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A WAR MINISTER
AND
HIS WORK
REMINISCENCES OF 1914-1918
BY
GENERAL VON STEIN
Late Quartermaster-General
and War Minister (1916-1918)
LONDON
SKEFFINGTON tf SON, LTD.,
34, SOUTHAMPTON ST., STRAND, W.C.2.
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CONTENTS
CHAPTER I
Homeless
PAGK
The Beginning — To Berlin — My Appointment as War
Minister — Reflections on the Housing Situation at
the End of the War - - - - 13
CHAPTER II
Personalities
Field-Marshal Count von Moltke.
The Laws of War — My Knowledge of Moltke 's Plans
during my Term as Chief of the Operations Depart-
ment — Moltke 's Principles — Moltke not a Soldier by
Temperament — Moltke and the Kaiser - 20
Field-Marshal Count Waldersee.
Waldersee as Chief of the General Staff — His Plan of
Operations Against France — His Views on the Training
of the Officers — His Attitude to Politics - - 33
Field-Marshal Count von Schlieffen.
My Acquaintance with Count von Schlieffen — His
Reputation for Taciturnity — His Development of the
System of General Staff Rides — His Work for the
Kriegsaeademie — His Preparations for the War — The
Development of Heavy Artillery — Not a Fighting
Temperament — A Hard Worker - - 39
viii CONTENTS
PAGE
General von Moltke.
My Term as Chief of a Section under Him — I am
Appointed Deputy Chief of Staff to Him and take the
Field with Him as Quartermaster-General at the
Beginning of the War — He Continues the Methods and
Traditions of His Predecessor — The Kaiser and Liege —
He is taken 111 during the Battle of the Marne — His
Sudden Death — His Achievements are not to be
Measured by Results - - - - 52
CHAPTER HI
Military Preparations for War and Politics
The Relations between Politics and Military Plans — The
Attitude of our Prospective Enemies — The Opening of
the War and our Plan of Operations — The March
Through Belgium — The Question of Right - 58
CHAPTER IV
Mobilisation
My Command of a Division in East Prussia — The Im-
possibility of a Secret Mobilisation — Confusion at
Deutsch-Eylau — My Appointment as Quartermaster-
General — I go to Berlin — I report to von Moltke —
Moltke 's Opinion of the Situation — The Concentration
— In the West — The Capture of Liege - - 65
CHAPTER V
War Days
Ludendorff and Liege — Headquarters Transferred to
Coblenz — The Recall of Hindenburg and Appoint-
ment of Ludendorff — The Movements in the West —
Headquarters Transferred to Luxemburg — Daring
Requisitions — The Failure at the Marne — I Visit the
Armies — A Visit to Rheims — " You Have Been
CONTENTS ix
PAGE
chapter v. — Continued.
Sacrificed for Me ! " — I am Appointed to the Command
of the XIV. Reserve Corps — From Lorraine to Cambrai
— Fighting in the North — On the Somme — Trench
Warfare Begins — My Headquarters at Martinpuich —
Our Relations with the Civilian Population — Pleasant
Memories — A Visit from the Kaiser — Trench-digging
— A Shortage of Ammunition — In the Front Lines —
The Monument in Bapaume Cemetery — Bapaume —
Air Heroes — The English Offensive on the Somme - 74
CHAPTER VI
The War Ministry
My Unfamiliarity with the Ways of the War Ministry — An
Awkward Building — The Routine — The Creation of an
Aviation Department — The Administration Depart-
ment — The Billeting Department — The Medical De-
partment — The General War Department — The Am-
munition Shortage — Anxieties — The Powder Question
— Man-Power — Measures to Meet the Crisis — The
Central Department — The War Bureau — Its Popularity
with the Reichstag — Special Legislation and the
Censorship — The War Press Office — The Question of
an Imperial War Ministry — Relations with the
Reichstag - - - - - -no
CHAPTER VII
The Reichstag
Tales of the Reichstag — The Demands it made on my Time
— My Work on the Auxiliary Service Law — Its Evil
Effects on the Troops — The Reichstag and the
Auxiliary Service Law- — The Reichstag and the
Prussian Franchise — The Reichstag Resolution of
July, 1917 — Its Effects at the Front — The Longing
for Peace — The Reichstag lacked Political Instinct
for Questions of Peace and War — Hardships and
x CONTENTS
PAGE
chapter vii. — Continued.
Complaints in the Army— The Agitation for the
Reduction of Punishments in the Army— The Reich-
stag Fails the Nation in its Hour of Need— The Conflict
of Parties— Our Pacifists— Not all Innocent— The
Vision of Universal Peace— The Attitude of England—
The Internationale and Bolshevism— The Independent
Socialists and Bolshevism— Their Dealings with the
Bolshevik "Ambassador," Joffre— The Efforts of
Michaelis and Capelle to prove Complicity frustrated
by the Reichstag— The Reichstag ignored in the
Revolution ------ 143
CHAPTER VIII
Governments
The Prussian Ministry and the Other States— The South
German States Unsuccessful in Politics— Prince Max as
an Example — The Prussian Ministry not a Foe to
Freedom— The Spirit of Bethmann-Hollweg—
Ludendorff on Bethmann-Hollweg— Michaelis— My
Relations with Count Hertling— Prince Max of Baden - 175
CHAPTER IX
The Army
The German Army of 1914 the Best that has ever entered
upon a War — Reserve Formations and Active Forma-
tions take the Field together for the First Time—
The Officers' Corps— Recruited from all Classes of the
Population— Popular Theories about the Training of
the Officers— The Vindication of the Officers of the
Reserve— Untrue Allegations that the Officers of the
Reserve were not Appointed to Posts on the Higher
Staffs— The Attacks on the Officers— The Question of
Promoting N.C.O.'s— The Men— Difficulties with the
Prisoners returned from Russia — Cases of Mutiny —
The Insubordination of the Younger Classes of Recruits
CONTENTS x i
True Orientals in Business Affairs— The Turkish
Soldier— Enver and Talaat— Our Relations with the
Turks ----.._
CHAPTER XI
Conclusion -
PAGE
chapter ix. — Continued.
—The Older Largely Exempt— The Lines of Com-
munication—The Nefarious Work of the Independent
Socialists— The Demoralisation of the Army— The
Influence of the Mutiny in the Navy - - - 183
CHAPTER X
The Allies
Austria.
The Question of the Nationalities— The Attitude
towards the War— Early Deterioration of the Austro-
Hungarian Army— Jewish Influences— The Officers-
Faint -heartedness in the Empire — The Ministers
Czernin— Efforts for Peace in Austria-Hungary - 218
Bulgaria.
Lack of Conscience among the Bulgarians —
Radoslawow and Neidenoff— Anti-German Agitation
—Quality of the Bulgarian Troops— The King— The
Crown Prince ------ 233
The Turks.
237
246
A WAR MINISTER
AND HIS WORK
CHAPTER I
HOMELESS
WHEN the world war broke out I closed my
house in Deutsch-Eylan, and consigned
my possessions to God's care. I went
away to the war and, at first, my daughters went
to stay with relations and acquaintances. When
Deutsch-Eylan seemed threatened by the Russians
my belongings were packed up by strangers, and sent
to Berlin to be stored. My daughters went to join
the nursing staff of the Army of the East, and my son
fought against the Russians, while I was busily
engaged with the French and English. We found
ourselves without a home of any sort, but service to
our Kaiser and country was sufficient compensation
for everything.
When I was appointed Minister of War in the
autumn of 191 6, I found at first that the War Office
only afforded restricted quarters, as the officials'
14 A WAR MINISTER AND HIS WORK
residence was still in occupation. However, one
room for my office, and an adjacent one, was all I
required. When my daughters returned from Russia
to take over my housekeeping they had to make
shift in the same way until the official residence was
vacated, and its luxurious rooms were ready for us.
This official residence was very fine in many respects,
but with its unfamiliar appointments, it never seemed
to me really homely. I put a few of my things into
some of the rooms, just to feel that from time to time
I could be alone among surroundings with which the
memories of a lifetime were associated. But the
greater part of my belongings had to remain in
store. How much has been lost or destroyed that
was once laboriously collected and carefully preserved
and looked after !
When I was a child I was once plunged into deep
grief, when another boy said to my brother and me :
" You have no home ; when your father dies you
will have to clear out." Of course we did not know
we were living in an official residence. Besides,
even places like these can be a real home, if one can
stay in them undisturbed until the children go out
into the world.
I like to think of the old, cramped and unpre-
tentious parsonage in which I spent my childhood,
and often found my haven of refuge even after I had
grown up. Those who spend their lives going from
one furnished house to another are even worse off ;
HOMELESS 15
they become mere nomads. All the same, I have
lost all feeling for it.
In the autumn of 191 8, when I was removed from
my position as Minister of War, I failed to find a
house in Berlin or its suburbs although I tried every
possible means. The obstacle to removal to a
distance was the difficult railway situation. But
many others were in the same boat. Every day the
papers displayed advertisements in which hundreds
of marks were offered for information about houses
to let. In these circumstances further search held
out no prospects of success, and as the official
residence had to be vacated, there was nothing for it
but to put our household goods back into the store
where, for the matter of that, the bulk of our be-
longings had been all the time. I should have
actually found myself without a roof over my head
if I had not been allowed to use a few empty rooms
in the War Office.
My uncomfortable and harrowing stay there was
prolonged by the misfortune to all our servants, who
fell victims to the ravages of influenza. We were
not going to leave faithful followers in the lurch.
Whenever I entered or left the house I was under
observation from the Soldiers' Councils or the
sentries who shared their political sympathies, so
that I might almost as well have been in prison.
The manner of the sentries was often most provoca-
tive, and they clearly regarded themselves as masters.
16 A WAR MINISTER AND HIS WORK
^How many homeless folk had the same experience
at the time and how many others have still to face
it ! I am thinking first and foremost of our warriors
who have already returned or will shortly do so.
For years they have been living in a strange land,
often without a roof over their heads, and death
hovering round them all the time. Where will they
find a home of their own now ? All kinds of diffi-
culties as regards housing were encountered after the
short and victorious war with France. This time
the whole matter was to be taken in hand in good
time ; the deplorable conclusion of the war and the
confusion at home put an end to the preparations.
A great many people are under the impression
that there must be plenty of houses available
because so many thousands have never come back.
That is a fallacy. The widows and their children are
left behind ; many new families have been founded,
and the masses pour into the centres of attraction —
the great towns. The result is that the shortage of
houses is not felt uniformly all over the country, but
it is certainly the greatest at those points where its
consequences are the most serious.
If I remember rightly, the bread-winner of a
family was, and probably still is, threatened with
the workhouse if he does not provide his family with
a roof. Often enough even decent people have
found themselves with no other last resort than the
poor-house. Reuter, in his poem " Kein Husung,"
HOMELESS 17
gives an affecting and distressing picture of the way
in which quite a modest fortune is dissipated when a
home is lacking.
We are thus faced with a crisis, the solution of
which must be the task of the State and all private
citizens. If we are ever to become a stable State
once more this will be one of the means by which our
recovery will be facilitated. The impulse in that
direction is already alive and active. It will become
more effective when men have not only a roof over
their heads but at any rate a small piece of land to
link them up with Nature and the productive forces
of the earth.
What man in a large town has ever stopped to ask
himself from what source the necessities of his daily
life are supplied ? The baker delivers the bread,
vegetables pour out from the greengrocer's, milk
makes its appearance from the milk-cart. Thought
travels no further back than that. The needs of the
times have broadened our outlook.
The first result of that process is that antagonism
has sprung up between town and country, an
antagonism which has to be cured before enlighten-
ment can do its blessed work. The soldier living
daily in the trenches has learned to watch the growth
of the plants, a phenomenon he has never observed
before. He has taken to growing flowers and
cultivating vegetables on a small scale. He must
never lose the benefit of those experiences. The
18 A WAR MINISTER AND HIS WORK
existing difficulties of our food situation — difficulties
which will remain for a long time yet — compel us to
co-operate in the production of even the simplest and
most essential necessaries of life.
I was anxious to leave Berlin. The dumb wit-
nesses of the great past of Prussia and Germany,
with their silent lamentations and accusations,
struck me to the heart. Only one pleasure was left
to me — the entry of the first troops. Many a man
among those well-tried warriors shed bitter tears.
He who had drawn his sword with the enthusiasm of
a good conscience, he who had held himself ready to
die for the greatness and honour of his Fatherland,
might well weep over the shame and disgrace, over
faithlessness and betrayal. But at any rate the
Prussian and German colours once more fluttered in
the breeze. Were they now to speak of the past or
should they now point to a new future ?
They alone could make the parting painful. The
same could not be said of the great mass of the people
who filled the streets. Many among them seemed
to be quite unconscious of the difficulties and shame
of the times. They were laughing and fooling about.
" Fieldgreys " were offering their belongings for sale
to hawkers. Some of them were selling newspapers
and pamphlets. What a world of self -mockery and
self-accusation was in their tones as they cried out
the merits of a certain book, " William the Last " !
Berlin had become a thoroughly demoralised city.
HOMELESS 19
I must away ! At the station we took a short
but extremely moving farewell of our own people.
My orderlies had been with me throughout the whole
period of the war. That is a link which lasts through
life. They had stood by my side in bad times as in
good, and for that reason I shall always count them
among my friends.
Luck was with us, for we not only found room in
the train (which was full to overflowing), but even
friendly fellow-travellers. Our destination was the
Harz, at the foot of which I was born. The old
home received the homeless ones once more. We
found shelter in the market town of Braunlage, right
under the Brocken.
There, in the cheerful and hospitable house of
Herr Dumling, are these lines written. I have
brought with me no books, no notes or other aids for
my work. Everything I write about my thoughts
and experiences is from memory. For that reason
much may seem to have little relation to space or
time. One's point of view is affected by the nearness
of events and a one-sided knowledge of the context.
Yet for all that it may not be without a certain
value to draw directly on my memory.
UN 1 121
CHAPTER II
PERSONALITIES
EXPERTS and other people may argue until the
end of time about the relative importance
of personality and mass movements in the
making of history. I, for my part, shall never cease
to believe that it is individuals who exercise the
greatest influence in the affairs of this world, and who
are alone able to determine the directions that events
ultimately take. All that is happening to-day only
confirms me in this belief ; for, while on the one
hand I behold the masses bent only upon the work
of destruction, on the other I have everywhere heard
the cry and clamour of the multitude for a man.
Thus, in these pages, the reader will find that
certain men are made to stand out who, though they
may not have stamped their age with their person-
ality to the same extent as Bismarck did, have yet
been able to wield enough directive power in their
own particular department, in order to influence to
no small extent the course of the war. I do not
propose to relate the history of their lives in this
volume ; but simply to consider and call attention
to those aspects of their work which happen to come
PERSONALITIES 21
under my notice either through my personal contact
with themselves or their activities. If at times I
should appear to concern myself also with the purely
human side of their natures, this will be only with
the object of bringing them more to the readers as
fellow-men, and of avoiding the common error of
presenting mere mortals in immortal guise.
Field-Marshal Count von Moltke
An old officer who had been through the campaign
of 1870-71 said to me at the beginning of the year
1 91 5, " If old Moltke had been among us, we should
have been victorious long ago, and the war would
have been at an end." These words demonstrate
the amazing and unbounded confidence which this
great whilom chief of the German General Staff once
enjoyed. But I must not be surprised that he
inspired this confidence from the start — not by any
means — even after he had shown himself successful.
I have had quite intelligent people assure me that
there were other generals of whom they thought
even more highly than of him. It was not un-
common on such occasions to hear the name of
Blumenthal mentioned.
But at the present day there is no one who would
venture to doubt the supreme greatness of the Field-
Marshal. But how is it, we may ask, that this
greatness has been brought home to the meanest
22 A WAR MINISTER AND HIS WORK
intelligence ? Only through the persuasive powers
of success. If only Hindenburg and Ludendorff had
been able to remain successful until the end, they
too would now have been elevated to the skies by a
jubilant and wildly enthusiastic multitude. As it
is, however, every fatuous coxcomb now thinks
himself justified in pronouncing his foolish criticism
against them.
It was Moltke who once said that success only
attends the able man. But not every able man has
had success, nor is he likely to have it in the future,
and this despite the fact that a general no less great
than Moltke has said : " Let all careers be open to
men of ability." 1 For have not a number of leaders
of men — from Hannibal to Napoleon himself — been
wrecked in the end, and perished under a cloud ?
Even the most powerful of great men may be ham-
pered by the smallness of those about them. Thus
the words that old officer said to me, which I have
quoted above, should not be too readily regarded as
true. The circumstances of the Great European
War cannot be compared with those of the war with
France. It should be borne in mind that behind
Moltke in those days there stood that simple, well-
balanced and strong-minded man, Kaiser Wilhelm,
not to mention the towering genius of Bismarck,
The French Army, moreover, had then not quite
1 Napoleon Bonaparte: " La carvicre ouverte aux talents."
PERSONALITIES 23
recovered from the wars in the Crimea and Italy,
let alone the adventure in America. We, on the
other hand, possessed a magnificent army, flushed
with the triumph of two campaigns, and superior at
least in numbers to that of the enemy.
Now I am not of those who swear by the belief
that God is always on the side of the big battalions,
or of superior numbers. Often enough have we seen
that the converse is true, without having to refer to
Leuthen * or any other hostile engagement of the
past. Be this as it may, there is truth in the old
adage. A Commander-in-Chief to-day cannot create
the strongest battalions at a moment's notice ; they
have to be mustered and held in readiness for him in
peace-time. But what a number of people have to
have their say before that can be done ! Occasionally
of course, he can by his skill make good the de-
ficiency by concentrating massed forces at a par-
ticular decisive point, and content himself with the
weaker forces in other quarters. But there are
limits even to this form of strategy.
During the whole of the past war we were
numerically inferior to the enemy. Nevertheless we
carried the day on more than one occasion, and also
succeeded in preventing not a few enemy's
successes. At the beginning the enemy on the
1 A village in Prussian Siberia where on Dec. 5th, 1757, Frederick
the Great with 34,000 men beat the Austrians, who numbered
90,000.
24 A WAR MINISTER AND HIS WORK
decisive front usually brought his superiority to bear
only on small sectors of the line at a time. And in
those days, of course, it was possible for us to
confront him with forces as strong as his own,
because the rest of our front was not engaged.
Later on, however, he attacked on ever-increasing
fronts, until at last he realised that he could only
make his numerical superiority felt, by attacking
along the whole length of the front at once. His
wealth in war material and the help of America
enabled him to accomplish this. Albeit he was never
able to achieve his principal object, which was to
paralyse the righting powers of our armies by his
attacks.
The laws regulating the conduct of war are as old
as the hills and as simple as they are old. It is,
however, not always a simple matter to observe
them. Despite the fact that they are valid for all
time and never change, they are frequently forgotten
and lost sight of. They might in certain circum-
stances degenerate into a game, as they did in the
days of Condottieri, when each side endeavoured,
by means of skilful chess moves and with least
possible loss of blood, to checkmate its adversary.
The first wild ruffian, however, who chose to dis-
regard these subtle rules and to wield his sword with
deadly effect destroyed these illusions at one blow.
All the great Commanders-in-Chief have always
laid stress upon the old and time-honoured rules of
PERSONALITIES 25
war. Clausewitz developed them in his book on
war, 1 and bequeathed them as an inheritance to the
Prussian Army. Moltke plainly recognised those
same rules both in his theory and his practice. The
rout of the enemy is achieved by an enveloping
movement, and in its most perfect form by means of
a complete encirclement of his forces, for which
Tannenberg will always stand as the pattern.
We came across a similar case under Moltke's
own leadership only once, and that was at Sedan.
The enveloping movement at Worth and St. Privat
ultimately determined the victory. At Worth, how-
ever, it succeeded only after very heavy fighting, and
cannot be regarded as a perfect example of the
method, while at St. Privat it was not systematically
achieved under the directions of the Commander-in-
Chief and his staff, but was brought about by the
spirit and resolution shown by certain subordinate
commanders. Thus it is by no means an easy
matter to observe these very simple rules. Many
people are now of the opinion that since the last
great war, these old rules have been superseded.
But where our methods failed in this war was in
those engagements in which the ultimate issue of the
battle depended upon the unity of our operations.
It would first have to be proved that this had been a
necessity.
1 Vom Kriege.
26 A WAR MINISTER AND HIS WORK
In a certain not very well-known essay Napoleon
draws a comparison between what he calls a gtntral
du terre and a gkn'eral du mer. The latter surveys
the whole of his battle area, as also the movements of
the enemy ; from the former however, both battle-
area and enemy are more or less concealed. He
therefore requires to be endowed with a peculiar
gift, which Napoleon calls divination — that is to say,
something which partakes of the supernatural.
Moltke substitutes for this gift the duty of a general
to take for granted that the enemy are capable of
adopting wise and effective measures, and to arrange
his plan of battle accordingly.
But even this in itself is no small undertaking. In
order to carry it out, a man must be possessed of a
clear and quite impartial mind, so as not to fall into
the error of suspecting the enemy of what appears to
be his rational course, but which is, in sooth, but
the creation of one's own wishes in the matter.
I only came across old Field-Marshal Moltke once,
and that was when I was working as a lieutenant on
the General Staff, and he took leave of us in August,
1888. His final words of farewell were distributed
to the whole staff in the form of a printed letter.
But even after that he continued to concern himself
with the training of officers, and took an active part
in the great final examinations at which they
qualified for Staff appointments. The principles he
laid down for the training of staff officers remained
PERSONALITIES 27
operative until the time of the last great war. In
regard to his general-staff rides, however, and his
experimental practice in tactics and the direction of
operations, others have written better and more fully
than I could possibly pretend to do. From very
small beginnings they gradually developed into the
elaborate system with which we were familiar at the
outbreak of the war.
Though at first they were only designed to apply
to mixed bodies of troops and divisions, they were
ultimately modified to meet the demands of work
with Army Corps and Armies. But the sound and
solid basis which he laid down was adopted without
alteration by those who followed in his footsteps.
The same remarks apply to the work of studying
foreign armies, fortifications and works, recon-
noitring, the history of war, and the measures to be
taken for the various mobilisation schemes.
As chief of the Operations branch, I became
acquainted with the preparatory measures by Moltke
for the war of 1870, and it strikes me that it is a very
remarkable thing how frequently great military
commanders who all their lives have advocated
aggressive tactics, in their old age incline to methods
of defence. Even Clausewitz recommends them as
the better policy. After 1871, Moltke, too, based his
calculations upon this principle.
Neither of these great men, however, can be said
to have recommended lifeless and inactive defence
28 A WAR MINISTER AND HIS WORK
alone ; both of them insist upon the advisability of
taking the offensive once the enemy's attack has been
met and repulsed. Observation of this rule is by no
means an easy matter. For instance, in the light of
what the last great war has taught, I cannot think of
a single engagement where an offensive on a great
scale was developed directly out of a purely defensive
position. There may be all sorts of reasons for
preferring defensive tactics. For example, they may
be the best policy at a time when one is confronting
the enemy, either with weaker forces, or with troops
of inferior quality ; the dread of the heavy losses
incurred in an offensive may also influence one in
favour of purely defensive tactics. Moltke had
other reasons for preferring them. The Army was
to concentrate in Lorraine and wait for the French
to attack.
The reason of this is not far to seek. We had no
plans of conquest and had achieved all we wished to
achieve. The object was to hold what we had won,
whereas the French wished to recover what they had
lost. That is why Moltke adopted the defensive,
and with it the choice of position. Should the
enemy advance through Luxembourg and Belgium,
in the directions of the Lower Rhine, we were to
wheel to the right, cross the Moselle, and attack the
enemy in his flank. The defensive tactics were,
therefore, not an end in themselves, and were part
and parcel of a scheme of offense. Moltke did not
PERSONALITIES 29
work out his plans on the basis of peaceful possi-
bilities ; he always dealt with realities. Until the
moment he came into contact with the enemy, he
wished to maintain the initiative. Everything be-
yond that point he regarded as uncertain and un-
reliable.
On the other hand, he who would win a victory
must not recoil from the task of attempting at least
to penetrate this veil of uncertainty. And for this,
decision and the power to carry it through are
necessary, both of which factors are insufficiently
appreciated either by the average civilian or by many
a critic. In order to realise the whole difficulty of
this undertaking a man must have found himself face
to face with it in the midst of war. It will be quite
wrong to suppose that any good can come out of
plunging blindly into the depths of uncertainty.
Before attempting to penetrate it, one must first have
formed a tolerably clear idea of what the enemy may
reasonably be expected to do, so as to shape one's
course accordingly.
But this is not such an easy matter as the sim-
plicity of the rules of warfare might lead us to
suppose. The conditions in war change much too
quickly, and they are too complicated for this to be
so. Details about the spirit, strength, style and
disposition of the enemy, and all intelligence received
about him, may, however, be either supplemented or
increased, or altogether confirmed by certain special
30 A WAR MINISTER AND HIS WORK
ruses of one's own. For instance, it is said of Goeben,
that being anxious on one occasion to know a little
more about his enemy, Faidherbe, and having
captured both his horse and his soldier groom, he
sent both of these back to the French general
together with a courteous letter. On the receipt of
Faidherbe's reply, which was contained in a long
epistle, Goeben exclaimed, after perusing the letter,
" Now I know my man ! "
In most cases, however, one gets to know the
enemy only in battle, and that is why, on the occasion
of the first encounter, we should always very much
over-estimate him. Thus it is clear that there are a
variety of doctrines within the limits of the laws of
warfare, though it may not be possible to provide a
rule for every possible contingency. Their par-
ticular application must depend upon the creative
spirit of the military commander.
As far as Moltke was concerned, his colleagues
were convinced that he would always find a solution
for every conceivable situation.
With all his powers of decision, however, Count
Moltke was by no means a fighter by nature. He
himself confessed to many a weakness, which he
ascribed to the circumstances of his youth and his
upbringing. Nevertheless he was known to have made
his views, which were recognised as correct, prevail
even against Bismarck. For even in those days there
were differences of opinion, as between the political
PERSONALITIES 31
leaders on the one hand, and the military authorities
on the other.
It is impossible to draw so sharp a line of demarca-
tion between these two spheres of control, as to
prevent them overlapping. On one occasion, when
he was holding a conference with the Supreme
Command, Count Hertling attempted to establish a
clear division between the two departments. He
argued on the principle that the Commander-in-Chief
was sufficiently covered, if his views of a particular
situation were not acceptable, either to the political
leaders or to the Kaiser, and that in that case he
would have no need to resign his position. The
political leader himself, however, would have to
resign, if the Kaiser's decision went against him.
But the problem is not capable of being solved
along these simple lines. After the righting round
Metz, for instance, Bismarck was of opinion that the
German forces might bide their time and merely hold
the ground while awaiting further developments.
But Moltke rejected this view, because had he
adopted it he would have been deprived of the
chance of attaining a swift and assured decision.
The political and the military departments must
always arrive at some sort of compromise when
their direction does not Jie, as it did in the case of
Frederick the Great, in the hands of one man. Under
the rule of the old Kaiser Wilhelm, the friction
between the political and military authorities never
32 A WAR MINISTER AND HIS WORK
gave rise to any very serious trouble. But the men
of those days were greater in their generation than
we are to-day. They knew how to subordinate all
individual and other interests to the one great
object, which was — victory.
Moltke always had the deepest respect for the
views of the old Kaiser. When, if ever there was a
difference of opinion between them, he always en-
deavoured to find an alternative intermediate solu-
tion, which satisfied both parties. I mention this
because his successor, Count Schlieffen, resembled
him in that respect.
There is a famous story, according to which
Bismarck, Roon and Moltke once found themselves
in company after their lifework had been completed.
One of them, either Bismarck or Roon, put the
following question : " What is there left for us to do
in life ? " Moltke immediately came out with the
answer : " Plant a tree ! ,; As far as it was possible
to judge, the proposed tree could not possibly be
expected ever to afford him either shade or fruit.
He must therefore have been thinking of those who
were to come after him.
That is the plain and obvious duty before us
to-day when we see the German oak rent in pieces.
We may set our hands to the work of reconstruction
but we shall not enjoy its fruits. The future alone
will profit by it ; and for that reason it is high
time that we should put an end to the work of
PERSONALITIES
oo
self-destruction which is going on in our own
house.
Field-Marshal Count Waldersee
Count Waldersee was Chief of Staff for a short
time only, from 1888 to 1891. As far as my official
duties were concerned I only came across him oc-
casionally, at conferences on tactical questions. At
a later stage I had to devote a good deal of my time
to his plan of the concentration and strategic
deployment.
The existence of the French barrier fortresses on
the western frontier of that country might be taken
as indicative of the intentions of the French to stand
on the defensive. On the other hand, they could
equally well serve the purpose of covering the
French concentration, at the end of which they would
be in a position to pass to the offensive. As we were
expecting that we should have to deal with the
French and Russians together, we had to look at
matters from another angle. It was quite possible
that from the shelter of their frontier fortresses the
French might wait until the Russians had completed
their concentration — a much slower business — and
then break out in a simultaneous offensive with
them. Things must never be allowed to get to that
stage.
Accordingly Count Waldersee evolved further
34 A WAR MINISTER AND HIS WORK
plans for initiating an offensive. The whole problem
was to discover some method of breaking the line of
frontier fortresses with the greatest possible speed.
For that purpose the heavy artillery of the field army
came into being, though a comparatively long period
of preparation and development was to be involved
before it bore, and deserved to bear, that description.
Heavy guns were to follow on the heels of the army
in readiness to destroy the fortresses.
For the work of creating the heavy artillery
Count Waldersee found the right man in Captain
Deines, who subsequently became General of Artil-
lery von Deines. He is the true father of this new
arm, and it can truly be said that he devoted his
whole life to its creation. I have worked under him
and seen something of what he accomplished. By
bringing this weapon into existence he smoothed the
path of the foot-artillery and showed it the way to a
new and important development. The late war
has given the most glorious proof of its effectiveness,
though General von Deines was destined not to live
to see it.
The first experiments were made with only a few
batteries, which had hired drivers and horses, and the
development of the new arm did not reach its full
height until the days of Count Waldersee's successor.
As a matter of fact, the problem of attacking the
frontier fortresses was never put to the test at that
time. There is no doubt that it would have been a
PERSONALITIES 35
very audacious enterprise to make a direct attack on
a hostile army which was covered by fortresses which
provided it with bases and powerful points d'appui.
Count Waldersee was not the man to shrink from a
bold plan. A man of the greatest energy and clear-
sightedness, he knew no fear of man or anything
else.
The plans of strategic deployment of those days
seem now to be simple ; perhaps in some respects
sketchy. They were all that the resources of the
troops destined to carry them into execution could
effect . They allowed sufficient room for manoeuvring,
as the Corps were to be concentrated adjacent to
and behind each other. That is, they were eche-
lonned in depth. At a later period this plan was
insufficient to meet requirements.
Count Waldersee devoted as much attention and
zeal to the training of the officers as his great pre-
decessor had done. The old Moltke is said to have
been delighted at times with the tactical exercises he
set. It was one of these very exercises that cost him
his post. The Kaiser had done him the honour of
being present. In the course of a discussion that
arose Waldersee expressed very strong views with
which the Kaiser did not agree. Moltke would
probably have found means of composing the
difficulty, but in this case the gulf was not to be
bridged. Accordingly Waldersee retired from his
post as Chief-of-Staff. Subsequent events have
36 A WAR MINISTER AND HIS WORK
shown that in spite of this contretemps he enjoyed the
affection and respect of the Emperor later on.
Shortly before a decision was to be taken as to
who was to be promoted to the General Staff, he once
remarked to us lieutenants, in his open, almost rude
way : " Now you can just save your aunts the trouble
of coming round to badger me on your behalf. I
don't pay the slightest attention to them." It is
the fact that many people believed that influence
could be brought to bear by " aunts." Unfortu-
nately jealousy plays a part in every walk of life,
especially when it comes to competition for the more
highly-prized posts. There is a natural tendency
among human beings to be their own witnesses to
their qualifications.
But there are many positions for which the
possession of learning cannot be the dominant
consideration. Personality is frequently a more
important matter. However that may be, the
appointments to the General Staff have proved that
a mistake was certainly a rare occurrence, and such
mistakes are in any case very easily corrected. I
may be allowed, perhaps, to express an opinion on this
matter all the more freely because at that time I
never found myself among the successful candidates.
When I recall the friends among my circle who were
selected at that time I can only admit that the right
men were chosen. All of them have played the most
distinguished parts in the war. And as far as I
PERSONALITIES 37
personally am concerned, it certainly never did me
the slightest harm to have had a further spell of
regimental duty before I was promoted to the
General Staff, as I was later on.
Count Waldersee always took a very keen per-
sonal interest in politics and was frequently con-
cerned with political affairs ; but he never allowed
it to play the slightest part in the course of training
prescribed for officers. The army was to have
nothing whatever to do with politics. That was a
very proper attitude, but of course that does not
mean that the officer is not to be allowed to form his
own opinions. It is more necessary at the present
time than ever before that he should do so.
The German nation is unpolitical and is likely to
remain so for a long time to come. Its horizon is
limited by the trivialities of petty party politics.
The strong national impulse, which is so conspicuous
with the French and English in spite of their lesser
average degree of education, is lacking with us. Of
course it is perfectly true that learning is by no means
always a basis for political judgment, but ignorance
is obviously still less so, and moral immaturity or
lack of experience of life least of all. On these
grounds I was personally very displeased at the
efforts made to interest the younger recruits in
questions of politics. All that happened was that a
mass impulse took the place of independent and
mature judgment.
383649
38 A WAR MINISTER AND HIS WORK
If the average citizen's measure of political
knowledge and judgment was sufficient for the great
bulk of the officers, those holding certain special
positions required rather more. In the course of the
late war very many of my officers found themselves
faced with problems which touched both home and
foreign politics and demanded keen insight, ripe
judgment and endless tact. I need only mention the
negotiations with neutrals and our enemies over the
question of prisoners of war.
But they are equally necessary if the officer is to
understand and properly support his superior in the
execution of his military plans.
It is certainly doubtful whether anything ap-
proaching a real education in politics is possible,
apart from the artificial notions and catchwords of
party politics. Moltke founded a school, whereas
Bismarck did not. It is quite certain that this is a
sphere in which, far more than in any other, he alone
will make good who carries the secret of successful
action within himself and does not need to draw it
from outside sources. Men like this are not made.
We only recognise them when we see them.
Count Waldersee chose Count Schlieffen to co-
operate with him in his work. Evil tongues have
spread it abroad that he selected this man, who was
renowned for his amazing capacity for work, in order
that he should take the burden off himself. Of
course, he was intended to relieve Count Moltke's
PERSONALITIES 39
burden in many respects. There is nothing more
crippling to a leader in a position of great responsi-
bility than the multitude of small daily affairs which
make demands on his time to the exclusion of more
important matters. Ludendorff found it a very
heavy burden that he had to take in hand so much
ordinary work. As Hindenburg's assistant, he felt
it his duty to take on this work though the whole
complex of duties of both men had reached giant
proportions.
Field-Marshal Count von Schlieffen
During the long period from 1891 to 1906 in which
Count von Schlieffen held the position of Chief of the
General Staff, I served for many years under him in
different posts. For that reason I came into close
relations with him and acquired a very accurate
knowledge of the man and his methods. He
continued along the lines of his predecessor's work,
although his own always bore the stamp of his
personality and originality. It was through him
that the General Staff attained its fullest develop-
ment.
It was an elementary principle with him that the
General Staff ought to work in silence, and above all
keep absolutely in the background. He certainly
observed that principle with regard to his own
person. It will be very difficult ever to find again a
40 A WAR MINISTER AND HIS WORK
man who worked harder or possessed a greater
capacity for work. As far as his own personal
requirements were concerned, he was often able to
do without sleep altogether and satisfy Nature with
a few hours' rest. On some occasions he spent the
whole night working in his office until he was driven
out by the charwomen in the morning.
I unhesitatingly pronounce Count von Schlieffen
the possessor of the acutest intellect I have met in my
life. He was very sparing of his words and his
expression seldom betrayed the course of his thoughts.
One of his adjutants called him the Sphinx, on
the ground that no one ever knew what was going
on behind his forehead.
