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 AN AMERICAN ISTHMIAN CANAL 
 
 THE CHOICE OF KOUTES. 
 
 SPEECH 
 
 Wm. JOHK T. MORGAN, 
 
 OF ALABAMA, 
 
 SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, 
 
 April 17, 1902. 
 
 i 
 
 ATE UNITED STATES 
 
 PART OF CONG. RECORD- FREE. 
 
 EJMERIGim ISTHMIAN CANAL AND THE 
 L CHOICE OF ROUTES. 
 
 SIE^EEOia: OIF 
 
 Hon. John T. Morgan, 
 
 OF ALABAMA, 
 
 THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, 
 April 17, 1902. 
 
•| Ml l-A "f "01 'I I il'RARY 
 
 SPEECH 
 
 OF 
 
 HON. JOHN T. MORGAN 
 
 NICARAGUA CANAL. 
 
 Mr. MORGAN. If there is no further business before the Sen- 
 ate, I should like to call attention to the notice I gave yesterday 
 that I would request the indulgence of the Senate this morning 
 to make some observations on the subject of the Nicaragua 
 Canal. I ask that the bill be called up simply for that purpose. 
 I do not propose to ask for its consideration this morning out of 
 order. 
 
 The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The bill will be read by title. 
 
 The Secretary. A bill (H. R. 3110) to provide for the con- 
 struction of a canal connecting the waters of the Atlantic and 
 Pacific oceans. 
 
 Mr. MORGAN. Mr. President, there is but one class of enter- 
 prises projected in the United States that is free from the control 
 of private interests and is intended only to promote the general 
 welfare. It is the class of enterprises that, in some form, in- 
 crease and facilitate ocean navigation. Such works are Goyera- 
 ment property and are guarded by every form of legal, judicial, 
 and executive power against the intrusion of private interests. 
 
 All rivers, harbors, bays, and canals that aid the commerce of 
 the country are free from private ownership and are open to the 
 use of the people, upon equal terms. 
 
 This policy can not be reversed as to a ship canal to be con- 
 structed and owned by the United States to connect the great 
 oceans without a breach of public faith. 
 
 Assuming that Congress is ready to undertake such a work in 
 this spirit of sincere devotion to the welfare of the people and to 
 realize the anxious hopes of all, except those who would profit by 
 further delays, I will address myself on this occasion to the ques- 
 tion of the choice of routes for an isthmian canal. It is a ques- 
 tion of the greatest moment, and should be considered carefully, 
 dispassionately, and with impartial sincerity. 
 
 A mistake made in the selection of a canal route which will or 
 may involve the failure of the effort to construct a safe canal 
 will be fatal. 
 
 A route that is safe for the construction and maintenance of a 
 ship canal is the supreme consideration that should control, the 
 selection now to be made by Congress. The interest at stake and 
 the expenditures involved are too great to justify the abandonment 
 of a safe route for the sake of the possible saving of money in a 
 less costly route that is of doubtful safety. 
 
 I wish to present the facts that bear directly upon this subject, 
 not in full detail, but in just outline, for the consideration of the 
 Senate, and will make quotations from the proofs, rather than 
 statements of their substance, in what I now have to say on this 
 subject. 
 
 6163 3 
 
In bringing the subject of an istlimian canal to the attention of 
 the Senate in advance of the consideration of the subject by the 
 vote of this body it is not my intention to discuss the merits of 
 the measure passed by the House of Representatives and reported, 
 without amendment, by the Committee on Interoceanic Canals, as 
 a national or commercial question. 
 
 I will assume that the Senate, without material division of 
 opinion, is convinced that a canal is an indispensable, national 
 necessity, and that the people, with almost complete accord, are 
 demanding it for that reason and for the additional reason that 
 it will remove the obstructions to industry and commerce that 
 have so long chained the right arm of their strength in almost 
 helpless paralysis. 
 
 I also assume that the honest enthusiasm that moved the House 
 of Representatives as one man to vote a second time for the Hep- 
 burn bill was not merely the result of thoughtless rejoicing that 
 the Clayton-Bulwer treaty had been put aside and that the way was 
 at last open to success, but that it was the result of long and mature 
 study of the whole situation, and of a noble and patriotic impulse 
 to accomplish a work that no other people could perform, for the 
 benefit of the world. Blind zeal has never led in such toilsome 
 work, where the dredge, the pick, and the shovel are the instru- 
 ments of winning national honors, instead of the battle ship, the 
 sword, and the rifle. 
 
 It is only a choice of methods and a comparison of national ad- 
 vantages that we are left to decide; all questions of financial 
 ability, of private interests and preferences, of political bias, and 
 other influences and antagonism having been relegated to the 
 rear by the command of a free, honest, and powerful people. 
 
 The honor and the high duty of making this choice now be- 
 longs to Congress. In its performance, on my part, I will not 
 permit any doubtful fact to sway my judgment, nor will I shrink 
 from presenting the whole truth, as I believe it, under the pres- 
 sure of any influence or the bias of preconceived opinions. It is 
 to reach the logical results that should follow the actual merits 
 of the claim of either canal route, in deciding the preference, that 
 I will try to present an outline of the questions that now require 
 discussion. 
 
 In this endeavor I will not attempt to discuss exhaustively any 
 point I may state, but I will present some of the leading points 
 which control my judgment, leaving their more complete presen- 
 tation to others who have studied them with gi-eater care and 
 will discuss them with greater ability than I could bring to their 
 consideration. 
 
 CERTAINTY OV SUCCESS IS THE TRUE FOUNDATION. 
 
 The subject presents itself to my mind with conclusive force in 
 the form stated in the six propositions I will now state: 
 
 1. We have reached the point where investigation is complete 
 by observation, experience, scientific research and forecast, and 
 these means of knowledge are as conclusive of the facts as we 
 could hope to make them in another half century of delay. 
 
 This knowledge of the controlling facts, as to the practicability 
 of a canal through the American Isthmus, satisfies the people of 
 the United States that the time for final action has come. 
 
 2. The question now to be decided is the choice of either of two 
 routes for a canal; whether it shall be located at Panama, or 
 
fhrough the valley of the San Juan River, in Nicaragua and Costa 
 Rica. 
 
 3. The controlling factor in making this selection is the assur- 
 ance of success in constructing a canal that will be permanently 
 useful for commerce, and for the needs of the Government and 
 its policies, and for the benefit of the people of the United States. 
 
 4. A sum of money necessary for expenditure in the work of 
 constructing such a canal, to accomplish such ends, can not be 
 reasonably compared with the real value of the results to the peo- 
 ple and the Government of the United States, and the choice of 
 either route, with safe, intelligent, and sincere regard to its 
 pennanent usefulness and advantage, should not be controlled or 
 affected by a difference in the present cost of construction. 
 
 An assumed or supposititious difference in the cost of construc- 
 tion of either canal that does not exceed $6,000,000 is not a real 
 factor in the choice of either route, if the route that it is cheap- 
 est to build is not the route that will give to the people and Gov- 
 ernment of the United States the most certain assurance of suc- 
 cess in constructing a canal that will be permanent and the most 
 useful for the industrial and commercial needs of the people and 
 the most necessary for the Government in its domestic and foreign 
 relations and its military and civil policies. 
 
 Yet, I will discuss the question of the estimated cost of the two 
 canals, to remove, if I can, the impression that there is a real 
 margin of expenditure in favor of the Panama route, the cost 
 of which is estimated at $184,233,358, if we should purchase that 
 canal and the railroad alongside it, for $40,000,000. 
 
 I will recur to this matter later on. 
 
 5. The assured certainty of success in the construction of a 
 permanent canal is, of necessity, the basic or foundation fact 
 upon which Congress must act in the selection of the canal route. 
 
 Considered as a simple proposition of civil engineering, there 
 is no doubt — not even a shadow of doubt — as to any fact touching 
 the practicability of a ship canal from Grey town to Brito, in and 
 along the San Juan River and across Lake Nicaragua. 
 
 It Is certain, beyond a reasonable doubt, that its cost is as 
 nearly within the limits of exact estimates as any great public 
 work that was ever undertaken. 
 
 As to this fact, there is no difference of opinion among the 
 great number of engineers who have surveyed the Nicaragua 
 route, or the boards and commissions that have studied and re- 
 ported upon it, or the contractors who have examined and counted 
 its cost in every element of calculation with a view to making 
 contracts for its construction, or among the great engineers sent 
 out by European countries to ascertain the feasibility of a pro- 
 posed great highway of the world. 
 
 It is upon this ascertained and settled basis of certainty that I 
 rest my judgment. I have been compelled to accept the conclu- 
 sion that the Nicaragua route is the true and safe route to be 
 adopted by Congress, and when I contrast it with the many and 
 dangerous uncertainties of the Panama route, my judgment will 
 not permit me to cast aside this assured success and this conclu- 
 sive state of facts and, for the possible saving of $5,630,704 in the 
 estimated cost of constructing the canal, to imitate the dog in the 
 fable, in dropping the bone from his mouth to seize its reflected 
 image in the water he was crossing, ^sop's homely fable illus- 
 trates a danger that now threatens this august Senate. 
 
6 
 
 6. If the dam al Bohio, on the Panama route, should fail for 
 any cause, the only hope of a canal across that isthmus would 
 perish, never to be restored. All engineers admit this fact. 
 
 The failure of a dam at Conchuda, or Boca San Carlos or at 
 Ochoa, or at Tambogrande, or at any other site on the San Juan 
 River, would only mean the loss of that structure, to be replaced 
 on a better location if a lake-level canal is preferred. 
 
 A dam at Bohio is the only possible location for such a structure 
 across the Chagres River; while there are many sites for dams 
 across the San Juan River that will raise the water to the level of 
 Lake Nicaragua and give 126.24 miles of lake-level navigation for 
 all classes of vessels. Or if lake-level navigation in the San Juan 
 River should be found impracticable, the resort to slack-water 
 navigation, with low-level dams at its rapids, would substitute the 
 present plan with one scarcely less desirable. 
 
 A SINGLE CHANCE OF SUCCESS IS TOO GREAT A RISK. 
 
 At Bohio there is but a solitary chance to employ the Chagres 
 River for canal pui-poses, and that is shaken with many serious 
 doubts in the minds of the same engineers who assert that no 
 doubts impend over the San Juan route; and on this route there 
 is an assured certainty of using the waters of Lake Nicaragua at 
 many places for the construction of a dam for a permanent canal 
 at the level of the lake. 
 
 These chances are at least ten to one, and if the risk is esti- 
 mated only at tenfold the cost of the dam at Bohio it would deter 
 the boldest gambler in futures from risking the possible loss of 
 more than $80,000,000 when, if he was successful, his profits 
 could not exceed $6,000,000. 
 
 But the loss of a dam at Bohio could not be less than $144,233,- 
 358 clear loss to the United States in cash, to say nothing of the 
 lives wasted in the work, the incalculable loss to our commerce, 
 and the national shame and despair that our people would suffer. 
 
 We are asked to stake too much upon the dam at Bohio, while 
 we will, in all likelihood, if we choose that route, yield to others, 
 either speculative Americans or jealous competitors for trade, the 
 opportunity to seize upon the advantages which we have demon- 
 strated to be certain on the Nicaragua route. That there maybe 
 no rational doubt that the United States has made this demon- 
 stration, at the cost of near $2,000,000, 1 will present the following 
 facts, which are undisputed: 
 
 THE CERTAINTY OF SUCCESS DEMONSTRATED AT NICARAGUA, ACCORDING 
 TO THE UNDISPUTED FACTS. 
 
 The Nicaragua Canal Commission, consisting of Rear- Admiral 
 John Q-. Walker, president; Col. Peter C. Hains, Corps of En- 
 gineers, and Prof. Lewis M. Haupt, civil engineer, a graduate of 
 West Point, was appointed in 1897. The Secretary of State issued 
 final instructions to this Commission on November 3, 1897, closing 
 as follows: 
 
 In other words, 3i;oiir report should be as full and conclusive upon the 
 subject as it is practicable to make it, to the end that "the proper route, the 
 feasibility and cost of construction of the Nicaragua Canal," may, if possible, 
 be absolutely fixed and determined. 
 
 The Commission and its assistants, about 100 men. entered the 
 field of work at Grey town December 5, 1897, and completed 
 their examinations March 20 following, a period of nearly four 
 months, leaving parties in the field at work acquiring addi- 
 tional data. Their report was completed May 9, 1899, and sent 
 
to the President. They were commissioned August 2, 1897, and 
 were closely engaged in this work until May 9, 1899 — a period of 
 one year and nine months. Their report has not been equaled by 
 any subsequent report as to carefulness of statement, the breadth 
 of inquiry, the precision of its measurements and estimates, and 
 the clear and frank conclusions at which it arrived. 
 
 They say in their report that they spent five days in Panama 
 " in examining the Panama Canal line, the work being done, and 
 the plans, drawings, and data in the office of the company at 
 Panama." 
 
 The dimensions of the canal in Nicaragua, surveyed and 
 located by this Commission, are as follows: In earth, 150 feet at 
 bottom. In the river, 300 feet at bottom. The canal nowhere to 
 be less than 30 feet deep. The entire cost, with 20 per cent added 
 for contingencies, was estimated by Commissioners Walker and 
 Haupt at $118,133,790, and by Commissioner Hains at $134,818,308. 
 
 In order to get this important report fairly before the Senate 
 and the country, I present the following extracts from the text 
 on pages 42, 43, under the head of "Feasibility," and from pages 
 45, 46, under the head of " Conclusions:" 
 
 FEASIBILITY. 
 
 Under this division of the subject the Commission would respectfully sub- 
 mit that it has failed to find any competent authority that denies the feasi- 
 bility of constructing a canal across Nicaragua. 
 
 Tte feasibility of the canal is conceded for the following reasons: 
 
 1. There are at this date sufficient precedents for ship canals capable of 
 passing the largest vessels, so that any question of the navigation of such a 
 channel is eliminated. 
 
 2. The ability to construct and operate locks of the requisite dimensions is 
 sufficiently established by existing structures on the Manchester and Keil 
 canals, at Davis Island on the Ohio, and at the St. Marys Canal, Michigan. 
 
 3. The possibility of constructing the necessary dams, weirs, sluices, and 
 embankments which shall be sufficiently stable and impermeable to control 
 the water required for navigation, as well as to regulate the floods, is within 
 the resources of the engineering profession and is fully demonstrated by 
 many hundreds of miles of embankments, levees, and dams both at home 
 and abroad. There is no reason to doubt the ability to build them out of 
 native rocks and earth and to give them the required strength and tightness 
 to retain or to discharge the water with safety. 
 
 4. There is no question as to the adequacy of the supply of water for all 
 purposes at all seasons, nor as to its control m times of floods. 
 
 5. Neither is there any doubt with reference to the ability to secure good 
 supporting ground for the trunk of the canal nor suitable sites for locks and 
 dams. 
 
 6. The harbor question is only a matter of money, and it is believed that 
 good, capacious, and safe artificial harbors can be created at a reasonable 
 cost. In brief, the Commission sees uo reason to doubt the entire feasibility 
 of the project, but it realizes the necessity of exercising due care in the prep- 
 aration for the specifications and in the conduct of the work, and that the 
 details of construction be thoroughly inspected and properly executed under 
 competent supervision. 
 
 CONCLUSIONS. 
 
 The Commission after mature deliberation has adoi)ted and estimated for 
 the route from Brito to Lake Nicaragua, called the Childs route, varient No. 
 1, and from the lake to Greytown,-that is called the Lull route, varient No, 1. 
 This line leaving Brito follows the left bank of the Rio Grande to near Buen 
 Retiro, crosses the western divide to the valley of the Lajas, which it follows 
 to Lake Nicaragua. Crossing the lake to the head of the San Juan River, it; 
 follows the upper river to near Boca San Carlos, thence, in excavation, by the 
 left bank of the river to the San Juanillo, and across the low country to Grey- 
 town, passing to the northward of Lake Silico. It requires but a single dam, 
 with regulating works at both ends of the summit level. 
 
 The new location selected for the dam at Boca San Carlos eliminates one 
 of the most serious engineering difficulties by avoiding entirely the San 
 Carlos River, with its torrential floods and large volume of sediment, and by 
 locking down immediately from this dam the difficulties and risks of the high 
 embankments of the Menocal lino are also avoided. 
 
 Instead of the dam at La Flor a lock and regulating works have been 
 5162 
 
8 
 
 substituted at Bueu Retiro, where the topography is well adapted for the 
 purpose. It is also proposed to divide the surplus waters of the lake basin 
 between the east and west sides, thus reducing the velocities in the San Juan 
 and securing ample waste-way capacity for the maximum discharge that can 
 ever occur, if stored and distributed over a short period of time. Ample 
 provision has also been made for a possible fluctuation of the lake of 6 feet or 
 more without injury to property by fixing the elevation of the bottom of 
 the canal sufficiently low to cover seasons of rainimum rainfall. The sur- 
 veys have in general revealed better physical conditions than were hereto- 
 fore supposed to exist, especially as to the amount of rock in the upper river, 
 whereby it is possible greatly to reduce the estimated cost of construction. 
 This fact will account largely for the comparatively moderate amount of 
 the estimate when the enlarged dimensions of the project are taken into 
 consideration. Other reductions are due to the improved methods and ma- 
 chinery available, as developed on the Chicago Drainage Canal, and which 
 can not be ignored in discussing a work of this magnitude. 
 
 The creation of sufficiently capacious interior harbors presents no unusual 
 difficulties, and they can be secured at a reasonable cost. 
 
 The field work, under the authority of this Commission, has been carefully 
 and well done, and is believed to be aU that is necessary for the preliminary 
 location of a canal, and to determine, within narrow limits, the final location 
 of dams, locks, and other constructions. Should a canal across Nicaragua 
 be authorized it will be necessary to make further minute and careful inves- 
 tigations by borings to determine the exact location of locks and dams, for 
 wnich the Commission has neither the time nor money, nor would it have 
 been justified in doing work of this character until the construction of a canal 
 was assured. The computations of amounts to be excavated have been care- 
 fully made and checked to guard against errors and are believed to be ac- 
 curate within narrow limits. All possible information has been sought with 
 regard to cost of similar work in the United States and in Central America, 
 and a careful comparison made of the probable differences between Nica- 
 ragua and the United States. 
 
 To determine the proper unit prices for excavation the average of prices 
 actually paid to contractors on the Chicago drainage canal, which represent 
 cost of plant, prices paid for work done, and contractors' profits, were taken. 
 Up to this point the Commission dealt only with facts. To the prices paid at 
 Chicago certain percentages have been added for the difference in location, 
 climate, etc. These percentages are, of course, a matter of judgment, upon 
 which men may honestly differ. But from all the information obtainable by 
 this Commission and after careful consideration, w-ith a desire to arrive at a 
 proper conclusion, those used in the estimate are deemed fair and reasonable. 
 
 In obtaining the estimate for cost of locks the prices actually paid for 
 building the Government locks at the Sault Ste. Marie were taken, and 33 
 
 Eer cent was added for the difference of location. This percentage is be- 
 eved to be ample, as a large part of the expense of constructing the locks 
 will be for material, much of which can be furnished in Nicaragua at the 
 same or only a small advance upon the prices in the United States. 
 
 After giving due weight to all the elements of this important question, and 
 with an earnest desire to reach logical conclusions, based upon substantial 
 lap ts, the Commission believes that a canal can be built across the Isthmus 
 on this route for a sum not exceeding that stated in the estimate. 
 
 The dimensions of the canal proposed are much larger than any heretofore 
 considered, and will be ample not only to meet the present requirements of 
 commerce, but also for many years to come. A navigable channel of smaller 
 dimensions than those proposed, only sufficient for present needs, can be con- 
 structed for a lesser sum, if deemed expedient. 
 
 The more reliable character of the work done in Nicaragua by 
 this Commission than that done at Bohio, in Panama, by the Isth- 
 mian Canal Commission, is shown by the fact that the diamond 
 drill was not used at Bohio, while it was used in all the borings 
 made by the Nicaraguan Canal Commission. 
 
 ADDITIONAL STATEMENTS MADE BY THESE COMMISSIONS IN 1001. 
 
 These three commissioners were also members of the subsequent 
 Isthmian Canal Commission, which was appointed on the 10th of 
 June, 1899. 
 
 They made statements before the Committee on Interoceanic 
 Canals on the 11th of May, 1900, touching their former report, in 
 which Admiral Walker stated, in response to questions, as fol- 
 lows: 
 
 The Chairman. Did you find any reason to depart from the report of the 
 foi-mer Commission on the following subjects? I will state them seriatim: 
 
9 
 
 Under the head of "Feasibility," jou say in the former report: 
 
 "Under this diTision of the subject the Commission would respectfully 
 submit that it has failed to find any competent authority that denies the 
 feasibility of constructing a canal across Nicaragua." 
 
 Have you, since that time, or did your Commission find any authority 
 that denied the feasibility of the canal? 
 
 Admiral Walker. As far as I know the opinions of the members of this 
 Commission, they have no doubt that it is feasible to build a canal across 
 Nicaragua. 
 
 The Chairman. You say: 
 
 "1. There are at this date sufficient precedents for ship canals capable of 
 passing the largest vessels, so that any question of the navigation or such a 
 channel is eliminated." 
 
 Are you still of that opinion? 
 
 Admiral Walker. I am still of that opinion. 
 
 The Chairman. You say: 
 
 "2. The ability to construct and operate locks of the requisite dimensions 
 is sufficiently established by existing structures on the Manchester and Kiel 
 canals, at Davis Island, on the Ohio, and at the St. Mary Canal, Michigan." 
 
 I suppose you might add to that the drainage canal of Chicago? 
 
 Admiral Walker. There are no locks on the drainage canal. 
 
 The Chairman. Do you still adhere to that opinion? 
 
 Admiral Walker. Yes, sir; I amstUl of the same opinion. 
 
 The Chairman. You say: 
 
 3. "The possibility of constructing the necessary dams, weirs, sluices, and 
 embankments which shall be sufficiently stable and impermeable to control 
 the water required for navigation, as well as to regulate the floods, is within 
 the resources of the engineering profession and is fully demonstrated by 
 many hundreds of miles of embankments, levees, and dams, both at home 
 and abroad. There is no reason to doubt the ability to build them out of the 
 native rocks and earth and to give them the required strength and tightness 
 to retain or to discharge the water with safety." 
 
 Do you stUl adhere to that opinion? 
 Admiral Walker. Yes, sir. 
 The Chairman. You say again: 
 
 4. "There is no question as to the adequacy of the supply of water for all 
 purposes at all seasons, nor as to its control in time of flood." 
 
 Do you still adhere to that opinion? 
 
 Admiral Walker. I am still of that opinion. 
 
 The Chairman. That is the principal factor in the canal business, is it not? 
 
 Admiral Walker. Those are pretty large factors; yes, sir. 
 
 The Chairman. You say further: 
 
 5. "Neither is there any doubt with reference to the ability to secure good 
 supporting ground for the trunk of the canal nor suitable sites for locks and 
 dams." 
 
 Do you still adhere to that view? 
 
 Admiral Walker. I think that they can be found; yes. 
 
 The Chairman. You say: 
 
 6. " The harbor question is only a matter of money and it is believed that 
 good, capacious, and safe artificial harbors can be created at a reasonable 
 cost. In brief, this Commission sees no reason to doubt the entire feasibility 
 of the project, but it realizes the necessity of due care in the preparation of 
 the specifications and in the conduct of the work, and that the details of con- 
 struction be properly executed under competent supervision. Do you adhere 
 to that?" 
 
 Admiral Walker. Yes, sir. 
 
 On that examination General Hains stated as follows: 
 
 The Chairman. General Hains, you were a member of the former Lud- 
 low commission, were you not? 
 
 Colonel Hains. No, sir; of the Walker Commission. 
 
 The Chairman. And you joined in the report, making a qualification of 
 your estimate of the cost? 
 
 Colonel Hains. Yes, sir. 
 
 The Chairman. You placed it above that of the other two associate com- 
 missioners? 
 
 Colonel Hains. Yes, sir. 
 
 The Chairman. You went out and made an examination of the Nicai-agua 
 Canal again, did you, with the board? 
 
 Colonel Hains. Yes, sir. 
 
 The Chairman. Have you any change to make showing a change of opin- 
 ion on your part as to the feasibiUty and practicability of the Nicaragua route? 
 
 Colonel Hains. No, sir. 
 
 Professor Hanpt made the following statements: 
 
 Professor Haupt. I did not accompany the Commission to Nicaragua ox* 
 Panama. 
 5162 
 
10 
 
 The Chairman. So that your personal knowledge on the subject is such 
 as you derived Then you went there with the former Walker Commission? 
 
 Professor Haupt. Yes, sir. 
 
 The Chairman. Have you made a study of this subject since you were 
 out on that Commission— a close study of it? 
 
 Professor Haupt. I have, sir, as far as the data were available. 
 
 The Chairman. Have you looked over the reports of the Walker Com- 
 mission recently? 
 
 Professor Haupt. No, sir; I have not revised them smce publication. 
 
 The Chairman. From what you have heard the other engineer say here 
 to-day, and from what you know of your personal examinations of the Nica- 
 ragua route, have you changed your opinions as expressed in that report? 
 
 Professor Haupt. I have not, sir. 
 
 The Chairman. You see no reason for changing your opinion? 
 
 Professor Haupt. No, sir. 
 
 The Chairman, Have you ever examined the Panama route? 
 
 Professor Haupt. Yes, sir. The Walker Commission went over the route 
 carefully and made a reconnoissance during the first Commission. 
 
 The Chairman. What length of time did you spend there? 
 
 Professor Haupt. We spent there about a week, and had every facility 
 that could be offered us by the railroad company, as well as the canal com- 
 panv, for the purpose. 
 
 The Chairman, In what year was that? 
 
 Professor Haupt. That was in the year 1898, in the winter. 
 
 The Chairman. While the new company were at work? 
 
 Professor Haupt. Yes, sir. 
 
 The Chairman. Did you see forces at work while you were there? 
 
 Professor Haupt. They had about 3,000 men at work, it was claimed. 
 
 The Chairman, What part of the Panama Canal did you examine while 
 you were out there? 
 
 Professor Haupt. The entire route of the line of the canal, extending from 
 Panama to Colon. 
 
 these statements again confirmed in 1900 AND 1901. 
 
 On the 30th of November, 1900, the Isthmian Canal Commission, 
 in their preliminary report to the President, recommended the 
 Nicaragua route as " the most practicable and feasible route for a 
 canal to be under the control, management, and ownership of the 
 United States." 
 
 A year later, in their final report to the President, the Isthmian 
 Canal Commission again recommended the Nicaragua route as the 
 most practicable and feasible. 
 
 This should establish the leading and foundation fact on which 
 the action of Congress may safely rest, that in Nicaragua there is 
 a route that is assuredly feasible and practicable, and that if one 
 plan of construction or one line of location of the canal should 
 fail another location will be readily found to substitute it, or other 
 dams can be built to supply the loss. 
 
 In the loss of a dam at Bohio the canal is lost; but if the dam 
 at Conchuda is lost, the canal is only delayed. 
 
 On page 161 of their report the Isthmian Canal Commission 
 say that— 
 
 A dam across the San Juan River at Machuca Rapids could be built more 
 quickly and would cost much less than at Conchuda or any Other point be- 
 low Machuca; but a canal in the San Juan Valley, between Conchuda and 
 Machuca, would be very expensive on account of the hilly chai'acter of the 
 country. 
 
 These places are about 10 miles apart. 
 
 As to the one vital point in the Panama Canal, the dam at 
 Bohio, and as to the dam at Conchuda, on the Nicaragua route — 
 that being one of several dam sites on the San Juan River that 
 are entirely practicable — Admiral "Walker, in his examination 
 under oath by the committee, made the following statements: 
 
 Senator Harris, The fact is with regard to the Bohio Dam that the future 
 of that is just as much an unknown quantity as the future of the dam at 
 Conchuda? 
 
 Admiral Walker. I should say it was more of an uncertain feature. It is 
 
11 
 
 a great work and a more diflS^cult work to build. The Conchnda Dam I look 
 upon as practically settled. 
 
 Senator Harris. So that we know no more about the possibilities and con- 
 tingencies at Bohio than we do at Conchuda— in fact, less? 
 
 Admiral Walkkr. We know less about the contingencies at Bohio, but 
 that is the only point in the whole line about which we are at all uncertain. 
 
 Senator Harris. But that is the vital point? 
 
 Admiral Walker. That is the vital point. Yes; it is vital to the canal, 
 because the safety of the canal depends on the integrity of the dam in both 
 
 Senator Harris. And the control of the river? 
 Admiral Walker. Yes. 
 
 And on page 463 lie stated as follows: 
 
 The Chairman. Do you remember any point or fact upon which you have 
 changed your opinion with regard to this work from the beginning— from 
 the time you first went to look at it— any point of fact upon which you have 
 changed your opinion? 
 
 Admiral Walker. Well, that would be pretty hard to answer. I went 
 into the thing with my sympathies and prejudices, as far as I had any, in 
 favor of the Nicaragua line, but I endeavored to take hold of this question 
 with a mind open to proof. 
 
 The Chairman. I have no doubt that is so, but I want to know whether 
 you have changed your mind upon any fact. 
 
 Admiral Walker. I have changed it to this extent, that I now think that 
 the best line is the Panama line, if that is a fact. That is an opinion; I do 
 not think it a fact. 
 
 The Chairman. In an engineering sense? 
 
 Admiral Walker. Yes; in an engineering sense. 
 
 The Chairman. Well, you come to that conclusion without changing any 
 facts in your former statements? 
 
 Admiral Walker. Yes. 
 
 The Chairman. Your judgment is convinced that you were in error in 
 the first statement? 
 
 Admiral Walker. No, sir; not at all. I have not changed my mind a 
 particle. 
 
 The statement of Professor Haupt, who was a member of the 
 Nicaragua Canal Commission, and also of the Isthmian Canal 
 Commission, on the point of the assurance of success on the two 
 routes is as follows: 
 
 Senator Harris. The entire safety and elSciency of the canal in each case 
 depends on the dam ? 
 
