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jiiiiiLiW en) is^fo 
 
THE 
 
 FEDERALIST. 
 
 A COMMENTARY 
 
 ON THE 
 
 CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 BY 
 
 ALEXANDER HAMILTON, 
 
 JAY AND MADISON. 
 
 A.LSO 
 
 ^bj ©onttncntalist anb Stiver Sapors, 
 
 BY 
 
 HAMILTON. 
 
 EDITED BY 
 
 JOHN C. HAMILTON, 
 
 AUTHOR OF THB HI8T0RT OF THE REPCBUC OF THE UNITED STAnS. 
 
 PHIL AD BLPHI a: 
 
 J. B. LIPPINCOTT COMPANY, 
 1904. 
 
Ent<>red, according to Act of Congress, in the year 1864. hy 
 JOHN C. HAMILTON, 
 
 in the Clerk's Office of the District Court of the United States for the Southern District 
 
 of New York. 
 
 Copyright, 1892, by CHAiti,ui'TE A. HAMILTON. 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 Ttmn 
 
 BisTORiCAL Notice ix 
 
 Kesolution for a General Convention of the States, passed by the 
 
 Legislature of New York, Sunday, July 21, 1782 1 
 
 Hamilton to Governor Clinton, Philadelphia, May 14, 1783 3 
 
 Resolution for a General Convention, 1783 4 
 
 Annapolis Convention, Address of, September 14, 1786 8 
 
 Speech on the Impost Grant 11 
 
 Resolution for an Act by Congress Recommending the Holding a 
 
 Convention, February 17, 1787 25 
 
 Resolution for the Appointment by New York of Delegates to thrt 
 
 General Convention, February 26, 1787 25 
 
 Articles of Confederation 26 
 
 Hamilton's First Plan of Government 3] 
 
 The Federal Constitution, as agreed upon by the Convention, Sep- 
 tember 17, 1787 39 
 
 K UMBER 
 
 I. Introduction 49 
 
 II. Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence 54 
 
 III. The same Subject continued 60 
 
 IV. The same Subject continued 65 
 
 V. The same Subject continued 71 
 
 VI. Concerning Dangers from War between the States 76 
 
 VII. The Subject continued, and Particular Causes Enumerated 83 
 
 VIII. The Effects of Internal War in Producing Standing Armies, 
 
 and other Institutions unfriendly to Liberty 90 
 
 IX. The Utility of the Union as a Safeguard against Domestic 
 
 Faction and Insurrection 97 
 
 X. The same Subject continued 104 
 
 XI. The Utility of the Union in respect to Commerce and a 
 
 Navy 113 
 
IV CONTENTS. 
 
 KUHBER PAOB 
 
 XII. The Utility of the Union in respect to Revenue 121 
 
 XIII. The same Subject continued, with a View to Economy.. 128 
 
 XIV. An Objection drawn from the Extent of Country 
 
 answered 131 
 
 XV. Concerning the Defects of the Present Confederation, 
 in Relation to the Principle of Legislation for the 
 States in their Collective Capacities 138 
 
 XVI. The same Subject continued, in Relation to the same 
 
 Principles 147 
 
 XVII. The Subject continued, and Illustrated by Examples, to 
 show the Tendency of Federal Governments, rather 
 to Anarchy among the Members, than Tyranny in 
 the Head 153 
 
 XVIII. The Subject continued, with farther Examples 158 
 
 XIX. The Subject continued, with farther Examples 165 
 
 XX. The same Subject continued, with farther Examples 172 
 
 XXI. Further Defects of the Present Constitution 178 
 
 XXII. The same Subject continued and concluded 184 
 
 XXIII. The Necessity of a Government at least equally Ener- 
 
 getic with the one proposed 195 
 
 XXIV. The Subject continued, with an Answer to an Objection 
 
 concerning Standing Armies 201 
 
 XXV. The Subject continued, with the same View 207 
 
 XXVI. The Subject continued, with the same View 213 
 
 XXVII. The Subject continued, with the same View 225 
 
 XXVIII. The same Subject continued 235 
 
 XXIX. Concerning the Militia 239 
 
 XXX, Concerning Taxation 240 
 
 XXXI. The same Subject continued 243 
 
 XXXII. The same Subject continued 248 
 
 XXXIII. The same Subject continued 258 
 
 XXXIV. The same Subject continued 259 
 
 XXXV. The same Subject continued 263 
 
 XXXVI. The same Subject continued 273 
 
 XXXVII. Concerning the Difficulties which the Convention must 
 
 have experienced in the Formation of a Proper Plan.. 282 
 
CONTENTS. r 
 
 trUMBEB PASa 
 
 XXXVIII. The Subject continued, and the Incoherence of the Ob- 
 jections to the Plan exposed 291 
 
 XXXI X. The Conformity of the Plan to Republican Principles: 
 An Objection in Respect to the Powers of the Con- 
 vention examined 
 
 XL. The same Objection further examined 309 
 
 XLI. General View of the Powers proposed to be Vested in 
 
 the Union 318 
 
 XLII. The same View continued 329 
 
 XLIII. The same View continued 338 
 
 XLIV. The same View continued and concluded 349 
 
 XLV. A further Discussion of the Supposed Danger from the 
 
 Powers of the Union to the State Governments 358 
 
 XLVI. The Subject of the Last Paper resumed ; with an 
 Examination of the Comparative Means of Influence 
 of the Federal and State Governments 365 
 
 XLVII. The Meaning of the Maxim, which requires a Separation 
 of the Departments of Power, examined and ascer- 
 tained 373 
 
 XLVIII. The same Subject continued, with a View to the Means 
 
 of giving Efficacy in Practice to that Maxim 382 
 
 XLIX. The same Subject continued, with the same View 388 
 
 L. The same Subject continued, with the same View 393 
 
 LI. The same Subject continued, with the same View, and 
 
 concluded 397 
 
 LII. Concerning the House of Representatives, with a View 
 to the Qualifications of the Electors and Elected, and 
 Time of Service of the Members 403 
 
 LIU. The same Subject continued, with a View of the Term 
 
 of Service of the Members 409 
 
 LIV. The same Subject continued, with a View to the Ratio 
 
 of Representation 416 
 
 LV. The same Subject continued, in Relation to the total 
 
 Number of the Boay 422 
 
 LVI. The same Subject continued, in Relation to the same 
 
 Point 420 
 
 LVII. The same Subject continued, in Relation to the Sup- 
 posed Tendency of the Plan of the Convention to 
 Elevate the Few abcve the Many 434 
 
VI CONTENTS. 
 
 KUVBER 'ASl 
 
 LVIII. The same Subject continued, in Relation to the Future 
 
 Augmentation of the Members 441 
 
 LIX. Concerning the Regulation of Elections 448 
 
 LX. The same Subject continued 454 
 
 LXI. The same Subject continued and concluded 461 
 
 LXII, Concerning the Constitution of the Senate, with Regard 
 to the Qualifications of the Members ; the Manner of 
 Appointing them ; the Equality of Representation ; the 
 Number of the Senators, and the Duration of their 
 Appointments , 466 
 
 . LXIII. A further View of the Constitution of the Senate, in Re- 
 gard to the Duration of the Appointments of its Mem- 
 bers 474 
 
 LXIV. A further View of the Constitution of the Senate, in 
 
 Regard to the Power of Making Treaties 483 
 
 LXV. A further View of the Constitution of the Senate, in 
 Relation to its Capacity as a Court for the Trial of 
 Impeachments 490 
 
 LXVI. The same Subject continued 496 
 
 LXVII. Concerning the Constitution of the President: A Gross 
 Attempt to Misrepresent this Part of the Plan de- 
 tected 503 
 
 LiXVIII. The View of the Constitution of the President con- 
 tinued, in Relation to the Mode of Appointment 508 
 
 LXIX. The same View continued, with a Comparison between 
 the President and the King of Great Britain on the 
 one Hand, and the Governor of New York on the 
 other 513 
 
 LXX. The same View continued, in Relation to the Unity of 
 the Executive, with an Examination of the Project 
 of an Executive Council 522 
 
 LXXI. The same View continued, in Regard to the Duration 
 
 of the Office 532 
 
 LXXII. The same View continued, in Regard to the Re-eligibility 
 
 of the President 538 
 
 LXXIII. The same View continued, in Relation to the Provision 
 
 concerning Support, and the Power of the Negative... 545 
 
 LXXI"^'^. The same View continued, in Relation to the Command 
 
 of the National Forces, and the Power of Pardoning.. 552 
 
CONTENTS. Til 
 
 LXXV. The same View continued, in Relation to tie Power of 
 
 Making Treaties ; 556 
 
 LXXVI. The same View continued, in Relation to the Appoint- 
 ment of the Officers of the Government 562 
 
 LXXVII. The View of the Constitution of the President con- 
 cluded, with a further Consideration of the Power of 
 Appointment and a Concise Examination of his Re- 
 maining Powers 568 
 
 LXXVIII. A View of the Constitution of the Judicial Department, 
 
 in Relation to the Tenure of Good Behaviour 574 
 
 LXXIX. A further View of the Judicial Department, in Relation 
 to the Provisions for the Support and Responsibility 
 of the Judges 583 
 
 LXXX. A further View of the Judicial Department, in Relation 
 
 to the Extent of its Powers 587 
 
 LXXXI. A further View of the Judicial Department, in Relation 
 
 to the Distribution of its Authority 595 
 
 LXXXII. A further View of the Judicial Department, in Reference 
 
 to some Miscellaneous Questions 605 
 
 LXXXIII. A further View of the Judicial Department, in Relation 
 
 to the Trial by Jury 611 
 
 LXXXIV. Concerning several Miscellaneous Objections 627 
 
 LXXXV. Conclusion 639 
 
 Collated Texts 647 
 
 PHILO PUBLIUS, by William Dcer. 
 
 Number 1 655 
 
 Number II 658 
 
 Number III 659 
 
 N.B. — In frequent instances quotations are italicized to point attention where thera 
 ara no italics in the original. 
 
HISTORICAL NOTICE. 
 
 Some time since, the intention was announced of publishing 
 an edition of the Federalist, which would *' state all the evi- 
 dence known to exist, to designate the respective contributions 
 of its authors."* 
 
 The great Rebellion which, while imperilling, has developed 
 the power of our Government, and by its suppression will esta- 
 blish the Unity of the American Empire, has been a sufficient 
 cause of delay; independent of those personal interests which 
 have irresistibly drawn the mind from the study to the camp 
 and to the battle-fields. This task is now performed. 
 
 As Alexander Hamilton is known to have been chiefly instru- 
 mental in the series of measures which finally resulted in the 
 establishment of the Constitution of the United States — was its 
 principal expounder — and as he had a large share in the prac- 
 tical exposition of its powers, under the Presidency of Washing- 
 ton and of his successor, I have permitted myself to believe, that 
 a preliminary exhibition of his progressive opinions and acts 
 — onward toward the goal of his great desires and hopes — the 
 organization of a firm National Government, resting directly on 
 the shoulders of the American people; acting directly upon 
 them as individuals ; and pervading the entire limits of their 
 country, might not be without interest or instruction. And, in no 
 other mode could this be more effectually done than by including 
 in this volume — precedent to the Federalist — certain papers 
 from his pen, which have hitherto had a very limited publicity 
 together with some elucidatory observations. 
 
 In a retrospect of the rise of the British Provinces in North 
 America, from their Colonial condition to that of an Independent 
 
 * History of the Republic of the United States of America as traced in the 
 writings of Alexander Hamilton and of his cotemporaries. iii. 371. 1859. 
 
X HISTORICAL NOTICE. 
 
 ponrer among the Nations of the "World; what that condit on 
 was, has at different periods been much discussed. At first, it 
 was treated as a question of the rights and duties of these Colo- 
 nies in reference to the parent Government ; later, it has been 
 more often investigated as a question, of the relation of the 
 Colonies to their Sovereigns, and to each other, in regard to 
 the relations which have existed and now truly exist, between 
 the particular States within the Union and the whole United 
 States; or between the People of each of those States and 
 the whole People of the United States, ordaining and establish- 
 ing a Constitution for the United States of America. The De- 
 claration of Independence disposed of the first of these ques- 
 tions, the latter has a living interest. In the second of his 
 early productions,* Hamilton touches this great question. To- 
 tally denying the claim of parliamentary supremacy over the 
 British Colonies, except as conceded by them, be remarks, •' In 
 order to form one State, that is, a number of individual societies, 
 or bodies politic united under one common head, there must 
 indeed be some connecting, pervading principle. This is found 
 in the person and prerogative of the King. He it is that con- 
 joins all these individual societies into one great body politic." 
 " He is King of America, by virtue of the compact between us 
 and the Kings of Great Britain." Their claim to allegiance was 
 founded upon the title derived from the Crown to the lands in 
 A.meriea, and on the King's being "the supreme protector of 
 the Empire," and having bestowed that protection. As fellow 
 subjects of one common Sovereign, the Colonists had the common 
 rights of British subjects, those rights which are the natural 
 rights of every human being, except as limited by statutes. 
 These common rights extended over the whole territory of 
 Great Bntain in North America. The colonists of each Colony 
 bad" the rights of trafiic with, of migration to ; of residence in, 
 and of inheritance by descent of real estate situate in, every 
 other Colony. To secure which common rights the local legis- 
 lation of all the Colonies was required to be in accordance with 
 the laws of England. 
 
 Thus, the British colonists of North America, were, in chief 
 respects, " one people,"f and as such, the delegates chosen to 
 
 ♦Hamilton's Works, ii. 55, Februarys, 1775. "The Farmer Refuted"— 
 written in his eighteenth year. 
 
 f Story's Commentaries, i. § 163, 165, 2 Dallas Reports, 470. Opiai«n of 
 (!hief Justice Jay. 
 
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDEN JE. Xl 
 
 the first "American Continental Congress," were (.'hosen, and 
 declare themselves chosen by "the good people of the several 
 Colonies" there represented. The powers exerted by it weie 
 exerted for their common protection ; and the Union of the 
 Colonies was symbolized to the world by that of " The Great 
 Union Plag," in which they still recognized their common aK 
 legiance to the crown.* 
 
 Notwithstanding this still recognized allegiance, Congress 
 representing the power of the United people, became, in place 
 of the King, their "supreme Protector;" and ere long, on this 
 protection being withdrawn from its subjects by the Crown, that 
 allegiance was likewise withdrawn, and was transferred to the 
 whole people of the United Colonies represented in that Con- 
 gress. Thus, the Declaration of Independence by the Conti- 
 nental Congress, as the act of " one people," about "to assume 
 among the powers of the earth," a " separate and equal station" 
 — AS ANATION — and "in the name and by the authority of the 
 good people of these colonies," declares, "that these United Colo- 
 nies are, and of right, ought to be free and independent States;" 
 and, as such, " have full power to levy war, conclude peace, con- 
 tract alliances, establish commerce, and to do all other acts and 
 things which independent States may of right do." 
 
 This manifestly was the joint act of all the people of the 
 United colonies of North America, not a single colony being 
 named. It was a Declaration of the Independence of the United 
 colonies — of Great Britain — not of an independence of each 
 colony of the other colonies — it was a declaration of the sove- 
 reignty of the people of the United States conjointly, not of the 
 sovereignty of any one colony, for the colonial condition then 
 ceased ; not of the sovereignty of any one State, for no State 
 Government, with a view to permanence, had then been formed. 
 Hamilton accurately pronounced, before the present Constitu- 
 
 * A flag combining the Crosses of St. George and St. Andrew united (the 
 distinctive Emblem of the United Kingdom of Great Britain) with a Field com- 
 posed of thirteen stripes alternate red and white, the combination of the Flags 
 previously used in the camp, on the cruisers and the floating batteries of the 
 Colonies, was adopted for this purpose, ("the declaration of their union under 
 a common sovereign") and called the "Great Union Flag." — " T'Ae National 
 Flag of the United States," p. 80-85, by Captain, since Major General Schuyler 
 Hamilton. The change from this flag to that of the flag of the United States 
 was ordered by a Resolution of Congress June 14, 1777, thus providing a sub- 
 stitute for the crosses of St. George and St. Andrews, that — "the Union be 
 
 irteen stars, white in a Blue Field — representing a new conttellatio*i." 
 
Xll HISTORICAL NOTICE. 
 
 tion \ru8 established, such to be the true political condition 
 " The Union and Independence of these States are blended and 
 incorporated in one and the same act"* — the Declaration of 
 Independence. " The sovereignty and independence of the 
 people," he declared, "began by & federal act. The Declaration 
 of Independence was the fundamental Constitution of every 
 State." " Congress had complete sovereignty." " Its constitu- 
 tional powers are not controllable by any State. "f 
 
 In prosecution of the great purpose of the Declaration of 
 Independence — the establishment of a nation of free men — Con- 
 gress proceeded in the exertion of many of the sovereign powers 
 necessary to that purpose — powers of action and of prohibition. 
 They had exerted and continued to exert the powers of levying^ 
 war on land and on sea, pledging the whole property of the 
 inhabitants of the twelve Colonies for the redemption of their 
 joint debt; and they had prohibited exportations to the British 
 dominions, with certain exceptions; the receipt and negotiation 
 of British government bills by, or supplies of money to, British 
 officers; and of necessaries to the British army and navy in 
 Massachusetts, or transports in their service,J acting directly 
 upon the people of the United States for many purposes, and 
 through the agency of the States when organized, for other 
 purposes. 
 
 It is not to be supposed that a people keenly jealous of their 
 liberties would long be content with the large discretionary 
 powers Congress was exercising; and, in midsummer of seven- 
 teen hundred and seventy-five, Benjamin Franklin submitted to 
 Congress a sketch of " Articles of Confederation," in the name 
 of " The United Colonies of North America." These articles 
 declared their purpose to be " common defence — the securities 
 of their liberties and properties — the safety of their persons and 
 families — and their mutual and general welfare." They were to 
 " be proposed to the several provincial Conventions or Assem- 
 blies," for their approval and ratification ; and " the Union 
 thereby established," was .to continue firm until a reconciliation 
 with Great Britain ; but, " on failure thereof," the Confederation 
 was "to be perpetual." Conferring upon Congress the power 
 of making "such General Ordinances as though necessary to the 
 general welfare, particular assemblies cannot be competent tj" 
 — they declared, " that each Colony shall enjoy and retain as 
 
 » Hamilton's Works, ii. 358. f Hist. Rep. iii. 16. 
 
 X Journal of Congress, June 2, 1775. 
 
FRAMES OF GOVERNMENTS. XU' 
 
 much as it may think fit of its own present laws, cu8toni.s, rights, 
 privileges, and peculiar jurisdictioris within its own limits; ana 
 may amend its own Constitution, as shall seem best to its own 
 assembly or convention."* Viewed as a merely temporary pro- 
 ject, this scheme was in accordance with the existing condition 
 of affairs ; but regarded in its future, as a plan " to be perpetual," 
 it wanted the" comprehensiveness and reach which that future 
 must demand. It was not acted upon. 
 
 The next step in our political organization was, a recommend- 
 ation to the Colonies to form themselves into Grovernments — 
 first temporarily, then permanently. The terms of this recom- 
 mendation are very significant — to " adopt such Government 
 as shall best conduce to the happiness and safety of their con- 
 stituents, in particular, and to America in general." 
 
 The People of the several Colonies, now emerged from their 
 colonial condition, proceeded under this recommendation, though 
 at long intervals, to the formation of State Constitutions. In 
 all these constitutions are seen a recognition of the then existing 
 Congress by provisions for its continuance, and a reservation, as 
 States, of the powers and rights incident and necessary to the 
 guardianship of their particular interests. 
 
 A month later,f a Declaration of Independence having been 
 ordered to be prepared, a draft of the form of a confederation 
 octween the Colonies was the next day directed to be made 
 Articles of confederation were soon after proposed, in the name 
 of " The United States of America," the second of which declared, 
 that the Colonies " unite themselves so as never to be divided 
 by any act whatever," and enter into a firm league of friendship 
 with each other for "'their common defence, the security of their 
 liberties and their mutual and general welfare."! This draft 
 having undergone frequent modifications — after discussions 
 chiefly affecting the representative power of each State — the 
 measure of its contributions, and their separate or joint interest 
 in the public lands, the "Articles of Confederation" became 
 operative, by the final ratification of them on the first of March, 
 1781, by the State of Maryland. 
 
 A comparison of the Articles ratified with those wh^'ch pre- 
 ceded them, evince a growing jealousy as to the deposit, extent, 
 and exercise of the general powers, necessary to " the mutual 
 *nd general welfare." While in the earlier draft the reserva- 
 
 * Secret Journals of Congress, i. 283, July 21, 1775. 
 
 + June 10, 1776. J Secret Journal, July 12, 1776. 
 
XIV HISTORICAL NOTICE. 
 
 tion wa8 simply "of the sole and exclusive regulation and 
 government of" the " internal police in all matters which shall 
 not interfere with the Articles of the Confederation" — as a 
 provision secondary to the general league — in the later and in 
 the ratified Articles, the primary declaration is, that " each State 
 retains its sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every 
 power, jurisdiction, and right which is not by thi& confederation 
 expressly delegated to the United States in Congress assembled." 
 Even, for a " Council of State" to be appointed by Congress, 
 and to act during its sitting and in its recess — " with power to 
 direct military operations by sea or land" — was substituted a 
 " Committee of Congress" to sit only during its recess ; and it 
 was provided, that no person be allowed to serve in the office of 
 President " of Congress more than one year in any term of 
 three years." 
 
 Instead of a National Government of undefined powers, u 
 had dwindled down to a league of States with limitations incon- 
 sistent with the great purposes and ends of a general govern- 
 ment J and more in the spirit of a penal statute. It had become 
 a mere league of States, disproportionate in territorial dimen- 
 sions, in wealth, in population — each having an equal vote in 
 their general Council, and of these equal votes, nine requisite to 
 the exercise of many of the most important powers conferred — 
 several of those powers of questionable authority because of 
 the intercipient reservations of powers in the States, and with- 
 out any common exponent; and it fixed a measure of contribu- 
 tion unequal, impracticable, and therefore never carried into 
 effect — with a process of requisitions, not of impositions — 
 without legislative departments, without a Judiciary, without ai- 
 Executive — without any direct relation to, or civil power over 
 the People as individuals, whose general welfare was committed 
 to it, and with a debated question as to whom allegiance was 
 due. " The Union," in the words of Hamilton, originally had 
 " complete sovereignty." " The Confederation was an abridge- 
 ment of this original sovereignty."* Although not binding 
 upon any of the States until its ratification by the whole, the 
 influence on the public mind of this very imperfect contrivance 
 was prominent in the proceedings of Congress and of the States 
 — delaying, and imperilling, during several years of the revolu- 
 tionary contest, the independence and sovereignty it professed 
 to assure. 
 
 * Hamilton's Works, i. 858. 
 
IMBECILE CONDITION OF THE COUNTRY. XV 
 
 The Congress issued pledges for money it h^d no means to 
 \)&y, called for soldiers it had no means to support, entered into 
 treaties it could not fulfil; while States endangered and did 
 injustice to their associate States, by disproportionate, inade- 
 quate, contributions of men and money ;* by the assumption of 
 powers inconsistent with a community of rights ; and by the 
 refusal of powers essential to the preservation of those rights.f 
 
 In Virginia it was proposed to abolish all private commerce 
 and to establish commercial companies including a State, or 
 parts of a State in districts. Their commercial operations were 
 to be represented by stock ; the price of every article to be fixed 
 by the companies ; and the power to be conferred upon them 
 •■' of taking private goods into their custody ;" — called a plan 
 •' for appreciating the currency and reducing the price of neces- 
 saries," An embargo of provisions followed. And the day after 
 Jefferson's election as Governor — the second of June, 1779 — 
 fearful of the breaking up of the Confederacy, and to secure u 
 strong foreign protector; a resolution unanimously passed her 
 legislature, by which, " the treaties of Alliance and Commerce 
 between France and the Congress of the United States were 
 ratified, confirmed, and declared binding; so far as in the power 
 of this Commonwealth." A special favor from France wa» 
 granted to her. 
 
 The sufferings in Virginia were a type of the general condi- 
 tion of this country. " The enemy," Washington wrote in 
 November seventy-nine, "are in great hopes of terminating the 
 war in their favor in another campaign, as they expect confidently 
 the entire ruin of our money and a failure of provisions for the 
 supply .of our army." In the following month, he again wrote 
 
 • Th« ineflSciency of Virginia, the then most populous State of the Confede- 
 racy, is thus exposed by.its Governor Patrick Henry: — "Public spirit seems 
 to have taken its flight from Virginia. It is too much the case; for the quota 
 of OUT troops is not half made up, and no chance seems to remain for com- 
 pleting it. Great bounties are offered. But I fear the only effect will be to 
 expose our State to contempt, for, I believe no soldiers will enlist, especially 
 in the Infantry. Can you credit it? No effort was made for supporting or 
 restoring public credit. I pressed it warmly on some, but in vain. This is 
 the reason you get no soldiers. Let not Congress rely on Virginia for soldiers. 
 I tell you my opinion — they will not be got here, until a different spirit pre- 
 vails."— ifmoir of R. H. Lee, i. 195. 1778. 
 Washington soon after wrote, "At present they are but a handful, oom- 
 
 ared to the quota they should furnish, and unless something is done, thlB 
 
 andful will dwindle to nothing." — Hist. Repub. i. 559. 
 
<V1 HISTORICAL NOTICE. 
 
 I find our prospects are infinitely worse than they have been, 
 jtt any period of the war, and unless some expedient can be 
 nstantly adopted, a dissolution of the army for the want of 
 subsistence is unavoidable. * * * We have never experienced 
 a like extremity at any period of the war." Well might be 
 feared " the entire ruin of the money." The bills in circulation 
 amounted to the enormous sum of one hundred and sixty millions 
 of dollars — and the total product of the taxes since the begin- 
 ning of the war was only three millions. 
 
 It was in the midst of this chaotic confusion, this vast dis- 
 tress, so discouraging to the people, and so encouraging to the 
 enemy — five years of indecisive war having nearly elapsed — 
 that Hamilton (Washington's " principal and most confidential 
 aid,") familiar with all his embarrassments and intimate with all 
 the wants of the army and of the country, at the age of twenty- 
 two, soon after the army entered winter quarters at Morristown, 
 is seen to "have projected an enlarged plan for the restoration of 
 the public credit, proposing an indispensable change in the 
 whole administration of the public affairs. After an argued 
 exposition of this plan, ho wrote, " Congress have too long 
 neglected to organize a good scheme of administration and to 
 throw public business into proper Executive Departments. 
 For commerce, I prefer a Board, but for most other things 
 single men. We want a Minister of War, a Minister of Foreign 
 Affairs, a Minister of Finance, and a Minister of Marine. There 
 is always more decisioTi, more dispatch, more secrecy, more 
 responsibility, where single men, than where bodies are con- 
 cerned. By a plan of this kind we should blend the advan- 
 tages of a Monarchy and a Eepublic in a happy and beneficial 
 Union."* 
 
 The adoption of this plan was not immediate, but the almost 
 desperate situation of affairsf prompted acfd induced Congress, 
 though reluctantly, to vest certain executive powers in a com 
 mittee of its own body. The immediate motive to this measure 
 was an occurrence which was of great immediate benefit, but 
 was afterwards productive of most deleterious consequenoAo 
 
 * History of Republic, i. 577. 1779. 
 
 f Ibid. ii. 11, February 25, 1780. " Re-inforcements are expected — General 
 iiagan is within a few miles. The Virginia troops are somewhere ! Assistance 
 from that sister State has been expected these eighteen months." Colonel Laurens 
 to General Lincoln — who, for want of this aid, was compelled to surrender 
 Charleston. 
 
FOREIGN AID — FOREIGN INFLUENCE. XVU 
 
 The American people, instead of the glory of achieving theii 
 final victorj' by their own unassisted valor, were obliged to ask 
 foreign aid. Foreign arms now came ; and subsequently abusing 
 its gratitude, foreign influence, for a time, poisoned the councils 
 of this yet infant nation. " It appears to me," Hamilton wrote 
 by the order and in the name of "Washington, " of the greatest 
 importance, and even of absolute necessity that a small com- 
 mittee should be immediately appointed to reside near Head 
 Quarters, vested with all the powers Congress have, so far as 
 respects the purpose of a full co-operation with the French fleet 
 and army on the continent. Their authority should be plenipo- 
 tentiary J to draw out men and supplies of every kind and to 
 give their sanction to any operations which the commander in 
 chief may not think himself at liberty to undertake without it, 
 as well beyond as within the limits of these States. This com- 
 mittee can act with dispatch and energy. The conjuncture is 
 one of the most critical and important we have seen. All our 
 prudence and exertions are required to give it a favorable issue. 
 Hesitancy and delay would, in all probability, ruin our affairs."* 
 A committee was appointed, but its powers were far short of 
 those suggested in this letter. Critical as was the state of the 
 public affairs, no adequate remedy had been provided. The 
 Emissions of credit bills were almost valueless. This accumula- 
 tion of promisesf fell to the ground; and Congress at last 
 adopted the measures proposed by Hamilton the preceding year, 
 — by a pledge to reimburse the subscribers to a Bank, and by 
 the sending a commissioner to Europe to negotiate a Loan. 
 The continental paper money had "been a substitute for Eevenue. 
 This failing, the fate of the Eevolution was cast on the voluntary 
 action of twelve States ungoverned by a common government, 
 untied by any other tie than their common necessities. This 
 was the natural and necessary consequence of the impotence 
 which had prevailed. The repeated recommendations of Con- 
 gress without power to enforce them, were as repeated procla- 
 mations of weakness. The influence of a lavish treasury, ceasing 
 with the cessation of the emissions of bills of credit, Congress 
 was almost without weight ; and the patriotism of many was 
 seen to sink in an equal ratio with the scale of the paper depre- 
 ciation. The actual power being in the States, this portion of 
 society turred towards them, and gave to their real an artificial, 
 
 * History of Republic, ii. 17, April 28, 1780. -f Ibid. 77. 
 
 2 
 
X.V111 HISTOKICAL NOTICE. 
 
 baneful preponderance — " Congress," to use the words of a 
 member,* " gradually surrendering or throwing iipon the several 
 States the exercise of powers they should have retained, and to 
 their utmost have exercised themselves, until at length they 
 have scarce a power left, but such as concerns foreign transac- 
 tions." The repeated recommendations to the States were not 
 the only public admissions of weakness. All the measures to 
 impart a temporary force to the action of Congress were equally 
 acknowledgments of its want of power. The dictatorial au- 
 thority conferred upon "Washington was the most objectionable 
 form national necessities could assume. Thus, every motive of 
 experience, of justice, of honor, of reputation, of interest, of 
 safety — demanded a Government of the People of the United 
 States, a general will and a general united power to direct, 
 express and enforce that will — in Hamilton's words, " a solid 
 COERCIVE Union." 
 
 The great industrial interests of New England early felt and 
 early suggested a concert of action ; and by successive conven- 
 tions prepared the way for this great measure of political salva- 
 tion. A Convention held at Providence in 'seventy-six was 
 followed by another at Springfield of the four New England 
 States and of New York, in 'seventy-seven. A third convention 
 met at New Haven in 'seventy-eight, where New Jersey and 
 Pennsylvania are stated also to have been present; and a fourth 
 at Hartford in 'seventy-nine. The earlier conventions had in 
 view limited but important, though, in part, impracticable, 
 objects. The last convention shewed a great advance in public 
 opinion. Massachusetts, at that time, the first of the States in 
 active power and large intelligence, instructed her delegates, 
 not only to consult as to measures to prevent a further depre- 
 ciation of the money medium, but " to agree on a mode of inter- 
 nal trade and commerce in consistency with the general welfare;" 
 and invited a larger meeting of Commissioners. This fifth Con- 
 vention was held at Philadelphia on the twenty-ninth of January , 
 'eighty, at which were present the New England States, New 
 Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland. New York was 
 unavoidably absent, her legislature not having met to appoint 
 commissioners ; and Virginia was not represented. The objec- 
 tion to her conferring on Congress a power of taxation — that 
 such taxes would fall upon the owners of lands was soon after 
 
 * John Matthews, of S/»n»h Carolina. 
 
INCREASED POWERS TO CONGRESS RECOMMENDIilJ. XIX 
 
 urged Eesolved to ascertain definitely her views, the President 
 of this convention was directed to request the Governor of that 
 State, " to give the earliest notice of her determination' as to 
 meeting the other States in Convention. Waiting her concur- 
 rence, it adjourned first until February, and then to April; when 
 a call was made for a meeting in August. At this Sixth con 
 vention the only States represented were Massachusetts, Con- 
 necticut and New Hampshire. 
 
 Wise resolutions as to finance were there passed; and the 
 great, much to be desired result, an invigoration of the power 
 of the general Government, was approached. " They conceived 
 it," they declared, " to be essential to our final safety, that the 
 Union of these States be fixed in a more solid and permanent 
 manner, — that the power of Congress be more clearly ascer- 
 tained and defined, — and that the important national concerns 
 of the United States be under the superintendency and direction 
 of one Supreme head — that the proper estimates of our public 
 wants be seasonably made ; and the necessary resources drawn 
 forth and expended." With this purpose, the States were 
 recommended " to invest their Delegates in Congress with 
 powers competent for the Government and direction of all those 
 common and national affairs, whioh do not, nor can come within 
 the jurisdiction of the particular States;" urging " a permanent 
 system — establishing proper Boards, oflScers, and regulations 
 for the direction of the several Departments necessary to be 
 executed under Congress." — To carry this proposal into effect, 
 a new confederation was to be acceded to by the States. 
 
 Insufficient as these suggestions were, Hamilton grasped at 
 them as a promise of greater good. The powers proposed to 
 be conferred would indeed be only revocable grants, at the 
 mercy of any State; and as the public mind then was, the pro- 
 bability that the States would concur in conferring them was 
 small. But these proceedings proved, that the necessity of a 
 change was widely felt ; and he resolved to endeavor by his 
 counsels to rescue the great cause of American liberty from its 
 present, its menacing, and menaced dangers. 
 
 An inaccurate statement of the proceedings of this Convention 
 reached him by the twenty eighth of August ; and on the third of 
 September, seventeen hundred and eighty, in conformity with a 
 previous promise, he communicated to a member of Congress, the 
 grave thoughts with which his mind long had laboured. The 
 enquiry during his non-age, written in his company pay-book, 
 
TX HISTORICAL NOIICE. 
 
 • 
 
 "Would it not be advisable to let all taxes, even those imposed 
 by the States, be collected by persons of Congressional appoint- 
 ment" ?* indicates the early direction of his views; and he subse- 
 quently wrote, " it has ever been my opinion that Congress ought 
 to have complete sovereignty in all but the mere municipal law of 
 each State." This opinion is expatiated upon in this communica- 
 tion, very important in itself and most important in all its conse- 
 quences,! generally admitted to be the first proposal made in 
 this country of a Convention to frame a National Government. 
 
 " The fundamental defect," Hamilton observed. " is a want of 
 power in Congress. It is hardly worth while to show in what 
 this consists as it seems to be universally acknowledged ; or to 
 point out, how it has happened, as the only question is, how to 
 remedy it. It may however be said, that it has originated from 
 three causes — an excess of the spirit of liberty, which has made 
 the particular States show a jealousy of all power not in their 
 own hands ; and this jealousy has led them to exercise a right 
 of judging in the last resort, of the measures recommended by 
 Congress, and of acting according to their own opinions of their 
 propriety or necessity, — a diffidence in Congress of their own 
 powers, by which they have been timid and indecisive in their 
 resolutions, constantly making concessions to the States, till 
 they have scarcely left themselves the shadow of power : — a 
 want of sufficient means at their disposal to answer the public 
 exigencies, and of vigor to draw forth those means, which have 
 occasioned them to depend on the States individually to fulfil 
 their engagements with the army, the consequence of which 
 has been to ruin their influence and credit with the army, to 
 establish its dependance on each State separately, rather than 
 on them — that is than on the whole collectively. It may be 
 pleaded that Congress had never any definitive powers granted 
 them ; and of course could exercise none — could do nothing more 
 than recommend. The manner in which Congress was appointed 
 would warrant, and the public good required, that they should 
 have considered themselves ; as vested with full power to pre- 
 serve the Republic from harm. 
 
 " They have done many of the highest acts of sovereignty, 
 which were always cheerfully submitted to — the declaration of 
 independence, — the declaration of war, — the levying an army. — 
 creating a navy, — emitting money, — making alliances witn 
 
 * Hist. Repub. i. pp. 4, 7. 
 
 f Ibid. ii. 86. Humilton to James Duane, Sept. 8, ITbC- 
 
INEFFICIENCY OF THE CONFEDERATION. XXl 
 
 Foreign powers — appointing a Dictator, etc. All tliese were 
 implications of a complete sovereignty, were never disputed 
 and ought to have been a standard for the conduct of adminis- 
 tration. Undefined powers are discretionary powers, limited 
 only by the object for which they were given ; — in the present 
 case, the independence and freedom of America. The Confede- 
 ration made no difference; for as it has not been generally 
 adopted, it had no operation. 
 
 *' But, from what I recollect of it. Congress have even de- 
 scended from the authority which the spirit of that act gives 
 them, while the particular States have no farther attended to it, 
 than as it suited their pretensions and convenience. It would 
 take too much time to enter into particular instances, each of 
 which separately might appear inconsiderable, but united are 
 of serious import. I only mean to remark, not to censure. 
 
 "But, the Confederation itself is defective and requires to be 
 altered. It is neither fit for war, nor peace. The idea of an 
 uncontrollable sovereignty in each State, over its internal 
 police, will defeat the other powers given to Congress, and 
 make our Union feeble and precarious. There are instances 
 without number, where acts necessary for the general good, 
 and which rise out of the powers given to Congress must 
 interfere with the internal police of the States; and there 
 are as many instances in which the particular States by ar- 
 rangements of internal police can effectually, though indirectly, 
 counteract the arrangements of Congress. You have already 
 had examples of this, for which I refer you to your own 
 memory. 
 
 " The Confederation," he proceeds, " gives the States indivi- 
 dually too much influence in the affairs of the army. They 
 should have nothing to do with it. The entire formation and 
 disposal of our military forces ought to belong to Congress. It 
 is an essential cement of the Union ; and it ought to be the 
 policy of Congress to destroy all ideas of State attachments in 
 the army and make it look up to them. The Confederation too, 
 gives the powers of the purse too entirely to the State legisla- 
 tures. It should provide perpetual funds in the disposal of Coc 
 gress by a land-tax, poll tax, or the like. All Imposts upon 
 commerce ought to be laid by Congress and appropriated to 
 their own use. For without certain revenues, a Government 
 can have no power. That power which holds the purse strings 
 absolutely must rule. This seems to be a medium which with- 
 
XXll HISTORICAL NOTICE. 
 
 out making Congress altogether independent will tend to givo 
 reality to its authority. Another defect in ovtr system is want 
 of method and energy in the administration. This has partly 
 resulted from the other defect, but, in a great degree, from 
 prejudice and the want of a proper Executive. Congress 
 have kept the power too much in their own hands, and have 
 meddled too much with details of every sort. Congress is pro- 
 perly a deliberative corps ; and it forgets itself when it attempts 
 to play the Executive." Passing on from particular errors, ho 
 advanced to a fuller statement. " The Confederation, in my 
 opinion, should give Congress complete sovereignty ; except as 
 to that part of internal police which relates to the rights of pro- 
 perty and life among individuals, and to raising money by 
 internal taxes. It is necessary, that every thing belonging to 
 this should be regulated by the State legislatures. Congres.«i 
 should have complete sovereignty in all that relates to war. 
 peace, trade, and finance, and to the management of foreign 
 affairs; the right of declaring war, of raising armies, officer- 
 ing, paying them, directing their motions in every respect ; of 
 equipping fleets, and doing the same with them ; of building 
 fortifications, arsenals, magazines &c. &c. ; of making peace on 
 such conditions as they think proper; of regulating Trade, 
 determining with what countries it shall be carried on, grantiny 
 indulgences, laying prohibitions on all the articles of export or 
 import: imposing duties, granting bounties, and premiums for 
 raising, exporting or importing ; and applying to their own use 
 the product of these duties, only giving credit to the State on 
 whom they are raised in the general account of revenues and 
 expense; instituting Admiralty Courts, &c. ; of coining money, 
 establishing Banks, on such terms and with such privileges as 
 they think proper; appropriating funds, and doing whatever 
 else relates to the operations of finance, transacting every 
 thing with foreign nations ; making alliances, offensive and 
 defensive, treaties of commerce &c. &c." 
 
 " The Confederation should provide certain perpetual revenuew, 
 productive and easy of collection ; a land tax — poll tax — or the 
 like, which, together with the duties on trade, and the unlocated 
 lands, would give Congress a substantial existence ; and a stable 
 foundation for their schemes of finance." The next step recom- 
 mended by him, was, a repetition of that of the previous year— 
 the appointment of Five " great officers of State." Another step 
 was, the recruiting of the Army for the war, or at least lor three 
 
HAMILTON URGES A CONVENTION. XXIU 
 
 years — and eventually a draft — and the placing the officers on 
 half pay. " The providing supplies," he added, " is the pivot of 
 every thing else;" and four ways to be united are mentioned — 
 " a foreign loan — heavy pecuniary taxes — a tax in kind — and a 
 Bank founded on public and private credit." 
 
 Having stated the want in Congress of powers, competent to 
 the public exigencies, he observed as to the remedy; "This 
 may happen in two ways : one by resuming and exercising the 
 discretionary powers, I suppose to have been originally vested 
 in them for the safety of the States, and resting their conduct 
 on the candor of their countrymen and the necessity of the con- 
 juncture ; — the other by calling immediately a Convention of 
 all the States with full authority to conclude finally upon a 
 general confederation ; stating to them beforehand explicitly 
 the evils arising from a want of power in Congress and the im- 
 possibility of supporting the contest on its present footing ; that 
 tbe Delegates may come possessed of proper sentiments, as well 
 as proper authority to give efficacy to the meeting." ..." The 
 reasons for which I require them to be vested with plenipoten- 
 tiary authority are, that the business may suffer no delay in the 
 execution, and may in reality come into effect. A Convention 
 may agree upon a Confederation, the States individually never 
 will. We must have one at all events, and a vigorous one ; if 
 we mean to succeed in the contest and be happy hereafter. 1 
 am persuaded a solid confederation, a permanent army, a reason- 
 able prospect of subsisting it would give us treble consideration 
 ill Europe and produce a peace this winter. If a Convention is 
 called, the minds of all the States and the people ought to be 
 prepared to receive its determinations by sensible and popular 
 writings which should conform to the views of Congress.". . . 
 " The measure of a convention would revive the hopes of the 
 People, and give a new direction to their passions, which may 
 be improved in carrying points of substantial utility." 
 
 Six days after the date of this remarkable letter, New York, 
 in the person of General Schuyler, who was in intimate com- 
 munion with Hamilton, in answer to a message from its Gov- 
 ernor, avowed its strong convictions.* " Our embarrassments 
 'n the prosecution of the war," Governor Clinton then declared, 
 " are chiefly to be attributed to a defect of power in those who 
 ought to exercise a Supreme jurisdiction; for while Congress 
 
 * Hist. Repub. ii. 110, 111, 112. 
 
CUV HISTORICAL NOTICE. 
 
 only recommend, and the different States deliberate upon the 
 propriety of the recommendation, we cannot expect a union of 
 force or council." " We perceive," Schuyler answered in behalf 
 of the Senate, " the defects in the present system and the neces- 
 sity of a supreme and coercive power m the government of these 
 States ; and are persuaded, that unless Congress ai'e authorized 
 to direct uncontrollably the operations of war, and enabled to 
 enforce a compliance with their requisitions, the common force 
 can never be properly united." 
 
 This idea of enforcing States seemed at these critical times to 
 be the only remedy in view ; and in fact, in such a confedera- 
 tion, force was the only possible sanction for the laws. Beside 
 contemplating the appointment of a Dictator, with a Vice Dic- 
 tator in each State, to be recommended by a seventh convention 
 about to meet at Hartford, New York, by a unanimous vote, in- 
 structed her delegates to it, " to propose and agree, that Con- 
 gress, during the present war or until a perpetual Confederation 
 shall be completed, should be explicitly authorized and em- 
 powered to exercise every power which they may deem neces- 
 sary for the effectual prosecution of the war ;" and that, when- 
 ever it shall appear to them that any State is deficient in its 
 contributions, they should " direct the Commander in Chief 
 without delay to march the army, or such part of it as may be 
 requisite in such State; and, by military force, compel it to 
 furnish its deficiency." 
 
 Eash as this proposal was,* it was only a proposal to carry 
 into effect upon a more extended scale a recent precedent in 
 Pennsylvania; where, a few months before, martial law was 
 proclaimed, to enable the State officers to procure supplies for 
 the army — ; Nor was this substitution of the arbitrary violence 
 of military law for the regular and mild processes of civil gov- 
 ernment, only approved in the Middle States. In the following 
 month, a leading delegate to Congress from Virginia, among his 
 first essaysf in that body, proposed as an expedient, that the 
 requisite supplies for the army " be impressed with vigor and 
 impartiality, and paid for in certificates not transferable ; and to 
 be redeemable at some period subsequent to the war, at specie 
 value, and bearing an intermediate interest." The advantages 
 promised were — an anticipation "of the future revenues of 
 
 * Hist. Rep. ii. 112, 1780. 
 
 f By James Madison — Madison Papers, i. 6t>. October 1780. 
 
DANGEKS OF AX UNBALANCED GOVERNMENT. XXV 
 
 peace," — " the compelling the people to lend the public their com 
 modities ; and that it would be a 'permanent resource by whicn 
 the war might be supported as long as the earth would yield its 
 increase." It was to be a system of impress — of forced loans — 
 which, merely as an occasional resort, Hamilton had recently 
 condemned as " violent, unequal, oppressive and odious." 
 
 Such are the dangers of an unbalanced government. It 
 threatened, as Hamilton afterwards deprecated, that " anarchy 
 would shoot into monarchy." Defeat and disaster following, 
 only called forth the powers of Hamilton's mind, in repeated 
 calls by him for increased governmental energies, but all were 
 to be the energies of an adequately constituted government. 
 " But, above all things," he wrote, " let us have without delay a 
 vigorous government, and a well constituted army for the war."* 
 " We must have an administration distinct from Congress, and 
 in the hands of single men, under their orders."f " I am sorry 
 to find," referring to his recent letter of September, "we do not 
 seem to agree in the proper remedies to our disorders, at least 
 in the practicability of applying those which are proper. Con- 
 vinced, as I am, of the absolute insufficiency of our present 
 system to our safety, if I do not despair of the Eepublic, it is 
 more the effect of constitution than of judgment. "| The disasters 
 which pressed at this time, were occurring at the South, whence 
 General Greene wrote to him ; " There is nothing but murders 
 and devastations in every quarter. Government here is much 
 more popular than to the northward; and there is no such 
 thing as national character or national sentiment. The inhabit- 
 ants are numerous, but they would be rather formidable abroad 
 than at home. There is a great spirit of enterprize among the 
 black people, and those that come out as volunteers are not a little 
 formidable to the enemy. "§ On the twelfth of December pre- 
 vious, a circular from the Convention, which had met at Hart- 
 ford, addressed to the several States, was presented to Congress. 
 This Convention proposed, " that the several States should make 
 the necessary provisions by law, to enable Congress to levy and 
 collect such taxes, and duties within them respectively, as Con- 
 gress should call for ;" and that the delegates thereto should be 
 authorized to pledge the faith of their respective States that 
 they will pass the requisite laws for that purpose. The States 
 
 * Hist. Kep. ii. 124 — Hamilton to Duane. 
 
 t Ibid. 134, to Isaac Sears, Oct. 12, 1780. % Ibid. 135, to Duane. 
 
 2 Hist. Rep. ii. 164, Greene to HamiHon, January 10, 1781. 
 
JCXVI HISTORICAL NOTICE, 
 
 were called upon to sink their full quotas of the continental 
 bills ; and were to call " for a return of the number of persons, 
 blacks as well as whites, in each State," as the basis of a rule 
 of contribution.* This circular boldly urged the necessity of 
 these grants. " Our present embarrassments, we imagine to 
 arise in a great measure from a defect in the present government 
 of the United States. All government supposes the power of 
 coercion. This power, however, in the general government of 
 the Continent never did exist ; or which has produced equally 
 disagreeable consequences, never has been exercised. By the 
 expulsion of the enemy we may be emancipated from the 
 tyranny of Great Britain. "We shall however, be without a 
 solid hope of peace and freedom, unless we are properly ce- 
 mented among ourselves ; and, although we feel the calamities 
 of war, yet we have not sufficient inducements to wish a period 
 to them, until our distresses, if other means cannot effect it, 
 have, as it were, forced us into a Union." In pursuance of its 
 suggestion, a Continental Judicature was ere long appointed by 
 Congress, " for the trial and determination of all causes, in 
 relation to offences committed against the United States in the 
 civil departments thereof."f 
 
 These departments were soon after constituted. On the tenth 
 of January, seventeen hundred and eighty one, Hamilton's 
 proposal of " an Administration by single men" was brought 
 before Congress ;J and subsequently a Secretary of Foreign 
 affairs — a Superintendent of Finance — a Secretary of Marine — 
 and a Secretary of War were appointed, with defined powers. 
 Hamilton was in contemplation as head of the finance, but 
 Robert Morris was wisely elected. § 
 
 This measure gave much alarm, yet in despite of factions 
 jealousies and opposition. Congress recommended to the States, 
 " as indispensably necessary to vest Congress with a power to 
 levy for the use of the United States," a duty on imports, and 
 on condemned prizes and prize goods. Wiser and more honest 
 counsels had now begun to prevail ; and this body, being without 
 power to provide any means for their redemption, declared that 
 their bills of credit, should not be a tender, in any other manner, 
 than at their current value compared with gold and silver ;|| and 
 
 * Hist. Rep. ii. 198. t Ibid. ii. 199. 
 
 X Duane, to whom Hamilton had proposed this measure, was of this Com 
 inittee. Ibid. ii. 200. 
 i Ibid. 201 II February 3, 1781. 
 
HAMILTON AGAIN URGES A CONVENTION. XXVU 
 
 recommended the States, where laws making paper bills a teudei 
 still existed, to repeal those laws.* But the dominant jealousy 
 yet prevailed j and a proposal to vest Congress with the exclu- 
 sive right of laying duties on all imports, and that these duties 
 should be uniform, was rejected. Hamilton, nevertheless, with 
 unfailing purpose, soon after renewed his financial suggestions, 
 and again urged a Convention. " 'Tis, in a National bank, alone," 
 he wrote, " that we can find the ingredients to constitute a 
 wholesome, solid, and beneficial paper credit." " Congress 
 must," he added, '' demand an instant, positive, and perpetual 
 investiture of an Impost on trade, a land tax, and a poll tax to 
 be collected by their own agents. This Act to become a part of tho 
 Confederation. It has ever been my opinion, that Congress 
 ought to have complete sovereignty in all, but the mere munici- 
 pal law of each State ; and I wish to see a Convention of all 
 THE States, with full power to alter and amend, finally and 
 irrevocably, the present futile and senseless Confederation."f 
 Ere the end of the following month, a bank was chartered by 
 Congress-! 
 
 Hamilton's plan of a national bank was, it is seen, but a part 
 of that larger system of measures on which his mind was fixed. 
 His proposed Convention of all the States to establish a Consti- 
 tution of Government, met with little countenance in Congress. 
 The Articles of Confederation were to them a new, and an 
 untried experiment. Not alive to the dangers of unbalanced 
 power, they were content to seek relief to the public necessities, 
 in solicitations to the States, to vest them with new powers. 
 "With this view, a grand committee, as it was called, of the 
 States ; after frequent deliberations, presented a report to Con- 
 gress late in July 1781, nearly three months subsequent to 
 Hamilton's letter to Morris. After enumerating the instances 
 in which the Confederation needed execution, it recommended a 
 grant by the States of certain specified powers; — a grant of 
 powers, from their very nature, certain to be refused. Of these 
 proposed powers, one was " to prescribe rules for impressing 
 property into the service of the United States during the present 
 war;" another was, "to distrain the property of a State delinquent 
 in its assigned proportion of men or money;" with which wore 
 
 * A short time before, Virginia enacted a law rendering her paper a legtu 
 tenatr. Eamund Pendleton to Madison, Dec. 4, 1780. 
 • 1 Hist. Rep. ii. 224. Hamilton to Robert Morris, April 80, 1781. 
 
 t Ibid. 227, May 26, 1781. 
 
XXVm HISTORICAL NOTICE. 
 
 Others of obvious utility — to appoint collectors of, and direct the 
 mode of accounting for taxes imposed, to admit into the Union 
 any part or more of the dismembered States, to stipulate in 
 treaties with foreign nations for the establishment of consular 
 powers without reference to the States individually ; to vary the 
 rules of suffrage in Congress ; adding the paralysing limitation 
 " to require a concurrence of two thirds of the States" in the 
 exercise of the most urgent powers — those, " of emitting bills of 
 credit, or of borrowing money; the regulating the value of 
 coin; determining the total number of land and sea forces, and 
 allotting to each State its quota of men or money; fixing the 
 number and force of vessels of war, and appointing a commander 
 in chief of the army and navy." 
 
 The proposition to the States to impart to Congress the power 
 of distraint upon them in case of delinquency — and the proposed 
 limitations on several general and necessary powers, are among 
 the most remarkable incidents in the political history of this 
 country; yet New York had urged the grant of this power of 
 distraint, and it had been vindicated by a delegate from Vir- 
 ginia, on the ground, that, " as the confederation now stands, and 
 according to the nature even of alliances much less intimate, 
 there is an implied right of coercion against the delinquent party, 
 and the exercise of it by Congress," " whenever a palpable ne- 
 cessity occurs, will probably be acquiesced in."* 
 
 * Madison to Jefferson, April 16, 1781 — Madison papers, i. 87. Jefferson 
 sustained this right subsequently on the ground that it was not necessary to 
 give Congress that power expressly, "<Aey have it by the law of nature.'^ Jef- 
 ferson's writings, ii. 203. The proposed report is in these words; "It is 
 understood and hereby declared in case one or more of the Confederated States 
 shall refuse or neglect to abide by the determinations of Congress, and to observe 
 all the Articles of Confederation, as required by the 13th Article, the said 
 United States in Congress assembled are fully authorized to employ the force 
 of the United States, as well by sea as by land, to compel such State or Statet 
 to fulfil their federal engagements ; and particularly to make distraint on any 
 of the effects, vessels, and merchandizes of such State or States, or of any of 
 the citizens thereof, wherever found; and to prohibit and prevent their trade and 
 intercourse as well with any other of the United States and the citizens thereof 
 as with any foreign State, and as well by land as by sea; until full compensa- 
 tion or compliance be obtained with respect to all requisitions made by th» 
 United States in Congress assembled, in pursuance of the Articles of Con- 
 federation." This new article was "to be binding on all the States not actually 
 In possession of the enemy, as soon as the same shall be acceded to and ratified 
 by each of the said States." Report to Congress for consideration — Madison 
 Papers, i. 89 
 
HAMILTON WRITES " THE CONTINENTALIST". Xxix 
 
 What the probability of this acquiescence was, may be judged 
 from the past history of this country ; for this tremendous power, 
 the analogy to which is seen in the worst feature of the ancient 
 confederacies, proving fatal to them ; contemplated the delinquency 
 of, and distraint not merely of one, but of "one or more States." 
 Well might Hamilton pronounce it a proposition to enact a 
 civil war I That, in war, Government should rise with plume 
 and mighty arms to the exertion of all the energies which war 
 demands, is at times, the great necessity, the very condition o*" 
 its existence; but that these energies should be so exerted as to 
 cause the least unnecessary sacrifice of public and private rights, 
 and interests ; and that in peace. Government by itb manly 
 prudence, avoiding war, should by its policy render peace truly 
 a blessing, these Hamilton felt, were objects worthy all a States- 
 man's care. Looking also, upon the States as essential parts of 
 a compound Federal system, he never forgat, that they were 
 '' artificial beings" — existing and to exist for certain limited 
 purposes; but regarding first and most the all involving genera] 
 interests, before his clear view ever was present the grand per- 
 spective of the people of the United States, as one nation. 
 And thus, it was, the steady aim of his whole life, that this 
 Unity should be perpetuated, not merely by parchment forms 
 and artificial ties, but by the lasting ties of a great brotherhood 
 of mutual aff'ections and interests under paternal counsels, able 
 not only to direct but to protect. To him nothing was more 
 distasteful than an irregular and unnecessary exercise of power. 
 Order working by its proper means to secure and enlarge the 
 sphere of order, was all his favorite thought — Moderation in the 
 selection and use of means, his favorite practice. To effect a 
 permanent system of order, was with him as yet, only a hope ; 
 but to aid in securing the present means, by which that hope 
 might become a certainty, was a duty. He felt it to be such. 
 Hitherto he had confined himself to private instances. Now he 
 came forward, and opened his embassy of great truths to all the 
 people. Having temporarily retired from active service in the 
 army ; while Congress were engaged in preparing the recom- 
 mendations to the States, previously mentioned, he wrote a 
 series of essays, " to confirm an opinion already pretty gene- 
 rally received, that it was necessary to augment the powers of 
 riie Confederation ;" and to fix the public judgment definitely 
 on the points which ought to compose that augmentation. 
 These Essays — the precursors of the Federalist, — he entitled, as 
 
XXX HISTORICAL NOTICE. 
 
 a term most expressive of their purpose — "■ The Continentalist," 
 the first of which was published on the twelfth of July seven- 
 teen hundred and eighty one. They open in a tone of kind 
 persuasion, well adapted to conciliate and to enlighten the 
 prevailing doubts, and fears, and prejudices. Then, stating the 
 object of his remarks — to shew " a want of power in Congress," 
 thej' jjroceed. " History is full of examples, where in coutesta 
 for liberty, a jealousy of power has either defeated the attempts 
 to recover or preserve it in the first instance, or has afterwards 
 subverted it by clogging the government with too great precau- 
 tions for its felicity, or by leaving too wide a door for sedition 
 and popular licentiousness. In a government framed for durable 
 liberty, not less regard must be paid to giving the Magistrate a 
 proper degree of authority to make and execute the laws with 
 vigor, than to guard against encroachments upon the rights of 
 the community. As too much power leads to despotism, too 
 little leads to anarchy ; and both eventually to the ruin of the 
 people. ... If the Federal government is too weak at first, it 
 will continually grow weaker. The ambition and local interests 
 of the respective members, will be constantly undermining and 
 usurping upon its prerogatives, till it comes to a dissolution ; if a 
 partial combination of some of the more powerful ones does not 
 bring it to a more speedy and violent end." 
 
 Having, in the succeeding numbers, strongly marked the dis- 
 tinctive dangers proper to a single State and to a Confederacy ; 
 and, from a comparison of the different situations of the United 
 States with those of the European Confederacies, drawn the 
 conclusion, that, " if the Federal government should lose its 
 
 AUTHORITY," CIVIL WarS '* WOULD CERTAINLY FOLLOW," he poiutS 
 
 to the probability of the larger States, in a short time become 
 "prosperous, rich, and powerful, being inspired with ambition 
 and nourishing ideas of separation and independence." " Though, 
 it will ever be their true interest to preserve the Union, their 
 vanity and self importance will be very likely to overpower 
 that motive; and make them seek to place themselves at the 
 head of particular confederacies, independent of the general 
 one. A schism once introduced, competitions of boundary and 
 rivalships of commerce will easily afford pretexts for war." The 
 prostrate condition of this country; not from a deficiency of 
 resources, but from a wart of governmental power to employ 
 them, is the next, and a most fertile and instructive topic; 
 teaching the conclusion ; that " we ought, without delay, tc> 
 
WANT OF A POWER TO REGULATE TRADE. XXXi 
 
 enlarge the powers of Congress. Everj^ plan, of which this is 
 not the foundation, will be illusory. The separate exertions of 
 the States will never suffice. Nothing but a well proportioned 
 exertion of the resources of the whole under the direction of a 
 Common Council, with power sufficient to give efficacy to their 
 resolutions, can preserve us from being a conquered people now, 
 or can make us a happy people hereafter." From these general 
 views, he proceeds to a specification " of the points which ought 
 to compose the contemplated augmentation of these powers." 
 Primarily is stated, "the power of regulating trade," preceding 
 a specification of the sources of revenue to be granted, " in 
 perpetuity," to Congress ; together with the power " of disposa' 
 of all unlOcated lands for the benefit of the United States and 
 the appointment of all land as well as naval officers of every 
 rank." Having argued the necessity of permanent revenues as 
 the basis of loans, and the policy of funding the debt, he dwells 
 at some length on the necessity " of authorizing the Federal 
 Government to regulate the trade of these States." 
 
 In the frame of the Articles of Confederation, nothing is more 
 remarkable than the absence of an express power of regulating 
 the external commerce of this country — a power which had 
 been conceded to the British parliament by the Congress of 
 1775, " for the purpose of securing the commercial advantages 
 of the whole empire to the mother country, and the commercial 
 benefits of its respective members." In vain, did New Jersey, when 
 consulting of the Confederation, avow her opinion ; that " the 
 sole and exclusive power of regulating the trade of the United 
 States with foreign nations ought to be clearly vested in the 
 Congress ; and that the revenues therefrom ought to be appro- 
 priated to such public and general purposes as to Congress shall 
 seem proper, and for the common benefit of the States ; thereby 
 deriving " a great security to the Union from the establishment 
 of a common and mutual interest." Her proposal was rejected 
 by two thirds of the voting States. And the Articles of* the Con- 
 federation provided, that " the free inhabitants of each of the 
 States shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of 
 free citizens in the several States," and "shall enjoy therein all 
 the privileges of trade and commerce, subject to the same duties, 
 impositions, and restrictions as the inhabitants thereof respect- 
 ively." They provided, that " no State, without the consent of 
 the United States in Congress, shall enter into any conference, 
 agreement, alliance, or treaty with any King, Prince, or State." 
 
XXXll HISTORICAL NOTICE. 
 
 They provided, that, " no two or more States shall enter into 
 any treaty, confederation, or alliance whatever between them, 
 without the consent of the United States in Congress." They 
 gave to Congress the power of, " entering into treaties and 
 alliances," declaring that " no State shall lay any imposts or 
 duties which may interfere with stipulations in such treaties ;" — 
 but they also provided, that, " no treaty of commerce shall be 
 made whereby the legislative power of the respective States 
 shall be restrained from imposing such imposts and duties on 
 foreigners as their own people are subjected to, or from pro- 
 hibiting the exportation or importation of any species of goods 
 or commodities whatever." They provided, " for regulating 
 the trade with the Indians ;" but, by their previous limitations, 
 they withheld the necessary plenary power " to regulate com- 
 merce with foreign nations and among the several States." 
 
 The wise proposition of New Jersey — closed up among the 
 secret proceedings of Congress — was made in 1778. Two years 
 later, Hamilton is seen urging the conferring upon Congress 
 this great power, with all those incidents which look to the pro- 
 tection and encouragement of domestic industry. The following 
 year, New Jersey, again, in the person of a distinguished dele- 
 gate,* proposed to vest Congress with a right " of superintend- 
 ing the commercial regulations of every State," and " with the 
 exclusive right of laying uniform duties on all imported articles." 
 A proposal, to vest in it the power of appropriating these duties 
 permanently, was rejected. 
 
 To impress on the public mind the necessity of imparting this 
 important power to Congress in all its extent was the next and 
 the most labored argument of " the Continentalist." The source 
 of the general prejudice against its being granted is there stated ; 
 and next, those comprehensive and economical views, which have 
 since, in the main, governed the policy of this country, are deve- 
 loped with decisive force. But Hamilton's views did not stop here. 
 It was a "part of his plan, that Congress should have the power 
 " of appointing all oflScers of the Customs," thereby, in fact, 
 combined with the power of appointment of all land (as well as 
 naval oflScers) of every rank, to constitute a Government of 
 self-sustaining properties. That this defect of a power to regu- 
 late their commerce should have continued until the Confede- 
 ration (roftsed to exist, among a people, which, in three quarters 
 
 * Dr. Witherspoon. 
 
NEW YORK PASSES FIRST ACT FOR A CONVENTION. XXXUi 
 
 of a century, has risen to be the second, and soon must be the 
 first commercial nation of the world ; is only another instance 
 of the obstinacy of local systems, often seen, not merely in 
 confederacies but in single kingdoms, of which each member or 
 province had differing rates of duties, and differing modes of 
 collection. 
 
 The latest of the Essays of the " Continentalist" was published 
 on the fourth of July 1782. It closes with this fine peroration. 
 " There is something noble and magnificent in the perspective 
 of a Great Federal Eepublic. closely linked in the pursuit of a 
 common interest, tranquil and prosperous at home — respectable 
 abroad ; but there is something proportionately diminutive and 
 contemptible in the prospect of a number of petty States, with 
 the appearance only of Union, jarring, jealous, and perverse, 
 without any determined action, fluctuating and unhappy at 
 home, weak and insignificant by their dissensions in the eyes of 
 other nations. Happy America, if those to whom thou hast 
 entrusted the guardianship of thy infancy, know how to provide 
 for thy future repose, but miserable and undone, if their negli- 
 gence or ignorance permits the spirit of discord to erect her 
 banner on the ruins of thy tranquility ! !" 
 
 The true, the only remedy was a total change of system. To 
 commence it by means of a Convention, Hamilton is seen to have 
 been the foremost to have proposed ; and only seventeen days 
 elapsed after the publication of this essay, when he effected a pur- 
 pose, to be classed among the most memorable acts of his short 
 but variously and widely useful life. In the autumn of 'eighty, 
 Hamilton, when recommending the appointment by Congress 
 of a Superintendent of Finance, had also intimated the import- 
 ance of appointing in each State a " Continental Superintend- 
 ent." This appointment was conferred upon him; and a few 
 months after on the thirteenth of July 'eighty two he attended 
 the legislature of New York, then in session at PoughkeejDsie, 
 to consult with it on the financial measures deemed necessary. 
 This body had, late in the preceding year, declared j '* their 
 readiness to comply with any measures to render the Union of 
 these United States more intimate." This emphatic decla- 
 ration had been preceded by an Act granting to Congress a 
 revenue from the customs; by the authorization of a census; 
 by the levy of a tax chiefly for continental use; and, by a de- 
 claration, in order to secure exclusive privileges to the recently 
 established bank of North America, that no bank should be 
 
XXXlV HISTOBICAL NOTICE. 
 
 established within the State of New York. It was now con- 
 vened in extra session, at the express instance of a Committee 
 of Congress, to provide " for a vigorous prosecution of the war." 
 Three days after Hamilton's arrival, on the motion of General 
 Schuyler, the Senate, of which he was still the leader, resolved 
 itself into a Committee, " to take into consideration the state of 
 the Nation." The next day, the most important resolutions 
 then proposed in this country, excepting those declaring its 
 Independence, were reported. They were unanimously con- 
 curred in, the following day — Sunday the twenty first of July 
 1782 — and were approved by the Governor, who was requested 
 to transmit them to Congress, and to the Executive of each of 
 the States. These Resolutions were from the pen of Hamilton, 
 embodying much that had appeared in the " Contineutalist." 
 After a series of resolutions stating the importance and neces- 
 sity of the measure, the closing Resolution, declared, " that it is 
 essential to the common welfare that there should be as soon as 
 possible a conference of the whole" of the States on the subject, 
 and that it would be advisable for this purpose to propose to Con- 
 gress " to recommend, and to each State to adopt the measure 
 of assembling a General Convention of the States, specially 
 authorized to revise and amend the Confederation, reserving a 
 right to the respective Legislatures to ratify the same." Thus 
 a legislative sanction was given to the great conception, he had, 
 nearly two years before, first suggested. By almost all his- 
 torical writers, under the enthralment which the slave power 
 seemed to have imposed upon the mind of this country, the pre- 
 cedence in this great movement has been ascribed to Virginia. 
 But, acting upon the examples* given in the previous New 
 England Conventions, to which New York had been a frequent 
 party, this precedence unquestionably belongs to New York.f 
 This procedure, Hamilton announced to the Superintendent of 
 Finance. I think this " a very eligible step, though I doubt of 
 the concurrence of the other States, but I am certain without it 
 they never will be brought to co-operate in any reasonable or 
 effective plan. Urge reforms or exertions ; and the answer con- 
 stantly is, what avails it for one State to make them without the 
 
 * History of Repub. ii. 108. 
 
 ■}• Kent's Commentaries, i. 228, note. Adverting to this statement, "there 
 is no doubt, that Colonel Hamilton . . . was the distinguished individual, who 
 by his wisdom suggested, and by his influence promoted, that earliest authorit/p- 
 tive measure taken for a general Convention of the States." 
 
DISCORDANT COUNSELS OF THE STATES. XXXV 
 
 consent of the others ? It is in vain to expose the futility of 
 this reasoning. It is founded on all those passions which have 
 the strongest influence on the human mind." The day after the 
 passage of these resolutions, General Schuyler retired from the 
 canvass to make room for Hamilton. He was elected a delegate 
 to Congress. Ere long, he replied to his friend Colonel Laurens, 
 announcing his election, "Peace made, my dear friend, a new 
 scene opens. The object then will be to make our Independence 
 a blessing. To do this we must secure our Union on solid found- 
 ations, an herculean task ; and to effect which mountains of 
 prejudice must be levelled. Come to Congress. We know each 
 other's sentiments. Our views are the same. "We have fought 
 side by side to make America free, let us, hand in hand, struggle 
 to make her happy." To expedite this great plan of a national 
 re-organization, a meeting of public creditors was held at 
 Albany, at which a State delegation to a general convention 
 was appointed. 
 
 Hamilton's doubts " of the concurrence of the other States," 
 in this great measure, were too well founded. Instead of 
 a spirit of union, a spirit of jealous discord prevailed. The 
 question of territorial rights had delayed the ratification of 
 the Articles of Confederation, and was attended with circum- 
 stances most unpropitious. The charters of some of the Colo- 
 nies extended their bounds to the South sea ; and these Colonies, 
 now States, claimed that, on the Declaration of Independence, 
 the property and jurisdiction of the crown lands passed from 
 the crown to these Colonies. A jealousy of these claims early 
 prompted a proposition, that " to render the Union and Confe- 
 deracy firm and perpetual; it was essential that the limits of 
 each respective territorial jurisdiction should be ascertained by 
 the Articles of Confederation." This proposition was rejected. 
 A second, asserting to the United States the sole and exclusive 
 power of ascertaining this boundary, was also rejected. This 
 proposition being repeated the next year, met with the same 
 fate. It was founded on the opinion, that, as " from the crown, 
 of Great Britain, the sovereignty of its territory passed to the 
 people, the unappropriated lands, which belonged to the crown, 
 passed, not to the people of the Colony or State within whose 
 limitp they were situated, but to the whole " people of the 
 United States."* 
 
 * Opinion of Jay, Chief Justice. 3 Dallas Rep. 419. 
 
XXXVl HISTORICAL NOTICE. 
 
 Under this conviction, a bounty in the public lands — as an 
 inducement to enlistments — was offered by Congress, in the 
 second year of the war. Averse to this measure, Maryland 
 suggested the substitution of a money bounty. Two years 
 later, Virginia passed a law, opening offices for the sale of her 
 lands. Congress urged her to " forbear." New Jersey, Dela- 
 ware, Maryland, each asserted its common right in these lands. 
 In her true solicitude for the preservation and peace of the 
 Union, New York, though with a strong conviction of her 
 territorial rights, ceded them to the United States " to enure to 
 their use and benefit." — Virginia did not willingl}- yield any 
 part of her wide domain, but adopted a remonstrance to Con- 
 gress, asserting " her exclusive rights of sovereignty and jui-is- 
 diction within her own territory ;" until, affrighted by the inva- 
 sion of her State, and the occupation by Arnold of her unde- 
 fended Capital, at that very moment,* she also passed a vote ot 
 cession. This cession was clogged with conditions, which Con- 
 gress pronounced " incompatible with the honor, interest and 
 peace of the Union." 
 
 To ascertain what territory belonged to the United States, 
 and to establish a plan for the disposal of it, in order to a dis- 
 charge of the national debts, was soon after proposed in Con- 
 gress. But, Virginia, now freed from the presence of an enemy 
 by the victory at Yorktown, resumed her pretensions; protested 
 against the proposed action of Congress; refused to give evi- 
 dence of her title ; and looked to a civil war in support of her 
 claims.f In Congress the advocates of a national policy, again 
 reported a recommendation to the States, of the cessions of the 
 late crown lands — as " an important fund for the discharge of 
 the National debt." On the final vote, this report was lost by a 
 geographical division — the States North of the Potomac being 
 unanimous in favor of it, and the four Southern States, with the 
 exception of two members| opposing it. Powerless as Virginia 
 
 * January 2, 1781. 
 
 f Hist. Repub. ii. 327. Madison writes — " We are very anxious to bring 
 the matter to an issue, that the State may know what course their hcmor and 
 tecurity require them to take." — Nov. 1, 1780. Again, '" Considering the exten- 
 sive interests and claims which Virginia has and the enemies and calumnies 
 which these very claims form against her, she is perhaps under the strongest 
 obligation of any State in the Union to preserve her military contingent on a 
 respectable footing ; and unhappily, her line is, perhaps of all, in the most dis- 
 graceful condition." April 1782. Madison Papers, vol. i. pp. 99, 101, 117. 
 
 J Colonel Bland, of Virginia, and Izard, of South Carolina. 
 
NAVIGATION OF THE MISSISSIPPI, RIGHT OF ASSERTED. XXXV I, 
 
 was in money, in arms, in discipline, Congress had declared, m 
 an address to the several States, while the integrity of the 
 Union was thus being menaced, ""We possess no funds which do 
 not originate with you. We can command no levies which are 
 not raised under your own acts." 
 
 The same spirit was shewn by Virginia in reference to a 
 matter of much gi'cater interest to the whole people of the 
 United States — the right of navigating the Mississippi. During 
 the pending negotiations with Spain, Virginia instructed her 
 delegates in Congress " to use their utmost endeavors to obtain 
 an express stipulation in favor of the United American States 
 for the free navigation of the Mississippi to the sea, with a free 
 port and other privileges at its mouth."* With the same affright 
 under which she had tremblingly thrown up her claim to the 
 late " crown lands," she authorized our negotiator " to recede 
 from his former instructions; aijd, if Spain unalterably insisted 
 on it, to content himself with a grant of its navigation to the 
 thirty-first degree of North latitude." Thus, was the Unity of this 
 great Empire in the enjoyment of this great national right, 
 trifled with by the then most populous of the States. Jay dis- 
 regarded the timid instruction, and Hamilton, as Chairman of a 
 Committee of Congress subsequently reported, " that the free 
 navigation of the Mississippi is a clear and essential right of the 
 United States, and that the same ought to be considered and 
 supported as such."f These were questions of the future, but 
 the urgency of the present necessities was most grievously 
 shown. Congress was compelled to pass a resolution, suspend- 
 ing the payment of the interest on the loan office certificates. 
 The wide spread public and private distress resulting, and the 
 impending pressing dangers, from the want of an efficacious 
 government, at last drew forth from Hamilton this melancholy 
 sentence — " The more I see, the more I find reason for those 
 who love this country to weep over its blindness." 
 
 It was in the midst of an almost hopeless national bank- 
 ruptcy, that he took his seat in Congress. | In the proceedings 
 of that body he had a large share ; and, it will be remarked, 
 the Articles of Confederation having then been ratified by all 
 the States ; that, while he interpreted their provisions so as to 
 give to them their full scope, he guardedly and strictl}' observed 
 their limitations. A compliance by all of the Statej with th« 
 
 * Nov. 5, 1779. t Sept. 16, 1788. J Nov. 25, 178?. 
 
XXXVm HISTORICAL NOTICE 
 
 past requisitions for money was the first urgency — to provido 
 for the immediate demands of the public service — to secure 
 additronal aids, and to fulfil the public obligations. The cry for 
 justice by the public creditors was a loud, and indignant, and 
 remonstrating wailing. Among these creditors were the suffer- 
 ing army about to be disbanded. Hamilton deeply felt their 
 wrongs; and, soon after he had taken his seat in Congress, 
 moved a resolution, directing the Superintendent of Finance to 
 represent to the States, the indispensable necessity of their com- 
 plying with the last requisition, " assuring them, that they were 
 determined to make the fullest justice to the public creditors an 
 invariable object of their counsels and exertions." His resolu- 
 tion embraced the appointment of a deputation to Ehode Island 
 to urge a grant of the impost — " as a measure essential to the 
 safet}'-, and reputation of these States." In vindication of her 
 refusal, that State communicated, through her Governor, her 
 reasons to Congress. These reasons involved in their principles 
 and in their policy the existence of the Confederacy; and 
 Hamilton forthwith came forward, as the champion of the 
 Union against the contumacy of a State. Ho prepared a 
 Ileport, the first, on the journals of Congress, which discussed 
 at length, the relations of the States, to the Confederation; and 
 explained and vindicated its powers. Having primarily com- 
 bated the objection of the unequal bearing of the Impost on the 
 Commercial States, he met that founded on its alleged invasion 
 of " the Constitution of the State." He asserted, that a State 
 had " a discretionary power of appointing officers, not expressly 
 known to its Constitution ;" including " that of authorizing the 
 federal government to make the appointments, in cases where 
 the general welfare may require it ;" and also, that such a dis- 
 cretionary power existed in the Confederation. '* No federal 
 constitution," he averred, " can exist, without powers, that in 
 their exercise, affect the internal police of the component mem- 
 bers. All that is required is, that the Federal government confine 
 its appointments to such as it is empowered to make, by the 
 original act of Union, or by the subsequent consent of the 
 parties. Unless there should be express words of exclusion in 
 the constitution of a State, there can be no reason to doubt, 
 that it is within the compass of legislative discretion, to com- 
 municate that authority." The propriety of so doing was next 
 urged. The inadequacy of the revenue to be raised within f,he 
 States rendering loans necessary; "the next resource," he 
 
HAMILTON DRGES POWER Of COLLECTING REVENUE. XXXi> 
 
 remarked, "is to borrow." We must not only stipulate a proper 
 compensation for what " is lent," " but we must give security 
 for the performance." " We must pledge an ascertained fund, 
 simple and productive in its nature, general in its principle, and 
 at the disposal of a single will." " This will not be the case, 
 unless the collection as well as the appropriation, is under the 
 control of the United States." — They " have a common interest 
 in a uniform and equally energetic collection; and not only 
 policy but justice to all the parties of the Union, designate the 
 utility of lodging the power of making it where the interest is 
 common." * * * " J3y the Confederation, Congress have an 
 absolute discretion in determining the quantum of revenue 
 requisite for the national expenditure. When this is done, 
 nothing remains for the States, sepai'ately, but the mode of 
 raising. 'No State can dispute the obligation to pay the sum 
 demanded, without a breach of the Confederation ; and when the 
 money comes into the treasury, the appropriation is the exclu- 
 sive province of the Federal Grovernment." The strong motive 
 for tlie compliance with the requisition, that of funding the 
 debt; and that, thereby, "the national credit would revive and 
 stand hereafter on a secure basis," having been stated; Hamil- 
 ton closed this paper with these observations — " There is a 
 happy mean between too much confidence and excessive jea- 
 lousy, in which the health and prosperity of a State consist. 
 Either extreme is a dangerous vice. The first is a temptation 
 to men in power to arrogate more than they have a right to ; 
 the latter enervates Government, prevents system in the admi- 
 nistration ; defeats the most salutary measures ; breeds confu- 
 sion in the State, disgusts and discontents among the people ; 
 and may eventually prove as fatal to liberty as the opposite 
 temper." To this Eeport was appended, the first public pledge 
 to establish a Sinking Fund. 
 
