THE LIBRARY 
 
 OF 
 
 THE UNIVERSITY 
 OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 LOS ANGELES

 
 
 
 i-
 
 A N /T6& 
 
 ESSAY 
 
 O N T H E 
 
 NATURE and CONDUCT 
 o F T H E 
 
 Paffions and Affettions. 
 
 WITH 
 
 ILLUSTRATIONS 
 
 On the MORAL SENSE. 
 
 By the Author of tb Inquiry into the 
 Original of our Ideas of l&eauty and 
 Virtue. 
 
 Hoc opus, hoc ftudium, parui properemus, & ampU 9 
 Si Patrice^ volmnus^fi Nobis viver-e cbari. Hor. 
 
 LONDON: 
 
 Printed by J. Darby and 7^ Browne, for 
 Smith and William Bruce t Bookfellers in 
 Dublin ; and fold by J. Osborn and 7*. Longman 
 in Pater-Nofter-Row, and S. Chandler in the 
 Poultry. M.DCC.XXVIII.
 
 B 
 
 /SO* 
 
 THE 
 
 PREFACE 
 
 AL T H o the main prac- 
 tical ^Principles, which 
 are inculcated in this 
 Treatife, have this Pre* 
 judice in their Favour, that they 
 have been taught and propagated by 
 the beft of Men in all Ages, yet 
 there is reafon to fear that renewed 
 Treatifes upon Subjects fo often well 
 managed, may be look'd upon as 
 fuperfluous 5 efpecially fince little is 
 offered upon them which has not 
 often been well faid before. But 
 A 2
 
 The PREFACE, 
 
 fcefide that general Confideration, 
 that old Arguments may iometimes 
 be fet in iuch a Light by one, as 
 will convince thofe who were not 
 moved by them, even when better 
 exprefs'd by another 5 fince, for e- 
 very Clafs of Writers, there are 
 ClaiTes of Readers adapted, who 
 cannot relifli any thing higher : Be- 
 fides this, I fay, the very Novelty 
 of a Book may procure a little At- 
 tention, from thofe who over-look 
 the Writings which the World has 
 long enjoy'd. And if by Curiofity, or 
 any other means, fome few can be 
 engag'd to turn their Thoughts to 
 thefe important Subjects, about which 
 a little Reflection will difcover the 
 Truth, and a thorow Confederation 
 of it may occafion a great Increafe 
 of real Happinefs 5 no Perfon need 
 be afliam'd of his Labours as ufe- 
 lefs, which do fuch Service to any of 
 his Fellow-Creatures.
 
 The P R E F A c &' v 
 
 .j 
 
 I F any fliould look upon fome 
 Things in this Inquiry into the faf- 
 Jions, as too fubtile for common 
 Apprehenfion, and confequently not 
 neceflary for the Inftruction of Men 
 in Morals, which are the common 
 bufmefs of Mankind : Let them 
 confider, that the Difficulty on thefe 
 Subjects arifes chiefly from fome pre* 
 vious Notions, equally difficult at 
 lead, which have been already re- 
 ceiv'd, to the great Detriment of 
 many a Natural Temper $ fince ma- 
 ny have been difcourag'd from all 
 Attempts of cultivating kind gene* 
 vous Affections in themfelves, by a 
 previous Notion that there are no 
 fuch Affections in Nature, and that 
 all Pretence to them was only Dif- 
 Jimulation, Affectation, or at beft 
 fome unnatural Enihujiafm. And 
 farther, that to difcover Truth on 
 thefe Subjects, nothing more is ne- 
 ceflary than a little Attention to 
 what paffes in our own Hearts, 
 A 3 and
 
 vi The PREFACE. 
 
 and confequently every Man may 
 come to Certainty in thefe Points, 
 without much Art or Knowledge of 
 other Matters. 
 
 WHATEVER Confufion the 
 Schoolmen introduced into Philofo- 
 phy, fome of their keeneft Ad" 
 verfaries feem to threaten it with 
 a worfe kind of Confufion, by at- 
 tempting to take away fome of 
 the moft immediate fimple Tercep- 
 tions, and to explain all Appvoba- 
 tion, Condemnation, Tleafure and 
 tPain, by fome intricate Relations to 
 the Perceptions of the External Sen" 
 fes. In like manner they have treat- 
 ed our jDe/fres or Affections, mak- 
 ing the moft generous, kind and 
 difinterefted of them, to proceed from 
 Self-Love, by fome fubtle Trains of 
 Reafoning, to which honeft Hearts 
 are often wholly Strangers. 
 
 LE T
 
 The PREFACE. vii 
 
 LET this alfo ftill be remembred 
 that the natural Difpojitions of Man- 
 kind will operate regularly in thofe 
 who never reflected upon them, nor 
 form'd juft Notions about them. 
 Many are really virtuous who can- 
 not explain what Virtue is. Some 
 ad a moft generous difinterefted Part 
 in Life, who have been taught to 
 account for all their Actions by 
 Self-Love, as their fole Spring. 
 There have been very different and 
 oppofite Opinions in Opticks, con- 
 trary Accounts have been given of 
 Hearing, voluntary Motion, Di~ 
 gejlion, and other natural Actions. 
 But the Powers themfelves in rea- 
 lity perform their feveral Operations . 
 with fufficient Conftancy and Uni- 
 formity, in Perfons of good Health, 
 whatever their Opinions be about 
 them. In the fame manner our 
 moral Attions and Affections may 
 be in good order, when our Opini- 
 A 4 ons
 
 y e PREFACE. 
 
 ons are quite wrong about them. 
 fTrue Opinions however, about both, 
 may enable us to improve our natu- 
 ral Powers, and to rectify accidental 
 Diforders incident unto them. And 
 true Speculations on thefe Subjects 
 muft certainly be attended with as 
 much Tleafure as any other Parts 
 of Human Knowledge. 
 
 I T may perhaps feerh ftrange, 
 that when in this Treatife Virtue is 
 fuppos'd di/interejled^ yet fo much 
 Pains is taken, by a Comparifon of 
 cur feveral Tkafures, to prove the 
 <:Pkafures of Virtue to be the great- 
 eft we are capable of, and that con- 
 fequently it is our trueft Intereft to 
 be virtuous. But let it be remem- 
 her'd here, that tho there can be no 
 Motives or Arguments fuggefted 
 which can directly raife any ultimate 
 ^Dejire^ fuch as that of our own 
 Happinefs, or publick Affettions (as 
 we attempt to prove in Treatife IV 3) 
 i yet
 
 The PREFACE. ix 
 
 yet if both are natural 'iDiJpoJitions 
 of our Minds, and nothing can ftop 
 the Operation of publuk Affeffions 
 but fome felfifa Interefl, the only 
 way to give publick AlFedions their 
 full Force, and to make them pre- 
 valent in our Lives, muft be to re- 
 move thefe Opinions of oppofite In- 
 terejts, and to (hew a fuperior In- 
 tereft on their fide. If thefe Confi- 
 derations be juft and fufficiently at- 
 tended to, a natural ^Difpojltion 
 can fcarce fail to exert it felf to the 
 full. 
 
 I N this Effay on the Taj/ions, the 
 Proofs and Illuftrations of a moral 
 Senfe, and Senfe of Honour are not 
 mentioned 3 becaufe they are fo, in the 
 Inquiry into Moral Good and Evil^ 
 in the firft and fifth Setfions. Would 
 Men reflect upon what they feel in 
 themfelves, all Troofs in fuch Mat- 
 ters would be needlefs. 
 
 SOME
 
 The PREFACE. 
 
 SOME ftrange Love of Simplicity 
 in the Structure of human Nature, 
 or Attachment to fome favourite 
 Hypothejls, has engag'd many Wri- 
 ters to pafs over a great mznyjimple 
 Perceptions, which we may find in 
 our felves. We have got the Num- 
 ber Five fixed for our external Sen- 
 fes, tho Seven or Ten might as ea- 
 fily be defended. We have Multi- 
 tudes of Perceptions which have no 
 relation to any external Senfation 5 
 if by it we mean ^Perceptions, oc- 
 cafiond by Motions or Imprejpons 
 made on our Bodies 3 fuch as the 
 Ideas of Number , 'Duration , fro- 
 portion^ Virtue, Vice, ^Pleafures of 
 Honour, of Congratulation 5 the 
 fains of Remorfe, Shame, Sympa- 
 thy, and many others. It were to 
 be wifli'd, that thofe who are at 
 fuch Pains to prove a beloved Max- 
 im, that " all Ideas arife from Sen" 
 " fation and Rejleffion" had fo ex- 
 
 plain'd
 
 The PREFACE. xi 
 
 plain 'd themfelves, that none fliould 
 take their Meaning to be, that all 
 our Ideas are either external Senfa- 
 tions, or reflex Afls upon external 
 Senfations : Or if by Reflection they 
 mean an inward fewer of <per~ 
 ception, as I fancy they do, they had 
 as carefully examin'd into the feve- 
 ral kinds of internal Perceptions^ as 
 they have done into the external 
 Senfattons : that we might have feen 
 whether the former be not as natu- 
 ral and necejfar^s the latter. Had 
 they in like manner confider'd our 
 Affections without a previous No- 
 tion, that they were all from Self- 
 Love, they might have felt an ul- 
 timate 'Defire of the Happinefs of 
 others as eafily conceivable, and as 
 certainly implanted in the human 
 Breaft, tho perhaps not fo ftrong as 
 Self-Love. 
 
 THE Author hopes this imper- 
 fect Effay will be favourably re- 
 
 ceiv'd,
 
 xii The P R E F A c . 
 
 ceiv'd, till fome Perfon of greater 
 Abilities and Leifure apply himfelf 
 to a more ftrict Philofophical Inqui- 
 ry into the various natural 'Prin- 
 ciples or natural 'Dtjpofitions of 
 Mankind 5 from which perhaps a more 
 exad Theory of Morals may be 
 form'd, than any which has yet ap- 
 pear'd : and hopes that this Attempt, 
 to fliew the fair fide of the human 
 Temper, may be of fome little ufe 
 towards this great End. 
 
 THE principal Objections offer'd 
 by Mr. Clarke of Hull, againft the 
 fecond Section of the fecond Trea- 
 tife, occurred to the Author in Con- 
 verfation, and had apprized him of 
 the neceffity of a farther illuftration 
 of dtfinterejisd Affettions, in anfwer 
 to his Scheme of deducing them from 
 Setf-Love, which feem'd more in- 
 genious than any which the Author 
 of the Inquiry ever yet faw in print. 
 He takes better from Mr. Clarke^ all 
 
 other
 
 The PREFACE. xiii 
 
 other Parts of his Treatment, than 
 the raifing fuch an Outcry againft 
 him as Injurious to ChrijHanity y for 
 Principles which fome of the mofl 
 zealous Chriflians have publickly 
 maintained : He hopes Mr. Clarke 
 will be fatisfy'd upon this Point, as 
 well as about the Scheme of dtfin- 
 terejled Affections, by what is of- 
 fer a in the Treatife on the tPaffions, 
 Seel:. I. and defignedly placed here, 
 rather than in any diftincl: Reply, 
 both to avoid the difagreeable Work 
 of Anfweving or Remarking upon 
 Books, wherein it is hard to keep off 
 too keen and offenfive Expreflions 5 
 and alfo, that thofe who have had 
 any of the former Editions of the 
 Inquiry, might not be at a lofs a- 
 bout any Ilhtftrattons or additional 
 Proofs necefiary to complete the 
 Scheme. 
 
 THE lafl Treatife had never feen 
 the Light, had not fome worthy 
 
 Gen*
 
 xiv The P R E FACE. 
 
 Gentlemen miftaken fome things a- 
 bouc the moral Senfe alledg'd to be 
 in Mankind : Their Objections gave 
 Opportunity of farther Inquiry into 
 the feveral Schemes of accounting for 
 our moral Ideas, which fome ap- 
 prehend to be wholly different from, 
 and independent on, that Senfe which 
 i -the Author attempts to eftablifh. 
 The following Papers attempt to 
 fhew, that all thefe Schemes muft 
 neceflarily prefuppofe thismoral Senfe y 
 and be relolv'd into it : Nor does 
 the Author endeavour to over-turn 
 them, or reprefent them as unnecef- 
 fary Superftructures upon the Foun- 
 dation of a moral Senfe $ tho what 
 he has fuggefted will probably fliew 
 a con(iderable Confufion in fome of 
 the Terms much ufed on thefe Sub- 
 jects. One may eafily fee from the 
 great variety of Terms, and diver- 
 fity of Schemes invented, that all 
 Men feel fomething in their own 
 Hearts recommending Virtue, which 
 
 yec
 
 The PREFACE. xv 
 
 yet it is difficult to explain. This 
 Difficulty probably arifes from our 
 previous Notions of a fmall Num- 
 ber of Strifes, fo that we are un- 
 willing to have recourfe in our The- 
 ories to any more 5 and rather ftrain 
 out fome Explication of moral I- 
 deas, with relation to fome other 
 natural Powers of Perception uni-v 
 verfally acknowledged. The like 
 difficulty attends feveral other T^r- 
 ceptions, to the Reception of which 
 Philofophers have not generally at 
 figned their diftintt Senfes^ fuch as 
 natural beauty, Harmony, the Per- 
 fection of <Poetry y Architecture^ 2)*?- 
 Jigning, and fuch like Affairs of Ge- 
 nius, Tafte, or Fancy : The Ex- 
 plications or Theories on thefe Sub- 
 jects are in like manner full of Con- 
 fiifion and Metaphor. 
 
 T o define Virtue by agreeabk- 
 nefe to this moral Senfe, or defcri- 
 bing it to be kind Jffe&ion, may 
 
 appear
 
 xvi The PREFACE. 
 
 appear perhaps too uncertain 5 con- 
 fidering that the Senfe of particular 
 Perfons is often depraved by Cnf- 
 tom, Habits, falfe Opinions, Com- 
 pany : and that fome particular 
 kind Taffions toward fome Perfons 
 are really pernicious, and attended 
 with very unkind Affections toward 
 others, or at leaft with a Neglect of 
 their Interefts. We muft therefore 
 only aflert in general, that " every 
 <c one calls that Temper, or thofe 
 " Actions virtuous, which are ap- 
 " prov'd by his own Senfe ^ and 
 withal, that " abftracting from par- 
 <c ticular Habits or Prejudices, every 
 " one is fo conftituted as to approve 
 " every particular kind Affettion 
 " toward any one, which argues no 
 " want of Affettion toward others. 
 " And conftantly to approve that 
 tt Temper which defires, and thofe 
 i Actions which tend to procure 
 " the greateft Moment of Good in 
 " the Power of the Agent toward 
 
 f'the
 
 
 R E F A c E. xv 
 
 " the moft extenfive Syftem to 
 " which it can reach 3 " and con- 
 fequently, that the Perfection of 
 Virtue confiils in u having the ai- 
 " verfal calm Benevolence y the pre- 
 " valent Affection of the Mind, fo 
 " as to limit and counteract not on^ 
 " ly the felfi/h ^Paffions, but even 
 " the particular kind j4jfetions" 
 
 OUR moral Senfe fhews this to 
 be the higheft Perfection of our 
 Nature 3 what we may fee to be 
 thew^or Dejign of fuch a Structure, 
 and confequently what is requir'd of 
 us by the Author of our Nature : 
 and therefore if any one like thefe 
 Defcriptions better, he may call 
 Virtue, with many of the Antients, 
 " Vita fecundum naturam^ '' or 
 " acting according to what we 
 " may fee from the Constitution 
 " of our Nature, we were in- 
 " tended for by our Creator 7 /' 
 
 IF
 
 xviii The P R E FACE. 
 
 I F this Moral Senfe were once 
 fet in a convincing Light, thofe 
 vain Shadows of Objections againft 
 a virtuous Life, in which fome are 
 wonderfully delighted, would foon 
 vanifli : alledging, that whatever 
 we admire or honour in a moral 
 Spectes, is the effect of Art, Edu- 
 cation, Cujlom, Policy, or fubtle 
 Views of Intereft 5 we fliould then 
 acknowledge 
 
 umus, & qmdnam <vitfuri 
 gignimur. Perf. 
 
 "T \ s true, a Tower of Reafon- 
 ing is natural to us $ and we muft 
 own, that all Arts and Sciences 
 which are well founded, and tend 
 Co direct our Actions, are, if not 
 to be called Natural, an Improve* 
 ment upon our Nature : yet if Vir- 
 tue be looked upon as wholly Ar- 
 tificial, there are I know not what 
 Sufpicions againft it 5 as if indeed 
 
 it
 
 The PREFACE. xix 
 
 it might tend to the greater In- 
 tereft of large Bodies or Socie- 
 ties of Men, or to that of their 
 Governors 5 whereas a private Per- 
 fon may better find his Interef y 
 or enjoy greater Pleafures in the 
 Practices counted vicious, efpeci*- 
 ally if he has any Probability of 
 Secrecy in them. Thefe Sufpicions 
 mud be entirely removd, if we 
 have a moral Senfe and pub/ick 
 Affettions^ whofe Gratifications are 
 conftituted by Nature, our moft in- 
 tenfe and durable Tleafures. 
 
 I HOPE it is a good Omen 
 of fomething ftill better on this 
 Subject to be expected in the lear* 
 ned World, that Mr. Butler, in 
 his Sermons at the Rolls Chapel, 
 has done fo much Juftice to the 
 wife and good Order of our Na- 
 ture 3 that the Gentlemen, who 
 have oppos'd fome other Senti- 
 ments or the Author of the /- 
 quiry, feem convinc'd of a mo- 
 a z ral
 
 xx The PREFACE. 
 
 ral Senfe, Some of them have 
 by a Miftake made a Compli- 
 ment to the Author, which does 
 not belong to him 5 as if the 
 World were any way indebted to 
 him for this Difcovery. He has 
 too often met with the Senfus 
 ^Decon & Honeftij and with the 
 AuWpf tLyaSteiti^ to afliime any fuch 
 thing to himfelf. 
 
 SOME Letters in the London 
 Journals , fubfcribed fht/aretus , 
 gave the firft Occafion to the 
 fourth Freatife 5 the Anfwers 
 given to them bore too vifible 
 Marks of the Hurry in which 
 they were wrote , and therefore 
 the Author declined to continue 
 the Debate that way $ chufing to 
 fend a private Letter to ^Phila- 
 retus, to defire a more private 
 Corrcfpondence on the Subject of 
 our Debate, I have been fince 
 informed, that his Death difap- 
 cpiated my great Expectations from
 
 The PREFACE. xxi 
 
 fo ingenious a Correfpondent. The 
 Objections propofed in the firft Sec- 
 tion of Treatife IV, are not al- 
 ways thofe of Thilaretus, tho I 
 have endeavoured to leave no Ob- 
 je&ions of his unanfwer'd 3 but I 
 alfo interiperfed whatever Obje&i- 
 ons occurr'd to me in Converfa- 
 tion on thefe Subjects. I hope I 
 have not ufed any Expreffions in- 
 confiftent with the high Regard I 
 have for the Memory of fo inge- 
 nious a Gentleman, and of fuch 
 Diftinaion in the World. 
 
 THE laft Section of the Fourth 
 Treatife, was occafion'd by a pri- 
 vate Letter from a Perfon of the 
 mod real Merit, in Glafgow 5 re- 
 prefenting to me fome Sentiments 
 not uncommon among good Men, 
 which might prejudice them againft 
 any Scheme of Morals, not whol- 
 ly founded upon *P\ety. This Point 
 is, I hope, fo treated, as to re- 
 jnove the Difficulty. 
 
 1 H
 
 xxii The PREFACE. 
 
 THE Deference due to a Per- 
 fon, who has appear 'd fo much 
 in the learned World, as M. Le 
 ClevCj would feem to require, that 
 I fhould make fome Defenfe a- 
 gainft, or Submiffion to, the Re- 
 marks he makes in his Biblio- 
 theque Anctenne & Moderns. But 
 I cannot but conclude from his 
 Abftracl:, efpecially from that of 
 the laft Seffion of the Inquiry, ei- 
 ther that I don't understand his 
 French, or he my Enghjb, or that 
 he has never read more than the 
 Titles of fome of the Se&ions : and 
 if any one of the three be the 
 Cafe, we are not fit for a Con- 
 troverfy. 
 
 I K the References, at bottom of 
 Pages, rhe Inquiry into Beauty is 
 called Treatife I. That into the 
 Ideas of moral Good and Evil, is 
 Treatife II. The Eflay on the Paf- 
 fions, Treattfe III. And the Uluf- 
 trations on the moral Senfe, Trea- 
 fife IV THE
 
 THE 
 
 CONTENTS 
 
 TREATISE I. 
 
 An Effay on the Nature and Condutt of 
 the Taffions. 
 
 S E C T. I. \ General Account of ourfeve- 
 
 y~\_ rat Senfes and Defires, 
 
 SelflJbor.PubUck. Page i. 
 
 SECT. II. Of the Affedions and Paffions : 
 The natural Laws of pure Affection : The con- 
 futed Senfations of the Pa/ions, with their fi- 
 nal Caufes. 27. 
 
 SECT. III. Particular Divifwns of the Af- 
 fections and Pafllons. 58. 
 
 SECT. IV. Howfar our fever al AfFe&ions 
 and Paffions are under our Power, either to 
 govern them when raifed, or to -prevent their a- 
 rifing : with fome general Observations about 
 
 88. 
 
 SECT. V. A Comparifon of the Pleafures 
 and Pains of the fever al Senfes, as to Intenfenefs 
 and Duration. 126- 
 
 SECT.
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 SECT. VI. Some general Conclufions con- 
 cerning the beft Management of our Defires. 
 With fome Principles necejfary to Happinefs. 
 
 Page 165. 
 
 TREATISE II. 
 
 IL L US TR4?IO NS upon the Moral Senfe. 
 
 Page 205. 
 
 SECT. I. Concerning the Character of Virtue ', 
 agreable to Truth or Reafon. 213. 
 
 SECT. II. Concerning that Character of Vir- 
 tue and Vice ; the Fitnefs or Unfitnefs of Ac- 
 tions. 245. 
 
 SECT. HI. Mr. Woolafton'j Significancy 
 of Truth, as the Idea of Virtue confidefd. 253. 
 
 SECT. IV. Shewing the Ufe 0/ Reafon con- 
 cerning Virtue and Vice, upon Suppofition that 
 we receive thefe Ideas by a Moral Senfe. 275. 
 
 SECT. V. Shewing that Virtue may have 
 whatever is meant by Merit j and be reward- 
 able upon the Suppofition that it is perceived by 
 a Senfe, and elecJedfrom Affection or Inftinft. 
 
 SECT. VI. How far a Regard to the Deity 
 is necfffary to make an Aftion virtuous. 301. 
 
 AN
 
 A N 
 
 ESSAY 
 
 O N T H E 
 
 NATURE and CONDUCT 
 o F T H E 
 
 PASSIONS 
 
 SECT. I. 
 
 A general Account of our federal 
 SENSES and DESIRES, Selfifh 
 or Publick. 
 
 >' ' H E Nature of human A&ions 
 
 cannci be fufficiently under- 
 
 flood without confidering the 
 
 - Affeflions and TaJJlons ; or 
 
 thofe Modifications, or Attions of the 
 
 Mind confequent upon the Apprehenfion of 
 
 certain Objetts or Events, in which the 
 
 Mind generally conceives Good or Evil* 
 
 B In
 
 Nature and Conduft 
 
 like manner, Affections, Temper s y Senti- 
 or Attions, refle&ed upon in our 
 felves, or obferved in others, are the con- 
 flant Qccafions of agreeable or difagreeable 
 Perceptions, which we call Approbation, 
 or 'Dtflike. Thefe Moral 'Perceptions a- 
 rife in us as neceflarily as any other Senfa- 
 tions ; nor can we alter, or flop them, while 
 our previous Opinion or Apprehenjion of 
 the Affettion^ Temper, or Intention of the 
 Agent continues the fame ; any more than 
 we can make the Tafte of Wormwood 
 fweet, or that of Honey bitter. / 
 
 IF we may call every ^Determination of 
 our Minds to receive Ideas independently 
 on our Willy and to have ^Perceptions of 
 yieajure and Tain, A SENSE, we mail 
 find many other Senfes beflde thofe com- 
 monly explained. Tho it is not eafy to 
 affign accurate Divifions on iuch Subjedis, 
 yet we may reduce them to the following 
 ClafTes, leaving it to others to arrange them 
 as they think convenient. A little Reflec- 
 tion will mew that there are iuch Natural 
 
 the Concomitant Ideas arc reputed Images of fomething Ex- 
 ternal. 
 
 From all thefe we may juftly diftinguifli " the Pleafures 
 " perceived upon the previous Reception and Comparifon of 
 " various fenfible Perceptions, with their concomitant Ideas, 
 ." or intellectual Ideas, when we find Uniformity, or Rc- 
 *' femblance among them." Thefe are meant by the Per- 
 ceptions of the internal Senfe, 
 
 'Powers
 
 of the PASS IONS. 5 
 
 Towers in the human Mind, in whatever Seel:. 
 Order we place them. In the ift Clafs are 
 the External Senfes, univerfally known. 
 In the 2d, the Tleafant "Perceptions ari- 
 fmg from regular^ harmonious, uniform 
 Objects ; as alfo from Grandeur and No- 
 velty. Thefe we may call, after Mr. 
 ADDISON, the Pleafures of the Imaginati- 
 on ; or we may call the Power of receiving 
 them, an Internal Senfe. Whoever diflikes 
 this Name may fubftitute another. 3. The 
 next Clafs of Perceptions we may call a 
 ^Ptiblick Senfe, viz*. " our Determination 
 " to be pleafed with the Happinefs of o- 
 " thers, and to be uneafy at their Mifery? 
 This is found in fome degree in all Men, 
 and was fometimes called ^otvovo^o<rvvn, or 
 Senfus Communis by fome of the Antients. 
 4. The fourth Clafs we may call the Moral 
 Senfe i by which " we perceive Virtue, 
 or Vice in our felves, or others." This is 
 plainly diftincl: from the former Clafs of 
 Perceptions, fince many are flrongly af- 
 fected with the Fortunes of others, who 
 feldom reflecl: upon Virtue, or Vice in 
 themfelves, or others, as an Objed: : as 
 we may find in Natural Ajfec^ion^ Com- 
 pajjion, Friendjhip* or even general Bene- 
 volence to Mankind, which conned: our 
 Happinefs or Plealure with that of others, 
 even when we are not reflecting upon our 
 own Temper, nor delighted with the Per- 
 ception of our own Virtue. 5. The fifth 
 B 3 Clafs
 
 6 The 'Nature and 
 
 Seel:, i .Clafs is a Senfe of Honour^ " which makes 
 ^.Approbation, or Gratitude of others, 
 for any good Adions we have done, the 
 neceffary occafion of Pleafure ; and their 
 'Diflike, Condemnation^ or Refentment 
 of Injuries done by us, the occafion of 
 that uneafy Senfation called Shame, even 
 when we fear no further evil from them.'* 
 
 THERE are perhaps other ^Perceptions 
 diftincl: from all thefe ClafTes, fuch as fome 
 Ideas " vi'Decency* ^Dignity, Suitablenefs to 
 ' human Nature in certain Actions and Cir- 
 " cumftances; and of an Indecency, Mean- 
 *' nefs, and 'Vnwor thine fs, in the contrary 
 '* Actions or Circumftances, even without 
 " any conception of Moral Good, or E- 
 " vil." Thus the Pleafures of Sight ^ and 
 Hearing, are more efleemed than thofe of 
 Tafte or Touch : The Purfuits of the Plea- 
 fures of the Imagination, are more ap- 
 proved than thofe of fimple external Sen^ 
 fations. *Plato * accounts for this diffe- 
 rence from a conflant Opinion of Innocence 
 in this fort of Pleafures, which would re- 
 duce this Perception to the Moral Senfe. 
 Others may imagine that the difference is 
 riot pwing to any luch Reflection upon their 
 Innocence, but that there is a different fort 
 of Perceptions in thefe cafes, to be reckon* 
 ed another Clafe of Senfations. 
 
 Ifippias Majpr, See atfq Treat* 2. SeCl. ?. Aft. 7. 
 
 Pi
 
 of the PASSIONS. 7 
 
 Sed. i. 
 
 II. DESIRES arife incur Mind, from ^y^y 
 the Frame of our Nature, upon Apprehen-jfJ^ ]J~ 
 fion of Good or Evil in Objects, Actions, our Defies. 
 or Events, to obtain for our felves or ci- 
 thers the agreeable Senfation^ when the 
 Obje<5b or Event is good ; or to prevent the 
 nneafy Senfation, when it is evil. Our 
 original Defires and Averfions may there- 
 fore be divided into five ClafTes, anfwering 
 to the Clafles of our Senfes. i . The De- 
 fire of fenfual 'Pleafare, (by which we 
 mean that of the external Senfes) ; and 
 Averfion to the oppofite Pains. 2. The 
 Defires of the Tleafares of Imagination or 
 Internal Senfe *, and Averfion to what is 
 difagreeable to it. 3. Defires of the Plea- 
 fures arifing from Tublick Happinefs, and 
 Averfion to the Pains arifing from the Mi- 
 fery of others. 4. Defires of Virtue, and 
 Averfion to Vice, according to the Notions 
 we have of the Tendency of Actions to 
 the Publick Advantage or Detriment. 
 5. Defires of Honour , and Averfion to 
 Shame f. 
 
 THE third Clafs of Tublick T>e fires 
 contains many very different forts of Af- 
 fections, all thofe which tend toward the 
 Happinefs of others, or the removal of 
 Mifery; fuch as thofe of Gratitude, Com- 
 
 * See Treat, i. f See Treat. 2. Stff. 5. Art 3 8, 
 
 B 4 fajjlon*
 
 8 fhe Nature and Condtttt 
 
 5ed:. i .faffionj Natural Affettion, Friendjhip, or 
 the more extend ve calm ^l^ejire of the uni- 
 *verfal Good of all fenfitive Natures, which 
 our moral Senfe approves as the Perfection 
 of Virtue, even when it limits, and coun- 
 teracts the narrower Attachments of Love. 
 
 N o vv fmce we are capable of Reflection, 
 i'l Me mory, Obfervation, and Reafoning a- 
 bout the diftant Tendencies of Objects and 
 Actions, and not confined to things pre- 
 fent, there muft arife, in confequence of 
 our original 'Dejires, ' ' Jecondary f DeJlres 
 " of every thing imagined ulefui to gratify 
 " any of the primary Defires, with ftrength 
 " proportioned to the feveral original De- 
 ct fires, and the imagined Ufefulnefs, or 
 " Necetfity, of the advantageous Objecl;." 
 Hence it is that as Toon as we come to ap- 
 prehend the Ufe of IVealth or ^Power to 
 gratify any of our original Defires, we mud 
 alfo defire them. Hence arifes the lluiver- 
 fality of thefe Defires of Wealth and Power, 
 fince they are the Means of gratifying all 
 other Defires. " How fooliih then is the 
 Inference, Ibme would make, from the 
 univerfal Prevalence of thefe Defires, that 
 human Nature is wholly felfifli, or that 
 each one is only fludious of his own 
 Advantage ; fmce Wealth or Power are 
 as naturally fit to gratify our 'PMick 
 'Dejires, or to ferve virtuous Turfofes, 
 as the felfijb ones ? " 
 
 "How
 
 of the PASSIONS. 
 
 " How weak alfo are the Reafonings 
 " of fome reclufe Moralifts, who condemn 
 ' ' in general all Purfuits of Wealth or Power, 
 ' as below a perfectly virtuous Character : 
 " fince Wealth and Power are the moft ef- 
 " fedhial Means, arid the moft powerful 
 " Inftruments, even of the greateft Vir- 
 " tues, and moft generous Actions?" 
 The Purfuit of them is laudable, when the 
 Intention is virtuous ; and the negled: of 
 them, when honourable Opportunities of- 
 fer, ig really a Weaknefs. This juftifies the 
 Poet's Sentiments : 
 
 Hie onus lorret, 
 
 Ut parvis Animis & parvo Corpcre majus : 
 Hie fubit & perfert : aut virtus novien inane eft y 
 Aut Decus 6? Pretium refte petit experiem Fir. 
 
 Ho R. Epift. 17. 
 
 * ( FURTHER, the Laws or Cufloms of 
 " a Country, the Humour of our Company 
 " may have made ftrange Affectations of 
 <c Ideas, fo that fome Objects, which of 
 ** themfelves are indifferent to any Senfe, 
 " by reafon of Ibme additional grateful 
 <c Idea, may become very defirable ; or by 
 " like Addition of an ungrateful Idea may 
 " raife the ftrongeft Averfion."- Thus 
 many a Trifle, when once it is made a 
 Badge of Honour, an Evidence of fome 
 generous ^Difpofition, a Monument of fome 
 great Attion, may be impatiently purfued, 
 
 from
 
 i o fhe Nature and Con duff 
 
 Seel, i from our Defire of Honour. When any 
 ircumjlance, 'Drefs, State, 'Poftttre is 
 conftituted as a Mark of Infamy, it may 
 become in like manner the Object of A- 
 verfion, tho in it felf moft inofFenfive to 
 our Senfes. If a certain way of Living, 
 of receiving Company^ of /hewing Cottr- 
 te/y, is once received among thofe who 
 are honoured ; they who cannot jbear the 
 Expence of this may be made uneafy at 
 their Condition, tho much freer from Trou- 
 ble than that of higher Stations. Thus 
 1)refe, Retinue, Equipage, Furniture, 
 Behaviour ; and c Di e uerJions are made Mat- 
 ters of confiderable Importance by additio- 
 nal Ideas*. Nor is it in vain that the 
 wifeft and greateft Men regard thele things ; 
 for however it may concern them to break 
 fuch AfTociations in their own Minds, yet, 
 fince the bulk of Mankind will retain them, 
 they mud comply with their Sentiments 
 and Humours in things innocent, as they 
 expect the publick Efteem, which is gene- 
 rally necefTary to enable Men to ferve the 
 Publick. 
 
 f SHOULD any one be furprized at this 
 -cDifpofo'ion in our Nature to afTociate any 
 
 TI* J i f i <* 1-1 !* 
 
 Ideas together for the future, which once 
 prelented themfelves jointly, confidering 
 what great Evils, and how much Corruf* 
 
 * See i Treat* Sefl. i* Art. 7. and 2 Treat* Sefl. 6- Art. 3. 
 
 lion
 
 of the P A S S I O N S. if 
 
 tion of Affections is owing to it, it may Sett, 
 help to account for this Part of our Con- 
 ilitution, to confider " that all our Lan- 
 " & ua g e an d much of our Memory depends 
 " upon it : " So that were there no fuch 
 AJfociations made, we muft lofe the ufe of 
 Words^ and a great part of our Power of 
 recollecting fa/t Events ; befide many o- 
 ther valuable Towers and Arts which de- 
 pend upon them. Let it alfo be confidered 
 jhat it is much in our power by a vigorous 
 Attention either to prevent thefe Afocia- 
 tions, or by Abftraffion to (eparate Ideas 
 when it may be ufeful for us to do (b. 
 
 CONCERNING our Purfuit of Honour, 
 tis to be obferv'd, that " fince our Minds 
 are incapable of retaining a great Diver- 
 fity of Objecl:s, the Novelty -, or Singu- 
 larity of any ObjecSt is enough to raife a 
 particular Attention to it among many 
 of equal Merit : " And therefore were 
 Virtue univerfal among Men, yet, 'tis 
 probable, the Attention of Obfervers would 
 be turned chiefly toward thofe who diflin-' 
 guiihed themfelvesby fame Jingular Ability, 
 or by fbme Circumftance, which, however 
 trifling in its own Nature, yet had forne 
 honourable Ideas commonly joined to it, 
 fuch as Magnificence, Generofity, or the 
 like. We fhould perhaps, when we con- 
 fldered fedately the conimoa Virtues of o- 
 
 thers.
 
 i ^ The Nature and Condutt 
 
 Se&. i . thers, equally love and efteem them * : 
 And yet probably our Attention would be 
 generally fixed to thofe who thus were di* 
 Jiingttifhed from the Multitude. Hence 
 our natural Love of Honour, raifes in us a 
 Defire of c Diftmffion, either by higher De- 
 grees of Virtue ; or, if we cannot eafily 
 or probably obtain it this way, we attempt 
 it in an eafier manner, by any Circumftance, 
 which, thro' a Confufan of Ideas t is re- 
 puted honourable.' 
 
 THIS Defire of *Diflinttion has great 
 Influence on the Pleafures and Pains of 
 Mankind, and makes them chufe things for 
 their very Rarity, 'Difficulty, or Expence ; . 
 by a confufed Imagination that they evi- 
 dence Generofity, Ability, or a fner Tafle 
 than ordinary ; nay, often the mereft Tri- 
 fles are by thefe means ardently purfued. 
 A Form of T)refs, a foreign T)ijh, a Ti- 
 tle, a "Place, a Jewel; an ufelefs f Pro- 
 blem, a Critic ifm on an obfolete IVord^ the 
 Origin of a ^Poetic Fable, the Situation of 
 a razed Town, may employ many an Hour 
 in tedious Labour : 
 
 Sic leve,Jic parvum eft, animum quodlaudh alarum 
 Submit aut reficit. H o R. 
 
 , ... . 
 See 2 Treat. Sett. 3. laft.Pajrag* 
 
 Art.
 
 of the PASSIONS. ij 
 
 Se<5t 
 
 Art.\\\. THERE is another t)ivifion 
 our Defires taken from the Perfons for who 
 Advantage we purfue or fhun any Obje 
 " The Defires in which one intends or 
 " purfues what he apprehends advantageous 
 *' to himfelf, we may call SELFISH ; and 
 " thofe in which we purfue what we appre- 
 " hend advantageous to others, and do 
 " not apprehend advantageous to ourfefoes, 
 " or do not purfue with this view, we 
 '* may call Tublick or BENEVOLENT 
 " Defires." If there be a juft Foundation 
 for this Divifion, it is more extenfive than 
 the former Divifion, fmce each of the for- 
 mer Claffes may come under either Mem- 
 ber of this Divifion, according as we are 
 defiring any of the five forts of Pleafures 
 for our fe toes, or defiring them for others. 
 The former Divifion may therefore be con- 
 ceived as a Subdivifion of the latter. 
 
 THIS Divifion has been difputed fince 
 Epicurus ; who with his old Followers, 
 and fbme of late, who deteft other parts of 
 his Scheme, maintain, " that all our De- 
 fires are felfijh : or, that what every 
 one intends or defigns ultimately, in 
 each Adion, is the obtaining Pleafure 
 to himfelf, or the avoiding his own/r/- 
 uate Tain." * 
 
 * See Cicero de ft 'nib. ftf. i. 
 
 i IT
 
 14 The Nature and Conduit 
 
 SecSt. i. 
 
 I T requires a good deal of Subtiky to 
 defend this Scheme, fb feemingly oppofite 
 to Natural Affection, Friendjhip, Love 
 of a Country r , or Community, which many 
 find very ftrong in their Breads. The De- 
 fenfes and Schemes commonly offered, can 
 fcarce free the Suftainers of this Caufe from 
 manifeft Abfurdity and Affectation. But 
 fome do * acknowledge a fublick Senfe in 
 many Inftances ; efpecially in natural Af- 
 fettion, and Compaj}ion\ by which ' the 
 " Obfervation of the Happinefs of .others 
 " is made the neceflary Occafion of Plea- 
 * c fure, and their Mifery the Occafion of 
 4C Pain to the Obferver ". That this Sym- 
 pathy with others is the Effecl: of the 
 Conftitution of our Nature, and not brought 
 upon our felves by any Choice, with view 
 to any /?/#/ Advantage, they muftown : 
 whatever Advantage there may be in Sym- 
 pathy with the Fortunate ', none can be 
 alledged in Sympathy with the 'Dtjlreffed : 
 And every one feels that this fublick Senfe 
 will not leave his Heart, upon a change of 
 the Fortunes of his Child or Friend ; nor 
 does it depend upon a Man's Choice, whe- 
 ther he will be afre&ed with their For- 
 tunes or not. But fuppofing this publick 
 Senfe, they infift, " That by means of it 
 ' there is a Conjunction of Inter -eft : the 
 
 * See Mr. Clark of Hitll, his Remarks on Treat, a. 
 
 << Hap-
 
 of the P A S S I O N S. 15 
 
 " Happinefs of others becomes the Means Se<3:. 
 " of private Pleafure to the Obferver ; " 
 " and for this Reafon, or with a View to 
 " this private Pleafure, he defires the Hap- 
 " pinefs of another." Others deduce 
 our Defire of the Happinefs of others from 
 Self-love, in a lefs fpecious manner. 
 
 Ira fublick Senfe be acknowledged in 
 Men, by which the Happiuefs of one is 
 made to depend upon that of others, in- 
 dependently of his Choice, this is indeed 
 a ftrong Evidence of the Goodnefs of the 
 AUTHOR of our Nature. But whether this 
 Scheme does truly account for our Love 
 of others, or for generous Offices , may be 
 determined from the following Confidera- 
 tions ; which being matters of internal Con* 
 fcioufnefs^ every one can bed fatisfy him- 
 felf by Attention, concerning their Truth 
 and Certainty. 
 
 LET it be premifed, ihat'De/ire is ge- 
 nerally uneajy^ or attended with an uneafy 
 Senfation, which is fomething diftinft from 
 that uneafy Senfation arifmg from fome 
 Event or Objefl, the Prevention or Re- 
 moval of which Senfation we are intending 
 when the Object is apprehended as Evil ; 
 as this uneajy Senfation of Ttejire is ob- 
 vioufly different from the fleafant Senfa- 
 , expedted from the Object or Event 
 
 which
 
 1 6 The Nature and Conduft 
 
 Sect, i. which we apprehend as Good. Then it is 
 ' plain, 
 
 i. " THAT no Defire of any Event is 
 " excited by any view of removing the 
 " tmeajy Sen fat ion attending Ms ^Deflre 
 " itfelf". Senfations which are previous 
 to a Defire, or not connected with it, 
 may excite Defire of any Event, appre- 
 hended necefTary to procure or continue the 
 Senfation if it be pleafant, or to remove it 
 if it be uneafy : Bat the uneajy Senfation^ 
 accompanying and connected with the 1)e- 
 Jire itfelf, cannot be a Motive to that 
 ^Defire which it prefuppofes. The Senfa- 
 tion accompanying Defire is generally un- 
 eafy^ and confequently our Defire is never 
 railed with a view to obtain or continue 
 it ; nor is the Defire raifed with a view to 
 remove this uneafy Senfation, for the De- 
 fire is raifed previoufly to it. This holds 
 concerning all ^Dejlre publick or private. 
 
 THERE is alfb a fleafant Senfation of 
 Joy , attending the Gratification of any 
 Defire, befide the Senfation received from 
 the Objeff itfelfw\\\c\\ wediredly intended. 
 " But Defire does never arife from a View 
 '* of obtaining that Senfation of Joy, con- 
 " neded with the Succefe or Gratifica- 
 * tion of Defire ; otherwife the ftrongeft 
 " Defires might arife toward any Trifle, 
 * or* an Event in all refpe&s indifferent: 
 
 Since,
 
 of the PASSIONS. 17 
 
 " Since, if Defire arofe from this View^ Se<3:. i 
 " the flronger the Defire were, the higher 
 ' would be the 'Pleafure of Gratification ; 
 " and therefore we might defire the turn- 
 " ing of a Straw as violently as we do 
 " Wealth or Tower." This Expectation 
 of the *Pleafore of gratified ''Dejire, would 
 equally excite us to defire the Mifery of 
 others as their Happinefs ; fmce the 'Plea- 
 fure of Gratification might be obtained 
 from both Events alike. 
 
 2. IT is certain that, " thatT>eJire of 
 " the Happinefs of others which we ac- 
 " count virtuous, is not direftly excited 
 " by profpe&s of oay fecit lar Advantage* 
 " frfM/tb, 'Power ; Pleafure of the ex- 
 " ternal Senfes, Reward from the T>eity^ 
 *' or future Tleafares of Self-Approba- 
 " tion" To prove this let us confider, 
 '* That no Defire of any Event can arife 
 ** immediately or diredbly from an Opinion 
 " in the Agent, that his having fuch a 
 " *DeJire will be the Means of private 
 " Good. " This Opinion would make us 
 wijh or dejlre to have that advantageous 
 *Defire or Affeflion ; and would incline us 
 to ufe any means in our power to raife that 
 AfTe&ion : but no Affection or Defire is 
 raifed in us, directly by our volition or de- 
 Jiring it. That alone which raifes in us 
 from Self-Love the Defire of any Event, 
 is an Opinion that that Event is the Means 
 C of
 
 1 8 The Nature and Conduct 
 
 Sect i . of private Good. As foon as we form 
 this Opinion, a Defire of the Event im- 
 mediately arifes : But if having the T)ejire 
 or Affeflion be imagined the Means of 
 private Good, and not the Exiflence of the 
 Event defired, then from Self -Love we 
 mould only defire or wifti to have the 
 T)efire of that Event, and mould not de- 
 fire the Event itfelf, fince the Event is 
 not conceived as the Means of Good. 
 
 FOR inftance , fuppofe GOD revealed 
 to us that he would confer Happinefs on us, 
 if our Country 'were happy ; then from Selfr 
 Love we mould have immediately the fiib- 
 ordmate <\Defire of our Country's Happi- 
 uefs, as the Means of our own. But were 
 we aflured that, whether our Country were 
 happy or not, it mould not arTed: our fu- 
 ture Happinefs ; but that we mould be re- 
 warded, provided we defired the Happi- 
 nefs of our Country ; our Self- Love could 
 never make us now defire the Happinefs of 
 our Country, fince it is not now conceived 
 as the Means of our Happinefs, but is per- 
 fectly indifferent to it. The Means of our 
 Happinefs is the having a TDeJire of our 
 Country's Happinefs ; we mould therefore 
 from Self- Love only wijh to have this T)e- 
 fire. 
 
 'Ti s true indeed in fa&, that, becaufe 
 Benevolence is natural to us, a little At- 
 tention
 
 of the PASSIONS. i 
 
 tention to other Natures will raife* in usSeft. 
 good-will towards them, whenever by any 
 Opinions we are perfaaded that there is no 
 real Qppojltton of Interefl. But had we 
 no Affection diftin& from Self- Love, no- 
 thing could raife our ^Dejlre of the Happi- 
 nefs of others, but conceiving their Hap- 
 pinefs as the Means of ours. An Opinion 
 that our having kind Ajfeffions would be 
 the Means of our private Happinefs, would 
 only make us defire to have thofe Affec- 
 tions. Now that AfTe&ions do not arife 
 upon our wijbing to have them, or our 
 volition of raifing them ; as conceiving the 
 Affections themfelves to be the Means of 
 private Good ; is plain from this, that if 
 they did thus arife, then a Bribe might 
 raife any Defire toward any Event, or any 
 Affettton toward the mod improper Ob- 
 jed. We might be hired to love or hate 
 any fort of Perfbns, to be angry, jealous, 
 or compajjlonate^ as we can be engaged into 
 external Actions ; which we all fee to be 
 abfurd. Now thofe who alledg, that our 
 Benevolence may arife from prof peel: of 
 fecular Advantage, Honour, Self- Appro- 
 bation, or future Rewards, muft own , 
 that thefe are either Motives only to exter- 
 nal Actions, or Confederations* mewing, 
 that having the ^Dejlre of the Happinefs 
 of others, would be the Means of private 
 Good ; while the Event fuppofed to be de- 
 fired, viz. the Happinefs of others, is not 
 C 2 fuppofed
 
 10 The Nature and Condufl 
 
 Sedt. i.fuppofed the Means of any private Good. 
 
 ^v^ But the belt Defenders of this part of the 
 Scheme of Epicurus, acknowledge that 
 * ' Defires are not railed by Volition? 
 
 This Di- j. " T H E R E are in Men T)ejires of the 
 
 "def*'!t*j " H a Pt' tne f s f others, when they do not 
 " conceive this Happinefs as the Means 
 c ' of obtaining any fort of Happinefs to 
 " themfelves. " Self-Approbation, or Re- 
 wards from the Deity, might be the Ends, 
 for obtaining which we might poffibly de- 
 Jlre or 'will from Self-Love, to raife in our 
 felves kind Affections \ but we could not 
 from Self-Love defire the Happinefs of 
 others, but as conceiving it the Means of 
 our own. Now 'tis certain that fbmetimes 
 we may have &foJubordi**te c Dcfirtoft\te 
 Happinefs of others, conceived as the 
 Means of our own ; as fuppofe one had 
 laid a Wager upon the Happinefs of 
 a Perfon of fuch Veracity , that he 
 would own fmcerely whether he were 
 happy or not ; when Men are ^Partners 
 in Stock, and mare in Profit or Lofs ; 
 when one hopes to fucceed to, or fome 
 way tojbare tn the Profperity of another ; 
 or if the DEITY had given fuch Threat- 
 nings, as they tell us Telamou gave his 
 Sons when they went to War, that he 
 would reward or punifh one according as 
 others were happy or miferable : In iuch 
 caies one might have this jubordinate "De- 
 
 4 &*
 
 of the PASSIONS. ii 
 
 fire of another's Happinefs from Self-Love. Se<5t. i 
 But as we are fure the DEITY has not given C/YV 
 fuch Coraminations, fo we often are con- 
 fcious of the 'Defire of the Happinefs of 
 others, without any Juch Conception of 
 it as the Means of our own; and are 
 fenfible that this fubordinate Tlejire is not 
 that virtuous AfTe&ion which we approve, 
 The virtuous Benevolence muft be an ul- 
 timate 'Defire, which would fubfift without 
 view to private Good. Such ultimate pub- 
 lick T>efires we often feel, without any 
 Jubordinate 'Dejire of the lame Event, as 
 the Means of private Good. The fubor- 
 dinate may fometimes, nay often does con- 
 cur with the ultimate ; and then indeed 
 the whole Moment of thefe confpiring De- 
 fires may be greater than that of either 
 alone : But t\\z fubordinate alone is not that 
 Affedion which we approve as virtuous. 
 
 Art. IV. THIS will clear our way 
 anfwer the chief Difficulty : " May n 
 " our Benevolence be at lead a 'Defire 
 ' the Happinefs of others, as the Means f arei .f th9 
 * of obtaining the Tleafures of the public 
 ' Senfc,from the Contemplation of their 
 " Happinefs ? " If it were fo, it is very 
 unaccountable that we fhould approve this 
 fubordinate Tiefire as virtuous, and yet 
 not approve the like Defire upon a JVa^er^ 
 or other Confederations of Intereft. Both 
 Pefires proceed from Self-Love in the fame 
 C rna.u-
 
 ii The Nature and 
 
 SecSt i . manner : In the latter cafe the Defires might 
 extended to multitudes, if any one 
 would wager fo capricioufly ; and, by in- 
 creafing the Sum wagered, the Motive of 
 Interejt might, with many Tempers, be 
 made ftronger than that from the Pieafures 
 of the publick Senfe. 
 
 DON'T we find that we often defire the 
 Happinefs of others without any fach fel- 
 fifh Intention ? How few have thought upon 
 this part of our Conflitution which we call 
 a Publick Senfe ? Were it our only View, in 
 Compaffion to free our (elves from the fain 
 of the publick Senfe; mould the DEITY 
 propofe it to our Choice, either to oblite- 
 rate all Ideas of the Perfon in Diftrefs, but 
 to continue him in Mifery, or on the other 
 hand to relieve him from it ; mould we not 
 upon this Scheme be perfectly indifferent, 
 and chufe the former as foon as the latter ? 
 Should the DEITY aflure us that we mould 
 be immediately annihilated, fo that we 
 mould be incapable of either Pleafure or 
 Pain, but that it ihould depend upon our 
 Choice at our very Exit, whether our Chil- 
 dren, our Friends, or our Country mould 
 be happy or miferable ; mould we not upon 
 this Scheme be intirely indifferent ? Or, if 
 we mould even defire thepleafant Thought 
 of their Happinefs, in our laft Moment, 
 would not this Defire be the fainteft ima- 
 ginable ? 
 
 >Tis
 
 of the PASSIONS. * 
 
 Sec* 
 
 'T i s true, our Tub lick Senfe might 
 as acute at our Exit as ever ; as a Man's 
 Tafte of Meat or Drink might be as lively 
 the inftant before his DifTblution as in any 
 part of his Life. But would any Man have 
 as ftrong ^Defires of the Means of obtain- 
 ing thefe Pleafures, only with a View to 
 himfelf, when he was to perifh the next 
 Moment ? Is it fuppofable that any T>ejlre 
 of the Means of private Tleafure can be 
 as ftrong when we only expect to enjoy it 
 a Minute, as when we expe6t the Conti- 
 nuance of it for many Years ? And yet, 
 'tis certain, any good Man would as ftrong- 
 ly defire at his Exit the Happinefs of other s^ 
 as in any part of his Life. We do not there- 
 fore defire it as the Means of private 
 Tleafure. 
 
 SHOULD any alledge, that this Defire of 
 the Happinefs of others, after our Exit, is 
 from fome confufed Affociation of Ideas ; 
 as a Mifer, who loves no body, might de- 
 fire an Increafe of Wealth at his Death ; or 
 as any one may have an Averfion to have 
 his Body difle&ed, or made a Prey to Dogs 
 after Death : let any honeft Heart try if 
 the deepeft Reflection will break this AJJb- 
 ciation (if there be any) which is fiippoled 
 to raife the Defire. The clofeft Reflection 
 would be found rather to ftrengthen it. 
 C 4 How
 
 24 %%* Nature and Conduit 
 
 Sed. i. How would any Spectator like the Tem- 
 UXV^ per of one thus rendered indifferent to all 
 others at his own Exit, fo that he would 
 not even open his Mouth to procure Hap- 
 pinefs to Pofteriry ? Would we efteem it 
 refned Wi'fdom, or a 'Perfection of Mind, 
 and not rather the vileft Perverfenefs ? Tis 
 plain then we feel this ultimate 'Defire of 
 the Happinefs of others to be a moft natu* 
 ral InJtinEt, which we alfo expect in o- 
 thers, and not the Effect of any confufed 
 Ideas. 
 
 THE Occafion of the imagined Difficulty 
 in conceiving difinterefted 'Defires, has 
 probably been attempting to define this 
 fimple Idea, 'Defire. It is called an uneafy 
 Senfation in the ab fence of Good. Where- 
 as ^Defire is as diftincSt from any Senfation, 
 as the Will is from the 'Under jlanding or 
 Senfes. This every one muft acknowledge, 
 who fpeaks of dejirmg to remove IJneafi- 
 uefs or Tain. 
 
 W E may perhaps find, that our Defires are 
 fo far from tending always toward private 
 Good, that they are oftner employed about 
 the State of others. Nay further, we may 
 have a Propenfity toward an Event, which 
 we neither apprehend as the Means of pri- 
 vate Good, or pub lick. Thus an Epicurean 
 \v ho denies a future State ; or, one to 
 
 whom
 
 of the PASSIONS. 25 
 
 whom God revealed that he fhould be an- Se&. i 
 nihilated, might at his very Exit defire 
 future Fame, from which he expected no 
 Pleafure to himfelf, nor intended any to o- 
 thers. Such Defires indeed no felfijb Be- 
 ing, who had the modelling of his own 
 Nature, would chufe to implant in itfelf. 
 But fince we have not this power, we muft 
 be content to be thus " befooled into a 
 " publick Intereft againft our Will;" as 
 an ingenious Author exprefTes it. 
 
 THE Profped of any Intereft may be a 
 Motive to us, to defire whatever we appre- 
 hend as the Means of obtaining it. Parti- 
 cularly, *' if Rewards of any kind are pro- 
 " poled to thofe who have virtuous Affec- 
 " lions, this would raife in us the Defire 
 " of having thefe Affeftions, and would 
 " incline us to ufe all means to raife them 
 " in our felves ; particularly to turn our 
 " Attention to all thofe Qualities in the 
 *' DEITY, or our Fellows, which arena- 
 " turally apt to raife the virtuous AfTedi- 
 " ons. 5 ' Thus it is, that Intereft of any 
 kind may influence us indirectly to Virtue, 
 and Rewards particularly may over-ballance 
 all Motives to Vice. 
 
 THIS may let us fee, that " the Sancti- 
 " ons of Rewards and Tunijhments, as 
 '< propofed in the Gofpel, are not rendered 
 
 " ufelels
 
 fhe Nature and Condutt 
 
 " ufelefs or unneceffary, by fuppofing the 
 " virtuous Affe&ion to be difinterefled ; " 
 fince fuch Motives of Interefl, propofed 
 and attended to, muft incline every Perfbn 
 to dejlre to have virtuous Affe&ions, and 
 to turn his Attention to every thing which 
 is naturally apt to raife them ; and muft 
 overbalance every other Motive of Inte- 
 reft, oppofite to thefe Affections, which 
 could incline Men to fiipprefs or counteract 
 them. 
 
 SECT.
 
 of the P A S S I O N S. 27 
 
 . 2. 
 
 SECT. II. 
 
 Of the Affections and Paffions : The 
 natural Laws of pure Affection : 
 The confufed Senfations of the 
 Faffions, with the'tr final Caufes. 
 
 I. \FTER the general account of 
 X~\. Senfations, we may confider other 
 Modifications of our Minds, confequent 
 upon thefe Perceptions, whether grateful,^ 
 or uneafy. The firft which occur to any 
 one are Defer e of the grateful Perceptions, 
 and Aver fan to the uneafy, either for our Averfion ' 
 felves or others. If we would confine the 
 word Affettion to thele two, which are 
 entirely diftincl: from all Senfation, and di- 
 rectly incline the Mind to Aftion or Voli- 
 tion of Motion^ we mould have no Debate 
 about the Number or Divifion ofAffeffions. 
 But fince, by univerfal Cuftom, this Name 
 is applied to other Modifications of the 
 Mind, fuch as Joy, Sorrow, 'Defpair, we 
 may confider what univerfal c Diftinftion 
 can be affigned between thefe Modifications^ 
 and thefeveral Senfations above-mentioned ; 
 and we mall fcarce find any other than this,. 
 that we call the d'trett immediate Ter- 
 ** ceftion of Pleafure or Pain from the pre-
 
 2 8 The Nature and Condutf 
 
 Sed. 2." Tent Objed: or Event, the Senfation : " 
 ^v~ But we denote by the Affetlion or Taffion 
 juton*, r me other " '"Perceptions of Pleafure or 
 viberein ** Pain, not dire&ly railed by the ^Pre fence 
 different * or Qp era tion of the Event or Objedt, 
 
 from Sen- . .-* -r* n <-t * 
 
 fation. ' but by our Reflection upon, or Appre- 
 " henfan of their preient or certainly fu- 
 " cure Exiftence ; fo that we are fare that 
 ' c the Obje<a or Event will raife the direft 
 " Senfations in us." In beholding a regu- 
 lar Building we have the Senfatton of Beau- 
 ty ; but upon our apprehending our felves 
 poffefled of it, or that we can procure this 
 pleafant Senfation when we pleafe, we feel 
 the Affettion of Joy. When a Man has a 
 Fit of the Gout, he has \hz painful Senfa- 
 tion ; when he is not at preient pained, yet 
 apprehends a fudden return of it, he has 
 the Affection of Sorrow, which might in 
 (bme lenfe alfo be called a Senfation. 
 
 'Affeftion WHEN the word ^PaJJion is imagined to 
 
 fnm^Ptf- d enote an y tni * n g different from the Affec- 
 
 (ion. tions, it includes, befide the ^Dejire or 
 
 Averfion, be fide the calm Joy upon appre- 
 
 , bended PofTefllon of Good, or Sorrow from 
 
 the Lofs of it, or from impending Evil, 
 
 ' a * confufed Senfation either of Pleafure 
 
 * Whoever would fee fubtile Divifions of thofe Senfa- 
 tions, let him read Malebranehe's Recherche de la Vente, 
 B. v. c. 3. Together with thefe Senfations there are alfo {bme 
 ftrong Propensities diftinft from any rational Defire : About 
 which fee StSt. j. Art. i. of this Treatife. 
 
 '* or
 
 of the P A S S I O N S. 29 
 
 " or Pain, occafioned or attended by fomeSe<St 2. 
 " violent bodily Motions, which keeps UO/ ^ 
 '' the Mind much employed upon the 
 " prefent Affair, to the exclufion of every 
 " thing elfe, and prolongs or ftrengthens 
 " the AfTe&ion fometimes to fuch a de- 
 * ' gree, as to prevent all deliberate Reajb- 
 " ning about our Conduct. " 
 
 II. WE have little reafbn to imagine, General 
 that all other Agents have fuch confuted 1 ^*'' . 
 
 r s> + \. T\ r an <l parti- 
 
 Senfations accompanying their Denres as /' Af- 
 we often have. Let us abftracl: from them,/^^ r 
 and confider in what manner we ihould p ^" f * 
 acl: upon the feveral Occafions which now 
 excite our Paflions, if we had none of 
 thefe Senfations whence our Defires become 
 pajfionate. 
 
 THERE is a Diftindfcion to be oblerved 
 on this Subjed:, between " thecaJm T>ejire 
 ' of Good, and Averfion to Evil, either 
 " felfifh or publick, as it appears to our 
 " Reafon or Reflection ; and the farticu- 
 ** lor fajjions towards Objects immedi- 
 *' ately prefented to fome Senfe. " Thus 
 noihing can be more diftincl: than the gene- 
 ral calm 'Dejire of private Good of any 
 kind, which alone would incline us to pur- 
 fue whatever Objects were apprehended as 
 the Means of Good, aad: the particular 
 ftlfi/h Tajfions \ fuch As <Ambition, Cove- 
 toitfnefs. Hunger ; Lnft, Revettge, Anger, 
 
 as
 
 jo jThe Nature and Condutt 
 
 Seel:. 2. as they arife upon particular Occafions. 
 
 tXVNJ In like manner, our publick Defires may be 
 diftinguifhed into the general calm Tlefire 
 of the Happinefs of other s y or Aver fan to 
 their Mtfery upon Refle&ion ; and the 
 particular Affections or TaJJlons of Love, 
 Congratulation, CompaJJion , natural Af- 
 f e ^ lon ' Thele^ particular Affections are 
 found in many Tempers, where, thro' 
 want of Refle&ion, the general calm *De- 
 Jires are not found : Nay, the former may 
 be oppofite to the latter, where they are 
 found in the fame Temper. We obtain 
 Command over the particular Taffions, 
 principally by ftrengthning the general T)e- 
 Jtres thro' frequent Reflection, and making 
 them habitttal, fb as to obtain Strength fu- 
 perior to the particular TaJJlons. 
 
