A TREATISE Concerning the PRIN CIP LES O F HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. WHEREIN THE Chief Caufes of Error and Difficulty in the Sciences, with the Grounds of Scepticifm, Atbeifm, and Irrfligion, are inquired into. Firft Printed in the Year 1710. To which are added THREE DIALOGUES BETWEEN Hylas and Philonous, In Oppofition to SCEPTICKS WATHEISTS. Firft Printed in the Year 1715. Both written by GEORGE BERKELET, M. A. Fellow of Trinity-College, Dublin. LONDON: Printed for Jacob Tonfon, 1734. INTRODUCTION. HILOSOPHY being nothing elfe but the ftudy of Wifdom and Truth, it may with reafon be expect- ed, that thofe who have fpent moft Time and Pains in it thould enjoy a greater calm and ferenity of Mind, a greater clearnefs and evidence of Know- ledge, and be lefs difturbed with Doubts and Difficulties than other Men. Yet fo it is we fee the Illiterate Bulk of Mankind that walk the High-road of plain, com- mon Senfe, and are governed by the Dic- tates of Nature, for the moft part eafy and undifturbed. To them nothing that's fa- miliar appears unaccountable or difficult to comprehend. They complain not of any want of Evidence in their benfes, and are out of all danger of becoming Sceptics. But no fooner do we depart from Senfe and Inftinct to follow the Light of a Su- perior Principle, to reafon, meditate, and reflect on the Nature of Things, but a thoufand Scruples fpring up in our Minds, concerning thofe Things which before w*e feemed fully to comprehend. Prejudices A 2 and INTRODUCTION. and Errors of Scnfe do from all Parts dif- cover themfelves to our view ; and endea- vouring to correct tjaefc by Reafon we arc infenfibly drawn into uncouth Paradoxes, Difficulties, and Inconfiftences, which mul- tiply and grow upon us as we advance in Speculation; till at length, having wander 'd through many intricate Mazes, we find our felves juft where we were, or, which is worfe, fit down in a forlorn Scepticifm. II. The caufe of this is thought to be the Obicurity of things, or the natural Weaknefs and Irrs perfection of our Un- derftandings. It is faid the Faculties we have are few, and thole defigned by Na- ture for the Support and Comfort of Life, and not to penetrate into the inward Effence and Constitution of Things. Be- fides, the Mind of Man being Finite, when it treats of Things which partake of Infinity, it is not to be wondered at, if it run into Abfurdities and Contradictions j out of which it is impoflible it fhould e- ver extricate it felf, it being of the na- ture of Infinite not to be comprehended by that which is Finite, III. But perhaps we may be too par- tial to our felves in placing the Fault ori- ginally in pur Faculties, and not rather INTRODUCTION, J in the wrong ufe we make of them. It is a hard thing to fuppofe, that right Deductions from true Principles fhould ever end in Confcquences which cannot be maintained or made confident. We fhould believe that God has dealt more bountifully with the Sons of Men, than to give them a ftrong defire for that Knowledge, which he had placed quite out of their reach. This were not agreea- ble to the wonted, indulgent Methods of Providence, which, whatever Appetites ic may have implanted in the Creatures, doth ufually furnim them with fuch means as, if rightly made ufe of, will not fail to fatisfy them. Upon the whole, I am inclined to think that the far great- er Part, if not all, of thofe Difficulties wnich have hitherto amus'd Philofophers, and block'd up the way to Knowledge, are intirely owing to our felves. That we have firft rais'd a Duft, and then complain, we cannot fee. IV. My Purpofe therefore is, to try if I can difcover what thole Principles are, which have introduced all that Doubt- fulnefs and Uncertainty, thofe Abiurdides and Contradictions into the feveral Sedts of Philofophy; infomuch that the Wileft Men have thought our Ignorance incur a- A 3 bie, INTRODUCTION. * ble, conceiving it to arife from the natu- ral dulnefs and limitation of our Faculties. And furely it is a Work well deferving our Pains, to make a ftrict inquiry con- cerning the firft Principles of Humane Knowledge, to fife and examine them on all fides : efpecially fince there may be fome Grounds to fufpect that thofe Lets and Difficulties, which flay and embarafs the Mind in its fearch after Truth, do not fpring from any Darknefs and Intricacy in the Objects, or natural Defect in the Un- derftanding, fo much as from falfe Princi- ples which have been infifted on, and might have been avoided. V. How difficult and difcou raging fo- ever this Attempt may feem, when I con- fider how many great and extraordinary Men have gone before me in the fame De- figns : Yet I am not without fome Hopes, upon the Confideration that the largeft Views are not always the Cleareft, and that he who is Short-fighted will be obliged to dravv the Object nearer, and may, per- haps, by a clofe and narrow Survey difcern that which had efcaped far better Eyes. VI. In order to prepare the Mind of the Reader for the eafier conceiving what follows, it is proper to premife iomewhat-, by INTRODUCTION. by way of Introduction, concerning the Nature and Abufe of Language. But the un- raveling this Matter leads me in fome mea- fure to anticipate my Delign, by taking notice of what feems to have had a chief part in ren- dering Speculation intricate and perplexed, and to have occafioned innumerable Errors and Difficulties in almoft all parts of Know- ledge. And that is the opinion that the Mind hath a power of framing Abftratf Ideas or Notions of Things. He who is not a perfect Stranger to the Writings and Dilputes of Philosophers, muft needs acknowledge that no fmall part of them are fpent about ab- Jftracl: Ideas. Thefe are in a more efpecial manner, thought to be the Object of thofe Sciences which go by the name of Logic and Metaphyjics, and of all that which paffes under the Notion of the moft ab- ftracted and fublime Learning, in all which one fhall fcarce find any Queftion handled in fuch a manner, as docs not fuppofe their Exigence in the Mind, and that it is well acquainted with them, VII. It is agreed on all hands, that the Qualities or Modes of things do never really exift each or them apart by it felf, and (eparated from all others, but are mix'd, as it were, and blended together, feyeral in the fame Object. But we are A 4 told* I N T R O D U C T LO N. told, the Mind being able to confider each Quality fmgly, or abftra&ed from thofe other Qualities with which it is united, does by that means frame to it felf abftradt Ideas. For example, there is perceived by Sight an Objedt extended, coloured, and moved : This mix'd or compound Idea the mind refolving into its Simple, conftituent Parts, and viewing each by it felf, exclu- five of the reft, does frame the abftradt Ideas of Extenfion, Colour, and Motion. Not that it is poflible for Colour or Mo- tion to exift without Extenfion: but only that the Mind can frame to it felf by Ab- Jlraftion the Idea of Colour cxclufive of Extenfion, and of Motion exclufive of both Colour and Extenfion. VIII. Again, the Mind having obferved that in the particular Extensions perceiv'd by Senfe, there is fomething common and alike in all, and fome other things pecu- liar, as this or that Figure or Magnitude, which diftinguifh them one from another; it confiders apart or fingles out by it felf that which is common, making thereof a moft abftract Idea of Extenfion, which is neither Line, Surface, nor Solid, nor has any Figure or Magnitude but is an Idea Entirely prefcinded from all thefe. bo like- wife the Mind by leaving out of the par- ticular INTRODUCTION. ticular Colours perceived by Senfe, that which diftinguifhes them one from ano- ther, and retaining that only which is common to all, makes an Idea of Colour in abftract which is neither Red, nor Blue, nor White, nor any other determinate Co- lour. And in like manner by confidering Motion abftracledly not only from the Body moved, but likewife from the Figure it defcribes, and all particular Directions and Velocities, the abftracl: Idea of Motion is framed; which equally correfponds to all particular Motions whatfoever that may be perceived by Senfe. IX. And as the Mind frames to it felf abftract Ideas of Qualites or Modes, fo does it, by the fame precifion or men- tal Separation, attain abftract Ideas of the more compounded Beings, which include feveral coexiftent Qualities. For exam- ple, the Mind having obferved that Peter> James y and John, referable each other, in certain common Agreements of Shape and other Qualities, leaves out of the complex or compounded Idea it has of Pefer, James, and any other particular Man, thai which is peculiar to each, re- taining only what is common to all ; and fo makes an abitracl: la -. . wherein all the particulars equally partak., abftracling in- tirely tirely from and cutting off all thofe Cir- cumftances and Differences, which might determine it to any particular Exiflence. And after thjs manner it is faid we come by the abftracl Idea of Man or, if you pleafe, Humanity or Humane Nature j wherein it is true there is included Colour, becaufe there is no Man hut has fome Colour, but then it can be neither White, nor Black, nor any particular Colour ; becaufe the is no one particular Colour wherein all Men partake. So likewife there is included Stature, but then it is neither Tall Stature nor Low Stature, nor yet Middle Stature, but fomething ab- ftracted from all thefe. And fo of the reft. Moreover, there being a great va- riety of other Creatures that partake in fome Parts, but not all, of the complex Idea of Man, the Mind leaving out thofe Parts which are peculiar to Men, and retaining thofe only which are common to all the living Creatures, frameth the Idea of Animal, which abilracls not only from all particular Men, but alfo all Birds, Beafts, Fiihes, and Infecls, The conftituent Pans of the abftraft Idea of Animal are Body, Life, benfe, and Spon- taneous Motion. By Body is meant, Body without any particular Shape or Figure, there being no one Shape or Figure com- BlOfl INTRODUCTION. it mon to all An:m:ls, without Covering either of Hr : r or Feathers, or Scales, &c. nor yet Naked: Hair, Feathers, Scales, andNakednefs being the ditiinguifhing Pro- perties of particular Animals, and for that reafon left out of the Abjlratf Idea. -Up- on the fame account the fpontaneous Mo- tion muft be neither Walking, nor Flying, nor Creeping, it is neverthelefs a Moti- on, but what that Motion is, it is not eafy to conceive. X. Whether others have this won* derful Faculty of Abftra&ing tbeir Ideas, they beft can tell: For my felf I find in- deed I have a Faculty of imagining, or reprefenting to myfelf the Ideas of thofe particular things I have perceived and of varioufly compounding and dividing them, I can imagine a Man with Two Heads or the upper parts of a Man joined to the Body of a Horfe. I can cotrfider the Hand, the Eye, the Nofe, each by it felf abftracted or feparated from the reft of the Body. But then whatever Hand or Eye I imagine, it muft have fome particular Shape and Colour. Likewife the Idea of Man that I frame to my felf, muft be either of a White, or a Black, or a Tawny, a Straight, or a Crooked, a Tall, or a Low, or a Middle-fized Man. I ,* INTRODUCTION. I cannot by any effort of Thought con- ceive the abftract Idea above deicribed. And it is equally impoffible for me to form the abftract Idea of Motion diftinct from the Body moving, and which is neither Swift nor Slow, Curvilinear nor Rectilinear; and the like may be faid of all other abftract general Ideas whatfo- ever. To be plain, I own my felf able to abftract in one Senfe, as when I con- fider fome particular Parts or Qualities fe- parated from others, with which though they are united in fome Object, yet, it is poflible they may really Exift without them. But I deny that I can abftract one from another, or conceive feparatcly, thofe Qualities which it is impoflible mould Exift fo feparated; or that I can frame a General Notion by aftracting from Par- ticulars in the manner aforefaid. Which two laft are the proper Acceptations of Abjlraftion. And there are Grounds to think moft Men will acknowledge them- felves to be in my Cafe. The Genera- lity of Men which are Simple and Illite- rate never pretend to abftratt Notions. It is faid they are difficult and not to be attained without Pains and Study. We may therefore reafonably conclude that, if fuch there be, they are confined only to the Learned. XI. INTRODUCTION. 15 XL I proceed to examine what can be alledfred in defence of the Doctrine of Abftradlion, and try if I can difcover what it is that inclines the Men of Spe- culation to embrace an Opinion, fo re- mote from common Senfe as that feems to be. There has been a late defer^edly Eftejemed Philofopher, who, no doubt, has given it very much Countenance by feem- ing to think the having abftradt general Ideas is what puts the wideft difference in point of Underftanding betwixt. Man and Beaft. " The having of general <{ Ideas (faith he) is that which puts a " perfed: distinction betwixc Man and " Brutes, and is an Excellency which the * c Faculties of Brutes do by no means " attain unto. For it is evident we ob- " fervenoFootfteps in them of making ufe " of general Signs for univerfal Ideas; from " which we have reafon to imagine that " they have not the Faculty of abjlrafting " or making general Ideas, fmce they have " no ufe of Words or any other general " Signs. And a little after. Therefore, and annexed them to every common Name they make ufe of? XV. Nor do I think them a whit more needful for the Enlargement of Knowledge than for Communication. It is I know a Point much infifted on, that al! Know- ledge and Demonftration are about univer- fal Notions, to which I fully agree : But then it doth not appear to me that thofe Notions are formed by Abftraftion in the manner premifed; UwverjfaMty, fo far as I can comprehend, not confifting in the abfolute, pofitive Nature or Conception of any thing, but in the relation it bears to the INTRODUCTION. the Particulars fignified or reprefented by it : By virtue whereof it is that Things, Names, or Notions, being in their own Nature Particular, are rendered Univerfal. Thus when I demonftrate any Propofition concerning Triangles, it is to be fuppofed that I have in view the univerfal Idea of a Triangle j which ought not to be under- ftood as if I could frame an Idea of a Triangle which was neither Equilateral nor Scalenon nor Equicrural. But only that the particular Triangle I confider, whether of this or that fort it matters nor, doth equally ftand for and reprefent all Rectilinear Triangles whatfoever, and is in that fenfe UniverJaL All which feems very Plain and not to include any Difficulty in it. XVI But here it will be demanded, how we can know any Propofition to be true of all particular Triangles, except we have firft feen it demonftrated of the abftract Idea of a Triangle which equally agrees to all? For becaufe a Property may be de- monftrated to agree to fome one particular Triangle, it will not thence follow that it equally belongs to any other Triangle, which in all refpedts is not the fame with it. For Example, Having demonftrated that the three Angles of an Ifofceles Rec- tangular Triangle are equal to two right B 3 Ones, it INTRODUCTION. Ones, I cannot therefore conclude this Af- fection agrees to all other Triangles, which have neither a right Angle, nor two equal Sides. It feems therefore that, to be cer- tain this Proportion is univerfally true, we muft either make a particular Demonftra- tion for every particular Triangle, which is impoffible, or once for all demonftrate it of the abftraffi Idea of a Triangle, in which all the Particulars do indifferently partake, and by which they are all equally reprefented. To which I anfwer, that though the Idea I have in view whilft I make the Demonflration, be, for inftance, that of an Ifofceles Rectangular Triangle, whofe Sides are of a determinate Length, I may neverthelefs be certain it extends to all other Rectilinear Triangles, of what Sort or Bignefs foever. And that, becaufc neither the right Angle, nor the Equality, nor determinate Length of the Sides, are at all concerned in the Demonftration. It is true, the Diagram I have in view in- cludes all thefe Particulars, but then there is not the leaft mention made of them in the Proof of the Propofition. It is not faid, the three Angles are equal to two right Ones, becaufe one of them is a right An- gle, or becaufe the Sides comprehending it are of the fame Length. Which fufficient- ly {hews that the right Angle might have been INTRODUCTION. been Oblique, and the Sides unequal, and for all that the Demonftration have held good. And for this reafon it is, that I conclude that to be true of any Obliquan- gular or Scalenon, which I had demon- grated of a particular Right-angled, Equi- crural Triangle 5 and not becaufe I demon- frrated the Proportion of the abftraft Idea of a Triangle. And here it muft be ac- knowledged that a Man may confider a Fi- gure merely as triangular, without attend- ing to the particular Qualities of the An- gles, or relations of the Sides. So far he may abftrac~l: But this will never prove, that he can frame an abftracl general in- confiftent Idea of a Triangle. In like man- ner we may confider Peter fo far forth as Man, or fo far forth as Animal, without framing the forementioned abftracl Idea, either of Man or of Animal, in as much as all that is perceived is not confidered. XVII. It were an endlefs, as well as an ufelefs Thing, to trace the Schoolmen, thofe great Matters of Abftraction, through all the manifold inextricable Labyrinths of Er- ror and Difpute, which their Doctrine of abftraft Natures and Notions feems to have led them into. What Bickerings and Con- troverfies, and what a learned Duft have been raifed about thofe Matters, and what B 4 mighty INTRODUCTION. mighty Advantage hath been from thence derived to Mankind, are things at this Day too clearly known to need being infifted on. And it had been well if the ill Effects of that Doftrine were confined to thofe only who make the moft avowed Profef- fion of it. When Men confider the great Pains, Induftry and Parts, that have for fo many Ages been laid out on the Cultiva- tion and Advancement of the Sciences, and that notwithftanding all this, the far greater Part of them remain full of Darknefs and Uncertainty, and Difputes that are like never to have an end, and even thofe that are thought to be fupported by the mofl clear and cogent Demonftrations, contain in them Paradoxes which are perfectly ir- reconcilable to the Underftandings of Men, and that taking all together, a fmall Portion of then* doth.fupply any real Benefit to Mankind, otherwiie than by being an in- nocent Diverfion and Amufement : I fay, the Confideration of all this is apt to throw them into a Defpondency, and perfect Contempt of all Study. But this may per- haps ceafe, upon a view of the falfe Prin- ciples that have obtained in the World, amongft all which there is none, methmks, hath a more wide Influence over the Thoughts of Speculative Men, than this pf abilrad general Ideas. XVIII. I INTRODUCTION. XVIII. I come now to conlider the Source of this prevailing Notion, and that feems to me to be Language. And furely nothing of lefs extent than Reafo'n it felf could have been the Source of an Opinion fo univerfally received. The truth of this appears as from other Reafons, fo alfo from the plain Confeffion of the ableft Patrons of abftracl: Ideas, who acknowledge that they are made in order to naming; from which it is a clear Confequence, that if there had been no fuch thing as Speech or Univerfal Signs, there never had been any thought of Abftradion. See B. 3. C. 6. Sect. 39. and elfewbere of the Effay on Hu- man Under/landing. Let us therefore ex- amine the manner wherein Words have contributed to the Origin of that Miflake. Firft then, 'Tis thought that every Name hath, or ought to have, one only precifc and fettled Signification, which inclines Men to think there are certain abftracl^ df- termmate Ideas^ which conftitute the true and only immediate fcignification of each general Name. And that it is by the me- diation of thefe abftradt Ideas, that a ge- neral Name comes to iignify any particular Thing. Whereas, in truth, there is no fuch thing as one precife and definite Sig- nification annexed to any general Name, they INTRODUCTION. they all fignifying indifferently a great number of particular Ideas. All which doth evidently follow from what has been already faid, and will clearly appear to any one by a little Reflexion. To this it will be objected, that every Name that has a Definition, is thereby reftrained to one certain Signification. For Example, a Tri- angle is defined to be a plain Surface com- prehended by three right Lines j by which that Name is limited to denote one certain Idea and no other. To which I anfwer, that in the Definition it is not faid whe- ther the Surface be Great or Small, Black or White, nor whether the Sides are Long or Short, Equal or Unequal, nor with what Angles they are inclined to each o- ther j in all which there may be great Va- riety, and confequently there is no one fet- tled Idea which limits the Signification of the word Triangle. 'Tis one thing for to keep a Name conftantly to the fame Defi- nition, and another to make it ftand every where for the fame Idea : the one is necef- fary, the other ufelefs and impracticable. XIX. But to give a farther Account how Words came to produce the Doctrine of abftracl: Ideas, it muft be obferved that it is a received Opinion, that Language has no other End but the communicating our Ideas, INTRODUCTION. z 7 Ideas, and that every fignificant Name (lands for an Idea. This being ib, and it being withal certain, that Names, which yet are not thought altogether infignificant, do not always mark out particular con- ceivable Ideas, it is ftraightway concluded that they (land for abftrad Notions. That there are many Names in ufe amongfl Spe- culative Men, which do not always iug- gefl to others determinate particular Ideas, is what no Body will deny. And a little Attention will difcover, that it is not ne- ceffary (even in the flricteft Reafonings) iig- nificant Names which {land for Ideas mould, every time they are ufed, excite in the Un- derflanding the Ideas they are made to (land for : In Reading and Difcourfing, Names being for the mofl part ufed as Let- ters are in Algebra, in which though a particular quantity be marked by each Letter, yet to proceed right it is not re- quifite that in every flep each Letter fug- geft to your Thoughts, that particular quantity it was appointed to ftand for. XX. Befides, the communicating of Ideas marked by Words is not the chief and only end of Language, as is commonly fuppoled. There are other Ends, as the raifing of fome Paflion, the exciting to, or deterring from an Action, the putting the 8 INTRODUCTION. the Mind in fome particular Difpofition ; to which the former is in many Cafes bare- ly fubfervient, and fometimes intirely o- mitted, when thefe can be obtained with- out it, as I think doth not infrequently happen in the familiar ufe of Language. I intreat the Reader to reflect with himfelf, and fee if it doth not often happen either in Hearing or Reading a Difcourfe, that the Paflions of Fear, Love, Hatred, Admira- tion, Difdain, and the like, arife imme- diately in his Mind upon the Perception of certain Words, without any Ideas coming between. At firft, indeed, the Words might have occafioned Ideas that were fit to pro- duce thofe Emotions ; but, if I miftake not, it will be found that when Language is once grown familiar, the hearing of the Sounds or Sight of the Characters is oft immediately attended with thofe Paflions, which at firft were wont to be produced by the intervention of Ideas, that are now quite omitted. May we not, for Example, be affected with the promife of a good Thing, though we have not an Idea of what it is ? Or is not the being threatned with Danger fufficient to excite a Dread, though we think not of any particular Evil likely to befal us, nor yet frame to oar felves an Idea of Danger in Abflraft ? If any one (hall join ever fo little Reflexion of INTRODUCTION. of his own to what has been faid, I be- lieve it will evidently appear to him, that general Names are often ufed in the pro- priety of Language without the Speaker's defigning them for Marks of Ideas in his own, which he would have them raife in the Mind of the Hearer. Even proper Names themfelves do not feem always fpo- ken, with a Defign to bring into our view the Ideas of thofe Individuals that are fup- pofed to be marked by them. For Exam- ple, when a Schoolman tells me Ariftotle hath faid it, all I conceive he means by it, is to difpofe me to embrace his Opinion with the Deference and Submiffion which Cuftom has annexed to that Name. And this effeft may be fo inftantly produced in the Minds of thofe who are accuftomed to refign their Judgment to the Authority of that Philofopher, as it is impoffible any Idea either of his Perfon, Writings, or Re- putation fhould go before. Innumerable Examples of this kind may be given, but why fhould I infift on thofe things, which every one's Experience will, I doubt not, plentifully fuggeft unto him ? XXI. We have, I think, {hewn the Im- pofiibility tf abftr act Ideas. We have con- fidered what has been faid for them by their abkft Patrons; and endeavoured to fhew 5 (hew they are of no Ufe for thofe Ends, to which they are thought necefiary. And laftly, we have traced them to the Source from whence they flow, which appears to be Language. It cannot be denied that Words are of excellent Ufe, in that by their means all that Stock of Knowledge which has been purchaied by the joint La- bours of inquifitive Men in all Ages and Nations, may be drawn into the view and made the poffeffion of one fingle Perfon. But at the fame time it muft be owned that moft parts of Knowledge have been ftrangely perplexed and darkened by the abufe of Words, and general ways of bpeech wherein they are delivered. Since therefore Words are fo apt to impofe on the Underftanding, whatever Ideas I con- fider, I {hall endeavour to take them bare and naked into my View, keeping out of my Thoughts, fo far as I am able, thofe Names which long and conftant Ufe hath fo ftridtly united with them ; from which 1 may exped to derive the following Ad- vantages. XXII. Firft, I fhall be fure to get clear of all Controverfies purely Verbal ; the fpringing up of which Weeds in almoft atl the Sciences has been a main Hindrance to the Growth of true and found Know- ledge. INTRODUCTION. ledge. Secondly, this feems to be a fure way to extricate my felf out of that fine and fubtiie Net of abftraff Ideas, which has fo miferably perplexed and entangled the Minds of Men, and that with this pe- culiar Circumftance, that by how much the finer and more curious was the Wit of any Man, by fo much the deeper was he like to be enfnared, and fatter held there- in. Thirdly, fo long as I confine my Thoughts to my own Ideas diverted of Words, I do not fee how I can eafily be miftaken. The Objects I confider, I clear- ly and adequately know. I cannot be de- ceived in thinking I have an Idea which I have not. It is not poffible for me to imagine, that any of my own Ideas are a- like or unlike, that are not truly fo. To difcern the Agreements or Difagreements there are between my Ideas, to fee what Ideas are included in any compound Idea, and what not, there is nothing more requifite, than an attentive Perception of what paries in my own Understanding. XXIII. But the attainment of all theffe Advantages doth prefuppofe an intire De- liverance from the Deception of Words, which I dare hardly promife my felf; fo difficult a thing it is to dilTolve an Union fo early begun, and confirmed by fo long INTRODUCTION. a Habit as that betwixt Words and Ideas. Which Difficulty feems to have been very much increafed by the Doctrine of Ab- Jiraftion. For fo long as Men thought ab- .ftraft Ideas were annexed to their Words, it doth not feem ftrange that they mould ufe Words for Ideas : It being found an impracticable thing to lay afide the Word, and retain the abftrad: Idea in the Mind, which in it lelf was perfectly inconceiva- ble. This feems to me the principal Caufe, why thofc Men who have fo emphatically recommended to others, the laying afide all ufe of Words in their Meditations, and contemplating their bare Ideas, have yet failed to perform it themfelves. Of late many have been very fenfible of the ab- *furd Opinions and infignificant Difputes, which grow out of the abufe of Words. And in order to remedy thefe Evils they advile well, that we attend to the Ideas figmfied, and draw off our Attention from the Words which fignify them. But how good ioever this Advice may be, they have given others, it is plain they could not have a due regard to it themlelves, fo long as they thought the only immediate ufe of Words was to fignify Ideas, and that the immediate Signification of every general Name was a determinate^ abjiraft Idea. XXIV. But XXIV. But thefc being known to be Miftakes, a Man may with greater Eafc prevent his being impofed on by Words. He that knows he has no other than parti- cular Ideas, will not puzzle himfelf in vain to find out and conceive the abftract Idea, annexed to any Name. And he that knows Names do not always ftand for Ideas, will fpare himfelf the labour of looking for Ideas, where there are none to be had. Ic were therefore to be wifhed that every one would ufe his utmoft Endeavours, to obtain a clear View of the Ideas he would confider, feparating from them all that drefs and incumbrance of Words which fo much contribute to blind the Judgment and divide the Attention. In vain do we extend our View into the Heavens, and pry into the Entrails of the Earth, in vain do we confult the Writings of learned Men, and trace the dark Footfteps of Antiquity ; we need only draw the Curtain of Words, to behold the faireft Tree of Knowledge, whofe Fruit is excellent, and within the reach of our Hand. XXV. Unlefs we take care to clear the firft Principles of Knowledge, , from the embarras and delufion of Words, we may make infinite Reafonings upon them to no C purpofe j purpofe; we may draw Confequcnces from Confequences, and be never the wifer. The farther we go, we ihall only lofe our felves the more irrecoverably, and be the deeper entangled in Difficulties and Mif- takes. Whoever therefore defigns to read the following Sheets, I intreat him to make my Words the Occafion of his own Think- ing, and endeavour to attain the fame Train of Thoughts in Reading, that I had in writing them. By this means it will be cafy for him to difcover the Truth or Fal- fity of what I fay. He will be out of all danger of being deceived by my Words, and I do not fee how he can be led into an ' Error by confidering his own naked, undifguifed Ideas. OF O F T H E PRINCIPLES O F Humane Knowledge. PART I. ; T is evident to any one who takes a Survey of the Objects of Humane Knowledge, that they are either Ideas aciually imprinted on the Senfes, or elfe fuch as are perceived by attending to the Paffions and Operations of the Mind, or laftly Ideas formed by help of Memory and Imagination, cither compounding, di- viding, or barely reprcfenting thofc origi- nally perceived in the aforefaid ways. By C 2 Sight 5 6 Of the Principles Part I. Sight I have the Ideas of Light and Co- lours with their feveral Degrees and Varia- tions. By Touch I perceive, for Example, Hard and Soft, Heat and Cold, Motion and Refinance, and of all thefe more and lefs either as to Quantity or Degree. Smel- ling furnifhes me with Odors ; the Palate with Taftcs, and Hearing conveys Sounds to the Mind in all their variety of Tone and Compofition. And as feveral of thefe are obferved to accompany each other, they come to be marked by one Name, and fo to be reputed as one Thing. Thus, for Example, a certain Colour, Tafte, Smell, Figure and Confiftence having been ob- ferved to go together, are accounted one diftinct Thing, fignified by the Name Ap- ple. Other Collections of Ideas conftitute a Stone, a Tree, a Book, and the like fen- fible Things j which, as they are pleafmg or difagreeable, excite the Paffions of Love, Hatred, Joy, Grief, and fo forth. II. But befides all that endlefs variety of Ideas or Objects of Knowledge, there is likewife fomething which knows or per- ceives them, and exercifes divers Operati- ons, as Willing, Imagining, Remembering about them. This perceiving, active Be- ing is what I call Mind^ Spirit, Soul or my Self. By which Words I do not denote any one of my Ideas, but a thing intirely diftincl: Part I. of Humane Knowledge. diftinct from them, wherein they exift, or, which is the fame thing, whereby they are perceived ; for the Exiftence of an Idea confifts in being perceived. III. That neither our Thoughts, nor Paffions, nor Ideas formed by the Imagi- nation, exift without the Mind, is what every Body will allow. And it feems no lefs evident that the various Senfations or Ideas imprinted on the Senfe, however blended or combined together (that is, whatever Objects they compofe) cannot exift otherwife than in a Mind perceiving them. I think an intuitive Knowledge may be obtained of this, by any one that fhall attend to what is meant by the Term Extft ; when applied to fenfible Things. The Table I write on, I fay, exifts, that is, I fee and feel it ; and if I were out of my Study I mould fay it exifted, meaning thereby that if I was in rny Study I might perceive it, or that fome other Spirit actu- ally does perceive it. There was an Odor, that is, it was fmelled ; There was a Sound, that is to fay, it was heard ; a Colour or Figure, and it was perceived by Sight or Touch. This is all that I can underftand by thefc and the like Expreffions. For as to what is faid of the abfolute Exift ence of unthinking Things without any relation C 3 to 3 8 Of the Principles Part I. to their being perceived, that feems per- fectly unintelligible. Their EJJ'e is Percipi, nor is it pofiible they fhould have any Exiftence, out of the Minds or thinking Things which perceive them. IV. It is indeed an Opinion ftrangely prevailing amongft Men, that Houfes, Mountains, Rivers, and in a word all fen- fible Objects have an Exiftence Natural or Real, diftinct from their being perceived by the Underftanding. But with how great an AfTurance and Aequiefcence foever this Principle may be entertained in the World ; yet whoever {hall find in his Heart to call it in Queftion, may, if I miftake not, per- ceive it to involve a manifeft Contradicti- on. For what are the forementioned Ob- jects but the things we perceive by Senfe, and what do we perceive beiides our own Ideas orSenfations; and is it nor plainly re- pugnant that any one of thefe or any Combination of them mould exift unper- ceived ? V. If we throughly examine this Tenet, it will, perhaps, be found at Bottom to depend on the Doctrine of Abjlraft Ideas. For can there be a nicer Strain of Abftrac- tion than to diftinguifli the Exiftence of fenfible Objects from their being perceived, fQ Part I. of Humane Knowledge. fo as to conceive them Exifting unper- ceived ? Light and Colours, Heat and Cold, Extenfion and Figures, in a word the Things we fee and feel, what are they but fo many Senfations, Notions, Ideas or Impreffions on the Senfej and is it poffible to feparate, even in thought, any of thefc from Perception ? For my part I might as eafily divide a Thing from it Self. I may indeed divide in my Thoughts or con- ceive apart from each other thofe Things which, perhaps, I never perceived by Senfe fo divided. Thus I imagiae the Trunk of a Humane Body without the Li-mbs, or conceive the Smell of a Rofe without thinking on the Rofe it felf. So far I will not deny I can abftract, if that may pro- perly be called Abjlraftion^ which extends only to the conceiving feparately fuch Ob- jects, as it is pofTible may really exift or be actually perceived afunder. But my con- ceiving or imagining Power does not ex- tend beyond the poiiibility of real Exif- tence or Perception. Hence as it is im- poffible for me to fee or feel any Thing without an actual Senfation of that Thing, fo is it impoflible for me to conceive in my Thoughts any fenfible Thing or Ob- ject diftindt from the Senfation or Percep- tion of it, C 4 VI. Some 40 Of the Principles Part I. VI. Some Truths there are fo near and obvious to the Mind, that a Man need only open his Eyes to fee them. Such I take this Important one to be, to wit, that all the Choir of Heaven and Furniture of the Earth, in a word all thofe Bodies which compofe the mighty Frame of the World, have not any Subfiftence without a Mind, that their Beirg is to be perceived or known; that confequently fo long as they arc not actually perceived by me, or do not exift ir. my Mind or that of any other created Spirit, they muft either have no Exiiieuce at all, or elfe fubfift in the Mind of feme eternal Spirit : It being perfectly tHiinreihgible and involving all the Abfur- d;ty of Abura&ion, to attribute to any fin- gle part of them an Exiflence independent of a Spine. To be convinced of which, tl e Reader need only reflect and try to fe- parate in his own Thoughts the being of a fenfible thing from its being perceived. < VII. From what has been faid, it fol- lows, there is not any other Subftance than 5/>/r/V, or that which perceives. But for the fuller proof of this Point, let it be confidered, the fenfible Qualities are Co- lour, Figure, Motion, Smell, Tafte, and ifach like, that is, the Ideas perceived by Senfe, Parti, of Humane Knowledge. 4* Senfe. Now for an Idea to exift in an un- perceiv ing Thing, is a manifeft Contradic- tion ; for to have an Idea is all one as to perceive: that therefore wherein Colour, Figure, and the like Qualities exift, muft perceive them ; hence it is clear there can be no unthinking Subftance or Subftratum of thofe Ideas. VIII. But fay you, though the Ideas themfelves do not exift without the Mind, yet there may be Things like them where- of they are Copies or Refemblances, which Things exift without the Mind, in an un- thinking Subftance. I anfwer, an Idea can be like nothing but an Idea ; a Colour or Figure can be like nothing but another Colour or Figure. If we look but ever fo little into our Thoughts, we fhall find it impoflible for us to conceive a Likenefs ex- cept only between our Ideas. Again, I ask whether thofe fuppofed Originals or exter- nal Things, of which our Ideas are the Pictures or Reprefentations, be themfelves perceivable or no ? If they are, then they are Ideas, and we have gained our Point; but if you fay they are not, I appeal to any one whether it be Senfe, to aflert a Colour is like fomething which is invifible; Hard or Soft, like fomething which is In- tangible j and fo of the reft. IX. Some Of the Principles Part I. IX. Some there are who make a Di- ftinction betwixt Primary and Secondary Qualities : By the former, they mean Ex- tenfion, Figure, Motion, Reft, Solidity or Impenetrability and Number : By the latter they denote all other fenfible Qualities, as Colours, Sounds, Taftes, and fo forth. The Ideas we have of thefe they acknowledge not to be the Refemblances of any thing exifting without the Mind or unperceived; but they will have our Ideas of the pri- mary Qualities to be Patterns or Images of Things which exift without the Mind, in an unthinking Subftance which they call Matter. By Matter therefore we are to underftand an inert, fenfelefs Subftance, in which Extenfion, Figure, and Motion, do actually fubfift. But it is evident from what we have already (hewn, that Exten- fion, Figure and Motion are only Ideas exifting in the Mind, and that an Idea can be like nothing but another Idea, and that confequently neither They nor their Ar- chetypes can exift in an unperceiving Sub- ftance. Hence it is plain, that the very Notion of what is called Matter or Cor- poreal Sub/lance, involves a Contradiction in it. X. They Part I. of Humane Knowledge. 