 An estimate now made by him showed that the probable 
 receipts from the Impost would be insufficient. Before the 
 assent of the States to an increase could be obtained, it was 
 necessary to remove their discontents as to the late requisitions. 
 With this view ; and with the much higher view, of keeping the 
 public faith, he moved the appointment of a Committee to 
 report the further provision necessary '' for discharging the 
 interest on the loan office certificates, and other liquidated 
 debts; to revise the existing requisitions, and to report, whether 
 they should be continued or altered." One great cause of thes^ 
 
Xl HISTORICAL NOTICE. 
 
 discontents was the absence of a practical rule for the appor- 
 tionment of the public burthens : and while the demands for 
 revenue were being considered, feeling the obligation of an 
 etfort to act upon the existing provision of the Confederation — 
 a valuation of the land within the States, — Hamilton offered a 
 resolution *' in order to enable Congress to form an eventual 
 plan towards carrying it into execution." In obedience also to 
 his sense of the importance of unswerving fidelity to the public 
 engagements, he sought to make provision for the Continental 
 bills, of which the people of New England were large holders. 
 In this he failed, the Southern States being much opposed to 
 their redemption. But there were other interests that could 
 not be wantonly disregarded. The main army presented a 
 memorial to Congress, setting forth its claims. In strict justice, 
 these claims had no precedence over those of other public cre- 
 ditors ; and Hamilton reported a declaration by Congress, that 
 the troops of the United States, *' in common with all their cre- 
 ditors, have an undoubted right to expect security for their 
 claims;" and that Congress will make every effort in its power 
 to obtain from the respective States, substantial funds, adequate 
 to the object of funding the whole debt of the United States ; and 
 will enter upon an immediate and full consideration of the nature 
 of such funds, and the most likely mode of obtaining them." — 
 To fulfil this pledge, he presented a resolution, " that it is the 
 opinion of Congress, that complete justice cannot be done to the 
 creditors of the United States, nor the restoration of public 
 credit be effected, or the future exigencies of the war be pro- 
 vided for, but by the establishment of permanent and adequate 
 funds, to operate generally throughout the United States, to be 
 collected by Congress."* 
 
 This great advance towards an effective general Government 
 acting upon individuals, Virginia had recently barred. In the 
 previous month of October, she passed a resolution ; not merely 
 in opposition to the grant to Congress of the power of levying 
 an impost, but formally and utterly hostile to the grant of any 
 power to Congress of raising a national revenue. Its terms are, 
 " Whereas the permitting any power, other than the general 
 Assembly of this Commonwealth, to levy duties or taxes upon 
 the citizens of this State within the same, is injurious to its sove- 
 reignty ; may prove destructive of the rights and liberty of tho 
 
 * Hist. Rep. ii. 30 
 
VALUATION OF LANDS RULE OF CONTRIBUTION. xh 
 
 people ; and, so far as Congress might exercise the same, is con- 
 travening the spirit of the Confederation in the eighth article 
 thereof;"* therefore the act previously passed granting it was 
 repealed. Unpropitious as this procedure of Virginia was, 
 Hamilton adhered to his purpose ; and, declared by a resolutiou 
 of Congress, " notwithstanding the discouraging obstacles they 
 have hitherto encountered, they conceive it a duty to themselves 
 and their constituents, to persevere in their intentions to renew 
 and extend their endeavors to procure the establishment of 
 I'evenues equal to the purpose of funding all the debts of the 
 United States." Immediately after this renewed pledge, the 
 mode of valuing the public lands — the rule of contribution — was 
 considered. The plan approved by Congress he deemed very 
 objectionable. It was acceded to by others from a persuasion 
 that " some plan was expected by the States, and that none 
 better could be fallen upon." Hamilton did not concur. His 
 reasons detailed in a letter to the Governor of New York, have 
 great weight. " A leading rule," he wrote at the close of this 
 letter, " which I have laid down for the direction of my conduct 
 is this; that, while I would have a just deference for the expecta- 
 tions of the States, I would never consent to amuse them by 
 attempts which must either fail in the execution or be produc- 
 tive of evil. I would rather incur the negative inconveniences 
 of delay, than the positive mischiefs of injurious expedients. 
 * * * There should, in my opinion, be a character of wisdom and 
 efficiency in all the measures of the federal council — the oppo- 
 site of a spirit of temporizing expedients. Every part of a 
 business which is of so important and universal concern should 
 be transacted on uniform principles, and under the direction of 
 that body which has a common interest. ... I regard the present 
 moment, probably the dawn of peace, as peculiarly critical; and 
 the measures which it should produce, as of great importance 
 to the future welfare of these States." 
 
 Having urged that the proposed plan should be deferred ; he 
 offered a pledge, that an accurate valuation of the land should 
 be made by Commissioners, appointed by Congress and acting 
 under their authority. Though this pledge was supported by a 
 majority of members, it was lost by a vote of States ; and the 
 plan he opposed was then rejected ; and was never adopted. 
 
 The consideration of the Financial policy was long interrupted 
 
 * Henning's Statutes, xi. 171. 
 
Xlii HISTORICAL NOTICE. 
 
 by a diBCUSHion cf the claims of, and the provision made for the 
 array; the necessity of adequate and permanent funds, having 
 beon declared by Congress. This subject was at last delibe- 
 rately resumed; and on the motion of Madison, a proposition 
 was made re-asserting the principle — the necessity of perma- 
 nent and adequate funds ; but omitting the provision in Hamil- 
 ton's previous resolution, that these funds should be collected by 
 Congress. This fatal concession to State prejudices was followed 
 by another. It was the limitation of the grant of these funds 
 to a period of twenty Jive years, defeating the intended purpose — 
 the making them a basis for loans.* In vain, did Hamilton 
 attempt by a modification of his plan, which gave to Congress 
 the nomination of the officers of collection, but left the approval 
 and appointment of them to the States, to secure his primary 
 objects. His proposal was defeated ; and a report was adopted, 
 inviting the States to confer on Congress the power of levying, 
 for the use of the United States, specific duties on certain 
 enumerated articles, and an ad valorem duty on others — the 
 duties to be continued for twenty five years ; — the Collectors to 
 be appointed by the States, removable by and amenable to Con- 
 i^ress; with power, in case a State omitted to appoint, to make 
 the appointment. Hamilton persisted in withholding his vote 
 from this plan as being violative of his principles; but ex- 
 pressed " the hope, that New York would consent to it," upon 
 special and general considerations. A similar plane of thought 
 and system of principles are manifest in the several other plans 
 submitted by him to Congress ; among which is his report of a 
 continental peace Establishment, land and naval. These plans, 
 though not adopted by this negative Congress, were important, 
 not only for the principles set forth as to the construction of the 
 powers of the Confederacy, but as preliminary to the measures 
 of a later period. Nor was his influence then unfelt as to the 
 foreign policy of this country. The terms of a treaty of peace 
 with Great Britain long and much agitated its counsels, these 
 agitations chieflj'- proceeding from the subservience of Virginia 
 to the views of France; from the questions which arose as to 
 the national boundaries ; and from the firmnesls of the negotia- 
 tors of this treaty, shewn in the insisting upon the common 
 
 * This limitation was in consequence of the opposition of Massachusetts, 
 New Hampshire, Connecticut, and Virginia — (Madison, Lee, and Mercer, voting 
 for it. Colonel Bland against it.) A similar limitation, much urged by Madison 
 in 1790, was then decisively rejected, and Hamilton's view prevailed. 
 
RESOLUTIONS lY HAMILTON FOR A CONVENTION. xlllV 
 
 rights of the people of the United States to the American 
 fisheries. As to all these matters Hamilton's policy is seen to 
 have been comprehensive and steadfast ; nor were his efforts 
 less strenuous to give a fair construction to the terms of this 
 treaty, when concluded; and to persuade honest and moderate 
 counsels in the execution of those of its provisions, as to which 
 unhappy opinions had prevailed,* and existed. 
 
 Having prepared the instrument of ratification of this treaty, 
 Hamilton wrote to Jay — its chief and most able negotiator, 
 "We have now concluded the great work of independence, but 
 much remains to be done to reap the fruits of it. Our prospects 
 are not flattering. Every day proves the inefiicacy of the 
 present Confederation. Yet the common danger being removed, 
 we are receding instead of advancing in a disposition to amend 
 its defects. The road to popularity in each State is, to inspire 
 jealousies of the power of Congress; though nothing can be 
 more apparent, than that they have no power; and, that for 
 the want of it the resources of the country during the war could 
 not be drawn out ; and we at this moment experience all the 
 mischief of a bankrupt and ruined credit. It is to be hoped, 
 that when prejudice and folly have run themselves out of breath; 
 we may return to reason and correct our errors." 
 
 Discouraging as this view is, Hamilton resolved, before re- 
 tiring from Congress to make another effort to retrieve by a 
 great public act, the public affairs. The proposal made by New 
 York to the other States to unite in a General convention to 
 amend the Confederation, framed by himself, had met with no 
 response. He well knew, that it was not easy to relieve the 
 atrophy of a nation. Nevertheless, though disappointed in his 
 exertions to recover it to health, full of apprehensions as to the 
 continuance of the Union, he felt that it was a high duty to the 
 people of this young country, while yet united in a general 
 Confederacy, again, to appeal to them in their own behalf, 
 through their several States, to save that Union. With this 
 
 *0n the 17th December 1781 Virginia passed resolutions, directing the Com- 
 missioners at Paris ; " neither to agree to any restituticn of property confiscated 
 by the State; nor to submit that the laws made by any independent State of the 
 Union be subjected to the adjudication of any power or powers on Earth." Con- 
 gress resolved "that this stipulation could not be retracted, without a 
 violation of the national faith; and that the honor and interest of these United 
 States require that it should be substantially complied with." Hist. Rep. ii 531. 
 532. 
 
XllV HISTORICAL NOTICE. 
 
 paramount object in view, he framed a series of Eesolutions, 
 setting forth in much detail the defects of the Articles of tho 
 Confederation, enumerating briefly the injurious consequences 
 of these defects; declaring the necessity of "a Government, 
 capable, both in peace and war, of making every member of the 
 Union, contribute in just proportion to the common necessities; 
 and of combining and directing the forces and wills of the 
 several parts to a general end ;" and recommending to the States, 
 "to appoint a Conventio*\ to meet on a fixed day; with full 
 powers to revise the Confederation; and to adopt and propose 
 such alterations, as to them shall appear necessary to be finally 
 approved or rejected by the States respectively." 
 
 On the draft of these resolutions Hamilton recorded the fact, 
 that they " were intended to be submitted to Congress, biit 
 abandoned for want of support." Full of an equal apprehension 
 as to the continuance of the Union, Washington, on the eighth 
 of June on the disbanding of the army, addressed a circular 
 letter to the Governors of all the States. In this parting appeal, 
 he urged, " as essential not only to the well being, but to the 
 existence of the United States as an independent power, an 
 indissoluble union of the States under one common head;" "a 
 sacred regard to justice ; the adoption of a proper peace estab- 
 lishment," and "the prevalence of that pacific and friendly dis- 
 position among the people of the United States, which will 
 induce them to forget their local prejudices and policies, to make 
 those mutual concessions, which are requisite to the general 
 prosperity; and, in some instances, to sacrifice their individual 
 advantages to the interest of the community." 
 
 deferring to these paternal counsels, Hamilton thus addressee 
 his late commander in chief. 
 
 "In a letter which I wrote to you several months ago, I inti- 
 mated that it might be in your power to contribute to the 
 establishment of our federal Union upon a more solid basis. I 
 have never since explained myself At the time, I was in hopes 
 Congress might have been induced to take decisive ground ; t^ 
 inform their constituents of the imperfections of the present 
 system, and of the impossibility of conductingthe public affairs 
 with honor to themselves and advantage to the community; 
 with powers so disproportioned to their responsibility ; and 
 having done this in a full and forcible manner, to adjourn, the 
 moment the definitive treaty was ratifie 1. In retiring at the 
 same juncture, I wished you, in a solemn manner, to declare to 
 
VIRGINIA REJECTS THE FINANCIAL PLAN. xl\ 
 
 the people, 3'our intended i*etreat from public concerns; your 
 opinion of the present Government, and of the absolute neces- 
 sity of a change. Before I left Congress, I despaired of the 
 first; and j-our circular letter to the States had anticipated the 
 last. I trust it will not be without effect ; though I am per- 
 suaded it would have had more, combined with what I have 
 mentioned. At all events, without compliment, sir, it will do 
 you honor with the sensible and well meaning; and ultimately 
 it is to be hoped, with the people at large ; when the present 
 epidemic frenzy has subsided."* 
 
 That frenzy did not soon subside; and the interval between 
 the ratification of the Provisional treaty of Peace with Great 
 Britain; and the operative influence of the present Constitution, 
 exhibits an unvarying scene of national degradation and un- 
 relieved distress. The compromising spirit which had induced 
 the concessions b}^ Congress in the financial policy of seventeen 
 hundred and eighty three failed wholly of its purpose. Sur- 
 rendering all that could commend these concessions to the con- 
 fidence of true national views, they retained too much to satisfy 
 the distrusts of opposite opinions. This twilight soon passed 
 into utter darkness. Not more than six months had elapsed 
 since the conclusion of the Definitive treaty of peace cheered 
 the public heart ; and now, at the time that Congress, insulted 
 by a contemptible party of mutinous soldiers, clamoring foi 
 their pay, abandoned, under their menaces, the seat of Govern 
 ment, the rejection by Virginia of the recent financial plan, 
 reprobating the principles enunciated by Hamilton in his reply 
 to Ehode Island, was announced.f Blind as was this jealousy • 
 under an impression that she had contributed disproportionately 
 to the general treasury ; a few months later, Virginia passed a 
 resolution, in precise conformity with the previously expressed 
 views of Madison ; " declaring that Congress ought to enforce 
 the payment of the balances due from any of the States by dis- 
 tress" on the property of the defaulting States or of their citi- 
 zens. J Virginia had offensively rejected the recent financial 
 plan, chiefly on the ground of the assertion of the safe and 
 necessarily implied power of the Confederation to impose and 
 levy duties on imports; and she now urged the exertion of a 
 power — founded solely on a dangerous implication of that power, 
 
 * Hamilton's Works, i. 402. 
 
 t Joseph Jones to Madison, June 14, 1783. — Madison Papers. 
 
 X Journal of House of Delegates of Virginia, 11, 12. May 1784. 
 
Xm HISTORICAL NOTICE. 
 
 as incidental to a league. This resolution — addressed to a Con- 
 gress whose army numbered only eighty men — fell lifeless before 
 the Councils of the Country, now called upon to consult the 
 great interests which peace had just opened to its view. A general 
 power in Congress to regulate commerce, as previously stated, 
 was not embraced in the Articles of Confederation ; and though 
 proposed to be after granted was not conferred; and the 
 measures resorted to by the separate States only proved their 
 utter incapacity of self protection. Fully aware of this weak- 
 ness, an(J sore at her defeats; England, by a proclamation issued 
 in 1783, the first act of her commercial policy towards her recent 
 subjects; closed her West Indies to all American vessels; and 
 prohibited in her own vessels the introduction there of fish and 
 other articles. Virginia, smarting under recent disgraces, re- 
 solved to rush into a peaceful war of commercial restrictions — 
 long the after favorite policy of her leaders. At the next 
 session of her Legislature, in early winter, she recommended 
 Congress to prohibit all intercourse with England, until the 
 restrictions upon the commerce of the United States were re- 
 moved. Congress, now composed of inferior men, recommended 
 to the States to invest them with powers of commercial retalia- 
 tion, for a limited term. These powers, though again asked, 
 were never imparted to the Confederation. The lessons of a 
 short experience told upon Virginia, as they did upon the other 
 States. Ere two years had elapsed; she proposed to authorize 
 Congress to regulate the foreign and internal trade of the States, 
 and to collect the revenue therefrom, but for a limited term, two 
 thirds of the States concurring; superadding other limitations. 
 She, at the same time refused authority to collect an Impost. 
 A year more intervened, when Virgmia passed a countervailing 
 law ; and an Act giving preference of duties to her own citizens. 
 Nor in these effete measures was she alone. Instead of one 
 general, uniform, commercial policy to pervade the whole Union, 
 are beheld, similar inchoations of strenuous weakness — the con- 
 flicting laws of conflicting States, each bidding for preferences by 
 rival tariffs; each seeking to compel, by countervails and pro- 
 hibitions, the advantages which those preferences did not obtain 
 The results of these commercial rivalries taught the needed 
 lesson. Pennsylvania, while enacting a restrictive law, pointed 
 10 the true remedy — a grant to Congress of one of the powers, 
 which Hamilton had so earnestly urged should be engrafted on 
 the Confederation. She declared, that " the privilege in the 
 
A CONVENTION URGED. xh^l 
 
 degree retained by the States individually, of controlling and 
 regulating their own trade was no longer compatible with the 
 general interest and welfare of the United States." Connecticut, 
 tired of vain experiments, under the same conviction, at last 
 passed an Act "vesting Congress with power to regulate the 
 commerce of the United States )' and Massachusetts wearied of 
 the narrow counsels which had too long prevailed there, also 
 asserted, through her Governor,* the duty of vesting in Con- 
 gress the power of regulating the trade of the whole country. 
 Nor did this enlightened person stop here. " It is of great im- 
 portance," he proclaimed, " and the happiness of the United 
 States depends upon it, that Congress should be vested with all 
 the powers necessary to preserve the Union, to manage the 
 general concerns of it, and promote its common interest." With 
 this intent, he proposed a convention, whose agreement, when 
 confirmed by the States, would comprehend these powers. The 
 approving legislature, declaring that the powers of Congress 
 were " not fully adequate to the great purposes they were 
 originally designed to effect," urged Congress to recommend, 
 " a Convention from all the States, to revise the Confederation ; 
 and report to Congress, how far it may be necessary in their 
 opinion, to alter or enlarge the same, in order to secure and 
 ■perpetuate the primary objects of the Union." This resolution 
 was not submitted to Congress by her delegates; under an im- 
 pression that the proposed powers ought only to be *' temporary, 
 until approved by experience ;" and, that, if a Convention was 
 necessary, its members, should be limited in their authority, 
 and confined to the revision of such parts of the Confedera- 
 tion, as are supposed defective; and not be intrusted with a 
 general revision of the articles, and a right to report a '' plan 
 of federal government essentially different from the Eepublican 
 form, now administered." In consequence, a resolution passed, 
 declaring that no further proceedings be had for revising the 
 Confederation. A sterner will was at this time curbing New 
 York. 
 
 An enlargement of the powers of Congi'ess to countervail 
 Great Britain was there proposed, — not granted; but a discri- 
 minating duty against British vessels was imposed by her legis- 
 lature. The next year, Congress were vested by this body with 
 the retaliatory commercial powers it had asked ; but were ex 
 
 ♦ Message of Governor Bowdoin. May 31, 1785. Hist. Rep. iii 136 
 
Xlviii HISTORICAL NOTICE. 
 
 pressly forbidden collecting any revenue within the State without 
 its sanction. The declaring her bills of credit a legal tender fol- 
 lowed, a vicious example — forthwith copied by North Carolina 
 and Georgia, and enforced in Rhode Island, by penal laws. 
 Amid this wide distemperature, an abdication of the Union by 
 New England became a current topic; and disaffection was 
 exasperated into violence among large bodies of their people, 
 by the honest vigor of Massachusetts, and of New Hampshire, 
 maintaining the obligations of their public faith. This threat- 
 ened collapse was prevented there. But in the two chief plant- 
 ing States, where the tone of the public pulse was weaker, and 
 the necessary vigor of government was suspended ; all was tend- 
 ing to an early dismemberment. Kentucky broke from unresist- 
 ing Virginia. North Carolina was dissevered, and a fragment 
 of her domain was forming into an independent State; while 
 the vast Western region of the United States, — the present seat 
 of mighty opulence and patriotic power, seemed sliding off from 
 the feeble hold of a dissolving league. In the midst of this 
 huge discord, the basis of a concentrated vigorous government 
 might have been laid in the region extending from the St. Croix 
 to Maryland; but below, on the Atlantic coast, physical obsta- 
 cles are seen in many an aspect. Virginia, though looming 
 with pride at her vast interior space, early felt the impossibility 
 of a total isolation ; and in the second year of Independence, 
 sought a compact with Maryland to arrange the jurisdiction of 
 their confluent wtiters, and common Estuary. In the first year 
 of peace; she again appointed a commission of conference, 
 which was renewed the following year, when her Commissioners 
 met at Mount Vernon with those of Maryland. There they 
 agreed upon an Act, regulating the commercial intercourse 
 through the Potomac and Chesapeake, and defining the juris- 
 diction of each State. But, at the moment of framing this com- 
 pact, these commissioners deemed it necessary to extend its 
 provisions, so as to authorize the establishment of a naval force 
 to protect their intervenient waters, and the formation of a 
 mutual tariff. This compact, by the Articles of Confederation, 
 required the previous consent of Congress. To obviate this 
 difficulty, these deputies recommended to their respective States, 
 the appointment of other Commissioners with enlarged powers, 
 to whose proceedings the permission of Congress was to be soli- 
 cited. In the first month of the ensuing year,* Virginia passed 
 * January 13, 1786. 
 
VIRGINIA PROPOSES A COMMERCIAL CONVENTION. xlix 
 
 resolutions for an uniformity of duties between the two States; 
 and that Commissioners be chosen to meet annually, if required, 
 to regulate their mutual commercial interests. A few days 
 after,* she directed the projected arrangement to be communi- 
 cated to all the other States, inviting a general meeting of 
 deputies for the precise purpose of considering, " how far a uni- 
 form system of taxation in their commercial intercourse and 
 regulations might be necessary to their common interest and 
 permanent harmony; and to report to the several States, such 
 an act relative to this great object, as when unanimously rati- 
 fied by them; will enable the United States in Congress assem- 
 bled, effectually to provide for the same."f A circular letter, 
 transmitting this resolution, named Annapolis, as the place of 
 meeting in the following September. This procedure merely 
 contemplated a commercial arrangement, far short of the pre- 
 vious proposals — first of New York, then of Massachusetts. 
 
 It is the province of the highest order of minds, to see in the 
 embryo of events, the fruits that are being born, and that may 
 ripen to a rich maturity. By the intelligent interests of the 
 navigating States, Hamilton felt almost assured, that every 
 obstacle to the organization of an efficacious Government, would 
 yield to wise persuasions ; but so far the planting States, slow to 
 learn and obstinate in their prejudices, had given no promise of 
 enlightened convictions. This proposition was their first great 
 advance ; and he seized with delight the opportunity of earnest 
 necessities that would not long be baffled. The first thing was 
 to accomplish the co-operation of New York. While the com- 
 mercial strifes of the several States were going on, the grant 
 to Congress of the long sought power of raising a revenue from 
 imports was still deferred, — ^partly owing to the fallacious 
 schemes of 1784 and 1785 ; but chiefly to the non compliance of 
 the two Central States, — Pennsylvania and New York. 
 
 Hemmed in by these great States, jealous of their commercial 
 superiority, and disappointed in her efforts to induce a liberal 
 general policy. New Jersey now took a decisive step. She 
 passed a resolution, reciting, as a reason for it, the delinquency 
 of other States, refusing a compliance with the requisition of 
 Congress for her quota; " until all the States in the Union had 
 complied with the revenue system of seventeen hundred and 
 
 * Hist. Repub. iii. 160. 
 
 t Moved by John Tyler, father of a late President f the U. S. 
 
1 HISTORICAL NOTICE, 
 
 eighty three; or until, States having peculiar commercial ad- 
 vantages, should forbear a system of partial legislation." Yield- 
 ing to wise influences she rescinded this resolution ; but declared, 
 that the requisition had no binding force. There was reason to 
 expect that Pennsylvania would perform her federal duty, and 
 would enlarge the federal powers ; but that New York would 
 depart from her then selfish and obnoxious policy, there was 
 little ground of hope. The improvident importations made on 
 the return of peace had poured into her coffers a large revenue, 
 increased by the navigation acts of other States ; rendering her 
 the entrepot of the region east of the Delaware. Under these 
 circumstances, it was not difficult to inculcate a persuasion, 
 "that the commercial advantage of the State depended upon 
 retaining the power to collect her own revenues."* Thus cupi- 
 dity, and ambition, and pride were all united in blinding her to 
 exterior dangers; in giving her an undue sense of her own im- 
 portance ; and in rendering her, for the time, a jealous advocate 
 of State sovereignty ! This was seen in all her recent persistent 
 legislation. An act passed, in accordance with the first recom- 
 mendation of Congress, in seventeen hundred and eighty one, of 
 the grant of power to raise an impost, giving them the fullest 
 authority to levy, and collect it by their own officers, was re- 
 pealed ; and, although the grant was renewed, the duties were to 
 be collected by the officers, and under the authority of the State. The 
 second recommendation of Congress, in seventeen hundred and 
 eighty three, was rejected by the two successive legislatures of 
 seventeen hundred and eighty four, and eighty five; and in 
 eighty six, though a power of raising a revenue by an impost 
 was granted, " the sole power of levying and collecting the 
 duties" was reserved to the State. Thus denied all virility, 
 Congress eoald only implore. Hamilton felt that it was now 
 time to bring to a definite issue, the pregnant question in her 
 policy, of granting or refusing the means of maintaining the 
 Union; if refused by her, of her entering into a concert in 
 a general arrangement embracing leading national objects.f 
 
 * Curtis — History of the Constitution, i. 344. In opposition to tlie adoption 
 of the present Constitution was a busy organization called " The Republican 
 Club," the most active person of which in his correspondence with the oppo- 
 nents of it in other States, was the Collector of the New York Customs 
 Becrge Mason agreed to act as chairman of the " Republican Society" in Vir 
 ginia. — Life of John Lamb. 
 
 ■f "Hamilton," Colonel Troup relates, *' had no idea that the legislature 
 could be prevailed on to adopt tlie system as recommended by Congress; 
 
Hamilton's report from annapolib li 
 
 Massachusetts, checked for a time in her forward action, was 
 now again in motion. Her Governor, after descanting upon the 
 importance of conferring the requisite powers upon Congress, 
 placed before her legislature the grave enquiiy — " Shall the 
 Union cease to exist ?" ; and, as soon as he received the Circular 
 of Virginia, recommended an appointment of Commissioners to 
 the contemplated Commercial Convention, which was made. 
 New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Delaware united with Virginia 
 in the mission to Annapolis, where Benson, the Attorney Gene- 
 ral. and Hamilton, two of the representatives appointed by the 
 legislature of New York, arrived on the seventh of September. 
 After some delay, awaiting the deputies from other States who 
 did not appear, this assemblage of only twelve persons, ap- 
 pointed a committee to prepare a report, which being accepted, 
 the Convention adjourned. 
 
 The draft of this report was by Hamilton, though not formally 
 one of the Committee.* In this draft, as originally framed, 
 Hamilton exhibited at large, the condition of the country, and 
 the necessity of an efficient national Government. But, from 
 the opinions he met there, and from the lukewarmness mani- 
 fested by the non-attendance of the delegates of most of the 
 States, it was thought, that his statements were too full, and 
 explicit; and he reduced the report to the form in which it was 
 issuedf on the fourteenth of September seventeen hundred and 
 eighty six. It was addressed to the five States there repre- 
 sented ; and copies of it were transmitted to Congress and to the 
 executives of the other States. The terms of this Address are 
 seen to have been very carefully guarded, so as to be in strict 
 accordance with the thirteenth of the articles of the Confedera- 
 
 neither had he any partiality for a commercial convention, otherwise than aa 
 a stepping stone to a general convention, to form a General Constitution. In 
 pursuance of his plan, Mr. Duer, the late Colonel Malcolm and myself, were 
 sent to the State legislature, as part of the city delegation, and we were to 
 make every possible effort to accomplish Hamilton's objects. * * * We went 
 all our strength in the appointment of commissioners to attend the commercial 
 convention, in which we were successful — Hamilton was appointed one of 
 them. Thus it was, that he was the principal instrument to turn the State to 
 a course of policy that saved our country from incalculable mischiefs, if not 
 from ruin." 
 
 * Memoir published by Judge Benson. 
 
 ■^ Edmund Randolph, Governor of Virginia, objected to the Report as first 
 framed; Madison then observed to Hamilton, "You had better yield to this 
 arm. otherwise all Virginia will be against you." 
 
.11 HISTORICAL NOTICE. 
 
 tion, which required that, "any alteration of them should be 
 agreed to in Congress, and confirmed by the legislature of every 
 State ;" while the latitude with which the object of the proposed 
 Convention is expressed — " to devise such further provisions as 
 shall appear to them necessary to render the Constitution of the 
 federal government adequate to the exigencies of the Union," in- 
 dicates clearly Hamilton's determined purpose to endeavor to 
 establish a well organized National Government. The con- 
 templated general Convention was asked to meet at Philadel- 
 phia on the second Monday of the coming May. 
 
 This interval was momentous. The insurrection in New 
 England, suppressed by a local force, raised without waiting the 
 sanction of Congress, which the Articles of Confederation re- 
 quired, proved the want of the peace establishment which Hamil- 
 ton in vain, had planned and urged ; and New York, in stolid stub- 
 bornness, was defying everj'^ appeal to her better reason, to her 
 great interests, and to her highest duty. The other States had at 
 length gi'anted to Congress, power to levy and collect an imjDOst. 
 These grants, the last act of New York in relation to it, rendered 
 nugatory. In this great emergency, Congress requested her 
 Governor to convene an extra session of her legislature. Clinton 
 refused on the ground, that his power to convene it was limited, 
 to " extraordinary occasions." Congress, then sitting at New 
 York, declared that the act of New York was not a compliance 
 with the general plan — that " the present critical and embar- 
 rassed state of the finances was such as to require that the 
 system of impost should be carried into immediate effect;" that 
 they consider this as " an occasion sufficiently important and 
 extraordinary" for the convening of the legislature, and earnestly 
 recommended that it should be immediately called. Clinton was 
 deaf to this most earnest appeal. The friends of the Union in 
 New York were roused with indignation. They resolved to 
 endeavour to redeem their State from such misguiding. General 
 Schuyler had again been elected to its Senate. Hamilton, though 
 opposed by the men whose cupidity he had exposed in 'eighty 
 four, and who were among the chief adherents of Clinton, was 
 chosen by the City of New York, one of its members of Assem- 
 bly. His services in this body have left a marked impress on 
 the legislative code of this State; but these were secondary to 
 the influence he was enabled to exert upon the counsels of the 
 Confederacy. The question before it, which rose in magnitudo 
 above all others, was — that of the grant to Congress of tbo 
 
Hamilton's speech on grant of impost. Hh 
 
 power to raise an Impost. In behalf of this grant, Hamilton 
 made an effort of argument and of eloquence not below the 
 momentous topic — the union and general welfare of a free 
 people. Around him were standing the few disheartened mem- 
 bers of an anxious Congress ; and most of the most distinguished 
 men of the State. His effort, though thwarted, was not in vain, 
 for he then and there established an influence, which, perhaps, 
 it may not be erroneously stated, established the Federal con- 
 stitution. What force of mind he displayed is seen in the fact, 
 that not one of the numerous opposition ventured a reply. The 
 resolution for the grant was defeated by a silent vote — as was 
 said — " the Impost was strangled by a band of mutes." This vote 
 was given on the fifteenth of February 1787 while Congress 
 were still hesitating their approval of the proposed General Con- 
 vention. Though outvoted in this measure, Hamilton felt that 
 in all this exertion of his powers, his gracious temper had 
 rightly touched the temper of the Assembly ; and, the day after 
 this vote, a notice was given of an intended motion for an in- 
 struction to Congress to recommend the call of a general Con- 
 vention. This proposed instruction was expressive of the great 
 purpose in Hamilton's thoughts; — that "of revising the Articles 
 of Confederation and perpetual Union, by such alterations and 
 amendments, as a majority of the representatives shall judge 
 proper and necessary to render them adequate to the preserva- 
 tion and government of the Union." Had this insti'uction as 
 thus framed passed, the present civil conflict would not have 
 taken place, and the question of the duration of this Govern- 
 ment would not continue to agitate thoughtful minds. Though 
 injuriously modified in its terms by the State party in the House, 
 this Instruction passed ; and through the influence of Schuyler, 
 at an urgent moment, was adopted by the Senate, by a majority 
 of 07ie vote. The next day, Hamilton's Report from Annapolis, 
 was called up in Congress. By some it was supposed their 
 sanction of the Convention might stimulate ; by others it waa 
 alleged, that it would impede the action of the States. Some 
 looked with jealousy at a body so formed, others doubted its 
 " legality." Amid this perplexity — at this critical moment — the 
 instruction of New York was presented to them and determined 
 their action. Its precise instruction failed, though supported by 
 Massachusetts and Virginia. A new resolution, offered by a 
 member of the former state, being amended, passed. 
 
 Referring to the provision for their alteration, in the Articles 
 
llV . HISTORICAL NOTICE. 
 
 of the Confederation, and to " the instructions of several States ; 
 and particularly the State of New York;" and declaring it to be 
 " the most probable means of establishing in these States a firm 
 national Government," it sanctioned the contemplated Conven- 
 tion, for the purpose " of revising" the Confederation, and re- 
 porting to Congress and to the several States " such alterations 
 and provisions therein, as shall, when agreed to by Congress, and 
 confirmed by the States, render the Federal Constitution, ade- 
 quate to the exigencies of government and the preservation of 
 the Union.'' One great barrier, Hamilton had now removed. 
 Congress had surrendered its exclusive right to innovate upon 
 the Articles of the Confederation. His great purpose was at- 
 tained — the calling of a Convention to be composed of men of 
 the highest intellect, and the longest and largest experience ir. 
 this country, — by Congress, thus giving its sanction to this 
 new body when convened — and trusting to the indeterminate 
 commissions of its members, to organize a government fully 
 capable of promoting and perpetuating the welfare of a great 
 nation. Nor was this all. The existing Government was, by 
 this act, made auxiliary to its own modification, or even subver- 
 sion, by the substitution of another government, without vio- 
 lating the constitutional provisions of the Confederation ; and, 
 still looking to every contingency, the ligaments of the imper- 
 fect league were preserved ; until, perhaps, the coming of some 
 more favorable moment for its reconstruction. This may be 
 pronounced a masterly achievement. 
 
 Having thus successfully exerted the influence of this act of 
 reluctant New York upon the reluctant Congress; Hamilton 
 was eager to derive the benefit of the influence of this recom- 
 mendation of Congress upon that State ; and five days after, he 
 presented a resolution to the assembly of New York, conform- 
 ing to that recommendation, for the appointment of five com- 
 missioners to meet in the General Convention. The proposed 
 number was reduced to three ; and a proviso was urged, that 
 the alterations and provisions of the Confederation " should be 
 not repugnant to, or inconsistent with the Constitution of this 
 State."* This proviso was lost by the vote of the presiding 
 officer of the Senate. Hamilton's resolution was passed ; and 
 on the eighth of March, Hamilton, Lansing and Yates were ap- 
 pointed the three commissioners. As the rule of the Confedera- 
 
 * Proposed by Chief Justice Yates. 
 
GENERAL COXVENTION MEETS. Iv 
 
 tion of voting by States, probably would be adopted ; and as his 
 colleagues differed from him in their views, Hamilton proposed, 
 near the end of the session, to add two delegates. This motion 
 prevailed in the assembly, but was defeated in the Senate. 
 Happily for his fame, this result did not prevent his assuming, 
 finally, a responsibility from which he did not shrink, and which 
 proved of large benefit to the American people. Vii'ginia, New 
 Tersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, and North Carolina appointed 
 their Commissioners, not \yaiting the sanction of Congress. 
 This sanction being given, each of the other States, Rhod'^ 
 Island excepted, also chose a deputation. 
 
 Amid a great diversity of opinions, and of interests, the 
 Federal Convention met at Philadelphia on the fourteenth of 
 May seventeen hundred and eighty seven, when, a majority of 
 States not being represented, it adjourned to the twenty-fifth 
 of that mouth. It is an evidence of the uncertain anticipations 
 of the result of its consultations, that Washington long hesi- 
 tated becoming a member of it ; and that Connecticut deferred 
 the choice of her delegation to it until May ; and New Hamp- 
 shire until the following June. Nine States having appeared 
 on the day to which it had adjourned, they gave to its proceed- 
 ings all the weight and influence of "Washington's great cha- 
 racter and popularity, by electing him to preside. To secure to 
 its deliberations the utmost freedom from external pressure, 
 these deliberations were ordered to be secret. 
 
 Four days later, on the twenty ninth of May, a series of 
 propositions for a National government were submitted for 
 consideration to a committee of the whole body* by Edmund 
 Randolph, of Virginia, and having been discussed and amended, 
 were reported to the House on the thirteenth of June. They 
 were called " the Virginia Plan." Two days after, a number 
 of resolves, framed by several of the representatives of States, 
 especially sedulous for a large retention of power in the States, 
 were presented. They were called " The Jersey Plan." These 
 being referred to a Committee of the whole House, the Virginia 
 resolutions were recommitted. 
 
 The broad question, whether " a national government ought 
 to be established, consisting of a Supreme legislative, executive* 
 
 * A plan of Government was submitted by Charles Pinckney, not that on thb 
 Journal, but that stated in "No. 2687 of Select Tracts of New York Historioal 
 Society." It does not appear to haye gained any special attention. 
 
ivi HISTORICAL NOTICE. 
 
 and judiciary," or the Articles of Confederation with enlarged 
 powers, was now before the Convention. The Virginia plan, 
 as essentially modified, proposed a National Legislature to con- 
 sist of two branches — the first "to be elected by the people of 
 the several States for the term of three years" — the second, " by 
 the individual legislatures;" — and it was resolved, that this 
 legislature so organized, " ought to be empowered to enjoy the 
 legislative rights vested in Congress by the Confederation ;" 
 and, moreover, " to legislate on all cases to which the separate 
 States are incompetent, or in which the harmony of the United 
 States may be interrupted by the exercise of individual legisla- 
 tion; and to negative all laws passed by the several States 
 contravening in the opinion of the national legislature the arti- 
 cles of union, or any treaties subsisting under the authority of 
 the Union." It was declared, that the right of suffrage in the 
 first branch ought to be "in proportion to the whole number 
 of white and other free citizens and inhabitants of every age> 
 sex, and condition, including those bound to servitude for a 
 term of years, acd three fifths of all other persons not compre- 
 hended in the foregoing description, except Indians, not paying 
 taxes in each State;" and, that the right of suffrage in the 
 second branch ought to be according to the same rule ; — that a 
 National Executive be instituted to consist of one person, to be 
 chosen by the National legislature, for the term of seven years, 
 with power to carry into execution the National laws; to 
 appoint to offices in cases not otherwise provided for; to be in- 
 eligible a second time; to be removable on impeachment and 
 conviction of malpractice or neglect of duty; and to receive a 
 fixed stipend from the national treasury, with a veto on any 
 legislative act, unless afterwards passed by two thirds of each 
 branch of the legislature ; — and that a National Judiciary be 
 established; to consist of one Supreme tribunal, appointed by 
 the second branch of the legislature, to hold ofiice during good 
 behaviour, with fixed compensations, unalterable as to the in- 
 cumbents — with power to the National legislature to appoint 
 inferior tribunals. The judicial jurisdiction was to extend to 
 all cases respecting "the collection of the National revenue, 
 impeachments of any National officers; and questions which 
 involve the National peace and harmony." The several depart- 
 ments being thus organized and their powers expressed ; a pro- 
 vision was added, for " the admission of States lawfully arising 
 without the limits of the U aited States." A provision was also 
 
JERSEY PLAN OF GOVERNMENT. Ml 
 
 made, for the continuance of Congress and its authorities until 
 a given day after the reform of the Articles of Union shall be 
 adopted, and for the completion of all their engagements. 
 Likewise, a resolution, that a republican constitution and its 
 existing laws, ought to be guaranteed to each State by the 
 United States — another resolution, that provision ought to be 
 made for the amendment of the Articles of Union — and that 
 the legislative, executive and judiciary powers ought to be 
 bound by oath to support the Articles of Union ; — and a final 
 resolution, that the amendments "offered by the Convention, 
 ought, after the approbation of Congress, to bo submitted to an 
 assembly or assemblies of representatives, recommended by the 
 several legislatures, to be expressly chosen by the people, to con- 
 sider and decide thereon." 
 
 "The Jersey planj" in direct contrast with that originating 
 with Virginia, proposed; " that the Articles of Confederation be 
 BO revised, corrected and enlarged, as to render the federal con- 
 stitution adequate to the exigencies of government and the pre- 
 servation of the Union." In addition to the existing powers, 
 were proposed those of levying certain revenue duties and of 
 regulating commerce — retaining the system of requisitions — 
 numbers being substituted as the measure of contribution; — 
 retaining a single legislative body with the command of the 
 purse and of the sword, deriving its authority from the States ; 
 and with equality of suffrage by the States ; but giving no nega- 
 tive upon the States. It contemplated a plural Executive, with 
 authority to execute the federal acts, to appoint federal oflScers, 
 and to direct all military operations ; removable for misconduct, 
 on application by a majority of the executives of the several States; 
 and without a negative on the acts of this single legislative 
 body. It proposed also, a federal judiciary to consist of a 
 Supi*eme tribunal ; to be appointed by the Executive, and to 
 hold during good behaviour; authorized to hear appeals in 
 several specified cases, and to try impeachments of federal 
 officers, without any other original jurisdiction, and without 
 providing for inferior tribunals. It was likewise resolved; 
 " that the legislative, executive, and judiciary powers within the 
 respective States, ought to be bound by oath to support the 
 Articles of Union;" and that Acts of Congress, "lawfully made, 
 and all treaties made and ratified under the authority of the 
 United States, shall be the supreme law of the respective States, 
 as far as those acts and treaties ghall relate to the said States or 
 
/viii HISTORICAL NOTICE. 
 
 to thiir citizens;" and that the State judiciaries shall Ov. bound 
 therel)y. To this impotent system, was superadded an express 
 power to the federal executive " to call forth the powers of the 
 Confederated States to enforce and compel" by States or indi- 
 vidual bodies, an obedience to the acts of the Confederacy or an 
 observance of its treaties. It also provided for the admission of 
 new States, and for the hearing and decision of territorial 
 disputes. 
 
 It is seen, that this plan proposed merely a modification of the 
 Articles of Confederation ; and in most respects a modification 
 embracing the several propositions made to Congress, from time 
 to time, prior to the call of the Convention. It was in accord- 
 ance with the policy of its advocates, to place themselves on the 
 ground of a strict observance of the terms of their Commissions 
 from their several States. The resolutions of Virginia, even 
 much as they had been amended, presented features little less 
 objectionable. With the undefined powers given to the national 
 legislature, it was also empowered " to negative all laws passed 
 by the several States, contravening, in the opinion of the na- 
 tional legislature, the articles of Union, or any treaties subsist- 
 ing under its authority;" superadding the election of the Execu- 
 tive b}' the general legislature, and the choice of the Judiciary by 
 the second branch of this legislature. A Government so consti- 
 tuted could not have been established ; or if established, could not 
 have maintained itself, without constant collisions with the States, 
 early fatal to its existence, or without resulting in an intolerable 
 tyranny. The two plans before the Convention were hopelessly 
 irreconcilable. A dissolution of the Convention, and a dissolu- 
 tion of the frail union were impending — almost instant. 
 
 Hamilton, though by the uniting controlling voice of his two 
 colleagues from New York, without a vote, resolved to present a 
 plan — himself free from any weak reserves — in the approach to 
 which might be framed a Government, resting entirely on the 
 free voice and power of the American people. Aware of the ex- 
 isting heresy, that " a party to a compact has a right to revoke 
 that compact" — the very heresy upon which the existing rebellion 
 places its vindication, asserting that the Constitution of the 
 United States is a mere compact of several sovereign States ; — 
 he fully saw " the necessity of laying the foundations of the 
 National Government deeper than in the mere sanction of 
 delegated authority." " The fabric of the American Empire," 
 are his words, " ought to rest on the solid basis of the consent 
 
RIGHTS OF SUFFRAGE. llX 
 
 OF THE People." " The streams of national power ought to 
 flow immediately from that pure original fountain of all legiti 
 mate authority." This elementary, leading principle of his 
 policy was avowed by him, on the first da}^ of the deliberations 
 of the Convention. The initial proposition of Virginia in the 
 formation of a new Government was ; " that the right of suffrage 
 in the National legislature, ought to be proportioned to the 
 quotas of contribution, or to the number of free inhabitants, as 
 the one or the other may seem best in different cases." Hamilton 
 met the open question at once by a resolution, "that the rights 
 of suffrage in the National legislature ought to be proportioned 
 to the number of free inhabitants."* This principle having 
 been adopted, as to the first branch of the legislature, was, 
 with his concurring vote, extended to the second branch ;f and, 
 upon a motion for the choice of the Executive by electors to be 
 chosen by the people in districts, as the vote of New York 
 was divided ;]; (its other representatives strictly adhering to the 
 theory of a State corporate vote) ; and as this was the mode of 
 election provided for in his plan of a Constitution, it cannot be 
 doubted, that Hamilton voted for it. Thus, did he propose to 
 stamp upon the new system its primary essential character in 
 his view, that of an Institution founded in the free voice of the 
 whole people of the United States ; and deriving all the depart- 
 ments of government from them; — confronting at the same time 
 — at the very outset, — in the foreground, — the theory of the 
 separate, controlling sovereignty of the mere, "artificial beings" 
 — the States ; and restoring to all the " free inhabitants of the 
 United States" — "as one people," in Union, the united sove- 
 reignty and united independence they had asserted to them- 
 selves in the Declaration of Independence, when assuming, 
 " among the powers of the earth, a separate and equal station." 
 Thus, did he carry into effect his own pregnant, explicit, never 
 to be forgotten attestation, that "the sovereignty and inde- 
 pendence of the People began by a federal act" — that, " the de- 
 claration of Independence was the fundamental Constitution ot 
 every State" — "that the Union and Independence of these 
 States are blended and incorporated in one and the same act." 
 The Convention had unanimously pledged themselves to esta- 
 
 * Journal of the Federal Convention, p. 83. The resolution moved by 
 Hamilton, seconded by Spaight, May 30, 1787. 
 f Ibid. 112. Moved by Wilson, seconded hj Hamilton. June 11, 1787. 
 X Ibid 92. 
 
IX HISTORICAL NOTICE. 
 
 blish a republican Government. The only question, tnerefoio, 
 which remained, was, what form that republican government 
 (»ught to take ? The first resolution of the States right, or "New 
 Jersey Plan" — is seen to have been, " that the Articles of the 
 Confederation ought to be so revised, enlarged and corrected, as 
 to render the federal constitution adequate to the exigencies of govern- 
 ment, and the preservation of the Union." To declare a purpose 
 beyond this; and to open the whole subject of the best form of 
 Government to be framed, this resolution was postponed ; and it 
 was now resolved; — "that the Articles of the Confederation 
 ought to be revised and amended, so as to render the government 
 of the United States adequate to the exigencies, the preservation, 
 and the prosperity of the Union." 
 
 At this moment of most critical, deepest, emergent interest, 
 Hamilton took the floor. After stating* the importance of the 
 occasion, he urged the obligation of adopting "a Bo\\&plan with- 
 out regard to temporary opinions" — that " if an ineffectual plan 
 were again proposed, it will beget despair ; and no Government 
 will grow out of the consent of the people — ; that there seemed 
 to be but three lines of conduct — ; a league offensive, a treaty 
 of commerce, and an apportionment of the public debts — ; an 
 amendment of the existing Confederation, by adding such 
 powers as the public mind deems nearest being matured to 
 grant — ; or, the forming a new government to pervade the whole" 
 country, " with decisive powers," in short, " with complete sove- 
 reignty." The last, he stated, seemed to be the prevailing senti- 
 ment, and he therefore fully examined its practicability. He 
 next exposed at much length " the objections" to the existing 
 Confederation, concluding, that it could not be amended, unless 
 the most important powers were given to Congress, constituted 
 as they were, shewing that this would be liable to all the objec- 
 tions against any fotm of general government, with the addition 
 of " the want of checks." On this point his speech took a large 
 scope; setting forth "the principles of Civil obedience," and the 
 absence of their operation in such a plan ; and stating in succes- 
 Bion, the causes of opposition to it which would exist, and would 
 be active, as the necessary consequences of su<jh a scheme; sus- 
 taining his positions by a full exhibition from history, of the 
 fate of ancient and modern Confederacies. The result, he de- 
 clared, would be, " dismemberment," promoted by " foreign 
 influence;" followed by "standing armies," and "domesiu 
 * Hist. Rep. iii. 275. June 18, 1787. 
 
SPEECH OF HAMILTON, PRlisENTING HIS PLAN. 1x1 
 
 factions;" ending in "monarchy in the Southern States' — ; the 
 jeopardy of " federal rights," especially, the " fisheries," and 
 the loss of their great natural " advantages" — that, " foreign 
 nations" would not respect our rights, nor grant us reciprocity ; 
 and would reduce us to a passive commerce, — that the fisheries, 
 the navigation of the lakes — of the Mississippi ; and the protec- 
 tion and power of a fleet — would all be hazarded or lost. That 
 to prevent all these evils, and to secure permanently the national 
 happiness; the treneral Government, must not only have a 
 .strong soul, but strong organs " by which that soul is to operate." 
 What that Government ought to be was the great question. 
 Here he gave his " sentiments of the best form of Government 
 — not as a thing attainable by us, but as a model which we 
 ought to approach as near as possible." That the " British Con- 
 stitution was the best form" — was the conclusion of the in- 
 quiries of the wisest philosophic investigators of the nature and 
 characteristics of government, — of Aristotle, of Cicero, Mon- 
 tesquieu, and Neckar. The advantages of this form of Govern- 
 ment were next fully pourtrayed ; the difficulties of establishing 
 a republican government with adequate checks were shewn, and 
 its defects exposed. The results of this wide survey were, thai 
 it was " impossible to secui'e the Union bj" any modification of 
 federal government" — that, " a league offensive and defensive 
 was full of certain evils, and greater dangers;" and that the 
 organization of " a General Government was very difiicult, if not 
 impracticable," and liable to various " objections." — " What," he 
 asked, " is to be done? Balance inconveniences and dangers, and 
 choose that which seems to have the fewest objections." He 
 then " read his plan of a Constitution, as illustrative of his views, 
 not as a project, but so prepared that it might have gone into 
 immediate effect if it had been adopted."* 
 
 Some of the objections to such a plan were then adverted to 
 and met — the apprehended increase of expense, by the fact, 
 that the expences " of the State Governments will be propor- 
 tionably diminished" — that " the interference of officers would 
 not be so great, because the objects of the General Government 
 and the particular ones would not be the same" — that the 
 finances would be the care of the former — the administration 
 of private justice that of the States ; — and that energy would 
 
 * Hist. Rep. iii. .301. Statement by Madison, that this plan "was a full 
 plan as long as the present Constitution ; and so prepared, that it might hay« 
 gone into immediate effect, if it bad been adopted." 
 
bdi HISTORICAL NOTICE. 
 
 not be wanting in essential points because the administration 
 of private justice will be carried home to men's doors by the 
 particular governments, and that the revenues might be col- 
 lected from imposts, excises, &c., and, if necessary to go further, 
 the general government may make use of the particular govern- 
 ments. The objection as to the non-attendance of members — 
 a frequent and most serious embarrassment in Congress — is 
 answered, by stating, that the Government must be so consti- 
 tuted as to offer strong motives to exercise its powers — in short, 
 " to interest all the passions of individuals and to turn them into 
 that channel." 
 
 Having stated, without reserves, his theoretical opinions of 
 the different kinds of Government; Hamilton declared, "that 
 the republican theory ought to be adhered to in this country, as 
 long as there was any chance to its success — that the idea of a 
 perfect equality of political rights among the citizens, exclusive 
 of all permanent or hereditary distinctions, was of a nature to 
 engage the good wishes of every good man, whatever might be 
 his theoretic doubts; that it merited his best efforts to give 
 success to it in practice ; — that, hitherto, from an incompetent 
 structure of the government, it had not had a fair trial; and 
 that the endeavor ought then to be to secure to it a better 
 chance of success, by a government more capable of energy and 
 order."* 
 
 The plan of Government read by him commences with a pre- 
 amble, brief, simple, comprehensive, fully expressive of its pur- 
 pose. " The People of the United States of America, do ordain 
 and establish this Constitution for the government of themselves 
 and their posterity." It consists of ten articles, each divided 
 into sections. 
 
 The first of these declared that the legislative power should 
 be vested in an assembly and senate, subject to a negative ; the 
 executive power, with specified qualifications, in a president of 
 the United States; and the supreme judicial authority, with 
 certain exceptions, in a supreme court, to consist of not loss 
 than six, nor more than twelve, judges. 
 
 The assembly of representatives were (by .the second article) 
 to be chosen by the free male citizens and inhabitants of the 
 several states in the union, all of whom, of the age of twenty 
 one years and upwards, were to be entitled to an equal vote. 
 TIjc first assembly was to consist of one hundred members 
 * His Rep. iii. 283. 
 
Hamilton's frame of government. Ixiii 
 
 which were apportioned an ong the states — the most populous 
 state, Virginia, having sixteen, and the least populous, Dela- 
 ware, having two representatives. The whole number was 
 never to be less than one hundred, nor more than a given num- 
 ber, which was not fixed, to be apportioned among the states by 
 a decennial census of the whole number of free persons, except 
 Indians not taxed, and three-fifths of all other persons : the terra 
 of service was to be determined by the legislature, but was not 
 to exceed three years, and to commence and end the same day. 
 It was to choose its own officers, to judge and decide on the quali- 
 fications and elections of its members, and to have the exclusive 
 power of impeachment; but the concurrence of two-thirds was 
 necessary to impeach a senator. 
 
 Revenue bills and appropriations for the support of fleets and 
 armies, and for the salaries of the officers of government, were 
 to originate in this body, but might be altered or amended by 
 the senate. The acceptance of office under the United States, 
 vacated a seat in it. Thus, in the constituency of this branch 
 of the government, (all the citizens and inhabitants of the 
 union,) the principle of universal suffrage was recognised, 
 and the democratic interests were fully represented. Its power 
 over the purse, the sword, and over impeachments, gave it the 
 means to resist usurpation, and rendered it an efficient counter- 
 poise to the more durable members of the government, and the 
 natural guardian of the rights and liberties of the people. 
 
 The third article related to the second branch of the legisla- 
 ture. The senate were also representatives of the people, but 
 under the modifications that the senators were to be chosen by 
 electors elected in districts of the states for that purpose, and 
 only by persons who had an estate in land for life, or for an 
 unexpired term of not less than fourteen years. The first 
 senate was to be apportioned among the states as the conven- 
 tion should decide. For the purpose of future elections, the 
 states which had more than one senator, were to be divided by 
 the act of the general legislature into convenient districts to 
 which the senators were to be apportioned; a state having one 
 senator, to be a district In case of death, resignation, or the 
 removal of a senator from office, his place was to be supplied by 
 a new election in the district from which he came; and upon 
 each election there were to be not less than six nor more than 
 twelve electors chosen in a district. The senate was never to 
 consist of less than forty members, nor was any state to have a 
 
IXIV HISTORICAL NOTICE. 
 
 less number than that originally allotted to it; but the number 
 might be increased in proportion to the whole number of repre- 
 sentatives in the ratio of forty to one hundred ; the increase to 
 be apportioned among the states according to the respective 
 numbers of their representatives. The senators were to hold 
 during good behaviour, removable only by conviction on im- 
 peachment for some crime or misdemeanor, and might vote by 
 proxy, but no senator present was to hold more than two 
 proxies. To the senate, thus representing the numbers and 
 property of the country, composing a not numerous body, and 
 removed from immediate popular influences and passions, were 
 confided the sole power of declaring war, and a control over the 
 patronage of the government, by requiring its consent to exe- 
 cutive appointments, which consent was also necessary to the 
 ratification of treaties. 
 
 By the fourth article, the president was to be elected by 
 electors chosen by electors chosen by the people in election 
 districts. The first electors of each state were to be equal in 
 number to the whole number of senators and representatives of 
 such state in the national legislature. They were to be chosen 
 by its citizens having an estate of inheritance, or for three lives 
 in land, or a clear personal estate of the value of a thousand 
 Spanish dollars of the then standard. These first electors of 
 each state, meeting together, were to vote for a president by 
 ballot, not being one of their own number. Then they were to 
 nominate openly two persons as second electors; and out of the 
 nominees having the four highest numbers, were to choose by 
 ballot, by plurality of votes, two who were to be the second 
 electors of each state. These second electors, neither of whom 
 could be voted for as president, were to meet on an appointed 
 day, and in the presence of the chief-justice, or of a senior judge 
 of the supreme court of the United States, were to open the lists 
 of the persons voted for by the first electors. The person having 
 a majority of the whole number, was to be president. If there 
 was not a majority, then the second electors were to vote foi 
 one of the three persons having the highest number of the votes 
 of the first electors; and the person having a number of votes 
 equal to a majority of the whole number of the second electorb 
 chosen, was to be the president. But if no such second choice 
 should be made, then the person having the highest number of 
 votes of the first electors, was to be president. By this compli- 
 cated process, it was hoped to obtain a corrected expression of 
 
hAxMilton's frame of government. 1x\ 
 
 thv, public wishes in the choice of the chief magistrate, who was 
 8till the representative of the people. 
 
 The president was to take an oath, "faithfully to execute his 
 office, and to the utmost of his judgment and power to protect 
 the rights of the peoj)le, and preserve the constitution inviolate." 
 He was to hold his office during good behaviour, removable only 
 by conviction upon impeachment of some ci'ime or misdemeanor. 
 He was to have power to convene and to prorogue the legislature; 
 to have a negative on the acts and resolutions of the assembly 
 and senate; to take care that the laws be faithfully executed: 
 to be commander-in-chief of the army, navy, and militia; and 
 to have the direction of war when commenced, but not to take 
 the actual command in the field without the consent of the 
 senate and assembly; to have the absolute appointment of the 
 chief officers of the four great executive departments, and the 
 nomination, and, with the advice of the senate, the appointment 
 of all other officers, except such as were dififerently provided for 
 by the constitution, reserving to the legislatures the power of 
 appointing by name, in their laws, persons to execute special 
 trusts, and leaving to ministerial officers the appointment of 
 their deputies. He might fill vacancies temporarily in the 
 recess of -the senate, and could pardon all offences, except 
 treason, which required the assent of the senate and assembly. 
 He might be impeached by two-thirds of the legislature, two- 
 thirds of each house concurring. If convicted, to be removed 
 from office, and then tried and punished in the ordinary course 
 of law. His impeachment was to operate as a suspension, until 
 determined. His compensation was to be fixed, and not to be 
 increased or diminished during his term of service. If he 
 departed the United States, his office was abdicated. 
 
 The president of the senate was to be vice-president; to exer- 
 cise all the powers of the president in case of his death, resigna- 
 tion, impeachment, removal from office, or absence from the 
 United States, until another was chosen. 
 
 The chief-justice, and other judges of the supreme court, were 
 {by the fifth article) to hold during good behaviour, removable 
 by impeachment and conviction. They were to have original 
 jurisdiction in all causes in which the United States shall be a 
 party; in all controversies between the United States and a 
 particular state, or between two or more states, except questions 
 of territory; in all cases affecting foreign ministers, consuls, 
 and agents: and an appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and 
 
 5 
 
LXVI HISTORICAL NOTICE. 
 
 fact, in all cases concerning the citizens of foreign nations; in 
 all questions between the citizens of different states, and in all 
 others in which the fundamental rights of the constitution were 
 involved, subject to specified exceptions, and to the regulations 
 of the legislature. The judges of all courts which might be 
 constituted by the legislature, were also to hold during good 
 behaviour, removable by impeachment, and were to have com- 
 petent salaries, to be paid at stated times, and not to be dimin- 
 ished during their continuance in oflS^cej but the legislatures 
 might abolish the courts themselves. 
 
 All crimes, except on impeachment, were to be tried by a 
 jury of twelve men, in the state where committed; and all civil 
 causes arising under the constitution, before triable by jury in 
 the states, were also to be tried by jury, unless two-thirds of 
 the national legislature should, in special cases, concur in a dif- 
 ferent provision. 
 
 When offices were of such duration as good behaviour, it 
 was felt to be highly important to provide an efficacious and 
 independent tribunal of impeachment; and as not only the 
 rights of the nation, but of the states, were to be guarded, to 
 have reference in its constitution to the general and particular 
 governments. 
 
 With this view, a court of impeachment was to be instituted, 
 by which the president, vice-president, the senators, governors, 
 and presidents of the states, the principal officers of the great 
 executive departments, ambassadors and other like public 
 ministers, judges of the supreme court, generals and admirals of 
 the navy, were to be tried. This court was to consist of the 
 judges of the supreme court, and of the chief-justice, or first or 
 senior judge, of the supreme court of law of each state, of whom 
 twelve were to compose a court, and a majority might convict. 
 All other persons, when impeached, were to be tried by a court 
 to consist of the judges of the supreme court and six senators^ 
 drawn by lot, a majority of whom might convict. Provisions 
 were made for conducting these impeachments. Such was to 
 have been the permanent structure of this government. 
 
 The danger of collisions between the states, arising out of 
 conflicting claims of territory, had been presented to Hamilton, 
 in the progress of the controversy between New- York and 
 Vermont. Other claims were unsettled. He proposed (m a 
 sixth article) that a court should be formed, when territorial 
 controversies should arise, of persons to be nominated by the 
 
Hamilton's frame of government. Ixvii 
 
 controverting states, not their own citizens, double the number 
 of the judges of the supreme court, one-half of whom, elected 
 by the senate, should, with the judges of that court, decide the 
 appeal. 
 
 In the resolutions prepared by Hamilton in seventeen hundred 
 and eighty-three, it is seen that the leading defect of the con- 
 federation proposed to be corrected by him was, its " confining 
 the federal government within too narrow limits; withholding 
 from it that efficacious authority and influence in all matters of 
 general concern, which are indispensable to the harmony and 
 welfare of the whole ; embarrassing general provisions by un- 
 necessary details and inconvenient exceptions, incompatible 
 with their nature, tending only to create jealousies and disputes 
 respecting the proper bounds of the authority of the United 
 States, and that of the particular states, and a mutual inter- 
 ference of the one with the other." 
 
 It was a settled maxim in his mind, " that a government ought 
 to contain within itself every power requisite to the full accom- 
 plishment of the objects committed to its care, and to the com- 
 plete execution of the trusts for which it is responsible; free 
 from every other control but a regard for the public good, and 
 to the sense of the people," 
 
 Another maxim was, "that every power ought to be com- 
 mensurate with its object; that there ought to be no limitation 
 of a power destined to affect a purpose which is of itself in- 
 capable of limitation." Applying these enlarged and obvious 
 principles, and having sought to guard, in the structure of the 
 government, against an abuse of its powers, he declared, in the 
 seventh article of this constitution, that " the legislature of the 
 United States shall have power to pass all laws which they shall 
 judge necessary to the common defence and general welfare of 
 the union." 
 
 As a check upon this power, every act, bill, or resolution, was 
 to have the assent of the president, which, if not given within 
 ten days after such act being presented to him, was to become a 
 law, of which the enacting style was to be, that it was " enacted 
 by the people of the United States of America;" thus recog- 
 nising in every exercise of legislative power the sovereignty and 
 unity .of the American people. This general power was fol- 
 lowed by the declaration of a few general restrictions in the 
 nature of a bill of rights, either suggested by the experience of 
 
iXVlH HISTORICAL NOTICE. 
 
 ihis country, or having reference to the nature of the govern- 
 ment. 
 
 The danger of legislative tyranny, and of retrospective laws, 
 not only to the domestic peace, but to the foreign relations of 
 the country, had been too immediately before him not to have 
 commanded his attention. To provide an efficient check to such 
 pernicious proceedings, he framed a clause declaring " that no 
 bill of attainder or ex post facto law shall be passed 3" and 
 adopting the language of the articles of the confederation, and 
 thus adding guards to the republican system, he provided that 
 no title of nobility should be granted by the United States, or 
 either of them, and that no person holding any office or trust 
 under the United States should, without permission of the legis- 
 lature, accept any present, emolument, office, or title, from a 
 foreign prince or state. " The prohibition of titles of nobility," he 
 said, "may truly be denominated the corner-stone of republican 
 government; for, so long as titles of nobility are excluded, there 
 can never be serious danger that the government will be any 
 other than that of the people." 
 
 To preclude the recurrence of such an attempt as he had 
 recently defeated in the assembly of New-York, and carry- 
 ing out the principle which is seen in his system of public 
 instruction, he embodied in the constitution the proviso, so 
 important to the interests of religion, to freedom of opinion, 
 and to the peace of society, " nor shall any religious sect, or 
 denomination, or religious test for any office or place, be ever 
 established by law." 
 
 In forming a government founded upon a full recognition of 
 the sovereignty of the people, it is seen that he had apportioned 
 the representation to the number of free persons, except Indians 
 not taxed, and three fifths of all other persons; thus following 
 this great principle to its appropriate result. So in apportioning 
 the direct contributions of the states to the public treasury, 
 there being no common measure of a nation's wealth, he took 
 the same basis, which, in the peculiar condition of this country, 
 promised a nearer approach to equality than any other. " Taxes 
 on lands, houses, and other real estate, and capitation taxes, 
 were to be proportioned in each state to the whole number of 
 free persons, except Indians not taxed, and three-fifths of all 
 other persons." 
 
 As the command over the purse of the nation was intended 
 by him to be a real check upon the action of the government, 
 
HAMILTON'S FRAME OF GOVERNMENT. IxiX 
 
 and with this view the originating revenue bills had been given 
 to the popular branch, he provided "that the two houses 
 might by joint ballot appoint a treasurer of the United States," 
 thus securing the custody of the revenues of the nation to 
 the department it had intrusted with raising and appropri- 
 ating them. 
 
 A government performing its great office of providing for the 
 common defence and safety, and for the general welfare, by its 
 own comprehensive organs, acting upon individuals, the only 
 proper objects of governm(;nt, would perhaps have possessed 
 a sufficiently central power to have maintained its due ascend- 
 en' y. But as the state governments were to continue, in order 
 to prevent a collision, it was declared that the laws of the 
 United States, and treaties made under the articles of the con- 
 federation, and to be made under the constitution, were to be 
 the supreme law of the land, and to be so construed by the 
 several courts of the several states. The legislature was to 
 convene once in each year, which, unless otherwise provided for 
 by law, should be on the first Monday in December; to receive 
 a reasonable compensation fixed by law, no succeeding assembly 
 to increase its own compensation. 
 
 The preceding injunction, that the laws and treaties of the 
 United States " shall be the supreme law of the land," obliga- 
 tory on all the courts, guarded against conflicts with the legisla- 
 tion of the states, and in theory secured the necessary supre- 
 macy to the judiciary power of the general government ; but 
 that power might be rendered nugatory by a defective execu- 
 tion of those laws. The position of New York at that moment 
 indicated the danger to be apprehended from the executive 
 trust of the states being independent of the government of the 
 union. 
 
 To provide against both these evils, he declared (m the eighth 
 article) that the governor or president of each state shall be 
 appointed by the authority of the United States, shall have a 
 negative on all laws about to be passed in the state of which 
 he shall be governor or president, subject to such regulations 
 as the legislature of the United States shall prescribe, but in 
 iill other respects, except as to the appointment of the officers 
 of the militia, to have the same powers the constitution of 
 the states then did or should allow. Each governor or presi- 
 dent of a state was to hold his office until a successor was 
 actually appointed, which could not be during the recess of 
 
IXX HISTORICAL NOTICE. 
 
 the stnatft, "unless he died, resigned, or was removed on im 
 peachment." 
 
 The officers of the militia might be appointed nnder the au 
 thority of the United States, unless its legislature authorized 
 their appointment by the governors or presidents of the states ; 
 and, to avoid any obstruction from that source, the governors 
 and presidents of the states at the time of the ratification of the 
 constitution, were to continue in office in the same manner, and 
 with the same powers, as if they had been appointed by the 
 president and senate of the United States. 
 
 " If it be possible," Hamilton observed, " to construct a fede- 
 ral government capable of regulating the common concerns, 
 and preserving the general tranquillity, it must carry its agency 
 to the persons of its citizens. It must stand in need of no 
 intermediate legislations, but must itself be empowered to em- 
 ploy the arm of the ordinary magistrate to execute its own 
 resolutions. The majesty of the national authority must be 
 manifested through the medium of the courts of justice. The 
 government of the union, like that of each state, must be able 
 to address itself immediately to the hopes and fears of indivi- 
 duals, and to attract to its support those passions which have 
 the strongest influence upon the human heart. It must, in 
 short, possess all the means, and have a right to resort to all the 
 methods, of executing the powers with which it is intrusted, 
 that are possessed and exercised by the governments of parti- 
 cular states." 
 
 Under this important provision as to the appointments of 
 these governors and presidents, the administration of the gene- 
 ral government, pervading the states, would have executed 
 itself, while their legislatures would have retained the control 
 of that part of internal police which relates " to the rights of 
 property and life among individuals, the administration of jus- 
 tice, the supervision of agriculture, and of such things as are 
 proper for local legislation." The advantages would thus have 
 been attained of the reproductiveness of the civil power, and 
 of its diffusive force throughout the whole extent of the re- 
 public, and the state legislatures would havfe acted as sentinels 
 to warn against the first approach of usurpation. 
 
 The ninth article provided that the president must then be " a 
 citizen of one of the states, or hereafter be born a citizen of the 
 United States;" that senators and representatives must be citi- 
 zens and inhabitants of the state in which they were chosen. 
 
Hamilton's frame of goverxmext. Ixxi 
 
 Prompted by the recent proceedings in New- York, he also 
 provided that no person eligible as president, or to the legisla- 
 ture, shall be disqualified but by the conviction of some offenco 
 for which the law shall have previously ordained the punishment 
 of disqualification; but that the legislature might provide by 
 law that persons holding offices under the United States, or 
 either of them, shall not be eligible to the assembly, and " shall 
 be, during their continuance in office, suspended from sitting in 
 the senate." The citizens of each state were to be entitled to 
 all the immunities of citizens of other states, and full faith and 
 credit was to be given to the public acts, records, and judicial 
 proceedings of each; fugitives from justice were to be delivered 
 up ; — provisions taken from the articles of confederation. No 
 new state was to be formed without the concurrent consent 
 of the United States, and of the states concerned; but new 
 states might be admitted by the general legislature into the 
 union. The United States were " declared bound to guarantee 
 a republican form of government to each state, and to protect 
 it as well against domestic violence as against foreign inva- 
 sion ;" a provision drawn from the propositions of Randolph, 
 but essentially enlarged — supplying, as Hamilton observed, 
 " a capital imperfection" in the articles of the confederation. 
 
 All treaties, contracts, and engagements under those articles, 
 were to have equal validity under the constitution ; no state 
 could enter into a treaty or alliance with another, or with a 
 foreign power, without the consent of the United States. The 
 members of the legislature of the United States and of each 
 state, and all officers, executive and judicial, were to take an 
 oath or affirmation to support the constitution of the United 
 States. 
 
 Though a change of government would not have dissolved 
 existing treaties not inconsistent with its principles, yet Hamil- 
 ton's knowledge of the distinctions of international law would 
 teach him the importance of a full and explicit declaration on 
 this important subject, as a guard of the interests and of the 
 faith of the nation. In the absolute prohibition of treaties by 
 the states with foreign powers, the restrictive clause of the 
 confederation was extended, and the requisition of an oath to 
 support the constitution was a useful additional bond. Amend- 
 ments to it were to be proposed by two-thirds of both houses, 
 to be ratified by the legislatures or conventions in two-thirds 
 of the states. 
 
LXXH HISTORICAL NOTICE. 
 
 Ti'mally, to secure the immediate operation of the new system, 
 and to give it the solemn sanction of the people, it was provided 
 (in the tenth article) that the constitution should be submitted to 
 conventions of the People of each state, by their deputies, chosen 
 under the direction of their respective legislatures; that each 
 convention ratifying the constitution should appoint the first 
 representatives and senators from such state, the representatives 
 so appointed to continue in office only one year. 
 
 "When the constitution shall have been duly ratified, congress 
 were to give notice of a day and place of meeting of the senators 
 and representatives from the several states ; a majority of whom, 
 when assembled, it was provided, shall, by plurality of voices in 
 joint ballot, elect a president of the United States, " and the 
 constitution, thus organized, shall be carried into effect." 
 
 From this abstract it will be seen, though Hamilton would 
 have made use of the state governments for certain purposes, 
 thus completely refuting the allegation that he contemplated 
 their abrogation, yet it was his desire to have established a 
 simple government pervading the whole union and uniting its 
 inhabitants as one people. As it was necessary that " each de- 
 partment should have a will of its own," this government was 
 so constituted that the members of each had no agency in the 
 appointment of the others, and, with the exception of the judi- 
 ciary, each was " drawn from the same fountain of authority, 
 the people, and through channels having no communication 
 whatever with one another." "In the constitution of the judi- 
 ciary in particular," Hamilton remarked, "it might be inexpe- 
 dient to insist rigorously on the principle ; because peculiar 
 qualifications being essential in the members, the primary con- 
 sideration ought to be to select that mode of choice which best 
 secures these qualifications, and because the permanent tenure 
 by which the appointments are held in that department must 
 soon destroy all sense of dependence on the authorit}^ conferring 
 them." 
 
 " It is equally evident," he observed, " that the members of 
 each department should be as little dependent as possible on 
 those of the others, for the emoluments annexed to their offices :" 
 hence is seen the provision that the compensation of the execu- 
 tive and the judiciary should be fixed by law ; that of the judges 
 not to be diminished during their term, and to guard against 
 executive influence, that of the president to be neither increased 
 nor diminished. In framing a government which is to be 
 
HAMILTON'S FRAME OF GOVERNMENT. IxXlU 
 
 adrainisterea by men over men, the great difficulty," he said, 
 "lies in this — ^j'ou must first enable the government to control 
 the governed, and, in the next place, oblige it to control itself. 
 A dependence on the people is, no doubt, a primary control on 
 the government; but experience has taught mankind the neces- 
 sity of auxiliary precautions." Of these, the chief was "in the 
 distribution of the supreme powers of the state." " But it is not 
 possible," he observed, " to give to each department an equal 
 power of self-defence. In republican governments, the legisla- 
 tive authority necessarily predominates. The remedy for this 
 inconvenience is, to divide the legislature into different branches; 
 and to render them by different modes of election, and different 
 principles of action, as little connected with each other as the 
 nature of their common functions and their common dependence 
 on the society will admit." "With these views, in the structure 
 of this government, while by the frequent choice of the popular 
 branch elected by universal suffrage, the democratic influence 
 was to be constantly renewed and invigorated, in the duration 
 of the senate and executive chosen by constituents with property 
 qualifications, he hoped to secure eflScient and enduring checks 
 on the impetuosity and instability of the many. The power of 
 the people was to be kept up by a constitutional augmentation 
 of the number of these representatives ; and thus the barrier 
 against executive usurpation, if attempted, was steadily strength- 
 ened; and "as the weakness of the executive," he remarked, 
 "may require that it should be fortified," he gave him an "abso- 
 lute negative on the legislature, as the natural defence with 
 which the executive magistrate should be armed." 
 
 Having provided these precautions, by the deposit of the 
 national trusts with representatives of different interests freely 
 chosen by the people, and holding by a responsible and defeasi- 
 ble tenure, governed by the great maxims previously stated, he 
 empowered the legislature " to pass all laws necessary to the 
 common defence and safety, and to the general welfare of the 
 union." 
 
 The speech of Hamilton accompanying the presentation of 
 this plan, was soon followed by a decisive procedure. This was 
 a resolution, which passed the next day, by the votes of seven 
 States, rejecting the Jersey plan, and for the reconsideration of 
 the amended resolutions from Virginia. 
 
 After the interval of one day,* Dr. Johnson of Connecticut 
 
 *.Iune 21. Secret rebates, p. 147 
 
IXXiv HISTORICAL NOTICE. 
 
 was the first to take the floor j and in the course of his remarks 
 made a suggestion, which being subsequently adopted, gave a 
 leading character to the Constitution. 
 
 " It appears to me," he observed, " that the Jersey plan has 
 for its principal object, the preservation of the State Govern- 
 ments. So far it is a departure from the plan of Virginia, which 
 although it concentres in a distinct national government, it is 
 not totally independent of that of the States. A gentleman 
 from New York, with boldness, and decision, proposed a system 
 totally different from both ; and though he has been praised by 
 every body, he has been supported by none. How can the State 
 governments be secured on the Virginia plan? I could have 
 wished that the supporters of the Jersey system could have 
 satisfied themselves with the principles of the Virginia plan ; 
 and that the individuality of the States could be supported. It 
 is agreed on all hands, that a portion of government is to be left 
 to the States. How can this be done ? It can be done by joining 
 the States in their legislative capacity with the right of appointing the 
 second branch of the legislature to represent the States individually." 
 
 The discussions which followed this important suggestion, 
 naturally related to the principle of representation. The Con- 
 vention having decided, that the first branch of the national 
 legislature should be chosen by the people, whence the Senate 
 was to be derived was the great question ? The advocates of a 
 purely National government again urged its election, directly, 
 or indirectly through the medium of electors by the people; 
 those of a Federal government by the legislatures of the States. 
 In support of the first system, Madison and Hamilton were con- 
 spicuous. The former urged the necessity of protecting the 
 landed interest. " Landholders," he remarked, " ought to have 
 a share in the government to support these valuable interests, 
 and to balance and check the other. They ought to be so con- 
 stituted, as to protect the majority of the opulent against the 
 minority. The Senate ought to be this body ; and to answer the 
 purpose ought to have permanency and stability. Various have 
 been the propositions; but my opinion is the longer'they continue 
 in office the better will" this " view be answered."* Eoger Sher- 
 man replied, that, " a bad Government was the worse for being 
 long, that frequent elections give security and permanency." 
 Hamilton answered — " This question has already been considered 
 in several points of view. We are now forming a npublican 
 * Secret Debates, p. 169. 
 