 Mr. Haupt. Unquestionably. There is no dam on the western slope in 
 either project, for the reason that the inclosing locks and their retaining 
 walls constitute the retaining wall for the water on the west side of the sum- 
 mit levels, so that the question of dams there is not involved. 
 
 Senator Hanna. That is slack water. 
 
 Mr. Haupt. Yes; for the summit level. 
 
 The Chairman. Now, the miestion that you just answered of Senator 
 Harris's relates to a plan in which one dam is held to be sufficient on the 
 Nicaragua route and one dam on the Panama route, does it not? 
 
 Mr. Haupt. It does; yes, sir. 
 
 Senator Hanna. Is there any way of which you are aware by which more 
 than one dam could be used or relied upon in the Panama route? 
 
 Mr. Haupt. No, sir. 
 
 The Chairman. With dams at intervals? 
 
 Mr. Haupt. No, sir; there is not. 
 
 The Chairman. In the Childs survey and in the Lull survey there were a 
 number of dams across a single river, f believe. 
 
 Mr. Haupt. Yes, sir. 
 
 The Chairman. Is that a practical method of constructing a canal? 
 
 Mr. Haupt. Entirely so. That would reduce the height of the dam and 
 the pressm-e or head of water and increase somewhat the expense and time 
 of operation. 
 
 Senator Harris. It would requii'e a greater number of locks? 
 • Mr. Haupt. Yes; if the lift is reduced. 
 
 The Chairman. If I remember it con*ectly, there was a dam at each of the 
 rapids? 
 
 Mr. Haupt. A dam at Machuca and one at Castillo, as well as others. 
 
 The Chairman. So that it is in an engineering sense practicable to build 
 a canal on the San Juan River with several dams? 
 
 Mr. Haupt. It is; yes, sir. 
 
 The Chairman, whereas that is not practicable on the Panama route? 
 5162 
 
12 
 
 Mr. Haupt. There was a dam proposed at Gamboa in an earlier plan, btit 
 It was found to be impracticable and it was abandoned, and Bobio is balieved 
 to be the only safe dam site of that route. 
 
 The Chairman. I am only asking your opinion as an engineer. 
 
 Gen. Peter C. Hains, who was a member of both commissions, 
 testifies as follows: 
 
 The Chairman. Has Mr. Childs always been regarded by engineers as a 
 good authoi-ity? 
 
 Colonel Hains. Yes. 
 
 The Chairman. Have the accuracy and faithfulness of his surveys ever 
 been questioned? 
 
 Colonel Hains. Wherever we have had occasion to go over the same ground 
 that he went over we have found that his work was generally reliable. 
 
 The Chairman. "Where he established bench marks, youi* surveys corre- 
 sponded? 
 
 Colonel Hains. I do not know whether we found any of his bench marks. 
 I doubt whether any of his bench marks were found at all. It is so long ago 
 that I guess they have all disappeared. 
 
 The Chairman. Is that a practicable canal, that depth and that prism, 
 running in the manner in which he surveyed it, for ships that would draw 
 less than 17 feet of water? 
 
 Colonel Hains. I do not think there is any thing impracticable about it. 
 
 The Chairman. Mr. Childs's plan, if I remember it correctly, was for a 
 dam at every one of the rapids of the San Juan River. 
 
 Colonel Hains. Yes. 
 
 The Chairman. He took them one after the other and built low dams. 
 
 Colonel Hains. Yes; put low dams in. 
 
 He further states: 
 
 -The Chairman. The length of the canal in the Lull survey is 181.26 miles, 
 according to the report. The prism of the canal in the earth, bottom width, 
 was from 50 to 72 feet, according to conditions and circumstances. 
 
 Colonel Hains. Yes. 
 
 The Chairman. In the rock it was 60 feet, and the depth of the canal was 
 26 feet. The locks were 70 by 400 feet, and there were 21 of them. I forgot 
 to mention that in the Childs survey there were 38 locks. 
 
 Colonel Hains. Different lifts. 
 
 The Chairman. Yes. Now, Lull's estimate was $65,722,147, and his unit of 
 
 § rices for work in rock was §1.25 to $1.50; for earth work 35 cents, and for 
 redging 30 to 40 cents per cubic yard; for embankments 10 cents, and for 
 concrete $8 per cubic yard; for rock under water $5 per cubic yard. "Would 
 that be a practicable canal at that depth, and with that prism, in those 
 waters, across from ocean to ocean? 
 
 Colonel Hains. Yes; if I have this project in my mind correctly. 
 
 The Chairman. Well, now, the Commission of which you were a member, 
 the Nicaraguan Canal Commission— you were a member of that? 
 
 Colonel MAINS. Yes. 
 
 The Chairman. They estimated the length of route at 187.31 miles. You 
 said that you had spent some months in making that survey. 
 
 Colonel Hains. Yes, sir. 
 
 The Chairman. How long? 
 
 Colonel Hains. You mean this last one? 
 
 The Chairman. No, sir; I mean the one that you and Mr. Haupt and Ad- 
 miral Walker were on. 
 
 Colonel Hains. I spent about three months down there. 
 
 The Chairman. About how many engineers did you have under your 
 employment? 
 
 Colonel Hains. I should say from 30 to 50; I don't remember. 
 
 The Chairman. Skilled engineers? 
 
 Colonel Hains. Yes, sir. 
 
 The Chairman. About how many employees were there of all kinds, in- 
 cluding the engineers. 
 
 Colonel Hains. I do not remember. I suppose a couple of hundred— two 
 or three hundred. 
 
 The Chairman. Well, you made a very careful survey, did you not? 
 
 Colonel Hains. Yes. 
 
 The Chairman. One that you are willing to stand on and make recom- 
 mendations on for spending money by the Government? 
 
 Colonel Hains. "Yes. 
 
 The Chairman. And you made a survey on a line of 187.31 miles, and then 
 you had a bottom in earth of 150 feet and you had a bottom in rock of 150 feet 
 and you had a depth of 30 feet. Your locks were 80 feet by 620 feet. Those 
 locks would accommodate 90 per cent of the ships in the world now? 
 
 Colonel Hains. Yes. 
 
13 
 
 The Chairman. Maybe more. Then you had 10 locks, 5 on a side? 
 
 Colonel Hains. Yes. 
 
 The Chairman. The time of passage you did not give, but you had an esti- 
 mated cost of $118,113,790? 
 
 Colonel Hains. No; I did not. 
 
 The Chairman. I mean the Commission did— the majority? 
 
 Colonel Hains. The majority of the Commission did; yes, sir. 
 
 The Chairman. And you dissented? 
 
 Colonel Hains. Yes, sir. 
 
 The Chairman. And you put your price at what? 
 
 Colonel^HAiNS. About $ia5,000,(XX). 
 
 The Chairman. So that the difference between you was between $118,- 
 000,000 and $135,000,000 for that construction? 
 
 Colonel Hains. Yes. 
 
 The Chairman. Now, the unit prices that you adopted were as follows: 
 In rock, $1.03 to $1.30 per cubic yard; in earth, 44 cents per cubic yard; in 
 dredging, 30 to 30 cents per cubic yard, and the embankment you did not 
 make any provision for. You did not make any estimate. For concrete, 
 $7.23, and for rock under water, $5 a cubic yard. Now, was that a good canal? 
 Where did you have your dam? 
 
 Colonel Hains. Was it a good canal? 
 
 The Chairman. Yes; was that a safe, reliable canal? 
 
 Colonel Hains. I think that it was a practicable canal. 
 
 The Chairman. And one that the Government could afford safely and 
 reliably to build, and depend upon it to spend its money? 
 
 Colonel Hains. Yes. 
 
 The Chairman. And one that would stay there after you put it there? 
 
 Colonel Hains. Yes. 
 
 The Chairman. Where did you have your dam? 
 
 Colonel Hains. At Boca San Carlos. 
 
 The Chai km an. How high was it? 
 
 Colonel Hains. I think it was about 113 to 120 feet in the deepest par^ 
 something like that. 
 
 Senator Harris. I have one more general question that I wish to ask you. 
 Is there any engineering work on the Nicaragua line that is not easily within 
 the limits of present engineering experience and knowledge? 
 
 Colonel Hains. On the Nicaragua? 
 
 Senator Harris. Yes. 
 
 Colonel Hains. I think not. 
 
 Senator Harris. There is no work there, either in the way of dams or 
 locks or cuts, that involves any new and untried problems? 
 
 Colonel Hains. No, sir. 
 
 Senator Kittredge. Is there on the Panama? 
 
 Colonel Hains. I do not think there is in Panama, unless it is this dam. 
 
 Senator Harris. Well, I thought we had discussed that, and I will put the 
 additional question and refer to what Mr. Morison says. Mr. Morison thought 
 it involved^ 'new and untried problems," the construction at this dam. 
 
 Colonel Hains. Yes. 
 
 Senator Harris. And you agree with that? 
 
 Colonel Hains. Yes; I agree with that. 
 
 Senator Hanna. Would you consider these untried problems as problems 
 that could not be overcome in engineering? 
 
 Colonel Hains. No, sir. 
 
 Senator Harris. Is there anything now among engineers that is not re- 
 garded as possible, given money enough and time enough? 
 
 Colonel Hains. Very little. 
 
 Senator Hanna. Do you believe generally that the Bohio Dam, as recom- 
 mended by the Commission, can be constructed for the amount of expendi- 
 ture estimated? 
 
 Colonel Hains. Yes; I think it can. 
 
 Senator Hanna. Your part of the work on this Commission was confined 
 to Nicaragua— that is, you were on the committee tiiat examined Nicaragua 
 more specially? 
 
 Col. Oswald H. Ernst states as follows: 
 
 The Chairman. Now, there have been many lines run through Nicaragua 
 along that lino, commencing with the line van by Childs. That was a piece 
 of engineering I have heard very highly applauded by engineers as being 
 
 Colonel Ern.st. Yes. 
 
 The Chairman. And Childs's survey has been taken as the basis of all the 
 subsequent surveys, so far as his route corresponded with others? 
 
 Colonel Ernst. Yes, sir. 
 
 The Chairman. Childs put in a canal there with 17 feet depth of water,a 
 harbor at Brito at the mouth of the little river there. 
 
 Colonel Ernst. The Rio Grande. 
 510 J 
 
14 
 
 The Chairman. No, this way, at the lake— Las Lajas— and then at Grey- 
 town, but the bay was there at Greytown when he made his survey at deep 
 water, and his survey included a slackwater navigation of the San Juan River, 
 with dams at all the rapids— three or four dams— and he took his canal 
 out in the vicinity of the mouth of the San Carlos, somewhere, and carried it 
 through that level country down to Greytown. That was a safe canal, was 
 it not V 
 
 Colonel Ernst. "Well, I do not know about below the San Carlos. I think 
 he would have had trouble below the San Carlos. 
 
 The Chairman. He did not have slack-water navigation below San Car- 
 los, as I remember it. 
 
 Colonel Ernst. My recollection of it is that he had, but I may be mistaken. 
 
 The Chairman. But it was considered that that Would have been a safe 
 canal, if constructed, for ships drawing, say, 1.5 or 16 feat of water? 
 
 Colonel Ernst. Oh, I think so. I think that Childs would probably have 
 changed his lines a little below the San Carlos, but, while I think so, I repeat 
 that I think it was an admirable plan. 
 
 * * * * # * * 
 
 The Chairman. And then after Childs came Lull, and Mr. Menocal was 
 his chief engineer, and they followed Childs's line, and adopted the slack- 
 water system in that survey down to a point near the mouth of the San Carlos 
 River, if I remember correctly, and then took the line through that low 
 
 ground around to Greytown, where there was still a good harbor, or a fair 
 arbor. That canal was 24 or 27 feet deep. I have the data somewhere here, 
 but I have not got it so that I can refer to it just now. That would have been 
 a safe canal, would it not? 
 
 Colonel Ernst. I think so. 
 
 The Chairman. Slack-water navigation. And it would have been a very 
 useful canal to the commerce of the world, would it not? 
 
 Colonel Ernst. I should think it might. 
 
 The Chairman. With ships of the size then in vogue. 
 
 Colonel Ernst. If they had got it done before the ships increased too far. 
 The trouble with all of our great enterprises is that before they are finished 
 they are outgrown. 
 
 THE certainty OP SUCCESS CONriRMED BY ALL, THE COMMISSIONERS AS 
 TO EIVE SEPARATE PLANS SURVEYED AND LOCATED. 
 
 We have surveyed, plotted, located down to the working point 
 five or six canals through Nicaragua, at a cost to us of more than 
 $3,000,000, and we have demonstrated to the world that a canal can 
 be built there for $68,000,000, and I shall be greatly disappointed, 
 if we should take the Panama Canal, if Nicaragua and Costa Rica 
 are not able to find friends enough to build that canal and plank 
 us out of 600 miles of length of line and take away from us our 
 coastwise trade. I should dislike very much to risk as against my 
 Government the energy and enterprise and sagacity of men who 
 built railroads across this continent, when they undertook, if they 
 should undertake to do it, to have a canal also to work in combi- 
 nation with them, and I should doubt very much the enterprise 
 of these Frenchmen, if we should pay them $40,000,000, and they 
 should undertake to build one of these canals, even that located 
 by Childs, by Lull, or by Menocal. 
 
 No member of either of the three commissions expressed a 
 doubt or apprehension as to the certainty of the successful com- 
 pletion of a canal on the Nicaraguan route on either of five plans 
 that have been adopted, surveyed, and located by the greatest 
 engineers in America; from the slack- water plan of Childs, for a 
 canal 17 feet deep', to the mammoth plan of the Isthmian Canal 
 Commission, with a single dam at Conchuda to raise the San 
 Juan River to the lake level, and to give unbroken summit-level 
 navigation from Lock No. 4, which is 46 miles from the 6-fathom 
 curve in the Caribbean Sea, to Lock No. 5, a length of 129.24 
 miles, in which there is only one curve with a radius of 4.045 
 feet, the other 26 curves being greater in radius, ranging from 
 4.297 to 17.189. 
 6102 
 
15 
 
 And no other engineer has seriously questioned the fact that 
 within the limits of a reasonable cost a perfectly feasible and per- 
 manent canal can be constructed on the Nicaragua route. 
 
 MR. COOLEY'S OPINION AND ITS VALUE. 
 
 On the contrary, such an engineer as Lyman E. Cooley, who 
 located and built the great Chicago drainage canal and many 
 other public works, who examined both these routes in 1897-98, 
 in company with other engineers and contractors, with the pur- 
 pose of contracting to build the Nicaragua Canal, states as follows 
 in respect of the certainty of success in constructing a canal on 
 the Nicaragua route. After discussing questions of doubt as to 
 the Panama route, as to which he had fewer engineering objec- 
 tions than some of the Isthmian Canal commissioners, he says: 
 
 The Chairman. Now, how many of these doubts and difficulties, if any, 
 exist on the Nicai*agua route? 
 
 Mr. CooiiEY. Why, there is nothing about the matter as I have outlined it 
 about which I have any doubts. A man in the face of a new problem feels, I 
 imagine, as a general feels in the face of a battle; he does not like it, but he 
 is up against it and he has got to fight it out. So, in regard to my mental at- 
 titude on the Nicai'agua route, I have not nearly as many doubts about the 
 building of a canal at Nicaragua as I had about the Chicago canal before we 
 had actually let the contracts. 
 
 No statements of reports made in respect to this subject are of 
 greater value than those made by this great engineer and canal 
 constructor in his deposition. 
 
 He took what some designate as '• a business view " of the sub- 
 ject, having great practical experience and great ability as an 
 engineer and canal constructor, and no sentimental or official 
 prepossessions to warp his judgment or to color his opinions. 
 
 MR. MENOCAL'S OPINION AND ITS VALUE. 
 
 Mr. Menocal, as the chief engineer of the Lull survey, made the 
 first survey of a canal line at Panama in 1875, and pointed out, 
 measured, and located the line for a lock canal that was adopted 
 by the Panama company and is now adopted by the Isthmian 
 Canal Commission, including the dams at Alhajuela and Bohio. 
 The canal he projected was 24 feet deep and from 60 to 73 feet 
 wide at bottom, with 23 locks. The summit level was 134 feet 
 above sea level and it was 30 miles long. He had previously, in 
 1873, surveyed the Lull canal line through Nicaragua, as chief 
 engineer of that expedition. The dimensions of the canals in the 
 two surveys were only slightly different, so that he had the earli- 
 est opportunity to compare them. 
 
 In 1879 he was appointed a delegate to an international canal 
 congress at Paris, by the President, in company with Admiral 
 Daniel Ammen. At that meeting they pointed out the impossi- 
 bility of maintaining a sea-level canal at Panama, and the ad- 
 vantages of the route through Nicaragua for a canal with locks. 
 
 In 1873, after the Lull survey of a canal at Panama, DeLesseps 
 endeavored to obtain a concession for a canal from Nicaragua, 
 which was refused. He then turned his attention to a sea-level 
 canal at Panama. The warnings of Ammen and Menocal as to 
 a sea-level canal at Panama were disregarded by the congress at 
 Paris in May, 1879, and their verification has proven to be one of 
 the severest financial blows a country ever received. In March, 
 1880, while De Lesseps was visiting the United States and was 
 preparing his campaign of promotion for the sea-level canal, and 
 organizing the "American committee," into whose hands were 
 
 5162 
 
16 
 
 paid 12,000,000 francs, he stated, before a committee of the House 
 of Representatiyes, as follows: 
 
 There were fourteen projects of canals presented at the Paris congress, 
 but the interest has centered entirely in the Nicaragua and Panama routes. 
 As to the Nicaragua Canal, Mr. Menocal gave explanations of it to the com- 
 mittee as he had given to the Paris congress. One of the objections to that 
 route was that it would be necessary first to construct a harbor at Brito, and 
 another objection to it was that it was impossible by that route to make a sea- 
 level canal. If it were determined to build a lock canal, and if there could 
 not be a canal between the two oceans except a lock canal, then there was no 
 doubt that the Nicaragua route was the best route. 
 
 Menocal personally suryeyed both routes more than twenty 
 years ago, and has since made two additional surveys of the Nica- 
 ragua route, one for the United States and the other for the Mari- 
 time Canal Company, besides his survey of the San Juan River 
 and Grey town Harbor for the Government of Nicaragua. 
 
 No living man more thoroughly understands every engineering 
 fact as to the Nicaragua route than he does. And few better un- 
 derstand the Panama route, on which he spent more than three 
 months at work in the field, against two weeks of observation by 
 the engineers of the Isthmian Canal Commission. Professor 
 Haupt, of the Isthmian Canal Commission; Mr. Harvey, who 
 planned and constructed the first locks at the Soo St. Mary's Ca- 
 nal, and made a close study of these routes; Lyman E. Cooley, 
 who has studied both routes, on the ground, by careful inspection 
 and careful examination, both as an engineering and as a '' busi- 
 ness proposition;" Mr. E. D. North, of New York, an eminent 
 engineer; Mr. Trundle, who located the canal lines for the Nica- 
 ragua Canal Commission and for the Isthmian Canal Commission, 
 and Gen. E. P. Alexander, the engineer who located the eastern 
 boundary between Nicaragua and Costa Rica, all these and many 
 more great engineers sustain Mr. Menocal's statement that there 
 is no uncertainty as to the construction of a canal on the Nicara- 
 guan route. 
 
 Mr. Menocal made the following statements in his deposition: 
 
 The Chairman. Now, you seem to be personally familiar with the ground 
 of Panama, and also personally familiar with the ground of Nicaragua. You 
 have stated how many surveys you have made there? 
 
 Mr. Menocal. Yes. 
 
 The Chairman. And how much attention you have given to the subject. 
 Because of the surveys you have made at Nicaragua, have you discovered 
 any point in your surveys which makes it doubtful as to the practicability 
 of a canal there? 
 
 Mr. Menocal. I have not. 
 
 The Chairman. Do you feel certain, as an engineer, that a canal is prac- 
 ticable? 
 
 Mr. Menocal. I do. 
 
 The Chairman. On the Nicaragua River? 
 
 Mr. Menocal. I do. 
 
 The Chairman. Leaving the question of the selection of the lines aside 
 entirely? 
 
 Mr. Menocal. Yes; I do \inder those conditions. 
 
 The Chairman. I ask you, from the survey that you first made down to 
 the last survey that has been made there and reported, including the one you 
 made across the divide, a short line, have you any reason as an engineer to 
 believe that either of those surveys is impracticable? 
 
 Mr. Menocal. I have not. 
 
 Senator Harris. In addition to the fact of your personal knowledge, you 
 are also familiar with the surveys and opinions that nave been made by otner 
 engineers in regard to it? 
 
 Mr, Menocal. Yes. 
 
 Senator Harris. Have you ever heard of any engineer condemning the 
 Nicaragua route as impracticable? 
 
 Mr. Menocal. I have not. 
 
 Senator Harris. My impression has been that it never has been pronounced 
 anything but feasible. 
 
17 
 
 Mr. Menocal. I never heard an engineer condemn it as impracticable. 
 ' There have been several routes 
 
 Senator Harris. Oh, there are variations, of course. 
 
 Mr. Menocal. Yes, variation; but every one of them is practicable. 
 
 Senator Harris. While we are on the Nicai-agua line I would like to ask 
 another question concerning that line. All of these various plans that have 
 been proposed by yourself and all engineers contemplate the use of the up- 
 per part of the San Juan River, practicable for slack- water navigation? 
 
 Ml*. Menocal. Yes. 
 
 Senator Harris. Do yoii not regard the curvature of that upper water of 
 the San Juan under any of the plans that you have examined— that of the 
 Commission most particularly— as impracticable or unsafe in any way? 
 
 Mr. Menocai.. Oh, not at all. There is nothing impracticable in them. 
 They are perfectly feasible. 
 
 Senator Harris. And that it is available for navigation at night with the 
 ordinary electric light? 
 
 Mr. Menocal. Just as well as in the daytime; yes, sir. 
 
 Senator Harris. So that in the thirty-three hours described by the Com- 
 mission as the time of passage will mean thirty-three continuous hours, and 
 not portions of three days as suggested? 
 
 Mr. Menocal. There is no reason why it should not be so. It has always 
 been contemplated by me that the canal would be navigated day and night. 
 
 Senator Harris. The same as the Suez Canal is? 
 
 Mr. Menocal. Precisely, just the same; better than the Suez Canal. The 
 
 Suez Canal goes through shallow lakes also. They have had to excavate 
 
 canals through these lakes, and they navigate the Suez Canal day and night. 
 
 Senator Harris. The channel can be so marked that there is no difficulty 
 
 in navigating it at night? 
 
 Mr. Menocal. No, sir; especially in a country where you have no fogs. 
 
 Senator Harris. They have no fogs? 
 
 Mr. Menocal. No, sir; always a clear atmosphere, day and night. 
 
 Senator Harris. Reverting to the question Vv-e touched this morning a lit- 
 tle, do you think that the minimum or the greatest curvature which is indi- 
 cated by the Commission is such as to permit vessels to move around fi'eely 
 without the use of tugs to assist them? 
 
 Mr. Menocal. I do. 
 
 Senator Harris. And under their own steam? 
 
 Mr. Menocal. Yes. 
 
 Senator Harris. And how is it with sailing vessels through the upper 
 part? 
 
 Mr. Menocal. They will have to be towed, except across the lake, where 
 they can use sails as there is always a breeze on the lake. 
 
 Senator Harris. Of course, in the canal in every case? 
 
 Mr. Menocal. That will be the same in every canal. 
 
 The Chairman. Now, I want to ask, with your knowledge of hydraulic 
 engineering, which is great, with regard to the double flight of locks, which 
 is recommended at Bohio, with a maximum lift of 45 feet each; how does that 
 compare with any other lock that you have knowledge of? 
 
 Mr. Menocal. That is a larger lift than that of any lock that has yet been 
 built. 
 
 The Chairman. There has been no lock built with a lift of 45 feet? 
 
 Mr. Menocal. No, sir. 
 
 The Chairman. Is not the situation complicated by having a double flight; 
 that is, two locks immediately after one another? 
 
 Mr. Menocal. Yes; I think the mechanical difficulties of building a lock of 
 a 45-foot lift will be. overcome, but when you come to put the two locks to- 
 gether the difficulties are increased. 
 
 The Chairman. That of course aggravates the situation? 
 
 Mr. Menocal. Yes; very much. 
 
 preference for the PANAMA ROUTE IS NOT BASED ON ANY DOUBT AS 
 TO THE NICARAGUA ROUTE. 
 
 If the preference given to the Panama route in the supplement- 
 ary report of the Istlimian Canal Commission was based upon any 
 physical or engineering fact, or conjecture, or belief, or opinion 
 that the Nicaragua route is not feasible or practicable, or that it 
 is not safe, useful, or profitable to the people or Government, 
 of the United States, the weight of evidence against such a con- 
 clusion is overwhelming. But such is not the case as to any 
 feature of the subject. The only ground stated for such a prefer- 
 ence is the alleged excess of cost of the Nicaragua Canal, and the 
 cost of maintenance over the cost of completing and maintain- 
 
 5162 2 
 
18 
 
 ing the Panama Canal and its purchase at $40,000,000, which sup- 
 posed gain in such a transaction is estimated at $5,630,704. 
 
 This sum of money, not so great by one-half as we have ex- 
 pended on expositions in the last twenty-five years and less than 
 one-fifth of the sum we have expended for Cuban independence 
 and one-thirtieth part of what we have contributed for trans- 
 continental railroads, is the bonus we are to receive for yielding 
 forever the right already secured, if we choose to accept it, to 
 construct a canal through Nicaragua and Costa Rica, which we 
 have surveyed at a cost of at least $2,000,000. 
 
 WB CAN NOT AFFOBD TO SUBRENDEB THE NICABAGUA BOUTE. 
 
 This is a canal that we have demonstrated to be practicable, 
 feasible, permanent, safe, useful, and necessary to the people and 
 Government of the United States. 
 
 It is a canal route that will pass into other hands and will be 
 constructed, beyond our power to prevent it, unless by the em- 
 plojrment of force and the disgrace of our country. It will be a 
 canal which, in the control of any other power, can be used 
 against us as a heavy handicap on our coastwise trade, or as a 
 sword thrust between our coast line and the right arm of our 
 naval power engaged in protecting the Panama Canal, 500 miles 
 distant. It need not be deeper than 30 feet or wider than 70 feet 
 to accommodate steamers and sailing ships that will take from 
 us the short line between the oceans. 
 
 There ought to be reasons that are imperative to cause us to 
 surrender such a canal for a possible saving of $5,630,704, but 
 there are none that are either imperative or valuable, or that are 
 inviting or well founded. On the contrary, there are facts, stub- 
 bom and inevitable, that block the way to the acquisition and 
 use of the Panama Canal and railroad by the United States, not 
 one of which can be removed by the expenditure of $5,630,704. 
 
 The feasibility, practicability, usefulness, permanence, and 
 commercial value of the Panama Canal to the United States, are 
 all clouded with many doubts, either one of which detracts more 
 than that sum from its value, if there was no other possible route 
 with which it could be compared. 
 
 THE DOUBTS AS TO THE PANAMA BOUTE MUST BE AS COSTLY AS 20 PEB 
 CENT OP THE ESTIMATES BEQUIRED TO CONSTRUCT IT. 
 
 Engineers, when they have measured and completed the work 
 on the canal, including every item of cost within the 20 per cent 
 allowance on unit prices, and for all other contingencies, and have 
 examined their work and called it good, as to the Nicaragua route, 
 can not reasonably ask Congress to estimate the doubts they can not 
 clear up, in advance of actual construction of the canal at Panama, 
 at a rate of less than 20 per cent of the whole cost of that canal. 
 The uncertainty of success, in that case, is quite as great a percent- 
 age of risk as the contingencies of the cost of constniction at 
 Nicaragua. 
 
 On an expenditure of $184,233,358, all of which may be lost, the 
 contingency for doubts, an unknown quantity, at 20 per cent, is 
 $36,846,671, or, if only $40,000,000 is at risk, the 20 per cent con- 
 tingency for doubts is $8,000,000, which sweeps off the proposed 
 gain of $5,630,704. 
 
 The existence of these doubts as to the Panama Canal is a sub- 
 stantial fact, a fact that can not be escaped, and the character of 
 the doubts is such that they can only be resolved by actual ex- 
 
 5162 
 
19 
 
 perience in building, controlling, and maintaining the canal, and 
 not by opinion in advance of construction, no matter what the 
 weight of that opinion may be. 
 
 WHAT ARK THESE DOUBTS? 
 
 Some of the gravest of these doubts, as to engineering results, 
 are admitted to be beyond the limit of all engineering experience. 
 They are the conjectured opinions of enthusiastic engineers, and 
 are not facts ascertained and demonstrated by actual engineering 
 experience. The engineers on the Isthmian Canal Commission 
 all admit that these doubts exist, and that they relate to unknown 
 facts and untried experiments that are of vital importance. As, 
 for instance, is pneumatic work indispensable at Bohio Dam? 
 
 This is scarcely a doubt, yet some of the engineers assert the 
 opinion that it is not indispensable. If it is indispensable, can it 
 be successfully done at Bohio dam? 
 
 All the engineers of the Commission are of the opinion that it 
 can be done, while all admit that it can not be done without 
 serious peril to human life, and all admit that it has never been 
 accomplished under water at a depth of 127 feet. It is a forlorn 
 hope of engineering audacity, and is most likely to find its Water- 
 loo at Bohio. 
 
 Can these conditions be relieved by pumping? Pumping is, of 
 old, the dernier resort of the Panamists. The comite d'estudes 
 of the old company solemnly recommended pumping to supply 
 the canal with water, and now an engineer commissioner recom- 
 mends it to keep the water down to a level that will permit men 
 at work to live under its pressure. Even freezing the Chagres 
 waters around the caissons is coolly hinted at by some as the 
 means of dredging under water at a depth of 127 feet. 
 