43 X. They who afTert that Figure, Mo- tion, and the reft of the Primary or Ori- ginal Qualities do exift without the Mind, in unthinking Subftances, do at the fame time acknowledge that Colours, Sounds, Heat, Cold, and fuch like fecondary Qua- lities, do not, which they tell us are Sen- fations exifting in the Mind alone, that depend on and are occafioned by the diffe- rent bize, Texture and Motion of the mi- nute Particles of Matter. This they take for an undoubted Truth, which they can demonftrate beyond all Exception. Now if it be certain, that thofe original Quali- ties are infeparably united with the other fenfible Qualities, and not, even in Thought, capable of being abftracted from them, it plainly follows that they exift only in the Mind. But I defire any one to reflect and try, whether he can by any Abftraction of Thought, conceive the Extenfion and Mo- tion of a Body, without all other fenfible Qualities. For my own part, I fee evi- dently that it is not in my power to frame an Idea of a Body extended and moved, but I muft withal give it fome Colour or other fenfible Quality which is acknow- ledged to exift only in the Mind. In fhort, Extenlion, Figure, and Motion, abftracted from all other Qualities, are inconceivable. Where 44 Of the Principles Part I. Where therefore the other fenfible Quali- ties are, there muft thefe be alfo, to wit, in the Mind and no where elfe. XI. Again, Great and Small, Swift and Slow, are allowed to exift no where with- out the Mind, being intirely relative, and changing as the Frame or Pofition of the Organs of Senfe varies. The Extenfion therefore which exifts without the Mind, is neither great nor fmall, the Motion neither fwift nor (low, that is, they are nothing at all. But fay you, they are Ex- tenfion in general, and Motion in general : Thus v/e fee how much the Tenet of ex- tended, movcable Subftances exift ing with- out the Mird, depends on that ftrange Doc- trine of abjlraft Ideas. And here I cannot but remark, how nearly the Vague and in- determinate Defcription of Matter or cor- poreal Subftance, which the Modern Phi- loiophers are run into by their own Prin- ciples, refcmbles that antiquated and fa rni'ch ridiculed Notion of Materia prima, to be met with in Ariflctle and his Fol- lowers. Without Extenfion Solidity can- not be conceived ; fmce therefore it has been fhewn that Extenfion exifts not in an unthinking Subftance, the fame mult alfo. be true of Solidity. XII. That Part I, of Humane Knowledge. XII. That Number is intirely the Crea- ture of the Mind, even though the other Qualities be allowed to exift without, will be evident to whoever coniiders, that the fame thing bears a different Denomination of Number, as the Mind views it with dif- ferent refpefts. Thus, the fame Extension is One or Three or Thirty Six, according as the Mind coniiders it with reference to a Yard, a Foot, or an Inch. Number is fo vifibly relative, and dependent on Mens Underftanding, that it is ftrange to think how any one fhould give it an abfolute Exiftence without the Mind. We fay one Book, one Page, one Line; all thefe are equally Unites, though fome contain feve- ral of the others. And in each Inftance it is plain, the Unite relates to fome particu- lar Combination of Ideas arbitrarily put together by the Mind. XIII. Unity I know fome will have to be a fimple or uncompounded Idea, ac- companying all other Ideas into the Mind. That I have any fuch Idea anfwering the Word Unity > I do not find; and if I had, methinks I could not mifs finding it; on the contrary it mould be the moft familiar to my Underftanding, fince it is faid to ac- company all other Ideas, and to be per- ceived Of the Principles Part I. ceived by all the ways of Senfation and Reflexion. To fay no more, it is an abftraft Idea. XIV. I {hall farther add, that after the fame manner, as modern Philofophers prove certain fenfible Qualities to have no Exif- tence in Matter, or without the Mind, the fame thing may be likewife proved of all other fenfible Qualities whatfoever. Thus, for Inftance, it is faid that Heat and Cold are Affections only of the Mind, and not at all Patterns of real Beings, exifting in the corporeal Subflances which excite them, for that the fame Body which ap- pears Cold to one Hand, feems Warm to another. Now why may we not as well argue that Figure and Extenfion are not Patterns or Refemblances of Qualities ex- ifting in Matter, becaufe to the fame Eye at different Stations, or Eyes of a diffe- rent Texture at the fame Station, they ap- pear various, and cannot therefore be the Images of any thing fettled and determi- nate without the Mind ? Again, It is proved that Sweetnefs is not really in the fapid Thing, becaufe the thing remaining unal- tered the Sweetnefs is changed into Bitter, as in cafe of a Fever or otherwife vitiated Palate. Is it not as reafonable to fay, that Motion is not without the Mind, fince if the Part I. of Humane Knowledge. 47 the Succeflion of Ideas in the Mind be- come fwifter, the Motion, it is acknow- ledged, fhall appear flower without any Alteration in any external Object. XV. In fhort, let any one confider thofe Arguments, which are thought manifeftly to prove that Colours and Taftes exift on- ly in the Mind, and he fhall find they may with equal force, be brought to prove the fame thing of Extenfion, Figure, and Mo- tion. Though it muft be confefled this Method of arguing doth not fo much prove that there is no Extenlion or Co- lour in an outward Object, as that we do not know by Senfe which is the true Ex- tenfion or Colour of the Object. But the Arguments foregoing plainly (hew it to be impoflible that any Colour or Extenfion at all, or other feniible Quality whatfoever, fhould exift in an unthinking Subject with- out the Mind, or in truth, that there fhould be any fuch thing as an outward Object. XVI. But let us examine a little the re- ceived Opinion. It is faid Extenfion is a Mode or Accident of Matter, and that Mat- ter is the Subftratum that iupports it. Now I defire that you would explain what is meant by Matter's fupporting Extenfion: Say 48 Of the Principles Part I. Say you, I have no Idea of Matter, and therefore cannot explain ir. I anfwer, though you have no pofitive, yet if you have any meaning at all, you muft at leaft have a relative Idea of Matter ; though you know not what it is, yet you muft be fuppofed to know what Relation it bears to Accidents, and what is meant by its fup- porting them. It is evident Support can- not here be taken in its ufual or literal Senfe, as when we fay that Pillars fupport a Building : In what Senfe therefore muft it be taken ? XVII. If we inquire into what the moft accurate Philofophers declare themfelves to mean by Material SubJIance j we (hall find them acknowledge, they have no other meaning annexed to thofe Sounds, but the Idea of Being in general, together with the relative Notion of its fup porting Ac- cidents. The general Idea of Being ap- peareth to me the moft abftract and in- comprehenfible of all other ; and as for its fupporting Accidents, this, as we have juft now obferved, cannot be underftood in the common Senfe of thofc Words j it muft therefore be taken in fome other Senfe, but what that is they do not explain. So that when I confider the two Parts or Branches which make the fignification of the Words Material Part I. of Humane Knowledge. Material Subjlance y I am convinced there is no diftincl: meaning annexed to them. But why mould we trouble our felves any far- ther, in difcuffing this Material Subftratum or Support of Figure and Motion, and other fenfible Qualities ? Does it not fup- pofe they have an Exiftence without the Mind ? And is not this a direct Repugnan- cy, and altogether inconceivable ? XVIII. But though it were poffible that folid, figured, moveable Subftances may ex- ift without the Mind, correfponding to the Ideas we have of Bodies, yet how is it poffible for us to know this ? Either we muft know it by Senfe, or by Reafon. As for our Senfes, by them we have the Knowledge only of our Senfations, Ideas, or thofe things that are immediately per- ceived by Senie, call them what you will: But they do not inform us that things ex- ift without the Mind, or unperccived, like to thofe which are perceived. This the Materialifts themfelves acknowledge. It remains therefore that if we have any Knowledge at all of external Things, it muft be by Reafon, inferring their Exif- tence from what is immediately perceived by Senfe. But what reafon can induce us to believe the Exiftence of Bodies without the Mind, from what we perceive, fince D the 50 Of the Principles Part I. the very Patrons of Matter themfelves do not pretend, there is any neceflary Con- nexion betwixt them and our Ideas ? I fay it is granted on all hands ( and what hap- pens in Dreams, Phrenfies, and the like, puts it beyond difpute) that it is poffible we might be affected with all the Ideas we have now, though no Bodies exifled with- out, refembling them. Hence it is evident the Suppofition of external Bodies is not ncceflary for the producing our Ideas: Since it is granted they are produced fometimes, and might porTibly be produced always in the fame Order we fee them in at prefent, without their Concurrence. XIX. But though we might poflibly have all our Senfations without them, yet perhaps it may be thought eafier to con- ceive and explain the manner of their Pro- duction, by fuppofing external Bodies in their likenefs rather than otherwife ; and fo it might be at leaft probable there are fuch things as Bodies that excite their Ideas in our Minds. But neither can this be faid; for though we give the Materialifts their external Bodies, they by their own confef- lion are never the nearer knowing how our Ideas are produced: Since they own them- felves unable to comprehend in what man- ner Body can act upon Spirit, or how it is poffible Parti, of Humane Knowledge. jt poffible it mould imprint any Idea in the Mind. Hence it is evident the Production of Ideas or Senfations in our Minds, can be no reafon why we {hould fuppofe Mat- ter or corporeal Subftances, fince that is acknowledged to remain equally inexpli- cable with, or without this Suppofition. If therefore it were poffible for Bodies to cxift without the Mind, yet to hold they do fo, muft needs be a very precarious O- pinion ; fince it is to fuppofe, without any reafon at all, that God has created innu- merable Beings that are intirely ufelefs, and ferve to no manner of purpofe. XX. In fhort, if thete were external Bodies, it is impomble We mould ever come to know it ; and if there were not^ we might have the vefy fame Reafons to think there were that we have now. Sup- pofe, what no one can deny poiiible, an Intelligence, without the help of external Bodies, to be affected with the fame train of Senfations or Ideas that you are, im- printed in the fame order and with like vividnefs in his Mind. I ask whether that Intelligence hath not all the Reafon to be- lieve the Exiftence of corporeal Subftan- ces, reprefented by his Ideas, and exciting them in his Mind, that you can pombly have for believing the fame thing ? Of this D 2 there 51 Of the Principles Part I. there can be no Queftion; which one Con- fideration is enough to make any reafonable Perfon fufpect the ftrength of whatever Arguments he may think himfelf to have, for the Exiflence of Bodies without the Mind. XXI. Were it neceflary to add any far- ther Proof againft the Exigence of Mat- ter, after what has been faid, I could in- ftance feveral of thofe Errors and Difficul- ties ( not to mention Impieties ) which have fprung from that Tenet. It has oc- cafioned nurnberlefs Controverfies and Dif- putes in Philofophy, and not a few of far greater moment in Religion. But I mail not enter into the detail of them in this Place, as well becaufe I think, Arguments a Pofteriori are unnecefTary for confirming what has been, if I rmftake not, fufficient- ly demonftrated a Priori, as becaufe I (hall hereafter find occafion to fay fomewhat of them. XXII. I am afraid I have given caufe to think me needlefly prolix in handling this Subject. For to what purpofe is it to di- late on that which may be demonftrated with the utmoft Evidence in a Line or two, to any one that is capable of the leaft Reflexion ? It is but looking into your own Thoughts, Part I. of Humane Knowledge. 5 3 Thoughts, and fo trying whether you can conceive it poffible for a Sound, or Figure, or Motion, or Colour, to exifl without the Mind, or unperceived. This eafy Trial may make you fee, that what you contend for, is a downright Contradiction. Info- much that I am content to put the whole upon this IfTuej if you can but conceive it poffible for one extended moveable Sub- ftance, or in general, for any one Idea or any thing like an Idea, to exift otherwife than in a Mind perceiving it, I (hall rea- dily give up the Caufe : And as for all that cowpages of external Bodies which you con- tend for, I mall grant you its Exiftence, though you cannot either give me any Rea- fon why you believe it exifts, or affign any ufe to it when it is fuppofed to exifl. I fay, the bare poffibility of your Opinion's being true, mall pafs for an Argument that it is fo, XXIII. But fay you, furely there is no- thing eafier than to imagine Trees, for in- ftance, in a Park, or Books exifting in a Clofet, and no Body by to perceive them. I anfwer, you may fo, there is no difficul- ty in it: But what is all this, I befeech you, more than framing in your Mind cer- tain Ideas which you call Books and Trees, and at the fame time omitting to frame D 3 the 54 Of the Principles Part I, the Idea of any one that may perceive them ? But do not you your felf perceive or think of them all the while ? This therefore is nothing to the purpofe : It on- ly (hews you have the Power of imagin- ing or forming Ideas in your Mind; but it doth not mew that you can conceive it pofiible, the Objects of your Thought may exift without ihe Mind : To make out this, it is neceflary that you conceive them ex- ifting nnconceived or unthought of, which is a manifeft Repugnancy. When we do our utmoft to conceive the Exiftence of external Bodies, we are all the while only contemplating our own Ideas. But the Mind taking no notice of it felf, is de- luded to think it can and doth conceive Bodies exifting unthought of or without the Mind ; though at the fame time they are apprehended by or exift in it felf. A little Attention will difcorer to any one the Truth and Evidence of what is here faid, and make it unneceflary to infift on any other Proofs againft the Exiftence of material Subftance. XXIV. It is very obvious, upon the leaft Inquiry into our own Thoughts, to know vrhether it be poflible for us to underftand what is meant, by the abfolute Exiftence of Jenfible Objeffs in tbemfefaes, or without the Mind. Part I. of Humane Knowledge. 5 5 Mind. To me it is evident thofe Words mark out either a direct Contradiction, or elfe nothing at all. And to convince others of this, I know no readier or fairer way, than to intreat they would calmly attend to their own Thoughts : And if by this Attention, the Emptinefs or Repugnancy of thofe Expreffions does appear, furely nothing more is requifite for their Convic- tion. , It is on this therefore that I infift, to wit, that the abfolute Exiftence of un- thinking Things are Words without a Meaning, or which include a Contradicti- on. This is what I repeat and inculcate, and earneftly recommend to the attentive Thoughts of the Reader. XXV. All our Ideas, Senfations, or the things which we perceive, by whatfoever Names they may be dhtinguimed, are vifi- bly inactive, there is nothing of Power or Agency included in them. So that one Idea or Object of Thought cannot produce, or make any Alteration in another. To be fatisned of the Truth of this, there is nothing elfe requilite but a bare Obferva- tion of our Ideas. For fince they and eve- ry part of them exift only in the Mind, ic follows that there is nothing in them but what is perceived. But whoever (hall at- tend to his Ideas, whether of Senfe or Re- D 4 flexion 5 6 Of the Principles Part I. flexion, will not perceive in them any Power or Activity j there is therefore no fuch thing contained in them. A little At- tention will difcover to us that the very Being of an Idea implies Paflivenefs and Inertnefs in it, infomuch that it is impof- fible for an Idea to do any thing, or, ftrict- ly fpeaking, to be the Caufe of any thing : Neither can it be the Refemblance or Pat- tern of any active Being, as is evident from Sect. 8. Whence it plainly follows that Extenfion, Figure and Motion, can- not be the Caufe of our Senfations. To fay therefore, that thefe are the effects of Powers refulting from the Configuration, Number, Motion, and Size of Corpufcles, mufl certainly be falfe. XXVI. We perceive a continual Sue- ceffion of Ideas, fome are anew excited, others are changed or totally difappear. There is therefore fome Caufe of thefe Ideas whereon they depend, and which produces and changes them. That this Caufe cannot be any Quality or Idea or Combination of Ideas, is clear from the preceding Section. It muft therefore be a Subftance; but it has been (hewn that there is no corporeal or material Subftance : It remains therefore that the Caufe of Ideas is an incorporeal active Subftance or Spirit. XXVII, A Part I. of Humane Knowledge. 5 7 XXVII. A Spirit is one fimple, undi- vided, active Being : as it perceives Ideas, it is called the Under/landing, and as it produces or otherwife operates about them, it is called the Will. Hence there can be no Idea formed of a Soul or Spirit : For all Ideas whatever, being Paffive and Inert, vide Seel. 25. they cannot reprefent unto us, by way of Image or Likenefs, that which acts. A little Attention will make it plain to any one, that to have an Idea which mall be like that active Principle of Motion and Change of Ideas, is abfolutely impoffible. Such is the Nature of Spirit or that which acts, that it cannot be of it felf perceived, but only by the Effects which it produceth. If any Man {hall doubt of the Truth of what is here deli- vered, let him but reflect and^try if he can frame the Idea of any Power or active Be- ing j and whether he hath Ideas of two principal Powers, marked by the Names Will and Under/landing, diftinct from each other as well as from a third Idea of Sub- ftance or Being in general, with a relative Notion of its fupporting or being the Sub- ject of the aforelaid Powers, which is lig- nified by the Name Soul or Spirit. This is what fome hold ; but fo far as I can fee, the Words Will, Sou/, Spirit, do not fland for j 8 Of the Principles Part I. for different Ideas, or in truth, for any Idea at all, but for fomcthing which is ve- ry different from Ideas, and which being an Agent cannot be like unto, or repre- fented by, any Idea whatfoever. Though it mutt be owned at the fame time, that we have fome Notion of Soul, Spirit, and the Operations of the Mind, fuch as Wil- ling, Loving, Hating, in as much as we know or underftand the meaning of thofe Words. XXVIII. I find I can excite Ideas in my Mind at pleafure, and vary and mift the Scene as oft as I think fit. It is no more than Willing, and ftraightway this or that Idea arifes in my Fancy : And by the fame Power it is obliterated, and makes way for another. This making and unmaking of Ideas doth very properly denominate the Mind active. Thus much is certain, and grounded on Experience : But when we talk of unthinking Agents, or of exciting Ideas exclufive of Volition, we only amufe our felves with Words. XXIX. But whatever Power I may have over my own Thoughts, I find the Ideas actually perceived by Senie have not a like Dependence on my Will. When in broad Day-light 1 open my Eyes, it is not in my Power to choofe whether I fhall lee or no, or Part I. of Humane Knowledge. 5 p or to determine what particular Objcdls {hall prefent themfelves to my View ; and fo likewife as to the Hearing and other Senfes, the Ideas imprinted on them are not Creatures of my Will. There is there- fore fome other Will or Spirit that pro- duces them. XXX. The Ideas of Senfe are more ftrong, lively, and diftincl: than thofe of the Imagination ; they have likewife a Sted- dinefs, Order, and Coherence, and are not excited at random, as thofe which are the effects of Humane Wills often are, but in a regular Train or Scries, the admirable Connexion whereof fufficiently testifies the Wifdom and Benevolence of its Author. Now the fet Rules or eftablifhed Methods, wherein the Mind we depend on excites in us the Ideas of Senfe, are called the Laws of Nature : And thefe we learn by Expe- rience, which teaches us that fuch and fuch Ideas are attended with fuch and fuch other Ideas, in the ordinary courfe of Things. XXXI. This gives us a fort of Fore- fight, which enables us to regulate our Actions for the benefit of Life. And with- out this we mould be eternally at a lofs: We could not know how to act any thing that might Of the Principles Part I. might procure us the leaft Pleafure, or re- move the leaft Pain of Senfe. That Food nourimes, Sleep refremes, and Fire warms usj that to fow in the Seed-time is the way to reap in the Harveft, and, in gene- ral, that to obtain fuch or fuch Ends, fuch or fuch Means are conducive, all this we know, not by difcovering any neceflary Connexion between our Ideas, but only by the Obfervation of the fettled Laws of Na- ture, without which we mould be all in Uncertainty and Confufion, and a grown Man no more know how to manage him- felf in the Affairs of Life, than an Infant juft born. XXXII. And yet this confident uni- form working, which fo evidently difplays the Goodnefs and Wifdom of that govern- ing Spirit whofc Will conftitutes the Laws of Nature, is fo far from leading our Thoughts to him, that it rather fends them a wandering after fecond Caufes. For when we perceive certain Ideas of Senfe conftantly followed by other Ideas, and we know this is not of our own doing, we forthwith attribute Power and Agency to the Ideas themfelves, and make one the Caufe of another, than which nothing can be more abfurd and unintelligible. Thus, for Example, having obferved that when we Parti, of Humane Knowledge. we perceive by Sight a certain round lu- minous Figure, we at the fame time per- ceive by Touch the Idea or Senfation cal- led Heat, we do from thence conclude the Sun to be the caufe of Heat. And in like manner perceiving the Motion and Colli- fion of Bodies to be attended with Sound, we are inclined to think the latter an effect of the former. XXXIII. The Ideas imprinted on the Senfes by the Author of Nature are called real 'Things: And thofe excited in the Ima- gination being lefs regular, vivid and con- ftant, are more properly termed Ideas, or Images of Things, which they copy and re- prefent. But then our Senfations, be they never fo vivid and diftinct, are neverthe- lefs Ideas, that is, they exift in the Mind, or are perceived by it, as truly as the Ideas of its own framing. The Ideas of Senfc are allowed to have more reality in them, that is, to be more ftrong, orderly, and coherent than the Creatures of the Mind ; but this is no Argument that they exift without the Mind. They are alfo lefs de- pendent on the Spirit, or thinking Sub- ilance which perceives them, in that they are excited by the Will of another and more powerful Spirit : yet ftill they are Ideas, and certainly no Idea, whether faint or \ Ct Of the Principles Part I. or flrong, can exlft otherwife than in a Mind perceiving it. XXXIV. Before we proceed any far- ther, it is necefTary to fpend fome Time in anfwering Objections which may probably be made againft the Principles hitherto laid down. In doing of which, if I feem too prolix to thofe of quick Apprehenfions, I hope it may be pardoned, fince all Men do not equally apprehend things of this Na- ture ; and I am willing to be underftood by every one. Firft then, it will be ob^ jc&ed that by the foregoing Principles, all that is real and fubftantial in Nature is ba- nifhed out of the World : And inftead thereof a chimerical Scheme of Ideas takes place. All things that exift, exift only in the Mind, that is, they are purely notio- nal. What therefore becomes of the Sun, Moon, and Stars ? What muft we think of Houfes,Rivers, Mountains, Trees, Stones 5 nay, even of our own Bodies ? Are all thefe but fo many Chimeras and Illufions' on the Fancy ? To all which, and what- ever elfe of the fame fort may be objected, I anfwer, that by the Principles premifed, we are not deprived of any one thing in Nature. Whatever we fee, feel, hear, or any wife conceive or underftand, remains as fecure as ever, and is as real as ever. There Parti, of Humane Knowledge. There is a rerum natura, and the Diftino tion between Realities and Chimeras re- tains its full force. This is evident from Sect. 29, 30, and 33, where we have fhewn what is meant by real Things in oppofition to Chimeras, or Ideas of our own framing j but then they both equally exift in the Mind, and in that benfe are a- like Ideas. XXXV. I do not argue againft the Ex- iftence of any one thing that we can ap- prehend, either by Senfc or Reflexion. That the things I fee with mine Eyes and touch with my Hands do exift, really exift, I make not the leaft Queftion. The only thing whofe Exiftence we deny, is that which Philofophers call Matter or corpo- real Subilance. And in doing of this, there is no Damage done to the reft of Mankind, who, I dare fay, will never mifs it. The Athcift indeed will want the Colour of an empty Name to fupport his Impiety ; and the Philofophers may poflibly find, they have loft a great Handle for Trifling and Difputation. XXXVI. If any Man thinks this de- tracts from the Exiftence or Reality of Things, he is very far from understanding what hath been premifed in the plaineft Terms Of the Principles Part L Terms I could think of. Take here an Abitrad of what has been faid. There are fpiritual Subftances, Minds, or humane Souls, which will or excite Ideas in them- felves at pleafure : but thefe are faint, weak, and unfteady in refpect of others they perceive by Senfe, which being im- prefTed upon them according to certain Rules or Laws of Nature, fpeak themfelves the Effects of a Mind more powerful and wife than humane Spirits. Thefe latter are faid to have more Reality in them than the former : By which is meant that they are more affeding, orderly, and diftind, and that they are not Fidions of the Mind perceiving them. And in this Senfe, the Sun that I fee by Day is the real Sun, and that which I imagine by Night is the Idea of the former. In the Senie here given of Reality, it is evident that every Vegetable, Star, Mineral, and in general each part of the Mundane Syftem, is as much a real Being by our Principles as by any other. Whether others mean any thing by the Term Reality different from what 1 do, I intreat them to look into their own Thoughts and fee. XXXVII. It will be urged that thus much at leaft is true, to wit, that we take away all corporeal Subftances. To this my Part I. of Humane Knowledge. my Anfwer is, That if the word Subftance be taken in the vulgar Senfe, for a Combi- nation of fenfible Qualities, fuchas Exten- fion, Solidity* Weight, and the like 3 This we cannot be accufed of taking away. But if it be taken in a philosophic Senfe, for the fupport of Accidents or Qualities with- out the Mind : Thf ; dted I acknow- ledge that we taks ir uway, if one may be faid to take away that which never had any Exiftence, not even in the Imagina- tion. XXXVIII. But, fay yon, it founds very hajrfh to fcv we eat and drink Ideas, and arc clothed with Ideas. I acknowledge it does Jo, the word Idea not* being ufed in common Difcourfe to fignily the feveral Combinations of lenfible Qualities, which are called "Things : arid it is certain that any Expreffion which varies from the fa- miliar Ufe of Language, will feem harfli and ridiculous. But this doth not concern, the Truth of the Proportion, which in other Words is no more than to fay, we are fed and clothed with thofe Things which we perceive immediately byourSen- fes The Hardnefs or Softnefs, the Co- lour, Tafte, Warmth, Figure^ and fuch like Qualities, which combined together conilituce the feveral forts of Victuals and E Apparel, Of the Prtnctpks Part I. Apparel, have been (hewn to cxift only in the Mind that perceives them ; and this is all that is meant by calling them Idtas ; which Word, if it was as ordinarily ufed as Thing, would found no harmer nor more ridiculous than it. I am not for difputing about the Propriety, but the Truth of the Expreflion. If therefore you agree with me that we eat and drink, and are clad with the immediate Objects of Scnfe which cannot exift unperceivcd or without the Mind : I mall readily grant it is more proper or conformable to Cuftom, that they mould be called Things rather than Ideas. XXXIX. If it be demanded why I make ufe of the word Idea, and do not rather in compliance with Cuftom call them Things. I anfwer, I do it for two Rea- fons : Firft, becaufe the Term Thing , in contradiftindtion to Idea, is generally fup- pofed to denote fomewhat exifting with- out the Mind : Secondly, becaufe Jibing hath a more comprehenfive Signification than Idea, including Spirits or thinking Things as well as Ideas. Since therefore the Objects of Senfe exift only in the Mind, and are withal thoughtlefs and inactive, I chofe to mark them by the word Idea, which implies thofe Properties. XL. But Parti, of Humane Knowledge. Cj XL. But fay what we can, fome one perhaps may be apt to reply, he will ftill believe his Senfes, ard never fuffer any Ar- guments, how plaufible foever, to prevail over the Certainty of them. Be it fo, af- fert the Evidence of Senfe as high as you pleafe, we are willing to do the fame. That what I lee, hear and feel doth exift, that is to fay, is perceived by me, I no more doubt than I do of my own Being. But I do not fee how the Teftimony of Senfe can be alledged, as a proof for the Exigence of any thing, which is not perceived by Senfe. We are not for having any Man turn Sceptic, and disbelieve his Senles ; on the contrary we give them all the Strefs and AlTurance imaginable ; nor are there any Principles more oppofite to Scepticifm, than thofe we have laid down, as (hall be hereafter clearly (hewn. XLI. Secondly, It will be objected that there is a great difference betwixt real Fire, forlnftancc, and the Idea of Fire, betwixt dreaming or imagining ones felf burnt, and actually being fo : Tlyp and the like may be urged in oppofition to our Tenets. To all which the Anfwer is evident from what hath been already faid, and I mall only add in this place, that if real Fire be E 2 very 6* Of the Principles Part I. very different from the Idea of Fire, fo al- fo is the real Pain that it occafions, very different from the Idea of the fame Pain : and yet no Body will pretend that real Pain either is, or can poffibly be, in an unper- ceiving Thing or without the Mind, any more than its Idea. XLII. Thirdly, It will be objected that we fee Things actually without or at a dif- tance from us, and which confequently do not exift in the Mind, it being abfnrd that thofe Things which are feen at the dif- tance of feveral Miles, mould be as near to ut as our own Thoughts. In anfwer to this, I delire it may be confidered, that in a Dream we do oft perceive Things as ex- ifting at a great diftance off, and yet for all that, thofe Things are acknowledged to have their Exiftence only in the Mind. XLIII. But for the fuller clearing of this Point, it may be worth while to coniider, how it is that we perceive Diftance and Things placed at a Diftance by Sight. For that we mould in truth fee external Space, and Bodies adfctelly exifting in it, fome nearer, others farther off, feems to carry with it fome Oppofition to what hath been faid, of their exifting no where without the Mind. The Consideration of this Dif- ficulty Part I. of Humane Knowledge. ficulty it was, that gave birth to my Effay towards a new Theory of Vtfion^ which was published not long fmce. Wherein it is ihewn that Dtjlance or Outnefs is neither immediately of it felf perceived by Sight, nor yet apprehended or judged of by Lines and Angles, or any thing that hath a ne- cefiary Connexion with it : But that it is only fuggcfted to our Thoughts, by cer- tain vifible Ideas and Senfations attending Vifion, which in their own Nature have no manner of Similitude or Relation, either with Diftance, or Things placed at a Dif- tance. But by a Connexion taught us by Experience, they come to fignify and fug- geft them to us, after the fame manner that Words of any Language fuggeft the Ideas they are made to ftand for. Info- much that a Man born blind, and after- wards made to fee, would not, at firft Sight, think the Things he faw, to be with- out his Mind, or at any Diftance from him. See Sefr. 41. of the forementioneci Treatife. XLIV. The Ideas of Sight and Touch make two Species, intirely diftind and he- terogeneous. The former are Marks tnd Prognoftics of the latter. That the proper Objects of Sight neither exift without ihc Mind, nor are the Images of external E 3 Things, 70 Of the Principles Part I. Things, was (hewn even in that Treatife. Though throughout the fame, the con- trary be fuppofed true of tangible Ob- jects : Not that to fuppofc that vulgar Er- ror, was neceffary for eftabliftiing the No- tion therein laid down j but becaufe it wa$ befide my Purpofe to examine and refute it in a Difcourfe concerning Vifan. So that in ftrict Truth the Ideas of Sight, when we apprehend by them Diftance an4 Things placed at a Diftance, do not fug- geft or mark out to us Things actually ex- ifting at a Diftance, but only admonifh us what Ideas of Touch will be imprinted in our Minds at fuch and fuch diftances of Time, and in confequence of fuch or fuch Actions. It is, I fay, evident from what has been faid in the foregoing Parts of this Treatife, and in Setf. 147, and elfwhere of the EiTay concerning Vifion, that vifible Ideas are the Language whereby the go- verning Spirit, on whom we depend, in- forms us what tangible Ideas he is about to imprint upon us, in cafe we excite this or that Motion in our own Bodies. But for a fuller Information in this Point, I refer to the Eflay it felf. XLV. Fourthly, It will be objected that from the foregoing Principles it follows, Things are every moment annihilated and created Part I. of Humane Knowledge. 7 i created anew. The Objects of Senfe exift only when they are perceived : The Trees therefore are in the Garden, or the Chairs in the Parlour, no longer than while there is fome body by to perceive them. Upon {hutting my Eyes all the Furniture in the Room is reduced to nothing, and barely upon opening them it is again created. In anfwer to all which, I refer the Reader to what has been faid in Sett. 3, 4, GV. and defire he will confider whether he means any thing by the actual Exiftence of an Idea, diftinct from its being perceived. For my part, after the niceft Inquiry I could make, I am not able to difcover that any thing elfe is meant by thofe Words. And I once more intreat the Reader to found his own Thoughts, and not fuffer himfelf to be impofed on by Words. If he can con- ceive it poffible either for his Ideas or their Archetypes to exift without being per- ceived, then I give up the Caufe : But if he cannot, he will acknowledge it is unreafonable for him to (land up in defence of he knows not what, and pre- tend to charge on me as an Abfurdity, the not alTenting to thofe Proportions which at Bottom have no meaning in them. XLVI. It will not be amifs to obferve, how far the received Principles of Philofo- E 4 phy 7*1 Of the Principles Part I. phy are rhemfelvcs chargeable with thofe pretended Abfurdities. It is thought ftrange- ly abfurd that upon clofing my Eyelids, all the vifible Objedls round me mould be reduced to nothing ; and yet is not this what Philofophers commonly acknowledge, when they agree on all hands, that Light and Colours, which alone are the proper and immediate Objects of Sight, are mere Senfations that exifl no longer than they are perceived ? Again, it may to fome perhaps feem very incredible, that things fhould be every moment creating, yet this very Notion is commonly taught" in the Schools. For the Schoolmen, though they acknowledge the Exiftence of Matter, and that the whole mundane Fabrick is framed out of it, are neverthelefs of Opinion that it cannot fubfift without the Divine Con- fervation, which by them is expounded to be a continual Creation. XL VII. Farther, a little Thought will difcover to us, that though we allow the Exiftence of Matter or Corporeal Subftance, yet it will unavoidably follow from the Principles which are now generally ad- mitted, that the particular Bodies of what kind fbever, do none of them exift whilft they are not perceived. For it is evident from Serf. XI. and the following Sections, that Parti, of Humane Knowledge. that the Matter Philofophers contend for, is an incomprehensible Somewhat which hath none of thofe particular Qualities, whereby the Bodies falling under our Sen- fe are diftinguifhed one from another. But to make this more plain, it muft be re- marked, that the infinite Divifibility of Matter is now univerfally allowed, at leaft by the moft approved and confide- rable Philofophers, who on the received Principles demonftrate it beyond all Ex- ception. Hence it follows, that there is an infinite Number of Parts in each Par- ticle of Matter, which are not perceived by Senfe. The Reafon therefore, that any particular Body feems to be 'of a finite Magnitude, or exhibits only a finite Num- berof Parts to Senfe, is, notbecaufe it con- tains nomore,fince in itfelf it contains an in- finite Number of Parts, but becaufe the Senfe is not acute enough to difcern them. In proportion therefore as the Senfe is rendered more acute, it perceives a greater Number of Parts in the Object, that is, the Object appears greater, and its Figure varies, thofe Parts in its Extremities which were before unperceivable, appearing now to bound it in very different Lines and Angles from thofe perceived by an obtufer Senfe. And at length, after various Changes of Size and Shape, when the Senfe becomes infi- nitely 74 Of the Principles Part I. nitely acute, the Body {hall feem Infinite. During all which there is no Alteration in the Body, but only in the Senfe. Each Body therefore confidered in it felf, is in- finitely extended, and confequently void of all Shape or Figure. From which it follows, that though we mould grant the Exigence of Matter to be ever fo cer- tain, yet it is withal as certain, the Ma- terialifts themfelves are by their own Prin- ciples forced to acknowledge, that neither the particular Bodies perceived by SenTe, nor any thing like them exifts without toe Mind. Matter, I fay, and each Particle thereof is according to them infinite and fhapelefs, and it is the Mind that frames all that variety of Bodies which compofe the vifible World, any one whereof does not exift longer than it is perceived. XL VIII. If we confider it, the Obje&ion propofed in Sett. 45. will not be found reafonably charged on the Principles we have premifed, fo as in truth to make any Objection at all againft our Notions. For though we hold indeed the Objects of Senfe to be nothing elfe but Ideas which cannot exift unperceived j yet we may not hence conclude they have no Exigence except only while they are perceived by Vis,, fince there may be fome other Spirit that Part I. of Humane Knowledge. that perceives them, though we do not. Wherever Bodies are fa id to have no Exif- tence without the Mind, I would not be underftood to mean this or that particu- lar Mind, but ail Minds whatfoever. It does not therefore follow from the fore- going Principles, that Bodies are annihi- lated and created every moment, or exift not at all during the Intervals between our Perception of them. XLIX. Fifthly, It may perhaps be ob- jedted, that if Extenfion and Figure exifl only in the Mind, it follows that the Mind is extended and figured -, fmce Extenfion is a Mode or Attribute, which (to fpeak with the Schools) is predicated of the Sub- ject in which it exiits. I anfwer, Thofe Qualities are in the Mind only as they are perceived by it, that is, not by way of Mode or Attribute, but only by way of Idea ; and it no more follows, that the Soul or Mind is extended becaufe Extenfion exiils in it alone, than it does that it is red or blue, becaufe thofe Colours are on all hands ac- knowledged toexift in it, and no where elfe. As to what Philofophers fay of Subject and Mode, that feems very groundlefs and unintelligible. For Jnftance, in this Pro- pofiupn, a Die is hard, extended and fquare, jhey will have it that the Word Die de- notes 7 6 Of the Principles Part I. notes a Subject or Subftance, diftindt from the Hardnefs, Extenfion and Figure, which are predicated of it, and in which they exift. This I cannot comprehend : To me a Die feems to be nothing diftinct from thofe things which are termed its Modes or Accidents. And to fay a Die is hard, extended and fquare, is not to attribute thofe Qualities to a Subject diftinct from and fupporting them, but only an Expli- cation of the meaning of the Word Die. L. Sixthly, You will fay there have been a great many things explained by Matter and Motion : Take away thefe, and you deftroy the whole Corpufcular Philofophy, and undermine thofe mecha- nical Principles which have been applied with fo much Succefs to account for the Phenomena. In mort, whatever Advan- ces have been made, either by ancient or modern Philofophers, in the ftudy of Na- ture, do all proceed on the Suppofition, that Corporeal Subftance or Matter doth really exift. To this I anfwer, that there is not any one Phenomenon explained on that Suppofition, which may not as well be explained without it, as might eafily be made appear by an Induction of Par- ticulars. To explain the Phenomena, is all one as to mew, why upon fuch and fuch Part I. of Humane Knowledge. 