted to pass
into the possession of any European power. Then we have British Oregon, with
Vancouver's island, the Halifax of the Pacific coast ; and last, though perhaps
not the least, the Russian possessions of the Sitka, &c., in the north ; and all
these in an ocean above all others adapted to the use of steam.
The third inquiry submitted by the department is whether it be necessary or
expedient to continue the system of fortifications on the shores of the northern
lakes.
The first view of this branch of the subject would probably lead to the con-
clusion that, as we dispensed with forts during the war of 1812, we need them
still less now ; that the contiguity of the two frontiers will enable us to keep
pace with any evidence of preparation on the other side ; that our progress in
population and resources, rendered so immediately available by the increase of
water communication with all parts of the border States, especially with such
important points as the city of Albany, which, in its turn, is connected with all
sections of the country by its great river, railroads, and canals, was far greater
442 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
than any progress within the Canaclas. Yet the advance there has been highly
respectable, and very extensive public works, intimately connected with a sys-
tem of defence, have been completed.
But this very progress on our lake frontier, showing itself in large and popu-
lous towns with a rapidly increasing commerce, all exposed to sudden assault*,
naturally lead one to pause well before advancing the opinion that the general
government is absolved from giving adequate protection to all exposed and im-
portant points, whether on our lake or sea-coast.
Why should not Buffalo and Oswego be protected, as well as Savannah and
Mobile ? Not by extensive and costly works, capable of resisting invasion or
siege, but sufficiently strong not to excite the cupidity or daring spirit of an enemy,
who in a rapid incursion, might, as elsewhere, destroy an enormous amount of
property before any resistance could be brought against him. To conduct a
surprise may be difficult on the lakes ; but we have had, within a few years, full
proof that it is possible.
In case of a war with England her provinces will, in all probability be invaded,
and this invasion, according to the declaration of a distinguished citizen, will be
one almost en masse. He predicts that an army of a hundred thousand men
will march upon the heart and capital of the country, and settle all at one blow;
that neither forts nor ships will be wanted ; and that the rivers and lakes, instead
of obstacles, would become bridges to the invaders. One cannot fail to be stirred
up by this captivating picture ; but in the only trial heretofore made upon Que-
bec the river was not found to be a bridge, and the campaign failed for want of one.
Suffice it, however, to say, if we carry on war on a large scale without being
governed by the art of war, by science, and past experience, we may, and doubt-
less will, still be successful ; but this result will be obtained by an increased
expenditure of blood and treasure.
While an army, however large, was marching upon a vital point, millions of
property might be destroyed along the lake shores, making a heavy discount on
the fruits of the victory, which might be prevented by moderate expenditures.-
Our large frontier towns, where great injury could be suddenly inflicted, should
be protected from liability to a coup de main by forts of moderate dimensions,
to be garrisoned, in time of need, by those whose hearths they shelter. All
lake harbors, whose position, depth of water, and accessibility would render
them important as refuge harbors to our own ships or to those of the enemy,
should also be defended by adequate works. All materials not perishable
should be gradually collected for the construction of ships and steamers. These
preparations become invaluable where war threatens or comes; neither are they
lost if it should not overtake us, for they may have had an important part in
averting it.
In many particulars, and according to the opinion of men of the most expe-
rience, Ontario is the most important in the series of inland seas in a military
point of view, and at this time the English steam tonnage upon it is greater than
our own. This fact alone is one for consideration.
In connexion with the movements of large armies, nothing has been said of
fortifying strategic points on the line of offensive operations, because this ques-
tions is a purely military one, and belongs so especially to another branch of the
service that it would be mere presumption to touch upon it here.
Though not specially referred to in the questions under consideration, it may
be expected that some notice will be taken of the facilities to be derived, in a
system of national defence, from rapid railroad intercommunication and trans-
portation. These certainly can confer a great and real benefit, amounting,
perhaps, to positive exemption from the possibility of invasion. An army, with
its baggage, can accomplish an ordinary march of twenty-five days in one day,
and reach the terminus without fatigue, all ready for fight. The experiment of
transporting troops in this way has already been tried in France, and, more
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 443
recently, the emperor of Russia lias been amusing himself by sending his guards,
with their artillery, to and fro between his capital and Moscow, with entire
success. But it is a misapprehension of means and ideas to suppose that the
necessity of coast defences will be done away with because we possess the power
of transporting the militia from the interior to the seaboard in the briefest space
conceivable. Are our farmers, mechanics, merchants, doctors, and lawyers to
constitute the defence of our maritime frontier'? Are they, in time of war, to
sleep with their knapsacks on their backs and their muskets by their sides, and
be ready at the sound of bell or steam-whistle to leave families and business to
man floating batteries in or near our seaports, or sounds, or rivers ? Besides,
mere numbers, though they may prevent an enemy from landing on our shores,
cannot prevent his ships approaching near enough to hurl destruction among
themselves, destroy cities, and burn shipping.
But if we are to rely upon railroads as one of the modes of repelling sudden
attacks, having for their object the destruction of property or the levying of
contributions, it will be well to inquire as to the amount of dependence that can
be placed upon them. The utility of a road may be destroyed in a few minutes
by very little exertion ; a single rail removed will cause delay if not a serious
accident. During the last revolution in Paris troops were thus prevented from
reaching the city from the departments. In time of war, for those roads at least
which lie along the coasts, a system of frequent inspection may be necessary,
and means of repairing injuries kept at hand.
In the first part of this report it has been stated that, however complete our
system of fortifications may be made, a large sphere of action in a scheme of
national defence will still devolve upon the navy. The general effect of fortifi-
cations is to exclude war from our borders, and contribute to the inestimable
advantage of leaving society in an undisturbed state, pursuing its usual avoca-
tions. A navy becomes efficient just in proportion as it is relieved from harbor
defence; and in a war, even defensive in its origin and object, the navy in almost
every case must assume an offensive attitude. We lose the vantage-ground if
we wait the assault of an enemy. One would suppose there could scarcely be
a dissenting opinion in reference to this point ; that the special function of the
navy, in war, is to be aggressive. Our able engineers, and especially their
present distinguished chief, in the admirable reports they have been making for
years on this subject, invariably assign this high and all-important position to
the navy.
General Cass tells us, "Our great battle upon the ocean is yet to be fought,
and we shall gain nothing by shutting our eyes to the nature of the struggle."
Similar views are held abroad as to the true sphere of a navy. The Duke of
Wellington, while urging increased activity in the permanent defences of Great
Britain, in the strengthening of forts, the construction of barracks, and place
cTarmes to be walled in, still considers the navy of England, through its powers
of aggression, its most essential defence.
The extraordinary expansion of this country and its development in every
department, shown especially in a commerce which, long since whitening every
sea, has received a marvellous stimulant recently, by the accession of a thou-
sand miles of coast on the Pacific, by new channels of trade, and by the modifi-
cations in the navigation laws of our great competitor, should lead all reflecting
minds to consider how great would be the revulsion in our prosperity if, through
any untoward event, we should loose the means of protecting this commerce.
Standing now in the front rank with our great commercial rival, shall we neglect
an old aphorism of Sir Walter Raleigh, most cogent still : "Whosoever com-
mands the sea commands the trade, and whosoever commands the trade com-
mands the riches of the world?"
Now, is our navy, in point of efficiency and numbers, what it should be?
Our statesmen constantly allude to it as the right arm of the nation's power;
444 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
yet has this arm been kept in any degree of vigor commensurate with the work
it may have to perform or in keeping with our position among the nations 1 Is
it equal to the ordinary exigencies occurring almost daily 1 The law passed
some years since limiting the number of seamen still exists. Since its passage
our commerce has nearly doubled, and our squadrons are too small to give it
adequate protection or to keep up a healthful spirit and experience in the naval
profession. Recently the government had not at its disposal the means to pre-
vent an unlawful aggression on the territory of a friendly power; nor was the
force sufficiently respectable afterwards to infuse, by its presence alone, a little
mercy into Spanish justice. But are we yet through with this question of Cuba?
Are we not threatened with a foreign intervention ? At any rate, does it not
offer another striking instance to be added to the long list of dangers which, at
different periods, have suddenly sprung upon us, and to which this day of special
international amity has proved no exception 1 ? The French claims, the north-
eastern boundary, the affair of the Caroline, the Oregon controversy, have all
shaken for the time being our relations with the two most formidable powers of
Europe formidable to us only because they have powerful navies a collision
with either of which would be rather a different affair from that with our neigh-
boring republic, with whom similar disturbances ripened into actual hostilities.
The naval power of England is greater than ever before in her history, and
the disparity between us is yearly increasing, particularly in her steam navy.
In the admiralty navy list for April, 1850, we find one hundred and fifty
steamers-of-war; of course many of these are already obsolete in construction
and machinery, but she is building new ones and launching numbers every year.
In addition to these, especially constructed for war purposes, she has between
sixty and seventy mercantile steamers, capable of being armed with thirty-two
pounder cannon, for which the guns, carnages, and ammunition are actually
prepared. She has, still further, two hundred and forty more, capable of mount-
ing a lighter armament, and some six hundred besides, which might be of ser-
vice to resist invasion from her neighbors. Exclusive of her squadrons abroad,
which are large and efficient, with a due proportion of steamers to each, in
January, 1851, she had in commission at home fourteen sail of the line, three
of them screw steamers, ten frigates, four of them steamers, besides several
steam sloops, all ready for sea. She has also ready for commissioning twenty
other powerful steamers, viz : eight large frigates and twelve sloops.
The training of officers and men is in full keeping with this colossal force.
Her squadron of evolutions offers the finest school for both, and the gunnery
ships are making her able seamen expert artillerists, good swordsmen, and
capital shots with pistol and carbine.
The navy of France is also powerful ; it has risen entirely from its almost
total extinction during the long and bloody contest from 1789 to 1815. In
steamers-of-war, at the commencement of this year, she had one line-of-battle-
ship of ninety guns, with screw propellers, fourteen steam frigates of first class,
mounting from eight to sixteen guns of heavy ordnance ; fifteen steam corvettes,
and forty despatch steamers, most of them mounting from two to four shell-
guns. (See Etat General de la Marine et des Colonies, for February, 1851.)
Both these navies have reached the highest state of efficiency, skill, and dis-
cipline, and their -morale never was higher: that of England, roused to the
maintenance of its boasted supremacy on the ocean; that of France, burning
for an opportunity to show the world that is practical skill is now equal to that
science and bravery which were ever conspicuous.
When completed, we shall have in our navy five steam frigates and one
steam sloop. These vessels mount or will mount from six to ten guns, some of
them of large calibre ; they are strong, well-built, and efficient vessels, one or
more of them quite equal, if not superior, to anything of the same class abroad.
But this statement, compared with the two made above of the navies of England
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 445
and France, shows terrible odds against us. It is well to remember this ; but
it is not exhibited here with the intention of making it the basis of an argument
to show that we should set to work and erect such fleets here. The temper of
our people in relation to any such expenditures has already been spoken of, and
there is no desire to advocate extravagant cost for contingent advantages.
But this disparity between us and other nations in our means of offence and
defence, already so great, is yearly increasing. How is it to be got rid of or
lessened ? The reply is often made : Has it not ever been so ? was it not quite
as great when we went into the war of 1812? And it may well be asked how
that disparity was overcome in that memorable contest. In the first place, it
was lessened by the skill, courage, and coolness of our officers, united to the
fine spirit, good gunnery, and high discipline of the crews. In the second
place, by a process equalling the greatest piece of strategy ever performed on
land by the greatest military captains. We built frigates which in size, calibre
of guns, and in the brave hearts who took charge of them, literally struck off
from the British navy list everything below a line-of-battle ship, at least so far
as these frigates were concerned.
The first encounter of our frigates with theirs astounded Britain. In account-
ing for her defeats, it was natural for her only to have seen the disparity in size
and armament, but the official account of these frigates shows something more,
and this is now acknowledged with becoming candor by some of her distin-
guished men. Sir Francis Head, in a recent work, says : " Gunnery was, in
naval warfare, in the extraordinary state of ignorance we have just described,
when our lean children, the American people, taught us, rod in hand, our first
lesson in the art." Certain it is that the British admiralty board thought it
necessary to put a stop to what they conceived to be a very unequal contest,
and accordingly intimated confidentially to the captains of their ships that they
did not conceive that any of his Majesty'syhg-ate? should engage single-handed
the larger class of Ameican ships, which, though they may be called frigates,
are of a size, complement, and weight of metal much beyond that class, and
more resembling line-of-battle-ships.
Now, can we not once more render obsolete one-half or two-thirds of the
English and French navies, and compel these powers to remodel their steam as
well as sailing ships'? It is the opinion of officers who have closely examined
this subject, aided by actual experiments, that we have not yet reached the
maximum point in the use afloat of heavy ordnance.
It is proposed to build ships that will carry guns of larger calibre and longer
range than any heretofore used ; to have auxiliary steam power, with the ma-
chinery out of reach of shot or shell, to be disencumbered of side-wheels, and,
when not using this auxiliary power, to be fast and manageable under canvas
very much such a ship as the Princeton was, on a larger scale, and with the
improvements which seven years have introduced. All candid minds will now
admit that the conception and principle involved in the construction and arma-
ment of this ship was in advance of her day, for in casting round we have found
nothing combining so many requisites for a steamer-of-war.
The advantage of guns with long ranges is feelingly dwelt upon by Sir
Francis Head, already quoted. Speaking of the American navy in the last
war, he says : " They not only converted their seamen into practical gunners
and expert artillerymen, but, by substituting long guns instead of our short
ones, they secured for themselves the immense advantage of being able, without
loss or danger, luxuriously to pummel us to death, at ranges which they had
precalculated they would be completely out of our reach."
It would seem unnecessary to mention that all improvements in the imple-
ments of war, the moment they are proved effective, will, of course, be seized
upon by other powers, for concealment in these matters is no longer attempted.
But the great point to be gained is to compel these powers, as it were, to
446 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
start, de novo, with us, and to render comparatively valueless tlieir gigantic
naval establishments. In the building of a steam navy we have scarcely com-
menced, and it is rather mortifying to think that even Spain has as many
steamers-of-war as we have. Candor compels the admission, however, that cir-
cumstances have greatly favored us, and though this extreme economy or in-
difference might have cost us dear, certain it is that many millions of dollars
have been saved by the delay. England and France have been going through
the usual costly process in such matters before reaching a measure of excellence
one improvement almost immediately laid aside for another, and this one as
rapidly giving way to something still better ; while all this time we have been
dealing most sparingly with this very expensive agent, steam power. But now
that a great degree of perfection has been reached in its application, that the
science and mechanical skill of the country are at so high a point, that our
wealth and resources have so increased, shall we continue to refuse a reasonable
measure of preparation for future exigencies ?
Allusion has been made to the assistance England is prepared to receive from
her mercantile steam vessels ; and it may be said we have the same resources, so
far as they go, of falling back upon our splendid mail steamers. These vessels
would doubtless prove serviceable in many ways ; they may carry a few guns
of very respectable, though not of the largest calibre ; built for speed, they would
be admirable despatch vessels, serve to reconnoitre with safety the movements
of an enemy, give warning of his approach, and the amount of his force in
short, be what Nelson termed his frigates, " the eyes of the fleet." But these
steamers cannot form the basis of a steam navy ; such an idea would be fatal to
our naval efficiency. It is not intended by this to object to government's giving
adequate protection to these mail steamers, in order to carry out the international
postal arrangements. But they are not such steamers as the government would
now build for war purposes ; the side- wheel may be said to be almost obsolete,
and their machinery is altogether too much exposed to shot and shell ; ships so
costly must, at least, be made less vulnerable. But if the mail steamers are to
be depended upon, as our steam navy, and not as auxiliaries to it, as the English
and French mercantile steamers are to their navies, then another question
presents itself. At what stage of an impending emergency is the government,
in conformity with the right granted in the contract, to take these steamers ?
If this be deferred until a late moment, there may be no time to fit them for
war service, for very material alterations will have to be made. If further
deferred, until hostilities break out, they certainly will not be ready for the first
brush, and half of them may be picked up abroad by the smallest armed cruiser.
Should they be taken by the government prematurely, tlieir business and profit
are broken up, and pass into the hands of their rivals, who may run their steamers
to the last moment consistent with safety ; for by the other powers, as stated
above, they are only held as auxiliaries.
A few alarms, then, leading to no rupture, may saddle the government with
a class of steamers not fit for the navy proper, to be disposed of at an enormous
loss ; for the alterations which will have been made to convert them into " men-
of-war" will have wholly unfitted them for their peaceful pursuits; just as
much so as the exorbitant expenditure for the luxurious accommodation of
passengers is wholly unnecessary for a steam frigate. In truth, in the transfer
of these mail steamers this item may be so great that it should not be altogether
overlooked. It has been stated that the saloons, cabins, and decorations of one
of these lines have cost from one hundred thousand to one hundred and twenty
thousand dollars per ship, which, of course, must be paid for, though not one
dollar of it would be required for naval use. Two iron hooks to swing his
hammock, make the berth of the seaman, and a few pine boards compose the
bunk of the officers.
In conclusion, whatever may be decided in relation to the national defence by
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 447
fortification, whether these be continued, extended, or modified, I beg leave to
express an emphatic dissent from all theories having for their object the substi-
tution of active ships-of-war for permanent works. This would be placing the
navy in a false position before the country ; giving it duties to perform for which
its organization is inapplicable ; preparing for its future discredit and loss, through
failures to execute that which should never have been undertaken, which is not
embraced in the general scope and design of a naval establishment.
To retain the navy for harbor defence was entertained at the commencement
of the last war with England ; the proposition to do so sprung from the appre-
hension that it could not compete with the vastly superior English forces upon
the ocean. But at that time some brave and sagacious officers in the high ranks
saved the navy from the fate that threatened it, and to these gentlemen it owes
all its subsequent honors, usefulness, and prosperity. If any such ideas prevail,
at this day, in or out of the profession, those holding them would do well to
pause and consider what the navy would have lost, and what the country would
have lost, if our ships-of-war had at that eventful period been deprived of the
opportunity of filling so bright a page in the nation's history by their achieve-
ments upon the ocean. In this connexion an eloquent passage in the speech of
a great statesman is recalled, delivered in the Senate of the United States in
1838. After alluding to our being at war with England, at a moment when
she had gained an ascendancy on the seas over the whole combined powers of
Europe, and quoting the familiar verse of her poet,
" Her march is o'er the mountain wave,
Her home is on the deep,"
Mr. Webster says : " Now, sir, since we were at war with her I was for inter-
cepting this march; I was for calling upon her, and paying our respects to her
at home; I was for giving her to know that we, too, had a right of way over
the seas, and that our officers and our sailors were not entire strangers on the
bosom of the deep; 1 was for doing something more with our navy than to keep
it on our shores for the protection of our own coasts and our own harbors; I was
for giving play to its gallant and burning spirit; for allowing it to go forth upon
the seas, and to encounter on an open and an equal field whatever the proudest
or the bravest of the enemy could bring against it. I knew the character of its
officers and the spirit of its seamen, and 1 knew that in their hands, though the
flag of the country might go down to the bottom, while they went with it, yet
that it could never be dishonored or disgraced.
"Since she was our enemy, and a most powerful enemy, I was for touching
her, if we could, in the very apple of her eye; for reaching the highest feather
in her cap; for clutching at the very highest jewel in her crown." * * * *
" The ocean, therefore, was the proper theatre for deciding this controversy with
our enemy ; and on that theatre my ardent wish was that our own power should
be concentrated to the utmost."
It would be ill suited, indeed, to the spirit of this nation to retain its naval
forces in its own waters during a war, especially if that war was with a naval
power. Steam, this new element in the affairs of the world, has very materially
changed our position with reference to other nations. Our distance from Europe,
measured in time, is now reduced to a brief period of ten days. These United
States have hitherto been advancing the general cause of human liberty by an
active and progressive peace ; but do not events abroad more and more indicate
that we may, at no distant day, be forced into our own defence to aid this
cause of freedom by an active war?
Respectfully submitted.
S. F. DUPONT,^
Commander United States Navy.
448 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
No. 5.
Report of Lieutenant J. Lanman.
NEW YORK NAVY YARD, September 20, 1851.
SIR : In obedience to the within order of the honorable the Secretary of the
Navy, I have the honor to submit the following, as the result of my best reflec-
tions upon the subject referred to in your communication of the 17th June last,
addressed to the honorable the Secretary of the Navy :
1st. " To what extent, if any, ought the present system of fortifications for
the protection of our seaboard to be modified in consequence of the application
of steam to vessels-of-war, the invention or improvement of projectiles, or other
changes that have taken place since it was adopted in the year 1816 1 M
The great change produced upon all maritime nations by the application of
steam must, of course, have a most important bearing in regard to the system
of our national defences, as adopted in the year 1816, and that system most
applicable to the same purpose at the present day.
I desire to say that should a foreign power design hostilities against the
United States, their steamers, with transport ships in tow, would not attempt
to pass our fortifications, but could land thousands of troops upon our shores at
the numerous points convenient for so doing, and free from the annoyance of
any battery.
At the same time, I conceive it all important that our seaports should be pro-
tected ; yet the great improvements made in projectiles, and the advancement
in the science of gunnery, would suggest that our fortifications need not be so
extensive, and consequently erected at much less expense. Though I would
not demolish any of the works now completed, yet those being erected could be
so modified as to receive the heavy armament of the present day, and be finished
at much less expense than by carrying out the designs of fortifications planned
many years since and not yet completed.
2d. " What reliance could be placed on vessels-of-war, or of commerce, float-
ing batteries, gunboats, and other temporary substitutes for permanent fortifica-
tions ? "
In reply I would say that great reliance could be placed on war steamers of
moderate draught of water, armed with our efficient eight and ten-inch colum-
biads, as they should at all times be in readiness to take in tow any armed
vessels at the naval station, and in a few hours from port could oppose the land-
ing of the enemy upon any part of the adjacent coast.
Sailing vessel of the commercial marine and river steamers (suitable for the
purpose) would be available means of transporting troops to oppose the landing
upon our shores of any hostile force.
Floating batteries and gunboats, and other temporary substitutes for perma-
nent fortifications, I conceive to be heavy expenditures of the public treasury,
and not of the least possible benefit to the government. Of course I would
except such temporary means of defence as a case of emergency might demand,
when the people of our country are ever ready to look out for themselves.
3d. " Is it necessary or expedient to consider the system on fortifications on
the shores of the northern lakes ? "
The same answer will apply to those works that I have made in regard to
the fortifications on our seaboard. Those unfinished should be modernized, and
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 449
those in service armed with projectiles and otherwise adapted to the improve-
ments of the year 1851.
I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,
JOSEPH LANMAN,
Lieutenant United States Navy.
Hon. C. M. CONRAD,
Secretary of War.
No. 6.
Report of Lieutenant M. F. Maury.
NATIONAL OBSERVATORY, Washington, August, 1851.
SIR : I have received a communication from the Secretary of the Navy, cover-
ing the copy of a letter from yourself of June 17, 1851, requesting him to
communicate certain resolutions of Congress concerning land defences and forti-
fications to several officers of the navy, and " to obtain their separate opinions in
writing" upon the following points, viz :
1st. " To what extent, if any, ought the present system of fortifications for
the protection of our seaboard to be modified, in consequence of the application
of steam to vessels-of-war, the invention or improvement of projectiles, or other
changes that have taken place since it was adopted in the year 1816 ?"
2d. " What reliance could be placed on vessels-of-war, or of commerce, float-
ing batteries, gunboats, and other temporary substitutes for permanent fortifica-
tions ?"
3d. " Is it necessary or expedient to continue the system of fortifications on
the northern lakes ?"
The resolutions are :
" 1st. Resolved, That the Secretary of War be directed to report to this
House, the second Monday in December next, on the subject of the land de-
fences of the country, in which he will review the general system adopted after
the war with Great Britain, and since pursued, in regard to the permanent forti-
fications then deemed necessary for the national defence ; and that he report
whether the general plan may not now be essentially modified by reducing the
number of works proposed to be erected, and by abandoning some of the forts
now in progress of construction."
" 2d. Resolved, That the Secretary of War also report the number of fortifi-
cations which have been built, including those nearly completed under the
general system, the number in progress of construction, and the number not yet
commenced, but proposed to be erected, and in such form as will conveniently
show the States and Territories in which the several forts are situated or to be
located, when the work was commenced, when completed or expected to be
finished, the number and calibre of the guns mounted or to be mounted, the
estimated cost, the amount expended, and the sums yet required to finish or
construct, as the case may be, each work."
I am directed by the Secretary of the Navy to give this subject my "best
reflections, and to communicate the result to the Secretary of War."
To make clear the result of my reflections upon this subject it is first neces-
sary to pass, at least briefly, in review the condition of the country immediately
preceding the year 1816, when the present system of fortifications was adopted,
and to contrast the condition and military resources of the United States then,
and their condition and military resources now.
H. Kep. Com. 86 29
450 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
In 1816 our population was eight millions; we had just come out of a trying
and expensive war with the most powerful nation in the world ; our soil had
been invaded, the Capitol burned, towns had been besieged, villages laid waste,
and the people greatly harassed by the presence among them of an insolent foe.
The application of steam as a motive power, even to river craft, was but an
experiment, and men had not yet waked from their dream in which they first
saw upon the ocean visions of steam navigation. Kailroads had not then begun
to thread themselves over the country, nor had the first telegraphic wire streaked
the horizon. The country had been and might again be invaded ; the alarm
could be spread only at the rate of one hundred miles a day ; and to repel the
enemy our generals could bring up their forces only at the rate of what, in this
day of steam and railroad car, would be considered as a snail's pace ; twenty
miles was a good day's march for an army.
Under these circumstances, with the horrors of war and the dread of invasion
fresh in the minds of the people, it was natural that the attention of the govern-
ment should be directed to a system of defence along our borders which, in
another war, should make the weak points strong, the salient impregnable, and
the exposed, the rich, and the tempting secure ; thus rendering the country in
another war safe from invasion. Accordingly, the plan was to line the seaboards
with forts and castles, which should oppose the advances of the enemy, beat
him back, resist sieges, and support garrisons for defence, until re-enforcements
should arrive or the patience and the energies of the assailants should become
exhausted. Under these circumstances the present system of fortifications was
commenced.
For defending the approaches to any particular part of the coast, the engi-
neer, in planning his works, had to take into account the importance to us of
the place to be defended; the importance which the enemy would probably
attach to its occupation by himself; and the force that he would or could,
probably, bring against it. Also an element which entered largely into the
engineer's plans was the kind of force, the calibre of guns, &c., that his fort
would have to withstand.
But since that time great changes have taken place. The relative importance
of ports and harbors, and places to be defended along the coast, has greatly
changed. The implements of warfare and the means of attack and defence
have changed; structures that were well calculated to resist the batteries of the
best appointed ships in 1816, would now tumble down before the appliances of
modern warfare. The improvements which have since taken place in ships,
their armaments and locomotion, are vast; and therefore works may be found
along our coast which, though sufficient in their day, would now be wholly
inadequate to the purpose for which they were intended.
At best, a fort can actually defend so much of the coast only as lies within
the range of its guns ; outside of this range and enemy may disembark an army,
land his heavy ordnance in the very sight of the strongest castle, as we our-
selves have since done at Vera Cruz, and proceed to invest, from the rear, the
strongholds of the country. It was therefore practicable for a bold and dashing
enemy, notwithstanding the powerful and costly works at Old Point Comfort,
in Virginia, to land in sight of these works an army, in Lynn Haven bay, march
up to Norfolk without coming in reach of the protecting battery, and invest the
city and the navy yard the very places the guns of these forts were intended
to protect.
True, it was practicable to erect works of defence at Lynn Haven bay ; but
being erected, the sagacity of our engineers perceived there were still other
places and times at which an enemy might land and march up to Norfolk with-
out once coming in range of the Lynn Haven guns. The country saw this,
and perceived that effectually to prevent an enemy of naval resources from
landing on our coast in war would require a structure but little short of a
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 451
Chinese wall, with bastions mounting guns to range and rake every point, from
one end of our extended sea-front to the other.
Solomon's exchequer could not withstand the drafts which such a complete
system of defence would make upon the treasury ; and neither the minds of the
people nor the purse of the public was prepared to incur it. Accordingly, the
most important points were selected for fortifications, which, even if completed,
would not have protected the country from invasion ; they would only have
prevented the enemy from anchoring with his fleet in the most safe roadsteads,
and from landing with his forces at the most convenient places, and from batter-
ing down our cities with the guns of his men-of-war.
And upon the carrying out of this system, as incomplete as it necessarily was,
there was involved, according to the estimates of the most skilful and accom-
plished engineers, a sum of money which it would be difficult for the imagination
to conceive, for it required eight or nine places of figures to comprehend it, so
enormous was the amount.
Virile this system, expensive and defective as it was, was in progress, com-
menced those changes in the country to which I have alluded; a change of '
population from eight to twenty odd millions, in the means of spreading the-
alarm of an intended invasion ; a change from the signal fire on the mountain
and the horse and his rider, to the fiery footed messenger of heaven, to raise the
country. For the foot pace of twenty miles a day, as the weary rate of our 1
advancing armies, a change which ties infantry, cavalry, and artillery all to the
tail of the iron horse, mounts them on railroads, and speeds off with them at the
rate of twenty times twenty miles a day, with the ability to land them at the
appointed place at the appointed time, refreshed with the ride and ready for
battle ; a change in ordnance and missiles of death, which are far more destruc-
tive and much more terrible in battle than any ever known in the annals o
military warfare, Anno domini 1816.
These changes are enough to revolutionize the system of coast defences..
They have rendered effete in part the system of 1816.
Railroads are now already completed, or actually in process of construction,,
leading from New York up among the granite hills of New England back to
the lakes and beyond the mountains cuts the great Miami bottom, and spread-
ing themselves out over the rich prairies beyond.
From Norfolk they go north and south, and are ramifying themselves far
away into the back country, with the intent of reaching the very heart of the
nation in the good valley of the west.
Now, were it possible for an enemy, with the greatest army that ever was led
into battle by the greatest captain, to take the country by surprise, and to land
at Long Island sound, or in Lynn Haven bay, and to be disembarking his last
piece of artillery before he was discovered, these railroads, the power of steam,
with the aid of lightning, would enable the government, before he could reach
the heights of Brooklyn, or the outskirts of Norfolk, to have there in waiting;
and ready to receive him and beat him back into the sea, a force two to one-
greater than his, however strong.
Suppose that in 1847 there had been in active operation between Vera Cruz;
and the city of Mexico a line of magnetic telegraph and such a railroad as is-
the Erie road of New York, can it be supposed that our generals, being cogni-
zant of the facts, would have so much as entertained the idea of landing
there as they did and laying siege to the town.
All the world knows where our railroads are, and that the country is pro-
tected from military surprise and invasion from the sea by a net-work of tele-
graphic wires ; the mere knowledge of the fact that Norfolk and New York
can bring to their defence such resources will forever prevent even the thought
in the mind of an enemy of landing in force at Lynn Haven bay or on Long
Island.
452 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
Those roads, therefore, render a siege to any of the works of defence before
those places out of the question.
To lay siege to any place along our sea-front involves not only the disem-
barking of an army, but the landing also of the siege-train. This requires time.
