THE 
 
 POLITICAL LIFE 
 
 OF 
 
 THE RIGHT HONOURABLE 
 
 GEORGE CANNING, 
 
 FROM 
 
 HIS ACCEPTANCE OF THE SEALS OF THE FOREIGN 
 
 DEPARTMENT, IN SEPTEMBER, 1822, 
 
 TO 
 
 THE PERIOD OF HIS DEATH, IN AUGUST, 1827. 
 
 TOGETHER WITH 
 
 A SHORT REVIEW OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS 
 
 SUBSEQUENTLY TO THAT EVENT. 
 
 BY 
 HIS PRIVATE SECRETARY, 
 
 AUGUSTUS GRANVILLE STAPLETON, Eso. 
 
 SECOND EDITION, 
 INCLUDING THE PART OMITTED IN THE FIRST. 
 
 IN THREE VOLUMES. 
 
 VOL. I. 
 
 LONDON: 
 
 PRINTED FOR 
 
 LONGMAN, REES, ORME, BROWN, AND GREEN, 
 
 PATERNOSTER-ROW. 
 
 1831-
 
 *
 
 -> ° SAM'A UAKBAIU 
 
 v.l 
 
 ERRATA IN VOL I. 
 
 Page 111. line 29. for as should, read that it might. 
 
 — line SO. dele make it. 
 
 187. line 15. for having, read the existence of. 
 
 225. line 21. for cannot be given, read be not entitled to. 
 
 231. line 7. for They, read Their relative positions. 
 
 258. line 10. for waked, read awoke, 
 
 343. line 2. dele rtof. 
 
 — line 3. dele that he. 
 
 3C3. line 11. for conferred, read reflected. 
 
 387. line 4. for France holding, read for France to hold 
 
 420. line 27. dele that. 
 
 449. line 13. for by preventing, read prevented. 
 
 — line 14. after money, insert and thus. 
 458. line 12. for were, read had been. 
 481. line 4. before hateful, insert to him. 
 
 when certain intimations, sufficiently vague in 
 their character to render an explanation of 
 them impossible, induced the Author, with 
 reluctance, to suppress the work for an inde- 
 finite period. But, in the course of last October, 
 a pamphlet having appeared throwing asper- 
 sions upon the memory of Mr. Canningj with
 
 
 ky^
 
 UNIVERSITY OP ri»™* 
 
 PREFACE. 
 
 This work was intended for publication early 
 in 1830; the object being to remove, as speedily 
 as possible, many erroneous notions which pre- 
 vailed, respecting Mr. Canning's policy. 
 
 The first two Volumes were already printed 
 before the conclusion of the preceding year, 
 when certain intimations, sufficiently vague in 
 their character to render an explanation of 
 them impossible, induced the Author, with 
 reluctance, to suppress the work for an inde- 
 finite period. But, in the course of last October, 
 a pamphlet having appeared throwing asper- 
 sions upon the memory of Mr. Canning, with
 
 VI PREFACE. 
 
 the view of exalting the then head of the 
 Government, the Author at once resolved to 
 disregard all personal considerations, and to 
 publish, without any further delay than was 
 necessary to complete the third volume. 
 
 This resolution (which was communicated to 
 several individuals) was further strengthened, in 
 consequence of another pamphlet, which issued 
 shortly after from the press, and which, although 
 bearing the stamp of official origin, nevertheless, 
 with even greater unfairness than the first, 
 sought to magnify the merits of the late Premier, 
 at the expense of Mr. Canning. 
 
 To the Representative of this lamented 
 Statesman the Author is indebted for the means 
 which have enabled him to compile the follow- 
 ing pages. Without the freest reference to Mr. 
 Canning's papers — a reference which his Re- 
 presentative alone had the power to accord — 
 the task which the Author has now performed, 
 he never could have undertaken. 
 
 In executing it, his main object has been so 
 to exhibit the great landmarks of Mr. Canning's 
 policy, that their true bearing and tendency may 
 be understood and appreciated.
 
 TIIEFACE. Vll 
 
 If this end be accomplished, it is hoped that it 
 will compensate for the many inaccuracies of 
 composition which may be found in these 
 volumes, and which are, in a great degree, 
 owing to the want of that attentive revision, 
 which the Author had not leisure to bestow. 
 
 Dec. 1. 1830.
 
 CONTENTS 
 
 OF 
 
 THE FIRST VOLUME. 
 
 CHAP. I. 
 
 Review of the State of Europe from the Fall of Napoleon to 
 the Death of the Marquess of Londonderry. - Page 1 
 
 CHAP. II. 
 
 Review of the State of England, from the Peace to the Ac- 
 ceptance of the Seals of the Foreign Office by Mr. Canning, 
 in September, 1822. - - - 6.5 
 
 CHAP. III. 
 
 Mr. Canning's "System" of Policy. — Discussions at Ve- 
 rona respecting Spain — Discussions between Spain and 
 Great Britain with regard to the Conduct of Spanish Au- 
 thorities in the New World. - - -131 
 
 CHAP. IV. 
 
 Commencement of Greek Insurrection. — Mr. Canning's 
 Views on Eastern Affairs. — Proceedings at Verona re- 
 specting, — 1. The Discussions between Russia and Tur- 
 key ; — 2. Italy; — 3. The Slave Trade; — 4. Spanish 
 America. - - - - - 181 
 
 CHAP. V. 
 
 Negotiations at Paris on the Subject of the Invasion of Spain. 
 — Lord Fitzroy Somerset's Mission to Madrid Further
 
 Tl CONTENTS. 
 
 Negotiations at Paris. — Speech of the King of France to 
 the Legislative Chambers. — Negotiations on the same 
 Subject at Madrid Proceedings in the French Cham- 
 bers. — Mr. Canning's last Effort at Paris to prevent War 
 counteracted by further Debates in French Chambers. — 
 Chateaubriand's Speech. — Proceedings at Madrid. — 
 Departure of Ferdinand from that Capital. — Commence- 
 ment of War. - Page 219 
 
 CHAP. VI. 
 
 Domestic Affairs Partial Changes in the Administration. 
 
 — Mr. Canning's Retirement from Liverpool. — Debates in 
 Parliament on Verona Negotiations. — Affairs of Ireland. 
 — Catholick Question. .... 289 
 
 CHAP. VII. 
 
 Progress of the French Troops in Spain Proceedings of 
 
 the Cortes at Seville — and their Retreat to Cadiz. — 
 Due d'Angouleme's Advance with his Army to Cadiz. — 
 Negotiations at that City. — Fall of Cadiz. — King's sub- 
 sequent Conduct. — State of Spain at the End of the Year 
 1 825. — Debates in Parliament on Spanish Affairs. — 
 Mr. Canning's " System " of Policy. - - 385
 
 MR. CANNINGS 
 
 POLITICAL LIFE, FROM, &c. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 REVIEW OF THE STATE OF EUROPE FROM THE FALL OF 
 NAPOLEON TO THE DEATH OF THE MARgUESS OF 
 LONDONDERRY. 
 
 The exertions of Great Britain to curb the 
 power of Napoleon, and to defeat his projects 
 for the attainment of universal Empire, were 
 not made without an expenditure of blood and 
 treasure commensurate with the magnitude of 
 the mortal struggle in which She was engaged. 
 
 To excite his country to these exertions, and 
 to encourage her in making the necessary sacri- 
 fices with cheerfulness, were the objects of Mr- 
 Canning's unwearied activity ; nor was there 
 any publick man whose efforts produced a greater 
 impression on the opinions of his countrymen. 
 He had never, from the commencement of 
 Napoleon's career, been dazzled by its brilliancy; 
 nor had he ever refrained from stigmatizing those 
 
 vol. i. * B
 
 actions by which its splendour was obscured, irr 
 those terms, which their iniquity, or their atrocity 
 demanded. 
 
 He felt assured that England would never 
 obtain from Buonaparte terms of peace, consistent 
 with her dignity and her interests, unless she 
 raised herself to a station, which would com- 
 pel him to proffer conditions befitting her ac- 
 ceptance. The honour and prosperity of Eng- 
 land were not only incompatible with the French 
 ruler's schemes of unlimited aggrandisement, 
 but they were dangerous to his authority over 
 the nations which he had conquered. For while 
 the integrity and independence of the British 
 Empire were preserved, the oppressed and de- 
 graded nations, who groaned under his yoke, 
 would ever have regarded Great Britain, as the 
 only Power capable of assisting to rescue them 
 from their degradation, or to avenge their suffer- 
 ings. 
 
 A peace, too, by which an unrestricted inter- 
 course would have been established between the 
 two countries, might (while the principles of 
 their respective governments continued so op- 
 posed to each other) have endangered the stabi- 
 lity of Napoleon's throne. The example of the 
 free institutions of this country, if closely ex- 
 amined, might probably have excited a spirit of 
 enquiry amongst his own subjects ; and the minds 
 of the French nation, once turned from contem-
 
 3 
 
 plating the glory of their external conquests to 
 consider their internal condition, might have 
 been seized with a desire of" imitating that ex- 
 ample, too strong even for the authority of 
 Napoleon to repress. A state of war, whether 
 accompanied by victory or defeat, is attended 
 with such feelings of excitement, that it absorbs 
 all minor interests, and leaves no leisure for re- 
 flection ; and although, indeed, such days as 
 those of Austerlitz and Jena were purchased by 
 France at the expence of much individual suffer- 
 ing, yet if families felt the horrors of the con- 
 scription (by far the heaviest of all the evils that 
 Napoleon's Government inflicted), the nation 
 forgot them in the vast increase of their territory, 
 in the unprecedented power of their Emperor, 
 and the unequalled triumphs of his arms. In 
 fact, it was not till after the fatal expedition to 
 Russia that this mode of recruiting the armies 
 pressed with such cruel severity on the French 
 people. But notwithstanding this, and their 
 other grievances, the mass of the population was 
 much happier under Napoleon's reign than dur- 
 ing any previous period of their history 5 certainly 
 happier than under the ancient dynasty, whilst 
 few did not prefer even the then existing des- 
 potism to those alternations of anarchy, and mis- 
 rule, which had been terminated by its establish- 
 ment. 
 
 u 2
 
 The duties of a military life, also, gave occu- 
 pation to those restless spirits, which, left without 
 employment, might have been engaged in ma- 
 chinations to overthrow that same government, 
 which they were willing to defend, at the hazard 
 of their lives, so long as it was identified with the 
 greatness of their country. But although men 
 of that character might be content with a govern- 
 ment which did not leave them in idleness, and 
 under which they were able to gain distinction 
 and renown ; and although the people of France 
 possessed more freedom than they had ever 
 before enjoyed ; yet the imperfections of their 
 government were so glaring, that Napoleon must 
 have been conscious that, in a nation which only 
 a few years before had (with apparent unanimity) 
 asserted the doctrines of liberty in their most 
 extravagant form, numbers must have existed 
 who secretly repined at seeing an absolute mon- 
 archy established, in every way opposed to the 
 principles which they had professed, and which 
 they had undergone so much misery to support. 
 War, therefore, was the very element of Napo- 
 leon's power ; but war with England, until she 
 should be reduced so low that none of his tributary 
 States that might venture to brave his anger, 
 could hope to receive security from her protec- 
 tion, and until the ruin of her institutions should 
 be effected, and the danger of her example clone
 
 away, was evidently his interest, as it undoubt- 
 edly was the one grand object of his life. 
 
 Mr. Canning saw that we were embarked in 
 a deadly conflict, from which any temporary 
 respite would have been worse than useless, and 
 was aware that no lasting peace could be pro- 
 cured, except by compelling the enemy to agree 
 to terms, in every respect consistent with the 
 honour and interests of the British nation. That 
 the deliverance of those European States, which 
 had the courage to struggle against Napoleon's 
 tyranny, was as essential to our interests as it was 
 to our honour, Mr. Canning always maintained ; 
 nor did he less strenuously contend that the plan 
 of insulated policy, which consisted in abjuring 
 the Continent, and shutting up ourselves in our 
 own island, was one which would be fatal to our 
 safety, because we should not long be allowed 
 to act upon it unmolested. The only effect of 
 such a policy, he said, would be to leave the 
 nations of the Continent an easy prey to the 
 French Emperor ; and he argued that, when 
 each country had separately been subjugated, 
 Napoleon would have been able to wield the 
 whole united power of Europe, and to turn that 
 power, notwithstanding the reluctance of some 
 of its constituent members, against this devoted 
 country. 
 
 That this was no chimera, but an evil actually 
 
 13 3
 
 to be dreaded, is abundantly manifest from the 
 way in which all the conquered States were com- 
 pelled to contribute their respective quotas of 
 troops in the war against Russia. Setting aside, 
 therefore, the higher considerations of national 
 reputation and national faith, it was our interest 
 to exert ourselves in behalf of other nations, even 
 if we derived no advantage from so doing beyond 
 the suspension of immediate danger to ourselves. 
 
 But Mr. Canning also loudly proclaimed, that 
 while Great Britain stood so high amongst the 
 nations of the world, her own dignity and cha- 
 racter required her to assist and protect weaker 
 nations against oppression ; not only so far as 
 that assistance could be afforded consistently with 
 her own interest, but so far as it was not abso- 
 lutely incompatible with her own security. 
 
 It was from the publick avowal of doctrines 
 such as these, by the best and most enlightened of 
 the British statesmen, and from the success of 
 those statesmen in persuading the country to act 
 up to their spirit, that the British name became 
 revered throughout the continent of Europe. 
 The deliverance of Europe was the avowed ob- 
 ject of the war ; the object avowed by Mr. 
 Pitt in its outset, and by Mr. Canning in urging 
 its continuance, when the colossal power, which 
 the mighty genius of Napoleon had created, led 
 many to look upon its attainment as utterly hope-
 
 less. But when, at last, that and much higher 
 objects were attained ; when Europe was not 
 only delivered for a time, but placed beyond the 
 possibility of re-conquest, Great Britain, who 
 had always kept alive the spark of resistance, 
 held the proudest station amongst the States and 
 Empires of the world. — Mistress of the seas, 
 counting amongst her subjects the greatest 
 General of the age, at the head of victorious 
 armies, she despatched her representatives to 
 the congress of assembled Monarchs armed with 
 a double power, — her great physical force, and 
 the moral predominance derived from the reflec- 
 tion, that, from the commencement to the close 
 of the eventful struggle, her strength had never, 
 but in one solitary instance, been put forth, ex- 
 cept to succour the oppressed, and to vindicate 
 throughout the world the freedom of mankind. 
 But although truth compels the confession that 
 our conduct towards unhappy Norway, in not 
 only sanctioning, but being instrumental in com- 
 pelling, her subjection to a Power, towards 
 which she had, from the earliest periods of her 
 history, entertained the most unconquerable 
 aversion, remains a solitary blot on the bright 
 page of this part of our history j yet, since it 
 was justified on the plea of its necessity for 
 securing the success of that great cause, on the 
 final triumph of which not only our own exist- 
 
 b 4-
 
 8 
 
 ence, but the liberation of the Continent de- 
 pended, it did not materially affect our right to 
 the distinction of being the deliverers of Europe, 
 to which we were so justly entitled by all our 
 other conduct. 
 
 So highly, indeed, was our character estimated 
 on the European continent, that a promise of 
 institutions, similar to those of England, was 
 made by most of the allied Sovereigns, as the 
 greatest blessing which they could confer upon 
 their respective dominions, and as the strongest 
 stimulus for their subjects to assist in the over- 
 throw of the common foe ; while, at the same 
 time, the grant of a constitution, modelled after 
 our own, was the peace-offering made by their 
 recalled Monarch to the French, to reconcile 
 that people to his restoration. 
 
 Nor, indeed, is it matter of surprise that a 
 nation, which had made such extraordinary ex- 
 ertions for her own deliverance, and that of the 
 world, should have been thought to possess 
 some germ of strength, peculiar to itself, by 
 which it had been enabled to perform such 
 wonders for mankind. And one of the grounds 
 of exultation to Mr. Canning at the conclu- 
 sion of the war was, the prospect thus opened, 
 that if nations moulded their institutions after 
 those of England, the blessings of a liberal 
 government would be diffused throughout the 
 whole human race.
 
 
 
 The confident hopes, therefore, of the whole 
 Continent centred in the British representatives 
 at the congress at Vienna, on the result of whose 
 deliberations the future destinies of the world 
 depended. 
 
 From the moderation professed by the Em- 
 perors of Russia and Austria, and the King of 
 Prussia, much was not to be expected. They 
 were already known to have appropriated to 
 themselves the rightful possessions of others ; 
 and now they respectively contemplated some 
 territory, which they wished to annex, or to 
 secure to their dominions. 
 
 Great Britain alone remained untarnished by 
 any attempt at unjust aggrandisement; more- 
 over, there were no possessions which she 
 coveted ; and the question which she had to 
 decide was not, what more she could acquire, 
 but what, in her generosity, she would sur- 
 render. 
 
 After the unprecedented convulsions which 
 Europe had suffered, — after the disorganisation 
 and reconstruction of her Monarchies which 
 had been effected by Napoleon, — it could not 
 be doubted that the Congress must have had to 
 settle many conflicting interests ; and that in so 
 doing it would have been impossible not to have 
 done violence to the feelings or prejudices of 
 some few countries : but what the people of 
 Europe hoped was, that the ties which bound
 
 10 
 
 them to the governments under which they had 
 long lived happily would not be severed, for the 
 mere interest or convenience of any favoured 
 Monarch ; or that, if that Monarch lost one 
 million of subjects in one direction for the con- 
 venience of his Brother-Sovereign, he would not 
 be indemnified in another, without at all regard- 
 ing the happiness of those, who were thus to be 
 made the means of indemnification. 
 
 Against the adoption of principles and ar- 
 rangements such as these, the people of Europe 
 fondly hoped, that, coming with all the renown 
 of victories by sea and land, which she had 
 gained in the war, but above all, coming with 
 clean hands herself to the decision of questions 
 so difficult, Great Britain would have had both 
 the wish and the power to protect them. They 
 trusted that if " the deliverance of Europe," 
 the watch-word that had so often echoed in 
 their ears, meant any thing, it meant not the 
 deliverance alone from the oppressive dominion 
 of Napoleon, but the deliverance from the un- 
 justly acquired dominion of any Sovereign, 
 whoever that Sovereign might happen to be. 
 
 It was, therefore, with feelings of unmixed 
 alarm, that those countries, whose fate yet re- 
 mained undecided, learnt that the act of the 
 Congress, which first transpired, was, its deter- 
 mination to deprive the Genoese of their inde- 
 pendence, and 10 make them over to their
 
 11 
 
 ancient enemy, the King of Sardinia ; and, as if 
 at once to blast the hopes of those who relied on 
 England for protection, England was the very 
 Power selected to carry into execution this most 
 unjust, if not perfidious decree. What made 
 the transaction more particularly unfortunate, 
 as tar as England was concerned, was, that many 
 very able and unprejudiced men thought, that 
 her faith and honour were pledged to the pre- 
 servation of Genoese independence. 
 
 That this was not the case, was maintained, 
 and perhaps successfully maintained, by the 
 English ministry ; but the mere possibility that 
 a doubt should be cast upon the integrity of 
 Great Britain, however unjust the aspersion 
 might have been, was certainly injurious to her 
 credit, which had hitherto been placed beyond 
 the reach of suspicion, or controversy. 
 
 This decision respecting Genoa was not com- 
 pensated by the other arrangments of the Con- 
 gress ; which arrangements neither enhanced the 
 reputation of this country, nor increased her 
 claims of gratitude from others. The avowed 
 object which the noble Lord, who had the con- 
 duct of the negotiations at Vienna, had in view, 
 was not to see justice done to the weaker states ; 
 not to guard their independence, and to watch 
 over their interests, thus seeming the attach- 
 ment of those whom he protected, and the re- 
 spect likewise of those whom he resisted ; but it
 
 12 
 
 was, as he did not scruple to declare, to effect 
 " the re-establishment and re-organisation of 
 " those two great Monarchies, Austria and Prus- 
 " sia, which to all practical purposes had been 
 " destroyed during the war." Every thing, 
 accordingly, was made to yield to the accom- 
 plishment of this purpose. Venice, whom, after 
 the treaty of Campo-Formio, Austria had de- 
 prived of independence, as a reward for having 
 been faithful to her in the war preceding that 
 treaty, but whom she subsequently had been 
 compelled to cede to Napoleon, was again made 
 over to Austria. More than half of Saxony, in 
 spite of the protestations of its Sovereign, and 
 the lamentations of its people, was granted to 
 Prussia ; and Poland was, for the third time, made 
 the subject of partition between her original 
 spoilers, although she was now, for the first 
 time, so divided with the countenance and sanc- 
 tion of Great Britain. All this was done, as 
 Lord Castlereagh stated in Parliament, for the 
 sake of giving military positions, and " flanks 
 " and rears," to Austria and Prussia; and thereby 
 securing whatever settlement of Europe the 
 Congress should finally adopt ; as if the real 
 security of a Government was to be found in 
 fortresses and military positions, rather than in 
 the attachment and fidelity of the people under 
 its rule; and this in spite of the example so 
 recently given in the downfall of Napoleon :
 
 13 
 
 for it is very remarkable, that, so long as that 
 wonderful man was supported by the feelings 
 and opinions of the people, he was unconquer- 
 able, while the Monarchs who fought against 
 him confirmed his power and lost their own. 
 But when he had trampled upon national rights 
 and predilections so far as to make the cause of 
 his opponents the cause of the people, victory 
 deserted his standard, and the tide of desolation 
 was turned back, to devastate his own terri- 
 tories, and to involve him, and apparently his 
 dynasty in irretrievable destruction. But these 
 arrangements of Lord Castlereagh were the re- 
 sult of our successful interference in continental 
 politicks; for the purpose of securing which, 
 we on our part voluntarily consented to restore 
 several valuable colonies which we had taken 
 during the war ! 
 
 One concession, however, which was obtained 
 from the Congress, and for the obtaining of 
 which our influence was exerted, must not be 
 overlooked. Russia, Prussia, and Austria, in 
 conjunction with Great Britain, declared, that, 
 they " had each, in their respective dominions, 
 " prohibited their colonies and subjects from 
 " taking any part in the slave-trade ; and they 
 " likewise engaged to concert together the most 
 " effectual measures for the entire and definitive 
 " abolition of that trade." It is certainly a 
 consolation to find even this solitary resolution,
 
 14 
 
 in the cause of humanity, adopted at the Con- 
 gress ; yet the declaration being only made by 
 those of the continental Powers which had 
 neither colonies nor slaves, the effects of the 
 measure were by no means equal to its pre- 
 tensions. 
 
 But though the principle of giving military 
 positions to the different States of Europe, for 
 their effectual defence against any attacks from 
 those who might hereafter desire to disturb the 
 settlement of the Continent, to be concluded at 
 the Congress, was that by which Lord Castle- 
 reagh professed to be guided, it was one which 
 was only partially maintained. The Power, 
 which, beyond all comparison, Europe had most 
 to dread, from the vastness of its territory, and 
 the amount of its population, was Russia : so 
 sensible of this, indeed, was Lord Castlereagh, 
 that previously to Napoleon's return from Elba, 
 he actually signed a treaty with France and 
 Austria, binding Great Britain and those two 
 Powers to unite in resistance to the ambitious 
 designs of the northern potentate. Yet, not- 
 withstanding these very wise alarms, and al- 
 though, perhaps, the future safety of Europe 
 depended on the erection of a strong barrier 
 against. Russia ; although, too, the kingdom of 
 Poland, if re-established, would have been that 
 barrier, and, by insisting upon its restoration, 
 England, had she succeeded, would have gained
 
 16 
 
 not only a great political object for herself and 
 the rest of Europe, but likewise immortal ho- 
 nour, while, if she failed, she would have been 
 in no worse situation, and would have been 
 spared the disgrace of consenting to its re-parti- 
 tion, still no attempts were made, or, if made, 
 they were urged so feebly as to be disregarded, 
 to apply towards Russia a principle so rigidly 
 adopted, when weaker States were in question. 
 Russia, therefore, (the Power against whom, ra- 
 ther than for whom, " flanks and rears " ought 
 to have been provided,) was allowed to bear 
 away the lion's share of Poland ; Austria and 
 Prussia being content to suffer it, because they 
 were admitted to be partakers in the spoil. 
 
 Neither was any effort made to restore the 
 Finland provinces to Sweden, although these, 
 if all Powers were to receive those territories 
 which were most essential to their safety against 
 foreign aggression, ought to have been ceded by 
 the Czar : since they were at least as necessary 
 to Sweden for security against Russia, as Genoa 
 was to Italy, or to Sardinia, against France ; with 
 this difference, however, in the two cases, that 
 while Sweden had the claim of ancient posses- 
 sion, and the plea of having been unjustly 
 deprived of Finland by Russia, Sardinia had not 
 the shadow of such a pretension on Genoa. 
 
 Had we, indeed, manifested an inflexible de- 
 termination to act on the principle of making
 
 16 
 
 each separate State strong in its own position, as 
 the price of our consent to its adoption ; a prin- 
 ciple which, however unjust in itself, yet, if 
 strictly adhered to, presented at least the ad- 
 vantage of erecting strong barriers against the 
 ambition of Russia, some excuse might have 
 been made for our so doing ; but, as it was, we 
 gave up the principle, in all cases where we 
 should have been benefited by its application, 
 while we incurred all the odium of enforcing it 
 against the weak, when no adequate gain was 
 likely to accrue from its enforcement. 
 
 But the real motives (if motives may be judged 
 from actions) by which the British Plenipoten- 
 tiaries were guided in their conduct at this 
 Congress, was the desire of complying with the 
 wishes, or the dread of thwarting the views, of 
 the Sovereigns of Russia, Austria, and Prussia. 
 Instead, therefore, either of adhering to the 
 principles professed by us during the war, and 
 taking our stand in determining to consent to 
 nothing but what was just, we managed, by 
 tamely consenting to acquiesce in whatever 
 plans were suggested by the desires or conve- 
 nience of those Sovereigns, and by thus mani- 
 festing our disregard for the happiness of the 
 people, to lose the confidence and the general 
 estimation of the world. 
 
 Whether this loss was balanced, or in any 
 degree compensated, by an increased influence 
 over the counsels of these Monarchs, or whether,
 
 17 
 
 on the other hand, that influence was not di- 
 minished from the want of that feeling of respect 
 which mankind will ever cherish for unbending, 
 integrity, can only be determined by a consi- 
 deration of subsequent events. 
 
 The first important transaction that occurred, 
 took place a few months after the treaties were 
 signed, which thus at once sealed the doom of 
 so many nations. It was the signature of an- 
 other treaty by the monarchs of Russia, Austria, 
 and Prussia, apparently of the most harmless 
 nature ; but which, however, was eventually 
 productive of consequences scarcely less impor- 
 tant than those effected by the treaties which 
 formed the ostensible business of the Congress. 
 This treaty, which was the foundation of the 
 Holy Alliance, (at first, called the Sacred Al- 
 liance,) was a mutual pledge entered into by 
 the Monarchs who signed it, not only to govern 
 their own subjects according to the doctrines of 
 Christianity, but to act towards other States with 
 those feelings of charity and mutual forbearance 
 which are so strongly enforced upon all man- 
 kind, throughout the whole of the sacred writings 
 of the Evangelists. 
 
 As soon as the three Monarchs had affixed 
 their autograph signatures to this treaty, the 
 Prince Regent of England was invited to be- 
 come a party to it. And so confident were its 
 authors, either in the purity or in the obscurity 
 
 vol. i. c
 
 18 
 
 of their intentions, that the treaty was made 
 publick as soon as signed. The Prince Regent, 
 however, declined acceding to it, on account of 
 the technical objection, that, since all treaties 
 were signed by his ministers, he could not 
 deviate from the established rule, by placing his 
 sign-manual to this one in particular ; and from 
 the way in which it was panegyrised by Lord 
 Castlereagh in the House of Commons, it would 
 appear, that this was the real reason for the 
 refusal. There were not, however, wanting 
 Members of that House, whose foresight and 
 discrimination led them to suspect, that the 
 treaty meant more than was intended to meet 
 the eye. That three Monarchs, absolute in their 
 respective dominions, and free to act, both 
 with regard to their own subjects and inde- 
 pendent States, according to the dictates of their 
 conscience, should think it necessary to bind 
 themselves by a solemn compact to act up to 
 the spirit of the religion which they professed, 
 was, certainly, a very extraordinary and unex- 
 ampled proceeding. It was not to be wondered 
 at, therefore, that those who saw no signs of 
 Christian morality, in the partition of their 
 neighbours' territories, should think that some 
 purposes were intended to be served by it, for 
 the safe disclosure of which the time had not 
 yet arrived. 
 
 The treaty was supposed to be the joint off. 
 pring of the Emperor Alexander, and Prince
 
 19 
 
 Metternich, but principally of the latter, who, 
 no doubt, in this instance, well knew what he 
 was about at the time that he framed it. 
 
 During the first three years after its signature, 
 it produced no very remarkable consequences. 
 But it must not be supposed, because its oper- 
 ation was not very evident to the British nation, 
 that, therefore, its effects were not, during that 
 time, sensibly felt upon the Continent. 
 
 The mode of conducting the internal adminis- 
 tration of a country, since it comes home to the 
 feelings of each individual belonging to it, is, 
 necessarily, what principally attracts attention ; 
 and since that of this Kingdom is too much 
 under the control of Parliament to admit of 
 the introduction of any foreign influence, the 
 mass of the people not being immediately af- 
 fected by the line of foreign policy which may 
 be pursued by the Government, do not feel the 
 same concern respecting their external rela- 
 tions which the nations of the Continent feel, 
 whose situation is more easily acted upon, by 
 the good or bad governments established in the 
 adjoining territories. As long as English com- 
 merce remains uninjured by the internal condi- 
 tion of a state, the English publick do not much 
 disturb themselves with what that condition 
 ma}r be, unless, indeed, they are shocked by 
 some dreadful instance of oppression on the 
 part of the governors, or some insurrectionary 
 
 c 2
 
 20 
 
 movements on the part of the governed. The 
 great majority of this nation, therefore, were 
 probably ignorant, or if not ignorant were indif- 
 ferent, as to whether the promise of Constitutions, 
 which had been made to the German states, in 
 one of the articles in the act of federation *, was 
 fulfilled or not, though the fact that, with a few 
 exceptions, that promise remained unperformed, 
 was necessarily a matter of deep import to the 
 German people. For the Emperor of the most 
 powerful Monarchy amongst them, Austria, ap- 
 peared to have no thought of redeeming his 
 pledge ; and the King of Prussia, who was com- 
 mitted, independently of the act of federation, 
 to the fulfilment of its stipulations, seemed 
 wholly to be employed in inventing excuses for 
 delay. It is hardly to be supposed that this 
 would have been the conduct of the Prussian 
 Government, had it not felt conscious of some 
 encouragement from without : and there can be 
 no doubt, that the confidence with which the 
 allied Monarchs relied upon each other for assist- 
 ance, confirmed them in their determination, 
 not to consent to the extension of popular pri- 
 vileges in their respective dominions. This 
 disposition, however, to evade the performance 
 of their engagements, on the part of two of the 
 principal members of the Holy Alliance, coupled 
 
 * Signed, shortly after the Peace, by the different Ger- 
 man Sovereigns.
 
 21 
 
 with the known countenance given to them by 
 the other members of the League, excited great 
 dissatisfaction throughout the whole of Germany, 
 where the "war of liberation," as it was termed, 
 against Napoleon, had given rise to ardent and, 
 perhaps, extravagant notions of liberty, which, 
 at the time they were engendered, were fostered 
 by those very Sovereigns, who, when the danger 
 had gone by, became most anxious for their 
 extinction. The fanaticism of a German stu- 
 dent, who assassinated an emissary of the Rus- 
 sian emperor, (who, as being a German, the 
 student looked upon as a traitor to his country,) 
 afforded the pretext for the establishment of 
 what was called a central commission, authorised 
 to prosecute inquiries in all parts of Germany 
 concerning " demagogic intrigues." This mea- 
 sure was the first step towards the formation of 
 a sort of European police, which shortly after- 
 wards was matured into a regular system of 
 espionage and restraint over those minor States, 
 whose Governments happened to be more libe- 
 rally disposed than those belonging to the Holy 
 Alliance : the views of which Alliance, from not 
 having thus far been thwarted, began to be more 
 openly avowed. The Prussian Court, in a circular 
 despatch, enclosing the decree of the Diet, erect- 
 ing the above-mentioned Central Commission, by 
 the way in which it talks of the people, clearly 
 enough showed the light in which the members 
 
 c 3
 
 a 
 «( 
 
 22 
 
 of the Holy Alliance looked upon their subjects, 
 and the manner in which they intended to treat 
 them. — " The Sovereigns cannot flatter them- 
 " selves with being able to combat their enemies 
 " with success, unless they (the Sovereigns) are 
 " united in a profession of their principles, and 
 " in vigorous measures to defend them," was 
 the language of the Prussian minister. Now, 
 the individuals thus designated as the enemies 
 of the European Sovereigns, were all those who 
 were of opinion that " a national representation, 
 calculated according to extent of territory and 
 population," would be a real amelioration in 
 the construction of the Governments of their re- 
 spective countries, and a wholesome check upon 
 the power of their arbitrary rulers; and as those 
 who held this opinion formed, beyond a doubt, 
 at least three fourths of the population of Ger- 
 many, it would appear from that minister's own 
 account, that these Monarchs reckoned in the 
 list of their enemies the great majority of their 
 own subjects. It is not to be wondered at, there- 
 fore, that, the Monarchs being guided by such 
 principles, discontent pretty generally prevailed, 
 — a discontent, however, not confined to Ger- 
 many, but existing equally in the countries 
 under the Austrian yoke in Italy, who had no 
 greater reason than those in Germany to be 
 satisfied with their lot. For there was no spe- 
 cies of cruel exaction and petty tyranny that 
 was not practised by the Austrian emissaries
 
 23 
 
 throughout Lombardy and the Venetian states, 
 the inhabitants of which remembered, with use- 
 less regret, the blessings which they enjoyed 
 whilst governed by Napoleon's viceroy. 
 
 This gloomy aspect of the political horizon, 
 in the countries under the immediate dominion 
 of the Holy Alliance, was not enlivened by any 
 more cheering prospect on the western extremity 
 of the European Continent. The conduct of the 
 King of Spain, from the very instant that he 
 crossed the frontiers of his kingdom, was one 
 continued series of tyranny and ingratitude. 
 Those who had exerted themselves the most in 
 his behalf were the very persons selected for 
 vengeance, and the dungeons of his prisons 
 were filled with all the most distinguished de- 
 fenders of their country. The first ordinance 
 that he signed after his restoration abolished the 
 Cortes j the second re-established the Inquisi- 
 tion ; and of a piece with this commencement, 
 was the whole tenour of his subsequent pro- 
 ceedings. 
 
 Accordingly (and naturally to be expected), 
 the very first year of his return was marked by 
 the discovery of one conspiracy, and the break- 
 ing out of two insurrections ; and, notwithstand- 
 ing that their authors were punished with the 
 most unrelenting severity, their punishment did 
 not prevent others from being stimulated by the 
 same causes to attempt similar enterprises. In" 
 
 c 4
 
 24 
 
 deed, the domestic history of Spain, from 1814 to 
 1819, presents few things worthy of notice, 
 except the details of unsuccessful rebellions, and 
 the persecutions consequent upon their failure : 
 although other effects, equally calamitous, were 
 produced by Ferdinand's system of misgovern- 
 ment, which evinced themselves in the general 
 impoverishment of the Nation, and the utter ruin 
 of the finances. 
 
 The total want of confidence in the Spanish 
 Government that every where prevailed, and the 
 arbitrary fiscal regulations which were adopted, 
 regulations constantly repealed by the enactment 
 of others equally arbitrary, were ill calculated to 
 restore Spain to prosperity, already exhausted 
 as she was by a destructive war, carried on for 
 so long a time in the very heart of her richest 
 provinces. Meanwhile her Colonies were taking 
 advantage of the weakness of the Mother Coun- 
 try gradually to effect the establishment of their 
 independence ; while the cessation of all inter- 
 course between them did not lessen the embar- 
 rassments of the latter, which were much in- 
 creased by the attempts made for the re-subju- 
 gation of the revolted territories, heretofore the 
 main source of the strength and greatness of the 
 Spanish empire. 
 
 It was not without the greatest sorrow and 
 indignation that Great Britain beheld a people 
 with whom she had fought side by side, in de-
 
 25 
 
 fence of their common liberties, thus reduced 
 to a state of impoteney and degradation. The 
 fact, however, that no inconsiderable portion 
 of the nation preferred an absolute King to a 
 limited Monarchy, proved, as it was, by Ferdi- 
 nand's being able to maintain himself, did not 
 tend to exalt the Spanish character in British 
 estimation, while it made many look with a fa- 
 vourable eye on the struggles of the Spanish Co- 
 lonies to emancipate themselves from the yoke 
 of such a Mother Country. But if the generous 
 sympathy of the English people alone led them 
 to wish success to the Spanish Colonies, in the 
 task which they had undertaken, there was yet 
 another cause for the same wish to be found in 
 the importance of that success to the continuance 
 of an immense commerce, which, in the course 
 of a few years, had sprung up between these 
 countries and England. While Spanish America 
 had been completely under the dominion of Old 
 Spain, all trade with any other country was 
 scrupulously forbidden. But at the time that 
 Ferdinand was kidnapped by Napoleon, the colo- 
 nists, confused by conflicting accounts as to what 
 really was the legitimate government in Spain to 
 which they owed allegiance, began to act for 
 themselves ; and one of the first measures of the 
 people was, to break the shackles that the self- 
 ish policy of the Mother Country had imposed 
 upon their trade. So tempting an opportunity
 
 2(3 
 
 for speculation would not have been likely, at 
 any time, to have been neglected by Great 
 Britain ; but coming, as it did, at a time when 
 Napoleon's decrees had, in a great measure, ex- 
 cluded her merchandise from the Continent, it 
 was seized upon with an eager delight, which 
 was rather increased than diminished, in propor- 
 tion as the value of it became known. Hence 
 all who were engaged in this trade dreaded lest 
 the success of Old Spain should bring back the 
 ancient system of monopoly, and that they should 
 be again excluded from a direct intercourse with 
 the rich markets of the New World. 
 
 These concurrent circumstances, which created 
 an almost unanimous wish in England that the 
 independent cause might prosper, led many offi- 
 cers on half pay, and disbanded soldiers, to enlist 
 themselves under the banners of the colonists, 
 and to such a length was this practice carried, 
 that armaments even against Spain herself, paid 
 for by private individuals, were actually being 
 fitted out in many of the ports of the United 
 Kingdom. This state of things naturally pro- 
 duced remonstrances from the Spanish Govern- 
 ment ; and to remedy the evil, a bill was brought 
 into parliament by the ministers, called the Fo- 
 reign Enlistment Bill, to put a stop to such pro- 
 ceedings. A bill of such a nature was, at this 
 crisis, peculiarly unpopular ; and since, from 
 want of being fairly considered, it was thought
 
 27 
 
 to be a part of the same kind of support, given by 
 our Government to the principles of legitimacy, 
 maintained by the Holy Alliance, it gave general 
 dissatisfaction both at home and abroad. At 
 the time that this bill was introduced, Mr. Can- 
 ning was a member of the administration. He 
 spoke zealously in its support, and justified it on 
 the broad ground, that fair dealing towards Spain 
 demanded its adoption ; for he preferred that we 
 should act justly towards our ally, even though, 
 in so acting, we might do that which would be 
 detrimental to ourselves. Mr. Canning, indeed, 
 would have thus decided, whatever consequences 
 might result, believing integrity and good faith 
 to be the foundations of political strength ; but 
 in this particular case, he contended that an op- 
 posite course would add folly to injustice, since 
 it woidd not only incur the odium consequent 
 upon a deed of bad faith, but would actually 
 help to defeat the very end which it was intended 
 to promote. Spain was, he was well convinced, 
 in too distracted and weak a condition to be 
 able to make any effectual exertions for the re- 
 covery of her lost dominions ; and he felt toler- 
 ably confident, that the time was not far distant 
 when the colonists would have established their 
 de facto independence. As soon as that event 
 should be brought about, the natural time would 
 have arrived for Great Britain to enter into 
 some definite relations with them. But with
 
 28 
 
 what injustice towards Spain should we have 
 done so, if the success of the colonists had been 
 the consequence of the assistance given to them 
 by British expeditions, fitted out in British ports, 
 to prevent which the Government, possessing 
 no power, had refused to take measures for its 
 acquirement ? 
 
 What answer coidd we have made to the 
 complaints of Spain for the non-fulfilment of our 
 treaty, by which we were bound not to assist the 
 Colonies, had every British port been allowed to 
 be a place where that treaty might be violated 
 with impunity? and with what face could we 
 have taken advantage of the de facto inde- 
 pendence of the Colonies, to recognise their 
 separate existence, had that de facto independ- 
 ence been effected by the tacit connivance of 
 the British Government, instead of being the 
 result of their own exertions ? Unless we were 
 prepared to throw aside all claims to uprightness 
 of conduct, we never could, had such been the 
 case, however serious the inconvenience, have 
 recognised their independence, until Spain her- 
 self had set the example. 
 
 It was these considerations that made Mr. 
 Canning declare his conviction, that if Parliament 
 denied to the executive Government the power 
 of " maintaining neutrality, instead of accelerat- 
 " ing, they would retard the period of a stable 
 " and permanent connexion between this country
 
 29 
 
 " and Spanish America." How abundantly the 
 truth of this proposition was borne out by the 
 event, is shown by the fact, that a great part of 
 our justification to Spain, when we did recognise 
 the independence of her Colonies, turned upon 
 the very circumstance of the passing of this bill. 
 
 Its enactment, however, neither improved the 
 internal condition of Spain, nor enabled her to 
 reconquer her colonies. 
 
 The condition of the adjoining kingdom of 
 Portugal, though in many respects much better 
 than that of its neighbour, was still extremely 
 critical. 
 
 The continued absence of the court, and the 
 erection of Brazil into a kingdom, had made 
 Portugal, though nominally the parent state, 
 in reality little better than an appendage of her 
 ancient colony ; a relative situation which ill 
 accorded with the pride or interests of the Por- 
 tuguese. Amongst them, as well as amongst the 
 inhabitants of the Spanish portion of the Penin- 
 sula, there were many of the best and wisest who 
 looked to a constitutional Government as the 
 best panacea for the evils which afflicted them ; 
 and at the close of the year 1819, there appeared 
 to those, w T ho watched the feelings of the people, 
 evident symptoms of an approaching crisis. 
 
 To this almost universal state of dislike of 
 the people to the forms of their governments 
 throughout the European Continent, France af-
 
 30 
 
 forded a remarkable exception. Whatever dis- 
 taste the French entertained towards their 
 government, it was not directed against the 
 form of their Constitution, but against the indi- 
 viduals in whose hands the administration was 
 vested ; a distaste which not unnaturally arose 
 from the reflection, that the dynasty which was 
 seated on their throne was not seated there by 
 their own choice, but was forced upon them by 
 the bayonets of hostile armies. True it was that 
 the foreign armies, which had replaced, and by 
 their presence maintained, the crown on the 
 brows of the Bourbons, had, at the end of three 
 years, been withdrawn from the French territory ; 
 but the recollection of these transactions still 
 rankled in the hearts of many, and did not 
 render them very kindly disposed towards those 
 for whose sake the indignity was offered. Still 
 there existed amongst the people a powerful 
 body, who, though little friendly to the Bourbons, 
 yet retained so lively a sense of the miseries that 
 they had experienced from internal commotions, 
 and foreign invasions, that they would have 
 thought the expulsion of that family dearly pur- 
 chased with the risk of again bringing down 
 either of those misfortunes on the country. 
 Others, also, there were, who wisely felt that 
 they had at last obtained, what they never had 
 acquired before, a real representation of the 
 people, the permanency of which might have
 
 31 
 
 been endangered by any change of government, 
 or by any unsuccessful resistance to the one 
 which was established. 
 
 While they were in possession of that blessing, 
 they felt that the people had a strong hold upon 
 the government, whereby they would be effectu- 
 ally protected from any great oppression, and 
 which hold, if not loosened, would, in process 
 of time, secure to them, in a legitimate way, all 
 the rights and liberties which constitute the hap- 
 piness of a free and enlightened nation. 
 
 Many things there undoubtedly were, in the 
 conduct of the government, in which there was 
 ample room for amelioration ; but still they 
 could not but be sensible of their good fortune, 
 in having come out of their late convulsions 
 with the establishment of a Constitution. If, 
 therefore, there were a majority of the French 
 people who entertained feelings of dislike to the 
 reigning Family, and who wished for their ex- 
 pulsion, by far the greater part of that majority 
 would have been unwilling to run the hazard of 
 the miseries that might have ensued from any 
 attempts to give effect to their wishes. Upon the 
 whole, therefore, the Throne of the Bourbons was 
 as likely to be permanent, as that of any other 
 of the Continental Sovereigns, provided only that 
 they did not violate the charter which the head 
 of their House had granted. 
 
 The conduct of Louis XVIII., after his re-
 
 32 
 
 storation, was, in general, wise and prudent. 
 Still there were many circumstances which oc- 
 curred during his reign, that gave rise to dis- 
 trust and dissatisfaction ; and few, perhaps, 
 more than his friendly disposition towards the 
 Holy Alliance, the proof of which is to be found 
 in his having procured an election law to be 
 passed unfavourable to the fair representation of 
 the people, which law was well known to be 
 the offspring of the Aix-la-Chapelle Congress. 
 
 Of the actual condition and sentiments of the 
 inhabitants of Russia, living, as they do, under 
 an absolute monarch, who forbids the expression 
 of their sentiments, and prevents their being 
 made known through the medium of the press, 
 it is difficult to form any correct judgment, unless 
 some extraordinary event arises, which proclaims, 
 in a way not to be misunderstood, the real 
 feelings of the nation. That event was to be 
 found in the conspiracy which burst forth on the 
 accession of the Emperor Nicholas to the throne, 
 in which there was hardly a noble family in 
 Russia of which some member was not im- 
 plicated ; and which clearly showed, as its objects 
 were in reality the establishment of a more 
 popular form of government, and not the placing 
 of Constantine on the throne, that even in that 
 country, whose soil is thought peculiarly con- 
 genial to despotism, and where the monarch had 
 really used his powers in a great degree for the
 
 33 
 
 benefit of his people, there were a very large 
 portion who sighed for popular privileges, and 
 were ill pleased with the existing nature of their 
 government. 
 
 The Holy Alliance being thus the object of 
 the dislike, not to say the hatred, of the people 
 of the several Nations either directly under its 
 sway, or indirectly under its influence, it is not 
 to be wondered at, that England, who only ap- 
 peared as the aider and abetter of that alliance, 
 was no longer held in the same estimation in 
 which she was regarded during the time of Na- 
 poleon, when she always stood forth as the friend 
 of the oppressed. 
 
 This was the state of things in Europe at the 
 close of 1819, and beginning of the following 
 year, in the course of which the Holy Alliance 
 was startled by the breaking out of three 
 several revolutions. The first occurred in Spain, 
 and was begun by the army, which, ill clothed, 
 ill fed, and worse paid, mutinied to prevent being 
 embarked for Spanish America, on board a fleet 
 composed of ships that were esteemed not sea- 
 worthy for so long a voyage. Although the 
 circumstances which enabled the leaders of this 
 army to excite a spirit of disaffection among the 
 soldiery, and to proclaim a Constitution, were 
 not connected with any abstract love of liberty, 
 but are chiefly to be traced to the state of des- 
 titution and privation under which the troops 
 
 VOL. I. D
 
 34 
 
 laboured — causes of themselves sufficient to 
 produce disobedience in any army where they 
 exist — yet the universal misery and degradation 
 which Ferdinand's government had occasioned 
 from one end of the Peninsula to the other, 
 soon caused corresponding movements to take 
 place in different parts of the Kingdom. In the 
 northern province of Gallicia, and the south- 
 eastern one of Catalonia, the news of the events 
 of the Isle of Leon were received with the most 
 unbounded joy j and the populace joined with 
 the military stationed at Corunna and Barcelona 
 in following the example thus set them, which, 
 since it was given by the army, the defence on 
 which arbitrary Governments generally rely, 
 afforded a more certain prospect of ultimate 
 success, attended with less hazard and danger, 
 than any attempt to overthrow the existing Go- 
 vernment which had hitherto been made. 
 
 Accordingly, we find that the time, from the 
 proclamation of the Constitution by the army 
 before Cadiz, to its acceptance by Ferdinand at 
 Madrid, amounted to little more than two short 
 months. 
 
 The progress of the Neapolitan revolution was 
 still more rapid than that of Spain : it com- 
 menced with the militia on the 2d of July, at 
 Nola ; and the new Constitution was accepted by 
 the King on the 6th of the same month at Naples. 
 It must be allowed, that there were by no means
 
 35 
 
 the same excuses for this forcible alteration of 
 the government of Ferdinand of Naples that 
 there were for that of his kinsman and namesake 
 of Spain. For the administration of the former, 
 unlike that of the latter, was in many respects 
 wise and liberal, and his people enjoyed, per- 
 haps, greater freedom than they had ever before 
 possessed ; yet the abolition of the constitutional 
 form of Government in Sicily, and the non-ful- 
 filment of the King's assurance, that he would 
 grant them a Constitution, were so great a dis- 
 appointment to their hopes, that although they 
 did not labour under any arbitrary laws or un- 
 redressed grievances, yet they seized the first 
 opportunity that offered to extort from him the 
 performance of his promise. 
 
 The scene of the third, for a time, successful 
 attempt to establish a representative form of 
 government was, Portugal ; where, as has been 
 already shown, there were ample grounds for 
 dissatisfaction with the established order of things. 
 Unfortunately in this case, as in the two pre- 
 ceding ones, the attempt at change was begun 
 by the military, and though it is not a matter of 
 wonder, that the armed force of a country, by 
 whose fidelity even an odious tyranny may be 
 preserved against the wishes of the people, 
 should possess more confidence for an under- 
 taking of this nature than the people ; who, if 
 that armed force were faithful to the goveru- 
 
 d 2
 
 36 
 
 ment, would be almost sure to fail in any revolu- 
 tionary enterprise ; yet it was attempted to be ar- 
 gued, notwithstanding that the acts of the soldiers 
 were adopted and seconded with enthusiasm by 
 large portions of their fellow-subjects, that the 
 changes made in Spain, Naples, and Portugal, 
 were those of a licentious soldiery, and were not 
 in consonance with the general desires of the 
 country. Certainly if, on these occasions, such 
 were the case, it would be vain to search the 
 page of history for their parallels. Teeming as 
 it does with accounts of rulers being dethroned, 
 to make way for others, by the armies under 
 their command, it may safely be affirmed that 
 there is no one instance on record, where an 
 army, naturally, as it is, the ally and instrument 
 of despotism, incurred the guilt of rebellion, in 
 defence of the liberties of the people, unless in 
 unison with the disposition of the majority of 
 those for whose sake they acted. 
 
 The constitution was first proclaimed at Oporto 
 on the 23d of August, and a junta at the same 
 time was established in that city. Similar move- 
 ments took place at Lisbon, in spite of the 
 efforts of the Regency, shortly after those which 
 had occurred at Oporto became known there ; 
 and on the 1st of October, the two juntas being 
 consolidated, entered the Capital in triumph, 
 and were installed in their new office, the Re- 
 gency having resigned its functions.
 
 37 
 
 The news of these three events following so 
 quickly one upon the other, struck terror and 
 dismay into the hearts of the Sovereigns com- 
 posing the Holy Alliance. They were well 
 aware, that having no good grounds to rely upon 
 the affection of their subjects, it was impossible 
 to foresee how soon they might be placed in a 
 similar predicament. The Emperor of Austria, 
 in particular, had especial reason for alarm, as 
 well on account of the vicinity of his Italian 
 provinces to one of the scenes of action, as 
 because he well knew, that those provinces, 
 from the very intolerable nature of His govern- 
 ment, must be ripe for revolt against it. 
 
 Instead, however, of these events inducing 
 them to redeem their pledges by showing some 
 disposition to consult the happiness of their 
 subjects, by granting what they themselves had 
 held out as inducements for exertion in the 
 time of danger, and which would have been the 
 best safeguard against popular re-action, their 
 first object was to try, whether, by union and 
 decision, they could not at once put down these 
 incipient struggles of the people to ameliorate 
 their condition. 
 
 With this object a Congress was immediately 
 summoned to be held at Troppau, of the three 
 allied Monarchs, at which the British and French 
 ministers were invited to be present ; not, how- 
 ever, to take part in its deliberations, for, from 
 
 d 3
 
 38 
 
 so doing, they were carefully excluded, but, 
 as Lord Castlereagh very ingenuously stated, 
 to perform the office of rendering to their 
 respective courts an accurate account of the 
 nature of those deliberations. But though 
 the discharge of a duty, so much beneath the 
 dignity of the countries that they represented, 
 was nominally the object for which their presence 
 was requested, the real purpose that those who 
 thus invited them evidently had in view was, 
 by the countenance which their presence gave 
 to the proceedings, to deceive the world into 
 the belief, that whatever unjustifiable attacks on 
 freedom this Congress might propose to make, 
 they would not be made without the consent 
 and sanction of the governments of France and 
 England. A circular despatch * to the diplo- 
 matic agents of Russia, Austria, and Prussia, 
 promulgated to mankind the nature of the 
 labours of the Congress. " The desire to main- 
 " tain peace, and to free Europe from the 
 " scourge of revolution," determined the three 
 powers forthwith to proceed to destroy by force 
 of arms the free institutions which the Nea- 
 politan nation had asked and obtained from their 
 Sovereign. But in assigning the reasons for the 
 selection of Naples in preference to either Spain 
 or Portugal, as the object of their interference, 
 
 * Of the 8th Dec. 1821.
 
 39 
 
 the intention to act in the same way, as soon as 
 possible, towards those two countries, was clearly 
 manifested. The constitutional government of 
 the kingdom of the Two Sicilies was to be " first 
 " overthrown," as, they said, " it daily took 
 " more root, and as no other could be so irame- 
 " diately and so speedily opposed ;" — a course 
 of argument which evidently implied, that that 
 government was not thus selected on account of 
 any more aggravating circumstances, as com- 
 pared with others, connected with its establish- 
 ment, or its subsequent behaviour ; but because, 
 being both weak and close at hand, it therefore 
 could be annihilated with a greater degree of 
 certainty and quickness. 
 
 It was evident, therefore, that the disposition 
 to upset the other Constitutional Governments 
 was not wanting, and that, as soon as the oppor- 
 tunity offered, it would not be allowed to pass 
 by unheeded. 
 
 The undisguised avowal of principles and 
 intentions such as these would be sufficient to 
 prove, if all other proof were wanting, either 
 that the Holy Alliance, from having been 
 always encouraged and never thwarted in their 
 proceedings, no longer felt it necessary to throw 
 any disguise over their projects, or else, that 
 they were well aware that these projects were 
 not disagreeable to the English Cabinet ; but so 
 convinced were they of the truth of this last- 
 
 d 4
 
 40 
 
 mentioned fact, that in the very same document 
 in which doctrines so hostile to liberty, and 
 " repugnant to the fundamental laws of this 
 " country" were propounded, a firm belief is 
 expressed, that France and England would give 
 them their concurrence, and, as the necessary 
 consequence of such concurrence, would join 
 with them in the attack on Naples. 
 
 By some lucky chance, the existence of this 
 document became known to the publick, by 
 means of an incorrect copy which found its way 
 into a German newspaper. Whether it was in 
 consequence of this disclosure that Lord Castle- 
 reagh judged it necessary to protest against the 
 assumption of England's approbations doctrines, 
 so hostile to her own institutions, or whether he 
 had previously determined to do so, it is impos- 
 sible to say. Certain, however, it is, that no 
 notice was taken of the Circular till after it had 
 been more, than a month in possession of the 
 Foreign Secretary. This fact is the more re- 
 markable from the consideration, that even if 
 the name of England had not been thus made 
 use of* it would have been the paramount duty 
 of an English minister not to have permitted 
 such doctrines to be published without at once 
 declaring his dissent from them. 
 
 Equally would it have been his bounden duty 
 to have protested against them, when made the 
 rule of action by the allies, even if they had
 
 n 
 
 not been embodied in this circular despatch. 
 Acquainted he must have been with their adop- 
 tion, if the British agent at Troppau in any way 
 performed the duties which he was expressly 
 sent to fulfil, viz. keeping Lord Castlereagh 
 informed of the proceedings of the Congress. 
 
 Long, therefore, before the circular despatch 
 in question was sent forth, his Lordship must 
 have been aware that principles, according to 
 his own admission, " in direct repugnance to 
 " the fundamental laws of this kingdom, and such 
 " as could not be safely admitted as the found- 
 " ation of a system of international law," were 
 the principles which the Congress were about to 
 make the foundation of all their measures. But 
 still, notwithstanding this knowledge, he made 
 no remonstrances against them ; and when at 
 last they are forced upon his observation by a 
 written communication, he begins his circular 
 reply to that communication, by deliberately 
 declaring, that had it not been made, he should 
 have thought it " unnecessary to have offered 
 " any remarks whatever upon the nature of the 
 " discussions which had occurred at Troppau." 
 The answer, however, was in some respects 
 worthy of a British Minister — since it condemned 
 in strong and energetic language the most pre- 
 posterous of the doctrines of the Alliance. Had, 
 indeed, the opinions expressed in it been avowed 
 at so early a period as would have proved them
 
 42 
 
 to have been a spontaneous declaration of genuine 
 sentiment, instead of by the very tardiness with 
 which they were circulated exposing them to 
 the suspicion that they were merely a sop, as it 
 were, thrown down to pacify the rising indig- 
 nation of the British Parliament and Nation, — 
 and above all, had there not been to be found 
 amongst them a saving clause of justification for 
 Austria in her meditated attack on Naples, then 
 there would have been no reason to complain of 
 this document ; and then, in all probability, it 
 would have produced a more powerful effect 
 upon the allied Sovereigns. 
 
 But so far was this despatch of Lord Castle- 
 reagh's from causing any alteration in the tone 
 of these Monarchs, that we still find them, little 
 more than three months afterwards, asserting 
 the same doctrines thus condemned by the Bri- 
 tish Minister, in a still more positive and un- 
 daunted manner. " To preserve what is legally 
 " established, was, as it ought to be, the invariable 
 " principle of their policy. Useful or necessary 
 " changes in legislation, and in the administration 
 " of states, ought only to emanate from the free 
 " will, and the intelligent, and well-weighed 
 " conviction of those whom God has rendered 
 " responsible for power," — are sentences to be 
 found in documents denouncing nothing but a 
 fixed determination on the part of the Holy
 
 43 
 
 Alliance to put down all political improvement 
 that should originate with the people. 
 
 It was not, perhaps, to be wondered at, that 
 the allied Sovereigns should thus set at nought 
 Lord Castlereagh's condemnation of the prin- 
 ciples by which they were guided, by again 
 insultingly repeating their fixed purpose to ad- 
 here to them, when it is considered that he took 
 such anxious pains to make an exception in their 
 favour, in the only instance in which a practical 
 application was about to be made of them. 
 
 The Congress at Troppau having invited His 
 Sicilian Majesty to repair to Laybach, to which 
 place they were about to adjourn, the King, 
 with the consent of his parliament, accepted the 
 invitation, and proceeded in a British Man-of- 
 War to the place of meeting. Whether when 
 he quitted Naples he had determined to play 
 false or not, it is impossible to decide with cer- 
 tainty, but his exertions in defence of the in- 
 stitutions which he had sworn to adopt and 
 support, were, to say the least, of a very faint 
 description. 
 
 As soon as the resolution of the allied Mo- 
 narchs to intermeddle in the internal concerns 
 of his Kingdom was made known to him, he, at 
 once, without a struggle, yielded to their views, 
 and wrote a letter to his son, whom he had left 
 Regent in his absence, to endeavour to persuade
 
 44 
 
 him to induce the supporters of the Constitution 
 at once to consent to its demolition. 
 
 The Regent, however, and the parliament, re- 
 mained firm, and rejected the proffered counsel. 
 
 On the 4th of February the Austrian troops 
 began their march for the southern extremity of 
 the Italian Peninsula. 
 
 The results of that expedition are too well 
 known to require here to be detailed. The raw 
 recruits which formed the greater portion of the 
 Neapolitan armies, proverbially none of the 
 bravest, made little or no resistance to the dis- 
 ciplined troops of the invaders ; and the aged 
 Monarch re-entered his capital on the 5th of 
 May, with all the guilt upon his head of being 
 an accessory to the introduction of hostile armies 
 into his own dominions. 
 
 Before, however, the success of this enterprise 
 was certain, a revolution, similar in almost every 
 respect to that of Naples, broke out in Piedmont, 
 and was attended with the same temporary suc- 
 cess. But the rapid progress of the Austrian 
 arms against the Constitutionalists in the South 
 was necessarily unfavourable to the cause of 
 those who advocated similar principles in the 
 North of Italy. The power of the constitutional 
 government in Piedmont had not even a month's 
 duration. For as soon as the occurrences at 
 Turin became known at Laybach, Austria set 
 her troops in motion to restore by force of arms
 
 45 
 
 the ancient order of things; and Russia gave 
 orders for the inarch of an army of 100,000 men 
 to the south of Europe, in case the Austrian 
 troops should prove insufficient for their task. 
 As soon, however, as they had accomplished it, 
 the Russian army was ordered to retire. Not 
 so the Austrian troops, large bodies of which 
 were stationed in the Neapolitan and Pied- 
 montese territories to prevent the possibility of 
 a re-action. 
 
 The allied Sovereigns having thus completely 
 succeeded in their views on Italy, broke up the 
 Congress at Laybach on the 13th of May. In 
 the furtherance of these views they had found 
 in the French Monarch a willing coadjutor, and 
 in the English minister any thing but a form- 
 idable opponent. The latter, as has been seen , 
 condemned their principles in the abstract, while 
 he admitted that their special application to 
 Naples might be justifiable. The former not 
 only abstained from such condemnation, but, on 
 the contrary, so cordially consented to co-operate 
 in their execution, that Louis himself actually 
 addressed a letter to his brother Sovereign at 
 Naples, to persuade him to comply with the 
 summons or invitation which had been sent to 
 him to appear in person before the assembled 
 Congress. 
 
 While these transactions were being enacted 
 in Italy, events of scarcely less importance were
 
 46 
 
 taking place in Portugal and Spain. To the 
 former country its King had unexpectedly re- 
 turned. A revolution similar to the four already 
 mentioned having taken place at Rio de Janeiro, 
 His Most Faithful Majesty, thinking that he 
 should be safer in his European than in his 
 Trans-atlantic dominions, determined to leave 
 Brazil, appointing his eldest son, Don Pedro, to 
 act as Regent. His Majesty arrived in the Tagus 
 on the 4th of July, and having sworn to accept 
 the Constitution, was received with acclamations 
 in Lisbon, 
 
 In Spain the state of things was far from 
 being satisfactory to the true lovers of liberty. 
 The rigour with which the popular party had 
 been treated by Ferdinand, during the time that 
 the absolute party were dominant, produced a 
 proportionate degree of violence when that 
 party, heretofore the oppressed, in their turn, 
 were in power. It is more, therefore, a matter 
 of regret than of surprise that, Ferdinand having 
 been supported by the priests in all his odious 
 tyrannical measures, the priests were the first to 
 suffer from the vengeance of the Cortes. 
 
 The not unnatural reasoning adopted by that 
 Body was, that the best security against the 
 monkish party's ever again prevailing in the 
 state would be to deprive them at once of their 
 revenues, and (as it was thought) consequently 
 of their influence. But though the general pro-
 
 47 
 
 position that wealth is a source of power and 
 influence is one, the truth of which cannot be 
 denied, yet it does not follow, as a necessary 
 consequence of that proposition, that power and 
 influence cannot exist without wealth ; neither 
 that an abstraction of wealth must necessarily 
 be immediately followed by a diminution of 
 influence. 
 
 In the present instance, for example, the 
 measure decided upon by the Cortes of con- 
 fiscating the revenues of the Church did not 
 diminish the authority of the Clergy. 
 
 The lower orders in Spain, prone to super- 
 stition, beheld with disgust those whom they 
 were accustomed to reverence treated with con- 
 tumely and injustice. Fond of idleness, and, if 
 disposed to indulge in it, sure of finding support 
 from the rich monasteries in their neighbour- 
 hood, they saw themselves, with sorrow, suddenly 
 deprived of a mode of subsistence to which long 
 habit had attached them. 
 
 If their priest was dear to them when he 
 made them partakers of his prosperity, he was 
 not the less so, because from the very fact of his 
 destitution they were necessarily sharers in his 
 adversity. 
 
 The Cortes, therefore, by this ill-judged law 
 contrived, in the very outset of their proceed- 
 ings, to alienate from them the affections of a 
 very large body of the people, — an error the
 
 48 
 
 most fatal which a government, depending for 
 its stability, as the Spanish government then did, 
 solely on public opinion, could possibly commit. 
 
 Had the priests been allowed to retain their 
 revenues they would not necessarily have been 
 the enemies of the Constitution ; neither would 
 those dependent on them have become so. 
 Whereas the suppression of the monasteries 
 made all who had been benefited by them in- 
 terested in the destruction of that government 
 by which they were suppressed. 
 
 But if the measure were unwise, on account 
 of the peculiar habits and predilections of the 
 Spanish peasantry, it must not be forgotten that 
 it was likewise impolitick in a general point of 
 view. 
 
 The security of all property is more or less 
 endangered by the invasion of any particular 
 species of it ; and such violations are sure to 
 excite in the hearts of all who possess any pro- 
 perty a distrust of the offending party. The 
 measure, therefore, while it created a host of 
 immediate enemies amongst those who directly 
 suffered by it, likewise excited a feeling of alarm 
 amongst others who could not but be sensible of 
 its injustice. 
 
 Ferdinand, indeed, had hardly given to the 
 decree his royal consent, which he did with great 
 reluctance, before bands of the country people 
 both in Andalusia and Gallicia armed them-
 
 49 
 
 selves to oppose its execution, and to defend, as 
 they thought, the cause of religion. It is true, 
 that the populace of some of the great towns 
 tried to anticipate the effects of the law ; and, 
 by themselves pillaging the convents, to snatch 
 the prize from the government, whose design it 
 was to make the riches of those establishments 
 minister to the public necessities. But no de- 
 cided inference as to the state of popular feeling 
 can be drawn from this last-mentioned circum- 
 stance, for probably the idea of pillaging would 
 never have occurred had not the government 
 first set the example ; and it ought to be attri- 
 buted more to a desire of plunder than to any 
 particular hatred of the persons to be plundered. 
 The Government may be said, therefore, hardly 
 to have gained a single friend by this measure, 
 whilst it created to itself innumerable enemies, 
 whose persevering hostility is proved by the long 
 period that several of the Spanish provinces 
 were kept in agitation by bands of armed peasants 
 devoted to, and in some instances headed by, the 
 priests. 
 
 Neither were the revenues benefited to any 
 great degree by this act of injustice. And the 
 financial difficulties of the Cortes, to the very 
 last hour of their existence, were on the increase 
 rather than on the wane. 
 
 That body, therefore, in decreeing the sup- 
 pression of convents, evidently, to say the least 
 
 VOL. I. E
 
 50 
 
 of it, mistook their real interests, while the course 
 of some of the events at Madrid, over which 
 they ought to have had a more efficient control, 
 was any thing but a counterbalance to the mis- 
 chiefs arising from this false step. Many dis- 
 graceful scenes were acted in that capital, which 
 unluckily bore a sufficiently close resemblance 
 to those of the French Revolution to enable the 
 enemies of the Cortes to represent the circum- 
 stances which attended the change in the Spanish 
 Government as in every respect similar in cha- 
 racter to those of that tremendous convulsion, in 
 the progress of which such fearful evils were in- 
 flicted not only upon France but upon Europe. 
 The object of those who instituted this parallel 
 could not be mistaken. They wished to show 
 that the same evils were then threatened, and 
 thereby to vindicate the propriety, or indeed, by 
 implication, to suggest the necessity of an attack 
 being made from without on the newly esta- 
 blished Constitution of Spain. But if there were, 
 as undoubtedly there were, some circumstances 
 which justified the comparison, there were not 
 wanting others of greater magnitude and import- 
 ance which marked the difference between them. 
 And, first, it should be remembered, that such 
 was the fierce hatred to Monarchy in France, 
 that notwithstanding the many personal virtues 
 which adorned the Sovereign, they were unable 
 to protect him from the most insulting treatment,
 
 51 
 
 or to save him from an ignominious death ; while 
 in Spain, although the vices of the monarch 
 were unredeemed by a single virtue, such was 
 the respect with which his sacred office was 
 treated, that he met with no indignities, and 
 was allowed to wear the Crown which he had 
 disgraced. 
 
 True, indeed, it was to have been wished, 
 that a greater share of real authority had been 
 left to the Kingly Office, to have maintained 
 more equally the balance of the Constitution, yet 
 was it to be wondered at that he, who had abused 
 so grossly his power whilst he held it, should be 
 entrusted with as small a portion of it as possible 
 by those who had suffered so severely from its 
 abuse ? 
 
 But, even if this glaring point of distinction 
 had not existed, there would yet have been 
 wanting that one all-sufficient ground for inter- 
 ference, by which the war, in 1793, with France, 
 however, could alone have been defended. The 
 French revolutionary government, by their ce- 
 lebrated decree, declared war against all esta- 
 blished Governments, while that of Spain, so far 
 from doing any thing of the sort, scrupulously 
 abstained from all external aggression. 
 
 The French Ministry, in the early period of 
 the existence of the Spanish constitutional Go- 
 vernment, did not venture to avow towards it 
 any open hostility, but the awful visitation of the 
 
 e 2
 
 52 
 
 yellow fever, in its most pestilential form, with 
 which it pleased Providence to afflict Spain, 
 furnished the French Government with a pretext 
 for the commencement of a series of measures, 
 which, as is well known, ended in the subversion 
 of her infant Constitution, 
 
 Under the pretence, or, perhaps, really for 
 the purpose of guarding the French territory 
 from infection, an army was encamped on the 
 confines of France, next to Spain, designated by 
 the name of the "Cordon Sanitaire." As long, 
 however, as there was any dread of contagion, 
 such a precaution on the part of the French 
 Government could hardly have been matter of 
 surprise ; but it was matter both of surprise and 
 suspicion that, after it had performed its duties, 
 and the fear of the pestilence was gone by, that 
 the army, instead of being quietly withdrawn, 
 should still continue stationed upon the same 
 spot, though under another name. It was then 
 affirmed by the French government, that they 
 found it necessary to keep up an " army of 
 observation, " to defend their territories from the 
 encroachments to which they were exposed, in 
 consequence of the civil war which then deso- 
 lated the frontier provinces of Spain ; and some- 
 thing was likewise whispered about the utility 
 of keeping out that moral infection, which it 
 was pretended the Spanish Constitutionalists 
 might communicate to the French people.
 
 53 
 
 Had it not been for the absolute denial of 
 any hostile intention on the part of the French 
 Government towards Spain, fears might have 
 been justly entertained for the ultimate desti- 
 nation of this army ; but when a declaration of 
 pacifick policy was ostentatiously and unneces- 
 sarily put into the mouth of the King at the close 
 of the session of the Legislative Chambers, it 
 was hardly to be supposed that the pious de- 
 scendant of St. Louis would have lent himself; 
 even for state purposes, to the gratuitous asser- 
 tion of what he knew to be false. But what- 
 ever might be the assurances of the French 
 Monarch, it was impossible not to fear but that 
 the presence of such an army on the Bidassoa 
 would be a cause of umbrage to the Spanish 
 Government. 
 
 The weakness, however, of Spain, together 
 with the general disorganization that every 
 where prevailed, and the yet tottering state of 
 her Government, was, to a certain degree, a 
 security that she would not wantonly provoke 
 her stronger neighbour; as well as that she 
 would patiently submit to what she had an 
 undoubted right to remonstrate against, rather 
 than incur the risk of affording any plausible 
 grounds of quarrel. But though these con- 
 siderations on the part of Spain would evidently 
 operate to prevent her seeking a rupture, and 
 though the disavowal by France of any hostile 
 
 e 3
 
 54 
 
 object, in maintaining this " army of observ- 
 ation," might have been sufficient to dispel the 
 fears of those who dreaded the breaking out of a 
 war between the two Powers, yet it was im- 
 possible to feel quite confident that that dreaded 
 event would not very shortly take place, when 
 the principles of eternal hostility to all popular 
 institutions, promulgated by the Holy Alliance 
 at Troppau and Laybach, were taken, as they 
 could not but be taken, into consideration. 
 
 The fact likewise before noticed, of Naples 
 being described as the "first" object selected for 
 attack, too surely implied, that, as soon as the 
 oceasion was ripe, a second selection would be 
 made ; and as at the time this threat was held 
 out the events in Piedmont had not occurred, it 
 was evident that, as a second, at least, was in- 
 tended, that second could be no other than 
 Spain. It was therefore very natural to suppose 
 that France would be made the instrument of the 
 Alliance to overthrow the Spanish Constitution, 
 while the ticklish state of the existing relations 
 between the two Countries might easily be made 
 to afford some plausible pretext for the at- 
 tempt. 
 
 This conjecture was further strengthened by 
 the consideration, that the complete success 
 which attended the first efforts of the Alliance 
 against constitutional liberty was only likely to 
 add to their confidence and to increase their
 
 55 
 
 appetite for similar exploits ; and the announce- 
 ment, before the Congress separated, of its in- 
 tention to meet again the following year, only 
 served to confirm the belief that, when they did 
 meet, some scheme for the subversion of the 
 Spanish Constitution would form the subject of 
 their deliberations. * 
 
 But it was not only the unsettled state of 
 things between France and Spain that gave rise 
 to apprehensions as to the probable duration of 
 the peace then existing amongst the great Powers 
 of Europe ; actual conflicts desolated various 
 parts of the world : in Greece the Rayah sub- 
 jects of the Porte were fighting in a manner 
 worthy of their ancient name, against their 
 Infidel Masters. In Spanish America the patriots 
 were making rapid strides towards the establish- 
 ment of their independence ; but still the strug- 
 gle continued : — and Brazil, in the course of the 
 
 * A singular proof was given at this time of the little 
 deference the Emperor of Russia, the chief of the Alliance, 
 thought necessary to maintain towards the feelings, or even 
 towards the rights of England, in the publication of an Im- 
 perial Ukase, forbidding all foreign vessels to trade, fish, or 
 settle, or to approach within one hundred Italian miles of 
 the N. W. coast of America from Behring's Straits to the 
 51st degree of latitude. It will hardly be believed, that 
 actually within the forbidden district, which, forsooth, we 
 were not to be allowed to approach within one hundred 
 miles, there were, and are, divers English settlements which 
 carry on a lucrative trade with the Mother Country. 
 
 E 4
 
 50 
 
 summer of 1822, had followed their example, in 
 declaring itself independent of Portugal. More- 
 over, in those countries where tranquillity pre- 
 vailed, it was the result of fear, and not of 
 contentment. The elements of combustion ex- 
 isted. A spark was only wanting to set them in 
 a blaze. And it must not be supposed, because 
 that spark has not yet fallen, that the danger is 
 gone by, and that a general convulsion may not 
 yet be the consequence of the policy pursued 
 by the Continental Governments. 
 
 Amidst this complication of affairs, and jarring 
 of opposite principles, the three Sovereigns of 
 the Holy Alliance, and the Representatives of 
 France and England, were again about to meet 
 in Congress at Vienna. 
 
 As the power of this celebrated Alliance for 
 the six months preceding this Congress was 
 greater than at any previous or subsequent period 
 of its existence, it may be well here to examine 
 the causes by which it had been gradually 
 enabled to acquire a strength, which used, as 
 the Alliance seemed determined to use it, threat- 
 ened at least the temporary suspension of the 
 liberties of the civilised World. 
 
 It will be remembered, that this Alliance was 
 first formed about three months after the break- 
 ing up of the first Congress at Vienna ; but 
 couched as the convention, by which it was held 
 together, was, in religious language, it was dif-
 
 57 
 
 ficult for any of the uninitiated to discover its 
 real object; yet still there was something in it 
 of so suspicious a nature, although concealed 
 by terms of the purest piety, that some mem- 
 bers of the House of Commons brought the 
 subject of it before Parliament ; and that the 
 then British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs 
 declared his conviction that its stipulations were 
 innocent, and its end harmless. That those, 
 however, who framed it, meant that it should 
 work, as it subsequently did work, is evident 
 from the different compacts which the treaty 
 contains : — 
 
 " The three contracting monarchs will remain 
 " united by the bonds of a true and indissoluble 
 " fraternity," says its first article ; " and consi- 
 " dering each other as fellow-countrymen, they 
 " will on all occasions, and in all places, lend each 
 " other aid and assistance" 
 
 In the second article they declare, that they, 
 the three allied Sovereigns, " look upon them- 
 " selves as merely delegated by Providence to 
 " govern," &c. 
 