77' fuch Occalions .we are affected with fuch and fuch Ideas. But how Matter mould operate on a Spirit, or produce any- Idea in it, is what no Philofopher will pretend to explain. It is therefore evident, there can be no ufe of Matter in Natural Philo- fophy. Betides, they who attempt to ac- count for Things, do it not by Corpo- real Subftance, but by Figure, Motion, and other Qualities, which are in truth no more than mere Ideas, and therefore can- not be the Caufe of any thing, as hath been already {hewn. See Sett. 25. LI. Seventhly, It will upon this be de- manded whether it does not feem abfurd to take away natural Caufes, andafcribe eve- ry thing to the immediate Operation of Spirits ? We muft no longer fay upon thefe Principles that Fire heats, or Water cools, but that a Spirit heats, and fo forth. Would not a Man be defervedly laught at, who mould talk after this manner ? I anfwer, he would fo ; in fuch things we ought to think with the Learned, and fpeak with the Vulgar. They who toDemonitra- tionare convinced of the truth of the Coper- nican byftem, do ncvet theleis fay the Sun rif- es, the Sun fets, or comes to the Meridian: And if they affected a contrary Stile in common talk, it would without doubt appear Of the Principles Part L appear very ridiculous. A little Reflexion on what is here faid will make it mani- fed that the common ufe of Language would receive no manner of Alteration orDiftur- bance from the Admiflion of our Tenets. LIT. In the ordinary Affairs of Life, any Phrafes may be retained, fo long as they excite in us proper Sentiments, or Dif- poiitions to a<5t in fuch a manner as is neceffary for our well-being, how falfe Ib- cver they may be, if taken in a ftricl: and fpeculative Senfe. Nay this is unavoida- ble, fince Propriety being regulated by Cuiiom, Language is fuited to the re- ce'ved Opinions, which are not always the truefl:. Hence it is impoffible, even in the ir.oft rigid philofophic Reafonings, fo far to? her the Bent and Genius of the Tongue we fpeak, as never to give a handle for Cavillers to pretend Difficulties and Incon- fiftencies. But a fair and ingenuous Reader .will celled: the Senfe, from the Scope and Tenor and Connexion of a Difcourfe, mak- ing allowances for thofe inaccurate Modes of Speech, which ufe has made inevitable. LIII. As to the Opinion that there are no Corporeal Caufes, this has been here- tofore maintained by fome of the School- men, as ic is of late by others among the modern Part I. of Humane Knowledge. modern Philofophers, who though they allow Matter to exift, yet will have GOD alone to be the immediate efficient Caufe of all things. Thefe Men faw, that amongft all the Objects of Senfe, there was none which had any Power or Activity includ- ed in it, and that by Confequence this was likewife true of whatever Bodies they fup* pofed to exift without the Mind, like un- to the immediate Objects of Senfe. But then, that they mould fuppofe an innu- merable Multitude of created Beings, which they acknowledge are not capable of produ- cing any one Effect in Nature, and which therefore are made to no manner of pur- pofe, fince God might have done every thing as well without them ; this I fay, though we mould allow it poffible, muft yet be a very unaccountable and extrava- gant Suppofition. LIV. In the eighth place, The univer- fal concurrent Aflent of Mankind may be thought by fome, an invincible Argument in behalf of Matter, or the Existence of external things. Muft we fuppofe the whole World to be miftaken ? And if fo, what Caufe can be affigned of fo wide- fpread and predominant an Error ? I an- fwcr, Firft, That upon a narrow Inquiry, k will not perhaps be found, fo many as is 8o Of the Principles Part I. is imagined do really believe the Exiftence of Matter or Things without the Mind. Strictly Jpeaking, to believe that which involves a Contradiction, or has no mean- ing in it, is impoffible : And whether the foregoing Expreffions are not of that fort, I refer it to the impartial Examination of the Reader. In one fenfe indeed, Men may be faid to believe that Matter exifts, that is, they aft as if the immediate Caufe of their Senfations, which affects them every moment and is fo nearly pre- fent to them, were fome fenfelefs unthink- ing Being. But that they mould clearly apprehend any Meaning marked by thole Words, and form thereof a fettled fpecu- lative Opinion, is what I am not able to conceive. This is not the only Inftance wherein Men impofe upon themfelves, by imagining they believe thofe Propoii- tions they have often heard, though at bot- tom they have no meaning in them. LV. But fecondly, Though we mould grant a Notion to be ever fo univerfally and ftedfaftly adhered to, yet this is but a weak Argument of its Truth, to who- ever confiders what a vaft number of Pre- judices and falfe Opinions are every where embraced with the utmoft Tenacioufnefs, by the unreflecting (which are the far greater) Part I. of Humane Knowledge. S i greater) Part of Mankind. There was a time when the Antipodes and Motion of the Earth were looked upon as monftrous Abfurdities, even by Men of Learning : And if it be conlidered what a fmall pro- portion they bear to the reft of Mankind, we (hall find that at this Day, thofe No- tions have gained but a very inconliderable looting in the World. LVI. But it is demanded, that we affign a Caufe of this Prejudice, and account for its obtaining in the World. To this I anfwer, That Men knowing they per- ceived feveral Ideas, whereof they them- felves were not the Authors, as not being excited from within, nor depending on the Operation of their Wills, this made them maintain, thofe Ideas or Objects of Perception had an Exiftence independent of, and without the Mind, without ever dreaming that a Contradiction was invol- ved in thofe Words. But Philofophers hav- ing plainly feen, that the immediate Ob- jects of Perception do not exift without the Mind, they in fome degree corrected the miltake of the Vulgar, but at the fame time run into another which feems no lefs abfurd, to wit, that there are certain Objects really exifting without the Mind, or having a Subfiftence diftinct from being F per- 8 1 Of the Principles Part I. perceived, of which our Ideas are only Imagesor Refemblances, imprinted by thofe Objects on the Mind. And this Notion of the Philofophers owes its Origin to the fame Caufe with the former, namely, their being confcious that they were not the Authors of their own Scnfations, which they evidently knew were imprinted from, without, and which therefore muft have fome Caufe, diftinct from the Minds on which they are imprinted. LVII. But why they fhould fuppofe the Ideas of Senfe to be excited in us by things in their likenefs, and not rather have re- courfe to Spirit which alone can act, may be accounted for, Firft, becaufe they were not aware of the Repugnancy there is, as well in fuppofing things like unto our Ideas exifting without, as in attributing to them Power or Activity. Secondly, becaufe the fupreme Spirit which excites thofe Ideas in our Minds, is not marked out and limited to our view by any par- ticular finite Collection of fenfible Ideas, as humane Agents are by their Size, Com- plexion, Limbs, and Motions. And third- ly, becaufe his Operations are regular and uniform. Whenever the Courfe of Na- ture is interrupted by a Miracle, Men are ready to own the Prefence of a fuperior Agent. Part. t. of Hamane Knowledge. Sj Agent. But when we fee things go on in the ordinary Courfe, they do not excite in us any Reflexion j their Order and Con- catenation, though it be an Argument of the greateft Wifdom, Power, and Goodnefs in their Creator, is yet fo conftant and familiar to us, that we do not think them the immediate Effects of a Fret Spirit : efpecially fince Inconftancy and Mutability in ailing, though it be an Im- perfection, is looked on as a mark of Freedom. LVIII. Tenthly, It will be objedled, that the Notions we advance, are incon- fiftent with feveral found Truths in Phi- lofophy and Mathematicks. For Example, The Motion of the Earth is now univerfal- ly admitted by Aftronomers, as a Truth grounded on the cleared and moft convin- cing Reafons ; but on the foregoing Prin* ciples, there can be no fuch thing. For Motion being only an Idea, it follows that if it be not perceived, it exifts not ; but the Motion of the Earth is not per- ceived by Senfe. I anfwer, That Tenet, if rightly underftood, will be found to agree with the Principles we have premi- fed : For the Queftion, whether the Earth moves or no, amounts in reality to no more than this, to wit, whether we have reafon F 2 ! 84 Of the Principles PartL to conclude from what hath been obfer- ved by Aftronomers, that if we were placed in fuch and fuch Circumftances, and fuch or fuch a Pofition and Diftance, both from the Earth and Sun, we mould perceive the former to move among the Choir of the Planets, and appearing in all refpects like one of them : And this, by the eftablimed Rules of Nature, which we have no reafon to miftruft, is reafon- ably collected from the Phenomena. LIX. We may, from the Experience we have had of the Train and Succeffion of Ideas in our Minds, often make, I will not fay uncertain Conjectures, but fure and well-grounded Predictions, concern- ing the Ideas we (hall be affected with, purfuant to a great Train of Actions, and be enabled to pafs a right Judgment of what would have appeared to us, in cafe we were placed in Circumftances very dif- ferent from thofe we are in at prefent. Here- in confifts the Knowledge of Nature, which may preferve its Ufe and Certainty very confidently with what hath been faid. It will be eafy to apply this to whatr ever Objections of the like fort may be drawn from the Magnitude of the Stars, or any other Difcoveries in Aftronomy or Nature. LX. In Fart I. of Humane Knowledge. 5 j LX. In the eleventh place, It will be demanded to what purpofe ferves that cu- rious Organization of Plants, and the ad- mirable Mechanifm in the Parts of Ani- mals ; might not Vegetables grow, and fhoot forth Leaves and Blon r oms > and Ani- mals perform all their Motions, as well without as with all that variety of inter- nal Parts fo elegantly contrived and put together, which being Ideas have notrrng powerful or operative in them, nor have any neceflary Connexion with the Effects afcribed to them ? If it be a Spirit that immediately produces every Effect by a Fiat y or Act of his Will, we mufl think all that is fine and artificial in the Works, whether of Man or Nature, to be made in vain. By this Doctrine, though an Artift hath made the Spring and Wheels,and every Movement of a Watch, and adjufted them in fuch a manner as he knew would produce the Motions he defigned ; yet he muft think all this done to no purpofe, and that it is an Intelligence which directs the Index, and points to the Hour of the Day. If fo, why may not the Intelligence do it, without his being at the pains of making the Movements, and putting them together ? Why does not an empty Caie ferve as well as another ? And how comes F 3 it Of the Principks Parti, it to pafs, that whenever there is any Fault in the going of a Watch, there is fome correfponding Diforder to be found in the Movements, which being mended by a skilful Hand, all is right again ? The like may be faid of all the Clock- work of Nature, great part whereof is fo wonderfully fine and fubtile, as fcarce to be difcerned by the beft Microfcope. In fhort, it will be asked, how upon our Principles any tolerable Account can be given, or any final Caufe affigned of an innumerable multitude of Bodies and Ma^ chines framed with the moft exquifite Art, which in the common Philofophy have very appofite ufes affigned them, and ferve to. explain abundance of Phae- nomena. LXI. To all which I anfwer, Firft, That though there were fome Difficulties re- lating to the Adminiftration of Providence, and the ufes by it affigned to the feveral parts of Nature, which I could not folve by the foregoing Principles, yet this Ob- jection could be of fmall weight againfl the Truth and Certainty of thofe things which may be proved a priori, with the utmoft Evidence. Secondly, But neither are the received Principles free from the like Difficulties j for it may flill be de- manded, Part I. of Humane Knowledge. gj manded, to what end God mould take thofe round-about Methods of effecting things by Inftruments and Machines, which no one can deny might have been effec- ted by the mere Command of his Will> without all that apparatus : Nay, if we narrowly confider it, we mall find the Ob- jection may be retorted with greater force on thofe who hold the Exiftence of thofe Machines without the Mind j for it has been made evident, that Solidity, Bulk, Fi- gure, Morion and the like, have no Afti- vity or Efficacy in them, fo as to be ca- pable of producing any one Effect in Na- ture. See SecJ. 25. Whoever therefore fuppofes them to exift (allowing the Sup- pofition poffible) when they are not per- ceived, does it manifeftly to no purpofe ; fince the only ufe that is affigned to them, as they exift unperceivcd, is that they pro- duce thofe perceivable Effects, which in truth cannot be afcribed to any thing but Spirit. LXII, But to come nearer the Difficul- ty, it muft be obferved, that though the Fabrication of all thofe Parts and Organs be not abfolutely neceffary to the produ- cing any Effect, yet it is neceffary to- the producing of things in a conflant, regu- Jar way, According to the Laws of Nature. F 4 There 88 Of the Principles Pnrt I. There are certain general Laws that run through the whole Chain of natural Ef- fects : Thefe are learned by the Obfer- vation and Study of Nature, and are by Men applied as well to the framing ar- tificial things for the Ufe and Ornament of Life, as to the explaining the various Phenomena : Which Explication confifts only in (hewing the Conformity any par- ticular Phenomenon hath to the general Laws of Nature, or, which is the fame thing, in difcovering the Uniformity there is in the Production of natural Effects ; as will be evident to whoever (hall at- tend to the feveral Inftances, wherein Phi- lofophers pretend to account for Appear- ances. That there is a great and confpi- cuous Ufe in thefe regular conftant Me- thods of working obferved by the Supreme Agent, hath been fhewn in Set. 31. And it is no lefs vifible, that a particular Size, Figure, Motion and Difpoiition of Parts are necefTary, though not abfolu re- ly to the producing any Effect, yet to the producing it according to the ftanding mechanical Laws of Nature. Thus, for Inftance, it cannot be denied that God, or the Intelligence which fuftains and rules the ordinary Courfe of things might, if He were minded to produce a Miracle, Ctufe all the Motions on the Dial-plate of Part I. of Humane Knowledge. 8 9 of a Watch, though no Body had ever made the Movements, and put them in it : But yet if he will aft agreeably to the Rules of Mechanifm, by him for wife ends eftablifhed and maintained in the Creation, it is neceflary that thofe Ac- tions of the Watchmaker, whereby he makes the Movements and rightly adjufts them, precede the Production of the afore- faid Motions ; as alfo that any Diforder in them be attended with the Perception of fome correfponding Diforder in the Movements, which being once corrected all is right again. LXIII. It may indeed on fome Occafi- ons be neceffary, that the Author of Na- ture difplay his overruling Power in pro- ducing fome Appearance out of the ordi- nary Series of things. Such Exceptions from the general Rules of Nature are pro- per to furprife and awe Men into an Acknowledgment of the Divine Being : But then they are to be ufed but feldom, otherwife there is a plain Reafon why they fhould fail of that E fifed. Befides, God feems to choofc the convincing our Rea- fon of his Attributes by the Works of Nature, which difcover fo much Har- mony and Contrivance in their Make, and are fuch plain Indications of Wifdom and 5?o Of the Principles Parti. and Beneficence in their- Author, rather than to aftonim us into a belief of his Being by anomalous and furprifing E- vents. LXIV. To fet this Matter in a yet clear- er Light, I (hall obferve that what has been objected in Setf. 60. amounts in re- ality to no more than this : Ideas are not any how and at random produced, there being a certain Order and Connexion be- tween them, like to that of Caufe and EfTecT: : There arc alfo feveral Combina- tions of them, made in a very regular and artificial manner, which feem like fo many Inftruments in the hand of Nature, that being hid as it were behind the Scenes, have a fecret Operation in producing thofe Appearances which are feen on the The- atre of the World, being themfelves dif- cernible only to the curious Eye of the Philofopher. But fince one Idea cannot be the C.tufe of another, to what purpofe is that Connexion ? And fince thofe In- ftruments, being barely inefficacious Percep- tions in the Mind, are not fubfervient to the Production of natural Effects ; it is de- manded why they are made, or, in other W6rds, what reafon can be affigned why God mould make us, upo r i a cloielnfpec- tion into his Works, behold fo great Va- riety Part I. Of Humane Knowledge. riety of Ideas, fo artfully laid together, and fo much according to Rule; it not be* ingcredible,that he would beat theExpence (if one may fo fpcak) of all that Art and Regularity to no purpofe ? LXV. To all which my Anfwer is, Firft, That the Connexion of Ideas does not imply the Relation of Cau/e and Effect, but only of a Mark or S.^n with the thing fignlfied. The Fire which I fee i not the Caufe of the Pain I fufFer upon my approaching it, but the Mark that fore- warns me of it. In like manner, the Noife that I hear is not the Effect of this or that Motion orCollifion of the am- bient Bodies, but the Sign thereof. Se- condly, The Reafon why Ideas are formed into Machines, that is, artificial and regu- lar Combinations, is the fame with that for combining Letters into Words. That a few Original Ideas may be made to fig- nify a great number of Effects and Ac- tions, it is neceflary they be varioufly com- bined together ; And to the end their ufe be permanent and univerfal, thefe Combinations muft be made by Rule, and with wife Contrivance. By this means abundance of Information is conveyed ur>- to us, concerning what we are to expect from fuch a.nd fuch Actions, and what Methods Of the Principles Part I. Methods are proper to be taken, for the exciting fuch and fuch Ideas : Which in ef- fect is all that I conceive to be distinctly meant, when it is faid that by difcern- ing the Figure, Texture, and Mechanifm of the inward Parts of Bodies, whether natural or artificial, we may attain to know the feveral Ufes and Properties depending thereon, or the Nature of the thing. LXVI. Hence it is evident, that thofc things which under the Notion of a Caufe cooperating or concurring to thePro- ductionof Effects, are altogether inexplica- ble, and run us into great Abfurdities, may be very naturally explained, and have a pro- per and obvious ufe afligned them, when they are confidered only as Marks or Signs for our Information. And it is the fearch- ing after, and endeavouring to underftand thofe Signs inftituted by the Author of Nature, that ought to be the Employ- ment of the Natural Philofopher, and not the pretending to explain things by Corporeal Caufesj which Doctrine feems to have too much cftranged the Minds of Men from that active Principle, that fupreme and wile Spirit, in 'whom ive live, move, and have our being. LXVII. It Part I. of Humane Knowledge. LXVII. In the twelfth place, it may perhaps be objected, that though it be clear from what has been faid, that there can be no fuch thing as an inert, fenfe- lefs, extended, folid, figured, moveable Subftance, exifting without the Mind, fuch as Philofophers defcribe Matter : Yet if any Man {hall leave out of his Idea of Matter^ the pofitive Ideas of Ex- tenfion, Figure, Solidity and Motion, and fay that he means only by that Word, an inert fenfelefs Subftance, that exifts with- out the Mind, or unperceived, which is the Occafion of our Ideas, or at the pre- fence whereof God is pleafed to excite Ide- as in us : It doth not appear, but that Matter taken in this fenfe may poffibly cxift. In Anfwer to which I fay, Firft, that it feems no lefs abfurd to fuppofe a Subftance without Accidents, than it is to fuppofe Accidents without a Subftance. But Secondly, though we {hould grant this un- known Subftance may poffibly exift, yec where can it be fuppofed to be ? That ic exifts not in the Mind is agreed, and that it exifts not in Place is no lefs certain ; fince all Extenfion exifts only in the Mind, as hath been already proved. It remains therefore that it exifts no where at all. LXVIII. Let $4 Of the Principles PartL LXVIIT. Let us examine a little the Defcription that is here given us of Mat- ter. It neither acts, nor perceives, nor is perceived : For this is all that is meant by faying it is an inert, fenfelefs, unknown fubflance ; which is a Definition intirely made up of Negatives, excepting only the relative Notion of its {landing under or fupporting : But then it muft be obfer- ved, that it Jupports nothing at all ; and ho\v nearly this comes to the Defcrip- tion of a non-entity, I defire may be con- fidered. But, fay you, it is the unknown Qccafion, at the prefence of which, Ideas are excited in us by the Will of God. Now I would fain know how any thing can be prefent to us, which is neither per- ceivable by Senfe nor Reflexion, nor ca- pable of producing any Idea in our Minds^ nor is at all extended, nor hath any Form, nor exifts in any Place. The Words to be prcferzf, when thus applied, muft needs be taken in fome abftradl and ftrange Meaning, and which I am not able to comprehend. LXIX. Again, let us examine what is meant by Occafion : So far as f can gather from the common ufe of Language, that Word fignifies, either the Agent which produces Part I. of Humane Knowledge. produces any Effect, or elfe fomething that is obferved to accompany, or go be- fore it, in the ordinary Courfe of things. But when it is applied to Matter as above defcribed, it can be taken in neither of thofe ienfes. For Matter is faid to be paffive and inert, and To cannot bean Agent or ef- ficient Caufe. It is alfo unperceivable,as be- ing devoid of all fenfible Qualities, and fo cannot be the Occafion of our Percepti- ons in the latter Senfe : As when the burn- ing my Finger is faid to be the Occafioa of the Pain that attends it. What there- fore can be meant by calling Matter an Occafion ? This Term is either ufed in no ferifc at all, or elfe in fome fenfe very diftant from its received Significa- tion. LXX. You will perhaps fay that Matter, though it be not perceived by us, is never- thelefs perceived by GOD, to whom it is the Occafion of exciting Ideas in our Minds. For, fay you, fince we obfcrve our Senfations to be imprinted in an or- derly and conflant manner, it is but reafonable to fuppofe there are certain conflant and regular Occafions of their being produced. That is to fay, that there are certain permanent and diftincl: Parcels of Matter, correfponding to our Ideas, Of the Principle* Part I. Ideas, which, though they do not excite them in our Minds, or any ways immedi- ately affect us, as being altogether paffive and unperceivable to Us, they are never- thelefs to G o D, by whom they are per- ceived, as it were fo many Occafions to remind him when and what Ideas to im- print on our Minds : that fo things may go on in a conftant uniform manner. LXXI. In anfwer to this I obferve, that as the Notion of Matter is here ftat- ed, the Queftion is no longer concerning the Exiftence of a thing diftindt from Spirit and Idea, from perceiving and b&- ing perceived : But whether there arc not certain Ideas, of I know not what fort, in the Mind of GOD, which are fo many Marks or Notes that direct him how to pro- duce Senfations in our Minds, in a conftant and regular Method : Much after the fame manner as a Mufician is directed by the Notes of Mufick to produce that har- monious Train and Compofition of Sound, which is called a Tune ; though they who hear the Mufick do not perceive the Notes, and may be intirely ignorant of them. But this Notion of Matter feems too extrava^ gant to deferve a Confutation. Befides, it is in effect no Objection againft what we have advanced, to wit, that there isno fenfe- lefs, unperceived Subftance. LXX1I. If Part I. of Humane Knowledge. LXXIL If we follow the Light of Rea- fon, we (hall, from the conftant uniform Method of our Senfations, collect theGood- nefs and Wifdom of the Spirit who excites them in our Minds. But this is all that I can fee reafonably concluded from thence. To me, I fay, it is evident that the Being of a Spirit infinitely Wife, Good, and Pow- erful is abundantly fufficient to explain all the Appearances of Nature. But as for inert Jenjelefi Matter^ nothing that I per- ceive has any the leaft Connexion with it, or leads to the Thoughts of it. And I would fain fee any one exp4ain any the meaneft Phenomenon in Nature by it, or (hew any manner of Reafon, though in the loweft Rank of Probability, that he can have for its Existence ; or even make any tolerable Senfe or Meaning of that Sup- poiition. For as to its being an Occafion, we have, I think, evidently (hewn that with regard to us it is no Occafion : It re- mains therefore that it muft be, if at all, the Occafion to GOD of exciting Ideas in ns ; and what this amounts to, we have juft now feen. LXXIII. It is worth while to reflect a little on the Motives which induced Men to fuppofe the Exigence of material Sub- G {lance -, 9 g Of the Principles Part I. ftance ; that fo having obferved the gra- dual ceafing, and Expiration of thofe Mo- tives or Reafons, we may proportionally withdraw the AfTent that was grounded on them. Firft therefore, it was thought that Colour, Figure, Motion, and the reft of the fenfible Qualities or Accidents, did really exift without the Mind; and for this reafon, it feemed needful to fuppofe fome unthinking Subftratum or Subftanct where- in they did exift, fince they could not be conceived to exift by themfelves. After- wards, in procefs of time, Men being con- .vinced that Colours, Sounds, and the reft of the fenfible fecondary Qualities had no Exiftence without the Mind, they ftripped this Subftratum or material bubftance of thofe Qualities, leaving only the primary ones, Figure, Motion, and fuch like, which they ftill conceived to exift with- out the Mind, and confequently to ftand jn need of a material bupport. But it having been fhewn, that none, even of thefe, can poffibly exift otherwile than in a Spirit or Mind which perceives them, it follows that we have no longer any rea- fon to fuppofe the being of Matter. Nay, that it is utterly impoflible there fhould be any fuch thing, fo long as that Word is taken to denote an unthinking Subftratum of Qualities or Accidents, wherein they ex- ift without the Mind. LXXIV. Part I. of Humane Knowledge. LXXIV. But though it be allowed by the Materialijts themfelves, that Matter was thought of only for the fake of fup- porting Accidents j and the reaibn intirely ceafing, one might expect the Mind fliould naturally, and without any reluctance at all, quit the belief of what was folely grounded thereon. Yet the Prejudice is ri- veted fo deeply in our Thoughts, that we can fcarce tell how to part with it, and are therefore inclined, fince the 'Thing it felf is indefenfible, at leaft to retain the Name-, which we apply to I know not what ab- ftracled and indefinite Notions of Being, or Occajion^ though without any mew of Rea- fon, at icaft fo far as I can fee. For what is there on our part, or what do we per- ceive amongft ail the Ideas, Senfations, No- tions, which are imprinted OQ our Minds, either by Senfe or Reflexion, from whence may be inferred the Exiftence of an inert, thoughtlefs, unperceived Occafion ? and on the otner hand, on the part of an all-fuffi-* dent Spirit, what can there be that fhould make us believe, or even fufpedt, he is Ji- refted by an inert Occafion to excite Ideas in our Minds? LXXV. Ic is a very extraordinary In-* of the force of Prejudice, and much G 2 ro ioo Of the Principles Parti. to be lamented, that the Mind of Man re- tains fo great a Fondnefs againft all the evidence of Reafon, for a ftupid though t- lefs Somewhat, by the interposition where- of it would, as it were, skreen it felf from the Providence of God, and remove him farther off from the Affairs of the World. But though we do the utmoft we can, to fecure the belief of Matter, though when Reafon forfakes us, we endeavour to (up- port our Opinion on the bare poffibility of the Thing, and though we indulge our felves in the full Scope of an Imagination not regulated by Reafon, to make out that poor Poffibility, yet the upfhot of all is, that there are certain unknown Ideas in the Mind of God; for this, if any thing, is all that I conceive to be meant by Occasion with regard to God. And this, at the Bot- tom, is no longer contending for the Tbingy but for the Name. LXXVI. Whether therefore there are fuch Ideas in the Mind of Go D, and whe- ther they may be called by the name Mat- ter, I fhall not difpute. But if you flick to the Notion of an unthinking Subftance, or Support of Extenfion, Motion, and ether fenfible Qualities, then tome it is mofr. evi- dently impoffible there mould be any fuch thing. Since it is a plain Repugnancy, that thofe Part I. of Humane Knowledge. i o i thofe Qualities mould exift in or be fup- ported by an unperceiving Subftance. LXXVII. But fay you, though it be granted that there is no thouglulefs fup- port of Extenfion, and the other Qualities or Accidents which we perceive ; yet there may, perhaps, be fome inert unperceiving Subftance, or Subftratum of fome other Qualities, as incomprehenfible to us as Co- lours are to a Man born blind, becaufe we have not a Senfe adapted to them. But if we had a new Senfe, we mould poffibly no more doubt of their Exigence, than a Blind-man made to fee does of the Exif- tence of Light and Colours. I anfwer, Firft, if what you mean by the word Mat- ter be only the unknown Support of un- known Qualities, it is no matter whether there is fuch a thing or no, fince it no way concerns us ; And I do not fee the Advantage there is in difputing about we know not wto, and we know not why. LXXVIII. But fecondly, if we had a new Senfe, it could only furnifh us with new Ideas or Senfations : And then we mould have the fame reafon againfl their exifting in an unperceiving Subftance, that has been already offered with relation to Fi- gure, Motion, Colour, an4 the like. Qua- G 3 lities, ioi Of the Principles Part I, litics, as hath been (hewn, are nothing elfe but Senfations or Idea?> which exift only in a Mind perceiving them; and this is true not only of the Ideas we are acquainted with at prefent, but like wife of all pofiibje Ideas whatsoever. LXXIX. But you will infift, what if I have no reafon to believe the Exiftence of Matter, what if I cannot affign any ufe to it, or explain any thing by it, or even con- ceive what is meant by that Word ? Yet ftill it is no Contradiction to fay that Mat- ter exifts, and that this Matter is in general a Subftance, or Occajion of Ideas-, though, indeed, to go about to unfold the meaning, or adhere to any particular Explication of thofe Words, may be attended with great Difficulties. I anfwer, when Words are ufed without a Meaning, you may put them together as you pleafe, without danger of running into a Contradiction. You may fay, for Example, that twice Two is equal to Seven, fo long as you declare you do not take the Words of that Propofhion in their ufual Acceptation, but for Marks of you know not what. And by the fame reafon you may 'fay, there is an inert thoughtlefs Subftance without Accidents, which is the occafion of our Ideas. And we {hall under- ftand juft as much by one Propofition, as the other. LXXX. In Part I. of Humane Knowledge. LXXX. In thelaft place, you will fay, What if we give up the Caufe of material Subftance, and aflert, that Matter is an un- known Somewhat, neither Subftance nor Accident, Spirit nor Idea, inert, thought- lefs, indivifible, immoveable, unextended, exifting in no Place ? For, fay you, What- ever may be urged againft Subftance or Oc- cajion^ or any other pofiuve or relative No- tion of Matter, hath no place at all, fo long as this negative Definition of Matter is ad- hered to. I anfwer, you may, if fo it mail feem good, ufe the word Matter in the fame Senfe, that other Men ufe nothing^ and fo make thofe Terms convertible in your Style. For after all, this is what appears to me to be the Refult of that Definition, the Parts whereof when I confider with Attention, either collectively, or feparate from each other, I do not find that there is any kind of EfFedt or Impreflion made on my Mind, different from what is ex- cited by the Term Nothing. LXXXI. You will reply perhaps, that in the forefaid Definition is included, what doth fufficiendy diftinguifh it from no- thing, the pofitive, abftract Idea of Quid- dity ', Entity, or Exiftence. I own indeed, that thofe who pretend to the Faculty of G 4 framing 104 Of the Principles Part I. framing abftraft general Ideas, do talk as if they had fuch an Idea, which is, fay they, the moft abftradt and general Notion of all, that is to me the moft incompre- henfible of all others. That there are a great variety of Spirits of different Orders and Capacities, whofe Faculties, both in Number and Extent, are far exceeding thofc the Author of my Being has be- ftowed on me, I fee no reafon to deny. And for me to pretend to determine by my own few, ftinted, narrow Inlets of Perception, what Ideas the inexhauftible Power of the SUPREME SPIRIT may imprint upon them, were certainly the ut- moft Folly and Prefumption, Since there may be, for ought that I know, innu- merable forts of Ideas or Senfations, as dif- ferent from one another, and from all that I have perceived, as Colours are from Sounds. But how ready foever I may be, to acknow- ledge the Scantinefs of my Comprehenfion, with regard to the cndlefs variety of Spi- rits and Ideas, that might poffibly exift, yet for any one to pretend to a Notion of Entity or Exiftence, abftrafted from Spirit and Idea, from perceiving and being per- ceived, is, I fufpect, a downright repjg- nancy and trifling with Words. It remains that we confider the Objections, which may poilibiy be made on the part of Religion. LXXXII. Part I. of Humane Knowledge. 105 LXXXII. Some there are who think, that though the Arguments for the real Exiftence of Bodies, which are drawn from Reafon, be allowed not to amount to De- monftration, yet the Holy Scriptures are fo clear in the Point, as will fufficiently con- vince every good Chriftian, that Bodies do really exift, and are fomething more than mere Ideas j there being in Holy Writ in- numerable Facts related, which evidently fuppofe the reality of Timber, and Stone, Mountains, and Rivers, and Cities, and humane Bodies. To which I anfwer, that no fort of Writings whatever, facred or profane, which ufe thofe and the like Words in the vulgar Acceptation, or fo as to have a meaning in them, are in danger of having their Truth called in queftion by our Doctrine. That all thofe Things do really exift, that there are Bodies, even corporeal Subftances, when taken in the vulgar Senfe, has been (hewn to be agreea- ble to our Principles : And the difference betwixt Things and Ideas^ Realities and Chimeras, has been diftinclly explained *. And I do not think, that either what Phi- lofophers call Matter^ or the Exiftence of Objects without the Mind, is any where mentioned in Scripture. LXXXIII. * Seel. XXIX, XXX, XXXIII, XXXVT, &c, io6 Of the Principles Part I. LXXXIII. Again, whether there be, or be not external Things, it is agreed on all hands, that the proper Ufe of Words, is the marking our Conceptions, or Things only as they are known and perceived by us ; whence it plainly follows, that in the Tenets we have laid down, there is nothing inconfiftent with the right Ufe and Signi- ficancy "of Language^ and that Diicourfe of what kind foever, fo far as it is intelligi- ble, remains undifturbed. But all this feems lo manifeft, from what hath been fet forth in the Premifes, that it is needlefs to infill any farther on it. LXXXIV. But it will be urged, that Mi- racles do, at lead, lofe much of their itrefs and Import by our Principles. What muft we think of Motes' $ Rod, was it not really turned into a Serpent, or was there only a Change of Ideas in rhe Minds of the Spec- tators ? And can it be fuppofed, that our Saviour did no more at the Marmge-Feaft in Caxa y than impofe on the Sight, and Smell, and Tafte of the Gucfts, fo as to create in them the Appearance or Idea on- ly of Wine ? The fame may be faid of all other Miracles : Which, in confequence of the foregoing Principles, muft be looked upon only as fo many Cheats, or Illufions of Parti, of Humane Knowledge. 