OF THE 
 
 UNIVERSITY 
 
 OF 
 
 m 
 
DIALOGUES 
 
 ON THE 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY 
 
 COMPRISING 
 
 THE NYAYA, THE SANKHYA, THE VEDANT; 
 
 TO WHICH IS ADDED A DISCUSSION OP THE 
 
 AUTHORITY OF THE VEDAS. 
 
 BY REV. K. M. BANEEJEA, 
 
 SKCOND PROFESSOR Op BISHOP'S COLLEGE. 
 
 oralcutta: 
 
 THACKER SPINK AND CO. 
 
 G. C. HAY AND CO. 56, COSSITOLLAH ; JAMES HILL A»D CO., ALLAHABAD. 
 J. HIGGINBOTHAM, MADRAS; THACKER, VINING AND CO., BOMBAY. 
 
 LONDON, WILLIAMS AND NORGATE, 14 HENRIETTA STREET 
 COVENT GARDEN. 
 
BISHOP S COLLEGE PRESS, CALCUTTA, 
 
313 
 
 TO 
 
 JOHN MUIR ESQ, D. c. L. 
 
 LATE OF THE BENGAL CIVIL SERVICE, 
 
 WHO FOR A LONG SERIES OF YEARS 
 HAS CONTRIBUTED 
 
 BOTH BY HIS PURSE AND HIS PEN 
 TO THE VERY OBJECTS HEREIN AIMED AT, 
 
 THIS WORK IS INSCRIBED 
 
 AS A SMALL TRIBUTE 
 
 OF THE author's RESPECT AND ESTEEM. 
 
Digitized by the Internet Archive 
 
 in 2008 with funding from 
 
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 http://www.archive.org/details/dialoguesonhinduOObanerich 
 
PREFACE. 
 
 iEfoSriT^ -m^cf II 
 
 The objects aimed at in the following dialogues are, 
 
 Jlrst, to give a correct and authentic statement of the 
 
 doctrines of Hindu philosophy, and, secondly, to suggest 
 
 such modes of dealing with them as may prove most 
 
 effective to the Hindu mind. 
 
 Our first object we have attempted to ensure by citing 
 the original authorities, and letting the old Rishis speak 
 for themselves. The second we have endeavoured to 
 attain by availing ourselves in some measure of the argu- 
 ments which the advocates of contending schools have 
 used against each other. We have thus impressed Kana- 
 da, Kapila, E^manuja, to do battle for us against the Ve- 
 dant, and taken advantage of S'ankarachd,rya's powerful 
 battery against the Nyaya and the Sankhya. 
 
 There was a time, not full fifty years ago, when politi- 
 cians and statesmen exjDressed the most extravagant 
 admiration of the Hindu philosophy, both in official 
 documents and in speeches delivered in the parliament 
 of Great Britain. In defence of the policy of excluding 
 Christian missions from the country, reference was made 
 to *^ her philosophers, lawyers, and moralists who have 
 left the oracles of political and ethical wisdom, to restrain 
 
VI PREFACE. 
 
 the passions and awe the vices which disturb the com- 
 monwealth ^" The panegyrics passed on the Hindu sys- 
 tems by poHticians are no doubt to be referred in part to 
 the temporary excitement and consequent bias under which 
 they were written or spoken. But writers are still not 
 wanting who affect to be amazed at the transcendental 
 excellency of the Hindu philosophy, and who do not 
 hesitate to declare that however much the undoubted 
 excellency of the system may be mixed up with possible 
 errors, it would be impossible without profane violence to 
 the one to refute the other. 
 
 The difficulty of the task we freely admit. But our 
 endeavour has been candidly to recognize what we have 
 found to be true, and courageously to condemn what we 
 have discovered to be false. 
 
 What, it may be asked, is to be the test of truth and 
 error in these discussions ? We say, in the language of 
 the Royal proclamation, — the only document through 
 which the Queen has ever spoken to her Indian subjects 
 and in Indian languages, — that " firmly relying ourselves 
 on the truth of Christianity, and acknowledging with 
 gratitude the solace of Religion, we disclaim alike the 
 Right and the Desire to impose our convictions," on any 
 of our controversial opponents. The Christian religion 
 itself, which recognizes '* the work of the law written 
 in the hearts" of men, forbids unfairness of argumen- 
 tation in discussions, voluntarily undertaken, with the 
 full understanding that the parties argued with are not 
 Christians. We have no right therefore in this argu- 
 ment to appeal to that which we believe to be the pri- 
 
 1 Speech of Mr Charles Marsh in the House of Commons in Capt. Kaye's 
 Christianity in India, p. 280. 
 
PREFACE. Vll 
 
 mary standard of truth, and the highest authority in all 
 controversies to which it is applicable. 
 
 That authority, however, as we have just hinted, re- 
 cognizes another authority — the authority of conscience 
 — limited indeed in its range, but still a sufficient autho- 
 rity within its own province. Now the questions discuss- 
 ed in these pages certainly fall within that province. 
 We have to deal with those who profess to discriminate 
 between dhanna and adhar^ma, between right and wrong. 
 Our test of truth and error in these discussions is accord- 
 ingly the same which writers on moral philosophy and 
 natural theology are in the habit of observing. It is 
 substantially the very test to which the founders of the 
 Hindu philosophy themselves appeal. 
 
 But do not the founders of the Hindu philosophy 
 appeal also to the positive authority of the Vedas which 
 they look upon as a revelation from God ? This is only 
 partially true, for most of the schools maintain that their 
 doctrines are superior to the Vedas, and as to the few 
 which profess to deduce their tenets from the authority 
 of texts, they certainly do not say that the texts contain 
 a revelation of God's will. Some of them say nothing at 
 all about the existence of God, and all deny that the Vedas 
 had any author, human or divine. (See below pp. 485, 
 486.) We have discussed their tenets on these points, and 
 the final appeal remains therefore to the work of the Law 
 written in the hearts of men. One of the staunchest of the 
 defenders of the Vedas allows that even their authority 
 could not sanction what involves an absurdity or a 
 contradiction. 
 
 It is generally believed by the modern followers of Brah- 
 minism that the Vedas contain a revelation from God, and 
 
VIU PREFACE. 
 
 under this impression they implicitly submit to their spi- 
 ritual guides ; whose authority they think may be traced 
 to the teaching of the Vedas, and through them to the 
 declaration of God's will. It is only justice to all parties 
 to say that those founders of Brahminical systems who 
 were considered must orthodox did not propound the Rich 
 Yajush Saman and Atharvan as given by God in any 
 sense of the term. 
 
 It is also a popular belief among the Hindus that the 
 great Rishis, who founded their schools, and whose teach- 
 ing they consider to be infallible, were themselves men of 
 superior sanctity that had laboured to counteract the 
 atheistic teaching of the Buddhists by zealously and skil- 
 fully arguing for the existence of a Supreme Intelligence, 
 the Author and Governor of the universe. This is what 
 living Pandits say, and their unlearned followers believe. 
 That nothing can be a greater delusion will appear from 
 the following pages. It is much to be regretted that the 
 delusion has in some respects been sanctioned even by 
 Christian authors writing on the Hindu philosophy. The 
 accounts given by living Pandits and the representations 
 contained in popular elementary treatises have been too 
 unsuspectingly received. Perhaps we may say that no 
 writer since the days of Colebrooke has endeavoured to 
 test the correctness of the popular representations by a 
 careful examination of the original Sutras themselves. 
 The popular delusion has consequently been widely spread- 
 ing without any thing to rectify it. 
 
 The following broad facts may be advanced without 
 much fear of contradiction. Neither of the two Rishis 
 of the Nyaya school, Gotama and KanMa, has argued 
 at all for the existence of a Supreme Intelligence as the 
 
PREFACE IX 
 
 Author and Governor of the universe. Kandda, again, 
 positively accounts for the construction of the world 
 without the intervention of any Supreme Intelligence^, 
 while the principles of Gotama with reference to life and 
 emancipation are almost identically the same as those 
 of the Buddhists. The principles on which Kapila (if 
 indeed he was the author of the Sankhya sutras) denied 
 the existence of God, he held in common with all the 
 other Rishis, and so far the elements of atheism exist in 
 all the schools. Patanjali, the author of the Ses'wara or 
 theistic Sankhya, though he acknowledged a Supreme 
 Being, did not declare Him to be the creator of the uni- 
 verse. Jaimini, the author of the Prior Mimdnsa, has 
 never argued for the existence of God, and if he ever 
 said any thing of a Supreme Being, it was only to deny 
 His providence and His moral government of the world. 
 His description of the Veda, as a s'abda or infallible 
 teaching without a teacher, involved atheism in the con- 
 ception of some of his eminent followers ; who have not 
 hesitated to argue on his principles against the possibility 
 of a God to create the world or teach the Veda. Vy4sa 
 the author of the Vedant sutras did certainly argue for 
 the existence of a God, but he taught that the universe 
 
 2 To prevent misconceptions we feel it right to explain that the aphorism in 
 which Kandda asserts the authority of the Veda as His word, is considered by some 
 succeeding writers as a proof of his theism. An author who could account for the 
 origin of the universe without God, can hardly be called theistic for any thing he 
 may say on other points. But the natural rendering of the aphorism would be, 
 /The Veda is of authority, because it is ITS declaration," (tadvachandt), the antece- 
 dent of "its" being Dharma mentioned in the previous aphorism. It is of authority 
 because it is the declaration of Dharma. It is after the same fashion that most 
 Brahminical writers have argued. We did not question the other rendering in 
 Dialogue X, because the point at issue being the authority of the Veda, we 
 were unwilling to clog the discussion with other matters. 
 
X PREFACE. 
 
 is identical with Him, and consequently that there is no 
 God above the world. 
 
 It is also believed among those who admire the trans- 
 cendental doctrines of the popular Yedanta that the 
 universe is but an illusion, a Maya, a phantom. The 
 discussion of this question will be found in the following 
 pages. Here we would only ask the advocates of Md<ya- 
 vada to remember that their favourite theory was first 
 propounded by the founder of Buddhism, and that the 
 Brahmins had probably learnt it from those very schools 
 on which they continue to this day to affix the stigma 
 of heresy. 
 
 We say that the Brahmins had probably borrowed 
 their transcendental doctrine of Maya from Buddhist 
 schools, because, when they first settled on the fertile 
 plains of Hindustan, they were far from pronouncing the 
 world to be a phantom, or sensuous life to be an essen- 
 tial evil. In their earliest literature, the Mantras of the 
 Vedas, we do not see any traces of such doctrine. Every 
 thing is there natural — nothing transcendental. We see 
 hymns and prayers addressed to divinities. The things 
 prayed for are all such as belong to our common every- 
 day life. Offspring, cattle, lands, houses, — such are the 
 boons which the gods are requested to bestow on their 
 votaries. No impatience of life, no description of the 
 world as an assemblage of evils, — much less as a mere 
 phantom or maya, — no aspirations after release from 
 corporeal existence, are found there. 
 
 Nor do we descry any decided advance toward the 
 transcendentalism of the Shad-Dars'anas in the Brdh- 
 manas of the Vedas. Hindoo society was,, then regularly 
 formed, — the institution of caste was manured, — the Brah- 
 
PREfACE. XI 
 
 mills were recognized as the repositories of learning, 
 and ministers for the performance of rites and ceremo- 
 nies. Rules had been formed for their initiation in 
 theology. The learned among them were teachers of 
 their order. Young Brahmins would be brought up in the 
 houses, and under the watchful eyes, of their preceptors. 
 They would take lessons on the Vedas. Clever pupils would 
 be allowed to ask questions on speculative science, and the 
 tutors would resolve their doubts. In these conferences be- 
 tween teachers and pupils, metaphysical questions would 
 naturally be debated. The prospects of the soul after 
 death would often become the subject of catechetical 
 instruction. But these instructions and speculations, so 
 far as appears from the Brahmanas, had nothing deci- 
 dedly transcendental in them. They were for the most 
 part ethical and ritualistic. We do indeed see occasion- 
 ally certain aspirations after union with the divinity, 
 but these are rare and exceptional. We also notice a 
 tendency toward identifying the universe and deified im- 
 personations with the Supreme Brahma. But we do 
 not see any marked condemnation of the world because 
 of the evils of disease and death. We do not see it 
 denounced as an assemblage of essential evils incapable 
 of remedy. We do not find any impatience of life and 
 embodied existence. We do not hear of the necessity of 
 getting rid of transmigrations. We are not told that 
 supreme felicity consists in the separation of the soul from 
 body and mind, or that the functions of body and mind 
 inevitably lead to misery. We do not learn that pravritti 
 or activity is an evil in itself— or that our chief good can 
 only be found in a state in which the soul will be deprived 
 of its capacities of thought, feeling, and action. 
 
XU PREFACE. 
 
 The transcendental notions, now the fundamental prin- 
 ciples of Hindu philosophy, had no existence in the 
 Mantras and Brahmanas. When, then, were they first 
 broached, by whom, and how ? 
 
 The Upanishads, as will be seen from the following 
 pages, do not give a satisfactory account of the origin of 
 the doctrine of Maya. The Buddhists, on the other 
 hand, do supply us with what must be admitted to be at 
 any rate a plausible explanation of its origin. The inci- 
 dents of their founder's life are all we require for this 
 purpose. They say the father of S'akya Muni had been 
 apprized from the beginning that his son would soon take 
 to the life of an ascetic. When the boy was twelve years 
 old, the king assembled his Brahmins and asked them to 
 state the cause for which the prince would renounce his 
 home and his kindred. They told him that the boy 
 would see four things — decrepitude, disease, a dead body, 
 and a recluse, which would induce him to leave the pa- 
 lace and retire to the forest. The king commanded that 
 those four sights should always be kept at a distance 
 from him, and that care should be taken to prevent his 
 ever coming across them. But these precautions were 
 all in vain. The gods themselves were impatiently 
 waiting for the happy moment when Siddhartha would 
 enter on his high calling. One day therefore when 
 he was resolved to go out on a drive — and when by 
 the king's orders all unseemly sights had been removed 
 from the town, the gods exhibited in his way the 
 appearance of a decrepid old man, humpbacked, 
 with broken teeth, grey locks, wrinkled, leaning on 
 a staff, and walking slowly with tremulous steps. 
 Wondering, aghast, at the wretched spectacle, the prince 
 
PREFACE. XIU 
 
 inquired of tlie coachman, who the person was ? ^' An 
 old man, my Lord, answered the coachman, bent down 
 by age, his strength and energy gone, his senses worn 
 out, and he himself destitute and disabled." Struck 
 by the coachman's answer, the prince asked again, "Is 
 such a wretched existence peculiar to the race or tribe 
 of which this unhappy person is a member, or is that the 
 common lot of the whole world ? Do tell me the truth 
 quickly." 
 
 The coachman replied : " It is not a peculiar misfor- 
 tune, my Lord, of this poor man — or of his family, or 
 country. Youth and old age are incident to all, nor can 
 your highness expect to be free from it. No one can 
 escape decrepitude." 
 
 The prince was so overwhelmed with the conception 
 of the world's misery, that he immediately ordered the 
 coachman to turn the carriage homeward, and he came 
 back in a most melancholy mood of mind. 
 
 When the prince on another occasion was driving out 
 with a large retinue, a leper, full of sores, unable to 
 move, and breathing with difficulty, fell in his sight — and 
 from the enquiries he made of the coachman, he conclud- 
 ed that disease was another evil to which all were subject. 
 A third drive brought him the sight of death in a simi- 
 lar manner, and another addition again was made to his 
 knowledge of the evils of life. A fourth drive revealed 
 the sight of a mendicant Brahmachari, absorbed in medi- 
 tation with subdued mind and senses. Buddha was at 
 once convinced that this was the only mode of living by 
 which earthly perils could be avoided. 
 
 The dreaded sights produced the effects which the 
 Brahmins had foretold. The prince began to cry shame 
 
XIV PREFACE. 
 
 on life and existence. " Fie on youth," said he, *' almost 
 in the very grasp of decrepitude ! Fie on health, soon to 
 be overpowered by disease ! Fie on life, running headlong 
 into the jaws of death^." 
 
 This legend is found in the traditions of all Buddhists, 
 whether of China, Nepaul, or Ceylon. Divested of the 
 romantic ornaments, the story means that certain sights 
 of woe had produced in young Buddha a feeling of dis- 
 gust with life and earthly existence, which he characteriz- 
 ed as an assemblage of decrepitude, disease, and death, a 
 maya, a mirage. The Brahminical philosophers use the 
 very same expressions with reference to the evils of life, 
 but they cannot produce a hero, as the original teacher of 
 the doctrine. When they say this doctrine was taught 
 by the Creator to the Sun, by the Sun to Manu &c., it is 
 simply a confession that they know not how to account 
 for it, — for their own Yedas show that the doctrine was 
 unknown in the period of the Mantras, and they them- 
 selves declare that the doctrine was lost by the lapse of 
 time, until it was restored in the Bhagavad-gitd"^ . But 
 the Bhagavad-gita is clearly a "post- Buddhistic work, and 
 we cannot admit Krishna's claim to the doctrine taught 
 by Sakya. It is singular that, on Krishna's own confes- 
 sion, the transcendental doctrine should have remained 
 with the kingSy instead of Brahmins. 
 
 3 Lalita Vistara. 
 
 'sin^^^ ^^cTi ^^^^j tr^^xTt II ^ ^^T^T ?nrr "^^ ^jt: 
 ^Iwj ^KTcr^j II 
 
i'KEFACK. XV 
 
 We have in the followhig pages suggested a historical 
 consideration of the relation between the Brahminical 
 philosophy and Buddhism. What appears to us most 
 strange is the occurrence of two names, Gotama and 
 Kapila, in the Buddhist tradition of the origin of the 
 race from which their leader sprang. The following is 
 the Tibetan version of a tradition held in common by all 
 Buddhists : 
 
 Sakya, is the name of that tribe or family of Sakya Muni, belonging 
 to the Kshatria caste. According to Buddhist traditions, this race des- 
 cends from Ikswaku, a prince of the solar line and founder of the royal 
 race of Ayodhya, or Oude. The name however does not appear in the 
 genealogical lists of Hindus, as that either of a tribe or of a people. 
 
 * * He had two sons, Gotama and Bharadhwaja. The former took 
 the religious character, but Gotama being afterwards accused of the 
 murder of a harlot, was unjustly impaled at Potala, and the latter 
 succeeded to his father. He dying without issue, the two sons of 
 Gotama inherit, who were born in a preeternatural manner; from the 
 circumstances of their birth, they and their descendants are called by 
 several names; as, Tan-lag -s^ky es ; (S. Angiras,) Nyi-mahignyeny (S. 
 Surya Vansa,) Gautama, Bii-ram shing-pa, (S. Ikshwaku.) One of the 
 two brothers dies without issue, the other reigns under the name of Iksh- 
 waku. 
 
 ** To him succeeds his son, whose descendants (one hundred) afterwards 
 successively reign at potala Gru-hadsin. The last of whom was Iksh- 
 waku Virudhaka, (or Videhaka.) He has four sons, and after the death 
 of his first wife, he marries again. He obtains the daughter of a king, 
 under the condition that he shall give the throne to the son that shall 
 be born of that princess. By the contrivance of the chief officers, to 
 make room for the young prince to succession, the king orders the expul- 
 sion of his four sons. 
 
 " They taking their own sisters with them, and accompanied by a great 
 multitude, leave Potala, go towards the Himalaya, and reaching the bank 
 of the Bhagirathi river settle there, not far from the hermitage of Ca- 
 piLA the Rishi, and live in huts made of the branches of the trees. They 
 live there on hunting ; and sometimes they visit the hermitage of Capila 
 
XVI PREFACE. 
 
 the Rislii. He observing them to look very ill, asks them why they were 
 so pale. They tell him how much they suffer on account of their res- 
 traint or continence. He advises them to leave their own uterine sisters, 
 and to take themselves (to wife) such as are not born of the same mother 
 with them. O great Rishi! said the princes, is it convenient .for us to 
 do this ? Yes, Sirs, answered the Rishi, banished princes may act in this 
 way. Therefore, taking for a rule the advice of the Rishi, they do ac- 
 cordingly, and cohabit with their non-uterine sisters, and have many chil- 
 dren by them. The noise of them being inconvenient to the Rishi in his 
 meditation, he wishes to change his habitation. But they beg him to 
 remain in his own place, and to design for them any other ground. He 
 therefore marks them out the place where they should build a town ; since 
 the ground was given to them by Capila, they called the new city Capi- 
 lavastu. They multiply there exceedingly. The gods seeing their great 
 number, show them another place for their settlement. They build there 
 a town, and call it by the name of Lhas-hstan, (shown by a god.) 
 
 " Remembering the cause of their banishment, they make it a law, that 
 no one of them hereafter shall marry a second wife of the same tribe, 
 but that he shall be contented with one wife. 
 
 "At Potala the king Ikshwaku Virudhaka, recollecting that he had 
 four sons, asks his officers, what has become of them. They tell him, 
 how for some offence His Majesty had expelled them, and how they had 
 settled in the neighbourhood of the Himalaya, and that they have taken 
 their own sisters for their wives, and have been much multiplied. The 
 king, being much surprised on hearing this, exclaims several times : Sha- 
 ky a ! Shakya ! Is it possible ! Is it possible ! (or O daring ! O daring !) 
 phod-pa, and this is the origin of the Shakya name^. 
 
 The Singalese legend is more circumstantial a« to names 
 and personalities. The Ikshwaku Virudhaka of Tibet is 
 Okkaka the third of the Singalese, otherwise called Amba. 
 He had five- principal queens, one of whom Hasta bore 
 him four sons and five daughters. 
 
 After the death of Hasta, the king promoted one of her maids to the 
 rank of queen and was by her persuaded to send Hasta's sons out of the 
 kingdom — who accordingly went away, as exiles, accompanied by their 
 
 5 Notes, in the rilgrimage of Fa Hian. 
 
PREFACE. XVll 
 
 fire sisters. Wandering in quest of a site to build a new City, they fall 
 in with the Rishi Kapila, who was the Bodhisat of the age, and who 
 was afterwards to become Gotama Buddha. Kapila had his habitation 
 on a charmed spot where hares over-awed the jackal, and frogs struck 
 terror into the naya or snake. This site he presented to the princes 
 for the building of a town which he requested them to name after him. 
 This was built according to the advice they received, and was called after 
 the name of the sage. Trie princes then said to each other, ** If we send 
 to any of the inferior kings to ask their daughters in marriage, it will 
 be a dishonour to the Okkaka race ; and if we give our sisters to their 
 princes it will be an equal dishonour ; it will therefore be better to stain 
 the purity of our relationship than that of our race." The eldest sister 
 was therefore appointed as the queen-mother and each of the brothers 
 took one of the other sisters as his wife. In the course of time each of 
 the queens had eight sons and eight daughters, or sixty-four children 
 in all. When their father heard in what manner the princes had acted 
 he thrice exclaimed, the princes are indeed able (Sakya), the princesses 
 are indeed very able (Sakya)^! 
 
 Such is the Buddhistic account of the origin of Kapila- 
 vastu and of the tribe of Sakya. It is singular that the 
 Buddhists should cherish a legend which assigns an inces- 
 tuous origin to the race from which their leader was de- 
 scended, and that they should perpetuate, in the surname 
 of Sakya Sinha, the very term which was derived from 
 the daring moral impurity by means of which that tribe 
 had sprung. And it is not the less remarkable that the 
 person who took the lead in protesting against the pride 
 of caste, should himself bear an appellation expressive of 
 the extreme jealousy oi clan and family dignity, to which 
 his progenitors did not scruple to sacrifice all other ideas 
 of domestic virtue and propriety. 
 
 Whether there is any connection between the charac- 
 ter Kapila, mentioned in the above legend, and that to 
 
 6 Hardy's Manual of Buddhism, 
 
XVm PREFACE. 
 
 which the S'dnkhya sutras are attributed, it is impossible 
 to determine with any accuracy. There is nothing im- 
 probable in the idea of Buddhists claiming the name 
 of an old Rishi as a friend and adviser of the progenitors 
 of their founder, nor is it unlikely, on the other hand, 
 that the Brahmins would deeply resent such a proceeding, 
 and claim him in their turn as the founder of one of their 
 great schools. 
 
 But whatever be the historical relation between the 
 two, the intelligent Hindu can scarcely fail to recognize 
 the analogy in point of doctrine between the conflicting 
 systems. Their difference is only in name and in the 
 personalities of the two parties. If the Hindu philosophy 
 be true. Buddhism cannot be far in the wrong ; and if 
 Buddhism be false, Hinduism cannot have much truth. 
 This consideration alone ought to stimulate the inquiry 
 whether there is saving truth in either of the systems ? 
 and, if bo'th be found equally barren in this respect, 
 the question must follow, where is such truth to be 
 looked for ? 
 
 Bishop's College : 
 29th June, 1861. 
 
 ^*^ The author must here acknowledge- his obligations to his senior 
 in office, the Revd. Dr. Kay, to whose remarks and suggestions, while 
 the work was passing through the press, is mainly owing any merit that 
 may be accorded to the following pages. 
 
TABLE 
 
 OF 
 
 <SoitUnt0* 
 
 Dialogue Z. 
 
 Accidental meeting of the inter- 
 locutors 
 
 Tarkakama sneers at Satya- 
 kama's singularity 
 
 The latter retorts 
 
 Brahminical theory versus prac- 
 tice 
 
 The way of the Vedas inferior to 
 that of philosophers . . 
 
 Veda a Sudder Court of appeal, 
 
 Hindu Philosophers discordant,. , 
 
 Agamika's candid admissions, . . 
 
 His aversion to philosophy, 
 
 Satyakama defends the proper 
 use of philosophy. 
 
 He explains his own views, 
 
 What is Swadharma ? . . 
 
 The word Hindu whence derived ? 
 
 No community of Dharma among 
 Hindus, 
 
 Swadharma means class-duties. 
 
 Duties of Brahmins, 
 
 Swadharma acknowledged to be 
 an impossibility, 
 
 Hence (according to Kapila) a 
 nullity 
 
 No sanatana Dharma in Hindu- 
 ism, 
 
 Renunciation 
 sometimes 
 Sastras, . . 
 
 Sectaries, . . 
 
 of Swadharma 
 lauded in the 
 
 6 
 
 7 \ 
 
 Dialogrue ZZ. 
 
 Conference interrupted by 
 eclipse, . . 
 
 11 
 13 
 
 14 
 15 
 
 17 
 
 18 
 24 
 25 
 26 
 
 28 
 29 
 29 
 
 31 
 
 32 
 
 33 
 
 34 
 35 
 
 38 
 
 Satyakama reads a paper, 3i 
 Vedas little known among the 
 
 Hindus,.. .. .. 41 
 
 Upanishads considered more ex- 
 cellent . . . . . . 42 
 
 Their gross indecencies . . 42 
 Reasons why the Vedas were held 
 
 in reverence, . . . . 43 
 
 Exclusive privilege of Brahmins, 45 
 
 Rise of Buddhism, . . 47 
 
 It failed to maintain its ground, 48 
 
 Left strong traces behind it, . . 48 
 All the schools of philosophy 
 
 openly condemned, 43 
 
 Brahminical intellectualism, 51 
 
 Sutra-teaching esoteric, . . 53 
 Order in which the schools 
 
 arose, 58 
 
 Kanada's theory of creation 
 
 apparently atheistic .. 61 
 Kapila's atheism, . . 65 
 Patanjali's mysticism, . . 69 
 Prakriti and Purusha personified, 75 
 Veda without God, . , 77 
 Dharma without God, . .79 
 Vyasa and Jaimini, ., 81 
 Vedanta stigmatized as Bud- 
 dhism in disguise, . 83 
 All right and all wrong, . . 85 
 
 Oialogrue ZZZ. 
 
 Doctrine of pre-existence, . . 89 
 How argued for, •• .90 
 How opposed, .. .. 91 
 Adrishta the cause of one's con- 
 dition in life, . . . . 93 
 Greek doctrine of pre-existence, 95 
 
XX 
 
 TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 97 
 
 98 
 103 
 108 
 
 109 
 
 111 
 
 141 
 118 
 119 
 
 120 
 123 
 125 
 127 
 
 Plato's doctrine of reminiscence 
 similar to Gotama's, . . 
 
 How Gotama argues for pre-exis- 
 tence, . . 
 
 How answered, . . 
 
 State of probation, 
 
 Sankara's idea of an endless suc- 
 cession of worlds, 
 
 Plato's theory of knowledge dis- 
 cussed, . . 
 
 God himself dependent on adrish- 
 ta, 
 
 Gotama's idea of works, . . 
 
 Adrishta opposed to theism, 
 
 Sankaracharya's opinion on Ad- 
 rishta, . . 
 
 Sankara's self-contradiction, . • 
 
 Doctrine of transmigrations, . . 
 
 Doctrine of Causation, . . 
 
 The material cause considered 
 most important in the Hindoo 
 schools, . . . - . . I28 
 
 Material not properly a cause, . . 131 
 
 Illustrated by a watch, . . . . 133 
 
 God is not dependent on materials, 135 
 
 Dialogrue XV. 
 
 A Brahmin's elementary studies 
 described, ..137 
 
 Large gathering on the Varuni, 139 
 
 Discussion of the theory of 
 Adrishta, •• .. .140 
 
 Was Kanada a theistic philoso- 
 pher? .. .141 
 
 Sankara's condemnation of Kana- 
 da's theory of creation, . . 151 
 
 How the Nyaya afterwards be- 
 came a theistic system, .. 153 
 
 The Nyaya in conflict with the 
 Sankhya, .. ..153 
 
 The atomic theory of the Nyaya 
 stated and discussed, .. 155 
 
 Distinguished from Newton's, .. 157 
 
 Sankara's strictures on the 
 Nyaya theory of atoms, .. 159 
 
 Discussion of the Nyaya theory 
 of the eternity of all souls, . . 
 
 The advocate of the Nyaya as- 
 tounded at the inferences clearly 
 deducible from his theory, . . 
 
 Sialogue V. 
 
 Agamika attempts to reconcile the 
 soul's eternity with its depen- 
 dence on God, . . . . 
 
 Satyakama's reply, 
 
 The Nyaya as a system of philo- 
 sophy and logic. 
 
 Its five-membered syllogism des- 
 cribed, . . 
 
 The mode in which its followers 
 justify it. 
 
 The Nyaya view of the evidence 
 of testimony, . . 
 
 The Nyaya view of the nature 
 and end of human existence 
 fundamentally incorrect, 
 
 Vatsayana's exposition of the 
 
 163 
 
 165 
 
 167 
 16S 
 
 169 
 
 171 
 
 172 
 
 177 
 
 181 
 
 184 
 
 The same corroborated by passa- 
 ges from the Yoga-vasishta, . . 188 
 
 Its close resemblance to the 
 Buddhistic view of life, 191 
 
 The orthodox Gotama scarcely 
 distinguishable from the here- 
 tical Gotama. . . 192 
 
 Emancipation and Nirvana both 
 alike, .. .. 197 
 
 Other points of resemblance be- 
 tween the Hindu and Bud- 
 dhistic systems, . . . . 204 
 
 The ethics of Buddhism and the 
 Nyaya compared, . . . . 206 
 
 Nyaya view of Emancipation dis- 
 cussed, .. .. .. ... 209 
 
 Existence without its signs, ,. 213 
 
 The moral philosophy of the 
 Nyaya, . . . . . . . . 214 
 
 The Nyaya harps in Buddhistic 
 tunes. .. .. .. ..217 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 XXI 
 
 Dialogue VX. 
 
 How Sankaracharya attacks the 
 
 Sankhya, 220 
 
 His argument quoted at length, 225 
 Kapila's view of nature's agency, 226 
 Sankara's inconsistency, . . 228 
 
 Kapila's contradictions, . . . . 230 
 
 His view of habit proved to be 
 
 erroneous, . . 232 
 Mutual adaptations a proof of de- 
 sign, ' 237 
 
 Meaning of prakriti discussed . . 241 
 Animal organisms proofs of de- 
 sign, . . 242 
 
 Development theory, . . 245 
 
 That theory not necessarily atheistic 
 like Kapila's, . . . . 247 
 
 Mind cannot be a product of 
 
 matter, . . . . 249 
 
 Kapila's atheism exposed by 
 
 passages from his Sutras, . . 250 
 Sankhya pleadings, . . 252 
 Inconsistencies of the Vedant, . 253 '< 
 Sankhya theory of the soul's free- 
 dom from attachments exa- 
 mined, .. .. 255 
 
 No moral greatness without God, 257 
 What true freedom is, . . ... 2r>g 
 
 Kapila teaches Buddhism, . . 263 
 Sankhya meditation is no-medi- 
 tation, . . . . . . 264 
 
 Dialogue VXZ. 
 
 A marriage assembly described, 268 
 Debate among Brahmins, . . 270 
 
 A Buddhist retorts on Hindu- 
 ism charges preferred against 
 his system and quotes Hindu 
 " authorities, . . . . . . 272 
 
 Discussion of the Vedanta's one 
 
 principle, . . 377 
 
 Vedant charged with atheism by 
 
 a Hindu writer, .. .. 280 
 
 *lhe doctrine of the world being a 
 mere shadow discussed, , . 284 
 
 Discussion of the alleged parallelism 
 between Vedantism and Ber- 
 keley, . . . . . . 287 
 
 Disproof of the assertion that the 
 ontology of the Vedant is that 
 of Berkeley, . . 294 
 
 Sankaracharya quoted to the 
 above effect, . . 296 
 
 Idealism proved to be a Bud- 
 dhistic dogma,. . . . 298 
 
 Dialogrue VZZZ. 
 
 The disputants meet again at the 
 Rajah's house,. . .. 304 
 
 \ The Buddhist encounters them, 307 
 / The Buddhist contends that the 
 \ doctrines of maya and mukti 
 were borrowed from Buddhism, 307 
 TKe original Vedas say nothing 
 
 of Maya, . . . . 309 
 Nor do most of the Upanishads 313 
 The Swetaswatara alone main- 
 tains the doctrine of Maya, .. 321 
 It is proved to be Post buddhis- 
 tic, 322 
 
 Review of Vedant sutras, . . 327 
 
 Sankara's authority as a com- 
 mentator, . . 329 
 Pantheism inculcated in Vedant 
 
 Sutras, . . . . 33 1 
 How Sankara met objections, . . 337 
 Sankara's self-contradiction, .. 371 
 Difficulties of pantheism, . . 370 
 Sankara's idea of the soul's iden- 
 tity with God, 376 
 
 Strictures on pantheism by 
 Gauda-purnananda, a Rama- 
 nuja, .. .. .. 379 
 
 Kanada against pantheism, . . 380 
 Moral consequences of pantheism, 38 1 
 Immorality excused by panthe- 
 ism 333 
 
 The old Vedantism of Vyasa dis- 
 tinguished from that of later 
 writers, . . . . . . 386 
 
xxu 
 
 TABLE OF CONTENTS, 
 
 391 
 
 m 
 
 Sankara'3 self-contradictions on < 
 
 the reality of the external world, 388 i 
 Whether Vyasa taught the theory • 
 
 of Maya, 
 Spiritual pantheism as bad as ma 
 
 terial, . . 
 Vedantism admits no idea of law 
 
 or duty, 397 
 
 Spiritual pantheism a libel on God 396 
 
 Sialogrue XX. 
 
 Discussion with a Dandi . . 400 
 
 The Dandi's explanations ,. 401 
 
 Satyakama's reply . . . . 402 
 
 Dependent existence not necessa- 
 rily illusory, . . . . . . 403 
 
 The absurdity of calling the 
 world false and yet God . . 404 
 
 Pantheism precludes the idea of 
 duty 405 
 
 What is Maya 406 
 
 Ramanuja's strictures on Pan- 
 theism . . . . 407 
 
 The Dandi asserts that the world 
 is called an illusion because of 
 its vanity .. . . . 414 
 
 Satyakama points out the limita- 
 tion of the doctrine . . ib 
 
 To deny the world is to deny the 
 power and wisdom of God .. 415 ; 
 
 True idea of Heaven .. 4J7 | 
 
 Vedantism militates aganist all < 
 
 proof . . . . . ..419 = 
 
 Vedantism falsified by its own \ 
 
 rules 42 1 I 
 
 Ramanuja's strictures (again) on 
 Pantheism 422 
 
 His idea of the essential form of \ 
 
 God 425 < 
 
 How Ramanandis differ from I 
 
 Raraanujas . . . . 427 c 
 
 Discussion of the modern Vedant- | 
 ism of Bengal . . . . . . 428 < 
 
 The pantheism of the Upanishads ex- \ 
 posed by citations of texts . . 422 \ 
 
 The text *' ekamevadwitiyam" 
 proved to be pantheistic . . 435 
 j Citations of passages proving 
 i the pantheism of the Upanishads 442 
 JHow the school of Rammohun 
 
 Roy gradually gave up all sastras 451 
 
 Dlalogrue X. 
 
 455 
 
 456 
 459 
 
 . 461 
 
 464 
 
 466 
 
 Discussion of the authority of the 
 
 Veda 
 
 Passages adduced in support of 
 its inspiration proved to be in- 
 conclusive, 
 Veda cannot prove itself 
 Review of arguments adduced by 
 philosophers in support of the 
 
 Vedas 
 
 Jaimini's violent artifice in ex- 
 plaining away the anachron- 
 isms in the Vedas, 
 Proofs adduced from Vedas 
 
 against their eternity .. 
 Sankara's theory of eternal 
 species . . . . 407 
 
 His argument refuted . . . 470 
 
 Arguments of Gotama, Kanada, 
 
 and Kapila refuted , . . . 473 
 Atheism of the Probhakara 
 mimansa . . . . . . 477 
 
 What can the Vedas be . . . . 485 
 
 Conflicting accounts of their pro- 
 duction . . 
 rheir own admission of a human 
 
 origin . . 
 Necessity of a Revelation, 
 The fact of a primitive Revela- 
 tion apparent from Brahminical 
 traditions . . . . 494 
 
 But they prove nothing in behalf 
 
 of the four Vedas , . . . 497 
 
 The Bible declared to be the 
 
 true record of God's will, . . 498 
 Evidence of prophecy, , . 499 
 
 ontrasted with alleged prophe- 
 cies in Brahminical sastras . . 507 
 
 486 
 
 490 
 
 491 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 XXlll 
 
 Evidence of miracles . . 508 
 
 Contrasted with the alleged 
 miracles of Brahminism .. 510 
 
 The Bible throws light on the 
 Brahminical institution of sa- 
 crifices .. .. .. ,. 513 
 
 Agamika speaks of the Vaishnava 
 doctrine of Krishna the "Lord 
 of all sacrifices" . .511 
 
 Satyakama suggests that the 
 Vaishnava doctrine may have 
 been borrowed from the Chris- 
 tians of Southern India .. 5 17 
 
 The character of Krishna a mo- 
 dern invention after the over- 
 throw af Buddhism . . . . 520 
 
 The Brahminical triad of divini- 
 ties probably a distorted tradi- 
 tion of primitive Revelation . . 522 
 
 So too the doctrine of Vishnu's 
 incarnations . . . . . . 623 
 
 The Great Duty and the Chief 
 End according to Christianity 524 
 
IE r tr a t a* 
 
 Pag€ 
 
 LvM 
 
 For 
 
 Read 
 
 23 
 
 6 
 
 you 
 
 your 
 
 88,69. 74 
 
 24, 1, 24 
 
 P^tanjala 
 
 Patanjali 
 
 97 
 
 10 
 
 80on 
 
 seen 
 
 153 
 
 18 
 
 sleaed 
 
 sealed 
 
 160 
 
 29 
 
 proces 
 
 process 
 
 180 
 
 1 
 
 argrued 
 
 argued 
 
 200 
 
 30 
 
 (anartha) 
 
 (andtmd) 
 
 204, 228 
 
 5, 24 
 
 controversalista 
 
 controversialists 
 
 204 
 
 18 
 
 P^ndava 
 
 P^ndu 
 
 207 
 
 5 
 
 temporay 
 
 temporary 
 
 224 
 
 7 
 
 niritis 
 
 Itis 
 
 227 
 
 13 
 
 objects enjoyment 
 
 objects of enjoyment 
 
 236 
 
 1 
 
 latters 
 
 letters 
 
 277 
 
 11 
 
 dessenting 
 
 dissenting 
 
 298 
 
 5 
 
 presince 
 
 presence 
 
 313, 316, 820 
 
 4 
 
 Aitireya 
 
 Aitareya 
 
 820 
 
 29 
 
 latter 
 
 former 
 
 358 
 
 18 
 
 in 
 
 is 
 
 402 
 
 26 
 
 meliferoua 
 
 melliferous 
 
 505 
 
 7 
 
 Note 8 
 Note 8 
 
 naratives 
 
 narratives 
 
 117 
 
 ft^ 
 
 ^w. 
 
 128 
 
 ^Tc^fici: 
 
 ^(^HcT: 
 
 407 
 
 Note 1 
 
 
 l?^fRf^^9lT« 
 
 arorrigenHa. 
 
 Page 50, line 5, for "its sixteen topics," substitute "the six categories of the 
 
 Vais'eshika." 
 Page 63, last line, /or " scarcely justify an elaborate exposition of their theistical 
 
 character," suhstitute " scarcely justify our explicitly assigning to them a theistical 
 
 character." 
 Page 141, line 7, for "adoption of another" suhstitute "reception into another." 
 Page 342, lines 18, 19, for "debating on what is good," suhstitute " each contending 
 
 for superiority." 
 Page 343, line 7, Make the same correction. 
 Page 343, line 17, /<w " excellency," suhstitute "superiority." 
 
DIALOGUE I 
 
 FEOM A BRAHMIN TO A BRAHMIN. 
 
 You wonder at the doings of the Kali Yuga. The late 
 mutiny in the Bengal array gives a plausible appearance 
 to your wonder. You quote the Sdstra that the Kali 
 Yuga will be followed by the return of the Satya Yuga ; 
 you say the terrible scenes you have witnessed are only a 
 prelude to the Mahapralaya, for which you are now look- 
 ing. But the mutiny is over, and there are no signs of a 
 Pralaya. 
 
 How do you know that the renovation is not to be 
 brought about by the gradual progress of opinion without 
 any violent catastrophe ? The manifestation of Vishnu, 
 which the Brahmins expect at the end of the Yuga, may 
 prove to be nothing more than the general dissemination 
 of truth and knowledge. That circumstances are tending 
 toward a new order of things cannot be doubted by the 
 most superficial observer. 
 
 You say that your fellow S'astris in the holy city show 
 now-a-days a freedom of speculation which would have 
 surprized Gotama and Kapila. You may consider that 
 as one of the signs of the times. But such plain speaking- 
 is not confined to the city of S'iva. 1 have witnessed 
 occasional instances of it in lower Bengal. 
 
2 DIALOGUE r. 
 
 After my departure from the North- West, on the 
 breaking out of the rebellion, 1 had many a narrow escape 
 from the violence of the soldiery, and at last arrived safe 
 in Bengal. Some time after finding lodgings in this 
 town, I paid a visit, in the cool of a lovely morning, to 
 my old friend Satyakama. I found him standing at the 
 gate on the side of the road. You have no doubt heard 
 of the movement in his mind. He no longer bows to 
 the high-sounding names of your Kishis. Notwithstand- 
 ing the tender cry of the Veda against being subjected to 
 the arguments of heretics, he feels no hesitation in con- 
 troverting some of its fondest doctrines. '^ Quarter," says 
 he, ^^must indeed be given to parties when they ask for 
 mercy, provided they suhmit at discretion ; — but while a 
 party continues rampant, and issues orders that you must 
 not attack him, the mandate is a threat, not capitulation." 
 
 While the Tilangas have been so fiercely plying their 
 S'astra (weapons) in the North- West, the pundits in Bengal 
 have been equally zealous in the exercise of their S'astra 
 — some of the latter manifesting no greater fidelity to the 
 systems of their order, than did the Sepoys to the Govern- 
 ment which so long protected and patronized them. Of 
 the Sepoys' doings you have had enough in your own pro- 
 vince. I will tell you something of the Pundits' doings 
 here. 
 
 I have already said I paid a visit to Satyakama. We 
 were talking on the events of the day, when two middle- 
 aged persons, from whose neat appearance I concluded 
 they were Brahmins, even before I saw their thread, 
 approached the house. They were both nearly as devoid 
 of artificial decorations as the poet represents the pea- 
 sants of Oude^, perhaps with this difference, that they 
 
MEETING OF OLD FRIENDS. 3 
 
 took pains religiously to wash and clean themselves every 
 morning, which was more than your rustics care to do. 
 
 If there be any truth in the common saying, that 
 externals form an index of the internal^, one of the new 
 comers was certainly a guileless candid Brahmin, though 
 the physiognomy of the other was somewhat ominous. 
 
 While they were yet at a distance, Satyakama appeared 
 to eye them very intently, paying little or no attention 
 for the moment to what 1 said. As soon as they were 
 near enough to be spoken to, '^ Obeisance, A'gamika," said 
 he, '^ Obeisance, Tarkak^ma ! What an unexpected plea- 
 sure to see you both together after so long a separation. It 
 is like the nectareous moonbeams on the thirsty Cha-kar !" 
 
 While uttering these words, he beckoned to them with 
 his hands to enter the house. In his eapferness to show at- 
 tention to his new (as I then thought, but, as I afterwards 
 learnt, his old) friends, he almost forgot that I was in the 
 company. I followed them however into the house, curious 
 to know who the new comers were. As we were walking 
 in, one of them, Agamika, pleasantly remarked, '^I am 
 glad to find, Satyakama, you can refer in such good hu- 
 mour to our sacred adages. I, too, am delighted to see 
 you, as indeed I am, to see all who were the companions 
 of my youth under the happy roof of our common pre- 
 ceptor." 
 
 I soon learnt who the new arrivals were. They were 
 old friends of our host — no way pleased with his recent 
 change of opinion, but very kind and respectful. In the 
 course of conversation, Agamika, though naturally cheer- 
 ful, said with an air of melancholy ; ^^ The only painful 
 reflection which crosses my mind whenever I think of you. 
 
4 DIALOGUE I. 
 
 Satyakama, (and believe me it does so^ with the sharpness, 
 no less than the swiftness, of an arrow,) is, that after all 
 the instruction you had received from our venerable 
 A'ch^rya, and the various tokens of affection he had 
 lieaped on his pupils, you should, by embracing foreign 
 opinions, have frustrated the hopes unce entertained of 
 you. Never did a father contemplate, more joyously, the 
 birth of his first-born, procuring him absolution from the 
 debt^ he owed to his ancestors, than did our holy tutor, 
 the gradual development of our minds under the discipline 
 of the Vedas and other S'astras. His benevolence and love 
 of literature had persuaded him, that besides the obUga- 
 tions which the Sastras entailed on the whole of the tivice- 
 born order, there was a fourth debt ^ which he owed to 
 posterity. ' The success with which he had mastered the 
 oracles of inspiration, and had traversed all the arcana of 
 a philosophy, which had exercised the minds of countless 
 sages, anxious for liberation from the bonds of transmigra- 
 tion, called upon him to communicate what he had learned 
 to intelligent pupils, that, through their instrumentality, 
 myriads, yet vmborn, might be supplied with the trea- 
 sures of knowledge, and thus a recurrence of that fearful 
 catastrophe, the loss of the Veda, which had once rendered 
 
 im a"! ^•S^^T ^*« XT'^m "^cfj S^e who has begotten a son is absolved from 
 his debt. Veda in Mallindtha. The Hindus are of opinion that the happiness of 
 those who have departed to another world depends in a great measure on the 
 performance of certain ceremonies by their descendants. A man is accordingly 
 considered to be in debt to his forefathers as long as he has no son — the hope of 
 the family, — as of the living so also of the dead. 
 
 * The Vedas speak of three debts in which the Brahmin is involved from his birth. 
 
 ^^^ ^W' ^^^T f^^^' w 
 
 "A Brahmin is born to three debts — he owes student-ship to the Riship, sacrifices 
 to the gods, and offspring to Via forefathers." Veda quoted in the Ny^ya iSutra 
 Vritti. 
 
BRAHMIKICAL APOSTACY. O 
 
 necessary an incarnation of the divine Vishnu, might be 
 averted. He was accordingly overjoyed at the prospect of 
 discharging what he owed to succeeding generations, by 
 bequeathing, through his pupils, those invaluable remedies 
 for the perils of our nature, which had come down from 
 the age, when the four heads of Brahma produced the 
 Kich, Yajus, Saman, and Atharvan. Oh what a disap- 
 pointment have you inflicted on him ! Have all his labours 
 come to this, that you should become a scoffer at the 
 Vedas, renounce the Sandhya^, forsake that which the 
 illustrious son of Vasudeva said, was the most excellent 
 for you, and adopt a foreign system, which the same sacred 
 authority emphatically pronounced to be fraught with 
 TERROR^. Who could have imagined that you would 
 bring on your preceptor the disgrace of betraying divine 
 learning to a future enemy, notwithstanding its tender 
 appeals for protection^. Why even the Mahometan 
 impostor Feizi, a very type of the demon who bad made 
 
 5 The prayers which the Brahmins have to repeat three times a day are called 
 the Saadhya. They are generally free from references to the more recent legends of 
 a directly idolatrous nature. They are held in the highest estimation. A Brahmin 
 forfeits his position, not only by practically neglecting, but even by theoretically 
 disregarding them. " Whosoever," says Satatapa, does not honor it, is not esteemed 
 
 a Brahmin" ^^RJ «TI^l5SfT^T:^r^ •! ^T sTf^^ ^^cf | 
 
 The Puranas are full of eulogies of the Sandhya. I shall give only one passage 
 from the Brahma- Vaivarta 5n^^^«TlTSf ^ 2rRi"^5«2f ^CTfcT "^1 ^ ^ 
 
 V sj ^ -J ■>> 
 
 XT^"^wf H^T^f 5 11 DhagavatGitalll. 35. 
 
 ^ It is said in the Vedaa that Divine Learning went to a Brahmin begging protec- 
 iion against unworthy candidates for instruction. 1%^T ^"^ STI^^ffT'^^T^ 
 
b DIALOGUE I. 
 
 off* with the churned-nectar in disguise, turned to a better 
 use the Vedic learning he had unblushingly stolen^. But 
 perhaps you could not help it ; there was no contending 
 against Adrishta (fate) !" 
 
 The Brahmin paused — evidently overcome by conflict- 
 ing feelings. But scarcely had he stopped, when his 
 companion broke forth in a tone which presented a re- 
 markable contrast to the melancholy gravity of A'gamika. 
 
 ''Yes/' said he, ''if idiosyncrasy be Fate!" "Our 
 friend," continued Tarkak^ma, "has so strong a predilec- 
 tion for what is singular, that he must needs forsake 
 every thing that accords with the common sense of his 
 countrymen." 
 
 Satyakama had listened very attentively to A^'gamika, 
 but he was vexed at the sneers of his other friend. 
 
 " My beloved friend A'gamika," said he, *'has greatly 
 misapprehended my doctrines and practice. I hope to 
 explain both before we part. I cannot help meanwhile 
 expressing my surprise at Tarkakama's taxing me with 
 singularity, and rebuking me for my deviation from the 
 
 8 " Not all the authority of Akbar could prevail with the Brahmins to reveal 
 *'the principles of their faith. He was therefore obliged to have recourse to artifice 
 "to obtain the information which he so much desired. The Emperor, for this 
 "purpose, concerted a plan with his chief Secretary, Abul Fazil, to impose Feizi, 
 •'then a boy, upon the Brahmins, in the character of a poor orphan of their tribe. 
 "Feizi, being instructed in his part, was privately sent to Benares, the principal 
 " seat of learning among the Hindoos. In that city the fraud was practised on a 
 " learned Brahmin, who received the boy into his house and educated him as his own 
 "son." — Dow's History of Hindustan While Feizi was carrying on his studies in 
 disguise, a secret attachment grew up between the preceptor's daughter and himself 
 The Brahmin was easily persuaded to make him his son-in-law. But Feizi's con- 
 science smote him. He could not any longer practise the deception without incurring 
 the guilt of swindling. He discovered himself to his benefiictor, and craved pardon 
 for what he had done. The Brahmin was thunderstruck. From the mortification 
 he felt in communicating the Vedas to an unclean barbarian, he could think of no 
 other relief than instant death. He drew his knife to stab himself. Feizi fell down 
 at his feet, beseeching him not to lay violent hands on himself. The Brahmin 
 consented to live only on the Mahometan's solemnly promising not to translate the 
 Vedas, nor to reveal the Brahrainical creed to his fraternity. 
 
RETORT ON THE BRAMIN. 7 
 
 track marked out by the common sense of our countrymen. 
 Such a censure might have been expected from the poetical 
 KaUdasa, who never allowed his mind to be distracted 
 with the intricacies of science and philosophy, and who 
 lauded the king and people of Ayodhia, for not deviating 
 from the path chalked out ever since the days of 
 Manu^. But I must confess I was not prepared for 
 such a lecture from my philosophical friend Tarkakama. 
 One who never for himself pretends to bow to common 
 sense, but is always in chase of bright ideas, dazzling to 
 ordinary intellects, should not condemn another on the 
 score of singularity. Nothing satisfies this A'charya 
 that is not transcendental. Nothing is of any value 
 that is not above popular sense. The teaching of the 
 Veda fails to come up to his mark. The whole town 
 talks of the eloquence with which he repeats and expounds 
 Kapila's and Is'warakrishna's open declarations of the 
 shortcomings^" of the Veda. Human society is to 
 be improved, and its highest interests secured, not by 
 the application of means which are open to ordinary 
 men, but by something that even the majority of the 
 learned fail to apprehend ; not by adherence to the 
 precepts and injunctions of the Vedas, but by something 
 which will be above the Vedas — something of which 
 Madhuchhand, Vis'wamitra, and other old sages were 
 all equally ignorant, — which it was reserved for a Gotama 
 or Kapila to expound for the edification of the wise. To 
 
 f%?r^«rft?^Tl€rt || Uaglmvansa. 
 ^° Sankhya Sutra I. 83. «ricr^f^^TTft cTfc^ftj ^I^^T^f^^ff^ 
 
 3Ti^ir^^mf# H 
 
 Karika, II. ^"^^Tl^^f^^: Hflft^f^^^lfcl^^r^li: I 
 
» DIALOGUE r. 
 
 be taxed with singularity by one wlio is so regardless 
 of established systems, is itself most singular." 
 
 Tarkakama seemed somewhat uncomfortable under the 
 rebuke which his own sneers had provoked. He was 
 anxious to drop a subject he had indiscreetly introduced, 
 and yet he was unwilling to appear vanquished by allow- 
 ing his opponent to have the last word. 
 
 '^ My friend Satyakama," said he, '^ is eager to take every 
 thing wrong. May it not be allowable in a person to 
 speculate on grand truths, so long as he does not practi- 
 cally deviate from the duties of his class ? I do not blame 
 you for thinking above the level of ordinary intellects. 
 A philosophic mind cannot help doing so.. Nor do 1 
 cavil at your diverging in thought from Yedic teaching, 
 which certainly has not exhausted the topics of rational 
 inquiry. I am not charging you with mental heresy. 
 What I find fault with you for is j our practice. You do 
 not tell the Sandhya. You mix and fraternize with 
 barbarians. You are for placing the unholy on the same 
 level with the holy, the race that proceeded from the feet, 
 with that which issued from the mouth of the Creator^. 
 Already has our discipline been sadly relaxed by the 
 ascendancy of barbarian rulers. Already are the worst 
 anticipations of ancient sages realized in the insolence of 
 the lower classes, and the depression of the sacerdotal 
 office. But if your principles prevail, there will be an 
 end to whatever still remains of peace and order. Social 
 anarchy, added to political humiliation, will fill the cup of 
 our misery up to the brim. The family will share the 
 fate of the state. Yile S'udras and apostate barbarians, 
 still under the ban of maledictions that cannot fail, will 
 
 1 The S'^stras speak of the Brahmins having been produced from the raouth, atid 
 the Sudraa from the feet of Brahma. 
 
THEORY AGAINST PRACTICE. 9 
 
 arrogate equality with gods-of-the-earth^. Nay ma- 
 trimonial alliances will be unblushingly proposed without 
 distinction of high and low. Our females, now scarcely 
 accessible to the solar rays, will be exposed to the gaze of 
 barbarian eyes ; and consequences, still worse than those 
 which were so graphically depicted by the son of Kunti^, 
 will be the result of disregarding the honor and dignity 
 of our race." 
 
 The debate now gi'ew^ warm. Principles and practices 
 were called in question, and though the parties were never 
 forgetful of the respect they owed to one another, each 
 was eager to defend his own point. 
 
 " I hope to satisfy you by and bye," replied Satyakama, 
 '^ that neither my practice nor my principles are justly 
 chargeable with any evil tendency. But allow me to ex- 
 press my wonder at the distinction you have drawn be- 
 tween your innocent speculations and my noxious example. 
 If I understand you rightly, your philosophy treats with 
 perfect contempt the very institutions which you blame 
 my practice for ignoring. You laugh at the rites and 
 ceremonies to which our countrymen are so much at- 
 tached. The pride of caste stands neither the test of your 
 dialectics, nor of your most favourite texts of the Vedas. 
 You claim for your system the moral dignity of inculcating 
 sympathy with all God's creatures. But it appears your 
 maxims are intended only for fine essays and eloquent 
 speeches. It is not your purpose that they should be 
 
 W^^T'* H^WT*' il So the Brahmins are called. 
 
 ^ ^'^S' giff?iTf^ ^^T^TWT* ^"TTci^T- I ^'^ ^"i" ^^ ^m 
 
 VJ ^ -^ v» -O 
 
 ^^^ mm^ "3TT^^ T^^'^?:*. i ^^^ -stt^t^^ ^^"^Rt ^^^ 
 
 ^ I XTcrfnT fq-cTCt W^t ^HflT^f^^f^^T' II Bhagavat Gita, I. 35-37. 
 
10 DIALOG UK 1. 
 
 realized in practice. This is a nice discrimination in 
 which I must confess my inability to follow you. I am 
 accustomed to believe that what is really good in theory 
 cannot be evil in practice. If you admit the maxim that 
 one should look on all creatures as on himself^, then 
 do not find fault with your more consistent neighbour, 
 for placing the race that proceeded from the feet on the 
 same level with that which issued from the mouth of the 
 Creator. 
 
 ^' I might go further and say, that such censure is the 
 more inconsistent on the part of those who are fond of 
 saying, not only that the rites and ceremonies of the Yedas 
 do not, as remedies, sufficiently meet the disease with 
 which mankind is afflicted, but that they are impure — 
 becaiise they enjoin sacrifices involving injury to the 
 animal creation. From pain can only proceed pain, nor 
 is a feeling of chillness removed by the affusion of water ^ ; 
 how then can the shedding of blood, while it makes 
 the victim writhe with pain, procure blessings for the 
 slaughterer ? Such is the reasoning of some of your philo- 
 sophers. Do you not see that they are animated by the 
 very spirit of Buddhism which they profess to detest ? 
 What more needs an open enemy say to throw discredit 
 on the whole Brahminical system. Whatever the origin 
 of the Vedas may be, it is easy to see the inconsistency of 
 calling them the word of God, and at the same time 
 charging them with encouraging impure practices. If the 
 Vedas were really revealed as the way to supreme feli- 
 city, they cannot be superseded by the mere theory of a mor- 
 tal. If on the other hand the Vedas do not teach what is ne- 
 cessary for our lasting interests, let them not be paraded as 
 
 ^ ^'^IT*^ ^^iftr^^WW ^TUf^^^J 11 K.ipila Si'itra, 1. 84. 
 
DISPARITIES AMONG BRAHMINS. 11 
 
 eternal repositories of truth. Let their higli pretensions 
 in such a case be at once and for ever repudiated. There 
 is something not only irreverent, but immoral, surely, in 
 saying that the Veda contains a revelation of God's will, 
 and yet that the means of salvation, therein propounded, 
 are futile — and I appeal to A'gamika himself, whether 
 my open disregard of the Veda is not at least more con- 
 sistent, than the professed allegiance of one, who nominally 
 acknowledges its authority, but in reality laughs at the 
 provisions it has made for final emancipation." 
 
 Tarkakama betrayed many tokens of uneasiness while 
 listening to this plain-spoken address. But he patiently 
 heard it out, and replied in a somewhat subdued and 
 faltering voice : ^' I do not see any inconsistency in the 
 position that the Vedas exhibit an inferior, but never- 
 theless, a real road to felicity. The felicity to which 
 that road leads may fall short of reaching the utmost 
 limits of human capacity and human aspiration ; but still 
 it is felicity. There may be two ways, both real, but dif 
 fering in character, and suited to men of different abilities. 
 The Vedas do not ignore the disparity which exists in the 
 capacities of men. Some persons there are, capable of 
 greater ment^ abstraction, and fitted for higher roads than 
 others, to whom every passage that does not keep to the 
 level of their gross sensibilities, appears uphill work." 
 
 '^ Oh," rejoined Satyakama, 'Hlien there are excep- 
 tions to the dogma that pain proceeds from pain ' You 
 think the aphorism is not of universal application. But 
 be that as it may, since the candidates for this transcen- 
 dental knowledge are manifestly few, it does not appear 
 to me particularly modest to condemn the largest portion 
 oven of learned Brahmins, to a state of deplorable igno- 
 rance of the more excellent way. But do you really 
 mean to adopt this distinction ? The Vedas you say 
 
12 DIALOGUE I. 
 
 teach a real but an inferior way, suited to men of small 
 capacities. Yet these Vedas in fact constitute the peculiar 
 inheritance of the twice-born classes. The Brahmin is 
 especially enjoined to study them, while the servile order, 
 in common with the female sex, is excluded from the pri- 
 vilege of even hearing them read^. The Vedic ritual can 
 only be used by the higher classes. Whom then do you 
 mean by the persons of gross sensibilities for whom the 
 Vedas are intended ? It can be no other than the Brahmins 
 themselves. What becomes now of the dignity of the exalt- 
 ed race, that sprang from the noblest member of Brahma's 
 body? Their high pretensions can have no solidity, if 
 their class privileges turn out to be of such questionable 
 worth. Their especial inheritance, the right to read and 
 expound the Vedas, has after all but a nominal value. 
 To obtain a real superiority, they must still qualify them- 
 selves as disciples of Gotama and Kanada. They must, 
 by a more successful cultivation of their intellects, exhibit 
 a higher proof of their second birth than the mere posses- 
 sion of their sacred thread, or they will be left in a posi- 
 tion scarcely more to be coveted than that of barbarians 
 and once-horn S'lldras. They will still be excluded from 
 the beatitude which awaits the adepts in the Nyaya and 
 Sankhya. They must know how to define terms and 
 classify ideas. They must enter the lists and choose their 
 sides in the philosophical controversies which have divided 
 Gotama, Kapila, Kanada, and Vyasa. They must decide 
 whether sound is eternal or not, whether proofs, or in- 
 struments of right knowledge^ are in number four, three, 
 two, or one. Failing in these and other like distinctions, 
 they must find themselves — in company with barbarians 
 and Siidras, as aliens from the society of emancipated 
 
 ^^^ff^^^^r ^^ ^ ^|%Jrr^^T II 
 
HUMAN AGAINST DIVINE. 13 
 
 saints. And so, alas ! Tarkakama, you too bring down 
 the exalted race that proceeded from the mouth, to the 
 same level with those that issued from the feet, of 
 Brahma. 
 
 ''But I have yet weightier matters against you. What 
 right have your philosophers to assert that fallible men 
 can teach a way which Sastras of God cannot teach ? Can 
 the teaching of finite minds be superior to that of the Infi- 
 nite ? Supposing you can surmount this (to me insur- 
 mountable) difficulty, another at once presents itself. 
 These your guides are not on\j fallible, they are discordant. 
 How then am I to choose ? I should still require an infal- 
 lible monitor to teach me which of these fallible guides 
 (if any) is to be followed." 
 
 Tarhahdma. — "The infallible monitor you require is 
 provided for you in the Veda. The Veda may not teach 
 the highest way to felicity. It is nevertheless an infallible 
 touchstone of truth — and herein consists its dignity. When- 
 ever great Kishis are discordant, the Veda steps in and 
 reconciles them. The final appeal with all of them is to 
 the Sriiti. You can easily understand what kn elevated 
 position I am allotting to the Veda, when I am declaring 
 it to be the highest authority in the decision of contro- 
 versies. It is our Sudder Court of appeal in philosophi- 
 cal disputes — " 
 
 Satyakdma. — *' And a pretty Sudder Court you make 
 of it ! I suppose Gotama, Kapila, and others, are your 
 Moonsifs and Deputy-Magistrates. Your Sudder Court 
 is so obliging that it upholds all their decisions, however 
 discordant and mutually conflicting. But what do you 
 think would be the fate of a Moonsif that set at naught a 
 construction of the Sudder Court, by maintaining that 
 justice could not flow from its decisions, any more than 
 the relief of chillness from the application of cold water f 
 
14 DIALOGUE I. 
 
 An English philosopher said that while man has the 
 exclusive privilege of forming general theorems, he has 
 also a monopoly of the privilege of absurdity, to which no 
 other living creature is subject. And of men, he added, 
 those are of all the most subject to it that profess philosophy. 
 Excuse my presumption, but it strikes me that in 
 India this monopoly is in the hands of those who profess to 
 adhere to the Dars'anas. All these systems are right in 
 their eyes, notwithstanding their mutual inconsistencies^. 
 Whichever system they happen to take up is for the time 
 supreme. This is your philosophy. The fact is you 
 hardly know your own minds. You care little for the 
 objects of science, and you have no hearty belief in 
 the Vedas. You cannot persuade yourselves that offerings 
 of twigs, steeped in butter, and thrown over a blazing fire, 
 will really procure heaven, and yet the fear of being 
 branded as heretics deters you from expressing your con- 
 tempt for the Mantras. Nor have you the courage to test 
 the correctness of philosophic results, which may have 
 been arrived at by teachers of established reputation. 
 And you virtually set the Veda at naught, when you 
 receive with admiration the aphorisms of your sages. It 
 is chiefly when an honest thinker, who candidly speaks 
 
 7 "The pundita of the Benares College were once asked the following questions: 
 " As the three systems of philosophy which you have studied in the College profess- 
 " edly dispute each other's positions, and cannot therefore all be entirely in the right, 
 *' tell me whether you adopt any one of them to the exclusion of the others : or, pro- 
 *' vided you really have formed any opinion of your own at all, whether you adopt, 
 " eclectically, something from each ? The answei's were generally to the effect that all 
 ** the three systems were reconcileable with Scripture, and that what appeared in any 
 **of thera to be a deviation from the truth, was, in reality, only an accommodation to 
 *' the weakness of the human understanding, which renders it necessary in the first 
 ** instance to communicate the truth under the garb of error, just as a mother, in 
 " pointing out the moon to her child, speaks of it as the shining circle at the end of 
 "her finger, which is intelligible to the child, while the mention of its being distant 
 " by thousands of leagues would have hopelessly bewildered Mm." — Synopsis of 
 Science, vol. I, pp. vii, viii. 
 
CANDID ADMISSIONS. 15 
 
 and follows out liis sentiments, is to be rebuked, that you 
 fall into a paroxysm of loyalty for the S'dstras." 
 
 While this animated conversation was going on, Aga- 
 mika appeared to be labouring under great perturbation 
 of mind. Attached as he was, devotedly, to the ritual 
 system of Brahmanism, he had much clearness of mental 
 perception and great honesty of purpose. He observed 
 with unexampled candour; ^'In justice to Satyakama 
 I must say that he has reason to inveigh against your po- 
 sitions, Tarkakama. I quite agree with the English phi- 
 losopher's remark. After the Vedas have laid down your 
 duties, it is highly arrogant in you to speculate on a more 
 excellent way. I do not question your liberty to expound, 
 illustrate, and declare the sense of the Vedas. That is 
 in truth the study and peculiar privilege of our class. 
 Jaimini, in his Sutras of the Mimansa, has indeed conferred 
 a benefit alike on learning and theology. I do not deny 
 that, in his eagerness to defend the institutions of the 
 Veda, he has made use of expressions, at least seem- 
 ingly at variance with the reverence due to Him who 
 breathed it out. But I am very jealous of Gotama, 
 Kanada, and even Vyasa, though the latter professes to 
 base his system almost exclusively on the authority of the 
 S'ruti. What respect could Gotama entertain for the 
 Vedas when he introduces terms and definitions on which 
 the sacred oracles are wholly silent, and declares their in- 
 vestigation to be necessary for emancipation ? The Vedas 
 then must fall short of securing that object. The wisdom 
 inspired by Brahma must then be inferior to that of the hus- 
 band of Ahalya ! And as to your Kapila, though I can 
 never deny the tribute of veneration to a name honourably 
 mentioned in the Vedas®, yet I consider his system as 
 
 Swetas'watara Upnnialiad, 
 
16 DIALOGUE I. 
 
 scarcely disguised Buddhism. If you can go the length 
 of Kapila, I really cannot see how you may not go further. 
 If you can be justified in openly declaring that the 
 means of salvation revealed in the Vedas are insufficient, 
 how can I blame Satyakama for reducing your maxims to 
 practice ? You are both impugners of the Vedas. If we 
 tolerate the one, while we exclude the other, we shall be 
 following neither Menu nor reason. You may differ 
 ever so much from each other, what have we to do with 
 that ? If the supreme authority of the Vedas be attacked, 
 it matters little what particular line of approach the rebels 
 adopt. As to the distinction attempted to be drawn be- 
 tween theory and practice, if there be any difference, it is 
 rather to the credit than the discredit of Satyakama." 
 
 Tarkakama appeared quite amazed at the tone in which 
 his friend spoke. He never expected such a rebuke from 
 that quarter. He was at a loss what to say in reply. 
 After a short pause — 
 
 '^ What," said he, " is it all the same to you whe- 
 ther a person follows a system that originated in the 
 country itself, the Aryavarta of Menu, called also Punya- 
 bhumi by the lexicographer, or whether he becomes an 
 adherent of foreign novelties hatched in the defiled land 
 of Mletchas ?" 
 
 The remark was accompanied by a misanthropic sneer 
 which certainly did not enlist my sympathy in its behalf 
 Satyakama however only observed, good humouredly — 
 
 " It seems as if the spirit of your pliilosophy ceases to 
 inspire you directly you begin to think of the poor 
 Mletchas. Does not your admired aphorist say that time 
 and place ^ cannot affect the cteimal soul. Truth cannot 
 
 
SASTRA AGAINST PHILOSOPHY. 17 
 
 suffer from the place where it is recognized, any more than 
 the sun ^ " from the disorders of the eye that beholds it. 
 Wliat is right in itself is riglit in all places, and at all 
 times. Truth may confer a distinction on a site otherwise 
 of no importance, but it is impossible for any place, how- 
 ever unholy, to cast a slur on truth. If what you call a 
 Mletcha region has received the light which truth sheds, 
 you must not say that the truth is thereby defiled. You 
 should, on the contrary, correct your vocabulary, and find 
 a better term for such a country." 
 
 To Ag^amika the turn which the discussion had taken 
 did not seem to augur well at all. He was trembling 
 lest his polemical friend might, in the heat of the debate, 
 take up positions which would do no credit to his order. 
 He was hardly more anxious that the controversy should 
 be dropped, than that Tarkakama himself should renounce 
 his attachment to logic and metapliysics. 
 
 ^' You see, Tarkakama," said he, ^^ your dialectics will not 
 do. You had better submit with becoming humility to 
 the teaching of the Yedas, without affecting wisdom supe- 
 rior to Brahma's. Unlearn, as fast as you can, the rest- 
 lessness which probably the aphorisms of Gotama and 
 Kapila have produced in you. Remember an unsettled 
 state of mind is not the characteristic of a wise man, nor 
 is there any moral dignity in continually seeking to split 
 straws. Keep to the duties enjoined in the Yeda, and 
 eschew your philosophy. Remember how hopeless it is 
 to arrive at truth by means of controversy. Listen to 
 what S'ankaracharya says : ^ Arguments, founded on 
 ' human speculation alone, and not derived from the Sastra, 
 ^are interminable, because there can be no limits to 
 
 Kathopanishad. 
 
18 DIALOGUE I. 
 
 ^ mere speculation. The arguments whicli some clever 
 ' disputants may bring forward, after much thought, may 
 ' be refuted by others broached by cleverer heads ; those 
 ' again may be cut up by still sharper intellects. It is 
 ' impossible to bring a discussion to a close, because of the 
 'diversity of human thought. Nor can one hope for 
 ' finality in a discussion, by resting on arguments, approved 
 ' by some eminent teacher of established reputation, such 
 'as Kapila; because we see that the opinions even of 
 ' Kapila, Kanada, and other saintly sectaries of acknow- 
 ' ledged eminence, are mutually conflicting.' ^ Thus said 
 S'ankaracharya. I hope this will satisfy you how danger- 
 ous it is to depend on the precarious results of human 
 philosophy." 
 
 Satyahdma. — ''Though it is not directed against any of 
 my positions, I must not allow your sweeping attack against 
 philosophy to pass without a remark. It is but just that 
 we should hear what S'ankaracharya says on the other 
 side of the questiofi :■ — 'It cannot be urged that no argu- 
 ' ment is allowable. Even where the sense of the Yedas 
 'is opposed, it is only by logically refuting such false 
 'interpretation that the true sense can be made out. 
 ' Manu, too, thought on this wise.' The Commentator 
 of the Vedanta then quotes the author of the Institutes 
 
 Commentary on Vedanta, II. i. 11. 
 
PHILOSOPHY NOT NECESSARILY BAD. 19 
 
 to uphold the lawfulness of argumentation^. Of course 
 neither Vydsa nor S'ankardchdrya will on the whole 
 tolerate an argument on matters revealed in the Sastra 
 (Agama.) But what if we be disagreed (as indeed you 
 and 1 are,) which is the real Agama — the true record 
 of God's will ? You cannot expect me to be silenced 
 by the authority of that which I do not allow to be an 
 authentic statement of the Divine law. The question 
 necessarily admits of fair discussion. Then again, though 
 I believe with you that God has spoken, it may yet be 
 possible that there are provinces of thought in which 
 scientific speculation is not only allowable, but highly 
 laudable. Human philosophy cannot of course, as I 
 have contended, teach a more excellent way than Divine 
 revelation. But there are various questions, connected 
 with our earthly improvement, on which the Divine law is 
 silent, because they fall within the range of human investi- 
 gation. Whatever it is within the power of reason to 
 discover, does not need the assistance of revelation. Such 
 questions are left to be determined by the light of nature. 
 Though not necessarily connected with the well-being of 
 the soul in another world, they are subjects justly demand- 
 ing our attention. 
 
 '^ Such philosophy, it must be remembered, can never 
 be opposed to God's will ; for one fact can never contra- 
 dict another fact, the book of nature cannot contradict the 
 book of revelation — nor the works of God be otherwise 
 
 ^^^ Tw^ T{l\xT^ %?^w ^^^ nam^imT^^ "^Tm^ f^T^Mm^ 
 
 Com. Vedant.. II. i. 11. 
 
20 DIALOGUE I. 
 
 than conformable to His word. The primary duty of 
 man is to inform himself of what is required of him 
 in the Word ; and, that he may do so as intelligently 
 as possible, his next duty is to cultivate his mind to 
 the utmost extent of his opportunities and capacities. 
 It is not the least of a man's privileges to read, as deeply 
 as he can, the book of nature, so full in its delineation 
 of the power and wisdom of his heavenly Father. The 
 Bhasha' poet ^ gives a description, as true as it is beauti- 
 ful, of the influence of material vestiges on human sen- 
 sibility, when he represents Bharata as deriving, from 
 the foot-prints of an absent brother, all the joy of a per- 
 sonal interview in the charming forests of Chitrakuta. 
 The pious heart may in like manner derive the unal- 
 loyed delight of a communion with his unseen Maker, by 
 recognizing the vestiges of His wisdom and beneficence 
 in the creation around him. 
 
 ''The success which has manifestly attended the culti- 
 vation of natural and experimental science in Europe, is a 
 sufficient index of God's will in this respect. Is it possi- 
 ble that the Supreme Being had created the elements, and 
 adapted their properties in such a manner, that water 
 should, by the application of heat, produce a power capable 
 of propelling vessels on the great deep, and dragging trains 
 of carriages on the dry land, without wishing that man 
 should, by the exercise of his intellect, discover the secret ? 
 Can a cultivated mind treat with scorn the science which, 
 by the agency of steam, has connected the very anti- 
 podes of the globe, as if they were no further off from each 
 other than Calcutta and Asfra — and which will one of these 
 
 ^ 'W^Vw f-^Tf-m n^Tj(^ ^wi I ^T^^ TTT^^ ^r5^ ^^T II ^5r 
 ftl^ vft: fr^^^^^?rRf# I ^cg-^^ f^^'r ^ft:^ ^^ m^fT^ ii 
 
 Toolsedass's Ramjiyana, Ayodhia KiCnda. 
 
TRIUMPHS OF SCIENCE. 21 
 
 days turn Purushottama itself into a single raanzal from 
 Kasi ? Is it possible that the application of certain acids 
 to certain metals should generate a power by which men, 
 separated by hundreds of miles, might communicate with 
 one another as if they were conversing in the same room ; 
 by which the priests of Vis'wes'wara can ask a question, 
 and get the reply in a minute from the Pandas of Jagan- 
 nath ; and the Creator of the Universe not will that men 
 should avail themselves of such a power ? The most rapid 
 communication, which the poetical genius of Kalidasa 
 could conceive, was by the flight of a cloud from the 
 verdant peak of Ramagiri to the genial atmosphere of 
 Alaka ; but he put forth the idea only to condemn it as 
 the reverie of a mad sentimentalist*, smarting under sen- 
 tence of separation from the wife of his bosom. Science 
 has however carried facts beyond the fictions of poetic 
 imagination. What would Kalidasa have said to a line 
 of electric telegraphs connecting Bengal with England, 
 and carrying messages with a velocity that may anticipate 
 the very steeds of the sun? Is it possible to decry the study 
 of science after such triumphs ? 
 
 " Of course the systems of philosophy which have pre- 
 vailed among us for centuries justify much of your appre- 
 hensions. They have produced no results on which the 
 mind can dwell with complacency. The misfortune is 
 that our leading Kishis, instead of patiently investigating 
 facts, and thence deducing general principles, laid down 
 certain dogmatic aphorisms, to be received without con- 
 troversy, or, if discussed at all, to be discussed after the 
 manner of a paid advocate. The way again in which 
 
 ^TTIT^lf^ ^fifcllTXrJTri^a^T^cf^W l Meghaduta. 
 
22 DIALOGUE I. 
 
 pliysics, ethics, and theology were blended (or rather, 
 confounded) did service to none of those sciences, but pro- 
 pagated and confirmed errors in them all. Such a process 
 is apt to alarm all inquirers after truth. 
 
 '^ But, because a Gotama or KanMa has staked the 
 soul's salvation on a precise knowledge of his own catego- 
 ries, and imposed his aphorisms on posterity, with the un- 
 derstanding that they were to be received, not reasoned 
 against ; it is not necessary that every teacher of science 
 should follow the example. S'ankar^charya says, ^there 
 is no reason whatever that one should himself be a fool, 
 merely because an elder was a fool/^ 
 
 " It must also be remembered, in justice to the founders 
 of our philosophy, that their eminence in learning, and in- 
 tellectual activity, necessarily earned for their writings an 
 authority to which their successors implicitly submitted. 
 They could not help their own greatness. 
 
 '^The rules of philosophical investigation which Gotama 
 and Kanada, more especially the latter, propounded, were 
 no doubt fundamentally correct. If they had followed out 
 those rules themselves, and encouraged their followers 
 to do the same, we could not have had much to complain 
 of. The pity is that they hastily entertained, and dogma- 
 tically inculcated, principles, which cannot stand the tests 
 of their own logic. 
 
 ^^ Still though a man may, without endangering his 
 soul's welfare, remain ignorant, not only of Gotama's own 
 ideas of the properties of water or air, but also of the 
 real facts, as unravelled by the patience and industry 
 of experimental philosophers in Europe, yet human 
 society has undoubtedly benefitted much by philosophical 
 
EXPLANATIONS. 23 
 
 investigations of physical and mental pltenomeua, in the 
 East no less than the West. The definitions of our 
 predecessors have unquestionably contributed to precise 
 expressions of truth. 
 
 ''As to scientific speculations in general, you cannot 
 refuse assent to the maxim of you own Veda, that the 
 ignorant are murderers of their souls.^ Those who 
 wilfully throw away opportunities of mental improvement, 
 and of philosophical investigation, certainly do great in- 
 justice to themselves." 
 
 Agamika was a good deal affected by the above speech. 
 He on his part had not calculated on hearing the names 
 of Gotama and Kanada mentioned with any degree of 
 approbation by Satyakama. " It is impossible for me," 
 said he, *' to make a hasty statement on all the points 
 that you have advanced. I can only prornise to think on 
 them. But, Satyakama, you said a little while ago — that 
 I greatly misapprehended your doctrines and practices, 
 and that you would explain both before we parted. I am 
 ready to hear you now." 
 
 Our host had now a delicate task to perform. He had 
 to satisfy his guests that the cry raised against himself had 
 no foundation. When men differ in opinion on points of 
 practical philosophy or theology, it is no easy work for 
 them to understand each other. Satyakama endeavoured 
 to make out that men who freely speculated among them- 
 selves, regardless of the authority of the Vedas, had no 
 just ground of complaint against him — and that his guests 
 
 ^ ^^m ^TiT^ "fxWl ^^-^ cT^^T^cTU cTT^ •gc2lfvr3T=^f'fr 5 
 ^ '^T«^'^«?t^«TT5 I Isopanisbad. 
 ^InHl^ ?f=TTtt% ^ErrrJT^'^-. % ^ S^^f^^t^J ^^ ^ ^fiTIif fifSf 
 
 S'ankara's Commentary on Ditto. 
 
24 DIALOGUE I. 
 
 had no more right to find fault with him than with one 
 another. 
 
 ^' The regrets you have expressed/' said he, '^ at my disap- 
 pointing expectations formed of me, I accept, not as re- 
 proaches, but as comphments — not as tokens of disregard, 
 but as proofs of kindness and affection. 1 fear, however, 1 
 am in your estimation a godless person, without those tender 
 sensibilities, which you think are not compatible with the 
 rejection of the Vedas, and neglect of the duties they en- 
 join on Brahmins. The pictures, which a large portion df 
 our literature has drawn, of the doctrines and practices 
 of those, who, in former times, impugned the Vedas, readily 
 present themselves to your imagination. You cannot 
 believe that one can reject the Vedas, without being a 
 Bauddlia, Jain, or Charvaka, or a demon incarnate, such 
 as Kansa or Havana was. Now will you allow me to 
 say that, whilst I pronounce no opinion at present as to 
 the correctness of the portraits that S'ankaracharya and 
 Vyasa have given of their heretical opponents, I do 
 most unhesitatingly repudiate (and with no less depth 
 of feeling than you yourself, Agamika, would,) the sup- 
 position that 1 hold any thing akin to the atheistical and 
 sensual doctrines attributed to Bauddhas and Charvakas. 
 Let me assure you that, although my opinions have 
 changed since I was young, I have not unlearnt a parti- 
 cle of the horror which we all entertained for God-deny- 
 ing and voluptuous principles. You are astonished at 
 this ? and yet is it not possible that two things may differ 
 from a third, and yet be very far from identical with 
 each other ? This is all that I have any right to demand 
 of you now : — but so much I may without impertinence 
 demand. 
 
 '^I must embrace another opportunity of explaining in 
 full the doctrines whicli at present guide my conduct. 
 
WHAT IS SWADHARMA? 25 
 
 But allow me, once for all, to relieve your anxiety 
 on my behalf, by satisfying you that not one of the 
 doctrines and practices which haunt your imagination, 
 when you think of me, has any countenance from myself. 
 You charge me with forgetfulness of spiritual duties, 
 because I have ceased to tell the Sandhya three times a 
 day. It is not from thoughtless indolence that I have 
 given up that form of devotional exercise. My maxim still 
 is — 'Evening, and morning , and at noon-day, will I pray ' 
 It is only because I have found a more excellent way that 
 I do not make use of the Sandhyd. I do not indeed in- 
 voke blessings from the waters of dry and marshy lands, 
 from natural and artificial pools'^ , nor call upon the sun, 
 and the elements, to take away in the. morning sins com- 
 mitted in the night ; but it is my practice to call daily 
 upon Him, who made the waters, the sun, and the ele- 
 ments, to confess before Him, morning and evening, both 
 what I have done and what I have left undone, and to 
 ask His pardon for sins, of thought, word, and deed, 
 whether committed at night or in the day. 
 
 " You have also charged me with abandonment of my 
 Swadharma. Now do not consider it a mere cavil, if I 
 ask you, what do you mean by Swadharma ?" 
 
 "Why, your own religion," said Tarkakama, rather 
 impatiently. 
 
 "Pardon me," said Satyakama, "if I repeat the ques- 
 tion — What is my own religion f' 
 
 irf^ ^I'^^f ^^T^T in^^^^* ^^fWT ^Tm "f^^iT^t TtTjT^TH^iir 
 
 T^^J ^^^^^^XT^ II Sandhyd. 
 
26 DIALOGUE I. 
 
 " The Hindu religion to which you were born — the re- 
 ligion of the people of India. That is plain enough as a 
 definition." 
 
 '' The Hindu religion ! does such a term or idea occur 
 in any S'astra. "Will you cite a passage of S'ruti or 
 Smriti, giving such a definition of Swadharma ?" 
 
 Tarkakama paused for a moment — when j^gamika 
 remarked, ^^Yes ! it is singular the term Hindu is not 
 found in our sacred language, and yet we speak of the 
 Hindu religion. I wonder how we got such a term. I 
 fancy we got it from the Mohammedans." 
 
 SatyaMma. — ^'The oldest writing in which the word, 
 or something very like it, occurs, is a portion of the 
 Hebrew scriptures®. The Greeks appear to have got it 
 from some eastern country, and rendered it ^ India/ and the 
 Arabians and Persians 'Hind' We received it no doubt 
 from the Mohammedans." 
 
 '^ Whatever the origin of the word may be," said Tarka- 
 kama, '^ here we have it — and by the Hindu religion we 
 mean the religion of the inhabitants of this country. I 
 mean the rightful inhabitants of our Punyabhumi, except- 
 ing of course such men as the Mohammedans, Parsees, and 
 other foreigners who have recently settled here." 
 
 Satyakdma. — '' But where do you find the religion of 
 the rightful inhabitants of the country ?" 
 
 Tarkalcdma. — ^'You are putting questions after the 
 manner of Vakeels in the courts ; — of course, in the Veda 
 and other Sastras." 
 
 "Pardon me again," said Satyakama, "I mean no 
 offence ; but I am not aware of any system inculcated 
 in the S'ruti and the Smriti which may be called the re- 
 ligion of the rightful inhabitants of this country. Nor is 
 
 ® nh, Esther. 
 
WHAT IS S WAD HARM A ? 27 
 
 it easy to determine who are the rightful inhabitants 
 of our Punyabhumi. The Vedas speak of the Aryas, 
 and it is supposed by many learned persons that the 
 Aryas were emigrants from the other side of the Indus. 
 But whether they were emigrants or aborigines, they 
 certainly did not form one community with the Dasyus, 
 spoken of also as inhabitants of the country — and there 
 could be no system which might be called their common 
 religion. And there were Rakshases, also inhabiting 
 the country, whose Sivadharma, or religion, as you have 
 expounded the term, consisted in acts which it would 
 not be safe in us to encourage, though Eama Chandra 
 himself did not deny it was their Dharma^." 
 
 '' But the Kakshases never pretended to be any other 
 than enemies of Brahmins." 
 
 a Very true — but they were nevertheless rightful inha- 
 bitants of the country. All I contend for, is that there 
 is no system in the Sastras, which may be called the 
 common religion of all Hindus." 
 
 " But the Rakshases were not Hindus." 
 
 " 1 do not know that you can deny them the right of 
 occupation in the country. But I will not dispute that 
 point with you. You acknowledge the S'lidras as Hindus 
 — do you not ?" 
 
 " Certainly. It we were to discard the S'lidras, tivelve 
 annas or more of our community would be lopped off — 
 The Bajah, our own Zemindar, would himself be excluded. 
 And we should lose almost all patrons of our religion." 
 
 ^T'^^^ffT 4clsf\T^^'^*' II Bhatti. 
 
2S DIALOGUE 1. 
 
 " Well: — do the S'astras inculcate any common Dliarmd 
 for Brahmins and S'lidras ? I suppose you cannot answer 
 the question in the affirmative. The Brahmins have to 
 study and meditate on the Vedas — S'udras only to do 
 service to the twice-born ^Only one duty/ says Menu, 
 *has the Creator ordained to the S'lidra — to serve the 
 three superior orders.' And this is his sivadharma* 
 
 '' Granted— what then ?" 
 
 ^^ Swadharma, then, means the duties proper for one's 
 class. I only wish to understand the precise nature of the 
 charge against me. I suppose I may expect that you 
 will not encourage the vulgar clamour in this respect. 
 People ignorant of the Sastra think that all Hindus have 
 a community of Dharma — a word by which they under- 
 stand religion, when, as we have just seen, it more pro- 
 perly means class-duty. The word Hindu is unknown in 
 the Sruti and Smriti, and there is no other term by which 
 the whole body of rightful occupiers of our punyahhumi 
 may be designated. If there were a community of religion, 
 there would surely be a name whereby to designate it." 
 
 TarkaJcdma. — '^Aryavarta is synonymous with Pun- 
 yahhumi. I should say the word Arya would be a com- 
 mon designation." 
 
 '^ But," said Satyakama, " Arya cannot possibly include 
 Dasyu, with which it is plainly contrasted in the Vedas, 
 and I believe it excludes S'lidra. ' The Brahmin is a caste 
 divine ; the S'lidra from Asuras or demons ^^' You 
 would hardly be disposed to call the S'lidra an A'rya." 
 
 " But why all this discussion ? Granted, Swadharma 
 means the peculiar duties of one's own class. Can its 
 observance be the less binding for that ?" 
 
 %Wt "^ ^^ ^r^^r: ^^Sr*. ^^M Taittiriyji Brahmana. 
 
DUTIES OF BRAHMtNS. 29 
 
 '' Let it be understood then, that I am to be put on my 
 trial on a charge of deviating from the duties of my class. 
 Will you tell me what those duties are ?" 
 
 '* Manu's summary/' said Tarkakama, '' is no doubt the 
 best. 'To Brahmins he assigned the duties of reading 
 ' the Veda, teaching it, of sacrificing, of alluring others 
 ' to sacrifice, of giving alms (if they be rich), and, if indi- 
 ' gent, of receiving gifts ^ .' " 
 
 *' You cannot easily convict me," said Satyakama, '^ of 
 habitual neglect of all these duties, unless I voluntarily 
 plead guilty of doubting the inspiration of the Veda." 
 
 " Well," said Tarkakama, '^ there can be no difficulty in 
 showing that you have not been particularly careful in 
 abstaining from acts forbidden in numerous texts of the 
 Sastras, such as the following : ' The Brahmin is not to 
 dinewiththeS'ildra^/" 
 
 '' You have not given the full meaning of that text, 
 as expounded by Bishis. The Brahmin is not to take any 
 food supplied by a S'lidra. Even raw materials ^ such as 
 ghee, and unprepared rice, given personally by a S'lidra, 
 are forbidden to him. Is that not the teaching of the 
 Sastras ? 
 
 ''It is," said Agamika. "There can be no doubt about 
 it." 
 
 " Well then," said Satyakama, " although on my trial, 
 allow me to suggest another rule, which may further 
 strengthen the cause of the prosecution, whenever a Brah- 
 min is arraigned before you for breach of duty. The 
 
 ^ ^T^TcT 3^;^^ 1%m^* I 
 
30 DIALOGUE I. 
 
 Brahmin is prohibited to coohfor the Sudra, — to perform 
 religious offices for him — to follow the profession of arms — 
 or to live by his pen or by selling his learning. Is that 
 not the dictum of the S'astras* ?" 
 
 ^' There can be no doubt about it/' said ^^gamika. 
 
 " Hear now my defence" — said Satyakama. '' You 
 have lamented over me as an apostate from my Swadharma. 
 We have seen that the observance of our Swadharma 
 means the observance of all the rules we have just cited, 
 and many others wliich we have not cited. Do you not 
 see that if I am to be lamented over as an apostate, there 
 are myriads of others who are as fitting objects of your 
 compassion. If my friend Tarkakama condemns me, I 
 find myself condemned in very good company. Whoso- 
 ever, being a Brahmin, follows the occupation of a paid 
 professor of our sacred language, in a College or School, 
 whosoever officiates as a village priest, or at poojahs in 
 the houses of Siidras, whosoever accepts from S'lidras 
 offerings of any thing eatable, whosoever enlists in an 
 army, or works for his livelihood as secretary or clerk, is 
 as much an'object of your compassion, as one that may have 
 given up the Sandhya, or renounced his Dharma, as the 
 vulgar would say. How many Brahmins do you think 
 there are who can stand a searching investigation on these 
 points ? You have no doubt heard of a society called 
 the Dharma Sabha ; you will recollect who its president 
 was — a Raja of the S'lidra caste, while the Secretary was 
 a Brahmin." 
 
 ''What could we do under the circumstances ? " said 
 Tarkakama. ''No Brahmin could be found possessing 
 sufficient influence to be fit for the President's office. 
 
 
SWADIIARMA AN IMPOSSIBILITY. 31 
 
 We were glad to accept the assistance which the Kajah 
 rendered, though a S'udra. We have no longer Kshetriya 
 princes. There would be none to defend our Dharma, if 
 we did not allow S'lidra zemindars to support it." 
 
 " They support your Dharma by really destroying it. 
 It is like the visit of congratulation which S'ani paid on 
 the birth of Ganes'a — the infant's head di^opping off from 
 his neck, the moment the visitor's eyes feU on it^ . The 
 S'lidra that puts himself at the head of a society, 
 having Brahmins for its members, breaks through his 
 Sivadharma, by placing himself in such a position — and 
 the Brahmins, who are members, break through theirs, 
 by humbling themselves before those who ought to be 
 their servants. What they then defend is neither the 
 spirit nor the letter — but the carcase of their Dharma, 
 strangled to death by the Sabha itself." 
 
 TarJcaJcdma. — '^ It would be impossible to maintain our 
 real position over the Siidras at a time when we have 
 no Kshetriyas to defend our Dharma, or to make public 
 provision for our maintenance, and the S'lldras have risen 
 to such power as Rajahs and landholders." 
 
 SatyaMma. — "I am rather surprized Tarkakama at 
 your defending deviations from Swadharma on the part of 
 men, like the domestic priest of our S'udra zemindar, while 
 you are still eagerly condemning me for my departures. 
 You say, there are no Kshetriya patrons of Brahmins — no 
 provisions for them from the public revenue — how are 
 they to maintain themselves ? They are compelled to 
 accept service from S'lidra patrons. I do not wish to 
 contradict your position. Let me however remind you 
 of what the Sri Bh%avat says : ' While there is the 
 
 "iR^^ fln II Brahma Vaivarta. 
 
32 DIALOGUE I. 
 
 'bare ground, why labour for beds ? While there is your 
 ' own arm, why labour for a pillow ? While the palms 
 ' of your hands may be joined, wh}'- trouble yourself 
 'for dishes and platters? While there are barks on 
 ' trees, why labour for raiment ? And — are rags never 
 ' found on the high way ? Do not hospitable trees give 
 ' alms ? Are rivers dried up ? Are caves closed up ? 
 'Besides — does not the Lord support all who seek his 
 ' protection ? Why then do the wise serve those who are 
 'blinded by the pride of wealth^ ?" You may admit this 
 reasoning if it please you. But if you persist in saying 
 that hard necessity has driven the stipendiary professors of 
 our Colleges, the domestic priests of our S'udra nobility, 
 the Brahmin clerks of our public offices, to a deviation 
 from the rules of Swadharma, then it is a confession, that 
 the observance of our own religion is impossible in these 
 days. Do not then insist on its observance, since it is 
 impossible to maintain it in its integrity. Scarcely a 
 single Brahmin keeps to the prescribed rules of his class. 
 You confess it would be impossible to observe them all 
 in these days. But Kapila says rightly, what is impossi- 
 ble is no rule — though enjoined, it is no injunction'^ J' 
 
 Agamika here heaved a deep sigh, and said, "Alas 
 for the humiliation of our Sanatana (eternal) Dharma in 
 this Kali Yuga !'' 
 
 l^TfSU^^ I II, 2. 
 
NO SANA'tANA DIIARMA in HINDUISM. 33 
 
 "You need not grieve, friend Agamika/' said Satya- 
 kama, "for there is no such thing as an eternal Dharma 
 to be deduced from the S'listras. Class rules, now called 
 swadharma, do not seem to have existed from the com- 
 mencement of Indian society. There are no traces of 
 them in the oldest Mantras of the Vedas. And it is said 
 in tlie Maliabharata itself^ that there tvas at first no dis- 
 tinction — the whole universe tvas of Brahma^, the distinc- 
 tion arose subsequently from different occupations. The 
 caste rules, then, could not have existed at that time. 
 They were formed long after in the age of the Puranas — 
 and if they are not strictly observed in the present day, 
 it is because the castes have been much modified under 
 new influences. Surely there is no sandtana, or eternal, 
 Dharma in all this. Our swadhai^ma, as we have been 
 speaking of it, may have existed in ,the mediseval period 
 of Hinduism — but certainly it had no existence in the 
 Mantra period, and, as you see, it has very much changed 
 in the present era of foreign domination." 
 
 TarhaMma. — ^^ But I cannot allow that one becomes an 
 apostate by officiating for S'udras, or accepting gifts of 
 eatables from them. A Brahmin's dignity may be some- 
 what compromised thereby, but he does not cease to be a 
 Brahmin." 
 
 Saiijakdma. — ^^Many texts inveigh as strongly against 
 such degrading acts, as they do against any other delin- 
 ({uency which you may call more heinous. While other 
 texts again speak of the indelible character of the 
 Brahmin's sanctity, so that he can never forfeit his 
 superior station, how gross soever his delinquency may 
 
 
34 DIALOGUE I. 
 
 be. But you will not deny, Tarkakama, that some of 
 the Sastras, at least, not only tolerate, but highly applaud 
 a total renunciation of caste, or, in other words, our oivn 
 Dharma.'' 
 
 Tarkakdma. — *^ What do you mean ? 
 
 Satyakdma. — " I mean when a person joins any of the 
 sects^, and devotes himself to some peculiar islita devatd, 
 Avhether it be a form of Vishnu or of Siva." 
 
 Tarkakdma. — ^^Ah, but then, he renounces the world 
 for his ishta devatd, and, with the world, all its occupa- 
 tions and pleasures — every thing appertaining to it — and, 
 consequently, its duties also." 
 
 Satyakdma. — '^ So may one, for aught you know to the 
 contrary, that gives up his swadharma for the sake of 
 some other ishta devatd. At any rate the renunciation 
 of the world by a sectar}^ does not mean that he may 
 not marry and keep house. For such persons are not 
 unfrequently exhorted^'^ to lead ^household' lives, and yet 
 they are absolved from the bondage of swadharma. Nor 
 are shortcomings in point of personal character considered 
 a disqualification for such liberty, for, it is added, that 
 if a person, giving up caste from religious motives, fails 
 in attaining his end, he suffers no harm thereby." 
 
 Agamika — "That is only when one gives up caste for 
 Hari, i. e. Vishnu." 
 
 Satyakdma, — '^Very true, but the principle of aban- 
 doning 07ie's own religion (as the vulgar understand 
 by Swadharma) for something more excellent — some 
 
 
SECTARIES. 35 
 
 ishta devatd to which the mind is devoted, is recognized, 
 nay applauded, in the SUstra. Whether 1 have found 
 a more excellent way to justify my act, is a point on 
 which I will not offer evidence now ; — and, indeed, ac- 
 cording to Indian custom, one ought not to 2^^'Z/ i^^^^ 
 another's ishta devatd, that being a pure question of con- 
 science with him. But if occasion should offer, and you 
 desire it, I, for my part, shall have no scruple in laying 
 before you the grounds on which I adhere to my Lord 
 and Master." 
 
 Tarhakdma. — '' But to what extent soever a person may 
 deviate from his Swadharma, we have never heard him 
 say he does not reverence the Vedas. All Hindus, in- 
 cluding S'udras and Sectaries, bow to the authority of those 
 oracles of inspiration." 
 
 Satyahdma. — ''The S'udras cannot know any thing of 
 the Vedas, because they are not allowed even to hear 
 them read — and there can be no real reverence for a Scrip- 
 ture without knowing something about it. As to the 
 sectaries, they are glad enough to seize on any passage 
 that may be tortured into an approval of their opi- 
 nions, but it is evident they care little for texts of 
 the Vedas when opposed to their sentiments. And it is 
 notorious they have fabricated many Upanishads in order 
 to beguile the unwary. Such a vague and questionable 
 reverence, producing the most opposite doctrines and 
 practices, cannot be recognized as a bond of union in 
 Hinduism, for even the Jesuits of Madura exhibited some 
 such reverence. You may have heard of their forgeries." 
 
 Tarkakdma. — ''The sectaries are a set of ignorant 
 fanatics — dupes of cunning and ambitious leaders. If 
 their minds had been enlightened by the teaching of 
 Gotama, Kapila, and others, they would not have been 
 so unsteady." 
 
36 DIALOGUE I. 
 
 Satyakdma. — ^^Some of the sectaries have ideas of 
 Divine love, and are animated by sentiments of devotion 
 to the Supreme Being, which they would fast unlearn, un- 
 der the teaching of Gotama and Kanada. And as to 
 Swadharma, those doctors would make quick work of it." 
 
 Tai^hahdma. — '^ You must be greatly mistaken. I won- 
 der the more at your mistake, because even foreign 
 scholars profess the greatest respect for the schools of 
 philosophy, though they despise our rites and ceremonies. 
 I should like to disabuse your mind by pointing out in 
 detail the excellencies of those systems, and refuting 
 your objections." 
 
 Satyakdma. — ^^ I shall be very happy to listen to your 
 explanations." 
 
 Tarkakama was going to commence his explanations, 
 when Agamika, having no great relish for them, and per- 
 ceiving that the son of Kasyapa had already driven the 
 solar car nearly over our heads, proposed that we should 
 stop this intellectual repast, however pleasant, and look 
 for something more material, which, whatever his philo- 
 sophical friends might say to the contrary, he, for his part, 
 particularly felt the need of at that moment ; promising, 
 if it pleased the company, to come some other morning to 
 listen to Tarkakama's explanations. All assenting to the 
 proposal, the meeting was adjourned to Monday week. 
 
 Such, my learned friend, was the conversation I wit- 
 nessed between the parties I have already named. The 
 whole occurrence was so novel — almost startling — that 
 I could not forbear sending you this full account. If 
 any thoughts strike you after reading it, pray let me have 
 the benefit of them. 
 
DIALOGUE II 
 
 F-ROM THE SAME TO THE SAME. 
 
 Pursuant to the arrangement of the previous week, I 
 went to Satyakama's as early as I could on Monday, hop- 
 ing, though not sanguinely expecting, to witness the 
 conference proposed by Tarkakania. We had all made a 
 grand mistake in appointing that morning for the dis- 
 cussion. On the day of the first conference, we did not 
 remember that our almanacs held out the threat of an 
 eclipse to the beautiful moon, which had been waxing for 
 several nights past. The giant was right earnest in veri- 
 fying the threat. Nearly a third of the splendid orb 
 which rose in the eveninof, sheddinof its nectareous beams 
 on a delighted world, was in the ruthless demon's grasp 
 for more than two hours after midnis^ht. The excitement 
 produced by the event turned night into day. Every 
 lane and alley was crowded by men, women, and cliildren, 
 some begging, others giving alms, and all in breathless 
 haste moving towards the river. For A^'gamika to think of 
 rest in such a night was impossible. The ceremonies, 
 usual on such occasions, occupied him nearly till the close 
 of the third watch. He could hardly have any sleep 
 after that. It was not to be expected that he could take 
 part in a conference on speculative subjects after the 
 
38 DIALOGUE II. 
 
 fatigue and excitement of a sleepless night. He did not 
 make his appearance at all. 
 
 Nor was Tarkakama punctual in coming. It is not 
 probable that a mere lunar eclipse could have disturbed 
 the repose of an admirer of Bhashkaracharya^ but he did 
 not wish to appear singular in his practice, and was 
 resolved not to show any disrespect to the institutions 
 which governed the conduct of his countrymen. 
 
 ^' Our friends are not yet arrived," said Satyakama, 
 *' perhaps they find it inconvenient to come this morning, 
 because of last night's eclipse." 
 
 " I have no doubt," said I, ^' that is the cause of their ab- 
 sence. But I am not sorry your conference is postponed. 
 As I never paid much attention to the dogmas of the schools, 
 the discussion will not be the less interesting to me, if mean- 
 while I can revive my knowledge of the Siltras. The 
 fact is we generally receive our ideas of the Nyaya and 
 other systems at second or third hand. Few of us ever 
 read the Sutras themselves. The Bhashaparichchheda and 
 the Vedanta Sara are text books with most of us. The 
 Sutras of Gotama are indeed studied to some extent. 
 But how few have read even the Vedanta Sutras. How 
 still fewer are those who have seen, (to say nothing of 
 reading) the Sutras of Kanada, Kapila, Patanjala and 
 Jaimini. And yet we all talk of the Vaiseshika, Mimansa, 
 and Sankhya, as if we were quite familiar with them. I 
 should be glad to know something definitely of tJiem. But 
 what puzzles me most is that the different schools are 
 supposed to discuss one another's views. We hear of 
 Gotama replying to Kapila, and Kapila to Gotama ; of 
 Vyasa assailing Kanada, and Kaiuida Vyasa. How could 
 the earlier philosopher reply to the later ? or are we to 
 suppose that they knew one another's opinions by super- 
 natural vision, and that the earlier sage replied to the later 
 
IGNORANCE OF SUTRAS. 39 
 
 by anticipation ? A mystery seems to hang over the whole 
 question. Is it quite impossible to trace the gradual 
 formation of the various schools ?" 
 
 Satyahdma. — '' It is perfectly true, as you have said, that 
 Brahmins often talk of the opinions of Gotama and Ka- 
 luida without caring to read their Sutras for themselves. 
 They thereby give circulation to erroneous opinions on the 
 subject. It is commonly believed, is it not ? that while Ka- 
 pila discarded the idea of a Supreme Intelligence creating 
 the universe, Gotama and Kanada repudiated such atheis- 
 tical views, and laboured hard to prove the existence of an 
 Almighty and Intelligent efficient cause who arranged 
 the universe." 
 
 '' Of course" said I, " that is the traditional account we 
 have of those eminent Rishis' doctrines." 
 
 " The Sutras do not bear out the tradition," said Satya- 
 kama. "I will show you the Sutras on some future occasion. 
 With reference to the order in which the various schools 
 were formed, — that is a question which has often exercised 
 my thoughts. Last night I put some ideas on paper on the 
 subject, which I would have read to you, but that I fear 
 they are very crude and undigested." 
 
 ^' You have no doubt studied the subject," said I, 
 " though it seems you have not drawn the right conclu- 
 sions. Such, however, is my desire to enlarge my general 
 knowledge of the question, that I shall gladly hear what 
 you have written. Do therefore read your paper." 
 
 Satyakama accordingly read as follows : — 
 
 " It is very difficult to trace the origin of Hindu philo- 
 sophy. Our ancient writers have left no records which 
 can be properly called historical. The charms of poetry, 
 by which their minds were captivated at an early period, 
 maintained their power to the lasfc. Not only in the de- 
 partment of subjective. theology (where the facilities which 
 
40 DIALOGUE n. 
 
 poetry lends to devotion cannot be denied), but in historical 
 narratives, in science and philosophy also, the genius of 
 poetry had absolute sway. The metaphysics of Is'wara 
 Krishna, and the astronomy of Bhaskaracharya are both 
 in verse. Pleasant reading it was, no doubt, to have the 
 fascinations of poetry along with the dry facts of history, 
 and the stern principles of science. But nothing can be 
 had in the world without a price. If history and science 
 were made to contribute pleasures and amusements 
 which they were not bound to supply, it has been at the ex- 
 pense of their proper tributes — truth and exactitude. 
 The exchange has been no benefit, but rather the reverse. 
 When the annals of kinofdoms, and the definitions of 
 science, are given in poetry, it is obvious that the labour 
 required for conducting critical and inductive investiga- 
 tions will be in constant danger of being supplanted by 
 the comparatively more agreeable exercise of the imagina- 
 tion and fancy. 
 
 ^^ And as to chronology nothing can be a more hetero- 
 geneous compound of possibilities and im^jossihilities. 
 You have the same Viswamitra, putting Haris'chandra 
 to the trial of his faith, and afterwards conducting Kama 
 Chandra to the palace of Janaka. You have tlie same 
 Vas'ishtha at the courts of Dilipa and Dasaratha. 
 
 '^ Accordingly we are left to grope our way in the dark 
 as we best may. All our writers were poets. Facts are 
 so blended in their compositions with fictions, that it is 
 impossible to disintegrate them." 
 
 ^' But," added he, folding his paper with some diflfidence, 
 '^I am afraid what I am reading. is irrelevant to your 
 question. You probably do not care about the early 
 history of the Brahminical intellect, nor the way in 
 which the various schools of philosophy arose." ^^ Pray 
 go on," said I — " Let me hear what you have written. 
 
REVERENCE FOR THE VEDA. 41 
 
 I feel much interested in the question how these several 
 systems originated ; — which was the earliest, and which 
 the most recent." 
 
 '^ I do not pretend to unravel that mystery, but perhaps 
 some light will be thrown by a consideration of the Sutras 
 themselves." Satyakama then continued to read : ^' In 
 the midst of the obscurities in which the want of histori- 
 cal records has left us, one thing we may assume as cer- 
 tain, that the Brahminical mind was formed in the mould 
 of the Vedas. Indian scholars were from the earliest times 
 possessed with the highest notions of reverence for those 
 writings. In all questions, whether political or religious, 
 dogmatic or philosophical, the authority of the Vedas was 
 conclusive. None dared to contradict what they incul- 
 cated. No appeal to reason or experience lay from their 
 verdict. 
 
 " But the Vedas are for the most part known to our 
 countrymen, now, by name only. Probably not one of 
 our contemporaries has read the whole of them — or even 
 seen them in their integrity. European enterprise has given 
 portions of them to the world, but few of us think it 
 worth our while to procure or peruse them. The small 
 tracts, distinguished by the name of Upanishads, are alone 
 familiarly known to any of us. Nay it appears that our 
 standard authors on theology and physics confined their 
 attention to those tracts, for it is but seldom we meet with 
 Vedic passages, quoted in their writings, which may not 
 be traced to some Upanishad or other. 
 
 ^' The division of our Vedas, it is well-known, is two- 
 fold, into Mantras and Brahmanas. The former may gene- 
 rally be considered devotional, the latter ceremonial and 
 dogmatic. As for the short treatises called Upanishads, 
 they are, with a few exceptions, appendices to the dogma- 
 tic parts, and, like codicils of wills, are held to be the most 
 
 G 
 
42 DIALOGUE 11. 
 
 recent, and therefore the most matured, expositions of the 
 authors' minds. They profess to be repositories of pard- 
 vidyd, or superior knowledge, and look down on the great 
 bulk of the Vedas, as apard, or inferior. They contain 
 some rude indicatii^ns of philosophic thought, and, like 
 the twinklings of stars in a dark night, may occasionally 
 serve as guides in a history of Hindu philosophy. They 
 do not however exhibit any great attempt at method, 
 arrangement, classification, or argument. Even there the 
 poetry predominates over the logic. Bold ideas abruptly 
 strike your fancy, but you find no clue to the associations 
 which called them forth in the author's mind, and search 
 in vain for the reasons on which they were based. Sub- 
 lime thoughts are not wanting, but they resemble sudden 
 flashes, at which you may gaze for a moment, but are, 
 immediately after, left in deeper darkness than ever. Nor 
 are they free from those irregular flights of the imagina- 
 tion in which poets, with vitiated tastes, delight to indulge, 
 setting at defiance all rules of decency and morality ^ 
 
 '^ The Upanishads appear from their language and style 
 to have been the latest, and the Mantras, the earliest of 
 Vedic compositions. It may be a delicate question, but it 
 is one which ought not to be unfairly suppressed, whether 
 the authors of the earliest compositions, the Mantras, 
 profess to have written them down as inspired records. 
 You are fond of saying that they were breathed out 
 by Brahma at the time of the creation, and yet you 
 speak of the Rishi of each Mantra. The Mantra itself 
 is such that its Rishi may well be supposed to have 
 
 ^ Thus : ^m ^x ^ftr jff c{»T cT^r ^XT^ ^^ ^fT^^Tf^ Wf 
 
 ^f^ ^f^^^'fr? ^sirrtfH ^^ifiT:! ^ftr^^^T f^^f%ifT ^%i- 
 
 Brihadiiranyaka. 
 
REVERENCE FOR THE VED^. 43 
 
 composed and chanted it, and there is nothing as to matter 
 and style which could possibly require divine illumination. 
 
 ''That our ancestors looked on the Vedas with such 
 reverence is no marvel. The Vedas were the first national 
 efforts in the department of literature. In the infancy of 
 literature, the ignorant, who did not know how to read or 
 write, would naturally look upon those mysterious talents 
 as divine endowments, as especial instances of Saras- 
 wati's grace. They would accordingly feel a sort of reli- 
 gious veneration for such gifted and highly favoured 
 persons, and consider their writings as divine inspira- 
 tions. 
 
 " The Mantras again were hymns. Those who could not 
 read, would listen to their recital with the greater devo- 
 tion, and learn to rehearse them in moments of leisure. 
 And those, who could read, would go over them as 
 religious exercises. 
 
 "Rhythmical phraseology is always favourable to the 
 sentiment of devotion. The fine versification of the Man- 
 tras, their excellent adaptation for chanting and music, were 
 charms which could not fail to impress both readers and 
 hearers. They accordingly considered them as the voice 
 of God. No wonder that in the language of poets even 
 birds and beasts should be subject to the spell of Vedic 
 recitations. 
 
 "The reverence, first accorded to the Mantras, was 
 easily extended to the whole Vedas. Their interpretation 
 was held a secondary point. It was received as tradition 
 hand-ed it down. No one dared to expound the Veda in 
 a novel way. The faith and practice of one generation 
 were quietly followed by that which succeeded it. Indeed 
 the question with the generality of men in all countries 
 has been, not, What says the law? but, What says 
 practice ? 
 
44 DIALOGUE 11. 
 
 '^ The Vedas formed from the first the peculiar inheri- 
 tance of the learned, who were honoured undqr the title 
 of Brahmins. Originally all who could, were allowed 
 to read them. This appears to be the meaning of the 
 tradition in the Mah4bharata, that there was no distinction 
 of castes in the beginning, and that the distinction arose 
 subsequently from diversities of occupations — and, it 
 may be added, of talents. The learned were then class- 
 ed in a separate order — the Brahmins — who became the 
 priests of the whole nation, charged with the duty, and 
 endowed with the privilege of tapasyd^ or divine medi- 
 tation, for the benefit of themselves and of the whole 
 community. The fact is attested by the Ramayana, the 
 oldest of epic or Pouranic poems, which says that, in 
 the Satya-yuga, devotional exercises were not allowed 
 to any but Brahmins^. And indeed some such spiritual 
 privilege must have been the monopoly of the priestly 
 order, when Vis'wamitra and Janaka, excluded therefrom 
 by their birth, made such strenuous efforts to partake of it. 
 
 ''That the right of engaging personally in hard religi- 
 ous exercises was not considered an empty privilege, 
 will appear from a story, related in the oldest epic poem, 
 just named^. After Kama had returned home from 
 
 "5T cfXI^ ^^^^ II Uttara. 
 
 ^ cT%T ^Tftr c{qj^ mtr^ ^h^tixi; j ^^^ tx^^- ^^\\ 
 
 sj 
 
 # # # 3^^^7?it ^^Tr(% •^^ ^li ^mf^rcTJ ii ^ f^^\^ ^^ 
 
EXCLUSIVE TRIVILEGE OF BRAHMINS. 45 
 
 his expedition to Lanka, and commenced a happy and 
 prosperous reign in Oudh, a Brahmin came to his door, 
 bitterly complaining of the untimely death of a child, 
 only five years old, and attributing the tragical event 
 to some curse under which the kingdom lay, owing to the 
 kinor's want of watchfulness. Rama, listened to the Brah- 
 min's invectives with self reproach, and could not, with 
 such a humiliating fact before him, gainsay the Brahmin's 
 conclusion. Advised by ministers and Rishis, he proceed- 
 ed, sword in hand, to search out the unknown cause of the 
 national sin. By the side of a tank he discovered a man 
 absorbed in deep and austere devotion. Challenged by 
 the king, the devotee gave his name (Sambuca), and 
 confessed his race (S'lldra). For a servile man to seek 
 admission to the society of gods by such religious exer- 
 cises, was an iniquity, which sufficiently accounted for 
 the national calamity. With one stroke of his sword, 
 the king severed the S'udra's head from his body. Indra 
 and the other gods fell into ecstacies of delight at the 
 promptness with which the son of Dasaratha extermi- 
 nated such a crying evil, and immediately sent down a 
 perfumed shower of celestial flowers, acknowledging at the 
 same time that the stop, so eifectually put to the aspiring 
 Sudra's attempt to obtain a footing in heaven, was a service 
 done to themselves. And Bama was then assured that 
 the moment the wretched man's head dropped from his 
 neck, life was restored to the Brahmin's son. 
 
 ^?:T^ u ^^i^mf^^ ^^ ^nici ^ w^v;^ \ ^^vrr^ ^ ff 
 
 cT%'3?^^ ^T^^ ^^^ ^?T^5q<T II Uttara. 75. 
 
46 DIALOGUE II. 
 
 " Although the Kshetriyas were afterwards (in Treta- 
 yuga, says the Eamayana^) admitted to the privilege of 
 devotional exercises, they were only allowed to read the 
 Vedas for themselves. They were forbidden to teach or 
 expound them. That still remained the exclusive privilege 
 of Brahminical scholars, to whom implicit obedience was 
 paid when they laid down any doctrine. 
 