One of his characteristics was a tendency to
cynicism, the result of his immense knowledge of the
world, and on this ground a good many people stood
in mortal terror of him. This trait was the source
of a good many stories which have gone the rounds.
One of his senior officers, a man of whom he had
an unusually high opinion but did not exactly like,
on account of certain uncommon peculiarities, asked
him one morning in the course of a staff ride how he
had slept. "I'd have slept a good deal better if I
hadn't had to read through your work before I went
to bed," was the answer.
On another occasion he had given an officer an
interview, and listened to what he had to say in
silence. After the officer had left the room it
PERSONALITIES 4*
occurred to him that he had made a mistake in a
very important point. He immediately went back
into the room, excused himself, and acknowledged
that he had made a mistake. Count Schlieffen
merely replied : " I didn't believe you in any case."
He would often listen to what a man had to say
during an interview without once changing his
expression and without saying a word in reply. It
was therefore impossible to see whether what was
being said was new to him or not. But he always
knew everything that was going on and could ask
some very awkward questions, particularly as he was
a past master of the art of cross-examination. Many
a great man felt uncomfortable in his presence.
One quartermaster-general used to take every pos-
sible precaution to avoid being left alone with him
for a minute. Another very experienced man of the
world, who has taken part in many an adventure,
once confessed to me that he was never able to
remain in the presence of the Count without losing
his presence of mind.
I have personally never been able to understand
all this. With Schlieffen one need not hesitate
to say anything and to put forward one's views with
full vigour. He always showed a warm heart in
personal matters ; there was no aspect of human life
of which he had not had experience. It is certainly
true, however, that he would make great demands
on a man, and regarded most men as lazy because
42 A WAR MINISTER AND HIS WORK
he measured them by the standard of his own
energy.
It is said that in his youth Count Schlieffen was
a very gay officer. One event in his life exercised a
restraining influence upon him long after it occurred
— the early death of his wife. She died in Strasburg
while he was stationed there as an officer of the
General Staff. There was a rumour that he never
again entered the town where she died. That is a
myth. I have myself been to Strasburg in his
company.
In his quiet way he did a great deal of good and
was the means of relieving a great deal of distress.
He could not bear, however, to be brought into
public notice and talked about. On one occasion a
regiment was being inspected which he had once
commanded. One of the officers who was con-
ducting the inspection indulged in the most flattering
remarks about the regiment in his presence, and
concluded with the words : " The achievements of
the regiment remind one of the glorious days when
Count Schlieffen was in command." To this the
Count muttered half aloud to himself, " What a
futile remark ! •'
To the General Staff rides, the number of which
he increased considerably, Count Schlieffen added the
tours of fortress inspection for the General Staff and
practice rides for the Supply Service. The study of
military history was developed to a degree that had
PERSONALITIES 43
never before been reached in the history of the army.
He himself, in spite of great demands on his time
made by his official duties, found time to do a large
amount of literary work. To read his books is a
pure joy. They set out the great doctrines of war
with admirable completeness. It is true that his-
torical accuracy is strained here and there in order to
make his teaching stand out with greater sharpness.
He was himself aware of this defect, and once
expressed to me how much he regretted that he had
never had sufficient time to make an even closer
study of history. An amusing mistake once arose
in connection with the most important of his works,
" Cannae." A somewhat brusque divisional com-
mander who was not in the habit of wasting many
words, once walked into the officers' mess of an Uhlan
regiment after an inspection. The colonel of the
regiment came forward to receive him and was
asked abruptly and without any preliminaries :
" Have you Cannae ? " The colonel whispered in the
adjutant's ear and both went away, to reappear
shortly afterwards followed by an orderly bearing a
bottle of Pontet Canet.
I once told this anecdote to old Schlieften after
his retirement, when he had invited to his house, as
he was fond of doing, some of his old brother officers.
He laughed very heartily at it and said : " Yes, the
Uhlans have always preferred drinking to study."
His words were not intended to be taken seriously,
44 A WAR MINISTER AND HIS WORK
for he himself had been in the Uhlans, and he wore his
Uhlan uniform to the last.
In setting the final test exercises in which every
candidate for promotion to the General Staff had to
qualify at the end of his regimental command, the
Count would take care that they should be taken
from reality. He would either choose a war situation
that in view of the political atmosphere of the time was
possible or probable, or he would choose an actual
example from history. It was also his custom to
devise exercises of this kind to illustrate and explain
his views and with a view to inviting others to bring
forward their opinions.
One particular example that always proved most
instructive to the critic, and produced valuable
results from the point of view of military criticism,
was the working out, at his orders, of Bazaine's
situation during his retreat through Metz to the bank
of the Meuse. To what adverse criticism this
unlucky commander has given rise by his handling of
the situation ! Now this same problem was set
before numbers of able men. As it turned out, not
one of them could produce a better solution to the
problem than that on which Bazaine actually acted.
The War Academy was the object of special care
on the part of Count Schlieffen. In the old, more
peaceful days large numbers of young officers tried
to qualify for this academy, both with a view to
extending their knowledge of their profession and at
PERSONALITIES 45
the same time to enjoy the life of the capital.
When they had finished their course they went
contentedly back to their regiments.
During the strenuous days of the war, when
every one did his best to win promotion, things were
altered. There was a great rush of candidates for
admission to the War Academy in order to qualify
for appointment to the General Staff. The number
of officers who sought admission amounted to many
hundreds, whereas it was only possible to admit a
little over a hundred. This gave rise to a great deal
of disappointment and bad feeling, and the authori-
ties were accused of not selecting the candidates on
their merits. I was for many years in command of
the War Academy, and I am able to assert, without
reserve, that the selection of the candidates was made
strictly according to the results of the entrance
examination. The large number of tests that were
set made it an easy matter to pick out the best and
the worst. The placing of the rest, those of average
capacity, offered the examiner a hard problem.
It was found very difficult to discover a really
satisfactory cut-and-dried system of arranging the
order of merit.
We have tested the most varied methods and tried
to take into consideration the personal circumstances
of the candidates. Thus, among a number of
candidates of equal merit the first consideration
would be given to officers whose age excluded them
46 A WAR MINISTER AND HIS WORK
from presenting themselves for examination again,
or those who lived in small and uncongenial stations,
or who had little or no private means. All attempts
that were made by influential persons, even including
princes and princesses, to obtain special treatment
for their proteges, were disregarded without excep-
tion. In the course of the long years during which
I was connected with the War Academy I can only
remember one exception to this rule. On one
occasion the Emperor gave orders that the son of one
of his oldest officials, with whom he was on very
intimate terms, should be admitted. With this one
exception even he refrained from bringing his
influence to bear. All the same, I am convinced
that the doubt that has been cast upon the justice
with which the selections were made still exists and
will continue to do so as long as we have to deal with
human beings.
The Count devoted himself with the greatest care
to the preparations for the war. The extraordinary
increase in the size of the active army, to which had
been added many units of the second and third lines,
made mobilisation no longer the simple matter it
used to be. In preparation for an enveloping
movement the mobilisation would have to be more
lateral. The utmost use would have to be made of
the line-of -march area and the transport roads. If
France was the enemy a frontal attack offered no
hope of success. Verdun, the forts of the Meuse, the
PERSONALITIES 47
system of forts at Toul, Nancy, Epinal and the
Moselle forts offered too formidable an obstacle. A
flanking movement to the left was made difficult
owing to Epinal, the Moselle forts, the Vosges and
Belfort. A flanking movement through Belgium
offered fewer difficulties provided that Liege could
be reduced without too much delay.
Schlieffen devoted a great deal of thought to this
plan of operations and drew up many others which
did not involve going through Belgium. With these,
however, he was not satisfied. Up to the last he held
the belief that in the case of a war with France the
enemy would make their first advance in Lorraine.
In this he proved to be right. In this case a flanking
movement through Belgium would strike at their
most vulnerable spot.
The protection of the frontiers and the railways
had been worked out down to the minutest detail.
The most careful attention was devoted to the
fortresses, guns, accoutrements and all innovations
and inventions. Count Schlieffen was well informed
in all departments of military knowledge, and lost
no time in mastering the details of anything new that
might crop up. He even took a good deal of trouble
to go into the question of the very doubtful aeroplane
that was invented by Ganswindt.
Under Schlieffen the heavy artillery of the active
army underwent a course of training, which brought
it to a high standard of efficiency and made it a
48 A WAR MINISTER AND HIS WORK
very formidable arm. I once took part in one of the
manoeuvres of this arm, which brought out very
distinctly the influence of the Count's training. A
stretch of country was selected in Westphalia which
offered special difficulties for artillery work, as the
deeply-cut sandy roads and the marshy nature of
the ground made the transport of heavy weights
very difficult. The heavy artillery, at that time
served by hired horses and drivers, had to move
to their appointed positions by a long march through
this unfavourable country. To the spectator the
picture presented was one of real war conditions :
gun-carriages with their wheels embedded in the
mud, overturned wagons, cursing drivers, and gun-
crews struggling with the wheels. There were a
good many officers present who doubted whether it
would be possible to carry through the manoeuvre.
But behind it all there was a determined will, and
on the following morning the guns were in their
appointed positions and ready to open fire. In the
pow-wow that followed Count Schlieffen pointed out
that in the time of Frederic the Great none of the
roads were any better than those that they had had
to use that day, and that his heavy artillery were no
lighter in weight than that of our own time ; never-
theless he used to take them with him into the field.
Schlieffen succeeded in doing the same thing. The
heavy artillery became a field-arm in his time, and
such it has remained ever since.
PERSONALITIES 49
The influence of the Chief of the General Staff
also made itself felt on the periodical testing of the
army's readiness for war, for he was responsible for
drawing up and carrying through the great Kaiser
manoeuvres. As the size of the army increased,
these manoeuvres were conceived on a continually
increasing scale. In spite of everything, however,
they could never really represent active service
conditions. Questions of expense and consideration
for the land on which the manoeuvres were conducted
limited their scope. What the manoeuvres were
unable to provide was supplied by elaborate war
games played on maps.
In these exercises the Count followed a custom
which has often been attacked and which is certainly
open to criticism. By careful working out before-
hand he was able to make the result so sure that
when the Supreme War Lord assumed the command of
one side that side was always sure to win. When it
is remembered that in peace manoeuvres, which are
intended to represent a series of consecutive opera-
tions, it is always necessary to decide beforehand
which side is going to be successful, so that the
operations may follow the course laid down, it will
be seen that this was more excusable than might
otherwise have been the case. In peace manoeuvres
it doesn't matter in the slightest which side wins or
loses.
Apart from this there are various other reasons
D
50 A WAR MINISTER AND HIS WORK
why it is impossible to come to an entirely satis-
factory decision as to the result, for many of the
conditions that are vital in real war are absent, and
can only be considered in the most arbitrary fashion,
— for instance, the bravery of the troops. A much
more important point is that every leader and every
unit, in whatever situation they may find themselves,
either rightly or wrongly, should form intelligent
decisions and act on them. It is often the case that
a retreat gives a man the best opportunity of showing
that he knows his business.
I have often discussed these matters with
Schlieffen, and was at no pains to conceal from him
my scruples. He used to say : " There may be
some doubt as to whether it is right that the Supreme
War Lord should command personally in the field, but
there can be no doubt that if he does command he
must win." As there were spectators of all kinds
at the grand manoeuvres, including the representa-
tives of foreign powers, it certainly seemed a suitable
occasion for risking, as it were, the reputation of the
Supreme War Lord. Nevertheless, many will not
share this view, least of all the commander of the
other side, who feels that his own reputation is
injured. The Emperor was too intelligent to allow
this for a moment, and always showed himself most
gracious towards his vanquished opponent.
Count Schlieffen was not by nature a fighter, and
in this he bore a resemblance to old Moltke. Like
PERSONALITIES 51
the latter, he always tried to find a peaceful middle
course when he found himself up against the deter-
mined opposition of his master. This was very much
in evidence at the time when the Upper Rhine was
to be fortified. The Emperor supported the point
of view that was held by his grandfather, that it is
absolutely essential that South Germany should be
fortified against the possibility of an enemy invasion.
He was therefore anxious to build an extensive
system of strong fortresses. Schlieffen was of the
opinion that in case of war South Germany would
have to bear her share of the burden in the same way
as any other German territory. Accordingly he
wanted to build simple fortresses that would make
the least possible demands on the strength and
resources of the army. He made a tour of the
Upper Rhine accompanied by a number of officers
and set them to work out various problems, the
solution of which would throw light on the question.
During this time he was not very approachable,
which with him was a sign that he was deeply
engrossed in the work in hand. But he found out
what he wanted and was able to deal with the
question in a way that satisfied the Emperor's
wishes.
The older the Count grew the harder he worked.
It almost appeared as if he were afraid that he
might not live long enough to get through all the
work he had set himself to do and which he regarded
52 A WAR MINISTER AND HIS WORK
as of vital importance. It is possible, too, in view
of the general European situation, he may have
thought it likely that he himself might be called on
to direct operations under war conditions. When in
1906 he retired from the service, his farewell speech
gave expression to his deep regret that his age had
imposed this limit on his career. When I, like many
of his old brother officers, took my leave in private,
I was able to realise how hard it was for him not to
be able to devote himself any longer to the service
of his King and Emperor.
His life was a life of hard work, and for that
reason alone an admirable one. There were only
two powers to which he acknowledged subjection :
his King and Emperor on earth, and his God in
heaven.
General von Moltke
A Saxon, but not as clear-sighted as Saxons
usually are, once wrote me an uncharitable letter
about Moltke. He began by quoting the well-
known words imputed to the Emperor when he was
receiving the new Chief of the General Staff : ' ' You
can look after what peace work there is ; in war I
am my own Chief of the General Staff " (das bisschen
Friedensarbeit machen sie im Kriege bin ich mein
eigener Generalstabschef). He added that Moltke
might perhaps have made a General commanding
PERSONALITIES 53
a district. This Saxon did not know Moltke, which
makes it possible to forgive his stupid letter. If
Moltke could have heard what this man had to say
about him he would have been greatly amused. He
never said anything to me about these words,
which rumour has put into the mouth of the Emperor.
I am always very suspicious of such stories as this.
One never knows in what context or in what tone
such words may have been spoken. However this
may be, it is certain that the Emperor did not act on
them.
On the other hand, I happen to know that when
Moltke took over his new post he told his War Lord
that it was his intention in all matters to lay his
views frankly before him. He kept faithfully to
this promise, and by doing so won for himself a
position of great influence with his sovereign. For
one thing, it was he who persuaded the Emperor to
abandon his practice of assuming the command of
one side at the general manoeuvres. His views on
this subject did not coincide with those of Count
Schlieffen.
When Moltke was Quartermaster-General I served
under him as Divisional Chief ; when he was appointed
Chief of the General Staff I became Assistant Quarter-
master-General, and finally I took the field as his
Quartermaster-General. It will be seen, therefore,
that I am in a better position to know him than his
superficial critics.
54 A WAR MINISTER AND HIS WORK
He had never prepared himself for this position
of responsibility, and indeed had never had any
idea that it would fall to his lot. For a long time,
however, he had been adjutant, and the companion
of his great uncle, and in this way had received a
training that can only be acquired in constant
association with an important man. Just as he had
hitherto proved himself an excellent commanding
officer, who had with a clear eye and acute under-
standing of the interests of the men of his com-
mand, so now he assumed with his natural adapta-
bility and great gifts the totally different type of
work in the same way as his predecessors. He
possessed a calm, mature judgment, worked with
great energy, and showed himself pleasant and
friendly to every one. It would have been impossible
to find oneself associated with a pleasanter companion
than he. He made no distinctions of person and
was free from prejudices. When the war broke out
he had for the second time in succession to interrupt
a cure at Carlsbad, which must have been a severe
strain on his health. He did not allow anything to
appear on the surface.
In the training of the General Staff and officers
he did not depart from the methods that had been
tested by his predecessors. His lectures on military
problems were models of clearness. His breadth of
view is testified to by the fact that he was the first to
give orders that aeroplanes should be armed and
PERSONALITIES 55
should take part in the fighting ; before that they
had only been used for purposes of observation. He
did not come much before the public eye, the reason
being, apart from his natural reserve and unselfish-
ness, that he had to follow an outstanding per-
sonality. He could only take over what his pre-
decessor had left to him. As he knew the work to be
right and complete he had little to alter and little to
add, as perhaps a smaller man might have done.
Quiet and modest as he always was, he never talked
about what he had done and never looked for any
acknowledgment. He was quite unmoved by male-
volent criticism and would retail it without any
embarrassment, for he was possessed of a very keen
sense of humour.
The leaning towards the metaphysical, which has
distinguished other members of the Moltke family,
was from time to time noticeable, but he did not
allow it in any way to influence his judgment. This
was doubtless an heirloom from the northern home
of his ancestors and is not by any means unusual
among us Low Germans. He was capable of suffer-
ing severe moral pain, for he had a very sensitive and
sympathetic heart. The sight of the faces of the
wounded has been known to draw tears into his eyes.
He often expressed a wish that he could join in the
actual fighting as it had been his good fortune to
do as a young man in the war of 1870-71.
When the first unfavourable news was brought
56 A WAR MINISTER AND HIS WORK
to him from Liege, he said to the Emperor, in his
frank, straightforward fashion : " Now you see
what you have done ; you have brought the
English down on my head for no reason." He never
forgot these words and often had good cause to
regret them, although the Kaiser shortly afterwards
thanked him heartily for the success that had in the
meantime been attained. When the unfavourable
situation on the Marne set in he began to show
signs that his health was breaking down. His is
not the only case of a general suffering, both physi-
cally and morally, in difficult situations. It is only
necessary to think of Frederick the Great to find
another example. I regarded these signs of physical
distress as transitory. But there were further, more
serious, troubles behind, as was shown later by his
sudden death at the commemoration of Field-
Marshal von der Goltz.
Moltke had to retire from the front and take over
the Deputy General Staff. We still continued to
exchange letters. I could tell from his letters how
hard it was for him to remain at home while the war
was still in progress. He thought it his duty,
however, to serve his country there, too. He was
spared the necessity of having to live through the
final collapse. With him there passed away a loyal,
upright and noble man.
Like a leader who knows his own mind, he
intervened in East Prussia at the beginning of the
PERSONALITIES 57
war when the situation had grown involved. By the
choice of the right men, Hindenburg and Ludendorff,
and by ordering the right measures, he got
order out of chaos. It was not granted to him to
relieve the serious position on the Marne. He
cannot, then, be judged according to results. He did
his country greater service than is yet known. A
more suitable time will come later to speak of this.
CHAPTER III
MILITARY PREPARATIONS FOR WAR AND POLITICS
I HAVE been asked by a historian whether the
plans for the opening of the campaign had been
drawn up in conjunction with the political
leaders. This goes without saying. I do not know
how the Chief of the General Staff and the Govern-
ment leaders arranged it among themselves. It
would, however, be a strange government that left
its Chief of the General Staff to conduct his own
politics. It would be impossible for him to draw up
his plan of campaign until he was informed as to the
political situation.
For a long time there had been no doubt in
Germany as to who her adversaries were likely to be.
There might have been some doubt as to whether
England would take a hand in the struggle or
whether, as has so often happened before, she would
stand aside and derive all the profit she could out of
the war between the other powers. In any case it
was necessary to be prepared for her intervention in
order to avoid being taken by surprise.
The popular view was accurately reflected in the
following conversation which I accidentally overheard.
MILITARY PREPARATIONS 5^
Immediately after England's declaration of war
two respectable-looking men were talking things
over in the neighbourhood of the Zoological Gardens
in Berlin, and they came to the conclusion : " Now
it is all up with us ! " A working man who happened
to be passing shouted to them : " Not by a long
way ! " Would that the whole people could have
maintained to the end the confidence of this simple
man !
There can be no doubt that France never for a
moment gave up her plans for revenge. Her stub-
bornness in this respect is plainly to be seen in
history. She avenged herself one after the other on
her victorious enemies of 181 5. First Russia in the
Crimean war, and then Austria in the Italian war.
Her attempt to deal with us in the same way failed
in 1870-71. Against us, therefore, she had a double
debt to wipe out.
The enmity of Russia, on the other hand, was
not based on history, but was none the less real. The
railways leading to our frontier, which had been
built with French gold, certainly pointed to ag-
gressive intentions. England was in the first place
responsible for turning her against us politically. In
contrast to this, Germany was in a position to point
to her love of peace which had for many decades
consistently pervaded her politics. There have
been times, indeed, when she has gone too far in her
anxiety to conciliate, and in doing so has made
60 A WAR MINISTER AND HIS WORK
herself the laughing-stock of the world. The Em-
peror wanted to live and die as the Peace-Emperor.
Our people would do well to keep constantly before
their eyes this contrast between our policy and that
of our enemies, instead of being content to repeat
like parrots their accusations that it was we who were
responsible for the war.
The last thing that the people thought likely was
that we should find ourselves at war with the
Japanese. During the first few days of mobilisation
I was myself a witness of the way in which a number
of Japanese in Berlin were cheered by the people.
It was generally expected that Japan would declare
war on Russia. The yellow sons of the East received
the popular enthusiasm, of which they found them-
selves the cause, with broad grins. How does it
come about that our people are so immature when it
comes to politics and are so easily carried away by
anything foreign ? Now we are stupid enough to
allow our enemies to persuade us that the guilt of the
war lies with us. I remember listening once to a
political conversation in the train between intelligent
men of the world whom I took to be connected with
business. They were unanimously of the opinion
that it was a mistake to declare war first, and a
further mistake to make our attack through Belgium.
It did not seem to occur to them for a moment that
it would have been nothing more or less than suicide
for Germany to have waited until all her enemies
MILITARY PREPARATIONS 61
had completed their mobilisation and taken the
field. I know that England and France were asked
what steps they would take in the case of a war
with Russia, and Belgium was asked to permit our
armies to march through her territory.
Their answers to these questions would give the
clue to their attitude. In the case of England,
however, a mistake occurred that was to have the
most fateful consequences. The first information
that came through seemed to point to neutrality ;
so much so that the Emperor wanted to give orders
for mobilisation against Russia alone. It was not
long, however, before this mistake was put right.
Another thing that our people have not estimated
at its true value is the importance of the part played
by the Russian mobilisation in bringing on the war.
They prefer to listen to the voice of the enemy, who
are careful to maintain silence on the question of
Russia's conduct, and allow themselves to be led
away by certain organs of the Press which, in utter
disregard of national loyalty, range themselves on
the side of the enemy. The unselfish and con-
scientious work of those who expend their energy
in the interest of their Fatherland and fellow-
countrymen is regarded with suspicion and de-
preciated. Thus even our careful preparations to
meet the contingency of war are counted among the
causes of its outbreak. But this question of pre-
parations applies to every state, and it must be so, for
62 A WAR MINISTER AND HIS WORK
a campaign cannot be carried on, on the impulse of
the moment. There is no justification for regarding
these preparations as evidence of an intention to
force war upon the world. They are nothing more
than a sign that we did not intend to allow ourselves
to be taken by surprise.
When France was the only enemy, old Moltke
could march into Lorraine and there wait for the
enemy to attack. When Russia threw in her lot
with France, Waldersee could not afford to wait until
the enemy had completed their preparations for a
concerted attack, but was obliged to attack
France, who was most easily accessible and whose
preparations were the farthest advanced ; and that
before Russia could intervene, so that he had no
choice but to take the shortest way in spite of the
forts that barred that way. As this possibility had
been excluded by the development of the French
system of fortification, Schlieffen had to seek other
methods.
It was to be expected that the Russian attack
would be made without loss of time, for she had
already concentrated large forces near to the frontier,
and these could quickly be reinforced by means of
the recently developed railway system. To seek
protection against these behind the Vistula would
have been ill-advised. Our eastern provinces might
need protection. The invasion by Russia would
seem to show that our people have less powers of
MILITARY PREPARATIONS 63
resistance with which to face the sheer hardships
that war brings in its train than the French, who in
spite of the capture by their enemies of larger and
more important areas of territory than was the case
in East Prussia, never allowed it to affect the firmness
of their bearing. But in this connection it must be
remembered that in their invasion of Germany the
Russians showed themselves far more ruthless foes
than we did in France.
Schlieffen therefore was faced with the necessity
of scoring a rapid success against one of the enemies.
It could not be Russia, for the Russians would have
had no hesitation about retreating further and
further into their vast country and so avoiding a
decisive issue until their allies were able to make
themselves felt. The only course that remained
open, then, was an attack on France and the march
through Belgium.
As to the justice of this move, opinions are so
sharply divided that it is not to be expected that an
agreement will ever be reached. Each party puts
the blame on the opponent. Apart from that our
enemies have now proved their right by means of
their might. However that may be, simple reasoning
leads to the question : Why is it always Belgium that
is the subject of the outcry and not the equally
neutral state of Luxembourg; and why is it that
long before the war Belgium only conducted
negotiations with our enemies and not with us, as
64 A WAR MINISTER AND HIS WORK
might have been expected from an honourable
neutrality ?
I am only anxious here to make clear the military
side of this question. It is certainly not without
interest, especially to-day, to know that the first
person to realise the necessity of a German march
through Belgium was an American. Schlieffen men-
tioned this in passing in the course of one of his
lectures.
CHAPTER IV
MOBILISATION
WE have always prepared for the eventuality
of war by dint of hard and conscientious
work, but we did not seek to precipitate
it. In any case we in the army had little thought of
the imminence of war in the year 1914. At that
time I was in command of a frontier division in
Deutsch-Eylan. We knew that there were strong
forces of Russian cavalry facing us and that we might
reckon on an early encounter with them. Our
defensive measures were already prepared. The
officers were well acquainted with the task that lay
before them and had been well trained in the steps
they were to take. These manoeuvres on a large
scale offer opportunities of constructing probable
war situations, as is the custom in all armies. That
we were on the brink of war never entered anyone's
head.
It is true that for a long time there had been
anxiety among the inhabitants of the frontier area.
Their misgivings were exploited by unscrupulous
dealers who persuaded the people to give them their
paper money in exchange for a smaller payment in
66 A WAR MINISTER AND HIS WORK
cash by representing to them that in time of war
the paper money would be of no value. Unfortu-
nately the report of these negotiations did not leak
out until it was too late for anything to be done.
Even when the news of the murder of the Arch-
duke at Sarajevo, and the Russian mobilisation
against Austria became known, many people did not
realise that it meant war. No preparations were
made, as has since been alleged. Not until the
announcement from Berlin of " threatening danger
of war " arrived was it known that it was necessary
to take war into account as a serious possibility.
It is usual for this announcement to be followed
a few hours later by the order to mobilise. The
announcement is intended to give opportunity for
getting in hand the preliminary work connected with
mobilisation. It shows complete ignorance of the
circumstances, or an evil intention, when the state-
ment is made that we had already mobilised secretly.
It is impossible in our country to mobilise secretly,
for mobilisation involves a complete dislocation of
the whole country. The migration of the masses of
men called to the colours and the levying of the
horses goes on in the sight of every one, for they take
up the whole of the transport facilities. In spite of
this, however, such nonsense as this is believed even
in our own country ; all the enemy have to do is to
go on repeating it in the full tones of conviction.
The preliminary warning from Berlin was
MOBILISATION 67
followed a few hours later by the order to mobilise, and
the following day was appointed as the first day of
mobilisation. All the work is arranged by days so
that the mobilisation can be carried through in a
definite time. In Deutsch-Eylan the war claimed
one victim at once. A man who had been called up
was seen approaching a railway tunnel. The sentry
of the railway guard challenged him, and as he
did not answer, fired. Fortunately he was only
wounded.
In Deutsch-Eylan several unpleasant results of
the mobilisation at once became apparent. In some
of the shops the shop-keepers refused to accept Ger-
man paper money at its face value. For a one-
hundred mark note only eighty marks in cash would
be given, and in the schnapps shops there was a good
deal of heavy drinking. It did not take long to put
down these evils. I gave orders that placards should
be posted to the effect that any one who was found
offering for German paper money less than its full
value would render themselves liable to be tried
by court-martial. The drinking-shops were closed
down.
Trouble arose among the workmen because,
owing to the dearth of small change, it was always
necessary to pay several of them together with a
larger note. The General Staff had drawn attention
to this shortage of small notes years before, and the
Treasury had been advised that it would be well to
68 A WAR MINISTER AND HIS WORK
make a provision of such notes against the possibility
of a shortage of small change ; this had, as a matter
of fact, already been done, but it took some little
time before the result became noticeable.
I was appointed Quartermaster-General and was
obliged to leave my division, which I thought I had
conscientiously trained for this theatre of war, at the
very moment when the first shots were being fired
on the frontier.
At the beginning of the year I had begged the
Chief of the General Staff, von Moltke, to give up the
idea of appointing me to this post, but he asked me
to take it on for one more year. I accepted it,
however, trusting in the ability of those who were
to be my colleagues and because I knew that I should
be closely associated with the Chief of the General
Staff, whose assistant and colleague I had been for
many years.
In this way it came about that I left Deutsch-
Eylan, where I had been stationed hitherto during
the first few days of mobilisation, and travelled to
Berlin, accompanied by my family. Nothing could
be taken with us with the exception of the most
necessary articles of clothing and equipment. The
train was full to overflowing, but there was on
grumbling about the lack of space. Each individual
did everything he possibly could to help his neigh-
bours to bear the discomforts of the long journey.
This train was on a small scale a model of the unity
MOBILISATION 69
and readiness for self-sacrifice of the whole people.
As we approached the bridges that span the Vistula
we could read on the notice-boards the warning :
" Don't look out of the windows ! " Force was given
to the warning by the sight of sentries who were
posted on the bridges with loaded rifles. They were
there to prevent any attempts to destroy the bridges
on the part of agents of the enemy. Armed men,
some in uniform and some in civilian clothes, were
posted along the railway to guard the permanent
way ; every thing and every one had been pressed
into the service of the State. The men who had been
called to the colours were travelling to join their
units and stations and were full of enthusiasm. No
one could have believed that this sacred fire of
enthusiasm would die down to lifeless ashes.
At times the excitement was even too fierce, as I
was to experience personally in Berlin. After I had
taken leave of my family I went to take up my
residence at the Hospiz des Westens. There, shortly
after my arrival, three worthy men appeared and
informed me that I was a Russian spy. As, after
giving them my name and rank, I did not take any
further notice of their accusations, they went away
dissatisfied. In the evening a large crowd assembled
in front of the hotel and a policeman entered and
asked me rather shamefacedly for my papers. It
was obvious that his task was very distasteful to
him. I handed him the whole of my papers to read,
70 A WAR MINISTER AND HIS WORK
although he had had enough when he had read the
first. After that he took his departure after I had
requested him to convey my compliments to the
crowd that was waiting in front of the door. I also
learned the cause of the suspicion with which I had
been regarded, and which I had been all the less able
to understand, as I had never been out except in
uniform. It appeared that it was the hang of my
trousers that had aroused the suspicions of the
people. They were not braced up tightly enough,
with the result that they hung in folds ; trousers like
that were supposed to be worn by Russian officers.
In the hotel there were a number of Germans who
had hurried home from abroad to join the colours.
The majority of the guests consisted of ladies by
themselves, whose men-folk had already responded to
the call of the Fatherland. Among these was Frau
Ludendorff, whose husband was at the moment
taking part in the fighting before Liege. We were
old acquaintances, for Ludendorff had worked under
me on the General Staff.
In order to avoid the delay involved in going to
and fro to my work at General Staff Headquarters, I
moved into residence there. Frau von Moltke had
had the thoughtfulness to have a bed and other
necessaries put up in my office so that I could devote
myself to my work without losing any time in
coming and going.
After I had reported myself to General von Moltke
MOBILISATION 71
he gave me a short survey of the situation. He told
me that the Emperor had been very strongly opposed
to the war. It was only after the case had been most
strongly put before him that he gave his consent
with a heavy heart.
It is pitiful to see to-day how quickly the people
can be swung over from one side to the other. At
that time every one was convinced that the Emperor
was innocent in the matter of causing the war. What
is the cause of this change ? Is it foreign influence or
the machinations of fellow-countrymen that have
fixed the guilt upon him ? It is another example of
the truth of the old sad experience that nothing is
less to be relied on than the favour of the crowd ;
whoever builds thereon builds on sand.
Moltke summed up the situation calmly and with
a level head. He was fully conscious of the diffi-
culty of the task that lay before him, but he faced it
with full confidence.
The Army Takes the FiELD
The concentration of the army was carried out
along the whole of the Western frontier from Wesel
to Alsace. The vast numbers of the troops made this
great area necessary. It is a fact that during the
concentration not a single enquiry reached General
Headquarters from any unit or any Government
Department, which is in itself a proof of the efficient
72 A WAR MINISTER AND HIS WORK
manner in which everything was arranged and
carried through.
In the East only weak forces were available. Their
numbers made it necessary to remain on the defensive
in this theatre of war, but the defensive could if
necessary be conducted by means of offence confined
to small areas.
In the West the concentration offered no guarantee
for any definite operation. The enemy might fore-
stall us ; the network of railways which he had at
his disposal made it seem possible that he would.
The statement that Germany had built her
railway system solely with a view to its use in war
is entirely without foundation. On the contrary,
our railway system had been designed solely with a
view to trade and traffic. It was not until a great
deal of alteration had been carried out that it
could be adapted to meet the military demands that
were made upon it. Even Russia was more favour-
ably situated with regard to railway communication
than we were, thanks to the system she had been
able to construct with the help of gold from France.
It was only the care with which our preparations
had been made that enabled us to overcome this
handicap.
The operation through Belgium was made pos-
sible by the promptness with which the concentration
of the army was carried through and by the quick
capture of Ltege.
MOBILISATION 73
While the actual concentration was being carried
out General Headquarters found little reason to
interfere, for everything worked with perfect smooth-
ness, as had also been the case in 1870. Until the
actual outbreak of hostilities, therefore, we had a
comparatively quiet time.
CHAPTER V
WAR DAYS
MAIN Headquarters was still established in
Berlin when the world-war was ushered in
by the attack on Liege. It was a bold
undertaking, which knocked on the head all accepted
ideas about operations against fortresses, and even
aroused misgiving among many of those who took
part in it. In every daring venture success always
hangs on a thread. The audacious decision has to
be followed up by the will to carry it into effect.
The first reports we received were not favourable.
Some of the attacking columns had been held up or
even forced to withdraw. Confusion and dismay
were spreading among the transport columns in the
rear. In short, things were taking a course such as
is by no means unusual in war. Only a man of real
resolution, who knows what war is, either from his
work or by experience, is able to overcome all
obstacles. Such a man was Ludendorff. To him
we owed our success.
As soon as operations were in progress Main
Headquarters was transferred to Coblenz. On the
journey thither I stood at the window of the com-
partment in which I was travelling and watched the
WAR DAYS 75
fields of my homeland fly past. Even when night
came down I was unable to tear myself away. Never
had my Fatherland seemed so fair as at that moment
when we were about to fight for its very existence
and for everything that the word " home " meant
to us.
At Coblenz we made our quarters in a hotel, the
wall of which bore an inscription to the effect that
the elder Moltke had resided there in the year 1870.
His nephew took it as a good omen.
Two sad occurrences happened to disturb the
otherwise unruffled course of our stay at Coblenz.
An officer commanding a cavalry division, and bear-
ing a very famous name, shot himself in the Eiffel.
I have never been able to discover his reason. Next,
a lady, well known at, and in the service of, the Court,
shot herself in Coblenz. There is no question that
in this case the cause was melancholy. I had sat
opposite to her in the train and entered into con-
versation with her.
At that time, before the war with its terrible
holocaust had somewhat deadened one's feelings, the
death of acquaintances still affected one deeply.
While our advance in the West was taking its
course according to plan, in the East the Russians
had succeeded in invading the country and our
counter-measures had failed. General von Pritt-
witz, in charge of the operations in that region, was
faced with a heavy task. The peculiarities of this
frontier district had previously been the subject of
76 A WAR MINISTER AND HIS WORK
much military speculation and discussion. The
latest idea was said to be that the line of the Vistula
must be held in case of a Russian invasion.