COMMITTEE OF COMPROMISE. IxXV 
 
 government. Eeal liberty is neither found in despotism, nor in 
 the extremes of democracy, but in moderate governments. 
 Those who mean to fonn a solid republican government ought to 
 proceed to the confines of another government. As long as 
 oifices are open to all men; and no constitutional rank is esta- 
 blished, it is pure republicanism. But if we incline too much to de- 
 mocracy we shall soon shoot into a monarchy. The difference of 
 property is already great among us. Commerce and Industry 
 will still increase the disparity. Your Government must meet 
 this state of things; or combinations, in process of time, will 
 undermine your system."* 
 
 At the close of this debate, the question was more broadly 
 discussed, of the representation of the people, or of the States, 
 resulting in an equal division of the votes by States — five to five 
 — except the State of Maryland, whose vote was divided.^ 
 
 It was now obvious, that some accommodation must be made, 
 or that the Convention must break up. To meet the emer- 
 gency, a committee of compromise, consisting of one member 
 from each State, was appointed; whose report declared, that 
 the first branch of the legislature should represent the people, 
 and that, in the s^ 'ond " each State shall have an equal vote," 
 which passed in the affirmative. The decisive manifestations 
 that followed, of a purpose to depart from a purely federal to a 
 compound government, determined the course of Hamilton's 
 colleagues from New York. They both abandoned the Conven- 
 tion.| The advocates of a national Government had reluctantly 
 yielded, in part. The friends of a Federal system sought to 
 secure to it other advantages. Amid great alarms, successive 
 propositions were discussed, until late in July, when a commit- 
 tee of detail was appointed who reported the outline of a Con- 
 stitution on the sixth of August. This outline was discussed, 
 not in Committee, but in the house, until the eighth of Septem- 
 ber; when many of its articles having been approved, it was 
 referred to a Committee appointed by ballot, to " revise its style 
 and to arrange its articles." Of this Committee Hamilton was 
 second to Johnson of Connecticut, § who, it is seen, at a moment 
 of great discordance, first proposed the great compromise of a 
 representation of the people in one branch of the legislature and 
 of the States in the other. This distinguished man remarked, 
 
 * Secret Debates, p. 170. f July 2, 1787. Journal of the ConTention. 
 
 I July 10, 1787. 
 
 § The other members were James Madison, Gouverneur Morris, Bufus King 
 
IXXVl HISTORICAL NOTICE. 
 
 "If the Constitution did not succeed on trial, Hamilton was less 
 responsible for the result than any other member, for he fully 
 and frankly pointed out to the Convention what he apprehended 
 were the infirmities to which it was liable. And, if it answered 
 the fond expectations of the public, the community would be 
 more indebted to Hamilton than to any other member; for, 
 after its essential outlines were agreed to, he labored most inde- 
 fatigably to heal those infirmities; and to guard against the 
 evils to which they might expose it."* Owing to the mutilation 
 of the Journal of the Convention at late stages of its proceedings, 
 it is not possible to state some of the important modifications 
 which, it is ascertained from other sources, were proposed. Two 
 very important changes, however, demand notice. The twenty- 
 second article of the plan reported by "the Committee of 
 Detail," on the sixth of August, declared, that the Constitution 
 " shall be laid before the United States in Congress assembled, 
 for their approbation; and it is the opinion of this Convention, 
 that it should be afterwards submitted to a Convention chosen 
 in each State, under the recommendation of its legislature, in 
 order to receive the ratification of such Convention." This 
 article, had it been adopted, would probably have proved fatal ; 
 for from the temper the Congress had shown, its " approbation" 
 was not to have been expected. Hamilton's plan of a Constitu- 
 tion anticipated this dangerous contingency. It provided, in its 
 tenth article, that " the Constitution shall be submitted to the 
 consideration of Conventions in the several States, the members 
 whereof sAaZZ be chosen by the people of such States respectively, 
 under the direction of their respective legislatures," the ratifica- 
 tion of each convention being final, with power to each conven- 
 tion, to appoint the first representatives and senators from such 
 State ; who, when the Constitution was duly ratified, " shall by 
 joint ballot, by plurality of votes, elect a I^resident of the 
 United States; and the Constitution thus organized shall be 
 carried into effect." By this provision, the establishment of 
 the Constitution would have been ensured. Its ratification, by 
 the Conventions of several of the States, was certain; and a 
 
 • The distinguished person Guizot remarks, — "Hamilton must be classed 
 among the men who have best known the vital principles and fundamental 
 conditions of a government ; not of a government such as this, but of a gov- 
 ernment worthy of its mission and of its name. There is not in the Constitu- 
 tion of the United States an element of order, of force, of duration, which he 
 baa not powerfullt/ contributed to introduce into it and to cause to predominatb. 
 
MODES OF AMENDING CONSTITUTION. IxXVU 
 
 Government ineipiently organized by them would inevitably 
 have drawn to it the concurrence of the other States, instead of 
 leaving its fate to the very dubious contingencies which existed 
 But, what would be the practical operation of so new a system, 
 what the state of public opinion in respect to it might perma 
 nently be, or what new circumstances might arise to indicate 
 the necessity of a change, were open questions. The nineteenth 
 article of the plan reporteii by the Committee looked wholly to 
 the action of the States in the provision for these possibilities, 
 and placed a change in the system entirely in their power. It 
 declared, that, " on the applicatioa of the legislatures of two 
 thirds of the States in the Union, for an amendment of this Con- 
 stitution, the legislature of the United States shall call a con- 
 vention for that purpose." Hamilton, in consistency with all 
 his views, regarded the national legislature — representing the 
 whole people of the United States in one body politic — as the 
 safest judges, whether any and what alterations should be made 
 in the national charter. Under this conviction, and with this 
 intent, his plan confided the proposal of alterations and amend- 
 ments solel}^ to that bod}', two thirds concurring, — such altera- 
 tions or amendments to be ratified by the legislatures of, or by 
 conventions chosen by the people in two thirds of the States 
 composing the Union. The Constitution as adopted, confided 
 the power of proposing amendments to two thirds of Congress, 
 or to a Convention applied for by two thirds of the States, which 
 when ratified by the legislatures of, or by conventions in three 
 fourths of the States were to be valid as pai't of the Constitu- 
 tion. Thus the initiation of changes in the system was confided 
 either to the national legislature, or to the States, while the 
 facility'' of a change was diminished by requiring the final ratifi- 
 cation of a larger number of the States. How far this substitute 
 was wise may be deemed problematical. The Report of the 
 Committee of revision was made on the twelfth of September, 
 which having been corrected still further in style; amended, and 
 engrossed, was on the seventeenth of September, signed by 
 Washington — "President and Deputy from Virginia;" and at- 
 tested by the Secretary, which attestations were followed by the 
 signatures of all the members present, with three exceptions.* 
 
 * The exceptions were Gerry of Massachusetts — Mason and Randolph of 
 Virginia The importance of the services of Madison and of Marshall in the 
 convention of their State which adopted the Constitution and the great infla- 
 snce .if Washington's approval may be the more estimated by the fact that Id 
 
IxXViil HISTORICAL NOTICE. 
 
 The single name of "Alexander Hamilton," as representing 
 New York, speaks his position in this body.* This plan of a 
 Constitution was submitted to the President of Congress, in a 
 letter, which stated it to be, "the result of a spirit of amity and 
 of that mutual deference and concession which the peculiarity 
 of our political situation rendered indispensable. That it will 
 meet the full and entire approbation of every State is not per- 
 haps to be expected ; but each will doubtless consider, that had 
 her interests alone been considered, the consequences might 
 have been particularly disagreeable or injurious to others : — that 
 it is liable to as few exceptions as could reasonably have been 
 expected, we hope and believe ; that it may promote the lasting 
 welfare of that country so dear to us all, and secure her freedom 
 and happiness, is our most ardent wish." 
 
 Uniting heartily and sincerely as Washington did in recom- 
 mending the adoption of the Constitution ; it is evident, that he 
 accepted it with reserves. He had previously stated, " Per- 
 suaded I am, that the primarj^ cause of all our disorders lies in 
 the different State Governments, and in the tenacity of that 
 power which pervades their whole system." — But, after the Con- 
 stitution had been submitted to the people, he wrote, "there are 
 some things in the new form, I will readily acknowledge, which 
 never did, and I am persuaded never will, obtain my cordial 
 approbation; but I do now most firmly believe, that, in the 
 aggregate, it is the best Constitution that can be obtained at 
 this epoch; and, that this, or a dissolution of the Union, awaits 
 our choice ; and is the only alternative before U8."f Jay, was 
 also the advocate of a strong government : " Might we not 
 have," he wrote, to "Washington, " a governor-general limited in 
 
 that State evidence exists that the adoption of the Constitution was regarded 
 as a measure of temporary expedience. April 5, 1790. R. B. Lee, the uncle 
 of the commander in chief of the present rebel army wrote a letter recently 
 found in the dwelling of General Stuart — also of Virginia. "The Southern 
 States are too weak at present to stand by themselves; and a General Govern- 
 ment will certainly be advantageous to us, as it produces no other effect 
 than protection from hostilities and uniform commercial regulations. And 
 when we shall attain our natural degree of population, . I flatter myself that 
 we shall have the power to do ourselves justice, with dissolving the bond which bin is 
 us together. It is better to put up with these little inconveniences than to run 
 the hazard of greater calamities." 
 
 * The signatures of the members were set opposite their respective States ; 
 The name of each of the States is in the handwriting of Hamilton. 
 
 f Washington's Writings, ix. 297. 
 
JAY URGES ADOPTION OF CONSTITUTION. Ixxix 
 
 his prerogatives and duration ? Might not Congress be divided 
 mto an upper and lower house — the former appointed for life, 
 the latter annually; and let the governoi'-general, (to preserve 
 the balance), with the advice of a Council, formed for that only 
 purpose, of the great judicial officers, have a negative on their 
 acts ? * * * What powers should be granted to the government 
 so constituted is a question which deserves much thought. I 
 think the more the better^ the States retaining only so much as 
 may be necessary for domestic purposes; and all their principal 
 officers, civil and military, being commissioned, and removable 
 by the national government." 
 
 " I am not sure," he wrote to Washington as soon as the plan 
 of the Constitution reached him, " I am not sure, that the new 
 government will be found to rest on principles sufficiently stable 
 to produce a uniform adherence to what justice, dignity, and 
 liberal policy may require." — But, while the Constitution was 
 before the People, admitting its imperfections, he addressed 
 them, urging its adoption. — " Is it probable," he asked, " a better 
 plan can be obtained ? If attainable, is it likely to be in season ? 
 What would be your situation, if, after rejecting this, all the 
 efforts to obtain a better should prove fruitless?" Madison 
 avowed, " I hold it for a fundamental point, that an individual 
 independence of the States is utterly irreconcilable with an 
 aggregate sovereignty. I think at the same time, that a con- 
 solidation of the States into a single republic is not less unat- 
 tainable, than it would be inexpedient. Let it be tried, whether 
 any middle ground cannot be taken which will support a due 
 supremacy of the national authority, and leave in force the local 
 authorities, so far as they can be subordinately useful." With 
 this view, he proposed, tbat the general government should 
 " have a negative in all cases lohatsoever on the legislative acts of 
 the States as the King of Great Britain had. This I conceive to 
 be essential, and the least positive abridgment of the State 
 sovereignties." " The right of coercion should be expressly 
 declared." It is not surprising, therefore, that he voted in the 
 Convention, for a President to hold office during good behaviour.* 
 G-eneral Washington, and Madison, Hamilton stated, " entirely 
 concurred in his views regarding the plan which he submitted 
 to the Convention, as not exceeding in stability and strength 
 what the exigencies of the country required." He added, " that 
 
 * Journal of Convention, p. 186. 
 
IXXX HISTORICAL NOTICE. 
 
 his final opinion was against an Executive during good beha- 
 viour on account of the increased danger to the public tran- 
 quillity incident to the election of a magistrate of this degree 
 of permanency."* Though entertaining doubts similar to, but 
 probably stronger than those, of these other distinguished men ; 
 Hamilton remarked, " the truth is, the plan in all its parts, was 
 a plan of accommodation;" and he declared, — " I am persuaded, 
 it is the best which our political situation, habits and opinions 
 will admit, and superior to any the revolution has produced. 
 Though it may not be perfect in every part, it is, upon the whole, 
 a good one ; is the best the present situation and circumstances 
 of the country will permit." Still the ominous future was before 
 him, and he recorded in pi'ivate, his hopes, his fears, and his 
 expectation. " If the government be adopted," this solemn 
 minute states, " it is probable. General Washington will be Presi- 
 dent of the United States. This will ensure a wise choice of 
 men to administer the government, and a good administration 
 A. good administration will conciliate the confidence, and affec- 
 tion of the people; and, perhaps, enable the Government to 
 acquire more consistency than the proposed Constitution seems to 
 promise for so great a country. It may then triumph altogether 
 over the State governments; and reduce them to an entire 
 subordination, dividing the larger States into smaller districts. 
 The organs of the general government may also acquire addi- 
 tional strength. If this should not be the case, in the course of a 
 few years, it is probable that the contests about the boundaries 
 •of power between the particular governments and the general 
 Government; and the momentum of the larger States in such 
 contests will produce a dissolution of the Union. This, after all, 
 seems to be the most likely result. But, it is almost arrogance 
 in so complicated a subject, depending so entirely on the incal- 
 culable fluctuations of the human passions, to attempt even a 
 conjecture about the event." 
 
 Were these doubts of these eminent persons without founda- 
 tion ? Let the history of this young country give the answer. 
 Ere the first decade of the existence of the present Constitution 
 had expired, the doctrine of Nullification was avowed and 
 approved by the legislatures of two of the planting States — that 
 a State had a right to decide as to the measure of its obedience 
 to "the supreme law of the land ;" and at its will to annul that 
 
 * Hist. Rep. iii. 845 — note. 
 
INCIPIENT REBELLION. AND EXISTING REBELLIONS. IxXXl 
 
 law. This incipient Rebellion was avoided bj- the elevation of 
 the party, originally hostile to the Constitution, to the supreme 
 power of this nation, and by the election to the Presidency of 
 the person who was — the author, the advocate, the abettor of 
 this treasonable doctrine. Ere the second decade of its exist- 
 ence had elapsed, another incipient Rebellion was prevented, 
 within six months after he had established the liberty of the 
 Press, by the self sacrifice of Hamilton's life in behalf of the 
 Union. "If they break this Union," were among his latest 
 words, " they Avill break my heart." This rebellion was menaced 
 by two of the Commercial States. Ert a third decade had 
 elapsed, another Rebellion, also by Commvjrcial States denying 
 to the national government the command of their militia, was 
 avoided by the timely conclusion of a peace, terminating a war 
 begun in the interests of a foreign despot — a peace the result of 
 an event over which this country had no control — the dethrone- 
 ment of that despot. After an interval of murmuring discon- 
 tents — of nullification become an act — of menaced hostilities ; 
 in the fifth decade of the Constitution, another incipient Rebel- 
 lion was prevented by the firmness of a successful soldier 
 wielding by his popularity a power dangerously strong — de- 
 nouncing NULLIFICATION, and proclaiming and maintaining the 
 supreme power of the national government. The seventh de- 
 cade had only closed, when, aided by the imbecility of the 
 Chief Magistrate of the Union, denying to it the right of coer- 
 cion — of self defence; and rejecting the wise monitions of a 
 great patriotic soldier, while a conspiracy was being plotted 
 under his eyes in the Senate house, the existing Rebellion began, 
 unparalleled in might and in extent. A million of lives well 
 sacrificed and millions of treasure expended tell the sublime 
 patriotism of the loyal American people — assuring their triumph. 
 But when suppressed will this Rebellion leave no unremoved 
 evil ? Do the results of other Rebellions teach no lessons and 
 promise no compensations ? Is the history of our progenitors 
 an empty page ? The insurrections against William the Con- 
 queror resulted in the establishment in England of the feudal 
 system and of the master power of the great military barons 
 After two centuries of the vassalage of her people another Re- 
 bellion took place, when these barons rose in arms ; and in the 
 presence of hostile encampments at Runnemede, extorted from 
 the King the great deed of Magna Charta, granting or securing 
 most "important liberties and privileges to e^ery order of 
 
IXXXll HISTORICAL NOTICE. 
 
 men m the kingdom — to the clergy, to the barons, and to the 
 people."* 
 
 Before half a century had elapsed, another Eebellion resulted 
 in the establishment of the House of Commons, one of the most 
 useful and, in process of time, one of the most powerful members 
 of the National Constitution.f Centuries of discord ensued, 
 until the great Eebellion terminated in a Convention which 
 settled the crown on a new dynasty, J annexing " a declaration 
 of rights," which circumscribed and defined the powers of the 
 royal prerogative, and established over the British people a 
 limited government ; the ecclesiastical independence of England 
 having been in the mean time secured, the Protestant religion 
 established, and every British subject clothed with an absolute 
 security against arbitrary imprisonment by the act of Habeas 
 Corpus. 
 
 Another and the last important Rebellion gave birth to us as 
 a nation of freemen. 
 
 All these rebellions were waged by subjects in their own 
 cause of liberty. The existing Eebellion is waged by rebel 
 States in the cause of Slavery ! — alone in the history of man — a 
 rebellion against a righteous unoffending Government to secure 
 and perpetuate the lash and the fetters of human bondage. And 
 here again will be seen ere long the compensating result — the 
 universal emancipation of an unfortunate race continued in 
 chains by the heathen barbarism that made captives in war the 
 property of the captors. But in the full broad aspect of our 
 Constitutional System, with the great good thus gained is there 
 not to be seen a great remaining evil ? All the incipient rebel- 
 lions and the existing Eebellion have been within three quarters 
 of a century of this nation's life. Such a life, so soon, so often, 
 so much imperilled, ought no longer to be at hazard. All these 
 menaced and this existing Eebellion are seen to have been begun 
 by an array of State governments against a General Govern- 
 ment dependent, by its very structure, upon the acts of States, of; 
 minor bodies politic too weak to protect themselves and entitled 
 to its guarantee, too strong to be effectually controlled and to 
 render that guarantee a thing of value. As the Federal Con- 
 stitution now is, " a republican form of government" cannot be 
 permanently secured to the people as a nation, nor to any part 
 of the people as States. Where is the remedy? It is found in 
 
 ♦ Hume'8 History of England, i. 106. t Ibid. i. 265. t Ibid. ii. 648. 
 
Hamilton's plan of a true national government. Ixxxni 
 
 the precedent of Hamilton's plan of a Constitution, providing 
 that the President and the Senate of the United States be in- 
 directly, and the Eepresentatives be directly chosen by the 
 people, divided into districts by Congress from time to time 
 according to their numbers — by rendering the National Gov- 
 ernment self existent and self sustaining as are the governments 
 of the several States. An eventual " dissolution of the Union" 
 Hamilton apprehended as the probable result of the imperfect 
 structure of our system. If prevented, it will be either by the 
 usurping power of the sword, or by the consenting reason of 
 the whole American people, restored to all the rights and powers 
 and sovereignty which their own Declaration of Independence 
 asserted to them. Let those who read the comments on the 
 present Constitution by Hamilton's hand, when commending it 
 to the favour of the public, perceive how strong though veiled 
 were his apprehensions, apprehensions in which Jay and "Wash- 
 ington concurred. " The men," he earnestly wrote to Hamilton, 
 then temporarily absent from the Convention — " The men who 
 oppose a strong and energetic government are, in my opinion, 
 narrow minded politicians, or are under the influence of local 
 views. I am sorry you went away. I wish you were back." 
 
 The Constitution is a reform of the Confederation. In the 
 words* of the friend of Cromwell, the immortal penman, — 
 •' Eeform the Eeformation." — Establish the Constitution on its 
 proper basis — not as a Federal, but as a National Grovernment — 
 and this done — " Go on hand in hand, O nation, never to be dis- 
 united, be the praise and heroic song of all posterity; merit this, 
 but seek only virtue, not to extend your limits, but to settle the 
 pure worship of God in his Church and justice in the State : then 
 shall the hardest difficulties smooth out themselves before ye; 
 envy shall sink to hell, craft and malice be confounded, whether 
 it be HoiMEBRED Mischief or Outlandish Cunning; yea, other 
 nations will then covet to serve ye, for lordship and victory are 
 but the pages of justice and virtue. Commit securely to true 
 wisdom the vanquishing and uncasing of craft and subtlety, 
 which are but her two runagates ; join your invincible might to 
 do worthy and godlike deeds ; and then he that seeks to break 
 YOUR Union, a cleaving curse be his inheritance to all genera- 
 tion? " 
 
 * of Reformation in England. The Proae Works of John Milton, i. 26. 
 
ijklXXlV HISTORICAL NOTICE. 
 
 PART SECOND. 
 
 The great question now was, would this plan of government 
 be adopted by the people. After stating the influences " in 
 favor of its success, and against its success;" Hamilton ob- 
 served — " It is difficult to form any judgment whether the plan 
 will be adopted or rejected. It must be essentially matter of 
 conjecture. The present appearances and all other circum- 
 Rtances considered, the probability seems to be on the side of its 
 adoption. But the causes operating against its adoption are 
 powerful, and there will be nothing astonishing in the con- 
 trary." To secure its adoption was now the chief care of the 
 able men, who, surrendering their doubts and preferences, had 
 united in framing it. No where, except in Rhode Island, were 
 the obstacles so great, or was the opposition so stubborn as in 
 the State of New York. The abandonment of the Convention 
 by Yates and Lansing, was in itself an act certain to alarm the 
 great body of its people. This alarm would be the greater, 
 because of the grounds on which they publicly declared they 
 had retired ; — the refusal of their " assent to measures," they 
 conceived " destructive to the political happiness of the citizens 
 of the United States ;" their " conviction of the impracticability 
 of establishing a general government pervading every part of 
 the United States and extending essential benefits to all ;" and 
 the duty, under their instructions, to preserve " the individual 
 States, in their uncontroulled constitutional rights." Its " gov- 
 ernment," Hamilton wrote, had already discovered strong marks 
 of disapprobation ; and its adherents " were constantly employed 
 in disseminating opinions unfavorable to its reception." Ere 
 long these opinions were promulgated in several series of 
 hostile essays.* 
 
 * Washington wrote — Nov. 30, 1787 — *'I have hardly seen one'' publication, 
 "that is not addressed to the passions of the people, and obviously calculated 
 to alarm their fears." — Writings of Washington, ix. 283. 
 
ORIGIN OF THE FEDERALIST. IXXXV 
 
 Private influences were not easy to be met, but an appeal tc 
 the public reason Hamilton welcomed. It was through the 
 Press he had acquired his earliest title to distinction,* as by its 
 after defence he secured to it for ever, its proper liberty .f 
 Indeed, he has been seen in his first suggestions of a new 
 system of government to have contemplated such an appeal. 
 " If a convention is called," he wrote to Duane in seventeen 
 hundred and eighty, "the minds of all the States, and the 
 people, ought to be prepared to receive its determinations by 
 sensible and popular writings." This expedient he had resorted 
 to in tlie numbers of •' The Continentalist ;" and he now resolved 
 to write a Vindication of the Constitution. This purpose gave 
 birth to the Essays — entitled " The Federalist" — over the signa- 
 ture of "Publius," which Hamilton had used in seventy eight, 
 exposing the gi*ave misconduct of a member of Congress. To 
 give to the country the united benefit of the talent and influence 
 of two persons, both of whom at that time concurred in his 
 opinions, he proposed to Jay, then Secretary of Foreign Aff'airs, 
 and to Madison, to take part with him; and also to "William 
 Duer, recently a useful member of the Ts^ew York legislature.^ 
 The eff'orts of Madison in the general Convention had shewn 
 his ability; and Jay, though excluded therefrom by the anta- 
 gonists of a truly National government, enjoyed a wide and well 
 founded confidence. § The first number of this "Work was written 
 
 * Hamilton's Works, i. 1-140. f Hist. Rep. vii. 736. 
 
 X "The undertaking," Madison states, "was proposed by Alexander Hamil- 
 ton to James Madison with a request to join him and Mr. Jay in carrying it 
 into eflFect. William Duer was also included in the original plan; and wrote 
 two or more papers, which, though intelligent and sprightly, were not conti- 
 nued, nor did they make a part of the printed collection." — Unpublished paper, 
 in the State Department, by Madison, entitled " The Federalist.^' 
 
 2 When Hamilton proposed to add two delegates to the number chosen to re- 
 present New York in the Convention, he observed, "I think it proper to apprise 
 the house of the gentlemen on some of whom I wish their choice to fall, and with 
 a view to which I bring forward the present motion. Their abilities and expe- 
 rience in the general affairs of the country cannot but be useful on such an occa- 
 sion. I mean Mr. Chancellor Livingston, Mr. Duane, Mr. Benson, and Mr. Jay ; 
 the particular situation of the latter, may require an observation. His being a 
 servant of Congress might seem an objection to the appointment ; but surely 
 this objection, if it had any weight, would apply with equal force to a member 
 of that body. In the case of Mr. Lansing, the two houses appear to have 
 thought there was no force in it, and I am persuaded there can be no reason to 
 apply a different rule to Mr. Jay. His knowledge, abilities, tried integrity 
 aui abundant experience in the aflFairs of the country, foreign and domestic, 
 
IxXXVi HISTORICAL NOTICE. 
 
 by Hamii ion in the cabin of a sloop, as he was descending the 
 Hudson. On the nineteenth of October, he transmitted it to 
 Washington. " The Constitution proposed," he wrote. " has in 
 this State warm friends and warm enemies. The first impres- 
 sions every where are in its favor, but the artillery of its oppo- 
 nents makes some impression. The event cannot yet be fore- 
 seen. The inclosed is the first number of a series of papers to 
 be written in its defence." 
 
 This number was published in the " Independent Journal," 
 issued in the city of New York, on the twenty seventh of 
 October, 1787, and was announced as " The Federalist, addressed 
 to the People of the State of New York." After the publica- 
 tion of the seventh number, it was advertised, " in order, that 
 the whole subject of the papers may be, as soon as possible, laid 
 before the public, it is proposed to publish them four times a 
 week."* And it will be remarked in their dates, that, with the 
 exception of the interval between the fourth of Aprilf and the 
 seventeenth of June, during which period, in part owing to the 
 pendency of the election of the delegates to the State Conven- 
 tion of New York, and in part to Hamilton's professional en- 
 gagements, the publication by numbers was suspended, these 
 Essays usually appeared at an interval of three days, two num- 
 bers being generally published at a time. Originally intended to 
 be comprised within twenty or at most twentj^ five| numbers, 
 they were extended to a series of eighty five Essays. 
 
 will not permit us to allow any weight to any objection which would imply a 
 want of confidence in a character that has every title to the fullest confidence '' 
 —Hist. Rep. iii. 242. 
 
 * Madison states, "the haste with which many of the papers were penned 
 in order to get through the subject whilst the Constitution was before the 
 public, and to comply with the arrangement, by which the printer was to keep 
 his paper open for four numbers every week, was such, that the performance 
 must have borne a very different aspect without the aid of historical and other 
 notes which had been used in the Convention, and without the familiarity with 
 the whole subject produced by the discussions there. It frequently happened, 
 that, whilst the printer was putting into types parts of a number, the following 
 parts were under the pen and to be furnished in time for the press." — Paper 
 by Madison in the State Department, entitled " llie Federalist." 
 
 f Hamilton to Madison — April 3, 1788. — " I send you the Federalist from 
 the beginning to the conclusion of the Commentary on the executive branches. 
 If our suspicions of the author be right, he must be too much engaged to raake 
 a rapid progress in what remains. The Court of Chancer}/, and a Circuit Court 
 are now sitting." 
 
 X Archibald McLean, one of the proprietors of the " Independent Journal,' 
 
FIRST EDITION OF THE FEDERALIST. Ixxxvij 
 
 Having caused the earlier numbers, as they appeared, to be. 
 published in several gazettes, on the first of January, 1788, an 
 edition of The Federalist, together with " Philo Publius," was 
 announced for publication. And, on the twenty second of 
 March, in order that these Essays might reach other States, 
 where the question of the adoption of the Constitution was 
 pending, a duodecimo volume, containing the first thirty six 
 numbers, was issued with a preface, dated the seventeenth of 
 March, and a syllabus or table of contents from the pen of 
 Hamilton. Tiie title page to this edition is in these words. 
 " The Federalist : A Collection of Essays, written in favor 
 of the NEW CONSTITUTION, AS AGEEED UPON BY THE 
 FEDEEAL CONVENTION, September 17, 1787, IN TWO 
 VOLUMES, Volume i. NEW YOEK. Printed & sold by J and 
 A MCLEAN No 41 Hanover Square 1788." 
 
 The Pi'eface states, — 
 
 " It is supposed that a collection of the papers which have 
 made their appearance in the Gazettes of this City, under the 
 Title of the Federalist, may not be without effect in assisting the 
 public judgment on the momentous question of the Constitution 
 for the United States, now under the consideration of the people 
 of America. A desire to throw full light upon so interesting a 
 subject has led, in a great measure unavoidably, to a more 
 copious discussion than was at first intended. And the under- 
 taking not being yet completed, it is judged advisable to divide 
 the collection into two Volumes, of which the ensuing Numbers 
 constitute the first. The second Volume will follow as speedily 
 as the Editor can get it ready for publication. 
 
 " The particular circumstances under which these papers have 
 
 wrote to Colonel Robert Troup, " When I engaged to do the work it was to 
 consist of twenty numbers, or at the utmost twenty-five, which I agreed to print 
 for thirty pounds — five hundred copies. I made my calculations accordingly, 
 and issued out proposals, each subscriber to pay six shillings." — Madison 
 wrote to Edmund Randolph from New York — December 2, 1787, "The enclosed 
 paper contains two numbers of the Federalist. This paper was begun about 
 three weeks ago. It proposes to go through the subject. I have not been able to 
 collect all the numbers, since my return from Philadelphia, or I would have sent 
 them to you. I have been the less anxious, as I understand the printer means 
 to make a pamphlet of them, when I can give them to you in a more convenient 
 form. You will probably discover marks of diflFerent pens. I am not at 
 
 iberty to give you any other key, than, that I am in myself for a few numbers; 
 and that one, besides myself, was a member of the Convention." — Maduon 
 
 Papers, ii. 655. 
 
IXXXVlll HISTORICAL NOTICE. 
 
 been written, have rendered it impracticable to avoid violations 
 of method and repetitions of ideas which cannot but displease 
 a critical reader. The latter defect has even been intentionally 
 indulged, in order the better to impress particular arguments 
 which were most material to the general scope of the reasoning. 
 
 "Respect for public opinion, not anxiety for the literary 
 character of the performance, dictates this remark. The great 
 wish is, that it may promote the cause of truth, and lead to a 
 right judgment of the true interests of the community." . 
 
 The residue of the Essays was completed early in May, and 
 on the twenty eighth of that month was published in a second 
 volume, also with a table of Contents. The publication of them 
 in the Gazettes was resumed on the seventeenth of June, and 
 was concluded on the fifteenth of August. Two days before, 
 Hamilton wrote to Washington, " I have delivered to Mr. Madi- 
 son, to be forwarded to you, a set of the papers under the signa- 
 ture of Publius, neatly enough bound to be honored with a 
 place in your library. I presume you have understood that the 
 writers of these papers are chiefly, Mr. Madison and myself, with 
 some aid from Mr. Jay." On the 28th of August, Washington 
 acknowledged them, observing — "When the transient circum- 
 stances and fugitive performances which attended this crisis 
 shall have disappeared, that work will merit the notice of pos- 
 terity, because in it are candidly discussed the principles of 
 Freedom and the topics of government, which will always be 
 interesting to mankind, so long as they shall be connected in 
 civil society." 
 
 No other edition was published in the United States until the 
 year eighteen hundred and two, three or more translations — the 
 first in seventeen hundred and ninety two — having, in the mean- 
 time, appeared in Paris, during the exciting discussions which 
 then occupied the minds of the people of France. Talleyrand 
 appreciating it, said to the Due D'Aj-anda, envoy at the French 
 Court from Spain — " Yous avez lu Le Federaliste ?" — " Non," 
 replied D'Aranda. — " Lisez done — lisez," — was the significant 
 answer. Guizot, another distinguished statesman of France, ob- 
 served, " In the application of elementary principles of govern- 
 ment to practical administration, it was the greatest work 
 known to him." I am not aware of any edition of this work 
 having been published in Great Britain, though it was noticed 
 in two leading Eeviews. One of these remarks, in an article on 
 
OPINIONS OF THE FEDERALIST. IxXXLX 
 
 a proposed amendment of the Constitution of the United States."* 
 The Federalist, " written principally by the late General Hamil- 
 ton — a work little known in Europe — but which exhibits an 
 extent and precision of information, a profundity of research, 
 and an acuteness of understanding which would have done honor 
 to the most illustrious statesmen of ancient or modern times." 
 Another,f of a later period, observes, " The Federalist, which 
 may be called seriously, reverently, the Bible of Eepublicanism. 
 It 18 a work altogether, which for comprehensiveness of design, 
 strength, clearness, and simplicity has no parallel. We do not 
 even except or overlook those of Montesquieu and Aristotle 
 among the writings of men." 
 
 The estimate of it in American minds could not be less. Chan- 
 cellor Kent states — " I know not, indeed, of any work on the 
 principles of free government that is to be compared in instruc- 
 tion and in intrinsic value, to this small and unpretending 
 volume of the Federalist : not even if we resort to Aristotle, 
 Cicero, Machiavel, Montesquieu, Milton, Locke, or Burke. It is 
 equally admirable in the depth of its wisdom, the comprehen- 
 siveness of its views, the sagacity of its reflections, and the fear- 
 lessness, patriotism, candor, simplicity, and elegance with which 
 its truths are uttered and recommended." The late Judge Story, 
 of the Supreme Court of the United States, has made it " the 
 basis of his Commentary on the Constitution ;" and the author 
 of a recent History of the Constitution remarks — " As soon as 
 the Constitution was promulgated, Hamilton came forward and 
 placed himself in the foremost rank of its advocates; making 
 himself, for all future time, one of the chief of its authoritative 
 expounders. He was very ably assisted in the Federalist by 
 Madison and Jay ; but it was from him that the Federalist de- 
 rived the w^eight and the power which commanded the careful 
 attention of the country, and carried conviction to the great 
 body of intelligent men in all parts of the Union. The extraor- 
 dinary forecast with which its luminous discussions anticipated 
 the operation of the new institutions, and its profound elucida- 
 tion of their principles, gave birth to American constitutional 
 law, which was thus placed at once above the field of arbitrary 
 construction, and in the domain of legal truth. They made it a 
 science; and so long as the Constitution shall exist, they will 
 continue to be resorted to as the most important source of co- 
 
 * Edinburgh Review, No. 24. 
 
 f Blackwood's Magazine, January, 1825. 
 
XC HISTORICAL NOTICE. 
 
 temporaneous interpretation which the annals of this country 
 afford.* 
 
 On the thirteenth of January, eighteen hundred and two, pro- 
 posals for the publication of the second American edition of this 
 work, were advertised in the city of New York by George F. 
 Hopkins. These proposals stated, that the whole would be " re- 
 vised and corrected ;^^ and mentioned that Hamilton was the 
 principal writer of it, adding that " two other gentlemen of dis- 
 tinguished talents occasionally contributed some essays, which 
 will be marked in the publication" — Madison and Jay. This 
 edition was in two octavo volumes. Instead of the title page 
 to the first, and at that time the only, American edition, the 
 title page to this edition is—" THE FEDEEALIST, ON THE 
 NEW CONSTITUTION. BY PUBLIUS. Written in 1788; 
 to which is added, Pacificus on the Proclamation of Neutrality." 
 — ^^ Revised and Corrected." The preface to this revised edition 
 states, that, " in presenting to the public a new edition of this 
 work, the object has been to render it correct, as well as neat. 
 Some verbal alterations will accordingly be found, though they 
 have been made with caution j and in such instances only as are 
 supposed to have escaped the writers in the hurry of composi- 
 tion, or to have arisen from the manner of the first publication." 
 Though announced in January, owing probably to the time 
 which could be spared in making and revising these alterations, 
 it was not published until the following December. In neither 
 of these two editions is any designation given of the authors of 
 the respective numbers. " It was at first intended," the preface 
 to this revised edition states, "to mark the numbers distinctly 
 which were written by each; but considerations have since 
 occurred which would perhaps render this measure improper." 
 
 A public disclosure of the authorship of the several numbers 
 having been made after Hamilton's decease, three volumes, en- 
 titled "The Works of Hamilton," were published in eighteen 
 hundred and ten. Two of these volumes embrace " The Fede- 
 ralist," in which there is a designation of the respective authors.f 
 Other editions followed, until the year eighteen hundred and 
 eighteen, when the work was published in one octavo volume, of 
 which the title page states — "the numbers written by Madison" 
 are " corrected by himself" It included the " Letters of Paci 
 
 * History of the Constitution, by George Ticknor Curtis, i. 417, 419. 
 ^ By Williams & Wliiting, New York. 
 
FEDERALIST REVISED BY HAMILTON. XCl 
 
 ficus" by Hamilton, and the reply entitled, " The Letters of 
 Helvidius," by Madison. This is known as Crideon's Edition ;* 
 the name of the publisher. In its preface it states, that the 
 numbers of Madison, as previously published, " contained many 
 inaccuracies.'" Frequent other editions have been since published. 
 It is from the text of that of Hopkins published in eighteen 
 hundred and two, revised and corrected, by John Wells, an eminent 
 barrister of New York, and supervised by Hamilton, as to the 
 numbers claimed by him ; and from the text of that of eighteen 
 hundred and ten, corrected by Madison as to the numbers claimed 
 by him, that the present edition has been printed. Having in 
 view a republication of The Federalist, to complete an edition 
 of Hamilton's " Works," which I had then been engaged in pre- 
 paring for the Press, an enquiry was made by me on the sixth 
 of February, eighteen hundred and forty seven, of Mr. Hopkins 
 — the publisher of the second edition of this work — for informa- 
 tion respecting it. Mr. Hopkins made a verbal statement to 
 me, which on the same day I reduced to writing on the fly leaf 
 of the first volume of this edition. " Mr. Hopkins informed me 
 to-day that this edition was in the first instance corrected by 
 John Wells, who compared it with the original edition, published 
 by M°Lean in 1788 ; and that it was subsequently revised by 
 my father, at whose casual suggestion Pacificus was printed 
 with it. New York, February 6, 1847."t At this interview, 1 
 requested him to address me a note on the subject, which 1 
 received two days after. 
 
 "New York, Feb. 8, 1847 
 " Dear Sir : 
 
 " In reply to your inquiries concerning the edition of the Fede- 
 ralist, that I published in 1802 (being the first octavo edition of the 
 
 * Jacob Gideon. 
 
 \ Hist, of Rep. 1859, toI. iv. 433. The editor is indebted to Thomas L. 
 Wells, Esqr., son of John Wells, for this note, dated February 16, 18G4. "In 
 reply to your letter respecting the early editions of the Federalist, I can only 
 say that I was told by Mr. Hopkins, now deceased, that an edition of the Fede- 
 ralint had been published under the care and revision of my father, the late 
 John Wells, but I do not remember to have heard my father say any thing on 
 the subject. I have always understood that an edition of that work was put 
 to press under his examination, and suppose Mr. Hopkins, who was a printer, 
 referred to the edition published by him in New York. There were a number 
 of letters, notes, and communications in the handwriting of ynur father, 
 addressed to my father, which he told me were in the handwriting of Gen. 
 Hamilton, and which, I very much regret, were destroyed by fire." 
 
XOll HISTORICAL NOTICE. 
 
 ^ork), your father's attention was called to the subject through 
 the urgent solicitude of two respectable professional gentlemen, 
 both of whom have long since departed this life. Your father^ 
 it appeared, did not regard the work with much partiality ; but, 
 nevertheless, consented to its republication on condition that 
 it should undergo a careful revision by one of the gentlemen 
 above alluded to. Accordingly the work (two coarse duodecimo 
 volumes, abounding with errors) was obtained with some diffi- 
 culty, and placed in his hands for correction. Having per- 
 formed his duty, he put the volumes into the hands of your 
 father, who examined the numerous corrections, most of which 
 he sanctioned, and the work was then put to press. Here, 
 I deem it proper to remark, that the most scrupulous delicacy 
 was observed in relation to any alterations in the numbers 
 written by Mr. Madison; so much so, indeed, that the alteration 
 of one word (a favorite one with Mr. M.) having escaped notice, 
 that part of the work was required to be re-printed and the 
 original word restored. 
 
 " It was proposed, that the name of the writer should be pre- 
 fixed to each number; but this, as I was told, met with your 
 father's decided disapprobation. But, after the publication ap- 
 peared, the Hon. Egbert Benson gave me in writing, a key to 
 the respective numbers, which I understood he had previously 
 received from your father; and which I kept for many years. 
 This key was subsequently made use of in an edition published 
 by Williams and Whiting of this city, in three volumes, to 
 which was appended the official Eeports made by him to Con- 
 gress, while Secretary of the Treasury, 
 
 " The letters of Pacificus were added at your father's sugges- 
 tion ; and corrected with his own hand. He remarked to me, 
 at the time; that ' some of his friends had pronounced them to 
 be his best performance.' 
 
 " With sincere respect I am your ob serv*. 
 
 " Gr. F. Hopkins.* 
 " John C. Hamilton, Esq." 
 
 * On the 28th March, 1817, a publication was made in "The New York 
 Evening Post" — a paper then of large and leading influence, by the editor, 
 William Colman, a gentleman of eminent literary ability, in reference to the 
 subject of the authorship of the respective numbers of the Federalist. He 
 mentions, as his motive, the "duty" he felt he owed "to the revered memory 
 of the great and good man who honored him" during seven years with hip 
 "friendship." This editorial article states, "In the year 1802, Mr. Hopkins 
 
ENUMERATION OF THE ESSAYS. XClll 
 
 In this edition, the syllabus which was printed in the first 
 edition — that of eighty-eight — as tha table of " Contents," is alao 
 printed as the table of "Contents" to it; and in addition, the 
 subject of each number, copied from the table of" Contents," is 
 prefixed to the pi'oper number which treats of it precisely as 
 was done in the first edition of the work. No dates of the time 
 of publication of these essays are given in either of these edi- 
 tions. These will be seen at the head of each essay, with a 
 designation of the author of it. The dates of the first thirty 
 of these numbers, I have taken from a file of the " Independent 
 Journal," in which they were first published. Not having had 
 access to the residue of this file, of which I have found no com- 
 plete copy in this city, I have taken the dates of the residue 
 of the essays, with one exception, from another gazette — " The 
 New York Packet." A comparison of the numbers of the edi- 
 tion of eighty-eight, which are in Eomati characters, with the 
 numbers, as printed in the two gazettes (those in the Inde- 
 pendent Journal being also Roman numerals, and those in the 
 Packet being in Arabic figures), shews a material variance in 
 the numbering. 
 
 Before this edition passed from Hamilton's hands to distant 
 points, a new enumeration of these Essays was made. The 
 numbers, as printed in the two gazettes, were prefixed to those 
 in the first volume, until the number of which the head is " Con- 
 ceniing the Militia." This number was not published until after 
 the number, thirty-foxir (XXXIY) ; and was printed in the 
 gazettes, as number thirty-five (XXXV), at the end of a series 
 of essays immediately preceding it, of which the subject is 
 totally different — taxation. In the first edition — that of 1788 — 
 it is transferred, and is placed next after number twenty-eight 
 (XXYIII), being " concerning the Militia," following in its 
 appropriate place the essays which relate to the military 
 force. The number printed thirty-four (XXXIV) in the news- 
 paper is consequently designated in this edition, as number 
 thirty-five (XXXV), being a continuation of the subject of" taxa- 
 
 printer of this city, intending to publish a new edition of The Federalist, took 
 this opportunity to apply to Gen. Hamilton, and solicit him to correct and 
 revise the numbers ; and, so far succeeded, as to obtain his consent to assist in the 
 revisal, provided a gentleman of competent literary talents would undertake to make 
 the first verbal corrections, for the original idea was to be strictly adhered to. 
 He then examined the whole with his own eye, previous to its being committed ta 
 the press, and saw that it was free from literary blemishes." 
 
XCIV HISTORICAL NOTICE. 
 
 lion." Another variance is to be seen as printed in the " ori- 
 ginal text." The closing paragraph in the original number, 
 thirty-five (XXXY), when transferred and placed in its proper 
 order as number twenty-nine (XXIX), is omitted; and a new 
 paragraph beginning with a few words in this original closing 
 paragraph of thirty-five (XXXV); but otherwise of entirely 
 different and more fitting purport, is added to the number 
 thirty-four, as numbered in the newspaper; but which is enume- 
 rated, when collected in the volume, as thirty-six (XXXVI). 
 This number completes the Essays " concerning taxation," 
 closing this first volume; the new additional paragraph forming 
 an appropriate termination of it. This change, obviously, is 
 the work of the admitted author of both these Essays — Hamil- 
 ton — before this volume passed finally through his hands from 
 the press to the public. Another variance is to be noted. In 
 the first volume of this first edition, the number printed in the 
 " Independent Journal," as number (XXXI) is published, as 
 divided into two numbers, designated (XXXII) and (XXXIII) ; 
 a new sentence being introduced at the beginning of number 
 XXXIII, to mark more distinctly the reply to an objection, in 
 respect to taxation, ingrafted on certain specified " clauses" of 
 the Constitution. The effect of this division is, to render each 
 subsequent number in this volume, and in the second volume, 
 including number (LXXVII), one number higher in the enu- 
 meration than the numbers of the essays, as printed in the 
 gazettes. Another consequence of this change is seen. The 
 number (LXXVII) in the second volume concludes the view of 
 "the constitution of the President;" and was printed in "the 
 Packet," on the fourth of April and called 76 — and when the 
 publication in this gazette was resumed in June, with the 
 number LXXVIII printed from the second volume* — this essay 
 
 * It has been previously mentioned that the second volume of the first edi- 
 tion was published on the 28th of May, 1788. On the 19th of that month 
 Hamilton wrote to Madison, " I executed your commands respecting the first 
 volume of the Federalist. I sent forty of the common copies and twelve of the 
 finer ones to Governor Randolph. The printer announces the second volume 
 in a day or two, when an equal number of the two kinds shall also be for- 
 warded." To preserve the incognito, he adds, " he informs, that the ' Judicial 
 Department'— ' Trial by Jury'— 'Bill of Rights,' &c., is discussed in some 
 additional papers, which have not yet appearedin the gazettes." On the 8th of June 
 Hamilton again wrote to Madison, "The number of the volumes of the Fede- 
 ralist which you desired have been forwarded, as well the second as the fir-Jt 
 
RESPECTIVE AUTHORS OF FEDERALIST. XCV 
 
 18 also printed in " the Packet" by the same number 78 ; and T 
 find no number seventy seven in its series. The enumeration 
 with the syllabus in the first edition of this work, published by 
 M'Lean in 1788, was retained in the second edition published 
 by Hopkins in 1802, and is that, I believe, used in all the subse- 
 quent copies, including that sanctioned by Madison, with one 
 exception. It ought manifestly to be retained to prevent much 
 confusion in the frequent references to the numbers of these 
 essays above the twenty eighth, heretofore made in the published 
 adjudications of the Courts, and by the writers on subjects per- 
 taining to the Constitution. The enumeration of the essays, as 
 printed in the " original text," from which the departure in the 
 volumes is seen to have had a sufficient motive, can only embar- 
 rass for general use ; a remark which also applies to a reprint 
 " from the original text, for which no sufficient motive will be 
 seen to exist."* 
 
 The attribution which is seen to have been made to Hamilton, 
 both in Europe and in America, of the principal and character- 
 izing share in the production of " the Federalist," may have 
 proceeded, either from a conviction of the superior merit of the 
 Essays of which he was the undisputed author; or from a 
 political affinity or bias towards his political opinions ; or from 
 the unlimited confidence of Washington which he enjoyed, and 
 his large participation in his administration ; or because of his 
 ascription to himself, long unquestioned, of the authorship of 
 much the larger portion of this work. How far this ascription 
 is well founded, it is my purpose to examine, hoping to explain 
 and to correct the errors into which " the fallibility of memory" 
 has led. 
 
 The total number of these essays by Hamilton's enumeration, 
 approved by Madison, is seen to be eighty-five. Of this enume- 
 ration, an abbreviated copy by Hamilton from his original 
 minute, both in Hamilton's autograph, ascribes to himself the 
 sole authorship of sixty three numbers, and the joint authorship 
 w ith Madison of three numbers, leaving to the latter the sole 
 authorship of fourteen numbers ; and to Jay, of Jive numbers. 
 
 In November eighteen hundred and seven, three years after 
 
 to Governor Randolph. It was impossible to correct a certain error."- 
 Hamilton's Works, vol. i. 454, 455. 
 
 * The alterations in Numbers 29 & 36 have been referred to. So in Number 
 83, also by Hamilton, there is an omission in his revised edition of superfluous 
 nviitf er 
 
XCVl HISTOKICAL NOTICE. 
 
 Hamilton's decease, a publication was made,* which gave a list 
 being a copy of the memorandum made by him. Tbis list was 
 not disputed until the year eighteen hundred and fifteen ; when, 
 in a sketch of the life of Jay,f the number sixty four was 
 ascribed to him. In the same work, in a biographical notice 
 of Hamilton, a copy of the list published in eighteen hundred 
 and seven was republished. Early in the year following this 
 notice, the accuracy of this list was denied; and a list was 
 published,! heing a copy of a memorandum "in Madison's 
 handwriting," in which Madison appropriated to himself, thirty 
 numbers ; to Jay, four numbers, and to Hamilton, the residue — 
 fifty one numbers. Three other lists were subsequently pub- 
 lished, each of which gives a designation hy Madison of the 
 authors of the respective numbers. In one of these lists, Madi- 
 son ascribes twenty nine numbers to himself— j^ue to Jay, and 
 fifty two to Hamilton. In the other two, the same total number 
 is apportioned to each writer with those in the two first of the 
 Madison lists. The variance, where it exists in these two lists, 
 is seen in the designation of the respective writers. 
 
 Two statements are also traced to Jefferson's knowledge. 
 One of these ascribes thirty numbers to Madison, five to Jay, 
 and fifty to Hamilton. The other ascribes fourteen to Madison 
 solely; three to Madison and Hamilton jointly, /ue to Jay, and 
 sixty three to Hamilton. 
 
 A more minute comparison of these several statements will 
 not be without interest. As to the paper left with Benson by 
 Hamilton, two days previous to his decease, it is stated that, he 
 called at the office of Judge Benson, where he found his nephew 
 Eobert Benson, who relates, "I was then a student in the office 
 and well known to the General, and enquired for the Judge. I 
 replied that he had left the city with Mr. King. The General 
 in his usual manner then went to the book case and took down 
 a book which he opened and soon replaced, and left the office. 
 Some time after the General's death, a memorandum in his own 
 handwriting was found in a volume of Pliny's letters, I think, 
 
 * The Port Folio, Nov. 14, 1807. f Delaplaine's Repository. 
 
 I National Intelligencer, March 20, 1817, "Corrector," and May 3, 1817, 
 "Corrector." In the former of these, it is stated by the writer, that he had 
 "been for several years in possession of the information upon which this state- 
 ment is predicated;" and he adds, "if it be doubted or denied, I will venture 
 to appeal to the papers of General Hamilton for the confirmation of my asser- 
 tion."— Dated March 10, 1817. 
 
HAMILTON S DESIGNATION OF AUTHORS. XCVll 
 
 which, I believe, was the book he took down, and which memo- 
 randum was afterwards wafered by the Judge in the inside of 
 the cover of the first volume of the Federalist, and where it 
 remained for several years. He subsequently removed it, and, 
 as I understood, gave it to some public library." It was 
 accompanied with a certificate that it was in the handwriting 
 of Hamilton. This list and this certificate remained in " The 
 New York Society Library" until the year eighteen hundred 
 and eighteen, but has been purloined. This paper was, as 
 stated, a designation of the names of the respective authors 
 of each number of the Federalist when written by one person, 
 and of the authors of certain numbers when written conjointly, 
 of which designation a copy was taken and preserved by 
 Benson. " The marks of the wafers still remain in the volume, 
 and above them in Judge Benson's handwriting is, what is pre- 
 sumed, and I believe to be, a copy of the General's memoran- 
 dum above referred to, and is as follows — 
 
 » Nos. 2, 3, 4, 5, 54, by J. 
 
 " Nos. 10, 14, 37 to 48 inclusive, M. 
 
 " Nos. 18, 19, 20, M. and H. jointly. 
 
 •'All the others by H."* 
 
 Some time after Hamilton's decease, it appears from a publi- 
 cation in 1807, that a copy of the Federalist was deposited in 
 the New York Society Library, in which were designated in his 
 own handwriting the parts of it written by himself, as well as 
 those contributed by Madison and Jay. 
 
 This minute is — 
 
 " Nos. 2, 3, 4, 5, 54, Mr. Jay. 
 
 " Nos. 10, 14, 37 to 48 inclusive, Mr. Madison. 
 
 " Nos. 18, 19, 20, by Mr. Hamilton and Mr. Madison jointly. 
 
 — All the rest by Mr. Hamilton." 
 
 A copy of this list was published previously to this copy of 
 the Federalist being purloined from this Library. This desig 
 nation was copied by me in the Federalist in my childhood, at 
 the request of my father.| 
 
 * Copy of a statement in my possession made for me by Egbert Benson, Esq., 
 a nephew of Judge Benson. 
 
 •}• In a letter addressed to me by Philip Church, a nephew, and previously 
 an Aide de Camp of General Hamilton, he states: "Some time in the years, I 
 believe, of 1802, or 1803, I am inclined to believe in the latter year, I handed 
 out of our Library, to your father, the two volumes of the Federalist; and 
 asked him to designate the authors of the different numbers. He promised to 
 
 7 
 
XCVm HISTORICAL NOTICE. 
 
 Of tho four several statements of Madison, one was published, 
 as previously mentioned, in the National Intelligencer of the 
 twentieth of March eighteen hundred and seventeen ; and stated 
 to be from " indubitable authority." It was copied from " a 
 pencilled memorandum in the handwriting of Madison."* This 
 memorandum appropriates to Madison the Nos. 10, 14, 18, 19, 
 20, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 
 
 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 62, 63, and 64— Nos. 2, 3, 4, and 5, to Jay,— 
 and the residue to Hamilton. Thus, Madison by this list, 
 ascribes to himself thirty numbers ; to Jay four numbers ; to 
 Hamilton yz/ify one numbers. 
 
 Another designation by Madison exists, in his handwriting, 
 in a copy of the Federalist which belonged to Riehai'd Eush 
 deceased, a member of Madison's Cabinet.f The attribution 
 in this designation, by Madison, to himself is, 10, 14, 18, 19, 20, 
 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 
 
 55, 56, 57, 58, 62, 63,— to Jay ; 2, 3, 4, 5, 64,— to Hamilton; 1, 6, 
 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 
 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 59, 60, 61, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 
 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85. Thus, it is seen, that 
 in this list, Madison ascribes to himself twenty nine numbers, to 
 J&y five, and to Hamilton ^/it?/ one numbers. 
 
 On the fifteenth of December, 1817, " The City of Washington 
 Gazette" published another designation, *' furnished by Madison 
 himself." This designation is very detailed — stating the number 
 — the topic and the name of the writer. In it, Madison ascribes 
 to himself, Nos. 10, 14, 17, 18, 19, 21, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 
 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 62 and 63—; to 
 Jay— 2, 3, 4, 5, 64— to Hamilton 1, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 15, 16, 20, 
 
 do 80, saying he would employ you as his amanuensis. The edition is printed 
 by J. and A. M^Clean, New York. The following is an exact copy of the 
 memorandum on the blank page of one volume. 
 "Nos. 2, 3, 4, 5, 54, John Jay. 
 
 10, 14, 37 to 48 inclusive — James Madison 
 18, 19, 20, Hamilton and Madison. 
 ••All the rest by Alexander Hamilton. 
 
 JOHN jC. HAMILTON." 
 "Angelica, July 25, 1834." 
 * National Intelligencer, April 18, 1817. 
 
 f This memorandum in the handwriting of Mr. Rush is on a fly leaf of the 
 second volume of the Federalist which was shewn by Mr. Rush at Paris to an 
 American gentleman now residing in this vicinity; and is now in Philadelphia, 
 in the possession of one of his sons. 
 
MADISON S DESIGNATION OF AUTHORS. ^CIX 
 
 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 59, 60, 61, 
 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82^ 
 83, 84, 85, to Hamilton. Thus, in this list he ascribes thirty num- 
 bers to himself, ^ye to Jay, and fifty to Hamilton. In the follow- 
 ing year, 1818, another, the fourth list, by Madison, was pub- 
 lished, in an edition in which the numbers whereof he claimed 
 to be the author were " corrected by himself," and the names of 
 the resj)ective writers were furnished by him. In this specifica- 
 tion, Madison assigns to AmseZ/Nos. 10, 14, 18, 19, 20, 37, 38, 39, 
 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 62, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 
 58, 62 and 63 — to Jay, Nos. 2, 3, 4, 5, 64 — to Hamilton, numbers 
 
 I, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 
 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 59, 60, 61, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71. 
 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84 and 85. 
 
 To number XVIII this note is seen, by Madison. " The sub- 
 ject of this and the two following numbers happened to be taken 
 up by both Mr. H. and Mr. M. What had been prepared by Mr. 
 H., who had entered more briefly into the subject, was left with 
 Mr. M. on its appearing that the latter was engaged in it, with 
 larger materials, and with a view to a more precise delineation, 
 and from the pen of the latter the several papers went to press."* 
 
 Of the two statements traced to Jefferson's knowledge, the 
 first is to be seen in his handwriting in a copy of the earliest 
 edition of the Federalist, now in the Library of Congress. In 
 this minute, Nos. 10, 14, 17, 18, 19, 21, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43,. 
 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 62 and 63, 
 are attributed to Madison, — 2, 3, 4, 5, 64 to Jay, and 1, 6, 7, 8, 9, 
 
 II, 12, 13, 15, 16, 20, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 
 34, 35, 36, 59, 60, 61, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 
 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84 and 85 to Hamilton. This state-' 
 ment agrees precisely with that furnished by Madison " in the 
 City of Washington Gazette." The other statement is in a 
 copy of the Federalist, formerly belonging to Gideon Granger, a 
 member of Jefferson's Cabinet. This minute is in the hand- 
 writing of Granger, who states, that, " it was made upon inform- 
 ation derived from Jefferson."-f In this minute Nos. 2, 3, 4, 5, 
 
 * It is added at foot, "Note by Madison written on the margin of the leaf 
 commencing with the present number, in the copy of the Federalist loaned by 
 him to the publisher." 
 
 ^ For this information the Editor is indebted to Lieutenant-Governor Franoia 
 Granger of Canandaigua, in a letter to him of the 7th July, 1855. 
 
 • The memorandum in the first volume *of the Federalist,' is in these words 
 
C HISTORICAL NOTICE. 
 
 54, are attributed to Jay. Nos. 10, 14, 37, 88, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 
 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, to Madison. Nos. 18, 19, 20, to Madison and 
 Hamilton jointly — and all the rest to Hamilton. 
 
 An unpublished paper prepared by Madison — entitled " The 
 Federalist," now in the Department of State at Washington, 
 gives these remarks. 
 
 "The particular papers assigned to each of the writers have 
 been diflferently presented to the public. The statement from a 
 memorandum left by Mr. Hamilton with Mr. Benson just before 
 his death, is very erroneous, owing doubtless to the hurry in 
 which the memorandum was made out. Besides the consider- 
 able number of papers written by J. M., and in the lump classed 
 with those written by himself, he ascribes to himself No. 14 
 written by Mr. Jay, and to Mr. Jay No. written not by 
 
 himself but by J. M. (See Life of Mr. Jay by Delaplaine.) The 
 paper No. 49 also, in which Mr. Jefferson is painted in such 
 strong colours, was not likely to be even approved by Mr. H., 
 and the paper No. 54 on the subject of the negroes as comprised 
 in the ratio of representation, was most likely to be within the 
 share executed by the Southern member of the club. * * * A 
 true distribution of the numbers of the Federalist among the 
 three writers is contained in the Edition of that work by Jacob 
 Gideon. It was furnished to him by me, with a perfect know- 
 ledge of its accuracy, as it relates to myself, and a full confi- 
 dence in its equal accuracy as it relates to the two others." 
 
 It will be observed, that in this comment prepared by Madi- 
 son, notwithstanding the variation of his several statements 
 had been publicly and pointedly criticised, there is no attempt 
 to reconcile them nor to explain the inaccuracy. That this 
 criticism came to Madison's knowledge may be inferred from the 
 fact, that a part of the exposition and vindication published in 
 the National Intelligencer immediately under his eye, is jjlaced 
 precisely on the same ground with that taken by Madison in his 
 comment as to Number 49.* 
 
 » The authors of the following work were as follows : Nos. 2, 8, 4, 5, 54, Mr. 
 Jay. 10, 14, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, Mr. Madison. Nos. 18, 
 19, 20, Madison and Hamilton jointly. All the rest were from the pen of Alex- 
 ander Hamilton.' This entry is in the handwriting of my father, who in- 
 formed me, that it was made upon information derived from Mr. Jefferson; 
 and, according to my recollection, /rowi a memorandum furnished by him." 
 
 * The quotation from No. 49 goes far to prove that Mr. Madison wrote it. 
 Mr. Jefferson is there referred to in terms of distinguished approbation. None 
 
AUTHORS OF THE FEDERALIST. ci 
 
 As to the variations in the several statements of MaditsOt., it 
 will be noticed, that in the enumeration by him in the volume 
 possessed by Eush, and likewise in that in the " National Intelli- 
 gencer" also made by him, number seventeen (XVII) is not 
 claimed by him, but is conceded to Hamilton ; while in " The 
 City of Washington Gazette," made not long after that made to 
 Eush, and published the same year with that in the " National 
 Intelligencer," this same number seventeen (XVII) is claimed by 
 Madison ; and is also ascribed to him in one of Jefferson's lists, 
 and is not claimed in the list furnished by Madison to Gideon for 
 publication, but is conceded to Hamilton in that list, and is also 
 ascribed to Hamilton in the other Jefferson list. In the three 
 designations made by Madison of numbers XVIII and XIX; 
 in that for Eush ;* in that in " The Intelligencer ;" in that in 
 " The City of Washington Gazette," and that in one of the 
 Jefferson lists, the sole title to the numbers eighteen (XVIII) 
 and nineteen (XIX) is claimed by Madison, but in the list 
 furnished by him to Gideon, there is a memorandam by Madison 
 shewing a joint contribution to these numbers by Hamilton,^ as 
 is seen in the other Jefferson list. As to number twenty (XX) ; 
 though the sole title to it is claimed by Madison in his list, made 
 for Eush, and also in his list in " The National Intelligencer," it 
 is not claimed, but is conceded by him to Hamilton in " The City 
 of Washington Gazette ;" and in Gideon's edition the memoran- 
 dum by Madison also shews a joint contribution to this Numbei' 
 
 but a zealous friend would have expressed such an unqualified eulogium oa 
 him ; and it is well known, that Mr. Madison has always manifested the most 
 unbounded regard to that gentleman." 
 
 * In the statement by Richard Rush, he says, "Number XVIII according to 
 the printed designation appears to be by Mr. Hamilton and Mr. Madison. But 
 the pen is drawn over the word ' Mr. Hamilton and,' leaving the printed desig- 
 nation to read simply ' By Mr. Madison,' the manuscript initials 'J. M.' occupy- 
 ing the usual place to the right of the number. Precisely the same remark 
 applies to numbers XIX and XX, of which, therefore, we have Mr. Madison's 
 authority for saying that he was himself the sole author, equally as to number 
 XVIIl." 
 
 f "The subject of this and the two following numbers happened to be taken 
 up by both Mr. H. and Mr. M. What had been prepared by Mr. H., who had 
 entered more briefly into the subject, was left with Mr. M., on its appearing 
 that the latter was engaged in it, with larger materials and with a view to a 
 more precise delineation ; and from the pen of the latter the several papers 
 went to the press." — ^ote by Madison written in the margin of the leaf com- 
 mencing with the present numbei in the copy of the Federalist loaned by him 
 to the publisher. 
 
Sll HISTORICAL NOTICE. 
 
 by jiariilton, while in both the Jefferson lists this number is 
 solely ascribed to Hamilton. 
 
 Number twenty one (XXI) is conceded to Hamilton by Madi- 
 son in the list made by him for Eush, and in the list by him in 
 " The National Intelligencer," and also in his list in Gideon's 
 edition ; but in the list in " The City of Washington Gazette" it 
 is claimed by Madison. In one of the Jefferson lists it is ascribed 
 to Madison, and to Hamilton in the other. As to numbers, forty 
 eight (XLYIII) to fifty eight (LYIII), both inclusive, the sole 
 authorship to these essays is claimed by Hamilton in his desig- 
 nation, and by Madison in all his lists, with the exception of fifty 
 four. As to this number, the designation made by Madison in 
 Eush's Copy — the edition of 1810 — has this feature. This num- 
 ber in the printed designation of this copy is ascribed to Hamil- 
 ton. There the memorandum of Eush states, " the pen" of 
 Madison " is drawn across Mr. Hamilton's name," and the manu- 
 script initials " J. M." substituted, " showing Mr. Madison to 
 have been the writer." " The single number LIV shows the 
 name ' Jay' in manuscript, near those initials, over which the 
 pen has been again drawn leaving the manuscript initials ' J. M.' 
 as before." 
 
 As to numbers sixty two and sixtj'^ three (LXII and LXIII) 
 the sole title to each of them is claimed by Hamilton in his list, 
 and by Madison in all his lists; and is ascribed to Hamilton in 
 one of Jefferson's lists and to Madison in the other. Number 
 sixty-four — LXIV — in the three lists, that of Eush, that in 
 *' The City of Washington Gazette" and in the Gideon edition 
 is assigned by Madison to Jay, but in the memorandum by 
 Madison published in " The National Intelligencer," it is claimed 
 by Madison to himself. In one of the Jefferson lists it is ascribed 
 to Hamilton, in the other to Jay. 
 
 In the inquiiy which it is now proposed to enter upon in orde» 
 to throw some light on the subject of the authorship of certain 
 numbers of the Federalist, or of separate parts of them it is 
 deemed proper to indicate the spirit in which it is the aim of the 
 editor to pursue it. Hamilton's principal agency in the sugges- 
 tion, preparation and superintendence of thts work has never 
 been a matter of controversy, nor that Jay and Madison were 
 efficient co-operators with him in the contributions to it, greater 
 or less. The supervision of the series fell to Hamilton; and it 
 was so much under his control, both from the place of publica- 
 tion, and his priority and prominence in the plan or scheme oi' 
 
AUTHORS OF THE FEDERALIST. ciii 
 
 argument, that it cannot be supposed that any part of it had 
 gone to press, without his inspection or such previous conference 
 or correspondence with his associates, as insured his assent to 
 what was submitted to the public. His intimacy with the whole 
 work in the course of its publication must have been complete, 
 — more so certainly than that of Jay, whose proportion of it was 
 the least in quantity, and probably more so than Madison's. 
 There can be no doubt, at the same time, that the whole work — 
 passing under the signature of "Publius," and prepared by each 
 of the writers with the common object of promoting the adop- 
 tion of the Constitution by the people in the several States, had 
 the united sanction of all of them. It therefore is, and ought to 
 be regarded, in this sense, as their joint work. 
 
 That Hamilton was particularly appreciative of his separate 
 part of it, or was particularly sensitive to the just distribution 
 of public approbation between himself and his coadjutors, on 
 that account, is believed to be without the least foundation in 
 point of fact, whoever may have said or written it. His state 
 of mind and feeling is believed to be just the reverse. After the 
 work was consummated by the adoption of the Constitution, 
 and especially after a great divergency had occurred between 
 himself and Madison in regard to the administration of it, 
 curiosity was probably awakened to discover their respective 
 contributions to it; but it is seen, that when the revision of an 
 edition was proposed to him in 1802, and a designation of the 
 respective authors was requested of him for this object, he ex- 
 pressly declined assenting to the request, while he at the same 
 time only conditionally favored a revision of it by some compe 
 tent editor. He seemed indeed to doubt whether such an edi- 
 tion of it was desirable ;* and when the new edition appeared, 
 it was without any key to indicate the respective writers ; and 
 its preface, with the utmost delicacy to his known wishes, stated 
 as to the papers of Jay and Madison, " that, as far as it has been 
 practicable to discriminate their productions, theyare not unequal 
 in merit to those which are solely from the pen of Hamilton." 
 
 After the publication of this edition in 1802 by George F. 
 Hopkins, the curiosity of personal friends doubtless often so- 
 
 * Mr. Hopkins relates, when Hamilton hesitated his consent, that he re- 
 marked to him, '^Heretofore I have given the people milk; hereafter I will give 
 them meat:" words indicating his formed purpose — to write a treatise upon 
 government. Experienoe is teaching us the solemn lessons he did not live to 
 incoloate 
 
CiV HISTORICAL NOTICE. 
 
 licited from Hamilton the same information as to the respective 
 authors, but, except in the instances now seen, it was always 
 met with the same reserve. The only instance in which he gave 
 it under his own pen, was that previously stated, to his venerable 
 and very confidential friend, the late Egbert Benson, who was a 
 joint delegate with him to the Convention at Annapolis. This 
 was probably in answer to Judge Benson's request, by leaving a 
 small slip of paper at a morning call in a volume of his library. 
 It is from this memorandum, made public after Hamilton's 
 decease, we first obtain his representation of the authorship of 
 the respective numbers of the Federalist. 
 
 No particular sanctity will be claimed for this brief memo- 
 randum. The pendency, at the time it was left in Judge Ben- 
 son's ofiice, of a personal controversy which might terminate 
 bis life, may have been his reason for then performing a promise 
 which he might not afterwards be able to perform, but the per- 
 formance may have been, and probably was, a mere incident to 
 a visit to a personal friend made for other reasons. It were an 
 unreasonable supposition that such a memorandum was intended 
 in the mind of Hamilton to be invested with any of the charac- 
 ters of sanctity or dignity, which an ultimate act in toe life of 
 a man is commonly thought to impart. It was written and left, 
 no doubt, in perfect good faith, as a true representation of the 
 writer's knowledge or recollection, with the minute exception of 
 a single figure which admits of explanation; but the entire memo- 
 randum will be regarded, and ought to be regarded, only as the 
 averment of an upright and honorable man, meaning to state 
 what he knew or believed to be true ; and believing also that he 
 had truly expressed what he knew. 
 
 The paper purports no more than to be a memorandum. It 
 wants the essential forms of a record. It has neither expressed 
 description nor signature. It is simply a collection of Arabic 
 numerals in three lines, with the abbreviated word numero — No. 
 — prefixed to each, the first line ending with the capital letter J; 
 the second line ending with the capital letter M ; and the third 
 line with the capitals M and H jointly — a fourth line contains 
 the words " all the rest by H." 
 
 The original cause of an apparent error of statement in Ham- 
 ilton's memorandum, in his own copy of the Federalist, may 
 have arisen from a mere slip of his pen or from a peculiarity in 
 the formation of a single figure, writing with his usual rapidity, 
 and ^specially of a figure which, in the cursive hand of manv 
 
AUTHORS OF THE FEDERALIST. CV 
 
 writers, looks much like another figure, that might embody an 
 unobserved or supposed mistake. His private letters shew in 
 his formation of three consecutive figures, that there is no break 
 or raising of the pen from the paper, but that they are formed 
 by a continuous movement of his hand. This may be regarded 
 as the true solution of the only mistake supposed to exist in 
 Hamilton's designation, and it is in reference to this supposed 
 mistake that the succeeding observations are made. The printed 
 numbers of the Federalist in " the Independent Journal" in 
 which they first appeared, are in Eoman characters. The 
 numerals of the minute by Hamilton, copied by myself from his 
 manuscript, and also in the minute left with Benson, are in 
 Arabic characters. The minute prefixes the figures 2 — 3 — 4 — 5 
 — 54 before the name of Jay, implying, of course, that Jay was 
 the writer of the papers of the Federalist numbered 2 — 3 — 4 — 5 
 — 54. Mr. Jay was incontestably the writer of numbers 2 — 3 — 
 4 — 5 and 64. The mistake is in the figure 5 instead of 6. In 
 the total number of papers ascribed by Hamilton to Jay there is 
 no mistake. Jay was but the author of five numbers. If the 
 topic of number 64 had been adverted to, the mistake could not 
 have occurred, for No. 64 is a paper on the power of making 
 treaties — a subject from his previous services and then official 
 station with which Jay was familiar, while the topic of number 
 54, — the apportionment of representation among the States — 
 with the mixed basis of property and persons — persons free and 
 persons regarded as property — was one with which Jay had no 
 special relation, while, it will be seen, that Hamilton had in 
 relation to it exerted a most important agency. Hamilton could 
 not possibly have confounded these, but in bringing Roman 
 numerals into Arabic, an erroneous glance of the eye, and either 
 a slip or blur of the pen, might easily pervert a figure. As the 
 memorandum does, in no part of it, allot the number 64 to either 
 Jay or Madison, or to Madison and Hamilton jointly, and does 
 allot all the non enumerated essays to Hamilton, it follows more- 
 over that if the subjects of the two papers 54 and 64 had been 
 the basis of enumeration, a double consciousness of the writer 
 of the memorandum must have guided his pen aright — that of 
 his being the author of No. 54, and of his not being the author 
 of No. 64. It was the error of a figure simply. That such was 
 the case, is shewn by a statement* in which it appears, that 
 
 • StnteiTK^nt by Judge Kent — more minutely referred to hereafter. 
 
CVl HISTORICAL NOTICE. 
 
 Haniii ;on did ascribe No. 64 to Jay, retaining 54 to /limself. 
 The aVibreviated copy by Hamilton of his original minute in the 
 same formation of figures shows the haste in which it was made 
 the day before he received the wound which terminated his life. 
 The statement or allotment by Madison published in the Na 
 tional Intelligencer differs in this respect. It ascribes to himself 
 both 54 and 64, to the latter of which numbers he subsequently 
 relinquished his claim. 
 
 Having explained Hamilton's supposed single mistake in the 
 ascription of the respective numbers, it is now proposed to pro- 
 ceed to a more minute investigation of the subject. But in 
 what has been already adduced as evidence of error by Madi- 
 son, or may be adduced in confirmation of Hamilton's accuracy, 
 the editor deems it proper to disclaim any intention to impute 
 premeditated error in either or in any of the statements which 
 have appeared on this subject — nor does he claim to settle or 
 to demonstrate any thing that will leave any imputation upon 
 any one in regard to the subject. His long since declared inten- 
 tion to publish an edition of the Federalist, which would " state 
 all the evidence known to exist to designate the respective con- 
 tributions of its authors,"* gives the purport of this notice. As 
 a question of mere literary interest, and also of comparative 
 accuracy or probability in the respective sources of information, 
 the subsequent remarks must pass for what they are worth. 
 Not withholding, as will be seen, his own conviction on the 
 subject, both from the evidence which exists and from a com- 
 parison of the numbers in question with those which are of the 
 acknowledged authorship of either writer, he does not affect to 
 regard what he may adduce as conclusive — or as taking from 
 the reader the fullest liberty of forming from the same or any 
 other sources his own free judgment. 
 
 As to number XYII claimed by Madison in " The Washington 
 City Gazette," though disclaimed by him in his other distribu- 
 tions, a marked similarity, both of thought and of expression, 
 will be seen with those of the brief of Hamilton's leading speech 
 in the Federal convention. 
 
 In this number it is remarked; " It is a known fact in human 
 nature that its affections are commonly weak in proportion to the diS' 
 tance or diffusiveness of the object."f 
 
 * Hist. Rep. iii. 371 ; 1869. f Federalist, page 154. 
 
AUTHORS OF THE FEDERALIST. CVl . 
 
 In this Brief,* " Distance has a ■physical effect on vien's minds ;'^ 
 and in Hamilton's MSS. notes, commenting on an observation 
 of Madison, he ohserves, " The human mind is prone to limit 
 its view to near and local objects." In this number, " The variety 
 of more minute interests"f is adverted to as giving influence to 
 the local administrations. In Hamilton's MSS. notes a similar 
 phraseology is found, connected with the same idea, " If more 
 raiuute links are wanting others will supply them." In this 
 number| it is stated, that " the operations of the National 
 government will be less likely to inspire a habitual sense of obli- 
 gation;" and the advantage of the States is said to consist in 
 " the ordinary administration of criminal and civil justice." In 
 this brief; among the " supports of government" is enumerated 
 an "§ habitual sense of obligation." 
 
 Number XYIII is stated in his list by Hamilton to have been a 
 joint production with Madison — a particularity which shews the 
 accuracy of his recollection. It was claimed, as his sole production, 
 by Madison in all of his lists ; until the publication of Hamilton's 
 statement, that it was a joint production, being publicly urged, 
 when it was in the list furnished by Madison to Gideon, first quali- 
 fiedly admitted by him also, to have been a "joint production." 
 
 The object or purport of this essay is, in continuation of the 
 preceding number, to " show the tendency of Federal Govern- 
 ments, rather to anarchy among the members than tyranny in 
 the head" — " with farther examples." In this essay, it is stated j 
 " II Athens, as we learn from Demosthenes, was the arbiter of Greece 
 seventy three years. The Lacedemonians next governed it twenty- 
 nine years: at a subsequent period after the battle of Leuctra the 
 Thebans had their turn of domination." In Hamilton's brief ;^ 
 are seen these notes : " Grecian Republics j Demosthenes says 
 — Athens seventy three years — Lacedsemon twenty seven — The- 
 bans after battle of Leuctra." In this number this passage is also 
 seen j** " The Phocians having ploughed up some consecrated 
 ground belonging to the temple of Apollo, the Amphyctionic 
 Council according to the superstition of the age imposed a fine 
 on the sacrilegious offenders." " The latter * * * invited the 
 assistance of Philip." In Hamilton's briefff are these notes; 
 '* Phocians — consecrated ground — Philip, &c." 
 
 * History of Republic of United States, iii. 276. 
 
 t Federalist, p. 155. % Ibid. ? Hist. Repub. iii. 277. 
 
 ;! Federalist, p. 159. ^ Hist. Repub. iii. 278. 
 
 ** Federalist, p. 160. ft Hist. Repub. 278 
 
evil] HISTORICAL NOTICE. 
 
 In number (XIX) also claimed solely by Madison in all his 
 A)ur lists, though with the admission in Gideon's edition quali- 
 fiedly that it was & joint production, the same subject is treated ;^ 
 and there is seen a similar coincidence. In this number thifi 
 example is cited;* " The first which presents itself is the Ger- 
 manic body.** In Hamilton's brief,f " The Germanic Empire.'^ 
 Subsequently in this number, this sentence is seen; ^^Charle- 
 magne and his immediate descendants^ possessed the reality." In 
 Hamilton's brief; — ^^Charlemagne and his successors." 
 