 That this expression in the second article 
 meant no other than to assert the long-combated 
 doctrine of the Divine Right of Kings, — and that 
 the agreement in the first article " to lend each 
 " other on all occasions, and in all places, aid and 
 " assistance," — was an agreement binding each 
 other mutually to support that Divine Right,
 
 58 
 
 cannot now be doubted. It is easy to under- 
 stand an enigma after it is explained, though not 
 so easy to solve it before-hand. And though 
 certainly the very fact of an enigma being pro- 
 pounded by the three sovereigns ought to have 
 aroused the suspicion of an English minister, yet 
 it was not to be expected that he should at once 
 be able to discover the solution. But Lord 
 Castlereagh not only did not find out the solu- 
 tion, but allowed himself to be deceived into 
 the belief, by the frank and open manner in 
 which the treaty was published to the world, 
 that there was nothing in it, either obscure or 
 enigmatick, forgetting, when he so reasoned, that 
 it was not the riddle, but the answer to it, of 
 which prudence would dictate the concealment. 
 But, again, the Prince Regent of England was 
 invited to become a party to the treaty, and 
 would the Allies, if they had had, when they 
 framed it, any sinister objects in view, would 
 they have invited England to become one of 
 their party ? Now, this treaty, it must be ob- 
 served, was concluded three months after the 
 treaties that were signed at Vienna, to which 
 England was a party. Did those treaties con- 
 sult the convenience of Kings, or were they 
 framed with a due consideration to the rights 
 and happiness of subjects? It is impossible to 
 affirm the latter, while it is equally impossible to 
 deny the former. What then was there extraor-
 
 59 
 
 dinary in the three Monarchs expecting England 
 to join in this treaty, merely intended to per- 
 petuate the same principles, which had been 
 their guide at the Vienna Congress ? Besides, 
 they were well aware, that if England chose to 
 set her face against such principles, it would be 
 impossible for them long to maintain their 
 ground. If, therefore, Lord Castlereagh had 
 penetrated the objects of the treaty, they had 
 no reason to imagine that those objects would 
 have been adverse to his own ; if, on the other 
 hand, he had not that penetration, no harm 
 could result from the invitation. In justice to 
 Lord Castlereagh, it can only be believed that 
 they remained wholly and entirely hidden from 
 his view ; for it is really out of the question to 
 suppose that a British Minister could have lauded 
 that treaty as he did, if he had suspected the 
 real purpose for which it had been framed. 
 
 For the first few years after its signature, the 
 only apparent effect that it produced was that 
 of encouraging the two German members of it 
 to delay the performance of their promise, viz. 
 the granting of a system of popular represent- 
 ation to their subjects. 
 
 At Aix-la-Chapelle, when France was re- 
 stored to the rank of an independent Power by 
 the withdrawal of the allied armies, the Holy 
 Alliance acquired increased strength by the
 
 60 
 
 continued and voluntarily sanction and adhesion 
 of her King to the treaty which united them. 
 
 From the Congress at Aix-la-Chapelle to the 
 period when the constitutional governments were 
 formed in Spain, Portugal, and Naples, this 
 Alliance was secretly strengthening itself under 
 the fostering protection of France, and acquies- 
 cence of England, and gradually contracting the 
 freedom of its subjects ; and when at last it was 
 startled by the four, almost simultaneous, efforts 
 of the people, to obtain some share in the direc- 
 tion of their own government, it felt so conscious 
 of its own power and security, that it did not 
 hesitate to put forth doctrines " in direct re- 
 " pugnance to the fundamental laws of Great 
 " Britain ; and such as could not," even in Lord 
 Castlereagh's opinion, " be safely admitted as 
 " the foundation of a system of international 
 " law." 
 
 So completely, however, did the allied So- 
 vereigns despise Lord Castlereagh's condemn- 
 ation of their avowed principles, that they forth- 
 with proceeded to act upon the principles thus 
 condemned ; and so entirely did they conceive 
 the British Minister unable to disengage himself 
 from their trammels, that shortly after they 
 again openly and advisedly propounded the 
 same principles, in the very teeth of his de- 
 nunciations of them.
 
 61 
 
 This conduct of the alliance solved the 
 enigma of its formation. 
 
 It was now evident that it was nothing else 
 but a league of absolute Monarchs for the mu- 
 tual preservation of their unlimited sway, against 
 the encroachments of their people. They were 
 no longer to consult the particular interests of 
 that nation over which each might happen to 
 rule. 
 
 The balance of power was no more. " Aus- 
 " tria, Russia, and Prussia were to be governed," 
 as the treaty stipulated, " as three branches of 
 " one family ;" but not content with thus uniting 
 themselves into one Empire, all the weaker States 
 were, whether willing or unwilling, to be made 
 members of the same family ; and if they pre- 
 sumed to act independently for themselves, and 
 to take a different view, from that entertained by 
 this triumvirate, of their own interests, by alter- 
 ing their form of government, they were to be 
 corrected by the paternal rod of these holy 
 Patriarchs. But it was not only for great 
 offences that the rod of punishment was exer- 
 cised. If the press of an independent but less 
 powerful State advocated doctrines more liberal 
 than those permitted by the Alliance, a notifica- 
 tion was sent to the government to put a bridle 
 on, what was called, its licentiousness. If a 
 weaker State (for instance the Cantons of Swit- 
 zerland) dared to give protection to those who
 
 62 
 
 had been obliged to flee their country on ac- 
 count of their political opinions, a mandate was 
 sent to it, with threats in case of disobedience, 
 to disregard the laws of hospitality, and to drive 
 the wretched exiles from the asylum which they 
 had sought. 
 
 In short, a new era had commenced in the 
 history of the World, — a system of governing 
 Europe by Congresses *, instead of by separate 
 and independent Governments, was established. 
 A scheme was formed, and actually begun to be 
 put in operation, to destroy throughout the 
 globe the just freedom of the people. And 
 while all this mighty machinery was being put 
 in movement, England was, if not a willing, 
 at least a passive spectator. England, that had 
 so long been looked upon as the land of freedom, 
 the protector of the oppressed, now no longer 
 afforded a hope that she would erect herself 
 into a barrier which should arrest the progress 
 of such frightful projects. 
 
 The glory which had once surrounded her 
 was fled. By sanctioning the unholy spoliations 
 of the Vienna Congress, she lost the respect 
 and confidence of the better portion of the 
 human race, and with it that control over their 
 rulers which alone could be secured by the pre- 
 servation of that moral strength which those 
 
 * Vide fourth article of the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, 
 Nov. 1818.
 
 63 
 
 who make the eternal principles of justice the 
 guide of their actions will ever acquire over the 
 minds of men. 
 
 It is not to be supposed that such a state of 
 things was the result which Lord Castlereagh 
 contemplated as likely to arise from his mode of 
 managing our foreign affairs. When he ap- 
 proved or yielded to the wishes of the Con- 
 tinental Monarchs at Vienna, it probably never 
 came across him that by so doing he would 
 ensure the hatred of their people ; when he 
 praised the objects of the Holy Alliance, and 
 stated that he believed them to be pure and 
 upright, he probably did not divine their nature ; 
 and when he sent a British minister to perform 
 the unworthy office of listening to and reporting 
 the deliberations of the Congresses at Troppau 
 and Laybach, he probably did not perceive that 
 by so doing he was giving the sanction of Great 
 Britain to whatever measures might be there 
 decided upon. But it would appear that the 
 real explanation of his conduct is to be found 
 in the fact, that, all his measures were but tem- 
 porary expedients, tending to produce no fore- 
 seen result. Certain general ideas as to the 
 advantages of preserving peace, coupled with a 
 bias against liberal opinions, were, apparently, 
 the springs, which regulated each separate de- 
 termination on which the force of circumstances 
 compelled him to resolve ; and these motives of
 
 64 
 
 conduct were sufficiently uniform in their opera- 
 tion to produce systematick mischief although 
 the individual who was ruled by them seemed to 
 have no settled system, or knowledge of first 
 principles to guide him. 
 
 Deficient, however, in foresight, as Lord 
 Castlereagh appears to have been, it can hardly 
 be imagined that he was blind to the alarming 
 aspect of affairs. Committed as he was to the 
 Alliance on the one hand, and responsible to the 
 British Parliament on the other, the difficulties 
 of his situation thickened around him on each 
 succeeding day. Neither was the internal con- 
 dition of this country at all calculated to afford 
 that consolation to his mind, which it must have 
 so much needed. 
 
 Two months before he was to have set out 
 for Verona symptoms of aberration of intellect 
 began to manifest themselves ; no doubt occa- 
 sioned by that great bodily fatigue and mental 
 anxiety which must ever be inseparable, from a 
 post in the Government so high, at an epoch so 
 momentous. 
 
 The fatal consequences of his state of mind 
 are too well known to require here to be men- 
 tioned. He died, leaving his successor, whoever 
 he was to be, in the most arduous situation that 
 it ever fell to the lot of the Foreign Minister of 
 this country to occupy.
 
 65 
 
 CHAP. II. 
 
 REVIEW OF THE STATE OF ENGLAND, FROM THE PEACE 
 TO THE ACCEPTANCE OF THE SEALS OF THE FOREIGN 
 OFFICE BY MR. CANNING, IN SEPTEMBER, 1822. 
 
 Mr. Canning was Lord Londonderry's suc- 
 cessor, not only in the situation of Foreign 
 Secretary, but in that of " King's Minister" in 
 the House of Commons. 
 
 A brief survey will, therefore, be necessary, 
 as well of the internal relations of the empire, 
 from the peace to the time of Mr. Canning's 
 acceptance of the Foreign Office, as of the line 
 of conduct which he himself pursued during 
 that period (part of which he was a member of 
 the Cabinet), in order that the exact nature 
 of the position in which he was placed may be 
 clearly understood. 
 
 Thoroughly to explain that position, a few 
 well known facts respecting the state of the 
 government, previously to the conclusion of the 
 peace, must first be mentioned. 
 
 Immediately after the death of Mr. Perceval, 
 in 1812, Lord Liverpool, by the election of his 
 colleagues, was placed at the head of the Trea- 
 
 VOL. I. F
 
 66 
 
 sury, as First Minister. An overture was forth- 
 with made by Lord Liverpool to Lord Wellesley 
 and Mr. Canning, to induce them to join the 
 Cabinet; an overture, however, which was made 
 in vain, in consequence of the refusal of Lord 
 Liverpool and his colleagues to take into con- 
 sideration the state of the Catholick question. 
 
 On the failure of this negotiation, Mr. Stuart 
 Wortley made a motion for an address to the 
 Prince Regent, praying that His Royal High- 
 ness would be graciously pleased to take mea- 
 sures for the formation of a strong and efficient 
 Administration, by which expressions it was 
 clearly intended to imply, that the Administra- 
 tion then in being was neither strong nor effi- 
 cient. 
 
 The motion was carried by a majority of four; 
 and the Prince Regent promised, when the ad- 
 dress was presented to him, to take it " into his 
 " immediate and serious consideration." 
 
 In conformity with this promise to the House 
 of Commons, the Regent proceeded to the task 
 of forming a new Administration ; and to effect 
 this purpose, His Royal Highness confided un- 
 limited powers to Lord Wellesley and Mr. Can- 
 ning. After fruitless negotiations with Lords 
 Grey and Grenville on the one side, and Lord 
 Liverpool on the other, in which the immediate 
 consideration of the Catholic claims, and a 
 strenuous prosecution of the war in Spain, were
 
 67 
 
 the only two points upon which a cordial agree- 
 ment was required, Lord Wellesley being unable 
 to execute the task intrusted to him was obliged 
 to surrender his commission into the hands of 
 His Royal Highness. 
 
 Another attempt of the same nature was made 
 by Lord Moira, which was equally unsuccessful ; 
 the negotiation going off in consequence of a 
 misunderstanding respecting the great officers of 
 State in the Royal Household. 
 
 These efforts to re-model the Government 
 having proved abortive, there seemed no other 
 alternative but the continuance in office of the 
 members of the old Cabinet ; and their exerting 
 themselves to carry on with efficiency the King's 
 service. This alternative was adopted ; but the 
 Government thus constituted was perfectly con- 
 scious of its own weakness. At the close of 
 the session, an offer was made to Mr. Canning, 
 (perhaps the handsomest that was ever made to 
 a single individual) to induce him to join the 
 Administration. The Foreign Secretaryship 
 (then held by Lord Castlereagh) was to have 
 been given up to Mr. Canning ; and nearly 
 all his political adherents were to have been 
 admitted to official situations. But the lead in 
 the House of Commons was still to have been 
 retained by Lord Castlereagh. This last circum- 
 stance suggested the idea to some of Mr. Can- 
 ning's friends, that, unless Lord Castlereagh 
 
 f <2
 
 68 
 
 surrendered the lead also, the offer ought to be 
 rejected. Mr. Canning himself was not of that 
 opinion. Had he been so, he would, at once, 
 of himself, have declined the proposal : but, as 
 it was, he resolved not to act upon his own indi- 
 vidual judgment. The point of precedency was, 
 therefore, referred to three members of the 
 House of Commons, who were supposed to be 
 peculiarly conversant with the usages of that 
 House. They decided that Mr. Canning ought 
 to insist upon the lead ; and, accordingly, the 
 non-acceptance of the offer was notified to those 
 by whom it had been tendered. 
 
 It was not again renewed : for not many 
 months after this negotiation, the brilliant suc- 
 cesses of Lord Wellington in Spain, and the 
 defeat of Napoleon in Russia, came very oppor- 
 tunely to reinstate the Ministry in the good 
 opinion of the country ; the loss of which good 
 opinion was not again endangered by any sub- 
 sequent reverses. 
 
 After the above-mentioned offer, in the first 
 instance, Mr. Canning, if not an opposer, was 
 still less a supporter of the Ministry ; but when, 
 in consequence of the triumphs of the British 
 arms in Spain, and the overthrow of the French 
 power in the northern parts of Europe, the 
 Government no longer hesitated to make every 
 possible exertion towards the prosecution of the 
 war, a course which, from first to last, Mr.
 
 69 
 
 Canning had urgently and invariably recom- 
 mended, he naturally became more closely united 
 with an Administration, under whose auspices, 
 his own prophecies, perseveringly and confi- 
 dently put forth in times when the cause was 
 apparently desperate, were rapidly advancing to 
 their fulfilment. Before, therefore, the war was 
 terminated by Napoleon's abdication, Mr. Can- 
 ning had become a zealous friend of Lord Liver- 
 pool's Administration. When the contest was 
 concluded, Mr. Canning, still being out of office, 
 determined, on account of the health of his 
 eldest son, to visit Lisbon. 
 
 The Ministers were then expecting the im- 
 mediate return of the Prince Regent of Por- 
 tugal to his European dominions. When, 
 therefore, the report of Mr. Canning's intention 
 came to the knowledge of Lord Liverpool 
 and his colleagues, they became desirous of 
 having the advantage of Mr. Canning's diplo- 
 matick services during his residence in the 
 Portuguese Capital. 
 
 Added to this consideration, was the wish to 
 obtain that moral support, which the members 
 of the Cabinet felt they would derive from the 
 unequivocal proof of his approbation of their 
 policy, which would be given by his consenting 
 to the formation of a connection between them. 
 
 It was accordingly proposed to him to go to 
 Lisbon as Ambassador ; and although he was 
 
 f 3
 
 70 
 
 well aware, that, if he accepted the proffered 
 situation, his enemies would misrepresent and 
 calumniate his motives, he was induced to do so, 
 because the Government made it the condition 
 of enrolling in its ranks, those of his personal 
 friends, who had attached themselves to his 
 political fortunes. For the welfare of those in- 
 dividuals he was peculiarly solicitous, because 
 at this period, it was certainly his intention, at 
 any rate for a season, if not for ever, to retire 
 from political life in this country. His antici- 
 pations respecting himself were unfortunately 
 but too correct ; for no calumny was too foul, 
 nor misrepresentation too gross, to be employed 
 for the purpose of injuring his character in pub- 
 lick estimation. He who had thrice sacrificed 
 the highest offices in the state, because he would 
 not swerve from his principles, was charged with 
 having basely caught at the Lisbon Embassy from 
 a greedy love of office : and liberal as he was, even 
 to a fault, and free from all pecuniary taint, yet 
 was he charged with having sacrificed his honour 
 from a sordid appetite for gain ! It cannot be 
 wondered at, that these accusations perpetually 
 asserted, and pertinaciously adhered to, after 
 they had been confuted, did produce a most 
 unjust prejudice against him ; and so difficult is 
 it to efface the impression made by oft-repeated 
 falsehoods, that, notwithstanding the triumphant 
 and unanswerable defence which he made of 
 his conduct in the House of Commons, up to
 
 71 
 
 this very hour, many well-meaning individuals, 
 from want of an accurate knowledge of it, will 
 avow their belief that there was no real ex- 
 pectation of the return of the Prince Regent of 
 Portugal to Lisbon, although a British Fleet was 
 actually sent out on purpose to convey His Royal 
 Highness to Europe, and that Mr. Canning 
 gained at least a clear 20,000/. by the Embassy, 
 although, to meet the whole of the heavy ex- 
 penses necessarily attendant upon it, he did not 
 receive altogether two thirds of that sum. 
 
 During Mr. Canning's absence at Lisbon, 
 Napoleon returned from Elba to France, was 
 defeated at Waterloo, and surrendered himself 
 a prisoner of war to the captain of a British line- 
 of-battle ship. The peace, which his return had 
 broken, was again restored to the world by his 
 surrender. But peace did not bring to Great 
 Britain unmingled prosperity j for before the 
 close of the year, which these events will ever 
 render memorable in the annals of history, great 
 distress began to afflict the agricultural classes ; 
 to remedy which, a bill for the regulation of the 
 importation of corn (highly favourable as it was 
 then thought, and too favourable, as it has since 
 proved, to the landed interest,) was passed by 
 the Parliament, amidst the riots of the Metro- 
 polis, and the almost universal complainings of 
 the consumers. This bill came into operation 
 on the 23d of March, 1814, from which time the 
 
 f 4
 
 72 
 
 ports were kept shut, until they were re-opened, 
 towards the close of 181G, in consequence of the 
 state of famine to which the country was re- 
 duced, by the dreadful weather in the harvest- 
 time of that year. 
 
 Meanwhile, as the stocks of foreign corn, 
 which had arrived before the passing of the act, 
 were declining, the price of British corn began to 
 rise under the protection of the new law ; and the 
 distress which had, after the peace, first afflicted 
 the agriculturists, and which was, from other and 
 unavoidable causes, approaching the manufac- 
 turers, appeared to have been transferred from 
 the one class to the other, in the spring and 
 summer of 1816. 
 
 It was only natural that the return of peace, 
 after so long and peculiar a war, should change, 
 and even reverse the positions of the great 
 branches of society ; and since agriculture had 
 flourished, and trade had languished, under the 
 commercial systems of the belligerents in the 
 last years of the war, the immediate suffering of 
 the first, and the temporary relief of the second, 
 in the commencement of the peace, ought not 
 to be matter of surprise. 
 
 But the new state, into which both were 
 doomed eventually to settle was fast preparing j 
 and the manufacturers found, that they could ill 
 support that enhanced price of food, which they 
 were beginning to feel long before it was assign- 
 able to natural causes.
 
 73 
 
 They were, however, on the eve of far greater 
 distresses j which, though much to be lamented, 
 were not properly to be complained of, for they 
 were such as could not have been prevented by 
 human efforts. The harvest of 1S16 was one of 
 the most calamitous in the memory of man, both 
 here and on the Continent ; and the rains which 
 destroyed the crops of that year were injurious 
 to the seed-time for those of the next. The 
 wheat crop of 1817 was consequently defective; 
 and although the extraordinary drought of 1818 
 was felt only by the spring-sown corn, still the 
 defalcation of oats and barley was sufficient to 
 prevent, in a great degree, the falling of the 
 price of wheat, which would in all probability 
 have otherwise occurred. 
 
 In consequence of such successive bad seasons, 
 the prohibitory nature of the corn act was for 
 more than two years rendered almost inoper- 
 ative ; and while the agriculturists were flat- 
 tering themselves that they were making out a 
 case for higher protection, and were discon- 
 tented with a state of markets, with which time 
 has since proved that they ought to have been 
 satisfied, the manufacturers were labouring under 
 the pressure of real and severe privations. 
 
 One evil was, however, unconsciously common 
 to both, — an utter ignorance of true or unartiricial 
 prices. They complained when they ought to 
 have conformed ; and it may be feared that the 
 publick mind continues to this day under much
 
 74 
 
 delusion of the same nature. The price of corn 
 in 1816 relieved the pecuniary difficulties of the 
 landlords and farmers, but it pressed with pecu- 
 liar severity on the manufacturing classes of 
 the community. 
 
 The trading interest had totally lost that em- 
 ployment which belonged to a state of war, and 
 to the advantages of a profuse expenditure by 
 the government. They had satisfied the de- 
 mands of those foreign markets which were in a 
 state of privation, until they were opened by the 
 peace ; and unfortunately they were far from 
 being prepared to supply their commodities at 
 those prices, which alone could insure to them a 
 continued or extended trade abroad. 
 
 The contemporaneous occurrences of these two 
 calamities, — scarcity of food and want of employ- 
 ment, — produced great discontent amongst the 
 lower orders ; a disposition of mind, of which 
 there were not wanting factious demagogues to 
 take advantage, who persuaded the multitude 
 that all their sufferings were owing to the cor- 
 ruption of the legislature, and that a Reform of 
 the House of Commons was the only panacea 
 for the miseries with which, but too surely, they 
 were afflicted. 
 
 When Mr. Canning returned to England in 
 the early part of 1816, he found the nation 
 divided into two great parties, — the advocates 
 and the opponents of Reform. 
 
 On the one side were ranged all the jacobins
 
 75 
 
 and republicans, whose principles were, in the 
 abstract, hostile to the Monarchy ; and to these 
 were joined all those whose hunger and penury 
 made them listen to whatever any man would 
 tell them respecting the causes of those evils. 
 
 In proportion, therefore, as the distress was 
 widely diffused, in like proportion were the friends 
 of Reform numerous amongst the lower classes 
 of the people. 
 
 To these, who were Radical Reformers, must 
 be added a portion of the Whigs, far more 
 moderate, however, in their views than those 
 with whom, to a certain extent, they coin- 
 cided. 
 
 On the other side were to be numbered the 
 Government of the Country, the whole of the 
 Tory Party, and an immense majority of the 
 most respectable and opulent classes of the 
 community. 
 
 To Reform, Mr. Canning had long been a 
 decided enemy ; for he was well aware what 
 Reform meant, amongst the radicals, who made 
 it the watch-word of their party. Reform with 
 them was not a reformation of the abuses, or 
 even of the fancied abuses, which during a 
 course of centuries might have crept into the 
 British Constitution ; but their aim w r as to de- 
 stroy that Constitution which they pretended to 
 desire only to improve. 
 
 Reform was the means, Revolution the end of 
 vol. i. * f 6
 
 76 
 
 all their machinations. Reform, therefore, was 
 the question of the day. 
 
 In this state of things, when Mr. Canning was 
 invited to become a member of the Cabinet by 
 taking the Presidency of the Board of Control, 
 he accepted the invitation. 
 
 With respect to Catholick Emancipation, 
 although it was not to be brought forward as 
 a Government measure, yet, since it was left 
 open for each member of the Cabinet indivi- 
 dually to support or to oppose it, according to 
 the bias of his own opinions, Mr. Canning's 
 junction with that body afforded him the best 
 chance of promoting its success. Indeed, from 
 the time when the principle on which the Ad- 
 ministration acted on this question was changed 
 from one of resistance into one of neutrality 
 (as was done subsequently to the failure of the 
 negotiations in 1812), there was no obstacle, 
 on account of the Catholicks, to Mr. Canning's 
 junction with the Government. 
 
 With respect to the only question of imme- 
 diate moment to the Empire at that epoch, — Re- 
 form, — he agreed entirely with his colleagues, 
 and was therefore well inclined to participate in 
 their labours, which had assumed a direction 
 peculiarly in unison with his own ideas of what 
 ought to have been their course ; since they 
 were employed in awakening the country to the 
 danger, and in stemming the torrent of Radical
 
 77 
 
 Reform, which many well-intentioned persons 
 were contributing to swell, from not perceiving 
 the direction which it might take, and the de- 
 vastation which it might occasion. 
 
 The distress which the bad harvest of 1816 
 produced greatly increased the numbers of the 
 disaffected. 
 
 Meetings to petition for Reform were held in 
 all parts of the kingdom ; and one, on the same 
 pretence, amounting to near one hundred thou- 
 sand persons, was congregated in Spa Fields, 
 and was concluded by an attempt at insurrection, 
 which for a few hours spread dismay throughout 
 the Metropolis. 
 
 This attempt was, at first, supposed to be 
 nothing more than a sudden and unpremeditated 
 effervescence of popular excitement ; but it was 
 afterwards clearly ascertained that it was in 
 reality the result of a serious conspiracy to upset 
 the Government, and that it had extensive rami- 
 fications in all parts of the country, and especially 
 in the manufacturing districts. 
 
 When the parliament met, early in the fol!ow r - 
 ing year (1817), the Ministers were prepared 
 with a chain of evidence to show that treason- 
 able designs to overthrow the Constitution, to 
 divide the land, and to destroy the funds, 
 were entertained by the leaders of the Spa 
 Fields' meeting, in which designs many dis- 
 affected persons, at a distance from London, had 
 participated.
 
 78 
 
 The Administration being thus already in pos- 
 session of information sufficient to convince 
 them of the existence of a conspiracy, that 
 conviction was further strengthened by an at- 
 tempt on the life of the Prince Regent on his 
 return from the two Houses of Parliament, after 
 His Royal Highness had opened the session in 
 person. 
 
 Shortly after the meeting secret committees 
 of both Houses were appointed to examine the 
 information which had been obtained respecting 
 these designs ; and in consequence of the re- 
 ports made by the Committees, both on the 
 alarming reality of the conspiracy, and the ne- 
 cessity of strengthening the hands of the exe- 
 cutive, four bills were brought in by Lord 
 Castlereagh : first, a Bill for the preventing the 
 Seduction of Sailors from their duty ; second, a 
 Bill to place the Person of the Prince Regent 
 under the same protection as that of the King ; 
 third, a Bill for preventing seditious Meetings ; 
 fourth, a Bill for the suspension of the Habeas 
 Corpus Act till the end of the Session. To 
 the two first bills no opposition was made ; but 
 the two last were fought, stage by stage, by the 
 Whigs and the Reformers. They were carried, 
 notwithstanding, by large majorities in both 
 Houses. 
 
 The unanimous report of another secret com- 
 mittee moved for by the Ministers towards the 
 close of the Session afforded a most complete
 
 79 
 
 justification of the much-condemned measure of 
 the suspension of the Haheas Corpus Act. By 
 means of that very suspension the Government 
 had been enabled, while the Parliament had 
 been sitting, three several times to disconcert 
 the plans of the disaffected, by arresting the 
 leaders, who were to have headed the proposed 
 insurrections. 
 
 The state of the manufacturing population 
 was indeed so alarming, that the Government 
 was induced to ask for, and Parliament was in- 
 duced to consent to, a continuance, during the 
 Prorogation, of the suspension of the Habeas 
 Corpus Act, which, at first, had only been 
 granted for as long as the Session lasted. 
 
 Before Parliament again met in the follow- 
 ing January (1818), the state of the country had 
 so much improved, that the very first measure 
 introduced by the Ministers was a motion for 
 the repeal of the suspension act ; for, notwith- 
 standing that the crop of 1817 was not very 
 productive, yet new markets for commodities 
 having been discovered, and the glut of those 
 articles, which, being manufactured to answer a 
 war demand, the cessation of war had left on 
 hand, having diminished, in the first months of 
 the year, employment began to return to the 
 lower orders, and with it contentment, and less 
 leisure or disposition to listen to the speeches 
 of those who wished to take advantage of the
 
 80 
 
 distresses of the poor to promote their own per- 
 sonal aggrandisement. 
 
 Shortly after the commencement of the session 
 (1818), the ministers applied to Parliament for 
 an indemnity to protect them against the con- 
 sequences of having imprisoned so many indivi- 
 duals. Heavy charges of unjust and arbitrary 
 conduct were brought by the Opposition against 
 the Government, for the manner in which the 
 powers which the Legislature had intrusted in its 
 hands had been exercised ; but no one single 
 case which was brought forward in aid of these 
 charges stood the test of an investigation. 
 
 The events of the year, upon the whole, 
 showed that the designs of the enemies of the 
 Constitution were at any rate defeated, if they 
 were not entirely laid aside ; and a most abundant 
 wheat harvest in the autumn contributed to the 
 restoration of general tranquillity. 
 
 But if the poor were blessed with again being 
 able to obtain their food at a cheap rate, it was 
 not productive of unmixed benefit to all classes 
 of the community. 
 
 The growers of corn began to suffer under a 
 return to those prices, which were yet mistakenly 
 held to be low, and which had for a time been 
 put aside by the dreadful harvest of 1816, and 
 its subsequent consequences. For although the 
 wheat crop of 1818 was not only abundant but 
 well harvested, the spring-sown corn, as before
 
 81 
 
 observed, was almost destroyed by drought. 
 This cause of failure (unlike that of a wet liar- 
 vest, which gives no previous notice,) became 
 evident at an early period of the year, and the 
 most extraordinary efforts were consequently 
 made by the merchants to procure supplies in 
 every foreign country where they could be 
 found. The importations of spring corn were 
 in consequence excessive ; and since it is more 
 easy to economise in the food of animals than in 
 that of human beings, and the rains at the close 
 of the year having brought forth a great abun- 
 dance of nutritious herbage to facilitate such 
 economy, the farmers found themselves deprived 
 of that advance of price, which alone would 
 have compensated them for the smallness of their 
 produce. 
 
 But although after so signal a failure of spring 
 corn it was consistent with the principle of the 
 law that the ports should be opened for that 
 species of grain, the case was far otherwise with 
 wheat; and yet so badly did the provisions of 
 that ill-imagined bill execute their objects, that 
 by the fatal surplus of two-pence, on a six- 
 weeks' average of falling markets, the ports were 
 kept open, for wheat also, during an additional 
 term of three months, in spite of an abundant 
 crop, and one of the finest harvest seasons ever 
 known. 
 
 The means and the opportunity of large im- 
 VOL. i. g
 
 82 
 
 porlations were coincident; and foreign wheat 
 (as well as all other sorts of corn) was poured 
 into the country in such quantities while the 
 ports were open, as tended to depress for a con- 
 siderable time afterwards the markets of this 
 country. 
 
 This distress amongst the agricultural classes 
 was, however, not long confined to those classes 
 alone. The manufacturers, who, during the 
 latter end of 1818, had found a renewal of work, 
 were again, in 1819, thrown out of employment, 
 and the same scenes that had disgraced the year 
 1817 were acted over once more. At last the 
 celebrated Manchester meeting, at which up- 
 wards of one hundred thousand people were 
 collected from the surrounding country, with 
 arms and banners, was of so formidable a de- 
 scription that it excited universal terror. 
 
 Parliament was assembled about the middle of 
 November, when measures were proposed by 
 the Government, calculated to remedy the then 
 existing evils. 
 
 These measures, commonly known by the 
 name of the Six Acts, though more than jus- 
 tified by circumstances, yet met with consi- 
 derable opposition both from the Whigs and 
 advocates of Reform in the two Houses, — never- 
 theless they all passed with considerable majo- 
 rities. 
 
 During the whole of these transactions, Mr.
 
 S.i 
 
 Canning took a prominent part, and defended 
 most efficiently the measures of the Government. 
 Indeed, it is not too much to say of his speeches, 
 that they mainly contributed to the discomfiture 
 of the plans of the Radicals, and to open men's 
 eyes to the dangerous tendency of their doctrines 
 and projects. 
 
 He opposed Reform, because he thought that 
 the House of Commons, in its existing con- 
 dition, fulfilled the purposes for which it was 
 designed. He condemned the principles which 
 were urged in support of that scheme, because, 
 if they proved either its necessity or its ex- 
 pediency, they likewise proved the necessity 
 and expediency of a complete change in the 
 form of the British Constitution, — a change 
 for which he was not prepared ; since, in his 
 opinion, that Constitution had conferred more 
 practical benefits on those who lived under it 
 than any that had ever been devised; and he 
 was, therefore, unwilling to give them up for 
 any speculative and untried theory of Govern- 
 ment. " I cannot conceive," he said, " a Con- 
 " stitution, of which one third part shall be an 
 " assembly delegated by the people, — not to con- 
 " suit for the good of the nation, but to speak, 
 " day by day, the people's will, — which must 
 " not in a few days' sitting sweep away every 
 " other branch of the Constitution that might 
 " attempt to oppose or to control it. I cannot 
 
 r. 9
 
 (( 
 
 l( 
 
 84 
 
 " conceive how, in fair reasoning, any other 
 " branch of the Constitution should pretend to 
 " stand against it. If government be a matter 
 " of will, all that we have to do is to collect the 
 will of the nation, and having collected it by 
 an adequate organ, that will is paramount and 
 supreme. By what pretension could the House 
 " of Lords be maintained in equal authority and 
 " jurisdiction with the House of Commons, when 
 " once that House of Commons should become 
 " a direct deputation speaking the people's will, 
 " and that will the rule of the government ? 
 " In one way or other the House of Lords must 
 " act, if it be to remain a concurrent branch of 
 " the Legislature. Either it must uniformly 
 " affirm the measures which come from the 
 " House of Commons, or it must occasionally 
 " take the liberty to reject them. If it uni- 
 " formly affirm, it is without the shadow of 
 " authority. But to presume to reject an act of 
 " the deputies of the whole nation ! — By what 
 " assumption of right could three or four hun- 
 " dred great proprietors set themselves against 
 " the national will? Grant the reformers, then, 
 " what they ask, on the principles on which they 
 " ask it, and it is utterly impossible that, after 
 " such a reform, the constitution should long 
 " consist of more than one body, and that one 
 " body a popular assembly." 
 
 Having thus shown how impossible it would
 
 85 
 
 be for the two other branches of the legislature 
 to exist with a radically reformed House of 
 Commons, he explained by it the meaning of 
 the apparently extraordinary and inconsistent 
 conduct of the Radicals, who while they 
 seldom " omitted an opportunity of discrediting 
 " and deriding the privileged orders of society, 
 " yet when they came to discuss the British Con- 
 " stitution, nothing could be more respectful 
 " than their language towards the Crown ; 
 " nothing more forbearing than their treatment 
 " of the Aristocracy. The House of Commons 
 " alone was the object of their denunciation. 
 " And why ? Because they well knew that with 
 " a House of Commons constructed on their own 
 " principles, the Peerage and the Throne might 
 " exist for a day, but might be swept away at 
 " any moment from the face of the earth by the 
 " first angry vote of such a House of Commons. 
 " Born under a Monarchy," said he, " I am not 
 " called upon to demonstrate, a priori, that it 
 " w 7 as necessary that the British Constitution 
 " should be a Monarchy. It is sufficient for me 
 " that I find it is so, and have, consequently, al- 
 " though without my individual vote or con- 
 " sent, imposed upon me the duty of allegiance 
 " to that monarchy under which I have been 
 " born." 
 
 Such was the language that Mr. Canning in- 
 variably held on this agitating question j and 
 
 g 3
 
 86 
 
 this exposure of the designs of the Radicals of 
 course made him a peculiar object of hatred and 
 terror to them. Neither, as has been already 
 stated, did he shrink from the responsibility of 
 being the strenuous and prominent advocate of the 
 several bills introduced to arm the Executive with 
 extraordinary powers to disconcert the plans of 
 the disaffected. His speeches on these occasions 
 are too well known to need any notice here. 
 But since in the course of one of them he let fall 
 an expression which his enemies seized for the 
 purpose of fastening upon him a charge of the 
 most malignant description, and, since notwith- 
 standing the most satisfactory explanation of 
 it, the calumny was repeated against him after 
 his death, it may be well to remind those who 
 only remember the oft-re-echoed expression " of 
 " the revered and ruptured Ogden," on what 
 occasion, and with what drift and application it 
 was that that expression was uttered. 
 
 Ogden was one of those taken up for sedition 
 under the suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act, 
 and had suffered from a rupture for several years 
 previously to his being so taken up. About 
 four months after he was arrested he was seized 
 with a paroxysm of his complaint, and was re- 
 lieved by the prison surgeon performing on him 
 an operation which effected a permanent cure, 
 for which, on his leaving the prison, as well as
 
 87 
 
 for his general good treatment, he expressed 
 himself) by letter, in grateful terms to his gaoler. 
 
 In a petition to Parliament this same Ogden 
 was induced to represent that his disease origin- 
 ated from the weight of his irons, (although it is 
 a fact that the paroxysm of it did not even 
 come on till several weeks after all fetters had 
 been removed from him,) and also to declare 
 that, after it had been so produced, he was left 
 for sixteen hours writhing in agonies without 
 assistance ! 
 
 It was, then, not Ogden's infirmity, but his 
 gross and infamous falsehood, which Mr. Can- 
 ning wished to expose ; and as some of the 
 members of the House had laid great stress 
 upon this case, as a proof of the tyrannical dis- 
 positions of the Administration, he ridiculed, 
 and justly ridiculed, the attempt on their part 
 to fix a charge of cruelty upon the agents of the 
 Ministers, and through them upon the Ministers 
 themselves ; since, in point of fact, nothing could 
 be more humane than the treatment which, 
 when confined by their orders, the wretched 
 man experienced at their hands. 
 
 It, therefore, was most unjust, on account of 
 these words, to accuse Mr. Canning of un- 
 feelingly laughing at the sufferings of a fellow- 
 creature, after those who had invented the fable 
 had so blended it with the infirmity, that it 
 was hardly possible, in holding up the falsehood 
 
 g 4
 
 88 
 
 to the derision which it deserved, to separate 
 it completely from the innocence of the mis- 
 fortune. 
 
 But the true cause of the great pains that 
 were taken to misrepresent this expression is to 
 be found in the desire to lower as much as 
 possible the character of a man whose unan- 
 swerable expositions of the effects which must 
 inevitably ensue from the following of the sug- 
 gestions of the Radicals presented the greatest 
 obstacles to their adoption. To lessen, there- 
 fore, the value of his opinions, by degrading his 
 character, was the reason why the meaning of 
 the expression was so maliciously and perse- 
 veringly misinterpreted. The same motive 
 operated to produce similar conduct with re- 
 spect to his Lisbon Embassy, — the latter was 
 the pecuniary job, the former the unfeeling jest, 
 of a man of the most unbounded liberality, and 
 the tenderest heart. But his real crime was his 
 love for the constitution of his country, and the 
 greatness of his talents to defend it. When 
 insidious schemes were brought forward to de- 
 stroy it, under the pretence of improving it, he 
 showed their fallacy, and laid bare their ten- 
 dency. When the hands of the Executive were 
 strengthened with extraordinary powers, he 
 proved that these powers were used for, and not 
 against, the people. When restrictive laws were 
 enacted, he satisfied the nation of their utility,
 
 89 
 
 and caused the better part to look upon them 
 in their true light, as protective and not sub- 
 versive of their liberties. 
 
 The passing of the Six Acts restored order, 
 confidence, and a reverence for the laws through- 
 out the nation; but if they extinguished the 
 hopes, it cannot be supposed that they at the 
 same time changed the feelings and opinions of 
 the radical reformers. 
 
 The disappointment, indeed, of a few of the 
 most desperate amongst them showed itself 
 in a still more daring and criminal enterprise 
 than any that had apparently ever been con- 
 templated. About a dozen of them entered into 
 a conspiracy to murder the whole of the Cabinet 
 Ministers when assembled at dinner at the house 
 of the Lord President of the Council. Through 
 the disclosure of an individual who was privy 
 to the plot, the whole gang were arrested just 
 before they were about to commence their bloody 
 operations ; and six of them paid shortly after the 
 extreme penalty of the law. The fact, however, 
 of any men being found hardy enough to en- 
 gage in so dangerous an enterprise was sufficient 
 evidence, that had they but succeeded in their 
 venturous task there would not have been want- 
 ing others who would have joined them, in their 
 ulterior views. 
 
 A short time before the discovery of this con- 
 spiracy, George the Third died. His succes- 
 vol. i. * g 5
 
 90 
 
 sor having so long held the reins of power, the 
 change in the situation of the latter personage 
 was more nominal than real. But such was not 
 the case with the Princess of Wales, who, in at- 
 taining the rank of Queen, acquired rights and 
 privileges, which hitherto she had not enjoyed. 
 
 The conduct, under all the circumstances of 
 this case, which it would have been wise for the 
 Ministers to pursue, was obvious. On the one 
 hand, the Prince of Wales, before his Consort 
 went abroad, had declared his fixed determination 
 never again to meet her either in publick, or 
 in private. On the other hand, Her Royal 
 Highness had led, during her absence from Eng- 
 land, a life of great indecorum and reported 
 profligacy ; of this the Ministers were not ig- 
 norant. That the Princess of Wales had been 
 in the habit of treating an individual, who had 
 been her servant, on a footing of perfect 
 equality, was a matter of publick notoriety in 
 Italy ; nor was Her behaviour towards him such 
 as to indicate that she thought concealment ne- 
 cessary, or desirable. The Ministers, therefore, 
 knowing how she had conducted herself) held 
 her return to England to be an event wholly 
 out of the question. This view of the matter 
 unfortunately lulled them into a state of false 
 security, and prevented the adoption of the 
 prudent course of leaving no effort untried 
 to induce Her Majesty to remain abroad.
 
 91 
 
 To keep her abroad was, in point of fact, their 
 wish. But unluckily they were so strongly 
 impressed with the idea that her return was 
 impossible, that they did not act with that 
 caution which probably they would have done 
 had they, for one instant, contemplated its 
 possibility. 
 
 Her Majesty's arrival in England, conse- 
 quently took the Ministers completely by surprise. 
 Things, however, were then gone too far for them 
 to hesitate. The manner in which she had been 
 treated could only be defended by the establish- 
 ment of her guilt. The Opposition were clamo- 
 rous that she should be considered as innocent 
 until she was proved to be guilty ; and the fact 
 of her return necessarily brought the question 
 to issue. For the Government to act towards 
 her as if she were blameless, when they felt con- 
 vinced that she was guilty, and believed that 
 they had the means of establishing the fact by 
 legal proofs, would neither have been a safe or a 
 justifiable course ; and for them to have treated 
 her as guilty without enquiry, was a still more 
 preposterous alternative. 
 
 From the very first instant of her setting her 
 foot in England, she became (as was to have 
 been expected) the rallying point for the dis- 
 affected. But besides this class of individuals, 
 which the events of the preceding years proved
 
 92 
 
 to have been very numerous, and who one and 
 all espoused the Queen's cause, for no other 
 reason than because it was against the King; 
 and the Government, there were vast numbers, 
 who, although firmly attached to the Con- 
 stitution, looked upon the Queen with com- 
 passion, and thought that she was entitled to ex- 
 emption from punishment. Certain it is that 
 there never was a period in the history of the 
 country when the public mind was worked up 
 to a greater degree of excitement than it was on 
 this occasion ; and it is to be lamented, that the 
 question should have been brought to that state, 
 in which it was equally dangerous either to 
 advance, or to recede. 
 
 For the Ministers themselves nothing was left 
 but to go on, and that, fearlessly, and without 
 delay. And accordingly, two days after Her 
 Majesty's arrival, a message from the King was 
 sent down to Parliament, accompanied by a 
 green bag, the contents of which were to be 
 submitted to a secret committee, to report to the 
 two Houses whether there were not grounds for 
 further proceedings against the Queen. 
 
 The House of Commons, however, showed 
 the greatest unwillingness to open the green 
 bag; and on Lord Castlereagh's proposing to 
 refer the bag to a secret committee, Mr. Wilber- 
 force moved, that the debate should be delayed ; 
 which motion, from the manner in which it was
 
 93 
 
 received by the House, the ministers judged it 
 expedient not to resist. A delay being thus 
 agreed upon, negotiations were entered into to 
 adjust the differences. 
 
 They, however, failed in their object ; Her 
 Majesty's legal advisers insisting, either on the 
 restoration of her name to the Liturgy, or an 
 introduction to the court of the Foreign Sove- 
 reign in whose dominions she might fix her 
 residence. Both these alternatives being re- 
 jected, the negotiations were broken off. Still, 
 however, Mr. Wilberforce would not relax in 
 his virtuous efforts to spare the morals of the 
 country, and the dignity of the crown, from the 
 pollution of such an investigation. An address 
 to Her Majesty, moved by that gentleman, im- 
 ploring her to give up the point of the Liturgy, 
 and to assure her that her so doing would not 
 be considered as reflecting upon her honour or 
 character, was carried by an immense majority, 
 and was presented to her by a deputation of 
 the House of Commons on the following day. 
 It did not, however, produce the desired effect ; 
 and all hopes of averting the evil being extin- 
 guished, the green bag was referred to secret 
 committees of both Houses of Parliament. 
 
 In consequence of the report of these com- 
 mittees, a bill of Pains and Penalties was in- 
 troduced into the House of Lords by Lord 
 Liverpool j and, as is well known, after a mass
 
 94 
 
 of evidence both for and against it had been 
 gone through, it was withdrawn in its last stage, 
 owing to the smallness of the majority by which 
 its third reading passed. 
 
 Of the evidence that was produced it will be 
 sufficient to say, that while it was difficult for 
 any unprejudiced mind to have examined it 
 without a moral conviction that the Queen was, 
 at some time or other, guilty of the adultery ; 
 so, on the other hand, the character of the wit- 
 nesses was damaged to that degree, that no 
 conscientious juryman could have considered 
 the crime as legally proved, beyond the possi- 
 bility of doubt. 
 
 The way in which the business terminated was 
 most fortunate for the Administration. While the 
 majority of the House of Lords absolved them 
 from having brought forward the charges without 
 sufficient grounds, the smallness of that majority 
 served them with a pretext for not sending down 
 the bill to the lower House of Parliament, where, 
 had it once been introduced, no one could have 
 ventured to have predicted what consequences 
 might have resulted, from keeping the people 
 in a continued state of excitement, by any fur- 
 ther proceedings ; and those proceedings to be 
 carried on in such an assembly as the House of 
 Commons. It was no doubt feelings of this 
 nature that induced many of the Peers to vote 
 against the bill.
 
 95 
 
 The failure of the measure was hailed as a 
 triumph by the Queen's party, and gave rise 
 to great demonstrations of joy throughout every 
 part of the United Kingdom. 
 
 Mr. Canning's conduct during these trans- 
 actions is well known. He acted with the Ca- 
 binet so long as any hope remained of averting 
 proceedings against Her Majesty, in which he 
 declared his resolution to take no part, both to 
 his colleagues before Her Majesty's return, and 
 to the House of Commons, in the very first 
 speech that he made upon the subject. It was 
 not, however, till all " hope of an amicable ad- 
 justment was finally extinguished, that he 
 " tendered the resignation of his office. Till 
 " then, he thought his continuance in the ad- 
 " ministration might have been advantageous." 
 The King, however, refused to accept the re- 
 signation, and gave Mr. Canning full permission 
 to withdraw entirely from any share in the mea- 
 sures to be adopted against the Queen. If it is 
 asked why he did not insist on the acceptance 
 of his resignation, the answer is, that other in- 
 terests besides Her Majesty's were at stake, and 
 believing, as he did, that the investigation then 
 was unavoidable, and likewise being convinced 
 that it would be most disastrous to the country 
 and to the King, and that it would give such 
 a fulcrum to the Radicals, on which to rest 
 their lever to overthrow the Constitution, he
 
 96 
 
 thought that, consistently with his duty and his 
 principles, he ought not to make that which was 
 at once inevitable, and dangerous, still more 
 dangerous, by insisting on the acceptance of his 
 resignation, when all personal reasons were ob- 
 viated by the parties to whom he tendered it. 
 Accordingly he left England, and " abstained 
 " entirely from all interference on the subject of 
 " the Queen's affairs." 
 
 When, however, after the trial was over, and 
 the danger from it had gone by, the " new state 
 " in which he found those affairs upon his return 
 " to England" induced him again to tender his 
 resignation. " For a minister to absent himself 
 " altogether from the expected discussions on 
 " that subject, intermixed as they were likely to 
 " be with the general business of the session, 
 " appeared to him quite impossible. To be 
 " present as a minister, taking no part in those 
 " discussions, could only have been productive 
 " of embarrassment to himself and of perplexity 
 " to his colleagues. To take any part in them, 
 " was then, as always, out of the question. 
 
 " Offering, therefore, to resign, was the only 
 " remedy for these difficulties ;" and the motives 
 which before had dictated the rejection of that 
 offer no longer existing, His Majesty was 
 graciously pleased to accept his resignation. 
 
 It was no sooner known at the India House 
 that Mr. Canning had resigned the Presidency
 
 97 
 
 of the Board of Control, than the Court of 
 Directors unanimously caused to be conveyed 
 to him " the expression of their deep regret at 
 his retirement, and the sincere respect wit'/ 
 which they had been impressed by the able, 
 upright, and conciliatory manner in which he 
 "had discharged the duties of his office." — 
 " The functions of the Board over which he 
 " had presided for a period of nearly five years 
 " had been exercised," they said, " with so 
 " much candour and courtesy, as well as with 
 " such invariable attention to the interests both 
 " of the publick and the Company, that they had 
 " been almost entirely divested of the invidious 
 " character, which must ever, in some degree, 
 " attach to a controlling Board." 
 
 But this was not the only testimony of grati- 
 tude that he received from the East India 
 Company : for, at a special Court of Proprietors, 
 a resolution was carried, expressive of the cordial 
 concurrence of the proprietors in the sentiments 
 expressed by the Court of Directors. 
 
 These two proceedings are without example 
 in the history of the Company. 
 
 Immediately after the Queen's trial was over, 
 Parliament was prorogued. Before it met again, 
 on the following year, meetings in all parts of 
 the country passed resolutions, or voted petitions, 
 condemnatory of Ministers, with respect to their 
 treatment of the Queen. Counter addresses 
 
 VOL. I. H
 
 98 
 
 were likewise got up, and meetings held on the 
 side of the x^dministration, but they chiefly con- 
 tented themselves with condemning the violent 
 and revolutionary spirit of the opposite party, and 
 rarely, if ever, dropped an expression laudatory 
 of the course adopted by the ministry in the 
 late unhappy investigation. 
 
 If there had been a party in the State, in 
 whom the country had reposed confidence, to 
 succeed those, it is very probable that they 
 would not have been able to have preserved 
 their places. But it so happened that the Whigs, 
 from having joined the Reformers, were little 
 trusted by the mass of the people of property 
 and influence ; the great majority of which 
 latter class would have dreaded, as the worst 
 extremity possible, the introduction of men into 
 power, many of whom were pledged to en- 
 deavour to carry a measure which was looked 
 upon as tending to the subversion of the Con- 
 stitution. Still, however, the whole business of 
 the Queen's trial afforded ample opportunity for 
 attack; and when Parliament met, several motions 
 on the subject were brought forward, which, 
 however, were negatived by large majorities. 
 
 The truth was, there was nothing in Her 
 Majesty's character to excite either respect, 
 enthusiasm, or even approbation j and from the 
 moment that, by the withdrawal of the bill
 
 99 
 
 against her, she ceased to be a victim, from that 
 moment her popularity began to decline. 
 
 The mortifications to which she was exposed 
 in attempting to preserve it, were, some of them, 
 of the most painful description ; and her abortive 
 attempt to be present at the Coronation, or to 
 create confusion, during the ceremonial, excited 
 the pity, indeed, of the spectators, but not their 
 sympathy. 
 
 The Queen herself deeply felt her altered 
 situation ; and it no doubt contributed to ac- 
 celerate the termination of her existence, and 
 to make her neglect, till too late, the remedies 
 necessary to preserve a life which she hardly 
 felt desirous of prolonging. 
 
 The suddenness of her death again called 
 forth sentiments of the deepest commiseration. 
 Her misfortunes were then alone remembered ; 
 and the people manifested their lively sorrow by 
 attending in multitudes her Funeral procession. 
 
 Unluckily, from an error in judgment, the Go- 
 vernment decided that it should not be allowed 
 to pass through the City, at the entrance of 
 which the Lord Mayor and Corporation had 
 intended to join the procession. So soon as 
 this decision became known, the most violent 
 indignation was excited ; and the mournful 
 pageant was accompanied, in its progress through 
 the metropolis, by enormous crowds, who created 
 very serious tumult and disorder. 
 
 vol. r. * h 2
 
 IOC) 
 
 In the course of the ensuing Session of Par- 
 liament the Ministers were more than once left 
 in a minority. The distress of the agricultural 
 classes produced the loudest clamours for eco- 
 nomy and retrenchment ; and although the 
 Ministry did all in their power to satisfy reason- 
 able expectations, yet, of course, in the eyes 
 of those whose business it was to be dissatis- 
 fied whatever retrenchments might be made, 
 enough was not done, and complaints on this 
 head afforded unceasing topicks for declamation. 
 Some of the efforts to embarrass the Ministry 
 were successful : thus a small majority was 
 obtained against the malt tax ; which vote, 
 however, was set aside two days after, by a 
 large majority. 
 
 When, however, the Government was outvoted 
 on the agricultural horse tax, it was not judged 
 expedient to attempt to reverse the decision. 
 
 On both these occasions many of the country 
 gentlemen swelled the lists of the majority : 
 smarting under the pressure of the times, 
 they were apt, like all in similar situations, 
 to listen to those who professed to be able 
 at once to point out to them the cause and 
 prescribe the remedy of the peculiar evils 
 under which they laboured. They therefore 
 acquiesced in the truth of the proposition 
 that the depression of agriculture was exclu- 
 sively owing to taxation ; the inaccuracy of 
 which assertion may be considered as proved
 
 101 
 
 by the fact, that the evils complained of have 
 diminished, in a far greater proportion than the 
 taxes. 
 
 The true causes, indeed, of those evils are to 
 be found in the low prices produced by the 
 great excess of supply occasioned by the Corn 
 Bill, and the increased value of money in every 
 part of the world. 
 
 These defeats which the Ministers had suffered 
 made them anxious to increase in the House of 
 Commons their strength, which had been much 
 weakened by the loss of Mr. Canning's sound 
 reasoning and eloquence, which had so often 
 secured them victory, and checked, by a salutary 
 awe, the vehement language of their most for- 
 midable opponents. 
 
 At the close of the session, therefore, Lord 
 Sidmouth resigned the Home Secretaryship of 
 State, and was succeeded in it by Mr. Peel, who 
 brought with him considerable talents ; and from 
 not having been connected with the Government 
 during the trial of the Queen, was free from the 
 unpopularity which had attached itself to all 
 those who had taken part in her prosecution. 
 
 Mr. Peel was the best substitute for Mr. Can- 
 ning that the Government could have pro- 
 cured. The latter had taken but a small part 
 in the business of the Session ; and with the ex- 
 ception of a speech on the affairs of Naples, 
 condemnatory of the policy of the Opposition, 
 
 h 3
 
 102 
 
 he only spoke on the subject of Catholick Eman- 
 cipation. A bill introduced by Mr. Plunket 
 granting that boon passed the House of Com- 
 mons, which was the first occasion on which 
 any bill with those provisions ever received the 
 sanction of either House of Parliament. 
 
 It was rejected in the Lords by a considerable 
 majority ; but, upon the whole, the question 
 seemed to have made considerable progress ; and 
 the appointment of the Marquess Wellesley as 
 Lord Lieutenant, and His Majesty's visit to 
 Ireland before the close of the year, contributed 
 to excite the sanguine hopes of the friends of 
 the measure that the time was not far distant 
 when this fertile source of contention would be 
 set at rest for ever. 
 
 Notwithstanding Mr. Peel's accession to the 
 Ministry, there can be no doubt but that the 
 head of it would have been too glad to have 
 again had the benefit of Mr. Canning's coun- 
 tenance and counsels ; and since the Queen's 
 affairs could no longer afford matter for dis- 
 cussion, it was supposed by many that Mr. 
 Canning would have rejoined the Administration. 
 Whether there would not have been insur- 
 mountable obstacles to his so doing, from the 
 course of our foreign policy, as well as from 
 other considerations, it is needless here to dis- 
 cuss, as no positive offer was made to him. 
 
 But the reason that prevented an offer being
 
 103 
 
 made to him was, as is well known, the feelings 
 of alienation entertained towards him by the 
 highest personage in the realm ; who had then 
 formed a determination that he should not again 
 be invited to become a member of the Cabinet. 
 These sentiments were strengthened by the con- 
 viction, which His Majesty entertained, that the 
 Ministry, as it was then constituted, was well 
 able to carry on the Government of the country ; 
 a conviction which was further confirmed by the 
 return of the people to those feelings of loyal 
 attachment to His Person, which, during the life 
 of the Queen, had been for a time suspended. 
 For the restoration of employment to the manu- 
 facturing districts, where, when distress exists, 
 from the population being more concentrated, 
 the cries of discontent are generally the loudest, 
 prevented any of those alarming indications of 
 disaffection which in preceding years had agitated 
 the British portion of the United Kingdom. 
 
 The continued low price of agricultural pro- 
 duce, however, still pressed heavily upon that 
 important interest ; but the sufferers of this class 
 were of a different description, and their suf- 
 ferings less acute. 
 
 When distress prevails amongst the manu- 
 facturers, thousands of labourers, all perhaps be- 
 longing to a single parish, are sometimes thrown 
 out of employ, and fall into a state of all but 
 actual starvation, from their numbers being too 
 
 h 4
 
 104 
 
 large to admit of their distress being sufficiently 
 relieved by parochial aid. On the other hand, 
 the agricultural labourers being dispersed over 
 the face of the country, the supply of their wants 
 is the more easy, because those on whom it falls 
 are more numerous, and in the aggregate more 
 wealthy. 
 
 True it is that agricultural labourers have to 
 endure privations in common with the manu- 
 facturers, but then a certain number must always 
 be employed, if the land is to be cultivated, 
 while a master manufacturer stops all his works 
 at once, and the whole, not a part, of the artizans 
 engaged in them are discharged, and sent forth 
 to cabal together, and brood over their mis- 
 fortunes. Hence stagnation in manufactures 
 has often produced a greater show of discontent 
 than perhaps an equal quantity of misery dis- 
 persed amongst the agricultural population. 
 
 Towards the end, therefore, of the year 1821, 
 and beginning of 1822, though the agricultural 
 interests were grievously depressed, yet there 
 was by no means that spirit of disloyalty mani- 
 fested, which had been the characteristick of 
 some former years, although the cry for Re- 
 form was raised by the agriculturists, which had 
 been the rallying cry of the manufacturers, who 
 had previously passed through a similar ordeal. 
 The meetings, called to consider of the distress, 
 generally ended by passing resolutions in favour
 
 105 
 
 of Reform ; and some of them, on the suggestions 
 of Mr. Cobbett, who went about from meeting 
 to meeting to propagate his own hatred of the 
 fundholders, or, as he called them, the " Fund 
 " Lords," recommended an " equitable adjust- 
 " ment;" or, in other words, a spoliation of one 
 species of property for the supposed benefit of 
 another. 
 
 The continuance of these embarrassments was 
 one of the first subjects that occupied the atten- 
 tion of Parliament after its assembling. 
 
 The topic was mentioned in the Speech 
 from the Throne, and debates took place on 
 every question, that could by possibility be sup- 
 posed, however remotely, to affect it. Tax- 
 ation, Currency, Corn Laws, Sinking Fund, 
 and Parliamentary Reform, each in their turn 
 came under discussion, but without producing 
 any practical result. Each member appeared to 
 think that his own particular plan, be it what 
 it might, would prove beneficial, if adopted, 
 to the agriculturists. And some curious doc- 
 trines on political economy (such as making 
 wheat the standard for money), which had 
 never before been broached, and which have 
 not since been attempted to be revived, were 
 gravely propounded by some Members for the 
 consideration and approval of the Legislature. 
 
 The question next in interest to this of agri- 
 vol. i. * h 5
 
 106 
 
 culture was the state of Ireland, where a spirit 
 of systematic outrage prevailed, to repress which, 
 the Executive Government of that Island re- 
 quired to be armed with extraordinary powers. 
 
 The insurrection act was re-enacted, and by 
 means of it the scenes of violence, by which the 
 southern provinces had been disgraced, were in 
 a great degree arrested. 
 
 Nothing was done this Session to carry the 
 great question, on which the peace of that un- 
 happy country so essentially depended. But Mr. 
 Canning made an effort to advance the cause, by 
 bringing in a bill to enable the Catholick Peers to 
 sit in the Upper House of Parliament, which, 
 however, like the more comprehensive measure 
 of the preceding year, after having passed the 
 Commons, received its death-blow in the Lords. 
 
 A few days before he introduced this measure, 
 he had made another eloquent speech pointing 
 out the dangers of Radical Reform, which 
 question had been again brought forward in the 
 House of Commons. 
 
 At the time when these two speeches were 
 delivered by him, he, in common with the rest 
 of the world, believed that they were the last, 
 at any rate for a great length of time, that it 
 would fall to his lot to make. From the cir- 
 cumstances already mentioned, he had given up 
 all idea of holding office in England. He was 
 (as is now known) straitened in his pecuniary
 
 107 
 
 affairs : the Presidentship of the Board of Con- 
 trol had given him an insight, and an interest in 
 the affairs of India ; and the experience that the 
 Directors had acquired of him during the time 
 that he held that office, made them anxiously 
 desire that lie should undertake the high and 
 arduous post of Governor General of their vast 
 possessions. When, therefore, the proposition 
 was made to him by the Court of Directors, lie 
 had not much difficulty in deciding ; and shortly 
 after the commencement of the session of 1822, 
 it was announced that he was to be the successor 
 of Lord Hastings. 
 
 The idea that the country was about to lose 
 his services at home, gave a peculiar zest to 
 what were then considered as his parting ad- 
 monitions ; and while it cannot be denied that 
 there were some in opposite extremes, (the ultra- 
 Tories who hated him for his liberality, and the 
 Radicals who dreaded his opposition,) who re- 
 joiced at the prospect of his approaching de- 
 parture ; there were others, and those the most 
 numerous, who sincerely regretted it. 
 
 Mr. Canning was to have left England early 
 in November. All his preparations were made : 
 when the unexpected death of Lord London- 
 derry, which took place on the 12th of August, 
 seemed likely to be an impediment to the ful- 
 filment of his intentions. No sooner was the 
 catastrophe announced to the world, than all
 
 108 
 
 eyes turned on Mr. Canning as the man to whom 
 the future guidance of the Empire ought to be 
 intrusted. 
 
 But, although Mr. Canning was at once pro- 
 claimed the successor of the deceased Minister 
 by the voice of the nation, its rulers did not seem 
 so prompt in coming to the same decision. At 
 the period when Lord Londonderry died, the 
 King was on his way to Scotland : Mr. Canning 
 was on his road to Liverpool, to take leave of his 
 constituents. The fatal event made no change 
 in Mr. Canning's plans ; for, notwithstanding 
 that rumours of the most positive kind were 
 afloat, he himself, perhaps, felt less certain than 
 any other man in the kingdom, and, undoubtedly, 
 was as little desirous as any, that a change should 
 be made in his destination. 
 
 He, therefore, neither delayed his visit to 
 Liverpool, nor ceased to avow that it was in- 
 tended as a farewell. 
 
 For the long space of ten years he had been 
 the popular Representative of that vast commer- 
 cial place. Without any efforts of himselfj or 
 his friends, and personally unknown to all but 
 two or three of the gentlemen who signed the 
 requisition, he was invited, at the Dissolution of 
 Parliament in 1812, by some of the principal in- 
 habitants of Liverpool, to become a candidate 
 for the representation of their Borough. He 
 at once acceded to the flattering proposal ; and
 
 109 
 
 after a severe contest (with Mr. Brougham for 
 one of his opponents) he was placed at the head 
 of the poll by a triumphant majority. The at- 
 tention which he paid to the interests of the 
 Town and its inhabitants, after he became their 
 member, considerably augmented his popularity, 
 which a visit in 1814, when he delivered one of 
 his most splendid orations, served only to in- 
 crease. In 1816 he was re-elected, having 
 vacated his seat by accepting the Presidency of 
 the Board of Control. On this occasion a sham 
 contest was got up by his opponents, who pro- 
 posed a gentleman of great respectability, in spite 
 of that gentleman's expressed determination, that 
 he would not take his seat, even in the event of 
 his return. 
 
 There was more of virulence shown on this 
 occasion than during the first election ; for the 
 truth was, at Liverpool, as elsewhere, Mr. Can- 
 ning's enemies had been zealously at work to mis- 
 represent him; and the calumnies which were cir- 
 culated on the subject of his Embassy to Lisbon 
 had not been altogether without their effect. 
 
 In the summer of 1818, Parliament had been 
 dissolved, and he again had to meet his Con- 
 stituents. During the interval that had elapsed 
 between this and the preceding election, he had 
 been chiefly occupied in taking an active part 
 against the Reformers. 
 
 Reform, indeed, at this period, was an all- 
 vol. i. * h 7
 
 110 
 
 absorbing question ; and certain it is, that He 
 conscientiously entertained the opinion, whether 
 that opinion was wrong or right, that during the 
 years 1816, 1817, 1818, and 1819, this country 
 passed through a crisis, which, had not the de- 
 cided and vigorous conduct of the Executive 
 Government been backed by the support of the 
 Legislature, would have ended in the total over- 
 throw of the whole fabrick of the Constitution. 
 Accordingly, the burden of all his speeches at 
 this election consisted in arguments against 
 Radical Reform, which he showed must inevita- 
 bly end in revolution. It was on one of these 
 occasions that he pronounced the ablest and 
 most conclusive speech that he ever uttered 
 against these sweeping changes in our consti- 
 tutional system. 
 
 Lord Sefton and General Gascoigne were the 
 other candidates; and the history of the contest 
 affords a curious specimen of electioneering 
 tacticks. On the eighth day, Lord Sefton re- 
 tired, and Mr. Canning's return was secured by 
 a large majority. 
 
 In 1820, when, in consequence of the deatli 
 of George the Third, Parliament was dissolved, 
 Mr. Canning was returned for the fourth and 
 last time for Liverpool, by a still larger majority 
 than had ever before placed him at the head of 
 the poll. His antagonist on this occasion had 
 no particular merit save that of being a Radical
 
 1 11 
 
 Reformer, and never had the most remote 
 chance of success. 
 
 It was about a year and a half after this 
 election, that, having accepted the office of Go- 
 vernor General of India, he arrived once more 
 at Liverpool, for any thing that he knew to the 
 contrary, for the last time, if not in his life, at 
 any rate until such a portion of it had been 
 consumed as would have been sufficient to have 
 severed for ever the connexion which then ex- 
 isted between himself and his constituents. 
 
 On the 23d of August he dined with the Can- 
 ning Club ; on which occasion he took the oppor- 
 tunity of recommending to the agricultural 
 classes "to practise that same degree of patience 
 " which had been generally displayed by those 
 " beneath them," when they had to endure 
 privations. 
 
 It was not, however, until the 30th of that 
 month that the grand festival was prepared for 
 him in the great room of the Lyceum ; on which 
 occasion upwards of 500 of his friends sat down 
 to dinner. - 
 
 In the morning of that clay, he had received 
 the most gratifying proofs of the respect and 
 attachment of the inhabitants. 
 
 An address, praising his conduct, and thanking 
 him for his services, was presented to him, after 
 it had been "approved and sanctioned by the 
 " unanimous votes of all the mercantile asso-
 
 112 
 
 " ciations in Liverpool:" amongst whom were 
 to be found all parties in politicks. 
 
 It was, therefore, with feelings of no common 
 joy and exultation, that, when addressing his 
 audience at the dinner, he was enabled to say 
 that " he stood in the peculiar circumstances 
 " of not knowing that he had amongst his 
 " constituents, at that moment, even one poli- 
 " tical enemy." 
 
 Mr. Canning's speech related to three dif- 
 ferent topicks. The first was Catholick Eman- 
 cipation j the second, Reform ; and the third 
 had reference to those reports already men- 
 tioned, that he was to be the successor of Lord 
 Londonderry. Under the second of these 
 heads, Mr. Canning, with his usual clearness of 
 demonstration, again showed that the doctrines 
 of the Reformers went not to an alteration, but 
 to a positive subversion of the Constitution. 
 
 On the subject of Emancipation, he said, that, 
 " after the experience of a fruitless struggle of 
 " more than ten years, as an individual, he 
 " should be induced thenceforth, or perhaps 
 " after one more general trial, to seek upon that 
 " question a liberal compromise, rather than 
 " persevere in fighting, perhaps ten years more, 
 " in vain, for unqualified concession." 
 
 This avowal was subsequently represented by 
 Mr. Canning's enemies as an abandonment, on 
 his part, of the Catholicks, and as having been
 
 113 
 
 made for the base purpose of facilitating his 
 entrance into office, for which the opening was 
 then apparently already made ; but with what 
 justice such a charge was brought against him, 
 may be decided by considering the whole tenour 
 of his conduct, from first to last, on this im- 
 portant question. 
 
 So long as George the Third was in possession 
 of his mental faculties, Mr. Canning, following 
 the example of Mr. Pitt, on his return to office, 
 opposed the Catholick claims, both out of respect 
 to the prejudices, or the scruples, of that good 
 and venerable monarch, and a dread of the 
 danger which might accrue to the country, 
 should the highest estate in the realm be at 
 variance with the others. 
 
 As soon, however, as the Regency was estab- 
 lished, Mr. Canning took the earliest opportunity 
 of declaring himself in favour of concession ; 
 and in support of the Catholick cause, in 1812, 
 he declined office (as has already been stated), 
 because the then existing Administration resisted 
 all deliberation upon the subject. 
 
 At that particular moment he considered 
 the question as one of the most pressing ur- 
 gency. Great Britain was then engaged in a 
 war, requiring unexampled exertion, the result 
 of which it was impossible with any certainty to 
 predict. 
 
 The very salvation of her independence might 
 
 VOL. I. I
 
 114 
 
 have turned upon the settlement of the Catholick 
 claims. He, therefore, refused to belong to a 
 government which was determined " to resist," 
 as a government, " all consideration" of the 
 state of those claims. And, when the task of 
 forming an administration devolved upon him, 
 in conjunction with Lord Wellesley, the prin- 
 ciple first mentioned of those " on which the 
 administration was intended to be formed" was 
 stated to be, the taking the Catholick question 
 into immediate consideration, with a view to its 
 settlement. 
 
 To further this same settlement, in June of 
 the same year, he himself brought forward a 
 resolution pledging the House of Commons to 
 take " into its consideration the state of the 
 " Catholick question, with a view to a final and 
 " conciliatory adjustment of it." 
 
 The resolution was adopted by a majority of 
 125. And, in the following session, a bill grant- 
 ing Emancipation was broughtin by Mr. Grattan, 
 which passed through its first and second stages 
 with majorities of about 40. 
 
 On its being committed, Mr. Abbott, who 
 was at that time Speaker of the House of Com- 
 mons, spoke against the measure, and moved, 
 (for the purpose of insuring its rejection) that 
 the clause by which Catholicks were enabled to 
 sit in parliament should be omitted. The Speaker 
 triumphed, the omission of the clause being car-
 
 115 
 
 ried by a majority of four ; and, as the admis- 
 sion to seats in the legislature was the boon above 
 all others to which the Catholicks looked, the 
 friends of emancipation, finding that the one 
 thing most desired was refused, abandoned al- 
 together the bill. 
 
 From the abandonment of this bill to the year 
 1821, the Catholick cause did not prosper in the 
 House of Commons ; probably from its sup- 
 porters feeling, that in the altered condition of 
 the world, the prosperity of the Empire was no 
 longer involved so deeply as it was in 1813 in 
 its being brought to an immediate termination. 
 Still, however, efforts were almost yearly made 
 to induce the legislature to concede the ques- 
 tion, and to restore, or rather to give for the 
 first time, tranquillity to Ireland. On all these 
 occasions Mr. Canning zealously exerted him- 
 self in support of whatever measures were pro- 
 posed ; but in the course of that period, from 
 the change as well in the temper of the publick 
 mind as in the position of the country, his opi- 
 nions became somewhat modified, — not, how- 
 ever, with respect to the expediency, safety, or 
 justice, but with respect to the possibility of 
 obtaining unqualified concession. 
 
 In 1812, when fighting for our existence, he 
 thought that the determination on the part of 
 the government to " resist all consideration" of 
 the question was fraught with imminent danger 
 
 i 2
 
 116 
 
 to the country. The obstacle, during the ex- 
 istence of which the Catholicks had been con- 
 tented to forbear, was then withdrawn. They 
 had well known the scruples of the King, and 
 were not unaware of the firm pertinacity with 
 which he adhered to the dictates of his con- 
 science. The larger and better portion of them 
 therefore had been willing to leave undisturbed 
 the few years which yet remained to a sovereign 
 under whose mild sway their condition had been 
 so considerably ameliorated. But when the 
 King ceased to be an obstacle, a refusal even 
 to "consider" of concession became peculiarly 
 galling. 
 
 So long as there existed for that refusal a 
 reason which was limited in its duration, so long 
 the Catholicks might have been content patiently 
 to wait for its extinction j but when every rea- 
 son urged for the continuance of their disabilities 
 was eternal in its operation, the period of their 
 degradation seemed to be indefinitely prolonged, 
 and thus to the pangs of disappointment was 
 added the bitterness of despair. 
 
 Mr. Canning, therefore, then held that the 
 resolution of the government to resist all con- 
 sideration was headstrong, and that it would be 
 highly desirable that concession should be im- 
 mediate. The House of Commons agreed with 
 him ; and it is very probable, that had not the 
 alarms of many been diminished by the war
 
 117 
 
 taking a favourable turn, the Catholick Question 
 Mould not have so long continued to agitate the 
 Empire, or cripple its resources. 
 
 As the fear of Buonaparte subsided, the dread 
 of the Pope arose ; and when Mr. Canning ac- 
 cepted office in 1816, the opinions of the great 
 mass of the population of England had become, 
 more than they had been, hostile to Eman- 
 cipation. 
 
 Mr. Canning perceived all the difficulties with 
 which the question was encompassed in con- 
 sequence of this change of sentiment; and since 
 the immediate urgency of it had gone by, he no 
 longer considered that it would be wise or po- 
 litick to do violence to the feelings of the people 
 of England by any extraordinary efforts to carry 
 Emancipation ; still less did he think that an 
 attempt on the part of the Cabinet to use the 
 influence of the Government for such a purpose 
 would be attended with success. 
 
 He thought that the question was one which 
 ought to " win, not force its way," and that, as 
 argument and sound reasoning were decidedly 
 in its favour, a temperate discussion of it was the 
 best means of insuring conversions. 
 
 In 1813, Mr. Canning was one of those who 
 acquiesced in the propriety of abandoning the 
 bill of that year when the Parliamentary clause 
 was thrown out. Since that period, however, he 
 frequently lamented his acquiesence. 
 
 i 3
 
 <( 
 
 a 
 
 118 
 
 In his speech in 1817 he said, " that for him- 
 " self, rather than, as in 1813, risk all, to obtain 
 " all, and throw away much, because all could 
 " not be secured,- he would be contented with 
 
 such a degree of concession as might be sanc- 
 « tioned by a tolerably general concurrence of 
 
 opinions." Again, in 1821, when Mr. Plunket 
 succeeded in carrying a bill for Emancipation 
 through the House of Commons, on its passing 
 through the committee, and Mr. Bankes (as 
 Mr. Abbott had done before) moving that the 
 Parliamentary clause in favour of the Catholicks 
 should be omitted, Mr. Canning took the op- 
 portunity of saying, that " he hoped that in 
 " whatever way the Committee might decide 
 " upon Mr. Bankes's motion, the progress of the 
 " bill would not be stopped." 
 
 It was in conformity with the opinion thus 
 expressed, that in the following year he himself 
 brought forward a bill to enable Roman Catholick 
 Peers to sit in the Upper House of Parliament. 
 There was something in their case which sepa- 
 rated it from that of the rest of their Catholick 
 brethren : they had been excluded by a more 
 recent act than that which had excluded Ca- 
 tholicks from the House of Commons; and they 
 were so limited in their numbers, that even the 
 most timorous opposers of their claims could 
 hardly fear the introduction, into the Legis- 
 lature, of seven men, yielding in loyalty and
 
 119 
 
 honour to no other seven men in the United 
 Kingdom. 
 
 Mr. Canning likewise felt confident, that the 
 admission of Catholicks into the Upper House 
 would go a great way towards dispelling' the 
 prejudices against their sitting in the Lower, 
 especially when it should have been discovered 
 that their votes and conduct were not influenced 
 by different motives from those of the Protestant 
 Peers. Besides, whatever diminished the quan- 
 tum that was left to be ultimately granted de- 
 stroyed a specifick ground of supposed danger, 
 and brought the question so much nearer to a 
 final adjustment. 
 
 It appears, therefore, that the view of the 
 question which he had for some time taken, was, 
 that the removal, step by step, of the remaining 
 disabilities would be the best, and perhaps the 
 surest, mode of eventually disposing of it. The 
 less the Catholicks had to ask, the less cause 
 of alarm was there to the Protestants on account 
 of what they would have to surrender. The 
 act, moreover, which was carried in 1817, by 
 which promotion in the Army and Navy was 
 opened to the Catholicks, served to strengthen 
 his opinions ; since this measure, which ten 
 years before had upset an Administration, was 
 actually passed, sub si lent io ! ! ! by the two 
 Houses of Parliament. 
 