It is always a mistake when academic opinions of
that kind influence the spirit in which the actual
operations are conducted. Decisions must be taken
only with an eye to the actual circumstances pre-
vailing at the moment. Hindenburg, who was still
unemployed at home, was hastily summoned, and
Ludendorff was transferred to him in the capacity of
Chief-of-Staff . The result was the Battle of Tannen-
burg, strategically as well as tactically one of the
most brilliant military operations of all time.
The progress of the movements in the West made
it necessary for us to transfer our headquarters to
Luxembourg. The villages in that country had very
much the same appearance as German villages. It
was impossible to say the same of the towns. The
proprietor of the hotel in which I was living said he
was the only friend of Germany in the place and
thought he would have to leave if we were forced to
evacuate it. For the matter of that, he often
behaved in none too friendly a manner towards us.
At that time I was not faced with any special
difficulties in dealing with the local populations and
the authorities. On the other hand, I will give one
example to show that an army, however well behaved
it is, always contains some evilly-disposed associates.
A man was caught in the uniform of a non-
commissioned officer who had been going round in a
WAR DAYS 77
motor-car from one village to another levying
contributions in money. He had a supply of special
notes with him which he left behind with the local
authorities as receipts of a military authority for
the sums forthcoming. It turned out that he was a
soldier who had been discharged for medical unfit-
ness, and who, instead of making his way back to the
rear, had been extorting money all over the country,
sometimes in the guise of a non-commissioned
officer, at others as an officer. At the time he was
caught he had managed to collect thirty thousand
francs. How many scoundrels may have injured the
fair name of our army then and later on by such
behaviour !
The villagers were highly delighted when their
money was returned to them. The miscreant, un-
fortunately, was not amenable to justice, so far as I
was concerned, as he had already left the army. I
should have had him shot out of hand. I am afraid
the civil courts treated him with greater leniency.
As the armies were advancing with extreme
rapidity, and those on the right wing were in touch
with us only by wireless telegraphy, Luxemburg
would obviously be unsuitable for our headquarters
before long. Among the Kaiser's immediate en-
tourage there was a considerable feeling against
moving Main Headquarters into France itself. The
Kaiser himself did not share that feeling, but had a
decided objection to Sedan as our residence.
78 A WAR MINISTER AND HIS WORK
Now came the reverse on the Marne. At the
present moment opinion about that event is still
confused and in its broad lines wrong. I myself am,
of course, acquainted with some aspects of the affair,
but as the whole circumstances are still unknown to
me I am not yet in a position to express a conclusive
judgment. I must postpone that to some later time.
After the retreat I went on a visit to the armies.
Composure and order were observable everywhere.
While I was with the 2nd Army (von Billow's) I was
able to witness the vain attempts of the French and
English to break through in the neighbourhood of
Rheims. Fort Brimont proved a magnificent view-
point.
On this occasion I was able to take part in a
battle for the first time. The conduct of the action
was not very resolute and did not make a particularly
favourable impression upon me. As I was an un-
attached observer I betook myself to a Jager
Company in the trenches. These " trenches " had
nothing in common but the name with the trenches
which were constructed later on. The men were
obviously pleased that I had come to pay them a
visit, and those nearest to me told me of their ex-
periences. We were not much troubled by infantry
fire. Only artillery sent their greetings in our
direction.
My adjutant, however, would not leave me in
peace and brought me bodily out of the trenches. I
WAR DAYS 79
could not deny the justification of his acting thus.
Even soldiers must give up their dreams of youth
when they have reached old age or attained to high
positions. I know one Corps Commander who
rushed into the first-line trenches to join his troops
in the first engagement. I can well understand such
an action, but all the same it was a mistake. The
trenches are not the Commander's place ; he has
other and more important things to do.
In critical situations, of course, he must be
allowed to risk his own person. Many Such examples
are to be found in military history, but they have not
always been attended with glory such as Napoleon's
when he rushed the bridge at Atcola with the flag in
his hand. All the same, when I was in actual
command of troops later on, I could not help envying
my young officers who had opportunities of dis-
tinguishing themselves by their courage, skill and
ready wits in action, whilst I was tied to my head-
quarters.
While I was at Rheims I witnessed the with-
drawal of the French, which was carried out in good
order under heavy artillery fire. Then I went by a
roundabout way to the ist Army (von Kluck's), as it
was uncertain whether enemy cavalry had not
broken through between the two armies. As a
matter of fact, there was a gap about thirteen miles
wide between them. I found the army hotly
engaged just at the moment when the report came
80 A WAR MINISTER AND HIS WORK
through : " The English are retreating ! " Now at
last were we absolutely certain that the army had
not been separated, as had been feared.
I drove back to Luxembourg during the night.
When I arrived in the morning I found my appoint-
ment to the command of the 14th Reserve Corps
waiting for me. I took a short but moving farewell
from Moltke. He seemed to me to be very ill, and
said : " You have been sacrificed for me." I did
not, however, regard myself in any way as a scape-
goat, but was only too glad to find myself once more
a leader of troops in the field. Then I reported
myself to the Kaiser and made the suggestion that
Main Headquarters should be more centrally situated
behind the line as it was too far from the right wing.
He was fully in agreement with the proposal, but
there was still a good deal of hesitation among the
men in his immediate entourage.
I now went by familiar roads through Lorraine,
past Metz and Morchingen, to the Vosges, where I
was to take over the command of my Corps. It had
been engaged in some bloody actions in the mountain
forests, especially round the Donon, but it was
enjoying a comparatively quiet spell when I joined it.
Within a very few days we received quite fresh
orders. We were withdrawn through Saarburg in
Lorraine to the neighbourhood of Saint Avoid and
Bolchen in readiness to be sent forward against
Antwerp. I should have been very glad to go there,
WAR DAYS 81
as I did not believe much in the strength of that
fortress and knew that the section of the front we
should probably have to attack was in course of
reconstruction.
We travelled through the Rhineland and the
Eiffel via Aachen and Liege. The old unrestrained
enthusiasm was still observable everywhere in
Germany. We were given the most boisterous wel-
come and quite overwhelmed with presents. Once
the frontier was crossed, however, the scene changed.
No more food was forthcoming, and we were sent on
from one supply depot to another. During the
journey fresh marching orders had reached us. We
were to go to Cambrai. As a result of this our move
was to take about seventy hours instead of thirty ;
we had to consume our iron rations. Another effect
of the change of plans was that the sequence of trains
was interrupted, and thus it happened that the train
of our Corps Headquarters, with only forty rifles
and carbines, was the first to arrive in Cambrai.
In Cambrai French doctors were moving about
undisturbed in uniform. There was nothing to
show that they were not officers. Steps had to be
taken to put things in order. A strange type of
German girl began to be unpleasantly noticeable.
How they got there I cannot explain, but they tried
to pass themselves off as nurses ; they were soon
removed and replaced by Red Cross nurses.
On the following day our outposts that had been
F
8 2 A WAR MINISTER AND HIS WORK
pushed forward in the direction of Bapaume were
attacked. Meanwhile communication had been es-
tablished with Headquarters in St. Quentin. Orders
were received that we should press forward as
quickly as possible to Albert by way of Bapaume.
That was easier said than done. My troops were
only gradually coming in and were still being de-
trained, while there was a particular shortage of
artillery. The reconnaissance of the area in our
front had only just been begun ; in front of us there
were said to be strong forces of French and British
cavalry. An abandoned French battery was found
by our cavalry in the neighbourhood of Cambrai.
Perhaps it was a relic of earlier fighting. In another
place lay the ruins of a train of our motor transport
wagons that had been destroyed by an enemy force
of armoured cars. The signs of war and conflict
were increasing.
It is a strange business when one is thrust
suddenly in this way into new conditions. One
knows very little of what is going on ; the air is alive
with rumours which exaggerate everything. It is
only gradually that the situation begins to clear and
touch begins to be established with the enemy and
with the troops on either flank who are in a similar
position.
On the left we established touch with the Second
Bavarian Corps, which was under orders to advance
north of the Somme to the Lower Ancre. Our right
WAR DAYS 83
flank was to be covered by two bodies of cavalry but
they had not yet come up.
In view of the situation in which I found myself
it will not be counted to my discredit that I expressed
myself in very plain language to a young officer of
the Headquarters Staff who wanted to hurry me
forward.
On the third day the advance was begun, the
right column (26th Reserve Division), under General
Freiherr von Soden, marching on Bapaume, the left
column (28th Reserve Division), under General von
Pawel, passing Bapaume on the left. A considerable
number of my force had not yet come up, while the
majority of those who had, began the march im-
mediately after detraining without even a night's
rest or a meal. But the men of the old army were
tried men and knew their duty.
The right column soon encountered the enemy. I
immediately set out in a car and drove straight to
where the column was situated in order to speak to
the commanding officer, who was said to be with the
advance guard. As we approached the column we
saw the first of our dead. Out of a wood on the
right of the road appeared a long line of trenches.
1 That is the enemy ! " called out my Chief-of-Staff,
Lieutenant-Colonel Bronsart von Schellendorf, who
was beside me. We drove behind a tile-works where
I came upon the commander of the column. He
was deploying his troops calmly and methodically.
84 A WAR MINISTER AND HIS WORK
The affair soon came to an end. It was not long
before the enemy was overcome, and it took even
less time for him to disappear.
Then I drove in the direction of the left column.
On my way I came upon a cavalry division which
should long ago have been in position covering our
right flank, blocking the road in a village. I did not
greet them in a very friendly spirit.
When I came up with the left column I found
that they had already been deployed and were
engaged with the enemy not far from the Bapaume-
Peronhe road. In front of us a battalion of Jager
had opened fire. Just then a column of heavy
transport appeared, advancing calmly towards us.
When I asked them where they thought they were
going, they answered : " To join the battalion." It
was the transport column of the battalion of Jagers
I have just mentioned. I immediately ordered them
to go back, and I mention the occurrence as an
example of the way in which in war the most un-
expected things, that would in the ordinary way be
thought impossible, are daily occurrences, and every
officer must be prepared to meet such contingencies.
It often occurs, however, that their knowledge and
experience are not equal to the occasion. The young
officer is too liable to expect in war the orderly
routine to which he has grown accustomed in peace,
and is easily put out by anything unexpected. He
must, however, be prepared for any emergency and
WAR DAYS 85
bear in mind that it is possible even for the best of
troops and the bravest of men to lose their heads.
Here, as with the other column, the fight went
forward quickly and the enemy disappeared.
The officer commanding the column proposed to
rest his men and wait for the fall of dark, as he was
afraid that if he pushed the advance too far the
marching columns might come under the fire of the
batteries of enemy horse-artillery. Our field artillery
at that time had not as yet found the range of the
enemy artillery and so could not prevent this. In
the meantime, the afternoon had come on, the corps
had not yet reached its full strength, and the men
were very tired after their exertions, so I ordered
them to have a meal and rest for a bit. We thought
the fighting was at an end for the time being. Orders
were given for outposts to be thrown out in the
neighbourhood of the Ancre. Just as the transport
of the Headquarters had been despatched to a village
not far from Longueval, an officer of the 2nd Bavarian
Corps appeared and reported that this corps was in
action with the enemy on the right wing at Longue-
val. The news was all the more surprising because
this corps had already sent us a report that they had
in the morning defeated the enemy on their front.
Apart from this, too, it was strange that no sound of
firing had reached our ears in spite of the shortness
of the distance from the position we were then
occupying.
86 A WAR MINISTER AND HIS WORK
Orders were once more given for the divisions to
get on the march, the right column following the
road that led to Albert, the left column marching
direct to Longueval. The latter did not become
involved in any further fighting ; the enemy had
withdrawn before their advance. The division on
the right had to fight its way through to its quarters
near the Ancre in the darkness which had come on in
the meantime. When our baggage arrived at the
place where it had been intended to take up quarters
for the night it was found that the village had been
the scene of fighting and had been set on fire by the
heavy firing. It was brought back without mishap,
however, in the charge of an adjutant. Head-
quarters was established in the considerable village
of Le Transloi, and accommodation was found in an
imposing farmhouse. The house bore witness to the
prosperity of the owners. In the room which was
assigned to me it was difficult to move about owing
to the great quantity of comfortably upholstered
furniture with which it was filled. The farmer's
family, however, used the kitchen as their living-
room. After the battle of the Somme I saw this
same village in a state of ruin and desolation, and
before that I was a witness of the sad spectacle
presented by the wretched inhabitants fleeing for
their lives. This sort of thing makes one reflect how
much Germany has been spared, and might still have
been spared, if only she had wished !
WAR DAYS 87
The fighting was renewed on the following day.
At first we had only been opposed by patrols and
cavalry which had not offered any considerable
resistance, but now there appeared troops of the line
strongly supported by artillery which had taken up
excellent positions on the heights beyond the Ancre
and between the Ancre and the Somme. The 2nd
Bavarian Corps came to a halt at the fortified village
and castle of Maricourt. We reached the line
Thiepval-Fricourt. On the right and to our rear
the enemy was still in possession of the villages round
Miraumont and to the north and rear of that place.
We therefore had him on all sides of us. The cavalry
divisions on our right were now in position and had
hard work to hold their own in front of the villages
that were in the hands of the enemy. When one
cavalry division on our extreme right failed to hold
its ground the enemy threatened my line of retreat
and communication to Cambrai. One cavalry leader
of my acquaintance shouted to me as we met :
■ ' Stein, Stein, we're in an awful mess ! "
However, we did not lose heart, and succeeded in
taking the villages in the flank and rear, for the most
part by means of a night attack. The army com-
mander, the Crown Prince of Bavaria, came to see
me just at this time and was very astonished at the
position in which he found us, but also very pleased
that we had been able to get as far as we had. It
is easy for those in high places to obtain wrong
88 A WAR MINISTER AND HIS WORK
impressions. Even von Falkenhayn, who was at that
time Chief-of-Staff to the army, sent me a message
based on information obtained from a French
general, according to which my corps and that next
to me were stated to have been held up the whole
day by patrols. I was able to furnish an energetic
reply to this by pointing out that on the first day of
the march the men had come straight off the trans-
port trains, not up to strength, and for the most part
without being able to get a meal or a sleep, but in
spite of that they had advanced a distance of forty-
five kilometres and fought two engagements on the
way. This was certainly an exceptional achieve-
ment and I did not intend that my men should be
deprived of the credit that was their -due.
At that time we were holding, along the Ancre
and to the rear of it, a front of twenty-seven kilo-
metres, and were opposed to a numerical superiority
of twice our own strength. There, of course, we had
come to a standstill. But the position improved
daily. New corps came up behind us and extended
the line on our right flank after securing our position
by the occupation of Bapaume. I give details of
this situation in order to show that even in times of
crisis there is no need to despair, and that the surest
way to hold the enemy is by attack. When one is
left to one's own resources it is necessary to act with
more caution, but when there is a prospect of rein-
forcements it is possible to take a good deal of risk.
WAR DAYS 89
In the line we had now reached, the fighting
gradually settled down to a war of positions. On
the other side of the Ancre the two villages of
Beaucourt and Beaumont were captured by a night
attack and in this way we were able to establish
touch with the Guards' Corps, which had been
advancing under heavy fighting on our right and now
carried on the line through Serre in the direction of
Arras as far as Monchy.
I had established my headquarters in the pretty
but poor village of Martinpuich. There we surprised
a few modest summer visitors from Paris who had
not been able to get away. In this place we were
so close to our troops that we could tell im-
mediately what was going on in the firing-line. At
first we were very cramped for room. We had two
rooms between us. In one of them I lived and we
messed together ; the other served as an office and
living-room for several officers. In this room was
also the telephone, which in some ways we could well
have spared. Several of my staff had for a long
time to be content with a bed of straw for their
night's rest. It was only gradually that we were
able to extend our quarters. The enemy fire only
reached the village occasionally, and perhaps by
accident. The French at that time did their best
to spare those villages which were not situated
directly in the firing-line ; this was in great contrast
to the English methods. Also they kept to certain
go A WAR MINISTER AND HIS WORK
fixed times and limits for their bombardment so that
it was easy to get out of the way.
The light-hearted spirit in which our men still
regarded those things at that time is well illustrated
by the following incident : One day when I was
sitting in my room in the company of several officers
of my staff a shell fell in a small, not very prosperous-
looking farm that lay opposite to our headquarters.
The men who were billeted there rushed out of the
farm like a swarm of bees and took refuge behind a
house. The fat cook who was engaged in stirring a
stew-pan in the courtyard of the farm, waved his
ladle and shouted : "It hasn't done me any harm
for it fell in the stable ! " and went on with his
stirring as though nothing had happened. But our
servants and orderlies had meanwhile run to the gate
of the garden in front of my house to get a better
view of what was going on. One of them shouted
to his companions : "I say ! in peace-time you
wouldn't see a sight like that if you paid a thousand
thalers ! "
I have very pleasant recollections of my quarters
in Martinpuich. I lived in a little country house
which had once been the residence of the doctor,
who was now with the army. The house had been
left in the charge of his sister, a matronly woman of
uncertain age, who looked very impressive when she
was got up in her best clothes, but at other times had
a rather slovenly appearance. She spent most of
WAR DAYS 91
her time making purses by sewing together bits of
leather. There was some uncertainty as to her past
history. When, on my first arrival, I asked for her
husband, she replied abruptly : " I haven't a
husband." Some time later I found out that she
was supposed to have lived for some time in New
York, where she was said to have made a lot of
money. It was also reported that she had a very
pretty daughter who was being educated in a
convent in Paris. Among the inhabitants of the
village she had the reputation of being rich and
miserly. She kept horses and a carriage, and her
staff of servants consisted of a small urchin and a
dirty girl, who seemed to spend their whole time
squabbling together. We got on quite well with our
hostess, and often made her presents out of our own
supplies. When our stay was coming to an end we
asked her to let us take away with us a number of
ordinary red cups which had been reserved for our
use, and which my officers wanted to keep as sou-
venirs ; in return we presented her with the finest
tea-set that we were able to raise in St. Quentin.
With this she was more than delighted. She came
to see me some time later in Bapaume to ask me to
use my influence to have her deported into France,
away from the occupied area. In the wonderful
splendour with which she was arrayed on this
occasion I should never have recognised her as the
same woman.
92 A WAR MINISTER AND HIS WORK
I could bring forward a good deal of evidence as
proof of the peaceful relations that existed between
the troops and the inhabitants of the occupied area.
In the large area that the corps was occupying, and
which included about sixty parishes, it was only
necessary to inflict an almost negligible number of
punishments upon the inhabitants. I was careful,
however, to refrain from issuing any unnecessary or
irksome regulations. At the present time our fellow-
countrymen on the left bank of the Rhine find some
of the regulations laid down by the enemy unjust
and humiliating, particularly the regulation with
regard to saluting. Some commanding officers in-
troduced this in France at the time of which I am
writing. I am opposed to regulations which I should
myself obj ect to if I were in the position of the other
side.
There are, however, cases in which such regula-
tions as this, and others of a similar type, have to be
enforced in order to ensure outward respect ; at the
same time care should be taken that this is not done
without good reason. Naturally it is not to be
expected that enemy inhabitants who have been well
treated and are apparently well disposed, should go
on showing themselves friendly when they are
subjected to rebuffs ; those who have been treated
badly will certainly not do so, for that would be
contrary to all national feeling. Such a state
of things could not be found anywhere except
WAR DAYS 93
in Germany, where national feeling does not
exist.
In France, too, incidents occurred which brought
out the kindly human feeling of the inhabitants. One
day, when I was going to attend the funeral of two
airmen who had been accidentally killed while flying,
I was surprised to find in front of the church a
number of elderly men in black clothes. When I
asked in astonishment how it was that so many
relatives had come to the funeral, I was informed
that the inhabitants of the village had asked that
they might be allowed to take part in the ceremony.
The deceased had been billeted in the village.
Our kitchen was looked after by a young girl
who came from Martinpuich, who, at her own request,
had accompanied us to Bapaume. A few weeks later
I happened to find the girl in tears and asked her
what she was crying for. She told me she felt
homesick, although the two places were barely a
mile apart, and she could go and visit her family
whenever she wanted to do so. When I pointed
out to her that Martinpuich was being pretty heavily
bombarded and that she would be in constant danger
if she went back to live there, she replied that she
would rather die at home than live in a strange place.
I had to let the girl go back, although I was very loth
to do so. It is to be hoped that she escaped the
destruction that befell her home.
In many of the inhabitants their German descent
94 A WAR MINISTER AND HIS WORK
was noticeable in their colouring and features. The
fair-haired children, and also large numbers of the
older people, might easily have gone to live in a
German village without attracting attention.
It is true that not a day passed without fighting
taking place at one point or another, but in spite of
it all our life flowed along pretty peacefully. About
Christmas time in 1914 the fighting grew heavier.
It brought out an incident which was very instructive
to the officers concerned. While the fighting was in
progress the transport columns were noticed to be
growing restless, although they lay far back in the
rear well out of range of the fighting. The men were
shouting : " They're falling back ! Why doesn't
someone order the horses to be put in so that we can
retire ? " What was the reason for this ? The
officer in command of the division that was being
attacked had ordered all the baggage that had been
brought up to be loaded up and everything to be got
ready to march, as is the custom in every engagement
in the open. I gave orders that this practice should
be discontinued. In the type of warfare on which
we were then engaged we had either to stand or fall.
If the transport was lost it did not make any odds.
On one occasion the Emperor was travelling past
and came to visit Bapaume. He did not come to
Martinpuich, as it was right that he should not, but
he sent me hearty greetings. I heard later from
some of his staff that dreadful stories were being
WAR DAYS 95
circulated about my headquarters at Martinpuich.
According to these we were supposed scarcely to
have a roof to our heads and we were said to be
sleeping on straw. This was not true at all ; our
quarters were simple, but they were good. A long
time afterwards the Emperor paid me a visit in
another place, St. Leger, in order to confer distinc-
tions and to address the men. The guns were
thundering and the shells were falling quite near.
It was a relief to me when the exalted guest was once
more seated in his car and driving away into safety,
for even the road by which he had come was not free
from danger. This should be taken to heart by
those people who accuse the Emperor of taking his
part in the fighting at a safe distance of fifty kilo-
metres in rear of the firing-line. That is a mean
slander, like so many others.
The old village church of Martinpuich will always
remain clearly fixed in my memory. Its tower had
fallen in years before and the bells stood in a farm-
yard near the dung-heap. Our engineers cleared
away the ruins and gave a more dignified appearance
to the disreputable-looking gable of the church.
In this church we often held a service in the evenings
in the dark. The bits of candle which some of the
men brought with them only served to throw the
darkness into sharper relief. It was not without
anxiety that I took my place among my men and
saw them thickly crowded together, and asked myself
96 A WAR MINISTER AND HIS WORK
what would happen if a shell should chance to fall
on the building. We were spared such a disaster.
At that time officers and men were still imbued with
a spirit of earnestness ; they liked to come to church.
In the course of the long war this has changed for the
worse ; in face of the constant imminence of death
the spirit of carpe diem gained the upper hand. A
friendly inhabitant made me a present of a photo-
graph of this church taken at a time when the tower
was still standing, and a painter friend of mine who
was visiting me made an oil painting of it.
I left this congenial village in January, 191 6, and
moved my headquarters to Bapaume. When, soon
afterwards, I received the command of four divisions
and took over the front as far as Monchy, I found
that Bapaume was more conveniently situated for
controlling this extended front than Martinpuich.
We got quite accustomed to living in Bapaume. We
did not leave it until the beginning of July, 191 6. It
was another simple, modest place and was devoid of
any external attractions. Its beautiful church of
the late Gothic period, with stained glass windows,
was regularly used by us for divine service and
classical concerts. The schools, which were of
considerable size, were readily adapted for hospitals,
and the hall of the municipal buildings made a very
good lecture-room.
In spite of the continuous fighting plenty of time
and energy were devoted to the things of the mind.
WAR DAYS 97
Scholars and artists placed their talents at the
service of the troops. There was no lack of lectures,
concerts and dramatic performances. On several
occasions we even had the opportunity of enjoying
the finished art of the company from the Royal
Theatre at Stuttgart. The reserve regiments had
formed bands since the outbreak of the war, and as
the result of able training they soon did excellent
work. Among others, a leading spirit in this work
was a conductor from Bayreuth. Among the
officers of one of the divisions was the leader of the
orchestra of the Royal Theatre at Munich. He, and
many talented and learned men from the training
colleges and academies of South Germany, together
with actors and artists of every kind who were found
among the regiments, all did a great deal towards
keeping up the spirits of the men under the stress of
the time. At times like this it is just as important
to provide food for the mind as for the body if the
men are to be kept fresh and alert.
Of first importance, too, is, of course, the question
of food supplies. Thanks to the devoted energy of
our excellent quartermaster, Presting, this depart-
ment received its full share of attention. My Chief-
of -Staff at that time, von Kleist, instituted a school
of cooking, which was attended by the regimental
cooks in turn. It also provided food for the troops
that were stationed in the town itself.
A trench newspaper was also founded in which
98 A WAR MINISTER AND HIS WORK
any one could air his opinions. It survived until the
formation of the corps was changed. Perhaps this
information will provide some young officer or other
with a hint or suggestion that may be of use to
him.
At that time we were still dealing with the
tried officers and men of the old firmly-united and
efficiently-trained army. There was at that time a
high standard of religious feeling and thirst for
knowledge. It is certain that, had it not been for
the moral enthusiasm that inspired the men and the
high standard of physical efficiency to which they
had been trained, we should never have been able to
hold our own as we did against an overwhelming
numerical superiority in the battle of the Somme.
Another factor that proved of great importance was
the careful building of the trenches and strengthening
of our position. Men are not eager to take part in
this kind of work ; they must be kept to it with a
firm hand. This task becomes less difficult when the
men have once realised from experience how im-
portant the work is to their own personal safety.
Some idea of the amount of work that had to be put
in will be obtained when it is known that these
divisions constructed over four hundred miles of
front line and communication trenches, without
counting the large numbers of dug-outs.
From time to time we found ourselves running
very short of arms and ammunition. We were at
WAR DAYS 99
first reduced to making up the number of machine-
guns, and even batteries of artillery, from the reserves,
from captured material, and by begging them from
other depots. Later these measures were forbidden
and what we wanted was issued to us. The shortage
of ammunition gave the commanding officers many
an anxious hour when they had to see men clutching
their overcoats or falling down in front of them and
begging : " Order the artillery to fire. We are only
too willing to hold out, but the artillery won't back
us up." Such incidents as this grip you at the heart
when you know that you can only allow a small
number of rounds to be fired through the day owing
to the greater need for the ammunition in other places.
At times it was the same thing with the sand-
bags. These sacks that were used for cover, and
which cost so much labour to erect, were continually
being shot away. It was almost impossible to keep
up with the demand by means of spade and shovel ;
it was necessary to have the sacks ready at hand.
During my period of office as Minister for War I had
to take action against a firm who were alleged to
have been charging exorbitant prices for sand-bags.
In addition the officer who was responsible for the
contract was brought to book. If he had heard
complaints and curses like those which filled our ears
at that time I can sympathise with the remark he
finally made : "It matters nothing to me where I
get them and what price I pay for them ! "
ioo A WAR MINISTER AND HIS WORK
In spite of all the shortage we managed to hold
out until relief came.
It always gave me great pleasure to visit the men
in the trenches. The ways that led to these trenches
were more dangerous than the trenches themselves,
except at such times when fighting was actually
going on. Those visits gave me an opportunity to
test myself. You find that you regard danger
with indifference as a rule. Then there come days
when you have to take a firm hold of yourself. Many
will have experienced this. The man who has the
easiest time in this way is the one who does not
know what danger means. A man whose mind
continually runs on it is lost.
I was very grateful to the men for the anxious
care with which they looked after my safety while I
was among them in the trenches. They kept
saying : " Excellency, you ought not to go that way ;
that part of the trench is always under machine-gun
fire. You ought not to drive that way or you will be
seen by the enemy artillery," and so on. A worthy
rifleman once dragged me down from the fire-step
because an enemy sharpshooter in a tree opposite
was taking aim at me. I felt so secure among the
men and could confidently entrust my life and
safety to their care. And what has become of all
this German loyalty to-day ? It seems to be a thing
of the past.
The villages through which the trenches ran, and
WAR DAYS 101
those immediately behind the firing-line, had been
reduced to ruins by the artillery fire. Certain
pictures of them stick with particular distinctness in
my memory.
Many a time I have gone into a village church-
yard and found the graves of people who had died
long before torn open by the heavy shells. It was a
horrible spectacle ! In one village the church, which
stood rather high, was a favourite target for the
enemy artillery. Through the ruins of the shell-
shattered roof the clouds looked down on a scene of
ruin and desolation. Leaning up against a pillar
stood a figure of Christ supported by its pedestal.
When it had hung above, the arms had been out-
stretched in benediction ; down here as it lay against
the pillar it raised one arm in accusation. On the
ruins of the high altar stood an untouched figure of
the Blessed Virgin surveying with wide-open eyes
the scene of destruction. It would have provided a
good subject for an artist or a poet. My artist friend
tried to make a picture of the little church, but he
was driven away by the fire of the enemy.
But the sight that made the deepest impression
was that of the graves of our dead which lay within
the lines. They had been laid to rest by their
comrades where they had fallen or close by. Little
graveyards tended with loving care marked the spot.
Among the larger graveyards further in the rear it
was possible to do more in the way of ornament.
102 A WAR MINISTER AND HIS WORK
These are the places where the artists should have
made their studies if they had wanted to catch the
true psychology of the fighting man. Some time
later I saw an exhibition of graveyard sculpture in
an art gallery in Berlin. It did not give the real
atmosphere of life and death in the trenches ; the
impression it made was one of coldness and want of
understanding.
In the graveyard of Bapaume we erected a
monument for the whole corps, not far from the
inartistic monument erected by the French to com-
memorate the war of 1870. Our monument con-
sisted of a simple pyramid, which was surrounded by
the graves of our and the enemy dead. The names
of those who were taking their last rest there were
carved on tablets and stones that would withstand
the ravages of time. Side by side with these stood
the grave of a Prussian officer of the Guards who had
been killed in 1871. I had the following words
carved on the monument :
" We do homage to our dead
Who gave up their lives loyally and without fear.
Their mortal remains we have here laid to rest,
Their spirit, released, has gone home."
What will remain of these tokens of affection and
respect now that the terrific battles of the later
periods of the war have swept over them ! However
this may be, their memory will not fade, for pictures of
the monument have been sent to every part of the
WAR DAYS 103
empire. The corps was a model in miniature of
united Germany made up of all the German tribes :
Schwabians and Badeners, inhabitants of the Han-
seatic towns and Mecklenburgers, Westphalians and
Thuringians, men from the Marches, Saxons, Rhein-
landers and Bavarians — all were represented.
I often paid a visit to this graveyard. With the
flowers and foliage that had been planted there it
had a more cheerful, friendly appearance than most
graveyards in Germany. The homely gravestones
were not striking. The grave of a young musician
was an exception ; it was ornamented by a Parisian
sculptor with a striking figure of a weeping muse.
I had a photograph taken of this monument and put
in safe keeping.
Our stay in Bapaume was disturbed almost
every day by squadrons of aeroplanes. At first we
were only provided with a few with which to oppose
them ; but an excellent anti-aircraft battery was
stationed near the town and forced our enemies to
exercise caution.
One night I was awakened by the sound of heavy
firing. I got up and went to the window and had
just reached it when a bomb burst in the next
garden, scarcely twenty yards from where I was
standing. An airship was passing over the town.
Two houses were destroyed by the bombs, including
the military post-office. Unfortunately, an officer
who was passing through the town, and who had been
io4 A WAR MINISTER AND HIS WORK
billeted in a neighbouring house, was killed by a
falling beam. The house in which I was sleeping,
and I myself, were quite unharmed ; the shell
and its contents had all been buried in the earth of
the broad garden. Later, judging by some un-
exploded shells we picked up, we were forced, to our
great astonishment, to the conclusion that it was one
of our own airships that had lost its bearings and got
out of control. The unhappy commander is said
to have been killed later himself.
I only saw one enemy airship, and that was some
time later in another village not very far away. It
passed over our headquarters during the night and
dropped all its bombs in an open field without doing
any harm.
The aeroplanes, however, were unwelcome visitors
until the Fokker machine made its appearance.
Then the enemy tried to regain the mastery by great
superiority of numbers.
The most famous flying men came from our
lines. Immelmann was with the neighbouring army,
but he used to make his appearance as soon as the
heavy fire of our anti-aircraft guns showed that
something was going on over our lines. I was able
to make his acquaintance after one of his victories,
by the side of the fallen enemy aeroplane. One of
his opponents was dead, the other unhurt. The
latter told us how, during the fight, his friend had
suddenly shouted out : " It's all up with us ! It's
WAR DAYS 105
Immelmann ! " Immediately afterwards he was
struck by the shot that killed him.
Bolke was my flight commander. Any one who
knew this quiet and modest man will know how
great was my grief when one of my staff told me,
with tears in his eyes, that Bolke was down. He had
been my guest not very long before. The change
from life to death was too sudden, and I, too, was not
ashamed to weep. Richthofen, too, was once, I am
told, a member of the squadron, but I have been
unable to recall him. A Berlin artist has made me a
present of an album containing etchings of these
three airmen who, crowned with fame, fell in the
service of their Fatherland.
I could name many other heroes whose names
have not appeared before the public notice but live
in the annals of the corps.
One patrol-leader in particular had won my
respect by his courage and skill. But he had a
passion that amounted to madness for " sausages,"
and especially the biggest ones . It was while engaged
with one of these that he met his death.
A certain vice-sergeant-major, who by profession
was a concert-singer, was known through the whole
corps as a bold and successful patrol-leader. He
was always at grips with the enemy. He, too, was
one day brought back dead ; one day while observing
in a shell-hole he came to a sudden end.
Many officers, non-commissioned officers and men
106 A WAR MINISTER AND HIS WORK
could be mentioned whose heroism was known only
within the corps, or whose heroic deeds were so
frequent that men got used to them, and they almost
ceased to attract attention. Their names, however,
were mentioned in the Orders of the Day, together
with an account of what they had done.
I will mention one with whom I was connected in
a specially intimate way and of whom it is fitting
that his name should be preserved in these pages.
His death hit me very hard. The man I refer to
was the youngest member of my staff, Captain
Taute, a man of sunny temperament who radiated
joy wherever he happened to be. Instead of going
on leave when his turn came he asked that he might
be allowed to take over the temporary command of
a company in the trenches. The last day of his
command had arrived, and in the evening he was to
come back to his post on the staff. Then came a
heavy attack. With heroic enthusiasm he threw
himself into the fight and fought hand-to-hand with
his men Until the enemy were beaten back. In the
evening he went out in front of the trench again
accompanied by his orderly ; a stray shrapnel shell
burst and killed them both. The officer commanding
the next company to his has written a glowing
account of his work in the trenches, and has described
the fight in which he was engaged and his death. He
did not wish to publish the description and presented
it to me. Some day I shall give it to the public. In
WAR DAYS 107
such times as those in which we are now living it is
right that no opportunity should be lost of setting
before the public such examples of bravery, self-
sacrifice and devotion to duty. We laid our beloved
comrade to rest in enemy soil. On his tombstone
are written the words :
" In youth you left us !
As the sun was setting after a day of hard battle
And the joy of victory still shone in your eyes,
You met your death.
We mourn for you in silence.
Yet each friend in our close-knit band of brothers
Is true to your memory and whispers softly :
You were dear to me."
When men died young like this the old words
often came to my mind : " Whom the gods love die
young." In those days one could not foresee how
these words were to be emphasised by the events of
the future.
It is not possible to erect a monument to every
brave and loyal man, but each one has his place in
the corporate body. For this reason I have sought
to leave a lasting memorial to the 14th Reserve
Corps, which since the war has ceased to exist. I
sent to every member a copy of a description of a
battle scene in which I have tried to give a picture
of a typical deed from the field itself. The sketch,
" Der Granathof," represents the whole corps. The
field newspaper also was intended to serve as a
memento of the corps. The same purpose is served
108 A WAR MINISTER AND HIS WORK
by the books I had published by my corps' printing
press, as, for example, the first volume of the work,
" The Castles of Northern France," and the picture,
" La Tour," a reproduction of the famous pastel of
St. Quentin.
But it does not require these outward signs to
keep the memory of the corps indelibly stamped on
the mind of every one of its members.