107 of Fancy. To this I reply, that the Rod was changed into a real Serpent, and the Water into real Wine. That this doth not, in the leaft, contradict what I have elfe- where faid, will be evident from Sect, 34, and 35. But this Bufinefs of Real and Imaginary hath been already fo plainly and fully explained, and fo often referred to, and the Difficulties about it are fo eafily an- fwered from what hath gone before, that it were an Affront to the Reader's Under- ftanding, to refume the Explication of it in this place. I (hall only obferve, that if at Table all who were prefent mould fee, and fmell, and tafte, and drink Wine, and find the effects of it, with me there could be no doubt of its Reality. So that, at Bot- tom, the Scruple concerning real Miracles hath no place at all on ours, but only on the received Principles, and confequently maketh rather for y than againjl what hath been faid. LXXXV. Having done with the Objec-? tions, which I endeavoured to propofc in the cleared Light, and gave them all the Force and Weight I could, we proceed ia the next place to take a view of our Te- nets in their Confequences. Some of thefe appear at firft Sight, as that feveral diffi- cult and obfcure Queftions, on which abundance i o S Of the Principles Part I. abundance of Speculation hath been thrown away, are intirely banifhed from Philofo- phy. Whether corporeal Subftance can think ? Whether Matter be infinitely divi- fible? And how it operates on Spirit? thefe and the like Inquiries have given infinite Amufement to Philofophers in all Ages. But depending on the Exiftencc of Matter, they have no longer any place on our Prin- ciples. Many other Advantages there are, as well with regard to Religion as the Scien- ces, which it is eafy for any one to deduce from what hath been premifed. Bat this will appear more plainly in the Sequel. LXXXVI. From the Principles we have laid down, it follows, humane Knowledge may naturally be reduced to two Heads, that of Ideas, and that of Spirits. Of each of thefe I flvall 'treat in order. And firft as to Ideas or unthinking Things, our Knowledge of thefe hath been very much obfcured and confounded, and we have been led into very dangerous Errors, by fuppofing a twofold Exiftence of the Ob- jeds of Senfe, the one intelligible^ or in the Mind, the other real and without the Mind : Whereby unthinking Things are thought to have a natural Subfiftence of their own, diftinct from being perceived by Spirits. This which, if I miftake not, hath Parti, of Humane Knowledge, hath been (hewn to be a moft groundlefs and abfurd Notion, is the very Root of Scepfjcijm} for fo long as Men thought that real Things fubfifted without the Mind, and that their Knowledge was only fo far forth real as it was conformable to real Things^ it follows, they could not be cer- tain that they had any real Knowledge at all. For how can it be known, that the Things which are perceived, are conform- able to thofe which are not perceived, or exift without the Mind ? LXXXVII. Colour, Figure, Motion, Extenfion and the like, confidered only as fo many Senfations in the Mind, are per- fectly known, there being nothing in them which is not perceived. But if they are looked on as Notes or Images, referred to Tbings or Archetypes exifting without the Mind, then are we involved all in Scepfi- cifm. We fee only the Appearances, and not the real Qualities of Things. What may be the Extenfion, Figure, or Motion of any thing really and absolutely, or in it felf, it is impoffible for us to know, but only the proportion or the relation they bear to our Senfes. Things remaining the fame, our Ideas vary, and which of them, or even whether any of them at all rep're- fent the true Quality really exifting in the Thing, no Of the Principles Part t. Thing, it is out of our reach to determine. So that, for ought we know, all we fee, hear, and feel, may be only Phantom and vain Chimera, and not at all agree with the real Things, exifting in Rerum Natura. All this Scepticifm follows, from our fuppofing a difference between Things and Ideas, and that the former have a Sub- fiftence without the Mind, or unperceived. It were eafy to dilate on this Subject, and (hew how the Arguments urged by Sceptics in all Ages* depend on the Suppofition of external Objects. LXXXVIII. So long as we attribute a. real Exiftence to unthinking Things, di- ftinct from their being perceived, it is not only impofiible for us to know with evi- dence the Nature of any real unthinking Being, but even that it exifts. Hence it is, that we fee Philofophers diftruft their Senfes, and doubt of the Exiflence of Hea- ven and Earth, of every thing they fee or feel, even of their own Bodies. And after all their labour and ftruggle of Thought, they are forced to own, we cannot attain to any felf-evident or demonftrative Know- ledge of the Exiftence of fenfible Things. But all this Doubtfulnefs, which fo bewil- ders and confounds the Mind, and makes Philojbpby ridiculous in the Eyes of the World, Part I. of Humane Knowledge. in World, vanishes, if we annex a meaning to our Words, and do not amufe our felves with the Terms Abjblute, External, Exift, and fuch like, fignifying we know not what. I can as well doubt of my own Being, as of the Being of thofe Things which I actually perceive by Senfe : It being a ma- nifeft Contradiction, that any fenfible Ob- ject mould be immediately perceived by Sight or Touch, and at the fame time have no Exiftence in Nature, fince the ve- ry Exiftence of an unthinking Being con- fifts in being perceived* LXXXIX. Nothing feems of more Im- portance, towards erecting a firm Syfteme of found and real Knowledge, which may be proof againft the Aflauhs of Scepticifin, than to lay the beginning in a diftinct Ex- plication of what is meant by 'L'bing, Rea~ lity, Exiftence : For in vain (hall we dif- pute concerning the real Exiftence of* Things, or pretend to any Knowledge thereof, fo long as we have not fixed the meaning of thofe Words. Taking or Being is the mo ft general Name of all, it com- prehends under it two Kinds intirely di- ftinct and heterogeneous, and which have nothing common but the Name, to wit, Spirits and Ideas. The former are active, indivifthle Subftances : The latter are inert, fleeting, in Of the Principles Part I. dependent Beings, which fubfift not by themfclves, but are fupported by, or exift in Minds or fpiritual Subftances. We comprehend our own Exiftence by inward Feeling or Reflexion, and that of other Spi- rits by Reafon. We may be faid to have fome Knowledge or Notion of our own Minds, of Spirits and active Beings, where- of in a ftrict Senfe we have not Ideas. In like manner we know and have a Notion of relations between Things or Ideas, which relations are diftinct from the Ideas or Things related, inafmuch as the latter may be perceived by us without our perceiving the former. To me it feems that Ideas, Spirits and Relations are all in their refpec- tive kinds, the Object of humane Know- ledge and Subject of Difcourfe : and that the Term Idea would be improperly ex- tended to fignify every thing we know or have any Notion of. XC. Ideas imprinted on the Senfes arc real Things, or do really exift ; this we do not deny, but we deny they can fubfift without the Minds which perceive them, or that they are Refemblances of any Ar- chetypes exifting without the Mind : Since the very Being of a Senfation or Idea con- Ms in being perceived, and an Idea can be like nothing but an Idea. Again, the Things Parti., of Humane Knowledge. Things perceived by Senfe may be termed external^ with regard to their Origin, in that they are not generated from within, by the Mind it felf, but imprinted by a Spirit diftinct from that which perceives them. Senfible Objects may likewife be faid to be without the Mind, in another fenfe, namely when they exift in fome other Mind. Thus when I {hut my Eyes, the Things I faw may ftill exift, but ic muftr be in another Mind. XCI. It were a miftake to think, that what is here faid derogates in the leaft from the Reality of Things. It is acknow- ledged on the received Principles, that Ex- tenlion, Motion, and in a word all fenfi- ble Qualities, have need of a Support, as not being able to fubiift by themfelves. But the Objects perceived by Senfe, are al- lowed to be nothing but Combinations of thofe Qualities, and confequently cannot fublift by themfelves. Thus far it is agreed on all hands. So that in denying the Things perceived by Senfe, an Exiftence indepen- dent of a Subflance, or Support wherein they may exift, we detract nothing from the received Opinion of their Reality, and ire guilty of no Innovation in that refpect. All the difference is, that according to us :he unthinking Beings perceived by Senfe, H hav* 1 1 4 Of the Principles Pare I. have no Exigence diftinct from Being per- ceived, and cannot therefore exift in any other Subftance, than thofe unextended, in- divifible SubfUnces, or Spirits, which acl, and think, and perceive them : Whereas Philofophers vulgarly hold, that the fenfi- ble Qualities exift in an inert, extended, unperceiving Subftance, which they call Matter, to which they attribute a natural Subfiftence, exterior to all thinking Be- ings, or diftinct from Being perceived by ay" Mind whatfoever, even the eternal Mind of the GREAT OK, wherein they fuppofe only Ideas of the corporeal $ub- jftances created by him : If indeed they allow them to be at all created. XCII. For as we have (hewn the Doc- trine of Matter or corporeal Subftance, to have been the main Pillar and Support of Sceptiafm, fo likewife upon the fame Foun- dation have been raifed all the impious Schemes of Atbeifm and Irreligion. Nay Ib great a difficulty hath it been thought, to conceive Matter produced out of no- thing, that the moft celebrated among the ancient Philofophers, even of thefe who maintained the Being of a GOD, have thought Matter to be uncreated and coe- ternal with him. How great a Friend ma- terial Subftance hath been to Atbeifts in all Ages, Part I. of Humane Knowledge. 1 1 Ages, were needlefs to relate. All theif monftrous Syftems have fo vifible and ne- cefTary a dependence on it, that when this Corner-ftone is once removed, the whole Fabrick cannot choofe but fall to the Ground ; infomuch that it is no longer worth while, to bellow a particular Con- iideration on the Abfurdities of every wretched Seel: of At.heijls. XCIII. That impious and profane Per- fons mould readily fall in with thofe Sy- ftems which favour their Inclinations, by deriding immaterial Subftance, and fup- pofing the Soul to be divifible and ftibject to Corruption as the Body> which exclude all Freedom, Intelligence, and Defign from the Formation of Things, and inilead there- of make a felf-exiftenr, ftupid, urrthink- Hig Subftance the Root and Origin of all Beings. That they mould hearken to thofe who deny a Providence, or infpedtion of a fuperior Mind over the Affairs of the World, attributing the whole Series of E- vents either to blind Chance or fatal Ne- ceffity, arifing from the Impulfe of one Bo- dy on another. All this is very natural. And on the other hand, when Men of bet- ter Principles obierve the Enemies of Re- ligion lay fo great a Strefs on unthinking Matter^ and all of them ufe fo- much In- H 2 duftry ii 6 Of the Principles Fart I. duftry and Artifice to reduce every thing to it ; methinks they mould rejoice to fee them deprived of their grand Support, and driven from that only Fortrefs, without which your Epicureans, Hobbifts, and the Hke, have not even the Shadow of a Pre- tence, but become the moil cheap and ea- fy Triumph in the World. XCIV. The Exigence of Matter, or Bo- dies unperceived, has not only been the main Support of Atheijls and Fatalijl^ but on the fame Principle doth Idolatry 1 ike- wife in all its various Forms depend. Did Men but coniider that the Sun, Moon, and Stars, and every other Object of the Senfes, are only fo many Senfations in their Minds, which have no other Exiftence but barely being perceived, doubtlefs they would ne- ver fall down, and wormip their own /- deal ; but rather addrefs their Homage to that ETERNAL INVISIBLE MIND which produces and fuftains all Things. XCV. The fame abfurd Principle, by mingling it felf with the Articles of our Faith, hath occafioned no fmall Difficul- ties to Chriftians. For Example, about the Re/urreftion, how many Scruples and Ob- jections have been raifed by Socinians and others? But do not the moft plaufible of them Part I. of Humane Knowledge. 117 them depend on the fuppofhion, that a Bo- dy is denominated the fame^ with regard not to the Form or that which is perceived by Senfe,but the material Subftance which remains the fame under feveral Forms ? Take away this material Subftance, about the Identity whereof all the Difpute is, and mean by Body what every plain ordi- nary Perfon means -by that Word, to wit, that which is immediately feen and felt, which is only a Combination of fenfible Qualities, or Ideas: And then their mofl unanfwerable Objections come to nothing. XCVI. Matter being once expelled out of Nature, drags with it fo many fceptical and impious Notions, fuch an incredible number of Difputes and puzling Queftions, which have been Thorns in the bides of Divines, as well as Philofophers, and made fo much fruitlefs Work for Mankind , that if the Arguments we have produced againft it, arc not found equal to Demonftration (as to me they evidently feem) yet I am fure all Friends to Knowledge, Peace, and Religion, have reafon to wifh they were. XCVII. Befide the external Exigence of the Objedts of Perception, another great Source of Errors and Difficulties, with re- ft 3 gard 1 1 8 Of the Principles Part I. gard to Ideal Knowledge, is the Doctrine of abftracl Ideas, fuch as it hath been fet forth in the Introduction. The plaineft Things in the World, thofe we are mod intimately acquainted with, and perfectly know, when they are confidered in an ab- ftract way, appear flrangely difficult and incomprehenfible. Time, Place, and Mo- tion, taken in particular or concrete, are what every Body knows ; but having paf- fed through the Hands of a Metaphyfician, they become too abftract and fine, to be apprehended by Men of ordinary Senfe. 3id vour Servant meet vou at fuch a Time. > * in fuch a Place^ and he mall never ftay to deliberate on the meaning of thofe Words: In conceiving that particular Time and Place, or the Motion by which he is to get thither, he finds not the leaft Difficulty. But if Time be taken, exclusive of all thofe particular Actions and Ideas that diverfify the Day, merely for the Continuation of Exiftence, or Duration in Abftract, then it will perhaps gravel even a Philofopher to comprehend it. XCVJII. Whenever I attempt to frame a fimple Idea of *Iime t abftra&ed from the fucceffion of Ideas in my Mind, which flows uniformly, and is participated by all B-ings, I am loft and embrangled in inex- tricable Part I. of Humane Knowledge. 1 1 tricable Difficulties. I have no Notion of it at all, only I hear others fay, it is infi- nitely divifible, and fpeak of it in fuch a manner as leads me to entertain odd Thoughts of my Exiftence : Since that Duclrine lays one under an abfolute necef- fity of thinking, either that he palTes away innumerable Ages without a Thought, or elfe that he is annihilated every moment of his Life: Both which feem equally ab- furd. Time therefore being nothing, ab- flracled from the Succeflion of Ideas in our Minds, it follows that the Duration of any finite Spirit muft be eftimated by the Number of Ideas or Actions fucceeding each other in that fame Spirit or Mind. Hence it is a plain confequence that the Soul always thinks : And in truth whoever {hall go about to divide in his Thoughts, or abftract the Exijicnce of a Spirit from its Cogitation , will, I believe, find it no eafy Task. XCIX. So like wife, when we attempt to abftracl: Exteniion and Motion from all other Qualities, and confider them by themfelves, we prefently lofe fight of them, and run into great Extravagancies. All which depend on a two- fold Abftraction : Firft, it is fuppofed that Extenfion, for Ex- ample, may be abftracted from all other H 4 1 10 Of the Principles Part I. fenfible Qualities ; and Secondly, that the Entity of Extenfion may be abftracted from its being perceived. But whoever (hall reflect, and take care to underftand what he fays, will, if I miftake not, ac- knowledge that all fenfible Qualities are a- like ScnJatloriSi and alike rea/-, that where the Extenfion is, there is the Colour too, to wit, in his Mind, and that their Arche- types can exift only in fome other Mind: And that the Objects of Senfe are nothing but thofe Senfations combined, blended, or ( if one may fo fpeak ) concreted together : None of all which can be fuppofed to ex- ift unperceived. C. What it is for a Man to be happy, or an Object good, every one may think he knows. But to frame an abftract Idea of Happinffsy prefcinded from all particular Pleafure, or of Goodnefs, from every thing that is good, this is what few can pretend to. So likewife, a Man may be juft and virtuous, without having precife Ideas of yuftice and Virtue. The Opinion that thofe and the like Words ftand for general No- tions abftracted from all particular Perfons and Actions, feems to have rendered Mo- rality difficult, and the Study thereof of lefs ufe to Mankind. And in effect, the Doctrine of Abftraftion has not a Jittle con- Part I. of Humane Knowledge. contributed towards fpoiling the moft ufe.- ful Parts of Knowledge. CI. The two great Provinces of fpecu- lative Science, converfant about Ideas re- ceived from Senfe and their Relations, are natural Philofophy and Mathematics ; with regard to each of thefe I mall make ibme Obfervations. And-Firft, I (hall fay fome- what of natural Philofophy. On this Sub- ject it is, that the Sceptics triumph : All that (lock of Arguments they produce to depreciate our Faculties, and make Man- kind appear ignorant and low, are drawn principally from this Head, to wit, that we are under an invincible Blindnefs as to the true and real Nature of Things. This they exaggerate, and love to enlarge on. We are miferably bantered, fay they, by our Senfes, and amufed only with the out- fide and mew of Things. The real Ef- fence, the internal Qualities, and Confti- tution of every the meaneil Object, is hid from our view; fomething there is in eve- ry drop of Water, every grain of Sand, which it is beyond the Power of humane Undenlanding to fathom or comprehend. But it is evident from what has been (hewn, that all this Complaint is groundlcfs, and that we are influenced by falfc Principles to that degree as to miilruft our Senfes, and Of the Principles Parti. and think we know nothing of thofe Things which we perfectly compre- hend. CII. One great Inducement to our pro- nouncing our felves ignorant of the Nature of Things, is the current Opinion that every thing includes* within it felf the Caufe of its Properties : Or that there is in each Object an inward EfTence, which is the Source whence its difcernible Qualities flow, and whereon they depend. Some have pretended to account for Appearances by occult Qualities, but of late they are moftly refolved into mechanical Caufes, to wit, the Figure, Motion, Weight, and fuch like Qualities of infenfible Particles: Where- as in truth, there is no other Agent or ef- ficient Caufe than Spirit y it being evident that Motion, as well as all other Ideas y is perfectly inert. See SeEt. 25. Hence, to endeavour to explain the Production of Colours or Sounds, by Figure, Motion, Magnitude and the like, muft needs be la- bour in vain. And accordingly, we fee the Attempts of that kind are not at all fatisfadtory. Which may be (aid, in gene- ral, of thofe Inftances, wherein one Idea or Quality is affigned for the Caule of an- other. I need not fay, how many Hypo- tbefes and Speculations are left out, and hovy Part I. of Humane Knowledge. \ 1 3 how much the Study of Nature is abridged by this Doctrine. CIII. The great mechanical Principle now in Vogue is Attraction. That a Stone falls to the Earth, or the Sea fwells to- wards the Moon, may to fome appear fuf- ficiently explained thereby. But how are we enlightened by being told this is done by Attraction ? Is it that that Word fig- nifjes the manner of the Tendency, and that it is by the mutual drawing of Bodies, initead of their being impelled or pro- truded towards each other ? But nothing is determined of the Manner or Action, and jt may as truly (for ought we know) be termed Impulfe or Protrufion as Attraction. Again, the Parts of Steel we fee cohere firmly together, and this alfo is accounted for by Attraction j but in this, as in the other Inftances, I do not perceive that any thing is fignified befides the Effect it felf ; for a$ to the manner of the Action where- by it is produced, or the Caufe which pro- duces it, thefe are not fo much as aimed at. CIV. Indeed, if we take a view of the feveral Phenomena, and compare them to- gether, we may obferve fome likenefs and conformity between them. For Example, in Principles Part I. in the falling of a Stone to the Ground, in the rifing of the Sea towards the Moon, in Cohefion and Cryftallization, there is fomething alike, namely an Union or rnu- tual Approach of Bodies. So that any one of thefe or the like Phenomena t may not feem ftrange or furprifing to a Man who hath nicely obferved and compared the Ef- fects of Nature. For that only is thought fo which is uncommon, or a thing by it fclf, and out of the ordinary Courfe of our Observation. That Bodies mould tend to- wards the Center of the Earth, is not thought ftrange, becaufe it is what we per- ceive every moment of our Lives. But that they mould have a like Gravitation towards the Center of the Moon, may feem odd and unaccountable to moft Men, be- caufe it is difcerned only in the Tides. But a Philofopher, whofe Thoughts take in a larger compafs of Nature, having obferved a certain fimilitude of Appearances, as well in the Heavens as the Earth, that argue innumerable Bodies to have a mutual Ten- dency towards each other, which he de- notes by the general Name Attraftion^ what- ever can be reduced to that, he thinks juft- ly accounted for. Thus he explains the Tides by the Attraction of the Terraque- ous Globe towards the Moon, which to him doth not appear odd or anomalous, but only Part I. of Humane Knowledge. 125 only a particular Example of a general Rule or Law of Nature. CV. If therefore we confider the dif- ference there is betwixt natural Philofo- phers and other Men, with regard to their Knowledge of the Phenomena, we (hall find it confifls, not. in an exacter Know- ledge of the efficient Gaufe that produces them, for that can be no other than the Will of a Spirit, but 't>nly in a greater Largenefs of Comprehcnfion, whereby A- nalogies, Harmonies, and Agreements are difcovered in the Works of Nature, and the particular Effects explained, that is, re- duced to general Rules, fee Sift. 62. which Rules grounded on the Analogy, and Uni- formnefs obferved in' the Production of na- tural Effects, are molt agreeable, and fought after by the Mind j for that they extend our Profpect beyond what is prefent, and near to us, and enable us to make very probable Conjectures, touching Things that may have happened at very great distances of Time and Place, as well as to predict Things to come ; which fort of endeavour towards Omnifciencc, is much affected by the Mind. CVI. But we mould proceed warily in fuch Things : for we are apt to lay too great Of the Principles Part I. great a Strefs on Analogies, and to the pre- judice of Truth, humour that Eagernefs of the Mind, whereby it is carried to extend its Knowledge into general Theoremes. For Example, Gravitation, or mutual Attrac- tion, becaufe it appears in many Inftances, fome are ftraightway for pronouncing Uni* wrj'al ; and that to attraft^ and be attracted by every other Body, is an ejfcntial Duality inherent in all Bodies ivbatfoe-ver. Whereas it appears the fixed Stars have no fuch Tendency towards each other : and fo far is that Gravitation, from being ejjential to Bodies, that, in fome Inftances a quite con- trary Principle feems to {hew it felf : As in the perpendicular Growth of Plants, and the Elafticity of the Air. There is no- thing neceflary or eiTential in the Cafe, DUE it depends intirely on the Will of the go- verning Spirit, who caufes certain Bodies to cleave together, or tend towards each other, according to various Laws, whilft he keeps others at a fixed Diftance ; and to fome he gives a quite contrary Tenden- cy to fly afunder, juft as he fees conve- nient. CVII. After what has been premifed, I think we may lay down the following Con- eluiions. Firft, Ic is plain Philoibphers amufe themfelves in vain, when they in- quire Part I. Of Humane Knowledge. quire for any natural efficient Caufe, di- ftincl: from a Mind or Spirit. Secondly, Confidering the whole Creation is the Workmanfhip of a 'wife and govd Agent^ it .mould feem to become Philofophers, to employ their Thoughts (contrary to what fome hold ) about the final Caufes of Things : And I muft confefs, I fee no rea- fon, why pointing out the various Ends, to which natural Things are adapted, and for which they were originally with unfpeak- able Wifdom contrived, mould not be thought one good way of accounting for them, and altogether worthy a Philofo- pher. Thirdly, From what hath been pre- mifed no reafon can be drawn, why the Hiftory of Nature fhould not ftill be ftu- died, and Obfervations and Experiments made, which, that they are of ufe to Man- kind, and enable us to draw any general Conclufions, is not the Refult of any im- mutable Habitudes, or Relations between Things themfelveSj but only of G o D'S Goodnefs and Kindnefs to Men in the Ad- miniftration of the World. See Setf. 30 and 3 1. Fourthly, By a diligent Obferva- tion of the Phenomena within our View, we may difcover the general Laws of Na- ture, and from them deduce the other Phcenomena^ I do not fay dcmonjlrate-, for all Deductions of that kind depend on a Suppofition 1 18 Of the Principles Part I. Suppofiddn that the Author of Nature al- ways operates uniformly, and in a conftant obfervance of thole Rules we take for Principles : Which we cannot evidently know. CVIII. Thofe Men who frame general Rules from the Phtznomena^ and afterwards derive the Phenomena from thofe Rules, ieem to confider Signs rather than Caufes. A Man may well underftand natural Signs without knowing their Analogy, or being able to fay by what Rule a Thing is fo or fo. And as it is very poffiblc to write im- properly, through too ftricl: an Obfervance of general Grammar- Rules: So in arguing from general Rules of Nature, it is not im- poilible we may extend the Analogy coo iar, and by that means run into Miftakes. CIX. As in reading other Books, a wife Man will choofe to fix his Thoughts on the Senfe and apply it to ufe, rather than lay them out in Grammatical Remarks on the Language; fo in perufing the Volume of Nature, it feems beneath the Dignity of the Mind to affect an Exactnefs in re- ducing each particular Pbammenon to ge- neral Rules, or ihewing how it follows from them. We mould propoie to our felves nobler Views, fuch as to recreate and exalt Parti, of Humane Knowledge. 12.9 exalt the Mind, with a profpeft of the Beauty, Order, Extenr, and Variety of na- tural Things : Hence, by proper Inferea- ces, to enlarge our Notions of the Gran- deur, Wifdom, and Beneficence of the C K E A T o R : And laftly, to make the fe- veral Parts of the Creation, fo far as in us lies, fubfervient to the Ends they were de- figned for, G o D'S Glory, and the Suften- tation and Comfort of our felves and Fel- low-Creatures. CX. The beft Key for the aforefaid A- nalogy, or natural bcience, will be eafily acknowledged to be a certain celebrated Treat ife 01 Mechanics : In the entrance of which juftly admired Treatife, Time, Space and Motion, are diftingui(hed into Abfolute and Relative, True and Apparent, Mathematical and Vulgar : Which Diftinc- tion, as it is at large explained by the Au- thor, doth fuppofe thofe Quantities to have an Exiftence without the Mind: And thac they are ordinarily conceived with relation to fenlible Things, to which neverthelefs in their own Nature, they bear no relation at all. CXI. As for Tifftfj as it is there taken in an abfolute or abftradted Senie, for the Duration or Perfeverance of the Exigence I of i jo Of the Principles Part I. of Things, I have nothing more to add concerning it, after what hath been alrea- dy faid on that Subject, Seff. 97 and 98. For the reft, this celebrated Am Lor holds there is an abfolute Space, which, being un- perceivable to Senfe, remains in it fr If ft- milar and immoveable : And relative Space to be the meafure thereof, which being moveable, and defined by its Situation in refpecl of fenfible Bodies, is vulgarly taken for immoveable Space. Place he defines to be that part of Space which is occupied by any Body. And according as the bpace is abfolute or relative, fo alfo is the Place. Abfolute Motion is faid to be the Tranflati- on of a Body from abfolute Place to ab- folute Place, as relative Motion is from one relative Place to another. And becaufe the Parts of abfolute Space, do not fall un- der our Senfes, inftead of them we are ob- liged to ufe their fenfible Meafures : And fo define both Place and Motion with re- fpecl: to Bodies, which we regard as im- moveable. But it is faid, in philofophical Matters we muft abftracl from our Senfes, fince it may be, that none of thofe Bodies which feem to be quiefcent, are truly fo : And the fame thing which is moved rela- tively, may be really at reft. As likewife one and the fame Body may be in relative Reft and Motion, or even moved with con- trary Part t. of Humane Knowledge. trary relative Motions at the fame time, according as its Place is variously defined. All which Ambiguity is to be found in the apparent Motions, but not at all in the true or abfolute, which fhould therefore be alone regarded in Philofophy. And the true, we are told, -are diftinguifhed from apparent or relative Motions by the follow- ing Properties. Firft, In true or abfolute Motion, all Parts which preferve the lame Pofition with refpect to the whole, par- take of the Motions of the whole. Second- ly, The Place being moved, that which is placed therein is alio moved : So that a Bo- dy moving in a Place which is in Motion, doth participate the Motion of its Place. Thirdly, True Motion is never generated of changed, other wife than by Force impre- fed on the Body it felf. Fourthly, True Motion is always changed by Force im- prefled on the Body moved. Fifthly, In circular Motion barely relative, there is nor centrifugal Force, which neverthelefs in that which is true or abfolute, is propor- tional to the Quantity of Motion. CXII. But notwithstanding what hath been faid, it doth not appear to me, that there can be any Motion other than rela- tive : So that to conceive Motion, there muft be at kaft conceived two Bodies, I 2 whereof 131 Of the Principles Part I. whereof the Diftance or Polidon in regard to each other is varied. Hence if there was one only Body in being, it could not poffibly be moved. This feems evident, in that the Idea I have of Motion doth necef- farily include Relation. CXIII. But though in every Motion it be necefTary to conceive more Bodies than one, yet it may be that one only is moved, namely that on which the Force caufing the change of diftance is imprefled, or in other Words, that to which the Action is applied. For however fome may define Relative Motion, fo as to term that Body moved, which changes its Diftance from fome other Body, whether the Force or Action caufing that Change were applied to it, or no : Yet as Relative Motion is that which is perceived by Senfe,and regarded in the ordinary Affairs of Life, it fhould feem that every Man of common Scnfe knows what it is, as well as the beft Philofopher : Now I ask any one, whether in his Senfe of Motion as he walks along the Streets, the Stones he pafles over may be faid to move, becaufe they change Diftance with his Feet? To me it feems, that though Motion includes a Relation of one thing to another, yet it is not necefTary that each Term of the Relation be denominated from Part I. of Humane Knowledge. \ 3 from it. As a Man may think of fome- what which doth not think, fo a Body may be moved to or from another Body, which is not therefore it felf in Motion. CXIV. As the Place happens to be va- rioufly defined, the Motion which is re- lated to it varies. 'A Man in a Ship may be faid to be quiefcent, with relation to the fides of the VelTel, and yet move with relation to the Land. Or he may move Eaftward in refpedt of the one, and Weft- ward in refpect of the other. In the com- mon Affairs of Life, Men never go beyond the Earth to define the Place of any Body : And what is quiefcent in refpect of that, is accounted abfolutely to be fo. But Philo- fophers who have a greater Extent of Thought, and jufter Notions of the Syftem of Things, difcover even the Earth it felf to be moved. In order therefore to fix their Notions, they feem to conceive the Corporeal World as finite, and the utmoft unmoved Walls or Shell thereof to be the Place, whereby they eftimate true Moti- ons. If we found our own Conceptions, I believe we may find all the abfolute Mo- tion we can frame an Idea of, to be at bottom no other than relative Motion thus defined. For as hath been already obferved, abfolute Motion exclufive of all external I 3 Relation 4 Of the Principles Part I. Relation is incomprehenfible : And to this kind of Relative Motion, all the above- mentioned Properties, Caufes, and Effects afcribed to abfolute Motion, will, if I mif- take not, be found to agree, As to what is faid of the centrifugal Force, that it doth not at all belong to circular Relative Mo- tion : I do not fee how this follows from the Experiment which is brought to prove it. See Pbilojbf.bi(Z Naturalis Principia Ma- thematica^ in Schol. Lief. VIII. For the Wa- ter in the Veffel, at that time wherein it is faid to have the greateft relative circular Motion, hath, I think, no Motion at all: As is plain from the foregoing Section. CXV. For to denominate a Body moved, it is requifite, fir ft, that it change its Di- ftance or Situation with regard to fome other Body : And fecondly, that the Force or Action occasioning that Change be ap- plied to it. If either of thefe be wanting, I do not think that agreeably to the Senfc of Mankind, or the Propriety of language, a Body can be faid to be in Motion. I grant indeed, that it is poffible for us to think a Body, which we fee change its Diftance from fome other, to be moved, though it have no force applied to it, ( in which Senfe there may be apparent Mo- EJpn,) but then it is, becaufe the Force cauling Part I. of Humane Knowledge. 135 caufin the Change of Diftance, is ima- gined by us to be applied or imprefled on thar Body thought to move. Which in- deed {hews we are capable of miftaking a thing to be in Motion which is not, and that is all. CXVL From what hath been faid, it follows that the Philofophic Confideration of Motion doth not imply the being of an abfolute Space, diftinct from that which is perceived by Senfe, and related to Bodies : Which that it cannot exift without the Mind, is clear upon the fame Principles, that demonftrate the like of all other Ob- jeds of Senfe. And perhaps, if we in- quire narrowly, we (hall find we cannot even frame an Idea of pure Space, exclu- five of all Body. This I muft confefs feems impoffible, as being a moft abftracl Idea. When I excite a Motion in fome part of my Body, if it be free or without Refif- tance, I fay there is Space : But if I find a Refiftunce, then I fay there is Body : and in proportion as the Refiftance to Motion is lerTer or greater, I fay the Space is more or Impure. So that when I fpeak of pure or empty Space, it is not to be fuppofed, that the Word Space ftands for an' Idea di- ftindt from, or conceivable without Body and Motion. Though indeed we are apt 14 t( > 3 6 Of the Principles Part I. to think every Noun Subftantive flands for a diftinct Idea, that may be feparated from all others : Which hath occafioned infinite Miftakes. When therefore fuppo- fing all the World to be annihilated befides my own Body, I fay there ftill remains pure Space : Thereby nothing elfe is meant, but only that I conceive it poffible, for the Limbs of my Body to be moved on all fides without the leaft Refiftance : But if that too were annihilated, then there could be no Motion, and confequently no Space. Some perhaps may think the Senfe of Seeing doth furnifti them with the Idea of pure Space ; but it is plain from what we have elie where (hewn, that the Ideas of Space and Pittance are not obtained by that Senfe. See the EJf'ay concerning Vi- fion. CXVII. What is here laid down, feems to put an end to all thofe Difputes and Difficulties, which have fprung up amongft the Learned concerning the nature of pure Space. But the chief Advantage arifing from it, is, that we are freed from that dangerous Dilemma, to which feveral who have employed their Thoughts on this Sub- ject, imagine themfelves reduced, to wit, of thinking either that Real Space is GOD, or elfe that there is fomething befide GOD which Part I. of Humane Knowledge. which is Eternal, Uncreated, Infinite, In- divifible, Immutable. Both which may juftly be thought pernicious and abfurd Notions. It is certain that not a few Di- vines, as well as Philofophers of great note, have, from the Difficulty they found in conceiving either Limits or Annihila- tion of Space, concluded it muft be Di- vine. And fome of late have fet themfelves particularly to (hew, that the incommu- nicable Attributes of GOD agree to ir. Which Doctrine, how unworthy foever it may feem of the Divine Nature, yet I do not fee how we can get clear of it, fo long as we adhere to the received Opinions. CXVIII. Hitherto of Natural Philofo- phy : We come now to make fome Inqui- ry concerning that other great Branch of fpeculative Knowledge, to wit, Mathema- tics. Thefe, how celebrated foever they may be, for their Clearnefs and Certainty of Demonftration, which is hardly any where elfe to be found, cannot neverthe- lefs be fuppofed altogether free from Mif- takes ; if in their Principles there lurks fome fecret Error, which is common to the ProfeiTors of thofe Sciences with the reft of Mankind. Mathematicians, though they deduce their Theoremes from a great height of Evidence, yet their firft Princi- ples 1 3 8 Of the Principles Part L pics arc limited by the confideration of Quantity : And they do not afcend into any Inquiry concerning thofe tranfcenden- tal Maxims, which influence all the parti- cular Sciences, each Part whereof, Mathe- matics not excepted, doth confequendy participate of the Errors involved in them. That the Principles laid down by Mathe- maticians are true, and their way of De- duction from thofe Principles clear and in- conteftable, we do not deny. But we hold, there may be certain erroneous Maxims of greater Extent than the Object of Mathe- matics, and for that reafon not cx- prefly mentioned, though tacitly fuppofed throughout the whole progrefs of that Science ; and that the ill Effects of thofe fecret unexamined Errors are diffufed through all the Branches thereof. To be plain, we fufpect the Mathematicians arc, as well as other Men, concerned in the Er- rors arifing from the Doctrine of abftract general Ideas, and the Exiftence of Ob- jects without the Mind. CXIX. Arithmetic hath been thought to have for its Object abftract Ideas of Num- ber. Of which to understand the Proper- ties and mutual Habitudes is fuppofed no mean part of fpeculative Knowledge. The Opinion of the pure and intellectual Na- ture Part I. of Humane Knowledge. ture of Numbers in Abftract, hath made them in efteem with thcfe Philofophers, who feem to have affected an uncommon Finenefs and Elevation of Thought. It hath fet a Price on the moft trifling nu~ merical Speculations which in Practice are of no ufe, but ferve only for Amufement: And hath therefore fo far infected the Minds of fome, that they have dreamt of mighty Myfteries involved in Numbers, and attempted the Explication of natural Things by them. But if we inquire into our own Thoughts, and confider what hath been premifed, we may perhaps entertain a low Opinion of thole high Flights and Ab- ftractions, and look on all Inquiries about Numbers, only as fo many difficilss mtgce, fo far as they are not fubfervient to prac- tice, and promote the benefit of Life. CXX. Unity in Abftract we have before considered in Sel. 13, from which and what hath been faid in the Introduction, it plainly follows there is not any fuch Idea. But Number being defined a Collection of Unites, we may conclude that, if there be no fuch thing as Unity or Unite in Ab- {tract, there are no Ideas of Number in Abftract denoted by the numeral Names and Figures, The Theories therefore in Arithmetic, if they are abftracted from the Names Of the Principles Part I. Names and Figures, as likewife from all Ufe and Practice, as well as from the particular things numbered, can be fup- pofed to have nothing at all for their Object. Hence we may fee, how intire- ly the Science of Numbers is fubordinate to Practice, and how jejune and trifling it becomes, when considered as a matter of mere Speculation. CXXI. However fince there may be fome, who, deluded by the fpecious Shew of discovering abftracted Verities, wafte their time in Arithmetical Theo- remes and Problemes, which have not a- ny Ufe : It will not be amifs, if we more fully confider, and expofe the Vanity of that Pretence; And this will plainly ap- pear, by taking a view of Arithmetic in its Infancy, and obferving what it was that originally put Men on the Study of that Science, and to what Scope they di- rected it. It is natural to think that at firft, Men, for cafe of Memory and help of Computation, made ufc of Counters, or in writing of fingle Strokes, Points or the like, each whereof was made to fignify an Unite, that is, fome one thing of what- ever Kind they had occafion to reckon. Afterwards they found out the more compendious ways, of making one Cha- rader ftand in place of feveral Strokes, or Parti, of Humane Knowledge. 141 or Points. And laftly, the Notation of the Arabians or Indians came into ufe, wherein by the repetition of a few Cha- racters or Figures, and varying the Sig- ni6cation of each Figure according to the place it obtains, all Numbers may be moft aptly exprefled : Which feems to have been done in Imitation of Lan- guage, fo that an exact Analogy is ob- ferved betwixt the Notation by Figures and Names, the nine fimple Figures anfvvering the nine firfl numeral Names and Places in the former, correfponding to Denominations in the latter. And agreeably to thofe Conditions of the fimple and local Value of Figures, were contrived Methods of finding from the given Figures or Marks of the Parts, what Figures and how placed, arc pro- per to denote the whole or vice vtr/a. And having found the fought Figures, the fame Rule or Analogy being obferved throughout, it is eafy to read them into Words; and fo the Number becomes per- fectly known. For then the Number of any particular Things is faid to be known, when we know the Name or Figures (with their due arangement) that according to the Handing Analogy belong to them. For thefe Signs being known, we can by the Ope- rations of Arithmetic, know the Signs of any Of the Principles Part I. any Part of the particular Sums fighified by them; and thus computing in Signs, (becauie of the Connexion efbbtilhed be- twixt them and the diftinct multi- tudes of Things, whereof dne is taken for an Unite,) we may be able rightly to fum up, divide, and proportion the things themfelves that we intend to num- ber. CXXII. In Arithmetic therefore we regard not the Things but the Signs, which neverthelefs are not regarded for their own fake, but bccaufe they direct us how to act with relation to Things, and difpofe rightly of tnem. Now a- greeably to what we have before obferved, of Words in general (Setf. 19. Introd.) it happens here likewile, that ab- ftract Ideas are thought to be fignified by Numeral Names or Characters, while they do not fuggeft Ideas of particular Things to our Minds. I malt not at preftnt enter into a more particular Dif- lertaaon on this Subject; but only obferve that it is evident from what hath been faid^ thofe Things which pafs for abftract Truths and Theoremes concerning Num- bers, are, in reality, converfant about no Object diflinct from particular nume- rable Things, except only Names and Cha- Part I. of Humane Knowledge. 