 It was, therefore, in exact accordance with 
 
 i 4
 
 120 
 
 all his previously declared sentiments, sentiments 
 avowed at different times from 1817 downwards, 
 that in his parting speech at Liverpool he de- 
 clared, as an individual, that " next to the im- 
 " mediate success of the whole measure, which 
 " he had as much as ever at heart, he should 
 " wish, as well for the benefit of those most im- 
 " mediately concerned, as for the general peace 
 " of the kingdom, to see such an arrangement 
 " as should remove all practical cause of com- 
 " plaint on the one side, without inciting vague 
 " and indefinite apprehensions on the other ; 
 " referring to a more favourable opportunity, 
 " and to the progress of publick opinion, that 
 " complete and final settlement, of which he 
 " should never cease to .maintain the expediency 
 " as well as the justice.'* 
 
 If these opinions had then for the first time 
 been published by him, it must be confessed, 
 that, however pure his intentions might have 
 been, they would have been liable to a sus- 
 picion which nothing could clear away ; but 
 when, for upwards of five years, he is found pub- 
 lickly avowing the same sentiments, and when 
 only a few short months had elapsed since he 
 introduced a measure into Parliament in accord- 
 ance with them, it is quite obvious, that it was 
 most unjust to attribute conduct so open, and so 
 consistent, to base and unworthy motives. 
 
 The third topick of his speeches, which related
 
 121 
 
 to the rumours afloat respecting his being the 
 successor of Lord Londonderry, was the one of 
 the greatest delicacy. 
 
 On the one hand, so far from wishing to oc- 
 cupy the offices which had been filled by that 
 nobleman, he felt that, if a sense of duty com- 
 pelled him to accept any offer that might be 
 made to him, he could not do so without making 
 a great personal sacrifice. Had he proclaimed 
 his feelings, it would have been, of course, said, 
 that he was unnecessarily enhancing the value 
 of his services. On the other hand, the ex- 
 pression of any wish to obtain the vacant post, 
 even had he entertained it, would have been 
 instantly described as a greedy appetency for 
 office. 
 
 To have said nothing on the subject, after the 
 chairman had pointedly alluded to it, would 
 have been but an ill return to his constituents 
 for their unbounded confidence and attachment ; 
 and, moreover, would have made a needless and 
 therefore foolish mystery of the fact, that " he 
 " knew as little as any man that then listened to 
 " him of any arrangements likely to grow out 
 " of the existing state of things.'' 
 
 He therefore frankly avowed that " he had 
 " nothing either to tell or to conceal. 
 
 " He declined entering into any explanation 
 " as to what might be the decision which he 
 " might think it right to take," in the event of
 
 122 
 
 any offer being made to him : and contented 
 himself with " declaring that in any such case, 
 " his decision would be founded upon an honest 
 " and impartial view of publick considerations 
 " alone, and that it would be determined, not by 
 " a calculation of interests, but by a balance 
 " and comparison of duties." 
 
 Mr. Canning not only at this time (30th of 
 August) had received no communication from 
 the ministry, but he did not receive one until 
 nine days * more had elapsed ; and then it con- 
 tained no specifick proposition, but was confined 
 to the expression of a wish on the part of 
 Lord Liverpool to see Mr. Canning as soon as 
 possible. 
 
 The absence of the King in Scotland, and the 
 supposed repugnance both of His Majesty and 
 of some few members of the cabinet to Mr. 
 Canning's again becoming a member of it, are 
 reasons more than sufficient to account for the 
 delays. The observations in which the Lord 
 Chancellor had indulged, when he fancied that 
 Mr. Canning's departure for India was certain, 
 
 * A foolish story was inserted in the newspapers shortly 
 after Mr. Canning's death, giving an account of a convers- 
 ation which he was supposed to have held on the 30th of 
 August respecting an overture from the government, which 
 he was said to have received on that day. The whole story 
 is an invention. Mr. Canning received no communication 
 from any member of the government till ten days subsequent 
 to the 30th of August.
 
 123 
 
 leads to a supposition that that learned Lord was 
 one of the foremost in opposition ; since he could 
 not but feel a little awkward at the prospect of 
 Mr. Canning's again becoming his colleague in 
 the cabinet. 
 
 Lord Eldon, it is believed, was not without 
 coadjutors. 
 
 The firmness of Lord Liverpool, however, in 
 declaring his determination not to continue the 
 Premier, if he were not allowed to have the 
 aid of Mr. Canning's services, soon overcame 
 the objections of the dissentient Ministers. 
 
 The indisposition of the King to the arrange- 
 ment, however, still remained to be subdued. 
 
 In the accomplishment of this work, it is sup- 
 posed there was little difficulty. George the 
 Fourth, indeed, was by far too patriotick a 
 Prince, and too generous a Man, to allow his 
 own personal feelings to interfere with what 
 was essential to the interests of his Country. 
 All, therefore, that it was necessary to do was 
 to convince His Majesty that the publick weal 
 required the aid of Mr. Canning's services ; that 
 being done, His Majesty's resistance to the 
 arrangement immediately ceased. 
 
 It was on the 8th of September that Lord 
 Liverpool addressed a letter to Mr. Canning, 
 requesting to see him. Mr. Canning received 
 the letter at Birmingham on the 9th, and on the 
 11th he had an interview with Lord Liverpool.
 
 124 
 
 At that interview, the entirety of Lord London- 
 derry's succession was offered to Mr. Canning ; 
 but it was not without a conflict that he decided 
 to accept the offer. 
 
 It is strictly true, that in taking this resolution 
 he was exclusively influenced by the consider- 
 ation of what he conceived to be his duty. Had 
 he only consulted the dictates of his own in- 
 clination, his choice would, without doubt, have 
 fallen upon India. 
 
 On the one hand the rule over that mighty 
 Empire afforded to a mind, constituted like 
 Mr. Canning's, an inexhaustible source of sa- 
 tisfaction and delight. In whatever plans he 
 might have conceived for the amelioration of 
 the lot of the millions under his care, he was 
 sure not to have been thwarted either in their 
 adoption, or their execution. The prospect of 
 fame was before him, and he had the certainty 
 of repairing a fortune (not his own), which, by 
 the force of circumstances, he had been com- 
 pelled to injure. These were the allurements 
 which the government of India held out to 
 him, allurements peculiarly calculated to fasci- 
 nate a philosophical mind and an ambitious dis- 
 position. 
 
 On the other hand, if he accepted the Foreign 
 Secretaryship, he was sure to be in a situation of 
 extreme difficulty and annoyance. 
 
 In the Cabinet which he was about to join,
 
 125 
 
 there were certain members who on some sub- 
 jects held principles very different from his 
 own. 
 
 He was not supported by the personal favour 
 of the Sovereign. 
 
 If he found himself unable (as was far from 
 impossible) to direct the policy of the govern- 
 ment, he would be exposed to the alternative of 
 sacrificing, either his character, by remaining in 
 office, or his official existence (for which he was 
 to give up India) by resigning. 
 
 The Foreign Affairs of the country, for the 
 conduct of which he was to be more peculiarly 
 responsible, presented any thing but an inviting 
 aspect ; and although the glory of regaining for 
 Great Britain that moral influence in the scale 
 of nations, which she had lost, was perhaps the 
 fondest object of his ambition, yet he was very 
 sensible that he would have to encounter not 
 only difficulties abroad but vexation at home ; 
 that even were he to succeed to the utmost 
 extent of his hopes, in the nature of the service, 
 there was nothing which would be sufficiently 
 striking to dazzle by its brilliancy, or to enable 
 those employed in it to make a reputation. 
 
 The events which happen whilst nations are 
 at peace are very frequently not less important 
 to the happiness of mankind than those which 
 occur in time of war; but for the most part 
 they make less noise, are seldom even under-
 
 126 
 
 stood by any considerable portion of the people, 
 and, consequently, the actors in them are less 
 known. 
 
 After the unparalleled manner in which the 
 world had been so lately convulsed, little com- 
 parative honour was to be reaped from mingling, 
 however usefully, in the more insipid trans- 
 actions of succeeding times. " Ten years," said 
 Mr. Canning, in answer to a letter from an in- 
 timate friend, congratulating him on his acces- 
 sion to office, " have made a world of difference, 
 " and have prepared a very different sort of 
 " ' world to bustle in,' from that which I should 
 " have found in 1812. For fame, it is 'a 
 " * squeezed orange,' but for publick good, there 
 " is something to do, and I will try, but it must 
 " be, cautiously, to do it." 
 
 With feelings such as these, it is not extraor- 
 dinary that the temptations of an Indian reign 
 outweighed, in his estimation, those which were 
 presented to him by office in England. But 
 although he himself much preferred India, he 
 was still true to the principle by which on every 
 similar occasion he had been guided, that a 
 public man, unless he can show cause of honour 
 or duty to the contrary, is bound to accept any 
 trust which he is selected, as competent, to 
 administer for the general interest; and since he 
 could not conscientiously think that either ho- 
 nour or duty opposed themselves to his accept-
 
 127 
 
 ance of the offer which was made to him, he 
 decided that it was his duty not to decline it. 
 
 At the time of his junction with the Cabinet, 
 the majority of its members were Ultra Tories. 
 Its numbers amounted to thirteen, exclusive 
 of himself. Of these, the Ultra Toryism of 
 the Lord Chancellor, the Duke of Wellington, 
 Lords Bathurst, Westmorland, Maryborough, 
 and Sidmouth, and Mr. Vansittart, was (with 
 the exception of Lord Bathurst's sentiments 
 on colonial slavery) unqualified by liberal opi- 
 nions upon any subject whatever, of external 
 or internal policy. Lord Melville, exclusively 
 of his being in favour of the Catholick claims, 
 agreed with his Ultra Colleagues. Lord Liver- 
 pool was the exact converse of Lord Melville, 
 advocating liberal doctrines on every question 
 but that of Catholick Emancipation. Lord Har- 
 rowby, Mr. Robinson, and Mr. Wynne, were 
 anxious for concession to the Catholicks, and pro- 
 fessed on other points liberal opinions. Mr. Peel 
 held opinions nearer to those of his ultra, than 
 any other of his, colleagues, with a mind, how- 
 ever, open to conviction. 
 
 But although the Cabinet was thus divided, it 
 must not be supposed that no common bond of 
 union existed between the two parties, since they 
 were one and all united in opposing Reform, 
 and in describing themselves as the followers of 
 Mr. Pitt.
 
 128 
 
 In this latter point of union, however, there 
 was perhaps more of apparent than real concert, 
 since the Ultra Tories and Liberal Tories differed 
 widely in their interpretation of that Statesman's 
 principles. The liberal party took the Mr. Pitt 
 who lived previously to the French Revolution. 
 The ultra party took the Mr. Pitt who lived in 
 the time of that tremendous convulsion ; and 
 they argued that his conduct would have been 
 the same when the dangers of it were gone by 
 as it was during their continuance. 
 
 The three most influential members of this 
 Cabinet were Lord Liverpool, the Duke of Wel- 
 lington, and Mr. Peel. 
 
 Lord Liverpool was a man of very considerable 
 talent, sound judgment, and unflinching inte- 
 grity. By the mildness, yet firmness of his 
 character, he was peculiarly well fitted for keep- 
 ing together an administration, of which the 
 component parts held somewhat discordant opi- 
 nions. He was valuable to the Ultras, because 
 he was anti-Catholick. He was valuable to the 
 liberals, because he understood commercial prin- 
 ciples. To Mr. Canning he was every thing : 
 a personal friend, a warm admirer, a zealous 
 coadjutor, a supporter of mild and conciliatory 
 government, and above all, a cordial approver of 
 his system of Foreign Policy. 
 
 The Duke of Wellington possessed military 
 talents of the very highest order, and his good
 
 129 
 
 fortune had afforded him the most favourable 
 opportunities for their display. After gaining 
 great victories over justly-celebrated commanders 
 in Spain, it at last fell to his lot to contend with 
 the most wonderful genius that ever lived, when 
 he obtained a triumph, the brilliancy of which 
 eclipsed all his former exploits. Had this great 
 General's warlike abilities been tenfold greater 
 than they were, he still might never have ac- 
 quired glory, equal to that which he has now 
 secured, by having conquered such an anta- 
 gonist as Napoleon. By his successes in Spain, 
 and at Waterloo, he saved his country from ruin, 
 and the world from bondage. The performer 
 of deeds so mighty must ever have had great 
 weight and influence in whatever councils he 
 was engaged. 
 
 Without entering into His Grace's qualifica- 
 tions as a Statesman, it will answer every purpose 
 simply to remark, that, at the moment when his 
 campaigns were concluded, he found Lord 
 Castlereagh directing the Foreign Policy of 
 Great Britain, and that he resolved to support 
 that Minister. Mr. Canning, therefore, on en- 
 tering into office, found him strongly predis- 
 posed towards the policy of the " Continental 
 School ; " and, consequently, had little to ex- 
 pect from the cordial co-operation, and not a 
 little to dread from the powerful opposition, of 
 the Duke of Wellington. 
 
 vol. i. . * K
 
 130 
 
 Mr. Peel was a Statesman whose conduct had 
 been marked by consistency, and had been dis- 
 tinguished, for the most part, by judgment, but 
 always by moderation. He was free from any 
 feelings of jealousy towards Mr. Canning, whose 
 junction with the Government he certainly faci- 
 litated. 
 
 Upon the whole, therefore, it appears that 
 the power of the ultra-Tory party was very con- 
 siderable. Nevertheless, Mr. Canning hoped 
 that his own exertions, supported by Lord Liver- 
 pool, would enable him to carry whatever mea- 
 sures he might think essential. At any rate, he 
 thought it his duty to make the attempt, and, 
 accordingly, as has been already stated, con- 
 sented to join the Ministry, with the firm and 
 avowed intention of resigning his office, in the 
 event of his finding himself unable to carry his. 
 own views into execution.
 
 131 
 
 CHAP. III. 
 
 MR. CANNING'S "SYSTEM" OF POLICY. DISCUSSIONS AT 
 
 VERONA RESPECTING SPAIN DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN 
 
 SPAIN AND GREAT BRITAIN WITH REGARD TO THE 
 CONDUCT OF SPANISH AUTHORITIES IN THE NEW 
 WORLD. 
 
 Mr. Canning received the Seals of Office from 
 the King on the 10th of September, 1822 ; and 
 perhaps at no one period of our history did the 
 misery or the happiness of the World depend so 
 entirely on the course of Foreign Policy which 
 England should think proper to adopt. 
 
 On the one hand, the power of the Holy 
 Alliance had arrived at a most formidable height; 
 and the avowed principles by which that power 
 was to be directed, were so utterly subversive of 
 all freedom, and so hostile to the spirit and 
 temper of the age, that the suspicions, which 
 under any circumstances must necessarily attach 
 to such an overgrown Colossus, became doubled, 
 
 k 2
 
 132 
 
 by the manner in which it seemed determined 
 to use the strength which it had acquired. 
 
 But if those who were determined to support 
 the obsolete principle of the Divine Right of 
 Kings, and the arbitrary doctrines which may 
 be deduced from it, had grown so prodigiously 
 in might ; the opposite doctrines had been gra- 
 dually working their way, and acquiring great 
 numbers of proselytes. For although England 
 was no longer looked upon with that admiration 
 that she had once inspired, still the mighty deeds 
 which she had so recently -achieved were not en- 
 tirely effaced from the recollection of the world. 
 The example, indeed, of her free Constitution 
 had created a very general opinion, that Nations 
 under the absolute sway of a single individual 
 enjoy a smaller portion of happiness than those, 
 in which the Prerogatives of the Crown are 
 limited by the Privileges of the People. 
 
 The two principles recognised by the British 
 Constitution, 1st, That the people are the origin 
 of power; 2d, That the object of all government 
 is the good of the governed ; had taken deep 
 root in the minds of the European Publick. 
 Of these two principles, the truth of the first the 
 Alliance openly denied ; while their actions 
 seemed too clearly to imply their doubt of the 
 correctness of the second. Thus the European 
 Continent was divided into two great parties, 
 professing principles diametrically opposite to, 
 and indeed incompatible with, each other.
 
 13S 
 
 It is obvious, that, for the best interests of 
 humanity, both sides should be brought to relax 
 something in their pretensions. Their forces 
 were nearly balanced. The supporters of ultra- 
 monarchical principles had the advantage of 
 being in the actual possession of authority ; 
 while the superiority of the advocates of popular 
 principles consisted in their greatly outnumber- 
 ing their adversaries. 
 
 The event to be dreaded from such a state of 
 things, was an universal collision between the 
 two parties. 
 
 The object to be sought, was the prevention 
 of popular tumults on the one hand, and of 
 arbitrary and oppressive conduct on the other. 
 
 The aim of the Holy Alliance, was both to 
 repress entirely all manifestations of liberal 
 opinions, and to extinguish (vain hope !) the 
 feelings that excited them. True indeed, in re- 
 spect to the first, they might for a time have 
 been successful ; but when at last the tyranny 
 became insupportable, and the compressing 
 force, (their armies) by being infected with the 
 same principles, had become less efficient, a 
 fearful reaction would have taken place. Europe 
 would have been convulsed from one end to the 
 other ; and whatever Thrones the desolation of 
 vengeance might leave, would have been stripped 
 of their attributes, and shaken to their centres. 
 
 In this posture of affairs, Mr. Canning saw 
 
 k 3
 
 131 
 
 his way, and at once conceived a "system" 
 which would be consistent with the honour, the 
 dignity, and the happiness of his country. 
 
 The Holy Alliance was to be annihilated, and 
 instead of the interests of that Union of Euro- 
 pean Sovereigns being made the main consider- 
 ation in British policy, the interests of Great 
 Britain herself, were what, as a British states- 
 man, Mr. Canning determined more particularly 
 to consult. It was not, however, that he thought 
 that the aggrandizement of Great Britain ought 
 to be sought at the expense of other Powers. 
 On the contrary, he said that " her pros- 
 " perity must contribute to the prosperity of 
 " surrounding Nations, and her stability to the 
 " safety of the World." 
 
 But it was in contradistinction to the doctrines 
 of Universal Philanthropy, and equally so to 
 their opposite extreme, the doctrines of Legi- 
 timacy and Divine Right, which had given birth 
 to the Holy-Alliance scheme of amalgamating 
 the different interests of separate States, and of 
 binding their Monarchs, as Monarchs, to each 
 other, instead of uniting them as Protectors to 
 their own dominions; that he asserted that the in- 
 terests of his own native land, are those to which 
 above all others a Statesman should attend. 
 
 Still it was not by any violent transition from 
 a practice of support to a system of active opposi- 
 tion to that Alliance, that he could have safely
 
 135 
 
 brought about any salutarv results. A sudden 
 change from one side to the other, would in- 
 fallibly, by raising the hopes of the democratical 
 party, have excited them to outrage, and have 
 thus produced the very evil which it was in- 
 tended to prevent. But, no : the dissolution of 
 the Alliance was to be effected, gradually, by the 
 withdrawal from it of the countenance of Eng- 
 land ; and the balance was to be held " not 
 " only between contending Nations, but be- 
 " tween conflicting principles," giving the pre- 
 ponderance to neither, but aiding rather the 
 liberal side, because the anti-liberals were then 
 the strongest. 
 
 This, then, is the key of Mr. Canning's policy, 
 the foundation of the "system" which he adopted. 
 And in perusing the history of his measures, the 
 reader should always bear in mind this, the 
 grand principle by which those measures were 
 directed. 
 
 Before, however, commencing that History, 
 it may be w T ell to point out the fallacy of some 
 observations respecting Mr. Canning, which from 
 want of an accurate recollection of facts have 
 more than once been made. It has been said, 
 and very justly, that not only is the Secretary 
 of State for Foreign Affairs responsible for the 
 Foreign Policy of the country, (of which, how- 
 ever, be it remembered, he is supposed to be 
 the originator and director,) but all his col- 
 
 vol. r. # k 4
 
 136 
 
 leagues, to whose judgment his measures are 
 submitted, share that responsibility. How, then, 
 it is asked, could Mr. Canning have been a 
 member, as he was, of a Cabinet whose Foreign 
 Policy led to consequences so fraught with danger 
 both to England and the world, and at the same 
 time throw off from his own 'shoulders all respon- 
 sibility for those consequences ? 
 
 If he foresaw them, why did he sanction by 
 his counsels the measures that led to them ? If 
 he did not foresee them, why then he was no 
 wiser than the rest ? 
 
 The answer to all this will be apparent, on 
 enquiring what measures, productive of such 
 consequences, were taken by the British Cabinet 
 while he was a member of it ? 
 
 It will doubtless be recollected that the two 
 periods when the conduct of the Foreign Policy 
 of this country was most disastrous were, those 
 of the first Congress at Vienna — and those of 
 the Congress of Troppau, which was adjourned 
 to Laybach. During the intermediate time few 
 important measures on this subject were sub- 
 mitted to the Cabinet. 
 
 On the first occasion, viz. that of the Vienna 
 Congress, Mr. Canning was not a member of the 
 Administration. When he joined it, the treaties 
 concluded at Vienna had been ratified, and 
 sanctioned by Parliament j and disapproving, as 
 he undoubtedly did, of those arrangements, he
 
 137 
 
 would not, after their final settlement, on any 
 consideration, have attempted to disturb them ; 
 and all his declarations respecting them, after he 
 became Foreign Secretary, concurred in the 
 necessity of maintaining the settlement of Europe 
 agreed upon at that Congress. " The pervading 
 principles," (he observed in a despatch to our 
 Ambassador in Russia, in 1825,) " of that in- 
 " timate union by which the Emperor of Russia 
 " and the King, our Master, are bound together, 
 " in common with their other Allies, are those 
 " established by the Treaties of Vienna, viz. the 
 " preservation of general peace, and the main- 
 " tenance against all ambition and encroach- 
 " ment of the existing territorial distribution of 
 " Europe. To these principles His Majesty has 
 vowed an inviolable fidelity. No temptation 
 that could be held out to His Majesty could 
 " induce him to depart from them for any ad- 
 " vantage of his own." 
 
 But, it may be said, that part of the very time 
 that Lord Castlereagh was acting in the way of 
 which Mr. Canning disapproved, he was in offi- 
 cial connection with him, since he held the office 
 of Ambassador at Lisbon. But he had accepted 
 this post before Lord Castlereagh went to the 
 Congress, and of course before he knew what 
 would be done there. And was he, because he 
 thought that Lord Castlereagh had not con- 
 sulted the interests of his country at Vienna, 
 was he, at once, on that account, to throw up his 

 
 138 
 
 situation, and to say, that he would not further 
 her interests in Portugal any longer, because 
 Lord Castlereagh had mismanaged them else- 
 where ? In point of fact, however, Mr. Canning 
 had resigned on other grounds, and his resig- 
 nation had been accepted, long before the most 
 important decisions of the Vienna Congress had 
 been taken, and, consequently, long before they 
 could have been either known to himself, or 
 have transpired to the world. 
 
 Weighty considerations there were (as has 
 been already explained, on account of the do- 
 mestick affairs of the Empire, which determined 
 him to accept office on his return from Lisbon. 
 Whatever evils were to result from the Vienna 
 Treaties were then only to be endured, for the 
 deeds were done, and could not be remedied. 
 A question irrevocably settled, although settled 
 in a way of which he did not approve, could 
 have been no bar to his joining a Government 
 with whom he agreed on all other points. During 
 the years that he remained in office, the internal 
 condition far outweighed in importance the Fo- 
 reign Relations of the Empire ; and before the 
 Congress at Troppau had been convoked, and 
 consequently before any question could have 
 arisen as to the course that it would be fitting 
 for this country to pursue there, he had ceased 
 to be a member of the Government. 
 
 But if the doctrine that the responsibility for 
 all great measures of Foreign Policy rests on all
 
 139 
 
 the members of the Cabinet be true, as it un- 
 questionably is, it may be well to remember that 
 the last publick declaration* of the principles of 
 the Cabinet, previously to Mr. Canning's ceasing 
 to take part in its deliberations, was made in a 
 confidential minute of the Foreign Secretary, 
 which was communicated to the Allied Courts, 
 in answer to some observations of the Court of 
 St. Petersburgh, in which " the charging any 
 " ostensible conference with commission to de- 
 " liberate on the affairs of Spain" was strongly 
 deprecated ; — in which " the notion of revising, 
 " limiting, or regulating the course of experi- 
 " mcnts of casting anew their governments, in 
 " which several States of Europe were then 
 " engaged, either by foreign force or foreign 
 '* council," was said to be, " as dangerous to 
 " avow as impossible to execute;" — in which 
 the Alliance is described as " never to have been 
 " intended as an union for the government of 
 " the World, or for the sup erin ten dance of the 
 " internal affairs of other States;" — and in 
 which it is distinctly declared, that " this Coun- 
 " try could not, and would not, act upon 
 " abstract and speculative principles of precau- 
 " tion ;" — " that the existing Alliance t had had 
 no such purpose in view in its original form- 
 ation, was never so explained to Parliament, 
 
 
 * May 1820. 
 
 f Viz. the quintuple alliance between England, France, 
 Russia, Prussia, and Austria.
 
 a 
 
 (< 
 
 140 
 
 " and if it had, would, most assuredly, never have 
 " received its sanction ;" — " that it would be a 
 " breach of faith were the Ministers of the 
 Crown to acquiesce in such a construction 
 of it, or were to suffer themselves to be be- 
 trayed into a course of measures, inconsistent 
 " with the principles which they avowed at the 
 " time, and which they had since maintained, 
 " both at home and abroad." 
 
 This was language for which Mr. Canning 
 was always ready to take his full share of re- 
 sponsibility, and to which, when he came into 
 office, he acted up, both in spirit and in letter. 
 
 The fault, indeed, in Lord Londonderry's 
 policy was not in the tone of the official docu- 
 ments which he put forth to the world, or the 
 speeches which he delivered in Parliament, but 
 in his not taking care to make his measures ac- 
 cord with his principles. 
 
 For how is it to be accounted for, that effects 
 essentially different were produced by actions 
 professedly regulated by the same rules, and 
 described in the same terms ? and how should 
 it occur that a line of policy completely at 
 variance with Lord Castlereagh's should be 
 ascribed to Mr. Canning, while both adopted 
 the same language ? But, however that may 
 have been, so satisfied was he with the tenour 
 of this note, and so completely was it in ac- 
 cordance with his own views, that, at the time 
 when he assumed the direction of our Foreign
 
 141 
 
 Affairs, he was content to adopt as his own all 
 the doctrines which it contained. Whether or 
 not Mr. Canning had any hand in the drawing 
 up of this particular paper, cannot be positively 
 affirmed; but Lord Londonderry himself would, 
 perhaps, scarcely have denied that there had 
 been occasions on which he had received assist- 
 ance from Mr. Canning. 
 
 As soon as Mr. Canning had received the seals 
 of office, besides the less urgent questions of the 
 Slave Trade, and the Russian Ukase concerning 
 the North-West Coast of America, the following 
 ones pressed themselves immediately upon his 
 attention : — 1st, The state of the relations 
 between Turkey and Russia, complicated as 
 those relations were by the Greek insurrec- 
 tion ; — 2d, The state of the relations between 
 France and Spain ; — 3d, The state of our 
 own relations with Spain, connected as they 
 were with those between Spain and her revolted 
 Colonies ; — and, 4th, the language to be held 
 by the Representative of this country at the 
 Congress at Vienna, which was subsequently 
 adjourned to Verona. 
 
 The direct object to be had in view respect- 
 ing the first two questions, was to bring them 
 to a settlement, without the intervention of war. 
 The indirect object respecting the last was, so 
 to shape our conduct as should, without giving 
 ground for offence, nevertheless make it ope- 
 rate incidentally to diminish the power and
 
 142 
 
 nullify the mischief likely to result from the 
 principles professed by the Alliance. 
 
 Undoubtedly, the most effectual means of at- 
 taining this latter end would have been, to have 
 declined sending any Plenipotentiary at all to 
 the Congress, and to have confined the exertions 
 of the British Government to separate consult- 
 ations with Russia on her affairs with the Porte ; 
 and with France, on her affairs with Spain. But 
 the British Government had been pledged by 
 Lord Londonderry to take part in these deli- 
 berations of the Allies; and the nonfulfillment of 
 that pledge would have been an impossible, or, 
 if possible, an injudicious mode of proceeding. 
 
 Since the question between France and Spain 
 was that which eventually engrossed, almost 
 entirely, the attention of the Congress, it is one 
 the history of which must be first narrated. 
 
 On the death of Lord Londonderry, who was 
 to have been the English representative at the 
 Congress, the instructions which he had drawn 
 up for himself were transferred by the Cabinet 
 to the Duke of Wellington, who left London a 
 few days after Mr. Canning had entered upon 
 the duties of his new office. It was at first 
 hoped by Mr. Canning, that the British Pleni- 
 potentiary would only have been present at the 
 Congress held at Vienna, the existing state of 
 affairs between Russia and the Porte, being what 
 was there to have formed the principal topick of
 
 143 
 
 deliberation ; that question having been disposed 
 oi\ the members of the Congress, with the ex- 
 ception of the British Minister, were to have 
 adjourned to Verona, there to sit in judgment 
 on the Italian Peninsula. Owing, however, to 
 the indisposition of the Duke of Wellington, 
 his journey was so long delayed, that the time 
 allotted for the sojourning of the Congress at 
 Vienna had nearly expired before the Duke 
 arrived in that capital. 
 
 Notwithstanding the wish of Mr. Canning, if 
 possible, to have avoided having an English 
 Minister at Verona, in order to mark to the 
 world, that England was not among those who 
 interfered with the independence of the Italian 
 States, yet, as there was no time left for con- 
 ferences between the Duke's arrival at Vienna, 
 and the departure of the Allied Sovereigns for 
 Italy, it became advisable that His Grace should 
 proceed with them to Verona, which he accord- 
 ingly did. 
 
 At the time of his departure from London, 
 the belief of the Government, and conse- 
 quently that of Mr. Canning, was, that Russia 
 and Turkey, and Italy were the only important 
 points that were intended to be taken into con- 
 sideration. It was, therefore, with somewhat of 
 surprise that Mr. Canning was informed by the 
 Duke of Wellington, that from a conversation 
 with M. de Villele, which the Duke had held
 
 144 
 
 with that Minister when at Paris, in his way to 
 Vienna, it appeared that the French Ministers 
 intended to call upon the Congress to come to 
 some decision before its separation on the posi- 
 tion of France towards Spain. 
 
 It appeared, that since the alarm of the in- 
 fectious fever, France had been collecting an 
 army in the South, fully equipped for active 
 service ; that although the numbers on the 
 frontier were not more than were necessary to 
 discharge the duties of the ".Cordon Sanitaire," 
 yet that there was a force behind, which, toge- 
 ther with that on the frontier, amounted to 
 100,000 men, and which could easily, and 
 quickly be united. There can be little doubt 
 that the army, thus assembled by the French 
 Cabinet, was formed without due deliberation 
 and concert on the part of all its members. 
 While M. de Montmorency, the Secretary of 
 State for Foreign Affairs, an emigrant, and an 
 ultra, was at the head of the war party in the 
 Ministry, urging preparations for the commence- 
 ment of hostilities, the First Minister was led 
 into consenting to those preparations without 
 sufficiently weighing the embarrassments which 
 they might produce. The army, thus impro- 
 vidently collected, it was equally dangerous to 
 employ, or to disband. M. de Villele, in truth, 
 well aware of the great danger of using it for the 
 purpose for which it was brought together, was
 
 145 
 
 unwilling to employ it in an attack on Spain, 
 and was yet equally unwilling to expose the 
 Government to the disgrace of dispersing it 
 without a blow, after the expectations which 
 had been raised by its collection. But M. de 
 Montmorency, eager against all revolutions, 
 only wished to force his colleague into turning 
 it against Spain. Both these Ministers, there- 
 fore, were anxious to obtain the opinion of the 
 Allies ; the Foreign Secretary, in the hope that 
 that opinion would be in favour of war ; and 
 M. de Villele, because, though rather inclined 
 to wish for a peaceable resolution, he felt that 
 the responsibility of war would be considerably 
 lessened, if the Allies gave their sanction to the 
 measure. The opinion of the King of France 
 apparently coincided with that of M. de Villele : 
 but he was perhaps more sensibly alive to the 
 hazard of keeping so large a body of men long 
 together, in a state of inaction, when tere was 
 abroad such a spirit of dislike towards his person, 
 and dynasty. 
 
 When Mr. Canning learnt that it was the 
 intention of the French Government to solicit 
 the expression of an opinion from the Congress ; 
 and also ascertained that the representative of 
 thatGovernmentwas bent on procuring an avowal 
 of the determination of the Allies to interfere 
 forcibly in the affairs of Spain, as well as that 
 
 vol. i. * L
 
 146 
 
 the dispositions of the Allies leaned the same 
 way, he immediately instructed the Duke of 
 Wellington, that " if a declaration of any such 
 " determination should be made at Verona, come 
 " what might, he should refuse the King's con- 
 " sent to become a party to it," even though 
 " the dissolution of the Alliance should be 
 " the consequence of the refusal." It was, in 
 truth, high time to convince the members of the 
 Alliance, that England would take whatever 
 course she thought right, independently of their 
 will and pleasure ; for, to such a pitch of con- 
 fidence had they arrived, that only two days be- 
 fore this despatch was written, the Ministers of 
 the four Courts called in a body on Mr. Canning, 
 to remonstrate with him against the appointment 
 of Sir William a Court as the King's Minister to 
 Madrid, on account of the countenance that his 
 presence would give to the Constitutional Go- 
 vernment. Mr. Canning, thinking it better to 
 treat such expostulations lightly, than to flatter 
 them into importance, by any indignant observ- 
 ations, contented himself, in reply to this remon- 
 strance, with simply saying, that, as Sir William 
 a Court must by that time have entered upon 
 his functions at Madrid, it was useless in any way 
 to discuss the propriety of sending him to that 
 capital. 
 
 Shortly after the Duke arrived at Vienna,
 
 147 
 
 Mr. Canning's instructions readied him : at the 
 time of his receiving them, the views and in- 
 tentions of the French Government on the 
 Spanish question had not been disclosed to the 
 Alliance ; respecting which question, at that 
 moment, there was a wide difference of opinion 
 between the Courts of Russia, and Austria. The 
 latter, however anxious it might be to overturn 
 the then existing order of things in Spain, could 
 not have been willing to incur the risk of any 
 military operations, which might either bring a 
 Russian army through the Austrian dominions, 
 or end in the occupation of the Peninsula by a 
 French force. 
 
 The former, on the other hand, strenuously 
 desired an armed interference, intending that 
 that interference should be carried into execu- 
 tion, at least, in part, by Russian troops. His 
 Imperial Majesty seemed bent on this plan ; for 
 the adoption of which he must have found 
 powerful motives, in his disapprobation of con- 
 stitutional principles, in the bad example which 
 the mere existence of a system founded on 
 mutiny afforded, and in the probable inconve- 
 nience of not giving employment to the Russian 
 army, which was much discontented with the 
 pacifick policy towards Turkey. The Emperor's 
 views were however somewhat disconcerted be- 
 fore his departure from Vienna, by doubts as to 
 
 l 2
 
 14-8 
 
 whether the French Government would refuse 
 their consent to the passage of a Russian army 
 through the French territory : this consideration 
 served His Imperial Majesty with subject- 
 matter for meditation during his journey from 
 that city to Verona. On his arrival at which last- 
 mentioned place, it became evident that his 
 opinions had become somewhat modified ; and 
 that his hopes were then apparently confined to 
 the collection of an army of observation some- 
 where in the south-western part of Europe : 
 whereby he would have been in readiness to aid 
 France in her attack on the Peninsula, in case 
 of its failure, either through the reverses or the 
 disloyalty of her troops : and the double pur- 
 pose of occupying the Russian army, and of in- 
 timidating the revolutionists of Europe, would 
 have been completely effected. 
 
 These humbler designs of the Russian Em- 
 peror were, however, checked by the opposition 
 of the Duke of Wellington, in which he was 
 feebly seconded by the Emperor of Austria and 
 his Ministers, who adhered to their original 
 opinions. The Prussians followed in the wake 
 of Austria. 
 
 Such respecting Spain, were the feelings of the 
 different parties who were present at the con- 
 ference, at which the French Minister, M. de 
 Montmorency, explained the views and position
 
 
 149 
 
 of his Government towards that country. The 
 first half of his statement consisted of an account 
 of the transactions between the King of Spain 
 and the Spanish Royalists on the one part, and 
 of the French Government on the other ; and 
 the latter half consisted of a few remarks, pre- 
 fatory to the delivery of a paper which contained, 
 the three following questions : — 
 
 1. " In case France should find herself under 
 ** the necessity of recalling her Minister from 
 " Madrid, and of breaking off all diplomatic^ 
 
 relations with Spain, would the high Courts 
 be disposed to adopt the like measures, and to 
 " recall their respective missions ? 
 
 2. " Should war break out between France 
 " and Spain, under what form, and by what acts, 
 " would the high Powers afford to France, that 
 " moral support which would give to her mea- 
 " sures the weight and authority of the Alliance, 
 " and inspire a salutary dread into the revolu- 
 " tionists of all countries ? 
 
 3. " What, in short, was the intention of the 
 " high Powers, as to the extent and the form of 
 "the effective assistance (« sec ours mat Uriels ') 
 " which they would be disposed to give to France 
 " in case active interference should, on her de- 
 " mand, become necessary ? " 
 
 The propounding of these three questions by 
 the French Minister must have been a source of 
 
 l 8
 
 150 
 
 infinite satisfaction to the Emperor Alexander, 
 since they afforded him so fair a pretext for the 
 execution of his favourite project. Immediately 
 on the receipt of the French paper, he avowed his 
 readiness to consent to all the terms proposed in 
 it, and to conclude a treaty stipulating for the 
 succours which he should furnish. He at the 
 same time stated, that those succours should be 
 given in the shape of an army of 150,000 men, 
 which he would march through Germany, and 
 station in Piedmont. The English Plenipoten- 
 tiary made no secret of what his answer would 
 be, and in conjunction with the Austrian Mi- 
 nister, forcibly exposed the dangers to which 
 such a proceeding on the part of Russia would 
 expose the French Government ; insinuating, as 
 it would, if done by its consent, either that the 
 French Ministers thought France was unable to 
 cope with Spain, or else that they mistrusted the 
 fidelity of their troops : — the first of which 
 insinuations, by throwing a doubt upon the mili- 
 tary abilities of France, was certain to hurt the 
 amour propre of a people so peculiarly jealous of 
 their military glory j the second it would have 
 been the height of imprudence to proclaim. But 
 His Imperial Majesty was difficult to be con- 
 vinced : and it is no wonder that he was unwil- 
 ling to throw aside so reasonable a pretence for 
 the accomplishment of a favourite purpose.
 
 151 
 
 Similar efforts were made, and fortunately with 
 better success, to impress with a full sense of the 
 danger the French Plenipotentiary, who, having 
 at first been inclined to think that France would 
 derive great advantage in her discussions with 
 Spain, from the presence of a Russian army in 
 Piedmont, had expressed much admiration of the 
 chivalrous spirit of the Russian Emperor. M. 
 de Montmorency, however, being converted, did 
 in consequence strongly represent the extreme 
 injury which would probably accrue to the 
 French Government from the march of any 
 Russian troops to the South of Europe. But 
 such representations, even though urged in 
 earnestness and truth, were more than counter- 
 balanced by the French questions respecting war, 
 which, being already put, could not be retracted; 
 and which gave an advantage to the Emperor in 
 the furtherance of his design, which advantage it 
 was hardly to be expected that he would sur- 
 render. 
 
 But, if these queries were a source of satisfac- 
 tion to Alexander, they were most embarrassing 
 to Austria ; calling upon Her to give replies, 
 which, however constructed, must necessarily 
 have sanctioned some measures, of which She 
 must have trembled at the consequences. 
 
 An hostile aggression by France on Spain, 
 whether successful or unsuccessful, Austria had 
 
 l 4
 
 152 
 
 almost equally strong reasons to deprecate. If 
 successful, those Countries would be, for a time 
 at least, closely united : — a state of things so 
 repugnant to the supposed ancient interests of 
 the House of Hapsburgh, that it could not, 
 under any circumstances, be contemplated with- 
 out jealousy, or indeed be submitted to without 
 dishonour; — but, if accomplished with Austrian 
 sanction, it would be still harder to reconcile to 
 Austrian pride, conniving, as it would appear to 
 be, at its own humiliation : — if unsuccessful, the 
 almost infallible consequences would have been, 
 a revolutionary re-action in France, which would 
 probably have spread throughout the greater part 
 of the European Continent. But if these were 
 strong reasons for opposing the invasion of Spain, 
 there were not wanting even stronger in its 
 favour. 
 
 The strong dislike of the Austrian Govern- 
 ment, not only to all revolutionary, but to all 
 constitutional, even though legitimate Govern- 
 ments, would probably have induced it, either 
 to hazard much, or to sacrifice something for the 
 destruction of the then existing order of things in 
 Spain. But, in addition to this, what was more 
 immediately calculated to operate, was the feel- 
 ing that, if the Emperor of Russia had not the 
 appearance at least of occupation in the West of 
 Europe, until the publick mind in Russia upon the
 
 153 
 
 Turkish and Greek questions should have become 
 calm, His Imperial Majesty would have returned 
 to his capital displeased with the Alliance, of 
 which the first effects would have been felt by 
 Austria. Since this last consideration was the 
 one which pressed hardest at the moment, and 
 since the Austrian Premier, however shrewd and 
 clever, was not in the habit of looking \ery far 
 before him, so perhaps it was the one which, 
 added to the strong bias of his mind agains't the 
 Spanish Constitution, determined the point of 
 shaping the reply of his Government to the 
 French queries, in the way that should best suit 
 the plans of the Russian Cabinet. 
 
 The Prussian Court continued to participate in 
 the Austrian sentiments, and to act accordingly. 
 
 The three Powers, therefore, in their official 
 notes, consented to grant all the countenance 
 and succours which were in fact required by the 
 French questions. Both the Russian and Aus- 
 trian Ambassadors, however, suggested the ne- 
 cessity of a treaty, in order that the cases of 
 succour might be distinctly defined j the object 
 of the Emperor of Russia probably being, to have 
 something tangible to show to his people, as an 
 excuse for not attacking Turkey ; — and that of 
 Prince Metternich being, to keep within as 
 narrow limits as possible, the grounds for French 
 interference.
 
 154 
 
 The answer of the British Plenipotentiary in 
 conformity with his instructions, was very dif- 
 ferent from those of the other Members of the 
 Alliance. 
 
 He dwelt upon the determination of the 
 English Government not to intermeddle in the 
 internal concerns of independent States, and on 
 the certain risks and probable disasters that 
 would be the result of such interference in the 
 present instance. He positively refused to give 
 the smallest countenance to the imagination 
 of a case, on which, should it occur, he might 
 be called upon to pledge his Government to 
 eventual co-operation, and concert ; and con- 
 cluded by exposing the groundlessness of the 
 alarms of any hostile attack of Spain upon France, 
 which the French Plenipotentiary pleaded in 
 defence of his proceedings. 
 
 This decided language on the part of the 
 Duke of Wellington, coupled with doubts as to 
 how far the signature of the treaty, proposed by 
 the other Allies, might be approved by his Go- 
 vernment, since it might be placed in difficulties 
 by an entire separation from England, again 
 shook the resolution of M. de Montmorency; 
 who, although evidently looking, by gaining the 
 support of the violent ultra party in France, to 
 re-establish despotism in Spain by French means, 
 yet could not have helped doubting the effect
 
 155 
 
 which such a treaty would have upon the other 
 parties in the Chambers : it appears that he 
 declined to sign one. 
 
 Whilst conflicting considerations were thus 
 operating to produce vacillation in the French 
 and Austrian Councils, it is curious enough that 
 all parties at the Congress were professing their 
 anxiety that war might not ensue. Of these, 
 the English and Prussian plenipotentiaries were, 
 doubtless, sincere : the Austrians seemed sincere 
 at one moment, and insincere at another, accord- 
 ingly as each particular consideration prevailed : 
 but the good faith of the French and Russian 
 declarations would seem to have been in the 
 highest degree equivocal. Since peace, how- 
 ever, was on the lips of all, it gave rise to pro- 
 positions, calculated to keep up at least the 
 appearance of sincerity. One of these was, that 
 France should employ the good offices of one of 
 the Allies at Madrid, a plan which M. de Mont- 
 morency rejected, because there was no positive 
 ground of dispute. He, however, gladly availed 
 himself of a proposal (as a sort of middle course) 
 made by Austria after the several answers had 
 been given in, that " the Allies should hold 
 " towards Spain a common language, in separate 
 " notes, but uniform in their principles and 
 " their object." 
 
 This scheme was at first adopted by the
 
 156 
 
 Allies, and was virtually indeed carried into 
 execution, although the notes were subsequently 
 changed into despatches, as being less offensive 
 in their form. 
 
 When these documents were drawn up, they 
 were communicated to the English Minister, who 
 took the opportunity of again pointing out the 
 impolicy of their being forwarded to their des- 
 tination. He said, that, if the preservation of 
 peace were, as was professed, the common wish, 
 no measures could be pursued more likely to 
 defeat it, calculated as " they were, to cause the 
 " discontinuance of diplomatick relations be- 
 " tween the three allied Courts and Spain, as 
 " well as to irritate the Spanish Government, by 
 *' affording ground for the belief that advantage 
 " had been taken of the angry feelings existing 
 " between France and Spain, to call down upon 
 " the latter the power of the Alliance ; that the 
 " English Government would not only not hold a 
 " common language with the Allies, but would 
 " refrain from making any communication with 
 " the Spanish Government, on the subject of its 
 " relations with Spain ; and, lastly, that His Ma- 
 " jesty's exertions would be confined to endea- 
 " vouring to allay the ferment which these 
 " communications would occasion at Madrid." 
 
 These representations of the Duke of Wel- 
 lington failed in producing all their effect in
 
 157 
 
 changing the purpose of the Allies. The French 
 and Russian influence indeed would have been 
 too strong for the Austrian and Prussian Courts 
 to resist, even if other causes had not operated 
 to induce consent. But there can be no doubt 
 that, had it not been for the manly language 
 thus held by the Duke, these despatches would 
 (as admitted by M. de Montmorency) have been 
 worded in a manner, which would have amounted 
 to a hostile declaration. After the course in- 
 tended to be pursued by England was declared, 
 the Allies consulted on the affairs of Spain, 
 without the English Plenipotentiary. At one of 
 these consultations, what was called a Proces 
 Verbal was agreed upon by the Allies, defining 
 the Casus Foederis which should entitle France 
 to their succour : — 
 
 1st. In case of an attack made by Spain on 
 France. 
 
 2d. Of any outrage on the person of the King 
 or Royal Family of Spain. 
 
 3d. Of any attempt to change the Dynasty of 
 that Kingdom. 
 
 This Proces Verbal was the last act of the 
 Congress on Spanish affairs, although some fur- 
 ther subsequent discussions respecting them took 
 place which are not unimportant. 
 
 At one of them, the following questions were 
 put by the British Plenipotentiary: — Whether,
 
 158 
 
 if the effect of the despatches should be to pro- 
 duce war, and if the war so produced should 
 end in the subjugation of Spain, it was intended 
 to occupy Spain with any armed force ; and if 
 it were, the troops of what nation or nations 
 were to compose it ? To this all the Plenipo- 
 tentiaries returned evasive answers ; but the 
 Austrian Plenipotentiaries in their answer, did 
 not seem to consider otherwise than with com- 
 placency the idea of French troops being the 
 occupying force, whatever might have been 
 their real opinion of such a mode of occupation. 
 At another discussion (the last), held just pre- 
 viously to the Duke's departure, the Allied 
 Ministers, and particularly the French Minister, 
 requested that Sir William a Court should be 
 instructed to do all in his power to allay the 
 ferment at Madrid, and to preserve peace. A 
 sigular request, considering that the ferment 
 which they professed to wish that Sir William 
 a Court should allay was of their own exciting, 
 and the peace which he was to preserve was 
 only in danger of being broken by their own 
 measures ! 
 
 Such is the curious history of the deliberations 
 of this celebrated Congress on the most import- 
 ant subject that occupied its attention ; from 
 which it would seem that the singular fact may 
 be deduced, that only two parties concerned in
 
 Id9 
 
 them, England and Russia, pursued through- 
 out a fixed and unvaried plan of conduct, 
 with a view to the attainment of a determinate 
 object. 
 
 The purposes of the Emperor of Russia, from 
 the beginning to the end, were apparently uniform. 
 The first, being to find occupation for his own 
 troops ; the next, being to subvert the Consti- 
 tutional Government of Spain by force of 
 arms. 
 
 The objects of the British Plenipotentiary 
 were likewise throughout consistent, and intel- 
 ligible. They were, first, to prevent any cor- 
 porate act of force or menace, on the part of the 
 Alliance, against Spain ; next, to preserve peace 
 between that Country and France; and, lastly, 
 to convince the Alliance that England would 
 not countenance their conduct. 
 
 The Austrian Government had, perhaps, nofixed 
 desire, with the exception perhaps of the one to 
 overthrow the Spanish Government; a desire, 
 it appears, however, by no means so paramount 
 as to outweigh all other considerations. Its 
 sentiments, varied accordingly as each separate 
 consideration predominated. It seemed to dread, 
 first, the permanent triumph of revolutionary 
 principles ; next, the occupation of Spain by 
 France ; thirdly, the passage of a Russian army 
 through the Austrian States ; fourthly, the inter-
 
 160 
 
 ference of Russia in the affairs of Turkey ; and, 
 lastly, the displeasure of the Emperor of Russia, 
 if His Imperial Majesty should go back discon- 
 tented to his dominions. It dreaded all the 
 evils, and all the remedies. 
 
 The fear, therefore, of witnessing the lasting 
 success of revolution, probably prevented a de- 
 cided opposition to the attack meditated by 
 France on Spain ; and the dread of the displea- 
 sure of the Russian Autocrat, and of his turning 
 his arms against Turkey, if not otherwise em- 
 ployed, appeared to prevent a decided opposition 
 to the march of that army to the South of 
 Europe: while a dislike of both these measures 
 must have been the obstacle to a cordial appro- 
 bation being given to either. 
 
 The French Minister's aim, at first, was to 
 obtain the sanction of the Alliance to a war 
 with Spain, and next the armed assistance of its 
 Members ; and then, when he had made some 
 progress towards procuring this help, perhaps 
 from thinking that he had gone too far, he tried 
 to retrace his steps. 
 
 The Prusian Government, if it dreaded revo- 
 lution, must have dreaded still more a war which 
 might in time become general ; its immediate 
 object must have been to keep on the best terms 
 with its powerful neighbours, and it successively
 
 Kil 
 
 adopted the vacillating opinions of the Austrian 
 Minister. 
 
 The result of this clashing of interests and 
 infirmity of purpose was, that no one party was 
 completely successful, though the English were 
 more so than the others. They were, indeed, 
 unable to prevent the sending of the despatch to 
 the Ministers of the three Courts at Madrid, by 
 which the chances of the continuance of peace 
 were diminished ; but they did prevent a corpo- 
 rate declaration of war, which, had it not been 
 for the dread of the steps which England might 
 take, would beyond a doubt have been conceded 
 in the outset by Austria and Prussia to the wishes 
 of the Russian Cabinet, and the demands of the 
 French Minister. 
 
 They likewise succeeded in alarming the Alli- 
 ance, as to how far it might be able to accomplish 
 the ends at which it aimed. 
 
 The Russian Monarch was unable to find em- 
 ployment for his army, and was likewise unable 
 to assure himself that, some way or other, an 
 attempt would be made to overturn the Spanish 
 Constitution. 
 
 Whether the Austrian Prime Minister had 
 better grounds for congratulation at the w r ay in 
 which the labours of the Congress terminated 
 than his French and Russian Colleagues, is 
 doubtful. 
 
 vol. i. * M
 
 162 
 
 The Emperor Alexander certainly did not 
 return home contented ; the probable invasion of 
 Spain by the French alone, was not prevented 
 nor even retarded ; and the Austrian territories 
 were not absolutely secured against the unwel- 
 come intrusion of a Russian army. To coun- 
 terbalance, however, all these annoyances, there 
 was the blow levelled at liberal principles, in the 
 insult offered to a newly-established Constitution : 
 but if this were a source of consolation, it was 
 not without its alloy ; for in the language of the 
 British Cabinet were evidently to be traced the 
 seeds of disunion, too likely to end in the disso- 
 lution of the Alliance. 
 
 As for Prussia, she had no particular reason to 
 be pleased with what was ultimately decided 
 upon ; for, had her interests been consulted, no 
 discussions would have been entered into respect- 
 ing Spain ; avoiding them altogether would 
 have been the best means of preserving peace, 
 which she must have chiefly desired; for if the 
 question were gone into, consistency compelled 
 the Allies to hold the same language to Spain 
 which in the preceding year they had held to 
 Naples and Sardinia. 
 
 During these transactions at Verona, where 
 the French Plenipotentiary was urging measures 
 directly tending to produce a war with Spain, 
 the head of the French Government was holding
 
 163 
 
 the most pacifick language, and declaring that 
 the King, Royal Family, and Council of Minis- 
 ters were unanimous in their wish to avoid a 
 rupture. It was evident, therefore, if M. de 
 Villele were sincere in what he said, and there is 
 no reason to doubt that he was so, either that 
 M. de Montmorency was ignorant of the opi- 
 nions of his colleagues, or else that he was 
 acting in defiance of them. However that 
 might be, it is certain that M. de Montmorency's 
 language, as the Congress drew near to its con- 
 clusion, was more moderate than it had been at 
 its commencement. 
 
 But while the French Minister at Verona (at 
 any rate not disavowed by his Government) was 
 endeavouring to fan the embers of discord into 
 a flame, and imagining hypothetical grounds of 
 justification for the commencement of hostilities 
 with Spain, from the want of any real substan- 
 tial grievances, there can be no doubt that the 
 French Government were actually giving en- 
 couragement and assistance to the bands of 
 factions that were in arms in Navarre and 
 Arragon, against the Spanish Constitutional Go- 
 vernment, which same bands French intrigues 
 and French gold had excited to rebellion. 
 
 Although the civil war thus raised necessarily 
 tended to increase the distraction and misery 
 which prevailed throughout that kingdom, yet 
 
 vol. i. * m 2
 
 164 
 
 it was only one more misfortune added to a cup 
 already overflowing. 
 
 Perhaps there never was a country that had 
 once stood so high in the scale of nations, which 
 fell to such a state of degradation in so short a 
 period. 
 
 Thirty years back, Spain was one of the most 
 powerful empires in Europe ; and although 
 viewed at a distance, the recollections of her 
 former greatness, her successful opposition to 
 foreign invasion, and the struggle for liberty in 
 which she was then engaged, all contributed to 
 create an illusion as to her then condition ; yet 
 it was an illusion that was soon dispelled by 
 closer observation. By an eye-witness, nothing 
 of wisdom, little of patriotism, little of talent, 
 could be discovered, although what little there 
 did exist was ranged on the Constitutional side. 
 With the exception, therefore, of some six or 
 seven individuals (and those the only ones out of 
 a whole nation), it might be truly said, that the 
 many were nugatory from their indifference — 
 the few, useless from their corruption. A total 
 want of force, moral as well as physical, was 
 evident on all sides; and if a given task was to be 
 executed, the means employed were sure to be 
 wholly inadequate to the ends proposed to be 
 attained by them. The only thing like a gene- 
 ral feeling that really seemed to exist, was the
 
 16 5 
 
 fear of a return to the ancient order of things ; 
 but even this, if traced to its source, was not so 
 much a horror of despotism itself as of despo- 
 tism in the hands of Ferdinand, and was, more 
 perhaps than any thing else, a question of gua- 
 rantee for personal security. 
 
 There was no devotion to the Constitution. 
 The necessity of modifying it, indeed, was ad- 
 mitted on all hands ; but so distrustful were all 
 parties of each other, and so doubtful of the 
 King, that there was little or no hope of any 
 modifications being effected. 
 
 The finances were in a deplorable state of ex- 
 haustion, and all the great sources of national 
 prosperity, from which they might have been re- 
 cruited, dried up, some of them past recall. 
 Commerce was annihilated, agriculture was neg- 
 lected, and the colonies were lost. The de- 
 moralization of the people, and the extinction 
 of their energy, took away the hope of a speedy 
 regeneration. Every where symptoms of a ge- 
 neral dissolution of society manifested them- 
 selves; — one part of the country refusing to 
 obey the Government, because it was not suf- 
 ficiently revolutionary, — another, plunged into 
 civil war, under the pretence of restoring to ab- 
 solute power a perjured Sovereign, but, in re- 
 ality, only fighting for gain : the soldiers of the 
 Royalist ranks of to-day being found amongst 
 the Constitutionalists of to-morrow, according as 
 
 m 3
 
 166 
 
 either side afforded the strongest temptations of 
 pay or plunder. 
 
 Such was the frightful picture of ruin which 
 Spain presented to the eyes of those who them- 
 selves examined into her real situation ; and to 
 this awful condition w r as she reduced by the ty- 
 ranny of priestcraft, and the abuse of despotism : 
 for despotism alone would not have produced 
 effects so disastrous. 
 
 But although this description is no exagger- 
 ation of what was the real situation of Spain, 
 yet it could not be doubted, that the best chance 
 she had of recovering from this abyss of degra- 
 dation was, by being left to herself, to work out 
 a cure for the evils which afflicted her. Cer- 
 tainly, the worst that could have happened to 
 her would have been the restoration of that 
 order of things to which almost entirely her 
 present misfortunes were to be attributed. For 
 the sake of humanity, therefore, if not of jus- 
 tice, she ought to have been left alone ; and, 
 as has been shewn, to secure her being left 
 alone, all the efforts of Mr. Canning's policy 
 were directed. But while we were fighting in 
 the cause of Spanish independence at Verona, 
 the state of our mutual relations compelled us, 
 at the same time, to fight our own battles at 
 Madrid. 
 
 The outrages that were daily committing on 
 English commerce by the Colonial Authorities,
 
 
 167 
 
 tliat still acknowledged the supremacy of the 
 Mother Country, and which had been going on 
 for several years, were arrived at that pitch that 
 they were no longer to be borne. — " The 
 " archives of the British Mission at Madrid con- 
 " tained a long list of such grievances, some- 
 " times justified, or palliated, by the Spanish 
 " Ministers, sometimes admitted and regretted, 
 " but in no one instance satisfactorily redressed. 
 " The mere existence of such a catalogue of in- 
 juries committed against the subjects of a 
 " friendly Power, and that Power the one to 
 
 whose exertions and sacrifices the Spanish 
 
 Monarchy owed its preservation, was as dis- 
 " creditable to the Government which had in- 
 " flicted or connived at them, as it would have 
 " been to that which, after having exhausted 
 " every amicable effort to obtain justice, should 
 «' have continued patiently to submit to the de- 
 " nial of it." 
 
 Mr. Canning therefore thought that the period 
 was arrived when such submission should cease. 
 
 And, since the Spanish Ministers, when pressed 
 by similar representations, had invariably con- 
 trived to elude them by references to authorities, 
 and promises of investigation, Sir William a Court 
 was instructed, Oct. 18. 1822, to require "instant 
 atonement" in the case of the condemnation of 
 the Lord Collingwood, which happened to be one, 
 of which "the facts were admitted, and would 
 
 m 4
 
 168 
 
 " therefore bring at once to the test the dis- 
 " positions of the Spanish Ministers." It was a 
 case, too, more particularly adapted to this end, 
 because the condemnation of the vessel turned 
 mainly upon an allegation, which rendered the 
 wrong inflicted a matter of direct national con- 
 cern. The grounds specified for the condemna- 
 tion of this vessel were, that it was " found 
 " trading with the rebels of Buenos Ayres." 
 Now Buenos Ayres had long ceased to yield 
 obedience to the mother country, and every 
 vestige of Spanish authority had long disappear- 
 ed from the precincts of that Colony : moreover, 
 it had been distinctly and solemnly declared by 
 England, and admitted by Spain, that if the 
 former forbore to prejudge the question of a 
 possible amicable arrangement between Spain 
 and her ancient Colonies, by acknowledging the 
 independent separate interests of the latter, " she 
 " did so in the complete understanding, and on 
 " the condition distinctly admitted by Spain, 
 " that her trade with those Colonies should be 
 " free and unmolested, and that Spain should 
 " not, even on the resumption of her au- 
 " thority (if ever she should be able to resume 
 " it), resort to the re-establishment of her exclu- 
 " sive system ; or, if at all, at least not without 
 " a previous warning, and an equitable allowance 
 " of time for the winding up of British commer- 
 « cial concerns."
 
 169 
 
 It was obvious that if such a pretension was 
 once tolerated by the British Government, as a 
 just cause for the confiscation of British vessels, 
 that all her trade with Spanish America must 
 have been put an end to at once. 
 
 Mr. Canning therefore determined that on 
 this point England should take her stand, and 
 demand retribution. 
 
 But this was not the only cause for complaint 
 that this country had against Spain : innumer- 
 able piracies upon British traders had been com- 
 mitted in the West Indian Seas, not only under 
 the Spanish flag (for which it might be alleged 
 that Spain was not responsible), but by persons 
 having their establishments on shore in the Island 
 of Cuba, resorting thither for refuge from pur- 
 suit, and depositing there the spoils of their 
 plundering and murderous expeditions. 
 
 On this subject (as well as on that previously 
 mentioned) representations and remonstrances 
 had been made to the Spanish Government, and 
 with no better effect. " Enquiry and redress had 
 " been promised ; but, whatever was the success 
 " of the enquiries, redress there had been none :" 
 nor did the Governor of the Havannah, when 
 applied to on the matter, acknowledge to having 
 received any orders from his Court, to take any 
 measures for the extirpation of the pirates, no- 
 toriously sheltering themselves within the limits 
 of his Government.
 
 170 
 
 Mr. Canning therefore thought, that " neither 
 " the pride, nor the interests, nor, after a fair 
 " time allowed for the effect of representations, 
 " the patience of this country ought any longer 
 " to bear such outrages." 
 
 The King therefore was advised to issue 
 orders to the Admiralty, to adopt the most deci- 
 sive and summary measures for affording protec- 
 tion to His Majesty's subjects, and to the naviga- 
 tion of the West Indian seas ; and as to sweep 
 the seas would have been unavailing so long as 
 the pirates found a sure and inviolable asylum 
 in the ports and fastnesses of Cuba, the com- 
 mander of the squadron appointed for the pur- 
 pose was to be directed, " after he should have 
 " communicated with the Governor of the Ha- 
 " vannah, and learnt whether or not he was 
 " ready to co-operate in the enterprise, in 
 " the one case with, in the other without the 
 " assistance of that officer, to land wherever 
 " on that coast the haunts of the pirates were 
 " to be discovered, and to take signal vengeance 
 " for the outrages which had in so many in- 
 " stances been committed by them against the 
 " commerce, persons, and lives of His Majesty's 
 " subjects." 
 
 "That the execution of these orders would 
 " involve a violation of the Spanish territory 
 " was neither overlooked nor denied ; but the 
 " growing magnitude of the evil, and the evident
 
 171 
 
 " want on the part of the Spanish Government 
 " either of the will or the power to suppress it, 
 " forced the decision to be taken, from which 
 " Great Britain, in deference to the Court of Spain, 
 " had forborne too long, and the recurrence to 
 " which under circumstances of such peculiar 
 " provocation on the one hand, and such hope- 
 " lessness of redress on the other, became a 
 " measure no less of obligation than necessity ; 
 " a necessity arising out of the apparent power- 
 " lessness of Spain to provide any other cure for 
 " the mischief; and an obligation imposed upon 
 " the King of Great Britain by a due regard for 
 " the interests of his subjects, which it is the 
 " first duty of a Sovereign to protect." 
 
 Sir William a Court was instructed frankly 
 to acquaint the Spanish Government with the 
 determination which had been taken ; but at the 
 same time he was desired to state, that it was 
 not intended " to imply by it any intimation of 
 " an hostile, or even unfriendly disposition." He 
 was further authorized to assure the Spanish Go- 
 vernment, that the King had no desire to inter- 
 fere in the internal affairs of Spain ; and that His 
 Majesty anxiously hoped that the issue of the 
 then existing struggles in that kingdom " might 
 " be favourable alike to its power and its happi- 
 " ness ; to the lawful authority of the Mon- 
 " archy, and to the just and regulated liberties 
 " of the Nation."
 
 172 
 
 " But in proportion as Great Britain was scru- 
 V pulous in abstaining from any interference in 
 " the internal concerns of Spain, she had a right 
 " to expect that in its external regulations care 
 " would be taken to respect British rights and 
 " honour ; and that no cause of offence would 
 " be given, and no injury inflicted, upon British 
 " Subjects." 
 
 Before sufficient time had elapsed to receive 
 from Madrid an answer to these communications, 
 and subsequently to the period of directing them 
 to be made, there came to the knowledge of the 
 British Government such multiplied instances 
 of British Ships, trading to the Spanish Main, 
 being captured by armed vessels under the Spa* 
 nish Flag, for presuming to violate constructive 
 blockades, which were declared of the whole 
 coast of Spanish America, that it was thought 
 absolutely necessary to give " a wider range to 
 " those measures of self-redress" which have 
 already been described. 
 
 Orders were issued to the British Commanders 
 in those Seas, to have recourse to reprisals, 
 wherever any British Vessels should suffer from 
 violence or depredation. 
 
 The fact of these orders being issued was like- 
 wise openly avowed to the Spanish Government; 
 but the communication was not made without a 
 renewal of the assurances of the sincere and 
 earnest desire of the King of England, to remain
 
 173 
 
 on terms of friendship with His Catholick Ma- 
 jesty : but since the Spanish Monarch was un- 
 able to prevent such repeated acts of provoca- 
 tion, no alternative was left to Great Britain, but 
 either " to pursue her claims for redress by repre- 
 " sentation and remonstrance, and at length 
 " when forbearance was exhausted, to resort to 
 " that last extremity, by which alone the unre- 
 " dressed grievances of one Crown against ano- 
 " ther can be vindicated ; or to adopt the more 
 " mitigated but more effectual course which was 
 " then decided upon." 
 
 The acts of which Great Britain complained, 
 Sir William a Court was instructed to say to the 
 Spanish Government, were (as this country was 
 willing to believe) as much " acts of disobe- 
 " dience to the Crown, under whose flag they 
 were perpetrated, as of offence to the friendly 
 power against whose flag they were directed. 
 " In applying, therefore, a local resistance to 
 " specified local aggressions, committed un- 
 " der cover of the Spanish Flag, which either 
 " escaped the superintendence, or defied the 
 " control of His Catholick Majesty, the King of 
 " England considered himself rather as exercis- 
 " ing a vicarious jurisdiction for the King of 
 " Spain, than as entering into a conflict with 
 " His Majesty's authority." That in exercising 
 his undoubted right of reprisal against those who 
 made use of the Spanish Flag against the per- 

 
 174 
 
 sons and property of British Subjects, his 
 Britannick Majesty only lent to the King of 
 Spain the aid of his naval force to put down 
 abuses, which, without doubt, it would have 
 been as much the desire of the Spanish Govern- 
 ment to repress for itself) as it unquestionably 
 was its duty, if it had possessed the means at its 
 disposal. 
 
 Perhaps there never was a more anxious mo- 
 ment in Mr. Canning's Life than when he thus 
 ordered these vigorous remonstrances to be ad- 
 dressed to the Spanish Government, and such 
 decisive steps to be taken to vindicate the na- 
 tional honour. 
 
 His policy, at that moment, was almost exclu- 
 sively directed to the preservation, if possible, of 
 peace between France and Spain. He was well 
 aware that the best chance of success depended 
 on our mediation, or our good offices, being em- 
 ployed for that purpose. 
 
 He was not insensible to the probability that 
 Spain would feel the measures to be adopted 
 both deeply and resentfully ; and to enhance 
 the difficulties of the crisis, the very period at 
 which these measures were resolved upon was 
 the precise time at which the Congress at 
 Verona broke up, leaving a state of things 
 neither to be denominated War nor Peace, 
 but tending to War. It was therefore far 
 from improbable, that an attack by France, on
 
 1?5 
 
 the side of the Pyrenees, would coincide, in 
 point of time, with hostile operations by Great 
 Britain against Spain in the West Indies ; a 
 coincidence, which would have produced an ap- 
 pearance of concert, which might have imposed 
 both on Europe and on the publick of England, 
 and fastened upon the very first of Mr. Can- 
 ning's official acts a character diametrically op- 
 posite to its real one. 
 
 But he clearly saw that it would be highly 
 detrimental to the interests of Spain herself to 
 abstain from demanding redress, on account of 
 her political distractions ; for if her internal 
 condition afforded any motives for forbearance, 
 and if England was to examine into it in search 
 of such motives, other nations might, in the ex- 
 ercise of the same right of examination, find 
 motives for a different course of conduct. 
 
 " England would not look upon the anarchy 
 " in Spain as an offence; but neither would she 
 " allow Spain to plead it as a privilege." But, 
 moreover, England had a right by Treaty*, if 
 redress was~ delayed beyond a certain time, to 
 take that redress into her own hands. 
 
 Mr, Canning felt that the honour of this Coun- 
 
 * The treaty which contains this provision was signed in 
 1667. It was incorporated in the treaty of Utrecht, which 
 is entitled a Treaty of Navigation and Commerce. It was 
 renewed in 17S3, and subsisted in 1796, and the treaty of 
 1814? ratifies all commercial treaties in existence in 1796.
 
 17(3 
 
 try was at stake, and that it was better to run 
 all hazards of misconstruction, than tamely to 
 submit any longer to unprovoked and continued 
 injuries. He resolved, therefore, upon doing 
 what was right fearlessly, and to trust to proving 
 that it was right, should the propriety or policy 
 of the act be called in question. 
 
 As it was, however, the frank and open man- 
 liness of our conduct entirely succeeded. All 
 the better part of the Spanish Government and 
 Cortes acknowledged how deeply we were ag- 
 grieved, and thought us justified in the resolu- 
 tions we had taken. And being well aware 
 how valuable our countenance and good will 
 would be to them at such a juncture, after a 
 little show of resistance on the part of the Minis- 
 ters, they promised to apply to the Cortes to 
 give them authority to settle all our differences, 
 by giving satisfaction for the ships captured in 
 the West Indies, by the withdrawal of the prohi- 
 bition against trading to the Spanish Colonies, 
 and by the immediate payment of the claims al- 
 ready acknowledged, and authority to settle the 
 others, in proportion as they should be passed. 
 Since these friendly assurances of redress were 
 given by the Spanish Ministers in an unqualified 
 way, England was once again placed in a condi- 
 tion to employ her best efforts as she might 
 wish in favour of Spanish Independence. 
 
 While these negotiations were being carried
 
 177 
 
 on, the Constitutional Generals Mina and 
 O'Donnell, had succeeded in crushing the 
 Army of the Faith, and compelling the self- 
 constituted Regency of Urgel to seek refuge in 
 France. 
 
 By the beginning of December the triumph 
 of the Constitutional cause over its internal ene- 
 mies seemed to be complete. 
 
 If the bias of M. de Villele's mind leaned 
 (as it undoubtedly did), even before the com- 
 mencement of the Congress, towards a pacifick 
 line of policy, the discomfiture of the Spanish 
 Royalists, and total dispersion of their bands, 
 was only calculated to confirm him in it. But, 
 besides this, other circumstances conspired to 
 strengthen his original opinion. 
 
 Before the conclusion of the Congress the ap- 
 prehension, which the French Premier had en- 
 tertained, probably, from a consciousness of his 
 intrigues, that Spain would declare war against 
 France, was dissipated. The French Government 
 received about the beginning of November satis- 
 factory accounts of the success of the Spanish 
 Government in keeping within bounds the irri- 
 tation that had been shown by the leading mem- 
 bers of the extraordinary Cortes against France. 
 The Spanish Government continued to pursue, 
 as M. de Villele himself acknowledged, a con- 
 ciliatory system towards the French Ministers, 
 and manifested a strong inclination to pay the 
 
 VOL. 1. n
 
 178 
 
 utmost attention to their complaints. The dan- 
 ger that for a short space of time seemed to 
 menace the personal liberty of some members of 
 the Royal Family was gone by. And the com- 
 mercial part of the community in France, begin- 
 ning to be alarmed at the prospect of a war with 
 Spain, petitions to the Minister of the Interior 
 from the principal trading towns were so nume- 
 rous, that that Minister judged it expedient to 
 decline receiving any further representations on 
 the subject. 
 
 The fear, too, that England might take advan- 
 tage of the disposition of the Cortes to empower 
 the Spanish Government to conclude a commer- 
 cial Treaty, granting her special privileges, was 
 also another incentive to M. de Villele to endea- 
 vour to preserve peace ; and, lastly, the firm 
 language held by the Duke of Wellington at 
 Verona, and the uncertainty what such language 
 might indicate, coupled with the Naval Arma- 
 ments that were being fitted out in the English 
 Ports for the West Indies, excited a salutary 
 alarm in M. de Villele's mind, as well as to whe- 
 ther attacking Spain might not risk a rupture 
 with England, as also how far it would be wise 
 to run such a risk with a nation whose Ministry 
 seemed so resolutely bent on vindicating the 
 national honour and avenging any insults to the 
 British Flag or any depredations on the British 
 Commerce,
 
 1/9 
 
 The same candid explanations as to the desti- 
 nation of these armaments were given to M. de 
 Villele when he asked them, that had been pre- 
 viously given, unasked, to the Spanish Govern- 
 ment; and, while Mr. Canning did not deny that 
 a proposal for a Commercial Treaty, if made, 
 might lead to practical consequences, he did not 
 hesitate to contradict, in the most unequivocal 
 manner, the extravagant reports that were circu- 
 lated, that Spain was to purchase the interposi- 
 tion of England at Verona, and her assistance, 
 if that interposition should fail, with commercial 
 advantages and Colonial cessions. 
 
 While this uncertainty existed as to whether 
 Spain would or would not be attacked, the 
 Portuguese Constitutional Government was 
 seated in too close a vicinity to that of Spain, 
 and bore too close a resemblance to it, both in 
 form and in the circumstances which attended 
 its establishment, not to feel the most intense 
 interest as to what might be the fate awaiting 
 its neighbour, 
 
 An attempt was accordingly made, at the 
 latter end of September, by Portugal to obtain 
 from Great Britain a guarantee both of the in- 
 tegrity of the Portuguese territory, and the exist- 
 ence of the Portuguese Constitution ; — insinuat- 
 ing, at the same time, if this were refused, an 
 offensive and defensive Treaty would at once 
 be negotiated with Spain. 
 
 n <2
 
 180 
 
 Mr. Canning, however, disregarded the threat, 
 and in declining to comply with the request, 
 took the opportunity of explaining to the Portu- 
 guese Government the exact nature of the en- 
 gagements subsisting between the two countries; 
 that those engagements were purely defensive, 
 and would not entitle Portugal to call upon 
 Great Britain for aid in a quarrel in which 
 Portugal herself should give the provocation. 
 Had it been otherwise, the effect would have 
 been to have placed the vital question of whether 
 this country should remain at peace, or go to 
 war, entirely in the decision of the Portuguese 
 Government. The consequence of this explana- 
 tion was the suspension, and ultimately the 
 abandonment, of the projected alliance between 
 Portugal and Spain. 
 
 Such was the state of the Spanish question 
 amongst the several European Powers at the 
 termination of the Congress at Verona. 
 
 Before, however, the history of this question 
 is continued, it will be advisable to go back to 
 the other matters which occupied the attention 
 of the Congress, of which the next in importance 
 was the state of affairs between Russia and the 
 Porte, and between the Porte and its Greek 
 subjects.
 
 181 
 
 CHAP. IV. 
 
 COMMENCEMENT OF GREEK INSURRECTION. MR. CAN- 
 NING'S VIEWS ON EASTERN AFFAIRS. PROCEEDINGS 
 
 AT VERONA RESPECTING, 1. THE DISCUSSIONS BE- 
 TWEEN RUSSIA AND TURKEY; 2. ITALY; 3. THE 
 
 SLAVE TRADE; 4. SPANISH AMERICA. 
 
 It was in the beginning of the year 1821 that the 
 Christian subjects of the Porte commenced their 
 attempt to conquer their independence. They 
 had for a long period been increasing in wealth 
 and numbers, and, at this time, engrossed nearly 
 the whole of the commerce and navigation of the 
 Ottoman Empire. It does not appear that any 
 unusual severities, or any very recent arbitrary 
 enactments inflicted upon them by their Mus- 
 sulman Masters, were the immediate causes of 
 their rebellion ; and although a merciless sys- 
 tem of government (the only one which is ever 
 followed by Turkish Rulers), must be peculiarly 
 grievous to Christians, yet they do not seem to 
 
 n 3
 
 182 
 
 have fared much worse, in these respects, than 
 their fellow-subjects, who followed the religion 
 of the Prophet. The undoubted fact, that the 
 Christians throughout the Turkish Empire had 
 in latter years increased in power, in numbers, 
 and in riches, tells more for the general lenity 
 of the Government under which they lived than 
 any insulated cases of oppression, of which with- 
 out doubt there were many, can avail in proof 
 of its general system of severity, or misrule. 
 