 AGAIN, the calm public T>efires may 
 be confidered as ** they either regard the 
 " Good of 'particular Terjbns or Societies 
 44 prefented to our Senfes ; or that of fome 
 ** more abftradted or general Community, 
 44 fuch as a Species or Syftem." This latter 
 fort we may call ttniverfal calm Benevo- 
 lence. Now 'tis plain, that not only par- 
 ticular kind Taffions, but even calm parti- 
 cular Benevolence do not always arife from, 
 or necefTarily preiuppofe, the univerfal 
 Benevolence ; both the former may be found 
 in Perfons of little Reflection, where the 
 latter is wanting : And the former two may 
 
 be
 
 of the PASSIONS. 31 
 
 be oppofite to the other, where they meetSedt 2. 
 together in one Temper. So the univer- 
 fal Benevolence might be where there was 
 neither of the former ; as in any fuperior 
 Nature or Angel, who had no .particular 
 Intercourfe with any part of Mankind. 
 
 OUR moral Senfe^ tho it approves all par- 
 ticular kind Affeff ion or ^Pajfion, as well 
 as calm particular Benevolence abftra&ly 
 confidered ; yet it allb approves the Re- 
 ftraint or Limitation of all particular Af- 
 fections or Paffions, by the calm univerfal 
 Benevolence. To make this Defire pre- 
 valent above 2\\f articular Affections, is the 
 only fure way to obtain conftant Self- Ap- 
 probation. 
 
 THE calm felfjh T>efires would deter- 
 mine any Agent to purfue every Objecl: or 
 Event, known either by Reafon or prior 
 Experience to be good to itfelf. We need 
 not imagine any innate Idea of Good in 
 general, of infinite Goody or of the great eft 
 Aggregate : Much lefs need we fappofe any 
 aflual Inclination toward any of thefe, as 
 the Caufe or Spring of all particular De- 
 fires. 'Tis enough to allow, 4 * that we 
 " are capable by enlarging, or by Abftra- 
 " ft ion t of coming to thefe Ideas : That 
 " we muft , by the Conflitution of our 
 '* Nature, defire any apprehended Good 
 " which occurs a-part from any Evil: 
 
 " That
 
 2 1 ffie Nature an A Conduct 
 
 Se&.2." That oftwoObjeds inconfiftent with 
 each other, we mall defire that which 
 " feems to contain the greateft Moment of 
 " Good? So that it cannot be pronounced 
 concerning any finite Good, that it fhall 
 neceflarily engage our Purfuit; fmce the 
 Agent may potfibly have the Idea of a 
 Greater, or fee this to be inconfiftent with 
 fbme more valuable ObjeEl, or that it may 
 bring upon him fbme frefollent Evil. The 
 certain Knowledge of any of thefe Things, 
 or probable Trefumption of them, may 
 flop the Purfuit of any finite Good. If 
 this be any fort of Liberty ', it muft be al- 
 lowed to be in Men, even by thofe who 
 maintain " the Tie/ire or IV ill to be ne- 
 " cefTarily determined by \hz prepollent 
 <l Motive ; " fmce this very 'Prejumftum 
 may be a prepollent Motive, efpecially 
 to thofe, who oy frequent Attention make 
 the Idea of the great eft Good always pre- 
 lent to themfelves on all important Occa- 
 fions. 
 
 THE fame may eafily be applied to our 
 Averfion to finite Evils. 
 
 THERE feems to be this Degree of 
 Liberty about the Underftanding, that tho ' 
 the^/j^?/? Certainty or ^Demonstration does 
 necefTarily engage our AfTent, yet we can 
 fufpend any abfolute Conclusion from fro- 
 bable Arguments, until we examine whe- 
 ther
 
 oftk PASSIONS. 
 
 ther this apparent Trobability be not op- Sed. 
 pofite to ^Demonjlration, or fuperior Tro* 
 babiiity on the other fide. 
 
 THIS may let us lee, that tho it were: 
 acknowledged that " Men are neceffarily 
 '* determined to purfue their own Happi- 
 " iiefs, and to be influenced by whatever 
 " Motive appears to be prepolLent^" yet 
 they might be proper Stibjetts of a Law ; 
 fmce the very Sanctions of the Law, if 
 they attend to them, may fugged a Motive 
 prepollent to all others. In like manner, 
 " Errors may be criminal, * where there 
 " are fufficient <Data or Objettiw Evi- 
 44 dence for the Truth ;" fince no Demon- 
 ftration can lead to Error, and we can 
 iulpend our AfTent to probable Arguments* 
 till we have examined both Sides. Yet 
 human 'Penalties concerning Opinions muft 
 be of little confequence, fince no Penalty 
 can fupply the place of Argument, or 'Pro* 
 babUity to engage our Affent^ however 
 they may as Motives determine our E~ 
 
 I N the calm public k 'Defires, in like man- 
 ner, where there are no oppofite Defires , 
 the greater Good of another is always; 
 preferred to the le(s : And in the cairn 
 
 * See Treat. 4. Seft. 6, Art. 6, laft Paragraph. 
 
 D universal
 
 34 %*he Nature and Conduft 
 
 Seel;, a.univerfal Benevolence, the Choice is de- 
 termined by the Moment of the Good, 
 and the Number of thofe who fhall enjoy 
 it. 
 
 WHEN ihepublick ^Dejires are oppofite 
 to the/ra;^, or feem to be fo, that kind 
 prevails which isjlronger or more intenfe. 
 
 Definitions. III. THE following definitions of cer- 
 tain Words ufed on this Subje&.may fhorten 
 our Expreflions ; and the Axioms fubjoined 
 may Ihew the manner of acting from calm 
 'Dejire, with Analogy to the Laws of 
 Motion. 
 
 Natural i. N A T u R A L Good is PleafuTC : Natu- 
 
 Good and ra l EvilisVzin. 
 
 hvd. 
 
 2 . N A T u R A i. good Qbjetfs are thofe which 
 are apt, either mediately or immediately to 
 give Pleafure ; the former are called Advan- 
 tageous. Natural Evil Objects are fiich 
 as, in like manner, give Pain. 
 
 3. ABSOLUTE Good is that which, 
 confidered with all its Concomitants and 
 Coniequences, contains more Good than 
 What compensates all its Evils. 
 
 4. ABSOLUTE Evil, on the contrary, 
 contains Evil which outweighs all its Good. 
 
 5. RE-
 
 of tie PASSIONS. 35 
 
 Sea. 2, 
 
 5. RELATIVE Good or Evil, is any ixvva 
 particular Good or Evil, which does not thu$ Relattvet 
 compenfate its contrary Concomitants or 
 Confequences. This Diftiridion would have 
 been more exactly exprefTed by the Bomim 
 Jimpliciter , and fecundum quid of the 
 Schoolmen. 
 
 Cor. RELATIVE Good may be Abfolute 
 Evil ; thus often ienfual Pleafures are in 
 the whole pernicious : And Abfolute Good 
 may be Relative Evil ; thus an imflea- 
 fant Totion may recover Health. 
 
 GOOD and Evil, according to the 
 *PerJbns whom they afredt, may be divided 
 into c l)niverfal, 'Particular and Trivate. 
 
 6. UN iv E R s A L Good, is what tends to unherfaL 
 the Happinefs of the whole Syftem of fen- 
 Jit ive Beings ; and 'Vniverfal Evil is the 
 contrary. 
 
 7. PARTICULAR Good is what tends particular^ 
 to the Happinels of a Part of this Syftem : 
 ^Particular Evil is the contrary. 
 
 8. PRIVATE Good or Evil is that ofp r hat& 
 the Perfon adting. Each of thefe three 
 Members may be either Abfolute or Rela* 
 tive. 
 
 D i Cor. i.
 
 3 6 fhe Nature and Conduft 
 
 Sea 2. 
 
 Cor. i. PARTICULAR or private Good 
 may poflibly be univerfal Evil: And mi- 
 verfal Good may be f articular or private 
 Evil. The Punifhment of a Criminal is an 
 Inftance of the latter. Of the former, per- 
 haps, there are no real Inftances in the 
 whole Adminiftration of Nature : but there 
 are fome apparent Inftances ; fuch as the 
 Succefs of an unjuft War ; or the Efcape 
 of an unrelenting Criminal. 
 
 Cor. 2. WHEN particular or private 
 Goods are entirely innocent toward others, 
 they are univerfal Good. 
 
 , p. COMPOUND good Objects or Events, 
 are (uch as contain the Powers of feveral 
 Goods at once. Thus, Meat may be both 
 pleafant and healthful ; an Action may give 
 its Author at once the Pleafures of the Mo- 
 ral Senfe and of Honour. The fame is 
 cafily applicable to compound Evil. 
 
 10. A MIXED Objett is v what contains 
 at once the Powers of Good and Evil : 
 Thus a virtuous Action may give the A- 
 gent the Pleafures of the Moral Senfe^ and 
 *Pains of the external Senfes. Execution of 
 Juftice may give the Plealures of the pub* 
 lick Senfe, and the Pains of Compafflon to- 
 ward the Sufferer. 
 
 Ti. THE
 
 cfthe PASSIONS. 37 
 
 2 . 
 
 ii. THE great eft or moft ferfett Good ^^r^. 
 is that whole Series, or Scheme of Even 
 which contains a greater Aggregate of Hap- 
 pinefs in the whole, or more abfolute uni- 
 verfal Good, than any other poflible 
 Scheme, after fubtracting all the Evils con- 
 nected with each of them. 
 
 1 2. A N Action \sgood, in a moral Senfe, 
 when it flows from benevolent Affection, Good ' 
 or Intention of abfolute Good to others. 
 Men of much Reflection may actually in- 
 tend univerfal abfolute Good ; but with 
 the common rate of Men their Virtue con- 
 fifts in intending and purfaing particular 
 abfolute Good^ not inconfiftent with uni- 
 verfal Good. 
 
 13. AN Action is morally evil, either Mor * 1 
 from Intention of abfolute Evil, univerfal, EM/ * 
 or particular, ( * which is feldom the cafe 
 with Men, except in fudden Paflions ; ) or 
 from purfuit of private or particular rela" 
 five Good> which they might have known 
 did tend to univerfal abfolute Evil. For 
 even the want of a \ juft Degree of Bene- 
 volence renders an Action^ evil. 
 
 * See 2 Treatife, Sett. z. Art. 4. p. 143. 
 f Treatife 4, Sett. 6. 4rt. 4. 
 
 D 3 [14. COM<
 
 3 8 The Nature and Conduct 
 
 Sett. 2. 
 
 ^"^, 14. COMPOUND moral Goodnefs is 
 
 Compound. , i . t I-/T~ i 
 
 that to which different w0ra/ Sfectes con- 
 cur : Thus the fame Action may evidence 
 Love to our Fellows, and Gratitude to GOD. 
 We may in like manner underftando?w/0/W 
 moral Evil. We cannot fuppofe mixed 
 moral Aftions \. - 
 
 15. AGENTS are denominated morally 
 good or evil* from their Affections and 
 Actions, or Attempts of Action. 
 
 'Axioms, or iv. A x i o M s, or natural Laws of calm 
 
 general 
 
 1. SELFISH ^c/lres purfiie ultimately 
 only the private Good of the Agent. 
 
 2. BENEVOLENT or fublick *Defires 
 purfiie the Good of others, according to 
 the feveral Syftems to which we extend our 
 Attention, but with different Degrees of 
 Strength. 
 
 3. THE Strength either of the private 
 or public k Defire of any Event, is propor- 
 tioned to the imagined Quantity of Good, 
 which will arife from it to the Agent, or the 
 Perfon beloved. 
 
 2 Treatife, Stft* 7. Art. 9. laft Parag. 
 
 4. MIXED
 
 of tie PASSIONS. 39 
 
 Sect. 2. 
 
 4. MIXED Qbjefts are purfaed or ihun- 
 ned with Defire or Averfion, proportioned 
 to the apprehended Excefs of Good or 
 Evil. 
 
 5. EQJIAL Mixtures of Good and 
 Evil (lop all Defire or Averfion. 
 
 6. A COMPOUND good or e 
 
 is profecuted or Ihunned with a TDegree of 
 Defire or Averfion, proportioned to the 
 Sum of Good, or of Evil. 
 
 7. I N computing the Quantities of Good 
 or Evil, which we purfue or fhun, either for 
 our felves or others, when the ^Durations 
 are equal,the Moment is as the Intenfenefs : 
 and when the Intenfenefs of Pleafure is the 
 fame, or equal, the Moment is as the 'Du- 
 ration. 
 
 8. H E N c E the Moment of Good in any 
 Object, is in a compound Proportion of the 
 'Duration and Intenfenefs. 
 
 9. THE Trouble ', Tain, or ^Danger, in- 
 curred by the Agent, in acquiring or retain- 
 ing any Good, is to be fubtradted from the 
 Sum of the Good. So the Tleafires which 
 attend or flow from the means if prepol- 
 lent Evil, are to be fubtra&ed, to find the 
 abfolute Quantity. 
 
 D 4, 10. THE
 
 4O fhe Nature and 
 
 Setf. 2. 
 
 10. THE Ratio of the Hazard of ac- 
 quiring or retaining any Good muft be mul- 
 tiplied into the Moment of the Good ; fo 
 alfb the Hazard of avoiding any Evil is to 
 be multiplied into the Moment of it, tq 
 find its comparative value. 
 
 Cor. HL N CE it is, that the fmalleft cer- 
 tain Good may raife ftronger Defire than 
 the greareft Good, if the Uncertain fy qf 
 the latter iurpafs that of the former, in a 
 greater Ratio than that of the greater to 
 the leis. Thus Men content themfelves 
 in all Affairs with jmalter^ but more fro- 
 b ably fuccefsful Purfuits, quitting thofe qf 
 greater Moment but lefs ^Probability. 
 
 fl ,\ 1 1 To an immortal Nature it is indif- 
 ferent in what part of its Duration it enjoys 
 a Good limited in Duration, if its Senfe be 
 equally acute in all parts of its Exiftence ; 
 and the Enjoyment of this Good excludes 
 Qt the Enjoyment of other Goods, at one 
 time more than another. The fame may 
 te applied to the Suffering of Evil, limited 
 $n Duration,, 
 
 i?. BUT if the Duration of the Good be 
 infinite, ihe Earlinefs of Commencement 
 che Moment, as finite added to 
 fjjrpalTes infinite ajone. 
 
 2H i
 
 of the PASSIONS. 41 
 
 Seel. 2, 
 
 13. To Beings of limited certain 'Dtt- 
 r at ion, Axiom 12. may be applied, when 
 the 'Duration of the Good would not fur- 
 pafs the Exiftence of the Pofleflbr, after 
 the Time of its Commencement. 
 
 14. To Beings of limited uncertain 
 duration, the Earlinefs of Commencement 
 increafes the Moment of any Good, ac- 
 cording to the Hazard of the To/ejffbr's 
 'Duration. This may, perhaps, account for 
 what fbme alledg to be a natural *DifpoJi- 
 tion of our Minds, even previous to any 
 Reflection on the Uncertainty of Life, viz. 
 that we are fb conftituted, as to defire more 
 ardently the nearer Enjoyments than the 
 rnore diftant , tho of equal Moment in 
 themfelves, and as certainly to be obtained 
 by us. 
 
 15. THE Removal of 'Pain has always 
 the Notion of Good, and Ibllicits us more 
 importunately : Its Moment is the lame 
 way computed by Intenfenefs and 'Dura- 
 tion, and afre&ed by the Hazard and by 
 t,he Uncertainty of our Exiftence. 
 
 THESE are the general Ways of com- 
 puting the Quantities of Good in any Object 
 pr Event, whether we are purluing our 
 pwn private Gppd from felfilh Defires, or 
 
 the
 
 Nature and Conduct 
 
 Seel:. 2. the Good of others from publick AfFedions. 
 v-^O*' Concerning thefe latter we may obferve, 
 
 1 6> THAT our Defires toward publick 
 Good are, when other Circumftances are e- 
 qual, proportioned to the Moment of the 
 Goods themfelves. 
 
 17. OUR publick Defires of any Events, 
 are proportioned to the Number of Perfons 
 to whom the good Event mall extend, when 
 the Moments and other Circumftances are 
 equal. 
 
 1 8. WHEN the Moments themfelves, 
 and Numbers of Enjoy ers are equal, our 
 Defire is proportioned to the Strength or 
 Nearnefs of the Ties or Attachments to 
 the Perfons. 
 
 i p. WHEN all other Circumftances are 
 equal, our Defires are proportional to 
 the apprehended Moral Excellence of the 
 Perions. 
 
 20. IN general, the Strength of pub- 
 lick Defire is in a Compound Ratio of 
 the Quantity of the Good it ft If* and the 
 Number , Attachment l , and ^Dignity of the 
 Perfons. 
 
 TH E SE feem to be the general Laws, 
 according to which our Defires arife. Our 
 
 Senfes
 
 of the PASSIONS. 43 
 
 Senfes conftitute Objeds , Events or Seel:. 2. 
 
 Actions good ; and ' * we have Power to 
 reafon^ reflect and compare the feveral 
 Goods, and to find out the proper and 
 effectual Means of obtaining the greateft 
 for our felves or others, fo as not to be 
 led afide by every Appearance of rela- 
 tive m particular Good. " 
 
 V. IF it be granted, that we have \ 
 planted in our Nature the feveral VeJir 
 above-mentioned, let us next inquire " in-Ajfe8u. 
 " to what State we would incline to bring 
 " our felves, upon the leveral Accidents 
 " which now raife our e Paflions\ fuppofing 
 " that we had the Choice of our own State 
 44 entirely, and were not, by the Frame of 
 '* our Nature, (iibje&ed to certain Senfa- 
 " tions t independently of our Volition." 
 
 I F it feems too ram to aflert a Diftin- 
 &ion between Affections and < PaJfionS) or 
 that ^Dejlre may fubfift without any uneafi- 
 neft, fince perhaps we are never confcious 
 of any Defire abfolutely free from all un- 
 eafinefs ; '* let it be confidered, that the 
 " fimple Idea of T)ejlre is different from 
 " that of Pain of any kind, or from any 
 " Senfation whatfoever: Nor is there any 
 '* other Argument for their Identity than 
 " this, that they occur to us at once: 
 ** But this Argument is inconclufive, other- 
 
 " Wife
 
 44 y*h* Nature anS, Conduct 
 
 Seel:. 2." Wife it would prove Colour and Figure 
 
 to be the fame, or Incifion and Tain" 
 i' ', ' y "'' 'j ' 
 
 THERE is a middle State of oor Minds, 
 when we are not in the purfiut of any 
 important Good, nor know of any great 
 Indigence of thofe we love, In this State, 
 when any fmaller pofitive Good to our 
 felves or our Friend is apprehended to be 
 in our power, we may refoiutely dejlre and 
 furfue it, without any confiderable Sevja- 
 tion of { Pain or Uneafinefs. Some Tem- 
 pers feem to have as ftrong ^Dejlres as any, 
 by the Conftancy and Vigor of their Pur- 
 fuits, either of publick or private Good ; 
 and yet give fmall Evidence of any uneafy 
 Senfation. This is obfervable in fbme fe- 
 date Men, who feem no way inferior in 
 Strength of Defire to others : Nay, if we 
 conlult our felves, and not the common 
 Sy Items, we ihall perhaps find, that "the 
 " nobleft Defire in our Nature, that of 
 *' univerfal Hapfinefs, is generally calm, 
 " and wholly free from any confufed unea- 
 " fy Senfation:" except in fbme warm 
 Tempers, who, by a lively Imagination ^and 
 frequent Attention to general Ideas, raife 
 fomething of PaCion even toward univer- 
 Jal Nature*. Yea, further, Defire may be 
 as ftrong as poflible toward a certainly fu- 
 
 See Marcus Aitrelius, in many places. 
 
 turs
 
 of the PASSIONS. 45 
 
 ture Event, the fixed Time of its Exiftence Sect. 2* 
 being alfo known, and yet we are not con- 
 fcious of any 'Pain attending mch Defires. 
 But tho this fhould not be granted to be Fad: 
 with Men, yet the Difference of the Ideas 
 of Defire and Pain, may give fufficient ground 
 for abftracting them ; and for our making 
 the Suppofition of their being feparated. 
 
 UPON this Suppofition then, when any 
 Object was defired, if we found it difficult 
 or uncertain to be obtained, but worthy of 
 all the Labour it would coft ; we would 
 fet about it with Diligence, but would 
 never chufe to bring upon our felves any 
 fainful Sen fat ion accompany ing our Defire, 
 nor to increafe our Toil by Anxiety. What- 
 ever Satisfaction we had ia our State before 
 the Profpecl: of this additional Good, we 
 ihould continue to enjoy it while this Good 
 was in fufpenfe ; and if we found it unat- 
 tainable, we mould be juft as we were be- 
 fore : And we mould never chufe to bring 
 upon our felves thole Fret tings which now 
 commonly arife from Dilappointments. 
 Upon Opinion of any impending Evil, we 
 ihould dejlre and ufe all means to prevent 
 it, but fhould never voluntarily bring upon 
 our felves the unealy Senfation of Fear, 
 which now naturally anticipates our Mifery, 
 and gives us a Foreiafte of it, more un- 
 grateful iometimes than the Suffering itfelf. 
 If the Evil did befal us, we (hould never 
 
 chufe
 
 Nature and Conduct 
 
 Sed. 2.chufib to increafe it, by the Senfations of 
 Sorrow or 'Defpair ; we fhould confider 
 what was the Sum of Good remaining in 
 our State, after fubtrading this Evil ; and 
 fhould enjoy our felves as well as a Being, 
 who had never known greater Good, nor 
 enjoyed greater Pleafure, than the abfolute 
 Good yet remaining with us ; or perhaps we 
 fhould purfue fbme other attainable Good. 
 In the like manner, did our State and the 
 Modifications of our Mind depend upon our 
 Choice, fhould we be affeded upon the ap- 
 prehended Approach of Good or Evil, to 
 thofe whom we love ; we mould have de- 
 Jires of obtaining the one for them, and 
 of defending them from the other, accom- 
 panied with no imeafy Senfations. We do 
 indeed find in fad, that our ftronger De fires, 
 whether private or publick, are accompa- 
 nied with uneafy Senfations \ but thefe 
 Senfations do not feem the neceffary Re- 
 fult of the Defire itfelf : They depend up- 
 on the prefent Conftitution of our Nature^ 
 which might poflibly have been otherwife 
 ordered. And in fad: we find a confidera- 
 ble Diverfity of Tempers in this matter ; 
 fomzfedate Tempers equally defiring either 
 publick or private Good with the more 
 paflionate Tempers ; but without that De- 
 gree of Ferment, Confujion, and Tain, 
 which attend the, fame Defires in the TaJ^ 
 Jionate. 
 
 Ac-
 
 of the PASSIONS. 47 
 
 Sea. 2 
 
 ACCORDING to the prefent Conflitu- 
 tion of our Nature, we find that the Mo- 
 dif cations or *PajJions of our Mind, are 
 very different from thofe which we would 
 chufe to bring upon our lelves, upon their 
 feveral Occafions. The Prolpedt of any 
 confiderable Good for our felves, or thole 
 we love, raifes Defire $ and this Defire is 
 accompanied with uneajy confufed Sen fa- 
 tions , which often occafion Fretfulnefs, 
 Anxiety^ and Impatience. We find vi- 
 olent Motions in our Bodies; and are 
 often made unfit for ferious Deliberation 
 about the Means of obtaining the Good 
 deftred "When it is firft obtained, we find 
 violent confufed Senfations of Joy, beyond 
 the Proportion of the Good itfelf, or its 
 Moment to our Happinefs. If we are 
 difappointed, we feel a Seufation of Sorrow 
 and %)efeffiQn 9 which is often entirely 
 ulelcfs to our prefent State. Forefeen Evils 
 are antedated by painful Senfations of Fear ; 
 and Reflection, attended with Senfations 
 of Sorrow, gives a tedious Exiftence to 
 tranfitory Misfortunes. Our public k *De- 
 Jires are in the fame manner accompanied 
 with painful Senfations. The Prefence or 
 Sufpence of Good or Evil to others , is 
 made the Occafion of the like confufed 
 Senfations. A little Reflection will fliew, 
 that none of thefe Senfations depend upon 
 our Choice, but arife from the very Frame 
 
 of
 
 48 Te Nature an 
 
 Sect. 2- of our Nature, however we may regulate 
 or moderate them. 
 
 . VI. L E T us then examine " for what 
 " Purpofe our Nature was fo conftituted, 
 
 - _ _ . -^ 
 
 ' that Senfations do thus neceflarily arife 
 " in us. " Would not thofe fir ft forts of 
 Senfations^ by which we apprehend Good 
 and Evil in the Objects themfelves, have 
 been fufficient, along with our Reafon and 
 pure 'Defires^ without thofe Senfations at- 
 tending the very Defires thefnfelves, for 
 which they are called 'Pajfions, or thofe 
 Senfations which attend our Reflection 
 upon the Prefence, Abfence, or Approach 
 of Good or Evil ? 
 
 THE common Anfwef, that " they 
 " are given to us as ufeful Incitements or 
 " Spurs to Action, by which we are 
 " roufed more effectually to promote our 
 " private Good, or that of the Publick, * 
 is too general and undetermined. What 
 need is there for roufing us to Action, more 
 than a calm pure 'Dejire of Good, and 
 Averfion to Evil would do, without thefe 
 confufed Senfations? Say they, " we are 
 " averfe to Labour; we are apt to be 
 " hurried away by Avocations of Curio- 
 ** Jity or Mirth ; we are often fo indolent 
 " and averfe to the vigorous Ufe of our 
 " Powers, that we ihould neglect our 
 " true Intereft without thefe ibllicitiog 
 
 " Sen*
 
 of the PASSIONS. 49 
 
 " Senfations." But may it not be anfwer- Se<5t 2. 
 ed, that if Labour and vigorous UFe 
 our Powers be attended with TJneafinefs 
 or Pain, why mould not th s be brought 
 into the Account? The Purfuit of a fmall 
 Good by great Toil is really fooiifh ; vi- 
 olent Labour may be as pernicious as any 
 thing elfe : Why mould we be excired to 
 any uneajy Labour, except for prepolient 
 Good ? And, when the Good \sprepollent)> 
 what need of any further Incitement than 
 the calm Defire of it ? The fame may be 
 faid of the Avocations of Cxrirjity or 
 Mirth ; if their ahfolute fleafures be 
 greater than that of the good from which 
 they divert us, why mould we not b 
 diverted from it ? If not, then the real 
 Moment of the Good propofed is fufficieht 
 to engage our Purluit of it, in Oppofition 
 to our Guriofity or Mirth. 
 
 IF indeed our Averfion to Labour, of" 
 Our Propenfity to Mirth be accompanied 
 with thefe Senfations, then it was necejfta- 
 ly that other 'De/ires mould be attended 
 with like Senfations, that Ib a Ballanc^ 
 might be preferved. So if we have confufed 
 Senfation ftrengthning and fixing our fri* 
 vafe *DeJires, the like Senfation joined td 
 fublick Affettions is neceflary^ left th<5 
 former Defires mould wholly engrofs out 
 Minds : If weight be caft into one Scale* 
 as much mud be put into the other to pre- 
 E
 
 50 T'he Natttre an A Conduct 
 
 Seel:. 2.ferve an Equilibrium. But the firft Que- 
 n is, " whence arofe the NecdTity of 
 " fuch additional Incitements on either 
 " fide?" 
 
 I T muft be very difficult for Beings of 
 fuch imperfect Knowledge as we are, to 
 anfwer fuch Queftions : we know very 
 little of the Conftitution of Nature, or 
 what may be neceflary for the Perfection 
 of the whole. The Author of Nature has 
 probably formed many active Beings, whofe 
 Defires are not attended with conrufed Sen- 
 fations, raifing them into Pafllons like to 
 ours. There is probably an infinite Vari- 
 ety of Beings, of all poflible Degrees, in 
 which the Sum of Happinefs exceeds that 
 of Mifery. We know that our State is 
 abfolutely Good^ notwithftanding a confi- 
 derable Mixture of Evil. The Goodnefs 
 of the great Author of Nature appears 
 even in producing the inferior Natures* 
 provided their State in the whole be abfo- 
 lutely Good : Since we may probably con- 
 clude*, that there are in the Univerfe as 
 many Species of fuperior Natures, as was 
 confiftent with the mod perfect State of 
 the whole. This is the Thought fo much 
 infifted upon by Simplicius, that the uni- 
 
 * See Simplicius on Epiftetus, Cap. 34. And the Arch- 
 bifhop of Dublin, de Origins Mali, above all others on this 
 Subject. 
 
 verfal
 
 of the PASSIONS. 51 
 
 verfal Cauie mud produce -rt^m, as well as SecSt 2. 
 7* 7r?7, $ TV 3*7*. We know not if this ^-^v^ 
 Giobe be a fit Place for the Habitation of 
 Natures fuperior to ours : If not, it muft 
 certainly be in the whole better that it fhould 
 have its imperfett Inhabitants, whofe State 
 is abfblutely Good, than that it fhould be 
 defblate. 
 
 ALL then which we can expect to do 
 in this Matter, is only to Ihew, that " thefe 
 " confufed Seufations are neceffary tofuch 
 " Natures as we are in other reffeUs : Par- 
 " ticularly that Beings of fuch Degrees of 
 " 'Underftanding^ and fuch Avenues to 
 " Knowledge as we have, muft need thefe 
 " additional Forces, which we call Pa 
 " ilons, befide the firft Senjations by which 
 " Objects are conftituted Good or Evil, 
 " and the pure JJe/ire or Averfion arifing 
 " from Opinion or Apprehenfion of Good 
 " or Evil/' 
 
 Now our Reafon, or Knowledge of the From the 
 Relations of external Things to our Bodies, f^ c ' M 
 is fb inconfiderable, that it is generally under. 
 fome pleafant Senfation which teaches 
 what tends to their Prefervarion ; and fome 
 fainful Senfation which mews what is per- 
 nicious. Nor is this Inftrudion fufficient ; 
 we need alfo to be directed when our Bo- 
 dies want fupplies of Nourifhment ; to this 
 our Reafon could not extend : Here then 
 E 2 ap-
 
 5 2 fhe Nature and Conduct 
 
 Seel:. 2. appears the firft Necefllty of uneajy Senfa* 
 tion, preceding Defire, and continuing to 
 accompany it when it is railed. 
 
 AGAIN, our Bodies could not be pre- 
 feryed without a Senfe of Pain, connected 
 with Inctfionsi Bruifes, or violent La- 
 bour, or whatever elfe tends to deftroy any 
 part of their Mechanifm ; fince our Know* 
 ledge does not extend fo far, as to judge 
 in time what would be pernicious to it : 
 And yet, without a great deal of human 
 Labour, and many Dangers, this Earth 
 could not fupport the tenth Part of its In- 
 habitants.^ Our Nature therefore required 
 a Senfation, accompanying its Defires of 
 the Means of Trefervation, capable to 
 lurmount the Uneafmefs of Labour : this 
 we have in the Pains or Uneafmefs accom- 
 panying the Defires of Food. 
 
 IN like manner, the Tropagation ofA- 
 nimals is a Myftery to their Reafon, but 
 eafy to their Inftinff. An Offspring of 
 fuch Creatures as Men are, could not be 
 preferved without perpetual Labour and 
 Care ; which we find could not be expected 
 from the more general Ties of Bene e uolence4 
 Here then again appears the Necefllty of 
 ftrengthning the STO?^ or natural Affec- 
 tion, with ftrong Senfarions, or Pains of 
 Defire, fufficient to counter-ballance the 
 Pains of Labour, and the Senfations of the
 
 of the PASSIONS. 53 
 
 felfjb Appetites \ fince Parents mud often Sed. ^. 
 check and difappoint their own Appetites, v 
 to gratify thole of their Children. 
 
 *' WH E N a Neceflity of joining ftrong 
 " Senfations to one CJafs of Defires ap- 
 " pears, there muft appear a like Neceflity 
 " of ftrengthning the reft by like Senfa- 
 " tions,to keep ajuftBallance." Weknow, 
 for inftance, that the Pleafures of the Ima~ 
 gination tend much to the Happinefs of 
 Mankind : the Defires of them therefore 
 muft have the like Senfations aflifting them, 
 to prevent our indulging a nafty iblitary 
 Luxury. The Happinels of human Life 
 cannot be promoted without Society and 
 mutual Aid, even beyond a Family ; our 
 fublick Affections muft therefore be ftrength* 
 ned as well as the private, to keep a Bal- 
 lance ; fb muft alfo our Defires of Virtue 
 and Honour. Anger, which fome have 
 thought an ufelefs PafTion, is really as ne- 
 ceffary as the reft ; fince Mens Intefefts 
 often feem to interfere with each other; 
 and they are thereby led from Self-Love to 
 do the worft Injuries to their Fellows* 
 There could not therefore be a wifer Con? 
 trivance to reftrain Injuries, than to make 
 every mortal fome way formidable to an 
 unjuft Invader, by fuch a violent Paffion. 
 We need not have recourfe to a 'Prome- 
 theus in this matter, with th.e old Poets : 
 E 3 they
 
 54 ffle Nature and Conduct 
 
 Sett 2. they might have afcribed it to their O/* 
 v-^v^ timus Maximus. 
 
 Jnfani Leonis, 
 Vim Stomacho appofuiffe nojlro. 
 
 'A Balance VII. WITH this Eallance of publick Pa 
 ^^^fions againft the private, with our TaJJions 
 ' toward Honour and Virtue, we find that 
 human Nature may be as really amiable in 
 its low Sphere, as fuperior Natures endow- 
 ed with higher Reafbn, and influenced only 
 by pure f UeJires ; provided we vigorously 
 exercife the Powers we have in keeping 
 this Ballance of Affections, and checking 
 any Paflion which grows fo violent, as to 
 be inconfiftent with the publick Good. If 
 we have lelfifla Paflions for our own Pre- 
 fer vation, we have alfo publick fajjlons^ 
 which may engage us into vigorous and la- 
 borious Services to Offspring^ Friends , 
 Communities* Countries. Compajjiw will 
 engage us to fuccour the diftrefled, even 
 with our private Lofs or Danger. An Ab- 
 horrence of the injurious, and Love to- 
 ward the injured, with a Senfe of Virtue, 
 and Honour, can make us deipife Labour, 
 Expence, Wounds and Death. 
 
 THE Senfations of Joy or Sorrow, 
 upon the Succefs or Difappointment of any 
 Purfuit, either publick or private, have di- 
 rectly the EfTecl: of Rewards or Tunijk-
 
 of the PASSIONS. 55 
 
 ments, to excite us to a6t with the utnioft Seel:. 2 
 Vigor, either for our own Advantage, 
 that of others, for the future, and to puniih 
 paft Negligence. The Moment of every 
 Event is thereby increafed : as much as 
 theSenfations of Sorrow add to our Mtfery* 
 fo much thofe of Joy add to our Happ't* 
 nefs. Nay, fince we have fbme confide- 
 rable Tower over our Defires, as ihall be 
 explained hereafter, we may probably, by 
 good Conduct, obtain more frequent 'Plea- 
 fares of Joy upon our Snccefs, than Tains 
 of Sorrow upon Difappointment. 
 
 'Tis true indeed, that there are 
 Tempers to be found, wherein thefe Sen- 
 fations of the feveral Paffions are in fuch 
 a Ballance, as in all cafes to leave the Mind 
 in a proper State, for confidering the Im- 
 portance of every Action or Event. The 
 Senfations of Anger in fbme Tempers are 
 violent above their proportion ; thofe of 
 Ambition, Avarice, dejire offenjual Tlea- 
 fure , and even of natural Affettion y in 
 feveral Difpofitions, poflefs the Mind too 
 much, and make it incapable of attending 
 to any thing elfe. Scarce any one Temper 
 is always conftant and uniform in its Paf- 
 fions. The beft State of human Nature 
 poflible might require a Diverfity of Pat 
 fions and Inclinations, for the different Oc- 
 cupations neceffary for the whole : But the 
 Difbrder feems to be much greater than is 
 E re-
 
 5 6 fThe Nature and Con&uffi 
 
 Se<2. 2.fequifitefor this End. Cuftom, Education, 
 Habits, and Company ', may often contribute 
 much to this Diforder, however its Origi- 
 nal may be afcribed to fome more universal 
 Caufe But it is not fo great, but that hu- 
 man Life is (till a defirable State, having a 
 fuperiority of Goodnefs and Happinefs. Nor, 
 if we apply our felves to it, does it hinder 
 qs from difcerning that juft Ballance and 
 Oeconowy, which would conilitute the moft 
 happy Stare of each Perion, and promote 
 the greaceft Good in the whole. 
 
 LET Phyficians or Anatomifts explain 
 the feveral Motions in the-F/a/^r or Solids 
 of the Body, which accompany any Paffiora ; 
 or the Temperaments oi Body which either 
 make Men prone to any Paflion, or are 
 brought upon us by the long Continuance, 
 or frequent Returns of it. 'Tis only to 
 our Purpofe in general to obferve, that 
 ' probably certain Motions in the Body 
 " do accompany every Paflion by a fixed 
 " Law of Nature; and alternately, that 
 " Temperament which is apt to receive or 
 " prolong thefe Motions in the Body, does 
 " influence our TaJJions to heighten or 
 ** prolong them. " Thus a certain Tempe- 
 rament may be brought upon the Body, 
 by its being frequently put into Motion by 
 the PafTions of Anger, Joy, Love, or 
 Sorrow ; and the Continuance of this Tem- 
 perameni; fhall make Men prone to the fe 
 
 veral
 
 of the PASSIONS. 57 
 
 veral Paffions for the future. We find our Sect. 2 
 felves after a long Fit of Anger or Sorrow , 
 in an uneafy State, even when we are not 
 refle&ing on the particular Occafion of our 
 Pafiion. During this State, every trifle 
 mall be apt to provoke or dejed: us. Oa 
 the contrary, after good Succefs^ after ftrong 
 friendly Tajjions^ or a State of Mirth, fome 
 confiderable Injuries or Lqffes, which at 
 other times would have affected us very 
 much, (hall be overlooked, or meekly re- 
 ceived, or at moft but flightly refented ; per- 
 haps becaufe our Bodies are not fit eafily 
 to receive thefe Motions which are confti^ 
 tuted the Occafion of the uneafy Senfa- 
 tions of Anger. This 'Diverfoy of Tem- 
 per every one has felt, who reflects on him- 
 felf at different Times. In fome Tempers 
 it will appear like Madnefs. Whether the 
 only Seat of thefe Habits, or the Occafion 
 rather of thefe 'Difyofitionsbz in the'Body ; 
 or whether the Soul itfelf does not, by fre- 
 quent Returns of any Pafiion, acquire fome 
 greater Difpofition to receive and retain it 
 again, let thofe determine, who fufficiently 
 underftand the Nature of either the one or 
 the other. 
 
 SECT.
 
 5 8 Fhe Nature and Conduct 
 
 SECT. III. 
 
 TOO V;/ SCft * 
 
 ^Particular fDii)i/ions of the Affec- 
 tions and Pa/lions. 
 
 I. ^ 1 ^ H E Nature of any Language has 
 _ considerable Influence upon Mens 
 Reaionings on all Subjects, making them 
 often take all thole Ideas which are denoted 
 by the fame Word to be the fame ; and on 
 the other hand, to look upon different 
 Words as denoting different Ideas. We 
 ihall find that this Identity of Names has 
 occafioned much confufion in Treatifes of 
 the Paffions ; while fome have made larger, 
 and fome fmaller Collections of Names, 
 and have given the Explications of them as 
 an Account of the Paffions. 
 
 - CICERO, in the Fourth Book of Tuf- 
 
 f ton . f the culan Queftions, gives from the Stoicks, 
 
 Steieks. . . ^> J . _^. .5 r \ rn rr 
 
 this general Divifion of the Pajjions : 
 Firft, into Love and Hatred, according as 
 the Objecl: is good or evil ; and then fubdi- 
 vides each, according as the Objecl: is pre- 
 fent or expefted. About Good we have 
 thefe two, Libido & L*titia, "Defire and 
 Joy: About Evil we have likewife two, 
 Metus & jEgritudo, Fear and Sorrow, 
 To this general Divifion he fubjoins many 
 
 Sub-
 
 of the PASSIONS. 59 
 
 SubdMfionsvi each of thefe four Paffions ; Se&. 3. 
 according as in the Latin Tongue they had 
 different Names for the feverai "Decrees of 
 thefe t'aflioiis, or for the fame Paflion em- 
 ployed upon different Objeds. A Writer 
 of Lexicons would probably get the moft 
 precife Meanings of the Latin Names in 
 that Book ; nor would it be ufelefs in con- 
 fidering the Nature of them. 
 
 THE Schoolmen, as their Fund of Lan- 
 guage was much fmaller, have not fo full 
 Enumerations of them, going no further 
 than their admired Ariftotle. 
 
 II. 'T i s flrange that the thoughtful M A- 
 LEBRANCHE did not confider, that " *De- 
 " fire and Averfion are obvioufly different 
 " from the other Modifications called f Paf- 
 " fans ; that thefe two directly lead to 
 " Action, or the Volition of Motion, 
 " and are wholly diftinc^ from all fort ojf 
 44 Senfation.'' Whereas Joy and Sorrow 
 are only a fort of Senfations ; and other 
 Aflecliions differ from Senfations only, by 
 including Defire or Averfion, or their cor- 
 refpondent Propenfities : So that 'Defire 
 and Averfion are the only pure Affe&ions 
 in the ftri#eft Senfe. 
 
 IF, indeed, we confine the Word 
 tton to the " immediate Perceptions n 
 *' Pleafure and Pain, upon rhe very Pre-//. 
 
 ** fence
 
 fhe Nature anH Conduct 
 
 fence or Operation of any Objed or E- 
 vent, which are occafioned by fome 
 " Impreflion on our Bodies;" then we 
 may denote by the Word Affettion, thofe 
 Tkafures or Tains not thus excited, but 
 " refalting from fbme Reflection upon, or 
 " Opinion of our PofTeffion of any Ad- 
 " vantage, or from a certain Profped of 
 4 * future pleafant Senfations on the one 
 " hand, or from a like Reflection or Trof 
 '* feft of evil or painful Senfations on the 
 " other, either to our felves or others.'* 
 
 WHEN more violent confufed Senfa- 
 tions arife with the Affettion* and are at- 
 tended with, or prolonged by bodily Mo- 
 tions, we call the whole by the Name of 
 cpaffion, efpecially when accompanied with 
 fbme natural Trofenjities \ to be hereafter 
 explained. 
 
 I F this nfe of thefe Words be allowed, 
 the Divifion ofMALEBRANCHEis very 
 natural. Good Objects excite Love ; evil 
 Objects Hatred : each of thefe is fubdivi- 
 ded, as the Object \prefent and certain* 
 or doubtfully expetted^ or certainly re- 
 moved. To thefe three Circumftances cor- 
 refpond three Modifications of the original 
 Artedions; viz. Joy, <DeJire and Sorrow. 
 Good prefent, raifes Joy of Love, or Love 
 of Joy: Good in fufpenfe, the Love of 
 *Defire \ Good loft, Love of Sorrow. Evil 
 
 prefent.
 
 tftb* PASSIONS. 61 
 
 prefent, raifes Aver fan of Sorrow ; Evil Sed. 3, 
 expected, Aver fan or Hatred of *DeJire ; ^ 
 and Evil removed, Aver/ton of Joy. The 
 Joy of Love, and the Joy of Hatred, will 
 poflibly be found nearly the fame fort of 
 Senfations, tho upon different Occafions ; 
 the fame may be faid of the Sorrow of 
 Love, and the Sorrow of Aver fan : and 
 thus this Divifion will amount to the fame 
 with that of the Stoicks. 
 
 PERHAPS it may be moreeafy to con 
 ceive our Affections and Paflions in 
 manner. The Apprehenfion of Good , 
 either to our felves or others, as attainable, 
 raifes c Defire : The like Apprehenfion of 
 Evil, or of the Lofs of Good, raifes A- 
 verfan, or Defire of removing or prevent* 
 ing it. Thefe two are the proper Affec- 
 tions -, diftind from all Sen fat ion : We may 
 call both ^Dejires if we pleafe. The Re- 
 flection upon the Preience or certain Futu- s ' rmt > 
 rity of any Good, raifes the Senfation of 
 Joy, which is diftind: from thofe immedi- 
 ate Senfations which arife from the Objedt 
 itfelf. A like Senfation is raifed, when we 
 refled: upon the Removal or Prevention of 
 Evil which once threarned our feives or 
 others. The Reflection upon the Prefence 
 of Evil, or the certain Profped: of it, or 
 of the Lofs of Good, is the Occafion of 
 the Seniation of Sorrow , diftind: from 
 
 thofe
 
 Nature and Conduff 
 
 Sect. 3 . thofe immediate Senfattons arifing from the 
 Objects or Events themfelves. 
 
 Affections THESE Affections, *viz>. ^Defae^ A- 
 
 y Joy and Sorrow , we may, after 
 from? If. MALEBRANCHE, cdlfpiritual or fur -e 
 fans. Affefltons ; becaufe the pureft Spirit, were 
 it fubject to any Evil, might be capable of 
 them. But befide thefe Affections, which 
 feem to arife neceffarily from a rational 
 Apprehenfion of Good or Evil, there are 
 in our Nature violent confufed Senfations^ 
 connected with bodily Motions^ from which 
 our Affections are denominated Taffions. 
 
 w E may further oblerve fomething in 
 our Nature, determining us very frequently 
 to Action, diftindt both from Sen fat ion 
 anc j <> e fi re . if by Defire we mean a diftind: 
 Inclination to fomething apprehended as 
 Good either publick or private, or as the 
 Means of avoiding Evil ^ viz. a certain Tro* 
 fenfity of Inftintt to Objects and Actions, 
 without any Conception of them as Good, 
 or as the Means of preventing Evil. Thefe 
 Objects or Actions are generally, tho not 
 always, in effect the Means of fome Good ; 
 but we are determined to them even without 
 this Conception of them. Thus, as we 
 obferved above *, the ^Profenfity to Fame 
 
 * Sett, i. near the End. 
 
 may
 
 of the PASSIONS. <{j 
 
 may continue after one has loft all notion Sedt 
 of Good^ either publick or private, which 
 could be the Objedt of a diftinCt Defire. 
 Our particular Ajfettions have generally , 
 fome of thefe fropenjities accompanying 
 them ; but thefe Propenfities are lometimes 
 without the Affections or diftincl: Defires, 
 and have a ftronger Influence upon the Ge- 
 nerality of Men, than the Affections could 
 have alone. Thus in Anger, befide the 
 Intention of removing theuneafy Senfation 
 from the Injury received ; befide the De- 
 fire of obtaining a Reparation of it, and 
 Security for the future, which are fome 
 fort of Goods intended by Men when they 
 are calm, as well as during the Paflion, 
 there is in the paflionate Perfbn a Propenfi- 
 ty to occafion Mtfery'to the Offender, a 
 Determination to Violence ', even where 
 there is no Intention of any Good to be 
 obtained, or Evil avoided by this Violence. 
 And 'tis principally this Propenfity which 
 we denote by the Name Anger ', tho other Anger 
 Defires often accompany it/ 
 
 S o alfo our Tre fence with the diftreffed 
 is generally neceffary to their relief; and 
 yet when we have no Hopes nor Intention 
 of relieving them, we mall find a Tropen- 
 fity to run to iuch Spectacles of Pity v Thus 
 alfo, befide the calm 'Defire of the Happi- 
 nefs of a Perfon beloved, we have a ftrong 
 Propenfity to their Company, to the very 
 2 Sight
 
 he Nature and 
 
 Se6t 3- Sight of them, without any Confideratiori 
 of it as a Happmefs either to our felves 
 or to the Perfon beloved. The fudden Ap- 
 pearance of great Danger, determines us 
 to fliriek out or fly , before we can 
 have any diflihcl: Defires, or any Confide- 
 ration that a Shriek or Flight are proper 
 means of Relief. Thefe Trofenjlties, a- 
 long with the Senfations above-mention ed^ 
 When they occur without rational Defire, 
 we may call Taj/ions, and when they hap- 
 pen along with Defires, denominate them 
 fajjlonate. This part of our Conftitution 
 is as intelligible as many others univerfally 
 obferved and acknowledged ; fuch as thefe, 
 that Danger of falling makes us ftretch out 
 our Arms ; noife makes us wink ; that a 
 Child is determined to fuck ; many other 
 Animals to rife up and walk ; fome to run 
 into Water, before they can have any No- 
 tion of Good to be obtained, or Evil 
 avoided by thefe means. 
 
 and I T may perhaps be convenient to con- 
 fj ne ove an( j n a t re d to our Sentiments 
 toward Moral Agents ; Love denoting 
 *Defire of the Happinefs of another, 
 
 fenerally attended with fome Appro- 
 ztion of him as innocent at leaft, or 
 being of a mixed Character, where Good 
 is generally prevalent- : " And Hatred 
 denoting Difapprobation by our Senje, 
 with the Ablence of Defire of their 
 4 " Hap*
 
 of the PASSIONS. 6 
 
 " Happinefs." Benevolence may denote Sedt. 
 only " the Defire of another's Happinefs ; 
 and Malice, " the Defire of theirfMifery," 
 abflra&ly from any Approbation or Con- 
 demnation by our Moral Senfe. This fort 
 of Malice is never found in our Nature, 
 when we are not tranfported with Paflion. 
 The Propenfities of Anger and Envy have ^^ 
 fbme Refemblance of it ; yet Envy is not 
 an ultimate Defire of another's Mifery, but 
 only a fiibordinate Defire of it, as the 
 Means of advancing our felves, or fbme 
 Perfon more beloved than the Perfon en- 
 vied. 
 
 FEAR, as far as it is an Affettion, 
 not an undefigning Propenfity, is " a Mix- 
 " ture of Sorrow and A^r/&#,'When we 
 " apprehend the Probability of Evil, or 
 " the Lofs of Good befalling our felves, or 
 " thofe we love : n There is more or lefs 
 of Sorrow, according to the apprehended 
 Degrees of Probability. Hope, if it be 
 any way an AfTedtion, and not an Opinion, 
 is " a Mixture of 'Dejire and Joy, upon 
 " the probability of obtaining Good, and 
 " avoiding Evil." Both thefe Paflions may 
 have fome Trofenfities and Senfations at- 
 tending them, diftind: from thofe of the 
 other Affections. 
 
 THE confufed Ufe of the Names, 
 Hatred, Joy, Sorrow, 'Delight, has made Names. 
 F fome
 
 66 fhe Nature and Conduct 
 
 Sedt 3. feme of the moft important Diftin&ions of 
 / our Affections and Paflions. to be over- 
 looked. No Modifications of Mind can 
 be more different from each other, than a 
 private 'Defire, and a publick ; yet both 
 are called Love . The Love of Money, for 
 Inftance , and the Love of a generous 
 Character, or a Friend: The Love of a 
 fne Seat, and the Love of a Child. Jn 
 Jike manner, what can be more different 
 than the Sorrow for a Lofs befallen our 
 felves, and Sorrow for the T)eath of a 
 Friendl Of this Men muft convince them- 
 felves by Reflection. 
 
 THERE is alfb * confiderable Difference 
 even among thefelfijb Tajfions, which bear 
 the fame general Name, according to the 
 different Senfes which conflitute the Ob- 
 je&s good or evil. Thus the Defire of 
 Honour, and the Defire of Wealth, are 
 certainly very different forts of Affections, 
 and accompanied with different Senfations : 
 The Sorrow in like manner for our Lofs by 
 a Shif wreck, and our Sorrow for having 
 done a bafe Attion, or Remorfe : Sorrow 
 for our being fubjecl: to the Gout or Stone, 
 and Sorrow for our being dejpifed and con- 
 demned, or Shame : Sorrow for the Da- 
 mage done by a Fire, and that Sorrow 
 which ariles upon an apprehended Injury 
 from a Partner, or any other of our Fel- 
 lows, which we call Anger. Where we 
 
 get
 
 of the PASSIONS. 67 
 
 get fbme fpecial diftind Names, we moreSedt 3'. 
 eafily acknowledge a Difference, as it may <XY"SJ 
 appear in Shame and Anger ; but had we 
 other Names , appropriated in the fame 
 manner, we mould imagine, with good 
 ground, as many diftinft TaJJlons. The 
 like Confufion is obfervable about our Sen- 
 fes*. 
 
 To fay that \hzSenfation accompany ing **/ 
 all forts of Joy ispleafant, andfte accom-^ 
 panying Sorrow uneafy, will not argue Nature 
 that there is no farther Diverfhy. Pains "&<* 
 have many differences among themfelves, 
 and fo have Pleafures, according to the dif- 
 ferent Senfes by which they are perceived, 
 To enumerate all thefe ^Dmerfities, would 
 be difficult and tedious. But fome Men have 
 piqued themfelves fo much upon reprefen- 
 ting " all our Affections as felfijh\ as if 
 *' each Perfon were 1 in his whole Frame 
 " only a feparate Syftem from his Fellows, 
 " fo that there was nothing in his Confti- 
 " tution leading him to zpublick Inter efl y 
 " further than he apprehended it fubfervi- 
 " ent to his own private Interefl; and this 
 " Intereft made nothing elfe, than the gra- 
 " tifying our external Senfes and Imagt- 
 " nation, or obtaining the Means of it :" 
 that thereby the Wifdom and Goodnefs of 
 
 * Treat. I. Sefl. i.Arf. 10. 
 
 F i the
 
 <58 7*he Nature and Condutt 
 
 Se6t 3. the AUTHOR of our Nature is traduced, as 
 if he had given us the ftrongeft 'Dijpojitions 
 toward what he had in his Laws prohibited; 
 and directed us, by the Frame of our Na- 
 ture, to the meaneft and molt contemptible 
 Puriuits; as if what all good Men have 
 reprefented as the Excellence of our Nature, 
 were a Force or Conftraint put upon it by 
 Art or Authority. It may be ufeful to con- 
 fider our AfTe&ions and Pafllons more par- 
 ticularly, as " they are excited by fome- 
 " thing in our Frame different from Self- 
 " Love, and tend to fomething elfe than 
 " the private Pleafures of the external 
 " Senfes or Imagination "_ This we may 
 do under the following Heads, by fhewing 
 
 L 
 
 1. How our Pafiions arife from the 
 Moral Senfe > and Senfe of Honour. 
 
 2. H o w our Paflions tend toward the 
 State of others, abftra&ly from any Con- 
 fideration of their Moral Qualities. 
 
 3. How the pub lick Tajfftons are di- 
 verfified by the Moral Qualities of the 
 Agents, when they appear to our Moral 
 Senfe as virtuous or vicious.. 
 
 4. How the publick Pafllons are di- 
 veriified by the Relations of feveral Agents 
 to each other, when we confider at once 
 their State, as to Happinefs or Mifery, and 
 
 their
 
 of the PASSIONS. 6 9 
 
 their paft as well as prefent Actions to wards Sect. 
 each other. 
 
 5. How all thefe Paflions may be com- 
 plicated with the felfjh. Under each of 
 thefe Heads we may find the fix Paflions of 
 Malebranche^ or the four of Zeno ; with 
 many other Combinations of them. 
 
 III. i. THE Paflions about our 
 Actions occafioned by the Moral 
 When we form the Idea of a morally 
 Affion, or fee it reprefented in the *Drama, 
 or read it in Epicks or Romance, we feel 
 a ^Defre arifing of doing the like. 
 leads moft Tempers into an imagined Series 
 of Adventures ', in which they are 
 acting the generous and virtuous Part, like 
 to the Idea they have received. If we Moral joy 
 have executed any good Defign, we feel" Sel f~ 
 
 ,,. / & tr i-r ApprWfr 
 
 inward Tmtmfh of Joy : If we are difap- t \ on . 
 pointed thro' our own Negligence, or have 
 been diverted from it by fome/e/Ji/bF r iew, 
 we mail feel a Sorrow called Remorfe. 
 
 W H E N the Idea is in like manner formed 
 of any morally evil Aftion, which we 
 might poffibly accomplifli, if we reflect up- 
 on the Cruelty or pernicious Tendency of 
 it, there arifes Reluctance, or Averfion:* e ;&w<*. 
 If we have committed fiich a Crime, upon 
 like Reflection we feel the Sorrow called . 
 Remorfe : If we have refilled the Tempta- 
 F tion,
 
 7o The Nature and Condttft 
 
 Se&. g.tion, we feel a fecret Joy and Self- Appro- 
 bat ion, for which there is no Ipecial Name. 
 
 WE might enumerate fix other Paflions 
 from the Senfe of Honour, according as 
 we apprehend our Actions, or any other 
 Circumftances , mall afTed: the Opinions 
 which others form concerning us. When 
 any Action or Circumftance occurs, from 
 which we imagine Honour would arife, we 
 feel 'Dejire ; when we attain it, Joy ; when 
 we are difappointed, Sorrow. When we 
 firft apprehend any Action or Circumftance 
 as dijhonourable^ we feel Averfion arifing ; 
 if we apprehend our felves involved in it, 
 or in danger of being tempted to it, we feel 
 & Paffion we may call Modefly or Shame ; 
 when we cfcape or refift fuch Temptations, 
 or avoid what is dishonourable, we feel a 
 , for which there is no Ipecial Name. 
 
 W E give the Name Ambition to a vio- 
 lent Defire of Honour, but generally in a 
 bad Senfe, when it would lead the Agent 
 into immoral Means to gratify it. The lame 
 Word often denotes the *DeJire of Tower. 
 Tride denotes fometimes the fame Defires 
 of Honour and Power, with Averfion to 
 their contraries ; fometimes Tride denotes 
 Joy upon any apprehended Right or Claim 
 to Honour ; generally it is taken in a bad 
 Senfe, when one claims that to which he; 
 has no Right. 
 
 MEN
 
 of the PASSIONS. 7* 
 
 MEN may feel the Paffion of Shame for 
 the difhonourable Adions of others, 
 any part of the Diihonour falls upon /6?;#- 
 y?/w.r ; as when the Perfon difhonoured is 
 one of their Club, or Tarty^ or Family. 
 The general Relation of human Nature 
 may produce fome uneafinefs upon the 
 Diihonour of another, tho this is more 
 owing to our fublick Senfe. 
 
 IV. 2. THE fecond Clafs are the 
 lick Tajfions about the *SV^ of others, 
 to Happinefs or Mifery, abftra&ly from 
 their Moral Dualities. Thefe Affections 
 or Paffions extend to all perceptive Na- 
 tures, when there is no real or imagined 
 Oppofition of Intereft. We naturally 
 fire the abfent Happinefs of others ; rejoice common. 
 in it when obtained, zndforrow for it when p/ "'y- 
 loft. We have Averfan to any impending; 
 Mifery ; we are for row fid when it befals 
 any Perfon, and rejoice when it is removed. 
 This Averflon and Sorrow we often call 
 Pity or Companion; the Joy we may 
 Congratulation. 
 
 SINCE our Moral Senfe reprefents Vir- 
 tue as the greateft Happinefs to the Perfon 
 poffefTed of it, our publick AfTe&ions will 
 naturally make us defire the Virtue of others. 
 When the Opportunity of a great Action 
 9ccurs to any Perfon againft whom we arc 
 F 4 10
 
 72 The Nature and Conduct 
 
 Sect. 3. no way prejudiced, we wijh he would at- 
 u^v"^' tempt it, and defire his good Succefs. If 
 he Succeeds, we feel Joy ; if he is difap- 
 pointed, or quits the Attempt, we feel 
 Sorrow. Upon like Opportunity of, or 
 Temptation to a bafe Action, we have 
 Aver fan to the Event: If he refills the 
 Temptation, we feel Joy, if he yields to it, 
 Sorrow. Qur Affections toward the Ter- 
 fon arife jointly with our Paffions about this 
 Event, according as he acquits himfelf vir- 
 
 tuoufly or bafely. 
 
 * 
 
 3 . Puiiick V. 3. THE Paffions of the third Clafs 
 Pafions are our publick Affettions, jointly with 
 moral Perceptions of the Virtue or Vice 
 of the Agents. When Good appears at- 
 tainable by a Perfbn of Moral ^Dignity, 
 our Defire of his Happinefs, founded upon 
 Efleem or Approbation, is much ftronger 
 than that fuppofed in the former Clafs. The 
 Misfortune of fuch a Perfbn raifes ftronger 
 negret. Sorrow, fity, or Regret* and 'Dijfatifi 
 fattion with the Administration of the 
 World, upon a light View of it, with a 
 Sufpicion of the real Advantage of Vir- 
 tue. The Succe(s of fuch a Character 
 raifes all the contrary Affections of Joy 
 and Satisfaction with Providence, and t5V- 
 curity in Virtue. When Evil threatens 
 fiich a Character, we have ftrong Aver (Ion 
 to it, with Love toward the Perfbn ' His 
 efcaping the Evil raifes Joy, Confidence in 
 
 Pro,
 
 of the PASSIONS. 73 
 
 Providence, with Security in Virtue. IfSecl. 3. 
 the Evil befals him, we feel the contrary vxvxj 
 Pafiions , Sorrow, T)iffat is faction with 
 Providence, and Sufficion of the Reality 
 of Virtue. 
 
 HENCE we fee how unfit fach 
 Jentations are in Tragedy, as make the per 
 fe&ly Virtuous miferable in the higheft de-**. 
 gree. They can only lead the Spectators 
 into ^Diftruft of Providence, 'Diffidence of 
 Virtue ; and into fuch Sentiments, as ibme 
 Authors, who probably miftake his meaning, 
 tell us Brutus exprefs'd at his Death, ' That 
 " the Virtue he had purfued as a folid Good, 
 " proved but an empty Name." But we 
 muft here remember, that, notwithftanding 
 all the frightful Ideas we have inculcated 
 upon us of the King of Terrors, yet an 
 honourable 'Death is far from appearing to 
 a generous Mind, as the greateft of Evils. 
 The Ruin of a Free State, the Slavery of 
 a generous Spirit, a Life upon Jhamefnl 
 Terms, ftill appear vaftly greater Evils ; 
 befide many other exquifite T^ijlrejfes of a 
 more private nature, in companion of which, 
 an honourable Death befalling a favourite 
 Character, is looked upon as a Deliverance. 
 