 Some of them say it can be relieved by pumping, and others are 
 in doubt. 
 
 All the engineers, outside the Commission, refuse to accept the 
 rock-bottom plan for a dam at Bohio, except General Abbott, and, 
 while he is kindly disposed toward a rock dam if it can be built 
 without too great cost, he prefers the clay dam of the comite 
 technique, which they adopted because they doubted the practica- 
 bility of reaching a rock foundation for the dam at Bohio. 
 
 The Culebra cut is a question of doubt, with its landslides, and 
 creeping clays, and its indurated clay, that melts in water. 
 
 It is left expressly in doubt whether a dam at Alhajuela is 
 necessary to control the floods in the Chagres River, and to sup- 
 ply the canal with water impounded there in reserve for the dry 
 season; but all the engineers think it would be, at least, a good 
 reliance in very dry weather. 
 
 Whether the Chagres River will repeat the floods of 1879 and 
 remove, as it did then, the girders of the great steel bridge on the 
 piers at Baracoa and flood the railroad track and the great 
 swamps to the depth of 10 or 15 feet, and whether in such an 
 event it can be shut out from the canal are matters of doubt. 
 Whether any dam can stand such torrential floods and escape the 
 fate of Johnstown and Austin are questions that only the Chagres 
 River will settle in the course of time. 
 
 A safe harbor at Colon and the safe passage of ships through a 
 submerged channel 3i miles long at Panama when the wind rises 
 and the tide is at the ebb are matters of doubt. They are matters 
 in which doubts are apt to be resolved by destruction, as they have 
 often been resolved at Colon. The abandoned anchors in the 
 
bay of Colon, left there by vessels that could not wait long enough 
 to get them aboai'd when northers drove heavy seas into the shal- 
 low bay, are mute witnesses to the reasons for such doubts. 
 
 All these doubts and many others that relate to the cost of 
 maintenance and the time of transit of ships from our Atlantic 
 to our Pacific ports are resolved by the opinion of a greater num- 
 hev of engineers, of at least equally high authority, against the 
 Panama route. 
 
 These doubts can neither be removed nor compensated for by 
 any sum of money saved in the estimates for a canal. Especially 
 is the sum of $5,680,704 insignificant when compared with these 
 uncertainties. 
 
 The United States can not afford to take such risks in such se- 
 rious matters for a supposititious gain of so small a sum. 
 
 Our people do not price their lives, or the prosperity of the 
 85,000,000 now concerned, or the hundreds of millions who will 
 succeed them, at $5,630,704, saved in a bargain that creates doubts 
 as to the national integrity in the minds of the people of all na- 
 tions, especially the people of France. 
 
 A DOUBT AS TO HEALTH THAT RBSOLVES ALL OTHER DOUBTS AGAINST THE 
 PANAMA ROUTE. 
 
 The health of the Panama route can not be safely classed with 
 the matters of doubt. It is a fixed condition that is in constant 
 warfare with human life. It depends upon natural conditions that 
 are beyond remedy, and as a fatal impediment to a successful 
 gateway for the world it is beyond doubt. 
 
 THE DOUBT IS NOT AS TO ITS PRESENCE AT PANAMA, BUT AS TO THE 
 CHANCES OF ESCAPING IT. 
 
 The constant presence of yellow fever and Chagres fever is not 
 alone due to the filthy condition of the cities of Panama and 
 Colon or to the unclean habits of the people, nor is it due to 
 mosquitoes. These are aggravations of fatal fevers, that make 
 them epidemic, but the seat, the habitat, the permanent home of 
 yellow fever and dengue, or "Chagres fever," is in the city ot 
 Panama and the adjacent coasts. 
 
 From that center they spread through a fostering atmosphere 
 and are transmitted by the constant and close association of a 
 large number of people at work in a narrow space of country 
 along the railroad'and the canal diggings or traveling through 
 it. Spreading from the principal breeding ground at Panama, 
 these fevers permeate the atmosphere of the canal belt and spread 
 through the hot depression leading to Colon, poisoning the people 
 along the entire route, and from these seaports they move out on 
 the ships and attack all other ports. The yellow fever at Panama 
 is hostie humani generis, and all the world can not conquer it. 
 
 The reasons are obvious. They are, certainly, three in number: 
 First. The tide of 20 feet that rushes into the bay twice in twenty- 
 four hours, bearing the refuse of the sea and decaying animal 
 matter and leaving it to rot on the hot beach when it recedes. 
 Second. The exposure of thousands of acres of mud flats to the 
 sun when the tide goes out, to give off their pernicious exhalations. 
 Third. The absence of winds to scatter or take the poisonous ex- 
 halations away from the beach and the Bay of Panama. . 
 
 THE CAUSES ARE NATURAL AND PERMANENT. 
 
 When these natural causes are removed, Panama can be made 
 comparatively as immune from yellow fever as Habana and San- 
 tiago de Cuba appear to be. But they are immovable. 
 
 61fJ2 
 
^1 
 
 The tides at the coasts of Cuba rise to the height of about 20 to 
 86 inches, and leave very small margins of sea bottom when they 
 ebb; while those at Panama rise 18 to 21 feet, and when they go 
 out they leave a naked and vast inclined plane of many square 
 miles, covered with mud and ooze and sea slime, in which shtjll- 
 fish and sea animals abound, to die and decay under a hot sun. 
 The average width of this expo'sed area, around the Bay and Gulf 
 of Panama, is not less than two miles, and when the tide recedes 
 it is uncovered and so remains for twelve hours at least. At night 
 the cooler temperature condenses the poisoned air, and it infects 
 all the coasts of that bay. 
 
 These facts have always been regarded as being so important 
 to the world that they have become a part of the history of the 
 bay and city of Panama. 
 
 A LUGUBRIOUS HISTORY FROM AN OFFICIAL SOURCE. 
 
 The final report of the Isthmian Canal Commission of Novem- 
 ber 30, 1901, treats of the health of the Panama route in the fol- 
 lowing strong, graphic, and just terms. They say, in their final 
 report, page 70: 
 
 The climate of tho isthmian canal regions is generally damp and ener- 
 vating. The temperature is not extreme, rarely i-aising as high as 95° or 
 falling below 70°, but the excessive humidity greatly restricts the capacity for 
 physical exertion. The lowlands along the coast have long been known as 
 insalubrious, and the seaports are subject to fevers. Perhaps the great diffi- 
 culty to b3 encountered in the construction of the canal will ba the procure- 
 ment of an adequate force of laborers, and the preservation of their health 
 and efficiency. 
 
 In this rofcpect the Panama route has a lugubrious history, from which the 
 Nicaragua route is free. The notorious mortality which attended the con- 
 struction of the Panama Railroad and later the operations of the Panama 
 Canal Company has taught a lesson which will not soon be forgotten for that 
 route. Among the white employees of this Commission sent to Nicaragua 
 there were fewer cases of sickness than there would probably have been 
 among the same number of men employed in some parts of the United States. 
 Among those sent to Panama the proportion of sick was greater. On the 
 Nicaragua line during tho operations of the Maritime Canal Company the 
 health of the force was reported to be good. 
 
 This matter is so vital to the commercial world, to our coast- 
 wise line of traffic, to all travelers by way of the canal, and to the 
 health of our seaports, that even this strong statement of the 
 Commission is not a full and sufficient warning of the danger. 
 
 A MORE ANCIENT HISTORY, NOT LESS TRUE. 
 
 Capt. Bedford Pirn, of the British navy, was sent along the 
 Caribbean coast in 1861 to 1865 to ascertain its fitness for canal 
 transit. Speaking of the country traversed by the line of rail- 
 road then in operation, he says: 
 
 The nature of the country through which the line of the road had to be 
 carried was calculatod to strike the hardiest speculator with dismay. 
 
 The first 13 miles from the Atlantic led through deep swamps covered with 
 jungle, full of reptiles and venomous insects. In all muddy places down to 
 the verge of the ocean are impenetrable thickets formed of mangroves, 
 which exhale putrid miasma. Farther on the line runs through a rugged 
 country, over rapid rivers and all sorts of impediments, and after passing 
 the summit, descends rapidly to the Pacific. 
 
 The cUmate was also sultry beyond almost any other part of the world, while, 
 during the wet season the rains descended in a perfect deluge. Moreover, to 
 crown all, the resources of the country were found to bo nil, or nearly so, 
 and consequently everything, especially labor, had to be imported. 
 
 In 1825 Robert B. Pitman published in London "A succinct 
 view and analysis of authentic information extant in original 
 works on the practicability of joining the Atlantic and Pacific 
 oceans by a ship canal across the Isthmus of America." 
 SIGH 
 
In his book lie makes extensive quotations from the books of 
 travel written by men of high reputation as geographers and 
 scientists. 
 
 On page 175, Pitman, a British historian and geographer, gives 
 the following quotation from Dampier: 
 
 I have said before that the bays have a greater quantity of rain than the 
 headlands. The Bay of Panama will furnish us with a proof of this by its 
 immoderate rains, especially the south side of it, even from the Gulf of St. 
 Michael to Cape St. Francis; the rains there are from April to November, 
 but in June, July, and August they are most violent. 
 
 The same author, after giving a description of a distemper 
 which proved fatal to above thirty of his crew, and which he at- 
 tributes to bad water, adds: 
 
 I have observed that in hot countries land floods, which pour into the chan- 
 nels of rivers about the season of the rains, are very unwholesome, for 
 when I lived in the Bay of Campeachy the fish were found dead in heaps on 
 the shores of the rivers and creeks at such a season and many we took up 
 half dead, of which sudden mortality there appeared no cause, but only the 
 malignity of the waters draining ofE the land through thick woods and savan- 
 nas of low grass and swampy grounds, with which some hot countries 
 abound. 
 
 On page 179, Pitman quotes from Wafer as follows: 
 Wafer nearly agrees in this general description of the site of Panama. 
 He says: " Between the River of Cheapo and Panama the land is low, even 
 land; most of it is dry and covered here and there with short bushes. The 
 town is surrounded with savannas, gentle flat hills, and courses of wood; " 
 but, he adds, " the place is very sickly, though it lies in a country good 
 enough; yet it is healthy in comparison with Portobello." Of the last-men- 
 tioned place, De Ulloa observes: "The heat is excessive, originated by the 
 situation of the town, which is surrounded with high mountains, without 
 any interval for the winds." 
 
 Pitman adds: 
 
 Walton has urged the unhealthiness of the damp and heated climate of 
 this IsthniTis as one of the greatest obstacles to the opening of a canal across 
 it, and has stated that the climate of Cruces is infinitely more healthy than 
 that of Panama. He says: "Disease is a barrier against settling on the Isth- 
 mus to improve it, and that persons who have withstood every other climate, 
 there become languid; and although the negroes appear fat and hearty, and 
 are possessed of personal strength to bear the heaviest burdens, yet want 
 alone impels them to work. 
 
 BARON HUMBOLDT. 
 
 Pitman adds, on page 180, the following extracts from Baron 
 Humboldt's writings in 1803. He says: 
 
 M. de Humboldt has the following passage on this division of the subject: 
 " For fifty years back, the vomito (black vomit of the yellow fever) has never 
 appeared on any point of the coast of the South Sea, with the excej^tion of 
 the town of Panama. It is situated on an arid tongue of land destitute of 
 vegetation; but the tide, when it falls, leaves exposed for a great way into 
 the bay, a large extent of ground, covered with fucus ulvoe et meducoe; the 
 air is infected by the decomposition of so many organic substances; and mi- 
 asmata, of very little influence on the organs of the natives, have a powerful 
 effect on the individuals born in the cold regions of Europe or in those of 
 the two Americas. 
 
 "The causes of the insalubrity of the air are very different on the two 
 coasts of the Isthmus. At Panama, where the vomito is endemical and where 
 the tides are very strong, the shore is considered as the origin of the infec- 
 tion. At Portobello, where remittent biliouB fevers prevail and where the 
 tides are scarcely sensible, the putrid emanations spring from the very 
 strength of the vegetation. A few years ago the forests which cover the in- 
 terior of the Isthmus extended to the very gates of the town; the salubrity of 
 the air has considerably increased since the governor gave orders for clear- 
 ing away the wood in the neighborhood. Of all places where the manchineel 
 and the mangle vegetate with vigor, the most unhealthy are where the roots 
 of those trees are not constantly covered with water." 
 
 THE MODERN HISTORY OF YELLOW FEVER AT PANAMA. 
 
 This is enough as to the history of Panama one hundred years 
 ftgo, but it is far worse half a century later. 
 
23 
 
 The yellow fever still dominates its ancient realm and will do 
 so until the three miles of sloping bottom out from the beach in 
 the bay of Panama is dug out, and until the tides cease to wash 
 the dead matter of that great gulf ashore, and until the winds, 
 with a steady offshore current, shall visit a coast along which for 
 periods of many months at a time in every year they have pes*- 
 sistently refused to blow. 
 
 In the forty years from 1850 to 1890, when the Isthmus drew 
 into its narrow confines many thousands of people to work on the 
 railroad and canal; the toilers, under the infatuation of high 
 prices for labor; the contractors, seeking great profits at the ex- 
 pense of human life; the speculators and robbers, seeking prey, 
 and the officers grasping for high salaries, crowded into the canal 
 belt, and the yellow plague and beri beri and Chagres fever rioted 
 in human destruction. 
 
 Such a history was never made elsewhere by the ravages of dis- 
 ease. It can be repeated and will be while the natural and irre- 
 mediable conditions continue to exist in the bay of Panama, when 
 the fevers are fed with people who are from temperate zones and 
 are unacclimated. 
 
 ACTUAL AND SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 Dr. John F. Bransford, a retired surgeon of the Navy, was sur- 
 geon to the Lull survey in Panama in December, 1875, and in 
 Nicaragua in 1872-73, and was detailed on duty with the Smith- 
 sonian Institution in 1876-77, and at other times has made careful 
 and extensive examinations of a scientific character in Nicaragua, 
 Costa Rica, and Panama, including climatic and sanitary condi- 
 tions, for which he is highly qualified. 
 
 In his deposition he states one cause for the permanent continu- 
 ance of the yellow fever at Panama, and also for the fact that it 
 has never appeared in Nicaragua along the proposed route of the 
 canal, as follows: 
 
 Dr. Bransford. I am quite sure the Isthmus of Panama is not a healthy 
 country. That is the story of it, I think, always, everywhere. Up in the 
 mountains of the interior it is all right: but along the Chagres River, and 
 particularly along that Rio Grande which comes down near the line of the 
 canal from the divide down to Panama, there is a great deal of mangrove 
 swamp, and there is where we had our bad fever, where Mr. Tausig had his 
 bad fever. That I consider a very unhealthy section. The trade wind does 
 not blow home in the same way that it does in Nicaragua. The line of the 
 Isthmus there is nearly east and west. Aspinwall is really west of Panama, 
 and the trade winds are interfered with and deflected by the mountains east 
 of Panama and the northern part of the State of Colombia, making a stag- 
 nation in the bay of Panama. 
 
 Senator H anna. You spoke about yellow fever being prevalent at Panama. 
 It has also been prevalent in Habana and Santiago de Cuba, has it not? 
 
 Dr. Bransford. Yes. 
 
 Senator Hanna. Very severely? 
 
 Dr. Bransford. Yes. If you will allow me, Senator, I may have used the 
 word "prevalent," but what I meant was that cases were liable to occur at 
 any time. 
 
 Senator Hanna, At any time of the year. I understood that. Well, after 
 exercising proper sanitary methods in Habana and in other ulaces in Cuba 
 that trouble has been obviated very largely, has it not? Yellow fever has 
 been reduced? 
 
 Dr. Bransford. Yes. 
 
 Senator Hanna. The same thing applied in Panama would produce like 
 results, would it not? 
 
 Dr. Bransford. Well, it ought, as far as the yellow fever goes. I do not 
 think anything will free the country of Panama fever. 
 
 The Chairman. Who was the chief engineer of Lull's expedition? 
 
 Dr. Bransford. Mr. Menocal, and there was an engineer by the name of 
 Crowell from Philadelphia, who was there also as an assistant. 
 
 The Chairman. Did you go ashore and remain ashore with the engineer- 
 ing party? 
 5162 
 
24' 
 
 Dr. Bransford. Yes; I was tlie medical officer of the surveying party. 
 
 The Chairman. That was the occasion when Lull made the survey of 
 Tboth routes, was it not, through Panama and also through Nicaragua? 
 
 Di*. Bransford. I also went on another survey in 1875, with Captain Lull, 
 when he surveyed the Panama route. 
 
 The Chairman. That was a separate survey? 
 
 Dr. Bransford. Yes. 
 
 The Chairman. He made the Nicaragua survey first? 
 
 Dr. Bransford. The Nicaragua survey first. 
 
 The Chairman. And then went to Panama? 
 
 Dr. Bransford. Two years afterwards he went down and made the Pan- 
 ama survey. 
 
 The Chairman. Was he under the orders of the Government of the United 
 States in making those surveys? 
 
 Dr. Bransford. Yes; I was an assistant surgeon, and went as medical 
 officer of both those surveys. 
 
 The Chairman. I will ask you to take up the Nicaragua line first; and I 
 want to ask you in regard to tne health of the country, the health of your 
 party, and such facts as will give the committee a fair and just idea of what 
 was the condition of the health of Nicaragioa as affected by the climate or by 
 any other consideration that you studied. 
 
 Dr. Bransford. I had only two serious cases of illness among those men 
 during that survey. 
 
 Senator Kittredge. How large a party was it? 
 
 Dr. Bransford. Forty-five, first and last, but it averaged 36. There were 
 only two serious cases of illness on that expedition. One was a lieutenant- 
 commander, who had a sunstroke, and another was an old case of dysentery, 
 which had existed before the man went there. We had a good many cases 
 of malarial fever, none of a very serious character, except that they would 
 recur. That is, a man would have a slight attack of chill and fever, and after 
 he got well it would come back on him. 
 
 Senator Hawley. Did the complaints there take the form of diarrhea 
 at all? 
 
 Dr. Bransford. We were very free from any bowel trouble at all, sir, 
 very. The bulk of my practice was with light cases of malarial fever. We 
 were there from the ^th of December until the 6th of July, and, as I said be- 
 fore, there were only two serious cases. Of course, there was malarial fever 
 in the swamps, particularly there in the neighborhood of Greytown; but I 
 think that the country generally is about as healthy as any tropical country 
 that I have known. 
 
 The Chairman. In your practice there as surgeon of that party did you 
 keep up with the body of the engineers who were surveying— the workmen? 
 
 Dr. Bransford. I lived in one camp or another. They were divided into 
 several parties, and I would go from one party to another, according to the 
 necessities of my profession . Sometimes I would be with one party and some- 
 times with the otner, but I was in the field all the time with one or the other 
 of the parties. 
 
 The Chairman. Did you make any observations of climatic conditions, 
 as to winds and other things? 
 
 Dr. Bransford. The prevailing wind there is the trade wind. It is right 
 m the trade- wind belt, and that is the prevailing wind pretty much the year 
 round. It was much stronger in the dry season than in the wet season, but 
 it blows home. I think the Ranger, a few years afterwards, on the west coast, 
 found that the wind was to the east, northeast, or southeast for two hundred 
 and eighty-three days during the year that she was there. That is the usual 
 and prevailing wind. Occasionally in the wet season the wind hauled around 
 to the southwest, and then heavy rains came. 
 
 The Chairman. Does that wind continue through the entire opening 
 there up the San Juan River and the lakes and across to Brito? 
 
 Dr. Bransford, All the way across the Pacific. It blows down in very 
 heavy gusts on the Pacific side, which they call papagoyos, down the gulches 
 at San Juan del Sur and Brito. The winds are often very strong, and the 
 wind reaches all the way across. 
 
 The divide in Nicaragua runs about northwest and southeast, right across 
 the ti*ack of the trade winds. The trade wind usually is east-northeast, and 
 the line of that canal from Greytown to Brito is very nearly east and west, 
 a little bit northwest from Greytown, but so nearly east and west that the 
 wind draws right through that gap, and, in my opinion, is the most impor- 
 tant factor in the health conditions along that route. 
 
 Senator Hanna. At about what rate does the trade wind blow there; how 
 many miles per hour? 
 
 Dr. Bransford. I do not know, sir; I could not say; but it usually com- 
 mences up to the northeast and blows very strong for two or three days, 
 Bometimes four or five days, and then moves down toward the east and dies 
 out a little and then shifts back again. I know that when I was there in 
 1876 and 1877—1 was also in Nicaragua on duty connected with the Smith- 
 
25 
 
 sonian Institution— very often the winds blew so strong, when I was on the 
 west side of the lake, that I would not be able to go to Ometepec Island, where 
 I was at work, for two or three days at a time sometimes. 
 
 The Chairman. What did you say you were doing on these last two occa- 
 sions? 
 
 Dr. Bransfohd. I went down at the request of the Smithsonian Institu- 
 tion on special duty, alone, on exploring duty for the Smithsonian Institution. 
 
 If Congress chooses to reinstate the horrors of Panama, the 
 motive or the consideration should be something greater than 
 the possible saving of $5,630,704 in the construction of a canal. 
 
 PRACTICALi EXPERIENCE. 
 
 The true history of the death rate at Panama was never writ- 
 ten. It has been suppressed, At this date we can find but few 
 men who knew and participated in that holocaust among the la- 
 borers who were stricken, to tell even what one man could see and 
 know of these great battles with *' the destruction that wasteth at 
 night, and the pestilence that walketh at noonday." 
 
 The lives of the survivors were shortened and they have nearly 
 all passed away. They were probably 30 years old, on an aver- 
 age, at that time, and if they were now living they would be from 
 60 to 80 years old. 
 
 One of the participants informed the committee of his personal 
 knowledge of this matter, and, though he is old and sick from 
 disease he there contracted, he came to Washington to testify, 
 declaring that he had no personal interest to subserve, but that 
 he is deeply concerned that his Government should not create the 
 opportunity for repeating the terrible history of Panama. For 
 nearly six years he was the track master of the Panama Railroad, 
 and was constantly in contact with the laborers who, in great 
 numbers, were at work on the railroad and the canal at Panama. 
 
 Mr. Plume states the following facts. His service with the 
 Panama Railroad Company was from 1883 to 1888. 
 
 The Chairman. How many hands did you have under you as a rule— about 
 an average? 
 
 Mr. Plume. I had 10 men to every section, and a section run 4 to 5 miles. 
 
 The Chairman. About how many people did the canal company have 
 there while you stayed there? 
 
 Mr. Plume. Well, it was estimated that they had 10,000, but I doubt very 
 much if 5,000 were working. The labor is of such a class that it is utterly im- 
 possible to get them to work; it is this lazy, good-for-nothing Jamaica labor, 
 and the climate there is so bad that a man can not work. 
 
 The Chairman, Well, now, I want to get at that, and I want you now to 
 be careful in your statements about that. Did you have any trouble in pre- 
 serving the health of the party under your control— these 10m.en to a section? 
 
 Mr. Plume. Oh, a great deal, sir. 
 
 The Chairman. What was the average amount of loss per annum, say 
 during the five or six years you were there, out of your own party, now? 
 
 Mr. Plume. Well, every month or two 1 would lose a man, perhaps two 
 men. I will explain it to you. If a man gets wet there with the rain he is 
 sure to be sick the next morning. The dew commences to fall at 3.30 o'clock 
 in the afternoon, and if a man gets his clothes wet with this dew and he goes 
 to bed with his clothes on, as sure as he is born he will wake up sick the next 
 morning. I never saw such a climate in all my life, and I have worked in 
 the rice fields of South Carolina, and gracious only knows that is bad enough. 
 
 The Chairman. Can you give the committee some idea of the condition 
 of health of these canal laborers during the time you wore in this Isthmus? 
 
 Mr. Plume. When I went there we' used to run one train- perhaps it 
 would be a car or two box cars— in the morning out of Colon up to Monkey 
 Hill. Our graveyard is about 5 miles from Colon, on a hill called Monkey 
 Hill, but I had not been there a year when we were up there. Over to 
 Panama it was the same way— bury, bury, bury, running two, three, and 
 four trains a day with dead Jamaica niggers all the time. I never saw any- 
 thing like it. It did not make any difference whether they were black or 
 white, to see the way they died there! They die like animals. 
 
 The Chairman. Of what diseases would they die, if you know anything 
 about it? 
 5162 
 
26 
 
 Mr. Plume. There are four most deadly fevers. There is the yellow fever, 
 the pernicious fever, the putrid fever, and the typhoid fever, and the inter- 
 mittent fever. If the intermittent runs long enough it will turn into typhoid 
 or those other bad fevers. A man will only last three or four days, unless 
 thev have pretty quick and pretty severe treatment. 
 
 The Chairman. Did the Panama Canal Company have good shelter for its 
 hands and good hospitals? 
 
 Mr. Plume. Yes, there is no finer hospital on the globe than the one they 
 have at Panama. It is on the side of the Ancon Mountain, which used to be a 
 volcano several centuries ago, and the lava from the volcano went across 
 Panama and out into the bay about a mile. The hospital is a splendid thing. 
 It is said to have cost §5,000,000, and I guess it did. Down in this valley you 
 dig a hole about two feet deep and you come to a boiling spring, right under 
 the mountains, and they have engines there pumping water up to this hos- 
 pital. There is a man in Panama who has a concession to bury people. He 
 opened a graveyard, I suppose 300 feet one way and 400 the other. Every 
 grave is numbered that they may know who is buried there. In exactly one 
 year after he opened it I drove by there, and there were 1,875 crosses in that 
 burying ground, and that does not count the men that were in the ovens. 
 They have ovens along the wall, a brick wall, and they bury people in there 
 who can afford to pay for it; but there were 1,875 crosses in that burying 
 ground, to give you a little idea of the health of the country. 
 
 The Chairman. About what year was that? 
 
 Mr. Plume. That was in the early part of 1887. De Lesseps brought out 57 
 men there for engineers, chiefs of sections, a,nd for different purposes, clerks. 
 In three months, sir, there were only 3 of them left. I never saw any- 
 thing like it in my life. If a man drinks tlaere, he is just as sure to die as he 
 is alive; it is fatal; and here is something very wonderful: I have always no- 
 ticed if a Frenchman gets one of those fevers, he is just as sure to die as he 
 has a hair on his head. The doctors have told me that it is on account of their 
 having drunk so much of this French claret in France, which is full of log- 
 wood, and it has burned the linings of their stomachs, and as soon as they get 
 a fever they die. My allowance of quinine was an ounce, and it would last 
 me three weeks. That is what affected my hearing. 
 
 The Chairman. You suffer from it yet? 
 
 Mr. Plume. What is that? 
 
 The Chairman. You suffer from it yet? 
 
 Mr. Plume. Oh, yes, and never will get over it. I always took medicine, 
 kept my liver clean, and that is the way I kept on my feet: and when I left 
 that climate and came here a doctor worked six days and six nights on me to 
 save my life. My brother-in-law told me that I must have a constitution of 
 iron, and I believe I have. 
 
 officers of the PANAMA COMPANY TESTIFY. 
 
 Mr. Colne, who was the agent for the old company in America, 
 states that the hospital expenses, not including the buildings, was 
 $4,548,127 from 1881 to 1890, of which sum $680,000 was for medi- 
 cine. 
 
 General Abbott testified that during the same period the an- 
 nual average percentage of diseases at Panama was, for diseases 
 of Europe, 18.83, and of diseases due to climate the percentage 
 was 47.24. This related to cases treated in the hospitals, and 
 proves that the local diseases were epidemic. 
 
 General Abbott tells of another " lugubrious " situation, as to 
 the railroad laborers, as follows: 
 
 Now, I will offer all that I have been able to collect with reference to health 
 on the Panama Railroad. There was a fearful loss of life during the construc- 
 tion of the railroad. I passed over the route in 1855, just after it had been 
 finished. The surgeon of the steamer had been employed on the line, and he 
 told me much about it. He said the conditions were something frightful— 
 that they had to contend not only with disease, but with suicide. A great 
 many coolies had been imported, and they were very unhappy and wanted to 
 get back to China. They had an idea if they committed suicide they would 
 go back. 
 
 The surgeon said it was necessary to watch them with the greatest care: 
 that if a Chinaman found a little puddle of water he would hold his face down 
 into it until he drowned, without exciting the attention or notice of anyone. 
 The excessive death rate was due, doubtless, not only to the climate, but also 
 to the conditions and to the varioas races that were tried. It was not then 
 known that the heavy work should be done by negroes. I have no idea that 
 anything like the mortality then encountered will be repeated on any isth- 
 mian line. 
 5162 
 
27 
 
 The Chairman. You never heard of a Chmaman committing suicide la 
 Washington, did you? 
 
 If it had occurred to General Abbott to state that the name of 
 the railroad station at Matachin means "dead Chinese," he would 
 have been able to account for the fact that Chinese, when taken 
 with the fever, would slip away from observation and drowa 
 themselves in puddles of water. 
 
 A NAVAIi OFFICER TESTIFIES, 
 
 Commander Lucien Young states in his deposition as follows: 
 
 The most unhealthy place on earth is the Isthmus of Panama. I had yel- 
 low fever myself in Panama, and I have seen them dying I5y the wholesale; 
 and so far as yellow fever is concerned, I would rather be in Habana than in 
 Panama. 
 
 This evidence, with much more that it is unnecessary to quote, 
 establishes the fact that yellow fever is indigenous at Panama 
 and other localities of the canal route; that it is of malignant type 
 and can not be extirpated, because it is the result of natural 
 causes that human agencies can not change. 
 
 If the choice of routes for a canal depended upon this one fact, 
 we would certainly be wise to turn to the Nicaragua route, even 
 at an excess of cost amounting to $5,630,704. 
 
 One duty that the Government owes to humanity — which rises 
 above all other personal considerations — in the choice of these 
 routes is the care of the health and lives of men whose labor is 
 the real power that must open this great waterway. No Senator 
 can be indifferent to this demand of duty, nor can the Senate 
 afford to take the risk of repeating the history of Panama during 
 the thirty years of human sacrifice that have made it so lugubri- 
 ous. 
 