 The very circumstance, however, of the im- 
 portance into which they had risen is sufficient 
 to account, both for their desire to recover their 
 independence, and their hope of success if they 
 should make the attempt. 
 
 Whether, therefore, they were induced to 
 make an effort at this particular time to throw 
 off the Turkish yoke, by the example of the 
 successful resistance long maintained by one of 
 the Sultan's vassals, Ali Pacha, against His High- 
 ness's authority, — or by the intrigues of Russian 
 Agents, that most assuredly were carried on by 
 them, but probably without the knowledge, 
 certainly without the consent, of the Russian 
 Emperor; — or, lastly, by becoming converts to 
 those liberal principles which had induced the 
 people of some of the European nations to rise 
 against their Governments, — or whether it was 
 from all these causes united, — certain it is, that 
 as soon as the standard of Rebellion was raised,
 
 183 
 
 the whole Christian population of Greece and 
 of the Islands, flocked around it with enthusiasm, 
 ready to perish in the cause of Liberty. 
 
 The rebellion first manifested itself in Wal- 
 lachia ; and before the Porte had time to take 
 effectual measures for its suppression, a revolt, of 
 a more alarming nature, broke out in Moldavia, 
 headed by Prince Alexander Ypsilanti, son of a 
 former Hospodar of that Principality. At first 
 Ypsilanti seemed confident of the support and 
 protection of Alexander, and actually applied to 
 that Monarch for assistance. Unfortunately, how- 
 ever, for Ypsilanti his application reached His Im- 
 perial Majesty at the moment when he was in the 
 act of concerting with his Allies, at Laybach, a 
 plan for putting down the Constitutional Govern- 
 ments of Naples and Piedmont. To have de- 
 nounced Revolution in Italy, and, at the same 
 instant, to have countenanced it in Moldavia, 
 would have been an inconsistency of which the 
 Russian Autocrat was not likely to be guilty. It 
 appears, therefore, that he publickly condemned 
 the conduct of Ypsilanti, and positively refused 
 him all assistance. 
 
 Meanwhile the Insurrection spread through- 
 out the Morea, and the Islands. When the news 
 of it reached Constantinople, the greatest atro- 
 cities were perpetrated upon the persons of the 
 unhappy Greeks residing in that capital. The 
 Patriarch of the Greek Church, a venerable man 
 
 N 4
 
 184 
 
 of nearly eighty years of age, was seized on 
 Easter Sunday, while in the act of celebrating 
 Mass, and was hanged a few hours afterwards, 
 at the door of his own house. Other Prelates, 
 who were with him at the same time, shared the 
 same fate. These cruelties only served to unite 
 as one man the whole Greek population, in their 
 determination to throw off the yoke of their op- 
 pressors ; and, whenever an opportunity offered, 
 they retaliated on the Turks, who fell into their 
 hands, the barbarities which had been inflicted 
 upon their brethren at Constantinople. The 
 Turks, in their turn, revenged themselves ; and 
 the history of the conflict is one continued series 
 of butcheries on both sides. 
 
 The Turks were successful in regaining their 
 authority in the Principalities. But in Northern 
 Greece, the Morea, and the Islands, although, 
 till the Autumn, they kept possession of the 
 fortified places, the Greeks completely drove 
 them from the open Country. The Greek Fleet 
 destroyed part of the Turkish Squadron, the 
 remainder of which retired to the Dardanelles, 
 leaving the Greek Navy mistress of the Archi- 
 pelago. 
 
 While the European dominions of the Sultan 
 were thus convulsed from one end to the other, 
 the very existence of his Empire seemed threat* 
 ened, by a quarrel, in which he found himself 
 engaged with the Russian Court. The Emperor
 
 185 
 
 Alexander, indeed, although he disclaimed all 
 idea of countenancing the Greek Insurrection, 
 yet thought proper to direct His Representative 
 to remonstrate with the Porte upon many of its 
 proceedings ; such as the occupation of the 
 Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia by 
 Turkish Troops, which was contrary to Treaty; 
 the profanation and destruction of many Christian 
 Churches ; and the general outrages to which 
 the Christian subjects of the Porte had been 
 exposed, for whose protection the Russian Go- 
 vernment had a right, by Treaty, to interfere. 
 
 Independently of all these general causes of 
 complaint, the conduct of the Porte towards the 
 Russian Ambassador, personally, was any thing 
 but conciliatory. 
 
 A Greek banker, with whom the Russian 
 Embassy was connected, was seized on a charge 
 of treason ; the Ambassador, Baron StrogonofF, 
 demanded from the Porte that he should be 
 instantly set at liberty. The Divan rejected 
 obstinately all the Ambassador's requests, but 
 yielded the point to the representations of the 
 British Ambassador, Lord Strangford. 
 
 A Russian Packet Boat, contrary to the orders 
 of the Turkish Government, entered a forbidden 
 channel, and cast anchor before the country 
 residence of the Russian Embassy at Bouyouk- 
 Dere. The Turkish Admiral declared that if 
 the packet proceeded farther it would be fired
 
 a 
 
 186 
 
 upon. Baron Strogonoff remonstrated ; but find- 
 ing his remonstrances disregarded, he withdrew 
 (June 10. 1821,) from Pera to his country 
 house ; refused to enter into any communi- 
 cations with the Porte, and sent home for in- 
 structions to ins Government. On the 18th of 
 July the Baron, having received his instructions, 
 delivered in a note, to reply to which he only 
 allowed the Porte the short space of eight days. 
 
 The conditions demanded were, 
 
 1st. " That the Greek Churches, destroyed, 
 " or plundered, should be immediately restored, 
 " and rendered fit for the celebration of Divine 
 
 worship. 
 
 2d. " That the Christian Religion should be 
 ' restored to its prerogatives, by granting it the 
 
 same protection it formerly enjoyed, and by 
 
 guaranteeing its inviolability for the future, 
 " thus to console Europe in some degree for 
 *« the murder of the Patriarch. 
 
 3d. " That an equitable distinction should be 
 " made between the innocent and the guilty ; 
 " and a prospect of peace held out to those 
 " Greeks, who should hereafter submit, within a 
 " given time. 
 
 And, lastly, " That the Turkish Government 
 " should enable Russia by virtue of existing 
 " Treaties to contribute to the pacification of 
 " the Principalities of Wallachia and Mol- 
 " davia." 
 
 n
 
 18? 
 
 Agreeing to these terms, was " the only 
 " means," it was stated, " by which the Turks 
 " would be able to avoid their utter ruin." 
 
 To these demands the Porte delayed return- 
 ing an answer within the given time. The 
 Ambassador demanded his passports, and it was 
 only when he, and the whole of the Embassy, 
 had actually embarked for Odessa, that the Reis 
 EfFendi returned an answer, which His Excel- 
 lency then refused to receive, and forthwith 
 proceeded on his voyage. 
 
 The Porte, therefore, was compelled to send 
 its answer to the Russian Foreign Secretary of 
 State, Count Nesselrode, at St. Petersburgh. 
 
 The answer (dated 28th July) denied having 
 any fixed design to wage war against the Chris- 
 tian Religion, declared that the Greek Patriarch, 
 and the other Prelates, had only suffered the 
 just punishment of their crimes, as they were 
 engaged in treasonable designs ; and retorted 
 upon the Russian assertion, that " no Patriarch 
 " of the Eastern Church had ever undergone a 
 u dreadful death, upon the very spot where he 
 " was performing his sacred functions, on a day 
 " the most revered by Christians," by informing 
 the Russian Minister that the Sublime Porte was 
 not ignorant that " under the Czar Peter, the 
 " Russian Patriarch was not only put to death, 
 " but the Patriarchal dignity was entirely sup-
 
 188 
 
 " pressed," for a season, by the offended Mo- 
 narch. 
 
 With regard to the Principalities, the Porte 
 promised, as soon as they should be delivered 
 from the brigands who disturbed their tranquil- 
 lity, to withdraw its troops, and " to proceed 
 " immediately to the nomination and investiture 
 " of the Waiwodes," on condition that Michael 
 Suzzo, the Rebel Chief of Moldavia, and his 
 accomplices, who had fled to Russia for protec- 
 tion, should, in virtue of existing Treaties, be 
 surrendered to the Turkish authorities. 
 
 In conformity with the promises made, in this 
 answer, the Sultan published a manifesto to the 
 authorities in Anatolia and Roumelia, denounc- 
 ing his severest displeasure against those who 
 should commit any violence upon his defenceless 
 Christian subjects, who had taken no part in 
 the revolt ; and a firman was addressed to the 
 new Greek Patriarch, offering an amnesty to 
 such of the Greeks as would return to their 
 allegiance. 
 
 Meanwhile the conflict was carried on chiefly 
 to the advantage of the Greeks. Tripolizza, 
 the largest town in the Morea, when half cap- 
 tured by assault, was surrendered by the Turkish 
 commander, on condition that the lives of the 
 garrison should be spared ; a condition which 
 was immediately violated by the Greek captors.
 
 189 
 
 Corinth, likewise, fell into their hands ; and 
 Napoli da Malvasia was reduced by famine. 
 At Thermopylae the Turks sustained a bloody 
 defeat; and, in Acarnania, and Etolia, the 
 Suliotes preserved their superiority over the 
 Turks, who gained, however, towards the close 
 of the year, some advantages in Macedonia. 
 But notwithstanding these partial successes of 
 the Greeks, the probability of the final triumph 
 of their cause seemed much diminished, by the 
 pacifick sentiments which the Russian Emperor 
 entertained, in spite of the anger manifested 
 at the departure of his Embassy from Con- 
 stantinople. His Imperial Majesty's personal 
 feelings, even in a question of this nature, were 
 what were sure to guide the policy of the Russian 
 Cabinet. Alexander professed to be his own 
 minister, and, in point of fact, had made himself 
 so to a degree of which the world in general had 
 little conception. For some time past, a struggle 
 had been going on between the two ostensible 
 Ministers of Russia, Count Nesselrode and 
 Count Capo d'Istrias, the one being at the head 
 of the party, who wished to preserve peace with 
 Turkey, — the other at the head of those who 
 were for immediate war. For a time it had 
 been doubtful which Minister would be triumph- 
 ant ; but at last, the fear of the revolutionary 
 spirit, which had shown itself in different parts 
 of Europe, had a greater influence over His Im-
 
 190 
 
 perial Majesty's mind, than the temptations 
 which a war with Turkey afforded to him, with 
 the chance of that war producing a dissolution 
 of the Alliance. Instead, therefore, of taking 
 advantage of the opportunity to commence hos- 
 tilities, he dismissed Count Capo d'Istrias, and 
 requested the good offices of the other Christian 
 Embassies at Constantinople, to induce the Porte 
 to comply with his demands. 
 
 The Internuncio * and British Ambassador 
 were, in consequence of this request, instructed to 
 urge concession on the Sultan, and his Ministers, 
 who, on the 19th of October, 1821, received at 
 Constantinople the answer from St. Petersburg!], 
 to their note of the 28th of July ; which was not 
 only a repetition of the same demands made in 
 Baron StrogonofFs original note of the 18th of 
 July, but required, in addition, that the Porte 
 should take some direct step (marche directe) 
 towards conciliation, by informing the Russian 
 Court of the fact, that the Principalities were 
 restored to the state in which, by treaty, they 
 ought to be ; and that the Navigation of the 
 Black Sea (the regulations respecting which the 
 Porte had, as far as regarded Russia, unwisely 
 and unfairly altered,) should be replaced upon 
 the same footing that it was on before the break- 
 ing out of the Greek Insurrection. 
 
 * Internuncio — the name given to the Representative 
 of Austria at Constantinople.
 
 191 
 
 The Porte returned no answer to this note 
 till the 10th of December, when, the Reis 
 Effendi having been dismissed, and a new 
 Minister appointed, a reply was sent to Lord 
 Strangford, in which the Porte consented to 
 adjourn the question of the surrender of its 
 rebellious subjects, who had taken refuge in 
 Russia ; but declined to evacuate the Prin- 
 cipalities, or to appoint Hospodars, till the re- 
 bellion of its Christian subjects, which had 
 begun in those Provinces, should be finally 
 crushed. Nevertheless, the Porte consented to 
 maintain no more troops there than were ne- 
 cessary to keep down the brigands with which 
 the country was over-run j and further engaged 
 to rebuild the churches as soon as peace should 
 be restored to the Empire. 
 
 This note was immediately sent to St. Peters- 
 burgh by Lord Strangford. The compliance 
 with the Russian demands being made to de- 
 pend upon a contingency little likely to occur, 
 at any rate for a considerable time, it was, in 
 fact, little better than a direct refusal of those 
 demands. Still, however, the Czar was unwilling 
 to appeal to arms, and actually sent M. de 
 Tatischeffto Vienna, with full powers to arrange 
 all the differences between the two Courts ; but 
 the Porte persevered in its determination not to 
 concede any thing beyond what it had offered 
 to concede, in its note to Lord Strangford ; and
 
 192 
 
 answered the remonstrances made on behalf of 
 Russia, by complaints against Russia for per- 
 severing in her violation of the stipulations of 
 the Treaty of Bucharest, by still retaining 
 possession of the fortresses on the Asiatick 
 frontier, which by that Treaty it had been 
 settled should be surrendered to the Porte. 
 M. de Tatischeff returned, therefore, to Peters- 
 burgh, without having succeeded in the objects 
 of his mission. 
 
 The English Ambassador and the Internuncio 
 were not, however, prevented from continuing 
 their exertions with the Porte, to induce Her to 
 yield to the just demands of Russia. Towards 
 the middle of May their representations began 
 to make some impression upon the obstinacy of 
 the Divan, which at last gave orders for the 
 evacuation of the Principalities, and appointed 
 two Christian, native boyards, to the Govern- 
 ment of those Provinces. It was, indeed, time 
 for the Turks to yield something of their pre- 
 tensions, pressed as they were by difficulties on 
 all sides, and especially by a war with Persia ; 
 to say nothing of the complete destruction of 
 Aleppo, and all the towns in its neighbourhood, 
 by an earthquake. 
 
 The contest in Northern Greece, the Morea, 
 and the Islands, was carried on with various suc- 
 cess during the early part of 182*2. It had, 
 however, assumed somewhat of a different cha-
 
 193 
 
 racter in consequence of the national Congress, 
 which had been established by the Greeks at 
 Epidaurus, having published a manifesto, claim- 
 ing, on their behalf, the rank of a Free and In- 
 dependent People. The same horrors which 
 had disgraced the conflict in the preceding year 
 were continued in this. But one, even still 
 greater than any that had occurred before, took 
 place in the beginning of April. Scio, the 
 richest and most commercial of the islands in 
 the Archipelago, had thus far taken no part in 
 the Rebellion. Towards the end of March, a 
 little squadron, belonging to the Insurgents, 
 appeared off the Island, and having disembarked 
 a small force of about 5000 men, the whole 
 Christian population rose against the Turks, 
 who, finding resistance useless, fled to the 
 citadel for protection. The victory of the 
 Greeks was, as usual, disgraced by outrages, 
 and the Turks resolved on a signal vengeance. 
 A fortnight after the Insurrection, a large 
 Turkish force, amounting to 15,000 men, landed 
 on the devoted island. The whole population 
 was exterminated ; every habitable dwelling was 
 set on fire, and the country left a complete 
 desert. 
 
 Vigorous remonstrances against these atro- 
 cities, addressed to the Porte by Lord Strang- 
 ford, by direction of the English Government, 
 
 vol. i. o
 
 194 
 
 certainly produced a very strong impression on 
 the Turkish Ministers. 
 
 The Greeks shortly after revenged themselves 
 upon the chief actors in these scenes of deso- 
 lation. They succeeded in fastening two fire- 
 ships to two of the largest ships of the Turkish 
 navy lying at anchor off Scio ; one of which 
 (the Admiral's) was burnt, and every soul on 
 board, to the number of 2300, perished. The 
 other ship was considerably injured, but the 
 crew managed to extinguish the flames. The 
 Turks in the remaining vessels forthwith again 
 landed, and destroyed every vestige of every 
 thing Christian in the island, which had before 
 escaped the general destruction. 
 
 While these dreadful occurrences were taking 
 place in the Archipelago, which could tend but 
 little towards bringing the contest to a termin- 
 ation, the Turks were gaining very considerable 
 advantages in Northern Greece and in the 
 Morea. They succeeded in introducing a large 
 army, under the command of the Seraskier, 
 Curshid Pacha, into the former country, through 
 the passes of Thermopylae, which the Greeks 
 had neglected to defend ; a part of which force, 
 having marched into the Morea, was joined by 
 a body of men under Yusuf Pacha, who then 
 assumed the command : Corinth and Argos fell 
 into his hands, and a large reinforcement was
 
 195 
 
 thrown into Napoli di Romania, the Turkish 
 garrison of which important place was just on 
 the eve of capitulation. 
 
 This was the state of affairs between the Porte 
 and its rebellious subjects, as known in England, 
 immediately subsequent to the Duke of Wel- 
 lington's departure for the Congress at Vienna, 
 where the condition of the East of Europe (as 
 it was then supposed) was to have been the chief 
 subject of deliberation. 
 
 With respect to the negotiations between 
 Russia and the Porte, the demands of the 
 former, founded on Treaties, (with the excep- 
 tion of the one relating to the Black Sea, of 
 which the British Government had not then 
 heard,) with one exception, were either actually 
 satisfied, or in the course of being so. The new 
 Hospodars had departed from Constantinople 
 for their Governments ; the Turkish troops 
 were gradually evacuating the Principalities; and 
 the Greek Churches, which had been destroyed 
 or injured, were being rebuilt or repaired. There 
 remained only for the Divan to renew the am- 
 nesty to the Greeks, the publication of which 
 instrument, on the part of the Turkish Govern- 
 ment, " would have completed all that the letter 
 " or spirit of existing treaties would have en- 
 " titled Russia to require from the Porte, or 
 " the Allies of Russia to countenance her in 
 
 " exacting. 
 
 o 2
 
 196 
 
 There consequently would have remained 
 little more to be done, beyond reducing to di- 
 plomatick form the reconciliation between the 
 Russian and the Ottoman Governments, if the 
 Emperor of Russia had not seemed to feel him- 
 self bound to obtain some more signal manifest- 
 ation of the success, wherewith he had pursued 
 the objects for which he menaced hostilities, and 
 of the deference with which he had been treated 
 by the Turkish Court. 
 
 It was only with this view that the attempt to 
 obtain the mission of a Turkish Plenipotentiary 
 to the frontiers, after almost all the points of the 
 dispute had been adjusted, could have been 
 pressed, so earnestly as it had been, by the Rus- 
 sian Emperor. It appeared, however, by the 
 accounts from Lord Strangford, that the attempt 
 had failed ; and it could hardly be expected to 
 be renewed with advantage, unless the Russian 
 Government should be disposed to admit the 
 bringing into discussion, under the mediation 
 of the Allies, his Imperial Majesty's disputes 
 with Turkey, on the frontiers of their respective 
 Asiatick dominions ; an admission which, as the 
 Emperor was the violator of Treaties in that 
 direction, was altogether improbable. 
 
 Failing, therefore, in this attempt, nothing 
 seemed to remain which could be required by 
 the Emperor with any reason, or with any pro- 
 bability of its being conceded by the Turks,
 
 197 
 
 except the addition to the proposed act of am- 
 nesty for the Greeks, of some solemn and re- 
 corded obligation on the part of the Turkish 
 Court, for the future good government of its 
 Greek subjects. " Such an addition would have 
 " been, without doubt, highly desirable ; and it 
 " was only natural that the Emperor of Russia 
 " should have been desirous to obtain it. But 
 " as such a demand was not within the limits of 
 " his ultimatum, nor in the letter of his Treaties, 
 " the question with the British Government was, 
 " whether His Imperial Majesty should be 
 " allowed to seek it in his own way, or through 
 " his own means, at the risk of a refusal leading 
 " to a renewal of angry discussions, and possibly 
 " to war ; or whether the Allies should join 
 " with him in a common demand, at the risk 
 " of compromising their dignity, if the Turks 
 " should refuse to yield, and the Allies should 
 " acquiesce in the refusal ; or, by asserting their 
 " dignity, of being drawn into a joint war." 
 
 Before being driven to such an alternative, 
 the British Government was determined to make 
 every amicable effort with the Porte to induce 
 it, for its own sake, to yield to the demands of 
 Russia. But if its efforts should be exhausted, 
 and exhausted in vain, then the British Govern- 
 ment would have to come to a decision upon the 
 alternative in question. " In deciding upon it 
 
 o 3
 
 198 
 
 * their object would continue to be, as it had 
 ' hitherto been, to maintain peace among na- 
 ' tions, and to avoid all interference in the in- 
 
 * ternal concerns of any nations — such inter- 
 ' ference not being authorized by the positive 
 1 rights or obligations of Treaty, nor justified 
 ' (except when Treaty or some very special cir- 
 ' cumstance authorized it) by the principles of 
 ' international law." 
 
 " The questions respecting Turkey presented 
 ' themselves under a double aspect. So far as 
 ' related to the struggle between the Greeks 
 ' and the Porte, Great Britain had no right to 
 ' interfere. Whatever might be her wishes, her 
 ' prejudices, or her sympathies, she was bound 
 
 * in political justice to respect, in this case, that 
 ' national independence, which in case of civil 
 ' commotion She would look to have respected 
 ' in her own. Nor was it for a Christian Go- 
 ' vernment, which ruled in its distant depend- 
 i encies over a population of millions of Ma- 
 ' hometans, to proclaim a war of Religion. " 
 
 The discussions between Russia and Turkey, 
 on the other hand, prescribed a case which called 
 for English mediation. It was impossible for 
 England to view the hazard to which Europe 
 was exposed by the collision of two such Powers, 
 without feeling herself bound to interfere, with 
 the utmost exertion of her good offices, to pre- 
 vent so formidable a contingency.
 
 199 
 
 Accordingly she, in concert with her Allies, 
 had so interposed, and not without effect. 
 
 " The quarrel of the Emperor of Russia was 
 founded on the non-observance of Treaties, 
 which gave the Emperor a right of interference, 
 to a certain extent, in the internal affairs of the 
 Turkish Government ; and through British in- 
 fluence the infractions of Treaty had been re- 
 dressed. But the right which Treaties might 
 give, Treaties must be held to limit. And if 
 the Emperor determined upon pushing his de- 
 mands beyond that limitation, neither was it 
 the policy of England, nor was it consistent 
 with her principles, to make common cause 
 with His Imperial Majesty." 
 " The Emperor might have motives of policy, 
 exclusively Russian, if not for regretting the 
 loss of an opportunity to aggrandize himself 
 at the expense of Turkey, at least for not 
 appearing to have thrown such an opportunity 
 away, so hastily, as to embitter the regrets, 
 and possibly excite the indignation, of his 
 army and his people. In such a temper of 
 mind the advisers of the Emperor of Russia 
 might wish that the terms of reconciliation 
 exacted from Turkey had been originally 
 higher, might feel disappointment at the con- 
 cession of them by Turkey, and might seek to 
 amend their error by new and unattainable 
 requisitions." 
 
 o 4
 
 200 
 
 In such requisitions Mr. Canning determined 
 that England should never join ; nor should she 
 make herself a party to any new calls upon 
 Turkey which Russia had no right to enforce. 
 " If, therefore, the Emperor of Russia should 
 C{ resolve upon urging such demands to the ex- 
 " tremity of war, England would withdraw alto- 
 " gether from any concern in the contest." 
 
 If this reasoning were applicable to the then 
 existing relations between Turkey and Russia, 
 it was still more applicable to the discussions 
 between the Porte and its Greek subjects. 
 
 " In those discussions England had not the 
 " pretence of a right to interfere. It was 
 " certainly her right, her duty, and her in* 
 " clination to employ her utmost endeavours to 
 " induce the Porte, with a view to its own irt- 
 " terests, not only to grant the fullest amnesty 
 " to, but really and in good truth to govern, its 
 " Christian subjects with a mild and equitable 
 " sway. But as to further interference, what 
 "if the Greeks, who had but lately published 
 " an Act declaratory of their independence, 
 " should determine to accept nothing short of 
 " its acknowledgment? And what if they should 
 " reject all terms short of that acknowledgment 
 " as insult and injury? And what if the Turkish 
 " Government were to put to England the 
 " question (as it would have a right to do)> 
 " ' Whether, if the Sultan should agree to grant
 
 201 
 
 " ' all that England required, and if the effect 
 " * of the offer of such a concession should be 
 " ' to raise the demands and exasperate the rc- 
 " ' sistance of the Greeks, would England make 
 " « common cause with the Turks, and chastise 
 " ' those who rejected at once their authority 
 " * and mediation?' Would the English Govern- 
 " ment be prepared to answer such a question in 
 " the affirmative ? It certainly would not ; and, 
 " even if it had wished, it would not be for the 
 " interest of the Greeks that England should 
 " interfere in the quarrel on such a condition." 
 
 It was for these reasons, therefore, that, while 
 Mr. Canning determined to spare no exertion, 
 by good offices, to preserve peace between 
 Russia and the Porte, and to restore internal 
 tranquillity to Turkey, yet he was equally deter- 
 mined, on no consideration, to incur the risk of 
 hostilities, on either of these accounts, if those 
 exertions should fail. To this effect the Duke 
 of Wellington received instructions for his 
 guidance at the Congress. 
 
 Lord Strangford having, as has been stated, 
 been most active in carrying on the negotiations 
 at Constantinople, His Lordship was permitted to 
 be present at Vienna at the time of the Congress. 
 Previously to his departure from the former 
 capital, he had a conference (27th September 
 1822) with the Turkish Ministers, in which he 
 urged upon them the renewal of the Amnesty,
 
 202 
 
 and the establishment of a system of mercy and 
 conciliation towards the Greeks, to be adopted 
 more or less in concert with the Allies, and 
 subject to their intervention in support of its 
 conditions. 
 
 The Turkish Minister declared, in answer, 
 that in point of fact it was already renewed ; 
 that every Tartar despatched from Constan- 
 tinople carried to the Pachas in the Morea in- 
 structions to treat the Greeks with mercy and 
 humanity ; but that the Porte would not admit, 
 for one moment, the proposal of rendering the 
 Allies in any way parties to the Amnesty, or of 
 placing its execution under their safeguard. 
 
 In urging, however, this point upon the 
 Turkish Ministers, Lord Strangfbrd was con- 
 tinually obliged to turn aside to defend the 
 agents of the Russian Government against im- 
 putations of having been the originators of the 
 Greek Rebellion, the proof of which it seemed 
 the Porte held most unquestionably in its hands. 
 Lord Strangfbrd, in answer, attributed that in- 
 surrection to the ill treatment of the Greeks by 
 their local rulers, and the violation of their rights, 
 as established by the Turkish laws ; and in so 
 doing, there can be no doubt that His Lordship 
 was so far right, that both he and the Turkish 
 Minister assigned the origin of the rebellion to 
 one of the causes, to which it was to be justly 
 attributed.
 
 203 
 
 In all the charges, however, of this nature the 
 Turkish Ministers scrupulously spared the cha- 
 racter of the Emperor, and imputed all that had 
 been done to his Ministers, whom they accused 
 of deceiving and misleading their Imperial 
 Master. The conference was concluded by the 
 Reis Effendi declaring, in the most positive 
 manner, that the Sultan would never tolerate 
 foreign interference in his domestick concerns ; 
 that every degree of indulgence and forgive- 
 ness would be granted to the Greek people ; 
 and that Lord Strangford was not only autho- 
 rized, but requested, to make this assurance in 
 the most positive terms to the Allied Ministers 
 at Vienna ; and, at the same time, to report the 
 kindness shown to the Rayahs* at Constantinople, 
 as was proved by the execution, within three 
 months, of 500 Turks for oppressing and in- 
 sulting them, besides the banishment of thou- 
 sands for no other offence. 
 
 Of this conference, Lord Strangford made a 
 Precis, which he communicated to Prince Met- 
 ternich. 
 
 As soon as this Precis became known at 
 Vienna, where the Allied Sovereigns were 
 assembled, the Emperor Alexander took offence 
 at the part which Lord Strangford had acted, in 
 not having struggled to preserve the dignity of 
 
 * Rayah— any subject of the Porte, not a Mahommetan.
 
 204 
 
 Russia, by denying the charges brought against 
 its agents by the Ministers of the Porte. The 
 Emperor, indeed, would not believe a word of 
 the Precis of Lord Strangford' s conference, and 
 looked upon it as a romance, written to set 
 His Imperial Majesty against his servants. But 
 the truth was, Lord Strangford could not have 
 repelled the charges against the Russian Govern- 
 ment more effectually than he did. The Porte, 
 he well knew, had received the most positive 
 proofs of the activity of Russian Agents in the 
 insurrection of the Morea ; and so anxious was 
 the Porte to force these proofs upon him, that 
 he was obliged, while he attributed the revolt to 
 other causes, carefully to abstain from expressing 
 even his doubts as to the existence of Russian 
 intrigues, lest the Reis Effendi should have 
 produced such proofs of their existence, as 
 would have left him no choice but that of ac- 
 knowledging them. 
 
 The circumstance, too, that the Russian Agent 
 had suppressed the declaration of the Emperor's 
 displeasure, at the first breaking out of the In- 
 surrection in Moldavia, made it impossible for 
 Lord Strangford to use this the strongest argu- 
 ment, in proof of the bond jide dispositions of 
 Russia. But the truth, as before stated, was, that 
 a difference of opinion, on the subject of Oriental 
 Politicks, had existed between the Autocrat, 
 and some of his Ministers j a circumstance
 
 205 
 
 "which explains the apparently inconsistent con- 
 duct pursued by the Russian Government. 
 
 Count Nesselrode, however, took advantage 
 of the occasion to circulate a note among the 
 Plenipotentiaries of the different Courts, animad- 
 verting on the conduct of Lord Strangford, 
 whereby the double purpose was answered, first, 
 of appearing to be highly indignant at the in- 
 sinuations against the good faith of the Russian 
 Government ; and next, of laying the grounds 
 for breaking off with the Turks, in case the 
 Emperor should change his mind, and think it 
 politick to do so. 
 
 The Duke of Wellington defended Lord 
 Strangford' s conduct to the Emperor Alexander, 
 and made so considerable an impression upon 
 His Imperial Majesty, that, before the conclusion 
 of the interview, he declared that he did not 
 mean to censure Lord Strangford, and promised 
 that he would receive him perfectly well ; which 
 promise he kept. 
 
 The Duke, however, before the Congress 
 adjourned from Vienna to Verona, addressed a 
 note to Count Nesselrode upon the subject, in 
 justification of Lord Strangford. 
 
 The questions that were still at issue between 
 Turkey and Russia His Grace did not touch 
 upon, but left them for discussion at the latter 
 place. The Porte having complied with all the 
 demands in the original Russian Ultimatum, and
 
 206 
 
 the pretension of being allowed to watch over 
 the execution of the amnesty to the Greeks 
 being no longer insisted upon by the Russian 
 Court, there remained (assuming that the Porte 
 fairly executed the measures respecting the 
 Principalities, which had been commenced,) 
 only two points to be conceded ; on the con- 
 cession of which, all pretence for the non-esta- 
 blishment of a complete reconciliation between 
 the two Powers would be done away. 
 
 Of these, the first was, that the Sultan should 
 send a Plenipotentiary to the Frontiers, or should 
 make some direct conciliatory overture to 
 Russia. 
 
 The second, which had sprung up sub- 
 sequently to the presentation of the original 
 Ultimatum, was to place the system by which 
 the Porte regulated the navigation of the Black 
 Sea upon its ancient footing, 
 
 With regard to the first, as the Porte had 
 already peremptorily rejected the proposal of 
 sending a Plenipotentiary to the Frontier, and as 
 the alternative offered was only a reasonable step 
 for the Porte to take, and not at all derogatory 
 to its dignity, there were fair grounds for hoping 
 that the Sultan would not hesitate long upon the 
 subject. 
 
 With regard to the second, it appeared that 
 the nations which had not by treaty acquired the 
 privilege of navigating the Black Sea, had long
 
 207 
 
 enjoyed it by adopting the flag of those Powers 
 to whom the right had been granted. This 
 system had given rise to the abuse of foreign 
 flags, and had even favoured the passage, to and 
 fro, of Greek Insurgent vessels. 
 
 The Divan resolved, therefore, to put a stop 
 to it, and accordingly issued an order, enjoin- 
 ing a strict search of every European vessel 
 which should pass, under whatever flag, and a 
 rigorous detention of all that should belong to 
 Nations not possessing the privilege, a privilege 
 granted to those Nations who enjoyed it, either 
 in consequence of a war, at the end of which 
 the Porte yielded it, or else, in consequence of 
 some amicable negotiation, stipulating the equi- 
 valent to be given for it, by the other contracting 
 party. The Porte, therefore, determined that it 
 would not suffer other Powers, who had not ob- 
 tained the privilege, to defraud the interests of 
 Turkey by surreptitiously availing themselves of 
 an advantage for which other States had been 
 content to pay. 
 
 The effect, however, of this order was to 
 injure, if not to destroy, the commerce of 
 Odessa, and of the Russian territories on the 
 Black Sea, which was carried on either in 
 Greek vessels, or in foreign vessels under Rus- 
 sian colours. The Porte, however, had an un- 
 doubted right to issue the order in question ; but 
 it must, nevertheless, be allowed that it would
 
 208 
 
 be somewhat painful for a Power like Russia, 
 quietly to see the prosperity of its most im- 
 portant provinces, which had grown up under 
 the acquiescence of its weaker neighbour, sud- 
 denly destroyed by the enforcement of a right 
 which had long been practically waived. 
 
 The demand, therefore, of Russia was either 
 that the Porte should grant to the Kings of 
 Sardinia, Denmark, Spain, and Naples, permis- 
 sion for vessels, under their flag, to pass, they 
 paying for the same ; or else, that it should con- 
 tinue to connive at the protections existing pre- 
 viously to the late regulations. 
 
 Neither the demand for some direct conci- 
 liatory overture from the Porte, nor this last- 
 mentioned one, respecting the navigation of the 
 Black Sea, were, it was understood, to be urged 
 by Russia to the extremity of war. The boon, 
 the granting of which was contingent upon the 
 concession of these demands, was simply the re- 
 establishment of the Russian Mission at Con- 
 stantinople. 
 
 Such was the state of Eastern affairs at the 
 time when the first conference was held respect- 
 ing them at Verona. 
 
 At that conference not much was done. M. 
 de TatischefF read a paper, explaining the exact 
 position of Russia towards the Porte, and stating 
 explicitly the Russian demands, the nature of 
 which have just been described. Prince Met-
 
 209 
 
 ternich read a paper, declarative of the readiness 
 of his Government to assist Russia in urging her 
 demands on Turkey j and the French and Prus- 
 sian Ministers declared, verbally, the determin- 
 ation of their respective Governments to adopt 
 the same line as Austria. The Duke of Wel- 
 lington simply made known his intention, to give 
 in his answer to the Russian Note, at a future 
 Meeting. The Duke, at that time, owing to 
 a misconception of Lord Strangford's, of which 
 it is unnecessary to detail the particulars, had 
 received instructions not to promise the co- 
 operation of the British Ambassador at Con- 
 stantinople, towards procuring from the Porte 
 the concessions sought respecting the navigation 
 of the Black Sea. As the Duke was aware of 
 the mistake into which Lord Stransrfbrd had 
 led Mr. Canning, His Grace did not hesitate to 
 comply with Count Nesselrode's request, not 
 to give in his note, until he should know whe- 
 ther his Government would consent to give its 
 good offices, in concert with the other Allies, to 
 prevail upon the Porte to grant firmans for the 
 navigation of the Black Sea, to those Powers, 
 who, not being permitted to appear in that sea, 
 should apply for them. 
 
 Before the second conference was held, the 
 Duke received permission (if he should think it 
 expedient) to direct Lord Strangford to exert 
 
 VOL. I. P
 
 210 
 
 himself at Constantinople in furtherance of the 
 Russian demands ; and this was granted, be- 
 cause it was no longer a question in which, if 
 the demands were not complied with, hostilities 
 were threatened as the alternative (an alternative 
 which could only have been defended by a 
 denial of justice) ; but was reduced to the in- 
 finitely less important point of the renewal of 
 Diplomatick Relations. 
 
 At that conference the French plenipotentiary 
 gave in a Note, in which he declared, that France 
 would neglect no means to induce Turkey to 
 satisfy, as soon as possible, the demands of 
 Russia ; and the Prussian Minister pledged his 
 country to a similar course of conduct. 
 
 The Duke of Wellington's Note promised, 
 on behalf of his Government, that the British 
 Ambassador should use his influence with 
 the Divan, to persuade it to send a friendly 
 notification to the Court of St. Petersburgh of 
 the evacuation of the Principalities ; and to pro- 
 cure the same privileges for the other Sove- 
 reigns, respecting the Navigation of the Black 
 Sea, which England, France, and Russia already 
 enjoyed ; and to obtain which for the King of 
 Sardinia, Lord Strangford had been exerting 
 himself previously to his departure from Con- 
 stantinople. 
 
 To these Notes Count Nesselrode replied,
 
 211 
 
 that the Emperor felt the greatest satisfaction at 
 the conduct of the Allies, and left himself with 
 perfect confidence in their hands. 
 
 Lord Strangford was accordingly instructed, 
 by the Duke of Wellington, to exert himself to 
 induce the Porte to take a step in advance 
 . towards Russia, and to push, as fast as pos- 
 sible, to a conclusion the Treaty between 
 Turkey and Sardinia. As soon as he should 
 report that his efforts had been attended with a 
 favourable result, it would then be determined, 
 in behalf of which of the King's Allies, similar 
 exertions should be renewed. 
 
 The determination of the British Government 
 to allow Lord Strangford again to undertake the 
 task of advocating the cause of Russia with the 
 Porte, restored His Lordship to favour both with 
 the Emperor, and his Ministers. His Imperial 
 Majesty honoured Lord Strangford with an 
 audience of leave before his departure for Con- 
 stantinople, and expressed his gratitude for 
 Lord Strangford's past services, and entire con- 
 fidence in his future conduct. His Imperial 
 Majesty said, that he had intended to confide 
 his interests to an individual in the service of 
 the Emperor of Austria, jointly with his Lord- 
 ship j but that he had since resolved to leave the 
 final arrangements of his differences with the 
 Porte exclusively in Lord Strangford's hands. 
 He hoped, he said, that Lord Strangford had 
 
 p 2
 
 212 
 
 dismissed from his mind every unpleasant feel- 
 ing excited by allusions made in the Russian 
 Note of the 20th September, respecting him. 
 Lord Strangford took the opportunity of urging 
 the Emperor to mark his restoration to the con- 
 fidence of His Imperial Majesty, as his loss of 
 it had been, by a letter, which might prove to 
 the Turkish Ministry that he was charged with 
 the Emperor's affairs at Constantinople ; and 
 which would be the means of removing any 
 unfavourable impression caused by the circum- 
 stances attendant on his first reception by the 
 Russian Ministers, of which the Porte was 
 doubtless apprised. To this proposal the Em- 
 peror graciously consented, remarking, that he 
 considered Lord Strangford as one of his own 
 Ministers. 
 
 Some further conversation passed at the inter- 
 view on the subject of the Greeks. The Em- 
 peror's feelings were evidently divided, between 
 anxiety for the principles of legitimacy, and 
 sympathy for the sufferings of his co-religionists ; 
 but the former feeling evidently prevailed over 
 the latter, since he considered himself so com- 
 mitted to those principles, that he was precluded 
 from avowing any wish, even for the success of 
 the Greek cause. The Emperor said, that he 
 felt convinced that publick opinion in England 
 would, in time, compel the British Ministry to 
 take the state of Greece into their consideration j
 
 213 
 
 and that that question would become, like the 
 Slave Trade, one of strong* national feeling ; 
 that he, therefore, preferred waiting for any 
 measures which the British Government might 
 originate, to taking the lead in proposing to the 
 Allies any plan for improving the political state 
 of Greece ; that the idea of Greek independ- 
 ence was a chimera, and that the utmost extent 
 of his wishes would be, to see the Greeks placed 
 on the same footing as the inhabitants of Servia, 
 or of Wallachia and Moldavia. 
 
 It is impossible not to be struck with the ex- 
 treme moderation manifested by the Emperor 
 Alexander, throughout the whole of his conduct 
 on the subject of Eastern affairs. There can 
 be no doubt that the great majority of his sub- 
 jects, of his army, and even of his ministers, 
 were anxious to undertake the conquest of 
 Turkey, and to revel in the plunder of Con- 
 stantinople. It was the general conviction that if 
 he chose, and if England did not interfere with 
 a fleet in the Black Sea to prevent him, the Em- 
 peror had it in his power to obtain possession of 
 the Turkish capital in a single campaign : such, 
 at least, was the opinion of many (if not all) of 
 the first military characters of the age; and 
 there is every reason to believe that the Em- 
 peror did not think differently himself; g and 
 yet, although he had, at one time, just grounds 
 for declaring war against the Porte, and no 
 
 vol. i. # p 3
 
 2W 
 
 Power could have gainsaid his right to do so, 
 he forbore to avail himself of circumstances 
 apparently so favourable for the annihilation of 
 the Moslem power in Europe, and preferred 
 obtaining his just rights by means of negotiation, 
 and the intervention of his Allies, to seeking re- 
 tribution by an appeal to arms. 
 
 For this moderation on the part of the Em- 
 peror it is not difficult to account. He was well 
 aware that in the operation against Constan- 
 tinople he would lose a great portion of his 
 army ; that the war would be one of peculiar 
 hardship and difficulty, rather than of manoeuvre 
 and gallantly j and that many would fall victims 
 to the climate : that, even supposing the con- 
 quest to be complete, he would necessarily 
 for some time be wholly occupied with the 
 affairs of Asia, and the Asiatick frontier ; 
 and that he would consequently be unable to 
 devote himself exlusively to the concerns of 
 Europe. He knew that the employment of 
 the Russian army in such an enterprise would 
 give courage to the advocates of popular prin- 
 ciples throughout the world ; and as he himself 
 perhaps did not feel his autocracy proof against 
 their influence, he preferred keeping secure 
 what he then enjoyed, to risking its safety for 
 the doubtful chance of being permitted to annex 
 to his already overgrown dominions, the Euro- 
 pean provinces of the Turkish Empire.
 
 215 
 
 There can be no doubt, therefore, that the 
 Emperor, in confiding his cause to Lord Strang- 
 fbrd, did so, with a sincere wish that it should 
 be advocated in a way which would enable him 
 to settle his differences with the Sultan with 
 credit to himself, both in the eyes of his own 
 people, and in those of his Allies. 
 
 The note promised by the Emperor, de- 
 claratory of Lord Strangford' s being again re- 
 ceived into his confidence, was to have been 
 written to His Lordship by Count Nesselrode ; 
 but Lord Strangford proposed, in order that the 
 Count might be spared the mortification of 
 addressing to him personally a letter, of a nature 
 so very different to that which had been cir- 
 culated before his arrival at Vienna, that the 
 laudatory epistle should be addressed to Prince 
 Metternich, for the purpose of being communi- 
 cated by His Austrian Highness. 
 
 This amende having been made to Lord 
 Strangford, he departed from Verona in the 
 beginning of December. 
 
 Such were the results of the Congress re- 
 specting the relations between Turkey and 
 Russia. No proposition was made at it by any 
 party, to interfere in the contest between the 
 Turks and Greeks ; and even a Plenipotentiary 
 from the latter, charged by the Provisional 
 Government with a message to the Congress, 
 
 p 4
 
 216 
 
 was not permitted to proceed to the place where 
 it was assembled. 
 
 Meanwhile, however, the Greeks had been 
 gaining considerable advantages over their oppo- 
 nents j that part of the Turkish army which had 
 penetrated into the Morea had been surrounded, 
 and cut off from all supplies. The Commander 
 of it offered to evacuate the Peninsula by capitula- 
 tion ; but the offer was rejected by the triumphant 
 Greeks. He was, therefore, compelled to en- 
 deavour to force his way to the Isthmus ; but his 
 army was completely destroyed in the attempt, 
 and of the 30,000 men that had entered the 
 Morea in the beginning of the campaign, 
 towards the close of September not above 10,000 
 remained. 
 
 Curschid Pacha, who had not entered the 
 Morea, in vain attempted to come to their 
 relief. Having failed, he tried to retreat 
 towards Macedonia ; but his efforts to pass 
 Thermopylae were unsuccessful, and he was, 
 therefore, compelled to fall back upon Larissa. 
 Towards the end of the year the Greeks got 
 possession of Napoli di Romania. 
 
 An attempt was made by the Turkish Fleet 
 to retake Missolounghi, which failed j and the 
 Greeks attacked with fire-ships, in a way similar 
 to that which they adopted near Scio, and with 
 similar success, this portion of the Ottoman 
 Navy.
 
 217 
 
 The Turks were not more fortunate in their 
 Asiatick war ; for in the beginning of August 
 they were completely defeated by the Persians, 
 under the command of the Prince Royal. 
 
 The Ministers of the Sultan were, as usual, 
 made responsible for the national disasters, and 
 the major part of those who had composed the 
 Turkish Cabinet, at Lord Strangford's departure 
 from Constantinople, were either beheaded or 
 dismissed, before he returned to that Capital to 
 renew the negotiations for which he had re- 
 ceived instructions at Verona. 
 
 ***** 
 
 The three remaining topicks which occupied 
 the attention of the Congress, were the position 
 of the Italian Peninsula, the Slave Trade, and 
 the existing state of Spanish America. 
 
 With respect to the first, though the British 
 Plenipotentiary was directed not to interfere on 
 the subject so long as no measures were pro- 
 posed to be adopted at the Congress, which 
 would affect either the obligations of Treaty, or 
 the rights of independent Powers, or the poli- 
 tical balance and general tranquillity of Europe, 
 yet he was instructed to promote any plan for 
 the withdrawal of the Austrian Troops both 
 from Piedmont and Naples, by not withholding 
 the expression of the satisfaction which his Go- 
 vernment would derive, from such steps being 
 resolved upon at the Congress. It was thought
 
 218 
 
 that such an opinion might be given without 
 prejudice to that " character of neutrality, but 
 " not of indifference," which, with respect to the 
 affairs of Italv, it was the wish of Great Britain to 
 maintain. Before the Duke of Wellington left 
 Verona, it was determined that some of the 
 Austrian Troops should forthwith quit Piedmont, 
 and that the remainder should all be withdrawn 
 before the end of nine months. It was likewise 
 settled that the Austrian forces in Naples should 
 be diminished about one half. 
 
 As to the second, the Slave Trade, no step 
 was taken by the Congress, although the oppor- 
 tunity was not lost by Mr. Canning to urge the 
 different Powers assembled there to take more 
 effectual measures for its suppression. 
 
 With regard to the last, Spanish America, a 
 Note was circulated by the Duke of Wellington 
 on the subject, the purport of which (as it was 
 followed by no results) will be better explained 
 hereafter, when the history of the circumstances 
 attending the appointment of British Consuls to 
 Spanish America is related, and a review taken 
 of the objects which Mr. Canning sought to 
 attain by the line of policy which he pursued 
 towards those important Colonies.
 
 219 
 
 CHAP. V* 
 
 NEGOTIATIONS AT PARIS ON THE SUBJECT OF THE IN- 
 VASION OF SPAIN. LORD FITZROY SOMERSET'S MIS- 
 SION TO MADRID. FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS AT PARIS. 
 
 SPEECH OF THE KING OF FRANCE TO THE LEGIS- 
 LATIVE CHAMBERS. NEGOTIATIONS ON THE SAME 
 
 SUBJECT AT MADRID. PROCEEDINGS IN THE FRENCH 
 
 CHAMBERS. MR. CANNING'S LAST EFFORT AT PARIS 
 
 TO PREVENT WAR COUNTERACTED BY FURTHER DE- 
 BATES IN FRENCH CHAMBERS. CHATEAUBRIAND'S 
 
 SPEECH. PROCEEDINGS AT MADRID. DEPARTURE 
 
 OF FERDINAND FROM THAT CAPITAL. COMMENCE- 
 MENT OF WAR. 
 
 The Duke of Wellington left Verona for Paris 
 on the 29th of November, to renew at the latter 
 place the remonstrances that he had made inef- 
 fectually at the former. 
 
 The Viscount de Montmorency set out three 
 days before him for the same destination, leav- 
 ing behind him M. de Chateaubriand (his col- 
 league in the negotiations), and carrying with
 
 220 
 
 him the despatches of the three Allied Courts 
 to their Ministers at Madrid, together with the 
 one which he had himself prepared, for the ap- 
 probation of his own Government, on which 
 despatch the others had been modelled. M. 
 de Montmorency was well received by his Go- 
 vernment, and had a Dukedom conferred on him 
 as the reward of his services. 
 
 On the Duke of Wellington's arrival at Paris, 
 he found M. de Villele in the same pacifick tem- 
 per of mind which has already been described ; 
 M. de Montmorency not having succeeded in 
 converting his chief to his own warlike opinions 
 during the three days that he had had the start of 
 the Duke. So little impression, indeed, had he 
 been able to make on M. de Villele, that that 
 Minister did not hesitate to inform the Duke, 
 in their first interview, that he had sent back the 
 despatches from the three Allied Courts to their 
 Ministers at Madrid to Verona (which place the 
 Allied Sovereigns could not then have quitted), 
 with entreaties for a re-consideration of their 
 contents; and with representations of the impro- 
 priety of sending them, when their transmission 
 would infallibly be followed by the departure 
 from Madrid of the several Ministers to whom 
 they were addressed, at a moment when their 
 presence was peculiarly desirable to watch over 
 the safety of the Spanish Royal Family. M. de 
 Villele, moreover, assured the Allied Monarchs,
 
 221 
 
 both that the King of Spain's desire for the in- 
 vasion of his country was diminished, and that 
 the defeat and expulsion of the Royalists from 
 Spain had lessened the chances of a successful 
 attack. 
 
 Whatever were the motives which actuated 
 the President of the French Council in taking 
 this decidedly retrograde step, there can be no 
 doubt that, at this time, he was willing to give 
 up any fears of danger to France from the vici- 
 nity of the Spanish Revolution, for the sake of 
 remedying the inconveniences which Spain might 
 experience from the separation of her American 
 Colonies ; and that he was ready, instead of 
 marching an army to Madrid, for the purpose 
 of restoring Ferdinand to his liberty, to convey 
 a Spanish army to Vera Cruz, to seat a Spanish 
 Infant on the throne of Mexico. 
 
 Notwithstanding that Mr. Canning was not 
 unaware that these were the dispositions of the 
 head of the French Government, he still thought 
 that any such attempts on the part of France 
 would be far less dangerous in their probable 
 consequences than a hostile aggression on Spain. 
 He, therefore, determined to leave no effort un- 
 exhausted to prevent the dreaded collision ; and, 
 for this purpose, instructions awaited the Duke 
 of Wellington on his arrival at Paris, to offer to 
 M. de Villele the mediation of His Britannick 
 Majesty between the Most Christian and Most 
 Catholick Monarchs.
 
 222 
 
 Previously to its being determined to make 
 this offer, a communication had been made to 
 Mr. Canning from the Spanish Foreign Secre- 
 tary at Madrid, which, if it did not distinctly 
 ask for the mediation of Great Britain, yet af- 
 forded strong hopes for believing that, if France 
 consented to make use of our proffered assist- 
 ance, Spain would not be unwilling to employ it. 
 And further, the discussions, at Verona, having 
 ended without any corporate hostile declaration of 
 the Allies against Spain, the question of war was 
 reduced to a question between France and Spain 
 respectively ; and, consequently, as a matter of 
 negotiation, was infinitely less complicated, and 
 more easy to manage than if there had been 
 several parties concerned, with as many separate 
 interests, all pulling different ways, to whom, if 
 the tender of mediation had been made and ac- 
 cepted, the party making it must have been 
 responsible for its conduct and issue. 
 
 The fact of the despatches having been sent 
 back to Verona was not known in London at 
 the time these directions were given. The 
 Duke of Wellington, therefore, suspended their 
 execution till he had referred home for further 
 instructions. Mr. Canning, however, confirmed 
 those which he had originally given, thinking that 
 it was very material for the clear and perfect 
 discharge of the duty of the British Government, 
 in an affair so deeply affecting the interests, not
 
 223 
 
 only of the Powers immediately concerned, but 
 of the world, that the Duke should not leave 
 Paris without having placed in the hands of the 
 French Government the offer of His Majesty's 
 mediation, in the event of the answer from Ve- 
 rona not being such as to preclude all danger 
 of hostilities. 
 
 The Duke of Wellington accordingly signified 
 the King's willingness to undertake the office of 
 Mediator in a note to M. de Montmorency, 
 dated the 17th of December, and on the 19th 
 quitted Paris. To this note M. de Montmo- 
 rency replied on the 26th ; but the reply was 
 not given till it had been ascertained that the 
 Allied Sovereigns would consent only to so 
 much delay as would not exceed the period at 
 which the Spanish Government, on receiving 
 the despatches, might believe that they were 
 written at Verona, and were the result of the 
 conferences in that town. 
 
 This determination of the Allies not to put 
 off, beyond a certain period, the transmission of 
 their despatches, did not diminish M. de Villele's 
 eagerness to enter into terms with the Spanish 
 Government for the execution of the projects 
 which he had conceived ; and he therefore re- 
 solved on pursuing a less offensive course than 
 the other Continental Powers, apparently that he 
 might thereby ingratiate himself with the leading 
 persons at Madrid. On the other hand, his
 
 224- 
 
 colleague, M. de Montmorency, was equally re- 
 solute in endeavouring to bring about an attack 
 upon the Spanish Constitution. Both ministers, 
 however, agreed in declining the tender of me- 
 diation made by the British Government. The 
 one, because its acceptance would increase British 
 influence at Madrid ; the other, because it would 
 diminish the chances of hostility, 
 
 M. de Montmorency, therefore, was permitted 
 to draw up the answer to the Duke of Welling- 
 ton. He began it by saying, that the King of 
 France fully appreciated the sentiments which 
 induced the King of England to make the offer, 
 but that the " nature of the situation of France 
 " with regard to Spain did not allow of medi- 
 " ation, as there existed no difference between 
 " them, no specifick point of discussion, by the 
 " arrangement of which their relations might be 
 " placed on the footing on which they ought to 
 " stand." He afterwards expressed " the plea- 
 " sure with which the French Government 
 " viewed the conciliatory dispositions of the 
 " British Government, which were manifested 
 " by its conduct ;" and further remarked, that 
 it was not *' between France and Spain alone 
 " that the existing differences needed to be ar- 
 " ranged, " for that the question regarding the 
 state of Spain was " wholly European." 
 
 Two days before (Dec. 24th, 1822,) this an- 
 swer was given by M. de Montmorency, the
 
 2-25 
 
 despatches of the three allied Courts of Russia, 
 Austria, and Prussia to their respective Minis- 
 ters at Madrid were sent off from Paris. They 
 all denounced the existing order of things in 
 Spain, and were full of the doctrines of legiti- 
 macy clothed in the usual plausible phraseology 
 of continental diplomacy. 
 
 They were accompanied with orders that if, 
 at the end of three days, either no answer should 
 be returned to them, or no promise should be 
 made by the Spanish Government to alter their 
 established Constitution, the Ministers were to 
 demand their passports, and to quit the capital. 
 
 M. de Montmorency, it appears, in conse- 
 quence of his considering the question as " wholly 
 " European," had undertaken at Verona that 
 similar instructions should be sent to the French 
 Minister, M. de la Garde, with the French des- 
 patch. But M. de Villele was bent on proceed- 
 ing in a more mitigated manner ; and though 
 he cannot be given the credit of having placed 
 France in the position in which she then was, from 
 any pre-concerted plan of operations, inasmuch 
 as it was evidently the result of chance, yet he 
 had too much penetration not to see that the 
 opportunity which the state of things then pre- 
 sented might be turned easily to account in fur- 
 thering French interests, which were always up- 
 permost in his mind. Spain, exhausted by 
 the insurrections and anarchy which the French 
 
 VOL. I. Q
 
 226 
 
 Government had encouraged, had no hope of 
 safety if hostilities were pressed against her, but 
 in abandoning herself to the guidance of Great 
 Britain. The three great Continental Powers 
 persisted in pursuing measures (originally insti- 
 gated by France) which he felt certain would 
 infallibly lead to the interruption of all inter- 
 course between them and Spain, by the with- 
 drawal of their missions. The French Minister 
 would then be left there alone, and after their 
 departure, would have a more open field for his 
 future operations ; and while the fact of France 
 having taken a milder tone than her allies would 
 recommend her to the Constitutional authorities 
 at Madrid, her influence might then be estab- 
 lished there to the exclusion of that of Great 
 Britain ; and provided that she offered her fleets 
 and treasure to assist in re-conquering the 
 Spanish Colonies for the Mother Country, she 
 might obtain some exclusive commercial advan- 
 tages, or, perhaps, even some colonial cession. 
 
 These were the ideas which evidently oc- 
 cupied M. de Villele's mind, when he refused 
 to comply with M. de Montmorency's wishes 
 to treat the question with Spain as " wholly 
 " European," and insisted on its being treated 
 as "wholly French ;" and by consequence that 
 France should pursue a very different line from 
 that pursued by the other Continental Powers. 
 In this dispute between the two Ministers, the
 
 227 
 
 majority of the Cabinet espoused M. de Villele's 
 cause ; and voted that Foreign Powers had had 
 greater influence over M. de Montmorency than 
 was compatible with the dignity of France. 
 The French King sided with M. de Villele and 
 his party, and it was, therefore, determined to 
 write a moderate despatch, and to direct the 
 French Minister not to quit Madrid, although 
 the Ministers of the other three Courts should 
 do so. 
 
 A despatch, accordingly, was sent to M. de la 
 Garde, signed by M. de Villele, which was 
 couched certainly in hostile language, if con- 
 sidered separately, but which, if compared with 
 the others, must have borne to the Spanish 
 Ministers more the appearance of conciliation 
 than of menace ; especially when they found 
 that it was not to be followed up, as the other 
 despatches were to be, with a demand for pass- 
 ports, in the case of non-compliance with the 
 suggestions made in them ; and when it con- 
 tained the assurance, " that the succours of 
 " every kind which France could dispose of in 
 " favour of Spain would always be offered to 
 " Her for the purpose of assuring Her happiness, 
 " and increasing Her prosperity.'* 
 
 M. de Montmorency, rinding himself thus 
 unable to carry into effect the system of policy 
 which he had engaged, at the Congress at Ve- 
 rona, to support in the Cabinet at Paris, in order 
 
 q 2
 
 228 
 
 to testify the sincerity of his engagement, at 
 once, resigned. 
 
 This victory of M. de Villele's, was, however, 
 only a partial one. 
 
 It was not, as was at first supposed, the vic- 
 tory of the arguments for peace over those for 
 war, for although gained by the Peace party, it 
 was not gained by them upon the merits of that 
 disputed point, but merely upon the merits of a 
 collateral question in which the pride of French- 
 men was concerned. 
 
 The resignation of M. de Montmorency 
 created such an alarm amongst the members of 
 the War party, that M. de Villele found it ad- 
 visable to endeavour to appease their discontent, 
 by the very unusual step of publishing in the 
 Moniteur the despatch to M. de la Garde, only 
 three days after it had been sent from Paris, to 
 prove that the Ministers had not abandoned 
 their hostile intentions. So strong, indeed, was 
 the War party in the Cabinet, and so numerous 
 was it in the Chambers, that M. de Villele did 
 not venture to insist upon replacing M. de 
 Montmorency by any opponent of the war ; 
 and was content, therefore, to admit into the 
 Cabinet, as his successor, an advocate of the 
 War, the Viscomte de Chateaubriand, who, 
 while M. de Villele was maintaining that the 
 question between France and Spain was " wholly 
 " French," and M. de Montmorency, that it
 
 J-29 
 
 was " wholly European," had qualified himself 
 for joining that party, whichsoever of the two 
 should come off triumphant, by adopting the 
 somewhat contradictory definition of its being, 
 at once, " both wholly French and wholly 
 " European." 
 
 M. de Chateaubriand, thus united with the 
 Ministry, breathed nothing but war ; and the 
 very first conference that he held with the 
 British Ambassador at Paris was spent in en- 
 deavouring to prove, as well that his sentiments 
 agreed almost entirely with those of M. de 
 Montmorency, as that war was essential to the 
 interests of France ; since it was impossible that 
 the angry diplomatic!; communications from 
 Spain, the language of the press, and the pro- 
 vocations that were heaped upon the troops 
 on the frontier, could continue long without 
 bringing on a rupture ; while, on the other hand, 
 it was impossible to withdraw the Army of Ob- 
 servation, the exciting cause of these grievances, 
 without producing a most unfavourable im- 
 pression upon the troops : moreover, he thought 
 it better to concede something to the Royalist 
 Party, because their division would be more 
 prejudicial to the Monarchy than any evils that 
 could result from war. 
 
 The language, however, and the objects of 
 M. de Villele were essentially different from 
 those of his new Colleague : he could by no 
 
 q 3
 
 230 
 
 means make up his mind that war was essential 
 for the interests of France ; though perhaps he 
 might have been reconciled to the idea of not 
 being able to prevent it, could he have been 
 quite certain that England would, in the event of 
 its taking place, have preserved a strict neu- 
 trality. 
 
 He made, therefore, every effort to secure the 
 co-operation of the English Ministers, and to 
 induce them to sign 'the Proces Verbale (al- 
 ready mentioned as agreed upon at Verona), in 
 the hope that, if they would make common 
 cause with France, Spain would be more likely 
 to make such alterations in her Constitution as 
 would justify a suspension of warlike prepar- 
 ations ; and also because, if they could once be 
 brought to countenance the French demands, it 
 would be impossible for England, if those de- 
 mands should be refused, to join the party which 
 refused them. To tempt England to accede to 
 his wishes, M. de Villele, knowing how Mr. 
 Canning had laboured to prevent the absolute 
 Monarchs of Europe from arraying themselves 
 against Spain, because the people had forced a 
 Constitution upon the King, declared his grand 
 object, and secret wish, to be, to prevent the 
 three Continental Powers from interfering in the 
 French discusions with that country. 
 
 The objection, however, of Mr. Canning to 
 joining in any measures of the sort was one of
 
 231 
 
 principle, and not of degree, and was, conse- 
 quently, not capable of being overcome by any 
 modifications in the execution of tliem. 
 
 Neither was he to be tempted, nor deceived 
 into thinking that the position of England towards 
 Spain had any thing in common with that of 
 France towards that country. They were, in 
 fact, essentially different. 
 
 France was a Power not only prepared to 
 become eventually the enemy of Spain, but one, 
 which, in contemplation of that event, had con- 
 federated the great Military Monarchies of 
 Europe against her, and had sounded the war- 
 note of hostility by the collection of armies on 
 the Spanish Frontiers. 
 
 England, on the other hand, if she had 
 grievances against Spain, " never contemplated 
 " — those grievances apart — engaging in a war 
 " with her, and least of all on such grounds as 
 " those of her internal agitations : if the British 
 " Government looked with anxiety at those 
 " agitations, it was an anxiety compounded of 
 " an anxious wish, that they should subside into 
 " a more settled order of things, better calculated 
 " for the happiness of Spain herself and of 
 " apprehension for the consequences of the ir- 
 " ritation which the then existing disorders had 
 " produced in France, consequences which might 
 " endanger the peace of Europe. The position 
 " of England was strictly mediatorial, a position
 
 232 
 
 " from which she was not to be driven ; and 
 " although she might not be invested with the 
 " office, it was her business to endeavour prac- 
 " tically to perform the duties of it." 
 
 It was while M. de Villele was trying to get 
 the countenance of England, and declaring his 
 conviction, that it was through the good offices 
 of the British Government alone that France 
 could look for any thing like an accommodation 
 of her differences with Spain, that it occurred 
 to Mr. Canning, that if Spain could be induced 
 to modify, in some degree, the form of her 
 Constitution, there might yet be opened to 
 France a way of escape out of the difficulties 
 in which her Government was involved, by the 
 mere existence of the Army of Observation ; 
 since, by any modifications in the Spanish Con- 
 stitution, a plausible pretext would have been 
 afforded for the withdrawal and dispersion of 
 that Army. Every thing, indeed, combined to 
 induce the British Government to advise Spain 
 to make some change in her Constitution, by 
 which the French attack on it might be averted; 
 for although Mr. Canning was well aware that 
 M. de Villele's first efforts, after the establish- 
 ment of a good understanding between the 
 French and Spanish Governments, would be di- 
 rected towards supplanting British influence at 
 Madrid, yet, even if M. de Villele should suc- 
 ceed, he trusted, by straight-forward conduct,
 
 233 
 
 to prevent any serious detriment arising to 
 British interests. On the other hand, a war, 
 once begun, might, long before it was extin- 
 guished, involve all Europe in its flames, and be 
 productive of far more disastrous consequences 
 to Great Britain than could arise from the mere 
 diminution, or even annihilation, of her influence 
 at Madrid. 
 
 Besides, — putting aside all consideration for 
 British welfare, and supposing that it was certain 
 that the war would be confined to the two parties 
 with whom it originated, it was almost sure to 
 end unfortunately, at any rate, for one, if not for 
 both of the contending parties. 
 
 If France were successful, the probability was 
 that the Spanish Constitution would be destroyed, 
 and Spain again condemned to endure the worst 
 of despotisms : if unsuccessful, either from the 
 stubbornness of the resistance of the population, 
 or from the repulse of her armies, then the pro- 
 bability was, that the glories achieved under the 
 tri-coloured cockade would have been contrasted 
 with the disgraces sustained under the white 
 one ; and the dynasty of which this last was the 
 emblem, would for the third, and perhaps for the 
 last, time, have been driven from the inheritance 
 of their fathers. Even, therefore, if the Spanish 
 Constitution had been considerably less faulty 
 than it was, to avoid the risk of such calamities, 
 it would have been wise and proper to have re-
 
 234 
 
 commended some modifications of it ; but how 
 much more was it so, when its imperfections 
 were admitted by every reasonable Spaniard ; 
 and when the Spanish Ministers themselves did 
 not deny, that a revision of it would afford the 
 best chance for its consolidation, and the best 
 safeguard against its destruction by hostile ag- 
 gression. 
 
 It would, therefore, have been but prudent in 
 ministers to have sought out some channel, 
 through which to make known to Spain, if pos- 
 sible, without offending her pride, their opinions 
 upon the subject. 
 
 But with such an instrument in their hands 
 with which to work, as the Duke of Wellington, 
 it would have been positively culpable in them 
 to have neglected to employ him. It was im- 
 possible that his services to Spain in the field 
 could ever be forgotten. By being in posses- 
 sion of a Spanish title, and a Spanish estate, 
 granted him as a token of national gratitude, 
 he was almost a Spaniard by adoption. He had, 
 therefore, a right to give an opinion, and to ten- 
 der his counsel as to what he thought hurtful, 
 and what useful in the government of a country 
 to which he was bound by such ties of interest 
 and affection ; a right, too, founded on grounds 
 calculated to disarm all feelings of pride which 
 the Spaniards might feel to listening to the 
 advice of a foreigner, when, from circumstances,
 
 235 
 
 that foreigner had become, as it were, a denizen 
 of their country. 
 
 Lord Fitzroy Somerset, the intimate and con- 
 fidential friend of the Duke of Wellington, there- 
 fore, was selected, with Mr. Canning's appro- 
 bation and sanction, to be the bearer of an 
 extra-official communication to the most influ- 
 ential persons at Madrid, expressive of His 
 Grace's opinions of the internal advantages 
 which Spain would derive from assigning to the 
 King, who formed " part of the system estab- 
 " lished by themselves, such power and prero- 
 gatives as would enable him to perform his 
 functions, and protect himself and those em- 
 ployed under him in the performance of their 
 "duties for the service of the publick;" for 
 that while the King had no more authority than 
 he then possessed, there would be (as there had 
 been) " perpetual successions of royalist insur- 
 " rections in one part of the country, or the 
 " other." And not only would the internal 
 peace of Spain be secured by such a plan, but 
 the French Army of Observation, which was so 
 endless a source of irritation to her, would ne- 
 cessarily be withdrawn, when all the grounds, 
 upon which the French Government justified its 
 existence, were taken away. 
 
 Such was the wise counsel given by the Duke 
 of Ciudad Rodrigo * to Spain for her guidance 
 
 * The Duke of Wellington's Spanish title. 
 
 a 
 u
 
 236 
 
 at this critical posture of her affairs ; while, at 
 the same time, to satisfy Spain that Lord Fitzroy 
 Somerset's mission was one of friendly counsel 
 only, Sir William a Court was instructed not to 
 interfere ; and Lord Fitzroy was charged to ex- 
 plain, in the most explicit manner, that we asked 
 nothing of Spain, and should act the same 
 whether she followed the Duke's counsel or 
 not. Had the concessions of Spain to our de- 
 mands for justice enabled the Duke to have 
 tendered this advice at an earlier period, the 
 chances would have been much greater of its 
 being productive of the effect for which it was 
 designed. But untoward events had unfor- 
 tunately occurred before Lord Fitzroy's arrival 
 at Madrid, whereby the delicacy and difficulty 
 of any attempt on the part of the leading cha- 
 racters in Spain to make any alterations in the 
 Constitution, was considerably increased. 
 
 The despatches of the three Allied Powers 
 had then been communicated to the Spanish 
 Government, and their Ministers had withdrawn 
 from Madrid : and more than this, the French 
 despatch, which, in whatever way the manner 
 of communication might induce the Spanish 
 Ministers to consider it, could be looked upon 
 in no other light by the Spanish people than as 
 a demand for a change, and as a threat of war 
 in case of refusal, had been published in the 
 official organ of the French Government. True
 
 237 
 
 it was that M. de Villele managed that his des- 
 patch, (notwithstanding that it left Paris two 
 days later,) should arrive at Madrid two days 
 earlier than the others ; and that M. de la Garde 
 contrived to make use of his time to give a 
 favourable impression of the intentions of his 
 Government ; yet, in spite of this, the despatch, 
 by the mere fact of its publication, was held out 
 to the nation as a defiance, to which even the 
 appearance of succumbing on the part of the 
 Ministry would probably have roused to their 
 ruin that proverbial pride and obstinacy which 
 stamps the character of almost every Spaniard. 
 
 But even these obstacles, great as they were, 
 might have been overcome, if those for whom 
 the Duke of Wellington's memorandum was 
 intended had not been buoyed up with false 
 hopes of assistance from this country ; hopes 
 that were not only not founded on any thing 
 said or done bv the British Government, but 
 were absolutely entertained in spite of the most 
 positive assurances on its part of its determin- 
 ation to preserve a strict bond jide neutrality. 
 It is certain that there were some of the most 
 violent English politicians, who persuaded not 
 only the most influential members of the Cortes, 
 but even the Spanish Minister in London, that 
 if the Government of itself would not come to 
 their aid, it would be forced to do so by the in- 
 dignant voice of the British people.
 
 238 
 
 That these representations were one main 
 cause of the failure of Lord Fitzroy's mission 
 cannot now be doubted ; especially if the very 
 great degree of moderation exhibited by the 
 Cortes when the despatches from the three 
 Courts were communicated to that Body is to 
 be taken as a specimen of its temper. 
 
 Instead of coming to any violent resolution 
 respecting them, it was determined, on the mo- 
 tion of Messrs. Arguelles and Galiano. to refer 
 them to a Committee, in order that a certain 
 time should be allowed for passion to subside, 
 that the members might come to the discussion 
 of so grave a question with the temper and de- 
 corum becoming the Spanish character and 
 nation. At the same time, however, an order 
 was given to the Committee to prepare an ad- 
 dress to the King, expressing their determin- 
 ation to die, if necessary, in defence of the 
 Constitutional Throne ; but still the Govern- 
 ment was so far inclined to listen to moderation, 
 that it waited, at the instance of Sir William a 
 Court, for the three Ministers to demand their 
 passports, instead of sending them, as was at 
 first intended, unasked. 
 
 While Mr. Canning was thus endeavouring to 
 produce some changes in Spain which would be 
 likely to secure the preservation of peace, he was 
 unremitting in his representations to the French 
 Ministers, to convince them of the dangers which
 
 23!) 
 
 they would incur by commencing a war for the 
 avowed purpose of effecting some modifications 
 in a popular Constitution. 
 
 But, if a war on such a plea would have been 
 pregnant with danger to the world, even if 
 begun by France, who might have had grounds 
 of annoyance and complaint, from being in the 
 immediate vicinity of Spain, it would have been 
 far more dangerous if the other Continental 
 Members of the Alliance, who could not by pos- 
 sibility have had a similar plea, had been, even 
 in theory, associated with France as partners in 
 the contest. Mr. Canning, therefore, thought 
 it necessary to reply to M. de Montmorency's 
 answer to the Duke of Wellington's note, in 
 which it was declared that the Continental 
 Courts considered the questions between France 
 and Spain as " wholly European," in order to 
 demonstrate that that question was not so con- 
 sidered at Verona, but, on the contrary, was 
 treated and consideredas one "peculiarly French." 
 
 Such a demonstration was not exactly agree- 
 able to M. de Chateaubriand, who would, not- 
 withstanding, have been too happy to have 
 avoided returning a written rejoinder to it, if he 
 had not been called upon by his Colleagues to 
 do so. Forced, therefore, to adhere to his para- 
 doxical definition, he was placed in the dis- 
 agreeable necessity of arguing, with the chance 
 of his arguments (as, indeed, they were in the
 
 240 
 
 end,) being published to the world, to prove the 
 truth of a proposition, which, as it implied a 
 contradiction, contained within itself its own 
 refutation. 
 
 Mr. Canning, likewise, in his answer, judged 
 it right to repel an insinuation made by M. de 
 Montmorency, that England had abandoned the 
 opinions which she had declared with respect 
 to the affairs of Spain in the celebrated circular 
 note already mentioned, written in May, 18^0 ; 
 in which, observed M. de Montmorency, " Eng- 
 " land, participating in the fears of other Powers, 
 6t foresaw cases, in which it might be impossible 
 " to preserve with Spain the relations of good 
 " intelligence and peace." 
 
 " Now, so far," said Mr. Canning, " from 
 " foreseeing cases, and deciding upon the con- 
 " duct which would be applicable to them, the 
 " British Government positively declined to 
 " bind itself by a contingent opinion to any 
 "conditional course of action j" "disclaimed 
 " the right of interference in the internal con- 
 " cerns of independent nations, and specifically 
 " stated, that there was perhaps no country of 
 " equal magnitude with Spain, whose internal 
 " disturbances would be so little likely to menace 
 " other States with that direct and imminent 
 " danger which could alone, in exception to 
 " the general rule, justify foreign interference." 
 
 Notwithstanding that this most surelv is an
 
 241 
 
 accurate account of the tcnour of that note, 
 M. de Chateaubriand undertakes to deny it, 
 and, in support of his position, quotes a part of 
 it, in " which an opinion was pronounced, that an 
 " interference in the affairs of Spain would be 
 "justifiable, 1st, if the violence of the persons 
 " in power led them to an attack against any 
 " other States ; 2dly, if Spain attempted to pos- 
 " sess herself of Portugal, or to effect a re-union 
 " of the two States." It is quite true that this 
 opinion is there "pronounced;" but, as Mr. 
 Canning observes in a despatch to Sir Charles 
 Stuart, " it leaves the question of interference 
 " in the internal affairs of Spain where it was, 
 " as Great Britain would admit, not only pros- 
 " pectivelyand hypothetically, as respected Spain, 
 " but positively and directly as to any Power 
 " whatever, that aggression against any of its 
 " neighbours would justify war ; and specifically, 
 " that aggression against Portugal would im- 
 " pose upon Great Britain the duty of protect- 
 " ing her Ally." 
 
 The remainder of M. de Chateaubriand's note 
 consists, 1st, in pointing out the inconveniences 
 to France arising from the state of Spain ; and, 
 2dly, in a declaration implying, that if the King 
 of Spain should be set free, so that the Consti- 
 tution might be the free gift of the Sovereign, 
 the objections to it would be done away. 
 
 With respect to the first, the inconveniences 
 VOL. i. it
 
 242 
 
 arising to France, they were stated chiefly to 
 consist in attempts to breed disaffection against 
 the Bourbons ; but in making this a matter of 
 complaint, M. de Chateaubriand has not the can- 
 dour to confess, that France was actually giving 
 shelter to the absolutists of Spain, and allowing 
 them to remain close to the frontiers, where 
 they could carry on their intrigues against the 
 Constitution ; that the French Government had 
 been unsuccessful in exciting a rebellion in 
 Spain against the established authorities, and 
 that it had done all in its power to assist a self- 
 constituted rebel Regency. The intrigues com- 
 plained of were not even imputed to the Spanish 
 Government ; and therefore, so far were these 
 mutual intrigues from affording France a just 
 ground for war against Spain, that if the balance 
 had been struck between them, the French in- 
 trigues would have been found to preponderate 
 in a very large proportion. 
 
 With respect to the second, as the idea was 
 more fully developed, and, indeed, openly avowed, 
 in the King of France's Speech, it is only ne- 
 cessary here to observe, as M. de Chateaubriand 
 took merit for his moderation, that Mr. Canning, 
 in commenting upon it in his answer, says, that 
 " the moderation of such demands in no degree 
 "justified the mode of enforcing them ;" " for 
 " Great Britain disclaimed for herself, and denied 
 " for other Powers, the right of requiring any
 
 243 
 
 " changes in the internal institutions of inde- 
 " pendent States, with the menace of hostile 
 " attack in case of refusal." 
 