In the summer of 191 6 there were increasing
signs that a heavy offensive by the English was
imminent. The fire of their artillery was gradually
being increased in strength. We knew fairly ac-
curately the strength of the force that was opposed
to us, and we had to reckon with a four or five-fold
numerical superiority. On June 24th the enemy
began a week of terrific bombardment that was
accompanied by day and night gas-attacks.
On the last night of June Bapaume was bombarded
by heavy artillery. When this happened we knew
the attack was about to be launched, and on July 1st
it was made in full force. Along nearly the whole
line he was beaten back. Only on the left wing did
he succeed in breaking through in a few places. Now
began the superhuman struggle in which every foot
of ground was disputed with the enemy that the
break-through might be prevented. During this
period I learned what it was to bear the heavy
burden of responsibility and the uncertainty of the
future. In order to prevent a break-through on the
WAR DAYS 109
left I had to withdraw battalion after battalion from
the right wing, where the attack had been com-
pletely held, and bring them up in cars to the left
wing. When I gave the senior staff officer, Major
von Lowenfeld, the same order for the last battalion
available, he said, with a tone of deep gravity :
" Excellency, it is the last ! " I answered : " Never
forget this hour. One must make up one's mind to
put in even the last, for the enemy, too, may be at
the end of his tether."
This battalion proved sufficient to prevent the
break-through, until reinforcements were sent up
from G.H.Q. The battle lasted for months. I was
not there to see the end. Towards the end of
October I was appointed by the Emperor, Minister
for War. For the second time I had to leave the
troops, with whom I felt myself bound for life or
death.
CHAPTER VI
THE WAR MINISTRY
PREVIOUS to my appointment as Minister 1
had never done any work at the Ministry for
War. For this reason I was only slightly
acquainted with the organisation, the routine and
the personnel. It was some time before this diffi-
culty could be overcome, owing to the fact that
during the war the staff had been increased to an
enormous extent and was scattered over every
conceivable type of building in every part of the
town. At that time the Ministry was employing a
staff of between four and five thousand officers and
civil servants. On the other hand, as a newcomer
I had the advantage of being able to approach the
work independently and unhampered by precedent,
and could go my own way.
My colleagues were men of experience, accus-
tomed to their work and absolutely to be relied on
There was every need for their devoted and self-
sacrificing energy. In contrast to the eight-hour
day aimed at by other workers, my working day
covered twice this number of hours and I was not
rationed as a heavy worker. My colleagues were in
THE WAR MINISTRY in
the same position ; many a night after a hard day's
work I have found myself obliged to go hungry to
bed.
The official residence of the Minister for War is
in the same building, if I remember rightly, as that
taken over for the Ministry for War in the year 1827.
Before it was taken over it is said to have played a
part in the artistic and intellectual life of Berlin.
The reception rooms of the house are beautifully and
artistically arranged, though in time of war these
advantages were wasted. The living rooms were a
long way off and were very scattered. Every
time I wanted to go to my bedroom I had to indulge
in quite a long constitutional. Apparently one of
my predecessors had found considerable difficulty
in finding his way about, for all the doors were
provided with notices showing to which room they
belonged. I found it easy to understand these
precautions, for there were certain m-ms about
which I, too, remained uncertain to the last. I only
went to my house for the purpose of sleeping or to
take my meals. Much of it has been built on or
absorbed in the course of years, and this helps to
make the house rambling and difficult to work.
This difficulty of control is even more marked in
the case of the offices of my colleagues, and in their
part of the building it would be quite impossible to
find one's way about without the services of a guide.
The building which contains the Prussian Ministry
ii2 A WAR MINISTER AND HIS WORK
for War cannot for a moment bear comparison with
that of the Turkish War Ministry in Constantinople.
It is quite time that attention was turned to the
provision of a new and more workable building for
this Ministry. Attached is a beautiful garden in
the nature of a park, and this I at once caused to be
broken up and planted with vegetables, as befitted
the exigencies of war-time.
Any one who wants to make his way to the office
of the Minister for War must first pass through the
Meldezimmer and the Ministersaal. Both these
rooms go back to the great days of Prussia's past,
which has now been wiped out through unfaithfulness
and treachery. In the Meldezimmer are still to be
seen on the shelves small figures, and on the walls
are hung copies of sketches, which are the work of the
painter Knotel, now dead. These figures and
pictures illustrate the different uniforms worn by the
different branches of the Prussian army, from the
earliest times down to the present day.
On one occasion when a lady was visiting us,
accompanied by her little boy, the child said :
" Mother, are all these toy soldiers what uncle used
to play with when he was a little boy ? I expect
he used to have them in his nursery." The child
had too high an opinion of me. My nursery was
God's free nature, and I have not fared badly there.
The Ministersaal gives an impression of stern
severity. Here are arrayed the portraits of all the
THE WAR MINISTRY 113
Prussian Brandenburg War Ministers, and of their
officers — equally worthy of respect — the first of
these being still in harness. The last of this dis-
tinguished gallery is General von Heeringen. After
him there is room for one more. No place seems to
be left for me. Scharnhorst and Roon would be
astonished and indignant if they could see what is
the present fate of their work. A member of the
Social Democratic party from South Germany has
given expression to the idea that I should be the
last Minister for War as this office was interpreted
by Roon. In front of the pictures and above them
are arranged the busts and pictures of the kings of
Prussia, together with their distinguished generals.
The greater part of the centre of the room is taken
up by the conference table, above which hangs
a magnificent chandelier. Now that things have
changed I shall never have the opportunity of seeing
these apartments again.
It is unnecessary for me to devote much space to
description of the work of the Ministry for War. It
was carried on with unsparing conscientiousness, and
its efficiency and thoroughness are beyond question.
In many directions a freer hand could have been
allowed with advantage and the office routine could
have been made simpler ; work which has to pass
through the hands of many secretaries and heads of
departments might be dealt with more expeditiously.
A beginning was made to bring this about, but
H
H4 A WAR MINISTER AND HIS WORK
war-time is not a suitable time to introduce innova-
tions. It is a point worth consideration whether the co-
operation of a few first-class business men would not
be effective in getting the best possible value for the
millions of money that are controlled at this office.
Brains of only average capacity, however, would be
of no use, and it is doubtful whether the money
could be found to pay for those of first-class calibre.
They would have to take it up for love of the work
itself.
This excess of work will gradually lessen after
the conclusion of Peace, but its influence will be felt
for a long time. The departments will have a lot of
work to do before the army organisation, broken by
the chaos of the present day, can be re-established,
unless the dream of disarmament materialises. The
signs of the times and the views of our enemies do
not bear out any such expectations.
I took a civilian suit of clothes to a tailor for
much-needed repairs ; he showed me some military
breeches, quite new, which had been brought to him
by discharged soldiers for alteration, and he told me
that many of these men had three or four pairs each.
It is the same thing everywhere. How the army
authorities are ever going to get back the rifles
which have been taken from the troops and are now
being used in civil war will remain an insoluble
problem. Loss through the guilt and folly of
individuals can involve milliards of marks.
THE WAR MINISTRY 115
It has several times been suggested that a special
ministry should be devoted to the work of
looking after pensions, as this will be of first im-
portance for many years to come, and is likely to
increase rather than diminish. The question is one
that must be carefully considered and not decided
by sentiment. So long as such an office remained
under the control of the military officials this might
lead, not to simplification, but to difficulties and loss
of time. The department of Maintenance and Justice
has up to now dealt in an exemplary manner with all
the needs of those who have suffered through the war.
An energetic attempt to establish an Air Depart-
ment arose from personal wishes ; it can only be
successful if the Flying Corps is made a separate
service, otherwise several departments will be work-
ing one against the other. According to what I hear
an Air Ministry has been established as a government
department. Whether it is to deal with the military
side of flying I do not know. The Air Service should
be left to develop independently, for we all have
every reason for grinding our own axes. The
following is an illustration which shows how careful
one has to be when dealing with matters which are
only understood by a few experts : The head of the
Air Section had asked me to divide his section as it
had grown too big for him to do the work alone.
Such a division would, of course, mean the setting up
of an Air Department. I called in an official of equal
u6 A WAR MINISTER AND HIS WORK
standing from another office to ask his advice, and
he was of opinion that the division was not necessary.
When, however, after the departure of the Chief, I
appointed him to this position it was quite another
matter ; he would only accept the post on condition
that the section was made a department. In the
Reichstag a department was voted, and the sub-
sequent course of events is in favour of this, if our
enemies do not prohibit the development of the Air
Service.
The difficulties of the situation as regards supplies
were seriously felt by the administrative department.
During the first years of the war provision was made
in the first place for the fighting troops, and what
was left over went to feed the people at home. This
arrangement suited the military authorities much
better than it did the civil departments. The
military authorities were able to make their plans as
to supplies for the whole year, while the civil depart-
ments, on the other hand, had to be content to make
the best of what was left over. During the period of
office of the Chancellor Michaelis this arrangement
was changed ; the two sections, military and civil,
were treated in the same way, and both lived from
hand to mouth, for the crops were never really
completely gathered in. The statistics that had
been drawn up to estimate the yield of the crops
were a complete failure. Years before, when I was
a divisional commander on the General Staff, I had
THE WAR MINISTRY 117
brought forward time and again the proposal that
something should be done to increase the yield of
crops and the necessities of life, and that after the
harvest the whole question should be dealt with, on
the assumption that Germany would be cut off from
the rest of the world on all sides. The proposal was
turned down because the government departments
have not enough power to carry it through, and
because the cost of realising my suggestions was
considered to be too high. Such a situation was
thought to be quite out of the question.
Under these circumstances the Administrative
Department was faced with a difficult task ; it was
continually necessary to pacify its harassed officials.
To this was added the further difficulty that in the
cases of forcible requisitioning the military authori-
ties had to carry out the duties of executioner. It
followed from this that we were by no means popular
with the agricultural classes. In addition there was
friction with the officials of the Food Control office,
for they had suspicions that the military authorities
had still considerable stores in the background.
This impression was perhaps due to our peace-time
regulation, according to which it was necessary that
our stores should always contain sufficient supplies
to last over several months. As a matter of fact
they were for the most part empty.
On the other hand, I am of the opinion that it is
quite possible that the troops in the field did not,
n8 A WAR MINISTER AND HIS WORK
and indeed could not, give a correct estimate of the
supplies they had in hand. When I was a General
Officer Commanding in the field I always found it a
matter for self-congratulation when my troops were
well furnished with supplies. In the field one finds
oneself faced with all kinds of unexpected difficulties,
which it is very hard to overcome, if one is handi-
capped by shortage of supplies.
Before the summer offensive I had a force of
somewhere about seventy thousand men to provide
for. During the fighting this number was increased
to about half a million. If I had not had good stores
of supplies how should I have been able to feed this
mass of men, with a corresponding number of horses ?
Later, when the control of supplies was taken out of
the hands of the military authorities, emergencies of
this nature had to be met by bringing up what was
needed in every available means of transport that
could be pressed into the service, and the demands
on this were already very heavy. It cannot be
wondered at that every now and again we found
ourselves faced with difficulties of supply.
The army was particularly hard pressed in this
respect in the year 191 8. Any one who is aware of
the situation with regard to supplies previous to the
harvest of that year will also know that it was a
question of getting full value out of the last grain of
corn that could be found. All gratitude is due to the
Commissioner for National Food Control, Herr von
THE WAR MINISTRY 119
Waldow, for the way in which he carried out his
difficult and thankless task. Instead of this, as is
the case with all unselfish and conscientious workers,
he was the victim of mud-throwing. Though it is
true that the military authorities were seriously
handicapped by the placing of the civilian and
military population on an equal footing as regards
supplies, there is no doubt that this was the just and
proper course to take. It would not have been any
use having in the field an army sure of its supplies if
the people at home were starving. It is to the
conscientious labours of all those concerned that we
owe the fact that in spite of all difficulties the troops
were adequately fed. This does not mean, of course,
that there were not individual cases of shortage and
hardship during and after the fighting ; such cases
have occurred always and in every war.
The department dealing with questions of ac-
commodation has been very conspicuously in the
public eye because of the problem of the disposal of
prisoners. The task that fell to this department was
a difficult one and called for a very tactful handling.
For the most part the negotiations were carried out
through the agency of neutral countries, who acted
as intermediaries between ourselves and the enemy,
and through them the wishes and suggestions of both
sides were expressed. In this connection we had
little dealing with neutral America. Spain showed
herself very accommodating but she was inaccessible.
120 A WAR MINISTER AND HIS WORK
Most of our negotiations were carried on through
Switzerland, Holland, Denmark and Sweden. We
were often approached by the Vatican on behalf of
French and Italian subjects, and even on behalf of
English and Americans. I never came across any
instance of intercession on behalf of German subjects.
As there was a good deal of jealousy between the
intermediaries, considerable care had to be exercised
in dealing with them. The late General Friedrich
carried through this task with skill and showed
great tact in steering through the difficult places.
We had also to enter into negotiations with the
enemy on the question of the exchange of prisoners.
In this respect the English proved to be the most
reasonable. The French were at first disinclined to
meet us, and afterwards they wavered according to
the changes in the military situation. With the
Russians it was very difficult to come to any under-
standing, for they were continually changing their
minds and adopted a policy of procrastination.
From the Americans we received no response at all
to our advances.
Whatever lay within our powers we carried
through conscientiously. That in spite of all our
efforts there was still a good deal of dissatisfaction
among our fellow-countrymen in the hands of the
enemy who felt themselves deserted could not be
avoided. These men did not realise that we were
powerless to make ourselves felt in enemy countries.
THE WAR MINISTRY 121
Measures of reprisal were often adopted with success,
but they will not accomplish everything, and every
time they were adopted there was a risk of doing
more harm than good ; on this question the Ministry
for War did not always find itself supported by the
Ministry for Foreign Affairs.
The Medical Department performed a noble task
and carried it through with efficiency. Our Nursing
Service for the sick and wounded has gained universal
recognition. The public do not realise how neces-
sary it was to exercise the greatest economy with the
necessary medical stores. In this respect, too, our
allies made great claims upon us. The hospitals
which I have inspected in the field were above
reproach. At home they were huddled together too
much in the large towns where the stores required
for their needs were more easily accessible.
The life of idleness led by the wounded in these places
did them no good ; in many cases the administration
could with advantage have taken a broader view.
I visited one convalescent home for officers in the
field in which the patients complained of hunger ;
the surgeon in charge was an eminent professor
who had no experience of administration. The
inspector referred to his instructions to justify
himself, until I pointed out to him that a difference
must be made between wounded and convalescents
whom it was necessary to restore to health as quickly
as possible.
122 A WAR MINISTER AND HIS WORK
In the battle of Serre in the summer of 1915 very
good work was done by the motor ambulance column
of a voluntary medical service ; at that time these
vehicles were rare. By this means the wounded
could be taken from the dressing station to the
hospital train in less than half-an-hour, It is true
that they had good roads at their disposal.
Many complaints have been heard, in the Reich-
stag among other places, of the apparently rough way
in which men suffering from shellshock and other
nervous complaints were dealt with. It is very
difficult to arrive at any definite understanding on
this point. If the course of treatment adopted by
the surgeon is justified by results the patient's view
should not be supported against the doctor, for at
times the patients take up the most extraordinary
point of view on these questions. In a hospital for
the blind I came across an official of the Afforestation
Service who had gone completely blind ; when
treatment produced an unexpected improvement and
he was able to distinguish a ray of light, he was not
at all pleased, but was obsessed by anxiety lest he
should lose his pension. In the majority of cases
where the nerves were affected it was easy to be
horrified and to come to a hasty and unjustified
conclusion that things were not what they should be-
One specialist estimated the number of cases of this
nature at the strength of two army corps ; he quali-
fied this statement, however, by saying that only in
THE WAR MINISTRY 123
a minority of cases was their condition the direct
outcome of war conditions, but that in most cases
they had broken down on their way into the firing-
line, either during transport or immediately behind
the front, as the result of some inherent weakness.
To explain the large numbers of these cases he
brought forward the argument that even in time of
peace thousands go insane every year, which is
naturally more noticeable in time of war.
How even intelligent orders can sometimes run
counter to intelligent action is illustrated by the
following case : There was on my staff an excellent
specialist in hygiene ; before the war he had pursued
research in the causes and treatment of typhus, in
collaboration with a French doctor. This doctor
was still living in the area which we were occupying.
The German surgeon paid him a visit and brought
away all his anti-toxine. With this he inoculated
every man of the corps, beginning with the trenches.
As a result of this we only lost two men from typhus
at a time when the troops next to us were dying in
large numbers from this disease ; his only reward
was to receive a reprimand from his medical authority
for not forwarding the anti-toxine to headquarters.
I sent in his name for distinguished service. In my
opinion both parties were right in this case. A
certain well-known surgeon was in charge of a
private hospital and was said to be obtaining good
results in some particular type of case ; at any rate,
124 A WAR MINISTER AND HIS WORK
many patients were anxious to submit themselves to
his treatment ; but he was in disagreement with
some professors and an investigation into the whole
matter was pending. This we had to take into
account.
Complaints have been heard from time to time
about the way in which the nurses were treated by
the doctors. I never came across any justification
for these complaints when I was in the field, but they
have been since brought to my notice. The remedy
for such cases as this must be left to the good breeding
of the parties concerned ; it is essential that the
selfless devotion to duty of the members of the
Nursing Service should not be abused through the
professional or personal bluntness of the surgeons.
The Dental Service has received but scant recog-
nition ; it is important that this unfair state of
things should be changed. While I was in France
I had an excellent dental surgeon, to whom every
facility was given. By his treatment of injuries to
the jaw he helped many a wounded man to recover.
But ordinary dentistry deserves to be given a more
important place in the organisation of the army. In
my intercourse with the men I have made a special
point of observing their teeth, and I have been
astonished at the number of cases of defective teeth
that have come under my notice. A higher and
permanent status must be given in the army to the
dental surgeon, and this service must be organised
THE WAR MINISTRY 125
and administered by experts who will be competent
to see to the provision of the necessary equipment
and medical stores on scientific and economical lines.
These remarks are not in any way intended to
detract from the reputation of the Medical Service.
The efficiency with which this service did its work is
sufficiently proved by the statistics of the wounded
who have been restored to health and the success
with which epidemics have been guarded against
and dealt with.
The General War Department shows by its name
its close connection with the war. The task of
providing the army with weapons, ammunition and
all sorts of equipment, of making good our losses in
men, horses and material, as well as the organisation
of fresh units and the reorganisation of those already
in existence — all these were carried out by this
department in co-operation with General Head-
quarters. It had to co-operate also with the civil
officials of the Ministry for War.
It has been stated in the Reichstag that soon
after the outbreak of the war a shortage of ammuni-
tion made itself felt, and that, in spite of this, the
Ministry for War was issuing statements to the effect
that we had enough for every possible contingency.
These statements are both true and untrue. The
requirements of the army with regard to ammunition
were estimated beforehand on the basis of our
experience in previous wars. During the Franco-
126 A WAR MINISTER AND HIS WORK
Prussian war there was several times a shortage of
rifle ammunition, but there was never any lack of
ammunition for the artillery ; in this war the
opposite was the case. The increase in the con-
sumption of artillery ammunition had become
noticeable during the war between Russia and
Japan. We had before the war increased our stores
of ammunition of both kinds, but there was a
definite limit fixed. Just as it is impossible to lay
in more than a certain quantity of food supplies, in
the same way questions of economy, and the limit of
time during which it can be kept, demand that only
so much ammunition be kept in store as can always
be kept in condition in peace-time by regularly
making good the wastage. Modern artillery am-
munition, with its fuses and delicate explosives, is
very sensitive and soon perishes if it is kept in store.
No one had foreseen that during the war the
consumption of artillery ammunition would or,
indeed, could, be increased to a degree that exceeded
what the endurance of the guns was considered to
warrant. As it turned out we were, in fact, faced
with a shortage of ammunition.
In 1 914, when I held the appointment of Quarter-
master-General, I watched with considerable anxiety
the rapid dwindling of our ammunition supply. By
dint of throwing into the scale all our available
resources of labour our stock of shell-cases was before
long brought up to such a high standard that we
THE WAR MINISTRY 127
actually had almost a superfluity. And yet it was
to no purpose, for the explosives were lacking. The
raw materials necessary for their manufacture were
cut off by the blockade, and the production of
nitrogen had not yet reached its full development.
What would have been the effect on the public
morale if we had declared at that time that we had
no more ammunition, and what use would the enemy
have made of such a confession ? In cases like this
the anxiety of the situation must be borne by the
responsible authorities alone, and this is not the only
case in which they have had to do so. To make
public the actual state of affairs could only have
worked harm.
The ammunition question has always turned on
the supply of explosives. It was not a question of
how many shell-cases could be turned out, but how
many of these could be turned into effective am-
munition with the available supply of explosives.
The guns were found to be capable of standing a
good deal more firing than had generally been
expected. We knew that they would stand a good
deal of hard use, but it has an effect on their
efficiency. The presence of much-worn guns in a
battery may ruin the accuracy of that battery's fire.
Means have been found by which this difficulty
can be overcome ; in the case of each gun a record
is kept of its history and the number of shots that
it has fired. There are two ways of producing
128 A WAR MINISTER AND HIS WORK
uniformity : either a particular gun can be tested
and the range of the others regulated accordingly, or
each battery can be composed only of guns of about
the same capacity. This is not, however, by any
means easy to put into practice, for it means search-
ing everywhere to find guns with similar records ;
they have to be brought from all parts and
continually re-tested, as they deteriorate with
further use. Nevertheless, the measures taken
proved adequate. In spite of heavy losses through
wear-and-tear and other causes, we have always
maintained enough reserve artillery to make them
good. In the case of some types of gun the reserves
were so well in hand that as the Hindenburg pro-
gramme went forward it was found possible to reduce
their production and utilise the labour for the
production of others of which there was greater need.
It must be remembered that all estimates based
on the experience of former wars went by the board.
Where once battles lasted a day or several days, they
now went on for weeks and months, and in many
places were continuous.
In the case of the men, too, their capacity to
stand the strain of such battles exceeded anything
that had been previously thought possible.
It was exactly the same in the case of the enemy ;
but he had all the resources of the world's markets at
his disposal, while we had not only to supply our-
selves but also our allies.
THE WAR MINISTRY 129
Members of the Reichstag who found fault with
our inadequate supply of tanks showed themselves
ignorant of the circumstances of the situation. In
the battle of the Somme I was one of the first to
have to stand up to these machines ; at that time
the enemy had them only in small numbers, and they
suffered from lack of speed. Soon afterwards we
produced a tank capable of double the speed.
Both sides continued to vie with one another in
the perfecting of this weapon. Our workshops could
not, of course, keep pace with the enemy in the
number produced, as the necessary material could
not be spared ; it was needed for the manufacture of
ammunition and guns. We had to devote ourselves
to the production of means of defence against tanks.
We already had at hand various devices which, with
slight alteration, could be used for this purpose ;
they were good, and justified the change as soon as
the workmen became accustomed to their new
job.
The fact is often overlooked that even in the
most perfectly organised works any innovation
involves loss of time. The only way in which this
difficulty can be overcome is by equipping all
available works in time of peace with machinery
that can be immediately adapted to the require-
ments of war ; that, however, means burying capital,
which must be guaranteed.
What we needed in the way of rifles and rifle
130 A WAR MINISTER AND HIS WORK
ammunition we either possessed already or were
able to produce quickly.
The most urgent question was the raising of
reserves of man-power. The disputes on this ques-
tion will never be settled. G.H.Q. had hoped to
be able to call on the Poles, the Ukraine and the
Baltic Provinces, but as it turned out hardly a man
was raised from these places. At first the Germans
in the Ukraine promised to do a great deal, but it
became evident later that they wanted all the men
they could raise for their own protection. When
in the year 191 8 the matter became of vital im-
portance, it was found that there were more than a
million exempted men in the country. The sugges-
tion was brought forward that the military age
should be raised to fifty-six at a time when the
discharge of the oldest classes had just been ordered.
Such a contradictory measure would not have been
understood in the country ; the oldest classes would
be of very little use to the army, but they were very
important for the economic side of the war, and,
indeed, if the exempted men were called up to work
on the land this work would depend entirely upon
them.
I did not hesitate to offer these exempted men,
even though the economic side of the war should
suffer by their removal from their work. This
could not be allowed to stand in the way if by this
means the war could be brought to a successful
THE WAR MINISTRY 131
conclusion. The men who have remained at home
until the last do not make strong reinforcements, but
in a long war the standard is bound to decline as
time goes on. The whole of these could not suddenly
be called up all together, and the untrained among
them took time to get into shape. This addition of
strength could only be brought to bear gradually,
and it would not be before the spring of 191 9 that
full use could be made of it — then the recruits of
the new year would be available. The 600,000 men
that my successor proposed to raise would have had
to come from the same source. That would have
reduced by half the strength of the men left to carry
on the economic labour. This number was based
on the assumption that the war industries would be
willing to set free their workmen, and that in face of
the universal shortage of labour.
We know what an outcry there was from industry
and agriculture for labour. I have several times
had expressed to me the suspicion that many work-
shops were in the habit of engaging more labour than
they really needed ; under the circumstances, how-
ever, they were all said to be willing to set men free.
Unfortunately the summons to mobilise the whole
man-power of the country was not given, and the
mutiny of the navy destroyed the morale of the whole
country.
The Central Department was charged with
keeping me informed on all matters concerning the
i 3 2 A WAR MINISTER AND HIS WORK
careers and personal history of all men employed at
the Ministry and elsewhere. In view of the heavy
demand for officers and officials and the constant
changes in the staff, which were the result of the
return to their regiments of men who had recovered
from wounds, this work was highly important and
had to be carried on by reliable and responsible men.
Among the regiments it was very easy for an
efficient officer to be marked down as suitable for
work at the Ministry, for no special training or
examination was required. These officers were then
called up on probation and were given an opportunity
to show what they could do. In spite of the great
demand there was never any difficulty in rinding
suitable men. Of course, there was also a good deal
of disillusionment and disappointment when men
were rejected as being either unsuitable or too old.
Experience has shown that the selection was made
on right lines. Among the officials from other
departments who were transferred to the Ministry for
War for the period of the war several have asked to
be retained permanently. They must therefore have
found the work there congenial.
I never had any discord, with the exception of a
mad letter from a civil servant, who did not give his
name ; he accused me of not knowing my staff and
threatened to blow up the Ministry. It is possible
that the letter was the work of foreign agents. I
took no notice of it.
THE WAR MINISTRY 133
The War Department I found already organised
when I went to the Ministry. I should not myself
have organised it on the same lines. On the one
hand it was practically independent, and had in
certain respects full powers over the command
represented ; on the other hand it was subordinate
to the Minister for War, in whom the ultimate
responsibility was vested. This was an unsatis-
factory situation. Further, many of its duties
clashed with those of other departments of the
Ministry, which led to unnecessary complication.
One point that the war has again emphasised is that
it takes considerable time before new departments
can be got into smooth working order.
It is simpler and more satisfactory to graft on
to and extend the organisations that already exist.
The War Department had the reputation among
the members of the Reichstag of being very favour-
ably disposed towards labour, and as a result of this
it was very popular in these circles. In dealing with
exemptions this department was at first inclined to
be too lenient. Many cases were reported where
men discharged from the army for work in the
factories did not put in an appearance. Instead,
they were travelling about or staying at home and
doing nothing. This was not the purpose for which
they had received their discharge from the army.
It was found very difficult to staff the offices of
the district commands with experts who had a
i 3 4 A WAR MINISTER AND HIS WORK
knowledge of the requirements of the army, and at
the same time understood the economic interests of
the country. The War Department dealt success-
fully with some knotty problems ; their example
might with advantage be remembered in time of
peace.
The work of the officers and officials of the
Ministry for War is all the more deserving of com-
mendation when it is remembered that in many
cases it was carried on through periods of great
scarcity. Many of them were actually suffering from
starvation, yet they never failed in their duty. I
shall always remember my colleagues with f eelings of
gratitude.
I was once asked whether, when I first came to
the Ministry for War, I encountered difficulties or
noticed instances of neglect that might be imputed
to the negligence of my predecessors. This question
I must answer in the negative. Of course, it must
be admitted that we might have been better equipped,
but this might be said of any army. The responsi-
bility for this cannot be laid at the door of the
Ministry for War.
Formerly I had had no opportunity of seeing the
work of the Ministry except from the point of view
of the General Staff. The General Staff regulates
its requirements according to the strength of the
enemy, and consequently they are more liable to be
too heavy than too light. The Ministry for War
THE WAR MINISTRY 135
must, before taking action, come to an agreement
with the Imperial Treasury as to means.
There a good deal of opposition has to be over-
come. I have heard Moltke complain that the last
time the strength of the army was increased, instead
of the four new corps asked for only two were sanc-
tioned, and part of these had already been raised.
These corps were rejected by the Treasury under
Wermuth. Had it been otherwise we could have
made very good use of them during the war. With
the man-power available we ought to have been able
to raise more troops. It would also have been
possible to lower the standard, as occurred during
the war. Then every possible source was exploited,
but a thorough training in peace-time would have
increased their fighting value to a considerable
extent.
I do not know for what reasons the regular trained
reserve was given up ; probably it was owing to
the formation of so many new small units, but there
were also other reasons for the step. The institution
of the Two Years' Service and the raising of the
standard of efficiency made too great a demand on
the training staff. Part of this staff found them-
selves from April until the end of the manoeuvres
continually employed on parade grounds, shooting-
ranges and all kinds of special training work. Those
who were particularly lucky might find themselves
in winter attached to a regiment under training.
136 A WAR MINISTER AND HIS WORK
That was difficult to keep up for any length of time.
If in addition to this there were a body of recruits
of the special reserve to be trained, the best of staffs
could not but grow tired and stale. The result of
the short period of training could not bear any
proportion to the effort expended. The general
reserve has been referred to continually in the
Reichstag, probably in support of the shortened
period of training.
Since we are limited by the necessity of keeping
our demands within the scope of the means at our
disposal we have to make the best of what we
have.
The Imperial Treasury certainly has a difficult
task to perform if it is to balance the various demands
made upon it with the available grants. There is
one thing, however, about which I was not satisfied.
According to the custom that ruled during my
period of office, the Minister had to cancel demands
which he had himself submitted if the Treasury
thought itself unable to provide the money. He was
thus obliged to act against his better judgment.
The Imperial Treasury was in a much better position
to give the grounds on which the refusal was based.
When it comes to questions of estimates it is
often very easy to get oneself into awkward situa-
tions. When I was a member of the General Staff,
and in charge of the War Academy, I found that the
required number of lecturers on military subjects
THE WAR MINISTRY 137
had been provided for in the estimates for years
back, but the Treasury had refused to sanction their
appointment. The lectures and instruction were
carried on by officers of the General Staff in addition
to their ordinary duties. I myself, in addition to my
work as a General Staff officer, found myself obliged
to give instruction in three departments of the War
Academy, and this I found a heavy burden. Never-
theless, I was in favour of this method of instruction
and opposed to its being put in the hands of the
instructors provided for by the estimates, because
the instruction given by an officer of the General
Staff is the direct outcome of his staff service and so
likely to be of greater value.
I was able to bring Count Schlieffen to agree with
my view of this question. He had previously
followed the advice of the directors of the Academy.
When the new proposals on the lines of my advice
were drawn up and submitted to the Ministry for
War the Ministry declared itself unable to fall in with
them as the Treasury had that year confirmed the
appointment of the instructors provided for in the
estimates, and it was thought that if new proposals
were substituted the Treasury would have good
grounds for saying that we did not know what we
wanted. This would have created further difficulties
when subsequent demands were put forward; so.
the instructors were appointed during my period of
office, in spite of the fact that I was opposed to the
138 A WAR MINISTER AND HIS WORK
measure. In these matters there arise often the
same contradictions that affect all human affairs.
The sphere of the Minister for War was often
seriously hampered by certain war regulations,
particularly that dealing with martial law. The
difficulties of his office have not been diminished by
the addition to his duties of the control of the censor
and police.
The publications of the censor were not issued by
the Minister for War. They were the work of all the
departments together. The Minister for War could
not alter them in any way ; all he could do was to
decide whether they were sufficiently discreet or not.
In the case of the police there was a good deal of
confusion and overlapping of civil and military law.
This was what a good many people failed to under-
stand. I grant it was difficult to find a clear course. In
the territory occupied by our armies doubtful people
were from time to time arrested, as opportunity
occurred, by one of our commanding officers. Later
it would occur that this officer moved on somewhere
else and the prisoner was forgotten ; this gave rise
to several cases of hardship.
In war, however, hard cases always occur and
must be borne for the good of the majority. Other
people are even shot. Our unfortunate fellow-
countrymen in the area occupied by the enemy have
a harder lot to bear to-day than at that time.
The department controlling the war Press also
THE WAR MINISTRY 139
led to difficulties, although it was not placed, as it
should have been, under the direct control of the
Minister for War.
So long as the Minister was at General Head-
quarters it was not difficult for the military depart-
ments to settle the questions regarding the Press
in co-operation. It can be understood that the
Minister who remains a soldier, and not a civil
servant as the Inland Revenue office would have liked
him to be, must take a part in the conduct of the
war. But he must bow to necessity. During his
absence his place had to be taken by a deputy
minister ; that led to countless difficulties. The
position of deputy was always a hampered and
thankless one. Of course, it might be necessary
from time to time that the Minister should be at
General Headquarters. In that case he had no
alternative but to go, but for the most part his
duties required his presence at his Ministry.
When I was attached to General Headquarters I
once said to von Falkenhayn, who was at that time
Minister for War, that his place was in Berlin. At
that time I had no idea that I should one day occupy
the position, but I am still of the same opinion.
In any case, the Minister for War in Berlin would
have been in a better position to control the war
Press than any other Minister. The war Press was
in itself not sufficient to keep the people at home
enlightened as to the course of events and to keep
140 A WAR MINISTER AND HIS WORK
them of stout heart ; what was required was an
Imperial Press office.
Such an office as this was never established during
the war. Each State department worked for its own
interests regardless of the others. Many attempts
have been made to fill this need, but they have never
come to anything.
At a time when the Press of our enemies had long
been smothering us with printer's ink, and a serious
need had arisen at home for enlightenment and
encouragement, a Chief of the Press was appointed.
I once asked him how it was that one never noticed
the result of his activities ; in reply he complained
of the difficulties with which he found himself
confronted on all sides and of the contradictory orders
with which his work was hampered. Under such
circumstances it is very difficult for any one to take
an independent course. The Government must
have been responsible for the existing situation.
There was one thing with which I was particularly
struck during my period of office at the Ministry for
War. Any question that in the remotest way
concerned the Reichstag or its members was re-
garded and dealt with exclusively from this point of
view. This is probably the result of long years of
precedent and co-operation. I, on the contrary,
set my face against this way of looking at things and
did my best to treat all questions that came under
my consideration strictly from the point of view of
THE WAR MINISTRY 141
fact. I had to learn by experience that this was a
thankless task.
Consciously and unconsciously the idea of estab-
lishing an Imperial War Ministry was gaining ground.
Even individual colleagues of mine brought forward
suggestions which supported this scheme without
realising it. I always, however, placed myself on
the side of the Constitution.
In general the Reichstag was favourably dis-
posed to the Ministry for War. This feeling, how-
ever, did not extend itself to the Minister. I have
often consoled myself With the words of old Payer
who, after he became a member of the Government,
said that from that position things took on quite a
different aspect from what they presented to the
outsider. Those who now hold the reins of govern-
ment will experience the same thing.
It is my belief that the Ministry for War has
always honestly striven to do everything that lay
within its power to ensure the efficiency and readiness
of the army and to provide for the safety of the
country. It is only natural that enquiries should be
made as to the causes of our failure, but they are to
be sought in quite other places than those that have
been generally indicated. The Ministry for War
need fear no investigation into its conduct of the war.
The enquiry has been placed in the hands of a
commission of scholars and experts. I pointed out
to the president, Professor Sering, that it was the
142 A WAR MINISTER AND HIS WORK
duty of the commission to hear without prejudice the
evidence of all who had worked at the Ministry.
There are bound to be contradictions in the evidence
of the military and non-military. The military
chiefs should be given an opportunity of placing
their views before the commission. My object was
to avoid the danger of a one-sided conclusion and to
give every opportunity of throwing all the light
possible on the question.