 '^This implicit obedience appears to have been cheer- 
 fully accorded to them in the Vedic period. The whole 
 community entertained such high notions of their learn- 
 ing and sanctity, that none dared to dispute their authority. 
 Between that period and the age of the Dars'anas, how- 
 ever, a tremendous revolution had taken place in the 
 opinions of men. 
 
 ''From extreme credulity to extreme infidelity the 
 transition is easy. Those who were called upon to render 
 implicit obedience to the Brahminical college, began to 
 question the very foundations of sacerdotal authority. 
 The Brahminical hierarchy had become so powerful, as to 
 set the sovereignty of kings and princes at defiance. The 
 fear of incurring their malediction — an anathema, the 
 effects of which would be felt for countless generations, — 
 would haunt the priest-ridden minds of Kshetriyas by day 
 and by night, if ever they set themselves in opposition to 
 Brahmins. The legend of Haris'chandra, who consented 
 to sell his queen and his only son, and submitted to 
 the vilest of servitudes, rather than incur the conse- 
 quences of a Brahmin's resentment, bears conclusive evi- 
 dence of the fact. At length, however, a prince arose in 
 the royal line of Ikshwaku, (to which Haris'chandra him- 
 self belonged,) determined to dissolve the charm by which 
 
BUDDHISM. 47 
 
 the minds of men were held in servitude to the Brahmins. 
 Sdkya Muni imposed on himself the task of reforming 
 the religion of his country. He cared not, like Vis'vva- 
 mitra, for promotion to the Brahminical College — nor, like 
 Janaka, for occasional participation in their exclusive pri- 
 vileges — nor yet for inflicting such temporary humiliation 
 on the priestly order, as was implied in Ramachandra's 
 triumph over Parus'arama. Disgusted, when young, with 
 the evils of disease and death, he renounced the pleasures 
 of dignity and royalty, and went about preaching every 
 where on the necessity of seeking for Nirvana, or release 
 from transmigrations, as the only remedy for the evils of 
 life. He pronounced the rites and ceremonies of the 
 Veda to be idle sports, and the exclusive privileges arro- 
 gated by the Brahmins, to be empty pretensions. He 
 assailed the authority of the very books on which those 
 pretensions were founded. He declared that the division 
 of castes was a mere human invention, and invited all ranks 
 to assemble under his banners on a footing of equality. 
 The Brahmins add that he also denied the immortality 
 of the soul, and pronounced the expectation of a future 
 world to be a vain reverie.^ Whether Buddhism was 
 really liable to the charge of materialism preferred against 
 it by the Brahmins, or not, it certainly had no divine 
 revelation to plead for its support, nor could it appeal to 
 any tradition in its favor. It could only stand on its 
 rational pretensions. The study of philosophy and meta- 
 physics was therefore absolutely needed for its very exist- 
 ence. So long as men believed in the infallibility of the 
 Veda, they could appeal to its texts for the decision of 
 
 Sarvadars'ana Sangraha. 
 
48 DIALOGUE II. 
 
 controversies and the solution of doubts. But when 
 revelation was ignored, disputes could only be settled by 
 the verdict of reason. The necessities of Buddhism 
 rendered the cultivation of logic and metaphysics abso- 
 lutely indispensable, and thus were the first attempts 
 at philosophy called forth in India. Hence it was that 
 the terms Haituka and Hetu-SUstra were applied to the 
 heretical systems. 
 
 '^ Buddhism however failed to maintain its ground 
 against the Brahmins. It was driven to seek refuge in 
 regions whither the Brahmins did not care to pursue it, 
 and where it found as firm a footinof as Brahminism itself 
 had on the plains of Hindustan. 
 
 '^But though expelled from India, Buddhism left 
 strong traces of its anti- Vedic rationalism on the field it 
 abandoned. It had infected the Brahminical mind itself. 
 It had sown the seeds of heresy in the very camp of 
 orthodoxy, and fostered among the champions of the 
 S'astra themselves, a spirit of discontent with its ritual. 
 Hence it is that so little of reverence for the Veda is 
 found in the systems of philosophers. All the Dars'anas 
 are branded in the Padma Purana as equally pernicious 
 with Buddhism, and equally destructive of the rites and 
 ceremonies of the Veda. S'iva openly confesses to his 
 wife Parvati that he had himself taught those doctrines of 
 darhnesSy in the forms of Kandda and others, with a view 
 to bring about the destruction of the world^. 
 
 ^ w^ ^f^ tr^'^ift? cTT^^rf^ ^T^T^iTH I ^m "^msmi^m 
 
NYAYA AND Sa'nKIIYA SOMEWHAT BUDDHISTIC. 49 
 
 " Of our six Dars'anas, or schools of philosophy, two, 
 however, those of Jaimiiii and Vyasa, are generally con- 
 sidered orthodox — while the other four are looked upon 
 with great suspicion by the Brahmins themselves^. I 
 think that the Dars'anas of Jaimini and Vyasa, (called 
 the Former and Latter Mimansas, or deciders,) were 
 written with a view to correct the errors of their prede- 
 cessors, and were of more recent dates than the rest. 
 
 "The Nyaya and the Sankhya are in fact a sort of 
 compromise between Brahminism and Buddhism. They 
 contain as much of the Buddhist element, as could be 
 held without danger to Brahminical supremacy. The 
 authors profess to uphold the Veda, because experience 
 had taught them that the dignity of their order could 
 not be maintained without the Veda — and they inculcate 
 the reality of future states of life against the Buddhists. 
 But the spirit of their teaching is quite as hostile to the 
 ritual of the Veda as that of Buddhism. 
 
 " I believe therefore that the Nyaya and Sankhya were 
 among the first fruits of the Brahminical intellect, when 
 
 •TT^^RTTI^Tcf i Cited by Vijiisina BliikHhu. 
 
 ^> <^ 
 
 i^x^f^^T^ ^fcim"c JT^ ff ^ II ii'iJ- 
 
 H 
 
50 DIALOGUE II. 
 
 it sought to enlist the aid of rationalism in the service of 
 the Brahminical order. As to the question of priority 
 between the two systems themselves, the fact of one of 
 the Sdnkliya Sutras making plain reference to the Nyaya, 
 and speaking of its sixteen topics, may be considered as 
 decisive proof in favor of the Nyaya. Such evidence, it 
 is true, is far from being conclusive, because there have 
 been many interpolations ; — but the Nyaya is the least 
 controversial among the systems, and there is no reason 
 of any cogency for rejecting the authenticity of the 
 Sankhya Siitra in question. The Nyaya may therefore 
 be considered the first production of Brahminical philo- 
 sophy after the overthrow of Buddliism in India. 
 
 " The prevalence of Buddhism had convinced the Brah- 
 mins of the use of metaphysics in conducting controver- 
 sies, and especially in refuting objections — and of the 
 risks, they ran, of incurring the contempt of the com- 
 munity by confining their attention to the simple ritual of 
 the Vedas. The Nyaya with its orderly array of scientific 
 terms, its physics, logic, and metaphysics, luas manifestly 
 fitted to train and quicJcen the intellectual powers. 
 
 ^^ While heresy had been rampant, the vast majority of 
 the Brahminical order were unable to think for them- 
 selves, or unlearn prejudices already instilled into their 
 minds. The reasons for which S'udras were relieved 
 from the task of intellectual exercises, were becoming 
 more and more applicable to the twice-born classes. 
 Traditional teaching, and the prescribed ritual, received 
 with implicit submission, were fast incapacitating them 
 for vigorous mental labour. If the servile tribes had a 
 routine of duties made ready for them, the higher grades 
 had also their routine, not indeed of servile attendance 
 on human superiors, but of endless rites and ceremonies, 
 no less enslavino- to the mind. As far as intellectual 
 
BRAHMINICAL INTELLECTUALISM. 51 ' 
 
 activity was concerned, the distinctioil between Brahmins 
 and S'lidras had become ahuost nominal. 
 
 '^The author of the Nyaya Avould no doubt have the 
 satisfaction of believing that his new system would arrest 
 the progress of heresy, and prevent the gradual decline of 
 the orthodox intellect. If the Brahmin's mind continued 
 to be stinted by the discipline of the Vedas, in the same 
 manner as the S'udra's was by the authority of the twice- 
 born, what real difference would there remain in point of 
 mental freedom between the highest and the lowest tribes ? 
 Implicit submission of intellect w^as exacted from both. 
 Was it at all wonderful then that heresy stalked abroad, 
 and that many Brahmins had themselves fallen into the 
 snare ? Could minds of any activity acquiesce in the above 
 restrictions ? Must they not meditate on the wonders of 
 the creation, except as the antiquated Vedas directed 
 them ? And must they always interpret the Vedas in the 
 monotonous way taught by the old Risliis ? 
 
 '^ Orthodox philosophers accordingly came forward to 
 supply the craving of the Brahminical mind, without en- 
 dangering the stability of the Brahminical order. They 
 did not seem to think very highly of the Vedas, but were 
 unwilling to renounce those time-honoured compositions. 
 The Vedas had indeed charms to which Gotama and 
 Kapila themselves, however sceptically inclined, could 
 not be insensible. And besides the real interest they might 
 take in the fine hymns of the Saman, and in the theo- 
 logical enigmas of the Upanisliads, there was another 
 point to be considered. A slur cast on the Vedas might 
 prove dangerous to the Brahminical order, and would 
 be enjoyed as a triumph by the vanquished Buddhists. 
 It might also lead to radical changes in the constitution of 
 society. The improvement of the Brahminical intellect 
 could not indeed be safely attempted, unless revolutionary 
 
52 DIALOGUE ir. 
 
 agitations among the Siidras were at the same time 
 jealously guarded against, and unless the twice-born them- 
 selves maintained inviolate their respect for authority. 
 
 *'To conservative considerations, such as the above, we 
 may fairly attribute the notable fact, that, in most of the 
 systems of Brahminical philosophy, we find the authors not 
 only addressing a select few, by means of enigmatical Sutras, 
 instead of the public at large, in language understood by 
 all, — but also maintaining the authority of the Veda, 
 without caring much for its doctrine and ritual, and, while 
 introducing mere physical and metaphysical subjects, pro- 
 mising to their pupils nothing less than the final emancipa- 
 tion of the soul as the reward of their intellectual labour. 
 
 ^^That the Brahminical philosophers taught initiated 
 scholars only, and that their systems were thoroughly 
 esoteric, is evident, not only from the jealousy with which 
 they excluded the inferior castes, but also from tlie mode 
 in which they committed their lectures to writing. It is 
 related of the great Alexander, who invaded our country 
 more than two thousand years ago, that when his tutor 
 Aristotle published bis physical lectures, the monarch 
 wrote him to the following effect : " You have not done 
 " well in publishing these lectures ; for how shall we, 
 " your pupils, excel other men, if you make that j)ublic to 
 '^ all which we learnt from you." To this Aristotle is said 
 to have replied, '^ My lectures are published and not pub- 
 ' Wished; they will be intelligible to those who heard them 
 " and to none beside®." The authenticity of this anecdote 
 may be reasonably questioned, but the very fabrication 
 of it would show the difficulty which the world experi- 
 enced in comprehending the lectures of Aristotle. Now 
 if lectures which, however abstruse, had their sentences 
 complete, and their subjects and predicates expressed, 
 
 ^ Whewcll's History of the Inductive Sciences. 
 
SUTRA TEACHING ESOTERIC. 53 
 
 could still be so obscure that their publication was held to 
 be no publication, how little was the chance of an uninitiated 
 mind's understanding the Sutras of oi«r philosophers ! Tlieir 
 sense was couched in sentences often incomplete, with 
 subjects or predicates in the minds, not in the language, 
 of the authors, with arbitrary anuvrittis, or ellipses, — and 
 the reasoning but obscurely hinted at. Sutras, without 
 commentaries, are proverbially sealed books. 
 
 '^ The peculiar construction of these sentences could not 
 have been accidental. We cannot suppose that Gotama 
 and Kapila were not competent to write more intelligibly, 
 nor can we entertain the idea that they would, without a 
 motive, write what no one could read. The obvious in- 
 ference is, that they were unwilling to speak but to a se- 
 lect body of pupils, for the edification of whom, and of none 
 others, the Sutras were composed. They were not in- 
 tended for the public. The S'ddras certainly had no right 
 to them. 
 
 '^ Nor does it appear that our philosophers had a real 
 belief in the Vedas. A'gamika was not far in the wrong 
 the other day, in saying that Gotama and Kand,da could 
 not entertain much respect for the Yedas, when they set 
 forth categories and topics, wholly unknown to those 
 Sastras, as absolutely necessary for Emancipation. And 
 yet they never formally denied their authority. On 
 the contrary, they professed the highest reverence for 
 them as oracles of truth, as if they really constituted (to 
 use the homely illustration of Tarkakama), a Sudder 
 Court of Appeal. This appears still more clearly from 
 the way in which some have endeavoured to reconcile 
 these inconsistencies. They divide the Veda into the 
 Karma Kdncla, or the Chapter on Works, and the Jndii 
 Kdnda, or the Chapter on Knowledge. The former, 
 they say, were intended for the ignorant, the latter, for 
 
54 DIALOGUE II. 
 
 the enlightened. We might have known how to un- 
 derstand them, if they had maintained that the Chapter 
 on Worlcs was revealed in the infancy of human society, 
 when the minds of men were not prepared for a higher 
 knowledge of divine things, and that the Chapter on 
 Knowledge was communicated in a more enlightened 
 age. But their theory is, that the Vedas were, in their 
 entire form, produced before the origin of human society. 
 And the division into the chapters on works and know- 
 ledge is altogether arbitrary. For the Jndn Kdrida 
 itself contains directions for ritual observances ! 
 
 '^ The most striking instance of such spasmodic fits of 
 reverence for the Veda is found in Kapila. In the 82 nd 
 Siltra of the 1st Chapter, he maintains that the provisions 
 in the Sruti are insufficient for the final cure of the three- 
 fold evils of life, and in the 83rd Siitra, he appeals to the 
 Yeda itself for the truth of that assertion, thus citing it as 
 a witness against its own incompetency, and extorting a 
 confession of its own imbecility. The fact is that while 
 our philosophers were glad enough to make a convenience 
 of the Veda, they entertained little or no respect for it 
 absolutely. 
 
 " Probably they conceived that, as some external respect 
 for the Vedas was necessary to conciliate the feelings, 
 and command the attention of even their own pupils, 
 the division mentioned above, would be the most saga- 
 cious device for inculcating a more rational doctrine than 
 that of mere ritualism. The Brahmins were far too de- 
 voutly attached to those writings to listen to teachers who 
 openly attacked them. Of course this mode of teach- 
 ing involved a sort of chhala, or deceit, which did no 
 credit to the teachers ; but if Gotama and Kapila did 
 not act altogether innocently in adapting their doctrine 
 to the prejudices of their contemporaries, the spirit of 
 
PROMISE OF EMANCIPATION. 55 
 
 the age in wliicli they lived would be some palliation of 
 their conduct. 
 
 '^ The same desire of humouring the prejudices of the 
 times led them to promise supreme felicity as the reward 
 of philosophical speculation. Nothing short of the surn- 
 mum honmn was considered a sufficient recompense for 
 the trouble it imposed. That the sentiment of religion 
 predominated in the minds of our ancestors is evident 
 from the spirit of our ancient literature. It indicates a 
 feeling of dependance on supernatural powers, which 
 is equalled only by the contempt the authors expressed 
 for the perishable objects of the world. Philosophers 
 perhaps imagined that whether they treated on the 
 highest truths which could concern human nature, or 
 merely speculated on the qualities of earth and water, 
 they could never find an audience, unless they held out 
 hopes of everlasting welfare as the 'praijojana, or end, 
 of their investigations. In the estimation of their con- 
 temporaries, no inferior boon was worth the trouble. 
 
 ''The offer of such spiritual rewards on the part of 
 philosophers, for investigations chiefly physical, at best 
 metaphysical, though it must be accepted as a pleasing 
 testimony to the religious feelings of our predecessors, 
 Avas productive of consequences very much to be regretted. 
 Physics, metaphysics, and theology, were confounded in 
 one mass. While the most trifling points of inquiry 
 ( whether, for instance, iipamdna, or " comparison," was a 
 distinct class of proof, and, whether the body was a com- 
 pound of one, three, or five elements,) were prosecuted with 
 some feeling of religious awe, questions of really vital 
 importance, which regarded the existence and attributes 
 of God, and the permanent interests of the soul, were 
 necessarily robbed of their due solemnity. Theology and 
 physics being placed on the same level, the former 
 
56 DIALOGUE II. 
 
 could challenge no greater degree of attention than was 
 accorded to the latter. The degradation of the one, and 
 the undue exaltation of the other, were the natural conse- 
 quences" — 
 
 ^' I do not quite comprehend the drift of your obser- 
 vations — " said I, interrupting the essayist. 
 
 '^ I mean," said Satyakama, ''our philosophers considered 
 the investigation of the elements of which the body was 
 composed, and the inquiry into the source whence tlie 
 world was produced, and into duties on which our ever- 
 lasting welfare depends, as of equal importance, thus 
 unduly exalting the one, and virtually degrading the other 
 branch of human inquiry. If we did not know the precise 
 nature of our corporeal composition, we could not lose 
 much by our ignorance ; but we miglit be in eternal peril 
 by our ignorance of the duties we owe to our Maker. 
 Things of time were placed on the same level with things 
 of eternity. That which might be called the one needful 
 thing for all persons, and which might therefore justly 
 engross our chief attention, was set on a footing of 
 equality with other questions of far less importance." 
 
 Satyakama continued ; " Gotama appears to me to 
 have led the way in the career of Brahminical philosojDhy. 
 The name must be familiarly known to all students of 
 Vedas and Puranas. My namesake in the Chhandogya 
 Upanishad, the son of Jabalii, liad a Gotama for his 
 patron and preceptor. It was a Gotama too ( I cannot 
 determine whether he was identical with the son of Hari- 
 drumat of the Chhandogya,) whose domestic happiness 
 was marred by the lascivious prince of the gods, himself 
 punished with the natural consequences of the Brahmin's 
 indignation. Various other Gotamas are also celebrated 
 in the S'astras. There was one of that designation, the 
 spiritual preceptor of the Pandavas. There was another 
 
GOTAMA ALSO CALLED AKSHAPa'dA. 57 
 
 too, famous in the legends of the Buddhists, and corrupted 
 in extra- Gange tic India into Gaudma. Which of these, 
 or whether any of them, was the author of the Sutras, 
 which claim the same name for their author, is more than 
 I can say. 
 
 *' The author of the Nyaya Siitras has been otherwise 
 called Akshapada. The Sarvadars'ana-Saiigraha styles 
 him so. Vijn^na Bhikshu, the commentator of the 
 Sankhya, gives him the same appellation. There are 
 various stories current among^ the learned as to the reason 
 for which this surname was given him. One of those stories 
 has been thus communicated to me. Gotama, they say, 
 used to go about in such a state of abstraction, pondering 
 the figments of his system, that his ordinary eyes quite 
 forgot their office, on which Vishnu was so good as to 
 plant a pair of optics in his feet, hence Akshapada 
 or eye-footed. Hemchandra however gives the word 
 Naiyayika as synonymous with Akshapada, the etymo- 
 logy of which is given differently in a manuscript lexicon, 
 the Sabda-muktd-mahdrnava^. 
 
 "Gotama aimed at the promotion of scientific and 
 metaphysical researches, as the best mental discipline 
 for the Brahmins. An idle dependance on the authority 
 of the Veda, and a blind adherence to the ritual therein 
 enjoined, had not proved a sufficient protection against 
 heresy. When Buddhists made their appeals from the 
 authority of the Vedas to that of reason and conscience, 
 Brahmins were almost silenced. Many were even con- 
 verted, to the no small triumph of the enemy ^^ It was 
 
 it^ The following text in Manu coukl not be a gratuitous hypothesis of an impro- 
 bable contingency : ^7^^^cT ^ ^^ ^^^T^l^^ f^^f: | ^ m'^fVf 
 iff 5^^r ^Xf*^^ ^^fs!5^^: 11 
 
 I 
 
58 DIALOGUE II. 
 
 liio^h time that Brahmins should know how to wield the 
 weapons of logic, and not allow their opponents to make 
 a monopoly of hetu, or argument. 
 
 ^'Gotama accordingly directed the attention of the 
 Brahmins to the several branches of human knowledge, 
 which he thought were calculated to strengthen the in- 
 tellect, and enable it to conduct polemical discussions with 
 advantage. He classified them under sixteen topics, which 
 he enumerates in his first aphorism. It is singular that, 
 unlike Brahminical authors in general, he commences his 
 work without any mmigcddchmxma, or auspicious intro- 
 duction. The aphorisms of all the other schools commence 
 with the word atha, supposed to be an auspicious particle. 
 The sixteen topics proposed by him certainly embrace a 
 wide range of human research and speculation ; but as 
 the Brahmins in general cared little for intellectual and 
 physical inquiries, not founded on the Veda, he endeavour- 
 ed to gain them over by proclaiming that the final libera- 
 tion of the soul depended on the study of his topics. 
 
 *^ I have supposed Gotama to be the earliest of Brahmi- 
 nical philosophers. My reason for doing so is that his 
 system, while it combats many opinions advanced by 
 teachers of heresy, contains nothing that may be consi- 
 dered as levelled against doctors of other orthodox schools. 
 He notices and answers numerous objections, ( some of a 
 most fanciful description, ) which cannot be traced to any 
 work or system now known ; but there is no evidence of 
 his contending against Vedantism, or even the Sankhya. 
 The commentator recognizes a few skirmishes against 
 Kapila in some of the Siitras, but in no Sutra does any 
 characteristic doctrine of the S4nkhya school appear to be 
 the point of attack. 
 
 " Gotama appears, as I have said, to have laboured 
 to introduce among the Brahmins the study of logic and 
 
CtOTamas logic. 59 
 
 physics, and although in consequence of the great variety 
 of topics which he undertook to discuss simultaneously, 
 he did not arrive at any great results, the rules he laid 
 down for correct reasoning, and especially for the detec- 
 tion of fallacies, have done great service to posterity. 
 He taught in its elementary form the very method of 
 syllogism with which the name of Aristotle is associated 
 in Europe — a name which many of us have heard from 
 the Omla of our courts, and from others who have care- 
 fully studied the literature of the Mohammedans. If 
 Gotama's system of logic were amended by succeeding 
 scholars, not bound by the authority of their immediate 
 teachers, we might expect the same success in India which 
 has crowned the efforts of philosophers in Europe. 
 
 ^' But in order to ensure that success it would be neces- 
 sary to allow fair discussion — unrestrained by the dictum 
 of authority, and unhampered by the dread of incurring 
 popular obloquy, when errors and defects required to be 
 corrected by careful experiment and investigation. To 
 perpetuate those errors and defects, instead of rectifying 
 them by the light of new discoveries, is in reality not 
 reverence to the memory of that eminent philosopher, but 
 injustice to the truths with which the errors are mixed up. 
 It was a great thing that he taught the rules of correct 
 reasoning, and a system capable of improvement — and if 
 he did not succeed in rightly applying those rules in many 
 points, it is incumbent on his successors to follow them 
 up, and supply the deficiency. But to perpetuate the 
 errors alongside the truths, is like an obstinate refusal 
 to wipe off the mildew on a beautiful picture, and like 
 wilfully thrusting a great piece of art on the notice of 
 posterity in an unclean and disfigured state." 
 
 Satyakama paused for a moment here to decipher 
 some scrawls in his paper. I took the opportunity of 
 
60 DIALOGUE II. 
 
 asking what he meant by errors in the system of Gota- 
 ma. ^' Kishis/' said I, ^' cannot err. We must have very 
 cogent reasons, indeed, if we be called upon to abandon 
 that long-cherished maxim." ^' I will not enter now," 
 said Satyakama, ^^into the question of the specific errors 
 of Gotama. We must have a conference on the subject 
 sooner or later. But the fact of the various Rishis, who 
 founded schools of philosophy, having disagreed among 
 themselves, is sufficient evidence against your long cherish- 
 ed maxim. Where two persons hold conflicting opinions, 
 one must be in the wrong — because truths cannot be 
 conflicting." 
 
 '^ But perhaps," said I, '' tliey only misunderstood each 
 other — perhaps their opinions were only seemingly con- 
 flicting." 
 
 ^^ S'ankaracharya," replied Satyakama, '^understood 
 them to be really conflicting, i^gamika cited a passage 
 to that eflect the other /day. But even if they misun- 
 derstood each other, the misunderstanding itself was an 
 
 error." 
 
 Satyakama resumed his discourse : — ^'1 should be inclin- 
 ed on general grounds to place Kapila as the immediate 
 successor of Gotama, but the express mention of the six 
 categories, and Hhe Vais'eshikas' in the 25th Sankhya 
 Siltra presents a difficulty. A comparison of the San- 
 khya and Yais'eshika does not countenance the supposi- 
 tion of that Sutra being an interpolation. I must there- 
 fore name Kanada as our second philosopher in order 
 of succession. 
 
 '^Kanada's system is considered a branch of the 
 Nyaya. His theory is what we call the Atomic — a theory 
 which was simply hinted at by Gotama. The founder of 
 the Vais'eshika school took up *^ the less than the least," 
 as the author of the Nyaya Siitras had defined an atom, 
 
KANi^DA's THEORY OF CREATION. 61 
 
 and produced the theory, which has earned for him and 
 his followers the nickname of feeders on small particles. 
 The name Kaiiada itself has that meaning, and was evi- 
 dently given him by his enemies. His real name appears 
 to be unknown. 
 
 '* His first three Sutras form an extraordinary introduc- 
 tion to his work. As if by way of making a mere con- 
 fession of faith, he begins by defining Dharma^ and 
 declaring the authority of the Vedas, though we hear no- 
 thing on religion or ethics in the first chapter, and but very 
 little in any other part. His categories and his classifica- 
 tion of causes bear a singular resefnblance to those of the 
 Greek philosopher Aristotle, while his mode of accounting 
 for the origin of the world, by the combination . of atoms, 
 is almost identical with that of a sect of ancient Eu- 
 ropean philosophers, the Epicureans, as represented by 
 Lucretius. He does not indeed betray the diffidence with 
 which the Latin poet asserts the necessity of a small, 
 the smallest possible, inclination in the motion of falling 
 atoms, nor is he afraid of introducing the theory of 
 oblique motions^, but he boldly attributes to adrishta, 
 four things, which he conceived to be necessary for the 
 first start of his world, viz. the upward course which heat 
 takes when emitted by fire, the oblique motion of the air, 
 and the primal action of atoms and of the mind^. He 
 does not seem to have entertained the idea of a Self- 
 existent Supreme Intelligence creating the world." 
 
 cT^xrifrT^^I^^TTTT?5i II ^ II ^* ^ H 
 
 4 Quare etiam atque etiam paullum clinare necesse est 
 Corpora, nee plus quam minimum, ne fingere motua 
 Obliques videamur, et id res vera refutet. 
 
62 DIALOGUE II. 
 
 I could not help interrupting my friend again. " Do 
 you mean/' said I, "to maintain that Kanada did not allow 
 the existence of God, or that his system is niris'ivara f 
 
 " I have no knowledge of him," answered Satyakama 
 " except from his Sutras, and I can safely say he makes 
 no mention of God in any of them — and that he ascribes 
 the primal action of his eternal atoms to adrishta. 
 Atoms combine by actions and impulses. These are im- 
 parted by combinations already formed, and thereby fresh 
 combinations are produced. In tracing these actions and 
 impulses to their origin, he could not find any cause for 
 the first impulse, excejtt in adrishta. If this implies that 
 he did not admit the existence of a God, I am sorry for 
 it, but I cannot help it." 
 
 " Does not S'ankaracharya say, and is it not universal- 
 ly believed, even among the opponents of Brahminism, 
 that the Nydya, including the Yais'eshika, considers 
 atoms as the material, but God as the efficient cause of 
 the world^?" 
 
 "S'ankaracharya certainly attributes that doctrine to 
 the followers of Kanada, and many of them indeed 
 maintain it, but there is no trace of it in the Sutras of 
 their original teacher ; and S'ankara thus represents his 
 doctrine : ' At the creation also, an operation is pro- 
 ' duced in aerial atoms, which is dependant on adrishta. 
 * That operation joins its own atom with another. Then 
 ^from binaries, by gradual steps, is produced the air. 
 ' The same is the case with fire. The same with water. 
 ' The same with earth. The same with organized bodies. 
 ' Thus is the whole universe produced from atoms. The 
 ' form and other qualities of binaries and other compounds 
 
kanada's theory of creation. 63 
 
 'are derived from those of the atoms themselves^.' As 
 to the opponents of Brahminism — if thereby you mean 
 Europeans, they have for the most part drawn their in- 
 formation from Colebrooke, the most learned of foreign 
 scholars — and the very few that may have consulted 
 native authorities, probably attended solely to modern 
 manuals, or confided in their pundits, and did not care to 
 verify what they read or heard by a reference to the 
 Sutras. 
 
 '^ Colebrooke makes no mention of the above Siitra, 
 but he evidently refers to it when he speaks of the Nyaya 
 theory of the original combination of atoms ^. As he did 
 not discuss the meaning of adrishtaf those that followed 
 him, without a knowledge of the Sutra itself, did not 
 perhaps pay especial attention to all the expressions which 
 he used, and so missed his real meaning. Whether 
 adrishia means destiny, or some unseen virtue in the 
 material atoms themselves, is a question which we shall 
 discuss afterwards. I shall for the present content my- 
 self with having given you Kanada's own words, which 
 scarcely justify an elaborate exposition of their theistical 
 
 v» s» '^ v» 
 
 6 " Two earthly atoms, concurring by an unseen peculiar virtue, the creative will of 
 God, or time, or other competent cause, constitute a double atom of earth ; and, by 
 concourse of three binary atoms, a tertiary atom is produced ; and, by concourse of 
 four triple atoms, a quaternary atom ; and so on, to a gross, grosser, or grossest 
 mass of earth : thus great earth is produced ; and in like manner, great water, from 
 aqueous atoms ; great light, from luminous ; and great air, from aerial. The 
 qualities that belong to the effect are those which appertained to the integrant part, 
 or primary particle, as its material cause : and conversely, the qualities which bo- 
 long to the cause are found in the effect." Colebrooke's Essays. 
 
64 DIALOGUE 11. 
 
 character^, nor is there any thing in Gotama calling for 
 the same." 
 
 I was much surprized by what Satyakama represented 
 to be the teaching of Kanada, but, reserving further dis- 
 cussion for a future occasion, I begged him to resume 
 his paper. He continued ; '^ Kapila came forward next with 
 his remedy for the three-fold evils of life, which neither 
 the Vedas nor the common sense of mankind had been 
 able to remove. Who this Kapila was, or when he lived, 
 is equally uncertain with the age and personality of Go- 
 tama. There is a Kapila mentioned in the Swetaswatara, 
 a son of Brahma, but some commentators explain it away 
 by taking the word as an adjective, not a substantive. 
 Kapila is also reckoned in the Pur^nas as an incarnation 
 
 7 " The Nyd,ya is essentially theistical. According to them, God is personal. He 
 is not, as it expressly asserts, mere existence, mere knowledge, mere bliss, but he 
 is a substance, of which existence, &c. are attributes ; for it is impossible to think 
 of existence, knowledge, &c., without referring them to a subject which exists, which 
 has knowledge, &c. He is not the supreme soul of the V^d^nta which is the whole 
 universe, but distinguished as well from the world as from finite spirits. He is not 
 a mere emanation from nature, as Kapila asserted, but altogether diflferent from 
 nature, and self-existent. He is also not, as appears to be P^tanjali's opinion, a 
 merely omniscient being ; but he is of infinite power, the Ruler of the universe, 
 and nature could not exist independent of a God, or could exist only without order, 
 harmony and object. And this idea is not only a fortuitous addition to the system, 
 but one of its chief springs ; for all the substances in the world, without God, 
 remain unconnected. There may be atoms, but they do not constitute a world, 
 they are solitary, unconnected, without any apparent difference ; of themselves they 
 have no action, produce no effects, and not even tlie simplest compound of two 
 atoms can arise from them alone, much less a compound of a certain form and for 
 certain objects, not the world in its unity, harmony, and infinite variety of forms. 
 There may be souls, independent of a creator, but without conscience, without enjoy- 
 ment, without development, and without a final end, for they are not united with 
 mind, the instrument, by which they are connected with the world, among them- 
 selves and with the Creator. Because this connexion exists, because there is form, 
 because individual souls have conscience, therefore it is necessary to assume a God who 
 by his infinite power and knowledge is the author of this connexion, of the all-pervad- 
 ing harmony of the world. This argument for the existence of a deity is essentially 
 theological or based upon final causes in nature. The deity is the creator of the 
 world as to its form, not as to its matter." Dr. Roer — Bibliotheca Indica, Vol. ix. 
 
 One cannot help wishing that the learned expositor had added definite references 
 to the passages of Gotama or Kanslda on which these remarks are based. 
 
WHO KAPILA WAS ? 65 
 
 of Vishnu, by whom the Saiikhya system was revealed 
 for the salvation of the world. He is identified with the 
 sage, represented in the Ramayana, as the destroyer of the 
 unhappy sons of Sagara, who were disturbing the world 
 in search of their stolen horse. Sa.gara had all but com- 
 pleted the wonderful sacrifice, As'wamedha, when an en- 
 vious god interrupted it by stealing the steed consecrated 
 for the altar. Commissioned by their father, the princes, 
 sixty thousand in number, went in all directions to trace 
 the course of the missinir animal, and when it could not be 
 found on the surface of the earth, they dug out a passage 
 to the lower regions, where the consecrated horse was 
 seen by the side of the divine Kapila absorbed in religious 
 contemplation. Not doubting that the apparent devotee 
 was in reality but a thief, the princes, meditating revenge, 
 set up a yell, which roused him from the lethargy of his 
 devotion. Directly the sage's eyes, glowing with fury 
 at the uncalled-for disturbance, fell on the vociferating 
 princes, they were reduced to a heap of ashes. A nephew 
 of the ill-fated youths afterwards recovered the sacrificial 
 horse, and was advised to make supplications for the des- 
 cent of the Ganga from heaven, with a view to the future 
 salvation of his uncles. At Gang^a Sauo^or, or the mouth 
 of the river Ilooghly, there is still a shrine dedicated to 
 Kapila, and that is supposed to be the spot where the 
 tragical event took place, though Saugor in central India 
 corresponds better to the geography of the site where 
 the sacrifice is said to have been celebrated. The Sri 
 Bhagavata expresses its doubt as to the correctness of this 
 legend, which, it says, ill accords with the excellence of 
 a character that was at the same time an incarnation of 
 Vishnu and the founder of the Sankhya. 
 
 ''Kapila went the length of denying, outright, the exis- 
 tence of the Deity. The wonder is, that he is still ranked 
 
 K 
 
66 DIALOGUE ir. 
 
 among orthodox philosophers, and not denounced as a 
 teacher of heresy like the Buddhists. But the Brahmins 
 are very forgiving, if one will humour them in their 
 notions of superiority as gods of the earth, and conform to 
 the authority of the Vedas. The 92nd and two following 
 Sutras of the first chapter of Kapila, may be characteriz- 
 ed as black aphorisms, since therein he not only declares 
 that the existence of a Supreme Being is not proved, but 
 asserts it impossible for such a Being to be the Creator of 
 the Worlds 
 
 ^' With Kapila there could be no real freedom if a person 
 were subject to a desire or motive. The soul, being essen- 
 tially free, is, according to his theory, incapable of voli- 
 tion. It is uddsin, or perfectly unmindful of the exter- 
 nal. It is a simple witness. He accordingly argues that, 
 since no thinking agent performs an action without a 
 motive, the Soul could not be supposed to be the Creator 
 without being subject to a motive or desire. Such sub- 
 jection however would imply a bondage, and detract from 
 its freedom, and, by necessary consequence, from its 
 ■power. If it had the desire, it would be wanting in the 
 poiver — and if it had the power, that is to say perfect 
 freedom, it would not have the mil. Hence a thinking- 
 agent ivould not, if he could, and could not, if he would, 
 create the universe. The acuteness displayed in this 
 argument is indisputable, but subtlety aud profundity are 
 not synonymous. 
 
 ^'The system of Kapila is more metaphysical than that of 
 Gotama or Kanada, and deals as much more with mere 
 subtleties, as the latter two, with the realities of psycho- 
 logy and physics. But Kapila has in many respects 
 
KNOWLEDGE THE TRUE REMEDY. 67 
 
 influenced the popular mind more than Gotama or Kana- 
 da. The title Sankhya, accorded to his system, signifies 
 numeral, implying its precision in the enumeration of first 
 principles. It stands also for discriminative knowledge, 
 or judgment. Although plainly denying the existence 
 of a Supreme Being, and therefore styled Niris'vjara, 
 neither he nor his system has incurred the odium which 
 had fallen to the lot of Buddha and his system. The 
 Puranas and Tantras, those undoubted exponents of the 
 popular mind, have borrowed more from Kapila's, than 
 from any other philosopher's, system. It is a common 
 saying that there is no knowledge equal to the Sdnkhyay 
 nor any power equal to the Yoga^, 
 
 ''Kapila maintained that the true remedy for the perils 
 of life is to be found in discriminative knowledge. The 
 instruments of that knowledge are three, perception, in- 
 ference, and s'abda, which may be rendered, the word. 
 Gotama also had acknowledged those sources of know- 
 ledge, and had added a fourth, upamdna, or analogy, 
 while Kanada had reduced the number to two, by contend- 
 ing that the ivord was implied in Inference. 
 
 '' It does not clearly appear what Gotama, Kandda, and 
 Kapila meant by S'abda, or the word. They defined it to 
 be the language of unerring authointy ; but was it unerr- 
 ing de jure, or simply de facto f If, as is more probable, 
 they meant the former, then by Sahda they understood 
 simply the authority of the S'dstra — ignoring that impor- 
 tant branch of evidence for truth, which is founded on 
 human testimony. According to the rules of those phi- 
 losophers, it would in that case be impossible to prove to 
 a Bengali, that the sepoys of the Bengal army mutinied 
 at Meerut and Delhi. 
 
 ^ ^if^ iETt^^ri ^V^ ^if^ ^ftJT^T^ W II 
 
68 DIALOGUE II. 
 
 '^ The objects of knowledge are, according to Kapila's ar- 
 rangement, twenty-five. Pi^akritiy or nature, defined to be 
 the equipoise of the three qualities of excellence , foulness. 
 and darkness y is the first, as Furusha, or soul, is the last. 
 The intervening twenty-three are mahatj or intelligence, 
 ahankdra, or self-consciousness, the five tanmdtra, or subtle 
 elements, eleven organs, inclusive of the mind, and the 
 fiVQ gross elements. Of these Prakriti, the rootless root, 
 is the first cause of all things — while Purusha, or soul, 
 is a simple witness. Both are eternal : but the former, 
 inanimate and non-sentient, is prolific and active ; — the 
 latter, intelligent and sentient, is non-productive, because 
 free and indifferent. Prakriti however creates for the 
 soul, and in its vicinity. 
 
 ''The atheistic part of Kapila's system was rectified by 
 a mystic Rishi of the name of Patanjala, who unmistake- 
 ably inculcated the existence of Is'wara or God, and whose 
 system has consequently been called Ses'wara, or theistical. 
 It must however be confessed, in justice to Kapila, that 
 P4tanjala does not attribute the creation to his Is'wara. 
 His definition of Is'wara corresponds exactly to Kapila's 
 idea of the soul — viz. ''untouched by troubles, works, fruits, 
 or deserts^^" The only difierence is that Patanjala consi- 
 ders him to be the guru, or master, of " even the elder 
 beings \" — thereby acknowledging one spirit as supreme 
 over the rest. The non-acknowledgment of some such 
 Supreme Being was a glaring inconsistency in Kapila, 
 when nevertheless he contended for the authority of the 
 Vedas. Who could have inspired the Vedas if there were 
 no Supreme Being ? 
 
 
PAT AN J A la's mysticism. 69 
 
 " Patanjala's is thoroughly a mystical system. It 
 consists mainly of some vague rules of yoga, or a sort 
 of mental and corporeal discipline, which cannot be 
 considered as other than chimerical. His references 
 to Is'wara prariidhdna, or divine contemplation, we must 
 accept as a pleasing witness to that religious sentiment, 
 which God has implanted in human nature, and which 
 is indeed the most satisfactory evidence of His existence. 
 But we cannot set much value on the rules he has laid 
 down for Yoga. They are only negatives^. The internal 
 and external senses must be abstracted from the out- side 
 world. Except the vague idea involved in the expres- 
 sion Is'wara pranidhdna, he suggests no realities on 
 which the mind is to exercise itself — nothing about the 
 doings of Is'wara, or his perfections. 
 
 '' The rules again for the performance of Yoga, not only 
 relate to various kinds of mental abstraction, but em- 
 brace peculiar corporeal practices, such as the suppression 
 of breath, the twisting of limbs, and certain prescribed 
 postures of the body. The system is in fact a motley 
 compound of mental and corporeal exercises. To these 
 exercises, extraordinary physical and intellectual powers 
 are ascribed. By abstracting the corporeal senses from 
 their ordinary media of communication, the Yogi is en- 
 dowed with heavenly senses. He may not see or hear 
 what passes around, — he may be insensible to external 
 impressions — but he has intuition of things which his 
 neighbours cannot see or hear. He becomes so buoyant, 
 or rather so sublimated by his Yoga, that, gravitation, or, 
 as Bhdskarachd,rya calls it, the attractive power of the 
 earth^, has no influence on him. He can walk and ascend 
 
 cffircT^^ HTfcT ^^ ^^^tTT^T W XTcTft^^f § I Siddhdnta Siromani. 
 
70 DIALOGUE II. 
 
 in the sky, as if he were suspended under a balloon. He 
 can, by this intuitive process, inform himself of the mys- 
 teries of astronomy and anatomy — of all things in fact 
 that may be found in any of the different worlds. He 
 may call to recollection the events of a previous life. 
 He may understand the language of the brute creation. 
 He may obtain an insight into the past and future. He 
 may discern the thoughts of others, himself vanish at 
 pleasure, and, if he chose to do so, enter into his neigh- 
 bour's body, and thus take possession of his living skin^ ! 
 '' Before I introduce the names of the two remaining 
 leaders of Brahminical philosophy, a few remarks 
 may not be irrelevant, on the effects produced by the 
 dogmas of the schools already named. I am not now 
 speaking of those dogmas in detail. But, from the 
 open avowal, or unmistakeable insinuation, that the 
 Vedas were not competent guides to inquirers after sav- 
 ing truth, and from the promise of emancipation to a 
 mere knowledge of physics or metaphysics, it will per- 
 haps be acknowledged that their speculations did not 
 contribute much, either to the growth of the religious 
 sentiment, or to any real advancement in human science. 
 When men prescribed means for attaining supreme 
 felicity other than the teaching of what was conceded to 
 
 ^l^TW.^^*t I P^ntanjala, Siitra III. 
 
PHILOSOPHY OF NO AVAIL. 7l 
 
 be a revelation from God, especially when those remedies 
 were trumpeted forth as superior to and purer than what 
 was ^' heard," — the tendency of the doctrine must have 
 been to foster a spirit of infidelity and of self-willed 
 philosophy, far worse, because more insidious, than that 
 of Buddhism ; at which Agamika's indignation, the other 
 day, was only consistent with his avowed principles as 
 a Vedic Brahmin. The desultory passages in which our 
 philosophers contended for the authority of the Vedas 
 were probably dictated by prudential motives. They 
 were mere manifestoes of faith, unconnected with the 
 arguments of the Sutras, and could not be intended for 
 the conviction of intelligent inquirers. 
 
 " The results of philosophical speculations, which, pro- 
 fessing to include theology, ignored every consideration 
 calculated to magnify the glory of Him, from whom the 
 science of theology derives its title, were not unlike the 
 effects produced elsewhere by the writings of the earlier 
 sages of Greece. There are but few educated Indians 
 who have not heard of Socrates and Plato. The philoso- 
 phers who preceded them had in some respects speculated, 
 like Gotama and Kapila, on the properties of matter and 
 mind. They were also classified into schools, such as the 
 Ionic, the Eleatic, the Pythagorean. They propounded 
 many theories on the origin of the world, the nature of 
 God, the properties of matter and mind. Water, air, fire, 
 had each its claims recognized as the primary element. 
 Some thought that the world was evolved by the disjunc- 
 tion or decomposition of an infinite mass, the reverse 
 process of the Nyaya ; others, like Kanada, taught that it 
 was formed by the combination of small particles. 
 
 " The effects produced by such speculations were the 
 unsettling of men's minds, and the mere disturbance of 
 existing institutions. Nothing was established, every 
 
72 DIALOGUE II. 
 
 thing was shaken. Sciences, distinct in themselves, were 
 blended together. Objects, which surpassed the limits 
 of the human understanding, were pursued with the same 
 confidence and eagerness with which the easiest questions 
 were investigated. The philosophers professed to have 
 solved problems, really out of the range of our knowledge, 
 while they threw doubts on matters which every body 
 believed, and which none could deny without belying his 
 nature. 
 
 ''The speculations of the Nytiya and S^nkhya bore a 
 striking resemblance to those of the Grecian schools, and 
 the results were not unlike. The topics of Gotama, the 
 categories of Kanada, and the twenty-five principles of 
 Kapila, though they included some important points of 
 human knowledge, proved nevertheless a failure. The 
 authors began to dogmatize in the very infancy of phi- 
 losophical speculation. They drew general conclusions 
 before they had collected facts. They worked up their 
 own ideas, without sufficient attention to external pheno- 
 mena. They delivered obscure Sutras to exercise the 
 ingenuity of their followers. Their disciples were reduced 
 to the necessity of exhausting their talents in servile com- 
 mentatorial work, without the liberty of rectifying what 
 was wrong. 
 
 " Neither did they stop to consider the true range of 
 human capacity, and the limits which mark off things 
 comprehensible, from those that are incomprehensible. 
 While they boldly speculated on points which man can 
 never determine by the exercise of reason, they did not 
 deal fairly with those inquiries for which they were really 
 competent. No wonder that their researches were unsatis- 
 factory. 
 
 ''Injustice to the founders of our schools, we must con- 
 fess that the opinions which they embodied in their systems 
 
LITTLE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN ORTHODOX AND HERETIC. 73 
 
 ]iad probably long been floating in the popular mind. 
 The Buddhist defection had no doubt produced a spirit 
 of scepticism, from which the authors of the Siitras were 
 not altogether free. And they perhaps laboured to give 
 such a shape to those sceptical opinions as might be con- 
 sistent with the supremacy of the Brahminical order. Two 
 things, they thought, were necessary for the maintenance 
 of that supremacy ; the toleration of the Vedas, and the 
 substitution of metaphysical speculations for the too fre- 
 quent performance of the Vedic ritual. Without the first, 
 the foundation of Brahminical supremacy would be cut 
 away. Without the second, the Brahminical mind would 
 be doomed to a state of perpetual imbecility, familiar 
 only with ceremonial observances, and utterly unable to 
 meet the challenges put forth by sceptical heretics on the 
 arena of controversy. 
 
 " Not that there was much essential difference in point 
 of doctrine between the heretical and some of the orthodox 
 schools. If Kapila could assert the non-existence of a 
 Supreme Being, and if Kanada could attribute the 
 primal action of eternal atoms to adrishta, 1 cannot see 
 how there could be a marked difference of opinion between 
 them and the heretics. And so, instead of repulsing and 
 discouraging the enemy, they armed him with stronger 
 weapons." 
 
 Scarcely had Satyakama read the last words when 
 Tarkakiima came in. After the customary salutations, 
 *' Whom were you comparing," said he, "with the here- 
 tics, and what is that long file of papers about ? " 
 
 SatyaMma. — '^I said that I failed to see a marked 
 difference of opinion between Kapila, Gotama, and B^andda 
 on one side, and the heretics on the other." 
 
 Tarkakdma. — " Indeed ! Then does it seem to you that 
 the distinction between those who revere, and those who 
 
74 DIALOGUE ir. 
 
 despise, the Vedas, is so extremely impalpable? To my 
 mind it involves something like down-right antagonism ?" 
 
 SatyaJcdma. — '* I have really failed to see much devo- 
 tedness to the Vedas in Kapila and others. But that 
 was not what I meant. I meant that the opinions of 
 the one party were very much like those of the other 
 party on the being and attributes of God'' 
 
 TarJcakdma. — ^' Then, again, the practices of the here- 
 tics, they are unclean and unholy." 
 
 SatyaJcdma. — " 1 was not talking of practice either. In 
 practice, the Buddhists are of course anti-Brahminical. 
 Their deviation from Brahminical practice is no doubt 
 an act which you cannot easily forget. If Buddhists had 
 only kept up your external observances, you would not 
 have treated them as heretics." 
 
 ^^ But what did you mean," said 1, ^^by asserting that 
 tlie teaching of Kapila has influenced the popular mind 
 more than that of any other philosopher ?" 
 
 '^I meant," replied Satyakama, "that the cosmogony of 
 the most popular Puranas is founded on the basis of the 
 Sankhya. Kapila taught that prakriti, or nature, produced 
 the world ybr Purusha, or soul — but without any interfer- 
 ence on the part of soul. This is the Niris'wara or atheistic 
 Sankhya. The Ses'wara, or theistic, Sankhya of Patan- 
 jala did not correct Kapila's theory of the creation. But 
 other popular teachers took up the ideas of Prakriti and 
 Purusha from the Sankhya, and, rejecting the doctrine 
 of Purusha's inactivity and unproductiveness, attributed 
 the creation of the world to the union of the two eter- 
 nal principles enunciated by Kapila. This was a sort of 
 philosophical amendment on the Niris'wara theory of 
 Kapila, — and it originally implied nothing more than that 
 the creation was the joint operation of God and nature, 
 or, in other words, that God and matter were concurrent 
 
PRAKRITI AND PURUSUA PERSONIFIED. 75 
 
 causes of all things — a doctrine not essentially different 
 from that of the modern Naiyayikas. But poetic imagi- 
 nation found something in the ideas of Prakriti and 
 Purusha, which it did not in God and Atoms — and there- 
 fore, leaving the system of the Nyaya to its own initiated 
 adherents, allegorized the philosophical amendment on 
 the Sankhya ; and mystic theology turned Prakriti and 
 Purusha into divine personifications. Prakriti was held, 
 in the philosophic conception, to be the passive or material 
 cause of the world, and Purusha the active or efficient. 
 The one was accordingly represented in popular theology 
 as the female, and the other, the male energy; and to the 
 union of tlie two was attributed the production of the 
 universe. Hence perhaps originated the mythological 
 representations of male and female divinities. The Pu- 
 rusha, or male creator, was identified either with Siva or 
 Vishnu, according as the mystic theologian was himself a 
 follower of the one or the other — while Prakriti, or the 
 female power, was considered to be no other than the wife 
 of either of those gods — Parvati, otherwise called S'acti, 
 or Lakshmi. And it is in this sense that Kalidasa called 
 S'iva and Parvati the parerits of the universe^, 
 
 ''To this compound of metaphysical and mythological 
 ideas is owing the reverence with which the legendary 
 accounts of Siva's and Krishna's sensual indulgences are 
 received by their respective adherents. The extent to 
 which Kapila's theory has in. this way affected the popular 
 mind can hardly be exaggerated." 
 
 " 1 do not understand," said Tarkakama, '' the drift of 
 all this. But let me not interrupt your discourse." 
 
 Satyakdma resumed his paper — " When Jaimini came 
 forward with his Mimdnsd, or decider, he was probably 
 
76 DIALOGUE II. 
 
 desirous of mediating between the controversialists that 
 preceded him, and hoped to determine questions which had 
 so long agitated the Brahminical mind. He could not fail 
 to see that neither the Vedas, nor the institutions they sup- 
 ported, could stand long, if the Nyaya and the Sankhya 
 were to direct the Indian intellect. Barren speculations, 
 he thought, had been abundantly indulged. Topics, catego- 
 ries, and principles, had been sufficiently discussed. What 
 was the result ? They had introduced some technical terms, 
 and taught some controversial tactics. But they gave 
 little or no assistance in the discovery of the truth which 
 those terms and tactics were intended to guard. The 
 patient was supplied with scales and weights, mortar and 
 pestle, but the medicines to be weighed and compounded 
 were not forthcoming. Poisons and noxious weeds were 
 alone at hand. Jaimini stepped in to give a practical turn 
 to what was before mere speculation. He commenced his 
 Mimdnsd with the enunciation of Duty^^ the only topic 
 he had to propound." 
 
 Tarkakdma. — ^^Kanada, too, commenced his system in 
 the same way — did he not?" 
 
 Satyakdma. — " He did, but, as I have already remark- 
 ed, after the second Sutra you hear nothing more of 
 Dharma until you come to the sixth chapter — and then 
 the only ethical instruction given is on the kind of 
 Brahmins among whom you are to distribute alms, and 
 the sort of men whose properties you may accept, as well 
 as the extent to which you may attack your neighbour in 
 self-defence. The author throws but little light on what 
 we absolutely owe to God and man." 
 
 Satyakama continued ; '' If Jaimini had carried out 
 his proposal of considering the nature of duty in a truly 
 
VEDA WITHOUT GOD. 77 
 
 philosophical spirit, he might have greatly contributed 
 to the improvement of the Indian mind. The wisest 
 philosopher of ancient Europe had undertaken to correct 
 the wild speculations of his predecessors in a similar 
 way, and it is universally confessed that he created an 
 epoch in the history of the human mind. The measure 
 of success which crowned his efforts was doubtless owing 
 to his powerful appeals to ' what is fixed and indestruc- 
 tible in man, his moral convictions.' He referred men to 
 those ethical principles which lay within the range of their 
 own consciousness. This was certainly treating man as his 
 Maker intended he should be treated. Had Jaimini la- 
 boured in a similar way to strengthen those moral princi- 
 ples which the Almighty had implanted in the human 
 mind, he might have met with a success honourable to 
 himself and beneficial to the nation. But a servile adhe- 
 rence to the Vedic ritual had unfitted his mind for such 
 speculations. Jaimini had no other idea of duty than as 
 an injunction of the Sruti ; and that, apart from any no- 
 tion of its Inspirer, or his Will. We have seen previously 
 how Kapila could admit the Veda as an authority, with- 
 out a Supreme Intelligence to inspire it. We observe a 
 similar anomaly in Jaimini. He urges the consideration 
 of DUTY, without caring for any to whom it may be 
 due. He contends for the authorized Veda without an 
 authorizer, for a law without a law-give?^ a revelation 
 without God. He detaches the idea of duty, not only 
 from moral convictions, but also from the sovereign will of 
 a Supreme Governor. It has no existence save in the 
 texts of the Mantras and Brahmanas. Bent on the 
 vindication of the Vedas, and anxious to avoid the rock 
 on which metaphysical authors before him had struck, 
 he felt no scruple in devastating the province of reason, 
 and contended for the paramount authority of the Veda, 
 
78 DIALOGUE II. 
 
 without any reference to Him from whom alone such 
 authority could be derived. He enforced the observance 
 of Dharma as the highest duty of Brahmans. But 
 no term in our language is liable to greater miscon- 
 ceptions than Dharma. While it means duty, it means 
 also religious merit, and hence the desert derived from 
 the doings of a previous life. In this last sense it im- 
 plies the same idea as adrishta. Now, while enforcing 
 Dharma in the sense of duty, or works, he has taken 
 no precaution to magnify Him from whose will alone 
 the idea of duty could receive its highest sanction. To say 
 that Dharma signifies an injunction of the Veda, can only 
 be intelligible in the sense of its involving the will of the 
 Author of the Veda. Jaimini however, has said notbinor 
 as to its Author, nor while talking of its eternity, as Sabda 
 or the word, has he made mention of any co-eternal Intelli- 
 gence, uttering or revealing it. His Sutras are so vague 
 on this point, and on the existence and providence of God, 
 that for any thing which may be adduced to the contrary, 
 he may be called a second Kapila, maintaining the au- 
 thority of the Veda, without admitting His existence 
 without whom no composition can be pronounced to be 
 inspired. His system has accordingly been understood by 
 many in a niris'wara sense. It is expressly stigmatized 
 by that name in the Padma Parana^ — and the Vid- 
 ivanmoda-tarangini attributes sheer atheistic opinions 
 to his follower, the Mimansaka, who is made to say there 
 is no God the creator or preserver of the world^. Some 
 
 7 See the passage cited in page 48. 
 
 ^ ^Tt "^ ^f^^^^^ ^'^T ^^T ^ W^Pt ^ ^^^ra 
 
 
BHARMA WITHOUT GOD. 79 
 
 of Jaimini's eminent disciples also took his lectures in 
 the same sense, and taught atheistic doctrines under the 
 title of the Mimansa. Sankaracharya too, whose fairness 
 in representing the opinions of orthodox schools is above 
 suspicion, puts the following language into the mouth of 
 Jaimini : ^ If the Veda be authority, the relation of 
 ' works and fruits (or effects), ought to be received just 
 ^ as it may be proved from that source. That God gives 
 'the fruit (or effect), is not deducible, because various 
 * kinds of effects cannot proceed from a cause in which 
 ' there is no variableness, and because [if an intelligent 
 ' author were allowed] he would be subject to a charge 
 ' of injustice and cruelty, by reason of inequalities in the 
 'creation. Such a theory would render the observance 
 ' of ceremonies futile. Wherefore fruits (or effects) are 
 'from Dharma (or works) alone^.' 
 
 "The opinions of Jaimini are still more startling than 
 those of Kapila — for Jaimini is the the great champion 
 of Dharma and the Veda. It is impossible to imagine 
 how Dharma or the Veda could stand without God. 
 
 " That the Mimansa of Jaimini met with no success in 
 settling the questions so long controverted, is no marvel. 
 Men who had learned the arts and tactics of Gotama and 
 Kapila were not to be silenced by the eternity of Sound. 
 
 ^T^^^g;-^^^ ST^cT^ a^ri" f^^T ^i'cT ^^cT ^^ ^^^T | 
 W^r^^' ^'i?^^^ Vrf^ W^V^ ^^^fxT '^TX'^T.-m II 8 II 
 
 ^m^qf ^^ I in. 2. 40. 
 
80 DIALOGUE II. 
 
 The human mind wanted something more substantial 
 than tlie offerings and oblations of the Yedas — the autho- 
 rity of which was contended for without an Intelligent 
 Author. Dharma w\as set forth ; but there was no one in 
 the system to whom it could be due, if it meant duty, — 
 nor any who could be trusted for its fruits, or reward, if 
 it meant works. 
 
 "Vyasa, the well-known compiler of the Vedas, ac- 
 cordingly put forth a second decider, the Uttara Mimansa, 
 or Vedanta, in which the old pantheistic doctrine of the 
 Upanishads was reproduced. Not to give an uncertain 
 sound like Jaimini on such a cardinal point in Theology 
 as the existence of a Supreme Intelligence, the Creator 
 and Governor of the universe, he propounded that as the 
 most prominent, and the only great, idea pervading his 
 system. But if there can be no mistake as to the idea of 
 a God in his doctrine, it is neutralized, if not nullified, by 
 the identity of that God with every thing else — with 
 the whole visible world. lie inculcated the existence of 
 one sole essence — manifesting or producing itself in the 
 form of the universe before our eyes. If Brahma is the 
 efficient cause or Creator of the world, he is also its 
 substance — as the gold is of the bracelet. This identity of 
 the universe with God precludes the idea of duty on the 
 part of the creature towards the Creator, quite as effec- 
 tually as does Jaimini's theory. 
 
 " Tradition will have it that Jaimini was a disciple of 
 Vyasa. Their Sutras certainly show that they were con- 
 temporaries, for they refer to one another by name^^ 
 
 10 Dr. Ballantyne says in a foot-note to the 1st Part of his "Aphorisms of the 
 Mim^nsji" — "The mention of the name of ' Ba Jiirayana' (or Vydsa) in the Aphorisms 
 "goes to prove that Jaimini's work, the 'Purvamira;£nsi£,' was not antecedent in 
 "time to Vydsa, the author of the 'Uttara-raim;lnsd'. Mr. Colebrooke's rendering 
 'of the terms Pwva and Uttara by 'prior' and 'later' (see Essays, vol. 1, pp. 227, 
 "and 29"),) would seem to have led Dr. Ritter to suppose that Jaimini's system was 
 
WHERE VyisA DIFFERS FROM JAIMINI. 81 
 
 "The very first aphorism of the Vedanta proves that 
 its object was to substitute Brahma for the Dharma, or 
 '' Duty," of the first Mimdnsd. Of the peculiar doctrines 
 of the Veddnta philosophy I need not now speak more 
 in detail. The analogy between the first and the second 
 Mim^nsds ought however to be noticed. One grand 
 feature is common to them. Both profess to be founded 
 on the Vedas, the texts of which their authors labour 
 to expound. Both repudiate arguments and assertions 
 unsanctioned in, or militating against, the S'ruti. But 
 here the similarity ceases. Jaimini is of opinion that 
 the end of the Vedas is to enforce certain practices^ : 
 Vydsa thinks their ultimate object is intellectual appre- 
 hension — even the knowledo^e of Brahma. His effort 
 accordingly is to discover the occult signification of pas- 
 sages whose obvious meaning had satisfied his pupil, and 
 to deduce a consistent theory from conflicting texts. Jai- 
 mini takes up the sense of the Veda as he finds it on the 
 surface ; Vyasa must dive into the depths, and collect 
 its tenets from the bottom. He will not allow that the 
 sentences of the Vedas are to be blindly followed. Their 
 sense must be logically arrived at. He therefore admits 
 deductive reasoninof as a lesfitimate source of knowledo-e, 
 
 "the earlier in point of time. He says, (at p. 376, Vol. IV of his History of Philo- 
 "sophy, — Morrison's version) that "according to Colebrooke, theadherents of this 
 " School may be divided into the earlier and the later," — and then he goes on to 
 "speak of "the older and genuine Vedanta:" — but in fact the terras 'prior' and 
 "' later' refer to the divisions of the Veda which Jaimini and Vyasa respectively 
 "expound, the latter confining himself to the Upauishads, or theological sections, 
 " which stand last in order." 
 
 Colebrooke, and after him Ritter, were not wrong in considering Jaimini's as the 
 earlier work. At any rate it is certain that Vy^aa speaks frequently of Jaimini 
 hy name. (See Veddnta Sdtras I. 2. 28, 31. T. 3. 31. 1. 4. 18. III. 2. 40. III. 4. 2. 
 IV. 3. 12). The master and pupil must have revised their works after seeing one 
 another's productions. From the nature of the subject, Jaimini's would appear to 
 bo the " prior" work. 
 
 * ^T^T^T^ f^^i^<^I^T^4^iTcT^WI^t II ^. H. H II. l. 
 
 M 
 
82 DIALOGUE II. 
 
 SO long as it is consistent with the dictates of the Yedas.' 
 
 He necessarily claims greater latitude in interpreting the 
 
 oracles of inspiration than Jaimini thought it proper 
 
 to allow to himself. S'ankara gives an ingenious reason 
 
 for this claim ; and that reason is itself a good index to the 
 
 character of the second Mimansa : 'In the inquiry after 
 
 ' Brahma, the Vedas alone are not authority, as is the case 
 
 ' in the inquiry after Dharma, or Duty. But here deduction 
 
 'too, is, as far as possible, proof; because the knowledge 
 
 ' of Brahma is to be collected by deduction, and because 
 
 ' it concerns an existent substance. In duties to be per- 
 
 ' formed, there is no room for deduction ; hence the 
 
 ' Vedas alone may be the proofs. That which is to be 
 
 ' done depends on the man for its accomplishment. A 
 
 ' duty, whether secular or Yedic, may be (at the doer's 
 
 'pleasure) performed, or omitted, or gone through in 
 
 * a modified manner. As one may go on horseback, 
 
 ' on foot, or in another way, or not go at all ; so it is 
 
 'possible for one (to fulfil opposite injunctions of the 
 
 ' Veda) and to receive a particular utensil in a particular 
 
 ' ceremony, and also not to receive it ; to sacrifice at 
 
 ' sunrise, and to sacrifice before sunrise. "^^ ''' '"' '"'" But one 
 
 ' cannot say alternately in the same way that a substance 
 
 'is thus and not thus, is and is not.'"' ^^ "'^ Therefore proofs 
 
 'concerning an existent substance depend on the sub- 
 
 ' stance itself 2." 
 
 JT^f?r ^^^[T^^m ^ ^ JT^ftfir crm ^fir^^ ^ft^fli^ ^Fifcr 
 
veda'nta pantheistic. 83 
 
 ''The doctrine which Vyasa brought to light from the 
 depths of the Veda is no other than the teaching of the 
 Upanishad, that this universe is God — that the things 
 made and their Maker are identical — that the human soul 
 is one and the same with the Divine Spirit. The doctrine 
 is held in two different ways^. One way is the Parindma 
 Vdclctj which, acknowledging the reality of the visible uni- 
 verse, while it identifies it with God, pronounces it to be 
 a formation or development of Himself The other is the 
 Vivarta Vdda, which, maintaining that the one eternal 
 essence, Brahma, manifests himself in various illusory 
 forms, denies the real existence of any substance which is 
 not God, and holds the visible world to be a mere shadow, 
 or Maya, such as the reflections of the sun and moon in 
 waters. Both these views are condemned in the passage, 
 to which 1 have already made reference, in the Padma 
 Purana^. The first is said to have been inculcated for 
 the destruction of the world — and the second is stigmatized 
 as Buddhism in disguise. 
 
 '' All ideas of duty and responsibility are openly repudi- 
 ated in the Vedantism of Vyasa. The human soul and the 
 Divine Spirit, being identical, how can there be an obli- 
 gation on the part of the one to the other ? How or whom 
 
 3 This is well expressed by Vis'wan^tha, the commentator on the Ny^ya, 
 
 ^^f% cT^f^ ^'^cT ^TH^xmiT^H^^ ft^ft;I!^i7^ ijfrr^^.. 
 ^^^i1\vrR^ ^ci^^ iTMcT^xT^ ^T^^Txiftcgijr*' mr^ '^^^^- 
 
 f^^T^^im^T^w ft^=^^ ^^fiR^ cfTr^smi^T^r^^i^if^fcT 
 
 * See the passage cited in pages 48 and 4J>. 
 
84 DIALOGUE II. 
 
 can one mind or despise^ ? ^Here, says S'ankara, there is 
 no admission of even a smell of works^.' Good manners 
 and good works are however declared to be useful for the 
 attainment of true knowledge. 
 
 ''To this rapid survey of the schools of Brahminical 
 philosophy, I shall only add, tbat the mistakes in their 
 various theories of the creation, were owing to a notion in 
 which they all participated, that since every human fabric 
 before us had a pre-existent material cause — since no ar- 
 chitect can make a house without bricks or bricks without 
 earth — the same necessity must be supposed in the case 
 of the universe at the creation. Waiving therefore the 
 question hy ivhom, they confined their attention to the 
 question of tvhat the world was made. The pre-existent 
 material must be such as to preclude the recurrence of 
 the question, And that matter whence f The Upanishads 
 had inculcated that Brahma or God was himself the sub- 
 stance of which the world is made. The Nyaya and the 
 Sankhya, rightly judging that a spirit could not be the 
 matter of a world, nor a pure intelligence the substance 
 of a universe full of impurities, rejected that pantheistic 
 theory, and introduced materialistic hypotheses. The 
 Nyaya propounded a theory of atoms less than the least, 
 and, in their disconnected state, incapable of forming any 
 magnitude cognizable by the senses ; and the Sankhya 
 found the material of the universe in Prakriti, or inanimate 
 and unintelligent Nature. Neither school however pro- 
 perly discussed the question of an intelligent efficient 
 Cause, to whose creative power the harmony, observable 
 in the world, might be attributed. The Vedanta, justly 
 condemning this omission, reproduced the theory of the 
 
ALL RIGHT AND ALL WRONG. 85 
 
 Upanishads, and maintained that Brahma was at the same 
 time both tlie material ( call it substantial, if you w^ill, ) 
 and efficient cause of the universe, which it produced 
 from itself — after the manner of a spider forming his web 
 from his own substance. In the controversy between the 
 three schools, we find the Nyaya and Sankhya strongly 
 inveighing against the doctrine of a spirit being the 
 substratum of a material world, and the Vedanta equally 
 ardent in condemning the theory of such a beautiful and 
 harmonious world coming into existence without the 
 agency of a Supreme Intelligence. They were all right 
 and all wrong — right in their exposure of opposite errors^ 
 wrong in their adherence to their favourite tenets. The 
 controversy does not appear to have been entirely fruitless 
 in its effects on posterity. The followers of the Nyaya 
 subsequently brought in their existing theory of atoms as 
 the material, and God as the efficient cause of the world. 
 The Sankhya was amended, (as I have just mentioned), 
 by the theory of Prakriti and Purusha jointly creating 
 the world — and the Vedanta modified its pantheism by 
 the doctrine of Maya, pronouncing the world to be a mere 
 reflection — a shadow — an illusion." 
 
 Satyakama having read thus far, placed his paper on 
 the carpet, when Tarkakama remarked that he must pro- 
 test against many points asserted in the essay, which, to 
 say the least, would admit of much discussion. 
 
 '^ I have no doubt of that," said the essayist. " We 
 hoped to see you earlier. It was the eclipse that pre- 
 vented your coming in time ?" 
 
 ''That was the reason of my being late this morning. 
 Will you have any objection to handing me your paper ? — 
 and then let us meet, say on Thursday morning, to discuss 
 the points you have raised. I will undertake to inform 
 A'gamika, if you approve of my proposal." Satyakdma 
 
86 DIALOGUE II. 
 
 cheerfully gave up his paper, and we, readily assenting to 
 what Tarkakama suggested, parted as good friends. 
 
 You see, my learned friend, what we are about. I 
 will not fail to communicate to you from time to time 
 how the discussion goes on. I hope you will also send 
 your comments on the topics contained in Satyakama's 
 essay. 
 
DIALOGUE III 
 
 FROM THE SAME TO THE SAME. 
 
 I told you in my last that Tarkakama took away 
 the discourse which Satyakama had read. He came to 
 the appointed place of meeting on Thursday, accompanied 
 by Agamika. After some conversation on the events 
 of the day, '^ I have read your paper, Satyakama," said 
 he, ''but cannot report that it has convinced me of the 
 correctness of your strictures. You evidently wrote 
 it in a spirit of hostility to all the orthodox schools : 
 which again you endeavoured to embroil in mutual dis- 
 putes. You have studied to damage the reputations of 
 their founders and leaders. Well, 1 do not regret your 
 attempt, — and I do not charge you with artifice or unfair- 
 ness ; but I am confident that the honoured names of 
 Gotama, Kanada, and the other great characters will out- 
 live your attack : — and that their memories will be all 
 the dearer to posterity for this onslaught. They will 
 shine the more brilliantly for all you have said against 
 them ; just as a mirror^, to use the poet's illustration, 
 becomes the clearer by the very action of the dusty hand 
 
88 DIALOGUE in. 
 
 that rudely brushes it. Two simple points, which you 
 seem to have ignored, might have explained all the difficul- 
 ties that you have found in the Sutras, and dissolved the 
 evil phantoms that your imagination has conjured up. You 
 seem to have forgot that our philosophers were devising 
 remedies by which the necessity of future births might be 
 obviated, and the bonds of Dharma, or works, be broken. 
 And you appear to have ignored the fact that, since nothing 
 can he produced out of nothing ^ our Ilishis were constrain- 
 ed to look for a material cause of the universe in their 
 theory of the creation. The Nyaya pronounced pre-exist- 
 ing atoms to be the materials of which the w^orld was 
 made — the Sankhya would not acquiesce in the theory 
 of an infinite number of eternal entities of diverse kinds, 
 and therefore declared Prakriti or nature to be itself the 
 cause of all thinofs — while the Vedanta maofnified the 
 ineffable glory of God, by teaching that He was the sole 
 cause — the maker and substance of the universe. There 
 is in all this nothing that should provoke criticism, much 
 less hostile declamations ; and there is certainly a great 
 deal to call forth our admiration." 
 
 SatyaMma. — ^'Confining myself to yowx first point 
 for the present, may I ask you what you mean by the 
 bonds of works, and the necessity of future births." 
 
 TarJcaJcdma. — " The necessity of future births arises 
 from the events of previous births, which were also the 
 causes of our bonds — the bonds of works. Every man 
 that you see in the world is by birth in a state of bondage. 
 He onust satisfy the requirements of adrishta. He must 
 undergo those troubles which are the necessary conse- 
 quences — the legitimate fruits — of his previous works. 
 His deeds in the present life, again, lay the foundation 
 of future sufferings in his next scene of existence. Philo- 
 sophers have therefore mercifully come forward to rescue 
 
DOCTRINE OF PRE-EXISTENCE. 89 
 
 them from that bo adage. There is nothing in all this 
 which it can be difficult to appreciate." 
 
 Satyakdma. — '' You are assuming that we have all 
 passed through a previous state of existence before the 
 present life." 
 
 Tarkakdma. — '' I am not assuming it without high 
 authority. Have not all the schools consentiently held 
 that doctrine as proved ? And does not the experience of 
 the world bear testimony to it ?" 
 
 Satyahdma. — '^ I have not observed any such testimony 
 in nature — nor have I noticed any reasoning on the subject 
 which may not be called Sddhya-sama, or identical with 
 the thing to be proved — in foreign words, a petitio prin- 
 cipUr 
 
 Tarkakdma. — " Do you mean to assert that the doctrine 
 of the soul's pre-existence is a gratuitous tenet, for which 
 our philosophers had no authority, and of which they ad- 
 duced no proofs ?" 
 
 Satyakdma. — " They certainly had no right to receive 
 or assert such a doctrine. The proofs they adduced 
 were no better than arbitrary assumptions. That there 
 are reasons for not considering this as the only scene of 
 our existence, I am far from denying. Eternity will 
 open before us as soon as we escape from the bonds of 
 time and sense. But no one can prove that we existed 
 in a previous state before we were born : much less ought 
 such a theco-y to be made the basis of those startling con- 
 elusions which our philosophers have drawn from it." 
 
 Tarkakdma. — "Do not the inequalities in birth, position, 
 tastes, and enjoyments, observable in human life, prove 
 such a prior existence ? Some are very happy, namely 
 the gods and other residents of the upper regions ; some 
 are very miserable, namely, the brute creation ; while 
 others have a middle state between the two, such as men. 
 
90 DIALOGUE III. 
 
 S'ankardcMrya reasons most justly in attributing these 
 inequalities of birth to works performed in a prior state, 
 and requited in this. 
 
 ''The incidents of life, again," continued Tarkakama, 
 ''are so irregularly diversified, that the only way to reconcile 
 them with rule or order, is by supposing them to be the 
 consequences of past works. In the same family you will 
 often find one member clever and sharp, a second dull 
 and stupid, a third self-denying and virtuous, a fourth 
 sensual and voluptuous, a fifth in the enjoyment of wealth 
 and plenty, a sixth in penury and misery. Do not such 
 facts prove a by-gone state of life, in which certain habits 
 were formed, by which tastes and dispositions are influ- 
 enced in this world, and certain merit or demerit acquired, 
 regulating the present distribution of pleasure and pain, 
 — especially when you often see the wicked prospering 
 and the righteous suffering?" 
 
 Satyakdma. — " They do not prove your theory. As to 
 S'ankaracharya's argument, we shall presently examine it. 
 You will then see in what different tones he speaks in two 
 different places. And with reference to the inequalities of 
 birth to which you have alluded, they do not necessarily 
 imply a disproportion of happiness or misery. How often 
 do we find the high-born man in greater misery than the 
 low-born ! A Persian poet has well said^, ' While a poor 
 man has only to seek a morsel for himself, and, when he 
 has got that, sleeps as soundly as if he were an emperor, 
 a prince is troubled with the concerns of a whole world.' 
 
 " As to diversities in intellectual and moral habits, they 
 do not require to be accounted for by the supposition of a 
 
 
STATE OF PROBATION. 91 
 
 previous life. Man is in a state of probation. The 
 development of his character depends on the way in which 
 he makes use of his opportunities j and profits by his 
 external circumstances. 
 
 '' Diversities of enjoyments and sufferings, again, may 
 in a great measure be traced to virtuous or vicious con- 
 duct in this very world. ^ Virtue, as such, naturally pro- 
 ' cures considerable advantages to the virtuous, and vice 
 'as such, naturally occasions great inconvenience and 
 'even misery to the vicious, in very many instances. 
 ' The immediate effects of virtue and vice upon the mind 
 'and temper are to be mentioned as instances of it. 
 ' Vice, as such, is naturally attended with some sort of 
 'uneasiness, and, not uncommonly with great distur- 
 'banco and apprehension^.' Our success in life also 
 is much dependent on ourselves. You will frequently 
 find that the man whom the world calls fortunate, has 
 made a better use of his time, his talents, and his abilities, 
 than he who has proved unfortunate. The fortunate 
 man has perhaps been industrious, attentive, honest, 
 courteous ; the unfortunate, on the contrary, may have 
 been inactive, lazy, imprudent, dishonest, ill-mannered, 
 or rash. 'Public honors too, and advantages, are the 
 ' natural consequences, are sometimes at least the conse- 
 ' quences in fact, of virtuous actions ; of eminent justice, 
 ' fidelity, charity, love to our country, considered in the 
 ' view of being virtuous. And sometimes even death 
 'itself, often infamy, and external inconveniences, are 
 'the public consequences of vice as vice^.' 
 
 "The facts to which you have adverted, Tarkakama, 
 in order to prove a prior existence, may be, in a great 
 measure, accounted for by differences observable in the 
 world itself, in the actions of men. 
 
 3 Butler. * Butler. 
 
92 DIALOGUE III. 
 
 '^ It is not necessary for any to blame Destiny, after 
 the fashion of the ignorant^, for what his own acts bring 
 on himself ; neither is it philosophical to seek an unseen 
 cause in ^ adrishta/ where there are visible causes before 
 you to explain the mystery. I do not of course mean 
 that all the inequalities in life can be accounted for in 
 this way. I admit that you will find a large residuum 
 which, after you have solved the far greater portion in the 
 manner suggested above, will still continue a difficulty 
 in one's way." 
 
 Tarhakdma. — " I admire your candour. I was going to 
 say you could not in that ingenious way explain away all 
 the inequalities in the world. Well, how can you account 
 for the residuum without admitting a previous life ?" 
 
 Satyalcdma. — ^^That, Tarkakama, only shows that we 
 cannot consider this as our only stage of life. It forces 
 us to look forward to another. It does not however neces- 
 sarily force our eyes hachvard to a previous state." 
 
 Tarhakdma. — " So you wish to get rid of what you call 
 an arbitrary assumption of our Kishis, in order to make 
 room for an arbitrary assumption of your own ?" 
 
 Satyahdma. — '' I am not contending for any arbitrary 
 assumption. But I can safely say that the doctrine of a 
 prior existence is the very worst way of accounting for 
 inequalities in life. You say they are the results of 
 peculiar habits and works in a previous scene of exist- 
 ence. But you thereby only remove your difficulty one 
 single step, for the question will recur, Whence those 
 jjeculiar habits and works,— d^^ndi, Whence the inequalities 
 in that life ? You will say with your philosophers that 
 those inequalities were owing to the acts of another 
 
 ^^ ■^fT'IT^TTfe^T: I Hitopades'a. 
 
DOCTRII^E OF ADRISHTA. 93 
 
 previous life. You will then refer to another still older, and 
 so on, until you are forced to conclude, as indeed the 
 Kishis before you did conclude, that the world had in 
 reality no beginning ! Thus your theory involves difficul- 
 ties far greater than any it is intended to remove. Your 
 remedy proves worse than the disease. One obvious 
 disadvantage is the false security on the one hand, and 
 the despair on the other, which it is calculated to pro- 
 duce. And it precludes that wholesome discipline which 
 hopes and fears of a future retribution must exercise on 
 the mind." 
 
 Tarkakdma, — '^ How can our theory preclude the whole- 
 some discipline of hopes and fears ? We do not say that 
 man has no control over his future lot. Why should 
 there be any false security or despair ? We only account 
 for his present condition in life by a reference to his prior 
 existence, and to adrishia. He has still the power of 
 self-determination, and there is every room for hope 
 and fear. Indeed the actual experience of the effects of 
 his previous acts will add strength to his hopes and fears, 
 and so deter him from repeating wicked deeds. He will 
 feel that there is such a thing as retribution in the 
 world." 
 
 Satyakdma. — ^^ But you do say — I mean philosophers, 
 and authors of S'astras, have said in several places — that 
 no one can resist the power of Destiny, or adrishta, 
 which not only determines the conditions, but also guides 
 the actions, of men, and imparts the motions under 
 which the body and its members perform their func- 
 tions^. The condition itself often influences actions, and 
 affects the interests of futurity. Eminent sages have 
 
 ^ ^^^m^^^ 9l^^f^2n1\ftT^^3fr3r5T^Tfr l Hand^sa Bhatta's 
 Commentary on the Kuaumanjali. 
 
94 DIALOGUE III. 
 
 also frequeDtly excused heinous acts of their own perpe- 
 tration, by laying them at the door of daiva or adrishta 
 ■ — that is to say, Destiny^. Some have also extenuated 
 offences committed by their neighbours by attributing 
 them to the same influence^ ; which others, again, have 
 held as a good reason for not putting forth any efforts 
 for the improvement of their circumstances^. These 
 views of your doctrine can exercise no good moral influence 
 on men — nor give rise to salutary motives. Why then 
 introduce a gratuitous theory so replete with evil ?" 
 
 "Of such inequalities as may not be explained by 
 men's virtuous or vicious conduct in this very world, a 
 simpler, and far more satisfactory, account may be found 
 in the doctrine of a future state of final rewards and 
 punishments ; for which the present is a mere preparation. 
 Are you puzzled on seeing honest men suffering in the 
 world without any fault of their own ? Do not aggravate 
 the infliction by telling them that it is the consequence of 
 vicious acts done in a former life, and for which there is 
 now no remedy ! The suffering may be intended as a dis- 
 cipline, only to enhance their future happiness. Have 
 you not heard, Tarkakama, of king Haris'chandra ? The 
 story may be a mere fable, but it beautifully illustrates 
 what I mean. You see there a good man and a great 
 
 •T'^I^T^fTP^pTTfr II Miircandeya Purjlna. 
 
 ^•W^i^rf?"*Tl^f?T I Hitopades-a. 
 
 '5TTfJTr'5T^ftr •5'^5'cT I Hitopades'a. 
 
 ^^^5l§^g^I?^ I Probh^kara Mlm^nsi. 
 
GREEK DOCTRINE OF PRE-EXISTENCE. 95 
 
 man reduced to a condition, the very recollection of which 
 floods your eyes with tears. Must you say he suffered 
 for his previous crhnes ? Do you not see what the end 
 was ? How it compensated for his past sufferings ! 
 Think you that the good king regretted what he had 
 undergone when he had received the fruition of the glory 
 that awaited him ? He did not. Thus it is that 'virtue is 
 * often militant here ; and various untoward accidents 
 ' contribute to its being often overborne : but it may 
 'combat with greater advantage hereafter, and prevail 
 'completely, and enjoy its consequent rewards in some 
 'future states. Neglected as it is, perhaps unknown, 
 'perhaps despised and oppressed here, there may be 
 'scenes in eternity, lasting enough, and in every other 
 ' way adapted to afford it a sufficient sphere of action ; 
 'and a sufficient sphere for the natural consequences of 
 'ittofollowinfactr" 
 
 Tarkakdma was for a moment silent, when Agamika 
 interposed a remark — "What you say, my long- tried 
 friend, suggests a most important consideration. That I 
 will not fail to give to the question. But is it not true, 
 (I have at least heard so from many friends learned in 
 Mohammedan lore,) that the most eminent philosophers 
 among the Yavanas held the doctrine of the soul's pre- 
 existence ? Is it fair, is it modest, so summarily to con- 
 demn a doctrine that has approved itself to the reasons 
 and consciences of so many races of men ?" 
 
 Satyakdma. — '' Had that doctrine not been productive 
 of so much undeniable mischief in our country, I could 
 not have denounced it in strong terms. It is truth which 
 constrains me to say that this is a question on which 
 philosophers had for a long time groped in the dark, even 
 
 10 Butler. 
 
96 DIALOGUE iir. 
 
 in Europe. That the soul was immaterial, and distinct 
 from the body which it animated, they understood easily 
 enough ; not indeed from the necessity of thinking charit- 
 ably of those who performed pious offices toward the dead, 
 as Gotama would have it^, but from its peculiar indepen- 
 dent functions, of which each individual was conscious 
 in himself That the soul was unaffected by those causes 
 of decay to which the body was subject, they also compre- 
 hended. But, like our own ancestors, they had (apparently, 
 without discussion) adopted a maxim, that whatever had 
 a beginning must have an end. Those who could not 
 allow that the soul died with the body were driven to the 
 conclusion that it had no beginning. Until nearly two 
 thousand years ago, when life and immortality were 
 hrought to light by One who spake as never man spake^ 
 (of whose teaching I shall embrace an opportunity on 
 some future day of saying something), men could not 
 understand that the soul could be immortal without 
 being also uncreated. They accordingly pronounced it 
 to be eternal. They stopped not to reflect on the 
 consequences involved in such a theory ; they did not 
 consider that it robbed the Supreme Being of some of 
 His most glorious titles which even their own poets had 
 accorded to Him, in common with other writers of more 
 than human authority. If all souls were eternal, then there 
 could be no Creator of souls, no Father of spirits , no Trarij/o 
 avlpwv T£ didiv r£. As most of those philosophers also held 
 that matter, too, was eternal in some shape or other, their 
 doctrine obviously involved the denial of a real creation, 
 and consequently of a Creator." 
 
 " You refer to the philosophers of Greece. Your Mo- 
 hammadan friends are right in saying they held the 
 
 ^ WK^?:^Ti" TTTr!«rflVrr^Tcr l Ny^ya SiUra, III. 4. 
 
Plato's doctrine of reminiscence. 97 
 
 theory of the soul's pre-existence. We should however 
 consider how they deduced it, before attaching much 
 value to their conclusion. 
 
 '^ AmoRo- the ars^uments which Plato uses in his 
 celebrated dialogue on the Immortality of the Soul, 
 one is the deduction of its eternity from its past and 
 future existence. Its past existence is deduced from his 
 well-known dogma, that all learning is reminiscence. He 
 proves this point by assuming that a spectator often 
 associates a truth he had never before soon or perceived 
 with some fact just presented to his senses. From this 
 mental association, which is carefully explained in another 
 dialogue (the 'Meno'), as well as from his theory of 
 general ideas, the philosopher deduced his maxim, that 
 knowledge is nothing but reminiscence ; — which of course 
 involved the pre-existence of the souP." 
 
 Tarkahtma. — "Plato's argument is almost identical with 
 Gotama's, and that is what I meant by the experience of 
 the world. I wonder how you can still resist the doctrine. 
 You may account for the unequal distribution of pleasure 
 and pain, by the supposition of a future state of retribu- 
 tion, but how can you account for peculiar capacities 
 and habits in men equally circumstanced. Gotama's 
 argument is unanswerable." 
 
 Satyakdma. — " Is it so ? Will you state the argument 
 in detail" 
 
 Tarkakdma. — ^'Gotama, you must remember, was de- 
 monstrating the eternity of the soul, and so he proves that 
 it never began, nor shall ever cease, to be. The former point, 
 
 " Eav TiQ Ti erepov rj tSwv rj aKOveraQ )/ riva aWrjv aiaOtjaiv 
 Xapcov fxi] fxovov ekeivo yv(f) aXXa Kai tnpov ivvorjari ov ^r\ r) 
 avTij £7rio-rr;/u)7 aW aWrj' ap ov^i tovto BiKanog Xtyo/biiv on 
 avEinvt}(jOii ov rrjv Evvniav cXapfi' ; 
 
 O 
 
98 DIALOGUE III. 
 
 from which the latter followed as a matter of course, 
 he thus attempts to make good. He says (III. 19.) * Be- 
 ' cause of the manifestation of joy, fear, and grief, in him 
 'that is born, from the memory of previous habits.' 
 The commentator expounds the meaning of the Siitra 
 in the following words : 'The rise of joy and other feelings 
 *in the infant that is born, while the occasions of 
 'those feelings are yet not apprehended in this birth, 
 ' can only be accounted for by his recollection of previ- 
 ' ous apprehensions. Thus the successive prior stages of 
 ' the present soul being shown, ifc is proved to be without 
 ' beginning. And what is without beginning can have 
 ' no destruction. Thus is its eternity demonstrated^.' Can 
 any one conceive a possible objection to this argument ?" 
 
 Satyakdma. — " It seems Gotama himself could conceive 
 an objection to his argument ; at least he notices one in 
 the next Sutra.— 'The changes (on the child's face) may 
 'be like the opening and closing of the lotus.' (III. 20.) 
 The commentator thus expounds the objection. 'Joy 
 ' and other feelings in the infant are inferred from changes 
 ' on his face. They may be produced by some especial 
 ' unseen virtue, as in the opening and closing of the lotus' ^." 
 
 TarJcakdma. — "But Gotama furnished a ready reply 
 to the objection. ' No ! for causes of changes in things 
 
 ^T^ TfcT f^c2Ic^fef^tTJ% Vn^J II 
 
 * TT^ft^ tTTfH^H Hfl rjj •rf^^T^i^TTf^^i:: II ^^^ II 
 
 ^ ^ -N 
 
INTERNAL EMOTIONS EXCITED BY EXTERNAL CAUSES. 99 
 
 'composed of the five elements, are heat, cold, rain, 
 ' season^.'" 
 
 Satyahdma. — ''The reply is not satisfactory. The 
 objection is neither worded' nor expounded as clearly as 
 it might have been. It may fairly be thus paraphrased. 
 Gotama says that certain internal emotions are indicated 
 by changes on the child's face, and that those emotions 
 are proofs of a prior existence. The objector does not 
 disallow the premises, but he disputes the conclusion. 
 He admits the existence of the internal emotions, but 
 he contends they are occasioned by external impressions 
 after birth. He contends that i\iQ first instances of joy 
 and fear are owing to outward causes surrounding the 
 child. Of the changes on its face, those emotions may 
 be the proximate causes ; but the external impressions, by 
 which the emotions themselves were excited, must be 
 recognized ae their remote causes. The changes on the 
 child's face may accordingly be compared with the expan- 
 sion and contraction of the lotus. You say the expansion 
 and contraction of the lotus are caused by heat and mois- 
 ture. Granted. But it would be more accurate to say that 
 the heat and moisture are neither their immediate, nor 
 only causes ; that the expansion and contraction have 
 the flower's own organism, as their proximate cause, and 
 that the external heat and moisture are remoter causes 
 acting on that organism : for without the intervention of 
 that organism the flower would no more be affected by 
 the atmosphere, than the wax or light- wood lotus which 
 your children value so much as a toy. The analogy 
 between the child and the lotus, therefore, stands good. 
 External circumstances act on something internal in each 
 case, and thereby occasion certain visible changes. That 
 
100 DIALOGUE III. 
 
 the organism is in the one case only physical, in the other 
 both physical and intellectual, does not affect the analogy. 
 
 " It cannot therefore be said, in reply, that the changes 
 on the child's face are independent of external causes. 
 That would be a begging of the question. The child is 
 exposed to certain outside impressions from its very birth, 
 and these impressions excite certain mental emotions 
 which are indicated by change of countenance. The case 
 of the lotus is an example in point. The child has a 
 mental constitution by virtue of which external circum- 
 stances are able to call into action certain internal feelings. 
 The lotus, too, has an organism of its own, by virtue of 
 which the action of the atmosphere occasions the expansion 
 and contraction of the flower. In both cases certain 
 effects are produced by virtue of internal organisms, 
 through the action of external impressions. The child 
 may be ofterwards capable of pure internal impulses, not 
 depending immediately on the external. But you cannot 
 prove that, previously to the reception of its Jlrst impres- 
 sions from without, any of its internal capacities are 
 in active exercise ; much less that such exercise is con- 
 scious and deliberate. The indications of joy and sorrow 
 on the infant's face do not, therefore, demonstrate the 
 fact of previous habits acquired in a prior state of life, 
 but are simply proofs of the capacities, in the mental con- 
 stitution of human nature, for certain emotions which 
 are put in exercise by impressions from without ; and 
 the analogy of the lotus stands good, inasmuch as the 
 lotus has also an organism in its tender stalk, by virtue 
 of which its flowers open and shut when acted upon by 
 heat and moisture." 
 
 TarkaMma. — '' I am not convinced that Gotama's argu- 
 ment is invalid. But that is not his only argument. He 
 has another : — ^ From the desire for milk, after dying, 
 
INFANT EFFORTS INVOLUNTARY. 101 
 
 caused by the habit of taking food.' (III. 22.) The com- 
 mentator gives the following scholium on it — ^ After 
 ' dying, or rather having died, means being just born, 
 'after the dissolution of the previous body^.'" 
 
 Satyakdma. — ''Neither is this argument above the pos- 
 sibility of asault in the author's estimation, for he anti- 
 cipates an objection. ' The child's spontaneous approach 
 ' to the mother's breast may be like that of the iron to 
 'the magnet.'" (III. 23). 
 
 Tarhakdma. — " That only shows the author's candour. 
 But see how he repels the objection. ' No ! because there 
 is no motive, elsewhere.' (III. 24). That is to say, as the 
 scholiast renders it, ' the child is moved only to suck the 
 ' milk. The rule does not hold good in the other case. 
 ' Why ? Because there is in reality no motive in the other 
 ' case i. e., in that of the iron. Motive is deduced from 
 'effort, not from a mere act^. Hence the argument is 
 'not vitiated.'" 
 
 Satyakdma. — "I do not deny that the child, being 
 endowed with intellectual and active powers, is capable 
 of an effort of which inanimate iron is incapable. But 
 this fact does not proves the soul's pre-existence. But as 
 Gotama has another argument yet, let us hear it before 
 we discuss the reasons he has adduced for and against 
 his doctrine." 
 
 ^m I't^r ^icTTTi'^r^ i schoua. 
 
 ^T^^ ^^^HRIcf II 
 
102 DIALOGUE III. 
 
 Tarhakdma. — ^^ ' From not seeing any one, born with- 
 out desire^.' The innate affections of human nature are 
 proofs of a previous state of existence, in which their 
 germs were planted." 
 
 Satyakdma. — ^' The author is again candid enough to 
 anticipate an objection. ' Its birth is Hke the production 
 of a substance with inherent quahties^.'" 
 
 Tarhakdma. — '^ He refutes it too. ' No ! for desire and 
 other affections are occasioned by intelUgence/ i. e., deli- 
 beration^^." 
 
 Satyakdma. — "I say again the answer is not to the 
 point. With reference to the second argument, facts do 
 not warrant the conclusion that the infant, previous to after- 
 birth experience, is moved, or makes a deliberate effort, to 
 approach the breast. All that you can say is, that when 
 the breast is applied, it sucks. But it will suck any thing 
 that is presented to it. It sucks its own fingers. The fact 
 only proves that it has a capacity and an inclination for 
 sucking, just as the magnet has the capacity of attracting 
 iron. If the infant afterwards indicates a discriminative 
 knowledge on the subject, that is owing to its experience 
 after birth. The three arguments of Gotama may be 
 compressed into one. He contends that men exhibit from 
 their infancy certain habits and inclinations, passions and 
 affections, which cannot be accounted for without assum- 
 ing a previous state of existence ; and, as that state, again, 
 must, for the same reasons, have another antecedent to it, 
 you must carry the argument successively backwards, 
 and pronounce the soul to be eternal. Is not this his 
 argument ?" 
 
 
CHARACTERISTICS OF SOUL. 103 
 
 Tarkahdma. — '^ I do not object to your construction of 
 his argument ; but what can you say in reply ?" 
 
 Satyakdma. — " I can say something by quoting one of 
 his own texts, by opposing Gotama to Gotama. He had 
 asserted in his definition of the soul, that ' Desire, Aver- 
 sion, Volition, Pleasure, Pain, and Knowledge, are it§ 
 characteristics, (i. 10)^.' If then the infant exhibits 
 external indications" of those mental operations, the 
 phenomenon simply proves the existence of a soul in him. 
 Those characteristics have nothing to do with the soul's 
 pre-existence. The examples cited in the objections, are 
 not fairly met by his answers. It is a characteristic of 
 the soul to think, feel, desire, shun ; to desire that which 
 imparts pleasure, to avoid that which communicates pain. 
 If the infant spontaneously takes to sucking, it is because 
 that is an effort natural and agreeable to him ; and 
 indeed every effort is then agreeable, which affords exer- 
 cise to his physical or mental capacities, with(Sut actually 
 imparting pain. There is not the slightest necessity for 
 assuming that his involuntary motions are the results of 
 habits acquired in a previous state of existence, or that 
 they are reminiscences of past associations." 
 
 Tarkakdma, — "The argument is not merely that the 
 infant evinces desire and inclination, but that he evinces 
 inclination for particular objects, as if known by previous 
 experience to be agreeable to the taste ; and hence Gotama 
 contends that it is proof of a previous life." 
 
 Satyakdma. — " Here the premise is incorrect. It is not 
 true in fact that the infant evinces a taste for particular 
 objects, prior to experience in his existing state. It makes 
 an effort to suck whatever is presented to its mouth. 
 Among some nations it is usual to give the oil of Rendi 
 
104 DIALOGUE III. 
 
 (castor-oil) as the first food for an infant when it is born — 
 and it takes the oil as promptly as it does milk. And it 
 would suck either liquid with the same readiness, even if 
 it contained arsenic. You cannot say it had found oil and 
 arsenic to be so agreeable in a previous life. 
 
 . '^ These involuntary efforts in the infant are exactly 
 what you would expect from human nature. You need 
 not form a theory of pre-existence in order to account for 
 them. Since light and heat are characteristics of fire, if 
 you make a piece of iron red-hot, it will naturally both shine 
 and burn. Would you say it is owing to habits of a previ- 
 ous state ? Of course you would not. You would simply 
 recognize the natural property of fire already ascertained. 
 So, when the child only manifests the characteristics of the 
 soul that animates his body, you have simply to accept the 
 fact as a verification of your own aphorism on the nature 
 of that soul. You have no room for bringing in a new 
 theory. You cannot do so without stultifying your own 
 Sutra. The child does what you would expect from his 
 soul. If the case were otherwise, if the child gave no 
 more indication of internal sensibility than a wooden doll, 
 you should have to revise your aphorism. You have 
 no phenomenon before you, but what is fully explained 
 by your previous premises. Your argument is redundant, 
 and your theory of a pre-existence unnecessary." 
 
 Tarhakdma. — '^ Even if Gotama's argument were in- 
 consistent with his definition of the soul, still how would 
 you account for such natural dispositions in the infant ? 
 Who taught him the way to take food at an age when 
 he is incapable of learning from those around him ?" 
 
 Satyahdma. — " The natural dispositions of the infant 
 are to be accounted for in the same way in which you 
 might account for the natural properties of other sub- 
 stances. Who gave the champd its fragrance, the lion its 
 
NATURAL LAW. 105 
 
 courage, and the sun its refulgence ? Answer my query, 
 and, I warrant you, the same answer will explain who 
 taught the way of taking food at an age when the infant 
 is incapable of communicating with his neighbours. The 
 same great Being, Tarkakama, is the giver and the 
 teacher in both instances. His Maker instructed the 
 infant to desire food, to take it in the way best suited 
 to his state, to give forth signs of pain when he misses 
 his sustenance. Do not stare at what I say, as if it were 
 something uncommon. The natural law which instructs 
 and guides the infant governs the whole of the animal 
 and veofetable creation. The same fiat which bestowed 
 on the peacock its beauty, the swan its gloss, the kokila its 
 voice, the chakwa its sentiment, the elephant its strength, 
 conferred on man the nature he exhibits even in infancy. 
 The babe is taught how to suck, by Him who instructs the 
 bird how to build her nest when the comforts of her offspring 
 require it ; who commands the mdlati to entwine itself 
 round the tree that supports it, the lotus to open by day, 
 and the Tcinnuda by night ; who admonishes trees, herbs, 
 and creepers to germinate in the way best suited to their 
 organism, and animals to seek the nourishment best 
 * adapted for their constitution." 
 
 Tarkakdma. — '^ What you say may be a fine theory in 
 itself. But it does not disprove Gotama's doctrine. The 
 phenomena you have mentioned may be accounted for 
 equally well on the supposition of a previous existence." 
 
 Satyakdma. — " Neither do the reasons adduced by 
 Gotama prove his theory; which indeed reaches much 
 further back than simple pre-existence. He contends 
 that the various stages of previous lives may in like man- 
 ner be proved from those immediately succeeding them, 
 and thus the soul demonstrated to be uncreated and eternal, 
 and that not merely in a spiritual state, unconnected 
 
106 DIALOGUE III, 
 
 with body and mind, but in an embodied and intellectual 
 state. See then the length to which the argument carries 
 you. If man has existed without beginning, sucked 
 milk, taken food, there must have been vegetable life, co- 
 existent with him. How could he otherwise be sustained ? 
 Even if he lived on nothing but animal matter, still the 
 animals which supplied that matter must have required 
 vegetable sustenance. And if animal and vegetable life 
 be uncreated and eternal, so must inorganic matter be 
 too ; for it is from inorganic matter that vegetables draw 
 the sap which sustains them, the gas which supports 
 them, and the heat which vivifies them. If you allow 
 the validity of Gotama's argument for the pre-existence 
 of the soul, and extend it, as he has done, to times 
 without beginning, you must then maintain the eternity 
 of every thing around you ; and that, not in an atomic 
 state, but collected in masses. And if the universe be 
 uncreated and eternal in a perfect state of development, 
 how can you, on your own theory, contend for the ex- 
 istence of God ? Since the theory of a previous life, and 
 the principles of Gotama drive us to this extremity, how 
 can you say that the supposition of a pre-existence ex- 
 plains the facts before us, equally tvell with that for which 
 I am contending ? " 
 
 Tarhahdma. — '' But granting that the argument, based 
 on the infant's spontaneous efforts, is inconclusive, be- 
 cause there is nothing to preclude the supposition of 
 their being natural to him ; how can you, still, get over the 
 moral argument, or withhold your assent from the doctrine, 
 when you consider the marked inequalities in the circum- 
 stances and positions of men ? How can you reconcile with 
 the justice and equity of God the fact of some men being 
 in the enjoyment of honor and wealth, others pining in 
 penury and misery, — except by considering their various 
 
HARMONY AND VARIETY. 107 
 
 conditions as the consequences of their own works in a 
 past world ? Human happiness or misery, you said, may 
 be traced to virtuous or vicious conduct in this very world. 
 I do not deny it may be so in some cases — but surely 
 you do not mean to stigmatize every poor man as a mon- 
 ster of wickedness. To vindicate the justice of God, and 
 to save the credit of men, it is necessary to look to the 
 events of a prior existence for an explanation of the 
 difficulty, especially when you consider that many are 
 born with disease and infirmity which they could not have 
 brought on themselves by their own acts, but which, 
 nevertheless render them miserable for life." 
 
 Satyakdma. — "That a portion of our happiness or 
 misery is owing to our actions in this life, you seem to 
 admit. 
 
 " So far then we are agreed. As regards differences 
 in race and birth they are not, ( I have already said, ) 
 necessarily connected with corresponding diversities in 
 enjoyment or suffering. The elephant is of a different 
 species from the lion, the peacock from the deer, the bull 
 from the horse. Does it necessarily follow that the 
 deer is less happy than the lion, or the horse than the 
 elephant ? By no means. Is it then impossible to vin- 
 dicate the justice of God without supposing a prior ex- 
 istence regulating the differences in their species ? Each 
 may be amply endowed in its own way, and each 
 bears testimony to the wisdom and beneficence of the 
 Creator. The same may be predicated of races of 
 mankind. There is a variety in the creation which, 
 while it indicates the inexhaustible riches of the Divine 
 intelligence and goodness, does not for a moment suggest 
 a want of equity in the Author of our being. No one 
 had an antecedent right to be created in a particular 
 manner, or of a particular race. He that was free to 
 
108 DIALOGUE III. 
 
 create in His own way, has so performed his work that 
 there should be symmetry, variety, and happiness, in the 
 universe. And that there is. The smallest insect that 
 crawls on the ground contributes to the beauty and har- 
 mony of the world in its own way, as the lofty elephant 
 does in his way. How could there be order if there 
 were no variety ? Is that symmetry, or that harmony 
 worthy of the name, where there is no plurality of different, 
 but proportional, substances ? Inequalities are in them- 
 selves no proofs of injustice, or culpable partiality. 
 
 ^' I will not deny, what I have already admitted, that 
 there is a large residuum of worldly inequalities which 
 may still remain to be accounted for. That account, 
 however, is found more satisfactorily in my theory than in 
 yours — I mean, in the supposition that this is a state of 
 probation and trial preparatory to another and a better 
 world. Probation itself demands difficulties. The gold 
 cannot be tried without being placed in the heated crucible. 
 The child is not trained for the purposes of life without 
 passing through the ordeal of a school. This world may 
 be to us a preparation for a better. There is nothing in 
 this idea which is derogatory to the justice and goodness 
 of God." 
 
 Tarhakdma. — " You called the doctrine of a prior state 
 an arbitrary assumption. Is your doctrine of probation 
 and trial, preparatory to a better world yet to come, any 
 thing better ? You cannot prove it either." 
 
 Satyakdma. — '' Strong presumptive evidence you know 
 is proof in cases which do not admit of mathematical 
 demonstration. The theory I propose accounts for our 
 difficulties, without giving the lie to our moral convictions. 
 Your theory, on the contrary, is nullified by its own vague- 
 ness, and, instead of justifying the ways of God, has a 
 tendency to cast doubts on His very existence. Witness 
 
sankara's idea of endless succession. 109 
 
 the argument of S'ankaracharya ; * What is the want 
 ' of equity ( on the part of God ) ? He makes a dis- 
 tinction between souls, high, low, middling. Hence 
 ' exhibiting partiality and prejudice, and other infirmities, 
 'he might be proved to be like ourselves, and therefore 
 'no God^." The question is accordingly one of vital 
 importance in theology. S'ankara, I may say, has given 
 two solutions of the problem which are apparently in- 
 consistent with each other. In one place, at least, he 
 strongly inveighs against the way in which you propose 
 to account for it. 
 
 'If it be said,' he continues, 'that the above distinctions 
 ' are owing to the past works of the souls themselves, and 
 'that consequently there can be nothing wrong in the 
 ' existing inequalities ; the solution will not stand : for 
 'works being motions, and God the mover, there will 
 'still be the fault of [cause and effect resting on] reci- 
 ' procal support [as in a vicious circle]. If you say 
 'there has been a series of works without a beginning, 
 'then, as in the present world, so also in past states, the 
 ' same fault must be found of reciprocal support, [each 
 'cause producing, and also being produced by, its own 
 ' effect] and it w^ill be after the manner of a troop of blind 
 'leading the blind ^.' 
 
 " I do not cite S'ankara approvingly, but I wish simply 
 to remind you that he does not here countenance your 
 
 Commentary on Ved^nta Siitra II. ii. 37. 
 
 'BfrT%fecf^cTij^^ftmf%^8rx^7^TT?:TiT^T5?iT2TTW5 1 ibid. 
 
110 DIALOGUE III. 
 
 theory of past works justifying present distinctions. It 
 will drive us from one world to a second, from that ao-ain 
 to its predecessor, until, as in Gotama's theory, you are 
 compelled to hold the eternity of the world before us." 
 
 Agamdha, — ^^But if so many philosophers of the west 
 and east held the doctrine of the soul's pre-existence, is it, 
 I ask again, modest to treat it as a mischievous theory?" 
 
 Satyakdma. — '^ I have myself only said that our 
 philosophers have drawn from it the most startling 
 conclusions. It would hardly be worth one's while to 
 combat the doctrine, if it were held as a mere opinion, 
 and if no inferences, subversive of the interests of religion 
 and morality, were deduced from it. 
 
 '^In Plato's system the theory of the soul's pre-existence 
 holds a very subordinate place. It is not pushed to any 
 extreme conclusion, destructive of religion or morals. 
 The doctrine appears to have had a feeble hold on his 
 mind. In the arguments brought forward there is no- 
 thing which corresponds to the force usually attached to 
 Socratic sayings. The immortality of the soul is his 
 great theme. Its past existence is insisted on for the 
 purpose of demonstrating that theme. As your Arabic 
 and Persian scholars constantly parade the name of Plato 
 in connection with the doctrine under consideration, let 
 us, once more, consider that philosopher's reasoning. 
 
 '^Plato's opinion of the soul's pre-existence appears 
 somewhat abruptly in the conversation which Socrates last 
 held with his friends before his death. The philosopher 
 was there joyously contemplating the happiness that 
 awaited his submission to the cruel sentence of his coun- 
 trymen. He did not grieve at a prospect which to his 
 friends appeared so melancholy, but looked without the 
 least concern for the fatal cup preparing for him. As a 
 reason for this indifference, he stated his belief that he 
 
Plato's opinion on pre-existence. Ill 
 
 was going to a happier world, where he should find a better 
 community. The scepticism of his friends leads him to a 
 philosophical discussion of his hope of immortality. He 
 assumes as an axiom, what his friends admit without 
 difficulty, that in all things which are produced, the pro- 
 cess is no otherwise than opposites issuing out of oppo- 
 sites^. So that when a thing becomes greater, it is from 
 having been less. Life proceeds out of death, and death 
 out of life. Thus he concludes that souls exist in Hades 
 after death. The pre-existence of the soul is involved 
 in this reasoning, which is founded on the gratuitous 
 assumption, so frequently observed in our Indian Sastras — 
 that whatsoever is born must necessarily die, and what- 
 soever dies must as necessarily be generated again^. Birth 
 succeeds death, no less than death birth. The soul when 
 it is born is only re-manifested after a previous death — 
 and consequently after an anterior existence. In the 
 course of the above reasoning, he refers to an old tradition, 
 that souls, dying, go to Hades, and, being born, return 
 from the dead. That this old saying had influenced 
 Plato more than any reasons by which the doctrine itself 
 was supported, would appear from the assertion of 
 Aristotle that the ancient philosophers were afraid of 
 nothing more than this one thing, that any thing should 
 be made out of nothing pre-existent. To say that the 
 soul was created would of course involve the dreaded pre- 
 dicament. 
 
 ''Then again Plato^s opinion of knowledge being mere 
 reminiscence, necessitated the doctrine of the soul's pre- 
 existence. Socrates calls up an untaught slave boy, and, 
 by a string of leading questions, makes him enunciate 
 
 ovK aWoOev r) eK tcjv Bvavriojv ra evavria. Phaedo. 
 ^IcT^ ff l^Tt ^^ ^ 5f^ fcT^ xf I Bhagavat GiU. 
 
112 DIALOGUE III. 
 
 the rule for the duplication of a square. I am not sure 
 that any catechizer, short of a Socrates, would succeed in 
 drawing, from the lips of an uninstructed clown, a state- 
 ment of the truth, that in a square, the square of " what 
 professors of science call the diagonal" is equal to twice 
 that of one of the sides. But even if every teacher of 
 youth had the tact and ability with which that great 
 philosopher catechized the boy, just referred to, what would 
 the fact prove ? Nothing more than this, that the hu- 
 man mind was so constituted that some ideas should 
 be stfggestive of others. The truths of geometry have 
 been successively deduced by that very mind. What 
 wonder then that a clown, under the tuition of such an 
 interrogator, should gather some of those truths, though 
 never before instructed. The notions which, from the 
 constitution of our minds, are generated within us by 
 external sensation and internal reflection need not be 
 considered as stamps of previously existing ideas. What- 
 ever those ideas be in Plato's system, there is no reason 
 why we may not at once assume the present as a world 
 of reality in which our ideas are for the first time learnt. 
 
 " Plato likewise concluded that the soul was uncreated 
 and immortal from its being an independent ever-moving 
 principle. ' Every soul is immortal, for that which is 
 ' in ceaseless motion is immortal. But that which moves 
 ' another, and is moved by another, as it stops in 
 ^ motion, stops in life. '" '"' ^ If then there be nothing 
 ' which moves itself but the soul, it necessarily follows 
 ^ that the soul is a thing uncreated and immortal^.' 
 
 '^ Plato you will observe did not deduce or persist in 
 any conclusions from that doctrine opposed to the glory 
 
 ® £1 ^6 sort TovTii ovT(i)Q ^\ov, fXY] aWo ri uvai to avro eavro 
 Kivovv 1} '>pv^}]v, £^ avayKrjQ aysvrjTOV re Kai auavarov v/'U^i? av Bit}. 
 
 Phaedrus, C. 24. 
 
PLATO*S OPINION ON PRE-EXISTENCE. 113 
 
 of God or the interests of man. In truth Socrates him- 
 self propounds it with diffidence in the Meno. He posi- 
 tively refuses to make any other use of it than that of 
 encouraging men to persevere in intellectual pursuits. 
 He thought people would be more manly and less idle, 
 if they were persuaded they were once endowed with 
 knowledge, and could consequently regain it with facility, 
 than if they believed they were never blessed with know- 
 ledge, and that what they had never known, it was neither 
 possible nor necessary to inquire after. If you were 
 once possessed of ideas, now forgotten, it is evident you 
 may recall them without difficulty. You should not 
 then indulge in idleness as if it were impossible for you 
 to improve your mind. This is the sort of exhortation 
 in which that philosopher delighted. But it is evident 
 there was no necessity for postulating the pre-existence 
 of the soul with a view to this. It were quite sufficient to 
 say the soul is naturally capable of intellectual acquisitions, 
 and that therefore earnest endeavours after knowledge 
 must be successful. 
 
 '' If he made any other practical use of his doctrine, it 
 was to enforce the observance of morals, by holding out 
 the terrors of a future world to the wicked and ungodly. 
 ' Whosoever passes his life justly, afterwards obtains a 
 ^ better lot, but who unjustly a worse one. Those who 
 'are timid and unjust are changed into women in their 
 ' second generation.' " 
 
 Tarkakdma. — *' What other conclusions could our 
 philosophers, either, have drawn from the doctrine of the 
 soul's pre-existence ? They too insisted on gogd behaviour 
 as a necessary qualification for future happiness." 
 
 Satyakdma. — '* I see I have not yet succeeded in ex- 
 plaining my views to you, notwithstanding several at- 
 tempts. I think it is not too severe a remark to say that 
 
 Q 
 
114 DIALOGUE III. 
 
 they have all drawn from it conclusions which militate 
 against our conceptions of the divine attributes, and which 
 tend to the subversion of good manners. Such conclusions 
 may be called mischievous, may they not, Tarkakama ?" 
 
 " Of course, if they really involved notions such as 
 you describe." 
 
 '^ Well, then, one great conclusion that our philosophers 
 have drawn from the doctrine of the soul's pre-existence 
 is that this world is a scene of reward or punishment 
 according to works performed in a previous state. What- 
 ever happens now is owing to adrishta, or the ^ unseen 
 merit or demerit of past works, otherwise called daiva'^ . 
 Our thoughts, feelings, and actions are all fettered by the 
 events of a life already passed. It is impossible even for 
 God to help us except as far as adrishta will allow. He 
 cannot get over this difficulty any more than he can pro- 
 duce rice out of wheat seed, as S'ankaracharya says. On 
 the immoral consequences of such a doctrine of necessity, 
 I need not expatiate." 
 
 Tarhahdma. — ^^ But adrishta simply regulates our con- 
 dition in life as the reward or punishment of past works. 
 I repeat, it does not diminish our control over ourselves." 
 
 Satyahdma. — " The condition itself is in your system 
 almost every thing. If a person is degraded by adrishta 
 to a S'lldra's condition, he is precluded from every 
 aspiration which may be called noble — for according 
 to the Sastra he should be engaged solely in doing 
 service to the twice-horn. He may, by a lucky stroke 
 of daiva, get up to the surface again, but he cannot 
 calculate on such a chance, nor guide himself by such 
 a hope. 
 
 ^^^ m^ ^?T^ f%f% ^^T^^lfWcT i Matsya Purina. 
 
FATALISM. 115 
 
 "Then, again, although some parts of the S'dstra, with a 
 view no doubt to stimulate human efforts, limit the ope- 
 ration of adrishta®, and magnify man's freedom of will and 
 action, thereby enhancing his responsibility, there are 
 other parts equally, — I may say, more, — decisive in 
 establishing the paramount influence of daivaj and 
 extendinof it without bounds to all actions and events^. 
 The very exceptions that are solemnly mentioned prove 
 its absolute sovereignty as a rule. Philosophers main- 
 tain that by true knowledge one can cast off* the bonds of 
 works, and sectarians contend that by devotion to their 
 ishta devatd^^j or favourite god, one can get over the 
 effects of daiva, or Fate ; both thereby admitting its un- 
 controlled potency in ordinary cases. And it is not denied 
 by those who would limit the influence of daiva that it 
 extends over every event — only that it requires the con- 
 currence of human efforts." 
 
 "But I do not see," said Tarkakama, '*what great 
 evil would arise from the doctrine of adrishta or daiva, 
 supposing that it does imply a restriction on men's 
 actions." 
 
 Satyahdma. — ^^ If you admit the extreme view of its 
 power, by which for instance the Brahmin, already 
 adverted to ^, excused an unnatural act of severity against 
 
 8 *5^ 
 
 9 =^ 
 
 ^^5^ f^oFri-JTrrf ^X.V' ^^15:^^f^?fTJ | Ma8tya Purina. 
 
 «T "^ ^^TcT TTTT ^^ II Brahma Vaivarta. 
 
 "ffT^fxr ^^ f^^fWct flcTTT^^fxr ^i" ^ ^^fcT II Hitopades-a. 
 
 ^ f^^^J II Matsya Purana. 
 1 See Foot note 7, page 94. 
 