 TV 
 
 UNDER this Clals are alfo included the-p^w 
 Paffions employed about the Fortunes ! 
 Characters, apprehended as morally E'vi 
 Such Characters do raife ^Dijlikem any 
 
 Obfer-
 
 74 yb* Nature and Conduct 
 
 Se&. g.Obferver, who has a moral Senle : But 
 Malice, or the ultimate ^Defire of their 
 Mi ** er y does not neceflarily arife toward 
 them. Perhaps our Natufe is not capable 
 O f defiring Cne Mifery of any Beins calm- 
 
 _ . & . J . J rr ^ 
 
 ly, farther than it may be neceflary to the 
 Safety of the innocent : We may find, per- 
 haps, that there is no Quality in any Ob- 
 ject which would excite in us pure difinte- 
 refted Malice -, or calm Defire of Mifery for 
 its own fake *. When we apprehend any 
 Perfon as injurious to our felves, or to any 
 innocent Perfon, efpecially to a Perfon 
 beloved, the Patfion of Anger arifes to- 
 ward the Agent. By Anger is generally 
 meant " a Propensity to occafion Evil to 
 " another, arifing upon apprehenfion of 
 ' an Injury done by him : " This violent 
 Propenfity is attended generally, when the 
 Injury is not very fudden, with Sorrow 
 for the Injury fuftained, or threatned, and 
 'Dejire of repelling it, and making the Au- 
 thor of it repent of his Attempt, or repair 
 the Damage. 
 
 THIS Pafiion is attended with the 
 mod violent uneajy Senfations, and pro- 
 duces as great Changes in our Bodies as any 
 whatfoever. We are precipitantly led by 
 this Pafiion, to apprehend the injurious as 
 
 * SSeft. .5 Art. 5. of this Treatife<
 
 of the P ASSIGNS. 75 
 
 direttly malicious, and defigning the Mifery Se&. 3 
 of others without farther Intention. While 
 the Heat of this Paffion continues, we feem 
 naturally to puriue the Mifery of the inju- 
 rious, until they relent, and convince us of 
 their better Intentions, by exprefllng their 
 Senfe of the Injury, and offering Repara- 
 tion of Damage, with Security againft fu- 
 ture Offences. 
 
 Now as it is plainly necefTary, in a 
 Syftem of Agents capable of injuring each 
 other, that every one Ihould be made/0r- 
 midable to an Invader, by liich a violent 
 Paflion, till the Invader ihevvs his Refor- 
 mation of Temper, as above, and no longer; 
 fo we find it is thus ordered in our Confti- 
 tution. Upon thefe Evidences of Refor- 
 mation in the Invader, our Paflion natu- 
 rally abates ; or if in any perverfe Temper 
 it does not, the Senfe of Mankind turns 
 againft him, and he is looked upon as cruel 
 and inhumane. 
 
 I N confidering more fully the Paffions 
 about the Fortunes of evil Characters, di- 
 ftindi from Anger , which arifes upon a 
 frefh Injury, we may firft confider the evil 
 Agents, fuch as a fudden View Ibmetimes 
 lepreients them, direflly evil and malici- 
 ous ; and then make proper Abatements, 
 for what the word of Men come ihort of 
 ;bis compleatly evil Temper. As Mathe- 
 A matitians
 
 7# T^he Nature and Condtitt 
 
 Se'cl. 3- maticians fuppofe perfect Hardnefs in Ibme 
 c/vx; Bodies, and Elaftictty in others, and then 
 
 make Allowances for the imperfect Degrees 
 
 in natural Bodies. 
 
 joy of HU- THE Profpeft of Good to a Perfbn ap- 
 tred. prehended as entirely malicious, railes A- 
 version in the Obferver, or ^Dejlre of his 
 Difappointment ; at lead, when his Succefs 
 would confirm him in any evil Intention. 
 His Difappointment raifes Joy in the E- 
 vent, with Truft in Providence, and Se- 
 curit y in V irtue - His Succefs raifes the 
 contrary Paffions of Sorrow, 'Diftruft, 
 and Suffmon. The Trofpett of Evil, 
 befalling an evil Character, at firft, perhaps, 
 feems grateful to the Obferver, if he has 
 conceived the Paflion of Anger ; but to a 
 fedate Temper, no Mifery is farther the 
 Occafion of Joy, than as it is necefTary to 
 fbme prepollent Happinefs in the whole. 
 The efcapmg of Evil impending over fuch 
 a Character, by which he is confirmed in 
 Vice % is the Occafion of Sorrdw, and *Dif- 
 truft of Providence and Virtue; and the 
 Evil befalling him raifes Joy, and Satisfac- 
 tion with Providence, and 'Security in Vir- 
 tue. We fee therefore, that the Succefs of 
 evil Characters, by obtaining Good, or 
 avoiding Evil, is an unfit Reprefentation 
 In Tragedy. 
 
 ' -'f'tfrTtl t'- .?''. j 
 
 LET
 
 of the PASSIONS. 77 
 
 Sett 
 
 LET any one reflect on this CJafs 
 Paffions, efpecially as they arife upon Oc- 
 cafions which do not affecSt himfelf, and he 
 will lee how little of Self-Love there is in 
 them ; and yet they are frequently as vio- 
 lent as any Paffions whatsoever. We feem 
 confcious of fome ^Dignity in thefe Paf- 
 fions above the felfifh ones, and therefore 
 never conceal them, nor are we alhamed 
 of them. Thefe complicated TaJJlons the 
 Philofophers have confufedly mentioned, 
 under fbme general Names, along with the 
 fimple felfifh Paffions.. The Toets and 
 Criticks have fufficiently mown, that they 
 felt thefe Differences, however it did not 
 concern them to explain them. We may 
 find Inftances of them in all Dramatick Per- 
 formances, both Antient and Modern. 
 
 THE Abatements to be made for what Pajf 
 human Nature comes fhort of the hig 
 
 ^ ~ TT . Tr . & i 
 
 Degrees either of Virtue or Vice, may be 
 thus conceived : When the Good in any 
 mixed Character farpafTes the Evil, the 
 Paffions arife as toward the Good ; where 
 the Evil iurpafles the Good, the Pafllons 
 arife as toward the Evil, only in both Cafes 
 with lefs Violence. And further, the Paf- 
 fions in both Cafes are either flopped, or 
 turned the contrary way, by want of due 
 'Proportion between the State and Cha- 
 raffer. Thus an imperfect good Chara&er, 
 
 in
 
 78 fhe Nature and 
 
 SecSt 3. in purfuit of a Good too great for his Vir- 
 <XV^ tue, or to the exclufion of more worthy 
 Characters, inftead of raifing 'Defire of 
 Envy, sor-his Succcls, raifes Averjion ; his Succefs 
 row, joy. ^fes Envy, or a Species of Sorrow, and 
 his Difappointment Joy. An imperfectly 
 evil Character, threatned by an Evil greater 
 than is neceflary to make him relent and 
 reform, or by a great Calamity, which 
 has no direct tendency to reform him, in- 
 ftead of raifmg Ttefire toward the Event, 
 raifes Aver/ion ; his efcaping it raifes Joy, 
 plt ^ and his falling under it raifes Tity, a Spe- 
 cies of Sorrow. 
 
 The btfl T H E R E is another Circumflance which 
 toaeT exceedingly varies our Paflions of this 
 Clafs, when the Agents themfelves, by 
 their own Conduff, procure their Mifery. 
 When an imperfed: good Character, by an 
 evil Adtion, procures the higheft Mifery to 
 himfelf ; this raifes thefe complicated Pa 
 fions, Tity toward the Sufferer, Sorrow 
 for the State, Abhorrence of Vice, Awe 
 and Admiration of Providence, as keeping 
 ftrid: Meatiires of Sanctity and Juuice* 
 Thefe Paflions we may all feel, in reading 
 the Oedipus of Sophocles, when we fee 
 the Diftrefs of that Prince, occafioned by 
 his fuperftitious Curiofity about his future 
 Fortunes ; his ram Violence of Temper, in 
 Duelling without Provocation, and in pro- 
 nouncing Execrations on Perlbns unknown. 
 
 We
 
 of the PASSIONS. ? 
 
 We feel the like Paflions from the Fortunes Sed:. 
 of Creon in the Antigone-, or from 
 Fates of 'Pyrrhus and Orefles, in the An- 
 dromache of Racine \ or our 'Dijlreffed 
 Mother. We heartily pity thefe Charac- 
 ters, but without repining at Providence ; 
 their Milery is the Fruit of their own 
 Actions. It is with the jufteft Reafon, 
 that Ariflotle * prefers fuch Plots to all 
 others for Tragedy, fmce thefe Characters 
 come neareft to thofc of the Spectators, 
 and confequently will have the ftrongeft 
 Influence on them. We a/e generally con- 
 Icious of fome good Difpofitions, mixed 
 with many WeaknefTes : few imagine them- 
 felves capable of attaining the height of 
 perfectly good Characters, or arriving to 
 their high Degrees of Felicity ; and fewer 
 imagine themielves capable of finking into 
 the Bafenefs of perfectly evitTetafers, and 
 therefore few dread the Calamities which 
 befal them. 
 
 THERE is one farther 
 which flrengthens this Clafs of Patfions 
 ceedingly, that is, the greatnefs of 
 Change of Fortune in the Perfbn, or the 
 Surprize with which it comes. As this," 
 gives the Perfbn a more acute 'Perception 
 either of Happinefs or Mifery, fo it 
 
 * Anjlotie Poetic, Chap, i j. 
 
 flrengthens
 
 8o The Nature and Con And 
 
 Sect. 3.ftrengthens our Taj/ions, arifing from Ob- 
 of his State. Of this the Poets 
 
 are very fenfible, who fo often reprefent to 
 us the former Profperity of the Perfon, for 
 whom they would move our pity ; his 'Pro- 
 jects, his Hopes, his half-executed *De- 
 Jigns. One left his ^Palace unfinijhed, a- 
 nother his betrothed Miftrefs, or young 
 Wife ; one promifed himfelf Glory, and a 
 fortunate old Age ; another was heaping up 
 Wealth^ boafted of his Knowledge, was 
 honoured for \i\sjine Armour, his Activity, 
 his Augury. 
 
 ouJl 77 o/ ro^' \7myui<n buyyv oAg^i/. Homer. 
 
 *5V^/ non Augur iofotuit depellere peftem ; 
 Sednon ^Dardani* medic art cuff tdis ittum 
 Invaluit. -- Virg. 
 
 'THE Joy is in like manner increafed 
 upon the Misfortunes of evil Characters, 
 by reprefenting their former Trojperity, 
 fride and Infolence. 
 
 THIS Sorrow or Joy is ftrangely diver- 
 fified or complicated, when the Sufferers 
 are multiplied, by reprefenting the Perfons 
 attached to the principal Sufferer, and fet- 
 ting before us their Affections, Friendfhips> 
 tender Solicitudes, care in Education, 
 Juccour in former T^ijlreffes ; this every 
 
 one
 
 PASSIONS. 81 
 
 one will find in reading the Stones of ?W-Sect. 
 las, Camilla, Nifus, and Euryalus ; 
 general, any Battle of Homer or VirgiL 
 What there is in Self-Love to account for 
 thefe Effects, let all Mankind judge. 
 
 VI. THE Paflions of the fourth Clafs arife4- 
 from thefame moral Senfe &?Mick 
 fftt0x,epGti obfervingthe Actions of Agents thm ofA 
 fome way attached to each other, by prior &"" 
 Ties of Nature or good Offices, or difen- 
 gaged by prior Injuries ; when thefe Re- 
 lations are known, the moral Qualities of 
 the Actions appear confiderably different, 
 and our Paflions are much diverfified by 
 them : there is alfo a great Complication of 
 different Paffions, and a fort of Contrafte, ContfA fl" 
 or afTemblage of oppofite Paffions to 
 the feveral Perfons concerned. The 
 moving c Peripeties, and Remembrances, 
 in Epick and c Dramatick Poetry, are 
 calculated to raife thefe complicated Pa 
 fions ; and in Oratory we ftudy to do the 
 fame. 
 
 THUS flrong Sentiments of Grati- 
 tude, and vigorous Returns of good Offi- 
 ces obferved, raife in the Spectator the 
 higheft Love and Efteem toward both the 
 Benefactor, and even the Terfon obliged, 
 with Security and delight in Virtue. - 
 Ingratitude, or returning bad Offices de- 
 flgnedly, raifes the greateft Tieteflation a- 
 G gainft
 
 8 2 2%e Nature and Conduft 
 
 Sedt ^.gainft the Ungrateful; and Love with Com* 
 ^^T^faffion toward the Benefa&or, with 'Dejec- 
 tion and 'Diffidence in a virtuous Courfe of 
 
 Life. Forgiving of Injuries, and much 
 
 more returning Good for Evil , appears 
 wonderfully great and beautiful to our mo- 
 ral Senie : it raifes the ftrongeft Love to- 
 ward the Forgiver, Compaffion for the In- 
 jury received ; toward the Injurious, if re- 
 tenting^ fome degree of Good-will, with 
 Companion ; if not relenting, the mod vio- 
 lent Abhorrence and Hatred. Mutual 
 
 good Offices done defignedly between mo 
 rally good Agents, raife Joy and Love in 
 the Obferver toward both, with delight in 
 
 Virtue. Mutual Injuries done by evil 
 
 Agents defignedly, raife Joy in the Events, 
 along with Hatred to the Agents, with <:)<?- 
 
 teftation of Vice., Good Offices done 
 
 defignedly by good Agents toward Evil, 
 but not fo as to encourage, or enable them 
 to further Mifchief, raife Love toward the 
 good Agent ; 'Difplicence, with fome Good- 
 will toward the evil Agent. Good Of- 
 
 fees defignedly done mutually among evil 
 Agents, if thefe Offices do not promote 
 their evil Intentions, diminifh our Diflike 
 and Hatred, and introduce fome Comfaf- 
 
 Jion and Benevolence. Good Offices 
 
 from good Agents, to Benefactors unknown 
 to the Agent, or to their unknown Friends 
 or Poftenty, increafe Love toward both ; 
 and raife great Satisfaction and Trufl in 
 
 Tro-
 
 of the PASSIONS. 83 
 
 with Security in Virtue, andSed. 
 
 Joy in the Event. f \)ndefigned evil Re- 
 
 turns in like Cafe with the former, raife Sor- 
 row in the Obferver upon account of the E- 
 vent, Tity toward both, with Sufpicion of 
 Providence and Virtue. k&undefigned Re- 
 turn of Evil to an evil Agent from a good 
 one, whom he had injured, raifes Joy up- 
 on account of the Event,- and Trujt in Pro- 
 vidence. ^Undejigned evil Offices mu- 
 
 tually done to each other by evil Agents, 
 raife Joy in the Event, Abhorrence of 
 Vice, and Satisfaction with Providence. 
 llndefigned good Offices done by good A- 
 gents toward the evil, by which they are 
 further excited or impowered to do evil, 
 raife ^Pity toward the good Agent, Indig- 
 nation and Envy toward the Evil, with 
 ^Diftrufl in Providence., 'Undejlgned 
 
 food Offices done by good to evil Agents, 
 y which they are not excited or enabled 
 to do further mifchief, raife Envy or /#- 
 dignation toward the evil Agent, if the Be- 
 nefit be great ; if not, they fcarce raife any 
 new Paflion diftind: from that we had be- 
 fore, of Love toward the one, and Ha* 
 tred or T>iflike toward the other. 
 
 THESE Paflions might have been di- 
 verfified, according to Malebranche's Di 
 vifion, as the Objed: or Event ^^prefent^ 
 mmfajpenfe, or certainly removed : And 
 would appear in different Degrees of 
 G 2 Strength,
 
 84 ffi> e Nature and Conduit 
 
 Sect. 3. Strength, according as the Perfons con- 
 were more nearly attach'd to the 
 Obferver, by Nature, Friendjhip, or Ac- 
 quaintance. 
 
 VII. THE Paffionsof the lad Clafs, are 
 Fa fi," s . , thofe in which any of the former Kinds are 
 3 tiefeiflb. complicated withjelfi/h *Pdjfions, when our 
 own Intereft is concerned. It is needlefs 
 here to repeat them over again : Only this 
 may be noted in general, that, as the Con- 
 junction of lelfiih Paffions will very much 
 increafe the Commotion of Mind, fo the 
 Oppofition of any felfjh Interefls, which 
 appear of great Importance, will often 
 conquer the public k "Dejires or Averfions, 
 or thofe founded upon the Senfe of Virtue 
 or Honour ; and this is the Caie in vicious 
 Adions done againft Conference. 
 
 THESE Complications of Paflions are 
 often not reflected on by the Perfon who is 
 acted by them, during their Rage : But a 
 judicious Obferver may find them by Re- 
 flection upon himfelf, or by Oblervation 
 of others ; and the Reprefentation of them 
 never fails to affect us in the moft lively 
 manner. 
 
 - - JEftuat ingens 
 
 Imo in Cvrde Pudor^ mixtoque Infania Luftu, 
 
 Et Fiiriis agitatns Amor^ & cwfcta Virtus. Virg. 
 
 I Ilf
 
 of the PASSIONS. 8j 
 
 Se(3. 3 
 
 IN all this tedious Enumeration, let any 
 one confider, " How few of our Paflions 
 " can be any way deduced from Self- 
 " Love, or defire of private Advantage: 
 " And how improbable it is, that Perfons 
 " in the Heat of Action, have any of 
 thofe fubtle Reflections^ and felfijb In- 
 " tent ions, which fome Philofophers in- 
 " vent for them : How great a part of 
 " the Commotions of our Minds arife up- 
 " on the moral Senfe, and from public k 
 " Affections toward the good of others. 
 " We fhouldfind, that without thefe Prin- 
 " ciples in our Nature, we mould not feel 
 " the one half at leaft of our prefent 
 " Tleafiires or Tains ; and that our Na- 
 " ture would be almoft reduced to Indo* 
 ' lence," 
 
 A N accurate Obfervation of the feveral#*u; 
 diftin<a Characters and Tempers of 
 which are conftiruted by the various 
 grees of their natural Sagacity, t 
 Knowledge^ their Interefls, their Opinions, 
 or Affociations of Ideas, with the Taffions 
 which are prevalent in them, is a moft 
 ufeful and pleafant Entertainment for thofe, 
 who have Opportunities of large Acquain- 
 tance and Obfervation. But our preient 
 Purpofe leads only to confider the mft ge- 
 neral Elements, from the various Combi- 
 G 3 nations
 
 86 The Nature and Con And 
 
 Sed, 3 .'nations of which, the feveral Tempers and 
 Characters are formed. 
 
 The order T H i s account of our Afte&ions will, 
 Nature however, prepare the way for difceruing 
 confiderabie Evidences for the Goodnefs of 
 the 2>/y, from the Conftitution of our 
 Nature ; and for removing the Objections 
 of voluptuous luxurious Men, againft the 
 Rules of Virtue laid down by Men of Re- 
 flection. While no other Ideas of Tlea- 
 fure or Advantage are given us, than thofe 
 which relate to the external Senfes ; nor 
 any other Affections reprefented as natu- 
 ral, fave thofe toward private Good : it 
 may be difficult to perfuade many, even 
 of thofe who are not Enemies to Vir- 
 tue from Inclination* of the Wifdom of 
 the Deity, in making the Biafs of our 
 Nature oppofite to the Laws he would 
 give us ; and making all Tleafure* the mod 
 natural Character of Good , attend the 
 prohibited Actions, or the indifferent ones ; 
 while Obedience to the Law muft be a 
 conftrmned Courfe of AcHon , inforced 
 only by ^Penalties contrary to our na- 
 tural 'Affections and Senfes. Nature 
 and Grace are by this Scheme made very 
 oppofite: Some would queftion whether 
 they could have the fame Author. Whereas, 
 if the preceding Account be juft, we fee 
 po fucty Inconfiftency : " Every Paffion 
 
 *' or
 
 of the PASSIONS. 87 
 
 " or Affe&ion in its moderate 'DegreeSetft. 3. 
 
 " is innocent, many are directly amiable 
 
 " and morally good: we have Senfes and 
 
 " Affections leading us to pub lick Good, 
 
 " as well as to private ; to Virtue ^ as well 
 
 " as to external Pleafure." 
 
 G 4 SECT.
 
 fhe Nature and Conduct 
 
 Sea. 4 . 
 
 " - 
 
 SECT. IV. 
 
 How far our federal Affedions and 
 Pa/lions are under our Power, 
 either to govern them when ratfed y 
 or to prevent their airijing : with 
 feme general Obferwtions about 
 their Objects. 
 
 I. j-'i ROM what was faid above it ap- 
 JT pears, that our Paffions are not fb 
 fend mcb much in our c Power, as fome feem to ima- 
 * ^~ gine, from the Topic ks ufed either to raife 
 or allay them. We are fo conftituted by 
 Nature, that, as loon as we form the Idea 
 of certain Obje<5ts or Events, our ^Dejlre 
 or Aver fan will arife toward them; and 
 confequently our ArTedions muft very much 
 depend upon the Opinions we form, con- 
 cerning any thing which occurs to our 
 Mind , its Qualities , Tendencies , or 
 Effeffs. Thus the Happiuefs of every 
 fenfitive Nature is defired, as loon as we 
 remove all Opinion or Apprehenfion of Op- 
 pojition of Inter efl between this Being and 
 others. The Apfrehenjion of morally good 
 Qualities, is the neceflary Caufe of Appro- 
 bation^ by our moral Senle, and of ftronger 
 Love. The Caufe of Hatred, is the Ap~ 
 
 prehenfan
 
 of the PASSIONS. 89 
 
 prehenjion of the oppofite Qualities. FearfieQt. 4. 
 in like manner, muft arife from Opinion o 
 ^Power, and Inclination to hurt us : Tity 
 from the Opinion of another's undeferved 
 Mifery : Shame only arifes from Appre- 
 henjion of Contempt from others : Joy, in . 
 any Event, muft arife from an Opinion of 
 its Goodnefs. Qmfelfijh Taffions in this, 
 do not differ from wtpublick ones. 
 
 THIS may fhew us fome Inconfiftency 
 in Topicks of Argument, often ufed to in- 
 culcate Tiety and Virtue. Whatever Mo- 
 tives of Intereft we fuggeft, either from a 
 prefent or future Reward, muft be ineffec- 
 tual, until we have firft laboured to form 
 amiable Conceptions of the 'Deity, and of 
 our Fellow Creatures. And yet in many 
 "Writers, even in this Caufe, " Mankind 
 " are reprefented as abfolutely evil* or 
 " at beft as entirely felfijb ; nor are there 
 " any nobler Ideas of the DEITY iuggefted. 
 " It is grown zfafliionableTopick* to put 
 '* fome fly felfijh Conftruttion upon the 
 " moft generous human Adions ; and he 
 " pafTes for t\\s/hreudeft Writer^ or Ora- 
 " tor, who is moft artful in thefe Infinua- 
 
 II. THE Government of our 
 muft then depend much upon our Opinions *% 
 But we muft here obferve an obvious Dif- 
 ference among our Defires, viz. that 
 
 " fome
 
 oo The Nature and Condufl 
 
 cT:. 4." fome of them have a previous, painful, 
 " or uneafy Senfarion , antecedently to 
 " any Opinion of Good in the Obje<5t ; 
 44 nay, the Object is often chiefly efteem- 
 " ed good, only for its allaying this Tain 
 " or Uneafinefs; or if the Objecl: gives 
 ' alfo pofitive Pleafure, yet the uneajy 
 ' Sen fat ion is previous to, and indepen- 
 " dent of this Opinion of Good in the 
 " Obje#." Thefe Defires we may call 
 Appetites. ' ( Other Defires and Averiions 
 " neceflarily prefuppofe an Opinion of Good 
 ' and Evil in their Objects; and the De- 
 ** fires or Averfions, with their concomi- 
 ** tant uneafy Senlations, are produced or 
 " occafioned by this Opinion or Appre- 
 '* heftjion." Of the former kind are 
 Hunger and Thirfl, and the Defires be- 
 tween the Sexes ; to which Defires there 
 is an uneafy Senfation previous, even in 
 thofe who have little other Notion of Good 
 in the Objects, than allaying this fain 
 or 'Uneafinefs. There is fomething like to 
 this in the Defire of Society, or the Com- 
 pany of our fellow Creatures. Our Nature 
 is fo much formed for this, that altho the 
 Abfenee of Company is not immediately 
 painful, yet if it be long, and the Perfon 
 be not employed in fomething which tends 
 to Society at laft, or which is defigned to 
 fit himfor Society, an uneafy Fretfulnefs, 
 Sullennefs, and Ttifcontent, will grow up- 
 on him by degrees, which Company a- 
 
 lone
 
 of the PASSIONS. ?l 
 
 lone can remove. He fhall not perhaps be Seel: 4. 
 {enfible always, that it is the Ablence of v-^v^ 
 Company which occafions his Uueafmefs : 
 A painful Senfation dictates nothing of it 
 felf ; it muft be therefore fome Reflection 
 or Inflmtt, diftincl: from the Pain, which 
 fuggefts the Remedy. Our Benevolence 
 and Companion prefuppofe indeed fome 
 Knowledge of other fenfitive Beings, and 
 of what is good or evil to them : But 
 they do not arife from any previous Opi- 
 nion, that " the Good of others tends to 
 *' the Good of the Agent." They are 
 ^Determinations of our Nature, previous 
 to our Choice from Intereft, which excite 
 us to Action, as foon as we know other 
 fenfitive or rational Beings, and have any 
 Apprehenfion of their Happinefs or Mifery. 
 
 IN other Defires the Cafe is different. 
 No Man is diftreffed for want sifne Smells , 
 harmonious Sounds, beautiful Objects , 
 Wealth, Tower, or Grandeur, previoufly 
 to fome Opinion formed of thefe things as 
 
 fDod, or fome prior Senfation of their 
 leafures. In like manner, Virtue and * 
 Honour as neceflarily give us Pleafure, 
 when they occur to us, as Vice and Con- * 
 tempt give us Pain ; but, antecedently to 
 fome Experience or Opinion of this Plea- 
 fare, there is no previous uneafy Senfation 
 in their Abience, as there is in the Abfence 
 of the Objects of Appetite. The Neceflity 
 
 of
 
 pi 'The Nature and Conduct 
 
 Seel:. 4. of thefe Senfations previous to our Appe- 
 tires, has been confidered already *. The 
 Senfations accompanying or fubiequent to 
 our other Defires, by which they are deno- 
 minated Ta/ions, keep them in a juft Bal- 
 lance with"'' our Appetites^ as was before 
 obferved. 
 
 BUT this holds in general, concerning 
 all our Defires or Averfions, that according 
 to the Opinion or Apprehenjlou of Good or 
 Evil, the Defire or Averfion is increafed or 
 diminished : Every Gratification of any 
 Defire gives at firft Pleafure ; and Difap- 
 pointment Pain, proportioned to the Vio- 
 lence of the Defire. In like manner, the 
 efcaping any Objed: of Averfion, tho it 
 makes no permanent Addition to our Hap- 
 pinefs, gives at firft a pleafant Sen/at ton, 
 and relieves us from Mifery, proportioned 
 to the Degree of Averjion or Fear. So 
 when any Event, to which we had an A- 
 verfion, befals us, we have at firft Mifery 
 proportioned to the Degree of Averfion., 
 So that fbme Pain is fubfequent upon all 
 Frustration of Defire or Averfion, but it is 
 previous to thole Defires only, which are 
 called Appetites. 
 
 * Seft. 2. Art. 6. 
 
 III. HENCE
 
 of the PASSIONS. 93 
 
 Sect. 4. 
 
 III. HENCE we fee how impoflible it 
 is for one to judge of the Degrees of Hap- 
 pinefs orMifery in others, unlefs he knows 
 their Opinions, their Affociations of Ideas, 
 and the 'Degrees of their Defires and A- 
 verfions. We fee alfo of how much Con- 
 fequence our Ajjociations of Ideas and Opi- 
 nions are to our Happinefs or Mifery, and 
 to the Command of our Paffions. 
 
 F OR tho in our Appetites there are un-^f " 
 eafy Senfations, previous to any Opinion, ^/ 
 yet our very Appetites may be ftrengthned^ / 
 or weakned, and varioufly alter'd by Opi- c a f e 
 
 ., . o T i r> ditnm 
 
 mon , or Affectations of Ideas. Beiore^ 
 their Intervention, the bodily Appetites c f r De ~ 
 are eafijy fatisfied : Nature has put it \ 
 almoft every one's power, fo far to gratify 
 them, as to fupport the Body, and remove 
 Pain. But when Opinion, and confufed 
 Ideas, or Fancy comes in, and reprefcnts 
 fome particular kinds of Gratifications, or 
 great Variety of them, as of great Impor- 
 tance ; when Ideas of ^Dignity, Grandure^ 
 Magnificence, Genero/ttySoi any other 
 moral Species^ are joined to the Objects of 
 Appetites, they may furnifh us with endlefs 
 Labour, Vexation, and Milery of every 
 kind. 
 
 A s to the other Defires which prefup- 
 pofe fome Opinion or Apprehtnfion of 
 
 Good,
 
 94 fhe Nature and Conduct 
 
 Sect.4.Good, previous to any Senfationof uneafi- 
 nefs ; they mud ftill be more dire&ly in- 
 fluenced by Opinion, and Affociations of 
 Ideas. The higher the Opinion or Appre- 
 henfion of Good or Evil is, the ftronger 
 muft the T>ejlre or Averfion be ; the 
 greater is the Pleafure of Succefs at firft, 
 and the greater the Pain of *Difappoint- 
 ment. Our publick Defires are influenced 
 in the fame manner with the private : what 
 we conceive as Good, we (hall defire for 
 thofe we love, as well as for our felves ; 
 and that in proportion to the ^Degree of 
 Good apprehended in it : whatever we ap. 
 prehend as Evil in any degree to thole we 
 love, to that we fhall have proportionable 
 Averfion. 
 
 THE common Effect of thefe Affocia- 
 tions of Ideas is this, ' * that they raife the 
 " Paffions into an extravagant Degree, be- 
 " yond the proportion of real Good in 
 " the Objecl: : And commonly beget fome 
 " fecret Opinions to juftify the Paffions. 
 44 But then the Confutation of thefe falfe 
 " Opinions is not fufficient to break the 
 " Affociation, fo that the *DeJire or Taf- 
 " Jion fhall continue, even when our Un- 
 ** derftanding has fuggefted to us, that the 
 " Object is not good, or not proportioned 
 " to the Strength of the Defire." Thus 
 we often may obferve, that Perfons, who 
 by reafoning have laid afide all Opinion of 
 
 Spirits
 
 of tie PASSIONS. ?5 
 
 Spirits being in the dark more than in the Sedfc. 4. 
 light, are ftill uneafy to be alone in the dark*, 
 Thus the luxurious , the extravagant Lo- 
 ver, the Mifer, can fcarce be mppofed to 
 have Opinions of the feveral Objects of 
 their Purfuit, proportioned to the Vehe- 
 mence of their Defires ; but the conftant 
 Indulgence of any Defire, the frequent Re- 
 petition of it, the diverting our Minds 
 from all other Purfuits, the Strain of Con- 
 verfation among Men of the fame Temper, 
 who often haunt together, the Contagion 
 in the very Air and Countenance of the 
 paflionate, beget fach wild Affbciations of 
 Ideas, that a fudden Conviction of Reafon- 
 will not flop the Defire or Averfion, any 
 more than an Argument will furmount the 
 Loathings or Averfions, acquired againft 
 certain Meats or Drinks, by Surfeits or erne- 
 tick Preparations. 
 
 THE Luxurious are often convinced, 
 when any Accident has revived a natural 
 Appetite, of the faperior Pleafures in a 
 plain Dinner, with a fharp Stomach f : but 
 
 * Ac veluti pueri trepidantflatque omnia caecis 
 
 In tenebris metuunt, fie nos in luce timemus 
 
 Interdum nihilo quae funt metuenda magis. Luc. 
 J- Leporem feftatus, equove 
 
 Laflus ab indomito, vel fi Roraana fatigat 
 
 Militia aiTuetum Grxcari 
 
 Cum labor extuderit faftidia 
 
 - . Cum fale panis 
 
 Latrantem ftomachum bene Icniet j HOR. 
 
 this
 
 p 6 fhe Nature and 
 
 Sed:. 4. this does not reform them ; they have got 
 the Ideas of ^Dignity, Grandure, Ex- 
 cellence, and Enjoyment of Life joined to 
 their Table. Explain to a Miler the Folly 
 of his Conduit, fb that he can alledg no- 
 thing in his Defence ; yet he will go on, 
 
 Ut locufles moriatur egenti vivere fato- Juv 
 
 He has likewife all Ideas of Good, of 
 Worth^ and Importance in Life confounded 
 with his Coffers. 
 
 ] A ROMANTICK Lover has in like 
 manner no Notion of Life without his 
 MtflrefS) all Virtue and Merit are fummed 
 up in his inviolable Fidelity. The Con- 
 no (ffenr has all Ideas of valuable Knowledge * 
 Gentlemanlike Wvrth w&Ability afTociated 
 with his beloved Arts. The Idea of Tro- 
 ferty comes along with the Tafle, and 
 makes his Happinels impofTible, without 
 yojfejjion of what he admires. A plain 
 Queftion might confute the Opinion^ but 
 will not break the Affociation : " What 
 " Pleafur.e has the Pofleffor more than 
 " others, to whofe Eyes they are expofed 
 ' as well as his?" 
 
 OUR publick "Dejires are afFe&ed by 
 confufed Ideas, in the fame manner with 
 our private Defires. What is apprehended 
 
 as
 
 of the PASSIONS. 97 
 
 as Good, thro* an Aflbciation of foreign Sedt 4. 
 Ideas, fhall be purfued for thofe we love, as l/VNj 
 well as what is really good for them. Our 
 benevolent ^Paffions in the nearer Ties, are 
 as apt to be too violent as any whatfbever : 
 this we may often experience in the Love 
 of Offspring, Relations, Tarties, Cabals. 
 The Violence of our Paflion makes us 
 fometimes incapable of purfuing effectually 
 their Good,and finks us into an ufelefs State 
 of Sorrow upon their Misfortunes. Com- 
 fajjlon often makes the Evil greater to the 
 Spectator than to the Sufferer; and fome- 
 times fubje&s the Happinefs of a Perfon of 
 great Worth, to every Accident befalling 
 one entirely void of it. 
 
 THE Defire of Virtue, upon extenfive 
 impartial Schemes of publick Happinefs, 
 can fcarce be too flrong ; but, upon miftaken* 
 or partial Views of publick Good, this 
 Defire of Virtue may often lead Men into 
 very pernicious Actions. One may con- 
 ceive a fort of Extravagancy, and effemi- 
 nate Weaknefs even of this Defire ; as 
 when Men are diflatisfied with themfelves 
 for ^Difappointments in good Attempts, 
 which it was not in their Power to accom- 
 plifh ; when fome heroick Tempers fhew no 
 Regard to private Good ; when the Purfuit 
 of the lovely Form is fo paflionate, that 
 the Agent does not relifh his Paft Condutt 
 H by
 
 9 8 *The Nature and Condufl 
 
 agreeable Reflection, but like the Am- 
 
 Nila^umrefutatf quid fufer^jfet agendum. Lucan. 
 
 BUT the mod pernicious Terverjions 
 of this Defire are 4 * fov& p&t&l Admi- 
 
 rations of certain moral Species, fuch as 
 
 Fortitude, Propagation of true Reli- 
 on^ Zeal for a 'Party ; while other 
 irtues are overlooked, and the very 
 
 End to which the admired Qualities are 
 " fubfervient is forgotten. Thus fbme 
 " Thantoms of Virtue are raifed, wholly 
 *' oppofite to its true Nature, and to the 
 " fole End of it, the pub lick Good?' 
 
 HONOUR, in like manner, has had its 
 foolifh Aflbciations, and the true Nature of 
 it has been overlooked, fo that the Defire 
 of it has run into Enthujiafm, and perni- 
 cious Madnefs. Thus, " however our 
 " Defires, when our Opinions are true, 
 " and the Defire is proportioned to the 
 " true Opinion, are all calculated for good, 
 " either publick or private ; yet falfc 
 '* Opinions , and con fu fed Ideas, or too 
 " great a Violence in any of them, above 
 " a due Proportion to the reft, may 
 " turn the belt of them into deftru&ivc 
 " FoUies." 
 
 THIS
 
 _THIS is probably the Cafe in 
 Affections which fome fuppoie natural, 
 at lead incident to our Natures, and 
 ab fo lately evil : Such as Rancour, or dif- h wth ** 
 interejled Malice ', Revenge, Mifanthropy.*' 
 We indeed find our Nature determined to 
 difapprove an Agent apprehended as evil, 
 or malicious, thro* direct Intention ; we 
 muft defire the Deftru&ion of fuch a Being, 
 not only from Self-Love, but from our Be- 
 nevolence to others. Now when we rafhly 
 form Opinions of Seffs, or Nations, as 
 abfblutely evil ; or get aflbciated Ideas of 
 Impiety, Cruelty, Vrofanenefs, recurring 
 upon every mention of them : when, by 
 repeated Reflection upon Injuries received, 
 we ftrengthen our Diflike into an obdurate 
 Averfion, and conceive that the Injurious 
 are directly malicious ; we may be led to 
 ad in fuch a manner, that Spectators, who 
 are unacquainted with omfecret Opinions^ 
 or confufed Apprehenfions of others, may 
 think we have pure dijinterefted Malice in 
 our Nature ; a very Inftinff toward the Mi- 
 fery of others, when it is really only the 
 overgrowth of a juft natural Affedlion, 
 upon falfe Opinions, or confufed Ideas; 
 even as our Appetites^ upon which our na- 
 tural Life depends, may acquire accidental 
 Loathings at the moft wholefbm Food. 
 Our Ideas and Opinions of Mankind are 
 often very rafhly formed, but our Affec- 
 H 2 t torts
 
 i oo 'The Nature and Condutf 
 
 are generally fuited to our Opinions. 
 When our Ideas and Opinions of the moral 
 Qualities of others are juft, our Affections 
 are generally regular and good : But when 
 we give looie Reins to our Imagination and 
 Opinion* our Affe&ions muft follow them 
 into all Extravagance and Folly ; and inad- 
 vertent Spe&ators will imagine Ibme T)if- 
 fojltions in us wholly ufelefs, and abfb- 
 folutely and directly evil. ~j j 
 
 Now the Gratification of thefe dc- 
 flruclive Defires, like thofe of all the reft, 
 gives at firft fome Tleafure, proportioned 
 to their Violence ; and the T)ifappointment 
 gives proportioned ^Pain. But as to the 
 Continuance of thefe Plealures or Pains, 
 we fhall find hereafter great Diversity. 
 
 FROM this view of our Defires, we may 
 fee " the great Variety ofO&Jeffs, Circum- 
 Jiances, Events, which muft be of Im- 
 portance to the Happinefs of a Creature, 
 furnifhed with fuch a Variety of Senfes 
 of Good and Evil, with equally various 
 T)ejires correfponding to them : elpeci- 
 " ally confidering the ftrange Combinations 
 " of Ideas, giving Importance to many Ob- 
 '* je&s, in their own Nature indifferent." 
 
 i IV. WE muft in the next Place en- 
 quire ' ' how far thefe feveral 'Dejires muft
 
 of the PASSIONS. 101 
 
 " neceflarily arife, or may be prevented by Seel. 4. 
 our Conduct." 
 
 THE Pleafures and Pains of the exter- 1. That of 
 nal Senfes muft certainly be perceived 
 by every one who comes into the World ; 
 the one raifmg fome Degree of Defire, and 
 the other Averfion : the ^Pains of Appe- 
 tites arife yet more certainly than others, 
 and are previous to any Opinion. But then 
 it is very much in our power to keep thefe 
 Senfations/#;r and unmixed with any fo- 
 reign Ideas : fo that the plained Food and 
 Raiment , if fufficiently nouriihing and 
 healthful, may keep us eafy, as well as the 
 rarejl or molt expenfive. Nay the Body, 
 when accuftomed to the fimpler Sorts, is 
 eafieft in the Ufe of them : And we are 
 raifed to an higher Degree of C hear fit Inefs, 
 by a fmall Improvement in our Table, than 
 it is poflible to bring a pampered Body into, 
 by any of the Productions of Nature. What- 
 ever the Body is once accuftomed to 5 pro- 
 duces no confiderable Change in it. 
 
 THE Pleafures of the Imagination, orof 
 the internal Senfe of 'Beauty \ and 'Decency, 
 and Harmony ', muft alfb be perceived by 
 us. The Regularity, Proportion and Or- 
 der in external Forms, will as neceflarily 
 ftrike the Mind, as any Perceptions of the 
 external Senfes. But then, as we have no 
 uneafinefs of Appetite^ previous to the 
 H Re*
 
 1 01 The Nature and Conclutf 
 
 Seel:. 4. Reception of thofe grateful Ideas, we are 
 not neceffarily made miferable in their Ab- 
 fence ; unleis by fbme fantaftick Habit we 
 have railed very violent Defires, or by a 
 long Purfuit of them, have made our ielves 
 incapable of other Enjoyments. 
 
 AGAIN, the Senfe and Defire of Beauty 
 of feveral kinds is entirely abftra&ed from 
 yoffejjlon or ^Property ; fo that the fined 
 Reliftj of this kind, and the ftrongeft fubfe- 
 qneut 'Dejtres, if we admit no foolifh 
 Conjunctions of Ideas, may almoft every 
 where be gratified with the Profpecls of 
 Nature, and with the Contemplation of the 
 more curious Works of Art^ which the 
 Proprietors generally allow to others with- 
 out Reftraint. But if this Senfe or Defire 
 of Beauty itfelf be accompanied with the 
 Defire of ToffeJJion or ^Property ; if we 
 let it be guided by Cttftom, and receive 
 Jjffbc tat ions of foreign Ideas in our Fancy 
 pf *Drefe, Equipage , Furniture, Retinue ; 
 if we relim only the Modes of the Great, 
 or the Marks of 'Diflinttion as beautiful ; 
 if we let fuch Defires grow ftrong, we mud 
 be very great indeed, before we can have 
 any Pleafure by this Senfe : and every 
 Difappointment or Change of Fortune 
 nauft make us miferable. The like Fate 
 may attend the Purfuit of Jpeculative Set- 
 $nces^ 'Poetry, Mujick, or Tainting ; to 
 excel in phefe things is grantee] but to few. 
 
 A
 
 of the PASSIONS. 103 
 
 A violent Defire of c Diftinflion and Emi- Seel:. 4. 
 nence may bring on Vexation and Sorrow. 
 for the longeft Life. 
 
 THE Pleafures and Pains 
 Senfe will alib neceffarily arife in us. Men 
 cannot live without the Society of others, 
 and their good Offices-, they muft obferve 
 both the Happinefs and Mifery, the 'Plea- 
 fares and Tains of their Fellows : *Defire 
 and Aver/ion muft arife in the Obferver. 
 Nay farther, as we cannot avoid more 
 near Attachments of Love, either from 
 the Inftincl: between the Sexes, or that 
 toward Offspring, or from Obfervation of 
 the benevolent Tempers of others, or their 
 particular Virtues 3M& good Offices, we mud 
 feel the Seufations of Joy and Sorrow, from 
 the State of others even in the ftronger De- 
 grees, and have the publick Defires in a 
 greater Height. All we can do to prevent 
 the Tains of general Benevolence, will 
 equally lefien the Tleajitres of it. If we 
 reftrain our pub lick Affettion from grow- 
 ing ftrong, we abate our Pleafures from the 
 good Succefs of others, as much as we 
 leflen our Compafllon for their Misfor- 
 tunes: If we confine our Defires to a (mail 
 Circle of Acquaintance, or to a Cabal or 
 Fattion, we contract our Pleafures as much 
 as we do our Pains. (The Diftinclion of 
 Pleafures and Pains into real and imagina- 
 ry ', or rather into necejjary and voluntary* 
 H 4 would
 
 1 04 yhe Nature and Conduct 
 
 SecT:. 4. would be of fome ufe, if we could correct 
 vx^VV the Imaginations of others, as well as our 
 own ; but if we cannot, we are fure, who- 
 ever thinks himfelf miferable, is really fb ; 
 however he might potfibly, by a better 
 Conduit of his Imagination, have prevented 
 this Mifery. All we can do in this affair, 
 is to enjoy a great Share of the Pleafures 
 . of the "ftronger Ties, with fewer Tains of 
 I them, by confining the ftronger Degrees of 
 I Love, or our Friendfhips, to Perfbns of 
 corrected Imaginations, to whom as few 
 \ of the uncertain Objects of Defire are ne- 
 ceflary to Happineis as is poffiblej Our 
 Friendfhip with iiich Perfons may proba- 
 bly be to us a much greater Source of 
 Happinefs than of Mifery, fince the Hap- 
 pinefs of fuch Perfons is more probable than 
 the contrary. 
 
 SINCE there is nothing in our Nature 
 determining us to dijinterejied Hatred to- 
 ward any Perfon ; we may be fecure againft 
 all the Pains of Malice, by preventing 
 falfe Opinions of our Fellows as abfolutely 
 evil, or by guarding againft habitual An- 
 ger ', and ram Aversions. 
 
 THE moral Ideas do arife alfb necefTari- 
 ly in our Minds. We cannot avoid ob- 
 ferving the Affettions of thofe we converfe 
 with; their Actions, their Words, their 
 Looks betray them. We are confcious of 
 
 our
 
 of the PASSIONS. 105 
 
 our own Affections , and cannot avoid Seel. 4. 
 Reflection upon them fbmetimes : the kind S -OTV 
 and generous Affections will appear amia- 
 ble, and all Appearance of Cruelty, Malice, 
 or even very ielfilh Affections, will be dif- 
 approved, and appear odious. Our own 
 Temper ', as well as that of others, will ap- 
 pear to our moral Senie either lovely or 
 deformed, and will be the Occafion either 
 of Pleafure or Uneafinefs. We have not 
 any proper A f petite toward Virtue, fo as 
 to be uneafy, even antecedently to the Ap- 
 pearance of the lovely Form ; but as fbon 
 as it appears to any Perfon, as it certainly 
 muft very early in Life, it never fails to 
 raife c Defire, as Vice does raife Averjion. 
 This is fo rooted in our Nature, that no 
 Education, falfe ^Principles, depraved Ha- 
 bits, or even Affectation itfelf can entirely 
 root it out. LUCRETIUS and HOBBES 
 fhew themfelves in innumerable Inftances 
 (truck with fome moral Species ; they are 
 full of Exprefiions of Admiration* Gra- 
 titude^ *P raife, 'Defire of doing Good-, and 
 of Cenfure, Ttifapprobation, Averjlon to 
 fome Forms of Vice. 
 
 SINCE then there is no avoiding thefe 
 Defires and Perceptions of Morality, all 
 we can do to fecure our felves in the pof- 
 feflion of Pleafures of this kind, without 
 Pain, confifts in " a vigorous Ufe of our 
 " Reafon, to difcern what Actions really 
 
 " tend
 
 106 7*he Nature and Condtifl 
 
 tend to the pubiick Good in the whole, 
 that we may not do that upon a partial 
 View of Good, which afterwards, upon 
 a fuller Examination, we fhall condemn 
 and abhor our felves for ; and withal, to 
 fix our Friend/hips with Perfons of like 
 Difpofitions, and juft Difcernment." Men 
 of partial Views of pubiick Good, if they 
 never obtain any better, may be eafy in a 
 very pernicious Conduct, fince the moral 
 Evilo* 'Deformity does not appear to them. 
 But this is feldom to be hop'd for in any 
 partial Conduct. Thofe who are injured by 
 us fail not to complain ; the Spectators, 
 who are difengaged from our partial Attach- 
 ments, will often take the Freedom to ex- 
 prefs their Sentiments, and fet our Conduct 
 in a full Light : This muft very probably 
 occafion to us Shame and Remorfe. " It 
 " cannot therefore be an indifferent Mat- 
 *' ter, to an Agent with a moral Senfe, 
 " what Opinions he forms of the Tenden- 
 " cy of Actions; what partial Attach' 
 " ments of Love he has toward ^Parties 
 " or Fa^i ions. If he has true Opinions 
 " of the Tendencies of Actions ; if he 
 * carefully examines the real Dignity of 
 " Terfofis and Caufes, he may be fure 
 *' that the Conduct which he now ap- 
 " proves he fhall always approve, and have 
 *' delight in Reflection upon it, however 
 * c it be cenfured by others. But if he takes 
 f - up ^t hazard Opinions of Actions; if 
 
 "he
 
 of the PASSIONS. 107 
 
 " he has a foolifh Admiration of particular Se#. 4. 
 
 " Seds, and as foolifh Aver fans and Dif- 
 
 " like to others, not according to any real 
 
 " Importance or Dignity, he lhall often 
 
 " find occafion for Inconftancy and Change 
 
 ' * of his AfFe&ions, with Shame and Re- 
 
 " morfe for his pad Conduct, and an in- 
 
 " ward <DiJlike and Self-Condemnation." 
 
 WHAT mod deeply affects our Happi- 
 nefs or Mifery, are the Difpofitions of 
 thofe Perfons with whom we voluntarily 
 contraft fome nearer Intimacies of Friend- 
 Ihip : If we act wifely in this Point, we 
 may fecure to our felves the greateft Plea- 
 lures with the feweft Pains, by attaching 
 our felves to Perfons of real Goodnefs, good 
 Offices toward whom are ufeful to the 
 World. The Ties of Blood are generally 
 very ftrong, efpecially toward Offspring ; 
 they need rather the Bridle than the Spur , 
 in all Cafes wherein the Object is not re- 
 commended to a fmgular Love by his good 
 Qualities. We may, in a confiderable mea* 
 fure, reftrain our natural Affettion toward 
 a worthlefs Offspring, by letting ova fub- 
 lick Affections and our moral Senfe againft 
 it, in frequent Contemplation of their Vices, 
 and of the Mifchief which may arile to 
 Perfons of more worth from them, if we 
 give them any Countenance in their Vices.
 
 i o8 Fhe Nature and Conduct 
 
 4 . 
 
 THE regulating our Apprehenfions of 
 the Actions of others^ is of very great 
 Importance, that we may not imagine 
 Mankind worfe than they really are, and 
 thereby bring upon our felves a Temper 
 full of Sufpicion^ Hatred, Anger and Con- 
 tempt toward others ; which is a conftant 
 State of Mifery, much worfe than all the 
 Evils to be feared from Credulity. If we 
 examine the true Springs of human Action, 
 we ihall feldom find their Motives worfe 
 than Self -Love. Men are often fubjecl: to 
 Anger, and upon fudden 'Provocations do 
 Injuries to each other, and that only from 
 Self-Love, without Malice ; but the greateft 
 part of their Lives is employed in Offices 
 of natural Affection, Friendjhip , inno- 
 cent Self- Love, or Love of a Country. The 
 little 'Party-'PrejudicesMQ generally found- 
 ed upon Ignorance, or falfe Opinions, rather 
 apt to move *Pity than Hatred. Such 
 Confederations are the beft Prefervative a- 
 gainft Anger, Malice, and Difcontent of 
 Mind with the Order of Nature. " When 
 " you would make your felf chearful and 
 " eafy ( fays the Emperor* ) confider the 
 * Virtues of your feveral Acquaintances, 
 ** the Induflry and 'Diligence of one, the 
 *' Mode fly of another, the Generofity or 
 
 Marcus Antoninus, Lib. vi. C. 48. 
 
 "/.
 
 of the PASSIONS. 109 
 
 Liberality of a third ; and in other Per- 
 fons fome other Virtue. There is no- 
 thing fo delightful, as the Refemblances 
 of the Virtues appearing in the Conduct 
 of your Contemporaries as frequently as 
 poffible. Such Thoughts we mould ftill 
 retain with us." 
 
 WHEN the moral Senfe is thus aflifted 
 by a found Underftandiug and Application, 
 our own Actions may be a conftant Source 
 of fblid Pleafure, along with the Pleafares 
 of Benevolence -, in the higheft Degree which 
 our Nature will admit, and with as few of 
 its Pains as poffible. 
 
 As to the Defires of Honour ; fince 
 cannot avoid obferving or hearing of 
 Sentiments of others concerning our 
 duel:, we mufl feel the Defire of the 
 Opinions of others, and Averfiou to their 
 Cenfures or Condemnation : fince the one 
 necefTarily gives us Pleafure, and the other 
 Pain. Now it is impoflible to bring all 
 Men into the fame Opinions of particular 
 Actions, becaufe of their different Opinions 
 tf pub lick Good, and of the Means of pro- 
 moting it ; and becaufe ofoppojite Inter efts ; 
 fo that it is often impoflible to be fecure a- 
 gainft all Cenfure or Difhonour from fome 
 of our Fellows. No one is Ib much Ma* 
 fler of external Things, as to make his 
 honourable Intentions fuccefsful ; and yec 
 
 Site-
 
 1 1 o 7%e Nature and Conduft 
 
 Se<5t 4. Succefs is a Mark by which many judge 
 the Goodnefs of Attempts. Whoever 
 therefore fufTers his Defire of Honour or 
 Applaufe to grow violent, without Di 
 tin&ion of the Terfons to whofe Judgment 
 he fubmits, runs a great hazard of Mifery. 
 But our natural Defire of Praife, to fpeak 
 in the Mathematical Style, is in a com- 
 pounded Proportion of the Numbers of 
 AppJauders , and their dignity. * c He 
 " therefore who makes 'DiftincJion of Per- 
 " fons juftly, and a&s wifely for the///- 
 '* lick Good, may fecure himfelf from much 
 " uneafinefs upon injudicious Cenfure, and 
 " may obtain the Approbation of thofe 
 " whofe Efleem alone is valuable, or at 
 " lead far over-ballances the Cenfure of 
 " others." 
 
 THE T>efire of Wealth muft be as ne- 
 O f wealth cefTary as any other Defires of our Nature, 
 ^ s ^ QQ ^ ^ Q apprehend the uferulnefs of 
 Wealth to gratify all other Defires. While 
 it is defired as the Means of fomething 
 farther, the Defire tends to our Happinefs, 
 proportionably to the good Oeconomy of 
 the principal 'Defires to which it is made 
 fobfervient. It is in every man's power, 
 by a little Reflection, to prevent the Mad- 
 ne(s and Enthufiafm with which Wealth is 
 infatiably purfued, even for itfelf, with- 
 out any dired: Intention of ufing it. The 
 Cpnfideration of thq fmall Addition often 
 
 made
 
 of the PASSIONS. m 
 
 made by Wealth to the Happinefs of the Se&. 4, 
 Potfeflbr, may check this Defire, and pre- '-^/"^ 
 vent that Infatiability which fometimes at- 
 tends it. 
 
 POWER in like manner is defired as the 
 Means of gratifying other originaLTjeJires ; 
 nor can the Defire be avoided by thofe 
 who apprehend its ufefulnefs. It is eafy to 
 prevent the Extravagance of this Defire, 
 and many of its conlequent Pains, by con- 
 fidering " the "Danger of affecting it by 
 " injurious Means, lupporting it by Force, 
 " without confent of the Subject:, and 
 " employing it to private Inter eft, in op- 
 " polition to publick Good." No Mortal 
 is ealy under fuch Subjection ; every Slave 
 to fuch a Power is an Enemy : The Poffef- 
 for muft be in a continual State of Fear, 
 Sufpicion and Hatred. 
 
 THERE is nothing in our Nature lead- The occ*- 
 ing us necefTarily into the Jantaftick < De-J ion ff a ' I ~ 
 fires ; they wholly arife thro* our Igno 
 ranee and Negligence ; when, thro* want of \ 
 Thought, we fuffer foolifli dflbciations of 
 Ideas to be made, and imagine certain 
 trifling Circumftances to contain fbmething 
 honourable and excellent in them, from 
 their being ufed by Perfons of ^Diflmftion. 
 We know how the Inadvertences , Negli* 
 gences, Infirmities, and even Vices, either 
 of great or ingenious Men, have been af- 
 A ftftcd,
 
 | 
 
 ' 
 
 1 1 2 The Nature a 
 
 Seft. ^..fe&ed, and imitated by thole who were 
 "w incapable of imitating their Excellencies. 
 y pthis happens often to young Gentlemen of 
 'plentiful Fortunes, which let them above 
 the Employments necefTary to others, when 
 they have not cultivated any relilh for the 
 Plealures of the Imagination^ fuch as Ar- 
 chiteflnre, Mujick, Tainting, *Poetry , 
 Natural Thilofophy^ Hiftory : When they 
 have no farther Knowledge of thefe things, 
 than ftupidly to praife what they hear o- 
 thers praife : When they have neglected to 
 cultivate their public k Affections, are ban- 
 tered a long time from Marriage and Off- 
 firing ; and have neither themlelves Minds 
 
 !fit for Friendjhips , nor any intimate 
 Acquaintance with fuch as are fit to make 
 Friends of: When their moral Senfe is 
 weakned, or, if it be ftrong in any points, 
 thefe are fixed ait random, without any re- 
 v gular Scheme : When thro* Ignorance of 
 publick Affairs, or want of Eloquence to 
 Ipeak what they know, they defpair of the 
 Efleem or Honour of the Wife : When their 
 Hearts are too gay to be entertained with 
 the dull Thoughts of increafing their 
 Wealth jxxb they have not Ability enough to 
 hope for 'Power ; fuch poor empty Minds 
 have nothing but Trifles to purlue ; any 
 thing becomes agreeable, which can fupply 
 the Void of Thought, or prevent the fal- 
 len Dilcontent which muft grow upon a 
 Mind coufciousof no Merit \ and expeding 
 2 the
 
 of the P A S S I O N S. 113 
 
 the Contempt of its Fellows ; as a Tack 0/$edt 44 
 'Dogs, an Horfe y a 'jewel, an j&quipage , < 
 a ?W/ 0/~ Cards, a Ta^-en ; any thing 
 which has got any confuted Ideas of Ho- 
 nour, 'Dignity, Liber ali. ,, or genteel En- 
 joyment of Life joined co it. Thefe fan- 
 taftick Defires any Man might have banifh- 
 ed at firft, or entirely prevented. But if 
 we have loft the Time of fubltituting bet- 
 ter in their (lead, we lhall only change from 
 one fort to another, with a perpetual Suc- 
 ceflion of Inconflancy and ^Dtffatisfattiom 
 
 Cuifi vitiofa Libido 
 
 Fecerit Aufpicium 
 
 lidem eadempoffunt horam durare prolantesl 
 
 Hor. Ep. rj 
 
 V. T H E End of all thele Confiderations, 
 is to find out the moft effedual way of ad- 
 vancing the Happinefs of Mankind ; in or- 
 der to which, they may perhaps appear of 
 confiderable Confequence, fmce Happinefs 
 confifts in " the higheft and moft durable 
 Gratifications of, either all our 'De/tres^ 
 or, if all cannot be p/atify'd at once, of 
 thofe which tend to the greateft and 
 moft durable Tleafures^ with exemption 
 either from all Tains and Objecls of A- 
 " 'verjion, or at leaft from thofe which 
 " are the moft grievous." The following 
 general Obfervations may be prerailed con- 
 cerning their Objects. 
 
 I i. " 1*
 
 1 1 4 fhe Nature and Conduct 
 
 Sea. * 
 
 i. " IT is plainly impotfible that any 
 Man mould purfue the Gratifications of 
 
 all kinds of" all thefe ^Dejlres at once, with Prudence, 
 ' * 4 Diligence, and Vigor, fufficient to ob- 
 " tain the higheft Pleafures of each kind, 
 " and to avoid their oppofite Pains." For, 
 not to mention the flarrownejs of the 
 Powers of our Minds, which makes them 
 incapable of a Multiplicity of Purfuits at 
 once ; the very Methods of obtaining the 
 higheft Gratification of the feveral Senfes 
 and Defires, are direaiy inconfiftent with 
 each other. For example, the violent Pur- 
 fuit of the Pleafures of \hzexternal Senfes^ 
 or Senfiiality, is oppofite to the Pleafures 
 of the Imagination* and to the Study of 
 the ingenious Arts, which tend to the Or- 
 .nament of Life : Thefe require Labour and 
 Application, inconfiftent with the Volup- 
 tuoufnefs of the external Senfes, which by 
 itfelf would engrofs the whole Application 
 of our Minds, thro' vain AfTociations of 
 Ideas. 
 
 AGAIN: The violent Purfuits of either 
 of the former kinds of Pleafures, is often 
 diredly inconfiftent with public 'k Affec- 
 tions, and with our moral Senfe, and Senfe 
 of Honour. Thefe Pleafures require a quite 
 different Temper, a Mind little fet upon 
 felfifh Pleafures, ftrongly potfetfed with 
 Love for others, arid Concern for their 
 
 Inte-
 
 of the P A S S I O N S. 1 1 j 
 
 Interefts capable of Labour and Pain. How- Sed:. 4. 
 ever our defire of Honour be really felfijh, ^/^T^ 
 yet we know it is never acquired by Actions 
 appearing felfiih; but by luch as appear 
 publick-lpirited, with neglect of the Plea- 
 lures of the external Seufes and Wealth. 
 Selfijhnefs is generally attended with 
 Shame ;* and hence we conceal even out 
 *Defire of Honour itfelf, and are afhamed 
 of Traife in our own Prefence, even when 
 we are doing beneficent Adions, with de- 
 fign to obtain it. The Purfuits of Wealth 
 and Tower are often directly oppofite to 
 the Pleafares of all the other kinds, at lead 
 for the preient, however they may be in- 
 tended for the future Enjoyment of them. 
 nCI "?<> 
 
 2. " THERE is no fuch Certainty in NO cer- 
 " human Affairs, that a Man can affure^/^ 
 '* himfelf of the perpetual* PofTefTion ofan"pu* 
 " thefe Objects which gratify any one/,/<* 
 " Defire," except that of Virtue itfelf : 
 which, fmce it does not depend upon ex* 
 ternal Objects and Events f, but upon our 
 own Affeftions and Conduit, we may pro- 
 mife to our felves that we mall always en- 
 joy. But then Virtue confifts in Benevo- 
 lence, or Defire of the publick Good : The 
 Happtnefs of others is very uncertain, fo 
 
 * Trent, z. Sett. 5. jfrt. 7. 
 
 f Treat, z. Sett. j. laft Paragraph. 
 