 During the time that these notes were passing 
 to and fro between the two Foreign Secretaries, 
 there were other official communications taking 
 place, through the medium of the British Am- 
 bassador at Paris between them, as well as be- 
 tween Mr. Canning and M. de Villele. 
 
 In all these, however, there still continued to 
 be, as before, a considerable difference between 
 the language of the two Ministers, the hopes ex- 
 pressed by the one, that peace would be pre- 
 served, being up to a certain period stronger 
 than those of the other. Both, however, pro- 
 fessed the greatest anxiety to maintain peace, if 
 possible ; and although M. de Villele was, pro- 
 bably, sincere in his professions, yet he could 
 not but feel that the War party was so strong 
 that it was more than probable that he should be 
 unable to make an effectual resistance to their 
 exertions. 
 
 As for M. de Chateaubriand, war was in his 
 heart, though peace still lingered on his lips. 
 
 It was while peace was still talked of by the 
 French Ministers that Mr. Canning received 
 through Sir William a Court, a request from the 
 Spanish Government for the good offices of Eng- 
 land, with the view of preventing the breaking 
 out of a war between Spain and France. 
 
 r 2
 
 244 
 
 Though the request was far from being that 
 fair and open appeal to England, which under 
 the then existing circumstances might have been 
 expected, yet such as it was, it certainly pre- 
 sented a chance for peace, which was not to be 
 thrown away. 
 
 As soon as the knowledge of it reached Mr. 
 Canning, lie instructed * Sir Charles Stuart, to 
 acquaint the French Ministers with the overture 
 that had been made by the Spanish Foreign 
 Secretary, M. de San Miguel, and to offer to 
 them Sir William a Court, as a channel of com- 
 munication with the Spanish Government. 
 
 Sir Charles Stuart was also instructed to 
 admit that those concessions implied in the note 
 containing M. San Miguel's request were not so 
 completely satisfactory as to leave nothing to 
 desire ; but in making this admission he was to 
 take care to point out the " peculiar circum- 
 " stances under which it was written ; for al- 
 " though the more enlightened part of the 
 " Government, and of the Cortes of Spain, did 
 " not believe the Constitution to be in all its 
 " parts usefully and permanently practicable,'* 
 yet could it reasonably be expected of them at 
 once to declare their readiness to yield to foreign 
 dictation ? 
 
 " Let M. de Chateaubriand," said Mr. Canning 
 
 * January 24th.
 
 245 
 
 to the British Ambassador, "ask of himself, 
 *' as we in England have asked of ourselves, 
 11 whether, if there existed in the frame of the 
 " Government of France, or of England, re- 
 " spectively, all those imperfections which either 
 " theoretical criticism, or factious clamour im- 
 " putes to them, we should consent, even if we 
 " were already resolved to probe and to reform 
 " those imperfections, to do so on the demand 
 " of a foreign Power, made under the menace 
 " of foreign war, as the penalty of refusal." 
 
 " Let M. de Chateaubriand/' continued Mr. 
 Canning, " further ask himself, whether even by 
 " the mode of making that demand that part of 
 " the Spanish Government or nation, which 
 " might be willing to undertake those amelior- 
 " ations of the present Constitution of Spain, 
 " without which it is alleged to be unsafe to 
 " her neighbours, has not been placed in a situ- 
 " ation of great difficulty. 
 
 " The Cabinet of France, as well as that of 
 " England, must know enough of the course of 
 
 popular Governments, and of the influence of 
 
 popular parties, to be aware that a proposition, 
 " even upon indifferent matters, thrown loose 
 " before the publick at the same time that it is 
 " submitted to the Government is one of which 
 " the Government is no longer master ; how 
 " much more so, when that proposition is of a 
 
 vol. i. * r 3 

 
 246' 
 
 1 nature to appeal to the strongest passions of 
 4 mankind, — to pride, to resentment, to pa- 
 ' triotism, — and, consequently, to array and 
 1 exasperate all those passions against a decision, 
 
 * which could only be expected from the calmest 
 ' temper, and most deliberate reflection. Is it 
 1 not plain that the same proposition completely 
 
 * changes its nature according to the manner in 
 1 which it is brought forward ? And that a 
 1 proposition, which if submitted through the 
 ' regular channels of diplomacy, to a Sovereign, 
 
 * or to a Cabinet, might be matter of whole- 
 
 * some advice or amicable remonstrance, when 
 ' addressed to the mass of a nation aloud, and 
 1 in the presence of all the world, becomes a 
 ' taunt and a defiance ? 
 
 " The publication of the despatch to M. la 
 < Garde, while it was yet on its road to Madrid, 
 
 * was defended by the alleged necessity of tran- 
 1 quillising the public mind at Paris; but if there 
 { was a public mind at Paris requiring to be 
 1 tranquillised, there was a publick mind at 
 ' Madrid liable to be inflamed ; and if it was so 
 ' desirable for the Cabinet of the Thuilleries to 
 1 carry with them the general sense and feeling 
 ' of the French people, how tremendous was the 
 ' task imposed upon the Government of Spain, 
 ' when a concession was exacted from them, 
 1 such as the strongest Government would find
 
 247 
 
 " it difficult to make, and when they were at the 
 " same moment deprived of the opportunity of 
 " preparing and reconciling (if that had been 
 " their wish) the feelings of the people of Spain 
 " to that concession ! " 
 
 These observations were not made by Mr. 
 Canning with a view to inculpate the conduct of 
 the French Government, but merely for the 
 purpose of reminding M. de Chateaubriand " of 
 " the situation in which the French Ministers 
 " had placed themselves towards Spain, by the 
 " manner in which their first alternative for war 
 " had been propounded ; and of impressing 
 " upon them the necessity of not omitting any 
 " opportunity, however little promising they 
 " might deem it, for again stating to Spain the 
 " grounds of their dissatisfaction, and the na- 
 " ture of their demands." 
 
 The remainder of the instruction was em- 
 ployed in endeavouring to convince them of the 
 small likelihood there was of their securing by 
 war the objects which they professed to seek 
 by it. 
 
 This communication reached Paris the day # 
 before the meeting of the Chambers ; and since 
 the French Ministers (as has been stated) still 
 /alked of peace, they did not, as indeed they 
 
 * January 26th. 
 VOL. I. * R 4
 
 248 
 
 well could not, on their part, reject the proffered 
 good offices of England, which the Spanish Go- 
 vernment, on its part, had solicited. 
 
 But although they had the decency not to 
 refuse, they could not have accepted them, 
 in the hope that any practical consequence 
 would result from them. It is evident indeed 
 that the French Government had already 
 decided on war, from the fact that orders, 
 at least four days previously, had been sent 
 to M. de la Garde at Madrid to return with- 
 out delay ; and it is only reasonable to sup- 
 pose that the tone to be taken in the King 
 of France's Speech to the Legislative Bo- 
 dies, was settled at the same time with this 
 decisive step. 
 
 There are strong grounds for believing that 
 a vigorous effort was made by M. de Villele 
 against this warlike determination. 
 
 But whether the French Premier did or did not 
 contend against the war, one thing is certain, that 
 he was content to continue to hold his office, and, 
 consequently, therefore, to take his share of 
 the heavy responsibility which attached to the 
 adoption of counsels of which there is reason to 
 believe that he did not approve. 
 
 M. de Villele, therefore, must come in for 
 his share of the reprobation, which the mon- 
 strous doctrines put into the mouth of the
 
 249 
 
 King of France, at the opening of the Cham- 
 bers, called forth almost universally, throughout 
 Europe. 
 
 Indeed a Speech * could hardly have been 
 penned which was so well calculated to arouse 
 
 * The King, in his speech to the Chambers, began with 
 
 describing the flourishing state of France, and the blessings 
 
 which she had derived from her return to legitimate rule : 
 
 he then proceeded to consider her relations with Spain. 
 
 " Divine justice permits," said he, " that after having for a 
 
 " long time made other nations suffer the terrible effects of 
 
 " our disorders, we should ourselves be exposed to dangers 
 
 " brought about by similar calamities among a neighbouring 
 
 " people. I have made every endeavour to guarantee the 
 
 " security of my people, and to preserve Spain herself from 
 
 " the extremity of misfortune. The infatuation, with which 
 
 " the representations made at Madrid have been rejected, 
 
 " leaves little hope of preserving peace. I have ordered the 
 
 " recall of my minister. One hundred thousand Frenchmen, 
 
 " commanded by a prince of my family — by him whom my 
 
 " heart delights to call my son — are ready to march, invok- 
 
 " ing the God of St. Louis, for the sake of preserving the 
 
 " throne of Spain to a descendant of Henry IV. — of saving 
 
 " that fine kingdom from its ruin, and of reconciling it with 
 
 " Europe. Our stations are about to be reinforced in those 
 
 " places where our maritime commerce has need of that 
 
 " protection. Cruisers shall be established at all points, 
 
 " wherever our arrivals can possibly be annoyed. If war is 
 
 «' inevitable, I will use all my endeavours to confine its 
 
 " circle, to limit its duration : it will be undertaken only to 
 
 " conquer peace, which the state of Spain would render 
 
 " impossible. Let Ferdinand VII. be free to give to his 
 
 " people institutions which they cannot hold but from him, and 
 
 VOL. I. * R 5
 
 260 
 
 against its authors all the better feelings of man- 
 kind, and to awake especially the indignation 
 of the British people. It contained, in the first 
 place, a declaration of war (for it could be con- 
 sidered in no other light) against a neighbouring 
 Power, with scarcely one word to explain its 
 necessity, or to prove its justice. 
 
 It asserted that the war was to be undertaken 
 as well " for the sake of preserving the Throne 
 " of Spain to a Bourbon Prince," as " to set 
 " Ferdinand free to give institutions to his 
 " people, which," it observed, " they could only 
 " hold from him." 
 
 Now if there be one principle which it is the 
 duty of any Government to hold more sacred 
 than another, it is, that, before recourse is had 
 to the dire extremity of war, both its necessity 
 and its justice shall be demonstrated, but, beyond 
 
 " which, by securing their tranquillity, would dissipate the 
 " just inquietudes of France. Hostilities shall cease from 
 " that moment. I make, gentlemen, before you, a solemn 
 " engagement on this point. I was bound to lay before you 
 " the state of our foreign affairs. It was for me to deliberate. 
 " I have done it maturely. I have consulted the dignity of 
 " my crown — the honour and security of France. Gentle- 
 " men, we are Frenchmen; we shall always be agreed to 
 " defend such interests." — Speech of the King of France on 
 " opening the session of the Chambers, Jan. 28. 1823.
 
 j.n 
 
 every thing-, its justice. By this document, how- 
 ever, the French Ministers appeared not to think 
 it incumbent upon them to do either the one 
 or the other, and had even the hardihood to avow 
 as their reasons for war ; first, the support of a 
 principle which, if once admitted, as justifying 
 an appeal to arms, would afford a perpetual cause 
 for war against Great Britain ; and next to 
 vive a compact (the Family compact) which 
 France was bound by compact never even to 
 attempt to renew. 
 
 Perhaps there never was an occasion in which 
 the opinions of the people of this country were 
 so united as they were in their condemnation, 
 and abhorrence of this document. Similar feel- 
 in £s to those which had once been directed 
 against the usurper of France and Spain in 1808 
 were now excited against the venerable Monarch 
 of the former Kingdom. Nay, the union of senti- 
 ment was more perfect ; for then the Jacobins 
 were unwilling to inculpate their idol ; but on 
 this occasion they, and the Whigs and Tories, 
 were all, as one man, of the same way of think- 
 ing, from one end of the country to the other. 
 
 Although this Speech could hardly be con- 
 sidered in any other light than as a declara- 
 tion of war, M. de Chateaubriand gave a curi- 
 ous specimen of diplomacy, by directing the 
 French Charge d* Affaires, «* when he communi- 
 
 vol. i. * r 6
 
 252 
 
 " cated it to Mr. Canning, to accompany the 
 " communication by a more profuse expression 
 ft of the desires of the French Government for 
 " accommodation, and by a more profuse de- 
 " claration of their wishes for the good services 
 *•' of the British Government in producing that 
 " accommodation, than had ever been made 
 " by them at any previous period of the trans- 
 " actions." 
 
 This might have been a clever expedient ; 
 but it certainly did not deceive Mr. Canning, 
 who saw through its nature. The speech was 
 made with a view to satisfy the violent war 
 party in France, who certainly composed the 
 great majority of the Chambers. The profes- 
 sions of a desire for peace seemed evidently 
 made, not because any sincere wish to perserve 
 it was entertained, or any real hope of it was 
 cherished, but from the fear that a speech so 
 singularly violent might excite to an hostile de- 
 monstration the British Government. 
 
 Mr. Canning, therefore, " while on the one 
 " hand he would not willingly either risk the 
 " misfortune, orincurthe responsibility of closing, 
 " by any act of his, the door of accommodation, 
 " which the French Government declared to be 
 still open ; yet, on the other hand, the sus- 
 pensive and conditional particle in the Speech 
 " of the King of France, on which the possi- 

 
 (« 
 
 it 
 
 253 
 
 " bilities of peace were supposed to hang, was 
 " so much obscured by the ambiguous character 
 " of the condition with which it was connected, 
 " that he found it very difficult to estimate its 
 " real value." 
 
 Since it was possible, however, to put a double 
 construction upon the offensive principle put 
 forth in one part of the Speech, he deter- 
 mined that, if the French Government would 
 adopt the construction (which, perhaps, the words 
 were hardly qualified to bear), that, " in order 
 to give stability to any modifications of the 
 present system in Spain, and to afford suffi- 
 " cient assurance to France to justify her in dis- 
 " continuing her warlike preparations, the King 
 " of Spain must be party, and freely consenting 
 " to such modifications," — " then the British 
 " Government would be most happy to continue 
 " at Madrid their amicable, and earnest en- 
 " deavours to ascertain the means, and to re- 
 " commend the policy, of accommodation." But 
 if it was to be construed, that " the free insti- 
 " tutions of the Spanish people could only be 
 " legitimately held from the spontaneous gift of 
 the Sovereign, first restored to absolute power, 
 and then divesting himself of such portion of 
 " that power as he might think proper to part 
 " with ; " then it was a principle " to which the 
 " Spanish nation could not be expected to sub- 

 
 &5<4 
 
 " scribe, nor could any British Statesmen uphold 
 " or defend it." 
 
 Nor could the British Government advise 
 any people " in adopting changes, however 
 " beneficial, to admit the principle on which 
 " (according to this latter construction) the 
 " Speech of the King of France would be un- 
 " derstood to prescribe them. It was, indeed, 
 " a principle which struck at the root of the 
 " British Constitution." 
 
 " The British Government," observed Mr. 
 Canning, " does not presume to hold out its 
 " own political institutions as the only prac- 
 " tical system of national happiness and freedom. 
 " It does not presume to question the freedom 
 " and happiness which France enjoys under 
 " institutions, emanating from the will of the 
 " Sovereign, and described, as octroyees from 
 " the Throne. But it could not countenance 
 " a pretension on the part of France to make 
 " her example a rule for other nations ; and 
 " still less could it admit a peculiar right in 
 «' France to force that example specifically on 
 " Spain, in virtue of the consanguinity of the 
 " reigning dynasties of those two Kingdoms. 
 " This latter reason would, on the contrary, 
 " suggest recollections and considerations, which 
 " must obviously make it impossible for Great 
 " Britain to be the advocate of pretensions 
 " founded on it."
 
 255 
 
 While Mr. Canning addressed this language 
 to the French Government through Sir Charles 
 Stuart, it was resolved by the Government, in 
 consequence of* the character of the King of 
 France's Speech, to omit in the King's Speech 
 what it had been settled to insert, — viz., the fixed 
 intention of England to preserve, in the contest, 
 a strict neutrality. The King of France's 
 Speech certainly did not vary that purpose ; 
 but it was one thing to vary it, and another, in 
 case the Government might see reason to vary 
 it, to put it out of their power to do so by 
 proclaiming neutrality to the world in the King's 
 Speech. 
 
 Thus were the French Ministers left in 
 doubt as to the intentions of England ; and 
 though, to a certain degree, they entertained 
 strong hopes that She did not intend to join in 
 the conflict against them, yet no mention of 
 such determination being made in the King's 
 Speech, coupled with the reception that that 
 part of it which related to the position of France 
 and Spain, by which the concurrence of all poli- 
 tical parties, and of all parts of the country, in 
 condemnation of the French war with Spain was 
 manifested, considerably increased the difficulties 
 of their situation. 
 
 The expectations of the French Ministers 
 with regard to the impression which the Speech 
 of their King would produce at Madrid, was
 
 256 
 
 quite as unreasonable as their professions of 
 a wish to maintain peace to the English Mi- 
 nistry, after they had apparently, and proba- 
 bly in reality, taken their decision against it, 
 by making a publick declaration of the most 
 warlike sentiments. 
 
 They pretended, still, to be "prepossessed 
 " with the notion, that the tone assumed by 
 " the King of France was well calculated to 
 " make the Spaniards give way, and grounded 
 " their hopes of preventing a war upon the 
 " results of that Speech." And although such 
 notions, if founded, as they were in fact pre- 
 tended to be, on the expectations of an absolute 
 party acquiring an ascendancy at Madrid, might 
 have been intelligible, yet when the "favour- 
 able" effect likely to be produced by it was 
 asserted, as constituting another equally strong 
 reason for such expectation, it is as difficult 
 to imagine in what way it could possibly have 
 operated " favourably" to the French cause in 
 the then temper of the Government and Cortes 
 (not to mention the populace) at Madrid, as it 
 is impossible not to question the sincerity of the 
 professions of the French Ministers. Mr. Can- 
 ning, assuming that they were sincere, too truly 
 warned them that they were mistaken. 
 
 Of a piece with this language of M. de Cha- 
 teaubriand, was his immediate adoption of that 
 construction of the principle, put forth in the
 
 « 
 [( 
 (( 
 
 a 
 
 257 
 
 King of France's Speech, which construction 
 Mr. Canning had suggested as not objectionable. 
 This adoption, however, enabled Mr. Canning 
 to continue his exertions at Madrid ; and since he 
 was not without hope that "some impression 
 " might have been made upon the French 
 " Ministers, by the unequivocal disclosure of the 
 temper of England, which might have led to 
 a reconsideration of their plans, if it were met 
 at the same time with any reasonable facility 
 on the part of Spain, which would afford to 
 " France a retreat without dishonour, " he di- 
 rected * Sir William a Court to urge upon the 
 Spanish Government, by every argument in his 
 power, the necessity of its resolving in some 
 way to modify the Constitution, in order to 
 avert the threatened invasion. 
 
 Too great security and incredulousness as to 
 the designs of France, certainly had contributed 
 to lead, if they did not do so entirely, the Spanish 
 Ministers into a most perilous error. Whether 
 if they had been earlier satisfied as to the reality 
 of those designs, thev would have taken another 
 course, and have considered seriously of such 
 modifications as might have disarmed France of 
 all plausible pretext for interference, may be 
 matter of question ; but, undoubtedly, they had 
 not viewed the importance and necessity of some 
 
 * February, 1823. 
 VOL. I. S
 
 258 
 
 decision on that point in their true light. They 
 had supposed France to be irresolute ; they had 
 misconstrued a partial change in the French 
 Ministry into an abandonment of warlike coun- 
 sels ; they had been misled by the Duke de San 
 Lorenzo, (himself, in all probability, purposely 
 deceived at Paris,) and by the language of the 
 French Minister at Madrid. 
 
 Mr. Canning hoped, therefore, that when they 
 waked to the consciousness of impending war, 
 which they had not taken any serious step to 
 avert, that that consciousness would lead, not to 
 desperation, but to an attempt to regain lost 
 opportunities. If, indeed, the Spanish Govern- 
 ment had made any proposal of immediate, and 
 some promise of future, modifications, an appeal 
 might have been made to France, to have paused, 
 at least, before she employed her arms, if not to 
 have laid them down. If Spain would have 
 done so, the position in which the English Go- 
 vernment had placed itself by the Speech from 
 the Throne, backed as it then was by the sup- 
 port of Parliament and the nation, would have 
 enabled it to speak to France in a tone of more 
 " authoritative persuasion." At the same time 
 it must be acknowledged, that France was too 
 far advanced to retreat, unless She had some 
 plausible plea for a change of counsel ; and that 
 plea could only be afforded by enabling Her to 
 affirm that something had been done, or pro-
 
 •2.59 
 
 mised, which removed Her apprehensions of 
 danger. 
 
 But while Mr. Canning endeavoured thus to 
 convince the Spanish Ministers that they could 
 only prevent war with France by some modifica- 
 tions of their Constitution, he did not omit to 
 implore them not to w fall into a false security, 
 " by placing their hopes of extrication from 
 " their difficulties in a war between France and 
 " this country.'* 
 
 The British Government had resolved on pre- 
 serving a strict neutrality, and that resolution 
 could not be too distinctly impressed upon the 
 minds of the Spanish Ministers ; for although 
 " neither the means, nor the determination would 
 " be wanting to vindicate, in any case that might 
 " arise, our honour and our interests, neither 
 " the one nor the other were immediately af- 
 " fected by the impending conflict between 
 " France and Spain." 
 
 The anxiety of the British Government was 
 to prevent the commencement of a war in 
 Europe, and to delay the execution of the 
 French projects. Such was the precariousness 
 of the resolutions of the French Cabinet, and of 
 the tenure of those who ruled in it, that a little 
 time gained might have put an end altogether 
 to the project of invasion. 
 
 At the moment when Mr. Canning directed 
 Sir William a Court to press the Spanish Go- 
 
 s 2
 
 260 
 
 vernment to make propositions which could be 
 communicated to the French Government, there 
 was just time for one communication before the 
 commencement of hostilities. " Urge, therefore, 
 " in every possible way," said Mr. Canning to 
 the English Minister, — " urge the Spanish Go- 
 " vernment to seize the passing moment, ere it 
 " be too late to profit by it." * 
 
 This was the last effort made by Mr. Canning, 
 at Madrid, to prevent the breaking out of the 
 war. 
 
 With the French Ministers, however, his 
 efforts ceased no very long time before that 
 event ; for whether they were likely to be suc- 
 cessful or not, he was determined that he would 
 at least have the consolation of knowing, that, no 
 exertions had been spared, on his part, to prevent 
 a calamity of which no one could presume to 
 foretell the extent. 
 
 The inclination, however, towards pacifick 
 counsels which Mr. Canning hoped the French 
 Ministers might have felt in consequence of the 
 events which took place at the opening of the 
 British Parliament, were, unfortunately, in a 
 considerable degree, counterbalanced by the 
 conduct of their own Chambers. 
 
 Addresses as strong, and as violent, as their 
 King's Speech, were voted by large majorities 
 
 * February 9th.
 
 261 
 
 in both of them ; and an attempt in the Chamber 
 of Deputies to carry an amendment, manifesting 
 a doubt respecting the probability of the war, 
 in contradistinction to its being inevitable, ex- 
 cited the greatest agitation, and was rejected by 
 a considerable majority : and the most violent 
 condemnation of the conduct of the Government 
 proceeded from the party which maintained, that 
 war had been too long delayed. 
 
 It was in answer to these attacks that the 
 avowal of having given every assistance to the 
 Spanish insurgents, and of " having stirred up 
 " insurrection in Spain, whenever, and wherever 
 " it was possible," escaped M. de Villele's lips. 
 
 It appeared, therefore, by the confession of 
 the head of the French Government, that at the 
 very time that the Representative of that Go- 
 vernment was carrying its complaints against 
 Spain to Verona, as if all the injuries were in- 
 flicted upon France, that efforts were actually 
 being made by France to overthrow by treachery 
 the Spanish Constitution ! 
 
 This avowal was only intended, as it would 
 seem, to gratify the ears of the audience before 
 whom it was made, since it was omitted in the 
 report of the Speech in the Moniteur ; and some 
 opposition Journals that had inserted it had pro- 
 ceedings instituted against them for so doing, on 
 the ground of its being a breach of privilege to 
 publish the debates of the Chamber of Peers. 
 
 s 3
 
 262 
 
 At the same time, and almost in the same 
 breath, that to satisfy the War party M. de Villele 
 made this confession, he thought it necessary 
 to make, as it were, a counter-declaration, to 
 satisfy the opposite side of the necessity of war ; 
 viz. that " it was necessary to attack the South, 
 "in order to escape the North j" in other 
 words, that if France would not put down the 
 Spanish Constitution, Russia would do it for 
 her ; from which observation it was intended 
 that it should be inferred that it was better to 
 attack a weak Power, than either to be attacked 
 by Russia for not doing so, or to submit to a 
 Russian Army passing through the French ter- 
 ritory : a remark, which implied that the Em- 
 peror of Russia had much more influence in 
 causing the invasion of Spain, than was in fact 
 the case. Further, M. de Villele asserted, that 
 he had all along wished for peace, but that, now 
 things were gone so far, war was necessary ; and 
 therefore they should appeal to the valour of the 
 French soldiers to restore Ferdinand to liberty, 
 and to re-establish the work of Louis the Four- 
 teenth, by the union of the two branches of the 
 House of Bourbon. 
 
 Such were the reasons given by M. de Villele 
 for undertaking so hazardous and unjust an 
 enterprise. It is true, it has not produced all 
 the evils which might have been dreaded from 
 it; but it is impossible not to view with sur-
 
 g@3 
 
 prise the short-sightedness of a policy which 
 in such a state of the world could venture to 
 stir elements so dangerous, and to risk, perhaps, 
 the stability of the then existing settlement in 
 France, for the unnecessary object of renewing 
 the Family Compact with Spain. M. de Cha- 
 teaubriand's observations on this occasion were 
 unimportant. 
 
 In the Chamber of Peers the most remark- 
 able speech was from the Prince de Talleyrand 
 against the war. " It is now," said that wary 
 politician, " just sixteen years since, com- 
 " manded by him who at that time ruled the 
 " world to deliver my opinion on the projected 
 " attack on Spain, I had the misfortune to dis- 
 " please that ruler by unveiling the future, and 
 " pointing out the multitude of dangers that 
 " would arise out of an aggression equally rash 
 " and unjust. Disgrace was the reward of my 
 " sincerity. And after so long an interval, I 
 " find myself, by a singular destiny, under the 
 " necessity of renewing the same warnings and 
 " the same counsels." 
 
 M. de Talleyrand proceeded to expose the 
 injustice of undertaking a war on the motives 
 avowed for the one in contemplation, and ap- 
 pears to have made a considerable impression. 
 Whether what fell from him once more aroused 
 the alarms of M. de Villele, as to the conse- 
 quences of the course which he was pursuing, is 
 
 s 4
 
 (I 
 (< 
 «( 
 <c 
 
 264 
 
 uncertain ; but it appears that he, as well as his 
 colleague M. de Chateaubriand, about this time 
 again began to renew in a stronger way the ex- 
 pression of their desire for peace ; and the latter 
 stated that the French Government would re- 
 consider the subject if the " Spanish Negotiators 
 " would engage at a future period to modify 
 " the Constitution, and in the mean time would 
 prove their good faith by restoring Ferdinand 
 to his physical liberty, by allowing him to fre- 
 quent the baths ; by a general amnesty ; by 
 the establishment of laws regulating the press ; 
 " and by a change of Ministry." 
 
 It could not be expected, however, that these 
 conditions, even if they had not been clogged 
 by the last, which was no other than insisting 
 upon a change of the Negotiators themselves, 
 would have been listened to by the Spanish 
 Government. 
 
 The reception of the King of France's Speech 
 at Madrid had fully justified all Mr. Canning's 
 anticipations, and proved beyond a doubt the 
 erroneousness of M. de Villele's, and M. de 
 Chateaubriand's representations, as to the effect 
 it was likely to produce upon the Cortes and the 
 Government. While the first ebullitions of anger 
 lasted, the contest seemed to be which party 
 should adhere most pertinaciously to things ex- 
 actly as they were, for the express purpose of 
 marking the universal resentment of a tone so
 
 265 
 
 domineering and intolerant. But after the ex- 
 citement of the moment had a little subsided, 
 there was a re-action in the feelings, not of the 
 Ministers indeed, but amongst some of the most 
 influential persons at Madrid ; and the next ac- 
 counts from Sir William a Court were more 
 favourable as to the state of publick opinion, 
 and held out a hope that some Members of the 
 Cortes would urge on the Ministers, further 
 negotiations to prevent a war. 
 
 The Government seemed likewise to be in a 
 better condition to assert their legitimate au- 
 thority, as it had had recourse to the decided 
 measure of shutting up the Landaburian Club, 
 which had for some time, in a most uncon- 
 stitutional manner, exercised considerable con- 
 trol over the deliberations of the Legislature. 
 The proposal, in the Cortes, of a general am- 
 nesty, showed also a disposition to adopt a 
 milder system than had hitherto prevailed. And, 
 lastly, the avowed will of the King, to admit any 
 reasonable compromise upon the subject of His 
 Royal Prerogatives, which, it had been before 
 supposed, His Majesty would require to be 
 maintained to the fullest extent of absolute 
 despotism, presented a fair opening for an at- 
 tempt to reconcile the conflicting interests and 
 prejudices, of the several parties, whose dissen- 
 sions had so long distracted the Spanish nation. 
 Mr. Canning, therefore, determined, since the
 
 266 
 
 language of the French Ministers had become 
 much more pacifick, to place before them all these 
 grounds for entertaining hopes that Spain might 
 yet accomplish the work of her internal rege- 
 neration, and at the same time to make another 
 attempt to induce them to delay their hostile 
 declaration. Further, he endeavoured to con- 
 vince them of the dangers, which they must 
 necessarily encounter in entering into a war, 
 under any circumstances ; but especially, when 
 it should be understood, as the Speeches of the 
 King of France and his First Minister had given 
 it to be understood, that the war was in fact not 
 so much a war of necessity as of ambition ; that 
 it was to recover French influence, and re- 
 establish the Bourbon connection at Madrid. 
 
 Perhaps there never was a question upon 
 which the sense of nations was so unanimously 
 pronounced as on the injustice of this war. 
 
 Even the two German Allies of France had, 
 by this time, begun to be as much alarmed at its 
 probable consequences as they were strangers to 
 its principle. For it should be remembered, that 
 France was not about to act any longer upon 
 the principle to which they consented at Verona, 
 which was purely defensive : there the three 
 cases, which could be foreseen, were defined, and 
 neither of those definitions comprised the case 
 on which the French Government now medi- 
 tated hostilities.
 
 26? 
 
 Sir Charles Stuart was therefore directed to 
 urge all these considerations upon the French 
 Ministers, both as reasons for delay, as well as 
 for relaxing in their tone of unqualified menace, 
 and reproach, in order to give an opportunity to 
 those persons at Madrid, who were willing to 
 adopt modifications, to propose them ; to do 
 which, while that tone was persevered in, it was 
 almost impossible for any individual, or even 
 any party, to venture. 
 
 The arguments of Mr. Canning, however, did 
 not alter the conduct of the French Ministers. 
 Between the time when (as has been said) they 
 again talked of their desire for peace, and the 
 communication to them of these arguments, 
 they were satisfied by the fresh debates that had 
 taken place, that to maintain their places they 
 must consent to carry into execution the views 
 of the dominant party in the French Chambers. 
 
 There were not, however, wanting, amongst 
 the men of whom these Chambers were com- 
 posed, those who condemned in strong and 
 energetick language the principle by which the 
 war with Spain was justified; and on the occa- 
 sion* of a vote for the appropriation of funds for 
 its support, several Deputies spoke with great 
 eloquence against the measure, one of whom, M. 
 de Lessert, quoted the Report made to the 
 
 * February 25th.
 
 268 
 
 Senate in 1808, by the Minister of Buonaparte, 
 in favour of war against Spain, and showed that 
 Buonaparte's defence was precisely the same as 
 that now adopted by Messrs. Villele and Cha- 
 teaubriand. The former of these Ministers 
 indignantly denied that there was any resem- 
 blance between the conduct of the French 
 Government at this period and that of Napo- 
 leon when he invaded Spain ; but said little in 
 defence of the principle of intervention. 
 
 He left that task to his Colleague, who made 
 a most elaborate speech * in justification both of 
 its principle and policy. 
 
 This speech must be considered as the mani- 
 festo of the French Government, declarative of 
 the principles and causes by which they sought 
 to justify their invasion of Spain. It will, there- 
 fore, be well to stop a little to examine it. 
 
 M. de Chateaubriand commenced by at once 
 broadly admitting the principle that one country 
 has not a right to interfere in the internal con- 
 cerns of another, except when its essential in- 
 terests are in danger of " perishing " from the 
 condition of the internal concerns of that other 
 country. All, therefore, that M. de Chateau- 
 briand had to do, to prove the justice of his 
 cause, was, clearly to make out, that the case of 
 France with Spain came within the meaning of 
 
 * February 25th.
 
 269 
 
 his exception ; the principle, and the exception 
 to it, being undeniable. 
 
 Since England was the Power which had 
 been the loudest in its condemnation of the 
 war, M. de Chateaubriand appears to have 
 been very anxious to justify the conduct of 
 France by the language and the example of 
 England. Mr. Canning was the disciple of 
 Mr. Pitt. If, therefore, M. de Chateaubriand 
 could prove that France was then holding the 
 same language, and following the same course, 
 which were held and followed by Mr. Pitt's 
 Government in 1793, when England declared 
 war against France, it would, if it did not 
 establish the rectitude of that into which the 
 French Government were about . to enter, at 
 least involve Mr. Canning in all the incon- 
 sistency and blame of having once approved a 
 similar proceeding. M. de Chateaubriand, there- 
 fore, quoted the declaration of war by England 
 against France in 1793 ; in which, after having 
 dwelt upon the horrors of the French Revolution, 
 it is said, that " such a state of tilings could not 
 (i exist in France without involving in one com- 
 " mon danger all the neighbouring Powers, 
 " without giving them the right, and imposing 
 " upon them the duty, to stop the progress of 
 " an evil which only existed by the violation of 
 " all law, and by the subversion of the fun- 
 " damental principles of civilized society." —
 
 270 
 
 " England would not dispute with France the 
 " riarht of ref brming her laws, would never wish 
 " to change by external violence the form of 
 " Government of an independent State. She 
 " only desired to do so because it had be- 
 " come essential to the repose and safety of 
 " other Powers. Under these circumstances, she 
 " required from France to put an end to the 
 " anarchy which prevailed throughout her terri- 
 " tory, and to establish a Government, founded 
 " on the acknowledged principles of universal 
 "justice, and able to preserve with other na- 
 " tions the accustomed relations of amity and 
 
 " peace." 
 
 It then went on to say, " that England would 
 " grant assistance and protection to all those in 
 " France, who would declare for a Monar- 
 " chical Government, and would withdraw 
 " themselves from the despotism of a bloody 
 " anarchy." 
 
 " Gentlemen," said M. de Chateaubriand, 
 when he had finished his quotation, " what think 
 " you of this declaration ? Have you not 
 " thought that you have heard the Speech of 
 " our King at the opening of this present 
 " Session ? England promised succours to the 
 " French Royalists, and we are found fault with 
 " because we have protected the Royalists of 
 " Spain. England demands from France, as the 
 " price of peace, the establishment of a Govern-
 
 27 1 
 
 " ment, capable of maintaining- its engagements, 
 " and the ordinary relations of amity and justice, 
 " and we have not a right to demand from 
 " Spain, for our safety, the establishment of in- 
 " stitulions legitimatized by the liberty of Fer- 
 " dinand." 
 
 But those who will call to mind the circum- 
 stances under which this declaration of the En- 
 glish Government was written, will at once see 
 the fallacy of M. de Chateaubriand's arguments, 
 and the incorrectness of the parallel which he 
 endeavoured to establish. 
 
 In the first place, it is said, " That the then 
 " state of things in France was such, that it could 
 " not exist without involving in one common 
 "danger all the neighbouring Powers;" and 
 was not the proof of this to be found in the 
 celebrated decree of the Convention, offering 
 assistance and protection to every discontented 
 faction, in every country, that would take up 
 arms against the established authorities ? 
 
 Does not the mere passing of such a decree 
 as this demonstrate the truth of the assertion, 
 that the " state of things in France was such, 
 " that it could not exist without involving in 
 " one common danger all the neighbouring 
 " Powers ? " But where could M. de Chateau- 
 briand find any proof that the then state of 
 things in Spain was such, that its mere existence 
 involved France in danger?
 
 Qiya 
 
 It might be, certainly, that, the Government 
 of France being ill disposed to that of Spain, 
 the latter might think proper to insult or to 
 attack France, in a way which would justify 
 France in declaring war ; and so might any 
 other Government, whether an absolute or 
 limited Monarchy ; but this cause of war is one 
 which must not be confounded with that cause 
 which arises from an internal state of things in 
 a country, the mere existence of which is dan- 
 gerous to neighbouring Powers. What made the 
 internal state of things in France in 1793 dan- 
 gerous to neighbouring states was not any acts of 
 positive physical aggression against them: these 
 might have been committed as well by Louis XVI. 
 as by the Convention ; but the proclaimed de- 
 termination of a design to assist, upon principle, 
 all the disaffected persons of all nations, in any 
 attempts that they might make to overthrow the 
 Governments under which they lived. 
 
 Now the Spanish Government had not passed 
 a decree, offering assistance to the discontented 
 in France against the Bourbon Government; on 
 the contrary, it had, as a Government, done the 
 utmost in its power to abstain from giving any 
 offence whatsoever to France. 
 
 Again, — were the offers of succour and pro- 
 tection to the French Royalists held out by Eng- 
 land under the same circumstances as those 
 under which the French Government gave their
 
 273 
 
 aid to the Spanish Royalists? Certainly not : 
 such aid was not proffered by England, until 
 she openly declared war against France. 
 
 The laws of civilized warfare allow of the em- 
 ployment of deserters, and discontented subjects. 
 This aid, therefore, was promised according to 
 the established rules of legitimate hostility. But 
 was this the case with France ? Did the French 
 Government wait till it declared war against Spain, 
 to give aid to Her rebellious subjects ? Or did 
 it, while it had an Ambassador accredited to the 
 Constitutional Government of Spain, secretly stir 
 up insurrection against that Government ? If it 
 did, and M. de Chateaubriand does not deny, 
 while M. de Villele avowed that it did, that con- 
 stitutes the essential difference between the two 
 actions, and makes that which was just and 
 open in the one, unjust and treacherous in the 
 other. 
 
 But to return to M. de Chateaubriand's way 
 of making out his exception to the rule which 
 he lays down, of non-interference in the internal 
 concerns of an independent State. And here 
 again he quoted the language of the British 
 Government in his justification, and said that 
 Lord Castlereagh " maintained the right of any 
 " State to interfere, when its own safety, or its 
 " essential interests, were seriously compromised 
 " bv the internal transactions of another State." 
 Although this principle is rather broadly laid 
 
 VOL. I. T
 
 274 
 
 down, the words " seriously compromised " 
 being somewhat ambiguous, yet as this is the 
 exception made by M. de Chateaubriand to his 
 general rule, it will be but fair to see whether 
 he was able to bring the case of France against 
 Spain within the range of this comprehensive 
 reservation. 
 
 The proposition which he had to demonstrate 
 then, is, that the essential interests of France 
 were " seriously compromised " by the internal 
 transactions of Spain. 
 
 1st. " Then," he said, " the essential in- 
 terests of France were injured by the state 
 of suffering in which the Revolution of Spain 
 " held a portion of French Commerce ; France 
 " was obliged to keep a maritime force in the 
 " American seas, on account of the pirates who 
 " infested them, produced by the anarchy in 
 " Spain." 
 
 There can be no doubt that the injuries com- 
 mitted on French Commerce by vessels under 
 the Spanish Flag, if unredressed, afforded justi- 
 fiable ground for war by France against Spain. 
 But then it is quite clear, that, so far from these 
 being internal transactions, they are to all intents 
 and purposes external aggressions: and, therefore, 
 though reparation from Spain for such injuries 
 may be very properly demanded, yet, until such 
 reparation should be refused or delayed upon the 
 plea of inability to give it, the mere fact of the 

 
 275 
 
 aggression could not justify war, much less hostile 
 interference to effect a change in the form of 
 the Spanish Government. 
 
 M. de Chateaubriand certainly endeavoured to 
 lay all the fault of such piracies at the door of 
 the Constitution ; but he here stated what is not 
 correct. Piracies were full as frequent under 
 the Flag of the Absolute, as they were under 
 that of the Constitutional, King of Spain, as the 
 Archives of the British Embassy at Madrid will 
 testify; and therefore the argument for the 
 necessity of a change in the Spanish Govern- 
 ment, applied with greater force to that of the 
 Absolute King, Ferdinand, under whose Govern- 
 ment the piratical system commenced, than to 
 that of the Constitution, under whom that system 
 was permitted to continue. 
 
 2dly. " The French Provinces, bordering on 
 " Spain, were unable to carry on so lucrative a 
 " Commerce with that country as they had been 
 " accustomed to do, on account of the disorders 
 " on the other side of the Pyrenees.' ' 
 
 Without entering into the question, whether 
 one country's trading less than usual with an- 
 other is a just reason for waging war, it is merely 
 necessary to observe, that if there were dis- 
 orders on the other side of the Pyrenees, they 
 were, according to the admission of the French 
 Ministers, fomented by themselves ; and there- 
 fore the idea of visiting Spain with punishment 
 
 t 2
 
 276 
 
 for what they themselves had produced, is one 
 of the most singular notions of justice that ever 
 fell from the lips of a Statesman. 
 
 3dly. " The essential interests of France were 
 " compromised, because the persons of the 
 " French Consuls in Spanish Ports were threat- 
 " ened with violence. French vessels were re- 
 " pulsed from Spanish Harbours, and French 
 " Territory violated three times by Spanish 
 " Soldiers." 
 
 Of the first two, of these three complaints, 
 M. de Chateaubriand did not give a single 
 instance ; of themselves thev would not afford 
 sufficient ground for war ; it would only be 
 upon reparation being demanded and refused, 
 that they would do so -, and it does not appear 
 that the French Government even complained 
 of them to that of Spain, much less that its 
 complaints had been passed by unheeded. Of 
 the last, if French Territory were violated by 
 Spanish Soldiers, how did it happen ? it was in 
 pursuit of those Insurgents whom France had 
 instigated to rebel. 
 
 - 4thly, " The essential interests of France were 
 " compromised, because She was obliged to keep 
 " up an Army of Observation on the Spanish 
 " Frontier, on account of the Civil War which 
 " raged within it." Again, who produced that 
 Civil War ? French intrigues. The French 
 Government had only to have ceased prosecuting
 
 277 
 
 them, and the pretence for the Army of Obser- 
 vation would have ceased likewise. 
 
 These reasons were all that the French 
 Government put forth, by one of its ablest 
 Ministers, in defence of the justice of the 
 measure. 
 
 In defence of its policy, M. de Chateaubriand 
 certainly gave two reasons of a rather more 
 substantial nature. The first of which was, that 
 if the Government of Spain should, (as he as- 
 sumed that it would, if the " Constitution of 
 " Cadiz should continue to exist much longer) 
 " become a Republick, that it would form 
 " alliances, and create relations, which in future 
 " wars would considerably weaken by division 
 " the French forces j for before the Revolution, 
 " France, guarded on the South by the Medi- 
 " terranean, on the West by Spain, on the North 
 " by the Ocean, and on the East by Switzerland, 
 " had only a short line, well fortified, between 
 " the North and the East to defend. But if 
 " She were to have to defend both her North- 
 " eastern and Western Frontiers at the same 
 " instant, she would certainly be weakened, and 
 " perhaps exhausted, by her efforts." 
 
 The other, that France " by acting by herself 
 " would prove her independence, and that the 
 " complete reconciliation of all Frenchmen 
 " would be brought about under the tent, as 
 " companions in arms soon become friends." 
 
 t 3
 
 278 
 
 There may be something more plausible in 
 these arguments for the policy of the war, than 
 in those he brought forward in defence of its 
 justice. 
 
 As far as they go, they are certainly argu- 
 ments in its favour ; but then, as the arguments 
 against its policy are not stated, and those on 
 the one side fairly balanced against those on 
 the other, they cannot be admitted to be con- 
 clusive. 
 
 After some other Deputies had spoken, the 
 discussion was adjourned to the next day ; on 
 which occasion M. Manuel, the Deputy from 
 La Vendee, a liberal, and a man of considerable 
 talent, proceeded to answer M. de Chateau- 
 briand. In the course of his speech, he made an 
 allusion to the death of Louis XVI., in which 
 he held out that event as a warning to those 
 who were now about to wage war with Spain, 
 lest by so doing they should bring about a 
 similar catastrophe. In speaking of that ex- 
 ecution, M. Manuel said, " that Revolutionary 
 " France found it necessary to defend herself 
 " by new strength and energy — " &c. Before he 
 could finish his sentence, all the war party rose 
 up, and raised such a clamour, that the President, 
 finding it vain to attempt to appease the tumult, 
 adjourned the sitting. Next day, in spite of 
 M. Manuel's explanation, it was decreed that he 
 should be expelled the Chamber for the re-
 
 mainder of the Session ; and when he had been 
 ejected from the Chamber, by force, the rest of 
 his party, to the number of sixty, having signed 
 a protest against his expulsion, seceded from the 
 Chamber, and persevered in their secession until 
 the prorogation. The consequence of this was, 
 that the war party had it all their own way ; the 
 vote of supply for the expenses of the war was 
 carried unanimously, and no discussions of any 
 interest took place during the remainder of the 
 Session, 
 
 From the time of the secession of the sixty 
 Deputies, the language of the French Ministers 
 to England was the same as before. They 
 -"wished" as much as ever for peace; but they 
 still continued their preparations for war, which 
 were, indeed, carried on with increased activity. 
 
 Meanwhile, the transactions at Madrid did not 
 increase the chances of peace. The dismissal 
 of the Nuncio, because the Pope, his master, 
 objected to receive the Spanish Minister accre* 
 dited to the Papal Court, on account of that 
 Minister having voted for certain measures 
 against the interest of the Church, had only 
 served to spread disaffection amongst the more 
 religious part of the community. The capital 
 was thrown into alarm by the near approach to 
 it of the insurgent forces, which again, under 
 the command of Bessieres, had taken up arms 
 in defence of the prerogatives of the absolute 
 
 t 4
 
 280 
 
 King, and there was strong ground for believing 
 this movement of the Rebel Chiefi who was 
 quickly driven back and defeated by the Con- 
 stitutional Forces, was not made without con- 
 cert with the Royalist part of the populace at 
 Madrid. The Ministers possessed but a very 
 small portion of that power which ought to 
 belong to an Executive Government; and though 
 the shutting up of the Landaburian Club, and 
 the promise of a general amnesty, for a time 
 gave hopes that a better order of things was 
 about to spring up, yet such hopes were not 
 realized ; and even the amnesty, when it was 
 published, so little deserved the name, that it 
 only afforded fresh food for disappointment to 
 those who looked for any good being derived 
 from its publication. 
 
 The language of M. de San Miguel was, that 
 the Continental Powers, and France in parti- 
 cular, by the withdrawal of her Minister, ac- 
 companied by the preposterous proposal that 
 Ferdinand should go to the Bidassoa, to treat 
 with the Duke D'Angouleme, together with the 
 tone assumed by Louis the Eighteenth at the 
 opening of the Chambers, had made it a point 
 of honour, at any rate at that moment, not to 
 entertain even the question of modifications. 
 On the other hand, however, a general wish for 
 peace, as well as for some revision of the Con- 
 stitution, pervaded the great majority of the
 
 281 
 
 nation. But then, unfortunately, there was no 
 man who had either sufficient courage to propose, 
 or sufficient influence to carry, any measures of 
 the sort. 
 
 The party at Madrid, called doctrinaires, were 
 the great obstacle to any arrangement. From 
 being decided enemies of the Ministers, they 
 had become their chief support, because they 
 were aware that no concessions would be con- 
 sented to by them ; and this all the while that 
 they were convinced that modifications in the 
 Constitution were necessary, and that they would 
 have consented to their adoption, if they could 
 have been brought about constitutionally. But 
 they were lost in their theories, and were willing 
 to sacrifice every thing for a word. 
 
 Mr. Canning's answer to M. San Miguel's 
 application for the good offices of the British 
 Government reached Madrid almost* at the 
 same time with the Speech of the King of 
 France, which (as has been before stated) pro- 
 duced an effect which would have been more 
 than sufficient to prevent any good resulting 
 from the interference of England. 
 
 Neither did the arguments which Sir William 
 a Court was subsequently directed to urge upon 
 M. de San Miguel alter that Minister's deter- 
 mination. He " listened to them with the 
 " greatest attention, but declared his conviction 
 
 * February 4th.
 
 282 
 
 " that it would be much easier to overturn the 
 " whole constitutional system, and to re-establish 
 " absolute despotism, than to concede even the 
 " most insignificant of the points which had been 
 " suggested as most likely to conciliate." The 
 consequence of this resolution on the part of the 
 Ministers was, that they began to take the steps 
 necessary for the removal of the seat of Govern- 
 ment whenever the invasion should actually 
 occur. 
 
 The Cortes granted them the requisite power. 
 The King, however, was violently opposed to 
 quitting Madrid, and, it seems, had " an intention 
 " of requesting the Council of State to choose a 
 " new Ministry selected out of their own body. 
 " The Ministers, alarmed, obtained from the 
 " Cortes the repeal of the decree authorizing 
 " the employment of Counsellors of State, with 
 " the exception of those already employed." 
 This device " effectually put an end to the pro- 
 " posed administration." But this intention was 
 not the only proof that His Majesty gave of his 
 dislike to leave his capital.* 
 
 On the occasion of his signing the speech by 
 which the Extraordinary Cortes were to be 
 closed, at which his Ministers were present, on 
 an allusion being made to his removal, he 
 started up in the most violent manner, declared 
 his intention not to stir, called his Ministers by 
 
 * February 18th.
 
 •283 
 
 names not often found in Roval mouths, ordered 
 them from his presence, and in so doing ex- 
 claimed that they would quickly see whether he 
 had courage or not, exemplifying his meaning by 
 an allusion too gross to repeat. The Ministers 
 retired, but returned at midnight, with a view 
 of tendering their Resignations. His Majesty, 
 however, was not to be seen. The Cortes were 
 closed the next morning in the usual form, after 
 which the Ministers gave in their Resignations 
 in writing. The next day all was agitation in 
 Madrid, and towards the evening of the suc- 
 ceeding day crowds of some hundreds assembled, 
 uttering the most seditious cries against the King 
 and Royal Family ; they proceeded to the palace, 
 but finding a company of militia, at the gates, 
 determined to resist their entry, they adjourned 
 to the municipality, where Riego and others ad- 
 dressed them from balconies, exhorting them to 
 have patience, and that His Majesty should be 
 solicited to re-appoint the discarded Ministers. 
 These scenes continued till past twelve at night, 
 when the intelligence was announced that the 
 King had been pleased to re-appoint the same 
 Ministers, ad interim. 
 
 It was after the re-appointment of the Ministry 
 that the King * sent for Sir William a Court to 
 
 * His Majesty was sitting up in his bed, with a beard of 
 some days' growth, and was wrapped in a not very clean 
 bed-gown.
 
 284 
 
 complain of the insults that he had received, 
 and of his being forced to take back the very 
 Ministers who wished to remove him from 
 Madrid against his will. Sir William a Court of 
 course lamented the insults to which he had been 
 exposed; and as His Majesty laid great stress 
 upon the words " against his will," Sir William 
 asked him whether he wished them to be re- 
 ported to his Government. The King answered, 
 " Undoubtedly" Little more passed at the in- 
 terview. It was evident that the object of the 
 King in sending for Sir William was merely that 
 he should hear those words. 
 
 The sudden boldness exhibited by Ferdinand 
 to his Ministers in the language which he held 
 to them, naturally gave rise to the idea that 
 His Majesty would not have risked such a pro- 
 ceeding, had he not felt confident of support. 
 There can be no doubt that there was at that 
 time a project on foot for bringing about a 
 counter-revolution ; a project, to be traced to 
 French intrigues ; it however failed, and with it 
 the evanescent courage of Ferdinand. When, 
 therefore, a few days after, the subject of the 
 removal was again brought forward by the 
 Ministers to the King, his manner and language 
 were more moderate. To create delay, His 
 Majesty declared that he would not decide upon 
 the question without the advice of his Council
 
 2S5 
 
 of State. This very much dissatisfied the 
 Minister of the Interior, who, in consequence, 
 gave in his resignation. The Council of State 
 advised His Majesty to have every thing in 
 readiness for a removal, though it saw no reason 
 why it should be immediate ; they advised, also, 
 that the resignation of the Minister of the In- 
 terior ought to be accepted. As soon as it was 
 accepted, all the other Ministers tendered theirs : 
 they were not immediately accepted, as great 
 difficulty was experienced in finding persons 
 who would consent to succeed them ; at last, 
 however, a new Administration was named, of 
 which M. Flores Estrada was Minister of Foreign 
 Affairs, and Don Antonio del Moral, of the 
 Interior. The character of the newly named 
 Ministry did not, however, increase the pro- 
 bability of any concessions being made. But all 
 those that were named did not accept, and 
 Don Antonio del Moral positively declined. 
 The new Ministry being thus in abeyance, the 
 Ex-Ministers transacted the publick business 
 in the Cortes, and * were called upon by that 
 body to report the latest news from the Frontier. 
 On M. de San Miguel stating that in a fortnight 
 there would be 80,000 Frenchmen between the 
 Garonne and the Pyrenees, it was moved that the 
 Ministers should in twenty-four hours take the 
 
 * March 2d.
 
 286 
 
 pleasure of the King both as to the place and 
 clay for the removal of the Government. The 
 King rinding that any further opposition to his 
 removal would probably be ineffectual, named 
 Seville as the place to which he wished to go. 
 The day on which the King made this decision, 
 the new Ministers, Flores Estrada and the 
 others, having received (as it was supposed) an 
 intimation from the Cortes that they would not 
 be supported, refused to retain their offices ; 
 and as the King's decree, accepting the re- 
 signations of M. de San Miguel and his friends, 
 stated that "he should only do so after they 
 " had delivered their respective reports to the 
 " Cortes ;" and as the Cortes declined to receive 
 them till after the adjournment to Seville, the 
 San Miguel Administration was once more in 
 temporary possession of the Government. 
 
 The Ministers and Cortes now * became more 
 pressing for the removal of themselves and the 
 King, but His Majesty's physicians reported 
 him to be ill. On the 12th the Ministers laid 
 before the Cortes the report of the physicians, 
 which stated that they could not be answerable 
 for the effects which a journey might have upon 
 the King in the then state of his health. The 
 Report was referred to a Committee, who re- 
 commended that His Majesty should be invited 
 
 * March 7th.
 
 287 
 
 to fix any day before the 18th for his departure. 
 A Deputation was immediately appointed to 
 submit the invitation to the King, who received 
 them graciously, and declared that he should 
 be ready to set out on the 17th, if the Cortes 
 desired it, but that he wished to delay his de- 
 parture till the 20th; and upon the Minister Gasco 
 declaring, that, if any unforeseen accident should 
 occur, which should render a more immediate 
 departure necessary, His Majesty would be 
 ready to set out, the Cortes acceded to his pro- 
 posal. No such accident occurred, and the King, 
 therefore, did not leave Madrid till the morning 
 of the 20th of March ; very few people assembled 
 to witness his departure, and a sort of dull in- 
 difference seemed to be the general feeling. 
 Those Members of the Diplomatick body that 
 still remained, were invited to go with the 
 King. 
 
 The Cortes closed on the 23d, and nearly the 
 whole of the Members set out for Seville on the 
 same day. The British Minister left Madrid 
 on the 25th, according to his instructions, to 
 follow the King, " unless His Majesty's removal 
 " should be accompanied by circumstances of 
 " violence, such as to mark a determined re- 
 luctance on the part of the King, and a ma- 
 1 nifest duresse on his person." 
 
 . .
 
 288 
 
 The Duke d'Angouleme left Paris for the 
 army on the 17th of March, and on the 6th of 
 April, as Prince Generalissimo, crossed the Ru- 
 bicon by making with his army the Passage of 
 the Bidassoa.
 
 289 
 
 CHAP. VI. 
 
 DOMESTICK AFFAIRS. PARTIAL CHANGES IN THE AD- 
 MINISTRATION. MR. CANNING'S RETIREMENT FROM 
 
 LIVERPOOL. DEBATES IN PARLIAMENT ON VERONA 
 
 NEGOTIATIONS. AFFAIRS OF IRELAND. CATHOLICK 
 
 QUESTION. 
 
 The domestick occurrences from the time when 
 Mr. Canning accepted office, to the period of 
 the entrance of the French into Spain — with 
 the exception of the changes in the Adminis- 
 tration, his retirement from Liverpool, and the 
 debates in Parliament, — are not of sufficient 
 importance to require here to be noticed. 
 
 It was very shortly after Mr. Canning took 
 office, that negotiations were set on foot to 
 bring about those changes. Of the negotiations 
 
 vol. i. u
 
 290 
 
 by which they were effected, it is not intended 
 to give a detailed history : such a history would 
 indeed shew, that the task of reconciling the con- 
 flicting interests of individuals in London, re- 
 quired no less skill and delicacy in its manage- 
 ment, than the more important task of settling 
 the Affairs of Nations at Verona, and might con- 
 sequently be amusing ; but it would be neither 
 fair to the parties concerned, nor useful to the 
 reader. Suffice it, therefore, to say, that it was 
 finally settled that Mr. Vansittart, under the 
 title of Lord Bexley, should become Chancellor 
 of the Duchy of Lancaster ; that Mr. Robinson 
 should succeed him as Chancellor of the Exche- 
 quer; that Mr. Huskisson should be President 
 of the Board of Trade, and Treasurer of the 
 Navy ; and Mr. Arbuthnot should succeed Mr. 
 Huskisson, as First Commissioner of Woods and 
 Forests. 
 
 Lord Amherst was appointed Governor-Ge- 
 neral of India, in lieu of Mr. Canning ; and Lord 
 Londonderry, having resigned the Embassy at 
 Vienna, was succeeded by Sir Henry Wellesley, 
 the brother of the Duke of Wellington. 
 
 By the acceptance of the seals of the Foreign 
 Office, Mr. Canning vacated his seat for Liver- 
 pool. A short time before the meeting of Par- 
 liament, he decided that he would not again 
 offer himself as a candidate for that place. It 
 was not, however, without " the deepest re-
 
 291 
 
 " gret " that he came to this decision : but 
 " four months' experience of the occupations of 
 " his office, forced upon him the reluctant con- 
 " viction, that he would no longer be able to 
 " give to the important duties of a representative 
 " of that great town, that degree of attention 
 " which would satisfy the just claims of its in- 
 " habitants, and his own conscientious estimate 
 " of them." 
 
 The severance of a connection, which during 
 the preceding ten years of his life had been, in 
 his opinion, " the single compensation for all 
 " the vexation and annoyance" which, during 
 that ten years, he had experienced, must neces- 
 sarily have been to him a very painful incident. 
 For he could not but have witnessed with regret 
 the post of Foreign Secretary occupied by a 
 Minister, who, while he reaped the harvest, the 
 seed of which Mr. Canning had sown, was so 
 unskilful in the performance of the task, that, 
 in the very act of securing, he lost more than 
 half the produce. 
 
 It was Mr. Canning who, when Foreign Se- 
 cretary in 1808, " discharged the glorious duty 
 " of recognising without delay the rights of the 
 " Spanish Nation, and of at once adopting that 
 " gallant people into the closest amity with Eng- 
 "land;" — it was Mr. Canning who discerned 
 the great military talents of Sir Arthur Wellesley, 
 and insisted upon their Employment in the Pe- 
 
 u %
 
 292 
 
 ninsula ; — it was Mr. Canning who foretold the 
 final triumph of the cause, at a time when it was 
 apparently desperate. But it was Lord Castle- 
 reagh who bore away the reflected glories of 
 Salamanca and Vittoria, and threw away at 
 Vienna their advantages. 
 
 It could not but have been a mortification to 
 Mr. Canning, not only as a Statesman, but as a 
 true lover of his Country, to see others spoiling 
 his own work : and this mortification must have 
 been embittered by the reflection, that in 1812 he 
 rejected the offer to join the Administration, by 
 which he would have been placed in the very 
 situation, which would have enabled him to do 
 all the good which he saw was capable of being 
 done. The loss of this opportunity, " at a time 
 " when office would have been dearer to him 
 " than at any other period of his political career ; 
 " when he would have given " (to use his own 
 strong expression) " ten years of life for two 
 " of office," could not have been otherwise to 
 him than a source of extreme disappointment. 
 Calumniated upon system by a faction ; who 
 saw in him the grand obstacle to the success of 
 its designs against the Constitution, every action 
 of his life, during these ten years, had been mis- 
 represented with the most unwearied malignity. 
 The object sought was to diminish the weight 
 of his opinion, by degrading, in general estima- 
 tion, the purity and integrity of his character.
 
 293 
 
 While, therefore, he had all the worry and 
 anxiety ever attendant upon publick life, he had 
 none of those rewards, by which its cares are 
 sweetened, with the exception of the treatment 
 which he experienced at Liverpool, which (as 
 he himself has said) was his only " consolation." 
 When his connection began with that place, he 
 certainly had many friends there ; but, perhaps, 
 a nearly equal number of opponents. When 
 his connection ceased with it, his friends had 
 been confirmed in their attachment, and, it is no 
 exaggeration to say, that, the enmity of his bit- 
 terest opponents had been converted, in all 
 cases, into respect, and in many, into the warmth 
 of friendship. In retiring, therefore, from a 
 place thus endeared to him by the kindness to- 
 wards him of its inhabitants — a kindness en- 
 hanced by the publick spirit in which it origin- 
 ated — it was no small satisfaction to have, in Mr. 
 Huskisson, a successor well qualified to discharge 
 the important duties of its representation. 
 
 Parliament met on the 4th of February. The 
 Speech from the Throne was not calculated to 
 excite controversy, by the manner in which it 
 dealt with the topics on which it touched. 
 
 All that it said with regard to the state of 
 affairs, between France and Spain, was, that 
 " the King's efforts had been unremittingly ex- 
 " erted to preserve the peace of Europe ; that 
 " His Majesty declined being a party to any 
 
 u 3
 
 l 294 
 
 " proceedings, at Verona, which could be deemed 
 " an interference with the internal concerns of 
 " Spain on the part of Foreign Powers ; and 
 " that His Majesty continued to use his most 
 " anxious endeavours and good offices to allay 
 " the irritation between the French and Spanish 
 " Governments ; and to arrest, if possible, the 
 " calamity of war between France and Spain." 
 
 It then expressed a confident hope that peace 
 would be preserved in the East of Europe ; 
 announced the engagements entered into by 
 Spain to give satisfactory reparation for the 
 depredations committed by Spaniards on British 
 commerce ; stated the exertions of the Govern- 
 ment at Verona for the more effectual sup- 
 pression of the Slave Trade ; promised a re- 
 duction of taxes ; recommended the adoption 
 of certain measures respecting Ireland ; and, 
 while it lamented the continuance of Agricul- 
 tural distress, expressed a hope that the " in- 
 " creased prosperity of the other interests of 
 " the country would contribute to the gradual 
 " improvement of that great interest, which was 
 " the most important of them all." 
 
 In the House of Lords, the Address was 
 moved by the Earl of Morley. The remarks 
 of the speakers, with the exception of Lord 
 Stanhope, were almost exclusively directed to 
 the subject of the war which seemed impending 
 between France and Spain.
 
 *J5 
 
 The conduct of the French Government 
 towards Spain was severely animadverted upon 
 by Lord Lansdowne ; and the speech of Lord 
 Liverpool plainly indicated, that, if the members 
 of the Government abstained, from an open 
 condemnation of the invasion, which France 
 projected on the Peninsula, such an abstinence 
 was to be ascribed, not to their entertaining 
 feelings of less decided disapprobation of that 
 invasion than those avowed by the Opposition, 
 but to the necessity which Ministers are under 
 of measuring each expression which they may 
 employ, and adapting it exactly to the purpose 
 which it is intended to answer. In the present 
 instance, the hopes of the Government, of still 
 being able to preserve peace, were not extin- 
 guished ; and one word of vehement reprobation 
 or menace, on the part of the First Minister, 
 might have made it a point of honour with the 
 French Ministers, from which they could not 
 have swerved, to have persevered in what they 
 had begun. 
 
 The Address would have been carried una- 
 nimously, had not Lord Stanhope moved an 
 amendment, relating to the Agricultural Dis- 
 tress ; a subject which was of that extensive 
 and complicated nature, that it was only fit to 
 be debated upon an evening, expressly set apart 
 for the purpose. This appeared to be the general 
 feeling of the House j since only two Peers, 
 
 u 4>
 
 296 
 
 besides the noble mover, supported the amend- 
 ment. The proceedings in the House of Com- 
 mons were marked by the most vehement 
 expressions of disgust at the conduct of France 
 and the Allies. Mr. Brougham pronounced a 
 tremendous philippick against their present de- 
 signs, and former conduct. Excelling, as that 
 learned gentleman's oratory does, in bitterness of 
 sarcasm, and severity of attack, he seems on this 
 occasion to have outdone all his former efforts 
 of a similar kind. His words inspired in the 
 breasts of his hearers the same indignation with 
 which his own was evidently animated, and the 
 House resounded with cheers at every pause, 
 whilst he was dragging each separate Sovereign 
 of the Allies before the tribunal of a free and 
 popular assembly, to answer for their attempts 
 to crush by mere physical force the just liberties 
 of the world. 
 
 Mr. Peel, who, with the exception of Mr. 
 Wynne, was the only Cabinet Minister present, 
 the others having vacated their seats by the 
 acceptance of office, confined himself j in replying 
 to Mr. Brougham, to a brief explanation of the 
 principles by which the Government had been 
 guided : and the House, after a speech from 
 Sir James Mackintosh, and another from Mr. 
 Denman, in the same strain as Mr. Brougham's, 
 carried unanimously the original address. 
 
 The following day, February 5th, when the
 
 207 
 
 Report was brought up, after a few observations 
 from Sir Robert Wilson, it was received, and 
 the Address ordered to be presented in the 
 usual manner. 
 
 Since both Lord Liverpool and Mr. Peel, in 
 the course of their speeches, had declared that 
 the Government still cherished hopes of being 
 able to preserve peace, between France and Spain, 
 the subject of the dispute between these two 
 Powers was not again mooted in either House of 
 Parliament, till three weeks from the day on 
 which the Session opened ; and then Lord Lans- 
 downe contented himself with simply enquiring, 
 whether the Ministers still thought that any 
 reasonable expectation existed that peace might 
 yet be preserved in " Western Europe ? " Lord 
 Liverpool, without saying whether the hopes that 
 he had entertained, on the first day of the Session, 
 were increased, or diminished, declared, that any 
 further discussion, at that period, was even more 
 to be deprecated than it was on the former oc- 
 casion. Lord Lansdowne then asked whether 
 any engagement had been entered into by this 
 country, as to any part she might take, supposing 
 war should actually break out between France 
 and Spain : to which question Lord Liverpool 
 replied, in the negative. 
 
 On the same day that this conversation took 
 place in the House of Lords, the subject was 
 incidentally introduced into the other House of
 
 298 
 
 Parliament, on a petition being presented by 
 Sir Robert Wilson from his Southwark Con- 
 stituents for the repeal of the Foreign Enlist- 
 ment Bill. Sir Robert took the opportunity of 
 complimenting Mr. Canning, by " congratulating 
 " the house, and the country, upon the favour- 
 " able aspect of its foreign policy." 
 
 Mr. Hobhouse followed, and " thanked the 
 " Ministers for the prudence they had hitherto 
 " displayed, and praised them for the course 
 " which thus far they had pursued." 
 
 " I wish, however," added the Honourable 
 Gentleman, " to be understood as speaking of 
 " the present, and not of the late Ministry ; for if 
 " the same language had been held, at Troppau 
 " and Laybach, which I believe to have been 
 " held at Verona, we should not now be placed 
 " in our present difficulties." 
 
 There can be no reason to doubt, that both 
 Sir Robert and Mr. Hobhouse only spoke the 
 genuine sentiments of their hearts, when they 
 thus expressed themselves in terms of appro- 
 bation at the dawn of liberal principles, which 
 they thought they perceived in the language 
 and policy of Mr. Canning, and were totally 
 devoid of any sinister intentions ; but it is not 
 less true, that, compliments paid to Mr. Canning 
 at the expense of a former Government, which 
 was composed, with the exception of the change 
 between himself and Lord Castlereagh, of nearly
 
 tft 
 
 29g 
 
 tlic same individuals who formed the constituent 
 parts of the present one, must inevitably have had 
 the effect, had he consented to receive them, of 
 breeding jealousy, if not disunion, between him- 
 self and his colleagues. He therefore at once 
 declared, that " he rejected all praise, which was 
 " bestowed upon the Government as then formed, 
 " and which was given to it at the expense of 
 " those by whom it was formerly composed. 
 
 He was compelled in mere justice to say, that 
 
 upon his entering into the office which he had 
 " the honour then to fill, he found the prin- 
 " ciples on which the Government was acting re- 
 " duced to writing ; and this State paper formed, 
 " what he might be allowed to call, the political 
 " creed of the Ministers. Upon the execution 
 " of the principles there laid down, and upon 
 " that alone, was founded any claim that he 
 " might have to credit from the House." 
 
 Now the State paper to which Mr. Canning 
 here refers is the State paper, which has before 
 been mentioned, as put forth by the Govern- 
 ment in May 1820, just one month before Mr. 
 Canning ceased to take any part in the deliber- 
 ations of the Cabinet : for the principles laid 
 down in that paper, as has been before observed, 
 he held himself to be responsible; and it is very 
 remarkable, that all the merit that he here 
 claims is for his bond fide execution of them. 
 
 No sooner had this declaration escaped Mr.
 
 300 
 
 Canning's lips than it was variously interpreted, 
 according as it suited the convenience of the 
 different parties who expounded it. By those 
 who disliked Mr. Canning, because he was the 
 Enemy of Reform, it was said that he was in 
 heart a friend to the Holy Alliance, and was 
 basely walking in the footsteps of Lord Castle- 
 reagh. By those who did not like Mr. Canning 
 much better, because he was the friend of liberal 
 principles, but were still conscious of the popu- 
 larity which the Government had acquired by 
 the way in which the foreign policy of the 
 country had been directed, it was said, that Mr. 
 Canning, indeed, deserved praise j but that he 
 only deserved it, because he had skilfully filled 
 up the outlines of a plan, which the genius of 
 Castlereagh had sketched. 
 
 These conflicting interpretations of what Mr. 
 Canning said, compelled him to take the earliest 
 opportunity of explaining his meaning. " It 
 was not," he observed, " with the intention of 
 " separating himself from those who preceded 
 " him in office, nor with the desire of claiming 
 " to himself any merit which belonged to them, 
 " that he felt himself called upon to repeat what 
 " he had stated on a former day, and what had 
 " been much misunderstood, — narrowed by some, 
 " and extended by others, — that, applicable to 
 " the considerations on which the Congress was 
 " to be employed, he had found in the records
 
 301 
 
 " of his office (and it was also in the records of 
 " the country") a state paper, laying down the 
 " principle of non-interference, with all the qua- 
 " lifications properly belonging to it. When, 
 " therefore, with whatever degree of courtesy, 
 " it had been ascribed to him that he had ap- 
 " plied new principles to a new case, he had 
 " thought it but just to remind the House of a 
 " fact, of which indeed it was already in pos- 
 " session. The principle of non-interference 
 " with the independence of foreign States was 
 " laid down in the document to which he al- 
 " luded, as broadly, clearly, and definitively as 
 " it was possible for any Statesman to wish to 
 " lay it down." 
 
 The fond pertinacity with which Mr. Canning 
 here appeals to the document in question, is 
 certainly enough to create a suspicion that he 
 felt conscious of having had, at least, some share 
 in its composition ; and it would certainly appear, 
 to those who are at all conversant with Mr. 
 Canning's style of writing, that several of the 
 sentences in that paper afford the strongest 
 internal evidence that he, and no other, was 
 their author. 
 
 Moreover, it should be observed that he does 
 not describe the principles by which he professes 
 himself to have been guided, as laid down by 
 Lord Castlereagh, but as " laid down in a docu- 
 " ment which he found in his office;" which
 
 302 
 
 document was put forth at a time when lie him- 
 self was a Member of the Government, and was, 
 therefore, responsible for its contents. * 
 
 But whether Mr. Canning was or was not 
 the author of several passages in this paper, 
 which was truly described in Parliament as 
 " a very unequal production," he could have 
 had no hesitation in avowing that the prin- 
 ciples laid down in it, of which he entirely ap- 
 proved, were those to which he had adhered 
 with the most scrupulous fidelity. For, in truth, 
 the propounding of general principles is of very 
 little use, unless those who propound them 
 follow up their words by actions. It was of very 
 small advantage to this country Lord Castle- 
 reagh's expressing his abstract opinion, that 
 " the notion of revising, limiting, or regulating 
 " the course of the experiments, in which many 
 " States of Europe were then employed, of 
 
 * The author of this history does not know, by means of 
 any personal confidence from Mr. Canning, that what he 
 here surmises is true : if he had been made the depositary 
 of such confidence, he would hold it to be of a nature too 
 sacred to be revealed. He has, however, reasons for think- 
 ing that parts of this paper were written by Mr. Canning; 
 and it is singular enough, that in the only history of these 
 transactions that he has read, he finds that the judgment 
 of the writer of that history coincides with his own, — that 
 the document in " question bears in its language, and even 
 " in its tone, internal evidence of not having been drawn up 
 " by Lord Londonderry himself."
 
 303 
 
 " casting anew their Governments upon the 
 " representative system, either by foreign force, 
 " or foreign council, was as dangerous to avow, 
 " as impossible to execute," — when, on the very 
 first occasion which presented itself for realizing 
 the notion, he admitted both the expediency and 
 justice of such a realization being attempted. 
 Of still less advantage was the enunciation of the 
 abstract principle, that " the Alliance was never 
 " intended as an union for the government of 
 " the world, or for the superintendence of the 
 " internal affairs of other States," — when he 
 countenanced the assembling of its members, by 
 sending British Ministers to be present at their 
 meeting, when that assembling was for the 
 avowed purpose, not of exercising even a mo- 
 derate superintendence over the internal affairs, 
 but of overthrowing by force of arms the 
 established Government of an independent 
 State. 
 
 The merit, therefore, which attaches to the 
 mode of conducting our Foreign policy at Ve- 
 rona, is not to be traced in the discovery of any 
 " new principles" of conduct, but in the fair 
 execution of those which were already professed, 
 and in Mr. Canning's marking his firm deter- 
 mination to act up to them both in spirit and in 
 letter. 
 
 After Lord Lansdowne's questions respecting 
 the relations between France and Spain, and the
 
 304 
 
 discussion which arose upon the same subject 
 on the occasion of Sir Robert Wilson's present- 
 ation of the petition for the repeal of the 
 Foreign Enlistment Bill (both of which occurred 
 on the 24th of February), nothing further was 
 said respecting Foreign Affairs in either House, 
 with the exception of a few unimportant observ- 
 ations of Sir Francis Burdett's on the third 
 reading of the Mutiny Bill, until Lord John 
 Russell (on 25th of March) enquired, " Whe- 
 " ther there were any stipulations, in any Trea- 
 " ties, by which this Country guaranteed the 
 " Throne of France to Louis XVIII. and his 
 " successors ? " Mr. Canning, in answer, ac- 
 knowledged that there was a Treaty in existence, 
 by which, to the best of his belief, we were 
 bound to exclude the family of Buonaparte 
 from the Throne of France ; and added, that 
 there was also another, by which, if a rebellion 
 should break out in France, we were bound to 
 meet and concert with our Allies, on the means 
 necessary to be taken. 
 
 On the following day Lord Liverpool gave 
 notice, that on the 14th of April he should lay 
 upon the table of the House some papers re- 
 lating to the Negotiations, which had recently 
 taken place, with reference to the Affairs of 
 France and Spain ; and, at the same time, he 
 announced his intention of making; a statement, 
 containing the general outline of the policy pur-
 
 305 
 
 sued by the Government with regard to those 
 Negotiations. 
 
 Lord Grey objected to the course proposed, 
 on the ground that the statement made by Lord 
 Liverpool would go forth to the publick, and 
 make an impression, which there would be no 
 immediate opportunity for other Noble Lords 
 to controvert, from their not being acquainted 
 with the contents of the papers. Lord Grey 
 further expressed his hope, that we were not 
 fettered by any secret engagements to support 
 France in her conduct towards Spain. 
 
 Lord Liverpool, in answer, having first de- 
 fended the course which he intended to pur- 
 sue against Lord Grey's objections, declared, 
 that the only engagement by which we were 
 bound, that had not been made publick, was 
 " of a completely negative nature, and related 
 " to the exclusion of the family of Buonaparte 
 " from the Throne of France." After a few 
 more words from Lord Grey, to which Lord 
 Liverpool replied, the conversation dropped. 
 