From the time that the head of our invading column jumped out of the boats,
up to their waists in the water, at Vera Cruz, till General Scott was ready to
send his summons to the city, was thirteen days, and it was four days more
before his heavy artillery drew overtures from the besieged total, seventeen
days.
Imagine an army, the best equipped it may be the world ever saw, that should
attempt to beleaguer one of our strongholds for seventeen days. Within that
time we could bring against him, by railroads and steamboats, millions of the
freemen, which this country ever holds in reserve, to fight its battles. It might
be Boston, before which this imaginary army is supposed to set down in im-
aginary siege, or it may be New York, Philadelphia, Norfolk, Charleston, or
New Orleans it is immaterial where. In less than half the Vera Cruz time
^we could throw millions of men into any one of these places, and subsist them,
iin the meantime, by a daily market train of cars and steamboats, catering for
ithem in the abundant markets of the Mississippi valley.
It is impossible that any army, however brave, spirited, and daring, should
*ever think of invading a country like this, and attacking us upon our own
:ground, when we have under our command such powers of concentration and
:such force in reserve as twenty millions of freemen, the electric telegraph, the
(railroad car, the locomotive, and the steamboat.
The present system of fortifying the coast is founded on the principle of
imaking the fortifications "strong in proportion to the value of the great objects
to be secured."*
This is the principle upon which every system of national defence must rest ;
and as to this principle itself there can be no difference of opinion. The ques-
tion is, in what shall the strength of a fortification consist? For a fortification
that is strong against the most powerful weapons and modes of attack known
to. our age may be weak before those that the inventions and improvements of
.another age may call forth.
In the feudal times castles were built to enable those within to withstand the
attack of spearsmen and archers. These old castles were strong in their day,
but in ours they are impotent and of no avail.
The fortifications of 1816 were built to withstand the armaments which were
Amounted upon the ships of that day; and what were they?
In .1812 the Duke of Wellington, when preparing to besiege Badajos, wrote
to Admiral Berkley, commanding the Lisbon station, to request the loan of
.twenty twenty -four pounders from the fleet. Admiral Berkley, in reply to the
request for twenty-four pounders, stated that no ship under his command carried
guns of so heavy a nature; but offered to supply twenty eighteen pounders,
\with carriages and ammunition complete.! It would be difficult to nd now-a-
<days any ship in any fleet with guns so small as a twenty-four pounder =
Now it has been proven, or made probable, that it is practicable to put on
Aboard ships, carry to sea with safety, and manage with effect, long guns with a
calibre for shot of one hundred and thirty-five pounds at least; and it would be
as reasonable to expect a fortification which was built to resist shot of eighteen
or twenty-four, or even of thirty-two or forty -two pounds, to withstand the con-
cussion of shot of one hundred and thirty-five pounds weight as it would be to
* See report of the board of army officers, 1840, on the millitary defences of the coun-
try a paper that is drawn with great ability, and to which I shall occasionally refer. It is
contained in Pub. Doc. No. 206, House of Reps., 1st session 26th Congress.
f Journal of Sieges in Spain and Portugal, vol. 1, p. 145.
I
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 453
expect a thirty-two pounder to strike harmlessly against a wall which was built
only to resist a ten pound shot.
In 1816 our fortifications had to be provided with the means of withstanding
sieges. Hence, they were required to be as strong in the rear as in the front,
and to be equally invulnerable from every direction. But now steam and elec-
tricity render our seaboard fortifications invulnerable in the rear and protect
them against sieges. Attempts to cany by storm may be made ; but as for an
enemy who sees and understands, as the leader of every army must see and
understand, the powers of concentration which steam gives us as for such an
enemy to think of setting down before one of our strongholds and proceeding
regularly to invest it, by executing parallels, building fascines, digging trenches, '
throwing up enbankments, making approaches and the like, it is out of the
question. Our railroads perfectly protect the entire coast line from Maine to
Georgia from any such attempt. We may be blockaded by sea, and harassed
from ships, but we cannot be beleagured on the land.
These are the changes which have rendered necessary a change in the whole
system of national defence, and the chief stationary works of defence which we
now want along the Atlantic seaboard, are those that will protect our cities and
towns from the great guns of big ships.
We may admit, in imagination, now, a dashing enemy again into the Chesa-
peake; we may suppose him landed, with all his forces, and to be, without op-
position, in the act of taking up his line of march again for this city.
Now, is it not obvious supposing the country to be in a reasonable state of
reparation at the commencement of war supposing this much, is it not obvious,
y sending telegraphic messages, and using the powers of steam for conveyance,
the American general might sit down here, in Washington, and at daylight the
next morning commence an attack upon that enemy, both in front and in rear,
with almost any amount of force, consisting of regulars, volunteers, and militia,
that can be named. Ketreat, for such a foe, would be out of the question, and
re-embarkation an impossibility.
Therefore, so far as the system of 1816 was intended to defend the country
from invasion along the Atlantic seaboard, steam, railroads, and the telegraph
have rendered it as effete as did the invention of fire-arms the defences which
the military science of that age had erected against the shafts of the archer.
It is not going too far to say that, as for invasion, we might raze every forti-
fication along the Atlantic coast without exposing the country to the danger of
being overrun by an enemy in war. He might, in such a case, take possession
of our seaports, destroy our dock yards and arsenals, and do an incalculable
amount of mischief, but as for his venturing to leave the strongholds on the
seabord, and attempting to penetrate, even for a few miles into the interior,
would be out of the question.
He would be besieged from the moment of his landing; he might return to
us our cities in ruins, our dock yards in ashes ; but as for invading the country,
and marching his armies over it from place to place, our steam machines forbid
it. Hence I maintain, we now want fortifications only to do what railroads and
steam never can, viz : as before said, to protect our seaport towns from the great
guns of big ships.
Suppose the system of 1816 to have been completed; that the fortifications
therein contemplated had all been built, provisioned, equipped, and garrisoned.
Now, saving only those which protect the large cities from the guns of men-of-
war, suppose the alternative should be presented to our military men, whether
they would undertake to defend the country from invasion, with such a complete
system of fortifications, but without the assistance of railroads, steamers, and
telegraph, or with the assistance of railroads, steamers, and telegraph, but with-
out the aid of the fortifications.
I suppose, could such an alternative be submitted to every officer of the army,
454 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
from the oldest down to the youngest, that there would be but one answer, and
that would be, " down with the forts, and give us the railroad, the locomotive,
the steamboat, and the telegraph."
I do not mean to advance the opinion that railroads, steam, and the telegraph,
with the military powers of concentration which they give us, have rendered
fortifications entirely useless. By no means : steam and electromagnetism on
the land can do but little against the tremendous power of armed ships on the
water; and if these can bring any one of our large cities within the reach of
their guns, its destruction is inevitable, despite all that the powers of the loco-
our motive and the telegraph can do. It is chiefly to keep such ships from burning
cities and havens, within reach of their broadsides, that we want forts and castles.
Therefore seeing that, in 1816, when the present system of defending the
coast was planned, railroads and the magnetic telegraph were unknown, they
now ought to involve modifications of that system. In military operations they
are powerful auxiliaries. They introduce new elements and new features into
the arts of war; they bear upon the whole system of attack and defence.
They, therefore, cannot fail to make necessary certain modifications in any
system of coast defence which was planned without regard to them.
With this exposition of my views, I proceed to answer your first question, viz :
"1. To what extent, if any, ought the present system of fortifications for the
protection of our seaboard to be modified, in consequence of the application of
steam to vessels-of-war, the invention or improvement of projectiles, or other
changes that have taken place since it was adopted in the year 1816 ?"
Let us first consider the modification applicable to the Atlantic seaboard, and
then those that are applicable to the Pacific.
The only fortifications that are wanted along our Atlantic seaboard, except
those at Key West and the Tortugas, at Ship island, and at one or two more
such places, are those which will protect our cities and towns from the broad-
sides of men-of-war.
The forts already completed, or well advanced towards completion, are believed
to be sufficient for this. They should, however, be mounted with heavier ordnance,
and pieces of the most effective calibre for throwing explosive shot and shells.
In 1840, the House of Representatives, by resolution of April 9th, called
upon the War Department for a report among other things, " of a full and con-
nected system of national defence."
The subject was referred to a board of engineer officers, who presented their
views in a masterly manner. I have before referred to this well-drawn paper,
and shall have frequent occasion to refer to it again. That report sustains the
system of 1816. The source whence it comes entitles it to far more weight than
is attached to any of my opinions. Nevertheless, honestly differing with that
board in some of its positions, I hope I may be permitted to express that differ-
ence of opinion without laying myself liable to the charge, from any quarter,
of want of respect for the distinguished officers who composed that board.
That report, which is by far the most able paper that I have seen in favor of
the system of 1816, does not contemplate any guns for our fortifications heavier
than a forty -two pounder, or an eight-inch howitzer ; of course I speak techni-
cally, and do not allude to mortars.
It may be considered as a fact pretty well established, that two or three ex-
plosive nine or ten-inch shells, well aimed and properly planted, are enough to
tear out the side of the largest ship, and completely to disable, if not wholly to
destroy her.
I quote from the experiments made with nine-inch explosive shot, in the har-
bor of Brest, upon the Pacificateur, an eighty-gun ship.*
c 'Vide an account of experiments made in the French navy for the trial of shell guns,
&c., by J. H. Paixhan's Lieutenant Colonel translated from the French by Lieutenant
John A. Dahlgren, U. S. N.
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 455
The piece to be fired was mounted on a small pontoon, and planted off upon
the water to the distance of about six hundred and forty yards from the eighty-
gun ship, which was to be the target.
The experiments were made in the presence of a number of the most eminent
officers in the French navy.
The first shot sufficed to determine opinions; but, to complete the evidence,
twelve shots were fired.
The following is a summary from the official report on the occasion :
" The first shot struck low, and, as soon as the explosion was heard the
commission repaired on board. A thick smoke filled the between decks, where
the bomb had burst. The fire engine was worked and the smoke lasted ten or
twelve minutes ; the bomb had made a breach of eight and a half inches in di-
ameter in the ship's side, which there was twenty-nine inches thick; it had
torn off two feet of the inner plank and then exploded ; made a hole in the orlop
deck of two to three feet square, kncoked away and shattered to atoms more
than one hundred and sixty square feet of timber.
" The second gun traversed the quarter-deck, carrying with it two peices of
plank, one of which was five and a quarter feet long, then striking the mainmast
obliquely, it knocked off a splinter from three to four feet long and nine and a
half inches thick, and bursting, tore away a mast band ten and a half feet in
circumference, weighing one hundred and thirty pounds ; this mass of iron was
driven with such a force that one of its halves struck the opposite bulwark, sev-
enteen feet distant, where it flattened and adhered. The splinters of the bomb
shattered the bitts, cut some of the braces, and would have injured many men
and articles of rigging if the ship had been equipped. The explosion also set
fire to a coil of rope.
" The third bomb entered the side, between two ports, struck and tore off an
oaken knee seven feet five inches long and six and a half to thirteen and three-
quarter inches thick, which, with its iron fastenings, weighed more than two hun-
dred and six pounds ; then bursting, its splinters knocked down forty of the
wooden figures nailed around the guns to represent men. The explosion also
shattered one of the beams supporting the cfeck above, starting several
planks, one of which was ten and a half feet long, and another five and a quarter
feet," &c.
"To abridge this detail, I will," says the reporter, "only refer to the two
most remarkable shots of the remaining nine.
" Perceiving that the bombs always passed through the side of the vessel,
the charge of the gun was diminished each time. With four and a half pounds
of powder, and always at six hundred and forty yards, a bomb struck in the
wood, between two ports, and burst, tearing away the frame and planking, and
making a breach of several feet in height and width, so shattered that all pre-
sent thought that the shot would have endangered the vessel had it taken effect
near the water-line.
" Besides this, two pieces of the iron work, weighing sixteen pounds, were
driven in board by the force of the explosion, and nineteen figures knocked
down.
" Finally, the twelfth and last bomb, with the same small charge and at the
same distance, struck the corner of a port, knocked away a heavy piece of iron
work, and lodged on the other side of the ship against an iron knee five and a
quarter inches in size and firmly supported ; the blow made three fissures in
the iron, two of which were four and a quarter inches thick ; and the bbmo
still unbroken buried itself further in the side, burst, and knocked down twenty
figures."
As to the havoc made upon a ship by these projectiles, the French commis-
456 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
sion was of opinion that it was " so terrible and so great that it is thought that
one or two bombs of this kind bursting in a battery would make such confusion
as to cause the surrender of the vessel, or at least conduce materially to it;" and
"to produce, by the power of the bomb and its splinters, such damage in the
frame that if the explosion should take place near the water-line the vessel
would probably sink. There is no doubt on this subject," it was added, " as
may evidently be perceived from the result of bomb No. , which, had it struck
a few feet lower, would certainly have done irreparable mischief,"
That any ship " must unavoidably give over the attack on being struck with
a few shells."
" That it would be very useful to mount these guns either on floating pon-
toons, gunboats with sweeps, or steamers ; and it is thought that for the defence
of roads and coasts, or for attacking ships in a calm, or on a lee shore, the
success of the bomb cannon would be infallible."
Furthermore, that commission of distinguished men also expressed the unani-
mous opinion " that these shell guns would be of incalculable utility in coast
batteries, gunboats, or launches, bombardment, floating batteries, steamers," &c.
The subject was brought before the Academy of Science, and the opinion of
the board were indorsed by that body after full deliberation.
Subsequently a second trial was made upon the same ship in the presence of
another board of officers, with like results. This board, after a full discussion
as to the effect of these shells, gave it as their opinion likewise, that "their power
is so terrible that should one or two bombs of this kind burst in a battery, the
vessel would be rendered untenable ; that the explosion of a bomb in the frame
of a ship would be productive of great mischief; and if this occur at the
water-line, the vessel must founder, as may be inferred from the effect of bomb
No. 8."
Respecting the use of this kind of ordnance in fortifications the commission
were unanimously of the opinion that these guns are capable of prodigious effect
in coast batteries, as no ship of any force could possibly w ithstand such a Jire
at 640 guns or 1,300 yards ; that it will also be desirable to mount the new
artillery on floating batteries, launches, gunboats, or steamers ; and it is believed
that the bomb cannon is well adapted to the defence of roads and coasts, the
attack of ships in a calm, or on a lee shore," &c.
Moreover, the experiments which have been conducted by the Bureau of Ord-
nance and Hydrography of the United States navy, show that guns of this heavy
calibre will carry further and truer, and penetrate deeper than 32-pounders ; and,
therefore, considering that the navies of the world are substituting these heavy
guns, whenever they can, for the old 32-pounders, and considering that it is
ships, and not sieges, that our fortifications are to be called upon to withstand,
it appears to me it would be both prudent and judicious so to modify the plan
of 1816 as to furnish our forts, as far as practicable, with heavy ordnance, all of
the most effective and destructive kind.
Whether a ship's battery, throwing 10-inch solid shot, would not readily
breach the walls of our strongest forts is worthy of inquiry. The concussion
from such a broadside would be tremendous. It is true there are no ships at
present that can throw such a broadside, yet it is thought practicable and de-
sirable by navy officers to build such ships, and experiments have been made
which leave no doubt that such ships will be built. Whether our ramparts on
shore could withstand such ordnance is not for me to say. I therefore suggest
the inquiry.
It is a curious fact that, as a general rule, the fire of large forts has always
been proportionally less destructive than those mounting only a few guns, and
having those in barbette, in open battery, either with or without breastworks.
This may be accounted for by the smoke; for wild firing applies not only to
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 457
the guns of a fort, mounted in casemates, but also to the guns of double-decked
ships.
A single broadside from the gun-deck of a man-of-war will so fill her between
decks with smoke as to render the object at which she is firing invisible, and
consequently, unless she will wait for her own smoke to clear off, which requires
some time, the rest of her firing, as all sea fights prove, is without aim, very
much by guess, and therefore to little purpose.
The same is the case with guns fired from casemates of forts on shore, for in
no other way can- we account for the random firing; the very shots, in proportion
to the whole number cast, that tell in the engagements of double-decked ships
and casemated forts.
Two frigates or two seventy-fours will engage each other within pistol shot,
or a fleet will attack a fort, and when we come to count the shot that have been
fired, and to compare those that have told with those that have been thrown
away, and then recollect the size of the target, we are astonished.
In the action between the Constitution and the Guerriere, which lasted for
about half an hour, the two ships being within pistol shot, the former sufferred
" very little in her hull, and lost but seven men."*
In the fight between the United States and Macedonian, the two ships were
at close quarters for one hour. The former had five men killed. " The United
States," says the same authority, " suffered surprisingly little, considering the
length of the cannonade."
In the case of the Constitution and the Java, the action lasted two hours.
The Constitution lost nine men, and only " received a few round shot in her
hull." Perhaps in this time the Java did not fire less than two thousand shot,
and fifty of them, well placed in the hull of her antagonist, would have sunk her.
The Hornet and the Peacock were single-decked ships ; their smoke would
clear, and the Hornet could see to take aim. In less than fifteen minutes she
sunk her antagonist.
In the battle of the Nile, where seventy-fours were principally engaged, and
they in smooth water at anchor, and close, too, lasted through a part of three
days. (No firing here like the Hornet's, though her target was so small in
comparison. The secret is, she fired with aim; they, blinded in smoke, without.)
The action between the Wasp and the Frolic, also - single-decked vessels,
lasted forty-three minutes, in which time the killed and wounded aboard the
Frolic amounted to between ninety and one hundred. These small vessels are
more unsteady in a sea-way than large ones; they do not offer so large a target,
and yet their fire is so destructive. How else is it to be accounted for 1
In the battle of Trafalgar, which was of long duration, and mostly between
ships-of-the line, the loss was only about six men to every ten guns engaged,
not one-tenth part of what it was in the action of the Wasp.
The use that I intend to make of these facts may be objected to, on the
ground that I deduce a principle from the sea and apply it to the land, viz :
that, because at sea, guns fired in the open air are much more destructive than
those about which the decks confine the smoke, it does not follow that guns,
when served from behind sand bags or mud banks on shore, are more destructive
than they would be if served in casemates, by a crew blinded with smoke. I
will quote cases directly in point : our army in Mexico, with guns behind sand
bags, battered down the walls of Vera Cruz, and lost only some half dozen men
in the siege.
At the battle of Fuenterabia, in 1836, the town, with two guns of small calibre
behind an old wall, and a third of large calibre, which was added on the evening
* Cooper's Naval History.
458 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
of the attack, was successfully defended for a whole day from a combined attack
of British and Spaniards, in six armed steamers and a number of gunboats.*
Then there was the famous case of the Martello tower, in the bay of Martello,
in Corsica ; one heavy gun, on the top of a tower, beat off in 1794 " one or two
British ships-of-war, without sustaining any material injury from their fires.'*
" This circumstance," says Colonel Pasley, in his rules for conducting the
practical operations of a siege, " ought merely to have proved the superiority
which guns on shore must always, in certain situations, possess over those of
shipping, no matter whether the former are mounted on a tower or not"
This is quoted with approbation by Colonel Totten, in his celebrated report
of 1840, as an example of the superiority of forts over ships. But it appears to
me only to prove and beautifully to illustrate the superiority of one gun, so
mounted that it can fire wit/i aim, over many guns that are enveloped in smoke,
and fired without aim.
But if this Martello case affords grounds really for the "just decision" claimed
by these two distinguished military authorities, then why have any forts at all ?
Why should our army engineers advocate so elaborately in 1836, and with so
much ingenuity in 1840, the continuance of the system of 1816, if one gun on
shore, " whether mounted on a tower or not," can and ought to beat off " one or
two British ships-of-war ?" May I not, therefore, in proposing to reply, in part,
upon open batteries on the shore for coast defence, urge the modification as a
thing proved by actual experiment, and, by legitimate conclusion, quote in favor
of such modification the opinion of our most distinguished engineers 1 We can
never expect our works on the seashore to have anything stronger to resist than
" British ships-of-war;" and if one gun, in open battery on the shore, "whether
mounted on a tower or not," be superior to " one or two" of those ships, surely
our seaport towns of second and third rate importance may safely rely upon
open batteries on the beach to protect them from " British" or any other " men-
of-war."
Colonel Jones, another authority of equal weight in military matters, quotes
Nelson's attack upon Copenhagen, Sir John Duckworth's daring passage of the
Dardannelles, the attack at Acre in 1840, and Lord Exmouth's cannonade of
Algiers, as cases which lead to the supposition that land batteries cannot resist
an attack by fleets. The Queen Charlotte, bearing Lord Exmouth's flag, being
brought within fifty yards of the Mole, at Algiers, " poured such an irresistible
fire on the works around," says Colonel Jones, " as to silence every gun, and
was ultimately compelled to withdraw, with the loss of only eight men killed
and one hundred and thirty-one wounded."
The sides of a ship are of wood; it is combustible, the walls of a fort are not;
and on board ships in a fight it is the splinters that do the mischief. One gun,
even in open battery on the shore, has greatly the advantage of one gun on
board ship. The former can take better aim, has nothing to fear from splinters,
and presents a very small target; whereas it has the whole ship, with all its
vulnerability for a target. But as to the superiority of ships over forts, it
appears to me there is scarcely room for the question; each in its own sphere is
superior to the other.
And that the Queen Charlotte should silence the mole battery, is to be ac-
counted for upon the principle of firing with and without aim. She was within
fifty yards of it ; it therefore occupied nearly or quite one-half of her horizon,
and she could not miss it, it was so large. In comparison to the fort she was a
small target, and it required some attention to aim to hit her ; but the smoke on
both sides prevented this.
Therefore, supposing that in the attacks of ships against forts, the guns on
each side be served with equal bravery, the question of superiority resolves
* Colonel Totten' s Report on National Defence, 1840, Doc. No. 206, page 16.
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 459
itself almost entirely into a question of marksmanship. A. shot that is fired
without aim is generally a shot thrown away,
Nevertheless, the gallant colonel very properly cautions the " engineer
charged with the defences of maintaining a fortress, so to arrange his batteries
that the defence may be from several points distant from each other, armed with
fifty-six pounders as the lowest calibre."
The system of 1816, according to the report of the board of army officers in
1840, does not contemplate a single gun heavier than a forty -two pounder, or an
eight-inch howitzer. It contemplates mortars, but mortars against ships and
random shots.
Previous to the attack of the junk ships in 1782, Gibraltar resisted a bom-
bardment for two years.*
In 1789, Admiral Rodney threw into Havre de Grace 19,000 heavy shells,
and 1,150 carcasses, in fifty-two hours, " to destroy a few boats."t
In 1792, the Duke of Saxe Tessehen threw into Lille, in one hundred and
forty hours, "without effect, 30,000 hot shot and six hundred shells."f
In 1795, Pichegree threw 3,000 shells into Manheim, and 5,000 into the Fort
of the Bhine.
In 1807, at Copenhagen, in three days of partial heavy firing, 6,412 shells,
besides carcasses were thrown.]) All these were thrown to no purpose.
At Fort Browne, on the Rio Grande, our men dodged the shells thrown by
the Mexicans from Matamoras.
At Fort McHenry "the bomb bursting in air" furnished the poet with a
stanzas ; they produced no other effect.
Bonaparte's opinion of them may be learned from the instructions which he
caused to be issued to the governors of besieged towns.
"Quant aux effets des bombes, et des autres projectiles incendiaires, nous ex-
aminerons plus tard, les moyens de les diminuer ; mais nous observerons des ce
moment, qu'ils n'ont jamais contraint une place, bien defendue ase rendre. Les
anciens sieges, en offrent la preuve; et les examples tout reens de Lille, de
Theonville, et de Mayence, la confoiment."
Therefore let us modify the system, so far as most of the mortars and all the
6,309 pieces of ordnance, from a twelve up to a long forty-two pounder, required
by the plan of 1816, are concerned, and substitute for them the heavy calibres
of the present day -the .nine, ten, and eleven-inch solid shot and shell guns.
Taking the Martello tower for our guide, let us also, instead of building forts
of the second and third class, contemplated in the system of 1816, send to every
town along the seaboard, that an enemy could reach in his ships, one or more
heavy pieces, and plant them there in open battery upon the beach, for the de-
fence of the place, "no matter whether they be mounted in a tower or not."
By a proper organization, easy to be effected and kept up without any draft
upon the treasury whatever, except for powder and ball to practice, volunteer
crews for these guns may be procured from the towns themselves. Well-trained
officers of the army should be sent 'to instruct them. In such hands each gun so
planted and served out in the open air, having an embankment or a few sand-
bags for protection, will be more than a match for "two British ships-of-war."
Sir Sidney Smith, whose dashing gallantry and skilful bravery have been so
much admired, attacked and felt the force of one of these open batteries in 1806.
He was in the Pompee, an eighty-gun ship, and accompanied by two frigates ;
he anchored about seven hundred yards from a battery of two guns, situated on
the extremity of Cape Licosa.
" The line-of-battle-ship and frigates fired successive broadsides till their am-
munition was nearly expended; the battery continually replying with a slow
Sir J. T. Jones's Journal of Sieges in Spain, vol. II, page 374.
Ibid. JIbid. Ibid. l|Ibid.
460 FOKTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
but destructive effect. The Pompe'e, at which ship alone it directed its fire, had
forty shot in her hull ; her mizzentopmast carried away; a lieutenant, midship-
man, and five men killed, and thirty men wounded. At length, force proving
ineffectual, negotiation was resorted to, and after some hours' parley, the officer,
a Corsican, and a relation of Napoleon, capitulated. It then appeared that the
carriage of one of the two guns had failed on the second shot, and the gun had
consequently been fired lying on the sill of the embrasure ; so that, in fact, the
attack of an eighty-gun ship and tivo frigates had been resisted by a single
piece of ordnance"*
Whatever Napoleon's cousin could do with a gun, our officers, our soldiers,
and the yeoman of this country can do as well.
This turning out of the citizens to defend their town, with a gun in open battery,
against the attack of ships-of-war, is no experiment with us. The thing has
been handsomely, gallantly, and successfully done.
" The affair of Stonington," says General Totten in his report of 1840,
" during the last war, affords another instance of successful defences by a battery .
In this case there were only two guns (eighteen pounders) in a battery which
was only three feet high, and with embrasures. The battery being manned ex-
clusively by citizen volunteers from the town, repelled a persevering attack of a
sloop-of-war, causing serious loss and danger, but suffering none."
In the war of 1828, between Peru and Columbia, I was serving on the Pacific
station. Admiral Guise, a dashing officer and brave Scotchman, attacked the
city of Guayaquil with the Peruvian squadron, which consisted of a frigate, a
sloop-of-war, and several brigs and schooners. The approaches to the city were
undefended. He took up his position without molestation within musket shot
of it and commenced his fire.
Under cover of the dark the besieged threw up an embankment, and planting
two or three field-pieces behind it opened a fire upon the ships at daylight, killed
the admiral, and beat off his squadron.
The annals of war, the written arguments of the most distinguished officers
of the engineer corps, and the facts which I shall state, afford, to my judgment
and reason, ample grounds for the- position which I maintain as to the dispensing
with fortifications, in a large majority of cases, along the seaboard ; and of
substituting therefor a few pieces of this new, heavy, and destructive ordnance,
without the protection of any mason work whatever. If these facts, annals,
and arguments do not impress conviction upon your mind as strongly as they
do upon mine, it is not because of their insufficiency but because, in attempting
to apply and illustrate them, I have obscured their bearing and weakened their
force.
" The fortifications of the coast," says the board of army officers, whose able
report of 1840 quieted the public mind, and fastened for ten years longer upon
the country the effete system of 1816 ; "The fortifications of the coast," say
they, " must be competent to the double task of interdicting the passage of ships
and resisting land attacks two distinct and- independent qualities. The first
demands merely an array in suitable numbers and in proper proportions of
heavy guns, covered by parapets, proof against shot and shells"}
Now I propose to show that the railroads and the means of locomotion in
this country sufficiently defend our fortifications from land attacks ; and that
consequently the principal requisite henceforward in a system of fortifications
for the coast, is merely an array in suitable numbers and in proper proportions
of heavy guns along the beach to cover the approaches of ships from sea to
seaport towns.
* Journal of Sieges. Colonel Jones.
fPage 41, Doc. 206, House Rep., 1st session 26th Congress.
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
461
To support the propositions taken by General Totten in favor of the system
of 1816, both in his report of 1840 and 1836, there was a table in the latter
estimating the number of men that, according to the census of 1830, could be
concentrated in Boston, Newport, New York, Philadelphia, Norfolk, Baltimore,
Charleston, Savannah, and New Orleans in eleven days.
This table was made the basis of important deductions in favor of the present
system ; and as the state of things now is so entirely different from what it was
then, I quote the table in order to show that the changes which have taken
place in our means of concentrating and moving forces in war leave abundant
room for many modifications in the old system of 1816.
TABLE P.*
Exhibiting tJie amount of militia force that may be concentrated at Boston,
Newport, New York, Philadelphia, Norfolk, Baltimore, Charleston, Savan-
nah, and New Orleans successively, from the first to the eleventh day; each
day's march being computed atffteen milesfounded on the census of 1830.
Days.
Boston.
Newport,
New York.
Philadel-
Norfolk.
Baltimore.
Charles-
Savannah.
New Or-
R. I.
phia.
ton.
leans.
1
5,422
1,397
20,218
26,132
1,864
10,046
2,513
1,173
3,032
2
28,351
2,373
28,131
26,521
2,880
18,042
7,160
3,960
7,836
3
34, 138
12,340
44,123
35,450
4,416
21,266
9,475
5,948
8,716
4
39,561
17, 143
57,925
69, 100
7,608
27,916
14,601
6,588
12,499
5
49,127
33,221
59,4^8
70,608
11,101
31,897
18, 443
9,263
14,474
6
59,893
42,807
81,252
127,666
14,511
49,648
22,490
19,725
17,339
7
81,867
61,335
104,180
154,036
20,699
65,382
24,393
21,903
17,906
8
97,697
65,583
137,048
167,703
28,039
77,543
29,416
25,220
22,561
9
111,655
83,111
152,841
195,265
32^562
78, 164
40,835
36,630
26,433
10
125,326
109,268
164,116
219,983
36,446
87,520
45,582
41,345
28,140
il
144,076
130,824
191,353
221,603
45,549
101,970
59,701
60,42-2
31,647
This possible concentration of forces, which it required eleven days to make
in 1836, may be now doubled and trebled, and made in as many hours; surely,
therefore, this process of concentration this immense artificial military aid
which steam and electricity now afford, and which was not anticipated nor
counted upon in 1816, when the foundations of the system were laid ; surely
they, by protecting our forts against sieges, call for modifications and suggest
changes which it would be wise to consider and prudent to make.
In this country, more than in any other, the genius of free institutions compels
the government to keep pace with the improvement of the age. The people do
it, and they are the government. But in military establishments there is evi-
dently a disposition to lag behind.
" In 1708 Marshal Boufners, by authority from the King, given on the advice
of the most experienced generals of that warlike age, ceded the strongest fortress
in France to Prince Eugene and the Duke of Marlborough, to avoid the risk of
the breaches being carried by storm ; and in those days the superiority of the
assailants was never doubted. The art of attack has since that period received
various improvements, and the art of defence remains the same."!