1 Characters; which originally came to be confidered, on no other account but their being Signs, or capable to reprefent aptly, whatever particular Things Men had need to compute. Whence it follows, that to ftudy them for their own fake would be juft as wife, and to as good purpofe, as if a Man, neglecting the true Ufe or ori- ginal Intention and Subferviency of Lan- guage, mould fpend his time in imper- tinent Criticifms upon Words, or Reafo- nings and Comroverfies purely Ver- bal. CXXIII. From Numbers we proceed to fpeak of Extenjion, which confidered as relative, is the Object of Geometry. The Infinite Divifibility of Finite Exten- fion, though it is not exprefly laid down, cither as an Axiome or Theoreme in the Elements of that Science, yet is through- out the fame every where fuppofed, and thought to have fo infeparable and efTen- tial a Connexion with the Principles and Demonflrations in Geometry, that Ma- thematicians never admit it into Doubt, or make the leaft Queftion of it. And as this Notion is the Source from whence do fpring all thole amufmg Geometrical Paradoxes, which have fuch a direct Re- pugnancy to the plain common Senfe of Mankind, 144 Of the Principles Part I. Mankind, and are admitted with fo much Reluctance into a Mind not yet debauch- ed by Learning: So is it the principal occaiion of all that nice and extreme Sub- tiity, which renders the Study of Mathe- matics fo difficult and tedious. Hence if we can make it appear, that no Finite Extenfion contains innumerable Parts, or is infinitely Diviiible, it follows that we fhall at once clear the Science of Geo- metry from a great Number of Difficul- ties and Contradictions, which have ever been efteemed a Reproach to Humane Reafon, and withal make the Atcainment thereof a Bufinefs of much lefs Time and Pains, than it hitherto hath been. CXXIV. Every particular Finite Ex- tenfion, which may poffibly be the Ob- ject of our Thought, is an Idea exifting only in the Mind, and confequently each Part thereof mufl be perceived. If there- fore I cannot perceive innumerable Parts in any Finite Extenfion that I conlider, it is certain they are not contained in it: But it is evident, that I cannot diftin- guifh innumerable Parts in any particu- lar Line, Surface, or Solid, which I ei- ther perceive by Senfe, or Figure to my felf in my Mind: Wherefore I conclude they are not contained in it. Nothing can Parti, of Humane Knowledge. 145 can be plainer to me, than that the Ex- ten (ions I have in View are no other than my own Ideas, and it is no lefs plain, that I cannot refolve any one of my Ideas into an innnire Number f other Ideas, that is, that they are not in- finitely Divilible. If by Finite Extenfiov be meant fomcthing diftincl: from a Fi- nite Idea, I declare I do not know what that is, and fo cannot affirm or deny a- ny thing of it. But if the terms Exteji~ don y Parts, and the like, are taken in any Senfe conceivable, that is, for Ideas j then :o fay a Finite Quantity or Extenfion :onfifts of Parts infinite in Number, is b manifeft a Contradiction, that everv ' j me at firft fight acknowledges it to be o. And it is impomble it mould ever ;ain the Ailent of any reafonable Crea- ure, who is not brought to it by gentle .nd flow Degrees, as a converted Gentile o the belief of Tranfubjlantiation. An- :ient and rooted Prejudices do often pafs nto Principles: And thofe Propofitions vhich once obtain the force and credit if a Principle^ are not only themfelves, ut likewile whatever is deducible from hem, thought privileged from all Exa- lination. And there is no Abfurdity fo rofs, which by this means the Mind of dan may not be prepared to fwallow. K CXXV. Of the Principles ParcL CXXV. He whofe Undemanding is prcpoffeft with the Doctrine of abftract general Ideas, may be perfuaded, that (whatever be thought of the Ideas of Senfe,) Extenfion in abjlraffi is infinitely divifible. And one who thinks the Ob- jects of Senfe exift without the Mind, will perhaps in virtue thereof be brought to admit, that a Line but an Inch long may contain innumerable Parts really exifling, though too fmall to be difcer- ned. Thefe Errors are grafted as well in the Minds of Geometricians, as of other Men, and have a like influence on their Reafoningsj and it were no difficult thing, to fhew how the Arguments from Geo- metry made ufe of to fupport the infi- nite ^ Divifibility of Extenfion, are bot- tomed on them. At prefent we (hall on- ly obferve in general, whence it is that the Mathematicians are all fo fond and tenacious of this Doctrine. CXXVI. It hath been obferved in ano- ther place, that the Thcoremes and De- monflrations in Geometry are converfant about Univerfal Ideas. Scff. 15. Introd. Where it is explained in what Senfe this ought to be underflood, to wit, that the particular Lines and Figures included in the Part I. of Humane Knowledge. 147 the Diagram, are fuppofed to ftand for in- numerable others of different Sizes : or in other words, the Geometer confiders them abftradting from their Magnitude : which doth not imply that he forms an abftract Idea, but only that he cares not what the particular Magnitude is, whether great or Imall, but looks on that as a thing indiffe- rent to the Demonftration : Hence it fol- lows, that a Line in the Scheme, but an Inch long, muft be fpoken of, as though ic contained ten thoufand Parts, fince it is re- garded not in it felf, but as it is univerfal ; and it is univerfal only in its Signification, whereby it reprefents innumerable Lines greater than it felf, in which may be dif- tinguimed ten thoufand Parts or more, though there may not be above an Inch in it. After this manner the Properties of the Lines fignified are (by a very ufual Figure) transferred to the bign, and thence through Miftake thought to appertain to it conii- dered in its own Nature. CXXVII. Becaufe there is no Number of Parts fo great, but it is poffible there may be a Line containing more, the Inch- line is faid to contain Parts more than any afiignable Number ; which is true, not of the Inch taken abfolutely, but only for the Things fignified by it. But Men not re- K 2 taining 148 Of the Principles Port I. taining that Diftindion in their Thoughts, flide into a belief that the fmall particular Line defcribed on Paper contains in it felf Parts innumerable. There is no fuch thing as the ten-thoufandth Part of an Inch -, but there is of a Mile or Diameter of the Earth, which may be fignified by that Inch. When therefore I delineate a Triangle on Paper, and take one fide not above an Inch, for Example, in length to be the Radius : This I confider as divided into ten thou- fand or an hundred thoufand Parts, or more. For though the ten-thoufandth Part of that Line confidered in it felf, is no- thing at all, and confequcntly may be neg- lected without any Error or Inconvenien- cy ; yet thefe defcribed Lines being only Marks ftanding for greater Quantities, whereof it may be the ten-thoufandth Part is very confiderable, it follows, that to pre- vent notable Errors in Practice, the Radius muft be taken of ten thoufand Parts, or more. CXXVIII. From what hath been faid the reafon is plain why, to the end any The- oreme may become univerfal in its Ufe, it is neceffary we fpeak of the Lines defcribed on Paper, as though they contained Parts which really they do not. In doing of which, if we examine the matter through- .fart I. of Humane Knowledge. ly, we (hall perhaps difcover that we can- not conceive an Inch it felf as confiding of, or being divifible into a thoufand Parts, but only fome other Line which is far greater than an Inch, and reprefented by it. And that when we fay a Line is infi- nitely divifible y we mufl mean a Line which is infinitely great. What we have here obferved feems to be the chief Caufe, why to fuppofe the infinite Divifibility of finite Extenfion hath been thought necef- fary in Geometry. CXXIX. The feveral Abfurdities and Contradictions which flowed from this falfe Principle might, one would think, have been efteemed fo many Demonftrations a- gainft it. But by I know not what Logic t it is held that Proofs a pofteriori are not to be admitted againft Propofitions relating to Infinity. As though it were not impofli- ble even for an infinite Mind to reconcile Contradictions. Or as if any thing abfurd and repugnant could have a necefTary Con- nexion with Truth, or flow from it. But whoever confiders the Weaknefs of this Pretence, will think it was contrived on purpofe to humour the Lazinefs of the Mind, which had rather acquiefce in an indolent Scepticifm, than be at the Pains to go through with a fevere Examination K 3 of j o Of the Principles Part I. of thofe Principles it hath ever embraced for true. CXXX. Of late the Speculations about Infinites have run fo high, and grown to fuch ftrange Notions, as have occafioned no fmall Scruples and Difputes among the Geometers of the prefcnt Age. Some there are of great Note, who not content with holding that finite Lines may be divided into an infinite Number of Parts, do yet farther maintain, that each of thofe Infi- nitefimals is it felf fubdivifible into an In- finity of other Parts, or Infinitefimals of a fecond Order, and fo on ad infinitum. Thefe, I fay, afTert there are Infinitefimals of Infinitefimals of Infinitefimals, without ever coming to an end. So that according to them an Inch doth not barely contain an infinite Number of Parts, but an Infi- nity of an Infinity of an Infinity ad infini- tum of Parts. Others there be who hold all Orders of Infinitefimals below the firft to be nothing at all, thinking it with good reifon abfurd, to imagine there is any po- fuive Quantity or Part of Extenfion, which though multiplied infinitely, can ever equal the fmalleft given Extenfion. And yet on the other hand it feems no lefs abfurd, to think the Sqtiare, Cube, or other Power of a pofitive real Root, fhould it felf Part I. of Humane Knowledge. i 5 i felf be nothing at all ; which they who hold Infinitefimals of the firft Order, de- nying all of the fubfequent Orders, are ob- liged to maintain. CXXXI. Have we not therefore reafon to conclude, that they are both in the wrong, and that there is in effect no fuch thing as Parts infinitely final!, or an infi- nite number of Parts contained in any fi- nite Quantity ? But you will fay, that if this Doctrine obtains, it will follow the ve- ry Foundations of Geometry are deftroyed : And thofe great Men who have raifed that Science to fo aftoniming an height, have been all the while building a Caflle in the Air. To this it may be replied, that what- ever is ufeful in Geometry and promotes the benefit of humane Life, doth ftill re- main firm and unfhaken on our Principles. That Science confidered as practical, will rather receive Advantage than any Preju- dice from what hath been faid. But to fet this in a due Light, may be the Subject of a diftinct Inquiry. For the reft, though it mould follow thatforne of the more in- tricate and fubtile Parts of Speculative Ma- thematics may be pared off without any prejudice to Truth 3 yet I do not fee what jDamage will be thence derived to Man- kind, On the contrary, it were highly to K 4 be Of the Principles Part I. be wifhed, that Men of great Abilities and obftinate Application would draw off their Thoughts from thofe Amufements, and employ them in the Study of fuch Things as lie nearer the Concerns of Life, or have a more direct Influence on the Manners. CXXXII. If it be faid that feveral The- oremes undoubtedly true, are difcovered by Methods in which Innnitefimals arc made ufe of, which could never have been, if their Exiftence included a Contradiction in it. I anfvver, that upon a thorough Examination it will not be found, that in any Inftance it is necetfary to make ufe of or conceive infinitefimal Parts of finite Lines, or even Quantities lefs than the Mi- nimum Senjibile : Nay, it will be evident this is never done, it being impoilible. CXXXIII. By what we have premifed, it is plain that very numerous and impor- tant Errors have taken their rife from thofe falfe Principles, which were impugned in the foregoing Parts of this Treatife. And the Oppoiitcs of thofe erroneous Tenets at the fame time appear to be moft fruitful Principles, from whence do flow innume- rable Confequences highly advantageous to true Philosophy as well as to Religion. Particularly, Matter or the alfilute Exif- tenc? Part I. of Humane Knowledge. fence of Corporeal Objects, hath been (hewn to be that wherein the moft avowed and pernicious Enemies of all Knowledge, whe- ther humane or divine, have ever placed their chief Strength and Confidence. And furely, if by diftinguifhing the real Exif- tence of unthinking Things from their be- ing perceived, and allowing them a Subfif- tence of their own out of the Minds of Spirits, no one thing is explained in Na- ture j but on the contrary a great many inexplicable Difficulties arife : If the Sup- pofition of Matter is barely precarious, as not being grounded on fo much as one fin- gle Reafon : If its Confequences cannot en- dure the Light of Examination and free Inquiry, but skreen themfelves under the dark and general pretence of Infinites being incomprcbenfible : If withal the Removal of this Matter be not attended with the leaft evil Confequence, if it be not even miffed in the World, but every thing as well, nay much eaiier conceived without it : If laft- ly, both Sceptics and Atheifts are for ever filenced upon fuppofing only Spirits and Ideas, and this Scheme of Things is per- fectly agreeable both to Reafon and Reli- gion : Methinks we may expect it {hould be admitted and firmly embraced, though it were propofed only as an Hypothefis, and the Exigence of Matter had been allowed poffible, 154 Of tke Principles Part I. pofiible, which yet I think we have evi- dently demonflratcd that it is not. CXXXIV. True it is, that in confe- quence of the foregoing Principles, feve- ral Difputes and Speculations, which are efteemed no mean Parts of Learning, are rejected as ufelefs. But how great a Pre- judice foevcr againft our Notions, this may give to thofe who have already been deeply engaged, and made large Ad- vances in Studies of that Nature : Yet by others, we hope it will not be thought any juft ground of Diflike to the Principles and Tenets herein laid down, that they abridge the labour of Study, and make Humane Sciences more clear, compendious, and attainable, than, they were before. CXXXV. Having difpatched what we intended to fay concerning the knowledge of Ideas, the Method we propofed leads us, in the next place, to treat of Spirits: With regard to which, perhaps Humane Knowledge is not fo deficient as is vuU * garly imagined. The great Reafon that is affigned for our being thought igno- rant of the nature of Spirits, is, our not having an Idea of it. But furely it ought not to be looked on as a defedt in a Hu- mane Part I. of Humane Knowledge. 155 mane Underftanding, thatch does not per- ceive the Idea of Spirit, if it is mani- feftly impoffible there mould be any fuch Idea. And this, if I miftake not, has been demonftrated in Sett. 27 : To which I (hall here add that a Spirit has been (hewn to be the only Subftance or Support, wherein the unthinking Beings or Ideas can exift : But that this Subftance which fup- ports or perceives Ideas mould it felf be an Idea or like an Idea, is evidently abfurd. CXXXVI. It will perhaps be faid, that we want a Senfe (as fome have ima- . gined) proper to know Subftances with- al, which if we had, we might know" our own Soul, as we do a Triangle. To this I anfwer, that in cafe we had a new Senfe beftowed upon us, we could only receive thereby fome new Senfations or Ideas of Senfe. But I believe no Bo- dy will fay, that what he means by the terms Soul and Sttbjtance, is only fome particular fort of Idea or Senfation. We may therefore infer, that all things du- ly confidered, it is not more reasonable to think our Faculties defective, in that they do not furnim us with an Idea of Spirit or active thinking Subftance, than it would be if we mould blame them for not being able to comprehend a round Square. CXXXVIL 1 5 6 Of the Principles Part I. CXXXVII. From the opinion that Spi- rits are to be known after the manner of an Idea or Senfation, have rifen many abfurd and heterodox Tenets, and much Sccpticifm about the Nature of the Soul. It is even probable, that this Opinion may have produced a Doubt in fome, whether they had any Soul at all diftinct from their Body, iince upon inquiry they could not find they had an Idea of it. That an Idea which is inactive, and the Exiftence whereof confifts in being per- ceived, mould be the Image or Likenefs of an Agent fublifting by it felf, feems to need no other Refutation, than barely attending to what is meant by thole Words. But perhaps you will fay, that tho* an Idea cannot refemble a Spirit, in its Thinking, Acting, or Subfifting by it felf, yet it may in fome other refpedls: And it is not neceflary that an Idea or Image be in all refpe&s like the Original. CXXXVIII. I anfwer, If it does not in thofe mentioned, it is impoffible it mould reprefent it in any other thing. Do but leave out the Power of Willing, Think- ing, and Perceiving Ideas, and there re- mains nothing elfe wherein the Idea can be like a Spirit. For by the Word Spi- rit Part I. of Humane Knowledge. 1 5 7 rit we mean only that which thinks, wills, and perceives; this, and this alone, conftitutes the Signification of that Term. If therefore it is impoflible that any de- gree of thofe Powers mould be represented in an Idea, it is evident there can be no Idea of a Spirit. CXXXIX. But it will be objected, tliac if there is no Idea fignified by the Terms Soul, Spirit^ and Sub/lance, they are whol- ly infignificant, or have no meaning in them. I anfvver, thofe Words do mean or fignify a real Thing, which is neither an Idea nor like an Idea, but that which per- ceives Ideas, and Wills, and Reafons about them. What I am my felf, that which I denote by the Term I, is the fame with what is meant by Soul or Spiritual Sub- Jlance. If it be faid that this is only quar- relling at a Word, and that fmce the im- mediate Significations of other Names arc by common confent called Ideas, no rcaibn can be alTigned, why that which is figni- fied by the Name Spirit or Soul may not partake in the fame Appellation. I anfwer, All the unthinking Objects of the Mind a- gree, in that they are intirely pafTive, and their Exiftence confifts only in being per- ceived : Whereas a Soul or Spirit is an ac- live Being;, whofe Exiilence conlifts not in ' u be ins 1 5 8 Of the Principles Part I. being perceived, but in perceiving Ideas and Thinking. It is therefore necefiary, in order to prevent Equivocation and con- founding Natures perfectly difagreeing and unlike, that we diftinguifli between Spirit and Idea. See Se&. 27. CXL. In a large Senfe indeed, we may be faid to have an Idea, or rather a Notion of Spirit, that is, we underftand the mean- ing of the Word, otherwife we could not affirm or deny any thing of ic. Moreover, as we conceive the Ideas that are in the Minds of other Spirits by means of our own, which we fuppofe to be Refemblan- ccs of them : So we know other Spirits by means of our own Soul, which in that fcenfe is the Image or Idea of them, it having a like relpect to other Spirits, that Bluenefs or Heat by me perceived hath to thofe Ideas perceived by another. CXLI. It muft not be fuppofed, that they who aflert the natural Immortality of the Soul are of opinion, that it is abfolute- ]y incapable of Annihilation even by the infinite Power of the CREATOR who firfl gave it Being : But only that it is not liable to be broken or difiblved by the or- dinary Laws of Nature or Motion. They indeed, who hold the Soul of Man to be only Part I. Of Humane Knowledge. i j only a thin vital Flame, or Syflem of ani- mal Spirits, make it periming and corrup- tible as the Body, fince there is nothing more eafily diffipated than fuch a Being, which it is naturally impoffible mould fur- vive the Ruin of the Tabernacle, wherein it is inclofed. And this Notion hath been greedily embraced and cherimed by the worft part of Mankind, as the moft effectual Antidote againft all Impreffions of Virtue and Religion. But it hath been made evi- dent, that Bodies -of what Frame or Tex- ture foever, are barely paflive Ideas in the Mind, which is more diftant and hetero- geneous from them, than Light is from Darknefs. We have fhewn that the Soul is Indivifible, Incorporeal, Unextended, and it is confequently Incorruptible. Nothing can be plainer, than that the Motions, Changes, Decays, and Diffolutions which we hourly fee befal natural Bodies (and which is what we mean by the Courfe of Nature) cannot poffibly affect an active, fimple, uncompounded Subftance : Such a Being therefore is indiflbluble by the force of Nature, that is to fay, the Soul of Man is naturally immortal. CXLII. After what hath been faid, it is I fuppofe plain, that our Souls are not to be known in the fame manner as fenfelefs inactive 160 Of the Principles Part I. inactive Objects, or by way of Idea. Spi- rits and Ideas are Things fo wholly diffe- rent, that when we fay, they exijl^ they are knoiun > or the like, thefe Words muft not be thought to fignify any thing common to both Natures. There is nothing alike or common in them : And to expert that by any Multiplication or Enlargement of our Faculties, we may be enabled to know a Spirit as we do a Triangle, feems as ab- furd as if we mould hope to fee a Sound. This is inculcated becaufe I imagine it may be of Moment towards clearing feveral important Queflions, and preventing fome very dangerous Errors concerning the Na- ture of the Soul. We may not I think flridly be faid to have an Idea of an ac- tive Being, or of an Action, although we may be faid to have a Notion of them. I have fome Knowledge or Notion of my Mind, and its Acts about Ideas, inafmuch as I know or underfland what is meant by thofe Words. What I know, that I have fome Notion of. I will not fay, that the Terms Idea and Notion may not be ufed convertibly, if the World will have it fo. But yet it conduceth to Clearnefs and Pro- priety, that we diftinguith Things very dif- ferent by different Names. It is alfo to be remarked, that all Relations including an Act of the Mind, we cannot fo properly be Part I. of Humane Knowledge. be faid to have an Idea, but rather a No- tion of the Relations or Habitudes between Things. But if in the modern way the Word Idea is extended to Spirits, and Re- lations and Ads; this is after all an Affair of verbal Concern. CXLIII. It will not be amifs to add, that the Dodrine of Abftratt Ideas hath had no fmall {hare in rendering thofe Scien- ces intricate and obfcure, which are parti- cularly converfant about fpiritual Things. Men have imagined they could frame ab- ilrad Notions of the Powers and Ads of the Mind, and confider them prefcinded, as well from the Mind or Spirit it felf, as frorn their refpedive Objeds and Effeds. Hence a great number of dark and ambi- guous Terms presumed to (land for ab- ilrad Notions, have been introduced into Metaphyfics and Morality, and from thefe have grown infinite Diftradions and Dif- putes amqngft the Learned. CXLIV. But nothing feems more to have contributed towards engaging Men in Controverfies and Miftakes, with regard to the Nature and Operations of the Mind, than the being ufed to fpeak of thofe Things, in Terms borrowed from fenfible Ideas. For Example, the Will is termed L the Of the Principles Part I. the Motion of the Soul : This infufes a Belief, that the Mind of Man is as a Ball in Motion, impelled and determined by the Obje and fantaftical Conceits of others. I am even fo far gone of late in this way of Thinking, that I have quit- ted feveral of the fublime Motions I had got in their Schools for vulgar Opinions. And I give it you on my Word, fince this Revolt from Metaphyfical Notions to the plain Dictates of Nature and common Senfe, I find my Under (landing ftrangely enlightened, fo that I can now eafily com- prehend a great many Things which before were all Myftery and Riddle. Hyl. I am glad to find there was nothing in the Accounts I heard of you. Phil. Pray, what were thofe ? Hyl. You were reprefented in lad Night's Converfation, as one who maintained the M 2 mo(t iSo Tfe F I R 5 T moft extravagant Opinion that ever entered into the Mind of Man, to wit, That there is no fuch Thing as material Subjiance in the World. Phil. That there is no fuch Thing as what Philofophers call Material Subftance, 1 am ferioufly perfuaded : But if I were made to fee any thing abfurd or fceptical in this, I mould then have the fame Rea- fon to renounce this, that I imagine I have now to reject the contrary Opinion. HyL What ! can any Thing be more fan- taftical, more repugnant to common Senfe, or a more manifeft Piece of Scepticifm, than to believe there is no fuch Thing as Matter ? Phil. Softly, good Hyfa. What if it fhould prove, that you, who hold there is, are by virtue of that Opinion a greater Sceptic, and maintain more Paradoxes and Repugnancies to common Senfe, than I who believe no fuch Thing ? HyL You may as foon perfuade me, The Part is greater than the Whole, as that, in order to avoid Abfurdity and Scepticifm, I fhould ever be obliged to give up my Opi- nion in this Point. Phil. Well then, are you content to ad- mit that Opinion for true, which upon Exa- mination fhall appear moft agreeable to common Senfe, and remote from Scepti- cifm ? Hyl. DIALOGUE. iSr HyL With all my Heart. Since you are for railing Difputes about the plaineft Things in Nature, I am content for once to hear what you have to fay. Phil. Pray, Hylas, what do you mean by a Sceptic ? Hyl. I mean what all Men mean, one that doubts of every Thing. Phil. He then who entertains no Doubt concerning fome particular Point, with re- . gard to that Point cannot be thought a Sceptic. HyL I agree with you. Phil. Whether doth Doubting confift in embracing the Affirmative or Negative Side of a Queftion ? HyL In neither ; for whoever underftanda EngHjfj, cannot but know that Doubting fignifies a Sufpenfe between both. Phil. He then that denieth any Point, can no more be faid to doubt of it, than he who affirmeth it with the fame Degree of AfTu ranee. HyL True. PhiL And confequently, for fuch his De- nial is no more to be efteemed a Sceptic than the other. Hyl. I acknowledge it. PhiL How cometh it to pafs then, Hylas, that you pronounce me a Sceptic, becaufe I deny wnat you affirm, to wit, the Exif- M 3 tencc The FIR 5 T tencc of Matter? Since, for ought you can tell, I am as peremptory in my Denial, as you in your Affirmation. Hyl. Hold, Philonous, I have been a lit- tle out in my Definition-, but every falfc Step a Man makes in Difcourfe is not to be infifted on. I laid indeed, that a Sceptic was one who doubted of every Thing; but I fliould have added, or who denies the Reality and Truth of Things. Phil. What Things ? Do you mean the Principles and Theoremes of Sciences? But thefe you know are univerfal intellectual Notions, and confequently independent of Matter ; the Denial therefore of this doth not imply the denying them. Hyl. I grant it. But are there no other Things? What think you of diftrufting the Senfes, of denying the real Exiftence of fenfible Things, or pretending to know no- thing of them. Is not this fufficient to de- nominate a Man a Sceptic ? Phil. Shall we therefore examine which of us it is that denies the Reality of Sen- fible Things, or proferTes the greateft Igno- rance of them ; fince, if I take you right- ly, he is to be efleemed the greateft Sceptic ? Hyl. That is what I defire. Phil. What mean you by Senfible Things? Hyl. DIALOGUE. 183 H)'l. Thofe Things which are perceived by the Senfes. Can you imagine that I mean any thing elfe ? Phil. Pardon me, Hylas, if I am defi- rous clearly to apprehend your Notions, fmce this may much fhorten our Inquiry. Suffer me then to ask you this farther Que- ftion. Are thole Things only perceived by the Senfes which are perceived immediate- ly ? Or may thofe Things properly be faid to be Senjible, which are perceived mediate- ly, or not without the Intervention of o- thers ? Hyl. I do not fufficiently under/land you. jP/6//. In reading a Book, what I imme- diately perceive are the Letters, but me- diately, or by means of thefe, are fug- geed to my Mind the Notions of God, Virtue, Truth, &c. Now, that the Let- ters are truly Senfible Things, or perceived by Senfe, there is no doubt : But I would know whether you take the Things fug- gefled by them to be fo too. Hyl. No certainly, it were abfurd to think God or Virtue Senfible Things, though they may be fignined and fuggefted to the Mind by Senfible Marks, with which they have an arbitrary Connexion. Phil. It feems then, that by Senfible 'Things you mean thofe only which can be perceived immediately by Senfe. M 4 Hyl. 184 The F I R S T Hyl. Right. Phil. Doth it not follow from this, that though I fee one part of the Sky Red, and another Blue, and that my Reafon doth thence evidently conclude there muft be fomc Caufe of that Diverfity of Colours, yet that Caufe cannot be faid to be a Sen- fible Thing, or perceived by the Senfe of Seeing ? Hyl. It doth. Phil. In like manner, though I hear Va- riety of Sounds, yet I cannot be faid to hear the Caufes of thofe Sounds. Hyl. You cannot. Phil. And when by my Touch I per- ceive a Thing to be hot and heavy, I can- not fay with any Truth or Propriety, that I feel the Caufe of its Heat or Weight. , HyL To prevent any more Questions of this kind, I tell you once for all, that by Senfible Things I mean thofe only which are perceived by Senfe, and that in truth the benfes perceive nothing which they do not perceive immediately : for they make no Inferences. The deducing therefore of Caufes or Occafions from Effects and Ap- pearances, which alone are perceived by Senfe, intirely relates to Reafon. Phil. This Point then is agreed between us, That Senfible Things are thoj'e only which pre immediately perceived by Sen/e. You will DIALOGUE. will farther inform me, whether we im- mediately perceive by Sight any thing be- fide Light, and Colours, and Figures : or by Hearing, any thing but Sounds: by the Palate, any thing befide Taftes : by the Smell, befide Odors~: or by the Touch, more than tangible Qualities. Hyl. We do not. Phil. It feems therefore, that if you take away all fenfible Qualities, there remains nothing fenfible. Hyl. I grant it. Phil. Senfible Things therefore are no- thing elfe but fo many fenfible Qualities, or Combinations of fenfible Qualities. Hyl, Nothing elfe. Phil. Heat then is a fenfible Thing. Hyl. Certainly. Phil. Doth the Reality of fenfible Things confift in being perceived ? or, is it fome- thing diftinft from their being perceived, and that bears no relation to the Mind? Hyl. To exift is one thing, and to be perceived is another. Phil. I fpeak with regard to fenfible Things only: And of thefe I ask, Whether by their real Exiftence you mean a bub- fiftence exterior to the Mind, and diftinct from their being perceived? H)L I mean a real abfolute Being, di- ftinct from, and without any relation to their being perceived. 'Phil. Tie F I R S T Phil. Heat therefore, if it be allowed a real Being, muft exifl without the Mind. HyL It muft. Phil Tell me, Hylas, is this real Exif- tence equally compatible to all Degrees of Heat, which we perceive : or is there a- ny Reafon why we mould attribute it to fome, and deny it others ? And if there be, pray let me know that Reafon. HyL Whatever Degree of Heat we per- ceive by Senfe, we may be fure the fame exifls in the Objf ct that occafions it. Phil. What, the greateft as well as the leaft ? HyL I tell you, the Reafon is plainly the fame in refpect of both : They are both perceived by Senfe; nay, the greater De- gree of Heat is more fenfibly perceived ; and consequently, if there is any Diffe- rence, we are more certain of its real Ex- iftence than we can be of the Reality of a lefTer Degree. Phil. But is not the mod vehement and intenfe Degree of Heat a very great Pain ? HyL No one can deny it. Phil. And is any unperceiving Thing capable of Pain or Pleafure ? HyL No certainly. Phil. Is your material Subftance a fenfe- lefs Being, or a Being endowed with Senfe and Perception? Hyl. DIALOGUE. 187 JJyl. It is fenfelefs, without doubt. Phil It cannot therefore be the Subjedt of Pain. Hyl. By no means. Phil. Nor confequently of the greateft Heat perceived by Senfe, fince you ac- knowledge this to be no imall Pain. Hyl. I grant it. Phil. What fhall we fay then of your external Object j is it a material Subftance, or no? Hyl. It is a material Subftance with the fenfible Qualities inhering in it. Pbil. How then can a great Heat exift in it, fince you own it cannot in a mate- rial Subftance ? I defire you would clear this Point. Hyl. Hold, Philonow, I fear I was out in yielding intenfe Heat to be a Pain. It mould feem rather, that Pain is fomething diftinct from Heat, and the Confequence or Effect of it. Phil. Upon putting your Hand near the Fire, do you perceive one fimple uniform Senfation, or two diftindl Senfations ? Hyl. But one fimple Senfation. Phil. Is not the Heat immediately per- ceived ? Hyl. It is. Phil. And the Pain ? Hyl. True. Thil. 1 88 The F I R S T Phil. Seeing therefore they are both im- mediately perceived at the fame time, and the Fire affects you only with one fimple, or uncompounded Idea, it follows that this fame fimple Idea is both the intenfe Heat immediately perceived, and the Pain ; and confequently, that the intenfe Heat imme- diately perceived, is nothing diftinct from a particular fort of Pain. HyL It feems fo. Phil Again, try in your Thoughts, Hy- las, if you can conceive a vehement Senfa- tion to be without Pain, or Pleafure. Hyl. I cannot. Phil. Or can you frame to yourfelf an Idea of fenfible Pain or Pleafure in general, abftracted from every particular Idea of Heat, Cold, Taftes, Smells? &c. Hyl. I do not find that I can. Phil. Doth it not therefore follow, that fenfible Pain is nothing diftinct from thofe Senfations or Ideas, in an intenfe De- gree? Hyl. It is undeniable ; and to fpeak the Truth, I begin to fufpect a very great Heat cannot exift but in a Mind perceiv- ing it. Phil. What ! are you then in that Scep- tical State of Sufpenfe, between Affirming and Denying ? Hyl. DIALOGUE. Hyl. I think I may be pofitive in the Point. A very violent and painful Heat cannot exift without the Mind. Phil. It hath not therefore, according to you, any real Being. Hyl. I own it. Phil. Is it therefore certain, that there is no body in Nature really hot ? Hyl. I have not denied there is any real Heat in Bodies. I only fay, there is no fuch thing as an intenfe real Heat. Phil. But did you not fay before, that all Degrees of Heat were equally real : or if there was any difference, that the Greater were more undoubtedly real than the Lef- fer? Hyl. True: But it was, becaufe I did not then confider the Ground there is for diftinguiming between them, which I now plainly fee. And it is this : Becaufe in- tenfe Heat is nothing elfe but a particular kind of painful Senfation ; and Pain can- not exift but in a perceiving Being ; it fol- lows that no intenfe Heat can really exift in an unperceiving corporeal Subftance. But this is no. Reafon why we mould de- ny Heat in an inferior Degree to exift in fuch a Subftance. Phil. But how mall we be able to dif- cern thofe Degrees of Heat which exift on- ly in the Mind, from thofe which exift without it ? Hyl. Tt>e F I R S T Hyl. That is no difficult matter. You know, the leaft Pain cannot exift unper- ceived; whatever therefore Degree of Heat is a Pain, exifts only in the Mind. But as for all other Degrees of Heat, nothing obliges us to think the fame of them. Phil. I think you granted before, that no unperceiving Being was capable of Plea- fure, any more than of Pain. Hyl. i did. Phil. And is not Warmth, or a more gentle Degree of Heat than what caufes Uneafinefs, aPleafure? Hyl. What then ? Phil. Confequently it cannot exift with- out the Mind in any unperceiving Sub- ftance, or Body. Hyl. So it feems. Phil. Since therefore, as well thofe De- grees of Heat that are not painful, as thofe that are, can exift only in a Thinking Sub- ftance ; may we not conclude that external Bodies are abfolutely incapable of any De- gret of Heat whatfoever ? Hyl On fecond Thoughts, I do not think it fo evident that Warmth is a Pleafure, as that a great Degree ot Heat is a Pain. Phil. I do not pretend that Warmth is as great a Pleat r-re as Heat is a Pain. But if you grant it to be even a (mail Pleafure, it icrvcs to make good my Concluiion. Hyl DIALOGUE. 77)7. I could rather call it an Indolence. It fcems to be nothing more than a Priva- tion of both Pain and Pleafure. And that fuch a Quality or State as this may agree to an unthinking Subftance, I hope you will not deny. Phil. If you are refolved to maintain that Warmth, or a gentle Degree of Heat, is no Pleafure, I know not how to convince you otherwife, than by appealing to your own Senfe. But what think you of Cold? HyL The fame that I do of Heat. An intenfe Degree of Cold is a Pain ; for to feel a very great Cold, is to perceive a great Uheafinefs : It cannot therefore exift with- out the Mind ; but a lefier Degree of Cold may, as well as a lefler Degree of Heat. Phil. Thofe Bodies therefore, upon whofe Application to our own, we per- ceive a moderate Degree of Heat, muft be concluded to have a moderate Degree of Heat or Warmth in them : And thofe, up- on whofe Application we feel a like De- gree of Cold, muft be thought to have Cold in them. HyL They muft. Phil. Can any Doftrine be true that ne- ceiTarily leads a Man into an Abfurdity ? HyL Without doubt it cannot. 