 Two days after this, on the motion in the 
 House of Commons for a fortnight's adjourn- 
 ment, during Easter, Lord Archibald Hamilton, 
 having made some general observations con- 
 demnatory of Mr. Canning's supposed policy at 
 Verona, moved that the House should only 
 adjourn for one week. Mr. Macdonald followed 
 in the same strain j and Mr. Warre enquired, 
 
 vol. i. x
 
 306 
 
 whether we had not, in effect, guaranteed the 
 Throne of France to the Bourbons? To this 
 question Mr. Canning replied by reading to the 
 House the different Articles of the Treaties 
 which related to the subject ; which only served 
 to confirm the correctness of his former state- 
 ment of the nature of the existing Treaties. 
 He then announced his intention, after the ad- 
 journment, of giving to the House some ac- 
 count of the late Negotiations. The original 
 motion for a fortnight's adjournment was then 
 carried. 
 
 The day that the House met after the ad- 
 journment, Colonel Davies urged the same ob- 
 jections that Lord Grey had urged in the House 
 of Lords, against a statement being made by 
 Mr. Canning explanatory of his conduct, at the 
 same time that he brought down the papers ; 
 since the Opposition, from being ignorant of 
 the contents of those documents, would not be 
 able immediately to reply to it. Mr. Canning, 
 however, persisted in thinking that the course 
 which he proposed to pursue would be most 
 fair, and most convenient, as Parliament would 
 be better able to understand, and, by conse- 
 quence, to form a correct judgment of the con- 
 duct of the Government, if the papers should 
 be accompanied by an explanation, than if they 
 were presented without comments. 
 
 On the 14th of April, therefore, in con-
 
 307 
 
 formity with the notices which they had re- 
 spectively given, Lord Liverpool in the House 
 of Lords, and Mr. Canning in the House of 
 Commons, severally made a statement illustrat- 
 ing the contents of the papers respecting the 
 war between France and Spain, which papers 
 were then laid upon the tables of the two 
 Houses. 
 
 The substance of the historical part of both 
 speeches has been given in the preceding chap- 
 ters of this work, in which the account of the 
 transactions at Verona, and of those which sub- 
 sequently took place on this subject, is circum- 
 stantially narrated. The observations of the 
 two Ministers were chiefly intended to place in 
 chronological order the facts of the case as they 
 became known in England, that by showing the 
 exact aspects under which they were presented 
 to the British Government, at the different 
 periods when it was called upon to take its 
 decisions respecting them, the motives by which 
 those decisions were regulated might be clearly 
 understood. 
 
 There was no intention on the part of the 
 Government to call upon Parliament for any 
 expression of its opinion upon the papers : the 
 object of their communication not being to ob- 
 tain approbation, but to make manifest to the 
 world, that if the negotiations in which the 
 Ministers had been engaged had failed to pre- 
 
 x 2
 
 308 
 
 serve peace, the failure was not to be attributed 
 to any want of skill or exertions on the part of 
 the negotiators ; and, above all, that in every 
 step that had been taken, the honour of the 
 country had been maintained, and its best in- 
 terests consulted. 
 
 Lord Liverpool, in his speech, explained and 
 justified what had been done, more at length 
 than Mr. Canning: but since, in both houses, 
 there was subsequently brought forward a motion 
 of censure upon the Government, when an op- 
 portunity was afforded to both of them for 
 making a full exposition of their conduct, and 
 for replying to the objections which were made 
 to it, it will be better to defer for the present 
 noticing what fell from them on these points, 
 that their accusation and their defence may be 
 brought at one view under the consideration of 
 the reader. 
 
 The debate, however, was not permitted to 
 close in either house, until Lord Grey in the one, 
 and Mr. Brougham in the other, had expressed 
 their dissent from the principles avowed by the 
 Ministers, and condemned (as far as they were 
 then able to understand it) the whole tenour of 
 their conduct. 
 
 Before this motion of censure was made, 
 another motion, bearing upon the contest then 
 going on between France and Spain, was brought 
 forward in the House of Commons by Lord
 
 809 
 
 Althorpe, for the repeal of the Foreign Enlist- 
 ment Act. Although his Lordship contented 
 himself with arguing the fitness of the repeal 
 upon the abstract merits of the question, main- 
 taining, at the same time, that if the act were 
 repealed, it would be no infraction of the 
 neutral course advisedly adopted by the Govern- 
 ment, of which course he did not hesitate to ap- 
 prove, yet it was evident that the attempt to 
 annul the provisions of this act was made at 
 this particular moment on account of the assist- 
 ance that would thus be given to the Spanish 
 cause. Lord Folkstone, indeed, in seconding 
 the motion, condemned in vehement terms the 
 original resolution of the Government to main- 
 tain neutrality ; and likewise reprobated, in still 
 more vehement language, the papers relating to 
 the negotiations, which the Ministers had laid 
 before Parliament. The speech of the noble 
 Lord was singularly violent, and pointedly so 
 towards Mr. Canning. 
 
 Of the supporters of the motion, the advo- 
 cates for neutrality about equalled in number the 
 advocates for war ; and the Government having 
 decided upon a neutral course, Mr. Canning, as 
 a member of the Government, could only argue 
 the question upon the assumption that the 
 country was to pursue a system of neutrality. 
 The policy of that system he was ready to justify 
 and explain, whenever it should be regularly 
 
 x 3
 
 
 310 
 
 made the subject of debate ; but it was not fitting 
 that a point, on the decision of which the whole 
 question as to the conduct of the Government 
 depended, should be settled by a mere incidental 
 discussion. Assuming, therefore, that a neutral 
 course was the one which Great Britain was to 
 pursue, any other, he said, but an honest, real, 
 bond jide, neutrality would be unworthy the 
 dignity of the country ; " for a neutrality under 
 " the mask of non-interference with one party, 
 " whilst a covert support was given to the other, 
 " would be palpably mean and unjust: that it 
 would inevitably ruin the character for honour 
 and integrity of any nation that should adopt it ; 
 " but more particularly would it be disgraceful 
 " to Great Britain, who, when she was a beili- 
 " gerent, had taught other Powers the nature 
 " of a strict neutrality, though, generally 
 " speaking, she had found them most reluctant 
 " scholars :," it therefore especially became her 
 to adopt the same course which she had re- 
 commended, and enforced, on former occasions, 
 upon others. As a proof of the disposition of 
 the Government so to act, it had, according to 
 the wish of the Spanish Government, taken off 
 the prohibition for the export of arms to Spain, 
 instead of extending the prohibition to France. 
 The latter course would, " in appearance, have 
 " been fair, but the vicinity of the Belgick 
 " ports to France would have rendered the
 
 •ill 
 
 «< 
 
 CI 
 
 prohibition of direct exportation to France 
 entirely nugatory." The prohibition had 
 originally been enforced at the request of Spain, 
 both against Her, and Her colonies; and it was 
 now, by the wish of Spain, that it was entirely 
 removed, " to produce an equality between 
 " France and Spain, — not in words, but in fact.*' 
 On the same principle, " the question of the 
 " repeal of the Foreign Enlistment Act ought 
 " to be decided," and if it were so decided, it 
 could not but be negatived ; for " it was well 
 " known that, in the then disposition of the 
 " country, the repeal of that Act would be a 
 " repeal only in words as respecting France, but 
 " a repeal in fact as respecting Spain. It was 
 " quite certain that such a repeal would occasion 
 " an inequality of operation," and would there- 
 fore be an insidious way of injuring France 
 totally unworthy of a great nation. " I will not 
 " now," said Mr. Canning, in conclusion, " argue 
 " in favour of a system of neutrality ; but it 
 " being declared that we intend to remain 
 " neutral, I call upon the House to abide by 
 " that declaration so long as it shall remain 
 " unaltered. When war comes, if come it must, 
 " let us enter into it with all the spirit and 
 " energy which becomes us as a great and in- 
 " dependent people. That period I do not wish 
 " to anticipate, still less to hasten. If a war 
 " must come, however, let it come in the shape 
 
 x 4
 
 312 
 
 " of satisfaction to be demanded for injuries, 
 " of rights to be asserted, of interests to be pro- 
 " tected, of treaties to be fulfilled ; but, in God's 
 " name, let it not come on in the paltry, petti- 
 " fogging way of fitting out ships to cruize for 
 " gain. At all events, let the country disdain 
 " to be sneaked into a war. Let us abide 
 " strictly by our neutrality as long as we mean 
 " to adhere to it ; and by so doing we shall, in 
 " the event of any necessity for abandoning 
 " that system, be the better able to enter with 
 " effect upon any other course which the in- 
 " terest of the country may require." 
 
 The question was rejected by a majority of 
 106, — the ayes being, 110; the noes, 216. 
 
 In the House of Lords, upon a motion made 
 by Lord King for an account of the extra- 
 ordinary expenses of foreign Missions between 
 the 1st of September and the 31st of December 
 1822, a discussion arose relative to the papers 
 which had been laid upon the table. All which 
 was then said, was repeated on the occasion of 
 the House being called upon by Lord Ellen- 
 borough to express an opinion upon the merits 
 of those documents, with the exception, how- 
 ever, of what related to the point — " whether 
 " any treaty existed, or any stipulation in any 
 " treaty, between this country and France, or 
 " any other country, by which it was provided
 
 313 
 
 " that the kingdoms of France and Spain should 
 " never be united under one head." 
 
 The question was asked by Lord Holland ; 
 and Lord Liverpool, in answering it, " had no 
 " hesitation in saying that, looking at all the 
 " Treaties, they amounted to an obligation that 
 " the Crowns of France and Spain should not 
 " be united." In consequence of what passed 
 in^the House of Lords on this evening, on the 
 occasion of some additional papers being pre- 
 sented to Parliament upon the subject of the 
 negotiations, there was included amongst them 
 a " separate article of a Treaty with Spain, in 
 " which the King of Spain engaged not to 
 " enter into any treaty, or engagement with 
 " France, of the nature of that known, under the 
 " denomination of the Family Compact j nor 
 " any other which might affect the independ- 
 " ence of Spain, or might be injurious to the 
 " interests of His Britannick Majesty." This 
 article was contained in a Treaty between the 
 Kings of England, and Spain, signed in 1814, 
 and, " in compliance with the wishes of the 
 " French Government, was not laid before Par- 
 " liament," with the other Treaties made at the 
 same time. 
 
 When all hope of the preservation of peace 
 between France and Spain was abandoned by 
 Mr. Canning, he sent this article to Sir Charles 
 Stuart, saying, that " he (Mr. Canning) had no
 
 314 
 
 " doubt that M. de Chateaubriand would at once 
 " acknowledge that such an act of compliance, 
 " with the wishes of the French Government 
 " enhanced the King's claim upon France to 
 " respect the solemn obligation of this Article. " 
 
 " M. de Chateaubriand," in answer, " assured 
 " Sir Charles Stuart, that the French Govern- 
 " ment were quite resolved to respect its obliga- 
 u tions." 
 
 The day following that on which the debate 
 on Lord Ellenborough's motion took place, Lord 
 Holland again reverted to this question. It ap- 
 pears that his Lordship was not entirely satisfied 
 with the efficacy of the Article to prevent Ferdi- 
 nand of Spain, from succeeding to the Throne 
 of France ; and that the words, " known under 
 " the denomination of the Family Compact," 
 were strangely indefinite, and might be evaded 
 with facility. Lord Liverpool said, that the 
 meaning " of the term * Family Compact,' was 
 " perfectly understood ; that the bearing of all 
 " the Treaties was, that the Crowns of France 
 " and Spain could not be united ; that the 
 " Treaties were recognised by other Powers, 
 " and assented to by the Legislatures of France 
 " and Spain at the time when they were made." 
 
 After this, the subject was not again mentioned 
 in Parliament. 
 
 On the 24th of April Lord Ellenborough 
 moved an Address to the King, censuring the
 
 U5 
 
 conduct of the Ministers in the late negotia- 
 tions ; and, on the 2Sth of the same month, Mr. 
 Macdonald moved a somewhat similar address in 
 the House of Commons. The debates to which 
 these motions gave rise lasted one night in the 
 Upper, and three in the Lower House of Par- 
 liament. As was naturally to be expected in so 
 lengthened a discussion, the arguments which 
 were used by one speaker were frequently re- 
 peated by others ; varied, indeed, sometimes in 
 their form and language, but still essentially the 
 same. The best way, therefore, of taking a 
 connected view of these debates is, by arrang- 
 ing, in some kind of order, the objections raised 
 against the policy which the Government pur- 
 sued, and the answers that were given to those 
 objections, assigning each separate argument, 
 whether for, or against, to its owners, whenever 
 they happen not to be too numerous to render 
 any thing like an exclusive appropriation of it 
 unattainable. 
 
 The question, which, in the very outset of the 
 proceedings, the Ministers had to decide was, 
 whether in case Spain w r as attacked, either by 
 the Alliance collectively, or by France singly, 
 this country ought to go to war, in the first 
 place, in defence of the Spanish Constitution ; 
 or, in the second, to prevent the invasion of the 
 Peninsula by a French force. 
 
 The Government decided, that neither the
 
 316 
 
 honour nor the interests of this country pre- 
 scribed her hostile interference to prevent the 
 one, or to support the other. 
 
 If this decision were wrong, it follows, as a 
 necessary consequence, that all the steps which 
 the Government took, which were influenced by 
 it, were likewise wrong from being founded on 
 error. 
 
 Before, therefore, the wisdom or the fitness of 
 the part which England acted in the late ne- 
 gotiations can be established, this preliminary 
 question must be set at rest. But it is re- 
 markable that, of all those who, in no measured 
 terms, condemned Mr. Canning's policy, there 
 were only two, Lord Grey and Mr. Hobhouse, 
 who boldly and fairly stated their opinion, that 
 Ministers were deserving of blame for having 
 in the outset adopted a pacifick resolution. 
 
 Mr. Hobhouse's reasons for thinking that 
 England ought to have gone to war in defence 
 of the Spanish Constitution are comprised in 
 a very narrow compass : — " The honour of 
 " England," said he, " was involved in the pre- 
 " servation of the free institutions of the Con- 
 " tinent ; and in the event of any war against 
 " the Tyrant Kings of Europe, the British 
 "people would undoubtedly be happy to sup- 
 " port it." 
 
 Now, a war of this nature, viz. a war of the 
 People against Kings, might be a war, which it
 
 S17 
 
 was both wise and consistent for Mr. Hobhouse 
 to recommend; but since it is quite certain that 
 no Ministers of this country, even if they had 
 themselves been disposed to act upon the recom- 
 mendation, could have persuaded Parliament to 
 commence a war, justified by such a principle, or 
 undertaken for such a purpose, it is idle to dis- 
 cuss the wisdom of a line of policy which, sup- 
 posing that they had the will, they had not the 
 power to pursue. 
 
 Lord Grey's reasons for desiring war were 
 of a more substantial nature than were those of 
 Mr. Hobhouse ; and since there is little doubt 
 that, had the Ministers been of the same opinion 
 with his Lordship, they could, without difficulty, 
 have carried the country with them, the im- 
 practicability of acting up to Lord Grey's advice 
 cannot be brought forward as a proof of its im- 
 policy. Its soundness, therefore, must be as- 
 certained by comparing the arguments by which 
 he supported his opinion with those by which 
 it was opposed. 
 
 It is admitted on all hands, that no war, of 
 which the justice is not demonstrable, ought to 
 be undertaken by a civilized Nation. Lord 
 Grey, therefore, began by contending that " the 
 " principle asserted by the French Government 
 
 of dictating to another, and an independent 
 
 Nation, a change in its constitution, was most 
 ( odious and most unjust;" and that, therefore, 

 
 318 
 
 if England should think it proper to take up 
 arms in defence of Spain, she would have an 
 undeniable right to do so. This proposition is 
 certainly true, but it does not, therefore, follow 
 that war ought to have been undertaken ; for, 
 as Lord Grey went on to observe, the justice of 
 a war is not all that ought to be required to 
 induce the Ministers of a country to plunge into 
 hostilities j they ought likewise to be satisfied 
 that the interests of their country demand the 
 adoption of so fearful an alternative. " But," 
 continued Lord Grey, " our best interests are at 
 " stake. If two of the most remote countries 
 " in the world had been about to go to war, 
 " under the same circumstances, it might have 
 " been said that our interests were not involved" 
 in their disputes ; " but here the danger is at 
 our very doors. The invading Power is 
 France — the Power invaded Spain ; and we 
 ought not to stand by and see this latter 
 " country overrun ;" and for this reason — that 
 the Balance of Power would be destroyed by 
 the ascendancy " of France in the Councils of 
 " Spain, and the military occupation of the Spa- 
 " nish territory and resources, — a danger against 
 " which this country ought to be on its guard, 
 " and against which this country had been on 
 " its guard at every former period of its history." 
 " It might sound," added he, " very plausible 
 " to say, ' that Spain was not so great as she
 
 31!) 
 
 " ' had been in times gone-by/ She might, in- 
 " deed, have lost her Colonies, but she possessed 
 " a vast extent of means of restoring her navy ; 
 " and when once France had the custody of 
 " Spain, she would be backed by the Holy Al- 
 " liance in her efforts to destroy the liberties of 
 " mankind. The monarchical principle once 
 " established, and liberty driven from the Con- 
 " tinent, it was not to be supposed, either that 
 " she would remain unassailed in this her last 
 " asylum ; or that the Despots of Europe would 
 " tolerate the bitter reproaches of the free press 
 " of England, or the unshackled discussions of 
 " her independent Parliament." " United with 
 " Spain, Great Britain would have possessed 
 " the best security against the ambition and 
 " power of France." As it was, the late " mea- 
 " sures of the British Government had not made 
 " peace secure; and war, if it did come, would 
 " be more dangerous, than, if undertaken at an 
 " earlier, and more favourable period." 
 
 These were all the reasons adduced by Lord 
 Grey to fortify his opinion, that if France was 
 determined to invade Spain, England ought to 
 have opposed herself by hostile interference to 
 the invasion. 
 
 The last of these arguments was pushed fur- 
 ther by the members of the party, with whom 
 Lord Grey acted, than it appears that lie himself 
 thought proper to push it ; for they pointed out,
 
 3-20 
 
 botli why peace was not secure, and why, if war 
 should come, it would be more dangerous after- 
 wards than it would be at that moment. They 
 said, — and, it must be allowed that, the fear was 
 not unreasonable — that France, once in posses- 
 sion of Spain, would in all probability attack 
 Portugal, as that country had likewise a Consti- 
 tution ; that then, in fulfilment of our Treaties, 
 we should be compelled to fly to the support 
 of Portugal ; and that we should do so at a 
 much greater disadvantage, when France was 
 in possession of Spain, than before She acquired 
 that possession. Those, however, it should be 
 remembered, who thus argued, did not recom- 
 mend war j but since this reasoning touching Por- 
 tugal undoubtedly afforded strong grounds for 
 hostilities, and since Lord Grey evidently implied 
 that what he dreaded was an invasion of Por- 
 tugal by France, although he did not say so, 
 in weighing the value of the respective argu- 
 ments for and against, this one, in its full extent, 
 must in fairness be thrown into the hostile scale. 
 The correctness of Lord Grey's views, as far 
 as they go, with one exception, must be fully 
 admitted. There can be no doubt that the 
 military occupation of Spain by France disturbed 
 the Balance of Power ; that it was a disparage- 
 ment to Great Britain ; that it was a danger, 
 against which She had strenuously contended at 
 every former period of her History; and that
 
 321 
 
 there was a considerable chance that an attack 
 on Portugal might ultimately compel England 
 to mingle in the fray, when, France being in 
 possession of Spain, a war to defend Portugal 
 would be, quoad the defence of Portugal, much 
 more dangerous and difficult. But the remain- 
 ing incentive to hostilities, viz. the fear that, 
 liberty once driven from the Continent, Eng- 
 land, her last asylum, would not long remain 
 nnassailed, was one of which Mr. Canning did 
 not feel the strength, because he did not partici- 
 pate in the alarm. He felt too conscious of the 
 "tremendous power "* which the existing state 
 of the world, divided as its inhabitants were by 
 two contending principles, gave to England, to 
 dread the consequences of any attack which the 
 Sovereigns of Continental Europe might dare 
 to make upon her liberties. He well knew that 
 the mere intimation of our consciousness that 
 we possessed that power, would be amply suf- 
 ficient to keep those Potentates in salutary awe : 
 a power, however, the use of which was carefully 
 to be avoided except in the extreme case of the 
 existence of our national independence, or liberty 
 being endangered, but which was still a power 
 which would be as surely successful in protect- 
 ing England, against the efforts of any com- 
 bination whatever to destroy her freedom, as 
 
 * Vide Mr. Canning's Speech on sending Troops to Por- 
 tugal, 1826. 
 
 VOL. I. Y
 
 322 
 
 hitherto it has proved all-efficacious in prevent- 
 ing those efforts being made. Time, indeed, has 
 shown that Mr. Canning was right in refusing 
 to reckon amongst the reasons for hostility this 
 fear of a future attack being made upon our in- 
 dependence. This alleged cause for war being 
 then struck out of the catalogue, all the others 
 must be acknowledged. They therefore must 
 be combated, not (as the one just discussed) by 
 denying their existence, but by showing others 
 of a more cogent nature, which prescribed a 
 different, and more pacifick policy. 
 
 It must be confessed, that there was a time in 
 the course of these transactions, when that ex- 
 treme sensitiveness for the honour of his country, 
 which always strongly influenced Mr. Canning's 
 conduct, made him hesitate whether the honour 
 of England would not make it her interest to 
 oppose by arms the invasion of Spain by the 
 French ; and this, not for the sake of supporting 
 the Spanish Constitution, but, on the very prin- 
 ciple on which Lord Grey recommended it, to 
 preserve the Balance of Power, in deference to 
 the antient policy of the country, which was 
 always opposed to so intimate a connection, be- 
 tween the Courts of Paris and Madrid. 
 
 But, before Mr. Canning again committed the 
 country to a war, it became him, on whom the 
 responsibility would mainly fall, to weigh well 
 whether the object to be gained was worth the
 
 323 
 
 fearful sacrifice which the means employed 
 would necessitate. 
 
 The occupation of Spain by France would 
 undoubtedly disturb the Balance of Power, most 
 surely in itself an evil ; but would it be dis- 
 turbed in that same degree as in olden time, 
 when our ancestors were so justly jealous of the 
 junction of those two Powers ? Was not the 
 proportionate weight of Spain reduced in the 
 scale by the introduction of other Powers, which 
 had not then sufficiently emerged from barba- 
 rism to have possessed any material influence 
 over the fate of the civilized nations of Europe ? 
 Was not, too, the actual weight of Spain re- 
 duced in the Balance, by her exhaustion from 
 recent struggles, — by the general disorganization 
 which a vicious Government had produced 
 in every thing of which the union constitutes 
 the strength of a nation, — by the political 
 discussions which divided her population, — 
 and, above all, by the one half of her Empire 
 being severed from the other ? It appears, 
 therefore, that, however essential to British in- 
 terests the preservation of the Balance of Power 
 might be, the derangement of that Balance, 
 which under the then circumstances would be 
 produced by the conquest of Spain by France, 
 could not be of near the same extent, as it 
 would have been in former times. 
 
 True it was, that, in 1808, England had (Mr. 
 
 y 2
 
 Canning recommending it) opposed Napoleon's 
 attempt to place the Spanish crown on his 
 brother's head, but under circumstances essen- 
 tially different. Peace or war was not then the 
 question ; that point had years before been de- 
 cided in favour of the latter : the question for 
 consideration then was, — how T , being at war, we 
 could wage it most advantageously ; and to this 
 Mr. Canning's answer was, that the Peninsula 
 then afforded " the theatre of exertion, in which 
 " we could contend with the greatest prospect 
 " of success." Then, indeed, Spain, if not as 
 powerful as ever, still had not lost her Colonies, 
 and did not present the picture of national de- 
 gradation that she did in 1822. France, too, 
 in 1808, when all the Great Powers of Europe 
 were at the beck of her Ruler, was not the same 
 France that in 1822 acknowledged Louis as 
 Her master. The union, consequently, of these 
 two Powers in 1808, was far more formidable 
 than in 1822, when, in comparison, both of 
 them had shrunk so considerably in their di- 
 mensions. 
 
 It would have been, therefore, surely most 
 impolitick to have neglected the consideration 
 of the altered state of Europe, and to have 
 plunged into a war to prevent Spain from being 
 overrun by France, with no better defence for 
 it than that our ancestors, in former times, had 
 done so wisely ; and that We, in more recent
 
 885 
 
 times, had neither commenced nor continued a 
 war, but merely directed our efforts, which at 
 any rate were to be made in some direction, to 
 the accomplishment of a similar object. 
 
 The proposition, then, that the magnitude 
 of the danger to England from an union be- 
 tween France and Spain in 1822 was very con- 
 siderably less than what it was in the times of 
 Louis XIV. and Napoleon, may be considered 
 as proved. There remains, however, to be con- 
 sidered, 1st, Whether the Balance of Power, 
 which would most assuredly be deranged to 
 some extent by the success of the French in- 
 vasion, would be deranged to so great an extent 
 as would make it advisable for England to inter- 
 fere by war to prevent that success ? 2dly, Whe- 
 ther war was likely to effect the purpose for 
 which it would be undertaken ? and, 3dly, Whe- 
 ther, if France should eventually attack Portugal, 
 war would be more dangerous and injurious to 
 England than it would be before the French 
 army should cross the Pyrenees ? 
 
 There are two considerations which suggest a 
 negative answer to the first of these questions : 
 1st, That the occupation of Spain, with her re- 
 sources in the state of exhaustion in which they 
 then were, and with one half of her population 
 arrayed against the other, was more likely to 
 be, upon the whole, a source of weakness than 
 of strength to France; and, 2dly, That the con- 
 
 y 3
 
 326 
 
 ferring of a recognised independent political 
 existence, on the Spanish American Colonies, 
 would be far more than a counterpoise to 
 England, for those advantages, which France 
 might gain, from the possession of the Mother 
 Country. 
 
 With regard to the second, it may be that if 
 we had " gone to war directly, unsparingly, and 
 " vigorously against France, in behalf of Spain, 
 " in the way in which alone Spain could derive 
 " any essential benefit from our co-operation, 
 " by joining with her heart and hand," and by 
 sending an Army to her succour, we might have 
 driven back the French from the Peninsula; 
 but since a naval, not a military, war was recom- 
 mended by Lord Grey, it would seem tolerably 
 clear that, although we might have " been 
 " scouring the French coasts for prizes, and 
 " capturing Martinicd for our indemnification, " 
 the only thing that we should certainly not have 
 accomplished was, the prevention of the con- 
 quest of Spain by France ; while, unless we had 
 sent an army to defend Portugal, we should 
 have withdrawn the only motive which was 
 likely to operate with France to leave that 
 country unmolested. But, in truth, a maritime 
 war is, a description of war, to which it is not in 
 our power to adhere, so long as we are bound 
 by Treaty to defend both Portugal, and the 
 Netherlands against foreign aggression j and
 
 3#7 
 
 had the other Great Continental Powers joined 
 France, as they most assuredly would, if Great 
 Britain had gone to war with France, it can 
 hardly be supposed that the territories of both 
 those States would have been scrupulously re- 
 spected. At any moment, therefore, we might 
 have been forced into military operations. 
 
 With regard to the third, Mr. Canning said 
 that " the strength of Great Britain had very 
 " lately been strained to the utmost ; that her 
 " means were at that precise stage of recovery 
 " which made it most desirable that the progress 
 " of that recovery should not be interrupted ; 
 " and that her resources, then in a course of 
 " rapid reproduction, would by any sudden 
 " check be thrown into disorder more deep and 
 " difficult of cure." That, therefore, if the 
 country " must be driven into a war sooner 
 " or later, it had better be later •" and that the 
 delay would be more advantageous to England, 
 than would be, considering the state of the 
 Spanish nation, the increase of advantage arising 
 to France from having achieved the conquest of 
 the Peninsula. It was for these reasons, there- 
 fore, that Mr. Canning raised his voice for 
 peace ! And if these reasons alone are fairly 
 weighed in the scale with those for war, their 
 preponderance can hardly be doubted. But 
 granting that they only balance each other, still 
 all those produced in favour of war are ex- 
 
 y 4
 
 328 
 
 hausted, while others in favour of peace, the 
 soundness of which experience has proved, re- 
 main in reserve to place the wisdom of a pacifick 
 policy beyond the reach of controversy. Fore- 
 most of these is the consideration of what were 
 likely to be the results of war, in the hypothesis 
 of its being a land war, and of its being carried 
 on with success. One result very probably might 
 have been the prevention of the occupation of 
 Spain by France ; but was it not also more than 
 probable, had the French army been driven 
 back, defeated, through the Pyrenees, that it 
 would have produced a convulsion in France, 
 from which England, in her turn, would have 
 suffered ? For although, if England were com- 
 mitted in hostilities with France, upon " an 
 external question, She might not have thought 
 herself justified, and indubitably would not 
 " have been disposed, to employ against her 
 " Foe the arms of internal Revolution," yet 
 Spain would have been both justified in using, 
 and willing to use, such weapons " in a struggle 
 " begun avowedly from an enmity to her internal 
 " institutions." Was it therefore for England, 
 who had so long fought against Jacobins and 
 Anarchists, to be instrumental in placing in the 
 hands of Spain the means of inflicting so dread- 
 ful a retaliation ? Was it for England " to be 
 " a party to a war in which, if Spain should be 
 " victorious, the consequences to France, and, 

 
 329 
 
 " through France, to Europe," might be such as 
 would make the effects of victory more baneful 
 than defeat? 
 
 To preserve unbroken the peace of the world 
 was Mr. Canning's anxious aim ; that failing, to 
 re-establish it as quickly as possible was the 
 next object of his solicitude : and would not 
 the appearance of England in the arena of 
 hostilities, have diminished in a tenfold degree 
 the chances of a speedy restoration of tran- 
 quillity ? The war, as it was, was only between 
 France and Spain ; but if England had been 
 joined with Spain, might not France have been 
 joined by other Powers, until at last the whole 
 of Europe was involved in the dispute ? " The 
 " duration and disasters of a war depend in a 
 " great degree upon the multitude or fewness 
 " of its elements ; the accession, therefore, of 
 
 any new party or parties to the war would 
 
 have only served to complicate it, and to add 
 " to the difficulties of pacification." Besides, 
 there was a very considerable chance that Eng- 
 land might altogether avoid engaging in a war ; 
 and the fact that the whole of Spain has been 
 evacuated, without the intervention of hostilities, 
 proves that that chance was of no inconsiderable 
 value. 
 
 But supposing England had resolved to fight, 
 would she, as in 1808, have taken up the 
 gauntlet in behalf of an united Nation ? On 

 
 330 
 
 the contrary, so divided were the Spanish 
 people, that " she would not have had to strike 
 " in the cause of Spain alone, but, fighting in 
 " Spanish ranks, she would have had to point 
 " her bayonets against Spanish bosoms." Surely 
 then, if the war was to be half civil in its cha- 
 racter, it was a war in which it became addi- 
 tionally expedient for England not to engage. 
 
 Other reasons in defence of a neutral policy 
 might yet be adduced, if those already stated 
 were not more than sufficient for their purpose. 
 One, however, is too important to be omitted, as 
 well on account of its own intrinsick importance, 
 as because it records a fact which has not yet 
 been mentioned. 
 
 The war with Spain was exceedingly un- 
 popular with the great majority of the French 
 People. As long as France and Spain were the 
 only parties to it, so long its unpopularity was 
 likely to continue. But, most assuredly, if 
 England had engaged in it, she would have be- 
 come a principal ; the inevitable consequence of 
 which would have been, that those who hated 
 the war, because they hated its injustice, would 
 have lost sight of its origin, and fought with all 
 their hearts when they had their antient Rival 
 for their Antagonist. 
 
 With all these arguments in favour of neu- 
 trality forcing themselves upon the attention of 
 the Government, it may safely be affirmed, that
 
 331 
 
 no Minister could have acted in defiance of 
 them. The position, therefore, that the Govern- 
 ment, in deciding on neutrality, acted wisely, 
 may be considered as established. 
 
 Always, therefore, bearing in mind this most 
 important decision, the propriety of which only 
 two individuals disputed, the next points to be 
 considered are, whether the negotiations were 
 conducted in the way best adapted to their end 
 — the preservation of the peace of the world ; 
 and whether the tone assumed in them was such 
 as to uphold the honour and the dignity of Great 
 Britain. 
 
 In examining this part of the subject, it must 
 not be forgotten, that those who object to a line 
 of conduct which has failed in securing its object, 
 possess a great advantage over those whose task 
 it is to justify that conduct. 
 
 To the objectors it is always open to say, that 
 a different course would have been successful ; 
 and, as the opportunity for trying it has gone by, 
 the assertion never can be demonstrably dis- 
 proved, while the failure of that which has been 
 pursued being certain, the supposition of a 
 favourable issue is precluded. 
 
 The complaint against the way in which the 
 Ministers conducted the negotiations, is con- 
 tained in the last sentence of each of the two 
 addresses that were respectively moved by Lord 
 Ellenborough and Mr. Macdonald.
 
 Lord Ellenborough said, that " a more prompt, 
 " decisive, and unequivocal policy would, under 
 " all the circumstances of France and of Europe, 
 " have afforded the best hopes of preventing the 
 " commencement of a war." 
 
 Mr. Macdonald said, " that a tone of more 
 " dignified remonstrance would have been better 
 " calculated to preserve the peace of the Con- 
 " tinent." 
 
 Now the expressions, " prompt, decisive, and 
 " unequivocal policy," and " tone of more 
 " dignified remonstrance, " — if they did not 
 mean war, which those who used them declared 
 that they did not, must mean that the effect of 
 a menace of war ought to have been tried, or 
 else the point at issue degenerates into a mere 
 verbal controversy. 
 
 If they mean a menace of war, then, unless 
 England were prepared to follow up her menace, 
 in case it were disregarded, no course can pos- 
 sibly be conceived less " decisive, unequivocal," 
 or " dignified." A menace not intended to be 
 executed, as Mr. Canning, with juster notions of 
 true dignity, observed, " was an engine which 
 " Great Britain ought never to condescend to 
 " employ." 
 
 The question, therefore, of menace was the 
 same as that of war, and was one which involved 
 exactly the same prudential considerations. The 
 same reasoning, therefore, which disposes of the
 
 331 
 
 question of war, disposes likewise of the question 
 of menace. 
 
 AH, then, that remains under this head to be 
 shown, in order to complete the triumph of Mr. 
 Canning, is, 1st, That the language in which he 
 expressed his sentiments was exactly suited to 
 the occasion ; — (for he is not accused of having 
 approved any offensive principle put forth by 
 France or the Allies ; but simply of not having 
 condemned it in words sufficiently energetick ;) — 
 2dly, That no measures were taken which were 
 not befitting the character of the country, and 
 no measures were omitted to be taken, which 
 ought to have been taken to prevent the violation 
 of the general tranquillity. 
 
 As to the 1st, — the not using language suffi- 
 ciently forcible, — that certainly was a fault, if 
 fault it were, of which Mr. Canning's accusers 
 took special care that they would not be guilty. 
 " It was necessary to delay the expression of an 
 " opinion until one had recovered from the im- 
 •« pression of one's first feelings on reading 
 " matters from which one's heart so totally re- 
 " volted — feelings of surprise and disgust which 
 " could never be entirely removed," said one 
 member. " The country had been degraded by 
 " the way in which the negotiations had been 
 " conducted," said another. " The documents 
 " submitted to Parliament did not discover a 
 " single proof of that open, manly, and inde-
 
 334 
 
 " pendent feeling which it became this country 
 " to express," said a third ; and a fourth, while 
 he " could not repress his feelings of shame 
 " and indignation at reading the papers, enter- 
 " tained nothing but scorn and contempt for 
 " their authors." 
 
 But, now, let us enquire, what gave rise to 
 these ebullitions of virtuous indignation. Let 
 us ascertain whether any sentiments had been 
 put forth by Mr. Canning which were unworthy 
 of him ; and let us try if we cannot find some 
 expressions, here, and there, that would have 
 done honour to any British Statesman. 
 
 The first sentence, which was the most ve- 
 hemently condemned and ridiculed, and which 
 comes the first in order in the correspondence, 
 is where Mr. Canning says, that if there " be a 
 " determined project to interfere, either by force 
 " or by menace, in the present struggle in Spain, 
 " so convinced is His Majesty's Government of 
 " the uselessness and danger of any such inter- 
 " ference ; so objectionable does it appear to 
 " them in principle, and so utterly impracticable 
 " in execution, that when the necessity arises, 
 " or, I would rather say, when the opportunity 
 " offers, I am to instruct your Grace, at once, 
 " frankly and peremptorily, to declare, that to 
 " any such interference, come what may, His 
 " Majesty will not be a party." 
 
 Lord Ellenborough led the attack in the
 
 335 
 
 House of Lords on this much-misconstrued 
 sentence ; pretending to expect after the words 
 "come what may" some tremendous denun- 
 ciation, he put on an air of surprise when he 
 repeated the conclusion, that " His Majesty 
 " would not be a party to any such interference." 
 His example was followed in the House of Com- 
 mons by three Honourable Members, who re- 
 peated the same remark, in the same way. 
 
 Mr. Canning, in defence of his sentence, ob- 
 served, " that if this declaration was applicable 
 " to the whole course of the negotiations, there 
 " might be something in the remark," thus 
 four times repeated ; but that the meaning of 
 the declaration would appear in a very different 
 light, when it was considered that it was an 
 answer to the question, " What part England 
 " would take if, in the Congress at Verona, a 
 " determination should be avowed by the Allies 
 " to interfere forcibly in the affairs of Spain ? " 
 The answer given plainly meant, " that the King 
 " would not concur in such a determination, 
 " even though a difference with his Allies, and 
 " a dissolution of the Alliance, should be a con- 
 " sequence of his refusal." The answer " had 
 " its effect. The Congress separated without 
 " determining in favour of any joint operation 
 " of a hostile character against Spain." The 
 answer, therefore, " gained the object that was 
 «' sought by it, and there was no necessity for
 
 336 
 
 " a greater flourish, or a greater pomp of 
 " words." 
 
 To the effect which it produced M. de Mont- 
 morency and Mr. Hobhouse bore testimony. 
 The former officially declared, that he should 
 have been completely successful " at Verona, 
 " if England had thought herself at liberty to 
 " concur in his efforts ; " and the latter ad- 
 mitted, that it was " generally understood at 
 " Verona" (where he happened to be) " that no 
 " joint declaration of war was to be made, and 
 " that the instructions given to the King's Ple- 
 " nipotentiary were the cause that there was 
 " none." 
 
 It may be matter of regret that the foreign 
 policy of the country had previously been so 
 conducted, as to have induced the Allied Sove- 
 reigns to entertain the idea, which their question 
 implies, that England would join them in an 
 attack on Spain ; but that could not be attri- 
 buted as a fault to Mr. Canning, since at the 
 time the question was put, he was not ten days 
 old in office. When asked, however, all that 
 could be discreetly done, was, to return a de- 
 cided, but not offensive, reply. 
 
 Although the reply produced its effect, there 
 were, as has been before stated, despatches sent 
 to the Representatives of the Allied Sovereigns 
 at Madrid, accompanied with orders to quit 
 that capital if the recommendations contained in
 
 337 
 
 those despatches, to alter and amend the Con- 
 stitution, were not listened to by the Spanish 
 Ministers. But what right had England to set 
 Herself up, as a judge, to decide whether the 
 Monarchs of independent States should or should 
 not continue diplomatick relations with any par- 
 ticular Court? The Duke of Wellington, as 
 the Plenipotentiary of a Power in alliance with 
 these Monarchs, certainly did tender his urgent 
 advice, that the despatches in question should 
 not be forwarded to their destination ; but had 
 he turned advice into menace, or rebuke, as it 
 was invariably argued by his opponents that he 
 ought to have done, would it not have been 
 setting the. example of acting up to the very 
 principle of interference in the internal concerns 
 of independent States, which his country was 
 condemning ; since the decision respecting di- 
 plomatick intercourse between two countries is 
 entirely a matter of internal regulation ? 
 
 Against hostile interference on the part of 
 the Allies with Spain, England had a right to 
 remonstrate, and, if She chose, to menace. But, 
 without doing either the one or the other, by the 
 firm, yet temperate expression of Her sentiments, 
 She prevented that interference from being at- 
 tempted. 
 
 Against the withdrawal of the Ministers of 
 the Allied Courts from Madrid, She had no 
 right either to menace, or remonstrate : She had 
 
 vol. i. z
 
 338 
 
 no right even to advise, except in the character 
 of a friend; and, therefore, it particularly became 
 Her to take care that Her language was not un- 
 necessarily violent, lest, if it were so, she should 
 lose the privilege of advising ; which, although 
 the advice was not taken, was still the only re- 
 source that was left to avert what was con- 
 sidered as an evil. 
 
 Against the promise of support to France 
 given by the Allies on three hypothetical cases, 
 1st, Of an attack made by Spain on France ; 
 2dly, Of any outrage on the person of the King, 
 or Royal Family ; 3dly, Of any attempt to 
 change the dynasty of that Kingdom, England 
 certainly had no right to protest. In refusing 
 to join in that hypothetical promise, she cer- 
 tainly did all that she could have been expected 
 to do, while she did not hesitate to express her 
 entire conviction that there was no prospect of 
 the occurrence of any one of those cases. 
 
 If) therefore, the language held by the British 
 Plenipotentiary at Verona was neither weaker 
 nor stronger than it ought to have been, since 
 it had produced exactly the effect which was 
 intended by it, when, it may be asked, ought 
 stronger language to have been used ? Surely it 
 would have been most unwise to have taken a 
 different tone, at Paris, immediately after the 
 Congress at Verona, when it was evident that 
 the Head of the French Government was doing
 
 339 
 
 all in his power to preserve peace, and before 
 any fresh circumstance had taken place to alter 
 the character of the business. After, however, 
 the King of France's Speech reached England, 
 which Speech — from the principle put forth in 
 it, that all Constitutions, to be legitimate, must 
 emanate from the spontaneous will of the So- 
 vereign — placed the question in a new point of 
 view, Mr. Canning forthwith acquainted the 
 French Ministers, that, in the opinion of the 
 English Government, " the Spanish Govern- 
 " ment could not be expected to subscribe to 
 " such a principle ; that it was one which no 
 " British Statesman could defend or uphold ; 
 " and that it struck at the root of the British 
 " Constitution." They were told, moreover, 
 that, if it were not disavowed, the good offices 
 of Great Britain to bring about an arrangement, 
 for which the French Ministers still professed 
 themselves most desirous, would be forthwith 
 withdrawn. 
 
 It is singular enough that those who were in- 
 dignant at this language, because it was " too 
 " civil," " were driven," in the very address in 
 which they condemned it, " in order to deliver 
 " themselves with the utmost force, to borrow 
 the very words used by Mr. Canning, c strike 
 * at the root of the British Constitution? to 
 " exemplify the omission which they imputed 
 « to him." 
 
 z Q 

 
 340 
 
 But the fairest way of judging of the lan- 
 guage, is, not by the selection of isolated sen- 
 tences, but by considering whether, as a whole, 
 it was not well adapted to its end : that end was 
 to prevent war with Spain altogether, whether 
 by the Allies in a body, or by France alone. 
 
 To attain these objects, there were only two 
 courses which afforded any prospect of success : 
 The first, to threaten wai\ and to be ready to 
 follow up that threat. The second, to act the part 
 of Mediator, and to show that Great Britain, in 
 recommending peace, had really at heart the 
 true interests of all parties. 
 
 To have blustered without threatening — to 
 have threatened without being ready to execute the 
 threat — would not only have been ridiculous, butr 
 would have destroyed the last chance of Peace, 
 by taking away from the Councils of England 
 the friendliness of their character, by the means 
 of which alone she could retain the position of 
 a Mediator. 
 
 Before the French Army entered Spain, Mr. 
 Canning, in a despatch in which he took a sum- 
 mary of all that had passed, distinctly told the 
 French Government where the forbearance of 
 England would cease. 
 
 An attack on Portugal — a design of a per- 
 manent military occupation of Spain on the part 
 of France — or an attempt to bring under her 
 dominion any of the Spanish American Colonies,
 
 a 
 
 a 
 
 •m 
 
 either by conquest or cession, were perhaps the 
 only contingencies, the occurrence of which 
 " could by possibility bring Great Britain into 
 " collision with Fiance." Mr. Canning merely 
 observed, that the English Government was 
 " satisfied " that France would take care that 
 these contingencies should not occur ; but " it 
 is obvious that under that suavity of expres- 
 sion was implied an < or/ which imported 
 another" (and a hostile) " alternative." 
 So much for the language. Before, however, 
 other points in the management of the negotia- 
 tions, which were vehemently condemned by 
 some parties, are touched upon, it may not be 
 amiss to mention two curious facts, which only 
 serve to exemplify the zealous anxiety, with 
 which Mr. Canning laboured in the cause of 
 Peace. 
 
 When M. de Chateaubriand was in England 
 as Ambassador from France, he had frequent 
 intercourse with Mr. Canning. Both parties 
 were mutually impressed with each other's ta- 
 lents. When Mr. Canning received the Seals 
 of office, a complimentary letter was addressed 
 to him by M. de Chateaubriand. When the 
 latter was appointed to the Foreign Office in 
 France, Mr. Canning took the opportunity, in 
 reciprocating the compliment, to point out the 
 extreme dangers to which the Throne of the 
 Bourbons would be exposed in case either of a 
 
 z 3
 
 342 
 
 defeat of the French Armies, or of a protracted 
 resistance to them. The letter was answered, 
 and the correspondence continued for some 
 short time ; and from the way in which M. de 
 Chateaubriand expressed himself respecting these 
 communications, Mr. Canning was not without 
 hopes that they might have produced the effect 
 which he intended. But it was not long before 
 it was evident, that M. de Chateaubriand had 
 resolved to float with the stream, and to execute 
 the will of the predominating party in the French 
 Chambers. 
 
 Mr. Canning made a similar effort to en- 
 deavour to induce the King of France's Brother, 
 Monsieur, with whom he had had the honour 
 of having been personally intimate, when His 
 Royal Highness was in England, to give the 
 sanction of his countenance to the Peace Party. 
 The letter was graciously received, but it appears 
 produced no salutary effects on the mind of the 
 Prince. 
 
 But to return — There was no charge which 
 was brought in the course of the debate with 
 greater frequency against Mr. Canning and the 
 Government, than that they had allowed them- 
 selves to be duped by the professions of theFrench 
 Ministers. There can be no doubt, that, if it could 
 be substantiated that Mr. Canning, by believing 
 in professions which were made for the purpose 
 of deceiving him, had acted in a way which he
 
 3A3 
 
 would not have clone had he not believed in 
 those professions, that he would have shown a 
 want of sagacity, and that he might have been 
 fairly designated, as a dupe ; but if^ so far from 
 altering his conduct on account of them, he 
 acted in precisely the same manner, as he would 
 have done, had he been certain that the pro- 
 fessions were false, it is quite clear that he was 
 not betrayed into any unwise step from an er- 
 roneous estimate of the intentions of others. 
 
 The truth was, that while the Councils of the 
 French Ministers were perpetually vacillating, 
 Mr. Canning continued to pursue " the even 
 " tenour of his way." Sometimes he had one 
 opinion, sometimes another, according as cir- 
 cumstances arose, as to what course the French 
 Government might ultimately adopt. For eight 
 and forty hours after M. de Montmorency's re- 
 signation, Mr. Canning thought that a change 
 from war to peace had taken place in the French 
 Councils : a little time showed that it was only 
 a change in the character of the question, from 
 European to French ; but no measure was taken 
 in consequence of the first belief which would 
 not have been taken had the true state of the 
 case been known in the first instance. 
 
 " That man is not a dupe who does not fore- 
 " see the vacillations of others ; but he who is 
 " misled to do something, which he would not 
 
 z 4
 
 344 
 
 " otherwise have done, by false pretences put 
 " forward for the purpose of misleading him." 
 
 Another fault that was attempted to be fas- 
 tened on Mr. Canning was, that he refused the 
 office of Mediator at Verona, and yet sub- 
 sequently proposed to the French Government 
 to undertake it ; and that the rejection was an 
 affront to which he tamely submitted. The 
 reason for this different conduct has already 
 been explained. The British Government had 
 no objection to mediate between nation and 
 nation, but would not mediate between " a na- 
 " tion and an alliance, assuming to itself the 
 " character of a general superintendant over the 
 " concerns of other nations." As to the refusal 
 of our mediation by France, the refusal was 
 couched in terms of courtesy ; and since the 
 offer was made for the sake, more of discharging 
 a duty, than with any confident hope that it 
 would be accepted, most assuredly it never would 
 have been made, if for one instant it had been 
 contemplated that its non-acceptance would 
 amount to an affront to those by whom it was 
 offered. Mr. Canning justified his conduct on 
 this point by a quotation from a writer *, " whose 
 " authority was not interested, nor partial, nor 
 " special in its application — but universal, un- 
 " influenced by the circumstances of any par- 
 
 * Martens.
 
 345 
 
 " ticular case, and applicable to the general 
 " concerns and dealings of mankind." That 
 writer says, " Mediation differs essentially from 
 " good offices. A State may accept the latter, 
 " at the same time that it rejects the former." 
 
 Mr. Canning's answer to the complaint, that 
 Spain ought to have been invited to send a Re- 
 presentation to the Congress, must be given in 
 his own words. " In the first place," said he, 
 " (so far as Great Britain was concerned,) as 
 " we did not wish the affairs of Spain to be 
 " brought into discussion at all, we could not 
 " have taken, or suggested a preliminary step, 
 " which would have seemed to recognise the 
 " necessity of such a discussion. In the next 
 " place, if Spain had been invited, the answer 
 " to that invitation might have produced a con- 
 " trary effect to that which we aimed at pro- 
 " during: Spain must either have sent a ple- 
 " nipotentiary, or have refused to do so. The 
 " refusal would not have failed to be taken 
 " by the Allies as a proof of the duresse of the 
 " King of Spain. The sending one, if sent (as 
 " he must have been) jointly by the King and 
 " Cortes, would have raised the whole question 
 " of the legitimacy of the existing Government 
 " in Spain ; and would almost to a certainty 
 " have led to a joint declaration from the Al- 
 " liance, such as it was our special object to 
 " avoid."
 
 34.fi 
 
 Another objection to Mr. Canning's conduct 
 was, that he hinted to M. de Chateaubriand the 
 possibility of putting an inoffensive construc- 
 tion on a sentence in the King of France's 
 Speech ; a construction which, it was affirmed, 
 that it would not bear, and which, therefore, 
 Mr. Macdonald maintained to be unworthv of 
 England to suggest. But surely when the 
 French Ministers were, by their Charge d' Affaires 
 in London, pouring into Mr. Canning's ears the 
 expression of their anxious desires for the pre- 
 servation of peace, and explaining away the 
 apparent meaning of different passages of the 
 above-named document, it would not have been 
 wise policy in Mr. Canning to have interpreted 
 the sentence in a way, which would have neces- 
 sitated the withdrawal of the interposition of 
 the good offices of England, the last hope of 
 peace which yet remained, especially when the 
 sentence was capable of an inoffensive meaning, 
 which, from the language of the French Mi- 
 nisters, it was clear they would be ready to 
 adopt. 
 
 If the policy of this country had been to seek 
 a ground of quarrel with France, then, perhaps, 
 it might not have been wise to have volunteered 
 the giving the French Ministers the option of 
 making a satisfactory explanation ; but if, even 
 had they insisted on the offensive interpretation, 
 it was not intended to revenge it by any hostile
 
 347 
 
 measures, surely the dignity of England was not 
 compromised, by pointing out a less objection- 
 able meaning. In an affair of honour, the very 
 first step which is taken by the party injured by 
 the words of another, is to call upon the offend- 
 ing party, either to retract or to explain his ex- 
 pressions ; to which, if the party so called upon 
 consent, it is considered the most complete re- 
 paration that can be given for the insult. How, 
 therefore, that course which, in the case of an 
 individual, is the most honourable to pursue, is, 
 where a nation is concerned, degrading, remains 
 unexplained by those who condemned Mr. Can- 
 ning's conduct in a matter so strictly analogous. 
 But the point on which the " fiercest battle 
 " was fought against Mr. Canning," was " the 
 " suggestion of the Duke of Wellington to 
 Spain, made through Lord Fitzroy Somerset, as 
 to the expediency of her modifying her Con- 
 stitution, which suggestion was made with Mr. 
 Canning's sanction. The motives which dictated 
 this mission have already been recorded. The 
 objection made to it was, that " it required 
 " every thing of Spain, and nothing of France, 
 " and that we advised Spain to sacrifice her 
 " honour." But was this fact ? Had Spain con- 
 sented to take the advice of England, England 
 would have had good right to expect that France, 
 at her instance, would have withdrawn the 
 Army of Observation. The Spanish Revolution
 
 348 
 
 disquieted France. The French Army of Ob- 
 servation irritated Spain. A modification of the 
 one, and the dispersion of the other, were the 
 mutual points of concession. 
 
 It must be allowed, that " the propriety of 
 " maintaining the Army of Observation depended 
 " wholly upon the truth of the allegations on 
 " which France justified its continuance. The 
 " truth of those allegations was not to be taken 
 " for granted. But it was not the business of 
 " the British Government to go into a trial, and 
 " examine evidence to ascertain the foundation 
 " of the conflicting allegations on either side. 
 " It was clear, that nothing but some modifi- 
 " cation of the Spanish Constitution would avert 
 " the calamity of war ; and, in applying the 
 means in our hands to that object, (an object 
 interesting not to Spain only, but to England,) 
 " it was not our business to take up the cause of 
 " either party, and to state it with the zeal and 
 " with the aggravation of an advocate, but 
 " rather to endeavour to reduce the demands of 
 " each within such limits as might afford a 
 " reasonable hope of mutual conciliation. 
 
 " The duty of * a Mediator,' says Vattel, ' is 
 " ' to favour well-founded claims, and to effect 
 " < the restoration to each party of what belongs 
 " « to him ; but he ought not scrupulously to 
 insist on rigid justice. He is a conciliator, 
 not a judge : his business is to procure 
 
 (t 
 
 a i 
 
 (i i
 
 349 
 
 " • Peace j and he ought to induce him who has 
 " « right on his side to relax something of his 
 " ' pretensions, if necessary, with a view to so 
 " ' great a blessing.' " 
 
 It, therefore, certainly was the duty of Eng- 
 land to urge Spain to make any sacrifice, short 
 of national honour and independence, to pre- 
 serve peace. The modifications were not asked 
 to be conceded to France, threatening war ; but 
 were to have been adopted in consequence of 
 the friendly advice of England to enable her 
 more effectually to mediate with France ; but 
 then England threatened nothing, whether her 
 advice were accepted or rejected. 
 
 These were all the objections of any import- 
 ance that were urged against Mr. Canning's 
 policy, by the Members of either House of Par- 
 liament. For the sake of brevity and perspi- 
 cuity, they have been placed, with their answers, 
 in some kind of order, without regard to the 
 periods in the Debate, at which they were seve- 
 rally brought forward. 
 
 In the House of Commons, the Speakers 
 against the Government attacked Mr. Canning 
 more fiercely than those of the House of Lords; 
 and so, likewise, the part which the Duke of 
 Wellington took in these transactions was more 
 vehemently censured by their Lordships, than 
 it was by the lower House of Parliament. Lord 
 Ellenborough led the attack upon the Duke. He
 
 350 
 
 insinuated that the Duke had, like another 
 Hannibal, been bred in camps, and " knew but 
 " little of civil institutions,'' and charged him, 
 without ceremony, " of having shown as much 
 " ignorance of the Spanish Constitution, as he 
 " had done of the Constitution of his own 
 " Country." 
 
 Lord King and Lord Grey likewise com- 
 mented upon the Duke's conduct with asperity. 
 The Duke defended himself with ability, and 
 was ably supported by Lords Liverpool and 
 Harrowby, both in defence of his Grace's con- 
 duct, and that of the Government of which 
 they were Members. An Amendment, moved 
 by Lord Granville, laudatory of the course 
 pursued by the Government in the negotiations, 
 was carried by a majority of 94. In the House 
 of Commons, Mr. Stuart Wortley brought for- 
 ward a similar Amendment, and Mr. Peel and 
 Mr. Robinson made very powerful speeches 
 in reply to Sir Francis Burdett and Sir James 
 Mackintosh. It was not until late on the 
 third night * of the Debate, that Mr. Canning 
 rose to defend himself. The substance of the 
 arguments contained in his Speech has been 
 employed in refuting the objections of his op- 
 ponents. To go over them again would be 
 unnecessary repetition. The irresistible effect 
 
 * April 28. 1823.
 
 351 
 
 of his address is shown by the fact, that those 
 who had condemned him in the most un- 
 measured language, and who had, during three 
 long nights, lectured him in the most unsparing 
 manner, were most anxious that no division 
 should take place ; and, when compelled to 
 divide, by Mr. Canning's refusing to allow the 
 original Motion to be withdrawn, and the 
 Amendment to stand in its place, they voted 
 for Mr. Wortley's Amendment, in preference to 
 Mr. Macdonald's Motion, so that the minority 
 consisted of a few Members on both sides, who, 
 owing to the lobby being full, were compelled 
 to remain in the body of the House. 
 
 The Opposition had the advantage of the last 
 word, since Mr. Brougham spoke immediately 
 after Mr. Canning, and concluded the debate. 
 
 The part of Mr. Canning's speech which per- 
 haps more than any other was conducive to these 
 results, was that in which he declared " his im- 
 " mediate object at Verona" to have been the 
 preventing any war " with Spain, growing out 
 " of an assumed jurisdiction of the Congress, 
 " and the keeping within bounds that areopa- 
 " gitical spirit, which," said Mr. Canning, again 
 referring to that same memorandum issued by 
 the British Cabinet in May 1820, " is described 
 as beyond the sphere of the original con- 
 ception, and understood principles of the 
 1 Alliance." 

 
 359, 
 
 The expression of a fixed intention to re- 
 press the designs of the Holy Alliance by a 
 Minister of the Crown, and that Minister, the 
 Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, was so 
 new to the House of Commons, that it fell like 
 musick on the ears of those, who had long 
 dreaded the influence of that Alliance, espe- 
 cially since it was evident that that which Eng- 
 land had done at Verona did, bondjide, counter- 
 act the designs of the Continental Sovereigns. 
 The strong language in which Mr. Canning re- 
 probated the conduct of France, furnished, also, 
 additional proof of his sincerity, and tended 
 considerably to increase the confidence which 
 the country seemed inclined to repose in him. 
 
 The conduct, indeed, of France was, with 
 one single exception, universally condemned ; 
 the Duke of Buckingham being the only in- 
 dividual in either House of Parliament who 
 ventured to avow his wish that the French 
 might triumph in their unjust aggression. 
 
 Notwithstanding the decided approbation ex- 
 pressed by the two Houses of Parliament of the 
 Policy pursued by the Government respecting 
 France and Spain, the subject was soon after- 
 wards again brought forward in each. 
 
 On the 12th of May, Lord Grey moved for 
 the production of some more papers, which he 
 considered necessary for the clear understanding 
 of those which had already been produced.
 
 353 
 
 This motion was apparently made chiefly for 
 the purpose of refuting a charge of inconsistency 
 which Mr. Canning had urged against him in 
 the debate on Mr. Macdonald's motion. 
 
 The first topick on which Lord Grey touched 
 related to the capture of a Spanish corvette in 
 the West Indies, by a French ship, which cap- 
 ture, had it taken place in consequence of any 
 orders from the French Government, would 
 have been an act of shameless perfidy, as the 
 orders must have been issued at the very moment 
 when the French Government was professing to 
 the English Ministry its anxious desire to pre- 
 serve peace. The circumstance was explained 
 by Lord Liverpool, who said, that the French 
 Government had issued no orders whatever to 
 make captures, and that the Spanish corvette 
 made the attack on the French ship ; and that 
 in consequence of this attack, the French ship 
 captured the corvette, as it was justified in 
 doing. 
 
 The second topick related to the supposed 
 approbation of the Due d'Angouleme to a pro- 
 clamation that had been issued by the pro- 
 visional Junta of Spain ; which proclamation 
 declared all acts done by the Constitutional Go- 
 vernment null and void ; and would conse- 
 quently have rendered null the engagements 
 entered into by the Spanish Government with 
 Great Britain to indemnify her for the piracies 
 
 VOL. I. A A
 
 354 
 
 and outrages on her trade that had been com- 
 mitted in the West Indies. To this Lord Liver- 
 pool replied, that the proclamation had been 
 completely disavowed by the French Govern- 
 ment. 
 
 The third topick " related to the state in which 
 " France stood with respect to the Sovereigns 
 " assembled at Verona ; and went to inquire, 
 " whether France was acting with the assurance 
 " of their assistance and support, or whether 
 " France was engaged in a strictly national 
 " war, to which those great Powers were no 
 " parties." 
 
 Lord Grey having stated this, his third topick, 
 before he proceeded to its discussion, turned 
 aside to defend himself against the before-men-, 
 tioned charge of inconsistency, which had been 
 brought against him by Mr. Canning. 
 
 It has been already stated that Lord Grey 
 and Mr. Hobhouse were the only two advocates 
 for war with France on account of her invasion 
 of Spain. Lord Grey urged it because he con- 
 sidered it both just, and expedient. Mr. Hob- 
 house urged it, because he considered it to be 
 both just, and generous. In answering Mr. Hob- 
 house, Mr. Canning took the liberty of remind- 
 ing him " of three circumstances calculated to 
 " qualify a little his feelings of enthusiasm, and 
 " to surest lessons of caution." The first of 
 these was the condition of this country in 1808 ;
 
 355 
 
 the second the condition of Spain in the same 
 year, as compared with their respective condi- 
 tions in 1829; and the third was " the manner in 
 " which the enterprise begun in 1808 was viewed 
 I* by certain parties in this country." 
 
 Mr. Canning having contrasted the difference 
 in the position of this country and Spain at the 
 two periods in question; and in so doing, having 
 shown how much more imperiously Great Britain 
 was called upon, for the sake of her interests, to 
 aid Spain in 1808, than she was in 1823, in 
 elucidation of the '* manner in which the propo- 
 " sition of succour was received," notwithstand- 
 ing that our interests were then, as he argued, 
 more nearly concerned, proceeded to quote a 
 part of a speech of Lord Grey's upon that 
 business delivered in 1810, — " In order," said 
 his Lordship, " to warrant England in embark- 
 " ing in a military co-operation with Spain, 
 " something more was necessary, than to show 
 " that the cause was just. It was not enough 
 " that the attack by France upon the Spanish 
 " nation was unprincipled, perfidious, and cruel ; 
 " that the resistance of Spain was dictated by 
 " every principle, and sanctioned by every 
 " motive honourable to human nature ; that it 
 " made every English heart burn with a holy 
 " zeal to lend its assistance against the op- 
 " pression ; — there were other considerations of 
 " a less brilliant and enthusiastick, but not less 
 
 a a 2
 
 
 356 
 
 " necessary and commanding nature, which 
 " should have preceded the determination of 
 " putting to hazard the most valuable interests 
 " of the country. It is not with nations as with 
 " individuals. Those heroick virtues which shed 
 " a lustre upon individual man, must, in their 
 " application to the conduct of nations, be 
 " chastened by reflections of a more cautious, 
 " and calculating cast. That generous mag- 
 nanimity and high-minded disinterestedness, 
 proud distinctions of national virtue (and 
 " happy were the people whom they charac- 
 " terise) which, when exercised at the risk of 
 " every personal interest, in the prospect of every 
 " danger, and the sacrifice even of life itself, 
 "justly immortalise the hero, cannot, and ought 
 " not, to be considered justifiable motives of 
 " political action ; because nations cannot afford 
 " to be chivalrous, and romantick." Mr. Can- 
 ning having finished the quotation, left it with 
 this single observation, " History is philosophy, 
 " teaching by example ; and the words of the 
 " wise are treasured for ages that are to come." 
 The argument in which Mr. Canning intro- 
 duced this quotation was to the following effect : 
 If, in the midst of all the enthusiasm with which 
 the breast of every lover of his country must be 
 inspired, at the spectrcle of a great nation ris- 
 ing almost to a man against its invaders, and 
 struggling for its freedom — if, at the very mo-
 
 357 
 
 ment of the occurrence of such heart-stirring 
 events, there were monitors, whose feelings of 
 indignation at the aggressors, and admiration of 
 the resisters, were tempered by those of a more 
 prudent, and calculating, and perhaps wiser na- 
 ture, — if, precepts of caution could be given 
 under such circumstances, and if they deserved 
 to be attended to, how much -more were such pre- 
 cepts likely to be enforced, how much more were 
 they worthy of attention, where the apathy of 
 one part of the Spanish People, and the hatred 
 of the other to the Constitutional cause, pre- 
 vented any enthusiasm being felt in its favour — 
 and w T hen, as Mr, Canning maintained, the calls 
 of self-interest upon Great Britain to mingle in 
 the fray were nothing like so imperious or 
 decisive, 
 
 The point of this argument then was, that the 
 same principles which induced Lord Grey to 
 condemn the policy of sending our armies to the 
 Peninsula in 1810, ought, if consistently applied, 
 to induce him to oppose the affording warlike 
 succours to that country in 1823 ; especially, 
 when, in 1810, the Spaniards were united, in 
 1823 they were divided amongst themselves, 
 and when success at the former period would 
 have been salvation to this country, while, at 
 the latter, victory would have been a very dubi- 
 ous advantage. 
 
 Lord Grey defended himself from this charge 
 
 a a 3
 
 358 
 
 of inconsistency, by saying, that from the 
 first moment that the Spaniards resisted Napo- 
 leon's " attack he had wished them success ; 
 " that there was no assistance likely to contri- 
 " bute to that success within the means of the 
 " Country to afford that he was not desirous of 
 " giving them ; that the very speech," which 
 had been quoted as a proof of his inconsistency, 
 " showed that his feeling as to the attack was 
 " the same in 1810 as it was in 1823 ; " that, in 
 1810, he had condemned the Government for 
 having improvidently sent Armies to Spain 
 which had been defeated, and, therefore, ob- 
 jected to the sending an additional Army to share 
 a similar fate ; that although that Army had 
 been, contrary to his expectations, triumphant, 
 it had been so in consequence of circumstances 
 arising which no man could have foreseen j that 
 " he admitted in 1810 he had been mistaken, 
 " but that, at subsequent periods, he had quali- 
 " tied, and explained, and even changed his 
 " sentiments ; " that, therefore, the bringing 
 such a charge against him was not only most 
 " extraordinary, but most unfair." 
 
 But Mr. Canning did not charge Lord Grey 
 with not entertaining the same feelings of indig- 
 nation at Napoleon's aggression that he pro- 
 fessed against that of the Bourbons ; neither did 
 he deny that Lord Grey was willing to give to 
 Spain, all the assistance that the means of the
 
 Country would afford, any more than that Lord 
 Grey had, when he found himself mistaken, 
 " qualified, and even changed his sentiments." 
 
 But what Mr. Canning did mean to say was, 
 that Lord Grey condemned the policy pursued 
 by the Government towards Spain ; that his 
 opinion of " the means that the country would 
 " afford," were very different from those enter- 
 tained by the Government ; and that, by the 
 same principles by which he condemned the 
 support given to Spain in 1810, he ought con- 
 sistently to approve the not giving similar sup- 
 port in 1823. 
 
 When, therefore, it is considered that Mr. 
 Canning's attack on Lord Grey was not unpro- 
 voked ; that it was made in self-defence, in answer 
 to a severe condemnation of his conduct by 
 Lord Grey ; it will surely be thought that the 
 epithet " most unfair" is not the most appro- 
 priate that could have been selected. 
 
 Lord Grey having disposed of this question, 
 returned to the third ostensible object of his 
 speech, which was directed to proving that 
 " the Allies had agreed with France, that if she 
 " engaged in a war they would support her with 
 " their Armies." 
 
 The reasons which Lord Grey gave for think- 
 ing that such an agreement had been entered 
 into, were certainly sufficient to justify him for 
 entertaining this opinion ; but since it is now 
 
 a a 4
 
 360 
 
 perfectly well known, that the Allies were under 
 no positive engagement " to France to support 
 " Her with their armies," although, had She 
 failed, they might have been very ready to do so, 
 it is needless to examine reasons, which, however 
 apparently convincing at the time, are now 
 known to have been fallacious. 
 
 Lord Grey concluded, by moving for the pro- 
 duction of papers. 
 
 After a short discussion, in which three noble 
 Lords declared for war, two of whom had not 
 done so in the first debate, the motion was nega- 
 tived without a division. 
 
 A few days before the Prorogation, Colonel 
 Palmer made a speech on the subject of Foreign 
 Policy. The motion with which he concluded 
 was simply seconded by Mr. Hume, and no other 
 member on either side made any observation. 
 
 This attempt was the last that was made that 
 session to condemn a line of policy which cannot 
 now be doubted to have been " consonant with 
 " the interests, and satisfactory to the feelings of 
 " the British People." 
 
 The other debates which occurred during; the 
 session produced an impression on the publick 
 mind very- favourable to Mr. Canning. He 
 seemed to have inspired his Colleagues with his 
 own sentiments, and to have changed the tone 
 of the Administration. 
 
 Little passed on the subject of Agricultural
 
 361 
 
 Distress. On the very first mention of it, Mr. 
 Canning declared it to be his sincere, although 
 reluctant conviction, that no measure of direct 
 relief could be suggested by the Government 
 which would produce any good effect. 
 
 There had been a moment when he had been 
 of a different opinion, and when he had thought 
 that the advancement of money to the landed 
 interests might have been productive of ad- 
 vantage ; but reflection had convinced him that 
 it would have been, " if practicable, mischievous 
 " in the highest degree." His reasons for so 
 thinking, although not then stated by him, were 
 given in detail two years afterwards, on Captain 
 Maberly proposing a similar plan for the relief 
 of Ireland. On that occasion Mr. Canning ob- 
 served, " Let us consider the relation in which, 
 " under the plan proposed, the Government 
 " would stand to the landed interests. The 
 creditor would technically be the Crown. The 
 prerogatives of the Crown with regard to the 
 recovery of its debts were well known j and 
 could there be any thing more inconvenient 
 " than the relation in which the landlords who 
 " had borrowed would stand to the Crown ? 
 " What class of landlords would those be who 
 " became bound to the Crown ? Why, the least 
 " opulent or the least provident, who, without 
 " means of their own, would be willing to be- 
 " come bound for sums to be advanced to them-
 
 36°2 
 
 " selves or their tenants. They, therefore, must 
 " become debtors to the Crown, for, unfbr- 
 " tunately, there could not be a lender without 
 " a debtor. It had been well observed by some 
 " essayist, how remarkably the person who ad- 
 " vanced money changed his character ; that 
 " nothing was so amiable as a lender, while 
 " nothing was so odious as a creditor ; that we 
 " went cap in hand to a lender, admiring his 
 " generosity and liberality., while in a year or 
 " two, when he assumed the aspect of a cre- 
 " ditor, we dreaded to see his face. Yet then 
 " were the same individuals in different stages 
 " of their progress. The Crown too must so 
 " change its character; and unless loans were to 
 " be a cloak for gifts, the Crown must come to 
 " demand payment. The Prerogatives of the 
 " Crown would be very inconvenient, not only to 
 " the borrower, but to all the creditors of the 
 " borrower, since it stepped in before them all. 
 " Such a scheme, therefore, would place the 
 " landlords in a state very inconvenient to them- 
 " selves, very inconsistent with their independ- 
 " ence, and very injurious, if not ruinous, to 
 " those who were their previous creditors." 
 
 These were the reasons which then led him 
 irresistibly to the conclusion, that no direct relief 
 could be afforded ; and if by his making this 
 declaration some of the Agriculturists were dis- 
 appointed, the majority of them were not much
 
 3(33 
 
 indisposed to admit its wisdom, in which they 
 were the more inclined to acquiesce, from a pro- 
 mise, made at the same time, of a remission of 
 taxes, as well as from the hope of more pros- 
 perous times, of which there were symptoms at 
 the commencement of the year. Before its con- 
 clusion, the depression of the Agricultural in- 
 terests had diminished to a very great extent. 
 
 The clear and candid exposition of the new 
 Chancellor of the Exchequer on the Financial 
 situation of the country, conferred great credit 
 upon himself and added to the popularity of 
 the Administration. The publick were de- 
 lighted with the novelty of hearing from the 
 Finance Minister a statement which all parties 
 allowed to be intelligible, and which nearly all 
 admitted to be correct, instead of those, to which 
 they had been so long accustomed, which to 
 most persons were incomprehensible, and which, 
 by those who professed to understand them, 
 were generally maintained to be erroneous. 
 
 Shortly after Mr. Canning had taken his seat, 
 he defended the Duke of Wellington against an 
 attack made upon his Grace, respecting the 
 disposal of the office of Lieutenant-General of 
 the Ordnance. 
 
 The House of Lords this Session made some 
 regulations respecting the more expeditious hear- 
 ing of appeals, which gave considerable satisfac- 
 tion to the Publick.
 
 36'4 
 
 The account of the Debates on the subject of 
 the Slave Population in the West Indies ; on 
 the Delays in the Court of Chancery, as well as 
 of the Measures respecting the Silk Laws, and 
 Relaxations of Commercial Restrictions, will be 
 deferred till the history is given of the further 
 proceedings on those subjects in future sessions, 
 in order that an entire and connected view may 
 be taken of the course which Mr. Canning pur- 
 sued upon these important questions. 
 
 An attempt was made by Mr. Whitmore to 
 obtain leave to bring in a bill to amend the Corn 
 Laws, for the purpose of admitting Foreign 
 Corn at all times, on payment of a duty. The 
 Agricultural Interests were yet, however, too 
 much depressed to allow of the success of his 
 attempt; and his motion was rejected on a 
 division. 
 
 Lord Archibald Hamilton brought the case 
 of Mr. Bowring before the House. Mr. Bow- 
 ring was an individual travelling in France, who 
 was arrested by the French Government, kept 
 in prison, and subsequently dismissed without 
 a trial. There can be no doubt that the real 
 cause of his detention was, his being supposed 
 to hold sentiments unfi'iendly to the Bourbon 
 Government; although the avowed pretence was, 
 that he was illegally conveying some letters. 
 As soon as the knowledge of this Gentleman's 
 arrest reached Mr. Canning, he forthwith gave
 
 365 
 
 directions to the British Ambassador, at Paris, 
 jealously to watch over the case, and to take 
 care that Mr. Bowring was treated with the 
 most scrupulous justice, according to the French 
 Law. It appeared that Mr. Bowring had ac- 
 tually, by illegally carrying letters, given ground 
 for his arrest ; and Mr. Canning thought it im- 
 possible to interfere, in any other way, than the 
 one proposed, as he held it to be an undisputed 
 principle, that " an individual who entered vo- 
 " luntarily into a foreign country, at the same 
 " time entered into a temporary and qualified 
 " allegiance to the laws of that country ; that he 
 " confined himself to their observance ; that he 
 " submitted to their operation ; and that however 
 " unwise the system of law might be in itself, 
 " however harsh, however little congruous to his 
 " notions of civil liberty, or to his happier ex- 
 " perience of the jurisprudence of his own 
 " country, he had still no right to complain of 
 " the operation of those laws on himself, pro- 
 " vided that operation was not partial, but was 
 " the same as it would bs in the case of a natural 
 " born subject of that state." 
 
 All, therefore, that the British Government 
 felt itself bound to do, in Mr. Bowring's behalf, 
 was " to take care that the laws, not of Eng- 
 " land, but of France, were applied to his case 
 " with perfect impartiality." Mr. Canning hav- 
 ing assured the House that this had been most
 
 366 
 
 scrupulously done, and the question being put 
 by the Speaker, it was at once negatived. 
 
 After the Easter Holidays, Lord John Russell 
 brought forward his annual motion for a Reform 
 in Parliament. The discussion was enlivened 
 by no new arguments, and the fact of all the 
 great interests of the country, being at that time 
 progressively improving, damped not a little 
 the reforming spirit of the House of Commons. 
 
 With the exception of the debates relating to 
 Ireland, and the Catholick Question, those 
 already enumerated were all of any importance 
 that took place during the session. " The 
 " consideration of such measures of internal 
 " regulation, as might be calculated to promote 
 " and secure the tranquillity of Ireland, and to 
 " improve the habits and condition of her 
 " people," had been recommended to Parlia- 
 ment in the Speech from the Throne ; and in 
 justice it must be acknowledged, that all parties 
 seemed anxious to comply with the Royal re- 
 commendation. So willing, indeed, was the 
 House of Commons to consider every question 
 that related to Ireland, that night after night 
 was consumed, in inquiring into the supposed 
 misconduct of an Irish Judge, and a Dublin 
 Sheriff-, and the examinations were conducted 
 with a patience and minuteness, that marked a 
 laudable desire on the part of the House of 
 Commons to probe every abuse, whether arising
 
 30? 
 
 from system, or from accident, in that part of the 
 United Kingdom. 
 
 The proceedings on the first of these cases, 
 originated in the Report of a Parliamentary 
 Commission, and ended in the House declaring 
 its opinion that it was unnecessary and inex- 
 pedient, to take any steps with reference to the 
 conduct of Chief Baron O'Grady, the Judge 
 accused. 
 