The edition from which I quote was published in 1846 the work is one of
acknowledged authority among military men and according to it, it would be
better to give our forts away than actually to subject them to a siege. Neither
Vera Cruz nor any other fort in Mexico could withstand a siege from us. How
important therefore is it that we should introduce in our system of coast defences
o Page 71, Doc. 293, first eession twenty -fourth Congress,
f See Journal of Sieges in Spain, vol. 2, page 336.
462
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
some of the "various improvements" which the art of attack has received since
1708, and of which the art of defence has received so few! That instead of
fighting ships from batteries of old-fashioned carroiiades, long twelves, eighteens,
and twenty -fours ; instead of the old-fashioned mortars, which Napoleon put his
seal against, let us have in our forts the improved shell guns and heavy ordnance
of the present day, which will plant shot and shell where they are aimed, and
cany destruction to a distance which not a gun with which our forts (according
to the list by the army board in 1840) are to be furnished can ever reach.
I am permitted by Commodore Warrington to quote from experiments which
he has caused to be made in naval gunnery at the Washington navy yard.
These experiments are going on there daily ; any one who pleases may witness
them. I cite from them to illustrate the position I maintain as to the destructive
powers of this new and heavy ordnance, the accuracy of its fire, &c.
The figures are copied from the note-book of Lieutenant Dahlgren, United
States navy, the officer who conducts the experiments.
The target is built of one upright and two horizontal layers of stout oak logs,
bolted and fastened together in the most substantial manner. It is two and a
half feet thick. These experiments were not conducted to represent the effects
of this heavy ordnance upon forts and their walls, but upon wooden walls and
the sides of ships. Therefore shells were used in the eight and nine-inch pieces
to contrast their range and probable effect with the range and probable effect of
a solid 32-pound shot.
The charge of powder used with the 32-pound shot was twenty-eight per cent,
of its weight. The charge used with the two shells was only about thirteen per
cent, of their weight, or, in proportion, not half as much as that used with the
solid shot. Figures 1, 2, and 3 exhibit a horizontal section of the target, made to
show the penetration of the shot.
Fig. 1.
8-inch shell, seven pounds of powder.
The penetration of the 8-inch shell was the least. It was unloaded. Had it
been charged it would have been lodged in the best place; for, exploding in the
middle of the target built to represent the side of a man-of-war, it would have
torn it to pieces.
Figure 2 is the 32-pound shot. The hole that it leaves behind it is so filled
up with splinters that a common knitting-needle cannot be thrust in after it.
Such a shot as figure 2 would do no serious hurt to a ship's side.
Fig. 2.
32-pounder shot, nine pounds of powder.
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
463
Figure 3 is the 9-inch shell. Here the shot
went through and dropped down on the other
side of the target, as shown in the drawing. It
tore off the logs and scattered the splinters in
the most frightful manner. Much more would
it have gone through had the shot been solid
instead of hollow, and had it been fired with
a full instead of a very reduced charge of
powder.
These big hollow shot, and the bigger the
better, are the things for our forts to use
against ships ; whereas it is the big solid shot
that ships want to use against forts, for shells,
after striking, are apt to explode without pene-
trating or breaking a stone wall.
Figure 4 illustrates a common example of
target firing in the open air. This target is
not one-fourth the size of that presented by
the cross section of a frigate. One nine or
ten-inch shell lodged in the ship's bows as
she approaches, and exploding, would prob-
ably sink or destroy her. Neither of the two
gentlemen named on figure 4 (whose balls
were so well planted) ever saw a shotted
gun fired before. They pointed and aimed
it themselves; and it is a fair example of
what an unpracticed eye may do with a gun
when planted where it may be fired with aim.
Certainly we have nothing l^e invasion by
sea to fear from any nation on this side of the
water, and it is hardly probable that any of
the crowned heads on the other side would
have the hardihood to send into this country
invading armies from beyond the sea. The
very air we breathe protects us from any
such liability. It is free air. Our republican
institutions are dangerous to kings; and, in
the minds of the kings, the effect of these
institutions upon the soldiers of royal armies
is far more dreadful than would be the sys-
tem of 1816, with all its panoply of big forts
and great guns.
It is, therefore, that our forts should be constructed and armed almost exclu-
sively for resisting and repelling the attack of ships.
According to the Paixhan experiments and the opinion of the French ofiicer,
one or two shot from an eight-inch gun lodged in the side of a seventy-four
would disable her. What would be the effect, therefore, of one or two; twice as
large, from a ten-inch gun, striking a frigate or a steamer ?
In turn, and per contra, suppose the battery of this heavy ordnance intended
to keep ships off from all our towns, except the principal cities, to be planted on
the beach without any support. The target that one of these guns and its crew
would expose to the ship is very small, and when we consider the English mode
of firing, and their sea fights, it would not be one shot in a hundred that, being
fired from a ship, would strike such a target ; her own smoke would conceal it
from her. It affords no surface for splinters, which do the mischief. So that
464
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
unless the shot would strike the gun or its carriage, and there is no necessity of
having them as exposed as in this hypothetical case I have represented them to
be, a shot from the ship might pass, even among the men, without its stiiking
any of them, and consequently without doing any mischief.
Fig. 4.
Experimental battery. Practice with 9-inch shell guns, January 2, 1851.
Screen, 550 yards. Shell, 73 pounds. Charges, 9 pounds.
Present : Hon. Mr. Stanton (chairman) and Hon. Mr. White, (member,) of the Naval Com-
mittee of the House of Kepresentatives. Some of the shot were fired by these gentlemen.
The lower shells were fired with the quadrant, (54',) the upper by the sights alone.
On accoun^of the above recited facts and circumstances, on account of the
considerations and reasons which they suggest, I propose, in answer to your
first question, modifications to our present system of fortifications, &c., in the
following particulars, to wit :
1st. That inasmuch as the new and improved heavy ordnance for throwing
shot, both hollow and solid, has a longer range, gives greater accuracy, and is
far more destructive than most of the ordnance with which our forts are now
furnished, or than that by which, according to the report of 1840, it is intended
to furnish them; therefore, I recommend that most of this ordnance of inferior
range, penetration, accuracy, and destructiveness, be disposed of; that the sup-
plies of more be discontinued ; and that the new and improved ordnance be
substituted in its stead.
I would not recommend that any of the old ordnance should be sold or melted
down until the supplies of the new are completed, or nearly so, for occasion
may arise, before we can be completely furnished with the new, when the old
would be of great service.
2d. That no further expenses be incurred for preparing our fortifications along
the Atlantic seaboard, to withstand sieges by land.
3d. That none of the works (except those in Portsmouth harbor) proposed in
the army report of 1840,* table D, "as works to be first commenced" nor in
table E, as "works to be commenced next after those in D;" nor in table F, as
"works to be last commenced," be commenced at all.
4th. That for the protection of the towns, villages, and landings, therein to
be provided for, one or more pieces, according to the condition of the place, of
the most effective ordnance, be planted at suitable points behind simple embank-
ments or earthen parapets.
* See page 74-7, Doc. No. 206, House Kep., 1st session.
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES 465
The carnages of the guns so mounted should be constructed with the view
of easy transportation from one point to another along the shores of the harbor
to be defended ; so that on rails, paved or plank roads built for the purpose, these
pieces might in fact constitute a locomotive battery along the beach, and not
leave it, as all shore-batteries have done, entirely optional with the assailants to
choose position. As far as the defences of the town against ships are concerned,
this improved ordnance may thus be converted into a sort of "flying artillery."
5th. Instead of supporting garrisons at the public expense, in times of peace,
for the care and management of these guns, it is proposed that they and their
munitions, properly secured, be given in charge of the State, or of the authori-
ties of the place to be defended; first taking such legislative steps in the mat-
ter as will induce the formation of one or more volunteer artillery companies at
such place for the purpose of exercising the guns, learning the practice, keeping
them in order, and ready for use, &c.
Officers of the army should be detailed to instruct the volunteers thus offer-
ing, in the great gun exercise ; to examine and report upon the state of these com-
panies and batteries, and keep the government informed, at all times, as to the
efficiency and condition of each.
The whole seaboard defences of this kind should be classed in divisions, each
in charge of an artillery, or engineer or ordnance officer of rank, with a proper
staff.
The headquarters of each division should be the principal place in it, as at
Old Point for one. New York for another, Charleston, Savannah, New Orleans,
&c., for others. Each of these places should be provided with the means of
great gun exercise, including a field of practice, targets, the kind of roads for
manoeuvring this kind of ordnance, &c.
The commander of each division should have authority to invite, annually, or
as often as necessary, these volunteer artillery companies, or the best disciplined
of them, to visit his headquarters and exercise in the practicing field, at target
firing, &c. ; the government paying the expenses of the trip, by allowing so
much mileage, and so much per day during the visit.
We see our volunteer companies now are continually in the habit of visiting
distant towns and villages, as a body, in their military capacity, and at their own
expense. The practicing and the exercise with such terrible pieces would draw
together a large concourse of people. This would give eclat, and the presentation
of a sword, or some other reward for the best shot, would invest this feature of
the modified system of defence with much animation, and infuse into these
volunteer artillery men a spirit, a nerve, and skill which, in the day of battle,
would make their pieces as firm as "Bragg's battery," and far more terrible and
destructive than they would be if casemated in stone walls and enveloped all
the time with their own smoke.
So far my remarks, in reply to your first question, relate to the defences of
the Atlantic seaboard only. I proceed now to consider how far, and to what
extent, the system of 1816 may be modified with regard to the defences of our
Gulf and Pacific coasts.
I will speak first of the defences for the Gulf of Mexico.
We have seen that the system of 1816, as extravagant as it is, was never
intended, in the mind even of its slrongest advocates, to provide fortifications
for every port, harbor, and anchorage along the seaboard in which an enemy
might find shelter, take refuge, or form rendezvous in time of war.
Fortress Monroe would not prevent an enemy from entering the Chesapeake
bay, nor hinder him from anchoring safely with his fleet at Tangier island, nor
at the mouth of the Rappahannock, the York, or the Potomac river, nor at any
one of the numerous safe and commodious anchorages that are to be found above
Old Point. As far as any permanent fortifications that it is possible to erect at
H. Rep. Com. 86 30.
466 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA- CO AST DEFENCES.
Fortress Monroe and the Rip Raps are concerned, an enemy might select any
one of the above-named places as a rendezvous for his fleet, and make that his
centre of operations against the whole bay coast, the rivers and towns along it,
and carry on his depredating and marauding expeditions with just as much
impunity as though no such fortress had been built.
It protects Norfolk and the navy yard from a fleet, but it does not prevent
that same fleet from running up to York river, or the Rappahannock, or the
Potomac, or up the bay, nor does it prevent it from landing an army at any one
of these places, and marching it off against Richmond, Fredericksburg, Wash-
ington, or Baltimore. The railroad and telegraph do that.
The circumstances that such a fortress as Monroe, with an important navy
yard under its cover, is between his fleet and the sea, might somewhat cramp or
embarrass such an enemy in his operations is admitted, but it would not, there-
fore, prevent them, for if his naval forces in the bay were superior to our own,
he would command the bay in spite of the fort.
Even if the Chesapeake bay was lined with works from head to mouth, and
on both sides, such a chain of military posts, however strong and costly, could
not prevent an enemy from entering the bay with his fleet, and safely riding
upon its broad bosom, out of the reach of their guns. He might still make it
the centre of his operations ; most of the time the anchorage is safe in any part
of the bay ; these forts would be immovable ; they could not go after him ; and
at most, they would only prevent him from selecting the most convenient places
for shelter, and the best points from which to operate. That is all.
The same is the case in the Gulf of Mexico. For eight or nine months in the
year vessels may ride in safety at anchor off the shore, anywhere between Pen-
sacola and Galveston. The land there forms a lee, and affords a shelter from
the northers. From two to twenty miles from the land, and in depth varying
from three or four to twenty-five or thirty fathoms, the anchorage is good.
Now, if we rely upon fortifications to protect that coast, it will be observed,
the whole Gulf front might be lined with them, and still they would be harmless
against a fleet with its powers of locomotion. It could string itself at anchor
along the coast, in sight of the very works built for defending it ; and if our
reliance were upon them, it might capture or dam up in stagnant ruin, all the
commerce of the Mississippi valley. In the Gulf, as well as in the Chesapeake,
and in our own waters generally, we must have the naval supremacy. In any
plan of providing for the national defences that is an essential feature, and it
ought to be sine qua non with Congress.
The plan, therefore, of providing permanent fortifications for the Gulf, seems
to be this : that we should select a few of the points which would be most im-
portant for us as places of refuge and rendezvous, and which, if occupied by an
enemy in war, would enable him the most to annoy us, and fortify them.
These points are Key West and the Tortugas, and perhaps Ship and Cat
islands. In a commercial and military sense, the Gulf of Mexico and the
Caribbean Sea are but an expansion of the Mississippi and Amazon rivers. In
this view of the subject, the mouth of the Mississippi is not at the ^alize, nor
that of the Amazon at Paia; they are both in the Florida pass, between Key
West and Cuba.
For one-half the year there is a sort of monsoon in the Gulf of Mexico ; during
this period the winds are from the southeast ; at this season, therefore, the winds
and the currents in the Yucatan pass are such as to prevent the passage that
way of vessels from the Gulf.
Moreover, the island 'of Jamaica, where the English have a naval station,
overlooks the Yucatan pass. When the northeast winds prevail the Yucatan
pass is open to sailing vessels; but a few steamers, with Jamaica as the centre
of operations, would close it to our commerce.
When the southeast winds prevail, the route of a sailing vessel bound from
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 467
the Gulf to Jamaica, is not through the straits of Yucatan; it is through the
Florida Pass by Key West, and then back on the south side of Cuba. Now a
maritime enemy seizing upon Key West and the Tortugas could land a few
heavy guns from his ship and make it difficult for us to dislodge him. Here
railroads and the telegraph do not reach, and as long as he should hold that
position, so long would he control the commercial mouth of the great Mississippi
valley.
In that position he would shut up in the Gulf whatever force inferior to his
own we might have there. He would prevent re-enforcements, sent to relieve it
from Boston, New York, and Norfolk, from entering the Gulf. Indeed, in a war
with England, the Tortugas and Key West being in her possession, it might be
more advisable, instead of sending from our Atlantic dock yards a fleet to the
Gulf, to send it over to the British islands and sound the Irish people as to
throwing off allegiance.
This country is too rich and powerful to confine itself to a system of national
defences which looks to a passive state for it in any war. It cannot content
itself by waiting for the enemy to come, that we may simply beat him off from
our shores. Neither is it sufficient for it to have the ability to send out a few
cruisers and armed privateers to prey upon the commerce of an enemy.
We have seen its free institutions, by their silent operations in times of peace,
shaking the thrones of Europe, and causing the crowned heads that sit upon
them to tremble. In time of war it must have the ability to re-enforce that
influence with its strong "right arm." The sensibilities of the people every-
where are alive to that influence their sympathies are so strongly with us, that
should it become necessary to carry war into any of the maritime States of
Christendom, the American legions would be regarded by the masses as friends
and deliverers, not as enemies.
Therefore, instead of being content with the capture of a few men-of-war and
unoffending merchantmen for prizes, we want a system of defences which shall
enable us to send naval expeditions against the enemy's country, invite and
* assist the down-trodden millions to throw off the hateful yoke, to break their
bonds asunder, and to stand up as freemen, like ourselves.
In an expedition upon Jamaica, Key West being in the hands of the enemy,
it would be difficult for our Gulf and Atlantic forces to unite.
Therefore the works at Key West and the Tortugas should be provided with
shell-guns of the most destructive calibre, and their walls should be substantial
enough to resist the concussion of a man-of-war broadside. They are wanted
to give protection to our fleeing merchantmen, to afford a refuge to our fleets
until time and opportunity and circumstances serve for striking the blow, or
making a move. They are wanted by us, because they would be so immensely
valuable to an enemy.
The railroads that will be in operation from Pensacola and Mobile soon, and
probably before any additional fortifications can be erected there, will secure
these places from invasion and seizure ; and the works already there, with a few
' more guns in open battery along the beach, would effectually protect them from
the great guns of ships. Still, an enemy with a fleet superior to the one we
might have in the Gulf could anchor along the shore, as he can in the Chesa-
peake, and greatly harass our commerce there. No system of fortifications can
prevent that.
In the next maritime war, (and in such a war we have nothing to fear from
any quarter except one,) it is not upon the Atlantic, properly speaking, that the
great sea.-fight is to take place : it is in the Gulf of Mexico, or near the English
shores.
Jamaica is an important naval station ; it commands one entrance to the Gulf.
There Great Britain can assemble her fleet, and within three days have it off
the Balize, in position to strike a terrible blow at the commerce of that valley.
468 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
Shutting up the Florida Pass, she would have complete control of the Gulf.
Norfolk and New York are inconveniently situated to defend it. Some years
ago a man-of-war was sent with despatches from Norfolk to Pensacola ; she was
fifty-odd days in making the passage.
The means of defence for the Gulf should be within the valley that belongs
to it. The resources of this valley are ample, its means most abundant, and its
people are its best and most appropriate defenders. Pensacola should therefore
be built up as a naval station, and the depot at Memphis fostered with care and
solicitude. Instead of draining the treasury for forts, under the system of 1816,
these two places should be put in condition for building, equipping, and fitting,
upon a scale sufficient to secure to us, in war, the naval supremacy at least in
the Gulf.
In a war with England, and with those two places as the centres of opera-
tions, it probably would be found desirable to move upon Jamaica and other
British islands in that quarter. New York and the Atlantic dock yards would
probably be the centre of other operations ; and if Jamaica fall in such a war,
it must fall under the guns and before the gallantry of the west the east will
have need and occupation for all its forces in other quarters.
Memphis is fast rising in importance as a place of construction. Private
enterprise has already commenced to establish building-yards there; and in that
teeming region there is no lack of naval and maritime resources. The ropewalk
there is of no consequence. We want docks, storehouses, machine-shops, and
founderies for casting, forging, making, and building anchors and cables, ships
and engines ; and for preparing and keeping in store, out of the excellent ma-
terials to be found in that valley, all the arms and munitions of war which would
be required for the defence of the Gulf, the capture of Jamaica or any other
British possession, if Britain be the enemy.
The affections of these islanders for the mother country cannot, in the nature
of things, be as strong or as abiding as those of our citizens for their own homes ;
and therefore it may be imagined that an attempt by us to invade and get pos-
session of these islands would be quite a different affair from an attempt, on her
part, at invasion and conquest here. A tower of strength has this nation in the
brave hearts and strong arms of its gallant yeomanry. Small indeed would be
the degree of aid and comfort which a national enemy would derive from dis-
loyalty and disaffection of American citizens.
I have, on former occasions, presented my views at large with regard to the
importance of Memphis as a naval depot. These views are before the public,
and therefore I deem it unnecessary to repeat them here. We have turned the
corner, and are now going ahead in the peaceful race for the commercial su-
premacy of the seas; the next trial is to be for maritime supremacy of another
sort. It is hoped that the day for that contest is far distant. But every people
are liable to war; and it is a fact which we cannot blink, that, in providing for
the contingency, our statesmen and warriors must, for many years to come, have
an eye to the forces which Great Britain, rather than any other power,, can bring
against us. But let that contest come when it may, it is most likely to be de-
cided in the Gulf of Mexico, and its twin basin, the Caribbean sea ; they are the
receptacles of all that the two grandest systems of river basins in the world
will have to pour into the lap of commerce. The valley of the Mississippi on
one side, and the valley of the Amazon on the other, will in time make these
two arms of the sea the commercial centre of the world.
The mouth of the Amazon, the mouth of the Orinoco, and the mouth of the
Magdalena, are, commercially speaking, almost as much in the Florida Pass as
is the mouth of the Mississippi river. Such is the course of the currents, and
such the direction of the winds in that part of the world, that a vessel sailing
from' the mouth of any one of these rivers for Rio de Janeiro, in Brazil, or for
India, or for the markets of the Pacific around Cape Horn, or for Africa, or for
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 469
Europe, has first to steer to the northward and westward until she reaches the
parallel of 25 or 30 north. This brings her off our own shores; and it is im-
possible for her to pursue any other route, so long as the northeast trade-winds
prevail, or the great equatorial current which feeds the Gulf Stream continues to
flow across the Atlantic. No vessel trading under canvas from the mouth of
these rivers to the markets of South America, Europe, Asia, or Africa, can go
any other way. They must pass by our doors.
Therefore, in planning a system of national defences, who can overestimate
the importance of the Gulf of Mexico as a nucleus of naval means, the centre of
naval operations ? That centre is at Key West and the Tortugas ; hence the
great need of strong works there.
Interests of the most delicate, valuable, and, to an enemy, of the most attractive
kind, are even now daily springing up, and expanding themselves out upon the
waters and about the borders of the Gulf of Mexico and Caribbean sea interests
which, if they should be injured or put in needless jeopardy, will create a greater
sensation throughout this country than would the landing of a hundred thousand
men-at-arms upon our shores. These interests are maritime they are Ameri-
can ; their defences and protection are naval ; they must be watched and guarded
from the Mississippi valley. Memphis and Pensacola by nature are, by rights
ought to be, and by legislation should be, the centres of operations in the case.
Panama, Nicaragua, and Tehuantep echave, or are about to impose new obli-
gations upon us. We must look to them, and, in providing for the common
defence, take them into consideration. They are links in the chain which binds
the most remote corners of the republic together. They are the gateways be-
tween distant parts of the Union ; and they must therefore be cared for in peace,
guarded and protected in war.
The Amazonian basin, embracing an area more than twice the extent of
our great Mississippi valley, fills too large a space in the world to escape atten-
tion from us, when we are in the very act of laying the foundations for a perma-
nent system of national defence. With all the climates of India, with unheard
of capacities of production, and the most boundless sources of wealth in the field,
the forest, and the mine, that valley, so soon as it shall begin to feel the axe and
the plough, will pour into our lap a commerce, the value of which is as limitless
as are its own vast resources. Nature has placed us in the position to command
that commerce. The great business of fetching and carrying there must be ours.
For coming and for going, the winds are fair for us ; and we are the only nation
for whose shipping they are so fair.
That arm of the ocean which severs the continent nearly in twain, to make
between the "Father of Waters," at the north, and the "King of tlivers," at the
south, a receptacle for their commerce, is receiving from the Mississippi valley
alone an amount of produce that astonishes the world. Yet the Mississippi val-
ley is not half peopled up. What, therefore, will this oceanic basin, this com-
mercial receptacle for the surplus produce of the two grandest systems of river
basins on the face of the earth be, when the great Amazonian valley, of double
area, with its everlasting summer and its endless round of harvests, comes to be
subdued and brought into cultivation ? What the Gulf of Mexico is now, is as
nothing to what it is to be. It abounds with commercial elements that cannot
be comprehended for their magnitude; and in proportion as it becomes the seat
of maritime wealth and greatness, so, too, must it become the centre of naval
strength and power. As Columbus lay sick, it was upon the waters of this sea-
basin that the angel visited him in a dream, and told him that God had made
his name great and sent him to "unbar the gates of ocean." The keys to these
gates are at Key West and the Tortugas, Memphis and Pensacola. Nature has
placed them among the wonderful resources of the great valley ; and to stand as
gatekeeper before them is the mission of those naval forces that naturally cen-
tre-in the Gulf.
470 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
OF THE PACIFIC SEABOARD.
No American statesman will, I imagine, rest content with any plan of national
defence which does not contemplate for us at least the naval supremacy in our
own waters. That is the starting point and that is the point which, in the
erection of military works on the land, in the construction of floating batteries
for our harbors, or in the building of ships and steamers for the sea, should be
constantly kept in view. It is the true basis to work upon.
In a military point of view, California and Oregon are colonies. Far remote
from the heart of the country and the strength of the nation, they are young and
feeble, open to attack, and inviting to conquest. In war no relief can be sent
them, however beset, unless at great risk and with an enormous expenditure of
both time and money.
The voyage by sea from the Atlantic to the Pacific ports of the United States
is the longest voyage in the world. Within the whole scope and range of com-
merce, there are no two shore-lines so remote from each other, in time, as these
are.
The average passage of all the vessels which sailed from the Atlantic ports for
California in 1850 was one hundred and eighty-seven days six months. These
vessels went singly, each making the best of her way without regard to the oth-
ers. In a fleet, it is the dullest vessel which regulates the speed of all ; the
fastest must reduce canvas, yard, and stand along under easy sail, that the
slow vessels may keep up.
Bound hence with a fleet for the relief of California, our ships would have to
pass no less than three important naval stations, all belonging to the same power.
One of them, St. Helena, is on the wayside ; the two others, Bermuda and the
Falkland Islands, are right in the middle of the road.
If the fleet should escape the vigilance and annoyance of the men-of-war sta-
tioned at those islands, there are still before it the storms of Cape Horn, the
dangers of the sea, and the war of the elements for it to encounter and contend
with.
Such would be the length of the voyage, and such the difficulties and the risks
to be encountered by the way, that the practicability of sending succor to Cali-
fornia around Cape Horn, in a war with England, may be considered out of the
question.
Single ships might find their way in safety around, but as for a large fleet,
covering as it goes miles in extent, and attracting the attention of the enemy
with the multitude of its ships escaping all the dangers that would beset it by
the way surely no one would count upon it, and it would be folly to expect it.
California and Oregon must, therefore, rely upon the means of defence which
can be sent forth from their own harbors in war ; and the question is, how shall
those means be provided in peace ?
Shall the system of 1816, which has been tried and found too costly and de-
fective for the Atlantic seaboard, be transferred to the Pacific, and engrailed upon
its shores for another third of a century ? Or shall the government resort to
railroads, steam and the navy, and do for that country what has been found to
answer so well for this 1
The extent of our sea front on the Pacific, compared with our sea front on
the Atlantic, is as eighteen to twenty-four; that is, the Pacific is three-fourths
the extent ot the Atlantic seaboard. To apply the system of 1816 to the former
would, in my judgment, be injudicious as to policy, extravagant as to expendi-
ture, and inadequate as to purpose; and therefore the system of 1816, excepting
in so far as two or three works are concerned, should not be applied to the
Pacific. We want no forts along that sea front, save only those that are neces-
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 471
sary to keep hostile ships, with their great guns, out of the reach of our cities,
and to give protection to our dock yards.
There is not at this time a single dock yard upon the waters of the Pacific,
belonging to any nation, at which even a frigate can be built and equipped.
All the maritime powers are far removed, with their naval resources, from the
eastern shores of that ocean. By establishing a dock yard there, and providing
it with the means and facilities for repairing and equipping, we may, without
difficulty, secure the naval supremacy upon that ocean; and once possessed, it
will not be an easy matter for any power to wrest it from such hands.
The most desirable means of defence for those regions are such as we have on
the Atlantic a navy, steam, the railway and the locomotive, with their powers
of concentration.
The characteristic feature which the improvements of the age have impressed
upon military operations is mobility. To the degree with which armaments
and armed forces are invested with locomotion and with celerity in movement,
to that degree and in that ratio are they provided with the elements of power
and destruction. It is its mobility, imparting toil in the field of battle, a sort of
ubiquity, that makes flying artillery such a tremendous arm in modern warfare.
It is the swift foot of the armed steamer which has given her such tremendous
force for battle that has appalled the most able sea captains, and left the mili-
tary men of the world at variance as to the extent of her powers, so transcendent
are they in the minds of all.
The part that railroads and magnetic telegraphs are to play in the great
drama of war with this country has not yet been cast, much less enacted. In
a military point of view, they convert whole States into compact and armed
masses. They can convey forces from one section of the Union to another as
quickly as re- enforcements can be marched from one part of an old-fashioned
battle-field to another.
The money that is expended in the erection of a fort adds nothing to the
national wealth, but the money that is spent in fortifying with railroads, while
it gives the military strength required, vastly increases also the elements of
national power, wealth, and greatness.
There have been expended by the States and people of the States, on this
side of the Rocky mountains, about four hundred millions of dollars in building
ten thousand miles of railroads and canals. These works have not only effec-
tually provided for the common defence so far as invasion is concerned, but,
besides reimbursing the projectors of them, in most cases, they have in all in-
creased the value of the land in their vicinity, advanced trade and commerce,
promoted the general welfare, and in the aggregate added not less than a thou-
sand million of dollars to the gross sum of the national wealth.
The money that has been expended under the system of 1816 has added
nothing to the value of the soil ; it has afforded no facilities to commerce ; it has
not increased the national prosperity in any manner whatever; and, therefore,
as to the alternative of providing for the defences of the Pacific coast by lining
it with forts and castles, or by sending a railroad there and collecting naval
means, it appears to me there is no choice, no need for deliberation, no necessity
for argument.
The strongest work that stone and mortar can make, being erected at the
mouth of the harbor of San Francisco, would not interrupt a blockade, nor pre-
vent an enemy from starving California into terms. It is the navy alone that
can do this; and vessels, with munitions of war sufficient for the purpose, should
be placed under cover there now.
California does not produce breadstuffs enough for her own consumption,
probably she never will. It is worthy of remark, that not one of our New
England States, including New York, does that. Mining, commerce, and manu-
472 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
factures, rather than agriculture, will probably ever constitute the chief indus-
trial pursuits of that distant State.
And until California has the means of deriving a support from the back coun-
try she must look for it to the sea ; therefore an enemy, by taking up his position
before the harbor of California in force sufficient to establish a rigid blockade,
may, without striking a blow, starve the people into terms of surrender.
The greater the number of men in garrison, in such a case, and the larger the
army sent there by us for its defence, the greater the distress ; for the reason
that they would the sooner eat out the substance of the land, and so assist the
enemy in his work of starvation.
A railway to California would make that country as invulnerable and as se-
cure from invasion as railroads have made the country on this side of the Rocky
mountains ; and with a railway a blockade would only annoy commerce, not
starve the people.
In a consideration of the soundest policy this railway is called for. I have
studied the subject, and the result of my best reflections with regard to it has
led me to the opinion that the general government cannot too soon take the
steps necessary and proper for procuring it to be built, and for collecting at the
other end of it the nucleus of a navy, with powers of expansion sufficient to meet
any probable emergency.
The vessels of our navy serving in the Pacific, instead of being brought home
around Cape Horn for repairs, should be laid up in ordinary in California until
sufficient numbers are gradually collected there to form this nucleus. The com-
merce of the country will supply the seamen for them whenever they shall be
required.
My answer to your second question, viz : "What reliance could be placed on
vessels-of-war, or of commerce, floating batteries, gunboats, and other temporary
substitutes for permanent fortifications?" is, to a great extent, included in the
answer just given to your first.
The defences upon which this country must and ought to rely are locomotive ;
therefore, to employ naval means to build floating batteries, which would have
to be confined to the limits of the harbor, would be a waste of money, when we
might, with that same money, give them wings or impart to them the breath of
steam, and send them here and there wherever they would be of most avail.
The money which a floating battery would cost might keep a steamer afloat ;
which, with its powers of locomotion, might reduplicate itself, as it were, along
the coast, by appearing successively before a number of places, and arriving at
each place exactly at the right time. If the enemy would not come to the
floating battery it would be of little use ; but as for the steamer, if the enemy
would not come to it, it could go to the enemy; it could select its own time,
manner, and point of attack, and thus make up by activity, skill, and manoeuvre,
what it wants in strength,
The reliance to be placed on vessels of commerce for coast defences is casual
and accidental ; Upon an emergency they might be armed and sent /to sea to
harass the commerce of the enemy ; they might be used as transports or as
fire-ships ; or they might be sunk in channel-ways to block up entrances, &c.,
and to assist the works on shore to protect the towns. When wanted, they will
be at hand; and in planning military expeditions, or preparing for defence, it is
enough for our sea captains and great generals to know that the commercial
marine old hulks and new vessels are among their means of attack and
defence, and constitute an important part of the military resources which they
hold in reserve which are at all times available, and which, therefore, may be
brought into play when required.