 I 2 that
 
 1 1 6 fhe Nature and Condtitf 
 
 Se<5t 4. that our publick Defires may often be di 
 appointed ; and every Difappointment is 
 uneafy, in proportion to the Degree of De- 
 fire. And therefore, however the Admi- 
 ration and fixed 'Pnrfuit of Virtue may 
 always fecure one ftabie and conftant Plea- 
 fure of Self- Approbation, yet this Enjoy- 
 ment prefuppofes a T)ejire of publick Good, 
 fubjed: to frequent Diiappointments, which 
 will be attended with Uneafmefs propor- 
 tioned to the Degree of publick Defire, or 
 the Virtue upon which we reflect. There 
 feems therefore no poffibility offecuringto 
 our felves, in our preient State, an unmix- 
 ed Happinefs independently of all other 
 Beings. Every Apprehenfion of Good 
 raifes defire, every Difappointment of De- 
 fire is uneafy ; every Object of Defire is 
 uncertain except Virtue, but the Enjoy- 
 ment of Virtue fuppofes the Defire of an 
 uncertain Object, viz. t\\z publick Happi- 
 nefs. To fecure therefore independently 
 of all other Beings invariable and pure Hap- 
 pinefs, it would be neceflary either to have 
 the Tower of directing all Events in the 
 Univerfe, or to root out all Senje of Evil, or 
 Averfionto it, while we retained our Senfe 
 of Good, but without previous Defire, the 
 Difappointment of which could give Pain. 
 The rooting out of all Senfes and Defires, 
 were it practicable, would cut off all Hap- 
 pinefs as well as Mifery : The removing or 
 flopping a part of them, might indeed be 
 3 of
 
 of the PASSIONS. 117 
 
 of confequence to the Happineis of the In* Sect 4. 
 dividual on fome occafions, however per- 
 nicious it might be to the Whole. But 'tis 
 plain, we have not in our power the mo- 
 delling of our Senfes or Tie fires ^ to form 
 them for a private Intereft : They are fixed 
 for us by the AUTHOR of our Nature,- 
 fubfervient to the Intereft of the Syftem ; 
 fo that each Individual is made, previoufly 
 to his own Choice, a Member of a great 
 Body, and affected with the Fortunes of 
 the Whole, or at leaft of many Parts of 
 it ; nor can he break himfelf off at plea- 
 fure. 
 
 THIS may ihew the Vanity of fome 
 the lower rate of Philofophers of the S* 
 ick Sett, in boafting of an undifturbed Hap- about >m- 
 pinefs and Serenity, independently even 
 the DEITY, as well as of their Fellow- 
 Creatures , wholly inconfiftent with the 
 Order of Nature, as well as with the Prin- 
 ciples of fome of their great Leaders : for 
 which, Men of Wit in their own Age did 
 not fail to ridicule them. 
 
 THAT muft be a very fantaftick Scheme 
 of Virtue, which reprelents it as a private 
 fub lime ly f elf fb 'Difctpline, to prefer ve our 
 felves wholly unconcerned, not only in the 
 Changes of Fortune as to our Wealth or 
 ^Poverty, Liberty or Slavery, Eaje or 
 but even in all external Events
 
 1 1 8 The Nature and Conduft 
 
 iect 4. whatsoever, in the Fortunes of our deareft 
 S^T*J Friends or Country, (oiacing our felves that 
 we are eafy and undifturbed. If there be 
 any thing amiable in human Nature, the 
 Reflection upon which can give us plea- 
 fure, it mud be kind difint ere fled Affections 
 towards our Fellows 3 or towards the whole, 
 and its AUTHOR and Caule. Thefe Af- 
 fections, when reflected upon, muft be one 
 conftant Source of Pleafure in Self- Appro- 
 bation. But fomeof thefe very Affections, 
 being toward an uncertain Object, muft 
 occafion Pain, and directly produce one 
 fort of Mifery to the virtuous in this Life. 
 'Tis true indeed, it would be a much greater 
 Mifery to want fuch an amiable Temper, 
 which alone fecures us from the bafeft and 
 moft deteftable State of Self-Condemnation 
 and Abhorrence. But, allowing fuch a 
 Temper to be the neceffary Occafion of 
 one fort of Happinefs, even the greatefl we 
 are capable of, yet it may alfo be the Oc- 
 cafion of no inconfiderable Pains in this 
 Life. 
 
 THAT this affectionate Temper is true 
 Virtue, and not that undifturbed Selfjh- 
 nefs, were it attainable, every one would 
 readily own who faw them both in Practice. 
 Would any honeft Heart relifh ftich a Speech 
 as this from a Cato or an dEmilius Taulus ? 
 " I forefee the Effects of this Defeat, my 
 Fellow-Creatures, my Countrymen, my 
 
 " honoura-
 
 of the PASSIONS. 119 
 
 " honourable Acquaintances ; many a ge-Seft. 4. 
 
 " nerous gallant ^Patriot and Friend, Fa- 
 
 " /forj, iSWj-, and Brothers, Husbands 
 
 '* and Wives , lhall be inflaved, tortured, 
 
 " torn from each other, or in each others 
 
 *' fight made fubjed: to the 'Pride, Ava- 
 
 " r/r*, <Petulancy, or /,/? of the Conque- 
 
 " ror. I have, for my own 'Pleafure, to 
 
 " fecure agreeable Reflections, laboured in 
 
 " their Defence. I am unconcerned in 
 
 <* their Misfortunes ; their bodily Tortures, 
 
 " or more exquifite ^Diflrejfes of Mind 
 
 " for each other, are to me indifferent I 
 
 " am entirely abfblute, compleat in my (elf; 
 
 " and can behold their Agonies with as 
 
 *' much Eafe or Pleafure, as I did their 
 
 " Profperity." This is the plain Language 
 
 of fome boafting Refiners upon Virtue; 
 
 Sentiments as difagreeable as thofe of Ca- 
 
 tiline. 
 
 THE Defire of Virtue is toward an Ob- 
 jq6kt*i*tij'iituf, or in our power, fmce all 
 Men have naturally kind Affettions^ which 
 they may increafe and ftrengthen ; but thele 
 kind Affections tend toward an uncertain 
 Qbjett* which is not in our power. Suppofe 
 the Stoick Ihould alledg, ** Vice is the only 
 Evil, and Virtue the only Good." If 
 we have Benevolence to others, we mud 
 wifti them to be virtuous, and muft have 
 compaffion toward the vicious : thus flill 
 we may be fubjetfted to Pain or Uneafinefs,, 
 
 14 >y
 
 Natttre and Condtttf 
 
 Se6t. 4. by our very Virtue ; unlefs we fappofe, 
 what no Experience can confirm , that 
 Men may have ftrong Defires, the Difap- 
 pointment of which will give no C 0neaji- 
 nefs, or that Uneafmels is no Evil. Let 
 the 'Philofopher regulate his own Notions 
 as he pleafes about Happinefs or Mifery ; 
 whoever imagines himfelf unhappy, is fo 
 in reality ; and whoever has kind Affec- 
 tions or Virtue, muft be unealy to fee others 
 really unhappy. 
 
 BUT tho a pure unmixed Happinefs is 
 not attainable in this Life, yet all their 
 Precepts are not rendered ufelefs. 
 
 Eft quoddam frodire tenus, fi ncn datur ultra. 
 
 3. FOR we may obfervc, thirdly, that 
 the Senfe of Good can continue in its full 
 !_ y " Strength, when yet we fhall have but 
 weak *De/ires. s) In this cafe we are ca- 
 "nater P a ^ c f en jy m g au * tne Good in any Ob- 
 Pains of Jed:, when we obtain it, and yet expofed to 
 S?!?'^? no S reat ^ ain U P OD 'DifappOMtmetit. This 
 be generally obferved, that " the Vio- 
 lence ofDefire does not proportion ably 
 enliven the Senfation of Good, when it 
 * is obtained ; nor does diminijhing the 
 ' *Defire weaken the Senfation, tho it will 
 ' diminifh the { l)neajinefs of c Difappoint- 
 ' ment, or the Mifery of contrary Evils" 
 Pur high Expectations of Happinefs from 
 
 any
 
 of the PASSIONS. in 
 
 any Object, either thro* the Acutenefs ofSecl:. 4. 
 our Senfes, or from our Opinions or Affb- 
 ciations of Ideas, never fail to increafe De- 
 fire : But then the Violence of T)efire does 
 not proportionably enliven our Senfation 
 in the Enjoyment. During the firft con- 
 fufed Hurry of our Succefs, our Joy may 
 perhaps be increafed by the Violence of our 
 previous T)e(ire, were it only by allaying 
 the great Uneafmefs accompanying the De- 
 fire itfelf. But this Joy fbon vanishes, and 
 is often fucceeded by 'Difguft and TJneafi- 
 nefs, when our Senfi of the Good, which 
 is more fixed in Nature than our Fancy or 
 Opinions, reprefents the Objecl: far below 
 our Expectation. Now he who examines 
 all Opinions of Good in Objects, who pre- 
 vents or corrects vain Affociations of Ideas, 
 and thereby prevents extravagant Admi- 
 rations, or enthufiajlick 'Defer es, above 
 the real Moment of Good in the Object, 
 if he lofes the tranjlent Raptures of the 
 firft Succefs, yet he enjoys all ti\z perma- 
 nent Good or Happinefs which any Objecl: 
 can afford ; and efcapes, in a great meafiire, 
 both the uneafy Senfations of the more vi- 
 olent T)efiresi and the Torments of 'Difi 
 appointment, to which Perfons of irregu- 
 lar Imaginations are expofed. 
 
 THIS is the Cafe of the Temperate and 
 the Chafte, with relation to the Appetites ; 
 of the Men of Moderation and Frugality, 
 
 and
 
 112 "The Nature and Conduff 
 
 Se<2. 4-and corrected Fancy, with regard to the 
 i/YNJ Pleafures of Imagination ; of the Humble 
 and the Content, as to Honour, Wealth 
 or Tower. Such Perfons upon good Suc- 
 cefs, want only the firft tranjitory Ecfta- 
 Jles - 9 but have a full and lively Senfe of all 
 the lading Good in the Obje&s of their 
 Purfait ; and yet are in a great mealure fe- 
 cure againft both the Uneafinefs of violent 
 'Defire, and the <]3 ejection of Mind, and 
 abjett Sorrow upon Difappointment, or 
 upon their being expofed to the contrary 
 Evils. 
 
 FURTHER, Perfbns of irregular Ima- 
 ginations are not foon reformed, nor their 
 AfTociations of Ideas broke by every Ex- 
 ferience of the Smallnefs of the Good in the 
 admired Object. They are often rather fet 
 upon new Turfuits of the fame kind, or of 
 greater Variety of like Objects. So their 
 experience of 7) i faff ointment, or of con- 
 trary Evils, does not foon correct their 
 Imaginations about the Degrees of Good 
 or Evil. The Lofs of Good, or the Pref- 
 fure of any Calamity, will continue to tor- 
 ment them, thro' their vain Notions of thefe 
 Events, and make them infenfible of the 
 real Good which they might (till enjoy in 
 their prefent State. Thus the Covetous 
 have finaller Pleafure in any given *Degree 
 of Wealth ; the Luxurious from a fplen- 
 did Table \ the Ambitious from any given 
 
 ^Degree
 
 of the PASSIONS. 123 
 
 ^Degree of Honour or Tower, than Men Sect. 4. 
 of more moderate Defires : And on the IXVNJ 
 other hand, the Miferies of Toverty, mean 
 Fare, Subjection, or Contempt, appear 
 much greater to them, than to the mode- 
 rate. Experience, while thefe confufed 
 Ideas remain, rather increafes the Diforder: 
 But if juft Reflection comes in, and tho ^ ; 
 late, applies the proper Cure, by correct- 
 ing the Opinions and the Imagination, 
 every Experience will tend to our Ad- 
 vantage. 
 
 THE fame way may our public 'k Tteferes 
 be regulated. If we prevent confufed No- 
 tions of Good, we diminifh or remove 
 many Anxieties for our Friends as well as 
 our felves. Only this muft be remembred, 
 that weakning Q\X public k AffeCtions, ne- 
 cefTarily weakens our Senfe of publick Good 
 founded upon them, and will deprive us of 
 the Pleafures of the moral Senfe, in reflect- 
 ing on our Virtue. 
 
 4. WE may laftly remark, " That the*, 
 " Expectation of any Pain, or the fr 
 " quent Confederation of the Evils which wj* 
 '* may befal us, or the Lofs of Good we" 
 ' now enjoy, before thefe Events actually 
 " threaten us, or raife any Confternation 
 " in our Minds by their Approach, does 
 " not diminifh our Joy upon efcaping Evil, 
 " or our y/ra/atffipoa the arrival of any 
 
 " Good
 
 124 %%* Nature and 
 
 Sect. 4." Good beyond Expectation: But this 
 l/\^J " previous Expectation generally diminifhes 
 " our Fear, while the Event is in luf- 
 " pence, and our Sorrow upon its arrival ;" 
 Since thereby the Mind examines the Na- 
 ture of the Event, fees how far it is necefla- 
 rily Evil, and what Supports under it are in its 
 power : This Confederation may break vain 
 Conjunctions of foreign Ideas, which oc- 
 cafion our greateft Fears in Life, and even 
 in Death idelf. If, indeed, a weak Mind 
 does not ftudy to correct the imagination, 
 but dill dwells upon its polTible Calamities, 
 under all their borrowed Forms of Terror; 
 or if it induftrioufly aggravates them to it 
 felf, this previous Confederation may em- 
 bitter its whole Life, without arming it 
 againft the fmalleft Evil. 
 
 THIS Folly is often occafioned by that 
 Delight which moft Men find in the Tity of 
 others under Misfortunes ; thofe efpeci- 
 ally, who are continually indulged as the 
 Favorites of Families or Company, be- 
 fng long enured to the Pleafure arifing from 
 the perpetual Marks of Love toward them 
 from all their Company, and from their 
 tender Sympathy in Diftrefs : this often 
 leads them even to feign Mifery to obtain 
 Pity, and to raife in themfelves the moft 
 dejected Thoughts, either to procure Con- 
 folatton, or the Pleafure of obferving the 
 Sympathy of others. Thisfeevt/h or pet- 
 
 tijh
 
 of the PASSIONS. 115 
 
 tijh Temfer, tbo it arifes from fomethingSecl:.^ 
 (bciable in our Frame, yet is often 
 Fore-runner of the greateft Corruption of 
 Mind. It difarms the Heart of its natural 
 Integrity ; it induces us to throw away our 
 true Armour, our natural Courage, and 
 cowardly to commit our felves to the vain 
 Protection of others, while we neglect our 
 own Defence. 
 
 SECT.
 
 ^^6 fhe Nature and Conduct 
 
 5. 
 
 _ 
 
 SECT. V. 
 
 A Comparifon of the Tleajures and 
 1 Tains of the federal Senfes, as 
 to Intenfenefs and Duration. 
 
 I. TT A V I N G confidered how far thefe 
 J[j[ Desires muft neceflarily afFed us, 
 and when they are the Occafions of Plea- 
 fure or Pain ; fince by the firft general Ob- 
 fervation , the Purfuits of their feveral 
 Pleafures, and the avoiding their feveral 
 Pains, may often be inconfiftent with each 
 other ; let us next examine, which of thefe 
 leveral Pleafures are the mofl valuable, fo as 
 to deferve our Purfuit, even with neglect 
 of the others ; and which of thefe Pains are 
 moft grievous, fo as to be ftiunned even by 
 the enduring of other Pains if necefTary. 
 
 " THE Value of any Pleafure, and the 
 '* Quantity or Moment of any Pain, is in 
 " a compounded Proportion of the Intenfe- 
 " nefs and "Duration :." In examining the 
 Duration of Pleafure, we muft include not 
 only the Conftancy of the Objeff, but 
 even of our Fancy ; for a Change in either 
 of thefe will put an end to it. 
 
 To
 
 of the PASSIONS. ,27 
 
 Sc<2. 5 . 
 
 T o compare thefe feveral Pleafares and ^v^> 
 Pains as to their Intenfenefs, feems difficult, g^ 
 becaufe of the Diverfity ofTaftes, or Turns comparing 
 of Temper given by Cuflomand Education, the f everal 
 
 i - i 1/1 y/y- /~ r Plea fares, 
 
 which make ftrange Affociations of Ideas, a * to in- 
 and form Habits ; from whence it happens, t 
 that, tho all the feveral kinds of original 
 Senfes and Defires feem equally natural, 
 yet fbme are led into a conftant Purfuit of 
 the Pleafures of one kind, as the only En- 
 joyment of Life, and are indifferent about 
 others. Some purfue, or Ieem to purfue 
 only the Pleafures of the external Senfes 9 
 and all other Purfuits are made fubfervient 
 to them : Others are chiefly fet upon the 
 Pleafures of Imaginat ion or internal Senfes ; 
 focial and kind Afettions employ another 
 fort, who feem indifferent to all private 
 Pleafure : This laft Temper has generally 
 joined with it anhigh moral Senfe^ and 
 Love of Honour, twe may fomerimes find 
 an high Senfi of Honour, and defire of^ty- 
 plaufe, where there is indeed a moral Sen fe, 
 but a very weak one, very much perverted, 
 fo as to be influenced by popular Opinion, 
 and made fubfervient to it : In this (26*- 
 ratter the Pleafures of the external Sen- 
 fes, or even of the Imagination, have Jit- 
 tie room, except fo far as, they may pro- 
 cure c DiJlinEiion. Now upon comparing 
 the feveral Pleafures, perhaps the Sentence 
 of the Luxurious would be quite oppofite 
 
 to
 
 1 2 8 fhe Nature and Condufl 
 
 Se&. 5. to that of the Virtuous. The Ambitious 
 would differ from both. Thofe who are 
 devoted to the internal Senfes or Imagina- 
 tion, would differ from all the three. The 
 Mifer would applaud himfelf in his Wealth 
 above them all. Is there therefore no dif- 
 puting about Taftes ? Are all Perfons alike 
 happy, who obtain the feverat Enjoyments 
 for which they have a Reliih? If they are, 
 the Diipute is at an end : A Fly or Mag- 
 got in its proper haunts, is as happy as a 
 Hero, or ^Patriot, or Friend, who has 
 newly delivered his Country or Friend* 
 and is furrounded with their grateful Traifes. 
 The Fly or Maggot may think fo of itlelf; 
 but who will ftand to its Judgment, when 
 we are fure that it has experienced only one 
 Ibrt of Pleafure, and is a {hanger to the o- 
 thers? May we not in like manner find 
 fome Reafons of appealing from the Judg- 
 1 ment of certain Men ? Or may not fome 
 1 Characters be found among Men, who a- 
 i lone are capable of judging in this matter? 
 
 lea- !! I T is obvious that " thofe alone arc 
 of a capable of judging, who have experi- 
 dfu d " enced ali the ^vcral kinds ofTleafure, 
 , 4 " an ^ have their Senfes acute and fully ex- 
 ercifed in them all." Now a high Relifh 
 for Virtue, or a ftrong moral Senfe, with 
 its concomitant public k Senfe and Affec- 
 tions^ and a Senfe of Honour, was never 
 alledged to impair our external Senfes, or 
 
 to
 
 of the PASSIONS. n ? 
 
 to make us incapable of any plealure of theSeft. 5. 
 Imagination ; Temperance never fpoiled a (SY\* 
 good Talate^ whatever Luxury may have 
 done ; r a generous affectionate pubiick Spi- 
 rit, reflecting on itieJf with delight, never 
 vitiated any Organ of external Yleafure* 
 nor weakned their Perceptions. Now all 
 virtuous Men have given Virttie this Tefti- 
 mony, that its Pleafures are faperior to any 
 other, nay to all others jointly ; that a 
 friendly generous Action gives a ^Delight 
 fuperior to any other ; that other Enjoy- 
 ments, when compared with the Delights 
 of Integrity, Faith, Kindnefs, Genero- 
 Jity, and pubiick Spirit, are but trifles 
 Icarce worth any regard *. 
 
 NAY, we need not confine our Evidence BytkeTef* 
 to the Teftimony of the Perfectly Virtu-* "? of 
 
 ,_,, . . J T.. \ J r i thtViwut* 
 
 vus. The vicious Man, tno no tit judge, 
 were he entirely abandoned, fince he lofes 
 his Senfe of the Pleasures of the moral 
 Kind, or at lead has not experienced them 
 fully, yet he generally retains Ib much of 
 human Nature, and of the Senfes and Af* 
 feffions of our Kind, as lometimes to ex- 
 perience even moral Pleafures. There is 
 icarce any Mortal, who is wholly infenfible 
 to all Species of Morality. 
 
 * See this Argument in Plato de Repub. Lib, 9. And 
 Lord Shaftesbury's Inquiry concerning Virtue. 
 
 K A
 
 1 3 o fhe Nature and Conduct 
 
 Seel. 5. 
 
 A LUXURIOUS ^Debauchee has never 
 perhaps felt the ^Pleafures of a wife pub- 
 lick-fpirited Conduct, of an entirely up- 
 right, generous, focial, and affectionate 
 Life, with the Senfe of his own moral 
 Worth, and merited Rfleem and Love ; 
 this courle of Life, becaufe unknown to 
 him, he may defpife in comparifon of his 
 yieafures. But if in any particular Affair, 
 a moral Species, or Tomt of Honour has 
 afTe&ed him, he will foon delpife his fenfual 
 Pleafures in companion of the Moral. Has 
 he a Perfon whom he calls his friend, whom 
 he loves upon whatever fantaflick Reafons, 
 he can quit his ^Debauch to ferve him, nay 
 can run the Hazard of IVounds and Tteath 
 to refcue him from DangerJ? If his Honour 
 be concerned to refenfan^f>w, will he 
 not quit his Pleafures, and run the hazard 
 of the greateft bodily Pain, to Ihun the Im- 
 putation of Cowardice or Faljbood ? He 
 will fcorn one who tells him, that * a 
 " Lyar, or a Coward, may be happy e- 
 " nough, while he has all things neceflary 
 " to Luxury? Tis in vain to alledge," that 
 " there is no difputing about Taftes : " To 
 every Nature there are certain Taftes af* 
 figned by the great AUTHOR of all. To 
 the human Race there are affigned & public k 
 Tafte, a moral one^ and a Tajie for Ho- 
 nour. Thefe Senles they cannot extir- 
 pate, more than their external Senfes : 
 
 They
 
 of the P A S S I O N S. i j 
 
 They may pervert them> and weaken them Seft 
 by falfe Opinions, and fooliih dffociations 
 of Ideas; but they cannot be happy but 
 by keeping them in their natural State, and 
 gratifying them. The Happinefs of an In. 
 Jeff or Brute, will only make an Infect or 
 Brute happy. But a Nature with further 
 'Powers, mud have further Enjoyments. 
 
 NAY, let us confider the different Ages 
 in our own Species. We once knew the 
 time when an Hobby-Horfe, a Top, a Rat* 
 tie, was fufficient Pleafiire to us. We grow 
 up, we now relifh Friend/hips^ Honour 9 
 good Offices, Marriage, Offspring, ferving 
 a Community or Country. Is there no dif- 
 ference in thefe Taftes ? We were happy 
 before, are we no happier now ? If not, 
 we have made a fooliih Change of Fancy. 
 An Hobby-Horfe is more eafily procured 
 than an Employment ; a Rattle kept in order 
 with lefs trouble than a Friend \ a Top than 
 a Son. But this Change of Fancy does not 
 depend upon our Will. " Our Nature de- 
 termines us to certain Purfuits in our fe- 
 veral Stages; and following her Dictates, 
 is the only way to our Happinefs. Two 
 States may both be happy, and yet the 
 one infinitely preferable to the other : 
 Two Specks may both be content, and 
 yet the Pleafures of the one, greater be- 
 yond all comparifon, than thofe of the 
 other." The virtuous Man^ who has 
 K 2 as
 
 1 3 1 fhe Nature and Condutt 
 
 Sed. 5. as true a Senfe of all external Pleafure as 
 v^v^ any, gives the preference to moral Tlea- 
 Jiires. The Judgment of the Vicious is 
 either not to be regarded, becaufe of his 
 Ignorance on one fide ; or, if he has expe- 
 rience of moral Sentiments in any particu- 
 lar Cafes, he agrees with the Virtuous?] 
 
 Experience III. A GAIN, we fee in fad, that in the 
 proves the virtuous Man, pub lick Affections, a moral 
 Senfe, and Senfe of Honour* actually over- 
 come all other Defires or Senfes, even in 
 their full Strength. Here there is the fairefl 
 Combate, and the Succefs is on the fide 
 of Virtue. 
 
 THERE is indeed an obvious Exception 
 againft this Argument. *' Do not we fee, 
 " in many Inftances, the external Senfes 
 " overcome the moralV But the Reply is 
 eafy. A conftant Purfuit of the Pleafures 
 of the external Senfes can never become 
 agreeable, without an Opinion of Inno- 
 cence, or the Ahfence of moral Evil ; fo 
 that here the moral Senfe is not engaged in 
 the Combat. Do not our * luxurious De- 
 bauchees, among their Intimates, continu- 
 ally defend their Practices as innocent ? 
 Tranfient Ads of Injuftice may be done, 
 contrary to the moral Sentiments of the 
 
 Treat, 2. Sett. 4. An. 4. laft Paragraph. 
 
 3 Agent,
 
 of the PASSIONS. ij: 
 
 Agent, to obtain relief from fome preffingSeft. 
 Evil, or upon fome violent Motion of Ap-<* 
 petite : and yet even in thefe cafes, Men 
 often argue themfelves into fome moral 
 Notions of their Innocence. But for a con- 
 tinued Courfe of Life difapproved by the 
 Agent, how few are the Inftances? How 
 avowedly miferable is that State, wherein 
 all Self-Approbation^ all confcioufnefs of 
 Merit or Goodnefs is gone ? We might here 
 alfb alledge, what univerfal Experience con- 
 firms, " that not only an Opinion of In- 
 " nocence is a necefrary Ingredient in a 
 " Courfe of felfjh Tleafures, fo that 
 " there fhould be no Oppofition from the 
 " moral Senfe of the Agent; but that 
 " fome pub lick Affections, fome Species 
 " of moral Good, is the mod powerful 
 " Charm in all fenfual Enjoyments." And 
 yet, on the other hand, " Tublick Affec- 
 " tions, Virtue, Honour, need no Species 
 " of fenfual Pleafure to recommend them; 
 " nor even an Opinion or Hope of Ex- 
 " emption from external Pain. Thefe 
 ' * powerful Forms can appear amiable, and 
 " engage our Purfuit thro* the rugged Paths 
 " of Hunger, Thirft, Cold, Labour, Ex- 
 " fences, Wounds and 'Death? 
 
 THUS, when a ProfpecT: of external 
 Pleafure, or of avoiding bodily Pain, en- 
 gages Men into Actions really evil, the 
 moral Senfe of the Agent is not really over- 
 K 3 come
 
 T }4 %%* Nature and Conduct 
 
 Se&. 5. come by the external Senfes. The Adion 
 or Omiflion does not appear morally evil 
 to the Agent. The Temptation feems to 
 extenuate, or wholly excufe the Action. 
 Whereas when a Toint of Honour, or a 
 moral Species, makes any one defpife the 
 Pleafures or Pains of the external Senfes, 
 there can be no queftion made of a real 
 Victory. The external Senfes reprefent 
 thefe Objects in the fame manner, when 
 they are conquered. None denies to the 
 Virtuous their Senfe of Tain^ Toil or 
 Wounds. They are allowed as lively a 
 Senfe as others, of all external Tleajure 
 of every kind. The Expences of Genero- 
 Jlty, Humanity, Charity and CompaJJlon 
 are allowed, even when yielded to Vir- 
 tue, to be known to the full. But the mo- 
 ral Senfe, weak as it often is, does not 
 yield even to known external 'Pleafure, 
 Eafe or Advantage : but, where there is 
 a depraved Tafle, and a weak Underftand- 
 tng, private Advantage, or the avoiding of 
 (bme external Evil, may make Actions ap- 
 pear innocent, which are not ; and then the 
 moral Senfe gives no Opposition. All the 
 Conqneft on fuch Occanons is only this, 
 that private external Advantage furmounts 
 our Averfion to ^Dijhonour^ by making us 
 do Actions which others will cenfure, but 
 we efteem innocent. In thefe Cafes we ge- 
 nerally fear only the Reproach of a Tarty, 
 
 of
 
 of the PASSIONS. 135 
 
 of whom we have conceived an unfavoura* Seel:. 5 
 ble Opinion *. 
 
 NAY farther : It was before obferved, 
 that " fantaftick Affectations of Ideas do 
 " not really increafe the Pleafure of En- 
 *' joyment^ however they increafe the pre- 
 " vious T)ejire. The wane of fuch Affbf 
 " ciations does not abate the external 
 " Pain ^ tho it diminifhes the previous 
 " Fear, or takes away fome farther Fears 
 " which may attend the Pain." So that 
 a Man of the moft correcl; Imagination does 
 feel and know all the Good in external 
 Pleafure, and all the Evil in Pain. ' ' When 
 therefore the moral Senfe, and pub tick 
 Affections, overcome all fenjual Tlea- 
 ftire, or bodily Tain, they do it by their 
 own Strength , without foreign Aids. 
 Virtue is never blended with bodily 
 'Pleafure) nor Vice with bodily 'Pain in 
 our Imaginations. But when the ex- 
 ternal Senfes feem to prevail againft the 
 moral Senfe, or publick AfTe&ions, it 
 is continually by Aid borrowed from the 
 moral Senfe t and publick Affections 
 themfelves, or from our Senfe of Ho- 
 nour." The Conqueft is over a weak- 
 ned moral Senfe, upon partial views of 
 Good, not by external Pleafare alone, but 
 
 * Sefl. 4. Art. 3.
 
 1 } 6 The Nature and Conduct 
 
 Seel:. 5. by fome moral Species , raifed by a falfe 
 Imagination. 
 
 SET before Men in the cleared Light 
 all external Pleafures, but ftrip them of 
 their borrowed Notions of 'Dignity, Hof- 
 fitality^ Friendjhip, Generojlty, Liber a~ 
 lity, Communication of Tleafure ; let no 
 regard be had to the Opinions of others, 
 to Credit, to avoiding Reproach, to Com- 
 pany: Separate from the Purfuit of Wealth 
 all Thoughts of a Family, Friends, Re~ 
 lations^ Acquaintance \ let Wealth be only 
 regarded as the Means of private Pleafure 
 of the external SenCes, or of the Imagina- 
 tion, to the PofTeflbr alone ; let us divide 
 our confufed Ideas, and confider things 
 barely and apart from each other : and in 
 oppofition to thefe Defires , fet but the 
 weakeft moral Species, and fee if they can 
 prevail over it. On thp other hand, let us 
 examine as much as we pleafe, a friendly ', 
 generous, grateful, or piiblick-fpirited Ac- 
 tion ; diveft it of all external Pleafure, ftill 
 it will appear the more lovely ; the longer 
 we fix onr Attention to it, the more we 
 admire it. What is it which we feel in our 
 own Hearts, determining as it were our 
 Fate as to Happinefsor Mifery? What fort 
 of Senfations are the rnofl lively and delight- 
 ful ? In what fort of Pofieflions does the 
 higheft Joy and Self- Satisfaction confift ? 
 Who has ever felt the Pleafure of a generous 
 
 friendly
 
 of tie PASSIONS. ,37 
 
 friendly Temper , of mutual Love, ofcom-Se&. 5. 
 pajjionate Relief and Succour to the dif- l 
 treffcd; of \izv\ug ferved a Community, and 
 render'd Multitudes happy ; of a find /#- 
 tegrity^ and thorow Honefty, even under ex- 
 ternal Difadvantages,and amidft Dangers ; of 
 Congratulation and publickRejoycingJn the 
 Wifdom and Profperity of Perfons beloved, 
 fuch as Friends, Children, or intimate 
 Neighbours? Who would not, upon Re- 
 flection, prefer that State of Mind, thefe 
 Senfations of Tleafure, to all the Enjoy- 
 ments of the external Senfes, and of the 
 Imagination without them ? * 
 
 IV. THE truth, in a Queftion of this na- 
 ture, one might expecl: would be bift 
 
 * * -i f n ^ " - 
 
 known by the Judgment of Spectators, other 
 concerning the Purfuits of others. Let/""^ 
 them fee one entirely employed in Solitude, ' 
 with the mofl exquifite Taftes, Odors, 
 ProJpe&s, Painting, Mufick ; but without 
 any Society^ Love or Friendship, or any 
 Opportunity of doing a kind or generous 
 Action ; and fee alfo a f Man employed in 
 protecting the Poor and Fatherlefs, receiving 
 the Bleflings of thofe who were ready to 
 perifli, and making the Widow to fing for 
 
 * See this Subjeft fully treated, in the fecond Part of 
 Lord Sh tfteibury's Inquiry concerning Virtue. 
 
 t See the Character of^o^, Ch. 31. See alfo Treat, r. 
 Sett. 6.
 
 1 8 fhe Nature and Conduct 
 
 Seel:. 5. Joy ; a Father to the Needy, an Avenger 
 of Oppreflion ; who never defpifed the 
 Caufe of his very Slave, but confidered him 
 as his Fellow-Creature, formed by the fame 
 Hand; who never eat his Morfel alone, 
 without the Orphan at his Table, nor 
 cauled the Eyes of the Poor to fail ; who 
 never fuffered the Naked to perifh, but 
 warmed them with the Fleece of his Sheep ; 
 who never took advantage of the Indigent 
 in Judgment, thro' Confidence in his own 
 Power or Intereft : Let this Character be 
 compared with the former ; nay, add to 
 this latter fome confiderable Tains of the 
 external Senfes, with Labour and kind 
 Anxiety : which of the two would a 
 Spectator chufe? Which would he admire, 
 or count the happier, and molt fuitable to 
 human Nature ? Were he given to Cajlle- 
 building^ or were he advifing a Son, or a 
 Friend, which of thefe States would he 
 chufe or recommend? Such a Trial would 
 foon difcover the Prevalence of the moral 
 Species above all Enjoyments of Life. 
 
 V. THERE are a fort of Pleamres op- 
 
 p fite to thofe of the p ublick Senfe > arifin g 
 
 . from the Gratification of Anger or Hatred. 
 To compare thefe Pleafures with thofe of 
 Benevolence, we muft obferve what holds 
 univerfally of all Mankind. The Joy, and 
 Gaiety, and Happinefs of any Nature, of 
 which we have formed no previous Opi- 
 nion,
 
 oftfa PASSIONS. 139 
 
 nion, either favourable or unfavourable, Seel:. 5. 
 iior obtained any other Ideas than merely v 
 that it is fenjitive, fills us with Joy and 
 Delight : The apprehending the Torments 
 of any fuch fenfitive Nature, gives us Pain, 
 The Poets know how to raife delight in us 
 by fachpaft oral Scenes, they feel the Power 
 of fuch fleafing Images : they know that 
 the human Heart can dwell upon fiich Con- 
 templations with delight ; thrr we can con- 
 tinue long with Pleafure, in the View of 
 Haffmefs of any Nature whatfoever. When, 
 we have received unfavourable Apprehen- 
 fions of any Nature, as cruel and favage, 
 we begin indeed from our very publick Af- 
 feclions, to defire their Mifery as far as it 
 may be neceflary to the Protection of 
 others. 
 
 BUT that the Mifery of another, for its 
 own fake, is never grateful, we may all 
 find by making this Supposition: '* That 
 " had we the mod lavage Tyger, or Cro- 
 " codile, or fome greater Monfter of our 
 " own Kind, a Nero, or ^Domitian^ chained 
 " in fome Dungeon ; that we were perfectly 
 " afTured they fhould never have power of 
 " doing farther Injuries \ that no Mortal 
 " fhould ever know their Fate or Fortunes, 
 " nor be influenced by them ; that the 
 " c Pumjhments inflidted on them would 
 *' never reftrain others by way of example, 
 " nor any Indulgence fhown be difcovered ; 
 
 *' that
 
 140 The Nature and Conduct 
 
 Sect 5. " that the firft Heat of our Refentment 
 " were allayed by Time" No Mor- 
 tal, in fuch a Cafe, would incline to tor- 
 ture fuch wretched Natures, or keep them 
 in continual Agonies, without fome prof- 
 peel of Good arifmg from their Sufferings. 
 What farther would the fierceft Rage ex- 
 tend to , if once the Tyrant, thus eter- 
 nally confined from Mifchief, began him- 
 felf to feel Remorfe and Anguifh for his 
 Crimes? Nay, did he continue without 
 Reflection on his pad Life, lb as neither to 
 betray Remorfe nor Approbation, were 
 Mankind well fecured againft his Temper, 
 who would delight to load him with ufelefs 
 Mifery ? 
 
 I F the Mifery of others then be not 
 grateful for itfelf, whence ariles the Plea- 
 iiire of Cruelty and Revenge ? The Reafon 
 is plainly this : Upon apprehending Injury 
 to our (elves or others, NATURE wiiely 
 determines us to ftudy ^Defenfe* not only 
 for the prefent, but for the future. Anger 
 arifes with its mod uneafy Senfations* as 
 every one acknowledges. The Mifery of 
 the Injurious allays this furious Pain, Our 
 Nature fcarce leads to any farther Refent- 
 ment, when once the Injurious feems to us 
 folly feized with Remorfe, ib that we fear 
 no farther Evils from him, or when all his 
 Power is gone. Thofe who continue their 
 Revenge further, are prepofTefled with 
 
 fome
 
 of the PASSIONS. 141 
 
 fbme falfe Opinion of Mankind, as worfe Sect. 5 
 than they really are ; and are not eafily in- LXV^V 
 clined to believe their hearty Remorie for 
 Injuries, or to think themfelves fecure. 
 Some Toint of Honour, or Fear of Re- 
 proach, engages Men in cruel Acts of Re- 
 venge : But this farther confirms, that the 
 Mifery of another is only grateful as it al- 
 lays, or fecures us againft a furious Pain ; 
 and cannot be the Occafion, by itfelf, of 
 any Satisfaction. Who would not prefer 
 Abfence of Injury to Injury revenged ? Who 
 would not chufe an untainted Refutation^for 
 Courage gained in a juft War, in which, 
 without Hatred or singer -, we acted from 
 Love of our Country, rather than the Fame 
 acquired by averting our queftioned Courage 
 with furious^vger mz'Duel, and with conti- 
 nued Platred to ward the Perion conquered? 
 Who can dwell upon a Scene of Tortures* 
 thopractis'd upon the vileft Wretch ; or can 
 delight either in the Sight or Defcription of 
 Vengeance^ prolonged beyond all neceffity 
 rfSelfSDejenfe, 01 public k Inter ejl ? The 
 " Pleafure of Revenge then is to the Plea- 
 " fares of Humanity and Virtue, as the fla- 
 " king the burning, and conftantly recur- 
 " ringThirft of a Fever, to the natural En- 
 " joyments of grateful Food in Health. " 
 
 VI. W E R E we to compare, in like man- Evil com- 
 ner, the Tains of the publick and moral pared 'wit 
 Senfe, and of the Senfe of Honour, with ^7* 
 
 Other greater.
 
 MMake. 
 
 1 4 1 y*hff Nature and Condutf 
 
 Se&. 5. other Tains of the external Senfes^ or with 
 ' the greateft external LofTes, we mould find 
 the former by far fuperior. And yet no- 
 thing is more ordinary, than to find Men, 
 who will allow " the Tleajures of the 
 former ClafTes fuperior to any other, and 
 yet look upon external Vain as more 
 intollerable than any." There are two 
 of Reafons for this Miftake. i. " They 
 compare the mod acute Tains of the ex- 
 ternal Senfes with fomzjmaller Tains of 
 the other Senfes." Whereas, would 
 they compare the ftrongeft of both Kinds, 
 they would find the Ballance on the other 
 fide. How often have Parents, Husbands, 
 Friends, Patriots, endured the greateft bo- 
 dily Tains, to avoid the Pains of their 
 fublick and moral Senfe, and Senfe of Ho- 
 nour ? How do they every day fufTer 
 Hunger, Thirft, and Toil, to prevent like 
 Evils to thofe they love ? How often do 
 Men endure, for their Tarty or Faflion, 
 the greateft external Evils, not only when 
 they are unavoidable, but, when by coun- 
 ter-acting their fublick or moral Senfe, or 
 Senfe of Honour, they could extricate 
 themfelves ? Some Crimes appear fo horrid, 
 fome Actions fo cruel and deteftable, that 
 there is hardly any Man but would rather 
 fuffer ^Death^ than be confcious of having 
 done them* 
 
 THE
 
 of the PASSIONS. i 4 j 
 
 Sed. 5 
 
 THE fecond Caufe of Miftake in 
 Matter, is this, " The avoiding moral 
 " Evil by the Sufferance of external Tain, 
 " does not diminim the Senfe of the Pain; 
 " but on the other hand, the Motive of 
 " avoiding grievous Pain, really diminimes 
 44 the moral Evil in the Action done with 
 " that defign." So that in iuch Inftances 
 we compare external Tain in its full 
 ftrength, with a moral 'Pain of the lighter 
 fort, thus alleviated by the Greatnefs of the 
 Temptation *. To make a jufl Comparifon, 
 it mould be thus : " Whether would a 
 " Man chufe to be tortured to Death, 
 or to have, without any Temptation or 
 ' Necejffity, tortured another, or a dear 
 " Friend, or Child to Death?" Not whe- 
 ther a Man will betray his Friend or Coun- 
 try, for fear of Tortures, but " whether 
 " it be better voluntarily, and under no 
 " fear, to betray a Friend, or our Country, 
 " than to fuffer Tortures, or the Pain of 
 " the Gout or Stone equal to Tortures ?" 
 Upon fuch Comparifons as thefe, we mould 
 find fome other Pains and Mifery fuperior 
 to any external Tain. When we judge 
 of the State of others, we would not be 
 long in fufpenfe which of thefe Evils to 
 
 * Treat.i.Sefi. 7, >, Cor. j. 
 
 chufe
 
 1 44 fhe Nature and Conduff 
 
 Sec*. 5 . chufe as the lightcft for thofe whom we 
 | mod regarded. 
 
 VII. W E have hitherto only compared 
 on the one fide the publick and moral 
 
 Sen fei and the Scn f e f Honour jointly, 
 with the external Scnfes, the 'Pleajitres of 
 Imagination, and external Advantage or 
 ^Disadvantage jointly. The reafon of 
 joining them thus mud be obvious, fince, 
 to a Mind not prepoffefled with any falje 
 Apprehenfans of things, the former three 
 Senfes and Defires really concur, in exciting 
 to the fame Courfe of Aclicn ; for pro- 
 moting the publick Good, can never be op- 
 pofite to frivate Virtue ; nor can the Tje- 
 Jire of Virtue ever lead to any thing per- 
 nicious to the Publick : Had Men alfo true 
 Opinions, Honour could only be obtained 
 by Virtue, or ferving the Publick. 
 
 BUT fince there may be fome corrupt 
 partial Notions of Virtue, as when Men 
 have inadvertently engaged themfelves into 
 fome Party or Faction pernicious to the 
 Publick, or when we miftake the Tenden- 
 cies of Actions, or have (bme Notions of 
 the DEITY, \ as requiring fome Adtions 
 
 appre- 
 
 f Tre*t. 2. Sett. 6. Art. i. 
 
 Such miftaken Notions of Religion, and of fome par- 
 ticular moral Species, have produced thefe monftrous Deci- 
 
 fions
 
 of the PASSIONS. 145 
 
 apprehended pernicious to the publick, asSe<2. 5. 
 'Duties to himieif; in fuch cafes there is- 
 room to compare our publick Senfe or ^De^ 
 Jlres with our moral, to lee which is pre- 
 valent. The Pleafures of thefe Senfes, in 
 fuch cafes, need not be compared ; the fol- 
 lowing either the one or the other will 
 give little Pleafure : The Pain of the coun- 
 teracted Senfe will prevent all Satisfaction. 
 This State is truly deplorable, when a Per- 
 fon is thus diftrad;ed between two noble 
 Principles, \\ispublick Affections, and Sen ft 
 of Virtue. But it may be inquired, which 
 of thele Senfes, when counteracted, would 
 occafion the greater Tain? Perhaps no- 
 thing can be anfwered unii-erfally on either 
 fide. With Men of reclufe contemplative 
 Lives ; who have dwelt much upon fome 
 moral Ideas, but without large extenftve 
 View of publick Good, or without en- 
 gaging themfelves to the rail in the pub- 
 
 fions or Apothegms ; viz. u Some ABuatt art net 
 " tbo they isere euffry ntt *drj tf ttmrverfal tem*ortl 
 a pmefs, b*t t the ettnui Stlvatint tf the wktte 
 '* tr t *void umrverftl eternal Miferj." 
 
 " Fiat J*fttt* cr nut Cabif? 
 
 Whereas the only Reafoa wby focne Adions arc looked up- 
 on as univerfaUy and neceflarily Ev3, is only rfiis, rt that in 
 " our prefent Conftttntion of Karure, they cannot poffibfy 
 " produce any g**d y prepoQent to their t-.-il Cfr-'anuxcetJ* 
 Whatever Adion would do fo t in the *& if ** 
 isuft neceflarily be gffd. This Propofition is UemttA.
 
 1 ^6 fhe Nature and Conduft 
 
 Seel:. 5. lick Affections -, and common Affairs of 
 tXV^J Life : The AVj of Virtue, in ibme par- 
 tial confined View of it , would proba- 
 bly prevail; efpecially fmce thefe partial 
 Species of Virtue have always fome fort of 
 kind Affection to aflift them. With atfive 
 Men, who have fully exercifed their pub- 
 lick Affieftwns* and have acquired as it 
 were an Habit this way, 'tis probable the 
 publick Affections would be prevalent. 
 Thus we find that active Men, upon any 
 public k Necejfity, do always break thro' 
 the limited narrow Rules of Virtue or 
 Juftice, which are publickly received, even 
 when they have fcarce any Scheme ofTrin- 
 ciples to juftify their Conduct : Perhaps, 
 indeed, in fuch cafes, their moral Senfe is 
 brought over to the Side of their AffeEtions^ 
 tho their Speculative Opinions are oppofite 
 to both. 
 
 The Moral VIII. IT is ofmore confequcnce to com- 
 senfecom- n^ Q tn e publick and moral Senfes, in oppo- 
 
 parea- luitfo \. . * f n^/^rr TT i 
 
 the senfe ution to the Senfe of Honour. Here there 
 of Honour. mav b e diredl Oppofition, fince Honour is 
 conferred according to the moral Notions 
 of thole who confer it, which may be con- 
 trary to thofe of the Agent* and contrary 
 to what he thinks conducive to the publick 
 Good. 
 
 T o allow the Prevalence of Honour ; 
 
 cannot with any Pcrfon of juft Reflection, 
 
 weaken
 
 of the PASSIOKS. 147 
 
 weaken the Caufe of Virtue, flnce Honour Sedt 
 prefuppofes * a moral Senfe, both in rhoie 'v'"Y 
 who defire it, and thofe who confer it. 
 But it is enough for fome Writers, who af- 
 fe& to be wondrous flirewd in their Obier- 
 vations on human Nature, and fond of ma- 
 king all the World, as well as themfelves, 
 a Jelfijh Generation, incapable of any real 
 Excellence or Virtue, without any natural 
 < T)ifpofition toward zpublick Intereft, or 
 toward any moral Species ; to get but a 
 " Set of different Words from thofe com- 
 " monly ufed, yet including the fame natu- 
 " ralT)ifpoJitions,\ or prefuppofing them," 
 however an inadvertent Reader may not 
 obferve it ; and they are fufficiently fur- 
 nifhed to ihevv, that there is no real Vir- 
 tue, that all is but Hypocrijy, 'Difeuife, 
 Art, or Inter eft > " To be honoured, nighty 
 ** efteemed, 'valued, praifed, or on the 
 " contrary, to be defpifed, undervalued* 
 " cenfured or condemned ; to be proud or 
 " ajbamed, are Words without any mean- 
 ' c ing, if we take away a moral Senfe. " 
 Let this Senfe be as capricious, inconftant % 
 different in different Perfbns as they pleafe 
 to alledge, " a Senfe of Morality there muft 
 ' be, and natural it muft be, if the 5D> 
 " fire of Efteem, <pride or Shame be na- 
 " rural" 
 
 * See Trtat. i< Srfl, 5. Art. 4. f && 
 
 L 2 To
 
 '148 The Nature and Confatt 
 
 Seel. 5. 
 
 T o make this comparifon between the 
 fublick and moral Senfes on the one hand, 
 and that of Honour on the other, 'tis to be 
 obferved , that all Aver/ion to Evil is 
 ftronger ibwofDefire ofpofitive Good. There 
 are many forts of pofitive Good, without 
 which any one may be eafy, and enjoy 
 others of a different kind : But Evil of al- 
 moft any kind, in a high Degree, may 
 make Life intolerable. The avoiding of 
 Evil is always allowed a more extenuating 
 Circumftance in a Crime, than the Tro- 
 fpeft yf pofitive Good : to make therefore 
 juft Comparifons of the Prevalence of fe- 
 veral Defires or Senfes, their feveral Goods 
 ihould be oppofed to each other, and their 
 Evils to each other, and not the Tlea- 
 fures of one compared with the Tains of 
 another. 
 
 PUB LICK. Affections , in their nearer 
 Ties, frequently overcome not only the 
 Pleasures of Honour, but even the Tains of 
 Shame. This is the moft common Event 
 in Life, that for fome apprehended Intereft 
 of Offspring, Families, Friends, Men 
 mould neglect Opportunities of gaining Ho- 
 nour, and even incur Shame and Contempt. 
 In Adions done for the Service of a Tarty, 
 there can be no comparifon, for Honour is 
 often a Motive -on both fides. 

 
 of the PASSIONS. 149 
 
 Sed. 
 
 Tis alfo certain, that the Fear 
 Shame, in lome inftances, will overcome al 
 other Deiires whatfoever, even natural Af- 
 feffiion, l^ovzoi'P/eafure, Virtue^ Wealth^ 
 and even of Life itfelf. This Fear has ex- 
 cited Parents to the Murder of their OfF- 
 fpring ; has perfuaded Men to the mod dan- 
 gerous Enterprises ; to iquander away their 
 Fortunes* to counteract their 'Duty, and 
 even to throw away their Live?. The 
 Diftra&ion and Convulfioa of Mind ob- 
 fervable in thefc Conflicts of Honour, with 
 Virtue and publick Affection, /hews how 
 *mM*rv?/tbat State is, wherein the fh ongeft 
 ^Principles of A6kio*\ naturally deflgnedto 
 co-operate and a (lift each other, are thus 
 iet in Oppofition. 
 
 'Tis perhaps impoffible to pronounce 
 any thing univerfaily concerning the Supe- 
 riority of the Defire of Honour on the one 
 hand, or that of the Defire of Virtue and 
 fublick Good on the other. Habits or 
 Cnflom may perhaps determine the Victory 
 on either fide Men in high Stations, who 
 have long indulged the Defire of Honour, 
 and have formed the mod frightful Appre- 
 henftonsof Contempt *$ the worft of Evils; 
 or even thofe in lower Srations, who have 
 been long enured to value Reputation in 
 any particular, and dread 'Dt/honnnr in 
 that point, may have Fear of Shame fupe- 
 L 3 rid*
 
 1 5 o The Nature and Conduct 
 
 Sect. 5-rior to all Averfions. Men, on the con- 
 who have much indulged good Na- 
 ture, or reflected much uporj the Excellen- 
 cy &t Virtue it! elf, abstracted from Honour \ 
 may find Affections of this, kind prevalent 
 above the Fear of Shame. 
 
 To compare the moral Senfe with the 
 Senfe of Honour ^ we mud find cafes where 
 the Agent condemns an Action with all its 
 prefeut Circumflances as evil , and yet 
 fears Infamy by omitting it, without any 
 unequal Motives of other kinds on either 
 fide : Or when one may obtain Traife by 
 an Action, when yet the Omiffion of it 
 would appear to himfelf as confiderable a 
 Virtue, as the 'Praife to be expected from 
 the Action would reprefent the Action to 
 be. The common Inftances, in which fbme, 
 who pretend deep Knowledge of human 
 Nature* triumph much, have not thefe ne- 
 M> ceffary Circumftances. . ' When a Man con- 
 /- demns 'Duelling in his private Sentiments, 
 . an( j y et p ra< 5tifes it, we have indeed a con- 
 fiderable Evidence of the Strength of this 
 *DeJire of Honour, or Averjion to Shame, 
 fince it lurpaffes the Fear of Death. But 
 here on one hand, befides the Fear of 
 Shame, there is the Fear of conflant In- 
 Jults, of lofmg all the Advantages depend- 
 ing upon the Character of Courage, and 
 fometimes even fome Species of Virtue and 
 publick Good* in jreftraming an infolent
 
 of the PASSIONS. 151 
 
 Villain : Oil the other hand is the Fear of$z&. 5, 
 T>eath. The moral Senfe is feldom much s 
 concerned : for however Men may condemn 
 voluntary fuelling ; however they may 
 blame the Age for the Cuftom, or cenfure 
 the Laws as defective, yet generally, hi 
 their preient Cafe, Duelling appears a ne- 
 cefTary Piece of Self -'Defence againft op- 
 probrious Injuries and Affronts, for which 
 the Law has provided no Redrefs, and con- 
 fequently leaves Men to the natural Rights 
 of Self-defence and 'Profecution of Inju- 
 ries. The Cafe feems to them the fame 
 with that of Thieves and Night -Robbers, 
 who may be put to Death by private Per- 
 fons, when there is no hope of overtaking 
 them by Law. Thefe are certainly the No- 
 tions of thofe who condemn fuelling, and 
 yet pra&ife it. 
 
 I r is foreign to our prefent Purpofe, to 
 detect the Fallacy of thefe Arguments, in 
 defence of 'Duels, as they are commonly 
 pradifed among us; when Men from a fiidden 
 Anger, upon fome trifling or imaginary Af- 
 fronts the defpifing of which would ap- 
 pear honourable in every wife Mans Eyes, 
 expofe themfelves, and often their deareft 
 Friends to Death, and hazard the Ruin of 
 their own Families, as well as that of their 
 Adverfary; tho the Succefs in mch At- 
 tempts can have no tendency to juftiry them 
 L 4 againft
 
 t y & 7%e Nature anA Condntf 
 
 SecSh ^.againft the difhonourable Charge, or to 
 V^VN^ procure any Honour from Men of worth. 
 
 THE magnified Inftance of Lttcretia *is 
 yet leis to our purpofe. Some talk, as if 
 " fhe indeed would rather have died than 
 ? confented to the Crime ; but the Crime 
 " did not appear fo great an Evil as the 
 *' Ilijbonour ; to the Guilt ihe fubmitted to 
 " avoid the Shame." Let us confider 
 this renowned Argument. Was there then 
 no Motive on either fide, but Fear of 
 Shame, and a Senfe of *Duty ? If we look 
 into the Story, we mall find, that to per- 
 fuade her to confeut, there confpirecl, befide 
 the Fear of Shame, and of *Death^ which 
 flie link: regarded, the Hope of noble Re- 
 venge^ or rather of Juftice on the Ravi/her, 
 and the whole Tyrant's Family ; nay, the 
 Hopes of a nobler Fame by her future 
 Coadud: ; the Fear of fufFering that con- 
 tumely by force, which ihe was tempted to 
 confent to, and that in fuch a manner as 
 flie could have had no Redrefs. All thefe 
 Confiderations concurred to make her con- 
 ient. On the othei fide, there was only 
 the moral Senfe of a Crime thus extenuated 
 by the moft grievous Necejfity, and by 
 hopes of doing Juftice to her Husband's 
 Honour, and rejcuing her Country : Nay, 
 
 t JLiyy, Lib. i. c. 57. 
 
 could
 
 of the PASSIONS. 155 
 
 could the not have at once faved her Cha-SeQt. 5. 
 racJer and her Life by confenting ; 
 in that virtuous Age me might have expected 
 Secrecy in the Prince, fince boafting of fuch 
 Attempts would have been dangerous to 
 the greateft Man in Rome ? 
 
 I T is not eafy to find juft Room for a 
 Comparifon even in fictitious Cafes, be- 
 tween thefe two 'Principles. Were there 
 aPerfbn who had no Belief of any DEITY, 
 or of any reality in Religion, in a Country 
 where \\isfecular Intereft would not iuffer 
 by a Character of Atbeijm ; and yet he 
 knew that the Profeflion of zealous Devo- 
 tion would tend to his Honour : If fuch a 
 Perfbn could have any Senfe of Morality ; 
 particularly an Averfion to ^Dijjlmulation^ 
 then his 'Profejfion of Religion would evi- 
 dence the Superiority of the Senfe of Ho- 
 nonr ; and his *Difcovery of his Sentiments, 
 or Neglett of Religion, would evidence 
 the Ballance to be on the other fide. I pre- 
 fume in England and Holland, we have 
 more Inftances of the latter than the former. 
 'Tis true, our Gentlemen who atTed: the 
 Name of Freedom^ may have now their 
 Hopes of Honour from their own Tarty, 
 as weli as others. 
 
 THE Adherence to any particular Reli- 
 gion by one in a ftrange Country, where it 
 was dishonourable, would not be allowed a 
 
 good
 
 i 54 < fk e Nature and Conduct 
 Sect. 5. good Inftance of the Prevalence of a moral 
 ^V"^ Species ; it is a very common thing indeed, 
 but here are Interefts of another Life, and 
 Regard to a future Return to a Country 
 where this Religion is in repute. 
 
 The plea- ' IX. T H E Pleafures of the internal Senfes, 
 furetof or of the Imagination, are allowed by all, 
 theater who have anv tolerable Tafle of them, as 
 than thofe a much fuperior Happinefs to thofe of the 
 of external extenia i faffo tho they were enjoyed 
 
 smfu ' , co the full.' 
 
 OTHER Comparifons might be made 
 but with lefs ufe, or certainty in any gene- 
 ral Conclufions, which might be drawn 
 from them. 
 
 THE Pleafures of Wealth or Tower ^ 
 are proportioned to the Gratifications of the 
 T)efires or Senfes, which the Agent intends 
 to gratify by them : So that, for the Rea- 
 Ions above offered, Wealth and Power give 
 greater Happinefs to the Virtuous, than 
 to thofe who confult only Luxury or ex- 
 ternal Splendor. If thefe Deftres are grown 
 enthufiajlick and habitual^ without regard 
 to any other end than TojjfeJJton, they are 
 an endlefs Source of Vexation, without any 
 real Enjoyment ; a perpetual Craving, 
 without Nourijhment or 'Digejlion; and 
 they may fqrmount all other Affections,
 
 cftbe PASSIONS. 155 
 
 by Aids borrowed from other Affections Sed. 5. 
 themfelves. v^v^ 
 
 THE fantaftick *De fires are violent, in 
 proportion to the Senies from which the 
 a/bciated Ideas are borrowed. Only it is 
 to be obferved, that however the Defires 
 may be violent, yet the obtaining the Ob- 
 jeff defired gives little Satisfaction ; the 
 ^Poffejfton difcovers the Vanity and Deceit, 
 and/the Fancy is turned toward different 
 Objects, in a perpetual Succeffion of incon- 
 (lant Purfuits. 
 
 X. THESE feveral kinds of Pleafure or A compa- 
 Pain are next to be compared as to their r J 
 'Duration. Here we are not only to con- 
 fider the Certainty of the Objects occa- 
 fioning thefe Senfations, but the Conftancy rAtl 
 of our Relilh or Fancy. 
 
 C i THE Objects neceflary to remove ^ 
 the Pains of Appetite, and to give as 
 grateful external Senfations as any others, 
 to a Perfon of a correct Imagination, may 
 be univerfally fecured by common Pru- 
 dence and Induftry. But then the Senfa- 
 tions themfelves are ihort and tranfitory ; 
 the ^Pleafure continues no longer than the 
 Appetite ', nor does it leave any thing be- 
 hind it, to fupply the Intervals of Enjoy- 
 ment/ When the Senfation is part, we are 
 no happier for it, there is no pleafure in 
 
 Re-
 
 The Nature and Conduct 
 
 i nor are pad Senfations any fe- 
 curity againft, or fupport under either ex- 
 ternal Tain, or any other fort of evil in- 
 cident to us. If we keep thefe Senfes pure, 
 and unmixed with foreign Ideas, they can- 
 not furniih Employment for Life : If fo- 
 reign Ideas come in, the Objects grow 
 difficult and uncertain, and our Reltjb or 
 Fancy full of Inconftaucy and Caprice. 
 
 2- IN like manner, the Pleafures of the 
 Imagination may be enjoyed by all, and 
 be a fure Foundation of Pleaiure, if we ab- 
 ftrad: from Property, and keep our Imagi- 
 nation pure. Such are the Pleafures in the 
 Obfervation of Nature , and even the 
 Works of Art\ which are ordinarily ex- 
 pofed to view. But as thefe give lefs Piea- 
 lure the more familiar they grow, they 
 cannot fufficiently employ or entertain 
 Mankind, much lefs can they (ecure us a- 
 gainft, or lupport us under the Calamities 
 of Life, fuch as Anger, Sorrow^ T>ijbo- 
 nour, Remorfe, or external Tain. If the 
 monjlrous or trifling Tafle take place, or 
 the Ideas of 'Property, they may indeed 
 give fufficient Employment, but they bring 
 along with them little Pleafure, frequent 
 f Difgufts, Anxieties, and ^Dif appointment s t 
 in the acquiring and retaining their Ob- 
 
 . THE
 
 of the PASSIONS. ij? 
 
 3. THE public k Happinefs is indeed, as 
 to external Appearance, a very uncertain 
 Object ; nor is it often in our power to re- 
 medy it, by changing the Courfe of Events. 
 There are perpetual Changes in Mankind 
 from Pieafures to Pains, and often from 
 Virtue to Vice. Q\xptiblick T>eferes muft 
 therefore frequently fubject us to Sorrow ; 
 and the Pieafures of the pub lick Senfe muft 
 be very inconftant. 'Tis true indeed, that 
 a general Good-will to our kind, is the 
 moft conftant Inclination of the Mind, 
 which grows upon us by Indulgence; nor 
 are we ever difTatisfied with the Fancy : 
 the Incertainty therefore is wholly owing 
 to the Gbjeffs. If there can be any Con- 
 fiderations found out to make it probable, 
 that in the Whole all Events tend to Hap- 
 pinefs, this implicit Hope indeed may make 
 Guxptibiick Affections the greateft and moft 
 conftant Source of Pleafure. Frequent 
 Reflection on this, is the beft Support 
 under the Sorrow arifing from particular 
 evils, befalling our Fellow- Creatures. In 
 our nearer Attachments brought upon our 
 felves, we may procure to our Idves the 
 greateft Enjoyments of this kind, with 
 confide Table Security and Conjtancy, by 
 chufing for our Fr tent's, cr dears]} .Favou- 
 rites, Perfons of juft Apprehenfions of 
 Things, who are itibje&ed only to the ne- 
 cejfary Evils of Lire, and can enjoy all 
 
 the
 
 1 5 8 fbe Nature and Conduff 
 
 Sect. 5. the certaia and conftant Good. And in 
 like manner, our Attachment to a Country 
 may be fixed by fomething elfe than the 
 Chance of our Nativity. The Enjoyments 
 of the publick Senfe cannot indeed fecure 
 us againft bodily Tains or Lofs ; but they 
 are often a confiderable Support under 
 them. Nothing can more allay Sorrow 
 and 'Dejection of Mind for private Misfor- 
 tunes, than good Nature, and Reflection 
 upon the Happinefs of thofe we love. 
 