 The proceedings on the second case, grew 
 out of a motion of Mr. Brownlow's, introducing 
 a Resolution condemning the Attorney General 
 of Ireland, Mr. Plunket, for what Mr. Brownlow 
 termed unconstitutional proceedings. 
 
 It appeared that a set of Orangemen in Dublin 
 had entered into a conspiracy, at least to insult, 
 if not to assault, the Lord Lieutenant * at the 
 theatre. His Excellency having made himself 
 obnoxious to the Orange faction, by a resolute 
 determination to act with the most perfect im- 
 partiality (as far as the law allowed him) towards 
 Catholicks and Protestants. 
 
 The grand jury of Dublin ignored the bill 
 against the conspirators, in spite of the evidence 
 against them ; and Mr. Plunket, in the ex- 
 ercise of the discretion with which the State and 
 the Law entrusted him, resolved that the accused 
 should, at any rate, be put upon their trial. He 
 
 * Lord Wellesley.
 
 568 
 
 accordingly filed an ex-qfficio information against 
 them. Mr. Brownlow's object was to prove that 
 this discretion was exercised in an unconsti- 
 tutional way; but notwithstanding his very able 
 and eloquent speech, he failed in establishing 
 his charge against Mr. Plunket, and the House 
 got rid of the motion by passing to the other 
 orders of the day. 
 
 It was in consequence of some observations 
 which fell from Mr. Plunket in the course of 
 his defence, inculpating the conduct of the 
 Sheriff of Dublin, that the House determined 
 to investigate his conduct. Mr. Canning voted 
 against the investigation, which he said " must 
 " terminate in one of two ways. The Sheriff 
 " might be acquitted of all blame, but then, as 
 " the House was precluded from hearing sworn 
 " evidence, he would have been accused by 
 " sworn, and acquitted by unsworn testimony ; 
 " or the charge might be substantiated against 
 " him, and he must then be sent to his trial, 
 " with the House as his prosecutor, and the pre- 
 judice resulting from the weight of its autho- 
 " rity against him." Mr. Canning, " therefore, 
 " preferred a judicial investigation." 
 
 A Parliamentary enquiry was, however, de- 
 cided upon ; and after many nights employed in 
 the examination of witnesses, in the course of 
 which the House was more than once placed 
 in situations of considerable embarrassment, it
 
 369 
 
 ceased, without the expression of an opinion 
 either one way or the other. 
 
 Besides these discussions on Irish affairs, four 
 other motions respecting them, which were all 
 rejected, were brought forward in the House of 
 Commons. One by Mr. Brougham for a Com- 
 mittee to enquire into the Administration of 
 justice in Ireland ; another by Mr. Hume for the 
 abolition of the office of Lord Lieutenant ; and 
 a third by Sir Henry Parnell for an enquiry into 
 the disturbances in Ireland; and a fourth by 
 Mr. Hume respecting the Irish Church Esta- 
 blishment. 
 
 Nothing of any great importance occurred in 
 the debates on the first three questions ; and as 
 to the questions themselves, if they were not 
 calculated to do much good, at any rate they 
 were not likely to be productive of mischief. 
 Not so the one relative to the Irish Church 
 Establishment, on which occasion Mr. Hume 
 moved resolutions, the simple statement of which 
 was calculated to have the very worst effects 
 upon the settlement of the great question on 
 which the peace of Ireland depended. 
 
 Mr. Hume's first resolution set forth, " That 
 " the property of the Church of Ireland in pos- 
 " session of the Bishops, Deans, and Chapters, 
 " was publick property at the disposal of the 
 " Legislature, for the support of Religion, and 
 " for such other purposes as Parliament in its 
 
 VOL. I. B B
 
 370 
 
 " wisdom might deem beneficial to the com- 
 " munity." 
 
 The second, " That it is expedient to enquire 
 " whether the Church Establishment was not 
 " more than commensurate to the services to be 
 " performed ; and whether a reduction of the 
 " same ought not to take place." 
 
 Now, even if the magnitude of the Irish 
 Church Establishment be greater than the wants 
 of the community, intrusted to the charge of 
 that Establishment, may require, yet the feeling 
 was very general, that any attack upon the 
 revenues of that Church would shake the found- 
 ations of all property in Ireland, without any 
 corresponding good being secured to the country. 
 The landed estates (for landed estates only, and 
 not tithes, were included in Mr. Hume's resolu- 
 tions) which belong to the dignitaries of the 
 Irish Church, are in the same situation as those 
 which belong to lay proprietors, with the ex- 
 ception that those by whom they are possessed, 
 do not acquire them by hereditary succession. 
 The payment of tithes may press heavily upon 
 the community. But, whether a landed estate 
 belongs to a clerical proprietor, in right of his 
 appointment by the crown, or to a lay pro- 
 prietor, by right of inheritance from his fathers, 
 must, cceteris paribus, as far as the community 
 at large is concerned, be a matter of absolute 
 indifference.
 
 3? 1 
 
 The tenure of confiscation and grant from the 
 crown, by which the greatest portion of land in 
 Ireland is held, is such as it was thought would 
 be peculiarly likely to be affected by any viola- 
 tion of Church property ; and since it was well 
 known that many of those who were unfriendly 
 to emancipation, were unfriendly on the express 
 ground of danger to the Irish Church Establish- 
 ment, and danger to the proprietors of the for- 
 feited lands, an attack upon that Establishment, 
 previously to the question of emancipation being 
 brought forward, was of all measures the most 
 certain to be fatal to its success, and was, as 
 Mr. Plunket described it, one of absolute folly, 
 and desperation. 
 
 Very different were the two measures which 
 were introduced by the government for amelior- 
 ating the condition of Ireland, which were justly 
 described by one of the most patriotick and able 
 of the Irish members, belonging to the Opposition, 
 as " measures of wisdom and conciliation, — the 
 " tendency of the one being to unite all classes 
 " of the community in Ireland, while the other 
 " would put an end to nearly all the grievous, 
 " and oppressive practices of the tithe system.'* 
 
 The first of these measures was a law to ex- 
 tend to Ireland the provisions of an act passed 
 in 1799, by which would be brought under the 
 operation of the law any society which commit- 
 ted an overt act in violation of it. 
 
 b b 2
 
 372 
 
 The second was a law for the commutation 
 and composition of tithes in Ireland. 
 
 Overrun as Ireland was with secret societies, 
 any enactment placing those societies under the 
 control of the law was sure to prove beneficial. 
 The intention of the government, therefore, to 
 introduce this bill, when declared on a motion 
 of Mr. Abercrombie's relative to the orange so- 
 cieties in Ireland, was received with satisfaction 
 by all sides of the house. But the plan for the 
 commutation of tithes, of which the merit is due 
 to Lord Wellesley, was likely to be productive, 
 and may now indeed be said to have produced, 
 the most advantageous consequences. 
 
 The benefit of these measures, however excel- 
 lent in themselves, could not be immediately 
 felt, and the disturbances in the southern coun- 
 ties of Ireland compelled Parliament again to 
 pass the Insurrection Act. 
 
 But although much was done this session to 
 wards ameliorating the condition of Ireland, the 
 one great boon of emancipation, without which 
 no extensive or permanent good could ever be 
 effected for that divided country, was lost in the 
 House of Commons. 
 
 Since the establishment of the Regency, it never 
 was discussed under more unfavourable circum- 
 stances. Independently of Mr. Hume's attack 
 on the Irish Church, the greatest pains had been 
 taken by Mr. Canning's enemies to propagate
 
 373 
 
 the opinion, that, in his speech at Liverpool, he 
 had betrayed the Catholick cause ; and conse- 
 quently that it had lost its most influential, and 
 ablest, advocate. His opponents in the House 
 of Commons were too ready to believe this ca- 
 lumny against him. But not content with mis- 
 construing his language on that occasion, some 
 observations which fell from him on Mr. Brown- 
 low's motion were likewise equally misunder- 
 stood, and made the plea for a most extraordinary 
 proceeding on the part of some members of the 
 Opposition. Sir Francis Burdett took the oppor- 
 tunity, afforded by the presentation of the Nor- 
 folk petition for Emancipation, to declare, that, 
 having heard from Mr. Canning, whom Sir 
 Francis described as the " former eloquent ad- 
 " vocate of the catholic claims, that there was 
 " not the least chance of the question being car- 
 " ried in their favour," he, for one, would not 
 consent to be a party " to the annual farce of 
 " discussing those claims ; " and, therefore, if 
 Mr. Plunket should determine on bringing the 
 question forward that evening, according to his 
 notice, he (Sir Francis Burdett) should with- 
 draw from the house. 
 
 Mr. Canning ■' contradicted flatly, and in 
 " toto, the words and the sentiments which Sir 
 " Francis had imputed to him." What he had 
 said, was, that " he thought it hopeless in the 
 " then state of the country and the Parliament, 
 
 b b 3
 
 
 374 
 
 " to form an Administration, which should agree 
 " on Emancipation, and upon all other general 
 " measures, so as to be able to carry on the 
 " general business of the nation. If any per- 
 sons said that the success of the question was 
 hopeless, unless it were made a Government 
 " question, the proposition was theirs, not his ; 
 " and so far from his being of that way of think- 
 " ing, he repeatedly said that the question would 
 " make its way under any Government, which 
 " did not actually unite, or openly set its coun- 
 " tenance against it. It might, however," 
 continued Mr. Canning, " receive its death- 
 " blow from the secession which had been 
 " threatened that evening ; but if it did so 
 " fail, on the heads of the seceders alone let the 
 " blame of its failure rest. For himselfi there 
 " was not a man in the House, let his general 
 «' opinions on politicks be hostile or favourable 
 " to the Government, to whom, if he brought 
 " forward this subject, either wholly, or in part, 
 " he would not give his unqualified support." 
 
 Mr. Tierney differed with Mr. Canning in 
 opinion as to the impossibility of forming an 
 Administration united on the question of Eman- 
 cipation ; but he did not point out the indivi- 
 duals of whom it could have been composed. 
 He laid great stress on Mr. Canning's having 
 consented to join the ministry, without having 
 stipulated for concession j and maintained, that
 
 • >75 
 
 if Mr. Canning had refused " to support the 
 " Administration, if the Administration would 
 " not support concession to the Catholicks, the 
 " anti-Catholick party would have given way." 
 A more erroneous idea can hardly be conceived. 
 Mr. Canning had accepted an important office, 
 to fulfil the duties of which he was about imme- 
 diately to leave England. His departure could 
 alone have been prevented by his being called 
 upon to administer the functions of another office, 
 still more important to his country, His power, 
 therefore, to force the Government was more 
 than half diminished, lor he could only proffer 
 his support, while he could not threaten his 
 opposition. 
 
 Undoubtedly the Administration stood in need 
 of Mr. Canning's services : and so thought its 
 most influential members. But is it to be cre- 
 dited that Lord Liverpool, however much he 
 might have felt the need of Mr. Canning's sup- 
 port, would have purchased mere increase of 
 strength to his Government, at a price which he 
 would not have paid for the preservation of its 
 existence ? Is it to be credited, that all those 
 members of the Cabinet who refused to serve 
 even under a Catholick Premier, would have 
 yielded their opinions to secure Mr. Canning, 
 when, without being required to make any such 
 sacrifice, some of them were adverse to his ad- 
 mission into the Cabinet? Could Lord Liver- 
 
 b b 4
 
 370 
 
 pool, or would he, have placed his own tenure 
 of office upon the admittance into the Ministry 
 of a man who demanded from him the sacrifice 
 of his principles ? Could he in honour or in 
 fairness have insisted with his anti-Catholick 
 colleagues on Mr. Canning's being invited to 
 join them, if Catholick emancipation had been 
 made a condition of that junction ? It is im- 
 possible to answer these questions affirmatively ; 
 and it is idle, therefore, to argue that Mr. Can- 
 ning had it in his power to have compelled the 
 Cabinet to yield. Not having it in his power, 
 it can hardly be maintained that the Catholick 
 cause would have been advanced by his de- 
 parture from England, which was the alterna- 
 tive to which he would have been reduced, had 
 he failed in his efforts to force it upon the 
 Cabinet. By accepting office, he was enabled 
 to give the question all the benefit of his own 
 individual exertions, backed by the weight and 
 authority which the second station in the Go- 
 vernment necessarily confers upon the indivi- 
 dual who holds it. By refusing, he would 
 have withdrawn his own talents from the cause, 
 and would have left the weight and authority 
 of that station in the hands of an adversary of 
 Emancipation. 
 
 But even had he had the power, on what 
 principle could he have declined the offer which 
 was made to him on account of the Catholick
 
 377 
 
 question ? He could not have refused to serve 
 under an anti-Catholick Premier, after he had 
 been acting under Lord Liverpool for nearly 
 five years. He could not have declined to join 
 a divided Cabinet, after he had repeatedly de- 
 clared his conviction, that it was impossible, in 
 the existing state of parties, and the opinions of 
 publick men, to form an Administration united 
 on this question. Mr. Tierney, and those who 
 held his language, suggested no reason why he 
 ought to have declined, save that, by so doing, 
 they were of opinion that he might have " com- 
 " pelled his colleagues to take him upon his 
 " own terms." This opinion, however, subse- 
 quent events have demonstrated to be erro- 
 neous : but granting that it was correct, Mr. 
 Canning could not have attempted to have 
 forced the Government, without being guilty of 
 the grossest inconsistencv. 
 
 Mr. Brougham followed up Mr. Tierney's 
 notion, that Mr. Canning might have reduced 
 the Ministry to concede Emancipation, and 
 went on to taunt him with having abandoned 
 his opinions, " at the critical moment at 
 " which," said Mr. Brougham, " his (Mr. Can- 
 " ning's) fate depended upon the Lord Chan- 
 " cellor Eldon, and his sentiments on the Ca- 
 " tholick cause. If," continued the learned 
 gentleman, " he who had said on a former night 
 " he would not truckle to Lord Folkstone, but
 
 378 
 
 " who had exhibited a specimen, the most in- 
 " credible specimen of monstrous truckling, for 
 *« the purpose of obtaining office, that the whole 
 " history of political tergiversation could fur- 
 " nish — " Mr, Canning, who, in the preceding 
 part of the evening, had been somewhat irritated 
 by the misrepresentations which had been put 
 upon his conduct on this question, when he 
 heard himself thus wrongfully accused of the 
 basest treachery, could contain himself no longer. 
 Conscious of his innocence, and regardless of 
 every thing but his honour, he at once inter- 
 rupted Mr. Brougham with this short but em- 
 phatick sentence, — " Sir, I rise to say, that that 
 « is false." 
 
 A dead silence for a few seconds followed the 
 remark. Mr. Brougham was preparing to quit 
 the House, but was restrained by his friends. 
 The Speaker then observed, that Mr. Canning 
 had violated the customs and orders of the 
 House, and that he deeply regretted that, even 
 in haste, such an expression should have been 
 used. 
 
 Mr. Canning lamented that he had violated 
 the decorum of the House, but no consideration 
 on earth should induce him to retract the sen- 
 timent. The Speaker called upon the House to 
 support him in requiring Mr. Canning to recall 
 his expression. 
 
 Mr. Canning expressed his sorrow for having
 
 (( 
 
 379 
 
 violated the order of the House ; M but if he 
 were to be required to recall his declaration, by 
 an admission that his impression was erroneous, 
 as to the expressions which had been applied 
 " to him, he could not in conscience do it." 
 
 After some vain attempts, by members on 
 both sides the House, to induce Mr. Canning 
 to recall, or Mr. Brougham to explain, what 
 they had respectively said, Mr. Bankes moved 
 that the two gentlemen should be committed to 
 the custody of the Sergeant-at-Arms. 
 
 Mr. Wynne, Mr. Abercrombie, Mr. Wilmot, 
 and Sir Francis Burdett addressed the House to 
 prevent the necessity of the motion being pressed. 
 Sir Ilobert Wilson then said that he was 
 satisfied that Mr. Brougham's expressions were 
 addressed to Mr. Canning in his official capacity, 
 and that he thought the interruption of Mr. 
 Canning arose from a firm conviction that the 
 expressions were " personal, and no otherwise 
 intended." With this " view of the case, he 
 " thought that Mr. Canning might, consistently 
 " with his honour and his feelings, say, that it 
 " was under an impression that the language 
 " was meant to be personal, that he had applied 
 " the epithet which had called forth the dis- 
 '* cussion." 
 
 Mr. Canning upon this said, that he acceded 
 to " the suggestion of Sir Robert, under the 
 " assurance that Mr. Brougham denied the in-
 
 (( 
 
 (C 
 
 380 
 
 M tention to convey any personal imputation in 
 " the language which he had used, a denial, 
 " which, if Mr. Brougham did not make, he 
 " wished to be understood as retracting nothing. 
 " Personal he had considered that language, as 
 " it meant to impute to him the acceptance of 
 " the office which he held, after having made 
 " unbecoming submissions to a high individual in 
 " the administration for the sake of obtaining it. 
 " Such an imputation he felt to have been cast, 
 not on his official, but his private, character. 
 If that imputation should be denied, he was 
 ready to avow, that in what he had stated 
 " subsequently, he was mistaken ; if, on the 
 " other hand, it should be avowed, he retracted 
 " nothing." 
 
 Mr. Canning having said this, the Speaker 
 called on Mr. Brougham to say whether he 
 meant to apply the words which he had used in 
 a personal sense. 
 
 Mr. Brougham said that " he could not re- 
 " member his exact expressions, but he re- 
 " membered his meaning. What he meant to 
 " say was this — he used the words political ter- 
 giversation. He described Mr. Canning's con- 
 duct as something which stood prominent in the 
 " history of Parliamentary tergiversation. The 
 expression was a strong one, but he had heard 
 it used over and over again, without its having 
 " given offence. He was sure he had never 
 

 
 381 
 
 " heard of any occasion on which it was more 
 " accurately applied. He entertained a strong 
 " feeling, and meant to express it with respect 
 " to Mr. Canning's publick and political life ; 
 " but as a private individual he had never known 
 " aught of him but what did him the highest 
 " honour. He did feel strongly on this passage 
 " of Mr. Canning's life; but he had not used the 
 expressions in question for party or factious, 
 and least of all for personal, purposes. He 
 considered that Mr. Canning had by his speech 
 at Liverpool, for the first time in his (Mr. Can- 
 " ning's) life, and for the first time in the his- 
 tory of the Catholick question, as connected 
 with him, said that he (Mr. Canning) did not 
 wish that question to be discussed again in 
 " Parliament. If Mr. Canning had not said so, 
 " he would readily beg his pardon." 
 
 Mr. Brougham then went on to say, that this 
 speech being made just at a moment when it was 
 doubtful whether Mr. Canning would go to 
 India, or take office at home, coupled with the 
 known opinions of Lord Eldon on the subject 
 of emancipation, did lead Mr. Brougham to 
 infer that it was made for the sake of conciliating 
 the Lord Chancellor. " He was aware," he said, 
 " that it was wrong to impute motives to any 
 " one ; and he gathered from Mr. Canning that 
 " he had been wrong in doing so in this in- 
 " stance." 
 
 
 a 
 
 «<
 
 382 
 
 After a few more observations, Mr. Brougham 
 sat down. Mr. Peel and Mr. Tierney thought 
 the explanations which were given on each 
 side were equally satisfactory to the House 
 and honourable to both parties. Mr. Bankes 
 withdrew his motion, and Mr. Brougham and 
 Mr. Canning both said that they should think 
 no more of what had passed. 
 
 It cannot be denied that Mr. Canning acted 
 wrongly in saying what he did. The expression 
 of which he made use was both intemperate and 
 unparliamentary ; and yet, notwithstanding this, 
 the uncontrolled indignation which he mani- 
 fested, found such sympathy in all honourable 
 breasts, that it contributed very considerably to 
 raise him in the estimation both of the House 
 and of the country. A vague notion was afloat, 
 that he had truckled to the Lord Chancellor at 
 the time that he had accepted office. Nothing 
 but an entire consciousness that he had not 
 done so, in the smallest degree, could have 
 given him the courage to deny it as stoutly as 
 he did. A man conscious of baseness may hate 
 the individual who reproaches him with it, but 
 he is not fired with indignation. Indignation is 
 a feeling which no guilty mind can experience. 
 Mr. Canning's indignation was a proof of his 
 innocence ; as such it was received by the 
 world j and, what is more, was one of the circum- 
 stances in his conduct which contributed to
 
 sss 
 
 " satisfy' ' the individual who excited it (as, 
 highly to the credit of that individual, he has 
 since confessed), that " Mr. Canning was dis- 
 " posed to act a high, manly, and honourable 
 " part." * 
 
 It is hardly necessary to remind the reader 
 how entirely at variance what Mr. Canning 
 really did say at Liverpool was, with what Mr. 
 Brougham imagined that he had said. 
 
 When this business was over, Mr. Brougham 
 finished his speech ; and after a few observations 
 from some other members, the petition was 
 ordered to lie upon the table. 
 
 The Speaker then called upon Mr. Plunket, 
 upon which Sir Francis Burdett, and several 
 other members of the Opposition benches, left 
 the House. Mr. Plunket proceeded with the 
 question, and after a powerful speech, concluded 
 by moving for a committee to enquire into the 
 disqualifying laws affecting His Majesty's Roman 
 Catholick subjects. 
 
 As soon as the question had been put from 
 the Chair, loud cries of question were raised. 
 The House seemed determined not to listen to 
 any further debate, and, after four different 
 motions for adjournment, the motion, " That 
 " this House do now adjourn," was carried by a 
 
 * This declaration is so honourable to the person who 
 made it, that it is hoped the quotation of a private letter 
 will be pardoned. — The Author.
 
 384 
 
 majority of 313 to 111 ; and thus the question 
 was indirectly disposed of, for the success of 
 which there was no hope in the then temper of 
 the House. 
 
 Parliament was prorogued on the 19th of 
 July ; nearly half the time of the House of 
 Commons having been devoted to the affairs of 
 Ireland.
 
 38J 
 
 CHAP. VII. 
 
 PROGRESS OF THE FRENCH TROOPS IN SPAIN. — PRO- 
 CEEDINGS OF THE CORTES AT SEVILLE AND THEIR 
 
 RETREAT TO CADIZ. DUC d'aNGOULEME's ADVANCE 
 
 WITH HIS ARMY TO CADIZ. NEGOTIATIONS AT THAT 
 
 CITY. FALL OF CADIZ. KING'S SUBSEO CENT CON- 
 DUCT. STATE OF SPAIN AT THE END OF THE YEAR 
 
 1825. DEBATES IN PARLIAMENT ON SPANISH AF- 
 FAIRS. MR. CANNING'S "SYSTEM" OF POLICY. 
 
 The efforts of Mr. Canning to prevent the in- 
 vasion of Spain by France having proved in- 
 effectual, the next object to which they were 
 directed, was, the taking care that British interests 
 should sustain the least possible injury from the 
 results of that invasion. Such, however, was the 
 nature of the enterprise, that whether it ter- 
 minated successfully, or unsuccessfully, it could 
 not fail of being more or less detrimental to Great 
 Britain. 
 
 vol. i. c c
 
 3SC) 
 
 An unsuccessful termination was, however, of 
 the two, that one which was the most to be depre- 
 cated ; since it would more surely, and certainly 
 more speedily, have involved this country in 
 war. Still, success would have been far from 
 being without its disadvantages. 
 
 On the one hand, in the event of the French 
 being defeated, or meeting with a resistance so 
 protracted as to call for fresh and large supplies 
 of men and money, if it had not produced, as it 
 probably would have done, internal commotions 
 in France, from the effects of which England 
 could not have escaped uninjured, would, most 
 indubitably, have ensured the armed interference 
 of the Alliance, either against Spain, or against 
 the revolutionary spirit of the French People. 
 In such a contest, with all the great Powers of 
 Continental Europe arrayed on the side of Abso- 
 lutism and Legitimacy against the just rights, and 
 reasonable privileges of the people, England, 
 with her free Constitution, could neither have 
 shown indifference, nor preserved neutrality. 
 
 On the other hand, if the French contrived to 
 overthrow the Spanish Constitutional Govern- 
 ment, and to restore Ferdinand to absolute 
 power, the temporary occupation of the Penin- 
 sula by a French force would have been necessary 
 to uphold a Government, thus established by 
 Foreign interference, upon the ruins of another 
 Government, which, even if it had become un-
 
 S8 1 / 
 
 popular, was originally set up by the Nation, and 
 had had sufficient strength Lo maintain itself 
 against domestick treason. 
 
 Now, France holding military possession of 
 Spain was at once hurtful to the pride, and in- 
 jurious to the interests of England. 
 
 Such a state of things, therefore, could only be 
 tolerated for a time, but still was, by no means, 
 such as must necessarily have ended in war. 
 On the contrary, so long as France abstained 
 from attacking Portugal ; from any design to 
 establish a permanent military occupation of 
 Spain ; and from any attempt, either direct or 
 indirect, against the independence of Spanish 
 America, so long there was little, or no pro- 
 bability, of her coming into collision with 
 England. 
 
 As to Portugal, experience had taught the 
 French how small was their chance of conquer- 
 ing that country, if it should be defended by 
 British troops ; even, though they made the 
 attack with a much larger army, and with a 
 more experienced General than they thought 
 fit to employ against Spain. Besides, if they 
 were triumphant in Spain ; and it is only in the 
 supposition of their being so, that there was any 
 possibility of their invading Portugal; they would 
 hardly have been disposed to risk the loss of all 
 the advantages of that triumph, by bringing into 
 the field against them a far more formidable 
 
 c c 
 
 o
 
 388 
 
 enemy than they had yet encountered. Again, 
 had they been defeated in Portugal by the 
 English, the Alliance would have immediately 
 proffered marching troops to their assistance, an 
 offer which it would have been no easy matter 
 for the French Government to have declined, 
 but which, as has been already seen, it would 
 have been most unwilling to have accepted. As 
 far, therefore, as Portugal was concerned, there 
 was any thing but an immediate prospect of this 
 country being called upon to fulfil her treaties, 
 by defending her against the aggression of 
 France. So likewise, there was little cause to 
 fear that the French Government would resolve 
 upon a permanent occupation of Spain, after 
 Mr. Canning had declared that this Country 
 would not hesitate to commence hostilities to 
 prevent it : and when Spain was in a condition 
 too exhausted to hold out sufficient inducement 
 to France, to seek to maintain a lasting pos- 
 session of that country, at the risk of a rupture 
 with England. 
 
 If* therefore, there were no immediate danger 
 of our being involved in a war with France, 
 either in defence of Portugal, or to prevent Spain 
 being converted into a French Colony, still less 
 chance was there of a collision on account of 
 Spanish America. 
 
 It might be, and probably was, quite true, that 
 the French Ministers would have been well
 
 u89 
 
 pleased, either to have appropriated to them- 
 selves a portion of those vast territories, or to 
 have restored them to the dominion of the 
 Mother Country, in order that, through the 
 Mother Country, France might have acquired 
 an influence over them. But with what prospect 
 of accomplishing the object would the attempt 
 have been made, with the certainty that the 
 English Fleet would have been ready to inter- 
 cept any Armaments fitted out for the purpose ? 
 And if there were no such prospect, was it 
 likely that the French Government would have 
 undertaken an expedition, of which they could 
 have had no hope that it would have been able 
 to secure the end for which it was designed. 
 
 It appears, therefore, while this country was 
 likely to avoid a war if the French were suc- 
 cessful, that war was almost inevitable, if they 
 met with reverses. 
 
 Did Mr. Canning, therefore, wish their cause 
 to prosper ? Certainly not. His heart was too 
 noble to desire the triumph of injustice ; but 
 the fact that the overthrow of the French would 
 be more injurious to Great Britain than their 
 triumph, furnished him, as a British Statesman, 
 with ample reason for not advising the adoption 
 of any measures which could contribute to that 
 overthrow ; and this the more, because the 
 Spanish nation was so little deserving of victory. 
 Who, indeed, could sympathize with a people 
 
 c c 3
 
 390 
 
 one half of whom looked with a favourable eye 
 upon their invaders, while the other wanted 
 spirit to resist them ? Who could care whether 
 the cause of liberty flourished or not in Spain, 
 when one portion of her population were con- 
 fessedly hostile to it, and the other, who pro- 
 fessed to be its defenders, were ready to betray 
 it for a bribe ? 
 
 Neutrality, therefore, in its strictest sense, was 
 the course which honour and interest prescribed 
 to this country. On that course the Cabinet 
 from the beginning resolved, and the sanction 
 of Parliament enabled them to persevere in 
 their resolution. 
 
 What remained for Mr. Canning to do was, 
 to endeavour, if France were unsuccessful, to 
 prevent, if possible, the interference of the 
 Alliance ; if successful, then, in the first place, 
 to hinder any step, being taken by the French, 
 which England would be necessitated to op- 
 pose by war; and, in the next, to seek some 
 means of compensation for the disparagement to 
 which She would be exposed by the Peninsula 
 beinp- brought under French dominion. For the 
 prevention of any such step, Mr. Canning took 
 the most effectual measures, by clearly explain- 
 ing: in the outset to the French Government 
 what conduct on its part would provoke hosti- 
 lities on ours. What he did to compensate 
 England for her disparagement must be left to 
 be related in a subsequent pnrt of this History.
 
 391 
 
 We must now return to the proceedings of 
 the Due d'Angouleme, an attempt to shake the 
 fidelity of whose army, ere it had crossed the 
 frontiers, was made by a party of French Re- 
 fugees (assembled on the Spanish side of the 
 Bidassoa), who raised at the same time the tri- 
 coloured flag, and the well known cry of " Vive 
 L'Empereur," 
 
 The flag was saluted, and the cry was an- 
 swered, only by a discharge of musketry and 
 cannon, from the regiments which were en- 
 camped on the opposite side. 
 
 The next day the French army entered the 
 Spanish territory : it amounted to something less 
 than 100,000 men, including the Spanish Royalist 
 division under Espana, and Quesada. 
 
 The Constitutional forces consisted of the 
 Army of the North under Ballasteros ; that of 
 Catalonia under Mina ; and that of the centre 
 under Abisbal ; each of which were calculated 
 to have numbered about 20,000 men. Besides 
 these, there were the Armies of Gallicias and 
 Asturias, amounting to about 10,000 men, under 
 Morillo, and about 50,000 men dispersed in the 
 several Garrisons. 
 
 The French professed to enter Spain, not for 
 
 the purpose of making war upon that country, 
 
 but merely to enable the Spanish Absolutists to 
 
 overthrow the Established Government. "France 
 
 " is not at war with Spain," said the Due d'An- 
 
 c c 4
 
 392 
 
 gouleme in his proclamation to the Spaniards, 
 and, " I cross the Pyrenees to assist the friends 
 " of order in setting free their captive King, 
 " and rescuing the nation from the dominion of 
 " the ambitious few, who now constitute its 
 " Government." And in conformity with this 
 principle, the French army " were to pay for 
 " every thing ; the Spanish standard alone was 
 " to float over Spanish cities, and the Go- 
 " vernments of the provinces traversed by the 
 " French were to be administered in the name 
 " of Ferdinand, by Spanish authorities." More- 
 over, no letters of marque against Spanish ships 
 were to be issued by the French Government. 
 
 The way in which the French were received 
 by the mass of the Spanish population fully 
 justified the wisdom of this policy, since the 
 troops were every where hailed as liberators by 
 the populace. 
 
 The important fortresses of Pampeluna and 
 St. Sebastian, which were garrisoned by Con- 
 stitutional troops, refused, however, to surrender, 
 when summoned by the French ; but these for- 
 tresses did not delay the march of the Due 
 d'Angouleme, who, having taken measures for 
 masking them, proceeded on his road towards 
 Madrid. 
 
 No effort to arrest the progress of his army 
 towards the capital was made by the army of the 
 North under Ballasteros, who retired down the
 
 393 
 
 course of* the Ebro, followed by a French corps. 
 The Due d'Angouleme entered Burgos, on the 
 9th of May, without having encountered any op- 
 position, and thence continued his march in two 
 columns to Madrid ; the one, under the Duke 
 de Reggio, marching by Valladolid, the other, 
 under the Due d'Angouleme himself, by Aranda 
 and Buitrago. 
 
 It was at this last place, which he reached on 
 the 17th of May, that His Royal Highness re- 
 ceived a flag of truce from theConde del Abisbal, 
 and the Municipality of Madrid, proposing that 
 the Spanish troops, which were to defend the 
 city, should evacuate it ; but that a part of the 
 garrison should be allowed to remain, until the 
 arrival of the French army, with the view of 
 preventing a collision of the various parties into 
 which the populace were divided, should they 
 cease to be overawed by a superior force. 
 
 A convention was accordingly agreed upon, 
 by which it was arranged that a corps of Abis- 
 bal's army, under Zayas, should remain in the 
 metropolis until the 2-Ath, by which day it was 
 calculated that the French troops might arrive. 
 
 Their near approach to the capital without 
 the slightest effort having been made to resist 
 them, excited great discontent amongst that 
 portion of the populace of Madrid, which was 
 attached to the Constitutional cause ; and sus- 
 picion, apparently not without reason, began to
 
 394 
 
 be generally entertained of the treachery of 
 Abisbal. It appears, that that General had on 
 the 15th of May written a letter, in answer to 
 one from the Count de Montejo, in which letter 
 he stated it to be his opinion that the majority 
 of the Spanish nation were hostile to the Con- 
 stitution. Copies of this letter he sent to Ballas- 
 teros, Mina, and Morillo, and likewise circulated 
 some amongst the officers of his own army. By 
 these last, the declaration of this opinion was 
 so ill received, that Abisbal published a dis- 
 avowal of the interpretation which had been put 
 upon the expressions of his letter, together with 
 a declaration of his unalterable attachment to the 
 Constitution ; but this measure did not restore 
 him to the confidence of his officers, who waited 
 upon him in a body on the morning of the 18th, 
 and charged him with having betrayed his trust. 
 A quarrel ensued. Abisbal resigned his com- 
 mand, and quitted Madrid for France, being 
 furnished with passports by the French Ge- 
 nerals. 
 
 So soon as Abisbal had resigned, the Marquis 
 of Castel Rias assumed the command of his 
 army ; and, in compliance with the Convention 
 which had been entered into with the French, 
 immediately evacuated Madrid, leaving behind 
 him a small corps, under Zayas, to prevent a 
 re-action taking place before their arrival. 
 
 To produce that re-action an attempt was
 
 395 
 
 made, two days after the departure of the main 
 body of the Constitutional army, by Bessieres, 
 the Royalist Chief, who, for the purpose of co- 
 operating with a part of the populace of Madrid, 
 had, by forced marches, got a few days' start of 
 the French. His force, however, was dispersed 
 byZayas; but this occurrence induced the French 
 Commanders to hasten the march of their army, 
 which took possession of the Capital on the 
 23d, one day sooner than had been agreed. On 
 the following day the Due d'Angouleme made 
 his publick entry, was enthusiastically welcomed 
 by many of the inhabitants, and had a con- 
 gratulatory address presented to him, signed by 
 thirty-one Grandees. 
 
 The French, thus in possession of Madrid, 
 were not much nearer to the completion of their 
 enterprise than they were at its very commence- 
 ment ; and none were more fully aware that this 
 was the case than the French Ministers at Paris, 
 who undoubtedly felt no inconsiderable fear, 
 notwithstanding the numbers of their Royalist 
 Allies, for the ultimate fate of the expedition. 
 
 It was evident that its conclusion depended 
 on the invading army getting possession of the 
 person of Ferdinand ; and while His Majesty 
 was at Seville, with Cadiz behind him as a place 
 of refuge for himself and the Cortes, the period 
 of his liberation seemed still as uncertain as 
 ever. The efforts, however, of the two Con- 
 
 vol. i. * c c 6
 
 396 
 
 stitutional Generals, Ballasteros and Morillo, 
 left little cause for apprehension. 
 
 They seemed ready to follow the example of 
 Abisbal ; and although Mina, the ablest of the 
 Spanish Generals, was, 
 
 " faithful found 
 " Amongst the faithless, faithful only he," 
 
 yet was he in the midst of a population, a con- 
 siderable portion of which was adverse to his 
 cause j and moreover had to conduct his oper- 
 ations in Catalonia, the proximity of which pro- 
 vince to France, diminished to the French the 
 difficulty of carrying on hostilities against him. 
 
 It was not, therefore, so much from the re- 
 sistance of the Constitutional Generals that the 
 French Government foresaw difficulties in the 
 prosecution of their enterprise, as from the dis- 
 position of those to whom the French troops 
 had come as auxiliaries. 
 
 The conduct of that party might have proved 
 fatal, either through its imprudence, or its 
 treachery. 
 
 For, in the first place, it was so unmanage- 
 able and violent, that the outrages, which, in 
 many instances, its partisans did commit, and 
 which in all probability they would have com- 
 mitted, had they not been restrained by the 
 French troops, bade fair, by making the cause 
 of the Constitution the less odious of the two
 
 397 
 
 to those whose chief desire was the maintenance 
 of something like tranquillity and order, to have 
 turned the whole neutral part of the population 
 against those, who came avowedly to restore to 
 power the perpetrators of such excesses. The 
 proceedings also of the Provisional Junta 
 seemed not less likely to lead to embarrassing 
 results. Notwithstanding that that body was 
 actually attached to the head-quarters of the 
 French, the latter were wholly unable to con- 
 troul it ; and a proclamation issued in its name, 
 put forth in defiance of the Due d'Angouleme, 
 Mas so intemperate in its language, that it was 
 calculated to drive to despair those individuals 
 on whose will the safety of the King and Royal 
 Family of Spain depended. 
 
 In the next place, a long defence of Cadiz 
 might have made the besiegers wearisome to 
 their friends, the Apostolicals, who, if it had 
 been their humour to grow tired of the presence 
 of a foreign army in their country, might not 
 have hesitated to have turned against it, although 
 they themselves had been the means of its in- 
 troduction. Besides all these causes for anxiety, 
 the temper of the French people was so doubtful, 
 that orders were actually issued to the Prefets 
 of the different Departments to prosecute any 
 person who should venture to circulate un- 
 favourable intelligence from the armies. 
 
 The first object, therefore, of the French 
 Ministers was to liberate the King of Spain; and
 
 398 
 
 to effect their purpose they were ready to have 
 recourse to any plan, whether of treachery or 
 surprise. 
 
 Their next object was, in case they found 
 themselves in a dangerous position, from which 
 extrication would be difficult, to be in a con- 
 dition to come to terms with the Cortes. For 
 this end they again sought the mediation of 
 England ; but although the mediation was earn- 
 estly requested, no distinct propositions were 
 brought forward, their design being apparently 
 to get England to induce the Cortes to offer 
 terms of accommodation, which they might 
 either accept or reject according as circum- 
 stances, at the moment, might render advisable. 
 Mr. Canning, however, was not to be de- 
 ceived, and therefore insisted, before he would 
 consent to interfere, that " some specifick sug- 
 " gestion should be made by the French Mi- 
 " nisters, and some positive pledge given by 
 " them to abide the issue of any negotiation 
 " founded on it." For it was quite obvious 
 that unless the British Minister was prepared to 
 say what concessions would satisfy the French, 
 and induce them to desist from their enterprise, 
 the Cortes would have had little inducement to 
 concede, since they could not be assured that 
 their concessions would have any useful con- 
 sequences. But the French Ministers were 
 unwilling to be fettered by pledging themselves 
 to any particular line of policy ; and, although
 
 399 
 
 they persisted in expressing their earnest wishes 
 for the aid of England, they carefully abstained 
 from complying with the only condition by 
 which they could expect that aid could be 
 secured. 
 
 While the French Government and Army were 
 thus severally employed, the Cortes were as- 
 sembled at Seville. 
 
 The news of the arrival of the French Army 
 at Madrid spread dismay amongst the Members. 
 They had quitted the Capital the day following 
 that on which Ferdinand had departed, and the 
 reception which they had met with on their 
 journey from the inhabitants of the towns and 
 villages through which they passed, contributed 
 to convince many of them who had reckoned 
 on a determined resistance to the invaders, that 
 neither enthusiasm nor sacrifices for the Con- 
 stitution were to be expected from the people. 
 The desire for peace, and the establishment of 
 order under any form of Government what- 
 soever, seemed to be the general feeling ; 
 and the hopes of ultimate success entertained 
 by the Cortes, were, on their first reaching 
 Seville, evidently only founded on the dis- 
 affection of the French army, and the bringing 
 about a fresh revolution in France. To en- 
 courage rebellion against the Bourbon Dynasty, 
 and to serve as a rallying point for the dis- 
 affected, a corps of French deserters, and re-
 
 400 
 
 fugee officers, had been (before the removal of 
 the Government) organized at Madrid, and sent 
 to the frontiers: and such was the blind mis- 
 calculation of those who had been most clamo- 
 rous against any concessions being made, that 
 all along they had chiefly depended on the 
 exertions of these men for the defence of the 
 Constitutional Government. The signal defeat 
 which attended the attempt to seduce the French 
 soldiers from their allegiance has already been 
 mentioned. But before the news either of its 
 failure, or of the Due d'AnP-ouleme having 
 crossed the boundary, had reached Seville, the 
 tone of the Exaltados was so much softened by 
 what they had seen of the feelings of the people, 
 that they began to preach the necessity of leav- 
 ing nothing undone, that could be done with 
 honour, to avoid the alternative of war. 
 
 The King arrived at Seville on the 10th of 
 April, without any thing remarkable having oc- 
 curred in the course of his journey from Madrid. 
 The Cortes opened on the 23d of the same 
 month, when the President congratulated the 
 Assembly upon the manifestations of confidence 
 and attachment on the part of all ranks of the 
 people, which had greeted the Members on 
 their road to Seville ! 
 
 At the same sitting, M. de San Miguel stated 
 (in answer to questions put to him), that no pro- 
 positions either direct or indirect had been
 
 401 
 
 made to Spain by the French Government, and 
 that nothing had passed upon the subject of a 
 possible arrangement, but in unofficial convers- 
 ations between the French Ministers and the 
 British Ambassador at Paris. 
 
 On the 24th the declaration of War was pub- 
 lished against France, and on the same day, 
 M. San Miguel read his Report on the Foreign 
 Relations of Spain ; in which he gave a descrip- 
 tion (by no means an accurate one) of the cir- 
 cumstances attending the Negotiations witli 
 France. This done, and the other Ministers 
 having also presented their Reports ; in con- 
 formity with the King's declaration before His 
 Majesty left Madrid, that the continuance in office 
 of M. de San Miguel and his Colleagues was to 
 determine so soon as they had discharged this 
 duty, they resigned their situations on the 26th 
 of April, leaving the Sovereign without any 
 Ministry whatever. 
 
 After a fortnight's interregnum, a new Ad- 
 ministration was at last appointed, of which M. 
 Calatrava was the head, as Minister of Grace 
 and Justice, and M. Pando, from being fourth 
 clerk in the Secretary of State's Office, was 
 raised to the post itself of Secretary of State for 
 Foreign Affairs ; M. Yandiola was named Mi- 
 nister of Finance ; Don Garcia Herreros, of the 
 Interior ; and Zarco del Valle, of War. The 
 new Ministers apparently had but little influence 
 
 VOL. i. d D
 
 402 
 
 over the progress of events. M. Pando was at 
 first desirous of entering into Negotiations with 
 the French. M. Calatrava was opposed to any 
 such measure, but the other Ministers rather in- 
 clined to M. Pando's opinion. Still, however, 
 no one, either in the Ministry or out of it, had 
 sufficient boldness to propose Negotiations in 
 the Cortes, from the uncertainty as to the 
 manner in which such a proposition would be 
 received. 
 
 In the meanwhile, time was wearing on, and 
 no steps were being taken for bringing about an 
 amicable settlement : so that, when the several 
 accounts of the failure of the attempt to induce 
 the French Soldiery to desert, of their unresisted 
 advance, and of the enthusiasm with which they 
 were every where received by the Spanish Peo- 
 ple, reached Seville, the only effect which was 
 produced on those of the more violent party, was 
 reducing them to despair ; and that despair only 
 made them more than ever hostile to concession : 
 since, as they argued, if the Constitutional 
 fabrick was doomed to perish, it was better that 
 it should fall from the force of circumstances, 
 than from any demonstration of weakness or 
 pusillanimity in those entrusted with its defence. 
 As for the moderate party, they reasoned in a 
 different way j and one of them, Prince Anglona, 
 actually proposed in the Council of State to 
 make a representation to the Ministry to induce
 
 103 
 
 it to enter into Negotiations with the French. 
 The Council rejected the proposal, although 
 they acknowledged its policy : the Members 
 declaring, that they were afraid to affix their 
 signatures to such a representation. So likewise 
 not one of them ventured to originate in the 
 Cortes any measures for conciliation, while they 
 clung to the hope that some overtures might 
 yet be made on the part of the Due d' Angouleme 
 — a hope, which was nurtured, by the appear- 
 ance at Seville of a sort of half-recognised Agent 
 from the Due, in the person of an Englishman : 
 but whether this man came as a spy to ascertain 
 the real posture of Affairs — or, as is more pro- 
 bable, to see what could be done by bribery 
 amongst the leading men to induce them to de- 
 liver up the King, is a matter which is somewhat 
 doubtful. At any rate, no regular official offers 
 were made by His Royal Highness, and every 
 day's delay rendered it more difficult for the 
 Cortes to volunteer concessions, and less hazard- 
 ous for the French to push matters to extremi- 
 ties. 
 
 During the sojourn of the Cortes at Seville, 
 several decrees were issued suited to the emer- 
 gency ; the nature of which decrees it is unne- 
 cessary now to mention, with the exception of 
 one, sanctioning an agreement for raising 10,000 
 troops by Sir Robert Wilson, who, with that 
 chivalrous generosity in the cause of Freedom, 
 
 d d *2
 
 404 
 
 which is the distinguishing feature of his cha- 
 racter, had come to Spain to place his Services 
 at the disposal of the Constitutional Govern- 
 ment. But the issuing of decrees was a far 
 easier task than the carrying of them into exe- 
 cution ; for the power of the Executive Govern- 
 ment, whose duty it was to give effect to them, 
 scarcely extended ten miles beyond the seat of 
 its establishment. 
 
 As a proof of its infirmity of purpose, its con- 
 duct towards General Lopes Banos may be cited. 
 That General having refused the offer which 
 was made to him of the command in Valencia, 
 in rather an offensive manner to the Govern- 
 ment, an official letter was sent to him, inform- 
 ing him that the King had no further occasion 
 for his services. Two days after the General 
 had received notice of his dismissal from the 
 King's service, he was restored to his rank, and 
 appointed to succeed Count Abisbal in the 
 command of the Armv of the Centre ! 
 
 While the Cortes were thus engaged, the 
 Due d'Angouleme determined on continuing 
 the march of two strong divisions of his Army 
 towards Seville : and on the 7th of June the news 
 of the defeat of General Plasentia at Santa Cruz, 
 who had a corps of about 1500 men under his 
 command, by one of those divisions, and the 
 consequent advance of that division on Cordova, 
 came to the ears of the Cortes.
 
 105 
 
 As that Body had neither any Army to resist, 
 nor hardly any Force to retard the arrival of the 
 Due d'Angouleme under the walls of Seville, 
 these two events warned them that there was no 
 safety but in flight. 
 
 The Ministers accordingly announced to the 
 King the necessity of immediately retiring to 
 Cadiz. 
 
 His Majesty replied, that " they might as well 
 " put a pistol to his head ; that he had quitted 
 " Madrid at the solicitation of his Ministers and 
 " the Cortes, in order not to show any reluctance 
 " to leave to the decision of the nation whether 
 " it would or would not come forward to sup- 
 " port the existing order of things ; that the 
 " appeal to the nation had been entirely with- 
 " out effect ; and such being the case, it was in 
 " vain to hope any thing more from a second 
 " removal, which could be of no other use than 
 " to prolong the struggle for a week or two." 
 
 His Majesty, however, promised to consult 
 the Council of State before he gave a definitive 
 answer. 
 
 On the 10th the Council gave its opinion in 
 favour of removal, but decidedly against con- 
 veying the Royal Family to Cadiz. The Mi- 
 nisters left His Majesty the choice of repairing 
 either to Cadiz, Algesiras, or San Roque. The 
 King declared in the most positive manner that 
 
 d d 3
 
 406 
 
 he would not consent to set out for either one 
 of the three. 
 
 On the 11 tli, the Ministers were summoned to 
 the Cortes to give information as to the dis- 
 positions of the King, when they stated that 
 they could only say that His Majesty had not 
 taken any decided resolution respecting his de- 
 parture. 
 
 Upon this the Ministers being asked whether 
 they thought the Constitution could be pre- 
 served if the Government were not removed 
 from Seville, M. Calatrava answered, that the 
 Ministers were satisfied that the safety of the 
 Country depended on the removal taking place. 
 The Cortes then declared their session perma- 
 nent, and Signor Galiano moved that the King 
 should once more be invited to set out for 
 Cadiz ; and, in the event of his refusal to do so, 
 that he should be declared to have fallen within 
 the meaning of that clause of the Constitution 
 which provides for the case of incapacity in the 
 sovereign, and that a Regency should be ap- 
 pointed. This motion was carried ; and a de- 
 putation was immediately named to proceed with 
 it to the Palace. About six o'clock in the 
 evening the deputation returned, and announced 
 His Majesty's determined resolution not to set 
 out. This was instantly followed by a declar- 
 ation of his incapacity, and by the nomination 
 of a Regency.
 
 407 
 
 On the following day, the 12th, the King and 
 his family left Seville, escorted by 1500 regular 
 troops, and about 2500 militia. Not a disturb- 
 ance of any kind attended the departure; and 
 His Majesty reached Cadiz on the 15th, with- 
 out having experienced any interruption, or 
 annoyance. 
 
 Notwithstanding the vigorous nature of this 
 measure, and the resolution which it appeared 
 to indicate on the part of its promoters, they in 
 point of fact had little hope that they should be 
 able to prolong by it, for any length of time, 
 the existence of the Constitutional System. 
 Many of them appeared to be frightened at 
 their own work, and did not proceed to Cadiz ; 
 and so reluctant were the Constitutional Ge- 
 nerals to commit themselves, by taking a part 
 in the transaction, that every one of them in 
 Seville, from Zayas down to the lowest brigadier, 
 refused to take the command of the King's 
 escort, so that the Cortes were obliged privately 
 to pass a law enabling them to employ Riego 
 for that purpose. M. Pan do, and some of the 
 other Ministers, tendered their resignations, 
 which were accepted by His Majesty before his 
 departure. 
 
 Of the Diplomatick Body who were with the 
 Court at Seville, the Saxon minister alone fol- 
 lowed the King, to watch over the safety of the 
 Queen. Sir William a Court remained behind. 
 
 d d 4
 
 408 
 
 A few hours after the appointment of the Re- 
 gency and temporary deposition of the King 
 had been resolved upon by the Cortes, Sir 
 William received a summons from His Majesty 
 to repair immediately to the Palace. Sir William 
 lost no time in obeying the Royal commands ; 
 and when he came into His Majesty's presence 
 the King acted over again the same kind of 
 scene that took place previous to his departure 
 from Madrid. 
 
 He declared that he was about to be carried 
 off to Cadiz as a private individual, and a pri- 
 soner, and that every thing that he thenceforth 
 did must be considered as forced upon him. 
 
 It was not, however, in consequence of this 
 declaration of Ferdinand's that the British Mi- 
 nister determined, before he proceeded to Cadiz, 
 to wait for instructions from his Government; 
 for, had such been the case, he would have been 
 equally bound to have abstained from following 
 His Majesty to Seville. Neither did he mean to 
 pronounce an opinion whether the Government, 
 as constituted during the abeyance of the King's 
 authority, was or was not a competent Govern- 
 ment; but the manner of the King's removal 
 exactly fitted the case pointed out in his in- 
 structions. " It was accompanied with cir- 
 " cumstances such as marked a determined 
 " reluctance on his part, and a manifest duresse 
 " of his person."
 
 109 
 
 Sir William, therefore, did not follow the 
 King to Cadiz, but waited for orders from home 
 as to how he was to act in such a novel and 
 unexpected case, as that of the temporary sub- 
 version of the kingly power. 
 
 Sir William, therefore, addressed a note to 
 M. Pando, in order to show the line which it 
 was his intention to follow. The King, he said, 
 having been declared unfit to reign, and another 
 Government having been installed, he found it 
 impossible to follow the newly-created Spanish 
 authorities in their march to Cadiz. " He was 
 " unwilling to sanction by his presence the steps 
 " which had been taken, and should therefore 
 " await at Seville, or San Lucar, fresh instruc- 
 " tions from his Government." 
 
 The morning of the 13th, the day after the 
 King's departure, a desperate riot occurred at 
 Seville, attended with pillage, and loss of lives. 
 The rioters destroyed the Lapida of the Consti- 
 tution, and the Archives of the Government and 
 Cortes. During the 13th and 14th, nearly all 
 the Authorities which existed before the Revo- 
 lution were re-established. Deserters came in 
 from the Constitutional Armies in immense 
 numbers, so that a sort of Royalist Military 
 force was set on foot in the town. 
 
 The triumph, however, of the Absolutists re- 
 ceived a temporary check, on the morning of 
 the 16th. The refusal of the people of Triana
 
 410 
 
 to permit the soldiers of General Lopes Banos to 
 cross the bridge there, led to an action, in which 
 the latter were successful. 
 
 The consequence was the capture of Seville 
 by Lopes Banos, who restored all the Constitu- 
 tional Authorities, and levied contributions on 
 the inhabitants. 
 
 While all these transactions were taking place 
 at Seville, the Due d'Angouleme continued at 
 Madrid. His Royal Highness, on entering that 
 Capital, had issued a Proclamation, appealing to 
 the Spaniards whether he had not fully acted up 
 to his declaration, that he was not come to make 
 War upon Spain. Every thing, he said, had 
 been paid for by the French Army. No contri- 
 butions had been exacted, and the Administra- 
 tion of the Provinces had been placed in the 
 hands of Spaniards. 
 
 The Proclamation further stated, that the 
 time was come when it would be necessary to 
 form a Regency, and for this purpose the Su- 
 preme Councils of Castile and the Indies were 
 to be convoked, for the purpose of selecting 
 those individuals of whom it was to be com- 
 posed. 
 
 The two Councils met, but not considering 
 themselves authorised to establish a Regency, 
 they merely furnished the Due d'Angouleme 
 with a list of those whom they judged most 
 competent for the office. The persons named
 
 HI 
 
 were, the Due del Infantado, the Due del Mon- 
 te ma, the Bishop of Osma, the Baron d'Erolles, 
 and M. Calderon, The Regency thus consti- 
 tuted, was formally recognised by the Due 
 d'Anoouleme on the 26th. 
 
 While His Royal Highness was settling this 
 matter, a considerable portion of the army, which 
 accompanied him to Madrid, proceeded (as has 
 been before stated) on their march to Seville. 
 
 When the smallness of the French force is 
 considered in comparison with the extent of the 
 country which it occupied, the Due d' Angouleme 
 may perhaps appear somewhat rash for having 
 decided to disperse his army, still more by des- 
 patching so large a portion of it to Seville ; 
 but, when it is remembered that the War could 
 not be terminated, but by the possession of Fer- 
 dinand's person — that the French had to act in 
 the midst, for the most part, of a friendly popu- 
 lation, and that there was little to be feared 
 from the Constitutional Generals, in consequence 
 of the defection of Abisbal — and the probability, 
 of which the Due was not unaware, that Morillo 
 and Ballasteros would imitate his example — it 
 cannot be doubted but that the determination to 
 advance was, under all the circumstances, the 
 wisest and most prudent that could have been 
 adopted. 
 
 The appointment of the Regency by the 
 Cortes, afforded to Morillo an opportunity to
 
 412 
 
 declare his desertion of the Constitutional 
 cause. 
 
 On the 25th of June he issued at Lugo, in 
 Gallicia, a Proclamation, saying, that he would 
 not recognise the Regency appointed by the 
 Cortes. He at the same time informed his 
 Army, that he was about to treat with the 
 French General. Quiroga, one of the ablest 
 and staunchest of the Constitutional Generals, 
 protested against these proceedings, and suc- 
 ceeded in inducing large bodies of Morillo's 
 troops to desert, and to range themselves under 
 him, in defence of the Constitution. Morillo, 
 with his army thus reduced to about 3000 men, 
 retired to the South towards Orense and Vigo ; 
 while Quiroga threw himself into Corunna, whi- 
 ther he was quickly followed by the French 
 General Bourke, who arrived before the Town 
 on the 15th of July. A severe action * took 
 place on the heights above the Town without 
 any decided advantage to either party. The 
 Spaniards, however, retired within the fortifica- 
 tions, and were summoned to surrender by the 
 French. Quiroga refused, and having placed 
 the Town in a state of defence, himself departed 
 for Cadiz. 
 
 In the meanwhile, Mina, with consummate 
 skill, and unparalleled exertions, was baffling 
 
 * Sir Robert Wilson was wounded on this occasion.
 
 413 
 
 all the efforts of the much superior forces of the 
 French to destroy him. The exertions, how- 
 ever, of this justly-celebrated Commander, were 
 unfortunately not of a nature to have any deci- 
 sive influence on the result of the contest ; and 
 Ballasteros, on whose conduct and fidelity much 
 more depended, was retreating so rapidly before 
 General Molitor to the Southern Provinces of 
 the Peninsula, that he left, several days behind 
 him, the corps under that General which was 
 ordered to pursue him. 
 
 But although the French were thus in all di- 
 rections getting the better of their most formid- 
 able opponents, they were not a little embarrassed 
 by the proceedings of their friends. The con- 
 duct of the Regency, whom the Due d'An- 
 goulcme himself had installed, was no better 
 than that of the Provisional Junta, whose func- 
 tions the former had superseded. 
 
 One of its first acts, after its instalment, was 
 to re-appoint all the Ministers, who were in 
 office before the breaking out of the Revolution, 
 to their former situations, with the exception of 
 the Minister for Foreign Affairs, in whose place, 
 Don Victor Saez, the King's Confessor, an 
 apostolical in the strictest sense of the word, was 
 substituted! 
 
 A decree was also issued by it, annulling all 
 the acts of the Constitutional Government, and 
 incapacitating all persons who had held office
 
 414 
 
 under that Government, from ever holding office 
 under the King. 
 
 It was in vain that the Due d'Angouleme re- 
 monstrated against these proceedings, both ver- 
 bally, and in writing. His remonstrances had 
 so little effect, that, in despair, he determined to 
 confine his attention exclusively to military 
 affairs, until Ferdinand's liberation ; of which, 
 as the Cortes had not even provisioned Cadiz for 
 a siege, the prospect did not seem far distant. 
 
 The two divisions of the army, under Counts 
 Bourdesoult, and Bourmont, met with little op- 
 position on their march to Seville, with the ex- 
 ception of the slight affair already mentioned, 
 between the Count Bourdesoult and the Consti- 
 tutional General Plasentia, whose corps amount- 
 ing to about 1500 men, was routed with little 
 difficulty. The other division, under Count 
 Bourmont, came up with the rear-guard of 
 Lopes Ban os' army, at Lucas la Mayor on the 
 19th, and took a considerable number prisoners. 
 
 From thence Count Bourmont proceeded to 
 Seville, which city he reached * three days after 
 Lopes Banos, with the main body of his Army, 
 had evacuated it, having kept possession of it 
 for only eight and forty hours. 
 
 That General left Seville on the 18th, and re- 
 treated across the river with the view of gaining 
 Huelva, and there embarking for Cadiz. A 
 
 * 21st June.
 
 415 
 
 French force of SOOO men was sent after him, by 
 whom his Army was completely dispersed, and 
 he himself obliged to seek his safety in flight. 
 No army consequently remained to oppose the 
 progress of the French to Cadiz, towards which 
 place they began to push large masses of in- 
 fantry, having declared it in a state of blockade, 
 both by sea and land. The Due d'Angouleme 
 left Madrid on the 8th of July, to direct the 
 operations against Cadiz, or, to prevent their 
 necessity, by being on the spot ready to enter 
 into negotiations for the delivery of the person 
 of the King, in case the Cortes should be dis- 
 posed to capitulate. 
 
 His Royal Highness arrived at Port St. Mary 
 on the 17th of the following month. Before he 
 arrived there, the War in Gallicia had terminated 
 by the surrender of Corunna ; and Ballasteros, 
 after having; made some resistance on the Moun- 
 tains near Grenada, where he was defeated, en- 
 tered into a convention with General Molitor, 
 whereby he consented himself to recognise the 
 Madrid Regency, and agreed to send orders to 
 the Governors of the Towns included within his 
 command to follow his example. 
 
 All that remained to the Constitutionalists after 
 these defeats and defections of their Generals, 
 were, the Town of Cadiz, and the fortresses in 
 Catalonia, where the gallant Mina still made a 
 vigorous resistance.
 
 416 
 
 The French were, notwithstanding, in an 
 uncertain position, since the violent conduct of 
 the Regency still rendered a re-action possible. 
 Moreover the King and Royal Family were as 
 yet in the hands of the Cortes ; and the King 
 was known to have endeavoured to betray the 
 Constitution, which he had sworn to preserve, 
 from the very first moment of its establishment. 
 
 There was, therefore, no inconsiderable danger 
 to His Majesty's person, if those, in whose 
 power the Monarch was placed, were driven to 
 desperation, when they had such heavy charges, 
 which, at any rate, bore the semblance of justice, 
 to bring against him. 
 
 It was to prevent such a catastrophe as this, 
 that the Due d'Angouleme published an ordi- 
 nance at Andujar, on the 8th of August, for- 
 bidding any Spanish Authority to make an arrest 
 without the sanction of the French Commanding 
 Officer of the district ; and ordering the French 
 Officers to set at liberty, all who had been 
 arrested for political offences. The Newspapers 
 were likewise placed under the controul of the 
 French Commander. 
 
 The publication of this ordinance excited a 
 great ferment amongst the party with whom the 
 French were co-operating. The Regency at 
 Madrid protested against it as an attack on their 
 authority ; and others of the Royalists com- 
 plained that the nation was outraged, by those
 
 M7 
 
 who had only conic to protect it. Since the 
 safety of the French Army in a great degree 
 depended on the continued friendship of the 
 Royalist Party, the Due prudently issued a 
 second ordinance, explaining and modifying the 
 first. 
 
 Meanwhile Sir William a Court was waiting 
 at Seville for fresh instructions from his Govern- 
 ment. 
 
 It will be remembered, that, that Minister, in 
 assigning to M. Pando his reasons for not fol- 
 lowing Ferdinand, abstained from pronouncing 
 any opinion upon the legality, or justifiableness 
 of the conduct of the Cortes towards the King ; 
 he so abstained, on purpose to leave it open to 
 his Government, to instruct him to proceed to 
 Cadiz, in the event of its being of opinion that 
 his presence there would be desirable. 
 
 When Mr. Canning, therefore, was called 
 upon to instruct the British Minister as to the 
 course which he w 7 as to adopt in consequence of 
 the proceedings at Seville, he decided that it 
 was not for this country to consider the mere 
 suspension of the Royal Authority for a limited 
 period, as a reason for treating the King as 
 if he were permanently dethroned, and was 
 no longer the Representative of the Spanish 
 Nation. 
 
 Sir William a Court was, therefore, instructed 
 in case of his receiving an invitation from the 
 
 E E
 
 418 
 
 King of Spain, restored to his Authority, to re- 
 sume his (Sir William's) residence, near his Ma- 
 jesty's person, that he was to be at liberty either 
 to comply with that invitation forthwith, or 
 to declare his inability to do so without special 
 instructions, according as the circumstances, 
 under which the invitation came, might appear 
 to make an immediate compliance, or an interval 
 of delay, advisable. 
 
 But if Sir William were to receive a pressing 
 intimation from the King, that His Majesty's 
 personal safety would be greatly assured by Sir 
 William's presence at Cadiz, he was immediately 
 to repair to that place. 
 
 If neither of those cases were to occur, and Sir 
 William's presence in Spain should thereby be- 
 come no longer necessary, as the King's Minister, 
 to His Catholick Majesty ; since it would have 
 been both inconvenient and unseemly, that Sir 
 William should remain in any place in possession 
 of the invading Army ; he was directed to pro- 
 ceed to Gibraltar: rinding means to inform some 
 leading members of the Cortes in Cadiz of his 
 destination, in order that should his intervention 
 be required to convey any propositions to the 
 French Government or Army, he might be 
 known to be at hand and ready to afford it. 
 
 A few days before these instructions reached 
 Seville, Sir William had received from M. Pando, 
 a note, informing him that the King had re-
 
 411) 
 
 sumed his functions, and inviting Sir William to 
 
 proceed to Cadiz. 
 
 Sir William had deferred replying to this note 
 until he should hear from England, and then, 
 when he did so, the circumstance of the blockade 
 of Cadiz having been publicly announced by 
 the French Authorities, determined him to go to 
 Gibraltar, rather than to Cadiz : but, in noti- 
 fying his intention to M. Pando, in answer to 
 that Minister's note, he did not neglect to ex- 
 press his readiness to afford his intervention 
 (should it be solicited), in conveying any pro- 
 positions, from the Constitutional Authorities in 
 Cadiz, to the French Commanders, or to the 
 French Government. 
 
 Sir William went by St. Lucar to Gibraltar, 
 where he arrived on the c 26th of July. 
 
 During this time little was being done in 
 Cadiz to prepare against the assaults of the 
 French. The Cortes had assembled the day 
 after the arrival of the King, and His Majesty 
 had been restored to that Authority, which 
 was assigned to the Sovereign, by the Consti- 
 tution. 
 
 The Cortes passed several decrees, directing 
 the mode of defending provinces which had 
 already ceased to acknowledge their Authority ; 
 and by one, the mention of which must not be 
 omitted, the thirty-one Grandees, who had signed 
 the address to the Due d'Angouleme, on his 
 
 e e 2
 
 420 
 
 entering Madrid, were deprived of* their rank, 
 their employments, and their property. On the 
 5th of August the ordinary Cortes closed their 
 sittings. 
 
 The day following that on which the Due 
 d'Angouleme arrived at Port St. Mary's, His 
 Royal Highness made propositions to the Au- 
 thorities in Cadiz to induce them to surrender. 
 
 He promised the Convocation of the ancient 
 Cortes, according to the form observed during 
 the reign of Charles the Third, and he offered 
 to guarantee the security of the property of all 
 the individuals composing the Constitutional 
 Cortes and Government, although he refused to 
 recognise them as a Corporate Body. Five 
 days were allowed for the consideration of these 
 proposals. 
 
 Ferdinand, however, did not take so long in 
 replying, but, before the limited period had 
 elapsed, returned an answer, in his own hand- 
 writing, rejecting the proposals, — repelling in 
 strong; terms the insinuation that he was under 
 the controul of the Constitutional Authorities, and 
 stating that since negotiations were pending with 
 the British Government, which might lead to the 
 acceptance of His Britannick Majesty's mediation 
 by both parties, that he could not permit the 
 Authorities of Cadiz to listen to the propositions 
 contained in the Due d' Angouleme's communi- 
 cation, and should direct them to continue their
 
 421 
 
 resistance to the aggressions of the Continental 
 Alliance. 
 
 The negotiations here spoken of by the King, 
 probably alluded to some communications which 
 Sir Robert Wilson (who, by this time, had found 
 his way to Cadiz,) had had with the Spanish 
 Ministers. 
 
 The knowledge of these communications was 
 verbally conveyed to Sir William a Court, who 
 lost no time in informing the Spanish Govern- 
 ment, that it was impossible for him, as a British 
 Minister, to allow himself to be joined, or in 
 any way whatsoever connected with, Sir Robert 
 Wilson, who was acting in defiance of the Go- 
 vernment, which he (Sir William) represented. 
 Sir William took the opportunity of once more 
 repeating, that, upon his receiving an official 
 written document soliciting his intervention, and 
 stating what was the ultimatum, and upon what 
 conditions the Spanish Government were pre- 
 pared to treat, he would, at once, come forward, 
 and make himself the channel for conveying any 
 proposals to the Commander-in-Chief of the 
 French army. 
 
 Before, however, this communication could 
 have reached Cadiz, Sir William received from 
 M. Yandiola, who was Minister for Foreign Af- 
 fairs, a letter requesting his intervention with 
 the French. Although a distinct declaration 
 was made in this letter, that, under the existing 
 
 ee 3
 
 422 
 
 circumstances, Spain could not tender any de- 
 finite propositions to the French Authorities ; 
 yet, with such a note in his hands, at such a mo- 
 ment, Sir William could not reconcile to himself 
 the responsibility of doing nothing. Accord- 
 ingly he forthwith informed M. Yandiola, in the 
 answer which he returned, that since he had in 
 clear and precise terms applied for the mediation 
 of Great Britain ; and since, before any inter- 
 vention could be efficaciously exerted, it must 
 be accepted, and approved by both parties, — 
 and since until he (Sir William) could ascertain 
 what were the feelings of the French Authori- 
 ties, it would be impossible for him to show 
 himself in the Bay of Cadiz, he would at once 
 put himself in communication with them in order 
 to be assured on this point. 
 
 Sir William accordingly addressed a note to 
 the Duke d' Angouleme, stating, that the Spanish 
 Ministers in communicating the correspondence 
 that had taken place between Ferdinand and 
 His Royal Highness, had solicited Sir William 
 to come to Cadiz to try if any means could be 
 found for reconciling conflicting interests : that 
 he earnestly hoped that His Royal Highness 
 would avail himself of this opening, either to 
 offer such terms through Sir William to the 
 Spanish Government as would justify him in 
 recommending it to accept them j or that His 
 Royal Highness would point out some other
 
 way, in which the British intervention might be 
 employed to bring about the establishment of 
 an order of things which would not disappoint 
 the just expectations of the Spanish people. 
 
 Mr. Eliot *, the Secretary of Legation, was 
 charged to convey this note to the French Head 
 Quarters, and to give any further explanation 
 which might be wanted. On his arrival, he was 
 immediately honoured with an audience ; when, 
 having delivered his note, the Due observed, 
 that his hands were so tied, that before he could 
 agree to any conditions, he was imperatively 
 bound to refer to Paris. Some further conver- 
 sation took place between Mr. Eliot, and His 
 Royal Highness. The only part of which, that 
 it is essential to record (to mark the feelings of 
 His Royal Highness), is, an answer returned by 
 him to Mr. Eliot, who called the Due's attention 
 to the fact, that Sir William a Court could not 
 tell what terms the Government in Cadiz would 
 offer, but that Sir William imagined that a 
 Representative Government would be a sine qua 
 non condition. 
 
 The Due fully assented to the desirableness 
 of establishing a similar form of Government ; 
 but thought that the violence of the two parties, 
 Jacobins, and Apostolicals, into which Spain was 
 divided, would render the formation of such a 
 Government almost impossible. 
 
 * Now Lord Eliot. 
 E E i
 
 4$t 
 
 Mr. Eliot returned on the 30th, bringing with 
 him the reply of the Due declining the offer of 
 intervention ; but stating that he would lose no 
 time in making the offer known to his Govern- 
 ment, and on the following day Sir William 
 communicated the result to the Spanish Minister. 
 Two days after, Mr. Eliot had left His Royal 
 Highness's Head Quarters, the French assaulted, 
 and succeeded in capturing the Fortress of the 
 Trocadero, on which the safety of Cadiz in a 
 great degree depended. 
 
 The fall of this Bulwark alarmed the defenders 
 of Cadiz. 
 
 A letter, in the King's own hand-writing, was 
 despatched to the Due d'Angouleme proposing 
 a suspension of hostilities, to afford an opportu- 
 nity to treat for peace. To this the Due replied, 
 that he would only negotiate with Ferdinand 
 himself, when restored to liberty. He added, 
 " that when the King should be free, he should 
 " engage His Majesty to publish a general am- 
 " nesty, and to give, or at least promise of his 
 " free will to give, such institutions as he should 
 " judge to be best adapted to the manners, and 
 " character of his people." 
 
 Ferdinand again wrote to know what was ne- 
 cessary to be done in order that he should be 
 considered " free." The Due replied that, be- 
 fore he could so consider him, the King and his 
 family should be permitted to come to Port
 
 425 
 
 St. Mary. His Royal Highness then promised 
 that he would do his utmost with His Majesty 
 to persuade him to pardon the past, and to grant 
 such a Constitution to his people as he might 
 deem best calculated for their happiness. He 
 likewise stated that all those who might wish to 
 quit Spain, should be allowed to do so, and a 
 body of French Troops should enter Cadiz to 
 preserve tranquillity. 
 
 In spite of this answer another attempt was 
 made to induce the Due to lower his conditions. 
 Ferdinand wrote to His Royal Highness, saying, 
 that he was at liberty to negotiate in some place, 
 at an equal distance between the two armies, or 
 on board of some neutral vessel : but this propo- 
 sition shared the fate of those which had gone 
 before it. 
 
 The Cortes now abandoned all hope of being 
 able, themselves, to induce the French to listen 
 to any terms short of the surrender of the King; 
 on the possession of whose person the whole 
 affair depended. It was therefore determined 
 by the Ministers, to solicit the intervention of the 
 British Minister with the French Commander. 
 A letter was accordingly addressed by M. Lu- 
 yando, a new Minister for Foreign Affairs, to 
 Sir William a Court, proposing that Sir William 
 should proceed to Cadiz, in order to receive the 
 King and the Due d'Angouleme on board a 
 British Ship of War to treat in person for a
 
 peace ; and further, asking, " what guarantees 
 England would afford ?" 
 
 Sir William, immediately on the receipt of this 
 communication, wrote to the Due, acquainting 
 His Royal Highness that if he thought proper 
 to accept the terms proposed, he would imme- 
 diately proceed to Cadiz, in a British Ship of 
 War, to receive on board the two Royal person- 
 ages in question. The Due, however, unequi- 
 vocally declared that he could admit of no 
 mediation whatever, avowing it to be his con- 
 viction that the deliverance of the Spanish Royal 
 Family was only to be effected by force of arms. 
 The truth was, His Royal Highness was well 
 aware that he could take the Town, whenever 
 he chose to assault it. The only motive, there- 
 fore, that could have operated upon him to ad- 
 mit of the interference of a third party, would 
 have been any fears which he might have enter- 
 tained for the safety of the King and his family. 
 But these fears could not have been very power- 
 ful, since he must have well known, that those 
 in whose power Ferdinand then was, would in- 
 fallibly be very shortly in his own power ; when 
 they would have had to have answered with 
 their lives for any violence committed on the 
 Royal Person. 
 
 With respect to the question about guarantees, 
 Sir William answered M. Luyando that, " Eng- 
 " land could afford no guarantee for political
 
 427 
 
 " institutions ; but whether she could afford any 
 " guarantee at all, of any kind, was a question 
 " which he was not authorised to answer.'* Sir 
 William, however, promised to submit the appli- 
 cation to his Government. When Mr. Canning 
 received it, he forthwith instructed Sir William 
 that " the British Government would not, in 
 " any case, undertake any guarantee whatever, 
 " either of territory, or internal institutions. 
 
 " The scrupulousness with which England 
 " was in the habit of fulfilling her engagements, 
 " made it the more necessary for her, not to 
 " contract them lightly. A guarantee is one of 
 " the most onerous obligations which one State 
 " can contract towards another. A defensive 
 " Alliance, binds the Government contracting 
 " it, to come to the aid of its Ally in case of an 
 " unprovoked attack upon his dominions : and 
 " to make on his behalf j every reasonable and 
 " practicable exertion — practicable in extent, 
 " and reasonable in duration. But it does not 
 " bind the assisting Government to the alterna- 
 " tive of either a successful result, or an indefi- 
 " nite prolongation of the War. A guarantee, 
 " strictly construed, knows no limits either of 
 " time, or of degree. It would be, unless dis- 
 " tinctly restricted in that respect, claimable in 
 " a War commenced by the Power to whom the 
 " guarantee is given, as well as in a War of 
 " unjust aggression against that Power ; and the
 
 
 a 
 
 a 
 
 428 
 
 ' integrity of the territory of that Power must 
 * be maintained, at whatever cost the effort to 
 maintain it is prolonged : nay, though the 
 guaranteed Power should contribute almost 
 " nothing to the maintaining it. If, on the other 
 " hand, the engagement were to be restricted 
 " in these particulars, it would constitute an 
 " unilateral defensive Alliance, but it would 
 " cease to be a guarantee ; and objectionable as a 
 " territorial guarantee was therefore shown to be, 
 the objections to a guarantee of internal institu- 
 tions were infinitely stronger. It is difficult to 
 say, whether these objections apply with greater 
 " force to the party giving, or to that which re- 
 " ceives such a guarantee. 
 
 " The very principle on which the British 
 " Government so earnestly deprecated the War 
 " against Spain, was, that of the right of any 
 " Nation to change, or to modify, its internal 
 " institutions. 
 
 " Was that War to end in the King of Eng- 
 " land consenting to assume to himself the pro- 
 vince of defending, against all challenges, from 
 within, as well as from without, the Institutions, 
 whatever they might be, which the War might 
 " leave standing in Spain ? 
 