116 DIALOGUE III. 
 
 his own sons, it amounts to a doctrine of fatalisna. Now 
 
 * suppose a fatalist to educate any one from his youth up, 
 ' in his own principles ; that the child should reason upon 
 ' them ; and conclude, that since he cannot possibly behave 
 ' otherwise than he does, he is not a subject of blame or 
 ^ commendation, nor can deserve to be rewarded for, or 
 ' punished : imagine him to eradicate the very percep- 
 ' tions of blame and commendation out of his mind, by 
 ' means of the system ; to form his temper and character 
 ' and behaviour to it ; and from it to judge of the treat- 
 ' ment he was to expect, say, from reasonable men, upon 
 ' his coming abroad into the world, as the fatalist judges 
 ' from this system, what he is to expect from the Author 
 ' of nature, and with regard to a future state. I cannot 
 
 * forbear stopping here to ask, whether any one of common 
 ' sense would think fit that a child should be put upon 
 
 * these speculations, and be left to apply them to practice. 
 
 * And a man has little pretence to reason, who is not 
 ^ sensible, that we are all children in speculations of this 
 ' kind. However the child would doubtless be highly 
 ' delighted to find himself freed from the restraints of fear 
 'and shame, with which his play-fellows were fettered 
 ' and embarrassed ; and highly conceited in his superior 
 ' knowledge so far beyond his years. But conceit and 
 
 * vanity would be the least bad part of the influence 
 'which these principles must have, when thus reasoned 
 'and acted upon, during the course of his education. 
 ' He must either be allowed to go on and be the plague 
 ' of all about him, and himself too^ even to his own des- 
 ' truction : or else correction must be continually made 
 ' use of, to supply the want of those natural perceptions 
 ' of blame and commendation which we have supposed 
 ' to be removed ; and to give him a practical impression 
 ' of w^hat he had reasoned himself out of the belief of, 
 
DAIVA. 117 
 
 ' that he was in fact an accountable child, and to be pun- 
 'ished for doing what he was forbid^/ 
 
 '* Our best security against this mischievous theory of 
 adrishta is in those principles of conscious responsibility 
 which the Supreme Being has implanted in our minds, and 
 which we cannot wholly unlearn, notwithstanding all 
 that philosophers may say to the contrary. Hence it is 
 that poets have often censured an idle dependence on 
 daiva, and inculcated a firm resistance of its power. But 
 the power itself is not denied^.'" 
 
 Tarkakdma. — " What is daiva but the inscrutable will 
 of God ? Is it not right that man should not presume 
 too much on his power or freedom, but be constantly 
 reminded of his dependence on the will of God ? " 
 
 Satyakdma. — '^ Certainly. If daiva or adrishta signi- 
 fied the inscrutable will of God, there could be no objec- 
 tion to extending the range of its operation. The impres- 
 sion that we are under the power of God's will, can never 
 discourage efforts in the right direction, nor diminish our 
 sense of responsibility. Indeed it would rather heighten 
 both. But neither daiva nor its synonym es dista, adrish- 
 ta, hhdgya, can be so construed. They are defined by 
 philosophers, poets, and lexicographers, all, to mean the 
 luck, desert, habit, or disposition which depends on, 
 and is derived from, one's own acts in a previous life*. 
 
 2 Butler. 
 
 ^Tf^^T ^^?^ I ^^ fiTf w ^^ ^^^^T?frw^T ^^ §1^ 2rf^ -if 
 
 f^Urt% Wt^ Tt^ II Hitopades-a. 
 
 ^^^ ^''^ItI^^^H^T^ I S abda-mukt^-raaharnava. 
 n^ ^^^fVr^W ^^ Xr o|^f%3(r I M^tsya in Ditto. 
 
118 DIALOGUE III. 
 
 To be under the influence of such luck is not to be 
 under the guidance of an all-wise and beneficent In- 
 telligence — but to continue subject to a blind influence, 
 the nature and extent of which are obscure and indefinite. 
 I do not wonder at men's impatience under such a sup- 
 posed bondage, and their eagerness to escape from its 
 trammels. 
 
 '^ The theological errors deduced from this theory of the 
 soul's pre-existence are equally grave. How does Gotama 
 for instance account for the creation? He introduces 
 a purvapaksha, or a prim4 facie opinion, different from 
 his own, to the eff'ect, that 'God is the cause (of the 
 universe) for the (previous) works of men are found to be 
 unfruitful.' (iv. 19) He then replies, 'No; for there 
 can be no fruit without (previous) works.' (iv. 20.) 
 The obvious meaning here is that the works of a previous 
 life, not God, produced the ivorld. The scholiast does 
 his best to explain away this apparent denial of God, 
 by contending that the author only denies the material, 
 or sole, causality of God, teaching thereby that God and 
 adrishta were joint causes of the Universe^. Even if 
 this explanation were accepted, it would still, by associat- 
 ing Him with Fate or Luck, be an avowed abridgment 
 of the Creator's power, already curtailed by the admission 
 of atoms. But this is not all. How could there be a 
 Fate or Luck, dependent on prior works, at the original 
 creation? If then, there could be no fruit ivithout such works, 
 the world could never have been really created. That 
 
 ^^^'^ ^TW •f ^VIT^W=ff ♦*l^* I Premachandra on the Naishadha. 
 XrS(ar^^cf ^liT cl^^pRt% ^Wcf I Hitopades'a. 
 
ADRISHTA OPPOSED TO THEISM. 119 
 
 this is not a mere speculative inference drawn by myself 
 from his principles, but expresses his real opinion, is 
 evident from his argument for the Soul's pre- existence 
 and eternity already considered^. 
 
 ''The Vais'eshika leader Kan^da, too, drew a similar 
 inference from the theory of pre -existence and adrishta. 
 He boldly asserted that the primal action of atoms is 
 caused by ' adrishta,' to which was also owing the fii^st 
 act of mind (manasas'cha.) So that if there be a Supreme 
 Beino-, still He cannot have moved without adrishta. 
 
 ''In Jaimini's system, again, every thing is works, that is 
 to say, vorks in the sense of adrishta. It is by virtue of 
 ' works' that the affairs of the world are conducted. "Works 
 procure merit, and merit regulates events. This succes- 
 sion of works, and their consequent events, has gone on 
 from eternity like seed and plant. The seed produces 
 the plant, and the plant again yields the seed. Works 
 regulate events, and events lead to works. They thus 
 form a chain of inter-dependent links. 
 
 " It is adrishta, too, which affords refuge to the 
 atheistic Sankhya. The arrangement of the world and 
 the regulation of human affairs might have driven him to 
 the necessity of acknowledging a Supreme Intelligence, but 
 the doctrine of adrishta furnished him with an escape. 
 'The distribution of fruits could not be by a divine 
 'cause, for it is determined by works'''.' This, as we 
 have seen, was likewise the opinion of Jaimini, S'ankara- 
 chdrya being witness®. 
 
 6 It must be confessed that a few commentators, of no great celebrity, take a 
 
 different view of the sictras quoted above. The question will be again mooted 
 in the next Dialogue. , 
 
 ^ ^^Tf^fe^ X^r^pfT^rTf: %Wm\ clfi^i-: | Kapila Stitra, v. I. 
 8 See page 79. 
 
120 DIALOGUE IIT. 
 
 '^ As to the Vedanta, although, as I have shown before, 
 it does not consider the doctrine of previous works as a 
 sufficient explanation of the diversity observable in human 
 condition, yet it draws in other places conclusions equally 
 subversive of the Creator's independent agency. As 
 S'ankaracharya always states his opinion with great per- 
 spicuity, I shall read his words in full. Commenting on 
 Siitra 11. i. 34, the object of \^hich is to show that 
 God creates the world out of regard to human works, 
 ' It may be objected,' he says, ' God is then proved not to be 
 ^ the cause of the universe. Why ? From the visible instan- 
 ' ces of injustice and cruelty. Some he makes very happy, 
 ^ i. e.y the gods ; some very miserable, the brutes, &c. ; 
 ^some middling, men, &c. As the author of such an 
 'unequitable creation, He is proved to be subject to pas- 
 ^ sions like other persons, that is to say, to partiality and 
 * prejudice, and therefore His nature is found wanting in 
 'the spotlessness which is set forth in the S'ruti and 
 'Smriti. And by dispensing pain and the ruin of all 
 'creatures. He is chargeable with a malicious cruelty, 
 ' deemed culpable even among the wicked. Hence, because 
 'of the visible instances of injustice and cruelty, God can- 
 'not be the cause of the universe.' 'To this,' continues 
 S'ankara, we thus reply : ' Injustice and cruelty cannot be 
 ' charged upon God. Why ? Because he did not act in- 
 ' dependently. If God, alone, had, independently, created 
 'the world of inequalities, then these faults of injustice 
 ' and cruelty might indeed be attributed to Him. But one, 
 ' who is not independent, cannot be charged with the act 
 ' of creation. God, being dependent, creates this world 
 ' of inequalities. If you ask on what is He dependent ? 
 ' We reply, He is dependent on Merit and Demerit. That 
 ' there should be an unequal creation, dependent on the 
 ' Merit and Demerit of the souls created, is no fault of 
 
sankara's opinion on adrishta. 121 
 
 ^God. God is to be looked upon as the rain. As 
 Hlie rain is the common cause of the production of 
 ' rice and wheat, but of their specific distinctions as 
 'rice and wheat, the causes are the varying powers of 
 ' their respective seeds ; so is God the common cause, in 
 * the creation of men, gods, and others, but of the distinc- 
 ' tions between gods, men, and others, the causes are the 
 ' varying works, inherent in their respective souls. Thus 
 'God, being dependent (on works), cannot be charged 
 'with injustice and cruelty^.' 
 
 " S'ankarach4rya then shows that the Vedas inculcate 
 the same view, and proceeds to expound the next Sutra, 
 in which is answered the objection, how could there be 
 
 f^rrfi:^^' ir^^cT ci^i n^^r^^cfET ^^f^^ f^^iir confer wricq" 
 ^5i§^5rrf^"^i^Tcr ^^ttw^w^^^tw it^^ct cTWi%^^Ti-?5i 
 
 ^iFTcT HT^^f^IcT^ ^1\ ff f^^^W* $^^ t^€t f^^Ht ^f^ 
 f^pR^cT fSJTcTW^ Tt^'^^^ ^W^ ^ g f^?:$^ll f%HT(2-(^- 
 f\'m ^T^^ ^^€Y f^^^T Wf^ f^f^Rift^ f^?T^=^cT XfcT ^cT 
 
 f^^?TT^i%lTfcr ^T2T5fft'Sr^^l^^T"^* t^^^TT^^W^^W? ^m ff 
 
 R 
 
122 DIALOGUE III. 
 
 previous works at the original creation ? The objection 
 itself is thus represented: 'This, beloved, was one, with- 
 ' out a second, at the beginning. Hence, as there could 
 ' be no distinctions before the creation, there could be no 
 'works, in dependence on which inequalities might be 
 ' created. After the creation there may be works depend- 
 ' ent on corporeal distinctions, and corporeal distinctions 
 ' dependent on works : this reciprocal inter-action may then 
 ' be made out. God may be dependent on works after the 
 'distinctions are made. But before those distinctions 
 ' are made, there could be no works caused by varying 
 ' instruments, and therefore we ought to find a uniform 
 ' creation.' 
 
 'If this objection be urged,' continues S'ankara, 'it does 
 ' not vitiate our doctrine, because the world is without 
 'beginning. It would vitiate our theory, if the world 
 ' had a beginning. But the world being without begin- 
 • ning, nothing can prevent works and unequal creations 
 ' continuing in the states of cause and effect, like the seed 
 'and its plant^^' 
 
 " Consider, friend Tarkakama, the mischievous conse- 
 quences that have resulted from the theory of the soul's 
 pre-existence. Our philosophers resort to adrishta in 
 order to account for certain difficulties in the world, and 
 
sankara's self-contradiction. 123 
 
 ddrishta compels them to fly from stage to stage, until 
 they are forced to declare, that the world was never 
 created — that it is without beginning, that it is eternal. 
 And that which is eternal, is, in their conception, again, 
 not dependent on a cause ^. How can our philosophers, 
 consistently find fault with the Charvacas who deny the 
 necessity of an intelligent First Cause, when they them- 
 selves pronounce the world to be without beginning ?" 
 
 While this conversation was going on between Satya- 
 k^ma and Tarkakama, Agamika and myself behaved 
 with exemplary patience. We did not once interrupt the 
 disputants. But I was now irresistibly led to express 
 my wonder how S'ankardchdrya could hold such an 
 opinion after ridiculing the idea of an eternal succession 
 of works and creations, as a troop of blind leaders of 
 blind. 
 
 '' Both passages are before you," said Satyakama, ^' you 
 can judge for yourselves. If I were to hazard a conjec- 
 ture, I should say that his object, in the passage I quoted 
 first, was to uphold the material causality of God against 
 a whole host of antagonistic philosophers, such as the 
 Vais'eshikas, the Mahes'waras, the followers of the S4n- 
 khya and the Yoga. He maintained against them all that 
 it was necessary, no less from moral considerations than 
 from regard to the authority of the Veda, to acknowledge 
 God to be both the material, or substantial, and the effi- 
 cient cause of the universe, and consequently to be iden- 
 tical with the world. Without that supposition, he 
 thought the inequalities in the world could not be satis- 
 factorily accounted for. Unless God and the world were 
 identical, how could He escape a charge of injustice and 
 
124 DIALOGUE III. 
 
 cruelty, when manifestly there are. so many inequahties in 
 the creation ? The idea of an eternal succession of works 
 and worlds depending on each other, he ridiculed by com- 
 paring it with a troop of blind leaders of blind. But in 
 the passage I have just read, he is facing the question of 
 inequalities in opposition to the atheistic followers of 
 Jaimini, who had on that ground argued for the non- 
 existence of a Creator ; and he takes refuge in the very 
 supposition of an eternal succession of works and worlds, 
 which he elsewhere ridicules." 
 
 '' Very strange self-contradiction I" said I. '' Is it not 
 possible to reconcile the two passages 1" 
 
 ^'That," replied Satyakama, '^must be left to the diplo- 
 matic abilities of friend Tarkakama." 
 
 Tarkak^ma said nothing. We waited a minute or two 
 to hear how he would reconcile such a seeming contradic- 
 tion. At length A'gamika asked, whether by arguing 
 against the souPs pre-existence, his friend meant to deny 
 its eternity both ivaySj and pronounce it to be perishable 
 with the body. "Most certainly, no^," replied Satyakama. 
 ''The soul, though it had a beginning, as indeed all 
 creatures must have, is imperishable. That whatever 
 had a beginning must have an end, may be a favourite 
 theory with some philosophers ; but they can never prove 
 it. The soul may be immortal .without being eternal. 
 The Greek philosopher who argued for its pre-existence, in 
 order to prove its immortality, had given reasons for the 
 latter which did not depend on the former, and which 
 human nature cannot gainsay. 'Good hope have I,' said 
 he, ' that something is in reserve for the dead, and that 
 (as I said long ago) the good shall fare far better than 
 the bad.'" 
 
 ''This," continued Satyakama, "together with the soul's 
 essential independence of the body, which he also asserts 
 
ENDLESS TRANSMIGRATIONS. 125 
 
 afterwards, ought to convince the incredulous that there is 
 another and a better world reserved for us, where our 
 souls' aspirations will find their corresponding objects, 
 and where that which we now but partially understand 
 will be clearly apprehended. Do not think, Agamika, 
 that I deny the future glories of the soul. I have reasons 
 for believing in them, still higher than the teaching of 
 mere philosophy, — on which we may converse some other 
 day. I believe that the righteous will meet with rewards 
 in another state of which the present world can afford 
 but faintest fore-shadowings. It is the supposition of a 
 previous life, and the consequences deduced from it, that 
 I protest against. Those consequences 1 have already 
 mentioned in detail, and I may add that as a further 
 corollary from the theory of the soul's pre-existence, 
 our philosophers also held the doctrine of its successive 
 transmigrations. The JN"yaya, Sankhya, and Vedanta 
 equally teach that the souls of the deceased remove for 
 a time to heaven or hell, to receive the due rewards of 
 their actions. Those rewards do not however exhaust 
 their merit or demerit, which still adheres to them, ' as 
 greasy substances stick to the pot, even after it has 
 been emptied'^. They accordingly return, and are again 
 born with such bodies as are suitable to their previous 
 lives. The new circumstances in which they appear, 
 and the new works which are developed in them, in- 
 fluence their destinies in the next succeeding age. In this 
 manner their souls transmigrate as gods, men, or ani- 
 mals, until the dissolution of the world, which again is 
 followed by a second creation and by their re-appearance 
 
 ^PgcT^ ^'^^^t^fcT^^ C?^I«r^?f IlJtfcr I Vedanta SiHra, Com. III. i. 8. 
 
126 " DIALOGUE III. 
 
 agreeably to their previous works. This succession of 
 creations and births, in which the events of each cycle 
 are regulated by those of its predecessor, is considered 
 by our philosophers an intolerable evil. They were 
 thoroughly disgusted with this idea of a puppet life, in 
 which rational beings were irrevocably committed to con- 
 ditions and impulses, not according to their own will, 
 but as they were, by the verdict of adrishta, declared to 
 have merited them, by reason of works of which they 
 were not themselves conscious ; and hence they look- 
 ed upon existence as a burden, and enjoyment itself 
 as a task. To a certain extent I cannot help sympathis- 
 ing with them. If indeed we were subject to the sort 
 of transmigrations taught in the Brahminical philosophy : 
 if our circumstances were so fixed by the events of a 
 previous life, that we were mere toys for the sport of 
 Fate ; if a hard, unsympathising, impersonal, adrishta 
 must necessarily govern our deliberations, and, in a 
 manner, supersede our judgments, then no man of any 
 energy could submit to such an infliction. Bitter com- 
 plaints would escape the lips of the most forbearing. 
 All would naturally wish they had never been born. No 
 wonder, then, that existence should be considered an 
 evil, and that men should pant for WAikti, or release 
 from this servile bondage to adrishta^ 
 
 Agamika, — '' Well, Satyakama, you have spoken out 
 your mind. We are glad at least to have some insight 
 into the mental process you have gone through. We 
 can only promise to think on these points." 
 
 Tarhakdma. — '^ Yes, thinking is man's great preroga- 
 tive. We must think on what our friend has said. But 
 (turning to Satyakama) you have overlooked one main 
 point. In your essay you condemned the theories of all the 
 schools about creation. Is it possible that the universe 
 
DOCTRINK OF CAUSATION. 127 
 
 could proceed out of nothing 1 Every effect must have a 
 cause." 
 
 SatyakdmcL — '^I do not deny that every effect must 
 have a cause. But we probably assent to the maxim in 
 very different senses. Let us see how the theory of 
 causation is treated in the schools. It is commonly 
 understood that the Nyaya philosophy acknowledges 
 three sorts of causes, substantial or inherent, non-sub- 
 stantial or exterior, and a third which might, perhaps, 
 be conveniently styled the operative cause. The modern 
 followers of the school do indeed entertain such a view, 
 as is evident from the Bhdshd paricJiheda in which we 
 find a neat expression of that view^. The founder 
 of the system, however, does not clearly inculcate that 
 doctrine. In truth, the most prominent, if not the only, 
 idea of causation which pervades his Sutras, is that 
 of a material or substantial cause. This, possibly, was the 
 reason of his abridging God's act in the work of creation. 
 Kanada indeed speaks of a multiplicity of causes, and 
 may be considered as an authority to which the Naiyayikas 
 may appeal for their theory of a threefold causality. 
 But while his ideas coincide with those of the moderns 
 as to the first two, his view of the third cause does not 
 quite correspond to that of an intelligent efficient agent, 
 such as the potter is of the jar, a favourite example 
 with the school in our days. His operative cause im- 
 plies simply an action tending to a result, but not the 
 
 ^TcT II 
 
128 DIALOGUE III. 
 
 action of an intelligent agent aiming at a certain end ; 
 and the examples given by his commentator are those 
 of" heat in the process of decoction or cremation, and 
 of texts of the Vedas inducing the observance of sacri- 
 fices^. Neither of the great authorities of the Nyaya 
 appears to have taught the idea of an intelligent efficient 
 cause of any thing. 
 
 ^^The Sankhya school, too, presents little or no trace of 
 the idea of efficient causation. The material or substantial 
 cause is what it mainly, if not exclusively, recognized. 
 The 79 th Siitra states plainly that a substance cannot 
 be made of no substance^. (Ex nihilo nihil fit.) The 
 author repeats in another Siitra that there must be a 
 material for every tiling^. But while so careful in his 
 recognition of the material cause, he says scarcely any- 
 thing, even by implication, of an efficient cause. He 
 adds in his definition of destruction that it is mere reso- 
 lution into the cause ^, and maintains that production 
 is nothing else than the manifestation of that which pre- 
 exists in the cause ^. The statue, already existent in its 
 cause, the stone, is only manifested by sculpture. The oil. 
 
 cffX^m* I Sankara Mis'ra. 
 
 ^ "TT^^T^ ^^f€%: I I. 79. 
 ^ ^TTKT'^f^^mcT I I. 116. 
 '^ "STT^J ^RW^^: I I. 122- 
 
 ^ -JrifH^f^f^^:^ ^T^'fT^T^^TfT^ I I- 121. 
 
SANKARA*S OPINION ON CAUSATION. 129 
 
 already existent in its cause, the sesamum, is only brought 
 out to view by pressing. The rice, already existent 
 in its cause, the paddy, is only educed by beating^. 
 Cause and effect stand to each other like the seed and its 
 germ^". Hence arose the godless conclusion that since 
 the created universe consists only of inanimate and irra- 
 tional substances, (the rational principle, or soul, being 
 uncreated and eternal) — it could have no other than an 
 unintelligent cause such as nature ; her products having 
 as common characteristics, ' the three qualities, and want 
 of thought and animation ^' 
 
 ^^ The Vedknta did certainly not ignore the theory of 
 an intelligent efficient cause ; but the idea of a material 
 cause, which it received from the Upanishads and held 
 in common with the other Schools, completely vitiated 
 its philosophy, and, what is still more unfortunate, its 
 theology. 
 
 ^' While reasoning against the Sankhya, S'ankaracharya 
 does not fail to expatiate on the intelligence of the First 
 Cause ; and, without committing himself to a decided 
 assertion of the necessity of an efficient agent, points 
 out the impropriety of hunting for a material cause to 
 the exclusion of an efficient agent. ^ There is no neces- 
 ' sity, says he, for seeking an original, such as earth or 
 ^ other material of the same substance (as the effect,) 
 ' instead of an exterior cause such as the potter or 
 'other artificer different from it. The idea of cause and 
 ' effect is founded on the skill with which beds, chairs, 
 ' and other articles are manufactured. Nor is it possible 
 
 ^ f^Tmi^cT^mf^ T^- 1 I- 127. 
 
130 DIALOGUE III. 
 
 ' to deduce from the idea of cause and effect a common 
 ' irrational substratum of external and internal diversi- 
 ' ties^.' The prominence here given to intelligent agency 
 stands in marked contrast to the examples elsewhere 
 made use of to express God's causality of the universe. He 
 is to the external world what the yarn is to the cloth, what 
 milk is to curds, the earth to a jar, the gold to a bracelet, 
 the iron to a nail-parer. The very passage of the 
 Upanishad, (the basis of the 2nd Siitra,) which declares 
 the universe to be the product of God, presents the 
 cause ( Yatas) in the ablative case ; which, says Sankara, 
 is alone sufficient to show that the creator is spoken of as 
 the substantial cause out of which, not the efficient cause 
 by whichy the universe was formed^. This proves that 
 the idea of material causation was uppermost in S'an- 
 kara's mind." 
 
 Tarhihdma. — '^ But where is the error, and where the 
 danger, in this idea of causation ? Gotama, Kapila, and 
 Sankara may not have thought it necessary to expatiate 
 on the efficient cause. Will you not allow an author to 
 choose his own subject ? Can you show that they have 
 not accurately represented what they did undertake to 
 explain ?" 
 
 Satyakdma. — '"A fair issue. I say, they did not. It is 
 not quite philosophical prominently to connect the idea 
 
 si &» 
 
 Com. Vedflnt Sritra II. ii. 1. 
 ' ^cT i:ft^?Tfq- xn^ ^^ ^T TJ{\f^ VTcTlf^ WT^^ ICW^ 
 
 Com. Ved^t StStra I. iv. 23. 
 
MATERIAL NOT PROPERLY A CAl'SE. 131 
 
 of causality with the material of a thing. That is the 
 substance of which, not the cause by which, an article 
 is made. It would sound rather strange to say that the 
 rim of your spectacles has gold for its cause. The idea 
 of substance is to my mind very different from that of 
 causality. Would it not be a truism to connect cause 
 and effect in this way ? Kapila virtually confesses this 
 when he says a product is identical with the cause ^. And 
 S'ankara, I have shown, admits that the radical idea of 
 causation is that of intelligent agency." 
 
 Tarkakdma — ^' I suppose you mean to read" a lecture 
 to our philosophers on Grammar and Rhetoric : — they 
 have not chosen the best term for the substance of a 
 thing. If that be all, it is a small offence, hardly de- 
 serving of criticism, except from unrazored lips within 
 the walls of a school, though even there, neither Panini 
 nor Vopadeva will assist you in deriving an intelligent 
 efficient agent from the word Cdranam (cause). And a 
 most celebrated philosopher of ancient Europe, I am 
 told, held exactly the same view of causality as the 
 Naiyayikas." 
 
 Satyakdma. — "^ You mean Aristotle. He did not hold 
 exactly the same view, but one very analogous to it. 
 He inculcated a quadruple causality. The fourth or 'final' 
 cause does not appear in the list of cdranas in the Brah- 
 minical philosophy. I would not object to the use of 
 the term, material or substantial cause, in a secondarv 
 sense of the word cause, and in reference to works of 
 human art ; but when we come to the grand question 
 about the universe 1 do object to its use. Human 
 agents cannot work without materials. The carpenter 
 wants his wood, the weaver his yarn, the jeweller his 
 
132 DIALOGUE III. 
 
 gold. But we have no reason for thinking that the great 
 Artificer of the universe stood in similar need. It is by 
 no means philosophical to attribute to One, whom we 
 acknowledge to be Omnipotent, the imperfections and 
 weaknesses of agents of limited capacities. S'ankara- 
 ch4rya-^ himself acknowledges that the work of creation 
 is not to be classed in the same category as human acts 
 in the world. The prominence given to the material 
 cause has a tendency to make men forget this distinction, 
 and hence my jealousy of it. 
 
 ^^ As for Aristotle, I would remark that he employed 
 his fourfold division of cause chiefly as a guide to the 
 inquiries of the physical philosopher ; who was thus 
 directed to inquire into (1) The internal physiological 
 character of a thing : (2) Its form, or logical definition 
 as a species : (3) Its history : (4) Its uses. He did not 
 profess to rescue men from misery by discovering to 
 them the cause of the Universe ; he only proposed to 
 investigate the nature of things, because man's nature 
 urged him to pursue ^' the true ;" — and since in the 
 course of this investigation man's own nature came to 
 be examined, and on examination turned out to be pre- 
 eminently mortal, he taught men to seek for happiness by 
 the practice of virtue. 
 
 '^ With reference to the grammatical formation of the 
 word cdranam, of course the afiix anat, as Vopadeva calls 
 it, does not indicate the agent. Neither does it signify 
 the substance of which a thing is made. It properly 
 means the instrument by which an action is done. 
 But the custom of philosophers of making it the cor- 
 relative of cdrya (act) does certainly point to the 
 agency of the efficient, as the most important of the 
 
 «T ^t^^ft'^ ^TpSTcTW I Com. Yed^nt Stitra I. 4. 27. 
 
ILLUSTRATED BY A WATCH. 133 
 
 causes. Now tell me candidly, Tarkakama, w^hat did 
 you admire most, when you saw a watch for the first 
 time ; the metal, the combinations, or the inventor's 
 
 skill r 
 
 Tarkakama stared. — The question seemed to throw 
 some new light on the theory of causation. The metal, 
 the combinations, and the inventor's skill were of course 
 the substantial, the non-substantial, and the operative 
 causes of the watch in the vocabulary of the Nyaya. 
 
 Tarkakama said, not without changing colour, '' Of 
 course I admired the inventor's skill the most." 
 
 '^ The idea foremost in your mind as to the causality 
 of the watch was the inventor's skill, was it not V 
 
 " I should think so." 
 
 ^^ The metal was quite a secondary idea. Your admi- 
 ration of its excellence as a time-piece would hardly lead 
 you to ask what the particular metal was. You would 
 think chiefly, if not solely, of the inventor's skill as regards 
 its causality. Would you not ?" 
 
 " Very probably I should." 
 
 '^ You would at once conclude that an intelligent 
 architect must be the cdranam of such a cdrya.'' 
 
 '' I suppose I should." 
 
 ^' Well ; you have passed sentence yourself on the theory 
 of causation in the Brahminical philosophy. You would 
 think first of a cause which Gotama and Kapila do not 
 recognize at all, which Kanada speaks of somewhat ob- 
 scurely as the last in the series, and which the Ved^nta 
 strangely mixes up with the substance of the manufacture." 
 
 Tarkakdma. — ** What do you mean by saying that 
 Gotama and Kapila do not recognize the cause which, in 
 the case of the watch, would be foremost in my mind ?" 
 
 Satyakdma. — '' An intelligent efficient cause is not 
 found in Gotama's and Kapila's lists. The latter certainly 
 
134 DIALOGUE III. 
 
 ignored the necessity, in the formation of the world, of 
 such an Agent directing the operation ofpr^akriti, or nature, 
 the rootless root of all things^ which acted independently, 
 ' like milk turning into curds / though the example was 
 singularly inappropriate, since milk would never turn 
 into curds without the action of the atmosphere. You 
 would not say, would you, that gold or silver turned into 
 a watch, like milk into curds." 
 
 Tarkakama gave no answer, but put a question ; 
 *' Admitting that the term material or substantial cause 
 is an unfortunate expression, and that it ought not to have 
 been put forth prominently in the theory of causation, 
 what are those dangerous consequences of which the 
 theory is productive ? Why this appeal to our fears ?" 
 
 Satyahdma. — ^' I have already answered this question. 
 By calling the substance of a thing its cause, our philo- 
 sophers introduced the most dangerous theological errors. 
 Whatever has a direct tendency to obscure the majesty 
 of God, and curtail our sense of His power, may well 
 be denominated dangerous. The theory which makes 
 the material the most important of the causes, led people 
 to rest satisfied with speculating on the material cause 
 of the Universe. That no man can work without mate- 
 rials is denied by none, simply because man is not omni- 
 potent, and has not creative power. But when one looks 
 at an exquisite production of art, he is so lost in admi- 
 ration at the skill of the artist, that he almost forgets 
 the minor que^^tion of the material. And yet so bane- 
 fully has the theory of material causality worked among 
 us that the mental energy of our philosophers has 
 found most active exercise not zji the exclamatioti, How 
 wonderful is the arrangement of the universe ! but in the 
 interrogation, Of what pre-existing substance is all this 
 made ? Nay they have been so lost in that worse than 
 
GOD NOT DEPENDENT ON MATERIALS. 135 
 
 useless question, as to forget that a Creator of infinite 
 power and perfection needs not, like weak and imper- 
 fect man, to stop for materials, but can make materials by 
 the mere fiat of His will. If the natural instincts of the 
 human soul lead us to believe in the existence of an All- 
 powerful and Perfect Being, if the irresistible arguments 
 of the Vedanta itself drive us to the conclusion that the 
 Universe was created by a God, infinite in wisdom and 
 contrivance ; then there can be no possible necessity for 
 speculating on the material of the world : then the most 
 philosophical course is to consider the objects originally 
 created by such a God as at once the matter and form of 
 the world. To assume the eternity of some gross material, 
 existing side by side with an intelligent and all-perfect God, 
 is not only unnecessary, (and therefore unphilosophical,) in 
 as much as it assumes two principles, where one is amply 
 sufficient to account for all we see ; but it is inconsistent 
 with the idea of perfection which we must attribute to 
 the Deity. If He had some material to work upon, pre- 
 viously existing independent of Him, then there was 
 nothing peculiar in His agency ; then it was of the same 
 species as that of a human architect ; then He was our 
 creator in no higher sense than that in which a potter is 
 the maker of a jar. The Vedantist, on the other hand, 
 placed himself in a false position, by seeking in a spiritual 
 essence, the substance of such a world consisting of pure 
 and impure, intelligent and unintelligent, rational and 
 irrational, animated and inanimate creatures. 
 
 " The fact is that if the Supreme Being could not really 
 create this world without pre-existent materials, it would 
 be no easy task to answer the arguments of the godless 
 Sankhya. Since then, this peculiar theory of causation 
 has driven our philosophers to the sad strait of virtually 
 abridging the power of God, and, in some cases, of even 
 
136 DIALOGUE III. 
 
 ignoring His operation and denying His existence alto- 
 gether, I suppose I am justified in stigmatizing it as a 
 dangerous error. 
 
 "It was," continued Satyakama, "these two cardinal 
 errors, that of the soul's pre-existence and this of material 
 causality, which betrayed the Brahminical intellect into 
 gross mistakes in philosophy and theology. Few philoso- 
 phers in any country were possessed of the acuteness, 
 the patience, and the industry which distinguished our 
 ancestors ; but, under the baneful influence of those two 
 errors, the excellent qualities of their minds produced 
 much evil, and little good. 
 
 " You seem to contend, Tarkakama, that the conclusions 
 of our philosophers are based on the two theories we have 
 been discussing®. This fact I concede to you once for 
 all. Granted that many of their conclusions are dedu- 
 cible from those theories ; what then ? Are we tamely 
 to submit to such startling conclusions because of those 
 gratuitous assumptions ? By no means. We are rather to 
 be the more jealous of them because of their leading to 
 those conclusions. Let us not resist our moral intuitions, 
 nor, because of arbitrary hypotheses hastily adopted, run 
 headlong into errors that would limit the range of 
 Almighty power, and deprive the world of the only Being 
 to whom the mind spontaneously betakes itself for help 
 and refuge when appalled by danger and difficulty. 
 
 6 See page 88. 
 
DIALOGUE IV. 
 
 FROM THE SAME TO THE SAME, 
 
 After long expectation I have at last received your 
 letter of the 20th Chaitra, commenting on the conferences 
 that are going on here. You say 'it is a great pity that, life 
 
 * being short in the Kali Yuga, Brahmins can now-a-days 
 'scarcely read one- twentieth of what they ought to study, 
 
 * and that is the reason why so few are familiar with 
 ' the texts and aphorisms on which our philosophy and 
 
 * theology are based. We begin our course of study early 
 ' enough, and we certainly keep it up as long as we can, 
 ' but it is a drop only from the inexhaustible ocean that 
 ' we are able to sip. As soon as a boy attains the age of 
 ' five, we put the chalk into his hand, and guide it to form 
 ' letters. The smartest lad must be allowed two or three 
 'years for learning to read and write in the vernacular. 
 ' When he is seven or eight, he commences his education 
 ' in the Sastras. He takes a year or two to commit the 
 ' Sutras, or rules, of Grammar to memory. Then the rules 
 'are explained to him. The study of the Grammar with 
 ' the Gana, or list of verbs, and the lexicon, or list of 
 ' nouns, must occupy him, perhaps, till he is sixteen. He 
 ' must then learn some of the poems in order to perfect 
 'his knowledge of the language. He can hardly be 
 
138 DIALOGUE IV. 
 
 ' expected to take up theology or philosophy before he 
 'is eighteen or twenty. If he commences the Nyaya, he 
 ' goes cursorily over a manual such as the Bhdslid parichh- 
 ' eda, with or without its commentary the MuJctdvali, 
 ' and then he takes up works treating on Anumana, or 
 ' deduction. A careful study of these occupies him for 
 ' many years, and then he can no longer continue in the 
 ' state of a student. He has by that time perhaps become 
 ' a father, and the duties of a house-holder, the second 
 ' stage in his life, press upon him. He has studied the 
 ' Anumdna Khanda, or the Chapter on deduction, and 
 ' made himself familiar with the rules of syllogism, but he 
 ' has learnt nothing else. Pramdna, or proof, is but one 
 ' of Gotama's sixteen topics, and Anumdna , or deduction, is 
 'but one of the four sub-divisions of proof So that he 
 ' has mastered but ^ of Gotama's teaching when he quits 
 ' College for the cares and anxieties of a house-holder. 
 ' And as to the Sutras, or aphorisms, of either of our 
 'leading teachers, he has not in all likelihood even 
 ' seen them. A controversy on the Sutras must therefore 
 'be something foreign to his habits and study. This 
 'appears to be the secret of your friend Satyakama's 
 ' success in some of his attacks against Tarkakama. 
 
 ' Satyakama', you continue to remark, ' represents a 
 ' new school of Brahmins altogether. These are raised in 
 ' the Colleges established by the English — and their course 
 ' of study is regulated by the maxim, something of every 
 filing, without caring for every thing of anything. They 
 ' learn the Siitras ; they read foreign literature too ; and 
 ' they obtain in a short time a general survey of all the 
 ' systems. They are up to all kinds of discussion, and it 
 ' requires more than ordinary tact to deal with them.' 
 
 Your remarks, my learned friend 1 perfectly coincide 
 with my experience. To what a low ebb is divine learning 
 
A LARGE GATHERING. 139 
 
 now reduced ! If Narada bad to confess he had no know- 
 ledge of the soul, notwithstanding his vast learning, how 
 pitifully small must our knowledge be in these days ! 
 
 With reference to your remarks on Kand-da's theory 
 about creation, you will see what use I made of them 
 when you hear of a conference which took place yesterday 
 on the Nyaya. 
 
 It was the Vdruni (a holy day) and the conjuncture 
 for bathing early in the morning, so the bank of the river 
 was more than usually crowded. Many had come from 
 distant villages to obtain the merit of a bath in the 
 Ganga on such a holy occasion. Tarkakama met several 
 of his learned friends, and related to them the discussions 
 he had with Satyakama. After our ablutions were over, 
 we all came into Satyakama's house. We formed a pretty 
 large circle, all deeply interested in scholastic disputa- 
 tions. There were some versed more particularly in the 
 Nyaya, and among them was one who had, by his ex- 
 tensive reading, earned the appellation of Nydya-ratna. 
 There were others, though but few in number, whose 
 studies had been directed to the Sankhya. They too had 
 one, more eminent than the rest, who rejoiced in the sur- 
 name of Kapila. Others again there were of various 
 acquirements who held opinions more or less different 
 from one another, but all entertained the highest reverence 
 for the founders of the several schools. One of them, 
 named Vaiyasika, knew the Vedanta Sutras and S'ankara's 
 commentary almost word for word by heart. 
 
 The conversation at my suggestion turned on Kandda^s 
 theory of the Creation to which reference was made in 
 Satyakama' s discourse. I began with reading your re- 
 marks on that point. ' Satyakama certainly read the 
 
 * Siitra right. Kanada does attribute the primal action 
 
 * of Atoms to adrishta, and the primal action certainly 
 
140 DIALOGUE IV. 
 
 ' means the impulse by which the first combination took 
 ' place, and that was of course the operative cause of the 
 
 * creation. The scholium of S'ankara Mis'ra is to the same 
 ' effect. * The primal means before the creation. At that 
 ^' time there could be no such thing as an impulse or a 
 ^^ stroke^ .' But the question is what is adrishta? Literally, 
 'it means unseen, and is an adjective. Technically, in the 
 ' usage of philosophers, it is a substantive, and means a 
 ' power or influence inhering in things both animate and 
 'inanimate. As inherent in the former it implies an 
 ' unseen power, both intellectual and active ; as inherent in 
 ' the latter it signifies a material power, perhaps partly 
 'the effect of previous combinations and motions. In 
 
 * souls embodied, it influences both thouofhts and actions. 
 ' Thus the poet S'riharsha^ says a person often dreams by 
 ' the power of adrishta of things he had never seen in life. 
 'And Kalidasa^ says that when Parvati commenced her 
 'studies, all her learning of a former life flocked into 
 'her mind, just as a swarm of cranes flocks into the 
 ' Gangd in autumn, or the spontaneous brilliancy of cer- 
 ' tain drugs comes into them at night. 
 
 ' And with reference to its impulses as an active power, 
 ' the commentator on the Kusum^njali^ says that in the 
 ' performance of ceremonies on which the enjoyment of 
 ' heaven depends, the body and the organs are moved by 
 ' adrishta. This unseen moving power in men is again the 
 ' consequence of works done in a previous life, and hence 
 
 Naishadha, I. 3&. 
 
 ' eft ^€^TWT ^ilfr^^lft f^^^f^ TWftr^T^mH: I %rtiT- 
 
 ^Sri^i^^rrm R5f^T:mW^W^1%^t ll Kumara Sambhava. 
 ♦ See page 9S Foot note. 
 
THEOLOGY OF THE NYAYA KANADa's. 141 
 
 'it stands sometimes for Dharma and Adharma (virtue 
 'and vice) and Karma (works). Thus the origin of the 
 ' world is attributed by the scholiast on Kand<da's Sutras 
 'to Dharma and Adharma^, after he had himself de- 
 ' Glared adrishta to be the cause of the Creation. And 
 ' Kan^da attributes the soul's departure from one body 
 'and adoption of another, to the agency of Adrishta^, 
 'while Gotama ascribes it to Karma'^ y both evidently 
 ' meaning the same thing. In inanimate objects it simply 
 ' signifies a material property or virtue, perhaps a sort 
 'of velocity or attraction ~- as in the (magnetic?) motion 
 ' of stones and needles which Kanada expressly attributes 
 'to adrishta^. 
 
 'Now the point to be decided is whether Kandda, who 
 * simply undertook to explain the phenomena of the world, 
 •as far as possible, by natural causes, that is to say, who 
 ' would not unnecessarily obtrude a supernatural cause, 
 ' excluded the divine operation, when he declared that the 
 ' primal action of Atoms was owing to a power or virtue 
 'inhering in them. What can debar the supposition that 
 ' he held the power itself to be a gift of God, who was con- 
 ' sequently the original operative cause of the Universe, the 
 ' adrishta itself being dependent on His Will ? Adrishta 
 'was a mere yantra or instrument, while the Supreme 
 ' Being was the yantri, or the user of the instrument.' 
 
 Tarkahdma. — "This is an excellent solution of the 
 difficulty raised by Satyakama, and I trust we shall 
 
 ?Tlf^ I V. ii. 
 
 ' TT4l!c!T?r^I^^^T'¥f^ri?fTr: I HI. 132. 
 
142 DIALOGUE IV. 
 
 hear no more of great men's names being subjected to 
 charofes of atheism — for it is a sin to be even a hearer 
 of such charges^." 
 
 Satyahdma. — " I wish I could report myself satisfied 
 with this explanation, but it is not in my power to do so. 
 We seem to be pretty well agreed as to one meaning 
 of adrishta. It is a power, influence, or habit based 
 on the acts or relations of a previous existence. It is 
 inherent in men, animals, and inorganic matter. But it 
 has another meaning. It is not only an inherent power 
 or habit. It is also a destiny that acts externally. The 
 adrishta, inherent in one man, will often influence others 
 with a view to bring about consequences which that 
 man's merit or demerit calls for. It is with reference 
 to this sense of Adrishta that men often excuse their 
 neighbour's delinquencies, as well as their own, by attri- 
 buting them to its influence^*'. 
 
 " We have not discussed in which sense Kanada used 
 the word when he attributed the creation to adrishta. 
 Was it an inherent power in Atoms, or an external 
 influence ?" 
 
 Nydyaratna. — ^' In whichever sense the word may have 
 been used, I suppose you may admit the explanation 
 suggested by our Benares friend in defence of Kanada's 
 theism." 
 
 Satyahdma. — "I do not see how the explanation can be 
 applicable, if adrishta be taken in the sense of destiny, or 
 
 Kumdra Sambhava. 
 X^ ^m W '^'^'^\ fxf^T t-^W^TcT^ g-^r I Mjircan. Pu. 
 
 10 
 
NO MENTION OF GOD IN KANADA. 143 
 
 a moving power, exterior to the Atoms. You must 
 therefore make up your mind as to the meaning of the 
 term in Kanada's Sutra." 
 
 Tarkakdma. — ^^ Well, suppose we take it in the sense 
 of an inherent power in Atoms, with which they were 
 endowed by the will of God." 
 
 Satyakdma, — " You wish me to try, by the process of 
 exhaustion, if, on either supposition, I can bring myself to 
 accept the explanation above referred to. I must frankly 
 say, I am not satisfied on either view of the meaning 
 of Adrishta. Taking it in the sense of an inherent 
 power, I am constrained to say, that the explanation not 
 only fails at the very outset in its object of defending 
 the theism of Kanada's system ; but is in itself vague and 
 almost unintelligible. It fails as a defence of Kanada, 
 because Kanada has never in any of his Sutras spoken 
 of God as the ultimate cause of all things. In truth, 
 the word God never occurs in his work. The only 
 aphorisms in which he may be supposed to make a 
 remote reference to Him are those (and they are only 
 two) in which he asserts the authority of the Veda. 
 But we know, as in the case of Kapila, that our philoso- 
 phers had a way of their own of asserting the authority 
 of the Sastra without acknowledging a Supreme Intelli- 
 gence as the Creator of all things. To maintain that 
 a writer, who has never spoken of God as the author 
 of the universe, and was yet all the time accounting for 
 the origin of that universe by a concourse of Atoms, 
 caused by a certain power or virtue of their own, was all 
 the time meaning that the power was communicated by 
 God, and was therefore himself a theistic teacher, is, to 
 say the least of it, mere Sdhasa (boldness)." 
 
 Nydyaratna. — '^ Are you not aware that Kanada's sys- 
 tem was only a supplement to Gotama's, and, therefore. 
 
144 DIALOGUE IV. 
 
 many things, expressly asserted by his predecessor, are 
 implied in his aphorisms." 
 
 Tarkakdma. — "You yourself acknowledged, Satya- 
 kama, in your essay, that the Vais'eshika was a branch of 
 the Nyaya." 
 
 Satyakdma. — ^."I do so still. And I am*quite ready 
 to concede that whatever is expressly asserted in the 
 Nyaya, belongs impliedly to the Vais'eshika as well. 
 But where has Gotama said any thing expressly for 
 God?" 
 
 Tarkakdma, — " What do you mean by laying the 
 emphasis on for?'' 
 
 Satyakdma, — '^Simply this, that the word Is'wara, or 
 God, is certainly found in Gotama, but it requires com- 
 mentatorial ingenuity to make out that it is used in a 
 theistic sense." 
 
 Tarkakdma, — " You are mystifying still." 
 
 Satyakdma, — "Pardon me, Tarkakama. I said some- 
 thing to you the other day on the same subject, and so 
 I thouofht a bare reference would be sufficient. Gotama 
 does introduce the name of God, but only to maintain 
 that he was not the cause of the universe — that works of 
 a previous world, (or, in other words, Adrishta) were the 
 cause. The popular scholiast Vis'wanatha says that the 
 aphorist simply meant that God was not the sole cause, 
 and that the co-operation of adrishta was necessary. 
 Supposing we accept the commentary, we can only allow 
 that the Nyaya hinted at a theistic doctrine, and that, 
 still more obscurely, than at the atomic theory. If the 
 Vais'eshika intended to confirm and develop that theistic 
 doctrine, as it really did the atomic, it would only be 
 natural to expect from it an explanation of the former, 
 at least somewhat corresponding to its exposition of the 
 latter. But far from expounding Gotama's implied idea 
 
GOTAMA AND KANADA. 145 
 
 of God, as an associate creator with adrishta, Kan^da 
 says nothing at all about an Intelligent Creator, and only 
 re-iterates, what Gotama had himself expressly stated, the 
 agency of adrishta in the creation. How then can we 
 allow the Vais'eshika any credit for theism based on the 
 Nyaya ? The rules of fair criticism would rather lead us 
 the other way, to make Kanada responsible for not ex- 
 patiating on that which his predecessor had so obscurely 
 taught ; if indeed we are to admit the popular commentary 
 of the scholiast Vis'wanatha." 
 
 Tarkahdma. — ''Your 'if indeed' is a very discreet 
 addition, Satyakama ; for the ' three aphorisms' are differ- 
 ently explained by other commentators, of whom you 
 have thought proper to say nothing." 
 
 Satyakdma. — ''If 1 have said nothing of them it was 
 because we have all along been talking of Gotama's 
 Sutras, as expounded by the popular scholiast Vis'wa- 
 natha. You refer now to such commentators as Udyota- 
 kara Mis'ra. I did not speak of this author simply be- 
 cause he is so little countenanced any where. I doubt 
 whether there are four copies of his work in all Bengal, 
 while Vis'wanatha's commentary is circulated every where 
 in print and received by every student. Besides, we are 
 discussing the Sutras, not their modern paraphrases and 
 commentaries, which I have repeatedly admitted are 
 theistic. We have been referring^ to Vis'wanatha for no 
 other reason than because he is a scholiast rather than 
 a commentator — and is generally intent more on the 
 literal interpretation of the words in the Sutras than on 
 any exposition of his own views. Udyotakara, on the 
 contrary, gives you little help in construing the aphorisms, 
 and writes his own discourse after citing a Sdtra, only 
 adding in conclusion, such is its meaning. But 1 have 
 no objection to your calling him in as a witness — and I 
 
14G DIALOGUE TV. 
 
 grant to you (what I have all along been saying with refer- 
 ence to modern commentators) that he understands the 
 'three Sutras' in a theistic sense. But you must remem- 
 ber that if he is a more favourable witness for Gotama 
 than Vis'wandtha, he is a dangerous one for Kanada — 
 because in writing against the theory of the fortuitous 
 concourse of Atoms, he evidently levels his remarks 
 against the very aphorism of Kanada now under dis- 
 cussion. He will allow no such explanation as has 
 been suggested by your Benares friend. ^ As to those/ 
 says he, ' who maintain that atoms are the cause of the 
 'universe, by virtue of the works of embodied souls, 
 ' (which is synonymous with Kanada's adrishta) we tell 
 ' them in reply that, if atoms are moved in that way, 
 ' they ought to move incessantly ; but they move depend- 
 'ent on especial causes and occasions^'. 'If you rejoin,' 
 he says again, 'that inanimate matter may move like 
 'milk; and that, just as for the nourishment of the 
 ' infant, the mother's milk, though itself inanimate, comes 
 'up spontaneously, even so may atoms, though inani- 
 'mate, move for the objects of animated creatures: 
 ' such a rejoinder is illogical, for its involves a S«adhya- 
 'sama (petitio principii). When you have to prove that 
 ' atoms can move independently, you assign as a reason, 
 ^ that milk, though inanimate, moves independently ! If 
 
 
KANADA CONDEMNED BY A CHAMPION OF THE NYAYA. 147 
 
 ' milk moved independently, then it would do so in 
 ' carcasses too, but it does not.' If therefore you wish 
 to save Gotama, you must sacrifice Kan^da by the verdict 
 of this chosen champion of the Nydya himself 
 
 '' And you must also consider that your new witness 
 discards the agency of Adrishta. He interprets Gota- 
 ma's Sutra IV. 21 to mean that because of God's causing 
 it, works (i. e., Adrishta) are no cause. Since Kanada 
 then brings in Adrishta as the cause, without any men- 
 tion of God, he is, according to the rendering of Udyo- 
 takara, in confiict with Gotama, and cannot receive any 
 credit on the score of his opponent. The wordings of 
 Gotama IV. 21 and Kanada V. ii. 12 are singularly ana- 
 logous. Both used Kdrita for caused — Kanada gave 
 Adrishta as the agent, Gotama tat or 'it.' If Udyotaka- 
 ra's comment is to be received, the tat of Gotama means 
 God. If the tat be God, then ahetu, or no cause (next 
 following), must refer to adrishta — which is therefore 
 discarded — and Kanada, by re-asserting it, must be 
 deliberately opposing the theistic theory." 
 
 Tarhahdma. — ''You say Kanada makes no mention 
 of God. You forget what he says on the iiaming and 
 operation of the five elements. He attributes them di- 
 rectly to God. He says that the air, invisible in itself, 
 is a matter of revelation, and that its name and opera- 
 tion are owing to God's agency." 
 
 Satyakdma. — "Is that not an over- statement of the 
 fact ? Kanada himself attributes them, neither directly 
 nor indirectly, to God. All he says is that naming 
 and action are signs of our betters^. Commentatorial in- 
 genuity discovers in these last words the occult meaning 
 
148 DIALOGUE IV. 
 
 of God and the great Rishis^. You must excuse my 
 obtuseness if I fail to find any thing decidedly theistic in 
 the phrase our betters. Even atheism may admit that there 
 are higher orders of beings in the world than man, and use 
 those words without self-inconsistency. Kan^da says that 
 names must have been given to things by certain intelli- 
 gent beings, more eminent than the class to which he himself 
 belono^ed ; but there is nothino^ in this assertion to warrant 
 the conclusion that ' the giver of names and the Author of 
 the universe are identical'"^ in his estimation, or that by 
 referring to the one, he necessarily admitted the other. 
 But the most singular point is that Kanada speaks, not of 
 One being, superior to himself, as the originator of names, 
 but of givers of names in the plural, i. e,, his betters. And 
 the commentator is obliged to confess that he speaks 
 of ' God AND the great Rishis.' He does indeed speak 
 of certain persons who gave names to certain things, and 
 perhaps invented human language, but he makes mention 
 neither of God, nor of great Rishis either. And if he had 
 heard of foreign, or as you would say, barbarian languages, 
 it may well be doubted whether he would include the 
 authors of those languages among * God and the great 
 Rishis.' " 
 
 Tarkakdma. — " Will you not allow that language is 
 of divine origin, and that Kanada, when he was speaking 
 on the subject, would not exclude the divine agency in 
 the matter ? To the great Rishis he attributed the 
 giving of such names as they were competent to give, 
 and to God, those that none but He was competent to 
 invent. Even the names which were of human creation 
 
 ?|t ^s^ V^-^T:m ^irfcTcT? ^ cT^ m^s H Ibid. 
 
NAMING OF THINGS. 149 
 
 were owing to God's act, for He laid down the law that the 
 father should give a name to his son on the twelfth day^ T 
 
 Satyahdma. — " As we are now conferring on Kan4- 
 da's theory about creation, we need not enter into the 
 wide question of the origin of languages. The origin of 
 language cannot supply a stronger argument for the 
 existence of God, than is presented by the origin of the 
 universe itself; unless indeed you accept the Buddhist 
 dogma that the letters of the alphabet are seeds of the 
 universe^. While we are discussing Kanada's teaching 
 on the greater question of the creation, we cannot be fairly 
 called upon to admit his theism on the lesser point without 
 decided evidence. His use of the phrase our betters cannot 
 be a decided proof of theism, even if the commentator's 
 scholium God and the great Rishis were found in the text 
 itself; for Kapila also admitted an inferior god although 
 he denied his creative power ^. 
 
 '' But we are flying off from our point, — which is your 
 Benares friend's comment on the siltra of Kanada under 
 disQussion. What does he mean by suggesting, that 
 adrishta was a power inherent in atoms as a gift from 
 God. When was it given ? I suppose he would not say 
 it was originally given by God, for atoms are, in Kand- 
 da's system, eternal and uncreated, and therefore they 
 could have no origin. The inherent power then must 
 have been imparted to them at some definite period, 
 when they commenced action. If so, then the communi- 
 cation of that power was itself a stroke or impulse. If 
 that was Kanada's meaning, it is impossible to conceive 
 
 i^^^'STTy^r^^ It 
 
 6 See Hodgson's Illustrations, p. 60. 
 
150 DIALOGUE IV, 
 
 why he should attribute the primal act to adrishta, and 
 not to the divinely imparted impulse itself. 
 
 '^The explanation under review, again, is opposed to the 
 interpretation, which the scholiast of Kanada put on his 
 theory, notwithstanding his discovery of God in the phrase 
 our betters. In the passage already cited, S'ankara Mis'ra 
 says, that Merit and Demerit, or in other words, adrishta, 
 were the original cause of the world®, thereby excluding 
 a remoter cause. 
 
 '^ But what appears to me conclusive against the expla- 
 nation suggested by your learned friend, is, that it is 
 directly opposed to S'ankaracharya's view of the Siitra. 
 That eminent scholar understood the aphorism of Kandda 
 in a very different sense. Here are his words^: 
 
 8 See page 141, Note 5. 
 ^T^ Pr cTcT ^-^ ^T^^ sjfiOTt f^f^'TT iET^Vrf?! ^^T^<iL^l^^ 
 
 si "^ 
 
SANKARAS VIEW OF KANADA S THEORY. 151 
 
 'The combining of atoms, while they are in a state 
 ' of separation, must be allowed to require an action ; 
 ' for we see that the conjunction of yarn requires action 
 ' (in the manufacture of clothes). But since an action 
 ' involves an effect, an efficient cause must be acknow- 
 
 * ledged. If an efficient cause be not acknowledged, then 
 ' there cannot be the primal action of atoms for want of 
 'an agent. And even if, being acknowledged, it implies 
 ' an effort or a visible cause, such as a stroke, the primal 
 'action of atoms would still be impracticable, because 
 'of the impossibility of such effort or stroke. In that 
 ' state (^. e., before the creation) there could not be an effort 
 ' which is a quality of the soul, because of the absence 
 'of a body. When there is a mind residing in a body, 
 'the connection of the soul with the mind may bring 
 ' about an effort which* is a quality of the former. The 
 ' same may be said of a stroke, or other visible cause. 
 ' All these come in after the creation ; they cannot be 
 ' the cause of the primal act. If it be said, let adrishta 
 ' or destiny be the cause of the primal act ; . that must 
 'be inherent either in the soul or in atoms. But on 
 'neither supposition can the action of atoms be attri- 
 ' buted to destiny, for destiny is inanimate. We have 
 
 * already said, while examining the opinions of the 
 'Sankhya, that an inanimate thing, unconnected with an 
 'animated one, can neither be self-moved nor move 
 ' another. 
 
 ' The soul too, continues Sankara, is at that time it- 
 ' self inanimate, for its animation is not then yet pro- 
 'duced. Nor can the supposition of a destiny, inhering 
 
 Com. Ved;inta Si'itra, II. ii. 12. 
 
152 DIALOGUE IV. 
 
 'in the soul, turn it into a cause of atomic action, for 
 'there is no relation (between the two). If you say, 
 'there is a relation between the soul endowed with 
 ' destiny, and atoms, that relation being permanent, there 
 * would be permanent motion too, because of the want of 
 'a separate governor. Therefore from the want of a 
 'directing efficient cause, there could be no primal 
 ' action in atoms, and without such action there could be 
 ' no combination ; nor without combination, the produc- 
 'tion of binaries &c.* 
 
 " You see here S'ankard-charya fails to discover in 
 Kanada's system any being of supreme and absolute 
 intelligence to whose operation, in the absence of any 
 other soul, endowed with body and mind, the primal 
 action of atoms might be attributed. Kanada left no 
 room for such a God. S'ankara at least saw none." 
 
 Nydyaratna. — " The argument appears to me to be 
 quite irrelevant, Satyakama. Whatever Udyotakara's 
 ideas of the Vais'eshika theory may be, and in whatever 
 sense Sankaracharya may have received the words of 
 Kanada, certain it is that we, Naiyayikas, do not hold 
 that the universe was constructed by the mere action 
 of Atoms impelled by a blind necessity. Nor can I 
 allow, notwithstanding the evidence you have adduced 
 to the contrary, that Kanada really taught such a 
 theory. I do not wish now to discuss the meaning of 
 his Sutras, but our immemorial tradition ought to deter- 
 mine the question. It is a fact that we do not teach any 
 atheistic doctrine, and we have always been followers of 
 Gotama and Kanada. You say we have modified and 
 improved on their doctrines. How could we dare do so ? 
 Can you point to any especial act of ours by which we 
 could have introduced the theistic element into our system, 
 if we did not receive it from our primitive Rishis?" 
 
NYAYA IN CONFLICT WITH SANKIIYA. 153 
 
 Satyakdma. — '^ I think I can. Gotama and Kanada, 
 when they introduced atmd, or spirit, into their list of 
 substances, did not discriminate between any two orders 
 of atmd. Later writers of your School, finding that 
 the original teachers said nothing of a Deity or His 
 attributes, made room for Is'wara, or God, by classifying 
 atma as two-fold ; jivatind, or ordinary soul, and para- 
 matmdy or Supreme spirit, that is God. This was a 
 classification which your leading doctors never thought 
 of, or we cannot conceive how they could have omitted 
 it, when they were so particular in their divisions and 
 classifications, elsewhere, even on common topics." 
 
 Nydyaratna. — '^ I am sure you will not, consider me 
 too sensitive if I protest against this free use of the names 
 of our holy Kishis." 
 
 Tarkakdma. — ^' You have yourself maintained in your 
 essay that our original teachers spoke to initiated pupils 
 only, and that Siitras without commentaries are sleaed 
 books. Why then do you wish to break the seal f You 
 must receive our commentary. We protest we do not 
 receive Kan^da's teaching in a niris'ivara, or godless, 
 sense. You must not therefore think that Kanada was 
 as atheistic as Kapila." 
 
 Scarcely had Tarkakama uttered these last words, when 
 the Sankhya s'astri, who was listening to the conversation 
 with deep interest, ejaculated, '^ Oh this Kali yuga 1" 
 Tarkakdma instantly felt as if he had given some 
 real cause of offence, and immediately apologized for 
 the use he had inadvertently made of Kapila's name. 
 " No offence, Sir," answered Kapila. ''Never mind it. 
 Kapila has left behind him too venerated a name to be 
 soiled by your handling. I know you did not intend 
 any offence. I only wish you had employed a little of 
 your generous ingenuity in favour of the Sankhya. 
 
154 DIALOGUE IV. 
 
 You might then have easily made out that it is no more 
 atheistic than the Nyaya." 
 
 ''For what" continued the S^nkhya philosopher, ''was 
 Kapila's difficulty ? Was it not simply this — that 
 intelligent agency would be inconceivable without an 
 effort, and an effort w^ould imply a motive. The sup- 
 position of a motive in the case of a creator, would in 
 other words be a supposition of incompetency. One 
 could not have a motive without yielding to a desire. 
 The same difficulty I see in the Nyaya. The founder of 
 this system classifies pravritti, or effort, with dukha, or 
 pain, dosha, or fault, and other hindrances to the soul's 
 emancipation. And he expressly defines j^wZ^ to be a 
 cause or effect of ej/bi^t. How could he then consis- 
 tently inculcate the existence of an Intelligent Creator ? 
 The author of the Vedanta and S'ankaracharya argue 
 for their pantheism on this very ground. They say 
 that if the world were not identical with God, and if 
 He created it as a substance, separate from Himself, 
 then, on the very principles of the Nyaya, He would be 
 chargeable with the fault of making efforts under 
 motives, and thus be proved to be no God at air**. The 
 only difference between Kapila and your teachers consists 
 in the one's frankly acknowledging his difficulty, and the 
 other covertly teaching the same doctrine." 
 
 Nydyaratna. — '' As we are discussing certain points 
 which Satyakama had urged against the Nyaya, you 
 will excuse us, learned Kdpila, if we decline a contro- 
 versy with you on the present occasion. You have al- 
 lowed, and I am sure you have done so heartily, that 
 
 'Sr^^I^lf fcT I Sankara. Conx. Ved. II. ii. 37. 
 
MODERN EXPLANATIONS OF ATOMIC THEORY. 155 
 
 Tarkakdma meant no disrespect to the venerable founder 
 of your school, and my friend has also expressed regret 
 for the lapse of his tongue. 
 
 " But now, Satyakama, you must not go on with your 
 own fancies about the teaching of great Ilishis. You 
 must allow us to interpret our own doctrine. We say 
 that Atoms are the material, and God the efficient cause 
 of the world. This doctrine I understand is much admired 
 even in Europe. Philosophers have in all ages had re- 
 course to it in order to account for the physical phenomena 
 which the world presents. Even Sir Isaac Newton I am 
 told was in this respect a follower of our Kanada. 
 
 ''Our doctrine, continued Nydyaratna, is the same 
 which Gotama held and Kanada taught. We have no 
 fancy of our own, no new theory. We keep to the old 
 paths of our primitive Acharyas. The doctrine is sim- 
 ply this ; that God constructed the world by combining 
 an infinite number of hard, indivisible, eternal, and in- 
 destructible particles. The primary combination was 
 of two atoms, which we call dwyanvka, or a binary. 
 The combination however does not become, what geo- 
 meters would call, a magnitude, before a trasarenu 
 (tertiary), or a compound of three dwyanukas is formed. 
 
 " It is necessary to believe that matter is not divisible 
 beyond a certain point. The point where it is no further 
 divisible we call an atom. If infinite divisibility were 
 allowed, than might a mustard seed be pronounced to be 
 equal to Mount Meru^, for it is a simple mathematical 
 truth that all things, which are divided by infinite, are 
 equal. Now unless you are prepared to combat this 
 great theory, thus explained, you must not assail the 
 time-honoured system of the Ny^ya. 
 
 ^ ^^8rT^iT^%cTi^?(cr^ ^^^^xr^^^xrfi:in^(^iiTlTT: ii 
 
156 DIALOGUE IV. 
 
 Satyakdma. — '^ I shall most willingly accept your own 
 interpretation of your scholastic theory. I will give up 
 further criticism on your original Sutras by simply re- 
 marking that the history of philosophy requires, that 
 there should be a discrimination between your modern 
 explanations and the opinions of the founders of your 
 school. We are all bound to contribute our mite to the 
 discovery of historic truth. But I admit that the 
 Naiyayika doctrine of our day does not ignore an 
 intelligent Framer of the world. Still you hold that your 
 Atoms are uncreated and eternal, do you not ? " 
 
 " Of course," said the Naiyayika, ^' that is the peculiar 
 teaching of our School, and I may say I glory in follow- 
 mg it. 
 
 ^' How came they into existence ?" 
 
 " We say they are eternal. They never began to exist." 
 
 " You maintain," said Satyakdma, '^ that souls are 
 eternal, and matter is eternal. Your School then teaches 
 that God created nothing in reality. He merely com- 
 bined the Atoms and constructed the universe." 
 
 ''What more could he do ? How could he make Atoms ? 
 Can the artificer make his bricks if he has no earth ? " 
 
 ''The artificer, said Satyakama, is a frail mortal. — He 
 is not omnipotent. But God is. You cannot account 
 for the wonderful arrangement which the world exhibits 
 without assuming the existence of an Independent and 
 Eternal Being, all sufficient and all powerful, of infinite 
 goodness and wisdom. The supposition of dead matter, 
 co-eternal and independent, must militate against His 
 perfection. ' If without something distinct wholly from 
 'Himself He cannot produce anything, then must He 
 ' want some thing external ; and whosoever wanteth any 
 'thin Of is not all-sufficient^.' 
 
 8 Bp. Pearson. 
 
MENTAL INTUITION OF GOd's ALL SUFFICIENCY. 157 
 
 '^ The theory of a co-eternal and independent material 
 substance," continued Satyakama, *4s opposed both to 
 our moral convictions and to the fundamental principles of 
 sound philosophy. A rightly constituted mind attributes 
 all perfection to the Deity. It is among our religious 
 intuitions. Is it not, Nyayaratna ?" 
 
 '^ Of course it is." 
 
 "The mind you pronounce to be an organ of internal 
 sensation. It must then have the same claim to our con- 
 fidence as the external organs. In fact without the mind 
 you could not have a complete perception of any object 
 of even external sensation. In a matter of pure mental 
 intuition, the testimony of the mind is quite as strong 
 as the testimony of other senses in matters of external 
 sensation. Now the mind intuitively bears testimony to a 
 Supreme Intelligence of all perfection, the author of the 
 universe. This testimony is as valid as the testimony of 
 your other senses to the existence of the river Ganga, 
 from the banks of which you have just returned after 
 your morning ablution." 
 
 *' I do not in the least doubt what you say." 
 
 ''You cannot then without violence to the religious 
 intuitions of your mind allow a rival material cause, 
 existing beside God from eternity." 
 
 NaiydyiTca. — '' Would you say that the great Newton 
 offered violence to our moral convictions and religious 
 intuitions, by inculcating the Atomic theory ?" 
 
 Satyahdma. — ''Certainly, not. He did not hold the 
 Atomic theory after your manner. He did not allow that 
 any thing could be uncreated and eternal, but God. This 
 one omnipotent and all-knowing Creator was sufficient 
 in his estimation for making every thing that exists. 
 Listen to his own words. At the close of his Opticks, 
 he says; 'All these things being considered, it seems 
 
158 DIALOGUE IV. 
 
 ' probable to me that God in the beginning formed matter 
 ' in solid, massy, hard, impenetrable, moveable particles, 
 ' of such sizes and figures, and with such other properties 
 ' and in such proportions to space, as most conduced to 
 ' the end for which He formed them, and that these pri- 
 'mitive particles, being solids, are incomparably harder 
 'than any porous bodies compounded of them, even so 
 'very hard as never to wear or break in pieces, no ordi- 
 * nary power being able to divide what God had made 
 ' one in the first creation. While the particles continue 
 'entire, they may compose bodies of one and the same 
 ' nature and texture in all ages : but should they wear 
 'away or break in pieces, the nature of things depending 
 ' on them would be changed. Water and Earth composed 
 ' of old worn particles and fragments of particles would 
 ' not be of the same nature and texture now with water 
 ' and earth composed of entire particles in the beginning. 
 ' And therefore that nature may be lasting, the changes 
 ' of corporeal things are to be placed only in the various 
 ' separations and new associations and motions of these per- 
 ' manent particles ; compounded bodies being apt to break, 
 ' not in the midst of solid particles, but where those parti- 
 'cles are laid together, and only touch in a few points.^'" 
 
 Naiydyika. — ''How could a substance be made out of 
 nothing ?" 
 
 Satyakdma. — " What can be impossible for the omnipo- 
 tent?" 
 
 " We never see any thing made out of nothing," re- 
 joined Nyayaratna. 
 
 "Neither do you see particles without magnitude, 
 said Satyakama, producing by combination substances 
 possessed of magnitude. Your atoms have no length, 
 
 3 Whewell's Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences. 
 
DIFFICULTIES OF THE NYAYA. 159 
 
 breadth, or thickness, and yet you allow they produce all 
 three by combination. 
 
 " See how S'ankara* criticises your theory — which in- 
 deed is as un philosophical, as it is repugnant to religious 
 intuition. You say that the universe was formed by 
 the combination of eternal atoms which are endowed 
 with colour, but are, like mathematical points, without 
 dimension. The measure of an atom you express by a 
 word, which, again, you cannot explain but by the 
 word atomic !^ When two atoms combine and form a 
 binary, you attribute to the compound a measure which 
 you call hraswa, or short. You do not call it dirgha, 
 or long. And it is not until the compound you call 
 mahat (great), or a magnitude, is formed, that you 
 attribute to it the property of sensible matter. Without 
 pronouncing any opinion on Sankara's criticism, may I 
 simply ask you, whether it can be more difficult to 
 conceive that the universe was created, both in matter 
 and form, by a Supreme and all-sufficient Intelligence, 
 than that material length, breadth, and thickness arose 
 
160 DIALOGUE IV. 
 
 naturally from invisible particles devoid of those pro- 
 perties ? And whether it is not far more philosophical 
 to recognize One Supreme Being alone as existing, 
 independently, by and of himself, and to attribute to 
 His creative power the existence of whatever else has 
 any sort of being, than to maintain a theory of innu- 
 merable eternal entities, of which you can form no con- 
 ception but by detaching from them your conception of 
 all things that you know, or have any idea of ? If God 
 could produce magnitudes out of no magnitude^ why could 
 he not also call into existence that hypothetical entity of 
 no magnitude out of a state of absolute non entity ? 
 
 ''The original creation. Sir, under the agency of an 
 omnipotent Supreme cause, is not to be compared with 
 mere human manufacture. T must again refer to Sankara- 
 charya's excellent remark^. You must not expect divine 
 perfection in human weakness, nor ought you to attri- 
 bute human deficiency to the divine sufficiency. 
 
 ''To prevent mistakes, however, let me say that I have 
 no wish to censure Kanada's doctrine of atoms, as such. 
 It is simply with his doctrine of eternal atoms that I 
 quarrel. European science is obliged to own that we 
 cannot speak otherwise than conjecturally about the 
 ultimate constitution of matter. 
 
 " That the Yais'eshika view, however, has its difficul- 
 ties, is evident from the notion of Panchikarana broach- 
 ed by some of our philosophers, and from certain other 
 strictures of S'ankaracharya on your doctrine. 
 
 "The proces of Panchicarana is the formation of a 
 specific Atom of one element by 'the combination of 
 parts of those of others. A specific earthy Atom, for 
 instance, is made up of -^ of a general earthy Atom, 
 
 6 See foot note page 132. 
 
DIFFICULTIES OF THE ATOMIC THEORY. 161 
 
 and ^ of each of the other elementary atoms'^. This pro- 
 cess pre-supposes the divisihility of what you have assumed 
 as indivisible. 
 
 ^' The Atomic theory involves another difficulty which 
 is thus represented by our ingenious S'ankarachdrya : 
 
 * The combination of one Atom with another must either 
 ' be by entire amalgamation or by partial contact. If it 
 
 * be an entire amalgamation, then because of the impossi- 
 ^ bility of collective increase®, the compound will still 
 
 * be an Atom, and an invisible substance ; for it is the 
 ' combination of one spacious substance with another that 
 ' is visible. If on the other hand the combination be a 
 ' partial contact, then the question is (virtually conceded 
 ' to be) one of aggregates, {i. e. it is no longer a combina- 
 tion of indivisible Atoms) ^.' 
 
 I do not however mean to say that I agree with S'an- 
 karachdrya' in his objection. 1 think the whole matter 
 is one that science cannot properly deal with. You may 
 
 TC^ Xf^ cT I Panchadas'i. 
 
 8 S'ankara alludes to the dogma of the Nai5'^^yikas themselves that the measures 
 of Atoms, each being infinitely small, cannot increase by addition. If the dimension 
 of a binary Atom were supposed to be the aggregate measure of the parts, it would, 
 on their theory, be still more infinitely small as a compound : thus, 
 
 ^Tft^l^If^ftr^^ ^T^TITr^H^l'^cf I Bh^sh^parichchheda. 
 
 Siddhanta mukt.-lvali. 
 
 ^i^^cTT ^^l^Or ^rfJTRI ^^f^IcT ^^^^i^^cT^ ^^T^^I^f^^^lS^: || 
 
 Com. II, ii. 12. 
 
162 DIALOGUE IV. 
 
 form convenient hypotheses about it, but nothing more. 
 The Brahminical philosopher has the same liberty to 
 try to account for facts by hypotheses as any other. 
 But our question is an entirely different one, with 
 which experimental science has nothing whatever to do. 
 Granted the existence of Atoms ; how came they into 
 existence ? 
 
 '^ I must hope that as you have apparently modified your 
 theory, so far as to introduce the idea of a supreme Intel- 
 ligence as the efficient cause of the Universe, by subdi- 
 viding the atmd, or spirit, of your original teachers into 
 the jivatmd, or ordinary soul, and paramatmd^ or supreme 
 Spirit, — you will continue to improve that idea until 
 you arrive at the conclusion, which alone is consistent 
 with sound philosophy, that having deduced the ex- 
 istence of an Omnipotent and absolutely independent 
 eternal Intelligence, as the author of all things, you have 
 no room left for the conception of any other eternal and 
 independent principle." 
 
 Nydyaratna, — '^ Your argument, Satyak^ma, has, I can- 
 not deny, some force in it, but it appears to me to prove 
 too much. If you will not allow more than one eternal 
 principle, how will you dispose of the human soul ? Will 
 you throw yourself into the arms of Vedantism, and pro- 
 nounce human souls to be identical with the Divine Spirit ? 
 If you do not, I cannot see how you can deny a separate' 
 eternal existence to the human soul. You cannot there- 
 fore persist in your doctrine of one eternal essence. You 
 must acknowledge at least a second, even the human 
 soul. Your theory will otherwise be confounded with 
 the teaching of such Vedantic texts (I mean as they are 
 interpreted by Vedantists) as the following ; ' This was in 
 ' the beginning a spirit like a male. He looked but found 
 ' nothing else beside himself This was in the beginning 
 
ALL SOULS ETERNAL. 163 
 
 'a spirit even one. All these become one here. This 
 ' was in the beginning one without a second^^'" 
 
 Satyakdma, — '^ There is no fear of my falling back on 
 Vedantism ; but I do maintain, — not that this Universe 
 was a spi7nt in the beginning, or that human souls were 
 identical with the Supreme Being, but — that there was only 
 ONE spirit (including, doubtless, in His own infinite 
 nature, mysterious depths that we can never fathom, but 
 still one), and nothing else before the origin of things. As 
 I have already said, I allow one eternal principle alone, 
 and that is, the Supreme Author of all things. As to 
 human souls I cannot admit their eternity. It is easy 
 to say the soul is eternal, but it is not so easy to define 
 what you mean by that saying. I am afraid you are 
 somewhat affected by Vedantism yourself when you speak 
 in that way. What can you mean by the soul collectively ? 
 The soul has no collective existence, no Samashti, except 
 in Vedantic vocabulary. Human souls have each an 
 individual existence. How many souls do you call 
 eternal. Every human soul ? " 
 
 Tarkakdma. — '' And what if we did say so ?" 
 
 Satyakdma. — " How many souls then do you reckon to 
 be eternal ?" 
 
 Tarkakdma. — '' As many as there are human beings." 
 
 Satyakdma. — '^ Whether in human form or not? For 
 your mythology speaks of souls passing through the bodies 
 of beasts." 
 
 Tarkakdma. — '^ All souls, those in brute forms in- 
 cluded." 
 
 *' And in the forms of gods ?" 
 
 Brihadftranyaka. The other passages will be found elsewhere. 
 
164 DIALOGUE IV. 
 
 *' Yes, all spiritual essences, men, beasts, gods." 
 
 " Anddemons ?" 
 
 '^ Yes, demons." 
 
 " But souls pass through vegetable forms too," said Sa- 
 tykama. ^' For, says the Veda, ' some souls enter the 
 ' womb for embodiment ; some into immoveable bodies, 
 ' (or trees) ^.' Witness the case of the two trees plucked 
 up from their roots by the infant Krishna. Are the 
 souls of trees too eternal ? " 
 
 *' Well, suppose I say, trees too." 
 
 ^' So then, said Satyakama, men, brutes, gods, demons, 
 trees are all eternal. Can you give an estimate of the 
 number of your eternal essences ?" 
 
 "I have no doubt our Rishis could have given it." 
 
 *'But to cut short such a s'ushka tarka (dry and 
 unprofitable debate), I appeal to you Nyayaratna, said 
 Satyakama, if it be not perfectly unphilosophical, because 
 absolutely unnecessary, and egregiously extravagant, to 
 assume such an indefinite number of eternal essences, when 
 one supreme essence is sufficient to account for all things, 
 visible or invisible, material or spiritual. 
 
 '^ Consider again the bad morals and the bad theology 
 which such a theory is calculated to teach. What would 
 you say, learned Nyayaratna, to a man who denied that 
 God was his Maker and heavenly Father ?" 
 
 Nydyaratna. — '^1 should say he was exceedingly im- 
 pious." 
 
 " Much more so, than if he denied his earthly parents, 
 though that is sufficiently heinous." 
 
 ^^ Certainly." 
 
 
 ^W. JlUil ^cT \\ 
 
naiyayika's confessions. 165 
 
 " Well," said Satyakama, ^' I am sure you will ap- 
 preciate the argument with which I mean to support my 
 assertion that your theory of the eternity of souls teaches 
 bad morals and bad theology. If all souls are eternal, 
 they must be uncreated too, for, says Kanada, that which 
 is eternal is not dependent on a cause ; and if uncreated, 
 and, yet in existence, they must be self- existent. To say 
 they are self-existent is to say they have independent 
 existence. They need not then acknowledge God as 
 their Maker or heavenly Father. If they are indepen- 
 dent essences, possessed of absolute existence, they can- 
 not be rightfully called upon to acknowledge a Supreme 
 Being as the Moral Governor of the universe. They 
 are themselves a sort of miniature gods. Nor can any 
 Supreme Being be especially entitled to the epithet of 
 Swayamhhu, or self-existent. You see the impiety to 
 which the doctrine leads ?" 
 
 Nydyaratna. — '^ To confess the truth, Satyakama, when 
 we received our scholastic doctrine of the eternity of the 
 soul, we never stopped to calculate its consequences. We 
 received it as a deduction from our received tenets. But 
 I now see that it involves, in its turn, another deduction, 
 which is certainly absurd and impious, that every creature 
 must have independent existence. Without countenancing 
 Vedantism, we cannot speak abstractedly of the soul's ex- 
 istence. The soul, you have truly remarked, can have no 
 samaslitiy or collective reality. We may indeed speak collec- 
 tively of the soul's characteristics, but that will imply that 
 the characteristics are distributive, that is to say, applicable 
 to all individual souls. I must thank you for suggesting a 
 consideration which imparts a new aspect to our theory. If 
 my venerable preceptor were now living I would submit my 
 doubts, and ask him, how the soul could be eternal without 
 being also self-existent and absolutely independent." 
 
166 DIALOGUE IV. 
 
 SatyaMma, — ''I commend your candour, Nyayaratna. 
 But since your preceptor is no more, is it not your duty 
 to consider and determine the question yourself? To the 
 world you are his representative, and to God you are 
 responsible for what you teach. You may yet save your 
 school from the odium of inculcating a doctrine, which as 
 you justly say, borders on impiety, and saps the founda- 
 tion both of philosophy and theology. The object of 
 philosophy is to narrow as much as possible the range of 
 first principles and first causes. To acknowledge count- 
 less millions of eternal principles, when one supreme 
 Author can account for them all, is a gaurava, a needless 
 multiplication of causes, which is as unphilosophical as 
 it is irreligious. It is a violence to our moral convictions 
 and religious intuitions. The glory and perfections of 
 God can leave no room for a second eternal and indepen- 
 dent principle. What must be thought then of your 
 countless millions of eternal beings, material and spiritual, 
 standing, as it were, in rivalry with God ? " 
 
 The apparent surrender on the part of Nyayaratna of 
 a peculiar tenet of the Brahminical philosophy struck 
 us all with a painful sentiment. Agamika seemed absorb- 
 ed in melancholy thoughtfulness. Tarkakama, too, already 
 vexed with himself for having inadvertently given offence 
 to Kapila, maintained a sullen silence. Not a voice was 
 heard for some minutes. Then the meeting broke up, 
 rather abruptly, by the company rising spontaneously, and 
 separating with the customary civilities and salutations. 
 
DIALOGUE V. 
 
 FROM THE SAME TO THE SAME. 
 
 Our last conference had an abrupt termination. The 
 regrets which Nyayaratna expressed for having all this 
 time been holding a doctrine from which it followed, as a 
 legitimate inference, that every soul, and consequently 
 every man, might claim the title of Sivayamhhuy or self- 
 existent, produced a strong impression on us all. No 
 one felt disposed to keep up the discussion at the time. 
 Even Tarkak^ma seemed for a moment to lose his pre- 
 sence of mind. So after some desultory conversation of 
 a purely social nature, and the customary civilities, we 
 returned each to his own home. The next morning the 
 same party met again on the banks of the river ; and 
 when the prescribed ablutions were over, all went in a 
 body to the scene of the conference. Nyayaratna alone 
 was not there. He had returned to his native village 
 after the conference the same evening. 
 
 Agamika began the conversation by avowing that he 
 had been thinking all night on the consequences, which, 
 according to Satyak4ma's showing, might follow from the 
 doctrine of the soul's eternity. ^' But," said he, turning to 
 Satyak^ma, ''your ingenious remark against a doctrine in 
 which all our schools are agreed admits of a conclusive 
 
168 DIALOGUE V. 
 
 reply, though it did not occur to me at the time. We say 
 the soul is uncreated and eternal, but we do not say it can 
 perform any functions before it is joined with body and 
 mind. That junction is properly speaking its creation, and 
 the beginning of its existence. Its previous existence is 
 more nominal than real, because it is not competent at 
 that time for thought or action, not having as yet obtain- 
 ed a body and mind. It cannot therefore be properly 
 called self-existent, for its real existence is derived from 
 something outside itself ^ 
 
 Satyahdma, — ''You say the soul's existence before it 
 is endowed with body and mind is more nominal than 
 real. That is not however the consentient opinion of 
 your philosophers. The Bhagavat Gita expressly mag- 
 nifies that existence, when it says that the soul is 
 'neither born at any time, nor does it ever die^.' And 
 is it not also that very existence, without body and mind, 
 which your doctors consider the summum bonum, or chief 
 good ? Do they not say that the soul's connection with body 
 and mind is its greatest misery ? Do they not teach 
 you that nis'reyasaj or your best interest, consists in 
 emancipation from the bondage of births ? Does not 
 Gotama classify hirth with pain and fault and the other 
 hindrances to emancipation ? Is it not separation from 
 body and mind to which you are taught to look up as your 
 supreme felicity ? Is it not return to the original state 
 of the soul that philosophers pronounce to be the end and 
 object of their speculations? If God be your Creator, 
 only because he caused the connection of the soul with 
 body and mind, — the very connection which you condemn 
 as an evil, — then He cannot have conferred any great 
 
NYAYA NOT A THEOLOGICAL SYSTEM. 169 
 
 benefit on you ; nor do you show much piety when you 
 look forward to the time when you may be able to cast 
 off that benefit, and return to the state in which you 
 were before the 'primal action of atoms and of mind/ 
 I do not see, Agamika, how the explanation suggested 
 by you can exhibit the theology of the Nyaya in a more 
 favourable light." 
 
 Tarhahdma. — '^ It appears to me, my dear friends, you 
 are proceeding too fast in your discussions. Will you allow 
 me to suggest a doubt, (I have a strong opinion myself 
 on the point), whether you are not mistaking the province 
 of the Ny^ya ? It does not profess to be a theological 
 system." 
 
 Agamika. — '^ I am very much of the same opinion with 
 yourself; but the inquiries of philosophers bear some 
 relation, — do they not, Tarkakama ? to the highest of all 
 problems." 
 
 Satyakdma. — " It is only so far as the Dars'anas tend 
 to impede the right view of divine truth, that we are 
 concerned with them, at least for the present. However, 
 as you, Tarkakama, have a strong opinion, perhaps you 
 will throw some light on the point." 
 
 Tarkahdma. — "Let us estimate every thing by the 
 degree in which it attains its professed object." 
 
 Satyakdma. — '' Certainly ; ii^ professed object." 
 
 Tarkakdma. — " And what is the manifest aim of the 
 Ny^ya, but to afibrd us an account of the methods of 
 attaining knowledge ? Its object was to teach the art of 
 reasoning ; and, as all reasoning depended on proofs 
 Gotama very properly laid the greatest stress on that, and 
 propounded rules which have gained the admiration even 
 of Mletcha philosophers. He tells you that proof is four- 
 fold — Pratyak^ha, or Perception, Amimdna, or Inference, 
 Upamdna, or Analogy, and Sabda, or Affirmation. 
 
 z 
 
170 DIALOGUE V. 
 
 '^ Perception he defined to be the knowledge derived 
 from the contact of the senses with their objects. It 
 includes internal perception, or intuition, but excludes 
 the errors that may be based on unsound sensation. 
 Inference is grounded on perception^, and is subdivided 
 into three classes, Purvavat, on a priori, Seshavat, or 
 k Posteriori, and sdmdnyato drishtam, or mixed. Anu- 
 mdna includes both induction and deduction. As this 
 branch of evidence involves the art of reasoning, and 
 the least flaw may induce serious errors, minute details 
 are given of sound and unsound inferences, so that 
 fallacies may be at once detected, and the truth recog- 
 nized, even when mixed up with error. Analogy is 
 defined to be that which helps you to arrive at the 
 unknown by means of that which is known ; and Af- 
 firmation is the teaching of unerring authority. 
 
 ^^ With a view to promote the detection of error and 
 the discovery of truth, the eminent founder of this great 
 School enters into an explanation of the true nature of 
 douht, of example, of demonstration , of argument, direct 
 and indirect, of controversy, of objection, o^ fallacies, of 
 7'eason, of confutation — in fact of every thing which can 
 claim a place in a system of logic. 
 
 '^ Men do not generally err much in their perception 
 and sensation. It is seldom that we mistake land for 
 water, or a house for a tank. Well has it been said in 
 the Veda that the eye is truth, although words and thoughts 
 may he untrue. Hence when a traveller relates a story 
 and affirms he has seen it, we believe it to he true^ . But 
 
 * ^^ci ^ ^T'^T ^^ I ^^ ^^m ^RfcT I '^W "^ ^n I 
 ^^I^Iir^lT ! ^^^rftfcT ) C?(^cli 1 Taittiriya Bnlhmana. 
 
THE FIVE MEMBERED ARGUMENT. 1 71 
 
 we are always liable to make mistaken inferences and 
 draw false conclusions. Gotama therefore considered the 
 subject of Inference, as the most important. He divid- 
 ed the process into five avayava, or members — 1st. 
 Pratijndy or the statement of the question, 2nd. Hetu, or 
 reason, 3rd. Uddharana, or example, 4th. U'pa7iaya, or 
 application, 5th. Nigamana or conclusion. 
 
 ^^ Anumdna is defined to be the instrument of anumitiy 
 which means the knowledge derived from the ascertained 
 fact of the subject possessing a property which is pervad- 
 edy or constantly attended, by another property. The 
 knowledge, that such a mountain is fiery, is anumiti ; 
 the instrument, whereby that knowledge is produced, 
 is the ascertainment of the fact, that the mountain has 
 smoJce, and that smoke is universally attended by 
 fire, Anumdna is therefore further explained as the 
 contemplation of the sign by which the facts of the per- 
 vading and pervaded properties may be ascertained^. 
 
 " I should be unwilling to repeat the well known illus- 
 tration of the five members by the mountain and fire. 
 But I have heard it objected against Gotama that his 
 division of an argument is unnecessarily prolix, and 
 that the Grecian syllogism is simpler. It is therefore 
 necessary to bear in mind that Gotama's anumana is 
 not identically the same with the Aristotelian syllogism. 
 Anumdna is classed among Pramdnas, or instruments 
 of pramdf which signifies accurate knowledge, and 
 accuracy consists in attinhuting to a thing that which is in 
 it^. The object of anumana, therefore, is not merely to 
 
 cl^ T'^f'^^TTT^TH^* I Anumdna Khanda of Tattwa Chint^mani. 
 ^^Ip5^ ^^T^ I Siddhinta Manjari. 
 
172 DIALOGUE V. 
 
 test the logical correctness of the conclusion, but to 
 investigate the major and minor premises themselves. 
 Nor must we forget that the author was writing at a time 
 when the minds of men were still infected with the here- 
 sies that had threatened the stability of Brahminical in- 
 stitutions before his age. He was accordingly desirous 
 of teaching the most efficacious way of dealing with error, 
 without carine for what the io^norant mis^ht choose to con- 
 demn as tautology. He had shown in his defence of the 
 Vedas^ that the charge of tautology, preferred against 
 them, was founded in popular error, that there was, in rea- 
 lity, no fault in the tautology of the sacred writings, and 
 that w^hat some people called tautology, was only a fuller 
 explanation of truth in condescension to human weakness, 
 and a more powerful enforcement of precepts in considera- 
 tion of human callousness. And so he taught that anumana 
 consisted of five members. The first two, or the state- 
 ment and reason, form what the Yavanas called an 
 enthymeme. The mountain is fiery ; because it has smoke. 
 It is a convenient and concise way of stating an argument, 
 and is generally followed by controversial writers where 
 there is no living disputation. No other form is made use 
 of in Sutras and commentaries. But when you may have 
 to convince an adversary before yourself, the three remain- 
 ing members will be found practically useful. After you 
 have given the statement and the reason, you may be 
 called upon to justify your reason. So you have the 
 third member, or example illustrating the minor premiss ; 
 thus, whatsoever has smoke has fire, such as a culinary 
 hearth. The fourth member is the application of the rule 
 to your subject ; now the mountain has the same : the 
 
 ^^TftlTTT^^ I II. 60. 5r ^^^3^ fVT:5Er5ft^"5TS fW ^^^^ 
 
THE FIVE MEMBERED ARGUMENT. 173 
 
 fifth is the inevitable conclusion, therefore it is fiery. The 
 fourth and fifth are repetitions of the second and first, 
 calculated to carry conviction into your adversary's mind, 
 and preclude the possibility of doubt. 
 
 " It may be said that the first, or the Proposition, is 
 itself no part of the argument^, being, at the time of the 
 statement, a mere assumption without proof; and that 
 the second, or Reason, should have been placed as the first 
 member. But the first is simply a statement of the ques- 
 tion under discussion, and, prior to its enunciation, the 
 appeal to Reason would be like the production of a wit- 
 ness before the plaint or plea is filed. In a disputation, 
 too, you may properly anticipate your adversary's chal- 
 lenge to prove a certain point, as for instance (if you have 
 a Mimdnsaka before you), that sound is not eternal ; and 
 in such cases it is necessary, for the sake of perspicuity, 
 that you begin with laying down the proposition which 
 you intend to prove. 
 
 "It has been objected against the third member that a 
 solitary example cannot lead to a universal rule. It is 
 never pretended that the rule relies on the example. We 
 say distinctly that no examples, how numerous soever they 
 may be, no observations, how often soever they may be 
 repeated, can of themselves establish a universal rule. A 
 hundred observations may err, and therefore fail in this 
 respect®. And if we ever speak of one example in point, 
 
 ^ ^^ ^1%'^T ^ HT^'TTif' f^gfirtr^j tr^^ftTri- cr^ nirr^rr- 
 ^3^f?r^(^ HT^^'ftT iTw^i=?i ^f^^ ^i^rf RT ^s^if^fZT^ mm 
 
 Anum^na Khanda. 
 
1 74 DIALOGUE V. 
 
 where counter examples are not found, it is practically to 
 illustrate, not logically to establish, the vydpti, or uni- 
 versality of the rule. 
 
 " The fourth and fifth members again have been objected 
 to on the ground of their not being necessary. It is said 
 that since the third gives the universal rule, and the second 
 the particular fact, the question is ipso facto demonstrated. 
 The second however only gives the reason {smoke) for 
 the inference (of fire). It is not intended, like the fourth, 
 solemnly to identify a particular mountain as containing 
 smoke defacto^. And with reference to the fifth member 
 you cannot say it is useless, or that the fact is already 
 demonstrated and the argument completed in the first 
 four'*^ ; for as you are talking of a particular mountain, 
 the argument is not really complete before you have 
 formally concluded, without the possibility of an opposite 
 error, whether it be one of rule or fact, that it — even the 
 mountain you are pointing to — is, and cannot but be, 
 
 FIERY. 
 
 '^This is but a meagre statement of Gotama's excel- 
 lencies as a teacher of mankind, but it may serve as a 
 specimen of what I conceive to be the true point of 
 view from which his merits should be canvassed." 
 
 Satyakdma. — '^ I concur with you, Tarkakama, in think- 
 ing that the logical principles laid down by Gotaina: and 
 
 5[^Tr^?I*r ^flT^HI cJ^^T'H^IcT I Anum^na Khanda 
 i"5^^^ITT^TXT^^Tclfq^?^TcT | Anum^na Khanda. 
 
 -'^KTf^cTT'ErfS^fcnr^f^^R^m '^rgwr^T^jxr^'^^T^Tcr i ibid. 
 
gotama's real merits. 175 
 
 Kandda, the rules they have enunciated for the detection 
 of error, the ideas they have broached on the origin of 
 human knowledge (excepting, of course, their theory of 
 the soul's pre-existence) are radically sound, and, in some 
 points, unimproveably good. I will not undertake to 
 decide that Gotama's four-fold classification of pramdnas, 
 as instruments of true knowledge, is not unnecessarily 
 prolix, or that Kapila's and Kanada's abridgements are 
 not improvements ; nor can I confess that his five-mem- 
 bered syllogism, as expounded by eminent writers on the 
 Nyaya, is not at all liable to the charge which has been 
 preferred against it. I must, however, acknowledge that 
 there is great force in the concise explanation, which the 
 author of the Tarka-Sangraha, has given, of that form of 
 syllogism, though I can find nothing in Gotama corres- 
 ponding to the discrimination between swdrtha and pardr- 
 tha — for oneself Siud for another'^. 
 
 " I may add that Gotama has also done essential service 
 to the cause of truth by exposing the quibbles of those 
 who had denied the possibility of attaining any knowledge 
 
 1 "An induction is of two kinds, [inasmuch as it may be employed] for oneself, 
 and for another. That which is for oneself is the cause of a private conclusion [in 
 one's own mind]. For example, having repeatedly and personally observed, in the 
 case of culinary hearths and the like, that where there is smoke there is fire, having 
 gathered the invariable attendedness [of smoke by fire], having gone near a mount- 
 ain, and being doubtful as to whether there is fire in it, having seen smoke on the 
 mountain, a man recollects the invariable attendedness, viz., * where there is smoke 
 there is fire.' Thereupon the knowledge arises that 'this mountain has smoke, 
 which is constantly accompanied by fire.' This is called the 'pondering of a sign* 
 (Unga-paramars'a). Thence results the knowledge that 'the mountain is fiery,' 
 which is the conclusion (anumiti). This is the process of inference for oneself, 
 
 " But, after having, for oneself, inferred fire from smoke, when one makes use 
 of the five-membered form of exposition, with a view to the information of another, 
 then is the process one of inference for the sake of another. For example : (1) The 
 mountain has fire in it ; (2) because it has smoke ; (3) whatever has smoke has fire, 
 as a culinary hearth ; (4) and so this has ; (5) therefore it is as aforesaid. By this 
 [exposition], in consequence of the sign [or token] here rendered, the other also 
 admits that there is fire." Ballantyne's translation. 
 
176 DIALOGUE V. 
 
 by perception or inference^ ; who maintained that Percep- 
 tion could neither be supposed anterior nor posterior to 
 its object, nor again simultaneous with it, — for, if anteri- 
 or, it would involve the absurdity of proving an object 
 before its existence, if posterior, it could not really be a 
 proving of the object, and if simultaneous, there would 
 be wanting the idea of succession between proof and its 
 object ; — who would, also, either give no room what- 
 ever for doubt f or open the door to universal scepticism^ ; 
 who would further insist on having an endless succession 
 of proofs for the proofs themselves, not allowing axioms 
 or first principles^. Gotama correctly says that if there 
 can be no knowledge, no truth, no perception, no proof, 
 then the quibbler himself has no right to obtrude his own 
 opinions, for they cannot be proved either. There must, 
 again, be first principles, and first principles are like the 
 light of a lamp^. It is a pity that the true nature of affir- 
 mation, or testimony, has not been more fully expounded 
 by his commentators. Gotama defined Affirmation to be 
 
 T^fTf* ^i ft V^ ^^giTTinirfciim^ i[fci$-5jTftrf^: 5^ II \^ cTfjrmm 
 
 ^i II i II 
 
 " * -if irft^Tir^mf%t%^ cTfsg-i: '^ it \e. 
 
EVIDENCE OF TESTIMONY. * l77 
 
 teaching of unerring authority, ^Apta,' says Vatsayana, 
 ' is one, who, having had ocular proof of a certain matter, 
 
 * desires to communicate it to others, who thereby under- 
 ' stand it ; and this is a common characteristic of Rishis, 
 ' Aryas, and Mletchas. The practice of all parties is 
 
 * thereby regulated. Gods, men, and animals act on these 
 'proofs, and not on any other. Affirmation is of two 
 
 * kinds, according as the object is visible or invisible. That 
 ' which is seen here is visible, that which appears in the 
 ' other world is invisible. And thus are the words of Rishis 
 
 * and ordinary men divided^.' So far good. But we have 
 nothing whereby to sift the testimony of ' Rishis, Aryas, 
 and Mletchas.' A great deal of unimportant discussion 
 has been raised in the refutation of frivolous objections 
 on the possibility of mistakes in the import of words. 
 Language may of course be sometimes ambiguous, but it 
 is nevertheless sufficiently explicit for all human purposes. 
 Gotama says, accordingly, 'Reliance is placed on the 
 ' contents of a statement on the strength of the affirma- 
 tion of a competent person.' 'By verbal evidence', I 
 believe this,' says the scholiast.' We do not however find 
 much discussion on the nature and characteristics of cre- 
 dible testimony ; nor are we taught how to discriminate 
 between that which may, and that which may not, pro- 
 perly challenge our belief. 
 
 * ^m: l§^ ^T'^cTlTcnTHT ^T^T^^^T^^ f^T^TTTr^^^I y^W 
 HHT^ ^^W cTTTIxT ^El^^t W^^T^T: IJ^cI^ tX^ ^^iTft?: IfiTm 
 ^^T^f^TcT ^^'f ^I??^^^t H ^^ivf 2T^W^ ir€t^^ ^f^^^m 
 
 2 A 
 
1 78 DIALOGUE V. 
 
 " 1 cannot follow Gotama in all he says about the com- 
 position of the body, and about the elements. You may 
 have heard that a great many more elementary substances 
 have been discovered than are found in his list. 1 do 
 not know that the supposition of an akds'a (ether), 
 pervading all space as a substratum of Sound is not some- 
 what gratuitous. But I have no hesitation, on the 
 whole, in acknowledging, learned Tarkakama, that the 
 works of Gotama and Kanada lay down excellent 
 rules for the investigation of Truth. But here the vulgar 
 proverb is verified : The man ivlio holds the torch does not 
 see for himself. Those who inculcated such correct modes 
 of investio^atino^ truth failed to find her themselves on 
 some points of great importance. In spite of their care 
 in furnishing us with the methods and instruments of 
 thought, they left us as far as ever from a satisfactory 
 solution of the most important problems that the human 
 mind can propose to itself" 
 
 Tarhakdma. — '' On this purely philosophical point, 
 we may perhaps fairly expect a dispassionate discus- 
 sion. What are the truths you think they failed to 
 discover?" 
 
 ^' Framdna, Sir," said Satyakama, ^^ is not pramd. 
 The two are quite different. The first is the instrument 
 of true knowledge ; the second is true knowledge itself 
 A person may possess the one, without employing it 
 to get at the other. He may have the instrument, and 
 yet fail to make any worthy use of it. Such I believe 
 to have been the case with Gotama and Kanada. On 
 several points of serious importance they have taught 
 what is inconsistent witli their own principles of Reason- 
 ing." 
 
 Tarkakdma. — ^' Do not indulge in general censures, 
 Specify what you mean." 
 
KNOWLEDGE OF TOPICS AND CATEGORIES. 179 
 
 Satyakdma. — "I will not again refer to tlieir theology. 
 You say their object was philosophy. Do they not how- 
 ever profess to clear the way to final emancipation there- 
 by ? Do thay nob say that a knowledge of their especial 
 topics and categories is necessary for Salvation? Gotania 
 promises Emancipation on an accurate knowledge of 
 his sixteen topics, and Kanada on that of his six cate- 
 gories. What connection those topics or categories can 
 have with the emancipation of the soul, is to me incom- 
 prehensible." 
 
 Tarkahdma. — ''Does not the knowledge of truth lead 
 to the improvement of our nature ?" 
 
 Satyakdma. — " Gotama does not speak of the know 
 ledge of truth, but of the true knoioledge of his sixteen 
 topics.'' 
 
 "You are so hard on poor Gotama," said Tarkakama. 
 "An eminent Scholar, himself a Mletcha, has construed 
 his first aphorism in a very different way. ' Gotama 
 ' starts,' says he, ' with the grand question of all questions, 
 ' the inquiry as to how we shall attain the summum honurriy 
 'the chief end of man, as the Westminster catechism 
 'literally represents the Sanscrit paramapurushdrtha. 
 ' The general answer to this he states in his first aphorism, 
 ' where he lays down further the position that deliverance 
 'from evil can be reached only through knowledge of 
 'the truth 8.'" 
 
 Satyakdma. — " Here are Gotama's own words as 
 translated by that eminent Scholar himself ' Proof (^. e., 
 'the instrument of right notion), that which (as having 
 'a proof) is the subject of right notion ; doubt ; 
 ' motive ; familiar fact ; scholastic tenet ; confutation ; 
 ' ascertainment ; disquisition ; controversy ; cavil ; sem- 
 ' blance of a reason ; perversion ; futility ; and unfitness 
 
 « Aphorisms of the NyiCya Part I, printed for the Benares College. 
 
180 DIALOGUE V. 
 
 * to be argrued with : — from knowing the truth in regard 
 ' to these (sixteen things) there is the attainment of the 
 'summum honum (nis'reyasa)^.' 
 
 " I do not see, continued Satyakama, what connection 
 most of these topics can have with any such improvement 
 of our spiritual nature, as is involved in the idea of 
 emancipation. You will say, the second topic, ' subject 
 of right notion,' includes every thing. So, according to 
 the Puranas, did the mighty ocean, both poison and 
 nectar. Would you then tell a person, who w^as longing 
 for immortality, to go down to the sea- shore, and drink a 
 quantity of sea water ?" 
 
 '' Do you then deny, asked Tarkakama, that the pursuit 
 of philosophy is the highest employment in which man 
 can engage ?" 
 
 '^ Philosophy is a loose expression ; so I cannot directly 
 answer your question. But to say to a mumuhshu, or an 
 inquirer after Salvation, that a knowledge of certain 
 topics and categories is necessary for the soul's welfare, 
 is like telling an invalid, who requires a remedy for 
 the cure of fever, that anatomy and materia medica are 
 necessary to be studied for the removal of diseases." 
 
 " But is not the mind improved by the knowledge of 
 logical rules ? and as the soul derives, through the mind, 
 the information necessary for its welfare, it follows that 
 the art of disputation is useful for the soul's welfare." 
 
 ''You mistake me, said Satyakama, if you think I 
 undervalue the study of logic. That study may be as 
 important a help in leading to right conclusions and 
 guarding against fallacies, as the sextant is to the 
 mariner in makinsr his observations at sea. But the 
 
 CO 
 
 9 
 
 
IS BIRTH A CALAMITY? 181 
 
 logician should not therefore set forth Nis'reyasa, or 
 emancipation, as the reward for studying that science." 
 
 Tarkakdma. — "But why do you exhaust your energy 
 on mere verbal' criticisms ? What wrong doctrine do you 
 find in Gotama's philosophy ?" 
 
 ''Let us then consider, said Satyakama, the nature 
 and end of human existence, as inculcated by Gotama. 
 Your Achdrya places jamna^^\ birth, and pravrittiy acti- 
 vity, among evils, the annihilation of which is necessary 
 for Emancipation. He also says distinctly that birth is 
 a calamity. (Nyaya Sutras i. 2 and iv. 55). I appeal to 
 you, is birth then essentially an evil ^ , and activity a sin ?" 
 
 1 The learned principal of the Benares College has thus expounded Gotama's view 
 on this point. 
 
 "The remembering of the order of the steps in 2. may be facilitated, to some 
 "readers, by availing ones self of the distributively cumulative form of exposition 
 "employed in the nursery tale of the house that Jack built." Thus : — 
 
 " 1. Dahha. — This is the pain that the man had. 
 
 "2. Janma. — This is the birth (again renewed) that gave room for the pain that 
 " the man had. 
 
 "3. Pravritti. — This is 'activity' (requiring reward) that led to the birth (again 
 "renewed) that gave room for the pain that the man had, 
 
 "4. Dosha. — This is the fault" (of 'desire — or dislike' alike to be shunned, or 
 " stupidity) which (in the man who, if wise, had done nothing at all,) begot the 
 *' activity' (requiring reward) that led to the ' birth' (again renewed) that gave room 
 " for the pain that the man had. 
 
 "5. Miihyd Jndtia. — This means the wrong notions (of that man unversed in the 
 "truth teaching Ny^ya Philosophy) which (since the man knew no better) gave 
 " rise to the 'fault' (of 'desire' or 'dislike' or stupidity,) which in the man who, if 
 " wise, had done nothing at all, begot the activity (requiring reward) that led to 
 *' the 'birth' (again renewed) that gave room for the ' pain' that the man had. 
 
 "6 Apavarga. — This last is beatitude* promised as fruit of the truth teaching 
 Nyiya Philosophy, which gave us right ones instead of the wrong notions, which 
 gave rise to what Gotama styles a fault, in as much as it mischievously begot the 
 'activity' carefully shunned by the wise, — for 'activity' shaping itself in acts that 
 are good or bad, and requiring reward of a like description, occasions a man to be 
 born again, — and 't was this same ' birth* that gave room for the ' pain' that the- 
 man had. 
 
182 DIALOGUE V. 
 
 Tarkahdma. — "Is it not a fact, notwithstanding what 
 Ao"amika said a little while ag^o, that our birth is attend- 
 ed with numerous sufferings, and that when the soul is 
 born, it is born to misery and unhappiness ?" 
 
 ''Is it not," said Satyakama ''sapping the very found- 
 ation of filial duty to parents, and of piety to God, to 
 say that birth is an essential evil ?" 
 
 Here I interposed a remark ; " 1 confess it is possible 
 to push the doctrine to an unwarrantable extreme." 
 
 "But," said Satyakama, "has not Gotama already so 
 pushed it ? We must get rid of our births if we are 
 desirous of Liberation. This view I know he deduced 
 from the endless transmigrations involved in his doctrine 
 of a pre-existence. Those transmigrations are in spite 
 of ourselves. We are tied hand and foot by karma or 
 adrishta^. If we do good, we shall have to return to the 
 world to enjoy our reward. If we commit evil we must still 
 return to undergo our punishment. Tired of such trans- 
 migrations, he considered birth itself an evil. The pity 
 is he rested so much on deductions from a theory hastily 
 adopted, in opposition to his own principles of inves- 
 tigation. He did not reason inductively by regular 
 argument from /ac^5. 
 
 "Then, again, continued Satyakama, ^ravr/^^/, or acti- 
 vity, is noted down as an evil, and pravritti is defined to 
 be the originator of the functions of the voice, the under- 
 standing, and the body." (Nyaya I. 17)^. 
 
 "I am sure, said A'gamika, you will not tax Gotama 
 with what he has not himself said. He iplaced pravritti 
 among the things to he removed^ but did not call it an 
 evil." 
 
 * ^T^^f^l" ^^K ^ "^ %^^ ^TWcT I M^rcandeya. 
 
gotama's representation of life. 183 
 
 "Whatever is necessary to be removed, rejoined Satya- 
 kdma, in order to attain a good object, must be its 
 pratiyogi, or something incompatible with it, and therefore 
 an impediment in its way, and whatever is incompatible 
 with a good object, must be an evil. But it is not by 
 mere implication that he condemns jpravritti. He has 
 defined it to be the cause of dosha, or fault^." (I. 18.) 
 
 " I cannot deny that he does say so," replied Agamika. 
 
 *' Let us then see what this amounts to. Agreeably 
 to Gotama's doctrine, it is a fault to speak, think, or do 
 any thing. Can this be a true view of the nature of 
 human existence ?" 
 
 Agaynika. — '* It is a fault because it is not the chief 
 good." 
 
 Satyakdma. — "And yet, on your theory, thought, 
 speech, and powers of action are divine gifts ; — indeed 
 the only gifts God bestows on man ; — for as regards 
 existence, that you do not hold to be a gift of God, since 
 the soul is uncreated, and has independent existence. 
 The body and mind are only given by God, and yet, you 
 say, it is a fault, or rather it is not for our chief good, to 
 give exercise to our physical and mental powers." 
 
 Agamika. — "But man has abused the gifts of God. 
 When the nectar is converted to poison, what can you 
 do ? You must throw it away." 
 
 Tarkakdma. — "Victory to Rama! You have made 
 a very good remark, Agamika. I contend that Gotama 
 has not pushed any doctrines to unwarrantable extremes, 
 nor is it mere deductions from a ' hastily adopted theory,.' 
 that he sets forth in liis work. In his representation 
 of the evils of life, he only reasoned from facts, and 
 there is no gap in the chain of his reasonings. Every 
 
184 DIALOGUE V. 
 
 conclusion has a hetUj or reason, to support it. You seem, 
 Satyakama, to stumble at the 2nd Sutra in which he 
 shows how certain hindrances to the soul's release require 
 to be removed. I had a sort of presentiment that it 
 might be a stumbling-block in your way, and I have 
 brought with me a leaf from Vatsayana (the very author 
 to whom you have just made reference) in the hope of 
 smoothing your passage. Now listen attentively how that 
 excellent commentator expounds these grand ideas of 
 Gotama, — ideas which he was the first among: our Rishis to 
 embody in a short pithy sentence for the instruction of man- 
 kind. That sentence is as follows : ^ pain, birth, activity, 
 ' fault, false notions, — since on the successive annihilation 
 ' of these in turn, there is the annihilation of the one next 
 ^ before it, there is (on the annihilation of the last of them) 
 ' Beatitude.' That is to say. Beatitude proceeds from 
 the annihilation of false notions as its primary cause. 
 Vatsayana thus expounds this sentence : ' False notions 
 are manifold ; (1) with reference to Spirit, that there is 
 ' no spirit at all ; (2) with reference to Matter, that it is 
 ' spirit ; (3) with reference to Pain, that it is pleasure ; 
 ' (4) with reference to the Transient, that it is eternal ; (5) 
 ' with reference to No-sal^ation, that it is salvation ; (6) 
 ' with reference to Risk, that it is security ; (7) with 
 ' reference to the Culpable, that it is desirable ; (8) with 
 ' reference to the thing to be eschewed, that it is not to be 
 ' eschewed; (9) with reference to Activity, that it does not 
 'involve karma, (deed), nor the fruits of deeds ; (10) 
 ' with reference to Faults, that this world is not caused 
 'by faults; (11) with reference to Renewed birth, that 
 ' there is no being, soul, entity, or spirit, that dies, and, 
 ' having died, is born. Birth is without cause, the cessa- 
 'tion of birth is without cause. Renewed birth has a 
 ' beginning and is without end. Being occasional, renewed 
 
gotama's view of life. 185 
 
 ' existence is not the effect of karma, (works.) Benewed 
 ' birth is without soul, because of the growth and exist- 
 ^ence of the body, the senses, the understanding, and the 
 ' feehng. That Emancipation is terrific. That it is in fact 
 ' the cessation of all work, the disruption of every thing. 
 'That many good things are thereby destroyed. What in- 
 ' telligent person, then, will desire such emancipation — a 
 'state of insensibility, in which all works and all enjoy- 
 ' ments are extinct ? 
 
 'From this false notion, or ignorance, continues the 
 commentator, proceed partiality to favourites and preju- 
 ' dice against adversaries. In partiality and prejudice, 
 ' again, consist the faults of detraction, envy, delusion, in- 
 ' toxication, pride, avarice, &c. Connected with faults, and 
 ' acting with a body, a person commits injury, theft, and 
 'unlawful sensualities; becomes false, harsh, and slander- 
 ' ous in speech ; with hatred, avarice, and atheism, in the 
 'mind. This vicious activity produces a(iAarma, (demerit). 
 ' But to do acts of charity, benevolence, and service, with 
 ' the body, to be truthful, useful, agreeable in speech, or 
 ' given to reading the Veda, to be kind, disinterested, and 
 ' reverential in the mind, these produce dharma, (merit) . 
 ' Now dharma and adharma, (merit and demerit), being 
 ' fostered by pravritti, (activity) , are denoted by the word 
 
 * pravritti, just as life is denoted by food which fosters 
 
 * it, for it is said. Food is the life of living creatures. 
 ' This activity is the cause of a vile, as well as of 
 ' an honourable, birth. Birth, again, is connected with 
 ' the manifestation and assemblage of body, senses, and 
 ' understanding. Attendant on birth is pain. That, 
 ' again,, comprises the feeling of distress, trouble, disease, 
 ' sorrow. The congregated attributes, beginning with 
 ' Ignorance and ending with Pain, compose sansdra, 
 ^(the world).' 
 
 2 B 
 
186 DIALOGUE V. 
 
 '^ Having thus described the concatenation of evils, pro- 
 duced by ignorance, the learned and ingenious Vatsdyana 
 proceeds next to represent the effects of true knowledge. 
 ' But when,' says he, ignorance is extinguished, then, by 
 *the extinction of ignorance, Faults are extinguished. By 
 * the extinction of faults, Activity is extinguished. By the 
 ' extinction of activity. Birth is extinguished. By the extinc- 
 ' tion of birth. Pain is extinguished. By the extinction of 
 'pain, is the beatitude of final Emancipation. As for 
 'true knowledge, it is best explained as the contrary 
 'of ignorance. With reference to spirit, that such a 
 'thing exists. With reference to matter, that it is 
 *not spirit. And it is to be similarly understood with 
 'reference to pain, to the transient, to the no-salva- 
 ' tion, to the perilous, to the culpable, and to the things 
 'to be eschewed. With reference to activity, that it in- 
 'volves karmay (works), and the fruit of works. With 
 ' reference to faults, that the world is caused by faults. With 
 'reference to renewed birth, that it is a living soul, 
 ' entity, or spirit, which, having died, is born. Birth has 
 ' a cause, the cessation of birth has a cause, renewed birth 
 ' is without beginning, and continues until emancipation. 
 ' Renewed birth has a cause, and its cause is activity. 
 ' Being endowed with a soul, renewed birth remains 
 ' in force until emancipation, with the restitution of 
 'the body, senses, understanding, and feeling. Eman- 
 'cipation, however, is the disruption of all these, the 
 ' cessation of all these. A multitude of troubles, fears, 
 'and vices is thereby extinguished. What intelligent 
 ' person will not desire an emancipation which is the 
 ' extinction of all pain, which is separation from all 
 ' pain 1 For, it is said, food mixed with honey and poison 
 ' is to be avoided ; pleasure, joined with pain, is to be 
 ' avoided.' " 
 
gotama's view of life. 187 
 
 *^ Such is the exposition of V4ts%ana^. You see how 
 correct was i\^gamika's remark, that if the nectar be 
 converted to poison, you must throw it away. Sansdra 
 is but an assemblaore of is^norance and other evils. This 
 
 ■^^^ ^og-^^ril?:^: H"5|f%?P?trft5xr^^T -^W^ H^^ ^cgcT TfcT 
 H^ fWcT ft?f ^T^T^^fcT iT-il^r ^^I^W^t ^^I^ ^"^ "^^^ I 
 
 ^^TITT^ Tt^in-fcT -^JlfTm^ ^T^f'f?^^SIT^^3IT f^^^f^fRfcT ( 
 
188 DIALOGUE V. 
 
 is a matter of fact, and not a mere deduction. If you are 
 disposed to deny the fact, then you must have a theory 
 of optimism, in which it will be impossible for me to 
 follow you. For I cannot overlook the miseries and suf- 
 ferings with which the world abounds. Let us only 
 make up our minds to call things by their right names, 
 and then — what can we say of life in this stage of exist- 
 ence ? Is- not this the one great characteristic of our 
 bodies, that they fall into decay and are dissolved ? How 
 can we, then, think complacently of them^ ? We may as 
 well repose confidence in lightnings, and autumnal clouds, 
 and fairy cities^. For what, indeed, is it to be born ? 
 Is it not simply — to die ! Every thing, accordingly, 
 
 Tt^f^ftTTf; H^K xfcT $cgHr^ i§r^r^ sr^^^j Hc^^r^i ¥t 
 ?r: -q^wr^t xT^ F^Pfttt^^'?? f^fHTf^T^ sr'sfrTTi:^ icw^Tf^j 
 S^Hifr^TT^^T'fr xFcT ^ffrffr^t ^^r $3ivrr^: ir^fTrf^fiTTr xU 
 
 ^"tt ^T^^ ^^w xT^ ^^ ^f^JiTT WVji§^^ ^^T'^m- 
 
 -J si ^ VJ V* 
 
 «i 
 
 ^ifefT^f'^rtft -^f^ W^ m^'m ^^m l Yogav^s'lshtha. 
 