 4. THE moral Senfe, if we form true 
 Opinions of the Tendencies of Actions, 
 and of the AJftttions whence they fpriog, 
 as it is the Fountain of the mod mtenfe 
 Tleafitre, fo ' it is in itielf conftant, not 
 fubject to Caprice or Change. If we re- 
 folutely incourage this Senfe, it grows 
 more acute by frequent Gratification, 
 never cloys, nor ever is forfeited. We 
 not only are fure never to want Oppor- 
 tunities of doing good, which are in 
 every one's power in the higheft De- 
 gree ; * but each good Action is Matter 
 of pleafant Reflection as long as we live. 
 Thefe Pleafures cannot indeed wholly 
 fecure us againft all kinds ofDnea/tnefe, 
 yet they never tend naturally to increafe 
 them. On the contrary, their general 
 
 * Treat, z. Se&. 3. laft Paragraph. 
 
 2 " Ten-
 
 of the PASSIONS. I55 > 
 
 " Tendency is to lead the virtuous Agent Seel:. 5 
 " into all Pleafures, in the higheft Degree 
 " in which they are confident with each 
 " other. Our external Senfes are not 
 " weakned by Virtue, our Imaginations 
 ' are not impaired ; the temperate Enjoy- 
 " ment of all external Pleafures is the 
 " higheft. A virtuous Conduct is generally 
 " the moft prudent, even as to outward 
 ' Trofperity. Where Virtue cofts us 
 " much, its own Tleafures are the more 
 ' fublime. It diredly advances the Plea- 
 " fares oft\isfublick Senfe, by leading us 
 " to promote the publick Happinefs as far 
 " as we can ; and Honour is its natural 
 " and ordinary Attendant. If it cannot 
 " remove the mceffary ^Pains of Life, yet 
 < it is the belt Support under them Thefe 
 ' ' moral Pleafures do fome way more nearly 
 " aflecl: us than any other : They make 
 " us delight in our fetoes, and relifh our 
 ' very Nature. By thefe we perceive an 
 ' internal "Dignity and Worth ; and feem 
 " to have a Pleafure like to that afcribed 
 ' often to the DEITY, by which ween- 
 " joy our own Terfettion, and that of e- 
 very other Being." \ 
 
 I T may perhaps feem too metaphyfical 
 to alledge on this Subjed, that other Sen- 
 fat ions are all dependent upon, or related 
 by the Conftitution of our Nature, to 
 fomething different from our fetoes ; to a 
 
 Body
 
 1 60 fbe Nature 
 
 Se&. ^.Body which we do not call Self, but fome- 
 thing belonging to this Self. That other 
 ^Perceptions of Joy or TLeafure carry with 
 them Relations to Objetts, and Spaces 
 diftincl: from this Self \ whereas "the 
 " Pleafures of Virtue are the very ^Perfec- 
 " tton of this SELF, and are immediately 
 " perceived as fuch, independent of exter- 
 " ualObje&s." 
 
 OUR Senfe of Honour may afford very 
 conftant Pleafures by good Oeconomy : If 
 our moral Senfc be not perverted ; if we 
 form juft Apprehenfions of the Worth of 
 others^ Honour /hall be pleafant to us in 
 a compound Proportion of the Numbers 
 and Worth of thofe who confer it. If there- 
 fore we cannot approve our felves to all, 
 fo as to obtain iiwuerfal Honour among all 
 to whom we are known, yet there are ftill 
 Men ofjuft Thought and Reflection, whofe 
 Efteem a virtuous Man may procure. Their 
 ^Dignity will compenfate the Want of Nam- 
 bers, and lupport us againft the Pains of 
 Cenjitre from the Injudicious. 
 
 THE Inconftancy of the PJeafiires of 
 Wealth and Tower is well known, and 
 is occafioned, not perhaps by Change of 
 Fancy, for thrle Deflies are found to con- 
 tinue long enough, fince they tend toward 
 the univerfil Means of gratifying all other 
 Defires ; but by the Uncertainty of Qbjettt 
 2 or
 
 of the PASSIONS. irfi 
 
 or Events neceflary to gratify fuch conti- Sect. 5. 
 nually increafing Defires as thefe are, where v * r v^- / 
 there is not fome fixed View different from 
 the Wealth or *Power irfelf. When indeed 
 they are defired only as the Means of gra- 
 tifying Ibme other well-regulated ^Defires^ 
 we may foon obtain fuch a Portion as will 
 fatisfy us. But if once the End be forgot- 
 ten, and Wealth or Power become grateful 
 forthemfelves, no farther Limits are to be 
 expected: the Defires are infatiable, nor 
 is there any confiderable Happ'mefs in any 
 given degree of either. 
 
 XL WERE we to confider the 'Dura- The Dura- 
 tion of the feveral Pains, we may find it^f tht 
 generally as the Duration of their Plea-/^ w . 
 lures. As to the external Senfes, the oldM"^* 
 Epicurean Confolation is generally juft : 
 " Where the Pain is violent itihortens our 
 " 'Duration ; when it does not fhorten 
 *' ourTJuration* it is generally either tole- 
 " rable, or admits of frequent Intermif- 
 " Jlons ; " and then, when the external 
 Pain is once paft, no Mortal is the worfe 
 for having endured it. There is nothing 
 uneafy in the Reflection, when we have 
 uo prefent Tain, or fear no Return of it. 
 
 THE internal Senfes are not properly ,\ 
 Avenues ofPam. No Form is necefTarily 
 the Occafion of pofitive Uneafmefs. 
 
 "N$ ' 
 
 M THE
 
 1 62 fhe Nature and Condutf 
 
 e. 5. 
 
 THE Pains of the moral Senfe and Senfc 
 of Honour, are almoft perpetual. Time, 
 the Refuge of other Sorrows, gives us no 
 Relief from thefe. All other Pleafures are 
 made infipid by thefe Pains, and Life itfelf 
 an uneafy Burden. Our very Self, our 
 Nature is difagreeable to us. 'Tis true, we 
 do not always obferve the Vicious to be 
 uneafy. The 'Deformity of Vice often does 
 not appear to thofe who continue in a 
 Courfe of it. Their Actions are under fome 
 Dilguife of Innocence, or even of Virtue 
 itfelf. When this Mask is pulled off, as it 
 often happens, nor can any vicious Man 
 prevent its happening, Vice will appear as 
 a Fury, whole Afpefi no Mortal can bear. 
 This we may fee in one Vice, which per- 
 haps has had fewer falfe or fantaftick AfTo- 
 ciations of favourable Ideas than any, viz. 
 Cowardice, or fuch a felfifh Love of Life, 
 and Averfion to Death, or to the very 
 Hazard of it, as hinders a Man from ier- 
 ving his Country or his Friend, or fupport- 
 Jng his own Reputation. How few of our 
 gay Gentlemen can bear to be reputed Cow- 
 ards, or even fecretly to imagine them- 
 felves void of Courage ? This is not tolera- 
 ble to any, how negligent fbever they may 
 be about other Points of Morality. Other 
 Vices would appear equally odious and de- 
 fpicable, and bear as horrid an Afpe&, were 
 they equally flript of the 'Difguifes of 
 
 Vtr-
 
 
 of the PASSIONS. 16 
 
 Virtue. A vicious Man has no other Se-Se# 
 curity againft the Appearances of this ter- 
 rifying Form, than Ignorance or Inadver- 
 tence. If Truth break in upon him, as it 
 often muft, when any Adverfay ftops his 
 intoxicating Pleafures, or Spectators trie 
 Freedom with his Conduct, he is render'd 
 perpetually miferable, or muft fly to the 
 only Remedy which Reafon would fugged:, 
 all pofTible Reparation of Injuries, and a 
 new Courfe of Life, the Neceffity of which 
 is not fuperfeded by any Remedy fuggefted 
 by the Chriftian Revelatiun, 
 
 THE Pains of the public k Smfi are very 
 lafting. The Mifery of others, either in 
 pad or prefent Ages, is matter of very un- 
 eafy Reflettion, and muft continue ib, if 
 their State appears in the whole abfofately 
 EviL Againft this there is no Relief but 
 the Confideration of a " good gowrnmg 
 " MIND, ordering all for good in the 
 " whole , with the Belief of a future 
 " State, where the particular feeming Dif. 
 " orders are rectified." A firm Perfuafion 
 of thefe Things, with ftrong public k Af- 
 fecJzons interefting us ftrongly in this 
 PVhole, and confidering this Whole as one 
 great Syftem* in which all is wifely ordered 
 for good, may fecure us againft theie Pains, 
 by removing the Opinion of any abfolute 
 
 M 2 THE
 
 1 64 The Nature and Conduct 
 
 Seel 5 . 
 
 THE Pains arifing from foolifh 
 tions of moral Ideas, with the Gratifica- 
 tions of external Senjes, or with the En- 
 joyment of Objects of Beauty or Grandeur, 
 or from the Defires of ^Property, the Hu- 
 mour of 'Dijl'mttion, may be as conftant 
 as the Pains of the Senfes from which 
 thefe Ideas are borrowed. Thus what we 
 gain by thefe AfFociations is very little. 
 " The 'Defer es of Trifles are often made 
 " very ftrong and uneafy ; the Tleafures 
 " of*PoffeJJion very fmall and of fhort Con- 
 " tinuance, only till the Object be famili- 
 " ar, or the Fancy change : But the Tains 
 " ofDifappointment are often very lafting 
 " and violent. Would we guard againft 
 " thefe Aflbciations, every real Tleafure 
 " in Life remains, and we may be eafy 
 *' without thefe things, which to others 
 " occafion the greateft Pains." 
 
 Sigilla,Tabellas> 
 Argentum, veftes Getulo Murice tinEias y 
 Eft qui non kabet, eft qui nee cur at halere. Hor. 
 
 SECT.
 
 of the PASSIONS. 
 
 SECT. VI. 
 
 Some general Conclufions concerning 
 the bejl Management of our 2)e- 
 Jires. With feme Trtncip/es ne. 
 cejfary to Happinefs. 
 
 w 
 
 E fee therefore, upon comparing 
 the feveral kinds of PJeafures and 
 Pains, both as to Intention and 'Duration, 
 that " the whole Sum of Intereftlies upon 
 the Side of Virtue^ 'Publick-Jpirit, and 
 Honour. That to forfeit thefe Pleafares 
 in whole, or in part, for any other En- 
 joyment , is the moft fooliih Bargain ; 
 and on the contrary, to fecure them 
 with the Sacrifice of all others, is the 
 truefl Gain" 
 
 THERE is one general Obfervation 
 be premifed, which appears of the 
 Neccflity for the juft Management of all 
 our Defires ; viz. that we Ihould, as much 
 as pofllble, in all Affairs of Importance to 
 our felves or others, prevent the Violence 
 of their confufed Scnjation, and flop their 
 Propcnfities from breaking out into Action, 
 till we have fully examined the real Mo- 
 of the Object, either of our Defires 
 M 3 or
 
 The Nature and 
 
 or Averfions. The only way to afreet 
 is, " a conftant Attention of Mind, 
 " an habitual T)ifcipline over our felves, 
 c< and a fixed Re f dint ion to flop all A&ion, 
 " before a calm Ex animation of every 
 *' Circumftance attending it ; more parti- 
 " cularly, the real Values of external Ob- 
 ' je&s, and the moral Dualities or Tern- 
 < pers of rational Agents, about whom our 
 ' Affections may be employed." This 
 Power we may obtain over our felves, by 
 a frequent Confideration of the great Cala- 
 mities, and pernicious Actions, to which 
 even the beji of our TaJJions may lead us, 
 when we are ralhly hurried into Action by 
 their Violence, and by the confufed Senfa- 
 tims, and fantajiick ^/bciations of Ideas 
 which attend them : Thus we may raife an 
 habitual Sufpicion and 'Dread of every 
 violent Taffion, which, recurring along 
 with them continually, may in fome mea- 
 fure counter-ballance their 'Propenfittes and 
 confufed Senfations. This 'Difctplhte of 
 our Pailions is in general necefTary. The 
 unkind or deftrufti've Affettions, our An- 
 ger^ Hatred, or Averfion to rational A- 
 gents, feem to need it moll ; but there is 
 alfb a great Neceflity for it, even about the 
 tender and benign Affeffions, left we mould 
 be hurried into unmerfalz&& abfohtte Evil, 
 by the Appearance of particular Good: 
 And confequently it muft be of the high eft 
 Importance to all, to ftrengthen as much
 
 of the 
 
 PASSIONS. 
 
 aspoflible, by frequent Meditation and Re-Seel, t 
 fledion, the calm Defires either private or <-^V> 
 publick, rather than the particular Paffions, 
 and to make the calm univerfal Benevo- 
 lence fuperior to them. 
 
 THAT the ueceflary Refignation of o-*jfc" 
 ther Pleafures may be the more eafy, we/i/ ^ 
 muft frequently fuggeft to our felves thefe/' 
 Confiderations above-mentioned. " Ex- 
 " ternal Tleafitres are fhort and tranfito- 
 " ry, leave no agreeable Reflection^ and 
 " are no manner of Advantage to us when 
 " they are paft ; we are no better than if 
 " we had wanted them altogether." 
 
 IN like manner, " paft Pains give us 
 no unpleafant RefleStion^ nor are we the 
 worfe for having endured them. If they 
 are violent, our Exiftence will probably 
 be fhort ; if not, they are tolerable, or 
 allow long Intervals of Eafe." Let us 
 oin to thefe zftoical Confederation ; " that 
 external fains give us a noble Oppor- 
 tunity of moral Tleafures in Fortitude, 
 and Submijjlon to the Order of the 
 whole, if we bear them refolutely ; but 
 if we fret under them, we do not alle- 
 viate the Suffering, but rather increafe 
 it by T^ifcontent or Sullennefs? When 
 external Tains muft be endured volunta- 
 rily to avoid moral Evil, we muft, as 
 much as poflible, prefent to our felves 
 MA " the
 
 1 68 fhe Nature and Con&ufi 
 
 Seel 6- 
 C/VXJ 
 
 the moral Species itlelf.with \hzpiiblick 
 Good to eniiie, the Honour and Appro- 
 bation to be expected from all good 
 Men, the DEITY, and our own Hearts, 
 if we continue firm ; and on the con- 
 trary, the Remorfe, Shame and Appre- 
 henfion of future 'Punijbments^ if we 
 yield to this Temptation." 
 
 How necefTary it is to break off the 
 vain AfTociations of moral Ideas, from the 
 Obje&s of external Senfes^ will alfo eafily 
 appear. This may be done, by confidering 
 how trifling the Services are which are 
 done to our Friends or Acquaintances, by 
 fplendid Entertainments, at an Expence, 
 which, otherways employed, might have 
 been to them of confiderable Importance. 
 Men who are at eafe, and of as irregular 
 Imaginations as our {elves , may admire 
 and praife our Magnificence ; but thofe 
 who need more durable Services , will 
 never think themfelves much obliged. We 
 cannot expedt any Gratitude for what was 
 done only to pleafe our own Vanity : 
 The Indigent eafily fee this, and juftly 
 confider upon the whole how much they 
 have profited. 
 
 IF the Wealth of the Luxurious fails, 
 he is the Object of Contempt : No body 
 pities him nor honours him : his perfonal 
 Dignity was placed by himfelf in his Ta-
 
 of the PASSIONS. 169 
 
 tie, Equifage and Furniture ; his Admi- Sett. 6. 
 rers placed it alfb in the fame : When t/VVJ 
 thefe are gone all is loft. 
 
 'Non eft melius quo infumere poffis ? 
 Cur eget indignus quisquam te Divite ? quare 
 Tewpla ruunt aatiqua Deiim ? cur imprcbe car a 
 Non aliquid P atria ex tanto emetiris ac.'rvo * 
 Uni nimlrum tibi recle femper erunt res * 
 
 O magnus fofthac inimicis Rffus. - Hor. * 2* * 
 
 THERE is no Enjoyment of external 
 Pleafure, which has more impofed upon 
 Men of late, by fome confufed Species of 
 Morality, than Gallantry. The fenfible 
 Pleafure alone muft, by all Men who have 
 the lead Reflection, be efteemed at a very 
 low rate : But the Defires of this kind, as 
 they were by Nature intended to found the 
 mofl conftant uninterrupted Friendflnf , 
 and to introduce the mod venerable and 
 lovely Relations, by Marriages and fa- 
 milies, arile in our Hearts, attended with 
 fome of 'the faeetejl Slffettions^ with a 
 difmterefled Love and Tendernefs, with a 
 mod gentle and obliging Deportment, with 
 fomenting great and heroick in our Tem- 
 per. The Wretch who rifes no higher in 
 thisPallion than the mean fenfual Gratifi- 
 cation, is abhorred by every one : But 
 thcfe fublimer Senfations and Paflions do 
 often fb fill the Imaginations of the Slmo- 
 rous> that they are unawares led into the 
 
 moll
 
 1 70 fhe Nature and 
 
 Sed:. 6. mod contemptible and cruel Conduct which 
 v^v^*^ can be imagined. When for fbrne trifling 
 traufitory Senfations, which they might 
 have innocently enjoyed along with the 
 higheft moral Tleajures in Marriage, they 
 expofe the very Perfon they love and ad- 
 mire to the deeped Infamy and Sorrow^ to 
 the Contempt of the World, to perpetual 
 Confufton, Remorfe, and Anguifli ; or, to 
 what is worfe, an Infenjibility of all Ho- 
 nour or Shame, Virtue or Vice, Good or 
 Evil, to be the Scorn and Averfion of the 
 World; and all this coloured over with 
 the gay Notions of Tleafantry, Genteel- 
 tiefs, Tolitenefs, Courage, high Enjoyment 
 of Life. 
 
 WOULD Men allow themfelves a little 
 Time to reflecT: on the whole Effett of 
 fuch capricious Purfuits, the Anguijh and 
 'DijlraRion of Mind which thefe Sallies 
 of Pleafure give to Husbands, Fathers, 
 Brothers ; would they confider how they 
 themlelves would refent fuch Treatment of 
 a Wife, a Child, a Sifter ; how much deep- 
 er fuch DiftrefTes are, than thofe trifling 
 LofTes or Damages, for which we think it 
 juft to bring the Authors of them to the 
 Gallows ; fure none but a thorow Villain 
 could either pracSHfe or approve the one 
 more than the other*
 
 of the PASSIONS. i?i 
 
 Se&. 6. 
 
 A WISE Man in his Oeconomy, rnuft 
 da much even in Complaifance to the Fol- 
 lies of others, as well as his own Conveni- 
 cncy, to fupporr that general good Opinion 
 which muft be maintained by thofe who 
 would be pubiickly uferul. His Expences 
 muft be lome way fuited to his Fortune, to 
 avoid the Imputation of Avarice. If in- 
 deed what is faved in private Expences ^ 
 be employed in generous Offices, there is 
 little danger of this Charge Such a Me- 
 dium may be kept as to be above Cenfure, 
 and yet below any AffecJation of Honour 
 or Tliflinftion in thefe matters. If one 
 corrects his own Imagination in thefe things, 
 he will be in no danger of doing any thing 
 pernicious to pleafe others. He is ftill in a 
 State fit to judge of the real Importance of 
 every thing which occurs to him, and will 
 gratify the falfe Relijh of others, no far- 
 ther than it is confiftent with, and fubfer- 
 vient to feme nobler Views. 
 
 II.) T o make the Pleafures of Imagina- 
 tion a conftant Source of 'Delight, as they 
 feem intended in the Frame of our Nature, pieafetr 
 with no hazard of Tain, it is necefTary f Ima 
 to keep the Senfe free from foreign Ideas 
 of 'Property, and the ^Defireof^tflMiion^ 
 as much as pofiible. If this can be done, 
 we may receive Pleafure from every Work 
 of Nat lire or Art around us. "1 We enjoy 
 
 not
 
 'The Nature and Condtttf 
 
 Seel. 6. not only the whole of Nature^ but the 
 united Labours of all about us. To pre- 
 vent the Idea of 'Property ^ let us confider 
 *' how little the ^Proprietor enjoys more 
 " than the Spectator : Wherein is he the 
 " better or the happier?" The Toet, or 
 the Connoiffeur^ who judges nicely of the 
 Perfection of the Works of Art, or the 
 Beauties of Nature, has generally a higher 
 Tafte than the Pofleflor. The magnificent 
 'Palace, the grand Apartments, the/ 7 ///^/, 
 the Fountains, the Vrns, the Statues^ the 
 Grottos and Arbours, are expofed either in 
 their own Nature, or by the Inclination 
 of the Proprietor, to the Enjoyment of 
 others. The Tleafure of the 'Proprietor 
 depends upon the Admiration of others . 
 he robs himfelf of his chief Enjoyment if 
 he excludes Spectators : Nay, may not a 
 Tafle for Nature be acquired, giving greater 
 Delight than the Obfervation of Art ? 
 
 Detenus Lybicis okt y nut nitet, Herba lapillis ? 
 Purior in vicis aqua tendit rumpere Plumbum, 
 Quam quaferpronum trepidatcum murmur eriuum? 
 Nempe inter "varias nuiritur Sylva Columnar, 
 Laudaturque Domus, longos qua projpicit Agros. 
 Naturam expellasjurca licet, ufque recunct. Hor. 
 
 Muft an artful Grove, an Imitation of a 
 Wildernefs, or the more confined Forms or 
 Ever-greens, pleafe more than the real Fo- 
 
 reft.
 
 of the PASSIONS. 
 
 reft, with the Trees of God? Shall a Sta- Setf. 6. 
 tue give more Plealure than the hurnan^/~V^* 
 Face 'Divine ? 
 
 WHERE the Humour of 'Diftinftion is 
 not corrected, our Equals become our Ad- 
 verfaries : The Grandeur of another is our 
 Mifery, and makes our Enjoyments in- 
 fipid. There is only one way of making 
 this Humour tolerable, but this way is al- 
 moft inconfiftent with the Inclination itfelf, 
 viz. *' continually to haunt with our Infe- 
 " riors, and compare our felves with them." 
 But if inconftant Fortune, or their own 
 Merit do raife any of them to equal us, our 
 Tleafure is loft, or we muft fink our felves 
 to thofe who are ftill Inferior, and abandon 
 the Society of every Perfbn whofe Art or 
 Merit raifes him. How poor a Thought 
 is this ! 
 
 T HE Purfutts of the Learned hwe often 
 as much Folly in them as any others, when 
 Studies are not valued according to their 
 'Vje in Life, or the real Plealures they 
 contain, but for the 'Difficulty and Qbftu- 
 rity, and confequently the Rarity and 
 c Di/ttnftion. Nay, an abufe may be made 
 of the mod noble and manly Studies, even 
 of Morals, ^Politicks^ and Religion itfelfj 
 if our Admiration and Defire terminate 
 upon the Knowledge itfelf, and not upon 
 
 the
 
 1 74 h ff Nature and Conduft 
 
 Se<2 6 the PofTeffioo of the Tlijpofaions and Af- 
 \^~y^ feet tons inculcated in thefe Studies. If 
 thefe Studies be only matter of Amufement 
 and Speculation^ intlead of leading us into 
 a conftant 'Difcipline over our ielves, to 
 correct our Hearts, and to guide our Actions, 
 W are not much better employed, than if 
 we had been (ludying fome delete Rela- 
 tions of Numbers , or Calculations of 
 Chances. 
 
 THE RE is not indeed any part of Know- 
 ledge which can be called entirely ufelefs. 
 The moft abftratfed Tarts of Mathcma- 
 ticks, and the Knowledge of mythological 
 Hiftory, or antient Allegories, have their 
 own Pleafures not inferior to the more gay 
 Entertainments of Tainting, Mufak^ or 
 Architecture ; and it is for the Advantage 
 of Mankind that fome are found, who have 
 a Tafte for thefe Studies. The only Fault 
 lies, in letting any of thofe inferior Tafles 
 engrols the whole Man to the Exclufion of 
 the nobler Purfuits of Virtue and Huma- 
 nity. 
 
 CONCERNING all thefe Pleafures of the 
 Imagination, let us confider alfb ** how 
 " little fupport they can give Men under 
 ' any of the Calamities of Life," fach as 
 the Treachery or Bafenefs of a Friend, a 
 a Child, or the perplexing Intrica- 
 cies
 
 of the PASSIONS. 175 
 
 cies of our common Affairs, or the Appre- Sec*. 6 
 henfion of <Deatb. vxv^ 
 
 Re veraque Aletus himinum, Curaque fequaca 
 Nee metuunt funitu* Armorum, ncc fera Tela ; 
 Audatterque inter Reges, rerumque Potentes 
 Ver$antuY> me fulgorem reverentur ab auro, 
 Nee clarum i-eftis fylendorem purpureat 
 Quid dub it as quin omne ft hoc rationis egeftas ? Luc. 
 
 III. UNDER this Head of our Internal ideas of 
 Senfe, we muft obferve one natural 
 of it, that it leads us into Apfrehenfions 
 a D E IT y. Grandeur, Beauty, Order, Har- nd 
 mony, wherever they occur, raife an Opi- 
 nion of a M i N D, of Ttefign^ and Wtfdom. 
 Every thing great, regular, or proportioned, 
 excites Veneration, either toward itfelf, if 
 we imagine it animated, if not animated, 
 toward fome apprehended Caufe. No De- 
 termination of our Mind is more natural 
 than this, no EfFed: more univerfal. One 
 has better Reafon to deny the Inclination 
 between the Sexes to be natural, than a 
 Dilpofition in Mankind to Religion. 
 
 W E cannot open our Eyes, without 
 difcerning Grandeur and Beauty every 
 where. Whoever receives thefe Ideas, feels 
 an inward Veneration arife. We may fall 
 into a Thoufand vain Reafbnings : foolifli 
 limited Notions of DIVINITY may be 
 formed, as attached to the particular Places 
 
 or
 
 1 7 6 ffie Nature and Con duff 
 
 Se6h 6. or Objetts^ which ftrike us in the moll 
 lively manner. Cuftom, Prejudice of 
 Senfe or Education, may confirm forne 
 foolim Opinion about the Nature or 
 Cauje of thefe Appearances : But wherever 
 a fuperior MIND, a governing INTENTION 
 or DESIGN is imagined, there Religion be- 
 gins in its mod fimple Form, and an in- 
 ward 'Devotion ariles. Our Nature is as 
 much determined to this, as to any other 
 Perception or Affection. How we manage 
 thefe Ideas and Affections, is indeed of the 
 greatefl Importance to our Happinefs or 
 Mifery. 
 
 THE Apprehenfion of anuniverfal MIND 
 with Power and Knowledge, is indeed an 
 agreeable Object of Contemplation. But 
 we muft form our Ideas of all intelligent 
 Natures, with fome Refemblance or Ana- 
 logy to our ielves: We muft conceive fbme- 
 thingcorrefpondent to our Affections in the 
 DIVINITY, with fome moral Apprehen- 
 fans of the Actions and Tempers of his 
 Creatures. The Order of Nature will 
 iuggeft many Confirmations of this. We 
 muft conclude fome Worjhip acceptable, and 
 fome Expreflions vtGratitude as our Duty. 
 The Conceptions of the DEITY muft be 
 various, according to the different Degrees 
 of Attention and Reafonmg in the Obfer- 
 vers, and their own Tempers and Affecti- 
 ons. Imagining the divine M i N D as cruel y 
 
 wrathful,
 
 of the PASSIONS. 
 
 wrathful* or capricious, muft be a perpe- Seel:. 6 
 tual Source of Dread and Horror ; and will 
 be apt to raife a Refemblance of Temper in 
 the Worlhipper, with its attendant Mijery. 
 A contrary Idea of the DIVINITY, as 
 good, and kind, delighting in univerfal Hap- 
 pinefs, and ordering all Events of the Uni- 
 verfe to this End, as it is the moft delight- 
 ful Contemplation, fb it fills the good Mind 
 with a conftant Security and Hope, amidft 
 either publick Dilbrders, or private Cala- 
 mities. 
 
 To find out which of thefe two Repre- 
 lentations of the DEITY is the true one, 
 we muft confult the TJniverfe, the Effect 
 of his Power, and the Scene of his Ad-tions. 
 After what has been obferved by fo many 
 ingenious Authors, both Antient and Mo- 
 dern, one cannot be at a lofs which Opi- 
 nion to chufe. We may only on this oc- 
 Cafion confider the Evidences of divine 
 Goodneis appearing in the Structure of 
 our own Nature, and in the Order of our 
 TaJJlons and Senfes. 
 
 IT was obferved above, how admirably 
 our Affections are contrived for good in the 
 whole. Many of them indeed do not pur- 
 fue the private Good of the Agent ; pay, Frame of 
 many of them, in various Cafes, feem to ourSe "J< s 
 tend to his detriment, by concerning hirn^ ; . ^ 
 violently in the Fortunes of others, in their 
 N Adver*
 
 178 fhe Nature and Conduct 
 
 Sedt 6> Adverfity, as well as their Profperity. But 
 C<YX> they all aim at good, either private or pub- 
 lick : and by them each particular Agent is 
 made, in a great meafure, fubfervient to the 
 good of the whole. Mankind are thus in- 
 ienfibly link'd together, and make one great 
 Syjlem, by an invifible Union. He who 
 'voluntarily continues in this Union, and 
 delights in employing his Power for his 
 Kind^ makes himfelf happy : He who does 
 
 not continue this Union freely, but affe&s 
 to break it, makes himfelf wretched ; nor 
 yet can he break the Bonds of Nature. 
 His fublick Senfe, his Love of Honour, 
 and the very Nece/Jities of his Nature, will 
 continue to make him depend upon his Syf- 
 tem, and engage him to ferve it, whether 
 he inclines to it or not. Thus we are for- 
 med with a View to a general good End \ 
 and may in our own Nature difcern a uni* 
 verfal Mind watchful for the whole. 
 
 THE fame is obfervable in the Order of 
 our external Senfes. The {imple Produc- 
 tions of Nature, which are ufeful to any 
 Species of Animals, are alfo grateful to 
 them ; and the pernicious or ufelefs Objects 
 are made difagreeable. Our external Senfa- 
 tions are no doubt often//#/#/, when our 
 Bodies are in a dangerous State; when they 
 want fupplies of Nourimment ; when any 
 thing external would be injurious to them. 
 But if it appears, " that the general Laws 
 
 " are
 
 of the PASSIONS. 
 
 " are wifely conftituted, and that it is ne-Sed. 6. 
 " ceflary to the Good of a Syftem 
 " fuch Agents, to be under the Influence 
 " of general Laws, upon which there is 
 " occafion for Trudence *x& Att'vuity \* 
 the particular Tains occafioned by a necef- 
 fary Law of Senfation, can be no Objec- 
 tion againft the Goodnefs of the Author. 
 
 Now that there is no room for com- 
 plaint, that '* our external Senfe of Tain 
 " is made too acute," muft appear from 
 the Multitudes we daily fee fo carelefs of 
 preferving the Blefling of Health, of which 
 many are fo prodigal as to lavifh it away, 
 and expofe themfelves to external Tains for 
 very trifling Reafons. Can we then re- 
 pine at the friendly Admonitions of Na- 
 ture, joined with fome Auflerity, when 
 we fee that they arc fcarce fufficient to re- 
 ftrain us from Ruin ? The fame may be 
 faid of the Tains of other kinds. Shame 
 and Remorfe are never to be called too fe- 
 vere, while fb many are not fafficiently re- 
 ftrained by them. Our Compajfion and 
 friendly Senfe of Sorrow, what are they 
 elfe but the Alarms and Exhortations of a 
 kind impartial Father, to engage his Chil- 
 dren to relieve a diftrefTed Brother ? Our 
 Anger itfelf is a neceflary Piece of Ma- 
 nagement, by which every pernicious At- 
 tempt is made dangerous to its Author. 
 
 
 N WOULD
 
 1 80 fhe Nature and Condutt 
 
 Sed:. 6. 
 
 l/V>J WOULD we allow room to our Inven- 
 tion, to conceive what fort of Mechanifin\ 
 what Conftitntions of Senfes or Affections 
 a malicious powerful Being might have 
 formed, we ihould foon fee how few Evi* 
 dences there are for any fuch Apprehenfion 
 concerning the AUTHOR of this World. 
 Our Mechanijm, as far as we have ever yet 
 difcovered, is wholly contrived for good. 
 No cruel 'Device, no Art or Contrivance 
 to produce evil : No fuch Mark or Scope 
 feems ever to be aimed at. How eafy had 
 it been to have contrived fbme neceffary 
 Engines of Mifery without any ufe ; fome 
 Member of no other fervice but to be mat- 
 ter of Torment ; Senfes incapable of bear- 
 ing the furrounding Objects without Pain ; 
 Eyes pained with the Light ; a Palate of- 
 fended with the Fruits of the Earth ; .a 
 Skin as tender as the Coats of the Eye , 
 and yet fome more furious Pain forcing us 
 to bear thefe Torments? Human Society 
 might have been made as uneafy as the 
 Company of Enemies, and yet a perpetual 
 more violent Motive of Fear might have 
 forc'd us to bear it. Malice ^Rancour ^Dijlrujl^ 
 might have been our natural Temper. Our 
 Honour and Self- Approbation might have 
 depended upon Injuries; and the Torments 
 of others been made our Ttelight, which 
 yet we could not have enjoyed thro' per- 
 petual fear. Many fuch Contrivances we 
 
 may
 
 of the PASSIONS, 181 
 
 may eafily conceive, whereby an evilSedt 6- 
 Mind could have gratified his Malice 
 our Mifery. But how unlike are they all 
 to the Intention or Defign of the Mecha- 
 nifm of this World ? 
 
 OUR Taffions no doubt are often mat- 
 ter of Uneafmefs to our ielves, and fome- 
 times occafion Mifery to others, when 
 any one is indulged into a Degree of 
 Strength beyond its 'Proportion. But which 
 of them could we have wanted, without 
 greater Mifery in the whole ? They are by 
 Nature ballanced againft each other, like 
 the Antagonifl Mufcles of the Body ; either 
 of which feparately would have occafioned 
 T>iftortion and irregular Motion^ yet joint- 
 ly they form a Machine, moft accurately 
 fubfervient to the Necejfities, Convenience, 
 and Happinefs of a rational Syjlem. We 
 have a Power of Reafon and Reflection* 
 by which we may fee what Courfe of Ac^ 
 tion will naturally tend to procure us 
 the moft valuable Gratifications of all our 
 Defires , and prevent any intolerable or 
 unnecefTary 'Pains, or provide fome fup- 
 port under them. We have Wifdom fuf- 
 ncient to form Ideas of Rights, Laws , 
 Conflitutions ; fo as to preferve large So- 
 cieties in Peace and Profperity, and promote 
 a general Good amidft all the private /- 
 tere/ts. 
 
 ' ' ^f 
 N j ](F
 
 1 8 1 The Nature and Condutt 
 
 SecT:. 6. 
 
 i^VXP I F f r om the prefent Order of Nature, 
 in which Good appears far fuperior to Evil, 
 we have juft Preemptions to conclude the 
 DEITY to be benevolent, it is not con- 
 ceivable " that any Being, who defires the 
 " Happinefs of others, ihould notdefire a 
 " greater 'Degree of Happinefs to them 
 " rather than a lels; and that confequent- 
 " Jy the whole Series of Events is the 
 " beft poffible, and contains in the whole 
 " the greateft poflible abfolute Good? ef- 
 pecially fmce we have no Preemption of 
 any private Inter eft ^ which an univerfal 
 MIND can have in view, in oppofition to 
 the greateft Good of the whole. Nor are 
 the particular Evils occurring to our Obfer- 
 vation, any juft Objection againft the per- 
 fect Goodnefs of the univerfal PROVI- 
 DENCE to us, who cannot know how far 
 thefe Evils may be neceflarily connected 
 with the Means of the greateft poflible ab- 
 folute Good. 
 
 The con- IV. I N managing our publick Senfe of 
 tufnfk Ur tne State of others, we muft beware of one 
 senfe and common Miftake , viz. " apprehending 
 ' " every Perfon to be miferable in thofe 
 ** Circumftances, which we imagine would 
 " make our felves miferable." We may 
 eafily find, that the lower Rank of Man- 
 kind, whofe only Revenue is their bpdily 
 JLabour, enjoy as nnuch Qhearfulnefs, Con*
 
 of the PASSIONS. 18} 
 
 tentment, Health, Gaiety, in their own way, Seel:. 6, 
 as any in the higheft Station of Life. Both 
 their Minds and Bodies are foon fitted to 
 their State. The Farmer and Labourer^ 
 when they enjoy the bare NecefTaries of 
 Life, are eafy. They have often moizcor- 
 retJ Imaginations, thro' Necejfity and 
 Experience ', than others can acquire by 
 Tbilofophy. This Thought is indeed a 
 poor Excufe for a bafe lelfifh Oppreffor, 
 who, imagining Poverty a great Mifery, 
 bears hard upon thofe in a low Station of 
 Life, and deprives them of their natural 
 Conveniences , or even of bare Recef- 
 faries. But this Confideration may fup- 
 port a compaflionate Heart, too deeply 
 touched with apprehended Miferies , of 
 which the Sufferers are themfelves infen- 
 fible. 
 
 THE Pains of this Senfe are not eafily 
 removed. They are not allayed by the 
 Diftinclion of Pains into real and imagi- 
 nary. Much lefs will it remove them, to 
 confider how much of human Mifery is 
 owing to their own Folly and Vice. Folly 
 and Vice are themfelves the mod pityable 
 Evils. It is of more confequence to con- 
 fider, what Evidences there are .' that the 
 " Vice and Mifery in the World are Imaller 
 " than we Ibmetimes in our melancholy 
 " Hours imagine." There are no doubt 
 mauy furious Starts of Pafiion, in which 
 N 4 Malice
 
 1 84 fhe Nature and Condutt 
 
 Sedt 3. Malice may feem to have place in our 
 o*VN; Conftitution ; but how feldom, and how 
 fhort, in comparifon of Years fpent in fixed 
 kind Purfuits of the Good of a Family, a 
 'Party, a Country ? How great a Part of 
 human AdHons flow directly from Huma- 
 nity and kind Affettion ? How many cen- 
 furable Actions are owing to the fame Spring, 
 only chargeable on Inadvertence ', or an At- 
 tachment to too narrow a Syftem ? How 
 few owing to any thing worfe than felfijh 
 Pa/lions above their Proportion ? 
 
 HERE Men are apt to let their Imagi- 
 nations run out upon all the Robberies , 
 'Piracies, Murder s y ^Perjuries, Frauds , 
 Maffacres, ^/off/nations, they have ever 
 either heard of, or read in Hiftory ; thence 
 concluding all Mankind to be very wicked : 
 as if a Court of Juflice were the proper 
 Place of making an Eftimate of the Morals 
 of Mankind, or an Hojpital of the Health' 
 fulnefs of a Climate. Ought they not to 
 confider, that the Number of honefl Citi- 
 zens and Farmers far (urpafTes that of all 
 forts of Criminals in any State ; and that 
 the innocent or kind A&ions of even Cri- 
 minals themfelves, furpafs their Crimes in 
 Numbers ? That 'tis the Rarity of Crimes, 
 v in comparifon of innocent or good Actions, 
 which engages our Attention to them, 
 and makes them be recorded in Hiftory ; 
 while incomparably more honefl, generous, 
 
 dome
 
 of the PASSIONS. 185 
 
 domeftick Adions are overlooked, onlySed. 6, 
 becaufe they are fo common ; as one great ^r*> 
 'Danger, or one Month's Stcknefs, ihall 
 become a frequently repeated Story, during 
 a Jong Life of Health and Safety. 
 
 THE Pains of the external Senfes are 
 pretty frequent, but howi fhort in compa- 
 rifon of the long Trads of Health, Eafe 
 and Pleafure ? How rare is the Inftance of 
 a Life, with one tenth fpent in violent 
 Pain ? How few want abfolute NecefTaries ; 
 nay, have not fomething to fpend on 
 Gaiety and Ornament ? The Pleafures of 
 Beauty are expofed to all in fome meafure. 
 Thefe kinds of Beauty which require 'Pro- 
 perty to the full Enjoyment of them, are 
 not ardently defired by many. The Good of 
 every kind in theUniverfe, isplainly fuperi- 
 or to the Evil. How few would accept of^n- 
 mhilation, rather than Continuance in Life 
 in the middle State of Age, Health and For- 
 tune? Or what feparated Spirit, who had 
 confidered human Life,would not,rather than 
 periih, take the hazard of it again, by return- 
 ing into a Body in the State of Infancy ? 
 
 * Who would lofe, 
 
 For fear of Pain, this intelle&ual Being, 
 "Thefe Thoughts which wander thro' Eternity, 
 To perifh rather, fwallowed up and loft 
 In the wide IVomb of uncreated Night, 
 
 Jpevoid of Swfe and Motion ? 
 
 MUton'j Par. loft, Book. 2.
 
 1 8 6 fhe Nature and 
 
 THESE Thoughts plainly mew a 'Pre- 
 valence of Good in the World. But ftill 
 our publick Senfe finds much matter of 
 compaflionate Sorrow among Men. The 
 Many are in a tolerable good State ; but 
 who can be unconcerned for the diftrefled 
 Few ? They are few in comparifon of the 
 whole, and yet a great Multitude. 
 
 WHAT Parent would be much concer- 
 ned at the Pains of breeding of Teeth, were 
 they fure they would be fhort, and end 
 well ? Or at the Pain of a Medicine, or an 
 Incifion, which was neceflary for the 
 Cure, and would certainly accomplilh it? 
 Is there then no Tarentin. NATURE, no 
 Thyfician who fees what is neceflary for 
 the Whole, and for the good of each Indi- 
 vidual in the whole of his Exiftence, as 
 far as is confident with the general Good? 
 Can we expedt, in this our Childhood of 
 Exiftence, to underftand all the Contri- 
 vance and Art of this Parent and Phyfician 
 of Nature ? May not fome harfli Discipline 
 be neceflary to Good ? May not many na- 
 tural Evils be neceflary to prevent future 
 moral Evils, and to corred: the Tempers of 
 the Agents, nay to introduce moral Good ? 
 Is not Suffering and 'Diftrefs requifite, be- 
 fore there can be room for generous Com- 
 paflion, Succour, and Liberality ? Can there 
 fre Forgivenefs, Returns of good for evil, 
 on.
 
 of tie PASSIONS. 187 
 
 unlefs there be fbme moral Evil! Muft theSedt 
 Whole want the eternally delightful Con- 
 fcionfnefs of fuch Attions and T)ijpojitions, 
 to prevent a few tranfient Senfations of 
 Pain, or natural Evil ? May there not be 
 fbme unfeen Necefiity for the greateft uni- 
 verfal Good, that * there fhould be an Or- 
 der of Beings no more perfect than we are, 
 fubje&to Error and wrong AfFe&ions fome- 
 times ? May not all the prefent Diforders 
 which attend this State of prevalent Or- 
 der, be rectified by the directing 'Provi- 
 dence in a future Part of our Exiftence ? 
 This Belief of a DEITY, a PROVIDENCE, 
 and a future State, are the only fare Sup- 
 ports to a good Mind. Let us then acquire 
 and ftrengthen our Love and Concern for 
 this Whole, and acquiefce in what the go- 
 verning MIND, who prefides in it, is or- 
 dering in the wifeft manner, tho not yet 
 fully known to us, for its moft univerfal 
 Good. 
 
 A FUTURE State, firmly believed, 
 makes the greateft Difficulties on this Sub- ining * 
 je<a to vanifh. No particular finite Evils /** 
 can be looked upon as intolerable, which State ' 
 lead to Good, infinite in 'Duration. Nor 
 can we complain of the Conditions of 
 Birth, if the prefent Evils of Life have 
 
 S the AjchbiQiop of Dublin, Ds Origixe Mall 
 
 even
 
 i 88 fbe Nature and Conduft 
 
 Seel:. 6. even a probable hazard of ever lofting Hap- 
 ^^T*> pinefs to compenfate them ; much more if 
 it be placed in our power certainly to ob- 
 tain it. Never could the boldeft Epicurean 
 bring the lighted Appearance of Argument 
 againft the "Pojfibility of fuch a State, nor 
 was there ever any thing tolerable advanced 
 againft its Probability. We have no Re- 
 cords of any Nation which did not enter- 
 tain this Opinion. Men of Reflection in 
 all Ages, have found at leaft probable Ar- 
 guments for it ; and the Vulgar have been 
 prone to believe it, without any other Ar- 
 gument than their natural Notions vtjujlice 
 in the Adminijlration of the World. Pre- 
 fent Hope is prefent Good : and this very 
 Hope has enlivened human Life, and given 
 eafe to generous Minds, under Anxieties 
 about the publick Good. 
 
 THIS Opinion was interwoven with all 
 Religions ; and as it in many inftances 
 overballanced the Motives to Vice, fo ic 
 removed Objections againft Providence. 
 The good Influence of this Opinion, how- 
 ever it might not juftify any Frauds -, yet 
 probably did more good than what might 
 overbalance many Evils flowing from even 
 very corrupt Religions. How agreeable 
 then muft it be to every good Man, that 
 this Opinion, were there even no more to 
 be done, mould be confirmed beyond 
 queftioa or doubt, by a well attefted di~
 
 of the P A S S I O N S. 
 
 'vine Revelation, for the perpetual Security Set 6- 
 of the virtuous, and for the conftant Support 
 of the kind and compajjionate ? How gladly 
 muft every honeft Heart receive it ; and 
 rejoice that even thofe who have neither 
 Leifure nor Capacity for deep Reflection, 
 ihould be thus convinced of it ? 
 
 As to the Management of thofe 
 fions which feem oppojite to the Hap 
 of others, fuch as Anger , Jealoiify, 
 vy, Hatred \ it is very necejlary to 
 fent to our (elves .continually, the moft fa- 
 vourable Conceptions of others, and to force 
 our Minds to examine the real Springs 
 of the refented Actions. We may almoft 
 univerfally find, that " no Man a&s from 
 " pure Malice ; that the Injurious only 
 " intended fome Interejl of his own, with- 
 *' out any ultimate ^Dejire of our Mife- 
 " ry ; that he is more to be pitied for his 
 " own mean /?///& Temper -, for the want 
 " of true Goodnefs, and its attendant Haf- 
 " pinefs, than to be hated for his Condud:, 
 " which is really more pernicious to him- 
 " felf than to others*. Our Lenity, For- 
 " grvenefs* and Indulgence to the Weak- 
 " nefs of others, will^e conftant Matter 
 <c of delightful Confcioufnefs^ and Self- 
 
 * See this Point handled with great Judgment, in Plato'* 
 Qorgias,
 
 t po 7*be Nature and Conduct 
 
 Se#. 6." Approbation ; and will be as probably 
 " effectual in moft cafes, to obtain Refa- 
 *' ration of Wrongs, from an hearty Re- 
 " morfe, and thorow Amendment of the 
 " Temper of the Injurious, as any Me- 
 " thods of Violence." Could we raife our 
 Goodnefs even to an higher Pitch, and 
 confider " the Injurious as our Fellow- 
 *' Members in this great intellectual Body, 
 " whofe Intereft and Happinefs it becomes 
 " us to promote, as much as we can con- 
 " fiftently with that of others, and not 
 " to defpife, fcorn, or cut them ojf 9 be- 
 ' caufe of every Weaknefs, ^Deformity y 
 ' or lighter T)ifordcr ;" we might bring 
 our felves to that divine Conduct, of even 
 returning good for evil. 
 
 IN like manner, our Emulation, Jea- 
 loujy, or Envy, might be reftrained in a 
 great meafure , by a conftant Refolution 
 of bearing always in our Minds the * love- 
 ly Side of every Character: f " The 
 " compleatly Evil are as rare as the per- 
 ' fe&ly Virtuous : There is fomething 
 " amiable almoft in every one." Could 
 we enure our felves conftantly to dwell on 
 thefe things, we might often bear patiently 
 the Succefs of a Rival, nay, fometimes 
 even rejoice in it, be more happy our 
 
 * Epiftet. Enchir. Cap, f, f Plato Phxdon. 
 
 felves,
 
 of the PASSIONS. fj >i 
 
 felves, and turn him into a real Friend. Seel:. 
 We ihould often find thofe Thantoms 
 Vice and Corruption which torment the 
 Jealous, vanilhing before the bright Warmth 
 of a thorow good Temper^ refolved to 
 fearch for every thing lovely and good, and 
 averfe to think any evil. 
 
 V. IN governing our moral Senfe, 
 
 ^De fires of Virtue, nothing is more 
 
 fary than to ftudy the Nature and Tenden- Sen f e f 
 
 cy of human Actions ; and to extend our Hono> 
 
 views to the whole Species, or to z\\fen- 
 
 fitlve Natures , as far as they can be af- 
 
 fected by our Conduct. Our moral Senfe 
 
 thus regulated, and conftantly followed in 
 
 our A&ions, may be the moft conftant 
 
 Source of the moft ft able Tleafure. The 
 
 fame Conduct is always the mod probable 
 
 Means of obtaining the Tleajures of Ho- 
 
 nour. If there be a Diftindion between 
 
 Truth and Faljhood, Truth mud be ftronger 
 
 than Fallhood : It muft be more probable 
 
 that Truth will generally prevail ; that the 
 
 real good Tendency of our Actions, and 
 
 the Wifdom of our Intentions will be 
 
 known ; and Mlfreprefentatlons or partial 
 
 Views will vanifh. Our Defire of 'Honour 
 
 is not confined to our prefent State. The 
 
 Profpecl: of future Glory is a ftrong Mo- 
 
 tive of A&ion. And thus the Time, in 
 
 which our Character may have the hazard 
 
 of obtaining Juftice, has no other Limits 
 
 than
 
 l p i fbe Nature and Condtitt 
 
 Sect. 6. tnan thofe of the Exiftence of rational Na- 
 Whereas, partial Notions of Vir- 
 tue, and partial Conduct, have no other 
 Foundation for Self-Approbation* than our 
 Ignorance, Error ', or Inadvertence ; nor 
 for Honour ; than the like Ignorance^ Er 
 ror, or Inadvertence of others. 
 
 *> f " T 
 
 THAT we may not be engaged into any 
 thing contrary to the publick Good, or to 
 the true Schemes of Virtue, by the Defire 
 offalfe Honour^ or Fear of falfe Shame, 
 it is of great ufe to examine the real 'Dig- 
 nity of thofe we converfe with, and to con- 
 fine our Intimacies to the truly virtuous 
 and wife. From fuch we can expect no 
 Honour, _but according to our fincere Pur- 
 firit of t\\epublick Good ; nor need we ever 
 fear any Shame in fuch a Courle. But above 
 all, did we frequently, and in the moft 
 lively manner, prefent to our felves that 
 great, and wife, and good MIND, which 
 prefides over the Univerfe, fees every Ac- 
 tion^ and knows the true Character and 
 ^Dijpofition of every Heart, approving no- 
 thing but fincere Goodnefs and Integrity ; 
 did we conflder that the time will come, 
 when we mall be as confcious of his Tre- 
 fence ^ as we are of our own Exiftence ; as 
 fenflble of his Approbation or Condemna- 
 tion* as we are of the Teflimony of our 
 own Hearts ; when we mail be engaged in 
 * Society of Spirits, ftripped of thefe Tre- 
 ti/ - judices
 
 of the PASSIONS. 
 
 judices and falfe Notions which fo often S e&. 6. 
 attend us in Fleili and Blood, how ihould IXVV* 
 we defpife that Honour which is from Men, 
 when oppofite to the trued Honour from 
 Goohimfelf? 
 
 VI. CONCERNING the Defires of The vefires 
 Wealth and Tower, befides what was fug- f Wealth 
 getted above to allay their Violence, fiom" 
 confidering the fmail Addition commonly 
 made to the Happinefs of the PofTeflbr, by 
 the greateft Degrees of them, and the *U- 
 certainty of their Continuance ; if we have 
 obtained any fhare of them, let us examine 
 their true *Ufe, and what is the belt En^ 
 joymentof them. 
 
 Quid afpt 
 
 Utile Nummus habet t P atria carifyuepropinquis 
 Quantum elargiri decet ? Perfi-us. 
 
 WHAT moral Tleafures, what Delights 
 of Humanity, what Gratitude from Perlons 
 obliged, what Honour \ may a wife Man of 
 a generous Temper purchafe with them ? 
 How foolifh is the Conduct of heaping up 
 Wealth for Tofterity* when fmaller Degrees 
 might make them equally happy ! when 
 great Trofpetts of this kind are the ftrongeft 
 Temptations to them, to indulge Sloth, 
 Luxury, ^Debauchery^ Infolence, Trzde, 
 and Contempt of their Fellow-Creatures ; 
 O and
 
 1 94 fhe Nature and Conduct 
 
 Sed:. 6. and to banifh fonie noble Difpofitions, Hu- 
 CompaJJion^ Induflry, Hardinefs 
 of Temfer and Courage, the Offspring of 
 the fober rigid Dame ^Poverty. How often 
 does the Example, and almoft direcl: In- 
 ftruffion of Parents, lead Pofterity into 
 thebafeft Views of Life! 
 
 ui nulla exempla beati 
 
 Pauper is effe put at -- 
 Cum diets Juveni flultum qui donat arnica*) 
 Qtti paupertatem lev at attollitque propinqui, 
 Etfpoliare doces & circumfcr there --- 
 Ergo Ignem, cttjusjcintillas ipfe dedifti, 
 - Flagraxtem late } & rapientem cunEia 'videbis. 
 
 Juv. Sat. 14. 
 
 How powerfully might the Example of 
 a wifely generous Father, at once teach his 
 Offspring the true Value of Wealth or 
 Power, and prevent their Negleff of them, 
 or foolifh throwing them away, and yet 
 inipire them with a generous Temper , ca- 
 pable of the juft Vfe of them ! 
 
 support a- D E A T H is one Object of our Aver fan, 
 
 which yet we cannot avoid. It can Icarcely 
 " hm be faid, that the T>efire of Life is as 
 ' ftrong as the Sum of dlfelfjh Ttefires? 
 It may be fo with thofe who enure them- 
 felves to no Pleafures but thofe of the ex- 
 ternal Senfes. But how often do we fee 
 
 Death
 
 of the PASSIONS. 195 
 
 Death endured, not only from Love of Seel:. 6, 
 Virtue, or public k Affections, in Heroes 
 and Martyrs, but even from Love of Ho- 
 nour in lower Characters ! Many Averfions 
 are ftronger than that to Death. Fear of 
 bodily f Pain, fear of 'Dijbonotir, which 
 are felfifti Averfions, do often furpafs our 
 Averfion to Death, as well ttfublick Af- 
 fections to Countries or Friends. It is of 
 the greateft Coniequence to the Enjoyment 
 of Life, to know its true Value ; to (trip 
 Death of its borrowed Ideas of Terror ; 
 to confider it barely as the Ceffation of 
 both the Tains and f Pleafures we now fee 1 9 
 coming frequently upon us with no more 
 Pain than that of Swooning, with a noble 
 Hazard, or rather a certain c Profpet of 
 fiiperibr Happinefs to every good Mind. 
 Death in this view muft appear an inconfi- 
 derable Evil, in comparifon office, Self- 
 Abhorrence , real T)ifl)onour, the Slave- 
 ry of one's Country, the Mifery of a 
 Friend. 
 
 THE tender Regards to a Family and 
 Offspring, are often the ftrongeft Bands to 
 reftrain a generous Mind from lubmitting to 
 Death. What ihall be the Fate of a Wife, 
 a Child, a Friend, or a Brother, when 
 we are gone, are the frequent Subjects of 
 grievous Anxiety. The Fortunes of fuch 
 Perfons often depend much upon us ; and 
 when they do not, yet we are more anxious 
 O 2 about
 
 196 fhe Nature and 
 
 Sect. 6. about their State when we fhall be ab- 
 fent. 
 
 . 1J t ajfidens implumibus pullis avis, 
 
 Ser pcntium allapfus timet 
 Magis relittis, non ut ad/it Auxili 
 Latura-flusfrafentibus. Hor. 
 
 Next to the Belief of a good PROVI- 
 DE N c E, nothing can fupport Men more 
 under fuch Anxieties, than confidering how 
 often the Orphan acquires a Vigor of Mind, 
 Sagacity and Induftry, mperior to thofe 
 who are enfeebled by the conftant Care and 
 Services of others. A wife Man would 
 defire to be provided with Friends againffc 
 fuch an Exigency ; Perfbns of fuch Good- 
 nefs, as would joyfully accept the Legacy 
 of a Child, or indigent Friend committed 
 to their Protection. 
 
 IF Death were an entire End of the 
 Perfbn, fo that no Thought or Senie ihould 
 remain, all Good muft ceale at Death, but 
 no Evil commence. The Lofs of Good 
 is Evil to us now, but will be no Evil to a 
 Being which has loft all Senfe of Evil. 
 Were this the Cafe, the Confolation againft 
 Death would only be this, frequently to 
 look upon Life and all its Enjoyments as 
 granted to us only for a jhort Term ; to 
 employ this uncertain Time as much as we 
 can in the Enjoyment of the noblejl <P lea- 
 fur es^
 
 of the PASSIONS. 197 
 
 fares ; and to prevent Surprize at our Re Se6t. 6. 
 moval, by laying our Account for ir. (^Y^i 
 
 BUT if we exift, and think after Death, 
 and retain our Senfes of Good and Evil, no 
 Confblation againft Death can be fuggefted 
 to a wicked Man ; but for the virtuous^ 
 there are the beft Grounds of Hope and 
 Joy. If the Adminiflration of the whole 
 be good, we may be fure ** that Order 
 " and Happinefs will in the whole prevail : 
 ' Nor will Mifery be inflicted any farther 
 " than is neceffary for fome prepollent 
 " Good." Now there is no Preemption, 
 that the abfolute Mifery of any virtuous 
 Perfpn can be neceflary to any good End : 
 Such Perfons therefore are the moft likely 
 to enjoy a State of perfecl Happinefs. 
 
 VII. T o conclude : Let us confider that lvhat 
 common Character, which when afcribed f/j;^ 
 to any State, Duality, c Difpofaion t or A, 
 AcJion, engages our Favour and Approba- 
 tion of it, viz. its being natural. We 
 have many Sufpicions about Tempers or 
 Dilpofitions formed by Art, but are fome 
 way prepofTefTed in favour of what is natu- 
 ral: We imagine it muft be advantageous 
 and delightful to be in a natural State, and 
 to live according to Nature. " This very 
 " Prefumption in favour of what is natural, 
 " is a plain Indication that the Order of 
 f* Nature is good, and that Men are fome 
 
 O ? *' way 
 
 j
 
 198 The Nature and Conduct 
 
 Se6h 6." way convinced of it. Let us enquire 
 " then what is meant by it." 
 
 I F by natural we mean " that which we 
 " enjoy or do, when we firft begin to ex- 
 " id, or to think," it is impoflible to 
 know what State, Temper , or ^Attiom, 
 are natural. Our natural State in this 
 Senfe differs little from that of a Tlant, ex- 
 cept in fbme accidental Senjations of 'Hun- 
 ger , or ofEaJe, when we are well nouri/hed. 
 
 SOME elaborate Treatifes of great Phi- 
 lofophers about innate Ideas, or Principles 
 practical or fpeculative, amount to no more 
 than this, " That in the Beginning of our 
 " Exiftence we have no Ideas or Jttdg- 
 " ments ; v they might have added too, on 
 Sight, Tafle, Smell, Hearing, T>efire, 
 Volition. Such DifTertations are juft as 
 ufeful for underftanding human Nature^ as 
 it would be in explaining the animal Oeco- 
 nomy^ to prove that the Foetus is animated 
 before it has Teetb 9 Nails, Hair^ or before 
 it can eat, drink^ digefl, or breathe : Or in 
 a natural Hiftory of Vegetables, to prove 
 that Trees begin to grow before they have 
 Branches, Leaves, Flower, Fruit, or Seed: 
 And confecjuently that all thefe things were 
 adventitious, or the Effeft of Art. 
 
 BUT if we call " that State, thofc 
 " *&ijfojitions and Attions, natural, to 
 
 " which
 
 of the PASSIONS. 
 
 " which we are inclined by fome part- ofSecl:. <5. 
 
 " our Conftitution, antecedently to any ^v^ 
 
 " Volition of our own ; or which flow 
 
 " fromfbme ^Principles incur Nature, not 
 
 '* brought upon us by our own Art, or 
 
 " that of others ;" then it may appear, 
 
 from what was (aid above, that " a State 
 
 " of Good-will, Humanity, CompaJJlon^ 
 
 " mutual Aid, propagating and fupport- 
 
 " ing Offspring, Love of a Community or 
 
 " Country, 'Devotion, or Love and Gra- 
 
 " titude to fome governing Mind, is our 
 
 " natural State," to which we are naturally 
 
 inclined, and do actually arrive, as univer- 
 
 fally, and with as much uniformity, as we 
 
 do to a certain Stature and Shape. 
 
 IF by natural we underfland " the 
 " highefl Terfettion of the Kind^to which 
 ' any Nature may be improved by culti- 
 " vating its natural Difpofitions or Pow- 
 " ers ;" as few arrive at this in the Growth 
 of their Bodies, fb few obtain it in their 
 Minds. But we may fee what this Perfec- 
 tion is, to which our natural ^Difpojltions 
 tend, when we improve them to the ut- 
 moft, as far as they are confiftent with 
 each other, making the weaker or meaner 
 yield to the more excellent and ftronger. 
 Our feveral Senfes and Affections, publick 
 and private, with our Powers of Reafon 
 and Reflettion^ fhew this to be the Ter- 
 fettion of our Ktnd^ viz. " to know, 
 O 4 love,
 
 200 The Nature and 
 
 Se6h 6." love, and reverence the great AUTHOR. 
 of all things ; to form the moft exten- 
 " Jive Ideas of our own true Interefls, and 
 " thofe of all other Natures^ rational or 
 " fenfitive ; to abftain from all Injury ; 
 " to purfue regularly and impartially the 
 " moft univerfal abfolute Good, as far 
 " as we can ; to enjoy conftant Self-Ap- 
 * probation, and Honour from wife Men ; 
 " with Trujt in divine PROVIDENCE, 
 " Hope of ever laft ing Happinefs, and a 
 " full Satisfaction and dffurance of Mind, 
 " that the whole Series of Events is di- 
 *' reeled by an unerring Wifdom, for the 
 * greateft univerfal Hapfinefs of the 
 whole." 
 