CHAPTER VII
THE REICHSTAG
BEFORE my appointment as Minister for War
I had been in the Reichstag on two occasions.
The first time I heard Prince Bismarck
speak when the Socialist Bill was passed. One
incident that impressed itself particularly on my
memory was the speech of a delegate from Poland.
Waving his arms and twisting his body with excite-
ment, he shouted : "I would rather suffer one
tyrant, Prince Bismarck, than many tyrants, the
Social Democrats." The other occasion was the
day on which Prince Biilow failed to find words to
defend his imperial master.
Constitutional assemblies will never have the
dignity that distinguished the old Roman senate,
which might be compared to a congress of kings.
But, nevertheless, dignity ought to be maintained.
President Fehrenbach received a significant rebuff
when he attempted a serious violation of the dignity
of the Reichstag.
One day, at their own request, I took my daugh-
ters with me to witness a sitting of the House. One
of them came back disillusioned, and said to me :
144 A WAR MINISTER AND HIS WORK
" But, father, the members did not behave at all
well. An old man with a long white beard was
standing on a platform and kept on ringing a bell
and shouting, and no one took the slightest notice of
him. They began to walk about and talk to one
another and didn't listen." It was a naive criticism,
but many visitors to the Reichstag have been struck
with the same thing.
I, too, have often felt indignation at the behaviour
of the House. I have often felt sympathy for the
Berichterstatter (reader of the report) when I heard
him read his report as quickly as possible, and quite
unintelligibly, knowing all the time that no one was
listening to a word he said. I have also forced myself
at long sittings and during long speeches to follow
everything that was said, and found it tiring work.
I have been even more astonished while the House
was in committee to see every one suddenly get up
and dash out. When in my astonishment, I asked
some one what was the matter, the answer I received
was : " Old X. is speaking now. He always has a
lot to say ; there is no need to listen to him ; it is
much better to go and have some lunch."
Long speeches are certainly tedious to listen to,
and not by any means the best ; but the art of making
short, concise speeches is rarely practised in the
Reichstag. I have never been able to understand
the weakness so many people have for hearing their
own voices. In the Reichstag much of interest
THE REICHSTAG 145
often goes on without attracting any attention. This
I found all the more remarkable, as the members are
very jealous and very sensitive, particularly in respect
to the members of the Government.
These members of the Government have to listen
to the most outrageous remarks about themselves
and their work, and it would be very deeply resented
if they tried to defend themselves in the same way.
That is not playing the game. On the other hand,
compliments and flattery always receive a favourable
hearing.
During the war, long sittings of the Reichstag
interfered seriously with my work at the Ministry
for War. As, however, all representatives of Gov-
ernment departments had to be present, so as to be
able to supply information asked for without delay,
all other work had to wait, which was often a very
serious matter when urgent business for the army
required immediate attention. This could only be
remedied by working far into the night.
The first important business in the Reichstag
in which I took part dealt with the National Service
Bill which was brought in during the late autumn of
1916. At the first reading of the Bill I had spoken
against a National Service Act, as I thought the
situation would be more suitably met by the issue of
an edict from the Emperor. It was, however,
plainly pointed out to me that if I persisted in the
standpoint I had taken up I should make my position
K
146 A WAR MINISTER AND HIS WORK
a very awkward one, and in any case I should find
myself faced with all kinds of difficulties when it
came to the debate on the next Army Estimates. At
that time I was still under the impression that the
question would be decided on its merits.
The Government Bill in its first draft was concise
and clear, but many subsidiary clauses would have
to be added before the Act could be put into practice.
The Reichstag rejected the Bill. Scheidemann said
at the time that its poisonous fangs would have to
be pulled out. It was the attitude of the Reichstag
that provided the poison. When I say this I am
not speaking of the party advantages which this
attitude aimed at winning ; I am thinking of a much
more important thing — the harm which the rejection
of the Bill did to the army. The result, as it turned
out, satisfied no one. The effect on the troops of this
Act was to make them discontented and restless.
Our men on leave at home had already looked with
an envy, which can well be understood, at those who
had been exempted from military service and were
engaged on comfortable jobs at home, and they had
compared the position of these men with their own
hard lot. These men from the trenches could not
understand why the people who were working at
home, on the lines of communication and behind the
front, should be drawing high wages while they
themselves, with their much harder and more danger-
ous work, or even with work of exactly the same
THE REICHSTAG 147
nature, should have to be satisfied with their
army pay. This gave rise to much bad feeling and
had a most insidious effect on the morale of the
army.
Soon after the war broke out it had come to my
notice that the men on leave were greatly influenced
by their friends who had been exempted for various
reasons. These men boasted of their much higher
wages and jeered at the men from the front for being
such fools as to accept the comparatively low rate of
pay that they were getting in the army. I com-
municated at the time with the Ministry for War on
this subject, and submitted that the only way of
getting over this unsatisfactory state of things was
to regard all men of military age, whether fit for
service or not, who were not serving with the army
as combatants, as being on war service, and paying
them at the same rates as the army.
The measure that gave rise to the greatest interest
and excitement in the Reichstag was the question of
the suffrage in Prussia, although constitutionally this
had nothing to do with the Reichstag. But this
trespassing into spheres that were altogether beyond
the scope of its authority was unfortunately allowed
to go unchecked by the Government.
I have been told that my attitude on this question
caused efforts to be made to have me removed from
my office. Whether this was the case or not I can-
not say with certainty ; I am opposed to class
148 A WAR MINISTER AND HIS WORK
suffrage, but I am equally strongly opposed to
universal suffrage.
I understand too little of the laws of the different
kinds of suffrage to venture on a considered opinion
as to which is the best or the most equitable. It is
quite probable that none of them is really satis-
factory. The reason on which I based my opposi-
tion was that I did not consider a time when the
German people was engaged in a struggle on which its
very existence depended a suitable moment for
dealing with such a far-reaching question as an
alteration of the suffrage. It was preposterous to
choose a time when so large a part of the country's
manhood was away from home. Such questions as
this should not be arranged for them in their absence.
It was a matter in which they were closely interested,
and it was only right that they should be given the
opportunity of taking part in the discussion of the
question and helping towards its settlement.
As it is, they have returned to find their country
in a state of turmoil. The real reason for this over-
hasty method of dealing with the suffrage question
has been well expressed by the words of a well-known
political leader : ' ' What we don't succeed in getting
now we shall never get at all."
It is true that in politics success depends on
seizing opportunities, but when this is done at a time
when the nation is struggling for its life, it is nothing-
more or less than blackmail.
THE REICHSTAG 149
Politics of a far-reaching and nobly-conceived
type the Reichstag was very little concerned with.
What went by the name of politics among these
people was for the most part the petty politics of
party, from which the German politician seems
unable to free himself.
Scheidemann once said, when the question of
national education was before the House, that many
private soldiers knew more about politics than their
officers who were supposed to educate them. It is
perfectly true that many of our regular officers were
absolutely ignorant of all that concerned politics ;
it was their duty as servants of the State to hold
themselves aloof from these matters. At the same
time, the most noble ambition of all — to save their
country — was nearer to their hearts than was the
case with the most skilful party politician, who saw
everything in terms of party politics and overlooked
what was really vital. One cannot cease to wonder
at the large number of people with pretentions to
acuteness who accept the statements and attitude of
the enemy at their face value. A little knowledge
of history and human nature would have led them
to take quite another view.
The famous revolution of July, 191 7, was a very
serious political mistake. When the report of it
reached the capitals of England and France people
rubbed their hands with satisfaction and told one
another with a grin : " Now it will soon be all up
150 A WAR MINISTER AND HIS WORK
with them." This conviction spurred the enemy on
to make fresh efforts.
Nevertheless, the revolution did great harm to
our people. Every one interpreted it in a different
way ; many shirked it, and no one dared to expose
its true nature even when some of its former sup-
porters backed out. It had once more developed
into a true German " principle." For such a
principle the German will do anything, no matter
how foolish or how ruinous.
There is, of course, no doubt that with many it
was a case of genuine conviction, but this did not
make it any the less political stupidity. It was
plain from the beginning that this war was not a war
of annexation, but a war of defence. All wishes and
hopes to the contrary which were expressed in some
quarters were exaggerated by the enemy and played
a part in his success.
To repeat continually the protestations of our
peaceful intentions was merely to arouse the enemy's
suspicions, for in their case, too, it must be remem-
bered that their assertion of the treachery and
untrustworthiness of Germany was not always
merely deliberate slander, but might to some extent
be based on actual conviction.
Far too little has been made of the effect which
this peace revolution had on our troops at the front.
Its unsettling influence made itself felt all along the
line. I remember speaking over the telephone at
THE REICHSTAG 151
the time with an officer belonging to a regiment that
was once under my command. He said : " I have
been a good democrat all my life, but now I feel I
should like to be a lieutenant with ten men charged
with the duty of sending the Reichstag to the
devil."
We had not learned to hold our tongues. Great
measures mature best in silence. It is not wise to
anticipate future events ; the wise course is to make
sure of the ground so that when the right time comes
vigorous action can be taken. I have on several
occasions taken the liberty of pointing out that the
first thing to aim at was to bring the war to a con-
clusion, and that this was the end on which all our
attention and all our efforts should be concentrated.
When that was done, and not till then, we should be
in a position to consider the further possibilities of the
situation. What a lot of trouble and labour has
been expended in dealing with the situation after the
war before it was over ! All this has been in vain,
and nothing remains but shame and humiliation.
I have always held, and still hold, the opinion that
it is not possible to make all policy public. The
talk about the League of Nations has not affected my
opinion. As soon as it suits their purpose to do so,
our enemies and other states will continue to make
secret treaties, even if it is only done by word of
mouth. If we remain innocent enough to believe
all that is said we shall continue to be deceived.
152 A WAR MINISTER AND HIS WORK
During the session of the second Hague Con-
vention (1907) I asked the president, Geheimrat
Kriege : " What security have we that the decisions
of the Convention will be adhered to ? " He replied
almost angrily : "No one can draw back, not even
England." Recent events must have given him
cause to change his opinion.
Apart from the mistakes which were the outcome
of genuine conviction, there were others that were
simply the result of ignorance. How often has the
statement been made that the only people who had
an interest in going on with the war were the officers
and the wealthy classes ! This blatant attempt to
arouse agitation against the war soon got a hold on
the people, and its effects were even noticeable in the
Reichstag. No one can find pleasure in a long war.
Poor and rich men and officers all bear their share in the
common burden of sacrifice. That was enough to make
it to everybody's interest to bring the war to an end.
I have only once met an officer in the field who
actually said that as far as he was concerned he did
not care if the war lasted five years. I might also
mention in this connection that a private soldier, a
waiter in civil life, said they could go on for years
yet, as they were living well and, after all, there were
risks to be faced even at home. Neither of these
opinions can be taken seriously ; every one was
longing for peace. Peace, however, is not to be
brought about by revolution, talking and wishing ;
THE REICHSTAG 153
it can only be won by action. It must have made a
strange impression on the outside world when it was
found necessary to repeat again and again in the
Reichstag that it was impossible to bring about peace
without negotiating with the enemy. In order to
make negotiations possible it is first necessary that
both parties should be willing to negotiate. The
enemy had left no doubt at all that they had no
desire to effect peace by negotiation : they had made
up their minds that peace must be dictated. Now
on all sides one hears wailing over lost opportunities
for the negotiation of peace. This can do no good ;
it only means the making of excuses and accusations,
for which no proof can be produced. If it is true
that the statement was made by Erzberger that he
could bring about peace in half an hour, the events
that have followed the signing of the armistice must
have undeceived him. Maliciously disposed people
will always find satisfaction in connecting his name
for all time with the shameful conditions that are
being imposed.
The Reichstag has shown itself devoid of all
understanding of the politics of war and peace. The
speeches of the American President, Mr. Wilson, had
befogged their minds. The parties of the Right have
made many political mistakes, it must be admitted,
but in these matters, at least, they showed themselves
possessed of a sure judgment, based on an experience
and an understanding of human nature.
154 A WAR MINISTER AND HIS WORK
There has never been, nor ever will be, a case
where a victorious enemy has shown himself dis-
posed to waive the advantages of his position and
negotiate with his vanquished opponent on equal
terms. It is impossible to understand how intelli-
gent people can allow themselves to be persuaded
into such an idea. I have often noticed that those
who make speeches are not in the habit of setting out
their reasoning and from it deducing their con-
clusions ; they generally produce the conclusion first
and make their reasoning fit in accordingly. Such
a method of argument is bound to result in self-
deception.
A striking feature of the Reichstag was that the
most brilliant and inspired orators were always led
away by their powerful imaginations. The most
admirable champion of Middle Europe was one of
these. It seemed such a simple matter to cut out
the tempting middle of the great European cake,
particularly as it was the territory of the Allies and
opened the way to the East.
I do not pretend to have any profound knowledge
of the peoples who occupy this territory. What I
have had the misfortune to learn of them, in the
course of business and the duties of my profession,
has not given me any cause for enthusiasm. But the
leader of the Social Democratic party has the gift
of inspiring oratory that carries his hearers away
with him. I wonder what he thinks now of the
THE REICHSTAG 155
glories of the future state. So much of the earthly
paradise of which such men dream is impossible, for
the reason that we cannot get beyond human nature
and earthly conditions.
Judging from the speeches of the Government and
the party politicians, it would appear that they
themselves are gradually coming to realise that this
is the case, for now these pictures of the imagination
must give way to the reality, and the people who have
so long been hypnotised by these dreamers are
beginning to cry out more and more for truth. The
treading of this path upon which they have now set
foot will bring the nation a good deal of healthy
disillusionment.
Many of these orators called to mind the parody :
" If you have a constituency thank God and be
content." But it is not enough to have a con-
stituency ; it is important that a politician should
take care to maintain and extend his influence. It
is difficult to do this without indulging in unrealities.
The main part of political influence is not based on
fact. It is so much easier to move men by appealing
to their human weaknesses, their desires and their
passions.
The grievances of the men in the field offered a
great opportunity for this method. If you were to
take ten million people in peace-time and ask them
what were their grievances, you would find them add
up to a good round sum. If you take these same
156 A WAR MINISTER AND HIS WORK
ten million men and transfer them to the changed
and disagreeable conditions of active service in the
field, the number of their grievances will not decrease
but will grow. As the army is a human institution
it will be found that a large number of the grievances
are sure to be well grounded, but that does not make
it any the less necessary that they should be
thoroughly investigated and proof established that
they really are justified.
In the Reichstag, however, the cases of grievance
and hardship were accepted at their face value with-
out any pretence at investigation of the circum-
stances. I have myself had too large an experience
of these matters to be in any danger of falling into
the same mistake. Apart from this, it is also a
mistake to assume that it is always possible to
obviate even well-founded causes of complaint by
simply issuing orders and prohibitions. Most of
them are the result of mistakes, which nothing short
of a generation of education could hope to prevent.
In war-time there are bound to be many hard-
ships which nothing can prevent. An impression
had arisen in many quarters that it was possible to
weigh and decide each individual case as is done at
home under peace conditions — a view of the situation
which shows an absolute lack of understanding of the
grim realities of war. Any officer who has observed
the condition of the men under him after they have
come through a period of heavy fighting and great
THE REICHSTAG 157
exertion, knows what their mental and moral con-
dition is under such circumstances. They are
physically exhausted and their mental and moral
condition is one of high tension. They snarl at one
another for the merest trifle and are in a highly
sensitive and touchy state. At a time like this there
is always plenty of grousing, which after a few days of
rest is in many cases forgotten, though in others the
grievance still rankles in the mind.
The over-exhaustion of the troops is only one
instance : there are in time of war many combina-
tions of circumstances that afford a fertile soil for
the rapid growth of grievances and complaints.
One other particularly striking instance is the long
imprisonment of men of all types and classes who are
cooped up together in the military hospitals. For
these reasons it is always necesary to take all the
circumstances into consideration before forming a
judgment as to how far a complaint is well grounded.
It is quite another matter if the root of the
matter is to be found in breach of duty or in crime.
In such cases as this it is necessary to deal with the
matter without delay and with the most relentless
severity. I have often wished the threats that have
been issued from time to time, that all military
offences would be brought up and tried after the
end of the war, had been carried into practice. If
that had been done it would have been possible to
establish a distinction between the false and the true.
158 A WAR MINISTER AND HIS WORK
As it is, there does not seem to be the slightest
grounds for supposing that this will ever be done.
Before any such action is possible it will first be
necessary to re-establish right and justice. The
practice that has been so continually indulged in of
inviting the statement of grievances from the men on
active service, and then making their statements
public, has been the cause of a great deal of harm.
Such action has simply resulted in the encourage-
ment of flabbiness and softness.
To the same category belong the persistent
efforts that have been made in certain quarters to
modify the punishment that has been inflicted for
military offences. Such a course of action is contrary
to all experience of war, but is always popular with
the mass of the people. It is quite true to say that
the longer a war lasts the more strictly must dis-
cipline be maintained. I have myself supported
the remission of slighter offences, in certain par-
ticular cases, out of consideration for the abnormal
circumstances of war, but I have never taken any
steps to stand in the way of the infliction of severe
punishments for serious offences.
With what jubilation the news was received that
the Emperor Charles had abolished the field punish-
ment of binding to a tree or gun-carriage, and what
an act of mercy and clemency it was said to be !
The good people are not aware that it was only too
soon after this that Austria found herself obliged to
THE REICHSTAG 159
re-institute in secret the method of punishment by
which the man was shut up in a cell in which he was
unable to stand upright. Nor was this enough :
frequent use had to be made of the death penalty.
These measures, however, came too late in the
day to save the discipline of the Austrian army. In
the brochure that has been brought out by the
Social Democrats to show what blessings the army
owes to their good offices there will be found among
other things that the Social Democratic party
abolished the punishment of tying up in face of the
opposition of the Minister for War.
There is no foundation for this assertion. It was
I who abolished this punishment ; the Social
Democratic party would have had no authority to
do such a thing. It is difficult to come to a decision
as to whether it is possible to do without this form
of punishment or not. It is absolutely essential
that offences against discipline should be punished
by some method that can be carried out immediately.
But how is it possible in the trenches, or immediately
after an engagement, for a sentence of imprisonment
to be carried out when there is no room adapted for
the purpose anywhere near ?
In spite of the earnest advice to the contrary of
many soldiers of experience, as, for example, Field-
Marshal von Hindenburg, I decided in favour of the
abolition of this form of punishment, because in many
parts of the army it had already been forbidden by
160 A WAR MINISTER AND HIS WORK
the commanders, and because several cases had been
brought to my notice where men, immediately after
being subjected to it, had taken their own lives.
On the other hand, I have on several occasions
ordered officers to use their arms in dealing with
mutinous subordinates and in extreme cases have
sanctioned the infliction of the death penalty.
It has been recognised from the earliest times that
insubordination is almost always the result of too
great leniency in the remission of punishment. The
only effective means by which it can be obviated has,
from the time of the Roman consuls down to the
rule of Marshal Foch, been found to be the strictest
carrying out of the disciplinary code.
The members of the Reichstag, or the majority
of them, at all events, have shown very little grasp of
the importance of these things, and by their mis-
guided readiness to give way to the wishes and
clamouring of the masses they have done a great
deal of harm to the army. Their proper course
would have been to tell the men that in time of war
it is necessary to put up with a lot of inconvenience
and hardship, but instead of this they encouraged
them to air their grievances. When, as a result of
this, things came to a crisis, there was a sudden
outcry for the members of the Reichstag to go to the
front to appeal to the men and explain to them their
duty to the country ; but it was too late, things had
gone too far to be remedied.
THE REICHSTAG 161
The German people have had to suffer a great
deal from the fact that its representatives have
never shown themselves capable of marching re-
solutely forward towards the goal that was set before
them and before their country, though at the
beginning of the war everything gave reason to hope
that this would not be the case. The interests of
party, and the eagerness to grasp every possible
advantage that could be squeezed from their coun-
try's need, brought about the final disaster.
In the case of the Social Democrats it is possible
that they may have been influenced by fear of their
big bad brothers the Independents. In any case it
led them into the most extraordinary behaviour.
The military state departments were called on by one
of their supporters to prevent the holding of a
meeting of metal workers, in which it was probable
that the Social Democrats would be driven into a
corner by the Independents. And what is more, the
meeting was prohibited. This had the unexpected
result of bringing Scheidemann to make a heated
attack on the Government.
Such a method of conducting politics is not
calculated to produce a favourable impression or to
inspire trust. The Government were obsessed by
the fear of a general strike. This was the bogey that
was held over their heads : the leaders of the
movement made it appear that if the Government
did not give way before this or that demand they
162 A WAR MINISTER AND HIS WORK
could not be answerable for maintaining their
authority over the masses. The Centre party has a
good deal to answer for before the German people for
its conduct in giving its support to the Social
Democratic party, in spite of the fact that it was in a
position to bring about quite different decisions.
This line of conduct will do the Centre party no good
in the long run. On the other hand, it is not to be
wondered at that the Democratic Progressive party
should have placed itself in line with the Social
Democrats. These two parties have always had
interests in common, and the Democratic Progressive
party has not yet risen out of the ranks of the
Philistines. They have never been able to take a
lofty view of the power and greatness of politics, and
have been carried away by the wild talk about world
citizenship.
The proper course would have been for all parties
to come out in support of the army. But even their
dealings with questions concerning the army did not
bring them together, but only served to widen the gulf
between them. The successes of the armies always
received recognition, for the reason that if it had been
otherwise deep resentment would have been ex-
pressed by the people. But in voicing this recogni-
tion of the army's services some members were at
pains to confine their praise to the men in the ranks,
others to the officers, particularly those of the
reserve. Only a few showed their gratitude for the
THE REICHSTAG 163
services of the regular officer, to whom the greatest
share of the credit was due for the efficiency and
leading of the army. Officers and men both belong
to the same body; neither can get on without the
other. It would therefore have been more fitting to
speak of them as a whole.
Considerable time and attention were taken up,
and widespread interest aroused, by the question of
the limitation of freedom that was the inevitable
consequence of the proclamation of martial law.
The debates on this question gave rise to a good
deal of misunderstanding and hard words. In this
case we might have followed with advantage the
example of the enemy countries . With them there was
no question of toleration. Everything had to give way
which appeared to be contrary to the interests of the
community.
To what an extent judgment was warped in this
country is shown by the discussion aroused by
Harden 's " Zukunft." In this publication Harden
had done his best to further the interests of the
enemy and had vilified the German nation and
particularly everything that was Prussian. Our
enemies might have employed him as counsel to
plead their cause. It was therefore found necessary
to suppress " Zukunft," and with good reason.
Nevertheless, it found men to champion its interests.
Heine, a member of the Reichstag, asked me to repeal
the suppression of the publication, and gave as his
1 64 A WAR MINISTER AND HIS WORK
reason that such a step would make a good impression
abroad, for our enemies would see that we were not
afraid to tolerate the expression of the freest opinions.
What a lack of knowledge of affairs is displayed
in such an opinion ! Our enemies would have been
only too delighted to see us committing such foolish-
ness. They themselves were in the habit not only of
suppressing pamphlets and newspapers but of sus-
pending and prosecuting their authors and editors
if they published the slightest thing that did not suit
them. It is only a German who will bring himself
to harm his own cause for the sake of a pet principle.
In comparison to the state of affairs in other coun-
tries there was already too much freedom in Ger-
many. It is possible that after hearing the speeches
of Harden, after our collapse, Herr Heine realises
that his pleading on behalf of this gentleman was a
mistake.
It was the same with the pacifists. For them,
too, the Reichstag fought and wrangled as over a
precious possession. The members could not be made
to see the insidious, emasculating effect these men
were working on the soul of the nation. I have read
many pacifist publications which seemed quite
intelligent ; they treat the subject scientifically,
philosophically, and from the point of view of
statesmanship or religion, but they have always
borne the stamp of unreality, a want of grasp of
practical affairs. There is no appreciation of the
THE REICHSTAG 165
most important factor of all — human nature. I once
received a visit from a pacificist, Professor Quidde,
who came to show me that they were not quite so
crack-brained as one might have been led to suppose.
I told him that I am in the habit of judging men
according to their actions. All the information we
possess of the history of mankind from the earliest
times shows that human nature has altered little.
It is only necessary to read the Old Testament.
All the heights and depths, all good and evil — in
short, everything that goes to make up the human
creature, can be found there just as it is to-day.
Civilisations change, but man remains always the
same. To-day I might add that the same men who
have caused, and are still causing, all the trouble in
Berlin might have done the same in Babylon, Rome
or Paris.
Quidde admitted the truth of what I said, and
even went so far as to say that the pacificists no
longer thought it possible to realise their aims in the
immediate future, though they thought it possible
to do so in a hundred or, perhaps, a few hundred years.
I replied that on that point we were more nearly in
agreement, and that it was possible that we might
find ourselves both in accord with the conclusion of
Kant, who also placed the end of war in the distant
future which to him seemed so far off as to be in-
distinguishable from infinity.
Our pacificists are, however, by no means all
1 66 A WAR MINISTER AND HIS WORK
harmless people. I once read a letter I had received
from one of them to Prince Hohenlohe. In this
letter the writer openly says that he had been
mortally afraid lest we should win the war in the
summer of 191 8.
Another, and a professor in a Prussian technical
college at that, showed his lack of patriotism even
more plainly, going so far as to preach the annihila-
tion of Prussia. Even the education of our children
has been exploited in the attempt to saturate the
people with pacificism. When that was once ac-
complished we should be ripe for slavery or ruin, and
what rejoicing there would be among our enemies !
It is difficult to understand the attitude of mind
of people who can work in this way against their own
interests and those of their country. Perhaps the
conditions imposed by the enemy have had a sobering
and disillusioning effect. But it is characteristic of
the German people to hold to the point of view they
have once taken up, even when the waves are rising
round them and threatening to submerge them. If
this were not so it must be plain to all that this peace
bears in its very nature the seeds of future war as
no peace has ever done in the past.
It seems to be inherent in the development of the
world that at certain periods old values should go by
the board to give place to new. This seems a neces-
sary process to the continuance of life and activity.
Perhaps it is in this sense that ancient wisdom saw
THE REICHSTAG 167
in war the father of all things. I have no faith in
the belief that a world tribunal can maintain peace,
quite apart from the very difficult question of the
executive power that must stand behind it if it is to
be in a position to compel peace, which in itself
would involve war. There are certain things which
it is impossible to decide by arbitration. When the
life and death of a nation are hanging in the balance,
as is the case with us to-day, no court of arbitration
will be able to persuade it that it is best for the
others that it should go under.
Many years ago an important business man said
to me that if we could maintain peace for another
hundred years we could have killed England. The
only reply I could make was to ask him if he thought
England was likely to keep quiet during the hundred
years and watch our progress. The answer to this
question has now been given beyond all doubt.
There are still nations on the earth that are in an
undeveloped state. Are these to be allowed no chance
of development ? Are they to be content to serve
the purpose of the others ?
A short time ago I overheard some soldiers dis-
cussing the negroes, with whom they had had good
opportunities of becoming acquainted in the course of
the war. One of them said quite decidedly : " Some
day they will come to the top."
If I remember rightly, it was at a conference of
the Churches at Byzantium that the Goths were
1 68 A WAR MINISTER AND HIS WORK
refused permission to take part because they were
barbarians and wild animals. To-day these Ger-
manic peoples rule the world.
I was once told by a highly-placed colonial official
that the invention of the machine-gun had made the
rising of savage and subject peoples an impossibility.
Recent events in this country have shown how
quickly these weapons can change hands.
I do not take the view expressed by old Moltke
that perpetual peace is not the beautiful dream it is
said to be. I do, however, maintain that it is
impossible so long as we remain human beings.
Many nations have sought to realise it in the past
and have talked of the Lost Paradise, the Golden Age,
and similar dreams. Christianity and many other
religions believe that it will come in the future, but
only after the destruction of earthly man by death.
In every case perpetual peace appears in the dark
ages of the past, or in the dim eras of a distant future
when the human race is no longer human. A man
is only at peace with himself after long years of severe
inward struggle, through self-denial and self-sup-
pression. In the same way the nations will only
attain peace through war. Even an unsuccessful
war leads finally to peace or annihilation. Those
who must go through the ordeal have to sacrifice
themselves in order to secure for those who follow
them whatever there is to save.
At the time of the collapse of our country I heard
THE REICHSTAG 169
a man in a high position break out with these words :
" To think that we should live to see such a dis-
aster ! " There is in these words something of
egotism. If the disaster had to come, we must bear
it like men and not give way to selfish wishing that
it should have fallen to the lot of another generation
than ours, for it is in our generation that the fault
of weakness lies that made us unable to stave off the
disaster.
Our enemies profess to be about to ensure inter-
national peace, and as a first step towards producing
this result they intend to destroy Germany. The
first duty that lies before us is to shake ourselves free
from the influence of the pacificists ; set ourselves
in every way possible to realise that to live is to
fight both for individuals and nations. England
offers us an example that is worthy of attention as
to how to set about conquering the world. The only
way in which it can be done is by ruthless selfishness.
Everything that stands in her way she treads under
her feet. All means are justified that will attain
the end she has in view. Nothing that can be used
to further her policy is considered wrong, even
though it be a crime.
I remember when I was very young a friend of
mine who was interested in missionary work told me
about a great missionary conference in England at
which there were also many officers present. He
turned to me — I was a young lieutenant at the time
170 A WAR MINISTER AND HIS WORK
— with the question : " Why is that not possible in
our country ? " To-day if I were asked the same
question I should reply : " The English regard even
missionary work in the first place as a means towards
the attainment of world dominion, and for that
reason it attracts general interest. The way in
which they have behaved towards our missionaries in
this war shows that the real motive of their zeal for
this work is not what they profess it to be."
I do not for a moment intend to hold up England's
behaviour in all matters as a pattern for us to follow.
All I want is to ask the pacificists where they
think their efforts will lead us in the face of such
ambitions ?
There were also in the Reichstag supporters of
the International party and of Bolshevism who seemed
to be getting more closely allied. They did not,
however, let this appear openly. The Social-Demo-
cratic party allowed themselves to be grossly
deceived by the international coalition. The Brit-
isher, the American, and most other nationalities,
think first of themselves and their own interests. No
one but a German could go on living in the belief
that the interests of all communities in the world are
one and the same. Many a Social Democrat is not
in a position to think internationally. The very
battle-cry, " Proletarians of all countries unite ! "
will not please him, for the ordinary worker is not a
proletarian. They all regard capital as their enemy.
THE REICHSTAG 171
Here, too, it is possible that their views will change
as they come to realise that capital is necessary to
their existence. In the furtherance of their socialistic
campaign they will meet with many unpleasant
experiences, for it will bring them no gain.
If I remember right, the Government of New
Zealand is socialistic. The only way it can be kept
going is through continual help from England. The
State is therefore hopelessly insolvent.
The Independents have allied themselves with
the Bolsheviks. They are associated with the Bol-
shevik ' ambassador " in Berlin, and at a banquet
that was held at the Russian Embassy a toast was
drunk to the success of internationalism. The name
of Cohn, the representative in the Reichstag for
Nordhausen, has been particularly connected with
this incident. It was openly stated in the news-
papers that he had received millions of marks from
Russia. According to his own account, these were
to be used for the benefit of the Russian prisoners ;
according to Joffre they were for the purpose of
propagating Bolshevism. That foreign money also
has played a part in the mutiny in the navy it is safe
to assume. Threads have been traced connecting
the first naval mutinies with the Independent party.
Imperial Chancellor Michaelis and Secretary of
State von Capelle in the Reichstag accused them of
being a party to the mutinies, but unfortunately
without bringing forward sufficient evidence to
172 A WAR MINISTER AND HIS WORK
prove their accusations, so that they did not succeed
in winning the support of the House.
International relations have existed from the
earliest times. They were necessary for the carrying
on of trade and barter. They have been cultivated
through the medium of princes, noblemen, scholars,
artists, commercial agents, financiers and travellers.
But this communication was limited within the
membership of certain national communities. The
people who have been most free from such limitations
are the financiers and the Jews, who seem very
frequently to have interests in common. There are,
however, exceptions.
Among the great religious movements Chris-
tianity has set before itself the task of spreading its
influence throughout the length and breadth of the
world. Other religions too, have had the same
ambition. But even these religious movements have
found themselves obliged to allow for national
individuality and have not attained a complete
internationality.
Last of all we have the people who possess
nothing. Their object is to unite together the
members of their own class of all nations, and so form
a union by means of which they hope to attain their
ends. This is not merely a moral movement ; its
followers intend to impose their will on the world by
force. It follows, therefore, that the only way by
which it can be successfully combated is by the use
THE REICHSTAG 173
of force, particularly as the moral side of the move-
ment is crude and primitive. The attempts that
have been made to save bloodshed by compliance
and compromise have proved a failure and are the
result of political and historical ignorance.
Movements of this type never make uniform
progress. In certain areas they die out or grow
weaker, while in others they are only beginning to get
a hold. International Bolshevism seems to be
advancing over ground that has been well prepared
beforehand, for in many places it has suddenly come
into evidence before any one was aware that it had
effected an entry. For this reason it is doubly
dangerous and calls for the most ruthless measures to
stamp it out.
As I write these lines the papers are announcing
the appalling death of Liebknecht and Rosa Luxem-
burg — an example that should warn us of the
seriousness of the movement, and one that should be
taken to heart by all those who, by their spreading
of illusions about freedom and by their lack of
restraint, have prepared the ground for this poisonous
growth.
In this time of our downfall the Reichstag has had
to undergo bitter humiliation. This assembly that
used to consider itself all-powerful has now been
ruthlessly pushed on one side in the upheaval. It
is to be hoped that it will re-establish its position of
authority, for it is the constitutional representative
174 A WAR MINISTER AND HIS WORK
of the German people. If it does once more attain
to power it must learn not to place the interests of
party before the welfare of the nation. Unfortu-
nately there is reason to doubt whether our nation
has yet reached the necessary state of political
maturity.
With the abdication of the reigning princes one
difficulty that stood in the way of the foundation
of a united state has vanished. Now we are faced
with the extraordinary situation in which not only
the numerous federal states wish to form themselves
into independent states — which seems to me natural
and just — but entirely new states are trying to come
into existence, like the Rhine-Westphalian Republic,
which Trimborn, a member of the Reichstag, and his
associates are striving to form.
Perhaps questions of religion are playing their
part in this. Is it possible that Rome has a hand in
the game ? These changes are not likely to have the
effect of strengthening the German Empire. They
are rather reminiscent of the hereditary German
weakness for splitting up, and are likely to favour the
cause of the enemy. The union established by the
power and skill of Bismarck has fallen to pieces.
The security on which it rested, the imperial crown
and the Bundesrat, has vanished. The German
dream can never be repeated, but dreamers avail us
little. Only men can help us who seek their task
not in words but in deeds.
CHAPTER VIII
GOVERNMENTS
BEFORE the war Prussia and Germany were
recognised, even by our enemies, to be the
best governed countries in the world. During
the war our enemies changed their tune, and our
misguided people believed them and the anti-
Government parties. It required a series of tragic
events to awaken a desire to get back to the orderly
conditions of former days, as the new governments,
one after the other, showed themselves inadequate
for their task.
The Prussian Ministry has been the example on
which Imperial Germany has modelled itself. I
have attended its sessions as a layman, but also as
an attentive observer. My first impressions were
favourable. The assembly conducted itself with a
calm dignity ; no member ever forgot himself ; no
measure was carried through without first being
subjected to keen and expert consideration. Prussia
was a model not only of resolute government but
also of political soundness. The states of South
Germany have never distinguished themselves for
good government ; their strength and importance
176 A WAR MINISTER AND HIS WORK
lay in other directions. They could afford to indulge
in their vaunted political liberty because Prussia
did not do so. It is not surprising that Democracy
has found its most fruitful soil among the South
Germans. Payer, Grober, Hausmann and Erzberger
were the first members of the new Government.
What have they effected, in conjunction with their
president, Prince Max, who came from democratic
Baden and within a year had lost his influence ?
The Prussian Ministry was not opposed to
freedom. Among its members were even men of
genuine liberal views, yet it was in no way demo-
cratic, but royalist.