8 Me F I R 5 F thing ) between the Sound we immediate- ly perceive, and that which exifts without us. The former indeed is a particular kind of Scnfation, but the latter is merely a Vibrative or Undulatory Motion in the Air. FbiL I thought I had already obviated that Diftinclion by the Anfwpr I gave when you were applying it in a like Cafe before. But to fay no more of that j Are you fure then that Sound is really nothing but Motion? Hyl. I am. PbiL Whatever therefore agrees to real Sound, may with Truth be attributed to Motion. Hyl. It may. Phil. It is then good Senfe to fpeak of Motion, as of a thing that is loud, fweet, acute, or grave. Hyl. I fee you are refolved not to under- Hand me. Is it not evident, thofe Acci- dents or Modes belong only to fenfible Sound, or Sound in the common Accepta- tion of the Word, but not to Sound in the Real and Philofophic Senfe, which, as I juft now told you, is nothing but a certain Motion of the Air ? PbiL It feems then there are two Sons of Sound, the one Vulgar, or that which is heard, the other Philoibphical and Real. Hyh DIALOGUE. Uyl. Even fo. Phil. And the Utter eonfifts in Motion. Jfyl. I told you To before. Phil. Tell me, Hylas, to which of the Senfes think you, the Idea of Motion be- longs : To the Hearing ? Hyl. No certainly, but to the Sight and Touch. Phil, It mould follow then, that accord- ing to you, real Sounds may podibjy bcjeert or felt, but never heard. Hyl. Look you, Philonous, you may if you pleafe make a Jeft of my Opinion, buc that will not alter the Truth of Things. I pwn indeed, the Inferences you draw me into, found fomething odly j but common Language, you know, is framed by, and for the Uie of the Vulgar: wemufi not there- fore wonder, if Expreffions adapted toex-^ a 200 The FIRST beard, and that the Idea of them is ob- tained by fome other Senfe. And is there nothing in this contrary to Nature and the Truth of Things? Hyl. To deal ingefiuoufly, I do not like it. And after the ConceiTions already made, I had as well grant that Sounds too' have no real Being without the Mind. Phil. And I hope you will make no Dif- ficulty to acknowledge the fame of Co- lours. HyL Pardon me: the Cafe of Colours is very different. Can any thing be plainer, than that we fee them on the Objects ? Phil. The Objects you fpcak of are, I fuppofe, corporeal subftances exifting with- out the Mind. HyL They are. : Phil. And have true and real Colours in- hering in them ? Hyl. Each vifible Object hath that Co- lour which we fee in it. Phil. How ! Is there any thing vifible but what we perceive by Sight. HyL There is not. Phil. And do we perceive any thing by Senfe, which we do not perceive imme- diately ? HyL How often muft I be obliged to re- peat the fame thing ? I tell you, we do not. Tbil. DIALOGUE. io Phil Have Patience, good Hy/as; and tell me once more, whether there is any thing immediately perceived by the Senfes, except fenfible Qualities. I know you aflerted there was not : But I would now be informed, whether you Hill perfift in the jfame Opinion. Hyl. I do. Phil. Pray, is your corporeal Subftance either a fenfible Quality, or made up of fenfible Qualities ? Hyl. What a Queftion that is I who ever thought it was ? Phil. My Reafon for asking was, becaufe in faying, each wfible Objift hath that Co- lour which we jee in if, you make vifible Objects to be corporeal Subftances ; which implies either that corporeal Subllances are fenfible Qualities, or elie that there is fome- thing befide fenfible Qualities perceived by Sight : But as this Point was formerly a- greed between us, and is frill maintained by you, it is a clear Confequence, that your corporeal Subftance is nothing diflinct from fenfible Qualities. Hyl. You may draw as many abfurd Confequences as you pleafe, and endeavour to perplex the plainest Things ; but you (hall never perfuade me out of my Senfes. I clearly underftand my own Meaning. Thil. The F I R $ T Phil. I wim you would make me tin- derftand it too. But iince you are unwil- ling to have your Notion of corporeal Subr ftance examined, I (hall urge that Point no farther. Only be pleated to let me know, whether the fame Colours which we fee, ex i ft in external Bodies, or forne other. Hyl. The very fame. Phil. What ! are then the beautiful Red and Purple we fee on yonder Clouds, realr ly in them ? Or do you imagine they have in themfelves any other Form, than that of a dark Mift or Vapour ? Hyl. I muft own, PhilonQus t thofe Co- Jours are not really in the Clouds as they feem to be at this Diftance. They are on- ly apparent Colours. Phil. Apparent call you them ? how mail we diftinguifh thefe apparent Colours from ftal? Hyl. Very eafily. Thofe are to be thought apparent, which appearing only at a diftance, vanim upon a nearer Ap- proach. Phil. And thofe I fuppofe are to be thought real, which are difcovered by ^he moft near and exact Survey. Hyl. Right. Phil. Is the neareft and exadleft Survey made by the help of a Microfcope, or by the naked Eye? V 1 A L G U n. ffyl. By a Microfcope, doubtlefs. Phil. But a Microfcope ofcen difcovcrs Colours in an Object different from thofe perceived by the unafTifted Sight. And in cafe we had Microfcopes magnifying to a- ny a ffigned Degree; it is certain, that no Object whatfoever viewed through them, would appear in the fame Colour which it exhibits to the naked Eye. HyL And what will you conclude from all this ? You cannot argue that there are really and naturally no Colours on Ob- jects : becaufe by artificial Managements they may be altered, or made to vanifh. Phil. I think it may evidently be con- cluded from your own Conceflions, that all the Colours we fee with our naked Eyes, are only apparent as thofe on the Clouds, lince they vanim upon a more clofe an4 accurate Infpection, which is afforded us by a Microfcope. Then as to what you fay by way of Prevention : I ask you, whe- ther the real and natural State of an Object is better difcovered by a very (harp and piercing Sight, or by one which is lefs jfharp ? Hyl. By the former without doubt. Phil. Is it not plain from ^Dioptrics^ that Microfcopes make the Sight more pene- trating, and reprefent Objects as they Would appear to the Eye, in cafe it were naturally 04 W of Sounds ? Hyl. DIALOGUE. Kyi. I frankly ovvn, Pbilonom, that it is in vain to ftand out any longer. Colours, Sounds, Taftes, in a word, all thofe termed Secondary Qualities, have certainly no Ex- iftence without the Mind. But by this Ac- knowledgment I muft not be fuppofed to derogate any thing from the Reality of Matter or external Objects, feeing it is no more than feveral Philofophers maintain, who neverthelefs are the fartheft imagina- ble from denying Matter. For the clearer Underftanding of this, you muft know fen- fible Qualities are by Philofophers divided into Primary and Secondary. The former are Extenfion, Figure, Solidity, Gravity, Motion, and Reft. And thefe they hold exift really in Bodies. The latter are thofe above enumerated ; or briefly, all fenfiblc Qualities befide the Primary, which they aflert are only fo many Senfations or Ideas exifting no where but in the Mind. But all this, I doubt not, you are already ap- prifed of. For my part, I have been a long time fenfible there was fuch an Opinion current among Philofophers, but was ne- ver thoroughly convinced of its Truth till now. Phil. You are ftill then of Opinion, that Extenfion and Figures are inherent in ex- ternal unthinking Subftances. HyL I arn. O Phil. o The F I R S T Phil. But what if the fame Arguments which are brought againft Secondary Qua- lities, will hold good againft thefe alfo ? Hyt. Why then I fhall be obliged td think, they too exift only in the Mind. Phil. Is it your Opinion, the very Figure and Extenfion which you perceive bySenfe, exift in the outward Object or material Sub- ftance ? Hyl. It is. Phil. Have all other Animals as good Grounds to think the fame of the Figure and Extenfion which they fee and feel ? Hyl. Without doubt, if they have any Thought at all. PhTi Anfwer me, Hylas. Think you the Senfes were beftowed upon all Animals for their Prefervation and Well-being in Life ? or were they given to Men alone for this End? Hyl. I make no queftion but they have the fame Ufe in all other Animals. Phil. If fo, is it not heceffary they (hould be enabled by them to perceive their own Limbs, and thofe Bodies which are capable of harming them ? Hyl. Certainly. Phil A Mite therefore muft be fuppofed to' fee his own Foot, and Things equal or even lefs than' it, as Bodies of fome confi- derable Dimenfion \ though at the fame time DIALOGUE. time they appear to you fcarce discernible, or at beft as fo many vifibie Points. HyL I cannot deny it. Phil. And to Creatures lefs than the Mite they will feem yet larger. HyL They will. Phil. Infomuch that what you can hard- ly difcern, will to another extremely mi- nute Animal appear as fome huge Moun- tain. HyL All this I grant. Phil. Can one and the fame thing be at the fame time in itfcif of different Dimen- fions ? HyL That were abfurd to imagine. Phil, But from what you have laid down k follows, that both the Extenfion by you perceived, and that perceived by the Mite itfelf, as likewifc all thofe perceived by tef- fer Animals, are each of them the true Bxtenfion of the Mite's Foot, that is to fay, by your own Principles you are led into an Abfurdity. HyL There feems to be fome Difficulty in the Point. Phil. Again, have you not acknowledged that no real inherent Property of any Ob*- ject can be changed, without fome Change in the thing itfelf? HyL I have, O z I fee fo many odd Confequenccs following upon fuch a Conceffion. Phil. Odd, fay you ? After the Concef- fions already made, I hope you will flick at nothing for its Oddnefs. But on the o- thcr hand mould it not feem very odd, if the general reafoning which includes all other fenfible Qualities did not alfo include Extenfion ? If it be allowed that no Idea nor any thing like an Idea can exift in an unperceiving Subrtance, then furely it fol- lows, that no Figure or Mode of Exten- fion, which we can either perceive or ima- gine, or have any Idea of, can be really in- herent in Matter j not to mention the pe- culiar Difficulty there muft be, in conceiv- ing a material Subftance, prior to and di- ftincl from Extension, ro be the Subflratum of Extenfion. Be the fenfible Quality what it will, Figure, or Sound, or Colour ; it feems alike impoffible it mould fubfift in that which doth not perceive it. HyL I give up the Point for the pre- fenr, referving ft. 11 a Right to retract my Opinion, in cafe I mall hereafter difcover any falie Mep in my Prcgrefs to it. Phil. That is a Right you cannot be de- nied. Figures and Extenfion being dif- O 3 patched, 2,14 T** FIRST patched, we proceed next to Motion. Can a real Motion in any external Body be at the fame time both very fwift and very flow? Hyl. It cannot. Phil. Is not the Motion of a Body fwift in a reciprocal Proportion to the time it takes up in defcribing any given Space? Thus a Body that defcribes a Mile in an Hour, moves three times fafter than it would in cafe it defcribed only a Mile in three Hours. Hy-l. I agree with you. PhiL And is not Time meafured by the Succeffion of Ideas in our Minds? Hyl. It is. Phil. And is it not poflible Ideas fhould fuceecd one another twice as faft in your Mind, as they do in mine, or in that of fome Spirit of another kind. HyL I own if. Phil. Confequently the fame Body may to another feem to perform its Motion over any Space in half the time that it doth to you. And the fame Reafoning will hold as to any other Proportion : That is to fay, according to your Principles (fmce the Mo- tions perceived are both really in the Ob- ject ) it is poffible one and the fame Body ihall be really moved the fame way at once, both DIALOGUE. both very fwift and very flow. How is this confiftent either with common Senfe, or with what you juft now granted ? //y/. I have nothing to fay to it. Phil. Then as for Solidity ; either you do not mean any fenfible Quality by that Word, and fo it is befide our Inquiry : Or if you do, it muft be either Hardnefs or Refiftance. But both the one and the other are plainly relative to our Senfes : It being evident, that what feems hard to one Ani- mal, may appear foft to another, who hath greater Force and Firmnefs of Limbs. Nor is it lefs plain, that the Refiftance I feel is not in the Body. HyL I own the very Senfation of Refif- tance, which is all you immediately per- ceive, is not in the Body, but the Caufe of that Senfation is. Pbil. But the Caufes of our Senfations are not Things immediately perceived, and therefore not fenfible. This Point I thought had been already determined. Hyl. I own it was; but you will pardon me if I feem a little embarafled : I know not how to quit my old Notions. Phil. To help you out, do but confider, that if Exteniion be once acknowledged to have no Exiftence without the Mind, the fame muft neceffarily be granted of MotU on, Solidity, and Gravity, fmce they all O 4 evidently The FIRST evidently fuppofe Extenfion. It is there- fore fuperfluous to inquire particularly con- cerning each of them. In denying Exten- lion, you have denied them all to have any real Exiftence. Hy/. I wonder, Philonous, if what you fay be true, why thofe Philofophers who deny the Secondary Qualities any real Ex- iftence, mould yet attribute it to the Pri- mary. If there is no Difference between them, how can this be accounted for ? Phil. It is not my bufinefs to account for every Opinion of the Philofophers. But among other Reafons which may be af- figncd for this, it feems probable, thatPlea- fure and Pain being rather annexed to the former than the latter, may be one. Heat and Cold, Taftcs and Smells, have fome- thing more vividly plealing or difagreeable than the Ideas of Extenfion, Figure, and Motion, affect us with. And it being too vifibly abfurd to hold, that Pain orPleafure can be in an unperceiving Subftance, Men are more eafily weaned from believing the external Exiftence of the Secondary, than the Primary Qualities. You will be fatis- fied there is fomething in this, if you re- coiled!: the Difference you made between an intenfe and more moderate Degree of Heat, allowing the one a real Exiftence, \vhile you denied it to the other. But af- ter DIALOGUE. 117 ter all, there is no rational Ground for that DiftindYion ; for furcly an indifferent Sen- fation is as truly a Senjation, as one more pleating or painful ; and confequently Ihould not any more than they be fuppofed to exift in an unthinking Subject. Hyl. It is juft come into my Head, Phi- hnous, that I have fomewhere heard of a Diftinction between abfolute and fenfible Extenfion. Now though it be acknow- ledged that great and fmall^ confiding merely in the Relation which other ex- tended Beings have to the Parts of our own Bodies, do not really inhere in the Subftances themfeives ; yet nothing obliges us to hold the fame with regard to ab joint e Extenfion, which is fomething abltracled from great and Jma// y from this or that particular Magnitude or Figure. So like- wife as to Motion, jivift and Jlow are al- together relative to the Succeflion of Ideas in our own Minds. But it doth not fol- low, becaufe thofe Modifications of Mo- tion exift not without the Mind, that there- fore abfolute Motion abftraded from them doth not. Phil. Pray what is it that diftinguifhes one Motion, or one Part of Extenfion from another ? Is it not fomething fentible, as fome Degree of Swiftnefs or Slownefs, fome certain Magnitude or Figure peculiar to each? Hyl. Th F I R S T HyL I think fo. Phil. Thcfe Qualities therefore ft ripped of all fenfible Properties, are without all fpecific and numerical Differences, as the Schools call them. HyL They arc. Phil. That is to fay, they are Exteniion in general, and Motion in general. HyL Let it be fo. Phil. But it is an univerfally received Maxim, That Every thing which exifts, is particular. How then can Motion in ge- neral, or Extenfion in general exift in any corporeal Subftance ? HyL I will take time to folve your Dif- ficulty. Phil. But I think the Point may be fpee- dily decided. Without doubt you can tell, whether you are able to frame this or that Idea. Now I am* content to put our Dif- , pute on this Ifltie. If you can frame in your Thoughts a diftincl: abftraft Idea of Motion or Exteniion, diverted of all thofe fenfible Modes, as fwift and flow, great and fmall, round and fqnare, and the like, which are acknowledged to exift only in the Mind, I will then yield the Point you contend for. But if you cannot, it will be tmreafonable on your Side to infift any lon- ger upon what you have no Notion of. HyL To confefs ingenuoufly, I cannot. ThiL DIALOGUE. PbiL Can you even feparatc the Ideas of Extenfion and Motion, from the Ideas of all thofe Qualities which they who make the Diftinction, term Secondary. HyL What ! is it not an eafy Matter, to confider Extenfion and Motion by them- fclvcs, abftracled from all other fenfible Qualities ? Pray how do the Mathemati- cians treat of them ? PbiL I acknowledge, Hytas, it is not difficult to form general Proportions and Reafonings about thofe Qualities, without mentioning any other ; and in this Senfe to confider or treat of them abftractedly. But how doth it follow that becaufe I can pro- nounce the Word Motion by itfelf, I can form the Idea of it in my Mind exclufivc of Body ? Or becaufe Theoremes may be made of Extenfion and Figures, without any mention of great or fmall y or any o- thcr fenfible Mode or Quality; that there- fore it is poffible fuch an abftracl: Idea of Extenfion, without any particular Size or Figure, or fenfible Quality, mould be di- ftinctly formed, and apprehended by the Mind ? Mathematicians treat of Quantity, without regarding what other fenfible Qua- lities it is attended with, as being altoge- ther indifferent to their Demonftrations. But when laying afide the Words, they contemplate the bare Ideas, I believe you will no The FIRST will find, they are not the pure abftracted Ideas of Extenfion. Hyl. But what fay you to pure Intellect ? May not abftracted Ideas be framed by that Faculty? Phil. Since I cannot frame abftract Ideas at all, it is plain, I cannot frame them by the help of pure Intellect > whatfoevcr Fa- culty you underftand by thofe Words. Be- fides, not to inquire into the Nature of pure Intellect and its fpiritual Objects, as Virtue^ Reajbn, God, or the like; thus much feems manifefl, that fenfible Things are only to be perceived by Senfe, or re- prefented by the Imagination. Figures therefore and Extenfion being originally perceived by Senfe, do not belong to pure Intellect. But for your farther Satisfaction, try if you can frame the Idea of any Fi- gure, abflracted from all Particularities of Size, or even from other fenfible Quali- ties. Hyl. Let me think a little 1 do not find that I can. Phil. And can you think it poflible, that fhould really exift in Nature, which implies a Repugnancy in its Conception ? Hyl. By no means. Phil. Since therefore it is impoflible e- ven for the Mind to difunite the Ideas of Extenfion and Motion from all other fen- fible DIALOGUE. fible Qualities, doth it not follow, that where the one exift, there neceflarily the other exift likewifc ? Hyl. It mould feem fo. Phil. Confequcntlv the very fame Argu- ments which you admitted, as conclufive againft the Secondary Qualities, are with- out any farther Application of Force againft the Primary too. Eefides, if you will truft your Senfcs, is it not plain all fenfible Qualities cocxift, or to them, appear as being in the fame Place ? Do they ever re- prefent a Motion, or Figure, as being di- verted of all other vifible and tangible Qua- lities ? Hyl. You need fay no more on this Head. I am free to own, if there be no fe- cret Error or Overfight in our Proceedings hitherto, that all fenfible Qualities are a- like to be denied Exiftence without the Mind. But my Fear is, that I have been too liberal in my former Conceflions, or overlooked fome Fallacy or other. In fhort, I did not take time to think. Phil. For that matter, Hylas, you may take what time you pleafc in reviewing the Progrefs of our Inquiry. You are at liber- ty to recover any Slips you might have made, or offer whatever you have omitted, which makes for your firft Opinion, Hyl HyL One great Overfight I take to be this : That I did hot Efficiently diflinguifti the Objeft from the Senfatiott. Now though this latter may not exift without the Mind, yet it will not thence follow that the former cannot. Phil. What Object do you mean ? the Object of the Senfes ? Hyl. The fame. Phil. It is then immediately perceived. ffyl. Right. Phil Make me to underftand the Dif- ference between what is immediately per* ceived, and a Senfation. HyL The Senfation T take to be an Act of the Mind perceiving ; befidc which, there is form-thing perceived ; and this I Call the Objeft. For Example, there is Red and Yellow on that Tulip. But then the Act of perceiving thofe Colours is in rnc only, and not in the Tulip. Phil. What Tulip do you fpeak of? is it that which you fee ? Hyl. The lame. Phil. And what do you fee befide Co- lour, Figure, and Extenfion ? HyL Nothing. Phil. What you would fay then is, that the Red and Yellow are coexiftent with the Extenfion ; is it not ? Hyl DIALOGUE. jfy/. That is not all ; I would fay, They have a real Exiftence without the Mind, in fome unthinking Subftance. Phil. That the Colours are really in the Tulip which I fee, is manifeft. Neither can it be denied, that this Tulip may exifl independent of your Mind or mine ; but that any immediate Object of the Senies, that is, any Idea, or Combination of Ideas, mould exifl in an unthinking Subftance, or exterior to all Minds, is in itfelf an evi- dent Contradiction. Nor can I imagine how this follows from what you faid juft now, to wit that the Red and Yellow were on the Tulip you faw, fince you do not pretend to fee that unthinking bubftance. HyL You have an artful way, 'Philo- nous, of diverting our Inquiry from the Subject. Phil. I fee you have no mind to be pref- fed that way. To return then to your Di- ftinction between Senfation and Object; if I take you right, you diftinguim in every Perception two Things, the one an Action of the Mind, the other not. Hyl. True. Phil. And this Action cannot exift in, or belong to any unthinking thing ; but whatever befide is implied in a Perception, may. HyL That is my Meaning. Thil 12.4 Tt* FIRST Phil. So that if there was a Perception without any Act of the Mind, it were pof- fible fuch a Perception mould exift in an unthinking Subftancc. Hyl. I grant it. But it is impoflible there mould be fuch a Perception. Phil. When is the Mind faid to be ac- tive ? HyL When it produces, puts an end to, or changes any thing. Phil. Can the Mind produce, difcon- tinue, or change any thing but by an Act of the Will ? ' Hyl It cannot. Phil. The Mind therefore is to be ac- counted active in its Perceptions, fo far forth as Volition is included in them. Hyl. It is. Phil. In plucking this Flower, I am ac- tive, becaufe I do it by the Motion of my Hand, which was confequent upon my Vo- lition; fo likewife in applying it to my Nofe. But is either of thefe Smelling r HyL No. Phil. I act too in drawing the Air through my Nofe ; becaufe my Breathing fo rather than otherwife, is the Effect of my Volition. But neither can this be cal- led Smelling : For if it were, I mould fmell every time I breathed in that man- ner. HyL DIALOGUE. 215 Hyl. True. Phil. Smelling then is fomewhat confe- quent to all this. Hyl. It is. Phil. But I do not find my Will con- cerned any farther. Whatever more there is, as that I perceive fuch a particular Smell or any Smell at all, this is indepen- dent of my Will, and therein I am alto- gether paffive. Do you find it otherwife with you, Hylas ? HyL No, the very fame. Phil. Then as to Seeing, is it not in your Power to open your Eyes, or keep them {hut; to turn them this or that way ? HyL Without doubt. Phil. But doth it in like manner depend on your Will, that in looking on this Flower, you perceive White rather than a- ny other Colour ? Or directing your open Eyes toward yonder Pan of the Heaven, can you avoid feeing the Sun ? Or is Light or Darknefs the Effect of your Volition ? Hyl. No certainly. PhiL You are then in thefe Refpedts al- together pafiive. HyL I am. Phil. Tell me now, whether Seeing con- fifts in perceiving Light and Colours, or in opening ai.d turning tue Eyes? HyL Without doubt, in the former. P Thil. the F 1 R S T Pbil. Since therefore vou are in the ve- j ry Perception of Light and Colours altoge- ther paffive, what is become of that Acti- on you were fpeaking of, as an Ingredient in every Senfation ? And doth it not fol- low from your own Conceffions, that the Perception of Light and Colours, includ- ing no Action in it, may exift in an unper- ceiving Subftance ? And is not this a plain Contradiction ? Hyl. I know not what to think of it. Phil. Befides, fince you diftinguifh the dftive and PaJ/ive in every Perception, you muft do it in that of Pain. But how is it poffible that Pain, be it as little active a$ you pleafe, fhould exift in an unperceiving Subftance ? In fhort, do but confider the Point, and then confefs ingenuoufly, whe- ther Light and Colours, Taftes, Sounds, Gfc. are not all equally Paffions or Senfo> dons in the Soul. You may indeed call them external Objtfts, and give them in Words what Subfiftence you pleafe. But examine your own Thoughts, and then tell me whether it be not as I fay ? Hyl. I acknowledge, Philonous, that up- on a fair Obfervation of what pafles in my Mind, I can difcover nothing clfe, but that I am a thinking Being, affected with Va- riety of Senfations j neither is it poffible to conceive how a Senfation (hould exift in an DIALOGUE. an tinperceiving Subftance. But then on the other hand, when I look on fenfible Things in a different View, confidering them as fo many Modes and Qualities, I find it neceffary to fuppofe a material Sub- ftratum^ without which they cannot be conceived to exift. Phil. Material Subftratum call you it ? Pray, by which of your Senles came you acquainted with that Being? Hyl. It is not itfelf fenfible ; its Modes and Qualities only being perceived by the Senfes. Phil. I prefume then, it was by Reflexi- on and Reafoo you obtained the Idea of it. Hyl. I do not pretend to any proper po- fitive Idea of it. However I conclude ic exifts, becaufe Qualities cannot be con- ceived to exifl without a Support. Phil. It feems then you have only a re- lative Notion of it, or that you conceive it not othcrwife than by conceiving the Re- lation it bears to fenfible Qualities. Hyl. Right. Phil. Be pleafed therefore to let me know wherein that Relation confifts. Hyl. Is it not furficiently exprefled in the Term Subftratum, or Subftance ? Phil. If fo, the Word Subftratum rtiould import, that it is fpread under the fenfible Qualities or Accidents. P 2 Hyl. The F I R S T Hyl. True. Phil. And confequently under Exten- fion. Hyl. I own it. Phil. It is therefore fomewhat in its own Nature intirely diftinct from Exten- fion. Hyl. I tell you, Extenfion is only a Mode, and Matter is fomething that fup- ports Modes. And is it not evident the Thing fupported is different from the Thing fupporting? Phil. So that fomething diftin<5t from, and exclulive of Extenfion, is fuppofed to be the Suhftratum of Extenfion. Hyl. Juft fo. Phil. Anfwer me, Hylas. Can a Thing be fpread withc-iit Extenfion ? or is not the Idea of Extenfion neceiTarily included in Spreading ? 5 Hyl. It is. Phil. Whatfoever therefore you fuppofe fpread under any thing, muft have in it- felf an Extenfion diftinft from the Exten- fion of that Thing under which it is fpread. Hyl. It muft. Phil. Confequently every corporeal Sub- fiance being the Subftratum of Extenfion, muft have in itielf another Extenfion by which it is qualified to be a Subftratum ; And DIALOGUE. And fo on to Infinity. And I ask whether this be not abfurd in itfelf, and repugnant to what you granted juft now, to wit, that the Subftratum was fomething diftindt from, and exclulive of Extension. Hyl. Ay but, Philonous, you take me wrong. I do not mean that Matter is Jpread in a grofs literal Senfe under Exten- fion. The Word Subftratum is ufed only to exprefs in general the fame thing with Subftance. Phil. Well then, let us examine the Re- lation implied in the Term Subftance. Is it not that it ftands under Accidents? Hyl. The very fame. Phil. But that one thing may ftand un- der or fupport another, muft it not be ex- tended ? Hyl. It muft. Phil. Is not therefore this Supposition liable to the fame Ablurdity with the foiv mer ? Hyl. You ftill take Things in a ftrict li- teral Senfe : That is not fair, Philonous. Phil. I am not for impofing any Senfe on your Words : You are at Liberty to ex- plain them as you pleafe. Only 1 befeech you, make me underftand fomething by them. You tell me, Matter iuppons or flands under Accidents. How ! is it a,s your Legs fupport your Body ? P 3 The FIRST Hyl. No ; that is the literal Senfe. Phil. Pray let me know any Senfe, lite- ral or not literal that you underftand it in. How long mufl I wait for an An- fwer, Hy/as? Hyl. I declare I know not what to fay. I once thought I underftood well enough what was meant by Matter's fupporting Accidents. But now the more I think on it, the lefs can I comprehend it; in fhort, I find that I know nothing of it r Phil. It .kerns then you have no Idea at all, neither relative nor pofitive of Matter; you know neither what it is in itfelf, nor what Relation it bears to Accidents. 'Hyl. I acknowledge it. Phil. And yet you aliened, that you could not conceive how Qualities or Acci- dents mould really exift, without conceiv- ing at the fame time a material Support of them. Hyl. I did. Phil. That is to fay, when you conceive the real Exiftence of Qualities, you do withal conceive fomething which you can- not conceive. Hyl. It was wrong I own. But ffcill I fear there is fome Fallacy or other. Pray what think you of this ? It is juft come in- to my Head, that the Ground of all our Miftakc lies in your treating of each Qua- lity DIALOGUE. lity by itfelf. Now, I grant that each Qua- lity cannot fingly fubfift without the Mind Colour cannot without Extcnfion, neither can Figure without fome other fenfiblc Quality. But as the feveral Qualities uni- ted or blended together form intire fenfible Things, nothing hinders why fuch Things may not be fuppofed to exifl without the Mind. Phil. Either, Hylas, you are jefting, or have a very bad Memory. Though in deed we went through all the Qualities by Name one after another ; yet my Argu- ments, or rather your ConceiTions no where tended to prove, that the Secondary Quali- ties did not fubfift each alone by itfelf; but that they were not at all without the Mind. Indeed in treating of Figure and Motion, we concluded they could not exift without the Mind, becaufe it was impoffible even in Thought to feparatc them from all Se- condary Qualities, fo as to conceive them exiiling by themfelves. But then this was not the only Argument made ufe of upon that Occafion. But ( to pafs by all that hath been hitherto faid, and reckon it for nothing, if you will have it fo ) I am con- tent to put the whole upon this IfTue. If you can conceive it poffible for any Mix- ture or Combination of Qualities, or any feniible Object whatever, to cxift without P 4 the The F I R S T the Mind, then I will grant it actually to be fo. HyL If it comes to that, the Point will foon be decided. What more eafy than to conceive a Tree or Houfe exifting by itfelf, independent of, and un perceived by any Mind whatfoever ? I do at this prefent time conceive them exifting after that man- ner. Phil. How fay you, Hylas y can you fee a thing which is at the fame time unfeen ? HyL No, that were a Contradiction. . Phil. Is it not as great a Contradiction to talk of conceiving a thing which is un- conceived? HyL It is. Phil. The Tree or Houfe therefore which you think of, is conceived by you. HyL How mould it be otherwife ? Phil. And what is conceived, is furely in the Mind. HyL Without queftion, that which is conceived is in the Mind. PHI. How then came you to fay, you conceived a Houfe or Tree exifting inde- pendent and out of all Minds whatsoever ? HyL That was I own an Overfight; but flay, let me confider wnat led me into it. It is :i pleafant Miftake enough. As I was thinking of a Tree in a folitary Place, where no one was prefent to lee it, me- thought DIALOGUE. thought that was to conceive a Tree as ex- ifting unperceivtd or unthought of, not coniidering that I myfelf conceived it all the while. But now I plainly fee, that all I can do is to frame Ideas in my own Mind. I may indeed conceive in my own Thoughts the Idea of a Tree, or a Houfe, or a Moun- tain, but that is all. And this is far from proving, that I can conceive them exijling out of the Minds of all Spirits. 'Phil. You acknowledge then that you cannot poffibly conceive, how any one cor- poreal fenfible Thing mould exift otherwifc than in a Mind. Hyl. I do. Phil'. And yet you will earneftly con- tend for the Truth of that which you can- not fo much as conceive. Hyl. I profcfs I know not what to think, but (till there are fome bcruples remain with me. Is it not certain I fee Things at a Diftance ? Do we not perceive the Stars and Moon, for Example, to be a great way off? Is not this, I fay, manifefl to the Sen- fs? Phil. Do you not in a Dream too per- ceive thofe or the like Objects ? Hyl I do. Phil And have they not then the fame Appearance of being diftant ? Hyl. FIRST Hyl. They have. Phil. But you do not thence conclude the Apparitions in a Dream to be without the Mind? Hyl. By no means. Phil. You ought not therefore to con* elude that fenfible Objects are without the Mind, from their Appearance op Manner wherein they are perceived. Hyl. I acknowledge it. But doth not my Senfe deceive me in thofe Cafes ? Phil. By no means. The Idea or Thing which you immediately perceive, neither Senfe nor Reafon inform you that it actu- ally exifts without the Mind. By Senfe you only know that you are affected with fuch certain Senfations of Light and Co- lours, &c. And thefe you will not fay arc without the Mind. Hyl. True : But befide all that, do you not think the Sight fuggefts fomething of Outnefs or Diftance ? Phil. Upon approaching a diftant Ob- ject, do the vifible Size and Figure change perpetually, or do they appear the fame at all Diftanccs ? Hyl. They are in a continual Change. Phil. Sight therefore doth not fuggeft or any way inform you, that the vifible Object you immediately perceive, exifts at DIALOGUE. 155 A Diftance *, or will be perceived when you advance farther onward, there being a continued Series of vifible Objects fuc- ceeding each other, during the whole time of your Approach. Hyl. It doth not ; but ftill I know, up- on feeing an Object, what Object I (hall perceive after having pafled over a certain Diftance : No matter whether it be exactly the fame or no : There is flill ibmething of Diftance fuggefted in the Cafe. *Phil. Good Hylas, do but reflect a little on the Point, and then tell me whether there be any more in it than this. From the Ideas you actually perceive by Sight, you have by Experience learned to collect what other Ideas you will (according to the {landing Order of Nature ) be affected with, after fuch a certain SuccefTion of Time and Motion. Hyl. Upon the whole, I take it to be no- thing clfc. Phil. Now is it not plain, that if we fuppofe a Man born blind was on a fudden made to fee, he could at firft have DO Ex- perience of what may be fuggefted by Sight. Hyl. It is. * See the Eflay towards a new Theory of Vifion ; And its Vindicatipn. TbiL The FIRST Phil. He would not then according to you have any Notion of Diftance annexed to the Things he faw j but would take them for a new Set of Senfations exifting only in his Mind. Hyl. It is undeniable. Phil. But to make it ftill more plain : Is not ^D'iftancc a Line turned end wife to the Eye? Hyl It is. Phil And can a Line fo fituated be per- ceived by Sight? Hyl. It cannot. Phil. Doth it not therefore follow that Diftance is not properly and immediately perceived by Sight ? Hyl. It mould feem fo. Phil. Again, is it your Opinion that Co-* lours are at a Diftance? Hyl. It muft be acknowledged, they are only in the Mind. Phil. But do not Colours appear to the Eye as coexifting in the fame place with Extenfion and Figures ? Hyl. They do. Phil. How can you then conclude from Sight, that Figures exift without, when you acknowledge Colours do not j the fenfible Appearance being the very fame with re- gard to both ? Hyl. I know not what to anfwer. Thil. DIALOGUE. 137 Phil. But allowing that Diftance was truly and immediately perceived by the Mind, yet it would not thence follow it exifted out of the Mind. For whatever is immediately perceived is an Idea : And can any Idea exift out of the Mind ? Hyl. To fuppofe that, wereabfurd: But inform me, Pbilonous, can we perceive or know nothing beiide our Ideas ? Phil. As for the rational deducing of Caufes from Effects, that is befide our In- quiry. And by the Senfes you can bed tell, whether you perceive any thing which is not immediately perceived. And I ask you, whether the Things immediately perceived, are other than your own Senfations or Ideas ? You have indeed more than once, in the Courfe of this Converfation, declared yourfelf on thofe Points ; but you feem by this lalt Queftion to have departed from what you then thought. Hyl. To fpeak the Truth, Pbilonous, I think there are two Kinds of Objects, the one perceived immediately, which are 1 ike- wife called Ideas.-, the other are real Things or external Obiedb- perceived by the Me- diation of Ideas, which are their Images and Reprefentations. Now I own, Ideas do not exiil without the Mind j but the latter fort of Objects do. I am forry I did not think of this Diilinction fooner ; it 3 8 The F I R S T it would probably have cut fliort your Dif- courfe. Phil. Are thofe external Objects per- ceived by Senfe, or by fome other Faculty ? HyL They are perceived by Senfe. Phil. How! is there any thing perceived by Senfe, which is not immediately per- ceived ? HyL Yes, Phihnous, in fome fort there is. For Example, when I look on a Pic- ture or Statue of Julius Cajar, I may be faid after a manner to perceive him (though not immediately) by my Senfes. Phil. It feems then, you will have our Ideas, which alone are immediately per- ceived, to be Pictures of external Things : And that thefe alfo are perceived by Senfe, inafmuch as they have a Conformity or Re- femblance to our Ideas. HyL That is my Meaning. Phil. And in the fame way that Julius Cczfar y in himfelf invifible, is neverthelefs perceived by Sight; real Things in them- Selves imperceptible, are perceived by Senfe. HyL In the very fame. Phil. Tell me, Hylas, when you behold the Picture of Julius C gaiaft it : Though another would think it reafonable, The FIRST rcafonable, the Proof mould lie on him who holds the Affirmative. And after all, this very Point which you are now re- folved to maintain without any Reafon, is in effect what you have more than once during this Difcourfe feen good Reafon to give up. But to pafs over all this ; if I underftand you rightly, you fay our Ideas do not exift without the Mind ; but that they are Copies, Images, or Reprefentati- ons of certain Originals that do. HyL You take me right. Phil. They are then like external Things. HyL They are. Phil. Have thofe Things a ftable and permanent Nature independent of our Sen- fes j or are they in a perpetual Change, upon our producing any Motions in our Bodies, fufpending, exerting, or altering our Faculties or Organs of Senfe. HyL Real Things, it is plain, have a fixed and real Nature, which remains the fame, notwithftanding any Change in our Senfes, or in the Pofture and Motion of our Bodies ; which indeed may affect the Ideas in our Minds, but it were abfurd to think they had the fame Effect on Things cxifting without the Mind. Phil. How then is it poffible, that Things perpetually fleeting and variable as ur Ideas, fhould be Copies or Images of any DIALOGUE. any thing fixed and conftant ? Or in other Words, fince all fenfible Qualities, as Size, Figure, Colour, &c. that is, our Ideas are continually changing upon every Altera- tion in the Diftance, Medium, or Inftru- ments of Senfation ; how can any deter- minate material Objects be properly re- prefented or painted forth by feveral di- ftincl: Things, each of which is fo diffe- rent from and unlike the reft ? Or if you fay it refembles fome one only of our Ideas, how mall we be able to di- ftinguifh the true Copy from all the falfe ones ? Hyl. I profefs, Philonous, I am at a lofs. I know not what to fay to this. Phil. But neither is this all. Which are material Objects in themfelves, perceptible or imperceptible ? Hyl. Properly and immediately nothing can be perceived but Ideas. All material Things therefore are in themfelves infen- fible, and to be perceived only by their Ideas. ^Phil. Ideas then are fcnfible, and their Archetypes or Originals infenfible. Hyl. Right. Phil. But how can that which is fenfi- ble be like that which is infenfible ? Can a real thing in itfelf invifible be like a Co- lour j or a real thing which is not au-drble^ be 144 Me FIRST be like a Sound? In a word, can any thing be like a Senfation or Idea, but another Senfation or Idea ? Kyi. I muft own, I think not. Phil. Is it poffible there fhould be any doubt in the Point ? Do you not perfectly know your own Ideas? Hyl. I know them perfe&ly ; fince what I do not perceive or know, can be no part of my Idea. Phil. Confider therefore, and examine them, and then tell me if there be any thing in them which can exift with- out the Mind : or if you can conceive any thing like them exifting without the Mind. Hyl. Upon Inquiry, I find it is impoffi- ble for me to conceive or underftand how any thing but an Idea can be like an Idea. And it is moft evident, that no Idea can exift without the Mind. y/j/7. You are therefore by your Prin- ciples forced to deny the Reality of fenli- ble Things, (ince you made it to confift in an abiblute Exiftence exterior to the Mind. That is to fay, you are a down- right Sceptic. So I have gained my Point, which was to mew your Principles led to Scepticifm. Hyl. For the prefent I am, if not intire- ly convinced, at lead filenced, Thil. DIALOGUE. 145 Pbil. I would fain know what more you would require in order to a perfect Convidion. Have you not had the Liber- ty of explaining yourfelf all manner of ways ? Were any little Slips in Difcourfe laid hold and iniifted on ? Or were you not allowed to retract or reinforce any thing you had offered, as bed ferved your Purpofe ? Hath not every thing you could fay been heard and examined with all the Fairnefs imaginable ? In a word, have you not in every Point been convinced out of your own Mouth ? And if you can at prc- fent difcover any Flaw in any of your for- mer Conceflions, or think of any remain- ing Subterfuge, any new Diitinction, Co- lour, or Comment whatsoever, why do you not produce it ? Hyl. A little Patience, Philonous. I am at prefent fo amazed to fee myfelf en fnared, and as it were imprifoned in the Labyrinths you have drawn me into, that on the fud- den it cannot be expected I mould find my way out. You muft give me time to look about me, and recoiled: myfelf. Phil. Hark j is not this the College- Bell ? Hyl. It rings for Prayers. Phil. We will go in then if you pleafe, and meet here again to Morrow Morning. In the mean time you may employ your Thoughts The FIRST tec. Thoughts on this Morning's Difcourfe, and try if you can find any Fallacy in it, or invent any new means to extricate your- fclf. Hyl. Agreed. THE THE SECOND DIALOGUE. H Y L A S. BEG your Pardon, 'Philonous, for not meeting you fooner. All this Morning my Head was fo filled with our late Converfation, that I had not leifure to think of the Time of the Day, or indeed of any thing elfe. Philonous. I am glad you were fo intent upon it, in Hopes if there were any Mif- takes in your Conceflions, or Fallacies in my Reafonings from them, you will now difcover them to me. Hyl. I aflure you, I have done nothing ever fince I faw you, but fearch after Mif- takes and Fallacies, and with that View have Tte SECOND have minutely examined the whole Series of Yefterday's Difcourfe : but all in vain, for the Notions it led me into, upon Re- view appear flill more clear and evident ; and the more I confider them, the more irrefiftibly do they force my Aflent. Phil. And is not this, think you, a Sign that they are genuine, that they proceed from Nature, and arc conformable to right Reafon ? Truth and Beauty are in this a- like, that the ftri&eft Survey fets them both off to Advantage. While the falfe Luftre of Error and Difguife cannot endure being reviewed, or too nearly infpedted. Hyl. I own there is a great deal in what you fay. Nor can any one be more in- tirely fatisfied of the Truth of thofe odd Confequences, fo long as I have in View the Reafonings that lead to them. But when thefe are out of my Thoughts, there feems on the other hand fomething fo fa- tisfadtory, fo natural and intelligible in the modern way of explaining Things, that I profefs I know not how to rejedl it. Phil. I know not what way you mean. Hyl. I mean the way of accounting for pur Senfations or Ideas. Phil. How is that ? Hyl. It is fuppofed the Soul makes her Refidence in fome part of the Brain, from which the Nerves take their rife, and are thence DIALOGUE. 