 U'f 
 
 To aflert that ' Men have generally 
 ' arrived to the TerfecJion of tfreir Kind 
 " in this Life," is contrary to Experience. 
 But on the other hand, tofuppofe " no Or- 
 * der at all in the Conflitution of our Na- 
 " ture, or no prevalent Evidences of good 
 " Order," is yet more contrary to Expe- 
 rience, and would lead to a Denial of 
 PROVIDENCE in the moft important Af- 
 fair which can occur to our Obfervation. 
 We adually fee fuch Degrees of good Order, 
 of focial Slffettion, of 'Virtue and Honour ', 
 as make the Generality of Mankind conti- 
 nue in a tolerable, nay, an agreeable State. 
 However, in fbme Tempers we lee the 
 felfJhTaJJlons by Habits grown too ftrong ; 
 
 in
 
 of the PASSIONS. 201 
 
 in others we may obferve Humanity, Corn-Sett. 6* 
 
 fajfion, and Good-nature fometimes raifed ^v^ 
 by Habits, as we fay, to an Excefs. 
 
 WERE we to ftrike a Medium of the 
 feveral Patfions and AfFedions, as they ap- 
 pear in the whole Species of Mankind, to 
 conclude thence what has been the natural 
 Ballance previoufly to any Change made 
 by Cuftom or Habit, which we fee cafts the 
 Ballance to either fide, we fliould perhaps 
 find the Medium of the publick Affections 
 not very far from a fufficient Counter-bal- 
 lance to the Medium of the Selfiih ; and 
 confequently the Overballance on either 
 fide in particular Characters, is not to be 
 looked upon as the original Conftitution^ 
 but as the accidental Effect of Cuftom, Ha- 
 bit, or AfTociations of Ideas, or other pre- 
 ternatural Caufes : So that an univerfal in- 
 creajing of the Strength of either ; might 
 in the whole be of little advantage- The 
 raifing univerlally the publick Affections, 
 the Dcfires of Virtue and Honour^ would 
 make the Hero of Cervantes, pining with 
 Hunger and Poverty, no rare Character. 
 The univerfal increafmgof Selfiflmefs, unlefs 
 we had more accurate Underftandings to dif- 
 cern our triceftlnterefts, would fill the World 
 with univerfal Rapine and War. The 
 Confequences of either univerfally abating* 
 or increajtng the Defires between the Sexes, 
 the Love of Offspring^ or the feveral 
 
 Taftes
 
 iox fhe Nature and 
 
 Seel:. 6. Taftes and Fancies in other Pleafures, 
 v/w; would perhaps be found more pernicious to 
 the whole, than the prefent Constitution. 
 What feems mod truly wanting in ourNature, 
 is greater Knowledge, Attention and Confe- 
 deration : had w 7 e a greater Perfection this 
 way, and were evil Habits, and foolifti 
 dffociations of Ideas prevented, our Taf- 
 Jions would appear in better order. 
 
 BUT while we feel in our felves fo much 
 publick Affettion in the various Relations 
 of Life, and obferve the like in others ; 
 while we find every one defiring indeed his 
 own Happinefs, but capable of difcerning, 
 by a little Attention, that not only his ex- 
 ternal Convenieticy, or worldly Interefl, 
 but even the mod immediate and lively Sen- 
 fat ions of 'Delight, of which his Nature is 
 mfceptible, immediately flow from a 'Pub- 
 lick Spirit, a generous, human^ compajpo- 
 nate Temper, and a fuitable 'Deportment ; 
 while we obferve fo many Thoufands en- 
 joying a tolerable State of Eafe and Safety, 
 for each one whofe Condition is made in- 
 tolerable, even during our prefent Corrup- 
 tion : How can any one look upon this 
 World as under the Direction of an evil 
 Nature, or even queftion a perfectly good 
 PROVIDENCE? How clearly does the 
 Order of our Nature point out to us our 
 true Hdppinefs and Terfeffion, and lead us 
 to it as naturally as the feveral Toivers of 
 2 the
 
 of the PASSIONS. 203 
 
 the Earth, the Sun, and Air, bring < PfantsScQ > 
 to their Growth, and the Perfection 
 their Kinds ? We indeed are directed to it 
 by our 'Vnderftanding and Affeflions, as 
 it becomes rational and atti f ue Natures ; 
 and they by mechanick Laws. We may 
 fee, that " Attention to the moft univer- 
 " fal Inter eft of all fenfitive Natures, is 
 " the Perfection of each individual of Man- 
 " kind : " That they mould thus be like 
 well-tuned Inftruments? affe<5ted with every 
 Stroke or Touch upon any one. Nay, how 
 much of this do we actually fee in the 
 World? What generous Sympathy, Com- 
 paffion, and Congratulation with each o- 
 ther ? Does not even the flourifhing State 
 of the inanimate Tarts of Nature, fill us 
 with joy ? Is not thus our Nature admo- 
 nifhed, exhorted and commanded to cul- 
 tivate univerfal Goodnefs and Love, by a 
 Voice heard thro 7 all the Earth, and Words 
 founding to the Ends of the World* 
 
 TREA-
 
 20 5 
 
 TREATISE II. 
 
 ILLUSTRATIONS upon the 
 MORAL SENSE. 
 
 TH E Differences of Actions from 
 which (bme are conftituted morally 
 Good, and others morally Evil, have 
 always been accounted a very important 
 Subject of Inquiry : And therefore, every 
 Attempt to free this Subject from the ufual 
 Caufes of Error and Difpute, the Confufion 
 of ambiguous Words, muft be excufable. 
 
 IN the following Difcourfe, Happinefs*>efini. 
 denotes pleafant Senfation of any kind, ot ttons ' 
 a continued State of fiach Senfations ; and 
 Mifery denotes the contrary Senfations. 
 
 SUCH Actions as tenet to procure Hap- 
 pinefs to the Agent, are called privately 
 ufeful: and fiich Adions as procure Mile- 
 ry to the Agent, privately hurtful. 
 
 ACTIONS
 
 206 Illustrations upon the 
 
 ACTIONS procuring Happinefs to others 
 may be called publicity ufeful, and the 
 contrary Actions publickly hurtful. Some 
 Actions may be both publickly and pri- 
 vately ufeful, and others both publickly 
 and privately hurtful. 
 
 THESE different natural Tendencies of 
 Actions are univerfally acknowledged ; and 
 in proportion to our Reflection upon human 
 Affairs, we mail enlarge our Knowledge of 
 theie Differences. 
 
 TWO Quef- WHEN thefe natural 'Differences are 
 tions about known, it remains to be inquired into : 
 Morality. jft> <4 yf^ Quality in any Adtion deter- 
 mines our Election of it rather than the 
 contrary?" Or, if the Mind determines 
 tfelf, " What Motives or ^Dejires excite 
 to an Action, rather than the contrary, 
 or rather than to the Omiffion .?" 2dly, 
 What Quality determines our Approba- 
 tion of one Action, rather than of the 
 contrary Action?" 
 
 THE Words Election and Approbation 
 feem to denote fimple Ideas known by Con- 
 fcioufnefs ; which can only be explained 
 by Jynonymous Words, or by concomitant 
 or confequent Circumflances. Election is 
 purpofing to do an Adion rather than its 
 contrary, or than being inactive. Appro- 
 bation
 
 MORAL SENSE. 207 
 
 bation of our own Action denotes, or is 
 attended with a Pleafure in the Contempla- 
 tion of it, and in Reflection upon the Af- 
 fections which inclined us to it. Appro- 
 bation of the Action of another is pJealant, 
 and is attended with Love toward the 
 Agent. 
 
 THE Qualities moving to Election ; or 
 exciting to A ft ion* are different from thofe 
 moving to Approbation : We often do 
 Actions which we do not approve, and ap- 
 prove Actions which we omit : We often 
 defire that an Agent had omitted an Action 
 which we approve ; and 'wijh he would 
 do an Action which we condemn. Appro- 
 bation is employed about the Actions of 
 other S, where there is no room for our 
 Election. 
 
 N o w in our Search into the Qualities 
 exciting either our Election or Approba- 
 tion, let us confider the feveral Notionszdi- 
 vanced of moral Good and Evil in both 
 thefe Refpects ; and what Senfes, Inflinfts, 
 or Affections , muft be necetfarily fuppofed 
 to account for our Approbation or Elec- 
 tion. 
 
 THERE are two Opinions on this Sub- The ^- 
 ject entirely oppofite: The one that of^^ 
 the old Epicureans, as it is beautifully ex- 
 plained in the firft Book of Cicero, *De 
 
 fnibus ;
 
 208 Illuflratiom upon the 
 
 fnibus ; which is revived by Mr. Hobbes, 
 and followed by many better Writers : 
 " That all the Defires of the human 
 *' Mind , nay of all thinking Natures, 
 " are reducible to Self Love y or f ]JeJire of 
 " private Happinefs : That from this 
 " Defire all Actions of any Agent do flow." 
 Our Chriflian Moralifts introduce other 
 forts of Happinefs to be deftred, but dill 
 'tis the Trofpect of private Happinefs, 
 which, with fbme of them, is the fole 
 Motive of Election. And that, in like 
 manner, what determines any Agent to 
 approve his own Action, is its Tendency 
 to his private Happinefs in the whole, 
 tho it may bring prefent Tain along 
 with it ; That the Approbation of the 
 Action of another, is from an Opinion 
 of its Tendency to the Happinefs of the 
 Approver ', either immediately or more 
 remotely : That each Agent may difco- 
 ver it to be the fureft way to promote 
 his private Happinefs, to do publickly 
 iifeful Actions, and to abftain from thole 
 which are publickly hurtful : That the 
 neglecting to obferve this, and doing 
 4 publickly hurtful Attions, does mifchief 
 to the whole of Mankind, by hurting 
 any one part ; that every one has fome 
 little damage by this Adtion: Such an 
 inadvertent Terfon might pofiibly be 
 ' pernicious to any one, were he in his 
 Neighbourhood ; and the very Exam- 
 
 " pie
 
 MORAL SENSE. 
 
 pk of fuch A&ions may extend over the 
 whole World, and produce fome perni- 
 cious Effects upon any Obferver. That 
 therefore every one may look upon fuch 
 A&ions as hurtful to himfelf, and in 
 this view does difapprove them, and hates 
 the Agent. In the like manner, zfub- 
 lickly ufeful Action may diffufe fome 
 fmail Advantage to every Obferver , 
 whence he may approve it, and love 
 the Agent." 
 
 THIS Scheme can never account 
 the principal Actions of human Life f : 
 Such as the Offices of Friendjhip, Grati- 
 tude, natural Affection, Generojity, pub- 
 lick Spirit, Compaffton. Men are confci- 
 ous of no fuch Intentions or acute Reflec* 
 tions in thefe Actions. Ingenious fpecula- 
 tive Men, in their draining to fupport an 
 Hypotbefis, may contrive a thoufand fub- 
 tie felfijb Motives, which a kind generous 
 Heart never dreamed of. In like manner, 
 this Scheme can never account for the fud- 
 den Approbation, and violent Sen/eof fbme- 
 thing amiable in Actions done in diftant 
 Ages and Nations, while the Approver has 
 perhaps never thought of thefe diftant Ten- 
 dencies to his Happinefs. Nor will it bet- 
 ter account for our want of Approbation 
 
 * See Treat. 3. Sett, it 
 
 P toward
 
 2 1 o Ilhijlrations upon the 
 
 toward public kly ufeful Actions done cafu* 
 ally.) or only with Intention of private 
 Happinefs to the Agent. And then, in 
 thefe Actions reputed generous, if the A- 
 gent's Motive was only a view to his own 
 ^Pleafeire, how come we to approve them 
 more than his enriching himfelf, or his 
 gratifying his own Tafle with good Food ? 
 The whole Species may receive a like Ad- 
 vantage from both, and the Obferver an 
 equal Share. 
 
 W E R E our Approbation of Adionsdone 
 in diftant Ages and Nations, occafioned 
 by this Thought, that fuch an Action done 
 toward our felves would be ufeful to us, 
 why don't we approve and love in like man- 
 ner any Man who finds a Treafure^ or in- 
 dulges himfelf in any exquifite Senfation, 
 fince thefe Advantages or Pleafures might 
 be conferred on our felves ; and tend more 
 to our Happinefs than any Actions in dif- 
 tant Ages? 
 
 THE Sanctions of Laws may make 
 any Agent chufe the Adtion required, un- 
 der the Conception of ufeful to himfelf, 
 and lead him into an Opinion of private 
 Advantage in it, and of detriment in the 
 contrary Adions ; but what fhould deter- 
 mine any Perfon to approve the Actions 
 of others, becaufe of a Conformity to a 
 
 Law,
 
 MORAL SENSE. lit 
 
 Law, if Approbation in any Perfbn were 
 only an Opinion of private Advantage ? 
 
 THE other Opinion is this, " That 
 " have not only Self- Love > but benevo^ 
 " lent Affections alfo toward others, in 
 " various Degrees, making us defire their 
 " Happinefs as an ultimate End, without 
 " any view to private Happineis : . That 
 " we have amoral Senfe or Determination 
 " of our Mind, to approve every kind Af* 
 " fetfion either in our felves or others, , , 
 " and all publickly ufeful Actions which 
 " we imagined do flow from fuch AfFec- 
 " tion, without our having a view to our 
 private Happinefs^ in our Approbation 
 '* ofthefeAdions." 
 
 THESE two Opinions feem both intel- 
 ligible, each confident with itfelf. The 
 former feems not to reprefent human Na- 
 ture as it is ; the other feems to do it. 
 
 THERE have been many ways o 
 fpeaking introduced, which feem to % 
 nify fomething different from both 
 former Opinions. Such as thefe , that 
 *' Morality of AdHons confifts in G?- 
 " formity to Reafon^ or ^Difformity from 
 44 />:" That " Virtue. \s ading accord- 
 '* ing to the abfolute Fitnefs and "Unfit- 
 " mfs of Things, or agreeably to the 
 P 2 " N&
 
 Illujtrations upon the 
 
 " Natures or Relations of Things," and 
 many others in different Authors. To 
 examine thefe is the Defign of the fol- 
 lowing Sections ; and to explain more 
 fully how the Moral Senfe alledged to 
 be in Mankind, mull be prefappofed even 
 in thefe Schemes. 
 
 SECT.
 
 MORAL SENS E. : 
 
 SECT. I. 
 
 Concerning the Character of Virtue, 
 agreeable to Truth or Reafon. 
 
 SINCE Reafon is underftood to de- 
 note our 'Power of fnding out true 
 'Propofitions, Reafbnablenefs mufl denote 
 the fame thing, with Conformity to true 
 fropojitions, or to Truth. 
 
 REASONABLENESS in an Action is 
 a very common Expreflion, but yet upon 
 inquiry, it will appear very confuted, whe- 
 ther we fuppofe it the Motive to Election, 
 or the Quality determining 
 
 THERE is one fort of Conformity 
 Truth which neither determines to the one 
 
 i i .... i ' w 
 
 or the other ; i;/^s.that Conformity which 
 is between every true ^Propojltion and its 
 Object. This fort of Conformity can never 
 make us chufe or approve one Action more 
 than its contrary, for it is found in i\ 
 Actions alike : Whatever attribute can be 
 afcribed to a generous kind Attion, the 
 contrary Attribute may as truly be afcribed 
 to a felfijh cruel Action : Both Propofi* 
 tions are equally true, and the two con- 
 trary Actions, the Objects of the two 
 P ' Truths
 
 1 1 4 Illujl rat ions upon the 
 
 Sect. \.Truths are equally conformable to their 
 v^v^ feveral Truths, with that fort of Confor- 
 mity which is between a Truth and its Ob- 
 ject. This Conformity then cannot make 
 a Difference among Actions, or recommend 
 one more than another either to Election 
 or Approbation^ fince any Man may make 
 as many Truths about Villany, as about 
 Heroifm, by afcribing to it contrary At- 
 tributes. 
 
 FOR Inftance, thefe are Truths con- 
 cerning the Trefervation of ^Property. 
 >' It tends to the Happinefs of human So- 
 " ciety : It incourages Induftry : It ihali 
 " be rewarded by God." Thefe are alfo 
 Truths concerning Robbery. " It difturbs 
 *' Society: It difcourages Induftry: Itihall 
 " be punifhed by God." The former three 
 Truths have the T refers at ion of 'Property 
 for their Qbjett\ the latter three have 
 Robbery. And each Clafs of Truths hath 
 that fort of Conformity to its Object, which 
 is common to all Truths with their Objects. 
 The moral 'Difference cannot therefore de- 
 pend upon this Conformity^ which is com- 
 /non to both. 
 
 THE Number of Truths in both cafes 
 may be plainly the fame ; fb that a good 
 Action cannot be (uppofed to agree to more 
 Truths than an evil one, nor can an evil 
 Action be difagreeable to any Truth or 
 i Com-
 
 MORAL SENSE. 215 
 
 Comfages of Truths made about it ; for Seel:. i. 
 whatever Propofitions do not agree with ^^T^ 
 their Objeds are not Truths. 
 
 IF Reafonabltnefs % the Charader of 
 Virtue, denote fome other fort of Confor- 
 mity to Truth, it were to be wifhed that 
 thele Gentlemen, who make it the original 
 Idea of moral Good, antecedent to any 
 Senfe or Affections ', would explain it, and 
 mew how it determines us antecedently to 
 a Senfe, either to Election or Approbation. 
 
 THEY tell us, " we mud have fbme 
 Standard antecedently to all Senfe or 
 Ajfeflions, fince we judge even of our 
 Senfes and Affedions themfelves, and 
 approve or difapprove them : This 
 Standard muft be our Reafon^ Conformi- 
 ty to which muft be the original Idea of 
 moral Good." 
 
 BUT what is this Conformity of Afl i 
 to Reafon ? When we ask the Reafon of an 
 Adion wefbmetimes mean, ' What Truth ' 
 " Jhewsa Quality in the Aflion, exciting 
 " the Agent to do it ?" Thus, why does a 
 Luxurious Man purfue Wealth ? The Rea- 
 fon is given by this Truth, * Wealth is 
 " uleful to pur chafe Pleafures." Sometimes 
 for a Reafon of Actions we fliew the 
 Truth exprejpng a Duality y engaging our 
 Approbation. Thus the Reafon of hazard- 
 P 4 ^
 
 2 1 6 llluf rations upon the 
 
 Se<5t. i. ing Life in juft War, is, that " it tends 
 VV^" to preferve our honeft Countrymen, or 
 " evidences publick Spirit : " The Reafen 
 for Temperance, and againft Luxury is 
 given thus, " Luxury evidences a felfifh 
 " bafe Temper." The former fort of 
 Reafbns we will call exciting, and the lat- 
 tvtj unifying. * Now we mall find that all 
 exciting Reafons prefuppofe Inftintfs and 
 Affetlions ; and wGJxjkfjting prefuppofe a 
 Moral Senfe. 
 
 Exciting As to exciting Reafons, in every calm 
 fiW&4f- rationa l A&ion fome end is defired or in- 
 fections. tended ; no end can be intended or defired 
 previoufly to ibme one of thefe Clafles of 
 Afre&ions, Self-Love, Self-Hatred, or de- 
 fire of private Mifery, (if this be poffible) 
 Benevolence toward others, or Malice : 
 All Affections are included under thefe ; 
 no end can be previous to them all ; there 
 can therefore be no exciting Reafon previ- 
 ous to Affection. 
 
 WE have indeed many confufed Ha- 
 rangues on this Subject, telling us, " We 
 ** have two Principles of Action, Reafon, 
 *' and Affection, or TaJJion {i.e. ilrong 
 " AfTecSlion ) : the former in common with 
 
 Thus Gntius diftinguiflies the Reafons of Wat, into 
 ) and SuaforU, 
 
 Angels,
 
 MORAL SENSE. 217 
 
 4t Angels, the latter with Brutes: NoSed. i 
 " A&ion is wife, or good, or reafouable, 
 ' ' to which we are not excited by Reajon, 
 *' as diftincl: from all Affeftions\ or, if 
 " any iuch Actions as flow from Affec- 
 " tions be good, 'tis only by chance ; or 
 *' materially and not formally? As if 
 indeed Reafon, or the Knowledge of the 
 Relations of things, could excite to A&ion 
 when we propofed no End, or as if Ends 
 could be intended without *DeJire or Af* 
 fettion. 
 
 BUT are there not alfb exciting Reafons, 
 even previous to any end, moving us to 
 propofe one end rather than another ? To Ends. 
 this Arijlotle long ago anlwered, " that 
 ' there are ultimate Ends defired without 
 " a view to any thing elle, zn&Jiibordivate 
 " Ends or Objeds defired with a view to 
 " fomething elfe." Tofuhordinate Ends 
 thofe Reafons or Truths excite, which ihew 
 them to be conducive to the ultimate End, 
 and ihew one Objeft to be more effectual 
 than another : thus fubordinate Ends may 
 be called rea finable . But as to the ultimate 
 Ends, toiuippofeexcitingRea/oMs for them, 
 would infer, that there is no ultimate End, 
 but that we defire one thing for another in 
 an infinite Series. 
 
 THUS ask a Being who defires private 
 
 llaffinefs, or has Self-Love? " what 
 
 4 Reafon
 
 1 1 
 Se<a. 
 
 8 
 
 Ilhtjlrations upon the 
 
 Reafon excites him to defire Wealth"? 
 will give this Reafon, that " Wealth 
 '* tends to procure Pleafure and Eafe." 
 Ask his Reafon for defiring Pleafure or 
 Happinefs : One cannot imagine what 
 Propofition he could affign as his exciting 
 Reafon. This Propofition is indeed true, 
 " There is an Injlinft or Ttefire fixed 
 " in his Nature , determining him to 
 " purfue his Happinefs ;" but it is not 
 this Reflection on his own Nature, or this 
 'Propojition which excites or determines 
 him, but the Infiintt itfelf. This is a 
 Truth, " Rhubarb (Irengthens the Sto- 
 " mach :" But 'tis not a 'Proportion which 
 ilrengthens the Stomach, but the Quality 
 in that Medicine. The Effect is not pro- 
 duced by Proportions (hewing the Caufe 9 
 but by the Cauft itfelf. 
 
 IN like manner, what Reafon can a be- 
 nevolent Being give, as exciting him to 
 hazard his Life in juft War? This perhaps, 
 luch Conducl: tends to the Happinels of 
 his Country." Ask him, " why he 
 ferves his Country ? " he will fay, " His 
 Country is a very valuable Part of Man- 
 kind." Why does he ftudy the Happi- 
 nefs of Mankind? If his Affedions be 
 really difinterejled, he can give no exciting 
 Reafonsfor it : The Happinels of Mankind 
 in general, or of any valuable Part cf it, is 
 an ultimate End to that Series of Defires. 
 
 WE
 
 MORAL SENSE. 
 
 W E may tranfiently obferve one Mif- ' 
 take which many fall into, who in their 
 Philofophical Inquiries have learned to form 
 very abftratJ general Ideas : They fuppofe, 
 becaufe they have formed fbme Conception 
 of an infinite Good, or greatejlpojfible Ag- 
 gregate , or Sum of Happinefs , under 
 which all particular Tleafures may be in- 
 cluded ; that there is alfb fome one great 
 ultimate End, with a view to which every 
 particular Object is defired ; whereas, in 
 truth, each particular Tleafure is defired 
 without farther view, as an ultimate End in 
 the felfi/h Ttefires. "Tis true, the Tro- 
 fpetJ of a greater inconfiftent Pleafure may 
 fiirmount or flop this Defire ; fo may the 
 Fear of a prepollent Evil. But this does 
 not prove, that " all Men have formed 
 " Ideas of infinite Good, or greatefl pof- 
 " fib le Aggregate, or that they have any 
 ' Inft'mft or 'Dejire^ without an Idea of 
 " itsObjecl:." Juft fo in the benevolent Af- 
 fections, the Happinefs of any onp Perfon 
 is an ultimate End, defired with no farther 
 view : And yet the obferving its Incon- 
 fiflency with the Happinefs of another more 
 belovdd, or with the Happinefs of many, tho 
 each one of them were but equally beloved, 
 may overcome the former Defire. Yet this 
 will not prove, that in each kind Atfion 
 Men do form the abflract Conception of 
 dll Mankind, or the Syftem of Rationals. 
 
 The
 
 no llhiftrattons upon the 
 
 Seel:, i. The forming fuch large Conceptions is in- 
 IXW deed ufeful, that fo we may gratify either 
 our Self-Love or kind Affections in the 
 fulleft manner, as far as our Power extends ; 
 and may not content our felves with fmaller 
 Degrees either of private ox publick Good, 
 while greater are in our power : But when 
 \ve have formed thefe Conceptions, we do 
 not ferve the Individual only from Love 
 to the Species, no more than we defire 
 Grapes with an Intention of the greateft 
 Aggregate of Happinefs, or from an Ap- 
 prehenfion that they make a Part of the 
 General fum of our Happinefs. Thefe 
 Conceptions only ferve to fuggeft greater 
 Ends than would occur to us without Re- 
 flection ; and by the Trepollency of one 
 Defire toward the greater Good, either 
 private or publick, to (top the Defire to- 
 ward the fmaller Good, when it appears 
 inconfiftent with the greater, 
 
 The com- LET us examine the Truths afligned as 
 nun Rea- exciting to thePurfuit of publick Good, even 
 *r by thoie, who, tho they allow difmterefted 
 Affections, and a moral Senfe, yet fuppofe 
 fomething reafonable in it antecedently. 
 They atfign fuch as thefe " publick Good 
 " is the End propofed by the DEITY." 
 Then what Reafon excites Men to concur 
 with the DEITY? Is it this, "Concurring 
 " with the DEITY will make the Agent 
 " happy 1" This is an exciting Reafon inr 
 
 deed,
 
 MORA L SENSE- 221 
 
 deed , but plainly fuppofes Self- Love : Sedt i 
 And let any one aflign the exciting Reafon 
 to the Defire of Happinefs. Is the Reafbn 
 exciting to concur with the DEITY this, 
 " The DEITY is our Benefactor ?" Then 
 what Reafon excites to concur with Bene- 
 factors ? Here we muft recur to an InftinCt. 
 Is it this Truth, '* The divine Ends arc 
 " reafonable Ends'!" Then what means 
 the Word [ reafonable ? ] Does it mean, 
 that " the Deity has Reafons exciting 
 * ' him to promote the publick Good ?" What 
 are thefe Reafons ? Why, perhaps '* we 
 ** do not know them particularly, but in 
 " general are fure that the DEITY has 
 " Reafons for them." Then the Queftion 
 recurs, What Reafon excites us to implicit 
 Concurrence with the Ends of the D E i T Y ? 
 The Reafons which excite one Nature may 
 not excite another : The Tendency of an 
 Action to the Happinefs of one Agent may 
 excite him, but will not excite another 
 Agent to concur, unlefs there appears a 
 like Tendency to the Happinefs of that 
 other. They may fay, * they are fure 
 " the divine Ends are good." What 
 means Goodnefs ? Is it moral or natural ? 
 If the divine Ends be natural Good^ i. e. 
 pleafant, or the Caufe of Tleafiire, to 
 whom is this *Pleafure ? If to the D E IT Y, 
 then why do we ftudy the Happinefs or 
 the pleating of the DEITY ? What Reafon 
 excites us? All the poflible Reafons muft 
 
 either
 
 122 Illujlrattons upon the 
 
 Se&. i. cither prefuppofe fome Affection, if they 
 are exciting ; or fome moral Senfe, if they 
 are juftifying. Is the divine End natu- 
 rally good to us ? This is an exciting Rea- 
 fon, but fuppofes Self-Love. If we fay 
 the divine Ends are morally Good y we are 
 juft where we began. What is moral Good- 
 vefsl Conformity to Reafon. What are 
 the Reafons exciting or juftifying ? 
 
 I F any alledg as the Reafon exciting us 
 to purfue publick Good, this Truth, that 
 the Happinefs of a Syflem^ a Thoufand* 
 or a Million, is a greater Quantity of 
 Happinefs than that of one Terfm : 
 and confequently, if Men defire Hap- 
 pinefs, they muft have ftronger Defires 
 toward the greater Sum* than toward 
 the lefs" This Reafon ftill fuppofes an 
 Inftinft toward Happmefs as previous to 
 it : And again, To whom is the Happinefs 
 of a Syftem a greater Happinefs ? To one 
 Individual, or to the Syftem ? If to the 
 Individual, then his Reafon exciting his 
 Defire of a haffy Syftem fuppofes Self* 
 Love : If to the Syftem^ then what Rea- 
 fon can excite to defire the greater Hap- 
 pinefs of a Syftem, or any Happinefs to 
 be in the PofTeflion of others'* None 
 forely which does not prefuppofe'jpg&gvi 
 Affections. Without fuch Affections this 
 Truth, " that an hundred Felicities is a 
 " greater Sum than one Felicity, " will no 
 7?: more
 
 MORAL SENSE* 22* 
 
 more excite to ftudy the Happinefs of theSeft. i 
 Hundred, than this Truth, " an hundred l/YVJ 
 " Stones are greater than one," will ex- 
 cite a Man, who has no dejire of Heaps, 
 to caft them together. 
 
 THE fame may be 'obferved concerning 
 that Tropofition, afligned by fome as the 
 ultimate Reajbn both exciting to, and 
 jnftifying the Purfuit of publick Good, 
 'viz,. " It is beft that all Jhouldbe happy? 
 Bejl is moft good : Good to whom? To 
 the Whole, or to each Individual ? If to 
 the former, when this Truth excites to 
 Action, it mud prefuppofe kind Ajfeftions ; 
 if it is good to each Individual, it mud 
 fuppofe Self-Love. 
 
 L E T us once fuppofe Affettions, Inftinffs Ue t 
 or 'Dejires previoufly implanted in our 
 ture: and we fhall eafily underftand 
 exciting Reafons for Actions, viz,. 
 " Truths which fhew them to be 
 
 i f~ * r-i i 
 
 * cive toward lome ultimate End, or to- 
 ** ward the greatefl End of that kind in 
 " our Power." He ads reasonably, who 
 confiders the various Actions in his Power, 
 and forms true Opinions of their Tenden- 
 cies; and then chnfes to do that which will 
 obtain the higheft Degree of that, to which 
 the Inftinlts of his Nature incline him, 
 with the fmalleft Degree of thole things to 
 
 which
 
 124 Illttftr attorn upon the 
 
 Sect. i. which the Affections in his Nature make 
 averfe. 
 
 MORE particularly, the exciting Rea- 
 fons to a Nature which had only felfjh 
 Affections, are thofe Truths which mewed 
 " what Object or Event would occafion 
 " to it the greateft Quantity ofP/ea/ure .-** 
 thefe would excite to the Profecution of 
 it. The exciting Truths about Means, 
 would be only thofe which pointed out 
 fbrne Means as more certainly effectual 
 than any other, or with lefs Tain or 
 Trouble to the Agent. Tublick Vfefat- 
 nefs of Ends or Means, or pub lick Hurt- 
 fulnefs would neither excite nor diffuade, 
 farther than rhs public k State might affect 
 that of the Agent. 
 
 IF there is any Nature with publick 
 Affections : The Truths exciting to any 
 End in this Order, are luch as mew, ct that 
 " any Event would promote the Happi- 
 " nefs of others." That End is called mod 
 reafonable* which our Reafon difcovers to 
 contain a greater Quantity of 'public 'k Good, 
 than any other in our power. 
 
 WHEN any Event may affect both the 
 Agent and others, if the Agent have both 
 Self-Love and public k Affeftions, he acts 
 according to thatAfTection which \sftrongeft) 
 when there is any Opfofottn of Interefts ; 
 
 if
 
 MORAL SENSE. 
 
 if there be no Oppofition, he follows both. Sect 
 If he difcovers this Truth, that " his con- 
 " ftant purfuit of public k Good is the mod 
 " probable way of promoting his own 
 " Happinefs? then his Purfuit is truly 
 reafonable and conftant; thus both Af- 
 fections are at once gratify'd, and he is 
 confident with himfelf. Without know- 
 ledge of that Truth he does not act reafb- 
 nably for his own Happinefs, but follows it 
 by Means not tending effectually to this 
 End : and muft frequently, from the Pow- 
 er of Self-Love, neglect or counteract his 
 other End, \hzpublick Good. If there be 
 alfb a moral Senfe in fuch an Agent, while 
 yet he is inadvertent to the Connexion of 
 private Happinefs with the Study of the 
 publick ; he muft be perpetually yet more 
 uneafy, either thro' the apprehended Neg- 
 lett of private Intereft when he ferves the 
 Publick ; or when he purfues only private 
 Interefl, he will have perpetual Remorfe 
 and 'Diffatisfaflion with his own Temper, 
 thro' his moral Senfe. So that the Know* 
 ledge of this Connexion of private Intereft, 
 with the Study of publick Good, feems ab- 
 folutely nece(Tary to preferve a conftant 
 Satisfaction of Mind, and to prevent an 
 alternate prevalence of feemingly contrary 
 Defires. 
 
 SHOULD any one ask even concerning 
 
 thefe two ultimate Ends, private Good 
 
 <3 aud
 
 z^6 Ilhijtratwns upon the 
 
 Sett. \.*&& public k, is not the latter more reafo- 
 
 nable than the former? What means 
 
 the Word reafonable in this Queftion ? If 
 we are allowed to prefuppofe InftinEts and 
 Affections, then the Truth juft now fup- 
 pofed to be difcoverable concerning our 
 State, is an exciting Reafon to ferve the 
 publick Intereft, fmce this Conduct is the 
 moft effectual, Means to obtain both ends. 
 But I doubt if any Truth can be afligned 
 which excites in us either the Defire of 
 private Happinefs or publick. For the 
 former none ever alledged any exciting 
 Reafon : and a benevolent Temper finds as 
 little Reafon exciting him to the latter ; 
 which he defires without any view to pri- 
 vate Good. If the meaning of the Queftion 
 be this, " does not every Spectator op- 
 " prove the Purfuit of publick Good more 
 " than private?" The Anfwer is obvious 
 that he does: but not for any Reafon 
 or Truth, but from a moral Senfe. 
 
 THIS leads to confider Approbation of 
 Actions, whether it be for Conformity to 
 any Truth, or Reafonablenefs, that Actions 
 are ultimately approved, independently of 
 any moral Senfe ? Or ifzlljujltfymg Rea- 
 Jons do not prefuppofe it ? 
 
 IF Conformity to Truth, or Reafonable \ 
 denote no thing elfe but that " an Action 
 " is the Obj*& f <* true Trofojition," 'tis 
 2 plain,
 
 MORAL SENSE. 227 
 
 plain, that all Actions fhould be approved Sed:. i. 
 equally, fmce as many Truths may be^-'V^' 
 made about the word, as can be made a- 
 bout the belt See what was faid above 
 about exciting Reafbns. 
 
 BUT let the Truths commonly ajfligned 
 zsjujiifying be examined. Here 'tis plain, 
 " ATruth Jbewing an Attion to be fit to 
 " attain an End" does not juftify it ; nor 
 do we approve a fubordinate End for any 
 Truth, which only fhews it to be fit to 
 promote the ultimate End ; for the worft 
 Actions may be conducive to their Ends^ 
 and reafonable in that Senfe. Thejuftzffr- 
 ing Reafons then muft be about the Ends 
 themfelves, efpecially the ultimate Ends. 
 The Queftion then is, " Does a Confor- 
 " mity to any Truth make us approve an 
 " ultimate End^ previoufly to any moral 
 Senfe T For example, we approve/ar- 
 fuing the public k Good. For what Reafon ? 
 or what is the Truth for Conformity to 
 which we call it a reafonable End ? I fanfy 
 we can find none in thefe Cafes, more than 
 we could give for our liking any pleafant 
 Fruit. 
 
 THE Reafons afllgned are fuch as thefe ; 
 " 'Tis the Endpropofed by the DEITY." 
 But why do we approve concurring with 
 the divine Ends? This Reaibn is given,- 
 " He is our Benefactor ; n But then, for 
 2 what
 
 21 8 Ilfajlrattons upon the 
 
 Se6t i. what Reafon do we approve Concurrence 
 with a Benefactor ? Here we mufl recur 
 to a Senfe. Is this the Reafon moving to 
 Approbation, *' Study of public k Good tends 
 " to the Advantage of the Approver ?" 
 Then the Quality moving us to approve 
 an A6Hon, is its being advantageous^o us, 
 and not Conformity to a Truth. This 
 Scheme is intelligible, but not true in fa&. 
 Men approve without Perception of pri- 
 vate Advantage ; and often do not con* 
 demn or difapprove what is plainly perni- 
 cious ; as in the Execution of a jujt Sen- 
 tence, which even the Criminal may ap- 
 prove* 
 
 1 F any allege, that this is \hzjuftifying 
 Reafon of the Turjuit of public k Good, 
 ' that it is befi all be happy? then we 
 approve Actions for their Tendency to that 
 State which is beft, and not for Conformity 
 to Reafon. But here again, what means 
 beft ? morally beft, or naturally bejl ? If 
 the former, they explain the lame Word 
 by itfelf in a Circle : If they mean the 
 latter, that " it is the mod happy State 
 ' where all are happy j v then, mo ft happy, 
 for whom ? the Syjtem, or the Individual ? 
 If for the former, what Reafon makes us 
 approve the Happinefs of a Syftem ? Here 
 we muft recur to a Senfe or kind Affec- 
 tions. Is it mod happy for the Individual ? 
 Then the Quality moving Approbation is 
 4 again
 
 MORAL SEN-S E. 
 
 again Tendency to private Happinefs^ notSedt i 
 Reafonablenefs. 
 
 THE R E are fbme other Reafons a 
 in Words differing from the former, 
 more confufed, fuch as thefe c " 'Tis 
 *' 'Duty to fludy pub lick Good. We are* 
 " obliged to do it. We owe Obedience to 
 'Deify. The whole is to be prefer- 
 /<? a Tart:' But let thefe Words 
 , Obligation, Owing, and the mean- 
 ing of that Gerund, is to be preferred, be 
 explained ; and we ihall find our felves 
 ftill at a Lofs for exciting Reafons previ-r 
 oufly to Affeflions, wjuftifying Reafons 
 Without recourfe to a moral Senfe. 
 
 WHEN we fay one is obliged to 
 A#ion, we either mean, i. That the 
 Action is neeejfary to obtain Happinefs to 
 the Agent, or to avoid Mifery : Or, 2. That 
 every Spectator, or he himfelf upon Re- 
 fleffioji, mitfl approve his Action, and clif* 
 approve his omitting it y if he conjlders 
 fully all its Circumflances. The former 
 Meaning of the Word Obligation prefup- 
 pofesy///fr Affections, and the Senfes of 
 private Happinefs : The latter Meaning 
 includes the moral Senfe. Mr. Barbey- 
 rac , in his Annotations upon Qrotius \ 
 
 r Jjk. i, Ckaf. I. $efl. 10.
 
 z 3 Q Illujlrattons upon the 
 
 Seel:, i . makes Obligation denote an indifpenfable 
 **/~V~*^ Necejfity to aft in a certain manner. 
 Whoever obferves his Explication of this 
 Necejfity, ( which is not natural, other- 
 wife no Man could acl: againft his Obliga- 
 tion ) will find that it denotes only " fuch 
 " a Conftitution of a powerful Superior, 
 *' as will make it impoflible for any Being 
 " to obtain Hafpmefs* or avoid Mifery, 
 " but by fuch a Courfe of Adion." This 
 agrees with the former Meaning , tho 
 fometimes he alfo includes the latter. 
 
 MANY other confufed Definitions have 
 been given of Obligation, by no obfcure 
 Names in the learned World. But let any 
 one give a diftinct Meaning, different from 
 the two above-mentioned. To purfue them 
 all would be endlefs ; only let the 'Defini- 
 tions be fubftituted in place of the Word 
 OBLIGATION, in other parts of each 
 Writer, and let it be obferved whether it 
 makes good Senfe or not. 
 
 BEFORE we quit this Character Rea- 
 fome fonablenefs, let us confider the Arguments 
 rals brought to prove that there muft be fome 
 to a Standard of moral Good antecedent to 
 
 en ^ e - Sa y. the ^' " ^ r ^^* j f 
 
 Senfe are deceitful, we muft have fome 
 Perception or Idea of Virtue more ftable 
 and certain ; this muft be Conformity to 
 R?a(bn : Truth dif covered by our Rea- 
 
 "fan
 
 MORAL SENSE. 151 
 
 " fon is certain and invariable: TlteSecT:. i 
 " then alone is the Original Idea of Virtue, 
 " Agreement with Reafon? But in like 
 manner our Sight and Senfe of Beauty is 
 deceitful, and does not always reprefent 
 the true Forms of Objects. We muft not 
 call that beautiful or regular, which pleafes 
 the Sight, or an internal Senfe ; but Beauty 
 in external Forms too, confifts in Confor- 
 mity to Reafon. So our Tafte may be vi- 
 tiated : we muft not fay that Savour is per- 
 ceived by Tafte, but muft place the original 
 Idea of grateful Savours in Conformity to 
 Reafon^ and of ungrateful in Contrariety 
 to Reafon. We may miftake the real Ex- 
 tent of Bodies, or their 'Proportions) by 
 making a Conclufion upon the firft fenfible 
 Appearance: Therefore Ideas of Extension 
 are not originally acquired by a Senfe, but 
 confift in Conformity to Reafon. 
 
 I F what is intended in this Conformity 
 to Reafon be this, " That we mould call 
 " 110 Action virtuous, unlels we have 
 ' fome Reafon to conclude it to be virtu- 
 ' ous, or fome Truth (hewing it to befo." 
 This is very true ; but then in like manner 
 we mould count no Action vicious^ unlefs 
 we have fome Reafon for counting it fo, or 
 when 'tis Truth " that it is vicious." If 
 this be intended by Conformity to Truth 9 
 then at the fame rate we may make Con- 
 formity to Truth the original Idea of Vice 
 0.4
 
 i 3 2 Illuftratwns upon the 
 
 Seft. i. as well as ^/r/^; nay, of every Attribute 
 i^YX; whatfoever. That !T*/?tf alone is fweet, 
 which there is Reafon to count fiveet ; 
 that Tafte alone is bitter, concerning which 
 'tis true that it is bitter ; that Form alone 
 is beautiful, concerning which 'tis true that 
 it is beautiful ; and that alone deformed* 
 which is truly deformed. Thus Virtue, 
 Vice, Sweet, Bitter, Beautiful, or 'De- 
 formed, originally denote Conformity to 
 Reafon, antecedently to Perceptions of 
 any Senfe. The Idea of Virtue is particu- 
 larly that concerning which 'tis Truth, 
 that it is Virtue ; or Virtue is Virtue ; 
 a wonderful Difcovery ! 
 
 S p when fome tell us, " that Truth is 
 " naturally pleafant, and more fo than. 
 '1 any fenjible ^Perceptions this rnuft 
 " therefore engage Men more than any 
 " other Motive, if they attend to it-" 
 Let them obferve, that as much Truth is 
 known about Vice as Virtue. We may 
 demonflrate the publick Miferies which 
 would enfue upon ^Perjury, Murder, and 
 Robbery. Thefe Demonftrations would be 
 attended with that Tleafure which is peculi- 
 ar to Truth ; as well as the Demonftrations 
 of the publick Happinefs to enfue fronj 
 Faith, Hunianity and Jujtice. There i 
 equal Truth on both fides, 
 
 WE
 
 MORAL SENSE. 2JJ 
 
 Setf. j 
 
 W E may tranfiently obferve what has 
 occafioned the Ufe of the Word reafona 
 as an Epithet of only virtuous Attio 
 Tho we have Inftintts determining; us to rea f onaU * 
 
 ,-_-,, . J . r r & an <l no* 
 
 genre Enas t without luppofing any pre- vice. 
 yious Reafoning ; yet 'tis by ufe of our 
 Reafon that we find out the Means of ob- 
 taining our Ends. When we do not ufe 
 our Reafon, we often are difappointed of 
 our End. We therefore call thofe A&ions 
 which are effectual to their Ends, reafona- 
 ble in one Senfe of that Word. 
 
 AGAIN, in all Men there is probably a 
 moral Senfe, making publickly ufeful Ac- 
 lions and kind Affe&ions grateful to the 
 Agent, and to every Obferver : Moft Men 
 who have thought of human Adions, a- 
 gree, that the publickly ufeful are in the 
 whole alto privately ufeful to the Agent, 
 either in this Life or the next : We con- 
 clude, that all Men have the fame <dffec~ 
 tions and Senfes : We are convinced by 
 our Reafon, that 'tis by publickly uleful 
 Actions alone that we can promote all our 
 Ends. Whoever then ads in a con- 
 trary manner, we prefume is miftaken, ig- 
 norant of, or inadvertent to, thefe Truths 
 which he might know ; and fay he acts 
 unreafonably. Hence fome have been led 
 SO imagine, fome Reafons either exciting or
 
 2 j 4 Illiiftrations upon the 
 
 Seel:, i.juftifying previoufly to all Affections or a 
 v-^VNj moral Senfe. 
 
 Two Arguments are brought in de- 
 r ^ is E P ir ^ et ' as ante cedent to any 
 viz. " That we judge even of 
 our Affections and Senfes themfelves, 
 whether they are 
 
 THE fecond Argument is, that 4< if 
 *' all moral Ideas depend upon the Confti- 
 " tut ion of our Senfe, then all Conftitu- 
 " tions would have been alike reafonable 
 " and good to the DEITY, which is ab- 
 furd." 
 
 [.That we A s to the firft Argument, 'tis plain we 
 judge our judge of our own Affections, or thofe of 
 ;< others by our moral Senfe, by which we 
 approve kind Affections, and difapprove 
 the contrary. Bnt none can apply moral 
 Attributes to the very Faculty of per- 
 ceiving moral Dualities ; or call his moral 
 Senfe morally Good or Evil, any more 
 than he calls the Tower ofTafting, fweet, 
 or bitter ; or of Seeing, flrait or crooked^ 
 white or black. 
 
 EVERY one judges the Affections of 
 others by his own Senfe ; fo that it feeras 
 not impoffible that in thefe Senfes Men 
 might differ as they do in Tafte. A Senfe 
 approving Benevolence would difapprove 
 
 that
 
 MORAL SENSE. 235 
 
 that Temper -, which a <SV/2/ approving &. \. 
 Malice would delight in. The former 
 would judge of the Latter by his own Senfe* 
 fo would the latter of the former. Each 
 one would at firfl view think the Senfe of 
 the other perverted. But then, is there no 
 difference ? Are both Senfes equally good ? 
 No certainly, any Man who obferved 
 them would think the Senfe of the former 
 more defirable than of the latter ; but 
 this is, becaufe the moral Senfe of every 
 Man is conftituted in the former manner. 
 But were there any Nature with no moral 
 Senfe at all obferving thefe two Perfbns, 
 would he not think the State of the former 
 preferable to that of the latter ? Yes, he 
 might: but not from any Perception of 
 moral Goodnefs in the one Senfe more than 
 in the other. Any rational Nature obferving 
 two Men thus conftituted, with oppojlte 
 Senfes, might by reafoning fee, not moral 
 Goodnefs in one Senfe more than in the 
 contrary, but a Tendency to the Happtnefs 
 of the TPerfbn htmfelf, who had the former 
 Senfe in the one Conftitution, and a con- 
 trary Tendency in the oppofite Conftitution: 
 nay, the Perfbns themfelves might obferve 
 this ; fince the former Senfe would make 
 thefe Actions grateful to the Agent which 
 were ufeful to others ; who, if they had 
 a like Senfe, would love him, and return 
 good Offices \ whereas the latter Senfe 
 make all fuch Aftions as are ufeful 
 
 t*
 
 i j 6 Jllujtrations upon the 
 
 Sect i. to others, and apt to engage their good Of- 
 v^Y^ fees, ungrateful to the Agent ; and would 
 lead him into publickly hurtful Aft tons* 
 which would not only procure the Hatred 
 of others, if they had a contrary Senfe, 
 but engage them out of their Self-Love to 
 fludy his 'Deftruftion, tho their Senfes 
 agreed. Thus any Obferver, or the Agent 
 himfelf with this latter Senfe y might per- 
 ceive that the Tains to be feared, as the 
 Confequence of malicious Actions, did 
 over-ballance the Tleaftires of this Senfe \ 
 fb that it would be to the Agent's Intereft 
 to counteract it. Thus one Conftitution 
 of the moral Senfe might appear to be 
 more advantageous to thofe who had it, 
 than the contrary ; as we may call that 
 Senfe of Tailing healthful, which made 
 wholefom Meat pleafant ; and we would 
 cafl a contrary Tafte pernicious. And yet 
 we fhould no more call the moral Senfe 
 morally good or evil, than we call the 
 Senfe of Tafting favoury or unjavoury^ 
 fweet or bitter. 
 
 BUT muft we not own, that we judge of 
 all our Senfes by our Reafon^ and often 
 corred their Reports of the Magnitude, 
 Figure, Colour, Tafte of Objects, and 
 pronounce them right or wrong, as they 
 agree or difagree with Reafon ? This is 
 true. But does it then follow, that Ex- 
 tenjlon^ Figure, Colour, Tafte, are not; 
 
 fen*
 
 MORAL SENSE* 237 
 
 fenfible Ideas, but only denote Reafona- Seel. 
 blenefs, or Agreement with Reafon ? Or 
 that thefe Qualities are perceivable antece- 
 dently to any Senfe, by our Tower of 
 Jindiwg out Truth ? Juft io a compajfionate 
 Temfer may rafhly imagine the Correction 
 of a Child, or the Execution of a Crimi- 
 nal, to be cruel and inhuman: but by 
 reafoning may difcover the fuperior Good 
 arifing from them in the whole ; and then 
 the fame moral Senfe may determine the 
 Obferver to approve them. But we muft 
 not hence conclude^ that it is any reafoning 
 antecedent to a moral Senfe^ which deter- 
 mines us to approve the Study of publick 
 Good, any more than we can in the former 
 Cafe conclude, that we perceive Extewfion^ 
 Figure, Colour, Tafle, antecedently to a 
 Senfe. All thefe Senfations are often cor- 
 rected by Reafoning, as well as our Ap- 
 probations of Adions as Gocdoi Evil* : 
 and yet no body ever placed the Original 
 Idea of Extenfion, Figure^ Colour, or 
 Tafte, in Conformity to Reafon. 
 
 THUS tho no Man can immediately 
 either af prove or difapprove as morally 
 good or evil his own moral Senfe , by 
 which he approves only Affetttons and 
 Actions confequent upon them ; yet he 
 
 Z See S*fl. 4. of this Treatife. 
 
 may
 
 2 3 8 Ilhjtrations upon the 
 
 Sect, i. may fee whether it be advantageous to 
 him in other refpects, to have it conftiruted 
 one way rather than another. One Gonfti- 
 tution may make thefe Actions grateful to 
 this Senfe which tend to procure other 
 *Pleafures alfb. A contrary Conflitution 
 may be known to the very Perfon himfelf 
 to be difadvantageotts* as making thefe 
 Actions immediately grateful, which mail 
 occafion all other forts of Mifery. His 
 Self-Love may excite him, tho with in- 
 ward "Diffatis faction, to counteract this 
 Senfe, in order to avoid a greater Evil. 
 Mr. Hobbes feems to have had no better 
 Notions of the natttral State of Mankind. 
 An Obferver, who was benevolent, would 
 defire that all had the former fort of Senfe ; 
 a malicious Obferver, if he feared no Evil 
 to himfelf^ from the Actions of the Per- 
 fbns obferved, would defire the latter Con- 
 Jtitution. If this Obferver had a moral 
 Senfe, he would think that Constitution 
 which was contrary to his own^ftrange and 
 furprizingi or unnatural. If the Ob- 
 ferver had no Affections toward others, 
 and were disjoined from Mankind, fo as 
 to have neither Hopes nor Fears from 
 their Actions, he would be indifferent a- 
 bout their Conflitutions, and have no T>e- 
 Jire or 'Preference of one above another ; 
 tho he might fee which were advantage- 
 ous to them, and which pernicious. 
 
 As
 
 MORAL SENSE. 259 
 
 Se#. i. 
 
 As to the fecond Argument, What ^v^ 
 means alike reafonable or good to the- e ^ 
 DEITY?] Does it mean, " that the that all 
 " DEITY could have had no Reafons Con f tltu -. 
 
 . . ^ n . . fions would 
 
 " exciting him to make one Comhtution &,$ 
 " rather than another ?" 'Tis piain, if t\iG a " ke rea f- 
 DEITY had nothing effential to his Na- n f ^ e red " n ' 
 ture, correfponding to our fweeteft and 
 mofl kind A ffe ft ions, we can icarce fuppofe 
 he could have any Reafon exciting him to 
 any thing he has done : but grant fuch a 
 ^Difpcfiiion in the DEITY, and then the 
 manifeft Tendency of the prefent Conflitu- 
 tion to the Happinefs of his Creatures was 
 an exciting Reafon for chufmg it before 
 the contrary. Each fort of Conftitution 
 might have given Men an equal immediate 
 fleafure in prefent Self -Approbation for 
 any fort of Action ; but the Actions ap- 
 proved by \hzprefent Setife, procure all 
 Thajures of the other Senfes ; and the 
 Actions which would have been approved 
 by a contrary moral Senfe^ would have 
 been productive of all Torments of the 
 other Senfes. 
 
 IF it be meant, that " upon this Sup - 
 " pojition* that all our Approbation pre- 
 ' * fuppofe s in us a moral Senfe, the DEITY 
 " could not have approved one Conftitution 
 " more than another ? where is the Con- 
 fequence? Why may not the Deity have 
 
 fomething
 
 24 Il/ujtrntiohs upon 
 
 Seel:, i.fomething of a fuperior Kind, analogous 
 IXW to our moral Senfe, elfential to him ? How 
 does any Conftitution of the Senfes of 
 Men hinder the DEITY to reflecl: and 
 judge of his own Actions ? How does it 
 afFe<2 the divine Apprehenfion, which way 
 foever moral Ideas arife with Men ? 
 
 IF it means" that we cannot approve 
 " of one Conftitution more than another, 
 *' or approve the DEITY for making the 
 " prefent Conftitution :" This Confe- 
 quence is alfo falfe. The prefent Conftitution 
 of our moral Senfe determines us to ap- 
 prove all kind Affections : This Conftitu- 
 tion the DEITY muft have forefeen as 
 tending to the Happinefs of his Creatures ; 
 it does therefore evidence kind Affeflion or 
 Benevolence in the DEITY, tins therefore 
 we muft approve. 
 
 The mean- WE have got fdme ftrange Phrafes, 
 ing of an- that fome things are antecedently reafo- 
 ReSbni- " nable ** the Nature of the thing? 
 Wenefs. which fbme infift upon : " That otherwife, 
 " fay they, if before Man was created, 
 " any Nature without a moral Senfe had 
 " exifted, this Nature would not have ap- 
 4< proved as morally good in the Deity, 
 " his conftituting our Senfe as it is at pre- 
 " fent." Very true; and what next? If 
 there had been no moral Senfe in that Na- 
 ture, there would have been no ^Perception
 
 MOR A L SENSE. 241 
 
 of Morality. But " could not fuch Na-Se#. i. 
 tures have feen fomething reafonable in i/VVJ 
 " one Conftitution more than in another ?" 
 They might no doubt have reafoned about 
 the various Confiitutions, and forefeen that 
 \hz prefent one would tend to the Happi- 
 nefs of Mankind, and would evidence Be- 
 nevolence in the DEITY: So alfb they 
 might have reafoned about the contrary 
 Constitution, that it would make Men mi- 
 ferable, and evidence Malice in the Deity. 
 They would have reafoned about both, and 
 found out Truths : are both Confutations 
 alike reafonable to thefe Obfervers ? No, 
 lay they, " the benevolent one is reafona- 
 " hie, and the malicious unreafonable :" 
 And yet thefe Obfervers reafoned and dif- 
 covered Truths about both : An Adion 
 then is cairfed by us reafonable when 'tis 
 ben'evolent y and unreafonable when mali- 
 cious. This is plainly making the Word 
 reafonable denote whatever is approved by 
 our moral Senfe, without Relation to true 
 Proportions. We often ufe that Word in 
 fuch a confufed Manner : But thefe ante- 
 cedent Natures^ fuppofed without a moral 
 Senfe, would not have approved one Con- 
 ftitution of the DEITY as morally better 
 than another. 
 
 H A D it been left to the Choice of thefe 
 
 antecedent Minds , what manner of Senfe 
 
 R they
 
 241 Ilhijl rations upon the 
 
 Sedt i. they would have defired for Mankind ; 
 
 l/V^J would they have feen no difference ? Yes 
 they would, according to their Affections 
 which are preluppoied in all Election. If 
 they were benevolent* as we fiippofe the 
 DEITY, the Tendency of the prefent Senfe 
 to the Happinefs of Men would have ex- 
 cited their Choice. Had they been mali- 
 cious \ as we fuppofe the Devil, the contra- 
 ry Tendency of the contrary Senfe would 
 have excited their Election of it. But is 
 there nothing preferable, or eligible ante- 
 cedently to all Affections too ? No cer- 
 tainly, uulefs there can be ^Dejire without 
 Affections, or fuperior 'Defire, i. e. Elec- 
 tion antecedently to all Ttefire. 
 
 SOME do farther perplex this Subject, 
 by averting, that " the fame Reafons de- 
 from ihofe " termining Approbation, ought alfb to 
 " excite to Election? Here, i. We often 
 fee jujiifying Reafons where we can have 
 no Eleftion ; -viz. when we obferve the 
 Actions of others, which were even prior 
 to our Exiftence. 2. The Quality moving 
 us to Election very often cannot excite Ap- 
 probation ; viz. private ufefulnefs , not 
 publickly pernicious. This both does and 
 ought to move Election, and yet I believe 
 few will fay, " they approve as virtuous 
 " the eating a Bunch of Grapes, taking a 
 ** Glafs of Wine, or fitting down when 
 
 n .. A 
 
 ;< one
 
 MORAL S E N $ fc. 243 
 
 " one is tired." Approbation is not whatSeft. i 
 we can voluntarily bring upon our felves. 
 When we are contemplating Actions, we 
 do not chuje to approve, becaufe Appro- 
 bation is pleafant ; othervvife we would al- 
 ways approve, and never condemn any 
 Action ; becaufe this is fome way un- 
 eafy. Approbation is plainly a 'Percep- 
 tion afifing without previous Volition* 
 or Choice of it, becaufe of any concomi- 
 tant Tleafare. The Occafion of it is the 
 'Perception of benevolent Affettions in our 
 felves, or the difcovering the like in others, 
 even when we are incapable of any Aftion 
 or Election. The Reafons determining 
 Approbation are fuch as fhew that an Ac- 
 tion evidenced kind Affections, and that 
 mothers, as often as m our felves. Where- 
 as, the Reafons moving to Election are 
 fuch as (hew the Tendency of an Ac* 
 tion to gratify fome AfecJion in the A- 
 
 THE Trofpetf of the Pleafure of 
 Self-Approbation, is indeed often a Mo- 
 tive to chufe one Aclion rather than a- 
 nother ; but this fuppofes the moral 
 Senfe, or Determination to approve, prior 
 to the Election. Were Approbation vo- 
 luntarily chofen, from the Profpecl: of 
 its concomitant Pleafure, then there could 
 R 2 be
 
 244 Illttjlrations upon the 
 
 Sedfc. i. be no Condemnation of oar own A&ions, 
 that is unpleafant. 
 
 A s to that confufed Word [ ought ] 
 'tis needlefs to apply to it again all 
 that was faid about Obligation. 
 
 SECT. 

 
 MORAL SENSE. 145 
 
 SECT. II. 
 
 Concerning that Char after of Virtue 
 and Vice , The Fitnefs or Unfit- 
 nefs of Actions. 
 
 WE come next to examine Ibme other r^Fimcft 
 Explications of Morality, which and unfit. 
 have been much infifted on of late. * We 
 are told, " that there are eternal andimmu- 
 ' table ^Differences of Things, abfblutely 
 " and antecedently : that there are alfo 
 " eternal and unalterable Relations in 
 " the Natures of the Things themfelves, 
 " from which arife Agreements and^D//^ 
 " agreements, Qongruities and Incongrui- 
 <' ties, Fitnefs and ^nfitnefs of the^- 
 ** plication ofdrcumftances, to the Qua- 
 ' * lif cations of Terfons ; that Actions 
 " agreeable to t he fe Relations are morally 
 " Good) and that the contrary Actions are 
 ** morally Evil? Thefe Expreffions are 
 fbmetimes made of the fame Import with 
 thofe more common ones : " atting agree- 
 ** ably to the eternal Reafon and Truth 
 
 * See Dr. Samuel Clarke's Boyle's Leftures j and many 
 late Authors. 
 
 R of
 
 Ilhijlrattons upon the 
 
 c of Things" 'Tis aflerted, that" God 
 ' who knows all thefe Relations, &e. 
 " does guide his Actions by them, fince 
 " he has no wrong AfTedion " ( the Word 
 [ wrong ] fhould have been firft explained) : 
 " And that in like manner thefe Relations, 
 " &c. ought'" ( another unlucky Word in 
 Morals) " to determine \h&Choice of all 
 " Rationals, abftra&ly from any Views 
 " of Inter eft. If they do not , thefe 
 " Creatures are infblently counteracting 
 " their Creator ', and as far as they can, 
 '* making things to be what they are not, 
 - which is the greareft Impiety." 
 
 THAT Things are now different is cer- 
 tain. That Ideas, to which there is no 
 Objett yet exifling conformable, are allb 
 different, is certain. That upon comparing 
 two Ideas there arifes a relative Idea, ge- 
 nerally when the two Ideas compared have 
 in them any Modes of the fame fimple 
 Idea, is alfo obvious. Thus every extend- 
 ed Being may be compared to any other of 
 the fame Kinds of ^Dimenfions ; and rela- 
 tive Ideas be formed of greater, lefs, 
 equal, double, triple, fub duple, &c. with 
 infinite variety. This may let us fee that 
 .Relations are not real Qualities inherent 
 in external Natures, but only Ideas necef- 
 farily accompanying our ^Perception of two 
 Objects at once, and comparing them. 
 JleJafive Ideas do continue, when the ex- 
 ternal
 
 MORAL SENSE. 247 
 
 ternal Objects do not exift, provided we Sed. 2 
 retain the two Ideas. But what the eter- v ^v^^ 
 nal Relations in the Natures of Things do 
 mean, is not To eafy perhaps to be con- 
 ceived. 
 