But the influence of Bethmann-Hollweg swayed
them all. Plenty of concessions were made to the
majority parties. This was done not without con-
siderable reluctance, but the members thought
themselves unable to go contrary to the reasoning
of the president. This is a state of things that passes
my comprehension. In my opinion if a man feels
the necessity of expressing scruples he should act in
accordance with his scruples. Only a few stood
firm to their opinions and had the courage to vote
accordingly.
The concessions that were made with a view to
conciliating the Poles has produced disastrous re-
sults. Lentze, a member of the Government, had
given emphatic warning that this would be the case,
and his prophecy has been fully justified by events.
GOVERNMENTS 177
The conflict of opinion reached its climax when
the bill providing for universal suffrage in Prussia
came under discussion. Every one had scruples
about this bill with the exception of Count Rodern,
who thought he had had favourable experience of
universal suffrage in Strassburg, and Helfferich, who
was of opinion that the internal situation had become
so precarious that it would be unwise to shirk the
bill.
Whether Bethmann-Hollweg acted according to
his real judgment, or whether he was influenced by
the fact that he had already pledged himself by
promises he had made, I am not in a position to say.
It is well known who the Ministers were who
refused to have anything to do with the bill. When
it was definitely decided that there should be no
delay in bringing in the bill these men sent in their
resignations. As I was a soldier it was not open to
me to follow their example.
Although this was a bill that concerned Prussia
alone, all the Secretaries of State were summoned to
the meeting of the Privy Council at which this step
was decided on. With the single exception of
Kratke, they one and all ranged themselves on the
side of the Imperial Chancellor.
I have always regarded this result as being the
outcome of panic, although at the time the Govern-
ment still had control of all the forces of the Empire.
An indication of the lengths to which they were
M
178 A WAR MINISTER AND HIS WORK
prepared to go in the direction of conciliation is
given by a suggestion, of which I was informed at
the time by Under-Secretary Wahnschaffe, that we
should seek to make a good impression by setting at
liberty Liebknecht. If ever conciliation has been
shown by its consequences to be a sign of weakness,
this was the case here.
Once, when after a conference some of the mem-
bers of the Government again expressed to the
Chancellor their scruples about the wisdom of the
bill, he retorted as he was leaving them : " Yes, now
is the time for it ; now is the time ! " But a really
great man should not allow his actions to be ruled
by time ; he should control time and make it
subservient to his purpose. After Bethmann-Holl-
weg's downfall Scheidemann said of him that he
was not a diplomat but a statesman. He was
neither of these things, and certainly not a statesman,
for a statesman must be afraid of nothing. There-
fore his fate overtook him, in spite of, or rather
because of, his fondness for compromise ; he was
deserted even by his old supporters. Shortly after
my appointment as Minister for War, and therefore
as early as the autumn of 191 6, Ludendorff said to
me : " Bethmann will never succeed in making
peace ; he must go ! " This remark should be
noted by those who maintain that owing to obstinacy,
ambition, or want of intelligence, Ludendorff pursued
the war without giving a thought to peace. He
GOVERNMENTS 179
had it in his mind from the moment he assumed a
position of influence.
I have reason to cherish grateful recollection of
the Prussian Ministry, both before and after it was
reconstituted, owing to the resignation of some of its
members, as I have described above. I did not find
myself in agreement with all its members, but they
were all able men who knew their job, and men of
cultured mind with whom it was a pleasure to work.
They were jealous guardians of the ancient, tried
tradition and firm believers in historical develop-
ment. The most staunch upholder of all that
concerned good form and correct behaviour was von
Breitenbach. Even many of his old opponents must
now wish to see again in public life the honourable,
safe and independent procedure and the strict
regard for order that distinguished those days.
In questions that concerned the Empire the
Ministry often came off second best. It did not
always receive sufficiently prompt information and
was not always given a proper hearing. This has
been the case, I believe, ever since the Biilow era.
It has often been urged that steps should be taken
to remedy this negligence, and promises have been
received that this should be done, but in the stress of
circumstances these promises have from time to
time been forgotten again. The master-mind was
wanting which neglects nothing.
The time during which Miehaelis held the office.
180 A WAR MINISTER AND HIS WORK
of Imperial Chancellor was too short to enable him
to make his influence felt. No one, however, can
feel anything but respect for this loyal and devoted
man. Unlike others who have held this high office,
he was glad when the burden of responsibility was
removed from his shoulders.
With Count Hertling I have often worked, and
we got on well together. It is a well-known fact
that it was with a heavy heart that he brought
himself to undertake the duties of Chancellor. His
patriotism and devotion to duty will be denied by
no one, but he was already too far advanced in age
to grapple firmly with the situation, although the
will to do so was in no way wanting. His principal
strength lay in his skill in mediation. According to
his own account, his work was often made difficult
and hampered by the opposition of Erzberger. I
have pointed out to him on more than one occasion
that if we were to come out of the war successfully it
would be necessary to get rid of the obsolete and
incompetent Reichstag ; he was not disinclined to
agree with me, but finally came to the conclusion
that it was too late in the day.
The last time I saw him was just before he
started on his journey to Spa, where the question of
the armistice was to be discussed and decided. He
did not, however, mention this to me and perhaps
had not himself been informed. On that occasion
he looked very old and weary. I am convinced that
GOVERNMENTS 181
the downfall of the Empire and the upheaval at home
have helped to hasten his end.
Of the interregnum of Prince Max of Baden I
have had no experience, except in its early days«
The appointment of large numbers of Ministers
without portfolio was only just beginning. It will
be found difficult to discover what was the object of
these appointments, unless they are regarded as a
necessary adjunct of democracy. As far as I can
remember, I had to do only with Grober, Erzberger,
Scheidemann and Bauer while I was a Minister.
Whether they or other powers were responsible for
getting rid of me I do not know, but I think it
important to let it be known that my resignation
was not voluntary, lest it should be thought that I
deserted my post in my country's hour of need.
The way in which it was done was certainly strange.
I made the acquaintance of Prince Max first in
Berlin. He was very friendly towards me, and
remembered that I had once been in command of a
division from Baden. A few days later I was asked
to be present at a conference. The assembly was
received by the Prince, who immediately afterwards
quitted us, as he had to leave the town at once
for an important audience with the Emperor. As
he said good-bye I again had a few words with him,
and again he was very friendly. At the audience he
told the Emperor that my resignation was a necessity.
If he had given me the slightest hint of his
182 A WAR MINISTER AND HIS WORK
intention I should have saved the Emperor the
trouble of dismissing me by requesting him to relieve
me of my office. I did not like the way in which this
was done, but I was grateful to be relieved of my
duties. As a German prince he would probably
have preferred not to hold office at all rather than
hold it for so short a time. This Government silently
disappeared, and no one seemed to regret its dis-
appearance.
I was sorry for old Payer, for whom I had a great
respect. He knew how to keep separate the double
role of member of the Government and party man,
and was a man of honour. Apart from him, the
Swabian soldiers whom I met in the field during the
Somme battle, and on previous occasions, seemed to
me to be far greater men than their politicians and
statesmen.
CHAPTER IX
THE ARMY
THERE can be no doubt that the German
army that took the field in 191 4 was easily
the best that has ever taken part in any
war. Thoroughly trained as it was, firmly united
and conscious of the duty that lay before it, and fired
not only by its own enthusiasm but also by that of
the whole nation, it was ready for any task it might
be called upon to carry through.
For the first time in the history of our army
reserve formations were sent into the field from the
beginning, side by side with the regular troops.
Regulars and reserves marched and went into action
together as parts of the same armies.
Even Landwehr troops were at once entrusted
with difficult and important duties. They did not
disappoint the confidence that had been placed in
them, and no further proof is needed that their
training had been conducted on right lines.
Doubt had been expressed in some quarters as to
whether the German people, and with them the army
itself, after so many long years of peace, and the high
and luxurious standard of living that comes with
184 A WAR MINISTER AND HIS WORK
peace, the refined and overstrained culture, and many
other enervating influences of the time through
which they had just been living, would still be
equal to undertaking tasks which would make great
demands on their courage, self-denial and sacrifice.
All such doubts as these were proved by events to be
without foundation.
The core of the nation and of the army was sound,
and the elements of weakness did not at first come
into evidence. But they were there from the first,
for wherever you have millions of men you are sure
to have a certain proportion of good-for-nothings,
cowards, criminals and men who have no thought
for anything beyond their own interests.
The corps of officers was by tradition and training
inspired with the true soldierly spirit ; they were
thoroughly loyal and filled with the love of their
Fatherland. They saw in their King and Emperor
their supreme war-lord, to whom they devoted
themselves body and soul ; it was to him that they
owed their position and the great respect in which
they were held by the people. The senior officers
had observed the affectionate care with which he
had watched over the interests of his army ever since
he had succeeded to the throne, and the younger had
never had any reason to think otherwise than that
their Emperor lived and worked for and with his
troops. They knew him only as a soldier and never
thought of him as anything else. They had all been
THE ARMY 185
thoroughly trained in their profession. From the
leading generals down to the youngest subaltern, the
war was to give them an opportunity to show what
they were capable of, for very few of them had had
any previous experience of active service.
The corps of officers was drawn from the most
widely different circles of the educated classes. In
a few branches of the service this was not the case :
the officers of these were recruited by tradition and
mutual interest from certain definite circles and
families. This system is apt to give rise to prejudice ;
it would seem wiser to mix the officers without any
regard to their origin and social standing. All
parties derive benefit from contact with other types
and classes ; it widens their outlook, prejudices
disappear, and corners are rubbed off. I should like
to see some members of our nobility of the sword in
every officers' corps. By their traditions these men
already possess the best military qualities. Many
of our officers were accustomed to wealth and
luxury, but the majority were used to a simple life
and were without private means. I once heard the
proposal made that a definite distinction should be
made between rich and poor officers' corps. Poor
men are often placed at a great disadvantage when
they have to associate with men who have plenty of
money ; but in an officers' corps it is to be expected
that these latter will exercise restraint and take this
fact into account.
186 A WAR MINISTER AND HIS WORK
It was often the case that poor men who wished
to become officers would select a corps in which the
standard of living corresponded with their means.
Men who make a wrong use of their wealth, or seek to
make a display, are out of place as officers. I like the
answer of the commanding officer of a regiment of
foot-guards to a father who introduced his son, whom
he wanted to place in this regiment, with the words :
" You can rely on me to provide my son with any
necessary allowance, no matter how big." The
commanding officer replied : "In my regiment I
have no use for subalterns of that type."
A good education is essential to every officer,
and more than ever to-day, when he is likely to find
so many well-educated men of every kind under his
command. It is, however, necessary to guard
against the danger of forcing them all up to the same
standard, for a good scholar is far from making,
necessarily, a good officer. A number of years ago it
was the custom to allow a certain period of seniority
in promotion to ensigns who had passed the school-
leaving examination that qualified for matriculation
to the technical colleges and universities when they
had reached a certain standard in the military
college. This scheme was instituted with the object
of avoiding hardship that otherwise arose in the case
of those who, having remained longer at school, did
not enter the army until a more advanced age than
the majority. It also acted as an incentive to
THE ARMY 187
candidates for the army to remain at school long
enough to enable them to pass the leaving examina-
tion. These young men soon outstripped in pro-
motion the others who had already put in two years
of hard work as officers. This always seemed to me
to be hard on the latter. This is generally the way
in life : in trying to remedy cases of hardship it often
occurs that hardship is simply diverted on to other
shoulders.
The public often got hold of some extraordinary
ideas on the subject of the training and education of
officers. The artillery and engineers came to be
regarded as the learned arms of the service ; they
were expected to have a profound knowledge of the
theory and application of mathematics. I was
myself an artillery officer and have always had a
liking for the study of mathematics ; but for prac-
tical purposes all the mathematics that were re-
quired for artillery work was simple addition from
one to ten. Any one who wishes to have a thorough
knowledge of the mechanism of his guns of course
requires more than this, but it is all that is required
for their ordinary use.
The cavalry was regarded by the public with some
aloofness if not actual animosity, as being the
preserve of the nobility and the wealthy classes. In
spite of this, however, this arm contained quite a
large number of highly-cultured and capable men of
the world. The infantry was regarded with the least
188 A WAR MINISTER AND HIS WORK
respect, probably because it was so much larger than
the other arms, and because it moved so laboriously
in the dust. Nevertheless the infantryman is the
truly typical soldier. It is not merely an accident
that it is from this arm that the greatest number and
the most famous of our highest generals have
sprung. I have often advised fathers to put their
sons into the infantry, which has always borne the
brunt of the battle and, in spite of the development
of science as applied to war, still continues to do so.
No service forms such a good training-ground for a
soldier and for war as service in the infantry.
The German nation has always been a nation
of soldiers, and it is to be hoped that when we have
waked again from the present nightmare it will
become so again. At the same time, as a nation we
have shown little understanding for military affairs.
I feel that it is my duty to express this opinion, at the
risk of its being strongly resented.
One of the results of the world-war has been to
break down many of the barriers that kept distinct
the different arms of the service, and this has brought
great changes. A cavalry officer had to fight on
foot, and not only with his own troop ; a great
number of cavalry officers, too, were permanently
transferred to the infantry. There was no longer
any difference made between the use of these two
arms. Even the heavy cuirassiers and the Garde du
Corps, which has so often been the object of attacks
THE ARMY 189
on the part of mischief-makers, have taken their
share of the fighting in the open field and the trenches,
and have lost quite as heavily as any infantry
regiments.
The artillery and the engineers have had to
adapt themselves to totally new conditions and
have had to invent every possible expedient to meet
them. The new weapons that were used in this war
for the first time — the hand-grenade, the mine-
thrower, the airship and aeroplane, the gas and the
tanks, as well as the rapid development of the
different means of communication and observation—
all called for wider knowledge and greater adapta-
bility. In coping with all these different branches
of the service officers of all arms found themselves in
close co-operation. The changes wrought by all this
seemed so radical that I was once asked by some
teachers from the technical colleges to allow them
permission to visit the front. They were anxious to
ascertain whether the methods of teaching science
and mathematics in the higher educational establish-
ments could not be placed on another footing. I
gave the necessary permission ; the journeys took
place, and a report was drawn up of the results of
their experiences.
I thought it necessary to warn them, however,
not to base all their conclusions on the phenomena of
this war, in which the most important forms of
warfare were only in evidence in exceptional cases.
igo A WAR MINISTER AND HIS WORK
We must, on the contrary, be prepared to deal with
new phenomena in future wars, and so be ready to
adapt ourselves to new developments as they appear.
This is true both for the officers and, to a lesser
extent, for the men.
For these reasons a shortened period of active
military training is to-day less adequate than ever
to produce efficient troops. The short period of
training that was given to the later reinforcements
cannot be brought up as an argument, against this
view. Their training was insufficient and this was
the cause of a good deal of lack of efficiency, which
did not appear on the surface so long as the old
army was still in the majority. It was not in-
frequently that one heard the latter exclaim angrily,
both in action and in the course of the daily round
of work : " You young fellows are too stupid for
anything ! "
The officers of the reserve who were trained in
peace-time, and went through the early part of the
war, did splendid work. They vied with their fellow-
officers of the active list in devotion to duty and
readiness for self-sacrifice. In the course of the war
attempts were made to sow discord between these
two classes of officers. An excuse was found in the
inequality of opportunity that existed between the
active and the reserve officer with regard to promo-
tion to the staff appointments. Later on, when the
officers of the reserve had shown their capacity to
THE ARMY 191
hold positions of leadership, this inequality was
abolished.
In peace-time there had been very few examples
of the appointment of these officers to the staff, as it
was considered that their training had been in-
sufficient to enable them to fill these important
posts. But when the war had given them ex-
perience, it is true that they should have been given
a larger share of this promotion than was actually
the case.
There was certainly one good reason why this
should not be done. Under the stress of the heavy
fighting they had soon been forged into excellent
regimental leaders. For the staff appointments,
however, quite other qualities and experience are
called for than those that are given by active service,
such, for example, as the capacity to select, form and
train an officers' corps.
Complaints were also made that officers of the
reserve were not selected for positions on the higher
staffs. But trained and experienced adjutants and
general staff officers were the best link between the
numerous untrained subordinate officers, who had no
previous training in the technicalities of their pro-
fession, and the higher command. But there were
other posts in which good use could be made of
conscientious workers in which expert knowledge
was not required. The services of officers of the
reserve were then made use of later in many posts on
192 A WAR MINISTER AND HIS WORK
the higher staffs ; they were already well represented
on the subordinate staffs.
It is not such a simple matter as it may appear
to break away from established custom and tradition
under active service conditions. It is not safe to
indulge indiscriminately in experiments that may
have the most disastrous consequences. In this
case it was found necessary to modify the conditions,
because ignorance and malice were trying to spread
the impression that the officers of the active list were
being spared at the expense of the others. Any one
who has had first-hand knowledge of the work of the
adjutants and officers of the general staff in the field
will never associate with them the idea of sparing.
Among the officers other than those of the active
list there existed great and unfair differences in
financial circumstances which, as the war became
prolonged, gave rise to cases of great hardship. A
man who in peace-time held a post in the public
service still drew, in addition to his officer's pay, the
greater part of the salary he had earned before the
war. Those who had been members of the in-
dependent professions, business men, etc., had to
rely entirely on their army pay ; many of these were
obliged to spend their savings, run into debt, or
starve with their families.
A member of the Social Democratic party in the
Reichstag seized the opportunity of the strike in
Upper Silesia to make an attack on the officers. He
THE ARMY 193
demanded for the miners who were on strike a mini-
mum wage of ten marks a day, and added that,
judging from their conduct in their clubs, the officers,
at any rate, were feeling nothing of the hardships
of the time. I had no difficulty in contradicting
this ridiculous fallacy. The lieutenants in the
army, even those who were married, do not here at
home draw the sum that this man was proposing as
the bare minimum required by the strikers, and it
was a fact that many of the clubs had been obliged
to close down because the officers had found them-
selves no longer able to afford the expense of fre-
quenting them. Many a cry of distress has reached
my ears from officers who begged to be allowed to
draw rations for themselves and their families from
the kitchens that supplied the men, as they were
unable to provide themselves with the means of
obtaining food, not to mention the other necessities
of life. This orator, who jumped to conclusions,
should have seen the clubs in which the lawless
members of the Soldiers' Councils lived with
their prostitutes ; in that case he would have
good reason to talk not merely of good living but of
riotous extravagance. This is an example of the
way in which agitation is carried on by lying and
ignorance. Many a man in the ranks was astounded
when he heard the real story of the circumstances
with which the officers had to contend. The social
scale is reversed to-day, when the labourer draws
N
194 A WAR MINISTER AND HIS WORK
wages to which the educated man, who has spent
many years and large sums of money in preparing
himself for his profession, never attains.
I should be the last to grudge the steady and
industrious working-man his good wages. He on his
side should not grudge others their fair share. It
may appear right to the Social Democrat to see large
numbers of educated men sink in the social scale
for lack of means, but this is of no service to the
community and the State.
In spite of much hardship the officers of our army
have done their duty. It is, of course, true that
there were among them many well-to-do and rich
men. All the greater is the honour due to those of
smaller means who, in close association with their
more fortunate comrades, had to do their duty in
circumstances of great hardship.
There have been many cases of failure on the part
of officers of the reserve to maintain discipline and
to take proper care of their men. Efficiency in this
respect can only be attained by long experience and
constant practice. This became still more noticeable
as the officers of the old army were replaced by
younger and younger men in respect to whom the
older reserve officers stood in very much the same
relationship as the old regular officers formerly bore
to those of the reserve. This new type of officer is
aptly described by the following words : " They
knew how to die in front of their men, but not how
THE ARMY 195
to live." It is true that their private life left a good
deal to be desired ; they lacked the steadiness of
manhood and experience of the world.
The question will be asked why non-commissioned
officers and picked men from the ranks were not
promoted to commissioned rank. Other armies have
instituted this system even in peace-time, but they
maintain a distinction between the two types of
officers by limiting the promotion of those who have
risen from non-commissioned rank below a certain
rank. We have always insisted on a certain stan-
dard of education for candidates for commissions in
our army. Now the school-leaving certificate, which
entitles the holder to limit his period of military
service to one year, or even the " certificate of
maturity," which demands a higher standard, can-
not be taken as a guarantee of a really complete
education. At the same time, a certain fixed
standard was considered desirable, and at any rate
it enabled the authorities to know where they stood.
You do not lessen the number of the malcontents by
establishing conditions under which every one has
the prospect or the right of promotion.
During the war it was made a very easy matter
to qualify for the necessary educational certificate.
There was a constant increase in the number of
educational establishments anxious to be recognised
as qualified to award this certificate. Even the
artists' clause was mistakenly taken advantage of
196 A WAR MINISTER AND HIS WORK
by those who wished to qualify as officers. This
clause was only intended to take effect in time of
peace, and to enable men with particular aptitude for
different branches of art to qualify for a shortened
period of military service, and so guard against the
ill-effects that a long period of training with the
army might have on the cultivation of their talent.
It does not give the holder any claim to a com-
mission. There was some misunderstanding caused
by this in the case of some individuals, and also in
some arms of the service.
To compensate for the shortage of officers
provision was made for the appointment for the
period of the war of a certain number of warrant-
officers and sergeant-lieutenants. These were inter-
mediate ranks which would have sufficed for a war of
short duration. They were intended as a concession
and a distinction to reward non-commissioned officers
of long service and unpromoted candidates for
commissions. Often enough in practice it worked
out as the contrary of what was intended, or at any
rate came to be regarded as such. If he was no
longer needed to make up the complement of officers,
a warrant-officer could be put back to his former
rank. This quite wrongly came to be regarded as a
degradation and the system was later abolished.
The sergeant-lieutenant was intended to rank as an
officer, but he was not always treated in accordance
with his rank and he was always the junior member
THE ARMY 197
of his mess. He felt slighted when a large number
of young officers were promoted over his head. It
was difficult for the regular non-commissioned officer
to reach these ranks, as they could only be qualified
for by long service and could not be retained after
the war as they did not exist in peace-time. He
would then have to give up his rank or resign at the
end of the war. In that case he would perhaps have
found difficulty in finding employment as a civilian.
One of these sergeant-lieutenants once wrote me
a letter in which he put down our collapse to the
fact that they had not been promoted. This is very
characteristic of their way of reasoning, but it is not
a good receipt to assure against failure, for many of
these men were quite unsuitable for further promo-
tion and others actually were promoted. Another
one appealed to a member of the Reichstag with an
application to be appointed to a commission in the
reserve, adding, that as a middle-aged man and the
father of a family he did not feel inclined to attempt
any deed of special heroism. That showed a very
worthy and frank spirit, but was also a judgment
against himself.
All these ranks could, like any other man in the
army, win a commission by some deed of special
distinction in face of the enemy. Quite a number,
indeed, have been promoted in this way, but greater
generosity might have been shown in dealing with
these cases. Any man who had consistently done
198 A WAR MINISTER AND HIS WORK
his duty through the long years of trench warfare, and
had been an example to others, might have become
an officer, provided that he was suitable in tempera-
ment, bearing and personal circumstances. It is,
however, absolutely necessary to keep to some
definite limit, not the least important reason being
the interests of the men who are always critically
observant of their superiors. Personally, I should
have preferred to do without these two new ranks
and kept to the traditional rank of vice-sergeant-
major, who was the recognised representative of the
officer. If the vice-sergeant-major was suitable for
commissioned rank it was possible to promote him.
In any case, it was by no means necessarily cer-
tain that a man gained by this promotion from the
ranks. I have known cases where an excellent
vice-sergeant-major begged that his name should not
be sent in for a commission, as he thought that it
would lead to difficulties later. It is not every one
who in the same circumstances would have taken
such a sensible view.
There is no doubt whatever that in the course of
the war mistakes were made in the selection of
officers. Commissions were given in this way to men
who were totally unfitted to hold them. The
superior officers on whose judgment it was necessary
to rely in making the choice were often too young
and inexperienced to be good judges of men. The
short periods of lull between the righting did not
THE ARMY 199
give them enough time to watch the candidates for
promotion and to get to know them sufficiently well
to decide as to their fitness. It was as a rule neces-
sary to fall back on the reports of those who had
charge of their courses of training, and these as a rule
dealt only with the aptitude they had shown on
parade, and only touched in the most general terms
on their other, more personal, qualifications.
As the enquiries into their personal and private
circumstances at home tended to become more and
more perfunctory their selection could not be
expected to produce irreproachable results. It was
only to be expected, therefore, that the appeal
should be heard from the men : " We want our old
officers back again ! " These, however, lay buried
under the soil, or sick and wounded in the hospitals,
or had gone home unfit for service. Their only
reward was to have mud thrown at them and be the
object of abuse and insult. In the storm and stress
of war the men had held a very different opinion of
their officers, under whose leadership they felt secure
and who had seen that they were well cared for.
In spite of periods of serious shortage, which is
bound to be the case in a long war, the Corps of
Officers fulfilled the needs of leadership to the last.
Many of the officers showed themselves incapable
of maintaining a proper standard of discipline.
Certain departments of an officer's life are soon
acquired, but the strict maintenance of discipline
200 A WAR MINISTER AND HIS WORK
calls for military qualities, which can only be acquired
by training and experience and the gift for compelling
respect for discipline in the men. Side by side with
these qualities must go a certain measure of know-
ledge of men, so that each man may be treated
according to his individuality and not as part of a
machine. But the most important thing of all in an
officer is that he should possess the necessary firmness
and use all the means at his disposal to see
that his will is carried out. To effect this he must
not shrink from employing the most drastic measures
when they are called for. The most serious con-
sequences have arisen from weakness of purpose and
unwise leniency in the infliction of punishment and
bringing cases of breach of discipline before a court-
martial, though these ideas of mercy have found
favour with, and been encouraged by, the people's
representatives.
There is one other point I feel I must touch on,
though it is difficult to bring forward supporting
evidence. I have not been able to feel convinced I
that every wounded or sick officer has done all that !
he could to get back to the front as quickly as
possible. It is, of course, natural that there should
be no desire to curtail the period of rest, convales-
cence and recuperation. It is possible, too, that this
disinclination may have been strengthened from
time to time by too anxious a view of the case on the
part of the medical officers. It is, however, the duty
THE ARMY 201
of every officer to realise that his place is at the front
as soon as he is at all fit to fill it. I have known
officers who quickly returned to their duty at the
front even after they had lost an arm or leg, and
bravely continued to take part in the fighting. These
man have set an example of devotion to duty that
all should follow. But the whole nation must be
imbued with this spirit of self-mastery and devotion
to duty if it is to be expected of every recruit. In
the Prussia of the old days such a spirit fired the
nation for a long period, but in the Germany of
to-day there have been times during the war when it
was by no means universal.
To-day the officer finds himself faced with the
serious question whether under the altered circum-
stances which prevail in our country he should
continue to serve in the army or not. Many will feel
that they are unable to do so if they are to remain
true to their convictions. Every man, however, who
does not feel himself bound by such convictions
should, in God's name, continue his service and not
desert his Fatherland in the hour of need.
Even a staunch supporter of the monarchy can
do faithful service in a republic, as has been amply
proved in France. The present state of disorder
and want of discipline will, it is to be hoped, eventu-
ally pass away, for an army can only exist where
there are order and discipline. Should the future
bring developments such as no good German ca n
202 A WAR MINISTER AND HIS WORK
hope to witness, then certainly there can be no place
for a loyal, honour-loving officer in an army as such
a state of things would produce.
The old, systematically-trained and carefully-
educated soldiers of the German army were excellent
material, with the bonds of comradeship that united
them one with the other, and the confidence and trust
with which they regarded their officers. They
understood the value of esprit de corps and were
jealous of their soldierly honour. When these men
fell their places were filled from a reserve in which
the standard of devotion and efficiency was equally
high, although the mobilisation of the newly-formed
reserve brigades that were put into the first line
early in the war had made a heavy demand on their
numbers. After convalescence the wounded and
sick were sent back to their old units, where they
rejoined their friends. This custom, however, was
soon departed from. The heavy losses that occurred
from time to time in particular sectors of the front
made it necessary to throw in all the reserve that
were in any way available at one particular point.
This inevitably led to a more or less radical change in
the personnel of the units concerned. Men who }
were strangers to one another, and even belonging to
different nationalities, were thrown together by this
means. If friendly feeling and mutual tolerance had
been shown this would have led to a widening of
outlook and a broadening of sympathy on both
THE ARMY 203
sides, but the desire to be back among their old
comrades proved too strong. Even a common
dialect or accent proved a bond that drew closer
together the men from the same part of the country.
In Prussia it used to be the custom to put men
who came from the same part of the country into
the same regiment, and the various army corps were
related to the different provinces from which they
were recruited and reinforced. This arrangement
had a very beneficial effect on the army in general.
The men were in close touch with one another, and
they knew that an interest was taken at home in
their welfare and the way they bore themselves as
soldiers. After the shifting of the population, as a
result of the development of industry, it became
impossible to continue this custom to the same
extent. The regiments recruited from thinly-popu-
lated areas had to be reinforced from any part of the
country where the necessary men were available.
This mixing would have done no harm if every
part of the Empire had been imbued with
a strong sense of nationality. Unfortunately this
was lacking in this great German war. A Swabian,
Bavarian, or Badener might feel himself an utter
stranger in a Prussian unit, and vice versa. The com-
plication and variety of the German tribes were the
source of great cultural forces, but at the same time
they presented a very serious obstacle when it was a
question of welding these elements into one great
204 A WAR MINISTER AND HIS WORK
whole. The homogeneity of the various tribes was
restored towards the end of the war as this was
demanded on all sides. But within the tribe it was
impossible always to post a man to the same unit.
Many men who were returned to service after being
wounded or sick had to be transferred time after time.
This involved cases of hardship, of course. Previous
service was not regarded and men had to begin again
at the bottom to recover their position. It was just
the same with the rota for leave. Of course every
man who was transferred took with him into his new
unit the claim to precedence he had already estab-
lished. But this often led to great difficulties. Perhaps
the sergeant-major who kept the nominal rolls or
leave-lists was killed or otherwise fell out, or new
officers came to the regiment who did not know the
men, or the lists themselves were lost in battle, or
destroyed by artillery fire, or burnt. The superficial
critic has never fully realised the appalling difficulties
which the immense scale of this war involved.
But all these inconveniences were put up with
so long as the old reserves were in the majority.
Reinforcement from the less thoroughly disciplined
Landsturm produced unsatisfactory results. It is
obvious that a Landsturm man of forty years of age
no longer possesses the same power of adapting him-
self to new conditions as a younger man. He finds the
discipline and the unaccustomed exertions of training
particularly irksome. The instructional staff in
THE ARMY 205
peace knew only one kind of training, and they were
expected to make serviceable soldiers out of these
older men too. It could not be expected that they
should suddenly master a quite different system of
instruction. Then there arose an outcry against the
monotony of the drill and the bullying of the men
by their instructors.
There is one way of avoiding this anomaly.
Every man who is physically fit should be trained
while he is young. Even the unfit should be con-
tinually called up for re-examination, for the war has
proved that many of their defects disappear as they
grow older. There is no need to be over-anxious on
this point ; the standard of physique has been
lowered in the course of the war without any evil
results. Many weaknesses resulting from sedentary
habits, and weaklings obsessed by their own ill-
health, have indeed been cured by military service.
A further source of difficulty were the men who
had been released from imprisonment in Russia.
They were under the impression that they could not
be called on for further service at the front. Those
who had returned from imprisonment in France did
enjoy this privilege, for in the negotiations between
the French and German Governments with regard
to the exchange of prisoners a stipulation had been
made that neither country should put exchanged
prisoners back into the firing-line. In Russia English
and French agents had deceived our prisoners into
206 A WAR MINISTER AND HIS WORK
thinking that they could not be sent back to the
front after their return home without running the
risk of being shot if they were again captured. The
result of this was that it was not easy to make it
clear to them that they were in no way exempt from
service at the front.
Many of them, therefore, resisted the order
transferring them to the western front. This was
also the case with many units that were transferred
in a body from the eastern to the western front, as
they knew that in the West war was far from being a
children's game. The many cases of mutiny during
transport by rail that occurred during the last
years of the war were a bad sign. In such cases
those in command should have dealt with the
situation much more firmly than was the case : one
summary example that would have put fear into the
others would soon have effected a change in their
behaviour. But the officers of the old army were no
longer there, and the younger ones were unable to
rise to the occasion. As these mutinous men were
for the most part soldiers who had already seen long
service, they fell back into the usual routine of
discipline as soon as they got back to the front.
Many of them were even ashamed of their un-
military and insubordinate behaviour. I know of
one case where a company had risen in this way and
run amok, firing off their rifles. Their rifles were
taken from them by another contingent and they
THE ARMY 207
were to be marched through a village. They begged
that they might not be subjected to this indignity,
and from that moment reverted to their previous
behaviour as loyal, honourable soldiers.
The worst of all was the influence exercised by the
youngest classes of recruits. When the war broke
out these young men were hardly old enough to have
left school. The army took away from them the
control of their fathers, and they soon began to earn
large wages and were an easy prey to the influence of
the malcontents and agitators. The large numbers
of combed-out men, who so far had been exempt from
military service, ranged themselves behind these
young men, and together they formed an undis-
ciplined and rebellious section of the army.
Many an officer commanding a regiment has told
me that the older classes were faithful to their duty
and were willing to carry it through, but nothing
was sacred to the young men, who held everything
up to derision. It was from these classes that
sprang, in the first place, those defaulters who broke
their ranks and in the retreat through Belgium
began to fraternise with the enemy, to sell their
rifles, and give themselves up to looting. There
were, of course, exceptions among them, but they
were not strong enough to make their influence felt.
Now the older classes were not all models of soldierly
virtue, and even before the younger men were called
up there existed malingerers, deserters and defaulters,
208 A WAR MINISTER AND HIS WORK
but the loyal men were in a sufficiently large majority
to keep them from doing very much harm, especially
at the front.
On the lines of communication the discipline was
uncertain, for this was the place where the enemy's
influence could most readily make an impression. It
has become the custom for the army in the field to
impute to the home country all the blame for the
collapse of the army. It is quite true that their
regrettable attitude was the cause of a good deal of
the trouble ; but the fault lies on both sides.
We know now out of their own mouths that the
Independent party had begun to work on the army
as early as 191 6. The result of their work was
manifested by the number of men on leave and in
hospital who influenced the people at home just as
unfavourably, and to an equal extent, as the people at
home influenced the army in the field. Many a
patriotic German has sent me information concerning
the agitating or pessimistic speeches indulged in by
men who were on leave, but unfortunately without
being able to furnish me with the names of these
men, which they did not know themselves. In a
few individual cases even officers have not shrunk
from doing what they could to lower the national
morale at home, particularly after the army had gone
through a period of misfortune. The people at home
were never encouraged, and nothing was done to keep
up their spirit ; they heard nothing but grousing and
THE ARMY 209
cursing. The discouragement was mutual, so that
it is unfair to lay the blame exclusively on either
side. The fault did not lie with any one in particular,
but with the whole nation.
But the greatest share of the responsibility
certainly lies with the recruits of the younger classes.
It will be asked why they were not taught better
during their period of training. A warped mind is
not so quickly put straight ; the period of training
was too short for the fault to be eradicated ; the
people at home did not set a good example, and the
reserve troops with which they were trained were not
all that could be desired. They had been combed
out again and again and every fit man had had to be
sent to the front ; so much so that from time to
time some of them had to be brought back. Every
effort was made to keep the troops who were under
training behind the lines away from any adverse
influence and to put them into the hands of ex-
perienced instructors and commanders. But even
in these training camps outside influences could not
be entirely excluded.
It is a matter for wonder that the older, loyal
troops did not keep these immature and insubor-
dinate youngsters in hand. It is true that they
were tired and dulled by the hardships they had
undergone. We find the same state of things at
home. Young boys, with and without uniform,
lounge about the streets and force their way
2io A WAR MINISTER AND HIS WORK
along, elbowing their elders to one side as they
pass.
There was a great difference between the conduct
of the troops in the field at the beginning of the war
and at the end. In the old days the infantry used
to forge their way irresistibly forward in the attack.