149 thenc? extended to all Parts of the Body: And that outward Objects by the different Impreffions they make on the Organs of Senfe, communicate certain vibrative Mo- tions to the Nerves -, and thefe being filled with Spirits, propagate them to the Brain or Seat of the Soul, which according to the various Impreffions or Traces thereby made in the Brain, is varioufly affected with Ideas. Phil. .And call you this an Explication of the manner whereby we are affected with Ideas ? Hyl. Why not, Philonous, have you any thing to object againft it ? Phil. I would firft know whether I right- ly underftand your Hypothecs. You make certain Traces in the Brain to be the Catifes or Occafions of our Ideas. Pray tell me, whether by the Brain you mean any fenli- ble Thing? Hyl. What elfe think you I could mean? Phil. Senfible Things are all immediate- ly perceivable ; and thofe Things which are immediately perceivable, are Ideas; and thefe exifl only in the Mind. Thus much you have, if I miftake not, long fince a- greed to. Hyl. I do not deny it. Phil. The Brain therefore you fpeak of, being a fenfible Thing, exifts only in the Mindl i 5 o The S E C N D Mind. Now, I would fain know whether you think it reafonable to fuppofe, that one Idea or Thing exifting in the Mind, occa- fions all other Ideas. And if" you think fo, pray how do you account for the Origin of that Primary Idea or Brain itfelf? Hyl. I do not explain the Origin of our Ideas by that Brain which is perceivable to Senfe, this being itfelf only a Combination of fenfible Ideas, but by another which I imagine. Phil. But are not Things imagined as truly in the Mind as Things perceived ? Hyl. I muffc confefs they are. Phil. It comes therefore to the fame thing ; and you have been all this while accounting for Ideas, by certain Motions or Impreffions in the Brain, that is, by fome Alterations in an Idea, whether fenfible or imaginable,- it matters not. Hyl. I begin to fufpecl: my Hypothefis. Phil. Befide Spirits, all that we know or conceive are our own Ideas. When therefore you fay, all Ideas are occafioned by Impreffions in the Brain, do you con- ceive this Brain or no ? If you do, then you talk of Ideas imprinted in an Idea, caufing that fame Idea, which is abfurd. If you do not conceive it, you talk unintelli- gibly, inflead of forming a reafonable Hy- pothefis* DIALOGUE. Hyl. I now clearly fee it was a mere Dream. There is nothing in it. Phil. You need not be much concerned at it : for after all, this way of explaining Things, as you called it, could never have fatisfied any reafonable Man. What Con- nexion is there between a Motion in the Nerves, and the Senfations of Sound or Co- lour in the Mind ? or how is it poiTiblc thefe mould be the Effect of that ? Hyl. But I could never think it had fo little in it, as now it feems to have. Phil. Well then, are you at length fa- tisfied that no fenfible Things have a real Exiftencc j and that you are in truth an ar- rant Sceptic ? Hyl. It is too plain to be denied. Phil. Look ! are not the Fields covered with a delightful Verdure ? Is there not fomething in the Woods and Groves, in the Rivers and clear Springs that fooths, that delights, that tranfports the Soul ? At the Profpecl of the wide and deep Ocean, or fome huge Mountain whofe Top is loft in the Clouds, or of an old gloomy Foreft, are not our Minds filled with a pleafing Horror? Even in Rocks and Deferts, is there not an agreeable Wildnefs ? How fmcere a Pleafure is it to behold the na- tural Beauties of the Earth ! To preferve and renew our Relifh for them, is not the Veil The S E C N D Veil of Night alternately drawn over her Face, and doth (he not change her Drefs with the Seafons? How aptly are the Ele- ments difpofed ? What Variety and Ufe in the meaneft Productions of Nature ? What Delicacy, what Beauty, what Contrivance in animal and vegetable Bodies ? How ex- quifitely are all Things fuited, as well to their particular Ends, as to conflitute ap- pofite Parts of the Whole ! And while they mutually aid and fupport, do they not alfo fet off and illuftrate each other ? Raife now your Thoughts from this Ball of Earth, to all thofe glorious Luminaries that adorn the high Arch of Heaven. The Motion and Situation of the Planets, are they not admirable for Ufe and Order ? Were thofe (mifcalled Rrratlque) Globes ever known to ftray, in their repeated Journeys through the pathlefs Void ? Do they not meafure Areas round the Sun ever proportioned to the Times ? So fixed, fo immutable are the Laws by which the unfeen Author of Na- ture actuates the Univerfe. How vivid and radiant is the Luftre of the fixed Stars! How magnificent and rich that negligent Profufion, with which they appear to be fcattered throughout the whole Azure Vault! Yet if you take the Telefcope, it brings into your Sight a new Hoft of Stars that efcape the naked Eye. Here they feem DIALOGUE. 153 feem contiguous and minute, but to a nearer View immenfe Orbs of Light at va- rious Diftances, far funk in the Abyfs of Space. Now you muft call Imagination to your Aid. The feeble narrow Senfe cannot defcry innumerable Worlds revolv- ing round the central Fires ; and in thofe Worlds the Energy of an all-perfect Mind difplayed in endlefs Forms. But neither Senfe nor Imagination are big enough to comprehend the boundlefs Extent with all its glittering Furniture. Though the la- bouring Mind exert and drain each Power to its utmoft reach, there ftill ftands out ungrafped a Surplufage immeafurable. Yet all the vaft Bodies that compofe this migh- ty Frame, how diftant and remote foever, are by fome fecret Mechanifm, fome divine Art and Force linked in a mutual Depen- dence and Intercourfe with each other, even with this Earth, which was almoft flipt from my Thoughts, and loft in the Crc .i of Worlds. Is not the whole Syilem imrnenfe, beautiful, glorious beyond Ex- preiTion and beyond Thought ! What treat- ment then do thole Philofophers deferve, who would deprive thefe noble and de- lightful Scenes of all Reality? How mould thole Principles be entertained, that lead us to think all the vifible Beauty of the Crea- tion a falfe imaginary Glare? To be plain, can i 5 4 Tie S E C tt D can you expect this Scepticifm of youfg will not be thought extravagantly abfurd by all Men of Senfe ? Hyl. Other Men may think as they pleafe : But for your part you have no-^ thing to reproach me with. My Comfort is, you are as much a Sceptic as I am. Phil. There, Hylas, I muff beg leave to differ from you. Hyl. What! have you all along agreed to the Premifes, and do you now deny the Conclufion, and leave me to maintain thofe Paradoxes by myfelf which you led me in- to? This furely is not fair. Phil. I deny that I agreed with you in thofe Notions that led to Scepticifm. You indeed laid, the Reality of fenfible Things confifted in an abfolute Exiftence out of the Minds of Spirits, or diftinct from their be- ing perceived. And purfuant to this No- tion of Reality, you are obliged to deny fenfible Things any real Exiftence : That is, according to your own Definition, you profefs yourfelf a Sceptic. But I neither faid nor thought the Reality of fenfible Things was to be defined after that man- ner. To me it is evident, for the Reafon* you allow of, that fenfible Things cannot cxift otherwife than in a Mind or Spirit. Whence I conclude, not that they have no real Exiftence, but that feeing they depend not DIALOGUE. not on my Thought, and have an Exiftcncc diftincl from being perceived by me, there mufl be fome other Mind 'wherein they exift. As fure therefore as the fenfible World really exifts, fo fure is there an infinite omniprelent Spirit who contains and fup- ports it. Hyl. What ! this is no more than I and all Chriftians hold ; nay, and all others too who believe there is a God, and that he knows and comprehends all Things. Phil. Ay, but here lies the Difference. Men commonly believe that all Things are known or perceived by God, becaufe they believe the Being of a God, whereas I on the other fide, immediately and neceffarily conclude the Being of a God, becaufe all fenfible Things mufl be perceived by him. Hyl. But fo long as we all believe the fame thing, what matter is it how we come by that Belief ? Phil. But neither do we agree in the fame Opinion. For Philofophers, though they acknowledge all corporeal Beings to be perceived by God, yet they attribute to them an abfolute Subfiftence diftincl: from their being perceived by any Mind what* ever, which I do not. Befides, is there no Difference between faying, There is a God, therefore he perceives all Things : and fay- ing, Senjible Things do really exiji : and if they 25 S The S E C N D they really exift, they are neceffarily perceived by an infinite Mind : therefore there is an infinite Mir.d^ or God. This furnifhes you with a direct and immediate Demonftrati- on, from a moft evident Principle, of the Being of a God. Divines and Philofophers had proved beyond all Controverfy, from the Beauty and Ufefulnefs of the feveral Parts of the Creation, that it was the Workmanmip of God. But that letting afide all Help of Aftronomy and natural Philofophy, all Contemplation of the Con- trivance, Order, and Adjustment of Things, an infinite Mind mould be neceffarily in- ferred from the bare Exiftence of the fen- fible World, is an Advantage peculiar to them only who have made this eafy Re- flexion : That the fenfible World is that which we perceive by our feveral Senfes; and rhat nothing is perceived by the SAnfes beiide. Ideas ; and that no Idea or Arche- type of an Idea can exift otherwife than in a Mind. You may now, without any la- borious fearch into the Sciences^ without any Subtilty of Reafon, or tedious Length of Difcourfe, oppofe and baffle the moft flrenuous Advocate for Atheilm. Thofe miierable Refuges, whether in an eternal Succeflion of unthinking Caufes and Ef- fects, or in a fortuitous Concourfe of Atoms j thofe wild Imaginations DIALOGUE. , Hobbes, and Spinofa > in a word the whole Syftem of Atheifm, is it not intircly over- thrown by this /ingle Reflexion on the Re- pugnancy included in fuppofing the Whole, or any Part, even the molt rude and fhapelefs of the vifible World, to exift without a Mind? Let any one of thofe A- bettors of Impiety but look into his own Thoughts, and there try if he can con- ceive how fo much as a Rock, a Defert, a Chaos, or confufed Jumble of Atoms - t how any thing at all, either feniible or imagina- ble, can ex.ift independent of a Mind, and he need go no farther to be convinced of his Folly. Can any thing be fairer than to put a Difpute on fuch an Iffue, and leave it to a Man himfelf to fee if he can con- ceive, even in Thought, what he holds to be true in Fact, and from a notional to allow it a real Exiflence ? HyL It cannot be denied, there is fome- thing highly ferviceable to Religion in what you advance. But do you not think it looks very like a Notion entertained by fome eminent Moderns, of feeing all things in God ? Phil. I would gladly know that Opini- on ; pray explain it to me. Hyl They conceive that the Soul being immaterial, is incapable of being united material Things, fo as to perceire R theru them in themfelves, but that (he perceives them by her Union with the Subftance of God, which being fpiritual is therefore purely intelligible, or capable of being the immediate Object of a Spirit's Thought. Befides, the Divine EfTence contains in it Perfections correfpondent to each created Being > and which are for that lleafon proper to exhibit or reprefent them to the Mind. Phil. I do not underftand how our Ideas, which are Things altogether paffive and inert, can be the EfTence, or any Part ( or like any Part ) of the EfTence or Subftance of God, who is an impaffive, indivifible, purely active Being. Many more Difficul- ties and Objections there are, which occur at firft View againft this Hypothecs; but I {hall only add that it is liable to all the Abfurdities of the common Hypothefes, in making a created World exift otherwife than in the Mind of a Spirit. Befide all which it hath this peculiar to itfelf j that it makes that material World ferve to no Purpofe. And if it pafs for a good Ar- gument againft other Hypothefes in the Sciences, that they fuppofe Nature or the Divine Wifdom to make fomething in vain, or do that by tedious round-about Methods, which might have been per- formed in a much more eafy and compen- dious DIALOGUE. z 55 > dious way, what (hall we think of that Hypothefis which fuppofes the whole World made in vain ? HyL But what fay you, are not you too of Opinion that we fee all Things in God ? If I miftake not, what you advance comes near it. Phil. Few Men think, yet all will have Opinions. Hence Mens Opinions are fu- perficial and confufed. It is nothing ftrange that Tenets, which in themfelves are ever fo different, mould ncverthelefs be con- founded with each other by thofe who do not confidcr them attentively. I flaall not therefore be furprifed, if fome Men ima- gine that I run into the Enthufiafm of Mai- branche, though in truth I am very remote from it. He builds on the moft abftradt general Ideas, which I intirely difclaim. He afferts an abfolute external World, which I deny. He maintains that we are deceived by our Senfes, and know not the real Natures or the true Forms and Figures of extended Beings; of all which I hold the dired contrary. So that upon the whole there are no Principles more fundamen- tally oppofite than his and mine. It muft be owned I intirely agree with what the holy Scripture faith, That in God we Izve t and move, and have our Being. But that we fee Things in his EfTence after the R^ 2 manner The SECOND. manner above fet forth, I am far from be- lieving. Take here in brief my Meaning. It is evident that the Things I perceive are my own Ideas, and that no Idea can exift un- lefs it be in a Mind. Nor is it lefs plain that thefe Ideas or Things by me percei- ved, either themfelves or their Archetypes, exift independently of my Mind, fmcc I know myielf not to be their Author, it be- ing out of my power to determine at plea- fure, what particular Ideas I mall be af- fected with upon opening my Eyes or Ears. They muft therefore exift in fome other Mind, whofe Will it is they mould be exhibited to me. The Things, I fay, immediately perceived, are Ideas or Scnfa- tions, call them which you will. But how can any Idea or Senfation exift in, or be produced by, any thing but a Mind or Spi- rit? This indeed is inconceivable j and to affert that which is inconceivable, is to talk Nonfenfe: Is it not ? Hyl. Without doubt. Phil. But on the other hand, it is very conceivable that they mould exift in, and be produced by, a Spirit; fince this is no more than I daily experience in myfelf, in- asmuch as I perceive numberlefs Ideas j and by an Act of my Will can form a great Variety of them, and raife them up in my Imagination : Though it muft be confeiTed, thefe DIALOGUE. thefe Creatures of the Fancy are not alto- gether fo diftinc~r., fo ftrong, vivid, and per- manent, as thofe perceived by my Senfes, which latter are called Real things. From all which I conclude, there is a Mind which affcffs me every Moment with all the fenfibie Imprejfiom I perceive. And from the Va- riety, Order, and Manner of thefe, I con- clude the Author of them to be ivifi, powerful^ and good, beyond* comprehenjkn. Mark it well; I do not fay, I fee Things by perceiving that which reprefents them in the intelligible Subftance of God. This I do not underftand; but I fay, The Things by me perceived are known by the Under- ftanding, and produced by the Will, of an infinite Spirit. And is not all this moft plain and evident ? Is there any more in it, than what a little Obfervation of our own Minds, and that which paries in them net only enableth us to conceive, but alfo obli- geth us to acknowledge ? Hyl. I think I underftand you very clearly ; and own the Proof you give of a Deity feems no lefs evident, than it is fur- prifing. But allowing that God is the .Supreme andUniverfalCaufe of all Things, yet may not there be ft ill a Third Nature be- fides Spirits and Ideas? May we not admit a fubordinate and limhed Caufe of our R 3 Ideas? Tfo SECOND Ideas? In a word, may there not for all that be Matter? Phil. How often muft I inculcate the fame thing ? You allow the Things imme- diately perceived by Senfe to exift no where without the Mind: But there is nothing perceived by Senfe, which is not perceived immediately : therefore there is nothing fenfible that exifts without the Mind. The Matter therefore which you ftill infift on, is fomething intelligible, I fuppofe; fome- thing that may be difcovered by Reafon, and not by Senfe. Hyl. You are in the right. Phil. Pray let me know what Reafon- ing your Belief of Matter is grounded on ; and what this Matter is in your prefent Senfe of it. Hyl. I find myfelf affected with various Ideas, whereof I know I am not the Cauie; neither are they the Caufe of themfelves, or of one another, or capable of fubfifting by themfelves, as being altogether inactive, fleeting, dependent Beings. They have therefore fome Caufe diftincl; from me and them : Of which I pretend to know no more, than that it is the Caufe of my Ideas. And this thing, whatever it be, I call Matter, Phil. Tell me, Hylas, hath every one a Liberty to change the current proper Sig- nification DIALOGUE. nification annexed to a common Name in any Language ? For Example, fuppofe a Traveller mould tell you, that in a cer- tain Country Men might pafs unhurc through the Fire} and, upon explaining himfelf, you found he meant by the Word Fire that which others call Water : Or if he fhould aflcrt there are. Trees which walk upon two Legs, meaning Men by the Term Frees. Would you think this rea- fonable ? HyL No; I fhould think it very abfurd. Common Cuftom is the Standard of Pro- priety in Language. And for any Man to affect fpeaking improperly, is to pervert the Ufe of Speech, and can never ferve to a better purpofe, than to protract and multi- ply Difputes where there is no Difference in Opinion. Phil. And doth not Matter, in the com- mon current Acceptation of the Word, fig- nify an extended, folid, moveable, unthink- ing, inactive Subftance ? HyL It doth. Phil. And hath it not been made evident, that no fuch Subflance can poffibly exiil ? And though it fhould be allowed to exilt, yet how can that which is inatfi've be a Caufe-y or that which is unthinking be a Caufe of^houghtl You may indeed, if you pleafe, annex to the Word Matter a con- R 4 trary Ue S E C N D. trary Meaning to what is vulgarly receiv- ed; and tell me you underftand by it an unextended, thinking, active Being, which is the Caufe of our Ideas. But what elfe is this, than to play with Words, and run into that, very Fault you jufl now con- demned with fo much Reafon? I do by no means find fault with your Reafoning, in that you colled; a Caufe from the Phe- nomena : But 1 deny that the Caufe de- duciblc by Reafon can properly be termed Matter. Hyl. There is indeed fomething in what you fay. But I am afraid you do not thoroughly comprehend my Meaning. I would by no means be thought to deny that God or an Infinite Spirit is the Su- preme Caufe of all things. All I contend for, is, that fubordinate to the Supreme A- gent there is a Caufe of a limited and in- ferior Nature, which concurs in the Pro- duction of our Ideas, not by any Act of Will or Spiritual Efficiency, but by that Kind of Action which belongs to Matter, viz. Motion. *PhiL I find, you are at every Turn re- lapfing into your old exploded Conceit, of a moveable and confequently an extend- ed Subftance exifting without the Mind. What! Have you already forgot you were convinced, or are you willing I fliould re- peat DIALOGUE. peat what has been faid on that Head ? In truth this is not fair Dealing in you, ftill to fuppofe the Being of that which you have io often acknowledged to have no Be- ing. But not to infill: farther on what has been fo largely handled, I ask whether all your Ideas are not perfectly paffive and inert, including nothing of Action in them? HyL They are. Phil. And are fenfible Qualities any thing elfe but Ideas? HyL How often have I acknowledged that they are not? Phil. But is not Motion a fenfible Qua- lity ? HyL It is. Phil. Confequently it is no Action. HyL I agree with you. And indeed it is very plain, that when I flir my Finger, it remains paflivcj but my Will which produced the Motion, is active. Phil. Now I defire to know in the firft place, whether Motion being allowed to be no Action, you can conceive any Action befides Volition: And in the fecond place, whether to fay fomething and conceive nothing be not to talk Nonfcnfe: And laftly, whether having confidered the Pre-. mifes, you do not perceive that to fup- pofe any efficient or active Caufe' of our Ideas, other than Spirit, is highly abfurd and unreafonable ? HyL The SECOND Hyl. I give up the Poinc intirely. But though Matter may not be a Caufe, yet what hinders its being an Inftrument fubfervient to the Supreme Agent in the Produ&ioa of our Ideas? Phil. An Inftrument, fay you ; pray what may be the Figure, Springs, Wheels, and Motions of that Inftrument ? Hyl. Thofe I pretend to determine no- thing of, both the Subftance and its Qua- lities being intirely unknown to me. Phil. What ? You are then of Opinion, it is made up of unknown Parts, that it hath unknown Motions, and an unknown Shape. Hyl. I do not believe it hath any Figure or Motion at all, being already convinced, that no fenlible Qualities can exift in an unperceiving Subftance. *Phil. But what Notion is it poffible to frame of an Inftrument void of all fcnfible Qualities, even Extenfion itfclf ? Hyl. I do not pretend to have any Noti- on of it. Phil. And what reafon have you to think, this unknown, this inconceivable Somewhat doth exift? Is it that you ima- gine God cannot ad: as well without it, or that you find by Experience the Ufe of fome fuch thing, when you form Ideas in your own Mind? Hyl. DIALOGUE. HyL You arc always teizing me for Rea- fons of my Belief Pray what Reafons have you not to believe it ? Phil. It is to me a fufficient Reafon not to believe the Exiftence of any thing, if I fee no Reafon for believing it. But not to infift on Reafons for believing, you will not fo much as let me know what it is you would have me believe, ilnce you fay you have no manner of Notion of it. After all, let me intreat you to confi- der whether it be like a Philofopher, or even like a Man of common Senfe, to pre- tend to believe you, know not what, and you know not why. HyL Hold, Tbilonous. When I tell you Matter is an Inftrument, I do not mean al- together Nothing. It is true, I know not the particular Kind of Instrument ; but .however I have fome Notion of Inftru- ment in general^ which I apply to it). Phil, But what if it mould prove that there is fomething, even in the moft ge- neral Notion of Inftrument, as taken in a diflinct Senfe from Caufe t which makes the Ufe of it inconfiftent with the Divine Attributes? HyL Make that appear, and I mall give up the Point. Phil. What mean you by the general J^ature or Notion of Injlrument \ HyL Hyl. That which is common to all par- ticular Instruments, compofeth the general Notion. Phil. Is it not common to all Inftru- ments, that they are applied to the doing thofe things only, which cannot be per- formed by the mere Act of our Wills? Thus for inftance, I never ufe an Inftru- ment to move my Finger, becaufe it is done by a Volition. But I mould ufe one, if I were to remove part of a Rock, or tear up a Tree by the Roots. Are you of the fame Mind ? Or can you (hew any Example where an Instrument is made ufe of in producing an Effect immedi- ately depending on the Will of the Agent ? Hyl. I own, I cannot. PbiL How therefore can you fuppofe, that an All-perfect Spirit, on whofe Will all things have an abfolute and immediate Dependence, mould need an Inftrument in his Operations, or not needing it make ufe of it ? Thus it feems to me that you are obliged to own the Ufe of a lifelefs inactive Inftrument, to be incompatible with the Infinite Perfection of God ; that is, by your own Confeffion, to give up the Point. Hyl. It doth not readily occur what I can anfwer you. Phil. DIALOGUE. 169 Phil. But methinks you mould be ready to own the Truth, when it hath been fair- ly proved to you. We indeed, who are Beings of Finite Powers, arc forced to make ufe of Inftruments. And the Ufe of an Inftrument fheweth the Agent to be limited by Rules of another's Prefcription, and that he cannot obtain, his End, but in fuch a Way and by fuch Conditions. Whence it feems a clear Confequence, that the fupreme unlimited Agent ufeth no Tool or Inftrument at all. The Will of an Omnipotent Spirit is no fooner exerted than executed, without the Application of Means, which, if they are employed by inferior Agents, it is not upon account of any real Efficacy that is in them, or neceflary Aptitude to produce any Effect, but merely in compliance with the Laws of Nature, or thofe Conditions prefcribed to them by the firft Caufe, who is Him- felf above all Limitation or Prefcription whatfoever. Hyl. 1 will no longer maintain that Mat- ter is an Inftrument. However, I would not be underftood to give up its Exif- tence neither; fince, notwithstanding what hath been faid, ic may ftiil be an Oc- cajion. Phil. How many Shapes is your Mat- ter to take ? Or how often muft it be proved SECOND proved not to exift, before you are con-' tent to part with it ? But to fay no more of this (though by all the Laws of Dik putation I may juftly blame you for fo frequently changing the Signification of the principal Term) I would fain know what you mean by affirming that Matter is an Occafion, having already denied it to be a Caufe. And when you have (hewn in what Senfe you underftand Oc- cafion y pray in the next place be pleafed to (hew me what Reafon induceth you to believe there is fuch an Occafion of our Ideas. HyL As to jhe firft Point: By Occafon I mean an inactive unthinking Being, at the Prefence whereof God excites Ideas in our Minds. Phil And what may be the Nature of that inactive unthinking Being? HyL I know nothing of its Nature. Phil. Proceed then to the fecond Point, and affign fome Reafon why we mould allow an Exiftence to this inactive, un- thinking, unknown thing. HyL When we fee Ideas produced in our Minds after an orderly and conftanc manner, it is natural to think they have fome fixed and regular Occafions, at the Prefence of which they are excited. Phil. DIALOGUE. 271 il. You acknowledge then God alone to be the Caufe of our Ideas, and that he caufes them at the Prefence of thofe Occafions. Hyl. That is my Opinion. Phil. Thofe Things which you fay are prefent to God, whithout doubt He per- ceives. Hyl. Certainly j otherwife they could not be to Him an Occafion of acting. Phil. Not to infift now on your mak- ing Senfe of this Hypothecs, or anfwer- ing all the puzzling Queftions and Diffi- culties it is liable to: I only ask whether the Order and Regularity obfervable in the Series of our Ideas, or the Courfe of Nature, be not fufficiently accounted for by the Wifdom and Power of God; and whether it doth not derogate from thoic Attributes, to fuppofe He is influenced, directed, or put in mind, when and what He is to acl, by any unthinking Sub- ftance. And laftly whether, in cafe I granted all you contend for, it would make any thing to your purpofe, it not being eafy to conceive how the exter- nal or abfolute Exigence of an unthink- ing Subftance, diftincl: from its being per- ceived, can be inferred from my allow- ing that there are certain things per- ceived by the Mind of God, which are to SECOND to Him the Occafion of producing Ideas in us. Hyl. I am perfectly at a lofs what to think, this Notion of Occafion feem- ing now altogether as groundlefs as the reft. Phil Do you not at length perceive, that in. all thefe different Acceptations of Matter, you have been only fuppofing you know not what, for no manner of Reafon, and to no kind of Ufe ? Hyl. I freely own my felf lefs fond of my Notions, fince they have been fo ac- curately examined. But flill, methinks I have fome confufed Perception that there is fuch a thing as Matter. Phil. Either you perceive the Being of Matter immediately, or mediately. If im- mediately, pray inform me by which of the Senfes you perceive it. If mediately, let me know by what Reafoning it is in- ferred from thofe Things which you per- ceive immediately. So much for the Per- ception. Then for the Matter it felf, I ask whether it is Object, Subftratum, Caufe, Instrument, or Occafion ? You have alrea- dy pleaded for each of thefe, (hifting your Notion?, and making Matter to appear fometimes in one Shape, then in another. And what you have offered hath been dif- approved and rejected by your felf. If you DIALOGUE. you have anything new to advance, I would gladly hear it. Hyl. I think I have already offered all I had to fay on thofe Heads. I am at a lofs what more to urge. Phil And yet you are loth to part with your old Prejudice. But to make you quit it more eafily, I defire that, befhie what has been hitherto fuggefted, you will farther confider whether, upon fuppofiuon that Matter exifts, you can polfibly conceive how you mould be affected by it ? Or fuppofing it did not exift, whether it be not evident you might for all that be affected with the fame Ideas you now are, and confequently have the very fame rea- fons to believe its Exiftence that you now can have ? Hyl. I acknowledge it is poffible we might perceive all things jiift as we do now, though there was no Matter in the World ; neither can I conceive, if there be Matter, how it mould produce any Idea in our Minds. And I do farther grant, you have intirely fatisfied me, that it is impoffible there mould be fuch a thing as Matter in any of the foregoing Accepta- tions. But ftill I cannot help fuppofing that there is Matter in fome fenfe or other. What that is I do not indeed pretend to determine. S Phil 174 T ht SECOND Phil. I do not expecl you (hould define exactly the Nature of that unknown Being. Only be pleafed to tell me, whether it is a Subftance : And if fo, whether you can fuppofe a Subftance without Accidents ; or in cafe you fuppofe it to have Accidents or Qualities, I defire you will let me know what thofe Qualities are, at leaft what is meant by Matter's fupporting them. Hyl. We have already argued on thofe Points. I have no more to fay to them. But to prevent any farther Queftions, let me tell you, I at prefent underftand by Matter neither Subftance nor Accident, thinking nor extended Being, neither Caufe, Inftrument, nor Occafion, but fomething intircly unknown, diftinct from all thefe. Phil. It feems then you include in your prefent Notion of Matter, nothing but the general abftracl Idea of Entity. Hyl. Nothing elfe, fave only that I fuper- add to this general Idea the Negation of all thofe particular Things, Qualities, or Ideas that I perceive, imagine, or in any wife apprehend. PbiL Pray where do you fuppofe this unknown Matter to exift ? Hyl. Oh PjbilonouiJ now you think you have entangled me ; for if I fay it exifts in Place, then you will infer that it exifts in the Mind, fince it is agreed, that Place or Extenfion DIALOGUE, Extenfion exifts only in the Mind: But I am not amamed to own my Ignorance. I know not where it exiftsj only I am fure it cxifts not in Place. There is a negative Anfwer for you : And you muft expect no other to all the Queftions you put for the future about Matter. 'Phil. Since you will not tell me where it exifts, be pleafed to inform me after what Manner you fuppofe it to exift, or what you mean by its Exiftence. Hyl. It neither thinks nor ads, neither perceives, nor is perceived. Phil. But what is there pofitive in your abftracted Notion of its Exiftence ? HyL Upon a nice Obfervation, I do not find I have any politive Notion or Mean- ing at all. I tell you again I am not afhamed to own my Ignorance. I know not what is meant by its Exiftence, or how it exifts. Phil. Continue, good Hylas, to act the fame ingenuous Part, and tell me fmcerely whether you can frame a diftinct Idea of Entity in general, prefcinded from and exclufive of all thinking and corporeal Be- ings, all particular things whatfoever. Hyl. Hold, let me think a little I profefs, PhilGnoiiS) I do not find that I can. At firft Glance methought I had fome di- lute and airy Notion of pure Entity in Abilract j but upon clofer Attention it hath S 2 quite i 7 6 The S E C N D quite vanimed out of Sight. The more I think on it, the more am I confirmed in my prudent Refolution of giving none but negative Anfwers, and not pretending to the lead Degree of any pofitive Knowledge or Conception of Matter, its Where, its How, its Entity, or any thing belonging to it. Phil When therefore you fpeak of the Exigence of Matter, you have not any No- tion in your Mind. Hyl. None at all. Phil. Pray tell me if the Cafe ftands not thus: At firft, from a Belief of Material Subftance you would have it that the im- mediate o Obje6ls exifted without the Mind; then that their Archetypes; then Caufes; next Inftruments; then Occafions: Laftly, fomething in general, which being interpre- ted proves nothing. So Matter comes to nothing. What think you, Hylas, is not this a fair Summary of your whole Pro- ceeding? HyL Be that as it will, yet I flill infift upon it, that our not being able to conceive a Thing, is no Argument againft its Ex- iftence. Phil. That from a Caufe, Effect, Ope- ration, Sign, or other Circumftance, there may reafonably be inferred the Exiftence of a Thing not immediately perceived, and that D I A L G U E. 177 that it were abfurd for any Man to argue again ft the Exiftence of that Thing, from his having no direct and pofitive Notion of it, I freely own. But where there is no- thing of all this; where neither Rcafon nor Revelation induce us to believe the Exiftence of a Thing ; where we have not even a relative Notion of it ; where an Abftraction is made from perceiving and being perceived, from Spirit and Idea: Laftly, where there is not fo much as the moft inadequate or faint Idea pretended to : I will not indeed thence conclude againft the Reality of any Notion or Exiftence of any thing: But my Inference mall be, that you mean nothing at all: That you irn- ploy words to no manner of Purpofe, with- out any Defign or Signification whatfoe- ver. And I leave it to you to confider how mere Jargon fhould be treated. HyL To deal frankly with you, Philonous, your Arguments feem in themfelves unan- fwerable, but they have not fo great an Ef- fect on me as to produce that intire Con- viclion, that hearty Acquiefcence which at- tends Demonftrauon. I find myfelf ftill relapfing into an obfcure Surmife of I know not what, Matter. Phil. But are you not fenfible, Hylas, that two Things mtift concur to take away all Scruple, and work a plenary Aflent in S 3 the The SECOND the Mind ? Let a vifible Objeft be fet in ne- ver fo clear a Light, yet if there is any Im- perfe&ion in the Sight, or if the Eye is not directed towards it, it will not be diftindl- ly feen. And though a Demonftration be never To well grounded and fairly propofed, yet if there is withal a Stain of Prejudice, or a wrong Bias on the Underftanding, can it be expected on a fudden to perceive clear- ly and adhere firmly to the Truth ? No, there is need of Time and Pains: The Attention muft be awakened and detained by a frequent Repetition of the fame Thing placed oft in the fame, oft in different Lights. I have faid it already, and find Imuftftill repeat and inculcate, that it is an unaccountable Licence you take in pretend- ing to maintain you know not what, for you know not what Reafon, to you know not what Purpofe ? Can this be paralleled in any Art or Science, any Seft or Profefli- on of Men ? Or is there any thing fo bare- facedly groundlefs and unreafonable to be met with even in the loweft of common Converfation ? But perhaps you will ftill fay, Matter may exift, though at the fame 'time you neither know what is meant by Matter, or by its Extftence. This indeed is furprizing, and the more fo bccaufe it is altogether voluntary, you not being led to it by any one Reafon ; for I challenge you to DIALOGUE. i 75 > to fhew me that Thing in Nature which n ' Matter to explain or account for it. /. The Reality of Things cannot be maintained without fuppoiing the Exiftence of Matter. And is not this, think you, a good Ren Ion why I mould be earneft in its Defence ? Phil The Reality of Things! What Things, fenfible or intelligible ? Hyl. Seniible Things. Phil My Glove, for Example? Hyl. That or any other thing perceived by the Senfes. Phil. But to fix on fome particular thing j is it not a fufficient Evidence to me of the Exiftence of this Gtove, that I fee it, and feel it, and wear it? Or if this will not do, how is it poflible I mould be affured of the Reality of this Thing, which I actually fee in this Place, by fuppofing that fome unknown Thing which I ne- ver did or can fee, exifts after an unknown manner, in an unknown place, or in no place at all ? How can the fuppofed Reali- ty of that which is intangible, be a Proof that any thing tangible really exifts? or of that which is inviiible, that any vifible thing, or in general of any thing which is imperceptible, that a Perceptible exifts ? Do but explain this, and I (hall think no- thing joo hard for you, S 4 The S E C O N D Hyl. Upon the whole, I am content to own the Exiftence of Matter is highly im- probable; but the direct and abfolute Im- poffibility of it does not appear to me. Phil. But granting Matter to be poffible, yet upon that account merely it can have no more Claim to Exigence, than a Gol- den Mountain or a Centaur. Hyl. I acknowledge it; but ftill you do not deny it is poffible; and that which is poffible, for ought you know, may actual- ly exift. Phil. I deny it to be poffible ; And have, if I miftake not, evidently proved from your own Conceffions that it is not. In the common Senfe of the Word Matter^ is there any more implied, than an ex- tended, folid, figured, moveable Sub/lance exifting without the Mind? And have not you acknowledged over and over, that you have feen evident Reafon for denying the Poffibility of fuch a Subftance? Hyl. True, but that is only one Senfe of the Term Matter. Pkil. But is it not the only proper ge- nuine received Senfe? And if Matter in iuch a Senfe be proved impoffible, may it not be thought with good Grounds abib- lutely impoiiible ? Elfe how could any thing be proved impoffible? Or indeed how could there be any Proof at all one way or o- ther, DIALOGUE. then, to a Man who takes the Liberty to unfettle and change the common Signifi- cation of Words? Hyl. I thought Philofophers might he allowed to fpeak more accurately than the Vulgar, and were not always confined to the common Acceptation of a Term. KL But this now mentioned is the common received Senfe among Philofo- phers themfelves. But not to infill: on that, have you not been allowed to take Matter in what Senfe you pleafed ? And have you not ufed this Privilege in the utmoft Ex- tent, fometimes intirely changing, at others leaving out or putting into the Definition of it whatever for the prefent bed ferved your Defign, contrary to all the known Rules of Reafon and Logick ? And haih not this fhifting unfair Method of yours fpun out our Difpute to an unneceiTary Length; Matter having been particularly examined, and by your own Confeffion re- futed in each of thofe Senfes? And cana- ny more be required to prove the abfo- lutelmpofiibility of a Thing, than the prov- ing it impoffible in every particular Senfe, that either you or any one elle understands it in? Hyl. But I am not fo thoroughly fatisfied that you have proved the Impoffibiliiv of Matter i8i The S E C N D Matter in the laft moft obfcure abftrad.