 THE HEALTH COlirTRAST BETWEEN THE TWO ROUTES. 
 
 If every other consideration of advantage was in favor of the 
 Panama route, the salubrity of climate and the natural conditions 
 that assure the health of Nicaragua would determine the choice 
 in favor of that route. The contrast between these localities as 
 places of abode gives great weight to the argument in favor of 
 Nicaragua. 
 
 All maritime and civilized nations will use an isthmian canal, 
 not alone for ships of war and commerce, but for migration and 
 travel around the world and to and from every coast and seaport 
 of every country^ all of which will be brought by it into direct 
 and unobstructed communication by the canal. The myriads of 
 people of coming generations that will pass through a canal cut 
 through the American Isthmus will have the right to reproach 
 this Congress and will not fail to do so if we select for them a 
 route on which pestilence lurks by the wayside, instead of a route 
 that nature has made free from such dangers. 
 
 The saving of $5,630,704 will appear to them as a paltry con- 
 sideration for the choice of a fever-breeding ground, when a 
 healthy and attractive route for a canal is offered. 
 
 THE WALKER NICARAGUA CANAL COMMISSION'S REPORT OF 1899. 
 
 Tliis question is not new. It arose at the first moment of a 
 choice between these routes, as long ago as the sixteenth cen- 
 tury. It was carefully studied by our Nicaragua Canal Commis- 
 sion, of which Admiral Walker was president, in 1897-1899, in 
 view of objections then urged by the Panama Canal Company 
 
 5163 
 
28 
 
 and others to the Nicaragua route, and the following answer was 
 made by that Commission: 
 
 The impression that this portion of the Isthmus is unusually unhealthy is 
 erroneous. On the contrary, the local conditions are such that with ordinary 
 hygienic precautions the risks from disease are slight. 
 
 The frequent i-ainf all on the east coast furnishes an ample supply of fresh, 
 soft water, condensed directly from the clouds. The porous, sandy soil ab- 
 sorbs it so rapidly as to prevent stagnation, while the animal refuse is quickly 
 removed by the scavenger birds and fish continually on the alert for food. 
 
 With their light, loose clothing, vegetable diet, and cleanly habits, the na- 
 tives seldom suffer from fevers. Even our unacclimated Americans, passing 
 from a rigorous winter temperature to the mild region of the trade winds, 
 were, with few exceptions, exempt from febrile complaints, and amongst 
 the largo number of engineers sent out there was no mortality in the coun- 
 try. The constant motion of the wind, sweeping through this low divide, 
 appears to remove the noxious exhalations which characterize other portions 
 or the Isthmus. 
 
 Yellow fever finds no habitat at Greytown, and even when imported does 
 not become epidemic. Abstemious habits and careful police of camps will 
 insure as good health among laborers as will be found in many locations in 
 this country. The climate would affect the labor question, therefore, chiefly 
 by the lassitude resulting from its enervating influence. 
 
 Assistant Engineer Stewart says that — 
 
 "The atmospheric conditions are excellent, and for the seven months we 
 were in the field we worked in all conditions of weather, losing but one entire 
 diiv on account of a heavy downpour of twelve hours." 
 
 The narrow limits within which the temperature I'anges are shown from 
 a few selected observations at various stations during the year as below. The 
 Rio Viejo station is located on the western slope of the Cordilleras, east of the 
 lake, and at a higher altitude than the others. Hence its greater range of 30 
 degrees. This uniformity of temperature is one of the important factors in 
 the considei-ation in the permanency of important works as well as in the health 
 of the inhabitants. 
 
 It would be quite sufficient to stop at this conclusive statement, 
 against which no fact is stated, but the subject vras again opened 
 on the hearings before the Committee on Inter oceanic Canals, 
 and some opinions were stated that the- cutting of a canal in 
 Nicaragua might produce health conditions there like those that 
 exist at Panama. 
 
 WILL NICARAGUA FALL A PREY TO DISEASE LIKE PANAMA? 
 
 The importance of the subject justifies a brief statement of the 
 facts deposed to by the witnesses before the committee. Dr. 
 Bransf ord, whose statements as to the health of Panama and Nica- 
 ragua I have read to the Senate, has actual, personal, and scien- 
 tific knowledge of this subject, makes the following statements as 
 to Nicaragua: 
 
 The Chairman. How long did you remain on these two latter visits? 
 
 Dr. Bransford. I think I went down each time in^anuary and stayed 
 until June. I am not absolutely sure of it, but that was about the time, from 
 January to June, in 1876 and also in 1877. Then in 1881 1 was down there again 
 for the Smithsonian Institution, in Guatemala, Nicai-agua, and Costa Rica. 
 
 The Chairman. "What particular duty were you on then? 
 
 Dr. Bransford. The same duty, examining the remains of the Indian 
 inhabitants. 
 
 The Chairman, Were you much over the country while you were down 
 there? 
 
 Dr. Bransford. All the time. I was in the interior. 
 
 The Chairman. What kind of country— agriculturally, topographically, 
 and with reference to climatic considerations— is Nicaragua? 
 
 Dr. Bransford, Well, conditions are entirely different on the two slopes. 
 On the Atlantic slope it is heavily wooded, and there is a much heavier rain- 
 fall than on the Pacific. Most of the population is on the Pacific side of the 
 main range of mountians. The country along the route of the canal from 
 Lake Nicaragua to Brito is one of the finest agricultural countries I have ever 
 seen. Rivas is the principal town. There are half a dozen smaller towns 
 around it, and the whole of that country from the lake to the coast moun- 
 tains, a distance of some 8 or 10 miles, is a garden spot for tropical fruits, 
 chocolate, sugar cane, and fruits of all kinds. 
 
 The Chairman. What kind of a population has it, with reference to in- 
 dustry, quietude, and general disposition? 
 6162 
 
29 
 
 Dr. BRANsrORD. The ruling portion of the i)opu]ation is the nsnal mixture 
 of Spanish and Indian. They are about like all the other South Americans. 
 Some of them claim to be pure Spaniards, and from that they are everything 
 down to pure Indian. They have the characteristics of the ordinary Spanish- 
 Americans, being inclined to revolutions and so on; but the main body of the 
 population is a very sturdy Indian people. I think they are very m.uch 
 stronger, more reliable, better men, than the mixed. 
 
 Senator Hawley. Well-behaved? 
 
 Dr. Bransford. They are, sir; as far as my experience goes. They are very 
 steady and good workers. When we wanted good, reliable men for work we 
 always tried to get the pure Indians. 
 
 MR. treat, a contractor, TESTTnBS. 
 
 Mr. Treat, a contractor who built nearly 10 miles of railroad 
 for the Maritime Canal Company, from Greytown west, made 
 the following statements: 
 
 Mr. Treat. It was a peculiar contract. I took it for the purpose of study- 
 ing the questions of labor and climate and health and supplios, having in 
 view a large contract on the canal, and I said if they would give me control 
 of the whole thing, and not let the engineers interfere with me too much, and 
 would furnish what I wanted from New York, I would build the railroad for 
 10 per cent of what I paid out for labor in the country, I paying my own of- 
 fice force and superintendent of construction. I commenced the work about 
 the last of May, 1890, and finished my work about the last of December, 1890— 
 I believe it was 1890. 
 
 The Chairman. What length of road did you build? 
 
 Mr. Treat. Nearly 10 miles— perhaps a little less than 10 miles. 
 
 Senator Hanna. Standard gauge? 
 
 Mr. Treat. Standard gauge. 
 
 The Chairman. Describe the point you started from and where you 
 "went. 
 
 Mr. Treat. I started from the Greytown Harbor— that is, the lagoon— and 
 went south of the canal line as located— parallel to it, perhaps a thousand 
 feet away from it— directly to the westward, parallel with the canal line all 
 the way. 
 
 The Chairman. Did you build out to the Deseado River, or stream? 
 
 Mr. Treat. I think I crossed that; I am not sure. 
 
 The Chairman. What sort of a country was it that you went through? 
 
 Mr. Treat. It was almost perfectly fiat, you might say, covered with 
 forests, the first 8 or 9 miles covered with water— completely covered with 
 water. 
 
 Senator Hanna. How deep? 
 
 Mr. Treat. From a foot up to over a man's head. 
 
 The Chairman. How did you construct a road through that water? 
 
 Mr. Treat. I cut down trees and built a solid corduroy by laying the logs 
 parallel to each other, perhaps 16 or 18 feet long, until I got above the water, 
 and then I laid rails on top ot this causeway of logs and put a steam shovel at 
 work where the entrance was to be for the canal and loaded flat cars there 
 with the excavation. I had two trains of flat cars, 15 cars to a train, and two 
 locomotives, and then I backed these cars out on this ti-ack laid on the logs, 
 and used a ballast plow, and in time completely buried this foundation taken 
 from the entrance to the canal. I actually commenced the construction of 
 the canal by taking out about 100,000 cubic yards at that point, and in time of 
 course I buried this substructure completely with sand. Of course, as these 
 logs were covered with sand, the track was raised and the sand tamped un- 
 der it until a substantial road was built. 
 
 The Chairman. Was it a substantial road? 
 
 Mr. Treat. Oh, yes. 
 
 The .Chairman. Now, at what cost per mile was that road built? 
 
 Mr. Treat. The whole cost was about $30,000 a mile. 
 
 The Chairman. Where did you get your cross-ties? 
 
 Mr. Treat. I got some from the timber alongside the track, and aome cy- 
 press ties from Now Orleans. 
 
 The Chairman. About how many men did you have under you while you 
 were at work there? 
 
 Mr. Treat. Perhaps a couple of hundred at the start, up to the neighbor- 
 hood of 1,000. I think I had nearly 1,000 after two months and from that up 
 to the end. 
 
 The Chairman. How long did you keep them there? 
 
 Mr. Treat. Seven months. 
 
 The Chairman. State what kind of work they did. 
 
 Mr. Treat. Why, of course a large part of the work was right In these 
 swamps, in water. I cut down the trees and cut them up into lengths, some 
 very large trees, 3 feet in diameter, mostly very heavy timbsr that would 
 5168 
 
30 
 
 not float, and the worlt was to drag these logs through the water; they would 
 BO nearly float that 20 to 30 men would tie a rope to a big log and drag it along 
 on the bottom to the place they wanted it ana then turn it around on tp the 
 line of the railroad, so that the work that these men did was wholly cutting 
 these trees and putting them in place to form a part of the embankment, a 
 foundation for the embankment, and fully half of the men were working in 
 this water ten hours a day. 
 
 The Chairman. Every day? 
 
 Mr. Treat. Yes; every day. Out of seven months we lost only two half 
 days from any reason, and that was on account of cold rains. 
 
 The Chairman. And that is aU the time that you lost? 
 
 Mr. Treat. That is all the time that we lost. "We did not work on Sunday. 
 
 The Chairman. "Well, what was the condition of health of your men? 
 
 Mr. Treat. Why, the first lot of men that we had there from Jamaica 
 were a poor lot, picked up off the streets largely and in poor health, seemed 
 to be half starved. I should say that their general health improved while 
 they were on the work. At the end of the work they went away looking bet- 
 ter and feeling better than when they commenced. They had good food, a 
 good dry place to sleep, and when they were sick a good hospital to go to. 
 
 MR. MENOCAL.. 
 
 Mr. Menocal, who has been more in Nicaragua than any other 
 American engineer — in all, more than ten years of time — states as 
 follows in speaking of Panama: 
 
 The Chairman. Do you consider that a healthy country? 
 
 Mr. Menocal. I do not. 
 
 The Chairman. Do you consider it very unhealthy? 
 
 Mr. Menocal. Very unhealthy. 
 
 The Chairman. How does it compare with Nicaragua in that respect? 
 
 Mr. Menocal. I regard Nicaragua as very healthy. 
 
 Senator Hanna. How would it be at Nicaragua if you were digging a canal 
 there? 
 
 Mr. Menocal. We did do some digging in the canal. 
 
 Senator Hanna. What I mean to ask is, there has been digging done pretty 
 much the whole length of the Panama Canal, the earth has been turned up 
 by excavations made. Suppose you had corresponding excavations along the 
 Nicaragua route from the valley of the San Juan Eiver and you turned up 
 the soil there, would you have any sickness from it? 
 
 Mr. Menocal. It is possible there may be some more sickness than they 
 have now, but I can say this: We built 12 miles of railroad, 6 of which was in 
 these swamps, and the men had to work in water from their feet to their 
 necks, and we did not lose a man on account of sickness contracted by reason 
 of the climate or the conditions under which the work was done. We had 
 1,800 men employed in the building of that railroad and we did dredging 
 there for a distance of about seven-eighths of a mile into the swamps, and 
 the condition of health of the people on board of the dredges was excellent, 
 and those living in the vicinity just the same. I was not ill there myself, 
 nor were the other engineers. We had cleared the timber for about 9 miles 
 from Greytown and about 10 miles on the west side of the lake, and we did 
 not have any illness on that account. 
 
 The Chairman. Is that remark true through the entire line to Brito in 
 regard to health? 
 
 Mr. Menocal. It is claimed, and I believe, that the more you go west the 
 healthier it is. I would like to caU the attention of the committee to one 
 matter, if I am permitted to do so. 
 
 The Chairman. Oh, yes. 
 
 Mr. Menocal. I refer to one condition in Nicaragua which does not exist 
 in Panama. It is very true that we have swamps back of Greytown extend- 
 ing several miles, but the rainfall is so great that the water in the swamps is 
 renewed constantly. You can drink it at any place. We used to drink it 
 constantly. 
 
 Senator Hawley. It is not stagnant? 
 
 Mr. Menocal. It is not stagnant. It is being renewed all the time from 
 the heavy rains, while in Panama in the four or five months of dry season the 
 swamps get dry, and then is when the sickness prevails. That is the time 
 that the country becomes extremely unhealthy. It is not in the rainy season. 
 What I fear is the dry season. 
 
 The Chairman, what effect do the trade winds have in Nicaragua, ac- 
 cording to your opinion? 
 
 Mr. MENOCAL. The healthy condition of Nicaragua is partly attributable 
 to the trade winds blowing up the valley of the San Juan, and I believe it is 
 correct. 
 
 Senator Hanna. Let me ask you, what year did you do this work that you 
 are talking about in Nicaragua? 
 
 Mr. Menocal. From 1887 to 1892. 
 5162 
 
MB. JONBS TESTIFIBS. 
 
 Mr. James O. Jones states as follows, speaking of the Nicaragua 
 Canal Commission: 
 
 The CHAiRMAisr. You were employed tinder that Commission for eleven 
 months? 
 
 Mr. JoNKS. Yes. 
 
 The Chairman. Were you in Nicaragua all the time? 
 
 Mr. Jones. I was in Nicaragua for eleven months, and I was here under 
 the same Commission for about nine months. 
 
 The Chairman. Writing up their report? 
 
 Mr. Jones. In the Washmgton office, working on the precise-level report. 
 
 The Chairman. When you went back a second time, under what author- 
 ity did you go? 
 
 Mr. Jones. I went back in July, 1899, under the Isthmian Canal Commia- 
 sion, headed by Admiral Walker. 
 
 The Chairman. How long did you remain there on that service? 
 
 Mr. Jones. I was there from July, 1899, until May, 1901— about twenty-two 
 months. 
 
 The Chairman. What were you engaged in while you were there on that 
 service? 
 
 Mr. Jones. I was engaged in the hydrographic work under Mr. Arthur P. 
 Davis. 
 
 The Chairman. Did you stop your work on account of the weather when 
 it was raining? 
 
 Mr. Jones. No, sir. 
 
 The Chairman. Here, when you were running the line, or when you were 
 attending to this hydrographic work? 
 
 Mr. Jones. The rain did not stop my work at all. I was out in the rain 
 and all kinds of weather while I was engaged in this hydrographic work, and 
 when on the line of precise levels that I speak of was out in the rain all day. 
 Of course, in the hardest showers or when it was raining very hard we could 
 not work. 
 - The Chairman. You were exposed to it? 
 
 Mr. Jones. We were exposed to all of it. 
 
 The Chairman. About now many men were in that precise-levels party? 
 
 Mr. Jones. There were six men. 
 
 The Chairman. And you continued at work for eleven months? 
 
 Mr. Jones. Yes, sir. 
 
 The Chairman. In the field? 
 
 Mr. Jones. Yes, sir. 
 
 The Chairman. What was the state of the health of those men during 
 that time? 
 
 Mr. Jo^TES. It was very, very good. They aU had very remarkable health 
 for the kind of country that we went through. 
 
 The Chairman. Did they have any sickness? 
 
 Mr. Jones. There was no sickness to amount to anything at aU, None of 
 the men were laid up. 
 
 The Chairman. During that eleven months? 
 
 Mr. Jones. Not to speak of. A man might bo laid up a day or two or 
 something of that kind occasionally, but never ill to speak of. 
 
 The Chairman. You were working right along through these ponds and 
 water courses, and so on? 
 
 Mr. Jones. For some distance on the river we encountered heavy swamps. 
 We worked right through them; worked in water up to our knees and some- 
 times up to our shoulders. We set up the instrument in water almost up to 
 the thumbscrews. , - , , 
 
 The Chairman. And none of that party were sick to spoak of, as I undei-- 
 
 Mr. Jones. No; there was no illness at all in the camp to amount to any- 
 thing. 
 
 The Chairman. Abotit how many men were engaged under Admiral 
 Walker in Nicaragua on the isthmian canal survey? 
 
 Mr. Jones. The Nicaragua Canal? 
 
 The Chairman. The Nicaragua Canal survey. 
 
 Mr. Jones. Why, there were about seventy. There were sixty-nine men 
 went down on the Newport and a few more came, and one or two returned to 
 the States. There wore about seventy men in all. 
 
 The Chairman. How long were those men employed on the Isthmus; I 
 mean to say at Nicaragua? 
 
 Mr. Jones. Why, I suppose they were there for eight months anyway. 
 
 Th& Chairman. In the wet season or the dry season? 
 
 Mr. Jones. They were there through a period of both. 
 
 The Chairman. Well, did they work right along through these jwndsand 
 moi-asses? 
 
 Mr. Jones. Yes; they worked just the same as I did. 
 
32 
 
 The Chairman. Wliat was tlie state of the health of that party during the 
 time they were there? 
 
 Mr. Jones. It was remarkably good. 
 
 The Chairman. Did any of them die? 
 
 Mr. Jones. No, sir; none of them died while the parties were there. 
 
 The Chairman. "Were any of them sick? 
 
 Mr. Jones. There was some sickness, but nothing to amount to anything 
 at all. 
 
 The Chairman. What kind of water did you drink while you were out 
 there during all this long service? 
 
 Mr. Jones. "We drank San Juan River water when we got to it, and when 
 we were back away from it we would drink the waters from the small rivers 
 that were tributaries of the San Juan. We would drink any water that we 
 came to, almost; swamp water or anything else. 
 
 Gen. Edward P. Alexander testified as follows: 
 
 General Alexander. After the civil war I was first professor of engi- 
 neering and mathematics in the University of South Carolina for four years- 
 and then I went to railroading, and I was engaged in railroading generally as 
 manager of roads with engineers doing work under me for some twenty 
 years, more or less Since then I have been on two governmental commis- 
 sions, one on the improvement of The Dalles of the Columbia River, The Dalles 
 and Salido Falls in Oregon, and one commission on the connection between 
 the Chesapeake Bay and the Delaware Bay. These were joint commissions 
 of civilians and Army and Navy officers generally. Then for three and a 
 half years I was employed as engineer arbitrator of the boundary survey be- 
 tween Nicai'agua and Costa Rica, by those two Governments. 
 
 The Chairman. Where did you reside during the time you were thus em- 
 ployed by Nicaragua and Costa Rica? 
 
 General Alexander. My headquarters were generally at Greytown, 
 Nicaragua. 
 
 The Chairman. How did you find the health conditions of Greytown dur- 
 ing your i-esidence there. 
 
 General Alexander. I found them very good indeed; never lived in 
 a place that had less malaria. 
 
 The Chairman. Is there much population in Greytown? 
 
 General Alexander. No; very small; only about 1,400. 
 
 The Chairman. What years were these? 
 
 General Alexander. 1897, 1898, 1899. and part of 1900. 
 
 The Chairman. I wish you would d9scrib3 that country as to its eligibil- 
 ity for civilized people— for white people— its productions, and other matters 
 connected with agriculture. Just give a description of it as you saw it. 
 
 General Alexander. It impressed me as one of the most attractive coun- 
 tries that I ever saw for a poor man to make a living in. As I laughingly told 
 the gentleman who was escorting me around, if I had to be born again I would 
 ask the*angel that was bringing me down to take me to Nicaragua, if I was 
 to be landed v/ithout any money; that I would rather light in Nicaragua than 
 in any other place I knew. 
 
 The climate is very pleasant. The agricultural opportunities are limitless. 
 The soil is good, and I do not know a more attractive country than that. 
 
 The Chairman. Do they raise a variety of crops there? 
 
 General Alexander. Everything in the world. 
 
 The Chairman. What are the characteristics of the population? 
 
 General Alexander. Its population are a good, plain, country people. 
 They seem to be amiable, courteous, and polite, and I do not think tliey were 
 specially disposed to go into insurrections or rebellions. They are indus- 
 trious enough at anytlaing— in fact, they are very industrious at anything 
 that they are used to. They would not do much if you put them at a wheel- 
 barrow and a ditch, perhaps, but put them in the woods with a machete or 
 on the river with aj^addle and they will do as good a day's work as any man 
 that I ever saw. There are plenty of instances there of men whom I saw 
 who are in very comfortable circumstances, who started out in life with 
 nothing but a machete, who have got little coffee plantations, fruit planta- 
 tions, etc. 
 
 The Chairman. Does cofifee grow abundantly in that country? 
 
 General Alexander. Yes. 
 
 The Chairman. Of good quality? 
 
 General Alexander. While I was there, in 1889, it was Nicaraguan coffee, 
 raised in the vicinity of Matagalpa, that brought the highest price in London 
 of any coffee sold that year from any part of the world. 
 
 The Chairman. That Matagalpa country is a white settlement, is it not? 
 
 General Alexander. Yes. 
 
 The Chairman. A prosperous people? 
 
 General Alexander. Yes. 
 
 The Chairman. Ai'e they peaceable and obedient to the laws? 
 
33 
 
 General Alexander. They seem to be so, entirely. 
 
 The Chairman. What do yon think of that region of country, including 
 Costa Rica and other parts of Central America that would be accessible com- 
 mercially to the canal, as a feeder to the canal, the income of it? 
 
 General Alexander. I think it ought to be one of the richest tropical 
 countries in the world. 
 
 The Chairman. Capable of sustaining large population? 
 
 General Alexander. Yes. 
 
 The Chairman. What would you expect from the health of the people? 
 
 General Alexander. There is no trouble about the health anywhere in 
 that country, I think. 
 
 The Chairman. You found it healthy? 
 
 General Alexander. I found it so, entirely. 
 
 The Chairman. Did you have as good health there as you had at home in 
 South Carolina? 
 
 General Alexander. Entirely so; yes, sir. 
 
 Senator Mitchell. That condition as to health applies to both sidesof the 
 divide, does it? 
 
 General Alexander. Yes, sir. 
 
 Mr. H. H. Trundle, the engineer who surveyed and located the 
 canal for the Nicaragua Canal Commission and also for the Isth- 
 mian Canal Commission east from Boca San Carlos to Grey town, 
 testifies as follows: 
 
 The Chairman. Would you think it any more difficult to construct a canal 
 through that portion of Florida where you were than at Greytown? 
 
 Mr. Trundle. No: I do not know that it would be any more difficult to 
 construct. I notice one difference, though, that while I was in Florida I em- 
 ployed most of my men to help me there, and none of them would last more 
 than a month or two. They would get sick or something and leave. One 
 that I took down from here was sick there and had to leave, qtiite sick, and 
 in Nicaragua we had very little sickness either among the natives or the men 
 that we took from the States. 
 
 The Chairman. In the first survey you made for Admiral Walker's com- 
 mission, or the Nicaraguan CanalCommission, about how many men, officers, 
 and employees of every kind were under your charge? 
 
 Mr. Trundle. Well, my i)arty numbered about 6 or 7, and I had about 20 
 or 30 laborers, depending upon the country that I was going through. 
 
 The Chairman. How long wore you engaged in the field there? 
 
 Mr. Trundle. I think I was in the field about ten and a half months. 
 
 The Chairman. Ten and a half months consecutively, straight along? 
 
 Mr. Trundle. Yes. 
 
 The Chairman. What was the health of your party on that occasion? 
 
 Mr. Trundle. I think I had one man at the hospital for a week or ten 
 days, one officer, and then all of us, I think, had a day or two of sickness occa- 
 sionally. I was sick three times, I think, but not sick enough to leave camp; 
 and I would only stay in camp while I had fever, and then go ahead on the 
 work. Among tne laborers there was practicallv no sickness other than a 
 few machete cuts that caused them a good deal of trouble. 
 
 The Chairman. Did you and your men take the water as it came? 
 
 Mr. Trundle. Yes. 
 
 The Chairman. And the swamps as they presented themselves? 
 
 Mr. Trundle. Yes. 
 
 The Chairman. And went right through them? 
 
 Mr. Trundle. Yes. 
 
 The Chairman. Cutting your way with machetes? 
 
 Mr. Trundle. Yes. 
 
 The Chairman. On the second occasion you had a larger party? 
 
 Mr. Trundle. Yes; I had four engineer parties, each alx)ut the same size 
 as my other party— four engineer parties of about six or seven men, and theu 
 each of those parties had from fifteen to twenU'-five laborers. 
 
 The Chairman. How long were you in the field with those men? 
 
 Mr. Trundle. Very nearly a year; more than eleven months, I think. 
 
 The Chairman. Consecutive work? 
 
 Mr. Trundle. Yes. 
 
 The Chairman. Every day? 
 
 Mr. Trundle. Yes. , _ , , ^ ,». ^ 
 
 The Chairman. That was the Isthmian Canal Commission work that you 
 were doing then? 
 
 Mr. Trundle. Yes. 
 
 The Chairman. What was the health of your party then? 
 
 Mr. Trundle. Well, the health was good. I had one or two men in the 
 
 hospital two or three times for a few days. One man was quite sick. That 
 
 is, he had some of the fever that thev have down there, and he was pretty 
 
 sick, but I don't remember how long he was in the hospital. I do not think 
 
 5162 3 
 
he was there over ten days, if as long, and then he went out on the work 
 again. 
 
 The Chairman. That was the only real sick man you had? 
 
 Mr. TrundLiB. That was the sickest I had, and he was at no time danger- 
 ously ill. 
 
 The Chairman. What was the general health of yonr party? 
 
 Mr. TbundLiI;. Oh, it was good. It was better than I would expect any- 
 where that I have ever been in the States where I had as much swamp to 
 contend with. 
 
 The Chairman. Was it as good as the health of your people when you 
 were in Florida? 
 
 Mr. Trundle. It was better. 
 
 The Chairman. Did you drink the water of the country as you came to 
 it, or did you have a particular supply of water? 
 
 Mr. Trundle. Well, I tried to have the water all boiled for drinking water 
 in the camps, and I thought that I was succeeding pretty well; but since I 
 have gotten back I have found out that I did not succeed quite so well as I 
 thought. I attribute the health largely to the fact that the water was boiled, 
 and I was speaking of it afterwards to some of the men, and they have told 
 me since that they always kept the boiled water but they seldom drank it. 
 I think all of them drank the water pretty much as they came to it. A good 
 many of them used the water vine, and drank water from that. 
 
 The Chairman. There is a vine there that yields water? 
 
 Mr. Trundle. Yes. 
 
 The Chairman. Gives about a pint as you cut it? 
 
 Mr. Trundle. Yes; you ctit off about 3 feet of it. 
 
 The Chairman. What is the health of the natives in that part of the 
 country who were employed by you? 
 
 Mr. TRUNDLE. They seemed to be healthy. They never lost much time, 
 other than wnen they would get a chance to go to Greytown and get drunk, 
 or something like that. 
 
 MB. LYMAN E. COOLEY TESTIFIES. 
 
 Mr. Lyman E. Cooley, the engineer and constructor of the Chi- 
 cago Drainage Oanal, spent four weeks in the field in Nicaragua 
 while the Nicaragua Canal Commission was at work there in 1899. 
 
 In his deposition he makes the following statements: 
 
 The Chairman. As engineer for the contracting company in 1897 and 1898, 
 of which you make mention, did you visit the localities of the Nicaragua and 
 Panama Canal routes? 
 
 Mr. Cooley. We went entu'cly over the Panama route and examined it in 
 a casual manner. We examined the Nicaragua route with great care on the 
 ground, as much as we could. 
 
 The Chairman. Was it a private enterprise? 
 
 Mr. Cooley. Yes. 
 
 The Chairman. What were you doing down there? What was your pur- 
 jKJse in going there? 
 
 Mr. Cooley. A number of gentlemen in New York were interested in the 
 canal proposition financially, and had undertaken to finance the project of an 
 interoceanic canal in case a group of contractors could put a price upon it. V/e 
 went down there for the purpose of ascertaining whether we could put a 
 price upon it or not. 
 
 You are in a wilderness in much of Nicaragua. It is not easy to see things. 
 The physical discomfort in getting around is simply enormous on the eastern 
 division. Fortunately I had the good sense, I congratulate myself on that, to 
 select men who were pioneer men, who had been doing pioneer work, not 
 municipal contractors, but men who had been out against the frontier, and 
 engineers of the same class, who would not be deterred by an unbroken 
 wilderness. 
 