It was no longer possible for the artillery to group the
batteries close together without running the risk of
annihilation. They had to be carefully concealed
and the firing positions disposed in scattered groups,
and careful communication established between the
different batteries and headquarters. This required
a good deal of time to arrange. In this way it came
about that the infantry could not always wait for
the artillery preparation before opening the attack.
The result was that they were subjected to a severe
strain and heavy losses. But the men of the old
army endured all this with a spirit of real heroism.
The spirit that prevailed among these men
showed itself in many ways, some very striking and
some hardly noticeable. When we met the wounded
we would often hear them express the wish to get
better as quickly as possible so that they might get
back to their unit with the least delay. As they
went into action the men would shout to their officers
some such words as these : " Don't get so far ahead,
sir ; you will only get hit. Keep back in the firing-
line and we will all go on together."
On one occasion, after an offensive south of
THE ARMY 211
Longwy, I came upon the Emperor in a village that
had just been taken by our troops. The men were
surrounding his car in dense crowds so that it was
only with difficulty that I was able to force my way
through. They were throwing flowers from the
village gardens into his lap and doing their best to
get hold of his hand. What has happened to all
these brave and faithful men ? Have they all
fallen or have they changed ?
At the beginning of the war the cavalry were still
mounted. The enemy cavalry could not stand
against them, but avoided an encounter. The
engineers fought shoulder to shoulder with the
infantry and cleared a way for them through every
obstacle. The soldiers were men who knew their
duty and would endure any hardship or exertion for
which they were called on without flinching. In
those days there was no grousing. The food from
the field-kitchens was eaten with relish and no one
thought of envying his officers their specially pre-
pared food. It is true that many gifts of food were
sent out from home, so that no one had to go short.
This state of things continued through the early days
of trench warfare. The men endured day after day
of heavy drum-fire without wavering, and beat back
the subsequent attack of superior numbers with
confidence.
Later on great changes came about. The gifts
sent out from home began to diminish. Even
212 A WAR MINISTER AND HIS WORK
though the officers in the trenches were ready and
glad to live on the same rations as the men, the
officers of the staff and those whose duties kept them
behind the lines still had special kitchens for their
own use. This gradually gave rise to envy and
distrust ; it was said that the officers were drawing
more than their fair share of the supplies. Even
to-day, at Social Democratic meetings, old officers'
menus are brought up as a means of stirring up
agitation. It would have been just as easy to bring
forward the luxurious way in which some of our
working-men were living as a result of the high wages
they were earning, while the majority of the people
were obliged to starve.
The men always received, at any rate, adequate
supplies to keep them from hunger. But the daily
ration of much the same food, with little variety,
served out for years is bound in the end to grow
distasteful. Every man naturally did his best in one
way or another to get hold of a few luxuries to vary
the monotony of the army ration, but many were
unable to afford much in this way, and a comparison
of their own lot with that of those in higher positions
roused feelings of envy. Nor was this the case only
with regard to officers ; envy often arose between the
men themselves. The men whose homes were in the
country continued to receive gifts of food from home
after their comrades from the towns had ceased to
get anything, and this gave rise to ill-feeling, though
THE ARMY 213
in many cases these gifts were shared one with
another.
It would perhaps have been better if the officers
had set a good example by denying themselves
special food and sharing the lot of their men. But
there are two ways of looking at these things. The
English army have always deliberately made a
special point of supplying those in the more respon-
sible positions with better food, and consider it
important that it should be so. Our supporters of
universal equality think otherwise ; they prefer to
get an advantage for themselves rather than allow
it to others, as we now see often enough. Respon-
sibility and duties that require a high standard of in-
telligence no longer seem to be valued in this country.
Once when I had occasion to mention in the
Reichstag that while I was in the field I never once
went on leave, Ebert, one of the members, said that
a general did not have such a bad time as a private
soldier and was in a better position to hold out.
Responsibility for the lives and welfare of many
thousands of men, and for the safety and honour of
the Fatherland, did not seem to him at that time a
heavy burden for a man to bear. It is to be hoped
that he has since learned to think differently. But
it was the custom of the Social Democratic party,
and part of a deliberately conceived plan, to dis-
parage everything that distinguished the officer from
his men.
214 A WAR MINISTER AND HIS WORK
There can be no doubt that the reduced morale in
the army was further depressed by the grumbling
and complaints at home. I have often felt ashamed
of my fellow-countrymen when I had to witness this
discontent and listen to their wailing, and then
compare this state of things with the patient en-
durance of the French, who had worse things to bear
than we. Now our people have been forced to assume
this role because they were too weak to shoulder a
reasonable burden.
In face of these many evil influences the morale of
our troops sank in very different degrees. Many
divisions were very little affected, and for a long
time continued to maintain their old standard
of excellence and loyalty, whilst others failed
absolutely.
The infantry had for the most part forgotten the
valiant way in which they used to advance to the
attack, and remained dependent on the effectiveness
of the artillery. This arm had been continuously
increasing ; the weight and efficiency of their guns
had increased in proportion. All means of defence
also grew in importance, side by side with the de-
velopment of the offensive ; this is always the case
in prolonged wars. The same was apparent on the
enemy's side. They no longer attacked while the
machine-guns were still firing. Their tanks were still
able to make an impression when their attack was
unexpected. As soon as our men learned to keep
THE ARMY 215
their heads they were able to hold off even this
formidable means of attack.
But the behaviour of the troops suffered more
and more as the younger and less satisfactory
reinforcements began to come up in greater numbers.
Whereas in the old days they would remain steady
under day after day of heavy drum-fire, and beat off
confidently the subsequent attack, now it often
required the drum-fire alone to shake their nerve.
In spite of all this, however, our fighting power
was not yet broken. The great successes we won in
the summer of 191 8 are proof of this. They were the
last great achievements and could never be repeated.
After that we had to content ourselves with the
defensive.
It must have made a deep impression on the
command when one of our armies was rolled back by
the enemy divisions that were occupying the opposite
trenches, unsupported by any considerable reserves.
This made General Headquarters at Spa begin to
think of the armistice. The inhuman conditions
put forward by the enemy, which called to mind the
Eastern conquerors of ancient time rather than
civilised peoples, revived the thought of resistance.
But the outburst of national enthusiasm that had
been hoped for did not materialise, and the treachery
at home cut the arteries of the army.
It is a strange and tragic fact that the navy should
be responsible for starting the insubordination that
216 A WAR MINISTER AND HIS WORK
caused the overthrow of our army. The pet of the
nation and of its representatives, the creation of the
Emperor which was to open the way for us to world-
power, the navy, in spite of the brave U-boat crews
and many other good elements, had become a hot-bed
of conspiracy and treachery.
Many parts of the navy had gone through years
without going into action. That is what poisoned
them. When they feared that they were at last
going to be led to battle they mutinied. This is the
blackest page in our history. When this period is
reviewed calmly and without prejudice, public opinion
will condemn the culprits without allowing itself to
be deceived by talk about the benefits of the Revolu-
tion. At present the masses are rejoicing over their
so-called freedom, but Germany has never been less
free than she is to-day. Already private soldiers are
raising their voices and condemning the conduct of
the mutinous sailors as treachery pure and simple.
Former supporters of the sailors have told me that
they had refused to join a Sailors' Union because
they were ashamed. It is impossible to assume that
the traitors acted alone and on their own initiative.
Their plan was carefully prepared beforehand.
Other powers must have stood behind them who were
not devoid of skill and intelligence. On this point,
too, it is to be hoped that further light will be shed.
It is no wonder that the English say that the
sailors stabbed the army in the back, and the French
THE ARMY 217
jeer and call it another Kopenick affair. But in this
case it is not a question of the reputation of the good
town of Kopenick, but of the honour and existence of
the German Empire. It is tragic enough that those
few troops, for the most part of inferior quality, who
were left in the country should have shown them-
selves weak enough to join the movement. They
and the large numbers who cheered on the sailors
will have to bear the consequences, as well as their
children and their children's children. The song of
German loyalty has been made a mockery. Faith
has not been kept, but unfaithfulness turns against
its own master.
CHAPTER X
THE ALLIES
THROUGH custom, tradition and the person-
ality of the old Emperor, Austria still
seemed capable of life. For a long time
she had been regarded as an effete collection of states.
The first impetus was given to the world-war in the
new crown-lands and by the Serbians. Twenty
years ago when I first became acquainted with these
countries the inhabitants of Serbia seemed to be
glad to have been freed from Turkish domination
and did not appear to be occupied with any in-
dependent aims. The Croats who had been flocking
into this country formed a counterpoise to their
neighbours, who held different religious beliefs, and
they were supported by the Church of Rome. The
friction between the two took the form of petty
quarrels for which the Croats were responsible. There
was a ridiculous dispute as to the name of the
language. It had always been known as Serbo-
Croat. The Croats thought themselves slighted
because their name came second.
In the new countries a good deal was done
towards the spread of civilisation in the forceful and
THE ALLIES 219
uncompromising manner of the Hungarians, and
their methods were not altogether without a touch
of the Oriental. According to their version of the
story, the Government was to do great things for the
education of the Serbs by means of schools. The
further developments I was unable to [follow.
Then suddenly the murder at Serajevo drew all
eyes to these countries and their inhabitants.
Whether this murder would of necessity have led
to the war and to our participation in it, it is idle to
discuss.
For the army there was no time for retrospective
reflection. The war was there ! In Austria it was
at first treated quite lightly. There the same
indifference and ignorance with regard to great
political questions reigned as with us. Frivolity
seemed to leave no room for the serious side of life.
I have witnessed the performance of an operetta in
the Prater that overstepped all bounds even accord-
ing to the Berlin standards. The audience consisted
of middle-class citizens, Government officials and
officers and their families, including their daughters,
with whom they chatted gaily and applauded loudly,
while I thought I should be obliged to go out.
When the war broke out the younger officers said
light-heartedly : " Francis Joseph has so far lost
every war he has entered on ; he will lose this one,
too." The attitude was : " If we are to go under let
us go under cheerful ly."
220 A WAR MINISTER AND HIS WORK
The decadent state into which the nation had
fallen, however, is testified to by the number of
cases in which officers in high positions were convicted
of treason at the beginning of the war.
Our officers and men have frequently formed a
very adverse judgment of the Austrians who fought
side by side with them. German- Austrians have
complained to me that our troops in forming these
opinions made no distinction between Germans and
Slavs. They were unable to distinguish between
these two separate races who were always pulling
opposite ways ; as the different parts of Germany are
all Germans so they took every one they saw in the
Austrian uniform to be Austrian. This dislike of
the Austrians developed later into hatred, par-
ticularly among the prisoners in Russia. The
Germans who were captured by the Russians found
themselves in the same camps as the Austrians, by
whom they were greatly outnumbered.
When the Swedish Red Cross brought to the
camps the gifts that had been sent from Germany for
our prisoners they could not keep the Austrians off
and had to give them a share to avoid having them
all taken by force. The Czechs, too, took away from
our men their gifts from home. This helped greatly
to fan the flame of hatred. Our isolated commands
in Galicia and Hungary, too, did not have any
reason to cherish very friendly recollections of the
inhabitants of these parts, for they had to overcome
THE ALLIES 221
a good deal of opposition in buying or requisitioning
the necessities of life. Of course, this dislike was
often directed against men who were quite innocent
of any of these things, which is much to be regretted.
The ill effects of a long war began to make their
appearance at a very early date in the Austro-
Hungarian army. When I say this I am speaking
quite apart from the untrustworthiness of the Slav
sections, which is well known. Large numbers of
officers and men were wandering about behind the
lines and at home who should have been at the front.
Far more men were drained from the firing-line to
fill all kinds of positions in the rear than was con-
sidered necessary in the German army.
The discipline was bad, for the delinquents were
treated with even greater weakness than was the
case with us, as we hear in the famous proclamation
of the Emperor Charles. An attempt was made later
to tighten up the discipline again by the ^introduc-
tion of severe punishment, but it came too late to do
any good. At last things came to such a pass that
on one occasion at a race meeting in Vienna several
thousands of officers were present who had absented
themselves without leave from the Italian front.
The numbers of the defaulters as told to me were so
large that I could not believe that they were correct.
Highly-placed officers and many other Austrians
pointed to the Jewish officers and men as the cankers
in the Austrian army. In spite of all the talk there
222 A WAR MINISTER AND HIS WORK
has been on this subject, the Jewish question has
played a very small part in our own army. It is
probable, however, that this difficulty will become
more formidable as time goes on. I have no anti-
Semitic convictions myself and shall always be
prepared to greet my Jewish brothers in arms as
comrades. I do not, however, consider them fitted
for the duty of training troops. They have a type of
mind which is quite foreign to us and with which we
are in many ways bound to be out of sympathy.
A highly-respected Jew, who was very anxious to
be a good German, once complained to me that even
the best members of his race would always be judged
in the light of their numerous undesirable fellow-
countrymen. No one will deny the tragedy that
runs through the history of the Jewish race, but
according to their own view, expressed long ago by
a Jewish high priest, it is better that one man
should suffer than that the whole race should be
wronged.
The circumstances of the downfall of the German
Empire are more likely to increase the antipathy
against the Jews than to diminish it. Their influence
in our country is far greater than their numbers or
their value to the state warrant.
I will not go into the question of their inter-
national connections and the willingness they often
show to identify themselves with the country that
chance has made their fatherland. There are Jews
THE ALLIES 223
who are anxious to be true Germans and even
Prussians. On the other hand, I have been told a
story about the daughter of Cohn, the member of the
Reichstag, according to which she is said to have
written in an essay on the Fatherland : '" I have no
Fatherland." Whether this story is true or not I
cannot say, but this I do know : that her father and
his associates have done the German Fatherland
grievous harm, and are continuing to do so.
The Jews and their friends prefer to set down the
aversion that is felt towards them in many quarters
as being based on religious differences, with a view
to making it seem all the more inexcusable. This is
misleading. The Jew of the old faith, on the
contrary, enjoys the fullest respect among religious
Christians, and they have both the Old Testament in
common. It cannot, then, be on religion that the
antipathy to the Jews is based ; long ago this feeling
was the result of superstition, but never of religion.
What keep Jew and Christian apart are race-
characteristics. The dislike of the foreign element
in the Jews is indeed often overcome in Christians
by the love of money, and there are numbers of
examples of marriages between rich Jewesses and
Christians, even members of the nobility and officers .
Cases where poor Jewesses are married by such men
for their outward or inward charms do, perhaps,
occur in novels, but one never comes across them in
real life.
224 A WAR MINISTER AND HIS WORK
The German and Austrian Jews cannot be
classed together, for one reason, because of the
difference in numbers. German Jews are hardly
likely to find their way into Galicia and Hungary,
whereas there is a constant stream of immigrants to
Germany, and especially Berlin, from these countries.
This increase in their numbers is not always regarded
with favour by the Jews already settled in Germany.
After Poland was established as a kingdom and when
there was a prospect of Lithuania becoming part of
the German Empire, I heard a Jew express anxiety
lest the result should be a strong influx of Jews to
Germany and Berlin : " They will eat us up ; if
they come I shall turn Christian," were his concluding
words.
A Hungarian Jew once told me that he and his
compatriots regarded themselves in the first place as
Magyars and not Jews. I am not in a position to
judge whether this is true. Be this as it may, it is
certainly true that Austrian officers who were Jewish
in appearance preferred to be known as Hungarians.
I have personal knowledge of the number of Jews in
the Austrian army and must rely on the judgment of
the Austrian leaders. According to this estimate the
Jewish element must have exerted considerable influ-
ence on the general demeanour of the Austrian army.
The Austro-Hungarian officer was generally an
attractive and capable person. This opinion, how-
ever, does not alter the fact that he was easy-going
THE ALLIES 225
and frivolous. This sort of thing can be understood
in the case of young officers, but with the Austrians
it was by no means confined to young men. These
characteristics, with all their consequences, were
common even among men of mature age and holding
positions of responsibility.
There is some foundation for the saying that the
East begins at Vienna. The well-known charac-
teristics of the East — bribery and corruption — are
far from being unknown there. They pervade the
whole of Austrian life up to the highest positions.
Malicious tongues did not even hesitate to maintain
that the Emperor Charles himself was not immune to
the temptations of foreign gold.
Any one who has had to conduct business negotia-
tions with Austrian agents will know what awkward,
slippery customers they are. They have the capacity
that comes so natural to the Oriental for smooth-
tongued bargaining and reducing their demands in
such a way as to make it appear that they are doing
it out of theii own kindness of heart. In this
respect they are surpassed by the Magyars, who are
just like spoilt children. So long as they are allowed
to have their own way they are well-behaved and
amiable. If it is impossible, even with the best
intentions in the world, to give them what they want,
they at once become unruly.
It was a favourite trick in Vienna to cry, "We
can't go on ! " as soon as they wanted something
226 A WAR MINISTER AND HIS WORK
which they could only obtain by bringing special
pressure to bear on Germany. In spite of our own
urgent needs, what have we not been forced to
supply them with in this way ! In spite of all we
did, however, the Austrian Press did not cease to
attack us and to make it appear as though, instead
of denying ourselves to keep them supplied, we were
actually drawing on them. When at last the strike
broke out that was so vociferously welcomed by our
Social Democrats, even the newspapers of our own
country accused the Government of supporting the
strike or even of actually causing it, and this was
done simply with a view to putting pressure on
Germany.
I have on more than one occasion urged on the
Government the necessity of showing greater firm-
ness in dealing with Austria. I once received the
following reply : " The strength of Austria's position
with regard to us lies in her weakness." This was
unfortunately the case with all our allies. We were
afraid of their deserting us. This anxiety was not
without foundation since the accession to the throne
of the Emperor Charles, who was ruled by the
Empress. He was a weak prince and finally it was
concluded that he was not to be taken seriously. He
had been the subject of a great deal of flattery on his
succession to the throne ; the high dignitaries of the
Church of Rome had proclaimed him as the true
apostolic Emperor. The old friction between the
THE ALLIES 227
evangelical King of Prussia and the Roman Catholic
Emperor once more sprang into life in the back-
ground. Negotiations with the enemy went on
widely in Vienna. The Emperor even went so far
as to refer in public speeches to Hindenburg and
Ludendorff as swine. Even in Vienna the Austrian
Emperor was laughed at in the open street. Although
he was ready to make any sacrifice so long as he
might be allowed to remain Emperor, he shared with
the Empress an ardent desire to see his head adorned
with the crown of Poland. From an ally like this
we could not expect much.
Among the Austrian Ministers I formed a slight
acquaintance with Czernin and Baron Burian. The
Minister for War, von Stoeger-Steiner, I got to know
more intimately. The latter was a cultured, honour-
able man of irreproachable character, with whom it
was a pleasure to be associated. He was, however,
quite powerless to remedy weaknesses of the army ;
it was too late.
Baron Burian gave one the impression of being a
straightforward, almost blunt man. What lay below
the surface I have had very little opportunity of
judging. Among our representatives in Austria he
had the reputation of being obstinate and pig-
headed.
Czernin was said to be a clever and finished
diplomat. It is probable that he had more in him
than the rest of the Austrian diplomatists, but on
228 A WAR MINISTER AND HIS WORK
this point I am not in a position to form a judgment.
The negotiations of these two diplomatists which
are best known to me had to do with the Polish
question. The Emperor Charles had represented to
our Emperor that in order to ensure the ascendancy
of the German element in Vienna the Poles would
have to be got rid of and bound down by the union
of Galicia with the crown of Poland. I have my
suspicions that this plan originated in his own
brain ; it always struck me as a move towards
getting the crown of Poland into the hands of the
Emperor of Austria. It is possible that the anxiety
as to whether Austria would be able to keep her hold
on Galicia for any length of time after the restoration
of the Kingdom of Poland may have had something
to do with it. As soon as Poland began to show
signs of inclining towards Germany, Vienna seemed
to be inclined to back out. It was proposed that the
crown of Poland should be given to an Austrian
Archduke under the supervision of Germany. Just
as everything had been arranged in accordance with
this plan the Archduke refused to accept the position
at the order of the Emperor. The whole intrigue is
as clear as day.
To begin with, our Emperor was inclined to fall
in with the proposals of the Emperor Charles.
When, however, Austria put difficulty after difficulty
in the way of their being put into practice, and
Poland seemed inclined to throw in her lot with
THE ALLIES 229
Germany, he refused to have anything more to do
with them. He was not blind to the danger to
Germany that would result from her being hemmed in
by a great Polish power with an Austrian as its over-
lord. In Austria the plan continued to be firmly
supported. Even after Germany had refused to be
a party to it Baron Burian stubbornly continued to
urge it.
After the dismissal of Czernin he made one more
attempt to urge upon Germany his views about the
Polish question. His agent came to see me, as he
did not know how to set about it. Czernin's sugges-
tion amounted to a compromise which was hardly
likely to be successful. His opinion was that we
should lose the war through the fault of Austria,
because the Emperor Charles had made up his mind
that peace must be made at all costs in the autumn
(191 8). To him the one hope of safety seemed to lie
in strengthening the German element in Austria by
getting rid of the Poles. Germany was to take from
Poland what was necessary to her, and the rest he
proposed to join with Galicia and put the whole
under a governor to be appointed by Germany. The
final details of the scheme were not to be settled
until after the conclusion of peace, and when Ger-
many was in possession of guarantees that Austria's
policy would run along lines that were parallel with
her own. He, Czernin, would consider a break with
Germany on the part of Austria a very underhand
230 A WAR MINISTER AND HIS WORK
piece of work that would have the most disastrous
results in his own country. He was anxious to
make known his views also to the Emperor Charles.
Another authority from the entourage of the
Emperor Charles confirmed Czernin's statement that
the Austrian Emperor had made up his mind to
conclude peace whatever might happen. He main-
tained that negotiations were constantly being
carried on between Austria and the Entente, and
that enemy money was flowing freely into Austria.
It is significant that his suggestion for saving the
situation was that Germany should buy the allegiance
of Austria by a still larger bribe. Czernin, he
thought, was finished with ; he did not think that
the Emperor wanted to have anything more to do
with him.
The enthusiasm for the German Empire with
which Hungary was once inspired soon changed to
hatred. She quickly forgot the part that Germany
had played in freeing her from the menace of Russia
and Rumania. Her vanity even tried to belittle the
part played by Germany, to the glorification of the
bravery of the Hungarian troops. In spite of the
fact that Hungary had at one time declared herself
ready to supply grain and cattle to Germany, which
she had refused to do for Austria, it now became
more and more difficult to carry on negotiations
with her. Her agreements were not carried out and
were continually being qualified with new demands.
THE ALLIES 231
This was followed by abuse of Germany in the Press,
as was the case in Austria, and no energetic steps
were taken on our part to deal with the slanders.
From Rumania and the Ukraine supplies of corn
were to be delivered to Austria-Hungary, which was
to have preference over Germany to begin with, a
stipulation having been made that the supplies for
Germany should be equalised later. This compact
was never fulfilled. They even had the audacity to
hold up our supplies as they were passing through
Hungary and make use of them themselves. Things
went from bad to worse until they ended in open
enmity, and the Austrians made no further attempt
to conceal their disloyalty to their allies. They have
reaped their reward, and sooner than any one could
have expected.
What the exact position is with regard to the
Austrian-Germans has not yet been properly cleared
up. After the formation of the German Empire,
their regret at having to remain outside the new
Empire has been voiced in prose and verse. To-day,
now that the Empire has broken up, they may be
the last to become members of it. As is the case
with ourselves, they will have a great deal to give up
and unlearn. In lack of unity and internal dissension
they were unfortunately on a par with us. If they
were to throw in their lot with us it would mean a
great access of strength to the Catholic population
in Germany, which would bring with it a change in
232 A WAR MINISTER AND HIS WORK
the domestic situation. Eternal Rome would have a
hand in the game and would do her best to turn the
general upheaval to her own advantage. Old con-
nections with South Germany still exist. The grow-
ing influence of this part of the Empire would
perhaps be strengthened.
Whatever new states may rise out of the ruins of
the Austrian Empire it is certain that they will not
be friendly to us. In this I agree with Kuhlmann
that it is essential for us in some way or other to
come to an understanding with Russia as soon as
the internal condition of that country makes it at
all possible. That will become especially important
for our future in the event of the establishment of a
state of Great Poland. The statesmen of South
Germany showed themselves devoid of any under-
standing of the Polish danger ; they had had no
first-hand experience of it. To-day, perhaps, sub-
sequent events may have taught them better. It
was a bad sign that Germany showed that she was
not able to put a stop to Polish ambitions in her own
territory.
It would be unjust not to admit that many
Austrian officers proved themselves good and loyal
comrades and that they regret as much as we do the
disastrous outcome of the war. Also, large numbers
of the Austrian troops conducted themselves with
great bravery under all circumstances. But the
Austrian army, like the effete Austrian Empire, was
THE ALLIES 233
made up of too many different and discordant
elements. In any advances on our part towards the
parts of the monarchy whose interests coincide with
our own, the policy adopted must be prompted by
clear-headed judgment and not feelings of senti-
ment. If the Austrian- Germans join hands with
us the choice of ways for our foreign policy will be
simplified.
The Bulgarians also proved themselves a very
awkward people to deal with. They wanted every-
thing and would give nothing in return, and thought
that they were within their rights. Whether they
were given guarantees in this direction I have never
yet been able to make out. They were in a position
to show themselves very important allies so long as
they maintained their strength and loyalty. It was
therefore necessary to offer full support to this
country, which in itself was poor. Bribery and self-
interest played their part. Those in pow,er looked
after their own interests, as is the custom in the
East, and is not unknown even in democratic
countries. In Sofia I heard a story of a Minister who
is reported to have said : "X. has made so many
millions : that is indecent. All the same, I shouldn't
mind having a million or two myself." It goes
without saying that the purchasing officers and
officials took money from the contractors. The
principal contractors were Germans, but Austria
tried to get a hold on the market, from time to time,
234 A WAR MINISTER AND HIS WORK
by means of supplies with which she had been
provided by us.
The Bulgarian President, Radoslawow, and the
Minister for War, Neidenoff, were friendly to Ger-
many. The men who succeeded them played a
doubtful role. Officers in the Bulgarian army told
us quite openly that President Malinow and Lukow,
the Commander-in-Chief, had both accepted money
from the Entente and had done their best to spread
Bolshevism in the Bulgarian army. Bulgarian news-
papers also were permitted to publish statements
to the effect that we were sucking the country dry
and were not fulfilling our obligations, without any
serious steps being taken to interfere. The opera-
tions in the Dobrudja provided ample material for
agitation against Germany. The intercourse with
our troops led to a good deal of friction. Our
Commander-in-Chief, General Scholtz, in a speech,
put the truth pretty plainly before the Bulgarians.
This did not, however, do much good. In their
capacity of Orientals they had quite a different point
of view from our own ; they were an immature people
who had never properly grown up, and with this they
combined the selfishness and cunning of the peasant.
They often came to us with demands for equip-
ment and clothing. We had reason to be suspicious
that they were not using all the stuff we were
sending them for the purposes of the war, but were
storing it up for use in peace. As a matter of fact,
THE ALLIES 235
their men at the front were from time to time very
badly provided for. The men were going about
without trousers and without boots, as we brought
to the notice of their Ambassador and of the King
himself. In the end I took the matter into my own
hands and sent the consignments not to the Bulgarian
but to the German authorities. This change, how-
ever, was very badly received. If we had had the
same financial resources at our back as the Entente
had, we could have afforded to give with a freer hand.
At the beginning the Bulgarian troops fought
well ; many remained good soldiers to the last.
But they no longer wanted to attack; all they
wanted to do was to hold their ground. The pick of
the Bulgarian divisions were surrendered by Malinow
as prisoners so that he could keep his hand free.
Had it not been for this his rule would soon have
come to an end, even after the retreat.
Many of the Bulgarian leaders and other officers
remained on very good terms with us to the end and
proved themselves good comrades. But they have
never been able to understand why we were unable
to send them reinforcements in the final struggle.
At the beginning we had no troops that could be
spared, and later when they became available and
were sent to the rescue it was too late. A disloyal
Bulgarian division had already surrendered their
position and enabled the enemy to effect a break-
through.
236 A WAR MINISTER AND HIS WORK
Bulgaria, too, has been taught a sharp lesson.
Insatiable in her demands at first, she has had to
give up stretches of territory that she had come to
regard as permanent possessions. Her hopes of
predominating power in the Balkans have ended in
nothing. Serbia and Rumania will continue to be
awkward neighbours, and there will be no peace in
the Balkans. In spite of this there may be a future
before Bulgaria. There is room within her own
borders for expansion and her peasant population is
vigorous and simple, though in need of culture and
education. Many people who are in a good position
to judge, maintain that the Serbians are a better and
more capable people ; on this point I am not able
to give an opinion.
I have had opportunities of becoming acquainted
with the King, who has abdicated. In the negotia-
tions in which I have had to do with him he gave me
an impression which bears out his reputation of
being a capable and well-informed prince. In these
negotiations he was assisted by the Crown Prince,
whom he is said to have employed as his private
secretary. If this is the case it was a very good way
of training an heir to the throne for the duties that
he would later be called upon to undertake. In
spite of his youthfulness the Crown Prince gave one
the impression of being an intelligent and clever man.
The Bulgarians regarded him as one of themselves,
which was not the case with the King. One day
THE ALLIES 237
when the King made a flight in an aeroplane no one
took any notice of him. When the Crown Prince
did the same thing there was a general outcry of
horror that the future king of the Bulgarians should
expose himself to such risk. For one thing, the
Crown Prince was a skilled athlete, in addition to
being a clever and daring motor-driver.
In spite of many difficulties I have always found
the Bulgarians pleasant to deal with. Combined
with their keen business ability a certain naivetb was
noticeable. They were not so sensitive and ready to
take offence as were the Austrians, but they sought
to make an impression by means of continually
lodging complaints. With the Minister for War,
Neidenoff, I have always found it a pleasure to do
business. He was a quiet, kindly man, of whom I
cherish very pleasant memories.
The Turks, being true Orientals, were by no
means easy to deal with. Their placidity and utter
indifference to the importance of time made negotia-
tions with them very tiresome. They always,
however, preserved a very dignified bearing, and
their manners were perfect. Here, too, we could
expect no return for the supplies and material with
which we had to furnish them. It is scarcely neces-
sary to mention that the country was a hot-bed of
corruption, where every man set his own interests
first. Here, too, highly-placed personages were
accused of accepting bribes from the Entente.
238 A WAR MINISTER AND HIS WORK
Preference for our enemies was apparent in many
quarters, although every one preserved, at any rate,
the appearance of friendship towards us. It was
only very rarely that a highly-placed officer or
Government official so far forgot himself as to let open
enmity appear on the surface. In these cases charges
were brought against the offenders, and after pro-
longed and delayed proceedings formal satisfaction
was attained.
Our officers were in a difficult position with regard
to Turkish officers of senior rank, who were for the
most part younger men than themselves, and also
with regard to the other officers. To support them
in their rights required the constant intervention of
the German Military Mission. It was hardly to be
expected that men of such widely different points of
view should understand one another.
It is, of course, possible that our choice of officers
who were to be sent to Turkey was not always as
happy as might have been the case. The competi-
tion for these appointments was extraordinarily
keen. Every officer sent to Turkey ought really to
have gone through a special course of instruction to
give him some knowledge of the ways of the East.
If this is not done there is sure to be friction caused,
not by intention, but by ignorance.
The Turk is a good soldier when he is properly
paid and fed. Those Turkish troops who fought in
Rumania side by side with our own bore themselves
THE ALLIES 239
excellently. In spite of this, however, half of them
deserted and ran home when they were taken back
to Syria. This can be understood ; they had to pass
through their home country, which they had not seen
for many a long day, and with which they had had no
means of communication. Another reason for their
behaviour was that the Turkish administration had
resumed control of their pay and supplies. Part of
them returned to their regiments when their visit
to their homes was over, the rest loafed about at
home or wandered about the country.
The Arabs, including their officers, were unreliable
and cowardly. Their countrymen were hostile and
the enemies of the Turks.
Nevertheless, the Turkish army rendered valuable
service m defence. In Gallipoli the troops had been
through a period of great want, without supplies,
artillery or ammunition. In spite of everything,
however, they managed to hold their ground.
Their leader, General Liman von Sanders, had been
Chief of the German Military Mission and thoroughly
understood the Turk, whom he kept well in hand.
They were more afraid of him than they were of the
enemy.
I have seen the positions of both sides at Gallipoli.
The enemy enterprise could only have hoped to
succeed if it had met with no resistance. The
Turks had suffered so severely from hunger, and
endured such hardships, that after the enemy had
240 A WAR MINISTER AND HIS WORK
evacuated his positions many of them literally
gorged themselves to death on the supplies which
were left behind.
The primary reason for the failure of the opera-
tions in Palestine was the quite inadequate com-
munications. An excellent relief force was sent out
from Germany and did splendid work, but they were
left in the lurch by the Turks when making their
most vital attacks. It would have been wiser to
have sent only leaders who were well versed in the
abnormal conditions under which the campaign was
to be fought. Liman von Sanders was sent out too
late. In the East, however, it is very difficult to
settle questions of personnel as there are so many
things to be taken into account. One of the most
important considerations is jealousy ; even our own
men have not been altogether free from this.
What was lacking was a central control capable
of taking the whole situation in hand. This need
should have been supplied by the Military Mission.
There were, however, too many posts outside the
scope of the Mission's authority. Even the regi-
mental officers were more directly responsible to
their Turkish chiefs than to the Mission.
In the administration the conditions were very
bad indeed. The workers in the departmental
offices were not paid and were starving. In face of
these facts the strongest forces that we could send
were of no avail. It seems a pity that the troops
THE ALLIES 241
who lived so simply and had so few needs should
have been ruined by defective administration.
We had to equip the Turks as we were doing in
the case of the Bulgarians. Often enough the men
sold their new clothing as soon as they received it.
A particular difficulty was the want of coin, and this
gave us a great deal of trouble while producing little
result. Paper money stood at a low value and was
often refused, especially by the Arabs. At the same
time there were said to be large stores of gold in the
country. The only way, however, in which the
Government could get hold of it was by using force
and even cruelty. Then we were turned to for help.
I most emphatically urged that no gold should be
given to the Turks, but that it should be kept by the
German officials under lock and key. Circumstances,
however, proved too strong for me.
The most important men for us were Enver and
Taalat. Without these two strong men Turkey
would not have been able to hold out as long as she
did ; they were unreservedly pro-German and could
be relied on, but they had many enemies. Enver
took up a lofty point of view ; he insisted on con-
tinuing to suffer defeats in his own theatre of war
when strong reinforcements on our front in the West
could have brought about a decision.
Any one who has ever been connected with the
Turks, otherwise than in business or military affairs,
will have pleasant memories of them. It is obvious
Q
242 A WAR MINISTER AND HIS WORK
from their manners and behaviour that they belong
to an ancient civilisation, though now it is out of
date and crumbling to pieces. The appearance of
Constantinople itself reminds one of this fact.
Seen on a bright, sunny day the town makes a
charming picture ; but a closer examination brings
into evidence the scenes of ruin and desolation.
The Young Turks have not effected any substantial
improvement, the only change that has come about
under their rule being that property has changed
hands, which is, in principle, what many of our
disturbing spirits are trying to bring about with us.
Before any real renascence of Turkey could come
about the whole nature of the people would have to
be radically altered. This can only be done by
many years of careful and efficient education. I have
seen in Constantinople a strikingly large number of
schools filled with countless numbers of boys and
girls. Is it possible that in this way a new founda-
tion is being laid ? I do not think so. In its present
form Mohammedanism no longer appears to possess its
old power of awakening life in the people, but seems
to have become an obstacle in the way of a new
civilisation.
All our allies proved to be weak and unable to
provide for themselves. We were obliged to keep
them provided with what they needed, in spite of the
fact that we were cut off from the markets of the
world. From fear that they might desert us we
THE ALLIES 243
treated them with far too much consideration. The
Entente held together with a firm hand all the separate
nations that composed it and kept them united
in pursuit of the common end ; we, on the other
hand, did not succeed in attaining this unity. Each
state had its own ends to serve and its own domestic
difficulties. In the end came, also, breach of faith
and treachery, which we had sought to prevent by
indulgence. Germany has not shown herself capable
of imposing her will from the first and so making the
position clear. An Austrian once wrote me a letter
which concluded with the following words : " Two
things are necessary to a ruler : intelligence and
force. We have been found wanting in both these
things. With you there has been no lack of in-
telligence but you needed the strong fist of Bis-
marck."