The report of the board of engineers of 1840 treats the subject of floating
batteries at length. It shows conclusively that they are neither tne most
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.. 473
efficient, effective, nor judicious shape into which the money voted for national
defence may be put.
The arguments of the board upon this part of their subject appear to me con-
clusive ; and, therefore, further remarks here with regard to floating batteries
would be useless.
A prominent idea upon which the system of 1816 appears to have been
founded is, that we as a naval power were to remain in hopeless inferiority ;
and hence the burden of the argument for a system of national defence has been
" build stationary works works that the enemy must come after ; line the coasts
with forts and castles to save the country from invasion, our women and children
irom the violence of enemies."
Railroads and steam have converted every village into a camp, every telegraph
office into a watch-tower, on which is placed a sentinel more sleepless than
Argus, for guarding and defending the coast from invasion. Steam, and rail-
roads, and canals have connected every forest in the land into a timber shed for
the navy, and our merchants and ship-builders have established scores of dock
yards along the sea shore, and upon the banks of our rivers, at which keels
may be laid and vessels launched and equipped with a rapidity that has never
before been known in any age or country.
.In 1836 General Cass, then Secretary of War, assumed the position, and
Greneral Jackson indorsed it,* (hat for the defence of the coast the chief reliance
should be on the navy; and that the system of 1816 (that of the board of engineers)
comprises works which are unnecessarily large for the purposes which they have
to fulfil.
At that time steam navigation was a problem which had yet to be solved
upon the ocean. Dr. Lardner had attempted it in the closet, and proved, as he
said, that the conditions of the problem involved an impossibility. He there-
fore pronounced it an absurdity ; and so men generally considered it. At that
time railroads were much less complete, and far less numerous than they now
are. The electric telegraph was also unknown.
Now the ocean is clouded with the smoke of sea steamers ; the country is
laced with lines of telegraph, and fretted with a network of railways all tend-
ing to make reliance upon the navy still more exclusive, dependence upon the
system of 1816 still more needless.
The board of engineers, to show how erroneous, in their judgment, this opinion
of General Jackson was, supposed a case in 1836, and cited it again in 1840
as an illustration.
The case was well put ; it produced a great effect upon the public mind ; and
as it is the hinge upon which the continuation of the present system was made
to turn, I beg leave- to quote the case now, that we may see how it will stand
the test of the new condition of things ; how the improvements that have since
taken place will affect it, and how far it may be modified by the ground I have
been endeavoring to make good.
"In the report," says the board of 1840,t presented by the engineer depart-
ment in March, 1836, (Senate Document, 1st session 24th Congress, vol. 4,
No. 293) " there is a demonstration of the actual economy that will result from
an efficient system of sea-coast' defence ; which is to the following effect, refer-
ring to the document itself for detail. :
" There is first supposed to be an expedition of twenty thousand men at
Bermuda or Halifax ready to fall upon the coast. This will make it necessary,
if there be no fortifications, to have ready a force at least equal at each of the
following points, namely : 1st, Portsmouth and navy yard ; 2d, Boston and navy
See page 5, No. 206 H. Doc., 1st session 26th Congress. See also page 1, No. 293 S.
D:c , 1st session 24th Congress.
f Page 70, No. 206 H. Doc., ,st session 26th Congress.
474 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
yard ; 3d, Narraganset roads ; 4th, New York and navy yard ; 5th, Philadel-
phia and navy yard ; 6th, Baltimore ; 7th, Norfolk and navy yard ; 8th, Charles-
ton, South Carolina ; 9th, Savannah ; and 10th, New Orleans, to say nothing
of other important places.
"At each of these places, except the last, ten thousand men drawn from the
interior, and kept under pay, will suffice, the vicinity being relied on to supply
the remainder. At New Orleans, seventeen thousand men must be drawn from
a distance. In a campaign of six months, the whole force will cost at least
$26,750,000.
" The garrisons necessary to be kept under pay for the fortifications in these
places will cost for the same time $8,430,500. The difference ($18,319,500)
will then be only $3,448,150 less than the whole expense of building these
defences, viz : $21,767,656; whence it follows that the expense of these erec-
tions would be nearly compensated by the saving they would cause in a single
campaign."
This is the demonstration, first given in 1836, and repeated in 1840, to prove
the very great economy and complete efficiency of the system of 1816 ; and in
order to complete this demonstration, it was required that twenty-one millions
of money and upwards should be first given to fortify only ten places along a
sea front of two thousand five hundred* miles in extent ; for there were " other
important places," of which nothing was to be said.
Now let us suppose that, in conformity with the modifications which I have
suggested, and according to the idea of maintaining such a system of national
defence that will secure to us the naval supremacy in our oivn, waters, a portion
of this $8,430,500 which the plan of the board requires to keep for six months
only the " necessary garrisons" in the powerful works which are supposed to be
erected at each one of the ten threatened places. Let us suppose, I say, that,
according to the proposed modifications of the system, a part of this eight and
a half millions had been applied to the building of some twenty or twenty-five
nien-of-war steamers, such a force of steamers would be required, even under
the system of the engineers, to serve as a coast guard in war, to brush from the
outside of our harbors, which are protected on the inside by forts, any block-
ading ships that the enemy may station there, and to keep straggling cruisers
from capturing and plundering our merchantmen in the sight of these same
forts, and along our shores generally.
To keep up the proposed garrisons for one year at the ten threatened places
only, would require, according to the estimate of the board of engineers them
selves, $16,861,000.
The steamers will last many years; and according to the estimate of the
navy board,f made at the same time, would cost, for the twenty-five, $5,625,000,
or only about one-third of the actual cost of the garrisons for one year, after the
forts were built at a cost of $21,767,6564
These twenty-five steamers would be stationed along the coast, and distribu-
ted, we may suppose, in the following manner, viz : two with their headquarters
at Portsmouth, three at Boston, four at New York, two at Charleston, two at
Pensacola, and two at the Balize.
The case put supposes it to be known that this expedition of twenty thou-
sand men, who are about to invade a country of more than twenty millions, has
rendezvoused at Halifax or Bermuda, suppose it to be at Halifax.
Two or three of these twenty-five smart, active steamers are sent to watch
the enemy's movements. As soon as he puts to sea and takes his departure,
one of them makes for the nearest post on our coast, and there delivers to the
See Engineer's (Col Totten's) Report, 1840.
fPage 83, No. 293, Seuate Doc., 1st session 24th Congress.
JPage 70, No. 293, Senate Doc., 1st session 24th Congress.
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 475
magnetic telegraph the intelligence that the enemy has put to sea, and is steer-
ing, with his expedition of twenty thousand strong, towards Charleston. The
effect is electrical ; instantly bodies of armed men heeding the summons would
spring up, not from bush and brake, in a single glen, as at the sound of Roderick
Dhu's whistle, but from every town and hamlet, mountain side and valley in
the land. Harnessing up the iron war-horse, they would hold him, panting on
the railway, ready at the word to speed off with them for the appointed place, at
the rate of thirty, forty, or fifty miles the hour, according to the emergency.
In the meantime, and without confusion, message is sent by lightning for the
look-out steamers and naval forces in the Gulf to proceed towards Savannah,
and for those at the north to steer south and look into the Chesapeake for further
orders. Or they may be directed to cross the enemy's hause and bring him to
action, or cut off his stragglers, or otherwise harass and annoy him.
At the end of three or four days, or it may be a week or more, according to
the weather, and the great variety of circumstances that tend to retard the
movements of such a force at sea, another of the guarda costa steamers puts into
the capes of the Delaware or elsewhere, with the certain intelligence that the
enemy is bound for Charleston. Because his rate of sailing is regulated by the
speed of the slowest vessel in the fleet, he is yet three days from Charleston at
the least.
All our ships-of-war that have returned from cruises, that are just fitting out,
or that may happen to be in port, together with the whole coast guard of twenty-
five steamers which, at the commencement of the war, were found on hand, may
thus appear off Charleston as soon as he : certainly they would be there before
he could disembark. And should he be so infatuated as to attempt a landing, it
would be practicable for us to have there, in force ready to receive him, an army,
with a regiment even of foot, from every State in the Union, except perhaps
California and Oregon.
Is it possible that an enemy could be tempted by any inducement whatever
to land in such a country, provided with such means of defence, invested with
such armed ubiquity, and such powers of concentration ?
Fort Moultrie, which has beleagured an enemy before, and has demonstrated
that it can hold a force from sea in check long enough at least for the lightning
to go for help, and for steam to come with it, is there to beleaguer him again ;
and our coast fleet, which we have supposed to be assembled there as a witness
to this hypothetical attempt at invasion, would be ready at the bar to receive
this discomfited and crippled foe as ,he attempted to escape. Great would be
the disappointment to the country if such a fleet should fail to give an account
of such an enemy.
The present system of fortifications seems to have been planned upon the
idea that in all wars this country was to stand on the defensive, and that all the
energies of the enemy would be directed to siege and invasion.
But in the death struggle, what have we to fear from invasion ? There is no
pillar nor post in this country which, like the Paris of France, when it falls,
carries the whole political edifice with it. There is no Paris in America. Unlike
Europe, the armed occupation of a capital here would be no more than the oc-
cupation of any other town by an enemy ; unlike Europe, there are no disaf-
fected people in this country for a foe to tamper with. The government is by
the people, for the people, and with the people. It is the people. And as for
invasion, there would be neither danger to the country, nor its government, nor
its institutions. Our free institutions are our best fortifications to protect the
country from siege, and the land from invasion. Captivating the minds of his
soldiers, the civil and political freedom enjoyed by all in these United States
would convert the rank and file of an invading foe into friends. An enemy
planting his foot upon our soil could at best hold no more of it than that upon
which he actually stands and covers with his guns. If he attempted to move,
476 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
in whatever direction he should take up the line of march, the people in front he
would find enemies, and those that he left behind, emboldened by his own deserters,
would rise up in arms against him the moment his presence was withdrawn from
them.
What attempts at invasion did England make during the last war ? She was
afraid of desertion and the propagandise* of republican institutions then. It is
true, she made a foray upon Washington, but found a precipitate retreat neces-
sary, and that foray was as barren and empty of military result as a cloud
without water. She attempted New Orleans, but there she encountered one of
those sand-bag or cotton-bag forts, and her hosts fell before it.
In the war of 1812 we were young and feeble ; England was at the summit
of her power. The difference between the military condition of the two countries
was immense ; yet upon what point along the seaboard did she attempt invasion]
Against what battery did she lay siege ? If in the defenceless state of the
country then a country that had a navy to build, that had yet to plan its sys-
tem of fortifications, to concentrate means of defence if, under those circum-
stances, sieges were not laid nor invasion attempted at any point along an open
sea front, with its indentations and windings of six thousand miles if but with
one-third of our present population if with not one-tenth part of our present
military resources, nor not the twentieth of our present powers of concentration,
siege and invasion were not attempted then by a most naughty and proud foe,
is it likely that in case of war now, when she looks upon us as her equal, and
at least as her match in everything except in the number of " wooden walls "
is it probable or possible that, with such a power for an enemy now, anything
like siege or invasion from the sea would be attempted or thought of?
With a home squadron comprised chiefly of steamers, it would be difficult to
conceive how an enemy should so threaten as to make it necessary to establish
a garrison of 17,000 or even 10,000 men for six months at Charleston or any
one of the ten places named in the report.
The operations of these twenty -five steamers would be mostly confined to our
own waters in war, for with want of depots. of coal abroad they would be required
to return into port at the end of every two or three weeks at least for a fresh
supply of fuel.
Now bearing in mind my answer to your first question, and always supposing
that one of the principal features in the system of national defence hereafter to
be provided for this country is naval supremacy for it in its own waters, my
answer to your second question is, with the modifications already proposed, that
all needful "reliance" for coast defence can be placed on vessels-of-war and of
commerce, upon open shore batteries, steam, railroads, and telegraph, OUR FREE
INSTITUTIONS, and such like "substitutes for permanent fortifications."
In reply to your third and last question, as to the expediency of continuing
the present system of fortifications on the shores of the northern lakes, I have
to remark that, in my judgment, it is neither necessary nor expedient so to do.
As for invasion from that quarter, the difference in political condition between
Canada and the United States is an ample fortification for us.
Large bodies of the people there now are known to be in favor either of
separation from the mother country or of annexation to the United States.
An American army, therefore, going over into Canada in a war with England
would be looked upon by a large number of the people there as friends and
deliverers, not as enemies and oppressors.
The last war on the waters of the lakes was a war of ship-building.
He who could muster the strongest naval forces there and there they had to
be created had the supremacy. And if, in case of war now, England should
succeed in getting ahead of us with her naval forces on the lakes she could
inflict great injury. A few days of uninterrupted control there by a few armed
vessels, insignificant altogether as to absolute force, would make dreadful havoc
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES 477
upon our lake shipping, our lake commerce, and our lake towns, if no precautions
were taken to guard against it.
The commerce of the lakes will soon be worth to us as much or more than
the commerce of the Atlantic.
During the season of lake navigation there is put afloat upon those waters
every week, on the average, millions of American property, besides vessels and
the lives of American citizens.
In no part of the world, except in the offings and harbors of the great com-
mercial emporiums, is there to be found such a concentration of merchandise afloat.
Nor is there, in case of our naval inferiority upon the lakes, any part of the
world that affords such an abundant harvest of prizes to tempt the cupidity of
seamen.
It is the policy of this country never to be the aggressor; it- loves peace and
hates war, and therefore it is not likely ever to be the party to strike the first
blow in war. That is an advantage at which Great Britain generally aims, and
that she fully understands and appreciates the importance of striking quickly
upon the lakes in case of war with this country we have evidence conclusive.
Before she sent her minister plenipotentiary here with his ultimatum, when
the friendly relations between the two countries a few years ago seemed to be so
much in danger, she first assembled a fleet of fifty-odd sail in our waters, and
upon our frontiers one-third of the whole British army, notwithstanding that
she was at that time engaged in two distant and expensive foreign wars.
No one who, calling to mind those times, will examine her military journals
of that day can foil to be impressed with the fact that her forces were especially
arranged with a view to Canada and the lakes, and that there the first blow, or
a blow synchronous with the first, was to be struck. Her intentions then were
too manifest to be forgotten or disregarded even now.
It is true the war might commence during the season when the navigation of
the lakes is annually closed, and when, consequently, all naval forces would be
tied up. In that case we should .have nothing to fear. But it might commence
in the height of the commercial season ; and the war might be commenced on
her part by first admitting from the sea a fleet of small-class vessels, passing
them up through the Canadian ship-canals into the lakes, and there letting the
declaration of her intentions consist in an attack upon Buffalo, Chicago, and
other lake towns with their shipping.
These interests are too valuable and important to be left at the mercy of an
enemy even for a day. Therefore it would be advisable, so long as Canada is
an English colony, to provide against a naval surprise on the lakes.
For this purpose it is only necessary to look to the means of assembling
quickly a small naval force on the lakes, and, in the meantime, to place at the
several cities and towns, and at the termini of the various railroads and canals
along the lake shores, a few pieces of ordnance, according to the plan suggested
for the towns generally along the Atlantic seaboard.
The forts which are already on the lakes need not be garrisoned in war only
until we acquire the naval supremacy there.
We have canals and railroads by which we could send the frames of vessels
and all requisite naval means to the lakes at short notice and in time to re-enforce
what we might suddenly assemble there.
It seems, therefore, that, acting upon the policy of so shaping our system of
national defence as to secure the naval supremacy in our own waters, we should
proceed to build the engines, provide the armaments, and get out at the navy
yards of Memphis and New York the frames of a few small men-of-war steamers
for the lakes. The engines and the armaments might be placed upon the lake
shores at once. The frames, on the first appearance of the war cloud, could be
sent there by the Erie and the Michigan canals, put together, and be ready for
launching at a moment's warning.
478 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
The Mediterranean is an inland sea, so are our lakes and rivers. Eminently
continental in its proportions and maritime in its features, our country looks out
upon blue water to the east, the south, and the west ; the ocean front of the
United States alone is greater in extent than the ocean front of the whole of
Europe. Therefore, like action to the orator, a navy to us is the first, second,
and third chief requisite to any effective system of national defence.
Respectfully, &c.,
M. F. MAURY,
Lieutenant United States Navy.
Hon. CHARLES M. CONRAD,
Secretary of War.
No. 7.
Report of Lieutenant J. A. Dahlgren.
ORDNANCE OFFICE, UNITED STATES NAVY YARD,
W^ashington, September, 1851.
SIR : I had the honor to receive a communication from the honorable Sec-
retary of the Navy, enclosing certain queries from yourself in relation to the
defences of the United States coast, with directions to " give to the subject my
best reflections, and communicate the result to the Secretary of War." I have
complied with the directions of the honorable Secretary of the Navy, as far as
permitted by the limited time allowed for the purpose, and now beg leave, very
respectfully, to lay before you such facts and opinions as have a bearing on the
subject-matter of the queries proposed.
Query 1. To what extent, if any, ought the present system of fortifications
for the protection of our seaboard to be modified, in consequence of the applica-
tion of steam to vessels-of-war, the invention or improvement of projectiles, or
other changes that have taken place since it was adopted in the year 1816 ?
Shells projected horizontally from cannon are most destructive agents when
used against shipping, but are not so efficacious against the masonry of regular
works as shot, though in entering an embrasure and bursting they might do
considerable mischief.
So far, therefore, as casemated batteries are concerned, shells have added
very little to the power of ships ; but against guns en barbette they will be
found of material assistance, especially if charged with balls and used as
shrapnel. And against open works, the concentration afforded by the well-
served broadsides of one or more ships, should suffice to silence the works, if
the vessels have no unusual disadvantages to encounter, and are brought within
sure distance.
On the other hand, shells are exceedingly destructive to vessels if exploded
in their sides ; but as land works already possess, in shot, especially when
heated, superabundant means for destroying ships that will expose themselves
long enough to their fire, it may, on the whole, be deemed fairly doubtful
whether, in a general view, the introduction of shells has materially altered the
relations of fort and ship when opposed to each other.
If the question between them were merely the relative capacity, so far as
attack and defence were concerned, there would be no difficulty in solving it.
But in the great majority of cases, where the sea defences of the United States
are concerned, the true question is in regard to the capacity of ships to endure
the fire of forts long enough to pass them without so much injury as to interfere
with the subsequent operations.
And it is on this account that the application of steam is to be considered as
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 479
materially affecting the power of forts. For whether it be used as a chief motive
power or as an auxiliary, it gives great facility in concentrating and appearing
suddenly on given points, and in assuring a certain and rapid transit when
required to pass the fire of a fort.
In the defence of nearly every one of the large commercial cities, it will be
observed that the chief reliance to prevent the approach of an enemy is by
fortifying some approach to it ; the naval question merely touches the practica-
bility of passing the fire of these works, and not of sustaining it any longer than
may be necessary in the most rapid movement that the ship is capable of.
To illustrate this practically let us turn to the mode proposed in the engineer's
report* for excluding an enemy from the lower bay of New York by a fort on
Sandy Hook, with floating batteries and bomb ketches inside.
The ordnance commonly mounted in the coast fortifications are 32-pounders,
42-pounders, and eight-inch howitzers. The effective fire of the 32-pounder can
hardly be said to extend beyond a mile where heavy ships are concerned.
At that distance the penetration will not exceed fourteen inches when the
shot strikes the surface fairly and directly. If the impact be oblique or on
ricochet, the penetration is decreased accordingly. The effect of the fire is
further decreased by the unavoidable deviation of shot at the distance of a mile,
and by the movement of the object which is changing its position in direction
and distance. It would be difficult to estimate correctly the number of shot
which would have a maximum penetration under these circumstances, but
perhaps not more than one in ten. The forty-two pounder and army eight-inch
howitzer will not vary this capacity considerably, and it seems reasonable to
assume that, if the distance be greater than a mile no material injury will be
experienced from such pieces by a heavy ship when under way.
The sketch annexed represents the localities in question as given by the chart
of the Coast Survey. The track at mean low water allowed to the heaviest
steamerst is shown by the coloring.
The effective fire for the proposed fort as indicated by the circle, evidently
covers no considerable part of the passage, and if a steamer chose to take the
main channel she would, by keeping its extreme right, be under fire about six
or seven minutes, and never approach the guns of the fort nearer than fourteen
hundred yards, thus rendering the chances of any damage exceedingly slight.
But the swash channel offers sufficient depth for her draught, and by using it
the steamer would pass entirely out of reach of the fort. The sole reliance,
then, to exclude the fleet becomes the floating batteries and bomb ketches ;
whether they may be trusted or not will be considered subsequently; the present
object is merely to inquire if the fort has the power of itself to exclude shipping.
It seems evident, therefore, that while it is very doubtful whether forts have
gained any advantage from the use of shells, it is certain their efficacy has been
considerably diminished by the application of steam to the vessels-of-war,
which by their decreased draught are enabled to enter channels not accessible
to ships -of-the-line, and when obliged to pass the fire of permanent works are
enabled to do so in so little time as hardly to afford the batteries an opportunity
to effect any essential damage.
Query 2. What reliance could be placed on vessels of war or of commerce,
floating batteries, gunboats, and other temporary substitutes for permanent forti-
fications 1
In proceeding to answer this query, I find the ground already occupied by
certain propositions contained in an official document drawn up in 1840 in rela-
tion to the defences of the coast. The source from which these views emanate
and their official character entitle them to full consideration, so that I do not
To War Department, 1840.
j- Susquehanna, full loaded, draws nineteen feet eleven inches.
480 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
Sketch of nook with fort Its fire and channel way.
The effective fire of the fort is shown by the circle.
feel at liberty to disregard them in treating the question proposed, and it becomes
imperative to scrutinize them ; because, if correct, they not only establish what
they were designed to prove, the unfitness of naval forces for protecting the
coast, but also their utter unfitness for any purpose whatever, which it is pre-
sumed was not contemplated.
The passages referred to are as follows :
" Even should all these, in the form we have presented them, be
objected to, we may still challenge opposition to the following broad proposi-
tions, namely :
"First. If the sea-coast is to be defended by naval means exclusively, the
defensive force at each point deemed worthy of protection must be at least equal
in power to the attacking force.
" Second. As, from the nature of the case, there can be no reason for expecting
an attack on one of these points rather than another, and no time for transferring
our state of preparation from one to another after an attack has been declared,
.each of them must have assigned to it the requisite means ; and,
^ " Third. Consequently, this . system demands a power and defence as many
times greater than that in the attack as there are points to be covered."
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 481
To the first proposition there lies a reasonable demurrer, because, under the
circumstances likely to attend the defence of any harbor or roadstead which is
" approached by a channel, great disadvantage must accompany the attempt,
particularly when the passage lies among the shoals, of which there is no indica-
tion, save by artificial marks or the lead. Where the movements of ships are
only limited by bold shores there can be little embarrassment in keeping them
from danger; but where the keenest eye can detect nothing on the surface of
- the water to give warning of the risk, and a slight error in the course or a tide-
eddy may ground a ship directly under fire, it is evident that the attention
requisite to clear these obstacles successfully will prevent the officers of a fleet
from giving full directions to its offensive powers, though at the very time the
opposing ship may be concentrating a deliberate and destructive fire on the
leading ship attempting to enter, or the assailants may be compelled by wind
and weather to postpone essaying the entrance, even under these disadvantages ;
while thus detained he must be exposed to the severe gales and to much damage,
a consideration not to be overlooked on our coast, even in the summer months.
In 1778 the English and French fleets, then off Rhode Island, were separated
from each other while manoeuvring for the weather gauge during the month of
August, and many of the heaviest ships dismasted on both sides.
On the other hand, the defending force, fully cognizant of the difficulties
which await the enemy, either take such position at anchor, or under way with
steam or sail, as will be best suited to annoy the enemy when most occupied in
clearing the intricacies of unknown shoals, and increase the danger by concen-
trating a deliberate fire at a moment critical not only to the vessel most exposed
to it but to those which follow and are liable to be thrown into disorder by the
least mishap.
Be it remembered that this capacity of transferring the power of its armament
from one point to another is the essential quality in the present case which the
fort does not possess.
Under such circumstances the most cool and brave are apt to hasten too
much, naturally desiring to shorten the time of inaction, and to make some
return to the fire of the enemy ; hence the liability to lose the services of one or
more ships in the moment of greatest need.
Well known instances of this may be cited. While standing in to attack the
French at the Nile, Nelson lost the use of the Culloden, 74, which grounded on
a shoal, though not even under fire at the time, arid remained there useless
during the whole action. At Copenhagen three of his line grounded on a shoal
the Agamemnon, 74, the Russell, 74, and Belloua, 74 ; and, in leaving their
anchors during the suspension of hostilities, the Defiance and Nelson's own
ship, the Elephant, with several others, grounded under the guns of the Three-
Crown battery.
The defending force has, moreover, the advantage, if anchored, of being able
to post some guns ashore so as to enfilade vessels taking the direction of its own
line, and also preven^ the weather ships from being doubled on by the enemy.
Every naval man will comprehend the difficulties of navigating a fleet of
heavy ships along channels skirted closely by shoals and commanded through-
out their extent by the guns of an enemy's line ; and the advantages, on the
other side, of being able deliberately to rake ships approaching in that way will
be very apparent.
Among the events of the revolution may be found an apt illustration of this :
In 1778 a large force was despatched from France with the view of surprising
the English fleet in the Delaware. Philadelphia had been evacuated, however.
The Count de Estaing followed to New York, and appeared off that harbor
about the 10th of July. Lord Howe was by no means prepared for his arrival,
but, nevertheless, he proceeded with energy and judgment to defend the entrance
with a force vastly inferior to that of the enemy.
H. Rep. Com. 86 31
482 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
The French admiral, after deliberating some ten days, finally declined to
attack, and on the 22d of July departed on another expedition.
On this occasion there were strong motives for bringing the English fleet to
action. Their army now occupied no other of the large cities than New York.
The recent evacuation of Philadelphia was not calculated to encourage the
hopes of the royalists, and if " the men-of-war were defeated at this time, the
fleet of transports and victuallers must have been destroyed, and the army of
course fallen with them." (Eakin, page 77.) The reinforcements, too, arriving
to succor the fleet, would have been cut off in detail. The consequence might
have been immediately fatal to the hopes of the British, though favorable to the
cause of humanity, by terminating a struggle which endured four years subse-
quently.
The difference in force seemed sufficient to justify an engagement under any
circumstances. The French had twelve ships of the line, carrying eight hun-
dred and seventy-six guns. The English only nine ships that could be brought
into line, and these mounting five hundred and thirty-four guns. The disparity
was even greater than that expressed by these figures, as the French carried
their guns in ships far superior in size and strength to those of the British.
The main channel which the French were obliged to make use of was thus
defended by Lord Howe : Five ships of fifty -four guns and one of fifty were
anchored in line bearing about W.NW. from the easternmost vessel that lay
near to a storeship, which was armed with some guns, and anchored close in
with the Hook. A battery of two howitzers and another of three 18-pounders
were posted on the shore close to the weather-ship to prevent that end from
being doubled on, and four regiments landed on the Hook to repel any attempt
of the French to disembark troops and destroy the batteries. Three ships were
placed near the bar to embarrass the passage, and a sixty-four, with frigates,
lay inside of the line to be used as occasion might require.
When the French had passed the bar in sufficient force, the three ships were
to retire and take the rear of the line, " which would bring their broadsides to
bear upon the direct line of approach N in the narrowest part of it, when, by
veering again, they would resume their situations, and continue to command the
long line of course which the enemy must pursue as he advances, while the
smaller vessels were so placed as to harass and distress him from inaccessible
positions." (Eakin, page 86.)
The plan of defence was well conceived, and would no doubt have been care-
fully executed.
The French admiral declined to attack under these circumstances, and in all
probability would have suffered great damage, if not defeat, if he had made the
attempt.
The superiority which a naval force derived from its mobility over the
strongest works is very apparent in this case.
The French ships could not even pass the bar at leisure ; they would have
been under fire from the first in venturing to do so, and be exposed to a raking
fire in approaching the British line, which they were not even at liberty to pass
as they could have done, if threatened by the fire of a fort only, but would
have been obliged to engage and to destroy it as an indispensable preliminary
to any further operations.
Touching the second proposition, it may be said that there is no doubt now
of the time that will be required to carry intelligence from any one point to
another, nor of that which may be needed to transfer aid from point to point
along the seaboard.
The appearance of an enemy, his force, and movements, may be known at
New Orleans almost instantly after it is known at Boston, and at any point
between these cities ; and whatever steam force may have been posted at the
principal entrances can be transferred from one of them to another at a reliabel
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
483
Defence of New York harbor, by Lord Howe, against the French fleet, July, 1778.
rate of speed. Ten knots per hour is not excessive for a good ocean steamer in
any weather in which an enemy would be likely to operate in a matter so deli-
cate as forcing a disputed channel.
484 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
The question, therefore, is not whether the inferior force stationed at a port
may be able to make good a final defence against an enemy appearing sud-
denly, but whether it may have the power to delay his movements until aid
shall arrive from another quarter.
Thus, -in thirteen hours after the first sight of an enemy from the Neversink
heights, a squadron from the Delaware would be off Sandy Hook ; and twenty-
eight hours would bring up a force from the Chesapeake.
If the hostile fleet shall not be able to pass the channel, destroy the squadron
that defends it, and still be in a state to attempt the passage of the Narrows in
ilinn thirteen hours, it is very certain that a fresh squadron, even though
somewhat inferior, will afford him good reason to look to his own defence, and
think of retreating, instead of venturing to prosecute his operations. Finally,
the Cluvjipcake vessels, arriving in fifteen hours after the Delaware steamers,
will give more than a chance for capturing at least every steamer of the enemy
that has been crippled in the engagement with the New York squadron.
The means requisite, therefore, at each port, are those that will insure the
time needed to concentrate the other portions of the home squadron.
The result of the preceding propositions, as announced in the third, has
received its practical application in a preceding passage,* thus: "The prepara-
tion by the enemy of twenty steam frigates would require the construction of
two hundred of equal force on our part, supposing that we design to cover but
ten of our principal harbors, leaving all others at his mercy."
The principal objection to the defensive position thus assumed to be imposed
on the two hundred steamers, by the necessities of the first and second proposi-
tions, would be the impossibility of carrying it into execution. There is certainly
no precedent for such a system of inaction ; and if any naval officer were so
disposed, it is more than probable' that public opinion would hardly permit the
precedent to occur here. Novel it would be to see two hundred steamers divided
into squadrons at distant points, quietly awaiting the onset of one-tenth their
whole number. The enemy himself would probably be alarmed at such a
peculiar demonstration, and rather be inclined to look upon it as a trap for his
twenty ships.