 Of this same number, the powers of " the diet,"% and the council 
 formed by " the electors," are the subjects. In Hamilton's brief ^ 
 ^^ Diet — recesses — Electors, now seven, excluding others." In 
 this same number|] — the example of " the Swiss Cantons" is 
 adduced. In Hamilton's brief,^ " Swiss cantons." In this num- 
 ber it is stated** — " The Protestant and Catholic cantons have 
 since had their separate diets — where all the most important con- 
 cerns are adjusted, and which have left the general diet little 
 other business than to take care of the common bailiages." In 
 the brief; " two diets." In this number the separation resulting^ 
 in opposite alliances with foreign powers — " of Berne and of Lu- 
 zerne," is stated. In Hamilton's brief; ^^ opposite alliances — 
 Berne — Luzerne." Some evidence as to Hamilton's title to a par- 
 ticipation in these two numbers is also to be seen in the papers 
 of " The Continentalist" published by him in the years 1781-82. 
 Having therein briefly alluded to the examples of the conten- 
 tions of the Grecian Eepublics — of Sparta and of " Athens" and 
 having also instanced the impotence of " the Germanic Diet" he 
 passes on to the example of " the Helvetic league" adverts to 
 '* their powerful neighbours," — and states that " the Protestants 
 and Catholics have had separate diets to manage almost all matters 
 of importance ; so that in fact the general diet is only kept up to regu- 
 late the affairs of the common bailiages." The coincidence of this 
 passage with that previously quoted from the Federalist; and 
 near its close, was not casual. 
 
 As to the number (XX). It is seen to be claimed by Madison 
 in his two first lists, not claimed by him but conceded to Hamil- 
 ton in his third list, and again qualifiedly claimed in his fourth 
 list; — and that it, also in his list, is stated by Hamilton to have 
 
 * Federalist, p. 165. f Hist. Rep. iii. 278 
 
 X Ibid. p. 166. § Federalist, 168. 
 
 II Fedc ralist, p. 170. f Hist. Rep. iii. 278 
 
 ** Federalist, p. 171. 
 
AUTHORS OF THE FIvDERALIST. CIX 
 
 been a, joint production. The analogy of this essay w/th Hamil- 
 ton's brief, is less marked than in the previous instances ; but 
 by referring to his letter to Duane, the similarity in the train 
 of thought is quite perceptible. In this number,* " the weight 
 and influence" of the Stadtholder in " The United Netherlands," 
 from his general power and prerogatives, and " his influence in 
 the individual provinces," are stated to have been the only pre- 
 ventatives "of anarchy;" and it is added, "fAe surrounding 
 powers impose an absolute necessity of union to a certain degree." 
 In Hamilton's letter to Duanef in 1780, as to " the United 
 Provinces." " But the family of the Stadtholder, whose authority is 
 interwoven with the whole Government, has been a strong link of 
 union between them. Their physical necessities and the habits 
 founded upon them have contributed to it." So in the " Conti- 
 nentalist,"! Hamilton observes of ^'the United Provinces," " The 
 authority of the Stadtholder pervades the whole frame of the He- 
 public, and is a kind of common link by which the provinces are 
 bound together." " The inconsiderableness of each province sepa- 
 rately, and the imminent danger to which the whole would be exposed 
 of being over-run by their neighbours, in case of disunion, is a 
 further preservation against the phrenzy of hostility." Tho 
 closing paragraph of this number,§ stating the " important truth" 
 resulting from these examples — that " a sovereignty over sove- 
 reignties, a government over governments, a legislation for com- 
 munities, as contradistinguished from individuals, is a solecism 
 in theory" — adds, " so in practice it is subversive of the order 
 and ends of civil polity, by substituting violence in place of law, 
 or the destructive coercion of the sword, in place of the mild and 
 salutary coercion of the Magistracy." A coercion by the sword, 
 it has been seen, was proposed by Madison in seventeen hun- 
 dred and eighty. Hamilton in his brief,|| enumerating among, 
 " the supports of Government" force, remarks, " Force of two 
 kinds — coercion of laws — coercion of arm^. First does not exist 
 — and the last useless. Attempt to use it, a war between the 
 States j" and in Hamilton's brief, it is urged among the objec- 
 tions to the Confederation that it " legislates upon communities." 
 
 The number Twenty one (XXI) not claimed by Madison in the 
 first, second, and fourth of his enumerations, is claimed by him 
 in his third. It is claimed by Hamilton in his list. In this 
 
 * Federalist, p. 173. f Hamilton's Works, i. 158, 
 
 X Continentalist, No. 2. | Federalist, p. 176. 
 
 y Hist. Repub. iii. 276. 
 
ex HISTORICAL NOTICE. 
 
 number it is stated — "The next most palpable defect of the 
 existing Confederation is the total want of a sanction to its 
 laws." In Hamilton's brief, among the objections to the Con- 
 federation, is stated this, ^'J^o sanction." In this number, this 
 passage is seen :* The wealth of nations depends upon an infinite 
 variety of causes. Situation, soil, climate, the nature of the produc- 
 tions — the nature of the Government — the genius of the citizens — the 
 degree of information they possess — the state of commerce, of arts, of 
 industry — these circumstances and many more too complex, minute, 
 or adventitious, to admit of a particular specification, occasion 
 differences hardly conceivable in the relative opulence and riches 
 of different countries. The consequence clearly is, that there 
 can be no common measure of national wealth. There is no 
 method of steering clear of this inconvenience but by author- 
 izing the national Government to raise its own revenues in its 
 own way." 
 
 In a letter from Hamiltonf to Clinton of February 24, 1783, 
 this observation is to be seen. " The truth is, the ability of a 
 country to pay taxes depends on infinite combinations of physical 
 and moral causes, which can never be accommodated to any 
 general rule ; climate, soil, productions, advantages for naviga- 
 tion, government, genius of the people, progress of arts, and in- 
 dustry, and an endless variety of circumstances. The diversities 
 are sufficiently great, in these States, to make an infinite dif- 
 ference in their relative wealth, the proportion of which can 
 never be found by any common measure whatever. The only 
 possible way, then, of making them contribute to the general 
 expense, in an equal proportion to their means, is by general 
 taxes imposed under continental authority." 
 
 The next Essay in question is number XLIX misprinted in 
 the head of this number in the first or M'Lean edition of 1788 
 — as " Number LXIX — that is 69 instead of 49. It is claimed 
 by Hamilton in his list and by Madison in all of his lists, is 
 ascribed to Madison in one of the Jefferson lists and to Hamil- 
 ton in the other. In relation to this number Madison remarks 
 " the paper number 49 also, in which Mr. Jefferson is painted in 
 such strong colors was not likely to be even approved by Mr. 
 Hamilton." To this observation, the counter remark is suggested 
 by the essay, that its objections to Jefferson's project, pointed 
 ar d studied as they are, were not to be expected from Madison, 
 
 » Federalist, p. 181. f Hamilton's Works, i. 382. 
 
AUTHORS OF THE FEDERALIST. CXI 
 
 Lis most intimate and perhaps most unquestioning friend. The 
 contrast is to be observed between this and the preceding number 
 48 admitted to be Madison's. In 48, the allusion to Jefferson is 
 simple commendation. In 49, there is seen indeed warm com- 
 mendation, but followed by a careful, elaborate, and very expli- 
 citly stated disapproval throughout the essay. But the reason 
 assigned by Madison for rejecting Hamilton's claim to this 
 number, founded on a fact as existing at the time this essay 
 was written, is not a fact. On the fifth of September, 1785, 
 Jefferson writes, " I would advise him to apply to Colonel 
 Hamilton, who was aid to General "Washington, and is now 
 very eminent at the bar, and much to be relied on." And on 
 the 10th of October, 1792, Hamilton writes to General Pinckney 
 of Jefferson — " that gentleman whom I once very much esteemed* 
 but who does not permit me to retain that sentiment for him, is 
 certainly a man of sublimated and paradoxical imagination, en- 
 tertaining and propagating opinions inconsistent with dignified 
 and orderly Government." As this and the following number 
 relate to a topic as to which no similar project had ever come 
 under Hamilton's view, no analogy was to be expected in his 
 writings. It is a proposition quoted from Jefferson's " Notes on 
 the State of Virginia,"f that, " whenever any two of the three 
 branches of Government shall concur in opinion, each by the 
 voices of two thirds of their whole number, that a Convention 
 is necessary for altering the Constitution, or correcting breaches 
 of it, a Convention shall be called for the purpose." Could any 
 project be more " paradoxical" than this, or more " inconsistent 
 with orderly government?" Could there be a project presented 
 that would more be in conflict with Hamilton's urgency for a 
 stable government ? 
 
 Some passages in this number, are not without similitude to 
 other of Hamilton's papers. " If it be true," this essay remarks,| 
 " that all governments rest on opinion ;" " The most rational 
 government will not find it a superfluous advantage to have the 
 prejudices of the community on its side." " The passions ought to 
 be controuled and regulated by the Government." In Hamilton's 
 
 * Hamilton's Works, v. 533. 
 
 f "Notes on the State of Virginia, written by Thomas JeflFerson, Philadel- 
 phia, 1788," — of which a copy, formerly in Hamilton's library, is in my poa- 
 session. 
 
 J Federalist, p. 390. 
 
CXll HISTORICAL NOTICE. 
 
 letter to Duane,* urging a change of government, he remarks 
 " men are governed by opinion." In his brief ;f among the 
 " supports of government" is stated, an " opinion of utility and 
 necessity." " To effect any thing passions must be turned towards 
 general government." " The Government must be so constituted 
 as to offer strong motives, in short, to interest all the passions of 
 individuals."! 
 
 * Hamilton's Works, i. 168. f Hist. Repub. iii. 277, 278, 283. 
 
 X A statement has recently been made public taken from an entry by Chan- 
 cellor Kent, in a volume of the Federalist of the edition of 1788. Nothing would 
 more have grieved this distinguished and devoted friend of Hamilton during 
 his life, and to his memory since his decease, as often manifested, and entitling 
 him to the most respectful gratitude of the editor, who had the honor of his 
 friendship, had he supposed that any minute of his would be used prejudi- 
 cially. From a copy of this entry, in my possession, it appears that Hamil- 
 ton represented " 2, 3, 4, 5 and 64 as written by Mr. Jay — 10-14, 37 to 49 
 both inclusive and 63 by James Madison, Junr. — numbers 18, 19, 20 by 
 Messrs. Madison and Hamilton jointly — all the rest by Mr. Hamilton." "Mr. 
 Hamilton told me that Mr. Madison wrote No. 48 and 49 — from pa. 101 to 112 
 of vol. 2d — N.B. I showed the above mem. to Gen. Hamilton in my ofifice in 
 Albany, and he said that it was correct, himself seeing the correction above 
 made." The note by Kent above quoted, that Nos. 2, 3, 4, 5 and 64 were 
 Jay's, " has no correction in it. It stands exactly as it was written"* by Judge 
 Kent; and as to the minute that this note or memorandum was shown to 
 General Hamilton indicating the pages " from 101 to 112 of vol. 2d," it is certain 
 that this minute was made some long time after the interview of Hamilton 
 with Kent, for the reasen that a letter of Judge Kent to William Coleman — 
 dated Albany, May 12, 1817, states a number differently. "The note which I 
 now possess" — that which states a number diflFerently — "written in one of 
 the volumes of the Federalist and which was there in February, 1804, and 
 which I am certain received the correction and sanction of General Hamilton, 
 I have annexed below." The corrections made by Judge Kent are these,— 
 " The numbers 64, 49 — 48 and 49 have been written over other numbers — 64 
 over 64 — 49 over 48 — 48 over 68 — 49 over 69." Here are two numbers 49, 
 written over different numbers. The correction of 49 over 48 must have re- 
 ferred to the number 48 as printed in the "Packet," and when this number 
 was referred to by its topic, Hamilton would of course ascribe it to Madison ; 
 for the 49 in the volume copy is the 48 of the "Packet," which Hamilton 
 ascribes to Madison in his own list. The correction of the same number twice 
 cannot be explained in any other way. The correction of 48 over 68 — and 
 the second correction of 49 over 69 — are thus explained. They are correc- 
 tions of misprints in the volumes of 1788 and carelessly repeated in the 
 volumes of 1802 by the printer. The number 48 in both these editions is 
 printed in Roman numerals as LXYIII — 68 — and the number 49 is printed 
 also in both editions in Roman numerals as LXIX — 69, but why 64 is writtes 
 
 * James Kent to the editor, kindly giving exact trauBcripts of the entries in the volames uf b<« 
 grandfather with explanatory statements. Feb. 6 and 11th. 1864. 
 
AUTHORS OF THE FEDERALIST. CXll! 
 
 In number L., claimed by Hamilton in his list and by Madison 
 in all his lists, the same topic is pursued, and after some general 
 observations, the jjrecedent of Pennsylvania in her " Council of 
 Censors" is canvassed. As to this, as well as to the scheme 
 of Jefferson, an analogy in Hamilton's writings — for the same 
 reason, that no such project had ever come before him, was not 
 to be expected. In number Fifty one (LI.), claimed by Hamil- 
 ton in his list and by Madison in all his lists, the necessity there 
 stated, that, "in order to lay a due foundation for a separate and 
 distinct exercise of the different powers of government, each 
 department should have a will of its own," is seen to be a primary 
 object in Hamilton's plan of a National Government, — read 
 before the Federal Convention. In his brief, he notes.* " The 
 general government must not only have a strong soul, but strong 
 organr. by which that soul is to operate." In his resolutions of 
 1783,f for a General Convention ; he states among the great 
 defects of the Confederation — " its confounding legislative, and 
 executive powers, in a single body." In his brief, he pointedly 
 remarks,! " the want of checks." This want was distinctly stated, 
 as one of the chief sources of his solicitude ; and in the struc- 
 ture of a Government, which he planned — he carried the prin- 
 ciple as far as could be deemed wise — of drawing ; as this essay 
 approves, § " all the appointments from the same fountain of 
 authority — the people, through channels having no communication 
 whatever with one another" adding with his own plan in his mind ; 
 "Perhaps, such a plan of constructing the several departments 
 would be less difficult in practice than it may in contemplation 
 appear." This Essay, after indicating the means of providing 
 security against " a gradual concentration of power," proceeds, 
 " ambition must be made to counteract ambition. The interest 
 of the man must be connected with the constitutional rights of 
 the place. It may be a reflection on human nature that such 
 
 OTer 54, the number LIV being accurately printed is not explained, nor ex- 
 plicable. Nor is the error of Judge Kent as to 53 to be explained in any 
 Bimilar way, for 53 is correctly printed in both editions — LIII. A list re- 
 cently published as " Chancellor Kent's MSS. Notes," is merely a copy in 
 the Chancellor's handwriting, and stated there as " copied from the news- 
 paper extract" of the " list furnished by Mr. Madison himself," the inaccuracy of 
 which it has been seen, was subsequently admitted by Madison in the Gideon 
 edition of 1810. No weight can be attached to this mere copy of an erroneous 
 list in Kent's hand, as being "Chancellor Kent's MSS. Notes." 
 
 * History of Repub. iii. 280. f Hamilton's Works, ii. 269 
 
 X Hist. Rep. iii. 278 I Fed. p. 398. 
 
•CXlV HISTORICAL NOTICE. 
 
 devices should be necesnary to control the abuses of government 
 But what is government itself but the greatest of all reflections on 
 human nature? If men were angels, no government would be 
 necessary."* 
 
 This tone of thought and of expression warrant the belief 
 that these sentences flowed from Hamilton's pen. They speak 
 the independence of mind shown by him in the Federal Conven- 
 tion which gained him a large place in its confidence, and which 
 he maintained in every stage of his responsible life. In the 
 brief, of his great speech in that body, he quotes the pregnantly 
 fallacious phrase — " Vox populi — Vox Dei," — " The voice of the 
 people is the voice of God" — and there meets it by a remark, 
 equivalent to this — " If men were angels, no government would be 
 necessary" — " Source of Government — the unreasonableness of the 
 people."1[ 
 
 In this essay it is also remarked ; " Different interests necessarily 
 exist iji different classes of citizens." So he had recently remarked 
 in the New York legislature. Whence can this danger — " to the 
 liberties of the people" — arise ? " The members of Congres , 
 are annually chosen" (under the Confederation) " by the mera- 
 bers of the several legislatures. They come together with dif- 
 ferent habits, prejudices and interests. They are, in fact, continu- 
 ally changing." It is observed in this Essay — " It is of great in} 
 portance in a Eepublic, not only to guard the society against the 
 oppression of its rulers; but to guard one part of the society 
 against the injustice of the other part." In his brief ;| Hamilton 
 observes, ^'■Society naturally divides itself into two political divi- 
 sions — the few and the many. If government in the hands of the 
 few, they will tyrannize over the many ; if in the hands of the 
 many they will tyrannize over the/ew. It ought to be in the 
 hands of both, and they should be separated." The scheme of 
 Charles Pinckney§ and the resolutions of Virginia submitteu 
 to the Federal Convention — wholly disregarded this principle — 
 both deriving the Senate and the Executive from the more 
 numerous branch of the legislature. 
 
 In this number, in the provision to fortify the Executive, it ib 
 stated — " An absolute negative, on the legislature, appears at first 
 view to be the natural defence with which the executive magis- 
 trate should be armed. But, perhaps it would be neither alto- 
 gether safe nor alone sufficient. "|| The analogy of this opinion 
 
 * Fed. 398. f Hamilton's Works, ii. 414. 
 
 X Hist. Rep. iii. 280. ? Ibid. 260. || Federalisl, 390. 
 
AUTHORS OF THE FEDERALIST. CXV 
 
 with Hamilton's course in the Fedei*al Convention cannot escape 
 observation. He contended for the power of an absolute veto ir 
 the President, providing effective checks in the other provisions 
 of his plan of a Constitution. Madison declared in the Con- 
 vention, " To give such a prerogative," an absolute negative, 
 " would certainly be obnoxious to the temper of this country — its 
 present temper at least."* It is not probable, that, in respect 
 to a Constitutional provision as to which he had avowed so 
 earnest an objection, he would have thus qualified that opiniop 
 by a ^^ perhaps," while on the other hand, the doubt was clearly 
 in Hamilton's mind, apprehending and indicating as he did, the 
 dangers of the engrossing and controlling influence of the legis- 
 lature. 
 
 From these " more general enquiries," the Federalist passes 
 " to a more particular examination of the several parts of the 
 government." The first topic was the plan of the House of 
 Representatives as it related to " the qualifications of the electors 
 and the elected." This is the subject of number fifty two (LII.) 
 claimed by Hamilton in his list and by Madison in all his lists. 
 That Hamilton would have preferred to treat of this subject 
 may reasonably be inferred from the uniform current of his 
 thoughts and from the marked position in which he stood in 
 relation to it. He is seen to have argued in the first of his 
 political essays with great force the right of representation. 
 " Thef right of Colonists to exercise a legislative power is an 
 inherent right." " The foundation of the English Constitution 
 rests upon the principle; that no laws have any validity or 
 binding force, without the consent, and approbation of the people, 
 given in the persons of their representatives, periodically elected 
 by themselves." " This constitutes the democratical part of the 
 Government." " A| share in the sovereignty of the State," he 
 subsequently wrote, "which is exercised by the citizens at large, 
 in voting at elections, is one of the most important rights of the 
 subject ; and in a Republic ought to stand /oremos/ in the estima- 
 tion of the law. It is that right by which we exist a free people." 
 In conformity with this maxim, it is stated in this number, 
 "The definition of the right of sufirage is very justly regarded 
 as a fundamental article of republican government."^ And in de- 
 Icnoe of this right he had very recently remarked in the legisla- 
 
 * Madison Papers, ii. 786. f Hamilton's Works, ii G2. 1776 
 
 + Hamilton's Works, ii. 315. | Fed. p. 403. 
 
CXV] HISTORICAL NOTICE. 
 
 ture of J^ew York. " The* qualifications both of the electors and 
 the elected ought to he fundamental in a republican form of govern- 
 ment, not liable to be varied or added to by the legislature, and 
 they should forever remain where the Constitution left them." 
 
 His theoretical opinions on this subject were the very opposite 
 of those of Madison, whose birth and education were in a plant- 
 ing State, the Constitution whereof he had an agency in forming, 
 and which limited the suffrage to persons having an interest in 
 real estate. Viewing the subject on its merits alone, Madison 
 remarked, " the freeholders of the country would be the safest 
 aepositories of American liberty."f Hamilton, on the contrary, 
 duly measuring the tendencies of opposite interests, earnestly 
 observed, " It is essential to the democratic rights of the com- 
 munity, that this branch be directly elected by the people. "^ The 
 second article of his plan of a Constitution is seen to have em- 
 bodied this principle ;§ and in all his successively developed opi- 
 m'ons, he has been seen seeking to limit the power of the State 
 Governments, and to organize a National Government self exist- 
 ing and self supporting — a National Government deriving its 
 power directly from the people, and acting directly upon them 
 as individuals, a system equally important in the preservation 
 of the Constitution, and, if temporarily suspended by civil war 
 — in the restoration of its powers — the only theory consistent 
 with the natural and constitutional rights of a free people. 
 
 The term of office of the Representatives in Congress is the 
 next topic of this number. In respect to this, the Essay ob- 
 serveslj — "As it is essential to liberty, that the government in 
 general should have a common interest with the people., so it is 
 particularly essential that the branch of it under consideration 
 should have an immediate dependence on, and an intimate sym- 
 pathy with the people." So, in a recent speech on granting the 
 power of levying an impost to the Confederation, he remarks — 
 " The truth is, the security intended to the general liberty in 
 the Confederation, consists in the frequent election, and in the 
 rotation of the members of Congress, by which there is a con- 
 Btant and an effectual check upon them. This is the security 
 which the people in every State enjoy against the usurpations 
 of their internal governments; and it is the true source of se- 
 curity in a representative republic." A vindication of " biennial 
 
 * Hist, of Repub. iii. 207. f Madison Papers, ii. 786. 
 
 X Secret Debates, 149. g Hamilton s Works, ii. 396 
 
 II Federalist, p. 404. 
 
AUTHORS OF THE FEDERALIST. CXvil 
 
 elections" is drawn from the previous " history of this branch 
 of the English Constitution" — from that of Ireland ; — and from 
 that of the several States when Colonies. When referrintj to 
 Virginia, the author of this number* observes — " In Virginia, 
 nevertheless, if I have not been misinformed, elections under the 
 former Government were septennial." Such might be the 
 language of a person, residing at a distance from that State 
 with which the communications were then infrequent; probably 
 without the means of recurring to her colonial records; who 
 had passed his early life in the camp, and much of his after life 
 under pressing professional engagements. But such an expres- 
 sion was not to be expected from Madison, a member of the 
 Convention in 1775 which framed the first Constitution of that 
 State, — in 1776 a member of her legislature — in 1777 a mem- 
 ber of her " Council of State ;" and in 1779 chosen one of her 
 delegates to Congress — speaking of the term of office in her 
 recent Colonial legislature. 
 
 In this number,f the change in England from triennial to sep- 
 tennial elections is justly disapproved. " The last change from 
 three to seven years, is well known to have been introduced -pretty 
 early in the present century under an alarm for the Hanoverian suc- 
 cession." Hamilton's previous language is equally explicit. " The 
 EnglishWhigs, after the Revolution," he remarks,;}: "from an over- 
 whelming dread of Popery, and of the Pretender, from triennial, 
 voted the Parliament septennial. They have been trying ever 
 since to undo this false step in vain, and repenting the effects of 
 their folly in the overgrown power of the new family." 
 
 Number Fifty three (LIII) is claimed by Hamilton in his list, 
 and by Madison in all of his lists — is ascribed to Madison in one 
 of the Jefferson lists, and to Hamilton in the other. It is a con- 
 tinuation of the subject last treated of in the preceding number 
 — the duration of the term of office of the members of the House 
 of Eepresentatives. From what is shown, there can exist little 
 doubt, that Madison was not the author of number fifty two. It 
 is seen to have derived its defence of the provision for biennial 
 elections from historical examples. In this succeeding number 
 Fifty three (LIII), after an allusion to the periods established 
 in certain of the United States, this subject is considered on 
 broader grounds. " The natural alarm in the votaries of free 
 government, of which the frequency of elections is the corner 
 
 * Fed. p. 407. t ^^^- P- ^06- 
 
 X Hamilton's Works, ii. 289.— «'Phocion," 1784. 
 
CXVlll HISTORICAL NOTICE. 
 
 stone,"* is he»*e stated to have resulted from the instances in tlie 
 acts of the IJritish Parliament, prolonging their term of office. 
 This "frequency of elections," he stated in the reference in 
 the preceding number — to have been — "the security of liberty ;" 
 and this essay meets this objection to the Constitution decidedly. 
 by referring to " the important distinction so well understood in 
 America between a Constitution established by the people, and un- 
 alterable by the Government, and a law established by the govern- 
 ment, and alterable by the Government." ■\ This " important dis- 
 tinction" had been brought pressingly before Hamilton by the 
 violent bigotry and selfish proscription, shewn, in New York in 
 1778, by the party whose leaders were now opposing the adop- 
 tion of the Constitution by that State. It was, while opposing 
 legislative discriminations violative of the Constitution that ho 
 asserted its supremacy. " If the Constitution," he wrote, | " de- 
 clares that persons possessing certain qualifications shall bo 
 entitled to certain rights, while that Constitution remains in 
 force, the Government, which is the mere creature of the Consti- 
 tution, can divest no citizen, who has the requisite qualifications, 
 of his corresponding rights." "Happily for us in this country, 
 the position is not to be controverted, that the Constitution is 
 the creature of the people ; but it does not follow that they are 
 not bound by it, while they suffer it to continue in force; nor 
 does it follow that the legislature, which is, on the other hand, a 
 creature of the Constitution, can depart from it, on any pre- 
 sumption of the contrary sense of the people. The Constitution 
 is the compact made between the society at large and each in- 
 dividual." "All the authority of the legislature is delegated to 
 them under the Constitution ; their rights and powers are there 
 defined ; if they exceed them, it is a treasonable usurpation upon 
 the power and majesty of the people ; aj^ by the same rule 
 that they may take away from a single individual the rights he 
 claims under the Constitution, they may erect themselves into 
 perpetual dictators." " The second question," it is stated in this 
 number, is, " whether biennial elections be necessary or useful ;" 
 and in reference to this, " the requisite knowledge" of the repre- 
 sentative is considered. " Some knowledge of the affairs, and 
 even of the laws of all the States ought to be possessed by the 
 members from each of the States. How can foreign trade be 
 properly regulated by uniform laws without some acquaintance 
 
 * federalist, p. 411. f ^^id. 410. % Hamilton's Works, ii 319, 322. 
 
AUTHORS OF THE FEDERALIST. CXIX 
 
 with the commerce, the ports, the usages, and the regulations 
 of the different States ? How can the trade between the differ- 
 ent States be duly regulated, without some knowledge of their 
 relative situations in these and other points ? How can taxes 
 be judiciously imposed and effectually collected, if they be not 
 accommodated to the different laws and local circumstances re- 
 lating to these objects in the different States ? How can uniform 
 regulations for the militia be duly provided without a similar 
 knowledge of some internal circumstances by which the States 
 are distinguished from each other? These are the principal 
 
 objects of federal legislation." "A branch of knowledge 
 
 which belongs to the acquirements of a federal representative, 
 and which has not been mentioned, is that of foreign affairs." 
 How much these observations are in accordance with the habit- 
 ual themes of thought in Hamilton's mind is seen in his various 
 writings and in the topics which he had selected for his own 
 pen in the numbers of this work. They are summed up in a single 
 sentence of one of his early concise productions, also entitled 
 " Publius."* Speaking of the high office of a representative In 
 Congress — " to form useful alliances abroad — to establish a wue 
 government at home — to improve the internal resources Sindi finances 
 of the nation — would be the generous objects of his care." This 
 number concludes by pointing briefly to the objections " of less 
 importance," to annual elections. Hamilton had recently re- 
 marked in the Federal Convention. "There is a medium in 
 every thing. I confess three 3-ears is not too long."-}- This was 
 the term of office in his plan of a Constitution. 
 
 Number Fifty four (LIV) is ascribed by Hamilton in his list 
 to Jay. Of the mistake in this ascription an explanation has 
 been given, and from Hamilton's statement, designating the 
 numbers by Madison and not including this, it is to be ascribed on 
 Hamilton's authority to himself. Madison in all his lists claims 
 this number to himself, although the minute of Eush previously 
 quoted would indicate some uncertainty in his own mind. 
 " The single number LIY," this minute states, " shows the name 
 of ' Jay' in manuscript, near those initials over which the pen 
 has been again drawn, leaving the manuscript initials * J. M.' as 
 before. In one of the Jefferson lists it is ascribed to Madison, in 
 the other to Jay. In support of his claim to this number Madi< 
 «nn remarks — '' The paper No. 54 on the subject of the Negroes, 
 
 * Hamilton's Works, ii. 161. \ Secret Debates, 161. 
 
CXX HISTORICAL NOTICE. 
 
 as comprized, in the ratio of representation, was most likely to 
 be within the share executed by the southern member of the 
 club." In a survey of all the circumstances connected with 
 the interesting subject of this paper, the probability is in the 
 opposite direction. The representation of three fifths of the 
 negroes was a reluctant concession to the Southern States^ 
 " whose unfortunate situation," Hamilton subsequently remarked 
 in the New York Convention, " it is 1o have a great part of their 
 population as well as property in blacks." The regulation 
 eomplained of, he said, " was one result of the spirit of ac- 
 commodation which governed the Convention, and without this 
 indulgence no Union could possibly have been formed." But 
 imperative as this concession was, it was only the result of 
 frequent negotiation in the Convention; and was a subject of 
 shai-p animadversion when the plan of the Constitution was 
 made public. Of this animadversion, Hamilton was the espe- 
 cial object. " The delegate from this State" — Hamilton — (it is 
 charged upon him) " acceded to it alone on the part of the 
 State. With what right they know best who deputed him; 
 and as the legislature are now convened, to them I refer him 
 for the present, only observing, that if he had not the most 
 full and ample power for what he didj (and I never heard 
 it pretended that he had) I cannot help thinking it a most 
 daring insult offered to the freemen and freeholders of this State, 
 besides being an unparalleled departure from his duty to this 
 State, as well as to the United States."* 
 
 The peculiar form in which this subject is presented in this 
 essay is not a little confirmatory of the probability that it is 
 the production of a delegate to the General Convention from a 
 Northern State. It sustains the provision for the, representa- 
 tion of the colored people by stating the argument, as it "might" 
 be urged " by one of our Southern brethren." And at the close 
 of this hypothetical view, adds — " Such is the reasoning which 
 an advocate for the Southern interests might employ on this 
 subject. And although it may appear to be a little strained in 
 some points, on the whole I must confess, that it fully reconciles me 
 to the scale of representation which the Convention have estab- 
 lished." These qualifying expressions do not seem to be the 
 natural or probable language of a delegate from Virginia. They 
 aro the terms which would naturally and probably be used by & 
 
 * Expositor, No. 1, Februiyry 7, 1788. 
 
AUTHORS OF THE FEi^ERALIST. 3XX1 
 
 delegate from New York, aware of the force and extent of the 
 Northern popular sentiment, jealous of the assuming temper of 
 the Southern States, and especially jealous of the admission of 
 any portion of the slave population, as the basis of representa- 
 tion, when the Southern field for the extension of slave labor 
 was so disproportionately large, and the cession of a part of it 
 to the Union had been so long, so tenaciously, and so offensively 
 withheld. 
 
 If the probability be, that the vindication of this provision 
 of the Constitution would more naturally have proceeded from 
 the representative in the Convention of a Northern State? If it 
 was to be expected, that the sole delegate from New York who 
 signed the Constitution, must have felt the strong and difficult 
 necessity of meeting and soothing, as to this new unexpected 
 feature of the Constitution, the earnest prejudices of the free- 
 men of this State at that time holding slaves, there is nothing 
 in the opinions or in the political action of Hamilton at any 
 time to diminish, but every thing to increase, this probability. 
 In the earliest preserved production of his pen, when at the 
 age of seventeen, writing " A Full Vindication" of the mear 
 sures of Congress, warm with his great theme — " the natural 
 rights of mankind" and the value of " civil liberty" — he de- 
 clares, *' All men have one common original, they participate 
 in one common nature, and consequently have onci common 
 right. No reason can be assigned why one man should exer- 
 cise any power or pre-eminence over his fellow creatures more 
 than another, unless they have voluntarily vested him with it." 
 " I consider civil liberty, in a genuine unadulterated sense, as 
 the greatest of terrestrial blessings. I am convin(!ed, that the 
 WHOLE HUMAN race is entitled to it; and that it cannot be wi'ested 
 from them without the blackest and most aggravated guilt."* — 
 " Civil liberty is only natural liberty, modified and secured by 
 the sanctions of civil society. It is not a thing in its own 
 nature, precarious and dependent on human will and caprice, but 
 it is conformable to the constitution of man, as well as necessary 
 to the well being of Society." He meant " the vim le human 
 RACE," and looked to the emancipation of the blacks as part of 
 the great sacrifice to be laid by the American jeople on the 
 Altar of Freedom. When urging upon the Continantal Con- 
 gress in 1779, the raising of several battalions of negroes with 
 
 * Hamilton's Works, toI i. p. 3. 
 
CXXU HISTORICAL NOTICE. 
 
 the assistance of th(. Grovernment of South Carolina, and avow- 
 ing his opinion, that "the negroes will make very excellent soldiers, 
 with proper management," Hamilton uses words that cannot 
 soon be unremembered. " The contempt," he writes to the 
 President of Congress,* " we have been taught to entertain for 
 the blacks, makes us fancy many things that are founded neither 
 in reason nor experience; and an unwillingness to part with 
 property of so valuable a kind, will furnish a thousand argu- 
 ments to show the impracticability or pernicious tendency of a 
 scheme which requires such sacrifices. . . . An essential part of the 
 plan is to give them their freedom with their swords. This will 
 secure their fidelity, animate their courage and I believe, will 
 have a good influence upon those who remain by opening a 
 door to their emancipation. This circumstance, I confess, has 
 no small weight in inducing me to wish the success of the 
 project, for the dictates of humanity and true policy equally in- 
 terest me in favor of this unfortunate class of men." Fifteen 
 days after the date of this letter. Congress met its suggestions 
 by recommending to South Carolina (whence a delegate was 
 present urging the measure) and to Georgia " immediately the 
 raising three thousand able bodied negroes" to be commanded 
 by white officers; by assuring a "provision for paying the pro- 
 prietors of the enlisted negroes a full compensation ;" and by 
 declaring, that " every negro who shall well and faithfully 
 serve as a soldier to the end of the present war, and shall 
 then return his arms, be emancipated;" and receive a small 
 reward. f The negro population of this country had rarely been 
 a special subject of consideration during the several periods of 
 the war of the Revolution, except in fixing the ratio of contri- 
 bution by the several States. In the project of a Confederation, 
 submitted by Franklin in 1775, he proposed that the ratio of 
 contribution should be the number of " male polls between 
 sixteen and sixty years of age." In the first draft of the Con- 
 federation, submitted in 1776, " the number of inhabitants of 
 every age, sex, and quality, except Indians not paying taxes 
 in any State," was proposed to be the rule. For this was sub- 
 stituted, a proposition made in 1777, that " the value of all land 
 within each State granted to or surveyed for any person" should 
 be the rule — which was adopted in " The Articles of Confedera- 
 
 * Hamilton's Works, i. 61. Ibid. 76, 77. Hamilton to John Jay, President 
 •f Congress, March 14, 1779. 
 f Secret Journals, i. 109. 
 
AUTHORS OF THE FEDERALIST. CXXlll 
 
 iion." The difficulties of such a valuation led to a proposvjl, as 
 the basis of contribution — of the proportion of numbers as early 
 contemplated; but, in this estimate, a compound of freemen and 
 slaves was suggested. The number of slaves to be embraced be- 
 came the disputed question. A vote was at last taken on the 
 ratio " of free inhabitants and three fifths of all other inhabitants 
 of every sex and condition, excepting untaxed Indians;"* when 
 owing to Hamilton's temporary absence from Congress, the vote 
 of New York was lost. But, three days after, on his motion for 
 a reconsideration, an amendment, offered by him, passed; de- 
 claring that the supplies to Congress by the States should be 
 "in proportion to the whole number of white and other free in- 
 habitants of every age, sex, and condition, including those bound 
 to servitude for a term of years, and three fifths of all other 
 -persons, not comprehended in the foregoing description, except 
 Indians not paying taxes in each State, "f the numbers to be tri- 
 ennially taken. For the word ^'■inhabitants" the word ^^ persons'" 
 was thus carefully substituted ; and from this, it is seen, that the 
 first express recognition by Congress of the slaves as '■'■persons" 
 was at the instance of Hamilton, a proud and memorable fact in 
 his history. This resolution was the first step towards — in fact, 
 laid the basis of — the recognition by the Constitution of the United 
 States, of the people of African descent within the United States 
 — as "persons," having representative rights, for Hamilton then 
 saw, as he subsequently declared in the New York Convention, 
 that " representation and taxation go together, and one uniform 
 rule ought to apply to both." In the plan of a Constitution re- 
 ported by the committee of detail, the measure of taxation, pro- 
 vided in the resolution of Hamilton passed in 1783, was incor- 
 porated as that measure. In his plan of a Constitution, he 
 provided, that the direct and capitation taxes should be " pro- 
 portioned in each State by the whole number of free persons, 
 except Indians not taxed, and by three fifths of all other per- 
 sons," thus expunging the term "white;" and, in the plan re- 
 ported by the committee of revisal, this provision of his plan of 
 d. Constitution, in its precise terms, was made ; and became a part 
 of the Constitution of the United States, in apportioning " the 
 representatives and direct taxes among the several States."! A 
 ftnal change in the provision of the Constitution with respect to 
 
 « Journal of Congress, viii. 166, March 28, 1783. 
 
 + Ibid. 171, April 1, 1783. J Art. 1. Sec. 2. 
 
eXXlV HISTORICAL NOTICE. 
 
 fugitives marks the sense of the general Convention. The plan 
 last reported that " no person legally held to service or labor in 
 one State, escaping to another, shall, in consequence of any 
 regulations subsisting therein, be discharged from such service 
 or labor," was so amended as to declare, instead of the terms — 
 no person ^Hegally held to service" — no person "held to service 
 or labor in one State under the laws thereof." " The laws of a State 
 might hold," but the Convention refrained from declaring, that 
 such holding was " legal.^' 
 
 Nor are the facts which have been stated the only facts in 
 evidence of Hamilton's view of the great and since momentous 
 political problem — the condition of the people of African descent 
 — the phrase habitually used by him when speaking in private 
 of this " unfortunate race." In the same spirit of liberty which 
 had asserted with pen and sword the Union and Independence 
 of the whole people of the United States in their individual 
 capacities, having retired from the cabinet of Washington retain- 
 ing all his confidence, at his instance writing on the subject of 
 the treaty of peace of 1783, Hamilton used these pregnant ex- 
 pressions to show that the freedom once proclaimed and pro- 
 mised to slaves never could be revoked. The last royal Governor 
 of Virginia, Lord Dunmore, had proclaimed freedom to its 
 slaves who should join his standard. England had freed and 
 deported numbers of these slaves. She refused to pay for them. 
 Tfie Virginian member* of Washington's cabinet urged this as an 
 objection to the ratification of the treaty with Great Britain of 
 1795, which made no provision for such payment. In answer 
 to this objection, when commenting on this refusal, Hamilton 
 remarked as to the freedom promised to the slave — " The grant 
 was irrevocable. Nothing in the law of nations or in those of 
 Great Britain will authorize the resumption of liberty once 
 
 granted to a human being." "In the interpretation of 
 
 treaties things odious or immoral are not to be presumed. The 
 abandonment of Negroes who had been induced to quit their 
 masters on the faith of Official Proclamations promising them 
 liberty, to fall again under the yoke of their masters and into 
 slavery, is as odious and immoral a thing as can be conceived. It 
 is odious not only as it imposes an act of perfidy on one of the 
 contracting parties, but as it tends to bring back to servitude 
 men once made free. The general interests of humanity conspire 
 
 * Edmund Randolph. 
 
AUTHORS OF THE FEDERALIdT. CXXV 
 
 With the obligation which Great Britain had contracted towards 
 the negroes to repel this construction of the treaty, if anothei 
 can be found." The President of these United States has pro 
 mised freedom to the slaves of rebels ; by an " official Proclama- 
 tion" he has granted to them that freedom. They are no longer 
 slaves. " The grant" is " irrevocable." That Proclamation — the 
 great event of modern history — is " a contract" which it were 
 ** an act of perfidy" not to perform. The wide door to Emanci- 
 pation — the universal emancipation of the oppressed colored 
 race from a cruel bondage, has been opened. That door never 
 can be, never will be, closed. It has been opened by the law by 
 which we exist as a nation — the righteous law of self-defence — , 
 the law of " common defence" proclaimed by the Constitution 
 mandatorily to be " the supreme law of the land," a law acknow- 
 ledged, interpreted, and recognized in its full extent by the most 
 intelligent of its then adversaries in Virginia. 
 
 " It has been repeatedly said here," is the language of Patrick 
 Henry, addressing the Convention of that State, called to con- 
 sider the Constitution, " It has been repeatedly said here, that 
 the great object of a National Government was national defence." 
 " If the}'^ give power to the General Government for the general 
 defence, the means must be commensurate to the end. All the 
 means in the possession of the people must be given to the Gov- 
 ernment which is intrusted with the public defence. ... If the 
 Northern States shall be of opinion, that our Slaves are number- 
 less, they may call forth every national resource. May Congress 
 not say, that every black man must fight f .... Have they not 
 power to provide for the general defence and welfare ? May 
 they not think that these call iorthe abolition of slavery? May 
 they not pronounce all slaves free, and will they not be war- 
 ranted by that power? This is no ambiguous implication or 
 logical deduction. The paper" (the Constitution) " speaks to 
 the point. They have the power in clear, unequivocal terms, 
 and will clearly and certainly exercise it." It has been exercised 
 under this very power of " common defence," and ere long the 
 feet of no slave will stain our soil. 
 
 This number of the Federalist also relates to the apportion- 
 ment of the members of the house of representatives among the 
 several States by the same rule with that of direct taxes. Re- 
 cognizing expressly the fitness of the number of the people being 
 *' the standard for regulating the proportion of those who arc to 
 represent the people of a State ;" and adverting to it as the 
 
CXXVl HISTORICAL NOTICE. 
 
 standard of contribution, this remark is to be noticed. " In the 
 latt*?r, it has reference to the proportion of wealth, of which it is 
 in no case a precise measure, and in ordinary cases a very unfit 
 one." This observation is in accordance with the opinions before 
 expressed by Hamilton as to a subject which he had well exa- 
 mined. In his previously quoted letter to G-overnor Clinton in 
 ]783, he remarks, "The proportion of the relative wealth in 
 these States can never be found by any common m.easure what- 
 ever." * * * «' If a general standard must be fixed, numbers were 
 preferable to land. * * Both these measures have the common 
 disadvantage of being no equal representative of the wealth of the 
 ^people, but one is more simple, definite, and certain than the 
 other." Still, it is remarked in this number; " notwithstanding 
 the imperfection of the rule, as applied to the relative wealth and 
 contributions of the States, it is evidently the least exception- 
 able among those that are practicable; and had too recently 
 obtained the general sanction of America not to have found a 
 ready preference with the Convention." The objection is then 
 stated, "it does not follow from an admission of numbers for the 
 measure of representation, or of slaves combined with free 
 citizens as a ratio of taxation, that slaves ought to be included 
 in the numerical rule of representation. Slaves are considered 
 SiB property, not us persons. They ought therefore to be compre- 
 hended in estimates of taxation which are founded on property; 
 and to be excluded from representation which is regxilated by a 
 census of persons." Without denying this distinction, the answer 
 is given, as expressing the views which would be preferred by 
 the South — denying that slaves are considered merely as pro- 
 perty and in no respect whatever as persons. " The}^ partake 
 of both these qualities, being considered by our laws, in some 
 respects, as persons, and in other respects as property." " The 
 Federal Constitution therefore decides with great propriety on 
 the case of our slaves, when it views them in the mixed charac- 
 ter of persons and property." "Would the Convention have 
 been impartial or consistent, if they had rejected the slaves from 
 the list of inhabitants, when the shares of representation were 
 to be calculated; and inserted them on the lists when the tariff 
 of contributions was to be adjusted? Could it be reasonably 
 expected that the Southern States would concur in a system 
 which considered their slaves in some degree as men when bur- 
 dens were to be imposed, but refused to consider thera in the 
 same light when advantages were to be conferred? M ght not 
 
AUTHORS OF THE FEDERALIST. CXXVU 
 
 eome surprise also be expressed, that those who reproach the 
 Southern States with the barbarous policy of considering as 
 property a part of their human brethren, should themselves 
 contend that the Government, to which all the States are to be 
 parties, ought to consider this unfortunate race more completely 
 in the unnatural light of property, than the very laws of which 
 they complain '/" . . . . " Let the compromising expedient of the 
 Constitution be mutually adopted, which regards them as in- 
 habitants, but as debased by servitude below the equal level of 
 free inhabitants, which regards the slave as divested of two fifths 
 of the man." Another reason is suggested, that "the votes, 
 allowed in the federal legislature to the people of each State, 
 ought to bear some proportion to the comparative wealth of the 
 State." It may be seen, in the debates of the Convention of 
 New York which soon followed, that one of the earliest urged 
 objections taken was to " the three fifths" compromise, and the 
 answer by Hamilton is almost in the words of this essay. " The 
 best writers on Government have held that representation should 
 be compounded of persons and property," * * * * « it will, how- 
 ever, be by no means admitted, that the slaves are considered 
 altogether as property, they are men though degraded to the 
 condition of slavery. They are persons known to the municipal 
 laws of the States which they inhabit, as well as to the laws of 
 nature. But representation and taxation go together, and one 
 uniform rule should be applied to both. Would it be just to 
 compute those slaves in the assessment of taxes and discard 
 them from the estimate in the apportionment of representatives ? 
 Would it be just to impose a singular burthen without conferring 
 some adequate advantage?" 
 
 The number of which the House of Eepresentatives was to 
 consist is the topic of the fifty fifth (LV) essay ; claimed also by 
 Hamilton in his list ; and by Madison in all his lists. It is here 
 stated ;* " that no political problem is less susceptible of a precise 
 solution, than that which relates to the number most convenient 
 for a, representative legislature, nor is there any point in which 
 the policy of the several States is more at variance." A marked 
 coincidence with this passage is seen in another of Hamilton's 
 briefs. It is there stated — '^nothing more difficult than to fix the 
 degree of numbers requisite. Constitutions of States differ." In this 
 number, it is also observed ;f " that the ratio between the repre- 
 
 » Federalist, p. 422. f Ibid. p. 423. 
 
CXXVlll HISTORICAL NOTICE. 
 
 oentatives and the people ought not to be the same, where the 
 latter are very numerous, as where they are very few." In this 
 brief, it is said; " Ratio ought not to he the same in a large as in a 
 small nation." In this number, it is remarked;* "In all very 
 numerous assemblies, of whatever characters composed, passion 
 never fails to wrest the sceptre from reason. Had every Athe- 
 nian been a Socrates ; every Athenian assembly would still have 
 been a mob." So in Hamilton's manuscript notes ;f " The assem- 
 bly when chosen will meet in one room, if they are drawn from 
 half the globe, and will be liable to all the passions of popular 
 assemblies." In this number it is also observed ; " At the expi- 
 ration of twenty five years, according to the computed rate of 
 increase, the number of representatives will amount to two 
 hundred ; and of fifty years to four hundred."^ In Hamilton's 
 brief, " The first Census 100—25 years, 200—50 years, 400." 
 
 In the Fifty Sixth (LYI) number; also claimed by Hamilton 
 in his list, and by Madison in all his lists, it is observed,§ " What 
 are to be the objects of federal legislation ? Those which are 
 of most importance, and which seem most to require local know- 
 ledge, are commerce, taxation, and the militia;" (a repetition of 
 the same observation in number Fifty three), and it is added, || 
 " the representatives of each State will not only bring with them, 
 a considerable knowledge of its laws, and a local knowledge of 
 their respective districts." In Hamilton's brief are found these 
 heads; ^^ Knowledge of local circumstances — Objects to be con- 
 sidered. These — Commerce — Taxation." "As to taxation — State 
 Systems." 
 
 In essay number Fifty seven (LVII) ; also claimed by Hamil- 
 ton in his list, and by Madison in all his lists, this passage is 
 seen ;^ •' Let me now ask, what there is in the Constitution of the 
 House of Representatives, that violates the principles of Eepuh- 
 lican government, or favors the elevation of the few on the ruins 
 of the many ?" " Who are to be the electors * * — Not the rich 
 more than the poor." " No qualification of wealth — of birth," &c. 
 In Hamilton's brief, — " Elevation of few. First — No qualifications 
 either for electors or elected." It is also stated in this number ;** 
 " This cannot be said without maintaining, that five or six 
 thousand citizens, are less capable of choosing a fit representative, 
 or more liable to be corrupted by an unfit one, than five or six 
 
 * Federalist, p. 424, f Hamilton's MSS. vol. i. p. 66. 
 
 i Federalist, p. 426. ^ Ibid. 430. 
 
 II Ibid. 431. T Ibid. 485. ** Ibid. 488. 
 
AUTHORS OF THE FEDERALIST. CXXIX 
 
 hundred." In Hamilton's brief 3 " Five thousand not less Jit to 
 choose than five hundred — not so easily corrupted." 
 
 Nor ought this remark as to New York, to be unnoticed. 
 " The members of Assembly, for the cities and counties of New 
 York and Albany, are elected by very nearly as many voters as 
 will be entitled to a representative in Congress, calculating on 
 the number of sixty five representatives only."* The least re- 
 flection will pronounce, that it is not probable, but that it is 
 indeed extremely improbable, that so minute a knowledge of 
 such a matter as the number of voters in two distant localities 
 of a distant State, should have been so positively stated — or 
 even adverted to at all, by Madison — a resident of Virginia 
 'Jhat Hamilton was familiar with these facts is to be ascribed to 
 nis residence both in New York, and in Albany; and to the 
 Hcveral questions which necessarily presented themselves to him 
 ..aring his very recent service in the legislature of New York.f 
 
 The Fifty eighth (LYIII) number, claimed by Hamilton in 
 his list, and by Madison in all of his lists — answers a supposition 
 " that the number of members of the House of Eepresentatives, 
 will not be augmented from time to time, as the progress of popula- 
 tion may demand ;"| and it is inferred, " that the larger States will 
 be strenuous advocates for increasing the number and weight of 
 that part of the legislature in which their influence predomi- 
 nates," from the fact that this branch of the legislature is a 
 representation of citizens, and consequently the larger States 
 will in it have most weight. 
 
 In Hamilton's brief this note is seen ; " Numbers will not be 
 augmented;" and the objection is answered, ^^ Large States to 
 increase influence will be for increasing representatives." How 
 solicitous his convictions were on the importance of an ade- 
 quately large representation of the people in one branch of the 
 legislature, may be seen in a report of a recent debate in the 
 Federal Convention. § Hamilton " expressed himself with great 
 earnestness and anxiety in favor of the motion," to increase its 
 numbers. " He avowed himself a friend to a vigorous govern- 
 ment, but would declare at the same time, he held it essential 
 that the popular branch of it should be on a broad foundation. He 
 was seriously of opinion, that the House of Representatives was 
 
 * Federalist, p. 439. 
 
 f He was in 1787, a member of the Committee of Ways and Means. — Htat, 
 Rep. iii. 21 1. 
 J Federalist, 441. \ Madison Papers, iii. 1531. 
 
 9 
 
CXXX HISTORICAL, NOTICE. 
 
 ou SO narrow a scale, as to be really dangerous; and to warrant 
 a jealousy in the people, for their liberties. He remarked, that 
 the connection between the President and Senate would tend to 
 perpetuate him, by corrupt influence. It was the more neces- 
 sary on this account, that a numerous representation in the 
 other branch of the legislature should be established." The 
 limitation in the Constitution, " that the number of representa- 
 tives shall not exceed one for every thirty thousand," instead of 
 forty thousand, persons, was the last act of the convention 
 previous to the vote for the adoption of the Constitution, and 
 was made at the request of Washington from his seat as Presi- 
 dent of the body. 
 
 The Sixty second (LXII) and Sixty third (LXIII) essays, are 
 the now remaining numbers in question. Hamilton claims them 
 in his list, and Madison in iall of his lists. These numbers treat 
 of " the constitution of the Senate with regard to the qualifica- 
 tions of the members; the manner of appointing them; the 
 equality of representation ; the number of the Senators, and the 
 duration of their appointments." 
 
 The first head of this subject is briefly noticed; — and the two 
 others, admitted to have been the results of an unavoidable com- 
 promise between the larger and the smaller States, are not dwelt 
 upon. The "number of the Senators and the duration of their 
 appointments" are more fully discussed in the several points c' 
 view in which the utility of the second branch of the legislative 
 department would present themselves. It may be observed, 
 that Madison's original view was, that the second branch should 
 be chosen by the first branch of the legislature. Hamilton from 
 the outset contended for an independent body of men to be 
 chosen by electors to be chosen by the people. Madison, how- 
 ever, felt the importance of its consisting " of a more select 
 number, holding their appointments for a longer term" than the 
 members of the other branch, and " going out in rotation," pre- 
 cautions the more necessary as he then thought of lodging in 
 this branch a " negative on the State laws." Hamilton's plan 
 of a Constitution was in accordance with his earliest opinion, 
 and he is seen to have urged on the General- Convention, as to 
 the second branch of the legislature, that " their duration should 
 be the earnest of wisdom and stability." Both these character 
 istics are considered in the discussion in these two numbers ot 
 this head of the subiect. — " the duration of the Senate ?" " With- 
 
AUTHORS OF THE FEDERALIST. CXXAl 
 
 out a select and stable member of the government,* the esteem 
 of foreign powers will be" forfeited. This idea is expressed by 
 him in the Convention. " Foreigners are jealous of our increas- 
 ing greatness, and would rejoice in our distractions. Those who 
 have had opportunities of conversing with foreigners respecting 
 sovereigns in Europe, have discovered in them an anxiety for 
 the preservation of our democratic Governments, probably for 
 no other reason but to keep us weak. Unless your government 
 is respectable, foreigners will invade your rights, and to main- 
 tain tranquillity it must be respectable — even to observe neu- 
 trality you must have a strong government." To maintain this 
 tranquillity, his plan of government provided that, " the Senate 
 shall exclusively possess the power of declaring war" — and that 
 " no treaty shall be made without their advice and consent." 
 
 The value of a Senate in insuring the other important cha- 
 racteristic — " stability" — in the policy of a government is fully 
 stated. " The objects of government may be divided into two 
 general classes; the one depending on measures which have 
 singly an immediate and sensible operation; the other depending 
 on a succession of well chosen and well connected measures, which 
 have a gradual and perhaps unobserved operation. The im- 
 portance of the latter description to the collective and per- 
 manent welfare of every country needs no explanation. And 
 yet it is evident, that an assembly elected for so short a term as 
 to be unable to provide more than one or two links in a chain of 
 measures, on which the general welfare may essentially depend, 
 ought not to be answerable for the final result. The proper 
 remedy for this defect, must be an additional body in the legis- 
 lative department, which, having a suflScient permanency to pro- 
 vide for such objects as require a continued attention and a train 
 of measures, may be justly and effectually answerable for the 
 attainment of those objects." " The necessity of a Senate," it is 
 stated, " is not less indicated by the propensity of all single and 
 numel'ous assemblies to yield to the impulse of sudden and 
 violent passions and to be seduced hj factious leaders into intem- 
 perate and pernicious counsels." This objection to a single body 
 has been quoted from Hamilton's MSS. notes, and the dangers 
 from " factious leaders" is pointed to in his brief in the General 
 Convention, that ^^ demagogues will generaWj prevail." The im- 
 portauce of a Senate, as " a defence to the people against their 
 own temporary errors and delusions" is also set forth in conformity 
 * Federalist, p. 474. 
 
CXXXU HISTORICAL NOTICE. 
 
 With the language of his brief. '' There ought to be a principle 
 in Government capable of resisting the popular current;" and it 
 is here added, " There are particular moments in public affairs, 
 when the people, stimulated by some irregular passion, or some 
 illicit advantage, or misled by the artful representations of inte- 
 rested men, will call for measures which they themselves will 
 afterwards be the most ready to lament and condemn." In his 
 brief,* it is stated — " Popular assemblies governed by a few in- 
 dividuals — the most popular branch will acquire an influence 
 over the other. The other may check in ordinary cases, in 
 which there is no strong public passion, but it will not in cases 
 where there is." Most happily for the people of this country, 
 under the guidance of Washington, with the systematic counsels 
 of Hamilton, the " irregular passions of the people misled by 
 the artful representations of interested men," calling "for mea- 
 sures which they themselves have afterwards been the most 
 ready to lament and condemn," were checked by "the inter- 
 ference of a temperate and. respectable body of citizens" — by the 
 " wisdom and stability" of the Senate of the United States. 
 
 Number Sixty four (LXIV.) is the last of the numbers as to 
 which there have been discrepant claims. In the second of 
 Madison's lists, he claims this number to himself, reducing the 
 contributions of Jay to four numbers, but, after the publication of 
 a life of Jay, which ascribes to him this number, as previously 
 stated; Madison relinquished this claim ;f and in his other lists 
 adds it to the numbers by Jay. Hamilton in his list gives to 
 Jay his full number of five essays, but attributes to him, by a 
 mistake of the pen as explained, fifty four instead of sixty four, 
 of which the evidence that Jay was the author has been recently 
 ascertained. J The enquiry may arise how it happened that, 
 
 * Hamilton's Works, ii. 414. 
 
 f In the paper entitled The Federalist, by Madison, previously quoted, is 
 this passage — "He" (Hamilton) "ascribes to himself No. 64, written by Mr. 
 Jay, and to Mr. Jay No. (the blank is there), written not by himself, 
 
 but by J. M. [See Life of Mr. Jay by Delaplaine."] 
 
 J In reply to a note of November 27th, 1863, addressed by me to Mr. John 
 Jay, a grandson of Governor Jay, stating, if there were "any family papers re- 
 lating to the Federalist which you would desire me to use in my edition, you 
 will oblige me by an early note." He answered, December 1, 1863, " The other 
 day I chanced upon a bundle of miscellaneous papers which contained Jay's 
 numbers of the Federalist, or three of them in his own hand, and these I will 
 get for you in a day or two." The draughts were of two of the early papers 
 and of No. 64. 
 
AUTHORS OF THE FEDERALIST. CXXXlll 
 
 after 80 long an interval between the last of the numbers from 
 the pen of Jay, he should have been the author of only one more 
 number. That he offered to write this number, is not to be 
 supposed. The probability is, its topic being the constitutional 
 deposit and office of the treaty power, that it was written by 
 him at the request of Hamilton, made in deference to his distin- 
 guished services as the chief negotiator of the treaty of peace 
 with Great Britain, whose great conduct on that occasion Ham- 
 ilton had defended in Congress. 
 
 The investigation of the authorship of the several essays 
 having been finished, and the pledge " to state all the evidence 
 known to exist to designate the respective contributions to it," 
 being fulfilled, I will not in closing this paper withhold the re- 
 newed declaration of my conviction that the attribution by 
 Hamilton of its numbers to the respective writers of them is, 
 with one exception, entirely correct. This being so, it will be 
 seen that the parts of each individual in the several topics of the 
 work were these. Hamilton wrote the first essay, which, after 
 an avowal of his solicitude for the adoption of the Constitution, 
 and an indication of the apprehended sources of opposition to it, 
 gives a programme of the work. The interesting particulars 
 proposed to be discussed are stated — " The utility of the Union 
 to your political prosperity : The insufficiency of the present confede- 
 ration to 'preserve that Union : The necessity of a government at least 
 equally energetic with the one proposed to the attainment of that object:' 
 The conformity of the proposed Constitution to the true principles of 
 republican government : Its analogy to your own State Constitution : 
 and lastly, the additional security which its adoption will afford to 
 the preservation of that species of government, — to liberty and to 
 property." 
 
 It is seen ; that Jay in the four succeeding numbers, exhibited 
 " the dangers from foreign force and influence," and that his re- 
 maining number relates to the treaty power — these being the 
 topics with which, as Embassador to Spain and to France, and 
 as then Secretary of foreign affairs, he would be familiar. Madi- 
 son took a larger and more varied part; some of his essays 
 being supplementary to those by Hamilton — one. on the dangers 
 of faction and the provisions against it, continued from a pre- 
 vious number by Hamilton — another on a distinct topic, being 
 an answer to " an objection drawn from the extent of country" 
 —a joint contribution with Hamilton in three numbers, on the 
 enhject of the tendency of Federal governments rather to 
 
cxxaiv historical notice. 
 
 anarchy among the members than tyranny in the liead; these 
 three numbers merely adducing historical examples to confirm 
 this view — two numbers, " concerning the difficulties which the 
 Convention must have experienced in the formation of a proper 
 plan ;" — two numbers, shewing "the conformity of the plan to 
 republican principles, with an answer to an objection in respect 
 to the powers of the Constitution" — four numbers, giving " a 
 general view of the powers proposed to be vested in the Union ;" 
 — two numbers, being "a discussion of the supposed danger 
 from the powers of the Union to the State governments, with 
 an examination of the comparative means of influence of the 
 Federal and State governments" — and two; his last numbers, 
 on " the meaning of the maxim which requires a separation of 
 the departments of power with a view of the means of giving 
 efficacy in practice to that maxim" — in the whole, three conjoint 
 and fourteen other numbers. The residue, being the great body 
 of the work, is Hamilton's. His essays, beside a delineation of 
 its scope and leading topics, are directed to their primary object 
 — a comprehensive manifestation of the value of the Union — of 
 the union of the People of the United States under one firm 
 National Government. They commence, with an exposition of 
 the causes which would induce the States, if disunited, to make 
 war upon each other, followed by a detail of the consequences 
 which would attend such a situation ; — the " producing standing 
 armies and other institutions unfriendly to liberty" — and by an 
 argued presentation of " the utility of the Union as a safeguard 
 against domestic faction and insurrection" — of its " utility in 
 respect to Commerce and a Navy," and of " its tendency to pro- 
 mote the interests of revenue, and as connected with it — that of 
 economy." Then follows the great topic, in contrast, so long 
 the burthen of his thoughts and previous writings — a full ex- 
 hibition of the "Defects of the Confederation, in relation to the 
 Principle of legislation for the States in their collective capa- 
 cities," illustrated by examples to shew " the tendency of Fede- 
 ral Governments rather to anarchy among the members than to 
 tyranny in the head" — a subject commenced by Hamilton and 
 jointly illustrated by Madison. Its other defects are next poui- 
 trayed; "the total want of a sanction to its laws" — "the want 
 of a mutual guarantee of the St.ate governments" — " the prin- 
 ciple of regulating the contributions of the States to the common 
 treasury by Quotas," with observations to prove " the import- 
 ance and advantage of authorizing the national government 
 
I 
 
 AUTHORS OF THE FEDERALIST. CXXXV 
 
 to raise its own revenues in its own way" — " the want of h 
 power to regulate commerce" — "the want of a direct and efiFect- 
 ive power of raising armies" — " the right of equal suffrage among 
 the States," condemned by " every idea of proportion and everj 
 rule of fair representation," and exposing the government to be 
 " obstructed at critical seasons" — the crowning defect — " the 
 want of a Judiciary power" — the " improper organization of 
 Congress — as a single body" — and the absence of "a ratification 
 of the existing Federal system by the People." The exposure 
 of these defects is naturally followed by a large and powerful 
 argument of " the necessity of a government at least equally 
 energetic," and by " an answer to the objection concerning 
 standing armies," shewing the necessity of a government having 
 within itself the means of national defence, and exhibiting 
 "the securities to liberty provided in the Constitution, and 
 those also resulting from the less frequent necessity of using 
 force, than would be that of separate Confederacies; and from 
 the checks to aggressions upon it in the power of the State 
 Governments." 
 
 This discussion is appropriately succeeded by an argument of 
 the necessary " power" in a Government charged with the com- 
 mon defence " of regulating the militia." The natural sequence 
 to this argument is, the evincing the necessity of " the power of 
 taxation to provide for the support of the national forces," by 
 procuring revenue to the full extent of the national exigencies, 
 leaving to the States " an independent and uncontrollable 
 authority to raise their own revenues for the supply of their 
 own wants," which involved an expobition of the interesting 
 topic — the extent of the alienation under the Constitution of 
 the " rights of State sovereignty," — the great and tangent diflft- 
 culty of that and of all future time until the Constitution, unless 
 amended, shall expire, — and a refutation of the alleged conflict 
 with State rights in the grant of power to the general govern- 
 ment " to make all laws necessary and proper for carrying into 
 execution the powers vested in it by the Constitution," and of 
 the provision, "that the Constitution and the laws of the United 
 States made in pursuance of it, and the treaties made by its 
 authority shall be the supreme law of the land." A defence of 
 the grant of a general power of taxation, as least burthensome 
 to the people in its economical operation, and least likely to be 
 »>avried to excess, closes the first original volume of the series, 
 ending with its thirty sixth number. 
 
CX>'X.Vl HISTORICAL NOTICE. 
 
 Having next exhibited the impolicy of the project in Virginia 
 and of tlie provision in Pennsylvania, for altering or correcting 
 breaches of a Constitution by occasional or periodical conventions, 
 Hamilton proceeds to show — instead of " exterior provisions for 
 maintaining in practice the necessary partition of power among 
 the several departments" of a government — that the true mode 
 is •' by so contriving its interior structure, as that its several 
 constituent parts may, by their mutual relations, be the means 
 of keeping each other in their proper places." The elucidation 
 of this view, in the symmetrical stages of this discussion, led to 
 " a more particular examination of the eeveral parts of the 
 government," beginning with the House of Representatives, 
 followed by a view of the Constitution of the Senate — of that 
 of the President, and closing with that of the judicial depart- 
 ment — the last number relative thereto being an answer to " an 
 objection raised against the Constitution with most success" — 
 its "want of a constitutional provision for the trial by jury in 
 civil cases." These examinations are much extended, and are 
 pregnant with a practical philosophy, of which the conclusions 
 are regarded in this country as maxims, and have served as early 
 controlling guides in the formation of subsequent State Consti- 
 tutions, since not always followed. 
 
 It has been seen, that " the commentary on the Executive 
 branch of the Government" was completed by Hamilton and 
 published on the fourth of April, 1788. The intelligence soon 
 after received from South Carolina shewed that the policy re- 
 sorted to in Massachusetts to induce there an unconditional 
 adoption of the Constitution — the promise of subsequent amend- 
 ments — had also been resorted to in that Southern State. One 
 of the chief grounds of objection to be removed by such amend- 
 ments was the want of a formal " bill of rights." This objection 
 is answered in the last essay but one ; by a recital of various 
 provisions of the Constitution, — especially, " the establishment 
 of the writ of Habeas Corpus— the prohibition of ex post facto 
 laws, and of titles to nobility" — and by declaring that " the 
 Constitution is in itself in every rational sense, and to every 
 useful purpose — A Bill of Rights." The vindication of the 
 Constitution is concluded by Hamilton with this brief summary 
 — " The additional securities to republican government, to 
 liberty and to property, to be derived from the adoption of the 
 plan under consideration, consist chiefly in the restraints which 
 the PRESERVATION of the Union will impose on local factions and 
 
AUTHORS OF THE FEDERALIST, CXXXVU 
 
 insurrections, and on the ambition of powerful individuals in 
 single States, who might acquire credit and influence enough 
 from leaders and favorites, to become the despots of the people; 
 in the diminution of the opportunities to foreign intrigue, which 
 the dissolution of the Confederacy would invite and facilitate ; 
 in the prevention of extensive military establishments, which 
 could not fail to grow out of wars between the States in a dis- 
 united situation ; in the express guarantee of a republican form 
 of Government to each; in the absolute and universal exclusion 
 of titles of nobility ; and in the precautions against the repe- 
 tition of those practices on the part of the State governments, 
 which have undermined the foundations of property and credit, 
 have planted mutual distrust in the breasts of all classes of 
 citizens, and have occasioned an almost universal prostration of 
 morals." 
 
 Having " thus executed the task " of the Federalist, these 
 Essays conclude with a decisive argument "of the extreme im- 
 prudence of insisting upon amendments previous to the adoption 
 of the Constitution," thus, " to prolong the precarious state of the 
 national affairs, and to expose the Union to the jeopardy of 
 successive experiments, in the chimerical pursuit of a perfect 
 plan," and with a solemn appeal "against hazarding anarch}- — 
 Civil War — a perpetual alienation of the States from each 
 other, and perhaps the military despotism of a victorious dema- 
 gogue, in the pursuit of what they are not likely to obtain, but 
 from TiriE and Experience." " I dread the more," Hamilton 
 declares in the last words of the Federalist, addressed to the 
 People of the State of New York, "I dread the more the 
 consequences of new attempts, because I KNOW that POWEK- 
 FTJL INDIYIDUALS, in this and other States, are enemies to 
 a General National Government, in every possible shape." 
 
 A critical analysis of this work is not within the province of 
 this notice, but it cannot escape observation, in addition to the 
 contributions of its other eminent writers, how much of its 
 varied value must be ascribed to the varied properties of the 
 mind of Hamilton — the headspring — as a scholar, a soldier, a 
 jurist, a legislator, a political economist, and a statesman, each 
 uniting its tributes in singular harmony to the great argument 
 of the proposed grand result — the inducing the institution of a 
 free, vigorous, yet moderate Government, to bind together in an 
 indissoluble bond the people of the United States, by a Consti- 
 tution ordained and established by themselves. 
 
CXXXVlll HISTORICAL NOTICE. 
 
 *■ A Nation without a National Government is, in my view," 
 he declared, " an awful spectacle. The establishment of a Con- 
 stitution, in time of profound peace, by the voluntary consent 
 of a whole people, is a PRODIGY, to the completion of which 
 I look forward with trembling; anxiety." 
 
THE CONTINENTALIST. 
 
 NUMBER I. 
 
 JULY 12, 1781. 
 
 It would be the extreme of vanity in us, not to be sensible, that we 
 began this revolution with very vague and confined notions of the 
 practical business of government. To the greater part of us it was a 
 novelty ; of those who under the former constitution had had opportu- 
 nities of acquiring experience, a large proportion adhered to the opposite 
 side, and the remainder can only be supposed to have possessed ideas 
 adapted to the narrow colonial sphere, in which they had been accus- 
 tomed to move, not of that enlarged kind suited to the government of 
 an independent nation. 
 
 There were, no doubt, exceptions to these observations ; men in all 
 respects qualified for conducting the public affairs with skill and advan- 
 tage; but their number was small — they were not always brought 
 forward in our councils ; and when they were, their influence was too 
 commonly borne down by the prevailing torrent of ignorance and 
 prejudice. 
 
 On a retrospect, however, of our transactions, under the disadvantages 
 with which we commenced, it is perhaps more to be wondered at that 
 we have done so well, than that we have not done better. There are, 
 indeed, some traits in our conduct, as conspicuous for sound policy, as 
 others for magnanimity. But, on the other hand, it must also be 
 confessed, there have been many false steps, many chimerical projects 
 and Utopian speculations, in the management of our civil as well as of 
 our military affairs. A part of these were the natural effects of the 
 spirit of the times, dictated by our situation. An extreme jealousy of 
 power is the attendant on all popular revolutions, and has seldom been 
 without its evils. It is to this source we are to trace many of the fatal 
 mistakes, which have so deeply endangered the common cause ; par- 
 ticularly that defect which will be the object of these remarks — A want 
 of power in Congress. 
 
 The present Congress, respectable for abilities and integrity, by expe- 
 rience convinced of the necessity of change, are preparing several 
 imoortani articles lo be submitted to the respective States, for aug 
 
CXl THE CONTINENTALIST. 
 
 menting the powers of the Confederation. But though there is hardly 
 at this time a man of information in America, who will not acknowledge, 
 as a general proposition, that in its present form, it is unequal, either to 
 a vigorous prosecution of the war, or to the preservation of the Union 
 in peace ; yet when the principle comes to be applied to practice, there 
 seems not to be the same agreement in the modes of remedying the 
 defect ; and it is to be feared from a disposition which appeared in some 
 of the States, on a late occasion, that the salutary intentions of Congress 
 may meet with more delay and opposition, than tho critical posture of 
 the States will justify. 
 
 It will be attempted to show, in a course of papers, what ought to be 
 done, and the mischiefs of a contrary policy. 
 
 In the first stages of the controversy, it was excusable to err. Good 
 intentions, rather than great skill, were to have been expected from us. 
 But we have now had sufficient time for reflection, and experience as 
 ample as unfortunate, to rectify our errors. To persist in them becomes 
 disgraceful, and even criminal, and belies that character of good sense, 
 and a quick discernment of our interests, which, in spite of our mistakes, 
 we have been hitherto allowed. It will prove, that our sagacity is 
 limited to interests of inferior moment, and that we are incapable of 
 those enlightened and liberal views, necessary to make us a great and 
 flourishing people. 
 
 History is full of examples, where in contests for liberty, a jealousy of 
 power has either defeated the attempts to recover, or preserve it, in the 
 first instance, or has afterwards subverted it by clogging government 
 with too great precautions for its felicity, or by leaving too wide a door 
 for sedition and popular licentiousness. In a government framed for 
 durable liberty, not less regard must be paid to giving the magistrate a 
 proper degree of authority, to make and execute the laws with vigor, 
 than to guard against encroachments upon the rights of the community. 
 As too much power leads to despotism, too little leads to anarchy, and 
 both, eventually, to the ruin of the people. These are maxims well 
 known, but never suflBciently attended to, in adjusting the frames of 
 governments. Some momentary interest or passion is sure to give a 
 wrong bias, and pervert the most favorable opportunities. 
 
 No friend to order or to rational liberty, can read without pain and 
 disgust, the history of the Commonwealths of Greece. Generally 
 speaking, they were a constant scene of the alternate tyranny of one 
 part of the people over the other, or of a few usurping demagogues over 
 the whole. Most of them had been originally governed by kings, whose 
 despotism (the natural disease of monarchy) had obliged their subjects 
 to murder, expel, depose, or reduce them to a nominal existence, and 
 institute popular governments. In these governments, that of Sparta 
 excepted, the jealousy of power hindered the people from trusting out 
 of their own hands a competent authority, to maintain the repose and 
 stability of the commonwealth ; whence originated the frequent revolu- 
 tions and civil i^roils, with which they were distracted. This, and the 
 
THE CONTINENTALIST. Cxil 
 
 want of a solid federal union to restrain the ambition and rivalship o-*" 
 the different cities, after a rapid succession of bloody wars, ended in 
 their total loss of liberty, and subjugation to foreign powers. 
 
 In comparison of our governments with those of the ancient republics, 
 we must, without hesitation, give the preference to our own ; because 
 every power with us is exercised by representation, not in tumultuary 
 assemblies of the collective body of the people, where the art or impu- 
 dence of the Orator or Tribune, rather than the utility or justice of the 
 measure could seldom fail to govern. Yet, whatever may be the 
 advantage on our side, in such a comparison, men who estimate the 
 value of institutions, not from prejudices of the moment, but from 
 experience and reason, must be persuaded that the same jealousy of 
 power has prevented our reaping all the advantages, from the examples 
 of other nations, which we ought to have done, and has rendered our 
 Constitutions in many respects feeble and imperfect. 
 
 Perhaps the evil is not very great in respect to our State Constitu- 
 tions; for notwithstanding their imperfections, they may, for some 
 time, be made to operate in such a manner, as to answer the purposes 
 of the common defence, and the maintenance of order ; and they seem 
 to have in themselves, and in the progress of society, among us, the 
 seeds of improvement. 
 
 But this is not the case with respect to the Federal Government ; if 
 it is too weak at first, it will continually grow weaker. The ambition 
 and local interests of the respective members, will be constantly under- 
 mining and usurping upon its prerogatives, till it comes to a dissolution ; 
 if a partial combination of some of the more powerful ones does not bring 
 it t^ a more speedy and violent end. 
 
:xlii THE CONTINENTALIST. 
 
 THE CONTINENTALIST. 
 
 NUMBER II. 
 
 JULY 19, 1781. 
 
 In a single state, where the sovereign power is exercised by delega- 
 tion, whether it be a limited monarchy or a republic, the danger most 
 commonly is, that the sovereign will become too powerful for his con- 
 stituents ; in foederal governments where different states are represented 
 in a general council, the danger is on the other side — that the members 
 will be an overmatch for the common head; or in otner words, thai it 
 will not have suflBcient influence and authority to secure the obedience 
 of the several parts of the Confederacy. 
 
 In a single state, the sovereign has the whole legislative power as well 
 as the command of the national forces, of course an immediate controul 
 over the persons and property of the subjects, — every other power is sub- 
 ordinate and dependent. If he undertakes to subvert the constitution, 
 it can only be preserved by a general insurrection of the people. The 
 magistrates of the provinces, counties, or towns, into which the state is 
 divided, having only an executive and police jurisdiction, can take no 
 decisive measures for counteracting the first indications of tyranny ; but 
 must content themselves with the ineffectual weapon of petition and 
 remonstrance. They cannot raise money, levy troops, nor form alli- 
 ances. The leaders of the people must wait till their discontents have 
 ripened into a general revolt, to put them in a situation to confer the 
 powers, necessary for their defence. It will always be difficult for this 
 to take place; because the sovereign possessing the appearance and 
 forms of legal authority, having the forces and revenues of the state at 
 his command, and a large party among the people besides, which with 
 those advantages he can hardly fail to acquire — he will too often be able 
 to baffle the first motions of the discontented, and prevent that union 
 and concert essential to the success of their opposition. 
 
 The security therefore of the public liberty, laust consist in such a 
 distribution of the sovereign power, as will make it morally impossible 
 for one part to gain an ascendency over the others, or for the whole to 
 unite in a scheme of usurpation. 
 
 In foederal Governments, each member has a distinct sovereignty, 
 
iHE CONTINENTALIST. CXliii 
 
 makes and executes laws, imposes taxes, distributes justice, and exer- 
 cises every other function of government. It has always within itself 
 the means of revenue. And on an emergency can levy forces. If the 
 common sovereign should meditate or attempt any thing unfavourable 
 to the general liberty, each member having all the proper organs of 
 power, can prepare for defence with celerity and vigour. Each can 
 immediately sound the alarm to the others, and enter into leagues for 
 mutual protection. If the combination is general, as is to be expected, 
 the usurpers will soon find themselves without the means of recruiting 
 their treasury, or their armies ; and for want of continued supplies of 
 men and money, must, in the end fall a sacrifice to the attempt. If the 
 combination is not general, it will imply that some of the members are 
 interested in that which is the cause of dissatisfaction to others, and this 
 cannot be an attack upon the common liberty, but upon the interests 
 of one part in favour of another part ; and it will be a war between the 
 members of the foederal union with each other, not between them and 
 the foederal government. From the plainest principles of human 
 nature, two inferences are to be drawn, one, that each member of a 
 poUtical confederacy, will be more disposed to advance its own authority 
 upon the ruins of that of the confederacy, than to make any improper 
 concession in its favour, or support it in unreasonable pretensions — the 
 other, that the subjects of each member, will be more devoted in their 
 attachments and obedience to their own particular governments, than 
 to that of the union. 
 