 And one of these men remarked, in a very significant way, that if the coun- 
 try was cleared up, if there were roads where men could ride about with a 
 liuggy and get around comfortably, and if there were good hotels at conven- 
 ient intervals, it would make every difference in the world in a man's mental 
 attitude. You may look for the average man who undertakes to examine 
 these routes to be in favor of Panama for that reason. I did not discover 
 anything in Nicaragua that was equal to an Arkansas canebrake in the St. 
 Francis bottoms. I did not discover anything in the way of a forest that w^s 
 equal to a Wisconsin forest. I did not discover anything in the way of in- 
 sects that was equal to experiences I have had on the Missouri River bottoms 
 in the State of Nebraska. 
 
 We looked particularly into the health conditions, and I am just as confi- 
 dent of the health conditions in Nicaragua as I am along the Gulf coast of the 
 United States; and I am not as confident of the health conditions at Panama. 
 
 I believe that those conditions, the mere difference on that one thing of 
 
35 
 
 comparative health alone, will make the diflference hetween a profit and a 
 loss to a syndicate that undertakes to build these works. I Tjelieve. further, 
 that if you will take the $40,()(M),()00 with which it is proposed to buy the situa- 
 tion at Panama, and spend that sum judiciously in Nicaragua, and then re- 
 call this same Commi&sion, there will not be a question of doubt as to the su- 
 periority of the Nicaragua route in the mind or any man who has signed this 
 last report. That is my best judgment, and I am very firm in that conclu- 
 sion. 
 
 The Chairman. I wish now, Mr. Cooley, to get your views on the com- 
 mercial and military advantages of the Nicaragua route as compared with 
 the Panama route, for the benefit of the United States Government and the 
 people of the United States, and I will be^in by asking you first as to the pos- 
 sibility of a local development of production and concentration of population 
 on the Nicaragua route; and the basis of that would be, first, the tempera- 
 ture of the country and its healthfulness. I ask you now, if you please, to 
 describe that country with reference to this matter. 
 
 Mr. Cooley. I looxed into that phase of it for the reason that, as a com- 
 mercial enterprise, which was then proposed, the question of what assets 
 could be created by a corporation building the canal there was a very mate- 
 rial question as to its profits, and whether it was justified in undertaking the 
 scheme at all or not. 
 
 Nicaragua Ues practically in the same latitude north as Java or the East 
 Indies lie in the south. It has eveiy variety of climate, from the lowlands, 
 where they produce indigo and cocoa and various fiber plants and fruits, 
 clear up to the frost line. 
 
 The Chairman. Rubber? 
 
 Mr. Cooley. Rubber trees, yes; and at an altitude of 1.200 to 1,500 feet you 
 strike the coffee belt, extending to the frost line, and up at the frost line and 
 above you can raise the northern cereals and vegetables. At a market in San 
 Jose I saw a collectian of kitchen truck raised m Costa Rica near the frost 
 line in the month of February that would duplicate a northern market garden. 
 
 You can select your climate. Nicaragua, Honduras, and Costa Rica, in an 
 area of perhaps 5(),(J00 to C0,(KX) square miles naturally tributary to the Nica- 
 ragua Valley— more than the State of New York, more than the island of 
 Java— has every variety of climate. I mention the island of Java because it 
 is one of the most highly developed spots on earth, carrying a population of 
 24,0(X),000 on 47,(XX) square miles. I believe that Nicaragua has as large a 
 potential, from the Pacific at the Bay of Fonseca through to the Caribfc^n. 
 Wheth'^r the country east of Castillo will be susceptible of much develop- 
 ment I do not know. They have develoi)ed a good deal on the Rama River, 
 and at Bluefields and at Limon they have done considerable in the way of 
 
 S reducing bananas. The bananas of the United States coming into New 
 cleans come largely from Bluefields, and the bananas going to New York 
 come largely from Limon, Costa Rica, and in the interior you can produce 
 everything that a tropical country produces. 
 
 As to the health conditions, I made diUgent inquiry, on the western divi- 
 sion, of Dr. Flmt, a man over 80 years old, at Rivas, who has lived in tho 
 country since 1848 as a practicing physician, and of Dr. Cole, who has been 
 there since 1854, at Rivas. I could not learn that they had any diseases which 
 we need bo apprehensive about, especially on the western division, and that 
 it was immune, you might say, from such things as kidney troubles and 
 rheumatism. 
 
 The Chairman. Pneumonia? 
 
 Mr. Cooley. No; they have pneumonia everywhere on earth. Tuberculosis 
 is not in the country, I believe. I asked Dr. Flint, after I had gone over the en- 
 tire catalogue, what the people really did die of, because it was evident that 
 they died. He said that the majority of the death i-ate in this country is due 
 to lack of proper nutrition and to dissipation. 
 
 On the Atlantic side we had Dr. Soto, who accompanied our party as physi- 
 cian to see that none of us got into ill health, and we got from nim the statis- 
 tics of what little experience they had had at Greytown with the force that 
 they worked there when he was the company's physician. He asserted that 
 there had never been a case of yellow fever at Greytown, unless it was 
 sx)oradic, and had been brought there. There had been only four cases that 
 ho knew of as a matter of fact, and that the so-called yellow fever, jungle 
 fever, spotted fever, or whatever you call them, which all belong to the men- 
 ingitis type, were not virulent. That was also the testimony of Dr. Flint and 
 Dr. Cole. 
 
 A year later a physician came to my place in Chicago and wanted to go 
 somewhere in the Tropics. There were four of them in the party bent on 
 new experiences and scientific collections, and I ad^^sed Nicaragua, and asked 
 that they investigate especially the health condition there. 
 
 One of these gentlemen turned up in my oflico three or four months ago 
 He had spent four months in Nicaragua, and as a physician he had inquired 
 diligently. He had si)ent part of his time in the Silico lagoon country down 
 around Greytown himting alligators and collecting sjpecimens for museums. 
 
He said he had ahsolntely no tronble, and he finally summed up the situation 
 as his personal opinion that no man need die in Nicaragua except of old age, 
 if he will take care of himself. 
 
 Now, the evidence of our own party was that we took 15 men across the 
 Isthmus. It was a question whether wo should make special provision and 
 take special precaution about the water and things of that kind. Mr. Mason 
 very sensibly remarked that if we ever did business in that country we would 
 have to drink the water that was in the country, and he was going to drink 
 it all. So we all did the same. We drank aU the water we came to, from one 
 side of the Isthmus to the other. 
 
 The Chairman. Took it as you came to it? 
 
 Mr. Coo LEY. Oh, yes. There were some streams that we avoided, of 
 course, used otir horse sense about, just as we would in the United States. 
 And there was no man in our party who suffered from it. On the Pacific 
 side we rode horses and some of us had not been on horseback for years. 
 Some were men of age. and we went right out there for four days and camped 
 on the ground, and slept out nights. On the Atlantic side we walked under 
 very great fatigue and camped out every night, and no man was inconven- 
 ienced, although the fatigue was as great as you coTild experience under any 
 conditions in tiie United States. 
 
 None of us experienced any inconvenience except Mr. Stephens, who 
 ought not to have taken that trip, because he was a man nearly 60 years of 
 age, and he got very much exhausted, tired out, and when he got up to San 
 Jose, Costa Rica, he had a little touch of intermittent fever that lasted him a 
 week and was vei'y light. That was the only experience of that kind we 
 had. And I feel confident that if we had stopped at Greytown a couple of 
 days longer and rested, he would not have come down with it. 
 
 The Chairman. Is that a good fruit country? 
 
 Mr. COOLEY. I was shown an orange tree at Greytown from which they 
 had picked 200 boxes of fruit the previous year. 
 
 The Chairman. Two hundred boxes? 
 
 Mr. COOLBY. Yes. 
 
 The Chairman. About how many in a box? 
 
 Mr. CooLEY. I don't know how many. There are about 125 in the ordi- 
 nary shipping box. That was told to me by the consul at that point. At 
 Castillo I picked limes off of trees that were loaded. 
 
 On the Pacific side the oranges were growing wild. There was no market 
 for them. The citrus fruits, I think, grow well all the way across. 
 
 The Chairman. And cocoa? 
 
 Mr. CooLBY. Yes; that is the chocolate bean. Manier, the French choco- 
 late man, whose brand you buy all over the country, has his plantations near 
 Rivas. 
 
 The Chairman. Is it an attractive country in its topography and scenery? 
 
 Mr. CooLEY. The shores of Lake Nicaragua are beaiitiful as a dream. 
 Lake Nicaragua is about half as bi^ as Lake Ontario. If I was leading the 
 ideal life which some people are striving for I should spend six months of the 
 year on Lake Nicaragua, or in that valley there after this canal was opened. 
 
 I feel a kind of indignation when I hear people talk fiippantly about this 
 health question. I remember that the army, the crack service of the United 
 States, with selected lives, were not able to do as well in Cuba or as well at 
 Chattanooga, right in our own country, as we did on the Chicago Drainage 
 Canal with 8,000 hoboes picked up from all creation. There we had as good 
 a condition of health as m the best wards of Chicago. The health question 
 was one that I went into deeply, and I think I can say justly that through my 
 initiative in that matter and through the cooperation of the State board of 
 health of Illinois that for the first time in the history of great public works 
 we produced an ideal condition of health. 
 
 The Chairman. Ometepe, which is a little island filled with volcanoes that 
 I think are extinct, in Lake Nicaragua, is referred to by some medical au- 
 thorities as being a very excellent site for hospitals and for sanitariums. 
 
 Mr. CooLEY. I think it undoubtly would be. 
 
 The Chairman. For navigators and sailors? 
 
 Mr. CooiiEY. I think it undoubtedly would be ideal; anywhere on that 
 western division is a fine coxmtry. Up there on the Brito headland, nearly 
 400 feet above the sea, is an outlook that is magnificent. 
 
 The Chairman. I believe that used to be a place of resort for the coast 
 people? 
 
 Mr. CooLEY. Yes; so I understand. I think anywhere around there the 
 health conditions are excellent. 
 
 MB. SOKSBY AND MR. DONALDSON, OUR CONSULS IN NICARAGUA, TESTIFY. 
 
 If we take the picture of Panama as drawn by Capt. Bedfore 
 Pirn, Baron Humboldt, and the Panama Canal Commission, and 
 set it beside that drawn by General Alexander and Mr. Cooley, 
 and by Consuls Sorsby and Donaldson, and if we could resolve 
 
37 
 
 every question in favor of Panama, except that of health, hn- 
 manity wonld forbid us from priceing that priceless blessing at 
 $5,630,704 and choosing a country always subject to the ravages 
 of sickness for the use of millions of people in preference to a 
 beautiful and healthful canal route through Nicaragua. Consul 
 Donaldson has resided at Managua, in Nicaragua, since 189a. He 
 went there with the Ludlow Commission as an engineer. 
 
 These depositions were taken in June, 1900. They are of great 
 importance and can not be abbreviated so as to present a correct 
 view of the facts stated in them. A few facts from each will 
 show their knowledge of the healthfulness of Nicaragua. Mr. 
 Donaldson says: 
 
 Q. I suppose your travels \7ith the engineering parties you accompanied 
 through tne San Juan region have given you an opportunity to bo stricken 
 with any of the diseases of that country? 
 
 A. Yes; I have had plenty of opportunities. I have slept in all sorts of 
 places. 
 
 Q. Slept in wet clothes? 
 
 A. I will not say I slept in wet clothes, because I always carried a bundle 
 wrapped in rubber, so that I could have something dry to wear for the 
 night. I have gone all day in wet clothes, have put on wet clothes in the 
 morning, and have done so for months at a time; but at night I have always 
 had dry i>ajam,as to get into and a dry blanket, which I kept rolled up in a 
 rubber sack. 
 
 Q. That was during your engineering work? 
 
 A. Yes. 
 
 Q. Were any of your party troubled with malaria or chills? 
 
 A. Nobody m our party had any sickness at all. We had 10 Americans in 
 the party, besides natives. 
 
 Q. Taking Nicaragua from ocean to ocean, would you be willing to say that 
 it is a healthful or an unhealthful country? 
 
 A. I should say that the country is perfectly healthful. The only unhealth- 
 ful places are the cities, and that is owing to their filthy conditions. 
 
 Q, You have a family of children? 
 
 A. I have three children. 
 
 Q. And they have been brought up in that country? 
 
 A. They have been in better health in that country than when they were 
 in New York. My youngest little girl in this country had a bronchial trouble 
 after she had had the whooping cough in New York at the age of 3. and natu- 
 rally I felt somewhat anxious about taking her to Nicaragua. But she has 
 come back to New York and is to-day one of the strongest little girls you ever 
 saw— at the age of 8 now. 
 
 Q. Taking Nicaragua from ocean to ocean, through and through, you 
 would say, I supi)ose, that it would be a very valuable country in the hands 
 of people who had any industry and thrift? 
 
 A. Yes. By nature it is a rich country and perfectly healthful. There is 
 nothing under the sun they need there but industi*y. It would make a fine 
 country to live in. 
 
 Q. For small farmers, particularly? 
 
 A. Yes. You can get a splendid climate there by going up 3,000 feet, where 
 you would not suffer from heat at all. It is only in the low country where 
 you suffer. I have siiffered much more in New York from heat than I ever 
 have in Managua. There is nothing the matter with the country; there is 
 nothing the matter with the climate; the whole difliculty lies witn the peo- 
 ple. They are too easy-going; they take life very easily. 
 
 Mr. Sorsby, who has resided at Grey town since 1898, says: 
 
 Senator Morgan. Are the lands in the valley of the San Juan River valu- 
 able— I mean for agricultural purposes and timber? 
 
 Mr. Sorsby. They are, beginmng at about 6 or 7 miles up the river from 
 Grey town. 
 
 Senator Morgan. And extending up to the lake? 
 
 Mr. Sorsby. Yes, sir; except immediately on the bank above Castillo. 
 
 Senator Morgan. If a ship canal were constructed through that country 
 would it add to the value of those lands* 
 
 Mr. Sorsby. It would add enormously to the value of the lands from about 
 that distance up. 
 
 Sei\ator Morgan. What are the chief agricultural and horticultural pro- 
 ductions of that country? 
 
 Mr. Sorsby. The chief production at present on the river is cacao, and 
 there is a great deal of rubber brought out from there. There are several 
 5162 
 
mbber plantations planted there. There are several cattle ranches along 
 the river. There are some bananas planted; not much, though it is consid- 
 ered excellent for bananas. There is none grown there now, because of the 
 difficulty of handling them, of shipping over the bar. The woods, the tim- 
 bers, higher up the river are considered fine and good. 
 
 Senator Mokgan. What kind of timber is it? 
 
 Mr. SoRSBY. I have seen various kind of hard wood. 
 
 Senator Morgan. Mahogany? 
 
 Mr. SoRSBY. No, sir; I have not seen any mahogany there. Up the river, 
 near the lake, there is quite a lot of cedar, red cedar, and several varieties of 
 cedar. There a*e various kinds of hard woods in there that I do not know 
 the names of. 
 
 Senator Morgan. Is it a coffee country? 
 
 Mr. SORSBY. No, sir. Between the lake and Greytown and near the line of 
 the proposed canal, or near the line of the river, it is not considered a coffee 
 country. The elevation is too low. 
 
 Senator Morgan. Is it a sugar country? 
 
 Mr. SoRSBY. Yes, sir; I think the soil and climate admirable for the culti- 
 vation of sugar cane. 
 
 Senator Morgan. Rice? 
 
 Mr. SoRSBY. Yes, sir; sugar, rice, friuts, and vegetables of all kinds. 
 
 Senator Morgan. Indian com? 
 
 Mr. SoRSBY. I doubt that Indian com "woxild grow very well in any part of 
 the country. 
 
 Senator MORGAN. Is it a good cattle country? 
 
 Mr. SORSBY. Yes, sir; a good cattle country. 
 
 Senator Morgan. Does it appear to be a well- watered country? 
 
 Mr. SoRSBY. Yes, sir. 
 
 Senator Morgan. How about the health of that region between the lake 
 and the seaboard? 
 
 Mr. Sorsby. I can only answer that by referring to the men employed by 
 the Nicaragua Canal Commission. 
 
 Senator Morgan. Have no people settled in that region? 
 
 Mr. Sorsby. There are some settlements immediately on the river banks 
 and up the various rivers emptying into the San Juan River. 
 
 Senator Morgan. Leading into, you mean? 
 
 Mr. Sorsby. Leading into the San Juan River. I have seen a great many 
 of those people— some foreigners are in there— living on the San Carlos and 
 various other rivers leading into the San Juan River, and the universal ex- 
 pression is that it is healthy. 
 
 Senator Morgan. Is there any yellow fever or Chagres fever in that 
 country? 
 
 Mr. Sorsby. There is no yellow fever in any part of Nicaragua. 
 
 Senator Morgan. Is there any Chagres fever? 
 
 Mr. Sorsby. No, sir; nothing that resembles either yellow or Chagres fever 
 on the Atlantic side. There is no yellow fever in any part of Nicaragua, 
 though at Granada and Managua they have malarial fevers. They are quite 
 prevalent during what is known as the dry season up there. 
 
 Senator Morgan. That is on the lake? 
 
 Mr. Sorsby. Yes,sir; on the two lakes. It is attributed to the bad sanitary 
 conditions and the water that is used. 
 
 Senator Morgan. If I understand you correctly, tne valley of the San 
 Juan River is very sparsely inhabited? 
 
 Mr. Sorsby. Yes, sir. 
 
 Senator Morgan. Is the forest heavy? 
 
 Mr. Sorsby. The undergrowth is very heavy. 
 
 Senator Morgan. Almost impenetrable? 
 
 Mr. Sorsby. Yes, sir. 
 
 Senator Morgan. What is the effect of the rainfall in that part of Nica- 
 ragua upon the health and comfort of those living in that region? 
 
 Mr. Sorsby. I think it is beneficial to health. It is inconvenient. It has 
 the effect of keeping fresh water in all the lagoons there. The engineers of 
 the canal commission tell me that they drank their water out of the lagoons 
 and streams, and it was good. In Greytown it serves to freshen the atmos- 
 phere, and there is very little sickness during the rainy system. 
 
 Senator Morgan. I gather from your statement, then, that the rainfall 
 there would neither be deleterious to the health of the country nor to the 
 construction or preservation of such a work as a canal with embankments? 
 
 Mr. Sorsby. It certainly would not affect the preservation, judging from 
 the indication shown by tne work that has been done there. It might be 
 inconvenient. Constant rainfall would naturally be inconvenient to a day 
 laborer. It is con.sidered there that that is the healthiest jjart of the year in 
 Qre3rtown and vicinity. 
 
 I thought these features of the case of sufficient importance to 
 require that the facts should be presented in some detail. 
 
 6162 
 
Under the health conditions as they are and will remain it 
 seems impossible that the United States can furnish the money 
 and take the risk of the sacrifice of lives that are necessary to 
 purchase and complete the canal at Panama. 
 
 POLICE POWERS NECESSARY IN SANITATION. 
 
 Connected with the health conditions at Panama, in such a 
 way that it is inseparable, is the question of police jurisdiction 
 and control of the bays of Colon and Panama, and of these cities. 
 A joint control of these places is indispensable to sanitation and 
 the preservation of the peace. , 
 
 A mixed or joint control is incongruous, irritating, and danger- 
 ous. In fact, it is utterly inadmissible. 
 
 The city of Panama is the capital of a State of Panama, and 
 lies within less than 3 miles of the Panama Canal; and the Pan- 
 ama Railroad enters the city. 
 
 It can not be reasonably expected that the powers of local gov- 
 ernment vested in that State and necessary for the control of its 
 capital city, whatever they may be, will be yielded to the United 
 States in whole or in part; or, if that should occur, that we 
 could expect to use them with such vigor and so exclusively as is 
 necessary in sanitation and quarantine. 
 
 In all our efforts to repress the contagion of yellow fever the 
 highest powers of government, both State and Federal, have 
 been necessarily resorted to, and even these have been frequently 
 ineffectual to prevent bands of private persons from anned inter- 
 ference with the regulations established by law. 
 
 Personal liberty, in its most personal and individual sense, is 
 always involved in the execution of health regulations, and such 
 occasions require the exertion of the most direct and arbitrary 
 authority, backed by force in frequent instances. 
 
 It will be in vain that we will hope to control or suppress yel- 
 low fever or the bubonic plague, cholera, beri-beri, or leprosy, to 
 all of which Panama is at all times exposed, when either Panama 
 or Colombia is to be allowed a voice in the regulations we must 
 adopt, or in the selection and control of the men who are to enforce 
 them. It is sheer folly to undertake such a conflict as is required 
 to suppress yellow fever with forces divided and alien to each 
 other, in the midst of a mixed throng of low-grade people. 
 
 The control of the trade and intercourse between Colon and 
 Panama, the State capital, and Carthagena, the commercial cap- 
 ital, and Bogota, the political capital of Colombia, by the con- 
 cessionaires of a canal, except by force or by some special agree- 
 ment, is impossible. The people of those places will not tolerate 
 sanitary regulations that will prevent their free intercourse. The 
 importance of this exclusive control of sanitation is gi*eatly mag- 
 nified when we attempt to apply the necessary regulations, at all 
 times and without relaxation, as they must be applied to the oc- 
 cupants of Panama City and to the intercourse of the people of 
 all nations through this highway of the world. 
 
 If the regulations are not of absolute authority and strictly and 
 continually enforced, the canal ^vill become an artery for the dis- 
 semination of diseases through the world. 
 
 WHY WE ARE AGAIN IN PANAMA WITH WAR SHIPS. 
 
 In 1846 we entered into a treaty agreement with New Gran- 
 ada — now Colombia — to guarantee the sovereignty of that Repub- 
 lic over the State of Panama. The consideration for this agree- 
 
 5102 
 
irn?iit, as it was expressed in tlie treaty, was of little value aa 
 compared with the burden of this engagement, which has proven 
 to be serious and is now a source of expense, anxiety, and trouble 
 to us. The real consideration was that our duty of protection 
 was exclusive and carried with it the right to admit or refuse 
 other nations to assume a like close relation with Colombia. 
 This became manifest when Great Britain and France, on the 
 suggestion of Colombia, sought to share with the United States 
 these burdens and obligations, which we refused; and so the mat- 
 ter stands to-day. 
 
 In 1846 Colombia had a single purpose in making that treaty, 
 which was, with our assistance, to hold the State of Panama sub- 
 ject to her sovereign dominion. The same cause exists to-day, and 
 the danger against which Colombia was providing is greater than 
 it was in 1 846 , and for stronger reasons. The cause is that Panama 
 has always been averse to the union with Colombia, preferring 
 independence or a union with the other isthmian States. They 
 have no patriotic sentiment and no identity of* business relations 
 to support the union with the continental States of Colombia. 
 Conste-nt jealousy has, on four occasions, broken out into open 
 wars of insurrection since 1846. 
 
 There have been and are still internecine wars, and are all po- 
 litical in character. Holding Panama in the leash bound to Co- 
 lombia, as we have been compelled to do and are now doing, we 
 incur the natural resentment of those people, nearly all of whose 
 possessions of any real value are at the canal terminals or near to 
 its line. 
 
 AN TJNTRrENDLY PEOPLE IN PANAMA. 
 
 If we acquire control of those people, along with the bays, the 
 cities, the railroad, and the canal, we will encounter the serious 
 difficulty of using and operating them among an unfriendly people. 
 
 Power alone can not be relied upon to protect a canal under 
 such conditions, and the task is full of dangers, especially where 
 the country is already occupied by insubordinate and revolutionary 
 elements. We may get along without it, but the experiment is very 
 costly at the price of $5,630,704, with an additional stipend to be 
 paid to Colombia. Panama must be paid at least the $25,000 per 
 annum, secured to her in the railroad concession, for more than 
 sixty years to come, or for all time, if the lease is to be made per- 
 petual, because she holds that right against the railroad company 
 under and as part of the concession of Colombia to the Panama 
 Railroad, which has been enacted as a public statute by the 
 Colombian Congress. 
 
 When Panama shall hereafter seek to increase her allowance as 
 the price of peace and good conduct toward the canal, as she cer- 
 tainly will, we will naturally expect trouble. 
 
 THERE IS NO ADVERSE CONDITION IN NICARAGUA OR COSTA RICA. 
 
 These political, sanitary, police, and social conditions are quite 
 the reverse on the Nicaragua route. There we have no natural 
 causes of epidemic diseases to remove, and yellow fever has never 
 been a visitor to the region in which the canal is located. It is a 
 salubrious country, constantly fanned by the trade winds, with a 
 temperature that varies only 30 degrees, between 56 and 96 Fah- 
 renheit, with a lake system, 45 miles across and 140 miles long, in 
 the center of the land, over which these winds move without ob- 
 struction. 
 
 The island of Ometepe, in Lake Nicaragua, has been selected by 
 
 6162 
 
41 
 
 the common judgment of travelers as a sanitarium for seamen 
 who will pass it on their long and weary voyages. The beautifnl 
 country is a place of refreshment for all voyagers, abounding in 
 excellent fruits and supplies of fresh foods. The lake can be con- 
 veniently utilized for the repairs of vessels, even to the cleansing 
 of the bottoms from the accumulation of sea grasses and barnacles 
 that lower their speed while they are en voyage passing through 
 its fresh waters. 
 
 But a much greater advantage as to sanitation and police is the 
 fact that this fertile country is practically unoccupied, and, un- 
 der our control, the future occupants will be subject to our selec- 
 tion. Bad characters can not congregate in the canal belt or in 
 the ports, if we object. In Panama this vital question is one of 
 expulsion. In Nicaragua it is a question of our permission. The 
 difference is wide enough and sufficiently important to make it 
 fundamental in the choice of a canal route. 
 
 At Panama it -is a question of purging out the bad characters 
 found in a low-grade population of 30,000 in a district of 35 
 miles. 
 
 At Nicaragua the question is whether we will tolerate bad men, 
 or demoralizing occupations, in the building up of the cities, towns, 
 and farms in the canal belt, which has not more than 2,000 in- 
 habitants in a distance of 183 miles. 
 
 There is no economic question connected with the future man- 
 agement of the canal of more importance than that of peopling 
 the canal belt and the terminal cities with proper occupants. 
 
 I am only touching the outline of all these vital questions, 
 leaving the further and better discussions of their merits to 
 others. 
 
 THE POLITICAL COOPEIIATTON OF THREE REPUBLICS. 
 
 It is a political situation of great moment, and it is a cause of 
 sincere gratification to the three Republics concerned in this canal 
 that their interests are unified and not discordant, as the interests 
 of the State of Panama are toward those of Colombia. 
 
 Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and the United States, if they unite in 
 establishing this canal by agreement, are not seeking profits from 
 its earnings, but from the general prosperity it will bring to the 
 Governments and the people of the three Republics. No local 
 dissension can arise in either Republic to question its sovereign 
 power to enter into or to keep the compact, such as may arise in 
 Panama. 
 
 The maintainance, safety, and prosperity of the canal is so 
 identified with the growth and solidarity of Costa Rica and Nica- 
 ragua, from which it is inseparable, that they will gladly con- 
 tribute all their governmental and moral power to its support and 
 protection. They will both be jealous for the safety and prosper- 
 ity of the canal, with no cause for jealousy toward each other as 
 to ownership or control, and the United States will he bound to 
 both in every bond of regard and sympathy and by the great and 
 overruling necessity of shortening the distance between all our 
 Eastern ports on the Great Lakes, the Atlantic and the Gulf of 
 Mexico, and our ports and possessions along the coast and in the 
 islands of the Pacific Ocean. 
 
 There seems to be no room for disagreement in future, when 
 our mutual interests are common to each Republic, and are en- 
 tirely separated from competition with each other. Such accord 
 and concurrence in the establishment of this gi-eat benefaction U} 
 
 5162 
 
42 
 
 mankind is a new and splendid proof of the unity and harmony 
 of principle that exists in the spirit and purpose of republican 
 government. 
 
 TBANSPORTATION IN SAILING SHIPS. 
 
 A greater question than any I have tried to present, so far as it 
 affects the commerce of the United States and the prosperity of 
 those who create commerce by production, manufactures, and 
 transportation, is directly presented in the proposition to purchase 
 and complete the Panama Canal. 
 
 That question is, whether vessels propelled by sail will be driven 
 from the ocean trade and ultimately from existence, by vessels 
 propelled by steam. This prediction is urged by the Panamists 
 as an inevitable fact. It is a prophecy of evil to mankind, which 
 Congress is asked to assist in fulfilling speedily. If it is a proph- 
 ecy like that which chained the blinded Sampson to the pillars 
 of the temple, the result will be equally destructive to all. 
 
 It is a disturbing thought and a distressing forecast, that the 
 alleged rapid progress of civilization, through commercial ex- 
 pansion, requires that we should discard the ocean winds that 
 have built up commerce from its cradle. 
 
 It is neither commercial wisdom nor common sense that would 
 cause the world to dispense with this incalculable power of the 
 ocean winds in propelling vessels, that is the free gift of the 
 Creator, and is always ready for use, to take up steam as the mo- 
 tive power of ships of commerce only for the reason that time is 
 saved in making voyages. 
 
 The saying that "time is money," which alone accounts for 
 this attempted destructive revolution in commercial economics, 
 means that money and credit are to supplant the benevolence of 
 the All- wise Creator in conferring this blessing upon all the gen- 
 erations of men. 
 
 That condition has not been reached and we will not witness 
 the day of its arrival. Our effort to hasten it will fail. May 
 God protect the people of the United States and of the world 
 against that day. 
 
 I have less dread of its realization because the prophets of this 
 evil are driven to this course of reasoning by the weight of the 
 fact that the calm belt off the bay of Panama is impracticable 
 for the profitable employment of sailing vessels. It is an absurd 
 theory, adopted as the only escape from a fatal dilemma. If 
 "the wish is not fathei* to the thought," the thought at least is 
 not disturbing to the advocates of the Panama route. They ac- 
 cept it as a decree of fate, with philosophic indifference to the 
 result. They openly avow that the Panama Canal is to be com- 
 pleted without any reference whatever to the interests or advan- 
 tages of the owners and navigators of sailing vessels or any losses 
 they may sustain through the assistance of Congress to increase 
 competitive advantages of vessels propelled by steam. 
 