 To /hew particularly how far Morality ^^^ 
 can be concerned in Relations, we may a 
 confider them under thefe Three Clades. < 
 i. The Relations of inanimate Objetts, as 
 to their Quantity, or attive and fajjwt 
 'Powers, as explained by Mr. Locke. 2. The 
 Relations of inanimate Qbjefls to rational 
 Agents, as to their aflive or pajjive Tow- 
 ers. 3. The Relations of rational Agents 
 among themfehes, founded on their Tow- 
 ers or Actions part or continued. Now let 
 us examine what Fitnejfes or 'TJnftneffes 
 arife from any of thefe forts of Relations , 
 in which the Morality of Actions may 
 confift ; and whether we can place Mora- 
 lity in them, without prefuppofing a moral 
 Senje, 'Tis plain, that ingenious Author 
 fays nothing againft the Suppofition of a 
 moral Senje : But many do imagine, that 
 his Account of moral Ideas is indepen- 
 dent upon a moral Senfe^ and therefore are 
 lefs willing to allow that we have fuch an 
 immediate Perception, or Senfe of Virtue 
 and Vice. What follows is not intended 
 to oppofe his Scheme, but rather to fug- 
 ged what feems a neceflary Explication of 
 it ; by mewing that it is no othervviie in- 
 & tel*
 
 248 Illujt rations upon the 
 
 Sect. 2-telligible, but upon Suppofition of 'a moral 
 Senfe. 
 
 None of i. RELATIONS 0/ inanimate Objects 
 
 them ex- being known, puts ic in the Power of a 
 
 ra^ y M " rational Agent often to diver fify them, to 
 
 without a change their Forms, Motions^ or Dualities 
 
 Senfe. o f an y ki nc ^ at n i s pleafure : but no 
 
 body apprehends any Virtue or Vice in 
 
 fuch Actions, where no Relation is ap- 
 
 prehended to a rational Agenfs Happinefs 
 
 or Mifery ; otherwife we mould have got 
 
 ipto the Clafs of Virtues all the practical 
 
 Mathematicks^ and the Operations of Chy- 
 
 miflry. 
 
 2. As to the Relations of inanimate 
 Objects to rational Agents ; the Know- 
 ledge of them equally puts it in one's Power 
 to dejlroy Mankind, as to preferve them. 
 Without prefuppofing Affections , this 
 Knowledge will not excite to one Adtion 
 rather than another ; nor without a moral 
 Senfe will it make us approve any Action 
 more than its contrary. The Relation of 
 Corn to human Bodies being known to a 
 Perfon of kind Affections , was perhaps 
 the exciting Reafon of teaching Mankind 
 Husbandry. But the Knowledge of the 
 Relations of Arfenick would excite a ma- 
 ficious Nature, juft in the fame manner, 
 to the greateft Mifchief. A Sword, an 
 flatter, a Musfot, bears the fame Rela- 
 
 tion
 
 MORAL SENSE. 249 
 
 tion to the Body of an Hero, which they Sect. 2. 
 do to a Robber. The killing of either i 
 equally agreeable to thefe Relations, but 
 not equally good in*a moral Senfe. The 
 Knowledge of thefe Relations neither ex- 
 cites to Actions, nor juftifies them, with- 
 out prefuppofmg either Affections or a 
 moral Senfe. Kind Affections with fuch 
 Knowledge makes Heroes ; malicious Af- 
 fections, Villains. 
 
 3. T H E lift, fort of Relations is that among 
 rational Agents, founded on their Actions 
 or Affections ; whence one is called Crea- 
 tor, another Creature ; one Benefactor, 
 the other Beneficiary ( if that Word may 
 be ufed in this general Senfe ; ) the one 
 Tarent) the other Child; the one G0- 
 vernor, the other Subject, c. Now let , 
 us fee what Fitneffes or ^Onfitneffes arife 
 from thefe Relations. 
 
 THERE is certainly, independently of 
 Fancy or Cuftom, a natural Tendency in 
 fome Actions to give ^Pleafure, either to 
 the Agent or to others ; and a contrary 
 Tendency in other Actions to give <Pain 9 
 either to the Agent or others : This fort of 
 Relation of Actions to the Agents or Ob- 
 jects is indifputable. If we call thefe Re- 
 lations Fitneffes y then the moft contrary 
 Actions have equal Fitneffes for contrary 
 Ends ; and each one is unfit for the End of 
 
 the
 
 25 Illuftrations upon the 
 
 Se&. 2. the other. Thus Companion is fit to make 
 *SY^J others huffy* and unfit to make others 
 miferable. Violation of 'Property is ft 
 to make Men miferable, and unfit to make 
 them happy. Each of thefe is both fit and 
 unfit^ with relped: to different Ends. The 
 bare Fitnejs then to an End, is not the 
 Idea of moral Goodnels. 
 
 PERHAPS the virtuous Fitnefs is that 
 of Ends. The Fitnefs of a fubordinate 
 End to the ultimate, cannot conftitute the 
 Action good, unlefs the ultimate End be 
 good. To keep a Confpiracy fecrct is not 
 a good End, tho it be fit for obtaining a 
 farther End, the Succefs of the Confpiracy. 
 The moral Fitnefs muft be that of the ul- 
 timate EWitfelf: T\\z public k Good alone 
 is a fit End, therefore the Means fit for 
 this End alone are good. 
 
 WHAT means the Fitnefs of an ulti- 
 mate Endl For what is it fit? Why, 'tis 
 an ultimate End, not fit for any thing far- 
 ther, but abfolutely fit. What means that 
 Word fit ? If it notes a fimple Idea it 
 muft be the 'Perception of feme Senfe : 
 thus we muft recur, upon this Scheme too, 
 to a moral Senfe. 
 
 Agree- 
 
 IF Fitnefs be not * fimple Idea, let it be 
 defined. Some tell us, rhat it is * an 
 mwai " Agreement of an dffetfioa, 'Defire, 
 Safe, " 4 ft ion t
 
 MORAL SENSE. 251" 
 
 " Attion, or End, to the Relations <?/Se<St. 2. 
 " Agents? But what means Agreement '{ 
 Which of thefe four Meanings has it? i . We 
 fay one Quantity agrees with another of 
 equal T>imenfions every way. 2. A Co- 
 rollary agrees with a Theorem ; when our 
 knowing the latter to be Truth, leads us 
 to know that the former is alfo a m/ Tro 
 pofaion* 3. ^l/<?^ agrees with that Body 
 which it tends to preferve. 4. Meat a* 
 grees with the Tafte of that Being in whom 
 it raifes zpleafant ^Perception. If any one 
 of thefe are the Meanings of Agreement in 
 the Definition, then one of thefe is the 
 Idea of Fitnefs. \. That an Action or 
 Affection is of the fame Bulk and Figure 
 with the Relation. Or, 2. When the Re- 
 lation is a true Tropojition, foisthe Attion 
 or Affeftton. Or, 3. The Attion or Af- 
 fettion tends to preferve the Relation ; and 
 contrary Attions would deftroy it : So 
 that, for inftance, GOD would be no 
 longer related to us as Creator and Bene- 
 faffor, when we difobey ed him. Or, 4. The 
 Action raifes pleafant ^Perceptions in the 
 Relation, All thefe Expreffions feem ab- 
 iurd f 
 
 THESE Gentlemen probably have fbme 
 other Meanings to thele Words Fitnefi or 
 Agreement, 1 hope what is faid will ihew 
 the need for Explication of them, tho 
 they be fb common. There is one Mean- 
 ing
 
 1 5 * Jlluftrations upon the 
 
 Sect. 2. ing perhaps intended, however it be ob- 
 *xv"x; fcurely exprefled, That certain Affec- 
 tions or Actions of an Agent, (landing 
 in a certain Relation to other Agents, 
 is approved by every Obferver, or raifes 
 in him * grate fulT ere ept ion, or moves 
 the Obferver to love the Agent." This 
 Meaning is the lame with the Notion of 
 pleafmg a moral Senfe. 
 
 WHOEVER explains Virtue or Vice by 
 Juflice or Injuflice, Right or Wrong, ufes 
 only more ambiguous Words, which will 
 equally lead to acknowledge a moral Senfe. 
 
 SECT.
 
 MORALSENSE. 2JJ 
 
 Sect. 3, 
 
 SECT. III. 
 
 Mr. Woolafton's Significancy of 
 Truth, as the Idea of Virtue con- 
 Jidered* 
 
 MR. WOOLASTON* has introduced 
 a new Explication of moral Virtue^ 
 ignificancy of Truth in Aflions, 
 fuppofing that in every Adtion there is fome 
 Significance ', like to that which Moralijls 
 and Civilians fpeak of in their Tacit Con- 
 mentions, and Quafi ContracJus !' 
 
 THE Word Signification is very com- significa- 
 mon, but a little Reflection will Ihew it 
 be very ambiguous. In Signification ofj/. 
 Words thefe things are included : i. An 
 Affociation of an Idea with a Sound, fb that 
 when any Idea is formed by the Speaker, 
 the Idea of a Sound accompanies it. 2. The 
 Sound perceived by the Hearer excites the 
 Idea to which it is connected. 3. In like 
 manner a "judgment in the Speaker's Mind 
 is accompanyed with the /<&<* of a Combi- 
 nation of Sounds. 4. This Combination of 
 
 * In hit Religion of Natttrt delineated. 
 
 Sounds
 
 2 54 Ilhf rations upon the 
 
 Se<5t 3. Sounds heard raifes the Apprehenflon of 
 that Judgment in the Mind of the Hearer. 
 Nothing farther than thefe Circumftances 
 feems to be denoted by Signification. 
 
 HEARING a Proportion does not of 
 from" itfelf produce either ^*tf or Vijfent, or 
 Speech. Opinion in the Hearer, but only prefents 
 to his Apprehenfion the Judgment , or 
 Thema Complexum. But the Hearer him- 
 lelf often forms Judgments or Opinions 
 upon this occafion , either immediately 
 without Reafbning, or by fome fhort Ar- 
 gument. Thefe Opinions are fome One or 
 more of the following Tropofitions. i . That 
 a Sound is perceived, and a Judgment ap- 
 prehended. 2. Such a 7 erf on can fed the 
 Sound heard. 3. The Speaker intended to 
 excite in the Hearer the Idea of the 
 Sound, and the Apprehenfan of the Judg- 
 ment^ or Thema Complexum. This Judg- 
 ment is not always formed by the Hearer, 
 nor is it always true, when Men are heard 
 [peaking. 4. The Speaker intended to pro- 
 duce Affent in the Hearer : This Judg- 
 ment is not always true. 5. The Speaker 
 aflents to the Tropofiticn fpoken : This 
 Judgment in the Hearer is often falfe, and 
 is formed upon Opinion of the Speaker's 
 Veracity, or fpeaking what expreffes his 
 Opinion ufually. 6. The Speaker does not 
 affent to the Tropofition fpoken: This 
 Judgment of the Hearer is often falfe, 
 
 when
 
 MORAL SENSE. 
 
 when what is fpoken is every way true. Seel:. 3. 
 7. The Speaker intended that the Hearer UVN^ 
 jhould believe or judge, " that the Tropo- 
 " Jit ion fpoken was affented to by the 
 " Speaker? 8. The Speaker had the con- 
 trary Intention, to that fuppofed in the 
 lajl Judgment : Both thefe latter Judgments 
 may be falfe, when the Proportion fpoken 
 is every way true. 9. The 'Proportion 
 fpoken represents the Qbjett as it is, or is 
 logically true, i o. The Tropojition fpoken- 
 does not reprefent the Object as it is, or it 
 is logically falfe. 
 
 As to the firftfour Circumjiances which J^JJ/ 
 make up the proper Signifaancy of Speech, clnjlftin 
 'tis fcarce pomble that any one fhonld place Significan- 
 moral Good or Evil in them. Whether the cy ' 
 Propofition were logically true or falfe, 
 the having a bare Apprehenjion of it as a 
 Thema Complexum, or railing this in ano- 
 ther, without intending to produce Ajfent 
 or Ttffint, can have no more moral Good 
 or Evil in it, than the Reception of any 
 other Idea, or raifing it in another. This 
 Signifaancy of Faljbood is found in the 
 very ^Proportions given in Schools, as /# 
 fiances of Falfhood, Abfurdity, Contra* 
 diction to Truth, or Blafyhemy. The 
 pronouncing of which, are Adionsy/g#/- 
 fying more properly than mod of our o- 
 ther Actions ; and yet no body condemns 
 them as immoral. 
 
 As
 
 Illuftrations upon the 
 Sedt 3. 
 
 As to the Opinions formed by the 
 conchi- Hearer, they are all his own Aft ton as 
 fionsform- much as any other Conclufionot Judgment 
 edby Hear- f ormec j f rom Appear ances of any fort what- 
 Ibever. They are true oifat/e, according 
 to the Sagacity of the Obferver, or his 
 Caution. The Hearer may form perfectly 
 true Opinions or Judgments, when the 
 Speaker is guilty of the bafeft Fraud \ 
 and may form falfe Judgments, when the 
 Speaker is perfectly innocent, and fpokc 
 nothing/^//% in any Senfe. 
 
 THE Evils which may follow from the 
 falfe Judgments of the Hearer, are no other- 
 wife chargeable on the Speaker^ than as 
 the evil Confequences of another's Adion 
 of any kind may be chargeable upon any 
 Perfon who co-operated; or, by his Action 
 or Omijfion, the Confequence of which he 
 might have forefeen , did either actually 
 intend this Evil, or wanted that ^Degree 
 of kind Affection^ which would have in- 
 clined him to have prevented it. 
 
 > ^> > 
 
 TheUo- THE Intention of the Speaker is what 
 
 raiity*/ all Moralifts have hitherto imagined the 
 
 /Ifitcn. Virtue or Vice of Words did depend upon, 
 
 on. and not the bare Significance of Truth or 
 
 Falfhood. This Intention is either, i. To 
 
 lead the Hearer into a true or falfe Opini- 
 
 on about the Sentiments of the Speaker. 
 
 2. To
 
 MORAL SENSE. 57 
 
 2. To make the Hearer affent to the *Pro-$e&. 3 
 pofition fpoken. Or, 3. Both to make the 
 Hearer ajfent to the ^Propojltion^ and judge 
 that the Speaker alfo affents to it. Or, 
 4. To accomplijh fome End, by means of 
 the Hearer's affentto the *Propofition fpo- 
 ken. This End may be known by the 
 Speaker to be either publickly ufeful, or 
 publickly hurtful. 
 
 SOME Moralifts * of late have placed 
 all Virtue in Speech in the Intention of the 
 laft kind, 'viz. " Accomplilhing fome pub- 
 " lickly ufefui End, by (peaking either lo- 
 ** gical Truth or Faljhood : and that all 
 " Vice in fpeaking, confifts in intending to 
 " effeft fomething public kly hurtful .by 
 *' Speech, whether logically true or falje, 
 " and known to be fuch; or by ufing 
 " Speech in a manner which we may fore- 
 " fee would be public kly hurtful* whether 
 44 we actually intendt\\\s evil Confequence 
 *' or nor." Some ftri&er Moralifts affert, 
 that *' \hQpublick Evils which would en- 
 ** fue from deftroying mutual Confidence^ 
 " by allowing to (peak 'Proportions known 
 "to be falfe on any occafioHj are fb 
 " great, that no particular Advantage to 
 41 be expedted from fpeaking known logfc 
 ' cal Faljhoods , can ever over-ballancc 
 
 Barberack'f Notes on PufFendorf, Lib. iv. c. \i 7* 
 
 S ' them;
 
 258 Illujlratiom upon the 
 
 Sect. 3." them ; that all ufe of Speech fuppofes a 
 " tacit Convention of Sincerity, the Vio- 
 " lation of which is always evil." Both 
 fides in this Argument agree, that the mo- 
 ral Evil in Speech confifts either in fome 
 dire ft malicious Intention^ or a Tendency 
 to the public k ^Detriment of Society ; which 
 Tendency the Agent might have forefeen, 
 as connected with his Action, had he not 
 wanted that Degree of good Affections 
 which makes Men attentive to the Effects 
 of their Actions. Never was bare Signifi- 
 cancy of Faljhood made the Idea of moral 
 Evil. Speaking logical Faljhood was (till 
 looked upon as innocent in many cafes. 
 Speaking contrary to Sentiment, or moral 
 Faljhood, was always proved evil, from 
 fbme publickly hurtful Tendency \ and not 
 fuppofed as evil immediately, or the fame 
 Idea with Vice. The Intention to deceive 
 was the Foundation of the Guilt. This 
 Intention the Speaker fludies to conceal, 
 and does notjignijy it : It is an Aft of the 
 Will, neither fignified by his Words, nor 
 itfelf Jignifying any thing elfe. 
 
 THIS Point deferved Confideration, bc- 
 caufe if any Action be Jignifcant, 'tis cer- 
 tainly the Att of Speaking : And yet even 
 in this the Virtue is not the Significancy of 
 Truth) nor the Vice the Jignifying Fal- 
 jhood. 
 
 THE
 
 MORAL SENSE. 
 
 Se<a. 3 
 
 THE Signification of feme Affions 
 pends upon a like Affoctation of Ideas with fic 
 them, made either by Nature, or arbi- 
 trarily, and by Cuftom^ as with Sounds. 
 Letters are by Cujlom the Signs of Sounds. 
 A Shriek or Groan is a natural iSV^/z of Fear 
 or y #/;/ : A Motion of the Hand or 
 Head may fignify A/ent^iffent.ot T>efire. 
 The cutting down tall 'Poppies was air 
 anfwer : The fending Spurs, advice to 
 Flight : Kindling many Fires raifes the 
 Opinion of an Encampment : Raijtng a 
 Smoke will raife Opinion of .F/'TT. 
 
 THE moft important Diftindion of 
 this, that * i. " Some Appearances 
 are the Occafion upon which an Obfer- 
 ver, by his own reajbning, forms a 
 " Judgment, without fuppofing, or having 
 *' reafon to believe, that the Agent, who 
 " caufed thefe Appearances, did it with 
 *' defign to communicate his Sentiments to 
 " others; or when the Actions are fuch 
 " as are ufaally done by the Agents, with- 
 " out dejigning to raife Opinions in Ob- 
 " fervers. 2. Some Actions are never 
 ** ufed but \j\\hprofefTed 'Defign to con- 
 " vey the Opinions of the Agent ^ to the 
 " Ohferver ; or fuch as the Obferver ./ 
 
 See Grotiuj de Jure Bell. IiJ. j. c. i, 
 
 S 2 " firs
 
 2<>o lUuJlratlons upon the 
 
 Seel:. 3." fers nothing from, but upon having 
 reafon to believe that the Caufer of the 
 ' ' Appearance intended to convey fome Sen- 
 " timent to the Obferver? 3. Other 
 Signs are ufed, when " the Signifer gives 
 " no reafon to conclude any other Inten- 
 " tion, but only to raife an Apprehenjlon 
 ." of the Judgment ', or the Thema Com- 
 " flexum, without profejfing any defign to 
 " communicate his Sentiments, or to pro- 
 " duce any Affent in the Obierver." 
 
 ~ T o do Actions from which the Obfer- 
 Ver will form falfe Opinions^ without 
 having reafon to imagine an Intention in 
 the Agent, is never of itfelf imagined evil, 
 let the Signs be natural or injlituted ; pro- 
 vided there be no malicious Intention, or 
 neglett of pub lick Good. "ITis never called 
 a Crime in a Teacher , to pronounce an ab- 
 furd Sentence for an inftance ; in a Noble- 
 man> to travel without Coronets ; or a 
 Clergyman in Lay-Habit, for private Con- 
 veniency, or to avoid troublefome Cere- 
 mony ; to leave Lights in a Lodge \ to 
 make People conclude there is a Watch 
 kept. This Significancy may be in any 
 Action which is obferved ; but as true Con- 
 clujions argue no Virtue in the Agent, fo 
 falfe ones argue no Vice. 
 
 RAISIN G falfe Opinions defigncdly by 
 ti\z fee ond Sort of Signs> which reafonably 
 
 lead
 
 
 MORA L SENSE. 
 
 lead the Obferver to conclude Intention in Seel 
 the Agent to communicate his Sentiments, 
 whether the Signs be cujlomary, inftituted* 
 or natural, is generally evil, when the 
 Agent knows the Falfhood ; fince it tends 
 to diminifh mutual Confidence. To fend 
 Spurs to a Friend, whom the Sender ima- 
 gines to be in no danger, to deceive by 
 Hieroglyphic ks or ^Painting, is as criminal 
 as a falfe Letter. This Signifcancy oc- 
 curs in very few human Adions: Some 
 of the mofl important Virtites profefs no 
 defign of communicating Sentiments^ or 
 raijing Opinions either true or falfe : Nor 
 is there any more Intention in fome of the 
 mofl vicious Actions. Again, who can 
 imagine any Virtue in all Adions, where 
 there is this Signifcancy of Truth with In* 
 tention ? Is it Virtue to fay at Chrijlmafs* 
 that *' the Mornings are fharp?" to beckon 
 with the Hand, in fign of Affent to fuch 
 an AfTertion ? And in falfe fropo fit ions- 
 thus fignified by Actions or fiords, there 
 is no Evil apprehended where the Faljhood 
 is only logical. When the Fasfhood is 
 known by the Agent, the Evil is not ima- 
 gined in the Signifcancy , but in doing 
 what one may forefee tends to breed *D/"- 
 Jiruft in Society. And did all moral Evil 
 confift in moral Falfhood^ there could be 
 no Sins of Ignorance. If Mr. Woolafton 
 ^Hedges, that " Ignorance of fome things 
 v figni6es this Falfhood, viz. le are not 
 
 S 2 * ' '
 
 ^6^ Ilhijlrations upon the 
 
 3." obliged to know the Truth" This 
 Fallhood is not fignified with Intention ; 
 nor is it moral Faljhood, but only logical: 
 fmce no Man in an Error knows that " be 
 ' /j obliged to kno\v the contrary Truth" 
 Mr. Woclafton's ufe of 'the Words [ought] 
 or [obliged] without a diftind: Meaning, is 
 not peculiar to this Place. 
 
 THE third fort of Significancy ofFalfe- 
 hood is never apprehended as morally Evil: 
 if it were, then every ^Dramatick Writer 
 drawing evil Characters , every Hijlory 
 'Painter, every Writer of Allegories, or 
 Epicks , every Thilofofher teaching the 
 Nature of contradictory ^Propojitions^ would 
 be thonght criminal. 
 
 g UT f lnce on iy the fir ft fort of Signif- 
 can t> e in a ^ Actions, and that too 
 the MO- fuppofing that every Action whatfoever is 
 ralil ) f - obferved by fome Being or other : Let us 
 fee if this will account for Morality. Per- 
 haps either, id, " Every Adion is good 
 4 * which leads the Obferver into true Opi- 
 *' nions concerning the Sentiments of the 
 ' Agent, whether the Agents Opinions 
 " be true orfalfe." Or, 2 dly, " That Ac- 
 ' tion is good which leads the Obferver 
 ' into true Opinions concerning the Ob- 
 " Jeff, the Tendency of the Attion, and 
 " the Relation between the Agent and 
 " the Objetf? 
 
 DID
 
 MORAL SENSE. 
 
 DID Virtue confift in this frjl fort 
 Significancy of Truth, it would depend not 
 upon the Agent but the Sagacity of the Ob- 
 ferver : The acute Penetration of one 
 would conftitute an Action virtuous, and 
 the Raflmefs or Stupidity of another would 
 make it vicious : And the mod barbarous 
 Actions would raifeno/^//? Opinion of the 
 Sentiments of the Agent ', in a judicious 
 Obferver. 
 
 THE fecondferf of Significancy would 
 alfb make Virtue confift in the Tower of 
 Obfervers. An exacl: Reafoner would re- 
 ceive no falfe Opinion from the word Ac- 
 tion concerning the Object or Relation of 
 the Agent to it : And a falfe Opinion might 
 be formed by a weak Obferver of a per- 
 fectly good Action. An Obferver who 
 
 knew an Agent to have the bafefl Temper ', 
 would not from his worft Adion conclude 
 any thing falfe concerning the Object : 
 And all fach falfe Opinions would arifc 
 only upon Suppofition that the Agent 
 <was virtuous. 
 
 BUT may it not befaid, that " whether 
 " Men realbn well about Actions or nor, 
 " there are fome Cone lufans really deduc /- 
 " ble from every Action 1 It is a T>atum 
 " from which fomething may be inferred 
 tc ty jufl Confluence * whether any one ac- 
 84 " tually
 
 2 64 Ilhiflrations upon the 
 
 Se&. 3. " tually infers it or not. Then may not this 
 v**V^ " Duality in Actions, whether we call it 
 " Signifcancy or not , that only true 
 " 'Proportions can be inferred from them 
 " ty j u ft Re a fining, be moral Goodnefs 1 
 ' And may it not be the 'very Idea of mo- 
 " ral Evil in A&ions, that feme falfe 
 " Conclujions can by juft Confeqnence be 
 " deduced from them ?" Or if we will not 
 allow thefe to be the 'very Ideas of moral 
 Good and Evil, " are they not univerfai 
 V juft Characters to diftinguifh the one 
 " from the other?" 
 
 ONE may here obferve in general, that 
 fince the Exiftence of the Action is (up- 
 pofed to be a true Tremife or 'Datum, no 
 falfe Conclufiou can poflibly be inferred 
 from it by juft Rea fining. We could per- 
 haps often juftly infer, that the Agent had 
 falfe Opinions ; but then this Conclufion 
 of the Obferver, 'viz. " that the Agent 
 ** has falfe Opinions," is really true. 
 
 true Con- BUT again, it will not make an unmet* 
 IkAMii fttCharafler of good Adions, that a juft 
 from AC- Reafbner would infer from them, that 
 tions, o ffe Opinions of the Agent are true" 
 %afa r h tf F r it. is thus Men muft reafon from Ac- 
 Virtue, tions ; viz. Given the Conftitution of 
 Nature, the Affections of Agents, and 
 the Action, to conclude concerning the Opi- 
 nions : Or more generally given any $hree
 
 MORAL SENSE. 265 
 
 ef thefe to conclude the fourth. Thus fup- Seel:. 3. 
 pofe the " Conftitution of Nature fuch, 
 " that the private Inter eft of each Indi- 
 " vidual /j connected with the public k 
 " Good:" Suppofe an Agent's Affections 
 felfijb only, then from a publickly ufefiil 
 Action we infer, that " the Agent's Opi- 
 " #/<?#j- are true :" And from z publickly 
 hurtful Action conclude his Opinions to be 
 falfe. 
 
 THE fame Conftitutian fuppofed with 
 public k Affections as well zsfelfifti. The 
 obferving a //W <?r publickly ufeful Attion, 
 will not immediately infer, that the Agent's 
 Opinions are either true or /^//? : With 
 falfe Opinions he might do publickly ufeful 
 Actions out of his pub lick Affections , in 
 thofe cafes wherein they are not appa- 
 rently oppofite to his Intereft. A pub lick 
 Action oppofite to fbme prefent /nfi^te 
 Intcreft, would generally evidence true 
 Opinions ; or if the Opinions were falfe* 
 that his public k Affections were in this 
 Cafe much ftronger than his Self-Love. A 
 cruel Action would indeed evidence falfe 
 Opinions. 
 
 SUPPOSE the fame Conftitution in afl 
 pther refped:s, with malicious Affections in 
 an Agent. A cruel or ungrateful Action 
 would not always prove the Opinions of 
 the dgent to b falfe ; but only that his 
 
 Mdice-
 
 2 66 Illujirations upon the 
 
 Sect. 3. Malice in this inftance, was more violent 
 than regard to his Interefl. A beneficent 
 Action would prove only one of thefe 
 two, either that his Opinions of the Con- 
 flitution were true ; or, that if he was 
 miftaken about the Conflitution^ he had 
 alfo a falfe Opinion of the natural Ten- 
 dency of the A&iop. Thus falfe Opini- 
 ons may be evidenced by contrary Ac- 
 tions. 
 
 SUPPOSE " a Conflitution wherein a 
 " private Interefl could be advanced in 
 -" Oppojition to the public k " (this we may 
 call an evil Conflitution:} Suppofe only 
 Self-Love in the Agent, then a publickly 
 ufeful AcJion, any way toilfome or ex- 
 penjive to the Agent, would evidence /#// 
 Opinions : And the mod cruel felfijh Ac- 
 tions would evidence true Opinions. 
 
 IN an evil Conflitution^ fuppofe kind 
 Affections in the Agent ; a publickly ufe- 
 ful Action would not certainly argue either 
 true or falfe Opinions. If his Opinions 
 were true, but kind Affections ftronger 
 than Self-Love, he might a& in the fame 
 manner, as if his Opinions were falfe, and 
 Self-Love the reigning Affection. 
 
 IN an evil Conflitution, fuppofe ma- 
 licious Affections in an Agent, all^ publickly 
 ufeful Actions would argue falfe Opini- 
 ons ;
 
 MORAL SENSE. 267 
 
 ons\ and publickly hurtful Actions would Sect. 3 
 argue true ones. 
 
 THIS may fhew us that Mens Actions 
 are generally public kly ufeful, when they 
 have true Opinions* only on this account ; 
 that we neither have malicious Affections \ 
 naturally, nor is there any probability, in 
 our prefent Conftitution, of promoting a 
 private Intereft feparately from, or in Op- 
 pofition to the 'Public k. Were there con- 
 trary Affections and a contrary Conftitu- 
 tion, the mod cruel Actions might flow 
 from true Opinions ; and confequently 
 pub lie kly ufeful Actions might flow from 
 falfe ones. 
 
 IN owe prefent Conftitution, 'tis 
 ble no Perfon would ever do any thing pub-^ 
 Jickly hurtful, but upon ibme falfe Opinion, virtue 
 T\\z flowing from true Opinions is indeed thatit 
 a tolerable Character or Property of 
 tue^ and flowing from fome falfe Opinion nions. 
 a tolerable Character of Vice ; tho neither 
 be ftridtly univerfal. But, i. This is not 
 proper Signification. A judicious Obfcrver 
 never imagines any Intention to communi- 
 cate Opinions in fome of the moft impor- 
 tant Actions, either good or evil. 2. Did 
 an Action Jignify Faljbood, 'tis generally 
 only logical, g. The falfe Opinion in the 
 Agent is not the Quality for which the 
 evil Action is condemned \ nor is the 
 
 true
 
 268 J llujl rations upon the 
 
 Sect. 3. true Opinion that for which the good Ac- 
 is approved. True Opinions in Agents 
 often aggravate Crimes, as they fhew 
 higher Degrees of evil Affection* or total 
 jib fence of good. And falfe Opinions ge- 
 nerally extenuate Crimes, unlefs when the 
 very Ignorance or Error has flowed from 
 evil Affettion, or total Abfence of good. 
 
 'Tis furprizing, for inftance, how any 
 fhould place the Evil of Ingratitude in 
 denying the Perfbn injured, to have been 
 a Benefactor. The Obferver of fuch an 
 Action, if he fuppofed the Agent had 
 really that falfe Opinion^ would think the 
 Crime the lefs for it : But if he were con- 
 vinced that the Agent had a true Opinion, 
 he would think his Ingratitude the more 
 odious. Where we mod abhor Actions, 
 we fuppofe often true Opinions : And ibme- 
 times admire Actions flowing even from 
 falfe Opinions, when they have evidenced 
 HO want of good Affection. 
 
 To write aCenfure upon a Book fb well 
 defigned as Mr. Woolafton's, and fo full of 
 very good Reafoning upon the mod ufeful 
 Subje&s, would not evidence much good 
 Nature. But allowing him his^'///? 'Praife, 
 to remark any Ambiguities or Inadverten- 
 cies which may lead Men into Confuflon 
 |n their Realbning, I am confident would
 
 MORAL SENSE. 
 
 have been acceptable to a Man of fo much Seel. 3. 
 Goodnefs, when he was living. t*/VXJ 
 
 ONE may fee that he has had fome 
 other Idea of moral Good, previous to 
 this Significancy of Truth , by his in- 
 troducing, in the very Explication of it, 
 Words prefuppofing the Ideas of Mora- 
 lity previoufJy known : Such as [ Right, ~\ 
 {Obligation^ \Lye^\ [his] denoting [Pro- 
 perty.] 
 
 M R. iVoolaflon acknowledges that there signifying 
 may be very little evil in fbme Actions fig- f* 
 nify ing Falfhood ; fuch as throwing away unequal 
 that which is of but little ^Ofe or Value -.Virtue. 
 It is objected to him, that there is equal 
 Contrariety to Truth in fuch Actions, as in 
 the greateft Villany : He, in anfwer to it, 
 really unawares gives up his whole Caufe. 
 He mud own, that there may be the 
 flritteft Truth and Certainty about Trifles ; 
 fo there may be the moft obvious Falfhood 
 fignified by trifling Attions. If then Sig- 
 nifcancy of Faljbood be the very fame 
 With moral Evil, all Crimes muft be 
 equal. He anfwers, that Crimes increafe 
 according to the Importance of the Truth 
 denied ; and fo the Virtue increafes , as 
 the Importance of the Truths affirmed. 
 Then 
 
 Virtue
 
 Illuflrations upon the 
 Sett. 3 . 
 
 Virtue and Vice increafe, as the Impor- 
 tance of Propo fit ions affirmed or denied ; 
 But Signification of Truth and Falfhood 
 
 does not fo increafe : 
 
 Therefore Virtue and Vice are not the 
 fame*, with Signification of Truth or 
 Faljhood. 
 
 * r ' .' . ; 
 
 BUT what is this Importance of Truth ? 
 Nothing elfe but the Moment or Quantity 
 of good or evil, either private or public /, 
 which mould be produced by Actions, con- 
 cerning which thefe true Judgments are 
 made. But 'tis plain, the Signification of 
 Truth or Falfhood is not varied by this 
 Importance ; therefore Virtue or Vice de- 
 note fomething different from this Signifi- 
 cation. 
 
 BUT farther, The ImportanceofA&ions 
 toward publick Good or Evil, is not the 
 Idea of Virtue or Vice : Nor does the one 
 prove Virtue in an Action, any farther 
 than it evidences kind Affections ; or the 
 other Vice, farther than it evidences either 
 Malice or Want of kind Affections : O- 
 therwife a cafiial Invention , an Action 
 wholly from views of private Inter eft > 
 might be as virtuous as the moft kind and 
 enerous Offices : And Chance-Medley, or 
 indly intended, but unfuccefsful Attempts 
 
 would
 
 MORAL SENSE. 271 
 
 would be as vicious as Murder or 2r*0-Se<5t j, 
 Jon. *^v^> 
 
 ONE of Mr. Woolafton's IlluftrationS5wf Am. 
 that Signifcancy of Falfhood is the Idea 
 of moral Evil, ends in this, " 'Tis acting 
 " a Lye" What then? Should he not 
 firft have ihewn what was moral Evil, 
 and that every Lye was fuch ? 
 
 ANOTHER Illuftration or, Proof is 
 that, " it is acting contrary to that Rea- 
 " fon which GOD has given MS as the 
 " Guide of our Actions" Does not this 
 place the original Idea of moral Evil in 
 counteracting the DEITY, and not in 
 fignifying Faljhood ? Bur, he may fay, 
 " Counteracting the DEITY denies him 
 " to be our Benefactor, and flgnifies 
 " Falfhood" Then why is fignifying 
 Faljhood evil ? Why, 'tis counteracting the 
 DEITY, who gave us Reafon for our 
 Guide. Why is this evil again ? It denies 
 the Truth, that " he is our Benefactor? 
 
 ANOTHER Illuftration is this, " That 
 " fignifywg Faljhood is altering the Na- 
 " tures of Things , and making them be 
 " what they are not, or de firing at leafl 
 " to make them be what they are not? If 
 by altering the Natures be meant deflroy- 
 mg Beings, then moral Evil confifts in 
 defiring the "Def ruction of other Natures 9 
 2 or
 
 27 2 Siuftfations upon 
 
 Seel:. 3. or in Evil Affections. If what is meant 
 altering the Laws of Nature ' y or de- 
 firing that they were flopped ; this is lel- 
 dom defired by any but Madmen, nor is 
 this 'Dejire eyidenced by fome of the worft 
 A&ions, nor is futh "Dejire always crimi- 
 nal ; otherwile it were as great a Crime as 
 any, to wilh, when a "Dam was broken 
 down, that the Water would not overflow 
 the Country. 
 
 I F making Things be what they are not, 
 means " attempting or defiring that any 
 i Subject mould have two oppojlte uali- 
 " ties at once, or a Duality and its *Pri- 
 '* vat ion ;" 'tis certain then, that accord- 
 ing to the Stoicks, all vicious Men are 
 thorowly mad. But 'tis to be doubted, that 
 fiich Madnels never hapned to even thd 
 worft of Mankind. When a Man murders, 
 lie does not defire his Fellow-Creature to be 
 both dead and living. When he robs, he 
 does not defire that both he and the Tro- 
 prietor ihould at the fame time pofTefs, 
 Jf any fays , that he defires to have a 
 Right to that, to which another has a 
 Right ; 'tis probably falfe Robbers neither 
 think of Rights at all , nor are felici- 
 tous about acquiring them : Or, if they 
 tetain fome wild Notions of Rights, they 
 think their Indigence, Conqueft or Courage 
 gives them a Right, and makes the Other's 
 Right to ceafe. Jf attempting to make 
 
 Old
 
 MORAL SENSE; 27 3 
 
 ?/^ Qualities or Rights give place to new, SecSt 3 
 be the Idea of moral Evil, then every .XVV 
 Artificer, 'Purchafer, or Magijlrate in- 
 vejledwith an Office is criminal. 
 
 MANY of Mr. Woolafiotfs Propositions 
 contradicted by A&ions, are about Rights* 
 'Duties, Obligation, Jnftice, Reafonable- 
 nefs. Thefe are long Words, principal 
 Names, or Attributes in Sentences. The 
 little Word [ his, ] or the Particles [ as 9 
 according ] are much better : they may 
 efcape Obfervation, and yet may include 
 all the Ambiguities of Right, 'Property, 
 Agreement, Reafonablenefs : " Treating 
 1 ' Things as they are, and not as they are 
 ' * not :" Or, According to what they are, 
 ** or are not" are Expreflions he probably 
 had learned from another truly great Name, 
 who has not explained them lufficiently. 
 
 I T may perhaps not feem improper on J Quafi 
 this occafion to obferve, that in the 
 Contraffus, the Civilians do not imagine no 
 any Aft of the Mind of the Terfon ob- 
 liged to be really fignified, but by a fort of 
 FicJio juris fuppofmg it, order him to ad: 
 as if he had contracted, even when they 
 know that he had contrary Intentions. 
 
 IN the Tacit Conventions, 'tis not a 
 
 Judgment which is fignifiedj but an AcJ of 
 
 the Will transferring Right, in which 
 
 T there
 
 274 Ilhtjlratwns upon the 
 
 Seel:. 3. there is no Relation to Truth or Fal/bood 
 v^v~ of itfelf. The Non-performance of Cove- 
 nants is made /0>/4/, not becaufe of their 
 Jignifying Fnljkoods, as if this were the 
 Crime in them : But it is neceflfary, in or- 
 der to prefer ve Commerce in any Society, 
 to make effectual all 'Declarations of Con- 
 fent to transfer Rights by any ufual Signs, 
 othervvife there could be no Certainty in 
 Meos Tranfa&ions. 
 
 SECT. 

 
 MORAL SENSE. 
 
 4. 
 
 SECT. IV. 
 
 the Ufe of Reafon concern- 
 ing Virtue and Vice, upon Suppo* 
 Jltion that we receive theje Ideas 
 by a Moral Senfe. 
 
 HA D thofe who infift fo much upon 
 the antecedent ReafonablenefsofVir- al>otft Mo * 
 tue, told us diftindtly what is reafonable r r^ owr 
 or provable concerning it, many of our 
 Debates had been prevented. Let us con- 
 fider what Truths concerning Actions Men 
 could defire to know, or prove by Reafon* 
 I fancy they may be reduced to thefe 
 Heads, i. " To know whether there are 
 " not fome Actions or Affections which 
 " obtain the Approbation of any Spedta- 
 " tor or Obferver, and others move his 
 " Tliflike and Condemnation?" This 
 Queftion, as every Man can anfwer for 
 himfelf, Ib univerfal Experience and H'ifto- 
 ry mew, that in all Nations it is Ib ; and 
 confequently the moral Senfe is univerfal. 
 2. " Whether there be any particular 
 " Quality \ which, wherever it is appre- 
 " hended, gains Approbation, and thecon- 
 ' trary raifes "DiCapprobationr We ihall 
 T 2 find
 
 Ilhjtrations upon the 
 
 Seel. 4. find this Qualify to be kind Affection, or 
 , Study of the Good of others ; and thus 
 the moral Senfes of Men are generally uni- 
 form. About thefe two Queftions there 
 is little reafoning ; we know how to an- 
 fwer them from reflecting on our own Sen- 
 timents^ or by confulting others. 3. " What 
 " Actions do really evidence kind Affec- 
 " tions^ or do really tend to the greatefl 
 " publick Goodf About this Queftion is 
 all the fpecial Reafoning of thofe who 
 treat of the particular Laws of Nature, 
 or even of Civil Laws: This is the largeft 
 Field, and the moft ufeful Subject of Rea- 
 foning, which remains upon every Scheme 
 of Morals. 4. ' ' What are the Motives 
 " which, even from Self-Love, would ex- 
 " cite each Individual to do thofe Actions 
 " which are publickly ufeful?" 'Tis pro- 
 bable indeed, no Man would approve as 
 virtuous an Action publickly ufeful^ to 
 which the Agent was* excited only by 
 Self-Love^ without any kind Affettion : 
 'Tis alfo probable that no view of Interefl 
 .can raife that kind A ff eel ion, which we 
 approve as virtuous ; nor can any Reajb- 
 ning do it, except that which mews fome 
 moral Goodnefs, or kind Affections in the 
 Object ; for this never fails, where it is 
 obferved or fuppofed in any Perfon to raife 
 the Love of the Obferyer j ib that Virtue 
 is not properly taught. 
 
 YET
 
 MORAL SENSE. 277 
 
 Seel 4. 
 
 YET fmce all Men have naturally Self- 
 Love as well as kind Affeflions, the former 
 may often counteract: the latter, or the 
 latter the former ; in each cafe the Agent 
 is utteafy, and in fbme degree unhappy. 
 The firft rajh Views of human AfTairs of- 
 ten reprefent private Interefl\ as oppofite 
 to the ''Public k : When this is apprehended, 
 Self -Love may often engage Men in pub- 
 lickly hurtful Actions, which their moral 
 Senfe will condemn ; and this is the ordina- 
 ry Caufe of Vice. To reprefent thefe 
 Motives of Self-Inter eft i to engage Men 
 to publickly ufeful Adtious, is certainly 
 the moft neceffary Point in Morals. This 
 has been fo well done by the antient Mo- 
 ralifts, by Dr. Cumberland, 'Puffendorf^ 
 Grotius, Shaft esbury ; 'tis made fb cer- 
 tain from the divine Government of the 
 World, the State of Mankind* who can- 
 not fabfift without Society, from univer- 
 fai Experience and Confent t from inward 
 Confcioufnefs of the Pleafure of kind Af- 
 fections, and Self-Approbation^ and of the 
 Torments of Malice, or Hatred, or Envy, 
 or Anger ; that no Man who confiders 
 thefe things, can ever imagine he can have 
 any poflible Intereft in oppofing the pub- 
 lick Good ; or in checking or reftraining 
 his kind Affections; nay, if he had no 
 kind AjfettionS) his very Self-Love and 
 Regard to his private Good might excite 
 T 3
 
 278 Illujirations upon the 
 
 Seclt. 4. him to publickly ufeful Actions, and dif- 
 . fuade from the contrary. 
 
 WHAT farther fhould be provable 
 concerning Virtue, whence it Ihould be 
 called reasonable antecedently to all Affec- 
 tion^ or Intereft, or Sejife, or what it 
 fhould be ft for, one cannot eafily ima- 
 gine. 
 
 PERHAPS what has brought the Epi- 
 thet Reasonable, or flowing from Reajon, 
 in oppofition to what flows from Inftmtt, 
 Affection, or ^Ptijjion, fo much into ufe, 
 is this, " That it is often obferved, that 
 " the very bed of our particular Affections 
 " or Tiefo'es, when they are grown vio- 
 " lent and pajfionate, thro' the confufed 
 " Sett fat ions and *Pr open fit ies which at- 
 ** tend them, do make us incapable of 
 " confidering calmly the whole Tendency 
 " of our Actions, and lead us often into 
 ?' what is abfolutely pernicious, under 
 " fome Appearance of relative or parti- 
 ** cular Good" This indeed may give 
 fome ground for diftinguifhing between 
 pajponate Actions, and thofe from calm 
 ^Dejire or Affection which employs our 
 Reafon freely : But can never fet rational 
 Actions in Oppofition to thofe from In- 
 flintt, ^Deflre or Affection. And it mud 
 be owned, that the mod perfect Virtue 
 confids in the calm, uvpajjionate Benevo- 
 
 lence^
 
 MORAL SENSE. 279 
 
 lence , rather than in particular Affec-Sed: 4. 
 tions. 
 
 IF one asks " how do we know that 
 " our Affections are right when thay are 
 " kind?' What does the Word [ right ] 
 mean ? Does it mean what we approve ? 
 This we know by Confcioufnefs of our 
 Senfe. Again, how do we know that our 
 Senfe is right, or that we approve our 
 Approbation ? This can only be anfwered 
 by another Queftion, viz. " How do 
 '* we know we are pleafed when we are 
 
 " pleafed ?" Or does it mean, " how 
 
 " do we know that we fhall always ap- 
 " prove what we now approve ?" To an- 
 fwer this, we mud firft know that the 
 fame Conftitution of our Senfe fhall always 
 remain : And again, that we have applyed 
 our felves carefully to confider the natural 
 Tendency of our Actions. Of the Conti- 
 nuance of the fame Conftitution of our 
 Senfe, we are as fure as of the Continu- 
 ance of Gravitation, or any other Law 
 of Nature : The Tendency of our own 
 Actions we cannot always know ; but we 
 may know certainly that we heartily and 
 fincerely ftudied to a& according to what, 
 by all the Evidence now in our Power to 
 obtain, appeared as moft probably tending 
 to pub lick Good. When we are confcious 
 of this Jlncere Endeavour -, the evil Con* 
 Sequences which we could not have fore- 
 T 4 feen t
 
 i8o Ilittjlrations upon the 
 
 Sed. ^. teen, never will make us condemn our Con- 
 l/"VN* duel. But without this fine ere Endeavour, 
 
 we may often approve ox. prefent what we 
 
 ihali afterwards condemn. 
 
 HOW our I F tne Option means, " How are 
 Moral " we fure that what we approve, all 0- 
 
 fowtted " tkerS ^ al1 aW a PP r Ve ?" Of thiS WC 
 
 JJiieafon.can be fureupon no Scheme ; but 'tis highly 
 probable that the Senfes of all Men are 
 pretty uniform: That the DEITY allb 
 approves kind Affections^ otherwife he 
 would not have implanted them in us, nor 
 determined us by a moral Sen fe to approve 
 them. Now ftnce the ^Probability that 
 Men jhall judge truly, abftra&ing from 
 any prefuppofed 'Prejudice, is greater than 
 that the y Jhall judge falfly ; 'tis more pro- 
 bable, when our Actions are really kind 
 and public -:ly iifeful, that all Obfervers 
 ihall judge truly of our Intentions, and of 
 the Tendency of our Actions, and conle- 
 quently approve what we approve our 
 ielves, than that they ihall judge falfly 
 and condemn them. 
 
 IF the Meaning of the Queftion be, 
 *' Will the doing what our moral Senfe 
 ?' approves tend to onr Happinefs, and to 
 ^ c the avoiding Mifery?" 'Tis thus we 
 call a Tafte wrong* when it makes that 
 Foods*, tys&ot. grateful, which fhall occa- 
 fipa future Tains, or "Death. This Quef- 
 
 t K
 
 MORAL SENSE. 181 
 
 tion concerning our Self-Inter efl muft beSecSt 4. 
 anfvvered by iuch Reafoning as was men- 
 rioned above, to be well managed by our 
 Moralijts both antient and modern. 
 
 THUS there feems no part of that Rea- 
 fining which was ever uled by Moralifts* 
 to be f uperfeded by fuppofing a moral Senfe. 
 And yet without a moral Senfe there is no 
 Explication can be given of our Ideas of 
 Morality ; nor of that Reafonablenefs fup- 
 pofed antecedent to all Inftinffs, Affec- 
 tions, or Senfe. 
 
 " BUT may there not be a right or 
 " wrong State of our moral Senfe, as 
 " there is in our other Senfes^ according 
 " as they reprefent their Objeds to be 
 ' ' as they really are^ or reprefent them o- 
 " therwife ?" So may not our moral Senfe 
 approve that which is vicious* and difap- 
 prove Virtue ', as a fickly 'Palate may dif- 
 like grateful Food, or a 'vitiated Sight 
 mifreprefent Colours or T>imenfans ? Muft 
 we not know therefore antecedently what 
 is morally Good or Evil by our Reafin, be- 
 fore we can know that our moral Senfe is 
 right ? 
 
 T o anfwer this, we mud remember that 
 of \hzfenfible Ideas, fome are allowed to 
 be only 'Perceptions in our Minds, and not 
 Images of any like external <juality^ as 
 
 Colours^
 
 282 Illujlratwns upon the 
 
 Se<5t 4. Co/ours, Sounds, Taftes, Smells, Tlea- 
 ^^r*s fare, 'Pain. Other Ideas are Images of 
 fbmething external, as 'Duration, Number, 
 Extension, Motion, Reft: Thefe latter, 
 for diftin&ion , we may call concomitant 
 Ideas of Sen fat ion, and the former///n?/y 
 fenfible. As to the purely fenfible Ideas, 
 we know they are altered by any Diforder 
 in our Organs, and made different from 
 what arife in us from the fame Objects at 
 other times. We do not denominate Ob- 
 jedts from our Perceptions during the 'Dif- 
 order, but according to our ordinary 'Per- 
 ceptions, or thofe of others 'vn good Health : 
 Yet no body imagines that therefore Co- 
 lours , Sounds, Taftes, are not finjible 
 Ideas. In like manner many Circumflati- 
 ces diverfify the concomitant Ideas : But 
 we denominate Objects from the Ap- 
 pearances they make to us in an uniform 
 Medium, when our Organs are in no dif- 
 ordcr, and the Object not very di ft ant from 
 them. But none therefore imagines that it is 
 Reafon and nQtSenfe which difcovers thefe 
 concomitant Ideas, or primary Qualities. 
 
 JUST fb in our Ideas of ^cJ ions. Thefe 
 three Things are to be diftinguifhed, i. The 
 Idea of the external Motion, known firft 
 by Senfe, and its Tendency to the Happi- 
 nefs or Mifery of fame fenjitive Nature, 
 often inferred by Argument or Reafon. 
 2. 4ffwfcitjion or Opinion of the Affec- 
 tions
 
 MORAL SENSE. 
 
 tions in the Agent, concluded by our Rea- Se6t 4. 
 fon : So far the Idea of an Action repre- -x~v^o 
 fents fomething external to the Obierver. 
 3 . The 'Perception of Approbation or <Dif- 
 approbation arifmg in the Obferver, accord- 
 ing as the Affections of the Agent are ap- 
 prehended kind in theirjw/? 'Degree, or de- 
 ficient, or malicious. This Approbation 
 cannot be fuppofed an Image of any thing 
 external, more than the fleajure of Har- 
 mony , of Tajie, of Smell. But let none 
 imagine, that calling the Ideas of Virtue 
 and Vice Perceptions of a Senfe, upon ap- 
 prehending the Actions and Affections of 
 another does diminifh their Reality, more 
 than the like Affertions concerning all 
 'Pleajitre and Tain, Happ'mefs or Mifery. 
 Our Reafon does often corred: the Report 
 of our Setifes, about the natural Tendency 
 of the external Action, and corrects rajb 
 Conclufions about the Affections of the A- 
 gent. But whether our moral Senfe be 
 iubjecl: to fuch a Diforder, as to have dif- 
 ferent Perceptions^ from the fame appre- 
 hended Affections in an Agent, at different 
 times, as the Eye may have of the Colours 
 of an unaltered Object, 'tis not eafy to 
 determine : Perhaps it will be hard to find 
 any Inftances of fuch a Change. What 
 Reafon could correct, if it fell into fuch a 
 *Diforder, I know not ; except fuggefling to 
 its Remembrance its former Approbations, 
 and reprefenting the general Senfe of Man- 
 kind.
 
 284 Illustrations upon the 
 
 Seel:. 4. kind. But this does not prove Ideas of 
 txw; Virtue and Vice to be previous to a Senfe , 
 more than a like Correction of the Ideas of 
 Colour in a Perfon under the Jaundice^ 
 proves that Colours are perceived by Re a* 
 fon, previoufly to Senfe. 
 
 IF any fay, ** this moral Senfe is not 
 a Rule:" What means that Word ? It is 
 
 not a y?rrf/> rigid Body : It is not a 
 ralTropoJition^ Jhewing what Means are 
 ft to obtain an end : It is not a Tropofiti- 
 o%, afferting, that a Superior will make 
 thofe happy who aft one way, and mifera- 
 ble who at the contrary way. If thefe 
 be the Meanings of Rule, it is no Rule ; 
 yet by refle&ing upon it our Underfland- 
 ing may find out a Rule. But what Rule 
 of Adions can be formed, without Rela- 
 tion to fome End propofed ? Or what End 
 can be propofed, without prefuppofmg /;/- 
 ftintts, T>cjlres^ Affettions, or a moral 
 ) it will not be eafy to explain. 
 
 SECT.
 
 MORAL SENSE. 185 
 
 Setf. 
 
 SECT. V. 
 
 Shewing that Virtue may have <what~ 
 ever is meant by Merit $ and be 
 rewardable upon the Suppojitwn, 
 that it is perceived by a Senfe, 
 and elected from Affection or In- 
 ftind:. 
 
 SOME will not allow any Merit in 
 Attions flowing from kind Inftinfts : 
 Merit, fay they, attends A&ions to 
 which we are excited by Reafon alone, 
 or to which we freely determine our 
 felves. The Operation of Injlinfts or 
 Affettions is neceffary, and not 'volun- 
 tary ; nor is there more Merit in them 
 than in the Shining of the Sun, the 
 Fruitfulnefs of a Tree, or the Over- 
 flowing of a Stream^ which are 
 lickly ujeful? 
 
 BUT what does Merit mean ? or Traifi 
 worthinefs? Do thefe Words denote 
 " Quality in A&ions, which gains ' Apfro- 
 " bat ion from the Oblerver ? Or, 'idly, Are 
 thefe Actions called meritorious, ** which, 
 " when any Obferver does approve all o- 
 ** ther
 
 186 Illujlvatiom upon the 
 
 Seel:. j" tner Obfervers approve him for his Ap- 
 *' probation of it; and would condemn 
 " any Obferver who did not approve thefe 
 " Actions?" Thefe are the only Meanings 
 of meritorious, which I can conceive as 
 diftinft from reivardable, which is confi- 
 dered hereafter feparately. 
 
 * V N o w we endeavoured already to (hew, 
 that " no Reafon can excite to Action 
 " previoufly to fome End^ and that no 
 " End can be propofed without fome /- 
 " f'tntt or Affection." What then can 
 be meant by being excited by Reafon, as 
 diftin& from all Motion of Inflintis or 
 Jffeflions? 
 
 THEN determining our felves freely, 
 does it mean aft'mg 'without any Motive 
 or exciting Reafon 1 If it did not mean 
 this, it cannot be oppofed to atting from 
 Inftintt or Ajfettions^ fince all Motives 
 or Reafons prefuppofe them. If it do mean 
 this, that " Merit is found only in Adions 
 " done without Motive or AffeEH&ti, by 
 " mere Election, without prepollent 5De- 
 " Jlre of one Action or End rather than 
 " its oppofite, or without c l)ejire of that 
 *' Tleajiire which * fome do fuppofe fol- 
 
 ' lows 
 
 * This is the Notion of Liberty given by the Archbifliop 
 of Dublin, in bis moft ingenious Book, De Grigine Mali. 
 
 This
 
 MORAL SENSE. 187 
 
 " lows upon any Election, by a natura/Se&. 5. 
 *' Connexion :" Then let any Man confider ^v~' 
 whether he ever adts in this manner by 
 were Election, without any previous 'De- 
 foe ? And again, let him confult his own 
 Bread, whether fuch kind of Adtion gains 
 his Approbation ? Upon feeing a Perfon 
 not more difpofed by Affection, Compaf- 
 fan, or Love or Dejirejco make his Country 
 happy than miferable, yet choofing the one 
 rather than the other, from no 'Dejire of 
 publick Happinefs, nor Averfan to the 
 Torments of others, but by fuch an unaf- 
 fettionate 'Determination, as that by which 
 one moves his fir ft Finger rather than the 
 fecond, in giving an Inftance of a trifling 
 Action; let any one ask if this Action 
 fhould be meritorious : and yet that there 
 ihould be no Merit in a tender compaf- 
 fanate Heart, which Ihrinks at every 
 Tain of its Fellow-Creatures &\\& triumphs 
 in their Happinefs ; with kind Affections 
 and ftrong Dejire labouring for the pub- 
 lick Good. If this be the Nature of me- 
 ritorious Actions ; I fancy every honeft 
 
 This Opinion does not reprefent Freedom of Ele&ion, as 
 oppofite to all Infiintf or Defire; but rather as arifing from 
 the Defire of that Pleafxre fuppofed to be connected with every 
 Election. Upon his Scheme there is a Motive and End pro- 
 pofed in every Election, and a natural Inftinft toward Hap- 
 pinefs prefuppofed : Tho 'tis fuch a Motive and End as 
 leaves us in perfeft Liberty. Since it is a Pleafure or Hap- 
 pinefs, not connected with one thing more than another, 
 but following upon the Determination itfelf. 
 
 3 -Heart
 
 288 niujtrattons upon the 
 
 Sect. 5. Heart would difclaim *\\ Merit in Morals -, 
 as violently as the old Trot eft ants rejected 
 it in ^ujlifcation. 
 
 BUT let us fee which of the two Senfes 
 of Merit or 'Praife-'worthincfs is founded 
 on this ( I won't call it unrcafonahle or 
 cafiial) but unaffectionate Choice. If Me- 
 rit denotes the Quality moving the Spec- 
 tator to approve^ then there may be unaf- 
 fettionate Election of the greatefl Villany, 
 as well as of the. mod ufeful Actions ; but 
 who willfay that they are equally approved? 
 But perhaps 'tis not the mere Freedom of 
 Choice which is approved, but the free 
 Choice of public k Good, without any Af- 
 fection. Then Actions are approved for 
 publick 'Vfefulnefs, and not for Freedom. 
 Upon this Suppofition the Heat of the 
 Sun, the Fruit fulnefs of a Tree, would 
 be meritorious : or if one fays, " thele are 
 '* not Actions? they are at lead merito- 
 rious Qualities, Motions^ Attractions, &c. 
 And a cafual Invention may be merito- 
 rious. Perhaps Free Election is a 
 
 Conditio fine qua non, and publick TJfeful- 
 nefe the immediate Caufe of Approbation ; 
 neither feparately, but both jointly are^<?- 
 ritorious : Free Election alone is not Me- 
 rit ; 'Tublick IJfefulncfs alone is not Me- 
 rit \ but both concurring. Then ihould 
 any Perfon by mere Election, without 
 any "Defire to ierve the publick, fet about
 
 MORAL SJSNSE; 185) 
 
 Mines \ or any ufeful Manufacture ; or Sec5h 5-4 
 fhould a Perfon by mere Election itab 
 Man, without knowing him to be a pub- 
 lick Robber ; here both free Election and 
 ptiblick IJfefulnefs may concur : Yet will 
 any one fay there is Merit or Virtue in fiich 
 Actions ? Where then mall we find Merit, 
 unlefs in kind Affettions^ or 'Defire and 
 Intention of the publick Good? This 
 moves our Approbation wherever we ob- 
 ferve it : and the want of this is the true 
 Reafon why a Searcher for Mines, a. free 
 Killer of an unknown Robber, the warm- 
 ing Sun, or the fruitful Tree^ are not 
 counted meritoriits. 
 
 -6b'>^ '-'. ..::,L Vj <>:- : C 9M2 CZO^'J ': ::i\!cV 
 
 BUT it may be faid, that to make att 
 Action meritorious, it is neccfTary not only 
 that the Adion ^ public kly nfeful, but 
 that it be known or imagined to be Juc h, 
 before the Agent freely chufes it. But 
 what does this add to the former Scheme ? 
 Only a Judgment or Opinion in the *D- 
 derftanding, concerning the natural Ten- 
 dency of an Action to the publick Good : 
 Few, it may be prefumed, will place Vir- 
 tue in A [ffent or 'Diffent* or 'Perceptions. 
 And yet this is all that is fuperadded to 
 the former Cafe* The Agent muft not 
 dejire the publick Good, or have any kind 
 Affettions. This would fpoil the Freedom 
 ef 'Choice, according to their Scheme, who 
 infill on a Freedom oppofite to Affections 
 U gr
 
 290 Illttftrations upon the 
 
 Sett. 5. or Infimtts : But he muft barely know 
 Tendency to publick Good, and with- 
 out any *Propenfity to, or ^Dejire of, the 
 Happinefs of others, by an arbitrary E- 
 leffion, acquire his Merit. Let every Man 
 judge for himfelf, whether thefe are the 
 Qualities which he approves. 
 
 WHAT has probably engaged many into 
 this way of (peaking, *' that Virtue is 
 " the Effect of rational Choice, and not 
 " oflnftmffs or Afettions" is this ; they 
 find, that " fome Actions flowing from 
 " particular kind Affections, are fometimes 
 ' condemned as evil? becaufe of their bad 
 Influence upon the State of larger Socie- 
 ties ; and that the Hurry and confufed Sen- 
 fations of any of our Paflions, may di- 
 vert the Mind from confidering the whole 
 Effect of its Actions : They require there- 
 fore to Virtue a calm and undiflurbedTem- 
 far. 
 
 THERE is indeed fbme ground to re- 
 commend this Temper as very neceflary 
 in many Cafes ; and yet fbme of the mod 
 fajjlonate Actions may be perfectly good. 
 But in the calmejl Temper there muft re- 
 main Affection or 'Defire, fome implanted 
 Inflintt for which we can give no reafon ; 
 other wife there could be no Adion of any 
 kind. As it was ihevvn above in the firft 
 
 IF
 
 MORAL SENSE. ipt 
 
 I F meritorious Attions are thefe which 
 whoibever does Dot approve^ is himfelf 
 condemned by others ; rhe Quality by 
 which they are conftiruted meritorious in 
 this Senfe, is the lame which moves our 
 Approbation. We condemn any Perion 
 who does not approve that which we our 
 felves approve : We prefume the Senfe of 
 others to be configured like our own ; 
 and that any other Perion, would he at- 
 tend to the Actions which we approve, 
 would alfo approve them, and love the A- 
 gent ; when we find that another does not 
 approve what we approve, we are apt to 
 conclude, that he has not had kind Affec- 
 tions toward the Agent, or that fome evil 
 Affettion makes him overlook his Virtues, 
 and on this account condemn him. 
 