 It is the temper of societies as well as of individuals to be impatient 
 of constraint, and to prefer partial to general interest. Many cases may 
 occur, where members of a confederacy have, or seem to have an advan- 
 tage in things contrary to the good of the whole, or a disadvantage in 
 others conducive to that end. The selfishness of every part will dispose 
 each to believe, that the public burdens are unequally apportioned, and 
 that itself is the victim. These, and other circumstances, will promote 
 a disposition for abridging the authority of the foederal government : 
 and the ambition of men in office in each state, will make them glad to 
 encourage it. They think their own consequence connected with the 
 power of the government of which they are a part: and will endeavour 
 to increase the one as the mean of increasing the other. 
 
 The particular governments will have more empire over the minds of 
 their subjects than the general one, because their agency will be more 
 direct, more uniform, and more apparent. The people will be habitu- 
 ated to look up to them as the arbiters and guardians of their personal 
 concerns, by which the passions of the vulgar, if not of all men are most 
 strongly affected ; and in every difference with the confederated body 
 will side with them against the common sovereign. 
 
 Experience confirms the truth of these principles. — The chief cities 
 of Greece had once their council of Amphyctions, or States-general, 
 with authority to decide and compose the differences of the several 
 cities ; and to transact many other important matters relative to the 
 
•TxliV THE CONTINENTALIST. 
 
 common interest and safety. At their first institution, they had great 
 weight and credit ; but never enough to preserve efiectually the balance 
 and harmony of the confederacy ; and in time their decrees only served 
 as an additional pretext to that side, whose pretentions they favoured. 
 When the cities were not engaged in foreign wars, they were at per- 
 petual variance among themselves. Sparta and Athens contended 
 twenty-seven years for the precedence, or rather dominion of Greece, 
 till the former made herself mistress of the whole; and till in subse- 
 quent struggles, having had recourse to the pernicious expedient of 
 calling in the aid of foreign enemies ; the Macedonians first, and after- 
 wards the Romans became their masters. 
 
 The German diet had formerly more authority than it now has, though 
 like that of Greece never enough to hinder the great potentates from 
 disturbing the repose of the empire, and mutually wasting their own 
 territories and people. 
 
 The Helvetic league is another example. It is true it has subsisted 
 nearly five hundred years ; but in that period the cantons have had 
 repeated and furious wars with each other, which would have made 
 them an easy prey to their more powerful neighbours, had not the 
 reciprocal jealousy of these prevented either from taking advantage of 
 their dissentions. This and their poverty have hitherto saved them 
 from total destruction, and kept them from feeling the miseries of 
 foreign conquest, added to those of civil war. The foederal government 
 is too weak to hinder their renewal, whenever the ambition or fanaticism 
 of the principal cantons shall be disposed to rekindle the flame. For 
 some time past indeed, it has been in a great measure nominal ; the 
 Protestants and Catholics have had separate diets, to manage almost all 
 matters of importance ; so that in fact, th« general diet is only kept up 
 to regulate the affairs of the common bailliages and preserve a sem- 
 blance of union ; and even this, it is probable would cease, did not the 
 extreme weakness of the cantons, oblige them to a kind of coalition. 
 
 If the divisions of the United Provinces have not proceeded to equal 
 extremities, there are peculiar causes to be assigned. The authority of 
 the Stadt-h older pervades the whole frame of the republic, and is a kind 
 of common link by which the provinces are bound together. The 
 jealousy of his progressive influence, in which more or less they all 
 agree, operates as a check upon their ill-humors against one another. 
 The inconsiderableness of each province separately, and the imminent 
 danger to which the whole would be exposed of being overrun by their 
 neighbors, in case of disunion, is a further preservative against the 
 phrenzy of hostility ; and their importance and even existence depend- 
 ing entirely upon frugality, industry and commerce; peace, both at 
 home and abroad, is of necessity the predominant object of their policy. 
 
THE CONTTNENTAIJST. cxb 
 
 THE CONTINENTALIST. 
 
 NTJMHKR III. 
 
 AUGUST 9, 1781. 
 
 The situation of these states is very unlike that of the United Pro- 
 vinces. Remote as we are from Europe, in a little time we should fancy 
 ourselves out of the reach of attempts from abroad, and in full liberty, 
 at our leisure and convenience to try our strength at home. This might 
 not happen at once ; but if the Fcederal Government shocld lose its 
 Authority it would certainly follow. Political societies, in close 
 neighbourhood, must either be strongly united under one government 
 or there will infallibly exist emulations and quarrels. This is in human 
 nature; and we have no reason to think ourselves wiser, or better than 
 other men. Some of the larger states, a small number of years hence, 
 will be in themselves populous, rich and powerful, in all those circum- 
 stances calculated to inspire ambition and nourish ideas of separation and 
 independence. Though it will ever be their true interest to preserve 
 the union, their vanity and self importance, will be very Hkely to over- 
 power that motive, and make them seek to place themselves at the 
 head of particular confederacies, independent of the general one. A 
 schism once introduced, competitions of boundary and rivalships of 
 commerce will easily afford pretexts for war. 
 
 European powers may have many inducements for fomenting these 
 divisions and playing us off against each other : But without such a dis- 
 position in them, if separations once take place, we shall, of course, 
 embrace different interests and connections. The particular confedera- 
 cies, leaguing themselves with rival nations, will naturally be involved 
 in their disputes; into which they will be the more readily tempted by 
 the hope of making acquisitions upon each other, and upon the colonies 
 of the powers with whom they are respectively at enmity. 
 
 We already see symptoms of the evils to be apprehended. In the 
 aaidst of a war for our existence as a nation ; in the midst of dangers too 
 •erious to be trifled with, some of the states have evaded, or refused, 
 
 10 
 
CKlVl THE CONTINENTALIST. 
 
 compliance witli the demands of Congress in points of the greatest 
 moment to the common safety. If they act such a part at this perilous 
 juncture, what are we to expect in a time of peace and security ? Is it 
 not to be feared that the resolutions of Congress would soon become 
 like the decisions of the Greek Amphyctions, or like the edicts of a 
 Grerman diet? 
 
 But as these evils are at a little distance, we may perhaps be insensi- 
 ble and short-sighted enough to disregard them. There are others that 
 threaten our immediate safety. Our whole system is in disorder; our 
 currency depreciated, till in many places it will hardly obtain a circula- 
 tion at all — public credit at its lowest ebb — our army deficient in num- 
 bers and unprovided with every thing — the government in its present 
 condition, unable to command the means to pay, clothe, or feed their 
 troops — the enemy making an alarming progress in the southern states, 
 lately in complete possession of two of them, though now in part rescued 
 by the genius and exertions of a General without an army — a force 
 under Cornwall is still formidable to Virginia. 
 
 AVe ought to blush to acknowledge that this is a true picture of our 
 situation, when we reflect, that the enemy's whole force in the United 
 States, including their American levies and the late reinforcement, is 
 little more than fourteen thousand effective men ; — that our population, 
 by recent examination, has been found to be greater, than at the com- 
 mencement of the war — that the quantity of our specie has alp^ 
 increased — that the country abounds with all the necessaries of life, and 
 has a sufliiciency of foreign commodities, with a considerable and pro- 
 gressive commerce — that we have beyond comparison a better stock of 
 war-like materials, than when we began the contest, and an ally, as 
 willing, as able, to supply our further wants. And that we have on the 
 spot five thousand auxiliary troops, paid and subsisted by that ally, to 
 assist in our defence. 
 
 Nothing but a General disaffection of the people, or mismanagement 
 in their rulers, can account for the figure we make, and for the dis- 
 tresses and perplexities we experience, contending against so small a 
 force. 
 
 Our enemies themselves must now be persuaded that the first is not 
 the cause, and we know it is not. The most decided attachment of the 
 people could alone have made them endure, without a convulsion, the 
 successive shocks in our currency, added to the unavoidable inconve- 
 niences of war. There is perhaps not another nation in the world, that 
 would have shown equal patience and perseverance in similar circum- 
 stances. The enemy have now tried the temper of almost every part of 
 America; and they can hardly produce in their ranks a thousand men, 
 who, without their arts and seductions, have voluntarily joined their 
 standard. The miseries of a rigorous captivity, may perhcps have added 
 half as many more to the number of the American levies, at this time in 
 their armies. This small accession of force is the more extraordinary. 
 
THE CONTINENTALIST. Cxlvn 
 
 as they have at some periods, been apparently in the full tide of success, 
 while every thing wore an aspect tending to infuse despondency into 
 the people of this country. This has been remarkably the case in the 
 southern states. 
 
 They for a time had almost undisturbed possession of two of them ; 
 and Cornwallis, after overrunning a great part of a third ; after two vic- 
 torious battles, only brought with him into Virginia about two hundred 
 tories — in the state where he thought himself so well established, that 
 he presumptuously ventured to assure the minister, there was not a 
 rebel left, a small body of continental troops, have been so eflFectually 
 seconded by the militia of that vanquished country, as to have been 
 able to capture a number of his troops more than equal to their own, 
 and to repossess the principal part of the state. 
 
 As in the explanation of our embarrassments nothing can be alledged 
 to the disaffection of the people, we must have recourse to the other 
 cause — of impolicy and mismanagement in their rulers. 
 
 Wliere the blame of this may lie is not so much the question as what 
 are the proper remedies ; yet it may not be amiss to remark that too 
 large a share has fallen upon Congress. That body is no doubt charge- 
 able with mistakes ; but perhaps, its greatest has been too much readi- 
 ness to make concessions of the powers implied in its original trust. 
 This is partly to be attributed to an excessive complaisance to the spirit, 
 which has evidently actuated a majority of the states, — a desire of 
 monopolizing all power in themselves. Congress have been responsible 
 for the administration of alfaii's, without the means of fulfilling that 
 responsibility. 
 
 It would be too severe a reflection upon us to suppose, that a disposi- 
 tion to make the most of the friendship of others, and to exempt our- 
 selves from a full share of the burthens of the war has had any part in 
 the backwardness, which has appeared in many of the states, to confer 
 powers and adopt measures adequate to the exigency. Such a senti- 
 ment would neither be wise, just, generous nor honourable; nor do I 
 believe the accusation would be well founded, yet our conduct makes 
 us liable to a suspicion of this sort. It is certain, however, that too 
 sanguine expectations from Europe have unintentionally relaxed our 
 efforts, by diverting a sense of danger, and begetting an opinion that 
 the inequality of the contest would make every campaign the last. 
 
 We did not consider how difficult it must be to exhaust the resources 
 of a nation circumstanced like that of Great Britain; whose government 
 has always been distinguished for energy, and its people for enthusiasm. 
 Nor did we in estimating the superiority of our friends make sufficient 
 allowance for that want of concert, which will ever characterize the 
 operations of allies, or for the immense advantage to the enemy, of 
 having their forces, though inferior, under a single direction. 
 
 Finding the rest of Europe either friendly or pacific, we never calcu- 
 lated the coi*'ngencies which might alter that disposition: nor reflected 
 
cxJviii THE CONTINENTALIST. 
 
 that the death* of a single prince, the change or caprice of a single 
 minister, was capable of giving a new face to the whole system. 
 
 We are at this time more sanguine than ever. The war with the 
 Dutch, we believe, will give such an addition of force to our side as will 
 make the superiority irresistible. No person can dispute this, if things 
 remain in their present state ; but the extreme disparity of the contest 
 is the very reason, why this cannot be the case. The neutral powers 
 will either eflfect a particular, or a general accommodation, or they will 
 take their sides. There are three suppositions to be made ; one, that 
 there will be a compromise between the united provinces and England ; for 
 which we are certain the mediation of Austria and Russia have been 
 offered — another a pacification between all the belligerent powers, for 
 which we have reason to believe the same mediation has been offered — 
 the third a rejection of the terms of mediation and a more general war. 
 
 Either of these suppositions is a motive for exertion — the first will 
 place things in the same, probably in a worse situation, than before the 
 declaration of the war against Holland. The composing of present dif- 
 ferences may be accompanied with a revival of ancient connections : 
 and at least would be productive of greater caution and restraint in a 
 future intercourse with us. 
 
 The second, it is much to be dreaded, would hazard a dismember- 
 mentf of a part of these states ; and we are bound in honor, in duty 
 
 * The death of the Empress Queen has actually produced a change : Her politics, if 
 not friendly to our connections, were at least pacific; and while she lived no hostile 
 interference of the House of Austria was to be expected. The Emperor, her son, by 
 her death, left more at liberty to pursue his inclinations, averse to the aggrandisement 
 of France, of course afraid of the abasement of England, has given several indications 
 of an unfriendly disposition. It should be a weighty consideration with us, that 
 among the potentates which we look upon as amicable, three of the principal ones are 
 at a very advanced stage of life, The King of Spain, the King of Prussia, and the 
 Empress of Russia. We know not what may be the politics of successors. 
 
 f Perhaps not expressly and directly, but virtually, under the plausible form of a 
 new arrangement of limits. 
 
 If we are determined, as we ought to be with the concurrence of our allies, not to 
 accept such a condition, then we ought to prepare for the third event, a more general 
 •nd more obstinate war. 
 
 Should this take place a variety of new interests will be involved, and the affairs of 
 America may cease to be of primarv importance. In proportion as the objects 
 and operations of the war become complicated and extensive, the final success must 
 become uncertain; and in proportion as the interests of others in our concerns. may be 
 weakened, or supplanted by more immediate interests of their own, ought our atten- 
 tion to ourselves, and exertions in our own behalf to be awakened and augmented. 
 
 We ought therefore, not only to strain every nerve for complying with the requisi- 
 tions, to render the present campaign as decisive as possible ; but we ought without 
 delay, to enlarge the powers of Congress. Every plan of which this is not the 
 foundation will be illusory. The separate exertions of the states will never sufSce. — 
 Nothing but a well proportioned exertion of the resources of the whole, under ine 
 direction of a common council, with power sufficient to give efficacy to their resolu 
 tions, can preserve us from being a conquered people now, or can make us a HApr> 
 PEOPLE hereafter. 
 
THE CONTINENTALIST. CXl * 
 
 and ill interest, to employ every effort to dispossess the enemy of whal 
 they hold. A natural basis of the negociation with respect to this con- 
 tinent, will be, that each party shall retain what it possesses at the con- 
 clusion of the treaty, qualified perhaps by a cession of particular points 
 for an equivalent elsewhere. It is too delicate to dwell on the motives 
 to this apprehension; but if such a compromise sometimes terminates 
 the disputes of nations originally independent, it will be less extraordi- 
 nary where one party was originally under tne dominion of the other. 
 
Cl THE CONTINENTALIST. 
 
 THE CONTINENTALIST. 
 
 NUMBER IV. 
 
 AUGUST 30, 1781. 
 
 The preceding numbers are chiefly intended to confirm an opinion, 
 already pretty generally received, that it is necessary to augment the 
 powers of the confederation. The principal difficulty yet remains to 
 fix the public judgment definitively on the points which ought to com- 
 pose that augmentation. 
 
 It may be pronounced vrith confidence that nothing short of the fol- 
 lowing articles can suffice. 
 
 1st — The Power of Regulating Trade, comprehending a right of 
 granting bounties and premiums by way of encouragement, of imposing 
 duties of every kind as well for revenue as regulation, of appointing all 
 officers of the customs, and of laying embargoes in extraordinary emer- 
 gencies. 
 
 2nd — ^A moderate — levied tax, throughout the United States, of a 
 specific rate per pound or per acre,* granted to the Federal Government 
 in perpetuity ; and if Congress think proper, to be levied by their own 
 collectors. 
 
 3d — A moderate capitation-taxf on every male inhabitant above fifteen 
 years of age, exclusive of common soldiers, common seamen, day 
 laborers, cottagers, and paupers, to be also vested in perpetuity, and 
 with the same condition of collection. 
 
 4th — The disposal of all unlocated land for the benefit of the United 
 States (so far as respects the profits of the first sale and the quit rents), 
 thft "irisdiction remaining to the respective States in whose limits they 
 n-e contained. 
 
 5th — A certain proportion of the product of all miiies discovered, or 
 to be discovered, for the same duration, and with the same right of 
 collection as in the second and third articles, 
 
 * Two pence an acre on cultivated, and a halfpenny on uncultivated land, would 
 answer the purpose, and would be so moderate as not to be felt — a small tax on uncul- 
 tivated land would have the good effect of obliging the proprietor either to cultiv«tf 
 It himself, or to dispose of it to some persons that would do it. 
 
 t Suppose a dollar, or even half a dollar per head. 
 
THE CONTINENTALIST, cH 
 
 6th — The appointment of all land (as well as naval) officers of es ery 
 rank. 
 
 The three first articles are of IMMEDIATE NECESSITY ; the three 
 last would be of great present, but of much greater future utility ; the 
 wliole combined would give solidity and permanency to the Union. 
 
 The great defect of the Confederation is, that it gives the United 
 States no property ; or, in other words, no revenue, nor the means of 
 acquiring it, inherent in themselves and independent on the temporary 
 pleasure of the diflferent members. And power without revenue, in 
 political society, is a name. While Congress continue altogether de- 
 pendent on the occasional grants of the several States, for the means of 
 defraying the expenses of the Federal Government, it can neither have 
 dignity, vigor, nor credit. Credit supposes specific and permanent 
 funds for the punctual payment of interest, with a moral certainty of 
 the final redemption of the principal. 
 
 In our situation, it will probably require more, on account of the 
 general diffidence which has been excited by the past disorders in our 
 finances. It will perhaps be necessary, in the first instance, to appro- 
 priate funds for the redemption of the principal in a determinate period, 
 as well as for the payment of interest. 
 
 It is essential that the property in such funds should be in the con- 
 tractor himself, and the appropriation dependent on his own will. 
 
 If, instead of this, the possession or disposal of them is dependent on 
 the voluntary or occasional concurrence of a number of different wills 
 not under his absolute control, both the one and the other will be too 
 precarious to be trusted. The most wealthy and best established nations 
 are obliged to pledge their funds to obtain credit, and it would be the 
 height of absurdity in us, in the midst of a revolution, to expect to have 
 it on better terms. This credit being to be procured through Congress, 
 the funds ought to be provided, declared, and vested in them.* It is a 
 fact that verifies the want of specific funds — a circumstance which 
 operates powerfully against our obtaining credit abroad is, not a distrust 
 of our becoming independent, but of our continuing united ; and with 
 our present confederation the distrust is natural. Both foreigners and 
 the thinking men among ourselves, would have much more confidence 
 in the duration of the Union, if they were to see it supported on tho 
 foundation here proposed. 
 
 There are some among us ignorant enough to imagine, that the war 
 may be carried on without credit, defraying the expenses of the year 
 with what may be raised within the year. But this is for want of a 
 knowledge of our real resources and expenses. 
 
 It may be demonstrated, that the whole amount of the revenue, which 
 
 • It might, indeed, be a good restraint upon the spirit of running in debt, with 
 which governments are too apt to be infected, to make it a condition of the grants to 
 Congress, that they shall be obliged, in all their loans, to appropriate funds for tha 
 payment of principal as well as interest, and such a r»«*~ction might be serviceable 
 \o public credit. 
 
Clh THE CONTINENTALIST. 
 
 these States are capable of afibrding, will be deficient annually, five or 
 six millions of dollars for the support of civil government and of the war. 
 
 This is not a conjecture hazarded at random, but the result of experi- 
 ment and calculation ; nor can it appear surprising, when it is considered 
 that the revenues of the United Provinces, equal to these States in 
 population, beyond comparison superior in industry, commerce, and 
 riches, do not exceed twenty five millions of guilders, or about nine 
 millions and a half of dollars. In times of war, they have raised a more 
 considerable sum, but it has been chiefly by gratuitous combinations of rich 
 individuals, a resource we cannot employ, because there are few men of 
 large fortunes in this country, and these for the most part in land. Taxes 
 in the United Provinces are carried to an extreme which would be im- 
 practicable here. Not only the living are made to pay for every neces- 
 sary of life, but even the dead are tributary to the public for the liberty 
 of interment at particular hours. These considerations make it evident 
 that we could not raise an equal amount of revenue in these States. 
 Yet, in '76, when the currency was not depreciated. Congress emitted, 
 for the expenses of the year, fourteen millions of dollars. It cannot be 
 denied, that there was a want of order and economy in the expenditure 
 of public money, nor that we had a greater military force to maintain 
 at that time than we now have ; but, on the other hand, allowing for 
 the necessary increase in our different civil lists, and for the advanced 
 prices of many articles, it can hardly be supposed possible to reduce our 
 annual expense very much below that sum. This simple idea of the 
 subject, without entering into details, may satisfy us, that the deficiency 
 which has been stated is not to be suspected of exaggeration. 
 
 Indeed, nations the most powerful and opulent are obliged to have 
 recourse to loans in time of war, and hence it is that most of the States 
 of Europe are deeply immersed in debt. France is among the number, 
 notwithstanding her immense population, wealth, and resources. Eng- 
 land owes the enormous sum of two hundred millions sterling. The 
 United Provinces with all their prudence and parsimony, owe a debt of 
 the generality of fifty millions, besides the particular debts of each 
 province. Almost all the other powers are more or less in the same 
 circumstances. 
 
 While this teaches us how contracted and uninformed are the views 
 of those who expect to carry on the war without running in debt. It 
 ought to console us with respect to the amount of that which we now 
 owe, or may have occasion to incur, in the remainder of the war. The 
 whole, without burthening the people, may be paid off in twenty years 
 after the conclusion of peace. 
 
 The principal part of the deficient five or six millions must be pro- 
 cured by loans from private persons at home and abroad. Every thing 
 may be hoped from the generosity of France, which her means will 
 permit, but she has full employment for her revenues and credit in the 
 prosecution of the war on her own part. If we judge of the future by 
 the past, the pecuniary succours from her must continue to be far short 
 
THE COXTINENTALIST. cIllJ 
 
 of our wants ; and the contingency of a war on the cont nent of Europe 
 makes it possible that they may diminish rather than increase. 
 
 We have in a less degree experienced the friendship of Spain in this 
 article. 
 
 The government of the United Provinces, if disposed to do it, can 
 give us no assistance. The resources of the Republic are chiefly mort- 
 gaged for former debts. Happily, it has extensive credit, but it will 
 have occasion for the whole to supply its own exigencies. 
 
 Private men, either foreigners or natives, will not lend to a large 
 amount, but on the usual security of funds properly established. This 
 security Congress cannot give, till the several States vest them with 
 revenU'3, or the means of revenue, for that purpose. 
 
 Coiagress have wisely appointed a Superintendent of their finances — a 
 man of acknowledged abihties and integrity, as well as of great })ersonal 
 credit and pecunia-ry influence. 
 
 It was impossible, that the business of finance could be ably conducted 
 by a body of men however well composed or well intentioned. Order 
 in the future manfigement of our moneyed concerns, a strict re^rd to 
 the p(!rformance of public engagements, and of course the restoration 
 of pubUc credit, raay be reasonablj"^ and confidently expected from Mr. 
 Morris.'s administration, if he is furnished with materials upon which to 
 operate; that is, if the Federal Government can acquire funds as the 
 basin of Irs arrangements. He has very judiciously proposed a National 
 Banfe, which, by uniting the interest and influence of the moneyed 
 men witl: the resources of Government, can alone give it that durable 
 and exte isive credit of which it stands in need. This is the best expe- 
 dient h( could have devised for relieving the public embarrassments ; 
 but to give success to the plan, it is essential that Congress should have 
 it in their power to support him with unexceptionable funds. Had we 
 begu n the practice of funding four years ago, we should have avoided 
 that depreciation of the currency which has been pernicious to the 
 morals and to the credit of the nation; and there is no other method 
 than -his to prevf nt a continuance and multrplication of the evils flowing 
 from *^hat prolific -ource. 
 
CllV THE CONTINENTALIST. 
 
 THE CONTINENTALIST. 
 
 NUMBER V. 
 
 APRIL 18, 1782. 
 
 [The saooeeding numbers of the Continentalist were written last fall, but aooident- 
 aUy got out of the possession of the writer. He has lately recovered them, and he 
 gives them to the public more to finish the developement of his plan, than from any 
 hope that the temper of the times will adopt his ideas.] 
 
 The vesting Congress with the power of regulating trade ought to have 
 been a principal object of the confederation for a variety of reasons. It 
 is as necessary for the purposes of commerce as of revenue. There are 
 some who maintain that trade will regulate itself, and is not to be bene- 
 fitted by the encouragements, or restraints of government. Such per- 
 sons will imagine, that there is no need of a common directing power. 
 This is one of those wild speculative paradoxes, which have grown into 
 credit among us, contrary to the uniform practice and sense of the most 
 enlightened nations. 
 
 Contradicted by the numerous institutions and laws, that exist every 
 where for the benefit of trade, by the pains taken to cultivate particular 
 branches and to discourage others, by the known advantages derived 
 from those measures, and by the palpable evils that would attend their 
 discontinuance — it must be rejected by every man acquainted with 
 commercial history. Commerce, like other things, has its fixed princi- 
 ples, according to which it must be regulated : if these are understood 
 and observed, it will be promoted by the attention of government, if 
 unknown, or violated, it will be injured — but it is the same with every 
 other part of administration. 
 
 To preserve the balance of trade in favour of a nation ought to be a 
 leading aim of its policy. The avarice of individuals may frequently 
 find its account in pursuing channels of traflBc prejudicial to that 
 balance, to which the government may be able to oppose effectual 
 impediments. There may, on the other hand, be a possibility of open- 
 ing new sources, which, though accompanied with great diflBculties in 
 the commencement, would in the event, amply reward the trouble and 
 expense of bringing them to perfection. The undertaking may often 
 exceed the influnnce and capitals of individuals, and may require no 
 
TEIE CONTINENT ALIST. CiV 
 
 email assistance, as well from the revenue as from the authority of the 
 state. 
 
 The contrary opinion, which has grown into a degree of vogue among 
 us, has originated in the injudicious attempts made at different times 
 to efifect a REGULATION of PRICES. It bccamc a cant phrase among the 
 opposers of these attemjjts, that trade must regulate itself; by which 
 at first was only meant that it had its fundamental laws, agreeable to 
 which its general operations must be directed ; and that any violent 
 attempts in opposition to these would commonly miscarry. In this 
 sense the maxim was reasonable; but it has since been extended to 
 militate against all interference by the sovereign ; an extreme as little 
 reconcileable with experience, or common sense, as the practice it was 
 first framed to discredit. 
 
 The reasonings of a very ingenious and sensible writer,* by being 
 misapprehended, have contributed to this mistake. The scope of his 
 argument, is not, as by some supposed, that trade will hold a certain 
 invariable course independent on the aid, protection, care or concern of 
 government; but that it will, in the main, depend upon the compara- 
 tive industry, moral and physical advantages of nations; and that 
 tliough, for a while, from extraordinary causes, tliere may be a wrong 
 balance against one of them, this will work its own cure, and things will 
 ultimately return to their proper level. His object was to combat that 
 excessive jealousy on this head, which has been productive of so many 
 unnecessary wars, and with which the British nation is particularly 
 infected; but it was no part of his design to insinuate that the regu- 
 lating hand of government was either useless or hurtful. The nature 
 of a government, its spirit, maxims and laws, with respect to trade, are 
 among those constant moral causes, which influence its general results, 
 and when it has by accident taken a wrong direction, assist in bringing 
 it back to its natural course. This is every where admitted by all 
 writers upon the subject; nor is there one who has asserted a contrary 
 doctrine. 
 
 Trade may be said to have taken its rise in England under the 
 auspices of Elizabeth ; and its rapid progress there is in a great measure 
 to be ascribed to the fostering care of government in that and succeed- 
 ing reigns. 
 
 From a different spirit in the government, with superior advantages, 
 France was much later in commercial improvements, nor would her 
 trade have been at this time in so prosperous a condition, had it not 
 been for the abilities and indefatigable endeavours of the great Colbert. 
 He laid the foundation of the French commerce, and taught the way to 
 his successors to enlarge and improve it. The establishment of the 
 woolen manufacture, in a kingdom, where nature seemed to have 
 denied the means, is one among many proofs, how much may be 
 effected in favour of commerce by the attention and patronage of a mse 
 administration. 
 
 » Hume's Essay — Jealousy of Trade. 
 
ClV" THE CONTINENTALIST. 
 
 The number of useful edicts passed by Louis the 14th, and since his 
 time, in spite of frequent interruptions from the jealous enmity of Great 
 Britain, has advanced that of France to a degree which has excited the 
 envy and astonishment of its neighbours. 
 
 The Dutch, who may justly be allowed a preeminence in the know- 
 ledge of trade, have ever made it an essential object of state. Their 
 commercial regulations are more rigid and numerous, than those of any 
 other country ; and it is by a judicious and unremitted vigilance of 
 government, that they have been able to extend their irafic to a degree 
 so much beyond their natural and comparative advantages. 
 
 Perhaps it may be thought, that the power of regulation will be best 
 placed in the governments of the several states, and that a general 
 superintendence is unnecessary. If the states had distinct interests, 
 were unconnected with each other, their own governments would then 
 be the proper, and could be the only depositories of such a power ; but 
 as they are parts of a whole with a common interest in trade, as in other 
 things, there ought to be a common direction in that as in all other 
 matters. It is easy to conceive, that many cases may occur, in which it 
 would be beneficial to all the states to encourage, or suppress a particu- 
 lar branch of trade, while it would be detrimental to either to attempt 
 it without the concurrence of the rest, and where the experiment would 
 probably be left untried for fear of a want of that concurrence. 
 
 No mode can be so convenient as a source of revenue to the United 
 States. It is agreed that imposts on trade, when not immoderate, oi 
 improperly laid, are one of the most eligible species of taxation. They 
 fall in a great measure upon articles not of absolute necessity, and being 
 partly transferred to the price of the commodity, are so far impercepti- 
 bly paid by the consumer. It is therefore that mode which may be 
 exercised by the foederal government with least exception or disgust. 
 Congress can easily possess all the information necessary to impose the 
 duties with judgment, and the collection can without difiiculty be made 
 by their own officers. 
 
 They can have no temptation to abuse this power, because the motive 
 of revenue will check its own extremes. Experience has shown that 
 moderate duties are more productive than high ones. When they are 
 low, a nation can trade abroad on better terms — its imports and exports 
 will be larger — the duties will be regularly paid, and arising on a greater 
 quantity of commodities, will yield more in the aggregate, than when 
 they are so high as to operate either as a prohibition, or as an induce- 
 ment to evade them by illicit practices. 
 
 It is difficult to assign any good reason why Congress should be more 
 liable to abuse the powers with which they are intrusted than the state- 
 assemblies. The frequency of the election of the members is a full 
 security against a dangerous ambition, and the rotation established by 
 the confederation makes it impossible for any state, by continuing the 
 same men, who may put themselves at the head of a prevailing faction 
 to maintain for any length of time an undue influence in the national 
 
THE CONTINENTALIST. clvij 
 
 councils. It is to be presumed, that Congress will be in general better 
 composed foi abilities, and as well for integrity as any assembly on the 
 continent. 
 
 But to take away any temptation from a cabal to load particular 
 articles, which are the principal objects of commerce to particular 
 Btates, with a too great proportion of duties, to ease the others in tho 
 general distribution of expense : let all the duties, whether for regula- 
 tion or revenue, raised in each state, be credited to that state, and let it 
 in like manner, be charged for all the bounties paid within itself for the 
 encouragement of agriculture, manufactures or trade. This expedient 
 will remove the temptation ; for as the quotas of the respective states 
 are to be determined by a standard of land, agreeable to the eighth 
 article of the confederation, each will have so much the less to contri- 
 bute otherwise, as it pays more on its commerce. An objection has 
 been made in a late instance to this principle. It has been urged, that 
 as the consumer pays the duty, those states which are not equally well 
 situated for foreign commerce, and which consume a great part of the 
 imports of their neighbours, will become contributers to a part of their 
 taxes. This objection is rather specious than solid. 
 
 The maxim, that the consumer pays the duty, has been admitted in 
 theory with too little reserve ; frequently contradicted in practice. It 
 is true, the merchant will be unwilling to let the duty be a deduction 
 fi-om his profits, if the state of the market will permit him to incorpo- 
 rate it with the price of his commodity. But this is often not practi- 
 cable. It turns upon the quantity of goods at market in proportion to 
 the demand. When the latter exceeds the former, and the competition 
 is among the buyers, the merchant can easily increase his price, and 
 make his customers pay the duty. When the reverse is the case, and 
 the competition is among the sellers, he must then content himself with 
 smaller profits and lose the value of the duty or at least a part of it. 
 When a nation has a flourishing and well settled trade this more com 
 monly happens than may be imagined, and it will, many times, be 
 found that the duty is divided between the merchant and the consumer. 
 
 Besides this consideration which greatly diminishes the force of the 
 objection, there is another which entirely destroys it. There is a strong 
 reciprocal influence between the prices of all commodities in a state, by 
 which they, sooner or later, attain a pretty exact balance and propor- 
 tion to each other. If the immediate productions of the soil rise, the 
 manufacturer will have more for his manufacture, the merchant for his 
 goods; and the same will happen with whatever class the increase of 
 price begins. If duties are laid upon the imports in one state, by which 
 the prices of foreign articles are raised, the products of land and labour 
 within that state will take a proportionate rise: and if a part of those 
 articles are consumed in a neighbouring state, it will have the same 
 mfluence there as at home. The importing state must allow an 
 advanced price upon the commodities, which it receives in exchange 
 iVom its neighbour, in a ratio to the increased price of the article it 
 
civiil THE CONTINEXTALIST. 
 
 nells. To know then which is the gainer or loser, we must examine 
 how the general balance of trade stands between them. If the import- 
 ing state takes more of the commodities of its neighbour than it gives in 
 exchange, that will be the loser by the reciprocal augmentation of prices, 
 it will be the gainer if it takes less, and neither will gain or lose if the 
 barter is carried on upon equal terms. The balance of trade, and con- 
 sequently the gain, or loss, in this respect, will be governed more by the 
 relative industry and frugality of the parties, than by their relative 
 advantages for foreign commerce. 
 
 Between separate nations this reasoning will not apply with full force, 
 because a multitude of local and extraneous circumstances may counter- 
 act the principle ; but from the intimate connections of these states, the 
 similitude of governments, situations, customs, manners, political and 
 commercial causes will have nearly the same operation in the inter- 
 course between the states, as in that between the different parts of the 
 same state. If this should be controverted, the objection drawn from 
 the hypothesis of the consumer paying the duty must fall at the same 
 time : For as far as this is true it is as much confined in its application 
 to a state within itself as the doctrine of a reciprocal proportion of 
 prices. 
 
 General principles in subjects of this nature ought always to be 
 advanced with caution: in an experimental analysis there are found 
 such a number of exceptions as tend to render them very doubtful : 
 and in questions which affect the existence and collective happiness of 
 these states, all nice and abstract distinctions should give way to plainer 
 interests, and to more obvious and simple rules of conduct. 
 
 But the objection which has been urged ought to have no weight on 
 another account. Which are the states that have not suflBcient advan- 
 tages for foreign commerce, and that will not in time be their own 
 carriers? Connecticut and Jersey are the least maritime of the whole; 
 yet the sound which washes the coast of Connecticut, has an easy outlet 
 to the ocean, affords a number of harbours and bays, very commodious 
 for trading vessels. New London may be a receptacle for merchants 
 men of almost any burthen : and the fine rivers with which the state is 
 intersected, by facilitating the transportation of commodities to and 
 from every part, are extremely favourable both to its domestic and 
 foreign trade. 
 
 Jersey, by way of Amboy has a shorter communication with the 
 ocean, than the city of New York. Prince's bay, which may serve as? 
 an out port to it, will admit and shelter in winter and summer vessels 
 of any size. Egg-harbour on its southern coast is not to be despised. 
 The Delaware may be mAde as subservient to its commerce as to that of 
 Pennsylvania, Gloucester, Burlington, and Trenton, being all conve- 
 niently situated on that river. The United Provinces with inferior 
 advantages of position to either of these states, have for centuries held 
 the first rank among commercial nations. 
 
 The want of large trading c ties has been sometimes objected as an 
 
THE CONTINENTALIST. <:.h\ 
 
 obstacle to the commerce of these states ; but this is a temporary 
 deficiency that will repair itself with the increase of population and 
 riches. The reason that the states in question have hitherto carried on 
 little foreign trade, is that they have found it equally beneficial to pur- 
 chase the commodities imported by their neighbours. If the imposts 
 on trade should work an inconvenience to them, it will soon cease by 
 making it their interest to trade abroad. 
 
 It is too much characteristic of our national temper to be ingenious 
 in finding out and magnifying the minutest disadvantages, and to reject 
 measures of evident utility, even of necessity, to avoid trivial and some- 
 times imaginary evils. We seem not to reflect, that in human society, 
 there is scarcely any plan, however salutary to the whole and to every 
 part, by the share each has in the common prosperity, but in one way, 
 or another, and under particular circumstances, will operate more to 
 the benefit of some parts than of others. Unless we can overcome this 
 narrow disposition and learn to estimate measures by their general 
 tendencies, we shall never be a great or a happy people, if we remain a 
 p'Hjple at all. 
 
CIX THE CONTINENTALIST. 
 
 THE CONTINENTALIST. 
 
 NUMBEF VI. 
 
 JULY 12, 1781. 
 
 Let us see what will be the consequences of not authorizing tne 
 Federal Grovemment to regulate the trade of these States. Besides the 
 want of revenue and of power, besides the immediate risk to our inde- 
 pendence, the dangers of all the future evils of a precarious Union, 
 besides the deficiency of a wholesome concert, and provident superin- 
 tendence to advance the general prosperity of trade, the direct conse- 
 quence will be that the landed interest and the laboring poor, will in 
 the first place fall a sacrifice to the trading interest; and the whole 
 eventually to a bad system of policy, made necessary by the want of 
 such regulating power. 
 
 Each State will be afraid to impose duties on its commerce, lest the 
 other States, not doing the same, should enjoy greater advantages than 
 itself, by being able to afford native commodities cheaper abroad, and 
 foreign commodities cheaper at home. 
 
 A part of the evils resulting from this would be, a loss to the revenue 
 of those moderate duties, which, without being injurious to commerce, 
 are allowed to be the most agreeable species of taxes to the people. 
 Articles of foreign luxury, while they would contribute nothing to the 
 income of the State, being less dear by an exemptiom from duties, would 
 have a more extensive consumption. 
 
 Many branches of trade, hurtful to the common interest, would be 
 continued for want of proper checks and discouragements. As revenues 
 must be found to satisfy the public exigencies in peace and in war, too 
 great a proportion of taxes will fall directly upon land, and upon the 
 necessaries of life — the produce of that land. 
 
 The influence of these evils will be to render landed property fluctu- 
 ating and less valuable — to oppress the poor by raising the prices of 
 necessaries — to injure commerce by encouraging the consumption of 
 foreign luxuries, by increasing the value of labor — by lessening the 
 quantity of home productions, enhancing their prices at foreign markets, 
 of course obstructing their sale, and enabling other nations to supplant us. 
 
 Particular caution ought at present to be observed in this country 
 
THE CONTINENTALIST. clxi 
 
 not to burthen the soil itself and its productions with heavy impositions 
 because the quantity of unimproved land will invite the husbandmen 
 to abandon old settlements for new : and the disproportion of our popu- 
 lation for some time to come will necessarily make labor dear, to reduce 
 which, and not to increase it, ought to be a capital object of our policy. 
 
 Easy duties, therefore, on commerce, especially on imports, ought to 
 lighten the burthens which will unavoidably fall upon land. Though it 
 may be said that, on the principle of a reciprocal influence of prices, 
 whereon the taxes are laid in the first instance, they will in the end be 
 borne by all classes, yet it is of the greatest importance that no one 
 should sink under the immediate pressure. 
 
 The great art is to distribute the public burthens well, and not sufFei 
 them, either first or last, to fall too heavily on parts of the community ; 
 else, distress and disorder must ensue — a shock given to any part of the 
 political machine vibrates through the whole. 
 
 As a suflicient revenue could not be raised from trade to answer the 
 public purposes, other articles have been proposed. A moderate land 
 and poll tax being of easy and unexpensive collection, and leaving 
 nothing to discretion, are the simplest and best that could be devised. 
 
 It is to be feared, the avarice of many of the landholders will be 
 opposed to a perpetual tax upon land, however moderate. They will 
 ignorantly hope to shift the burthens of the national expense, from 
 themselves to others — a disposition as iniquitous as it is fruitless — the 
 public necessities must be satisfied ; this can only be done by the con- 
 tributions of the whole society. Particular classes are neither able nor 
 will be willing to pay for the protection and security of the others, anxi 
 where so selfish a spirit discovers itself in any member, the rest of the 
 community will unite to compel it to do its duty. 
 
 Indeed, many theorists in political economy have held, that all taxes, 
 wherever they originate, fall upon land, and have therefore been of 
 opinion, that it would be best to draw the whole revenue of the State 
 immediately from that source, to avoid the expense of a more diversified 
 collection, and the accumulations which will be heaped in their several 
 stages, upon the primitive sums advanced in those stages which are 
 imposed on our trade. But though it has been demonstrated that this 
 theory has been carried to an extreme, impracticable in fact ; yet it is 
 evident, in tracing the matter, that a large part of all taxes, however 
 remotely laid, will, by an insensible circulation come at last to settle 
 upon land — the source of most of the materials employed in commerce. 
 
 It appears from a calculation made by the ablest master of political 
 arithmetic, about sixty years ago, that the yearly product of all the 
 lands in England amounted to £42,000,000 sterling ; and the whole 
 annual consumption at that period, of foreign as well as domestic com- 
 modities, did not exceed £49,000,000, and the surplus of the exportation 
 above the importation £2,000,000, on which sums arise all the revenues 
 in whatever shape, which go into the treasury. 
 
 11 
 
CIXU THE CONTINENTALIST. 
 
 It is easy to infer from this, how large a part of them must, directly 
 or indirectly, be derived from land. 
 
 Nothing can be more mistaken, than the collision ana rivalship wnicb 
 almost always subsist between the landing and trading interests, for the 
 truth is they are so inseparably interwoven that one cannot be injured 
 without injury nor benefited without benefit to the other. Oppress 
 trade, lands sink in value ; make it flourish, their value rises ; incumber 
 husbandry, trade declines, encourage agriculture, commerce revives. 
 The progress of this mutual reaction might be easily delineated, but it 
 is too obvious to every man, who turns his thoughts, however superfi- 
 cially, upon the subject, to require it. It is only to be regretted, that it 
 is too often lost sight of, when the seductions of some immediate advan- 
 tage or exemption tempt us to sacrifice the future to the present. 
 
 But perhaps the class is more numerous of those, who, not unwilling 
 to bear their share of public burthens, are yet averse to the idea of 
 perpetuity, as if there ever would arrive a period when the State would 
 cease to want revenues ; and taxes become unnecessary. It is of import- 
 ance to unmask this delusion, and open the eyes of the people to the 
 truth. It is paying too great a tribute to the idol of popularity, to 
 flatter so injurious and so visionary an expectation. The error is too 
 gross to be tolerated any where but in the cottage of the peasant. 
 Should we meet with it in the Senate House, we must lament the igno- 
 rance or despise the hypocrisy on which it is ingrafted. Expense is in 
 the present state of things entailed upon all governments ; though, if 
 we continue United, we shall be hereafter less exposed to wars by land 
 than most other countries ; yet while we have powerful neighbors on 
 either extremity, and our frontier is embraced by savages, whose alliance 
 they may without difficulty command, we cannot, in prudence, dispense 
 with the usual precautions for our interior security. As a commercial 
 people, maritime power must be a primary object of our attention, and 
 a navy cannot be created or maintained without ample revenues. The 
 nature of our popular institutions requires a numerous magistracy, for 
 whom competent provision must be made, or we may be certain our 
 affairs will always be committed to improper hands, and experience will 
 teach us that no government costs so much as a bad one. 
 
 "We may preach, till we are tired of the theme, the necessity of dis- 
 interestedness in republics, without making a single proselyte. The 
 virtuous declaimer will neither persuade himself nor any other person 
 to be content with a double mess of pottage, instead of a reasonable 
 stipend for his services. We might as soon reconcile ourselves to the 
 Spartan community of goods and wives, to their iron coin, their long 
 beards, or their black broth. There is a total dissimilarity in the cir- 
 cumstances, as well as the manners of society among us, and it is as ri- 
 diculous to seek for models in the small ages of Greece and Rome, as it 
 would be to go in quest of them among the Hottentots and Laplanders. 
 
 The public, for the different purposes that have been mentioned, 
 must always have large demands upon its constituents, and the only 
 
* THE CONTINENTALIST. clxili 
 
 question is, whether these shall be satisfied by annual grants, perpetually 
 renewed by a perpetual grant, once for all, or by a compound of perma- 
 nent and occasional supplies. The last is the wisest course. The Federal 
 Government should neither be independent nor too much dependent. 
 It should neither be raised above responsibility or control ; nor should 
 it want the means of maintaining its own weight, authority, dignity, 
 and credit. To this end, permanent funds are indispensable ; but they 
 ought to be of such a nature, and so moderate in their amount as never 
 to be inconvenient. Extraordinary supplies can be the objects of extra- 
 ordinary emergencies ; and in that salutary medium will consist our 
 true wisdom. 
 
 It would seem as if no mode of taxation could be relished, but the 
 worst of all modes, which now prevails by assessment. Every proposal 
 for a specific tax is sure to meet with opposition. It has been objected 
 to a poll tax at a fixed rate, that it will be unequal, and the rich will 
 pay no more than the poor. In the form in which it has been offered 
 in these papers the poor, properly speaking, are not comprehended, 
 though it is true, that beyond the exclusion of the indigent, the tax has 
 no reference to the proportion of property, but it should be remembered 
 that it is impossible to devise any specific tax that will operate equally 
 on the whole community. It must be the province of the Legislature 
 to hold the scales with a judicious hand, and balance one by another. 
 The rich must be made to pay for their luxuries, which is the only 
 proper way of taxing their superior wealth. 
 
 Do we imagine that our assessments operate equally ? Nothing can 
 be more contrary to the fact. Wherever a discretionary power is lodged 
 in any set of men over the property of their neighbors, they will abuse 
 it. Their passions, prejudices, partialities, dislikes, will have the prin- 
 cipal lead in measuring the abilities of those over whom their power 
 extends ; and assessors will ever be a set of petty tyrants, too unskilful, 
 if honest, to be possessed of so delicate a trust ; and too seldom honest 
 to give them the excuse of want of skill. 
 
 The genius of liberty reprobates every thing arbitrary or discretionary 
 in taxation. It exacts that every man, by a definite and general rule, 
 should know what proportion of his property the State demands. 
 Whatever liberty we may boast in theory, it cannot exist in fact while 
 assessments continue. 
 
 The admission of them among us is a new proof, how often hiunan 
 conduct reconciles the most glaring opposites ; in the present case, the 
 most vicious practice of despotic governments, with the freest constitu- 
 tions and the greatest love of liberty. 
 
 The establishment of permanent funds would not only answer the 
 public purposes infinitely better than temporary supplies, but it would 
 be the most effectual way of easing the people. 
 
 With this basis for procuring credit, the amount of present taxes 
 might be greatly diminished. Large sums of money might be borrowed 
 abroad, at a low interest, and introduced into the country, to defray the 
 
clxiv THE CONTINENTALIST. 
 
 current expenses and pay the public debts; which would not onlv 
 lessen the demand for immediate supplies, but would throw more 
 money into circulation, and furnish the people with greater means of 
 paying the taxes. 
 
 Though it be a just rule that we ought not to run in debt to avoid 
 present expense, so far as our faculties extend ; yet the propriety of 
 doing it cannot be disputed, when it is apparent that these are incompe- 
 tent to the public necessities. Efforts beyond our abilities can only tend 
 to individual distress and national disappointment. The product of the 
 three foregoing articles will be as little as can be required, to enable 
 Congress to pay their debts, and restore order into their finances. In 
 addition to them — 
 
 The disposal of the unlocated lands will hereafter be a valuable source 
 of revenue, and an immediate one of credit. As it may be liable to the 
 same condition with the duties on trade, — that is, the product of the 
 sales within each State to be credited to that State, and as the rights of 
 jurisdiction are not infringed, it seems to be susceptible of no reasonable 
 objection. 
 
 Mines in every country constitute a branch of the revenue. In this, 
 where nature has so richly impregnated the bowels of the earth, they 
 may in time become a valuable one ; and as they require the care and 
 attention of government to bring them to perfection, this care and a 
 share in the profits of it will very properly devolve upon Congress. All 
 the precious metals should absolutely be the property of the Federal 
 Government, and with respect to the others it should have a discretion- 
 ary power of reserving, in the nature of a tax, such part as it may judge 
 not inconsistent with the encouragement due to so important an object. 
 This is rather a future than a present resource. 
 
 The reason of allowing Congress to appoint its own officers of the 
 customs, collectors of the taxes, and military officers of every rank, is to 
 create in the interior of each State, a mass of influence in favor of the 
 Federal Government. The great danger has been shown to be, that it 
 will not have power enough to defend itself, and preserve the Union, 
 not that it will ever become formidable to the general liberty. A mere 
 regard" to the interests of the confederacy will never be a principle suf- 
 ficiently active to crush the ambition and intrigues of difi^erent members. 
 Force cannot effect it. A contest of arms will seldom be between the 
 common sovereign, and a single refractory member, but between distinct 
 combinations of the several parts against each other.. A sympathy of 
 situations will be apt to produce associates to the disobedient. The 
 application of force is always disagreeable — the issue uncertain. It will 
 be wise to obviate the necessity of it, by interesting such a number of 
 individuals in each State, in support of the Federal Government, as will 
 be counterpoised to the ambition of others, and will make it diflScult 
 for them to unite the people in opposition +o the first and necessary 
 measures of the Union. 
 
 There is something noble and magnificent in the perspective of a 
 
THE CONTINENTALIST. ClxV 
 
 great Federal Republic, closely linked in the pursuit of a common 
 interest, tranquil and prosperous at home — respectable abroad ; but 
 there is something proportionably diminutive and contemptible in the 
 prospect of a number of petty States, with the appearance only of 
 Union, jarring, jealous, and perverse, without any determined direction, 
 fluctuating and unhappy at home, weak and insignificant by their dis- 
 sensions in the eyes of other nations. 
 
 Happy America, if those to whom thou hast intrusted the guardian- 
 ship of thy infancy, know how to provide for thy future repose, but 
 miserable and undone, if their negligence or ignorance permits the spirit 
 of discord to erect her banner on the ruins of thy tranquillity I 
 
HAMILTON S KESOLUTION FOR A GENERAL CONVENTION 
 
 RESOLUTION FOR A GENERAL CONVENTIOK OF 
 THE STATES. 
 
 Passed by the Legislature of New York, Sunday, July 21st, 1782. 
 
 Resolved, That it appears to this Legislature — after full and solemn con- 
 sideration of the several matters communicated by the Honorable the Com- 
 mittee of Congress, relative to the present posture of our affairs, foreign 
 and domestic, and contained in a letter from the Secretary for Foreign 
 Affairs, respecting the former, as well as of the representations, from time 
 to time made by the Superintendent of the Finances of the United States, 
 relative to his particular department — that the situation of these States is 
 in a peculiar manner critical, and affords the strongest reason to appre- 
 hend, from a continuance of the present constitution of the continental 
 Government, a subdivision of the public credit, and consequences highly 
 dangerous to the safety and independence of these States. 
 
 Resolved, That while this Legislature are convinced by the before 
 mentioned communications, that, notwithstanding the generous intentions 
 of an Ally, from whom we have experienced, and doubtless shall still 
 experience all possible support ; exigencies may arise to prevent our 
 receiving pecuniary succors hereafter, in any degree proportioned to our 
 necessities. They are also convinced from facts within their own know- 
 ledge, that the provisions made by the respective States for carrying on 
 the war, are not only inadequate to the end, but must continue to be so, 
 while there is an adherence to the principles which now direct the operation 
 of public measures. 
 
 Resolved, That it is also the opinion of this Legislature, that the present 
 plan, instituted by Congress, for the administration of their Finances, is 
 founded in wisdom and sound policy. That the salutary effects of it have 
 already been felt in an extensive degree ; and that after so many violent 
 shocks sustained by the public credit, a failure in this system, for want of 
 the support which the States are able to give, would be productive of evils 
 too pernicious to be hazarded. 
 
 Resolved, That it appears to this Legislature, that the present British 
 ministry, with a disposition not less hostile than that of their predecessors, 
 taught by experience to avoid their errors ; and assuming the appearance 
 of moderation, are pursuing a scheme calculated to conciliate in Europe, 
 and seduce in America. That the economical arrangements they appear 
 to be adopting, are adapted to enlarging the credit of their Government, 
 and multiplying its resources, at the same time that they serve to confirm 
 the prepossessions and confidence of the people ; and that the plan of a 
 defensive war on this Continent, while they direct all their attention and 
 resources to the augmentation of their Navy, is that which may be pro- 
 ductive of consequences ultimately dangerous to the United States. 
 
 Resolved That it is the opinion of this Legislature, that the present 
 
2 lIAMILTON'ji RESOLUTION FOR A GENERAL CONVENIION. 
 
 system of these States, exposes the common cause to a precarious issue, 
 and leaves us at the mercy of events over vrhich we have no influence — ■ 
 a conduct extremely unwise in any nation, and at all times; and to a 
 change of which, we are impelled at this juncture, by reasons of peculiar 
 and irresistible weight ; and that it is the natural tendency of the weak- 
 ness and disorders in our national measures, to spread diffidence and 
 distrust among the people ; and prepare their minds to receive the im- 
 pressions the enemy wish to make. 
 
 Resolved, That the general state of European affairs, as far as they have 
 come to the knowledge of this Legislature, affords, in their opinion, reason- 
 able ground of confidence, and assures us, that with judicious, vigorous 
 exertion on our part, we may rely on the final attainment of our object: 
 but far from justifying indifference and security, calls upon us by every 
 motive of honor, good faith, and patriotism, without delay, to unite in some 
 system more effectual, for producing energy, harmony, and consistency of 
 measures, than that which now exists ; and more capable of putting the 
 common cause out of the reach of contingencies. 
 
 Resolved, That in the opinion of this Legislature, the radical source of 
 most of our embarrassments is, the want of sufficient power in Congress, 
 to effectuate that ready and perfect co-operation of the different States, on 
 which their immediate safety and future happiness depend — that ex- 
 perience has demonstrated the confederation to be defective in several 
 essential points, particularly in not vesting the Federal Government either 
 with a power of providing revenue for itself, or with ascertained and pro- 
 ductive funds, secured by a sanction so solemn and general as would 
 inspire the fullest confidence in them, and make them a substantial basi? 
 of credit — that these defects ought to be without loss of time repaired, the 
 powers of Congress extended, a solid security established for the payment 
 of debts already incurred ; and competent means provided for futvire credit, 
 and for supplying the current demands of the war. 
 
 Resolved, That it appears evidently to this Legislature, that the annual 
 income of these States, admitting the best means were adopted for drawing 
 out their resources, would fall far short of the annual expenditure ; and 
 that there would be a large deficiency to be supplied on the credit of the 
 States, which, if it should be inconvenient for those powers to afford, on 
 whose friendship we justly rely, must be sought for from individuals, to 
 engage whom to lend, satisfactory securities must be pledged for the 
 punctual payment of interest, and the final redemption of the principal. 
 
 Resolved, That it appears to this Legislature, that the foregoing im- 
 portant ends can never be attained by partial deliberations of the States 
 aeparately ; but that it is essential to the common welfare, that there 
 should be as soon as possible a conference of the whole on the subject ; and 
 that it would be advisable for this purpose to propose to Congress to recom- 
 mend, and to each State to adopt the measure of assembling A GENERAL 
 CONVENTION OF THE STATES, specially authorized to revise and 
 amend the Confederation, reserving a right to the respective Legislatures 
 to ratify their determinations. 
 
HAMILTON ON FINANCIAL PLAN. 
 
 HAMILTON TO GOVERNOR CLINTON. 
 
 Philadelphia, May 14, 1783. 
 
 i'he president of congress will of course have transmitted to your ex- 
 cellency the plan lately adopted by congress for funding the public debt. 
 This plan was framed to accommodate it to the objections of some of the 
 states ; but this spirit of accommodation will only serve to render it less 
 efficient, without making it more palatable. The opposition of the state of 
 Rhode Island, for instance, is chiefly founded upon these two consider- 
 ations: the merchants are opposed to any revenue from trade; and the 
 state, depending almost wholly on commerce, wants to have credit for the 
 amount of th \ duties. 
 
 Persuaded hat the plan now proposed will have little more chance ol 
 succeiis than i better one, and that if agreed to by all the states it will in a 
 great measure fail in the execution, it received my negative. 
 
 My principal objections were — First, that it does not designate the funds 
 (except the impost) on which the whole interest is to arise ; and by which 
 (selecting; the capital articles of visible property) the collection would have 
 been easy, the funds productive, and necessarily increasing with the 
 increafie of the country. Secondly, that the duration of the funds is not 
 coextensive with the debt, but limited to twenty-five years, though there is 
 a moral certainty that in that period the principal will not, by the present 
 provisi)n, be fairly extinguished. Thirdly, that the nomination and 
 appoin ment of the collectors of the revenue are to reside in each state, 
 instead of, at least, the nomination being in the United States ; the conse- 
 quence if which will be, that those states which have little interest in the 
 funds, by having a small share of the public debt due to their own citizens, 
 will take care to appoint such persons as are the least likely to collect the 
 revenue. 
 
 The evils resulting from these defects will be, that in many instances the 
 objects of the revenue will be improperly chosen, and will consist of a 
 multitude of little articles, which will, on experiment, prove insufficient; 
 that, for want of a vigorous collection in each state, the revenue will be 
 unproductive in many, and will fall chiefly on those states which are 
 governed by most liberal principles ; that for want of an adequate security, 
 the evidences of the public debt will not be transferable for any thing like 
 their value. That this not admitting an incorporation of the creditors in 
 the nature of banks, will deprive the public of the benefit of an increased 
 circulation, and of course will disable the people from paying the taxes 
 for want of a sufficient medium. I shall be happy to be mistaken in my 
 apprehensions, but the experiment must determine. 
 
 I hope our state will consent to the plan proposed ; because it is her 
 interest, at all events, to promote the payment of the public debt in con- 
 tinental funds, independeat of the general considerat'ons of vnion and 
 propriety. I am much mistaken, if the debts di ' from '^e Dnitv ^ .*^tatcg 
 
4 HAMII DON S RESOLUTIONS FOR A GENERAL CONVENTION. 
 
 to the citizens of the state of New- York do not considerably exceed its 
 proportion of the necessary funds ; of course it has an immediate interest 
 that there should be a continental provision for them. But there are 
 superior motives that ought to operate in every state — the obligations of 
 national faith, honour, and reputation. 
 
 Individuals have been too long already sacrificed to the public con- 
 venience. It will be shocking, and, indeed, an eternal reproach to this 
 country, if we begin the peaceable enjoyment of our independence by a 
 violation of all the principles of honesty and true policy. 
 
 It is worthy of remark, that at least four-fifths of the domestic debt are 
 due to the citizens of the states from Pennsylvania inclusively northward. 
 
 P. S. — It is particularly interesting that the state should have a repre- 
 sentation here. Not only many matters are depending which require a full 
 representation in congress, and there is now a thin one, but those matters 
 are of a nature so particularly interesting to our state that we ought not to 
 be without a voice in them. I wish two other gentlemen of the delegation 
 may appear as soon as possible, for it would be very injurious to me to 
 remain much longer. Having no future views in public life, I owe it to 
 myself without delay to enter upon the care of my private concerns in 
 earnest. 
 
 RESOLUTIONS FOR A GENERAL CONVENTION, 1783. 
 
 " Whereas, in the opinion of this congress, the confederation of the 
 United States is defective in the following essential points. 
 
 " First, and generally, in confining the foederal government within too 
 narrow limits ; withholding from it that efficacious authority and influence 
 in all matters of general concern, which are indispensable to the harmony 
 and welfare of the whole ; embarrassing general provisions by unnecessary 
 details and inconvenient exceptions incompatible with their nature, tend- 
 ing only to create jealousies and disputes respecting the proper bounds of 
 the authority of the United States, and of that of the particular states, and 
 a mutual interference of the one with the other. 
 
 " Secondly — In confounding legislative and executive powers in a single 
 body ; as that of determining on the number and quantity of force, land 
 and naval, to be employed for the common defence, and of directing their 
 operations when raised and equipped; with that of ascertaining and making 
 requisitions for the necessary sums or quantities of money to be paid by 
 the respective states into the common treasury, contrary to the most 
 approved and well-founded maxims of free government, which require that 
 the LEGISLATIVE, EXECUTIVE, and JUDICIAL authorities should be deposited 
 in distinct and separate hands. 
 
 " Thirdly — In the want of a Federal Judicature, having cognizance of 
 all matters of general concern in the last resort, especially those in which 
 foreign nations and their subjects are interested ; from which defect, by 
 the interference of the local regulations of particular states militating, 
 directly or indirectly, against the powers vested in the union, the na^^ioiial 
 
HAMILTON S RESOLUTIONS FOR A GENERAL CONVENTION. 
 
 trcjitifes will be liable to be infringed, the national faith to be violated, and 
 the public tranquillity to be disturbed. 
 
 "Fourthly — In vesting the United States, in congress assembled, with 
 the power of general taxation, comprehended in that ' of ascertaining the 
 necessary sums of money to be raised for the common defence, and of 
 appropriating and applying the same for defraying the public expenses ;' 
 and yet rendering that power, so essential to the existence of the union, 
 nugatory, by withholding from them all control over either the imposition 
 or the collection of the taxes for raising the sums required, whence it 
 happens that the inclinations, not the abilities, of the respective states are, 
 in fact, the criterion of their contributions to the common expense, and 
 the public burden has fallen, and will continue to fall, with very unequal 
 weight. 
 
 " Fifthly — In fixing a rule for determining the proportion of each state 
 towards the common expense, which, if practicable at all, must in the 
 execution be attended with great expense, inequality, uncertainty, and 
 difficulty. 
 
 "Sixthly — In authorizing congress 'to borrow money, or emit bills, on 
 the credit of the United States,' without the power of establishing funds 
 to secure the repayment of the money or the redemption of the bills 
 emitted, from which must result one of these evils — either a want of suffi- 
 cient credit in the first instance to borrow, or to circulate the bills emitted, 
 whereby in great national exigencies the public safety may be endangered, 
 or, in the second instance, frequent infractions of the public engagements, 
 disappointments to lenders, repetitions of the calamities of. depreciating 
 paper, a continuance of the injustice and mischiefs of an unfunded debt, 
 and, first or last, the annihilation of public credit. Indeed, in authorizing 
 congress at all to emit an unfunded paper as the sign of value ; a resource, 
 which, though useful in the infancy of this country, indispensable in the 
 commencement of the revolution, ought not to continue a formal part of 
 the constitution, nor ever hereafter to be employed, being in its nature 
 pregnant with abuses, and liable to be made the engine of imposition and 
 fraud, holding out temptations equally pernicious to the integrity of govern- 
 ment and to the morals of the people. 
 
 "Seventhly — In not making proper or competent provision for interior 
 or exterior defence : for interior defence, by leaving it to the individual 
 states to appoint all regimental officers of the land forces, to raise the men 
 in their own way, to clothe, arm, and equip them, at the expense of the 
 United States ; from which circumstances have resulted, and will hereafter 
 result, great confusion in the military department, continual disputes of 
 rank, languid and disproportionate levies of men, an enormous increase of 
 expense for want of system and uniformity in the manner of conducting 
 them, and from the competitions of state bounties ; — by an ambiguity in 
 the fourth clause of the sixth article, susceptible of a construction which 
 would devolve upon the particular states in time of peace the care of their 
 own defence both by sea and land, and would preclude the United States 
 fri)m '•aising a single regiment or building a single ship before a declara- 
 
b HAMILTON S RESOLUTIONS FOR A GENERAL CONVENTION. 
 
 tion of war, or an actual commencement of hostilities ; a principle danj^orous 
 to the confederacy in different respects, by leaving the United States at all 
 times unprepared for the defence of their common rights, obliging them to 
 begin to raise an army and to build and equip a navy at the moment they 
 would have occasion to employ them, and by putting into the hands of a 
 few states, who from their local situations arc more immediately exposed, 
 all the standing forces of the country, thereby not only leaving the care of 
 the safety of the whole to a part, which will naturally be both unwilling 
 and unable to make effectual provision at its particular expense, but also 
 furnishing grounds of jealousy and distrust between the states, unjust in 
 its operation to those states in whose hands they are, by throwing the 
 exclusive burden of maintaining those forces upon them, while their neigh- 
 bours immediately, and all the states ultimately, would share the benefits 
 of their services ; for exterior defence, in authorizing congress ' to build 
 and equip a navy,' without providing any means of manning it, either by 
 requisitions of the states, by the power of registering and drafting the sea- 
 men in rotation, or by embargoes in cases of emergency, to induce them to 
 accept employment on board the ships of war ; the omission of all which 
 leaves no other resource than voluntary enlistment; a resource which haa 
 been found ineffectual in every country, and for reasons of peculiar force, 
 in this. 
 
 "Eighthly — In not vesting in the United States a general superin- 
 tendence OF TRADE, equally necessary in the view of revenue and i^egu- 
 lation: of revenue, because duties on commerce, when moderate, are 
 among the most agreeable and productive species of it which cannot with- 
 out great disadvantages be imposed by particular states, while others 
 refrain from doing it, but must be imposed in concert, and by laws ope- 
 rating upon the same principles, at the same moment, in all the states ; 
 otherwise those states which should not impose them would engross the 
 commerce of such of their neighbours as did: of regulatio?i, because by 
 general prohibitions of particular articles, by a judicious arrangement of 
 duties, sometimes by bounties on the manufacture or exportation of certain 
 commodities, injurious branches of commerce might be discouraged, favour- 
 able branches encouraged, useful products and manufactures promoted ; 
 none of which advantages can be effectually attained by separate regu- 
 lations without a general superintending power ; because, also, it is essen- 
 tial to the due observance of the commercial stipulations of the United 
 States with foreign powers, an interference with which will be unavoid- 
 able if the different states have the exclusive regulation of their own trade, 
 and of course the construction of the treaties entered into. 
 
 "Ninthly — In defeating essential powers by provisoes and limitations 
 inconsistent with their nature, as the power of making treaties with foreign 
 nations, * provided that no treaty of commerce shall be made whereby the 
 legislative power of the respective states shall be restrained from imposing 
 euch imposts and duties on foreigners as their own people are subjected to, 
 or from prohibiting the importation or exportation of any species of goods 
 or commodities whatever ;' a proviso susceptible of an interpretation whi^.b 
 
HAMILTON S RESOLUllONS FOR A GENERAL CONVENTION. 7 
 
 includes a constitutional possibility of defeating the treaties of commerce 
 entered into by the United States. As also the power 'of regulating the 
 trade, and managing all affairs with the Indians, not members of any 
 states ; provided, that the legislative right of any state within its own limit8 
 be not infringed or violated,' and others of a similar nature. 
 
 " Tenthly — In granting the United States the sole power 'of regulating 
 the alloy and value of coin struck b}' their own authority, or Vjy that of the 
 respective states,' without the power of regulating foreign coin in circu- 
 lation, though one is essential to the due exercise of the other, as there 
 ought to be such proportions maintained between the national and foreign 
 coin, as will give the former a preference in all internal negotiations ; and 
 without the latter power, the operations of government, in a matter of 
 primary importance to the commerce and finances of the United States, 
 will be exposed to numberless obstructions. 
 
 "Eleventhly — In requiring the assent of nine states to matters of 
 principal importance, and of seven to all others, except adjournments from 
 day to day, a rule destructive of vigour, consistency, or expedition, in the 
 administration of affairs, tending to subject the sense of the majority to 
 that of the minority, by putting it in the power of a small combination to 
 retard and even to frustrate the most necessary measures, and to oblige 
 the greater number, in cases which require speedy determinations, as 
 happens in the most interesting concerns of the community, to come into 
 the views of the smaller ; the evils of which have been felt in critical con- 
 junctures, and must always make the spirit of government a spirit of com- 
 promise and expedience, rather than of system and energy. 
 
 "Twelfthly — In vesting in the fcederal government the sole direction of 
 the interests of the United States in their intercourse with foreign nations, 
 without empowering it to pass all general laws in aid and support of the 
 laws of nations ; for the want of which authority, the faith of the United 
 States may be broken, their reputation sullied, and their peace interrupted, 
 by the negligence or misconception of any particular state. 
 
 "And whereas experience hath clearly manifested that the powers 
 reserved to the union in the confederation, are unequal to the purpose of 
 effectually drawing forth the resources of the respective members, for the 
 common welfare and defence; whereby the United States have, upon several 
 occasions, been exposed to the most critical and alarming situations ; have 
 wanted an army adequate to their defence, and proportioned to the abilities 
 of the country ; have on account of that deficiency seen essential posts 
 reduced — others imminently endangered — whole states, and large parts of 
 others, overrun and ravaged by small bodies of the enemy's forces ; have 
 been destitute of sufficient means of feeding, clothing, paying, and appoint- 
 ing that array, by which the troops, rendered less eflBcient for military 
 operations, have been exposed to sufferings, which nothing but unparalleled 
 patience, perseverance, and patriotism could have endured. Whereas 
 also, the United States have been too often compelled to make the adminis- 
 tration of their affairs a succession of temporary expedients, inconsistent 
 ivith order, economy, energy, or a scrupulous adherence to the public 
 
8 ANNAPOLIS CONVENTION. 
 
 •ragageuifnts, and now find themselves, at the close of a glorious struggle 
 for indeppndence, without any certain means of doing justice to those who 
 have been its principal supporters — to an army which has bravely fought, 
 and patiently suffered — to citizens who have cheerfully lent their money — 
 and to others who have in different ways contributed their property and 
 their personal service to the common cause ; obliged to rely for the only 
 effectual mode of doing that justice by funding the debt on solid securities, 
 on the precarious concurrence of thirteen distinct deliberatives, the dissent 
 of either of which may defeat the plan, and leave these states, at this early 
 period of their existence, involved in all the disgrace and mischiefs of 
 violated faith and national bankruptcy. And whereas, notwithstanding 
 we have, by the blessing of Providence, so far happily escaped the com- 
 plicated dangers of such a situation, and now see the object of our wishes 
 secured by an honourable peace, it would be unwise to hazard a repetition 
 of the same dangers and embarrassments, in any future war in which these 
 states may be engaged, or to continue this extensive empire under a 
 government unequal to its protection and prosperity. And whereas, it is 
 essential to the happiness and security of these states, that their union 
 should be established on the most solid foundations, and it is manifest that 
 this desirable object cannot be effected but by a government, capable, both 
 in peace and war, of making every member of the union contribute in just 
 proportion to the common necessities, and of combining and directing the 
 forces and wills of the several parts to a general end ; to which purposes, 
 in the opinion of congress, the present confederation is altogether inade- 
 quate. And whereas, on the spirit which may direct the councils and 
 measures of these states, at the present juncture, may depend their future 
 safety and welfare — Congress conceive it to be their duty, freely to state to 
 their constituents the defects which, by experience, have been discovered 
 in the present plan of the foederal union, and solemnly to call their 
 attention to a revisal and amendment of the same. Therefore resolved, 
 That it be earnestly recommended to the several states to appoint a Con- 
 vention, to meet at on the day of , with full powers to revise 
 
 the confederation, and to adopt and propose such alterations as to them 
 shall appear necessary, to be finally approved or rejected by the states 
 
 respectively — and that a committee of be appointed to prepare an 
 
 address upon the subject." 
 
 ANNAPOLIS CONVENTION. 
 
 Annapolis, September 14th, 1786. 
 
 " To the honourable the legislatures of Virginia, Delaware, Pennsylvania, 
 New-Jersey, and New- York. 
 "The commissioners from the said states respectively assembled at 
 Annapolis, humbly beg leave to report. That pursuant to their several 
 appointments, they met at Annapolis, in the state of Maryland, on the 
 eleventh day of September, instant, and having proceeded to a communi- 
 cation of their powers, they found that the states of New-York, Pennsyi- 
 
ANNAPOLIS CONVENTION. b 
 
 vania, and Virginia, had in substance, and nearly in the same ternia, 
 authorized their respective commissioners to meet such commissioners as 
 were or might be appointed by the other states in the union, at such time 
 and place as should be agreed upon by the said commissioners, to take 
 into consideration the trade and commerce of the United States, to consider 
 how far an uniform system in their commercial intercourse and regulations 
 might be necessary to their common interest and permanent harmony, and 
 to report to the several states such an act relative to this great object, as, 
 when unanimously ratified by them, would enable the United States in 
 congress assembled effectually to provide for the same. 
 
 " That the state of Delaware had given similar powers to their commis- 
 sioners ; with this difference only, that the act to be framed in virtue of 
 these powers, is required to be reported ' to the United States in congress 
 assembled, to be agreed to by them, and confirmed by the legislature of 
 every state.' 
 
 " That the state of New-Jersey had enlarged the object of their appoint- 
 ment, empowering their commissioners ' to consider how far an uniform 
 system in their commercial regulations, and other important matters, might 
 be necessary to the common interest and permanent harmony of the several 
 states ; and to report such an act on the subject, as, when ratified by them, 
 would enable the United States in congress assembled effectually to pro- 
 vide for the exigencies of the union.' 
 
 " That appointments of commissioners have also been made by the states 
 of New-Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and North Carolina, 
 none of whom, however, have attended. But that no information has been 
 received by your commissioners of any appointment having been made by 
 the states of Connecticut, Maryland, South Carolina, or Georgia. That 
 the express terms of the powers to your commissioners supposing a depu- 
 tation from all the states, and having for their object the trade and com- 
 merce of the United States, your commissioners did not conceive it advisable 
 to proceed to the business of their mission under the circumstance of so 
 partial and defective a representation. 
 
 "Deeply impressed, however, with the magnitude and importance of the 
 object confided to them on this occasion, your conmiissioners cannot forbear 
 to indulge an expression of their earnest and unanimous wish that speedy 
 measures may be taken to effect a general meeting of the states in a future 
 convention for the same, and such other purposes, as the situation of public 
 affairs may be found to require. 
 
 " If in expressing this wish, or intimating any other sentiment, your 
 commissioners should seem to exceed the strict bounds of their appoint- 
 ment, they entertain a full confidence that a conduct dictated by an anxiety 
 for the welfare of the United States will not fail to receive a favourable 
 construction. In this persuasion, your commissioners submit an opinion 
 that the idea of extending the powers of their deputies to other objects 
 than those of commerce, which had been adopted by the state cf New- 
 Jersey, was an improvement on the original plan, and will deserve to be 
 incorporated into that of a future convention. They are the more naturally 
 
10 ANNAPOLIS CONVENTION. 
 
 led to this conclusion, as, in the course of their reflections on Zt » subject, 
 they havt! been induced to think that the power of regulatiuj; \ fide is of 
 such comprehensive extent, and will enter so far into the generr.l sj stem 
 of the federal government, that to give it efficacy, and to ob^^iate questions 
 and doubts concerning its precise nature and limits, may r jquii e a corre- 
 spondent adjustment of other parts of the federal system. That there are 
 important defects in the system of the federal government, is acknow- 
 ledged by the acts of all those states which have concurred in the present 
 meeting; that the defects, upon a closer examination, may be found greater 
 and more numerous than even these acts imply, is at least so ."ar probable, 
 from the embarrassments which characterrze the present state of our 
 national affairs foreign and domestic, as may reasonably be supposed to 
 merit a deliberate and candid discussion in some mode which will unite 
 the sentiments and councils of all the states. 
 
 " In the choice of the mode, your commissioners are of the opinion that 
 a CONVENTION of deputies from the different states for the special and sole 
 purpose of entering into this investigation, and digesting a plan of supply- 
 ing such defects as may be discovered to exist, will be entitled to a prefer- 
 ence, from considerations which will occur without being particularized. 
 Your commissioners decline an enumeration of those national circum- 
 stances on which their opinion respecting the propriety of a future con- 
 vention with those enlarged powers is founded, as it would be an intrusion 
 of facts and observations, most of which have been frequently the subject 
 of public discussion, and none of which can have escaped the penetration 
 of those to whom they would in this instance be addressed. 
 
 " They are, however, of a nature so serious, as, in the view of your com- 
 missioners, to render the situation of the United States delicate and critical, 
 calling for an exertion of the united virtue and wisdom of all the members 
 of the confederacy. Under this impression, your commissioners with the 
 most respectful deference beg leave to suggest their unanimous conviction, 
 that it may effectually tend to advance the interests of the union, if the 
 states by which they have been respectively delegated would concur them- 
 selves, and use their endeavoujs to procure the concurrence of the other 
 states, in the appointment of commissioners to meet at Philadelphia on the 
 second Monday in May next, to take into consideration the situation of the 
 United States, to devise such further provisions as shall appear to them 
 necessary to render the constitution of the federal government adequate to 
 the exigencies of the union, and to report such an act for that purpose to 
 the United States in congress assembled, as, when agreed to by them, and 
 afterwards confirmed by the legislature of every state, will effectually pro- 
 vide for the same. 
 
 " Though your commissioners could not with propriety address these 
 observations and sentiments to any but the states they have the honovir to 
 represent, they have nevertheless concluded, from motives of respect, to 
 transmit copies of this report to the United States in congress assembled, 
 and to the executives of the other States." 
 
SPEECH ON THE IMPOST GRANT. 11 
 
 SPEECH ON THE IMPOST GRANT. 
 
 The first objection (and that which is supposed to have the greatest force) 
 against the principles of the bill, is, that it would be unconstitutional to 
 delegate legislative power to Congress. If this objection be founded in 
 truth, there is at once an end of the enquiry. God forbid that we should 
 violate that Constitution which is the charter of our rights ! But it is our 
 duty to examine dispassionately whether it really stands in our way. If it 
 does not, let us not erect an ideal barrier to a measure which the public 
 good may require. 
 
 The first ground of the objection is deduced from that clause of the Con- 
 stitution which declares " that no power shall be exercised over the people 
 of this state Vjut such as is granted by or derived from them." 
 
 This, it is plain, amounts to nothing more than a declaration of that fun- 
 damental maxim of republican governments, "that all power, mediately oi 
 immediately, is derived from the consent of the people," in opposition to 
 those doctrines of despotism which uphold the divine right of kings, or lay 
 the foundations of government in force, conquest, or necessity. It does not 
 at all affect the question how far the legislature may go in granting power to 
 the United States. A power conferred by the representatives of the people, 
 if warranted by the Constitution under which they act, is a power derived 
 from the people. This is not only a plain inference of reason, but the 
 terms of the clause itself seem to have been calculated to let in the prin- 
 ciple. The words, " derived from," are added to the words, " granted by," 
 as if with design to distinguish an indirect derivation of power from an 
 immediate grant of it. This explanation is even necessary to reconcile the 
 Constitution to itself, and to give effect to all its parts, as I hope fully to 
 demonstrate in its proper place. 
 
 The next clause of the Constitution relied upon, is that which declares 
 that •' the supreme legislative power within this state shall be vested in a 
 Senate and Assembly." This, it is said, excludes the idea of any other 
 legislative power operating within the state. But the more obvious con- 
 struction of this clause, and that which best consists with the situation and 
 views of the country at this time, with what has been done before and 
 since the formation of our Constitution, and with those parts of the Consti- 
 tution itself which acknowledge the Federal Government, is this — " In the 
 distribution of the different parts of the sovereignty in the particular 
 government of this state, the legislative authority shall reside in a Senate 
 and Assembly," or, in other words, " the legislative authority of the par- 
 ticular (government of the State of New York shall be vested in a Senate 
 and Assembly." 
 