 THE ISSUE IS SQUARELY MADE AND THIS CONGRESS WILL DECIDE IT ON 
 THIS BILL. 
 
 No more reckless an attitude was ever taken with reference to 
 an economic question, or with less benevolence, reason, or jus- 
 tice to support it. But by confession of the advocates of the 
 Panama route, boldly stated, and by the pressure of facts that 
 can not be controverted or avoided the issue is squarely made 
 and must be met. 
 
 L162 
 
43 
 
 Since the era in which Job spoke of those " that go down to 
 the sea in ships," the winds have been as necessary to sea travel 
 and commerce as the rains have been to the productions of the 
 soil, and it is as likely that men and animals will abandon, the 
 brooks and springs and take to hot drinks as it is that steam will 
 supplant the winds in the movement of ships. 
 
 Steam represents the mechanical force of expansion, caused by 
 heat operating upon water, while the winds represent that 
 force, combined with the force of gravitation, oi)erating upon 
 the air, a highly elastic agent. Through these qualities the winds 
 transport themselves to the places where they are needed for com- 
 merce, by the action of natural laws, and they are unfailing in 
 supply and in volume and power. They are almost, if not quite 
 as certain as " the stai*s in their courses," and require no prep- 
 aration of human labor or skill to prepare them for their work, 
 or to marshal them in their constant array to answer the calls of 
 the Master, who directs the breezes and rules and guides the 
 tempests. 
 
 The winds are not dug from the deep mines under the moun- 
 tains and transported on- railroads to the seaboard as coals are, 
 and they require no human help to cross the seas to some coaling 
 station, again to be handled and transferred to coal bunkers, 
 and again handled in furnace rooms of ships under the severest 
 exactions upon human health and strength. The winds, once 
 used, return to the places where they were found, awaiting the 
 service of man, with all their vigor and elastic force. But coals, 
 when once they are used to generate power, disappear and can not 
 be recreated. They create a vacuum in eai-th and air that they 
 can not restore. 
 
 Comparing these forces, a child should understand the imi>er- 
 ishable nature and value of the winds, and be able to contrast 
 them with the perishable forces generated from coal, which con- 
 sume themselves in the use. If the winds did not come to the aid 
 of coal, to transport it to the points where it is to be used in 
 steamships, the percentage consumed in tliis transportation, like 
 an eating cancer, would soon destroy the body that supports it. 
 
 Africa, South America, the Pacific coasts of Russia and North 
 America, and the vast area of southern Asia are so scantily sux>- 
 plied with coal that the commerce of those regions could not be 
 transported by the power of steam that they could supply during 
 a period of even a half century. The rapid-transit commerce of 
 those regions, which only includes such commodities as c^n bear 
 the burden of heavy freight rates, is transported in steamers that 
 burn coals from Germany, the United Kingdom, Australia, and 
 the United States. The coal supply of the Eastern Hemisphere 
 begins to fall away, and all Europe, including Germany and Great 
 Britain, are beginning to import coals from America. 
 
 That fact strikes the vain notion dead, that steamships will 
 ever drive sailing ships from the oceans. This fact is exemplified 
 in the lists of steamships and sailing ships built in the United 
 States in 1901, which I will append to my remarks. 
 
 On the contrary, the cost of steam transportation, as it affects 
 commerce in the coarser and cheai)er articles of traffic, is so 
 burdensome to countries that have scant supplies of coal tliat 
 France is granting heavy subsidies to sailing vessels, with the 
 effect of a rapid growth of such tonnage under her flag within 
 
44 
 
 the past five years, and Norway-Sweden is rapidly increasing 
 her merchant sailing fleet. 
 
 THE INCREASE OF STEAMSHIPS. 
 
 After the opening of the Suez Canal in 1871 there was a rapid 
 increase in the number and tonnage of steamships for ocean serv- 
 ice, in which Great Britain led all other countries and hegan by 
 pouring subsidies into their coffers. 
 
 This movement was in pursuance of a great and necessary 
 national policy of Great Britain far more than as a result of any 
 legitimate commercial demand for rapid or cheap transportation. 
 Great Britain had her Pacific- possessions to guard and care for. 
 She had Egypt and South Africa to look after, and the trade of 
 India to continue to hold in the grasp of monopoly. She had Rus- 
 sia to exclude from the Mediterranean, and France, Italy, Ger- 
 many, Spain, and Portugal to compete with for the traffic of the 
 Orient. 
 
 There were no winds in the Red Sea to move sailing ships, and 
 there were dangerous winds in the Indian Ocean and fitful winds 
 in the Mediterranean that rendered sailing ships useless on the 
 Suez Canal route. She purchased the stock of the Khedive in the 
 canal en bloc, and, while it was not the majority of the stock of 
 the canal company, it enabled her to put her directors in that 
 company, which she did. And by repressive influences of a dip- 
 lomatic sort she strangled the possible competition of an Ameri- 
 can isthmian waterway, while she was reaping great profits from 
 her Suez Canal stock and was forcing new channels of trade 
 through the Pacific Ocean. 
 
 It was not that she abandoned her long-settled policy of building 
 sailing ships as the burden bearers of commerce, but because she 
 needed more steamships for emergent service to work the Suez 
 Canal and to maintain her supremacy on the sea. 
 
 The proof of this is clear when the rapid and great increase of 
 sailing-ship tonnage to Australia and around the Cape of Good 
 Hope is considered. 
 
 In 1884 vessels aggregating 1,565,649 tons entered and cleared 
 at the Cape of Good Hope. In the year 1898 this tonnage 
 amounted to 5,602,955, a fivefold increase in fourteen years. 
 The proportion of sailing ships in this increased tonnage was 
 greater than it was before the Suez Canal was opened. It was 
 the Suez Canal fleet of steamers that she so rapidly increased 
 with the stimulus of subsidies, while her sailing ships increased 
 without such aids. 
 
 AMERICAN VESSELS AND THEIR TONNAGE, 
 
 On page 1146 of the Hearings Professor Johnson gives the ton- 
 nage of registered American vessels as follows: 
 
 Steamers, 1,183,000 tons; sailing vessels, 1,360,000 tons, show- 
 ing an excess of 177,000 tons in favor of sailing ships. Having 
 reached this safe equilibrium, the sailing-ship construction is re- 
 suming its activity and is steadily growing. It does not grow so 
 rapidly as steamships in tonnage, but more rapidly in the num- 
 ber of vessels. 
 
 Ships enrolled for the coastwise trade are not included in the 
 above statement, and the professor states that three-fifths of the 
 coastwise trade is conducted in sailing ships. 
 
 It is needless to speculate how or why these conditions have 
 
45 
 
 occnrred. They are actual and existing conditions, established 
 by actual computations in iBgures. They certainly do not justify 
 adverse prophecies as to their ultimate disappearance. 
 
 The proposition to create a canal by drawing on the treasury of 
 the people, and to locate it where sailing ships can not use it, be- 
 cause of the calm belt into which its Pacific terminus opens, thereby 
 depriving more than half the tonnage of the United States of all 
 advantage from it, is simply monstrous, when taken by itself. 
 
 It is grievously unjust when it drives sailing ships, built on 
 either coast, from access to the other, even around Cai)e Horn, in 
 profitable voyages, by giving to steamships the advantage of 
 more than 10,000 miles in distance in passing to and from the 
 North Atlantic and North Pacific, and by shutting them off from 
 such opportunity it is unjust to all commercial men and to all 
 producers and manufacturers by destroying more than one-half 
 the competition beween water transportation and railroad trans- 
 portation on commodities that find their interchangeable mar- 
 kets on our sea coasts, lake shores, and gulf coasts from Sitka 
 around to Duluth. 
 
 It is ruinous to individual enterprise in the building, owning, 
 and navigating sailing ships, by turning over the whole business 
 of ocean transportation to the owners of costly steamer lines, and 
 putting the commercial dominion of the seas in the hands of cor- 
 porate trusts, and of the combiner; of the sceptered masters of 
 finance and credit who are called capitalists. 
 
 There is no American need of such exclusive privileges, and it 
 is sheer spoliation to tax the people to the extent of $180,000,000 
 in this generation to construct the canal and in all coming gener- 
 ations to make them pay tolls on their productions to support 
 such privileged classes, while they will gather harvests of gold 
 from their labors. 
 
 I pass by the contracts of the Panama Railroad with other lines 
 of transports now existing and have in the recent past extorted 
 hundreds of millions of dollars from producers, chiefly from the 
 people of the Pacific slope, to which agreements the United States 
 will become a party when it buys the Panama Railroad, with the 
 consent of New York. As compared with the destruction of our 
 sailing ships that we would surely visit upon them in purchasing 
 and completing the Panama Canal, this is even a smaller naatter 
 than the inheritance of the Panama scandals, which will stink in 
 the nostrils of all men who live and all who shall follow us. 
 
 When the era of destruction has overtaken the sailing ships, 
 which is so flippantly predicted by our economic soothsayers, 
 then, also, will come the era of lockouts and strikes in the coal 
 mines of the leading producers of " sea power," and commerce 
 will be brought to a standstill, a dead center, in all the seaports 
 of the world. Labor may then have its dire revenge upon capi- 
 tal, unless armies are interposed to compel miners to work, to 
 produce coal to propel the ships of war and commerce. 
 
 I can think of no more helpless state in which the world's com- 
 merce would be found than the realization of these dreams of our 
 learned pundits, who so confidently and with such a smiling air 
 of hope look forward to the abolishment of sailing ships as in- 
 convenient tools of trade. 
 
 I would then be hopeless of relief through even the magical 
 skill of the associated peace arbitrators, who now promise a great 
 
 5162 
 
46 
 
 remedy for a very slight attack of this annual visitation of lock- 
 outs and strikes. If the world is to be destroyed by fire in the 
 end of all things, I would dread the destruction of the sailing 
 ship by the fires of the steamers as the beginning of the end. 
 
 THE VALUE OF A DAY IN THE VOYAGE BETWEEN CUB ATLANTIC AND 
 PACIFIC COASTS. 
 
 If steamers are so essential to the speed of commercial inter- 
 course, or if the emergencies of war demand the shortest line 
 and the quickest voyage for our armed fleets for their rapid con- 
 centration, the advantage of a day may be vital to the country 
 in the one case or to the merchant in the other. And the cost of 
 even a day's voyage, when applied to 1^000 ships through an in- 
 definite reach of time, will be a loss of incalculable sums to the 
 persons or the government that owns the ships. 
 
 Ascertained facts, as to which there is no real controversy, 
 demonstrate the assertion that on a round trip between ports of 
 the North Atlantic and the North Pacific oceans there is an 
 actual loss of not less than three days, or seventy-two hours, be- 
 tween the voyages of steamers that will pass through a canal 
 at Panama as compared with the same steamers on voyages to 
 and from the same ports passing through the canal at Nicaragua. 
 
 This is a vital point in the economic question involved in the 
 choice of routes, and it is due to its importance that it should be 
 established in a satisfactory manner. 
 
 If we will strain our thoughts up to the conception of the ac- 
 tual loss of time and money that will fall upon the owners of 
 steam vessels that will pass through an isthmian canal in a hun- 
 dred years, which is the shortest period for any proposed lease of 
 canal privileges, and if we will add to it the loss that mil fall 
 upon the owners of cargoes, we -will find that the route which is 
 shortest by three days would be the cheapest to the American 
 people if it cost $500,000,000 more than the longer route, and that 
 $5,030,704 saved in the proposed bargain would not pay the inter- 
 est on that sum for a single year. 
 
 Sailing ships, in this connection, being entirely excluded from 
 consideration, the sailing distances for steamers between the 
 same teiininals of a voyage through the respective routes and the 
 speed of the same vessels, as it is eifected by the tides on each 
 coast and the length and the curvature of each canal, and the ad- 
 vantages of speed derived from a voyage through fresh water, 
 are the factors that decide this important economic question. 
 
 THE VOYAGE OF THE OREGON. 
 
 These points are conclusively established by the testimony in 
 favor of the Nicaraguan route. The dimensions of the ship se- 
 lected by the witnesses for the test is 5,000 tons' burden, and the 
 normal rate of speed is 10 knots an hour, or 250 miles per day. 
 The distance, computed between Key West, which is an average 
 central point on the Atlantic and Gulf coast, and San Francisco, 
 our chief mart of trade on the Pacific, is shown in the following 
 official statement of the Navy Department as to the voyage of 
 the Oregon during the war with Spain. This distance is 3,665 
 knots by the Nicaragua route, measured by the shortest practi- 
 cable line of navigation, and 3,750 knots measured by "a route 
 thfit avoids all shoal water and is absolutely safe for navigating 
 battle ships." 
 
 By the Panama route the distance is 4,363 knots, and the dif- 
 
 6162 
 
47 
 
 ference in distance is 613 knots in favor of Nicaragua by the ronte 
 that is absohitely safe for battle ships, and 965 knots by a route 
 that is practicable for battle ships and must be entirely safe for 
 5,000-ton merchant steamers. 
 
 But the supreme need for the canal being governmental, in case 
 of national emergency, the distance of 613 knots to the credit of the 
 Nicaragua route is adopted for the further basis of computation 
 as to the saving of distance, time, and money by that route. 
 
 The voyage of the Oregon, as it is stated by the Navy Depart- 
 ment, with reference to time, distance, and the cost to the Gov- 
 ernment, is as follows: 
 
 MEMORANDUM REGARDING THE PASSAGE OF THE OREGON ITROM THB 
 ATLANTIC TO THE PACIFIC. 
 
 The U. S. S. Oregon left San Francisco on March 19, 1898, with 1,567.4 tons 
 of coal on board. Of this coal, l,127i tons had been taken on board in San 
 Francisco, at a cost of $7.95 per ton, and the remaining 439.9 tons had been on 
 board previously, at a cost of $5.50 per ton, making the total value of coal on 
 board |ll,l]2.6o and the average value per ton $7.09. 
 
 Coal was received on the trip at Callao, Peru, Sandy Point, Chile, Rio de 
 Janeiro, Brazil, and Barbados, West Indies, and the vessel arrived at Key 
 West with 251.8 tons of the coal originally on board at San Francisco. 
 
 In regard to the cost of the trip through either the Nicaraguan or Panama 
 canal, the following distances were furnished by the Hydi'ographic Office, 
 Navy Department: 
 
 Knots. 
 
 San Francisco to Brito (west end of Nicaragua Canal) 2,700 
 
 Jan Juan del Norte to Key West 965 
 
 San Francisco to Panama - 3,277 
 
 Colon to Key West 1,086 
 
 The following table shows the cost of coal for the trip in making the pas- 
 sage to Key West from San Francisco by the Nicaraguan and Panama canals, 
 based on the knots per ton of coal and cost of coal taken on board in San 
 Francisco, which coal would have been enough in either case to make the 
 entii'e trip: 
 
 
 Nicaragua Canal. 
 
 Panama Canal. 
 
 
 Dis- 
 tance. 
 
 Coal. 
 
 Coal, 
 cost. 
 
 Dis- 
 tance. 
 
 Coal. 
 
 Coal, 
 cost. 
 
 San Francisco to end of 
 canal . 
 
 Miles. 
 
 2,700 
 
 . 170 
 
 965 
 
 Tons. 
 
 651.7 
 
 41 
 
 232.9 
 
 $4,620.00 
 290.69 
 
 1,651.26 
 
 Miles. 
 
 3,277 
 
 50 
 
 1,068 
 
 Tons. 
 791 
 12.1 
 
 257.8 
 
 $5,608.19 
 
 Through canal 
 
 85.79 
 
 From eastern end of canal 
 to Key West 
 
 1,827.80 
 
 
 
 Total 
 
 8,835 
 
 925.6 
 
 6,562.16 
 
 4,395 
 
 1,060.9 
 
 7,521.78 
 
 
 
 Delays at 15 tons per day . 
 
 
 
 45 
 
 319.05 
 
 
 30 
 
 212.70 
 
 Total 
 
 . 
 
 970.6 
 
 6,881.21 
 
 
 1,090.9 
 
 7,833.48 
 
 
 
 
 Coal remaining on board 
 
 
 956.8 
 
 
 
 476.5 
 
 
 Saving in cost of fuel by 
 going through the canal- 
 
 
 43.385 
 
 
 42.483 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 The cost of sending the Oregon around the Horn from San Francisco to 
 Key West was as f oUows: 
 
 Coal $.50,266 
 
 Pay of officers and crew, rations, etc 42,411 
 
 Stores (except coal and ordnance stores) 4,870 
 
 Total 97,547 
 
 Actual time taken to make the trip through the straits, sixty -eight days. 
 Average speed with coal taken in San Francisco, per day, 260 knots. 
 5162 
 
48 
 
 Days. 
 Time by Nicaraguan Canal (including delay of three days getting throtigh 
 
 Time by Panama Canal (including two days delay getting through canal) . 19 
 
 Total saving in time by Nicaragua Canal 51 
 
 Total saving in time by Panama Canal 49 
 
 Note.— The distance herein given of 965 knots from San Juan del Norte 
 (Qreytown) to Key West is the shortest practicable distance, while that fur- 
 nished by the Committee on Interoceanic Canals of 1,055 knots for the same 
 route is longer by reason of a route being chosen which avoids all shoal water 
 and is absolutely safe for navigating battle ships. 
 
 The other witnesses— Professor Haupt, Mr. Cooley, Captain 
 Miller, Mr. Noble — and the report of Lieutenant Sullivan, all sub- 
 stantially agree as to these sailing distances by the two routes; 
 but the foregoing statement from the Navy Department settles 
 the matter beyond reasonable controversy. 
 
 Taking the distances thus ascertained, and one-half the coal 
 consumption as the ratio for a merchant steamer of 5,000 tons, 
 and the time saved at the average of four days on a round-trip 
 voyage, and the loss by the Panama route in the item of coal con- 
 sumption is as follows: 
 
 The per diem coal consumption on a ship of $5,000 tons $37. 61 
 
 For tour days, on each round trip 150.44 
 
 On five ships of 5,000 tons, each day it is 752.20 
 
 For a year it is for the single item of coal 274,553.00 
 
 Interest, insurance, depreciation, wages, and supplies, and in- 
 tsrest and insurance on cargo, if they are estimated only at an 
 eciual cost, increases the loss on five ships per day to $1,508.40, 
 and per annum to $550,566, and for ten years to $5,505,660. 
 
 These estimates are on a less tonnage than passes through the 
 Suez Canal, and on about one-third of the tonnage that passes 
 through the Sault Ste. Marie Canal annually. 
 
 Instances that prove these facts are multiplied in the testimony 
 of the witnesses, but these figures, taken from the voyage of the 
 Oregon, are a demonstration, and I prefer to adopt them as the 
 basis of my verdict. 
 
 THE LOSS OF MONEY TO SAILING SHIPS. 
 
 As to the loss of time on sailing ships, it is not necessary to 
 make a calculation to compare these two routes, since the advo- 
 cates of the Panama route dismiss them from all calculations "as 
 unconsidered trifles." If we should still venture a plan, that 
 sailing ships shall not be destroyed by excathedra declarations of 
 their enemies, but shall have at least the opportunity to visit the 
 great oceans through Nicaragua, where favoring winds from the 
 heavens invite them continually, we can support that plan out of 
 the mouths of the enemies of this great industry. 
 
 The subject has been most carefully examined by that greatest 
 of the geographers of the seas, Mathew F. Maury, who ranks as 
 a great admiral amongst all sailors, but was only a lieutenant 
 and chief of the National Observatory in the old Navy, from 
 which he resigned. 
 
 Under the orders of the Government, this subject has been care- 
 fully reexamined by Lieutenant Sullivan, and for many years it 
 has been under the close observation of the Hydrographic Office 
 of the Navy Department. The sailing directions of the Bureau 
 of Navigation are in evidence on the hearings; the testimony of 
 Captain Bryan, Captain Miller, Commander Young, and others, 
 detailing their personal observations, and the report of the Isth- 
 6162 
 
49 
 
 mian Canal Commission show, beyond dispute, that the calm belt 
 off the Bay of Panama forbids commerce to seek the Northern Pa- 
 cific Ocean through the Panama Canal, while the strong and steady 
 trade winds blow across Nicaragua at Grey town and Brito, and 
 continue constantly and without interruption across the Pacific 
 to the coast of China. 
 
 Between Panama and San Francisco the average loss of time 
 for a sailing vessel is fifteen days one way, and frequently it is 
 more than two months. Putting the loss of time for a sailing 
 ship of 5,000 tons at one-half the sum it will cost a steamer, the 
 loss in money for thirty days on a round trip, or $75 per diem, will 
 be $2,350 on each voyage out and in. What the loss will be to 
 the whole country through the exclusion of sailing ships from 
 the advantages of an isthmian canal I will leave to the computa- 
 tion of those who have the courage to face that disastrous sit- 
 uation. 
 
 THE CURVATURE OP THE TWO ROUTES. 
 
 The curves on the canal line on the Nicaragua route are for the 
 much greater part in the section occupied by the San Juan River, 
 where the washing of the canal banks by the waves from vessels 
 will do no possible harm and will constantly improve the channel. 
 
 The following statement from the bureau of inquiry, furnished 
 by the great navigator. Rear- Admiral George W. Melville, utterly 
 dissipates the contention that the curvatures of the canal as lo- 
 cated by the Isthmian Canal Commission is either dangerous to 
 ships or that they will reduce the speed to a minimum rate. 
 
 It would seem very sad if that Commission in their plan had 
 so arranged it that the greatest ships could not safely pass 
 through it with their own steam. But the following paper proves 
 that they have made ample provision for even high speed: 
 
 Washington, D. C, March 31, 1902. 
 
 Dear Senator: Answering your letter about permissible speed of ships 
 around curves, I have gotten out the following for you, which with pleasure 
 I now transmit: 
 
 A twin-screw ship can, on her own steam, round a curve of any radius 
 down to one of less than her own length by the expedient of g:oing ahead 
 with one screw and backing with the other; her speed, meantime, will of 
 necessity be very small, or even backward, depending on the relative speeds 
 of the two screws. 
 
 With both engines going ahead under equal steam, the sharpest turns that 
 can be followed oy means of the rudder alone will be: 
 
 Name. 
 
 Draft. 
 
 "'JSnT- Speed. 
 
 Ra- 
 dius. 
 
 Brooklyn 
 
 Oregon: 
 
 Port helm... 
 
 Starboard helm 
 
 Indiana 
 
 Feet. 
 
 Tons. 
 9,215 
 
 11,460 
 11,460 
 10,235 
 10,225 
 
 Knots. 
 
 10 
 
 Feet. 
 1,113 
 1,012 
 918 
 
 480 
 435 
 592 
 637 
 
 The speeds given in the table are those of actual trials. At other speeds 
 the minimum radius would not be veiy different, and the maximum speed at 
 which such a short curve would be attempted would be limited only by the 
 tendency of the vessel to heel over, a limitation which, however, is never 
 approached in a vessel having reasonable stability. 
 
 All of the above applies to the conditions on the open sea. 
 
 In a canal the greatest permissible speed, whether on a curve or a straight 
 516 
 
60 
 
 stretch, is determmed by the w^ear and t«ar on the banks from the wash of 
 the waves. At a given (wave-making) speed the waves produced in the canal 
 are much larger than on the open sea, and their destructive action, even 
 when the banks are protected by riprap, is such that speeds greater than 6 or 
 7 knots are practically out of the question. 
 
 With best wishes and respect, yours, faithfully, 
 
 GEO. W. MELVILLE. 
 Hon. John T. Morgan, 
 
 United States Senate. 
 
 THE CLEANSING OF SHIPS' BOTTOMS IN ITRESH WATER. 
 
 As the opporttmity is now directly presented, and the subject 
 is of much importance to commerce and navigation and gives to 
 the Nicaragua Canal route a prominent advantage over the Suez 
 and Panama routes, I will present, without argument, a paper 
 from Rear- Admiral Melville, chief engineer of the Navy, relating 
 to the effect of immersion of ships in fresh water, in clearing 
 their bottoms of sea grass and barnacles after long ocean voyages. 
 
 It is a subject of great importance, and it is to be noted that the 
 Nicaragua Canal is the only place where this can be done while 
 the ship is pursuing its voyage. The fresh-water navigation in 
 the Nicaragua Canal extends for 180 miles, while in the Panama 
 Canal it extends no more than 21 miles. If it is true that the sub- 
 mergence of ships in fresh water for a day will kill these parasites, 
 they wiU soon afterwards drop from the vessel while on its voy- 
 age, and the impediment to speed will be removed. It is asserted 
 by Mr. McDonell, who is a close student of such matters, that the 
 real work is done in the submergence of the vessel for twenty- 
 four hours by killing the parasites. 
 
 It wiU be seen from the following letter that our naval authori- 
 ties attach great importance to this subject in respect of war 
 vessels. 
 
 Mr. President, that is quite a lengthly letter, considering the 
 nature of the subject, but it is so very important that Admiral 
 Melville has gone into the subject for the ascertainment of his- 
 torical facts and calculations. I shall not undertake to delay the 
 Senate by reading the figures, as no Senator could pretend to re- 
 tain them in his mind; but the advantage of the immersion of a 
 man of war, or, in fact, of any steamer or any sailing ship, in the 
 fresh waters of the Nicaragua Canal over a sailing distance of 
 180 miles — it is all fresh water in the Nicaragua Canal — in re- 
 spect of the cleansing of the bottoms of ships of barnacles, sea- 
 weeds, and other Crustacea, is one of the most important features 
 connected with the whole subject. It looks like a small matter, 
 but still, when we count the loss of speed of ships, particularly 
 battle ships and cruisers, when speed at times is of such absolute 
 indispensable necessity, we can save to the Government of the 
 United States millions upon millions of dollars by passing those 
 ships through these fresh-water lakes that otherwise would be ex- 
 pended in cleaning the bottoms of ships in dockyards, etc 
 
 The letter referred to is as follows : 
 
 Department OF THE Navy, 
 
 Bureau of Steam Engineering, 
 
 Washington, D. C, March SI, 1902. 
 Dear Senator Morgan: The efficiency of all vessels is greatly impaired 
 by the foulness of the ships' bottoms. In the days of sail the resulting loss 
 was not so great, for the hulls of the wooden ships were sheathed and there- 
 fore barnacles and graases did not attach themselves so readily to the hull 
 Ktructure. Th(> sheathing of the modern war ship and ocean steamer is prac- 
 tically impossible, and therefore the docking of vessels is necessary about 
 twice a year. 
 6102 
 
61 
 
 The fouling of ships' bottoms depends on the time spent in cruising, the 
 waters in which the cruise is made, and the service performed. 
 
 The loss of speed and the corresponding increase in coal consumjition due 
 from the fouling of the hull are matters that vitally concern the shipowner. 
 As for men-of-war, the subject is of greater moment, since one of tne most 
 important factors in determining tne usefulness and efficiency of the war 
 ship is the ciuestion of radius of action, or the distance that the vessel is able 
 to steam without coaling. 
 
 The following data will show how seriously a foul hull will interfere with 
 the efficiency of the war ship. This data ia taken from official records and 
 has been compiled with exceeding care, since it is necessary that the Depart- 
 ment secure absolutely correct information upon the subject. 
 
 Oregon, 10,000 tons displacement. 
 
 Knots. 
 
 1. One-half month out of dock, speed 11.42 
 
 2. Two and a half months later, having been under way at a speed of 
 
 11 or 12 knots almost continuously (three months out of dock) 11. 17 
 
 3. Three months later, having been on blockade and in tropical waters 
 
 three months (six monthsout of dock) 9.6 
 
 The same horsepower, practically, was developed and the same conditions 
 obtained in all three of these runs. 
 
 The loss of speed, then, in two and a half months, with th6 vessel under 
 way almost continuously, was 0.25 knots, while after three months more, 
 with the vessel on blockade and in tropical waters, the loss of speed was 1.5 
 knots. 
 
 Philadelphia, k,325 tons displacevient. 
 
 Knots. 
 
 1 . With half power, clean bottom (If months out of dock) 13. 22 
 
 2. Same power, 3 months later, after having been under way about half 
 
 the time (4i months out of dock) 11.9 
 
 Three-quarter power, 6 months later, after lying in the harbor of 
 
 Honolulu G months (10^ monthsout of dock) 10.19 
 
 These results can not be compared as well as the ones for the Oregon, but 
 the speed of 10.19 knots made with three-quarter power compared with 13.22 
 knots made with half power shows a loss of speed equivalent to 3.5 knots had 
 the powers been the same. 
 
 Detroit, 2,000 tons displacement. 
 
 Knots. 
 
 1. On half power, clean bottom 10.28 
 
 2. After lying 4} months in a tropical harbor 7.95 
 
 Same power for both runs. 
 
 Nashville, 1,871 tons displacement. 
 
 Knots. 
 
 1. With clean bottom made 10.28 
 
 2. With seven months' cruising in the Philippines, same power 8. 46 
 
 Celtic, collier, 6,1^8 tons displacement. 
 
 Knots. 
 
 1. One-half month out of dock; trip, Sydney to Manila 10.4 
 
 2. Six months out of dock, Manila to Sydney 9.4 
 
 Same power for both runs. 
 
 Hannibal, collier, h,291 tons displacement. 
 
 Knots. 
 
 1. With clean bottom, Hampton Roads to Ponce, P. R 10.00 
 
 2. One and six-tenths months later, Ponce to Hampton Roads, same 
 
 power 8.82 
 
 These results cover a wide range of conditions. The second run of the 
 Oregon shows the least loss of speed (0.25), the vessel having been under way 
 at a comparatively high sustained speed. The greatest loss of speed is shown 
 in the case of the Philadelphia^ third run, when the loss of speed was Over 3 
 knots, notwithstanding the fact that three-quarters power was used on the 
 third run and only half power on the first run. (Loss would have been 3.5 
 knots with the same power. ) Under average conditions of cruisings vessels 
 with a sustained speed of 9 to 11 knots lose 1 to 3 knots after six months out 
 of dock. The loss is very much greater than this with vessels lying in trop- 
 ical ports for a considerable length of time, and less if cruising continuously. 
 If a vessel is immersed in fresh water, the effect is to clean the bottom of 
 barnacles and sea grasses to some extent. The following data shows a com- 
 parison of performances of sevei-al vessels before and after having been in 
 
52 
 
 tresh. water, and their performance with clean bottoms. The conditions and 
 power developed were pi'actically the same for each set of results: 
 
 Monterey. 
 