 PERHAPS by meritorious is meant the 
 fame thing with another Word ufed in like 
 manner, viz. rewardable. Then indeed 
 the Quality in which Merit or Rewarda- 
 blenefs is founded, is different from that 
 which is denoted by Merit in the former 
 Meanings. 
 
 REWARDABLE, or deferving Reward, 
 denotes either that Quality which would 
 incline afuperior Nature to make an Agent 
 happy: Or, 2dly, That Quality of Ac- 
 tions which would make a Spectator ap- 
 U 2 frove
 
 29 * Illnjlrattons upon the 
 
 .Sect. 5. prove afuperior Nature, when he confer- 
 fW; red Happinefs on the Agent, and difap~ 
 prove that Superior, who inflicted Mtfery 
 on the Agent, or punijhed him. Let any 
 one try to give a Meaning to the Word 
 rewardable diftinct from thefe, and not 
 fatisfy himfelf with the Words worthy ofr 
 or deferring, which are of Very complex 
 and ambiguous Signification. 
 
 Now the Qualities of an Action de- 
 termining a powerful Nature to reward it, 
 muft be various, according to the Confti- 
 tution and AjfecJions of that Superior. 
 If he has a moral Senfe^ or fomething ana- 
 lagous of a more excellent fort, by which 
 he is determined lotove thofe who evidence 
 kind Affeflions, and to defire their Happi- 
 nefs, then kind Affeftion is a Quality 
 moving to Reward. 
 
 BUT farther, if this Superior be bene- 
 volent, and obferves that inferior Natures 
 can by their mutual Actions promote their 
 mutual Happinefs ; then he muft incline to 
 excite them to publickly ufeful Actions, 
 by Profpecls of private Intereji to the 
 Agent, if it be needful : Therefore he will 
 engage them to publickly ufeful Actions by 
 Trofyeffs of Rewards, whatever be the 
 internal Principle of their Actions, or what- 
 .ever their Affections be. Thefe two Dua- 
 lities in Actions, viz. flowing from kind
 
 MOR A L SENSE. 
 
 Affect ions ) and public k^fefulnefs concur- Sect. 5 
 rin, undoubtedl incline the be 
 
 ring, undoubtedly incline the benevolent 
 Superior to confer Happinefs : The former 
 alone, where, thro' want of Tower, the 
 Agent is difappointed of his kind Inten- 
 tions, will incline a benevolent Superior to 
 reward ; and the want of Tower in the 
 Agent will never incline him to punifli. 
 But the want of kind Affections, altho 
 there be public kly 11 feful Actions^ may be fb 
 oflenfive to the moral Senfe ofthcfitperior 
 Nature, as to prevent Reward, or excite 
 to punijb ; unlefs this Conduct would oc- 
 cafion greater publick Evil, by with- 
 drawing from many Agents a neceffary 'Mo- 
 tive to publick Uiefulnels, viz. the Hope 
 
 of Reward. 
 
 J ^t 5 
 
 BUT if the Superior were malicious 
 with a moral Senfe contrary to ours, the 
 contrary Affections and Tendency of Ac- 
 tions would excite to reward, if any fuch 
 thing could be expected from fuch a 
 Temper. 
 
 \ F Actions be called rewardable, when 
 " a Spectator would approve the Jitperior 
 ' Mind for conferring Rewards on fuch 
 *' Actions :" Then various Actions mud 
 be rewardable, according to the moral 
 Senfe of the Spectator. Men approve re- 
 warding all kind Affections : And if it 
 will promote publick Good to promife 
 U j Rewards
 
 Ilhf rations upon the 
 
 Sect. 5. Rewards \Q public kly ujeful Aftions from 
 v^v^ whatioever Afftttions they proceed, it 
 will evidence Benevolence in the Superior 
 to do fo. And this is the Cafe with human 
 Governors^ who cannot dive into the Af- 
 fections of Men. 
 
 whether S o M E ftronely aflert ( which is often 
 
 Motives or , i T- I t r 
 
 indmati- the only Proot) that " to make an Action 
 ns to Evil rewardable, the Agent ihould have had 
 b r e y n t e otale" Inclinations to evil as well as to good." 
 an Agent What does this mean, That a good govern- 
 
 r tu? rda ' * D ^ l N p ^ s OD ^ i nc ^ lie d to make an 
 Agent happy, or to confer a Reward on 
 him when he has fome evil Affections* 
 which yet are furmounted by the benevo- 
 lent Affections ? But would not a bene- 
 volent Superior incline to make any bene- 
 volent Agent happy, whether he had any 
 weaker evil Inclinations or not ? Evil In- 
 clinations in an Agent would certainly 
 rather have (bme Tendency to diminifh the 
 Love of the fuperior Mind. Cannot a 
 good Mind love an Agent, and defire his 
 Happinels, unlefs he obferves fome Quali- 
 ties, which, were they alone, would ex- 
 cite Hatred or Averfion ? Muft there be a 
 Mixture of Hatred to make Love ftrong and 
 effectual, as there muft be a Mixture of 
 Shade to fet off the Lights in a Picture, 
 where there are no Shades ? Is there any 
 JLp,vg, where there is po Inclination fo
 
 MORAL SENSE. 
 
 make happy ? Or is ftrong Love made up of Sect. 5 
 Love and Hatred ? 
 
 'Tis true indeed, that Men judge of 
 the Strength of kind Affections gene- 
 rally by the contrary Motives of Self- 
 Love, which they furmount : But muft the 
 D E IT Y do fo too ? Is any Nature the lefs 
 lovely, for its having no Motive to make 
 itfelf odious? If a Being which has no 
 Motive to evil can be beloved by a Supe- 
 rior, mail he not defire the Happinefs of 
 that Agent whom he loves ? 'Tis true, 
 fuch a Nature will do good Actions with- 
 out Profpect of any Self-Interefl \ but 
 would any benevolent Superior ftudy the 
 
 lefs to make it happy on that account ? 
 
 But if they apply the Word rewardabk 
 to thofe A&ions alone, which an Agent 
 would not do without Trofyett of Reward: 
 then indeed to make an Action in this 
 Senfe rewardable, 'tis nece(Tary that the 
 Agent mould either have no kind Affec- 
 tions , or that he fliould live in fuch Cir- 
 cumftances, wherein Self-Love fhould lead 
 to Actions contrary to the publick Good, 
 and over-power any kind Affections ; or 
 that he Ihould have evil Ajfettiom, which 
 even in a good Conftitution of the World, 
 his Self-Love could not over-ballance 
 without Reward. 
 
 UA THIS
 
 1 9 <5 Illujlrations upon the 
 
 Sea. 5. 
 
 THIS poor Idea of Rewardablenefs is 
 taken from the 'Poverty and Impotence of 
 human Governors : Their Funds are foon 
 exhaufted ; they cannot make happy all 
 thole whofe Happinefs they defire : Their 
 little Stores muft be frugally managed ; 
 none muft be rewarded for what good 
 they will do without Reward, or for ab- 
 flaining from Evils to which they are not 
 inclined. Rewards muft be kept for the 
 mfolent Minifter, who without reward 
 would fly in the Face of his Prince ; for 
 the turbulent 'Demagogue, who will raife 
 Factions if he is not bribed ; for the cove- 
 tous, mean-fpirited, but artful Citizen, 
 who will ferve his Country no farther than 
 it is for his private Intereft. But let any 
 Jcind honeft Heart declare what fort of 
 Characters it loves ? Whofe Happinefs it 
 moft defires ? Whom it would reward if 
 it could ? Or what thefe 'Difpofitions are, 
 which if it faw rewarded by a fuperior 
 Nature, it would be moft pleafed, and 
 moft approve the Conduct of the Superior? 
 When thefe Queftions are anfvver'd, we 
 ihail know what makes Actions reward- 
 able. 
 
 .'BK;VV<. : '*T> 
 
 IF we call all Actions rewardabU, the 
 rewarding of which we approve ; then in- 
 deed we ihall approve the rewarding of all 
 which we affrove, whether the 
 
 Agent
 
 MORAL SENSE. 297 
 
 Agent has had any Inclinations or Mo-SeGt. 5-. 
 fives to Evil or not : We (hall alfo approve v-*^v>^ 
 ihzpromijing of Rewards to all publickly 
 ufeful Actions i whatever were the Affec- 
 tions of the Agents. If by this Trojpett 
 of Reward either malicious Natures are 
 reftrained from Mifchief, or felfifl? Natures 
 induced to ferve the Publick, or benevolent 
 Natures not able without reward to fur- 
 mount real or apparent felfijb Motives : In 
 all thefe Cafes, the propofing Rewards does 
 really advance the Happinefs of the Whole, 
 or dimini(h its Mifery ; and evidences Be- 
 nevolence in the iuperior Mind, and is con- 
 fequently approved by our moralSenfe. 
 
 I N this lad Meaning of the Word re- 
 wardable, thefe Difpofitions are rewarda- 
 ble. i. "Pure unmixed Benevolence. 2. Tre- 
 pollent good jljfeflions. 3 . Such weak Be- 
 nevolence^ as will not without Reward 
 overcome apparently contrary Motives of 
 Self- Love. 4. Unmixed Self-Love, which 
 by 'Profpefl of Reward may ferve the 
 publick. 5 . Self-Love, which by djfijlance 
 of Rewards, may overbalance fome mali- 
 cious Affections. If in thele Cafes pro- 
 pojing Rewards will increafe the Happi- 
 nefs of the Syftem, or diminifti its Mifery, 
 it evidences Goodnefe in the Governor, 
 when he cannot fo well otherwife accom- 
 plifh fo much good for the whole. 
 
 IP
 
 298 Ilfajlrations upon the 
 
 Sea. 5. 
 
 IF we luppofe a Neceflity of making 
 all virtuous Agents equally happy, then in- 
 deed a Mixture of evil 'Difpojitions , tho 
 furmounted by the good, or of ftrong 
 contrary Motives overbalanced by Mo- 
 tives to Good, would be a Circumftance of 
 fbme Importance in the Diftribution of 
 Rewards : Since fach a Nature, during the 
 Struggle of contrary Affections or Mo- 
 tives, muft have had lets Tleafure than 
 that virtuous Nature which met with no 
 Oppofition : But as this very Oppofition 
 did give this Nature full Evidence of the 
 Strength of its Virtue, this Confcioufnefs 
 may be a peculiar Recompense to which 
 the unmixed Tempers are Strangers : And 
 there ieems no fuch neceffity of an equal 
 Happinefs of all Natures. It is no way 
 inconfiftent with perfect Goodnefs, to make 
 different Orders of Beings ; and, provided 
 all the Virtuous be at laft fully content , 
 and as happy as they defire, there is no- 
 thing abfurd in fuppofing different Capaci- 
 ties and different degrees ; and during 
 the Time of ^Probation, there is no ne- 
 ceflity, not the lead fhew of it, that all 
 be equal, 
 
 THOSE who think " no Terfon fu- 
 ' nifhable for any Quality or* Action, if 
 ' he had it not in his Tower to have had 
 " the ofpofite Duality, or to have ab-
 
 MORAL SENSE. 299 
 
 " famed from the Action if he had 
 " led it-" perhaps are not miftaken : 
 but then let them not afTert on the other 
 Handy that it is unjuft to reward or make 
 happy thofe, who neither had any 1>if- 
 po fit ions to Evil, nor could poflibly de- 
 Jire any fuch Difpofhions. Now if Mens 
 Affedions are naturally good, and if there 
 be in their Fellows no Quality which would 
 neceffarily raife Malice in the Oblerver ; 
 but, on the contrary, all Qualities requisite 
 to excite at lead Benevolence or Compaf- 
 Jion : It may be juftly faid to be in the 
 'Power of every one, by due Attention, 
 to prevent any malicious Affections, and 
 to excite in himfelf kind Affections to- 
 ward all. So that the intricate Debates a- 
 bout human Liberty do not affect what is 
 here alledged, concerning our moral Senfe 
 of AfTe&ions and Actions, any more than 
 any other Schemes. 
 
 SOME alledge, that MERIT luppoies, 
 befide kind Affection, that the Agent has a 
 moral Senfe^ reflects upon his own Vir- 
 tue, delights in it, and chufes to adhere 
 to it for the Tleafure which attends it*. We 
 need not debate the Ufe of this Word Merit : 
 'tis plain, we approve a generous kind Ac* 
 tion, tho the Agent had not made this Re- 
 
 * Sec Lord Shafteflttry's Inquiry concerning Virtue. Part i
 
 300 ] ilujtrations upon the 
 
 Seel. ^.fleCtion. This Refle&ion {hews to him a 
 IXVNJ Motive of Self-Love, the joint View to 
 which does not increafe our Approbation : 
 But then it muft again be owned, that we 
 cannot form a juft Conclufion of a Cha- 
 ratter from one or two kind, generous Ac- 
 tions, efpecially where there has been no 
 very ftrong Motives to the contrary. Some 
 apparent Motives of Intereft may after- 
 wards overbalance the kind Affections, 
 and lead the Agent into vicious Actions. 
 But the Reflection on Virtue, the being 
 once charmed with the lovely Form, will 
 
 Idifcover an Intereft on its fide, which, if 
 well attended to, no other Motive will 
 overba'iance. This Reflection is a great 
 Security to the Character ; this muft be 
 fuppofed in fuch Creatures as Men are, be- 
 fore we can well depend upon a Conftancy 
 in Virtue. The fame may be laid of many 
 other Motives to Virtue from Intereft ; 
 which, tho they do not immediately ir> 
 fluence the kind Affections of the Agent, 
 yet do remove thefe Qbft teles to them, 
 from falfe Appearances of Intereft, Such 
 are thefe from the Sanctions of divine 
 Laws by future Rewards and Punifhments* 
 and even the manifeft Advantages of Vir- 
 tue in this Life: without Reflection on 
 which, a fteddy Courfe of Virtue is fcarce 
 to be expected amidft the prefent Confufion 
 of human Affairs. 
 
 SECT.
 
 MOR AL SE N S E. $01 
 Sect. 6. 
 
 SECT. VI. 
 
 How far a Regard to the ^Detty is 
 necejfary to make an Affton vir* 
 tuous. 
 
 I. Q1 O M E do imagine, that " to make 
 [j " an Action virtuous, it is necefla- 
 " ry that the Agent mould have previoufly 
 *' known his Action to be acceptable to 
 " the DEITY, and have undertaken it 
 ** chiefly with defign to pleafe or obey 
 " him. We have not, fay they, reafbn 
 " to imagine a malicious Intention in many 
 " of the worft Actions: the very want 
 " f &d Slffeftions in their jufl ^Degree* 
 " muft conftitute moral Evil. Jf fo, then 
 * ' the moral Evil in the want of Love or 
 '* Gratitude ', muft increafe in proportion 
 " to the Caufes of Love or Gratitude vo. 
 " the Object : by the Caufes of Love, 
 " they mean thoje Dualities in the ObjeEt 
 ** upon Obfervation of which Love ox 
 *' Gratitude do arife in every good Tera- 
 " per. Now the Caufes of Love toward 
 " the DEI T Y are infinite ; therefore the 
 " want of the higheft poffible Degree of 
 " Love to him, muft be infinitely evil. 
 To be excited more by /mailer 
 
 Motives .
 
 3 oi IJJuJtratwns upon the 
 
 Seel:. 6-" Motives or Caufes than by greater; to 
 love thofe who are lefs lovely, while 
 " we neglect him in whom are infinite 
 " Caufes of Love, muft argue great f Per- 
 " verfenefs of AfTe&ions. But the Caufes 
 " of Love in the DEITY, his infinite 
 ' Goodnefs toward all, and even toward 
 c our felves, from whence fprings all the 
 " Happinefs of our Lives, are infinitely 
 " above any Caufes of Love to be found 
 " in Creatures : Therefore to ad: from 
 *' Love to them without Intention to pleaie 
 ** GOD, muft be infinitely evil." 
 
 IF this Reafoning be juft, the beft of 
 Men are infinitely evil. The Diftin&ion 
 between habitual and attual Intention will 
 not remove the Difficulty, fmce thefe Ar- 
 guments require attual Intention. An 
 habitual Intention is not a prefent ad of 
 Love to the DEITY, influencing our Ac- 
 tions more than actual Love to Creatures, 
 which this Argument requires ; but a prior 
 general Refolution not at prefent repeated. 
 
 T o find what is juft on this Subject, we 
 may premife fome Propofitions of , which 
 Men muft convince themfelves by Re- 
 flettion. 
 
 Temper 
 
 II. T H E R E is in Mankind fuch a 
 
 naturally, that they defire the Hap- 
 of pinefs of any known fenfit'we Nature,
 
 MORAL SENSE. JO} 
 
 when it is not inconfiftent with fomethingSect 6. 
 more ftrongly defired ; fo that were there ^v x *' 
 no Oppojltions of Intereji eirher private or 
 publick, and fufficient Power, we would 
 confer upon every Being the higheft Hap- 
 pinefs which it could receive. 
 
 BUT o\K e ~Underftanding and Tower are 
 limited, fo that we cannot know many 
 other Natures, nor is our utmoft Tower 
 capable of promoting the Happinefs of 
 many : our Actions are therefore influen- 
 ced by fome Jlronger Affections than this 
 general Benevolence. There are certain 
 Qualities found in fome Beings more than 
 in others, which excite ftronger^D^^jof 
 Good-will, and determine our Attention to 
 their Interefts, while that of others is neg- 
 lected. The Ties of Blood, Benefits 
 conferred upon us, and the Obfervation of 
 Virtue in others, raife much more vigo- 
 rous Affections, than that general Bene- 
 volence which we may have toward all. 
 Thefe Qualities or Relations we may call 
 the Caufes of Love. 
 
 HOWEVER thefe Affections are very 
 different from the general Benevolence to- 
 ward all, yet it is very probable, that there 
 is a Regularity or Proportion obferved in 
 the Conftitution of our Nature ; fo that, 
 abftra&ing.from fome acquired &/>/, or 
 
 Aflb-
 
 304 Illujlrattons upon the 
 
 Seel:. 6 .Affectations of Ideas, and from the more 
 l/vv fudden Emotions of fome particular Pa 
 fions, that Temper which has the mod 
 lively Gratitude^ or is the mod fuiceptive 
 of Friendjhip with virtuous Characters, 
 would alfo have the ftrongeft general Be- 
 nevolence toward indifferent Perfbns : And 
 on the contrary, where there is the weakelt 
 general Benevolence, there we could ex- 
 peel: the lead Gratitude, and the leafl 
 Friendjhip, or Love toward the Virtuous. 
 If this "Proportion be obferved, then, if 
 we exprefs all thefe Defires of the good of 
 others by the Name of Benevolence, we 
 may denote the feveral '[Degrees in which 
 Men pofTefs thefe feveral kind Difpofitions 
 by the Goodnefs of the Temper: And the 
 Degrees of Defire toward the Happinefs of 
 any Perlbn, we may call the Quantity of 
 Love toward him. Then, 
 
 THE Quantity of Love toward any 
 Perfon is in a compound Proportion of the 
 apprehended Caufes of Love in him, and 
 of the Gcodnefs of Temper in the Obfer^- 
 ver. Or L = C x G. 
 
 WHEN the Caufes of Love in two Ob- 
 jects are apprehended equal, the Love to- 
 ward either in different Perlbns is as the 
 Goodnefs of Temper ; or L = G x i . 
 
 2 WHEN
 
 MOR A L SENS E; 30? 
 
 Sect. 6* 
 
 WHEN the Goodnefs of Temper is the 
 fame or equal, the Love toward any Ob- 
 jects will be as the Caufes ; or L = Cx i. 
 
 
 THE Goodnefs of any Temper is there- 
 fore as the Quantity of Love, divided by 
 
 the apprehended Caufes , or G= -. Arid 
 
 fince we cannot apprehend any Goodnefs in 
 having the 'Degree of Love above the 'Pro- 
 portion of its Caufes, the moft virtuous 
 Temper is that in which the Love equals 
 its Caufes, which may therefore be expref- 
 fed by Unity *. 
 
 'liu.tonr.VHU unfi.,Di:j -old*"*! 
 HENCE it follows, that if there were 
 any Nature incomparably more excellent 
 than any of our Fellow-Creatures, from 
 whom alfo we our felves,. and all others 
 had received the greateft Benefits; there 
 would be Jefs Virtue in any fmall Degree of 
 'Dejire of his Happinefs, than in a like 
 "Degree of Love toward our Fellow-Crea- 
 ture. But not loving fuch a Being, or 
 having a Jmaller 'Degree of Love^ muft 
 evidence a much greater 'DcfeEi in Virtue* 
 than a like want of Love toward our Fel- 
 low-Creatures. For the Caufes of Love 
 being very great, unlefs the Love be alfo 
 
 * See Trent, z. Sift. 3. Art. n. laft Paragraph. 
 
 X very
 
 306 Illttftrations upon the 
 
 Seel:. 6. very great, the Quotient which exprefies 
 ^-nr^ the Goodnefs of Temper will be very much 
 below Unity. 
 
 T . , r v r *Jt* 
 
 The gene- HI. T o apply this to the D E i T Y is very 
 l f*A* obvious. Our Affections toward him arife in 
 *e Love tne ^ me manner as toward our Fellows, in 
 of God. proportion to our Attention to the Caufes 
 of Love in him, and the Goodnefs of our 
 Temper. The Reflection on his Good- 
 nefs railes Approbation and Complacence, 
 his Benefts raife Gratitude* and both oc- 
 cafion Good-will or Benevolence. Some 
 imagine, that " his Happinefs is wholly 
 " detached from all Events in this World, 
 " abfblute, and unvaried in himfelf." And 
 yet the lame Inclination of Mind might 
 remain in us, tho we had this Opinion. 
 When the Happinefs of a Friend is in 
 Sufpenfe^ we defire it ; when he has ob- 
 tained all that which we defired, the lame 
 Inclination of Mind feems to remain to- 
 ward him, only without that 'Vneajinejs ac- 
 companying Defire of an uncertain Objecl: : 
 Thus Gravity may be faid to be the fame 
 when a Body is refting on a fixed Bafe, as 
 when it caufed defcent. 
 
 UPON this Scheme of the divine Hap- 
 pinefs, it is not eafy to account how our 
 Love to him could excite us to promote the 
 Happinefs of our Fellows. Our frequent 
 Contemplation of fuch an amiable excellent 
 
 Nature
 
 MORA L S E N s E. 
 
 Nature, might indeed tend to reform or Sect. 6. 
 improve our Temper. 
 
 I F we imagine that the D E i T Y has fuch 
 'Perceptions of Approbation or ^Dijlike to- 
 ward Actions as we have our felves, then 
 indeed our Love to him would directly ex- 
 cite us to do whatever he approves, and 
 fhun what he condemns. We can fcarce 
 avoid imagining, that the frequent recurring 
 of Events dij approved, muft be uneafy to 
 any Nature, and that the obferving ap- 
 proved Actions muft be delightful. 
 
 I F we imagine that the divine Happi- 
 nefs, or any part of it is connected with 
 the Happinefs of his Creatures, fo that 
 their Happinefs is conftitutcd the Occafion 
 of his ; then indeed our Love to the DEITY 
 will directly excite us to all manner of be- 
 nefcent Actions. 'Tis true, many good 
 Men deny thefe two laft Opinions, yet it 
 is probable, when their Minds are diver- 
 ted from Speculations \ by Opportunities 
 of Action, there recurs fome Imagination 
 of Offence, IJneafinefs, and Refentmerit 
 in the DEITY, upon obferving evil Ac- 
 tions \ of 'Delight and Joy in beholding 
 good Actions ; of Sorrow upon obferving 
 the Mifery of his Creatures, and Joy upon 
 feeing them happy : So that by their Lovf 
 to the DEITY they are influenced to be- 
 neficent Actions , notwithstanding their 
 X 2 ffecu-
 
 308 Illufirations upon the 
 
 Sect. 6^fpcculative Opinions. In our Conceptions 
 v^vx-/ of the DEITY, we are continually led to 
 
 imagine a Refemblance to what we feel in 
 
 our lelves. 
 
 O/' ; .' " v 
 
 WHOEVER maintains thefe Opinions of 
 the DEITY to be true, muft allb fuppofe 
 " a particular 'Determination of all Events 
 " in the Univerfe ;" otherwife this part of 
 the divine Happinels is made precarious 
 and uncertain, depending upon the unde* 
 term'med Will of Creatures. 
 
 THE Diverfity of Opinions concerning 
 the divine Happinefs, may lead Men into 
 different ways of accounting for the Influ- 
 ence which the Love of GOD may have 
 upon our Actions toward our Fellows : But 
 the AfFedions toward the DEITY would 
 be much the lame upon both Schemes. 
 Where there were the lame juft Apprehen- 
 fans of the divine Goodnefs in two Per- 
 fons, the Love to the. DEITY in both 
 would be proportioned to the Goodnefs of 
 Temper. Tho the higheft potfible ^Degree 
 of Love to a perfectly good DEITY, would 
 evidence no more Virtue of Temper* than 
 a proportioned Love to Creatures \ yet 
 the having only fmaller Degrees of Love 
 to the DEITY, would evidence a greater 
 T)efeff of Goodnefs in the Temper, than 
 any want of dffeftion toward Creatures. 
 
 HERE
 
 MORAL SENSE. 309 
 
 Sett. 
 
 HERE it mud be remembred, that i 
 arguing concerning the Goodnefs of Temper 
 from the degree of Love directly, and the 
 Cattfes of Love inverfly, actual Attention 
 to the Caufts of Love is fuppofed in the 
 Perfbn. For 'tis plain, that in the beft 
 Temper no one Affettion or Idea can al- 
 ways continue prefent, and there can be 
 no Affetfion preient to the Mind, toward 
 any Object, while the Idea of it is not 
 prefent. The bare Abfence therefore of 
 AfTe&ion, while the Mind is employed up- 
 on a different Object, can argue no evil 
 in the Temper, farther than want of At* 
 tention may argue want of Affeflion. In 
 like manner, in the beft Temper, there can 
 be no Love toward an Objed: unknown : 
 The want therefore of Love to an Objett 
 unknown , can argue no evil in the Temper, 
 farther than Ignorance may argue want of 
 Affettisn. It is certain indeed , that he 
 who knows that there is a good DEITY, 
 and actually thinks of him, and of all his 
 Benefits, yet has not the flrongefl Love 
 and Gratitude toward him, muft have a 
 Temper void of all Goodnefs ; but it will 
 not follow, that that Mind is void of Good- 
 nefs which is not always thinking of the 
 DEITY, or actually loving him, or even 
 does not know him. How far the want 
 of Attention to the DEITY, and Igno- 
 rance of him, may argue an evil Temper, 
 X muft
 
 3 1 o Illujlratwns npon the 
 
 Se<5t 6. mud be fliown from different Topicks, to 
 confidercd hereafter. 
 
 IV". Bur previoufly to thefe Inquiries we 
 greet of muft confider " what 'Degrees or Kinds of 
 nwfiry " AfTedion are neceffary to obtain the 
 toinno. " fimple Approbation of Innocence." 'Tis 
 ccncc. pl a i n , the ^r^ Ab fence of all Malice is 
 not enough. We may have the general 
 Benevolence toward a mere fenjitive Na- 
 ture, which had no other defire but Self- 
 Lave-, but we can apprehend no moral 
 Goodnefs in fuch a Being : Nay, 'tis not 
 every Jrnall degree of kind Affections 
 which we approve. There muft be fbme 
 proportion of kind Affections to the other 
 Faculties in any Nature, particularly to its 
 ^nderftanding and atJive Towers to ob- 
 tain Approbation. Some Brutes evidence 
 fmall Degrees of Good-will^ which make 
 them be approved in their Kind ; but the 
 fame Degrees would not be approved in a 
 Man. There is an higher Degree expedted 
 in Mankind, to which, if they do not 
 come up, we do not account them inno- 
 cent. It is not eafy to fix precifely that 
 ^Degree which we approve as innocent by 
 our moral Senfe. Every kind Affection, 
 if it be confidered only with relation to its 
 own Object, is indeed approved ; fuch as 
 natural Affection , Gratitude , Tity , 
 Friendjloip : And yet when we take a 
 rpore extenfive View of the Tendency of 
 
 feme
 
 MORAL SENSE. 311 
 
 fome Adtions proceeding even from thefeSecl:. 6. 
 Affections, we may often condemn thefe 
 Actions when they are apprehended as per- 
 nicious to larger Syflems of Mankind. In 
 the fame manner we often condemn Ac- 
 tions done from Love to a particular 
 Country, when they appear to be perni- 
 cious to Mankind in general. In like man- 
 ner, Self -'Prefer vat ion and purfuing pri~ 
 vate Advantage abftradly confidered, is 
 innocent : But when it is apprehended as 
 very pernicious in any cafe to the Safety 
 of others, it is condemned. 
 
 MANKIND are capable of large exten- 
 five Ideas of 'great Societies. And it is ex- 
 pected of them, that their general Bene- 
 volence fhould continually direcl: and limit, 
 not only their fe 'Ifi 7 /h Affeffions, but even 
 their nearer Attachments to others: that 
 their Defire of pttblick Good, and Aver- 
 flon to publick Mifery, mould overcome 
 at lead their Defire of pojltive private Ad- 
 vantages, either to themfclves or their 
 particular Favourites ; fo as to make them 
 abftain from any Action which would be 
 pofitively pernicious or hurtful to Man- 
 kind, however beneficial it might be to 
 themfelveS) or their Favourites. To un- 
 dergo pofitive Evil for the fake of pofitive 
 Good to others, fecms fome degree of Virtue 
 above Innocence * which we do not univer- 
 fally cxped:: But to reject fofitive at- 
 X 4 tamable
 
 1 ^ Illustrations upon the 
 
 Seel:. 6. tamable good, either for our felves or our 
 particular Favourites, rather than occafion 
 any confiderable Mifery to others, is re- 
 ,quifite to obtain the Approbation of Inno- 
 cence. The want of this Degree we po- 
 fitively condemn as evil ; and an Agent 
 mud rife above it by pojltive Services to 
 Mankind, with fome Trotible and Exfence 
 to himfelf, before we approve him as viVr 
 tuous. We feem indeed univerfally to ex- 
 ped: from all Men thofe good Offices which 
 give the Agent no trouble or expence : 
 Whoever refufes them is below Innocence. 
 But we do not pojltively condemn thofe as 
 evil, who will not facrifice their private In- 
 tereft to the Advancement of the pofitive 
 Good of others, unlefs the private Intereft 
 be very Jmall, and the publickGood very 
 
 BUT as the Defire of fojitive private 
 Good is weaker than Averfion to private 
 Evil, or Pain ; fo our ^Defire of the pofi- 
 tive Good of others, is weaker than our 
 Averjion to their Mifery : It feems at leaft 
 requifite to Innocence* that the ftronger 
 jpublzck Affeffion, viz-, our Averfion to 
 the Mifery of others, ihould fin-mount the 
 weaker private Affeffipn, the Defire of 
 pofitive private Good; fo that no profpecl: 
 of Good to our felves, fhould engage us 
 to that which would occafion Mifery to ' 
 pthers. It is in like manner requifite to 
 
 In-
 
 MOR A L S E N S E. 313 
 
 Innocence, that our Averfion to the Mifery Seel:. 5. 
 of greater or equal Syftems, fhould fur- 
 mount our Defire of thepo/ttive Good of 
 theie to which we are more particularly 
 attached. 
 
 How far it may be neceflary to Inno* 
 cence to fubmit to fmaller private fains 
 to prevent the greater Sufferings of others, 
 or to promote fome great ^0/fr/w Advan- 
 tages ; or how far the Happinefs of pri- 
 vate Syflems fhould be negleded for the 
 Happinefs of the greater , in order to ob- 
 tain the Approbation of Innocence, it is 
 perhaps impoiTible preciiely to determine, 
 or to fix any general Rules ; nor indeed is 
 it necefTary. Our bufmefs is not to find 
 out " at how cheap a Rate we can purchafe 
 " Innocence, but to know what is moft 
 *' noble, generous and virtuous in Life." 
 This we know confifts in facrificing all/0- 
 fitive Interefls , and bearing all private 
 Evils for the publick Good : And in fub- 
 mitting alfo the Interefts of all fmaller 
 Syftems to the Interefts of the whole: 
 Without any other Exception or Rcfcrve 
 than this, that every Man may look upon 
 himfelf as a Tart of this Syftem, and con- 
 fequently not facrifice an important pri- 
 vate Intereft to a lefs important Intereft 
 of others. We may find the fame Ibrt of 
 Difficulty about all our other Senfes, in 
 determining precifely what Objects are in- 
 different,
 
 3 1 4 lUitf rations upon the 
 
 Se&. 6,dtff&tnt^ or where Pleafare ends, and Dif- 
 begins, tho the pofitive Degrees of 
 the grateful and ungrateful are eafily 
 diftinguifhed. 
 
 I T is alfb very difficult to fix any pre- 
 cife'Degreeof Affe&ion to ward the DEITY, 
 which "fhould be barely requifite to Inno- 
 cence. Only in general we muft difapprove 
 that Temper, which, upon Apprehenfion 
 of the perfect Goodneis of the DEITY, 
 and of his innumerable Benefits to Mankind, 
 has aotflrOKgtr Affections of Love and 
 Gratitude toward him, than thofe toward 
 any other Being. Such Affections would 
 DccefTarily raife frequent Attention and 
 Confideration of our Actions ; and would 
 engage us, if we apprehended any of them 
 to be ofFenfive to him, or contrary to that 
 Scheme of Events in which we apprehen- 
 ded the DEITY to delight, to avoid them 
 with a more firm Refolutiou than what we 
 had in any other Affairs. Tojitive Virtue 
 toward the DEITY muft go farther than a 
 refolute abstaining from Offence^ by en- 
 gaging us with the greateft Vigor, to do 
 whatever we apprehend as positively 
 f leafing, or conducive to thofe Ends in 
 which we apprehend the DEITY delights. 
 It is fcarce conceivable that any good Tem- 
 per can want fuch Affections toward the 
 DEITY, when once he is known, as were 
 above fuppofed neceffary to Innocenw. Nor 
 
 can
 
 MORAL SENSE. 315 
 
 can we imagine /0/fr/-z/' 'Degrees of Good- Sedt. 6 
 nefs of Temper above Innocence, where O^YNj 
 Affections toward the D E i T v do not arife 
 proportionably. 
 
 WHAT is here faid relates only to the 
 Apprehenjions of our moral Senfe, and 
 not to thofe Degrees of Virtue which the 
 DEITY may require by Revelation : And 
 every one's Heart may inform him, whether 
 or no he does not approve, at lead as in- 
 nocent , thofe who omit many good Offices 
 which they might fojjlbly have done, pro- 
 vided they do a great deal of good ; thofe 
 who carefully abftain from every appre- 
 hended Offence toward the DEITY, rho 
 they might poflibly be more frequent in 
 Acls of 'Devotion. 'Tis true indeed, the 
 Omijfion of what we know to be required 
 is pofitivcly evil ; fo that by a Revelation 
 we may be obliged to farther Services than 
 were requifite previoufly to it, which we 
 could not innocently omit, after this Re- 
 velation is known : Bur we are here only 
 confidering our moral Senfe. 
 
 V. N o \v let us inquire how hrfimple Ig- HOW far 
 norance of a D E I T Y, or unaffettedAtheifm 1 ****' 
 does evidence *\\ evil c Difpofit ion, Of 2jfe-/* & ' 
 feft of good Affections below Innocence. 
 
 T. AFFECTIONS arifing upon apparent 
 Canfes, or prefect Opinions, rho falfe, if 
 
 they
 
 $v6 Il/ujlrations upon the 
 
 Seel:. 6. they be fach as would arife in the heft 
 *SY**>) ] Temper, were rhefe Opinions true, cannot 
 argue any prefent want ofGoodnefs in any 
 Temper, of themfelves : the Opinions in- 
 deed may often argue a want of Goodnefs 
 at the time they were formed : But to a 
 benevolent Temper there is no Caufe of 
 Malice, or Defire of the Mtfery or Non- 
 exiflence of any Being for itfelf. There 
 may be Caufes of Diflike, and Defire of 
 Mifery or Non-exiftence, as the Means of 
 greater Good, or of leflening Evil. 
 
 2. No Object which is entirely tin- 
 known, or of which we have no Idea, can 
 raile Affection in the beft Temper ; conic- 
 quently want of Affettion to an unknown 
 Objecl: evidences no evil. This would be 
 the Cafe of thofe who never heard even 
 the Report of a DEITY, if ever there 
 were any fuch : Or who never heard of 
 any Fellow-Creatures, if one may make 
 a Suppofition like to that made by Cicero *. 
 And this is perhaps the Cafe, as to the 
 DEITY, of any unfortunate Children, who 
 may have fome little 'Vfe of Reafon, before 
 they are inftru&ed in any Religion. 
 
 I F there really were an Innate Idea of a 
 DEIT Y fo imprinted, that no Perfon could 
 
 * De Nat, Deor. Lib. i. cap. 37- E* Ariftotele. 
 
 be
 
 MORAL SENSE. 317 
 
 be without it ; or if we are fo difpofed, aSg A 
 neceffarily to receive this Idea, as foon as 
 we can be called moral Agents : then no 
 Ignorance of a DEITY can be innocent ; all 
 Atheifm muft be affected, or an Opinion 
 formed, either thro 7 evil Affection, or 
 want of good Affection below Innocence. 
 But if the Idea of a D HIT Y be neither im- 
 printed, nor offer itlelf even previoufly to 
 any Reflection, nor be nniverfally excited 
 by Tradition, the bare Want of it, where 
 there has been no Tradition or Reflection, 
 cannot be called criminal upon any Scheme. 
 Thofe who make Virtue and Vice relative 
 to a Law, may fay, " Men are required 
 * ' to reflect, and thence to know a D E IT Y." 
 Butthey muftallow^V -omu Igat 'ion neceffary, 
 before Difbbedience to a Law can be cri- 
 minal. Now previoufly to Reflection it is 
 fuppofed impofllble for the Agent to know 
 the Legijlator, .or to know the Law re- 
 quiring him to reflect, therefore this Law 
 requiring him to reflect, was not antece- 
 dently to his Reflexion publiihed .to. him. 
 
 i-ffo 
 
 THE Cafe of human Laws, the Igno- 
 rance of which does not excufe, is not pa- 
 rallel to this. No Perfon under any Civil 
 Government can be fuppofed ignorant that 
 there are Laws made for the whole State. 
 But in the prefent Suppofition, Men antece- 
 dently to Reflection may be ignorant of the 
 DEITY, or that there are Laws of Na- 
 
 ture.
 
 3 1 8 IliuJlYations upon the 
 
 Seel:. 6.ture. If any Subject could thus be unaf- 
 ^^r*s priz,ed, that he lived under Civil Govern- 
 ment, he fhould not be accounted Compos 
 Mentis. The Suppofirion indeed in both 
 Cafes is perhaps wholly imaginary, at 
 lead as to Perfons above Childhood. One 
 can fcarce imagine that ever any Perfon 
 was wholly unapprized of a governing 
 Mind, and of a Right and Wrong in Mo- 
 rals. Whether this is to be afcribed to in- 
 nate Ideas, to univerfal Tradition^ or to 
 fome nece/ary ^Determination in our Na- 
 ture, to imagine a defigning Caufe of the 
 beautiful Obje&s which occur to us, with 
 a moral Senfe, let the curious inquire. 
 
 3. SUPPOSE an Idea formed in a bene- 
 volent Mind, of other fenfitive Natures, 
 'Defire of their Exiftence and Happinefs 
 would arife. 
 
 ..At-siii '' ; Mv* ^v^^^a^,^ 
 
 4. A G o o D Temper would incline any 
 one to wifh, that other Natures were be- 
 nevolent, or morally Good, fmce this is 
 the chief Happinefs. 
 
 5. A GOOD Temper would defire thac 
 the Adminiftration of Nature were by a be- 
 nevolent or good Mind. 
 
 6. ALL Defire of any Event or Cir- 
 cumftance inclines any Mind to fearch into 
 the Truth of that Event or-Circumilance, 
 
 by
 
 Mo R A JL SE NS'BI jip 
 
 by all the Evidence within its power to Se&. 6- 
 obtain. 
 
 7. WHERE there is fuch Tic fire, and 
 fufficiently obvious Evidence given in pro- 
 portion to the Sagacity of the defiring 
 Mind, it will come to the Knowledge of 
 the Truth, if its Defire be ftrong. 
 
 Now from thefe Propofitions we may 
 deduce the following Corollaries. 
 
 1 . SUPPOSING the Idea of a good 
 DEITY once apprehended, or excited ei- 
 ther by Report^ or the flighted Reflec- 
 tion ; if there be objective Evidence in Na- 
 ture proportioned to the Cafacicy of the 
 Inquirer, for the Exiftence of a good 
 DEITY, Atheifm directly argues want of 
 good AfFe&ion below Innocence. 
 
 2. IF there be only the ilmple Tradi- 
 tion or Trefumption of a governing Mind 
 once raifed ; and if there be Evidence as 
 before for his Goodnefs, to conclude the 
 DEITY evil or malicious , muft argue wane 
 of good Affetlion as before. 
 
 3. SUPPOSE the Idea of an evil DEITY 
 once excited, and fome Preemptions for 
 his Malice from Tradition, or flight Re- 
 flettion upon particular Evils in Nature ; 
 to reft in this Opinion without Inquiry, 
 
 would
 
 jio lllujtrations upon the 
 
 Seel:. 6- would argue want of good Affection ; to 
 i/V^o defire to reject this Opinion, or confute it 
 by contrary Evidence, would argue good 
 Affection : Suppofe fuch contrary Eviden- 
 ces obvious enough in Nature to one who 
 inquired as diligently about it as about 
 his own Interefl ; to continue in the falfe 
 Opinion cannot be innocent. 
 
 HOW igno- VI. I N like manner concerning our Fel- 
 rance in low-Creatures, who are actually known to 
 
 fairs e-vi- US * 
 dences a. 
 
 bad Tem- ^ x o imagine Fellow-Creatures morally 
 Good, either according to Evidence upon 
 Inquiry, or even by a rafli Opinion* evi- 
 dences good Affection. 
 
 5 . IMAGINING them Evil contrary to 
 obvious Evidence, argues want of good 
 Affection below Innocence. 
 
 ;\ m?; , idi Lo *J - ui-b - ,1.1 $ 
 
 -^'REqrAiNiNG and inculcating ari 
 Opinion either of the Caufes of Love in 
 others, or of the Caufes of Averfion, in- 
 duces an Habit ; and makes the Temper 
 prone to the AffeEtion often raifed. Opi- 
 nion of Goodnefs in the DEITY and our 
 Fellows, increafes good- Affection^ and im- 
 proves the Temper : Contrary Opinion of 
 either , by raifing frequent Averfions , 
 weakens good AJfeffion, and impairs the 
 Temper. 
 
 THIS
 
 MORAL SENS fc. 521 
 
 Sett. 6, 
 
 THIS may fhew how cautious Men 
 ought to be in patting Sentence upon 
 the Impiety of their Fellows, or repre- 
 fenting them as wicked and profane* or 
 hateful to the DEITY, and juftly given 
 over to eternaJ Mifery : We may lee aJfb 
 what a wife Mark it is to know the true 
 Church by, that " it pronounces Damna- 
 " tion on all others." Which is one of 
 the Characters of the Romijh Church, by 
 which it is often recommended as the fafeft 
 for Chriftians to live in. 
 
 THE lame TPropofitions may be ap- 
 plied to our Opinions concerning the na- 
 tural Tendencies of Actions. Where the 
 Evidence is obvious as before* good 
 Affection will produce true Opinions, 
 and falfe Opinions often argue want of 
 good Affection below Innocence. Thus, 
 tho in djjent or ^Diffent of themfelves, 
 there can neither be Virtue nor Vice* 
 yet they may be Evidences of either in 
 the Agent, as well as his external Mo- 
 tions. Tis not poflible indeed for Men 
 to determine precifely in many cafes the 
 Quantity of Evidence, and its propor- 
 tion to the Sagacity of the Obferver, which 
 will argue Guilt in him, who contrary to 
 it, forms a falfe Opinion. But Men are no 
 better judges of the degrees of Virtue 
 Y ' and
 
 3 1 ^ Ilhijlrations upon the 
 
 SecSt 6.*z;/^ J^/V? in external Actions. Thisthere- 
 re will not prove that all falfe Opinions 
 or Errors are innocent, more than ex- 
 ternal Aflions : The Searcher of Hearts 
 can judge exactly of both. Human Tu- 
 nijbments are only Methods of Self-*De- 
 fenfe ; in which the degrees of Guilt 
 are not the proper Meafure, but the Ne- 
 cejjlty of refraining Attions for the Safety 
 of the Tublick. 
 
 t VIL IT is next to be confidered, how 
 &* want of Attention to the DEITY can 
 argue want of good A ffe ft ions, in any Agent, 
 bad Tem- to whom he is known. 
 
 per. 
 
 EVERY good Temfer will have flrong 
 Affections to a good DEITY, and where 
 there is flrong Affettion there will be fre- 
 quent Reflection upon the Objecl: beloved, 
 *Defire of pleafing, and Caution of offence. 
 In like manner every Perlbn of good Tem- 
 per, who has had the Knowledge of a 
 'Country, a Syftem, a Sfecies, will confi- 
 der how far thefe great Societies may be 
 afle&ed by his Actions, with fuch Atten- 
 tion as he ufes in his own Affairs ; and will 
 abftain from what is injurious to them. 
 ffejH ' \7*i-mrv . .; 
 
 ATTENTION to aDsiTY apprehended 
 as good, and governing the Univerfe, will 
 increafe the Moment of Benefcence in any 
 
 good
 
 MORAL SENSE. 32* 
 
 good Agent, various ways, fuch as by Seel 6. 
 Profpe&s of Reward, either prefent 
 future, by improving his Temper thro* 
 Obfervation of fo amiable a 'Pattern, or 
 by raifing Sentiments of Gratitude toward 
 the DEITY, a part of whofe Happinefs^ 
 the Agent may imagine depends upon the* 
 Happinefs of the Univerfe. In like man- 
 ner, the considering a Sfecies or Syftem 
 may increafe our good Offices, fince their 
 Interefts are advanced by good Offices to 
 Individuals. 
 
 BUT then from a like Reafonifag to that 
 in Art. H. 'tis plain, that in equal Mo- 
 ments of good produced by two Agents, 
 the Goodnefs of the Temper is inverfly 
 as the feveral additional Helps, or Mo- 
 fives to it. So that more Virtue is evi- 
 denced by any given Moment of Benefi- 
 cence from good AfFe&ions only toward 
 our Fellows, or particular Perlons, than 
 by the fame Moment produced from the 
 joint Confutations of the DEITY, or of 
 a general Syjlem or Sfecies. 
 
 B u T an injurious A&ion which ap- 
 peared to the Agent not only pernicious to 
 his Fellows, or to particular Perfbns, but 
 offenjive to the DEITY, and pernicious to 
 * Syftem^ is much more vicious than when 
 the Agent did not reflect upon the D E i T y 
 or a Community. 
 
 Y * vnr.
 
 Illujlrations upon the 
 
 Sed. 6. 
 
 VIII. WE mufl not hence imagine, 
 tnat in or ^ er to P rO( ^ uce grater Virtue in 
 our felves, we fhould regard the DEITV 
 Duty no f ar ther, than merely to abflain from 
 , Offences, Were it our fble Intention in 
 
 and gene- beneficent Actions, only to obtain the 
 private Tleafure of Self- Approbation for 
 the Degree of our Virtue, this might feem 
 the proper Means of having great Vir- 
 tue with the lead Expence. But if the 
 real Intention, which conftitutes an Adion 
 virtuous, be the promoting pub lick Good\ 
 then voluntarily to rejedt the Confidera- 
 tion of any Motive which would increafe 
 the Moment of publick Good, or would 
 make us more vigorous and ftedfaft in Vir- 
 tue, muft argue 'want of good Affection. 
 In any given Moment of Beneficence, the 
 unaffected Want of Regard to the DEITY, 
 or to private Interefl^ does really argue 
 greater Virtue. But the retaining thefe 
 Motives with a View to increafe the Mo- 
 ment of publick Good in our Adious, if 
 they really do (b, argues Virtue equal to, or 
 greater than that in the former Cafe : And 
 the affected Neglect of thefe Motives, 
 that fb we may acquit our felves virtuoufly 
 with the leaf Expence to our felves, or 
 With the lean: Moment of publick Good, 
 muft evidence want of good Affections, and 
 bafe Trick and Artifice to impofe upon 
 
 Ob-
 
 MOR AL SENSE. ji 
 
 Obfervers, or our own Hearts. There- Se# 
 fore 
 
 SINCE Gratitude to the D E i T Y, 
 
 and even Confideration of private Inte- 
 ref, tend to increafe the Moment of our 
 Beneficence, and to ftrengthen good Af- 
 fections, the voluntary Retaining them 
 with this View evidences Virtue, and of- 
 feffing to negled; them evidences Vice*. 
 And yet, 
 
 I F the Moment produced by the Con- 
 junction of thefe Motives, be not greater 
 than that produced with unaffected Neg- 
 lect of thefe Motives, from particular good 
 
 * T H i s may fufficiently juftify the Writers of Morality 
 in their proving, that " Virtue is the fureft Means of Hap 
 " pinefstothe Agent." "Tis alfo plain from univerfal .v- 
 perience, that a Regard to the Deity, frequent Reflection on 
 his Goodnefs, and confequent A5ls of Love, are the 
 ftrongeft and moft univerfally prevailing Means of obtaining 
 a good Temper. Whatever Inftitution therefore does moft 
 effeftually tend to raife Mens Attention, to recal their 
 Minds from the Hurry of their common Affairs, to 
 ytftrutt them in the Ways of promoting publick Good 
 /farther than the bufy Part of the World without afllftance 
 Would probably apprehend, muft be fo wife and good, that 
 every honed Mind fhould rejoice in it, even tho it had no 
 other Authority than human to recommend it. Every one 
 will underftand that by this is meant zpublick Worflnp on fet 
 Pays, in which a flop is put to Commerce, and the bufy 
 part of Mankind inftrufted in the Duties of Pttty and #4 
 manity, 
 
 AfTec-
 
 Illujlrattons upon the 
 
 SecSt. tf.Affe&ion, there is lefs Virtue in the for- 
 ' mer than in the latter. 
 
 MEN may ufc Names as they pleafe, 
 and may chufe to call nothing Virtue 
 but " what is intended chiefly to evi- 
 " dence Affeftion of one kind or other 
 44 toward the DEITY." Writers on this 
 Scheme are not well agreed about what 
 this virtuous Intention is ; whether only 
 to evidence SubmiJJion, or SubmiJJion and 
 Love, or to obtain the divine Benevo- 
 lence, and private Happinefs to the A- 
 gent, or to give 'Pleafure to the T)eity. 
 But let them not aifert, againft univerlal 
 Experience, that we approve no Actions 
 which are not thus intended toward the 
 DEITY, *Tis plain, a generous compaf- 
 fanate Heart ^ which, at firft view of the 
 Diftrefs of another, flies impatiently to 
 his Relief, or ipares no Expence to ac- 
 complifh it, meets with flrong Approba- 
 tion from every Obferver who has not 
 perverted his Senfe. of Life by SchoolSDi- 
 vinity , or Thilofophy. "Pis to be fuf- 
 pe6ted, that fome Vanity muft be at the 
 Bottom of thefe Notions, which place 
 Virtue in fome Nicety^ which attive 
 Tempers, have not leifure to apprehend, 
 and only the Recluje Student can attairi 
 to,
 
 MORAL SENSE. 327 
 
 T o be led by a weaker Motive, where (XV^J 
 a jlronger is alike prefent to the Mind, 
 to love a Creature more than GOD, or 
 to have jlronger T>ejlres of doing what 
 is grateful to Creatures than to GOD, 
 when we equally attend to both, would 
 certainly argue fome Terverjlon of our 
 Affections ; or to ftudy the particular 
 Good of one, more than that of a Syftem* 
 when we reflected on both : But as BO jfefcr 
 Mind can retain at once a Multiplicity 
 of Objects* fo it cannot always retain 
 any one Obje#. When a Perfon there- 
 fore not thinking at prefent of the DEITY, 
 or of a Community or Syftem , does a 
 beneficent Action from particular Love y 
 he evidences Goodnefs of Temper. The 
 bare Ab fence of the Idea of a D E i T y , or 
 of Affections to him, can evidence no 
 evil ; otherways it would be a Crime to 
 fall ajleep, or to think of any thing 
 elfe : If the bare Abfence of this Idea be 
 no evil, the Pretence of kind Affections 
 to Fellow- Creatures cannot be evil. If 
 indeed our Love to the DEITY excited to 
 any Action, and at the fame time Love to 
 a Creature excited to the Omiffion of it, 
 or to a contrary Action, we muft be 
 very criminal if the former do not pre- 
 vail ; yet this will not argue all A&ions 
 ^o be evil in which pleajlng the I) BIT, Y,
 
 Ilhiflrations upon the 
 
 Se#. 6- is not dire&ly and chiefly inr ended. Nay, 
 that Temper muft really be very defi- 
 cient in Goodnefs, which needs to ex- 
 cite it to any good Office, to recal the 
 Thoughts of a D E i T Y, or a Community ? 
 or a Syfiem. The 'frequent recalling thele 
 Thoughts, indeed, does ftrengthen all good 
 Affections, and increafes the Moment of 
 Beneficence to be expected from any Tem- 
 per ; and with this View frequently to 
 recal fuch Thoughts, muft be one of the 
 beft Helps to Virtue, and evidence high 
 Degrees of it. Nay, one cannot call that 
 Temper entire and complete, which has 
 not the ftrongeft dffeflion toward the 
 greatefl Benefadtor, and the mod worthy 
 Object 
 
 BEINGS of fuch Degrees of Knowledge ^ 
 and fuch Extent of Thought, as Man- 
 kind are not only capable of, but gene- 
 rally obtain, when nothing interrupts their 
 Inquiries, muft naturally ar jf e to the 
 Knowledge of the DE IT v, if their Tem- 
 per be good. They muft form general 
 Conceptions of the whole, and fee the Or- 
 der, Wifdom, and Goodnefs in the Ad- 
 minijlration of Nature in fbme Degree. 
 The Knowledge and Love of the DEITY, 
 the unmerfal MIND, is as natural a Per- 
 fection to fiich a Being as Man, as any 
 Accomplifhment to which we arrive by
 
 MORAL SENSE. 319 
 
 cultivating our natural Difpofitions ; nor Seel:. 
 is that Mind come to the/ roper State and 
 Vigor of its kind, where Religion is not 
 the main Exercife and ^Delight. 
 
 IX. THERE is one very fubtle Arg 
 menton this Subject. Some alledge, "Th 
 " fince the DEITY is really the Caufe 
 " all the Good in the Univerfe, even of' eft of 
 " all the Virtue , or good Ajfeflion in 
 " Creatures, which are the ieeming Caufes 
 " of Love toward them, it muft argue 
 " ftrange Server fan of Temper to love 
 ' thole in whom there is no Caufe of 
 " Love, or who are (as they affeft to 
 " fpeak ) nothing, or Emptinefs of all 
 " Goodnefs. The DEITY alone is amiable, 
 '* in whom there is infinite Ftilnefs of 
 " every amiable Quality. The DEITY, 
 " (ay they, not without fbme Reafcn, is 
 4 * the Caufe of every fleafant Sen fat Jon, 
 " which he immediately excites according 
 ' to a general Law, upon the Occafion 
 " of Motions arifmg in our Bodies ; that 
 " likewife he gave us that general Incli- 
 " nation, which we modify into all our 
 " difTerent Affections ; GOD therefore, 
 " fay they, is alone lovely. Other Things 
 " are not to be beloved, but only the 
 f< Goodnefs of God appearing in them ; 
 ' nay fome do make the loving of them, 
 ?* without confidering GOD as dilplay- 
 
 ing
 
 Ilfaf rations upon the 
 
 6. " ing his Goodnefs in them, to be infi- 
 " nitely evil." 
 
 IN anfwer to this it mud be owned, 
 that " GOD'S being the Caufe of all 
 " the Good in the Univerfe, will no 
 " doubt raife the higheft Love to him in a 
 " good Temper , when it reflects upon 
 " it.** 
 
 BUT i ft, had all Men this Apprehenfion 
 that " there was no good in any Crearure," 
 they really would not love them at all. 
 But Men generally imagine with very good 
 ground, that there arc good Beings diuindfe 
 from God, tho produced by him : And 
 whether this Opinion be true or falfe, it 
 evidences no evil. 
 
 2. As upon this Scheme GOD is the 
 Caufe of all fleafant Senfation* fb is he 
 the Cauie of all Pain : He is, according 
 to them, the Caufe of that Inclination 
 which we modify into ei)il Affection^ well 
 as into good. If then we are to love GOD 
 only, for what we call good Affection in 
 Creatures, and not the Creatures them- 
 felves, we mud alfb only love GOD upon 
 obferving evil Affections in Creatures^ 
 and have no Averfion to the bafeft Tem- 
 per ', fmce God gave the general INCLI- 
 NATION alike in both Cafes,
 
 MORAL SENSE. 
 
 3 . I F we may luppofe r^/ Beings di- 
 Hind: from Q o D, that their Affections are 
 not GOD'S Affections, if G o D is not the 
 only Lover and Hater, if our moral 
 Senfi is determined to approve kind Af- 
 fections , and our Love or Benevolence 
 muft arife toward what we approve ; or if 
 we find an Inftintt to defire the Happinefs 
 of every fenfitive Nature, we cannot avoid 
 loving Creatures, and we muft approve 
 any kind Affections obferved in others to- 
 ward their Fellows, Tis true, we muft 
 approve the higheft Affections toward the 
 DEITY, and condemn, as a 'Deficiency 
 of juft Affections toward GOD any De- 
 gree which is not fuperior to our other 
 Affe&ions. But (till, Affections towards 
 Creatures, if they be difintt Natures 
 from GOD, muft be approved. 
 
 4. IF to make a Mind virtuous, or 
 even innocent, it be neceffary that it mould 
 have fuch fublime Speculations of GOD, 
 as the mV in the Intellectual attive Syf- 
 tem (if we may call one Agent in many 
 'PaJJive Organs an active Syftem) then 
 God has placed the Bulk of Mankind i"a 
 an abfolute Incapacity of Virtue, and in- 
 clined them perpetually to infinite Evil, 
 by their very Inftincts and natural Af- 
 fecJions. Does the Parental Affettion di- 
 
 redt
 
 3 j i Illujtrattons upon the 
 
 Se&. tf.recta Man to love the DEITY, or his 
 Children ? Is it the DIVINITY, to which 
 our Pity or Comfaffton is dire&ed ? Is GOD 
 the Obje& of Humanity ? Is it a 2>/%# 
 to fiipport the DIVINITY, which we call 
 Generojity or Liberality If Upon Receipt 
 of a Benefit , does our Nature lugged 
 only Gratitude toward GOD? Affections 
 toward the DEITY may indeed often ac- 
 company Affections toward Creatures, 
 and do fo in a virtuous Temper : but thefe 
 are diftind Affections. This Notion of 
 making all virtuous Affedions to be only 
 directed toward GOD, is not fuggefled 
 to Men by any thing in their Nature, 
 but arifes from the long fubtle Reafonings 
 of Men at leilure, and unemployed in the 
 natural Affairs of Life. 
 
 5 . I F there be no Virtue or Caufe of 
 Love in Creatures, it is vain for them 
 to debate wherein their Virtue confifts, 
 whether in regard toward the DEITY, or 
 in any thing elfe, fince they are fuppofed 
 to have none at all. 
 
 To conclude this Subject. It feems 
 probable , that however we muft look 
 upon that Temper as exceedingly imfer- 
 fetf, inconftant, and partial, in which 
 Gratitude toward the univerfal Bene- 
 ^ Admiration and Love of they&- 
 
 preme
 
 MORAL SENSE. 
 
 preme original Beauty, T erf eft ion 
 Goodnefs, are not the flrongefl and moft<-/VV 
 prevalent Affe&ions ; yet particular Ac- 
 tions may be innocent , nay virtuous, 
 where there is no aftual Intention of 
 pleafmg the DEITY, influencing the 
 Agent. 
 
 FINIS.
 
 Juft publifll'd, by the fame Author, 
 
 AN Inquiry into the Original of our 
 " Ideas of Beauty and Virtue ; in two 
 Treat ifes. L Concerning Beauty ', Order, 
 Harmony, and 'Defign. II. Concerning 
 Moral Good and Evil. The fecond Edi~ 
 tion corrected and enlargdi.
 
 PROPOSALS 
 
 For frinting by Subfcriftion^ 
 
 AN hiftorical, critical, geographical, 
 chronological, and etymological 
 Dictionary of the Holy Bible ; wherein 
 are explained all the proper Names, men- 
 tion'd in the Oldoi New Teftament, whe- 
 ther of Men, Cities, Countries, Rivers, 
 Mountains, &c. As alfo the fignificanc 
 and remarkable Appellatives that any 
 where occur therein, and all the natural 
 Productions, as Plants, Animals, Stones, 
 Gems, Qfc. The whole digefted into alpha- 
 betical Order, and illuftrated with correct 
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 To which is prefixed, BiblitthccA Sacra, 
 or a copious Catalogue of the bed Editions 
 and Verfions of the Bible. Together with 
 an Account of the moil valuable Commen- 
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 the Whole or any Part thereof. Conclu- 
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 all the Jewijh Coins, Weights and Mea- 
 fures, reduced to our own ; and a literal 
 Tranflation of all the Hebrew, Chaldee, 
 Syriac, and Greek Names in the Bible. 
 With Prefaces proper to each Part. Writ- 
 ten originally in French by Father duguftin 
 
 Calmet,
 
 Calmet, a Benedictine Monk, Abbot of 
 St. Leopold in Nancy. And now tranflated 
 into Englijb) with additional Notes, by 
 Samuel TJOyley M. A. late Fellow of Tri- 
 nity-College in Cambridge ', and Chaplain to 
 the Right Honourable the Earl of Lin- 
 coln ; and 'John Colfen F. R. S. and Vicar 
 of Chalk in Kent. 
 
 This Work upon the neareft Computa- 
 tion will make about three Hundred and 
 Forty Sheets in Folio, befides one Hun- 
 dred and Eighteen curious Copper Plates, 
 Forty-nine whereof are whole Sheet- 
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 two of which to be paid in Hand. 
 
 Subfcriptions are taken in by John- 
 Smith and William Bruce Bookiellers in 
 ^Dublin ; John Osborn and John Longman 
 at the Ship in 'Pater-nofter-Roix, and by 
 mod other Bookfellcrs in Great Britain 
 and Ireland.

 
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