EVILS OF LIFE. 189 
 
 is unstable®. Life is only a source of trouble, the 
 mind being intoxicated with the poisoned objects of 
 sense, and the soul being destitute of true knowledge^. 
 You may speak of the beauty and symmetry of our cor- 
 poreal frames, you may talk of our mental powers, you 
 may set forth the excellencies of our understaadings, 
 and the greatness of our efforts ; but is not the whole, I 
 ask, troublesome in the extreme, — like an additional 
 weight on the neck of a man already burdened ?'^ To 
 what is an infant born in the world ? To a life of happi- 
 ness ? By no means. It is only to buffet the waves of 
 works in the ocean of this world ^ . And, as he grows in 
 years and attains manhood, he is exposed to temptations 
 calculated to cause his ruin^. As to old age, again, it 
 is difficult to determine which of its infirmities are the 
 more pitiable — the physical or the moral^. Who, then, 
 can desire to continue in this embodied state — this house 
 of a body, in which the organs of sense, and desire, and 
 the mind, are, as fellow-occupants, continually delud- 
 
 ^I^TcT ^cT^T ^^^rt fW^cT ^^-ffT^ ^ I 
 
 ^m\T?T^f^?^I"5fTTTI^T^m^T^W I Ibid. 
 VTT^ HTT^^li^ ^^ ^5I5R ^f^^Ts I Ibid. 
 
 •v ^ ^ 
 
 Si 
 
 ^Xt ^T^ftr^^"^ JT^TW^fcT ^Il|^ I Ibid. 
 
190 DIALOGUE V. 
 
 ing and distressing us ?^ Of all the causes of our 
 miseries the greatest is desire, which, like a traitor in 
 your own house, betrays its inmates to danger and dif- 
 ficulty^. Hence we say that the renouncement of this 
 whole assemblage of evils is our only remedy, and that 
 they alone live happily, whose birth shall not be re- 
 newed in the world® ! 
 
 '' We do not say that there is no such thing as happi- 
 ness in the world. We do not deny the possibility of 
 dharma, or merit, but we cannot ignore the painful fact that 
 dharma is mixed up with adharma, that pleasure is link- 
 ed with pain, and that birth, when renewed, is but a 
 renewal of misery. W^e do not deny the existence of 
 pleasure, nor do we say that there is no good pravritti, 
 or laudable activity^ ; but, since evil unquestionably pre- 
 dominates, we cannot help considering life, in our present 
 stage, to be a great misfortune. Hence we denote both 
 dharma and adharma by pravritti, because it produces 
 karma, which is our great bondage. When honey is 
 mixed, with poison, the whole cup is called poison, 
 and thrown away. Even so we call pravritti an evil, 
 and look for emancipation, as our only effectual escape 
 from the miseries of transmigration and the sufferings 
 of life." 
 
 fcTTfif SriTcTT^''^ ^i: ^^^^ ^^ I Yoga-v^s'ishtha. 
 
 ^ :j^'rf ^T^m ^m 5T-3:^cjr^HT{ i ibid. 
 
 Gotama iv. 56, 64. 
 
NYAYA AKIN TO BUDDHISM. 191 
 
 Satyakdma- ^' If you had not said that the yellow 
 paper® iii your hand is a leaf from Vdtsdyana's commen- 
 tary, and that you are giving an exposition of the doc- 
 trine of Gotama, the author of the Nyaya, I might have 
 mistaken it for the teaching of Gotama, the founder 
 of Buddhism." 
 
 Agamika. — " Mahdbharat ! Mahabharat^ ! Oh Satya- 
 kdma ! what do you say ? Can there be any similitude be- 
 tween a learned Rishi, who contended for orthodoxy, and 
 the unhappy heretic, who reviled gods and Brahmins 1 " 
 
 Satyakdma. — *' Pardon me, A'garaika, if I have caused 
 you pain. But the 'heretic who reviled gods and Brah- 
 mins' taught doctrines so very much akin to those of the 
 ' learned Bishi who contended for orthodoxy,' that it is 
 no hyperbole to say you are liable to mistake the one for 
 the other. Indeed, the tenets of the two Gotamas, the 
 orthodox and the heretic, bear such a strong resemblance in 
 their features, that you may safely declare they were uterine 
 brothers, if not twins; and, unless you studied to note 
 their distinctive signs, you might always incur the danger 
 of a mistake. Now mark their resemblance. The ortho- 
 dox Gotama begins with the assertion that supreme felicity 
 is derivable from true knowledge. The heretical Gotama 
 exhorts his followers to seek it from the same source^^. 
 
 8 Native manuscripts are generally preserved in paper saturated with yellow arsenic 
 to guard against insects. 
 
 9 When iirahmins hear any thing which shocks their feelings, they repeat some 
 auspicious word, just as the Mahometans rehearse ^^li»3| 2>.XJlj j| cJll*.'^^ Jv^i! 
 
 ^ ^ * * * * 
 
 ♦ * * * * 
 
192 DIALOGUE V. 
 
 The orthodox Gotama says that Ignorance, by producing 
 faults and activity, becomes the cause of Birth. The 
 heretical Gotama taught the same — only enlarging the 
 list of intermediate agencies between Ignorance and 
 Birth. The orthodox Gotama acknowledged that the 
 world is a compound of good and evil, dharma and 
 adharma, pleasure and pain, and' yet maintained that the 
 whole is to be renounced, and that the only remedy 
 for the perils of life is a^pavarga, or the complete cessa- 
 tion of effort and activity, and separation of the soul 
 from body and mind. The heretical Gotama also al- 
 lowed that the world contains dharma and adharma, 
 kus'ala and akus'ala, the one being a cause of virtue, and 
 the other of vice, and yet that there is no other salva- 
 tion from the miseries of life, than the ' acquirement of 
 the unchangeable state of nirvdna^.'" Both pronounced 
 the world to be a state of suffering, and transmigrations 
 to be calamities and misfortunes^. Both considered hu- 
 man life to be unimprovable, except as it tends to 
 apavarga or nirvdna. 
 
 %T^^ f^Ht^^^^^T f^H^H^^^T I Lalita Vistara. 
 
 1 Way land's Memoir of Judson. Also in the Lalita vistara ; 
 
 2 '* Painful are repeated births" (^;^X 3TTfcTXr*rJ TT^j) Hardy's Manual 
 of Buddhism Again in Lalita vistara, ^ 
 
 Compare these lines with Gotama I. 2. iv. 55. 
 
BUDDHIST CHAIN OF EVILS. 193 
 
 '^You have heard how Gotama, the orthodox, con- 
 nected birth with ignorance, and emancipation with true 
 knowledge. Hear now how Gotama, the heretic, did 
 the same in the following catechism ; 
 
 'On what existing, do decrepitude and death come 
 ' into existence, and on what do they depend ? 
 
 ' On Birth taking pl^e, decrepitude and death come 
 ' into existence, and they depend on birth. 
 
 ' On what existing, does birth come to pass, and on what 
 ' again does it depend ? 
 
 'On the World existing, birth comes into existence, 
 ' and it depends on the world. 
 
 ' On what existing, does the world come into existence, 
 ' and on what does it depend ? 
 
 ' On Affection existing, the world comes into existence, 
 'and it depends on affection. 
 
 ' On what existing, does affection come into existence, 
 ' and on what does it depend ? 
 
 'On Desire existing, affection comes into existence, 
 ' and it depends on desire. 
 
 'On what existing, does desire come into existence, 
 ' and on what does it depend ? 
 
 ' On Sensibility existing, desire comes to exist, and it 
 ' depends on sensibility. 
 
 ' On what existing, does sensibility come to exist, and 
 ' on what does it depend ? 
 
 ' On Contact existing, sensibility comes to exist, and it 
 ' depends on contact. 
 
 ' On what existing, does contact come to pass, and on 
 ' what does it depend ? 
 
 ' On the Six organs existing, contact comes to pass, and 
 ' it depends on the six organs. 
 
 ' On what existing, do the six organs come to existence, 
 ' and on what do they depend ? 
 
 2 c 
 
194 DIALOGUE V. 
 
 ' On Name and form existing, the six organs come to 
 ' exist, and they depend on name and form. 
 
 * On what existing, do name and form come into exis 
 ^ tence, and on what do they depend ? 
 
 ^ On Apprehension existing, name and form come into 
 * existence, and they depend on apprehension. 
 
 ' On what existing, does apprehension (vijndna) come 
 ' to exist, and on what does it depend ? 
 
 ' On Ideas (sanskara) existing, does apprehension come 
 ' into existence, and it depends on ideas. 
 
 ' On what existing, do ideas come into existence, and 
 ' on what do they depend ? 
 
 * On Ignorance existing, ideas come to exist, and they 
 'depend on ignorance ?'^'^ 
 
 i-^-STT^t ^Wt (S^HT Vr^fcT i-^^T^ST^T ^ ^^r II 
 
BUDDHIST CHAIN OF REMEDIES. 195 
 
 '* Having thus given the succession of causes by which 
 the sutFerings of decrepitude and death, the two great 
 evils which had struck Sakya most, are produced, he 
 proceeds next to show how their cessation may be brought 
 about. ^ On what subsiding, do decrepitude and death 
 ' subside, and on whose cessation is the cessation of decre- 
 * pitude and death ? * 
 
 ' On birth subsiding, decrepitude and death subside, and 
 ' on its cessation is their cessation. 
 
 ' On what subsiding, does birth subside, and on whose 
 ' cessation, is its cessation ? 
 
 ' On the world subsiding, birth subsides, and on the 
 'world's cessation, is the cessation of birth. 
 
 ' On what subsiding, in fine, do ideas subside, and on 
 ' whose cessation is the cessation of ideas ? 
 
 ' On ignorance subsiding, ideas subside, and on its cessa- 
 ' tion is their cessation. On the cessation of ideas, is the 
 cessation of apprehension*.' " 
 
 «ir%-^^fir TifcT^^ Hqrfir ^^ m fiTrt^r^Trfirf^rl'^; ft 
 
 i^^T^^Tl^- ft 
 
196 DIALOGUE V. 
 
 Tai^kakdma. — "The sufferings and miseries of existence 
 are the common lot of all men. Tliat the Buddhists had 
 their share is no marvel ; and it is only natural that, in 
 their deplorable ignorance of the true remedy for the 
 perils of life, they should be somewhat uncomfortable. 
 To place them on the same level with us, simply because 
 they did not know how to escape from their miseries, 
 and therefore complained of their sufferings, is certainly 
 not fair. Our Gotama did not rest satisfied with giving 
 us a knowledge of evil and a sight of darkness. He also 
 taught us the way of emancipation. He showed us light. 
 Like a benevolent and experienced physician, he told us 
 at once what our disease was, — what its cause, — and 
 what the treatment should be, that we might be restored 
 to health. The Buddhists, on the contrary, only set up 
 loud yells under their sufferings, but were lamentably 
 ignorant of the means of escape. Their master physician, 
 as they delighted to call their leader, could only tell them 
 what the very clowns in the streets knew for themselves 
 — that they were miserable and wretched, and that their 
 only escape was in the extinction of their miserable 
 existence ! The great empiric could only cure souls by 
 condemning them to — perdition. He could talk of 
 nothing but Nii^vdna, (annihilation), as if an eternal 
 principle, such as the soul, could ever cease to exist. The 
 founder of the Nyaya led us to look for apavarga or 
 emancipation." 
 
 Satyahdma. — ^' But what is apavarga ?" 
 Tarkakdma. — '^ Apavarga, or emancipation, is final 
 deliverance from these, that is to say, from pain, birth, 
 activity, fault, false notions, and it is a state of unmingled 
 felicity." 
 
EMANCIPATION AND NIRVANA BOTH ALIKE 197 
 
 Satyakdma. — '^If, as you say, the soul, when emanci- 
 pated gets rid of birth it must, on your theory, be separated 
 both from body and mind. It cannot then have any 
 powers of thought and action. Emancipation must 
 accordingly be a state of torpor and of perfect insensi- 
 bility. I cannot understand what felicity there can be 
 in such a state, nor, in what respect, it can differ from 
 the Nirvana of the Buddhists." 
 
 Tarkakdma. — ^' There are certain truths, Satyakama, 
 which cannot be described by metaphysical definitions. 
 They can only be realized by the feeling, I mean they 
 are comprehensible to those alone, who can understand 
 and enjoy them. I must therefore decline a discussion 
 of the metaphysical definition of our Emancipation. I 
 can only say that it is a state of supreme felicity, by 
 which all evil, -all suffering, all sorrow, all pain, are at once 
 and for ever extinguished. The utmost efforts of human 
 rhetoric cannot adequately represent — the highest flights 
 of human imagination cannot properly comprehend — such 
 a state of ineffable joy and of undisturbed tranquillity. 
 But do not, I pray you, commit such a grievous outrage 
 on common sense, as to confound our Emancipation with 
 the Buddhistic Nirvdna or annihilation." 
 
 Satyakdma. — '^But Buddhists talk of their Nirvdna 
 precisely in the same way as you do of your emancipation. 
 ' The Pali doctrinal books speak of Nirvana as an exemp- 
 ' tion from old age, from decay, and from death ; and as 
 ' being also the acquirement of all bliss. The most celebra- 
 ' ted of the Burman priests at Ava, in reply to inquiries 
 ' made by one of the Catholic Missionaries, replied as fol- 
 ' lows : * When a person is no longer subject to any of the 
 '' following miseries, namely, to weight, old age, disease 
 '* and death, then he is said to have obtained nigban. No 
 '' thing, no place, can give us any adequate idea of nigban ; 
 
198 DIALOGUE V. 
 
 '* we can only say that to be free from the four above- 
 '^ mentioned miseries, and to obtain salvation, is nigban^." 
 ' Here, said Buddha, lust and anger arising from de- 
 
 * lusion, and infesting the world, are, like convicted thieves, 
 ' utterly destroyed. Here that ignorance and worldly lust, 
 ' which are ever productive of mischief, are burnt up from 
 ' their corrupt roots, by the great fire of knowledge. Here 
 ' the intractable cords of time, with lands and houses as hard 
 ' knots, and consisting of the selfish discriminations, myself 
 ^ and mine, are cut down by the weapons of my knowledge. 
 
 ' Here is dried up, by the sun of my knowledge, the violent 
 ' stream of desire, which takes its rise in evil, and is fed with 
 
 * the waters of sight, together with avidity and all evil 
 ' thoughts. The forest of troubles, slander, and detraction, 
 together with delusion, jealousy, and envy, is here burnt 
 'up by the fire of moderation. The three-fold bonds of 
 ' the world are all loosened by me on attaining emanci- 
 ' pation by the weapon of knowledge. Here I have, by the 
 ' boat of resolution, (virya), got over the ocean of sansara, 
 ' (the world), infested with the aquatic monster of lust, and 
 ' agitated by the waves of the waters of desire, excited 
 ' by an evil eye. Here I have an experience of immor- 
 tality for the benefit of the world, wherein is cessation 
 'of old age, death, sorrow, and trouble, and which is 
 ' unattainable by the followers of other doctrines. Here 
 ' I have experience of that which was known to innume- 
 ' rable saints of yore, whose agreeable and pleasing report 
 'is celebrated in the world ^.'" 
 
 5 Way land's Memoir of Dr. Judson . 
 
HAD BUDDHA ONLY GLIMPSES OF GOTAMA's IDEAS. 199 
 
 Tarhakdma — ^^ I cannot understand the utility of 
 this laborious attempt to confound the teaching of the 
 Nyaya with that of Buddhism. You are acting with a 
 vengeance on the principles of upamdna, or analogy, 
 inculcated by Gotama himself. You are exerting your- 
 self to no purpose with a view to turn his own weapon 
 against himself. You forget that there are certain truths, 
 which, like the solar rays, are self apparent to the whole 
 world, and that although, if a desperately blind man 
 fails to recognize them, it is no proof against their exist- 
 ence, (any more than the incapacity of certain animals for 
 seeing by day-light is an argument against the existence 
 of the meridian sun,) yet when men of gross sensibilities 
 do succeed in getting glimpses of the truth, the fact is a 
 verification not refutation of it. What if the Buddhists 
 
 
 
 M 
 
200 DIALOGUE V, 
 
 had understood a few fragments of the grand truth which 
 our Gotama was the first to embody in his memorable 
 work r 
 
 Satyakdma. — '' I do not see how you can justly say 
 that the Buddhists had only got glimpses of the ^ grand 
 truth' which Gotama taught in the Nyaya. The follow- 
 ers of Sakya appear to me to have had greater reasons 
 for saying that the grand truth was first inculcated by 
 their leader. '^ The fact is that the thoughtful natives of 
 India had begun at an early period to recognize the evils 
 which existed in the world, and were not satisfied that 
 the mere performance of the ceremonies inculcated in the 
 Veda could give them deliverance. Such ideas had long 
 been floating in the popular mind, and certain aspirations 
 after higher objects than were propounded in the Man- 
 tras and Brahmanas had also occasionally found entrance 
 into it. But to say that Gotama, the founder of the 
 Nyaya, was the first to embody them in his sdtras, appears 
 to me to betoken no small sdhasa or boldness. For the 
 age of Buddha was confessedly anterior to that of the 
 Nyaya. Indeed you glory in saying that one great ob- 
 ject of the Nyaya was the refutation of Buddhism. And 
 surely the inculcation of the evils of existence and of the 
 alleged felicity of emancipation or Nirvana was more 
 characteristic of Buddhism than of the Nydya. What is 
 the idea prominently suggested by the word Buddhism ? 
 Is it not (however divided public opinion may be as to 
 its theism) associated with the idea of an aspiration after 
 something called Nirvdna as an escape from the sufFerino-s 
 of life ? * Anitya, Dukha, Anatta, (anarthaj, Transience, 
 ' Pain and Unrealty, (so the devout Buddhist mutters 
 'as he tells his beads) these are the characters of all 
 
 €tfV€f?^Rl TTSoT^^^ "^JT^I Lalita vistara. 
 
NIRVANA PECULIAR TO BUDDHISM. 201 
 
 ' existence, and the only true good is exemption from these 
 4n the attainment of Nirvana®.' What again is the 
 prominent idea associated with the Nydya ? Is it not 
 metaphysical and logical speculation ? If then the Nyaya 
 gives a representation of the evils of life and of emancipa- 
 tion, which has a strong resemblance with Buddhistic 
 teaching, the probability is that the author of the Nydya 
 made a concession to Buddha on these points under the 
 pressure of existing popular opinion, or was perhaps 
 himself infected by the doctrine of the great heretic. 
 
 '' You say that the author of the Nyaya was the first 
 to embody those ideas in his siitras. But the founder 
 of Buddhism had embodied them in his personal history. 
 For what is his biography, but a consecutive account of 
 acts, deeds, and speeches, all indicative of his impatience 
 of life, because of the evils of decay, old age, and death, 
 and of tlie sufferings entailed by desire and attachment, 
 and bearing record to his idea of nirvana, or final escape 
 from these ? Sakya was in this respect a character , such 
 as the Brahminical literature fails to produce in the pre- 
 Buddhistic age." 
 
 Agamika. — '^ But the divine Bdma, we find, was also 
 disgusted with the evils of life, and panted after mukti 
 or emancipation." 
 
 Satyqkdma. — " V41miki, if he was really the author 
 of the Yoga vdsistha, has certainly attempted the persona- 
 tion of a character in that work, somewhat approaching 
 to Sakya's. Nay he makes use of the identical terms 
 (jard, wxtranam, trishndj by which Buddha described 
 old age, death, desire. But Vdlmlki's sketch is a poor 
 imitation of the Buddhists, and in ill keeping with 
 the story of his own Epic. Rama was only for a time 
 
 s Capb Yule's Narrative of the Mission to the court of Ava. 
 
 2 D 
 
202 DIALOGUE V. 
 
 afflicted, when a boy, with the ideas in question. 
 The Brahmins in the palace of Das'aratha were evidently 
 greater adepts in the art of persuasion than those in the 
 court of his successor Sudhodhana, for we find that Rama 
 had quickly unlearnt his disgust with the world. He 
 chased the Rakshases, when his infantine locks were yet 
 uncropped on his head, in the hermitage of Vis'wamitra, 
 and then accompanied the sage to the court of Janaka, 
 where he competed successfully for the prize of fair Sita's 
 hand. Returning home with his bride, he accepted his 
 father's proposal for his installation as associate king, and 
 was only prevented from assuming the reins of Govern- 
 ment by the jealousy of his step-mother. He became a 
 voluntary exile from his country under the necessity of 
 vindicating his father's truthfulness, and retired to the 
 forests in the cheering company of his wife and brother. 
 Even there, though unjustly excluded from his home and 
 his throne, and afterwards deprived of his wife's society 
 by the dastardly outrage of the wicked Ravana, he does 
 not appear to have had any relapse into his early • disgust 
 with life. On the contrary, nothing can exceed the 
 thoroughly business-like energy, with which he proceeds 
 to the rescue of his captive wife. We then see Rama 
 happily returning home with his queen, and resuming the 
 pleasures and responsibilities of his throne. And if we 
 afterwards find him abandoning the world in a melancholy 
 mood of mind, we are at the same time assured that it 
 was to return to a life of sensuous enjoyment in heaven. 
 
 " Buddha, on the contrary, declined to accept a throne 
 and a sceptre, the possession of which was undisputed, 
 and betook himself to the life of an ascetic, notwithstand- 
 ing the importunities of affectionate relatives, — teaching 
 every where that life was a series of troubles and 
 sorrows, and holding out the hope of nirvana as the only 
 
WHETHER BUDDHA DENIED GOD AND SPIRITS. 203 
 
 eftectual escape. The means adopted for reconciling his 
 mind to the pleasures of a palace served only to increase 
 his disgust. To the characteristic peculiarities of his life 
 and doctrine, and to the success which attended his efforts, 
 ample testimony is borne to this day by the history and 
 traditions of Nepaul, Thibet, Burmah, Ceylon, Siam, 
 China and Tartary." 
 
 A'gamika. — ''You seem to have a greater faculty for 
 recognizing resemblances than differences. You are ig- 
 norinor the fact that the Buddhists denied the existence 
 of God and spirits, and reviled the Vedas and Brahmins." 
 
 Satyahdma. — " Atheism is certainly not the common 
 teaching of all Buddhists, for the Ais'warikas among them 
 acknowledge a self-existent Deity whom they call Adi 
 Buddha^. Nor do they positively deny the existence of 
 the soul. In fact the existence of the soul cannot be practi- 
 cally denied by men who hold out promises and threats of 
 future reward and punishment. The Buddhists certainly 
 do hold out such hopes and fears. ' The sceptic/ they say, 
 ' will bd punished in one or other of these two ways. He 
 'will be born in hell or as a beast. The wise man will 
 'be rewarded in one or other of these two ways ; he will 
 'be born in a dewa-loka, or as a man^^' They, again, 
 who get a sight of Buddha are exempted from troubles 
 for thousands of Kalpas ^ . 
 
 " I do not pretend to have a clear understanding of 
 Buddhistic psychology. Many of their writers speak of 
 the soul in terms that might justify your suspicion of 
 their denying its existence. But it is impossible to 
 charge them with such positive denial of the soul in the 
 face of their declarations of future retribution. 
 
 9 Hodgson, 10 Hardy's Manual of Buddhism, p. 472. 
 
 ^r'**4f*r( "^^m II Lalifca Vistara. 
 
204 DIALOGUE V. 
 
 " As to their ' reviling ' of the Yeda, it would be more 
 correct to say that they do not enforce the necessity of the 
 prescribed rites and ceremonies, and thus ignore, rather 
 than revile, its contents. They may, under cross exmina- 
 tion by Brahminical controversalists, or when irritated 
 by invective and abuse, have used strong expressions 
 against its authority, or even denounced it as the produc- 
 tion of impostors. But that was the language of pro- 
 vocation, and what a man says under provocation requires 
 to be charitably construed, for Narada himself poured, 
 under irritation, blasphemous invectives on Vishnu^, and 
 yet no one would call him a reviler of gods. 
 
 '^ With reference to the Veda, again, has not the 
 divine lecturer in the Bhagavad-gita himself spoken in 
 disparagement of it. Those who, relying on the promises 
 of the Yedas, engage in the performance of prescribed 
 rites and ceremonies are denounced sls fools. The heroic 
 son of Pandava is exhorted to rise above the level of the 
 Veda, which propounds nothing but objects connected 
 with the three qualities. ^Be thou, O Arjuna, above 
 Hhe three qualities^.' And since Gotama and Kapila 
 themselves say that something else is necessary for hu- 
 man emancipation than the mere observance of its ritual, 
 1 do not practically see any real difference between 
 theirs and Buddha's teaching. 
 
 * ^cT -^^'^ ^ITWT ^flr #r^T I iTT^T^^ "^T IT'f T ^^ ^^T II 
 
 ^T^l5^ I ^3C^ 5-ft: f^^ TTl^ ^^K^ II '^^ER^^T f^BT ^^iTf# 
 
 SJ NJ S» SI \* 
 
 ^TTT rm j\fm ^t^ i ^\x.^ ^rv^ ^fe^ cth ^^t ^xt^-^rit^ ii 
 
 Toolseedas's R^mayana. 
 
WHETHER BUDDHA REVILED BRAHMINS. 205 
 
 *' Nor do I find, with reference to their ' reviling Brah- 
 mins/ that Buddha ever taught his desciples to denounce 
 the sons of Brahmd on peril of their salvation. Many 
 Brahmans had themselves enlisted under his spiritual 
 standard. He was of course no advocate for the distinc- 
 tions of caste, and received as equals all that came unto 
 him. But he did not say, ' revile Brahmins and be saved.' 
 On the contrary, he virtually allowed some sort of supe- 
 riority to the higher castes, when he declared that birth 
 in a Brahmin family was a reward for merit. He taught 
 ' (with reference to those who commit murder) that such 
 ^persons, on the breaking up of the elements (the five 
 ' Khandas), will be born in one of the hells ; or if on ac- 
 ' count of the merit received in some former birth, they 
 ' are born as men, it will be of some inferior caste, or if 
 ' of a high caste, they will die young, and this shortness 
 ^ of life is on account of former cruelties. But if any one 
 'avoid the destruction of life, not taking a weapon into his 
 ' hand that he may shed blood, and be kind to all, and 
 ' merciful to all, he will, after death, be born in the world 
 ' of the dewas, or if he appear in this world, it will be 
 ' as a kshatra, or Brahman, or some other high caste, 
 ' and he will live to see old age^.' 
 
 *' He only denied the spiritual supremacy of Brahmins. 
 I do not know however that some of the sects, tolerated 
 by yourselves, do not go a good way with him in this 
 respect. The Yaishnavas and other followers of special 
 gods admit men in their respective fraternities without any 
 distinction of caste or race. The Buddhists do the same. 
 They do not go about teaching that salvation depends on 
 service done to Brahmins. They maintain that Nirvdna 
 consists in the moral improvement of human nature with 
 which caste has nothing to do. 
 
 4 Hardy's Manual, \). 446. 
 
206 DIALOGUE V. 
 
 " And here I 'will take the liberty of adding that their 
 scheme of Nirvana, notwithstanding the false view of 
 human nature implied in it, is more consistent than 
 Gotama's of emancipation. While they agree with the 
 Naiyayikas in denouncing the world as an assemblage 
 of evils, and in considering karma as the cause of con- 
 tinuance in life, they do not say thaf good works presen^ 
 an obstruction to final bliss by requiring reward and so 
 keeping up the transmigrations of the soul. They do 
 not say you must get rid both of merit and demerit in 
 order to escape transmigration. They agree with the 
 Naiyayikas in representing that Adharma, which they 
 also call Akus'ala, leads to punishments here and 
 hereafter, and causes ignoble births, but they do not 
 say that Dharma, or, as they more frequently style it, 
 Kus'ala, is a hindrance to what they consider supreme 
 felicity. ^The reward of merit is according to its cha- 
 ' racter, as well as its degree. When it arises from 
 ' something unconnected with dharma, worldly pros- 
 ' perity is received, or birth is secured as a garuda, with 
 'suparna, or naga. When it arises from something 
 'connected with dharma, it secures birth in a dewa-16ka 
 'or brahmaldka, or an entrance into the paths^,' — the 
 paths being four in number, 'leading to Nirwana^.' 
 The Buddhists accordingly felt themselves at liberty to 
 propound an elaborate system of ethics for the moral 
 government of their community. They enforced the 
 practice of virtue, and held out hopes of the highest of their 
 rewards to the meanest of their fraternity. 
 
 " The author of the Ny4ya, however, could not consistent- 
 ly propound such a system of ethics — could not so boldly 
 enforce the practice of virtue — because the rewards of 
 
 5 Ibid p. 453. 6 Ibid p. 37. 
 
NYAYA ETHICS 20 7 
 
 virtue were, on his theory, oj)posed to the attainment of 
 Emancipation. He does indeed advise his followers to 
 purify their souls by ^ abstinence and observance,' and re- 
 commends them to have recourse to the Yoga'^ , but that 
 is simply as a temporay expedient, not so much with a 
 view to emancipation, as with the intention of prevent- 
 ing inveterate habits of sinfulness. For how does he 
 dispose of the objection, cited by himself, to the possibility 
 of Emancipation ? ^ There is no emancipation because of 
 ' the association of one's debts and troubles and exertions®,' 
 or, as the scholiast expounds it, ' there can be no emanci- 
 ^ pation, because, by reason of the clinging to us of our 
 '* debts,' &c., there is no opportunity for working out our 
 
 * salvation : — and so it is stated in scripture 'when born, 
 ' verily, a Brahman is born triply indebted ; — from the 
 ' Rishis, by his course of student-life ; from the gods, by 
 ' sacrifice ; from the progenitors, by progeny ;' — that is to 
 'say, one is freed 'from the Rishis,' i. e., from his debts 
 ' to the Rishis, by his course of student-life ; he is freed 
 'from the gods,' i. e., from his debts to the gods, by 
 ' sacrifice ; he is freed ' from the progenitors,' i. e. , from 
 
 -'his debts to the progenitors, 'by progeny,' i. e., by [his 
 
 * begetting] offspring : and life passes away in the mere 
 ' clearing off of these debts^.' The debts or duties, thus en- 
 tailed by the Sastra, are opposed to the idea of Emanci- 
 pation, — for their non -performance would be a demerit, 
 and hence require punishment by renewed birth, while 
 their performance^on the other hand, would entail merits 
 and require reward, also precisely in the same way. Well 
 how does he dispose of the objection ? Not by contending 
 
 g ^ Ny%a Sutra iv. 111. 
 
 ^5rii^"Er^rT5f^^^KTT^7ft>TT^« I'Ny^ya iv. 59 
 9 Ballantyne's tramlaiion. 
 
208 DIALOGUE V. 
 
 that the discharge of duty is not incompatible with sal- 
 vation,— but by endeavouring to weaken the force of 
 the injunctions, and showing that, since the words could 
 not be literally interpreted, — for how can a child, just 
 born, perform any duty or discharge a debt ? — they must 
 be taken figuratively^". And then he falls back on another 
 rule of the Sastra which requires a Brahmin to retire 
 from the world when he is old. Noticing the objection 
 that ^ even if burnt sacrifices were no obstacle, the very 
 ' fruit of it, Heaven, must be an obstacle to emancipation,' 
 Gotama refutes it by saying that the Brahmin, when old, 
 must retire from the world, and so be unable to procure the 
 utensils necessary for a sacrifice, which cannot therefore be 
 completed, and the enjoyment of heaven will as a matter 
 of course be avoided ^ Dr. Ballantyne, expounding 
 Vis'wan^tha's scholium on iv. 61, says, 'when a Brahmin, 
 ' having reached the age at which he ought to retire from 
 ' the world, is no longer competent to perform the regular 
 'daily duties, he must imagine himself performing them; — 
 ' and this will free him from the bad consequences of 
 ' neglecting them ; while, on the other hand, the defect of 
 ' actual fulfilment will free him from the necessity of 
 'having to undergo reivard for the same.' ' In the case of 
 ' him that possesses knowledge, the ' fruit,' i. e.. Paradise, 
 * does not take place : — for burnt sacrifice implies a 
 'collection of vessels,' — vessels, i. e., vessels for burnt 
 ' sacrifice, — a collection of such, — an arrangement of them 
 ' with respect to the members of the victim, the thing 
 ' sacrificed, — according to the direction " In the mouth 
 ' a ladle filled with butter," and so in order. These cannot 
 ' be provided by a beggar, and therefore, the fruit of the 
 
 
OU) BRAHMAN S ONLY CAPABLE OF EMANCIPATION. 209 
 
 ' burnt sacrifice, from the want of these things, does not 
 'take place.' Dr. Ballantyne makes the scholiast's mean- 
 ing clearer, by adding, ' for it is he '^ that possesses know- 
 ledge" who can both perform the " constant duties," so as 
 ' to avoid the guilt of their neglect, and at the same time 
 ' escape the opposite Charybdis of having to si[fe7' the 
 ' reward of them in Paradise.' 
 
 ^'The scheme of emancipation in the Nyaya comes 
 then to this — that none but Brahmins of advanced age can 
 possibly attain it, for all others are bound by duties, the 
 performance of which, quite as much as their neglect, must 
 subject them to transmigration. To the Kshetriyas, 
 Vais'yas and S'udras, and to young Brahmins, the Nyaya 
 has nothing to say — nothing to propound with a view to 
 their final salvation. The Buddhist scheme, to say the 
 least of it, is certainly more consistent and better arrang- 
 ed. Sakya could address himself to all men, and enforce 
 the practice of virtue by holding out the prospect of 
 supreme felicity or Nirvana.*' 
 
 Tarkakdma. — ''You are talking after a fashion which 
 makes me suspect that Buddhism is your newly adopted 
 faith. You must be a follower of Sakya in disguise, and 
 are attempting to lead us, blindfolded, to the borders of 
 his impious system." 
 
 Satyakdma. — *'I can assure you, Tarkakama, I am no 
 Buddhist. In the midst of this controversy I will not 
 tell you what my new faith is, for I do not wish to pro- 
 pound it as a rival system. If after mature consideration 
 of the points we are discussing, you should be desirous of 
 hearing me on that subject, I shall gladly embrace a future 
 occasion of explaining my views. Meanw^hile I must tell 
 you that you have already been brought, — and that, blind- 
 folded too, — by Gotama himself into the very heart of 
 Buddhism. What a melancholy prospect you -are laying 
 
210 DIALOGUE V. 
 
 before liuman nature when you say that life is an essential 
 evil, that the soul must get rid of its moral powers and 
 emotions, and return finally to the state of torpor and insen- 
 sibility, in which it was before ' the primal action of atoms 
 and of the mind ;' — that the only escape from transmigra- 
 tions is in that torpid state ; — that this escape, again, is 
 available to old Brahmins only, who, being necessarily 
 beggars, cannot have the means of completing sacrifices, 
 and thus, not meriting heaven, may attain to emanci- 
 pation, if only they be versed in the topics and categories 
 of Gotama and Kanada." 
 
 Tarkakdma. — '' You seem, Satyakama, to be ridiculing 
 the systems of Gotama and Kanada. You cannot surely 
 be such an optimist as to deny the corruptions which abound 
 in the world. Take facts as they are, and you will easily 
 understand the difficulty our Acharyas had to deal with. 
 Here is an evil world tormenting the soul which is bur- 
 dened with the accidents of body and mind. Its physical 
 and mental powers are not necessary to its existence, for 
 it existed before it was endowed with them, and it exists 
 independent of them during pralayas, or periods of the 
 world's dissolution. Whatever is accidental and transi- 
 ent is removable. The divine Vasudeva has taught us 
 that as the constantly existing can never cease to be, so 
 the transient can never have constant existence^. The 
 soul then is capable of final release from its bondage of 
 life. The possibility is evident from the freedom it enjoys 
 during periods of dissolution. Now how is the transient 
 freedom, which recurs periodically, to be made perpetual ? 
 The question will be best understood by considering its hin- 
 drances. What is it that prevents the perpetuation of that 
 freedom ? Is it not the merit and demerit of past works ? — 
 
 * ^m^ f^^^ HTTt ^TVTT^ fW^W ^cT: | Bhagavad-gita. 
 
THE NYAYA ARGUMENT FOR EMANCIPATION. 211 
 
 the requital of which requires fresh creations and brings on 
 the transmigrations of individual souls. How to procure 
 emancipation means in other words how to prevent trans- 
 mio-rations. This is a question as important as it is solemn. 
 You cannot avoid merit without incurring clemerit, for we 
 have certain duties to perform, certain debts to discharge. 
 Are we to perform those duties and discharge those debts ? 
 If we do, we must accept merit, and be entitled to 
 rewards, the enjoyment of which will render renewed 
 birth necessary. But can we not avoid the merit by 
 neglecting the duties 1 We may, but demerit will then 
 stick to us, and require a repeated life of punishments. 
 In this dilemma Gotama proposes that since a Brahmin 
 must, toward the close of life, become a mendicant, he may 
 as well take care to remain in want of the utensils neces- 
 sary for the due performance of sacrifices. Let him per- 
 form the prescribed rites in his intention, but neglect 
 them in the act. The intention will be accepted for the 
 deed, and guard him against punishment. The non-ful- 
 filment, from want of the requisite vessels, will protect 
 him from the evils of merit, and save him from reward. 
 He may thus get rid of the bondage of birth, and, meriting 
 neither reward nor punishment, be released from the ne 
 cessity of transmigration. Thus will he be blessed with 
 emancipation, like a person who sleeps soundl}^, and, not 
 bein^f disturbed bv dreams, has no distress^." 
 
 Agamiha. — '^ I do not like this subtle metaphysic, 
 Tarkakiima. It appears to me to be a piece of refinement, 
 unworthy the character of spiritual guides and leaders 
 of communities. And this is the reason for which I have 
 always had a dislike of your philosophy. Why not rest 
 satisfied with the plain injunctions of the S'astia ? Let 
 
 JFT^HR? ^^(^^ ^^^IVTT^^^^TT: Gotama, iv. 63. 
 
212 DIALOGUE V. 
 
 him ivho desires heaven perform sacrifices^. Why not 
 content yourself with heaven, and the plain words of the 
 Vedas. You wish to obtain emancipation by setting one 
 injunction against another. Because you must be poor 
 in your old age, you will take advantage of your poverty, 
 and neglect to procure the sacrificial vessels, and thus 
 leave undischarged your debts to the gods." 
 
 TarkaMma. — ^^ Oh Agamika ! beware of the precipice 
 of heresy. You wish to be satisfied with heaven. Do 
 3^ou not know that it is equally transient with the earth, 
 that Brahma, Vishnu, and Kudra are all fast approaching 
 their end^. Emancipation is our only escape from the 
 evils of life." 
 
 Satyakdma. — " But what is Emancipation ? It is a 
 state in which the soul must get rid of its physical 
 and mental powers, in which there can be no speech, 
 no deed, no thought, nor any feeling or sensibility. It 
 is, you say, a sleep without dreams. What then is the 
 meaning of the soul's being in the enjoyment o^ felicity 
 in such a state of torpor. What right have you to say that 
 the soul exists at all, when it is without its characteristics, 
 without thought, desire, or aversion ? You know it now 
 by these characteristics. How can you say it is capable 
 of existence without them ? You have no udahdrana or 
 instance of spiritual life in which there is an atyantd- 
 hhdva, a necessary absence, of signs of animation and 
 intellect. You may as well undertake to predicate of a 
 stone that it has spiritual existence, in a sound sleep 
 unthout dreams'' 
 
 
 ^T^oT ^T"^^ I Yoova-vas'iglit.hfi. 
 
WHAT IS EXISTENCE WITHOUT ITS SIGNS. 213 
 
 Tarkakdma. — '' I have already told you that the soul 
 exists in an emancipated state in the same manner as it 
 did before creation." 
 
 Satyakdma. — '^ What is existence then ? How can a 
 spiritual essence exist without thought, feeling, desire ? 
 The very idea is incomprehensible. And if it were 
 possible, it would still be far from desirable The 
 existence you attribute to the soul in such a state 
 appears to be a mere technical deduction from certain of 
 your maxims. But what idea can you form of spiritual 
 existence, destitute of thought and feeling, not only with- 
 out body, but also without mind ? It becomes a w^ord 
 without meaning. You have dwelt too much, learned 
 Tarkakama, on the dark side of human nature. That 
 nature is no doubt corrupt. But the picture, as a whole, 
 is far from being so melancholy as you are representing 
 it. That the affections of human nature, if unrestrained 
 and misdirected, lead to evil, no one can for a moment 
 deny. But it must, be remembered, that it is useless to 
 dream of perfect release from those characteristics with- 
 out which the soul cannot possibly exist in any state. 
 Nor must you forget that God has endowed us wdth the 
 capacity of correcting and purifying our affections. True 
 happiness consists in seeking the best way of rectifying 
 our passions, not in vainly trying to get rid of them ; for 
 improvement does not imply annihilation or eradication. 
 When you improve your garden you do not pluck up 
 every plant, and reduce your grounds to a desert. 
 
 '' I say again it is useless to dream of a total release 
 from our passions and appetites. Your venerable Kana- 
 da himself maintains, that no substance can exist with- 
 out action or quality. The soul is a substance. The 
 soul must always possess some characteristic qualities. 
 If it be, as you rightly hold, indestructible, it can never 
 
214 DIALOGUE V. 
 
 be deprived of its peculiar properties. Emancipation, 
 such as you define it, is simply a creature of the imagina- 
 tion, a sky-flower, a town of Gandharva. It can have no 
 reality. 
 
 '* Then, again, you have entirely left out of considera- 
 tion that we are endowed with the capacity of correcting 
 and purifying our passions. Have you not heard of the 
 filial piety of a Nachiketas, not only cheerfully submitting 
 to his fate, when unjustly consigned to death by an angry 
 father, but continuing, without abatement, the affection and 
 reverence due to a parent ? You would not surely say that 
 the affection he exhibited was a dosha. What think you 
 again of the joy with which a Saivya accepted the degraded 
 condition of a menial slave in order to absolve her 
 royal husband, Haris'chandra, from a debt, which she 
 believed was pressing on him ? Could such conjugal devo- 
 tion be called an evil ? I do not cite these as instances of 
 human perfection, but I ask you if the affection and 
 devotion therein displayed could be called dosha. Perfec- 
 tion is not of coarse to be found on the earth. Desire and 
 aversion. Love and hatred, when misdirected, are no doubt 
 sources of misery and unhappiness. But would you call 
 the love of good and hatred of evil, sources of misery ? In 
 classifying the active powers of the mind, the popular 
 scholiast of Gotama has not made a fair enumeration ; and 
 of those which he has enumerated he has given the darkest 
 definitions. He gives seven sorts of desire, and six of 
 aversion. He speaks of thirst after objects, of covetous- 
 ness, of desiring others' evil, &c^. But of those affec- 
 tions which bind men with men, he mentions only Kdma, 
 and defines it to be riransd, which again he renders a 
 
 ^ n-^ TT^XT^t SR-[i7 TR^f:' W ^T UWl ^W ^RT ^'H l^fcT 
 
THE MORAL PHILOSOPHY OF THE NYAYA. 215 
 
 desire of sensual enjoyment. Kama itself does not, how- 
 ever, exclusively imply lust, since the Upanishads them- 
 selves attribute it to the Supreme Spirit before the 
 creation. ' He desired (akamayata) let me become many.' 
 And as to those feelings which attach parents to children 
 and children to parents; which distinguish the amity 
 that brothers and sisters bear to one another ; which knit 
 the hearts of friends and companions, fellow citizens and 
 fellow subjects ; which compose the links by which Society 
 is kept together; of these lovely traits of the human 
 character the author of the Vritti makes not the slightest 
 mention. 
 
 " Likewise, in classifying Aversion, he speaks of anger 
 * which produces a redness in the eye,' of envy, malice, 
 &c.^ but says nothing of such feelings as resentment, in- 
 dignation, and impatience of that which is wicked or evil. 
 
 '^ This, 1 repeat, is not a correct analysis of human feel- 
 ings. The Upanishad, notwithstanding what I believe to 
 be its fundamental error, i. e., its pantheism, gives a much 
 more correct description of the human passions. It com- 
 pares them to horses which the understanding, as chario- 
 teer, guides by the reins of the mind. When the 
 passions are left unrestrained, they become like bad 
 horses : when properly checked they resemble good 
 steeds®. You would not condemn the whole breed of 
 
 ^ ^\^v^ tT^^ f^r^ ^ftt ^^^^g I ^f^^i mxf^ l^f^ 
 
 vr^fcT ^W^ ^-^^1 ^^T I cT^f^;sTTftr ^TrnT^ ^^'^TT T^ ^t:^: II 
 
'2H) DIALOGUE V. 
 
 horses as essentially evil, because when they are not pro- 
 perly restrained they turn out bad. Neither ought you 
 to pass a sweeping condemnation on human affections. 
 Without those affections man would be incapable of piety, 
 devotion, and charity ; and, sure I am, that the pleasure 
 and satisfaction which these feelings of duty to God and 
 man contribute to the mind are far more cheering than 
 your artificial notion of Emancipation which is only an 
 imitation of the Buddhist conception of nirvana. It is 
 a satisfaction, however, to believe that there is no reason 
 for thinking such a catastrophe to be even possible. 
 Why spend your strength, then, on what — supposing its 
 desirability — is yet impracticable ? 
 
 ^' It is useless to exhaust one's energies on the achieve- 
 ment of impossibilities. Even if the annihilation of our 
 passions were desirable, it is impracticable. Our wisest 
 course is to seek the amendment of that which we cannot 
 destroy. By amending and purifying, we may turn them 
 into sources of unalloyed pleasure and of rational enjoy- 
 ment. But by seeking their destruction we may be in 
 danger of imparting to them a greater impetus i7i the 
 opposite direction. A most profound writer says : 
 ^ Those who formerly aimed at this (i. e., the destruction of 
 * the passions) upon the foot of philosophy, appear to 
 ' have had better success in eradicating the affections 
 ^of tenderness and compassion, than they had with the 
 ^ passions of envy, pride, and resentment^." How many 
 instances do our own Itihases and Puranas present of 
 B/ishis, who in the midst of their efforts to eradicate their 
 passions, were a great deal more liable to be overcome 
 by the temptations of sights and sounds than ordinary 
 mortals ? 
 
 9 Bishop Butler. 
 
NYAYA HARPS IN BUDDHISTIC TUNE. 21 7 
 
 " To say that the mental powers of human nature are 
 essentially corrupt, and that the only remedy is Apavarga, 
 which implies entire eradication, sounds as bad in a moral- 
 ist, as it would in a physician to say that the organs of 
 respiration are dosha, because they admit malaria into the 
 system, and cause diseases, and that the only way of 
 guarding against the evil is suffocation, or destruction of 
 those organs. What would you say to the doctor who, 
 instead of prescribing the proper medicine and aliment, 
 would advise his patient to abstain from all kind of food, 
 and thereby to starve himself, that he might effectually 
 escape the pains and torments of indigestion ! And yet 
 Gotama's moral treatment of the soul is no better. It 
 must get rid, (which however it cannot,) of sensibility and 
 activity, and exist without any characteristic signs of 
 existence. I said you have been brought, blindfolded, 
 into the very heart of Buddhism. Is it not so in reality 
 with reference to your doctrine of the present and future 
 pros23ects of human nature ? You affect to harp on 
 the transience, instability, and vanity of the world in the 
 very tune of Gotama Buddha, and you talk of your 
 emancipation precisely in the same terms as he did of 
 Nirvana. If there be a difference between you, it seems 
 to be in favor of the Buddhist leader ; for his metaphysics 
 did not technically compel him to deny the perpetual 
 concomitance of the Soul with mind, and therefore he 
 might have meant that Nirvana was a sort of spiritual 
 existence in which the Soul was not debarred from capa- 
 cities for thought and feeling. He had also this further 
 advantage that his theory did not preclude him from the 
 privilege of inculcating a code of morals, to be enforc- 
 ed equally on the highest and the lowest of his adhe- 
 rents, as the direct means of attaining supreme felicity. 
 Gotama however could not enjoin the practice of virtue 
 
 2 F 
 
218 DIALOGUE V. 
 
 SO freely, for on his principles merit was hardly less an 
 obstacle to emancipation than demerit." 
 
 Agamika. — '^I cannot certainly regret our conference of 
 this morning — for it has opened my eyes to the defects of 
 our philosophers, of whom I long had a sort of intuitive 
 dread. I am now convinced that some of our leaders at 
 least, have only been drawing us, nearer and nearer, to- 
 ward the vortex of Buddhism, by broaching transcendental 
 ideas of emancipation, unheard of in the Mantras and 
 Brahmanas. I for my part will return to the old paths, 
 and continue to seek for admission to heaven by the per- 
 formance of sacrifices. It appears to me to partake of 
 no small irreverence to talk slightingly of the heavenly 
 reward. All I can say is that 1 shall be perfectly satis- 
 fied with it — only, may I attain it !'* 
 
 Satyakdma. — " I say tathdstu ! (So be it.) And may 
 you be led still further to understand the True Sacrifice for 
 sin, and may you attain, I do not say such heaven as the 
 Puranas describe — but the Heaven of unspotted purity, of 
 ever-enduring stability, and of joy without alloy, — of 
 which our ancestors had evidently derived some idea 
 from the primitive traditions of the human race, when they 
 styled it suvarga^^ (the good society), since corrupted, 
 perhaps both in form and idea, into svjarga." 
 
 Agamika's concluding sentence was articulated in a 
 tone which for the moment produced a strong impression 
 on us all. Even Tarkakama, with his strong opinion of 
 the transience and the chequered character of celestial exist- 
 ence, and of the vanity of earthly life and deeds, seemed 
 for once to fear that he was perhaps, after all, himself 
 pursuing a mere mirage, while he was denouncing the 
 
 10 "nS^ -"N ^. ^ -s^ ^ . . . -^ „ 
 
 cf^^Tif^Xnil g"W^T«^5 H«r7T ^i^^m | Taittmya Brahmana. 
 
SUVARGA AND SWARGA. 219 
 
 heavenly rewards of Dharma. Satyakama's closing 
 reply, again, was not quite intelligible to any of us, though 
 it received an expressive response from Agamika, by a 
 muscular motion on his face, which I shall not attempt 
 to describe. I have scarcely recovered myself from the 
 mental excitement produced by the last conference, and 
 you must therefore excuse my inability to add any further 
 remarks. 
 
DIALOGUE YL 
 
 FROM THE SAME TO THE SAME. 
 
 My last letter was written in a very excited state of 
 mind. I was wondering what Satyakama could mean 
 by the 'True Sacrifice for sin/ or what he could be driving 
 at, either, by the ingenious distinction between suvarga 
 and swai-ga. I went yesterday to put these questions to 
 him personally, but I found that Kapila and A'gamika 
 had already come, and commenced a controversy on the 
 Sankhya system. On entering the room, I heard Satya- 
 kama saying, *' I believe S'ankaracharya's strictures on 
 your system are unanswerable." 
 
 Kdpila. — '' I am surprized at your saying so. Have 
 you never observed the vac-chhala (verbal tricks) played 
 by that bigoted Vedantist ? When for instance he quotes 
 against us texts implying an intellectual exercise on the 
 part of the Creator, such as seeing, desiring, he reasons as 
 if we held lorakriti (Nature) to be the efficient cause of the 
 universe, and labours to convict us of supreme folly in sup- 
 posing that unintelligent and inanimate nature can see or 
 desire. But Sankara knew, quite as well as our own selves, 
 that nature is, in our system, the material, or substantial, 
 not the efficient, cause of the world. While again he 
 has ransacked the -Vedas for every sentence or phrase that 
 
sankhya's complaints against vedanta. 221 
 
 might by any stretch of criticism be turned against us, he 
 has cautiously avoided to mention those texts which 
 obviously teach what we inculcate. I will not be so dis- 
 ingenuous as to deny that there are a few passages which 
 are apparently against us, and of these Sankara has not 
 failed to take the utmost advantage. You will perhaps 
 not deny that the question between us and the Vedantists 
 is how to reconcile the two sets of conflicting texts. We 
 hold that the texts which ascribe the creation to inani- 
 mate and unintelligent prakriti as its material cause, or, 
 in the language of our venerable i^charya, as the rootless 
 root^, are the key whereby all others are to be interpreted. 
 Yyasa and Sankara, on the other hand, maintain that our 
 texts are to be overruled by those which seem to incul- 
 cate that Brahma, or the spirit, is the material of which 
 the universe is made. I may venture to hope you will 
 allow our argument its due weight. It is certainly more 
 consistent than that of the Vedantist. The universe is com- 
 posed both of rational and irrational principles. We are 
 not here discussing the origin of rational principles, because 
 the Vedantists and ourselves are both agreed that the 
 Soul is uncreated and eternal. It is only the inanimate 
 and irrational creation that we are called upon to account 
 for. And here our much misunderstood Acharya thought, 
 I must add, rightly, that it would be losing sight of all 
 moral and physical discrimination to say that an intelli- 
 gent spirit could be the substance of inanimate matter. 
 To say again that the universe sprang from a spirit, that 
 the impure was a development of the pure, would be to 
 maintain that creation was a process of deterioration. 
 We have numerous instances of animated beings spring- 
 ing from inanimate matter, as vermin from filth, but we 
 
 
222 DIALOGUE VI. 
 
 nowhere see a single instance of inanimate matter arising 
 out of spiritual substances. I have yet to learn that he 
 who is loth to pronounce the world, with all its grossness 
 and impurity, to be consubstantial with the spirit, and 
 therefore traces it to a cause connatural with itself, (as 
 the Vedas themselves phrase it,) can be guilty of the 
 impiety which is charged upon us. You must remember 
 that the question is not, who is the efficient cause of the 
 Universe. That, the Vedantists and ourselves are agreed, 
 is a minor point of inquiry. Both of us, also, maintain 
 that instrumental causality is here unnecessary, for the 
 source from which the world was produced may have 
 worked itself out, like milk becoming curds. We do not 
 fear discomfiture, if we be allowed a fair field with the 
 Yedantist ; if those who are to judge between us will 
 remember that we are both speculating on the substance 
 of which, not the agent by whom, the world was made. 
 
 ''True it is," continued the advocate of the Sdnkhya, 
 " that Vyasa and S'ankara have in some places argued for 
 an efficient cause. But that is against the general spirit 
 of their speculations. They ought not surely to have 
 the benefit of their own inconsistency. After these ex- 
 planations, I should be very much surprized to find you 
 still taking the Vedantist's part in this controversy." 
 
 Satyahdma. — '' When I spoke of S'ankar4charya's ar- 
 gument against your doctrine, I did not allude to the 
 texts which he cited from the Vedas. Nor did I mean 
 that he, as a Vedaritist, had a right to say any thing to 
 you. I cannot deny there is some force in what you 
 say, as the matter stands between you and the Vedantists. 
 I believe that if you be bound hand and foot by dogmas 
 of the Vedas, you may be driven to some of the con- 
 clusions which Kapila has drawn ; for there is no denying 
 the fact that the Upanishads do speak of an unproduced 
 
BEAUTIFUL ARRANGEMENT OF THE UNIVERSE. 223 
 
 female, answering to your description of pi^akriti, red, 
 white, and black, (the very colours by which the three 
 original qualities are typified,) producing many creatures 
 like itself^. But I do not see any reason why you should 
 allow the Vedas to lead you astray. If the Vedas lay 
 down doctrines so manifestly absurd, why should you bow 
 to their authority ? The founder of your School did not 
 hesitate to pronounce an independent verdict about the 
 ritual of the Vedas. Why should you allow their cosmo- 
 gony to warp your judgment ? 
 
 " Why should you, either, discard the notion of an 
 efficient cause of the world ? If S'ankarach^rya is incon- 
 sistent, that does not vitiate a good argument. He may 
 be debarred from the privilege of benefitting by it, but 
 what is good reason in itself continues such, notwithstand- 
 ing the fault of the party who adduces it. True know- 
 ledge may, according to Menu, be reverently received even 
 from the vulgar ; just as nectar is not the less acceptable 
 when extracted from poison^. Now it appears to me 
 extremely unphilosophical to speculate on the substance 
 of the universe. The first thing that strikes us when 
 we look around is the beautiful arrangement of the 
 heavens and the earth, the uniformity of the law which 
 regulates the planetary motions, and secures the stability of 
 the solar system ; and the adaptation of the whole to the 
 happiness and comforts of animal life. Huge masses, 
 far exceeding the earth in magnitude, are perpetually mo- 
 ving in space, not without some eccentricities in their 
 orbits, and yet there is no collision. 
 
 ^BT^llft^^'^ 5Tf ra"ift WHiHT^T^^S^J II Swetas'vvatara Upa. 
 -mt"^*^ ^^TTT^fq" I 1%^Ktzr»f cT TnW ll Menu II 238, 239. 
 
224 DIALOGUE VI. 
 
 '* The uninterrupted succession of days and nio-hts, 
 of weathers and seasons ; and the adaptation of the 
 atmosphere to the properties of light and heat, whereby 
 evaporation and condensation are so regulated that the 
 waters on the earth are alternately drained and replenished, 
 just in the manner suited to the wants of animal and ve- 
 getable life, precluding alike the opposite niritis (plagues) 
 of too much and too little rain ; the structure again of 
 animals and vegetables in exact conformation to the ac- 
 tion of the elements by which they are surrounded and to 
 the material properties of that to which their sustenance 
 and growth are owing ; all these mutual adaptations 
 indicate design, and point, not to a plastic substance, but 
 to an intelligent Artificer, an efficient Agent, of infinite 
 wisdom, power, and goodness. 
 
 " I confess that Sankaracharya's argument against you, 
 so far as it relies on the Vedas, is singularly unsatisfactory. 
 But his appeals to common sense, his reasoning from the 
 beautiful structure of the world, however inconsistent 
 with his other sayings, are irresistible. I know you may 
 reason against his doctrine (the Vedanta) with equal 
 force. But that does not embarrass me. My motto is 
 truth. Let us seek out the truth, no matter what system or 
 school is thereby falsified or stultified. S'ankaracharya 
 says* ; 'If the question is to be decided by analogy 
 
sankara's argument against sankhya. 225 
 
 ' (without the authority of the Vedas) then no irrational 
 ^ substance, undirected by a rational essence, is seen in the 
 * world transforminor itself of its own accord into some- 
 'thing that may be useful to men. Houses and palaces 
 'with rooms for sleeping, sitting, and amusement, are 
 ' seen to be erected by skilful artists, in adaptation to the 
 ' seasons, for the enjoyment of pleasure and the avoiding 
 ' of pain ; how then can unin^lligent nature form the 
 ' earth and this whole universe, adapted to various works 
 ' and enjoyments, organic and inorganic, containing bodies 
 ' and various matter, with parts mutually and severally 
 ' adapted to one another ; the scene of many works and 
 'enjoyments, incomprehensible to the mind even of the 
 ' most skilful artist ? Such formations are never seen in 
 ' clods and stones. Earth and other materials are seen to 
 ' be moulded into fine shapes under the direction of potters 
 'and other manufacturers. Nature too must in like 
 ' manner have an intelligent director. Nor is there any 
 ' necessity, in the tracing of the original cause, to confine 
 ' the attention to the want of a homogeneous substance, 
 'such as earth, overlooking the requirement of an ex- 
 ' ternal cause, such as the potter or other manufacturer. 
 ' There could be no absurdity in the latter supposition ; 
 ' and it would certainly be agreeable to the Vedas, for 
 ' there the cause of the universe is declared to be in- 
 
 2 G 
 
226 DIALOGUE VI. 
 
 ' telligent. Therefore because of the existence of arrange- 
 ' ment, and of the want of conclusiveness in the reason, 
 'an unintenigent cause of the world cannot be inferred.' 
 
 '^ You say, learned Sir, this argument is not to the 
 point, because you pronounce nature to be the material, 
 not the efficient, cause. But S'ankara justly says there 
 is no necessity for deducing a consubstantial cause. 
 You are not called upon to speculate on the material 
 cause of the world. That undertaking is itself a radical 
 defect in your system. The defect is the more glaring 
 because you have not elsewhere provided an intelligent 
 efficient cause. 
 
 '' And here I must say the passages of the Vedas to 
 which you look with such confidence do not bear you out. 
 A Prakriti, such as you assume, is no doubt spoken of, 
 but it is nowhere asserted that it performs the creative 
 office, undirected by the soul. Your Acharya seems to 
 glory in denying such direction. 
 
 '^^ Nature is the real agent' says he ; ' the agency attri- 
 
 * buted to the soul is only apparent or illusory ; the 
 
 * soul is no agent even in connection with nature, as it 
 ' is not the iron that burns when heated, but the fire 
 'tliat is connected with it. Nature, though inanimate, 
 'works like the curdling of milk, or like the operation of 
 ' time. Nature is the original cause. Other things are 
 ' its products. The spirit, though eternal, is not the agent, 
 ' because it is incompetent. The products of nature are 
 ' found every where ; hence nature is all pervading^.' 
 
 - "^ 
 
 ^77I?^rHT^TcT I ^^^ ^OT^^^TcT f^Hc# I Ssinkhya. Sutras, ii. .'5, 8, 
 iii. 59, GO. vi. 32, 3.3, 36. ' 
 
HOW THE VEDA COUNTENANCES 'SANKHYA. 227 
 
 ''Now the few texts of the Upanishads on which you 
 rely do indeed inculcate a duality of principle, but they 
 do not justify the boldness with which you define one 
 of those principles as, at the same time, both devoid of 
 sensation, and also productive of the world. I do not 
 find any such lesson in the three texts which you are in 
 the habit of citing : 
 
 'Two birds inhabit the same tree as friends joined 
 ' together ; one tastes its fruits, the other looks on in 
 ' abstinence.' 
 
 'Two unproduced males (there are), intelligent and un- 
 ' intelligent, independent and dependent ; and one un- 
 ' produced female joined to enjoyer and objects enjoyment ; 
 ' when the soul attains this three-fold Brahma, it becomes 
 ' infinite, of universal form, and freed from agency.' 
 
 ' One unproduced male united enjoys the unproduced 
 ' female, red, black, white, and producing many creatures 
 ' like herself ; another unproduced male renounces her, 
 'the enjoyer^.' 
 
 " Of your extreme repugnance to the idea of an intelli- 
 gent creator, your Pedantic opponents have no doubt 
 taken ample advantage. So far indeed you have given 
 a color to their pantheism, and I do not doubt that many 
 persons have been the more readily reconciled to the 
 Vedanta by regarding it as the onl}^ refuge from the 
 repulsive idea of a creation without an intelligent Creator. 
 
 ^ ^[ ^nr^T ^^5TT ^T§\m ^m-^ ^^ ttr^^ptstt^ I ct^t:^: 
 
228 DIALOGUE VI. 
 
 ''In this respect your theory is worse than that of the 
 Naiydyikas — (1 mean — the modern followers of Gotama 
 and Kanada,) for though they set up atoms as eternal 
 principles, they do not reject the agency of a supreme 
 Intelligence. I do not deny you had some reason to 
 argue against the Naiyayika the other day, and to contend 
 that Gotama or Kanada was no better theist than Kapila. 
 But if the disciples of those two Rishis are determined to 
 interpret the Nyaya and Vais'eshika Siitras in a theistic 
 sense, w^iat right have we, outsiders, to say any thing 
 against them ? You may, if you choose, interpret the 
 Kapila Sutras in a similar manner, and I will not under- 
 take to say you will not be justified in your construction, 
 quite as much as they consider themselves to be in 
 theirs. 
 
 '^ But you boldly avow that yoar prakriti is the sole cause. 
 Your Acharya says, and you do not deny, that nature works 
 itself up like the self-working of milk into curds. You are, 
 so far, fully exposed to S'ankara's powerful battery ; though 
 his own system sufiers equally by it ; for he too maintains 
 that the spirit worked up itself into the world like milk 
 into curds ! " 
 
 Kdjnlct. — "And he does so with a boldness which ill 
 befits a controversalist in a question such as this. ' For, 
 says he, 'it (the creation) is accomplished like milk, 
 'through the peculiar property of the substance itself. 
 ' As in the world milk or water turns of itself into curds 
 ' or ice, without requiring an external instrument, so also 
 ' here. But does not milk itself when turning into curds 
 'require an external instrument, such as heat ? Then how 
 * can it be said that the creation is like the operation of 
 ' milk ? This is no fault. Milk is only more quickly 
 'turned by heat into the state of curds, but not in a 
 'greater measure -than it would itself attain. If it had 
 
SAN KARA S INCONSISTENCY. 229 
 
 ' not the capacity of turning into curds, it could not be 
 ^ forced into that state by the power of heat ; for air and 
 'ether cannot be forced into that state by the power of 
 'heat^/ And yet S'ankara attacks tis for teaching the 
 ' same doctrine !" 
 
 Satyakdma. — '^ S'ankara is no doubt chargeable with 
 inconsistency, but he attacks you because you deny the 
 existence of an intelligent Author in a creation so full 
 of indications of design. You say that ■prahriti is the 
 equipoise of the three qualities of goodness activity and 
 darkness. The equipoise of the three qualities cannot be a 
 substance. Tt is a mere relation, not an entity, — a quality, 
 not a thing. What conception can you form of a quality 
 without a substance ? But whatever your prahriti may 
 be, you flatly deny the agency of a living and in- 
 telligent creator. Had I not read the very words of 
 your teacher and found you maintaining the same doc- 
 trine, I should have considered it perfectly impossible 
 for a philosopher to hold such an opinion. And here, as 
 if to complete our perplexity, you attribute to the equipoise 
 of the three qualities, a creative power, of which, you say, 
 the soul is incapable, because it involves desire and 
 activity. How can you consistently attribute to the 
 equipoise that which implies an excess of rajas, or your 
 
 ^r ^^^^ ^f^Ff i^HT?-5T TTftjUiT^ ^^$^ ^T'li ^T^^ c^^^Tft 
 ^^l^fti^R?TIXT?I^ II Com. Vedant, 11. 1. 24. 
 
230 DIALOGUE VI. 
 
 second quality, Activity ? The balance must then be 
 disturbed. It is no longer an equipoise. S'ankaracharya 
 gives you a terrible hit on this point. 
 
 " Your plea that your material cause should not be 
 argued against, as if you held it to be an efficient agent, 
 is again nullified by your admission of an end in the 
 creation. You say the final cause^ of nature's agency is 
 the emancipation of the Furusha, or soul, passively watch- 
 ing her proceedings. She labours for the soul's use, just 
 as the camel carries the kumkum for another. With 
 reference to those who attain knowledge, the agency of 
 nature ceaseth, because of their aversion to the world, 
 just as cooking ceaseth when food is prepared ; but as to 
 all others nature ceaseth not. She does not desist even 
 when she has done with the already wise. But when 
 the object is attained she ceaseth, like a dancing girl 
 when dancing is over. When her fault is known she no 
 longer approaches the soul, just as a lady of rank is 
 ashamed to appear before her husband if she be known 
 to have misbehaved. 
 
 ^^ Now the idea of a final cause cannot be separated 
 from that of design. It pre-supposes intelligence quite as 
 much as the idea of efficient agency. That unintelligent 
 and inanimate nature, which cannot think or feel, could 
 have an end in view, is simply a self-contradictory 
 assertion. That it should know when to work and when 
 
 ^fSftr ^m^T^W tim^^ ^^TH^<^ I San. Sut. 
 
FORCE OF HABIT. 231 
 
 to cease is an enigma which I for my part cannot pretend 
 to solve." 
 
 Kdpila. '^ Ah ! but the contradiction disappears when 
 we say that nature does so from habit^, Hke the in- 
 voluntary services of a devoted servant, — or perhaps 
 from the attraction of works \vhich are without beginning. 
 Is it absurd to say that an irrational substance should 
 perform a certain act by habit ? 
 
 '^ Consider how forcible a principle of action habit is. 
 Instances of it are constantly met with in the animal and 
 even the vegetable world. The horse drags your car- 
 riage, the ox draws your plough, the elephant carries your 
 luggage. They have drivers, it is true, but how often the 
 drivers do nothinsf but watch the animal's motions. It 
 is not that they whip or goad the beasts without intermis- 
 sion. It is habit which guides those irrational creatures. 
 The best driver in the world will not drive those which 
 are not influenced by habit. Witness the cases of wicked 
 and untrained horses. There can be no absurdity in 
 saying that jprakriti does for the soul what your horses 
 are seen to do for yourselves. But you will perhaps 
 say, that horses and oxen, though irrational, are still ani- 
 mated creatures, and that nature's case is not parallel with 
 theirs. Well, what say you as to the power of steam ? 
 Have you not seen the Railway train dragged by the iron 
 horse, as the locomotive is sometimes called ? Is not that 
 an instance to the purpose? Nature works similarly. 
 Though unintelligent, she is sufficiently powerful for her 
 purpose. As the cow's milk, itself formed from grass, 
 though inanimate, is naturally moved for the growth of the 
 
 
232 DIALOGUE VI. 
 
 calf" ; as the water, though inanimate, flows naturally for 
 the benefit of men, so inanimate nature and her products 
 also move for the accomplishment of the soul's object." 
 
 Satyahdma. — '^ We are speaking of the original crea- 
 tion. I am astonished at your attributing such an act 
 to habit, or the attraction of works. Habit presupposes 
 past acts, which the idea of an original creation precludes. 
 Nor could there be, at that time, the attraction of works, 
 for works there could not be before the creation. Will 
 you fall back on the old idea of an eternal succession of 
 adrishta, or works, and worlds, mechanically following 
 one another ? Your A'ch4rya does indeed recognize karma 
 (works) as the cause of differences^ in creation, but he 
 appears to reject the theory of an eternal succession of 
 works and worlds like seed and plant ^. 
 
 '' Again, although an irrational creature may, under the 
 power of habit, induced by previous training under the 
 superintendence of a rational agent, produce an end 
 which that agent had in view, and an inanimate sub- 
 stance may, by means of an impulse it had received from 
 a similar agent, mechanically subserve a purpose, yet such 
 an idea is incomprehensible where no intelligent direc- 
 tion of any kind is admitted. Our horses, oxen, and 
 elephants would be of no avail, if they were not trained 
 and directed under intelligent superintendence. But 
 your system flatly denies such direction on the part of 
 the soul, and yet maintains that inanimate nature works 
 for its benefit. 
 
 
HABIT PRODUCED BY INTELLIGENT TRAINING. 233 
 
 "If you got a wild horse from the jungles, would he 
 spontaneously get into harness, drag your carriage, go 
 where it is your object he should go, and stop where 
 it ought to stop ? Your Achdrya has compared Nature's 
 operation with the camel's carrying kumJciim for the use of 
 men. Would the camel carry it without direction and 
 guidance ? An operation which has an end necessarily 
 implies design — and though the mechanical instrument of 
 the operation may be inanimate or irrational, the designer 
 must be both animated and intelligent. 
 
 " You have spoken of the railway train, of the mother's 
 milk issuing for the offspring's nourishment, of waters 
 flowing for the benefit of men. Hear what S'ankaracharya 
 says on your two last pleas : 
 
 ' This is not well said for, from the fact, acknowledged by 
 ' both parties, that we never see independent action in in- 
 ' animate substances, such as carriages, we infer that 
 ' action in the cases of milk and water must be from ani- 
 ' mated agents. The Sastra too says : He who resid- 
 'ing in water is different from it, is the imperishable 
 ' person under whose government the other eastern rivers 
 ^flow. The milk ao^ain flows because of the tender 
 ^ affection of the animated cow, and because of the suck- 
 ^ ing of the calf Nor is the flowing of water spontane- 
 'ous, it depending on low lands and other causes^.' 
 
 iri^ Tf ^^fcf^^ir^^^^l ^Y^^l^^ift ^T^^fcT ^cT^^r ^W^^ 
 
 Com. Vedant. J I. 2. 3. 
 2 H 
 
2S4: • DIALOGUE vr. 
 
 '' The substance of Sankaracharya's reply cannot be gain- 
 sayed. He refers to a proximate and an ultimate cause. 
 The proximate cause is the law to which things are na- 
 turally subject ; the ultimate cause is that Omniscient 
 and All-wise Governor who gave that law. The proxi- 
 mate cause alone, I allow, would be a mere repetition 
 of what you say. That water flows over low grounds, 
 or that steam acts upon every thing that presents a 
 barrier to it, is merely enunciating the natural process. 
 But there is an ultimate or Supreme cause, who enacted 
 the law which steam, water, and milk all equally obey. 
 If it were not liable to be construed in a pantheistic 
 sense, I should have no objection to Sankara's own for- 
 mula as quoted from the Upanishad : — ^ He who, residing 
 in water, is different from it,' is the governor under whose 
 guidance steam and water exhibit the powers which prove 
 so beneficial for men. 
 
 ^^ The power of steam is no doubt wonderful as we see 
 it daily in the train that passes from Kajmahal to 
 Howrah. But can you forget the mental exercise involved 
 in the projection of the Railway scheme — the vast pre- 
 parations making for years by skilful engineers, the mak- 
 ing of roads and bridges, the laying of the rail, and the 
 daily labour bestowed by intelligent workmen on the 
 guiding of the train ? The Railway is no doubt a bril- 
 liant triumph of science, but science implies intellectual 
 exercise, not the blind force of nature. 
 
 '* Do you think the locomotive moves from Rajmahal 
 to Howrah without the intervention of intelligent 
 engineers ? Do the boiler and the hearth find water 
 and coals for themselves as often as they are wanted, 
 and in the exact quantities of their requirements? 
 What would you say to a man if he showed you a 
 book — say the S'litras of Kapila himself with the com- 
 
COULD A BOOK BE SELF PRODUCED ? 235 
 
 mentary of Vijnana Bhiksliu — and said that the words 
 and sentences which appear in black and white were 
 produced by a quantity of rags. Part of the rags took 
 fire by friction, and from the smoke was produced 
 collyriura which turned into ink. Part dissolved through 
 damp, and became paper, which folded into pages and 
 stuck together. The ink then traced the letters which 
 appear on the several pages in large and small cha- 
 racters, distinguishing the Sutra from the Bhdshya — 
 and all this, like milk turning into curds, without an 
 author to compose Sutra or Bhashya, without manufacturer 
 k> make the paper and ink, without clerk to write out 
 the sentences, or binder to fold and stitch the papers. If a 
 person gave you such an account of the production of the 
 SdyikJuja pravachana Bhdshya — what would you say to 
 him?" 
 
 Kdpila. — ^' That is an unfair question. We all know 
 that the Sankhya siitras were composed by Kapila. 
 How could I then believe such a story ?" 
 
 Satyakdma. — '^ Well, suppose a manuscript book were 
 brought to you of which you kneio nothing. Could you 
 receive such a story of its production — especially, if you 
 found that it was a work of great excellence as regarded 
 philosophy and rhetoric ?" 
 
 Kdpila. — ^' If a book contained transcendental con- 
 ceptions in regard to philosophy, it would itself be an 
 evidence of mental effort, and of the existence of some 
 great mind prior to its production. In a work of any 
 value we must have (1) the concei3tions of the authors 
 mind ; (2) those conceptions couched in appropriate and 
 intelligible terms ; (3) the terms correctly inflected, and 
 put together agreeably to the rules of grammar ; (4) the 
 sentences and phrases arranged accurately and syntac- 
 tically ; (5) the whole again written out in the ordinary 
 
236 , DIALOGUE VI. 
 
 latters of the alphabet with orthographical correctness. 
 All this could not be achieved by the fortuitous action of 
 mere rags. A good book is universally held to betoken 
 the prior existence of a master mind. Your allusion 
 to the Sankhya Sutras, excuse me for saying so again, is 
 unfair. It looks like a surrender of your point in this 
 debate. " 
 
 Satyakdma. — " It does not certainly appear so to me. 
 You say that a good book betokens the prior existence 
 of a master mind. No doubt it does. But does not 
 the visible world the same too ? Does not matter itself 
 betoken the prior existence of mind ? If matter had the 
 power or capacity of self-action, who endowed it with that 
 power ? Who made and fitted it with that capacity ? Are 
 not the arrangement of the universe and the structure of 
 animal bodies superior by 'far to the arrangement of letters 
 and the structure of sentences in a book ? Letters could 
 not form words, nor words signify ideas, if they were not 
 arranged by a mind familiar with orthography and gram- 
 mar. But could the sun, moon, earth, and atmosphere 
 be placed as they are without a supreme Intelligence 
 ordaining and regulating their positions, attractions, mo- 
 tions, and powers, so as to cause our days and months, 
 our seasons and years, our light and heat, in exact 
 adaptation to our wants and comforts ? A book could 
 not be produced without a master mind. The very idea 
 appears preposterous to you. And yet you think this 
 world could be self-produced from an inanimate and 
 unintelligent principle, and that, with a view to the 
 soul's emancipation I You think- undirected nature suffi- 
 cient to account for the beauty, symmetry, and arrange- 
 ment of a universe — the combinations of which are so 
 complex as to baffle our highest efforts to comprehend 
 them — the links and adaptations so numerous that we 
 
MUTUAL ADAPTATIONS. 237 
 
 can never hope to live long enough to master even a 
 small portion of them ; the structure of animal organs 
 so curiously formed that each performs a certian func- 
 tion, and the whole produces a certain end to which 
 it is adapted. You think such an arrangement could 
 be made without a Designer, a Director, a Governor. 
 Consider once more the consequences of your theory. 
 Think on the sort of works which you thus attribute to 
 an inanimate, irrational principle, incapable of design or 
 deliberation. We have a sun above us the source of 
 light and heat. An inestimable blessing it is; but 
 without the co-operation of just such an atmosphere 
 as surrounds our globe, it would be impossible for us 
 to benefit by it. Without such diffusion of its rays as is 
 caused by the atmosphere, our houses, indeed all places 
 in the >shade, would at noon-da}^ be as cold as ice, and 
 as dismal as the night of an amdvasyd, or the last of the 
 moon ; while the open air would be a furnace of fire during 
 day-light. When we got out of doors it would be like 
 going suddenly from thick darkness into a blaze of light, — 
 to the sun of a noon-day from the gloom of a midnight. 
 I need not tell you that creatures, such as we are, could 
 never live if the sun and the atmosphere were not so 
 adapted to each other, as that light and heat, shot forth 
 from the one, should, by the other, be diffused to suit our 
 condition. Could this adaptation, far transcending any 
 conception of Kapila's mind, proceed from a blind princi- 
 ple like your Nature ? 
 
 " The same sun again is the centre of our system. You 
 have no doubt heard, what I believe you are prepared to 
 admit, that the theory of the sun's being the centre of 
 motion in our system is a philosophic necessity, the non- 
 acknowledofement of which would lead us to the wildest 
 schemes in order to account for the phenomena observed 
 
238 T>rALor,UE vr. 
 
 in the heavens. And it Is the principle of attraction^ of 
 which our own Bhaskaracharya was not entirely ignorant, 
 which regulates the motions, and prescribes the velocity 
 with which the planets perform their revolutions. Their 
 orbits are also fixed by the nature of that attraction. 
 
 '^ The advantatres derived from this arransfement of the 
 solar system are so obvious that I need scarcely mention 
 them. To specify one instance, — the position of the earth 
 is such that her two poles are alternately presented toward 
 the sun during her revolution, and thus our periodical 
 chanofe of seasons is occasioned. Consider what' the conse- 
 quences would be if this change of seasons did not come 
 round regularly. It may be all very fine in poets to 
 extol the pleasures of an eternal spring, but fancy what 
 the result would be of the realization of such a con- 
 ception. Not only would the anticipated pleasure be 
 annihilated by its monotonous sameness, but the effect 
 would soon be manifest in the failure of our crops and 
 the drying up of our ponds. After you have had abund- 
 ance of rain, and passed through the cold of winter, it may 
 be all very pleasant to have for a month or two a bland 
 atmosphere and a mild sun. But the process of evapora- 
 tion would be affected by a perpetual spring, and that, 
 in its turn, would cause a suspension of rain. The atmos- 
 phere would itself prove hurtful to life in the absence of 
 the elements of purification presented by the summer and 
 autumn. Is it possible that inanimate nature could give 
 a position to the earth's axis, and create a law of motion, 
 so exactly adapted to the wants of terrestrial life ? 
 
 '^ Consider again the wisdom manifested in the structure 
 of animal and vegetable organs. The arrangement and 
 mutual adaptation of the parts, harmonious as they are, are 
 yet so complex, that they have given occasion to several 
 sciences, each of which separately requires the study' of 
 
ARE BOOKS GREATER WORKS THAN THE UNIVERSE ? 239 
 
 years. Anatomy and the other departments of medical 
 science, with Natural History, and Botany, present an 
 accumulation of extraordinary facts, all loudly testifying to 
 a uniformity of purpose and benevolence of design, infi- 
 nitely beyond the grasp, as Sankaracharya well expresses 
 it, of ' the most skilful' of our species. The smallest insect, 
 hardly discernible by the naked eye, presents as perfect an 
 arrano^ement of oro^ans for the sustentation of life and the 
 reproduction of its species, as the largest animal. Who can 
 for a moment believe that all this systematized arrange- 
 ment and adaptation of parts, with a provident eye to 
 the life and comforts of the lowest no less than the highest 
 animal, — an arrangement and an adaptation by which 
 crude matter turns into vegetable, and vegetable matter is 
 assimilated with animal flesh, by which blood and milk 
 are extracted from leaves and roots, and leaves and roots 
 formed from gas and moisture, — could be projected and 
 accomplished by an agent that is devoid of thought, ani- 
 mation, and design ? 
 
 *' You confess that a quantity of rags could not of them- 
 selves produce a book, and yet you say that nature, or the 
 equipoise of the three original qualities, was able to bring 
 such a world into existence. Is the Sdnkhya pravachana 
 hhdshya, or any other book that may be named, a greater 
 proof of intelligence or design, than the Universe with its 
 complicated but harmonious arrangements V Of the one 
 you think it preposterous that mere rags should produce 
 it. To the other .you would assign a cause more flimsy 
 even than rags. For your prakriti appears to me to be 
 a mere name, a mere phantom. You say it is tlie equi- 
 poise of the three original qualities of goodness, activity, 
 and darkness. Quality is itself no substance. Your 
 doctrine amounts to the assertion that the external world 
 came spontaneonsly into being without any cause at all. 
 
240 DIALOGUE VI. 
 
 What conception can we have o^ prakriti, as an aggregate 
 of qualities, without a substance qualified thereby — 
 or, to speak in the language of Naiyayikas, without a 
 samavdya, (substratum) ? To such a mere theoretic 
 nature you assign the work of creation, a work for which 
 you say the soul was not competent. How could the soul 
 fail to do that for which nature sufficed ? Your doctrine is 
 simply unintelligible." 
 
 Kdpila. — ^' I will explain what our A'charya means. 
 He has shown that Atoms could not be considered the 
 first cause of all things ; and, as to the soul, it is evident 
 an intelligent principle could not be the material of which 
 the inanimate world is composed. Besides it is ahanhdra^ 
 (egotism), one of the products of praJcriti, not the soul, 
 that has agency. The soul can never be moved to make 
 an effort, and without effort there could be no creation." 
 
 Satyakdma. — ^' But why could not the soul do every 
 thing that was necessary without a material cause ?" 
 
 Kdpila. — *^ Because, says the reverend Rishi, a sub- 
 stance cannot he out of no substance. Because also, he 
 says elsewhere, there is necessity for a material cause." 
 
 ^^ Can you, continued the Sankhya s'astri, make a house 
 without bricks or a box without wood ?" 
 
 " I cannot," said Satyakdma, ^' but the Almighty can. 
 With incomparably greater reason might I ask you to 
 say how a nfere equipoise of three qualities could supply 
 the place of bricks ?" 
 
 Kapila appeared somewhat perplexed. Agamika, who 
 had all this time been listening patiently to the above 
 conversation, interposed a remark on the etymology of 
 the word ^Prakriti.' ''Some light," said he, ''may be 
 thrown on the subject by considering the etymology of 
 
 * ^TTl^- ^"^T "^ ^^^' S'-^n- Sut. vi. 54. 
 
ETYMOLOGY OF PRAKRITI. 241 
 
 the word. Prakriti is derived from kri with the afliK 
 f^^. Generally speaking that affix is added to express 
 hlidva, or the abstract idea, sometimes the karma, or 
 the object, of the action. The rule has many excep- 
 tions, but they are always obvious. I am told that 
 the Greek language has a grammatical affix {mg) cor- 
 responding to our fW^I^j which, released from its character- 
 istic redundants, and inflected in the nominative, becomes 
 Tm ( tis) not more different from the Greek, than r is 
 from (J. These two letters are notoriously interchanged 
 in that language, and the affixes in the two languages 
 may be considered similar. 
 
 '' Frah'itis is the «/)V(Ttc of the Greeks. I am the , more 
 confirmed in this opinion by a passage which a friend 
 read to me from Strabo in which (^utrtc was called thejifth 
 element of the Brahmins. I suspect the Greek geogra- 
 pher meant by the term (jivaig to represent this very pixc- 
 kritis of Kapila, especially as he added that it was from the 
 same element that heaven and the stars were produced. 
 Now what is the cosmogony of Kapila ? There is the self- 
 existent Puruslia, and there is this prakritij or nature. 
 The first product of the latter is mind, the immediate 
 cause of ahankdra or self-consciousness, from which all 
 the rest were produced. Might not Kapila have only 
 meant to say that the self-existent Spirit was naturally 
 endowed, first with mind, then with self-consciousness, 
 and so created the world." 
 
 Satyakdma, — '^ There would be some meaning in the 
 theory according to the interpretation you suggest. In- 
 deed the Matsya Puraiia appears to identify the equipoise 
 of the three qualities with the one-formed triad'^ (ekd 
 
 2 I 
 
242 DIALOGUE vr. 
 
 murti strayodcvdh, one form and three gods) Bralima, 
 Vishnu, and Mahes'wara. Even the admirers of Kapila 
 have not received his doctrine without an amendment. 
 But he himself glories in denying creative agency to the 
 Purusha or soul. Prakriti worked itself up like milk in 
 the cow's body." 
 
 "I am astonished," continued Satyakama, turning, after 
 a brief pause, to Kapila, " at your Acharya referring to 
 the cow and her milk in support of his doctrine. A better 
 example cannot easily be adduced for its refutation. Your 
 Acharya maintains that nature, inanimate and unintelli- 
 gent, works without direction and guidance for the bene- 
 fit of the soul. The instance of the cow and her milk is 
 appealed to in illustration of this theory. That milk, it is 
 said, comes up spontaneou^y for the benefit of the calf. 
 S'ankaracharya replies to you that the milk does not come 
 up spontaneously, and that its determination is owing 
 to the tender affection of the cow and to the calf's power 
 of suction. I admit this reply does not fairly meet your 
 doctrine. But how does the milk come up in the cow ? The 
 animal eats the grass which goes into its stomach, where 
 by the process of digestion food turns into chyle, which is 
 carried by a curious mechanism into the reservoir of blood 
 mtli which it then assimilates. The mechanism is as fine 
 as it is curious, and by a wonderful contrivance it protects 
 the blood vessels against any matter in the chyle which 
 
 SI 
 
 ^^cFt ^T^^ ^T^^f ^s I ^f^^^rrftr cfci:xf=^ ^% ^T^^mT^ g 11 
 
 ^f^jnunfj^cT^ II Matsya Purina. 
 
ANIMAL ORGANISMS. 243 
 
 mioflit cause inconvenience to the animal. The blood, thus 
 replenished by food, performs a secreting function, the 
 very conception of which strikes the mind with awe. The 
 secretions are partly constant and partly occasional. 
 Those that are constant are necessary for the conservation 
 of the organs and the healthy state of the body. Those 
 that are occasional answer certain purposes called for by the 
 condition of the animal at a definite time. And provision 
 is made in its physical organism for meeting such contin- 
 gencies. When the animal is in a condition to bring forth 
 young, the blood makes a new secretion, with a quality 
 not found in any other secretion, namely, that of nutrition. 
 This secretion we call milk. There is an organ already 
 provided by a prospective contrivance for the reception 
 and retention of that secretion, and there is an excretory 
 duct annexed whereby the fluid determines to the udder at 
 the particular juncture when it is about to be wanted. We 
 have in all this a machinery and a contrivance, suited to an 
 especial end and purpose, and obviously indicative of de- 
 sign. Now to say that an inanimate and irrational principle 
 is capable of design is simply a contradiction in terms." 
 
 Kcipila. — ^^ You were candid enough to admit that 
 Sankaracharya's remark on the instance of the cow and 
 her milk is not to the point. This admission encourages 
 mo to hope that you will not lend any countenance to the 
 popular calumny against our system. Men, incapable 
 of nice discriminations, think they will pass muster for 
 piety by only calling the Sankhya niris'wara (godless). 
 Wiser heads have however confessed that there is no 
 knowledge equal to that which is embodied in our system. 
 Even the popular poet Tulasidasa^ is compelled to speak 
 
 6 
 
 ^Tf<? $^ TO ^t^ ^^fl^T I W^^ Tj-r^ $ff 5»ifq-^ ^m^\ 
 
244 DIALOGUE VI. 
 
 of Kapila with religious reverence, and to acknowledge 
 that the distinguishing characteristic of the Sankhya 
 is tattwa vichdra, or discussion of truth. It is perfectly 
 gratuitous to charge us with ungodliness. Any dis- 
 cussion may be cut short by putting on a cloak of 
 piety after this fashion. But how stands the argu- 
 ment ? Sankaracharya has told us of houses with 
 rooms for sleeping, sitting, and amusements, and you 
 have just made reference to a wonderful organism in 
 the cow's body. We never denied that. The organism 
 in the cow's body cannot surely be more wonderful than 
 the organism of the world itself, which we not only 
 admit but perhaps admire even more than our ad- 
 versaries. But what is the question between us ? With- 
 out contravening what people call the religious in- 
 tuitions of human nature, we simply declare that the 
 physical arrangement of the universe may be sufficiently 
 accounted for by physical causes, that nature and natural 
 law, that is to say pi^akriti and her prolific operations, 
 were themselves competent to settle the positions, and 
 give the propelling impulses which regulate the motions, 
 and secure the stability of all things in heaven and earth. 
 Whether you refer to the phenomena which are owing 
 to the motions of luminaries far above, or to formations, 
 mechanisms, and oro^anisms near at hand on our sclobe, 
 they may be all traced to the agency of the same pra- 
 kriti or natural law as their ultimate cause. The forma- 
 tions and organisms have been gradual, have taken time, 
 and been developed by a slow process like milk turning 
 into curds. And this is a conception of Kapila's mind 
 in which, I am credibly informed, he is followed by emi- 
 nent philosophers in Europe, and which is confirmed by 
 recent discoveries in all parts of the world. I have 
 heard from a relative, who has received a paper of 
 
DEVELOPMENT THEORY. 245 
 
 commendation (Diploma) from the Doctors' College in 
 Calcutta, that many learned Europeans have come to the 
 conclusion that the earth has, from time immemorial, 
 been a scene of changes, by natural development, of dead 
 matter into organic and vegetable substances, and of 
 vegetables into animal life. One eminent writer says, 
 that 'in pursuing the progress of development of both 
 plants and animals upon the globe, an advance is visible 
 in both cases, from simple to higher forms of organi- 
 zation.' ^ In the botanical department we have first sea, 
 afterwards land, plants.' In the department of zoology, 
 too, we see, first traces of the very lowest, removed 
 by a few steps only from vegetable life, and leading by 
 slow gradation to higher forms. Then we have fishes, 
 then land animals, commencing with reptiles, then birds, 
 and at last the ja7rtyuja, or mammalia. 
 
 " Thus after a long series of years you see a wonderful 
 confirmation of Kapila's grand conception. For what 
 else is his great doctrine ? He recognized onward pro- 
 gress in the world, and therefore protested against the 
 fanatical doctrine of the Vedanta that the world was a 
 product of the Supreme Spirit, as if dead matter could 
 be a manifestation of a pure and spiritual essence. The 
 process of creation would then be a process of deteriora- 
 tion — a process inconsistent with the very idea of crea- 
 tion. In opposition to such a fantastic notion he taught 
 that nature was the original of all things, and that the 
 act of creation was one of development and progress. 
 But as the spiritual could not proceed from the material, 
 he added that the soul was eternal and independent. 
 The ignorant may brand him as niris'wara, or godless, 
 and cover their imbecillity as logicians by an affoctation 
 of piety, but his doctrine is found to commend itself 
 now to all thoughtful minds — even in Europe." 
 
246 DIALOGUE VI. 
 
 Satyahdma. — ''You have given a colouring to Kapila's 
 doctrine which I do not remember to have seen else- 
 where, and you seem to think you have strengthened 
 his cause by forming an alliance with certain philoso- 
 phers of Europe. But it does not add strength to your 
 doctrine in reality. For the eminent writer to whom 
 you have made reference does not ignore an intelligent 
 Creator, the author of nature and the giver of nature's law. 
 His theory has reference only to proximate or secondary 
 causes which fall within the province of science. The 
 doctrine, however, has not, certainly, commended itself 
 
 * to all thoughtful minds' in Europe, for the leading men 
 of science consider it to be based on inaccurate statements 
 of fact and on untenable premises. But I am not going 
 to discuss the theory of transmutation of species. That 
 has been already done satisfactorily by profound investi- 
 gators. All that I am concerned with at present is to 
 say that the author to whom you have made reference 
 does not deny a supreme Intelligence as the ultimate 
 cause of all things, — as the initiator and ordainer of the 
 natural law which science attempts to expound. Your 
 medical friend who spoke to you of the development 
 theory ought to have drawn your attention to passages 
 like the following : 
 
 ' All these considerations, when the mind is thoroughly 
 
 * prepared for them, tend to raise our ideas with respect 
 ^ to the character of physical laws, even though we do not 
 'go a simple step further in the investigation. 
 
 ' But it is impossible for an intelligent mind to stop 
 ' there. We advance from law to the cause of law, and 
 ' ask what is that ? Whence have come all these beautiful 
 ' regulations? Here science leaves us, but only to conclude, 
 
 * from other grounds, that there is a First cause to which 
 'all others are secondary and ministrative, a primitive, 
 
THAT THEORY IS NOT ATHEISTIC. 247 
 
 ' Almighty will, of which these laws are merely the man- 
 ' dates. That great Being, who shall say where is his 
 ' dwelling place, or what is his history ! man pauses 
 ' breathless at the contemplation of a subject so much 
 'above his finite faculties, and only can wonder and adore ! 
 'When all is seen to be the result of law, the idea 
 * of an Almighty author becomes irresistible, for the crea- 
 'tion of a law for an endless series of phenomena, an act 
 ' of intelligence above all else that we can conceive, could 
 ' have no other imaginable source, and tell^, moreover, as 
 ' strongly for a sustaining as for an originating power ^/ 
 
 ''The eminent writer to whom you have made reference 
 does not accordingly inculcate a iiiris'wara, (excuse me, 
 for repeating the word,) or atheistic doctrine. How 
 could there be a law without a lawgiver? or a final 
 cause without design and purpose ? or a design or pur- 
 pose without a designer ? It is impossible therefore for 
 an inanimate principle, such as nature, to have worked, 
 as you represent, without intelligent direction. 
 
 " But are you not shifting from your original ground ? 
 You contended in opposition to the Vedanta that your 
 Prakriti is the material or substantial cause, and now you 
 talk of its operation and its aim. You treat it, then, as 
 an efficient cause. S'ankaracharya's argument, of which 
 you complained, recoils therefore with double force 
 ao"ainst you. How could a principle, itself inanimate and 
 therefore incapable of thought and intelligence, produce 
 by its operation such a vast and wonderful world with its 
 infinite adaptations, and with such harmony in all its 
 parts ? '* 
 
 Kdpila. — " Of God we can know nothing. Of physi- 
 cal causes we are constantly witnesses. The founder of 
 
 7 Vestiges of the Natural history of creation. 
 
248 " DIALOGUE VI. 
 
 the Sankliya Avas only treating his subject scientifically, 
 and all that he meant to inculcate, was, that as far as 
 pure science was concerned, the development of the 
 world can be explained by n'atural law. The European 
 author to whom I made reference, and from whose work 
 you have just read a passage, confessed that the Almighty 
 Being he spoke of was found, not in science, but out of 
 science. Kapila did not choose to go out of science." 
 
 Satyakdma. — '^ But you cannot stop at what you call 
 natural law without offering violence to a science which is 
 higher than mere physics." 
 
 Kdpila. — " I do not quite understand your meaning. 
 Explain yourself" 
 
 Satyakdma. — ^^How do you arrive at what you call 
 the known in science. How do you come to know what 
 you call objects oi pi^atyahsha, or perception? A wave of 
 light strikes your optic nerve, and hence you perceive 
 some form before you. A vibration of the atmosphere 
 strikes your acoustic nerve, and you perceive a sound. 
 The particles of some substance resist your touch, and 
 you feel its presence. Knowledge, which is itself power, 
 is also produced by power — ^the force of sensation. But 
 as you have the organs of external sensation, so you 
 have also an organ of internal perception, the mind, which 
 your system dignifies by the appellative maliat or great. 
 Now this great organ has a force, no less powerful than 
 those of external sensation, and it convinces you of 
 the existence of certain objects quite as forcibly and con- 
 stantly, as the organs of seeing and hearing do. If your 
 organs of external sensation force on your observation 
 the form and mechanism of the world — if your science 
 tells you of the wonderful adaptations of means to ends 
 on our globe — if indeed you are thereby compelled to 
 theorize that your prahritij or nature, worked for the 
 
MATTER CANNOT BE PROGENITOR OF MIND. 249 
 
 happiness and comforts of Purmha (Soul) in the forma- 
 tion of the world, (just as the king's cook aims at the 
 king's satisfaction in liis culinary office, and as an experi- 
 enced servant aims at his master's convenience,) — the great 
 organ of internal perception at once compels you to look 
 up higher. It protests against the possibility of adapta- 
 tions of means to ends without intelligent agency, and 
 rejects the notion of such numerous harmonious mecha- 
 nisms and wonderful combinations being brought into 
 existence by mere chance. It also repudiates your account 
 of its oivn ci^eation from an unintelligent principle. Mind 
 will not admit matter to be its progenitor or superior. 
 The fact of intelligent agency in creation becomes there- 
 fore as much a suggestion of science as any physical deduc- 
 tion with reference to cosmical phenomena. 
 
 " What constitutes the distinction between our ideas 
 of matter and mind ? Is it not simply this — that the one 
 has no pravritti, no motion or action, of itself and that 
 the other has both ; that the vis inertias of matter requires 
 •to be overcome by an external impulse before matter can 
 act, and that all impelling forces, which have an object in 
 view, pre-suppose the existence of mind. To speak of the 
 self-moving power of matter is to introduce a confusion 
 of language calculated only to create misunderstanding 
 and misapprehension. Design, purpose, aim are all 
 mental operations. To speak of them as predicates of an 
 inanimate principle is to talk like childreii and mad^nen^, 
 to adopt Kapila's own expression when administering a 
 wholesome rebuke to the Vedantists." 
 
 Agamika. — ^^But does not Kapila virtually acknow- 
 ledge a Supreme intelligence as the creator of the 
 
 2 K 
 
250 DIALOGUE VI. 
 
 world ? He speaks of * an omniscient author of all 
 things'^?" 
 
 SatyaMma. — ''The scholiast says he thereby means the 
 Jirst male^^, or the first agent at the commencement of a 
 world. I would have most willingly received this Siitra as 
 a consoling proof of Kapila's theism, had not Kapila him- 
 self exhibited a sort of unaccountable obstinacy in argu- 
 ing, not only against the existence, de facto, of a Supreme 
 Being, but also against the possibility of a Supreme Intelli- 
 gence, the author and governor of all things. The all-know- 
 ing creator is only a sort of god ; such a god, says he, is 
 proved ; that god being, as the scholiast adds, himself a 
 creature or a created agent ^ . In the first book it is broadly 
 stated that the existence of God is not proved — that if there 
 were a God he must be either bound or free, if bound, he 
 would be incompetent for the act of creation ; if free, that 
 is to say, if unmoved by passion and desire, he could be 
 subject to no motives, and hence would not concern him- 
 self in the act of creation ; whether therefore bond or free, 
 he could not be the creator of the universe. As to theistic 
 passages in the S'astra, they are, says the author of the 
 Sankhya, ' either mere eulogies of emancipated souls, or 
 ' expressions of devotion to perfected spirits, such as (ac- 
 ' cording to the scholiast) the transient or created gods 
 'Brahma Vishnu and Hara, figuratively styled eternal 2.' 
 
 ^° ^og-f^cT ^og^?r'Sr^ ^if^IT^T^ H^fcT I Vijnana Bhikshu. 
 ^ t^^'Sr^ftrf^'. ftf ^I I iii. 57. 
 st-^^t;^ fef%5 I V. B. 
 
 * ^^T^^: ^"im ^^\m ftr^^ ^t i i- 95. 
 
 f^^c^lf^^f^f^Wm^m^TiTTT I V. B. 
 
THE ATHEISTIC ARGUMENT OF KAPILA. 251 
 
 He defends the infallible authority of the Vedas, while 
 thus denying the existence of an omniscient inspire r, 
 simply by asserting that their texts are experimentally 
 verified^ by events, just as the teaching of medical 
 science is established by facts. 
 
 " In the fifth book, again, Kapila resumes his atheistic 
 argument, and commences with denying God's providence 
 and his government of tlie world. ' The distribution of 
 ' fruits, or rewards, is not by divine appointment, for it is 
 'regulated by works,' which, the scholiast designates neces- 
 sary"^. 'If, continues the author, there were any divine 
 ' interference, then it must be for God's own purpose, and 
 ' if God had a purpose in view, he would himself be a 
 
 * worldly God. If a worldly God were acknowledged, it 
 ' would be using a mere technical term^,' for, adds the 
 scholiast, ' the theist would then be speaking like us of a 
 ' created being by the technical term God^ V ' Such an act, 
 *■ with a purpose in view, is not possible without rdga, or 
 ' passionate desire, for effort invariably implies such desire. 
 'And if he were subject to a vehement passion he could 
 ' nob be essentially free. Passions and affections cannot 
 ' be attributed to God, for then he would be proved to 
 
 * be a soul with attachments. If it be said that God is 
 ' creator by the very virtue of existence, then all existing 
 
 ^ ftf^^XTTf^l^T^T^T^mW: I i. 98. 
 
 HTftr^rr ^i I 
 
252 DIALOGUE VI. 
 
 ' souls must be gods^, and, so adds the commentator, the 
 * doctrine of one God must be surrendered.' 
 
 '^ Kapila then goes on saying that the existence of God 
 'cannot be estabHshed^ because there is no proof. There 
 ' can be no evidence of sensation^ on such a subject, 
 ' nor can it be proved by Inference, ^^ because you cannot 
 ' exhibit an analogous instance. And as to the testimony 
 ' of the S'astra, it is decidedly for pradhdna, or nature ^ , 
 ' as the ultimate cause of all things.' 
 
 '^ I need not follow our author further in what he says 
 to point out certain inconsistencies in the Vedanta 
 doctrine. But I suppose there can be no doubt of his 
 absolute denial of a Supreme Deity." 
 
 Kcipila. — '^ I think my good friends you are not doing 
 justice to Kapila. As I said the other day, his only fault 
 is his unflinching honesty. He will not equivocate on a 
 serious subject such as the one under discussion. The 
 difiiculty with all philosophers has been how to reconcile the 
 idea of perfect freedom, suggested by the conception of a 
 Supreme Divinity, with the bondage betokened by subjec- 
 tion to motives. No animated and thinking agent does 
 any thing without a purpose, and a purpose must always 
 betoken mental imbecillity. The followers of the Nyaya 
 and the Vedanta feel this difficulty as keenly as ourselves, 
 
 cr^irftr ^ f^c????^: i v. e, 7. 
 
 ?IT7r^<^2"^T I Vijnjina Bhikshu. 
 
 ■gm^^ifw^T^in^ci; ^^nrffr: 1 ^TfTm^T^cr ^Si^^ 1 v. 8, 0. 
 ^ irTn^mT^T^ cTf<^f^ 1 v. 10. 
 
 ^ t'Sri' cTT^cT ^cq^ "511% I 
 
SANKIIYA PLEADINGS. 253 
 
 only they do not boldly avow it. The Vedantists evade 
 the real question by saying that God creates the world 
 in connection with avidijd, (ignorance or delusion). They 
 thus support their system by actually attributing ignorance 
 and delusion to the creator of the universe. They vir- 
 tually deny supreme intelligence to the creator. Such 
 is the theism of our opponents before whom Kapila's 
 teaching must dwindle into a iiiris'ivara system ! I doubt 
 whether any one can have the boldness to say that avidyd, 
 or a principle of ignorance, is a more intelligent cause than 
 prahriti or inanimate nature. Sankaracharya's wonder at 
 the idea of inanimate nature producing such a harmonious 
 world ill consorts with his own doctrine that the same 
 world was created by ignorance or want of deliberation. 
 He that can believe that a principle of ignorance could 
 project a plan of the universe before us, need not look 
 aghast at the idea of an unintelligent principle performing 
 the same exploit. 
 
 " S'ankara is as confident that Brahma or the spirit is 
 nirgmia, or destitute of affections, as Kapila that the 
 Purusha is nissanga or free from attachments. Kapila 
 carries out his principle and maintains that the soul with- 
 out attachments cannot be a creator, having no motive for 
 any action. The Vedantist endeavours to reconcile opposite 
 principles by maintaining that the ni7'gima Spirit, also 
 independent of motives, creates the universe in association 
 with avidya or ignorance. 
 
 '^ But the most unaccountable flight of Vedantic imagi- 
 nation is in the saying that Brahma or the spirit is not 
 really associated with delusion — that it is through avidya 
 or delusion that delusion is attributed to him. Kapila 
 will have nothing to do with this tissue of inconsistencies-. 
 
 V. 13, 11. 
 
254 DIALOGUE VI. 
 
 If it is a delusion to attribute delusion to the spirit, then 
 he is not really associated with delusion, and if without 
 such unworthy association he could not create the uni- 
 verse, then it is a fallacy to call him the creator. 
 Avidya or ignorance must be the real creator. If the 
 Vedantist will only give up his addiction to party and 
 boldly search out the truth, he must be driven to the 
 conclusion that the world was created by a principle 
 of ignorance, a conclusion not essentially different from 
 ours — while ours has the further advantage of being 
 a more intelligible and consistent theory. 
 
 " It is useless to remind us of the complex and harmo- 
 nious arrangement of the world. The real question re- 
 mains unchanged — how to associate a perfectly free intelli- 
 gence (such as you must suppose the Creator to be) 
 with ignorance and delusion, or with a subjection to mo- 
 tives and purposes." 
 
 Agamika. — '^But you do not deny, friend Kapila, — do 
 you ? — that purusha, or the Spirit, does perform various 
 acts in the world. Why then must you deny his creative 
 agency V 
 
 Kdpila. — '^ We do deny that purusha does any thing 
 in reality. He is essentially free from those impulses 
 which lead to action, and from the encumbrances of body 
 and mind wherein consist capacities for operativeness. 
 The soul appears operative simply because of its active 
 accidents — just as a crystal vase appears coloured because 
 of the red flowers placed in it, but is itself devoid of any 
 taint or tinge. It is not affected or fettered by the opera- 
 tiveness of its accidents. If it appears affected, disturbed, 
 or fettered, it is because of the mind with which it is for 
 a time associated. The actions and passions are all of 
 the mind not the soul*'^. Nor does this accidental and 
 
SANKHYA THEORY OF SOUL AND MIND. 255 
 
 temporary association produce any permanent, or even 
 momentary, impression on the soul, for it passes off like 
 water on a lotus leaf without real contact, and without 
 leaving any traces behind itself^. 'The soul is witness, 
 solitary, by-stander, speculator, and passive.' ' The quali- 
 ties, as agents, act ; a witness neither acts nor desists from 
 action.' 'Though the qualities be active, the stranger 
 (soul) appears as the agent.' ' There being activity of 
 the qualities, soul which is indifferent, or inactive, appears 
 as if it was the agent, which it is not^.' 
 
 " So you see we do deny the operativeness, and maintain 
 the perfect freedom o^ purusha. And even if the contrary 
 were the fact — even if we allowed that the soul was 
 competent for certain acts, still it would not follow that 
 he was competent for the act of creation. Supposing the 
 soul were subject to motives and impulses, and therefore 
 capable of ordinary agencies in the world, he would for 
 that very reason be disqualified for the great work of 
 creation, for which no agent, fettered by attachments, could 
 be competent." 
 
 Agamika. — ''You have just cited a passage from the 
 Karika and Gaurapada's commentary thereon. Those 
 authorities seem to acknowledge the superintendence of 
 the soul over nature. The Karika says ' there must be 
 superintendence,' on which Gaurapada comments thus; 
 ' As a charioteer guides a chariot drawn by horses able 
 ' to curvet, to prance, to gallop, so the soul guides the 
 ' body : as it is said in the Shashti Tantra, — Nature, 
 
 
 5 Wilson's Ssinkhya Kitrika. 
 
256 DIALOGUE VI. 
 
 ' directed by soul, proceeds.' Yacliaspati also says, ' whe- 
 ther this (evolution) of nature be for its own purpose or 
 ^ that of another, it is a rational principle that acts. 
 ' Nature cannot act without rationality, and therefore there 
 ' must be a reason which directs nature. Embodied souls, 
 ^ though rational, cannot direct nature, as they are ignorant 
 ' of its character ; therefore there is an omniscient Being, 
 'the director of nature, which is I's'wara, or God^.' 
 
 ''Thus you see, Kapila, that even among the upholders 
 of your characteristic doctrine of creation by the agency 
 of nature, men are compelled to aknowledge a Supreme 
 Intelligence, the author and director of nature." 
 
 Kapila. — "The Sankhya is pre-eminently a system of 
 discriminative knowledge. We are, by name and profes- 
 sion, guardians of the interests of truth and reason, and it 
 would be a betrayal of those interests, if on a subject of 
 such awe-striking solemnity as the creation, we failed to 
 follow out our principles to their legitimate consequences. 
 I have told you that we are not wanting in admiration of 
 the wonderful mechanism of the universe, but we cannot 
 persuade ourselves so far to lower our conceptions of 
 moral and spiritual greatness as to allow the competence 
 of a creator that is itself under the thraldom of motives 
 and purposes. The very title of Sankhya would be a 
 misnomer if we admitted such a low standard of moral 
 greatness in the Creator of the world." 
 
 Satyahdma. — " I feel more perplexed than ever how 
 to understand the drift of your sayings. You have 
 challenged our veneration by speaking of the awe-striking 
 solemnity of the subject of Creation, and you have been 
 raising our conception of the moral greatness of the 
 Creator of the world. You have been raising our con- 
 ceptions however only to hurl them down by a dash. 
 
 6 Wilson's Sankhya Kjirika. 
 
NO MORAL GREATNESS WITHOUT OOD. 257 
 
 You tell US of the moral greatness of the Creator, only 
 as a prelude to your doctrine that there is no Creator of 
 any intellectual and moral qualifications whatever ; and you 
 raise our conceptions of that greatness, only to assure us 
 that there is no moral greatness of any standard in the 
 world — for thought and action are affections of the mind, 
 not the soul. They can no more touch the soul than the 
 red roses in a vase taint the crystal of which it is composed. 
 What is the meaning of ^awe-striking solemnity' if there 
 be no God in the universe ? Who is to strike the awe ? 
 What can be the value of knowledge at the utmost, if 
 there be no God to be known ? What can you mean by a 
 betrayal of the interests of truth and reason, if the soul 
 is not responsible for any acts ? 
 
 " You say your difficulty in the way of acknowledging 
 a Creator of supreme intelligence is how to reconcile 
 subjection to motives and purposes with omnipotence. 
 Yoru do not deny the evidences of design which the 
 universe displays, but you cannot allow the existence of 
 a Designer because of the moral difficulty you have men- 
 tioned. Before this difficulty the argument from design 
 loses its force with you. 
 
 " In the case of the Supreme Being, however, we are 
 not called upon to say that he requires an external motive 
 for any thing He he does, much less are we at liberty to 
 speculate on his motives. He has His all-wise, all- 
 gracious plans, and he acts according to the good pleasure 
 of His will. 
 
 ''The argument from design, again, is a sheer logical 
 argument based on the very nature of all reasoning. It 
 cannot lose its force from any consideration whatsoever, 
 while the moral difficulty you have raised is a creature 
 of your own imagination. It does not consort well with 
 the position you claim for your system, as 'pre-eminently 
 
 2 L 
 
258 DIALOGUE VI. 
 
 one of discriminative knowledge/ to set aside a logical 
 argument on a mere fanciful theory about motives and 
 purposes. That the universe was created by a Supreme 
 Intelligence is attested by the indications of design around 
 us, prior to all other considerations. As to His motives 
 and purposes, that is a point which concerns the question 
 of His attributes, not of His existence. 
 
 *' And here must we not pause to consider the nature 
 of our inquiry before we venture a single step further ? 
 Before Him who projected the vast universe, in which 
 our own dwelling place is but an atom, and of which 
 our powers of sensation and reflection can reach but the 
 smallest conceivable portion, before Him, I ask — what are 
 we, and what are the highest flights of our imagination ! 
 Are we to venture on probing His motives and purposes ? 
 Can the human mind by any of its devices fathom the 
 depth of His purposes — the finite grasp at the Infinite ? 
 And are we to say that His motives and purposes are 
 abridgments of His essential freedom ? 
 
 *' Well does the author of the Sarva-dars'ana-sanofraha 
 say that benevolence is His purpose^ ! And that such a 
 purpose can be no detraction from His freedom, just as a 
 person's own body cannot be an interposing barrier to 
 himself. His motives and purposes who shall presume to 
 fathom ? Enough for us that in all He has made we see 
 striking adaptations to the comforts and conveniences of 
 animal life, and thus descry signs of benevolence written 
 in indelible characters. 
 
 " To say that an essentially free spirit is incapable of 
 motives is to beg a moral question — and to build a moral 
 system on a mere fanciful theory. Granted, Brahminical 
 
WHAT TRUE FREEDOM IS. 259^ 
 
 philosophers have held the same theory — granted, the 
 Veddntists are guilty of inconsistencies; — (though I very 
 much doubt they will protest against your version of 
 their doctrine) — is that a reason why the divine glory 
 should be obscured, and knowledge deprived of its. 
 highest object — the only object that can lend it dignity 
 or importance ? Do you think you have made out a 
 great case for your system by contending that all its 
 speculations end in this, that there is no God in the 
 world — and that all its knowledge consists in the dogma 
 that there is not and cannot be any intelligent and 
 deliberate act or moral agency in the universe ? 
 
 " Is not the saying that a free spirit can have no motive 
 itself a gross abridgment of its freedom ? The only idea 
 we can have of a spiritual essence is that it is an existent 
 substance endowed with mind, with will, with powers 
 of intelligence and action, but destitute of physical organs. 
 To deprive it of motives and emotions is to deprive it of 
 will and of active powers. You do not deny that mind 
 implies all this, but you will not allow that spirit is essen- 
 tially and constantly connected with mind. What cmi its 
 existence mean then ? How can it differ from a nullity ? 
 
 " What is the value of a freedom, either, in which there 
 is no freedom of action ? What is independence, if one is 
 denied the choice of doing what he pleases ? True freedom 
 implies not a mental void, not a destitution of attachment 
 and activity, not a state which can only be characterized 
 by a negation, but a power, a power to think and to act. 
 If it involves a negation at all, it is simply a negation of 
 attachment to that which is evil — a negation of activity 
 in the wrong direction." 
 
 Kdpila. — ^' But how can you trust to one's discrimina- 
 ting between that which is good and that which is evil 
 — between a right and a wrong direction ? " 
 
260 DIALOGUE VI. 
 
 Satyakdma. — ^^ Is not that the very discrimination 
 which your philosophy undertakes to discuss ? But whe- 
 ther your philosophy teaches that discrimination or not, 
 you will perhaps allow that it is no bondage to the 
 creature to do that which his Creator intended he should 
 do. And the intention of the Creator may be inferred 
 from the constitution of the mind itself. If desire and 
 aversion be, as they undoubtedly are, natural to the 
 mind, they cannot of themselves be evils. It is not a 
 bondage to the father to love his son. It is no bondage 
 to any — it is on the contrary true freedom to love virtue 
 and hate vice. It is no bondage to desire or do what is 
 good. No one has ever regretted such an impulse or 
 act. No one has ever derived any thing but pleasure 
 therefrom. 
 
 "There is no doubt much evil in the world. One can- 
 not be too jealous of his affections lest they lead him 
 astray. Care should be taken to regulate them. Human 
 nature requires to be reformed and regenerated. But 
 to destroy is not to reform. To renounce is not to 
 regulate. Nay you cannot destroy, you cannot renounce 
 the passions and emotions of the mind. They are natural, 
 and, as your Acharya admits, what is natural cannot be 
 destroyed^. You will only force them to take the wrong 
 way by refusing them a field of action in the right way." 
 