 " Was His Majesty to guarantee the Constitu- 
 " tion of 1812, indifference to which, to say the 
 " least, was the single point upon which any 
 " thing like an agreement of opinion had been 
 
 a 
 
 ti
 
 "found to exist in Spain ? or was the King to 
 " guarantee the antient despotism, the restor- 
 " ation of which, with all its accompaniments, 
 " appeared to be the object of the largest party 
 " in the Country ? or was it to be in behalf of 
 " some new system, struck out at a heat, at the 
 " winding up of affairs at Cadiz, that the faith 
 " of Great Britain was to be pledged, and that 
 " her blood and treasure were to be forthcoming? 
 " or was it only to the undoubted right of the 
 " Spanish Nation to reform its own Government, 
 " that the sanction of the King's guarantee was 
 " to be added? If such a guarantee were to be 
 " any thing more than the mere affirmance of 
 " an abstract proposition, against whom would 
 " it have practically to operate ? clearly against 
 " Spaniards themselves : and in the endless strug- 
 " gles which might be expected from the then 
 " distracted state of parties in that Country, 
 " against every party by turns ? 
 
 " Could any thing be more unbecoming than 
 " the assumption of such a right by a foreign 
 " Power ? could any thing be more intolerable 
 " to the Country with respect to which it was 
 " assumed ?" 
 
 For these reasons, Mr. Canning said that " the 
 " King declined accepting such a right for him- 
 " self, nor would he acknowledge it in any other 
 " Power. 
 
 " The exercise of such a right would neces-
 
 fc30 
 
 " sarily lead to an intermeddling witli the affairs 
 " of the guaranteed State, such as to place it, in 
 " fact, at the mercy of the Power who gave the 
 " guarantee. 
 
 " Russia, in former times, guaranteed the 
 " Constitution of Poland. 
 
 " The result is known — and it was inevitable. 
 " The natural and necessary course of things, in 
 " such a case, is sure to overbear even the most 
 " sincere and studied abstinence from interposi- 
 " tion on the part of the guaranteeing Power. 
 
 " Such an arrangement was wholly incom- 
 " patible with the engagement by which the 
 " King and his Allies were bound to each other ; 
 " viz. to maintain the State of territorial posses- 
 " sion established at the Peace, and the rights of 
 " independent Nations." 
 
 Long, however, before this answer reached Sir 
 William a Court, the Government, which applied 
 for the guarantee had ceased to exist. On the 
 6th of September, the extraordinary Cortes were 
 convoked and held a Session. It was opened 
 by a Speech delivered in the King's name, 
 in which His Majesty was made to speak in 
 terms of indignation of the liberty, which the 
 French were desirous of bestowing on him. The 
 day after the meeting, a Committee, appointed 
 to enquire into the state of the Nation, made 
 their Report, in which the conditions offered by 
 the Due d'Angouleme were described as so
 
 i.; i 
 
 humiliating that it was better to die than accept 
 them. The Report was adopted by the Cortes, 
 who gave the Government unlimited powers to 
 take whatever measures it thought necessary for 
 the defence of the Town. On the 20th, the 
 French took the Fort of Santi Petri, the loss of 
 which rendered a prolonged defence of the 
 Island nearly impossible. 
 
 On the 23d the town was bombarded by their 
 Fleet, and set on fire in several places ; and 
 almost at the same time, the preparations for a 
 general assault w r ere brought to a completion. 
 
 Every body in Cadiz then began to see the 
 folly of any further resistance ; every body 
 began to mistrust his neighbour ; and every 
 body became anxious to secure an amnesty for 
 the past, without a thought of what might oc- 
 cur, or what might be the fate of their unfor- 
 tunate country, for the future. 
 
 No money, no resources were left to the 
 Cortes ; their naval and military commanders 
 did not disguise the fact, that they had not at 
 their command adequate means for making a 
 resistance : but what was still worse, a general 
 disaffection to the Constitutional cause began to 
 show itself, not only in the regular army, but 
 even in the militia ; cries of " Viva el Rey 
 " absoluto," being so frequently heard among 
 the troops, that it was evident that upon the first
 
 432 
 
 attack, the greater part would have passed over 
 to the enemy. 
 
 In this desperate extremity, with the know- 
 ledge of Ferdinand's character, the wisest course 
 would have been to have treated with the Due 
 d'Angouleme, who would, at least, have taken 
 care to fulfil the terms to which he might have 
 consented to have agreed ; but, unfortunately, 
 some unlucky spirit broached the fanciful idea, 
 that it would be more consistent with the cha- 
 racter of a great nation, to throw itself upon the 
 mercy of the King, than to bargain with the 
 enemy at the gates. The idea was too truly 
 Spanish not to take. The engagements to 
 which the Due d'Angouleme was still willing 
 to accede, were entirely lost sight of; and after 
 forcing the King's signature to a decree of 
 amnesty (in which His Majesty was made to 
 speak of the " Enemy's Camp" in a manner 
 that clearly marked that he wrote under sub- 
 jection), the Cortes and Government announced 
 that he was free, and even facilitated his de- 
 parture. 
 
 Accordingly, on the 1st of October, Ferdi- 
 nand, accompanied by his family, left Cadiz, 
 and arrived at Port St. Mary's, the head quarters 
 of the commander of the invading army. 
 
 The liberation of the King put an end very 
 shortly to all further resistance by the Consti-
 
 tutionalists in other parts of the Peninsula. 
 The fortresses in Catalonia were delivered up to 
 the French, and Mina himself, who had so 
 skilfully and so gloriously contributed to their 
 defence, quitted his native land to seek refuge 
 in England. The French were thus left in 
 quiet possession of the whole of their conquest. 
 
 It may at first sight appear extraordinary that 
 a form of Government, which in 1820 was 
 established with little opposition, and amidst 
 unequivocal marks of popular approbation, should 
 in 1823 have found amongst the Spanish popu- 
 lation only decided enemies, or lukewarm sup- 
 porters. 
 
 But these phenomena are easily to be ex- 
 plained by a consideration of the state of things 
 at the two respective periods of the establish- 
 ment and the overthrow of the Constitutional 
 Government. At the former period the ma- 
 jority of the nation, without doubt, were weary 
 of Ferdinand's system of mismanagement. They 
 saw that the nation was losing past redemption, 
 its Colonies, the great source of its wealth and 
 power ; that all its great interests were de- 
 pressed to a degree hitherto unexampled ; and 
 that personal security was that on which no 
 man could rely. It was therefore felt, that 
 hardly any change could be for the worse ; 
 and, consequently, the proposition for setting 
 up a Representative form of Government was 
 
 VOL. I. F F
 
 434 
 
 opposed by none, and welcomed with joy by 
 many. But no form of Government, much less 
 one so imperfect as that which was then framed, 
 could have at once restored to Spain any thing 
 like prosperity, or eradicated, for many years, the 
 evils, which many years had been consumed in 
 planting. The expectations, therefore, of the 
 people were disappointed at finding, that al- 
 though their Government was changed, their 
 condition was not ameliorated. But when, 
 added to this, the resentment of so powerful a 
 body of men, as those who compose the Spanish 
 Priesthood, was roused against the Cortes, by 
 the confiscation of the revenues of the Church, 
 it is not to be wondered at that the Constitutional 
 Government became an object of hatred to 
 large classes of the population, and of indiffer- 
 ence to those who were not better off under its 
 rule than they had been under the despotism of 
 Ferdinand. It must not, however, be supposed, 
 that because the French were received as de- 
 liverers in each town into which thev entered, 
 that therefore there were none of the inhabitants 
 who viewed them in a very different light. For, 
 on such occasions, not only are the vanquished 
 silenced, but it is in the very nature of things, 
 that many of them would contribute to swell the 
 shouts of welcome, in order that, by appearing 
 to belong to the dominant party, they might 
 escape the persecutions which, in such com-
 
 {35 
 
 motions, those who are triumphant are too apt 
 to inflict upon their humbled adversaries. 
 
 VV r hile the Constitutional Government was 
 thus being subverted in the Spanish portion of 
 the Peninsula, by means of a foreign Army, 
 a similar fate attended the same form of Go- 
 vernment in Portugal, by means of the revolt of 
 the native Army. 
 
 It will be remembered, that when it was first 
 rumoured that the deliberations at the Congress 
 of Verona were connected with the form of 
 Government established in Spain, the Portuguese 
 Government, which was of the same kind, 
 naturally felt alarm lest it should, equally with 
 its neighbour, become the object of attack by 
 the Continental Powders. 
 
 It therefore endeavoured to persuade the 
 British Government to guarantee the existence 
 of the Constitutional Government by insinuat- 
 ing, that if Great Britain refused to do so, an 
 offensive and defensive alliance would be entered 
 into with Spain ; thereby wishing it to be inferred 
 that, since England w r as bound by treaty to 
 assist Portugal in case she should be attacked, 
 the chances of an attack would be much in- 
 creased were She so to connect herself with Spain; 
 and, consequently, that the chances of British 
 assistance being called for would be augmented 
 in the like proportion. When the proposition 
 of guarantee was made to Mr. Canning, accom- 
 
 f f 2
 
 436 
 
 parried with the threat of the alliance with 
 Spain, he lost no time in pointing out to the 
 Portuguese Government, — First, That were 
 England to guarantee the political institutions 
 of Portugal, the so doing " would be a direct 
 " infraction of that principle of non-interference 
 " in the internal concerns of other States, which 
 " She professed for Herself, and which it was 
 " obviously the interests of Portugal to see 
 " respected and maintained. Her treaty bound 
 " Her to consult the external safety of Portugal ; 
 '« and not to examine, to challenge, or to cham- 
 " pion Her internal institutions. 
 
 " If England examined the new institutions 
 " of Portugal for the sake of deriving from 
 " them new motives for fulfilling old engage- 
 " ments, with what propriety could she prohibit 
 " other Powers from examining them for the pur- 
 " pose of drawing any other conclusion ? It 
 " was enough to say, that such internal changes 
 " no way affected our engagements with Por- 
 " tugal, and that England felt as much bound 
 " to defend her under her altered Constitution, 
 " as under the antient Monarchy with which 
 " the alliance had been contracted." 
 
 In the next place, Mr. Canning showed that 
 there were no circumstances to justify such an 
 alliance with Spain as the one proposed, and 
 that the infallible tendency of it would be, to 
 loosen the claim of Portugal upon Great Britain,
 
 437 
 
 for that general aid and protection to which 
 antient alliance, and long-existing friendship 
 might entitle her upon an adequate emergency ; 
 for it was only in the event of an unprovoked 
 aggression upon her territory, that Portugal 
 would have a claim upon British assistance ; 
 and should She think proper to contract any 
 new or special obligations, by which She should 
 place herself at the call of another Power to act 
 against a third, and should thereby incur the 
 risk of an attack from that third Power, then 
 England would be under no obligation to de- 
 fend her against aggression, which would have 
 been produced by her own misconduct. This 
 argument of Mr. Canning contributed not a 
 little to put an end to the contemplated treaty ; 
 although it did not entirely extinguish the wish 
 of the Portuguese Ministers to embroil their 
 country with France. For when the speech of 
 the King of France, at the opening of the Cham- 
 bers, reached Lisbon, the Portuguese Charge 
 d'Affaires at Paris was directed to notify to the 
 French Government, that his Court would con- 
 sider an invasion of Spain to imply a declaration 
 of war against Portugal. 
 
 To this communication the French Minister 
 returned a dignified and temperate answer ; to 
 the effect that the dispute between France and 
 Spain was to be attributed to the positive incon- 
 veniences resulting to the former from the in- 
 
 ff 3
 
 138 
 
 ternal state of the latter kingdom j that as these 
 causes of dispute did not apply to Portugal, 
 hostility, under such circumstances, on Her part 
 would be an unprovoked aggression upon France; 
 and that His Most Christian Majesty would not 
 withdraw his diplomatick and commercial agents, 
 whatever might be the measures, short of war, 
 which the Portuguese Government might think 
 proper to adopt. 
 
 The entry of the French Army into Spain 
 was, notwithstanding, the signal for the de- 
 parture of the Portuguese Charge d' Affaires from 
 Paris ; but so determined were the French Mi- 
 nisters to avoid doing any thing which could 
 afford Portugal a pretext for commencing hos- 
 tilities, that when the application for passports 
 was received, an effort was made to induce M. 
 Sampayo to suspend the execution of his orders, 
 until he should have again referred to his Govern- 
 ment ; while he was at the same time informed 
 that the French Charge d' Affaires would not be 
 withdrawn from Lisbon, nor would the French 
 Consuls in Portugal be ordered to quit that 
 country in consequence of M. Sampayo's de- 
 parture. The Portuguese Government, how- 
 ever, on hearing of the entry of the French 
 Army in Spain, notified to the French Charge 
 d' Affaires the suspension of his diplomatick 
 functions. To this notification an answer was 
 returned, which produced from the Portuguese
 
 139 
 
 Minister a reply, couched in very strong lan- 
 guage, refusing to hold any further diplomatick 
 intercourse with the French Charge d' Affaires, 
 who nevertheless addressed to that Minister a 
 very moderate rejoinder, which was commu- 
 nicated to the Foreign Agents in Lisbon, in 
 order that they might bear witness to the desire 
 of the French Court not to give offence to the 
 existing Government of Portugal. 
 
 The French Ministers were indeed resolved, 
 that nothing short of being attacked, should 
 involve them in a quarrel with Portugal : no 
 declaration, therefore, of war, was made, nor was 
 any act committed by France against Portugal, in 
 consequence of the latter thus breaking off all 
 diplomatick intercourse between them. 
 
 Throughout the whole affair indeed, the most 
 scrupulous anxiety was continued to be evinced 
 by the French Authorities to avoid a collision ; 
 and when Count Amarante, who, having raised 
 in the province of Tras os Montes, the standard 
 of rebellion against the Government of the 
 Cortes, was defeated by the Constitutional Forces 
 under General Rego, and driven, about the same 
 period that the French crossed the Pyrenees, into 
 the Spanish Territory, made an offer to the Due 
 d'Angouleme to combine his movements with 
 those of the French Army, His Royal Highness 
 declined the offer, stating, that all co-operation 
 was impossible, as long as France continued at 
 
 F F 4
 
 440 
 
 peace'with Portugal, and that lie was determined 
 not to lend himself to any measure which could 
 interrupt the good understanding between the 
 two Courts. Moreover, in consequence of 
 General Rego having crossed the frontier in pur- 
 suit of Count Amarante, His Royal Highness 
 caused it to be intimated to that General, that 
 the French Government were determined to 
 remain at peace with Portugal, and that General 
 Rego would be considered as responsible for any 
 act of hostility on his part, against the French 
 Troops. 
 
 The French, however, were not much longer 
 called upon to exercise their forbearance : for in 
 spite of Amarante's defeat, discontent against the 
 then existing Government in Portugal, began to 
 make such rapid strides, that shortly after the 
 French Army had reached Madrid, a complete 
 revolution took place at Lisbon. 
 
 The manner in which this event was brought 
 about, is as follows. The ordinary Cortes closed 
 their sittings on the 31st of March ; on the 
 15th of May the extraordinary Cortes assembled. 
 On the 27th a whole Regiment of Infantry, 
 which had left Lisbon to join General Rego, who 
 had taken up a position in Tras os Montes, for 
 the purpose of watching Count Amarante, were 
 met by their quondam Colonel, who had a short 
 time before been dismissed by the Government, 
 and were induced by him to declare against the
 
 •Ill 
 
 Constitution. The regiment then proceeded to 
 Villa Franca, where it found Don Miguel, who 
 had secretly left the Capital to join them. The 
 Prince immediately published a Proclamation, 
 calling upon the nation to deliver the King. The 
 news of Don Miguel's flighty and the revolt of 
 the regiment reached the Cortes on the same 
 day. A letter, from the Colonel of the regiment, 
 addressed to General Sepulveda, the Governor 
 of Lisbon, giving reasons for his conduct, was 
 read at a meeting of that body. The General 
 was called in and examined. He affirmed that the 
 Troops in Lisbon were entirely in favour of the 
 Constitution, and the Cortes invested him with 
 full powers to preserve the peace of the Capital. 
 A deputation from that assembly was named to 
 wait upon the King, to congratulate him on his 
 constancy, and to beg he would join his endea- 
 vours to those of the Cortes, to save his Country. 
 He was likewise requested to dismiss his Mi- 
 nisters, who forthwith resigned, and another 
 Administration was appointed. 
 
 The day after (the c 28th), great numbers joined 
 Don Miguel, and on the following day General 
 Sepulveda, who had been playing a double part, 
 left Lisbon to join the Prince, and was followed 
 by the whole of the troops in the Capital, except 
 the 18th Regiment. In the meanwhile the 
 Cortes continued their sittings, and received a 
 Report from the new Minister of Justice upon the
 
 442 
 
 state of Publick Affairs, in which Report, he drew 
 a most discouraging picture of the condition of 
 the Capital, and Provinces. His assurance of 
 the King's firmness was the only part of his re- 
 port, which held out any hopes of the continu- 
 ance of the Constitutional System. The " firm- 
 ness " of the King was, however, the last quality 
 which His Majesty possessed, on which the 
 Cortes could confidently reckon. Faithful, as 
 far as depended upon himself, to the oath which 
 he had taken, there is no reason to believe that 
 he was either privy to the defection of the 
 troops, or was in any way instrumental in its 
 encouragement. 
 
 But John VI. was not the Sovereign to stand 
 alone, against a formidable Mutiny, in support 
 of a system of Government, which he might 
 have been willing to maintain, but for which he 
 could not have entertained any strong feelings of 
 partiality. When, therefore, the only regiment 
 which remained faithful to the Constitution, de- 
 termined to go over to Don Miguel, His Ma- 
 jesty resolved to accompany it, and to make 
 common cause with his hitherto rebellious Son. 
 
 The Cortes met for the last time on the 2d of 
 June. They declared, that being forsaken by 
 the Executive Power, and held in a state of 
 coercion by the Military, they should, without 
 considering themselves dissolved, interrupt their 
 sittings till again convened by the permanent
 
 \4S 
 
 Deputation, and concluded with a protest against 
 any change in the Constitution. 
 
 Before the King left Lisbon lie published a 
 Proclamation, declaring that he did not desire 
 absolute power, and promising to grant a New 
 Constitution " which should secure personal 
 " safety, property, and employment duly ac- 
 " quired in any period of the actual Govern- 
 " merit." On the 3d he dissolved the Cortes, 
 who made no further attempt at resistance; and 
 on the 5th he made his public entry into Lisbon, 
 where he was received with acclamations by the 
 inhabitants. 
 
 Don Miguel was made Generalissimo of the 
 Armies, and the decree against the Queen, con- 
 demning her to be banished, because she had 
 refused to swear fidelity to the Constitution, was 
 revoked. A new Ministry was also appointed ; 
 at the head of which was M. de Pamphma, and 
 the Marquis of Palmella was made Secretary of 
 State for Foreign Affairs. Thus was the dis- 
 solution of the Constitutional Government ef- 
 fected, without any conflict, or excesses on either 
 side. 
 
 The King being restored to unlimited autho- 
 rity, the Diplomatick Agents of France, and the 
 other Continental Powers, once more returned 
 to Lisbon : and in compliance with the expressed 
 wish of His M. F. Majesty, Sir Edward Thorn- 
 ton was sent in the character of Minister Pleni-
 
 444 
 
 potentiary, to replace Mr. Ward, who had acted 
 as Charge d' Affaires, ever since the year 1816. 
 The first acts of the King, after the change in the 
 Government, manifested no vindictive feelings 
 towards the Constitutional party; and notwith- 
 standing that the Queen and Don Miguel, who had 
 been chiefly instrumental in bringing about the 
 Counter-Revolution, were adverse to the grant of 
 any free institutions under any form, or modi- 
 fication whatsoever, the King, faithful to fulfil 
 the promises which he had made to his people, 
 about a fortnight after his return to the Capital, 
 nominated a Commission, of which M. de Pal- 
 mella was the President, to draw up a Projet of 
 a Constitution. 
 
 Very different was the conduct of the King 
 of Spain, after his liberation from Cadiz ; 
 which city was surrendered, without even the 
 security of a real amnesty, for those by whom 
 it had been defended. The consequence of this 
 false step was, that the Due d'Angouleme, not 
 being possessed of any right whatever to in- 
 terfere, the Spaniards were deprived of that 
 support and protection which they would un- 
 doubtedly have derived from any engagements 
 contracted with His Royal Highness ; and Fer- 
 dinand was therefore free to act according to the 
 dictates of his unfettered will j for His Majesty 
 declared that he held himself in no wise bound 
 by the decree which he signed the day on
 
 4A5 
 
 which lie quitted Cadiz, because at the time at 
 which he affixed his name to it, he was coerced 
 by the Constitutional Authorities. 
 
 The very day on which he was released from 
 the power of the Cortes, he commenced his 
 course of misrule : and although no victims, 
 (with the exception of Riego) were made to pay 
 the forfeit of their lives, for their fidelity to a 
 form of Government which he himself had sworn 
 to uphold and to defend j yet every act and de- 
 cree of the Monarch was calculated to exasperate, 
 and to take away all feelings of security from 
 those who had been in any way connected with 
 the late Government, both as to their property, 
 and their lives. The most conspicuous actors in 
 the Constitutional System, had indeed, with- 
 drawn themselves from their country ; but since 
 that system had endured for so long, that the 
 great majority of the nation was committed to 
 it in some way or other, there were numbers 
 left to feel the effects of the Royal anger, as 
 manifested in the decrees of Port St. Mary, and 
 Xeres. By the first of these Decrees, all acts 
 done by the Constitutional Government were 
 declared null and void, and by the latter, all 
 persons who had been in any way connected with 
 the Cortes, were prohibited from approaching 
 within five leagues of the route which the King 
 was about to take in his way to Madrid, and, for
 
 446* 
 
 ever(!) from coming within fifteen leagues of the 
 capita], so long as his Majesty should think pro- 
 per there to fix his residence. Thus all were 
 placed on the same level ; and the most violent 
 of the doctrinaires, and the most moderate of the 
 Constitutionalists, were left, without distinction, 
 in the same state of doubt and anxiety, as to 
 their future fate. 
 
 It was in vain that the French Authorities 
 represented the impolicy of this line of conduct : 
 Ferdinand, whom they had liberated, was as 
 little disposed, as the Regency, which they had 
 constituted, had been before him, to listen to 
 their advice. 
 
 The Due d'Angouleme, whose good sense 
 and discretion in conducting the arduous task 
 assigned to him, had been throughout remark- 
 able, deplored, while he was unable to prevent, 
 the impolitick conduct of the King : His Royal 
 Highness, indeed, urged, in every possible way, 
 the immediate publication of an amnesty, but his 
 representations were disregarded; and so dis- 
 pleased was he with the proceedings of Ferdinand 
 that when he had his audience of leave, he re- 
 fused the decorations tendered to himself and 
 staff; requesting His Catholick Majesty, as a 
 more honourable mark of his royal favour, to 
 allow the whole of the Grandees to return to 
 Madrid who had signed the original address,
 
 11.7 
 
 presented to His Royal Highness on his arrival 
 in Spain : many of whom had been included in 
 the proscriptive decrees. 
 
 The Due left Madrid on the 5th of No- 
 vember, without waiting to be present at the 
 publick entry of Ferdinand into his Capital, 
 which took place on the 13th of the same 
 month. 
 
 The Spanish Ministers whom the Regency 
 had selected, had all been confirmed in their 
 situations by one of the clauses in the Xeres 
 decree, issued four days after the King had 
 quitted Cadiz ; they were all of the violent 
 Apostolical party, and encouraged His Majesty 
 in the violent measures which he adopted. 
 
 Don Victor Saez, the Foreign Minister, as 
 soon as he had joined His Majesty, resumed his 
 functions as Confessor; and to his influence over 
 the Royal mind, was, in a great degree, attri- 
 buted the delay, or refusal, to publish an amnesty, 
 which the French Authorities and the Foreign 
 Ambassadors all concurred in strenuously re- 
 commending. 
 
 Their continuance in power was not, however, 
 of long duration, and about a fortnight after 
 Ferdinand's return, they found themselves most 
 suddenly and unexpectedly dismissed, and an- 
 other Administration appointed in their places. 
 
 M. Casa Irujo was at the head of the new 
 Ministry : but the Count Ofalia was the indi-
 
 448 
 
 vidual on whose talents it chiefly depended for 
 support. Its Members were all of the moderate 
 party, and those who really entertained patriotick 
 feelings, began to hope that better days were 
 about to dawn upon their country. 
 
 But whatever good intentions might have been 
 entertained by the new Ministers, the manner 
 in which they had been brought into power, the 
 little talent of which any of them could boast, 
 and their want of money, all contributed to 
 paralyze their efforts for the publick good. The 
 Apostolical party were furious at the change, 
 and the weakness of the Administration served 
 to revive their courage, which the disgrace of 
 their own party at first had shaken. The whole 
 body of the Clergy, supported by the King's 
 brother, Don Carlos, declared against the new 
 Ministry, urged the necessity of severe mea- 
 sures, and demanded the re-establishment of the 
 Inquisition, " a tribunal," which they described 
 as " congenial to the manners of the People, 
 '• and only condemned by Foreigners actuated 
 " by interested motives, or ignorant of the 
 f country ; a tribunal which had always been 
 " the surest bulwark of the Altar and the 
 " Throne." 
 
 The Ministers meanwhile were busily em- 
 ployed in endeavouring to arrange an amnesty, 
 as the first step towards the re-establishment of 
 order and peace j but their endeavours were
 
 Hit 
 
 foiled by the fanatical and vindictive spirit of 
 the individuals by whom the King was sur- 
 rounded. The head of the Ministry was not, 
 however, destined to live to continue the 
 struggle. About a fortnight after his accession 
 to office, he was struck with apoplexy, from 
 which he never recovered. The Count Ofalia 
 was nominated to succeed him. 
 
 The year was suffered to close without any 
 amnesty being published ; and the uncertainty 
 which prevailed as to whether the King would, 
 or would not acknowledge the bonds of the 
 Cortes, by preventing the great capitalists from 
 lending their money, reduced the Government 
 to such straits, that the most pressing publick 
 business was with difficulty carried on, and all 
 attempts at establishing any regular system of 
 Government were rendered utterly hopeless. 
 
 The Government was dependent for its safety 
 on a foreign force, which, however, by a sin- 
 gular destiny, was much more frequently em- 
 ployed in restraining the excesses of the party 
 which it came to support, against the party 
 which it had overthrown, than in keeping down 
 the struggles of the latter party, to regain their 
 lost ascendency ; on the plea of doing which, 
 its presence in the Peninsula was required. 
 
 Although France was the ostensible Power 
 by whose agency the changes in the Spanish 
 Government were effected, her Continental Allies 
 
 VOL. I. G G
 
 450 
 
 had neither looked on with indifference at her 
 proceedings, nor had they abstained, as circum- 
 stances developed themselves, from tendering 
 their advice. 
 
 In the early part of the Campaign, while the 
 success of the French, and the fidelity of their 
 Army seemed doubtful, the Emperors of Russia 
 and Austria assembled Armies on the frontiers 
 of their Dominions, ready to march in support 
 of the French, should these last meet with any 
 reverses on the other side of the Pyrenees ; but 
 when the unresisted advance of their Armies 
 made their final success more than probable, the 
 Ambassadors of the Allied Courts at Paris were 
 unceasing in their representations to the French 
 Ministers on no account to treat with, or in any 
 way whatsoever to acknowledge the legitimacy 
 ot\ the Constitutional Government. 
 
 On the other hand, the policy of Great Britain 
 was to keep aloof as much as possible from all 
 these discussions, and to preserve a strict neu- 
 trality j letting the French Ministers understand, 
 that She was ready to be the medium of Nego- 
 tiation between them and the Cortes, whenever 
 the former should think proper to entitle them- 
 selves to it, by stating any definite conditions 
 of Peace by which they would pledge them- 
 selves to abide, provided they were accepted by 
 the latter. 
 
 But the French Ministers (as has been seen)
 
 151 
 
 were unwilling to fetter themselves: and al- 
 though they were anxious to induce the British 
 Government to take some step which might 
 have the appearance, at least, of its not wholly 
 disapproving of the invasion of the Peninsula, 
 yet they were unwilling to allow Great Britain 
 to adopt any measures by which she might 
 acquire a right to interfere afterwards in Spanish 
 Affairs. 
 
 The same kind of feelings seemed apparently 
 to actuate their conduct towards their Conti- 
 nental Allies, from whom they were desirous of 
 obtaining all the support to be derived from 
 their countenance ; while, at the same time they 
 were jealous lest any one of them should obtain 
 a share in the influence, w T hich they intended to 
 establish for themselves, in the Spanish Councils, 
 so soon as, through their labours, those Councils 
 should again fall under the absolute direction of 
 Ferdinand. 
 
 From the commencement to the termination 
 of the Campaign, the grand object of the French 
 Government was to get possession of the Spanish 
 Monarch ; that they might at once bring the 
 War to a successful conclusion, and commence 
 the task of governing Spain after their own ideas. 
 To bring about, therefore, this result, they would 
 have been content, before they passed the Ebro, 
 to have negotiated with the Cortes as the legiti- 
 mate Government of the Country. When they 
 
 G G 2
 
 452 
 
 found that the Cortes would not treat, but had 
 removed with the King from Madrid to Seville, 
 they were incessant in their suggestions to the 
 British Cabinet to advise the Spaniards to set 
 Ferdinand free ; and were willing to sanction 
 any plan for carrying him off by surprise, or 
 facilitating his escape by treachery, to get him 
 into their power ; and when at last, from the 
 reports which reached them of Cadiz being 
 totally unprepared for a siege, and consequently 
 that there was little chance of the King's being 
 much longer kept out of their hands, they would 
 not allow the Due d'Angouleme to negotiate at 
 all (except in undertaking for an amnesty) unless 
 he had in his own custody the person of the 
 King. 
 
 But Ferdinand was much less manageable than 
 the French Ministers had expected ; and would 
 not relinquish the sweets of vengeance for the 
 sake of showing gratitude to those to whom he 
 was indebted for the power of retaliation. The 
 French Authorities in fact were wholly unable 
 to restrain him, even at the very moment when 
 he first reached their head-quarters, and was sur- 
 rounded by their Army ; and still less influence 
 vlid France for some time possess in the Spanish 
 Councils, when her wishes were ur^ed through 
 the medium of her Ambassador, who, after the 
 fall of Cadiz, had immediately taken up his 
 residence at the Court of His Catholick Majesty.
 
 I,;3 
 
 The Diplomatick Agents of the Allied Courts, 
 who had been accredited to the Regency at 
 Madrid, had followed the example of their 
 French Colleague. To the counteractions of 
 these Ministers, the little influence possessed 
 by the French Ambassador must in some degree 
 be attributed. 
 
 The Sovereigns of the Alliance, although 
 they had witnessed with delight the overthrow 
 of the Constitutional system, and the triumph of 
 Absolutism, yet did not view altogether without 
 distrust the dispositions of the French Cabinet. 
 They did not approve of the War having been 
 converted by M. deVillele from an European 
 into a French War ; neither did they like the 
 idea (which the Government of the Most Chris- 
 tian King did not scruple to avow) of persuad- 
 ing the Spanish Monarch, when he should be set 
 free, to grant a Constitution to his people. 
 
 The Ministers, therefore, of Russia, Prussia, 
 and Austria, when they arrived at Seville, 
 thwarted, rather than co-operated with, the 
 French Ambassador. 
 
 They all three held extreme Royalist opinions, 
 and were adverse to any sacrifice of the princi- 
 ples of Legitimacy, at whatever cost those prin- 
 ciples were to be maintained. And since their 
 counsels were therefore more congenial to the 
 disposition of Ferdinand and his advisers, than 
 were those of the French Ambassador, M. de 
 
 g g 3
 
 4o4 
 
 Talaru, who recommended moderation and 
 mercy, their advice was listened to, whilst that 
 of the latter was disregarded. In one point, 
 however, all the four were agreed — and that 
 point was, that the British Minister ought not 
 to be allowed to acquire any preponderating 
 influence. 
 
 Such was the state of affairs, when Sir William 
 a Court arrived at Seville from Gibraltar ; which 
 place he quitted so soon as the intelligence 
 reached him, that the King of Spain was no 
 longer residing within the walls of a besieged 
 and blockaded city. 
 
 On Sir William's first arrival a great in- 
 clination was manifested by the Spanish Go- 
 vernment to dispute his right to be received as 
 British Minister, without the delivery of fresh 
 credentials ; he, however, insisted, since he was 
 accredited personally to the King, and not to 
 the Cortes, and since the change of Govern- 
 ment had made no difference in the person of 
 the Sovereign, that there was no necessity for 
 him to be re-accredited : and he distinctly de- 
 clared, that, if he were not immediately received 
 in the plenitude of his rights as British Minister, 
 he would directly leave Seville, and proceed to 
 Madrid, on his way to the frontiers, to await the 
 orders of his Government. 
 
 The evil consequences which would necessarily 
 have resulted to the newly-restored Govern-
 
 nient of Spain, from the departure of the British 
 Minister, were too obvious not to be seen by 
 those, of whom it was composed, as well as those 
 by whose advice it was acting. The threat, there- 
 fore, decided the point, and Sir William received 
 the regular invitation, as British Minister, to 
 attend the circle at Court on the King's birth- 
 day, on which occasion he accordingly attended. 
 
 The difficulty about receiving him liad arisen 
 from the determination of Ferdinand, if possible, 
 to adhere to the principle laid down in the de- 
 cree which he had issued upon the day on which 
 he reached Port St. Mary's, that every act per- 
 formed under the Constitutional Government 
 was to be considered as null and void ; but if 
 this were a reason for Ferdinand to desire that 
 the British Minister should be afresh accredited 
 to him, it afforded an equally strong reason on 
 the other side why the British Minister should 
 not listen to a proposal, the compliance of which 
 would have been a sort of acknowledgment, on 
 his part, of the nullity of past acts \ the effect 
 of making which acknowledgment would have 
 been to have cancelled the Convention con- 
 cluded between England, and Spain, for the 
 adjustment of the commercial claims of the 
 respective countries. 
 
 Sir William, therefore, did not content him- 
 self with merely refusing his consent to an act 
 which indirectly would have called in question 
 
 g g <i<
 
 4.5(3 
 
 the validity of that Convention ; for no sooner 
 did he learn that all the acts of the Consti- 
 tutional Government, of every class and de- 
 scription, without any exception being made in 
 favour of diplomatick transactions, had been an- 
 nulled by the Port St. Mary decree, than he 
 requested explanations from the Foreign Se- 
 cretary, Don Victor Saez, touching the fulfil- 
 ment of the Convention. 
 
 No difficulties were made by the Spanish 
 Government in confirming it ; and, disagree- 
 able as it must necessarily have been to Ferdi- 
 nand and his Ministers to have made this 
 exception to their rules, especially in favour 
 of a Power that had evinced no friendly feel- 
 ings towards the system of absolute Govern- 
 ment, yet they were too well aware of the 
 firmness of the British Cabinet to run the risk 
 of provoking its displeasure, by refusing to hold 
 themselves bound by a Treaty which Ferdinand 
 himself had ratified, although in the character of 
 a Constitutional King. The readiness of His 
 Catholick Majesty to hold himself bound by the 
 Convention was communicated in a note from 
 Don Victor Saez to the British Minister, before 
 the Court quitted Seville for Madrid. 
 
 At Madrid the Diplomatick Body was rein- 
 forced by M. Pozzo di Borgo, who had been 
 sent by the Russian Court to congratulate the 
 King on his deliverance.
 
 This distinguished diplomatist, with all his 
 dislike to any measures bordering upon liberal, 
 was yet sufficiently wise in his generation to see, 
 that absolute Monarchies would have but little 
 chance of being suffered to exist, if all those by 
 whom they were administered should imitate the 
 example of Ferdinand. His Excellency was, 
 therefore, an advocate for milder measures ; and 
 finding that no impression could be made on the 
 King, he employed himself in endeavouring to 
 remove the Ministry, which existed when the 
 King first arrived in his Capital, and to establish 
 another, composed of individuals holding more 
 moderate opinions. 
 
 Whether, however, he would have succeeded 
 in his endeavours if it had not been for the ab- 
 solute bankruptcy of the Government, it is diffi- 
 cult to determine ; but it was generally believed 
 that he managed to work upon the King's mind 
 by some pecuniary temptations of no xery cre- 
 ditable nature. Certain it is that to the exertions 
 of M. Pozzo di Borgo was owing the dismissal 
 of the Administration of the Due del Infantado 
 and Don Victor Saez, and the appointment of 
 that of M. Casa Irujo and the Count Ofalia. 
 
 The French Ambassador had little share in 
 bringing about the change, although he did not 
 hesitate to express his conviction, that the offices 
 of the King's Confessor, and Secretary of State, 
 were wholly incompatible with each other.
 
 458 
 
 As for the British Minister, he remained a 
 passive spectator of all the intrigues that were 
 being carried on, contenting himself with merely 
 transacting the ordinary business of his mission, 
 and discussing with the Spanish Ministers such 
 matters of external policy, as mutually affected 
 the two countries. 
 
 Amongst these latter, the state of Spanish 
 America was of course included ; but all that 
 relates to this important subject must be deferred 
 to the next Chapter. 
 
 As for Spain Herself, if Her condition were 
 deplorable at the commencement of this year *, 
 it certainly was not improved at its conclusion. 
 Defective as the Constitutional Government un- 
 doubtedly was, and administered by individuals, 
 whose conduct rather tended to aggravate than 
 to mitigate those defects, it was still essentially 
 Spanish, and was not under Foreign dictation. 
 Its aim, therefore, must have been to benefit 
 some class or other of Spaniards, and whether 
 that class was or was not, less numerous, and 
 less deserving than others, still the interests of 
 Spaniards were those which the Government con- 
 sulted. The blemishes in the Constitution would 
 probably have worked their own cure. Already 
 they had arrayed against it a majority of the 
 Nation ; and publick opinion could not have 
 failed in producing its effect upon the publick 
 
 * 1823.
 
 459 
 
 Councils. The next election of the Cortes 
 would have afforded the opportunity. Modi- 
 fications might then have been introduced, 
 whereby the form of Government might have 
 been rendered more congenial to the national 
 feelings, and an era of prosperity might have 
 arisen to which Spain had been too long a 
 stranger. But the restoration of the old Despo- 
 tism, unmitigated, and unchanged, took away 
 this single chance of internal regeneration. 
 
 Measures of state no longer originated with 
 Spaniards, and every act of the Government 
 might be traced to foreign influence, or intrigue. 
 
 Was a Convention to be ratified or a Minister 
 to be received, the opinions of the Agents of 
 Foreign Powers decided the question. 
 
 Was a Ministry overthrown, and another ap- 
 pointed, it was not because the publick voice de- 
 manded a change, or the caprice of the Sovereign 
 willed it, but because the members of the one 
 that fell, were not sufficiently yielding to the 
 views of the Russian Ambassador, and greater 
 pliability was expected from their Successors. 
 
 In short, the Spanish Government no longer 
 acted to promote the welfare of any description 
 of Spaniards, but either to gratify the vindictive 
 feelings of Ferdinand, or to further the views of 
 the Representative of some foreign Potentate. 
 
 To complete the picture of national degrad- 
 ation, the constituted authorities did not ad-
 
 460 
 
 minister justice ; the country was overrun with 
 Banditti : and neither life nor property were 
 secure against the attacks of these lawful, and 
 lawless depredators. 
 
 Such was the condition of Spain at the end of 
 1823, in the course of which year her newly esta- 
 blished institutions had been overthrown by 
 foreign interference. 
 
 Early in the succeeding year a treaty was signed 
 between France and Spain, by which the former 
 agreed, to keep for the following six months in 
 Spain, an army consisting of 45,000 men, who 
 were to be dispersed to garrison the principal 
 Fortresses in Spain, and were to have their head 
 quarters at Madrid. 
 
 Of the policy of this country preserving neu- 
 trality in the contest between France and Spain, 
 so much has already been said in justification, 
 that it would be needless to say more upon the 
 subject, were it not, that on the first day of the 
 session of 1824, the soundness of that policy was 
 again indirectly called in question : not, indeed, 
 by condemning the motives which had dictated 
 it, but by lamenting the occurrences which had 
 taken place contemporaneously with an ad- 
 herence to it. 
 
 The decided manner in which the majority of 
 the Spanish Population had declared against the 
 Constitution was, in the opinion of the Ministers, 
 one of the strongest proofs of their wisdom in
 
 having abstained from recommending to their 
 Country to undertake the defence of institutions, 
 which the greater part of those who professed 
 them, neither desired to preserve, nor knew how 
 to value. This sentiment was accordingly ex- 
 pressed in the King's Speech at the opening of 
 Parliament, in which it was said, that, " anxiously 
 " as His Majesty deprecated the commence- 
 " ment of the war in Spain, he was every day 
 " more satisfied, that in the strict neutrality 
 " which he had determined to observe in that 
 " contest, he best consulted the true interests of 
 " his people." 
 
 To this way of mentioning the recent events 
 in Spain, objections were raised in both Houses, 
 because there was no expression " of regret at 
 " the manner in which the war had terminated, 
 " although its origin was deprecated :" and, be- 
 cause the position in which Great Britain and 
 Europe were placed, by France being in pos- 
 session of Spain, afforded no grounds for con- 
 gratulations ; but, on the contrary, " was fraught 
 " with inevitably disastrous consequences." 
 
 But this posture of affairs was neither set forth 
 in the King's Speech, nor described by his 
 Ministers, as subject-matter of exultation. On 
 the contrary, it was felt by them to be one of 
 the greatest difficulty and embarrassment ; and 
 was one which they had publickly declared, it 
 would not be for the interests of this country
 
 462 
 
 permanently to tolerate ; but what they did con- 
 sider matter of congratulation was, that they had 
 husbanded the resources of the Country, and con- 
 centrated its power, instead of having wasted 
 either the one or the other, by engaging in a war, 
 in which our only allies would have been a 
 minority of the People of the Peninsula, and in 
 which we should have had ranged against us the 
 majority of that same people, together with all 
 the great Powers of Europe. And whether, it 
 may be asked, were we more likely to have pre- 
 vented France from establishing a lasting; footing 
 in Spain, by committing ourselves in hostilities 
 when the point at issue would necessarily have 
 been the merits or dements of the Constitutional 
 System, to effect the overthrow of which the 
 Continental Powers were desirous ; or, by wait- 
 ing until that question was gone by, and we 
 could declare war upon the principle of hinder- 
 ing France from acquiring permanent territorial 
 aggrandizement ? 
 
 In the one case, all Europe would have been 
 combined against us* In the other, our Allies 
 were bound by treaty to act with us, the fulfil- 
 ment of which treaty on their parts would in no 
 wise have compromised their principles. 
 
 The Ministers, therefore, held, that in the 
 policy which had been pursued, the true in- 
 terests of the country had been consulted. And, 
 if this were the case, (and it is remarkable that,
 
 4,63 
 
 with all the attempts then made to discredit that 
 policy, it Mas no longer denied,) then there can be 
 no doubt that there was good cause for joy and 
 congratulation that, out of two evils, the Govern- 
 ment had had the sagacity to choose the least. 
 
 With regard to the absence of any expressions 
 of sorrow, it may be observed, that it would 
 have been very undignified to have given utter- 
 ance to sentiments of regret, at a state of things, 
 to which (however much we might lament it) we 
 had no intention of applying any immediate and 
 ostensible remedy. 
 
 In the next debate which took place * on the 
 affairs of Spain, the policy of neutrality was not 
 impugned, but merely the mode of its exe- 
 cution. Lord Nugent led the attack, which 
 was wholly directed against the conduct of Sir 
 William a Court, for which his Lordship cor- 
 rectly held that Minister to be responsible, or 
 otherwise, according as it emanated from his 
 own discretion, or was in conformity with the 
 instructions of his Government. 
 
 The principal charges which Lord Nugent 
 urged against Sir William, and indeed the only 
 ones which had their foundation in fact, (for 
 the others were mere hearsay stories for which 
 there cannot be said to have been any real 
 foundation,) were, 1st, That he had abstained 
 from following the Regency set up by the Cortes, 
 * February 17. 1824.
 
 464 
 
 and had remained at Seville after the King 
 had been declared unfit to reign ; 2dly, That he 
 kept studiously aloof from "co-operating" with 
 the Constitutional Government ; and, lastly, That 
 instead of going to Cadiz, he went to Gibraltar, 
 and remained there. With respect to the first 
 of these charges, it must be remembered that Sir 
 William a Court was accredited to King Ferdi- 
 nand, and not to a Regency ; and that had he 
 acknowledged the Regency established by the 
 Cortes against the will of Ferdinand, it would 
 have been a gross breach of neutrality towards the 
 Regency which was constituted at Madrid, with- 
 out doubt in consonance with His Catholick 
 Majesty's wishes. So long as Ferdinand was 
 ostensibly in possession of the Government, so 
 long it was the duty of the British Minister to 
 sanction that Government by his presence ; 
 but when a Regency was appointed in spite of 
 the King, to whom Sir William was accredited, 
 and not even possessing so much de facto power 
 over the country, as its rival Regency, it would 
 have been, at the least, an act of great partiality 
 to have recognised the authority of either one, 
 to the prejudice of the other. 
 
 With regard to Sir William's remaining at 
 Seville, it was undoubtedly true that the Royal- 
 ists there did endeavour to make him an instru- 
 ment in their hands j but it is equally true, as 
 has been already stated, that he refused to be-
 
 4,65 
 
 come their instrument, and that they failed in so 
 making use of him. 
 
 With regard to the second charge, that he 
 studiously kept aloof from " co-operating" with 
 the Constitutional Government, it must be ob- 
 vious to every one, that had Sir William " co- 
 " operated" with that Government other than 
 as a mediator, he would have violated every 
 principle of neutrality. 
 
 With regard to the last charge, viz. that he 
 did not go to Cadiz, the sole reason which pre- 
 vented his so doing was, that Cadiz was at the 
 time when he had to decide upon his going, 
 blockaded and besieged by sea and land, and 
 that it was impossible but that the residence of 
 a Minister of a neutral Power in a town so 
 circumstanced, would have created misunder- 
 standings with the blockading Belligerent, by 
 giving rise to questions as to his rights and 
 privileges ; " questions of which the usually ad- 
 " mitted authorities in matters of international 
 " law had never contemplated the occurrence ; 
 " and for the decision of which history afforded 
 " no practical example." For instance, " would 
 " the Minister so situated have a right of un- 
 " limited communication with his Court ? Ought 
 " he to direct the vessel which he might employ 
 " to submit to search, or to resist it?" " These 
 " and other questions of like difficulty must have 
 " arisen had Sir William placed himself in a 
 
 VOL. T. H II
 
 4>66 
 
 " situation so new and anomalous ; and questions 
 " between nations, which are not referable to 
 " preconcerted agreements, or to settled prin- 
 " ciples and acknowledged law, no power but 
 " the sword can decide." 
 
 Sir William, therefore, surely j udged wisely when 
 he resolved to prevent such complications from 
 arising ; for, as Mr. Canning observed, in approving 
 Sir William's resolution, " if England had been 
 " disposed to go to war with France in behalf 
 " of Spain, she would have done so openly, and 
 " either on the merits of the cause, or in vindi- 
 " cation of some intelligible interest. But after 
 " professing and maintaining a perfect and 
 " scrupulous neutrality throughout the contest, 
 " to have been betrayed, at the close of it, into 
 " hostilities, through an uncalled for, and un- 
 " profitable discussion upon abstract points of 
 " international jurisprudence, would have been 
 " a weakness unworthy of any Government." 
 
 Lord Nugent concluded by moving for, 
 " Copies of all the correspondence between Sir 
 " William a Court and his Government, and 
 " Sir William and the Constitutional Govern- 
 " ment of Spain, from the period of the entrance 
 " of the French into Spain up to the surrender 
 " of Cadiz." 
 
 The whole of the Noble Lord's speech was 
 criminatory of Sir William a Court, and, through 
 Sir William, of the Government.
 
 K>7 
 
 Mr. Canning rose immediately after the ques- 
 tion had been put by the Chair, to take all the 
 blame of that conduct, if blameable it were, 
 upon himself and his Colleagues ; and to de- 
 clare, that they were ready to sustain and justify 
 it. In Mr. Canning's opinion, indeed, it was 
 impossible for any man to have conducted him- 
 self with greater ability, discretion, and imparti- 
 ality than Sir William a Court had done in the 
 very difficult and delicate circumstances in which 
 he was placed ; and it is but fair to state, that 
 the services which that Minister rendered, and 
 the talents which he displayed, then in Spain, 
 and subsequently in Portugal, obtained for him 
 the very highest place in Mr. Canning's esti- 
 mation. "I cannot charge Sir William a Court," 
 said Mr. Canning near the close of their official 
 connection, " with one imperfect exercise of his 
 " discretion, during the course of the most 
 " difficult transactions, in which ever Foreign 
 " Minister was engaged." 
 
 Mr. Sturges Bourne, in a speech of great 
 ability, defended Sir William, and concluded by 
 moving an amendment, expressive of the opi- 
 nion of the House, that " under circumstances 
 " of peculiar difficulty, the neutrality of this 
 " Country had been scrupulously, and inviolably 
 " maintained." 
 
 None of Lord Nugent' s party rising to sup- 
 port him, his Lordship replied j after which the 
 
 H H 2
 
 468 
 
 House divided, and the amendment was carried 
 by a majority of 171 to 30. 
 
 Notwithstanding that the effect of this motion 
 was thus to obtain from the House of Commons 
 a vote, praising the Ministers for their conduct, 
 (a benefit which there would have been no excuse 
 for conferring upon them, had not an attempt 
 been made to inculpate their proceedings,) yet, 
 exactly on the same day of the following month, 
 after the tocsin of preparation had long been 
 sounded, Lord John Russell brought forward a 
 motion to address the Throne for " Copies or 
 " extracts of any communications that had been 
 " received from the Government of France re- 
 " specting the evacuation of Spain by the French 
 
 " Army." 
 
 In the beginning of his speech, Lord John 
 disclaimed having " any intention of fixing any 
 " blame upon the Government for the policy 
 " which it had pursued respecting Spain." His 
 object being, as he said, simply " to learn from 
 " the King's Ministers what was the policy of 
 " the Country ; " or, in other words, his object 
 was, as Mr. Canning described it, similar to 
 Lord Nugent's ; viz. to discredit the Ministers, 
 by selecting for animadversion " particular parts 
 " of the transactions with Spain, in which it was 
 " thought blame, up to a certain point, might 
 " be fixed upon the Government, without at- 
 « tacking the general vote of approbation "
 
 460 
 
 which the Houses of Parliament had passed in 
 the preceding Session, and the House of Com- 
 mons had confirmed in the one which succeeded 
 it. The particular point selected for attack in 
 this instance was, that Government were not 
 sufficiently on their guard against the designs of 
 France, and had not taken sufficient securities 
 against the permanent occupation of the Penin- 
 sula by French Troops. 
 
 Sir Robert Wilson followed Lord John in 
 support of the motion, and concluded his speech 
 with a defence of himself against the indignities 
 which the Allied Sovereigns had put upon him, 
 by depriving him of the various orders with 
 which his services had been rewarded at their 
 hands. His speech produced a most favourable 
 impression, with regard to himself, upon the 
 minds of all who heard him. 
 
 Mr. Littleton defended the Government ; and, 
 following Mr. Sturges Bourne's example on 
 Lord Nugent's motion, concluded by moving as 
 an amendment, that " this House, being satis- 
 " tied of the firmness and sound policy which 
 " had guided His Majesty's Councils in respect 
 " to the late hostilities between France and 
 " Spain ; and considering the several conditions 
 " with which His Majesty's declaration of neu- 
 " trality in that contest was qualified, sees 
 " nothing in the present circumstances that calls 
 " upon the House to express any apprehension 
 
 ii ii 3
 
 470 
 
 " of a permanent military occupation of the 
 " Spanish territory by France/' 
 
 The amendment was seconded by Mr. Gooch ; 
 and Mr. Canning, having waited till the very 
 last moment for some of the opposition members 
 to rise, rose, and expressed his surprise, that 
 " a motion brought forward after such immense 
 " preparation, and a motion, to the effective 
 " prosecution of which, one other hapless mo- 
 " tion had already been sacrificed, was itself in 
 " its turn to be abandoned by all the accustomed 
 " supporters of the noble mover." He said that 
 the motion was only one " of a series in which 
 " an attempt had been made to take away some- 
 " thing from the recorded approbation of the 
 " House of the conduct of Government; " and 
 then, having alluded to the utter discomfiture of 
 the former efforts to throw blame upon the Go- 
 vernment, he went on to say, that " it was im- 
 " possible to view the Noble Lord's proposition 
 " singly ; that his proposition was not that it 
 " was contrary to the interests of this Country 
 " that France should remain in possession of 
 •' Spain- — for that was a proposition that no one 
 " would contradict" — but the Noble Lord's ar- 
 gument went to prove, that the intentions of 
 France to retain possession of Spain were so ma- 
 nifest, or, at least, so ill concealed, that the 
 Government was not entitled to confidence ; 
 and, therefore, that it became necessary for Par-
 
 471 
 
 1 iament to interfere, and no longer to trust to 
 the Ministers alone for preventing the accom- 
 plishment of those intentions. Mr. Canning 
 met this argument, by saying, that " in the 
 " quarrel between France and Spain, this Coun- 
 " try had qualified her neutrality with three 
 " conditions." That with the first two, viz. that 
 Portugal should not be attacked, and that there 
 should be no interference with Spanish America, 
 France had strictly complied ; that, therefore, 
 there was fair ground for presuming, that she 
 would not violate the third ; and that, as far as 
 then appeared, no such design was entertained 
 by her. That some kind of occupation of Spain 
 by French Troops was always contemplated by 
 the British Government, if the French were 
 successful, was proved by the fact, that the 
 "permanency" of the occupation, not the occu- 
 pation itself, was that against which the British 
 Government had thought it necessary to pro- 
 test. That occupation had then only lasted six 
 months. The troops had conducted themselves 
 in a most exemplary manner ; and such was the 
 state of Spain, that if the question were put to 
 him (Mr. Canning) " whether they should march 
 " out at once, or should not, it would be quite 
 " beyond his power to say that they should. 
 " For, by a strange course of events, their whole 
 " situation, and business in Spain, had become 
 " changed. They had gone into the country to 
 
 ii ii 1
 
 472 
 
 " defend the fanatical Party against the Consti- 
 " tutionalists, and now they were actually inter- 
 " fering for the Constitutional party with the 
 " Fanaticks. How long that system was to last 
 " he did not know ; but he entertained the most 
 " decided conviction, that whenever the time 
 " came that Spain might be left to herself with 
 " safety, France would be as much pleased to 
 " withdraw her Troops, as England could be to 
 " see her evacuate the country." 
 
 Mr. Canning then went on to explain the 
 
 difficulties in which the British Government had 
 
 been placed with regard to their neutrality, in 
 
 consequence of two Members of Parliament, 
 
 Lord Nugent, and Sir Robert Wilson, having 
 
 gone to Spain to assist the Constitutionalists, in 
 
 direct contravention of the policy of their country 
 
 — and having produced a good-humoured laugh 
 
 at the expense of Lord Nugent, he concluded 
 
 by saying, that " he hoped the House would do 
 
 1 the Government the justice to say openly to 
 
 ' the Country, that, as they had nothing to 
 
 1 allege against its past conduct, so they still 
 
 1 held undiminished confidence in it for the 
 
 1 future." 
 
 After a few observations, in reply, from Sir 
 James Mackintosh, and Lord John Russell, the 
 amendment was carried without a division. 
 
 After this debate the subject was allowed to 
 drop : the Opposition finding, that each motion
 
 173 
 
 of censure which they submitted, was invaria- 
 bly " converted into a regular panegyrick on 
 " the Government." 
 
 Indeed, from this time forth they were so 
 well satisfied with the whole course of our foreign 
 policy, that they never mentioned it, except to 
 praise it; or to endeavour to appropriate to 
 themselves some share of its merits. 
 
 It has been thought better to give the account 
 of these debates before concluding this chapter, 
 in order that all which relates to the French In- 
 vasion of Spain may be brought consecutively 
 under the consideration of the reader. 
 
 In the early part of this work it was stated that 
 the grand object of Mr. Canning's policy was to 
 promote the interests of Great Britain, and by so 
 doing, to contribute to the " prosperity of sur- 
 " rounding Nations." It was likewise stated 
 that at the time when he assumed the direction 
 of our Foreign Affairs, Great Britain did not 
 possess that share of influence amongst the other 
 Powers of Europe to which She was so justly 
 entitled by Her rank and station : and further, 
 that at that time the world was threatened with 
 a danger of the most alarming nature, from an 
 universal collision between the supporters of 
 Ultra-monarchical, and the advocates of Revolu- 
 tionary doctrines.
 
 474 
 
 The restoration of England to her proper 
 position, and the dispersion of the imminent 
 danger to which mankind would have been ex- 
 posed by so tremendous a conflict, were the 
 effects which Mr. Canning predestined should 
 result from his measures ; and the principle 
 by which he determined that those measures 
 should be guided, in order to be productive of 
 such effects, was, that " England should hold 
 " the balance, not only between contending nations, 
 " but between coirflicting principles" favouring, 
 however, in order to preserve the equilibrium, the 
 Liberal scale, because the Anti-liberal scale, at 
 that time, preponderated. 
 
 If things were to be prevented from going 
 
 to extremities," said he, " it must be by 
 
 Great Britain keeping a distinct middle 
 " ground, staying the plague both ways." 
 
 Mr. Canning, therefore, may be said to have 
 reduced to a «« system " the Foreign Policy of 
 this Country — that is, to have conceived a 
 scheme of Policy, regulated by fixed principles 
 of action, and, operating to produce, definite, and 
 foreseen results : and since, from the peace to 
 the time when he accepted office, Great Britain, 
 by the countenance which she had given to the 
 Holy Alliance, had sided with Legitimacy, it is 
 strictly correct to say, that Mr. Canning changed 
 the whole tenour of our Foreign Policy ; and in 

 
 475 
 
 ceasing to encourage Ultra-monarchical tenets, 
 adopted a new " system " of his own. 
 
 We have not yet arrived at a period of this 
 history, when the desired results were effected ; 
 but the following remarks are here introduced, 
 for the sake of tracing the gradual workings of 
 the " system," in the progress of its develope- 
 ment ; and of showing that, each and all of Mr. 
 Canning's measures, whether with respect to the 
 Peninsula, or to the other great Powers of Eu- 
 rope, were referable to the same unchanging 
 motives, and were no temporary expedients, 
 whose nature and tendency were liable to be 
 altered by the varying circumstances of the 
 moment. 
 
 With respect to Spain then, let the reader 
 recall to his mind the transactions at Verona. 
 There, there were two out of the four Great 
 Powers of the Continent, desirous of commenc- 
 ing hostilities with that Country, for the purpose 
 of overturning its Government, because its free 
 institutions had been extorted by a long suffering, 
 but at last resisting, Nation, from the worst of 
 Kings. The remaining two (although some 
 motives of policy peculiar to themselves pre- 
 scribed a different course), would yet have been 
 ready, from their common feeling of hatred to 
 Constitutional Forms of Government, to have 
 met the views of their Allies, and would have 
 been content to have witnessed, in support of the
 
 476 
 
 Monarchical principle, the lighting up in Europe 
 of a new war, a war of principle, of all wars the 
 most to be deprecated. 
 
 Here then, were the supporters of Monarchy 
 about to bring themselves into immediate con- 
 flict with the advocates of Revolution. What 
 then was the conduct of Great Britain ? Did 
 she throw her weight into either scale, either by 
 admitting that the state of Spain justified the 
 interference, or by declaring, that if the inter- 
 ference were persisted in, she should join those 
 against whom it was to be directed ? No, she 
 contented herself with stating, that " she would 
 " not be a party " to such a scheme j and with 
 openly denying the right of the Allies to carry it 
 into execution. The effect of this language was 
 the prevention of any corporate declaration of 
 the Allied Powers against Spain ; although it 
 did not prevent sufficient encouragement being 
 given to France to do that singly, upon doing 
 which jointly, the Alliance did not care to ven- 
 ture. At Verona, therefore, a triumph was ob- 
 tained by neither side, although the frustration 
 of the combined designs of the Great Powers 
 against Spain, served to strengthen the Liberal 
 cause. 
 
 Again, when after the Congress, France 
 trumped up grievances against Spain, as a pre- 
 tence for war, the English Ministers urged her 
 to abandon her purpose by every persuasive
 
 -177 
 
 argument; and botli to France herself directly, 
 and to the British Parliament publickly, they con- 
 demned the principles by which she sought to 
 justify her hostilities. 
 
 But here again the English Ministers would 
 not commit their Country to the cause of Revo- 
 lution ; and instead of encouraging Spain to 
 resist, they did all in their power, by friendly 
 counsel, to induce her to adopt certain modifi- 
 cations of her Constitution, by which they might 
 have been enabled to bring about a compromise 
 between Her and France. 
 
 The Spaniards, however, being too obsti- 
 nate to compromise, the French army entered 
 Spain ; and strict neutrality between the con- 
 tending Nations, was the course which Great 
 Britain determined to pursue. But the conflict 
 was not one of Nations only, but principles; and 
 it was in the power of the English Government, 
 by taking certain steps, equally easy to justify, 
 to have given a triumph, at least of principle, to 
 either party : but the so doing would have been 
 at variance with Mr. Canning's " system " of 
 policy. 
 
 What then was the spirit and purport of the 
 instructions given to Sir William a Court ? Why, 
 that since he was accredited to the King; of 
 Spain, he was to remain with His Majesty, so 
 long as His Majesty even " apparently," pos- 
 sessed the reins of Government. That it was not
 
 ft 
 « 
 
 
 (< 
 (< 
 
 478 
 
 because the British Government might believe 
 that " Ferdinand preferred being an absolute 
 King, to the enjoying any, the most extensive 
 prerogatives, under any, the most perfect of 
 " Constitutions, that therefore, while he was 
 " ostensibly King, they were to assume that he 
 " was a prisoner. There would be no end," 
 said Mr. Canning, " of uncertainties, and inter- 
 ferences, if we were to take upon ourselves to 
 enquire into the degree of freedom and con- 
 " straint, under which all the Sovereigns of 
 Europe might execute their functions ; espe- 
 cially those amongst them, who, having con- 
 curred avowedly in the limitation of their 
 " power, were nevertheless notoriously bent 
 " upon resuming the concessions which they 
 " had made. 
 
 " Into such an enquiry, no Constitutional Go- 
 " vernment could enter. What should we have 
 " thought of an interference from Foreign Eu- 
 " rope when King John granted Magna Charta ? 
 " or of an interposition in the quarrel between 
 " Charles I. and his Parliament ? In either of 
 " these cases, or any such case, the business of 
 " Foreign Powers is with the King, who, till he 
 " is actually deposed, represents the nation at 
 " which he is the head. 
 
 " This was the principle acted upon by Eng- 
 " land at the French Revolution ; for the British 
 " Ambassador was not withdrawn from Paris,
 
 J7 ( J 
 
 " till after the decheance of the King had ex- 
 " tinguished the Power to which he had been 
 " accredited.'* 
 
 Although, therefore, Sir William a Court was 
 not ignorant that Ferdinand quitted Madrid for 
 Seville against his will, he did not, on that ac- 
 count, think himself authorised to withdraw from 
 his attendance on the Royal person. When, 
 however, by the proceedings at Seville, the 
 King's authority was for a time suspended, Sir 
 William " would not sanction by his presence 
 " the measure which had been adopted." Had 
 he done so, he would have flung the weight 
 and authority of his Government into the Revo- 
 lutionary scale. 
 
 But on the other hand, Mr. Canning did not, 
 as he might have done, had he wished to throw 
 that weight and authority into the opposite 
 scale, notify to the Spanish Minister in London 
 the discontinuance of his functions; nor did he 
 instruct Sir William a Court not to rejoin the 
 King, in case His Majesty should resume his 
 authority, and invite the British Minister to his 
 Court : but a discretionary power was given to 
 him to accept the invitation or not, according 
 as the circumstances of the moment might in 
 his opinion, make it expedient, or inexpedient 
 for him so to do. 
 
 In the single case of the King himself request- 
 ing Sir William to repair to Cadiz, as a pro-
 
 480 
 
 tection to his person from violence, he was at 
 all hazards to obey the Royal summons. 
 
 When the time arrived for Sir William to 
 decide the question, no such request had been 
 made by Ferdinand ; moreover, Cadiz was block- 
 aded : Sir William, therefore, prudently deter- 
 mined not to place himself within its walls. 
 
 Nevertheless he did not abstain from giving 
 10 the Cortes all the assistance in his power to 
 bring about an accommodation with the French 
 authorities, and to save the Constitutionalists from 
 the consequences of an unconditional surrender. 
 
 It was from no fault of Sir William's that his 
 exertions were unsuccessful. 
 
 By the King's ceasing to reside in a block- 
 aded city, the only obstacle to the return of 
 Sir William to the Spanish Court was removed. 
 He therefore immediately rejoined His Most 
 Catholick Majesty ; but when an attempt was 
 made to commit the British Minister to an ad- 
 mission of the illegality of the Constitutional 
 Government, by requiring of him that he should 
 be furnished with fresh credentials, because his 
 former ones had been received by Ferdinand 
 during the existence of the Constitutional Sys- 
 tem, he at once scouted the idea of such a 
 purification being necessary, and compelled the 
 Spanish Monarch to acknowledge the sufficiency 
 of the credentials which had already been 
 presented. Neither would he allow the Con-
 
 181 
 
 vention between Great Britain and Spain to be 
 considered as void ; and Ferdinand was once 
 more compelled to admit the validity of an act, 
 done by himself in the hateful character of 
 Constitutional King. 
 
 Thus, in every measure, was this principle of 
 holding the balance to be traced. The refusal 
 of Sir William a Court to sanction by his pre- 
 sence the Regency of the Cortes, might at first 
 sight appear to be a measure in favour of legi- 
 timacy ; but it was counteracted by the fact, 
 that the British Minister did not refuse, on ac- 
 count of the royal functions of the King having 
 been suspended, from afterwards sanctioning, 
 when His Majesty resumed them, the Con- 
 stitutional Government by his presence, but on 
 account of the peculiar circumstances in which 
 the city, where it was established, w r as placed. 
 
 The return of the British Minister to Fer- 
 dinand after his release might have seemed to 
 favour the cause of Absolutism ; but such appa- 
 rent favour was more than outweighed by his 
 insisting on the admission by Ferdinand, that 
 he was bound by an act done, and an agree- 
 ment made by himself, when Head of the Go- 
 vernment of the Cortes. 
 
 It was this same principle that induced Mr. 
 Canning, when he received a letter from Don 
 Victor Saez, the Secretary of State appointed 
 by the Regency, established at Madrid by the 
 
 vol. i. i i
 
 482 
 
 Due d'Angouleme, purposely and openly to 
 decline to acknowledge Don Victor as Secretary 
 of State, or the Regency as the legitimate Go- 
 vernment of Spain, as well as to forbid the 
 British Ambassador at Paris to be present, at 
 any rejoicings given in celebration of the French 
 successes in the Peninsula. 
 
 But it was not only in his policy in Spain that 
 this principle was in operation. The result of 
 the contest in that country (which terminated in 
 October 1823) caused great exultation to the 
 Apostolical Party throughout Europe. The fact 
 of the establishment of despotism by the means 
 of Foreign interference, on the ruins of free 
 institutions (Great Britain remaining a passive 
 spectator), was manifest to all the world ; while 
 the nature of the British Diplomatick Trans- 
 actions presented a much less striking feature, to 
 attract the general attention of the Continental 
 Nations. Mr. Canning, therefore, thought that 
 a publick exposition of the views of England, 
 with regard to Spain and France, would be 
 necessary as a counterpoise to the successes of 
 the latter, in order that the world might be 
 assured that " if England had taken a neutral 
 " position in the Spanish question, it was one 
 " that she had chosen from a just regard for her 
 " own interests, and not because she was unpre- 
 " pared for war, or still less in compliance with
 
 483 
 
 " Foreign dictation, or in enmity with national 
 " freedom." 
 
 The opportunity offered itself for this * exposi- 
 tion very shortly after the time when the French 
 entered Cadiz. On the occasion of the pre- 
 sentation to him of the freedom of the Borough 
 of Plymouth, when, after having shown that 
 the internal feuds by which Spain was divided 
 more than justified England for not having 
 "Quixotically " mingled in the " contest," he 
 observed, " Let it not, however, be said that 
 " we cultivate peace either because we fear, or 
 " because we are unprepared for war ; on the 
 " contrary, if eight months ago the Government 
 " did not hesitate to proclaim that the country 
 " was prepared for war, if war should be unfor- 
 " tunately necessary, every month that has since 
 " passed, has but made us so much the more 
 " capable of exertion. 
 
 " The resources created by peace, are the 
 " means of war. In cherishing these resources, 
 " we but accumulate those means. 
 
 " Our present repose is no more a proof of 
 " inability to act, than the state of inertness and 
 " inactivity in which I have seen those mighty 
 " masses that float in the waters above your town, 
 " is a proof that they are devoid of strength, 
 
 * At the time this Speech was made, Parliament was 
 not to meet for upwards of three months. 
 
 i I 2
 
 484 
 
 " and incapable of being fitted out for action. 
 " You well know, Gentlemen, how soon one 
 " of those stupendous masses, now reposing on 
 " their shadows in perfect stillness, — how soon, 
 " upon any call of patriotism or of necessity, it 
 " would assume the likeness of an animated 
 " thing, instinct with life and motion, — how soon 
 " it would ruffle, as it were, its swelling plumage ; 
 " how quickly it would put forth its scattered 
 " elements of strength, and awaken its dormant 
 " thunder. Such as is one of these magnificent 
 " machines, when springing from inaction into a 
 " display of its might ; such is England Herself, 
 " while apparently passive and motionless, she 
 " silently concentrates the power to be put forth 
 " on an adequate occasion. But, God forbid that 
 " that occasion should arise." 
 
 England, then, was declared by her Foreign 
 Minister to be possessed of the power of going 
 to war, should an " adequate occasion arise : " 
 and was not this declaration a warning to the 
 Governments of Foreign Europe to take care 
 that they did not make that " occasion *' which 
 would be adequate to call forth the dormant 
 vengeance of Britain ? But in taking care 
 that the Continental Powers should not be 
 permitted to think that he was in his heart an 
 admirer of those ultra principles, which they 
 professed, he likewise took care that they should 
 not represent him as a friend of democracy j
 
 48J 
 
 since, failing the consolation to be derived from 
 making out that he was, in secret, an Apos- 
 tolical, they next preferred to fix upon him the 
 odium of being a Revolutionist. Mr. Canning, 
 however, was vehement in declaring that he 
 was no " lover of Revolutions : he had passed," 
 he said, " near thirty years of his life in fighting 
 " for old institutions. But then it ought not to 
 " be forgotten that, in resisting the French Re- 
 " volution, in all its stages, from the Convention 
 " to Buonaparte, he had advocated resistance to 
 " the spirit of change to be sure ; but resist- 
 " ance, also, to the spirit of foreign domination. 
 «« So long as these two spirits were leagued, the 
 " resistance to one animated that to the other ; 
 but if they were to be separated, or, still 
 worse, arrayed against each other, the most 
 " strenuous and most consistent anti-revolutionist 
 " might well hesitate which part to choose. " 
 
 Mr. Canning's principles were essentially Mo- 
 narchical. Abstractedly he preferred Monarchy 
 to any other form of Government; and he was 
 not in any way hostile to " Absolute Monarchy 
 " in that part of Europe where it continued to 
 " flourish. He had no objection to its continu- 
 " ing to flourish where it was the growth of the 
 " soil, and where it contributed to the happiness 
 or to the tranquillity of a people. He would 
 not less readily have denounced any attempt 
 " to invade the Austrian Dominions, for the 
 
 
 it 
 (I
 
 486 
 
 " purpose of overthrowing the Austrian Mo- 
 " narchy, than he did the invasion of Spain for 
 " abolishing the Spanish Constitution ; but he 
 " did think it very inadvisable (as the Holy Alli- 
 " ance seemed resolved to do) to force into con- 
 " flict the abstract principles of Monarchy, and 
 " Democracy. He held it to be the business of 
 " England to preserve, so far as might be, the 
 " peace of the world, and the independence of 
 " the several nations which compose it. He 
 " did not think (as the Holy Alliance seemed 
 " to think) that there was no security for peace 
 " between nations, unless every nation was at 
 " peace within itself; or that Absolute Mo- 
 " narchy was the charm on which such internal 
 " tranquillity depended. 
 
 " He thought, that the harmony of the po- 
 " litical world was no more destroyed by the 
 " variety of Civil Institutions, in different States, 
 " than that of the physical world by the different 
 " magnitudes of the bodies which constitute the 
 " system. There is one glory of the Sun, and 
 " another glory of the Stars, and so forth j but the 
 " Holy Alliance seemed to be of opinion that it 
 " would be desirable to make our glory as like 
 " to that of the Sun and Moon of the Con- 
 " tinent, as possible — but," said Mr. Canning, 
 " they had better leave us quiet in our sphere, 
 " or we shall make most unharmonious musick. " 
 
 Such were Mr. Canning's notions of the re-
 
 487 
 
 lative position of the different States of Europe, 
 one towards the other; and such was the language 
 which he held to our Continental Allies, when 
 they complained that he was too democratical. 
 
 On the other hand, when, at the commence- 
 ment of the Session of 1824, the Opposition in Par- 
 liament insinuated a contrary charge against him, 
 and magnified the danger to this Country from the 
 designs of the Holy Alliance, and the increased 
 power which it had derived from the French 
 success : when they lavished much vituperation 
 upon that league of Sovereigns, on account of 
 their administration of the internal concerns of 
 their own dominions ; and when they predicted 
 that the Alliance would, in process of time, 
 " wound the pride, and outrage the feelings of 
 " the people of this country ; not, however, by 
 " any direct and immediate measures, but by 
 " accustoming us by degrees, to bear first one 
 " thing, and then another, till at last when they 
 " had come to that point at which we neces- 
 " sarily must stop, we should find that we had 
 " lost the golden opportunity of resisting them 
 " with success : and having lost with it that 
 " which to individuals was every thing, and to 
 " nations almost every thing, viz. our honour, 
 " we should be driven, at the good time of these 
 " Sovereigns, and not at our own, to wage a 
 " long and sanguinary, and perhaps unsuccessful 
 " struggle, against those whom we could have
 
 488 
 
 " resisted successfully, had we resisted them in 
 " the outset of their aggressions * ; " then Mr. 
 Canning did not hesitate to raise his voice in 
 defence of the Sovereigns who were attacked. 
 For although there was no individual in ex- 
 istence, who was more alive than himself to the 
 evil consequences which might result from the 
 proceedings of the Holy Alliance, if some means 
 were not devised to put a decided check upon 
 them, yet he held that the resistance here re- 
 commended, was not the best, or surest mode of 
 effecting such a purpose. 
 
 When he first came into office he found this 
 country entangled with that Alliance. From 
 that entanglement he was determined to set 
 It free ; but he thought that that would best 
 be done, not by violently severing the knot 
 which held them together, and convulsing the 
 world with their mutual recoil ; so as to render 
 difficult, if not, impracticable, any future re- 
 union between the former, and any of the 
 members of the latter ; but rather by so loosen- 
 ing the ties which bound them to each other, as 
 that, when the opportunity offered for dissolving 
 those ties altogether, the Monarchs from whom, 
 as a body, Great Britain disengaged herself, might 
 not be left united amongst themselves against 
 Her, but might be ready individually to main- 
 
 * Vide Mr. Brougham's Speech.
 
 489 
 
 tain with Her the relations of the strictest 
 friendship. 
 
 " For surely," said Mr. Canning, in answer to 
 Mr. Brougham's philippick, in which the learned 
 gentleman magnified and set forth in terms of 
 glowing eloquence, and indignant invective, the 
 tyrannical conduct of the Austrian Government 
 in Lombardy, " surely it would be any thing but 
 " sound policy, to refuse to hold communion 
 " with States unless they were possessed of free 
 " Constitutions : — we cannot, " continued he, 
 " make a new world, nor form another of ' one 
 " * entire and perfect chrysolite,' we must deal 
 " with the world as it is, and it is the business of 
 " this Country to maintain her external relations, 
 " to preserve her connection with the great 
 " Powers of Europe with reference to the corpus 
 " imperii, on broad and general principles of 
 " State policy, without examining too minutely 
 " into abuses which may exist in their Govern- 
 " ments, or into practices which our better Go- 
 " vernment and happier Institutions enable us 
 " to criticise with severity, or denounce with 
 " abhorrence. 
 
 " The true policy of England," he said, " was 
 " to move steadily on in her own orbit, without 
 " looking too nicely to the conduct of 'the Powers 
 " in alliance with her ; to be content with her 
 " own glory, and, by its example, to excite other 
 " nations to arrive at the same advantages which 
 
 VOL. I. K K
 
 490 
 
 " her peculiar system had bestowed upon her ; 
 " but not by a wild crusade, to endeavour to 
 " force those advantages upon other Countries ; 
 " converting blessings into curses, as respected 
 " them, and courting danger and difficulty, as 
 " regargded herself." 
 
 Thus it was that Mr. Canning endeavoured 
 " to stay the plague both ways ;" and thus he 
 " held the balance between conflicting principles, 
 " and contending nations." 
 
 END OF THE FIRST VOLUME. 
 
 London : 
 Printed by A. & R. Spottiswoode, 
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