 The framers of the Constitution could have had nothing more in view 
 
 than to delineate the different departments of power in our own State 
 
 government, and never could have intended to interfere with the formation 
 
 of such a Constitution for the Union as the safety of the whole might 
 
 require. 
 
 12 
 
12 SPEECH ON THE IMPOST GRANT. 
 
 The jui?tn«'ss of this construction Mnll be further elucidated by that part 
 of the Constitution -which prescribes that "the supreme executive authority 
 of the state shall be vested in a governor." If the former clause excludes 
 the grant of legislative povrer, this must equally exclude the grant of 
 executive power. And the consequence would be that there would be no 
 Federal Government at all. 
 
 It will be of no avail to say that there is a difference in the two case*; in 
 the mode of expression ; that, in one, the terms of description are " within 
 the state," in the other, "of the state." In grammar, or good sense, the 
 difference in the phrases constitutes no substantial difference in the mean- 
 ing, or, if it does, it concludes against the objection ; for the words, within 
 this state, which are applied to the legislative power, have a certain pre 
 cision that may be supposed to intend a distinction between that legislative 
 power which is to operate within the state only, and that which is to operate 
 upon this state in conjunction with the others. But I lay no stress on this 
 observation. In my opinion the legislative power " within this state" or 
 the legislative power "of this state," amount in substance to the same 
 thing. And therefore (as has been already observed) if the Constitution 
 prohibits the delegation of legislative power to the Union, it equally pro- 
 hibits the delegation of Executive power — and the Confederacy must then 
 be at an end ; for without legislative or executive power, it becomes a 
 nullity. 
 
 Unfortunately for the objection, if it proves anything it proves too much 
 — It proves that the powers of the Union in their present form are an 
 usurpation on the Constitution of this State. This will appear not only 
 from the reasoning adduced, but from this further consideration, — that the 
 United States are already possessed of legislative as well as Executive 
 authority. The objects of Executive power are of three kinds, to make 
 treaties with foreign nations, to make war and peace, to execute and inter- 
 pret the laws. This description of the executive power will enable us the 
 more readily to distinguish the legislative ; which in general may be defined 
 the power of prescribing rules for the community. 
 
 The United States are authorized to require from the several states as 
 much money as they judge necessary for the general purposes of the union, 
 and to limit the time within which it is to be raised : to call for such a 
 number of troops as they deem requisite for the common defence in time 
 of war — to establish rules in all cases of capture by sea or land — to regu- 
 late the alloy and value of coin, the standard of weights and measures, 
 and to make all laws for the government of the army and navy of the 
 union. All these are powers of the legislative kind, and are declared by 
 the confederation to be binding upon all the states. 
 
 The first is nothing less than a power of taxing the states in gross 
 though not in detail ; and the last is the power of disposing of the liberty 
 and lives of the citizens of this state, when in arms for the common defence. 
 That the powers enumerated are all, or most of them of a legislative 
 nature, will not be denied by the law members on the other side of the 
 question. If the Constitution forbids the grant of legislative power to the 
 
SPEECH ON THE IMPOST GRANT. 13 
 
 Union, all those authorities are illegal and unconstitutional, and ought to 
 be resumed. 
 
 If, on the contrary, those authorities were properly granted, then it fol- 
 lows that the Constitution does not forbid the grant of legislative power, 
 and the objection falls to the ground; for there is nothing in the Constitu- 
 tion permitting the grant of one kind of legislative authority, and forbid- 
 ding that of another. The degree or nature of the powers of legislation 
 which it might be proper to confer upon the federal government would in 
 this case be a mere question of prudence and expediency to be determined 
 by general considerations of utility and safety. 
 
 The principle of the objection under consideration would not only sub- 
 vert the foundation of the Union as now established — would not only 
 render it impossible that any federal government could exist ; but would 
 defeat some of the provisions of the Constitution itself. This last idea 
 deserves particular attention. 
 
 The nineteenth clause makes it the duty of the Governor " to correspond 
 with the continental Congress." The twentieth provides "that the judges 
 and chancellor shall hold no other ofiBce than delegate to the general Con- 
 gress ;" and the thirtieth directs " that delegates to represent this state in the 
 general Congress of the United States of America shall be annually 
 appointed." 
 
 Now, Sir, I ask, if Congress were to have neither executive nor legisla- 
 tive authority, to what purpose were they to exist? To what purpose were 
 delegates to be annually appointed to that body ? To what purpose were 
 these delegates to represent this state ? Or how could they be said to 
 represent it at all ? 
 
 Is not the plain import of this part of the Constitution, that they were 
 to represent this state in the general assembly of the United States, for the 
 purpose of managing the common concerns of the union ? And does not 
 this necessarily imply that they were to be clothed with such powers as 
 should be found essential to that object? Does it amount to a constitutional 
 warrant to the legislature to confer those powers of whatever kind they 
 might be ? 
 
 To answer these questions in the negative would be to charge the Consti- 
 tution with the absurdity of proposing to itself an end, and yet prohibitino 
 the means of accomplishing that end. 
 
 The words "to represent this state" are of great latitude, and are of 
 themselves sufficient to convey any power necessary to the conduct and 
 direction of its afiFairs in connection with the other parts of the confederacy. 
 
 In the interpretation of laws it is admitted to be a good rule to resort to 
 the co-existing circumstances and collect from thence the intention of the 
 framers of the law. Let us apply this rule to the present case. 
 
 In the commencement of the revolution delegates were sent to meet in 
 Congress with large discretionary powers — In short, generally speaking, 
 Tith full power "to take care of the republic." In the whole of this 
 transaction the idea of an Union of the colonies was carefully held up. — 
 U pervaded aU our public acts. 
 
1-ii SPEECH ON THE IMPOST GRANT. 
 
 In the declaration of independence we find it continued and confirmed. 
 That declaration, after setting forth its motives and causes, proceeds thus — 
 " We, therefore, the representatives of the United States of America in 
 general Congress assembled, appealing to the Supreme Judge of the vForld 
 for the rectitude of our intentions, do in the name and by the authority of 
 the good people of these colonies, solemnly publish and declare, that these 
 United Colonies are, and of right ought to be, free and independent states; 
 that they are absolved from all allegiance to the British Crown, and that 
 all political connection between them and the State of Great Britain is and 
 ought to be totally dissolved ; and that as free and independent states they 
 have full power to levy war, conclude peace, contract alliances, establish 
 commerce, and do all other acts and things that independent states may of 
 right do." 
 
 Hence we see that the Union and Independence of these States are 
 blended and incorporsited in one and the same act; which taken together, 
 clearly imports that the United States had in their origin full power to do 
 all acts and things which Independent States may of right do ; or, in other 
 words, full power of sovereignty. 
 
 Accordingly, we find that upon the authority of that act only approved 
 by the several states, they did levy war, contract alliances, and exercise 
 other high powers of sovereignty even to the appointment of a dictator, 
 prior to the present confederation. 
 
 In this situation, and with this plenitude of power, our Constitution 
 knows and acknowledges the United States in Congress assembled, and pro- 
 vides for the annual appointment of delegates to represent this state in that 
 body ; which in substance amounts to a constitutional recognition of the 
 Union with complete sovereignty. 
 
 A government may exist without any formal organization or precise defi- 
 nition of its powers. However improper it might have been, that the 
 federal government should have continued to exist with such absolute and 
 undefined authority, this does not militate against the position that it did 
 possess such authority. It only proves the propriety of a more regular 
 formation to ascertain its limits. This was the object of the present 
 confederation, which is, in fact, an abridgement of the original sovereignty 
 of the Union. 
 
 It may be said, (for it has been said upon other occasions,) that though 
 the Constitution did consider the United States in the light I have described, 
 and left the legislature at liberty in the first instance to have organized the 
 FEDERAL GOVERNMENT in such a manner as they thought proper, yet that 
 liberty ceased with the establishment of the present confederacy. The dis 
 cretion of the legislature was then determined. 
 
 This, upon the face of it, is a subtilty, uncountenanced by a single prin 
 ciple of government, or a single expression of the Constitution. It is say 
 ing that a general authority given to the legislature for the permanent 
 preservation and good of the community, has been exhausted and spent by 
 the exercipe of a part of that authority. The position is the more destitute 
 of colour ; because the confederation, by the express terms of the compact. 
 
SPEECH ON THE IMPOST GRANT. 15 
 
 preserves and continues this power. The last clause of it authorises Con- 
 gress to propose, and the states to agree to such alterations as might he 
 afterwards found necessary or expedient. 
 
 We see, therefore, that the Constitution knows and acknowledges the 
 United States in Congress ; that it provides for the annual appointment of 
 .delegates to represent this state in that body without prescribing the objects 
 or limits of that representation. That at the time our Constitution was 
 framed, the Union existed with full sovereignty ; and that therefore the 
 idea of sovereignty in the Union is not incompatible with it. We see, fur- 
 ther, that the doctrine contained in the objection against granting legisla- 
 tive power, would equally operate against granting executive power, would 
 prove that the powers already vested in the union are illegal and unconsti- 
 tutional, would render a confederacy of the states in any form impractica- 
 ble, and would defeat all those provisions of our own Constitution which 
 relate to the United States. I submit it to the committee, whether a doc- 
 trine pregnant with such consequences can be true — whether it is not as 
 opposite to our Constitution as to the principles of national safety and 
 prosperity — and whether it would not be lamentable if the zeal of opposi- 
 tion to a particular measure should carry us to the extreme of imposing 
 upon the Constitution a sense foreign to it ; which must embarrass the 
 national councils upon future occasions, when all might agree in the utility 
 and necessity of a different construction. 
 
 If the arguments I have used under this head are not well founded, let 
 gentlemen come forward and show their fallaci/. Let the subject have a 
 fair and full examination, and let truth, on whatever side it may be, 
 prevail I 
 
 Fluttering myself it will appear to the committee that the Constitution 
 at least offers us no impediment, I shall proceed to the topics of objection. 
 The next that presents itself is a supposed danger to liberty from grant- 
 ing legislative power to Congress. 
 
 But before I enter upon this subject, to remove the aspersions thrown 
 upon that body, I shall give a short history of some material facts relating 
 to the origin and progress of the business. To excite the jealousies of the 
 people, it has been industriously represented as an undue attempt to acquire 
 un increase of power. It has been forgotten or intentionally overlooked, 
 that, considering it in the strongest light as a proposal to alter the confede- 
 ration, it is only exercising a power which the confederation has in direct 
 terms reposed in Congress, who, as before observed, are by the 13th article, 
 expressly authorised to propose alterations. 
 
 But so far was the measure from originating in improper views of that 
 body, that, if I am rightly informed, it did not originate there at all. It 
 was first suggested by a convention of the four Eastern states, and New 
 York, at Hartford, and I believe was proposed there by the deputies of this 
 state. A gentleman on our bench, unconnected with Congress, who now 
 hears me, (I mean Judge Hobart,) was one of them. It was dictated by a 
 Drinciple which bitter experience then taught us, and which in peace or war 
 will always- be found true — that adequate supplies to the federal treasury 
 
I*) SPEECH ON THE IMPOST GKANl. 
 
 ean never flow from any system which requires the intervention of thirteen 
 delibertatives l^etween the call and the execution. 
 
 Congress agreed to the measure and recommended it. This state complied 
 without hesitation. All parts of the government, senate, assembly, and 
 council of revision concurred — neither the Constitution nor the public 
 liberty presented any obstacle. The diflBculties from these sources are a 
 recent discovery. 
 
 So late as the first session of the legislature after the evacuation of this 
 city, the Governor of the state in his speech to both houses, gave a decided 
 countenance to the measure — this he does, though not in express terms, yet 
 by implications not to be misunderstood. 
 
 The leading opponents of the impost, of the present day, have all of 
 them at other times, either concurred in the measure in its most excep- 
 tionable form, and without the qualifications annexed to it by the proposed 
 bill, or have by other instances of conduct contradicted their own hypothe- 
 sis on the Constitution which professedly forms the main prop of their 
 opposition. 
 
 The honorable member in my eye ( ) at the last session brought 
 
 in a bill for granting to the United States the power of regulating the trade 
 of the union. This surely includes more ample legislative authority 
 than is comprehended in the mere power of levying a particular duty. It 
 indeed goes to a prodigious extent much farther than on a superficial view 
 can be imagined. Can we believe that the constitutional objection, if well 
 founded, would so long have passed undiscovered and unnoticed? or is it 
 fair to impute to Congress criminal motives for proposing a measure which 
 was first recommended to them by five states, or from persisting in that 
 measure, after the unequivocal experience they have had of the total ineffi- 
 cacy of the mode provided in the confederation for supplying the treasury 
 of the union ? 
 
 I leave the answer to these questions to the good sense and candor of the 
 committee, and shall return to the examination of the question, how far the 
 power proposed to be conferred upon Congress would be dangerous to the 
 liberty of the people. And here I ask, 
 
 Whence can this danger arise? The members of Congress are annually 
 chosen by the members of the several legislatures. They come together 
 with diflFerent habits, prejudices, and interests. They are in fact continu- 
 ally changing. How is it possible for a body so composed to be for- 
 midable to the liberties of States, several of which are large empires iis 
 themselves ? 
 
 The subversion of the liberty of these states could not be the business of 
 a day. It would at least require time, premeditation, and concert. Can it 
 be supposed that the members of a body so constituted would be unanimous 
 in a scheme of usurpation ? If they were not, would it not be discovered 
 and disclosed ? If we could even suppose this unanimity among one set of 
 men, can we believe that all the new members who are yearly sent from one 
 state or another would instantly enter into the same views? Would there 
 not be found one honest man to warn hie country of the danger ? 
 
SPEECH ON THE IMPOST GRANT. 17 
 
 Suppose the worst — suppose the combination entered into and continued. 
 The execution would at least announce the design ; and the means of defence 
 would be easy. Consider the separate power of several of these states, and 
 the situation of all. Consider the extent, populousness, and resources ot 
 Massachusetts, Virginia, Pennsylvania ; I might add of New York, Con- 
 necticut, and other states. Where could Congress find means sufficient to 
 subvert the government and liberties of either of these states ! or rather, 
 where find means sufficient to effect the conquest at all ? If an attempt is 
 made upon one, the others from a sense of common danger, would make com- 
 mon cause ; and they could immediately unite and provide for their joint 
 defence. 
 
 There is one consideration of immense force in this question not suffi- 
 ciently attended to. It is this, that each state possesses in itself the full 
 powers of government, and can at once in a regular and constitutional 
 way, take measures for the preservation of its rights. In a single King- 
 dom or state, if the rulers attempt to establish a tyranny, the people can 
 only defend themselves by a tumultuary insurrection ; they must run to 
 arms without concert or plan ; while the usurpers clothed with the forms 
 of legal authority can employ the forces of the state to suppress them in 
 embryo ; and before they can have time or opportunity to give system to 
 their opposition. With us the case is widely different. Each state has a 
 government completely organized in itself; and can at once enter into a 
 regular plan of defence. With the forces of the community at its command 
 it can immediately form connections with its neighbors, or even with for- 
 eign powers, if necessary. 
 
 In a contest of this kind, the body of the people will always be on the 
 side of the state governments. This will not only result from their love of 
 liberty and regard to their own safety ; but from other strong principles 
 of human nature. The state governments operate upon those immediate 
 familiar personal concerns to which the sensibility of individuals is awake. 
 The distribution of private justice belonging to them, they must always 
 appear to the senses of the people as the immediate guardians of their 
 rights — they will of course have the strongest hold on their attachment, 
 respect and obedience. Another circumstance will contribute to the same 
 end. Far the greatest number of offices and employments are in the gift 
 of the states separately — the weight of official influence will therefore be 
 in favor of the state governments ; and with all these advantages they can- 
 not fail to carry the people along with them in every contest with the gen- 
 eral government in which they are not palpably in the wrong, and often 
 when they are. What is to be feared from the efforts of Congress to estab- 
 lish a tyranny with the great body of the people under the direction of 
 their state governments combined in opposition to their views? Must not 
 their attempts recoil upon themselves, and terminate in their own ruin and 
 disgrace? or rather, would not these considerations, if they were insensi- 
 ble to other motives, forever restrain them from making such attempts ? 
 
 The causes taken notice of as securing the attachment of the people to 
 their local governments, present us with another important truth — th» 
 
18 SPEECH ON THE IxMPOST GRANT. 
 
 natural imbecility of federal governments, and the danger that they will 
 never be able to exercise power enough to manage the general affairs of 
 the Union. Though the States will have a common interest, yet they will 
 also have a particular interest. For example, as a part of the Union, it 
 will be the interest of every State to pay as little itself, and to let its neigh- 
 bors pay as much as possible. Particular interests have always more 
 influence upon men than general. The federal States, therefore, consulting 
 their immediate advantage, may be considered as so many eccentric powers 
 tending in a contrary direction to the government of the Union ; and as 
 they will generally carry the people along with them, the confederacy will 
 be in continual danger of dissolution. This, Mr. Chairman, is the real 
 rock upon which the happiness of this country is likely to split — this is the 
 point to which our fears and cares should be directed ; to guard against 
 thi^, and not to terrify ourselves with imaginary dangers from the spectre 
 of power in Congress, will be our true wisdom. 
 
 But let us examine a little more closely the measure under consideration. 
 What does the bill before us require us to do ? Merely to grant duties on 
 imposts to the United States for the short period of twenty-five years — to 
 be applied to the discharge of the principal and interest of the debts con- 
 tracted for the support of the late war ; the collection of which duties is to 
 be made by officers appointed by the State, but accountable to Congress, 
 according to such general regulations as the United States shall establish ; 
 subject to these important checks, that no citizen shall be carried out of 
 the State for trial ; that all prosecutions shall be in our own courts ; that no 
 excessive fines or penalties shall be imposed ; and that a yearly account of 
 the proceeds and application of the revenue shall be rendered to the legis- 
 lature, on failure of which it reserves to itself a right of repealing its 
 grant. 
 
 Is it possible for any measure to be better guarded ? or is it possible that 
 a grant for such precise objects, and with so many checks, can be dangerous 
 to the public liberty ? 
 
 Having now as I trust satisfactorily shown that the Constitution offers no 
 obstacle to the measure, and that the liberty of the people cannot be 
 endangered by it, it remains only to consider it in the view of revenue. 
 
 The sole question left for discussion is whether it be an eligible mode for 
 supplying the Federal treasury or not? 
 
 The better to answer this question, it will be of use to examine how far 
 the mode by quotas and requisitions has been found competent to the 
 public exigencies. 
 
 The universal delinquency of the States during the war shall be passed 
 over with the bare mention of it. The public embarrassments were a 
 plausible apology for that delinquency, and it was hoped the peace would 
 have produced greater punctuality. The experiment has disappointed that 
 hope to a degree which confounds the least sanguine. A comparative view 
 of the compliances of the several States, for the five last years, will furnish 
 a striking result. 
 
 During that period, as appears by a statement on our files, New Hamo- 
 
SPEECH ON THE IMPOST GRANT. 19 
 
 ihire, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia, have paid nothing. 1 
 say nothing, because the only actual payment is the trifling sum of about 
 seven thousand dollars by New Hampshire. South Carolina indeed has 
 credits, but these are merely by way of discount, on the supplies furnished 
 by her during the war, in consideration of her peculiar suiferings and 
 exertions, while the immediate theatre of it. 
 
 Connecticut and Delaware have paid about one-third of their requisitions. 
 Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Maryland, about one-half. Virginia, 
 about three-fifths, Pennsylvania, nearly the whole, and New York, more 
 than her quota. 
 
 These propoi-tions are taken on the specie requisitions, the indents have 
 been very partially paid, and in their present state are of little account. 
 
 The payments into the federal treasury have declined rapidly each year. 
 The whole amount for three years past in specie has not exceeded 1,400,000 
 dollars, of which New York has paid one hundred per cent more than her 
 proportion. This sum, little more than 400,000 dollars a year, it will 
 readily be conceived, has been exhausted in the support of the civil esta- 
 blishments of the Union, and the necessary guards and garrisons at public 
 arsenals, and on the frontiers; without any surplus for paying any part of 
 the debt, foreign or domestic, principal or interest. 
 
 Things are continually growing worse, the last year in particular pro- 
 duced less than two hundred thousand dollars, and that from only two or 
 three States. Several of the States have been so long unaccustomed to pay, 
 that they seem no longer concerned even about the appearances of com- 
 pliance. 
 
 Connecticut and New Jersey have almost formally declined paying any 
 longer. The ostensible motive is the non-concurrence of this State in the 
 impost system. The real one must be conjectured from the fact. 
 
 Pennsylvania, if I understand the scope of some late resolutions, means 
 to discount the interest she pays upon her assumption to her own citizens ; 
 in which case there will be little coming from her to the United States. 
 This seems to be bringing matters to a crisis. 
 
 The pecuniary support of the Federal government has of late devolved 
 almost entirely upon Pennsylvania and New York. If Pennsylvania 
 refuses to continue her aid, what will be the situation of New York ? Are 
 we willing to be the Atlas of the Union ? or are we willing to see it perish ? 
 
 This seems to be the alternative. Is there not a species of political 
 knight-errantry in adhering pertinaciously to a system which throws tht 
 whole weight of the Confederation upon this state, or upon one or two 
 more? Is it. not our interest, on mere calculations of state policy, to pro- 
 mote a measure, which, operating under the same regulations in every 
 State, must produce an equal, or nearly equal, effect everywhere, and oblige 
 all the States to share the common burthen ? 
 
 If the impost is granted to the United States, with the power of levying 
 it, it must have a proportionate effect in all the States, for the same mode 
 of collection everywhere will have nearly the same return everywhere. 
 
 What mus-t be the final issue of the present state of things? Will tha 
 
2V) SPEECH UN THE IMPOST GRANT. 
 
 few States that now contribute be willing to contribute much longjr? Shall 
 we ourselves be long content with bearing the burthen singly? will not 
 our zeal for a particular system soon give way to the pressure of so unequal 
 a weight? and if all the States cease to pay, what is to become of the 
 Union ? It is sometimes asked, why do not Congress oblige the States to do 
 their duty ; but where are the means ? Where are the fleets and armies, 
 where the Federal treasury to support those fleets and armies, to enforce 
 the requisitions of the Union? All methods short of coercion have re- 
 peatedly been tried in vain. 
 
 Let us now proceed to another most important inquiry. How are we to 
 pay our foreign debt ? This, I think, is estimated at about 7,000,000 of 
 dollars ; which will every year increase with the accumulations of interest. 
 If we pay neither principal nor interest, we not only abandon all preten- 
 sions to character as a nation, but we endanger the public peace. However 
 it may be in our power to evade the just demands of our domestic creditors, 
 our foreign creditors must and will be paid. 
 
 They have power to enforce their demands, and sooner or later they may 
 be expected to do it. It is not my intention to endeavour to excite the 
 apprehensions of the committee, but I would appeal to their prudence. 
 A discreet attention to the consequences of national measures is no im- 
 peachment of our firmness. 
 
 The foreign debt, I say, must sooner or later be paid, and the longer pro 
 vision is delayed, the heavier it must fall at last. 
 
 We require about 1,600,000 dollars to discharge the interest and instal- 
 ments of the present year, about a million annually upon an average for ten 
 years more, and about 300,000 dollars for another ten years. 
 
 The product of the impost may be computed at about a million of dollars 
 annually. It is an increasing fund. This fund would not only suflBce for 
 the discharge of the foreign debt, but important operations might be in- 
 grafted upon it, towards the extinguishment of the domestic debt. 
 
 Is it possible to hesitate about the propriety of adopting a resource so 
 easy in itself, and so extensive in its eflfects ? 
 
 Here I expect I may be told there is no objection to employing this 
 resource. The act of the last session does it. The only dispute is about 
 the mode. We are willing to grant the money, but not the power required 
 from us. Money will pay our debts ; power may destroy our liberties. 
 
 It has been insinuated that nothing but a lust of power would have pre- 
 vented Congress from accepting the grant in the shape it has already 
 passed the legislature. This is a severe charge; if true, it ought un- 
 doubtedly to prevent our going a step further. But it is easy to show that 
 Congress could not have accepted our grant without removing themselves 
 further from the object than they now are. To gain one State they must 
 have lost all the others. The grants of every State are accompanied with a 
 condition, that similar grants be made by the other States. It is not denied 
 that our act is essentially different from theirs. Their acts give the United 
 States the power of collecting the duty. Ours reserves it to the state, and 
 makes it receivable in paper money. 
 
SPEECH ON THE IMPOST GRANT. 21 
 
 Tlie immediate consequences of accepting our grant w uld be a relin- 
 quishment of the grants of other States ; they must take the matter up 
 anew, and do the work over again, to accommodate it to our standard. In 
 order to anchor one state, would it have been wise to set twelve, or at least 
 eleven others, afloat ? 
 
 It is said, that the States which have granted more would certainly be 
 willing to grant less. They would easily accommodate their acts to that 
 of New York, as more favorable to their own power and security. 
 
 But would Massachusetts and Virginia, which have no paper money nf 
 their own, accede to a plan that permitted other States to pay in paper, 
 while they paid in specie? Would they consent that their citizens should 
 pay twenty shillings in the pound, while the citizens of Rhode Island paid 
 only^w^r, the citizens of North Carolina ten, and of other States in different 
 degrees of inequality, in proportion to the relative depreciation of their 
 paper? Is it wise in this State to cherish a plan that gives such an advan- 
 tage to the citizens of other States over its own ? 
 
 The paper money of the State of New York, in most transactions, is 
 equal to gold and silver ; that of Rhode Island is depreciated to five for 
 one ; that of North Carolina to two for one ; that of South Carolina may 
 perhaps be worth fifteen shillings in the pound. 
 
 If the States pay the duties in paper, is it not evident that for every 
 pound of that duty consumed by the citizen of New York, he would pay 
 twenty shillings, while the citizen of South Carolina would pay fifteen 
 shillings, of North Carolina, ten shillings, and Rhode Island, only four! 
 
 This consideration alone is sufiicient to condemn the plan of our grant 
 of last session, and to prove incontestably that the States which are averse 
 to emitting a paper currency, or have it in their power to support one when 
 emitted, would never come into it. 
 
 Again, would those States, which by their public acts demonstrate a con- 
 viction that the powers of the union require augmentation ; which are 
 conscious of energy in their own administration — would they be willing to 
 concur in a plan which left the collection of the duties in the hands of 
 each State, and of course subject to all the inequalities which a more or 
 less vigorous system of collection would produce ? 
 
 This too is an idea which ought to have great weight with us. We have 
 better habits of government than are to be found in some of the States, 
 and our constitution admits of more energy than the constitutions of most 
 of the other States. The duties, therefore, would be more effectually col- 
 lected with us than in such States, and they would have a similar effect to 
 the depreciation of the money, in imposing a greater burthen on the citizens 
 of this State. 
 
 If any State should incline to evade the payment of the duties, having 
 the collection in its own hands, nothing would be easier than to effect it, 
 and without materially sacrificing appearances. 
 
 It is manifest from this view of the subject, that we have the strongest 
 reasons as a State, to depart from our own act, and that it would have been 
 nighly injudicio\i8 in Congress to have accepted it. 
 
22 SPEECH ON THE IMPOST GRANT. 
 
 If there even had been a prospect of the concurrence of the other States 
 in the plan, how inadequate would it have been to the public exigencies, 
 fettered with the embarrassments of a depreciating paper! 
 
 It is to no purpose to say, that the faith of the<State was pledged by the 
 act to make the paper equal to gold and silver, and that the other States 
 would be obliged to do the same. What greater dependence can be had on 
 the faith of the States pledged to this measure, than on the faith they 
 pledged in the confederation, sanctioned by a solemn appeal to heaven ? 
 If the obligation of faith in one case has had so little influence upon their 
 conduct in respect to the requisitions of Congress, wl: at hope tan there be 
 that they would have greater influences in respect to the deficiencies of the 
 paper money? 
 
 There yet remains an important light in which to consider the subject in 
 the way of revenue. It is a clear point that we cannot carry the duties 
 upon imports to the same extent by separate arrangements as by a general 
 plan. We must regulate ourselves by what we find done in the neigboring 
 States. While Pennsylvania has only two and a half per cent, on her 
 importations, we cannot greatly exceed her. To go much beyond it would 
 injure our commerce in a variety of ways, and would defeat itself — While 
 the ports of Connecticut and New Jersey are open to the introduction of 
 goods free from duty, and the conveyance from them to us is so easy — 
 While they consider our imposts as an ungenerous advantage taken of 
 them, which it would be laudable to elude, the duties must be light, or 
 they would be evaded. The facility to do it and the temptation of doing 
 it would be both so great, that we should collect perhaps less by an in- 
 crease of the rates than we do now. Already we experience the effects of 
 this situation. But if the duties were to be levied under a common 
 direction, with the same precautions everywhere to guard against smuggling, 
 they might be carried without prejudice to trade to a much more consider- 
 able height. 
 
 As things now are, we must adhere to the present standard of duties, 
 without any material alterations. Suppose this to produce fifty thousand 
 pounds a year. The duties to be granted to Congress ought, in proportion, 
 to produce double that sum. To this it appears by a scheme now before 
 us, that additional duties might be imposed for the use of the State, on 
 certain enumerated articles, to the amount of thirty thousand pounds. 
 This would be an augmentation of our national revenue by indirect taxa- 
 tion to the extent of eighty thousand pounds a year ; an immense object 
 in a single State, and which alone demonstrates the good policy of the 
 measure. 
 
 It is no objection to say that a great part of this fund will be dedicated 
 to the use of the United States. Their exigencies must be supplied in 
 some way or other. The more is done towards it by means of the impost, 
 the less will be to be done in other modes. If we do not employ tha*^ 
 resource to the best account, we must find others in direct taxation. And 
 to this are opposed all the habits and prejudices of the community. There 
 is not a farmer in the state who would not pay a shilling in the voluntarv 
 
SPEECH ON THE IMPOST GRANT. 23 
 
 consumption ol articles on which a duty is paid, rather than a penny 
 imposed immediately on his house and land. 
 
 There is but one objection to the measure under consideration that has 
 come to my knowledge, which yet remains to be discussed. I mean the 
 effect it is supposed to have upon our paper currency. It is said, the diver- 
 sion of this fund would leave the credit of the paper without any effectual 
 support. 
 
 Though I should not be disposed to put a consideration of this kind in 
 competition with the safety of the Union, yet I should be extremely cau- 
 tious about doing anything that might affect the credit of our currency. 
 The legislature having thought an emission of paper advisable, I consider 
 it my duty as a representative of the people to take care of its credit. The 
 farmers appeared willing to exchange their produce for it. The merchants 
 on the other hand, had large debts outstanding. They supposed that giv- 
 ing a free circulation to the paper would enable their customers in the 
 country to pay, and as they perceived that they would have it in their power 
 to convert the money into produce, they naturally resolved to give it theii 
 support. 
 
 These causes combined to introduce the money into general circulfttion, 
 and having once obtained credit, it will now be able to support itself. 
 
 The chief difficulty to have been apprehended in respect to the paper, 
 was to overcome the diffidence which the still recent experience of depre- 
 ciating paper had instilled into men's minds. This, it was to have been 
 feared, would have shaken its credit at its outset; and if it had once began 
 to sink, it would be no easy matter to prevent its total decline. 
 
 The event has however turned out otherwise, and the money has been 
 fortunate enough to conciliate the general confidence. This point gained, 
 there need be no apprehensions of its future fate, unless the government 
 should do something to destroy that confidence. 
 
 The causes that first gave it credit still operate, and will in all probability 
 continue so to do. The demand for money has not lessened, and the mer- 
 chant has still the same inducement to countenance the circulation of the 
 paper. 
 
 I shall not deny that the outlet which the payment of duties furnished to 
 the merchant, was an additional motive to the reception of the paper. Nor 
 is it proposed to take away this motive. There is now before the house a 
 bill, one object of which is, the establishment of a state impost, on certain 
 enumerated articles, in addition to that to be granted to the United States. 
 It is computed on very good grounds that the additional duties would 
 amount to about £30,000, and as they would be payable in paper cur- 
 rency, they would create a sufficient demand upon the merchant, to leave 
 him in this respect, substantially the same inducement which he had 
 before. Indeed, independent of this, the readiness of the trading people to 
 take the money can never be doubted, while it will freely command the 
 commodities of the country ; for this to them is the most important use 
 they can make of it. 
 
 But, besides the State Imposts, there must be other taxes ; and these will 
 
24 SPEECH ON THE IMPOST GRANT. 
 
 all contribute to create a demand for the money ; which is all we now mean, 
 when we talk of funds for its support ; for there are none appropriated for 
 the REDEMPTION of the paper. 
 
 Upon the whole the additional duties will be a competent substitute for 
 those now in existence ; and the general good will of the community 
 towards the paper, will be the best security for its credit. 
 
 Having now shown, Mr. Chairman, that there is no constitutional impedi- 
 ment to the adoption of the bill ; that there is no danger to be apprehended 
 to the public liberty from giving the power in question to the United States ; 
 that in the view of revenue the measure under consideration is not only 
 expedient, but necessary. Let us turn our attention to the other side of 
 this important subject. Let us ask ourselves what will be the consequence 
 of rejecting the bill ? What will be the situation of our national affairs 
 if they are left much longer to float in the chaos in which they are now 
 involved ? 
 
 Can our National Character be preserved without paying our debts? 
 Can the Union subsist without revenue ? Have we realized the consequences 
 which would attend its dissolution ? 
 
 If these States are not united under a Federal government, they will 
 infallibly have wars with each other ; and their divisions will subject them 
 to all the mischiefs of foreign influence and intrigue. The human passions 
 will never want objects of hostility. The Western territory is an obvious 
 and fruitful source of contest. Let us also cast our eye upon the map of 
 this State, intersected from one extremity to the other by a large navigable 
 river. In the event of a rupture with them, what is to hinder our Metrop- 
 olis from becoming a prey to our neighbors? Is it even supposable 
 that they would suffer it to remain the nursery of wealth to a- distinct 
 community ? 
 
 These subjects are delicate, but it is necessary to contemplate them, to 
 teach us to form a true estimate of our situation. 
 
 Wars with each other would beget standing armies — a source of more 
 real danger to our liberties than all the powers that could be conferred 
 upon the representatives of the Union. And wars with each other would 
 lead to opposite alliances with foreign powers, and plunge us into all the 
 labyrinths of European politics. 
 
 The Romans in their progress to universal dominion when they conceived 
 the project of subduing the refractory spirit of the Grecian Repuljlics, 
 which composed the famous Achaean league, began by sowing dissensions 
 among them, and instilling jealousies of each other, and of the common 
 head, and finished by making them a province of the Roman Empire. 
 
 The application is easy ; if there are any foreign enemies, if there are 
 any domestic foes to this country, all their arts and artifices will be em- 
 ployed to effect a dissolution of the Union. This cannot be better done 
 than by sowing jealousies of the Federal head and cultivating in each 
 state an undue attachment to its own power. 
 
RESOLUTIONS CALLING A CONVENTION. 25 
 
 RESOLUTION FOR AN ACT BY CONGRESS RECOMMENDING THE 
 HOLDING A CONVENTION. 
 
 February 17, 1787. 
 Resolved, If the Honorable the Senate concur, That the Delegates of this 
 State in the Congress of the United States in America be, and they are 
 hereby instructed to move in Congress for an Act recommending to the 
 States composing the Union, that a Convention of Representatives from the 
 said States respectively, be held and meet at a time and place to be men- 
 tioned in said recommendation, for the purpose of revising the Articles of 
 Confederation and Perpetual Union between the United States of America, 
 by such alterations and amendments as a majority of the Representatives 
 in suoh Convention shall judge proper and necessary to render them ade- 
 quate to the preservation and support of the Union. 
 
 RESOLUTION FOR THE APPOINTMENT BY NEW YORK OF 
 DELEGATES TO THE GENERAL CONVENTION. 
 
 February 26, 1787. 
 Resolved, (if the Honorable the Senate concur herein,) That five Dele- 
 gates be appointed on the part of this State to meet such Delegates as may 
 be appointed on the part of the other States respectively, on the Second 
 Monday of May next, at Philadelphia, for the sole and express purpose of 
 revising the Articles of Confederation, and reporting to Congress and to the 
 several Legislatures such alterations and provisions therein, as shall, when 
 agreed to in Congress and confirmed by the several States, render the Fed- 
 eral Constitution adequate to the exigencies of Government and the pre- 
 servation of the Union ; and that, in case of such concurrence, the two 
 Houses of the Legislature will meet on Thursday next, at such place as 
 the Honorable the Senate shall think proper, for the purpose of electing 
 the said delegates by joint ballot. 
 
26 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATIOW. 
 
 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION. 
 
 Articles of Confederation and perpetual Union between the States of 
 New Hampshire, Massachusetts Bay, Rhode Island and Providence Planta- 
 tions, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Mary- 
 land, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia. 
 
 Article I. The style of this Confederacy shall be " The United States of America." 
 
 Art. II. Each State retains its sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every 
 power, jurisdiction, and right, which is not by this Confederation expressly delegated 
 to the United States, in Congress assembled. 
 
 Art. III. The said States hereby severally enter into a firm league of friendship 
 with each other, for their common defence, the security of their liberties, and their 
 mutual and general welfare, binding themselves to assist each other, against all force 
 offered to, or attacks made upon them, or any of them, on account of religion, sov- 
 ereignty, trade, or any other pretence whatever. 
 
 Art. IV. The better to secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and intercourse 
 among the people of the different States in this Union, the free inhabitants of each 
 of these States, paupers, vagabonds, and fugitives from justice excepted, shall be 
 entitled to all the privileges and immunities of free citizens in the several States, and 
 the people of each State shall have free ingress and regiasi to and from any other 
 State, and shall enjoy therein all the privileges of trade and commence, subject to the 
 same duties, impositions, and restrictions as the inhabitants thereof respectively, pro- 
 vided that such restrictions shall not extend so far as to prevent the removal of prop- 
 erty imported into any State, to any other State of which the owner is an inhabitant ; 
 provided also, that no imposition, duties or restriction shall be laid by any State, on 
 the property of the United States, or either of them. 
 
 If any person guilty of or charged with trettson, felony, or other high misdemeanor 
 in any State, shall flee from justice, and be found in any of the United States, he 
 shall upon demand of the governor or executive power of the State from which 
 he fled, be delivered up and removed to the State having jurisdiction of his ofi"ence. 
 
 Full faith and credit shall be given in each of these States to the records, acts, and 
 judicial proceedings of the Courts and magistrates of every other State. 
 
 Art. V. For the more convenient management of the general interests of the United 
 States, delegates shall be annually appointed in such manner as the legislature of 
 each State shall direct, to meet in Congress on the first Monday in November, in every 
 year, with a power reserved to each State, to recall its delegates, or any of them, at 
 any time within the year, and to send others in their stead, for the remainder of the 
 year. 
 
 No State shall be represented in Congress by less than two, nor by more than seven 
 members ; and no person shall be capable of being a delegate for more than three 
 years in any term of six years, nor shall any person, being a delegate, be capable of 
 holding any oflSce under the United States, for which he or another for his benefit 
 receives any salary, fees, or emolument of any kind. 
 
 Each State shall maintain its own delegates in a meeting of the States, and while . 
 they act as members of the committee of the States. 
 
 In determining questions in the United States, in Congress assembled, each State 
 8hall have one vote. 
 
ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION. 27 
 
 Freedom of speech and debate in Congress shall not be impeached or questioned in 
 any Court or place out of Congress, and the members of Congress shall be protected 
 in their persons from arrests and imprisonments, during the time of their going to 
 and from, and attendance on Congress, except for treason, felony, or breach of thn 
 peace. 
 
 Art. VI. No State, without the consent of the United States in Congress assem- 
 bled, shall send any embassy to, or receive any embassy from, or enter into any con- 
 ference, agreement, alliance, or treaty with any king, prince, or State ; nor shall any 
 person holding any office of profit or trust under the United States, or any of them, 
 accept of any present, emolument, office, or title of anj- kind whatever from any king, 
 nrince, or foreign State ; nor shall the United States in Congress assembled, or any 
 of them, grant any title of nobility. 
 
 No two or more States shall enter into any treaty, confederation, or alliance what- 
 ever between them, without the consent of the United States in Congress assembled, 
 specifying accurately the purposes for which the same is to be entered into, and how 
 long it shall continue. 
 
 No State shall lay any imposts or duties, which may interfere with any stipulations 
 in treaties entered into by the United States in Congress assembled, with any king, 
 prince, or State, in pursuance of any treaties already proposed by Congress, to the 
 Courts of France and Spain. 
 
 No vessels of war shall be kept up in time of peace by any State, except such num- 
 ber only as shall be deemed necessary by the United States, in Congress assembled, 
 for the defence of such State or its trade ; nor shall any body of forces be kept up by 
 any State, in time of peace, except such number only as in the judgment of the United 
 States, in Congress assembled, shall be deemed requisite to garrison the forts neces- 
 sary for the defence of such State ; but every State shall always keep up a well regu- 
 lated and disciplined militia, sufficiently armed and accoutred, and shall provide and 
 constantly have ready for use, in public stores, a due number of field pieces and tents, 
 and a proper quantity of arms, ammunition, and camp equipage. 
 
 No State shall engage in any war without the consent of the United States in Con- 
 gress assembled, unless such State be actually invaded by enemies, or shall have 
 received certain advice of a resolution being formed by some nation of Indians to 
 invade such State, and the danger is so imminent as not to admit of a delay till the 
 United States in Congress assembled can be consulted ; nor shall any State grant 
 commissions to any ships or vessels of war, nor letters of marque or reprisal, except 
 it be after a declaration of war by the United States in Congress assembled, and then 
 only against the kingdom or State, and the subjects thereof, against which war has 
 been so declared, and under such regulations as shall be established by the United 
 States in Congress assembled, unless such State be infested by pirates, in which case 
 vessels of war may be fitted out for that occasion, and kept so long as the danger 
 shall continue, or until the United States in Congress assembled shall determine 
 )therwise. 
 
 Art. VII. When land forces are raided by any State for the common defence, all 
 officers of or under the rank of Colonel shall be appointed by the legislature of each 
 State respectively, by whom such forces shall be raised, or in such manner as such 
 State shall direct ; and all vacancies shall be filled up by the State which first made 
 the appointment. 
 
 Art. VIII. All charges of war and all other expenses that shall be incurred for the 
 common defence or general welfare, and allowed by the United States in Congress 
 assembled, shall be defrayed out of a common treasury, which shall be supplied by 
 the several States, in proportion to the value of all land within each State, granted to 
 )r surveyed for any person, buC «uoh land and the bnildings and improvements thereon 
 
 13 
 
28 ARTICLES OF CONFEDEP ATION. 
 
 ehall be estimated according to such mode as the United States in Congress assen. led 
 shall from time to time direct and appoint. 
 
 The taxes for paying that proportion shall be laid and levied by the authorit.' and 
 direction of the legislatures of the several States within the time agreed upon t / the 
 United States in Congress assembled. 
 
 Art. IX. The United States in Congress assembled shall have the sole and jxclu- 
 sive right and power of determining on peace and war, except in the cases mentioned in 
 the sixth article — of sending and receiving ambassadors — entering into treaties and 
 alliances, provided that no treaty of commerce shall be made whereby the legislative 
 power of the respective States shall be restrained from imposing such imposts and duties 
 on foreigners as their own people are subjected to, or from prohibiting the exportation or 
 importation of any species of goods or commodities whatsoever — of establishing rules 
 for deciding, in all cases, what captures on land or water shall be legal, and in what 
 manner prizes takeo by land or naval forces in the service of the United States shall 
 be divided or appropriated — of granting letters of marque and reprisal in times of 
 peace — appointing Courts for the trial of piracies and felonies committed on the high 
 seas, and establishing courts for receiving and determining finally appeals in all cases 
 of captures, provided that no member of Congress shall be appointed a judge of any 
 of the said Courts. 
 
 The United States in Congress assembled shall also be the last resort on appeal in 
 all disputes and diflferences now subsisting or that hereafter may arise between twc or 
 more States concerning boundary, jurisdiction, or any other cause whatever ; which 
 authority shall always be exercised in the manner following : — Whenever the legisla- 
 tive or executive authority or lawful agent of any State in controversy with another 
 shall present a petition to Congress stating the matter in question and praying for a 
 hearing, notice thereof shall be given by order of Congress to the legislative or execu- 
 tive authority of the other State in controversy, and a day assigned for the appear- 
 ance of the parties by their lawful agents, who shall then be directed to appoint, by 
 joint consent, commissioners or judges to constitute a court for hearing and determin- 
 ing the matter in question ; but if they cannot agree. Congress shall name three per- 
 sons out of each of the United States, and from the list of such persons each party 
 shall alternately strike out one, the petitioners beginning, until the number shall be 
 reduced to thirteen ; and from that number not less than seven nor more than nine 
 names, as Congress shall direct, shall, in the presence of Congress be drawn out by 
 lot, and the persons whose names shall be so drawn, or any five of them, shall be cor 
 missioners or judges, to hear and finally determine the controversy, so always 8 
 major part of the Judges who shall hear the cause shall agree in the determination ; 
 and if either party shall neglect to attend at the day appointed, without showing rea- 
 sons, which Congress shall judge suflBcient, or, being present, shall refuse to strike, the 
 Congress shall proceed to nominate three persons out of each State, and the secretary 
 of Congress shall strike in behalf of such party absent or refusing ; and the judg- 
 ment and sentence of the Court to be appointed, in the manner before prescribed, shall 
 be final and conclusive ; and if any of the parties shall refuse to submit to the autho- 
 rity of such court, or to appear or defend their claim or cause, the Court shall never- 
 theless proceed to pronounce sentence or judgment, which shall in like manner be final 
 and decisive, the judgment or sentence and other proceedings being in either case 
 transmitted to Congress, and lodged among the acts of Congress for the security of 
 the parties concerned : provided that every commissioner, before he sits in judgment, 
 shall take an oath, to be administered by one of the judges of the Supreme or Supe- 
 rior Court of the State where the cause shall be tried, "well and truly to hear and 
 
 ietermine the matter in question according to the best of his judgment, without favour, 
 affection, or hope of retoard :" provided also that no State sl^all be deprived of terri- 
 tory for the benefit of the United States. 
 
ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION. 29 
 
 All controversies concerning the private right of soil, claimed under dififerent granU 
 of two or more States, whose jurisdictions as they may respect such lands and the 
 States which passed such grants are adjusted, the said grants or either of them being 
 at the same time claimed to h<ave originated antecedent to such settlement of jurisdic- 
 tion, shall, on the petition of either party to the Congress of the United States, be 
 finally determined as near as may be in the same manner as is before prescribed for 
 deciding disputes respecting territorial jurisdiction between diflFerent States. 
 
 The United States in Congress assembled shall also have the sole and exclusive right 
 and power of regulating the alloy and value of coin struck by their own authority, or 
 by that of the respective States — fixing the standard of weights and measures through- 
 out the United States — regulating the trade and managing all affairs with the Indians, 
 not members of any of the States, provided that the legislative right of any State 
 within its own limits be not infringed or violated — establishing and regulating post- 
 offices from one State to another, throughout all the United States, and exacting such 
 postage on the papers passing through the same as may be requisite to defray the 
 expenses of the said office — appointing all officers of the land forces in the service of 
 the United States, excepting regimental officers — appointing all the officers of the 
 naval forces, and commissioning all officers whatever in the service of the United 
 States — making rules for the government and regulation of the said land and naval 
 forces, and directing their operations. 
 
 The United States in Congress assembled shall have authority to appoint a commit- 
 tee, to sit in the recess of Congress, to be denominated "A Committee of the States," 
 and to consist of one delegiite from each State ; and to appoint such other committees 
 and civil officers as may be necessary for managing the general affairs of the United 
 States under their direction — to appoint one of their number to preside, provided that 
 no person be allowed to serve in the office of president more than one year in any 
 term of three years ; to ascertain the necessary sums of money to be raised for the 
 service of the United States, and to appropriate and apply the same for defraying the 
 public expenses — to borrow money, or emit bills on the credit of the United States, 
 transmitting every half-year to the respective States an account of the snms of money 
 so borrowed or emitted — to build and equip a navy — to agree upon the number of land 
 forces, and to make requisitions from each State for its quota, in proportion to the 
 number of white inhabitants in such State ; which requisition shall be binding, and 
 thereupon the legislature of each State shall appoint the regimental officers, rajse the 
 men, and clothe, arm, and equip them in a soldier-like manner, at the expense of the 
 United States, and the officers and men so clothed, armed, and equipped shall march 
 to the place appointed, and within the time agreed on by the United States in Con 
 gress assembled ; but if the United States in Congress assembled shall, on considera 
 tion of circumstances, judge proper that any State should not raise men, or should 
 raise a smaller number than its quota, and that any other State should raise a greater 
 number of men than the quota thereof, such extra number shall be raised, officered, 
 clothed, armed, and equipped in the same manner as the quota of such State, unless 
 the legislature of such State shall judge that such extra number cannot be safely 
 spared out of the same, in which case they shall raise, officer, clothe, arm, and equip 
 as many of such extra number as they judge can be safely spared. And the officers 
 and men so clothed, armed, and equipped shall march to the place appointed, and 
 within the time agreed on by the United States in Congress assembled. 
 
 The United States in Congress assembled shall never engage in a war, nor grant 
 letters of marque and reprisal in time of peace, nor enter into any treaties or alliances, 
 nor coin money, nor regulate the value thereof, nor ascertain the sums and expenses 
 necessary for the defence and welfare of the United States, or any of them, nor emit 
 bills, nor borrow money on the credit of the United States, nor appropriate money, 
 nor agree upop ine number of vessels of war to be built or purchased, or the auiab«r 
 
30 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION. 
 
 *f land or sea forces to be raised, nor appoint a commander in chief of the army or 
 navy, unless nine States assent to the same ; nor shall a question on any other point, 
 except for adjourning from day to day, be deteririued, unless by the votes of a majority 
 of the United States in Congress assembled. 
 
 The Congress of the United States shall have power to adjourn to any time within 
 the year, and to any place within the United States, so that no period of adjournment 
 be for a longer duration than the space of six months, and shall publish the journal 
 of their proceedings monthly, except such parts thereof relating to treaties, alliances, 
 or military operations, as in their judgment require secresy, and the yeas and nays of 
 the delegates of each State on any question shall be entered on the journal, when it 
 is desired by any delegate ; and the delegates of a State, or any of them, at his or 
 their request, shall be furnished with a transcript of the said journal, except such 
 parts as are above excepted, to lay before the legislatures of the several States. 
 
 Art. X. The Committee of the States, or any niae of them, shall be authorized to 
 execute, in the recess of Congress, such of the powers of Congress as the United 
 States in Congress assembled, by the consent of nine States, shall from time to time 
 think expedient to vest them with : provided that no power be delegated to the said 
 Committee, for the exercise of which, by the Articles of Confederation, the voice of 
 nine States in the Congress of the United States assembled is requisite. 
 
 Art. XL Canada, acceding to this Confederation, and joining in the measures ol 
 the United States, shall be admitted into and entitled to all the advantages of this 
 Union ,■ but no other colony shall be admitted into the same, unless such admission be 
 agreed to by nine States. 
 
 Art. XII. All bills of credit emitted, moneys borrowed, and debts contracted by or 
 under the authority of Congress, before the assembling of the United States in pursu- 
 ance of the present Confederation, shall be deemed and considered as a charge against 
 the United States, for payment and satisfaction whereof the said United States and 
 the public faith are hereby solemnly pledgftd. 
 
 Art. XIII. Every State shall abide by the determinations of the United States in 
 Congress assembled, on all questions which by this Confederation are submitted to 
 them. And the Articles of this Confederation shall be inviolably observed by every 
 State, and the Union shall be perpetual ; nor shall any alteration at any time here- 
 after be made in any of them; unless such alteration be agreed to in a Congress of 
 the United States, and be afterwards confirmed by the legislatures of every State. 
 
 And whereas it hath pleased the Great Governor of the world to incline the hearts 
 of the legislatures we respectively represent in Congress to approve of and to author- 
 ize us to ratify the said articles of Confederation and perpetual Union, Know ye, 
 That we the undersigned delegates, by virtue of the power and authority to us given 
 for that purpose, do by these presents, in the name and in behalf of our respectivo 
 constituents, fully and entirely ratify and confirm each and every of the said Articles 
 of Confederation and perpetual Union, and all and singular the matters and things 
 therein contained : and we do further solemnly plight and engage the faith of our 
 respective constituents that they shall abide by the determinations of the United 
 States in Congress assembled, on all questions which by the said Confederation are 
 submitted to them. And that the Articles thereof shall be inviolably observed by tha 
 States we respeotively represent, and that the Union shall be perpetual. 
 
Hamilton's first plan of government. iil 
 
 HAMILTON'S FIRST PLAN OF GOVERNMENT. 
 
 The People of the United States of America do ordain and estor 
 blish this Constitution for the Government of themselves and 
 their Posterity. 
 
 ARTICLE I. 
 
 Section 1. The Legislative power shall be vested in two distinct bodies of men, 
 one to be called the Assembly, the other the Senate, subject to the negative herein- 
 after mentioned. 
 
 Sec. 2. The Executive power, with the qualifications hereinafter specified, shall be 
 vested in a President of the United States. 
 
 Sec. 3. The supreme Judicial authority, except in the cases otherwise provided for 
 in this Constitution, shall be vested in a court to be called the Supreme Court, to 
 consist of not less than six, nor more than twelve judges. 
 
 ARTICLE II. 
 
 Sec. 1. The Assembly shall consist of persona to be called Representatives, who 
 shall be chosen, except in the first instance, by the free male citizens and inhabitants 
 of the several States comprehended in the Union, all of whom of the age of twenty- 
 one years and upwards shall be entitled to an equal vote. 
 
 Sec. 2. But the first Assembly shall be chosen in the manner prescribed in the last 
 Article, and shall consist of one hundred members, of whom New Hampshire shall 
 have five, Massachusetts thirteen, Rhode Island two, Connecticut seven. New York 
 nine, New Jersey six, Pennsylvania twelve, Delaware two, Maryland eight, Virginia 
 sixteen, North Carolina eight, South Carolina eight, Georgia four. 
 
 Sec. 3. The Legislature shall provide for the future elections of Representatives, 
 apportioning them in each State, from time to time, as nearly as may be to the 
 number of persons described in the 4th Section of the Vllth Article, so as that the 
 whole number of Representatives shall never be less than one hundred, nor more 
 than hundred. There shall be a census taken for this purpose within three 
 
 years, after the first meeting of the Legislature, and within every successive period 
 of ten years. The term for which Representatives shall be elected shall be determined 
 by the Legislature ; but shall not exceed three years. There shall be a general 
 election at least once in three years ; and the time of service of all the members in 
 each Assembly shall begin (except in filling vacancies) on the same day, and shall 
 always end on the same day. 
 
 Sec. 4. Forty members shall make a bouse sufQcient to proceed to business. But 
 this number may be increased by the Legislature, yet so as never to exceed a majority 
 of ',ho whole number of Representatives. 
 
 Sec. 5. The Assembly shall choose its President and other officers : shall judge of 
 the qualifications and elections of its own members ; punish them for improper con- 
 duct in their capacity of Representatives not extending to life or limb, and shall 
 exclusively possess the power of impeachment, except in the case of the President of 
 
32 Hamilton's first plan of government. 
 
 the United States ; but no impeachment of a member of the Senate shall be by less 
 than two-thirds of the Representatives present. 
 
 Sec. 6. Representatives may vote by proxy, but no Representative present shall be 
 proxy for more than one who is absent. 
 
 Sec. 7. Bills for raising revenue and bills for appropriating monies for the support 
 of fleets and armies and for paying the salaries of the oflScers of government shall 
 originate in the Assembly, but may be altered and amended by the Senate. 
 
 Sec. 8. The acceptance of an office under the United States by a Representative 
 ■hall vacate his seat in the Assembly. 
 
 ARTICLE II L 
 
 Sec. 1. The Senate shall consist of persons to be chosen, except in the first instance, 
 by Electors elected for that purpose by the citizens and inhabitants of the several 
 States, comprehended in the Union, who shall have in their own right, or in the right 
 of their wives, an estate in land for not less than life, or a term of years, whereof, at 
 the time of giving their votes, there shall be at least fourteen years unexpired. 
 
 Sec. 2. But the first Senate shall be chosen in the manner prescribed in the last 
 Article, and shall consist of forty members to be called Senators, of whom New Hamp- 
 shire shall have ; Massachusetts ; Rhode Island ; Connecticut 
 ; New York ; New Jersey ; Pennsylvania ; Delaware ; 
 Maryland ; Virginia ; North Carolina ; South Carolina ; 
 Georgia 
 
 Sec. .3. The Legislature shall provide for the future elections of Senators ; for which 
 purpose the States respectively, which have more than one Senator, shall be divided 
 into convenient districts to which the Senators shall be apportioned : a State having 
 but one Senator shall be itself a district. On the death, resignation, or removal from 
 office of a Senator, his place shall be supplied by a new election in the District from 
 which he came. Upon each election there shall be not less than six, nor more than 
 twelve electors chosen in a District. 
 
 Sec. 4. The number of Senators shall never be less than forty, nor shall any State, 
 if the same shall not hereafter be divided, ever have less than the number allotted to 
 it in the second Section of this Article. But the Legislature may increase the whole 
 number of Senators, in the same proportion to the whole number of Representatives, 
 as forty is to one hundred, and such increase beyond the present number shall be 
 apportioned to the respective States, in a ratio to the respective numbers of their 
 Representatives. 
 
 Sec. 5. If States shall be divided, or if a new arrangement of the boundaries of 
 two or more States shall take place, the Legislature shall apportion the number of 
 Senators (in elections succeeding such division or arrangement) to which the con- 
 stituent parts were entitled, according to the change of situation, having regard to 
 the number of persons described in the 4th Section of the Vllth Article. 
 
 Sec. 6. The Senators shall hold their places during good behaviour, removeable 
 only by conviction on impeachment for some crime or misdemeanour. They shall 
 continue to exercise their offices, when impeached, until a conviction shall take place. 
 Sixteen Senators attending in person shall be sufficient to make a house to transact 
 business. But the Legislature may increase this number, yet so as never to exceed a 
 majority of the whole number of Senators. The Senators may vote by proxy, but nt 
 Senator who is present shall be proxy for more than two who are absent. 
 
 Sec. 7. The Senate shall choose its President and other officers, shall ji'dge of ti« 
 qualifications and elections of its members, and shall punish them for improper con- 
 duct in their capacity of Senators; but such punishment shall not extend to lile or 
 limb, nor to expulsion. In the absence of their President, they may jhoose a tempo- 
 
Hamilton's first plan of government. 88 
 
 rary President. The President shall only have a casting vote wnen the House u 
 equally divided. 
 
 Sec. 8. The Senate shall exclusively possess the power of declaring war. No treaty 
 shall be made without their advice and consent, which shall also be necessary to the 
 appointment of all officers, except such for which a different provision is made in this 
 Constitution. 
 
 ARTICLE IV. 
 
 Sec. 1. The President of the United States of America (except in the first instance) 
 shall be elected in the manner following. 
 
 The Judges of the Supreme Court shall, within sixty days after a vacancy shall 
 happen, cause public notice to be given in each State of such vacancy, appointing 
 therein three several days for the several purposes following, to wit — 
 
 A day for commencing the election of Electors for the purposes hereinafter specified 
 — to be called the first Electors, which day shall not be less than forty, nor more than 
 sixty days after the day of the publication of the notice in each State ; another day 
 for the meeting of the Electors not less than forty, nor more than ninety days, from 
 the day for commencing their election ; another day for the meeting of Electors, to be 
 chosen by the first Electors, for the purpose hereinafter specified, and to be called the 
 second Electors, which day shall not be less than forty, nor more than sixty days, 
 after the day for the meeting of the first Electors. 
 
 Sec. 2. After notice of a vacancy shall have been given, there shall be chosen in 
 each State a number of persons, as the first Electors in the preceding Section men- 
 tioned, equal to the whole number of the Repres^ntativep and Senators of such State 
 in the Legislature of the United States ; which Electors shall be chosen by the citizens 
 of such State, having an estate of inheritance, or for three lives in land, or a clear 
 personal estate of the value of one thousand Spanish milled dollars of the present 
 standard. 
 
 Sec. 3. These first Electors shall meet in their respective States at the time 
 appointed, at one place, and shall proceed to vote by ballot for a President, who shall 
 not be one of their own number, unless the Legislature upon experiment should here- 
 after direct otherwise. 
 
 They shall cause two lists to be made of the name or names of the person or persons 
 voted for, which they or the major part of them shall sign and certify. They shall 
 then proceed each to nominate openly in the presence of the others two persons as for 
 second Electors, and out of the persons who shall have the four highest numbers of 
 nominations ; they shall afterwards by ballot by plurality of votes choose two, who 
 shall be the second Electors, to each of whom shall be delivered one of the lists before 
 mentioned. These second Electors shall not be any of the persons voted for as 
 President. 
 
 A copy of the same list, signed and certified in like manner, shall be transmitted 
 by the first Electors to the seat of the government of the United States, under a 
 sealed cover directed to the President of the Assembly, which, after the meeting of 
 the second Electors, shall be opened for the inspection of the two houses of the Legis- 
 lature. 
 
 Sec. 4. These second Electors shall meet precisely on the day appointed (and not 
 on another day) at one place. The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, or if there 
 be no Chief Justice, the Judge Senior in office in such court, or if there be no one 
 Judge Senior in office, some other Judge of that court, by the choice of the rest of the 
 Judges, or of a majority of them, shall attend at the same place, and shall preside at 
 the meeting, but shall have no vote. Two-thirds of the whole number of the Electors 
 shall constitute a sufficient meeting for the execution of their trust. At this meeting 
 the lists delivered to the respective Electors shall be produced and inspected, and if 
 
34 HAMILTON'S FIRST PLAN OF GOVERNMENT. 
 
 there be any person who has a majority of the whole number of the votes given by 
 the first Electors, he shall be the President of the United States. But if there be no 
 Buoh person, the second Electors so met shall proceed to vote by ballot for one of the 
 persons named in the lists, who shall have the three highest numbers of the votes of 
 the first Electors, and if upon the first or any succeeding ballot, on the day of the 
 meeting, either of those persons shall have a number of votes equal to a majority of 
 the whole number of second Electors chosen, he shall be the President. But if no 
 Buch choice be made on the day appointed for the meeting, either by reason of the 
 non-attendance of the second Electors, or their not agreeing or any other matter, 
 the person having the greatest number of votes of the first Electors shall be the 
 President. 
 
 Sec. 5. If it should happen that the Chief Justice or some other Judge of the 
 Supreme Court should not attend in due time, the second Electors shall proceed to the 
 execution of their trust without him. 
 
 Sec. 6. If the Judges should neglect to cause the notice required by the first 
 Section of this Article to be given within the time therein limited, they may never- 
 theless cause it to be afterwards given ; but their neglect, if wilful, is hereby declared 
 to be an offence for which they may be impeached, and if convicted, they shall be 
 punished as in other cases of conviction on impeachment. 
 
 Sec. 7. The Legislature shall by permanent laws provide such further regulations 
 as may be necessary for the more orderly election of the President, not contravening 
 the provisions herein contained. 
 
 Sec. 8. The President, before he shall enter upon the execution of his oflBce, shall 
 take an oath or affirmation faithfully to execute the same, and to the utmost of his 
 judgment and power to protect the rights of the people, and preserve the Constitution 
 inviolate. This oath or affirmation shall be administered by the President of the 
 Senate for the time 'being, in the presence of both houses of the Legislature. 
 
 Sec. 9. The Senate and the Assembly shall always convene in session on the day 
 appointed for the meeting of the second Electors, and shall continue sitting till the 
 President take the oath or affirmation of office. He shall hold his office during good 
 behaviour, removeable only by conviction upon an impeachment for some crime or 
 misdemeanour. 
 
 Sec. 10. The President at the beginning of every meeting of the Legislature, as 
 Boon as they shall be ready to proceed to business, shall convene them together at the 
 place where the Senate shall sit, and shall communicate to them all such matters as 
 may be necessary for their information, or as may require their consideration. He 
 may by message during the session communicate all other matters which may appear 
 to him proper. He may, whenever in his opinion the public business shall require it, 
 convene the Senate and Assembly, or either of them, and may prorogue them for a 
 time not exceeding forty days at one prorogation, and if they should disagree about 
 their adjournment, he may adjourn them to such time as he shall think proper. He 
 shall have a right to negative all bills, resolutions or acts of the two houses of the 
 Legislature about to be passed into laws. He shall take care that the laws be faith- 
 fully executed. He shall be the Commander in Chief of the army and navy of the 
 United States, and of the militia within the several States, and shall have the 
 direction of war when commenced ; but he shall not take the actual command in the 
 field of an army, without the consent of the Senate and Assembly. 
 
 All treaties, conventions, and agreements with foreign nations shall be made by 
 him, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. He shall have the appoint- 
 ment of the principal or chief officer of each of the departments of war, naval affairs, 
 finance and foreign affairs, and shall have the nomination, and by and with the con- 
 Bent of the Senate the appointment of all other officers to be appointed under the 
 authority of the United States, except such for whom different provision is maae oy 
 
HAMILTON'S FIRST PLAN OF GOVERNMENT. 35 
 
 this Constitution, and provided that this shall not be construed to prevent the Legis- 
 lature from appointing by name in their laws persons to special and particular trusts 
 created in such laws, nor shall be construed to prevent principals in oflBees merely 
 ministerial from constituting deputies. In the recess of the Senate he may fill 
 vacancies in offices by appointments, to continue in force until the end of the nest 
 iiession of the Senate, and he shall commission all officers. He shall have power to 
 pardon all offenct s , except treason, for which he may grant reprieves until the opinion 
 of the Senate an 1 Assembly can be had, and with their concurrpnce may pardon the 
 same. 
 
 Sec. 11. He stall receive a fixed compensation for his services, to be paid to him 
 at stated times, ind not to be increased nor diminished during his continuance in 
 office. 
 
 Sec. 12. If he depart out of the United States without the consent of the Senate 
 and Assembly, h* shall thereby abdicate his office. 
 
 Sec. 13. He m ir be impeached for any crime or misdemeanour by the two houses 
 of the Legislatui , two-thirds of each house concurring, and if convicted shall be 
 removed from of5 ?. He may be afterwards tried and punished in the ordinary course 
 of law. His imj ichment shall operate as a suspension from office until the deter- 
 mination thereof. 
 
 Sec. 14. The Pi jsident of the Senate shall be Vice President of the United States. 
 On the death, resignation, impeachment, removal from office, or absence from the 
 United States of the President thereof, the Vice President shall exercise all the 
 powers by this Constitution vested in the President until another shall be appointed, 
 or until he shall return within the United States, if his absence was with the consent 
 of the Senate and Assembly. 
 
 ARTICLE V. 
 
 Sec. 1. There si all be a Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, who, together with 
 the other Judges tl ?reof, shall hold their offices during good behaviour, removeable 
 only by conviction an impeachment for some crime or misdemeanour. Each Judge 
 shall have a com etent salary, to be paid to him at stated times, and not to be 
 diminished during ais continuance in office. 
 
 The Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction in all causes in which the 
 United States shall be a party ; in all controversies between the United States and a 
 particular State, or between two or more States, except such as relate to a claim of 
 territory, between the United States and one or more States, which shall be determined 
 in the mode prescribed in the VI. Article ; in all cases affecting foreign ministers, 
 consuls, and agents, and an appellate jurisdiction both as to law and fact, in all cases 
 which shall concern the citizens of foreign nations, in all questions between the 
 citizens of different States, and in all others in which the fundamental rights of this 
 Constitution are involved, subject to such exceptions as are herein contained, and to 
 snch regulations as the Legislature shall provide. 
 
 The Judges of all courts which may be constituted by the Legislature shall also 
 hold their places during good behaviour, removeable only by conviction on impeach- 
 ment for some crime or misdemeanour; and shall have competent salaries, to be paid 
 at stated times, and not to be diminished during their continuance in office. But 
 nothing herein contained shall be construed to prevent the Legislature from abolish- 
 ing such courts themselves. 
 
 All crimes, except upon impeachment, shall be tried by a jury of twelve men. and 
 ii they shall have been committed within any State shall be tried within such State, 
 and all civil causes arising under this Constitution of the like kind with those which 
 have beo? heretofore triable by;nry in the respective States, shall in like manner be 
 tried hy jury, unless in spe 'M cases the Legislature shall think proper to mabfr 
 
36 Hamilton's first plan of government. 
 
 diflferent provision, to which provision the concurrence of two-thirds of both houses 
 shall be necessary. 
 
 Sec. 2. Impeachments of the President and Vice President of the United States, 
 members of the Senate, the Governors and Presidents of the several States, the 
 principal or chief officers of the departments enumerated in the tenth Section of the 
 fourth Article, ambassadors and other like public ministers, the Judges of the Supreme 
 Court, generals, and admirals of the navy, shall be tried by a court to consist of the 
 Judges of the Supreme Court and the Chief Justice or first or senior Judge of the 
 Superior Court of law in each State, of whom twelve shall constitute a court. A 
 majority of the Judges present may convict. All other persons shall be tried on 
 impeachment by a court to consist of the Judges of the Supreme Court and six 
 Senators drawn by lot; a majority of whom may convict. 
 
 Impeachments shall clearly specify the particular ofience for which the party accused 
 is to be tried, and judgment on conviction upon the trial thereof shall be either of 
 removal from office singly, or removal from office and disqualification for holding any 
 future office or place of trust ; but no judgment on impeachment shall prevent prose- 
 cution and punishment in the ordinary course of law, provided that no Judge con- 
 cerned in such conviction shall sit as Judge on the second trial. The Legislature 
 mav remove the disabilities incurred by conviction on impeachment. 
 
 ARTICLE VI. 
 
 Contro'^ersies about the right of territory between the United States and particular 
 States shall be determined by a court to be constituted in manner following. 
 
 The State or States claiming in opposition to the United States as parties shall 
 nominate a number of persons equal to double the number of the Judges of the 
 Supreme Court for the time being, of whom none shall be citizens by birth of the 
 States which are parties, nor inhabitants thereof when nominated, and of whom not 
 more than two shall have their actual residence in one State. Out of the persons so 
 nominated the Senate shall elect one-half, who, together with the Judges of the 
 Supreme Court, shall form the court. 
 
 Two-thirds of the whole number may hear and determine the controversy by 
 plurality of voices. The States concerned may at their option claim a decision by 
 the Supreme Court only. All the members of the court hereby instituted shall, prioi 
 to the hearing of the cause, take an oath impartiallj', and according to the best of 
 their judgments and consciences, to hear and determine the controversy. 
 
 ARTICLE VII. 
 
 Sec. 1. The Legislature of the United States shall have power to pass all laws 
 which they shall judge necessary to the common defence and safety, and to the 
 general welfare of the Union. But no bill, resolution, or act of the Senate and 
 Assembly shall have the force of a law until it shall have received the assent of the 
 President, or of the Vice President when exercising the powers of the President, anr. 
 if such assent shall not have been given within ten days after such bill, resolution, or 
 other act shall have been presented for that purpose, the same shall not be a law. No 
 bill, resolution, or other act not assented to shall be revived in- the same session of 
 the Legislature. The mode of signifying such assent shall bo by signing the bill, act, 
 or resolution, and returning it so signed to either house of the Legislature. 
 
 Sec. 2. The enacting style of all laws shall be: "Be it enacted by the people of 
 the United States of America." 
 
 Sec. 3. No bill of attainder shall be passed, nor any ex post facto law; nor shall 
 any title of nobility be granted by the United States or by either of them ; no- shall 
 any person holding an office or place of trust under the United States, without the 
 
Hamilton's first plan of uovernment. 37 
 
 permission of the Legislature accept any present, emolument, office, or title froui a 
 foreign prince or state ; nor shall any religious sect or denomination, or religious test 
 for any office or place be ever established by law. 
 
 Sec. 4. Taxes on lands, houses, and other real estate, and capitation taxes, shall 
 be proportioned in each State by the whole number of free persons, except Indiana 
 not taxed and by three-fifths of all other persons. 
 
 Sec. 5. The two houses of the Legislature may by joint ballot appoint a Treasurer 
 of the United States. Neither house (in the session of both houses) without the con- 
 sent of the other shall adjourn for more than three days at a time. The Senators and 
 Representatives in attending, going to and coming from the session of their respective 
 houses shaH'be privileged from arrests, except for crimes and breaches of the peace. 
 The place of meeting shall always be at the seat of Government, which shall be fixed 
 by law. 
 
 Sec. 6. The laws of the United States and the treaties which have been made under 
 the Articles of the Confederation, and which shall be made under this Constitution, 
 «hall be the supreme law of the land, and shall be so construed by the courts of the 
 several States. 
 
 Sec. 7. The Legislature shall convene at least once in each year, which, unless 
 •otherwise provided for by law, shall be the first Monday in December. 
 
 Sec. 8. The members of the two houses of the Legislature shall receive a reasonable 
 compensation for their services, to be paid out of the treasury of the United States 
 and ascertained by law. The law for making sach provision shall be passed with the 
 concurrence of the first Assembly, and Ehall extend to succeeding Assemblies, and no 
 succeeding Assembly shall concur in an alteration of such provision, so as to increase 
 its own compensation j but there shall be always a law in existence for making such 
 provision. 
 
 ARTICLE VIII. 
 
 Sec. 1. The Governor or President of eaoh St&te shall be appointed under the 
 authority of the United States, and shall have a right to negative all laws about to be 
 passed in the State of which he shall be Governor or President, subject to such quali- 
 fications and regulations as the Legislature of the United States shall prescribe. He 
 shall in other respects have the same powers only which the Constitution of the State 
 does or shall allow to its Governor or President, except as to the appointment of 
 officers of the militia. 
 
 Sec. 2. Each Governor or President of a State shall hold his office until a successor 
 be actually appointed, unless he die or resign, or be removed from office by conviction 
 on impeachment. There shall be no appointment of such Governor or President in 
 the recess of the Senate. 
 
 The Governors and Presidents of the several States, at the time of the ratification 
 of this Constitution, shall continue in office in the same manner and with the same 
 powers as if they had been appointed pursuant to the first Section of this Article. 
 
 The officers of militia in the several States may be appointed under the authority 
 of the United States ; the Legislature whereof may authorize the Governors or 
 Presidents of States to make such appointments, with such restrictions as they shall 
 think proper. 
 
 ARTICLE IX. 
 
 Sec. 1. No person shall be eligible to the office of President of the United States 
 unless he be now a citizen of one of the States, or hereafter be born a citizen of the 
 United States. 
 
 Sec. 2. No person shall be eligible as a Senator or Representative unless at the 
 time of his election he be a citizen and inhabitant of the State in which he is chosen. 
 
Ii8 HAMILTON'S FIRST PLAN OF GOVERNMENT. 
 
 proj'ided that he shall not be deemed to be disqualified by a temporary absence from 
 the State. 
 
 Sec. 3. No person entitled by this Constitution to elect or be elected President of 
 the United States, or a Senator or Representative in the Legislature thereof, shall be 
 disqualified but by the conviction of some ofience for which the law shall have pre- 
 viously ordained the punishment of disqualification. But the Legislature may by law 
 provide that persons holding ofiices under the United States or either of them shall 
 not be eligible to a place in the Assembly or Senate, and shall be during their con- 
 tinuance in ofiice suspended from sitting in the Senate. 
 
 Sec. 4. No person having an oflBce or place of trust under the United States shall 
 without permission of the Legislature accept any present, emolument, (JflRce, or title 
 from any foreign prince or state. 
 
 Sec. 5. The citizens of each State shall be entitled to the rights, privileges, and 
 immunities of citizens in every other State, and full faith and credit shall be given in 
 each State to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of another. 
 
 Sec. 6. Fugitives from justice from one State who shall be found in another shall 
 be delivered up on the application of the State from which they fled. 
 
 Sec. 7. No new State shall be erected within the limits of another, or by the 
 junction of two or more States, without the concurrent consent of the Legislature of 
 the United States and of the States concerned. The Legislature of the United States 
 may admit new States into the Union. 
 
 Sec. 8. The United States are hereby declared to be bound to guarantee to each 
 State a republican form of Government, and to protect each State as well against 
 domestic violence as foreign invasion. 
 
 Sec. 9. All treaties, contracts, and engagements of the United States of America, 
 under the Articles of Confederation and perpetual Union, shall have equal validity 
 under this Constitution. 
 
 Sec. 10. No State shall enter into a treaty, alliance, or contract with another or 
 with a foreign power without the consent of the United States. 
 
 Sec. 11. The members of the Legislature of the United States and of each State. 
 and all officers executive and judicial of the one and of the other, shall take an oath 
 or affirmation to support the Constitution of the United States. 
 
 Sec. 12. This Constitution may receive such alteration and amendments as may be 
 proposed by the Legislature of the United States, with the concurrence of two-third» 
 of the members of both houses, and ratified by the Legislatures of or by conventions- 
 of deputies chosen by the people in two-thirds of the States composing the Union. 
 
 ARTICLE X. 
 
 This Constitution shall be submitted to the consideration of conventions in ttie- 
 several States, the members whereof shall be chosen by the people of such States 
 respectively under the direction of their respective Legislatures. Each convention 
 which shall ratify the same shall appoint the first Representatives and Senators froiiy 
 such State, acording to the rule prescribed in the Section of the Article. 
 
 The Representatives so appointed shall continue in office for one year only. Each 
 convention so ratifying shall give notice thereof to the Congress- of the United States, 
 transmitting at the same time a list of the Representatives and Senators chosen. 
 When the Constitution shall have been duly ratified. Congress shall give notice of a 
 day and place for the meeting of the Senators and Representatives from the several 
 States, and when these or a majority of them shall have assembled according to such 
 notice, they shall by joint ballot by plurality of votes elect a President of the Unitfid 
 States, and the Constitntion, thus organized, shall be carried into effect. 
 
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. '6\* 
 
 THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, 
 
 AS AGREED UPON 
 
 BY THE CONVENTION, 
 
 SEPTEMBER 17, 1787. 
 
 ?t2^*^ the ^COpU of the United States, in order to form a mort, 
 perfect Union, establiah Justice, insure domestic Tranquillity, pro- 
 vide for the common Defence, promote the general Welfare, and 
 secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do 
 ordain and establish this CONSTITUTION for the United 
 States of America. 
 
 ARTICLE L 
 
 Section 1. All legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a congress oi 
 the United States, which shall consist of a senate and house of representatives. 
 
 Sect. 2. The house of representatives shall be composed of members chosen every 
 second year by the people of the several states, and the electors in each state shall 
 have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the 
 state legislature. 
 
 No person shall be a representative who shall not have attained to the age of twenty- 
 five years, and been seven years a citizen of the United States, and who shall not, 
 when elected, be an inhabitant of that state in which he shall be chosen. 
 
 Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several states 
 which may be included within this union, according to their respective numbers, which 
 shall be determined by adding to the whole number of free persons, including those 
 bound to service for a term of years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three-fifths of 
 all other persons. The actual enumeration shall be made within three years after the 
 first meeting of the congress of the United States, and within every subsequent term 
 of ten years, in such manner as they shall by law direct. The number of represen- 
 tatives shall not exceed one for every thirty thousand, but each state shall have at 
 least one representative ; and until such enumeration shall be made, the state of New- 
 Hampshire shall be entitled to choose three, Massachusetts eight, Rhode-Island and 
 Providence Plantations one, Connecticut five, New-York six, New-Jersey four, Penn- 
 sylvania eight, Delaware one, Maryland six, Virginia ten, North-Carolina five, South- 
 Carolina five, and Georgia three. 
 
 When vacancies happen in the representation from any state, the exeoative autho- 
 rity thereof shall issue writs of election to fill such vacancies. 
 
 The house of representatives shall choose their speaker and other oflSoers ; and shall 
 bave the sole power of impeachment. 
 
 Sect. 3. The senate of the United States shall be composed of two senators from 
 each state, chosen by the legislature thereof, for six years ; and each senator shall 
 \iave one vote. 
 
10 THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 
 
 Immediately after they shall be assembled in consequence of the first election, they 
 ehall be divided as equally as may be into three classes. The seats of the senators of 
 the first class shall be vacated at the expiration of the second year, the second class at 
 the expiration of the fourth year, and the third class at the expiration of the sixth 
 year, so that one third maj' be chosen every second year: and if vacancies happen by 
 resignation or otherwise, during the recess of the legislature of any state, the execu- 
 tive thereof may make temporary appointments until the next meeting of the legisla- 
 ture, which shall then fill such vacancies. 
 
 No person shall be a Senator who shall not have attained to the age of thirty years, 
 and been nine years a citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, 
 be an inhabitant of that state for which he shall be chosen. 
 
 The vice-president of the United States shall be president of the senate, but shall 
 have no vote, unless they be equally divided. 
 
 The senate shall choose their other officers, and also a president pro tempore, in the 
 absence of the vice-president, or when he shall exercise the office of president of the 
 United States. 
 
 The senate shall have the sole power to try all impeachments. When sitting for 
 that purpose they shall be on oath or affirmation. When the president of the United 
 States is tried, the chief justice shall preside. And no person shall be convicted with- 
 out the concurrence of two-thirds of the members present. 
 
 Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from 
 office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any office of honour, trust, or profit, 
 under the United States ; but the party convicted shall, nevertheless, be liable and 
 subject to indictment, trial, judgment, and punishment, according to law. 
 
 Sect. 4. The times, places, and manner of holding elections for senators and repre- 
 sentatives, shall be prescribed in each state by the legislature thereof: but the con- 
 gress may at any time by law make or alter such regulations, except as to the places 
 of choosing senators. 
 
 The congress shall assemble at least once in every year, and such meeting shall be 
 on the first Monday in December, unless they shall by law appoint a different day. 
 
 Sect. 5. Each house shall be the judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications 
 of its own members; and a majority of each shall constitute a quorum to do business: 
 but a smaller number may adjourn from day to day, and may be authorized to compel 
 the attendance of absent members, in such manner, and under such penalties, as each 
 house may provide. 
 
 Each house may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its members for dis- 
 orderly behaviour, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds, expel a member. 
 
 Each house shall keep a journal of its proceedings, and from time to time publish 
 the same, excepting such parts as may in their judgment require secresy; and tho 
 yeas and nays of the members of either house on any question shall, at the desire of 
 one-fifth of those present, be entered on the journal. 
 
 Neither house, during the session of congress, shall, without the consent of the 
 other, adjourn for more than three days, nor to any other place than that in which the 
 two houses shall be sitting. 
 
 Sect. 6. The senators and representatives shall receive a compensation for their 
 services, to be ascertained by law, and paid out of the treasury of the United States. 
 They shall in all cases, except treason, felony, and breach of the peace, be privileged 
 from arrest during their attendance at the session of their respective houses, and in 
 going to and returning from the same, and for any speech or debate in either house, 
 they shall not be questioned in any other place. 
 
 No senator or representative shall, during the time for which he was elected, be 
 appointed to any civU office under the authority of the United States, which shall 
 have been created, or the emoluments whereof shall have been increased during such 
 
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 41 
 
 time ; and no person, holding any office under the United States, shall be a member 
 of either house during his continuance in office. 
 
 Sect. 7. All bills for raising revenue shall originate in the house of representatives ; 
 but the senate may propose or concur with amendments as on other bills. 
 
 Every bill which shall have passed the house of representatives and the senate shall, 
 before it become a law, be presented to the president of the United States; if ho 
 approve, he shall sign it; but if not, he shall return it, with his objections, to thai 
 house in which it shall have originated, who shall enter the objections at large on 
 their journal, and proceed to reconsider it. If after such reconsideration two-thirds of 
 that house shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with the objections, to the 
 other house, by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two-thirds 
 of that house, it shall become a law. But in all such cases the votes of both houses 
 shall be determined by yeas and nays, and the names of the persons voting for and 
 against the bill shall be entered on the journal of each house respectively. If any bill 
 shall not be returned by the president within ten days (Sundays excepted) after it 
 shall have been presented to him, the same shall be a law, in like manner as if he had 
 signed it, unless the congress by their adjournment prevent its return, in which case 
 it shall not be a law. 
 
 Every order, resolution, or vote, to which the concurrence of the senate and house 
 of representatives may be necessary (except on a question of adjournment) shall be 
 presented to the president of the United States ; and before the same shall take efiect, 
 shall be approved by him, or, being disapproved by him, shall be repassed by two- 
 thirds of the senate and house of representatives, according to the rules and limita.- 
 tions prescribed in the case of a bill. 
 
 Sect. 8. The congress shall have power, 
 
 To lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises, to pay the debts and provide 
 for the common defence and general welfare of the United States ; but a.11 rti^ tj««, y n- .• C 
 
 posts,, and excises, shall be uniform throughout the United States: 7^"-^^^ ''^'^'l iT\/^ 1-aA^a<JLJ .r 
 
 To borrowmoney on the credit of the United States : cj^"^**^ " nr.^MtA'*^ *f^*^^^'*-^^''*^ 
 
 To re gulate commerce w ith foreign nations, and among the several states, and with 
 thelndian tribes : <y^^^ ;v.*A»^W. v^A^ c.m/^ . «-:<iyi3£i 
 
 To establish an uniform rule of naturalization, and uniform laws on the subjects of 
 bankruptcies throughout the United States : 
 
 To coin money, regulate the value thereof, and of foreign coin, and fix the standard 
 of weights and measures : 
 
 To provide for the punishment of counterfeiting the securities and current coin of 
 the United States : 
 
 To establish post-offices and post-roads : 
 
 To promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to 
 authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries ; 
 
 To constitute tribunals inferior to the supreme court : 
 
 To define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and ofiences 
 against the law of nations : 
 
 To declare war, grant letters of marque and reprisal, and make rules concerning 
 captures on land and water : 
 
 To raise and support armies, but no appropriation of money to that use shall be for 
 a longer term than two years : 
 
 To provide and maintain a navy : 
 
 To make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces : 
 
 To provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the union, suppress 
 insurrections, and repel invasions : 
 
 To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia, and for governing 
 ?uch parts of them as may be employed in the service of the United States, reserving 
 
ef 
 
 42 THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 
 
 to tb<> slates respectively, the appointment of the oflBcers, and the in-hority of train- 
 ing tbe militia according to the discipline prescribed by congress : 
 
 To exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever, eve aoh district (not 
 exceeding ten miles square) as may, by cession of particular states, ad the acceptance 
 of congress, become the seat of the government of the United Stf. ?, and to exercise 
 like authority over all places purchased by the consent of the lej; a ature of the state 
 in which tbe same shall be, for the erection of forts, magazines, xrienals, dockyards, 
 and other needful buildings : And, 
 
 To make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for cf rryiag into execution 
 the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this constitutii.>n in the govern- 
 ment of the United States, or in any department or oflBcer thereof. 
 
 Sect. 9. The migration or importation of such persons as any sf the states now 
 »'xisting shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by th« congress prior to 
 the year one thousand eight hundred and eight, but a tax or duty e ay be imposed on 
 such importation, not exceeding ten dollars for each person. 
 
 The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be sus^jendjd, unless when in 
 oases of rebellion or invasion the public safety may require it. 
 No bill of attainder or ex post facto law shall be passed. 
 
 ^jf pnpifftfinnj nr othvr ^irpn t. tax gh all be laid, unless in p oportion to the egn^ nr 
 
 enumeration herein before directed to be taken. 
 
 . L^^litt. No tax or duty shall be laid on articles exported from iny state. No preference 
 
 '^^ I shall be given by any regulation of commerce or revenue to the ports of one state over 
 
 those of another ; nor shall vessels bound to, or from, on state, be obliged to enter, 
 
 clear, or pay duties in another. 
 
 No money shall be drawn from the treasury, but in coi. sequence of appropriations 
 made by law ; and a regular statement and account of the receipts and expenditures 
 of all public money shall be published from time to time. 
 
 No title of nobility shall be granted by the United States : And no person holding any 
 oflSce of profit or trust under them, shall, without the consent of the congress, accept of 
 any present, emolument, office, or title, of any kind whatever, from any king, prince^ 
 or foreign state. 
 
 Sect. 10. No state s hall enter into any treaty, alliance, or confederation ; grant let- 
 ters of marque and reprisal ; coin money ; emit bills of credit ; make any thing but 
 gold and silver coin a tender in payment of debts ; pass any bill of attainder, ex post 
 facto law, or law i ni pairing the obligjation of contracts : or grant any title of nobility. 
 No state shall, without the consent of the congress, lay any imposts or duties on 
 iBi}Ui£tfl_cr exports , except what may be absolutely necessary for executing its inspec- 
 tion laws ; and the net proceeds of all duties and imposts, laid by any state on imports 
 or exports, shall be for the use of the treasury of the United States ; and all such laws 
 shall be subject to the revision and control of the congress. No state shall, without 
 the consent of congress, lay any duties of tonnage, keep troops, or ships of war, in 
 time of peace, enter into any agreement or compact with another state, or with a for- 
 eign power, or engage in war, unless actually invaded, or in such imminen, danger aa 
 will not admit of delay. 
 
 ARTICLE IL 
 
 Sect. 1. The executive power shall be vested in a president of the United States of 
 America. He shall hold his office during the term of four years, and together with the 
 vice-president, chosen for the same term, be elected as follows : 
 
 Each state shall appoint, in such manner as tho legislature thereof may direct, a num- 
 ber of electors, equal to the whole number of senators and representatives to which the 
 utate may be entitled in the congress : but no senator or representative, or person hold- 
 u-.g an office of trust or profit under the United States, shall be appointed an elector. 
 
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. , 43 
 
 The electors shall meet in their respective states, and vote by ballot for two perions, 
 of whom one at least shall not be an inhabitant of the same state with themselves. 
 And they shall make a list of all the persons voted for, and of the number of votes for 
 each ; which list the}' shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to the seat of the 
 government of the United States, directed to the president of the senate. The presi- 
 dent of the senate shall, in the presence of the senate and house of representatives, 
 open all the certificates, and the votes shall then be counted. The person having the 
 greatest number of votes shall be the president, if such number be a majority of the 
 whole number of electors appointed ; and if there be more than one who have such 
 majority, and have an equal number of votes, then the house of representatives shall 
 immediately choose by ballot one of them for president ; and if no person have a ma- 
 jority, then from the five highest on the list the said house shall in like manner choose 
 the president. But in choosing the president, the votes shall be taken by states, the 
 representation from each state having one vote; a quorum for this purpose shall con- 
 sist of a member or members from two-thirds of the states, and a majority of all the 
 states shall be necessary to a choice. In every case, after the choice of the president, 
 the person having the greatest number of votes of the electors shall be the vice-presi- 
 dent. But if there should remain two or more who have equal votes, the senate shall 
 choose from them by ballot the vice-president. 
 
 The congress may determine the time of choosing the electors, and the day on 
 which they shall give their votes; which day shall be the same throughout the Uniteil 
 States. 
 
 No person except a natural born citizen, or a citizen of the United States, at the 
 time of the adoption of this constitution, shall be eligible to the ofl5ce of president; nei. 
 ther shall any person be eligible to that ofiice who shall not have attained to the age 
 of thirty-five years, and been fourteen years a resident within the United States. 
 
 In case of removal of the president from oflSce, or of his death, resignation, or ina- 
 bility to discharge the powers and duties of the said office, the same shall devolve on 
 the vice-president, and the congress may by law provide for the case of removal, death, 
 resignation, or inability, both of the president and vice-president, declaring what officei 
 shall then act as president, and such officer shall act accordingly, until the disability 
 \»e removed, or a president shall be elected. 
 
 The president shall, at stated times, receive for his services a compensation, which 
 shall neither be increased or diminished during the period for which he shall have been 
 elected, and he shall not receive within that period any other emolument from the 
 United States, or any of them. 
 
 Before he enter into the execution of his office, he shall take the following oath or 
 affirmation : 
 
 " I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute the office of president 
 of the United States, and will to the best of my ability, preserve, protect, and defend 
 the constitution of the United States." 
 
 Sect. 2. The president shall be commander in chief of the army and navy of the 
 United States ; and of the militia of the several states, when called into the actual 
 service of the United States ; he may require the opinion, in writing, of the principal 
 officer in each of the executive departments, upon any subject relating to the duties 
 of their respective offices, and he shall have power to grant reprieves and pardons for 
 offnnces against the United States, except in cases of impeachment. 
 
 He shall have power, by and with the advice and consent of the senate, to make 
 treaties, provided two-thirds of the senators present concur; and he shall nominate, and 
 by and with the advice and consent of the senate, shall appoint ambassadors, other public 
 ministers and consuls, judges of the supreme court, and all other officers of the United 
 States, whose appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be 
 established by law. But the congress may by law vest the appointment of such infe- 
 U 
 
44 THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 
 
 rior officers, as they think proper, in the president alone, in the courts of law, or in 
 the heads of departments. 
 
 The president shall have power to fill up all vacancies that may happen during the 
 recess of the senate, by granting commissions which shall expire at the end of their 
 next session. 
 
 Sect. 3. He shall from time to time give to the congress information of the state of 
 the union, and recommend to their consideration such measures as he shall judge 
 necessary and expedient; he may, on extraordinary occasions, convene both houses, 
 or either of them, and in case of disagreement between them, with respect to the time 
 of adjournment, he may adjourn them to such time as he shall think proper; he shall 
 receive ambassadors and other public ministers ; he shall take care that the laws be 
 faithfully executed, and shall commission all the officers of the United States. 
 
 Sect. 4. The president, vice-president, and all civil officers of the United States 
 shall be removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of, treason, bribery, 
 or other high crimes and misdemeanors. 
 
 ARTICLE III. 
 
 Sect. 1. The judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one supreme 
 court, and in such inferior courts as the congress may from time to time ordain and 
 establish. The judges, both of the supreme and inferior courts, shall hold their offices 
 during good behaviour, and shall at stated times, receive for their services a compen- 
 sation, which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office. 
 
 Sect. 2. The judicial power shall extend to all cases in law and equity, arising 
 under this constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made, or which 
 shall be made, under their authority ; to all cases aflfecting ambassadors, other public 
 ministers and consuls ; to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction ; to contro- 
 versies to which the United States shall be a party ; to controversies between two or 
 more states ; between a state and citizens of another state ; between citizens of differ- 
 ent states; between citizens of the same state claiming lands under grants of different 
 states; and between a state, or the citizens thereof, and foreign states, citizens or 
 subjects. 
 
 In all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and those in 
 which a state shall be party, the supreme court shall have original jurisdiction. In 
 all the other cases before mentioned, the supreme court shall have appellate jurisdic- 
 tion, both as to law and fact, with such exceptions, and under such regulations, as the 
 congress shall make. 
 
 The trial of all crimes, except in cases of impeachment, shall be by jury ; and such 
 trial shall be held in the state where the said crimes shall have been committed ; but 
 when not committed within any state, the trial shall be at such place or places as the 
 congress may by law have directed. 
 
 Sect. 3. Treason against the United States, shall consist onlj^ in levying war against 
 them, or in adhering to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort. No person shall 
 be convicted of treason unless on the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt 
 act, or on confession in open court. 
 
 The Congress shall have power to declare the punishment of treason, bat no attain- 
 der of treason shall work corruption of blood, or forfeiture, except during the life of 
 the person attainted. * 
 
 ARTICLE IV. 
 
 Sect. 1. Full faith and credit shall be given in each state to the public acts, records, 
 and judicial proceedings of every other state. And the congress may by general laws 
 prescribe the manner in which such acts, records, and proceedings shall be proved, and 
 the effect thereof. 
 
THE FEDERAL COXSTITUTION. 4/) 
 
 Sect. 2. The citizens of each state shall be entitled to all privileges and immunitie* / / 
 of citizens in the several states. Xr>*^ ^-o* ^\^c£^<**^ c,o-r^. 
 
 A person charged in any state with treason, felony, or other crime, who shall flee 
 from justice, and be found in another state, shall, on demand of the executive authority 
 of the state from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the state having 
 jurisdiction of the crime. 
 
 No person held to service or labour in one state, under the laws thereof, escaping 
 into another, shall, in consequence of any law or regulation therein, be discharged 
 from such service or labour, but shall be delivered up on claim of the party to whom 
 such service or labour may be due. 
 
 Sect. 3. New states may be admitted by the congress into this union; but no new 
 state shall be formed or erected within the jurisdiction of any other state, nor any 
 state be formed by the junction of two or more states, or parts of states, without the 
 consent of the legislatures of the states concerned, as well as of the congress. 
 
 The congress shall have power to dispose of and make all needful rules and regula- 
 tions respecting the territory or other property belonging to the United States ; and 
 nothing in this constitution shall be so construed as to prejudice any claims of the 
 United States, or of any particular state. 
 
 Skct. 4. The United States shall guarantee to every state in this Union, a republi- 
 can form of government, and shall protect each of them against invasion; and on 
 application of the legislature, or of the executive (when the legislature cannot be con- 
 vened) against domestic violence. 
 
 ARTICLE V. 
 
 The congress, whenever two-thirds of both houses shall deem it necessary, shall 
 propose amendments to this constitution, or, on the application of the legislatures of 
 two-thirds of the several states, shall call a convention for proposing amendments, 
 which, in either case, shall be valid to all intents and purposes, as part of this consti- 
 tution, when ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several states, or by 
 conventions in three-fourths thereof, as the one or the other mode of ratification may 
 be proposed by the congress : Provided, that no amendment which may be made prior 
 to the year one thousand eight hundred and eight, shall in any manner afi'ect the first 
 and fourth clauses in the ninth section of the first article ; and that no state, without 
 its consent, shall be deprived of its equal sufi°rage in the senate. 
 
 ARTICLE VI. 
 
 All debts contracted and engagements entered into, before the adoption of this con- 
 stitution, shall be as valid against the United States under this constitution, as under 
 the confederation. 
 
 This constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursu- 
 ance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of 
 ihe United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every stat« 
 shall be bound thereby, any thing in the constitution or laws of any state to the con- 
 trary notwithstanding. 
 
 The senators and representatives before mentioned, and the members of the several 
 state legislatures, and all executive and judicial oflBcers, both of the United States and 
 of the several states, shall be bound by oath or aflSrmation to support this constitu- 
 tion : but no religious test shall ever be required as a qualification to any ofiBce or 
 public trust under the United States. 
 
 ARTICLE VI L 
 
 The ratification of the convention of nine states, shall be sufficient for the establish. 
 Dicnt of this constitution between the 8tJi*<»3 so ratifying the same. 
 
46 
 
 THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 
 
 DONE in convention, by the unanimous consent of the states present, the seventeenth 
 day of September, in the year of our Lord one thousand seven hundred and eighty- 
 seven, and of the independence of the United States of America the twelfth. In 
 witness whereof, we have hereunto subscribed our names. 
 
 «EORGE WASHINGTON, Vrrsidf.ht, and Deputy from Virginia. 
 
 NEW-HAMPSHIRE. 
 
 j John Langdon, 
 
 ■■ I NiCHC 
 
 lOLAS GiLMAN. 
 
 MASSACHUSETTS { R^JusSg^*'''''''"' 
 
 CONNECTICUT I ^^i^^'^" Samuel Johnson, 
 
 ( Roger Sherman. 
 
 NEW-YORK -{ Alexander Hamilton. 
 
 William Livingston, 
 
 NEW-JERSEY. 
 
 PENNSYLVANIA 
 
 Uavid Brearly, 
 William Paterson, 
 Jonathan Dayton. 
 Benjamin Franklin, 
 Thomas Mifflin, 
 Robert Morris, 
 George Clymer, 
 Thomas Fitzsimons, 
 Jared Ingersoll, 
 James Wilson, 
 
 GOUVERNEUR MoRRIS. 
 
 ' George Read, 
 Gunning Bedford, junior, 
 
 DELAWARE i John Dickinson, 
 
 Richard Bassett, 
 (^ Jacob Broom. 
 ( James M'Henry, 
 
 MARYLAND -J Daniel of St. Thomas Jenifer, 
 
 ( Daniel Carrol. 
 
 VIRGINIA j John Blair, 
 
 [ Jamks Madison, junior. 
 
 r William Blount, 
 NORTH-CAROLINA... i Richard Dobbs Spaight, 
 
 (Hiigh Williamson. 
 
 f John Rutledge, 
 Chs. Cotesworth Pinckney, 
 Charles Pinckney, 
 
 [PiERCK Butler. 
 OT70POTA (William Few, 
 
 GEORGIA 1 Abraham Baldwin. 
 
 Attest. WILLIAM JACKSON, Stcretarv. 
 
 SOUTH-CAROLINA , 
 
 IN CONVENTION. 
 
 Monday, September 17. 17S7. 
 Presbnt, The States of New-Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Mr. Hamilton from 
 
 New- York, Neio-Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Mary land, Virginia, North- Carolina, 
 
 South- Carolina and Georgia. 
 
 Resolved, That the preceding constitution be laid before the United States in con- 
 gress assembled, and that it is the opinion of this convention, that it should after- 
 wards be submitted to a convention of delegates, chosen in each state by the people 
 thereof, under the recommendation of its legislature, for their assent and ratification ; 
 and that each convention assenting to, and ratifying the same, sliould give notice 
 thereof to the United States in congress assembled. 
 
 Resolved, That it is the opinion of this convention, that as soon as the convention? 
 of nine states shall have ratified this constitution, the United States in congress assembled 
 should fix a day on which electors should be appointed by the states which shall have 
 ratified the same, and a day on which the electors should assemble to vote for the 
 president, and the time and place for commencing proceedings under this constitution. 
 That after such publication the electors should be appointed, and the senators and 
 representatives elected : That the electors should meet on the day fixed for the election 
 of the president, and should transmit their votes certified, signed, sealed, and directed, 
 as the constitution requires, to the secretary of the United States in congress asseiu 
 bled ] that the senators and representatives should convene at the time and phuc 
 

 THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 47 
 
 ussi^nej ; that the senators should appoint a president of the senate, for the sole pur- 
 pose of receiving, opening, and counting the votes for president; and that after h» 
 shall be chosen, the congress, together with the president, should without delay pro- 
 ceed to execute this constitution. 
 
 By the unanimous order of the Convention. 
 
 GEORGE WASHINGTON, President. 
 
 William Jackson, Secretary. 
 
 AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION. J, 
 
 The first ten amendments were proposed in Congress during its Jirst session, and on 
 the loth of December, 1791, were ratified. The eleventh amendment was proposed ^, 
 during the Jirst session of the third congress, and was announced by the President of ^j(x» jL^ 
 the United States in a message to it, of date January 8th, 1798, as having been rati- 9 • /wk*^ 
 fied. The twelfth amendment originated with Hamilton,* and was proposed during ..^j/Ju 
 the first session of the eighth Congress, and was adopted in 1804. v^^^ 
 
 ARTICLE THE FIRST. 
 Congress shall make no law respecting the establishment of religion, or prohibiting 
 the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the 
 right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress 
 of grievances. 
 
 ARTICLE THE SECOND. 
 A well regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free state, the right 
 of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed. 
 ARTICLE THE THIRD. 
 No soldier shall, in time of peace, be quartered in any house without the consent 
 of the owner ; nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law. 
 ARTICLE THE FOURTH. 
 The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
 against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants 
 shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or afiirmation, and particu- 
 larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
 ARTICLE THE FIFTH. 
 No person shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime, unless 
 on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising in the land or 
 naval forces, or in the militia when in actual service in time of war or public danger; 
 nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life 
 or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be witness against himself ; 
 nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ; nor shall pri- 
 vate property be taken for public use without just compensation. 
 ARTICLE THE SIXTH. 
 In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public 
 trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall have been 
 ••-ommitted, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be 
 informed of the nature and cause of the accusation ; to be confronted with the wit- 
 nesses against him : to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favour, 
 und to have the assistance of counsel for his defence. 
 
 ARTICLE THE SEVENTH. 
 In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, 
 ihe right of trial by jury shall be preserved ; and no fact tried by a jury, shall be 
 otherwise re-examined in any court of the United States than according to the rules 
 of the common law. 
 
 ARTICLE THK EIGHTH. 
 Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unu- 
 sual punishments inflicted. * 
 ARTICLE THE NINTH. 
 The enumeration in the constitution of certain rights, shall not be construed to den^ 
 or disparage others retained by the people. 
 
 ARTICLE THE TENTH. 
 The powers not delegated to the United States by the constitution, nor prohibited 
 *>y it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people. 
 ARTICLE THE ELEVENTH. 
 The judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit 
 fti law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by oiti- 
 zfus of another state, or by citizens or subjects of any foreign state. 
 
 * Hist. Rep. TIL. Sfifi. 
 
48 THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 
 
 ARTICLE XIL 
 
 The electors shall meet in their respective states, and vote by ballot for president and 
 vice-president, one of whom, at least, shall not be an inhabitant of the same state with 
 themselves j they shall name in their ballots the person voted for as president, and in 
 distinct ballots the person voted for as vice-president ; and they shall make distinct lists 
 </f all persons voted for as president, and of all persons voted for as vice-president, and 
 of the number of votes for each, which lists they shall sign and certify, and transmit 
 sealed to the seat of the government of the United States, directed to the president of the 
 senate; the president of the senate shall, in the presence of the senate and house of rep- 
 resentatives, open all the certificates, and the votes shall then be counted : the person 
 having the greatest number of votes for president, shall be the president, if such number 
 be a majority of the whole number of electors appointed; and if no person have such 
 majority, then from the persons having the highest numbers, not exceeding three, on the 
 list of those voted for as president, the house of representatives shall choose immedi- 
 ately, by ballot, the president. But in choosing the president, the votes shall be taken 
 by states, the representation from each state having one vote; a quorum for this pur- 
 pose shall consist of a member or members from two thirds of the states, and a majority 
 of all the states shall be necessary to a choice. And if the house of representatives 
 shall not choose a president whenever the right of choice shall devolve upon them, 
 before the fourth day of March next following, then the vice-president shall act as 
 president as in the case of the death or other constitutional disability of the president. 
 
 The person having the greatest number of votes as vice-president, shall be the vice- 
 president, if such number be a majority of the whole number of electors appointed : and 
 if no person have a majority, then from the two highest numbers on the list, the senate 
 shall choose the vice-president : a quorum for the purpose shall consist of two thirds 
 of the whole number of senators, and a majority of the whole number shall be neces- 
 sary to a choice. 
 
 But no person constitutionally ineligible to the office of president, shall be eligible 
 to that of vice-president of the United States. 
 
 IN CONVENTION. 
 
 September 17th, 1787. 
 
 Sir : We have now the honor to submit to the consideration of the United States in 
 Congress assembled, that Constitution which has appeared to us the most advisable. 
 The friends of our country have long seen and desired, that the power of making war, 
 peace, and treaties ; that of levying money and regulating commerce, and the corre- 
 spondent executive and judicial authorities should be fully and efifectually vested in 
 the general government of the Union ; but the impropriety of delegating such extensive 
 trusts to one body of men is evident. Hence results the necessity of a different 
 organization. It is obviously impracticable, in the federal government of these States, 
 to secure all rights of independent sovereignty to each, and yet provide for the interest 
 and safety of all. Individuals entering into society must give up a share of liberty to 
 preserve the rest. The magnitude of the sacrifice must depend as well on situation 
 and circumstance as on the object to be obtained. It is at all times difficult to draw 
 with precision the line between those rights which must be surrendered, and those 
 which may be reserved ; and on the present occasion this difficulty was increased by a 
 difference among the several states as to their situation, extent, habits, and particular 
 interests. 
 
 In all our deliberations on this subject we kept steadily in our view, that which 
 appears to us the greatest interest of every true American, the consolidation of our 
 union, in which is involved our prosperity, felicity, safety, perhaps our national exist- 
 ence. This important consideration, seriously and deeply impressed on our minds, 
 led each ptate in the convention to be less rigid on points of inferior magnitude than 
 might have been otherwise expected; and thus the Constitution, which we now present, 
 is the result of a spirit of amity, and of that mutual deference and concession which 
 the peculiarity of our political situation rendered indispensable. 
 
 That it will meet the full and entire approbation of every state is not perhaps to be 
 expected : but each will doubtless consider, that had her interests alone been consulted, 
 the consequences might have been particularly disagreeable or injurious to others ; 
 that it is liable to as few exceptions as could reasonably have been expected, we hope 
 and believe ; that it may promote the lasting welfare of that country so dear to us all, 
 and secure her freedom and happiness, is our most ardent wish. With great respect, 
 we have the honor to be, sir, your excellency's most obedient and humble servants. 
 By unanimous order of the convention. Go : Washinoton, I'resident 
 
 His excellency the President of Congress. 
 
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 48a 
 
 The following amendment was ratified by Alabama, December 
 2d, 1865, which filled the requisite complement of ratifying 
 states, and was certified by the secretary of state to have be- 
 come valid as a part of the Constitution of the United Stetes, 
 December 18th, 1865. 
 
 ARTICLE XIIL 
 
 Sect. 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for 
 crime, whereof the party shail have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United 
 States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction. 
 
 Skct. 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation. 
 
 The following amendment was certified by the secretary of 
 state to have become valid as a part of the Constitution of thej 
 United States, July 28th, 1868. 
 
 ARTICLE XIV. 
 
 Sect. 1. All persons bom or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
 jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the states wherein they 
 reside. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges oi 
 immuTlities of citizens of the United States ; nor shaji any stat« deprive anyjierson^^ 
 of life, liberty, or property without due procpss -iif law ; nor deny to anyjersoii 
 ^•Within its jurisdiction the equal protection of thp law.gi. ">t^^ C.«'^-/»« / <*22iy •^ VJ_ 
 
 Sect. 2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the several states according 
 to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State, 
 excluding Indians not tase4. But when the right to vote at any election for the 
 choice of electors for president and vice president of the United States, representa- 
 tives in congress, the executive and judicial officers of a state, or the members of the 
 legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such state, being 
 twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, 
 except fi>r participation in rebellion or other crime, the basis of representation 
 • herein shall i.e reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens 
 shall bear to the whole number of male citizens of twenty-one years of age in such 
 state. 
 
 Sect. .3. No person shall be a senator or representative in congress, or elector of 
 president and vice president, or hold any office, civil or military, under the United 
 States, or under any state, who, having previously taken an oath as a member of 
 congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of any state legisla- 
 ture, or as an executive or judicial officer of any state, to support the Constitution 
 of the United Siates, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same 
 or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But congress may, by a vote of two- 
 thirds of each house, remove such disability. 
 
 Sect. 4. The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, 
 including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in sup- 
 pressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the United 
 States nor any state shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of 
 insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any claim for the loss or eman- 
 cipation of any slave ; but all such debts, obligations, and claims shall be held illegal 
 and void. 
 
 Sect. 5. The congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, tht 
 orovisions of this article. 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 NUMBEK I. 
 
 NEW YORK, OCTOBER 27, 1787. 
 
 HAMILTON. 
 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 After full experience of the insufficiency of the existing 
 Federal Government, you are invited to deliberate upon a new 
 Constitution for the United States of America. 
 
 The subject speaks its own importance ; comprehending in its 
 consequences, nothing less than the existence of the UNION — 
 the safety and welfare of the parts of which it is composed — 
 the fate of an empire, in many respects, the most interesting in 
 the world. It has been frequently remarked, that, it seems to 
 have been reserved to the people of this country, to decide by 
 their conduct and example, the important question, whether 
 societies of men are really capable or not, of establishing good 
 government from reflection and choice, or whether they are for 
 ever destined to depend, for their political constitutions, on acci- 
 dent and force. If there be any truth in the remark, the crisis, 
 at which we are arrived, may with propriety be regarded as the 
 period when that decision is to be made; and a wrong election 
 of the part we shall act, may, in this view, deserve to be con- 
 sidered as the general misfortune of mankind. 
 
 This idea, by adding the inducements of philanthropy to those 
 of patriotism, will heighten the solicitude, which all considerate 
 and good men must feel for the event. Happy will it be if our 
 
 49 
 
50 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 choieti should be directed by a judicious estimate of our true 
 interests, uninfluenced by considerations foreign to the public 
 good. But this is more ardently to be wished for, than seriously 
 to be expected. The plan offered to our deliberations, affects too 
 many particular interests, innovates upon too many local institu- 
 tions, not to involve in its discussion a variety of objects ex- 
 traneous to its merits; and of views, passions, and prejudices^ 
 little favourable to the discovery of truth. 
 
 Among the most formidable of the obstacles, which the new 
 constitution will have to encounter, may readily be distinguished 
 the obvious interest of a certain class of men in every state, to 
 resist all changes which may hazard a diminution of the power, 
 emolument, and consequence, of the offices they hold under the 
 state establishments : and the perverted ambition of another class 
 of men, who will either hope to aggrandize themselves by the 
 confusions of their country, or will flatter themselves with fairer 
 prospects of elevation from the subdivision of the empire into 
 several partial confederacies, than from its union under one 
 government. 
 
 It is not, however, my design to dwell upon observations of 
 this nature. I am aware that it would be disingenuous to 
 resolve indiscriminately the opposition of any set of men into 
 interested or ambitious views, merely because their situations 
 might subject them to suspicion. Candour will oblige us to 
 admit, that even such men may be actuated by upright inten- 
 tions; and it cannot be doubted, that much of the opposition 
 which has already shown itself, or that may hereafter make its 
 appearance, will spring from sources, blameless at least, if not 
 respectable — the honest errors of minds led astray by pre- 
 conceived jealousies and fears. So numerous indeed, and so 
 powerful are the causes, which serve to give a false bias to the 
 judgment, that we, upon many occasions, see wise and good men 
 on the wrong as well as on the right side of questions, of the 
 first magnitude to society. This circumstance, if duly attended 
 to, would always furnish a lesson of moderation to those who are 
 engaged in any controversy, however well persuaded of being 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 51 
 
 m the right. And a further reason for caution, in this respect, 
 might be drawn from the reflection, that we are not always 
 sure, that those who advocate the truth are actuated by purer 
 principles than their antagonists. Ambition, avarice, personal 
 animosity, party opposition, and many other motives, not more 
 laudable than these, are apt to operate as well upon those who 
 support, as upon those who oppose, the right side of a question 
 Were there not even these inducements to moderation, nothing 
 could be more illjudged than that intolerant spirit, which has, 
 at all times, characterized political parties. For, in politics as 
 in religion, it is equally absurd to aim at making proselytes by 
 fire and sword. Heresies in either can rarely be cured by 
 persecution. 
 
 And yet, just as these sentiments must appear to candid men, 
 we have already sufficient indications, that it will happen in this, 
 as in all former cases of great national discussion. A torrent of 
 angry and malignant passions will be let loose. To judge from 
 the conduct of the opposite parties, we shall be led to conclude, 
 that they will mutually hope to evince the justness of their 
 opinions, and to increase the number of their converts, by the 
 loudness of their declamations, and by the bitterness of their 
 invectives. An enlightened zeal for the energy and efficiency 
 of government, will be stigmatized as the offspring -of a 
 temper fond of power, and hostile to the principles of liberty 
 An overscrupulous jealousy of danger to the rights of the people, 
 which is more commonly the fault of the head than of the heart, 
 will be represented as mere pretence and artifice; the stale bait 
 for popularity at the expense of public good. It will be for- 
 gotten, on the one hand, that jealousy is the usual concomitant 
 of violent love, and that the noble enthusiasm of liberty is too 
 apt to be infected with a spirit of narrow and illiberal distrust. 
 On the other hand, it will be equally forgotten, that the vigour 
 of government is essential to the security of liberty ; that, in 
 the contemplation of a sound and well informed judgment, their 
 interests can never be separated; and that a dangerous ambi- 
 tion more often lurks behind the specious mask of zeal for the 
 
52 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 rights of the people, ihan under the forbidding appearances of 
 zeal for the firmness and efficiency of government. History will 
 teach us, that the former has been found a much more certain 
 road to the introduction of despotism than the latter; and that 
 of those men who have overturned the liberties of republics, 
 the greatest number have begun their career, by paying an 
 obsequious court to the people, commencing demagogues and 
 ending tyrants. 
 
 In the course of the preceding observations it has been my 
 aim, fellow citizens, to put you upon your guard against all 
 attempts, from whatever quarter, to influence your decision in a 
 matter of the utmost moment to your welfare, by any impres- 
 sions other than those which may result from the evidence of 
 truth. You will, no doubt, at the same time, have collected 
 from the general scope of them, that they proceed from a source 
 not unfriendly to the new constitution. Yes, my countrymen, 
 I own to you, that, after having given it an attentive con- 
 sideration, I am clearly of opinion, it is your interest to adopt 
 it. I am convinced, that this is the safest course for your 
 liberty, your dignity, and your happiness. I affect not reserves, 
 which I do not feel. I will not amuse you with an appearance 
 of deliberation, when I have decided. I frankly acknowledge 
 to you my convictions, and I will freely lay before you the 
 reasons on which they are founded. The consciousness of good 
 intentions disdains ambiguity. I shall not, however, multiply 
 professions on this head. My motives must remain in the depo- 
 sitory of my own breast : my arguments will be open to all, and 
 may be judged of by all. They shall at least be offered in a 
 spirit, which will not disgrace the cause of truth. 
 
 I propose, in a series of papers, to discuss the following inte- 
 resting particulars... 2%e utility of the UNION to your political 
 prosperity... The insufficienq/ of the present confederation to preserve 
 that Union... The necessity of a government, at least equally energetic 
 with the one proposed, to the attainment of this object... The conformity 
 of the proposed constitution to the true principles of republican govern- 
 ment.. .Its analogy to your own state constitution.. .&nd lastly, 2%e 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 53 
 
 additional security, which its adoption will afford to the preservation 
 of that species of government, to liberty, and to property. 
 
 In the progress of this discussion, I shall endeavour to give 
 a satisfactory answer to all the objections which shall have 
 made their appearance, that may seem to have any claim to 
 attention. 
 
 It may perhaps be thought superfluous to offer arguments to 
 prove the utility of the UNION; a point, no doubt, deeply 
 engraved on the hearts of the great body of the people in every 
 state, and one which, it may be imagined, has no adversaries. 
 But the fact is, that we already hear it whispered in the private 
 circles of those who oppose the new constitution, that the Thir- 
 teen States are of too great extent for any general system, and 
 that we must of necessity resort to separate confederacies of 
 distinct portions of the whole.* This doctrine will, in all pro 
 bability, be gradually propagated, till it has votaries enough to 
 countenance its open avowal. For nothing can be more evident, 
 to those who are able to take an enlarged view of the subject, 
 than the alternative of an adoption of the constitution, or a 
 dismemberment of the Union. It may therefore be essential to 
 examine particularly the advantages of that Union, the certain 
 evils, and the probable dangers, to which every state will be 
 exposed from its dissolution. This shall accordingly be done. 
 
 PUBLIUS 
 
 * The same idea, tracing the arguments to their consequences, is held out in 
 seyeral of the late publications against tne new constitution. 
 
64 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 NUMBER II. 
 
 NEW YORK. OOTOBER 51, J787. 
 
 JAY. 
 
 CONCERNING DANGERS FROM FOREIGN FORCE AND INFLUENCE. 
 
 When the people of America reflect, that the question now 
 submitted to their determination, is one of the most important 
 that has engaged, or can well engage, their attention, the pro- 
 priety of their taking a very comprehensive, as well as a very 
 serious, view of it, must be evident. 
 
 Nothing is more certain than the indispensable necessity 
 of government; and it is equally undeniable, that whenever 
 and however it is instituted, the people must cede to it some of 
 their natural rights, in order to vest it with requisite powers. 
 It is well worthy of consideration therefore, whether it would 
 conduce more to the interest of the people of America, that they 
 should, to all general purposes, be one nation, under one federal 
 government, than that they should divide themselves into sepa- 
 rate confederacies, and give to the head of each, the same kind 
 of powers which they are advised to place in one national 
 government. 
 
 It has until lately been a received and uncontradicted opi- 
 nion, that the prosperity of the people of America depended 
 on their continuing firmly united ; and the wishes, prayers, and 
 efforts, of our best and wisest citizens, have been constantly 
 directed to that object. But politicians now appear, who insist 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 55 
 
 that this opinion is erroneous, and that instead of looking for 
 safety and happiness in union, we ought to seek it in a division 
 of the states into distinct confederacies or sovereignties. How- 
 ever extraordinary this new doctrine may appear, it neverthe 
 less has its advocates ; and certain characters who were formerly 
 much opposed to it, are at present of the number. Whatever 
 may be the arguments or inducements, which have wrought 
 this change in the sentiments and declarations of these gentle- 
 men, it certainly would not be wise in the people at large to 
 tidopt these new political tenets, without being fully convinced 
 that they are founded in truth and sound policy. 
 
 It has often given me pleasure to observe, that independent 
 America was not composed of detached and distant territories, 
 but that one connected, fertile, wide-spreading country, was the 
 portion of our western sons of liberty. Providence has in a 
 particular manner blessed it with a variety of soils and produc- 
 tions, and watered it with innumerable streams, for the delight 
 and accommodation of its inhabitants. A succession of navi- 
 gable waters forms a kind of chain round its borders, as if to 
 bind it together; while the most noble rivers in the world, run- 
 ning at convenient distances, present them with highways for 
 the easy communication of friendly aids, and the mutual trans- 
 portation and exchange of their various commodities. 
 
 With equal pleasure I have as often taken notice, that 
 Providence has been pleased to give this one connected coun- 
 try to one united people; a people descended from the same 
 ancestors, speaking the same language, professing the same 
 religion, attached to the same principles of government, very 
 similar m their manners and customs, and who, by their joint 
 counsels, arms and efforts, fighting side by side throughout a 
 long and bloody war, have nobly established their general 
 liberty and independence. 
 
 Tliis country and this people seem to have been made for 
 each other; and it appears as if it was the design of Provi- 
 dence, that an inheritance so proper and convenient for a band 
 of brethren, united to each other by the strongest ties, should 
 
5t» THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 never be split into a number of unsocial, jealous, and alien 
 sovereignties. 
 
 Similar sentiments have hitherto prevailed among all orders 
 and denominations of men among us. To all general purposes, 
 we have uniformly been one people. Each individual citizen 
 every where enjoying the same national rights, privileges, and 
 protection. As a nation, we have made peace and war: as a 
 nation, we have vanquished our common enemies : as a nation, 
 we have formed alliances, and made treaties, and entered into 
 various compacts and conventions with foreign states. 
 
 A strong sense of the value and blessings of Union induced 
 the people, at a very early period, to institute a federal gov- 
 ernment to preserve and perpetuate it. They formed it 
 almost as soon as they had a political existence ; nay, at a 
 time, when their habitations were in flames, when many of 
 them were bleeding in the field ; and when the progress of 
 hostility and desolation left little room for those calm and 
 mature inquiries and reflections, which must ever precede the 
 formation of a wise and well balanced government for a free 
 people. It is not to be wondered at that a government insti- 
 tuted in times so inauspicious, should on experiment be found 
 greatly deficient, and inadequate to the purpose it was intended 
 to answer. 
 
 This intelligent people perceived and regretted these defects. 
 Still continuing no less attached to union, than enamoured of 
 liberty, they observed the danger, which immediately threatened 
 the former and more remotely the latter; and being persuaded 
 that ample security for both, could only be found in a national 
 government more wisely framed, they, as with one voice, con- 
 vened the late Convention at Philadelphia, to take that import- 
 ant subject under consideration. 
 
 This Convention, composed of men who possessed the con- 
 fidence of the people, and many of whom had become highly 
 distinguished by their patriotism, virtue, and wisdom, in times 
 (vhich tried the souls of men, undertook the arduous task. In the 
 mild season of peace, with minds unoccupied by other subjects, 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 57 
 
 they passed many months in cool uninterrupted and daily con- 
 sultations : And finally, without having been awed by power, 
 or influenced by any passion, except love for their country, they 
 presented and recommended to the people the plan produced 
 by their joint and very unanimous counsels. 
 
 Admit, for so is the fact, that this plan is only recommended, 
 not imposed, yet, let it be remembered, that it is neither 
 recommended to blind approbation, nor to blind reprobation ; but 
 to that sedate and candid consideration, which the magnitude 
 and importance of the subject demand, and which it certainly 
 ought to receive. But, as has been already remarked, it is 
 more to be wished than expected that it may be so con- 
 sidered and examined. Experience on a former occasion 
 teaches us not to be too sanguine in such hopes. It is not 
 yet forgotten, that well grounded apprehensions of imminent 
 danger induced the people of America to form the memorable 
 Congress of 1774. That body recommended certain measures 
 to their constituents, and the event proved their wisdom; yet 
 it is fresh in our memories how soon the press began to 
 teem with pamphlets and weekly papers against those very 
 measures. Not only many of the officers of government who 
 obeyed the dictates of personal interest, but others from a 
 mistaken estimate of consequences, from the undue influenco 
 of ancient attachments, or whose ambition aimed at objectts 
 which did not correspond with the public good, were inde- 
 fatigable in their endeavours to persuade the people to reject 
 the advice of that patriotic Congress. Many indeed were 
 deceived and deluded, but the great majority reasoned and 
 decided judiciously; and happy they are in reflecting that 
 they did so. 
 
 They considered that the Congress was composed of many 
 wise and experienced men. That being convened from dif- 
 ferent parts of the country, they brought with them and com- 
 municated to each other a variety of useful information. 
 That in the course of the time they passed together in in- 
 quiring into and discussing the true interests of their country, 
 
5b THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 tney must have acquired very accurate knowledge on that 
 head. That they were individually interested in the public 
 liberty and prosperity, and therefore that it was not less their 
 inclination than their duty, to recommend such measures only, 
 as after the most mature deliberation they really thought pru- 
 dent and advisable. 
 
 These and similar considerations then induced the people to 
 rely greatly on the judgment and integrity of the Congress; 
 and they took their advice, notwithstanding the various arts 
 and endeavours used to deter and dissuade them from it. But 
 if the people at large had reason to confide in the men of 
 that Congress, few of whom had then been fully tried or gene- 
 rally known, still greater reason have they now to respect the 
 judgment and advice of the Convention ; for it is well known, 
 that some of the most distinguished members of that Con 
 gress, who have been since tried and justly approved foi 
 patriotism and abilities, and who have grown old in acquiring 
 political information, were also members of this Conven- 
 tion, and carried into it their accumulated knowledge and ex- 
 perience. 
 
 It is worthy of remark, that not only the first, but every 
 succeeding Congress, as well as the late Convention, have in- 
 variably joined with the people in thinking that the prosperity 
 of America depended on its Union. To preserve and perpetuate 
 it, was the great object of the people in forming that Conven- 
 tion; and it is also the great object of the plan which the Con- 
 vention has advised them to adopt. With what propriety there- 
 fore, or for what good purposes, are attempts at this particular 
 period made, by some men, to depreciate the importance of the 
 Union ? or why is it suggested that three or four confederacies 
 would be better than one ? I am persuaded in my own mind, 
 that the people have always thought right on this subject, and 
 that their universal and uniform attachment to the cause of the 
 Union, rests on great and weighty reasons. 
 
 They who promote the idea of substituting a number of dis- 
 tinct confederacies in the room of the plan of the Convention, 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 5» 
 
 aeem clearly to foresee that the rejection of it would put tbc 
 continuance of the Union in the utmost jeopardy : that certainly 
 would be the case ; and I sincerely wish that it may bfi as clearly 
 foreseen by every good citizen, that whenever the dissolution 
 of the Union arrives, America will have reason to exclaim in 
 the words of the Poet, " Farewell I a long farewell, to all 
 my greatness i" 
 
 Publius. 
 
 15 
 
60 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 NUMBER III. 
 
 NEW YORK, NOVEMBER 3, 1787. 
 
 JAY. 
 
 THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED. 
 
 It is not a new observation that the people of any country 
 (if like the Americans, intelligent and well informed) seldom 
 adopt, and steadily persevere for many years, in any erroneous 
 opinion respecting their interests. That consideration naturally 
 tends to create great respect for the high opinion which the 
 people of America have so long and uniformly entertained of the 
 importance of their continuing firmly united under one federal 
 government, vested with sufficient powers for all general and 
 national purposes. 
 
 The more attentively I consider and investigate the reasons 
 which appear to have given birth to this opinion, the more I 
 become convinced that they are cogent and conclusive. 
 
 Among the many objects to which a wise and free people find 
 it necessary to direct their attention, that of providing for theii 
 safety seems to be the first. The safety of the people doubtless 
 has relation to a great variety of circumstances iand considera- 
 tions, and consequently affords great latitude' to those who wish 
 to define it precisely and comprehensively. 
 
 At present I mean only to consider it as it respects security 
 for the preservation of peace and tranquillity, as well against 
 dangers from foreign arms and influence, as against dangers 
 
THE FEDERALIST. tJi 
 
 arising from domestic causes. As the former of these comes 
 fii'St in order, it is proper it should be the first discussed. Let 
 us therefore proceed to examine whether the people are not 
 right in their opinion, that a cordial Union under an efficient 
 national Government, affords them the best security that can be 
 devised against hostilities from abroad. 
 
 The number of wars which have happened, or may happen in 
 the world, will always be found to be in proportion to th« 
 number and weight of the causes, whether real or pretended, 
 which provoke or invite them. If this remark be just, it be- 
 comes useful to inquire, whether so Tn&nyjust causes of war are 
 likely to be given by united America, as by disunited America ; 
 for if it should turn out that united America will probably give 
 the fewest, then it will follow that, in this respect, the Union 
 tends most to preserve the people in a state of peace with other 
 nations. 
 
 The just causes of war for the most part arise either from 
 violations of treaties, or from direct violence. America has 
 already formed treaties with no less than six foreign nations, 
 and all of them, except Prussia, are maritime, and therefore 
 able to annoy and injure us : She has also extensive commerce 
 with Portugal, Spain, and Britain; and with respect to the two 
 latter, has the additional circumstance of neighbourhood to 
 attend to. 
 
 It is of high importance to the peace of America, that she 
 observe the law of nations towards all these powers; and to me it 
 appears evident, that this will be more perfectly and punctually 
 done by one national government, than it could be either by 
 thirteen separate states, or by three or four distinct confedera- 
 cies. For this opinion various reasons may be assigned. 
 
 When once an efficient national government is established, 
 the best men in the country will not only consent to serve, but 
 will also generally be appointed to manage it; for although 
 town, or county, or other contracted influence, may place men 
 in state assemblies, or senates, or courts of justice, or executive 
 departments; yet more general and extensive reputation for 
 
62 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 talents ana other qualifications, will be necessary to recommend 
 men to ofiiees under the national government, especially as it 
 will have the widest field for choice, and never experience that 
 want of proper persons, which is not uncommon in some of the 
 states. Hence it will result, that the administration, the politi- 
 cal councils, and the judicial decisions, of the national govern- 
 ment, will be more wise, systematical and judicious, than those 
 of individual states, and consequently more satisfactory with 
 respect to the other nations, as well as more safe with respect 
 to ourselves. 
 
 Under the national government, treaties and articles of 
 treaties, as well as ' the laws of nations, will always be ex- 
 pounded in one sense, and executed in the same manner; 
 whereas adjudications on the same points and questions, in 
 thirteen states, or in three or four confederacies, will not always 
 accord or be consistent ; and that as well from the variety ol 
 independent courts and judges, appointed by different and inde- 
 pendent governments, as from the different local laws and inte- 
 rests which may affect and influence them. The wisdom of the 
 Convention in committing such questions to the jurisdiction and 
 judgment of courts appointed by, and responsible only to one 
 national government, cannot be too much commended. 
 
 The prospect of present loss or advantage, may often tempt 
 the governing party in one or two states to swerve from good 
 faith and justice; but those temptations not reaching the other 
 states, and consequently having little or no influence on the 
 national government, the temptations will be fruitless, and good 
 faith and justice be preserved. The case of the treaty of peace 
 with Britain, adds great weight to this reasoning. 
 
 If even the governing party in a state should be disposed to 
 resist such temptations, yet as such temptations inay, and com- 
 monly do, result from circumstances peculiar to the state, and 
 may affect a great number of the inhabitants, the governing 
 party may not always be able, if willing, to prevent the injustice 
 meditated, or to punish the aggressors. But the national gov 
 ernment, not being affected by those local circumstances, will 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 63 
 
 neither be induced to commit the wrong themselves, nor want 
 power or inclination to prevent, or punish its commission by 
 others. 
 
 So far therefore as either designed or accidental violations of 
 treaties and of the laws of nations afford just causes of war, they 
 are less to be apprehended under one general government, than 
 under several lesser ones; and in that respect, the former most 
 favours the safety of the people. 
 
 As to those just causes of war which proceed from direct and 
 unlawful violence, it appears equally clear to me, that one good 
 national government affords vastly more security against dangers 
 of that sort, than can be derived from any other quarter. 
 
 Such violences are more frequently occasioned by the passions 
 and interests of a part than of the whole, of one or two states 
 than of the union. Not a single Indian war has yet been produced 
 by aggressions of the present federal government, feeble as it is; 
 but there are several instances of Indian hostilities having been 
 provoked by the improper conduct of individual states, who 
 either unable or unwilling to restrain or punish offences, hare 
 given occasion to the slaughter of many innocent inhabitants. 
 
 The neighbourhood of Spanish and British territories, border- 
 ing on some states, and not on others, naturally confines tho 
 causes of quarrel more immediately to the borderers. The bor- 
 dering states, if any, will be those who, under the impulse of 
 sudden irritations, and a quick sense of apparent interest or 
 injury, will be most likely by direct violence, to excite war with 
 those nations; and nothing can so effectually obviate that danger, 
 as a national government, whose wisdom and prudence will not 
 be diminished by the passions which actuate the parties imme- 
 diately interested. 
 
 But not only fewer just causes of war will be given by the 
 national government, but it will also be more in their power to 
 accommodate and settle them amicably. They will be more 
 temperate and cool, and in that respect, as well as in others, 
 will be more in a capacity to act with circumspection than the 
 offending state The pride of states, as well as of men. 
 
64 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 naturally disposes them to justify all their actions, and opposes 
 their acknowledging, correcting, or repairing their errors and 
 offences. The national government in such cases will not be 
 affected by this pride ; but will proceed with moderation and 
 candour to consider and decide on the means most proper to 
 extricate them from the difficulties which threaten them. 
 
 Besides, it is well known that acknowledgments, explanations, 
 and compensations, are often accepted as satisfactory from a 
 strong united nation, which would be rejected as unsatisfactory 
 if offered by a state or confederacy of little consideration or 
 power. 
 
 In the year 1685, the state of Genoa having offended Louis 
 XlVth, endeavoured to appease him. He demanded that they 
 should send their Doge or chief magistrate, accompanied by four 
 of their Senators, to France, to ask his pardon and receive his 
 terms. They were obliged to submit to it for the sake of peace. 
 Would he on any occasion either have demanded or have re- 
 ceived the like humiliation from Spain, or Britain, or any other 
 powerfol nation ? 
 
 PUBLIUK. 
 
THE FEDERALIST. %6 
 
 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 NUMBER IV. 
 
 NEW YORK, NOVEMBER 7, 1787. 
 
 JAY. 
 
 THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED. 
 
 My last paper assigned several reasons why the safety of the 
 people would be best secured by Union against the danger it 
 may be exposed to hy just causes of war given to other nations; 
 and those reasons show that such causes would nqt only be more 
 rarely given, but would also be more easily accommodated by a 
 national government, than either by the state governments, or 
 the proposed confederacies. 
 
 But the safety of the people of America against dangers from 
 foreign force, depends not only on their forbearing to give just 
 causes of war to other nations, but also on their placing and con- 
 tinuing themselves in such a situation as not to invite hostility 
 or insult j for it need not be observed, that there are pretended 
 as well as just causes of war. 
 
 It is too true, however disgraceful it may be to human na- 
 ture, that nations in general will make war whenever they have 
 a prospect of getting any thing by itj nay, that absolute 
 monarchs will often make war when their nations are to get 
 nothing by it, but for purposes and objects merely personal, such 
 as, a thirst for military glory, revenge for personal affronts, ambi- 
 tion, or private compacts to aggrandize or support their par- 
 ticular families, or partizans. These, and a variety of motives, 
 
66 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 wnicb affect only the mind of the sovereign, often lead him to 
 engage in wars not sanctioned by justice, or the voice and inte- 
 rests of his people. But independent of these inducements to 
 war, which are most prevalent in absolute monarchies, but 
 which well deserve our attention, there are others which affect 
 nations as often as kings ; and some of them will, on examina- 
 tion, be found to grow out of our relative situation and circum- 
 stances. 
 
 With France and with Britain we are rivals in the fisheries, 
 and can supply their markets cheaper than they can themselves, 
 notwithstanding any efforts to prevent it by bounties on their 
 own, or duties on foreign fish. 
 
 With them, and with most other European nations, we are 
 rivals in navigation, and the carrying trade ; and we shall deceive 
 ourselves if we suppose that any of them will rejoice to see 
 these flourish in our hands : for as our carrying trade cannot 
 increase, without in some degree diminishing their's, it is more 
 their interest and will be more their policy, to restrain than to 
 promote it. 
 
 In the trade to China and India, we interfere with more than 
 one nation, inasmuch as it enables us to partake in advantages 
 which they had in a manner monopolized, and as we thereby 
 supply ourselves with commodities which we used to purchase 
 from them. 
 
 The extension of our own commerce in our own vessels, 
 uannot give pleasure to any nations who possess territories on 
 or near this continent, because the cheapness and excellence of 
 our productions, added to the circumstance of vicinity, and the 
 enterprise and address of our merchants and navigators, will 
 give us a greater share in the advantages which those territories 
 afford, than consists with the wishes or policy of their respec- 
 tive sovereigns. 
 
 Spain thinks it convenient to shut the Mississippi against us 
 on the one side, and Britain excludes us from the St. Lawrence 
 on the other; nor will either of them permit the other waters. 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 4 
 
 which are between them and us, to become the means of mutual 
 intercourse and traflSc. 
 
 From these, and like considerations, which might, if consistent 
 with prudence, be more amplified and detailed, it is easy to see 
 that jealousies and uneasinesses may gradually slide into the 
 minds and cabinets of other nations; and that we are not to 
 expect they should regard our advancement in union, in power 
 and consequence by land and by sea, with an eye of indifference 
 and composure. 
 
 The people of America are aware that inducements to war 
 may arise out of these circumstances, as well as from others not 
 BO obvious at present; and that whenever such inducements 
 may find fit time and opportunity for operation, pretences to 
 colour and justify them will not be wanting. Wisely therefore, 
 do they consider union and a good national government, as neces- 
 sary to put and keep them in such a situation, as, instead of 
 inviting war, will tend to repress and discourage it. That situa- 
 tion consists in the best possible state of defence, and necessarily 
 depends on the government, the arms, and the resources of the 
 country. 
 
 As the safety of the whole is the interest of the whole, and 
 cannot be provided for without government, either one or more, 
 or many, let us inquire whether one good government is not, 
 relative to the object in question, more competent than any 
 other given number whatever. 
 
 One government can collect and avail itself of the talents and 
 experience of the ablest men, in whatever part of the Union 
 they may be found. It can move on uniform principles of policy. 
 It can harmonize, assimilate, and protect the several parts and 
 members, and extend the benefit of its foresight and pre- 
 cautions to each. In the formation of treaties' it will regard 
 tne interest of the whole, and the particular interests of the 
 parts as connected with that of the whole. It can apply the 
 resources and power of the whole to the defence of any par- 
 ticular part, and that more easily and expeditiously than state 
 governments, or separate confederacies, can possibly do, f<* 
 
68 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 want of concert and unity of system. It can place the militia 
 under one plan of discipline, and by putting their officers in a 
 proper line of subordination to the chief magistrate, will in a 
 manner consolidate them into one corps, and thereby render 
 them more efficient than if divided into thirteen, or into three 
 or four distinct independent bodies. 
 
 What would the militia of Britain be, if the English militia 
 obeyed the government of England, if the Scotch militia 
 obeyed the government of Scotland, and if the Welch militia 
 obeyed the government of Wales ? Suppose an invasion : 
 would those three governments (if they agreed at all) be able 
 with all their respective forces, to operate against the enemy 
 80 effectually as the single government of Great Britain 
 would? 
 
 We have heard much of the fleets of Britain ; and if we 
 are wise, the time may come, when the fleets of America may 
 engage attention. But if one national government had not 
 so regulated the navigation of Britain as to make it a nursery 
 for seamen — if one national government had not called forth 
 all the national means and materials for forming fleets, their 
 prowess and their thunder would never have been cele- 
 brated. Let England have its navigation and fleet ; let Scot- 
 land have its navigation and fleet ; let Wales have its naviga- 
 tion and fleet; let Ireland have its navigation and fleet; let 
 those four of the constituent parts of the British empire 
 be under four independent governments, and it is easy to per- 
 ceive how soon they would each dwindle into comparative insig- 
 nificance. 
 
 Apply these facts to our own case. Leave America divided 
 into thirteen, or, if you please, into three or four independ- 
 ent governments, what armies could they raise and pay, 
 what fleets could they ever hope to have ? If one was 
 attacked, would the others fly to its succour, and spend their 
 blood and money in its defence? Would there be no danger 
 of their being flattered into neutrality by specious promises, 
 or seduced by a too great fondness for peace to decline haz- 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 69 
 
 aiding their tranquillity and present safety for the sake of 
 neighbours, of whom perhaps they have been jealous, and 
 whose importance they are content to see diminished? Al- 
 though such conduct would not be wise, it would nevertheless 
 be natural. The history of the states of Greece, and of other 
 countries, abound with such instances ; and it is not improbable 
 that what has so often happened, would, under similar circum- 
 stances, happen again. 
 
 But admit that they might be willing to help the invaded 
 state or confederacy. How, and when, and in what propor- 
 tion, shall aids of men and money be afforded? Who shall 
 command the allied armies, and from which of the associates 
 shall he receive his orders? Who shall settle the terms of 
 peace ? and in case of disputes, what umpire shall decide be- 
 tween them, and compel acquiescence? Various difficulties 
 and inconveniences would be inseparable from such a situa- 
 tion; whereas one government, watching over the general 
 and common interests, combining and directing the powers 
 and resources of the whole, would be free from all these 
 embarrassments, and conduce far more to the safety of the 
 • people. 
 
 But whatever may be our situation, whether firmly united 
 under one national government, or split into a number of 
 confederacies, certain it is, that foreign nations will know and 
 view it exactly as it ib ; and they will act towards us accord- 
 ingly. If they see that our national government is efficient 
 and well administered — our trade prudently regulated — our 
 militia properly organized and disciplined — our resources and 
 finances discreetly managed — our credit re-established — our 
 people free, contented, and united; they will be much more 
 disposed to cultivate our friendship, than to provoke our re- 
 sentment. If, on the other hand, they find us either destitute 
 of an effectual government, (each state doing right or wrong, 
 as to its rulers may seem convenient) or split into three or 
 four independent, and probably discordant, republics or con- 
 federacies, one inclining to Britain, another to France, and a 
 
70, THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 third to Spain, and perhaps played off against each other by 
 the three, what a poor pitiful figure will America make in 
 their eyes ! How liable would she become, not only to their 
 contempt, but to their outrage; and how soon would dear 
 bought experience proclaim, that when a people or family so 
 divide, it never fail 3 to be against themselves. 
 
 PUBLTUS. 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 71 
 
 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 NUMBER V. 
 
 NEW YORK, NOVEMBER 10, 1787. 
 
 JAY. 
 
 THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED. 
 
 Queen Ann, in her letter of the Ist July, 1706, to the Scotch 
 Parliament, makes some observations on the importance of the 
 Union then forming between England and Scotland, which merit 
 our attention. 
 
 I shall present the public with one or two extracts from it 
 "An entire and perfect union will be the solid foundation of 
 lasting peace : It will secure your religion, liberty, and property; 
 remove the animosities amongst yourselves, and the jealousies 
 and differences betwixt our two kingdoms. It must increase 
 your strength, riches, and trade; and by this union the whole 
 island, being joined in affection and free from all apprehensions 
 of different interests, will be enabled to resist all its enemies." 
 " We most earnestly recommend to you calmness and unanimity 
 in this great and weighty affair, that the union may be brought 
 to a happy conclusion, being the only effectual way to secure 
 our present and future nappiness; and disappoint the designs 
 of our and your enemies, who will doubtless, on this occasion, 
 use their utmost endeavours to prevent or delay this union." 
 
 It was remarked in the preceding paper, that weakness and 
 divisions at home, would invite dangers from abroad ; and that 
 nothing would tend more to secure us from them than union, 
 
72 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 strength, and good government within ourselves. This subject 
 is copious, and cannot easily be exhausted. 
 
 The history of Great-Britain is the one with which we are in 
 general the best acquainted, and it gives us many useful lessons 
 We may profit by their experience, without paying the price 
 which it cost them. Although it seems obvious to common 
 sense, that the people of such an island should be but one nation, 
 yet we find that they were for ages divided into three, and that 
 those three were almost constantly embroiled in quarrels and 
 wars with one another. Notwithstanding their true interest, 
 with respect to the continental nations, was really the same, yet 
 by the arts and policy, and practices of those nations, their 
 mutual jealousies were perpetually kept enflamed, and for a long 
 series of years they were far more inconvenient and troublesome, 
 than they were useful and assisting to each other. 
 
 Should the people of America divide themselves into three or 
 four nations, would not the same thing happen ? Would not 
 similar jealousies arise, and be in like manner cherished ? Instead 
 of their being "joined in affection, and free from all apprehension 
 of different interests," envy and jealousy would soon extinguish 
 confidence and affection, and the partial interests of each con- 
 federacy, instead of the general interests of all America, would 
 be the only objects of their policy and pursuits. Hence, like most 
 other bordering nations, they would always be either involved in 
 disputes and war, or live in the constant apprehension of them. 
 
 The most sanguine advocates for three or four confederacies, 
 cannot reasonably suppose that they would long remain exactly 
 on an equal footing in point of strength, even if it was possible 
 to form them so at first : but admitting that to be practicable, 
 yet what human contrivance can secure the continuance of such 
 equality ? Independent of those local circumstances, which tenu 
 to beget and increase power in one part, and to impede its pro- 
 gress in another, we must advert to the effects of that superior 
 policy and good management which would probably distinguish 
 the government of one above the rest, and by which their reJa^- 
 tive equality in strength and consideration would be destroyed 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 78 
 
 For it cannot be presumed, that the same degree of sound pohcy, 
 prudence, and foresight, would uniformly be observed by each 
 of these confederacies, for a long succession of years. 
 
 Whenever, and from whatever causes it might happen, and 
 happen it would, that any one of these nations or confederacies 
 should rise on the scale of political importance much above the 
 degree of her neighbours, that moment would those neighbours 
 behold her with envy and with fear. Both those passions would 
 lead them to countenance, if not to promote, whatever might 
 promise to diminish her importance; and would also restrain 
 them from measures calculated to advance, or even to secure her 
 prosperity. — Much time would not be necessary to enable her to 
 discern these unfriendly dispositions. She would soon begin, not 
 only to lose confidence in her neighbours, but also to feel a dis- 
 position equally unfavourable to them. Distrust naturally creates 
 distrust; and by nothing is good will and kind conduct more 
 speedily changed, than by invidious jealousies and uncandid 
 imputations, whether expressed or implied. 
 
 The North is generally the region of strength, and many local 
 circumstances render it probable, that the most northern of the 
 proposed confederacies would, at a period not very far distant, 
 be unquestionably more formidable than any of the others. No 
 sooner would this become evident, than the Northern Hive would 
 excite the same ideas and sensations in the more Southern parts 
 of America, which it formerly did in the Southern parts of Eu- 
 rope : Nor does it appear to be a rash conjecture, that its young 
 swarms might often be tempted to gather honey in the more 
 blooming fields and milder air of their luxurious and more 
 delicate neighbours. 
 
 They who well consider the history of similar divisions and 
 confederacies, will find abundant reasons to apprehend, that those 
 in contemplation would in no other sense be neighbours, than as 
 they would be borderers; that they would neither love nor trust 
 one another, but on the contrary, would be a prey to discord, 
 Jealousy, and mutual injuries; in short, that they would place 
 us exactly in tho situation in which some nations doubtless 
 
74 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 wish to see us — in which we should be formidable only to each, 
 other. 
 
 From these considerations, it appears that those persons are 
 greatly mistaken, who suppose that alliances oflfensive and defen 
 sive might be formed between these confederacies, which would 
 produce that combination and union of wills, of arms, and of 
 resources, which would be necessary to put and keep them in a 
 formidable state of defence against foreign enemies. 
 
 When did the independent states into which Britain and Spain 
 were formerly divided, combine in such alliances, or unite their 
 forces against a foreign enemy? The proposed confederacies 
 will be distinct nations. Each of them would have to regulate 
 its commerce with foreigners by distinct treaties; and as their 
 productions and commodities are different, and proper for differ 
 ent markets, so would those treaties be essentially different 
 Different commercial concerns must create different interests, 
 and of course different degrees of political attachment to, and 
 connection with, different foreign nations. Hence it might and 
 probably would happen, that the foreign nation with whom 
 the Southern confederacy might be at war, would be the one, 
 with whom the Northern confederacy would be the most desirous 
 of preserving peace and friendship. An alliance so contrary to 
 their immediate interest would not therefore be easy to form, 
 nor if formed, would it be observed and fulfilled with perfect 
 good faith. 
 
 Nay, it is far more probable that in America, as in Europe, 
 neighbouring nations, acting under the impulse of opposite inte- 
 rests, and unfriendly passions, would frequently be found taking 
 different sides. Considering our distance from Europe, it would 
 be more natural for these confederacies to apprehend danger 
 from one another, than from distant nations, and therefore that 
 each of them should be more desirous to guard against the others, 
 by the aid of foreign alliances, than to guard against foreign 
 dangers by alliances between themselves. And here let us not 
 forget how much more easy it is to receive foreign fleets into our 
 ports, and foreign armies into our countrv. than it is to persuade* 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 71 
 
 or compel them to depart. How many conquests did the Eoman? 
 and others make in the character of allies, and what innovation? 
 did they under the same character introduce into the govern- 
 ments of those whom they pretended to protect? 
 
 Let candid men judge then whether the division of America 
 into any given number of independent sovereignties, would tend 
 to secure us against the hostilities and improper interference of 
 foreign nations. 
 
 PUBLIUS 
 
 1« 
 
76 THE FEDERADIST. 
 
 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 NUMBER VI. 
 
 NEW YORK, NOVEMBER 14, 1787. 
 
 HAMILTON. 
 
 CONCERNING DANGERS FROM WAR BETWEEN THE STATES. 
 
 The three last numbers of this work have been dedicated to 
 an enumeration of the dangers to which we should be exposed, 
 in a state of disunion, from the arms and arts of foreign nations. 
 I shall now proceed to delineate dangers of a different, and, 
 perhaps, still more alarming kind, those which will in all proba- 
 bility flow from dissentions between the states themselves, and 
 from domestic factions and convulsions. These have been already 
 in some instances slightly anticipated; but they deserve a more 
 particular and more full investigation. 
 
 If these states should either be wholly disunited, or only united 
 m partial confederacies, a man must be far gone in Utopian spe- 
 culations, who can seriously doubt that the subdivisions into 
 which they might be thrown, would have frequent and violent 
 contests with each other. To presume a want of motives for 
 such contests, as an argument against their existence, would be 
 to forget that men are ambitious, vindictive, and rapacious. To 
 look for a continuation of harmony between, a number of inde- 
 pendent unconnected sovereignties, situated in the same neigh- 
 bourhood, would be to disregard the uniform course of human 
 events, and to set at defiance the accumulated experience of ages. 
 
 The causes of hostility among nations are innumerable. There 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 77 
 
 are some which have a general and almost constant operatiop 
 upon the collective bodies of society. Of this description are 
 the love of power, or the desire of preeminence and dominion- 
 the jealousy of power, or the desire of equality and safety. There 
 are others which have a more circumscribed, though an equally 
 operative influence, within their spheres: such are therivalships 
 and competitions of commerce between commercial nations. 
 And there are others, not less numerous than either of the former, 
 which take their origin entirely in private passions; in the 
 attachments, enmities, interests, hopes, and fears, of leading indi- 
 viduals in the communities of which they are members. Men of 
 this class, whether the favourites of a king or of a people, have 
 in too many instances abused the confidence they possessed; and 
 assuming the pretext of some public motive, have not scrupled 
 to sacrifice the national tranquillity to personal advantage, or 
 personal gratification. 
 
 The celebrated Pericles, in compliance with the resentments 
 of a prostitute,* at the expense of much of the blood and trea- 
 sure of his countrymen, attacked, vanquished, and destroyed the 
 city of the Samnians. The same man, stimulated by private 
 pique against the Magarensians, another nation of Greece, or to 
 avoid a prosecution with which he was threatened as an accom- 
 plice in a supposed theft of the statuary Phidias, or to get rid 
 of the accusations prepared to be brought against him for dissi- 
 pating the funds of the state in the purchase of popularity, or 
 from a combination of all these causes, was the primitive author 
 of that famous and fatal war, distinguished in the Grecian annals 
 by the name of the Peloponnesian war; which, after various vicis- 
 situdes, intermissions, and renewals, terminated in the ruin of 
 the Athenian commonwealth. 
 
 The ambitious cardinal, who was prime minister to Henry 
 Vlllth, permitting his vanity to aspire to the triple-crown, 
 entertained hopes of succeeding in the acquisition of that splendid 
 prizn by the influence of the emperor Charles Vth. To secure 
 
 * AsPASiA, vide Pltttabch's life of Pericles. 
 
78 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 the favour dnd interest of this enterprising and powerful monaren, 
 he precipitated England into a war with France, contrary to the 
 plainest dictates of policy, and at the hazard of the safety and 
 independence, as well of the kingdom over which he presided by 
 his counsels, as of Europe in general. For if there ever was a 
 sovereign who bid fair to realize the project of universal mon- 
 archy, it was the emperor Charles Vth, of whose intrigues Wolsey 
 was at once the instrument and the dupe. 
 
 The influence which the bigotry of one female,* the petulances 
 of another,f and the cabals of a third,| had in the cotemporary 
 policy, ferments, and pacifications, of a considerable part of 
 Europe, are topics that have been too often descanted upon not 
 to be generally known. 
 
 To multiply examples of the agency of personal considerations 
 in the production of great national events, either foreign or 
 domestic, according to their direction, would be an unnecessary 
 waste of time. Those who have but a superficial acquaintance 
 with the sources from which they are to be drawn, will them- 
 selves recollect a variety of instances; and those who have a 
 tolerable knowledge of human nature, will not stand in need of 
 such lights, to form their opinion either of the reality or extent 
 of that agency. Perhaps, however, a reference, tending to illus- 
 trate the general principle, may with propriety be made to a 
 case which has lately happened among ourselves. If Shays had 
 had not been a desperate debtor, it is much to be doubted whether 
 Massachusetts would have been plunged into a civil war. 
 
 But notwithstanding the concurring testimony of experience, 
 in this particular, there are still to be found visionary, or design- 
 ing men, who stand ready to advocate the paradox of perpetual 
 peace between the states, though dismembered and alienated 
 from each other. The genius of republics, say they, is pacific; 
 the spirit of commerce has a tendency to soften the manners of 
 men, and to extinguish those inflammable humours which have 
 80 often kindled into wars. Commercial republics, like ours, will 
 
 * Madame de Maintenon. f Duchess of Marlborough. 
 
 X Madame de Pompadour. 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 79 
 
 never be disposed to waste themselves in ruinous contentions 
 with each other. They will be governed by mutual interest, and 
 will cultivate a spirit of mutual amity and concord. 
 
 We may ask these projectors in politics, whether it is not the 
 true interest of all nations to cultivate the same benevolent and. 
 philosophic spirit ? If this be their true interest, have they in 
 fact pursued it? Has it not, on the contrary, invariably been 
 found, that momentary passions, and immediate interests, have a 
 more active and imperious control over human conduct, than 
 general or remote considerations of policy, utility, or justice? 
 Have republics in practice been less addicted to war than mon- 
 archies ? Are not the former administei od by men as well as 
 the latter? Are there not aversions, predilections, rivalships, 
 and desires of unjust acquisition, that affect nations, as well as 
 kings? Are not popular assemblies frequently subject to the 
 impulses of rage, resentment, jealousy, avarice, and. of other, 
 irregular and violent propensities ? Is it not well known, that 
 their determinations are often governed by a few individuals in 
 whom they place confidence, and that they are of course liable 
 to be tinctured by the passions and views of those individuals ? 
 Has commerce hitherto done any thing more than change the 
 objects of war? Is not the love of wealth as domineering and 
 enterprising a passion as that of power or glory? Have there 
 not been as many wars founded upon commercial motives, since 
 that has become the prevailing system of nations, as were before 
 occasioned by the cupidity of territory or dominion ? Has not 
 the spirit of commerce, in many instances, administered new 
 incentives to the appetite both for the one and for the other? — 
 Let experience, the least fallible guide of human opinions, be 
 appealed to for an answer to these inquiries. 
 
 Sparta, Athens, Eome, and Carthage, were all republics; two 
 of them, Athens and Carthage, of the commercial kind. Yet 
 were they as often engaged in wars, offensive and defensive, as 
 the neighbouring monarchies of the same times. Sparta was 
 little better than a well regulate! camp; and Eome was never 
 sated of carnage and conquest. 
 
80 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 Cai tltage, though a commercial republiis, was the aggressor in 
 the very war that ended in her destruction. Hannibal had 
 carried her arms into the heart of Italy, and even to the gates 
 of Eome, before Scipio, in turn, gave him an overthrow in the 
 territories of Carthage, and made a conquest of the common- 
 wealth. 
 
 Venice, in latter times, figured more than once in wars of 
 ambition; till becoming an object of terror to the other Italian 
 states. Pope Julius the Second found means to accomplish that 
 formidable league,* which gave a deadly blow to the power and 
 pride of that haughty republic. 
 