 Kdpila. — "We do not deny that passions and ajffec- 
 tions are natural to the mind. We say it is endowed 
 both with intellectual and active powers^. But the mind 
 is distinct from the soul, nor are they so associated as that 
 the passions of the one should really affect the other. The 
 association is temporary. The two are not essentially 
 connected with each other." 
 
 ^^T^^T"5TTITftr(^IcT II ^ ^H^riffT^ ^-^i 1 II. 26. 
 
WHAT TRUE FREEDOM IS NOT. 261 
 
 Satyahdma, — "You mean the soul is not essentially 
 possessed of intellectual and active powers. The freedom 
 then which you are postulating in behalf of the soul is 
 not the freedom which implies moral greatness. It is 
 the freedom of which stocks and stones may boast ; it is 
 the freedom which the paralytic attains in proportion to 
 the extent of his disease. There can be no moral great- 
 ness without moral agency, nor any moral agency without 
 choice of action. He that is open to impulses and has the 
 power of action, he that resists temptations to evil and 
 deliberately chooses that which is good may assert a 
 claim to moral greatness — not he, who is destitute of 
 feeling and emotion, or has no power of action. 
 
 '* Nor do you propound a very dignified idea of spiritual 
 freedom when you say that the soul's tranquillity and 
 contentedness are or ought to be like those of the harlot 
 PingaM who simply submitted to what she considered a 
 hard necessity when it was out of her power to attain 
 her wished-for object'^'. There is no moral virtue in such 
 forced resignation. 
 
 " And yet on a mere moral quibble, itself militating 
 against every moral principle, you must set at nought all 
 the indications of benevolent design which you see in the 
 world, and pronounce it to be a world without God. And 
 rather than allow freedom of action to a free spirit you are 
 content to admit the undirected agency of an inanimate 
 and unintelligent principle. You will allow that dead 
 matter is competent to produce the wonderfully complex 
 mechanism of the world, but you cannot admit that an in- 
 
 " f^^^t ^li\ flTlS^^T^cT^ ! IV. 11. 
 ^?lt mWl ^T^^* ^^TETT^^^^l^ HSfTcT ftn^^WcT | ^T^T 
 
262 DIALOGUE VI. 
 
 telligent spirit, having a purpose in view, could have such 
 competence. This is, to use a well known proverb, to strain 
 at a gnat while swallowing a camel. And the gnat, too, 
 is simply a creature of your own fancy ; for there is no 
 moral difficulty in the supposition of a free spirit acting 
 freely according to the good purpose of his own will. 
 
 ^' 1 am perfectly amazed at your undertaking to rid the 
 country of heresy and yet admitting and enforcing some 
 of its worst tenets. The sioabhdvicas are no doubt the most 
 dangerous of Buddhists. And yet your theory seems 
 to me precisely the same as theirs." 
 
 A'gamika. — ^^Is it possible that the doctrine of the 
 venerable Kapila can be so bad as that !" 
 
 Satydkama. — '' The Buddhists I have named deny God's 
 agency and attribute the creation to swabhdva. They 
 speak also of the efficacy of Karma, or the merit of 
 works, and reject the idea of a divine providence by assert- 
 ing the necessary connection between works and their 
 deserts. They say ; — if God is the agent, then what are 
 works for ? and what is the use of yatna (effi^rt) either ^ ? 
 Kapila's teaching on creation and providence appears to 
 me to be precisely the same. He deliberately gives up the 
 idea of an intelligent Creator by maintaining the theory of 
 an inanimate but yet operative _pra^ri^2*, and he says, almost 
 in the very words of the swahhdvika Buddhists, that the 
 distribution of rewards is not under divine direction 
 because it is regulated by karma, (works). I must do 
 him the justice to add that the majority of Brahminical 
 philosophers have broached the same doctrines in other 
 words. Yed^ntism, as our friend Kapila justly remarked, 
 did not dare to assert God's creative power without asso- 
 ciating him with avidyd, nor could it acknowledge his 
 providence without at the same time teaching that God 
 
 1 i^amhhvt, Purdna in Hodgson. 
 
KAPILA TEACHES BUDDHISM. 263 
 
 and the world were identical, and that there could be no 
 giver or receiver of benefits or favors. Vedantism also 
 falls back on the old idea of adrishta or karma and its 
 deserts, in order to account for the unequal distribution of 
 pleasure in the world. 
 
 " Our philosophers, indeed, while professing to guard 
 against Buddhistic teaching, have only contributed to 
 its wider diffusion by setting forth, perhaps unconsciously,' 
 some of its characteristic tenets of a very pernicious 
 tendency. Discontent with life and existence are taught 
 as clearly in the Brahminical schools as in the Buddhist 
 sects. The merit and demerit of karma or works are 
 spoken of, in some of our schools at least, not only 
 without reference to, but also to the absolute denial 
 of, a judicial governor of the universe. The influence 
 of karma is supposed to be itself sufficiently powerful 
 for the government of the world, and the idea of God 
 as Creator and Supreme ruler is deliberately renounced. 
 Dhydna or meditation is inculcated as an effectual means 
 of escape from the miseries of life and existence, but no 
 object is presented to the mind on which dhydna is to be 
 exercised. 1 do not know whether Buddha himself taught 
 all these doctrines, but there is no denying that many 
 of his followers hold them with great tenacity — and our 
 Kapila has evidently adopted them from the same 
 source. He denies a Supreme Being as creator and 
 governor of the universe, and attributes the distribution 
 oi fruits or rewards to the influence of karma. And 
 yet, like the Buddhists, he talks of dhydna and of true 
 knowledge as the only means of emancipation. What 
 importance can possibly be attached to dhydna or know- 
 ledge if the world be without a God ? " 
 
 Kdpila. — " I will not be so disingenuous as to deny 
 the force of some of your observations. I must however 
 
264 . DIALOGUE VL 
 
 exlpain our definition of dhydna. Our Acharya had said 
 that knowledge is the only means of emancipation. But 
 lust after the things of the world presents formidable 
 obstructions in the way of knowledge. He accordingly 
 tells us that dhydna is the best means of suppressing 
 lust and promoting knowledge^. He tells us also that 
 dhydna consists in the stoppage of intellectual exercises 
 on other points than those which are the select objects 
 of contemplation^. And this is done by controlling the 
 breath in a proper posture and by assiduous discharge 
 of the duties of one's'^ own stage of life, as well as by 
 renouncement of all passions and desires." 
 
 Satyahdma. — '^ But what can be the ' select object' of 
 dhydna or knowledge in your system ? You acknowledge 
 no Supreme Divinity, and your great conclusion is / am 
 not, nor aught is mine." 
 
 Kdpila. — ^^ By dhydna we mean the abstraction of the 
 mind from all objects.*' 
 
 Satyakdma. — ''Am I to understand that dhydna or 
 meditation means that the mind does not actually meditate 
 on any thing, and that it is in a state of entire inactivity, 
 not dwelling on any reality whatever." 
 
 Kdpila. — ''Yes — certainly you are to understand so." 
 For though the scholiast adds, ' other than the select 
 
 * ^jft^ffcTWl^ I in. 30. 
 
 Vijndna Bhikshu. 
 
DHYANA IMPLIES NO-MEDITATION. 265 
 
 objects of contemplation,' yet that is not found in the 
 Sutra itself And Kapila says elsewhere that dhydna 
 implies the mind ivithout an object^,'' 
 
 Satyakdma. — " What can be the efficacy of such me- 
 ditation, or rather such no-meditation ?" 
 
 Kdpila. — '^ Our Acharya, in anticipation of this very 
 question; says that one great use of dhydaa is the sup- 
 pression of lust^. When you can abstract your mind 
 from every thing in the world, it is certain you exclude 
 all passion and lust." 
 
 Satyakdma. — ^' Your dhydna or meditation is then a 
 negative idea. It does not imply the pondering of any 
 reality in the mind, but rather dwelling on no-thing. It is 
 natural that your knowledge should be equally negative, 
 — ^for, says the Karika, ^ through study of principles, the 
 'conclusive, incontrovertible, one only knowledge is at- 
 ' tained, that neither I am, nor is aught mine, nor do I 
 'exist.'" 
 
 Kdpila. — ^^ Is it not one of the most admirable features 
 in the Sankhya system that it teaches you the truth of 
 truths — that all things are vain and transient. You may 
 call it a negative conclusion, but are not some negative 
 conclusions of the greatest value, and above all is it not 
 of prime importance that men should be convinced of 
 the vanity and nullity of vain and unreal things ?" 
 
 Satyakdma. — '' It is no doubt of the greatest import- 
 ance to be convinced of the vanity of vain things, but 
 why is it so ? Is it not because the exposure of the vanity 
 of vain things facilitates the knowledge of things that 
 are real ? But if, as you say, there be no .God in 
 the world, nothing pre-eminently real — if all that your 
 
 * ^rt" f^fl^jf T{^' I 
 
 2 M 
 
266 DIALOGUE VI. 
 
 discriminative knowledge has to unfold is that we are 
 not, nor is aught ours, — I really cannot see what great 
 value there can be in such knowledofo. That knowledo^e 
 is simply the information that nothing is ours. It might 
 be a most valuable information, if alonof with the denial 
 of things unreal, it contained an assurance of that which 
 is real and abiding. The dispelling of error is no doubt 
 an inestimable blessing when there is a corresponding 
 great truth to be communicated. But in a system with- 
 out God, without an active soul, with simply a passive 
 by-stander purusha, essentially devoid of mind, and with 
 the mere projections of an inanimate principle, themselves 
 to be denounced as vain and transient — in an empty sys- 
 tem such as this, what claims can be possibly set up on 
 the score of valuable information of any kind ? 
 
 ''And as to the ultimate object which the system 
 professes to have in view, the emancipation of the soul, the 
 idea becomes preposterous when you confidently assert that 
 the soul neither has nor is capable of any real bondage or 
 freedom^. There is nothing to emancipate the soul from 
 — for you say the soul can have no bondage. If it has 
 any pain by reason of its connection with mind, it is 
 merely a reflection or shadow of pain^. Nor could there 
 be a possible way of emancipating it, for you say it is not 
 so associated with mind and the senses (the only media 
 through which it could be reached) as that sensation and 
 reflection could affect it any more than water can affect 
 the lotus leaf on which it drops^. And even if the soul 
 could be reached, it could not be emancipated from a real 
 
 ^ ^^1%^ ^r^'ft'^ ir^TEr??iTr^^T^5- 1 
 
 ^ET ^ •^:^^f?[f^'^^Xr ^^ ! Vijru^na Bhikshu. 
 
 ^^T'rTciiT^^^nrTW I Vijn^na Bhikshu 
 
SANKHYA IN LEAGUE WITH BUDDHISM AGAINST GOD. 267 
 
 bondage, because that which is essentially bound cannot 
 on your theory be liberated. 
 
 ''Such is your system, and it is you say a preservative 
 from Buddhism. But, what Buddhistic doctrine can pos- 
 sibly be put down thereby, appears to me an enigma 
 incapable of solution. It cannot be its atheism, for 
 Kapila's system is itself without God. Is it then simply 
 its rejection of caste that you wish to remedy with the 
 help of the Sankhya ? Allow me once for all to put 
 you on your guard against the spirit that pervades your 
 system. You care not for the honor due to God, or 
 rather you argue against His existence ; but you are 
 particularly jealous for the honor of your own fraternity. 
 You are not offended at Buddhists' denying the God of 
 Heaven — on the contrary you support their doctrine in 
 this respect, you are ready with your prakriti to re-inforce 
 their swabhdva in the unholy contest against God. But 
 you cannot tolerate their denial of Brahminical supre- 
 macy — you cannot allow their onset against gods-of-the- 
 earth as you delight to call yourselves." 
 
 Kapila remained silent for some minutes He then 
 remarked that he had never thought of the Sankhya except 
 in connection with the Vedanta, and there could be no 
 doubt it contrasted favourably with S'ankara's pantheism. 
 He never reviewed it in its relation to Buddhism. He 
 must confess that such a review was desirable for the pur- 
 pose of investigating truth, but all he could now promise 
 was that he would cogitate calmly on the subject. 
 
DIALOGUE VIL 
 
 FROM THE SAME TO THE SAME. 
 
 We have just got through the festivities of a grand 
 marriage in our neighbourhood. The Rajah's daughter 
 v/as united to a fine young man, as handsome in his 
 person, as he is noble in his origin and graceful in his 
 manners. You have never yet told me how you manage 
 these social affairs in your part of the world. With us 
 matrimonial ceremonies are generally performed at night. 
 The bridegroom comes with a large retinue of friends, 
 marching in procession. He is received at the door by 
 the bride's party, and thence conducted to a spacious 
 hall where he takes his seat as the lion of the evening. 
 Before him are assembled, on the one hand, the party he 
 has himself brought, and on the other the company in- 
 vited by the bride's friends. Learned Brahmans often 
 take these opportunities of making themselves known by 
 means of literary and philosophical controversies ; which 
 commence in good humour indeed, but sometimes become 
 sufficiently animated to require the interference of third 
 parties for the peace of the house. 
 
 On the occasion of the wedding I have just mentioned, 
 all pundits of any pretensions in the neighbourhood were 
 invited to grace the assembly. Tarkakama, Agamika, 
 
VEDANTA ALONE RELIED ON FOR SALVATION. 269 
 
 among my new friends, as well as many old faces long 
 familiar to me, were there. Satyakama was not asked, 
 for his highness, though himself of an enlarged mind, 
 was afraid of offending the prejudices of others. The 
 bridegroom, however, was not so timid. Young Bengal, 
 you may have heard, does not give way to such scruples ; 
 and we had an instance the other night in the bridegroom's 
 bringing Satyakama in his company. 
 
 As soon as the bridegroom was conducted to his splen- 
 did velvet throne, and the numerous guests who formed 
 the two parties for the evening had assembled, Tarkakama 
 came up to' me and said, ^^Do you see, Satyakama is 
 here ? He has, as you know, lately been carrying on hot 
 debates on the several schools of our philosophy. I 
 think we should have told him at the very beginning 
 that although we assent to the teaching of the Nyaya 
 and the Sankhya in deference to the venerable Rishis 
 who propounded them, yet it is not on the Nyaya or the 
 Sankhya that our hopes of salvation are practically placed. 
 We dare not say that Gotama or Kapila was or could 
 be wrong, but we certainly do not look to the system 
 founded by either for spiritual consolation. Men may 
 in their speculations give a preference to their analysis of 
 the intellectual powers or their peculiar rules of reasoning ; 
 vidydrthis (students) may go to the school of Gotama or 
 Kandda for mental discipline, but the mumulcshu will not 
 turn that way for the salvation of his soul. It is to the 
 Vedanta that we look for such salvation. It is on the 
 sacred teaching of this school that we rely in our efforts 
 to escape the miseries of life. Satyakama could not have 
 enjoyed even a seeming triumph against us if we had 
 taken our vantage-ground on the Vedanta, and cut short 
 the unprofitable discussion of categories and topics. Our 
 case has at present an unfavourable appearance because 
 
270 DIALOGUE VII. 
 
 of our not having considered what would be the best 
 tactics for us to adopt. But it is not too late to set him 
 and ourselves right on this point. We have a good and 
 fitting opportunity now and here." 
 
 Scarcely had Tarkakauia finished these words when 
 our attention was arrested by a noisy debate which 
 several pundits had commenced with a view to introduce 
 themselves to the notice of the assembled audience. It 
 did not appear to be a regular controversy on any 
 particular point. It was a series of desultory discussions, 
 kept up at random, by several persons, impelled by 
 jigishd (a desire of victory) rather than jijndsa (a desire 
 of knowledge), in which there was a greater display of 
 learning than search after truth. It is impossible to 
 report to you all I heard. As there was no connected 
 argument the reasoning employed cannot be called to re- 
 collection on any principle of suggestion. I can only put 
 down desultory passages as memory may serve them out. 
 
 One said the world was produced by the union of 
 jyrakriti and purusha, and that S'iva w^as the great God. 
 ' I cannot, said another, allow your last saying. The 
 Mahes'waras are all wrong. Vishnu is the great God. 
 Did not S'iva confess his inferiority when he failed to pro- 
 tect his devotee, king Vana, against the divine Krishna^ ?* 
 *■ You are all wrong, cried a Yogi of the Sankhya school, 
 all wrong, both Mahes'waras and Bhagavatas. The ac- 
 tive intervention of God is not at all necessary, prakriti is 
 alone sufficient.' ^ Prakriti alone sufficient ! (said another) 
 1 say purusha is alone sufficient. No necessity for a 
 prakriti. All this is out of nothing' ^All this is out 
 of nothing ! Then the husbandman may reap without 
 
 ^^T<^^Tim^T^T?7T^T^ &^^^i: I Sri Bhagavata, x. 63. 
 
DIVERSE DISPUTES. 271 
 
 sowing, the potter may get his vessel without working, 
 and the lazy weaver find his cloth as successfully as his 
 hard working associate^!' 
 
 One of the loudest talkers was a Vaishnava of the 
 new school of Chaitanya, and a follower of the Bh4ga- 
 vata philosophy, for which he had acquired the surname 
 of Bhagavata. He was contending, against a follower 
 of Sankaracharya, that the Supreme Being was not and 
 could not be nirdhdra (formless), that he had an eternal 
 vigraha or form of which no created being can have the 
 least conception, and that those who denied this truth 
 denied in effect the existence of God, and are to be 
 stigmatized as those rankest of rank Buddhists who 
 maintained that the creation and conservation of the 
 world do not require the exercise of divine agency, the 
 merit of karma being itself sufficient. 'Well has it been 
 said that the doctrine of mdyd, which falsifies the eter- 
 nal form of God, is only disguised Buddhism^ — a blas- 
 phemy against gods and Vedas.' 
 
 While the learned expounder of the jpancha i^dtra theory 
 was thus declaiming against the ideal Vedantists, there 
 came forward, from one of the hinder rows, a pundit, whose 
 features and habiliments were somewhat different from 
 the rest of the company, and who, I afterwards learnt, was 
 a Buddhist s'astri attending on a Nepaulese officer (colo- 
 nel, they called him) now on a visit to Bengal. The 
 officer and the s'astri were both invited by the bride's 
 father. ''So, venerable Bhagavata, said the Buddhist, 
 you take us to be not only impious ourselves, but also 
 
 cT^T«T^Tfxr cT^^'^T^qT ^^^T^t I Sankara Cora. Vedant, II. 2. 27. 
 ^ m^RK^^^T^ ^'^^ ^^^^ "^ ! Padnia Purana. 
 
272 DIALOGUE VII, 
 
 patterns of impiety. You cannot find a more rhetorical 
 term for rebuking your opponents than by comparing 
 them with Buddhists. You call us revilers of gods and 
 Vedas. Well, we shall patiently submit to your inflic- 
 tions. This is not the first time when we have been called 
 to bear them. But will you allow us to say one word in 
 our defence ?" 
 
 Bhdgavata. — " I meant no offence to you, Sir. But we 
 shall gladly receive any explanations from you." 
 
 Buddhist. — '^ Well, then, I say, if we have reviled 
 gods and Vedas, we have done nothing more than your 
 own Bhagavan Vasudeva has done." 
 
 No sooner had the Buddhist S'astri uttered these words 
 than a whole troop of Bhagavatas and Vaishnavas voci- 
 ferated aloud — ^' Dont hear him ! dont hear him ! Oh 
 blasphemy against the Lord ! could the Lord revile gods 
 and Vedas ? Impossible." 
 
 The assembly was now in an uproar. It was with 
 some difficulty that a domestic Brahmin of the Bajah 
 restored silence and order, and told the disputants that 
 it was unbecoming the dignity of learned and aged reli- 
 gionists to create such confusion and disorder. " Young 
 men of hot blood," said he, ^^ have been known on occa- 
 sions of marriage festivities to carry literary contests to 
 the length of smashing lights and chandeliers, but the 
 Rajah has a right to expect better examples from vene- 
 rable s'astris." 
 
 The Buddhist was now allowed to speak for himself 
 ''If," said he, ''the force of numbers and the power of 
 eloquence are to decide between us, then I must at once 
 retire from the contest. I am a foreigner, single-handed, 
 and far from my country, and I do not pretend to the 
 dialectics of your schools. But if you will listen to 
 facts, I will point to certain sayings of your Vasudeva 
 
DISPUTE BETWEEN BUDDHIST AND BHAGAVATA. 273 
 
 in proof of my assertion that we do not revile gods and 
 Vedas more than he has done. For how did he re- 
 monstrate with his foster father Nanda against the popu- 
 lar custom of tendering divine worship to Indra. ^ B}-^ 
 ' karma or the merit of works, said lie, are living creatures 
 'born, by karma again they enter into dissolution. Plea- 
 ' sure, pain, fear, bliss, all proceed from kai^ma. If there 
 ' be a god, the distributer of the fruits of others' actions, 
 ' he too bestows them only on workers. There is no such 
 'thing as a Lord of one that works not. What can 
 ' Indra do to men following their respective actions ? 
 'He cannot counteract what they do by virtue of swa- 
 ' bhdva, or nature. We are subject to nature and we fol- 
 ' low nature. Every one, whether a man, an asura, or a 
 ' god is under the control of nature. A person receives and 
 ' gives up various sorts of bodies by the instrumentality 
 ' of karma, which is itself our friend, our foe, our stranger, 
 'our preceptor, our god. Let one therefore following 
 'his nature and doing his own w^ork worship karma. 
 'That which a person is fitted to observe is in reality his 
 'god. He who, living on one principle observes another, 
 'receives no good therefrom, just as a lady of honor 
 'receives no benefit from a paramour^.' 
 
 
 -^ 
 
 "5T cI^Tf^J^^ %?T ^^im^^^ ^^T n Bhagavata. x. 24. 13—20. 
 
 2 N 
 
274 DIALOGUE VII. 
 
 '^ I appeal to your fairness, learned Sirs, continued the 
 Buddhist, if any precept of S'4kya Sinha can be a 
 stronger denunciation of the divine power than the pas- 
 sage I have just read from the great text book of all 
 Bhagavatas. And as to the Yedas, allow me to remind 
 you how the Upanishad itself talks of them when it stigma- 
 tizes all four as apardy or inferior, and classifies them with 
 books which may be considered manuals for children^. 
 We never intended to say any thing more severe than 
 this. S'andilya also speaks of the four Vedas as failing 
 to teach the way of salvation, and S'ankaracharya calls 
 that saying a reviling of the Veda^. And your divine 
 Vasudeva himself condemns the florid speech of those 
 unwise men who, ^ addicted to the texts of the Veda, and 
 bent on the enjoyment of heaven, say that there is no 
 other way than this. The sentiments of such men are 
 not fitted for samddhi, or the mental abstraction necessary 
 for nirvdna in Brahma^,' — terms and ideas which I very 
 much suspect you have borrowed from our philosophy 
 and its nomenclature." 
 
 Bhdgavata. — -^Ah, but the divine Vasudeva has else- 
 where set forth the authority of the Vedas and the 
 dignity of the gods. It is only when he was expounding 
 the Jndna-Kdnda, or chapter on knowledge, that he was 
 speaking in depreciation — not of the whole Veda, but of 
 the Karma- Kdnda or chapter on works." 
 
 Buddhist. — " And yet, relying on the same ^ chapter 
 on works,' he inveighed against the worship of any 
 
 ^ cT^ttt:! ^^^T ?5r^^^: ^mwftS^^^: filWT W^i -^l^- 
 
 Mundaka. 
 
 cZnf^^^f«T5^r T^«TIrr l Vedant Com. II. 2. 45. 
 ' Bhaeavad-Gita. II. 
 
BRAHMINICAL PHILOSOPHY BORROWED FROM BUDDHISM. 275 
 
 divinity, after the fashion of Jaimini. Well, Sirs, 
 the only difference between us is that we hold to 
 a consistent doctrine, whereas you make a convenience 
 of your gods and Vedas, — sometimes defending, some- 
 times condemning them, just as your fancy prompts you 
 for the moment. This only confirms me in my opinion 
 that when our Sakya of blessed memory protested against 
 your original system of mere rites and ceremonies, and 
 taught the way of escaping the miseries of life and of 
 transmigration, you would neither follow him, nor could 
 you resist the force of his doctrines. So you borrowed 
 some of his ideas about the bondage of works and the 
 means of samddhi and nirvana. But truth does not find 
 its natural place in a system of error, and so you have 
 a series of inconsistencies in your philosophy on which 
 your best doctors are perpetually wrangling with one 
 another. Your original Vedas say nothing of the miseries 
 of life, decay, and transmigration, nor impress on your 
 minds the necessity of seeking for nirvdna or mukti. 
 Several of your Upanishads too present to your aspira- 
 tions nothing higher than the sensuous enjoyment of 
 heaven® ; and, if some of those Vedic appendages chime 
 in other tunes, they were evidently written after the age 
 
 W^W'I'H'^T"^!^^ ^^^51 ^^"fT II Taittiriya. 
 ^^^Ta[a1"f?iJ^t II Sank ara on ditto. 
 
 fcr^fcT irfclfcf'SfcT 1! Kena. 
 
276 , DIALOGUE VII. 
 
 of S'iikya, and have learnt those tunes from the lyre of 
 our philosophy." 
 
 The debate was going on after this fashion when 
 Tarkakania told me fchere was no use sitting and listening 
 to such incoherent discussions. He proposed that we 
 should leave the disputants to themselves, and seek a less 
 noisy place for ourselves. We accordingly moved to a 
 quiet corner in one of the side wings of the hall. Aga- 
 mika, Satyakama, Vaiyasika, and a few other friends 
 followed us. We formed a little group of our own. 
 Tarkakama, referring to our past conferences, said to 
 Satyakama that the Nyaya and the Sankhya were intended 
 as intellectual exercises rather than as means of escape 
 from the troubles of a sinful world. '^ It was the Vedanta 
 to which we really looked for salvation. Yyasa and 
 S'ankara are our real guides in a spiritual point of view. 
 Gotama and Kapila may have taught us metaphysics 
 and logic, but the author of the Brahma siitras and his 
 commentator have shown us the way to life and happi- 
 ness." 
 
 Vaiyasika, not anticipating a controversy on the sub- 
 ject, spoke thus in support of Tarkakama's remarks ; " Do 
 you not see, Satyakama, the great service which our 
 venerable Acharya and his commentator have rendered 
 to the cause of Theology. How nobly have they fought 
 with men who would set up other eternal principles in 
 rivalry with the one Supreme Spirit Vyksa told them, 
 as he told the whole world, that it was perfectly needless 
 to look for other causes than one only Brahma in order 
 to account for the origin of the universe." 
 
 Satyakama. — ^^ 1 should be unwilling this night to enter 
 into a discussion with you Vaiydsika. You and I have 
 come in the same procession ; it is not usual for friends of 
 the brideo-room to. choose such an occasion for a debate 
 
vedanta's one principle exceeds millions. 277 
 
 among themselves. I will simply remark that your 07ie 
 Brahma is otherwise described to have as many forms or 
 modifications as there are things in the universe, and 
 therefore your one eternal principle exceeds millions." 
 
 Tarkahdma. — ''I am glad to find you enter so readily 
 into the spirit of our social institutions. Well, I have 
 not come in your procession ; perhaps you will have no 
 objection to discuss the question with me. How do you 
 make out that our one Brahma is of as many forms as 
 there are things in the universe ?" 
 
 Satyahdma. — " S'ankarach&;rya, while dessenting from 
 the Bh%avata theory of God possessed of four mo- 
 difications, Vasudeva, Sankarshana, Pradyumna, and 
 Aniruddha, acknowledges that all existing substances 
 * from Brahma down to a bundle of grass' are modifica- 
 tions of God^. And he approvingly cites the text of the 
 Upanishad which pronounces all this {i. e., the whole uni- 
 verse) to he God}^. The effect is declared to be identical 
 with its cause, and that in a way which smells strongly 
 of material pantheism." 
 
 Tarkakdma. — '^ Invert the predicate and you will easily 
 understand the meaning of that text. Let 'God' be 
 the subject, and ' all this,' the predicate. It will then read 
 thus : ' God is all this,' that is to say, God is manifest in 
 all this. On whatever substance you may cast your eyes, 
 you see nothing but an instance of the power of God." 
 
 Satyakdma. — *' Very ingenious, friend Tarkakama. 
 But the 5th Sutra of IV. I. protests against the idea of 
 looking on the superior as inferior, on the king as a mere 
 coachman, on Brahma as a creature. Brahma is to be 
 
 &■, -^ 
 
 ^iT^^ 5T3Tcft ^JTWU^m^^TTTcT I Ved. Com. U. 2, 44. 
 10 ??. ^ . 
 
278 DIALOGUE tir. 
 
 predicated of creatures, not any creature of Brahma ^ 
 You may say A'ditya is Brahma, vital air is Brahma, 
 lightning is Brahma, but you cannot affirm the converse. 
 Besides you must remember I am not criticising the text 
 itself I spoke of the leading doctors of the Yedanta who 
 cited it. If you refer to their writings you will find they 
 did not cite it in the sense in which you read it. I suspect 
 Vaiyasika will not be thankful to you for reading that cele- 
 brated passage in a sense which will evidently stultify the 
 authorized teaching of his school. And, Tarkakama, you 
 can scarcely be ignorant of the fact that the meaning you 
 attach to that sentence, though it is suggested by some 
 eminent critics, is not supported by the context. What 
 are the words that follow ? ' Tajjaldn,' an elliptical ex- 
 pression, the meaning of which no one has controverted, 
 (i. e.) being produced from , resolved into, and existing in 
 Him^. It would not be a natural readinof to take the 
 whole sentence in your sense ; " God is all this, being 
 produced from, resolved into, and existing in Him !" 
 The sense in which S'ankaracharya and other eminent 
 expositors have read the passage must be the correct 
 signification." 
 
 Tarhahdma. — '^ Well, I will not press that point. But 
 you cannot be iguorant of the fact that Vedantists consi- 
 der the universe as a mere idea, a non-entity, a no-thing. 
 
 S"ankard.chjlrya. 
 
 * ^m\\ ^-^ff^-i f^^I^^T'cf ^^^ cl^r^Tcr^ n^r^TcT^ ^^^f^TW I 
 
 Ibid. I. 2, 1. 
 
ALL THIS IS GOD ! 279 
 
 The passage cannot therefore inculcate, as you contend it 
 does, a material pantheism, or an indefinite deification of 
 every thing. It does not say that every thing is God ; 
 but that all this, which is no thing, is God. 
 
 Satyahdma.— ^'l am not sure the Vedantists will 
 thank you for this interpretation either, though it has 
 the support of Benares scholarship^. If 'all this' 
 means ' no thing, then the sentence will teach that some- 
 thing, which is itself no thing y is God, or 'the one only 
 thing !' Will you tell me if the passage in question is 
 intended to teach doctrine or enforce practice ? I can 
 understand those interpreters who say that this text, 
 inculcating the identity of the world with God, is cal- 
 culated to recommend mental tranquillity and contentment 
 by showing that there is no room for ambition avarice 
 and lust*. According to your rendering, the text pro- 
 nounces the world, itself no thing, to be ' the one only 
 thing.' Why this compliment ? There is a class of Ve- 
 dantists who say the world is a non-entity, but I doubt 
 whether their theology is at all better than that of Kapila 
 or Kanada." 
 
 Tarhakdma. — '' I do not quite understand you. Ex- 
 plain yourself." 
 
 Satyakdma. — '' Whichever view you may take of exter- 
 nal nature, whether with the parindma-vddis, who maybe 
 called material pantheists, you pronounce it to be a reality, 
 or with the vivarta-vddis, who are a species of spiritual pan- 
 theists, you call it a non-entity, the text above cited must 
 teach very questionable theology. It must either deify 
 the world and inculcate the very error (which Kapila 
 
 3 ** AH, that is, no thing : Brahma being the one only thing.'* Benares Magazine 
 vol v. p. 421. 
 
 * ^ xT ?ETo^^^T?fr^ ^ftr ^T3rr^^? ^'H^Ptt ct^t^ptt 
 
 ^q-[^cT I Sankara. Com. Vedant, I. 2. 1. 
 
280 DIALOGUE VII. 
 
 contended was necessarily involved in the Vedant doctrine) 
 of every thing being God, or it will nullify the creation, and 
 declare that nothing was called into being by God. And 
 really it is difficult to say which is the worse teaching of the 
 two. One thing however is certain ; it confirms the 
 opinion I lately read in an English review that pantheism 
 is practical atJieisin. He who says the world is God 
 precludes the idea of serving that God ; for where the 
 creature itself is God, who is to be the worshipper. 
 The Vedant triumphantly adopts this conclusion, but 
 we ought not therefore to be the less jealous of the im- 
 piety implied in it. It involves the very essence of 
 Kapila's atheism. And he who says nothing was pro- 
 duced from him, as effectually excludes the practice of 
 religion ; for if nothing be a reality in the world, there 
 can be no real worship of God." 
 
 Tarhakdma. — ^' I think, Satyakama, you rely too much 
 on English reviewers. If you adopt them as your masters, 
 no wonder you will vilify the doctrine of the Vedant 
 as practical atheism. Like teacher like pupil. But you 
 cannot expect me to be much influenced by the language 
 of your English masters." 
 
 Satyahdma. — '^Pardon me, Tarkakama. I should 
 have told you that it was Chiranjiva, the author of the 
 Vidivan-moda'tarangini, that first suggested the idea 
 which I afterwards found in the Review of which I 
 have spoken. Listen to the words he has put into the 
 mouth of his atheistic interlocutor; ^Atheist (to the 
 Vedantist) Well, very well, you have now entered a little 
 ' into my views *"' '''" '" But if the universe be in your 
 'opinion unreal, then why unnecessarily invent your 
 ' Brahma ? Without form, without agency, what can he 
 ' be doing in the world ^ V 
 
VEDANTIST SILENCED BY ATHEIST. 281 
 
 ''The Vedantist, the author adds, was silenced by the 
 question*^. But this was not the whole extent of his hu- 
 miliation. The Tarkika, or philosophical interlocutor, 
 who seems to propound the author's own views, says after- 
 wards to the Vedantist ; * By pronouncing the world to 
 ' be false, notwithstanding the evident proofs of its exis- 
 ' tence, you appear to be a master atheist, destitute alike 
 'of shame and fear"^.'" 
 
 Tarkahdma. — " It may be all very fine to talk in this 
 way, but how do you know the world has ' evident proofs 
 of its existence' ? How do you know that there are ex- 
 ternal substances ? The evidence of the senses is surely 
 not to be depended upon. How can you credit the eye 
 which has been proved to be delusive in the case of a 
 Mirage ? Will you follow the example of the irrational 
 deer who falls a sacrifice to his thirst, thereby giving the 
 name to the Mirage^. 
 
 " How can you trust the ear which has practised decep- 
 tion on you in open day light, as, for instance, in an exhi- 
 bition of ventriloquism ? What confidence can the organs of 
 smell and taste consistently call for, when they will present 
 the same objects as sweet and savoury to some, but insi- 
 pid or fetid to others ? Witness the effects which assafoe- 
 tida and English cheese produce on men of different tastes. 
 Have you never walked, Satyakama, through the China 
 
 ^T^T^.^'^T JrcTft\'^^ 5R^^«^^ f5R?T%^^ II 
 
 ^^ yvw^T^ II 
 
 2 o 
 
282 DIALOGUE VII, 
 
 bazar of Calcutta, nor covered your nostrils before shops 
 to which the barbarians flock for refreshment ? The world, 
 whose existence you deduce from proofs of this descrip- 
 tion, doubtless occupies a considerable space in your ima- 
 gination : but I cannot conceive what right you can have 
 to speak of it as real, much less to vilify those who do not 
 follow you in your phantastic flights." 
 
 Satyakdma. — *' I think 1 have the same right to speak 
 of the world as a reality that any of us has to speak of any 
 thing at all. You cannot hold an argument and at the 
 same time deny the validity of proof. Remember the 
 language of Gotama whom you confess to be a master of 
 logic. ^ If all evidence is to be rejected, then the refuta- 
 tion itself is inadmissible^.' 
 
 '^ The reasons you have advanced against the validity 
 of the evidence which our senses give, themselves demo- 
 lish your argument. The facts concerning the Mirage 
 and ventriloquism must have been communicated to you 
 through the instrumentality of the senses ; and if the 
 senses are never to be trusted, then the facts from which 
 you have deduced your objections fall to the ground. 
 How do you know, but through your senses, that the 
 Mirage and ventriloquism have deceived you ? 
 
 " Kanada has well said that it is only when the 
 senses are unsound^^ or defective, or when some particular 
 bad habit is contracted, that a person may be deceived. 
 
 ^' When however one sense may thus deceive you, the 
 others may come to your relief, and disabuse your mind. 
 If the eye is imposed upon by a mirage^ you can soon 
 discover the illusion by the help of the ear and the touch. 
 If the ear is deluded by the practice of ventriloquists, the 
 
 * ^^EliTT^Elfcl^^T^ Ilf?f5"^Tftrf^: I Ny^ya Siitra, II. 3. 
 
VEDANTISxM UPSETS ITS OWN FOUNDATION. 283 
 
 eye helps it to detect the error. You cannot I believe 
 adduce a single instance in which all the senses were 
 simultaneously deceived. 
 
 " But by arguing against the validity of the senses and 
 the doctrine of the world's realit}^ you are by no means 
 doing good service to the cause of Vedantism ; for you 
 are thereby cutting away the ground on which the sys- 
 tem rests. How does the great doctor of Vedantism 
 introduce his doctrine ? He declares the reasonableness 
 of desirinof the knowledofe of Brahma. But who is 
 Brahma? He from whom is the production dc, of this^, 
 says the aphorist ; that is to say, as S'ankaracharya 
 explains and expounds it ; 'That Omniscient and Omnipo- 
 ' tent cause, from which proceed the production, conserva- 
 'tion, and destruction of this world, which is distin- 
 'guished by names and forms, containing many agents 
 'and patients, and times, spaces, causes, effects, and 
 ' fruits, adapted to one another, and the beautiful arrange- 
 ' ment of which cannot be even imagined by the mind, is 
 'Brahma^.' The aphorism and the commentary are but 
 expositions of the text in tlie Upanishad in which the 
 inquirer is informed that * He is Brahma from whom 
 
 * these elements are produced, by whom those which are 
 
 * produced are sustained, in whom departing they are 
 ' resolved^.' Now if these elements are mere phantoms, 
 no argument based simply on them, can be other than 
 phantastic. Whether the maxim (ex nihilo nihil fit,) 
 
 ^'^T^^ ^cT*. I Vedant Siitra, I. i. 2. 
 
 ^cft gi X^'if^ H^TfiT ^T^I^ $*f ofTcfTf^ ^^frT 2T?5r2T5?5rfH- 
 
284 DIALOGUE VII. 
 
 which affirmatively is an exact rendering of our interroga- 
 tory adage"* of the Vedas, be universally true or not, so 
 far as the necessity of a material cause is concerned, there 
 can be no doubt as to the logical fallacy involved in 
 reasoning a ijosteriori from nothing at all to something. 
 What sort of a Seshavat anumdna would Gotama call it, 
 if after asserting it has rained, because the river has 
 risen ; you were presently to declare that tJie river has 
 not really risen. The author of the Vidwan-moda-tar- 
 angini does no injustice to the Vedantist when he calls 
 him a master atheist^ and represents him as foiled by 
 the unhappy man who had worked up his mind into a 
 denial of God. Nor does Chiranjiva wrong the Vedantist 
 much by adding, ' If that be the case, then who are you ? 
 ^ what do you say ? and what is your Brahma ? Of you 
 ' the utterer of unreality, nothing can be reab^.' 
 
 Tarhakdma. — '^ But does not even a shadow betoken 
 some reality which has cast it? Does not a reflection 
 point to its substance ? does not even the mirage prove 
 the existence of something of which it is a distorted 
 likeness. The world is indeed a mere shadow, but it 
 points to Brahma as its substance." 
 
 Satyahdma. — " We must remember that a shadow is 
 only cast by an opaque body when it intercepts the rays 
 shot by a luminous body, and it must be cast on some- 
 thing from which those rays are intercepted. A shadow, 
 if it betokens a reality at all, must prove the existence at 
 least of three entities, the luminous bod}^ whose light- is 
 intercepted, the opaque body which intercepts it, and the 
 body on which the shadow is cast. But where is the 
 
 * ^^iT^cTJ ^^tS'cT I Chh^ndogya. 
 
REFLECTION AND MIRAGE IMPLY TWO OR THREE THINGS. 285 
 
 luminary before which Brahma stands as an opaque 
 substance ? Is not Brahma 'light of lights by whose re- 
 fulofence all other thinsfs shine^?' How then can it cast 
 a shadow like an opaque substance ? Or if you prefer to 
 use the words i-efiection and mirage, you must remember 
 that a reflection, in like manner, must prove the ex- 
 istence at least of two or rather three substances ; the lu- 
 minous body, the light, and the reflecting mirror or 
 refracting medium. The mirage too, besides pointing to 
 the substance of which it is a distorted image, implies 
 the existence of an atmosphere in which the refraction 
 takes place. What room then can there be for your 
 much talked of unity of essence. It is impossible for 
 you to answer Kanada's or Kapila's objections to your 
 unity. You must either renounce your theory of one 
 essence, or you must avow that you have no reasons for 
 holding that opinion. You can have no reason if you deny 
 every thing that is not Brahma, for then there can be no 
 independent reason. What then will become of your 
 Vedas either ? If there be nothing but the Supreme Spirit, 
 then tlie Vedas must be a nullity." 
 
 While Satyakdma and Tarkakdma were thus discus- 
 sing the idealism of the Vedanta, I was reminded of what 
 you so often wrote to me, learned s'astri, of the lectures 
 which the accomplished president of your Pathas'ala deli- 
 vered on the subject, and specially of the analogy he 
 pointed out betw^een the doctrines of the Vedanta and 
 the Philosophy of a celebrated English Bishop. And 
 this brings to my recollection my ingratitude in never yet 
 thanking you for the Reprints for the Pundits which 
 contain the opinions of Berkeley, and propound the 
 
 fnr f^^lfcT Mnndnka. 
 
286 > DIALOGUE VII. 
 
 problem of pressing into the ranks of progress the gene- 
 rally revered system of the Veddnta. I thought it only 
 just to Tarkakama that he should have the benefit of the 
 sentiments broached at Benares. We misfht then be able 
 to discuss the question of assimilating the philosophy of 
 the East with that of the West. Nothing could be more 
 desirable than this consummation, if only it were practi- 
 cable. You might then hope to see the Reverend gentle- 
 men of Sigra and the learned alumni of your pdthas'dld 
 allied in one great cause. 
 
 Did you, T asked Satyakama, approvingly cite the 
 rebuke administered to the Vedantist in the Vidwan- 
 moda-tarangini ? Do you really think that to deny the 
 reality of the external world savours of atheism ? What 
 then would you say to Bishop Berkeley ? 
 
 Tarkakkma who, it appears had read the Reprints, 
 instantly took the hint, and triumphantly exclaimed ; 
 ^^ Well said I well said ! the ontology of the Vedanta is the 
 philosophy of Berkeley ! How can you pronounce the one 
 to be atheism without including the other in the same con- 
 demnation ? — You seem to hesitate, friend Satyakama. 
 Out with your usual boldness." 
 
 Satyahdma. — '^ 1 was not hesitating from fear. Indeed 
 what can I have to fear ? My object is to vindicate the 
 truth. I care not where and in what shape that truth is 
 found. But I was hesitating because I think you are not 
 dealing fairly with learned Europeans by pressing them 
 into this controversy. It is impossible for you to have 
 read the fourth number of the Reprints without being 
 convinced that Berkeley's opinions are not those of your 
 Vedantists. It was Colonel Kennedy that first suggested 
 the idea that the opinions of Berkeley were similar to 
 those of the Vedanta, but in the plenitude of his surprize 
 at the Ne plus ?^^^ra of transcendentalism which he found 
 
VEDANTISM AND BEKKKLEY. 287 
 
 in the Vedaiita, he could only say that the good Bishop 
 approached in some degree to that system. Another 
 gentleman has since remarked that the ontology of the Ve- 
 d^nta is the doctrine of that prelate. But you must for 
 your part remember that the object of those authors is to 
 narrow as much as possible the points of difference be- 
 tween philosophers of Europe and India. If they have 
 made any over-statement, it must be attributed to their 
 charity. At any rate it is not for us to build philosophical 
 arguments on mere compliments generously paid to the 
 systems of our fathers. If you take unfair advantage of 
 compliments, foreigners will be at a loss how to deal with 
 you. Courtesy will then prove a dangerous virtue." 
 
 Vaiydsika. — ^'I do not understand what you mean. 
 But is it true that there is any resemblance between the 
 Ved^nta and Berkeley's doctrine ?" 
 
 Satyakdma. — ''I should like to hear what Tarkakama 
 says to this. A question from the bridegroom's party 
 had better be answered by the bride's guests." 
 
 Tarkakdma. — '^Not a resemblance merely, but, as it 
 has been well said, the doctrine of Berkeley is the onto- 
 logy of the Vedant." 
 
 Satyakdma, — ''Is it in their affirmations or negations 
 that Berkeley and the Vedanta are consentient ?" 
 
 Tarkakdma. — *'Both. Berkeley acknowledges the ex- 
 istence of spirit, and denies that of matter. The Vedanta 
 does the same." 
 
 Satyakdma. — '* First then with reference to their affir- 
 mations : — can you tell me whether Berkeley allowed the 
 existence of one Eternal Spirit only, or did he also assert 
 the reality of many created spirits." 
 
 ''On this point, said Tarkakama, the Christian is of 
 course inferior to the Brahman. Berkeley was unfortu- 
 natelv destitute of the lio^ht of the Vedas, and iornorant 
 
288 DIALOGUE VII. 
 
 of our grand doctrine of unity. Consequently he allowed 
 a multiplicity of real spirits." 
 
 *' Such as God, angels, men, &c." 
 
 *' I must say so." 
 
 '^ Well, said Satyakama, how many spirits does the 
 Vedanta allow ? 
 
 Tarkakama replied instantly, *' Ekamevddivitiyam, one 
 only without a second." 
 
 ''And that is a cardinal doctrine of the Yedanta. Is it 
 
 not r 
 
 ''Of course, or it would degenerate into a divaitavdda, 
 a system of duality." 
 
 " Is Berkeley's teaching adivaitavdda, a system of 
 unity ?" 
 
 " I wish, said Tarkakama, it were, but here is his 
 failure." 
 
 "Then in one of your cardinal points, the very point 
 which distinguishes the Vedanta from other schools of 
 Brahminical philosophy, the ontology of the Yedanta is 
 not the doctrine of Berkeley. The Vedanta's idea of 
 spiritual existence is eternal and underived existence. It 
 does not allow the possibility of a created soul really 
 existing. It likens such souls to the reflection of the 
 sun or the moon in the waters. It pronounces all derived 
 existence to be a nullity. Nothing can be which has not 
 always been. Nothing can really exist which has not 
 always existed. But Berkeley held the real existence 
 not only of God, but also of all created spirits. Berke- 
 ley found no diifioulty in admitting that a soul could come 
 into existence without having existed from eternity — that 
 a spiritual substance, which once was not, could afterwards 
 begin to be — an idea perfectly inconsistent with the onto- 
 logy of the Vedant. I am only astonished that you did 
 not see the differoiicje directly. Now as to the negations : — 
 
VEDANTISM AND BERKELEY. 289 
 
 Berkeley, you say, denies identically what the Yeddnta 
 also rejects." 
 
 '' No doubt about it ?" 
 
 ** Please to tell me, said Satyakama, what it is that 
 he denies." 
 
 '' Matter." 
 
 " And what does the Vedanta deny." 
 
 ** The same, answered Tarkakaraa, even matter ? 
 
 " What is the word used in the Vedd,nta for matter V 
 
 *' It is difficult to light on a Sanscrit word that is 
 exactly equivalent to wMter. Haughton proposed a good 
 many, but an ingenious Writer of our own day has shown 
 that none of them will do^." 
 
 '' Then the objects denied in the two systems cannot 
 be prima facie identical ; the one sums up the things 
 denied by a term for which the other has no equivalent. 
 You still think their negations are the same, and that the 
 objects denied in the one correspond to those denied in 
 the other ?" 
 
 ^^Yes." 
 
 ** What, asked Satyakama, are the objects denied in 
 the Vedanta ?" 
 
 '^ Every thing which is not Brahma. The whole 
 universe." 
 
 " As we have seen before, much that the Vedanta 
 denies is acknowledged by Berkeley ; viz. men, angels, 
 demons. These are spiritual essences. But you think 
 Berkeley denies all other things ; whatever is not spirit, 
 whatever has parts or dimensions." 
 
 '^Does he not?" said Tarkakama, somewhat faltering. 
 
 Agamika, who fancied that the Vedanta doctrine in- 
 volved a sublimity which none but a Brahmin, learned 
 in the Veda and taught. by an Ach4rya in the prescribed 
 
 7 There is no Sauacrit word for "Matter." Ballantyne's prize Essay p. 123. 
 
 2 P 
 
290 DIALOGUE VII. 
 
 way, could comprehend®, was not pleased with the idea 
 that an English Bishop, untaught of a Brahmin, had 
 discovered the great mysteries of philosoph}^ ''If you 
 find any reason for faltering, said he, the question should 
 have been asked and considered ere you undertook to 
 pronounce, in such a circle and on such an occasion, that 
 the doctrine of a Mletcha dualist was identical with our 
 divine Vedanta.". 
 
 Satyakama remarked that his friend A'gamika needs 
 not be alarmed. If the learned disputant of the bride's 
 party had attentively read the Reprints for the Pundits, 
 he might have solved that question in a way that would 
 be quite satisfactory to the admirers of Berkeley on the 
 one hand and the followers of the Yedanta on the other. 
 
 A member of the Rajah's family, who was listening to 
 the discussion with great interest, produced the book in 
 a minute from his highness's library, when Satyakama 
 read the following extracts from it : 
 
 'When Berkeley denied the existence of matter he 
 ' simply denied the existence of that unknown substratum, 
 'the existence of which Locke had declared to be a 
 'necessary inference from our knowledge of qualities, 
 ' but the nature of which must ever be altogether hidden 
 'from us. Philosophers had assumed the existence of 
 'substance, i. e., of a noumenon lying underneath all 
 'phenomena, a substratum supporting all qualities^ a 
 ' something in which all accidents inhere. This un- 
 ' known substance Berkeley denies. It is a mere ab- 
 ' straction, he says. If it is unknown, unknowable, it is a 
 ' Figment : and I will none of it : for it is a Figment 
 ' worse than useless : it is pernicious as the basis of all 
 ' Atheism. If by matter you understand that which is 
 
 ^ ^^T^tI^ f^^T f^f^cTT iETTfV'S m^^rfcT ! Chhjlndogya. 
 
VEDANTISM AND BERKELEY. 291 
 
 ' seen, felt, tasted, and touched, then I say matter exists. 
 ' I am as firm a believer in its existence as any one can 
 
 * be. Herein I agree with the vulgar. If on the con- 
 ' trary, you understand by matter that occult substratum, 
 
 * which is not seen, not felt, not tasted, and not touched, 
 ' that of which the senses do not, cannot inform you, then 
 ' I say I believe not in the existence of matter, and here- 
 'in I differ with the philosophers and agree with the 
 ^ vulgar. 
 
 'I do not argue against the existence of any one thing 
 ' that we can apprehend either by sensation or reflection. 
 ' That the things I see tvith my eyes arid touch with my 
 ^ hands do exist, really exist , I make not the least question. 
 ' The only thing whose existence I deny is what philosophers 
 
 * call matter, or corporeal substance. And in doing this 
 ' there is no damage done to the rest of mankind, who 
 ' I dare say will never miss it^.' 
 
 '* It appears, said Satyakama, from the above extracts 
 that Berkeley only denied something which philosophers 
 called matter, but could not explain, which no body per- 
 ceived by his senses. He acknowledged the pratyahsha- 
 siddha-jagat (the world proved by the senses), the denial 
 of which savoured of atheism in the estimation of the 
 Vidwan-moda-tarangini. 
 
 '' Berkeley, in short, did not deny the whole external 
 world, nor any thing we see or touch. The only thing 
 he denied is * that which philosophers called matter.' 
 The Vedanta has no term for matter, and as matter, in 
 Berkeley's use of the term, is something different from 
 what is seen, it cannot be made out that he understood 
 by it the identical things denied in the Vedanta. In fact 
 it is difficult to say what Berkeley denied. It is easier 
 to say what he did not deny. He did not deny the 
 
 9 Reprints for the Pundits No. 4, 
 
292 DIALOGUE VII. 
 
 truthfulness of the senses, nor the facts of sensation, 
 nor the existence of objects of sensation — all which how- 
 ever are denied in that school of the Vedanta which 
 talks of ^all this as no thing.'' Every thing is false which 
 is not B^^ahma^^. 
 
 '^ You see then what a large residuum Berkeley's ne- 
 gations leave untouched, not of spiritual essences alone, 
 but of non- spiritual things perceptible by the corporeal 
 senses, which the Vedanta, I mean the doctrine of the 
 elementary treatises, nevertheless absolutely denies, by 
 falsifying every thing which is not Brahma." 
 
 Tarkakdma. — " But the Vedanta's denial is not ab- 
 solute. It allows a vyavahdrika existence to them," 
 
 Satyakdma. — *^That it could not help doing. Vyava- 
 hdrika means what is customary, conventional, popular. 
 If people cannot divest their minds of the reality of the 
 world, the Vedantist cannot help saying, it is Vya- 
 vahdrika, just as even Bhaskaracharya will allow it is 
 Vyavahdrika to say the moon is taken (by the giant) 
 when she is in an eclipse, although he knows that the true 
 cause of that phenomenon is the interception of the solar 
 light by the intervention of the earth. This is not the 
 sense in which Berkeley admits the existence of external 
 thino-s. What he saiv, heard, and felt, he believed to exist 
 as really as his own being ; not in the sense in which 
 Bhaskaracharya believed in the periodical capture of the 
 moon. 
 
 " Whatever vyavahdrika existence and the Berkeleyian 
 matter may be, it is evident that no negation in the one 
 system is obviously identical with the other. If there be 
 any occult matter equally denied by both, it is a hypothesis 
 on wliich no theory can be built." 
 
 ^^fir^ ^o^ fiTim I Ved^uta Paribhdsha. 
 
VEDANTISM AND BERKELEY. 293 
 
 But how was it, 1 asked, that Berkeley has been so uni- 
 versall}^ accused of denying the reality of the external world? 
 
 "The reason, said Satyakania, is explained in the 
 Reprints. ^ True it is that owing to the ambiguities of 
 ' language, Berkeley's Theory does seem to run counter 
 ' to the ordinary belief of mankind, because by matter 
 
 * men commonly understand the seen, the tasted, the 
 ^ touched &c. : therefore when the existence of matter is 
 ^ denied, people naturally suppose that the existence of 
 'the seen, the tasted, and the touched is denied, never 
 ' suspecting that matter in its philosophical sense is the 
 
 * not seen, not tasted, not touched.'"' 
 
 Agamika. — " Then there does not seem to be a shadow 
 of reason for confounding the ontology of the Vedanta 
 with the doctrine of Berkeley, if the extracts you have 
 read are genuine. The one denied the very .thing the 
 other allowed, viz. the seen, the tasted, the touched. 
 How was it then that eminent men have hazarded such 
 assertions ?" 
 
 Satyakdma. — ''The extracts are from the Reprints, and 
 I have also verified them. There cannot be a doubt on 
 that score. But, as it is added in the Reprints, ' Berkeley 
 'has not, it must be confessed, sufficiently guarded against 
 ' all ambiguity. He says ' It is indeed an opinion strangely 
 ' prevailing amongst men that houses, mountains, rivers, 
 'and in a word, all sensible objects have an existence, 
 ' natural or real, distinct from their being perceived by 
 *the understanding.' 
 
 " I do not pretend to stand up as Berkeley's advocate, 
 nor do I feel myself called upon to reconcile what may 
 appear inconsistencies in him. All I contend for is that 
 no case has been made out for asserting that the ontology 
 of the Vedanta is the doctrine of Berkeley, and that 
 neiilier in their affirmations nor in their negations are the 
 
294 . DIALOGUE VII. 
 
 systems characteristically consentient. The stigma of 
 idealism which has been affixed to Berkeley's theory is 
 no doubt owing to assertions like the following : — 
 
 'For what are the forementioned objects but the things 
 ' we perceive by sense ? and what do we perceive, besides 
 
 * our own ideas or sensations, and is it not plainly repug- 
 ' nant that any one of these, or any combination of them, 
 
 * should exist unperceived ? 
 
 ' In short, if there were external bodies it is impossible 
 'we should ever come to know it, and if there were not, 
 ' we might have the very same reasons to think there 
 ' were that we have now ; suppose, what no one can 
 'deny possible, an intelligence, without the help of 
 ' external bodies to be affected with the same train of 
 ' sensations or ideas that you are, imprinted in the same 
 'order, and with like vividness in his mind, I ask 
 'whether that intelligence hath not all the reason to 
 'believe the existence of corporeal substances, represented 
 ' by his ideas and exciting them in his mind, that you 
 'can possibly have for believing the same thing? Of 
 ' this there can be no question ; which one consideration 
 ' is enough to make any reasonable person suspect the 
 'strength of whatever arguments he may think himself 
 ' to have, for the existence of bodies without the mind. 
 
 ' I say it is granted on all hands, and what happens 
 'in dreams, frenzies, and the like, puts it beyond dis- 
 ' pute, that it is possible we might be affected with 
 ' all the ideas we have now, though no bodies existed 
 'without, resembling them. Hence it is evident the 
 ' supposition of extei^nal bodies is not necessary for the 
 ' producing our ideas : since it is granted they are pro- 
 ' duced sometimes, and might possibly be produced always, 
 ' in the same order we see them in at present, without 
 ' their concurrence.'" 
 
DISPROOF OF ANALOGY BETWEEN VEDANTISM AND BERKELEY. 295 
 
 Vaiyasika, on hearing the above extracts from Ber- 
 keley, said he was perfectly astonished at the remark 
 that the doctrine of Berkeley was the ontology of the Ve- 
 danta. Nothing could be a greater mistake than to 
 charge such an opinion on the founder of the Vedanta or 
 his erreat commentator. 
 
 '''Did you not know, he asked, that the extracts last 
 read contain the very heresy of the Buddhists which Vyasa. 
 and S'ankarkchiirya have taken infinite pains to refute ? 
 The learned president of the Benares p^has'alk should 
 rather have taught that the ontology of Buddhism 
 was the doctrine of Berkeley — that its Vijnkna-vada, 
 demolished by our commentator, was identical with his 
 idealism." 
 
 '* Impossible !" said I, " do you mean to say that the 
 founder of the Vedanta and his celebrated commenta- 
 tor have denounced idealism ?" 
 
 Vaiydsiha.—^^ I appeal to my learned friends here." 
 
 " What, said I, the »very system which the atheistic 
 interlocutor in the Vedwan-moda-tarangini hailed as his 
 auxiliary, and which the author stigmatized as the teaching 
 of a master-infidel, because it denied the visible world, — 
 that very system contains a refutation of idealism ?" 
 
 Tarkak&,ma and j^gamika remained silent. 
 
 Satyakama said that the Vedant, as taught by Vyksa, 
 was not idealistic, and that his fellow-companion of the 
 bridegroom's procession was right. 
 
 " Let us have the Sutras and commentary," he added, 
 " you, Vaiyksika, must have them at your finger's end : — 
 come, give us chapter and verse." 
 
 A copy of the Vedant Sdtras with commentary was 
 instantly brought from the Royal library and handed to 
 Vaiyiisika, who, on opening the book, said, " The 28th 
 Siitra o^<-hp '^nd Section of the second Chapter reads : 'Not 
 
296 DIALOGUE VII, 
 
 unreality, because of perception \' or perhaps apprehension 
 would be a better rendering of upalabdhi. This Siitra 
 was intended for the refutation of Buddhistic idealism 
 which denied the reality of the world, and which S'ankara 
 thus epitomized^ : 
 
 ' In that theory of Vijndna (cognitions or ideas,) all deal- 
 ' ing with proof and the provable is an internal process by 
 
 * crf^^ f^^"5T^T? ^^T^^ ^wra:^ Jm ir^TiirOT^rqr^- 
 
 f?T^ 'sfT"^^ STT^HT^^ rti^f pfcrf%W5rxT=^TTTcrJ ^if^r^cf 
 
 ^f^f*TTr?5 ^iW^f^^^g ^2TT^»?r^3rr7?7^T"5Tf^Tcr cT^KTsiHift 
 
BUDDHISTIC VIJNANA-VADA. 297 
 
 / means of images existing in the understanding. Eveii 
 ' if there were external objects, their proof could not 
 ' be had except by its existing in the understanding. 
 ' If it be asked, how is it known that all operations are in- 
 ^ ternal, and that external objects have no existence apart 
 
 * from cognitions ? The reply is — from sheer impossibility. 
 
 * External objects must be comprehended either as atoms, 
 
 * or as their aggregates^ pillars &c. But there cannot 
 ' be atoms distinct from pillars &c., for it is impossible 
 ' there should be cognition of atomic appearances. Nor 
 ' can they be the pillars, their aggregates, for it is impos- 
 
 * sible to regard them as at the same time both different 
 ' from and identical with atoms. ''^ '"' '"' Again ; of the 
 ' general apprehensions produced by perception, that which 
 ' becomes especial with reference to individual objects, 
 ' such as the notion of pillar, the notion of wall, the notion 
 ' of pot, the notion of cloth, is not produced but by 
 
 * peculiarities in the notion itself Hence it must be 
 ' acknowledged that objects are similar to cognitions. 
 ' And this being acknowledged, the theory of real objects 
 ' is rendered nugatory, because it is contradicted by the 
 ' cognition of their forms. * * * This is also to be regarded 
 ' in the light of dreams, &c. As dreams, jugglery, mirage, 
 
 * fairy towns, become, without the presence of external 
 ' objects, forms of apprehensions and apprehenders ; in the 
 ' same manner may the notions of pillars &c. come in 
 ^ when one is awake, for in either case the notion is the 
 ' same. If it be asked, how a variety of notions is occa- 
 ' sioned if there be no external objects ; the answer is, from 
 
 * a variety of fancies. There can be no difficulty in sup- 
 ' posing that in this world without a beginning fancies 
 ' and cognitions may have mutually caused each other's 
 ' varieties like seed and sprout. That the variety in no- 
 ' tions is owing to a variety of fancy is evident from 
 
 2 Q 
 
298 DIALOGUE YIl. 
 
 ' positive as well as negative proof. We are both agreed 
 ' that in dreams and other visions there is a variety of 
 ' notions occasioned by fancy even in the absence of 
 ' external objects. Only [we Buddhists maintain the same 
 ^ is also the case in the presince of objects] we do not 
 ' allow a variety of notions occasioned by objects in the 
 ^ absence of fancy. Hence there is no real external 
 ' object.' 
 
 '^ This, learned Sirs, continued Vaiyasika, w^as a theory 
 of the Buddhists who pronounced the world to be a mere 
 phantom. Sankara has by no means made an over-state- 
 ment of their doctrine. Their popular books liken the 
 universe to a mdydy a mirage, a flash of lightning, a 
 froth ^. They no doubt carried the ideal theory further 
 than Berkeley, but substitute the word idea for vijndna, 
 and you put the very words of the Christian Bishop into 
 the mouths of those Buddhists. And now listen to the 
 masterly way in which our accomplished leader demolish- 
 ed the whole of that phantastic argument^. 
 
 ^<tf^^^^T f^^cT T^^rjlT^l^lT^T: I Lalita-vistara. 
 
 ^ ^T^fcT w^^ 2jf^jTin^2r^^"^s^m ^^ ^T^fl# wftftr -^wf^- 
 
ANALOGY BETWEEN BERKELEY AND VEDANTA DISPROVED. 299 
 
 ' Not unreality , because of perception. It is impos- 
 ^sible to maintain that there is no external object. Why? 
 ^Because of perception. External objects are severally 
 ' perceived such as a pillar, a wall, a pot, a cloth. It is 
 'impossible there can be unreality in that which is per- 
 'ceived. As if a man, while enjoying a good dinner, 
 'were to say, I am not eating, nor am I enjoying it, the 
 ' saying would not be handsome ; so if, while himself 
 ' apprehending an object by sensation, a person w^ere to 
 ' say, I am not apprehending it, nor is there any external 
 ' substance, how could his disclaimer be acceptable ? If it 
 ' be objected, I do not say I do not perceive any object, 
 ' but that I do not perceive any thing besides the perception. 
 ' Well, you say this because your mouth is ungoaded, but 
 ' you do not speak reasonably ; for from the very act of 
 'perception, something distinct from perceptions must 
 ' also be apprehended by the force of objects. No one 
 
 f^^jr^i^mif^Br^^T^i vr^fcT ^^fcr f^w5- 1%i^^^t^i?iRxrxr^! 
 
300 DIALOGUE VII. 
 
 ' indeed perceives that a pillar or a wall is a mere percep- 
 tion, but every one perceives it as an object of perception . 
 ' Thus do (idealistic) men, too, perceive things ; for, even 
 ' while denying external objects, they virtually ack no w- 
 ' ledge them by avowing that the forms, internally appre- 
 ' hended, are lihe the externals. Partaking of the know- 
 ' ledge of externals, universally prevalent among men, and 
 'yet desirous of denying external objects, they turn them 
 ^into a simile by using the phrase like the externals. 
 'Otherwise [i. e., if they did not perceive external objects] 
 ' why should they use the phrase like the externals. No 
 ' one can say Vishnu Mitra appears like a barren woman's 
 ' son. Those therefore who perceive things as they are, 
 * should say that the externals themselves appear, not 
 'that appearances like externals are seen. Perhaps it 
 ' will be urged that because of the [antecedent] impossi- 
 'bility of external objects you talk of appearances like 
 ' externals. This is not a right saying at all, for possi- 
 ' bility or impossibility is determined by the impulse or 
 ' non-impulse of proof, not the impulse or non-impulse 
 ' of proof by possibility or impossibility. That which is 
 ' established by perception or any other proof is possible : 
 ' that which cannot be established by any proof is im- 
 ' possible. Now external objects being established, like 
 ' the spirit itself, by all descriptions of proof, why should 
 ' exceptions be taken to the one, when they are not taken 
 ' to the other, and the former be pronounced impossible ? 
 ' Nor, again, because cognitions may resemble objects, 
 ' therefore objects must be negatived ; for there could not 
 ' be such resemblance with objects if there were no 
 ' objects, and because those objects are externally appre- 
 ' hended.' 
 
 " S'ankaracharya, you will observe, contends that 
 there is the same, proof for the reality of the external 
 
ANALOGY BETWEEN BERKELEY AND VEDANTA DISPROVED. 301 
 
 world as there is for that of the internal spirit. It is 
 impossible to conceive how learned men could persuade 
 themselves, merely on the authority of a few pages of 
 elementary manuals, that the ontology of the Vedant 
 was the doctrine of European idealism. Our commentator 
 goes on smashing to fragments all the idealistic argu- 
 ments of, the Buddhists. He denounces the theory that 
 there could be cognition, or any intellectual process, 
 without objects to act upon. 'If you say, he continues, 
 'that cognitions, being of the nature of light, are self- 
 ' produced, like a self-shining lamp, without the force of 
 ' external objects, you utter a most unreasonable doctrine 
 ' that the spirit acts on itself, as if one could say fire 
 ' burns its own self. But that which every body calls 
 ' reasonable, the perception of external objects by cogni- 
 ' tions distinct from themselves, you do not allow. Oh, 
 ' what great wisdom you show^ !' 
 
 "The 29th Siitra denies that external objects are like 
 dreams and visions because the characteristics of the two 
 are different^. And S'ankara thus expounds it : 'As to 
 ' what has been said by the denier of external objects 
 ' that waking sensations of pillars &c. may be caused like 
 ' the visions of dreams without the presence of external 
 ' objects, the sensations being alike in both cases, we 
 ' thus reply to it. Waking sensations cannot be like 
 ' visions of dreams, because the two are different. There 
 'is a difference between dreaming and waking. What 
 
302 DIALOGUE VII. 
 
 ^ now is the diiference ? We reply, Contradiction and 
 'Non-contradiction. What is perceived in a dream is 
 'contradicted by the waking conviction, my interview 
 ' with a great man is untrue, there has been no inter- 
 ' view with a great man, my mind was deceived in sleep, 
 ' hence it is a misapprehension. Jugglery and similar 
 ' appearances are also contradicted in that manner. But 
 'waking sensations are never contradicted in any state ^. 
 
 The Nepaulese Buddhist, worried by the Bhagavatas, 
 had sought refuge in our little circle while the extracts 
 from S'ankara were yet being read ; and he was now going 
 to speak in defence of his doctrine, when the military musi- 
 cians commenced beating their drums and blowing their 
 trumpets, and the European guests, ladies as well as gen- 
 tlemen, began to dance in front of the bride-groom. The 
 attention of all present was thereby concentrated in the 
 middle hall, and our philosophical discussion was at once 
 interrupted, i^gamika's simplicity amused us not a little, 
 when, mistaking the company for professional dancers, 
 he expressed his indignation at the station-doctor, the 
 only European face he could recognize^ engaging in such 
 a questionable occupation from mere pecuniary motives. 
 I told him that the company was not one of professional 
 
 Os SI ^ 
 
 ^l-T^^HiTTTTTT tRt I ^ 'fife TT^T^'^^^^'tI" f^^TJ^f^^rf ?T 
 
A brahmin's opinion of a ball. 303 
 
 dancers, but of respectable ladies and gentlemen, who 
 were expressing their joy on the happy event they had 
 come to celebrate, by joining in a dance for the amuse- 
 ment of all present. " Then, said A'gamika, even Indra's 
 court could not exhibit a scene, so beautiful, and this was 
 not an occasion when any argument for Buddhistic 
 idealism can prevail against the reasoning of S'ankar4- 
 ch'arya. It would certainly be most unhandsome at this 
 moment to say we are not perceiving any objects by our 
 eyes and ears." 
 
DIALOGUE VIII 
 
 FROM THE SAME TO THE SAME. 
 
 The conference we held at the marriage assembly in a 
 corner of the Hall was reported to the Rajah by his 
 nephew, who was listening with great attention to the 
 arguments adduced on both sides. The following day 
 his highness gave a private audience to Vaiyasika, Aga- 
 mika, Satyakama, and myself He thanked us all for 
 the interest we took in the happy event of his daughter's 
 marriage. He felt proud, he said, that his assembly was 
 graced by such learned men, and that his house was the 
 scene of a discussion, in which certain ideas were elicited, 
 which he for his part had not met with elsewhere, and 
 which might possibly throw new light on the history of 
 Indian philosophy. ^^ It is a great pity that the Brahma 
 Siitras and S'ankara's commentary are so little known. I 
 have not met with a single pundit, with the exception of 
 the venerated Vaiyasika, who w§.s familiar with the 
 whole of the Saririka mimdnsa hhdshya. Yedantic 
 scholars in my circle profess to have read only such 
 manuals as the Veddnta sdra and the Parihhdsa. Their 
 acquaintance with the Sutras and commentary never 
 extended beyond the opening section of the opening chap- 
 ter. When therefore I first read in a native newspaper 
 at Bombay, now more than a quarter of a century ago, 
 
HOW THE PRECEDING ARGUMENT AFFECTS THE VEDANTA. 305 
 
 that Colonel Kennedy had discovered some resemblance 
 between the theory of Bishop Berkeley and the Vedantic 
 doctrine, I sought for farther information from my father's 
 pundits, but in vain. Colonel Kennedy's idea was lately 
 adopted and enforced by the authorities of the govern- 
 ment College at Benares. I then thought it must be 
 substantially correct. You have however now success- 
 fully disproved it, as far as Vyasa's Vedant is concerned. 
 But, Satyakama, what have you gained by it ? The 
 disproof of that idea does not necessarily throw discredit 
 on the Vedant, for my friend Vaiyasika was no less im- 
 patient than yourself of the statement, which has of late 
 been so widely circulated, that the ontology of the Vedant 
 is the doctrine of Berkeley." 
 
 Satyakdma. — '^ Please your highness, I cannot say what 
 I have gained, or whether I have gained any thing, nor 
 do I know that I came with the expectation of gaining 
 any thing besides the pleasure of congratulating you on 
 the happy occasion which brought us together. With 
 reference to our conference, the right way to look at it is 
 to consider — not if a particular system is necessarily 
 overthrown thereby, but if in the course of fair discussion 
 truth of any kind is elicited. If a wrong idea, which had 
 been much in vogue of late, has been disproved, it must so 
 far be a service to truth. Your highness will now know 
 how to -deal with persons that may say in your presence 
 that the ontology of the Vedant is the doctrine of Ber- 
 keley." 
 
 Rdjdh. — '^ But will you accept my friend Vaiyasika's 
 suggestion that the ontology of Buddhism is the doctrine 
 of Berkeley ? Are you gratified at the idea that Berkeley 
 is proved a Buddhist ?" 
 
 Satyakdma, — '' Certainly not, please your highness. I 
 always protested against making free with Berkeley's 
 
 2 R 
 
306 DIALOGUE VIII. 
 
 name in an Indian discussion. What he wrote had re- 
 ference to philosophers that lived far away from us. 
 Even Europeans find it diftlcult to say what Berkeley's 
 opinions were. We cannot expect so to understand 
 them in a hurry as to find analogies between them and 
 Indian theories. 1 did not think it necessary last night 
 to undertake the defence of Berkeley, because 1 thought 
 his reputation for piety and theological orthodoxy was 
 far too well established to require any advocacy from 
 myself" 
 
 Rdjdli. — ^' Do you think, Vaiyasika, you have gained 
 any thing for the Vedant by last night's conference ?" 
 
 Vaiycisika. — '' Blessings on your highness ! I agree 
 with Satyakama that if a popular error has been disproved 
 the result itself must be a gain to truth, and 1 must 
 rejoice over it. I think also that the Vedant, as inculcated 
 in the Siltras, does not involve the doctrine of Maya, 
 which some of our S'astras condemn as Buddhism in dis- 
 guise. The erroneous notion, disproved last night, virtu- 
 ally connected the Vedant with the doctrine of Mciyd. 
 It is only just to our system that people should know it 
 was not originally allied to that theory, and that it con- 
 tended strenuously, against the Buddhists, for the reality 
 of external objects. Whether later writers have mixed 
 it up with the doctrine of Mdyd, or not, is quite a dif- 
 ferent question." 
 
 The Chobdar now came in, and, with hands joined, an- 
 nounced that the Nepaulese colonel and the Buddhist 
 SUstri had come to bid farewell before leaving the sta- 
 tion for Calcutta. ^' Show them, said his highness, into 
 this private-audience chamber. You will not mind their 
 presence, my learned friends. I am sure the Colonel 
 will be pleased to see you. He takes great interest in 
 philosophical discussions. He has adopted the Buddhist 
 
BUDDHIST CHARGES AGAINST BRAHMINISM. 307 
 
 faith, though by birth a Kshetriya, and a Hindu. The 
 Sastri, you saw last night, is his domestic priest." 
 
 The Colonel entered the room with his Sastri, and was 
 courteously received. The Rajah apologized to the Sastri 
 for the annoyance he had received the night before from 
 the turbulent Vaishnavas, and told him what the nature 
 of our conference was — that some of us were anxious to 
 disclaim the doctrine of Maya, and that therefore Vaiya- 
 sika was reading S'ankaracharya's argument against the 
 idealism of Buddhists. 
 
 '' You have every right, said the Buddhist, to disclaim 
 what you do not hold. I will not deny that S'ankara in 
 his commentary on the Vedant contends against, what 
 you call, our idealism, but his argument is virtually shown 
 to be untenable — not only by his own admissions in his 
 commentaries on the Upanishads, but also by the general 
 reception of our doctrine by all recent writers on the 
 Vedant." 
 
 Rajah.'-^'^ I do not quite understand you. Do you 
 mean that Vedantic writers have generally adopted any 
 of your doctrines." 
 
 Buddhist, — '^ I have no doubt they have. In fact all 
 your schools of philosophy have taken lessons from us." 
 
 Rajah. — '^ What lessons ? Speak more definitely." 
 
 Buddhist, — ^' Blessings without number on your high- 
 ness ! The doctrine of Maya and all your ideas of Muhti 
 and Nirvdna are borrowed from us. We first taught you 
 to reflect on the miseries of life and transmigration, and 
 to seek for perfect release from the bondage of works. 
 Your highness will allow that our system is older than 
 that of Vy^sa or Gotama." 
 
 Rajah. — "Of course I must allow that, for the Rishis 
 who founded our schools aimed at the refutation of 
 Buddhism as one of their principal objects." 
 
308 DIALOGUE Vlll. 
 
 Buddhist. — " I do not know whether they aimed at 
 the refutation of Buddhism. They have certainly done 
 much for the reproduction of Buddhism, for which we 
 must ever be thankful to them." 
 
 Rajah. — ''How so? You astonish me. Speak more 
 plainly. Name the doctrines one by one which you think 
 we have learnt from you." 
 
 Buddhist. — ''The very doctrine of ilfa^a, of which you 
 were speaking before we came." 
 
 Rajah. — " How do you know we learnt it from you ?" 
 
 Buddhist. — " Because before the rise of our Sakya 
 Muni (blessings on him !) you knew nothing but rites 
 and ceremonies, and your sole business was how to fulfil 
 them agreeably to the formula of your Vedas. The great 
 objects of your ambition were the good things of earth and 
 heaven. For them you worked, for them you sacrificed, 
 for them you prayed. Sakya was the first to teach you 
 that the good things of earth and heaven were transient 
 and illusory — that the external world by which you 
 were so fascinated was a phantom, a maya, a mirage, a 
 mere flash of lightning. You cannot point to a single 
 sage of your school who taught that idea before the age 
 of Buddha." 
 
 Rajah. — " What ! not Vas'ishtha, Valmiki, or Vis'- 
 wkmitra ?" 
 
 Buddhist. — " It is not for me to say when those Bishis 
 lived, or what they taught; but I think I may affirm that 
 none of your Bishes can, like our S'&,kya, be singled out, 
 even in your own traditions, as the original teacher of a 
 novel doctrine in depreciation of the sensuous and carnal 
 enjoyments promised in your older Vedas, and certainly 
 no work, written decidedly before the age of Buddha, 
 contains any description of the world as a mere phantom 
 or mirage." 
 
HISTORICAL AUTHORITY OF UPANISHADS. 309 
 
 Rajah. — ^' What do you mean by writings before the 
 age of Buddha ?" 
 
 Buddhist. — ^^ The Vedas certainly, — by which I mean, 
 what your own writers themselves generally understand 
 by the term, the Mantras and Brahmanas. These do not 
 represent the world as an illusion, nor direct the mind to 
 any higher aspirations than sensuous enjoyments, whether 
 of heaven or of earth." 
 
 Rajah. — " What say you of the Upanishads ?" 
 
 Buddhist. — '^ The term Upanishad, please your highness, 
 itself a vague designation, cannot mark out a separate 
 division of the Vedas. It is applied to certain parts 
 from doctrinal considerations. Any thing is called an 
 Upanishad which sets forth a certain favourite doctrine — 
 the doctrine of Brahma. Hence even the Bhagavad-gita 
 is called an Upanishad. I think therefore the authority 
 of the Upanishads, as historical guides, cannot be very 
 weighty. A small section might at any time have been 
 added to a Veda with a view to set up a claim for 
 antiquity in behalf of a favourite doctrine. Such claims 
 ought to be received with great suspicion — especially 
 when you consider that, in order to fecommend their own 
 novel doctrines, some of those spurious additions have 
 gone the length of slighting the original Vedas them- 
 selves, and treating them with quite as much contempt as 
 Sakya could ever have poured on them, calling them the 
 repositaries of inferior doctrines, and classing them with 
 mere children's books. And if any of the Upanishads 
 bear marks of decided antiquity, they do not inculcate 
 the doctrine of mdyd. 
 
 ''That the doctrine of the Brahmins was not originally 
 a maija-vdda is evident from the Vedas themselves — i. c, 
 the Mantras and Bralimanas. Wlien, then, was it first 
 taught? Who introduced it. wliere, and how ? What is 
 
310 DIALOGUE VIII. 
 
 the history of this great innovation, — this transition from 
 doctrines purely carnal to a denial of the material world ? 
 How came you into possession of that which you must 
 acknowledge you did not possess originally, and which is 
 decidedly not a natural development of your primitive 
 doctrine of sacrifices and heavenly enjoyments ? You can- 
 not answer these questions. You cannot account for your 
 possession of the doctrine of Mkya. We can. We tell 
 you that Sakya taught it first — that, reflecting on the 
 vanity of the world, he condemned the whole as a sha- 
 dow without substance, a maya, a mirage. His life is 
 the best history of the doctrine. While you were scram- 
 bling and fighting for the pleasures of life, he renounced 
 them all as vain and illusory. Myriads were convinced 
 by his precepts and his example. But his party could 
 not ultimately hold their place in Hindoostan. They 
 were turned out, but their teaching was left as a legacy 
 to their country. Y'ou banished them under the in- 
 fluence of party-spirit, but nevertheless the watchword of 
 your philosophy has since continued to be maya. " 
 
 Rajah. — ^^ Well, my Buddhist friend — what other stolen 
 goods do you find amongst us V 
 
 Buddhist. — '^ Our doctrine of Nirvdna and mukti. It 
 is well known that your original Vedas propound to 
 your aspirations nothing but the sensuous enjoyments of 
 life, whether in heaven or earth, — houses, lands, cattle, and 
 similar things. It is equally well known that S'^kya Muni 
 taught his disciples to regard those very enjoyments as 
 vain, illusory, and fleeting, and to look forward to nirvana, 
 or complete release from life and transmigration. Teach- 
 ing this transcendental doctrine, he exemplified it in his 
 life — renouncing his home which was a palace, his dignity 
 which was that of a throne, his enjoyments which were 
 those of empire and- sovereignty. These are facts patent to 
 
HISTORICAL AUTHORITY OF UPANISHADS. 311 
 
 all the world, and you dare not dispute tliem. They are 
 interwoven with the rise and progress of our society — a 
 society which now overspreads the greater part of the vast 
 continent of Asia. Even children are catechized on the 
 vanity of this passing world from the great wall of China 
 to the utmost boundary of Ceylon. If now you say you 
 knew the same doctrine before the birth of S'akya, the 
 burden of proof is decidedly on you. - You are bound to 
 account for the way you got possession of what we assert, 
 and you cannot deny, to be a characteristic tenet of our 
 great corporation. And you failing to prove your acquisi- 
 tion of it from a Brahminical source, we hold ourselves 
 justified in charging you with borrowing it from us. 
 
 '' I repeat, your original Vedas say nothing of the 
 miseries of life and transmigration, or of the necessity of 
 complete escape from the bondage of works. Apavarga, 
 nirvana, and mukti are words unknown to your Vedas. 
 You will refer me to your Upanishads. As the burden 
 of proof is on you, because the doctrine of mukti involves 
 an impatience of life, not only unknown to your earlier 
 system, but at variance with its essential doctrines, you 
 must adduce some stronger evidence than the Upanishads, 
 and give a better account of its introduction than is 
 furnished in those writings, before you can justly claim 
 the merit of originating a doctrine so foreign to your 
 ancient philosophy. I repeat the testimony of the 
 Upanishads cannot be held satisfactory in a Ijistorical 
 research. The name Upanishad is arbitrai'ily applied to 
 works, or rather tracts, setting forth a favourite doctrine — 
 that of Brahma. Such of the Upanishads, again, as 
 chime, in our tunes and in our very words, on the mise- 
 ries of life, both earthly and heavenly, and on the necessity 
 of emancipation, contain references to doctrines and ideas 
 so manifestly modern, that they cannot, consistently witli 
 
312 DIALOGUE VII L 
 
 historical criticism, be classed with the original Veda in 
 point of antiquity. 
 
 "Some of them stand, also, in open rivalry with the 
 four Vedas which they stigmatize as inferior. This 
 shows that they are compositions of a much later date, 
 when the Vedas had partially lost credit with the learned, 
 probably owing to our own forcible denunciations of mere 
 rites and ceremonies. 
 
 " Please your highness, I must crave your indulgent 
 consideration of the points I have had the good fortune 
 to advance in your presence. I think we may fairly 
 claim the honor of having, at the cost of expatriation, 
 somewhat diverted the Brahminical mind from an empty 
 ritual, stained with the blood of helpless animals, and of 
 having taught it the elements of a philosophy to which 
 it betakes itself to this day. for rest and consolation. 
 S'ankara may have argued strongly ^.gainst our denial of 
 the reality of external objects, but it is that very denial — ■ 
 it is the idea of a may a and the prospect of mukti and 
 nirvana^ which at the present moment constitute the 
 hopes, and regulate the aspirations of all minds, capable 
 of rising above the world and its fascinations." 
 
 The Nepaulese colonel apprehending that the hortatory 
 strain, which the Buddhist had adopted, might be disres- 
 pectful to the Rajah, here stopped his spiritual guide. 
 " Enough, said he, enough ! — a word to the wise. — You 
 have stated our argument, and the Kajah will no doubt 
 give it a fair consideration." 
 
 The colonel, then, after a few minutes of social conver- 
 sation with the Rajah, took leave agreeably to the mode 
 prevalent among men of distinction and dignity. 
 
 When the Nepaulese oi?icer had left the room the 
 Rajah asked Vaiyasika what he thought of the Buddhist's 
 charges against our philosophy. 
 
THEORY OF MAYA BORROWED FROM BUDDHISM. 313 
 
 *' As far, said Vaiydsika, as the doctrine of M4ya is 
 concerned, I cannot say that the Buddhist's charge is 
 entirely without foundation. Vyasa does not inculcate 
 that doctrine, nor do the Upanishads Taittiriya, Aitireya 
 and Kend. Vijnana Bhikshu, in his commentary on 
 the Sdnkhya siitra (1.22), only does us justice when he 
 draws a marked distinction between the Brahma Sutras 
 and the theory of mdyd. * There is not a single Brahma 
 ' Siitra, says he, in which our bondage is declared to be a 
 ^ mere deception. As to the novel theory of mayd, pro- 
 ' pounded by persons calling themselves Vedantists, it is 
 ' only a species of the Vijnana- vada (of Buddhists).' The 
 commentator then quotes the well known passage in the 
 Padma-purana in which that theory is called disguised 
 Buddhism. He proceeds to say, * that theory is not a 
 ' tenet of the Vedanta, and it must be understood that the 
 ' doctrine of the newfano^led disofuised Buddhists, who 
 * assert the theory of maya, and reduce our bondage to a 
 'mere delusion, is in this way refuted^.'" 
 
 Rajah. — " But is it not singular that learned Europeans, 
 who have written on our philosophy in a friendly spirit, 
 should not have discovered that the theory of Maya is 
 not inculcated in the Brahma siitras, and that they should 
 in reality be complimenting Buddhism by seeking analo- 
 gies between their Bishop Berkeley and our Vedanta." 
 
 Satyakdma. — '' Please your highness, there were at 
 least two Europeans who knew how to distinguish between 
 
 ^ sj ,^ •• V 
 
 W5lT%cT(^ f^T:Tlvcf ^f^cT^ I 
 
 2 s 
 
314 DIALOGUE VIII. 
 
 the original Vedant and the theory of M4ya. Your 
 highness has no doubt heard that an eminent scholar, Cole- 
 brooke by name, wrote digests of the siltras of our several 
 schools for the information of his countrymen. In his 
 digest of the Yedanta, he translated many of Vyd,sa's 
 aphorisms, inculcating that God is the material cause of 
 the universe, and remarked in conclusion that ' the notion 
 ' that the versatile world is an illusion (Maya) ; that all 
 'which passes to the apprehension of the waking indivi- 
 
 * dual is but a phantasy, presented to his imagination, and 
 ' that every sensible thing is unreal and all is visionary, 
 ' does not appear to be the doctrine of the text of the Ve- 
 
 * dant. I have remarked nothing, he added, that coun- 
 ' tenances it in the Siltras of Vydsa, nor in the gloss of 
 ' ^ankara, but much concerning it in the minor commen- 
 ' taries and elementary treatises.' 
 
 *' This conclusion of Colebrooke proved unsatisfactory to 
 Colonel Kennedy, the Bombay Officer you have already 
 mentioned, who, in a letter to the Royal Asiatic Society, 
 remarked : ' I am therefore at a loss to understand the 
 ' grounds on which Mr. Colebrooke, in his essay on this 
 ' system, has thus stated : ' The succeeding section affirms 
 '' the important tenet of the Vedanta, that the Supreme 
 ^' Beinof is the material as well as the efficient cause of the 
 '* universe ; it is a proposition directly resulting from the 
 ''tenor of the passages of the Vedas, and illustrations 
 " and examples adduced.' For the copy of the Siitras 
 ' now before me is divided in a different manner from 
 ' the one referred to by Mr. Colebrooke, and I have 
 ' not been able to find in them a single Si^tra which, 
 ' in my opinion, would bear such a meaning. In fact, 
 ' the Sanscrit language does not contain any term equi- 
 ' valent to the word matter ; and even the four principal 
 ' schools of Hindu philosophy concur in rejecting the 
 
COLEBROOKE, HAUGHTON, KENNEDY. 315 
 
 ' notion of matter which has invariably prevailed in Eu- 
 ' rope2." 
 
 Rajah. — " But who was the other European, who, you 
 say, did not fall into the popular error about the Vedanta ?" 
 
 Satyakdma. — ^*Sir G. C. Haughton ; who defended 
 Colebrooke and to whom Colonel Kennedy replied saying : 
 ^ If therefore, Maya, or illusion, is not the doctrine of the 
 ' Vedantikas, as Sir G. C. Haughton maintains, and their 
 ' belief is that the Creator and nature are one, and that he 
 ' is the efficient and material cause of the universe, it 
 ' must necessarily follow that their tenets are precisely the 
 
 * same as those which have been held to constitute mate- 
 ' rial pantheism by every writer on philosophy. But, so 
 ' far are the Vedantikas from identifying God with 
 
 * matter, that they have always denied the existence of 
 ' matter, and maintained that one sole undivided spiritual 
 ' essence alone exists. '" '" * For otherwise, he (Sir G. 
 ' Haughton) must have perceived that, if the creation is 
 ' held to be material, the identifying the Creator with the 
 ' creation necessarily turns the Vedanta system into one 
 
 * of pure materialism^." 
 
 Rajah. — '^ Well, Vaiy^sika, if you maintain that the 
 doctrine of maya is not an original tenet of the Vedant, 
 then you do pronounce us guilty of possessing stolen 
 goods." 
 
 Satyakdma. — " Not exactly so, please your highness, 
 if I may interpose a remark by way of qualifying the 
 verdict. You may have, in your possession, goods claim- 
 able by Buddhists, but you may also on your part ask, 
 whence did they themselves get them 1 We have heard 
 of Sakya's teaching certain doctrines, but whence did 
 S'&,kya himself learn them? He was brought up under 
 
 « Transactions of the Royal Asiatic Society Vol. III. 
 5 Col. Kennedy in Asiatic Journal. 
 
316 DIALOGUE VIII, 
 
 the influence of Brahminism, and if Brahminism has 
 taken lessons from his school, it is simply the tutor 
 learning in his turn from a smart pupil." 
 
 Rajah. — '* Speak more plainly, Satyakkma. Have we 
 learnt from Buddhism any thing which our Vedas and 
 Upanishads do not inculcate?" 
 
 Satyakdma. — *^You have just heard Vaiyksika re- 
 pudiate the doctrine of May'a, and refer to certain autho- 
 rities which condemned it as Buddhism in disguise. 
 That is certainly a lesson which Brahminical philoso- 
 phers have taken from Sakya Muni. The Upanishads, 
 with perhaps one or two exceptions, (of which I shall 
 speak presently), taught no such lesson. They do not 
 maintain that the world is a mere phantom or shadow, a 
 no thing. Most of them on the contrary promise sensu- 
 ous enjoyments both here and hereafter as the rewards 
 of knowledge. The Taittiriya says repeatedly, ' He 
 'who knows these great summaries of doctrine, thus 
 'explained, will obtain offspring, cattle, holiness, food, 
 'and heaven^.' These words form a sort of chorus, 
 which is repeated five or six times in the short compass 
 of the tract. The Aitireya too contains a similar chorus 
 which it repeats at the end of two out of its three sec- 
 tions called the Upanishad part. ' He, knowing this, 
 ' went upward on the dissolution of body, and, attaining 
 'all desires in that heavenly world, became immortal^.' 
 The ^e^a promises the same 'heavenly world' to those 
 who attain knowledge^. The Katha^ also, to which a 
 discerning translator has assigned a date posterior to the 
 S4nkhya^, is quite ignorant, notwithstanding its trans- 
 
 4 See note 8 in page 275. 5 See the same. 6 See the same. 
 
 7 " In the order of manifestations or emanations from the absokite spirit, it deviates, 
 however, from that adopted by other Upanishads and by the later V^dfinta, and is 
 evidently more closely allied to the S^nkhya The order is here: — The unmanifested 
 (avyakta), the great soul, (mahiCtma or mahat), intellect, (buddhi), mind, the objects of 
 
UPANISHADS PROMISE SENSUOUS ENJOYMENTS. 317 
 
 cendentalism in other respects, of the idea that the 
 world is a phantom and a shadow. The Pras'na says, 
 ' he who, thus knowing, knows the vital air, will not be 
 'wanting in offspring, and will be ininiortaP.' It cer- 
 tainly does not inculcate the doctrine of May 4. The 
 word mkya does indeed occur in this Upanisliad, but it 
 is in the sense of a moral turpitude, akin to deceit and 
 falsehood'^, disqualifying men from entering the world 
 of Brahma, not in the philosophical sense of an illusion. 
 The same Upanishad says, also, ' all this and whatever is 
 ' of repute in heaven is subject to life. Do thou protect 
 ' us, as a mother protects her sons ; give us also pros- 
 * perity and knowledge^"*.' The Is'a says, 'performing duty 
 'in this world, one is to desire a life of a hundred years ^,' 
 and adds nothing as to tlie unreality of the world. Nor has 
 the Manclukya, notwithstanding the grand Kdrika which 
 Gaudapada has made on it, any tiling to say against 
 the reality of the external. It promises the attainment of 
 all desires J and of pre -eminence y with a learned progeny j 
 as the rewards of knowledge^. The Brihaddranyaha 
 
 the senses and the senses. The same order is followed by the S^nkhya, with the 
 exception, that they have not between tlie unmanifested and intellect the intervening 
 " raahat," which with thera is equivalent to intellect The "manas'' (mind) has here 
 also the same founction as in the Sankhya the ahamkara (self-consciousness). Hence 
 it is probable, that this Upanishad was written at a time, when the Sankhya had 
 already been founded." Dr. lioer, in Bihliotheca Indica. 
 
 ^ ^ ^^ f^-^[\ ^xm ^^ ^ -^[^ -q-^T Tt^^5^cfT vr^fcT II 
 
318 DIALOGUE Vlll. 
 
 and Chhdnddgya, both a good deal larger than the tracts 
 already named, are also silent on the subject of Mdyd, 
 or illusion. They say nothing about the unreality of the 
 world. 
 
 ''The Brihaddranyaha says, he who knows thus, he- 
 comes a god, and attains heaven. The ignorant, departing 
 from this world, become slaves, the knowers. Brahmins^. 
 The Chhdndogya assures to those who understand its 
 mysteries, a heroic progeny, and heavenly enjoyments, 
 as well as a life of sixteen hundred years, together with 
 the free choice of any pleasm^es for which they may 
 have a taste, whether it be for those of food and 
 drink, or of ^perfumery, or of music, or whether it be 
 for objects of filial, fraternal, or conjugal affection^. The 
 
 ^ ^€t ^r i'^T^Wfcf ■^ ^^ m'^'l^cT-^ITTO l This is repeated 
 several times in the form of a chorus- JIJ^ ^^T ^loR ^ ^^ ef^ || 
 
 * ^ 2? ^cii^^ ^^ ^'^^'^m\ ^icm ^^w -^T^iir^ ^^t^ 
 ^■i^ ^1^^ ^it:x[t^^ ^^ I * * ^"^^^r •^^'sm ^^fcr ^r ^# ^^ i 
 
MUNDAKA NOT A WORK OF VEDIC PERIOD. 319 
 
 Mundaka is more sparing in its promises of sensuous en- 
 joyments, but it does not decidedly countenance the 
 theory of Maya, and as this is the Upanishad which 
 passes a sweeping censure on the Vedas, calling all four 
 (to use the Buddhist S'kstri's words) the repositaries of in- 
 ferior doctrines, and placing them in the same category 
 witli grammars and children's manuals, — it would hardly 
 be correct chronologically to class it among books whose 
 short- comings it professes to supply. It would almost 
 be a contradiction in terms to say that the Mundaka is a sec- 
 tion of the Atharva-veda, which it condemns, along with 
 the others, as inferior science. And if it must be referred 
 to a post Vedic age, it would be difficult to affirm that it 
 was composed before the age of Buddha. But even the 
 Mundaka says nothing directly of Maya, though it marks 
 a period, still riper than that of any other Upanishad 
 above named, and still further removed from the date of 
 the original Vedas. It boldly condemns sacrificial rites 
 with their eighteen members as vain and futile, and affixes 
 the stigma of folly to those who perform or rely on them^. 
 But it does not plainly say that the world is a phantom, 
 or a shadow without substance." 
 
 ^^?r ^«T^i Hict^^ I ^^ ^f^ ^^^^^nfr w^fcT ^T^^n^^ra 
 
320 DIALOGUE VIII. 
 
 Rajah. — " But the Buddhist Sastri seemed to admit 
 that some of the Upauishads did affirm the doctrine of 
 maya — only he would not allow their existence in the 
 Vedic period. He likewise claimed the doctrine of Nir- 
 vana or mukti as Buddhistic property." 
 
 Satyakdma. — '' I cannot say that he has a right to 
 claim the doctrine of mukti as the peculiar property of 
 his sect, though the formation of a distinct school, fearless- 
 ly inculcating the necessity of Nirvana and mukti, in open 
 opposition to sacrificial rites and ceremonies, was perhaps 
 an unprompted act of S'akya. The Brahmins had long been 
 panting for some reward more permanent than the termi- 
 nable enjoyment of heaven. In some of the Upanishads, 
 the Brihadaranyaka and the Chhandogya for instance, we 
 see the commencement of a notion, that those who attain 
 to the knowledge of their mysterious teaching do not 
 revolve again^, which Sankara understands to imply a 
 release from the necessity of transmigration. I do not 
 see any trace of this notion in the Taittiriya, Aitireya, 
 Mdndukya, Pras'na, or Kena. These were probably the 
 productions of an anterior age, when the Brahmins had 
 only begun to identify the Creator with the creation, and 
 when their pantheism had not yet got to its maturity. The 
 notion of a release from life and birth had not attained 
 any thing like the vigor of age in the Brihadaranyaka and 
 Chhandogya either, for while the conception of sensuous 
 enjoyments, as the rewards of knowledge, is constantly 
 met with, that of a freedom from transmigration is but 
 rarely found. Nor can the latter be said to occupy its na- 
 tural place in the midst of boons, not only described in the 
 language of voluptuaries, but also sometimes opposed to 
 
 e -s 
 
 
CRUDE IDEA OF MUKTI IN UPANISHADS. 321 
 
 all ideas of decency^. One of the Upanishads, again, in 
 which this crude notion of release from the necessity of 
 transmigration is found, speaks of 'Krishha, son of Devaki,' 
 receiving a certain lesson from Ghora, son of Angiras. 
 The name, Krishna, was not itself unknown in the Vedic 
 period, but the 'son of Devaki' was a character of a later 
 date. If then the passage be accepted as genuine, it 
 must militate very much against the antiquity of the 
 Chhandogya. If, on the other hand, the idea of an in- 
 terpolation be admitted, I do not see any reason for not 
 extending it to a few more isolated passages, promising 
 freedom from sensuous existence, — a notion not less at 
 variance with other Vedic promises than is the appella- 
 tive Devakiputra with the ordinary rule of Vedic patro- 
 nymics. 
 
 ''The transcendental idea of emancipation has a more 
 definite form in the Mundaka and the Katha, but these 
 are Upani shads which, for reasons already mentioned, 
 we may fairly assign to a much later, probably a post 
 Buddhistic, age. And it is only in the Swetds'watara 
 that we see the notion in its full grown shape, and it was 
 perhaps this very Upanished which the Buddhist had in 
 his mind, when he made the admission to which your 
 highness refers There we have the theory of mayd, and 
 we hear of GocJ as its projector in the sense of a juggler^. 
 There, too, we have tlie doctrine of mukti, or release from 
 transmigration and bondage. But, as the Buddhist con- 
 tended not unreasonably, there we also see evident marks 
 of a still more advanced era in the history of Brahminical 
 
 7 Dr. Roerwas obliged to translate nearly the whole of the concluding chapter of 
 the Brihad^ranyaka into Latin because of its gross indecencies. " It would not bear 
 an English rendering." See note page 273. Bibliotheca Jndica No. 135. 
 
 2 T 
 
322 DlALOCiUE Vill. 
 
 philosophy, and it would only harmonize the better with 
 ascertained facts to ascribe its origin, or at least its recast- 
 ing, to a period after the rise of Buddha." 
 
 Rajah. — ^'But what evident marks of a still more 
 advanced age do you detect in it ? The simple doctrine 
 of Maya cannot be held as such, for we have not conceded 
 the Buddhist's claim that his sect originated it, albeit some 
 of our own writers have called it Buddhism in disguise." 
 
 Satyahdma. — "As we are considering the Buddhist's 
 charges against Brahminism, it would certainly be unfair 
 to call the Swetds'ivatara a post- Buddhistic work, merely 
 because it inculcates the doctrine of maya. But I think 
 I can adduce at least two or three independent reasons 
 for assigning it to an age much riper than the Vedic 
 period. It appears to be a sort of Saiva Upanishad. It 
 sets forth the glory of S'iva. It speaks of Mahes'wara, 
 ' the supreme among gods, ' as the ' adorable Lord of the 
 world^.' The words Rudra, Is'ana, Hara, Bhava, which 
 are all proper names of Siva, are interspersed in the 
 tract as designations of the Supreme Being. When 
 five or six of the characteristic names of Siva are re- 
 peatedly found, in a small tract of a hundred and twelve 
 slokas, as appellatives of the Creator, the fact may be 
 considered conclusive proof of its fabrication by a mo- 
 dern S'aiva hand. The supreme being, "Rudra, is again ac- 
 costed as Giris'anta and Giritra, or protector of the moun- 
 tain, holding an arrow in his hand. He has a Swd or 
 Aghord — as his body personified, in the sense of a female 
 emanation. These are descriptions which can only become 
 intelli^^-ible by a reference to the legendary acts of Siva, 
 recounted in the . Itihases and Puranas. There we have 
 giva, the lord of Kail4sa and Himalaya, armed with the 
 
 ciif^srnwt tncH Trr'srt" * * f^Tiir t^ ^t^^^^^ ii 
 
SWETASWATARA UPANISHAD POST BUDDHISTIC. 323 
 
 bow Pindka, and having, as a wife, Parvati, otherwise 
 called Siva, originally an emanation from himself The 
 conception of Siva and S'iva in later mythology is the very 
 conception of the Supreme Being and Siva, of Mahes'wara 
 and Prakriti or Mdya''\ contained in the Sweias'watay^a. 
 
 " My next reason is that Kapila, the author of the 
 S&,nkhya, and his system the Sankhya Yoga, are men- 
 tioned and lauded, and several terms are used which are 
 peculiar to that system, such as pradhdna, praA;fi^i, 
 sdkshi, together with something like a description of 
 two eternal principles, which the modern followers of 
 the Sankhya are fond of quoting to this day m defence 
 of their theory. This may be considered indisputable 
 proof of the tract being a post-Sankhya, and therefore 
 a post Buddhist, Upanishad. And I may add in further 
 confirmation of this view that the S'wetas'watara speaks 
 of the creation of Brahm^, and the production of the 
 Veda through him under the agency of the Supreme 
 Being ^, a legend of which no other Upanishad makes 
 any mention, and which decidedly belongs to the later 
 mythological period of the Puranas. 
 
 *' Again atheistic speculations, deliberately attributing 
 the production of the universe to other causes than the 
 Supreme Being, were unknown in the Vedic period, and 
 are clearly post Buddhistic in point of date. The S'wetas'- 
 
 firf^ eft ^TT m f^jft*- ^^ SITTrT II 
 
 ^Rr^ ^^frf f^m^ w[f€i^5fT "^^^i: ii 
 
 ^ W^rCr f^^TJlfcT ^ ^ W ^^t^ ^ff^^f?f cl^ I The idea 
 contained in last sentence is almost identical "with that in the S'ri Bh&rtnvrtta 
 
324 DIALOGUE VIII. 
 
 watara, however, addresses itself to a community in which 
 such infidel speculations had already gained currency. It 
 starts with the questions, ^ Is Brahma the cause ? "Whence 
 * are we produced ? Is time, nature (swabhava), or succes- 
 ' sion of works, or chance, or the elements, or Purusha, 
 'the cause ^." Now most of these hypothetical causes 
 of the universe were originally inculcated in Buddhistic 
 schools, though they may have been afterwards counten- 
 anced by Brahminical atheists. Several Buddhistic schools 
 were in fact designated by terms which were derived 
 from some of those very theories. We have the Swabhd- 
 vicas from Sivahhdva, or nature, to which they attributed 
 the origin of all things. We have the Kdrmihas from 
 Karma, or works, which they considered as one of the 
 causes, at least, of the universe. We have also those 
 who contended that the conjunction of the material ele- 
 ments is sufficient of itself to produce intelligence, just as 
 the intermixture of fermenting drugs begets the power 
 of intoxication^. The Swetaswatara must be glancing at 
 those infidels when it proposes to refute the theories just 
 mentioned, and especially when it adds afterwards, ' Some 
 wise men talk of Nsiture (Swabhava J, others of time ^.' 
 We have heard of no infidels in the Pre-buddhistic period 
 attributing the creation of the universe to the sole opera- 
 tion of Nature or time, or the conjunction of the material 
 
 f«T^fe^fW^^lTOr ^ITT ^^# ^"^ II Sankara. 
 
 ^tr^nxm f^^rf^^*- H^^^T ^^^ ^^^fW^^ ll ^^rva Darsana 
 Sangraha. 
 
sakya's improvement of the idea of mukti. 325 
 
 elements, although we find some such doctrine repro- 
 duced in the Sankhya. It would certainly be the very 
 extreme of sdhasa (boldness) to deny under these cir- 
 cumstances that the Swetaswatara was written after the 
 rise of Buddha. 
 
 ''Your highness will observe that the doctrine of Maya 
 is definitely inculcated only in the Swetaswatara Upa- 
 nishad, and that appears to be a post Buddhistic work. 
 There can be no absurdity in attributing the eventual 
 reception of that theory by the Brahmins to the influence 
 of S'akya's teaching. As to the idea of mukti or eman- 
 cipation, the Brahmins had certainly been pondering it 
 for some time before the rise of Buddhism. It was 
 probably they themselves who instilled it into the mind 
 of Sakya. It was perhaps their own aspirations after 
 something better than the degrading pleasures of Indra's 
 territories, that first suggested the futility of rites and 
 ceremonies to the fertile imagination of the young prince 
 of Kapilawastu. But it was the prince himself who ap- 
 pears to have imparted a coherent shape to the doctrine, 
 which in some of the Pre-buddhistic Upanishads appears 
 in a chaotic state of disconnected fragments, not unfre- 
 quently by the side of the very contrary idea of sensuous 
 enjoyments. Sakya appears to have first separated the 
 two by contending that rites and ceremonies do not con- 
 tribute to our highest good, and that it was nirvana 
 alone which could secure our final escape from the 
 miseries of sensuous life. In Post -buddhistic writings the 
 notion of emancipation which pervades the philosophy of 
 the Nyaya, the Sankhya, and the Yedant, appears in 
 a consistent form as distinct from that of heavenly en- 
 joyment. Siuarga and apavarga are always contrasted. 
 The Buddhists therefore have some right to say you have 
 received Jessons from them, thoup^h their own leader was 
 
326 DIALOGUE VIII. 
 
 originally your own pupil, indoctrinated in early life by 
 your predecessors in the faith." 
 
 Rajah. — ^' But does not the disproof of the Maya-yada 
 acquit the Yedantist of the charge master- atheist^'' 
 
 Satyakdma. — '' If it acquit the Vedantist of that charge, 
 it arraigns him at once on another. Keverting to the 
 text, all this is God, how can we acquit him of the charge 
 of deifying every material thing, that is to say of teaching 
 a system of gross pantheism ? Since the theory of Maya, 
 which was his only defence against this latter charge, 
 must as a plain matter of feet be separated from the 
 Vedknta, I do not see how Colonel Kennedy's hypothe- 
 tical inference can be denied." 
 
 Rajah. — '^Whatever Colonel Kennedy's view of the 
 discussion might have been, a single text, approvingly 
 cited by the commentator, cannot decide such a weighty 
 question. All that you may be allowed to say is, what 
 Vaiyasika himself contends for, that Yyasa and Sankara 
 were not idealists. But you have not proved that they 
 really taught material pantheism." 
 
 Satyakdma.— *' Your highness is quite right in saying 
 that this is a question which cannot be decided by a 
 single text, however pointed ; I mean, if you concede that 
 the Yedas and the Siltras are, in some respects at least, 
 human compositions. For if you adhere unflinchingly to 
 the story of Brahma's breathing the Yedas out, whole 
 and entire, then even a single text ought to decide the 
 question however weighty. Still I will not press that point 
 for the present, but, treating the Yedas and the Sutras 
 as human compositions, will make such allowances as the 
 rules of liberal criticism may call for. A single isolated 
 passage may be explained away in such a case. The 
 general tenor of the work must afford the key to- the 
 interpretation of detached texts. 
 
rb:vikw of vedant sutras. 327 
 
 ''May we then, with your highness's permission, review 
 the general tenor of the siitras of Vyasa with reference 
 to the relation which Brahma bears to the world ? [The 
 Rajah nodded, and Satyakama continued,] Professing to 
 deduce his system from a critical examination of the 
 texts of the Vedas, Vyasa commences his work by assail- 
 ing the Sankhya, and denounces Kapila's theory on the 
 origin of the Universe. He prosecutes this aggressive war 
 against Kapila, by appeals to the Vedas, almost through- 
 out the whole of the first chapter. He labours to show 
 that the dogmas of his antagonists are contradicted by 
 express passages of the Upanishads, and that the texts on 
 which they rely may be otherwise explained. In the 
 course of this war on the Sankhya, he takes occasion to 
 declare that wherever the Vedas speak of any substance, . 
 as a cause of the universe, they can mean no other than 
 the one Supreme Intelligence which prevades all space, 
 and which will eventually be the receptacle of all things. 
 He says the purusha (soul) in the sun, the puo^usha in the 
 eye, the little purusha no bigger than a thumb, the jmrusha 
 of the measure of a span, the ether in the heart, all these 
 personifications, set forth in the Upanishads, are no other 
 than the supreme Brahma who is without a second. So 
 likewise the passages which speak of certain inanimate 
 things as the primary element, e. g., food, air, breath 
 of life, light, ether, are referred to Bralima. If it be 
 asked what right the author had to identify those des- 
 criptions with Brahma, the commentator reminds you 
 of the great charter of Pantheism, the text. All this 
 is Brahma. Vyasa does not however say, except by 
 implication, that the world is identical with Brahma, 
 or that Brahma is Prahriti, nature, or substance of the 
 universe, before the 23rc? siitra of the Uh Pada of the 
 1st chapter." 
 
:^28 DIALOGUE VIII. 
 
 Rajah. — ''Bufc does he, in the earlier portion of his 
 work, say by implication that the world is identical with 
 Brahma?" 
 
 ^'The idea is undoubtedly found, said Satyakama, 
 in the following siitras : ' Because of resolution or ab- 
 ' sorption into the spirit.' (I. i. 9.) 'It (the Veda) de- 
 ' clares its (the world's) assimilation into Him." (I. i. 19.) 
 ' He is the Eater, because he takes into Himself move- 
 'ablesand immoveables.' (I. ii. 9.) 'Because it is dis- 
 ' tinguished as the place to be approached by the eman- 
 ' cipated.' (T. iii. 2.) ' It (the Sankhya) is not true, 
 ' it is disproved, because of observation.' I. i. 5. ' From 
 'desire, too, there is no room for the Sankhya inference^.' 
 I. i. 18. The two Sutras, last mentioned, evidently refer 
 to texts in which the Supreme Being is represented as 
 desirous of multiplying himself by the process of creation. 
 
 "I, of course, continued Satyakama, make use of San- 
 kara's authorized gloss in interpreting the above siltras, 
 but I am not confounding the commentator's deductions 
 with the author's language. The light which the com- 
 mentator throws on the Sutras must be accepted, but 
 it would be quite unphilosophical to attribute to the 
 author of the Sutras all that the fertile mind of his 
 commentator has imagined. Were I to consider every 
 sentence of S'ankara to be an exact index of Vyasa's 
 mind, I could recognize many more decided instances of 
 his pantheism before coming to the 23rd siitra I. iv. 
 But it is at that sutra that the author commences a 
 series of aphorisms, unhesitatingly pronouncing God to 
 be the material cause of fche world." 
 
 
sankara's authority as a commentator. 329 
 
 Rajah. — '^ Do you mean to say that Sankara's com- 
 mentary contains any misconception of Vyksa*s teaching ?" 
 
 Satyakdma, — ^^ I do not exactly mean that, but T do 
 not wish to lose sight of the distinction between the 
 author and his commentator." 
 
 Rajah. — '^ What do you say, Vaiyasika, to this V 
 
 Vaiydsika. — ''As Satyakama has not charged the 
 commentator with misrepresenting the author's views, I 
 do not wish to say anything." 
 
 Rajah. — ''What authority then do you attach to 
 Sankara's commentary ?" 
 
 Vaiydsika. — " S'ankara deserves all credit for learning, 
 honesty, and clearness of mind. He at once gets at the 
 mind of his author, and expounds the meaning plainly 
 and fully. I cannot conceive the possibility of his mis- 
 apprehending a single expression of Vyasa, — nor can I 
 imagine it to be within the range of a mortal's capacity 
 to add to or subtract from what S'ankara has said. To 
 say less would involve a sacrifice of fuhiess. To say 
 more would be incurring prolixity. There is nothing 
 redundant in liis commentary, nor any thing defective. 
 You cannot improve it by adding or curtailing. Still 
 S'ankara was not a Rishi, The author of the Sankara- 
 digvijaya has indeed represented him as an incarnation of 
 S'iva^, but we have not received that story in any other 
 light than that of a complimentary tribute for his success- 
 ful refutation of Buddhism. We cannot say he was essen- 
 tially infaUible. Vydsa was a Rishi. He was essentially 
 infallible, for Rishis cannot err," 
 
 Satyakdma. — "Have not different Rishis, — Gotama, 
 Kapila, Vyasa, — taught mutually conflicting doctrines ? 
 Are we then still to suppose them all to be infallible?" 
 
 2 u 
 
330 DIALOGUE VIII. 
 
 Raja. — '^ But, a learned writer has suggested that their 
 differences are capable of being reconciled^." 
 
 Vaii/dsika. — '' Without waiting for Satyakama's reply, 
 I shall at once admit that the differences are not capable 
 of being reconciled. At least S'ankaracharya did not 
 think they were. He not only condemns the opinions 
 of the Nyaya and the Sankhya on the origin of the 
 universe, but he brands their authors as discordant 
 heretics®. There is certainly no reason for saying that 
 Gotama lays greater stress on sensation than Kapila, or 
 that Kapila speaks more of emotions than Gotama. Nor 
 can it be urged that the authors of the Nyaya and the 
 Sankhya undertook to teach their systems on the fou7ida- 
 tion of the Vedas. The fact of their differences is cer- 
 tainly a difficulty with us, but still we hold that Rishis 
 are infallible. We are not bound to receive their teach- 
 ing if it be opposed to the Veda, but we must not be want- 
 ing in reverence to their memory. But why do you press 
 
 ? "Assuming, each of them implicitly, the truth of the Vedas, and proceeding to 
 give, on that foundation, a comprehensive view of the totality of things, the three 
 systems diflFer in their point of view. To illustrate this, suppose that three men in 
 succession take up a cylindrical ruler : the one, viewing it with its end towards his 
 eye, sees a circle ; the second, viewing it upright before his eye, sees a parallelo- 
 gram ; the third, viewing it in a direction slanting away in front of his eye, sees a 
 frustum of a cone. These three views are different, but no wise irreconcileable. So 
 far are they from being irreconcileable, that it might be argued that all of them 
 must be accepted in succession, before any adequate conception of the form of the 
 ruler can be arrived at. Now, in somewhat such a way, the three Hindu systems 
 differ mainly in their severally regarding the universe from different points of view, 
 — viz., as it stands in relation severally to sensation, emotion, and intellection, — 
 The Naiydyika, founding on the fact that we have various sensations, enquires 
 what and how many are the channels through which such varied knowledge flows 
 in. The Sankhya, struck with the fact that we have emotions, — with an eye to the 
 question whence our impressions come, — enquires their quality. The Vedantin, 
 rising above the question as to what is pleasing, displeasing, or indifferent, asks 
 simply, what is, and what is not." — Ballantyiics prize Essay pp. xvi, ccbii. 
 
 Com, V'edant, IF. i. 4. 
 
REVIEW OF VEDANT SUTRAS. 331 
 
 on our attention a point which we confess is attended 
 with some difficulty, and which is irrelevant to our present 
 discussion ? Go on with your review of the Vedant 
 teaching." 
 