 Knots. 
 
 With clean bottom made .. 10.00 
 
 With foul bottom (dust before entermg the Columbia River) 9. 00 
 
 Af tei' leaving the Columbia River, having been in fi-esh water for 44 
 
 days - 9.73 
 
 Monadnock. 
 
 With clean bottom made 9-5 
 
 With foul bottom (just before entering the Columbia River).., 7.88 
 
 After leaving the Columbia River, having been in fresh water for 14 days 9. 01 
 
 Scorpion. 
 
 This vessel was in the Mississippi River for ffty -seven da-ys. Data for ac- 
 curate comparisons could not be obtained, as the runs before entering the 
 river and after leaving it were under such different conditions that compari- 
 sons were impossible. However, the vessel was eight and one-half months out 
 of dock on entering the river, and after leaving made 11.49 knots on power 
 that would have given 11.6 to 11.7 knots had the bottom been clean. Un- 
 doubtedly her condition was greatly improved. 
 
 These results show that when vessels with foul bottoms are immersed in 
 fresh water for a considerable length of time the condition of the hull is 
 greatly improved, from two-thirds to three-fourths of the loss of speed being 
 recovered. 
 
 Thfijeaet^time, spent in fresh water by any of these ships was fourteen 
 davs. " - _ 
 
 Unfortunately there is no data available for shorter peri6'ds,~and I regret 
 that I am unable to give you any information as to the effect of time on the 
 cleansing of ships immersed in fresh water. 
 
 Yours, truly, GEO. W. MELVILLE, 
 
 Engineer in Chief, U. 8. Navy. 
 
 Hon. John T. Morgan, 
 
 United States Senate, Washington, D. C. 
 
 CLIMATE, TEMPEBATUBB, AND HEALTH OF THE MIDWAY STATIONS AROUND 
 THE WORLD. 
 
 If this advantage meets the anxious expectations of our naval 
 officers and commercial navigators and dry docks are constructed 
 in Lake Nicaragua they will add immensely 'to the sea power of 
 the United States and will, with other attractive features of the 
 climate and the productions and the sea air blowing across that 
 country make the Nicaragua Canal route so attractive to naviga- 
 tors that those who control that canal route need not fear compe- 
 tition with the Suez Canal and the Red Sea, which is the hottest 
 region of the world accessible to ships. As the midway station 
 of the equatorial zone of navigation around the world, one of the 
 m.ost useful features will be the docks for cleaning and repairing 
 vessels, while the ships' companies will find rest and refreshment 
 after long voyages. It is the only way station where such facili- 
 ties can be found grouped together. They are far too important 
 to be lightly considered. 
 
 PAGE 103 OE THE REPORT. 
 
 I will now close this outline statement of this great subject with 
 an inquiry that is not intended as a criticism, but is intended to 
 point out the fact that the statements on page 103 of the final re- 
 port of the Isthmian Canal Commission, which the hunger of the 
 Panama Canal Company provoked them to snap up as if it had 
 been prepared as a bait, was not considered or prepared by that 
 commission with any such purpose. It was evidently prepared 
 only to satisfy Congress that the offer of the Panama Canal Com- 
 pany to sell its concessions and their belongings for $109,000,000 
 was too exorbitant, and to dismiss that subject from further 
 consideration. 
 
 That commission had no authority tmder the law to make or to 
 accept any offer of purchase or sale connected with the canal, and 
 5162 
 
53 
 
 they repeatedly so informed M. Hntin, who was the general 
 manager of the Panama Canal Company. 
 
 Even the President of the United States had not the authority 
 to make or accept any such offer, under the statute. His express 
 duty was to recommend a route for the acceptance of Congress, 
 after he had employed the commission in ascertaining the facts 
 relating to the practical question, not the diplomatic or political 
 question, of the practicability and feasibility of the respective 
 routes and the material advantages and disadvantages of both 
 routes. 
 
 It was the sole and exclusive duty of the President to determine 
 which route he would recommend to the acceptance of Congress. 
 In perf omiing that duty he would necessarily obtain light from 
 sources that were closed against the examination of the Commis- 
 sion and even of Congress, unless he chose to invite Congress into 
 his confidence as the diplomatic head of the Government under 
 the Constitution. 
 
 The shrewd traders of the Panama Canal Company having 
 failed for five years to involve the United States in the partial joint 
 ownership of a property that was already wrecked ^^ y|^ino or./! 
 (#f^iTiife^^'^^<^ ^^ rharartfir. they found, on page lu^ or tne reportTDf 
 our Commission, a bed on which its fall could be broken, and they 
 suddenly dropped their price for the wreck all the dizzy distance 
 from $109,000,000 to $40,000,000. The fall was so startling as to 
 shock all observers, but the agile performers discovered the safety 
 net and leaped for it. It was a desperate leap, but they had faith 
 in the reputed American fondness for glittering temptations in 
 the way of bargains. It rests with Congress to say whether they 
 have made any serious miscalculation. 
 
 If we would be magnanimous to those who are performing this 
 apparent act of felo de se, let us lend them the money, with Co- 
 lombia as security, and let them proceed with their costly experi- 
 ment. If we are ready to accept the inviting bargain, at the 
 expense of their suffering and apparent loss, let us play true to 
 the character and price the property at the sum that it would cost 
 us to reproduce it. 
 
 When we have paid Colombia for the privilege of buying the 
 canal and the railroad stock, we will abandon the role of shrewd 
 and heartless dealers, to which character we will be forever 
 doomed in the estimation of the French people, whatever else we 
 may do, and when we pay a percentage of $10 on each share 
 for the railroad stock, the par value of which is $100, we will be 
 written down as dolts. And so, when we pay $2,000,000 for maps, 
 the useful parts of which have been thrust upon us as a donation— 
 if we pay $2,000,000 premium on the maps under the head of 
 " contingencies," we will lose our reputation for shrewd dealing, 
 and will be classed as veiy common and foolish i>eople who ao 
 not know what to do with their money. 
 
 REASONS FOR AN EXCHANGE OF MAPS. 
 
 If the inducements for cheap bargains are to be a feature of the 
 trade, it would be well to offer them in exchange for their maps 
 our Nicaragua maps, that represent to us a cost of at least $2,000,- 
 000. They could be kept for a time of need; which time will 
 surely arrive when the railroads, or the men who are to get the 
 $40,000,000, shall take up Lull's or Menocal's plan and build a 
 cheap slack- water canal for $65,000,000, in combination with 
 Costa Rica and Nicaragua. 
 
 5162 
 
54 
 
 Our owners of sailing ships conld afford to build snch a canal 
 for the accommodation of our coastwise trade. Such an enter- 
 prise is no more than Great Britain accomplished with the Suez 
 Canal, after using all its powers short of war to defeat its con- 
 struction. 
 
 That this subject is in the minds of the persons connected with 
 the Panama Canal, is manifest from the statement of General 
 Abbott in his deposition, on pages 838-840. 
 
 What our situation would be with a canal between our coast 
 and the Panama Canal when completed by the United States is 
 a subject worthy the attention of thoughtful men. How we 
 could prevent such a situation, under the recognized right of 
 Costa Rica and Nicaragua to build a canal with money borrowed 
 in trans-oceanic countries or in South America or in Mexico and 
 Cuba is a problem that will demand solution whenever we build 
 the Panama Canal, 600 miles away from our coasts. 
 
 WHY THE ESTIMATES ON PAGES 101 AND 103 WERE MADE. 
 
 It is evident from the report of the Commissioners, on pages 
 101-103, that the inventory of the assets of the Panama Canal 
 and the railroad stock and its appraisement was intended to con- 
 vince Congress that the actual value of it to the United States, 
 even when swollen by 30 per cent of contingencies, was far below 
 the estimate of $109,000,000 put on the property by the French 
 appraisement. That appraisement is $19,000,000 greater than the 
 estimate of M. Hutin, made to President McKinley in the letter 
 of January 18, 1899, addressed to him by Mr. Cromwell, general 
 attorney for the Panama Canal Company. 
 
 M. Hutin must have had some strong encouragement in Amer- 
 ica for thus raising the price of this property from $90,000,000, in 
 January, 1899, to $109,000,000 in November, 1900. It must have 
 been this that stimulated him to attack the Isthmian Canal Com- 
 mission, and especially Admiral Walker, for misleading him, 
 which M. Hutin did in a letter addressed to the Secretary of 
 State, dated November 22, 1901. In this letter M. Hutin exhibits 
 petulance and resentment because his estimates were rejected 
 without discussion, and without the acceptance of an arbitration 
 proposed by him to ascertain these values, for the want of au- 
 thority to agree t(i it. 
 
 He demanded that Admiral Walker should print their cori'e- 
 spondence in his official report to the President, which was done, 
 without any good reason, notwithstanding the fact that M. Hutin 
 has suppressed Admiral Walker's letters of October 22, 1901, to 
 him, which utterly destroyed the ground of his complaint to the 
 President, through his letter to the Secretary of State. (See Re- 
 port No. 1, Fifty-seventh Congress, p. 127.) This company has 
 not been able to forget the large sums paid to its American com- 
 mittee by the old company for influence, or that it succeeded in 
 tempting a Secretary of the Navy to quit the Cabinet and become 
 its agent and promoter, on a salary of $25,000 per annum, and 
 the audacity of the company is correspondingly aggressive. 
 
 ■WHY THE SUPPOSED COMMITTAL,, ON PAGE 103, WAS SEIZED UPON AS AN 
 OFFER OF PUUCHASB. 
 
 When M. Hutin had delivered this Parthian arrow at Admiral 
 Walker and returned to Paris, the Hepburn bill passed the Hou^e 
 of Representatives by a vote wanting only two votes of unanim- 
 ity, and General Abbott says a panic ensued in the Panama Com- 
 pany. 
 
55 
 
 M. Hutin was deposed and M. Bo was elected general manager 
 of the Panama Canal Company. The price of the property was 
 dropped to the $40,000,000 mark, assumed to have been prepared 
 as an offer of purchase, by the report of the Commission on page 
 103. Sixty-nine millions of property values was thrown away in 
 the "panic," and the wheels of justice in the French courts re- 
 volved rapidly to anticipate results and to confirm the acceptance 
 of the proposed agreements before they were made or accepted 
 by anybody, which provisional arrangements the ocean cable was 
 taxed to send to Washington. 
 
 Hot haste was winged with lightning to stop the Senate from 
 passing the bill which had just passed the House of Representa- 
 tives. The innocent and loose estimates of page 103 of the report 
 of the Isthmian Canal Commission was identified by M. Bo by 
 reference to a single page of that report, when the estimate in- 
 cluded two pages, and was seized upon by telegram as a solemn 
 offer of the Government to pay money for property valued at a 
 fixed price, which cash value was increased |4,942,038 by the ad- 
 dition of contingencies. 
 
 And Congress is now asked to appropriate this sum to meet the 
 contingency, that our Commission had really undervalued the 
 property in their report of its actual value made to the President. 
 If we accept it, we do so as a glittering success in making a bar- 
 gain for property that our Commission had greatly undervalued. 
 If we accept what the Commission say, and what the proof shows 
 to be true, we can not do this on account of any just regard for 
 the men who are trying to save themselves at the expense of many 
 thousands of innocent people, who have been grossly defrauded 
 by them. 
 
 WHAT THE PACTS STATED IN THE REPORT ACTUALLY SHOW. 
 
 The report shows the actual value of the work done in its pres- 
 ent condition. It is all excavation and embankment, capable of 
 being estimated in cubic yards at current prices for labor, and 
 there is no other sort of work, so that the calculation is simple 
 and no room is left for contingencies. This sum allowed for contin- 
 gencies is only less than the whole difference in the cost of the 
 canals by the sum of $291,361, as the same is estimated by the 
 Commissioners. 
 
 On page 103 of their report the Commissioners say: 
 
 The concession is of no value to the United States since a new one must be 
 obtained from the Colombian Government in any event. It is the same with 
 the lands, title to which is dependent upon the completion of the canal, and 
 is still to be earned. 
 
 Much of the property is ill adapted to American methods, and all of it is 
 now from thirteen to twenty years old, during which period the imjjrove- 
 ' ' ■ m 
 
 ments of this class of machinery have been such that contractors would gen- 
 ally find it to their advantage to buy entirelv new machinery of modern 
 ittern, rather than attempt to use this of an older class, even if it was given 
 
 The same is true of the greater part of the buildines, including all bar- 
 racks, storehouses, shops, stable3, and miscellaneous buildings, and excepting 
 only hospitals and prin9ipal administration buildings. The latter would be 
 the subject of special negotiation. They have appeared in the estimate 
 under the head of contingencies. No special allowance is made for them. 
 
 All this means that the canal machinery and the buildings, ex- 
 cept the hospitals and principal administration buildings, are of 
 no value to the United States, and that those that are of value are 
 included under the estimates for contingencies. Therefore these 
 excepted buildings are to be paid for at the sum of $4,579,005, 
 with 10 per cent on that, §457,900, making a total for houses, 
 
56 
 
 $5,036,905. This 10 per cent is said to be '* omissions," but there 
 are no omissions of articles to be purchased, for on page 101 there 
 are 11 classes of articles of wliich a full description, by items, is 
 given in an " inventory furnished to the Commission." 
 
 Under the statement of the value of the property made by 
 the Commission, the value of canal excavation is $21,920,386. 
 The value of houses is $5,036,905. The value of maps is $2,000,000. 
 The value of railroad stock is $6,850,000. Total, $35,807,291. 
 Here is a gap of $4,192,709 to be filled by Chagres diversion, 
 $178,187; Gatun diversion, $1,396,456; railroad diversion, $300,- 
 000; total, $1,874,642, leaving $2,318,067, for which there is 
 nothing to answer but a bonus or placebo. With $2,000,000 for 
 maps and $2,318,067 for bonus, we have $4,318,067 in this $40,000,- 
 000 for which we have nothing of value to show. 
 
 This is more than half the sum that Nicaragua asks for per- 
 petual and exclusive canal rights and privileges through the 
 heart of her country. In any light in which these estimates can 
 be viewed they can not be justly regarded as fixing the actual 
 cash value of the property. They were never intended as such, 
 and Congress, if it appropriates this money, should find a more 
 solid basis for the appropriation than this loose and conjectural 
 estimate, made to show the exorbitant price set upon it in the in- 
 definite and incomplete offer of M. Hutin. 
 
 If our Commission is to have credit for high diplomatic ability 
 in driving a good bargain with the failing Panama Canal Com- 
 pany, their estimates of the value of the property they purchase, 
 as stated by them in detail, should come nearer to a balance with 
 the round sum of $40,000,000 than the sum of $4,818,067, which 
 is their nearest approximation to a balance, and when this dif- 
 ference is taken into account in estimating the actual cost of 
 completing the Panama Canal as compared with the cost of the 
 Nicaragua Canal, it reduces the difference to $1,312,637. 
 
 And it is for this sum we are asked to yield all tolls forever 
 from sailing vessels, half the competition of the canal with the 
 transcontinental railways, 600 miles of shorter lines for our war- 
 ships, more than 100 miles of voyage in fresh water for ships that 
 are fouled with sea travel, and the speed gained by them by im- 
 mersion in the river and Lake Nicaragua. And we tax sailing 
 ships with 10,000 miles of sea voyage through cold and dangerous 
 seas around Cape Horn, and steamships with a loss of four days 
 on a round trip between our Atlantic ports, at a cost of $150 per 
 day on a 5,000-ton ship. For this we compel the wheat growers 
 and lumbermen of the great Pacific slope to cross the Pacific to 
 find the markets of Europe, instead of the markets of our Gulf 
 and Atlantic States. 
 
 When we have concluded this brilliant bargain we shall find, 
 like poor Richard, that we have paid too dear for our whistle. 
 
 THE COST OF MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF THE CANALS. 
 
 I will allude to the expenses charged to the respective routes for 
 operating expenses and the maintenance of way, to add only a 
 few observations that need to be made. 
 
 Under this head there are no items given in the report of the 
 Isthmian Canal Commission as to which a computation can be 
 made in order to test the accuracy of their estimates, or the cost 
 of maintaining and operating any other canal as an approximate 
 criterion. 
 
 6162 
 
67 
 
 The cost of maintenance, -per mile, of the Suez Canal is $13,000; 
 of the Kiel Canal, $8,600, and of the St. Marys Canal from $46,000 
 to $60,000 per mile. 
 
 The St. Marys Canal is only 1^ miles long and has all the ad- 
 vantages of concentration. At the rate of $1 per ton, its income 
 during the eight months it is open during the year would be 
 more than $30,000,000. It is the force employed in handling the 
 traffic in the open months that costs so heavily. 
 
 The basis of these estimates was discussed by the Commission, 
 but it was not given in their final report, because it was not 
 agreed upon. It was produced by Colonel Ernst, on his exami- 
 nation, and is found in his deposition on pages 687 to 698 of the 
 hearings. 
 
 The scheme of government is elaborate, even grand, and is 
 quite ample in officials and salaries for the government of a 
 commonwealth. It consists of a supreme board of control, at 
 Washington, and an engineering department. A, with a governor 
 at a salary of $15,000, and the other salaries are correspondingly 
 high for five other departments. 
 
 The risk of life in the climate of Panama may excuse this ex- 
 travagance for that canal, but it is without justification for Nica- 
 ragua. The following summary of these items will show the 
 great magnitude of this plan: 
 
 THE BAIiABIBS OP FIVE MEMBERS OP THE SUPREME BOARD OP CONTROIj 
 AND THEIR SUBORDINATES IS NOT GIVEN. 
 
 Annual cost of maintenance of both canals. 
 
 ANNUAL COST OP MAINTENANCE, 
 NICARAGUA CANAL. 
 
 Salaries, etc . , of governor . . $39, 300 
 Engineering dei)artnient, A: 
 
 268 employees 187,780 
 
 Plant 397,400 
 
 Supplies lOO.noO 
 
 li per cent depreciation 620, 532 
 
 Total 1,305,713 
 
 Transit department, B: 
 
 390 employees 
 
 Plant 
 
 846,160 
 320,500 
 
 Total. 
 
 Medical department, C: 
 
 84 employees 
 
 • glaunclies 
 
 Supplies 
 
 Total 
 
 Finance department, D: 
 
 15 employees 
 
 Supplies 
 
 Total 
 
 Law department, E: 
 
 13 employees 
 
 Suppues 
 
 Total 
 
 666,660 
 
 70,980 
 5,000 
 50,000 
 
 125,980 
 
 27,200 
 500 
 
 27,700 
 
 18,200 
 500 
 
 18,700 
 
 ANNUAL COST OP MAINTENANCE, 
 PANAMA CANAL. 
 
 Salaries, etc., governor $39, 000 
 
 Engineering department, A: 
 
 170 employees 128,640 
 
 Plant 211,600 
 
 Supplies 50,000 
 
 7i per cent depreciation 407, 373 
 
 Total. 
 
 797,613 
 
 Transit department, B: 
 
 158 employees 142,840 
 
 Plant 150,000 
 
 Supplies for locks 9, 000 
 
 Lignte on locks 4,500 
 
 Maintenance of railroad 45,000 
 
 Total. 
 
 851,840 
 
 Medical department, C: 
 
 74 employees 
 
 2 launches 
 
 Supplies 
 
 64,880. 
 
 5,000 
 
 85,000 
 
 Total. 
 
 Finance department, D: 
 14emT' 
 Supplies" 
 
 104,860 
 
 26,800 
 500 
 
 Total 
 
 Law deiMirtment, E: 
 
 8 employees 
 
 Supplies 
 
 27,300 
 
 14,800 
 500 
 
 Total. 
 
 15,800 
 
 6162 
 
58 
 
 Annual cost of maintenance of both ca?ia?s— Continued. 
 
 NICARAGUA cANAL—continued. 
 
 Police department, F: 
 
 443 employees $600,800 
 
 30 horses, at S250 7,500 
 
 Supreme control in 
 XJnited States 100,000 
 
 Total. 
 
 608,300 
 
 PANAMA CANAL— continued. 
 
 Police department, F: 
 
 213 employees $241,100 
 
 40 horses, at $250 10, 000 
 
 General expense in 
 United States 100,000 
 
 Total. 
 
 351,100 
 
 Grandtotal 3,350,000 Grandtotal 2,024,174 
 
 The law department at Panama is put at $15,300, for providing 
 the legal regimen for 35,000 resident people, while it is put at 
 18.700 at Nicaragua, where not more than 2,000 people now reside. 
 
 The police department is put at $251 ,100 at Panama, where there 
 are 35,000 unruly people to control, and at $508,300 at Nicaragua, 
 to control a scattered population of 2,000, quite orderly and peace- 
 able people. 
 
 The finance department is put at $27,700 at Nicaragua, and 
 $27,300 at Panama. The amount of money to be received in tolls 
 is supposed to be the cause of this discrimination against Nicara- 
 gua of $400 in the expenses. 
 
 The medical department is made to cost $125,000 at Nicaragua, 
 in a healthy country, and 13 medical officers, 6 stewards, 36 
 nurses, and 18 laborers are provided, while the total cost of the 
 medical department at Panama is $104,860, with 7 medical offi- 
 cers, 3 stewards, 12 nurses, and 6 laborers at emergency hospitals, 
 and 5 medical officers, 2 stewards, 20 nurses, and 10 laborers at 
 the regular hospital. The difference of $20,620 per annum is 
 made in favor of Panama, where the pestilential character of that 
 region is described as " fever hole " by General Alexander, and is 
 known of all men to be a region where the yellow fever and chagres 
 fever have their habitat, from which they are never absent. It 
 is so in each of the departments of this proposed government, 
 which seems to have been created to form a basis for the calcu- 
 lation of maintaining an isthmian canal and then retired from 
 observation for future use. 
 
 THIS STATELY PROGRAM FOR WORKING A CANAL, AS IF IT WAS A KINGDOM, 
 IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THESE TREMENDOUS ESTIMATES OF EXPENSES. 
 
 It is in this programme that the idea had its origin that $2,024,174 
 was required for maintenance and operation of the canal at Pan- 
 ama, and that $3,350,822 is required for the canal at Nicaragua. 
 The difference of $1,326,664 is ample to operate either canal, if we 
 accept the experience at the Suez Canal, the Sault Ste. Marie 
 Canal, or any other canal between great bodies of water. 
 
 It is impossible to know or safely to conjecture by what rule 
 or principle the Isthmian Canal Commission fixed the charges of 
 maintenance and operation of the canal at Nicaragua or com- 
 pared them with those of the Panama Canal. For engineering, 
 police, sanitation, and general contingencies their estimate of the 
 cost of construction of the canal is $31,644,010. This evidently 
 includes all the plant that is needed for these purposes, and for 
 a canal completed and equipped. Then they add other sums for 
 plant, for the maintenance of all the canal purposes, for keep- 
 ing the canal in good order, and for vessels and other appliances 
 aeeded for such service. 
 
 The contingencies charged to the Nicaragua Canal are $558,470 
 in this plan of government, and those charged to the Panama 
 Canal are $337,362, a difference of $221,118 annually, while the 
 
59 
 
 steam tugs, insi)ection steamers, dredge^, pile drivers, tugs, scows, 
 pilot boats, naphtha launches, canoes, and saddle horses, which in 
 their nature can not be reasonably expected to be resupplied each 
 year, are charged at full cost, which is very great, for each year^ 
 as if they would all disappear after a single year of service. 
 
 These estimates, which are far too extravagant and are so 
 loosely made, and these salaries and pay rolls, which are very ex- 
 pensive, account in great part for the charge of §3,350,832 to the 
 Nicaragua Canal for maintenance and operation, when the Chief 
 of the Bureau of Statistics, in December, 1900, said in an official 
 bulletin of that date: 
 
 There are no locks on the Suez Canal, but the channel is throngh drifting 
 sand for a ^reat part of its length. The entrance to the harbor or Port Said, 
 on the Mediteri*anean, intercepts the drift of sand discharged from the Nile 
 and carried along the coast by the easterly current. The navigation in 
 which steamships can make full speed if they chose is longer than the entire 
 length of the Suez Canal. The line of canalization on land at Nicaragua is 
 53.^ miles, only about half that of the Suez Canal, and only 6 miles longer 
 than the Panama Canal, all of which is artificial canal. 
 
 Suez has 100 miles of navigation through an ailificial channel, and Panama 
 has 47 miles, while Nicaragua has 63 miles of artificial channel and 120 miles 
 of river and lake navigation in which there are no locks. On this state 
 of facts it is impossible that any reason can be stated why it should require 
 $18,310per mile to maintain 183 miles of canal, of which only G3 miles isof actual 
 canalization, when the cost per mUe of the Suez Canal is $13,000, and that 
 canal is dug entirely through the desert sands, which blow into it and make 
 constant di'edging necessary to keep it open. 
 
 That is the official statement of your Government, which Imocks 
 the estimate of the canal commissioners into dust. Nobody is 
 responsible for that but your Government. 
 
 It is beyond all reason and experience that the more than 100 
 miles of deep water on the route of the Nicaragua Canal, where 
 there is no lock and where a dredge will never be used, should be 
 charged annually with $1,741,400 for cost of maintenance and 
 operation. It is on this absurd conjecture that this erroneous 
 calculation has been made. When this sum of $1,741,400 is sub- 
 tracted from the estimate of $3,850,822, made by the commis- 
 iioners, it still leaves $1,611,492 to be applied to maintenance aiid 
 operation, which is still more than is expended annually on the 
 Suez Canal for those purposes by the sum of $811,422, which is 
 more than the estimates of the Isthmian Canal Commission for 
 operating and taking care of the locks, with 20 per cent added 
 for contingencies. 
 
 The uncertainty of the situation as to the cost of maintenance 
 and operation of the canal, created by this effort to fabricate a 
 great and expensive system for its government and control, has 
 introduced into this subject an element of doubt and confusion of 
 a serious character. 
 
 It would not have existed if the commissioners, -at the time they 
 made this report, had been confronted with the $40,000,000 propo- 
 sition of the Panama Canal Company. They then had no doubt 
 that this company was acting sincerely in the statement that 
 $109,000,000 was the sum, below which, they would not sell the 
 ditch, the maps, and the railroad stock, with the right, without 
 objection from them, to purchase new concessions from Colombia; 
 and they had no special reasons for closely estimating the cost of 
 maintaining and operating the canal, as to which there must 
 always be a margin of doubt. 
 
 The effort was made, on a plan of great amplitude, to institute 
 a very costly government for the canal, but it failed in committee 
 
 5163 
 
60 
 
 and was not sent to the President with their report, and it is this 
 abortive scheme that is now presented as the estimate of great 
 engineers, carefully made, as to the difference of the cost of main- 
 tainance and operation as between the two routes. 
 
 The number and salaries of the official corps, the cost of the 
 plant, to be renewed, annually, and the contingencies, have no 
 actual relation to the experience of governments in respect of 
 other canals. They are arbitrary suggestions, and are not calcu- 
 lations based on facts that are even alluded to as supporting the 
 plan. 
 
 The following statements in the deposition of Colonel Ei-nst 
 sufficiently explain this situation: 
 
 The Chairman. About what is the population of Panama? 
 
 Colonel Ernst. About 20,000, 1 think. 
 
 The Chairman. And about how much in Colon? 
 
 Colonel Ernst. About five or six thousand. 
 
 The Chairman. Is there any considerable number of French citizens or 
 people located in Panama or Colon permanently? 
 
 Colonel Ernst. Well, I fancy not. Of course, most of the people that we 
 saw were French. They were the oflBcers of the canal company, but I do not 
 think there are many outside of those officials. 
 
 The Chairman. Are there many French residents in that part of the 
 country, in those cities? 
 
 Colonel Ernst. I did not see any. 
 
 The Chairman. In the sanitation that is necessary on the Panama route, 
 would you feel that it was safe without including the city of Panama and the 
 city of Colon? 
 
 Colonel Ernst. No; I can not say that I think it would be safe. 
 
 The Chairman. How far is the city of Panama from the line of the canal 
 as it is dredged from the bay there? 
 
 Colonel Ernst. It is about 3 miles. 
 
 The Chairman. That would be included in the canal limits, if they were 
 3 miles wide? 
 
 Colonel Ernst. I certainly would prefer that they should beincluded. 
 
 The Chairman. Would you not think that it was absolutely necessary to 
 include it in order to preserve the sanitation, or whatever results might come 
 from sanitation, on the Panama route? 
 
 Colonel Ernst. I think the result would undoubtedly be better with it. It 
 is a question of degree. You certainly could not have the same sanitary 
 state there without that city as you can with it. 
 
 The Chairman. That would apply equally well to Colon? 
 
 Colonel Ernst. Yes; but Colon is neai-ly all owned by the Panama Railroad 
 Company, and if you buy that you buy the city. 
 
 The Chairman. Well, I think that is a legal question. Suppose, however, 
 that we bought it and got the title to all the property that had passed through 
 the hands of the railroad company and under concessions from Colombia, it 
 would be still necessary to have the control of it in order to accomplish this 
 sanitary purpose? 
 
 Colonel Ernst. I think so. 
 
 The Chairman. Well, it would be also necessary to have the control of it 
 for police purposes? 
 
 Colonel Ernst. Yes, sir. 
 
 The Chairman. What sort of a population Is there at Colon and at 
 Panama? 
 
 Colonel Ernst. Well, I could not say that it was a very high order of pop- 
 ulation. I did not come into very close personal contact with it. I would 
 say, however, that- they were a rather low order of people, a great many of 
 them. Of course there are some respectable people there. 
 
 The Chairman. A very mixed population? 
 
 Colonel Ernst. Yes, sir. 
 