Admitting, for an instant, that any necessity could exist for pursuing a plan
BO strictly defensive in its character, would it not be better to send the ships out
to sea, where the public attention would not be enforced to the humiliating
character of the operation, and cause them to form a cordon along the coast,
from Maine to Florida? This distance of fourteen hundred miles could be easily
lined by two hundred ships, seven miles asunder; and being within the notice
of any unusual signal from each other, -the enemy's twenty ships, in attempting
to pass the line, would be seen and overhauled by the ready concentration of an
equal number from the cordon, before he could reach the port to be assailed.
Be that as it may, no naval officer can doubt that if the United States had
fully available two hundred war-steamers of the largest class, or sailing ships of
equal tonnage, the question would be entirely in regard to the character of
offensive operations. It would no longer be an object to defend our own ports,
but to capture and destroy the enemy's ships in distant seas, while protecting
his colonies and trade to intercept his commerce everywhere to dispute the
command of the high seas with his mightiest fleets, and blockade every naval
station of his island empire.
It is not necessary to prosecute further objections to these propositions.
Naval men, with hardly an exception, would take the very converse of the first
and second propositions, and utterly protest against the consequent contained in
the third. Stronger reasons have yet to be adduced to make good the position
that defence by means exclusively naval is impracticable, for the reasons given
'in these three propositions.
* Engineers' report, page 14.
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 485
The practical interpretation of the second query, however, has no reference
to the question of an exclusive defence by the forts or ships, so far as the
Atlantic coast is concerned, if I understand rightly. The answer must necessa-
rily be based upon the existing state of things ; and as a great part of the con-
templated system of coast fortification has been completed, the expediency of
substituting ships, &c., has reference only to such of the system as remains
unfinished.
The works for the protection of Boston and of the navy yard at Norfolk are
already completed. At New York, likewise, excepting the fort on Sandy Hook.
The approach to Philadelphia, however, and the anchorage at the breakwater
are yet undefended, though the works have been planned and perhaps partly
appropriated for.
I have no doubt when these places, and some harbor on the southeast coast,
have received whatever aid can be furnished by the art of the engineer, that a
naval force of no immoderate extent will be fully competent to defend the
Atlantic seacoast from any attempts which an enemy would find it advisable to
make.
Under no circumstances, except of the most unquestionable superiority at sea,
is it presumed that it would be well to resort to a defence exclusively naval.
The ship and the fort have each a particular province in every general system of
well regulated national defence, and if these can be agreed on the result will be
reliable and economical. I do not mean to apply the latter word to the least
possible outlay of means, but to the judicious expenditure of whatever may be
required to effect the end proposed.
It is not needful here to enter into any statement of the part properly allotted
to forts ; this has been ably and frequently expounded by the chief engineer.
Admitting them fully, and the necessity also for the works in the principal
points above alluded to, as the base for the naval operations that are to guard
the intermediate points, it may be well to examine whether even the great har-
bors and watercourses are fully defensible by fortifications, when of the most
extensive character.
Let us again revert to the defences of New York.
The first object is to prevent the occupation of the lower harbor by a hostile
fleet, for if able to effect this the enemy would obtain the following advantages,
according to the report of the board of engineers, (page 54 :)
"An enemy's squadron being in the bay, into which entrance is very easy,
would set a seal upon this outlet of the harbor. Not a vessel could enter or
depart at any season of the year. And it would also intercept the water com-
munication, by way of the Raritan, between New York and Philadelphia.
"The same squadron could land a force on the beach of Gravesend bay, (the
place of the landing of the British, which brought on the battle of Long Island,
in the revolutionary war,) within seven miles of the city of Brooklyn, of its
commanding heights, and of the navy yard, with no intervening obstacle of any
sort.
"This danger is imminent, and it would not fail, in the event of war, to be as
fully realized as it was during the last war, when, on the rumor of an expedi-
tion being in preparation in England, 27,000 militia were assembled to cover
the city from an attack of this sort. It is apparent that the defences near the
city and those of the Narrows, indispensable as they are for other purposes,
cannot be made to prevent this enterprise."
There can be no doubt of the great damage that would be wrought to the
revenue of the government, and to the immense interests of various sections, by
the presence of an enemy's force in the lower harbor. A heavy expenditure
would be well laid out in establishing the means of prevention, and this should
certainly be looked to in time.
486 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
What fortifications, then, can be applied to the purpose, and how far will they
be efficacious in excluding a fleet ?
A glance at the chart will show a wide extent of water between the outer
extremes of land that form the harbor from Sandy Hook to Coney island;
the distance is about seven miles. Large ships, however, are not at liberty to
pass over any part of this entrance. Their course is confined to two channels,
the principal one of which is near the Hook, and another somewhat to the north-
ward of it, (the swash.) Line-of-battle ships can use the first only, but the
heaviest steam frigate in our service, when loaded for a long cruise, only draws
twenty feet, (the Susquehauna,) and therefore has sufficient water to pass in by
the swash channel.
According to their report the board of engineers propose to fortify the east
'branch and middle ground, under the belief that the bottom was sufficiently
permanent to receive such works. Recent surveys, however, have so far shaken
such opinion as to induce them to forego the project.
The report goes on to state, (page 55 :) " This may, however, be said with
certainty, namely : that, all other means failing, works may be erected on Sandy
Hook which will have a good action upon the channel, and under cover of
which bomb ketches or steam batteries, or both, may lie. With such an arrange-
ment there would be little probability of the lower bay being occupied as a
blockading station."
I have already endeavored to make it apparent that any works on the Hook
would, of themselves, be insufficient to prevent the passage of ships into the
lower harbor, and it will be perceived that this is also fairly inferable from the
passage just quoted, as it includes other aid in the arrangement designed to pre-
vent the occupation of the lower harbor.
Line-of-battle ships, in taking the main channel, would, however, sustain the
fire of a fort without material detriment for the eight or ten minutes required to
pass it, with a fair wind and tide ; and, if annoyed by the floating batteries and
ketches, would not hesitate to run close to them and brush them with a few
broadsides, which would probably leave them little more to do than to take care
of themselves.
The heaviest steamers, by taking the swash channel, would avoid the fire of
the fort and floating batteries altogether, and afterward have leisure to destroy
the latter from the anchorage of the lower harbor.
So far, therefore, from believing that, " with such an arrangement, there would
be little probability of the lower bay being occupied as a blockading station,"
it seems conclusive that tlie occupation of the lower harbor by a naval force
would be liable to the least degree of interruption from the defences planned for
that purpose. The report itself admits the necessity of using floating batteries
and bomb ketches as auxiliaries, which, of all the naval means, are certainly
the least worthy of reliance. With the limited preventive powers of a fort, so
far as passage is concerned, they have in no degree the least of its capacity to
endure battering, their material being as vulnerable as that of a ship, *without
its great advantage of passing from one point to another, whether far or near.
And as for bomb ketches against objects no larger than ships, and those in rapid
motion, it may be said that the chances of even a single bomb dropping upon
them are too remote to be taken into account as a means of defence in the con-
ditions of this case.
Conceiving, therefore, the entrance of an enemy into the lower harbor to be
fairly feasible, the next matter for consideration is the capacity of the inner
defences to prevent entrance into the upper harbor and the destruction of such
means of war and revenue as may be found in and about the city, such as the
vessels-of-war built or building at the navy yard, of the timber, ordnance, and
stores, arid, above all, of the extensive private establishments for manufacturing
steam-engines ; a purpose which, if effected, would cripple the nation in every
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 487
enterprise of offence and defence, and probably could not be remedied in the
course of a war.
The levying of contributions might not be disregarded where means so ample
were placed by the chances of war within the grasp of an invader. These
objects individually are sufficient to warrant a military attempt on a large scale.
The number and character of the works arranged by the engineers are best
set forth in the language of the " Report," page 54 :
"At the Narrows, about seven miles below the city, the passage becomes so
contracted as to permit good disposition to be made for defence. On the Long
Island side of the Narrows is Fort Lafayette, which is a strong water battery,
standing on a reef at some distance from the shore ; and immediately behind it,
on the top of the bank, is a small but strong work called Fort Hamilton.
Some repairs being applied to these works, this position may be regarded as
well occupied.
" On the west side or Staten Island side of the Narrows are the following
works belonging to the State of New York, viz : Fort Richmond, which is a
water battery ; Battery Hudson, which is at some height above the water ;
Battery Morton, which is a small battery on the top of the hill ; and Fort
Tompkins, which is also on the top of the hill, and is the principal work. All
these need great repairs, but, being once in proper order, would afford a very
important contribution to the defence of the passage, nothing further indeed
being contemplated for this position except the construction of a small redoubt
on a commanding hill a little to the southwest. The repairs of these works
cannot too soon be taken in hand, and it is hoped some arrangements may soon
be made with the State authorities to that end.
" With the Narrows thus defended, and the works near the city in perfect
order, New York might be regarded as pretty well protected against any attack
by water through this passage."
That these works are themselves perfectly capable of resisting the attack of
any fleet there is no doubt, but that they are able to interdict the passage to a
like naval force is very far from being certain ; on the contrary, the chances of
passing, without suffering to any material extent, are reasonable enough to
warrant the attempt in view of the great results to be derived therefrom.
The distance between the nearest batteries is seventeen hundred yards. The
water is deep to the very shore of Staten Island, and the edge of the reef well
marked, on the Long Island side, by the water battery. The largest ship,
therefore, may choose the course likely to be most advantageous in receiving
the least weight of metal.
If the officer in command run mid-channel he will be under the fire of both
sides at a most effective distance (eight hundred yards) when right abreast of
them, but by taking one side or the other he will recede from one fire, and in
approaching the other be exposed to no great increase of effect.
Suppose he choose to keep the left shore and risk the fire of these batteries,
while, by doing so, he will place fourteen or fifteen hundred yards between his
ships and the Long Island batteries.
The sketch annexed shows the course within the scope of effective fire, which
is about two statute miles. It will hardly be questioned that a decent sea
steamer should run ten knots hourly (sea miles) in smooth water ; these are
equal to eleven and a half statute miles. Of course, she takes the strength of a
flood tide and spreads every stitch of canvas to a fair wind, which ought to add
another mile, making the total speed twelve and a half statute miles per hour,
(three hundred and sixty-seven yards per minute,) at which rate she will pass
over a mile in four and three-fourth minutes.
Tracing the assigned course through the scope of the guns on both sides,
marked by the circles, it will be found that the distance run is about two miles ;
that is, the steamer will not be more than ten minutes under fire.
488 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
The 32-pounders and the 42-pounders of the Long Island water battery will
require an elevation of about three degrees to reach the enemy, the 8-inch sea-
coast howitzers about four degrees both unfavorable to ricochet ; for the pro-
jectiles will bound high in rising, and with a power much diminished even when
the weather is smooth ; but with the ripple occasioned by the moderate breeze,
which is supposed to be taken advantage of, the ricochet could not be depended
on for direction or force, and therefore the direct firing only will be available on
the right hand, especially from Fort Hamilton, which is five hundred yards in
rear of the water battery, and the guns there mounted would need at least five
degrees ; their shot could have no ricochet whatever, and would generally sink
where they strike the water.
Taking into consideration the deviation of the projectiles and the rapid move-
ment of the steamers, the chances of oblique impact from the incurvation of the
trajectory, the variety of curved surfaces forming a ship's side, and the constant
change in their manner of presentation to the direction of the ball, it is probable
that not more than one shot or shell in ten can be relied on at this distance to
produce a maximum penetration.
The principal work on the left, Fort Tompkins, is situated on a high hill, and
two other batteries (Hudson and Morton) are in elevated positions.* Their fire
is therefore not so efficacious for short distances.
To an enemy which should thus attempt to escape the fire of Fort Lafayette,
by steering in with the Staten Island shore, the guns of the water batterv (Fort
Richmond) would be very formidable.
This work mounts twenty-seven 42-pounders,* of which it is probable that
not more than a third can be made to bear on any one point.
At two hundred yards, which is to be the nearest approach of the ships in
passing, the maximum penetration of 42-pounder shot in oak will not exceed
fifty inches.
The time of exposure to the fire of the fort would be about fifteen minutes for
a sailing ship at the rate of eight knots, and about ten minutes for a steamer
going eleven knots.
Would the damage received in that time be likely to injure so many vessels
as to prevent the design on the city entirely, in consequence of the reduction of
the force ]
In attempting to arrive at some satisfactory response to this query one is
bound to avoid possible contingencies, and to adhere to those Avhich experience
has indicated as probable.
A shell properly placed will sink a ship ; a hot shot will set her on fire ; but
it would be very unwise thence to infer that this would necessarily be the effect
of every shot fired at the ship.
The Hornet sank the Peacock in fifteen minutes ; but no naval officer would
infer from the fact that a sloop-of-war could generally obtain a like result. So
far from that, it is unprecedented and may hardly occur again.
Uncertainty as to the distance, change of position, interposition of the, smoke
in a covered battery, lack of deliberation, will cause the failure of many shot to
strike the object at all.
The exactly fatal spot is limited to a few inches of surface near the water
line ; in other places a ship will sustain a large number of shells.
The prodigious endurance of line-of-battle ships will appear to any one who
will look over the records of sea fights. Hour after hour they have been known
to sustain an unceasing fire at each other, with every gun on the whole broad-
side, and yet but one or two cases of sinking during a fight will be found.
See report of Board of Engineers.
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA- CO AST DEFENCES.
Passage through the Narroivs, New York harbor.
489
Let us note a few instances of endurance that have occurred in well-known
engagements :
In 1770 the Sandwich, ninety-eight, received seventy shot holes, seventeen
of them between wind and water, (Rodney and DeGuichen.) She continued to
form part of the English fleet, and cruised actively, as the flag-ship, until Rodney
went home, eighteen months afterwards.
At Copenhagen, Nelson anchored his ships ahout three hundred yards from
the Danish line, and received its fire for more than three hours. Of the fleet
490 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
not one was sufficiently injured to interfere with the active operations against
Sweden and Russia that followed.
More recently, in an affair ill calculated to maintain the prestige of ships in
attacking batteries, it will be seen that a line-of-battle ship received the fire of
two batteries, of four guns each, during seven hours. The deliberate operation
of one of these with hot shot, through the whole afternoon, was entirely unmo-
lested by the fire from the ship, as it appears hardly more than half a dozen
shots from her struck near the battery ; yet she did not take fire until six in the
evening. I allude to the action of the Danish ship Christiana VIII, of eighty-
four guns, Eckenfjorde, 1849.
At Algiers (3816) the Impregnable received two hundred and sixty-eight
shots in her hull, of which fifty penetrated below the lower deck, and three, of
68-pounders, six feet below the water line.
Even frigates will endure severe service. The Macedonian received one hun-
dred shots in her hull in the engagement with the frigate United States, and was
brought safely into port. After receiving repairs in her topworks she was used
in the United States navy for sixteen years, after which she was broken up and
rebuilt entirely.
In 1810 the Galatea, a small thirty-two gun frigate of eight hundred tons,
received seventy-eight shots in her hull,* many between wind and water. She
continued to cruise, however.
A fleet of line-of-battle ships, then, would have little to dread, it is believed,
from Fort Richmond in attempting to pass it, and could probably do so without
material damage. If the enemy should deem it advisable to allow the leading
ship to anchor abreast the battery during the thirty minutes occupied by the
line in passing, the other ships would be insured against the severest of the fire,
and the entire loss devolved on one which certainly ought to endure this without
being disabled.
Steamers have the additional liability of injury to the machinery or boilers,
thereby suspending the action of the engine. But if their sides are lined, as
they should be, with the coal bunkers, their contents would suffice to arrest the
progress of the shot or shells, and prevent damage to the machinery ; the explo-
sion of the latter might be rendered comparatively harmless in the loose masses
of coal, unless it were bituminous, and on that account susceptible of being
ignited.
The fire of the ships would, of course, be kept up, though probably with very
little damage to casemated works. The smoke enveloping the hulls would,
however, tend to increase the difficulties of distinguishing from the fort suffi-
ciently, and would embarrass the aim, while the entrance of an occasional shot
into an embrasure might dismount a gun and fracture the cast iron casemate
carriage into atoms, thereby doing infinite mischief.
It has been assumed that the enemy attempts the passage of the Narrows in
broad day. But suppose he choose a dark night and mid-channel. The strait
is more than three-fourths of a mile wide, without a shoal nearer than the shore.
There is neither difficulty nor danger, so far as the navigation is concerned ; and
the random fire of guns at eight hundred yards, from both sides of the shore,
would be a small matter.
The brief outline of the probable results of a well-designed and well-conducted
endeavor to pass the Narrows may perhaps fail to shake the faith of military
men in the capacity of the works to exclude ships. But would it be wise to
trust the fate of the city even to a chance, remote as it may be 1 For if success-
ful, even the board of engineers would hardly rely on the works about the city
In a squadron that captured the French frigate Renommee, afterwards named the Java,
and taken by the United States ship Constitution.
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 491
as a means of further prevention. Speaking of them, (Fort Columbus, &c.,) the
report says, (page 53:)
"It is a disadvantage of their positions, however, that the destruction of the
city might be going on simultaneously with the contest between these forts and
the fleet."
If the Narrows are forced, certain it is that in less than half an hour the
steam frigates will be within range of the batteries of Governor's island and
the small forts about the city. What now will intervene to prevent the destruc-
tion of the public works 1 Should the enemy choose to pass some of his ships
round to the northward of Governor's island, every shot from our own guns
that misses his hulls will tell on the devoted city, and effect more damage than
the enemy himself would, in cold blood, be willing to inflict. A force now may
also be detached to the navy yard and other places. Rockets, carcasses, and
shell put in operation, and in a few hours the flames will strip us of the public
and private resources. If a detachment be landed, meanwhile, to aid, the work
will be done effectually; and the ebbing tide convey the fleet to the lower
harbor, there to intercept the commerce and to blockade. Two or three steamers
of the attacking force may be destroyed, the detachment on shore cut off; but
what would such losses be in comparison to those inflicted 1 ?
In the conclusion from certain premises, then, the views here entertained
accord with that of the engineer's report, as thus expressed :
"If the mere passing under sail, with a leading wind and tide, one or even
two sets of batteries, and then carrying on operations out of the reach of these
or any other, were all, the enemy might perhaps accomplish it."
At the same time there can be no doubt that the defence of a port may be
made good, when its shore line permits of the condition prescribed by the report
as sufficient, thus :
"Batteries should succeed each other along the channel, so that the enemy
may nowhere find shelter from the effective range of shot and shells while within
the harbor, even should he succeed in passing the first batteries. Provided the
shores admit this disposition, and the defences be supplied with an armament,
numerous, heavy, and selected with reference to the effects on shipping, the facts
we have quoted from history show that these defences may be relied on."
The only question will be as to the certainty of so disposing the land works.
Other passages which occur in the report of the board of engineers seem far
more applicable to the case under consideration, and I cheerfully avail myself
of them as fully expressing all that I desire to add on this head.
"There are, doubtless, situations where it may be necessary for us to present
a defensive array, at the same time that to do so by fortifications alone would be
impracticable; and it is not, therefore, prejudging the question we are about to
examine; it is neither underrating fortifications, nor overrating these floating
defences, to say that these last are, some or all of them, indispensable in such
position.
" Any very broad water, where deep soundings may be carried at a distance
from the shores greater than effective gun-range, and where no insular spot,
natural or artificial, can be found or formed nearer the track of ships, will present
such a situation, and we may take some of our great bays as examples.
"Broad sounds and wide roadsteads, affording secure anchorage beyond good
gun-range from the shores, will afford examples of another sort ; and harbors
with very wide entrances and large surfaces exhibit examples of still another
kind.
"As in all such cases fortifications alone will be ineffectual, and, nevertheless,
recourse to defences of some sort may be unavoidable, it has not failed to be a
recommendation in the several reports on the defence of the coast since 1818,
that there should be a suitable and timely provision of appropriate floating
defences. And until the invention of man shall have caused an entire revolution
492 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
in the nature of maritime attack and defence, these or kindred means must be
resorted to ; not, however, because they are means intrinsically good, or suitable
under other circumstances, but because they are the only means applicable."
Admitting, then, that "any very broad water, where deep soundings may be
carried at a distance from the shores greater than effective gun-range, and where
no insular spots, natural or artificial, can be found or formed nearer the track of
ships', will present such a situation ; and we may take some of our great bays as
examples," as a premise to the second query, then what auxiliaries shall be
resorted to ? Of all those which, in connexion with permanent works, might be
selected to control effectually the channels of our principal watercourses and
harbors, none are less reliable than floating batteries and gunboats.
In the well-constructed fort, the chief merit is a capacity of endurance almost
impregnable to the assaults of shipping.
In the ship, a mobility which gives the facility of transferring the great power
of her battery to any part of the channel that may need it. The disadvantage
of one is its immobility, which restricts it to a fixed point, whence it can control
nothing beyond gun range ; of the other, a vulnerable material very susceptible
of damage from protracted battering.
The floating battery unites the weak points of both fort and ship. It is
neither spear nor shield, and is altogether objectionable, as inefficient, costly, and
unsuited to the character and resources of a great nation. Its worthlessness as
a defence is well manifested by the affair at Copenhagen in 1800, under circum-
stances when, of all others, it would have been most gratifying to every sense
of justice that it should have protected the neutral rights of a brave but feeble
nation. On that occasion there were six hundred and twenty-eight guns mounted
on a line of floating defences, supported, as well as the urgency of the case ad-
mitted, by several forts and a reserve of heavy ships.
Nine English line-of-battle ships entered the channel skirted by the Danish
line ; commenced action at distances varying two hundred to four hundred yards,
captured and destroyed the Danish floating batteries in three or four hours, and
sustained no damage sufficient to interfere with their proceeding against the
other parties to " armed neutrality " Sweden and Russia.
The report of the board of engineers, previously referred to, embodies many
interesting details of this event, to which the only material objection is the
mode of stating the force.
1st. The Bellona, 74, and Russell, 74, grounded on the edge of the shoal, having
their own line directly between them and the Danes, so that their fire could be
of little avail, though themselves might be much damaged by the shot from the
enemy which missed the English line.
2d. The frigates and sloops had been directed to take the stations of these
ships opposite the tick rouer battery, so that of the twelve line-of-battle ships
only nine were opposed to the floating batteries, being about fifty guns stronger
than the Danish line, and not three hundred and eighty -two, as the report infers.
One of the board of engineers' deductions from this engagement is go conclu-
sive that it may be quoted without further comment. It is thus (page 20 :)
" That it illustrates strikingly the advantages that a fleet possesses over a
stationary line of floating defences. Lord Nelson was superior to the whole of
his adversary's floating force ; but not being disposed to run any unnecessary
hazard, he directed all his force upon a part of the Danish line, which was of
course defeated ; and had there been no other than a floating force present, so of
course would have been the remainder, had it been twice the strength it was.
This example fully confirms what we have before urged on this topic."
Some idea of the expense of large floating batteries may be gathered from
the paper of General Gaines on coast defence. Those proposed by him were to
carry one hundred and twenty to two hundred cannon. The estimated cost by
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 493
the chief naval architect was $1,400,000, for each of the batteries with its tow
boats ; which sum would build three line-of-battle ships or two war steamers.
' It is further to be urged, that any such passive system of defence is entirely
at variance with the tone and temper of our people, and the reputation of a
powerful nation. The national policy may be strictly defensive, but when com-
pelled to resort to war, its system of operations should be rather offensive in its
character, if it were only to enforce the sound maxim of preserving its own soil
from the desolating presence of an enemy.
If the floating battery is the most useless of all the stationary defences, the
gunboat may be considered as the most miserable of all the war craft that sail ;
nothing more effectual could possibly be devised to render skill and bravery
unavailing. The experience which we have already had has sufficiently con-
firmed opinion in the navy as to the dependence that may be placed on the per-
formance of these pigmy warriors, and renders it needless to occupy time in any
labored exposition of their worthlessness. In reciting the events of past days,
our own naval historian (Cooper) has very distinctly given his estimate of their
demerits, which, by the way, he does not altogether confine to the question now
at issue, of capacity for offence and defence, if we may judge from the following
pithy paragraph :
" This was the development of the much condemned ' gunboat system,' which
for a short time threatened destruction to the pride, discipline, tone, and even
morals of the service."
It is singular, however, that two distinguished statesmen should, about the
same time, have given their faith to the efficacy of the gunboat one in England,
and the other here. Mr. William Pitt, about the year 1803, in a motion cen-
suring the ministry, found a strong reason in their neglect to provide more gun-
boats. Admiral Sir E. Pellow, then in Parliament, was unable to sustain his
political friends in the measure, and in a short and characteristic speech used
these words :
" As to the gunboats which have been so strongly recommended, this mosquito
fleet, they are the most contemptible force that can be employed."
About thirteen years later it fell to his lot to verify this opinion. In his
memorable attack on Algiers, it is stated that "soon after the battle began the
enemy's flotilla of gunboats advanced, with a daring which deserved a better
fate, to board the Queen Charlotte and Leander. The smoke covered them at
first, but as soon as they were seen, a few guns, chiefly from the Leander, sent
thirty-three out of thirty-seven to the bottom."
Dispensing, then, with such inefficient aids, there remains for consideration
the navy proper, which, it may be asserted, is indeed not only a sure reliance,
if it be properly constituted, but is indispensable to any degree of security along
our line of coast, now washed for thousands of miles by the two great oceans ;
and also to maintain the communication by water and the isthmus between the
Atlantic and Pacific States, where forts, floating batteries, and gunboats can no
longer enter into the question, even were they a perfect defence for every other
interest covered by our flag.
In the first place, it is believed to be susceptible of proof that a naval force,
somewhat greater than the attacking force, may be relied on in connexion with
the present or proposed works at Boston, New York, Delaware, Chesapeake,
and some southeast port, to protect the coast from Florida to Maine, and (as
corollary to this proposition,) will destroy or capture the enemy that may com-
mit itself seriously against either of these ports.
To illustrate this, I will assume the attacking force to be ike twenty steam
frigates of the engineer's report of 1840. To New York harbor, to Delaware
and Chesapeake bays, would be assigned a certain number of ships, varying
with the peculiar circumstances of the time; for the present, let us assume the
defending force to be stationed thus : New York ten ships,' Delaware eight, and
494 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
Chesapeake seven; and to avoid the recounting of local details, I again recur
to New York as the object selected by the enemy.
The stationary floating defence to be used will be the old sailing frigates and
line-of-battle ships of the navy, having heavy batteries on the gun-decks, and
pivot pieces of the largest calibre on the upper deck. Every spar taken out,
even to the lower masts, and the ships well secured with several chains to their
moorings; one at A, to bear on the ships in crossing the bar; three at B, C, and
D, to close the swash channel; and one at E, inside of the southwest spit;
which, with the fort on the Hook, is to assist in defending the main channel.
The enemy's twenty ships are signalled from the Neversink heights, and in
half an hour the Delaware and Chesapeake squadrons are at sea steering north.
It is obvious that any loss of time from irresolution or from want of informa-
tion which is to be obtained by reconnoitring, must be to the disadvantage of
the enemy.
Suppose him well supplied with pilots, which, in a war, the Cunard line can
furnish abundantly, and aware that reinforcements are on the way, it is probable
that the attack will be commenced without delay.
The first point of defence is at the bar ; the deep water here is so narrow
that the enemy will hardly risk his ships in any one channel, even in two col-
umns, and his line is therefore exposed to the concentrated fire of our ten ships,
and of the line-of-battle ship at A.
After crossing, the van will endeavor to form the line abreast, as far as the
channel admits, in order to relieve the leading ships ; but our own ships recede
before them, and by this time the guns of the line-of-battle ships B and C are
beginning to tell. Following our steamers, the enemy soon comes within the
fire of the fort, and advancing onward, the line-of-battle-ship at E is brought
into play. The headmost of his ships have now for more than half an hour
been under the concentrated fire of four hundred pieces of the heaviest calibre ;
and it is hardly possible that they should not be incapacitated for moving with
any rapidity. Even if their offensive powers be undisabled, they must there-
fore be soon dropped astern by their main body moving with full speed, and
their force be lost in the rest of the day's operations. On the other hand, our
own ships have felt the fire of the enemy's leading ships only, and if any one
be damaged, can anchor near the fort or line-of-battle ships, and do good ser-
vice on the passing ships.
It is probable that in rounding the southwest spit, the number of the hostile
fleet will be reduced to fifteen or sixteen ships, capable of full motive power, if
an average degree of success have attended the defending force. And these
must be brought to action before reaching the city.
Without pretending to indicate the precise time and place most proper for
this, suppose that it be decided to make a stand before entering the Narrows.
When it is evident that the enemy will not attempt to force the swash, and
has followed the main channel, the line-of-battle ships A, B, C may slip their
moorings and be towed by river steamers on each side up the s\yash, their
draught having been adapted to that purpose, and take in moorings previously
provided at the debouche of the channel into the main course below the Narrows.
Our own steamers will here prepare to receive the attack, or to make it if
declined by the enemy, who may adhere to the main purpose of reaching the
city.
The action will, of course, terminate in the defeat of the weaker party, though
not necessarily in the destruction or capture of his ships. But in what condition
will the enemy find his ships 1 How many of his steamers will there remain to
attempt the passage, and what will be their capacity to do it after the rough
handling that has been experienced ?
It may be that not one of his vessels has struck its flag or is disabled, but the
power of moving with certainty and speed is crippled, and their exposure to the
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA COAST DEFENCES.
495
Proposed defence of New York harbor.
fire of the forts therefore so much increased in time as to render the attempt
hazardous. Pieces of heavy ordnance can also be mounted on stout merchant
ships and steamers, forming a reserve to be placed along the passage where the
guns of the forts do not command, so as to sustain a steady cannonade on what-
ever ships of the enemy may remain in a condition to proceed. Meanwhile a
few hours will bring up a fresh squadron, and soon after this will be reinforced,
so that fifteen steamers in perfect order will enter the bay. The result must be
the capture and destruction of the invading force.
This is the view which I consider fairly presentable of the favorite case so
frequently urged, wherein the advantage is enjoyed by the assailing party of
selecting time and place without warning to the defending force.
It seems highly probable that the defence of any important point, with some
49 G FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
exception as it regards the southeast and Gulf coasts, can be made good with no
greater additional force in the aggregate than above mentioned, admitting every
advantage that can be claimed for this arrangement of the enemy.
That advantage is limited to a space in time that admits of no accident to
force, speed, or any of the multifarious details >f a fleet. Its operations must
be as precise and perfect as those of the machine that moves each steamer.
From the moment that the hostile fleet COUNTS in sight there is a sure concen-
tration of a superior force, and in a few hours {, here will no longer be the power
to choose. An action is inevitable ; and whatever be the result to our own
squadron, that of the enemy will certainly be unable to prosecute any enterprise
against harbors or coasts for the time.
It is, however, out of the question for any such fleet to hazard itself on a
coast where the certain superiority, no matter how small, exists ; and the entire
line of shore northward would therefore be fully secured against an enemy's vessel.
Southward of Hatteras the necessity of naval means for defence is even more
stringent than to the northward.
The objects of attack differ as widely also from those just under consideration
as the manner in which shipping must be applied to defence in order to be
available.
The resources of private enterprise are no longer aggregated so densely, but
are scattered along the country bordering on the coast in a manner that renders
it difficult for the most eager marauder to do much in his line.
The commercial cities are pretty well defended from the extensive movements
of large fleets by the bars which border the channel-ways to their harbors.