 ScUyakdma — '^Well then, with reference to Sutra 23. 
 iv. I., it runs thus^, — 'He is also prakriti (the substance 
 
 i[7^ f^^^ f^f^'i ^T^ f^^^^ f^^W^l^oinf^^f^»?7! I tttPc- 
 
 Si 
 
 Si 
 
332 DIALOGUE VIII. 
 
 ' of the world) because the Question and Example require 
 'it.' S'ankara expounds the aphorism thus. 'It has 
 ' already been said that as inquiry into duty is necessary 
 ' for prosperity, so inquiry into Brahma is also necessary 
 'for emancipation. Brahma again has been defined as 
 ' He ' from whom are the production &c., of this.' But that 
 'definition is equally applicable [both to material and 
 ' eflficient causes] to the substance, such as the clay and 
 * gold are in the case of the jar and necklace, and to the 
 'agent such as the potter and the goldsmith. Hence the 
 ' doubt, ofivhat kind is the causality of Brahma ? Here it 
 ' might appear that He is only the efficient cause. Why ? 
 < Because we hear of observation preceding the agency. 
 
 ^%^ vr^rft f^'^m ^^-ftr^ f^-^m vrw^tfcT srfci^r^ ^m 
 
REVIEW OF VEDANT SUTRAS. 333 
 
 'The agency of Brahma is indeed found preceded by 
 ' observation, in the following texts. ' He observed. He 
 'created the vital air.' Now agency with observation is 
 ' seen only in efficient causes such as potters and others. 
 ' Therefore it is proper to understand the causality of 
 ' God as simply that of an agent. The universe, again, 
 'as a work, is composed of parts, inanimate, impure. Its 
 ' cause must likewise be of tbe same kind, for cause 
 ' and effect are homogeneous. But Brahma does not 
 ' answer to this description ; witness the texts, ' with- 
 ' out parts, without work, quiet, unblemished, unstained.' 
 ' In fine, a material cause, different from Brahma, and 
 ' possessed of impurity and similar qualities, — such a 
 ' cause as is set forth in the smriti, — should be looked 
 ' for ; and as to the text declaring the causality of Brah- 
 * ma, it would be quite sufficient to consider Him as 
 ' the efficient agent (alone) . To this argument, (con- 
 tinues S'ankara) ^ve reply : Brahma is to be understood 
 ' as the Prakriti, the substance or material, and also the 
 ' the efficient cause. Not simply the efficient cause. 
 ' Why ? Because the congruity of the question and ex- 
 ' ample requires it. This is the question, ' Did you ask 
 " him for the doctrine by which that which is unheard 
 " becomes heard, that which is unthought of becomes 
 "thought of, that which is unknow^n becomes known?' 
 ' Herein it was understood that by the knowledge of one, 
 ' all others, though unknown, become known. Now it 
 ' is by the knowledge of the material cause, that every 
 ' thing else is known, because the material cause is in- 
 ' separable from the effect. But the efficient cause is 
 'not inseparable from the effect, because a difference 
 ' between the architect and the edifice is seen in the 
 ' world. This, again, is the example, — ' As O beloved \ 
 " by means of one clod of earth every earthy form is 
 
834 DIALOGUE VIII. 
 
 " known, it being in truth only earth, though called, in 
 '' words, a modification.' Thus is the material cause set 
 'forth in the Vedas. Also, 'as by means of one magnet, 
 '' every [magnetized] iron becomes known, and as by 
 '' means of one nail-clipper, every black iron is known.* 
 ' So also elsewhere, ' What is that, Sir, which being 
 " known, all this becomes known V on this question the 
 ' example is ; 'as in the earth herbs are produced.' ' The 
 '' Spirit being seen, heard, thought of, known, all this is 
 '' known,' — on this question the example is, ' as one cannot 
 " take hold of the external sound of a drum that is beaten, 
 " but by taking up the beaten drum itself, the sound of 
 "the stroke is also taken up.' Thus in every Vedant 
 
 * text bearing on the point, the question and example are 
 ' to be known as proving material causality. Again, in 
 ' the sentence, ' From whom all these creatures proceed,' 
 
 * —from ivhom. is in the ablative case ; hence since it 
 ' refers especially to the maker's material, it must be ex- 
 ' pressive of the material cause. His efficient causality 
 ' is to be deduced from the want of any other agent. As 
 'in the world, the material causes, such as earth and 
 ' gold, need the working of potters, goldsmiths, and other 
 ' agents, not so does the material cause Brahma need ano- 
 ' ther agent, for before the creation we learn there was one 
 ' only without a second. The want of another agent is 
 ' also deducible from the congruity of the question and 
 ' example, for if there were another agent, separable from 
 ' the material, then by means of one thing every thing else 
 ' could not be known, and the question and example would 
 ' become incongruous. Hence from the want of another 
 ' agent, is deduced the spirit's agency, and from the want 
 
 * of another substance his material causality.' 
 
 "The next Siatra (24th) confirms the above view. 
 ' From the doctrine of his desire too.' S'ankara thus ex- 
 
REVIEW OF VKDANT SUTRAS. ^>^5 
 
 pounds it. ' The doctrine of desire, too, demonstrates the 
 
 * spirit's efficiency and material causality. ' He desired, 
 " let me become many, let me be born.' Also ' He saw 
 '&c.' * Here from the independent action preceded by 
 ' desire he is inferred as the actor ; from the words 4et me 
 '' become many,' because of individual souls being the 
 
 * objects of the thought or intention of multiplication, he is 
 ' inferred to be the substance or material cause also^".' The 
 founder of the Vedanta School goes on urging the same 
 doctrine. ^ Because the two processes [of springing from 
 ' and being resolved into] are both manifestly spoken of 
 ' in the Vedas^.' Sankara explains it thus : SThis is the 
 ' exposition of the state of prakriti. Hence too is 
 ' Brahma the material cause, for the Vedas, manifestly 
 ' taking Brahma to be the only cause, speak of production 
 ' and absorption. ' All these elements proceed from ether 
 "and are resolved into ether.' That from which any 
 ' thing proceeds and into which it is resolved is called 
 ' the material cause — as the earth is of rice and wheat. 
 ' By the use of the word ^ manifest,' too, he shows that 
 ' the words ^ from ether' exclude the supposition of any 
 
 10 
 
 ^% ^WT\ ^H^fcT 2Tfw^ iT^^r^ crTiT^xrr^T^ vf^^ v^\ 
 
336 DIALOGUE VIII. 
 
 ^ other material. Nor is the resolution of an effect ever seen 
 ^ to be into any other than the material cause.' Again, 
 says Vyasa, ' Because of his creating himself — by muta- 
 ' tion.' S'ankara thus expounds it : 'Hence too is Brahma 
 ' the material cause — for with reference to his operation, 
 'it is said 'He himself created himself — thereby indi- 
 ' eating that he was both the agent and the object of the 
 'creation — 'himself signifying the object — 'he himself 
 ' created' signifying the agent. But now how can one, 
 ' already held to be the Maker, be again represented as 
 'an object, being onadef We reply, by mutation. The 
 ' spirit, before proved to be existent, altered himself, by a 
 ' particular modification. It is by particular modifications 
 Hhat the mutation of materials like earth and other 
 'things is found. The specification, too, of 'He himself 
 'excludes the supposition of another agent ^.' Vyasa con- 
 'tinues: 'He is also sung as the womb^.' S'ankara 
 'explains it thus — ' Hence also is Brahma the material 
 ' cause, for the expression ' Brahma is the womb' is read 
 * in the Vedant, thus ' the Lord, the creative soul, Brahma, 
 
 XJ^"^ ^^T^ ^^T?:^^ IT^T^ W^ ^ftf^f'Tfcr 5I5^cT^f# TTftrXT^fsff 
 
 ^^T xf^ ^ I ^tf'T^^^ T?i\fcT-=f^^{ ^^rf^jTcrr ^^ ^fzr^ 
 
HOW SANKARA MET OBJECTIONS. 337 
 
 " is the womb/ also, ' the self-restrained see the womb of 
 * the creation/ The womb is popularly understood to 
 'be the material cause — thus the earth is the womb of 
 ' herbs and trees.' The fourth section, and consequently 
 the first chapter, concludes with he aphorism, 'Hereby 
 'all (hostile tenets) are refuted*.' 
 
 ''The above extracts, continued Satyakkma, prove 
 that according to the teaching of Vyksa and S'ankara 
 the substance or material of the universe is God, and 
 that the world is only a development of Him. Such a 
 view of Brahma's relation to the world could not but 
 be startling. Many were the objections preferred by 
 the followers of the S^nkhya and Nyaya, which S'ankarii- 
 charya cited and answered. I cannot say he has fairly 
 met them, — but let us now review that discussion. 
 
 Objection^. — 'Brahma is not the material cause for 
 ' this has a characteristic difference, and so also the 
 
 4 -v NP 
 
 3lfT?Tfr ITIifcI^W^ XT'^^r^' Wfcrf^fiTTr: TTfCfcTJ cl^iriTfiqfTr 
 
 ^^ ^cT5f ^^^ ^^r*^ IT ^ f^^^ur^ ?r§\fiTf^^Kwr^l?:^t ^f-5 
 
 fT?^ ^^f^cTT f^^Kl! ^fm^^ ^^^'T XT ^^^^rf^cTf: cT^^TTfiT 
 
 2 X 
 
333 DIALOGUE VIII. 
 
 ' Veda says.' This is Vyasa's epitome of his adversaries' 
 sayings. Sankara thus expounds it. 'The objection, 
 'raised on the authority of the Srariti against Brahma's 
 ' substantial and efficient causality has been refuted ; 
 
 •5T;n-^T5^^^cf5!f^^^-?rR^;n-n^^ ^^i i^i: ^jtct ^zgf^ii^^^- 
 
 TffSRcI^T P^fcfXTfCcITTTf^^I^Tf^^^r^lcr ^^"^TT^I^^^^^^^c^T^ I 
 
 ^9c[^%^ m^ci ^cT^ -gfcT^rr^sif^i^rvrf^^iT^^wHT^xwHici^ ^f^ 
 
 ^ci^^ ftrf^c?^ irHiiTr?T% lErfe^^T^ ^cf^T^^nf^Hirft^i' I 
 
 f^^ifwcic^Tf^ynfsrcTc^mcrTfT^^i^mf^HT^TVTRwr^ ^r4-5iTorT 
 xrif^^f^Tf^^ft ^m^^^^ift^t ^ogic^^fi^^f^^rsncr ti^- 
 
 ^^^f^^^w f^^w^^ ^^ xrftf^^^ ■jr'^ciii^fxT f^^=^5r(# 
 
HOW SANKARA MET OBJECTIONS. 339 
 
 'that founded on argumentation is now being disj^osed 
 'of. It may be asked how could there be room for 
 ^argumentation on a point settled by the S'astra ? May 
 
 H13T ^^^r*. iriJrfHf^cTJ ^4%cT-iTcTT^t ^T^^TT^$c^ I ^ftr ^ 
 
 TTfl^ ^^^T ^^T f^ftt^r^ ^cfTf^ ^^m W^^^H f^^^?TRT 
 ^^JTcTI^TT W^^r ^lTf^I?JcT T^T "^^^ I cf^lf^^W^T^^^ 
 
340 DIALOGUE Vlll. 
 
 not the Sastra be an independent authority in the 
 case of Brahma, as it is in the case of Dharma ? But 
 then it would be a question of practice, whereas Brahma 
 is a demonstrable substance. Hence further evidence 
 is admissible. And so he anticipates the logical objec- 
 tion, ^This has a characteristic difference &c.' You say 
 that the sentient Brahma, the cause of the world, is also 
 its jprakriti. This is not congruous. Wliy ? because 
 of the characteristic difference between this, the fabric, 
 and its substance. This world, which you would describe 
 as a production of Brahma, is of a different charac- 
 ter from Him, being perceived to be non-sentient, 
 impure. And Brahma is declared to be of a different 
 cliaracter from the world, i, e. sentient and pure. The 
 relation of material and fabric is never seen where there 
 is characteristic difference ; for neckchains and other 
 golden fabrics cannot have earth for their material, nor 
 earthen pots, gold. Earthen fabrics are made only of 
 earth, and golden of gold. So this world, too, being 
 connected with pleasure, pain, and delusion, must be the 
 production of a non-sentient cause, also connected with 
 pleasure, pain, and delusion, and not of Brahma, 
 which is of a different character. That Brahma has 
 a characteristic difference is evident from our obser- 
 vation of the world's be'ing non-sentient and impure. 
 This world is indeed impure, because, being a compound 
 of pleasure, pain, and delusion, it is a cause of delight, 
 sorrow, and grief, and because it consists of the opposite 
 varieties of heaven and hell. And it is non-sentient, 
 for we see that it serves the sentient as an object 
 or an instrument. But there cannot be the relation 
 of server and served where there is equality. Nor 
 can two lamps serve each other. But cannot the 
 sentient too serve as the object and instrument of 
 
HOW SANKARA MET OBJECTIONS. 341 
 
 ' the enjoy er^ after the manner of master and servant ? 
 ' No ! for even as regards master and servant, it is the 
 ' non-sentient part that serves the sentient. That which 
 
 * is the attribute of one that is sentient, such as the under- 
 ' standing, itself non-sentient, does service to another that is 
 
 * sentient, but the sentient himself does neither service nor 
 
 * damage to another sentient. Sentient actors have no 
 ' superior. Thus do the followers of the Sankhya believe. 
 ' Therefore object and instrument are non-sentient. Nor 
 
 * is there any sign of sentiency in wood and earth, and 
 ' this distinction between the sentient and non-sentient 
 ' is notorious in the world. Therefore because of its 
 ' characteristic difference from Brahma, this world cannot 
 ' have him for its material. Perhaps some one will say, 
 ^' since the Vedas declare that the world has a sentient 
 ^' being for its material, I shall for that very reason hold 
 '' the world to be sentient, because the quality of the 
 '^ material follows in the fabric. Its sentiency may 
 *' be latent owing to some especial modification. As 
 " in souls, obviously sentient, sentiency does not properly 
 *' appear in the state of sleep or trance, so the sentiency 
 " of wood and earth may also be only latent. Because 
 ^' also of this difference of manifestation and non-man i- 
 '' festation, and of colour and no colour, notwithstanding 
 " that sentiency is common to objects and instruments 
 " and to spirits, the predominant quality is not affect- 
 '^ ed. As also flesh, sauce, and rice, though all of 
 '^ one common element, earth, are still subservient to each 
 *' other, because of their several distinctions, so also 
 '' here. Therefore the known distinction is not affected.* 
 ' It is with difficulty that this person explains away the 
 
 * characteristic difference between sentiency and non- 
 
 * sentiency, but he cannot explain away the character- 
 ' istic difference between purity and impurity. Nor can 
 
342 DIALOGUE VIII. 
 
 ' he really explain away the other either, and therefore it 
 ' is added [by Vyasa in his summary of the Sdnkhya ob- 
 'jectionj 'And so also the Veda.' This sentiency 
 ' of all things, which is not held among men, is a mere 
 ' hypothetical deduction from the Vedic teaching of a 
 ' sentient material cause, depending solely on that teach- 
 ' ing. But it is negatived by Vedic teaching itself, for 
 'the Veda also inculcates that (characteristic difference). 
 ' 'And so' — the Veda itself expresses the characteristic 
 ' difference — thus, ' Knowledge and ignorance' — teaching 
 ' thereby that some part being non-sentient, the non- 
 ' sentient world is characteristically different from the 
 ' sentient Brahma. But do not some texts inculcate the 
 ' sentiency of the elements and organs, (otherwise) con- 
 ' sidered non-sentient ? thus, ' the earth spake, the waters 
 ' spake,' and, ' that light saw, those waters saw.' These 
 * texts teach that the elements are sentient. So do others 
 ' about the organs, thus, ' these my vital airs debating on 
 ' what is good went to Brahma' — also, ' they said, do thou 
 ' sing us.' To this the objector replies, (as Vyasa represents 
 'him in the next Sutra II. i. 5.) ' But that is proved to 
 ' be a mere personification, both by the distinction and 
 ' the usage.' S'ankara again thus expounds Vy^sa's curt 
 representation of his adversary's rejoinder : ' The word 
 ' hut contradicts the previous supposition. From texts 
 ' such as ' the earth spake,' one cannot suppose that the 
 ' elements and organs are sentient, because it is a mere 
 ' personification. Sentient gods, imagined as personifica- 
 'tions of earth and other elements, and of speech and 
 ' other organs, are described as speaking and discoursing, 
 ' which are acts of sentient beings ; not that elements and 
 ' organs speak. Why ? because there is the distinction 
 'and the usaofe. A distinction has been before esta- 
 ' Wished between . enjoyers and elements and organs, 
 
HOW SANKARA MET OBJECTIONS. .14.3 
 
 ' marking the division between sentient and non-sentient. 
 ' That would not consort with the notion of every thing 
 ' being sentient. Moreover in the Kaushitaki, the vital 
 ' airs are distinguished by the word gods, in order to 
 'show that the sentient divinities which direct them, 
 ' are meant, and not the mere organs themselves, thus 
 ' these ray gods debating what is good,' and, ' these 
 'gods know the supreme felicity to be in the vital air.' 
 ' And in the figurative language of the Mantras, as well 
 ' as in the Itihasas and Puranas, there are every where 
 'personifications of sentient gods introduced. Again, 
 'texts, such as 'Agni becoming speech, entered the 
 'mouth,' exhibit gods personifying the organs. In the 
 ' context of the passage about vital airs, also, we have, 
 ' they, the vital airs, went and spoke to Prajapati the 
 ' father.' The going to Prajapati was for the ascertain- 
 * ment of excellency, and the speech, directly and in- 
 ' directly, sets forth the excellence of the vital airs. So 
 ' also the taking of offerings to him. Such following of 
 ' acts like ours confirms the personification. In the pas- 
 ' sage, ' that light saw,' we are also to observe that the 
 ' seeing is predicated of the presiding Supreme Divinity, 
 ' personifying his own modification. The world is there- 
 ' fore characteristically different from Brahma, and because 
 'of the difference he cannot be its material.' 
 
 " I have no great respect, continued Satyakama, for the 
 Sankhya philosophy, but the above argument, enforced 
 by its adherents, appears irresistibly powerful. I do nofc 
 acquiesce in every thing continued in the objection, so 
 candidly and elaborately represented by S'ankara, but 
 there is no denying that the external universe is cha- 
 racteristically different from Brahma, and that it cannot 
 have the spirit for its subject matteVy which indeed is 
 a contradiction in terms." 
 
344 DIALOGUE VIII. 
 
 Rajah. — " But has not S'ankaracharya given a suffi- 
 cient reply to that argument ? " 
 
 Satyakdma. — " His reply is singularly unsatisfactory. 
 Let us consider it in detail. The next Sutra (IL i. 6,) 
 reads, ' But it is seen®,' which S'ankara thus expounds. 
 ' That which you urge, that the universe cannot, because 
 * of its characteristic difference, have Brahma for its sub- 
 ' stance, is not conclusive ; for from men and other animals, 
 ^ well known to be sentient, the production of hair, nails, 
 ' and other things, different in character, is witnessed 
 
 >. VJ vj 
 
 s# v» -=» 
 
 ■ETcj^Tf^^cT ^m^^i^ ^^^ici?5i w^mifcr^(^i*5cr^;RT^ n 
 
 Ibiciril. i. 7. 
 
HOW SANKARA MET OBJECTIONS. 345 
 
 ' in the world ; and that of scorpions and other insects 
 ' from cowdung and other things, well known to be non- 
 ' sentient. If you object that the causes of hair and 
 ' nails, which are non-sentient, are only the bodies of men 
 ' and other animals which are no other than non-sentient, 
 ' and the productions of cowdung and other matter, which 
 ' are non-sentient, are the bodies of scorpions and other 
 ' insects which are no other than non-sentient ; my reply 
 ^ is, Here too there is a difference in the characters ; 
 'something non-sentient becomes the receptacle of the 
 ' sentient and something does not. Hence there is a 
 ' difference. Great, again, is this natural mutation, be- 
 ' cause of the difference in colour between the human and 
 
 * other bodies (on the one hand,) and hair, nails, &c. (on 
 
 * the other) ; so also between cowdung and other matter 
 ' and scorpions and other insects. Nor could there be the 
 ' relation of material and fabric, if there were too much 
 ' similarity [and no difference at all in the characters]. 
 
 * Again if you say that there is a certain earthiness, or 
 ' other natural character, in the human and other bodies, 
 ' which is also found in hair, nails, and other things, 
 ' and a similar one in cowdung and other matter, which 
 ' is also found in scorpions &c. I reply, so is there a na- 
 tural character in Brahma, even his entity, which is also 
 'found in ether and other things. By finding fiult with 
 'the notion of the universe having Brahma for its mate- 
 ' rial, because of a difference of characters, tell me, do you 
 'refer to the absence of the whole of Brahma's nature in 
 ' the effect, or of any part of it, or merely of His Intelli- 
 ' gence ? In the first case your argument would destroy 
 
 * the very possibility of the relation of material and fabric, 
 ' for there cannot be such things, if the one is to have no 
 ' excess above the other. In the second case the argu- 
 
 * ment is not founded in fact, for, as I have already said, 
 
 2 Y 
 
'^46 DIALOGUK VIII. 
 
 ' one natural character of Brahma, i. e., his entity, exists 
 ' in ether and other things. As to the third case, it has 
 'no example. Against them who assert that Brahma 
 ' is the cause, what example can be adduced of a thing 
 ' which is not endowed with sentiency having other mate- 
 ' rial than Brahma, — when we declare that all this, which 
 'has sprung from a substance, has Brahma for its 
 ' material ? ' 
 
 *' I submit, continued Satyakama, the reply is not sa- 
 tisfactory. The example of hair and nails, as products of 
 the animal body, gives no countenance to the relation 
 which Sankara would establish between the world and 
 Brahma. Hair and nails, themselves material, (or earthy 
 as he himself calls them), are produced from the animal 
 body, also material, or earthy. The example would be 
 analogous if hair and nails were products of the immate- 
 rial and unearthy soul. The Sankhya would not however 
 admit such a premiss, nor does Sankara, though commen- 
 cing the argument with such a suggestion, insist on it in 
 the end. But then he tells us that as the relation of cause 
 and effect between the animal body and hair and nails is 
 verified by the property of earthiness, common to both, 
 so may the relation of cause and effect, or rather ma- 
 terial and fabric, between Brahma and the universe, be 
 verified by the common property of entity. We shall 
 see afterwards, when we Review his theory of avidyd, 
 or ignorance, whether this common property is compati- 
 ble with that theory. Meanwhile I must remark that 
 this part of his argument involves an ati-vydpti. It 
 proves too much. To say that mere entity is a character 
 on which the relation of cause and effect, or rather of 
 material and fabric, may be founded, is simply to assert 
 that merely because two things exist, the one may be a 
 material of the other. Then any thing may be proved to 
 
SANKARAS UNFAIR ENCOUNTER WITH SANKHYA. 34/ 
 
 be a material of every fabric. When you are called upon 
 to show in what respect can this fabric, the universe, 
 exhibit a sameness of quality with its material Brahma, 
 you say it is in respect of entity. But entity is a univer- 
 sal attribute of every thing that exists. It cannot be a 
 characteristic attribute of a particulai» cause or effect. 
 The argument involves the fallacy which Kanada has 
 expressed by the formula, because it has horns, therefore it 
 is a cow. The general attribute of all horned animals 
 cannot be an especial attribute of the individual cow. 
 
 '* Then, again, the Sankhya comes forward with a coun- 
 ter assertion, directly negativing the Vedantist's propo- 
 sition. He says the non-sentient cannot be a product of 
 the sentient. An assertion, such as this, might be at once 
 disproved by a single example, if one could be adduced, 
 and it is therefore for the opponent of the Sankhya to 
 dispose of it in that way if he can. S'ankara however 
 challenges an example in support of the Sankhya's ne- 
 gative proposition, and asks for a parallel instance of an 
 inanimate fabric being produced from a material other 
 than Brahma. It would be easier for him to disprove 
 the Sankhya's negative, than for the Sankhya to adduce 
 an instance in its support. Still it might not be unjust 
 in itself to demand such an example. But Sankara, 
 when he demands the example, demands it in such a way 
 as would make it absolutely impossible for the Sankhya 
 to satisfy him. He assumes that whatever exists has 
 Brahma for its material ! This is to ask for a thing you 
 have antecedently resolved not to accept. It is in fact 
 a mockery, and is in other words an evasion of the argu- 
 ment. No man can undertake to argue a case where 
 his adversary plainly tells him he will admit no counter 
 evidence. When you allowed room for the Sankhya's 
 argument — when you boasted that if Veda alone were 
 
348 DIALOGUE Vllf. 
 
 proof and arguments disallowed, then the question of 
 Brahma would be degraded into one of mere practice — • 
 nay, Avhen you confidently added, that, as, when there 
 are conflicting texts one may be overruled by another, 
 so, in the conflict of arguments, Veda itself may be over- 
 ruled by the foi*>e of proofs —you virtually staked the 
 correctness of your inference on the result of a logical 
 discussion. But directly you enter into the argument, 
 you endeavour to stop your adversary's mouth by a 
 sddhya-sama, or an assumption, which not only amounts 
 to, but is rather identical with the very proposition under 
 examination. If such was your intention, why did you 
 not say so to the Sankhya at the first onset ? Why did 
 you meet him in the field of argumentation ? Why did 
 you not say plainly that since you cannot agree with the 
 Sdnkhya on first principles, you are mutually nigraha- 
 sthdna to each other, or not in a position to carry on a 
 discussion." 
 
 Rajah. — '* Well, go on with your review of the Vedan- 
 ta Sutras, we shall have plenty of time for discussion 
 afterwards." 
 
 Satyahdma, — ^' I cheerfully acquiesce. Here then is 
 another objection preferred by the followers of the San- 
 khya. ® ' Because of contact with it in dissolution, there 
 
 •nt^^ ^^ i[i=imT'fr^f^^"Hltr ci^^i!^ ^fcT "iff 5r^ i 
 
 Com. Vedant, II. i. 4. 
 
HOW SANKARA MET OBJECTIONS. 349 
 
 ' is incongruity/ * They say if a gross, material, inani- 
 ' mate, divisible, and impure effect have Brahma for its 
 ' cause, then at the dissolution, when the effect resolves 
 ' into, and becomes inseparable from, the cause, it will 
 'defile the cause by association with its own qualities. 
 'Therefore since at the dissolution the cause Brahma 
 ' must become impure like its effect, the doctrine of the 
 ' Upanishad, that the cause of the universe is omniscient 
 * Brahma, becomes incongruous. Moreover, because of all 
 ' distinctions being then dissolved (by absorption in Brah- 
 ' ma) there cannot, at the reproduction, be a production of 
 ' the distinction of enjoyer and enjoyment owing to want 
 ' of direction. This is another incongruity. Again, en- 
 ' joyers being at that time inseparable from the supreme 
 ' Brahma, and a re-production being inevitable even at the 
 ' dissolution occasioned by works, the emancipated also 
 ' are liable to that reproduction. This is another incon- 
 ' gruity still. If you say the universe may, even in dis- 
 ^ solution, remain distinct from the Supreme Brahma, 
 ' then there cannot be a dissolution at all, nor can the 
 ' effect be inseparable from the cause. This is likewise 
 ' an incongruity.' 
 
 ^^^ STTr^TftcTl^fTT f^HW^^'T^^ W^lffRf??^?! ^?iRTag[^f?R^ 
 
 Ibid. II. i. 8.' 
 
350 DIALOGUE VIII. 
 
 The Vedanfcist replies^ : ' Not so, there being example.' 
 S'ankardcharja expounds the aphorism in the following 
 manner. ' There is no incongruity in our doctrine. That 
 
 
 •\0 
 
 
HOW SANKAllA MET OBJECTIONS. 351 
 
 ' which is said as to the effect defiling the cause by con- 
 ' tact with its own qualities on being resolved thereinto ; 
 'it is not a valid objection. Why? Because we have 
 ' instances on our side. There are instances of effects 
 ' not defiling the cause by contact with their own quali- 
 ' ties on being resolved thereinto ; e. g.y earthen saucers 
 *and other manufactures, having mud for their material, 
 ' and being in their separate states distinguished as large, 
 ' small, middling, do not, when resolved into their mate- 
 ' rial, affect it with their own qualities. Neck chains, 
 ' having gold for their material, do not, when dissolved, 
 ' affect their material with their own qualities. The four- 
 ' fold organic modifications, too, of earth (viviparous, 
 'oviparous &;c.) do not in dissolution affect it with their 
 ' own qualities. But on your side there is no example. 
 
 5r^«TtrT^ fsT^i^^KIfl" ^xiXRJcT^fcT ^^Tixg^^: ^^n:^HT^i$^ 
 
 V sj ^ Si 
 
 fir Hf^wfcT I ^fcl^l^ *T^fcr TJ{V ^^TJ "Q^V- 'Fffci ^T?^ ^f^f : 
 
 Ibid. II. i. 9. 
 
352 DIALOGUE VIII. 
 
 ' Nor would it be a dissolution at all, if the effect, when 
 ^ resolved into the cause, could continue with its own 
 ' qualities. And though we say that the cause and effect 
 
 * are inseparable, we mean by such words as mere names, 
 ' that the effect is of the same nature as the cause, not the 
 ' cause as the effect. The objector, again, far understates 
 ' his own argument, when he says that the effect may, 
 ' in dissolution, affect the cause with its own qualities. 
 ' For the same contact remains in the state of existence 
 ^ too, because cause and effect are held inseparable. 
 ' All this is the same as this spirit.' ' All this is Spirit.' 
 
 * This is immortal in its front, even Brahma.' ' All 
 ' this is indeed Brahma.' These texts teach that the 
 ^ cause and effect are inseparable in all the three states. 
 ^ Now the argument by which this difficulty is removed 
 ^ holds equally good in regard to dissolution also, viz. 
 ' that the effect and its qualities, being fictions of Ignor- 
 ^ance, cannot affect the cause. There is also this other 
 
 * example. As a juggler is not himself touched in any 
 
 * of the three states by the projected illusion, because of 
 ' its not being a substance, so the Supreme Spirit is un- 
 ^ touched by the illusion of the world. As also a seer 
 ' of dreams is not touched by the illusion, seen in dreams, 
 ^ because the pleasing vision does not follow the waking 
 ^ state, so the one invariable observer of the three-fold 
 
 * states [of production, continuance, and dissolution] is 
 ^ not touclied by the variable three-fold state. For the 
 ' appearance of the Supreme Spirit, as in the form of 
 ' the three-fold states, is but an illusion, like that of a 
 ' rope in the form of a snake. Thus has it been said 
 ' by scholars versed in the Vedant doctrine : ^ when 
 ' the animal soul, sleeping under an eternal delusion, 
 ' awakes, then it understands itself to be uncreated, un- 
 ' sleeping, undreaming, without a second.' Thus that 
 
HOW SANKARA MET OBJECTIONS. 353 
 
 ' which has been said that in dissohjtion the cause may 
 ' be defiled by the grossness of the effect, is absurd. This, 
 'again, which has been said that ail distinctions being 
 ' then merged in a state of no distinction, there cannot 
 ' be a dix'ecting cause for the reproduction of the distinc- 
 'tions, is also no objection, for there are examples on our 
 ' side. As in sleep and samddhi (or fixed meditation), 
 ' notwithstanding the natural attainment of a state of 
 ' no distinction, the distinctions come to pass again in 
 ' the waking state, as before, because of ignorance not 
 ' being destroyed, — so may it be here too. There is the 
 ' Veda here also ; ' All these creatures, having attained 
 '^ to the [eternally] existent, did not know that they had 
 " attained to the [eternally] existent.' ' Whatever they 
 *' be in this state, whether it be a tiger, or a lion, or a wolf, 
 '^ or a boar, or an insect, or a fly, or a gnat, or a musquito^ 
 '' they become the same [in the reproduction].' As in the 
 ' state of existence [in life], notwithstanding that there 
 ' is no distinction from the Supreme Being, still the 
 ' practice of distinction after tli^ manner of a dream is, 
 'owing to ignorance, not precluded, so may the capacity 
 ' of distinction be inferred also in dissolution owing to 
 * ignorance. By this the idea of the reproduction of the 
 ' emancipated is also refuted, because their ignorance is 
 ' dispelled by full knowledge. With reference to the 
 ' other supposed alternative, that the woiid may, then, in 
 ' dissolution remain distinct from the Supreme Brahma, 
 ' that is also refuted, simply by its not following neces- 
 ' sarily from the premises. Hence this doctrine of the 
 ' Upanishad is consistent.'" 
 
 Rajah. — " I do not wish to interrupt you, Satyakama, 
 but is not this a Sutra in which Vyasa and S'anka- 
 rdcharya inculcate the theory of Maya ? What do you 
 say Vaiyasika to this ?" 
 
 2 z 
 
354 DIALOGUE VIII. 
 
 Vaiydsika. — '' Please your highness, there is nothing 
 in the language of Vyd-sa that countenances such a theory. 
 He only relies on ' examples ' seen in the world, which 
 Sankara correctly expounds notwithstanding that he adds 
 something about Ignorance." 
 
 Satyahdma. — '' And I may add with reference to San- 
 kara himself that he seems to make use of a convenient 
 theory, inculcated by ' certain scholars versed in the 
 Vedant doctrine,' rather than inculcate it himself. He 
 certainly takes advantage of it in self-defence, and so far 
 acquiesces in that doctrine, but he does not enforce or 
 argue for it. His primary argument, suggested by the 
 words in the Sutra, has reference to ' examples.' Earthen 
 saucers do not, when in dissolution, affect their material 
 with their specific qualities, nor neck- chains their gold." 
 
 Rajah, — " Well go on, Satyakama, but we must consi- 
 der afterwards to what extent Sankara has adopted the 
 theory of Maya after having so forcibly written against 
 the idealism of Buddhists." 
 
 Satyahdma. — '^ A third Sankhya objection is thus re- 
 presented'*^. 'It may be said this distinction between 
 
HOW SANKARA MET OBJECTIONS. 355 
 
 ' enjoyer and enjoyment is well known in the world. The 
 ^ sentient soul is the enjoyer. Objects, such as sound, are 
 ' enjoyments. For instance Devadatta is enjoyer. Food 
 'is enjoyment The distinction would be destroyed if 
 ' the enjoyer were to become the enjoyment, or the en- 
 'joyment the enjoyer. Such interchange of conditions 
 ' between the two would be inevitable, if they are iden- 
 
 * tical with their supreme cause Brahma. This con- 
 ' founding of the distinction is not reasonable. As the 
 ' distinction between enjoyer and enjoyment is visible at 
 ' the present moment, so must it be supposed as to the 
 ' past and future. Therefore because of the confounding 
 'of the well known distinction between enjoyer and en- 
 ' joyment, this theory of Brahma as the cause is absurd. 
 'If any one bring forward this objection, the author 
 ' (Vyasa) would reply, 'it is as in the world.' 
 
 ' Such a difference is proved even on our theory, because 
 
 * it is seen in the world. For it is usual to consider, at the 
 'same time, as different from one another, and also 
 ' characteristically alike, waves, froths, and bubbles which 
 ' are various modifications of the sea, though essentially 
 
 * water, and therefore identical with it. Nor can froths 
 ' and waves which, though of the same substance as 
 ' water, are various modifications of the sea, lose their 
 ' separate individualities ; neither are they different in 
 'substance from the sea because they are individually 
 ' separate. So here too there is no confusion of enjoyer 
 
 <i -i 
 
 Z-^tkX^f^ Hf%^f?T II Ibid. II. i. 13. 
 
356 DIALOGUE VIII. 
 
 ' and enjoyment, nor is any thing different from the 
 ' supreme Brahma." 
 
 A fom'th objection is thus noticed ^ ' Because of one 
 ' being styled the other, there is the objection of doing 
 'injury.' S'ankara thus expounds it. 'The theory of a 
 ' sentient cause is again objected to. If the produc- 
 'tion of the universe be from a sentient cause, then 
 ' objections present themselves on the score of doing 
 ' injury. Why ? Because of one being styled the other. 
 ' The Veda styles another, that is the embodied soul, 
 ' Brahma ; thus in the assurance [given to S'wetaketu 
 as follows.] ' He is the Spirit, thou art He, O S'weta- 
 
 ftrfcT ^^Tf^ w\w, -mi^ ^tsf w^\ wrT^ ^5"^ ffieif^rfcr | ^wi ^ 
 
HOW SANKARA MET OBJECTIONS. 357 
 
 'kefcu.' Or [as it may be otherwise construed] another, 
 ' that is Brahma, is styled the embodied soul : thus, ' Hav- 
 'ing created it, he entered into itself,' representing 
 ' God, the unchanged creator, to bo the embodied soul 
 ' by his entrance into his own production. The same 
 ' also appears from the text, ' by entering as this animal 
 'spirit I will make names and forms/ The supreme di- 
 ' vinity, describing the animal soul by the word spirit, shows 
 ' that the embodied soul is not different from Brahma. 
 ' Therefore that which is the agency of Brahma is in truth 
 ' the agency of the embodied soul. Hence, being an 
 
 * independent actor, he would do that which was for his 
 'own benefit, and pleasing to himself, — not that which 
 'was injurious to himself, namely, the assemblage of 
 ' vanities, such as birth, death, decay, and disease. No 
 ' one indeed makes of his own accord a prison for him- 
 ' self, and enters it ; nor, being himself perfectly unstained, 
 ' would he betake himself to a body that is extremely 
 ' foul. And even if he had created a world some how 
 ' or other, he would willingly renounce that which was a 
 ' cause of pain, and take to that which was a cause of 
 'pleasure. And he would remember that this variegated 
 ' and diversified world was created by himself. For 
 ' every person, when he has distinctly performed -an act, 
 'remembers, 'this was done by myself.' Again, as a 
 ' conjurer can, at pleasure, easily dissolve an illusion, [or 
 
 * charm], projected [or set up] by himself, so would 
 ' the embodied soul dissolve this his own creation. But 
 'the embodied soul cannot, at pleasure, easily dissolve the 
 'body, though his own. Thus from non-observation of 
 ' beneficial acts, it may be inferred that the world is pro- 
 
 * duced from an irrational and inanimate cause.' 
 
 It is thus answered ' But it is the superior, because 
 'a difference is inculcated.' Sankara thus expounds it. 
 
358 DIALOGUE VIIT. 
 
 ' The word hut contradicts the foregoing objection. We 
 'call that the world's creator which is omniscient, all 
 'powerful, Brahma, eternal, pure, intelligent, free, true 
 'in his nature, superior to and different from the em- 
 ' bodied soul. There cannot against him be objections 
 ' on the score of doing injury. He has no benefit to 
 ' bring about, nor injury to avert, being eternally free. 
 ' Nor can there ever be in him any lack of knowledge, or 
 ^ of power, being omniscient and all powerful. The embo- 
 ' died soul however is not so. Against him such objec- 
 ' tions may be taken on the score of doing injury. But 
 ' we do not call him the creator of the world. Why so ? 
 ' because a difference in inculcated. ' The spirit is to be 
 '' seen, heard, thought of, meditated on, sought, enquired 
 "after. The embodied soul is then endued with the ex- 
 ''istent. The spirit followed by the knowing spirit.' 
 ' Such inculcation of distinction between agent and ob- 
 *ject shows that Brahma is superior to the embodied 
 ' soul. But is not identity also inculcated ? thus, thou 
 ' art He ! How then can the two contradictory ideas, iden- 
 ' tity and distinction, stand ? This is no fault. Both are 
 ' possible in their respective places after the manner of 
 ' the ether and the ether-in-a-pot. Moreover, when iden- 
 ' tity is inculcated after the fashion of the identification, 
 ' 'thou art He,' then the worldliness of the animal soul 
 ' and the creativeness of Brahma are both passed away. 
 ' Since the practice of all distinctions, set up by Ignorance, 
 ' is contradicted by full knowledge, where then is the 
 ' creation, and where the objection on the score of doing 
 ' injury ? The total exhibition of name, form, act, object, 
 ' instrument, being set up by ignorance is an error, a crea- 
 'ture of thoughtlessness. I have repeatedly told you 
 ' that the world, characterized by good or evil acts, does 
 ' not in reality exist, it being like the fancies of birth, 
 
HOW SANKARA MET OBJECTIONS. 359 
 
 'death, separation, and division. But if the practice 
 'of distinctions be not disallowed, then such texts, as 
 ' 'He is to be sought after,' inculcating a distinction, 
 
 * establish the superiority of Brahma, and preclude the 
 'ascription of fault because of doing injury^.' 
 
 The same objection is again answered. 'It [the 
 
 * objection] is refuted, after the manner of stones &c. ' 
 S'ankara says, 'Moreover, as in the world, of stones, 
 
 * though endowed with the common property of earthi- 
 
360 DIALOGUE VIII. 
 
 ^ness, a great variety is seen, some being gems of great 
 ' value, e. g. diamonds and vaidurya, others of middling 
 'worth, e. g. suryakdnta, others, again, of low estimate, 
 ' fit for casting at dogs and birds ; as also of seeds, 
 •though all partaking of the same earthiness, a great 
 'variety [of developments] is found, of leaves, flowers, 
 'fruits, perfumes, and flavors, e. g. in the sandal and 
 ' champa plants ; as also, in fine, of the same substance 
 ' of food, various effects are produced, e. g. blood, wool, 
 ' so may there be a variety of productions from the same 
 ' Brahma, in the distinction between the animal and 
 ' the knowing souls. Hence 'it is refuted' — meaning, the 
 'objection adduced by the adverse party is refuted. 
 'It may also be said that the product, being agreeably 
 ' to the Veda, a mere nominal one, appears various like 
 'visions seen in dreams^.' 
 
 Another objection is thus met.' If you say, No! 
 ' because an elaborate process is seen, I reply. No! it is like 
 'milk.' S'ankara vsays : 'The saying that one sentient 
 ' Brahma is the only cause of the world is not demonstra- 
 ' ble, because an elaborate process is seen. In this world, 
 ' potters and other workmen, as manufacturers of jars, 
 ' clothes, and other things, are found to accomplish their 
 
HOW SANKARA MET OBJECTIONS. 361 
 
 ' works, by successfully using the instrumentality of many 
 'agencies, earth, staff, wheel, string. You say Brahma 
 ' had no helper. If he had no other instruments to assist 
 
 * him, how could he be the Creator ? Hence Brahma is not 
 ' the cause of the world. If this be said, it is no fault. 
 ' For it is accomplished like milk, through the peculiar 
 
 * property of the substance itself As in the world milk 
 ' or water turns of itself into curds or ice, without requir- 
 
 * ing an external instrument, so also here. But does not 
 ' milk itself when turning into curds require an external 
 
 * instrument, such as heat ? Then how can it be said that 
 
 * the creation is like the operation of milk ? This is no 
 ' fault. Milk is only more quickly turned by heat into 
 
 * the state of curds, but not in a greater measure than it 
 ' would itself attain. If it had not the capacity of turning 
 'into curds, it could not be forced into that state by the 
 
 * power of heat ; for air and ether cannot be forced into 
 ' that state by the power of heat. By the fulness of the 
 ' instrument, also, is its fulness accomplished. But 
 ' Brahma has fulness of power. His fulness cannot be 
 
 * accomplished by any thing else. There is the Veda, 
 ' too, saying. He has no work or instrument. He has no 
 ' equal or superior. His power is heard to be supreme 
 
 * and diversified, and the exercise of his knowledge and 
 ' strength, natural. Therefore, because of his diversified 
 ' power, though but one Brahma, his diversified change, 
 ' like milk, is proved* ? 
 
 3 A 
 
36' 2 DIALOGUE VIII. 
 
 The objection is further answered*^, ' Like gods and 
 ' other beings, in the world/ S'ankara's gloss is as follows : 
 ' Be it so. Milk and other non-sentient things are 
 ' proved by observation to change into curds &c. without 
 'requiring external instruments. But sentient agents, 
 
 ^^^ ^"^ W^%?J^ ^^^TI^ ig^^^fcT I ?^Tf^?fVftwTr: I 
 
 ^mr ^^ i^^iJ ftfcf?: ^^^r x^^^^^T ^'^t'QHt^i^ct^t ^ftr 
 
HOW SANKARA MET OBJECTIONS. 363 
 
 'such as potters, are found to engage in their occupations 
 ' only by applying their tools and instruments to their 
 ' respective works. Why then should sentient Brahma 
 'engage without help? We reply, Like gods and other 
 
 * beings. As in the world, Rishis, and other beings of 
 
 * superior power, though sentient, are, without requiring 
 'any external instruments, found, on the authority of 
 'the illustrative language of Mantras, and of Itihd.sas 
 'and Puranas, to create bodies, houses, chariots and 
 
 * many other things of various descriptions by the simple 
 ' exercise of volition, by virtue of their especial dignities, — 
 ' and as spiders weave their nets of themselves — as also 
 ' cranes conceive without the assistance of their males — 
 ' as again assemblages of the lotus move, without requir- 
 ' ing any external help, from pool to pool, so may Brahma, 
 ' though sentient, himself create the universe without 
 
 * any external instrument.' 
 
 Another objection is thus anticipated^ : 'The whole 
 ' would be affected, or violence done to the Yeda that he 
 
 
364 DIALOGUE VIII. 
 
 ' is without parts.' Sankara says, ' It is proved that the 
 
 * one sentient Brahma, changing himself without a second, 
 'and without requiring external helps, becomes the 
 ' cause of the world. But with a view to clear the sense 
 
 * of the S'astra, he again anticipates an objection : * The 
 ' whole would be affected.' Brahma, as a whole, would 
 ' be changed into the form of his product, because he 
 ' has no parts. If Brahma were, like earth and other 
 ' materials, composed of parts, then one portion might 
 ' be lost, and one portion might stand. But texts, 
 
 * like the following, preclude the possibility of any quali- 
 ' fications, and describe him as without parts. ' Without 
 '* parts, without work, quiet, unstained, without blemish.' 
 " The heavenly soul is without form, uncreated within and 
 ^'without.' 'This great substance is without bounds, 
 '•without end.' 'He is a mass of knowledo^e.' 'This 
 *'is a spirit, not such, not such.' ' Not stout, not thin.' 
 ' The alteration of a part being thus impossible, if the whole 
 
 * be supposed to be altered, then there will be a destruc- 
 ' tion of the root itself, and the exhortation to observe him 
 ' prove futile. Besides, from the want of a Brahma, 
 ' separate from his production, there would be violence 
 ' done to the texts which describe him as uncreated. If 
 ' to obviate this difficulty he were held to be composed 
 ' of parts, then the texts, already cited, which inculcate 
 ' he is without parts, would he outraged. If, again, he 
 ' were supposed to have parts, he would be proved un- 
 ' eternal. On all accounts therefore this theory appears 
 ' impracticable.' 
 
 Answer to the objection. ' But because of the Veda, 
 'because of its being founded on texts,' Sankara thus 
 
HOW SANKARA MET OBJECTIONS. 365 
 
 expounds it. 'The word 6 it^ refutes the objection. There 
 *is indeed no fault on our side. There is no aiFection 
 ' of the whole. Why ? because of the Veda. For as 
 ' the production of the world from Brahma is heard, so 
 'is also his continuance, separate from the production, 
 'heard from the description of the substance and modifi- 
 ' cation as distinct. ' That divinity observed, I am these 
 
 * three s^ods. By entering as animal soul I will make 
 'names and forms.' 'So much is his dignity. The* soul 
 'is greater than he. The world is a quarter of Him. 
 ' Immortality is three quarters of Him in heaven.' His 
 ' existence, as separateTrom his production, is also evident 
 ' from the declaration of his dwelling in the heart, and 
 ' from that of being endowed with [eternal] entity. If 
 ' Brahma were, in his totality, to be held as a production, 
 ' then the following text, ' one is endowed with [eternal] 
 ' entity,' describing the state of sleep, would be futile, 
 
 * because the altered Brahma must be held to be transient, 
 'and because of the non-existence of unaltered Brahma. 
 ' Also because of Brahma not being su1>ject to sensuous 
 ' perception, and the mutation, or product, being subject to 
 ' it. Therefore Brahma is unaltered. Nor can there be any 
 ' violence done to texts which inculcate that He is without 
 ' parts, for that very description is inculcated in the Veda, 
 ' and received. ' It is founded on texts.' Brahma is de- 
 ' pendent on Vedic testimony, not on that of the senses &c. 
 ' He is to be received as inculcated in the Veda. The 
 ' Veda describes Brahma both as unaffected in his tota^lity, 
 ' and also as being without parts. In worldly things, too 
 ' such as stones, Mantras, medicines, owing to varieties of 
 ' place, time, and occasion, powers are seen, productive of 
 ' contradictory effects. They can, neither, be understood by 
 ' mere argumentation without the indoctrination, that of 
 ' such a substance, such are the powers, with such helps, 
 
'S66 DIALOGUE VIII. 
 
 ' such objects, and for such uses. What wonder then that 
 ' the form of Brahma, who is of inconceivable power, 
 
 * cannot be established but by Vedic teaching ? And the 
 ' Pauranikas say, 'one is not to apply argumentation to 
 
 * topics that are inconceivable ; that which is above nature 
 ' is a sign of the inconceivable.' There the truth of matters 
 ' that transcend the senses is based on the Veda alone. 
 ' But may it not be said that contradictions cannot be 
 ^ established even by the Veda, such as the tenet that 
 ' Brahma, though without parts, alters, but not in his tota- 
 ' lity ? If Brahma be without parts, then, either he would 
 ' not alter at all, or would alter in his totality. To say that 
 'he alters in one form, and remains in another, is, by 
 ' introducting a distinction of forms, to say he has parts. 
 ' With reference to practice, contradictory injunctions 
 ' may be both alternately performed, and so there be no 
 ' contradiction, the performance being dependent on the 
 ' soul itself But contradictions [in ontology] cannot be 
 ' reconciled by means of alternation, for a substance is not 
 ' dependent on the soul ; therefore this doctrine is imprac- 
 ' ticable. This is no objection — because the distinction 
 'of forms is held to be a creation of ignorance. A 
 ^substance is proved to be composed of parts by dis- 
 ' tinction of forms created by ignorance. For the moon, 
 
 ' observed as many by the diseased eye, does not therefore 
 ' really become numerous. By a distinction of forms, 
 ' created by ignorance, signifying names and figures, modi- 
 ' fied and unmodified, and not describable either as that 'or 
 ^ another J Brahma is held to be subject to alteration, and 
 ' other conventional ideas, but he remains unaltered, 
 ' in his essential form, superior to all conventional notions. 
 ' The expression, that distinctions of names and forms, 
 ' created by ignorance, are merely in words, protects the 
 ' text about Brahma's being without parts, from being 
 
HOW SANKARA MET OBJECTIONS. 367 
 
 * outrasred. Nor is this text about alteration intended to 
 ' set forth alteration, for there could be no [practical] 
 'fruit resulting from such doctrine, but the following 
 ' aims at setting forth Brahma's spiritual essence, freed 
 ' from all conventional notions, for there is a [practical] 
 ' fruit resulting from that teaching, viz. (commencing with 
 ' the words ' he is a spirit, not such, not such') ' O Janaka 
 'thou hast attained fearlessness.' Therefore there -is 
 ' no fault on our side"^.' 
 
 ^c[^ ^[s^^^c^icr II n ^^^T'^if xtPcttRt "t^i^^ct 
 
 xra ^f^^fxT ^l^f^ ^c(l^cT fi^5I^fW^f% ^^5 ^^: ^^^^ 
 
 ^ ^P^5f3riXf?:fr[xnT^-« i c{^T^i% ^"f^^rcf w^ i ^^ fir^- 
 
368 DIALOGUE vni. 
 
 Another objection is again brought forward : ' Not so, 
 'for there must be an object.' S'ankara says, ' He again 
 'anticipates an objection to the universe being a produc- 
 'tion of a sentient beiag. The sentient supreme could not 
 ' have fabricated this spectre of a world, for efforts must 
 'have objects. In the world a sentient person, acting on 
 ' previous deliberation, is seen to engage, even in small 
 ' efforts, to say nothing of great efforts, moved by some 
 ' objects of his own. There is also the text concurring 
 ' with this popular idea, — ' Every thing is not agreeable 
 * to every one's desire, but every thing is agreeable to 
 
 ^ Ox Cs 
 
 '^flr^T^' -^^ftj^ ^^ift ^TfcTTrr^ Fj^^if rj^x^mi ^i#t- 
 
now SANKARA MET OBJECTIONS. 369 
 
 'the Spirit's desire.' The effort is indeed a great under- 
 ' taking, that the world, with its varieties of high and low, 
 ' should be fabricated. But if this effort on the part of 
 nhe sentient Supreme Spirit be supposed to have an 
 'object of his own, then the all-contentedness of the 
 ' Supreme Spirit, taught in the Veda, would be contradict- 
 'ed. And if such an object be not supposed, there 
 'could not be the effort. Perhaps it may be said that 
 ' a maniac, though sentient, is sometimes seen to engage 
 ' in efforts, by a default of his understanding, without 
 'an object of his own. The Supreme Spirit may have 
 ' ent^agfed in a similar manner. But in that case violence 
 * would be done to the Vedic doctrine of his omniscience. 
 'Therefore creation from a sentient cause is impossible^.' 
 The objection is thus answered. ' But it is only a sport, 
 ' as in the world.' S'ankara expounds it thus: ' By the word 
 ' hut he repels the objection. As in the world a king or 
 ' courtier, having attained all his wishes, may be seen, in 
 ' games and amusements, to engage in efforts, merely as 
 
 TTftS^f^ TT^^<iriT5 ^^TTTTXir ^T?3fT ^[^^^1^1$ =?! y^T^THlftft 
 
 3 B 
 
370 DIALOGUE VIII. 
 
 ' sports, without aiming at any objects, — and as acts of 
 ' respiration also take place naturally without aiming at any 
 'other external objects,— so does God's effort naturally 
 ' take place, after the manner of a sport, without looking 
 'for any other objects. The assignment of an ulterior 
 'object to God is not consistent with reason or Veda. 
 'Nor can nature oppose an argument. Although the 
 ' fabrication of this spectre of a world appears to us like 
 ' a great undertaking, yet to God it is a mere sport, be- 
 ' cause his power is unbounded. Although again with 
 ' reference to worldly sports, some subtle object may be 
 'imagined, still no object can be imagined here, for 
 ' the Veda says. He is one that has attained his wishes. 
 ' Nor can the want of an effort, or a mad effort, be sup- 
 ' posed, because of the texts inculcating creation and all 
 ' power^.' 
 
 " Please your highness, continued Satyakama, I must 
 submit that S'ankara's replies to the Sankhya are not at 
 all conclusive. He commences with logic, but falls back 
 
 ^^f^^TTi^^^"Ri ^T=rt ^T^miw^ ^T ^f%ft:w f^f^c?^ wt^^ 
 
 St 
 
 ^^T^TTT xr^fxT Hf^^fcT I ^^'sit:^ ^jft^r^Tn^rt f^^WHlW 
 ^^ ir^sT-JT^^Wcr crmft" ^m'^ fwf^'^ ^^m^j^-^fm'i 
 
 ^(^^^^1 ll.i.33. . 
 
sankara's self-contradiction. 371 
 
 on the Veda, and then, at last, when neither logic nor 
 Veda is of any avail, he has recourse to the traditional 
 doctrine of his school that the world is a fiction of igno- 
 rance, that there is no real universe, that it is Brahma 
 himself that appears to you in the form of the world, just 
 as a rope may do in that of a snake, and that there is no 
 creation in reality ! Without going into the question of 
 Maya, at present, I shall only say that S'ankara has him- 
 self argued for the reality of the external world, which in 
 most of his answers here he also takes for granted, and his 
 arguments lead to the theory that so far as the world is 
 a reality, it is itself God. He quotes texts which declare 
 that the world is the same as this spirit or God. That 
 the world is a reality is a doctrine, he himself incul- 
 cates elsewhere, and it is only by self-contradiction that 
 he can maintain his position against the Sd,nkhya." 
 
 Rajah. — " What self-contradiction ?" 
 
 Satyahdma. — '^He says in his reply to the Sankhya, 
 'The appearance of the Supreme Spirit, as in the form 
 'of the three-fold states, is but an illusion, like that of a 
 ' rope in the form of a snake.' He says, elsewhere, in his 
 reply to the Buddhists. ' Desirous of denying external 
 ' objects, they turn them into a simile by using the phrase 
 ' like the externals.^ He rebukes the Buddhists for deny- 
 ing the reality of the external world, and yet saying that 
 the forms internally perceived are like the externals. The 
 rebuke is certainly well deserved, for, as he justly adds, 
 'no one can say Vishnu Mitra is like a barren woman's 
 son.' But the same rebuke may with equal propriety 
 be administered to himself for denying the reality of the 
 ' three-fold states,' and yet maintaining that the Supreme 
 Spirit appears in those forms. To use his own words, 
 again, ' no one can say that Vishnu Mitra is like a bar- 
 ren woman's son.' If the * spectre of a world' be an 
 
372 DIALOGUE Vlll. 
 
 unreality, ' like a barren woman's son/ then it is absurd 
 to say God appears in that form. If the 'spectre' be 
 not altogether 'like a barren woman's son,' whatever 
 minimum of reality may be ascribed to it, as an object 
 of sensuous perception, must so far be material, and if 
 that minimum of material reality be solemnly styled 
 God, it must be material pantheism to the same extent." 
 
 '' But, answered Vaiyasika, neither Vydsa nor S'ankara- 
 charya has said that God is a gross material substance." 
 
 ''It is true he has never said that. It is also true that 
 he desired that the world should be looked upon as God, 
 not God as the world''*; but the conversion cannot be 
 altogether precluded if Brahma be an undivided and in- 
 divisible essence. Indeed when the Vedantic doctor brino:s 
 in his caveat against the assimilation of God with the 
 world, he does so as a matter of ethical policy. It will 
 only be enhancing the coachman's dignity to give him a 
 royal title. No one in our country takes offence on being 
 addressed a king. In truth the word Maharaja has become 
 a mere term of compliment like the English Sir. But you 
 will not do well to address the King as a subject. That 
 will be a degradation of the royal dignity. This is a way 
 of reasoning which ill suits the solemnity of the subject. 
 It is only by way of compliment that a subject can ever 
 be addressed with royal appellatives, and the appellatives 
 themselves have in such a case a gauna, or figurative, sig- 
 nification. But if you were seriously and solemnly to call an 
 ordinary person your King, as verily and indisputably the 
 
 ^^ ^^^f%^<^^Ic[ 11 Vedanta, IV. i. 5. 
 
 cTWT'cr ^f%^[^T^^?m1 H^fcT^ffT2:?'f^f^ f^^^«ll%cT^frT 
 
DEIFYING OF CREATURES OPPOSED TO GODS GLORY. 373 
 
 Vedant does every creature, it would involve the guilt of 
 high treason against your rightful sovereign. Even though 
 you did not dishonor your King by calling him a subject, 
 still if you render royal honors to all his subjects, you 
 virtually degrade him by elevating every body else to the 
 level of his dignity. Levelling may be brought about in 
 two ways. You may either bring down your high places 
 to the level of the low, or you may raise your low grounds 
 to the height of your eminences. In either case there 
 will be a levelling. And so you may destroy the royal 
 dignity either by degrading the king, or by unduly exalting 
 the subject. You may not say in so many words that 
 God is an impure material substance ; it is impossible for 
 a cultivated mind so barefacedly to belie our moral persua- 
 sions as to affirm that God is an impure material sub- 
 stance. And yet when the world is pronounced to be 
 identical with Him, that revolting doctrine is involved in 
 the declaration. Men have, since the days of Vyasa, en- 
 deavoured to refine the grossness of the theory by incul- 
 cating that the world is an illusion, not a reality. Vyasa 
 however has himself never said so, and you, Vaiyasika, 
 yourself read out, at the marriage assembly, S'ankarkcha- 
 rya's strictures on Buddhistic idealism. Whether S'ankara 
 is consistent or not is a different question. The case is 
 worse for the Vedant if he has not been able to maintain 
 his consistency, if its great champion, while inculcating 
 that the external universe has the same evidence for its 
 reality as the internal spirit, is driven, in his encounter with 
 antagonistic objections, to self contradictions. We may 
 examine more fully bye and bye his tenets as to the illusory 
 character of the world. I shall simply remark now that 
 even if author and commentator had both declared the 
 world to be an illusion that would not save their doctrine ; 
 for what would then become of S'ankara's assertion that 
 
374 DIALOGUE VIII. 
 
 there is the characteristic attribute of entity as a common 
 qualification between Brahma and the world. His argu- 
 ment would be destroyed by his own pen, if he wrote that 
 the world was not a real entity, after having argued that 
 the quality of entity in the cause, Brahma, is found in the 
 effect, the world, — the only common attribute which he 
 could cite in defence of his theory against the Sankhya." 
 
 Agamiha. — " But what inconsistency could there be 
 in the saying that God projected this spectre of a world, 
 which has an illusory entity, but is himself a real entity 
 and no illusion V 
 
 Satyakdma. — '^ S'ankara himself has told us that there 
 is no medium between entity and non-entity i. If an 
 illusion means no things then it is a mere play on words 
 to speak of illusory entity. In case you pronounce the 
 world to be a mere illusion, it cannot have the quality of 
 entity as a common characteristic attribute with Brahma. 
 Besides what is the doctrine under discussion ? Is it not this, 
 that Brahma is not only the author or efficient cause, but 
 also the prakritiy or substance, the subject matter of 
 the world. If the world be an illusion projected by him- 
 self, he cannot be its substance or subject matter. The 
 Mdyi, or conjurer, may be the author, he cannot be the 
 substance of the illusion by means of which he be- 
 guiles or deceives you. If it be a sensible illusion, its 
 substance or basis, however subtle, must also be an object 
 of sensuous perception, and therefore material. And if 
 the Mayi is himself both the substantial and efficient 
 cause of his illusion —if the illusion be himself, — and it is 
 at the same time an object of sensuous perception, then the 
 projector must also be an object of sensuous perception, 
 or in other words material." 
 
 ^ ^ ^^? ^^ ^f^ ^T^fcT ^T f^^^T2I? I. 1.2. 
 
DIFFICULTIES OF PANTHEISM. 375 
 
 The Chobdar now came in and said tliat pundit Tarka- 
 kkma was waiting in the public hall, desiring to confer 
 his benediction on the Rajah. 
 
 " Show him into this room," said the Rajah. Tarka- 
 kama entered the room and pronounced his benediction. 
 As soon as he was comfortably seated, his highness said, 
 *' we are discussing the Vedant doctrine. Satyak&,ma 
 contends that it inculcates material pantheism." 
 
 Tarkakdma. — " Material pantheism ! There is no word 
 for matter in the whole Vedant, nor in the Sanscrit 
 language." 
 
 Satyakdma. — ^* That may be true, but the idea con- 
 veyed by the word matter exists both in the Vedant and 
 in Sanscrit. The external world, as the object of sensu- 
 ous perception, corresponds to that idea, and the external 
 world is declared to be God. This is material pantheism. 
 What again can the word prakriti mean but matter ? 
 And God is, in so many words, called the prakriti of the 
 world." 
 
 Tarkakdma. — '^ But what objections can you have to 
 the opinion that all this, the whole universe, is God ? " 
 
 Satyakdma. — ^' If you say the external world is identi- 
 cal with God, then there cannot be a God over it, and 
 the assertion involves the Sankhya theory of there being 
 no God besides or above the universe, which is described 
 as a spontaneous production from nature. The assertion 
 would amount to atheism, for if there be no God besides 
 the world itself, there can be no God over and above it. 
 Or if you say the world is God in the same sense in which 
 froth is water, you affirm that it is consubstantial with 
 God, which is saying, in other words, that the material 
 is consubstantial with the spiritual, — that matter and 
 spirit are the same substance. This is a clear contradic- 
 tion in terms, and involves the very confusion of ideas, 
 
376 DIALOGUE Vlll. 
 
 which all our philosophers call a falise notion. If again 
 you say that the world is God because it is an emanation 
 from Him, then in case you call that emanation a subs- 
 tance or thing, it must so far be a part or particle of 
 the divinity. The divinity cannot then be an integral 
 substance, devoid of parts, or incapable of increase or 
 diminution, for the smallest particle must still be a part, 
 the separation of which, as at the creation, must be a 
 diminution of the Deity, and its reunion at the dissolution 
 an increase of the same. But you declare rightly that 
 God is devoid of parts, member, or body. Or if you say 
 that the world, as an emanation from Deity is absolutely 
 nothing, a mere charm, so that its separation involves no 
 decrease, nor its restoration any increase of the divine 
 substance, than you not only contradict Vyasa's and 
 S'ankara's own arguments for the reality of the world, 
 but you maintain that which is falsified by every branch 
 of evidence to which appeal can possibly be made in a 
 discussion between man and man. If, finally, you 
 declare in a gauna, or figurative, sense that the world is 
 God, only meaning thereby that it bears witness to, and 
 is dependent on, the power and wisdom of God, you 
 ought, in order to avoid the possibility of mistake on 
 such a solemn subject, clearly and unequivocally to confess, 
 at the same time, that the world is not and can never be 
 really and essentiall}^ God — that the formula ^ thou art 
 He,' is not only not maha-vakya or a great mysterious 
 saying, but that it is only a complimentary atyukti or 
 hyperbole, — that the knower of God is not and cannot 
 be God, — and that God and" the universe are distinct 
 substances as Creator and creature. 
 
 " But Sankaracharya insists on the identity of the soul 
 with God in a literal sense of the term. He says that 
 identity is not founded on a mere community of attribute 
 
SANKAllAS IDEA OF SOULS IDENTITY WITH GOD. 377 
 
 or quality, whereby a small thing may be classed as one with 
 a greater ; nor is it a mistaking of one thing for another, 
 as when it is said, Mind is Brahma, A'ditya is Brahma. 
 Neither is the identity founded on any occasional acts of 
 assimilation, or absorption, such as the resolution of things 
 into the atmosphere, or the vital air, as it is heard in the 
 Sanvarga vidyd : 'The atmosphere is the great receptacle. 
 ' When fire blazes up, or is extinguished, it is resolved into 
 ' the atmosphere, when the sun sets, it is resolved into the 
 ' atmosphere, when the moon sets, it is resolved into the 
 'atmosphere. Whatever dries up resolves itself into the 
 'atmosphere. The atmosphere receives them all.' Nor 
 again is that identity after the fashion of vicariously 
 taking the consecrated butter for the woman, as in the 
 New and Full moon sacrifices. If the unity of the soul 
 with Brahma were taken in these factitious senses, 
 violence would be done to texts teaching the substantial 
 unity of the soul with God, such as, 'Thou art He/ 
 'I am Brahma.' 'This soul is Brahma^.' 
 
 Tr^lET«R«^^5 ifY^cT I I. 1. 4. The technical words here used are thus explained . 
 ^ ^^^f% ^T^^^Wf^ ^T^UcTT'T H^T^ iH«i"^-^ ll Eatnaprabh^. 
 
 N* S» >J ^ X "S "S 
 
 3 c 
 
378 DIALOGUE VIII. 
 
 '^ The Vedantic theory, continued Satyakama, Is simply 
 a delusion. It is itself avidydy conflicting with what 
 logicians call accurate knowledge. A writer of no mean 
 authority says ; ^ Thou art verily rifled, O thou animal 
 ' soul, of thy understanding, by this dark theory of Maya, 
 ' beccxuse like a maniac, thou constantly ravest, ^ I am 
 ^Brahma.' Where is thy divinity, thy sovereignty, thy 
 ^omniscience? O thou animal soul ! thou art as different 
 ' from Brahma as is a mustard seed from Mount Meru^.' 
 Certainly the idea we have of God, and the experience 
 we have of the visible universe, are widely different. 
 God, you rightly say, is without body, and without parts. 
 The universe has both. God is not an object of external 
 perception. The universe is. You cannot see, hear, or 
 touch God. You may the world. God is immutable. 
 The world is changeable. God is not subject to decay. 
 The universe is. The two therefore can neither be iden- 
 tical nor consubstantial. They do not bear the relation 
 which earth and jar, gold and neckchain, yarn and cloth, 
 sea and froth, bear to one another. I thought the simple 
 citation of passages which contain such extravagant 
 sentiments would be a sufficient refutation of the theory. 
 That was the reason of my not adding many remarks of 
 my own. If all this be God, then matter and spirit are 
 one. What a confusion of ideas this must be I What 
 criteria for the distinguishing of truth and falsehood will 
 then remain ?" 
 
 Tarhakdyna. — ^'If 3^ou mean that the Vedanta destroys 
 differences and distinctions, you confess to a fact which is 
 
 St . 
 
 Tattvva-muktivali by Gaudapurn^nanda. 
 
TRANSMUTATION OP INDIVIDUALITY IMPOSSIBLE. 379 
 
 the glory of the system. It does obliterate distinctions 
 and differences." 
 
 Satyakdma. — "I cannot conceive what glory there can 
 be in obliterating distinctions that exist essentially, or in 
 identifying things naturally different. The writer I have 
 just cited, adds on this point : 'Thou art a finite soul, He 
 ' is infinite. Thou canst occupy but one space at a time, 
 'He is always every where. Thou are momentarily 
 'happy or miserable, He is happy at all times. How 
 ' then canst thou say, ' I am He V Hast thou no siiame^T 
 The self-denying devotee, the sensual voluptuary, and the 
 blood-thirsty t3^rant must be the same according to your 
 theory, because each is God." 
 
 ' Tarkakdma. — " The Vedanta never encourages a volup- 
 tuary to say, I am God. It only teaches that the knower 
 of God becomes Brahma." 
 
 '' No one can become, said Satyakama, what essentially 
 he is not. You must allow me to quote another passage 
 yet from Gauda-purndrianda. ' Glass is glass, stone is 
 ' stone, shell is shell, silver is silver. There can never be 
 ' a cessation of their distinctive notions. Never does a 
 ' Sudra, although devotedly worshipping Brahmins, with- 
 ' out intermission, become himself a Brahmin. He may 
 ' obtain a little merit, but the Sudra race cannot attain to 
 'Brahminhood^.' There is no such thing as a transmu- 
 
 ^^ ?T^ ^fe ^cf W^t -ST ^^^ II 
 3S:i^5TlfcT: II 
 
380 DIALOGUE VIII. 
 
 tation of individuality. If the Vedanta teaches that 
 certain men may each become God by the knowledge of 
 Brahma, but that every man is not God, it teaches what 
 is simply an impossibility. 
 
 *' Again S'wetaketu was assured, ' Thou art He,' before 
 he was perfected in knowledge. Hence it is acknow- 
 ledged by implication that he was essentially God. S'an • 
 kara distinctly taught this by repudiating any other 
 sense of the souFs unity with God. 
 
 '^ All men must thus be identical, because each soul is 
 essentially God, whether it be aware of it or not. This 
 is an inference which, as I have just shown, 1 am not 
 gratuitously deducing from your principles. Those who 
 think with you have drawn it themselves. But that 
 ^all are identical is disproved by the very fact of this 
 conference. On no trust- worthy evidence can you or I 
 say that we are the same individual. We have every 
 possible kind of proof to believe that we are separate 
 persons. The difficulty we feel in agreeing on vital 
 points is itself no small evidence of what I say. But 
 even if we could agree in all things — if we were of one 
 heart and one mind, we would still continue separate 
 personalities. If you were pinched, I should not feel it. 
 If you saw a fine sight, I should not participate in your 
 sensation. Our hearts might be so knit that we should 
 perfectly sympathize with each other ; and so when you 
 communicate your joy or your sorrow I may be a parta- 
 ker of it. But it would be a gross error to say we are 
 identical. That error is involved in the theory that every 
 person is God. 
 
 *^ Kanada says rightly, that souls are manifold, be- 
 cause of varieties in condition. The scholiast S'ankara 
 Mis'ra says on that aphorism : ' Souls are manifold. 
 * Why ? Because of varieties. One is respectable, another 
 
MORAL CONSEQUENCES OF PANTHEISM. 381 
 
 ' poor. One is happy, another miserable. One is high, 
 'another is low. One is a scholar, another a clown. 
 * These varieties, which cannot be reconciled with the 
 ^ unity of the Spirit, prove the distinction of souls^.' 
 
 "Consider the moral consequences of the pantheistic 
 doctrine. The founder of the system himself is anxious 
 that his followers should still continue in the perform- 
 ance of the duties they owe to God and man. But if 
 God and man be identical, then there can be no relation 
 in life to give rise to the notion of duty. If there be 
 only one essence in the world, then, 'who will regard, 
 or honour, and whom ?' — says the TJpanishad. Where 
 there is a diflference of personality, one can perform cer- 
 tain offices to another. Such an interchange of offices 
 is impossible where all are one^. It would be absurd 
 to say that one can adore or worship himself In truth 
 Vedantic authors have boldly asserted that they are 
 subject to no law, no rule, and that there is no such 
 thing as virtue or vice, injunction or prohibition. 
 
 " Ponder now the drift of your theory. To give up 
 all distinctions between right and wrong — all morals, all 
 
 ^ ^^^T^ ^TTT I "I. ii. 20. 
 
 "^ 2T^ ff ^iT^ Vr^fcT <Tf^cT?; TJ\K xn?TfcT crt^TcTC l^cT?: 
 ffc^ ^ I^^T^^TcT I Brihad. 
 
382 DIALOGUE viir. 
 
 religioQ, all science, all philosophy — would be to reduce 
 human nature to a chaotic state — to destroy the bands 
 of society, and outrage the sanctity and decency of 
 domestic life. Once more I remind you of what the 
 pious author, already cited, says : ^ If I and the whole 
 ' universe be God, then you and I are one. Then my 
 'wealth, my children, my wife, must be our common 
 ^property, without any distinction. If, again, there be 
 ' such unity, how can there be injunction or prohibition ? 
 ' If you are decided that there is no difference, then what 
 * faults have the Buddhists committed^ ?' What barrier 
 can you oppose to the encroachments of bad passions, if 
 men are to be persuaded that there can be in reality no 
 law binding on any individual ; that virtue and vice, 
 right and wrong, are mere vydvahdrikaj or conventional 
 ideas, founded on misapprehension ; that no one can do 
 good or evil to his neighbour, there being no such thing 
 as a neighbour, for all are one." 
 
 Rajah. — '^ Is it fair, Satyakama, to deduce far-fetched 
 inferences of an immoral tendency from a system which 
 repudiates such tendency ? Can you show on any res- 
 pectable authority that principles of an immoral tendency 
 have been practically deduced from the doctrine of the 
 soul's unity with God ?" 
 
 Satyakama. — '^ Without making any remarks on your 
 highness's first question, I shall only say, in reply to the 
 second, that I think I can show that inferences of an 
 immoral tendency have been deduced from the Vedant 
 doctrine of the identity of the creature with the Creator. 
 
mMORALITY JUSTIFIED BY PAIS THEISM. 383 
 
 The Upanishads do not allow the possibility of any offices 
 being done by one person to another. This is in itself a 
 denial of all kinds of duty or obligation. And it is S'an- 
 karacharya's own argument when he justifies the in- 
 equalities found in the world by the plea that God and 
 the world being essentially one, there can be no such 
 thing as injustice ! 
 
 S'ankara's arofument has ao^ain been enforced in another 
 way in the Sri-Bhdgavata, second only, perhaps, to the 
 Pa7icha-rdt7'a, in point of authority as a text-book of 
 Bhagavatas. These theosophists receive the pantheistic 
 element of the Vedant, notwithstanding their peculiari- 
 ties in other respects. The character which they set up 
 as the incarnation of the Supreme Being was a foul 
 pattern of sensuality and lust. No community can en- 
 courage such sensuality without bringing instant ruin on 
 itself Now the Bhagavatas do not say that sensuality 
 and lust are themselves innocent. How then do they 
 justify the irregularities of the youthful Krishna ? Chief- 
 ly by relying on the theory of pantheism. King Parik- 
 shit asks S'uka, ' The Lord of the world became incar- 
 ' nate with a view to establish virtue and put down vice. 
 ' How could he, then, the preacher, the author, and the 
 ' keeper of the bridges of virtue, behave so inconsis- 
 ' tently, and dally with other men's wives V S'ukadeva 
 says in reply, ' He who lives within the cowherdesses, 
 * their husbands, and indeed all embodied souls, is the 
 'rightful owner and possessor of the sporting body®.' 
 
 ^^HI^ 1 Sri BhtCgavata. 
 
384 DIALOGUE VI ri. 
 
 This is a practical api3lication of the pantheistic dogma 
 of the Upanishads and the Brahma-sutras, at which one 
 cannot help looking aghast, and your highness will allow 
 it is a serious warning against the reception of that dogma." 
 Tarkahdma. — '* But S'uka does not not say that the 
 example of Vdsudeva can be safely followed by a mortal. 
 
 * He who is not himself divine should not commit 
 ' such acts even in his mind. If a mortal were foolish 
 ' enough to do so, he would perish as inevitably as if 
 
 * one, not being Rudra, took the sea-produced poison. 
 ' The words of the gods are true, their acts only occasion- 
 ' ally right. What is agreeable to their words, the wise 
 'are to observe in their conduct^^" 
 
 Satyahdma. — *' It will be practically hard to persuade 
 men to observe the precepts of those whose examples they 
 are instructed to avoid. But the gods (Is'wardndm), 
 spoken of in the plural, necessarily include other persons 
 than Vasudeva, and they represent a dignity, certainly 
 within the reach of mortal ambition, according to the 
 transcendental system of Bhagavata pantheism. ^ Every 
 thing is Krishna from Brahma to a bundle of grass ^' 
 So that every person can consider himself Bhagavan, 
 and, as such, claim the same liberty of action as Vasu- 
 deva. Especial mention is made of the dignity of the 
 Guru, or spiritual preceptor, who is entitled to equal 
 honor with Krishna himself^. The Gurus and other 
 
 %^t ?Tor^^^^^ ^f^TTT^cT HHT^^cT | Sri-Bh%avata. 
 ^T^T'^^'^^^^ '^^ IfM^TT"^^ I N^rada panch.r^tra. 
 
IMMORAL CONSEQUENCES OF PANTHEISM. 385 
 
 men of note in the Vaishnava community, eagerly ac- 
 cept the honor thus conferred on them, and do not scruple 
 to avail themselves of the privilege, therewith joined, of 
 following Krishna's example. I do not wish to pry into 
 the secrets of society, but it is no breach of charity, or 
 departure from decorum, to notice what appears on the 
 surface. Men there are who profess to have abandoned 
 the world for the sake of their Bhagav^n, and who are 
 sometimes regarded as having, even in life, earned a 
 sort of equality with him. They are then considered as 
 Prabhus, or Lords, and females are never wanting who 
 glory in the title of sevd-ddsi, or ministering slaves, and 
 who take as much pride and delight in placing their tan, 
 man, and dhan, (body, mind, and wealth) at the service 
 of those prabhus, as the cowherdesses of Vrindavan had 
 ever done in devoting their whole selves to Krishna. 
 
 " S'uka himself adds in justification of Krishna, that 
 ' if sages, who emancipated from the bondage of works by 
 ' contact with the dust of his own lotus feet, and by the 
 ' peculiar power of yoga, or contemplation of personal 
 ' unity with him, are at liberty to act as they please, 
 ' then what restraints could be imposed on the body 
 * voluntarily adopted by the god^." 
 
 Rajah. — " But I am not yet satisfied that Yjissi, did 
 not elsewhere say something in modification of this ap- 
 parent assimilation of God with the material world." 
 
 IPfv^TC W^ ir^J W^i XR:T"f^^s II Ibid. 
 
 Sri-Bhigavata. 
 3 D 
 
'AS6 DIALOGUE Tin. 
 
 Tarkakdma. — ^' Sankaracharya says plainly that the 
 Universe is an illusion. How could he materialize the 
 Deity by his doctrine ?" 
 
 Satyakdma. — " He falls back on that traditional teach- 
 ing only with a view to answer objections. He does not 
 assert it as a primary doctrine of his school. It is only 
 when logic and Veda both fail, that he betakes himself 
 to that theory. In order to arrive at right conclusions 
 on this point, we must discriminate between Vydsa the 
 founder, S'ankara the commentator, and the minor com- 
 mentaries and elementary treatises, of the system. That 
 the Vedanta doctrine was very much modified by the 
 successors of Yy4sa, no one in his senses can deny : and 
 therefore it is a great historical inaccuracy to attribute to 
 the founder the doctrines contained in the Panchadas'i, and 
 little manuals such as the Vedanta Sara and the Paribha- 
 sh^. Vyasa repeatedly identified the world with God, 
 and contended strenuously for the reality of the external 
 Universe. 
 
 '*The characteristic doctrine of the Vaiyasika Vedanta 
 is that God being himself the efficient and substantial 
 cause of all things, the universe is necessarily consub- 
 stantial with Him. The characteristic doctrine of later 
 Vedantists, (the veddnti-bruvas, or the so-called Vedantists, 
 to use Vijn^na Bhikshu's term^,) is that the Universe is 
 but an illusion, projected by God, and is itself God. It is 
 no doubt in reference to Vyksa himself that the master 
 spiritualizer, Gaudapada, says, in his Kkrika on the Man- 
 dukya Upanishad, that ^ it is contemplaters of the creation 
 who consider this to be an expansion of God^.' 
 
 " I confess I cannot speak of the commentator's teach- 
 ing with the same confidence as the founder s. S'ankard- 
 
 4 See note 1 page SKi, . * f^Vrft* U^^S^ef^ ^^'^ ^f^ferff^T^ tl 
 
CREATION OF AVIDYA. 387 
 
 chdrya lived at a time when the pantheism of the original 
 Vedanta had been much modified by the general reception 
 of the Buddhistic doctrine of Maya. In expounding 
 the Sdtras, S'ankara, while stoutly contending for the 
 doctrine delivered by Vyasa, and opposing the idealism of 
 the Buddhists, could not maintain his consistency in bis 
 conflict with the Sankhya, and so allowed himself, in some 
 respects, to diverge from the old doctrine. He spoke of 
 the world as the creation of Avidyd, or ignorance, thereby 
 giving some reason to the followers of the Sankhya to 
 charge him with inconsistency, and although he has gene- 
 rally avoided calling the universe itself an illusion, he has 
 in one or two places, at least, described it as such. But 
 by speaking of the world as the creation of Avidyd, he did 
 not necessarily deny its reality. The Brahrainical mind 
 had from times immemorial found it diflicult to believe 
 that great exploits could ever be performed without some 
 impulse, contra-distinguished from reason and deliber- 
 ation, and akin to Avidyd. The passions and emotions 
 were supposed to be the very opposites of reason and 
 discrimination ; and, long before the rise of philosophical 
 schools, Indra, fabled as the lord of heaven, was supposed 
 to have been equal to his great efforts, (one of which at 
 least involved the act of creation,) only because he had 
 been under intoxication^ ! 
 
 " S'ankara however does not use the favourite phraseo- 
 logy of later spiritualizers, that the illusion is neither 
 existent nor non-existent. His own ideas of substantial 
 reality are marked by an exactitude, utterly at variance 
 with such a loose proposition, — a mode of talking which, 
 
 ^ VK^cT i3fwff i7^w^ €]j\-^ m H^ X'^^^ix: !i 
 
 Max MuUer's, l^ig Veda, Vol. II. p. 483. 
 
388 DIALOGUE VIII. 
 
 as Kapila rightly says, becomes none but idiots and 
 children'. 
 
 ^' S'ankara's view of substantial existence is very dif- 
 ferent from that of spiritualizers who distinguish vydva- 
 .hdrikay or conventional, from pdramdrthika, or real, 
 existence. The terms are indeed found in his writings, 
 but he has not technicalized them after the fashion of 
 the Paribhash'a and the Ved'anta Sara. To prevent mis- 
 takes, however, I must add that great as my admiration 
 is of S'ankarach^rya's talents, I cannot repose much 
 confidence in his opinions, he has so often contradicted 
 himself on points of vital importance. You know how 
 he has reasoned, against the Buddhists, that waking sen- 
 sations are essentially different from dreams, and yet, in 
 his commentary on Gaudapada's K^rik^ on the Mdn- 
 duJcya Upanishad, he follows that writer in comparing 
 our waking sensations of the world with dreams, and 
 joins him in placing ' contemplaters of the creation' in 
 opposition to ' contemplaters of the chief good, who take 
 no interest in the creation' !^" 
 
 Rajah. — *^ But you say Vyksa does not inculcate the 
 doctrine of Maya in his siltras. I have read of an Eng- 
 lish scholar's citing one in proof of that doctrine." 
 
 Satyahdma. — "The 3rd of III. ii. was cited by Colonel 
 Kennedy ,M)ut under a great mistake. It reads thus : ' But 
 'it is a mere illusion, because its reality does not ap- 
 'pear by the whole of the properties of real substances^.' 
 
 '' ^f^^cT^Sftr ^T^fHi^ff^ ^TTTt^^^T ^I^f^'ffTft^^^ II 
 
 Sinkhya Sdtra, I. 29 
 
THEORY OF MAYA NOT TAUGHT BY VYASA. 389 
 
 The latter part is of course elliptical. As the Colonel 
 was not satisfied with S^ankara's explanation, let us con- 
 sider the Siltra in detail. The 2nd P4da of the 3rd chap- 
 ter commences with discussing the question whether the 
 ideas which arise in the mind in dreams are real, as are 
 those which arise in the waking state. ' In the intermediate 
 state [between sound sleep and waking, i. e., in dreams] 
 is there a real creation ? for it is so said^^' S'ankara proves 
 by citing a Vedic text that the 'intermediate state' means a 
 dream. He thus expounds the question contained in the 
 Siitra : 'There is the doubt, Is the creation (or ima- 
 ' gination in dreams) real, as is the case in the waking 
 'state? ^^ * * for the Veda says so^* The question is 
 repeated in the 2nd Siitra where reference is made to 
 other Vedic passages, seemingly inculcating that dreams 
 are real. In the 3rd Siitra (that which the Colonel 
 quoted) the author decides the question by declaring 
 that a dream is a mere ' Maya/ or delusion, for its reality 
 is not established by the collection of proofs by which 
 real substances are distinguished. 
 
 "The late E-ajah Ram Mohun Roy interpreted the 
 last mentioned Siitra after the manner of S'ankara, in 
 his Bengalee edition. He thus translates the question 
 contained in the 1st Aphorism : 'Since the creations in 
 ' a state of dreaming are like God's works, let them al- 
 *so be true, like His other creations. This question he 
 ' determines in the following Siitra. Those things which 
 * are presented in a dream are mere illusions ; for, of those 
 ' which are seen in dreams, the reality is not sufficiently 
 
 ^^ FT^^^feCFff? nr. ii. 1. 
 
 "m^^f^ ^'Om, on Do. 
 
390 DIALOGUE VIII. 
 
 ' manifest^.' Thus the very Siitra, which the learned 
 Colonel had cited to prove his theory, proves precisely 
 the contrary by implication. The author of the Ve- 
 danta calls dreams maya, or illusions, because they 
 are unlike the realities perceived in the waking state. 
 
 *^To me, however, spiritualistic pantheism, as it is 
 called, I mean that which Col. Kennedy attributes to the 
 Vedanta, appears scarcely better than material, or that 
 which the 'so-called Vedantists' are anxious to disown. 
 For it is as great a departure from truth, and as dangerous 
 an error, to spiritualize matter, as it can be to materialize 
 the spirit. You shrink from the idea of identifying the 
 visible world with God, because the material world is 
 not, and cannot be, a spiritual substance, much less, God, 
 and because such an idea is subversive of the very first 
 principles of religion. But is it not equally erroneous 
 to say that the world is false, that all our senses are 
 under a deception, and that God has deUberately projected 
 certain appearances for the very purpose of practising that 
 deception f I am quite sure it is equally subversive of 
 the interests of religion and morals. And I may add it 
 is more dangerous, because more insidious in its plausi- 
 bility. For there can be no religion, there can be no 
 devotion, without a subject and an object. There must be 
 the devotee, and there must be the object of devotion. 
 If however the world is a nullity, if the human soul itself 
 is a mere reflection, then I ask in the words of the 
 Upanishad, who will worship, whom, and how ?" 
 
 ''The successors of Vyasa, who were unwilling to iden- 
 tify matter with God, and therefore pronounced the 
 
 ^^^■z ^5fT 3Ti^ ^t^ c^^ TTsi ^^^ * * * ^r^ -^z^ 1%-^tNsr ^f?- 
 
TECHNICAL SHIFTS IN DEFKNCK OF MAYA. 391 
 
 world to be an illusion, were aware of the difficulties 
 connected with their new position. The denial of a world, 
 which was evident to all our senses, was itself so much 
 opposed to nature and common sense, that they taxed 
 their ingenuity, as far as they could, to qualify that denial. 
 They introduced the terms vydvahdrika o^nd pdramdrthika, 
 or conventional and real existences, in order to save their 
 doctrine. The former they attributed, the latter they 
 denied, to the world. If asked, hoio all this can he God, — 
 they would tell you the material world was a Maya, an 
 illusion, and that by not recognizing any visible entity, 
 they virtually inculcated nothing but monotheism. But 
 the true inference from their position was — not unity of 
 Deity, but unity of being. 
 
 " If however charged, on the other hand, with the 
 absurdities, so well set forth in the Vedwan moda tarangini, 
 they instantly shift from their position, and tell you they 
 did not entirely deny the visible world. It had an 
 existence in vyavahdra, though it was, paramdrthatah, 
 no reality. 
 
 " But the soul of man itself has no other than vydva- 
 hainka existence. Do you think you are an entity ? — You 
 may be one in popular parlance — you are not so para- 
 marthataJi, in reality. 'This one, says the Vedanta Skra, 
 ' which, fancies itself to be agent and patient, and passes 
 'to and fro between this and the other world, is called the 
 ^ vyavaharika jiva, or conventional soul^.' 
 
 ''The inference from the principles of this vspiritualistic 
 pantheism is inevitable, that in the sense in which the 
 material world is existent, it is identical with God ; and 
 since it is existent in the same sense, and quite to the 
 
 ^^ j.^^^ ii 
 
H92 DIALOGUE VIII. 
 
 same extent, as the human soul is existent ; it must be 
 God in the same sense in which a human being is not a 
 non- entity. The Vedantist may solemnly swear hy his 
 life that the universe is God ! The profound thinker, I 
 have already cited several times, suggests, that the as 
 serter of maya, if called on to declare, after the manner 
 of jury-men, whether such and such persons, being guilty 
 of theft, are to be punished by the King, will affirm on 
 his oath that the whole is a tissue of falsehood**. 
 
 ^* Vyasa's Vedanta was an unsuccessful attempt to 
 reason from nature up to nature's God. The aphorist 
 was certainly a contemplater of the creation and its won- 
 ders. He eyed the world — was struck by its reality 
 and beauty, and fancied that it proceeded from God, as a 
 spark proceeds from fire, or froth from the sea." 
 
 Tarkakama. — " But how can you avoid the train of 
 thought which passed in Vyasa's mind ? How can you 
 deny that the universe is to God what the spark is to 
 fire, and froth to the sea ? It must have a substantial 
 cause, and if you deny that God is its cause, will you pre- 
 fer to be an atheist ?" 
 
 Satyakama. — *' I do not think one needs be in such a 
 dilemma. It is not necessary to be an atheist in order to 
 meet the Vedantic conclusion with a negative. It is quite 
 sufficient for all purposes of theism to consider God as the 
 effi^cient cause and author of the world, without going the 
 length of pronouncing it to be consubstantial with Him.'' 
 
 Tarkahdma.— ^^ Yiov7 could God make a substantial 
 world of no substance." 
 
 Satyakama. — '^ I will simply refer to Vydsa's own 
 aphorism, ' Like the gods and others.' He maintains that 
 
 tl=?^?1^ ^^^ ff\YSil [\ Tattwa.rauktdvali by Gaudapurn^nauda, 
 
SPIRITUAL PANTUEISM AS BAD AS MATERIAL. 393 
 
 it is possible for gods, Rishis, and others of great power 
 to prod ace effects by their own volition. Why could not 
 the Supreme Being likewise create, by the exercise of 
 His own will, the Universe before us, as a real substance — 
 dependent indeed on Himself, and differing from Him 
 infinitely, (for who, save God Himself, can fathom the 
 gulph that separates' the self-existent from the created ?) 
 and yet real, not deceptive, or fallacious ? No other con- 
 ception of creative power is worthy of the Almighty. 
 All other theories of creation are, not only unnecessary, 
 but liable to insuperable objections and difficulties. It was 
 only to escape from those difficulties that the successors of 
 Vy&,sa had recourse to the maya-vada of Buddhism. But 
 if they escaped one error, they ran headlong into an 
 opposite one. In order to preserve the spiritual purity of 
 the God whom their founder had identified with the visible 
 world, they denied the reality of His productions; not 
 remembering that unless the world were originally received 
 as a real effect, its cause could never have been deduced by 
 human reasoning. Nor could there be any pious intuitions 
 in a soul, that, in the plenitude of Vedantic knowledge, 
 would deny its own existence. Howsoever deduced, 
 whether setiologically or morally, the truth of God's exis- 
 tence would, as an article of human belief, be affected in 
 the same proportion in which the reality of the visible 
 world and of the human soul was denied. The Vedantist 
 forgot that the moment the effect was denied, the ground 
 on which the deduction of the cause rested was cut away ; 
 the instant the deducer's existence was doubted, his moral 
 persuasions lost all their value. 
 
 '' If the Vedantism of Vyasa, who was a * contemplater 
 of the creation,' materialized, and thereby degraded, the 
 Divinity, the pantheism of Gaudap^da, who * took no in- 
 terest in the creation,' deified humanity. I for one will 
 
394 DIALOGUE YIII. 
 
 not undertake to say which of the two is, physically, the 
 grosser error, — morally, the more pernicious delusion, — 
 or, theologically, the more dangerous doctrine." 
 
 Tarkakdma. — '^ Excuse my repeating a question which 
 I put last night, but to which you gave no distinct reply. 
 Does not even a shadow betoken some reality which has 
 cast it, or a reflection point to its substance ? The world, 
 though itself a mere shadow, may prove the existence of 
 God as its substance." 
 
 Satyahdma. — '^ If you mean by the word reflection, or 
 shadow, a reflection, or shadow, of God, as S'ankara sug- 
 gests^, I shall only remind you of the learned commenta- 
 tor's own admission in his scholia on the Taittiriya^. He 
 allows that God, being Himself infinite and without form, 
 cannot have a reflection, or cast a^ shadow — especially 
 as there cannot be a medium or receptacle for such a 
 reflection or shadow. If, again, there could be such a 
 receptacle, would it not be material, and if it were identi- 
 fied with God, would that not be a material pantheism ? 
 
 '' Now there can be no such thing as a substance exist- 
 ing cohventionally, but not really. Things there may be, 
 existing in the opinions of men, or implied in their 
 conduct, but if we deny their reality, we can only 
 mean that they are mere fancies, and therefore not ac- 
 tually existing substances. S'ankaracharya has said, what 
 it is impossible to gainsay, 'that the question of the 
 ' reality of a substance is not dependent on human notions. 
 ' It depends on the substance itself To say of a post that 
 ' it is either a post, or a man, or something else, is not to 
 ' enunciate the truth. That it is a man, or something 
 
 5 Seep. 371. 
 
WHAT IS VYAVAIIAIIIKA EXISTENCE. 395 
 
 'else, is a false notion. That it is a post is alone the 
 'truth, since it is dependent on the substance itself. 
 ' Thus the determination of an existing substance depends 
 ^on the substance itself^.' It must either exist, or not 
 exist, whatever men may say or think. In fact conven- 
 tional, as opposed to real, can only mean imaginary, in 
 other words, false. It is conventional, even with the 
 followers of Bhashkarach^rya, to say that the sun mounts 
 the udaydchala (or the eastern mountains) in the morn- 
 ing, it is a vyavalidra, or custom, to say so, thougli 
 they know very well that it is a mythological fable. 
 There are no such eastern mountains, notwithstanding 
 their vydvalidrika existence. So also with reference to 
 eclipses, it is a vyavahdrcCj or popular custom, to believe 
 that the solar or lunar orb is in the giant's grasp, and, on 
 that belief, to perform certain ceremonies. But here 
 what is a vyavaharika truth is, in essence, a gross error." 
 
 Tarhakdma. — ^' But the cases are not parallel. When 
 the Vedanta tells a person that while he is in society he 
 ought not to slight what is vyavaharika, it merely means 
 that conventional rules ought not to be set aside. Will 
 you not acknowledge that a man's duty may vary with 
 his position ? A man in a state of ignorance must perform 
 the duties attached to that state, and he must not aspire 
 after the rights of the truly wise." 
 
 Satyakdma. — '' You mean you will not allow the astro- 
 nomer to evade the peformance o^ 'puras'charana ! But the 
 question at present is not respecting a man's duty, but the 
 
 ^I^^fcT fHWrgrTT* ^T^^^fir cTf^^Iit ^^cT^(^IcT | ^^ V^- 
 
396 DIALOGUE VIII. 
 
 truth of substances. Whether duties may vary, as 
 S'ankara admits, we shall consider bye and bye — but, 
 as that eminent commentator says, it is nnpossible for 
 physical realities to change with the notions of society. 
 Objective truth is independent of the subjective man. 
 
 '* The moment you deviate from this unalterable rule of 
 truth, you can have no confidence in any reality. What 
 evidence can you have even of spiritual reality, but from 
 traces of spiritual agency visible in the world, or from moral 
 convictions in the mind itself ? If you falter in your admis- 
 sion of those traces, and of the real existence of that mind, 
 how can you be sure of any truth ?" 
 
 Tarhakdma. — ^^ When the Vedantist says that every 
 thing is false Vhich is nob Brahma, or when he says the 
 visible world, and even the human soul, have vydvahdrika, 
 not par amdrthika, existence, he merely means that nothing 
 can have the kind of reality which God has." 
 
 Satyakdma. — ^' When you say that the human soul 
 and the visible world have a different kind of reality from 
 the reality of God, and then add that both are God, you 
 talk simply in unintelligible language. If the two classes 
 of reality are different, then what do you mean by identi- 
 fvinor them ? 
 
 '^ No fallacy is more insidious than that of ambiguity, 
 in ascribing two different meanings to the same word, 
 and in the same argument. If you say the universe is of 
 the same substance with God, and that the soul is identical 
 with the Supreme Being in the strict sense of the term, (ex- 
 cluding the figurative senses of sampat &c.,) then you must 
 either unduly exalt the world, or grossly degrade the divini- 
 ty. In either case you strike at the root of Dharma, or duty. 
 You cannot, with any fairness or consistency, impose upon 
 persons duties which on your own theory are impossibili- 
 ties. Whether you acknowledge the universe to be God, 
 
VEDANTISM ADMITS NO LA^Y. 397 
 
 or deny the existence of every thing that is not Brahma, 
 you can have no law, no ethics, no discipline." 
 
 Tarkakdma. — *^ We allow that a man in a state of 
 ignorance is bound by laws, rules, and duties." 
 
 S. ^' You allow that which your better sense contradicts. 
 You hold that in truth there can be neither law nor law- 
 giver. The bolder spirits among you glory in denying in- 
 junctions or prohibitions." 
 
 T. " When a man arrives at such a state of knowledge 
 he needs no law." 
 
 S. '* How can you prevent a sensualist from being en- 
 couraged in his evil course by your doctrine ? " 
 
 T. *' He has no right to deviate from the path of his 
 duties." 
 
 S. '^ If you tell him so, he will only wonder you can keep 
 your countenance, while you lecture him to do that which 
 your better sense pronounces to be an illusion, a fabrica- 
 tion of ignorance. May he not say that since whatever he 
 does must be an illusion, he had better remain satisfied with 
 that which suits his pleasures best ? What can you with 
 any consistency say in order to exhort him to holiness of 
 lifer 
 
 T. " I will tell him that if he goes on at that rate, he 
 will never enjoy Brahma." 
 
 *S^. ^' Do not say, ' Never', for you hold that at general 
 dissolutions, every thing is swallowed up by Brahma. 
 Whether a man be good or bad, he cannot help enjoying 
 Him on those occasions. The stream, whether turbid or 
 limpid, must flow into the ocean." 
 
 T. " I will remind him of what Vyasa says that if he 
 attend to his duties, he might be much more quickly 
 emancipated from the bondage of the world." 
 
 S. " Which in itself is nothing. The soul is no more in 
 bondage than the crystal in the vicinity of blue cloth 
 
398 DIALOGUE virr. 
 
 is tinged®. If there be no world, there can be no bondage. 
 Your spiritual pantheism again is a iibel on God. You 
 say the world is a maya, an illusioQ, and that God is the 
 mayi, the conjurer who thus deceives you. Is it not 
 grossly revolting to our moral feelings to say that God 
 has deliberately projected a false appearance with a view 
 to beguile rational minds of His own creation ? And if 
 the world be a mere spectacle — a mere charm — why again 
 dignify it by the appellation of God ?" 
 
 The sun had, by this time, got very near to the wes- 
 tern hills, and was about to give rest to Aruna and his 
 horses by betaking himself to the mountain summit. The 
 Rajah desired us to lodge for the night in his gardens, 
 where the requisite utensils would be provided for our 
 evening prayers, and where a Koolin Brahmin had charge 
 of the culinary department — '' so competent for the ojfice," 
 said his highness, '' and — without the least injury to animal 
 life, that if the Mlechas could have but made sure of such 
 dishes every day, the world would at once have got rid 
 of the butcher's profession." 
 
 Leaving the Rajah in his palace, we came to the gar- 
 dens, and attended first to our evening duties, and then 
 proceeded to consider our physical wants for the night. 
 But here a difficulty presented itself The ingeni- 
 ous member of our sacred fraternity, at the head of 
 the culinary office, was of the Vaidic S'reni. Vaiy^sika, 
 who was a Rddi, and Agamika, who was a Varendra, 
 were, as matters of course, obliged to deny themeslves 
 the dainties of the royal kitchen. ^Tarkakama said that 
 although he was of the same s'reni as the provisioner- 
 royal, yet he could not persuade himself to taste food 
 
 ^¥r?iTT #l:^?Wf^^5r^ ^fe^'t ^^rm l A'tinabodha. 
 
HOW THE DISPUTANTS PASSK1» THK NIGHT. 899 
 
 prepared by one who was a S'udra's hireling cook. As 
 for myself, I had been so long in the habit of observing 
 your close practice of absolutely refusing to partake of 
 food, dressed by strangers, that I excused myself by tell- 
 ing the Koolin president of cookery, I had been accustom- 
 ed to Hindoostani dishes, and had lost all relish for those 
 of Bengal. Satyakama accordingly engrossed to himself 
 all the good things which, the Rajah said, required 
 only to be tasted, in order to put a stop to the slaughter 
 of dumb creatures for the table. We had to cook each 
 for himself All being of different s'renis, no one could 
 perform that accommodating office for another. Utensils 
 and raw materials were liberally and richly supplied, 
 and we soon prepared every thing we could possibly 
 require, and passed the night merrily and joyously. 
 
DIALOGUE IX, 
 
 FROM THE SAME TO TtlE SAME. 
 
 My last letter informed you of our doings on the day 
 we spent at the Rajah's house. I shall now report to you 
 what passed on the morrow. We had scarcely done our 
 prescribed duties of the first prahara, (or, quarter of day,) 
 when the adhikdrij in charge of the garden, came, and said, 
 that the Rajah had sent a Jemadar to communicate his 
 remembrance of us in the private-audience chamber. We 
 responded to the summons, and repaired to that chamber. 
 His highness was engaged in conversation with a Dandi, 
 who had taken to his staff the year before, and, giving up 
 his home, had ever since been performing the exercises of 
 a Yogi in the hope of attaining to Samddhi and Nirvdna. 
 On our reaching the audience -chamber, and taking our 
 seats, the Dandi turned to Satyakama, and spoke as fol- 
 lows : '^The Rajah has told me of the discussion you had 
 yester-day. I will not deny that your arguments have 
 some force, but I still feel, that on several important points, 
 you have totally misapprehended our views. You say 
 there is no medium between reality and unreality, and 
 that, if we call the world an illusion, we cannot argue 
 from it as a reality. You say we cannot be sure of any 
 truth if we consider the world an illusion, and the human 
 
A DANDl's EXPLANATIONS. 401 
 
 soul a mere Vydvahdrika fiva. You also argue that on 
 our theory no one can have a -motive for virtue, nor can 
 there be such a thing as law or duty. You accuse us too, 
 of gross inconsistency in talking of emancipation from a 
 bondage which in reality has no existence, because the 
 world is itself an illusion. 
 
 '^ Now, whatever Vydsa or Sankardchdrya may have 
 said on the nature of substantial existence, I can point out 
 a palpable middle term between reality and unreality. 
 There is such a thing as a self-subsisting independent ex- 
 istence, and there is such a thing as dependent existence. 
 The former we attribute to the Deity, the latter to the 
 world. We accordingly say, emphatically, that He alone 
 is sat J or really existent. He lives paramdrthatah. We 
 add that the world is asat^ that is, not real in this absolute 
 sense, because it is not self-subsisting, and therefore tran- 
 sient. And yet we do not pronounce it to be such an 
 unreality as that we could not argue for any truths founded 
 on its existence. It is certainly real, in some sort ; for it 
 is producing actual impressions on the senses, and surely 
 we may with logical propriety deduce the existence of a 
 first cause from an illusion ; for how could the illusion be 
 produced without the agency of a cause ? It requires to be 
 accounted for as much as any phenomena on your hypo- 
 thesis. Then again as to the human soul, the recipient of 
 the impressions occasioned by the illusion, whatever the 
 Vedanta S4ra may say, we do not attribute to it a mere 
 vyavahdrika existence ; nor do we consider it as part of 
 the Universe, for the human soul is consubstantial with 
 God. With reference to practical duties, our theory can- 
 not disturb them, for howsoever the ignorant voluptuary 
 may argue to the contrary, we say, what every thinking 
 man will readily understand, that in the state of avidyd, 
 the observance of duty is the safest, and, when avidyd is 
 
 3 F 
 
402 DIALOOL'K IX. 
 
 removed, and the soul gets the fulness of divine illumi- 
 nation, the violation of duty will be as impossible as its 
 observance unnecessary. Nor can you justly say that we 
 toil to no purpose in seeking for emancipation from a 
 bondage, which, notwithstanding its illusory character, 
 produces real appreliensions and fears in the mind. We 
 are actually in terror under its influence, and therefore it 
 is said, ' O Janaka, thou has attained fearlessness !'" 
 
 Satyakdma. — '' I think, revered and learned Sir, the 
 new explanations you have introduced into the Vedant 
 philosophy fail to impart to it any additional strength. 
 Your view of the Vedanta appears to be derived from 
 foreign sources, and is therefore somewhat different, not 
 only from Vy^sa's and S'ankara's, but also from the minor 
 treatises, such as the Paribhashd, and the Ved4nta Sdra. 
 It is impossible in a general refutation of a system to an- 
 ticipate every thing that an individual follower of the 
 doctrine, especially one who is acquainted with other sys- 
 tems of philosophy, may conceive in his mind, apart 
 from the positions laid down by leading expositors. 
 Your philosophical principle seems to be that which 
 Kapila recommends in Sankhya Sutra iv. 13. ' Notwith- 
 ^ standing much reading of Sd-stra, and much instruction 
 ' from tutors, one is to take the substantial part only, 
 ' like the bee^.' The bee flies from flower to flower and 
 takes only the meliferous matter. You seem to be 
 collecting ideas in the same eclectic way. Now it would 
 be a great historical inaccuracy to give to such a collec- 
 tion the name of Vedantism. But as you have unbo- 
 
 cT^lR I mw^^ ^'^^J^^ mW^- -^HWt sfX' I 'FT^W' ^T^ 
 
DEPENDENT EXISTENCE NOT NECESSARILY ILLUSORY. 403 
 
 somed yourself so franklv; I am bound to tell you what 
 I think on the subject. 
 
 '^ That God's existence is independent and self- subsist- 
 ing, is a doctrine which you cannot hold more firmly than 
 myself. If by adding that the world has a dependent ex- 
 istence, you only mean that the world is a created, and, 
 therefore, not a self-existent, substance, it is impossible for 
 us to differ on that point either. You cannot then call it an 
 illusion, for surely God is able to create a real substance 
 by the power of his will. Why must you compare Him 
 with a conjurer, that calls up an appearance, having no 
 existence except in a deceived imagination ? Why should 
 you limit His power by such an unworthy comparison? 
 If your meaning be that the world has no existence but 
 in human ideas, cognitions, or impressions, then that is 
 the very theory of the Buddhists which has been so suc- 
 cessfully refuted by S'ankar4charya. I can only repeat 
 that eminent philosopher's language, that the world has 
 an existence, independent of human notions. 
 
 '^Assuming, however, that the only difference in point of 
 real existence that you desire to establish between God 
 and the Universe is the necessary one of Creator* and 
 creature, my objection to the Vedantic tenet, that the 
 Universe is identical with God, does not lose its force at 
 all. That identification would, on the theory now before 
 us, clearly amount to material pantheism. It must either 
 be a degradation of the Creator, or a deification of the 
 creature. 
 
 " Since, again, you call the world an illusion, I do not 
 understand how you can reconcile such language with the 
 notion of its existence (however dependent) as a creature. 
 For I still contend that an existent creature cannot be 
 an illusion. An illusion may, as an effect, prove the 
 agency of a cause. That I do not deny. But the phan- 
 
404 DIALOGUE IX. 
 
 torn, as Sankaracharya himself admits, must have a 
 medium, a really existing medium, separate from its 
 projector. The medium then must be a second substance, 
 and so contradict your theory of one essence without a 
 second. The medium, again, must be something ma- 
 terial, for the illusion is an object of sensuous perception, 
 and, if ' all this' be God, the material medium must 
 be deified too. Supposing, however, the world to be an 
 illusion and no-thing, what do you mean by saying. All 
 this is God ? What can be the drift, what the motive 
 of such an assertion ? What truth can you explain, 
 what knowledge can you impart, what object can you 
 attain by calling that to be God which you are convin- 
 ced is a no-thing ? What can you be possibly aiming at 
 by saying, almost in the same breath, ' every thing from 
 Brahma to a bundle of grass in false,' and again, ' every 
 thing, animate or inanimate, from Brahma to a bundle of 
 grass is Krishna, i .e., God?'^^ 
 
 '' When, moreover, calling the world an illusion, you 
 still contend that it has perils which require to be remedi- 
 ed by a laborious process of philosophy, your argument 
 is simply unintelligible." 
 
 Yogi — ^^ Even an illusory peril may produce real fears 
 in the mind. So long as a man is subject to such fears, the 
 peril must be considered real, and remedied accordingly." 
 
 Satyakdma. — " Well how do you propose remedying 
 the illusory peril ? " 
 
 Yogi — " By teaching that nothing is existent but the 
 Supreme Being. AW else being a vanity, (^^.^jt as the 
 Javans say. Allah bas, baki haus (God is sufficient, the 
 rest is vanity)." 
 
 '^'^'^XX^T^ II NaraHa-panchji li^ni. 
 
DUTY PRESUPPOSES TWO PARTIES. 405 
 
 Satyakdma — ''But the Javans do not say that the 
 world is an illusion. They call it a vanity, because it has 
 nothing solid, nothing abiding, nothing worthy of love or 
 attachment. You again contend that the vanity is God. 
 The Javan theory may have a tendency to lead men to 
 look up to God as their only refuge from evil, but your 
 theory teaches there is no real evil, or the evil is God 
 himself, and, there being one essence alone, no possibility 
 of law or duty." 
 
 Yogi. — *^ But we do admit both law and duty. We 
 tell men that, so long as they are in a state of Avidyd, or 
 ignorance, it is safe for them to conform to the duties of 
 their respective classes." 
 
 Satyakdma — " People look for what is practically safe 
 when they are in a dilemma. The deluded subject of 
 May ay whom you wish to reclaim ,will naturally ask, why 
 you speculate on what is merely safe, or expedient, if you 
 are sure the world is an illusion, and there is no real evil ? 
 To tell a man that he must do his duty, merely, because 
 it is safe to do so, is in fact to tell him that he is not 
 bound by duty. It is to lose sight altogether of the 
 definition of duty. Duty is what ought to be done. Such 
 a duty, that is to say strict duty, cannot however exist 
 where all is illusion, but Brahma. Duty presupposes 
 the existence of two parties, the person bound by the 
 duty, and the party to whom he is bound. The ques- 
 tion of the Upanishad, however bold in setting duty at 
 defiance, is, on its own principles, unanswerable, Who will 
 regardy lohorriy and how ? Do you think you will produce 
 any impression on your neighbour by . playing fast and 
 loose with him on points of duty ?" 
 
 Yogi. — *' If my neighbour is determined to act like a 
 depraved person I cannot help it. If he be a mass of cor- 
 ruption, nothing will save him." 
 
406 DIALOGUE IX, 
 
 Satyakdma. — ^^ But how can you expect better things 
 from Maya ? How can there be a real mass of corrup- 
 tion, either, if all is illusion but Brahma ? I of course 
 believe that not your neighbour only, but all men are 
 naturally depraved, tliough capable of the highest im- 
 provement. And it may be expected of a scheme pro- 
 pounded for the amelioration of the human race, that it 
 will meet the disease with which our race is afflicted, and 
 work on the affections of our nature, so as to promote 
 virtuous and restrain vicious inclinations. But this service 
 can never be performed by a system which confounds all 
 distinctions of right and wrong, by pronouncing every 
 thing to be an illusion but Brahma. 
 
 ^^What again is the precise meaning of your theory 
 of maya ^ What is maya ? Is it a deceptive power, or 
 is it the deception itself? Is it the illusion by which you 
 are deceived, or is it the delusive influence through which 
 God presents the illusion to your senses ? S'ankar4ch4rya 
 appears to take it in the sense of a delusive influence, the 
 instrumental cause of the illusion — for he talks of the 
 world as a creation of ignorance. This is something 
 like the old story of Indra's propping up the heavens 
 in a state of intoxication, but, in this sense, the creation 
 itself may be a substance. A real and abiding effect may 
 be produced under intoxication." 
 
 Yogi. — '' We say it is either no-thing, or a distorted 
 reflection of the only one thing existent, that is God." 
 
 Satyakdma. — '^Is it not an extremely low view of 
 the Divinity to say that He appears to us in the form of 
 the world, that He has projected a distorted reflection of 
 Himself with a view to delude His rational creatures ? 
 We are all agreed that religious errors are the most seri- 
 ous of all errors, and of all religious errors, the greatest 
 must be that which consists in a false notion of the Divine 
 
RAMANUJA AGAINST PANTHP:rSM. 407 
 
 attributes. Ts it possible to believe that God would 
 deliberately produce such an error in his creatures by- 
 projecting a distorted likeness of Himself? 
 
 '' And here allow me to direct your attention to the 
 opinions which Ramanuja expressed on this point. He, 
 like yourself, had abandoned the pleasures of the world, 
 and looked for a higher spiritual position than most men 
 think of It is not for me to say anything as to his 
 success, but his remarks on the subject of our present 
 discussion, as recorded by one of his followers, will per- 
 haps have some weight in your estimation ^ 'In the re- 
 
 (^TH^^THifHT^lW ftr^fcT I X^ ^^f??^r Tif f^fcT Hf^5 ^4fH I 
 cTTT'lTW^ VTTT^cft ^T^^tIT: ^TcT ^^TW^T'^^^nTTft!i?cft m^T^J I 
 
 •5T ?Jfft^^ cTcT c(^T^i^T^cT?: if ifif |1 
 
408 DIALOGUE IX. 
 
 'cesses of all s'astras we are told of both knowledge 
 ' and ignorance, of virtue and vice, of right and wrong 
 
 * sciences. Thus we see [opposites in] pairs every where, 
 ' and God and the soul are also notoriously so. How then 
 'can they have unity? Let holy men answer this with a 
 ' candid mind. The word tat (it) stands for the ocean of 
 ' immortality, full of supreme felicity. The word twam 
 
 * (thou) stands for a miserable person, distracted in mind, 
 ' through fear of the world. The two cannot therefore 
 
 5N 
 
 ^T^fr^ iTTif m^ II 
 
 ^^TTT f'TcZIT irWT"^ (TT^^T?^ I ^^ TTJft f^rf^T V^ ^W\ 
 "I il^T^ ^^^TV^I- -^TW^iTTV cT^T^tPt f^^wnST !7#r^S II 
 
IlAilANUJA AGAINST PANTHEISM. 409 
 
 'be one. They are substantially different. He is to be 
 ' worshipped by the whole world. Thou art but His slave. 
 ^ There can be no designation, nor substantial existence, nor 
 ' definition, where there is no foundation or reason. How 
 ^ can Brahma be understood or inferred on the theory of 
 ' Maya ? His existence we deduce as the author of the 
 ' universe, for all this appears, on the evidence of inference, 
 ' to have a cause. This earth must surely have an author, 
 ' for, like pots and other things, it is but a production. Mark 
 ^ the great difference between the Lord, and men, working 
 ' with axes, choppers, and ploughshares. These are sore 
 ' troubled by the six waves of their passions. They toil, 
 ' and labour, and are exhausted. He effects every thing 
 ' by a mere turn of his brow. How could there be an 
 ' image or reflection of the Infinite and spotless one ? How 
 
 * could the Veda, either, declare the merit and demerit 
 ' of a non-sentient (reflection), or the reflection itself be 
 'a subject of pain or pleasure? There may be a re- 
 ' flection of a finite substance ; how could there be such 
 'a thing of the Infinite. Ramanuja, the first among 
 ' great men, condemned this theory of an image and 
 ' reflection. That his opinions were not received by 
 ' great men makes them only still dearer. I am some- 
 ' times happy, sometimes miserable. He, the [Supreme] 
 ' Spirit, is always happy. Such is the discrimination. 
 ' How then can two distinct substances be identical ? 
 ' He is an eternal Light, without anything to obscure 
 ' it — pure, the one superintendent of the world. But the 
 ' animal soul is not so. Thus a thunder-bolt falls on 
 
 * the tree of no-distinction. How canst thou, oh slow 
 ' of thought ! say, I am He, who has set up this im- 
 ' mense sphere of the universe in its fulness ? Con- 
 ' sider thine own capacities with a pure mind. Can a 
 ' collection of infuriated elephants enter into the stomach 
 
 3 u 
 
410 DIALOGUE IX. 
 
 * of a musquito I Whose art thou ? Whence art thou 
 ' come ? What is the connection of this bondage of the 
 ' world ? Ponder these questions in thy mind, give up 
 ^ the way of the erring. By the mercy of the Most 
 ' High a little understanding has been committed to thee, 
 ' it is not for thee, oh perverse one, to say, therefore I am 
 ' God. That would be, as if some wicked person, having 
 ' received [from a king], elephants, horses, and infantry, 
 ' were to form the intention of usurping the royal dignity. 
 ^ Some sophists, sunk in a sea of false logic, addicted to 
 ' evil ways, labouring to bring about the destruction of 
 
 * the world by false statements, themselves deceived and 
 ^ deceiving the world, say I am God, and all this uni- 
 ' verse is God. Their wicked device is now abundantly 
 ' exposed. To speak of a void of qualities in the ocean 
 ' of qualities ! Oh theirs is like the stream of a flock of 
 ' sheep. Having made a separate paraphrase of the 
 ' sutras, they are deceiving the followers of their own doc- 
 ' trine. All the qualities of sovereignty and activity are 
 ' eternally God's. He is therefore one endowed with quali- 
 ' ties (gunij, how can He be nirguna, or devoid of 
 ' qualities ? The assertion of the void of qualities is 
 ' mere disputation. A substance without attributes, like 
 
 * the sky-flower, is never admitted either in the Veda, or 
 
 * or in the world. If the Vedas were to set forth such 
 ' an object, they would no longer be any authority. 
 ^ As the stone, or utensils, and the sacrificer are instru- 
 
 * ments of a sacrifice, so is this theory of no-attribute 
 ^ or no-duty an instrument for tlie obstruction of Dharma 
 ^ or virtue.' 
 