 The Chairman. They are a turbulent people, too, are they not? 
 
 Colonel Ernst. I would say they are; yes, sir. 
 
 The Chairman. Hard to manage? 
 
 Colonel Ernst. They are fighting and quarreling all the time; yes, sir. 
 
 The Chairman. And they are insui-rectionary? 
 
 Colonel Ernst. Yes, sir. 
 
 The Chairman. We have had several occasions when we have had to send 
 ships of war down there with marines aboard in order to preserve the peace 
 and save the property that the French people have got on that Isthmus, and 
 also to protect and guarantee the sovereignty of the Republic of Colombia 
 over the State of Panama. That is in our treaty. 
 
 Colonel Ernst. Yes. 
 5102 
 
61 
 
 - The Chairman. Now, in making up your estimate of the maintenance of 
 the Panama Canal, the current expenses of maintenance and preservation and 
 protection, etc., I suppose you took all of those elements into consideration? 
 
 Colonel Ernst. Yes. 
 
 The Chairman. Did you include the sanitation and the i)olice control of 
 the city of Panama, with 20,000 inhabitants? 
 
 Colonel Ernbt. We did not in terms. The way we did that was to drav 
 up an organization for the management of the canal, a separate board of 
 control here in this country consisting of 5 members, a governor on the 
 Isthmxis with his staff and ofRce, and then provide for 6 departments, the 
 engineering department, with all its various assistants and appliances and 
 the material required; the transit department, having charge or the regula- 
 tion of duos and the transit and management of all pilots and all that sort of 
 thing, and the light-houses; the medical department, charged with the quar- 
 antine regulations, the general hospitals, and the hospital supphes, the sub- 
 ordinate hospitals, and sanitary inspection; the police dei)artment, and a 
 law department, and a finance department. 
 
 We had all those worked out in detail, and the medical department was 
 charged mainly with the hospitals and subhospitals and the sanitary inspec- 
 tion and the quarantine service. Now, we allowed a force necessary for tnat, 
 without taking into account any great city. 
 
 The Chairman. You took into account the men who were connected with 
 the operation of the canal? 
 
 Colonel Ernst. Yes. 
 
 The Chairman. And the railroad? 
 
 Colonel Ernst. And the railroad. The general hospitals, which would be 
 some Uttle way off, probably, from the canal. 
 
 The Chairman. But you made your estimate on the number of men that 
 would probably be employed in the nayigati(»x and management of tine ciuial 
 and railroad? 
 
 Colonel Ernst. Yes. 
 
 The Chairman. You did not include in it the citizenship of these cities? 
 
 Colonel Ernst. No, sir. 
 
 The Chairman. Could you name here the appendix that contains those 
 estimates? We have been very much at a loss to nnd out about them. 
 
 Colonel Ernst. We did not publish those, because it is purely theoretical; 
 we felt that we could not defend every estimate of it. We felt that there 
 were errors both ways. You can conceive of the difficulty of getting up of 
 such an organization at a desk for a great work like that, which must actu- 
 ally be tested and corrected in practice. I mean it must be adjusted. There 
 are many of those items that we felt would err, some on one side and some 
 on the other, and we thought that they would correct each other; but doing 
 it the same for both lines, we thought it was a fair comjxarison. 
 
 The Chairman. You made a comparison in your own minds, based unon 
 facts that you yourselves had observed on the line or had learned from other 
 sources, but you did not make up an itemized statement and balance sheet 
 between the cost of maintenance on the one route and the other? 
 
 Colonel Ernst. Oh, yes; we went through this organization for both canals. 
 Of course the Nicaragua Canal had the same general control. The govern- 
 ing board in this country woxtW be the same as for the Panama and also the 
 governor and his staff on the Isthmus would be the same and the chiefs of 
 these departments would all be the same. Now. when it came to the num- 
 ber of posts you would have to have for police force, there would be more 
 on the Nicaragua than on the Panama, We would have to have more 
 engineering divisions. 
 
 The Chairman. What I want to get at is whether the items were put down 
 on the list. 
 
 Colonel Ernst. Oh, I have got them all, and I would be very glad to show 
 them to you. I have not got them here to-day, but I can bring them if you 
 wish to see them. 
 
 The Chairman. They were not published? 
 
 Colonel Ernst. No. 
 
 The Chairman. I would be very glad if you will furnish us with them, 
 because wo have had a great difficulty in getting at the items of the estimate. 
 
 Colonel Ernst. It is one of those things that we are perfectly aware is 
 open to attack, because they are approximations, but they are identical for 
 the two linos. 
 
 The Chairman. You will furnish them to us? 
 
 Colonel Ernst. Yes. 
 
 The Chairman. Then I will not go any further into that question. 
 
 Additional statement of CJol. Oswald H. Emst: 
 The Chairman. Did you get the pai)er I refeired to? 
 Colonel Ernst. Yes; here it is. 
 
 The Chairman. I would like very much to have this go mto the record. 
 It may become very important if the canal should be built. 
 5102 
 
62 
 
 Colonel Ernst. It is very carefully gotten up. The reason we did not pub- 
 lish it is because there are undoubtedly errors in it. Estimates are too nigh 
 in some respects and too low in others. We thought they would correct each 
 other. The comparison, however, is a fair one. It is the same for both 
 canals. It is a study to which we devoted a good many weeks. It is as 
 follows: 
 
 Tkntativb Organization for the Maintenance and Operation of 
 THE Canals. 
 
 I. NICARAGUA CANAL. 
 
 Supreme control to rest in a board of five members, located in Washing- 
 ton. The duties of the board will be: 
 
 1. To make regulations for the government of the canal, including the 
 tariff of charges, navigation rules, police and sanitary rules, and, in short, 
 all rules required for the operation and maintenance of the canal. 
 
 2. To make or approve all appointments, the salary of which equals or ex- 
 ceeds $100 per month. 
 
 3. To make or approve all contracts. 
 
 4. To audit all money accounts before transmitting them to the Treasury 
 Department. 
 
 The annual expenses of the board may be placed at $100,000. 
 
 Organization on the Isthmus.— The general control to be vested in a gov- 
 ernor, having his headquarters at Greytown, where the genei-al offices will 
 be located. 
 
 The administration will be divided among six departments, viz: 
 
 A. Engineer department, charged with all the maintenance and improve- 
 ment of the canal, including the repair shops and storehouses, and the 
 repairs of public buildings; also with the location and sale or rental of lands. 
 
 B. Transit department, charged with the navigation of the canal, the as- 
 sessment of dues, the service of the ports, including light-houses, and the 
 operation of telegraph and telephone lines. 
 
 C. Medical department, charged with the hospital and other medical 
 service, including port, quarantine, and sanitary inspection service. 
 
 D. Finance department, charged with the collestion of dues, payment of 
 salaries, and management of the funds. 
 
 E. Law department, charged with the supervision of such minor courts 
 as may be esteblished and with all legal matters. 
 
 P. Police department, charged with the preservation of order and with 
 the management of the armed force required for that purpose. 
 
 The governor.— The governor will issue orders to the heads of departments, 
 will make reports to the board of control, and conduct all correspondence 
 with that board, and will make frequent inspection of all parts of the canal. 
 Attached to his office will be a secretary, two clerks, two messengers, and 
 one small inspection steamer, the latter to be available for other officials 
 when not required by the governor. 
 
 Annual expense of governor's office. 
 Salaries: 
 
 Governor $15,000 
 
 Secretary 5,000 
 
 Clerks, 2 at $1,500 3,000 
 
 Messengers, 2 at $400 8(X) 
 
 Impection steamer 15,G(X) 
 
 Office supplies 500 
 
 Total 39,300 
 
 A board of five members in Washington, for the government 
 of the Philippine Islands, with salaries corresponding with those 
 of the Isthmian Canal Commission of $60,000 a month, would be 
 quite as safe and useful, as this proposed board would be for the 
 government of an isthmian canal and, probably, more expedi- 
 tious in getting through with their work. 
 
 No salaries are named for this supreme board of control, and 
 the only precedent we have on that point is that it would cost 
 not less than $60,000 each year. 
 
 The estimated contingencies of $558,470 for the Nicaragua route 
 and $337,362 for the Panama route, in all $895,832. included in the 
 cost of this plan of canal government, would safely cover the es- 
 timate of $60,000 and provide living salaries for the five mem- 
 bers of the board of supreme control, and still leave enough to 
 
 fi.C2 
 
63 
 
 pay the salary of the governor, at $15,000 per annnm, and his offi- 
 cial staff, and for a steamer for their use, which is summed up at 
 $39,300 per annum. The total annual expense of the supreme 
 board of control and of the governor's executive department is 
 not to be less than $783,000 in the plan proposed for the govern- 
 ment of the canal. This plan, although it was not adopted, is the 
 actual basis of computation of the cost of the maintenance and 
 operation of this canal. 
 
 Yet it is no hazardous venture to assert that, with a good, 
 honest, industrious, and reliable engineer at the head of the en- 
 terprise, this array of salaried officials could be dispensed \vith 
 far more safely than they could be employed in the conduct of 
 the work. 
 
 It has required the estimates that were made for this novel, 
 extravagant, and dangerous plan of canal government to support 
 the estimates of the commission for the maintenance and opera- 
 tion of these canals, which have no support in the actual experi- 
 ence of any other canal in the world. 
 
 An argument against the Nicaragua Canal based on such esti- 
 mates has no just support in fact and no sanction in the history 
 of any other canal. 
 
 Mr. President, I have not attempted to discuss a single question 
 that I have presented upon the mere weight of the conflicting 
 testimony. As to many of the matters there is not one particle 
 of conflict. The very leading issues upon which I plant myself 
 in this case and upon which the majority of the committee plant 
 themselves are sustained by proofs against which there is no ob- 
 jection and about which there is no controversy. 
 
 At the expense of very great personal risk and labor, and doubt- 
 less at the expense of the patience of the Senate, possibly of the 
 country, I have undertaken to present those leading issues and the 
 facts that sustain them absolutely and without controversy, for 
 the consideration of the Senate of the United States, in giving to 
 the majority of the committee that support of tmth and justice 
 in their action in this great case which is due to the occasion and 
 to their own character and to the country we serve and to the 
 prosperity we are trying to advance. I am grateful , indeed , to the 
 Senate for having permitted me to stand this long time on my feet, 
 even in the absence of many Senators, and trust that those who 
 were away will take occasion, when it suits them to do so, to read 
 what I have had to say. 
 
 Appendix 1. 
 List of sailing vessels over S50 tons built in 1901 in the United States. 
 
 Name. 
 
 A.P.Coates 
 
 A. "W. Thompson. 
 
 Acme 
 
 Ada F.Brown 
 
 Adelaid Barbour , 
 
 Advent 
 
 Apena 
 
 Alumna 
 
 Alvena 
 
 Amaranth 
 
 Annie , 
 
 6162 
 
 Ton- 
 nage. 
 
 716 
 2,279 
 
 3,388 
 
 1,450 
 
 !,»«> 
 
 431 
 
 970 
 
 696 
 
 772 
 
 1,109 
 
 613 
 
 Builder and where built. 
 
 Geo. H. Hitchings, Hoguiam, Wash. 
 American Shipbuilding Co., West Bay 
 
 City, Mich. 
 Arthur So wall & Co., Bath, Me. 
 Chaa. V. Minott, Phippsburg, Me. 
 W. S. Currier & Co., Newbursrport, Mass. 
 North Bend MiU Co., North Bond,Oreg. 
 Hall Bro's. Shipyard, Port Blakoley , Wash. 
 North Bend Infill Co., North Bend,Orefr. 
 Bendixen Shipbuilding Co.,Faii'haven,Cal. 
 Mathew Turner, Benicia, Cal. 
 Carleton, Norwood & Co.,Rockport,Me. 
 
64 
 
 List of sailing vessels over 
 
 S50 tons built in 1001 in the United States— QonV A. 
 
 Name. 
 
 Ton- 
 nage, 
 
 Builder and where built. 
 
 
 2,207 
 
 1,211 
 
 2,792 
 
 777 
 
 1,576 
 
 522 
 
 620 
 
 723 
 
 1,281 
 
 821 
 
 682 
 
 1,263 
 
 881 
 
 352 
 
 1,476 
 
 613 
 
 726 
 
 998 
 
 847 
 
 730 
 
 861 
 
 1,778 
 
 1,149 
 
 1,664 
 
 1,274 
 
 1,2.53 
 
 1,808 
 
 929 
 
 955, 
 
 679 
 
 1,067 
 
 955 
 
 371 
 
 1,492 
 
 955 
 
 738 
 
 1,247 
 
 955 
 
 548 
 
 2,178 
 
 1,833 
 
 1,579 
 
 679 
 
 1,589 
 
 312 
 
 1,120 
 
 905 
 
 2,374 
 
 677 
 
 789 
 
 703 
 
 2,556 
 
 389 
 
 955 
 
 481 
 
 955 
 
 2,279 
 
 l,5a5 
 588 
 955 
 584 
 405 
 675 
 633 
 1,763 
 1.169 
 
 H. M. Bean, Camden, Me. 
 
 Aurora 
 
 Everett Shipbuilding Co., Everett, Wash. 
 
 Baker Palmer 
 
 Welt's Shipyard, Waldoboro, Me. 
 
 Balboa 
 
 Hairs Shipyard, Port Blakeley , Wash. 
 
 Cardenas - 
 
 Kelley, Spear & Co., Bath, Me. 
 
 Clias H.Clinke 
 
 Palmer's Shipyard, Noank, Conn. 
 
 Clias. S.Hirsch 
 
 Kelley, Spear & Co., Bath, Me. 
 Bendixsen Shipbuilding Co., Fairhaven, 
 
 Chehalis 
 
 Cordelia E. Hayes 
 
 Cal. 
 Percy & Small, Bath, Me. 
 Marshfield, Oreg. 
 
 E.B.Jackson . . .. 
 
 Liindstrom's Yard, Aberdeen, Wash. 
 
 Edith G Folwell 
 
 New England Co. , Bath, Me. 
 Lindstrom's Yard, Aberdeen, Wash. 
 
 
 Emily I. White 
 
 E. J. White, Machias, Me. 
 
 Francis C. Tunnel 
 
 Frederick W. Day 
 
 Gamble 
 
 Warren Sawyer, Millbridge, Me. 
 Kelley, Spear & Co., Bath, Me. 
 Hall's Shipyard, Port Blakeley, Wash. 
 Bendixsen S. B. Co., Fairfaxen, Cal. 
 
 Georgina 
 
 Henry B. Fiske 
 
 George A. Gilchrist, Belfast, Me. 
 New England Co Bath, Me. 
 
 
 J. C. Strawbridge 
 
 Jacob M Haslceil 
 
 H. N. Bean, Camden, Me. 
 
 Cobb, Butler & Co., Rockland, Me. 
 
 
 Moran Bros. Co., Seattle, Wash. 
 
 
 
 James Tuft 
 
 Henry K. Hall, Port Blakeley, Wash. 
 Washburn Bros., Thomaston, Me. 
 
 Joseph G.Ray 
 
 James W. Paul, jr 
 
 Kenwood.. 
 
 Kimberton 
 
 McKay & Dix, Verona, Me. 
 Wm. McKie, East Boston, Mass. 
 Palmer's Shipbuilding Co., Noank, Conn, 
 Hay «fe Wright, Alameda, Cal. 
 
 Kona 
 
 Lahaina 
 
 Oakland, Cal. 
 
 Langhorn.. 
 
 Palmer's Shipbuilding Co., Noank, Conn. 
 Sawyer Bros., Milbridge, Me. 
 Thomaston, Mo. 
 
 
 L. Herbert Taft 
 
 Logan 
 
 Palmer's Shipyard, Noank, Conn. 
 
 Geo. H. Hitchings, Hoquiam. Wash. 
 
 Gardner G. Deering, Bath, Me. 
 
 Palmer's Shipbuilding Co., Noank, Conn. 
 
 Leesburg, N. J. 
 
 Percy & Small, Bath, Me. 
 
 Gardner G. Deering, Bath, Me. 
 
 
 Malcolm B. Seavey 
 
 Manheim 
 
 Marie F. Cummings 
 
 Martha P. Small 
 
 Mary F. Barrett 
 
 Matanzas 
 
 Kelley, Spear & Co., Bath, Me, 
 Hay & Wright, Alameda, Cal, 
 Parcy & Small, Bath, Me. 
 
 
 Miles M. Merry 
 
 Newport 
 
 Kelley, Spear & Co., Bath, Me. 
 
 Harlan «fe Hollongsworth Co., Wilmington. 
 
 R. M. Spedden Co., Baltimore, Md. 
 
 Parcy & Small, Bath, Me. 
 
 New England Co., Bath, Me. 
 
 White's Shipyard, Everett, Wash. 
 
 Bethel, Del. 
 
 No. 6 
 
 No. 21 
 
 Oakley C. Curtis 
 
 Orlando V. Wooten 
 
 OteUa Pedersen 
 
 R. J. Camp 
 
 Rebecca Palmer 
 
 Cobb, Butler & Co., Rockland, Me. 
 
 Robert Donaldson 
 
 Robesonia 
 
 E.James TuU, Pocomoke City, Md. 
 Palmer Shipbuilding' Co., Noank, Conn. 
 Kelley Spear & Co., Bath, Me. 
 R. Palmer & Sons, Noank, Conn. 
 
 Rockland 
 
 Rutherford 
 
 S. D. Warriner 
 
 American Shipbuilding Co., West Bay 
 
 City, Mich. 
 Kelley, Spear & Co., Bath, Me. 
 Copi)er & Saurhof,Sharpstown,Md, 
 Palmer Shipbuilding Co., Noank, Conn. 
 
 Sagua 
 
 Saliie C. Marvil 
 
 Saucon 
 
 Savannah 
 
 David Clark, Kennebunkport, Me. 
 C. V. Minott, Phippsburg, Me. 
 Hall Brothers, Port Blakely, Wash. 
 New England Co., Bath, Me. 
 Palmer's Shipyard, Noank, Conn. 
 P. W, Stone, San Francisco, Cal. 
 
 Seguin 
 
 Sophia Christensen 
 
 Springfield . 
 
 Trevorton 
 
 W.H.Marston 
 
65 
 
 List of sailing vessels over 250 tons built in 1001 in the United States — Cont'd. 
 
 Name. 
 
 Builders and where built. 
 
 W. J. Patterson 
 
 Watson A. West.... 
 
 Weir 
 
 Wempe Brothers... 
 
 Whitman 
 
 Wm. F. Garms 
 
 Wm. H. Yerkes .... 
 William P. Frye.... 
 
 Total tonnage 
 
 Lindstrom's yard, Aberdeen, Wash. 
 
 Do. 
 Kelley Spear & Co., Bath, Me. 
 Lindstrom's yard, Aberdeen, Wash. 
 Kelley Spear & C;o., Bath, Me. 
 White Shipyard, Everett, Wash. 
 Washburn Brothers, Thomaston, Me. 
 Arthur Sewall & Co., Bath, Me. 
 
 Appendix 2. 
 List of new American steamers of over 250 tons capacity built in 1901. 
 
 . Name. 
 
 Acme 
 
 Alvina 
 
 Apache 
 
 Arapohe , 
 
 Ai'ctic 
 
 Argo 
 
 Bound Brook 
 
 Buckman 
 
 Cape May 
 
 Cai-tegena 
 
 Carlisle 
 
 Charles S.Nefr 
 
 Chas. R. Spencer. . . 
 
 Chicago 
 
 Chicago 
 
 Christopher 
 
 City of Rockland.. 
 City of St. Joseph . 
 City of Trenton ... 
 
 Colonel 
 
 Cuba 
 
 David M. Whitney 
 
 Denver 
 
 ElDia 
 
 ElSiglo 
 
 ElValle 
 
 Esperanza 
 
 F.B.Jones 
 
 F.T.Heffleflnger .. 
 Frederick B. Wells 
 G.A.Flagg 
 
 George Gar butt ... 
 George W. Peavey 
 
 George W. Thomas 
 Gilchrist 
 
 5162- 6 
 
 416 
 526 
 
 8,378 
 
 3,878 
 
 392 
 
 1,089 
 
 1,016 
 
 1,820 
 714 
 
 1,532 
 644 
 
 474 
 3,195 
 1,334 
 4,260 
 1,696 
 
 691 
 
 3,879 
 
 594 
 4,626 
 
 4,549 
 
 4,616 
 4,605 
 4,702 
 
 324 
 
 4,807 
 4,897 
 8,062 
 
 '442 
 4,997 
 
 8,871 
 
 Builder and where built. 
 
 Not known. 
 
 Harlan & HoUings worth Co., Wilmington, 
 
 Del. 
 Wm. Cramp & Sons Ship and Engine 
 
 Building Co., Philadelphia, Pa. 
 Do. 
 H. R. Reed, Bay City, Oreg. 
 Craig Shipbuilding Co., Toledo, Ohio. 
 Harlan & Hollingsworth Co., Wilmington, 
 
 Del. 
 Craig Shipbuilding Co., Toledo. Ohio., 
 Harlan & Boilings worth Co., Wilmington, 
 
 Del. 
 James Davidson, West Bay City, Mich. 
 Neafie & Levy Ship and Engine Building 
 
 Co. , Philadelphia, Pa. 
 Jenks Shipbuilding Co. .Port Huron, Mich. 
 E. W. Spencer, Portland, Oreg. 
 Buffalo Dry Dock Co. , Buffalo, N. Y. 
 Buries Dry Dock Co., Port Richmond. 
 Superior Shipbuilding Co., West Superior. 
 Wm. McKie, Boston. Mass. 
 Alexander Stewai't, St. Joseph, Mo. 
 Neafle & Levy Ship and Engine Building 
 
 Co., Philadelphia. 
 Detroit Shipbuilding Co., Wyandotte, 
 
 Mich. 
 Bath Iron Works, Bath, Me. 
 Detroit Shipbuildiag Co., Wyandotte, 
 
 Mich. 
 Harlan Ss Hollingsworth Co., Wilmington, 
 
 Del. 
 Newport News Ship and Engine Building 
 
 Co., Newport News, Va. 
 Do. 
 Do. 
 Wm. Cramp & Sons Ship and Engine 
 
 Building Co., Philadelphia, Pa. 
 Taiuas Ellington, Portland, Oreg. 
 Chicago Shipbuilding Co. Chicago, 111. 
 
 Do. 
 Superior Shipbuilding Co., West Superior, 
 
 Wis. 
 Thomas W. Gar butt, Wright, Ga. 
 American Shipbuilding Co., Cleveland, 
 
 Ohio. 
 E. J. Howard, Jeffersonville, Ind. 
 American Shipbixilding Co., West Bay 
 
 City, Mich. 
 
List of new American steamers of over 250 tons capacity built in 1901— ConVd. 
 
 Name. 
 
 Ton- 
 nage. 
 
 Builder and where built. 
 
 GoldDust 
 
 Hampton 
 
 Harry B. Hollins 
 
 Hawaiian 
 
 Hawalei 
 
 Henry Steinbrenner . 
 
 Hugoma ..., 
 
 Illinois 
 
 International . . . 
 
 Irociuois 
 
 J.S. 
 
 John B.Collins.. 
 John English ... 
 John F, Carroll. 
 
 John J. Albright . . 
 
 John S. Tompkins. 
 
 Jupiter 
 
 Kennebeck 
 
 Lake Shore 
 
 Lakeside.. 
 Lakewood 
 
 Louise 
 
 Lyra. 
 
 M.F.Henderson. 
 
 Majestic 
 
 Marion 
 
 Mars 
 
 Marshfleld 
 
 Mary C. Elphicke . 
 
 Mauch Chunk 
 
 Meggido 
 
 Meteor 
 
 Mills 
 
 Mineola 
 
 Minne tonka 
 
 Monterey 
 
 Morning Star 
 
 Neptune 
 
 New Shoreham 
 
 New York Central, No. 6. 
 Notth Beach 
 
 Northwestern . 
 
 Northman 
 
 North Star .... 
 
 Northtown 
 
 Northwestern. 
 
 Oregonian 
 
 Orion 
 
 Ossian Bedell . . 
 Pathfinder 
 
 Patience 
 
 Pennsylvania. 
 
 Pere Marquette 
 
 Puritan 
 
 Randolph S. Warner '.. 
 
 Batum... 
 5102 
 
 430 
 
 580 
 
 1,019 
 
 5,597 
 
 660 
 
 4,719 
 
 403 
 590 
 
 1,169 
 292 
 325 
 
 1,022 
 510 
 
 4,805 
 
 593 
 3,719 
 2,183 
 3,781 
 
 450 
 1,016 
 
 335 
 
 4,417 
 534 
 657 
 262 
 
 3,748 
 
 4,998 
 4,499 
 
 250 
 2,301 
 2,525 
 
 295 
 5,270 
 
 4,702 
 
 3,717 
 503 
 453 
 833 
 
 2,157 
 2,157 
 3,195 
 2,157 
 2,157 
 6,597 
 1,736 
 296 
 2,792 
 
 394 
 
 2,775 
 1,547 
 3,062 
 
 8,717 
 
 E. J. Howard, Jeffersonville, Ind. 
 
 Lewis Nixon, Elizabethport, N. J. 
 
 T. S. Marvel & Co., Newburg, N. Y. 
 
 Roach Shipyard, Chester, Pa. 
 
 John W. Dickey, Alameda, Cal. 
 
 Jenkins Shipbuilding Co., Port Huron, 
 
 Mich. 
 DetroitShipbuildingCo.,Wyandotte,Mich. 
 Quincv, 111. 
 
 John Slarr, "West Haven, Conn. 
 Craig Shipbuilding Co.. Toledo, Ohio. 
 E.J. Howard, Jeffersonville, Ind. 
 A. C. Brown & Sons, Tottenville, N. Y. 
 T. S. Marvel & Co., Newburgh, N. Y. 
 Rodermond's Shipyard, Tompkins Cove, 
 
 N. Y. 
 American Shipbuilding Co., Cleveland, 
 
 Ohio. 
 Mound City, 111. 
 
 American Shipbuilding Co., Lorain, Ohio 
 Jenks Shipbuilding Co., Port Huron, Mich! 
 American Shipbuilding Co., West Bay 
 
 City, Mich. 
 Craig Shipbuilding Co., Toledo, Ohio. 
 Harlan Sz HolUngs worth Co., Wilmington, 
 
 Del. 
 A. D. Stevens, Jacksonville, Fla. 
 Maryland Steel Co., Sparrow Point, Md. 
 J. H. Johnson, Portland, Oreg. 
 E. J. Heath, Everett, Wash. 
 Wilmington, Del. 
 Detroit Shipbuilding Co., Wyandotte, 
 
 Mich. 
 Mai*shfield, Ore^. 
 
 Chicago Shipbuilding Co., Chicago, 111. 
 Union Dry Dock Co., Buffalo, N. Y. 
 M. J. Godfrey, Lyons, Ohio. 
 Craig Shipbuilding Co., Toledo, Ohio. 
 Maryland: Steel Co., Sparrow Point, Md. 
 Port Clyde Marine Ways, Port Clyde, Me. 
 American Shipbuilding Co., Cleveland, 
 
 Ohio. 
 Wm. Cramp & Sons, Ship and Engine 
 
 Building Co., Philadelphia, Pa. 
 E. J. Howard, Jeffersonville, Ind. 
 American Shipbuilding Co.. Lorain, Ohio. 
 Wm. McKie, East Boston, Mass. 
 Burlee Dry Dock Co., Port Richmond, N.Y. 
 Townsend & Downey, Shooters Island, 
 
 N.Y. 
 Chicago Shipbuilding Co., Chicago, 111. 
 
 Do. 
 Roach's Shipyard, Chester, Pa. 
 Chicago Shipbuilding Co., Chicago, HI. 
 
 Do. 
 Roach's Shipyard, Chester, Pa. 
 George Johnson, Green Bay, Wis. 
 Buffalo Dry Dock Co., Buffalo, N. Y. 
 Harlan & HoUingsworth Co., Wilmington, 
 
 Del. 
 John H. Dialogue, Camden, N. J. 
 American Shipbuilding Co., Cleveland, 
 
 Ohio. 
 Do. 
 Craig Shipbuilding Co., Toledo, Ohio. 
 Superior Shipbuilding Co., West Sui>erior, 
 
 American Shipbuilding Co., Lorain, Ohio. 
 
67 
 
 List of new American steamers over S50 tons capacity built in 1901— ConVd. 
 
 Name. 
 
 Builder and where built. 
 
 Springfield 
 
 Standard 
 
 Tamalpais. 
 
 Thomas Patton 
 
 Two States 
 
 Uranus 
 
 Valetta 
 
 Venus 
 
 W. H. Paringle , 
 
 Walter Scranton . . . 
 
 Watson 
 
 West Point 
 
 WillH.Isom 
 
 William L. Brown.. 
 Williams. Mack.... 
 
 Yozemite 
 
 Zulia 
 
 Total tonnage 
 
 The Pusoy & Jones Co., Wilmington, Del. 
 Burlee Dry Dock Co., Port Richmond, N.Y, 
 Union Iron Works, San Francisco, Cal. 
 T. S. Marvel & Co., Newburg, N. Y. 
 John M. Graham, Savannah, Ga. 
 Detroit Shipbuilding Co., Wyandotte, 
 
 Mich. 
 W. D. Delaney, Benecia, Cal. 
 American Shipbuilding Co., LoraiiL, Ohio. 
 Louis Pacquet, Pasco, Wash. 
 American Shipbuilding Co., Cleveland, 
 
 Ohio. 
 Craig Shipbuilding Co., Toledo, Ohio. 
 T. S. Marvel & Co., Newbiirg, N. Y. 
 Thomas Dunbar, Ballard, Wash. 
 Chicago Shipbuilding Co., Chicago, 111. 
 American Shipbuilding Co., Lorain, Ohio. 
 Detroit Shipbuildin g Co . , Wyandotte, Mich . 
 Neafle «fe Levy Ship and Engine Building 
 
 Co., Philadelphia. 
 
 O 
 
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