- ed and indefinite Senfe. Phil. When is a thing {hewn to be im- poflible? Hyl. When a Repugnancy is dcmonttra- ted between the Ideas comprehended in its Definition. Phil. But where there are no Ideas, there no Repugnancy can be demonflrated be- tween Ideas. Hyl. I agree with you. Phil. Now in that which you call the obfcure indefinite Senfe of the Word Mat- ter ', it is plain, by your own Confeffion, there was included no Idea at all, no Senfe except an unknown Senfe, which is the fame thing as none. You are not therefore to expedt 1 mould prove a Repugnancy be- tween Ideas where there are no Ideas ; or the Impoflibility of Matter taken in an un- known Senfe, that is no Senfe at all. My bufinefs was only to (hew, you meant no- thing ; and this you were brought to own. So that in all your various Senfes, you have been fhewed either to mean nothing at all, or if any thing, an Abiurdity. And if this be not fufficient to prove the Impoffibility of a Thing, I defire you will let me know what is. Hyl. I acknowledge you have proved that Matter is impoffible; nor do I fee what more more can be faid in defence of it. But at the fame time that I give up this, I fuf- pect all my other Notions. For furely none could be more feemingly evident than this once was : And yet it now feems as falfe and abfurd as ever it did true before. But I think we have difcuifed the Point fuffici- ently for the prefcnt. The remaining Part of the Day I would willingly fpend, in run- ning over in my Thoughts the fevcral Heads of this Morning's Converfation, and to Morrow (hall be glad to meet you here again about the fame time. Phil. I will not fail to attend you. THE THIRD DIALOGUE. PHILONOUS. J/f&Si gp*==J||| tion ? Hath it confirmed you in tSyi&*Sly c ^ e ^ ame Mind you were in at parting ? or have you flnce feen Caufe to change your Opinion ? HyL Truly my Opinion is, that all our Opinions are alike vain and uncertain. What we appove to day, we condemn to morrow. We keep a Stirabout Knowledge, and fpend our Lives in the Purfuit of it, when, alas! we know nothing all the while: nor do 1 think it poffible for us ever to know any thing in this Life. Our Faculties are too narrow DIALOGUE. 185 narrow and too few. Nature certainly never intended us for Speculation. Phil. What ! fay you we can know no- thing, Hylas? Hyl. There is not that fingle thing in the World, whereof we can know the real Na- ture, or what it is in itfelf. Phil. Will you tell me I do not really know what Fire or Water is? Hyl. You may indeed know that Fire appears hot, and Water fluid: But this is no more than knowing what Senfations are produced in your own Mind, upon the Application of Fire and Water to your Or- gans of Senfe. Their internal Conftitution, their true and real Nature, you are utterly in the dark as to that. Phil. Do I not know this to be a real Stone that I (land on, and that which I fee before my Eyes to be a real Tree ? Hyl. Know? No, it is impomble you or any iVIan alive mould know it. All you know, is, that you have fuch a certaift Idea or Appearance in your own Mind. But what is this to the real Tree or Stone ? I tell you, that Colour, Figure, and Hard- nefs, which you perceive, are not the real Natures of thofe Things, or in the leafl like them. The fame may be faid of all other real Things or corporeal Subftances which compofe the World. They have none 286 The THIRD none of them any thing in themfclves, like thofe fenfible Qualities by us perceived. We mould not therefore pretend to affirm or know any thing of them, as they are in their own Nature. Thil. But furely, Hylas, I can diftinguifh Gold, for Example, from Iron : And how could, this be if I knew not what either truly was ? HyL Believe me, f PbiIonous, you can only diftinguilh between your own Ideas. That Yellownefs, that Weight, and other fenfible Qualities, think you they are really in the Gold ? They are only relative to the Senfes, and have no abfolute Existence in Nature. And in pretending to diftinguifh the Species of real Things, by the Appearances in your Mind, you may perhaps act as wifely as he that mould conclude two Men were of a different Species, becaufe their Clothes were not of the fame Colour. Phil. It feems then we are altogether put off with the Appearances of Things, and thofe falfe ones too. The very Meat I eat, and the Cloth I wear, have nothing in them like what I fee and feel. HyL Even fo. *Pbtl. But is it not ftrange the whole World mould be thus impoled on, and fo foohfli as to believe their Senfes ? And yet I know not how it is, but Men eat, and drink, DIALOGUE. 187 drink, and deep, and perform all the Of- fices of Life as comfortably and conveni- ently, as if they really knew the Things they are converfant about. Hyl. They do fo: But you know ordi- nary Practice does not require a Nicety of fpeculative Knowledge. Hence the Vulgar retain their Miftakes, and for all that, make a Shift to buftle through the Affairs of Life. But Philofophers know better things. Phil. You mean, they know that they know nothing. Hyl. That is the very Top and Perfecti- on of Humane Knowledge. Phil. But are you all this while in car- neft, Hylas-, and are you ferioufly perfua- ded that you know nothing real in the World? Suppofe you are going to write, would you not call for Pen, Ink, and Paper, like another Man ; and do you not know what it is you call for ? Hyl. How often muft I tell you,_that I know not the real Nature of any one thing in the Univerfe? I may indeed upon Oc- cafion make ufe of Pen, Ink, and Paper. But what any one of them is in its own true Nature, I declare pofitively I know nor. And the fame is true with regard to every other corporeal thing. And, what is more, we are not only ignorant of the true and real 188 The THIRD real Nature of Things, but even of their Exiftence. It cannot be denied that we perceive fuch certain Appearances or Ideas ; but it cannot be concluded from thence that Bodies really exift. Nay, now I think on It, I muft agreeably to my former Con- ceffions farther declare, that it is impoffible any real corporeal Thing mould exift in Nature. Phil. You amaze me. Was ever any thing more wild and extravagant than the Notions you now maintain : And is it not evident you are led into all thefe Extrava- gancies by the Belief of material Subftance ? This makes you dream of thofe unknown Natures in every thing. It is this occafions your diftinguiming between the Reality and fenfible Appearances of Things. It is to this you are indebted for being ignorant of what every Body elfe knows perfectly well. Nor is this all : You are not only ignorant of the true Nature of every Thing, but you know not whether any thing really exifts, or whether there are any true Na- tures at all ; forafmuch as you attribute to your material Beings an abfolute or exter- nal Exiftence, wherein you fuppofe their Reality confifts. And as you are forced in the end to acknowledge fuch an Exiftence means either a direct Repugnancy, or no- thing at all, it follows that you are obliged to DIALOGUE. to pull down your own Hypothecs of , material Subftance, and pofltively to deny the real Exiftence of any Part of the Univerfe. And fo you are plunged into the deepeft and mofl deplorable Seep-, ticlfm that ever Man was, Tell me, Hy- las, is it not as I fay ? Hyi. I agree with you. Material Sub- flanee was no more than an tfypothefis, and a falfe and groundlefs one too. I will no longer fpend my Breath in defence of it. But whatever Hypothefis you advance, or whatsoever Scheme of Things you in- troduce in its ftead, I doubt not it will appear every whit as falfe : Let me but be allowed to queftion you upon it. That is, fuffer me to ferve you in your own kind, and I warrant it {hall conduct you through as many Perplexities and Contra- dictions, to the very fame State of Seep-. ticifm that I my felf am in at prefent. Phil. I aflure you, Hy/as, I do not pre- tend to frame any Hypothefis at all. I am of a vulgar Caft, limple enough to believe my Senfes, and leave Things as I find them. To be plain, it is my Opinion, that the real Things are thole very Things I fee and feel, and perceive by my Senfes. Thefe I know, and rind- ing they anfwer all the NecerTities and Purpofes of Life, have no reafon to be T felicitous i5>o The THIRD. felicitous about any other unknown Be- ings. A Piece of fenfible Bread, for In- ftance, would ftay my Stomach better than ten thoufand times as much of that infenfi - ble, unintelligible, real Bread you fpeak of. It is likewife my Opinion, that Colours and other fenfible Qualities are on the Objects. I cannot for my Life help think- ing that Snow is white, and Fire hot. You indeed, who by Snow and Fire mean cer- tain external, unperceived, unperceiving Subftances, are in the right to deny White- nefs or Heat to be Affections inherent in them. But I, who underftand by thofe Words the Things I fee and feel, am obliged to think like other Folks. And as I am no Sceptic with regard to the Nature of Things, fo neither am I as to their Exiftence. That a thing mould be. really perceived by my Senfes, and at the fame time not really exift, is to me a plain Contradiction ; fince I cannot pre- fcind or abftracl:, even in Thought, the Exiflence of a fenfible Thing from its being perceived. Wood, Stones, Fire, Water, Flefh, Iron, and the like Things, which I name and difcourfe of, are Things that I know. And I mould not have known them, but that I perceived them by my Senfes; and Things perceived by the Sen- fes are immediately perceived ; and Things immediately DIALOGUE. 2<>i immediately perceived are Ideas ; and I- deas cannot exift without the Mind; their Exiftence therefore confifts in being per- ceived j when therefore they are actually perceived, there can be no doubt of their Exiftence. Away then with all that Scep- ticifm, all thofe ridiculous philofophical Doubts. What a Jeft is it for a Philo- fopher to queftion the Exiftence of fenfi- ble Things, till he hath it proved to him from the Veracity of God : Or to pre- tend our Knowledge in this Point falls fhort of Intuition or Demonftration ? I might as well doubt of my own Being, as of the Being of thofe Things I actu- ally fee and feel. Hyl. Not fo faft, Pbilonoiis: you fay you cannot conceive how fenfible Things Ihould exift without the Mind. Do you not ? Phil. I do. Hyl. Suppofmg you were annihilated, cannot you conceive it poffibie, that Things perceivable by Senfe may ft ill exift? Phil. I can j but then it muft be in another mind. When I denv iendble Things an Exiftence out of the Mind, I do not mean my Mind in particular, but all Minds. Now it is plain they have an Exiftence exterior to my Mind, fince I T 2 find the THIRD. find them by Experience to be indepen- dent of it. There is therefore fome other Mind wherein they exift, during the In- tervals between the Times of my perceiv- ing them : As likewife they did before my Birth, and would do after my fuppofed Annihilation. And as the fame is true, with regard to all other finite created Spirits; it necefTarily follows, there is an Omniprejent Eternal Mind, which knows and comprehends all things, and exhibits them to our View in fuch a manner, and according to fuch Rules as He Himfelf hath ordained, and are by us termed the Laws of Nature. Hyl. Anfwer me, Philonous. Are all our Ideas perfectly inert Beings ? Or have they any Agency included in them ? Phil. They are altogether paffive and inert. Hyl. And is not God an Agent, a Be- ing purely adtive? Phil. I acknowledge it. HyL No Idea therefore can be like un- to, or rcprefent the Nature of God. Phil. It cannot. HyL Since therefore you have no Idea of the Mind of God, how can you con- ceive it pofiible, that things fhould exift in his Mind? Or, if you can conceive the Mind of God without having an Idea of DIALOGUE. it, why may not I be allowed to conceive the Exigence of Matter, notwithftanding that I have no Idea of it? Phil As to your firft Qneftion ; I own I have properly no Idea, either of God or any other Spirit; for thefe being aftive, cannot be reprefented by things perfectly inert, as our Ideas are. I do neverche- lefs know, that I who am a Spirit or thinking Subftance, exift as certainly, as I know^my Ideas exift. Farther, I know what I mean by the Terms / and My- Jiff-, and I know this immediately, or intuitively, though I do not perceive it as I perceive a Triangle, a Colour, or a Sound. The Mind, Spirit or Soul, is that indivifible unexiended Thing, which thin,ks, adts, and perceives. I fay indi- ixjiblc, becaufe unextended; and unexfen- ded, becaufe extended, figured, moveable Things, are Ideas; and that which per- ceives Ideas, which thinks and wills, is plainly it felf no Idea, nor like an Idea. Ideas are Things inactive, and perceived: And Spirits a fort of Beings .altogether different from them. I do not therefore jay my Soul is an Idea, or like an Idea. However, taking the Word Idea in a large Senfe, my Soul may be faid to furnim me with an Idea, that is, an Image, or Like- nefs of God, though indeed extremely in- T 3 adequate. THIRD adequate. For all the Notion I have of God, is obtained by reflecting on my own Soul heightning its Powers, and removing its Imperfections. I have therefore, though not an inactive Idea, yet in my felf fome fort of an active thinking Image of the Deity. And though I perceive Him not by Senfe, yet I have a Notion of Him, or know Him by Reflexion and Reafon- ing. My own Mind and my own Ideas I have an immediate Knowledge of; and by the help of thefe, do mediate- ly apprehend the Poffibility of the Exif- tence of other Spirits and Ideas. Farther, from my own Being, and from the De- pendency I find in my felf and my Ideas, I do by an Act of Reafon, necefTarily in- fer the Exiftence of a God, and of all created Things in the Mind of God. So much for your firfl Queftion. For the fecond : I fuppofe by this time you can anfwer it your felf. For you neither per- ceive Matter objectively, as you do an inac- tive Being or Idea, nor know it, as you do your felf by a reflex Act: Neither do you mediately apprehend it by Similitude of the one or the other : Nor yet collect it by Reafon ing from that which you know immediately. All which makes the Cafe of A$atter widely different from that , of the Dtity. Hyl. DIALOGUE. 25>5 HyL You fay your own Soul fupplies you with fome fort of an Idea or Image of God. But at the fame time you ac- knowledge you have, properly fpeaking, no Idea of your own Soul. You even af- firm that Spirits are a fort of Beings al- together different from Ideas. Confequent- ly that no Idea can be like a Spirit. We have therefore no Idea of any Spirit. You admit neverthelefs that there is fpirhual Subftance, although you have no Idea of it ; while you deny there can be fuch a thing as material Subftance, becaufe you have no Notion or Idea of it. Is this fair Dealing? To adt confiftently, you muft either admit Matter or reject Spirit. What fay you, to this? Pbik I fay in the firft place, that I do not deny the Exiftence of material Sub- ftance, merely becaufe I have no Notion of it, but becaufe the Notion of it is in- continent, or in other words, becaufe it is repugnant that there fhould be a Notion, of it. Many things, for ought I know, may exift, whereof neither I nor any other Man hath or can have any Idea or Noti- on whatfoever. But then thofe things muft be poffiblc, that is, nothing incon- fiftenr. muft be included in their Definiti- on. I fay fecondly, that although we be- lieve things to exift which we do not per- ceive ; yet we may not believe that any T 4 particular ?bt THIRD. particular thing exifts, without fome rea- fon for fiich Belief: But I have no rea- fon for believing the Exiftence of Matter. J have no immediate Intuition thereof: neither can I mediately from my Senfati- ons, Ideas, Notions, Actions or Paffions, infer an unthinking, unperceiving, inactive Subftancc, either by probable Deduction, or neceflary Confequence. Whereas the Being of my felf, that is, my own Soul, Mind or thinking Principle, I evidently know "by Reflexion. You will forgive me if I repeat the fame things in anfwer to the fame Objections. In the very Notion or Definition of material Subftance, there is included a manifeft Repugnance and InconiTftency. But this cannot be faid of the Notion of Spirit. That Ideas fhould exift in what doth not perceive, or be produced by what doth not act, is repug- nant. But it is no Repugnancy to fay, that a perceiving Thing mould be the Subject of Ideas, or an active Thing the Caufe of them. It is granted we have nei- ther an immediate Evidence nor a demon- flrative Knowledge of the Exiftence of o- ther finite Spirits j but it will not thence follow that fuch Spirits are on a foot with material Subftances : if to fuppofe the one be inconfiftent, and it be not inconfiftent ;o fuppofe the other -, if the one can be in- ferred DIALOGUE. ferred by no Argument, and there is a Probability for the other; if we fee Signs and Effects indicating diftincl: finite Agents like our felves, and fee no Sign or Symp- tom whatever that leads to a rational Be- lief of Matter. I fay laftly, that I have a Notion of Spirit, though 1 have not, ftrictly fpeaking, an Idea of it. I do not perceive it as an Idea or by Means of an Idea, but know it by Reflexion. Hyl. Notwithftanding all you have fai<3, to me it feems, that according to your own way of thinking, and in confequence of your own Principles, it mould follow that you are only a Syftem of floating Ideas, without any Subftance to fupport them. Words are not to be ufed with- out a meaning. And as there is no more Meaning in fpiritual Subftance than in material Subftance, the one is to be ex- ploded as well as the other. Phil. How often muft I repeat, 'that I know or am confcious of my own Be- ing; and that I my felf am not my I- deas, but fomewhat -elfe, a thinking active Principle chat perceives, knows, wills, and operates about 'Ideas. I know that J, one and the fame felf, .perceive both Colours and Sounds : that a Colour cannot per- ceive a Sound, nor a Sound a Colour : Thac I am therefore one individual Prin- ciple, The T H I R D ciple, diftincl: from Colour and Sound ; and, for the fame reafon, from all other fenfible things and inert Ideas. But I am not in like manner confcious either of the Exiftence or Effence of Matter. On the contrary I know that nothing inconfiftent can cxift, and that the Exiftence of Mat- ter implies an Inconfiftency. Farther, I know what I mean, when I affirm that there is a fpiritual Subftance or Support of Ideas, that is, That a Spirit knows and perceives Ideas. But I do not know what is meant, when it is faid, that an unper- ceiving Subftance hath inherent in it and fupports either Ideas or the Archetypes of Ideas. There is therefore upon the whole no parity of cafe between Spirit and Mat- ter. Hyl. I own my felf fatisfied in this point. But do you in earneft think, the real Exif- tence of fenfible things confifts in their being actually perceived ? If fo ; How comes it that all Mankind diftinguifh be- tween them ? Ask the firft Man you meet, and he mall tell you, to be perceived is one thing, and to exijl is another. Phil. I am content, Hylas, to appeal to the common Senfe of the World for the Truth of my Notion. Ask the Gardiner, why he thinks yonder Cherry-Tree exifts in the Garden, and he lhall tell you, be- caufe DIALOGUE. caufe he fees and feels it 3 in a word, be- caufe he perceives it by h's Senfes. Ask him, why he thinks an Orange-Tree not to be there, and he lhall tell you, becaufe he does not perceive it. What he per- ceives by Senfe, that he terms a- real Be- ing, and faith it is, or exifts ; but that which is not perceivable, the fame, he faith, hath no Being. Hyl. Yes, Pbilonous^ I grant the Exif- tence of a fenfible thing confifts in be- ing perceivable, but not in being actually perceived. Phil. And what is perceivable but an Idea ? And can an Idea exift without being actually perceived ? Thefe are Points long iince agreed between us. Hyl. But be your opinion never fo true, yet furely you will not deny it is Shocking, and contrary to the common Senfe of Men. Ask the Fellow, whether yonder Tree hath an Exigence out of his Mind : What An- fwer think you he would make ? Phil The fame that I (hould my felf, to wit, That it doth exift out of his Mind. But then to a Chriflian it cannot furely be ihocking to fay, The real Tree exift- ing without his Mind is truly known and comprehended by (that is, exifts in) the in- finite Mind of God. Probably he may not at nrft glance be aware of the direct and The T H I R D and immediate Proof there is of this, in- afmuch as the very Being of a Tree, or any other fenfibie Thing, implies a Mind wherein it is. But the Point it ielf he can- not deny. The Queftion between the Ma- terialifts and me is not, whether Things h.ave a real Exigence out of the Mind of this or that Peribn, but whecher chey have an abfolute Existence, diftinct from being perceived by God, and exterior to all Minds. This indeed fome Heathens and Philofophers have affirmed, -but whoever entertains Notions of the Deity fuicahle to the Holy Scriptures, will be of another Opinion. Hyl. Bat according to your Notions, what Difference is there between real Things, and Chimeras formed by the Ima- gination, or the Viiions.of a Dream, fince they are all equally in the Mind ? Phil. The Ideas formed by the Imagi- nation are faint and indiftinthing of their real Natures, though we both fee and feel them, and perceive them by all our Senfes ? Hyl. And in Confequence of this, muft we not think there are no fuch Things as Phyfical or Corporeal Caufes ; but that a Spirit is the immediate Caufe of all the Phenomena in Nature ? Can there be any thing more extravagant than this ? Phil. Yes, it is infinitely more extrava- gant to fay, A thing which is inert, ope- rates on the Mind, and which is unper- ceiving, is the Caufe of our Perceptions. Befides, that which* to you, I know not for what Reafon, feems fo extravagant, is no more than the Holy Scriptures aiTert in a hundred Places. In them God is repre- fented as the fole and immediate Author of all thofe Effects, which fome Heathens and Philofophers are wont to afcribe to Nature, Matter, Fate, or the like unthink- ing DIALOGUE. 503 ing Principle. This is fo much the con- ftant Language of Scripture, that it were needlefs to confirm it by Citations. Hyl. You are not aware, Pbilonous, that in making God the immediate Author of all the Motions in Nature, you make him the Author of Murder, Sacrilege, Adultery, and the like heinous Sins. Phil. In Anfwer to that, I ohferve firft, that the Imputation of Guilt is the fame, whether a Perfon commits an Action with or without an Inftrument. In cafe there- fore you fuppofe God to act by the Medi- ation of an Inftrument, or Occafion, called Matter, you as truly make Him the Au- thor of Sin as I, who think Him the im- mediate Agent in all thofe Operations vulgarly afcribed to Nature. I farther ob- ferve, that Sin or moral Turpitude doth not confift in the outward Phyfical Action or Motion, but in the internal Deviation of the Will from the Laws of Reafon and Religion. This is plain, in that the killing an Enemy in a Battle, or ptitting a Criminal legally to Death, is not thought finful, though the outward Act be the very fame with that in the Cafe of Murder. Since therefore Sin doth not confift in the Phy- fical Action, the making God an imme- diate Caufe of all fuch Actions, is not making him the Author of Sin. Laftly, I 304 * THIRD I have no where faid that God is the only Agent who produces all the Motions in Bo- dies. It is true, I have denied there are any other Agents befide Spirits: But this is very confiftent with allowing to Thinking Rational Beings, in the Production of Mo- tions, the Ufe of limited Powers, ulti- mately indeed derived from God, but im- mediately under the Direction of their own Wills, which is fufficient to intitle them to all the Guilt of their Actions. Hyi But the denying Matter, Pbihnoiis, or corporeal Subftance; there is the Point. You can never perfuade me that this is not repugnant to the univerfal Senfe of Man- kind. Were our Difpute to be determined by moft Voices, I am confident you would give up the Point, without gathering the Votes fbil. I wifli both our Opinions were fairly ftated and fubmitted to the Judg- ment of Men who had plain common .Senfe, without the Prejudices of a learned Education. Let me be reprefented as one who trufts his Senfes, who thinks he knows the Things he fees and feels, and entertains no Doubts, of their Exiftencej and you fair- Jy fet forth with all your Doubts, your Pa- radoxes, and your Scepticifm about you, and I (hall willingly acquiefce in the De- termination of any indifferent Perfon. That there DIALOGUE. 305 there is no Subftance wherein Ideas can exift befide Spirit, is to me evident. And that the Objects immediately perceived are Ideas, is on all Hands agreed. And that fenfible Qualities are Objects immediately perceived, no one can deny. It is there- fore evident there can be no Subftratum of thofe Qualities but Spirit, in which they exift, not by way of Mode or Property, but as a thing perceived in that which perceives it. I deny therefore that there is any un- thinking Subjlratum of the Objedlsof Senfe, and in that Acceptation that there is any material Subflance. But if by material Sub- fiance is meant only fenfible Body, that which is feen and felt, (and the unphilofo- phical Part of the World, I dare fay, mean no more) then I am more certain of Mat- ter's Exiftence than you, or any other Phi- lofopher, pretend to be. If there be any thing which makes the Generality of Man- kind averfe from the Notions I efpoufe, it is a Mifapprehenfion that I deny the Reali- ty of fenfible Things : But as it is you who are guilty of that and not I, it follows that in truth their Averfion is againft your No- tions, and not mine. I do therefore aflert that I am as certain as of my own Being, that there are Bodies or corporeal Sub- ftances, (meaning the Things I perceive by my Senfes) and that granting this, the U Bulk The THIRD Bulk of Mankind will take no Though) about, nor think themfelves at all concern- ed in the Fate of thofe unknown Natures and Philofophical Quiddities, which fom( Men are fo fond of. HyL What fay you to this? Since, ac- cording to you, Men judge of the Realit) of Things by their Senfes, how can a Mar be miftakcn in thinking the Moon a plair lucid Surface, about a Foot in Diameter or a fquare Tower, feen at a diftance round j or an Oar, with one End in the Water, crooked? Phil. He is not miftaken with regard t< the Ideas he actually perceives; but in the Inferences he makes from his prefent Per- ceptions. Thus in the Cafe of the Oar what he immediately perceives by Sight i< certainly crooked; and fo far he is in the right. But if he thence conclude, that up- on taking the Oar out of the Water h( {hall perceive the fame Crookednefs; 01 that it would affect his Touch, as crook- ed things are wont to do : In that he ii miftaken. In like mannner, if he mall conclude from what he perceives in on< Station, that in cafe he advances towarc the Moon or Tower, he mould ftill b< affected with the like Ideas, he is miftaken But his Miftake lies not in what he per- ceives immediately and at prefent, (it being DIALOGUE. 307 a manifcft Contradiction to fuppofe he mould err in refpeft of that) but in the wrong Judgment he makes concerning the Ideas he apprehends to be connected with thofe immediately perceived: Or concern- ing the Ideas that, from what he perceives at prefent, he imagines would be perceived in other Circumftances. The Cafe is the fame with regard to the Coperniean Syftem* We do not here perceive any Motion of the Earth: But it were erroneous thence to conclude, that in cafe we were placed at as great a Diftance from that, as we are now from the other Planets, we mould not then perceive its Motion. HyL I underftand youj and muft needs own you fay things plaufible enough: But give me leave to put you in mind of one thing. Pray, Philonous, were you not for- merly as pofitive that Matter exiiled, as you are now that it does not ? Phil. I was. But here lies the Diffe- rence. Before, my Pofitivenefs was found- ed without Examination, upon Prejudice; but now, after Inquiry, upon Evidence. HyL After all, it feems our Difputc is rather about Words than Things. We a- gree in the Thing, but differ in the Name. That we are affedted with Ideas from with- out is evident; and it is no leis evident, that there muft be (I will not fay Arche- U 2 types, 3 o8 The T H I R D types, but) Powers without the Mind, cor- refponding to thofe Ideas. And as thefe Powers cannot fubfift by themfelves, there is fome Subject of them neceffarily to be admitted, which I call Matter, and you call Spirit. This is all the Diffe- rence. Phil Pray, Hy/as, is that powerful Be- ing, or Subject of Powers, extended? Hyl. It hath not Extenfion; but it hath the Power to raife in you the Idea of Ex- tenfion. Phil. It is therefore itfelf unextended. Hyl. I grant it. Phil. Is it not alfo active ? Hyl. Without doubt: Otherwife, how could we attribute Powers to it? fhil. Now let me ask you Two Que- ftions: Firft> Whether it be agreeable to the Ufage either of Philofophers or others, to give the Name Matter to an unextend- ed active Being? And Secondly, Whether it be not ridiculoufly abfurd to mifapply Names contrary to the common Ufe of Language ? Hyl. Well then, let it not be called Mat- ter, fince you will have it fo, but fome Third Nature diftinct from Matter and Spirit. For, what reafon is there why you fliould call it Spirit ? does not the Notion DIALOGUE. 3 op of Spirit imply, that it is thinking as well as active and unextended? Phil. My Rcafon is this : becaufe I have a mind to have fome Notion or Meaning in what I fay ; but I have no Notion of any Action diftinct from Volition, neither can I conceive Volition to be any where but in a Spirit: therefore when I fpeak of an active Being, I am obliged to mean a Spirit. Betide, what can be plainer than that a thing which hath no Ideas in it- felf, cannot impart them to me; and if it hath Ideas, furely it mufl be a Spirit. To make you comprehend the Point ftill more clearly if it be poffible: I affert as well as you, that fince we are affected from without, we muft allow Powers to be with- out in a Being diftinct from ourfelves. So far we are agreed. But then we differ as to the Kind of this powerful Being. I will have it to be Spirit, you Matter, or I know not what (I may add too, you know not what) Third Nature. Thus I prove it to be Spirit. From the Effects I fee pro- duced, I conclude there are Actions; and becaufe Actions, Volitions; and becaufe there are Volitions, there mult be a Will. Again, the Things I perceive mufl have an Exiftence, they or their Archetypes, out of my Mind: But being Ideas, nei- ther they nor their Archetypes can exift U 3 other wife 3io The T H I R D otherwife than in an Underftanding: There is therefore an Underftanding. But Will and Underftanding conftitute in the ftrict- cft Sei.fe a Mind or Sp : rit. The power- ful Cau't therLf.?re of my Ideas, is in ftrict Propriety of Speech a Spirit. HyL And now I warrant you think you have made the Point very clear, little fuf- pecting that what you advance leads di- rectly to a Contradiction. Is it not an Ab- furdity to imagine any Imperfection in God? Phil. Without douht. HyL To fuffcr Pain is an Imperfection. Phil- his. Hyl. Are we not fometimes affected with Pain and Uneafinefs by fome other Being ? Phil. We are. HyL And huve you not faid that Being is a Spirit, and is not that Spirit God ? Phil I grant it. HyL But you have afferted, that what- ever Ideas we perceive from without, are in the Mind which affects us. The Ideas threfore of Pain and Uneafinefs are in God j or in other words, God fuffers Pain : That is to fay, there is an Imperfection in the Divine Nature, which you acknowledged was ablurd. So you are caught in a plain Contradiction. Phil. DIALOGUE. 3 PbiL That God knows or underftands all things, and that He knows among other things what Pain is, even every fort of painful Senfation, and what it is for His Creatures to fufFerPain, I make no que- ftion. But that God, though He knows and fome ; do you in other Cafes, when a Point is once evidently proved, withhold your Aflent on account of Ob- jections or Difficulties it may be liable to ? Are the Difficulties that attend the Doctrine of incommeniurable Quantities, of the An- gle of Contact, of the Afymptotes to Curves or the like, fufficient to make you hold out againft Mathematical Demonftra- tion ? Or will you disbelieve the Provi- dence of God, becaufe there may be fome particular things which you know not how to reconcile with it ? If there arc Diffi- culties attending Immaterialifm, there are at the fame time direct and evident Proofs for it. But for the Exiftence of Matter, there is not one Proof, and far more nu- merous and infurmountable Objections lie againft it. But where are thole mighty Difficulties you infift on? Alas! you know - not where or what they are; fomething which may poflibly occur hereafter. If this be DIALOGUE. be a fufficient Pretence for withholding your full AfTent, you mould never yield it to any Propofition, how free foever from Excep- tions, how clearly and folidly foever de- monftrated. Hyl. You have fatisfied me, Philonous. Phil. But to arm you againft all future Objections, do but confider, That which bears equally hard on two contradictory Opinions, can be a Proof againft neither. Whenever therefore any Difficulty occurs, try if you can find a Solution for it on the Hypothefis of the Materialifts. Be not de- ceived by Words ; but found your own Thoughts. And in cafe you cannot con- ceive it eafier by the help of Materialifm y it is plain it can be no Objection againft Im- materiallfm. Had you proceeded all along by this Rule, you would probably have fpared yourfelf abundance of trouble in ob- jecting ; fince of all your Difficulties I chal- lenge you to (hew one that is explained by Matter ; nay, which is not more unintel- ligible with, than without that Suppofition, and confequently makes rather againft than for it. You fhould confider in each Parti- cular, whether the Difficulty arifes from the Ncn-exijience of Matter. If it doth not, you might as well argue from the infinite Divifibility of Exteniion againft the Divine PrefcUnce, as from fuch a Difficulty againft 3 jo The T H I R D ImmateriaUfm. And yet upon Recollection \ believe you will find this to have been of- ten, if not always the Cafe. You fhould Hkewife take heed not to argue on a petitio Principii. One is apt to fay, The unknown Subftances ought to beefteemed real Things, rather than the Ideas in our Minds : And who can tell but the unthinking external Subftance may concur as a Caufe or Inftru- ment w the Production of our Ideas ? But ;s net this proceeding on a Suppofition that there are fuch external Subftances ? And to fuppofe this, is it not begging the Queftion ? But above all things you mould beware of impofing on your felf by that vulgar Sophifm, which is called Ignoratio Elenchi. You talked often as. if you thought I naaintained the Non-exiftence of fenfible Things : Whereas in truth no one can be more thorowly allured of their Exiftence than I am : And it is you who doubt ; I flaould have faid, pofitively deny it. Every thing that is feen, felt, heard, or any way perceived by the Senfes, is on the Principles I embrace, a real Being, but not on yours. Remember, the Matter you contend for is an unknown fomewhat, (if indeed it may be termed fomewhat) which is quite ftrip- ped of all feniible Qualities, and can neither be perceived by Senle, nor apprehended by the Mind. Remember, I fay, that it is not any DIALOGUE. ' any Object which is hard or fofr, hot or cold, blue or white, round or fqnare, Gfr. For all thefe things 1 affirm do exift. Though indeed I deny they have an Exif- tence diftindt from being perceived ; or that they exift out of all Minds whatfoever. Think on thefe Points ; let them be attentive- ly confidered and ftill kept in view. Other- wife you will not comprehend the State of the Queftion j without which your Ob- jections will always be wide of the Mark, and inftead of mine, may poffibly be direc- ted (as more than once they have been) againft your own Notions. Hyl. I muft needs own, Philonous, QO- thing feems to have kept me from agree- ing with you more than this fame mif- taking the Queftion. In denying Matter, at firft glimple I am tempted to imagine you deny the things we fee and feel -, but upon Reflexion find there is no Ground for it. What think you therefore of retaining the Name Matter, and applying it to fenfible Things ? This may be done without any Change in your Sentiments : And believe me it would be a Means of reconciling them, to fome Perfons, who may be more {hock- ed at an Innovation in Words than ia Opinion. Phil. With all my heart : Retain the Word Matter, and apply it to the Objc&R of 35 * The THIRD of Senfe, if you plcafe, provided you do not attribute to them any Subfiftence diftincl: from their being perceived. I {hall never quarrel with you for an Expreffion. Mat- ter, or material Subftance, are Terms intro- duced by Philofophers ; and as ufed by them, imply a fort of Independency, or a Subfiftence diftinct from being perceived by a Mind : But are never ufed by com- mon People ; or if ever, it is to fignifythc immediate Objects of Senfe. One would think therefore, folong as the Names of all particular Things, with the Termsfenjib/e, Subftance, Body, Stuff, and the like, are re- tained, the Word Matter mould be never miffed in common Talk. And in Philofo- phical Difcourfes it feems the beft way to leave it quite out ; fmce. there is not per- haps any one thing that hath more favou- red and ftrcngthned the depraved Bent of the Mind toward Atheifm, than the Ufe of that general confufed Term. Hyl. Well but, Philonous, fmce I am content to give up the Notion of an un- thinking Subftance exterior to the Mind, I think you ought not to deny me the Pri- vilege of ufing the Word Matter as I pleafe, and annexing it to a Collection of fenfible Qualities fubiifting only in the Mind. I freely own there is no other Subftance in a ftrid Senfe, than Spirit. But I have been DIALOGUE. 353 been fo long accuftomed to the Term Mat- ter, that I know not how to part with it. To fay, There is no Matter in the World, is Hill {hocking to me. Whereas to fay, There is no Matter, if by that Term be meant an unthinking Subftance exifting without the Mind: But if by Matter is meant fome fenfible Thing, whofe Exift- ence confifts in being perceived, then there is Matter: This Diftinction gives it quite another Turn : And Men will come into your Notions with fmall Difficulty, when they are propofed in that manner. For after all, the Controverfy about Matter in the Ariel: Acceptation of it, lies altogether between you and the Philofophers ; whofe Principles, I acknowledge, are not near fo natural, or fo agreeable to the common Senfe of Mankind, and Holy Scripture, as yours. There is nothing we either defire or fhun, but as it makes, or is apprehend- ed to make fome Part of our Happinefs or Mifery. But what hath Happinefs or Mi- fery, Joy or Grief, Pleafure or Pain, to do with abfolute Exiftence, or with unknown Entities, abftra&ed from all Relation to us ? It is evident, Things regard us only as they are pleating or difpleafmg : And they can plcafe or difpleafe, only fo far forth as they are perceived. Farther there- fore we are not concerned j and thus far Z you 354 The T H I R D you leave things as you found them. Yet ftill there is fomething new in this Doc- trine. It is p4ain, I do not now think with the Philofophers, nor yet altogether with the Vulgar. I would know how the Cafe f|ands in that refpecl:: Precifely, what you have added to, or altered in my for- mer Notions. Phil. I do not pretend to be a Setter- up of New Notions. My Endeavours tend only to unite and place in a clearer Light that Truth, which was before (hared be- tween the Vulgar and the Philofophers: The former being of Opinion, that thoj'e Things they immediately perceive are the real f f kings; and the latter, that the Things immediately perceived,, are Ideas 'which ex- ijl only in the Mind. Which Two Noti- ons put together, do in effect conftitute the Subftance of what I advance. Hyl. I have been a long time diftruft- ing my Senfesj methought I faw things by a dim Light, and through falfe piaffes. Now the Glaffes are removed, and a new JLight breaks in upon my Understanding. I am clearly, convinced that I fee things in their native Forms j and am no longer in Pain about their unknown Natures or abfolute Exigence. This is the State I find my felf in at prefent: Though in- deed the Courfe that brought me to it, I do do not yet thorowly comprehend. You fet out upon the fame Principles that Aca- demicks, Cartefians y and the like Seels, ufually do; and for a longtime it looked as if you were advancing their Philofophi- cal Scepticifm-, but in the End your Con- clufions are directly oppofite to theirs. Phil. You fee, Hylas, the Water of yon- der Fountain, how it is forced upwards, in a round Column, to a certain Height; at which it breaks and falls back into the Bafon from whence it rofe: Its Afccnt as well as Defcent, proceeding from the fame uniform Law or Principle of Gravitation. Juft fo, the fame Principles which at firfl View lead to Scepticifm, purfued to a cer- tain Point, bring Men back to common Senfe. FINIS, University of California SOUTHERN REGIONAL LIBRARY FACILITY 405 Hilgard Avenue, Los Angeles, CA 90024-1388 Return this material to the library from which it was borrowed.