 " To these extracts I shall only add a few passages from 
 ilamanuja's own philosophical work. With reference to 
 the pantheistic dogma, that individual animal souls are 
 but reflections of -the Supreme Spirit, he says; ^ Some 
 
RAMANUJA AGAINST PANTHEISM. 411 
 
 'persons^, betaking themselves to the doctrine of God's 
 ' being the only entity, have come to the condusion that 
 'animal souls are but reflections of the one Supreme 
 * Being. Their happiness, misery, and other conditions 
 
 irfcrft'^i'^Tt ?Tf%§iXTi5r^^5rrf^w^^*?Tm^T'5fTT^^f^^^T^frr^^c^ 
 f%^ ^f^^ m^^^ ^^^ ^^W' ^ Tfcrf^^xrift^ "^ m^^- 
 
 'sTI^fl^TmcT f^^ W^T^I^T'^^JrH fsjT ^^ ^^I^T^ TTi^fcT ^I^^T 
 
 ^fcTftW f5Fr"8iri^^ "<^^^^ "5T ^^M\ 1%qttcT^-^^i-g: ^ci^«T 
 ^if^^mf^fcT ^«f ^^^^ '^T^^T^ f^=^=^^^# %<fKxgf^^Tf2fTcr 
 
412 DIALOGUE IX. 
 
 'are owing to their different receptacles, just as the same 
 'face may appear, variously, small, large, obscure, and 
 'clear, when reflected from various gems, swords, and 
 'looking-glasses. '" '"" This difference in condition is 
 ' [they say] owing to a fabricated distinction. Now, it 
 'may be asked, whose fabrication is it? Not surely 
 ' God's, for He is incapable of such fabrication, being 
 'Himself pure knowledge. Nor can it be the animal 
 'soul's, for then there would be reciprocal support [i. e., a 
 ' vicious circle] ; thus, the soul itself is dependent [for its 
 ' existence] on the fabrication, and the fabrication is ow- 
 'ing to the soul.' 
 
 " Ramanuja asks again, ' Of the soul, fabricated by 
 ' ignorance, who is the fabricator ? This ought to be 
 ' determined. Not surely the ignorance itself, for it is 
 ' inanimate. Nor the soul, for then it would be a case 
 ' of self- fabrication, because [you say] the soul is the ob- 
 ' ject of the fabrication by Ignorance, after the manner 
 ' shell and silver. If you say God is himself the fabri- 
 ' cator of the notion of soul, then you introduce igno- 
 ' ranee into the Deity And, if you do not introduce 
 'ignorance into the Divinity, [may I ask] whether God 
 ' looks on souls or not ? If he does not look, then [the 
 ' Vedic description of] the creation of varieties of names 
 'and forms after observation, is falsified. If you say he 
 ' looks [on the fabricated souls] then, since the one integral 
 ' Bra.hma cannot look on souls without the intervention of 
 ' ignorance, you necessarily talk of his ignorance. Tlierefore 
 ' the theory of distinction founded on maya and ignorance 
 
 Eatntduija's S'.-iririka Bhashya. 
 
RAMANUJA AGAINST PANTHEISM. 413 
 
 'is refuted. For even the conjurer (mayi), Brahma, can- 
 'not look on souls without the intervention of Ignorance. 
 ' Nor can the conjurer delude others without seeing them. 
 ^ Nor can a maya itself be the means of observation on 
 'the part of the mayi, or conjurer. The instrument of its 
 ' delusiveness is observation of otliers. But you will say 
 ' that the maya of Brahma, bringing about his observation 
 ' of souls, is the cause of the soul's delusion. Then the 
 ' maya, bringing about the observation of othei's on the 
 ' part of the one integral self-apparent Brahma, is, in other 
 
 * words, his ignorance. You may say that ignorance is the 
 'cause of a wrong observation, but maya, which only 
 ' brings about an observation, on the part of Brahma, of 
 ' all besides him being false, is not the cause of a wrong 
 ' observation, and therefore there is no ignorance in him. 
 ' But you cannot say that when the moon is seen as one, 
 ' it is seen as two, even if there be ignorance in the cause. 
 ' If Brahma saw every thing to be false besides himself, 
 ' he would not think of deluding it again. For none but 
 ' a mad man w^ould study to delude that which he knew 
 ' to be false.' 
 
 ' Why again,' asks Ramanuja, ' should this useless idle 
 ' delusion be exercised [by God] ? If you say, as a sport, 
 ' [I ask again] why should a being of unbounded joy 
 ' engage in sport ? If you retort that sports are found in 
 ' the world to be engaged in, only by men whose enjoy- 
 ' ments are full, [I reply] this does not hold good here, 
 
 * for none but mad men would entertain the sportful sen- 
 ' timent in a case where the objects of sport are admitted 
 ' to be unreal and illusory, and the sporter to be real, and 
 'himself the projector of the illusions.' 
 
 " Beware then, my dear Sir, of the consequences of 
 playing fast arnd loose on such questions as these. To 
 say that God has projected an illusion for deluding his 
 
414 DIALOGUE IX. 
 
 creatures, or that, being essentially nirgunay or devoid 
 of qualities, He becomes active under the influence of 
 maya, is equally opposed to godliness. You cannot, if 
 you believe Him to be all Truth, allow the possibility of 
 His projecting a deceptive spectacle ; nor can you, if you 
 believe Him to be all knowledge and all power, assent to 
 the theory of His making anything under the influence 
 of avidyd, or ignorance, which cannot but be akin to the 
 mad effort which S'ankara repudiates^, and which can- 
 not differ essentially from the intoxication attributed to 
 Indra." 
 
 YogL — *'The right way to look on our doctrine is to 
 contemplate its drift. We say that God alone exists, be- 
 cause He is the only independent reality. We say again that 
 the world is an illusion, because it is transient, impure, 
 and corrupt. We say also, each, He is myself and I am 
 He*, because, by becoming one with God, we desire to 
 escape the perils of the world, and the lusts of the flesh." 
 
 Satyahdma. — '' I can have no objection to your use of 
 the most exclusive terms that human language can sup- 
 ply, to express the self-dependent existence of God, as the 
 only eternal essence. You may also adopt the strongest 
 words you can find, to express the vanity of the world, 
 because of its transiency, impurity, and corruptibility. 
 All I contend for is, that you must hold both those ideas 
 with their proper limitations. God is self-existent and 
 eternal. You may emphatically call Him the sat, you may 
 say He is sat in a sense in which nothing else is sat. He 
 is an entity in a sense in which nothing else is an entity — 
 for he is eternal and self-existent. But you must remember 
 
 3 See page 370. 
 * ^^PT^Iff ^ff^TfcT ^^[^HT fw^cT ^^: | UI^^^ ^ ^^TT- 
 ^fV^^ ICfh pSffl^rfT I Yoga S'jlstra in S'ridhara swdmi's Com. Bhag. Gita. 
 
IIAMANUJA AGAINST PANTHEISM. 41 J 
 
 the proper limitation of the doctrine. God is the eternal 
 sat, but if sat be taken in its grammatical sense, as the 
 present participle of the verb as (to be), then the world is 
 also sat, or existent, as a creature, though not eternal, and 
 so, strictly speaking, God is not the only sat. 
 
 '^ Nor must you forget when you call the world a 
 vanity, an empty vanity, because of its transience, impu- 
 rity, and corruptibility, that there is a limitation here too, 
 beyond which you cannot advance a single step without 
 falling into serious errors. Use the strongest words you 
 please, to indicate its transience and impurity, but re- 
 member that though transient, it is still existent, and 
 though corrupt, it is capable of purification, and that it is 
 only with a view to that purification that one is bound to 
 study and meditate what is right and true. You must 
 not forget that our notion of divinity, however intuitive, 
 is educed and fashioned from the exhibition of God's power 
 in the world before us. To deny that world is to deny the 
 premises on which that notion is founded. Our ideas of 
 omnipotence and omniscience likewise pre -suppose the 
 existence of many things as products, in esse or in posse, of 
 an efficient power, and as objects of a searching know- 
 ledge. Would it not be absurd to talk of all power 
 and all knowledge, if nothing existed, or was to be 
 done or known ? To deny the world is therefore to deny 
 the power and wisdom of God. 
 
 '' And while you may entertain the highest possible 
 notions of the divine existence, and the lowest possible 
 views of the world's entity, you must avoid the strange 
 inconsistency of identifying the two opposite ideas, and 
 teaching that all this, which is no-thing, is the only 
 thing existent. Such opposites, as Kamanuja very pro- 
 perly sa3^s, can never be unified, and, if they could be 
 unified, then Brahma might, alternately, be pronounced 
 
416 DIALOGUE IX. 
 
 to be false, and the universe, to be true^ ! Nor must 
 you encourage frail and corrupt humanity to say, I am 
 God." 
 
 Yogi. — '^ The frail and corrupt humanity says, ^He is 
 myself and 1 am He,' because it thereby endeavours to 
 detach itself from the Universe. We say to a person 
 ' thou art He,' because we wish him 'to meditate on his 
 heaven-born prerogative as an immortal spirit, and to rise 
 above the world. The more he rises above the world, 
 the more is he assimilated to the divine nature." 
 
 Satyakdma. — " It is no doubt a grand truth that the 
 more a person rises above the world, the more he ap- 
 proaches the divine essence. But here too there is a limi- 
 tation beyond which one may fall into the greatest im- 
 piety under a semblance of godliness. The human soul, 
 though immortal, is still a creature. It may, by rising 
 above the world, approach, but it can never attain, the 
 divinity. The creature can never rise to be the Creator. 
 The highest aspirations may be entertained, and piously 
 entertained ; only they must be short of aspiring after the 
 divinity itself 
 
 " You, Sir, who have left your home, and cut asunder 
 all earthly ties, — you have no doubt taken a step which, 
 under further light from heaven, and with the divine 
 blessing, may guide you unto all truth, and lead you 
 to God. You may thus attain a position hereafter which 
 angels may covet for themselves, and I heartily wish 
 you all spiritual success. But perhaps you will allow me 
 to remark that certain ties are bound up with duties ^o 
 society and to those whom God has placed under our 
 
 ?6rt ^^Ri!r^t^^^c# ftr^f^ ?Er^fH^m^T:^i^T3nT%5 i ri^i 
 
TRUE IDEA OF HEAVEN'. 417 
 
 protection. Such ties cannot be cut asunder with impu- 
 nity. And I cannot, under any circumstances, say to you, 
 thou art He — without being guilty of treason against God, 
 nor can you accept such assurance without impiety, and 
 without the greatest self-deception, for you are not, and 
 can never become, — though you may attain the highest 
 state which a creature can attain, yet, 1 repeat, you can 
 never become — God." 
 
 Yogi. — '^ But what state short of the divinity can be 
 free from transience and impurity ? If a high place in 
 heaven be all that we are permitted to aspire after, the 
 reward of knowledge can be little better than that of 
 ignorance. Earth with all its faults is not essentially 
 worse than Indra's palace, one of the highest seats in 
 Heaven." 
 
 Satyakdma. — '' Heaven, my dear Sir, such as the Pur^- 
 nas describe, with the corrupt attendants of Indra, is cer- 
 tainly not a place to be desired. But why shall we accept 
 that corrupt description of the Puranas? Why may we not 
 look forward to a heaven, which, as the direct manifesta- 
 tion of God's presence, is itself stable and enduring, — 
 the residence of myriads of immortal souls that have obtain- 
 ed deliverance from earthly troubles, and that are now 
 unceasingly contemplating, admiring, and lauding the 
 divine perfections ? Our ancestors used the word suvarga 
 for heaven, which meant good company. Sivarga may 
 have been derived from suvarga, as swarna (gold) is from 
 suvarna. At any rate why may we not believe that there 
 is a heaven answering to the literal meaning of that word 
 — a good company, a holy company, neither transient 
 nor impure — such as shall endure for eternity ?" 
 
 The Yogi turned toward the Bajah and said, ^'Your 
 highness will excuse me, if I leave the discussion of these 
 questions in tlie hands of your Pundits. Satyak^ma's 
 
 3 H 
 
418 DIALOGCF IX. 
 
 words, and Rdmanuja's sentiments, suggest certain consi- 
 derations on which I would rather exercise my mind in 
 retirement, than carry on a debate in this assembly. 
 Blessings on the Rajah and his household ! Salutation to 
 the Brahmins 1" So saying he bowed, and left the room. 
 
 A few minutes after the Yogi had thus abruptly left 
 the i-oom, the Rajah said, "The Dandi, you must 
 remember, is a practical pantheist. He seeks to carry 
 out in his life, what S'ankara discusses in his book. Our 
 philosophical works are written chiefly by controversia- 
 lists. They give us no insight into the practical man. 
 Such an insight can only be found in the life and conver- 
 sation of men like this Yogi." 
 
 Satyakdma. — ^' Please your highness, pantheism ap- 
 pears to be the very antagonist of the practical man. It 
 is a sheer impracticability. It is incapable of being carried 
 out in life. I can only wonder, when I hear of a person 
 exhorting his neighbour to follow the discipline of pan- 
 theism. Every teacher that addresses his pupil, Saumya, 
 (O gentle youth !), every pupil that addresses his mas- 
 ter, Bho Bhagavan (0 Sir), every author that writes, iti 
 chen-na (if this be said, I deny it), every commentator 
 that pleads for his author's texts, every argument in reply 
 to a hostile opinion, every warning and every assurance, is 
 a testimony against pantheism, is a practical protest against 
 the dogma that the universe is God, or that whatever 
 is not Brahma is a phantom — against the theory of ad- 
 waita, (unity). There could be no teaching, no com- 
 mentary, no controversy, no lecture, no warning, no 
 assurance, if one only being existed in the universe, 
 and nothing else. The very terms vydvahdrika and pdra- 
 md^'thika, which were invented in defence of the system, 
 bear testimony against it, by testifying to the exis- 
 tence of tlie eommunitv in which the vvavahara is found. 
 
VEDANTISM MILITATES AGAINST ALL PROOF. 419 
 
 Here then we see that every thing, in which human 
 knowledge consists, is opposed to the Vedant, and 
 this means that the Vedant is falsified by every des- 
 cription of proof, admissible in human argument. It is 
 opposed to those things which (S'ankara himself being 
 judge®) are established by all manner of evidence. 
 The Vedant, in fine, is in conflict with fact and argu- 
 ment. The very texts which set forth the spirituality 
 of God by means of negations, which say he is with- 
 out parts, without ivories, without faults, without spot'' , 
 prove, by implication, the existence of a world in which 
 there are parts, agencies, faults^ and spots. Why other- 
 wise the protest against such things being attributed to 
 the Deity ? No one makes a protest against Vishnu 
 Mitra being taken for a barren woman's son. 
 
 "The threefold means which S'ankara himself dog- 
 matically sets forth in his Atmopades'a are all conclusive 
 evidences against his own doctrine. 'Pondering the 
 'Guru's words, 'thou art the Supreme Being,, endowed 
 *' with such and other attributes,' and receiving the text 
 'of the Vedas, 'I am God,' having thus in three several 
 ' ways, i. e., by the precept of the guru, by the word of 
 'God, and by his own contemplation, persuaded himself 
 'I am God,' he became liberated®.' If there be the least 
 reality in this esoteric description, it militates against the 
 doctrine of one being, for here three parties are men- 
 tioned, the Guru, the pupil, and God. If as all our 
 
 6 See page 300. 
 
420 DIALOGUE IX. 
 
 philosophers are agreed, and, as S'ankara says also in the 
 catechetical tract I have just named, that ignorance, or 
 bondage, consists in thinking that to be the spirit which 
 is not spirit®, then that very delusion pervades the text, 
 (' this whole world is a spirit,') which that great Vedantist 
 quotes, and on the strength of which he counsels all who 
 have brought themselves under that delusion, to act as 
 they please^ and assures them that no one could impose 
 any prohibitory law on them^^. 
 
 " Your highness may have heard of a vulgar notion 
 among the lower orders of our countrymen, that certain 
 princes (yourself among others) are endowed with the 
 privilege of annually committing one or more homicides 
 (the number being supposed to be specified in your pa- 
 tents from the foreign office) without being called to ac- 
 count. S'ankaracharya, however, gives, in his charter of 
 Vedantism, unlimited liberty of action, without reckoning. 
 There it appears a far more terrible privilege than what 
 the peasantry think you to be invested with. But we find 
 it is naturally limited by the restrictive rules of admis- 
 sion to the privileged class. And certainjy the standard 
 of qualification for matriculating in the Vedantic College 
 is high enough. The first rule of initiation is renounce- 
 ment of all desire of enjoyment, here or hereafter. In 
 the catechetical lecture, already cited, S'ankara tells us 
 how this qualification is obtained. ' By a lucky chance, 
 ' or by some peculiar merit, a man gets through the cere- 
 ' monial acts enjoined in the Vedas, and thereby his mind 
 
 ^ ^^T7^5irT«^^^5^» II A'tmopades-a. 
 ^TT^RTT ?T T^^5 ^''^T W. li A'tmopades'a. 
 
VEDANTISM FALSIFIED BY ITS OWN RULES. 421 
 
 ' is freed from desires.'^ Another qualification is faith or 
 confidence in the words of the guru and the Vedas. 
 Now, I contend, if these rules of initiation be truthful, 
 then the doctrine of one being is necessarily falsified, for 
 they pre-suppose the existence of the guru and of all 
 things which are necessary for the performance of the 
 Vedic ritual ; and if the rules are themselves illusory, the 
 Vedantic initiation must itself be an illusion, and if the 
 initiation be false, the indoctrination must be false too — 
 for he only gets knoivledge who has got an dchdrya 
 (tutor) ^. The Vedant will not allow that its grand 
 consummation can be brought about without a qualified 
 tutor. If there be no dchdrya, there can be no teaching, 
 and if the indoctrination is a delusion, the conclusion of 
 this spiritual exercise, i. e., mukti, must be the grandest 
 of delusions, and the whole system of Vedantism, all its 
 texts and sayings, its precepts and promises, its dcharya 
 and adhikari (qualified pupil) are therefore built, like a 
 house (as Ramanuja suggests^) upon an imaginary ma- 
 thematical line ! But is there such a creature as a real 
 Vedantist to be found any where ? Is there any man, 
 can there be any person, who seriously thinks he is God, 
 and that all else is false ? What does he do with his 
 eyes and ears ? Does he see any thing ? does he hear 
 any thing ? does he feel any thing ? A Vedantist, if he 
 cannot answer these questions, has no right to say any 
 thing to any body." 
 
 ^T^T^^r^^ f^^T f^r^cTT ^Xftr^ JrJT^% I Chh^ndogya. 
 
 li^mainuja Sir. Bh^s. 
 
422 DIALOGUE IX. 
 
 Rajah. — '^ But to put a historical question, — I did not 
 understand before that the Bhagavatas rejected pan- 
 theism, as Satyakama has just shown from E-amdnuja, 
 and Gauda-purnananda." 
 
 Satyakdma. — '^Please your highness, I did not mean 
 that all the Bhagavatas rejected pantheism. Ramdnuja 
 and his followers alone rejected it, but others, e. g., the Rd- 
 mdnandis, accepted its dogmas. Ilamanuja himself held 
 some of the tenets connected with pantheism. Only he 
 would not allow that the universe, or the human soul, 
 was God." ' 
 
 Rajah. — "What pantheistic doctrine then could he 
 hold 1" 
 
 Tarhakdma. — '' He allowed that at general dissolutions 
 the world was absorbed in the Divinity, but denied that 
 it could be unified with it. Thus, ' Many flavours of trees, 
 ' there are in honey, but separable from it. How other- 
 'wise could it remove the three -fold disorders? Souls, 
 
 * in like manner, are absorbed in the Lord at the dissolu- 
 ' tion, but are not unified with Him, for they are again 
 ' separated at the creation. As there is a difference be- 
 ' tween rivers and the sea, between sweet and salt waters, 
 ' so is there a difference between God and souls, because 
 ' of their characteristic distinctions. Rivers, when joined 
 ' with the sea, are not altogether unified with it, though 
 ' they do appear inseparable. There is a real difference 
 ' between salt and sweet waters. Men cannot discrimi- 
 ' nate between milk and water, when the two are mixed 
 ^ up, but the swan at once makes out the separation be- 
 ' tween milk and water ^. In the same manner when 
 
 * souls are absorbed in the Supreme Lord, Brahma, at 
 
 •* There is a common saying among the Hindus that if a cup of milk be present- 
 ed to a swan (hansa), it will take the milky substance alone, leaving out the 
 watery. 
 
RAMANU.TA AGAINST PANTHEISM. 423 
 
 ' the dissolution, the devout, contemplating the Guru's 
 ' words, can make out the difference. Even milk, when 
 ' mixed with milk, and water with water, do not obtain 
 ' unification, merely because they are supposed to be 
 ' unified. Neither do souls, when absorbed in the Su- 
 
 * preme Being by virtue of meditation, obtain identity 
 
 * with Him. So say all pure-minded saints^.'" 
 
 Satyahdma. — ^' Another objection of Ramanuja was to 
 the following effect. It apparently militated, however, as 
 much against the idea of an eternal succession of worlds, 
 or ages, and against the eternity of individual souls, 
 as against pantheism. ^ It is inconsistent, ' says he, ' in the 
 ' asserters of unity to speak of tutor and pupil, and to 
 
 * say that some are emancipated, others in bondage, for 
 
 * since the succession of ages past is infinite, even if you 
 
 * allowed a single case of emancipation in each age, all 
 ' souls must have been already emancipated, and none 
 ' left in bondage. If it be said that souls are also in- 
 ' finite, hence there are some still in bondage, — what is 
 ' meant by this infinite ? Innumerable, will you say ? 
 
 ^TcT^ I ^^T^WT Vl^^cf -sr^i f^^^T %m ;»rcTT5 1§^ ^TcT: 
 
424 DiALoauE jx 
 
 'That cannot be. For although because of its multipli- 
 * city, it appears innumerable to persons of little know- 
 ' ledge, it is capable of being numbered by God who is 
 ' omniscient. To sav He cannot number it, would be to 
 ' say He is not Omniscient. If you say that souls being 
 ' themselves innumerable, it is no denial of God's Omnisci- 
 ' ence to say He does not know a number which does not 
 ' actually exist, 1 reply that there cannot be a want of 
 ' number where things are separable. Souls must have a 
 ' number, since they are . separable like grain, mustard, 
 'pots, and cloths^.' 
 
 ''Ramanuja contends strenuously against the doc- 
 trine of unity, and the arbitrary manner in w^hich its 
 advocates alternately pronounce the universe to be 
 no reality and God. He accordingly exhorted men 
 to renounce the theory of Adwaita, or unity of being, 
 and acknowledge that of Divaita'^ .'' 
 
 Tarkakdma. — '^ And also to devote themselves to the 
 worship of Hari®." 
 
 Rajah. — '* What then is the point of difference between 
 
 T^^xJ^ i^^^■^^ ^Tciri^*. ^?^R^r fHWc^Tci^ m^'Er^TTErs"- 
 
 irSrxf^^cr l Raman uj a Bar. Bhks. 
 
 '' ^^T^ ^cf t%^T^ ^fsrfcf ¥^ g^^ H^ I Tattwa Muk. 
 ^ €tT '-SlT^fH^ ^^^^ Vr^ r^ X^T^'TT^ "^^5 I Ibid. 
 
RAMANUJA ON THE ESSENTIAL FORM OF GOD. 425 
 
 the Ramanandis and the Ram^nujas ? I thought they 
 both united in some common point in opposition to the 
 Vedant." 
 
 Tarkakdma. — " Your highness is right. All Bhaga- 
 vatas, R^manandis as well as Ramanujas, maintain that 
 God subsists in an eternal body which is His essential 
 form. * It is heard/ say they, ' in the Purdnas, that all 
 ' this proceeded from the lotus-navel of God. Hence is 
 ' his body proved, for how could there be a navel without 
 ' a body^ .' Ramanuja thus writes in defence of the 
 doctrine of God's having an eternal corporeal form. He 
 answers the objections brought forward by those, who 
 contended that God could not have a corporeal frame 
 without being subject to growth and decay, pleasure and 
 pain, like animal souls. ' The corporeal frame^** of the 
 
 f^f^^cT ^^ m-^ ^ifiTJ W^ Tf^ f^'^T ^€t^ I Tattwa MuktavaU. 
 
 ^HT^s^Tf f^^^ ?=r -^^m w^fcT psf^i w^fcT ^ ^f^ ftrs^itfr 
 mx^ H^fcT ^ cr^ xT^rfcT ^w<t ^t^'r T^mm jT^ ^H^^if^f^- 
 
 O ^ »» sj 
 
 Ti^j-^ ■^fift^HT^'irr^: ^^r ^(^ tt^t •Er'5r?:^^3^2r^^ 
 >ff7irr^ m^^S ct^t^ ^ti^rt«iH^m«7wm^rt^l^~ 
 
 3 I 
 
426 DIALOGUE IX. 
 
 'animal soul/ says he, 4s not the real cause of the sound 
 ' or unsound state of its physical system, nor of its liability 
 ' to pleasure or pain. The real cause is the virtuous or 
 ' vicious acts committed by itself. That which is said 
 'in the Veda, Hhe corporeal is not free from pleasure 
 'and pain,' has reference to the body, received in con- 
 'sequence of previous acts. But the Veda also speaks, 
 ' elsewhere, of the essential corporeal form of the eman- 
 ' cipated soul, free from the bondage of works. ' He 
 " becomes of one form, or of three forms. If he desire 
 " the world of the fathers, he wanders there, eating, 
 '' sporting, indulging '. Here there is no smell of evil, or 
 'vanity. And as to the Supreme Being, free from sins, 
 ' although in his gross and subtle forms, the whole universe 
 ' be His body, still there can be no smell of the bondage 
 ' of works in Him, nor again of any evil or vanity. It is 
 ' as in the world, — the liability to pleasure and pain is not 
 ' owing merely to corporealness on the part of subjects, 
 'who (the king being himself the ruler,) enjoy or suffer 
 ' from his kindness or severity, according as they submit 
 ' or not to his government. Thus says the Dravida com- 
 ' mentator. ' As in the world, when there is a terrific 
 " plague of gnats in the country, the king's body, unceas- 
 " ingly fanned by punkhas, is not affected by the evils, 
 ^'and he can govern his people at pleasure, and enjoy 
 " perfumes and other good tilings which his subjects can- 
 "not procure, so also the Lord of the universe (God), 
 " with the cJidmara of his own power in motion, is not 
 "affected by evils, but can protect the various worlds, 
 " and command enjoyments, not within the reach of any 
 "others." Here the Ramanandis and Ramanujas stand 
 
SAGUNA AND AGUNA. 427 
 
 on common ground. But they soon part company. The 
 Ramanandis assert that God is both sagiina and nircjima. 
 Tulasidasa, one of their own popular poets, strongly in- 
 veighs against those, who, like the Ramanujas, reject the 
 theory of 7iirgtcna, or void of qualities^. And he thus 
 explains how saguna and aguna are reconcileable. ^ There 
 * is no difference between the sa^ima and aguna. Thus 
 ' do the Munis, Puranas, sages, and Vedas sa}^ He who 
 ' is void of quality and shape, who is invisible and uncreat- 
 ' ed, the same becomes joined with qualities out of love 
 'for His devotees. But how can one who is Avithout 
 ' qualities become joined with qualities ? Even as water 
 'and ice and hailstones are not different substances^.'" 
 
 The orderly now came and said that the Kumar (the 
 Raja's son) was coming with two new friends whom he 
 was desirous of presenting to his highness. The prince 
 entered the room, in a minute or two, prostrated himself 
 before his father, introduced his friends, and then remain- 
 ed standing for several minutes. On the Rajah giving 
 the order, he took a seat with the young Baboos that ac- 
 companied him. His highness told them that we had 
 been debating on the doctrines of the Vedant, and gave 
 a summary of what had been advanced on both sides of 
 the question. On hearing the summary, one of the 
 Baboos, Adhunika by name, made the following remark: 
 ''I will not allow that the Vedanta is pantheistic in 
 any sense of the term. I will not undertake to decide 
 
 ' H^nnrPf ^Bnmfi?- ^f^ ^"^ w^t i Jri^f# ^rf^xr^mir ^"^j^ ii 
 
 WJps ^^XT ^^15 ^5T ^it I Vrw ^JT^W ^m Wt 'f\t II ^ 
 
 S» Si 
 
 l\dm:iyana. 
 
428 DIALOGUE IX. 
 
 whether pantheism is right or wrong. If I do so, 1 may 
 possibly be pronouncing judgment against some of the 
 brightest intellects of the age. But I can boldly say 
 that the Vedanta does not necessarily partake of either 
 material or spiritual pantheism." 
 
 Vaiyasiha. — ^^Do you mean to say that Vyasa and 
 S'ankara do not inculcate the identity of the world with 
 God." 
 
 Adhimika. — '^ I do not deny that that is the teaching of 
 Vyasa and S'ankdracharya. How could you suppose for 
 a moment 1 was ignorant of it. But the Vedanta Dar- 
 s'ana of Vyasa is of no higher authority than ^ the N3^aya, 
 * Sankhya, or any other Dars'ana, or school of Hindu 
 ' philosophy. The Vedantic school of Vyasa maintain 
 ' the doctrine of the consubstantiality of the human soul 
 ' with God, and support their opinion by several citations 
 ' from the Vedas. The Nyaya school admits the distinct 
 ' nature of the soul and maintains its position by citations 
 ' from the same Vedas ; to jumble up together the Upa- 
 ' nishads, which are parts of the revealed Vedas, and the 
 'Vedanta Dars'ana of Vyasa, the creation of man, as 
 'things of equal authority, is not proper^.' I am not an 
 advocate of the Vedanta founded by Vydsa. I am for 
 the system contained in the Upanishads, the pure Vedant. 
 Ours is the old system of the Vedas. Vyksa's is of 
 yesterday. We wish to return to the old paths, from 
 which Vyksa and S'ankaracharya had diverged so much. 
 Why do you stare ? Has not your highness heard of ' the 
 German reformer Luther'^ ? He maintained that the adher- 
 ents of the Pope had corrupted the simplicity of the Bible, 
 and he sought to return to the primitive religion. Our aim 
 
 3 ''Remarks" on a Lecture on Vedantism by Rev. K. M. Bauerjea. 
 * The Reformer Newspaper. It was established more than thirty years ago in 
 Calcutta and professed to be based on the principles of True Vedantism. 
 
ARE UI'ANISHADS OLD PATHS. 429 
 
 is similar. "We wish to revert to the original system of 
 the Vedas." 
 
 " Is it then your aim, asked Satyakama, to restore the 
 worship of fire, air, and the heavenly bodies?" 
 
 *' No, that is contained in the Mantras, and other cere- 
 monial parts of our S'astra. Our system is in the 
 Upanishads." 
 
 S. — ''Are the Upanishads then older compostions than 
 the Mantras ?" 
 
 '' People are accustomed, said A'dhunika, to call the 
 Vedas eternal. I cannot undertake to say the Upanis- 
 hads are older than the Mantras." 
 
 " The Mantras are written in a language which appears 
 older than that of the Upanishads, are they not?" asked 
 Satyakama. 
 
 A. — '* As far as the structure of sentences is concerned, 
 I should say so. But this is not a quite conclusive reason 
 against the popular tradition." 
 
 ** It would be a conclusive reason, said Satyakama, in 
 the absence of any evidence to the contrary. But I am 
 not particularly desirous of discussing that point with 
 you. You must at any rate acknowledge that the Upa- 
 nishads are not older than the Mantras." 
 
 A. — ''I never pretended they were." 
 
 S. — " What mean you then by the old paths, if the 
 Upanishads be not older than the Mantras." 
 
 A. — ''I mean that our system is that excellent science 
 which includes all knowledge, even the science of Bra- 
 hma^, taught by the first of the gods to his son Atharvan, 
 the science that is distinguished by the appellation of 
 pard, the eminent." 
 
 ^ ^^T ?^^t y^iT? ^i^VR f^^T^ W^\ ^r^m JTtTri I ^ 
 
430 DIALOGUE IX. 
 
 S. — *'Tlien you acknowledge the mythological pan- 
 theon. You say, the first of the gods." 
 
 A. — ^' We acknowledge it so far as to believe that the 
 worship of the sun and fire and other gods, together 
 with the whole allegorical system, was only inculcated for 
 the sake of those whose limited understandinos rendered 
 them incapable of comprehending and adoring the In- 
 visible Supreme Being, so that such persons might not 
 remain in a brutified state, destitute of all religious prin- 
 ciples.^ " 
 
 S. — '' Allegorical instruction, I thought, was intended 
 for the wise. Illiterate people of little judgement re- 
 quire plain teaching. But you seem to think that the 
 vulgar would benefit by idolatrous doctrine. I cannot 
 conceive how idolatrous doctrine or practice can lead to 
 good results. You would not cure high treason by teach- 
 ing men to render allegiance to a pretender. But to 
 return to our subject. The same Upanishad speaks of 
 an apara, or inferior science too, does it not ?" 
 
 A. — ^'Yes, the Bich, Yajus, S^man, and Atharvan, 
 with grammar, versification, astronomy, are the inferior 
 science^." 
 
 S. — ''The two must have been simultaneously commu- 
 nicated at the creation, for the Vedas, they say, are 
 eternal." 
 
 A. — '' God provided two kinds of doctrine for the wise 
 and the unwise." 
 
 S, — '* Which classes did not exist at the time, for there 
 was only one spirit and nothing else in the beginning." 
 
 A. — '' But God foreseeing that there would be wise 
 and unwise in the world, might have made provision for 
 the mental improvement of both." 
 
 6 «* Vedantic doctrines vipdicated." See Note 5; page 274. 
 
OBSCENITIES IN THE UPANISIIADS. 431 
 
 S. — '^Tliat is to say, breathed out the Upanishads for 
 the one, and the other Vedas for the other." 
 
 ^' It migfht be so," said Adhunika." 
 
 Satyakdma. — '' Was it as a punishment for folly and a 
 reward for wisdom that He gave the two different sorts 
 of books ? or was it that the unwise could not compre- 
 hend the sublimity of the Upanishads, and therefore 
 were left to grope their way through the other Vedas ?" 
 
 A. — *'They were not fit for the lessons contained in the 
 Upanishads. They could not appreciate the purity of 
 our doctrine, and rather than that they should remain 
 without any guide at all, the Vedas were given to them 
 out of compassion for their weakness. They were 
 allowed to indulsfe in carnal observances and mantras 
 until they should be wiser." 
 
 S. — ''But the Upanishads, too, contain descriptions, 
 not only of carnal observances, but also of obscenities, 
 still worse than Jayadeva's battles of love." 
 
 A. — "There are a few such passages, but we pass 
 them over." 
 
 S. — •'' Not a few passages, but rather a large sprinkl- 
 ing of obscenities in some of them. But waiving the 
 questions which your remark suggests, I will simply ask, 
 is not the following a portion of the excellent knowledge 
 revealed at the beginning, as your Upanishads will have 
 it? ' As a spider projects and receives back (his web), 
 ' as herbs grow in the earth, as from a living person the 
 ' hairs of the head and body, so from the Imperishable is 
 ' the universe produced^'." 
 
 Adhunika. — ■'' Yes, the Mundaka Upanishad says so, 
 and a sublime conception it is." 
 
 ^cT5 Xr^Bncf ^?I^l?TTf^ cr^TTg?:rcr ^^^crt^ f^^gn ll Mundaka 
 
432 DIALOGUE IX. 
 
 Satyahdma. — ''It may be a sublime conception, but 
 the transition is easy from the sublime to something very 
 different. Does not the passage savour of the gross 
 pantheism which you said was a corruption of the Vaiya- 
 sika Vedant ?" 
 
 A. — '' It does not necessarily involve pantheism/' 
 
 S. — '' No ! I do not see how I can derive any sound 
 doctrine from that passage. But what do you think of 
 the celebrated text, ' All this is God.'" 
 
 ''That, said j^dhunika, should be understood as an 
 'effusion of fervid devotion, when contemplating the 
 'omnipresence of the Diety'^." 
 
 S. — " Whose fervid devotion ? I thought you held 
 that the Upanishads, in common with the other Vedas, 
 were revealed by God himself at the creation. It is 
 impossible to conceive that God would make an over- 
 statement of the fact, from any feeling, which, however 
 natural to men, would in Him be unaccountable. 
 
 "But, continued Satyakama, that one passage is not all. 
 The Upanishads abound with texts declaring that God is 
 the one spirit, the substance of which the universe is com- 
 posed, that the creation is but a multiplication and de- 
 velopment of Himself. That the world is to Him what 
 froth is to the sea, the butter to the milk, the web to the 
 spider, the cloth to the yarn. This is systematically 
 taught from beginning to end. The air is God. The 
 food is God. The mind is God. The vital air is God^^" 
 
 Rajah. — '*' Is it fair to cull such detached texts to 
 serve a particular purpose ? You do not surely mean 
 that the Upanishads set up the air or food as God." 
 
 Satyahdma. — " The Upanishads, please your highness, 
 
 9 '• Remarks .^-c." 
 
 10 "V -V -v. . . .is^ .-«. 
 
 ^iRf^ ^I^TT ^^f{^ -^c^T^ W^ I ^^ W^l lETPfft W^ I 'T^ ^^ II 
 
PANTHEISM OF UPANISHADS. 433 
 
 cannot be taken as the works of the same author, or even 
 as productions of the same age. With this single excep- 
 tion that each inculcates pantheism of one sort or another, 
 the scope of no two of them can be considered precisely 
 the same. Some of them appear to speculate, much 
 after the fashion of development philosophers, on the 
 physical primeval element of the universe, and what- 
 ever is for the moment taken as a first principle, is declared 
 or be Brahma or God. The Taittiriya, for instance, 
 gives the following definition of Brahma or God : ' That 
 'from which these elements are produced, by which, 
 ' being produced, they exist, and into which, at dissolution, 
 ' they are resolved, is Brahma or God.' Giving this 
 definition of Divinity, the Upanishad goes on to show that 
 it is applicable to food, to the vital air, to the mind, to 
 vijndna (knowledge), and to dnanda (joy), and repeats, in 
 turns, that the production and final resolution of the 
 universe may be traced to all those five principles \ 
 The same Upanishad speaks, elsewhere, of the produc- 
 tion of ether ' from that or this Spirit', and from ether air, 
 from air fire, from fire water, from water earth, from 
 earth herbs, from herbs food, from food retaSy from retas 
 i\iQ jpurusha (personal soul), which is pronounced to be 
 annarasamaya (all food.) It is then added ' those who 
 
 '3[\'^•^ I ft'^R'T ^Tcnf^ ^t^f^i ft'^T'f "sr^JrjrfHHftii- 
 
 3 K 
 
4.34 DIALOGUE IX. 
 
 worship food as God, obtain all food/ aiid tliat ' all crea- 
 tures are produced from food.' The Upanishad proceeds 
 to say that from the soul which is all food, another, 
 the inner spirit, is produced, which is _2^r(friama?/a (all 
 vital air), thence again, manomaya (all mind), thence 
 vijnana-maya (all knowledge), thence ananda-maya (all 
 joy)^. Vyasa and S'ankara thought that passages such 
 as these could not be explained except on the panthe- 
 istic theory." 
 
 '* All seemingly pantheistic passages, said Adhunika, 
 must be so interpreted as to be consistent with other 
 texts expressly declaring the unity of God, and His dis- 
 tinction from the world." 
 
 S. — '*It was in trying to reconcile the texts in question 
 with the unity of God, that Vyasa was led to Pantheism. 
 The other idea of His distinction from the world forced 
 Vyasa's successors to the necessity of denying the reality 
 of that world. If you can interpret the texts to which I 
 have referred, without either identifying the world with 
 God, or denying its reality, you will achieve an exploit 
 which no Vedantist, from Vvasa to Sadananda down- 
 wards, had been able to accomplish. But what are the 
 texts, pray, which expressly declare the unity of God, 
 and His distinction from the world ?" 
 
 
 
PANTHEISM OF LTANISHADS. 435 
 
 A. — '^ An to the unity of God, you have our celebrated 
 formula, which we mscribe on our solemn documents, and 
 with which we conclude our devotions : Ekamevddwitiyam 
 — ' God is one only without a second.' " 
 
 S. — "The word ' God' does not occur in the passage." 
 
 A. — '^No, but it is understood ; you must supply the 
 ellipsis." 
 
 '' We shall see, said Satyakama, how the ellipsis is to 
 be supplied ; but you, who are so jealous of corrupt criti- 
 cisms of the Upanishads, ought to be careful how you 
 construe your sacred books. Give us the whole passage, 
 where the formula occurs, and we shall then be able intelli- 
 gently to consider wliat the ellipsis is." 
 
 ^.— ^^'This, O gentle (pupil), was even an entity at 
 the beginning, one without a second^." 
 
 " How then, asked Satyakama, can you, as a matter of 
 course, interpolate the word * God' here. The subject is 
 ^ this' (idam) ; is it not ?" 
 
 ^.— '^Of course." 
 
 S. — " Well ; to what does the word this, in the neuter 
 gender, generally refer in the language of the Upani- 
 shads ? Is it not to the visible universe ?" 
 
 "I cannot say readily, answered Adhunika, to what it 
 generally refers, but I should say there can be no doubt it 
 refers to God here. " 
 
 "Is not the passage you quoted the solution of a question 
 which had been disputed ? Give us the whole paragraph." 
 
 A. — "'This, O gentle (pupil), was even existent at the 
 
 * beginning, one only without a second. Some say, in- 
 
 * deed, this was even non-existent at the beginning, one 
 ' only without a second : hence out of a non-existent an 
 
 * existent may be begotten. But how, O gentle (pupil). 
 
436 . DIALOGUE IX. 
 
 ^ can this be ? lie said, liow out of a non-existent can an 
 'existent be begotten ? This, O gentle (pupil), was even 
 'an entity at the beginning, one without a second'".^ 
 
 '' You will find it difficult, said Satyakama, to maintain 
 that the word this refers to God, throughout the passage 
 without involving pantheism. No one that acknowledg- 
 ed a God would doubt His existence at the beginning. 
 S'ankara's commentary is perfectly intelligible. He un- 
 derstands ' this' to refer to the visible world, and the 
 question to be whether the world was existent or non-ex- 
 istent at the beginning, i. e., before the creation. The Upa- 
 nishad decides that the Universe was existent in its ma- 
 terial cause (God), and was thus one without a second at 
 the beginning, — it being, as the commentator adds, a pro- 
 test against the Sankhya, which inculcated two eternal 
 principles. Nature and Soul, and against the Vais'eshika, 
 which assumed the eternity of innumerable Atoms. And 
 thus the very text in which your community reposes so 
 much confidence, which is exalted into a formula to express 
 its characteristic doctrine, is inexplicable except in a pan- 
 theistic sense. I do not think you will contend for the 
 possibility of considering God as the material cause of 
 the world without countenancing pantheism." 
 
 Adhmiika. — *'But there is a passage, the very first 
 verse in the Aitareya Upanishad, in which the Spirit 
 Himself is called one" 
 
 Satyahdma. — '' I fear that passsge will give you no 
 better help. It reads thus ; ' This was a spirit, even one, 
 
 f^^^ I Chhandogya. 
 
PANTHEISM OF UPANISHADS. 4.S7 
 
 at the beginning^.' You must remember that idam 
 (this) is in the neuter gender, and therefore cannot as an 
 adjective pronoun, belong to atma (spirit) in the mas- 
 culine. Idam must be the subject, atma the predicate. 
 I am afraid you will find this passage even more pan- 
 theistic than the one from the Chhandogya. It directly 
 pronounces the external world to have been, at the begin- 
 ning, one only spirit, from which it was afterwards evolved 
 in its present form." 
 
 A. — " But what say you to the following beautiful 
 passage from the Mundaka ; ' Know him, the spirit, to 
 be one. Give up all words contrary to this. This is ihe 
 bridge of immortality'^." 
 
 S, — ^' It is in itself, and as you have translated it, cer- 
 tainly a beautiful passage. But take it in connection with 
 what precedes and what follows, and the beauty will very 
 soon disappear. The preceding clause is, 'In Him are 
 placed the heaven, the earth, the sky, the mind, with 
 all the vital airs^ ' And that which follows your quotation 
 is ; * In whom the arteries are collected like spokes at the 
 nave of a carriage-wheel. He moves inside, becoming 
 variously affected'® That one spirit of yours is thus iden- 
 tified with the human soul, for that which is variously 
 affected within a person can be nothing else than his soul." 
 
 Adhuniha. — ^* You cannot explain away every passage 
 expressive of the unity of God. There are scores of texts 
 
 '^ ^rrcm ^T T^^^ ^'SJrm ^I^r? I Aitareya. 
 
 v. 
 
 Mundak.i. 
 3TT^^T*fJ t Mundaka. 
 
438 DIALOGUE IX. 
 
 in the S'wetas'watara Upanishad which cannot be inter- 
 preted in a pantheistic sense." 
 
 Satyahdma. — '' I doubt very much whether the Swetas'- 
 watara will give you any substantial help. It contains 
 passages as decidedly pantheistic as any other Upanishad, 
 and if you can light on detached stray passages, declara- 
 tory of the unity of God, it will not in any way decide the 
 question between us. Unity is not only not opposed, but 
 is actually necessary, to the idea of pantheism. It is the 
 one God with whom all thino^s visible and invisible are 
 identical, that forms the essence of Pantheism. 
 
 '^ If however the Swetas'watara bears any testimony 
 aofainst Pantheism, it is in those two celebrated texts 
 which the followers of the Sankhya philosophy are so fond 
 of citing, and in which a duality of principle appears to 
 be inculcated. You cannot derive from it any sound 
 lesson on divinity, not onlv because two or three texts 
 must in ordinary justice be made to yield to the 
 majority of passages which are indisputably for pan- 
 theism, but also because the acknowledgement of t^^'o 
 eternal principles will be no less subversive of a pure 
 monotheism than the identification of the world with 
 God could be. 
 
 ''If your opinions do not preclude a critical examina- 
 tion of the Upanishads, I should say that the Swetas'wa- 
 tara appears; prima facie, to be of a much -later date than 
 the others. It is, I may say, in some respects, a Sankhya 
 Upanishad, either composed, or corrupted, at a more re- 
 cent period by the followers of that school. It not only 
 speaks of an uncreated female principle, red, white, and 
 black, producing many creatures connatural with itself, and 
 thus presenting the very picture of the p7'(X^T^^^ of the 
 Sankhya ; but it also makes highly honourable mention 
 of Kapila., and sets forth the excellence of the Sankhya 
 
PANTHEISM OF UPANISHADS. 439 
 
 Yoga.^ * He who being one resides from generation to 
 ' generation in various forms and in all productions, first 
 ' filled the Rishi Kapila His son with knowledge and be- 
 Mield him born\'" 
 
 '' Another proof of the S'wetas'watara being a more re- 
 cent Upanishad than the others is found in its constant 
 repetition of the names which the followers of S'iva have 
 set apart for their favourite god. Is'ana, Kudra, Siva, 
 Girls'anta, Giritra Mahes'vvara, Bhava may, most of them, 
 it is true, be construed as appellatives, and may not 
 necessarily be proper names ; but the coincidence of so 
 many epithets, popularly expressive of the god S'iva, in 
 the same Upanishad, leads to the suspicion that the 
 S'aiva sect had something to do with its composition. 
 The mystic union of Prakriti and Purusha, inculcated in 
 the Sankhya philosophy, is the foundation of the mytho- 
 logical legends of S'ivci, whose characteristic is the lingum, 
 and of Parviti, the personification of female energy. And 
 this union of S'iva and Parvati is also hinted at in the 
 S'wetas'watara. 
 
 '^ But whatever be your opinion of the origin of that 
 Upanishad, certain it is, it will afford no harbour for any 
 thing like sound theology. It is a compound of Vedant 
 pantheism and of the Sankhya duality. It is difficult to 
 say which ingredient is the worse of the two. The one 
 identifies the world with God. The other seis up an eter- 
 nal female principle producing the world in connection 
 with the soul (Purusha) or the male principle. You can- 
 not get a good monotlieistic passage, free, on the one hand 
 from pantheism, and, on the other, from the idea of 
 duality, just mentioned. 
 
 
440 DIALOGUE IX. 
 
 '' Nor can a few monotheistic passages explain away 
 the vast number that are pantheistic. God may have 
 been, in a few solitary texts, declared to be distinct from 
 the world, and free from the impurity attached to matter, 
 and yet those texts may be perfectly consistent with others 
 in which the world is pronounced to be consubstantial 
 with Him. In order to enunciate Pantheism, one must 
 have a subject, which may exist in mental analysis 
 distinct from that which is its predicate. Two ideas may, 
 at first, be separately conceived, and then pronounced to be 
 identical. When the Upanishad says, ' all this is God,' 
 the subject ^ all this' may have been originally pre- 
 sented to the writer s mind as distinct from the predicate 
 ' God,' and then he may have determined that all this, 
 which was before and around him, was God. Unless you 
 can make out that there is no real identification of the 
 subject and predicate, no real declaration that Brahma is 
 himself the Prahriti, passages merely expressive of their 
 distinctness can have no force in overruling texts decidedly 
 pantheistic. Then again you must not argue on the sup- 
 position that we are agreed as to the divine authority of 
 the Vedas. I am not bound to interpret them in an unna- 
 tural way, merely that I may maintain their consistency. 
 You may feel yourself under such a necessity, but until you 
 can demonstrate their divine inspiration by satisfactory evi- 
 dence, no such necessity can be laid upon me. Fair criti- 
 cism, which is due to all ancient writings, is due to the 
 Vedas and Upanishads too. It is of course opposed to the 
 rules of fair criticism not to consider the end and scope of 
 a writer, or any peculiar idiom which may be observable 
 in his works. It would be unjust and improper hastily to 
 conclude that the works are self-contradictory, or reckless- 
 ly to interpret texts without taking into account how far 
 they may be be consistent with one another. But you can 
 
PANTHEISM AN INTERNAL EVIDENCE AGAINST VEDAS. 441 
 
 not call upon me to submit to unnatural rules of interpre- 
 tation with the sole object of proving the doctrine of one 
 Upanishad to be consistent with that of any other, so that 
 there may be no theory in the Mundaka contradictory to 
 the lessons of the S'wetds'watara ; for you have not yet 
 shown that the Upanishads have all the same paternity. 
 Nor can you require me to surrender my private judg- 
 ment before you have proved that the Vedas are of 
 divine authority. I conceive I may undertake to say that 
 you have no external proof to bring forward in behalf 
 of such authority." 
 
 Adhunika. — '' We do not pretend to bring forward 
 such proofs*. There are no historical records in our 
 country. You cannot expect such proofs. But the 
 internal evidence which the real doctrines of the Vedas 
 afford ought to satisfy a reasonable inquirer of their divine 
 authority." 
 
 Satyakdma. — ''That evidence cannot be admitted at 
 least before the Vedas are acquitted of the charge of pan- 
 theism, now under consideration. Passages really pan- 
 theistic cannot, I say, be overruled by texts, merely set- 
 ting forth a distinction between God and the world. The 
 pantheism I am charging on the Upanishads does not 
 imply that God and the universe are one in such a sense 
 as that it would be a truism to say, 'All this is God.' 
 That pantheism is inculcated in three different ways : first, 
 by teaching that God is the material cause of the world : 
 Secondly J by maintaining that the soul and the universe 
 are consubstantial with God ; thirdly by asserting that 
 
 1 " The Vaids having existed from a time when Indian literature and indeed all 
 *' literature, was only (as it were) in a state of germination, it is impossible to prove 
 ** the divine origin of these sacred books by any historical testimonies, the value of 
 ** which was not understood at the time." Vaidantk doctrines vindicated. 
 
 3 L 
 
442 DIALOGUE IX. 
 
 be who knows God is absorbed in, and identified with. 
 Him. 
 
 '^ The Upanishads clearly inculcate that God is the ma- 
 terial cause (call it substantial, if you prefer it) of the 
 world. That from which a thing is produced and into 
 which it is resolved is called its material cause. The 
 following texts will prove the teaching of your Vedas 
 on this point : 
 
 ^Brahma ie he from whom all these elements are pro- 
 duced, and into which they are resolved^.' 
 
 ^As the spider projects its web, as small sparks pro- 
 'ceed from fire, so from this Spirit are produced all 
 ^animals, all worlds, all gods, all creatures^.' 
 
 'As a water bubble, when cast into the water, is resol- 
 ' ved into water, so that no one can restore it ; whence- 
 ' soever it be taken, it will be saline ; so this great being 
 ' (in yourself), which has neither end nor limit, will be 
 ' resolved into the solid aggregate of knowledge (God)^." 
 
 *This God of all, this omniscient, this in-goer, this 
 ' origin or womb of all, is the source and resolution of 
 ' creatures^.' 
 
 ^ ^rt ^T ^^ifff vrmf^ ^i^^ * * ^cT iT^'TgifH^F^grpTr 
 
 On "* 
 
 cTT^'^ II Taittiriya. 
 
 "Vf "Nr "NC "N «> 
 
 ^T?iT^5 5Efqr milTTJ ^^ W\^\' ^^ ^?TJ iET^fftr VTcTTf^ ^^^Pfl II 
 
 Brihad. 
 WcTT'Sflt M.^ndukya. 
 
PANTHEISTIC TEXTS CITED. 443 
 
 *This was in the beginning one, even Brahma^.' 
 ' Tins was in the beginning a spirit, even one^.' 
 * This was in the beginning a spirit hke a male person®.' 
 ' This is the truth, As from a blazing fire consubstan- 
 ' tial sparks proceed thousand-fold, so from the Imperish- 
 * able, O gentle pupil, diverse entities are produced, and 
 Hhey return into him too ^.' 
 
 ' He desired, Let me become many — let me be produ- 
 ' ced. He conceiving knowledge created all this. Having 
 created it, He got into it'^' 
 
 ' He observed. Let me become many, let me be pro- 
 duced ^'" 
 
 Adhunika. — *^ The text, 'Let me become many, let me 
 be produced,' is only in accommodation to our ancient con- 
 ventional zVZea that the father is begotten in the son^." 
 
 Satyakdma, — " I thought your opinion was that the 
 Upanishads were given by God at the creation, before con- 
 
 Ijrihad. 
 Mundaka. 
 
 ^° 3R^l5^iTf?icr ^-^^t ^r^T^^icTs H cixTucnzfcT ^ cT^T^irm ^^ 
 
 ^ cT^^cT ^^^t g^I^^fcT I Chhiiudogya. 
 
 2 This is the way in which the Neo-Vedantists endeavour to explain away the 
 
 passage given in Note 1, " The text ^^^Cff ySfX^^ does not mean, as the Revd. 
 
 "gentleman asserts, that God has been many, and that the objects of the universe 
 " are of the same substance with God. It is a conventional thought pecriliar to 
 "ancient Sanscrit writings to consider the Creator himself .la born in bis creation, 
 
 " as for example ^TfTTT ^T ^TT^cT W^'* Veda. Asa man's self is bom in his son, 
 
 \» 
 
 "yet remains distinct from him, so God, having created man and the world, remains 
 "distinct from them." Remarks &c. 
 
444 DIALOGUE IX. 
 
 ventional idioms could be formed. It seems your mind is 
 far from being saturated with that belief I see you invol- 
 untarily treat it as an ordinary work, and reason from its 
 style as a 'creation of man.'" 
 
 Adhuniha. — '' May not an inspired work be characterized 
 by particular idioms ?" 
 
 Satyakdma. — '^ If composed by a mortal under divine 
 direction, it may still bear traces of the writer s idiom 
 and style : but if it were revealed at the creation, before 
 idiom and style could be formed, it must be independent 
 of such human peculiarities." 
 
 " We do not receive, said j^dhunika, nor do we literal- 
 ly interpret the fable respecting the revelation of the 
 Vedas at the time of the creation." 
 
 Satyakdma. — " But the fable is contained in the Vedas 
 themselves. The S'wetas'watara says, that God revealed 
 the Vedas at the creation. How can you receive the 
 Vedas as the word of God if you reject that fable ? But 
 as regards the passage under consideration, you cannot 
 prove that the conventional idea you speak of really 
 existed at any time. The father is indeed said to be bom 
 in the son ; that is because the latter is of the substance 
 of the former. But no writer ever said that the potter 
 was begotten in the jar. On your own confession, then, 
 the text teaches that the world is consuhstantial with God, 
 — which is the second characteristic of pantheism taught 
 in the Upanishads. That this characteristic is prominently 
 inculcated will be apparent from the following passages : 
 
 ' This was nonentity in the beginning ; then was en- 
 ' tity produced. It made itself^.' 
 
 **If the Upanishad is not inculcating the atheistic 
 
 * ^^1 IC^^nr ISTT^tcT cT#t ^ H^^T5STor cT^?fTT^ ^^T^^^cT |1 
 
 Tait. 
 
PANTHEISTIC TEXTS CITED. 445 
 
 dogma of Kapila, that nature made itself into the form of 
 the universe, the obvious meaning is that the world is a 
 formation of Brahma, and is consubstantial with Him. 
 
 ' As the one fire having entered into the world became 
 ' diversified in form, so the one spirit pervading all crea- 
 ' tures, inside and outside, becomes many forms. As 
 ' the one air having entered into the world became diver- 
 ' sified in form, so the one spirit pervading all creatures, 
 ' inside and outside, becomes various forms^/ 
 
 " The Chhandogya teaches the relation, in which the 
 world stands to God, thus : ' As, O gentle pupil, by means 
 ' of one clod of earth, every earthy form is known, being 
 ' in truth only earth, though called in words a modifi- 
 ' cation, and as, O gentle pupil, by means of one magnet 
 * every magnetized iron becomes known, being in truth 
 ' only iron, though called in words a modification, and 
 ' as by one nail-parer every black iron, is known, being 
 ' in truth only black iron, though called in words a 
 'modification; so is the doctrine I delivered^.' Then 
 follows the assertion of one original principle which was 
 multiplied into many. Connect the above passages with 
 
 Wt%^ I Katha. 
 
 ChliJindogya. 
 
446 DIALOGUE IX. 
 
 the text, ' All this is God/ and the meaning of the 
 Upanishad can no longer admit of doubt. Again, 
 
 'Here all these become one^.' 
 
 'This universe is even Purusha (or a male person)^.' 
 
 'All this is Brahma. This spirit is Brahma. This 
 spirit is four footed, [has four quarters^.}' 
 
 " Equally decisive of Pantheism are those passages 
 which declare that the student is unified with God on 
 attaining to the knowledge of Brahma. Nay sometimes 
 he is identified with God even before fulness of know- 
 ledge. ' He that knows God becomes God.' ' He is a 
 spirit. Thou art he, O S'wetaketu^.' This is given as a sort 
 of refrain, and is repeated nine times in the Chhandogya. 
 
 'I am Brahma'.^^ 'Whoever knows this, I am 
 ' Brahma, he knows this all. Even the gods are unable 
 ' to prevent his becoming Brahma^.' 
 
 'As flowing rivers are resolved into the sea, losing 
 ' their names and forms, so the learned, freed from name 
 'and form, get into the heavenly and super- excellent 
 ' Spirit. He who knows that supreme Brahma becomes 
 'Brahma^'. 
 
 ^ ^^ 9'^ ^ ^^ H^f% I Brihad. 
 7 •v • ^ . 
 
 Xr^^ ^^^ V^^ Mundaka. 
 
 ^ ^^* 'icT^^^Rm^T W^ ^^TTTnFn ^^^IcT^ ( Mundaka. 
 
 ^° ^i: ^^T^fif I Brihad. 
 
 ^T>mrT t^^ I Brihad. 
 
 ^^T ^^; ^^JTI^T: ^^^-^^^ JT^ffT ^T^T^^ f^TT^ cT^I 
 
PANTHEISTIC TEXTS CITED. 447 
 
 ^ The knowers of Brahma, understanding the difference 
 ' here, are resolved into Brahma, being bent on Him and 
 
 * freed from birth. He who sees this by true devotion is 
 ' received into the Spirit, even as oil is in sesamum seed, 
 'butter in curds, water in streams, and fire in the flint ^.' 
 
 'Where there is something like duality, there one may 
 ' see the other, one may smell the other, one may hear 
 'the other, one may honour the other, one may regard 
 'the other, one may know the other; but where the 
 ' whole of this is one spirit, there whom and by what 
 ' can one smell ? whom and by what can one see ? whom 
 ' and by what can one hear ? whom and by what can one 
 ' honour ? whom and by what can one regard ? whom 
 'and by what can one know^ ?' 'That is his excellent 
 'state in which he thinks, I am alP.' 
 
 "The Brihadaranyaka again contains the following 
 catechetical lecture : 
 
 * Ushasta asked Ydjnawalkya, Declare to me the all-pervading spirit, 
 
 * who is manifestly and perceptibly, Brahma. 
 
 * Y^jnawalkya answered, This thy spirit is all-pervading. 
 
 * U. Which is that all-pervader, Yajnawalkya ? 
 
 * r. The same who performs the physical functions of the five vital 
 ' airs. This thy spirit is the all-pervader- 
 
 * U. This is like an evasive description of the cow or the horse. Tell 
 me which is the all-pervading spirit, manifestly and perceptibly, Brahma. 
 
 * Y. Your spirit is the all-pervader. 
 
 * U. Which is that all-pervader, Yajnawalkya? 
 
 * Y. Look not at him who sees through sight, hear not him who hears 
 
 * through the hearing, think not of him who thinks through thinking, 
 
 * '^^I'rrt W^f^ft f^f^f^T ^^T W^ftr c!fq^T ^f^^WT- I 
 
 ^TfJ^^^^ ^S^if cmm WtS^^^T^T^ \ Swetiisw.itara. 
 •» See note 7 page 381. 
 ^ ^?f?^fcf ^^^ ^SH? IT^lft^^! I Brihad. 
 
448 DIALOGUE IX. 
 
 * know not him who knoweth through knowing. This thy spirit is all- 
 
 * pervader. The rest is subject to decay^.' 
 
 " I need not stop to remark on the meaning of some 
 of these antitheses, on which even eminent commentators 
 are not agreed ; but no one dissents from the obvious 
 construction of the identity of the querist with the Su- 
 preme Being. Another inquirer is introduced, Kahola, 
 by name, asking precisely the same questions, and he is 
 answered in a similar manner, that his spirit was the all- 
 pervader, ' that is above hunger and thirst, grief, anxiety 
 and death ^.' Eventually Yajnawalkya says to the querist 
 Uddalaka : 
 
 * This thy spirit which, remaining in earth, is diflferent from the earth, 
 
 * which the earth itself does not know, whose body is the earth, which, 
 
 * being within, directs the earth, is the immortal In-goer. This thy spirit 
 
 * which, remaining in water, is different from water, which the water 
 
 * itself does not know, whose body is the water, which, being within, 
 'directs the water, is the immortal In-goer. This thy spirit which, 
 
 * remaining in fire, is different from fire, which the fire itself does not 
 
 ^lc5FTr ^^^T'fiTt ^ ^^^T^^^lfiTfcT ^ cT ^Tc^T ^^I'tR ^^ cT 
 ^ Tt^'^^W^T^TWt ^^T f%W??T^ jfV^Cm^'g IC^^^- 
 
 ^ ^^^RT^lfiiqii .tft^ ^^ ^^t 'jai^^fcT II 
 
PANTHEISTIC TEXTS CITED. 449 
 
 * know, whose body is the fire, which, being within, directs the fire, is 
 
 * the immortal In-goer. This thy spirit which, remaining in ether, is 
 
 * different from ether, which the ether itself does not know, whose body 
 
 * is the ether, which, being within, directs the ether, is the immortal 
 
 * In-goer. This thy spirit which, remaining in air, is different from the 
 *air, which the air itself docs not know, whose body is the air, which, being 
 
 * within, directs the air, is the immortal In-goer. This thy spirit which, 
 ' remaining in heaven, is different from heaven, which the heaven itself does 
 
 * not know, whose body is heaven, which, being within, directs the heaven, 
 
 * is the immortal In-goer**.' 
 
 " It is not necessary to quote the whole of this long 
 passage in which the querist's spirit (in common, adds 
 the commentator, with that of every other man) is de- 
 clared to be the immortal In-goer, pervading all things, the 
 sun, the cardinal points, the moon and the stars, the 
 firmament, darkness, light, the vital air, speech, the eye, 
 the ear, the mind, the skin, knowledge, the retas itself be- 
 ing expressly included in the list. — The same spirit of the 
 querist, is, in conclusion, pronounced to be ' the seer, though 
 ' unseen, the hearer, though unheard, the thinker, though 
 ^ unthought of, the knower, though unknown, there being 
 
 ^ ^j ¥fErwt fcT^^^ ^fzTWI ^^ift' ^ ^f^ ^ ^^ ^^ '^f^ft 
 
 ^^ ^^ jfT^ ^i Uttt ?rt f^H^^ ^iT^^iET cT ^TcJTPrTJqiw-. 
 ^cT! II 
 
 3 M 
 
450 DIALOGUE IX. 
 
 ' no other seer, no other hearer, no other thinker, no other 
 'knower^/ 
 
 " The preceding passages are so significant that I cannot 
 conceive how any one can doubt their meaning. They 
 indisputably inculcate a compound of material and mys- 
 tical pantheism. Had there been the least ambiguity in 
 them, 1 might have understood your anxiety to give them 
 the benefit of the doubt. The texts I have cited are 
 however so pointed, that I am unable to enter into your 
 feelings." 
 
 AWiunika.—^^ Will you not accord to us the same 
 liberty of interpretation that you claim for yourself We 
 choose to construe them consistently with pure monothe- 
 ism. What is the use of telling us we are bad interpre- 
 ters ? What is your object ? Is it to convert us to pan- 
 theism, or to read us lectures on philology." ? 
 
 Satyakdma. —*' Neither. My object is to enter a protest 
 against assumptions calculated, on the one hand, to pervert 
 historical truths, and, on the other hand, to circulate 
 wrong ideas on the teaching of the Vedas. If you 
 abjure pantheism, while accepting the Upanishads, your 
 renouncement of a gross error must be a subject of con- 
 gratulation, but your adherence to books, which teach 
 that error and do not contain the true word of God, 
 cannot but be a cause of anxiety." 
 
 Here iVdhunika paused for a momenij-, when the Kumd- 
 ra, finding he could speak without interrupting any party, 
 said to his father, that he had come to ask permission 
 for amusing himself with the hhas billiard table for half 
 
 
UPANISIIADS SET ASIDE BY THE NEW SCHOOL. 451 
 
 an hour. ''You need not/' said his highness, 'Miavo 
 waited for permission, my only liquidator of debts to 
 ancestors ! You may go into that amusement-room, 
 whenever and with whomsoever you please. I am only 
 too glad to find you have a taste for such manly 
 exercises. But stop for one moment. I wish you to 
 write down what presents are to be made to my learned 
 friends, who attended your sister's wedding-party, and 
 have since been with me from yesterday." 
 
 The Kumara pulled out a golden pencil from his pocket 
 and wrote out an order on the Dewan of the Household. 
 The Rajah, without stopping to read the list, ordered it 
 to be taken to the Dewan. 
 
 While the Kumara's autograph was on its way to the 
 royal Wardrobe (Toshahhana) and the Treasury, we 
 were in pleasant expectation of what was coming, (I may 
 at least confess for myself). Agamika, however, could 
 not, when the Kumdra had left the room with his young 
 friends, suppress his astonishment at the view which 
 Adhunika had taken of the Vedant. Vaiyasika said, ''The 
 Baboo belongs to the new school initiated by Rammohun 
 Roy. But A'dhunika has evidently been absent from the 
 Head-quarters of his own school longer than myself, for, 
 when I was there last, I noticed that the divine authority 
 of the Vedas and Upanishads had been given up as a 
 false idea ! The Brahma-dharma was now inculcated as 
 sahaja-jndna, or simple natural theology." 
 
 Eajah.— '-''Is it possible they have changed again? 
 The school commenced with the acknowledgement of all 
 the s'astras, — Puranas, Smritis, as well as Vedas. At least 
 Rammohun Roy did not avowedly reject any of them, 
 though he did not follow the orthodox interpretation. In 
 his preface to the Is'opanishad lie admitted the authority 
 of the whole body of our s'astras. His successors set aside 
 
452 DIALOGUE IX. 
 
 the Smriti and the Puranas, and adhered to the Vedas 
 alone. And now they have given up the Upanishads 
 too ! Why a learned writer claimed consideration for 
 those writings on the very ground of their finding ac- 
 ceptance in Bengar^" 
 
 Scarcely had his highness finished these words when a 
 number of servants, dressed in diverse colours, entered 
 the room with silver trays, shawls, silks, and gold coins. 
 Each of us received a tray with a pair of costly Cashmere 
 shawls, silk dhooties, and twenty pieces of gold coin. 
 Laden with these gifts we took leave of the Rajah, wish- 
 ing him a long life of health and prosperity. 
 
 10 * But the challenger cannot claim the choosing of the ground, and the Mis- 
 
 * sionary who heartily seeks the conversion of these men will seek it vainly if he shirk 
 'the task, however irksome, of exploring the field where alone the Vedantista of 
 
 * modern Bengal will consent to be found. He must try to take accurate account of 
 
 * the Upanishads; that is to say, he must not content himself with picking out a few 
 
 * of the passages which are most open to ridicule, but he must endeavour candidly to 
 ' understand what it is, in these treatises, that satisfies the modern thinkers of Beu- 
 
 * gal.' Ballantyne's Christianity contrasted with Hindii> philosophy, p. 51. 
 
DIALOGUE X. 
 
 FROM THE SAME TO THE SAME. 
 
 I told you in my last how we returned home from the 
 Rajah's, laden with presents. We were all happy and 
 cheerful with the single exception of Agamika, who 
 appeared to be labouring under some inward perturbation. 
 None asked him any questions at the time, but I called the 
 day after, to inquire after his health. '^ I am quite well," 
 said he, — '^physically, but feel rather unhappy at the 
 progress of sceptical sentiments. Even the new class of 
 Vedantists have given up the divine authority of the 
 Upanishads. What is all this leading to ? Is it possible 
 for human society to keep together for a single century 
 without the discipline and direction of God's word ?" 
 
 The good Brahmin was talking after this fashion when 
 Satyakama came in, also to make friendly enquiries. 
 Agamika turned to him, and, after some desultory obser- 
 vations on the Vedant controversy, said : ^' I cannot 
 help complaining, Satyakama, that you have not been 
 dealing fairly with Vyasa and S'ankanicharya. You 
 have been forcing them to submit to an ordeal against 
 which they have often protested. Tliey do not pre- 
 tend to base their doctrine on the suirfifestions of 
 reason. If they had done so, perhaps I might have 
 joined you to a certain extent in finding fault with their 
 deductions. But their appeal is to the Yedas, the 
 
454 DIALOGUE X. 
 
 eternal and infallible Vedas, which were co-eval with the 
 creation. As the productions of Brahma's wisdom, they 
 contain truths which it would an act of profaneness to 
 gainsay. For every doctrine contained in the Uttara 
 Mimdnsdy S'ankaracharya has adduced ample proof from 
 the Vedas. There is, I think, not a single Sutra which 
 is not supported by the unerring texts of the Upani- 
 shads. Nay, he has in more than one place plainly ex- 
 pressed his jealousy of argumentations not founded on 
 those records of eternal truth. He has never hesitated to 
 avow that his teaching is regulated by passages breathed 
 out by the Creator. It is only when reason is subser- 
 vient to the Vedas, and, as a faithful handmaid, assists 
 in enforcing their doctrine, that he allows her room. * The 
 ' knowledge of Brahma, says he, proceeds from a critical 
 'consideration of the sense of Vedic texts, not from 
 ' inference and other proofs ; and the Vedanta texts 
 'being recognized as setters forth of the cause of the 
 'world's production, inference, when it is a proof not 
 ' opposed to those texts, is not excluded from confirming 
 * their meaning ^ .' 
 
 " You do not, continued A'gamika, really meet S'anka- 
 racharya, when you use against his system arguments 
 quite irrelevant to his position. How can I, or any body 
 else, submit to your wisdom, when we believe it to be 
 opposed to that of the Omniscient." 
 
 Satyahdma. — " But does the Veda contain the wisdom 
 of the Omniscient ? This question has never yet been dis- 
 cussed. You assume it as already decided in your favour. 
 
 Com. Vedant I. i. 2. 
 
HAS TUE VEDA MARKS OF OMNISCIENCE. 455 
 
 I do not deny that S'ankaracharya is generally borne out 
 by texts of the Vedas. I say generally, because I do not 
 wish absolutely to pronouce judgment, as between him and 
 the leaders of other schools. But you must prove that 
 the Vedas are records of eternal truth, before their texts 
 can be allowed to drown the voice of reason, and stifle the 
 dictates of conscience." 
 
 Agamika. — ''Has not S'ankaracharya himself proved that 
 point ? ' Nor could such Sastras, says he, as the Kich and 
 ' other Vedas, endowed with the characteristics of omnis- 
 'cience, proceed from any other than the Omniscient'^." 
 
 Satyahdma. — '' Do you call that proof ? In Gotama's 
 vocabulary, the reason adduced would be called Sddhya- 
 sama, a mere petitio principii. S'ankara assumes that 
 the Vedas contain characteristic marks of omniscience, 
 and thence argues that they proceeded from the Omnisci- 
 ent. The hypothesis is almost identical with the infer- 
 ence. The argument is not a process of logic. It is a 
 mere assertion. Nor must it be forgotten that S'ankara 
 is not, in the above passage, proving the authority of the 
 Vedas. His object is to demonstrate the omniscience of 
 God by asserting that of the Vedas which proceeded from 
 Him. He assumes but does not prove that point." 
 
 Agamika. — " But does not the Veda itself decide the 
 question. ' Being desirous of liberation, I seek Him, the 
 * manifestation of spiritual understanding, who in the be- 
 ' ginning created Brahma and revealed to him the Vedas ^.' 
 
 ^^^S 5ET^Ttrf% 1 Ibid. I. i. 3. 
 
4jG dialogue X. 
 
 'That which all the Vedas set forth — I declare^/ 
 'This Rig-veda was breathed out by that great Being' ^." 
 
 Satyakdma. — '* Why do you commence and stop just 
 where S'ankara commenced and stopped when citing those 
 passages ? Why do you give the text second-hand ? 
 Read out the passages whole and entire from the Upa- 
 nishads themselves ?" 
 
 Agamika. — *' As from the fire contained in damp- fuel, 
 * smoke comes out separate, so, (O Maitreyi) was breathed 
 ' out of the great Being this, namely, the Kig-veda, the 
 ' Yajur-veda, the Sama-veda, the Atharva, Angirasa, the 
 ' Itihasa, Pur4na, Sciences, Upanishads, S'lokes, Sutras, 
 'After-expositions. All these were breathed out of 
 Him'6." 
 
 Satyahdma. — " Does not this prove too much for you ?" 
 
 Agamika. — " S'ankara has shown that all these stand 
 simply for the Vedas, for in his commentary on the 
 passage he remarks : f The Veda is not like any other 
 ' work ; having issued like a man's breath, without any 
 ' personal exertion' ^ ." 
 
 " I thought, rejoined Satyakama, you said a little while 
 ago that the Vedas were productions of the wisdom of 
 Brahma. But it appears now that they issued from the 
 
 ^"^crTf^ 5R^[ftr f^^1%crif«T l Brihaddranyalla. 
 
BRAHMA ALL EVERY THING. 457 
 
 Oinuiscieiit like human breath without any other effort on 
 his part. We cannot then say that they contain his deli- 
 berate teaching. He did not intelligently utter them ; 
 tliey escaped Him like smoke from fire. You have no 
 right to say that an involuntary emanation of that kind 
 is the production of his intellect." 
 
 Agamiha. — *' He is called ^^rajndna-glianay a mass of 
 intelligence. Whatever issues from Him must also par- 
 take of the Omniscient." 
 
 Satyakdma. — "But the Yedas say that every thing 
 issues from Him. He is not a mass of intelligence only, 
 but ' this spirit, Brahma, is all mind, all vital air, all eye, 
 ^ all ear, all earth, all water, all air, all ether, all light, all 
 * no-light [or darkness,] all desire, all no-desire, all anger, 
 'all no-anger, all virtue, all vice, all every thing' ^. Is 
 not this the language of the Upanishad? How can 
 you then trust the Veda to be all knowledge, merely 
 because it escaped him ?" 
 
 " You are so fond of vilifying the Vedas," said iV^ga- 
 mika, somewhat irritated. '^ That is your besetting sin. 
 You are such a contemner of the Veda." 
 
 *'I thought, said Satyakama, I was speaking guard- 
 edly enough by making no observation of my own, and 
 confining myself to the very language of .the Veda." 
 
 Agamika. — ''You will draw us again into the whole 
 question of the Vedanta. We have had that to our 
 heart's content." 
 
 Satyakdma. — " My impression is, you conceded that on 
 the grounds of human reasoning the Vedanta could not 
 
 3 N 
 
458 DIALOGUE X. 
 
 stand, but that it is supported by the Yedas. We are 
 now surveying that fundamental support. I am anxious 
 to get at your theory of the Veda before proceeding to 
 examine it." 
 
 Agamika. — " Well, hear patiently the proofs we adduce. 
 I have already shown that the S'wetas'watara, Katha, and 
 the Brihadaranyaka support the authority of the Vedas. 
 The Mundaka does the same. ^' From Him the Rich, 
 Saman, Yajus^." 
 
 Satyakdma. — '^ Go on, why do you stop short ? Does 
 not the Upanishad specify the whole creation as a proces- 
 sion from him like the Vedas ?" 
 
 Agamika. — " It does." 
 
 '^ And who is the ^ Him' here ?" asked Satyakdma. 
 '^ What is the antecedent of the tasmdt V 
 
 ^' The soul, or Male person, spoken of immediately 
 before." 
 
 '' That is a Male described as one of like passions with 
 ourselves, becoming a father after the ordinary animal 
 fashion, the description itself not being at all choice 
 in point of decency of language. It is hardly consistent 
 with the reverence due to God to identify Him with such 
 a ' male,' and call him the author of the Vedas on the 
 strength of this passage^^" 
 
 '' What is the use of such criticisms ?" said Agamika 
 querulously. '^ Do you seriously mean that the Upanis- 
 hads do not uphold the authority of the Vedas." 
 
 Satyakdma. — •^' I think you cannot deny that some of 
 the texts you have quoted actually disprove your theory 
 
 
 cT^I^xf: ^m ^^ftr j Mundaka. 
 
 0\ 
 
* VEDAS CANNOT PROVE VEDAS. 459 
 
 of Vedic inspiration. But suppose I waived that question 
 for the present, and allowed that the Vedas support the 
 authority of the Vedas. What then ? Not even a dexter- 
 ous person can ride on his oivn shoulder^." 
 
 Agamika. — " What do you mean ?" 
 
 Satyahdma. — '' As you are impatient of cross-question- 
 ing on the Vedas, you had better ask what Sayana means 
 by introducing that remark, for it is not mine. The re- 
 mark means that the Vedas cannot prove their own autho- 
 rity, any more than a man support himself on his own 
 shoulders." 
 
 Agamika. — ^' I am astonished at your still calling the 
 authority of the Vedas in question. At the marriage 
 assembly you quoted Gotama against Tarkakama in order 
 to prove that if all evidence were denied there would be 
 an end of discussion. You are now actingf ag^ainst the 
 spirit, if not the letter, of that Sutra of the Nyaya. You 
 are calling in question the authority of that which every 
 body allows is the word of God. Really I feel now the 
 wisdom of Manu's ordinance that those who vilify the 
 Vedas ought to be banished from Society." 
 
 Satyakdma. — ''You may banish me, if you like; but 
 you must remember, I have not wantonly said any thing 
 against the Vedas. On certain questions of vital import- 
 ance you contend that the authority of the Veda should 
 be binding on all. You say that it is the repository of 
 infinite wisdom. I ask only for proof If your point can 
 be established by satisfactory evidence, I cannot fail to be 
 highly edified. Your summary appeal to Manu does not 
 augur well for the strength of your position. Nor is it 
 just to the great interests at stake. The Vedas are now 
 
 S.-fyana in Max MuUer's liig-Veda. 
 
460 DIALOGUE X. 
 
 appealed to as the only support of the Vedantic doctrine, 
 which appears to be much at variance with reason and 
 conscience. Before I can consent to this appeal, I am 
 anxious to examine the authority of our judge. Is the 
 Veda the inspired word of God ? Let the question be dis- 
 passionately discussed. You can gain nothing by hastily 
 asserting its authority, if it really have none. Nor can I 
 gain any thing by disproving its authority. Before we 
 can once for all surrender our Reason, it is necessary to 
 sift the pretensions of that which challenges implicit 
 obedience. 
 
 " Besides, continued Satyakama, it is somewhat out of 
 place now to decline discussion on the authority of the 
 Vedas, when some of our eminent scholars long ago con- 
 descended to cite objections against their genuineness and 
 inspiration, and undertook to answer them. Indeed it 
 is impossible to conceive stronger objections against the 
 authority of a S'astra tiian those which Jaimini, Sayana, 
 Gotama, Kanada, and Kapila have themselves cited. 
 If they could but have refuted them with any success, the 
 cause of the Vedas would have been entirely triumphant. 
 You need not be afraid of condescending too much to 
 sceptical cavillers, when such authorities attempted 
 to answer the objections to which I refer. Allow me to 
 bring some of them to your notice. Sayana notices the 
 following objections as to the authenticity of the Vedas. 
 
 1. The four Vedas are named in several texts. Is 
 not that proofs ? ' No, says he, for those texts being 
 
 ^ ^ s* (K 
 
 ^^T^I I Ibid. 
 
sayana's «eply inconclusive. 461 
 
 ' contained in the Vedas, their admission would amount 
 ' to a satisfaction with mere self-dependence. Not even a 
 
 * dexterous man can support himself on his own shoulders.' 
 
 2. But the Smriti bears testimony to the Vedas. ' This is 
 ' nothing, because the Smriti itself depends on the Vedas.' 
 
 3. ' As to the popular opinion in favor of the Vedas, 
 ' though it prevail universally, it may be as erroneous as 
 ' the notion that the sky is blue.' If such objections, ad- 
 ded Satyakama, have been noticed by so many conde- 
 scending sages, perhaps it may not be beneath your dig- 
 nity to resolve my doubts." 
 
 Agamika. — " But Say ana has satisfactorily replied to 
 those objections and disposed of them. You have yourself 
 said you can conceive no stronger objections. You should 
 accordingly declare yourself satisfied." 
 
 Satyakdma. — '' If Sayana's reply to those objections 
 were at all satisfactory, I should never have troubled you 
 with my doubts. But he has left the objections quite 
 intact. He says^, ' with reference to the authenticity of the 
 
 * Vedas, proofs as mentioned, founded on tlie Vedas, on 
 ' Smriti, on popular opinion, may be seen. As it is not 
 
 * absurd that the sun, moon, and other luminaries should 
 ' have the quality of self-manifestation, though pots, clothes, 
 ' and other substances cannot manifest themselves ; so 
 ' there may be, in the extraordinarily powerful Vedas, the 
 ' quality of proving themselves, as they have that of prov- 
 ' ing other substances, though it may be impossible for 
 'men to ride on their own shoulders.' 
 
462 DIALOGUE X. 
 
 "This, I submit, added Sktyakama, is no demonstration. 
 The argument comes too late after the entertainment of 
 the objections already mentioned. The entertainment of 
 the objections shows that the proposition was not, in the 
 conception of Sayana, self-evident ; for no sane man would 
 seriously entertain an objection against a self-evident 
 proposition, such as the existence of the sun and moon 
 though a blind man might question it. The blind man 
 would in such a case be simply nigraha-stJidnay i. e., not 
 fit to be argued with on that question. But it would be 
 a mockery to think of satisfying a man by an assertion 
 of which he was not capable of judging for himself" 
 
 Agamika. — " But if you were called upon to prove 
 the existence of the sun, what would you say ? You 
 would only wonder, would you not ? at the question. 
 My feeling is, and I have no doubt Sayana's also was, 
 the same, at this question on the authority of the 
 Vedas." 
 
 SatyaJcd7na. — " It is not for me to contradict you in 
 what you describe as a matter of feeling. But Say ana 
 could not have been possessed with such a feeling : for 
 then he would not have so elaborately cited objections, or 
 tendered replies. Nor does any other sage appear to have 
 partaken of your wonder at the question, for we find 
 Jaimini, Vyasa, Gotama, Kanada, Kapila, Sankaracharya 
 all undertaking to establish the authority of the Veda, 
 by the refutation of arguments adduced by infidels. 
 They could not therefore have considered it as clear 
 as the sun or moon. If the omniscient wisdom contained 
 in the Vedas were of this self-evidencing description, 
 you could not have staggered at the conclusions of the 
 Vedanta. It is because they were prima facie opposed to 
 the dictates of reason and conscience, because they were 
 NOT as clear as the sun or moon, that you appeal to 
 
OBSCENE DESCRIPTIONS IN VEDAS. 463 
 
 the positive authority of the Vedas. However brilliant 
 the Vedas may be in other respects, here is the Vedantic 
 doctrine hanging over it as a cloud. Here we have 
 Indra's achievements, as a chief god, enthusiastically 
 celebrated as acts performed under the influence of 
 liquor^. Here we have Brahm.a, declared to be all-vice, 
 no less than all-virtue. Here we have the Creator pro- 
 nounced to be a sort of conjurer, deliberately deluding 
 rational souls, by the projecting of illusory appearances^. 
 Here we have the very author of the Vedas described 
 as an ordinary male, with animal propensities, producing 
 a large offspring. Here we have elaborate lectures on 
 the most obscene subjects, which even profligate men 
 would think it beneath the dignity of human nature to 
 realize in practice®. Are we to be silenced by the as- 
 sertion that the divine authority of such books is as 
 apparent as the sun or moon ? If you have any ex- 
 planations to offer on these revolting descriptions, we 
 may give you the patient hearing due to your learn- 
 ing and character. But if you wish to persuade us 
 that the Vedas are of divine authority, you must prove 
 your position by evidence. You must show by external 
 proofs that they are possessed of such authority, or we 
 must draw the natural inference, to which the offensive 
 descriptions I have just mentioned, would lead us. There 
 is no use therefore in screening them from a critical exa- 
 mination. Jaimini himself never did so. He noticed 
 numerous objections against those works." 
 
 4 See above page 387. Note 6. 
 
 6 See the last section but one of the Brihadjii-anyaka Upanishad pp. 1077 — 1089. 
 Bibliotheca Jndica Vol. ii No. 18. We cannot make ujx our minds to reprint such a 
 long obscene passage. 
 
464 DIALOGUE X. 
 
 Agariiika.— " And has answered tUeni too. Are you 
 not satisfied with his replies ?" 
 
 Satyakama. — '' Satisfied ! No, on the contrary, I am 
 confirmed in my doubts." 
 
 ^._^^Howr 
 
 S. — *' Jaimini notices an objection to the eternity of 
 the Vedas, founded on their containing names of persons 
 and places. ' From connection with non-eternal objects 
 ' the Mantras are vain'. On this Sutra the commentator 
 remarks ^ In the Mantra, what do they in Kikata, 
 ' there is mention made of the country Kikata. So are 
 * other uneternal objects mentioned, such as the town 
 ' Naichas'akha, the king Pramangada. This being the 
 ' case, it follows that the Mantra could not have existed 
 ' before Pramangada^ .' The answer to the objection is obvi- 
 ously inconclusive. It can refer only to those names after 
 which any portions of the Vedas are called. ' The names, 
 says the philosopher, * from reading'®. Different sections 
 were styled after different men who first read them. This 
 does not at all meet the question regarding the names 
 which historically occur in the narratives. Another an- 
 swer is therefore attempted, but that is a mere reference 
 to a previous Sutra in which a similar objection was 
 noticed. That objection concerned a text wherein men- 
 tion was made of ' Babara .son of Pravahani.' The 
 question was how could the Veda be eternal when non- 
 eternal objects are named in it. Jaimini replies that 
 
 ^^^ '5f^xr'iTxfVfH I J'l-i'iiiwi quoted in Max MuUer's Rig-Veda. 
 
JAlMlNl's ARGUMENT INCONCLUSIVE. 4G5 
 
 the words may be otherwise interpreted, and the commen- 
 tator makes out, ingeniously enough, that Pravahani 
 may be tortured to do duty for the ' wind' and Babara 
 may serve as the imitation of its sound^. This explana- 
 tion is not only unsatisfactory ; it is something more. 
 It recoils against the Vedas. A sad plight such as this 
 shows how much the philosopher must have been strait- 
 ened. Is it possible to explain away by this violent arti- 
 fice all the passages that one can adduce containing narra- 
 tives concerning men? Is it to be pretended that no per- 
 sons, places, or human actions are historically named in the 
 Vedas ? The very supposition is preposterous. What 
 for instance is the Kathopanisliad — but a series of lectures 
 given by Yama to Nuchiketas ? Are not Sanatkumara, 
 S'wetaketu, Yajnawalkya, Uddalaka, Gotama, my own 
 namesake, persons of Vedic notoriety ? How could the 
 Vedas be composed before the persons mentioned in them 
 were born ? The objection recoils with redoubled force after 
 such an ineffectual attempt to refute it. Had Jaimini never 
 undertaken the refutation of objections against the Vedas, 
 my doubts on their divine authority could hardly have been 
 so strong as now they are. Vi^hen a philosopher of 
 his intelligence is driven to the necessity of spelling out 
 a fanciful meaning from a well-known word (Pravahani), 
 the cause must be bad indeed. This subtile interpretation 
 is however impossible with scores of proper names that 
 occur in the Vedas. You cannot volatilize the whole 
 army of Risliis celebrated in those writings. Are Indra's 
 exploits against Vitra also to be dissolved into the ^ wind' ? 
 
 * ^g cT^f^^ ^^?:T^: ^F'STfJ^^ f^^%cr: f^^ ^^^ T^T 
 
 Jaimini quoted in Max Muller's Rig-veda. 
 
 3 
 
46G DIALOGUE X. 
 
 Even Jaimini's shift therefore must fail. You cannot 
 reconcile with your theory of Vedic eternity the existence 
 of historical narratives in the Vedas. 
 
 '^ Aofain the Vedas themselves refer to times anterior 
 to their own age. How could there be a period before 
 eternity ? In the very first Sukta of the Rig- Veda there 
 is mention made of old and new Rishis. The S'wetas- 
 watara speaks also of former periods of gods and Risliis^^ 
 The Kena, or as it is otherwise called the Talavahdi^a, 
 similarly speaks of old teachers, from whom was derived 
 its mysterious doctrine ^ . The 1$% or Vdjasaneya, repeats 
 the same idea in two different places, only substituting the 
 word wise for old^. The Katha describes the doctrine 
 delivered to Nuchiketas as so subtile that even the gods 
 had doubts about it in olden times ^. The Mundaka says 
 that Atharva m the days of yore revealed the science 
 of Brahma to Angir^. Again, that Angiras declared 
 it of old to Saunaka^, The Taittiriya Brahmana says 
 'the Vajas'ra vases knew this Brahmana of old^.' Thus 
 the Vedas themselves testify against your theory of their 
 eternity." 
 
 Agamika. — '* Well, but have not Gotama, Kanada, 
 Vy'asa, S'ankaracharya, and Kapila defended the authority 
 of the Vedas. To begin with Vyasa and S'ankara : — they 
 explain the anachronisms you complain of by declaring 
 
 ^^ $ ^?^T '^^■^'^ cff^^t ii 
 
 * <T$cTcT ^cZT^fsT^f^^T' J^^T'er II 
 
sankara's theory of eternal species. 467 
 
 that there are eternal species of gods, men, and other 
 beings, and that it is ' with the species that words are con- 
 ' nected, and not with individuals, for as the latter are infi- 
 ' nite, such a connection would in their case be impossible. 
 ' But as species are eternal (though individuals begin to 
 ' exist) no contradiction is discoverable in the case of such 
 ' words as coio, etc. In the same way it is to be remarked 
 
 * that though we allow that the individual gods, etc., have 
 ' commenced to exist, there is no contradiction [to the 
 ' eternity of the Vedic word] in the [existence of the] 
 ' words Vasu, etc. [which denote those individual gods], 
 ' since species are eternal. And the fact that the gods, 
 ' etc., belong to particular species may be learned from 
 
 * this, that we discover their corporeality and other attri- 
 ' butes in the hymns and arthavddas (explanatory remarks 
 
 * in the Vedas), etc^.' In truth it was by means of the 
 eternal words of the Vedas, as prototypes of things, that 
 the Creator formed the universe. ' Thus the Veda says, 
 ' at (or with) the word ete (these) Prajapati created the 
 ' gods ; at asrigram (they tvere poured out) he created 
 'men; at indavah (drops of soma) he created the pitris ; 
 'at tirah pavitram (through the filter) he created the pla- 
 ' nets ; at dsUvah {swift) he created hymns ; at vis'vdni 
 ' (all) he created praise ; and at the words ahhi sauhhagd 
 
 * (for the sake of blessing) he created the other creatures. 
 ' And in another place it is said ' with his mind he 
 'produced speech, as a mate.' (Brib. Ar. Up. p. 50.) 
 
 * By these and other such texts the Veda declares that 
 
 * creation was preceded by the word. And when the 
 ' Smriti says, ' At first a divine voice, eternal, without 
 
 * beginning or end, formed of the Vedas, was uttered 
 ' by Svayambhu, from which all activities [proceeded J 
 
 7 Dr. Muir'a Sanscrit Tests, Part lii, p. 70. 
 
4GS DIALOGUE X. 
 
 ' the expression, utterance of the voice, is to be regar- 
 'ded as employed out of deference to the customary 
 ^ phraseology, since it is inconceivable that a voice wliich 
 ' was * without beginning or end,' could be uttered in the 
 'same sense as other sounds. Again, we have this other 
 
 * text. ' In the beginning Mahes'vara created from the words 
 ' of the Veda the names and forms of creatures, and their 
 ' several modes of action ;' and again, ' He created in the 
 ' beginning the several names, functions, and conditions of 
 ' all creatures from the words of the Veda.' And it is a 
 ' matter of common observation to us all, that when any 
 
 * one is occupied with any end which he wishes to accom- 
 ' plish, he first calls to mind the word which expresses it, 
 ' and then proceeds to effect his purpose. So, too, in the 
 ' case of Prajapati the creator, we conclude that before the 
 ' creation the words of the Veda were manifested in his 
 ' mind, and afterwards he created the objects which resul- 
 ' ted from them. Thus the Vedic text which says, ' utter- 
 ' ing hliiiry he created the earth (hhumi), etc.,' intimates 
 ' that the different worlds, earth and the rest, were mani- 
 ' fested,z. 6., created from the words bhilr% etc., manifested 
 'in his mind^.' 
 
 "Tiiose eminent expounders of the Veda have also 
 shown that the world being in reality without beginning, 
 there is no absurdity in the supposition of all worldly 
 events being only repetitions of the same things in other 
 ages. There can be no such thing, therefore, as past or 
 future. What is past is also future in reference to the 
 next age in which it will re-appear. What is future is 
 also past in reference to the last age in which it had al- 
 ready occurred once. There is no room for an argument 
 founded on a charge of anachronism. 
 
 8 Ibid. pp. 71, 72. 
 
ARGUMENTS OF OTHER RI^HIS. 469 
 
 " Gotama has also noticed certain objections preferred 
 by unthinking heretics, complaining of the failure of 
 Vedic promises, of mutually conflicting texts, and of 
 tautologies. He answers them quite effectually by con- 
 tending that the failure of the promised fruit may be 
 owing to defects in the performance of ceremonies ; that 
 the conflicting texts may be reconciled by the sup- 
 position that they refer to different times and places, 
 and that tautologies are useful in the inculcation of 
 doctrine. 
 
 ''This defence is unanswerable. Men ought not to 
 charge on the Vedas the consequences of their own 
 neglect in the performance of ceremonies, nor ought 
 they to be so narrow-minded as not to perceive that 
 differences of time and season may occasion differences 
 of description and injunction : and, instead of murmur- 
 ing, they ought to be thankful for tautologies, for they 
 may thereby have better chances of understanding the 
 mysteries of truth. 
 
 '' Kanada too contends for the authority of the Vedas. 
 ' The composition of sentences, says he, in the Vedas is ac- 
 ' cording to reason.' ' In the Brahmanas the occurrence 
 'of names is the characteristic (of omniscience.)' How 
 could the Vedas contain the names of all things if they 
 were not inspired? Again 'the rules of alms-giving 
 are also after reason.' Accordingly Kanada begins and 
 ends his work with the declaration of the authority of 
 the Vedas as his word^. 
 
 " Kapila, too, notwithstanding his many eccentricities 
 and his denial of the eternity of the Vedas, avows that no 
 
 Nf-v 
 
 
470 DIALOCJUE X. 
 
 person could have fabricated them ; for, of free or bond, 
 none was competent to produce them'^" 
 
 Satyakdma. — ^" You have produced a formidable array 
 of witnesses in support of the Vedas. Do not think I 
 am wanting in respect for any of them ; but you must 
 remember that it is no disrespect to a witness to subject 
 him to a cross-examination. I will do nothing more than 
 test their assertions by that logical touchstone which 
 they have themselves supplied. 
 
 ^^ Let us first classify the questions under discussion. 
 They may be considered as fourfold : 
 
 1. How can the Vedas be eternal when they not only 
 contain narrations of events that occurred in time, but 
 also speak of periods previous to themselves ? 
 
 2. What proofs are there of their eternity, or of their 
 inspiration by God ? 
 
 3. What are the Vedas ? 
 
 4. What are their own claims ? 
 
 " In answer to the first question you refer to Vyasa 
 and S'ankaracharya, who maintain that there are eternal 
 Species of men and gods, and that when the Vedas speak 
 of names which appeared in time, they refer really to 
 those eternal species, the individual members of which 
 were manifested in the transactions of the world. They 
 also maintain that the universe was created after the words 
 contained in the Vedas. As those words arose in the 
 Creator's mind, he formed the things indicated by them. 
 They likewise contend that the world, being in reality 
 without beginning, is revolving in continued cycles, so 
 that the Vedas are only speaking of past events, namely 
 those which happened in a previous age, when they refer 
 to what appears to be posterior to their production. 
 
ALL INCONCLUSIVE. 471 
 
 " On this explanation of the difficulty contained in the 
 first question, I have only to make three remarks. First, 
 the explanation is founded on a gratuitous hypothesis of 
 the existence of eternal species, for which no proof is 
 offered other than a few sentences of the Vedas. This 
 reason is vitiated by the fault of self -dependence. Se- 
 condly, assuming the existence of eternal species, and 
 the unceasing revolution of worlds with the same per- 
 sonal manifestations and events, you may still be called 
 upon to account for the singular fact that the Vedas 
 make allusion only to such incidents as happened be- 
 fore a certain definable era, but are totally silent on 
 all affairs that belong to a later date. Thirdly, S'ankara 
 quotes the text that the Supreme Being settled ' the 
 names, functions, and conditions of all creatures from 
 the words of the Vedas T If the fact were so, the Vedas 
 would be a real s'ahda-kal'pa'druma, or a cyclopaedia of 
 every thing conceivable by any body. But the fact is 
 not so, and we may meet the extravagant affirmation 
 with a direct negative. For the Vedas have no terms, 
 no names, for multitudes of things which are either of 
 modern discovery, or were unknown in India in times of 
 yore. If the creation of the universe was after the words 
 of the Vedas suggesting ideas to the Creator's mind, 
 how is it that there is an endless variety of things for 
 which there are no terms in the Vedas, but of the crea- 
 tion of which we have nevertheless ocular evidence ?" 
 
 Agamika. — ^^ I do not quite comprehend what you 
 mean." 
 
 Satyahdma. — " In the first place the ' supposition of 
 eternal species is altogether gratuitous. What is the 
 meaning of species before the existence of individuals ? 
 Or supposing that dkriti means form, and vyakti its 
 manifestation, what is the meaning of a form before its 
 
472 DIALOGUE X. 
 
 manifestation ? Assuming however that such eternal form s 
 are possible, how is it that the Vedas only allude to 
 forms of such things as may have appeared in India 
 down to a certain ascertainable period ? Again, the 
 Vedas speak not of names only, as the vyakti of the 
 dhriti, but also of acts performed in time. How can 
 the theory of eternal species account for the narration of 
 events, in books supposed to have been completed before 
 the creation of the universe ? Is there for instance 
 an eternal form of a drunken Indra when he kills Vitra^, 
 of a sober Indra when awe-stricken, with folded hands, 
 before a more powerful god, and of a profligate Indra 
 in the company of the Apsarases^ f If you refer, in reply, 
 to the theory of an eternal succession of worlds, I must 
 then ask again, how is it there is no mention of any incident 
 of an age posterior — say — to that of Yudhisthira. You 
 hear of certain anecdotes of S'wetaketu, of Sanatkumara, 
 of Uddalaka, of Vas'ishtha ; but you never meet with 
 any accounts of Vikramaditya, Kalidasa, Ghatakarpara, 
 Bhaskarachkrya, S'ankaracharya, Adisura, BuUalsen ; — 
 not to mention characters still nearer to our times. How 
 is it that some old manifestations of forms only are 
 given, but there is profound silence concerning events 
 later than the time of Yudhisthira, or transpiring else- 
 where than in India ? 
 
 '* If again the whole creation was regulated by the 
 words of the Vedas, how is it that there are multitudes of 
 created thinofs of which there is no intimation to be found 
 
 Max Muller's Rig-Veda vol. ii. p. 487. 
 cI"^^r^W^'^*T II Markandeya Purana. 
 
MANY NAMES OF THINGS UNKNOWN TO THE VEDAS. 473 
 
 in them ? How many plants and animals are there, how 
 many organic and inorganic substances, how many things 
 noticed in the different physical sciences and in natural 
 history, are there, for which we have no term, no name, 
 in the Vedas ? Their s'ahdas are only indicative of some 
 Indian produce of a date anterior to tlie age of Yudhis- 
 thira. Why are you obliged to use foreign words when 
 you apply to the sub-assistant surgeon for a little quinine, 
 or ask Tarkakama to decide a question of conscience, 
 as to whether you can take a little tea, or coffee, as a remedy 
 against cold ? And if with our limited knowledge we 
 are acquainted with so many things of which there are 
 no traces in the Vedas, if we who have never travelled 
 beyond the boundaries of our native land know more 
 s'ahdas than are found in those writin^fs, how much orreater 
 still must be the range of things, which men of larger 
 experience must miss in their pages ? 
 
 "As to the second question of proofs of Vedic inspira- 
 tion, nothing that Gotama, Kanada, or Kapila has advanc- 
 ed on the subject is worth a moment's consideration. 
 Gotama says that its authority is deduced from the 
 infallible person who (as the commentator adds) made 
 the Vedas^. The Sddhya, or point to be proved, is, in 
 other words, cited as its own hetu or reason ! Who would 
 doubt for a moment that the Vedas were of authority, 
 if once convinced of their infallible original? That the 
 very philosopher who discriminated so clearly between 
 true and false reasons, in the explanation of his topics, 
 should himself offer a proof, exactly corresponding to. his 
 own definition of the false reason, styled Sddhyasama, 
 
 3 P 
 
474 DIALOGUE X. 
 
 lecaves little room for doubting that the cause, which 
 drove him to such a departure from his own logical 
 principles, must be piteously weak." 
 
 A'gamika. — '^Not exactly so, for Gotama says that the 
 infallibility of the Veda is proved like that of Mantras 
 (spells) and tlie i^yurveda (the medical treatise)." 
 
 Satyahdma. — ^^That only removes the difficulty one 
 step. For what are spells f Nothing ! At any rate we 
 cannot connect the Most Holy, that governs according to 
 rule and moral law, with spells that profess to be inde- 
 pendent of rule, and make no discrimination of right and 
 wrong. None but the vulgar practise them, none but 
 the vulgar repose confidence in them, and certainly none 
 can prove any thing about them. If spells be true, 
 then it must be idle to talk of morals or of relio^ion, then 
 must we surrender reason and conscience to the freaks of 
 the profligate men that deal in those unmeaning things. 
 And as to the medical treatise, I need hardly remind 
 you that the Medical College of Calcutta has served to 
 throw it very much into discredit. I believe few in our 
 days would trust a cholera patient to an adept in the 
 Ayurveda. 
 
 '^ Kanada's pleas for the authority of the Vedas are lit- 
 tle better than Gotama's. His assertion in the third and 
 last Sutras is a mere confession of faith. *The Veda is of 
 authority, because it is His (God's) word' ! This reason, 
 almost identical with that which Gotama urged, is like- 
 wise Sddhya-sama, being scarcely different from the 
 inference. Two other reasons, given by him, resemble 
 the vicious arguments by which he himself exemplifies 
 false reasoning. ^The composition of sentences and 
 'the rules of alms-giving contained in the Vedas are 
 ' according to reason.' If the premises be admitted, 
 tlie argument is an antitype of tke one. It has ho7ms, 
 
kanaka's argument for the VEDA INCONCLUSIVE. 475 
 
 the7'efore it is a cow^. Many human compositions are 
 reasonable, though not divine ; just as many animals 
 are horned, though not cows. But the premises are by 
 no means certain, if not positively untrue. This very 
 appeal to the authority of the Vedas is caused by the 
 fact of their teaching not being according to reason, and 
 as to the rules of alms-giving which they inculcate, they 
 are based on class prejudices rather than on i^easoii. Wit- 
 ness the passage cited by Kanada's own commentator, 
 th(Jugh it is on Oolui^-taking rather than alms-^zvm^, but 
 the two are treated as one subject by the author. 
 'On the seventh (day of going without food) he may 
 ' steal S'udra's food : on the tenth, the Vais'ya's : on the 
 ^ seventeenth, the Kshetriya's : in peril of life, or for the 
 'preservation of himself or a relative, the Brahmin's^.' 
 Excellent instance of reasonable jurisprudence ! The 
 above argument for the Vedas rather resembles the other 
 exemplar of false reasoning ; it has horns, therefore it is 
 an horse^ ! 
 
 ^' There is a fourth reason adduced by Kanada, but that 
 is identical with one of S'ankaracharya's, already noticed, 
 viz., that the Vedas contain names of all things. 
 
 '^ You have cited Kapila, too, as as a witness for the 
 divine authority of the Veda. How a person that dis- 
 believes the existence of the Deity, can bear testimony 
 to His ivord is a problem which it is impossible to solve. 
 But Kapila's attempt to prove the authority of the Veda 
 
 Ti^t m^: ^5f ^9ift^T^T^^^yM ^N^TicT yroi^gj^ ^T^^m 
 
476 DIALOGUE X. 
 
 gives us an insight into a theory which most of the 
 schools held on this point, but which is now little thought 
 of by their followers. They looked upon it as a talisman, 
 — a charm. Kapila grounds the authority of the Veda 
 on the perfect knowledge of its utterers, and on its 
 practical success, as in the dyur-veda, or the medical 
 treatise. But he denies the possibility of its having an 
 author of any kind. His reaso^ing on this point is ana- 
 logous to that which he used in denying the existence of 
 a Supreme Being. He says it could not be the produc- 
 tion of any personal being, because there could be no 
 personal being competent for the task of composing it. 
 A person must either be free or in bondage. A free 
 person would not, and one in bondage coidd not, com- 
 pose it. A free person ivould not, because, (as Vijn'ana 
 Bhikshu^ expounds the last sutra cited by yourself) not 
 being subject to a motive, he would not impose on himself 
 the task of composing such a work with its ' thousand 
 ramifications,' and one in bondage could not, because he 
 had not the omniscience necessary for the office. The 
 fact of the first personal being having uttered it, does 
 not constitute it his work ; for it is only essays® in- 
 telligently and elaborately composed, that may be called 
 an author's work. But the Vedas issued from the self- 
 exisfcent by the power of adrishta, like breath, without 
 
 ^ -^t^^WVft^ f^Wr^^^HT^ci^T fiT-3CfcT^T?T^|^fxT ^cT 
 
 TjmW' II 
 
A RELIGION WITHOUT GoD ! 477 
 
 any deliberation on his part. And the self-existent 
 himself is no God on Kapila's theory. The Vedas 
 therefore are destitute of any external authority, and 
 it is only their internal self-evidencing virtue^, by force 
 of which they challenge our obedience. 
 
 " Kapila is not singular in his view of the authority of 
 the Veda. Vyiisa, S'ankarachkrya, Jaimini, S&-yana, and 
 others hold substantially the same opinion. But Kapila 
 disavows the doctrine of its eternity^^. He calls it a pro- 
 duct. And here we have an extraordinary theory of a 
 work, which is neither eternal, nor the composition of 
 any person, divine or human, bond or free. 
 
 '* But Kapila's theory cannot astound us more than that 
 of a large and influential clsss of the followers of Jaimini, 
 the author of the Purva Mim&,nsk. Jaimini contends for 
 the paramount authority of the Vedas, and the universal 
 obligation of Dharma, or the sacrificial works enjoined in 
 their texts. Now religious injunctions can only have their 
 authority from the sanction of God's will. To say that 
 there can be a religion without God, is to say there can be 
 a law without a law-giver, or a verdict without a judge. 
 Jaimini however says nothing about a God. We are to 
 be bound by words of which there was no intelligent 
 utterer. Some of his followers have gone the length of 
 denying the possibility of an original utterer, a First 
 cause of the Vedas, ridiculing the idea, as if it were 
 hunting after a rabbit's horn — a sheer impossibility. 
 
 " It is the school of Prabhakara that talk in this bold 
 and audacious way. ^ An injunction, they say, implies a 
 'saying that moves to action. Hence is the authority 
 ' of the Veda only in regard to acts. How then do we 
 'learn about objects, or existent substances? By the 
 
478 DIALOGUE X. 
 
 ' explanatory remarks and the mantras, (hymns or 
 ' incantations) . The Veda does not teach any thing 
 ^ liable to contradiction : hence there can be no fear of 
 'there being any incongruity in it ^' This implies that 
 the Vedas have nothing to do with existent substances 
 which cannot be established for certain. There are no 
 objective truths taught in them. You have only to 
 follow out their injunctions and perform the established 
 ceremonies. ' Wliac is good ? That which leads to 
 ' supreme felicity, such as the performance of the jyotisht- 
 ' oma and other sacrifices. What is evil ? That which 
 ' leads to ruin, such as theft^.' As to the origin of the 
 Vedas, one is to restrain his curiosity. The doctrine 
 amounts to this that we can know of no being that could 
 have composed them. If you talk of deducing the 
 authority of the Veda from an author, the question will 
 recur, and whence the authority of that author ? Such au- 
 thority, again, can only be settled by a text, and hence there 
 will be a vicious circle. The Veda you see ; its author you 
 do not see. You have ocular proof of the existence of the 
 Veda. You have no proof of the existence of its author. 
 Nor is there any necessity for speculating about an au- 
 thor, for the un-beginning or eternal tradition of society 
 is quite enough. The following extracts will show how 
 some of the staunchest advocates for the Vedas argued 
 on these points. 
 
ATHEISTS AKUUKNG lUK lllh Al lllOlUTV OF VEDA. 479 
 
 ' Persons use language in order to communicate to 
 'others something which they know. But that which 
 *is not apprehended (on proof) cannot be known, hence 
 * a person's words ought to be supported by some other 
 ' proof. Therefore it is said that a person cannot know 
 'any thing without a text (of tiie Veda). But why 
 ' should we say ' without a text/ when we ought to say 
 ''without some other proof? And even though the 
 ' aim [of the assertion] be some act, still ought not texts to 
 ' have a personal utterer ? [No!] Without a text (the 
 'utterance could not be proved). "'" '" Thus Dharma is 
 'estabhshed as derived from age to age without any 
 ' other proof. How is this established ? In consequence of 
 'the futility of other proof than traditional instruction, 
 ' it is impossible to introduce any prompter [of Dharma.] 
 
 'Observation is everywhere a proof with us. A 
 ' work that is seen is independent of any person's exer- 
 ' tion, because no person could be proved (as its author) . 
 ' It is dependent when it is not known at the first appli- 
 'cation, and is known at another application. If the 
 'injunction does not teach (or persuade) at the first 
 ' hearing, what is the meaning of its being an author's 
 ' work ? If again an author's work may be not of time, 
 ' that is only establishing an established point, for the 
 ' meaning of those who speak of the s'abda [Veda] as 
 ' proof is precisely that it is independent of any person's 
 ' exertion or of any other aid. 
 
 ' Now relation is that by which the sense is known 
 ' when a word is known. ''* ^^ But is there not another 
 ' relation than this of a name and its object? That is 
 ' an unreasonable saying, for even then the relation 
 ' between the thing to be apprehended and the causer of 
 ' the apprehension is of the same character as that of the 
 'name and its object. But why [the Mimansaka asks] 
 
480 DIALOGUE X. 
 
 'is this objection ? ' Because, [the opponent of Jainiini's 
 ' theory replies], as before explained, it (the Veda) has an 
 ' author. Hence we believe that the Vedas were composed 
 ' by some person who had settled the relation of the words 
 ' with their meaning. And thus are they dependent.' 
 'To this now it is replied. It has been proved, that be- 
 ' cause of the relation not being caused by any person, the 
 * old usage of society is without a beginning. How is 
 ' this ? On this question the reply is, because of the want 
 ' of a person to create the relation. The reply is not to 
 ' the purpose. It is. The object is to exclude that which 
 ' is opposed to the no-beginning theory. But why do you 
 ' fear that it is opposed to your theory ? Yes, we fear, 
 ' because though it has been proved that the sense of words 
 ' is determined by the un-beginning usage of old, yet if an 
 'author were allowed, then a beginning must come per force, 
 'like the vriddhi of certain vowels after a (in grammar). 
 ' Therefore the idea of an author must be excluded. 
 
 ' The Veda cannot be proved [to be an author's work] 
 ' by the first kind of inference, because the old usage of 
 ' society is without beginning. It cannot be established 
 ' either by perception, or inference a priori. 
 
 ' Even if it could be shown that the Veda had fallen into 
 ' oblivion, still we could not, without further proof, esta- 
 ' blish any other relation. In the case of an existing sub- 
 ' stance missing, we could not, without proof, fancy it to 
 ' be a rabbit's horn. Suppose oblivion were established, 
 ' what is the object forgotten ? The very thing that we 
 ' desire to demonstrate ? Well then, it itself is a proof, 
 ' the oblivion. 
 
 ' If, [says the opponent of Jaimini] non-perception were 
 ' only possible of existent things, then who can say there 
 ' is no rabbit's horn ? But [replies the Mimansaka] we 
 ' do not adduce oblivion or non-perception as proof, we 
 
ATHEISTS ARGUING FOR VEDA. 481 
 
 ' only bring it forward to refute the absurdity of assigning 
 ' a cause to an object established by perception. Because 
 ' there may be a non- perception (or missing) of perceived 
 ' objects, like pots, you cannot for that reason imagine 
 'the existence of the rabbit's horn. Tlie non-perception 
 'of a perceived object is dependent on another cause, 
 ' but the non-perception itself is simply the non-perception 
 ' of a non -perception. 
 
 ' But how is it, [asks the opponent of Jaimini] that 
 ' the author of the relation is not inferable from the non- 
 ' understanding of the sense after the first hearing ? 
 
 'If on the first hearing, [replies the Mimansaka] the 
 ' sense is not comprehended, what do you get from it of 
 ' an author of the relation ? If Devadatta is not found 
 'at home, what does it prove of his being without ? 
 
 ' But does not conversancy itself presuppose that it is a 
 ' work ? How ? Thus, that such a one is its utterer. But 
 ' there can be no inconclusiveness in that which is seen. 
 ' We see in the case of boys that the sense of words is 
 ' arrived at by mere practice. Therefore of an object which 
 ' is seen by perception, it is not consistent to speculate 
 ' about an author. This is another reason for excludino^ 
 'an instrument [or originator] of the practice. Even if the 
 'relation [of words with their meaning] were itself [an 
 ' author's] w^ork, its production by gods, who are them- 
 ' selves unseen, would be excluded by the impossibility of 
 ' the case. The relation being therefore eternal, it is proved 
 ' to be independent. 
 
 'This notion of an effect is owing to tlie expansion of 
 ' similarity (with the cause) . But here dissimilarity being 
 ' perceived, there can be no proof (of a cause) . If you say 
 ' there can be no production without dissimilarity, it only 
 ' establishes your inconsistency. By this very reasoning, 
 'an author, his desire and recollection, are all refuted. 
 
 3 Q 
 
482 DIALOGUE X. 
 
 ' Pleasure and other feelings being mere material affec- 
 ' tions can only be described as properties of matter. 
 ' Now one that has no quality or property cannot affect 
 
 * that which has. 
 