It would be better to maintain silence on the
subject of our faithless former allies, Italy and
Rumania, were it not that they must serve as a
warning. With Rumania I have never come into
contact personally ; Italy I only know through our
military negotiations. We have never trusted her
beyond a certain point and have only made her a
party to our information as far as was absolutely
necessary.
After 1866 Bismarck wrote a letter to Moltke in
which he warned him against placing too much
faith in Italy, and pointed out that King Victor
244 A WAR MINISTER AND HIS WORK
Emmanuel I. and his Commander-in-Chief, La
Marmora, had during the war of 1866 supplied France
with important information about our side . That was
during the war in which we were fighting side by side
against a common foe. The faithlessness of Italy is
therefore of long standing.
His successor, Victor Emmanuel II., once revealed
the fact that France was in possession of minute
information about the details of our mutual agree-
ments, as had been reported to him by his repre-
sentatives in France. Count Schlieffen, with whom
I had to confer on this matter, said with a smile :
" He gave them the information himself." In view
of all this, therefore, we did not admit Italy into our
confidence. It will be understood, then, that the
defection of Italy was not received with any great
surprise. A state like this is no use as an ally and
will always be regarded with suspicion.
There were, however, some Italians who were
very distressed at the disloyalty of their country.
One member of the Italian Embassy, when the time
arrived for his departure from Berlin, came to take
his leave, and with tears in his eyes, said : "I have
always been a respectable fellow ; don't think any
the less of me because of the attitude of my Govern-
ment ! " The Chief of the General Staff, Polkio,
also had the reputation among those who knew him
of being loyal and reliable. His sudden end before
Italy deserted us leads one to suspect that he did
THE ALLIES 245
not die a natural death, but was got rid of by his
enemies.
For the champions of a well-ordered world it is
difficult to account for the way in which these states
who were untrue to their pledged word seem to have
secured the prizes of the war. But similar cases are
of every-day occurrence in life. A dishonourable
man is not prevented from amassing great possessions
and living in enjoyment of them, while honest and
industrious people suffer want. It is no use worrying
our heads to explain why this should be so. Ernst
Moritz Arndt calls to us : " That which is over and
done with throw calmly into the broad lap of eternal
necessity and look to the younger generation —
educate them, train them and guide them so that
they may turn out men." We shall have need of
men, for our future depends on them. The dis-
appointments that we have suffered from our allies
should be a warning to us and teach us to pay heed
to the words of the Great Elector : " Allies are good,
but our own strength is better ! "
CHAPTER XI
CONCLUSION
ONE of the effects of the world- war has been
to take us Germans into foreign lands and
among strange nations which, otherwise, the
great majority would never have seen. There
seemed good cause for anxiety lest in addition to
widening their outlook they should also learn some
of the practices and vices which are characteristic of
these nations. In many instances this has actually
been the case.
In Russia and Poland they saw the comforts that
the fruits of corruption can bring. In Bulgaria and
Turkey they had opportunities of observing the way
in which those in high places enriched themselves at
the expense of the state, and private soldiers followed
their example on a small scale by selling their equip-
ment, the property of the state. These things were
not without their effect on our men. But we did
the foreign nations an injustice. The war has shown
that the same evil tendencies and habits were latent
in our people, too, and only required more favourable
conditions to bring them out. Unjust stewards of
property entrusted to their care, war profiteers with
their ill-gotten gains, traitors, thieves, and finally
CONCLUSION 247
outlaws and murderers, sprang up among us in a way
that was nothing short of terrifying. We had no
need to take lessons from the French in immorality,
certainly not in gluttony, to say nothing of the large
number of greater and lesser offences for which the
innumerable laws and regulations that govern com-
merce and trade give an opportunity.
I once heard a story of a child who asked his
mother : " It is true, mother, isn't it, that after the
war we shall go back to the ten commandments ? "
A terrible indictment from the mouth of innocence !
The new Government is seeking to replace
religion by morality. In order to bring this about
the moralists will have to borrow from religion ; they
will find no other foundation on which to build. But
morality can be twisted to suit each man's own will
if it has no other standard than that fixed by men
themselves, or even if it is established and upheld by
the power of the Government.
Once in the train I heard a conversation between
a civilian and a field-grey. The latter made use of
the word " morality," whereupon he was interrupted
by the other man as follows : " Morality consists in
not being found out."
Of course there have been, and still are, people
who act morally and live moral lives without the
help of religion. They are unintentionally fulfilling
the demands of religion and are conscious of a moral
responsibility. Among the mass of the people the
248 A WAR MINISTER AND HIS WORK
idea of responsibility will always be absent from
their conception of morality so long as there is no
corresponding penal code. If, however, there exists
no loftier conception of responsibility than this, the
words of the railway passenger I have just mentioned
will be the code of the majority.
I do not believe that the conscience of the people,
which during the war has been allowed to run wild,
will be set in order by means of moral teaching alone.
On the contrary, it is my firm conviction that this
appalling disaster, the extent of which is not yet by
any means fully realised, has been visited upon us
by God that we may be led back to remembrance of
Him and cease to leave Him out of account in all our
actions.
In the midst of the turmoil and upheaval of
November, 191 8, there stepped out of the Berlin
train at Dierschau station, among other passengers,
young girls who were decked out in red scarves and
ribbons. One of them was addressed by a splendid
specimen of a soldier in the following words : " You
too are wearing the red ribbon ? " The girl answered
with a laugh : " But it is very pretty ! " She was
thinking only of the outward attraction of the thing,
while the soldier went down to the inner meaning of
which the ribbon was the visible emblem, and added
in a tone of enthusiasm : " Yes, it is splendid ! "
Poor fellow, I thought ; how soon the splendour will
pass away and the dream vanish ! Since then there
CONCLUSION 249
has been a succession of plunder, murder and
assassination. But still the dream continues ; people
are feasting and dancing as though there was not a
care in the world. After the time of carnival follows,
as a rule, Ash Wednesday.
The speeches in Weimar could do nothing to
change all this. At the same time, from some of
their speeches it was easy to understand what the
position of our Fatherland is at the present moment
and what it will be in the future. That to all the
pangs that the nation has endured should be added
disloyalty does not seem in the least disturbing to
the majority. We still go on living in the present
and leaving the morrow to take care of itself, until
our enemies wonder how a nation in the situation in
which we find ourselves can be so callous. But the
wolf is at the door. Penury, hunger and bankruptcy
are menacing us from a dangerously short distance
and are preparing the ground for a fresh outbreak of
lawlessness and rebellion.
The worst is still to come. Let us not give up all
hope that the strength of the German people, now
lying dormant under the outer covering of rubbish
and decay, will yet rouse itself and prove equal to the
direst needs of the future.
What will happen then ? After the wars of
liberty the Prussians found themselves united and
of one purpose. High and low, noble and commoner,
came to regard each other as brothers in tribulation
250 A WAR MINISTER AND HIS WORK
under the foreign yoke that had been thrown off, and
as brothers-in-arms in the struggle for the liberty of
the Fatherland. Will history repeat itself ? We do
not want characterless equality which has never been,
and never will be, genuine. Democracy aims at
abolishing all differences, but it does not succeed.
In democratic states there exist differences in social
standing that are far more unpleasant than anything
that is to be found among ourselves. An income of
a few more hundred francs is enough in these
countries to raise a man above his less wealthy
fellows. The unfortunate omnipotence of money
makes equality an impossibility.
Socialism claims to be a remedy for these evils,
but Socialism will not succeed in making good its
claims. A clergyman whom I used to know, but
who is long since dead, is supposed to have prophesied
that Germany would be overthrown in the year
1 91 9 and then the millenium would begin. In just
the same way Socialism dreams of paradisal condi-
tions which are to rise from the ashes of the German
Empire. It forgets that it has to deal with human
nature.
One of the new men, I think it was Scheidemann,
has said that one section of the working-classes has
not shown itself worthy of the revolution. He will
have experiences which will alter his views about
men and had already had plenty of opportunities
for this in Berlin, Halle and other places.
CONCLUSION 251
That Socialism is not possible from an economic
point of view is easy to work out. The cleverer men
among the Socialists have already realised this fact
and regard the future with an anxious eye.
Now a condition of things in which every one is
content with a minimum, and the hunt for gold and
property is abandoned, can be conceived, even
though culture would come off rather badly. But for
such conditions to be possible they would have to be
accepted, not only by a single nation, but by the
whole world. If the experiment were tried by one
nation alone in the midst of others in which the old
order continued, that nation would of necessity go
bankrupt, and that before very long. Can it seriously
be believed that America and England would be
parties to such a movement ? They are much more
likely to take advantage of the so-called League of
Nations to further their aim of getting into their own
hands the economic mastery of the world.
Even among themselves there are not many
supporters of Social Democracy to be found who are
disposed to be contented with their lot, but there are
among men in leading positions many members of
that very race in which the bump of acquisitiveness
is most strongly developed. These are not the
paths that lead to content and happiness.
Just as once the Prussians stood shoulder to
shoulder in war and in tribulation, so it behoves the
Germans to do to-day. We had become estranged
252 A WAR MINISTER AND HIS WORK
from one another and knew one another no more. A
celebrated sculptor who, though advanced in years,
joined the army as a volunteer and rose to be an
officer, once said to me of his men during the war :
" What splendid men they are ! I didn't know they
were like that before." He had lived in Berlin
among men of his own class and the rest had re-
mained strangers to him. Even among the private
soldiers it was the same thing. If on the one side
the fault lay in false reserve and arrogance, envy
and suspicion were on the other, and neither knew or
understood the other. Out there in the trenches
the most widely different types of men were brought
into intimate contact ; they learned to know and
respect one another. I had hoped that something of
this would be carried over into peace. The tragic
end of the war seems to have interrupted all develop-
ment in this direction, and now the distinctions and
opposition are greater than ever. It is essential
that a change should be wrought in this direction if
we are to be restored to health as a nation. It is the
duty of every man who loves his country to do his
part towards effecting this change. Each must
allow his neighbour what is due to him, and must
respect the manhood that lies in him, so long as he
does not behave in such a way as to prove himself
unworthy of respect.
Luther has said that all honest work is worship of
God. This lesson should be taken to heart and work
CONCLUSION 253
esteemed accordingly, whether it be high or low.
But this esteem of work must be kept within reason-
able limits and not pushed to a ridiculous extreme
as has been the case with the wages of the mill-hands
in Berlin.
When I call for mutual respect between one
citizen and another I have no intention of excluding
the men of the army. I know very well that in the
old days there was plenty of room for improvement
in many sides of army life, but I do not think that
the improvement lies in the direction of substituting,
as is now being done, equality and independence for
obedience and discipline. In this direction lies the
ruin of an army. But at the same time, men must
be treated with human consideration. An officer
should never allow himself to be guilty of insulting
or ill-treating his men. Naturally all soldiers are
not models of virtue, as is seen on all sides at the
present time ; many of them are incapable of
responding to reasonable treatment. It is therefore
necessary that severe punishment can be fallen back
upon if it is called for. It must not be imagined,
however, that a radical change is to be brought about
by merely issuing an order. Grievances may be the
result of tradition, or sometimes it is the case that
they only come to be felt as grievances in the course
of time. It is often necessary to go very far back to
get to the root of the matter, and they are aggravated
by custom and repetition.
254 A WAR MINISTER AND HIS WORK
The non-commissioned officer who stands in
closest association with the men is bred in these
traditions. He hands on and metes out to others
the same treatment as he himself received. An
officer ought to be capable of keeping himself in
hand, but he does not always do so by any means.
It is certainly difficult to preserve one's patience in
face of stupidity, indifference and defiance. It
would be a good thing if many of those who are wont
to criticise would ask themselves whether they
always come up to the standard they demand from
others within their own spheres of influence. This,
however, should not be brought forward by an
officer as an excuse. Young officers follow the
example set by their seniors ; it is therefore the duty
of every senior officer to set a good example to others
in his treatment of the men who have been placed in
his charge.
The critics never make any mention of the ilh
treatment and bullying that go on among the
soldiers in the ranks themselves. There was no
harm, for instance, in the tradition which existed
among the mounted troops of the old army, according
to which the older men would not allow a recruit to
groom his horse with his cap on his head, or when the
older men claimed for themselves the exclusive use
of certain inns which the recruits were not permitted
to enter. There were, it is true, cases of ill-treatment
when the recruits encroached on these privileges of
CONCLUSION 255
their seniors. Worse went on in the barracks.
These recruits were beaten by the older men in bed
at night or forced to get up in their night-shirts and
then thrashed. There was even a certain unpleasant
name for this sort of thing which, however, the men
did not take very seriously. It is certain, too, that
many other things used to go on in these places
which did not come to the notice of the officers. Woe
betide the unhappy man who was bold enough to
lodge a complaint ! He would have been the victim
of a terrible revenge. Such evils and abuses are not
to be suddenly abolished, in spite of the strictest
supervision and regulations, for it is easy to transfer
them to other places where they are outside the range
of authority. The only way in which they can be
stopped is by a long and strict course of training,
and even this remedy will not always produce the
desired result owing to the fact that the personnel is
constantly being changed.
The struggle to obtain humane treatment for the
soldiers did not always spring from motives of pure
philanthropy. As a rule older men recalled their
period of military service with pleasure, so they
cannot have had such a bad time when they were in
the army. Naturally insubordinate men, however,
did not look at things in the same light. Their
quarrel was directed against the irksome discipline
which to many was a thorn in the flesh and stood in
the way of their plans, as has now been made quite
256 A WAR MINISTER AND HIS WORK
clear. A short time ago Will Vesper brought out a
pamphlet in which he makes an attempt to account
for the feeling of hatred for their officers by the men
which has been brought to light by the Revolution.
He claims to have found the cause in the constant
looking out for the signs of rank, the military salute,
the standing to attention ; in short, in the necessity
for always showing respect for superiors. It is
obvious that he has little understanding of the nature
of discipline, for he was, I hear, called up for the first
time when he was no longer a young man and had no
eye for anything beyond the personal discomf Oi ts of
the army. Whether he ever had an opportunity
during the war of learning the true necessity for
strict discipline I do not know. Hermann Winter
came to understand, as is shown by his poem in
Simplissimus, which contains the following lines :
" Not one of the great words is greater than this ;
Not God, nor King nor Fatherland.
Like an age-old rock in the wild turmoil of the waves towers
Discipline.
She stands unshaken. Her face is radiant with the light oi
knowledge of good and evil.
Veiled in grey silence, her eyes fixed
Until they smart, she fulfils her destiny."
Discipline is not compatible with individual
freedom. Discipline demands constant training and
practice until it becomes a habit. It would have
been much better for Germany if her discipline had
continued to stand like an age-old rock in the waves
and not been undermined and overthrown by
CONCLUSION 257
systematic agitation. The value of discipline cannot
be judged by its discomforts and by the fact that it
must be maintained from time to time in the respect-
ful treatment of unworthy officers .
When this subject is touched on there nearly
always arises a wide-spread outcry against the
procedure of the court-martial. It may be defec-
tive ; a good many unsuccessful attempts would
have to be made before it could be arranged in such
a way as to fit in with everybody's wishes. It would
be a simple matter if one only had to deal with men
of strong, firm character and real manliness.
I have known a case where an appeal against the
decision of a court-martial was even brought before
the Emperor himself and he confirmed the judgment.
This is not likely to occur often. It very rarely
happened that the judgment of a court-martial was
quashed, for this involved dismissal from the service.
But any one who has had anything to do with court-
martials has unfortunately only too good reason to
know that little reliance can be placed on the state-
ments of witnesses.
When I was in command of a regiment I had on
probation a non-commissioned officer who was not
known to me. One day I saw a gunner who had a
wound on his head ; when I asked him how it had
happened he told me that this same non-commis-
sioned officer had thrown a stool at him as he was
going into the room. The N.C.O. maintained that
R
258 A WAR MINISTER AND HIS WORK
the stool had been standing on the top of a cupboard
near the door and had fallen down when the door
was opened. Every man who had been in the room
at the time either supported the statement of the
N.C.O. or said they had seen nothing. It was
therefore impossible to have him punished. As,
however, the man had made a favourable impression
upon me I immediately had the N.C.O. reduced.
This is the difficulty with which one is continually
faced unless one happens to have been a witness of
the offence complained of. I have recently heard a
proposal put forward that all accusations should first
be examined by a confidential commission before
being brought before the officers concerned. Such
commissions may prove a means of avoiding friction ;
they will never produce successful results. An officer
who knows his men and keeps his eyes open will give
a juster decision than a commission of several.
There was in Germany a universal outcry against
militarism without any clear conception of what was
meant by the word. The organisation of our army
has been copied by the majority of foreign armies.
In France discipline in the field was much more
strictly enforced than was the case in our army, and
there was no sparing of the death-penalty. Even
in Switzerland, the home of liberty, I have seen a
staff-officer, and not a regular officer at that, strike
a man behind the ear. I must admit, too, in contrast
to this, that I have also seen in the same country a
CONCLUSION 259
drunken soldier smash his water-bottle on his rifle in
the presence of an officer and shout : "It doesn't
matter, it's only state property," and the officer only
laughed at him. It is in the nature of the German to
admire things in foreign countries of which he
complains at home. The new order of things will do
nothing to change this, but it will experience the
same criticism which it has been so ready to offer in
the past, and, indeed, the criticism will be more richly
deserved than was the case under the administration
of the old Government.
At the present moment criticism is busying itself
with the peace conditions that have been imposed
by our enemies, and indeed there is full justification
for criticism. Instead, however, of uniting and
rising in protest against these extravagant and
shameful demands, we are dissipating our energies in
abusing one another. We are, and remain, a people
with no idea of politics, and this fact becomes more
evident every day. Talk is going on in Weimar as
once it did in Frankfort. At Frankfort there were
certainly more wise heads assembled together than
there are to-day in Weimar, but nevertheless they
were, and remained, children in politics.
Scheidemann has made reference to the great
minds that have made Weimar sacred. It is true
that every German will look back on these with
pride and reverence. But their greatness did not lie
in their political importance ; nor can it be imagined
260 A WAR MINISTER AND HIS WORK
that a place imbues with the greatness of its own
memories every casual visitor to its shrines.
The new Government throws all the blame upon
the old. That is very convenient, but it is also a
proof that the new Government is afraid that it, too
will one day be called upon to give an account of its
stewardship. One of its members has made the
statement that the armistice was agreed to by
Prince Max's Government. That is right as to the
letter but false as to the spirit. When the armistice
was agreed to the power of the Emperor had already
been torn away from him by General Headquarters,
because they could no longer rely on the army to
continue their resistance. 'When, however, the
shameful peace conditions became known, and
meanwhile the front seemed to have become firmer,
General Headquarters, counting on a universal
rising of the people, wanted to go on resisting. But
the democratic Government insisted on an un-
conditional surrender. At this juncture the mutin-
ous sailors stabbed the army in the back, and ruin
was allowed to run its course. Those who share the
responsibility for this act may well prefer to have it
hushed up, but nevertheless it is the truth. Who
was it who opposed the adoption of more drastic
measures to deal with the mutiny of the sailors ?
Who are they who have never ceased their efforts to
ruin the discipline of the army and to sap its strength ?
Who has opposed in the Reichstag every one of
CONCLUSION 261
the Government's measures by which it was hoped
to put a stop to the intrigues which were eating at
the heart of the army ? In addition to all this our
Social Democrats have thought it no shame to
say outright that a complete victory for Germany
would not please them. This is pretty overwhelming
evidence !
Instead of looking for the root of the evil where it
really exists, Scheidemann accuses General Luden-
dorff of being a gambler. In making a statement of
this kind he is merely revealing the fact that he
knows nothing about the principles of war and
nothing about the character of General Ludendorff.
Before every enterprise that he undertook Ludendorff
carefully balanced his objectives and the means he
had at his disposal, and only acted when he felt that
he could do so with a clear conscience. Up to the
time of the successes in the summer of 191 8 he had a
right to believe in victory. He had also every good
reason for continuing the offensive until the Ameri-
cans got the better of us. I do not dare to-day to
give judgment on the succession of disasters which
then began, for I have no sufficiently intimate
knowledge of the attendant circumstances. But Herr
Scheidemann will be no better off. War is always
a matter of insecurity and uncertainty. The only
constant factor is the determination and will-power
of the Commander-in-Chief. No one can deny that
Ludendorff was well equipped in both these respects.
262 A WAR MINISTER AND HIS WORK
It is certainly time that people stopped running
down men who have only done their duty. The
blame for the loss of the war cannot be laid at the
door of any one man ; it must be divided among
many, and indeed must rest in the end with the
whole people.
A short time ago a clergyman wrote me a letter
in which he claimed that our downfall was a punish-
ment for our sins. This may possibly be true, but
we can also lay a pretty extensive budget of sin at
the door of our enemies, and this is by no means
lessened by their peace conditions, which are them-
selves nothing less than wicked. In spite of this,
however, they triumph.
They show themselves to be the most shameless
hypocrites when, for example, they try to make
General Liman von Sanders responsible for the
Armenian atrocities and profess to regard these with
horror, while all the time they as civilised and
Christian peoples treat us with greater cruelty than
even the Armenians were treated. Even Italy and
Rumania come out of the war unpunished.
The theory of this good clergyman does not,
then, solve the riddle. Johannes Scheer conjectured
that Germany would be called upon in the nineteenth
or twentieth century to play a similar role to that
she assumed in the sixteenth, when she helped the
world to win spiritual freedom. She would get as
little thanks for it as she did then, but only
CONCLUSION 263
oppression and tribulation, and the " to be or not to
be " of our nation would come more seriously into
question than was the case in the Thirty Years War.
I, too, am firmly of the conviction that God is
pursuing a definite purpose with regard to our
nation. He has not been mentioned much in
Weimar for He is not taken into account by our
rulers. Only Herr Gr&ber of the Christian National
party, or, I should say, the Centre, has made an
attempt to quiet the conscience of his Catholic
colleagues by calling on Him to come to the help of
the new Government by reference to the words of
the Apostle Paul : " For there is no authority
without God ; where there is authority it is from
God." Good ! But he must admit that the same
applies to the old authority. Now St. Paul goes on
to say : " Whoever sets himself against authority
sets himself against God." Who are they who set
themselves against the authority of the old Govern-
ment and even went so far as to overthrow it ? No,
Herr Grober, that is not enough to salve our con-
sciences. It only serves to show that the Centre
party can play on all the strings and knows how to
adapt itself to every situation. It only requires that
the new Government should be overthrown and
replaced by the Spartacists or the Bolshevists for
these to be recognised as the authority desired of
God. It is better not to touch on this matter,
especially as with few exceptions every one has
264 A WAR MINISTER AND HIS WORK
placed his services at the disposal of the new Govern-
ment in order to help in infusing new life into our
stricken Fatherland. This is not the time for
listening to more or less brilliant speeches ; it is the
time for action.
One is forced to admit one's sympathy with the
Minister of State for War, Herr Noske. He is acting,
and he is acting rightly. But it is interesting to
notice that his actions follow the lines of the old
Government in the days before its work was ham-
pered by the men who are now ruling the country.
These men wanted to save bloodshed by protecting
the revolutionaries, and in doing so made the
revolution a permanency, and instead of saving blood-
shed they caused it to be poured out on all sides.
It seemed a strange thing that the revolution-
aries, who recoiled before no crime, should be treated
as equal adversaries until Noske struck out a new
and right line. There will be no return to order and
peace until these enemies are regarded as what they
really are : traitors to the German nation. The
worst criminals are not those who rush to their
weapons in a fit of madness and fanaticism, but their
moral leaders who help themselves at a safe distance
from the danger and fighting and are respected and
treated as politicians of equal standing with the
others. There is surely nothing to surpass the easy-
going innocence of the German people ! Or is it
possible that the real explanation is fear ?
CONCLUSION 265
We do not know how the fate of our people will
work out. Our enemies are treating us in a way I
could have imagined possible with savage, un-
cultured peoples but not with civilised nations.
Imagine Germany in their position ! It is un-
thinkable that she would have acted in the same way
or anything like it. In spite of it all, however, our
enthusiasts for international peace and the League
of Nations do not yet seem to have learned their
lesson, although the neutrals have already begun to
grow suspicious. The German remains unteachable.
Wilhelm Baabe seems, unfortunately, to be right
when he uttered the grimly prophetic words :
" German people ? What are you talking about ?
A German-speaking or German-chattering concoction
of tribes who were mixed together for a moment by
a few great men and shaped into the semblance of a
state ! To-morrow, perhaps, these men will be dead,
and the compound will dissolve again into its
different elements and then from all sides the foreign
nations can come boldly with their spoons to restore
and set up again the ancient freedom of the German
nation ! "
The Germans will never establish order, and will
certainly never attain to greatness except under
the compulsion of a carefully-considered and clear-
sighted power which will set them in the right path
and lead them and compel these foolish, obstinate
people to unite. So far this has only been accomplished
266 A WAR MINISTER AND HIS WORK
by the monarchy and the great personalities
who placed themselves at the monarchy's service.
In her imagination Germany has yearned for the
immortal Emperor, and for centuries the Germans
have talked and sung of him. In reality they have
rejected him when he had hardly been granted to
them. Is it possible that this longing of the genera-
tions has proved an error ? I do not think so. The
German Emperor will come back, when everything is
bankrupt, to begin once more the laborious task of
rebuilding his empire. It may be that the inter-
ruption of her development and culture may be the
means of securing for Germany a longer life and
influence in the world, if only her people show them-
selves capable of taking a hold on life. If, however,
it is decreed that this shall be our end it would have
been better to have gone under righting in the welter
of the world-war, as our ancestors believed and
expected of us. For it is a worthless nation that will
not gladly put her all to the touch for honour's sake.
THE END
INDEX
A
Accommodation Department,
119
Administrative Department,
116, 117
Air Department, 115
„ Service, 115
Albert, 82, 86
Allies, the, 218-245
America, 23, 24, 119
Ammunition, 126, 127, 128,
129
Ancre, 85, 87, 88, 89
Antwerp, 80
Arabs, the, 241
Armenian atrocities, 262
Army, the, 183-217
manoeuvres, 49
von Bulow's, 78
von Kluck's, 79
Arndt, Ernst Moritz, 245
Arras, 89
Austria, 59, 158, 218, 226,
229, 230, 231, 232
Austrian Emperor, 227, 228
Germans, 231, 233
Austrians, 220, 225, 227, 232,
237
Austria-Hungary, 231
Austro-Hungarians, 221, 224
Bapaume, 82, 83, 88, 91, 93,
94, 96, 102, 103
Bapaume-Peronne Road, 84
Bauer, 181
Bavaria, Crown Prince of, 87
Beaucourt, 89
Beaumont, 89
Belfort, 47
Belgium, 28, 47, 60, 61, 63,
64,72
Berlin, 13, 15. l8 > 60 » 66 > 6 9.
102, 139, 171, 181
Bethmann-Hollweg, 176, 177,
178
Bismarck, 20, 30, 31, 32, 143,
174, 243
Bolke, 105
Bolshevism, 170, 171, I73>
234
Braunlage, 19
Breitenbach, von, 179
British cavalry, 82
Brocken, 19
Bulgaria, 246
King of, 236, 237
Crown Prince of,
236, 237
Bulgarians, 232, 233, 234,
235, 236, 241
Bulow, Prince, 143
Burian, Baron, 227, 229
B
Baabe, William, 265
Baden, 181
Balkans, 236
Baltic Provinces, 130
Cambrai, 81, 87
11 Canna," 43
Capelle, von, 171
Carlsbad, 54
268
INDEX
Central Department, 131
Centre Party, 162
Charles, Emperor, 158, 221,
225, 226, 228, 229, 230
Christmas 1914, 94
Clausewitz, 25, 26
Coblentz, 74, 75
Cohn, 171
Crimea, 23
Croats, 218
Czechs, the, 220
Czernin, 227, 229, 230
D
Daughters, My, 13, 14
Deines, General von, 34
Democracy, 250
Democratic Progressive
Party, 162
Denmark, 120
Dental Service, 124
Deputy General Staff, 56
Deutsch-Eylan, 13, 65, 67, 68
Dobrudja, the, 234
Dumling, 19
East Prussia, 63
Ebert, 213
Emperor, the, 50, 51, 52, 53,
61, 71. 94, 95, 145, 181,
182, 184, 211, 216, 227,
228, 257, 266
England, 58, 59, 61, 149, 167,
169, 170
English, the, 37, 80, 89, 120,
170
Enver, 241
Epinal, 47
Erzberger, 153, 176, 180, 181
Faidherbe, 30
Falkenhayn, von, 88, 139
" Fieldgreys," 18
Foch, Marshal, 160
Fokker, the, 104
Food supplies, 18, 116, 117,
118, 119
France, 46, 47, 59, 61, 62, 63,
72, 91, 93, 149, 244
Francis Ferdinand, murder of
Archduke, 66
Francis Joseph, 219
Franco-Prussian War, 126
Frederic the Great, 48, 56
French, the, 28, 33, 37, 79,
89, 120, 214
French Army, 22, 28
„ cavalry, 82
fortresses, 33, 34
Friedrich, General, 120
G Alicia, 229
Gallipoli, 239
Ganswindt aeroplane, 47
General Headquarters, 71, yz>
125, 130, 139, 215
General Staff, 21, 26, 36, 39,
42, 44, 45, 49, 52, 54, 67,
7°, 137
General Staff, Chief of, 52, 54,
58,68
General War Department, 125
German nation, 37, 148, 163,
166, 174, 183, 216, 217
German officers, 185-201
„ soldiers, 202-210
Germany, 18, 58, 63, 76, 81,
86, 93, 150, 169, 216, 230,
232, 240, 243, 2 66
Goeben, 30
Goltz, Field-Marshal von der,
Government Bill, 146
Governments, 175-182
Great European War, 22
Grober, Herr, 176, 181, 263
Guards Corps, 89
Guns, 127-9
INDEX
269
H
Hannibal, 22
Harden, 163, 164
Harz, 19
Hausmann, 176
Heine, Herr, 164
Helfferich, 177
Hertling, Count, 31, 180
Hindenburg, Field-Marshal
von, 22, 39. 57. 7 6 . I28 > x 59.
227
Hohenlohe, Prince, 166
Holland, 120
Home, my, 14
Houses, want of, 15
Hungarians, 219, 230
Hungary, 230
I
Immelmann, 105
Imperial Treasury, 136, 137
Independents, the, 161, 171
Infantry, the, 214
Italians, the, 120
Italy, 23, 243, 244
Jagers, 84
Japan, 60
Jews, the, 172, 221, 222, 223,
224
Joffre, General, 171
K
Kaiser, the, 31, 35. 49. 56,
77, 80
Kant, 165
Kleist, von, 97
Kratke, 177
Kriege, Geheimrat, 152
Kuhlmann, 232
La Marmora, 244
Landwehr troops, 183
Laws of war, 24-29
League of Nations, 151, 251,
265
Lentze, 176
Le Transloi, 86
Leuthen, 23
Liebknecht, 173, 178
Liege, 47, 5°. 7°. 74
Longueval, 85, 86
Longwy, 211
Lorraine, 28, 47, 62, 80
Lower Ancre, 82
Lower Rhine, 28
Ludendorff, 22, 39, 57. 7°>
74, 76, 178, 227, 261
Ludendorff, Frau, 70
Lukow, Bulgarian Comman-
der-in-Chief, 234
Luther, 252
Luxemburg, 28, 63, 77, 80
Rosa, 173
M
Magyars, 225
Main Headquarters, 74, 77, 80
Malinow, President, 234, 235
Man-power, 130, 131, 132
Marne, the, 56, 57, 78
Martinpuich, 89, 90, 93, 94,
95. 9 6
Max, Prince, 176, 180, 260
Medical Department, 121, 122,
123, 125
Metz, 31, 44, 80
Meuse, the, 44, 46
Michaelis, Chancellor, n6,
171, 179
Minister for War, 13, 99, no,
138, 139. 143. 145. 147. 159
Ministry for Foreign Affairs,
121
270
INDEX
Mobilisation, 66, 68
Moltke, Field-Marshal Count
von, 21, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29,
30, 3i, 32, 35. 38, 52-7, 7°>
71, 80, 135, 243
Moltke, Frau von, 70
„ Old, 50, 62, 75
Monchy, 89, 96
Money, 67
Monuments to the fallen, 102,
103, 107
Morchingen, 80
Moselle, 28, 47
N
Nancy, 47
Napoleon, 22, 26, 79
National Service Bill, 145
Navy, the, 216
Neidenoff, Bulgarian Minister
for War, 234,. 237
New Zealand, 171
Noske, Herr, 264
Nursing service, 121, 124
Q
Quartermaster General,
68, 126
Quidde, Professor, 165
R
Radoslawow, Bulgarian
Fresident, 234
Reichstag, 133, 140, 141, 143-
174
Revolution of July, 1917, 149
Rheims, 79
Rhineland, 81
Rhine-Westphalian Republic,
174
Richthofen, 105
Rodern, Count, 177
Rome, 174, 232
Roon, 32
Rumania, 230, 231, 236, 243
Russia, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63,
72, 232, 246
Russia and Japan, war
between, 126
Russian Embassy, 171
Russians, 33, 63, 65, 66, 75
Pacificists, the, 165, 169
Palestine, 240
Paw el, General von, 83
Payer, 176, 182
Peace-Emperor, 60
Peace manoeuvres, 49
Poland, 143, 227, 228, 229,
232, 246
Poles, the, 130, 176
Polkio, 244
Press, 6r, 139, 140, 226, 231
Presting, Quartermaster, 97
Prittwitz, General von, 75
Prussia, 18, 147, 163, 166
Prussian Army, 25
Ministry, 175, 179
Saarburg, 80
St. Leger, 95
St. Privat, 25
St. Quentin, 82, 91
Sanders, General Liman von,
239, 240, 262
Scheer, Johannes, 262
Scheidemann, 146, 149, 161,
178, 181, 250, 261
Schellendorf, Lt.-Col. Bron-
sart von, 83
Schlieffen, Field-Marshal
Count von, 32, 38, 62, 63,
64, I37» 244
Scholtz, General, 234
INDEX
271
Sedan, 25, 77
Serajevo, 66, 219
Serbia, 218, 236
Serbs, 219
Sering, Professor, 141
Serre, 89, 122
S'avs, 220
Social Democratic Party, 154,
159, 161, 170, 213, 251, 261
Socialism, 250, 251
Socialist Bill, 143
Soden, General Freiherr von,
83
Sofia, 233
Somme, the, 82, 86, 87, 98,
129
Son, my, 13
South Germany, 51
Spain, 119
Stoeger-Steiner, von, 227
Strasburg, 42
Supreme War Lord, 49, 50, 53
Swedish Red Cross, 220
Switzerland, 120
Taalat, 241
Tannenberg, 25, 76
Taute, Captain, 106
Trimborn, 174
Turkey, 238, 241, 242, 246
Turkish Army, 239, 240
officers, 238
War Ministry, 112
Turks, the, 239, 240, 241
Young, 242
U
U-BOAT, 2l6
Uhlans, 216
Ukraine, 130, 231
Upper Rhine, 51
Vatican, 120
Verdun, 46
Vesper, Will, 256
Victor Emmanuel I., King,
244
Victor Emmanuel II., King,
244
Vienna, 225, 227
Vistula, 62, 69, 76
Vosges, 47, 80
W
Wahnschaffe, Under-Sec-
retary, 178
Waldersee, Count, 33, 34, 35,
37, 38, 62
War Academy, 44, 45, 46,
136, 137
War Department, 133, 134
„ Ministry, 110-142, 125,
134, 140, 141, 147
War Office, 13, 15
Weimar, 249, 259, 263
Wermuth, 135
Wesel to Alsace, Western
frontier from, 71
Westphalia, 48
Wilhelm, Kaiser, 22, 31, 32
Wilson, President, 153
Winter, Hermann, quotation
from, 256
Worth, 25
" ZUKUNFT," 163
PRINTED I3T THE ANCHOR PRESS, LTD., TIPTREE, ESSEX, ESGLAKD.
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