The interior lines of communication formed by the long downs of sand that
skirt the Atlantic shore are, however, accessible to vessels of inferior force, and
the command of these would give the control of all the trade that by its light
draught finds convenience in the smoother waters of the inlet. The most im-
portant debouch, however, for the resources of the country is the outlet of the
Mississippi, through which is poured, in a never-failing tide, the rich products
of the great valley of the river. To check this, to impede it, to harass in the
least degree, would be an evil of the greatest magnitude, and be felt in the re-
motest regions of the west.
The general character of the southern shore of itself prevents the operations
of vessels of heavy draught ; hence the defence must be nearly the reverse of
that recommended for the shores north of Hatteras. There heavy ships will lie
inshore, and light cruisers be thrown out seaward to watch the motions of the
main force of the enemy, and coastwise to check small marauders or parties for
wood and water. On the southeast and Gulf coast the light steamers and vessels
of the third class would keep the inlets and their approaches and the various
avenues contiguous to the Mississippi. While seaward the heaviest ships must
abide the first brunt of the attack and defence at all risk, so as to cripple the
forces of the assailant should he be strong enough to close with the inshore
squadron.
The true and only key, however, to the defence of these shores, and to the
immense interest there collected, is the Havana. The island to which it belongs
enters its western extreme into the Gulf, leaving but two passages for vessels so
narrow as to be commanded with the greatest facility; these are the great
thoroughfares of trade and the mail steamers from New Orleans to California
and New York. Hence if the use of the Havana be even at the disposal of an
enemy while in the hands of a neutral power, each and all of these interests
could be with difficulty defended, even by a superior naval force, and never
guaranteed against severe losses. While from it as a United States port, a
squadron of moderate size would cover the southeast and Gulf coasts, protect the
foreign and inshore traders, and secure the lines from New Orleans or New York
to the Pacific States by way of the Isthmus, its occupation would necessarily
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 497
be the object of every expedition, military or naval, preliminary to any attempt
on the southern trade or territory.
At present the force of large vessels for the southeast coast would be obliged
to use the harbor of Brunswick as their depot, refuge, and centre of operations.
The report of the commissioners has already decided this to be the best south
of the Chesapeake. With the command afloat, Key West and the Tortugas
might be used, but not otherwise, as no supplies are to be had at either, and no
water at the latter. Pensacola would have to answer for the Gulf shore.
The coast of the Pacific States diifers in many respects from that of the At-
lantic in formation as well as in condition.
The circumstances of settlement, product, and trade have yet to determine
much that will govern in the extent and application of the elements of defence.
At present there can be no doubt that the two great harbors at San Francisco
and the Columbia river will require immediate measures for their protection.
The sites of land works have probably been vindicated by the engineers sent
for that purpose, though some time must elapse before these can be completed.
It seems, therefore, that the naval force in these regions should be of the
most effective character in power and number, singly and collectively, inasmuch
as it must for a while be the exclusive reliance for a defence of any kind of
harbors, as well as of coasts. The squadron should always be able to land at
any point a force of two thousand seamen and five hundred marines, which,
with twenty or thirty of the boat howitzers on their field carriages, would be
found an effective auxiliary in emergencies.
The manner in which our own squadron operated along the coast of California
while held by the Mexicans will best exhibit the character of the attempts
likely to be made by an enemy against our own people now inhabiting that
State. If the views above expressed, in relation to the defence of the United
States harbors and coasts, be correct, it then remains to consider the species of
naval force which will be required to perform the part assigned to it.
By referring to the navy list it will be seen that the number of heavy ships
that is available, or could be made so by necessary repairs, consists of nine line-
of-battle ships, twelve frigates, and five steamers.
This force is obviously too small for the objects for which a navy should be de-
signed. If the number already assumed to be required for the defence of the
Atlantic coast in war be applied to that purpose, it would leave a very insuffi-
cient force for the Pacific shores, for the protection of the line of communication
by sea between the Atlantic and Pacific States, and for general cruising to cover
our own commerce, and annoy that of the enemy.
Not only is the effective number of the present navy too small, but the char-
acter of the force has been depreciated to a very serious extent by the superior
powers of offence that have been conferred on the large steamers that now con-
stitute part of a navy here and elsewhere. The cannon carried usually as the
main reliance of line-of-battle ships and frigates are thirty-two and forty-two-
pounders. In our service the latter calibre may be considered as exceptionable,
inasmuch as it is not recognized by the regulations of 1845.
The war steamers carry sixty-four pounders. It is true that the line-of-battle
ships may have one hundred of the thirty-two-pounders, while a steamer of the
same tonnage has but three of the sixty-four-pounders.
But it will be admitted that if the constituent of one battery is deficient in
any one element of power, ,which is possessed by that of another battery, that
no mere increase in the number will compensate for this defect. Thus, if the
thirty-two-pounder shot fired with nine pounds of powder be inferior to a shot
of sixty-four pounds fired with sixteen pounds of powder in the distance to
which it will range with sufficient force to do material damage, then it is plain
that so long as that distance can be preserved it will matter little whether a
II. Hep. Com. 86 32
498 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
ship oppose one hundred or one thousand thirty-two-pouudcrs to the three sixty-
four-pounders : she will receive constant damage from the repeated efforts of tin,-
small number of large pieces without the power of inflicting any harm by lit -r
large number of small pieces. A similar relation, in effect, may be noted in the
effects of other military projectiles. Thus, we know that grape from a thirty-
two-pounder would be harmless against the side of a ship, when the shot would
pass through easily, and yet the stand of grape is composed of three-pound
shot which, even if fired separately, would still be very little nearer the effect
of the thirty-two-pounder shot.
The important question is in relation to the capacity of the steamer to main-
tain the distance suited to her powers of annoyance and of this there can be
little doubt since the passage between the United States and England is made
with ease and certainty in the severest winter weather by the steam packets,
their average speed being then seven to eight knots with fair and foul winds,
and they could in all probability go very little below their highest rate in any
weather in which cannon could be used.
.Those who have witnessed the performance of the Mississippi in some of the
Mexican "northers" know what can be done by a good steamer in a strong gale.
Thus the twenty steam frigates would be very unequally matched in action, by
our covering squadron of sailing ships with the thirty-two and forty-two-pounders,
if it could be said that they were matched at all. The remedy for this is not
difficult, and can readily be attained by a reorganization of our armament,
though it would be more expensive to adapt the present sailing ships fully
to the ordnance which experimental practice has indicated as preferable than to
build new ships. Thus a two-decker would cany the same weight of metal, but
not the same number of cannon. Hence, it would become necessary to reduce
the number of ports, and to re-distribute them along the broadside ; and to do
this, the whole planking and frame, nearly to the water's edge, must be removed
and replaced to suit the changes required in piercing the side with the proper
number of ports involving an expense equal to half the cost of a new ship.
They would still need an addition that could not be dispensed with, which
is an auxiliary steam power sufficient to give a moderate rate in a calm, in
manoeuvring or in getting out and in harbor. For this purpose, greater length
would be required than any of our present frigates possess, as they now barely
stow the provisions and water required for distant cruising. If these ships be
cut and lengthened, the cost in connexion with that necessary for heavier ord-
nance will be fully equal to the expense of building new ships with every dis-
advantage that can attach to a sacrifice of unity of design in model ; for no
skill in the builder could possibly develop any one essential of form in this
piece of patchwork, except by mere accident.
The true policy, not only as regards economy, but in reference also to accom-
plishing the object in view, is to commence without delay the reorganization of
our naval power by the gradual addition of ships built upon the most recent
models, and to carry heavy ordnance as well as an auxiliary steam power.
The experimental practice at the navy yard has developed some points of
interest in relation to the pieces likely to combine the several essentials of ac-
curacy, range, and force, and the bearing of all the results has induced me to
propose the construction of a class of ships designed to unite a higher degree of
^fficiency than any frigate or seventy-four mounting the present armament, &c.
Instead of twenty-six thirty -two-pounders, and four eight-inch shell guns on
the gun deck, the new frigate is to carry twenty-six nine-inch shell guns. The
comparative penetrating 'power of the two pieces is shown in the sketch an-
nexed: The thirty -two-pounder shot passed twenty-one inches into an oak
target, three-fourths of a mile distant. The nine-inch shell, uncharged, broke
through the whole thickness of thirty inches.
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
499
Fig. 1.
Shot from a long 32-pounder, charge 9 Ibs. Penetration in oak, distant 1,300 yards, thickness 30 in.
The diminution of force which both would
undergo at greater distances would lessen
the power of the thirty-two-pounder shot
yet more, while the nine-inch shell would
still retain every advantage arising from its
explosive power. The only pieces of the
present force that would approach it being
the two eight-inch shell guns, which, in num-
ber and intensity of effect, are not compar-
able to the thirteen nine-inch shell guns.
If the distance were lessened, the broad-
side of nine-inch shell guns would in weight
of metal alone be nearly double that of the
thirty -two -pounder and eight -inch shell
guns.
On the spar deck are to be no broadside
guns, but, in lieu thereof, seven shell guns,
of ten or eleven-inch calibre, on pivots, and
capable of being pointed around the circle in
every direction.
An auxiliary propeller power will be placed
astern, for which purpose the length of the
ship must be adapted to its convenient re-
ception.
The points of this ship will be :
1st. Cost of Construction. This ought
not to exceed the cost of an ordinary sailing
frigate, with the additional expense of steam
equipment.
The St. Lawrence cost about $350,000 ;
and the cost of a suitable engine, boilers,
&c., as furnished by Kemble, would be about
$70,000; total, $420,000.
The Susquehanna steam frigate cost very
little less than $700,000.
2d. Force. The broadside weight of
metal of the new frigate would be about
1,800 pounds. The Pennsylvanian, three
decker, present armament, 2,100 pounds.
The Ohio, two decker, 1,500 pounds,
500 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
Comparing the long range with that of the steam frigate.
New ship, seven pivot guns, 11-inch 940 pounds.
Susquehanna, three 64-ponnders 192 "
3d. Cost in commission. Only greater than that of a sailing frigate when
steam is used, the crew not exceeding six hundred men, which is about that of
the Congress frigate.
Comparing such a frigate with the heaviest steam frigate, it will be seen that
the advantages are, far greater superiority in range and force, as the propeller
frigate opposes seven 1 1-inch shell guns to three 64-pounders, the relations of which
are about those of the 9-inch to the 32-pounders; and though her speed by steam
is not equal, yet if the steam frigate once commit herself to the chances of a com-
bat she will be beaten, for her motive power is far more vulnerable in nearly every
point, and if deranged in the least by any of the contingencies of an engagement,
she is at once exposed to the nearer approach of the propeller, and consequently
to the full effect of the broadside guns, while her opponent loses but an auxiliary
power, if any of her machinery be touched, her defence being made good against
the steamer at any distance or position which the latter may select.
If opposed by the ordinary line-of-battle-ship with the present armament of
32-pounders and 42-pounders, the propeller frigate may, at a long range, play
her seven pivot guns with comparative impunity, or she may close and bring into
action the whole broadside.
Of course it is not designed to assert that the navy would be constituted of
this force exclusively, but only that on such a class of ships reliance might safely
be placed for defence of the coasts and harbours against any of the heaviest ships
in foreign service. In time of peace they would cruise as flag-ships, while the infe-
rior classes might receive pieces of such calibre and number as would be suitable.
The second class would be ships with a light deck over the battery and a pivot
gun on the to'gallant forecastle and poop.
The third class, ships with a light deck over a broadside battery, or else neither
light deck nor broadside pieces, but heavy pivot guns to the extent of the accom-
modation.
All the vessels of lower rate to be steamers of five hundred to one thousand
tons, mounting two pivot guns.
Query 3. Is it necessary or expedient to continue the system of fortifications
on the shores of the northern lakes ?
It would be a loss of expenditure already incurred not to finish the works which
have been commenced on the northern frontier, and these would certainly be use-
ful in the initial operations of a war ; though there can be but little doubt that if
it ever becomes necessary to direct the military operations of the United States
to that quarter, the population of the States that border thereon would furnish a
force fully sufficient to a prompt and final issue against any army that co,uld be
sent from England. It may indeed be questioned whether any decent opportu-*,
nity for severing a connexion so expensive and unproductive would not be very
acceptable to the government of Great Britain.
I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
JNO. A. DAHLGKEN,
Lieutenant United States Navy.
Hon. C. M. CONRAD, Secretary of War.
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 501
F.
Order to the Chief Engineer.
WAR DEPARTMENT, April 17, 1851.
The chief engineer will please prepare and report to the department the infor-
mation called for by the second of the enclosed resolutions.
He will also, at as early a period as practicable, submit to the department his
views and opinions on the subject embraced in the first of these resolutions, and
will request Colonel Thayer, Lieutenant Colonel De Russy, Major Delafield, and
Major Chase to submit to the department their views and opinions in relation to
this subject.
It is desired that the chief engineer and the above-named officers should direct
their inquiries particularly to the following points :
1st. How far the invention and extension of railroads have superseded or dimin-
ished the necessity of fortifications on the seaboard.
2d. In what manner and to what extent the navigation of the ocean by steam,
and particularly the application of steam to vessels-of-war, and recent improve-
ments in artillery and other military inventions and discoveries, affect this
question.
3d. How far vessels-of-war, steam batteries, ordinary merchant ships and
steamers, and other temporary expedients, can be relied upon as a substitute for
permanent fortifications for the defence of our seaports.
4th. How far the increase of population on the northern frontier, and of the
mercantile marine on the northern lakes, obviates or diminishes the necessity of
continuing the system of fortifications on these lakes.
C. M. CONRAD, Secretary of War.
The CHIEF ENGINEER.
No. 8.
Report of Lieutenant Colonel R. E. De Rtcssy.
FORT MONROE, VIRGINIA, July 26, 1851.
SIR: Being called upon by the instructions of the Hon. the Secretary of War
to present my views and opinions on certain points specified in his letter to the
engineer department of April 17, 1851, I beg leave to place before you the fol-
lowing observations upon the subject, which I request you will lay before the
Secretary of War.
Fortifications had their origin with the Greeks, and have been adopted, im-
proved, and perfected by all civilized nations from that time to this. They long
since have become a combination of sciences, involving mathematics, pyrotechny,
strategy, and the art of war. The objects of fortifications are to make strong by
art what otherwise would need an accumulation of active physical means, as also
to protect exposed positions from sudden assaults of an enemy. In producing
the first result, they leave at the disposal of the country invaded or attacked an
active force which otherwise might be kept in check by an equal or superior one.
Again, they secure in a great degree, within certain distances, positions rendered
important either by their location or the magnitude of their commerce and
resources ; hence all important seaports should, in my opinion, be protected by
suitable fortifications.
1st. Because otherwise an enemy's fleet might for a time with impunity ride
502 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
in safety in our harbors, and harass or even destroy the commerce and property
in those harbors.
2d. Because they become dangerous barriers, which an enemy is seldom dis-
posed to leave behind him, the custom of war being to attack fortifications when
offensive operations are intended to be carried on by an enemy beyond their
localities ; and finally, a fortification is the usual depot for all munitions of war,
both in implements and provisions. The heavy ordnance, so essential to our
present system of defence, could hardly be stored in safety elsewhere, unless at
such distances from the seaboard as to render their transportation tardy and per-
haps hazardous to the several points where they might be immediately needed.
I will close these preliminary remarks by adding, that fortifications give confi-
dence at home and mistrust to an enemy, and compel him to make additional
and costly preparations, both in money and time, when he expects to come in
contact with them.
, I will now proceed to give my views and opinions on the several points enume-
rated in the Secretary's letter to the chief engineer, and will discuss these in the
order in which they are presented.
1st. I look upon the invention and extension of railroads as of important advan-
tage during a state of war, so far as the rapid transit of both troops and munitions
are concerned, but that advantage might be too much depended upon.
Railroads are so easily impaired or destroyed that it would be dangerous to
depend entirely upon their use. An enemy would naturally weigh the value or
importance of such conveyances, and would offer such high rewards for their
destruction as would be likely to meet with success. It is well known that our
railroads are generally constructed through the most uninhabited portions of our
country, and are in consequence liable to be approached and destroyed by mer-
cenaries, who would run many risks to obtain rewards commensurate with the
importance of the undertaking.
I have already remarked that without fortifications our harbors and seaports
would be exposed to an enemy's fleet, and I now give it as my opinion that all
the facilities afforded by the railroads that centre, for instance, in and about the
city of New York woiild not prevent an enemy's fleet. from destroying that city,
were it not protected by suitable fortifications. The same result would undoubt-
edly attend any other of our important commercial cities on the seaboard; this
opinion is based upon the supposition that an active and competent naval force
would be employed by the enemy to attain these important results by a sudden
attack, and that, too, combined with an adequate number of troops in case it
would be found necessary to make a simultaneous one.
We have had during the late war with Great Britain many instances to warrant
this opinion. I will cite a few of them to show the necessity of fortifications in
our harbors.
The defence of Fort McHenry saved the city of Baltimore. The defence of
Craney island saved Norfolk and the navy yard at Gosport. The temporary
defences at Sandy Hook, New York, prevented the blockading squadro'n from
entering within the waters of the bay, and compelled the ships every evening to
make an offing, thereby giving an opportunity to our merchant vessels to slip
out of the harbor. These latter- defences were insignificant in themselves, but
they acted in conjunction with some fifteen or twenty gunboats, each mounting
one gun, which were generally anchored in the cove, and ready at any time to
co-operate with the fort and block-house erected on the Hook ; and, had Fort
Washington been defended instead of being destroyed, it is my opinion that the
Capitol of the Union would have remained unmolested during that war. v
2d. The navigation of the ocean by steam, and the application of steam to
vessels-of-war, would seem, in rny opinion, to increase the necessity of fortifying
our sea-coast. The great advantage of steam power lies more in the certainty
of accomplishing an object in a given time than in increasing the strength and
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 503
power of an enemy. In other words, an expedition planned for a particular
point on our sea-coast by a transatlantic power can be calculated to a day when
steam vessels are being employed for the purpose ; but those steam vessels, in
the presence of or passing our fortifications, are more exposed to be injured by
our forts than ships-of-war would be. The machinery of the one cannot be well
protected, consequently is easily impaired, and when impaired, the steamer's
motive power is either retarded or entirely suspended, whilst the other is so con-
structed as to be at times crippled in her hull and even her spars by shots
without losing much, if any, of her way in passing a battery.
I have just said that the certainty of arriving at a particular point at an ap-
pointed time is the advantage obtained by the use of steam in vessels-of-war ;
that advantage is a great one, and the only means to counteract it is to have
permanent defences where it is likely an enemy would endeavor to surprise any
one or more of our seaports.
I believe it to be demonstrable that, with our present system of fortifications,
provided, as they are intended to be, with the heaviest mortars, howitzers, and
columbiads, the advantage on our side would be increased had we to contend
against war steamers instead of ships-of-the-line.
The difference of speed between the two kinds of vessels when within shot
distance from our forts is more than counterbalanced by the greater surface
offered in the length and breadth of the deck of a steamer, and the constant
exposure of her machinery to curved fires.
The machinery of these war steamers is supposed to occupy about one-fifth
of the length of the vessel ; one single shell or shot passing through that por-
tion of her hull would in all probability injure some part of that machinery, and
delay or stay her progress. With our heavy guns we may calculate to reach
with certainty and effect an enemy's vessel at the distance of two miles. If
that vessel is compelled to pass under our guns, she will, sailing at the rate of
twelve miles per hour, be within reach of our pieces, say twenty minutes ; in
those twenty minutes each gun will, upon an average, discharge twelve shots,
consequently a battery of say forty guns will discharge four hundred and eighty
shots and shells, which, when directed with skill, will, in most instances, have
their effect against passing vessels.
In answering the third point in the Secretary's letter to the chief engineer, I
would say that vessels-of-war would at all times afford important services in
the' defence of our seaports ; and could they be so multiplied as to be found at
each port in sufficient numbers to cope, with the assistance of auxiliary means
obtained on the spur of the moment, with a powerful naval force, then they
would in a measure remove the necessity of creating another species of defence ;
but this state of things cannot well take place. Our navy can never attain such
pre-eminence, and consequently must, while subdivided along the coast, as it
will be in time of war, be found in the minority by an invading force, and thereby
be compelled to seek for protection under our fortifications. Their co-operating
with the defences in our harbors, they will become extremely important and of
great assistance.
Steam batteries have often been spoken of, and might, perhaps, be of service
where the channel-way is narrow, and can afford them protection from the
shores ; but in open roadsteads I would not rely much upon them ; they neces-
sarily must be slow and unwieldly, and in consequence liable to be turned and
even avoided by an active naval force. All other temporary expedients, such
as arming merchant ships, steamers, &c., might, perhaps, be made useful for a
short time, and upon a particular emergency, but no reliance could be placed
upon them. The immense expense attending the transformation of these ves-
sels together with the cost of their imperfect armament, would hardly warrant
the introduction of such a doubtful system of casual defence in our large sea-
ports. The havoc which would naturally result to these light vessels, when
504 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
engaged with heavy ships-of-the-line and war steamers, would, I am inclined to
believe, be extremely disastrous. The expense, moreover, for such temporary
means would, I believe, exceed the cost of the permanent fortifications con-
structed for the same object.
Permit me for a moment to digress, by stating that there is one consideration
attending our expenditures for fortifications which, in my opinion, is for from
being unimportant to the general welfare of the country, aside from the impor-
tance I attach to fortifications as national defences, and which but few, perhaps,
have considered ; it is, that every article used for our defences is found in a
crude state in our country, and generally in the neighborhood of our important
works. The manipulation of these materials gives employment to a largo and
useful class of our citizens, and creates, as it were, a sort of revenue which
benefits both the laborer and the government, first by rewarding industry,
and that industry, by the natural course of things, bringing back to the aid of
the general government portions of the revenue which that industry enables the
laborer to obtain from abroad through our custom-houses. For instance, a
quarry, when worked, requires many hands ; these hands, devoting all their
time to their arduous labor, find it necessary to exchange the price of that labor
for the necessaries of life, hence imported goods of many kinds must find a
market with them. The manufacturers of bricks, cement, lime, lumber, iron,
and other materials used in the construction of our fortifications come under the
same rule, and, independent of the mechanics and laborers employed in our
public works, form a large and useful class of our citizens, all returning to the
general fund a portion of revenue created, in fact, only by their industry.
I name this fact to show that, although many look upon our system of defence
as costly, yet the advantages of it, independent of the security it affords to the
country in a military point of view, are substantial and important to the commu-
nity at large, inasmuch as they create a revenue by bringing out the latent
resources of the country.
The fourth point relates to our northern frontier and its defences. I can but
look upon that frontier as an exposed one, and consequently requiring the watch-
ful eye and fostering care of the government. Our neighbors have been dili-
gently employed since the war of 1814 in strengthening her borders, and many
vast improvements have been made by them to keep pace with our increasing
strength in population on the lakes. Their population, too, is increasing, and
the Welland canal has removed obstacles which gives them now the advantage
of an inland navigation from the St. Lawrence through to all the lakes. If there
ever was a time when a system of defences planned and executed for the pro-
tection of our extensive northern frontier, it is the present one, when we can
weigh the advantages that could be derived from the great improvements already
in evidence on the opposite side of the lakes. If Great Britain should ever here-
after be found at war with us, a portion of the naval force would be found on
the lakes, and interfering with our frontier towns and cities and our inland com-
merce. The redundancy of her population at home would naturally place,at her
disposal the means of increasing her forces in those inland seas, and by a sys-
tem of locomotive warfare disturb and annoy a population numerically much
stronger than the forces she would oppose to them.
To meet this state of things it would seem indispensable to fortify permanently
certain points in our northern frontier, not only for the protection of those posi-
tions, and as depots for provisions and munitions of war, but as great rallying
points for the militia and other troops.
The remarks I have already made upon the subject of national defences for
the seaboard, in connexion with auxiliary means, will apply to the lake defences
so far as the mercantile marine is concerned ; they might become of use if sup-
ported or protected by permanent fortifications, but left to themselves they could
hardly be expected to cope with vessels- of- war.
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 505
In the war of 1812 and 1814 the ascendency on the lakes between the British
navy and ours fluctuated according to the number of vessels constructed and
the time they took their element ; one single vessel added to the one or the
other would give, for the time being, the preponderance to that side; but the
time is past when we ought to think of adopting the same system, since, by the
vigilance of Great Britain, she has opened the way for any number of armed
vessels she may be able to spare from her own coast. These circumstances
would, of themselves, seem to indicate the necessity of fortifying the vulnerable
as well as the important points on the lakes.
The few defences temporarily erected during that war on the northern frontier
bore testimony of their great usefulness in checking the enemy's ingress. At
Plattsburg, for instance, when our navy, protected under the guns of the forts,
gained a brilliant victory over the enemy ; Sir George Prevost, with an army of
fourteen thousand men, found there an opposition which compelled him to retreat
precipitately, leaving his sick and wounded at the mercy of the American
general commanding. Thus a garrison of fourteen hundred men, which was the
force of General Macomb, within well planned defences, protected our navy on
Lake Champlain, and taking the offensive as well as the defensive, compelled
an army of fourteen thousand men to abandon the project of invading the
country, which was understood to be the avowed intention of the British com-
mander.
Many other instances of the kind occurred during that war which could be
mentioned to show the importance of works of defence on our inland borders.
In conclusion, permit me to say that to protect the lives of its citizens is a
high consideration with every government, but with none can it be so important
as with ours, when it is considered that our population is yet too thin and sparse
to furnish large masses for war services. We must, in consequence, use all
means at our disposal to reduce the number of troops required for active service
in time of war, and these should, so far as practicable, be protected by these
means ; I know of none more effectual for this important object than permanent
fortifications. By multiplying them you relieve a portion of your useful citizens
from the perils and hardships incident to the fields of battle, and leave them at
home to pursue their useful avocations.
In presenting this feeble view of the subject, could I persuade myself that
any portion of it would be acceptable or useful to the honorable the Secretary
of War, it would be most gratifying to me; as imperfect as it is, I submit it
with all respect.
R. E. DE RUSSY,
Lieutenant Colonel Engineers.
Brigadier General Jos. G. TOTTEN,
Chief Engineer of the United States, Washington.
No. 9.
Report of Major W. H. Chase.
CHASEFIELD, NEAR PENSACOLA, April 17, 1SG1.
The undersigned, in compliance with the orders of the Secretary of War,
communicated through the chief engineer, has the honor to submit to the War
Department the following views and opinions of the subject embraced in the
first resolution of the series adopted by the House of Representatives of the
United States during its session on the 3d of March, 1851.
506 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
In viewing " the general system adopted after the war with Great Britain,
and since pursued in regard to the permanent fortifications then deemed nf-e<-.
sary for the national defence," it will be relevant to the subject to allude to the
condition of that defence when the United States declared themselves indepen-
dent of Great Britain, and prepared to sustain that declaration by force of arms
during the period of peace from 1783 to 1S12, and during the war of 18 12-' 15.
In the first period the defences on the seaboard of the colonies, extending
from Nova Scotia to Florida, were confined to a few points. England having
driven the French from their North American colonies, had little fear of any
future attempt on the part of France either to regain her lost possessions or to
attack the other possessions of England in America.
In the course of the war of independence the English were driven in succes-
sion from Boston, New York, Yorktown, and other places, and finally from the
whole country, by which the power of the United States, even in its incipiency
to resist aggression from the most powerful of nations, was favorably exhibited.
Few or no additional sea-coast defences were constructed during the war,
yet the public and private armed ships, issuing from the ports of the United
States, did immense injury to British commerce, and even kept the whole
western coasts of England and Scotland in constant alarm. Some hastily raised
redoubts on Dorchester heights, compelled the English to retreat from Boston
with their fleet and army ; and the castle defending the entrance to the harbor,
falling into the hands of the Americans, together with some temporary erections
of earth on the surrounding heights and islands, secured Boston from again
being occupied by the enemy. Charleston was successfully defended by the
Palmetto fort against a squadron of ships ; and the success generally of the
Amercan arms up to the surrender of Yorktown, demonstrated, if not the
impossibility of reducing the colonies to subjection, at least the enormous expen-
diture of life and money attendant on the attempt.
This truth led, with other things, to a change of policy in England in regard
to the United States. The new administration made peace with the colonies ;
and the wise statemen of England saw that an intimate commercial intercourse
with the United States as an independent power would probably be more
advantageous to the interests of their country than the possession of colonies
that would require much blood and treasure to regain and hold ; whilst the trade
with the same would be interrupted and precarious. The foundation of this
policy was the preservation for the future of uninterrupted friendly relations
between England and America ; and it was the determination of the party in
power to secure at all hazards and at all times peace with the United States.
But unfortunately for a strict adherence to these views, the great wars growing
out of the French revolution placed England in position to struggle for
her very existence as an independent power; and in the course of the con-
test principles in relation to neutrality were adopted, and so rigidly adhered to,
that the interests and honor of neutral nations, and of the United States in
particular, were compromised. In persisting to assert her arrogant pretensions,
the government of England was deceived by its diplomatic agents and friends
as to the effect produced in America. These, judging of the strength of the
party in opposition to Mr. Madison's administration, and of the talent and
influence of the principal men of that party, constantly represented to the
English government that the President would not recommend to Congress a
declaration of war against England in the face of the powerful party opposed
to such a measure. A secretary of legation in Washington was the only corres-
pondent of the English ministry who understood the exact state of things in
the United States. He repeatedly advised the minister of foreign affairs that
the latter was not correctly informed of the feeling in America; and that, unless
the orders in council were revoked and other obnoxious measures and acts
abated, Avar would certainly be declared against England by the United States.
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 507
At last the secretary was listened to, and the orders in council- were repealed ;
but before the news reached the United States war had been declared. The
messengers bearing respectively the declaration of war and the order removing
the principal cause which led to the declaration, passed each other on the ocean.
Thus was the war of 1812-'15, or, as it has been termed, "the second war
of independence," a blunder which England lost no time in remedying, by seek-
ing for and concluding a peace with the United States as soon as she could do
so with honor to herself.
At the time peace was made England was nevermore powerful. Triumphant
over all her enemies in Europe by sea and land, she was left by the general
peace of 1814 in possession of vast means, ready organized and practiced in
war, with which she might have given the United States some severe though
not fatal blows. But however much her pride of power might have been grati-
fied by carrying her triumphant arms to America, she preferred at once to resume
peaceful and intimate relations with the United States, and to secure all the
advantages flowing therefrom, then and forever. Her far-seeing statesmen knew
that the true policy to be followed in respect to the United States in 1815 was,
with increased reasons for its adoption, that indicated by the statesmen of 1783;
and they resolved that no future blunder should lead to a war between the
United States and England so far as the latter could prevent it. In this favor-
able state of the political atmosphere, the clouds that lowered over the north-
eastern boundary, over Canada during the patriot demonstration, and over Oregon,
were soon cleared away. It is true that the United States yielded in these
instances something more than was due to England's just claims ; but it was
rather the graceful yielding of a daughter to a mother's solicitation than the
acknowledgment of any power of coercion possessed by England. If the
peaceful views of England were not then generally acknowledged, they are now
made manifest. England is not only at this time to a great degree dependent
on the United States in commercial matters, but signs are significant that she
considers her future fate depends on maintaining the most friendly relations with
the United States, so that they would, from interest in commercial matters, and
perhaps from a better feeling for their noble mother, look with disfavor on any
combination of the European powers to humble and crush her.