 'Other adepts in Brahma (Vedantists) say that from 
 'the word author, from remembrance, from desire, they 
 ' find the existence of a spirit different from the material 
 
 * body and its organs. Hence they conclude there is an 
 ' existent spirit as author. But [the Mimansaka asks] is 
 ' he not also described as without work or agency ? Thus 
 ' the illustrious commentator [Prabhakara] refutes those 
 ' reasons for taking that to be a spirit [or reality] which is 
 ' no-spirit (or unreal) . 
 
 ' Without a sensuous perception of the spirit itself, 
 ' there cannot be this inference [of a spirit]. 
 
 ' Perception can only be allowed as a proof in the 
 ' establishment of the Supreme [Spirit]. It is useless to 
 ' talk of inference. 
 
 ' If the adepts in supreme Brahma (Vedantists) come 
 ' to the conclusion that what is perceived is untrue, the 
 ' real is not perceived, then we would simply bid them 
 ' adieu with a bow. 
 
 ' If there be nothing but knowledge, then knowledge 
 ' itself would be disproved. 
 
 ' If the spirit is to be known, then the instrument of the 
 ' knowledge and the knower cannot be said to be excluded^.' 
 
 ^ ^Tcf f^ ^ TRW "ErfinrKftg xf^^T? viJ^^ ^i^if^ ■jt'^t^- 
 
ATHEISTS ARGUING FOR VEDA. 483 
 
 '* I need not multiply these extracts, but the passages 
 already given show that Kapila was not the only niris'- 
 wara, or atheistic, teacher among the Brahmins. A large 
 body of the followers of Jaimini openly inculcated the 
 
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 N» ^ ">* S# 
 
 cT^T^ ^^^T^^T^WJ?^^?rcTT cTT^W ^'HWfcT ^^T^ ^^^^- 
 
484 DIALOGUE X. 
 
 same idea. Indeed they went a good many paces beyond 
 the author of the Sankhya. For they contended that 
 since the existence of a soul, as distinct from physical orga- 
 nization, is not an object of sensuous perception, it could 
 
 ^ft- ir^^^wS-^H irFcTi??!^ f^m^TcT ^i^^j^ ^=^^^ crfl 
 
 v^ SI " 
 
 ifcT II 
 
 ifisvrfT.' 's\^9^^ f^m'^ i:^»5TTjrcf ii 
 
WHAT CAK THE VEDAS BE? 485 
 
 not be one of Inference, either. Thought and feeling they 
 considered to be affections of our corporeal members. And 
 it was with a view to defend the paramount authority of the 
 Vedas that they were led to this atheism and materialism. 
 
 *' I cannot say that the principles on which they based 
 their reasoning are peculiar to themselves. All schools 
 of Brahminical philosophers considered the mind, the 
 instrument of thought and feeling, as a sort of material 
 organ, which can only co-exist with the body. But they 
 recognized an dtmd, or spirit, as the owner or director of 
 the mind and other organs. The school of the Prabhakara 
 Mimansa appear to deny such a director, and to assign all 
 mental phenomena to the physical organization. And yet 
 they are staunch defenders of the Vedas. 
 
 '' Thirdly, therefore, I ask, what can the Vedas possibly 
 be in the conception of Brahminical philosophers ? Not 
 the word of God, not a revelation of His will, such as 
 you justly say is needed for our guidance under bewilder- 
 ing circumstances, but something which, certain of them 
 affirm, mechanically issued from Brahma, like smoke from 
 burning fuel, something which, others declare, was educed 
 from the elements, something which, others again tell us, is 
 
 ^^ xi^^lfxr IfftxT^ T3(2T^^ ir^WpRfS ^cf ^^i?T^X(5^T5ft 
 f?Tfcr ^H^Hj: 11 
 
 IndijCcli^rya Saraawati, 
 
486 DIALOGUE X. 
 
 eternal and independent of a cause. But what that thing is, 
 it is impossible to gather from them, unless it be a charm or 
 a talisman. They talk of it as articulate sound, but what 
 is articulate sound without a sounder, an utterer ? And 
 they all identify it with the Rich, Yajush, S'aman, and 
 Atharvan. Singularly enough, they know nothing about 
 the date or circumstances of these compositions. It is 
 clear, however, that whatever the eternal sound of the 
 Veda may have been, it could not have been committed 
 to writing without a fresh revelation from God — with- 
 out the direct inspiration of His Spirit. Such revela- 
 tion must be impossible on the theory of the atheistical 
 writers I have noticed. And as to those that were 
 theists, they do not pretend to give us any account of 
 such a repeated revelation. They all talk indeed of tra- 
 dition, but you will admit that tradition cannot be trusted 
 as an infallible guide. 
 
 " Again I ask, what are the Vedas ? In the S'atapatha 
 Brahmana, it is said, * He (Prajapati) brooded &c. over 
 ^[i. e. infused warmth into] these three worlds. From 
 ' them, thus brooded over, three lights were produced, — fire, 
 Hhis which purifies (i. e. pavana, or the air), and the sun. 
 ' He brooded over these three lights. From them so 
 'brooded over, the three Vedas were produced, — the E-ig- 
 Weda from fire, the Yajur-veda from air, and the Sama- 
 ' veda from the sun. He brooded over these three Vedas. 
 ' From them so brooded over, three seeds [or essences] 
 ' were produced, — hhui' from the Rig- veda, bhuvah from 
 Hhe Yajur-veda, and svar from the Sama-veda^.' 
 
 ^' What were these productions? Mere sounds, or wri- 
 tings on paper, or palm leaf? In either case how could 
 they be generated by brooding over fire and the sun ? 
 What again is the meaning of the production of bhur, 
 
 * Dr. Muir'a Sanscrit Texts. 
 
WHAT CAN THE MlbA^J li\^ i 487 
 
 hhuva, svar hy brooding over the Vedas? The Chlian- 
 dogya and Manu speak in a similar way of the origin of the 
 Vedas. (See the passages in Dr. Muir's Sanscrit texts) 
 Kulluka Bliatta, in explanation of the difficulty we have 
 stated, says, 'The same Vedas which [existed] in the 
 
 * previous mundane era (Kalpa) were preserved in the 
 ' memory of the omniscient Brahma, who was one with 
 ' the supreme spirit. It was those same Vedas that, in 
 ' the beginning of the [present] Kalpa, he drew forth from 
 
 * fire, air, and the sun : and this dogma which is founded 
 ' upon the Veda is not to be questioned, for the Veda 
 'says, 'The Rig-veda comes from fire, the Yajur-veda 
 ' from the sun.' 
 
 ' Another commentator on Manu, Medhatithi, explains 
 ' this passage in a more rationalistic fashion, ' by remark- 
 ' ing that the Rig-veda opens with a hymn to fire, and the 
 'Yajur-veda with one in which air is mentioned^.' 
 
 " Manu adds, ' Prajapati also milked out of the three 
 ' Vedas the letters a, u, and w, together with the words 
 ' hhur, hhuvah, and sva7\ The same supreme Prajapati 
 ' also milked from each of the three Vedas one of the 
 ' [three] lines of the text called sdvitri [or gdyatri]^ begin- 
 'ningwith the word tat. The three great imperishable 
 ' particles (hhilr, bhuvah, svar J preceded by om, and the 
 ' gdyatri of three lines, are to be regarded as the mouth 
 'of Veda[or Brahma]^.' 
 
 " What in the name of common sense is the meaning 
 of all this ? What is milking of letters or words from 
 Vedas ? The explanation of Medhatithi only shows that 
 the difficulty had occurred to him, but it does not at all re- 
 move it — for not only is nothing said as to the significa- 
 tion of the extraction of the Saman from the sun, but the 
 
 5 Ibid. 6 Ibid. 
 
488 DIALOGUE X. 
 
 explanation about the Rich and the Yajush too is very 
 unsatisfactory. 
 
 "The S'wetas'watara Upanishad, however, gives a differ- 
 ent story of the origin of the Vedas . The Supreme Being 
 is there set forth as its imparter to Brahma^, and the 
 Harivans'a says, "For the emancipation of the world, 
 ' Brahma, sunk in contemplation, issuing in a luminous 
 'form from the region of the moon, penetrated into the 
 ' heart of Gayatri, entering between her eyes. From her 
 ' there was then produced a quadruple being, lustrous as 
 ' Brahma, indistinct, and eternal, undecaying, devoid of 
 ' bodily senses or qualities, distinguished by the attribute of 
 ' of brilliancy, pure as the rays of the moon, radiant, and 
 'embodied in letters. The god fashioned the Rig-veda, 
 ' with the Yajush, from his eyes, the Sama-veda from the 
 'tip of his tongue, and the Atharvan from his head. 
 ' The Vedas, as soon as they are born, find a body (xetraj, 
 ' Hence they obtain their character of Vedas, because 
 ' they Jlnd (vindanti) that abode. These Vedas then 
 ' create the pre-existent eternal Brahma (sacrifice or cere- 
 ' monial,) a being of celestial form, with their own mind- 
 ' born qualities^.' 
 
 " In the Rig-veda, again, we have another story, ' In 
 ' the 9th verse of the Purusha Sukta, the three Vedas 
 ' are said to have been derived from the mystical victim, 
 ' Purusha. ' From that universal sacrifice were produced 
 ' the hymns called Rik and Saman, the metres, and the 
 'Yajush^.' 
 
 " The Atharva Veda says, ' From time the Rik verses 
 ' sprang, the Yajush sprang from time.' The Bhagavata 
 ' Purana says, ' From these three letters the divine and 
 ' unborn being created the various letters of the alphabet, 
 
 ? See above p. 329 note 1:. 8 Dr. Muir'a Sans. Texts. 9 Ibid. 
 
SELF-CONTRADICTORY ACCOUNTS oF THE ORIOIN OF VEDA. 489 
 
 ' distinguished as inner (y^ r, I, v), ushmas (s', sh, s, hj, 
 ' vowels, long and short, and consonants. With this 
 ' [alphabet] the omnipresent Being, desiring to reveal the 
 * functions of tlie four classes of priests, [created] from his 
 'four mouths the four Vedas with the three sacred 
 ' syllables and the omkdrct^'^. Again, ' There was for- 
 ' merly only one Veda, the sacred monosyllable oni, the 
 ' essence of all speech ; only one god, Narayana ; only 
 ' one Agni, and [one] caste. From Pururavas came the 
 ' triple Veda in the beginning of the Treta age*.' 
 
 ''The learned Rishis who propounded these theories 
 of the production of the Vedas must have calculated 
 on the permanence of a state of popular ignorance in 
 the country. They could hardly have expected criticism 
 or cross questioning from their readers. For even this 
 meteoric origin of their s'astra is related in a slovenly 
 manner without any regard to consistency. At times we 
 hear of the Gayatri being the mother of the Veda which 
 was produced from it ; at times, again, the Gayatri ap- 
 pears to be the child of the Vedas, having itself been 
 milked from them ! 
 
 " Now before we can absolutely submit to the guidance 
 of the Vedas, is it not a solemn duty to ponder these 
 unmeaning, incoherent, and inconsistent descriptions of 
 their nature and origin ? I cannot at all gather from 
 any of these descriptions what the substance, called Veda, 
 was at its production, and certainly it could not be eter- 
 nal, without falsifying some of these accounts." 
 
 A'r/amika. — "The substance, called Veda, must at first 
 have been sound, or words uttered, but not written down." 
 
 Satyakdma. — " What can be the meaning of producing 
 words from fire, air, and the sun, or of extracting bhur, 
 bhuvah, svar from words or sounds ? Elsewhere, the 
 
 10 Ibid. 1 Ibid. 
 
490 DIALOGUE X. 
 
 Vedas are said to have been breathed out. What is 
 meant by this ? Brahma^ or whoever was the producer, 
 emitted the sounds or words at the beginning, for that is 
 what most S'astras say. Was there any person present 
 to hear those sounds ?" 
 
 Agamiha. — "There was no person present when the 
 sounds were uttered, but the same words were after- 
 wards written down by the persons to whom they were 
 revealed." 
 
 Satyakdma. — '^ What evidence have you of that ? 
 How do you know they were revealed to the writers in 
 question, and not produced from their own imaginations ? 
 The story of their original extraction from the elements, 
 even if it could be made intelligible, can have no practical 
 use in determining their authority, because we have no 
 means of knowing any thing beyond what is written, and 
 what we require is evidence of the writers' inspiration. 
 
 "But the writers in many instances claim their writings 
 as their own productions, and not as communications 
 of pre-existing sounds. And this leads me to the fourth 
 question, what are the claims set up by the Vedas them- 
 selves ? The following are but a few among many pass- 
 ages which have been cited by Dr. Muir to show that 
 the Rishis claimed their compositions as the products 
 of their own minds : — 
 
 " This hymn, conferring wealth, has been made to the divine race, by 
 the sages, with their mouth [or in presence of the gods]." 
 
 ** Grow, O Agni, by this prayer which we have made to thee through 
 [or according to] our power, or our knowledge." 
 
 "Thus, o Indra, yoker of steeds, have the Gotamas made for thee 
 pure [or beautiful] hymns." 
 
 "These, your ancient exploits, o Asvins, our fathers have declared. 
 Let us, who are strong in bold men, making a hymn for you, o bountiful 
 gods, utter our offering of praise." 
 
 " Nodhas, descendant of Gotama, fashioned this new hymn for [thee], 
 Indra, who art of old, and who yokest thy steeds," etc. 
 
VEDAS THEMSELVES CLAIM HUMAN AUTHORSHIP. 491 
 
 " Desiring wealth, men have fashioned for thee this hymn, as a skilful 
 workman [fabricates] a car, and thus they have disposed {Jit. fashioned) 
 thee to (confer) happiness." 
 
 " This reverential hymn, o divine Maruts, fashioned by the heart, has 
 been presented by the mind [or, according to Sayaua * let it be received 
 by you with a favourable mind']."" 
 
 " Thus, o hero, have the Gritsamadas, desiring succour, fashioned for 
 thee a hymn, as men make roads." (Sayana explains vaijuna by "road ;" 
 but it generally means knowledge). 
 
 "We generate a hymn, like pure butter, for Agni Vaisvanara, who 
 promotes our sacred rites." 
 
 " I have generated a new hymn to Agni, the falcon of the sky ; who 
 bestows on us wealth in abundance,'* 
 
 " Indra, the wise rishis, both ancient and modern, have generated 
 prayers." 
 
 "The soma cheers not Indra unless it be poured out; nor do libations 
 [gratify] Maghavan when offered without a priest. To him I generate 
 a hymn such as may please him, that, after the manner of men, he may 
 hear our new [song]." 
 
 " In like manner as I sprea 1 the sacrificial grass to the Nasatyas 
 (Asvins), so do I send forth to them hymns, as the wind [drives] the 
 clouds ; to them (I say), who bore off to the youthful Vimada his bride 
 in a chariot which outstripped the enemy's host." 
 
 "The devout sage, deeply versed in sacred lore, sends forth his hymns 
 to you, o Mitra and Varuna. You mighty gods, receive his prayers with 
 favour, since ye fill [prolong?], as it seems, his autumns by your power.'* 
 
 A'gamiha. — '^ I cannot deny the force of your argu- 
 ments, Satyakama, and yet I am far from being convinced. 
 The result of our conferences hitherto has been to weaken 
 the foundations of human belief, and foster a spirit of 
 universal scepticism. There must be a grave error some- 
 where in all this. To disprove a certain position is not 
 to find out the truth. And if there be no truth in the 
 texts of the Vedas, or the aphorisms of philosophers, 
 where are we to sro in search of it. The characteristic of 
 righteous men is to set forth Faith, as the poet says^, not 
 
492 DIALOGUE X. 
 
 scepticism. Our studies^ speculations, and discussions 
 cannot be considered successful, if they end in the conclu- 
 sion that there is no truth in the world. Our faculty 
 of reason could never have been granted by the Al- 
 mighty for that ; it is doubtless intended to put us in 
 possession of some definite and positive truth, to discover 
 His will in nature and in His word, for it is preposter- 
 ous to think of discovering His will for all practical pur- 
 poses without His word. Surely He could not have 
 left us in the dark destitute of a revelation of His will. 
 Like yourself 1 find it difficult to believe that He would be 
 deliberately deluding us by the projection of an illusion. 
 But I cannot on the other hand understand that he would 
 leave us, without an dgama, or revelation, to follow our 
 own bewildering reason in things beyond its range, and 
 thus, in another way, consign us to inevitable delusions. 
 Hence my still cleaving to the hope that the Vedas may 
 contain His word notwithstanding all you have said. We 
 must have something on which to repose our faith, or our 
 minds must be tossed to and fro by the waves of doubt 
 and disputation, like a boat without a rudder on stormy 
 waters. I cannot say that our conferences have at all 
 tended to the discovery of that something ." 
 
 Satyakdma. — " I perfectly agree with you here, Aga- 
 mika. You are quite right in saying that belief, not 
 scepticism, is the end of human study, but not belief 
 of every kind. Bad as it is to be in a state of doubt, 
 to believe in falsehood is still worse. To get rid of error 
 is a most important step toward the discovery of truth. 
 You will allow that he who removes rubbish in order to 
 secure a good foundation, assists in raising the super- 
 structure, as much as he that puts in layers of bricks. 
 If the foundation of your house be radically bad, so 
 that no supply .of props or buttresses will save the 
 
EUROUS TO BK REMOVED EUR THE TEACHING OE TKUTH. 493 
 
 building, you will doubtless be thankful to the man who 
 points out the fact to you, and you wil ladmit that your 
 wisest course then is to dig it up. You dig up, however, 
 only to build anew, and, in doing so, you do not reck- 
 lessly throw away all the bricks and materials of the old 
 edifice. Whatever is good you retain with pleasure, not 
 only because that is the dictate of economy, but also be- 
 cause a stone that has stood the encroachments of time, 
 uninjured, in a certain locality, lias proved its adaptation 
 to that locality, and must be preferable to one untried. 
 Good stones of the old building may be depended upon 
 more confidently than new ones." 
 
 Agamika. — "I do not understand what you mean. 
 You have certainly dug up the foundation by condemn- 
 ing the only revelation of God's will to which we looked 
 for guidance. And as to bricks, I really do not know 
 whether you have left any unbroken." 
 
 SatyaJcdma. — '^ I have only been condemning the E/ich, 
 Yajush, Saman, and Atharvan. Their condemnation is 
 not synonymous with the rejection of all revelation. A 
 person does not disallow the true coin, merely because he 
 refuses to accept a counterfeit one." 
 
 Agamika. — " But where is your true coin ? you are 
 only finding fault with the Veda. We say that God 
 communicated his will in the beginning. You say, No." 
 
 Satyakdma, — '' I certainly do not say, No, to the idea 
 of a primitive Kevelation of God's will. If by talking 
 of the eternal s'astra, you only mean that God gave an 
 utterance to His will in the beginning, and if you do not 
 insist on that utterance being recorded in the Ricli, Yajush, 
 Saman, and Atharvan, I am sure we are both of the same 
 opinion." 
 
 Agamika. — *' But if the revelation be not on record, of 
 what use would it be ?" 
 
494 DIALOGUE X. 
 
 Satyakdma. — " You acknowledge that the primitive 
 Revelation was not at the time committed to writino*. 
 It could only be transmitted by traditional instruction. 
 It could not under such circumstances be recorded with- 
 out direct inspiration from God, — in other words with- 
 out a fresh revelation. You have no evidence to offer 
 in favor of the Rich and others being such an after-re 
 velation, and the books themselves purport in some places 
 to be ordinary human compositions. 
 
 '^I cannot join you in saying that an unwritten revela- 
 tion is of no use. It serves the immediate object of its 
 utterance, and, notwithstanding the mistakes and errors 
 incident to human tradition, there is some utility in its 
 oral transmission. Gold with alloy may still have some 
 value. But I agree with you so far as to believe that 
 revelation, thus transmitted, becomes mixed up with hu- 
 man errors, and gradually loses its influence. Unless 
 it were recorded under divine inspiration it could not be 
 a trustworthy guide for all ages. 
 
 '' But that the oral transmission of unwritten revelation 
 is not altogether useless is apparent from the fact that 
 the Brahminical systems, notwithstanding all their errors, 
 have at least one crreat truth lurkimx in them all." 
 4'^am^Z;a.T— ^^ What truth do you allude to ?" 
 SatyaJcdma. — '^The fact of a primitive Revelation, 
 No case has been made out for tlie Rich, Yajush, Saman, 
 and Atharvan, but the fact of a primitive Revelation 
 from the Almighty can admit of little doubt, and the 
 idea, almost universal in India, of an eternal Yeda, may 
 be accepted as an evidence of that great fact. The zeal- 
 ous apologist for the Vedas, the author of the Prior Mi- 
 mansa, himself suggests some such consideration. His ar- 
 gument is that the Yedas are eternal, for sound is eternal. 
 People may naturally wonder at the confidence with which 
 
JAIMINI UNCONSCIOLbi.\ ihMlMh^ lu A (,REAT TRUTH. 49;j 
 
 this argument is broached. What especial connection, it 
 may be asked, is there between the Sddhya and hetu, 
 between the thing to be proved and the reason adduced. 
 If the eternity of sound were admitted as a reason for the 
 eternity of words, phrases, and sentences, all words, phra- 
 ses, and sentences, and consequently all compositions must 
 be eternal. How could a philosoplier offer such a poor 
 argument to his readers ? How could he rely on its 
 satisfying those who had reasoned so strongly against the 
 Mantras and Brahmanas ? 
 
 '* The mystery can only be explained on the supposition 
 of some distorted tradition existing among the Brahmins 
 of a primitive revelation from God. By s'abda, or sound, 
 as an instrument of true knowledge, they meant the 
 teaching of an infallible author. Those, who, like Jaimini, 
 would not allow that the Vedas had an author, still 
 understood s'abda in the sense of an infallible teaching. 
 When, again, they speak of s'abda as eternal, they suggest 
 the idea that there was an infallible teaching co-eval with 
 the creation of man. This is the only sense in which 
 their language becomes intelligible, and, whether they 
 understood their own minds or not, whether they were 
 conscious of what they were propounding or not, we can 
 find no difficulty in admitting that a great truth is couched 
 in their words. The reason they give for their position is 
 thus expressed : ' It is eternal, for its manifestation was 
 for the benefit of others^.' 
 
 "Jaimini's theory, then, amounts to this, that there 
 was an infallible teaching from the beginning for the 
 benefit of others. This theory we may cordially accept 
 as a testimony to the fact of a Primitive Kevelation. 
 We may well take for granted that an infallible teaching 
 
 * U^m -mx^i^^-m ^T^^m\\ h \^ H ^ \\\ 
 
496 DIALOGL!E X. 
 
 was available ' for the benefit of others/ when sentient 
 creatures were called into being. We can have no diffi- 
 culty in believing that the Almighty made a communica- 
 tion of His will to our first parents when He created 
 them. How dependent human beings are upon external 
 aid for years after their birth, is known to all men. They 
 are quite powerless as infants and children. They neces- 
 sarily look to their parents and guardians for mainten- 
 ance and education. But the first man could have had no 
 earthly father to foster him. The inference is accordingly 
 almost inevitable that He, who gave him being, furnished 
 him at the same time with such directions as were neces- 
 sary for his guidance. That which the first man thus 
 heard from His Maker, was a s'abda, an infallible teach- 
 ing, intended for the benefit of others, i. e., mankind, 
 and co-eval with the commencement of human society. 
 
 " So far I see no reason for differing from Jaimini's 
 aphorism, which certainly a theistic commentator may 
 construe in our sense, whatever the author's own meaning 
 may have been. But then he proceeds to identify that 
 s'abda, or infallible teaching, with the Veda. And, here, 
 the double meaning attached to this word helped to 
 introduce a great error. Veda is by some defined to be 
 Sahda rdsi^, or a collection of words, sounds, or infallible 
 teachings. When Jaimini argued that the Veda is eternal, 
 for sound is eternal, he was probably thinking of this 
 definition. But if the word Veda be synonymous with 
 sound, or infallible teaching, then the argument is a 
 truism. If it signifies a specific collection of words, then 
 the argument involves the false reasoning, it has horns, 
 therefore it is a coiv. Because there was some infallible 
 teaching in the beginning, therefore the Kich, Yajush, &c. 
 
 cf^^^^Tf g ^og-'f ^^^Tlftlfsr^f^cT • II Sankara on the M^ndukya. 
 
NO EVIDENCE FOll lilClI YAJUSU &C. 497 
 
 are eternal ! Assuming, however, that the word Veda 
 stands simply for a collection of words, or infallible 
 teachings, tlio aphorism, as we liave interpreted it, only 
 amounts to the assertion of a primitive Revelation, which, 
 as I have already said, is more than probable in itself. 
 
 '^ But, as we know that Jaimini contends for the autho- 
 rity of the Rich, Yajush, Saman, and Atharvan, the signifi- 
 cation of the word Veda must shift from the general to the 
 particular at same point in the argument. The moment 
 however the word stands for the Rich and the other 
 three, Jaimini's argument must be repudiated. Because 
 some infallible teaching existed in the beginning, some 
 collection of sounds was given, it does not follow that the 
 Rich, Yajush, and others are eternal. To say that man 
 was created in the beginning may be a truth, but to con- 
 clude from thence that Vikramaditya was co-eval with the 
 creation is a gross error. Similarly; to say that some in- 
 falUble teaching was received in the beginning may be a 
 truth ; to conclude from thence that the Rich and others 
 were breathed out at that time is an error. 
 
 "The assertion of Jaimini, that the Rich, Yajush, 
 Saman, and Atharvan contain the primitive Revelation 
 is not proved. No one knows when, where, or .by whom, 
 those four works were written, and consequently no one 
 can pretend that they are a record of the primeval Sound. 
 On the contrary a critical examination of their contents 
 disproves their authority. As to the argument that the 
 Vedas must have proceeded from the divinity because 
 no human author can be shown to have produced it, 
 it is not of much validity. If a stranger, or a man 
 brought up as a foundling, came to you, and no one 
 was able to give you an account of his paternity, you 
 would not surely conclude that he was co-eval with the 
 creation. 
 
 3 s 
 
498 DIALOGUE X. 
 
 '' And there is nothing in the general scope of the Vedas 
 to justify tlie conclusion that they were revealed in the 
 beginning. It is impossible to fancy what edification our 
 first parents could derive from m^re praises of the Sun, 
 Moon, and Fire. If historical narratives were entirely 
 excluded, the residuum would be mere invocations of the 
 elements, and a few ceremonial injunctions." 
 
 Agamika. — " But you have not answered my question, 
 where is your true coin ? " 
 
 Satyakdma. — '^ The true coin I believe fco be the Bible. 
 It has strong external evidences for its being composed un- 
 der divine inspiration, and its contents are just what might 
 be expected from a work intended for the spiritual instruc- 
 tion of mankind." ^ 
 
 Agamika. — ^^ I have often heard of the Bible, but 
 what I cannot fancy is the confidence with which you 
 speak of the external' evidences of the Bible, while you 
 summarily reject those of the Vedas." 
 
 Satyakdma. — " You have no external evidences for the 
 Vedas. You have not the slightest idea of the time wdien, 
 and the persons by whom, the Kich, Yajush, Saman, and 
 Atharvan were composed. There is a complete want of 
 evidence here. As regards the Bible, it is, you must 
 know, divided into two parts, the Old and New Testa- 
 ments. The former was written by .the prophets of the 
 Jews, the latter by the apostles and followers of Jesus 
 Christ, the Saviour of mankind. In both cases we have 
 the evidence of miracles and prophecy ; the evidence be- 
 coming, in the case of the New Testament, especially 
 strong, because of its being confirmed by collateral and 
 circumstantial proofs. Now to set your face against 
 these evidences, simply because you have no external evi- 
 dences for the Veda, would not be acting witli the man- 
 liness of an inquirer after truth." 
 
PROPHECY AN EVIDENCE FOR THE BIBLE. !f)D 
 
 A'ganilka. — ^' Well, what do you mean by the evidence 
 of prophecy ?" 
 
 Satyakdma. — " By the evidence of prophecy I mean 
 the exact coincidence of events, as foretold long before their 
 occurrence. There are in the Old and New Testaments, 
 more especially the former, many predictions of events, far 
 beyond the range of human sagacity, which were fulfilled, 
 in some cases many centuries afterwards, exactly as they 
 were uttered. The future condition of many nations of 
 Asia and of Africa were thus accurately predicted long 
 before the events. The circumstances attending the 
 birth, death, and resurrection of Christ were in like man- 
 ner foretold. Now since no man can obtain an insight 
 into the future, beyond the ordinary range of aiiumana, 
 or guess, by natural sensation or reflection, the inference 
 is inevitable that the writers of the Old and New Testa- 
 ments obtained such knowledge by divine inspiration. 
 
 " To specify one instance of such predictions, — Moses, 
 who lived fifteen hundred years before Christ, foretold 
 the future sufferins^s of his own nation, which are still 
 being realized in our days. At the time of the pre- 
 diction, there was no lakshana, or sign, from which 
 the prophet might have formed an idea of the calami- 
 ties he was describing, especially since those calamities 
 were, in some respects, without a parallel in the history 
 of mankind. Consider now a few of those predictions, 
 and the manner in which each was fulfilled. 
 
 *' The following prophecies are taken from the 28th Chap- 
 ter of the Book of Deuteronomy, and the statements repre- 
 senting their exact fulfilment, from a valuable work of a 
 learned divine of the last century. Bishop Newton by name : 
 
 I'ROPUKCY. 
 
 *' The Lord shall hring a nation against thee from far, from the end of 
 'the earth, as swift as tho oagle flieth ; a nation whose tongue thou shalt 
 * not understand.* 
 
500 DIALOGUE X. 
 
 FULFILMENT. 
 
 ** This description cannot be applied to any nation witli such propriety 
 as to the Romans. They were truly brought /row /«;•, from the end of 
 the earth. Vespasian and Adrian, the two great conquerors and destroy- 
 ers of the Jews, both came from commanding here in Britain. The 
 Romans too for the rapidity of their conquests might very well be com- 
 pared to eagles, and perhaps not without an allusion to the standard of 
 the Roman armies, which was an eagle : and their language was more 
 unknown to the Jews than the Chaldee." 
 
 PROPHECY 
 
 * A nation of fierce countenance, which shall not regard the person of 
 
 * the old, nor shew favour to the young : 
 
 ' i\.nd he shall eat the fruit of thy cattle, and the fruit of thy land, 
 ' until thou be destroyed : which also shall not leave thee either corn, 
 
 * wine, or oil, or the increase of thy kine, or flocks of thy sheep, until, 
 ' he have destroyed thee.' 
 
 FULFTLMENT 
 
 Such also were the Romans : for when Vespasian entered Gadara 
 
 Joscphus saith, that ' he slew all, man by man, the Romans showing 
 
 mercy to no age, out of hatred to the nation, and remembrance of their 
 
 * former injuries.' The hke slaughter was made at Gamala, *For no body 
 
 * escaped besides two women, and they escaped by concealing themselves 
 'from the rage of the Romans. For they did not so much as spare 
 
 * young children, but every one at that time snatching up many cast them 
 
 * down from the citadel.' 
 
 PROPHtCY. 
 
 * And he shall besiege thee in all thy gates, until thy high and fenced 
 ' walls come down, wherein thou trustedst, throughout all thy land : and 
 ' he shall besiege thee in all thy gates throughout all thy land, which 
 *the Lord thy God hath given thee.' 
 
 FULFILMENT. 
 
 So likewise the Romans, as we may read in Josephus's history of 
 the Jewish war, demolished several fortified places, before they besieged 
 and destroyed Jerusalem. And the Jews may very well be said to have 
 trusted in their high and fenced walls, for they seldom ventured a battle 
 in the open field. They confided in the strength and situation of 
 Jerusalem, as the Jebusites, the former inhabitants of the place, had done 
 before them: insomuch that they are represented saying (Jer. XXI. 13.) 
 Who shall come down against us ? or who shall enter into our habitation ? 
 Jerusalem was indeed a very strong place, and wonderfully fortified both 
 by nature and art according to the description of Tacitus as well as of 
 Joscphus : and yet how many times was it taken ? It was taken by 
 
PROPHECIES AND TIIElll FULFILMENTS. 501 
 
 Sliishak king of Egypt, by Ncbucliailuezzar, by Antiocbus Epiphanes, by 
 Pompey, by Sosius and Herod, before its final destruction by Titus." 
 
 PROPHECy. 
 
 * And tbou sbalt eat the fruit of tbine own body, the flesh of thy sons 
 
 * and of thy daughters, which the Lord thy God hath given thee, in 
 
 * the siege and in the straitncss, wherewith thine enemies shall distress 
 ' thee : 
 
 * So that the man that is tender among you, and very delicate, his 
 ' eye shall be evil toward his brother, and toward the wife of his bosom, 
 ' and toward the remnant of his children which he shall leave : 
 
 * So that he will not give to any of them of the flesh of his children 
 
 * whom he shall eat: because he hath nothing left him in the siege and 
 
 * in the straitness, wherewith thine enemies shall distress thee in all 
 
 * thy gates. 
 
 * The tender and delicate woman among you, which would not adven- 
 
 * ture to set the sole of her foot upon the ground for delicateness and 
 'tenderness, her eye shall be evil toward the husband of her bosom, and 
 
 * toward her son, and toward her daugliter, 
 
 *And toward her young one that cometh out from between her feet, 
 •and toward her children which she shall bear : for she shall eat them for 
 
 * want of all ihint/s secretly in the siege and straitness, wherewith thine 
 
 * enemy shall distress thee in thy gates.' 
 
 Ft LFILMENT 
 
 ** And in the last siege of Jerusalem by the Romans there was a most 
 terrible famine in the city, and Josephus hath given so melancholy an ac- 
 count of it, that we cannot read it without shuddering. He saith, parti- 
 cularly, that * women snatched the food out of the very mouths of their 
 'husbands and sons of their fathers, and (what is most miserable) 
 'mothers of their infants:' and in another place he saith, that 'in 
 'every house, if there appeared any semblance of food, a battle ensued, 
 ' and the dearest friends and relations fought with one another, snatching 
 'away the miserable provisions of life.' 
 
 ^ * And again it was fulfilled above 1500 years after the time of Moses 
 in the last siege of Jerusalem by Titus, and we read in Jose])hus parti- 
 cularly of a noble woman's killing and eating her own sucking child. 
 Moses saith, IVie tender and delicate woman among you^ who would not 
 adventure to set the sole of her foot upon the ground, for delicateness 
 and tenderness : and there cannot be a more natural and lively descrip- 
 tion of a woman, who was according to Josephus illustrious for her 
 family and riches. Moses saith, she shall eat them for want of all 
 things : and according to Josephus she had been plundered of all her 
 siibstance and provision by the tyrants and soldiers. Moses saith, that 
 
502 DIALOGUE X. 
 
 she shonlil do it secretly : and according to Josephus, when she had 
 boiled and eaten half, she covered up the rest, and kept it for another 
 time." 
 
 PROPUKCY. 
 
 * And ye shall be plucked from off the land whither thou goest to poss- 
 
 * ess it. 
 
 * And the Lord shall scatter thee among all people, from the one end 
 
 * of the earth even unto the other ; 
 
 * And among these nations shalt thou find no ease, neither shall the 
 
 * sole of thy foot have rest: but the Lord shall give thee there a trem- 
 ' bling heart, and foiling of eyes, and sorrow of mind : 
 
 ' And thy life shall hang in doubt before thee ; and thou shalt fear day 
 
 * and nidit, and shalt have none assurance of thy life : 
 
 FULFILMENT. 
 
 " Now not to mention any other of the calamities and slaughters which 
 they have undergone, there was in the last siege of Jerusalem by Titus 
 an infinite multitude, saith Josephus, who perished by famine, and he 
 computes, that during the whole siege, the number of those who were 
 destroyed by that and by the war amounted to eleven hundred thousand, 
 ^the people being assembled from all parts to celebrate the passover : and 
 the same author hath given us an account of 1.240.490 destroyed in Jeru- 
 salem and other parts of Judea, besides 99.200 made prisoners ; as 
 Basnage has reckoned them up from that historian's account. Lideed 
 there is not a nation upon earth, that hath been exposed to so many 
 massacres and persecutions. Their history abounds with them. If God 
 had not given them a promise of a numerous posterity, the whole race 
 would many a time have been extirpated. 
 
 They had come out of Egypt triumphant, but now they should return 
 thither as slaves. They had walked through the sea as dry land at their 
 coming out ; but now they should be carried thither in ships. They 
 might be carried thither in the ships of the Tyrian or Sidonian mer- 
 chants, or by the Romans who had a fleet in the Mediterranean : and 
 this was a much safer way of conveying so many prisoners, than sending 
 tliem by land. It appears from Josephus that in the reigns of the two 
 first Ptolemies many of the Jews were slaves in Egypt. And when Jeru- 
 salem was taken by Titus, of the captives who were above 1 7 years he 
 sent many bound to the works in Egypt ; those under 1 7 were sold ; 
 but so little care was taken of these captives, that eleven thousand of 
 them perished for want. And vfe learn from St. Jerome, that * after 
 
 * iheir last overthrow by Adrian many thousands of them were sold, and 
 ' those who could not be sold were transported into Egypt, and perished 
 
 * by shipwreck or famine, or were massacred by the inhabitants. 
 
PROPHECIES AND THEIR FULFILMENTS. 50:3 
 
 They were indeed plucked from off their own land^ when the ten tribes 
 were carried into captivity by the king of Assyria, and other nations 
 were planted in their stead ; and when the two other tribes were carried 
 away captive to Babylon ; and when the Romans took away their place 
 and nation ; besides other captivities and transportations of the people. 
 Afterwards, when the Emperor Adrian had subdued the rebellious Jews, 
 he published an edict forbidding them upon pain of death to set foot in 
 Jerusalem, or even to approach the country round about it. Tertullian 
 and Jerome say, that they were prohibited from entering into Judea. 
 From that time to this their country hath been in the possession of 
 foreign lords and masters, few of the Jews dwelling in it, and those only 
 of a low servile condition. Benjamin of Tudela in Spain, a celebrated 
 Jew of the twelfth century, travelled into all parts to visit those of his 
 own nation, and to learn an exact state of their affairs : and he hath 
 reported, that Jerusalem was almost entirely ahandoiied by the Jews. 
 
 What people indeed have been scattered so far and wide as they 1 and 
 where is the nation, which is a stranger to them, or to which they are 
 strangers ? They swarm in many parts of the East, are spread through most 
 of the countries of Europe and Afric, and there are several families of 
 them in the "West Indies. They circulate through all parts, where trade 
 and money circulate ; and are, as I may say, the brokers of the whole world. 
 They have been so far froai finding rest, that they have been banished 
 from city to city, from country to country. In many places they have 
 been banished, and recalled, and banished again. We will only ju?t 
 mention their great banishments in modern times, and from countries 
 very well known. In the latter end of the thirteenth century they 
 were banished from England by Edward I, and were not permitted to 
 return and settle again till Cromwell's time. In the latter end of the 
 fourteenth century they were banished from France (for the seventh 
 time, says Mezeray) by Charles VI; and ever since they have been only 
 tolerated, they have not enjoyed entire liberty, except at Metz where they 
 have a synagogue. In the latter end of the fifteenth century they 
 were banished from Spain by Ferdinand and Isabella ; and according to 
 Mariana, there were a hundred and seventy thousand families, or as some 
 say eight hundred thousand persons who left the kingdom. Most of 
 them paid dearly to John II for a refuge in Portugal, but within a few 
 years were expelled from thence also by his successor Emanuel. And in 
 our own time, within these few years, they were banished from Prague 
 by the queen of Bohemia." 
 
 *^ That part of the prophecy which related to the dis- 
 persion of the Jews all over tlie world, is being still 
 
504 DIALOGUE X. 
 
 fullillecl before us. The fact is itself almost miracu- 
 lous, and it is a standing evidence of Christian truth. 
 There have been other people, dispossessed of their 
 homes and banished from their country, but they have 
 either been exterminated, or their nationality has been 
 destroyed by amalgamation with strangers. The Jews, 
 however, though long banished from their own country, 
 still live as a separate people, with all their distinctive 
 traditions and peculiar manaers of old. They still live, not 
 as emigrants in a new colony of their own, not removed 
 in one body to any particular spot inhabiting it as another 
 Judea, but they live, scattered over the whole world, 
 ' present in all countries and with a home in none, inter • 
 ' mixed and yet separated, and neither amalgamated nor 
 'lost: but like those mountain-streams which are said 
 ' to pass through lakes of another kind of water and 
 'keep a native quality to repel commixture^.' There is 
 no land in the world which may now be called Jews' 
 Land, and yet Jews are to be found, aliens, in all lands. 
 They live under all governments, and yet have no govern- 
 ment of their own. Such a fact has no parallel in history. 
 It can only be looked upon as a wonder. He that could 
 predict such a wonder, more than fifteen hundred years 
 before the event, could only have done so under the 
 inspiration of the Omniscient." 
 
 Agamika. — '' Are you not reasoning after a fashion for 
 which even Gotama's category fails to find the proper 
 terms ? The eternity of the Veda, you say, is disproved 
 by its recording events that transpired in time, and yet 
 not only is the antiquity of Moses not disproved by his 
 description of events that followed the capture of Jeru- 
 salem, but his prophetical authority is thereby actually 
 established !" 
 
 5 Daviaon on Prophecy 
 
VEDIC DESCRIPTIONS CONTRASTED WITH THOSE OF MOSES. 505 
 
 Satyakdma. — '' The Vedas, you must remember, my 
 friend, describe the events alluded to as by -gone facts, as 
 past occurrences. The dialogues between Yama and 
 Nuchiketas, between Yajnawalkyaand Maitreyi, between 
 Uddalaka and S'wetaketu are recorded, not as prophecies 
 of the future, but as narrations of the past. Hence we 
 say that the naratives must have been written after the 
 events. Moses, on the other hand, recorded the future 
 sufferings of his countrymen as predictions. His writino-s 
 existed before the Koman nation, 'of a fierce countenance,' 
 which was, in the divine counsels, finally to inflict those 
 chastisements on tlie Jews, was yet formed, or had ob- 
 tained its name. These writings again were alread}^ 
 translated into Greek above three hundred years before 
 the destruction of Jerusalem ; and the destruction of 
 Jerusalem, as a fact, is recorded by two of the most 
 accurate of ancient historians. The alternative of assiofn- 
 ing to Moses a date posterior to the events is not open 
 in this case. It is precluded by the facts of the 
 Septuagint translation and of the corruption of the 
 Jewish language during the captivity. The Jews, 
 you must know, were taken captives to Babylon about 
 six hundred years before the Christian era, and, for 
 seventy years, they remained exiles from their own 
 country. There, by mixing w^ith a strange nation, their 
 language was very much corrupted. The five books of 
 Moses must therefore have been written, at latest, before 
 the captivit}^ while the destruction of Jerusalem and the 
 dispersion of the Jews could not have taken place before 
 the reign of the Emperor Vespasian. 
 
 " Judea, you must remember, had been brought under 
 the subjection of the Romans some time before the catas- 
 trophe predicted by Moses. Roman historians, who, as 
 Gentiles, could have had ^no motive in recording any 
 
 3 T 
 
50G DIALOGUE X. 
 
 thing from which a favourable inference might be drawn 
 for the divine inspiration of prophets whom they despised, 
 themselves inform us that one of their generals, Pompey, 
 had forced himself into the temple of Jerusalem more than 
 five hundred years after the captivity, which, as we saw, 
 is the latest possible date that could be assigned to the 
 Pentateuch, and about two hundred years after Moses had 
 been translated into Greek. The temple, then, on the tes- 
 timony of historians whose honesty was above suspicion, 
 was in existence many hundred years after Moses, and 
 it was destroyed in the reign of Vespasian, when the 
 events gave accurate fulfilment to the predictions of 
 Moses. 
 
 " In the above representation of the facts, I have con- 
 fined myself to the testimony of enemies, and to the very 
 extremes of historical possibilities. I have have taken 
 no account of the evidence which the Jewish writers 
 themselves afford. As those writers again give a consis- 
 tent account of the age of Moses and the times of his 
 successors, we must consider the actual date of the 
 Pentateuch as established, beyond doubt, by the cumula- 
 tive evidence of Jews aud Gentiles." 
 
 Agamika, — " Is it certain that Moses lived long before 
 the events described ? 
 
 Satyakdma. — " I have just told you that Moses lived 
 fifteen hundred years before Christ, and Jerusalem was 
 destroyed seventy years after Christ. The works of 
 Moses, originally written in Hebrew, were translated into 
 Greek two hundred and seventy years before Christ, so 
 that many persons unacquainted with Hebrew had also 
 known, more than three hundred years before the event, 
 what was coming on the Jews." 
 
 Agamika. — ^' But is there no doubt of the events them- 
 selves ?" 
 
NO EVIDENCE FOR PROPHECIES IN PURANAS. 507 
 
 Satyahdma. — " The events are minutely described by 
 Josephus and Tacitus, one writing in Greek, the other in 
 Latin — the former a Jew, the latter a Roman, and both 
 cautious, accurate, and faithful as historians. And we see 
 with our own eyes the J ewish people dispersed all over the 
 world, and without a country of their own." 
 
 Agamika. — " But there are numerous prophecies in our 
 own Puranas. May we not cite them as proofs of their 
 authority? The Ramayana was written before Rama 
 was born." 
 
 Satyahdma. — *' You cannot settle the age or paternity 
 of any of the Puranas. How can you urge any thing as 
 to the date of the predictions ? The Upanishads say that 
 the Puranas were breathed out from Brahma along with 
 the Vedas at the time of the creation. The Puranas 
 themselves claim Vyasa for their author, and one of them 
 goes the length of saying that it was composed for cor- 
 recting the errors of the Vedas, while another pretends 
 to be prior in point of time to the Vedas. Thus ; ' That 
 'about which, venerable sage, you have enquired, is all 
 ' known by me, the essence of the Puranas, the pre-emi- 
 ' nent Brahma- vaivartta, which refutes the errors of the 
 ' Puranas and Upapuranas and of the Vedas.' ' First of 
 ' all the sfastras, the Purana was uttered by Brahma. 
 'Subsequently the Vedas issued from his mouths^.' 
 
 " Learned critics, again, are forced to assign a much 
 more recent date to all the Iti bases and Puranas that 
 are extant in our days. What trust- worthy evidence 
 can you possibly have of any prophecy having been deli- 
 vered? or even of the facts (supposed to have been 
 predicted), having really occurred ? We do not know of 
 any contemporaneous historian that recorded them. Nay 
 the writing of history does not appear to have been 
 
 6 Dr. Muir'8 Sanscrit Texts Part iii. 
 
508 DIALOGUE X. 
 
 undertaken by any Braluiiinical authors, either in prose 
 or poetry. Prose writers have chiefly treated of specu- 
 lative subjects, and as to poetry, it is a recognized rule 
 in rhetoric that poetry must be rasdtmaka, or full of 
 striking ideas and sentiments, and that iti vritta, or a 
 mere narrative, is a defect in poetry. 
 
 '^ As to the Kamayana, the popular saying about its 
 composition before the events, may be a bold effort of 
 fancy, but it cannot stand the test of historical criticism. 
 Valmiki is said to have been a contemporary of Rama. 
 Whether that be an authenticated fact or not, is not now 
 the question, but what evidence can be possibly adduced 
 under such a circumstance of his writing the whole epic 
 before the recovery of Sita, and the conqueror's return 
 to Ayodhia?" 
 
 Agamika.—^^ You said that the Bible was attested by 
 miracles as well as prophecies. What have you to say 
 on the question of miracles ?" 
 
 Satyakdma. — ^^ As prophecy is a sign of divine know- 
 ledge, so are miracles proofs of divine power. Numer- 
 ous miracles of that description were publicly performed 
 by Christ, and they were recorded by men who had am- 
 ple opportunities for obtaining correct information, and 
 whose honesty as historians has been established by irre- 
 fragable proofs. 
 
 '' Miracles of course require to be authenticated by 
 stronger evidence than ordinary facts. We must have the 
 testimony of contemporaries, and the witnesses must 
 prove their competency and their integrity. Proof of 
 competency is required as a safeguard against mistakes 
 founded on their ignorance, and proof of integrity is 
 necessary to prevent impositions. A learned divine says, 
 ' The strength and validity of every testimony must bear 
 'proportion with the authority oi the testijier ; and the 
 
CHARACTERS OF CREDIBLE EVIDENCE. 509 
 
 ' authority of the testifier is founded upon his ability and 
 ' and integrity : his ability in the knowledge of that which 
 ' he deUvereth and asserteth ; his integrity in dehvering 
 'and asserting acoording to the knowledge. For two 
 ' several ways he which relate th or testifieth any thing 
 ' may deceive us ; one, by being ignorant of the truth, 
 ' and so upon that ignorance mistaking, he may think 
 ' that to be true which is not so, and consequently deli- 
 ' ver that for truth which in itself is false, and so deceive 
 ' himself and us ; or if he be not ignorant, yet if he be 
 ' dishonest or unfaithful, that which he knows to be false 
 ' he may propound and assert to be a truth, and so, 
 Hhough himself be not deceived, he may deceive us. 
 ' And by each of these ways, for want either of ability 
 ' or integrity in the testifier, whoso grounds his assent 
 ' unto any thing as a truth, upon the testimony of ano- 
 ' ther, may equally be deceived. But whosoever is so 
 ' able as certainly to know the truth of that which he 
 ' delivereth, and so faithful as to deliver nothing but 
 * what and as he knoweth, he, as he is not deceived, so 
 ' deceive th no man^." 
 
 " Both these characters of credible evidence are pro- 
 minent in the testimony on which we receive the mira- 
 cles of Christ. Those who have testified to them were 
 his own disciples, who constantly kept company with 
 him and had every opportunity of knowing the truth of what 
 they declared to others. And their honesty was unimpeach- 
 able. In tlie first place, they had nothing to gain by false 
 testimony. Men are known in the world to pervert facts 
 only from interested motives. No one teDs a lie where 
 he has nothing to gain. When we are satisfied that a 
 person is disinterested, we never doubt his testimony. 
 And so from the obvious disinterestedness of the disci- 
 
 ' Peaibon on the Creed. 
 
510 DIALOGUE X. 
 
 pies of Christ, their testimony is beyond suspicion. In 
 the second place, their honesty was proved by the severest 
 ordeal to which a human witness could possibly be subject- 
 ed. Judea was at that time under the government of the 
 Romans who, being idolaters, were bitterly opposed to 
 the teaching of Christ. That teaching was also hateful 
 to the Jews who had contracted the strongest prejudices 
 against the Saviour. His disciples had therefore to en- 
 counter the severest persecutions both from Jews and 
 Gentiles for their proclaiming the doctrines and miracles 
 of Christ. They were reviled and reproached, impri- 
 soned and beaten, and most of them were finally put to 
 cruel deaths because of their unflinching honesty in declar- 
 ing what they had seen and heard. 
 
 " The miracles, thus attested, were also numerous and 
 stupendous. They could not otherwise have been such 
 satisfactory credentials of divine commission. A single 
 isolated act, however wonderful, might fail as an evi- 
 dence of religious truth. It might be a deception, or 
 a delusion. But Christ's miracles were both numerous 
 and stupendous. The eye or the ear might have been 
 deceived in a single instance. It could not be so in a 
 multiplicity of instances, or in cases in which persons, 
 born blind, were cured in an instant, or dead men were 
 raised to life. 
 
 '^ The miracles of Christ, again, had nothing in them, 
 militating with our conceptions of God's goodness and 
 majesty. They were exhibitions of the divine benevo- 
 lence no less than the divine power." 
 
 Agamika. — "But there are numerous miracles recor- 
 ded in our Itih&,ses and Purdnas. Why may we not 
 cite them also as instances of divine power ?" 
 
 SatyaJcdma.-^^^ Because of a failure of evidence and 
 because of their -militating with our conceptions of the 
 
THE BIBLE THROWS LIGHT ON BRAHMINICAL DEBATES. 511 
 
 divine perfection. Where nothing is known as to the 
 age, circumstances, and character of the writers, how can 
 the least confidence be placed in their sayings ? Tlie 
 descriptions again are unworthy of the Godhead. The 
 alleged miracles were in many instances performed by 
 the most immoral personations and for improper purposes. 
 
 *^ The Christian miracles are in these respects totally diff- 
 erent. The performer, Christ, was in his life a perfect 
 pattern of holiness and moral virtue. It would be literally 
 impossible for the disciples of Christ to have composed 
 such an exemplar of perfection from their own heads. 
 
 '* And the Bible, thus attested by external evidences, 
 teaches in point of doctrine and precept precisely such 
 things as might be expected from the teaching of God, 
 and throws light on many points on which we were 
 perplexed by doubts and difficulties. The internal evidence 
 thus confirms the external, and leaves no possible room 
 for doubt." 
 
 Agam.ika. — '^ What are the points on which the Bible 
 throws light ?" 
 
 Satyakdma. — '' Some of the very points on which we 
 have been conversing for some days of late. As regards 
 the external universe, it tells us, ' In the beginning God 
 created the heavens and the earth,' thus showing that the 
 Nykya, Sankhya, and Vedant were all right and all wrong. 
 They rightly apprehended the truth, as regarded their op- 
 position to each other's systems. The Vedant was right in 
 its protest against the eternal atoms of the one, and the 
 unintelligent creative prakriti of the other; and the Ny%a 
 and Sankhya were equally right on their part in inveigh- 
 ing against the doctrine of the world's identity with God. 
 But they were all wrong in regard to their positive doc- 
 trines — the Nyaya in its theory of eternal atoms, the 
 Sankhya in that of creative Prakriti, and the Vedant in its 
 
512 DIALOGUE X. 
 
 denial of a duality of substance. The universe is neither 
 an illusion nor self-formed, but was called into being, out 
 of nothing, by the one only Eternal and Supreme Intelli- 
 gence, the author of all things in heaven and in earth. 
 All perplexing difficulties are thus cleared. 
 
 "As regards the chief end of human existence, again, we 
 learn, that the soul is a created substance but immortal, 
 neither eternal or self-existent, nor again a mere compound 
 of physical organs ; born in time but to endure for ever, 
 neither siuayamhhu, nor anitya in the sense of perishable. 
 It has neither independent nor termdnahle existence. 
 Being a creature, it can never be promoted to the dignity 
 of the Creator, but it has an eternity before it, to look 
 forward to. It may strive to approach Him — it may 
 aspire after communion with Him, but it can never be 
 unified with its Creator. There may be spiritual commu- 
 nion, but not physical identity. Since, however, the 
 human soul is become tainted with sin, it must be 
 cleansed and purified before it can look for that commu- 
 nion. It is impossible there can be any fellowship 
 between the most holy God and impure sinners, before 
 the latter have been redeemed and freed from sin. But 
 the sinner, could not compass his own redemption, and 
 therefore Christ came into the world for the salvation 
 of helpless man. 
 
 ''Thus, A'gamika, we have a clearing up of those points 
 on which philosophers had so long debated unprofitably. 
 And in the doctrine of Christ's atoning sacrifice for the 
 sins of men, we have an explanation of a point which had 
 certainly often puzzled me, and, I dare say, you too. The 
 followers of Jaimini you know are all most forward in ex- 
 horting men to perform the sacrificial rites enjoined in the 
 Veda. The only way to the realms above, they say, is by 
 means of sacrifices. Now it is singular that Jaimini 
 
THE BIBLE THROWS LIGHT ON BRAHMINICAL INSTITUTIONS. 513 
 
 never talks of God; and, as we have just seen, a large and 
 influential class of Mimd,nsakas set aside altogether the 
 idea of a Supreme Creator and moral Governor of the 
 universe. Works and worlds, they say, mechanically fol- 
 low one another in eternal succession. There was no more 
 necessity, in the opinion of the atheistic Mimansakas, for a 
 Supreme Being to create the universe, than there was, in 
 the opinion of the whole school, for a purusha, or personal 
 autlior, to compose the Yedas, or for an intelligent Gover- 
 nor to direct the distribution o^ fruits. And yet they all 
 say, he that desires heaven must perform sacrifice. I do 
 not know whether the question ever struck you, but I 
 have often asked myself, what could they possibly mean 
 by performing sacrifices, when they did not acknowledge 
 a Supreme Divinity ? 
 
 '^ The difficulty is cleared up in the Bible. We there 
 learn that in the inscrutable wisdom of God, there could 
 be no remission of sin apart from sacrifice, that Christ 
 was revealed in the primitive age of the world as the 
 great sacrifice for the sins of men, and that immolation of 
 animals was ordained at an early period as typical of that 
 great sacrifice. On the dispersion of the families of men, 
 the institution must have extended widely over the sur- 
 face of the globe. But while the ceremonial performance 
 of the rite was kept up, probably every where, its object 
 and intention were gradually forgotten or lost sight of 
 in many countries. The practice, no doubt, came down 
 to our ancestors from their immediate progenitors, but its 
 signification appears to have fallen into oblivion before 
 the formation of our literature. The zeal and assiduity 
 with which it was maintained in our country is accounted 
 for by its transmission from age to age as an immemorial 
 primitive practice, but the inability of our ancestors to give 
 the least intelligent explanation of the rite, and the want of 
 
 3 u 
 
514 DIALOGUE X. 
 
 any informafcion in the oldest of the Vedas on its connex- 
 ion with the celestial fruits of which it was believed to 
 be invariably productive, are enigmas which can only be 
 understood by the light of Biblical history. Viewed as 
 an institution originally appointed of God to represent the 
 future sacrifice of Christ, and transmitted from father to 
 son in every age as a most important ceremony connected 
 with the eternal happiness of mankind, the external ob- 
 servance of the rite would, we can easily comprehend, 
 be religiously maintained, even though the doctrine typi- 
 fied by it might be forgotten. Without the light which 
 the Biblical account affords, one can find no adequate ex- 
 planation of the difficulty. Why should the writers of the 
 Vedas tell us abruptly that the only way to the felicity of 
 heaven is the regular observance of certain sacrifices ? 
 What ao^ain could those advocates for rites and ceremonies 
 possibly mean, w^ho either doubted or actually denied the 
 existence of God, and yet contended for the necessity of 
 offering sacrifices ?" 
 
 '^ Oh !" said I, ^^ this is what you meant by the Great 
 Sacrifice for sin of which you spoke the other day. Now 
 I understand your meaning." 
 
 Agamika. — " I have sometimes been perplexed, I must 
 confess, by the zeal with which persons have contended 
 for the importance of sacrificial ceremonies who were 
 perfectly indifferent, if not absolutely opposed, to the 
 very foundation of all religion, the doctrine of a Supreme 
 Being, the creator and moral governor of the world. 
 
 '' But I have always consoled myself with the idea that 
 even atheists might by a happy inconsistency be animated 
 by the sentiment contained in the following formula of 
 adoration to Vishnu ; ' Obeisance to the sovereign God, 
 ^ the benefactor of Brahmins and kine. Obeisance, O 
 ' obeisance ! to Krishna, even Govinda, the benefactor of 
 
DOCTRINE OF KRISHNA THE SUPREME QUITE MODERN. 515 
 
 ' the world. I am sin, my works are sin, my spirit is sin, 
 ' my origin is sin. Save me, O thou lotus-eyed Hari, 
 ' who art the Lord of all sacrifices. None such a sinner 
 
 * as myself, none such a destroyer of sin as thyself, taking 
 'this, O God, into consideration, do what is proper.' Sen- 
 timents such as these give some insight into the meaning 
 of our ancient practice of animal sacrifices®." 
 
 Satyakdma. — '' That is however a formula of very re- 
 cent origin. It was unknown to those who composed the 
 Vedas and enjoined the sacrifices. There are reasons for 
 suspecting that the idea contained in the formula you 
 have quoted is derived from an exterior source." 
 
 Agamika. — ^^ What are those reasons ?" 
 
 Satyakdma. — ^' In the first place, the doctrine of Krishna, 
 as a distinct object of worship, identical with the Supreme 
 Being, appears to be quite modern. Professor Wilson, 
 whom all Brahmins respected for his profound Sanscrit 
 learning and who was never suspected of having ever 
 done the least injustice to our national S'astras, says : 
 
 ' The whole of this book is dedicated to the biography of Krishna. 
 
 * Many of the Puranas omit this subject altogether, or only allude to it 
 
 * occasionally. In others, it is equally prominent. The Brahma P. 
 'gives the story exactly in the same words as our text :^ which has the 
 
 * best right to them may be questioned ; but as it is usually met with, 
 
 * the Brahma P. is a very heterogeneous compilation. The Hari Vansa 
 
 * has a narrative more detailed than that of the text, with additions and 
 'embellishments of its own. The Brahma Vaivartta throughout celebrates 
 'the acts of Krishna; and one portion of it, the Krishna Janma Khanda, 
 
 * especially describes his boyhood and youth. The incidents are the same 
 ' in general as those in the text, but they are lost amidst interminable 
 
 ■^iFf w TT^^it^i'^ ^sJ^T^^T 'iftTJ n ^f^W" iTTcrmt -5111% 
 ?^(^^ ^if^ xim^r I TfcT fif^i ?Tfct ^ w^\ -^tm cnri ^r^ 11 
 
516 DIALOGUE X. 
 
 'descriptions of Krishna's sports with the Gopis and with his mistress 
 
 * Radha, a person not noticed elsewhere ; the whole is in a style indicative 
 
 * of a modern origin. The Agni P. and Padma P. (Uttara Khanda) have 
 
 * accounts of Krishna, but they are mere summaries, compiled evidently 
 
 * from other works. The principal authority for the adventures of Krishna 
 •is the Bhagavata, the tenth book of which is exclusively devoted to 
 *him. It is this work which has, no doubt, mainly extended the 
 
 * worship of Krishna, as its popularity is evinced by its having been 
 
 * translated into all the spoken languages of India professing to have a 
 
 * literature. The Prem-sagar, its Hindi version, is well known ; but there 
 'are also translations in Mahratta, Telugu, Tamil, &c. It does not seem 
 'likely, however, that the Vishnu P. lias copied the Bhagavata; for 
 ' although its greater conciseness may sometimes look like abridgment, 
 'yet the descriptions are generally of a more simple and antiquated 
 ' character. Here, as usual, the Mahabharata is no doubt the earliest 
 ' extant authority ; but it is not the earliest, for whilst it omits to narrate 
 ' most of his personal adventures unconnected with his alliance with the 
 
 * Pandavas, it often alludes to them, and names repeatedly his capital, 
 'his wives, and his progeny. It also devotes a section, the Mausala P., 
 ' to the destruction of the Yadavas. The story of Krishna, the prince 
 ' and hero, must have been complete when the Mahabharata was compiled. 
 ' It is doubtful, however, if Krishna the boy, and his adventures at 
 
 * Vrindavan, were not subsequent inventions. There are no allusions to 
 
 * them in the poem, of an unsuspicious nature. The only ones that I 
 ' have met with are contained in a speech by Sisupala, Sabha P., in which he 
 ' reviles Krishna ; but they may easily have been interpolated. There may 
 ' be others scattered through the poem, but 1 have not observed them. 
 
 " As a warriof and prince he is always on the scene ; but he is repeat- 
 ' edly called an Ansa, or portion of Vishnu ; whilst in a great number of 
 ' places he is identified with Vishnu Narayana, and is consequently ' all 
 'things.' This latter is his character, of course, amongst the Vaishna- 
 *vas, agreeably to the Bhagavata; 1\ W^ HJT^T ♦!, "^^ I * Krishna is 
 "the lord (Vishnu) himself.^'" 
 
 '' Professor Wilson is of opinion that the Sri Bhagavata 
 was composed in the twelfth century of the Christian 
 era, or about seven hundred years ago. The worship of 
 Krishna as identical with the Supreme Being cannot then 
 be much older than that." 
 
 9 Note, Translation of the Vishnu Purkna, pp. 491, 492. 
 
NARADA PANCHA-RATUA. 517 
 
 Agamika. — *' Surely the Ndrada-pancha-rdtra speaks 
 of Krishna's sports with the Gopis and with BAdhi, 
 magnifying his glory as the Supreme Brahma. And 
 that work is older than the S'ri-Bhagavata." 
 
 Satyakdma. — '^ I have no objection to allow that the 
 Pancha-ratra was prior to the Bhagavata in point of 
 time, notwithstanding its express mention of the Bhaga- 
 vata in one of its chapters. That mention I think is an 
 interpolation. The Pancha-ratra must have been written 
 before Sankardcharya, for he not only refers to it by 
 name, but controverts some of its doctrines. I believe it 
 was the Narada- Pancha-ratra that first invested Krishna 
 with the dignity of the Supreme Godhead, and celebrated 
 his youthful freaks as something mystically divine. I 
 have my theory of the reasons which led the author of 
 that work to exhibit as adorable what I believe had 
 before been held to be at best only tolerable in a prince 
 and a warrior. But we cannot possibly have any reasons 
 for assigning to the doctrine of ' Krishna the lord of sacri- 
 fices ' any date anterior to the Pancha-ratra which was 
 written probably in the eighth or ninth century. The 
 formula which affords you an insight into the doctrine 
 of sacrifices cannot accordingly be of an older date than the 
 eighth or ninth century. Now we have strong evidences 
 for believing that the doctrine of the Great Sacrifice for 
 sin, of which I have been speaking, had been introduced 
 before that period into some parts of India, not far from 
 the scene of the literary labours and theological discus- 
 sions of the age. It was in the South of India that the 
 Brahminical genius was in those days most active, as is 
 apparent from the history of Sankaracharya, R^mdnuja, 
 and their respective followers, and it was also in the South 
 of India that large congregations of Christians, calling 
 themselves after the name of St. Thomas, had, for some 
 
518 DIALOGUE X. 
 
 centuries before the formation of Vaishnava sects, been 
 maintaining the doctrine of tlie Great Sacrifice for sin. 
 It is not at all improbable that some enterprising Brah- 
 mins had fallen in with them, and, struck by the doctrine 
 in question, made use of it in giving a more imposing 
 character to their popular god Krishna." 
 
 Agamika. — '^ But what is your theory of the reasons 
 which led to the deification of Krishna in the Pancha- 
 ratra and the Sri-Bhagavata V 
 
 Satyakdma. — '^ I do not know whether I can explain 
 myself in a few words, but I will make the attempt. 
 Krishna, you must remember, is a great character in the 
 Mah&,bharata, as the friend of the Pandavas. He must 
 have been admired from the beginning for the abilities 
 he displayed both on the field of battle and in the hall of 
 consultation. He was feared and honoured as an extra- 
 ordinary person, perhaps a god. But though celebrated 
 as a hero, there is no record of his youthful irregularities 
 being held as adorable. Public morals had not as yet 
 become so low. We need not consider the reproaches 
 which Sis'upala cast on him as an interpolation. There 
 may have been reports of his having, as a boy, led a very 
 dissolute life. Most princes in our country still do the same. 
 But we have no reason for taxing the age of which we are 
 speaking with recounting those irregularities as divine acts. 
 If the hero was deified, it was only by throwing the 
 mantle of pious charity over the infirmities of the boy. 
 
 '' Indeed the Brahmins were so much opposed in those 
 days to the recounting of the foibles of deified persons, that 
 one entire canto of a popular poem was suppressed or ex- 
 punged because of its containing an indelicate description 
 of a god's dalliance with his own wife. Kalid&.sa who 
 seems to have taken peculiar delight in such descriptions 
 had given a very indecent representation of Siva's uxorious- 
 
MORAL DETERIORATION OF THE BRAHMINICAL MIND. 519 
 
 ness in the last canto of the Kumara-sambhava, and the 
 horror of the Brahmins at such an impious exposure of a 
 god's infirmities has thrown that canto into utter oblivion. 
 
 *' The moral constitu^n of the Btahminical mind must 
 therefore have undergone a radical change when poems 
 like the Narada-pancha-ratra and S'ri-Bhagavata were 
 composed. These works not only recounted as divine, 
 acts on the part of Krishna, far worse than those which 
 Kdlidasa had described of S'iva, but they attached a 
 peculiar religious merit to the constant hearing, uttering, 
 and contemplating of those acts. And these impure 
 descriptions have not only been received with favor, but 
 that which is the more circumstantial of the two, I mean 
 the Sri-Bhagavata, has been classed among the sacred 
 writings, and translated, more or less freely, into most 
 of the vernacular dialects of the country. What can be 
 the cause of this moral revolution in the Brahminical 
 mind ? What inducement could there be for selecting, as 
 objects of religious worship, the most ugly traits in a 
 character who had before been conspicuous in the tradi- 
 tions of the country only as a skilful prince and warrior. 
 Above all, what could be the motive for exhibiting such 
 a character as higher than all other gods, and identical 
 with the Supreme Being ? " 
 
 Agamika. — ^' I never thought of this point ; but I see 
 that the deification of Bal Krishna is an event that may 
 require to be accounted for. What do you think was the 
 motive of our ancestors in setting up such an object of 
 worship ?" 
 
 Satyakdma. — '^I have only a theory on the subject. 
 1 think it will afford an explanation of the moral pheno- 
 menon of the chanofe in the Brahminical mind, but since 
 there is a total absence of historical evidence, I cannot 
 propound it as absolutely true. The Pancha-ratra was 
 
520 DIALOGUE X. 
 
 written after the overthrow of Buddhism. What was the 
 meaning of that overthrow ? Only that its leaders were si- 
 lenced or expelled. The great body of the people still 
 entertained their venil:"ation for the character of Buddha. 
 They — more especially the Sudras — had found in that per- 
 sonation an object of reverence and adoration, such as had 
 never been supplied to them by the Brahmins. Indeed the 
 Brahmins had denied them the privilege of engaging in 
 religious exercises of any kind, and even punished such 
 acts on their part as were indicative of the least aspiration 
 after celestial blessings^^ Buddha however had allowed 
 them to participate freely in religious acts and meditations. 
 He had so far emancipated the Sudras. The Brahmins 
 saw, on regaining their supremacy after the fall of the rival 
 school, that it would be impossible to enlist the popular 
 sympathy in their favour without some concessions to the 
 Sudras. They accordingly pitched on the well-known, and 
 perhaps already deified, character of Krishna, and set it up 
 as an object of universal worship. And in order to make 
 it the more fascinating to the popular mind, and to give 
 that mind a strong impulse in a direction the very oppo- 
 site of Buddhism, they invested their new god with those 
 infirmities of the flesh from which Sakya Muni is said to 
 have been somewhat unnaturally free. The rude mind of 
 the populace, devoid of education, is easily led in the 
 direction of sensuality, and whereas Buddha had observed 
 rigid chastity in the midst of several thousand damsels 
 resident in his own palace, Krishna was represented as 
 the very antithesis of Buddha, deliberately going about 
 to seek, seduce, carry off", or procure by other means 
 many thousands of females from dififerent j)arts of the 
 country. The moral perversion of the Brahminical 
 mind was accordingly brought abaut by the reaction 
 
 10 See above page 45. 
 
WORSHIP OF KRISHNA UNDER REACTION AGAINST BUDDHA. 521 
 
 against Buddhism. The Brahmins had found no difficulty 
 in adopting the speculative principles of that system, but, 
 as regarded practical devotion, they were desirous of 
 setting up a character the very opposite of S'akya, with a 
 view to wean the popular mind from Buddhism. 
 
 '^ Under the impulse of the reaction in their own minds 
 the Brahmins set up their popular god as the Supreme 
 Brahma, allowing all castes freely to worship him, taking 
 care only to maintain their ministerial importance as guruSy 
 or spiritual guides of other classes. Whatever ideas, 
 expressive of the divine majesty, they could themselves 
 imagine, and whatever sentiments, borrowed from other 
 quarters, struck their fancies as suitable for a popular 
 system, they freely received in the construction of their 
 new idol. And thus the very character which had 
 injured so many husbands and stained the purity of 
 so many households, was otherwise described as the Lord 
 of sacrifices, the greatest destro3''er of sin, and the deli- 
 verer of the world. If a man had only faith in that 
 pre-eminent divinity, he would obtain excellence what- 
 ever his caste or race^ The S'udras carried the dogma 
 to greater lengths than was intended by the Brahmins. 
 Sects arose afterwards which conferred the dignity of 
 gurus on eminent members of their bodies without dis- 
 tinction of caste or colour. 
 
 ^' I need hardly add, Agamika, that Krishna, invested 
 with the attributes of a Saviour from sin, presents only the 
 picture (to use the fabulist's illustration) of a jackdaw in 
 peacock's plumes. The picture looks unnatural, and you 
 have no hesitation in saying that the plumage is borrowed. 
 
 "^^^ ^^T^'^^ ^* II Kjis'i Khanda iu Wihoii on the Religious Sects <jf the 
 Hindus. 
 
 3 X 
 
522 DIALOGUE X. 
 
 And yet the fact has some value in it. The jackdaw that 
 borrows the peacock's plumes testifies thereby that the 
 plumes are beautiful. And so the character of Krishna 
 proves that, in the conception of its framers, human salva- 
 tion could only proceed from the free grace of Him who 
 was the Lord of sacrifices, * in whom/ to quote a text from 
 the Bible, ' we have redemption through His blood, the 
 forgiveness of sins, according to the riches of His grace.' " 
 
 Agamiha. — '' But I am told that the Christian religion 
 which you are now advocating speaks of a plurality of 
 gods, three gods." 
 
 Satyakdma. — '^ Not three gods, nor a plurality of gods, 
 but a plurality of persons in the unity of the Godhead. 
 This doctrine you can find no great difficulty in acknow- 
 ledging, (1) because it is inculcated in the Bible which, 
 as we have seen before, is attested by miracles and pro- 
 phecies, and (2) because the Brahminical s'astras them- 
 selve bear some confirmatory testimony to its truth." 
 
 Agamika. — '^ How ?" 
 
 Satyakdma. — ^^ The Brahminical s'astras speak of a triad 
 of divinities, Brahma, Vishnu, and S'iva. They speak of 
 it, as one form and three gods. They tell us that they 
 are mystically united in One Supreme Being. But the 
 doctrine appears incongruous, and quite out of place in 
 their system. The gods are frequently represented, not as 
 different personal manifestations of the same Godhead 
 ought to be, but as impure characters and antagonistic 
 gods, wrangling and fighting with one another. S'iva 
 fights and punishes Brahma 2, and Vishnu humbles S'iva ^. 
 
 3 See above p. 270,' 
 
HINDU GODS ANTAGONISTS TO EAUii OTHER. 523 
 
 The votaries of Vishnu anathematize those of S'iva'^, and 
 the votaries of S'iva anathematize those of Vishnu. 
 And all three are, again, pronounced to be transient and 
 perishable^. The doctrine represents an idea which is 
 quite foreign to the Brahminical system, and we can only 
 unravel the mystery by supposing it to be a relic of some 
 primitive revelation, of which a distorted tradition had 
 probably reached our ancestors " 
 
 Agamiha. — ''These appear to be strange and novel 
 views of things, and yet 1 certainly cannot gainsay them. 
 Well is there any other point on which you can collect 
 evidence from our s'astras in behalf of Christianity ?" 
 
 Satyahdma. — ''The doctrine of Christ's incarnation for 
 the redemption of the world, involved in the primitive re- 
 velation of a future Saviour, receives some confirmation 
 from detached expressions in several portions of the Brah- 
 minical s'astras. The idea propounded in the Bhagavad- 
 gita and other works that Vishnu descends in human 
 form for the relief of the world, whenever it is oppressed 
 with sin and wickedness, is ill in keeping with the acts 
 attributed to his alleged incarnations, of which Krishna is 
 declared to have been the fullest and most conspicuous. E 
 need not offend your ears by a description of his charac- 
 ter. You will admit that from such a character it would 
 be preposterous to expect any relief from . sin. The idea 
 was apparently derived by tradition from the primitive 
 revelation of a future Saviour, and it was eagerly enter- 
 tained owing to the necessities of sinful human nature, 
 
 Piidma, vittara Khandn, in Dr. Muir's Mala P'arikslid, Part 1. 
 5 See above p. 21:2. Note 5. 
 
524 DIALOGUE X. 
 
 incapable of helping itself, and panting for reconciliation 
 with God. 
 
 '^ But the ineffectual rites and ceremonies of the Brah- 
 minical system and the adoration of its imitation gods and 
 pretended incarnations of Deity, have never succeeded in 
 administering anything like solid or enduring peace and 
 consolation to the human mind. The people want some- 
 thing better, and it was no doubt with a view to the 
 satisfaction of this craving that the transcendental and 
 mystic systems were propounded. How barren they 
 are of anything really good, we have already seen. 
 They labour to tranquillize the soul by simply telling it 
 there is no hope for tranquillity but in the cessation of 
 sentient existence or the destruction of individual consci- 
 ousness. It is however a mere mockery to speak of 
 happiness without sentient existence or individual con- 
 sciousness." 
 
 Agamika. — '^ But what is the great duty and what the 
 chief end inculcated in the Christian religion." 
 
 SatyaMma. — ^' The great duty is devotion to God, 
 through Christ, in consideration of the great sacrifice 
 for sin. 'I beseech you, therefore, brethren, says an 
 * inspired apostle, by the mercies of God, that ye present 
 ' your bodies a living sacrifice, holy, acceptable unto God, 
 ' which is your reasonable service. And be not con- 
 ^ formed to this world : but be ye transformed by the 
 ' renewing of your mind, that ye may prove what is that 
 ' good, and acceptable, and perfect will of God.' The 
 chief end of human nature is to escape the evils of this 
 corrupt and deceitful world, — this vanity of vanities, 
 which though not a nullity, can still give no satisfaction, 
 — and to enjoy God, not by identification with Him, 
 nor by absorption in His essence to the destruction of 
 separate individualities, but by communion with His 
 
CHRISTIAN IDEA OF FINAL BUSS. 525 
 
 Holy Spirit, and by being filled with all the fulness of 
 God. 
 
 ''The philosopher talks of mukti, and the Vedantist 
 speaks of unification with God. I do not know whether 
 either of them had any traditionary knowledge of the fact 
 that man was created in the image of God. Not that an 
 essentially formless Being can have a corporeal image, but 
 man was made in the likeness of His Spirit. The 
 Vedantic conception of the human soul being a reflection 
 of the Supreme, like that of the sun or moon in the 
 waters, is not correct, but the human soul is certainly an 
 image, a likeness, and, in that sense of the term, a reflec- 
 tion of the Supreme Spirit. The likeness has been dis- 
 figured by the introduction of sin. The reflection 
 partakes of the mirror's impurity, but the chief end of 
 human existence is so to cleanse and polish the mirror of 
 the soul by personal holiness that it may present an un- 
 spotted likeness of its God and Saviour, and be fiilly 
 restored to the image in which it was originally made. 
 The restoration of that image implies perfect release from 
 all those corruptions which the Brahminical philosopher 
 dreaded most, but it does not involve destitution of 
 sentient existence or loss of individual consciousness. 
 Christianity animates us with the hope of positive hap- 
 piness and glory. Far from involving a destitution of 
 sentient existence or loss of individual consciousness, the 
 ineffable bliss we look for, signifies the full sanctification 
 of our senses, and the unceasing contemplation of the 
 divine perfections without the least abatement of indi- 
 vidual consciousness. We do not seek to fall into a 
 state of irreparable insensibility, but we seek for an eter- 
 nal life of perfect sentiency, that we may live for ever, 
 intelligently and consciously to laud and magnify the 
 goodness and mercy of God, We wish our passions and 
 
526 DIALOGUE X. 
 
 affections, not to be destroyed, but to be brought in sub- 
 jection to God, and to continue as immortal trophies of 
 His omnipotent grace." 
 
 Agamiha. — " Many ideas are suggested by what you 
 say. I shall not ask any more questions now. It is so 
 late in the day, and I must first of all think more 
 maturely of what you have already advanced. 1 shall 
 probably call upon you soon for further information. I 
 certainly feel that if there be truth in the world, it must 
 be found in the Christian Scriptures." 
 
 Satyakdma. — " Since there is a God, the author and 
 director of all things, there must also be a corresponding 
 TRUTH. And if we seek it in dependence on Him, we 
 shall no doubt find it, and the truth shall make us free, 
 shall give us real Miilcti'' 
 
NATIVE AUTHORITIES CITED IN llli^ WORK. 
 
 Bhatti-kavya, Calcutta edition, Devanaj^ri character. 
 
 HiTOPADESA, the same. 
 
 Nyaya SUTRA VRiTTi, the Same. 
 
 Bhagavad-gita, the same, but in Bengali character. 
 
 Brahma-vaivarta, in Raja Radhakant's Sabda-kalpa-druma. 
 
 Raghu-vansa, Cal. Ed. Dev. Nag. 
 
 Sutras of Gotama, the same. 
 
 Ditto of Kapila, the same, also the Serampore edition. 
 
 Ditto of Kan A DA, Manuscript borrowed from the Benares College. This 
 
 work has since been printed by the Asiatic Society of Calcutta. 
 Ditto of Pantanjali, Manuscript borrowed from a pandit of the Maharajah 
 
 of Burdwan. 
 Ditto of Jaimini, Manuscript borrowed from the Library of the Asiatic 
 
 Society. 
 Ditto of Vyasa, Cal. Ed. Beng. 
 Commentary of Sankaracharya, Cal. Ed. Beng. 
 Ditto of Vatsayana, Manuscript (imperfect) borrowed from the library of 
 
 the Calcutta Sanscrit College. 
 Ditto of ViJNANA Bhikshu, Calcutta and Serampore Editions. 
 Ditto of Udyotakara Misra, Manuscript b(^rrowed from the Library of 
 
 the Asiatic Society. 
 Ditto of San KARA Misra, Manuscript from Benares College. This work 
 
 has since been printed by the Asiatic Society. 
 Ditto of Induacharya Saraswati, Ms. from Asiatic Society. 
 Ditto of Raman uj a, Ditto Ditto. 
 
 Sankhya Karika, Professor Wilson's edition, London. 
 Sri Bhagavata, Cal. Ed. Beng. 
 Swetaswatara Upanishad, Bibliotheca Indica. 
 
 Katha 
 
 Ditto 
 
 Ditto. 
 
 Prasna 
 
 Ditto 
 
 Ditto. 
 
 MundakA 
 
 Ditto 
 
 Ditto. 
 
 Mandukya 
 
 Ditto 
 
 Ditto. 
 
 Chhandogya 
 
 Ditto 
 
 Ditto 
 
 Brihadabanyaka 
 
 Ditto 
 
 Ditto 
 
 ISA 
 
 Ditto 
 
 Ditto 
 
 Aitareya 
 
 Ditto 
 
 Ditto 
 
 Taittiriya 
 
 Ditto 
 
 Ditto 
 
 Kena 
 
 Ditto 
 
 Ditto 
 
528 
 
 Megha-duta, Cal. Ed. Dev. Nag. 
 
 TuLASiDASA, his Ramayana, Ditto Ditto 
 
 Taittiriya Brahraana, Bibliotheca Indica. 
 
 Mahabharata, some passages from Dr .Muir's Sanscrit Pexts Part 1. 
 
 YoGA-VASisHTHA, Cal. Ed. Beng. 
 
 Sarva-darsana-sangraha Bibliotheca Indica. 
 
 Sabda-mukta-maharnava, Ms. in the author's possession. 
 
 Ramayana, Cal. Ed. Dev. Nag. 
 
 SiDDHANTA-SIROMANI DittO DittO. 
 
 Vidwan-moda-tarangini, Ms. in the author's possession. There is 
 
 printed edition, but it is very imperfect and inaccurate. 
 Vasavadatta, Bibliotheca Indica. 
 
 Haridasa Bhatta on the Kusumanjali, Cal Ed. Dev. Nag. 
 Marcandeya Purana, Bibliotheca Indica. 
 Matsya Purana, Ms. 
 
 Premachandra on Naishadha Charita, Cal Ed Dev. Nag. 
 Bhasha-pariccheda, Ditto Ditto. 
 Naishadha-charita, Ditto Ditto. 
 
 Gaudapada, Karika on the Mandukya, Bibliotheca Indica. 
 Lalita vistara, Bibliotheca Indica. 
 Kumara sambhava, Cal. Ed. Dev. Nag. 
 Panchadasi, Ditto Beng. 
 
 SiDDHANTA-MUKTAVALI, DittO DcV. Nag. 
 
 Tattwa-Chintamani, Ditto Ditto. 
 
 SiDDHANTA-MANJARi, Ms. in the author's possession. 
 
 Vedanta-sara, Cal. Ed. Beng. 
 
 Paribhasha, Ditto Dev. Nag. 
 
 Gauda-purnananda, his Tatiwa-muktavali, Ms. from the Asiatic Society. 
 
 Atmopadesa, by Sankaracharya, Ditto Ditto 
 
 Sayana, in Max Muller's Rig-veda. 
 
 Narada-pancha-ratra, Ms. from Asiatic Society. 
 
 Rammohun Roy, brief commentary on the Vedant sutras, Cal. Ed. Beng. 
 
INDEX AND GLOSSARY. 
 
 A. 
 
 Acbarya ; an authorized religious 
 
 teacher. No teaching is allowed to 
 
 be successful without him, 290, 421. 
 
 Adharma, demerit, sin, 141, 1S5, 190, 
 
 192, 206. 
 Adhikari, superintendeftt, 400 ; a qua- 
 lified student, 421. 
 Adhunika, recent, novel : one of the 
 
 interlocutors in this book, 427- 
 Adi-buddha, the first Buddha; identi- 
 fied with the Supreme Being, 203. 
 Adisura, a king supposed to be the 
 founder of the last native dynasty 
 of Bengal, 472. 
 Aditya, a god, the sun, 377. 
 Adrishta, literally unseen. It stands 
 for fate, luck, merit or demerit 
 founded on works of a previous state 
 of existence ; destiny, necessity, 6, 
 61, 62, 63, 73, 73, 92, 93, 114, 115, 
 JI7, 119, 140, 141, 149, 151, 476. 
 Adwaitavada, the theory of unity of 
 
 being; pantheism, 2S8. 
 Agama, sastra, or a book of revelation ; 
 applied generally to the Vedas, 19, 
 492. 
 Agamika, literally that which rests on 
 the Sastra or revelation. One of 
 the interlocutors in this book. 
 Agni, the god of fire, 490. 
 Aguna, devoid of quality, 427- 
 Ahalya, wife of a sage named Gotama, 
 
 15, dishonoured by Indra, 56. 
 Ahankara, egotism, or self-conscious- 
 ness, the third principle in the San- 
 khya philosophy, 68, 241. 
 Aiswarika, one of the theistic sects 
 among Buddhists, 203. 
 
 j Akasa, ether ; one of the five elements 
 mentioned by Brahminical philo- 
 sophers, 178. 
 I Akshapada, eye-footed, a name of Go- 
 I taraa. Some say it means intellec- 
 tualism and indicates the system 
 I of Gotama, 57. 
 j Akriti, form, species, 471. 
 \ Akusula, evil ; applied in Buddhistic 
 j terminology to adharma, 192, 206. 
 Alaka, the city of the Yakshas, 21. 
 Amavasya, the last of the moon when 
 I it is dark all night, 237. 
 j Ananda, joy, 433. 
 I Anatta, for anatma, unreality ; told by 
 
 Buddhists on their beads 200. 
 '': Angir, name of a sage, 466. 
 I Angiras, the same 46G, 
 I Aniruddha, a grandson of Krishna; 
 I one of the four forms of the Su- 
 \ preme Being agreeably to the Bha- 
 l gavatas, 277. 
 
 I Anitya, transient; one of the words 
 which Buddhists tell on their beads, 
 200,. 
 Annarasamaya, all food, made up of 
 
 the essence of food. 433. 
 Anumana, Inference; one of the in- 
 struments of knowledge, somewhat 
 diflferent from the Aristotelian syl- 
 logism, 171. 
 Anumiti, the knowledge derived from 
 the process of Inference, 171. 
 Anuvritti, that which is understood, 
 
 ellipsis, 53. 
 Apara, inferior, low; so the older 
 Vedas are called in some of the 
 Upanishads, 274. 
 Apavarga, emancipation, freedom from 
 3 Y 
 
530 
 
 INDEX AND GLOSSARY. 
 
 transmigration, renouncement of 
 body and mind, 192. 
 
 Apsaras, the dancing girls of Indra's 
 palace, 472. 
 
 Apta, unerring, infallible, spoken of 
 valid testimony, or the teaching of 
 sastras, 177. 
 
 Arjuna, one of the five brothers Pan- 
 davas, to whom Krishna is said to 
 have addressed the Bhagavad-gita, 
 204. 
 
 Arthavada, explanatory remarks in the 
 Vedas, 467. 
 
 Aruna, the charioteer of the sun, 39S. 
 
 Arya, excellent, noble ; the name by 
 which the ancient Hindus were dis- 
 tinguished, 27, 2S, 177. 
 
 Aryavarta, the land of the Aryas, 
 Hindustan proper, 16. 
 
 As, the verb substantive, to be, 4 1 5. 
 
 Asat, not being, non-entity, 401 . 
 
 Asura, a demon, an enemy of the 
 gods, 28. 
 
 Asvins, celestial twins celebrated in 
 the Vedas, 490. 
 
 Aswamedha, a horse offering, in which 
 the animal is burnt after being put 
 to death. 
 
 Atha, an auspicious particle used on 
 the introduction of a new sub- 
 ject. 58. 
 
 Atharvan, the last of the four Ve- 
 das, 5, 493, 491, 497. 
 
 Ati- vyapti, when the reason adduced 
 proves too much, 346. 
 
 Atma, spirit, soul, 153. 162. 
 
 Atyantabhava, absolute want, or im- 
 possibility, 212. 
 
 Atyukti, an exaggeration, a hyper- 
 bole, 376. 
 
 Ava, the capital of Burmah. How the 
 Buddhist priests thereof explained 
 their idea of Nirvana, 197. 
 
 Avayava, the five members of a regu 
 lar argument according to Gota- 
 ma, 17J. 
 
 Avidya, ignorance, delusion, 346, 373, 
 
 3S7, 401, 402,. 
 Ayodhya, a town in Oude, the capital 
 
 of Rama 7- 
 Ayurveda, the treatise on medicine, 
 474. 
 
 B. 
 Babara, a person named in the Vedas, 
 
 464. 
 Bal Krishna, the boy Krishna; how 
 
 and when he was set up as an ob- 
 ject of universal worship, 519- 
 Ballalsen, one of the kings of the last 
 
 Hindu dynasty in Bengal, 472. 
 Bhagavad-gita, a discourse purporting 
 
 to be addressed by Krishna to Ar- 
 juna; its depreciation of the Vedas, 
 
 204. 
 Bhagavan, Lord ; applied especially to 
 
 Krishna. 
 Bhagavata, one belonging to the sect 
 
 of Vishnu or Krishna, 
 Bhagya, luck, destiny, fate I17. 
 Bharata, a brother of Rama, 20. 
 Bbasha, dialect ; spoken especially of 
 
 vernacular dialects, 20. 
 Bhaskaracharya, an eminent Hindu 
 
 astronomer, the author of the Sid- 
 
 dhanta siromani, 69, 395. 
 Bho Bhagavan, O Lord, O Sir, 4 IS. 
 Brahma, the first sentient being, or 
 
 god 323. 
 Brahmana, one of the two parts into 
 
 which each Veda is divided. 
 
 c. 
 
 Caranam, cause, 131. 
 
 Carya, an effect, a product, 132. 
 
 Chakar, a bird represented as pecu- 
 liarly fond of moonlight, 3. 
 
 Chaitanya, a native of Bengal who 
 pretended to be an incarnation of 
 Vishnu and founded a new school 
 of Vaishnavas, 231. 
 
 Chamara, a chowri or sort of flap for 
 beating off gnats, flies &c. 426. 
 
 Charvaka, a follower of a Buddhist 
 
INDEX AND GLOSSARY. 
 
 531 
 
 teacher of the same name supposed 
 to have held atheistic doctrines, 2t. 
 
 Chakvva. a bird supposed to be ex- 
 tremely impatient of separation 
 from its mate, 105. 
 
 Chhala, fraud, artitice in argumenta- 
 tion, 54. 
 
 Chiranjiva, the author of certain 
 Dialogues on the Hindu philosophy 
 written in Sanscrit verse, 280. 
 
 Chitrakuta, a ^nountain in Bundel- 
 khund, where Rama is said to have 
 halted in his progress to the 
 south, 20. 
 
 D. 
 
 Daiva, luck, destiny, 1 J 5, 
 
 Dandi, one that has taken to his staff 
 and retired from the world, 40O. 
 
 Darsana, observation ; applied to sys- 
 tems of philosophy. 
 
 Dasaratha, king of Ayodhya, father 
 of Rama, 40, 202 
 
 Dasyu, a people spoken of in the 
 Vedas as the antagonists of the 
 Brahmins, 27. 
 
 Devakiputra, son of Devaki, Krish- 
 na, 327. 
 
 Dhan, wealth, 3-5. 
 
 Dharma, duty, merit, works, property, 
 destiny, 27, 141, 1S5, ]9(), 206. 
 
 Dharma-sabha, a Hindu society estab- 
 lished in Calcutta for the protection 
 of Hindooism, 30. 
 
 Dhyana, meditation ; in the Sankhya 
 philosophy meditation without an 
 object, a mental void, 265. 
 
 Dilipa, a king of the solar race, an 
 ancestor of Rama, 40, 
 
 Dishta, luck, destiny, 117- 
 
 Dosha, fault, applied to the passions 
 and emotions of human nature, IS3, 
 214,217. 
 
 Dukha, i)ain, trouble. 
 
 Dwaitavada, duality of entities, belief 
 in the existence of more than one 
 substance. It is the opposite of 
 
 pantheism, 288. 
 Dwyanuka, a compound of two atoms, 
 a binary, 855. 
 
 G. 
 
 Gana, a list of verbal roots composed 
 in metre, the final letters being ar- 
 ranged alphabetically, 137. 
 
 Gandharva, a species of supernatural 
 beings. A town of Gandharva means 
 an imaginary thing, a fairy town, 
 2J4. 
 
 Ganga, the Ganges. 
 
 Ganga Sagur, Sagur, at the mouth of 
 the Hooghly. 
 
 Guru, Teacher. 
 
 Garuda, a fabulous bird, the bird of 
 Vishnu, 206. 
 
 Gaudapada, a commentator on the 
 Sankhya Karika, and the author of 
 a Karika on the Mandukya Upan. 
 
 Gauna, not the literal sense, figurative, 
 376. 
 
 Gaurava, multiplicity; the assigning of 
 more causes than would be neces- 
 sary for the accounting of a pheno- 
 menon, 166. 
 
 Gayatri, a sacred verse, 4S7. 
 
 Ghatakarpara, a poet who flourished in 
 the age of Vikramaditya 472. 
 
 Girisanta, one that secures the welfare 
 of the mountain, 322. 
 
 Giritra, protector of the mountain, 439. 
 
 Gotama, the author of Nyaya- It is 
 a name of Buddha too; also, of one 
 or more of his ancestors. 
 
 Gritsaraada, a Vedic character, 491. 
 
 Guni, one endowed with qualities, 410. 
 11. 
 
 Haituka, rational, 48. 
 
 Harischandra, a king of the Solar race 
 forced to sell his wife and child, and 
 himself to submit to servitude, for 
 fear of a malediction from Viswa- 
 mitra. 
 
 Harivansa, a poem appended to the 
 Mahabharata, 4S9. 
 
532 
 
 INDEX AND GLOSSARY. 
 
 Hetu, reason ; the second member of 
 a regular argument according to 
 Gotama; the major premiss, ]7J, 
 184. 
 
 Hindu, a word not of Indian origin, 
 not found in the Sastras, 26. 
 
 I. 
 
 Ikshwaku, the first king of the Solar 
 race, 46. 
 
 Ikshwaku Virodhakha, the progeni- 
 tor of the Sakya race. 
 
 I Sana, Lord, lording, a name of Siva, 
 322, 439. 
 
 Ista-devata, the divinity whom any in 
 dividual worships as his own chosen 
 God, 34. 
 
 Iswara, God, Lord. 
 
 Iswarakrishna, author of the Sankhya 
 Karika ; spoke slightingly of the 
 Veda, 7. 
 
 Itihasa, an epic poem held as author- 
 itative among the Brahmins. 
 
 Iti-vritta, a mere narrative, 498. 
 
 Iti, plague, drought, inundation, 
 Sfc [The word appears in a mistak- 
 en form of niriti,] 224. 
 
 J. 
 
 Jabala, mother of Satyakama ; a cha- 
 racter in the Vedas, 56, 
 
 Jaimini, author of the Prior raimansa; 
 his denial of God's providence, 79. 
 
 Janaka, king of Mithila, reputed to be 
 a great saint and sage, though a 
 King, and a Kshetriya 44, 402. 
 
 Janma, birth ; pronounced to be a cala- 
 mity, 18 J. 
 
 Jar&, decrepitude ; one of the evils of 
 life according to Buddha, 201. 
 
 Jarayuja, viviparous, 245. 
 
 Jayadeva, author of the Gita Govinda, 
 a poem full of obscene descrip- 
 tions, 431. 
 
 gisha, desire of victory, 270. 
 ijnasa, desire of knowledge, 270. 
 vatma, the spirit of life, individual 
 souls, 153. 
 
 Jnana-kanda, those sections of the 
 
 Veda which treat of knowledge, 274. 
 
 Jyotishtoma, a particular sacrifice, 478. 
 
 K. 
 
 Kahola, a character in the Vedas, 448. 
 
 Kalidasa, a celebrated poet who lived 
 in the age of Vrikramaditya, 472. 
 
 Kali-yuga, the last or iron age of the 
 world, J. 
 
 Kalpa, the period of the duration of 
 the world, 2 1 4. 
 
 Kama, desire, 203. 
 
 Kanada, author of the Vaiseshika (su- 
 tras,) a branch of the Nyaya. 
 
 Kansa, king of Mathura, represented 
 as an enemy of God and the Brah- 
 mins, 24. 
 
 Kapila appertaining to Kapila, a fol- 
 lower of Kapila ; one of the interlo- 
 cutors in this book. 
 
 Kapila, author of the Sankhya sutras ; 
 spoke slightingly of the Veda, 7, 
 denied the existence of God, 66, 
 251. 
 
 Karma, works, the merit of works ; 
 hence destiny, 141, 184, 48, 206, 
 273, 324,. 
 
 Karma kanda, those sections of the 
 Vedas which treat on works, 2, 4. 
 
 Karmika, those who rely on works, 
 524. 
 
 Kshetriya, the second or warrior caste 
 among the Hindus. 
 
 Kasi, a native name of Benares- 
 
 Kasyapa, a sage, the father of the im- 
 mortals. The son of Kasyapa p. 36, 
 means the sun. 
 
 Kausitaki, one of the sections of the 
 Vedas, 343. 
 
 Khanda, in Buddhistic vocabulary, 
 the elements. 
 
 Kshatra, in Buddhistic vocabulary, a 
 Kshetriya, a person of the second 
 or warrior caste, 205, 
 
 Kikata, a country mentioned in the 
 Vedas, 464. 
 
INDEX AxND GLOSSARY. 
 
 533 
 
 Kokila, the cuckoo, 
 
 Kshetra. a field, a site, a body, 48S. 
 
 Kulluka Bhatta, a celebrated commen- 
 tator on the institutes of Manu, 
 4S7. 
 
 Kumkura, saflfron, 2)0. 
 
 Kurauda, a flower that opens at night, 
 105. 
 
 Kusula. good, meritorious ; applied by 
 Buddhists to Dharraa, 192, 206. 
 
 L 
 
 Lakshana, sign, 491. 
 Lakshmi, the wife of Vishnu, 75. 
 Lanka, the kingdom of Ravana ; 
 Ceylon, 45. 
 
 M. 
 
 Madhuchhanda, ( ne of the old Vedic 
 Rishis, 7' 
 
 Maghavan, Indra, 491- 
 
 iVlahapralaya, the great dissolution, or 
 end of the world, ]. 
 
 Mahat, great ; so Intelligence or the 
 first created principle in the Sankhya 
 philosophy is called, 68- 
 
 Mahavakya, a great saying; the pan- 
 theistic dogma ' thou art He' is so 
 called, 376. 
 
 Maheswara, a follower of Maheswara 
 or Siva, 270, 439- 
 
 Maheswara, great god, a name of Siva, 
 322. 
 
 Malati, a creeper that bears a sweet 
 flower, 105. 
 
 Man, mind, 3S5. 
 
 Mangalacharana, auspicious particles 
 or words or sentences at the com- 
 mencement of a work, 158. 
 
 Manomaya, all-mind, purely mental, 
 434. 
 
 Mantra, a hymn, an incantation. 
 
 Manu, the celebrated Rishi who wrote 
 the Institutes called after his name. 
 J6, 459. 
 
 Manzal, a day's journey, 21. 
 
 Maranara, death, one of the evils of 
 life, 201. 
 
 Marut, a species of gods, attendants 
 
 on Indra, 491. 
 Matsya. one of the Puranas or mytho- 
 
 logical poems ; speaks of a triad of 
 
 gods under the title of one form and 
 
 three gods, 241. 
 Maya, illusion, delusion, imposition, 
 
 83, 85, 27], 307. 309, Zlg, 313, 314, 
 
 316, 3)9, 322, 323,325, 409. 
 Mayi, a conjurer, one that practises 
 
 Maya, S74. 
 Medhatithi, a commentator on Manu, 
 
 4S7. 
 Meru, a mountain at the North pole 
 
 where the gods are supposed to 
 
 reside, \5^, 371. 
 Mimansa, decider, one of the schools 
 
 of Brahrainical philosophy. 
 Mitra, one of the gods invocated in the 
 
 Vedas, the sun, 491. 
 Mletcha, a barbarian, one not a Hin- 
 doo, 177- 
 Mukti, freedom from transmigration, 
 
 emancipation, 307. 
 Mumukshu, one that is desirous of 
 
 liberation, ISO, 269- 
 
 N. 
 
 Nachiketas, son of Vajasravasa who 
 was delivered to Yama or death by 
 his father, 214. 
 
 Naga, a species of serpents celebra- 
 ted as demi-gods, 206. 
 
 Naichasakha, a town spoken of in the 
 Vedas, 464. 
 
 Narada, a divine Rishi, 204. 
 
 Narayana, a name of Vishnu, the 
 Supreme Being, 4S9. 
 
 Nasatyas, the twins Aswins 491. 
 
 Nigamana, the fifth member of a re- 
 gular argument according to Go- 
 tama, the conclusion, 171. 
 
 Nigban, Burmese and Singalese cor- 
 ruption of the ward Nirvana, I97. 
 
 Nigraha sthana, not to be admitted on 
 the field of argument, unfit to be 
 argued with, 348, 462. 
 
534 
 
 INDEX AND GLOSSARY. 
 
 Nirakara, without form or shape, 27 i. 
 
 Nirguna, devoid of qualities, 410. 
 
 Nirisvvarrt, godless, 153. 
 
 Nirvana, extinction, freedom from 
 transmigration 196, 197, 200, 201, 
 205, 217. 
 
 Nisreyasa, the chief good, emancipa- 
 tion, ISl. 
 
 Nissanga, without attachment, 253. 
 
 Nodhas, one of the authors of Vedic 
 hymns, 490. 
 
 Nyaya, one of the six schools of Brah- 
 minical philosophy ; its close resem- 
 blance to Buddhism, 191. 
 
 Nyayaratna, jewel or ornament of the 
 Nyaya, one of the interlocutors in 
 this book. 
 
 0. 
 
 Om, a mystical syllable, 4S9. 
 
 'p. 
 
 Pada, a quarter, a fourth part, 327. 
 
 Pali the sacred language of Singalese 
 Buddhists. 
 
 Panchikarana, the formation of a spe- 
 cific atom in the composition of the 
 animal body, 161. 
 
 Panda, a priest of a public temple, 21. 
 
 Pandava, a son of Pandu. 
 
 Pandu, a celebrated king, brother of 
 Dhritarastra and father of Yudhis- 
 thira. 
 
 Para, excellent, 
 
 Paramapurushartha, the chief end of 
 man, 179. 
 
 Paramarthika, real, 3S8, 391, 396. 
 
 Paramatma, the supreme Spirit, J 53. 
 
 Parartha, for the sake of another, with 
 a view to another, J 75 
 
 Parikshit. grandson of Arjuna, heir 
 of the I'andavas, 383. 
 
 Parinama-vada, the theory of the crea- 
 tor being changed into the crea- 
 tion, S3. 
 
 Parusarama, a Brahminical hero who 
 is said to have extirpated the Kshe- 
 triyaa, 47. 
 
 Parvati, fabled as the daughter af 
 Mount Himalaya, wife of Siva, 75, 
 3*23. 
 
 Patanjali, author of the Yogasutras, 68, 
 69. 
 
 Pinaka, bow of Siva,323. 
 
 Pingala, 261. 
 
 Prabhakara, a follower of the school 
 of Jaimini, 477. 
 
 Prabhu, Lord, master, S85. 
 
 Pradhana, chief, spoken of nature as 
 the first cause of all things accord- 
 ing to the Sankhya, 323. 
 
 Pradyumna, a son of Krishna; one of 
 the forms of the Supreme Being ac- 
 cording to the Bhagavatas, 277. 
 
 Prahara, one quarter of the day or 
 night, 400. 
 
 Prajapati, the Lord of the creation, 
 Brahma, 46 ^. 
 
 Prakriti, nature, 323. 
 
 Pralaya, a dissolution of the world, 
 210. 
 
 Prama, true knowledge, J71, 178. 
 
 Pramana, proof, an instrument of true 
 knowledge, 1 78, 178. 
 
 Praraangada, a proper name in the 
 Vedas, 464. 
 
 Pranama5'a, all vital air, 434. 
 
 Pranidhana, contemplation, 69. 
 
 Pratijna, the first member of a regular 
 argument according to Gotama, the 
 question, J71- 
 
 Pratiyogi, something which is incom- 
 patible with its correlative, 183. 
 
 I'ratyaksha, perception, 248. 
 
 Pravahani, a proper name in the Ve- 
 das, 464. 
 
 Pravritti, activity, motive, ISI, 182, 
 183, 185. 
 
 Prayojana, end, object, aim, final 
 cause, 55. 
 
 Punyabhumi, holy land, so the Hin- 
 dus called their country, Hindus- 
 tan proper, J 6. 
 
 Purana, a mythological poem. 
 
INDEX AND GLOSSARY. 
 
 535 
 
 Parurava, a king in whose age there 
 
 became for the first time three Ve- 
 
 das, 489. 
 Puruscharana, name of a ceremony 
 
 performed on the occurrence of an 
 
 eclipse, 395. 
 Purusha, a male, a person, soul, 230, 
 
 254, 439, 4 16, 449, 254, 255. 
 Purushottaraa, the excellent personal 
 
 being, so Jagannatha was called; 
 
 hence the land of Jagannatha, Poo- 
 
 ree, 21. 
 Purvapaksha, the opposUe party in 
 
 an argument, 118, 4S9. 
 Purvavat, a priori, 170. 
 
 R. 
 
 Radha, mistress of Krishna, 516, 517. 
 
 iiadhi, a classification of Bengal Brah- 
 mins, 398. 
 
 Raga, affection, attachment. 
 
 Rajas, the principle of activity, foul- 
 ness, one of. the three qualities in 
 the Hindu philosophy. 
 
 Rakshasa, a demon, an enemy of 
 gods and Brahmins, 202. 
 
 Rama, prince of Ayodhya, son of 
 Dasaratha ; Kills a Sudra for enga- 
 ging in religious exercises, 45. 
 
 Ramagiri, a moanain where l>ama 
 had once halted, 21. 
 
 Ramanandi, a follower of Hama- 
 nand, 426. 
 
 Rasatmaka, full of striking senti- 
 ments, 508. 
 
 Ravana, king of Lanka, vanquished 
 and slain by Rama, 202 439. 
 
 Retas, the seminal fluid, 433. 
 
 Rich, the first of the four Vedas. 
 
 Riransa, a desire of sensual enjoy- 
 ment, 214. 
 
 Rishi, a Brahminical sage considered 
 to be infallible. 
 
 Rudra, fierce, a name of Siva, 322, 439- 
 
 s. 
 
 Sabda-kalpa-druma, an encyclop®- 
 
 dia, 470. 
 
 Sabdarasi, a collection of words, 496. 
 
 Sacti, power, energy ; the deified female 
 principle in Hindu mythology, 57, 
 
 Sadananda, a modern Vedantist, author 
 of the Vedanta-sara, 434. 
 
 Sadhya-sama, equal to the thing to be 
 proved, a petitio principii, 425, 473, 
 472. 
 
 Sagara, one of the kings of the Solar 
 race, 62. 
 
 Saguna, endowed with qualities, 427. 
 
 Sahaja-jnana, natural knowledge, 451. 
 
 Sahasa, boldness, 143, 200. 
 
 Saiva, a follower of Siva, 322. 
 
 Saivya, wife of Raja Harischandra, 214. 
 
 Sakshi, witness, 323. 
 
 Sakya, the race from which Buddha 
 sprang, who was thence called Sakya 
 Muni, Sakya Sinha. 
 
 Sakya-sinha, the Lion of the Sakya 
 race, a name of Buddha. 
 
 Samadhi, deep meditation, in Bud- 
 dhistic philosophy, as also in the 
 Brahminical, the state immediately 
 preceding Nirvana, 374, 275. 
 
 Saman, the third of the four Vedas. 
 
 Samashti, coUectiveness, 163. 
 
 Samavaya, substratum. 
 
 Sambuka, a Sudra put to death for 
 engaging in religious excercises, 55. 
 
 Sampat, attainment, when a thing falls 
 into a state in which it was not from 
 the beginning, 396. 
 
 Samvarga-vidya, the science of Reso- 
 lution ; resolution of things into the 
 atmosphere, .377. 
 
 Sanatana, everlasting, 32. 
 
 iiandhya, prayers which the Brahmins 
 utter three times a day, 5. 
 
 Sandilya, a Rishi whom Sankaracharya 
 rebukes for teaching other ways of 
 salvation than those propounded in 
 the Vedas, 274. 
 
 Sankaracharya. an eminent commen- 
 tator on the Vedant sutras and the 
 Upanishads. 
 
536 
 
 INDKX AND GLOSSARY. 
 
 Sankarshana, a brother of Krishna, one 
 of the four forms of the Supreme 
 Being according to the Bhagavatas, 
 277. 
 
 Sankhya, one of the six systems of 
 Brahminical philosophy ; the school 
 of Kapila, its absolute denial of God, 
 66, 25, 222. 
 
 Sansara, the world, an assemblage 
 of evils, 185. 
 
 Sanskara, habit, ideas, 294. 
 
 Saririka-mimansa-bhashya, the com- 
 mentary or paraphrase of the Ve- 
 dant by Sankaracharya. 
 
 Sdstra, that by which faith and practice 
 are governed; used of the Vedas 
 and other authorized scriptures of 
 the Brahmins. 
 
 Sastra, weapons, 2. 
 
 Sat, being, present participle of as, 
 to be. 
 
 Satapatha, one of Brahmanas of the 
 Vedas 4S6. 
 
 Satyakama, a lover of truth, the princi- 
 pal speaker in this book. 
 
 Satya-yuga, the first or golden age of 
 the Brahmins, 1. 
 
 Saumya, gentle, 4 IS. 
 
 Savitri, Gayatri 4S7. 
 
 Sayana, a commentator on the Vedas, 
 459. 
 
 Seshavat, a posteriori, 170. 
 
 Sesyvara, possessing God, theistical, 
 86. 
 
 Seva-dasi, a ministermg slave, 3S5. 
 
 Shad-darsana, the six schools of Hindu 
 philosophy. 
 
 Sita, wife of Rama, 203. 
 
 Siva, one of the three principal gods 
 of the Brahmins, 439. 
 
 Siva, wife of Siva, 76, 439. 
 
 Smriti, recollections of Rishis versed 
 in the Vedas. 
 
 Sreni, class, 399- 
 
 Sruti, that which has been beard ; the 
 Veda. 
 
 Strabo, his remark on the five ele- 
 ments of the Brahminical philoso- 
 phy, 241. 
 
 Sudder Court, the highest appellate 
 Court in any presidency. 
 
 Sudhodhana, father of Buddha, 202. 
 
 Sudra, the lowest caste among the 
 Hindus. 
 
 Suka, a Rishi, the narrator of the Sri 
 Bhagavata, 3S3. 
 
 Sukta, a hymn of the Vedas, 466. 
 
 Suparna, a fabulous bird, 206. 
 
 Suryakanta, bright as the sun, name 
 of a precious stone mentioned in 
 Brahminical literature. 360, 
 
 Sushka-tarka, a dry argument, 164. 
 
 Sutra, aphorism. 
 
 Suvarga, an old Vedic word for hea- 
 ven, 21s, 517. 
 
 Suvarna, gold, 417. 
 
 Swabhava, nature, 324 
 
 Swabhavica, natural ; a sect of Bud- 
 dhist philosophers who accounted 
 for all things by the laws of nature, 
 334. 
 
 Swadharma, one's own Dharma, duty, 
 or religion, 25. 
 
 Swarga, heaven, 417- 
 
 Swarna, gold, 417. 
 
 Swartha, for one's own self, l75. 
 
 > Swayambhu, self-existent, 165. 
 
 \ T. 
 
 I Tan, body, 385. 
 
 > Tanmatra, subtle, only itself, QS. 
 
 \ Tantra, a portion of the Hindu sastra, 
 \ addressed by Siva to his wife Par- 
 
 \ vati. 
 
 > 
 
 \ Tapasya, religious exercises, medita- 
 \ tion, austerity, 4t. 
 i Tasma^ thence, from it or him, 558 
 I Tat, it, 408. 
 
 > Tathastu, so be it! 218. 
 
 \ Tattwa-vichara, discussion of truth, 
 \ 244. 
 
 \ Tilanga, a native of Tilanga in the 
 i South of India, the first levies in 
 
INDEX AND GLOSSARY. 
 
 537 
 
 the East India Company's arnt^y 
 were in that country, hence all se- 
 poys are called by that name, 2 
 
 Trasarenu, a tertiary, or compound of 
 8ix atoms, 155. 
 
 Trishna, thirst, desire, 20l 
 
 Twam, thou, 408. 
 
 U. 
 
 Udaharana, example, the third mem- 
 ber of a regular argument according 
 to. Gotama, the minor premiss, 171. 
 
 Udasin, a stranger, one that takes no 
 interest in any thing, 66. 
 
 TJdayachala, the mountain of rising, 
 the eastern mountains, 395, 
 
 Upalabdhi, apprehension, perception, 
 296. 
 
 Upamana, analogy, one of the four 
 instruments of knowledge accord- 
 ing to Gotama, 65. 
 
 Upanaya, the application, the fourth 
 member of a regular argument ac- 
 cording to Gotama, the repetition of 
 the reason or major premiss, 17J. 
 
 Upanishad, sections of the Veda which 
 set forth the doctrine of Brahma. 
 
 Ushma, a sibilant letter, 489- 
 
 Ushusta, a character in the Vedas, 448. 
 
 Uttara mimansa, the latter miraansa, 
 the Vedanta. 
 
 V. 
 
 Vac-chhala, artifice in words, 220. 
 
 Vachaspati, a theistic commentator 
 on the Sankhya, 256. 
 
 Vaidurya, a precious stone spoken of 
 in Brahminical writings, 360. 
 
 Vaiseshika, one of the six systems of 
 Brahminical philosophy ; the atomic 
 system of Kanada. 
 
 Vaishnava, a follower of Vishnu. 
 
 Vaisya, the third or mercantile caste 
 among the Hindus. 
 
 Vaiyasika, appertaining to Vyasa, a 
 follower of Vyasa : one of the inter- 
 locutors in this book. 
 
 . Vajasravasa, son or descendant of 
 
 Vajasrava, 466. 
 < Valraiki, the author of the Ramayana. 
 J Varendra, a classification of Bengal 
 ) Brahmins, 398. 
 
 I Varuna, one of the gods in the Vedas, 
 I the god of water 491 
 I Varuni, a bathing festival, l.i9 
 } Va^istha, a Rishi spoken of in the 
 I Vedas, the domestic priest of Dasa- 
 ratha and other solar kings, 40. 
 Vasu, one of the gods, wealth, 467. 
 Vasudeva, the son of Vasudeva ; 
 
 Krishna, 272. 
 Veda, the original sacred literature 
 of the Brahmins ; conflicting ac- 
 counts of its production, 486 — 489, 
 its own admissions of human 
 authorship, 490 491. 
 Vedant. one of the six systems of 
 Brahminical philosophy ; the pan- 
 theistic school. 
 Vedanta-vruva, one who calls himself 
 a Vedantist but is not so in truth, a 
 pseudo-Vedantist, 386. 
 Vidyarthi, a student, 269. 
 Vigraha, body, form, 27 J. 
 Vijnana, knowledge, cognition, ideas, 
 
 296. 
 Vijnana-vada, the theory of cogni- 
 tions, the ideal theory, 313 
 Vijnanamaya, essentially possesed of 
 knowledge all knowledge, all-cog- 
 nition 434. 
 Vikramaditya, a king of Ougein who 
 
 lived 50 years before Christ, 472. 
 Vishnu, one of the three principal gods 
 
 of the Brahmins, 
 Viswamitra, a Rishi, born of a Kshe- 
 triya race but promoted to the 
 Brahminical for his sanctity, 7, 44, 
 Visweswara, the lord of the world, 
 proper name of one of the forms of 
 Siva at Benares ,2]. 
 Vitra, a giant destroyed by Indra, 465. 
 Vivarta-vada, a pantheistic theory 
 
 3 z 
 
538 
 
 INDEX AND GLOSSARY. 
 
 which speaks of God as the material 
 or substantial cause of the world, but 
 not changed into that modification, 
 83. 
 
 Vritti, explanation, commentary, 215. 
 
 Vyacti, personal manifestation, 47 i- 
 
 Vyapti, pervasion, the distribution of 
 the middle term, 174. 
 
 Vyasa, the author of the Vedant 
 sutras. 
 
 Vyavaharika, appertaining to vyava- 
 
 hara, practice, or custom ; conven- 
 tional, 382, 3S8, 391, 395, 
 
 Y. 
 
 Yantra, an instrument, a machine, 141. 
 
 Yantri, the director of the instru- 
 ment, 141. 
 
 Yatna, effort, 262. 
 
 Yoga, one of the six systems of Brah- 
 minical philosophy, the system of 
 Pantanjali, meditation. 
 
 Yudhisthira, the eldest of the five 
 brothers Pandavas, 1 72. 
 
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