France also gave evidence how much importance she attached to the main-
tenance of the most intimate relations in trade with this country, and how
reluctantly, if at all, she would resort to hostilities with the United States. The
King of the French, supported by public opinion, was enabled to overcome the
opposition of the chambers to the payment of the amount stipulated by treaty
to be paid for spoliations on our commerce. This public opinion was especially
expressed by numerous petitions, coming up from the great commercial and
manufacturing districts of the kingdom, praying that the difficulties with
America might be settled and peace preserved.
During the period extending from 1783 to 1812, considerable expenditures
were made from time to time on the forts and batteries at the principal seaports,
in anticipation of possible Avar growing out of the French revolution, and more
recently in consequence of the continued aggression on our commerce by English
cruisers; so that when war actually broke out in 1812 there was not a town of
any magnitude that was not supplied with one or more batteries. Nevertheless,
there were a great many small towns exposed without defence to the enemy, and
were left unmolested by him, seeing that their destruction or injury could in no-
wise facilitate his operations, whilst such acts of vandalism would serve only to
hold him up to the execration of the civilized world.
In the course of the war of 1812-' 15 the defences of^the country were con-
siderably increased in value by the construction of field-works; and in no
instance were such defences, supported by well-trained and patriotic volunteers,
ever overcome. Attacks were made on Fort Boyer at Mobile, on Fort McHeriry
508 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
at Baltimore, and on Fort St. Philip below New Orleans, and were successfully
repelled. Our vessels-of-war were blockaded in New London, and chased into
Marblehead and Boston, where they found security under the batteries. Castine
was taken and held by the enemy, but being a point of no importance it was
not retaken, for it served to detach a portion of the enemy's forces from opera-
ting at other points.
Washington was reached, and the Capitol brutally attacked and defaced.
The success of the enemy, in this instance, was obtained less from the well-
arranged plan of his operations than from the imbecility of the generals com-
manding the American forces rallied for the defence. The enemy was signally
defeated many times, by sea and land, and the war was triumphantly terminated
by the battle of New Orleans.
Thus was the country preserved intact, during a war of two years and eight
months, against the operations of an enemy having the mastery at sea, and when
the defences of the country were comparatively weak.
It should be here remarked that a large expenditure of money was incurred
in consequence of the want of facile lines of rail, canal, or common way com-
munications leading toward and along the northern, Atlantic, and Gulf frontiers,
through which men, munitions, and machinery of war could be transported.
Yet in face of these difficulties, movements were generally made when required,
efficiently and with considerable promptness.
It was on account of the difficulty of wielding mobile forces for the defence
of the seaboard and lake frontiers, rather than from any signal success obtained
by the enemy against the ports and batteries, that it was determined at the close
of the war to adopt a system of defence by permanent fortifications on a large
scale. Under an excitement fed by the friends of the scheme, Congress voted
large sums of money to be expended on works which were to be planned, prin-
cipally, by a foreign engineer, with such help as might, perchance, be rendered
by the native officers of engineers, some of whom had not altogether escaped
distinction in the late war. A distinguished general officer of engineers in
France, who stood high in the estimation of Napoleon, was engaged and re-
ceived in service of the United States under the title of assistant engineer, with
the rank and pay of a brigadier general. No protest against this arrangement
was made by those officers of engineers whose rank and influence would have
entitled them to be heard in opposition, if any was entertained by them. The
acquiescence of these officers, if not amounting to approval, led Congress and
the authorities to suppose that no serious disapproval of the measures adopted
was entertained by them. Being thus negatively indorsed, it was considered
that a good arrangement had been made by the government, by which a lack of
skill in the native officers, unfitting them for the task of designing the grand
scheme of defence, might be supplied by an importation from abroad.
Under the auspices of the foreign engineer, a scheme for the defence of the
seaboard from Passamaquoddy to the Sabine was devised, involving a cost of
many millions of dollars, and submitted to and approved by the government.
The progress of construction of the works under the new, or as it has been
termed "the third system of defence," was not very rapid. The Gulf frontier
being considered the weakest and most assailable was first attended to, and in
about ten years the river and lake approaches to New Orleans, and the entrance
to Mobile bay, were occupied by strong works. The commencement of new
works of the system was, in the meantime, gradually extended to the north and
south Atlantic coasts, and subsequently to all of the most important points along
the Gulf and Atlantic frontiers. These defences, combining the repairs of old
works with the construction of new ones, place the sea-coast of the United States
in a better condition of defence than that of any other sea-coast in the world.
In planning the new works, it seems to have been taken for granted, in many
instances, that each work must depend on itself, without chance of succor from
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 509
forces operating on the rear and flanks. "Works were thus constructed, to sustain
a siege from ten to fifty days, in the midst of a population from which relief to
"the invested work could be drawn in twenty-four hours. The expensive ar-
rangement of these land defences have greatly increased the cost of the works,
already from their nature very costly ; and at this day excite the surprise of the
professional examiner, acquainted with the vast means of collateral defence pos-
sessed by the United States, that anything more should have been required for
most of the works, than security against assault by escalade.
The report to be made by the chief engineer of the United States, on the
second resolution of the series before mentioned, will exhibit the exact condition
of the works composing "the third system of defence," the number and strength
of the works; the first estimates of cost; their extent, capacity, armament, and
actual cost; and an estimate of the sums necessary to complete them.
This exhibition will prove what has been herein stated, that the United States,
at this time, possess the best fortified sea-coast in the world.
Whilst the defence of the coast has been gradually accomplished in the course
of thirty-five years by the construction of permanent, extensive, and expensive
fortifications, new and important elements in the national defence and security
have been rapidly, almost magically, developed. Our population has increased
from 8,000,000 to 23,000,000. The progress of improvement in agriculture,
manufactures and commerce, and in the facile lines of intercommunication neces-
sary to meet the demands of the growing prosperity of the country, has
advanced in a ratio even greater than that of the population.
The lines of communication, in combination with the electric telegraph, whilst
they impart new life and vigor to the country, bring distant sections of it in
easy correspondence with the centre, at once affording security against foreign
aggression, and making the people more interested in preserving those glori-
ous institutions under which, for seventy years, they have happily lived and
prospered.
The interior and exterior commerce of the country have advanced with sur-
prising strides, the latter has become so necessary to the leading commercial
nations of the world, that its interruption would produce disastrous results to
those nations. The stoppage of the supply of cotton following a war with the
United States, would be attended in England by the most serious consequences
to her trade and finances consequences deemed by many as being fatal to the
political institutions of that country.
In this brief review we have passed through three epochs: that of the rev-
olutionary war ; that of the war of 1S12-'15 ; and that of the elapsed time from
1815 to 1851.
In the first epoch it has been shown that the power of England, although
relatively greater than it is now in respect to this country, aided also as it was
by a considerable portion of the inhabitants remaining loyal to England, was
inadequate to subdue our people, or to retain any portion of our soil.
In the second epoch it has also been shown that though the national defence
by permanent fortifications was weak in comparison with the present one, and
the means for the operation of the mobile forces were limited and difficult in
their use, the most formidable demonstrations of the enemy were easily defeated
and the country preserved from any injurious attacks of the enemy, except in
one or two instances.
And in the third epoch it is shown that, in the several international difficulties
which have arisen with France and England, those powerful nations gave evidence
throughout the pending negotiations, of their desire to maintain that pacific policy
so essential to the prosecution of the commercial and manufacturing pursuits which
have been extended so rapidly in their respective countries during the last thirty
years.
This epoch, now of thirty- five years duration, is distinguished for the profound
510 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
peace which has been maintained throughout the civilized world without inter-
ruption, except in the instances of the Mexican war, and of some unimportant
conflicts in Europe ; and that whilst it has thus been distinguished, it is no less
so on account of the wonderful progress made in the arts and sciences, by whose
influence the character of nations and of their governments have been greatly
changed for the better, affording new guarantees that the pacific policy, so long
and profitably maintained by the leading commercial nations, will continue to
be cherished toward all countries and toward ours in particular.
In view, then, of all these things, and especially of the new elements, moral,
political, aiid physical, claimed to have been developed and to have greatly in-
creased the power of the United States, and which must be considered in relation
to the future arrangement of the national defence, the undersigned thinks that
the general plan adopted thirty-rive years ago should be essentially modified,
by reducing the number and size of the works proposed to be constructed, and
by abandoning some of the defences now in progress of construction, or which
are about to be constructed under existing appropriations made by Congress.
The undersigned is also of the opinion that the best interests of the country
require that the subject of modification should be submitted to a board composed
of artillery and engineer officers, and some eminent civilians. That no new
work should be commenced, even if it has been appropriated for by Congress;
and that no appropriation should be made by Congress for the completion and
repairs of existing works, until the whole subject of the national defence has
been considered and reported by the said board.
The Secretary of War desires " that the chief engineer and the above-named
officers (Colonel Thayer, Lieutenant Colonel De Russy, Major Delafield, and
Major Chase) should direct their inquiries particularly to the following points :
" 1st. How far the invention and extension of railways have superseded or
diminished the necessity of fortifications on the seaboard?
"2d. In what manner and to what extent the navigation of the ocean by
steam, and particularly the application of steam to vessels-of-war, and recent
improvements in artillery and other military inventions and discoveries, affect
the question?
" 3d. How far vessels-of-war, steam batteries, ordinary merchant ships and
steamers, and other temporary expedients can be relied upon as substitutes for
permanent fortifications for the defence of the large seaports ?
" 4th. How far the increase of the population on the northern frontier, and of
the mercantile marine on the northern lakes, can obviate or diminish the necessity
of continuing the system of fortifications on those lakes?"
The results of the inquiries made by the undersigned in the premises are
expressed as follows :
1st. The invention and extension of railways and of the electric telegraph, in
connexion with the great increase in the number and size of steam vessels navi-
gating the rivers, bays, lakes, and ocean, have added greatly to the strength of
the Union, by bringing the most distant sections within a few days] travel of
the centre, and do thus contribute to preserve tranquillity at home and repel
aggression from abroad.
The lines of railways, assuming the radiating point at New York, will shortly
be extended to most of the important seaboard and inland towns in the United
States. The telegraph lines following the rails, and also diverging from them,
are beginning to interlace the country in every direction. By these means, and
the rapid increase of our population indigenously and by immigration, agricul-
ture and manufactures, 'have been surprisingly extended throughout our broad
domain, and an internal commerce has arisen, by the interchange of the products
of art and of our various climates, which is considered to be of greater value
than the exterior commerce of the country. With the exception of a few articles,
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 511
our artificial and natural productions embrace everything that can be produced
in any part of the world.
These are immense elements of strength to a nation, and insure its power and
prosperity. This is the moral effect.
The existence of these railways and telegraphs contribute directly and physi-
cally to the defence of the country, by enabling men and military supplies to be
collected promptly and moved rapidly to points threatened with invasion. Rail-
ways extend already along the coast, in some instances, in double lines, from
Portland to Savannah, connecting all the intermediate cities and other important
points with the canals and rivers and the naval and military arsenals and depots.
From this great base line, other lines convergent and divergent, have reached
lakes Erie, Ontario, and Champlain, and they are rapidly approaching and
crossing the great lakes and rivers of the west. And it is hoped that Congress
will not long delay, in conjunction with the State of Texas, in making such a
donation of lands as will enable private enterprise to commence and complete a
railway leading from some point between the mouth of Red river and New Orleans,
through Louisiana and Texas to El Paso, and thence through the valley of the
Gila to San Diego, in California.
A single example of the pervading extent of the railway system will at once
illustrate the subject, and exhibit in a favorable light these new means for the
national defence. The completion of the railway now in course of completion,
from Wilmington, in North Carolina, to Manchester, in South Carolina will
enable troops to be transported continuously, by railway, from the valley of the
Tennessee to Norfolk in two days, to Washington in two and a half days, and
to Charleston and Savannah in one day. The extension of the railway now
being made from Chattanooga, on the Tennessee river, to Nashville, will enable
the volunteers from the superb military population of Tennessee to be carried to
the most distant points of the north and south Atlantic, almost at a moment's
warning, and in the course of three or four days; whilst the speedy completion
of the road from Atlanta, in Georgia, to Montgomery, in Alabama, and the
probable construction of a road from Montgomery to Mobile and Pensacola, will
bring the Gulf of Mexico within a day's travel of the same great State of Ten-
nessee.
At the north the system of railways is much more extended. The New
York and Erie road, now complete, is proposed to be extended along the shore
of Lake Erie to Cleveland, and thence to Detroit, from whence a road has been
carried to Chicago, on Lake Michigan. The seaboard base of railways will
thus be brought within easy communication of the most distant lake frontier.
The Massachusetts, Vermont, St. Lawrence, and Montreal railways will bring
the whole Canada frontier, extending from Lake Ontario down to Montreal,
within twenty -four hours' travel, on an average, of Boston, Portland, and New
York.
The transportation of troops on railways may be effected with great prompt-
ness. The first regiment of Pennsylvania, raised in Philadelphia, the most dis-
tant^point from the scene of action, were transported so rapidly to New Orleans,
ma Pittsburg and the Pennsylvania railways, that the regiment, one thousand
strong, was placed in the van of the volunteer forces, raised for the campaign
against Mexico, under General Scott.
Sufficient has been said to show that railways and the electric telegraph con-
tribute largely to the national defence ; that the works^ covering our large sea-
ports and other important points, placed in connexion with the railways and
telegraph, if they were now to be constructed, might be much reduced in size
and cost, if not in number ; that the facility with which these works could be
relieved, in case of an attempted siege, would have rendered it only necessary
for them to be made secure against a coup-de-main.
Under these views of the subject, it is at once perceived that, whilst the ex-
512 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
tension and invention of railways and the electric telegraph do not supersede,
they greatly diminish the necessity of adding to the number and cost of the
fortifications on the seaboard ; or, in other words, that the future prosecution of
the system of defence by permanent fortifications should be on a very reduced
scale in comparison with the magnificent one adopted thirty-five years ago.
2d. The navigation of the ocean by steam, and the application of steam to
vessels-of-war, have certainly added to the facilities of naval operations in
making attacks and transporting troops. But such operations are necessarily
confined to short lines, like those between France and England, in the Mediter-
ranean, or on the lakes between Canada and the United States.
Attacks by steamers can only be formidable when they are numerous and
filled with troops destined for a grand attack ; but when they are thus filled
with troops, munitions of war, provisions, armament, and their regular crews,
little room is left for the fuel necessary to propel them to the scene of action
and in retreat. Such steamers cannot be propelled either conveniently or rapidly
until the propelling power can be produced at a less outlay for fuel. At the
rate supposed to be the maximum of speed of war-steamers, lines of operations
over one thousand miles (five hundred in advance and five hundred in retreat)
cannot be occupied advantageously, or with the efficiency necessary to a great
movement of a strategic or direct attack. Numerous transports would be neces-
sary to convey supplies of coal to convenient places on the coast, where depots
for the same would have to be established and defended at great cost, for they
would be constantly in danger of attack by sea and land from enterprising as-
Builants. Besides, the great loads of men, munitions, armaments, provisions,
and fuel that war and transport steamers would be obliged to carry, multiply
the dangers of navigation.
Certainly steamers could make sudden and brief attempts to enter harbors
and destroy towns, but fast-sailing ships with favorable winds could do the same,
if this kind of marauding and piratical warfare was carried on by any Christian
nation calling itself civilized, and if not opposed by the same machines of war
as those used by the enemy and by acts of retaliation.
Such attempts might be successful in attack and retreat, if made in the night,
even if the harbor was strongly fortified, if the fortifications were unaided by
rafts and hulks lying across the channels.
But a demonstration 011 a large scale against the important ports and arsenals,
for the purpose of taking possession and levying contributions, requires con-
siderable land forces, even against such points as were not defended by batteries,
for at such points, in time of war, earth erections would be made and easily sup-
plied with cannon of heavy calibre, that would do great damage, by direct and
vertical cannonade, to the enemy's vessels and forces afloat after they had entered
the harbor, and probably compel them to leave it, and force him to select a more
distant point for the initiative of attack.
If the enemy, strong in ships and soldiers, could be driven from Boston by
the erection of some redoubts in the course of one night, it is hardly to be sup-
posed that he would attempt to recapture the position, or to attack any either
position similarly situated.
Any such demonstration at the present day would be checked by the means
just enumerated, and be met on its flanks and in front by the mobile forces ral-
lied by the telegraph to the point of attack.
The improvement in artillery, as regards size and efficiency, has been of late
years very great, but it inures more to the benefit of the defence than the attack.
In the same way that, if steam applied to ships-of-war afford any advantage to
the attack, steam applied on railways, combined with the electric telegraph,
affords greater advantages to the defence, by reason of the greater facility with
which forces may be moved by the latter means.
From all which it may be safely asserted that the navigation of the. ocean by
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 513
steam, the application of steam to vessels-of-war, and recent improvement in
artillery and other military inventions, do not exhibit the attack of forts on the
seaboard superior to the defence, where those forts are connected with railways
and are brought within succor of the surrounding population, nor do they render
additions to the present fortifications in number, size, or cost in anywise neces-
sary. But, on the contrary, the improvement in artillery, if those fortifications
had now to be built, would enable their plans to be reduced one-half in size and
the armament one-fourth in amount.
The substitution of the 10-inch columbiad for the mixed and most inefficient
armaments with which our fortifications have been garnished at great expense,
is already forced upon us by the introduction of those superb guns on board of
vessels-of-war. It would be ridiculous, if it be intended to adhere in any degree
to the present system of sea-coast defence, to retain the present armaments,
composed principally as they are of 12, 18, 24, 32, and 42-pounders. It is the
opinion of many persons, entertained for years past, that but one class of guns
should be generally used in our batteries on the coast, and that these guns
should be of the largest calibre which experiment has demonstrated could be
efficiently used.
Fort McKee, in the harbor of Pensacola, is supplied with one hundred and
twenty guns, composed of about equal numbers of 24, 32, and 42-pounders.
The average effective range of these guns may be stated at 1,100 yards, and
the weight of metal that may be projected from the entire battery at 3,920
pounds. Now thirty 10-inch columbiads would throw the same weight of solid
shot and strike an object with precision at 2,200 yards distant ; so that whilst
the number of guns at Fort McKee might be reduced seventy-five in one hun-
dred, the effective range by solid and hollow shot would be increased one hun-
dred in one hundred, and the efficiency of the batteries greatly increased, at the
same time the size & that work might be reduced at least one-half.
3d. Our large seaports and naval depots being already covered by extensive
works, and requiring but small additional defences, the discussion of the question
as to the superiority of those defences over vessels-of-war, floating batteries,
ordinary merchant vessels and steamers, and other temporary expedients, would
seem to be unnecessary All experience, however, has shown that any kind of
floating defences is inferior, on every score, to land batteries where the localities
will permit the latter to be used. This subject has been ably discussed and
illustrated in the report made by a board of officers to the Secretary of War in
1840, on the national defences. Other temporary expedients, such as rafts,
hulks sunk in channels, and ridges of stone thrown across the same, could be
relied upon, in most instances, only as auxiliary defence to land batteries.
4th. In considering how far the increase of population on the northern frontier,
and of the mercantile marine on the northern lakes, obviates the necessity of con-
tinuing the system of fortifications on those lakes, it will be necessary to bring
into view some of the elements of strength, moral, physical, and political
possessed by the United States, and which have already been alluded to in this
report.
The chief moral and political element is the aversion to war with the United
States felt by Great Britain, whose present superiority in naval means of attack
makes her, of all nations, alone formidable to us. This aversion arises from the
intimate and entangling relations in commerce with this country, and from the
dependence of England upon the United States for the chief supply of cotton to
the leading branch of her manufactures. And this aversion to the slightest
approach, of international hostility is not abated by the consideration that the
untoward event of war with the United States would prompt Russia and France
to carry out their long-cherished designs of aggrandizement in Turkey, Syria,
and India.
The principal physical elements are : first, the facility with which, by means
H. Rep. Coin. 86 33
514 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
of existing railways, we could approach Montreal with a large force, and drive
thence the British forces to seek shelter under the walls of Quebec, and finally
from all Canada ; by which simple and rapid movement the two provinces would
fall without a struggle into our possession, with one-half of its population, at
least, inclined to a change of sovereignty; and second, the superiority of our
mercantile marine, affording convertible means for a naval force, giving us the
mastery of the lakes, and enabling us to crush any partisan attempts coming
from the Canada shore; and third, the superiority of our advantages on the
score of a military population lying along the whole northern and lake frontier.
These great moral, physical, and political advantages being undeniable, the
continuation of the system of fortifications on the northern and lake frontier
would involve a useless waste of public money.
The large sums of money expended and proposed to be expended on the
defensive works extending from House's Point to the Sault of St. Marie would
have been, and will be more beneficially applied to the improvement of the lake
harbors and dependent rivers, thus promoting the interests of commerce in time
of peace, and affording depots for our naval forces in time of war.
By demonstrating that such an application of the public money would directly
promote the, national defence, not only on the lakes, in substitution of fortifica-
tions, but on the seaboard, in aiding the defence by fortifications, much of tlie
opposition entertained, on constitutional grounds, towards internal improvements,
would be removed.
Under these views, it is the opinion of the undersigned that the whole system
of fortifications for the defence of the northern and lake frontiers should at once
be abandoned, and that no more money be applied even for the repairs or com-
pletion of the existing works.
The undersigned, in conclusion, would express his opinion in repetition, that
a board of artillery and engineer officers and civilians shoilld be formed to take
into consideration the whole subject of the national defences, as called for by the
resolutions of the House of Representatives, passed in the session of March 3,
1851, and as particularly and searchingly alluded to by the Secretary of War,
in his order of April 17, 1851, with a view to the changes necessary to be made
in "the third system of defence," commenced thirty-five years ago; and of the
adaptation of the same, inversely, to the increased power, political, physical, and
moral, of the United States.
The composition of such a board being well calculated to have the whole
subject opened fairly and discussed freely, by which errors of opinions, par-
ticularly those arising from professional prejudices and interests, would be
exposed and corrected, the truth in the premises made manifest, and the good
of the commonwealth secured.
Civilians versed in national and international policy, and officers known to be
opposed to the system of defence on its present scale, as well as those who have
declared in its favor, would cause the pour and centre to be fairly stated, and
all sophistry and false principles to be detected and discarded.
In the event of such a board being formed, it is suggested that the uyes and
noes on all important questions should be ordered to be taken and recorded.
Respectfully submitted,
WM. H. CHASE,
Major of Engineers.
Hon. C. M. CONRAD,
Secretary of
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 515
No. 10.
Report of Major R. Delafield.
Views and opinions of Major Richard Delafield, of the corps of engineers, on
the following points connected with the defence of the coasts of the United
States, called for by the Secretary of War in his communication of the 17th of
April, 1851:
1st. How far the invention and extension of railroads have superseded or
diminished the necessity of fortifications on the seaboard ?
No member of the corps of engineers, so far as I am acquainted, has ever
considered it expedient to construct permanent fortifications along our seaboard,
to defend it against armies operating on the land. The art of fortification, in
such an emergency, is principally confined to temporary field-works, thrown up
after the enemy has effected a landing, and selected his route of approach.
Such fortifications are only needed to oppose infantry and field artillery,
requiring little less than earth for their construction, and executed by the troops
in the field, and with a few days' labor.
To the more speedy accomplishment of this particular, in the defence of the
nation, railroads have contributed greatly.
Fortifications of a permanent character, requiring a long time to construct and
perfect, are, however, considered indispensably necessary to prevent the ingress
of the powerful floating batteries that can sail or steam into our harbors, against
which railroads can oppose, neither directly nor indirectly, an efficient resistance.
The city of New York, for example, is within three hours' sail of the ocean.
Ships-of-war of the heaviest class, and war steamers with troops, can come to
the docks of this city, or lay at anchor in the East and North rivers, and do as
much injury and destruction as may suit an enemy's purpose. Now, although
several railroads centre in this city from distant and most populous sections of
our country, they can bring nothing to prevent the entrance of a maritime force.
No number of men that can be concentrated in New York, or along the shores
of the water approaches, however well disciplined they may be, can oppose,
with any probability of success, the passage of a hostile fleet from the sea to
the city, or prevent its destroying its mercantile marine and real estate. Field
artillery, infantry, cavalry, and riflemen can have no effect upon ships-of-the-
line ; and the increase of numbers would but swell the loss of our citizens by
uselessly exposing them to a ship's broadsides.
The many thousands of uniformed militia that could, within forty-eight hours,
be concentrated by railroad and river steamers in New York and its vicinity,
could do positively nothing in arresting a hostile fleet from destroying the city.
It will be asked, then, are railroads of no value or use in the defence of the
sea-coast? Most certainly, they are a valuable auxiliary; economizing time
and treasure, and preventing many a predatory expedition that an enemy might
otherwise undertake.
Landings for supplies of provisions, water, or for any hostile purpose against
all the cities and towns of the Union, are rendered much more difficult and haz-
ardous to an enemy. Ere he can effect a landing, march to the city, and destroy
or lay it under contribution, the railroads and river steamers could transport
from hundreds of miles the uniform militia of the country in far greater num-
bers than any fleet can be expected to bring across the ocean; provided, we can
cause such landings to be made at such a distance from the cities as to give time
for the railroads and steamers to transport the militia after they are assembled.
In all such landings an enemy can have no other description of force than we
can bring to oppose him. He has, in such case, been compelled to leave his
heavy battering ships.
516 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
But so long as he could reach the cities in his ships, he never could throw
the advantage in our favor by landing, unless the distance to march was within
a few hours' march of his landing.
There is, then, no other permanently reliable, economical, and efficient means
of preventing the approach and entrance into our harbors of these ships' bat-
teries, whether sailing or steam, than by opposing them with similar and supe-
rior batteries, and compelling the ships to fight the batteries by temporary
obstructions in the channels locating these batteries at the greatest distance
that can be found to protect the channels. Such batteries are \mtfortifications.
In their construction we must arrange them for the heaviest class of guns, to
secure their action at the greatest distance, and to produce the greatest injury to
ships-of-the-line or steamers.
That the troops manning these batteries may not be exposed to the ships'
fire, they must be covered in front by earth or masonry, and either placed so
high that from a ship's deck, thirty feet above water, they cannot be looked
into, or else must be covered over head to secure the gunners. Where the site
is not naturally high enough for this purpose, we gain it by masonry, which
introduces the construction known as a casemated battery. Once forced to this
mode of construction, economy prompts us to put tiers of guns over each other.
.But these batteries, however well calculated to protect the men at their guns,
must be enclosed in the rear ; otherwise, the marines of a fleet could land, pass
into them and drive the artillerists from their guns.
This makes an enclosed battery or fortification, and upon these alone can we
depend to protect our harbors, cities, dock yards, &c., economically and efficiently.
These enclosed works must be of such a nature that there shall be no one
point outside that cannot be seen from some point within, of such a height that
they cannot be scaled by an active and disciplined force, and so strong that field
artillery cannot destroy them, which gives time for the militia of the country
to march to their relief, and force back any troops that may have landed to
take them.
The great change brought about by railroads and river steamers in our sys-
tem of defence is in lessening the artificial strength of the land defences of the
sea-coast fortifications. Just after the war of 1812 to 1815, it was considered
necessary to give them such strength as to require as many days for their
reduction as would suffice for assembling the militia in mass and marching to
the relief of the forts.
The time of taking a well-constructed fort, properly defended, is a matter of
calculation, when its strength is such as to compel the forms of a siege. The
basis of this calculation is the excavation and removal of a given quantity of
earth, and the landing, mounting, and serving a given number of heavy guns.
The guns are to be mounted on the edges of the ditches of the forts, and this
can only be done by what is termed zigzag approaches, constituting a siege.
At the period above referred to, there were few positions in the United States
that did not allow time for an enemy to land, and take, in the above manner, an
ordinary bastioned front, ere the militia of the country could come to its relief
in sufficient numbers to contend with disciplined forces.
But at the present time we have but to fulfil the condition of strength on
the land side to resist a coup de main or escalade, thereby forcing an enemy to
bring up a battering train for its reduction, and we gain the time necessary for
its relief. We now need no second line of defence a simple flanked scarp, cov-
ered wifh earth, suffices. Herein is the great difference brought about by rail-
roads, that of reducing the -magnitude and expense of the land defences of the
sea-coast batteries. But the power of the batteries themselves, it will be seen
hereafter, must be stronger than ever.
2d. In what manner and to wha.t extent the navigation of the ocean by steam,
and particularly the application of steam to vessels-of-war, and recent improve-
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA- COAST DEFENCES. 517
ments in artillery and other military inventions and ' discoveries affect this
question ?
The navigation of the ocean by steam has had a great influence upon the
defence of our seaboard. " The heavy armament of war steamers, their ample
storage and accommodation for troops, the rapidity of their evolutions and facility
of transport, altogether constitute them convenient and formidable instruments
for offensive warfare, particularly for making a descent upon any line of coast
with a powerful army. Since 1815 it has enabled seamen to set the elements
at defiance, and this would lead hostile powers to consider us more open to
invasion."
Before its introduction, it required an immense marine and long time for prep-
aration ere an enemy could effect an invasion of our shores. The expedition
fitted out by England against New Orleans was known by us to be in prepara-
tion, for some part of our coast, six months before its arrival. After sailing, it
had to rendezvous at Jamaica, (from whence, also, we heard of its concentra-
tion,) and again at Ship island, before commencing to disembark. This gave
much time for us to prepare. At that date we may be considered as having had
six months' notice of an intended expedition.
At the present time, with the aid of steam, the notice comes with the blow ;
a few days now suffices to invade either Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Bal-
timore, Norfolk, Charleston, or Savannah, from Bermuda. It is the introduc-
tion of steam navigation that has given such an advantage over us, compared
with the sailing vessels of 1815.
In 1812 Great Britain considered Halifax a suitable place for her naval
depot, and stores for her fleet on our coast. It so continued until a recent date,
when they discovered that our proximity by land enabled us to reach and destroy
it, beyond their power to prevent it. The consequence has been, that a central
point opposite our Atlantic seaboard (Bermuda) has been selected, fortified, and
still being fortified with great care and strength, and fitted as a naval depot.
To it, already, have all the naval stores been removed from Halifax. It is
secure against the power or force we can most readily command, (an army,) and,
by fortifications, is secure against any naval armament we are likely to possess.
From this point an army can embark in steamers, and in three days be
anchored in our harbors, without any other notice than their coming in sight of
our headland, but not long enough to enable us to draw together militia to
oppose them. Hence it is tuat we are comparatively weaker, at this time, by
the introduction of steam navigation.
Another important facility to an enemy, and to our disadvantage, is gained
by the steamship. Fifteen such vessels as have lately been built will carry an
army of ten thousand men, with their munitions, to any point on our Atlantic
coast in a given space of time, and without any necessity for other rendezvous
than the point of attack. Whereas, some hundred sailing transports would be
required for the same army, and no calculation made of their arriving at their
destination within days of each other.
The defences of the coast of France and England, on the channel, forcibly
illustrate the change effected by ocean steam navigation. England considered
herself safe from invasion, by the strength of her channel fleet. France con-
sidered herself equally safe, by the fortifications of her harbors. For a long
period neither power could injure each other, guarded as they were. The fleets
of England made many demonstrations upon the coasts of France, but never
effected anything of importance, and Napoleon made a powerful combined dem-
onstration with his army and fleet, and failed by the superiority of the English
fleet.
But since steam has risen to its present importance, these two nations are
considered as having materially changed their relations of defence.
France, with her preponderating land force, transported by steamers, can
518 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
readily invade England. The channel fleet of old would no longer be a pro-
tection. The statesmen of England, fully aware of this state of things, have
for some time past been endeavoring to restore their ascendency.
A channel fleet combined with the aid of fortification, "which experience in
war and science can suggest," (Duke of Wellington to the chief engineers,) is
now their reliance, but it is a fleet of steam ships-of-war. Several of their
ships-of-the-line have been fitted with screw propelling engines, as an auxiliary
power, retaining the sails and their powerful broadsides. The first ship built
in the English dock yards of this class is the Sanspareil of eighty-one guns,
2,235 tons; carrying on her lower deck thirty 32-pounders of fifty-six hundred-
weight, nine feet six inches long; main deck, thirty eight-inch guns of fifty-two
hundredweight, eight feet long; quarter deck and forecastle, twenty 32-pound-
ers of twenty-five hundredweight, six feet long, one ten-inch gun of eighty-
four hundredweight, nine feet four inches long, with a three hundred and fifty
horse-power engine, launched at Davenport in April, 1851. With vessels of
this description they hope to retain their ascendency on the water, and protect
their ports, in the absence of the fleet, against sudden attacks of an enemy's
steamers, by fortifications.
In relation to the application of steam to ships-of-war, up to the building of
the above vessel, the problem had not been solved. Not a single steamship
had been built calculated to contend with a land battery, or a broadside of a
ship-of-the-line. We have not, to this day, an instance of steamers having
exposed themselves successfully or for any determined purpose to hostile guns,
with the exception of the little English iron steamer Nemesis in the Chinese
war, where she accomplished much, but against batteries of no value.
As transports and tow-boats, they have contributed greatly to the success of
fleets on the invasion of Algiers by the French under Beaumont ; the fleet was
towed into position abreast the Algerine batteries by their war steamers. At
Vera Cruz they made the same use of their steamers at Beyrout, on the coast
of Syria, although the English had the best of their war steamers, they were
only used as tow-boats taking distant stations in the latter part of the action
and shelling the fortification.
The French army that recently operated against Rome was transported from
Toulon by steamers, carrying artillery, cavalry, and infantry.
The result, then, of the navigation of the ocean by steam goes to prove a
greater necessity than ever for defending our cities, harbors and dock yards by
some efficient means, whether by fortifications, steam vessels-of-war, or other
means, is yet to be considered.
The next branch of inquiry under this second head is : " In what manner and
to what extent has the recent improvements in artillery and other military
inventions and discoveries affected this question ?"
The recent improvements in artillery, I apprehend, are rather the result of
calling old things by new names, and thus bringing them afresh into notice,
than any substantial advantage.
The use of what is generally called the Paixhan gun is supposed to have
produced a great revolution in the sea-coast defence. It is no more nor less
than firing hollow shot horizontally, a practice that has prevailed as long as the
howitzer has been known (about 1693.) The only difference between the field
and siege howitzer and Colonel Paixhan's gun is, that he makes his gun longer,
and, by his writings, has caused them to be introduced again on board ships-of-
war, and probably more used for sea-coast batteries.
In our own service we had made use of such long howitzers for sea-coast
defence years before Colonel Paixhan gave anything to the public on the subject.
We called them columbiads, many of which are now to be seen on Governor's
island, in this harbor, that were in use from 1812 to 1815.
On the ocean the use of hollow shot fired horizontally was made by the Count
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 519
De Grassc, off the Chesapeake, during our revolutionary war, and abandoned in
consequence of the serious injury caused by the accidental explosion of the
shells about the decks.
Since their re-introduction similar results have occurred. The steamer Medea,
one of Admiral Stopford's fleet, operating against the Egyptians in 1840, when
off Alexandria, was seriously injured by the bursting of a shell that, with five
others, had been got on deck for examination ; one beam was split asunder, the
whole deck raised, and every buckhead in the captain's cabin, ward, and gun-
rooms torn to shreds, and the vessel set on fire.
About the same period (December, 1840,) a similar accident occurred on board
the Excellent, the gunnery ship at Portsmouth, on trying some shells after hearing
of the accident on board of the Medea. The fuses, in both cases, were metal
with screw caps, supposed to be a secure preventive against accidents on board
vessels. The use, therefore, of this improvement in artillery, for steamers, and
on board ships- of- war is, I conceive, quite problematical, while, on the other
hand, its value in the sea-coast batteries is increased by the greater ranges,
precision of fire, and facility of causing the explosion about the intended and
critical moment.
While such shells fired from ships against stone walls and earthen parapets
are harmless, breaking to pieces in the one case, and throwing up a few yards of
earth only in the other, the injury to the steamer or ship is far greater than from
any other artillery in use.
It may not be amiss, under this head, to show the effect of this species of
artillery upon vessels, proving, as I think, very conclusively, the safe reliance
we may have in defending our harbors by them if mounted in favorable positions.
The effect of hot shot and shells from these columbiads (I must be permitted
to use the American name as of prior invention) against shipping was shown by
Captain Hastings, in the service of the Greeks, who, at Salona, in 1826-'7, fired
not only hot shells, which he substituted for hot shot, as by their weight they
broke through both sides of small vessels, but he fired carcasses and shells from
68-pounder guns. During the affair at Salona, he says, by the time he had fired
twice, a brig-of-war blew up, owing to a shell exploding in her magazine. An
armed transport brig sank forward owing to a shell exploding in her bow, and
was set on fire aft by a hot shell. At Trickere he burnt a brig-of-war with hot
shot. During an attack of the Greeks against a monastery at Pinseus, within the
straits between Salonis and Megara, and for the relief of Athens, the Turkish
pacha opened a battery of five guns upon the Greek steamer Perseverance, two
of them long five-inch howitzers, producing considerable effect. One shot struck
the carriage of a long 68-pounder and exploded there, another exploded in the
counter of the Perseverance and tore out two streaks for a length of six feet,
and started out the planking from two adjacent streaks, when the steamer
retreated from this dangerous position.
In the attack on the harbor of Tolo, the Greeks directed the fire of 68-pounders'
shells on a brig a shell struck her, exploding in her hull and blew her foremast
into the water. They afterwards made an attack upon a Turkish squadron of
nine vessels, and opened a fire upon the Turkish admiral's ship, distant about
five hundred yards, with hot shells. The second fire of two hot shells from the
long guns and two carcasses from carronades, one lodged in the hull df the
Turkish commodore, and, reaching the magazine, blew her up. A carcase shell
exploded in the bows of a brig next to the commodore ; she sank foi ward, while
a hot shell striking her stern, which stood up in shallow water, soon enveloped
her in flames. In a few minutes another vessel was on fire, and an Algerine
vessel having received a shell, which exploded between decks, was abandoned
by her crew.
In the harbor of Patras, the Greeks made an attack upon an Austrian brig
loaded for the Turkish army, by opening upon her a fire of shells from 68-
520 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
pounders ; one of them exploded in her hull near the water's edge, tore out a
great part of her side, when she sank almost immediately.
All these results are calculated to show the effect of hollow shot fired horizon-
tally from what is generally called Paixhan guns against shipping, and proves
the efficacy of sea-coast defences armed with such artillery.
Of the effect of such a fire against forts, from ships or steamers, I recall to
mind that of the French fleet under Joumanville, against the castle of St. Juan
d'Ulloa, when a shell entering an embrasure, passed into a magazine through
an unprotected door, and blew it up.
In 1840, the steam frigates Phoanix, Stranbole, Gorgon, and Vesuvius, were
of the fleet that made an attack upon St. Jean d'Acre. They shelled the tmon
with long guns, from positions beyond gun-range of the batteries, during the
attack by the ships-of-the-line, keeping beyond the range of the shore batteries,
During the Carlist war, in Spain, several English steamers presented them-
selves against the land batteries, but retired on receiving the first fire from the
land.
Other than the several instances herein referred to I can recall to mind now,
and they all go to show that the use of columbiads is a most reliable means of
protecting our harbors against ships or steamers.
Another improvement having a bearing on this subject is that of submarine
artillery. Fulton's efforts with torpedoes were of little avail during his lifetime.
The attempts upon the English ship Plantagenet, in Lynuhaven bay, and upon
Admiral Wan-en's fleet, off New London, during the war of 1812 to 1815, which
proved abortive, are the Only instances I am aware of with these machines.
Since his death, however, a new agent that of electro-galvanism has come
into use, enabling us to explode a shell or magazine of powder under water at
any particular instant of time. This power may be made auxiliary in the defence
of our coast, in the channels over which hostile vessels must pass in approaching
our cities ; but it can only be of use in connexion with forts, from which the
electro-agent is worked, and from whence to protect the torpedoes until the
proper moment of using them, as well as from whence to ascertain the exact
instant of time in firing them. An undefended position will not admit of their
successful application. It is an uncertain auxiliary in the defence of our ship
channels, yet one that would be resorted to by officers acquainted with its
advantages. Gutta-percha elastic tubes, within which the wires may be pro-
tected, is another modern invention, facilitating the use of the electro-galvanic
mode of instantaneous explosion.
The effect of the railroad is to economize greatly the military resources of the
nation, by relying upon a much smaller disciplined force to act against hostile
landings. For example, the same troops that would operate against a hostile
army moving on Boston, would suffice to act against the same force that should
afterwards attempt to march upon New York, Philadelphia, or Baltimore, or
Washington. Before their transports could pass from one to the other, the rail-
road could transport the army to oppose them.
It is a knowledge of an enemy's movements only that is necessary to enable
us to take advantage of the railroad speed of transportation ; and here the more
recent discovery of the electro-telegraph comes into valuable use. But there
is nothing in these inventions or improvements that lessens the importance and
necessity of opposing the powerful floating armaments that can be brought
against us by equally powerful batteries ; for let me again repeat, that a myriad
of men, with rifles and other small arms, is nothing against a ship's broadside.
One other change in modern artillery deserves to be noticed : During the last
half century the calibre of the guns mounted on board ships-of-war has greatly
increased, and made it necessary to increase the power of the batteries that may
be constructed to oppose them. Objections have sometimes been taken to the
power of our sea-coast batteries ; a little reflection will, I doubt not, show the
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 521
necessity of their being made equal, in all respects, to the batteries by which
they can be assailed.
From 1776 to 1783 frigates of thirty-two, twenty-eight, and twenty-four
guns mounted twelve-pounders on their main deck.
In 1800 most of the English frigates mounted twelve and eighteen-pounders.
In February of that year the admiralty ordered all ships of twenty-four and
twenty guns to be fitted on the main deck for thirty-two pounder carronades, in
lieu of the long NINE-POUNDERS hitherto carried.
The Danish forty-gun ship Freya mounted eighteen-pounders. The Danish
vessels at Copenhagen, attacked by Nelson, mounted
Forty-eight thirty-six-pounders.
Three hundred and sixty twenty-four-pounders.
Seventy eighteen-pounders.
Ninety-eight twelve-pounders.
Fifty-two eight-pounders.
Nelson's fleet mounted
One hundred and forty thirty-two-pounders.
Seventy-four twenty-four-pounders.
One hundred and ninety -two eighteen-pounders.
Twenty-two twelve-pounders.
One hundred and fourteen nine-pounders.
Six six-pounders ; together with carronades.
1805. The Victory, Nelson's flagship at Trafalgar, mounted on her first deck,
long thirty-two-pounders ; second deck, long twenty-four-pounders ; third deck,
long twelve-pounders; quarter deck and forecastle, twelve-pounders, and two
sixty-eight-pounders, carronades. The French admiral's ship, in the same
action, mounted thirty-two and eighteen-pounders; thirty of the eighteen-
pounders on her upper deck. The Tarinant, of ninety guns, mounted eighteen-
pounders on her main deck. The Belle Isle has twenty -four-pounders on her
main deck. The San Ildefonsa had fifty-eight long twenty-four-pounders on
the first and second decks ; four long eight-pounders and ten thirty-six-pound-
ers, carronades, on the quarter deck and forecastle.
1808. The Caledonia, English ship of one hundred and twenty- two guns,
launched this year, mounted on first deck, thirty-two-pounders; second deck,
twenty-four-pounders; third deck, eighteen-pounders; quarter deck, twelve-
pounders and thirty-two-pounders, carronades, and the same calibre on the fore-
castle; on the roundhouse she carried eighteen-pounders.
1811. France had no frigate, and England only four that carried long twenty-
four-pounders, at this date.
1820. At this date France ordered thirty and thirty-two-ponnders for all
their ships-of-war.
1839. Finally, the English, on the 20th of February of this year, ordered
all her ships-of-war to be armed with thirty-two and sixty-eight-pounders.
1851. By referring to another part of this memoir, it will be seen that an
eighty-one-gun ship-of-the-line is now mounted with the tremendous battery of
thirty-two-pounders and eight-inch guns.
This regular increase demands, on our part, a like armament, and that^we
relax nothing in the artillery for the defence of the coast, requiring more time
to build, and stronger works to receive and resist such artillery.
3d. How far vessels-of-war, steam batteries, ordinary merchant ships, and
steamers, and other temporary expedients, can.be relied upon as a substitute for
permanent fortifications for the defence of our large seaports ?
It follows, from what has been said under the two previous heads, that a
nation may rely upon a navy as a substitute for fortifications, in a great meas-
ure, for the defence of not only her large seaports, but for her coasts generally.
522 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
The two cases of France and England exemplifying that either a fleet or forti-
fications have heretofore sufficed.
The great question that arises, in adapting the one or the other exclusively,
will be the cost, the efficiency at the eventful moment, and the consequences, in
a political point of view, of directing such immense resources as dependence
upon a fleet would require to a system that has its advantage in throwing the
evils of war from our shores at the same time that its success brings a spirit of
conquest and aggrandizement, limited only by the extent to which the nation
may be led by the glory its arms shall achieve.
My opinion is, that sound policy calls upon us to adopt the mixed system of
permanent batteries in conjunction with ships-of-the-line and war steamers.
If we adopt a floating system, we must make ourselves superior afloat to our
enemy. Every seaport and dock yard must be provided with its own floating
batteries, available for its waters and adjacent shoals. The great estuaries
leading into the heart of the country must each be watched and protected.
The floating defences that will protect Boston cannot secure the Hudson, Dela-
ware, Chesapeake, southern coast, Gulf of Mexico, and Pacific, at one and the
same time. Nor can we place reliance upon our superior fleet blockading our
enemy in his ports. The fallacy of this reliance is exemplified by the sailing
of the Yavlan fleet and transports no less than three times without being per-
ceived, and being afloat in the narrow sea of the Mediterranean fifty-two days,
notwithstanding all the watchfulness of the English fleet ; a single detachment
of the enemy's fleet escaping the blockade, sails for any of our harbors, where
it must be met either by floating or land batteries. Hence, we have no alterna-
tive but a decided superiority, if we place reliance upon floating batteries.
These floating defences are of the most perishable character, and enormously
expensive in first cost and repairs, compared with land batteries. To have some
idea of the cost of fleets, let us look to the history of Europe.
The French estimate that a ship will last but twelve years ; and to have forty
ships-of-the-line and fifty frigates in commission, it is necessary to have fifty-
three ships-of-the-line and sixty frigates, so great and constant are the necessary
repairs. The fact was stated to the French Chamber by C. Dupin, as deduced
from their own experience.
The cost of maintaining the French fleet annually, from 1689 to 1789, was
averaged $7,808,000
From 1776 to 1783 was averaged 19,400,000
" 1783 to 1786 it was 12,6CO,000
For the year 1797. .do 16,700,000
1805 . . do 28,000,000
1808. .do 22,000,000
1814. .do 10,200,000
1816 . .do 9,600,000
1818. .do 8,640,000
In 1837 the Chambers voted 10,800,000
In 1847 do 18,053,908
The cost of maintaining the navy of the United States for forty-one years,
from 1792 to 1832, inclusive, was $112,097,122, giving an annual average
of $2,734,076
From 1812 to 1815, inclusive, it amounted to 26,376,215
The annual average being (four years) 6,594,053
From 1831 to 1837, 31,393,151
The annual average being (six years) 5,232,191
The cost of maintaining the navy of Great Britain, from 1799 to 1851,
(not including 1841 to 1844,) a period of forty-one years, amounts to the
sum of $2,283,645,277
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 523
The annual average being (forty-nine years) $46,604,284
From 1799 to 1815, fifteen years of war 1,356,248,803
The annual average being 79,779,341
From 1816 to 1851, not including 1841 to 1844 927,395,437
The annual average being (thirty-two years) 28,981,106
These enormous sums enable us to form some judgment of the gradual
increase in the annual expenses of maintaining a navy, and the expenses in
periods of peace, compared with war. Now let us examine into the magnitude
of the fleets of Europe, at different points, to form some idea of the number of
ships we must have to secure that superiority that will justify our reliance upon
floating defences.
The French fleet, by no means the strongest we are likely to contend with,
consists of the following number of large ships at the period stated :
In 1789 81 ships-of-the-line, and 69 frigates.
March, 1791 73 do 67 .. .do.
Dec., 1791 86 do 78... do.
1792 82 do 68. . .do.
Feb., 1793 75 do 59 . . .do.
1801 39 do 35... do.
June, 1814 73 do 41... do.
1817 68 do 38... do.
1827 59 do 51 . . .do.
1828 59 do 51... do.
July, 1829 33 do 41. . .do. only.
At this date she was building eighty ships to restore her navy and replace
the rotten and decayed ships.
In 1837 she had one hundred and fifty-three ships afloat, and in 1847 she
had two hundred and sixteen ships afloat, sixty-six of which were steamers.
The study of the above shows the losses that the vanquished have to sustain
from time to time an item to be more particularly stated hereafter.
The following table gives a more enlarged view of the strength of the differ-
ent naval powers :
524 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
Fleets of the different nations in 1783, 1793, 1829, and 1840.
England.
jj
1
d
1
Holland.
Sweden.
1
as
ir
|
Portugal.
3
1
P
1783.
Sbips-of-the-line
105
80
50
32
Ships of fifty guns. ....
13
7
3
Frigates .
132
103
48
28
217
86
31
13
88
34
25
6
455
319
160
79
1793.
Ships-of-the-line
153
86
76
49
30
60
39
149
78
56
38
11
57
21
Smaller vessels
109
82
72
32
60
3
140
411
246
204
119
101
120
200
1829.
Ships-of-the-line ...
131
33
6
12
32
2
Frigates .
149
41
12
80
25
6
Smaller vessels
336
148
94
63
24
15
615
222
102
105
81
23
1840.
Ships-of-the-line . .
120
49
3
11
11
50
15
11
Frigates
141
62
4
21
8
25
15
30
Smaller vessels
317
242
9
32
14
40
18
16
578
353
16
54
33
115
48
57
Having now some data upon which to judge of the number of ships we must
have as a substitute for permanent fortifications for the defence of our coast, let
us now examine the losses that must be sustained by a reliance upon floating
defences, as conqueror and conquered.
Loss of the English fleet during the war from 1793 to 1801. Captured,
destroyed, wrecked, foundered, and burnt :
Ships-of-the-line 20
Under the line . . 145
Tetal
165
Loss of the French, Dutch, Spanish and Danish ships during the same war.
Captured, destroyed, wrecked, foundered, and burnt :
Ships-of-the-line 84
Under the line, of which 150 were frigates 234
Total
318
Loss of the English fleet during the war from May, 1803, to July, 1815.
Captured, destroyed, wrecked, foundered, and burnt :
Ships-of-the-line 13
Under the line . . . 304
Total., 317
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 525
Loss of the enemy's fleet during the same wars, namely, French, Dutch,
Spanish, Danish, Russian, Turkish, and American. Same causes as above :
Ships-of-the-line 71
Under the line 108
Total 179
In our statements of the cost of maintaining fleets, the total expenditure has
been given, including wages of seamen, ordnance, &c. To make some compar-
ison between the cost of building fortifications and building ships, the following
facts may be useful :
The wear and tear of ships of the English fleet, 1799 to 1819,
inclusive, was $322,849,296
The cost of building and repairing ships during the same period,
was 70,789,070
Total cost of wear and tear and building in 21 years 393,638,366
Or, an average per annum of 18,744,784
The cost of building the ships afloat, comprising the navy of the
United States in 1842, was $9,052,725
The cost of repairs upon the same vessels from time to time, was 5,579,229
Total 14,631,984
Here we have the repairs to first cost in the ratio of five and a half to nine.
This cost was for fifty vessels, or for five ships-of-the-line, eleven frigates,
including two steamers, and thirty-four smaller vessels, mounting in all 1,440
guns. The average cost per gun, repairs included, is $10,161. The average
cost per gun, omitting repairs, is $6,286.
But cost of an exclusive reliance upon floating defences is far greater than
appears by this statement. To it should be added the cost and repairs put upon
the Constellation, Java, Guerriere, two steamers Fulton, and all the other ves-
sels lost, broken up, foundered, &c., of which I can find no account, and which
of themselves (the cost) would go far towards building lasting and permanent
defences for some of the harbors on our coast.
I would wish to present the cost of the several fortifications on our coast and
the repairs from time to time, but have ne data therefor. The only fortifica-
tions with which I can make the comparison is Fort Schuyler, the cost of which
to this date is $843, 187
To this add for completion, (it is now ready to receive its entire ar-
mament, and is as defensible as can be made ; the work remaining
to be done consists in conveniences for the garrison,) say. ....... 50, 000
Making the sum of 893, 187
This work is to be armed with one hundred and eighty-four guns, producing
an average of $4,855 per gun. This single fort, calculated to endure for ages,
is considered an equivalent in defence to am enemy's fleet, and a substitute for a
fleet of floating batteries, otherwise necessary.
If we look to permanent land batteries for the defence of our harbors, we
have at all times a suitable disciplined force in the uniform militia of our cities
and towns for their garrisons, ready at short notice to man the guns. On the
contrary, for floating defences we must look to the more limited number of
sailors, unaccustomed to guns, and to be disciplined for the purpose.
There is no room for doubt, in my mind, that we cannot, with due regard to
526 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
the safety of our cities, towns, and dock yards, rely upon vessels-of-war and
steam batteries, and that economy demands a dependence to be placed in heavy
land batteries built in the most permanent manner. The reliance upon ordi-
nary merchant ships and steamers, as well as any other temporary expedient, I
consider as no dependence whatever. Let us imagine a small fleet only of such
STEAMSHIPS OF THE LINE as that elsewhere described, mounting thirty-two
pounders and eight and ten-inch columbiads, and what chance is there against
such broadsides for anything that can be made of merchant ships and mercan-
tile steamers 1 Such vessels are in no manner suited for heavy armaments, and
would, in a measure, have to be rebuilt to fit them for defence. Against a single
ship-of-the-line, becalmed or anchored in smooth water, we might hope to inter-
pose a formidable resistance with temporary batteries on merchant ships' decks,
towed by mercantile steamers; but against several, mutually acting either on the
offensive or defensive, and with auxiliary steam power, (or even without,) capable
of flanking each other's position, no defence whatever could be placed in them.
There is no part of our coast where beneficial results might be better calcu-
lated upon from temporary expedients of this character than Louisiana. The
ports being built to keep off the enemy's heavy batteries, he must take to his
boats. These, when transporting troops, could readily be run down and de-
stroyed by merchant steamers. A hostile army that might have gained the dry
land of the Mississippi would be exceedingly annoyed by floating batteries on
the decks of ships towed by steamers ; but as a defensive, no reliance could be
placed upon them. The facility with which field-guns and howitzers could set
fire to and destroy such floating expedients is exemplified by the destruction of
vessels used by us in the defence of Louisiana in 181 4-' 15. Where such expe-
dients are unexpected, and no suitable force at hand to contend with them, they
are of great value ; but let our enemy know that such is our only defence, and
he readily commands the means of destroying them.
4th. How far the increase of population on the northern frontier, and of the
mercantile and marine on the northern lakes, obviates or diminishes the neces-
sity of continuing the system of fortifications on these lakes ?
Upon this point I am not so well prepared to present my views fully, having
seen but little of the country and possessing few statistical facts upon which to
rely.
On the lakes, as on the ocean, we have no need of fortresses to arrest the
movements of invading armies. It is against the operations of floating batteries,
as in the former case, that we build forts in this section of our country. Had
our neighbors no vessels or means of procuring them we would have no need of
forts ; but we know they possess both a naval and a mercantile marine of steam
aad sailing vessels, and have fortified positions superior in strength to our own,
within which to protect their mercantile marine, and, when occasion offers, to
equip them either as transports or armed vessels.
In the event of a war, a desperate effort would be made to seize upon every-
thing afloat in our ports. The same effort we would doubtless make .to secure
the floating power of our neighbors. We know, however, that Kingston has
for years past been fortified, and strong works, I believe, are still in progress
for the land and water defences of that harbor. So long as they hold it, we
cannot gain the important point of capturing the only means in their possession
to annoy us. An invasion into the heart of our country is not likely to be
thought of; and if undertaken, must result in the destruction of the invading
force by the vast increase and present density of our population.
It would not be possible for an invading army to leave the lake shores beyond
a few days' march. With the command of the lakes, our shores and all the
towns and important lines of canals and railroads would be at the mercy of an
enemy to lay under contribution, or burn and destroy, as might be their policy.
Without heavy batteries to combat their fleet, we can offer no successful oppo-
sition by our superiority of numbers to such predatory naval expeditions.
FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 527
With a naval superiority we could blockade their ports and have the means
of pursuing any vessels that might escape the blockade. To protect ourselves
in this way our force must be decidedly superior ; and our resources would enable
us to do so if we can in the commencemeet of a war save- even our mercantile
marine and capture that of our enemy. Without fortified harbors I cannot see
how we can gain such results and advantages with an enemy possessing safe
harbors, offering effectual security to his vessels.
Nor could we at once calculate upon reducing Kingston. The fortifications
at that place cannot be taken by assault or destroyed by bombardment. It is
only by the operations of a systematic siege that they can be arrested from the
hands of an enemy. Some time must elapse after the breaking out of the war
before we could hope to take so important a place.
The command of the wider parts of the St. Lawrence is in the hands of the
power possessing the naval superiority. We could not cross that river, where
its banks are beyond gunshot from our shores without such naval ascendency,
thereby prolonging the time necessary for reducing Kingston.
The commercial ports, in which self-interest now draws our numerous mer-
chant steamers and ships, should therefore be provided with such heavy land
batteries as will effectually secure the shipping in the commencement of hostili-
ties and during any temporary check to our operations on land and water.
The same protection should be given to inlets, by which vessels could cut the
lines of our railroads and canal communications.
Such batteries or fortifications are our only certain security. No increase of
population or of mercantile marine can give us that protection (with the means
our neighbors have at command) in the commencement of hostilities ; nor can
we gain the ascendency on the lakes without some fortified harbor, under cover
of which to build and equip a fleet. The subjugation of the Canadas, if
the result of a war, will not be accomplished before Quebec and Kingston are
reduced.
These two places, if defended in proportion to their artificial strength, will
call for harder fighting and more prolonged than any battle we have yet fought.
They certainly can be taken, and we believe we know enough of their con-
struction to fit out the necessary armaments,, but it Avill require time, and large
military resources, during which the lake coast should not be left unguarded
and unprotected.
The reduction of these two fortresses cuts off in the one case all further relief
from the northern country, and all means of further annoyances by water in the
other; but the entire subjugation and annexation of the country to ours depends
more upon the people. Unless they see fit to govern themselves, as a part of
our confederacy, we cannot make them. We may hold it by military power,
but with the people opposed, the struggle will not cease with the fall of Quebec
and Kingston.
All of which is respectfully submitted.
RICHARD DELAFIELD,
Major of Engineers.
Letter from Charles Stewart, United States navy.
BORDENTOWN, NEW JERSEY,
November 11, 1851.
SIR : I received from the Hon. Secretary of the Navy a copy of your letter
to him, dated June 22, together with a copy of the resolutions of the House
of Representatives at their last session, in relation to the fortifications adopted
in the year 1816 by the United States government, and after the war with
528 FORTIFICATIONS AND SEA-COAST DEFENCES.
Great Britain, requesting answers to the questions propounded in the letter from
some of the naval officers. Having no knowledge of the plan proposed at the
period referred to, I l am only enabled to predicate my opinion on the presumption
that what was then adopted, and that under the experience of the war which
had then terminated, was the best that could be devised to afford protection to
those places and interests they were designed to secure.
The first question demands to know, "To what extent, if any, ought the
present system of fortifications for the protection of our seaboard to be modified,
in consequence of the application of steam to vessels-of-war," &c., &c.
In answer to this question, I beg leave to say that no good reason presents
itself to my mind for the abandoning of any of the works now in progress of
construction, or for the reduction of the number contemplated to be erected, in
consequence of the application of steam to the purposes of maritime warfare, or
in consequence of the improvement in projectiles. But, on the contrary, I
should presume, that as the application of steam is now assuming a determined
and fixed means in the prosecution of national hostilities, that instead of an
abandonment of any portion of the defences that have been adopted, a more
extensive means of resistance and protection at all such points as present objects
worthy of being attacked on our maritime frontier would be called for and
induced, that the honor of the government may be sustained and the deep
interest of the people secured. It may be true, yet I do not think it probable,
that some of the places contemplated to be fortified in the plan of 1816 may
have so deteriorated in interest as to admit of modifications or changes in the
plan of fortifying ; of this, however, I have no means of forming an opinion ;
but if we take into consideration the great advantage and facilities which steam
power will accord to naval armaments for approach, attacking, or for passing
insufficient fortifications, it cannot but appear to the government that this con-
stitutes a new and highly dangerous power to be guarded against in all future
time; more especially on a maritime frontier of very great extent, and deeply
indented with water communication, affording to an enemy who possess steam
power the greatest facilities of annoyance in all directions of our country.
Your second question asks, " What reliance could be placed on vessels of
war or of commerce, floating batteries, gunboats, &c., &c., as substitutes for
permanent fortifications ? "
In answer to this question, I must say that I am of opinion that bfct little
reliance ought to be placed for the security of high national interest on defences
of such doubtful character. They are too subject to untoward casualties to
constitute at all times a reliable means of resistance; and besides, they would
require permanent fortifications to afford them continuance and protection. As
auxiliaries to permanent works in resisting attacks, they might be made avail-
able sometimes with good effect, but no further ought they to be relied on.
To the third question which you ask, " Is it necessary or expedient to con-
tinue the system of fortifications on the shores of the northern lakes 1 "
I again beg to express my entire ignorance of what that system proposes
should be done. But considering that those lake shores constitute an important
frontier boundary between our interior country and a powerful military and
naval nation, I should think that it would be politic to secure by fortifications
as far as reasonably practicable, all the important positions essential to commer-
cial purposes and naval preparations for the lakes. In this direction there is
but one power with whom we may be brought into collision, and that is Great
Britain. She is, however, a power who, on a probability of hostilities with the
United States, would readily throw on to our border and on the lakes a power-
ful re-enforcement of military and naval annoyance to our lake frontier.
Very respectfully, I have the honor to remain your obedient servant,
CHAKLES STEWART.
Hon. C. M. CONRAD,
Secretary of War, Washington, D. C.
THIS EOOK IS DUE ON THE LAST DATE
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DEC 15 1915
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