 The provinces of Holland, till they were overwhelmed in 
 debts and taxes, took a leading and conspicuous part in the 
 wars of Europe. They had furious contests with England for 
 the dominion of the sea ; and were among the most persevering 
 and most implacable of the opponents of Lewis XIV. 
 
 In the government of Britain the representatives of the people 
 compose one branch of the national legislature. Commerce has 
 been for ages the predominant pursuit of that country. Yet few 
 nations have been more frequently engaged in war; and the 
 wars, in which that kingdom has been engaged, have in nume- 
 rous instances proceeded from the people. There have been, if I 
 may so express it, almost as many popular as royal wars. The 
 cries of the nation and the importunities of their representa- 
 tives have, upon various occasions, dragged their monarchs into 
 war, or continued them in it, contrary to their inclinations, and 
 sometimes contrary to the real interests of the state In that 
 memorable struggle for superiority, between the rival houses of 
 Austria and Bourbon, which so long kept Europe in a flame, it is 
 well known that the antipathies of the English against the 
 French, seconding the ambition, or rather the avarice, of a 
 favourite leader ,f protracted the war beyond the limits marked 
 
 * Thk LKAamc or Cahbbat, comprehending the Emperor, the King of France 
 the King of Aragon, and most of the Italian Princes and States, 
 f The Duke of Marlborough. 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 81 
 
 out by sound policy, and for a considerable time in opposition to 
 the views of the court. 
 
 The wars of these two last mentioned nations have in a great 
 measure grown out of commercial considerations ; — the desire 
 of supplanting, and the fear of being supplanted either in par- 
 ticular branches of traffic, or in the general advantages of trade 
 and navigation; and sometimes even the more culpable desire 
 of sharing in the commerce of other nations, without their 
 consent. 
 
 The last war but two between Britain and Spain, sprang from 
 the attempts of the English merchants, to prosecute an illicit 
 trade with the Spanish main. These unjustifiable practices on 
 their part, produced severities on the part of the Spaniards, 
 towards the subjects of Great Britain, which were not mort> 
 justifiable ; because they exceeded the bounds of a just retalia- 
 tion, and were chargeable with inhumanity and cruelty. Many 
 of the English who were taken on the Spanish coasts, were sent 
 to dig in the mines of Potosi j and by the usual progress of a 
 spirit of resentment, the innocent were after a while confounded 
 with the guilty in indiscriminate punishment. The complaints 
 of the merchants kindled a violent flame throughout the nation, 
 which soon after broke out in the house of commons, and was 
 communicated from that body to the ministry. Letters of 
 reprisal were granted, and a war ensued; which, in its con- 
 sequences, overthrew all the alliances that but twenty years 
 before had been formed, with sanguine expectations of the most 
 beneficial fruits. 
 
 From this summary of what has taken place in other coun- 
 tries, whose situations have borne the nearest resemblance to our 
 own, what reason can we have to confide in those reveries, which 
 would seduce us into the expectation of peace and cordiality 
 between the members of the present confederacy, in a state of 
 separation ? Have we not already seen enough of the fallacy and 
 extravagance of those idle theories which have amused us with 
 promises of an exemption from the imperfections, the weak- 
 nesses, and the evils incident to society in every shape? Is it 
 
82 THE FEDERALIST 
 
 not time to awake from the deceitful dream of a golden age, 
 and to adopt as a practical maxim for the direction of our 
 political conduct, that we, as well as the other inhabitants of the 
 globe, are yet remote from the happy empire of perfect wisdom 
 and perfect virtue ? 
 
 Let the point of extreme depression to which our national 
 dignity and credit have sunk; let the inconveniences felt every 
 where from a lax and ill administration of government; let the 
 revolt of a part of the state of North Carolina; the late men- 
 acing disturbances in Pennsylvania, and the actual insurrec- 
 tions and rebellions in Massachusetts, declare ! 
 
 So far is the general sense of mankind from corresponding 
 with the tenets of those, who endeavour to lull asleep our appre- 
 hensions of discord and hostility between the states, in the event 
 of disunion, that it has from long observation of the progress of 
 society become a sort of axiom in politics, that vicinity, or near- 
 ness of situation, constitutes nations natural enemies. An intel- 
 ligent writer expresses himself on this subject to this effect: 
 " Neighbouring nations (says he) are naturally enemies of 
 each other, unless their common weakness forces them to league 
 in a CONFEDERATE REPUBLIC, and their constitution prevents the 
 differences that neighbourhood occasions, extinguishing that 
 secret jealousy, which disposes all states to aggrandize them- 
 selves at the expense of their neighbours."* This passage, at 
 the same time, points out the evil and suggests the remedy. 
 
 PUBLIUS. 
 * Vide, Prinoipea des Negotiations par I'Abb^ de Mably. 
 
THE FEDERALIST. . 83 
 
 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 NUMBER VII. 
 
 NEW YORK, NOVEMBER 17, 1787. 
 
 HAMILTON. 
 
 THE SUBJECT CONTINUED, AND PARTICULAR CAUSES ENUMERATED. 
 
 It is sometimes asked, with an air of seeming triumph, what 
 inducements the states could have, if disunited, to make war 
 upon each other? It would be a full answer to this question 
 to say, — precisely the same inducements which have, at dif- 
 ferent times, deluged in blood all the nations in the world. 
 But unfortunately for us, the question admits of a more par- 
 ticular answer. There are causes of difference within our im- 
 mediate contemplation, of the tendency of which, even under 
 the restraints of a federal constitution, we have had sufficient 
 experience to enable us to form a judgment of what might be 
 expected, if those restraints were removed. 
 
 Territorial disputes have at all times been found one of the 
 aiost fertile sources of hostility among nations. Perhaps the 
 greatest proportion of the wars that have desolated the earth 
 have sprung from this origin. This cause would exist, among 
 us, in full force. We have a vast tract of unsettled territory 
 within the boundaries of the United States. There still are 
 discordant and undecided claims between several of them ; and 
 the dissolution of the union would lay a foundation for similar 
 claims between them all. It is well known, that they have 
 heretofore had serious and animated discussions concerning the 
 
«4 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 right to the lands which were ungranted at ihu timi> of the 
 revolution, and which usually went under the name of crown- 
 lands. The states within the limits of whose colonial govern- 
 ments they were comprised, have claimed them as their pro- 
 perty; the others have contended that the rights of the crown 
 in this article devolved upon the union; especially as to all that 
 part of the Western territory which, either by actual pos- 
 session, or through the submission of the Indian pi'oprietors, 
 was subject to the jurisdiction of the King of Great-Britain, 
 till it was relinquished by the treaty of peace. This, it has 
 been said, was at all events an acquisition to the confederacy 
 by compact with a foreign power. It has been the prudent 
 policy of Congress to appease this controversy, by prevail- 
 ing upon the states to make cessions to the United States 
 for the benefit of the whole. This has been so far accom- 
 plished, as under a continuation of the union, to afford a 
 decided prospect of an amicable termination of the dispute. 
 A dismemberment of the confederacy however would revive 
 this dispute, and would create others on the same subject 
 At present, a large part of the vacant "Western territory ig 
 by cession at least, if not by any anterior right, the common 
 property of the union. If that were at an end, the states 
 which have made cessions, on a principle of federal com- 
 promise, would be apt, when the motive of the grant had 
 ceased, to reclaim the lands as a reversion. The other states 
 would no doubt insist on a proportion, by right of represen- 
 tation. Their argument would be, that a grant once made, 
 could not be revoked; and that the justice of their partici- 
 pating in territory acquired or secured, by the joint efforts 
 of the confederacy, remained undiminished. If, contrary to 
 probability, it should be admitted by all the states, that each 
 had a right to a share of this common stock, there would 
 still be a difficulty to be surmounted, as to a proper rule of 
 apportionment. Different principles would be set up by dif- 
 ferent states for this purpose; and as they would affect the 
 
THE FEDERALIST. flS 
 
 opposite interests of the parties, they miglit not easny be sus- 
 ceptible of a pacific adjustment. 
 
 In the wide field of Western territory, therefore, we per- 
 ceive an ample theatre for hostile pretensions, without any 
 umpire or common judge to interpose between the contend- 
 ing parties. To reason from the past to the future, we shall 
 have good ground to apprehend, that the sword would some- 
 times be appealed to as the arbiter of their differences. The 
 circumstances of the dispute between Connecticut and Penn- 
 sylvania, respecting the lands at "Wyoming, admonish us not 
 to be sanguine in expecting an easy accommodation of such 
 differences,. The articles of confederation obliged the parties 
 to submit the matter to the decision of a federal court. The 
 submission was made, and the court decided in favour of 
 Pennsylvania. But Connecticut gave strong indications of dis- 
 satisfaction with that determination; nor did she appear to be 
 entirely resigned to it, till by negotiation and management some- 
 thing like an equivalent was found for the loss she supposed 
 herself to have sustained. Nothing here said, is intended to 
 convey the slightest censure on the conduct of that State. She 
 no doubt sincerely believed herself to have been injured by 
 the decision; and states, like individuals, acquiesce with great 
 reluctance in determinations to their disadvantage. 
 
 Those who had an opportunity of seeing the inside of the 
 transactions, which attended the progress of the controversy 
 between this state and the district of Vermont, can vouch the 
 opposition we experienced, as well from states not interested, 
 as from those which were interested in the claim ; ' and can 
 attest the danger to which the peace of the confederacy might 
 have been exposed, had this state attempted to assert its rights 
 by force. Two motives preponderated in that opposition ; one, 
 a jealousy entertained of our future power; another, the inte- 
 rest of certain individuals of influence in the neighbouring states, 
 who had obtained grants of lands under the actual government 
 of that district. Even the states which brought forward claims, 
 ;n contradiction to ours, seemed more solicitous to dismember 
 
86 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 this Stale, than to establish their own pretensions. These were 
 New-Hampshire, Massachusetts, and Connecticut. New-Jersey 
 and Rhode-Island, upon all occasions, discovered a warm zeal for 
 the independence of Vermont; and Maryland, until alarmed by 
 the appearance of a connection between Canada and that 
 place, entered deeply into the same views. These being small 
 states, saw with an unfriendly eye the perspective of our grow- 
 ing greatness. In a review of these transactions, we may trace 
 some of the causes which would be likely to embroil the states 
 with each other, if it should be their unpropitious destiny to 
 become disunited. 
 
 The competitions of commerce would be another fruitful 
 source of contention. The states less favourably circumstanced, 
 would be desirous of escaping from the disadvantages of 
 local situation, and of sharing in the advantages of their more 
 fortunate neighbours. Each state, or separate confederacy, 
 would pursue a system of commercial polity peculiar to itself. 
 This would occasion distinctions, preferences, and exclusions, 
 which would beget discontent. The habits of intercourse, on 
 the basis of equal privileges, to which we have been accustomed 
 from the earliest settlement of the country, would give a keener 
 edge to those causes of discontent, than they would naturally 
 have, independent of this circumstance. We should be ready to 
 denominate injuries, those things which were in reality the justifiable 
 acts of independent sovereignties consulting a distinct interest. The 
 spirit of enterprise, which characterizes the commercial part of 
 America, has left no occasion of displaying itself unimproved. 
 It is not at all probable, that this unbridled spirit would pay 
 much respect to those regulations of trade, by which particular 
 states might endeavour to secure exclusive benefits to their 
 own citizens. The infractions of these regulations on one Side, 
 the efforts to prevent and repel them on the other, would natu 
 rally lead to outrages, and these to reprisals and wars. 
 
 The opportunities, which some states would have of rendering 
 others tributary to them, by commercial regulations, would be 
 impatiently submitted to by the tributary states The relative 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 87 
 
 situation of New-York, Connecticut, and New-Jersey, would 
 afford an example of this kind. New- York, from the necessities 
 of revenue, must lay duties on her importations. A great pan 
 of these duties must be paid by the inhabitants of the two other 
 states, in the capacity of consumers of what we import. New- 
 York would neither be willing, nor able to forego this advantage. 
 Her citizens would not consent that a duty paid by them should 
 be remitted in favour of the citizens of her neighbours; nor 
 would it be practicable, if there were not this impediment in the 
 way, to distinguish the customers in our own markets. 
 
 Would Connecticut and New-Jersey long submit to be taxed 
 by New- York for her exclusive benefit? Should we be long 
 permitted to remain in the quiet and undisturbed enjoyment of 
 a metropolis, from the possession of which we derived an ad- 
 vantage so odious to our neighbours, and, in their opinion, so 
 oppressive ? Should we be able to preserve it against the incum- 
 bent weight of Connecticut on the one side, and the co-operating 
 pressure of New-Jersey on the other ? These are questions that 
 temerity alone will answer in the aflSrmative. 
 
 The public debt of the Union would be a further cause of 
 collision between the separate states or confederacies. The 
 apportionment, in the first instance, and the progressive extin- 
 guishment, afterwards, would be alike productive of ill humour 
 and animosity. How would it be possible to agree upon a rule 
 of apportionment, satisfactory to all ? There is scarcely any, 
 that can be proposed, which is entirely free from real objections 
 These, as usual, would be exaggerated by the adverse interest 
 of the parties. There are even dissimilar views among the 
 states, as to tne general principle of discharging the public 
 debt. Some of them, either less impressed with the importance 
 of national credit, or because their citizens have little, if any, 
 immediate interest in the question, feel an indifference, if not a 
 repugnance, to the payment of the domestic debt, at any rate. 
 These would be inclined to magnify the difficulties of a distribu- 
 tion. Others of them, a numerous body of whose citizens are 
 creditors of the public, beyond the proportion of the state 
 
38 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 in the total amount of the national debt, would be strenuous 
 for some equitable and effectual provision. The procrastina- 
 tions of the former, would excite the resentments of the latter. 
 The settlement of a rule, would in the mean time be postponed, 
 by real differences of opinion, and affected delays. The citizens 
 of the states interested, would clamour ; foreign powers would 
 urge, for the satisfaction of their just demands; and the peace 
 of the states would be exposed to the double contingency of 
 external invasion, and internal contention. 
 
 But suppose the difficulties of agreeing upon a rule sur- 
 mounted, and the apportionment made. Still there is great 
 room to suppose, that the rule agreed upon would, in the ex- 
 periment, be found to bear harder upon some states than upon 
 otLers. Those which were sufferers by it, would naturally seek 
 for a mitigation of the burthen. The others would as naturally 
 De disinclined to a revision, which was likely to end in an 
 increase of their own incumbrances. Their refusal would 
 afford to the complaining states a pretext for withholding theii 
 contributions, too plausible not to be embraced with avidity; 
 and the non-compliance of these states with their engagements, 
 would be a ground of bitter dissention and altercation. If even 
 the rule adopted should in practice justify the equality of its 
 principle, still delinquencies in payment, on the part of some of 
 the states, would result from a diversity of other causes — the 
 real deficiency of resources; the mismanagement of their 
 finances; accidental disorders in the administration of the gov- 
 ernment; and in addition to the rest, the reluctance with which 
 men commonly part with money for purposes, that have out- 
 lived the exigencies which produced them, and interfere with 
 the supply of immediate wants. Delinquencies from whatever 
 causes would be productive of complaints, recriminations, and 
 quarrels. There is, perhaps, nothing more likely to disturb the 
 tranquillity of nations, than their being bound to mutual contri- 
 butions for any common object, which does not yield an equal 
 and coincident benefit. For it is an observation as true, as 
 
THE FEDERALIST. fc9 
 
 It is trite, that there is nothing men differ so readily about, as 
 tlie payment of money. 
 
 Laws in violation of private contracts, as they amount to 
 aggressions on the rights of those states, whose citizens are 
 injured by them, may be considered as another probable source of 
 hostility. We are not authorized to expect, that a more liberal, 
 or more equitable spirit would preside over the legislations of 
 the individual states hereafter, if unrestrained by any additional 
 checks, than we have heretofore seen, in too many instances, 
 disgracing their several codes. We have observed the disposi- 
 tion to retaliation excited in Connecticut, in consequence of the 
 enormities perpetrated by the legislature of Rhode-Island; and 
 we may reasonably infer, that in similar cases, under other cir- 
 cumstances, a war, not of parchment, but of the sword, would 
 chastise such atrocious breaches of moral obligation and social 
 justice. 
 
 The probability of incompatible alliances between the dif- 
 ferent states or confederacies, and different foreign nations, and 
 the effects of this situation upon the peace of the whole, have 
 been sufficiently unfolded in some preceding papers. From the 
 view they have exhibited of this part of the subject, this con- 
 clusion is to be drawn, that America, if not connected at all, or 
 only by the feeble tie of a simple league offensive and defensive, 
 would, by the operation of such opposite and jarring alliances, 
 be gradually entangled in all the pernicious labyrinths of Euro- 
 pean politics and wars; and by the destructive contentions of 
 the parts into which she was divided, would be likely to become 
 a prey to the artifices and machinations of powers equally the 
 enemies of them all. Divide et impera must be the motto of 
 every nat;' n ♦iat either hates or fears ub. 
 
 JfUisLiUb. 
 
90 THE FBDERALIST. 
 
 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 NUMBER VIII. 
 
 NEW YORK, NOVEMBER 21, 1787. 
 
 HAMILTON. 
 
 THE EFFECTS OF INTERNAL WAR IN PRODUCING STANDING 
 
 ARMJES, AND OTHER INSTITUTIONS UNFRIENDLY 
 
 TO LIBERTY. 
 
 . Assuming it therefore as an established truth, that, in case of 
 disunion, the several states, or such combinations of them as 
 might happen to be formed out of the wreck of the general con- 
 federacy, would be subject to those vicissitudes of peace and 
 war, of friendship and enmity with each other, which have 
 fallen to the lot of all neighbouring nations not united under 
 one government, let us enter into a concise detail of some of 
 the consequences that would attend such a situation. 
 
 War between the states, in the first periods of their separate 
 existence, would be accompanied with much greater distresses 
 than it commonly is in those countries, where regular military 
 establishments have long obtained. The disciplined armies 
 always kept on foot on the continent of Europe, though they 
 bear a malignant aspect to liberty and economy, have, notwith- 
 standing, been productive of the signal advantage of rendering 
 sudden conquests impracticable, and of preventing that rapid 
 desolation, which used to mark the progress of war, prior to 
 their introduction. The art of fortification has contributed to 
 the same ends. The nations of Europe are encircled with chains 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 91 
 
 of fortified places, which mutually obstruct invasion. Cam- 
 paigns are wasted in reducing two or three frontier garrisons, 
 to gain admittance into an enemy's country. Similar impedi- 
 ments occur at every step, to exhaust the strength, and delay 
 the progress of an invader. Formerly, an invading army would 
 penetrate into the heart of a neighbouring country, almost as 
 soon as intelligence of its approach could be received ; but now, 
 a comparatively small force of disciplined troops, acting on the 
 defensive, with the aid of posts, is able to impede, and finally to 
 frustrate, the enterprises of one much more considerable. The 
 history of war, in that quarter of the globe, is no longer a his- 
 tory of nations subdued, and empires overturned; but of towns 
 taken and retaken, of battles that decide nothing, of retreats 
 more beneficial than victories, of much effort and little acquj- 
 sition. 
 
 In this country, the scene would be altogether reversed. The 
 jealousy of military establishments, would postpone them as 
 long as possible. The want of fortifications, leaving the fron- 
 tiers of one state open to another, would facilitate inroads. The 
 populous states would, with little difficulty, over-run their less 
 populous neighbours. Conquests would be as easy to be made, 
 as difficult to be retained. War, therefore, would be desultory 
 and predatory. Plunder and devastation ever march in the 
 train of irregulars. The calamities of individuals would make 
 the principal figure in the events, which would characterize our 
 military exploits. 
 
 This picture is not too highly wrought; though, 1 confess, it 
 
 would not long remain a just one. Safety from external danger, 
 
 is the most powerful director of national conduct. Even the 
 
 ardent love of liberty will, after a time, give way to its dictates. 
 
 The violent destruction of life and property incident to war; the 
 
 continual effort and alarm attendant on a state of continual 
 
 danger, will compel nations the most attached to liberty, to resort 
 
 for repose and security to institutions which have a tendency to 
 
 destroy their civil and political rights. To be more safe, they, 
 
 Ht length, become willing to run the risk of being less free. 
 
 17 
 
92 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 The institutions chiefly alluded to, are standing armies, and 
 the correspondent appendages of military establishment. Stand- 
 ing armies, it is said, are not provided against in the new consti- 
 tution; and it is thence inferred that they would exist under it.* 
 This inference, from the very form of the proposition, is, at best, 
 problematical and uncertain. But standing armies, it may be 
 ■"eplied, must inevitably result from a dissolution of the con- 
 federacy. Frequent war, and constant apprehension, which 
 require a state of as constant preparation, will infallibly produce 
 them. The weaker states, or confederacies, would first have 
 recourse to them, to put themselves upon an equality with their 
 more potent neighbours. They would endeavour to supply the 
 inferiority of population and resources, by a more regular and 
 effective system of defence, by disciplined troops, and by forti- 
 fications. They would, at the same time, be obliged to strengthen 
 the executive arm of government ; in doing which, their consti- 
 tutions would acquire a progressive direction towards monarchy. 
 It is of the nature of war to increase the executive, at the 
 expense of the legislative authority. 
 
 The expedients which have been mentioned would soon give 
 the states, or confederacies, that made use of them, a superiority 
 over their neighbours. Small states, or states of less natural 
 strength, under vigorous governments, and with the assistance 
 of disciplined armies, have often triumphed over large states, or 
 states of greater natural strength, which have been destitute of 
 these advantages. Neither the pride, nor the safety, of the 
 more important states, or confederacies, would permit them long 
 to submit to this mortifying and adventitious superiority. They 
 would quickly resort to means similar to those by which it had 
 been effected, to reinstate themselves in their lost pre-eminence. 
 Thus we should in a little time see established in every part of 
 this country, the same engines of despotism which have been 
 
 * This objection will be fully examined in its proper place; and it will be 
 shown, that the only rational precaution which could have been taken on this 
 Bubjeot, has been taken; and a much better one than is to be found in any 
 constitution that has been heretofore framed in America, most of which contain 
 no guard at all on this subject. 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 98 
 
 the scourge of the old world. This, at least, would be the 
 natural course of things; and our reasonings will be likeiy lo 
 be just, in proportion as they are accommodated to this stan- 
 dard. 
 
 These are not vague inierences deduced from speculative 
 defects in a constitution, the whole power of which is lodged in 
 the hands of the people, or their representatives and delegates j 
 they are solid conclusions, drawn from the natural and necessary 
 progress of human affairs. 
 
 It may perhaps be asked, by way of objection, why did not 
 standing armies spring up out of the contentions which so often 
 distracted the ancient republics of Greece ? Different answers 
 equally satisfactory, may be given to this question. The indua 
 trious habits of the people of the present day, absorbed in tha 
 pursuits of gain, and devoted to the improvements of agriculture 
 and commerce, are incompatible with the condition of a nation, 
 of soldiers, which was the true condition of the people of those 
 republics. The means of revenue, which have been so greatly 
 multiplied by the increase of gold and silver, and of the arts 
 of industry, and the science of finance, which is the offspring of 
 modern times, concurring with the habits of nations, have pro- 
 duced an entire revolution in the system of war, and have 
 rendered disciplined armies, distinct from the body of the citi- 
 zens, the inseparable companion of frequent hostility. 
 
 There is a wide difference also, between military establish- 
 ments in a country which, by its situation, is seldom exposed to 
 invasions, and in one which is often subject to them, and always 
 apprehensive of them. The rulers of the former can have no 
 good pretext, if they are even so inclined, to keep on foot armies' 
 so numerous as must of necessity be maintained in the latten 
 These armies being, in the first case, rarely, if at all, called into 
 activity for interior defence, the people are in no danger of being 
 broken to military subordination. The laws are not accustomed 
 to relaxations, in favour of military exigencies ; the civil state 
 remains in full vigour, neither corrupted nor confounded with 
 ihe principles or propensities of the other state. The smallneea 
 
94 . THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 of ihe army forbids competition with the natural strength of 
 the community, and the citizens, not habituated to look up to 
 the military power for protection, or to submit to its oppressions, 
 neither love nor fear the soldiery: They view them with a spirit 
 of jealous acquiescence in a necessary evil, and stand ready to 
 resist a power which they suppose may be exerted to the preju- 
 dice of their rights. 
 
 The army under such circumstances, though it may usefully 
 did the magistrate to suppress a small faction, or an occasional 
 mob, or insurrection, will be utterly incompetent to the purpose 
 of enforcing encroachments against the united efforts of the 
 great body of the people. 
 
 But in a country, where the perpetual menacings of danger 
 oblige the government to be always prepared to repel it, her 
 armies must be numerous enough for instant defence. The 
 continual necessity for his services enhances the importance of 
 the soldier, and proportionably degrades the condition of the 
 citizen. The military state becomes elevated above the civil. 
 The inhabitants of territories often the theatre of war, are 
 unavoidably subjected to frequent infringements on their rights, 
 which serve to weaken their sense of those rights; and by 
 degrees, the people are brought to consider the soldiery not 
 only as their protectors, but as their superiors. The transition 
 from this disposition to that of considering them as masters, is 
 neither remote nor difficult : But it is very difficult to prevail 
 upon a people under such impressions, to make a bold, or effectual 
 resistance, to usurpations, supported by the military power. 
 
 The kingdom of Great Britain falls within the first descrip- 
 tion. An insular situation, and a powerful marine, guarding it 
 in a great measure against the possibility of foreign invasion, 
 supersede the necessity of a numerous army within the kingdom. 
 A sufficient force to make head against a sudden descent till the 
 militia could have time to rally and embody, is all that has been 
 deemed requisite. No motive of national policy has demanded, 
 nor would public opinion have tolerated a larger number of 
 ♦joops upon its domestic establishment. This peculiar felicitv 
 
THE FEDERALIST. • 95 
 
 of situation* has, in a great degree, contributed to preserve the 
 liberty, which that country to this day enjoys, in spite of the 
 prevalent venalit}' and corruption. If Britain had been situated 
 on the continent, and had been compelled, as she would have 
 been, by that situation, to make her military establishments ai 
 home co-extensive with those of the other great powers of 
 Europe, she, like them, would in all probability, at this day be 
 a victim to the absolute power of a single man. It is possible, 
 though not easy, for the people of that island to be enslaved 
 from other causes; but it cannot be by the prowess of an army 
 so inconsiderable as that which has been usually kept up within 
 the kingdom. 
 
 If we are wise enough to preserve the union, we may for ages 
 enjoy an advantage similar to that of an insulated situation. 
 Europe is at a great distance from us. Her colonies in our 
 vicinity, will be likely to continue too much disproportioned in 
 strength, to be able to give us any dangerous annoyance. Ex- 
 tensive military establishments cannot, in this position, be neces- 
 sary to our security. But if we should be disunited, and the 
 integral parts should either remain separated, or which is most 
 probable, should be thrown together into two or three confede- 
 racies, we should be in a short course of time, in the predica- 
 ment of the continental powers of Europe. Our liberties would 
 be a prey to the means of defending ourselves against the 
 ambition and jealousy of each other. 
 
 This is an idea not superficial nor futile, but solid and weighty. 
 It deserves the most serious and mature consideration of every 
 prudent and honest man, of whatever party: If such men wil\ 
 make a firm and solemn pause, and meditate dispassionately on 
 its vast importance; if they will contemplate it in all its atti- 
 tudes, and trace it to all its consequences, they will not hesitate 
 to part with trivial objections to a constitution, the rejection of 
 
 * The recent prodigious aggrandizement of France has, probably, altered tht 
 Bituation of Great-Britain in this respect: it will be happy if the alteration 
 has no tendency inanspicious to British liberty. 
 
fiQ • THE FEDEBALIST. 
 
 which would in all probability put a final period to the Union. 
 The airy phantoms that now flit before the distempered imagi- 
 nations of some of its adversaries, would then quickly give place 
 to the more substantial prospects of dangers, real, certain, and 
 extremely formidable. 
 
 PUBLIUS 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 97 
 
 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 NUMBER IX. 
 
 NEW YORK, NOVEMBER 21, 1787. 
 
 HAMILTON. 
 
 THF UTILITY OF THE UNION AS A SAFEGUARD AGAINST DOMESTIC 
 FACTION AND INSURRECTION. 
 
 A FIRM union will be of the utmost moment to the peace 
 and liberty of the states, as a barrier against domestic faction 
 and insurrection. 
 
 It is impossible to read the history of the petty republics of 
 Greece and Italy, without feeling sensations of horror and 
 disgust at the distractions with which they were continually 
 agitated, and at the rapid succession of revolutions, by which 
 they were kept perpetually vibrating between the extremes of 
 tyranny and anarchy. If they exhibit occasional calms, these 
 only serve as shortlived contrasts to the furious storms that 
 arc to succeed. If now and then intervals of felicity open 
 themselves to view, we behold them with a mixture of regret 
 urising from the reflection, that the pleasing scenes before us 
 are soon to be overwhelmed by the tempestuous waves of 
 sedition and party rage. If momentary rays of glory break 
 forth from the gloom, while they dazzle us with a transient 
 and fleeting brilliancy, they at the same time admonish us to 
 lament, that the vices of government should pervert the direc- 
 tion, and tarnish the lustre, of those bright talents and exalted 
 endowments, for which the favoured soils that produced them 
 hav*» been so justly celebrated. 
 
98 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 From the disorders that disfigure the annals of those re- 
 publics, the advocates of despotism have drawn arguments, not 
 only against the forms of republican government, but against 
 the very principles of civil liberty. They have decried all free 
 government, as inconsistent with the order of society, and have 
 indulged themselves in malicious exultation over its friends and 
 partizans. Happily for mankind, stupendous fabrics reared 
 On the basis of liberty, which have flourished for ages, have 
 in a few glorious instances refuted their gloomy sophisms. 
 And, I trust, America will be the broad and solid foundation 
 of other edifices not less magnificent, which will be equally 
 permanent monuments of their error. 
 
 But it is not to be denied, that the portraits they have 
 sketched of republican government, were too just copies of 
 the originals from which they were taken. If it had been 
 found impracticable, to have devised models of a more perfect 
 structure, the enlightened friends of liberty would have been 
 obliged to abandon the cause of that species of government 
 as indefensible.. The science of politics, however, like most 
 other sciences, has received great improvement. The efficacy 
 of various principles is now well understood, which were either 
 not known at all, or imperfectly known to the ancients. The 
 regular distribution of power into distinct departments; the 
 introduction of legislative balances and checks; the institution 
 of courts composed of judges, holding their offices during good 
 behaviour; the representation of the people in the legislature, 
 by deputies of their own election; these are either wholly new 
 discoveries, or have made their principal progress towards 
 perfection in modern times. They are means, and powerful 
 means, by which the excellencies of republican government 
 may be ratained, and its imperfections lessened ct avoided. 
 To this catalogue of circumstances, that tend to the ameliora- 
 tion of popular systems of civil government, I shall venture, 
 however novel it may appear to some, to add one more, on a 
 principle, which has been made the foundation of an objection 
 to the new constitution; I mean the enlargement of the orbit 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 99 
 
 within which such systems are to revolve, either in respect 
 to the dimensions of a single state, or to the consolidation of 
 several smaller states into one great confederacy. The latter 
 is that which immediately concerns the object under consider 
 ation. It will, however, be of use to examine the principle in 
 its application to a single state, which shall be attended to in 
 another place. 
 
 The utility of a confederacy, as well to suppress faction, and 
 to guard the internal tranquillity of states, as to increase their 
 external force and security, is in reality not a new idea. It has 
 been practised upon in different countries and ages, and has 
 received the sanction of the most approved writers on the 
 subjects of politics. The opponents of the plan proposed have 
 with great assiduity cited and circulated the observations of 
 Montesquieu on the necessity of a contracted territory for a 
 republican government. But they seem not to have been 
 apprised of the sentiments of that great man expressed in 
 another part of his work, nor to have adverted to the conse- 
 quences of the principle to which they subscribe with such 
 ready acquiescence. 
 
 "When Montesquieu recommends a small extent for republics, 
 the standards he had in view were of dimensions, far short of 
 the limits of almost every one of these states. Neither Vir- 
 ginia, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, New- York, North-Carolina, 
 nor Georgia, can by any means be compared with the models 
 from which he reasoned, and to which the terms of his de- 
 scription apply. If we therefore receive his ideas on this point, 
 as the criterion of truth, we shall be driven to the alternative, 
 either of taking refuge at once in the arms of monarchy, or 
 of splitting ourselves into an infinity of little, jealous, clash- 
 ing, tumultuous commonwealths, the wretched nurseries of un- 
 ceasing discord, and the miserable objects of universal pity or 
 contempt. Some of the writersi, who have come forward on 
 the other side of the question, seem to have been aware of 
 the dilemma; and have even been bold enough to hint at the 
 division of the larger states, as a desirable thing. Such an 
 
100 THE FEDEKALIST. 
 
 infatuated policy, such a desperate expedient, might, by the 
 multiplication of petty offices, answer the views of men, who 
 possess not qualifications to extend their influence beyond the 
 narrow circles of personal intrigue; but it could never promote 
 the greatness or happiness of the people of America. 
 
 Referring the examination of the principle itself to another 
 place, as has been already mentioned, it will be sufficient to 
 remark here, that in the sense of the author who has been most 
 emphatically quoted upon the occasion, it would only dictate 
 a reduction of the size of the more considerable members 
 of the union; but would not militate against their being all 
 comprehended in one confederate government. And this is 
 the true question, in the discussion of which we are at present 
 interested. 
 
 So far are the suggestions of Montesquieu from standing in 
 opposition to a general union of the states, that he explicitly 
 treats of a confederate republic as the expedient for extend- 
 ing the sphere of popular government, and reconciling the advan- 
 tages of monarchy with those of republicanism. 
 
 "It is very probable," says he,* "that mankind would have 
 been obliged, at length, to live constantly under the govern- 
 ment of a SINGLE person, had they not contrived a kind of 
 constitution, that has all the internal advantages of a repub- 
 lican, together with the external force of a monarchical govern- 
 ment. I mean a confederate republic. 
 
 " This form of government is a convention, by which several 
 smaller states agree to become members of a larger one, which 
 they intend to form. It is a kind of assemblage of societies, 
 that constitute a new one, capable of increasing by means 
 of new associations, till they arrive to such a degree of power 
 as to be able to provide for the security of the united body. 
 
 " A republic of this kind, able to withstand an external force, 
 may support itself without any internal corruption. The form 
 of this society prevents all manner of inconveniences. 
 
 * Spirit of Laws, Vol. I. Book IX. Chap. I. 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 101 
 
 "If a single memler should attempt to usurp the supreme 
 authority, he could net be supposed to have an equal authority 
 and credit in all the confederate states. Were he to have 
 too great influence over one, this would alarm the rest. Were 
 he to subdue a part, that which would still remain free might 
 oppose him with forces, independent of those which he had 
 usurped, and overpower him before he could be settled in his 
 usurpation. 
 
 "Should a popular insurrection happen in one of the con- 
 federate states, the others are able to quell it. Should abuses 
 creep into one part, they are reformed by those that remain 
 sound. The state may be destroyed on one side, and not on 
 the other; the confederacy may be dissolved, and the confede- 
 rates preserve their sovereignty. 
 
 "As this government is composed of small republics, it enjoys 
 the internal happiness of each, and with respect to its external 
 situation, it is possessed, by means of the association, of all the 
 advantages of large monarchies." 
 
 I have thought it proper to quote at length these interesting 
 passages, because they contain a luminous abridgment of the 
 principal arguments in favour of the union, and must efifectu- 
 ally remove the false impressions, which a misapplication of the 
 other parts of the work was calculated to produce. They have, 
 at the same time, an intimate connection with the more im- 
 mediate design of this paper; which is to illustrate the tend- 
 ency of the union to repress domestic faction and insurrection. 
 
 A distinction, more subtle than accurate, has been raised 
 between a confederacy and a consolidation of the states. The 
 essential characteristic of the first, is said to be the restriction 
 of its authority to the members in their collective capacities, 
 without reaching to the individuals of whom they are com- 
 posed. It is contended that the national council ought to 
 have no concern with any object of internal administration. 
 An exact equality of sufirage between the members, has also 
 been insisted upon as a leading feature of a confederate govern- 
 ment. These posit'oixs are. in the main, arbitrary; they are 
 
102 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 supported neither by principle nor precedent. It has indeed 
 aappened, that governments of this kind have generally ope- 
 rated in the manner which the distinction taken notice of sup- 
 poses to be inherent in their nature; but there have been in 
 most of them extensive exceptions to the practice, which serve 
 to prove, as far as example will go, that there is no absolute 
 rule on the subject. And it will be clearly shown, in the course 
 of this investigation, that, as far as the principle contended for 
 has prevailed, it has been the cause of incurable disorder and 
 imbecility in the government. 
 
 The definition of a confederate republic seems simply to be, 
 *' an assemblage of societies," or an association of two or mere 
 states into one state. The extent, modifications, and objects, of 
 the federal authority, are mere matters of discretion. So long 
 as the separate organization of the members be not abolished, 
 so long as it exists by a constitutional necessity for local pur- 
 poses, though it should be in perfect subordination to the gene- 
 ral authority of the union, it would still be, in fact and in 
 theory, an association of states, or a confederacy. The pro- 
 posed constitution, so far from implying an abolition of the 
 state governments, makes them constituent parts of the national 
 sovereignty, by allowing them a direct representation in the 
 senate, and leaves in their possession certain exclusive, and 
 very important, portions of the sovereign power. This fully 
 corresponds, in every rational import of the terms, with the 
 idea of a federal government. 
 
 In the Lycian confederacy, which consisted of twenty-three 
 CITIES, or republics, the largest were entitled to three votes 
 in the common council, those of the middle class to two, and 
 the smallest to one. The common council had the appoint- 
 ment of all the judges and magistrates of the respective cities. 
 This was certainly the most delicate specie's of interference 
 in their internal administration; for if there be any thing 
 that seems exclusively appropriated to the local jurisdictions, 
 It is the appointment of their own officers. Yet Montesquieu, 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 103 
 
 speaking of this association, says, " Were I to give a model of 
 an excellent confederate republic, it would be that of Lycia." 
 Thus we perceive, that the distinctions insisted upon, were not 
 within the contemplation of this enlightened writer; and we 
 shall be led to conclude, that they are the novel refinements of 
 an eironeous theory. 
 
 PUBLIUS. 
 
104 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 NUMBER X. 
 
 NEW YORK, NOVEMBER 24, 1787. 
 
 MADISON. 
 
 THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED. 
 
 Amonq the numerous advantages promised by a well cod 
 structed union, none deserves to be more accurately developed 
 than its tendency to break and control the violence of faction 
 The friend of popular governments, never finds himself so much 
 alarmed for their character and fate, as when he contemplates 
 their propensity to this dangerous vice. He will not fail, there- 
 fore, to set a due value on any plan which, without violating the 
 principles to which he is attached, provides a proper cure for it 
 The instability, injustice, and confusion, introduced into the 
 public councils, have, in truth, been the mortal diseases under 
 which popular governments have everywhere perished; as they 
 continue to be the favourite and friiitlul topics from which the 
 adversaries to liberty derive their most specious declamations. 
 The valuable improvements made by the American constitu- 
 tions on the popular models, both ancient and modern, cannot 
 certainly be too much admired ; but it would be an unwarrant- 
 able partiality, to contend that they have as effectually obviated 
 the danger on this side, as was wished and expected. Com- 
 plaints are every where heard from our most considerate and 
 virtuous citizens, equally the friends, of public and private faith, 
 and of public and personal liberty, that our governments are 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 105 
 
 tjo unstable; that the public good is disregarded in the con- 
 flicts of rival parties; and that measures are too often de- 
 cided, not according to the rules of justice, and the rights of 
 the minor party, but by the superiour force of an interested 
 and overbearing majority. However anxiously we may wish 
 that these complaints had no foundation, the evidence of known 
 facts will not permit us to deny that they are in some degree 
 true. It will be found, indeed, on a candid review of our situ- 
 ation, that some of the distresses under which we labour, have 
 been erroneously charged on the operation of our governments; 
 but it will be found, at the same time, that other causes will not 
 alone account for many of our heaviest misfortunes; and, par- 
 ticularly, for that prevailing and increasing distrust of public 
 engagements, and alarm for private rights, which are echoed 
 from one end of the continent to the other. These must bo 
 chiefly, if not wholly, effects of the unsteadiness and injustice, 
 with which a factious spirit has tainted our public admin 
 istrations. 
 
 By a faction, I understand a number of citizens, whethei 
 amounting to a majority or minority of the whole, who are united 
 and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, 
 adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and 
 aggregate interests of the community. 
 
 There are two methods of curing the mischiefs of factiou. 
 The one, by removing its causes ; the other, by controlling ite 
 effects. 
 
 There are again two methods of removing the causes of fac- 
 tion : The one, by destroying the liberty which is essential to its 
 existence ; the other, by giving to every citizen the same opi- 
 nions, the same passions, and the same interests. 
 
 It could never be more truly said, than of the first remedy, 
 that it was worse than the disease. Liberty is to faction what 
 air is to fire, an aliment, without which it instantly expires. 
 But it could not be a less folly to abolish liberty, which is essen- 
 tial to political life because it nourishes faction, than it would 
 
106 
 
 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 be to wish the annihilation of air, which is essential to animal 
 life, because it imparts to fire its destructive agency. 
 
 The second expedient is as impracticable, as the first would 
 be unwise. As long as the reason of man continues fallible, and 
 he is at liberty to exercise it, different opinions will be formed. 
 As long as the connection subsists between his reason and his 
 self-love, his opinions and his passions will have a reciprocal in- 
 fluence on each other ; and the former will be objects to which 
 the latter will attach themselves. The diversity in the faculties 
 of men, from which the rights of property originate, is not less 
 an insuperable obstacle to an uniformity of interests. The pro- 
 tection of these faculties is the first object of government. 
 From the protection of different and unequal faculties of ac- 
 quiring property, the possession of different degrees and kinds 
 of property immediately results; and from the influence of 
 these on the sentiments and views of the respective proprie- 
 tors, ensues a division of the society into different interests and 
 parties. 
 
 The latent causes of faction are thus sown in the nature of 
 man; and we see them every where brought into different de- 
 grees of activity, according to the different circumstances of 
 civil society. A zeal for different opinions concerning religion, 
 concerning government, and many other points, as well of 
 speculation as of practice ; an attachment to different leaders, 
 ambitiously contending for pre-eminence and power ; or to per- 
 sons of other descriptions, whose fortunes have been interesting 
 to the human passions, have, in turn, divided mankind into 
 parties, inflamed them with mutual animosity, and rendered 
 them much more disposed to vex and oppress each other, than 
 to co-operate for their common good. So strong is this propen- 
 sity of mankind, to fall into mutual animosities, that where no 
 substantial occasion presents itself, the most frivolous and fan- 
 ciful distinctions have been sufficient to kindle their unfriendly 
 passions, and excite their most violent conflicts. But the most 
 common and durable source of factions, has been the various 
 and unequal distribution of property. Those who hold, and 
 
THE FEDERALIST, 
 
 101 
 
 Ao 
 
 ^vcrur-: 
 
 those who are Avithout property, have ever formed distinct in- 
 terests in society. Those who are creditors, and those who are 
 debtors, fall under a like discrimination. A landed interest, a 
 manufacturing interest, a mercantile interest, a moneyed in- 
 terest, with many lesser interests, grow up of necessity in civil- 
 ized nations, and divide them into different classes, actuated by 
 diflferent sentiments and views. The regulation of these various V %,^J,^ /y^'-O'^^ 
 and interfering interests forms the principal task of modern 
 legislation, and involves the spirit of party and faction in the 
 necessary and ordinary operations of government. 
 
 No man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause ; because 
 his interest will certainly bias his judgment, and, not impro- 
 bably, corrupt his integrity. With equal, nay, with greater 
 reason, a body of men are unfit to be both judges and parties 
 at the same time; yet what are many of the most important 
 acts of legislation, but so many Judicial determinations, not 
 indeed coucernmg the rights of single persons, but concernmg 
 the rights of large bodies of citizens? and what are the difier- 
 ent classes of legislators, but advocates and parties to the 
 causes which they determine? Is a law proposed concerning 
 private debts? It is a question to which the creditors are 
 parties on one side, and the debtors on the other. Justice ought 
 to hold the balance between them. Yet the parties are, and 
 must be, themselves the judges : and the most numerous party, 
 or, in other words, the most powerful faction, must be expected 
 to prevail. Shall domestic manufactures be encouraged, and in' 
 what degree, by restrictions on foreign manufactures? are ques- 
 tions which would be differently decided by the landed and the 
 majuifacturing classes ; and probably by neither with a sole 
 regard to justice and the public good. The apportionment of 
 taxes, on the various descriptions of property, is an act which 
 seems to require the most exact impartiality; yet there is, per- 
 haps, no legislative act, in which greater opportunity and tempt- 
 ation are given to a predominant party, to trample on the rules 
 of justice. Every shilling, with which they overburden the) 
 inferiour number, is a shilling saved to their own pockets. 
 
 18 
 
 
108 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 It ia iu vain to say, that enlightened statesmen will be able to 
 adjust these clashing interests, and render them all subservient 
 to the public good. Enlightened statesmen will not always be 
 at the helm : nor, in many cases, can such an adjustment be made 
 at all, without taking into view indirect and remote considerations, 
 which will rarely prevail over the immediate interest which one 
 party may find in disregarding the rights of another, or the good 
 of the whole. 
 
 The inference to which we are brought is, that the causes of 
 faction cannot be removed ; and that relief is only to be sought 
 in the means of controlling its effects. 
 
 If a faction consists of less than a majority, relief is supplied 
 by the republican principle, which enables the majority to defeat 
 its sinister views, by regular vote. It may clog the administra- 
 tion, it may convulse the society; but it will be unable to exe- 
 cute and mask its violence under the forms of the constitution. 
 When a majority is included in a faction, the form of jpopular 
 government, on the other hand, enables it to sacrifice to its 
 ruling passion or interest, both the public good and the rights 
 of other citizens. To secure the public good, and private rights, 
 against the danger of such a faction, and at the same time to 
 preserve the spirit and the form of popular government, is then 
 the great object to which our inquiries are directed. Let me 
 add, that it is the great desideratum, by which alone this form 
 of government can be rescued from the opprobrium under which 
 it has so long laboured, and be recommended to the esteem and 
 adoption of mankind. 
 
 By what means is this object attainable ? Evidently by one 
 of two only. Either the existence of the same passion or in- 
 terest in a majority, at the same time must be prevented; or the 
 majority, having such coexistent passion or interest, must be 
 rendered, by their number and local situation, unable to concert 
 jind carry into effect schemes of oppression. If the impulse and 
 the opportunity be suffered to coincide, we well know, that 
 neither moral nor religious motives can be relied on as an 
 adequate control. They are not found to be «uch on the in- 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 109 
 
 J astice and violence of individuals, and lose their eflScacy in 
 proportion to the number combined together; that is, in pro- 
 portion as their efficacy becomes needful. 
 
 From this view of the subject, it may be concluded, that a 
 pure democracy, by which I mean a society consisting of a 
 small number of citizens, who assemble and administer the 
 government in person, can admit of no cure from the mischiefs 
 of faction. A common passion or interest will, in almost every 
 case, be felt by a majority of the whole; a communication and 
 concert, results from the form of government itself; and there 
 is nothing to check the inducements to sacrifice the weaker 
 party, or an obnoxious individual. Hence it is, that such de^ 
 mocracies have ever been spectacles of turbulence and con-' 
 tention ; have ever been found incompatible with personal' 
 security, or the rights of property; and have, in general, been; 
 as short in their lives, as they have been violent in their deathsj 
 Theore tic politiciajis, who have patronized this species of gov- nn''rT' 
 emment, have erroneously supposed, that by reducing mankind 
 to a perfect equality in their political rights, they would, at the 
 same time, be perfectly equalized and assimilated in their pos- 
 sessions, their opinions, and their passions. 
 
 ^^ A republic, by which I mean a government in which the 
 sdieme of representation takes place, opens a different prospect, 
 and promises the cure for which we are seeking. Let us examine 
 the points in which it varies from pure democracy, and we shall 
 comprehend both the nature of the cure and the efficacy which 
 it must derive from the union. 
 
 The two great points of difference, between a democracy and 
 a republic, are, first, the delegation of the government, in the 
 latter, to a small number of citizens elected by the restj 
 secondly, the greater number of citizens, and greater sphere of 
 country, over which the latter may be extended. Vv^? 1Vi^«./M.....--^U.*'Vi^^ 
 
 The effect of the first difference is, on the one hand, to refipQ 
 and enlarge the public views, by passing them through the 
 medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best 
 disrerr tne true irlerest of their country, and whose patriotism 
 
no 
 
 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 ^' 
 
 and lov«? of justice, will be least likely to sacrifice it to tem- 
 porary or partial considerations. Under such a regulation, it 
 may well happen, that the public voice, pronounced by the re- 
 presentatives of the people, will be more consonant to the public 
 good, than if pronounced by the people themselves, convened 
 for the purpose. On the other hand, the effect may be inverted. 
 Men of factious tempers, of local prejudices, or of sinister 
 designs, may by intrigue, by corruption, or by other means, 
 first obtain the suffrages, and then betray the interests of the 
 people. The question resulting is, whether small or extensiyfi 
 republics are most favourable to the election of proper guar- 
 dians of the public weal ; and it is clearly decided in favour of 
 the latter by two obvious considerations. 
 
 In the first place, it is to be remarked, that however small the 
 republic may be, the representatives must be raised to a certain 
 number, in order to guard against the cabals of a few ; and that 
 however large it may be, they must be limited to a certain 
 number, in order to guard against the confusion of a multitude. 
 Hence, the number of representatives in the two cases not being 
 in proportion to that of the constituents, and being proportion- 
 ally greatest in the small republic, it follows, that if the propor- 
 tion of fit chara-cters be not less in the large than in the small 
 republic, the former will present a greater option, and conse- 
 quently a greater probability of a fit choice. 
 
 In the next place, as each representative will be chosen by a 
 ■y^ , greater number of citizens in the large than in the small repub- 
 '^ lie, it will be more difficult for unworthj' candidates to practice 
 with success the vicious arts, by which elections are too often 
 carried ; and the suffrages of the people being more free, will be 
 more likely to centre in men who possess the most attractive 
 merit, and the most diffusive and established characters. 
 
 It must be confessed, that in this, as in most .other cases, there 
 is a mean, on both sides of which inconveniences will be found 
 to lie. By enlarging too much the number of electors, you 
 render the representative too little acquainted with all their 
 'ocal circumstances and lesser interests ; as by reducing it too 
 
THE FEDERALIST. IH 
 
 much, you render him unduly attached to these, and too littlt^ 
 fit to comprehend and pursue great and national objects. The 
 federal constitution forms a happy combination in this respect; 
 the great and aggregate interests being referred to the national, 
 the local and particular to the state legislatures. 
 
 The other point of difference is, the greater number of citi- z'^*' . *^ 
 zens, and extent of territory, which may be brought within the ^S- ,^^^f^^^ 
 compass of republican, than of democratic govei*nment ; and it 
 is this circumstance principally which renders factious combina- 
 tions less to be dreaded in the former, than in the latter. The 
 smaller the society, the fewer probably will be the distinct 
 parties and interests composing it ; the fewer the distinct 
 parties and interests, the more frequently will a majority be 
 found of the same party ; and the smaller the number of indi- 
 viduals composing a majority, and the smaller the compass 
 within which they are placed, the more easily will they concert 
 and execute their plans of oppression. Extend the sphere, and 
 you take in a greater variety of parties and interests; you 
 make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a 
 common motive to invade the rights of other citizens ; or if such 
 a common motive exists, it will be more difficult for all who feel 
 it to discover their own strength, and to act in unison with each 
 other. Besides other impediments, it may be remarked, that 
 where there is a consciousness of unjust or dishonourable pur- 
 poses, communication is always checked by distrust, in pro- 
 portion to the number whose concurrence is necessary. 
 
 Hence, it clearly appears, that the same advantage, which a 
 republic has over a democracy, in controlling the effects of fac- 
 tion, is enjoyed by a large over a small republic — is enjoyed by 
 the union over the states composing it. Does this advantage 
 consist in the substitution of representatives, whose enlightened 
 views and virtuous sentiments render them superiour to local 
 ])rejudices, and to schemes of injustice ? It will not be denied, 
 that the representation of the union will be most likely to pos- 
 sess these requisite endowments. Does it consist in the greater 
 security afforded by a greater variety of- parties, against the 
 
112 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 event of uny one party being able to outnumber and oppress the 
 rest? In an equal degree does the increased variety of parties, 
 comprised within the union, increase this security. Does it, in 
 fine, consist in the greater obstacles opposed to the concert and 
 accomplishment of the secret wishes of an unjust and interested 
 majority ? Here, again, the extent of the union gives it the 
 most palpable advantage. 
 
 Ihe influence of factious leaders may kindle a flame within 
 their particular states, but will be unable to spread a general 
 conflagration through the other states ; a religious sect may de- 
 generate into a political faction in a part of the confederacy; 
 but the variety of sects dispersed over the entire face of it, 
 must secure the national councils against any danger from that 
 source : a rage for paper money, for an abolition of debts, for an 
 equal division of property, or for any other improper or wicked 
 project, will be less apt to pervade the whole body of the union, 
 than a particular member of it ; in the same proportion as such 
 a malady is more likely to taint a particular county or district, 
 than an entire state. 
 
 In the extent and proper structure of the union, therefore, we 
 Oehold a republican remedy for the diseases most incident to re- 
 publican government. And according to the degree of pleasure 
 and pride ws feel in being ropublicans, ought to be our zeal in 
 cherishing the spirit, and supporting the character of federalists, 
 
 PUBUUS. 
 
 '^•'**7 JUa-c^Z*^ #U.<,Ct eUtl^ t-v-^-UX Uul. dSrvt.,.*i*«rw f'-^'-^f^t.^ r^ 
 
 ■^^Hf- 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 118 
 
 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 NUMBER XI. 
 
 NEW YORK, NOVEMBER 24, 1787. 
 
 HAMILTON. 
 
 THE UTILITY OF THE UNION IN RESPECT TO COMMERCE AND 
 
 A NAVY. 
 
 The importance of the union, in a commercial light, is one of 
 those points, about which there is least room to entertain a dif- 
 ference of opinion, and which has in fact commanded the most 
 general assent of men, who have any acquaintance with the sub- 
 ject. This applies as well to our intercourse with foreign coun- 
 tries, as with each other. 
 
 There are appearances to authorize a supposition, that the 
 adventurous spirit, which distinguishes the commercial character 
 of America, has already excited uneasy sensations in several of 
 the maritime powers of Europe. They seem to be apprehen- 
 sive of our too great interference in that carrying trade, which 
 is the support of their navigation, and the foundation of their 
 naval strength. Those of them, which have colonies in America, 
 look forward, with painful solicitude, to what this country is 
 capable of becoming. They foresee the dangers, that may 
 threaten their American dominions from the neighbourhood of 
 states, which have all the dispositions, and would possess all the 
 means, requisite to the creation of a powerful marine. Impres- 
 sions of this kind will naturally indicate the policy of fostering 
 divisions among us, and of depriving us, as far as possible, of an 
 
Hi THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 ACTIVE COMMERCE in our own bottoms. This would answei then 
 the threefold purpose of preventing our interference in their 
 navigation, of monopolizing the j)rofit8 of our trade, and of 
 clipping the wings, on which we might soar to a dangerous 
 greatness. Did not prudence forbid the detail, it would not be 
 difficult to trace, by facts, the workings of this policy to the 
 cabinets of ministers. If we continue united, we may, in a 
 variety of ways, counteract a policy so unfriendly to our pros- 
 perity. By prohibitory regulations, extending at the same time 
 throughout the states, we may oblige foreign countries to bid 
 against each other, for the privileges of our markets. This 
 assertion will not appear chimerical to those who are able to 
 appreciate the importance, to any manufacturing nation, of the 
 markets of three millions of people — increasing in rapid progres- 
 sion; for the most part, exclusively addicted to agriculture, 
 and likely from local circumstances to remain in this disposi- 
 tion ; and the immense difference there would be to the trade and 
 navigation of such a nation, between a direct communication in 
 its own ships, and an indirect conveyance of its products and 
 returns, to and from America, in the ships of another country. 
 Suppose, for instance, we had a government in America, capable 
 of excluding Great Britain (with whom we have at present no 
 treaty of commerce) from all our ports ; what would be the pro- 
 bable operation of this step upon her politics? Would it not 
 onable us to negociate, with the fairest prospect of success, for 
 commercial privileges of the most valuable and extensive kind, 
 in the dominions of that kingdom ? When these questions 
 have been asked, upon other occasions, they have received a 
 plausible, but not a solid or satisfactory answer. It has been 
 said, that prohibitions on our part would produce nc change in 
 the system of Britain ; because she could prosecute her trade 
 with us, through the medium of the Dutch, who would be her 
 immediate customers and pay-masters for those articles which 
 were wanted for the supply of our markets. But would not her 
 navigation be materially injured, by the loss of the important 
 advantage of being her own carrier in that trade ? Would not 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 115 
 
 the principal fart of its profits be intercepted by the Dutch, 
 as a compensation for their agency and risk? Would not the 
 mere cii'cumst ince of freight occasion a considerable deduction ? 
 Would not sc circuitous an intercourse facilitate the competi- 
 tions of othei nations, by enhancing the price of British com- 
 modities in 01 r markets, and by transferring to other hands the 
 management Df this interesting branch of the British commerce '( 
 
 A mature consideration of the objects, suggested by these 
 questions, will justify a belief, that the real disadvantages to 
 Great Britain, from such a state of things, conspiring with the 
 prepossessions of a great part of the nation in favour of the 
 American trace, and with the importunities of the West-India 
 islands, would produce a relaxation in her present system, and 
 would let us into the enjoyment of privileges in the mai'kets 
 of those islanis and elsewhere, from which our trade would 
 derive the most substantial benefits. Such a point gained from 
 the British government, and which could not be expected without 
 an equivalent in exemptions and immunities in our markets, 
 would be likely to have a correspondent effect on the conduct 
 of other nations, who would not be inclined to see themselves 
 altogether supplanted in our trade. 
 
 A further resource for influencing the conduct of European 
 nations towards us, in this respect, would arise from the esta- 
 blishment of a federal navy. There can be no doubt, that the 
 continuance of the union, under an efficient government, would 
 put it in our power, at a period not very distant, to create a 
 navy, which, if it could not vie with those of the great maritime 
 powers, would at least be of respectable weight, if thrown into 
 the scale of either of two contending parties. This would bo 
 more particularly the case, in relation to operations in the West- 
 Indies. A few ships of the line, sent opportunely to the reinforce- 
 ment of either side, would often be sufficient to decide the fate 
 of a campaign, on the event of which, interests of the greatest 
 magnitude were suspended. Onr position is, in this respect, a 
 very commanding one. And ii to this consideration we add 
 that of the usefulness of supplies ft ^ti this ^nntry, in the prose- 
 
116 
 
 THE FEDEKALIST. 
 
 <XI^ 
 
 eution of military operations in the West-Indies, it will readily 
 be perceived, that a situation so favourable, would enable us to 
 bargain with great advantage for commercial privileges. A 
 price would be set not only upon our friendship, but upon our 
 neutrality. By a steady adherence to the union, we may hope, 
 ere long, to become the arbiter of Europe in America; and to be 
 able to incline the balance of European competitions in this part 
 of the world, as our interest may dictate. 
 
 But in the reverse of this eligible situation, we shall discover, 
 that the rivalships of the parts would make them checks upon 
 each other, and would frustrate all the tempting advantages, 
 which nature has kindly placed within our reach. In a state so 
 insignificant, our commerce would be a prey to the wanton inter- 
 meddlings of all nations at war with each other; who, having 
 nothing to fear from us, would, with little scruple or remorse, 
 supply their wants by depredations on our property, as often 
 as it fell in their way. The rights of neutrality will only be 
 respected, when they are defended by an adequate power. A 
 nation, despicable by its weakness, forfeits even the privilege of 
 being neutral. 
 
 Under a vigorous national government, the natural strength 
 and resources of the country, directed to a common interest, 
 would baffle all the combinations of European jealousy to restrain 
 our growth. This situation would even take away the motive 
 to such combinations, by inducing an impracticability of success. 
 jLn active commerce, an extensive navigation, a flourishing 
 marine, would then be the inevitable offspring of moral and 
 physical necessity. We might defy the little arts of little poli- 
 ticians to control, or vary, the irresistible and unchangeable 
 course of nature. 
 
 But in a state of disunion, these combinations might exist, 
 and might operate with success. It would be in the power of 
 the maritime nations, availing themselves of our universal im- 
 potence, to prescribe the conditions of our political existence; 
 and as they have a common interest in being our carriers, and 
 still more in preventing us from becoming theirs, tLey would, in 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 117 
 
 nil probability, combine to embarrass our navigation in such » 
 manner, as would in effect destroy it, and confine us to a PA&diVE 
 COMMERCE. We should thus be compelled to content oui'selves 
 with the first price of our commodities, and to see the profits of 
 our trade snatched from us, to enrich our enemies and perse- 
 cutors. That unequalled spirit of enterprise, which signalizes 
 the genius of the American merchants and navigators, and which 
 is in itself an inexhaustible mine of national wealth, would bo 
 stifled and lost; and poverty and disgrace would overspread a 
 country, which, with wisdom, might make herself the admira- 
 tion and envy of the world. 
 
 There are rights of great moment to the trade of America, 
 which are rights of the union : I allude to the fisheries, to the 
 navigation of the Lakes, ajid_to that of the Mississippi. The 
 dissolution of the confederacy would give room for delicate ques- 
 tions, concerning the future existence of these rights; which the 
 interest of more powerful partners would hardly fail to solve to 
 our disadvantage. The disjjosition of Spain, with regard to thelj 
 Mississippi, needs no comment. France and Britain are con- 
 cerned with us in the fisheries; and view them as of the utmost 
 moment to their navigation. They, of course, would hardly 
 remain long indifferent to that decided mastery, of which 
 experience has shown us to be possessed, in this valuable branch 
 of traflSc; and by which we are able to undersell those nations 
 in their own markets. What more natural, than that they shouldf | 
 be disposed to exclude from the lists such dangerous compe 1 1 
 titers ? 
 
 This branch of trade ought not to be considered as a partial 
 l)enefit. All the navigating states may in different degrees 
 advantageously participate in it; and under circumstances of a 
 greater extension of mercantile capacity, would not be unlikely 
 to do it. As a nursery of seamen, it now is, or when time shall 
 have more nearly assimilated the principles of navigation in the 
 several states, will become an universal resource. To the esta- 
 oliflhment of a navy, it must be indispensable. 
 
 To this great national object, a navy, union will contribute io 
 
118 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 various ways. Every institution will grow and flourish in pro- 
 portion to the quantity and extent of the means concentered 
 towards its formation and support. A navy of the United States, 
 as it would embrace the resources of all, is an object far less 
 remote than a navy of any single state, or partial confederacy, 
 which would only embrace the resources of a part. It happens, 
 indeed, that different portions of confederated America, possess 
 each some peculiar advantage for this essential establishment. 
 The more southern states furnish in greater abundance certain 
 kinds of naval stores — tar, pitch, and turpentine. Their wood, 
 for the construction of ships, is also of a more solid and lasting 
 texture. The difference in the duration of the ships of which 
 the navy might be composed, if chiefly constructed of southern 
 wood, would be of signal importance, either in the view of naval 
 strength, or of national economy. Some of the southern and of 
 the middle states, yield a greater plenty of iron and of better 
 quality. Seamen must chiefly be drawn from the northern hive. 
 The necessity of naval protection to external ©r maritime com- 
 merce, and the conduciveness of that species of commerce, to 
 the prosperity of a navy, are points too manifest to require a 
 particular elucidation. They, by a kind of reaction, mutually 
 beneficial, promote each other. 
 
 An unrestrained intercourse between the states themselves, 
 will advance the trade of each, by an interchange of their re- 
 spective productions, not only for the supply of reciprocal wants, 
 but for exportation to foreign markets. The veins of commerce 
 in every part will be replenished, and will acquire additional 
 motion and vigour from a free circulation of the commodities of 
 every part. Commercial enterprise will have much greater 
 scope, from the diversity in the productions of different states 
 When the staple of one fails, from a bad harvest or unproductive 
 crop, it can call to its aid the staple of another. The variety, 
 not less than the value, of products for exportation, contributes 
 to the activity of foreign commerce. It can be conducted upon 
 much better terms, with a large number of materials of a 
 given value, than with a small number of materials of the sam" 
 
'kio-^^xt^^ *&^ 
 
 THE . EDERALIST. IJ^ 
 
 value; arising from the competitions of traoe, and from the flue 
 tuations of markets. Particular articles may be in great de- 
 mand at certain periods, and unsaleable at others ; but if there be 
 a variety of articles, it can scarcely happen that they should all be 
 at one time in the latter predicament; and on this account, the 
 operations of the merchant would be less liable to any consider- 
 able obstruction or stagnation. The speculative trader will at 
 once perceive the force of these observations ; and will acknow- 
 ledge, that the aggregate balance of the commerce of the United 
 States, would bid fair to be much more favourable than that of 
 the Thirteen States, without union, or with partial unions. 
 
 It may perhaps be replied to this, that whether the states are 
 united, or disunited, there would still be an intimate intercourse 
 between them, which would answer the same ends : But this 
 intercourse would be fettered, interrupted, and narrowed, by a 
 multiplicity of causes; which in the course of these papers have 
 been amply detailed. An unity of commercial, as well as politi- 
 cal interests, can only result from an unity of government. 
 
 There are other points of view, in which this subject might 
 be placed, of a striking and animating kind. But they would 
 lead us too far into the regions of futurity, and would involve 
 topics not proper for newspaper discussion. I shall briefly ob- 
 serve, that our situation invites, and our interests prompt us, to 
 aim at an ascendant in the system of American afiairs. The 
 world may politically, as well as geographically, be divided into 
 four parts, each having a distinct set of interests. Unhappily 
 for the other three, Europe, by her arms and by her negocia- 
 tions; by force and by fraud, has, in different degrees, extended 5L 
 
 her dominion over them all. Africa, Asia, and America, have "^ 
 
 successively felt her domination. The superiority she has long 
 maintained, has tempted her to plume herself as the mistress of 
 the world, and to consider the rest of mankind as created for 
 her benefit. Men, admired as profound philosophers, have, in 
 direct terms, attributed to her inhabitants a physical supe- 
 riority; and have gravely asserted that all animals, and with ^ _ 
 them the human species, degenerate in America — that even dogs ' "S 
 
 iJ 
 
 ^ 
 
120 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 cease to bark, after having breathed a while in our atmosphere.* 
 Facts have too long supported these arrogant pretensions of the 
 European : It belongs to us to vindicate the honour of the 
 human race, and to teach that assuming brother moderation. 
 Union will enable us to do it. Disunion will add another victim 
 to his triumphs. Let Americans disdain to be the instruments 
 of European greatness ! Let the Thirteen States, bound together 
 in a strict and indissoluble union, concur in erecting one great 
 American system, superior to the control of all transatlantic 
 force or influence, and able to dictate the terms of the connec- 
 tion between the old and the new world ! 
 
 PUBLIUS. 
 * Uecherches philosophiques sar les Am^ricains 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 121 
 
 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 NUMBER XII. 
 
 NEW YORK, NOVEMBER 28, 1787. 
 
 HAMILTON. 
 
 THE UTILITY OF THE UNION IN RESPECT TO REVENUE. 
 
 The effects of union, upon the commercial prosperity of the 
 states, have been sufficiently delineated. Its tendency to pro- 
 mote the interests of revenue, will be the subject of our present 
 inquiry. 
 
 A prosperous commerce is now perceived and acknowledged, 
 by all enlightened statesmen, to be the most useful, as well as 
 the most productive, source of national wealth ; and has accord- 
 ingly become a primary object of their political cares. By mul- 
 tiplying the means of gratification, by promoting the introduc- 
 tion and circulation of the precious metals, those darling objects 
 of human avarice and enterprise, it serves to vivify and invigor- 
 ate all the channels of industry, and to make them flow with 
 greater activity and copiousness. The assiduous merchant, the 
 laborious husbandman, the active mechanic, and the industrious 
 manufacturer — all orders of men, look forward with eager ex- 
 pectation, and growing alacrity, to this pleasing reward of their 
 toils. The often-agitated question between agriculture and com- 
 merce, has, from indubitable experience, received a decision, 
 which has silenced the rivalships that once subsisted between 
 them, and has proved, to the entire satisfaction of their friends, 
 that their irterests are intimately blended and interwoven. It 
 
122 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 has been found, in various countries, that in proportion as com- 
 merce has flourished, laud has risen in value. And how could it 
 liavo happened otherwise? Could that which proc ures a freer 
 vent for the products of the earth ; which furnisliee new incite- 
 ments to the cultivators of land ; which is the m- st powerful 
 instrument in increasing the quantity of mon )y in a state — 
 could that, in fine, which is the faithful handma d of labour and 
 industry, in every shape, fail to augment the value of that 
 article, which is the prolific parent of far the greatest part of 
 the objects, upon which they are exerted ? It is astonishing, 
 that so simple a truth should ever have had an adversary; 
 and it is one, among a multitude of proofs, how apt a spirit 
 of ill informed jealousy, or of too great abstraction and refine- 
 ment, is to lead men astray from the plainest paths of reason 
 and conviction. 
 
 The ability of a country to pay taxes, must always be pro 
 portioned, in a great degree, to the quantity of money in circu 
 lation, and to the celerity with which it circulates. Commerce, 
 contributing to both these objects, must of necessity render the 
 payment of taxes easier, and facilitate the requisite supplies to 
 the treasury. The hereditary dominions of the emperor of Ger- 
 many, contain a great extent of fertile, cultivated, and populous 
 territory, a large proportion of which is situated in jnild and 
 luxuriant climates. In some parts of this territory are to be 
 found, the best gold and silver mines in Europe. And yet, from 
 the want of the fostering influence of commerce, that monarch 
 can boast but slender revenues. He has several times been 
 compelled to owe obligations to the pecuniary succours of other 
 nations, for the preservation of his essential interests; and is 
 unable, upon the strength of his own resources, to sustain a long 
 or continued war. 
 
 But it is not in this aspect of the subject alone, that union 
 will be seen to conduce to the purposes of revenue. There are 
 other points of view, in which its influence will appear more 
 immediate and decisive. It is evident from the state ot the 
 country, from the habits of the people, from the experience we 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 123 
 
 have had on the point itself, that it is impracticable to raise 
 any very considerable sums by direct taxation. Tax laws have 
 in vain been multiplied; new methods to enforce the collection 
 have in vain been tried; the public expectation has been uni- 
 formly disappointed, and the treasuries of the states have re- 
 mained empty. The popular system of administration, inherent 
 in the nature of popular government, coinciding with the real 
 scarcity of money, incident to a languid and mutilated state of 
 trade, has hitherto defeated every experiment for extensive 
 collections, and has at length taught the diflferent legislatures 
 the folly of attempting them. 
 
 No person, acquainted with what happens in other countries, 
 will be surprised at this circumstance. In so opulent a nation 
 as that of Britain, where direct taxes, from superior wealth, 
 must be much more tolerable, and, from the vigour of the 
 government, much more practicable, than in America, far the 
 greatest part of the national revenue is derived from taxes of - 
 the indirect kind; from imposts, and from excises. Duties on] 
 imported articles, form a large branch of this latter description^ 
 
 In America, it is evident, that we must a long time depend for 
 the means of revenue, chiefly on such duties. In most parts 
 of it, excises must be confined within 'a narrow compass. The 
 genius of the people will illy brook the inquisitive and peremp- 
 tory spirit of excise laws. The pockets of the farmers, on the 
 other hand, will reluctantly yield but scanty supplies, in the 
 unwelcome shape of impositions on their houses and lands ; and 
 personal property is too precarious and invisible a fund to be 
 laid hold of in any other way, than by the imperceptible agency 
 of taxes on consumption. 
 
 If these remarks have any foundation, that state of things j 
 
 which will best enable us to improve and extend so valuable a 
 resource, must be the best adapted to our political welfare. And 
 it cannot admit of a serious doubt, that this state of things must 
 rest on the basis of a general union. As far as this would be 
 conducive to the interests of commerce, so far it must tend to 
 the extension of the revenue to be drawn from that source. As 
 
 19 
 
124 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 far at> it would contribute to render regulations for the collection 
 of the duties more simple and efficacious, so far it must serve to 
 answer the purposes of making the same rate of duties more 
 productive, and of putting it into the power of the government 
 to increase the rate, without prejudice to trade. 
 
 The relative situation of these states; the number of rivers 
 with which they are intersected, and of bays that wash their 
 shores; the facility of communication in every direction; the 
 affinity of language and manners ; the familiar habits of inter- 
 course; all these are circumstances that would conspire to 
 render an illicit trade between them a matter of little difficulty; 
 and would ensure frequent evasions of the commercial regula- 
 tions of each other. The separate states, or confederacies, 
 would be driven by mutual jealousy to avoid the temptations 
 to that kind of trade, by the lowness of their duties. The 
 temper of our governments, for a long time to come, would not 
 permit those rigorous precautions, by which the European na- 
 tions guard the avenues into their respective countries, as well 
 by land as by water, and which, even there, are found insufficient 
 obstacles to the adventurous stratagems of avarice. 
 
 In France, there is an army of patrols (as they are called) 
 constantly employed to secure her fiscal regulations against the 
 inroads of the dealers in contraband. Mr. Neckar computes the 
 number of these patrols at upwards of twenty thousand. This 
 proves the immense difficulty in preventing that species of 
 traffic, where there is an inland communication, and shows, in 
 a strong light, the disadvantages, with which the collection of 
 duties in this country would be incumbered, if by disunion the 
 states should be placed in a situation with respect to each other, 
 resembling that of France with respect to her neighbours. The 
 arbitrary and vexatious powers with which the patrols are 
 necessarily armed, would be intolerable in a free country. 
 
 If, on the contrary, there be but one government, pervading 
 all the states, there will be, as to the principal part of our com- 
 merce, but ONE SIDE to guard, the Atlantic coast. Vessels 
 arriving' directly from foreign countries, laden with valuable car- 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 125 
 
 goes would rarely choose to expose themselves to the complicated 
 and critical perils, which would attend attempts to unlade prior 
 to their coming into port. They would have to dread both the 
 dangers of the coast, and of detection, as well after, as before 
 their arrival at the places of their final destination. An ordinary 
 degree of vigilance, would be competent to the prevention of 
 any material infractions upon the rights of the revenue. A few 
 armed vessels, judiciously stationed and employed, might at 
 small expense be made useful sentinels of the laws. And the 
 government, having the same interest to provide against viola- 
 tions everywhere, the co-operation of its measures in each state, 
 would have a powerful tendency to render them effectual. 
 Here also we should preserve, by union, an advantage which 
 nature holds out to us, and which would be relinquished by 
 separation. The United States lie at a great distance from 
 Europe, and at a considerable distance from all other places, 
 with which they would have extensive connections of foreign 
 trade. The passage from them to us in a few hours, or in a 
 single night, as between the coasts of France and Britain, and 
 of other neighbouring nations, would be impracticable. This is 
 a prodigious security against a direct contraband with foreign 
 countries; but a circuitous contraband to one state, through the 
 medium of another, would be both easy and safe. The differ- 
 ence between a direct importation fi-om abroad, and an indirect 
 importation, through the channel of an adjoining state, in small 
 parcels, according to time and opportunity, jvith the additional 
 facilities of inland communication, must be palpable to every 
 man of discernment. 
 
 It is, therefore, evident, that one national government would 
 be able, at much less expense, to extend the duties on imports, 
 beyond comparison, further, than would be practicable to the 
 states separately, or to any partial confederacies: Hitherto I 
 believe it may safely be asserted, that these duties have not 
 tipon an average exceeded in any state three per cent. In 
 France they are estimated at about fifteen pej cent, and in 
 Britain the proportion is still greater There seems t-o be 
 
/ 
 
 126 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 notniug to hinder their being increased in this country, to at 
 least treble their present amount. The single article of ardent 
 spirits, under federal regulation, might be made to furnish a 
 considerable revenue. According to the ratio of importation 
 into this state, the whole quantity imported into the United 
 States may, at a low computation, be estimated at four millions 
 of gallons; which at a shilling per gallon, would produce two 
 /^' hundred thousand pounds. That article would well bear this 
 
 rate of duty ; and if it should tend to diminish the consumption 
 of it, such an effect would be equally favourable to the agricul- 
 ture, to the economy, to the morals, and to the health of society. 
 There is, perhaps, nothing so much a subject of national extra- 
 vagance, as this very article. 
 
 What will be the consequence, if we are not able to avail our 
 selves of the resource in question in its full extent ? A nation 
 cannot long exist without revenue. Destitute of this essential 
 support, it must resign its independence, and sink into the de 
 graded condition of a province. This is an extremity to which 
 no government will of choice accede. Revenue therefore must 
 be had at all events In this country, if the principal part be 
 not drawn from comi^erce, it must fall with oppressive weight 
 upon land. It has been already intimated that excises, in their 
 true signification, are too little in unison with the feelings of the 
 people, to admit of great use being made of that mode of taxa- 
 tion : nor indeed, in the states where almost the sole employ- 
 ment is agriculture^ are the objects proper for excise sufficiently 
 numerous, to permit very ample collections in that way. Per- 
 sonal estate, as before remarked, from the difficulty of tracing 
 it, cannot be subjected to large contributions, by any other 
 means than by taxes on consumption. In populous cities, it 
 may be enough the subject of conjecture, to occasion the oppres- 
 sion of individuals, without much aggregate benefit to the state ; 
 but beyond these circles, it must, in a great measure, escape the 
 eye and the hand of the tax gatherer. As the necessities of the 
 state, nevertheless, must be satisfied in some mode, the defect oi" 
 other resource? must throw the principal weight of the p«blic 
 
THE FEDERALIST 127 
 
 burthens on the possessors of land. And, as on the other hand, 
 the wants of the government can never obtain an adequate 
 supply, unless all the sources of revenue are open to its de- 
 mands, the finances of the community, under such embarrass- 
 ments, cannot be put into a situation consistent with its respect- 
 ability or its security. Thus we shall not even have the con- 
 solations of a full treasury, to atone for the oppression of that 
 valuable class of citizens, who are employed in the cultivation 
 of the soil. But public and private distress will keep pace with 
 each other in gloomy concert ; and unite in deploring the infatu- 
 ation of those counsels which led to disunion. 
 
 PUBLIUS. 
 
123 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 NUMBER XIII. 
 
 NEW YORK, NOVEMBER 28, 1787. 
 
 HAMILTON. 
 
 THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED, WITH A VIEW TO ECON(JMY. 
 
 As connected with the subject of revenue, we may with pro- 
 priety consider that of economy. The money saved from one 
 object, may be usefully applied to another; and there will be so 
 much the less to be drawn from the pockets of the people. If 
 the states be united under one government, there will be but 
 one national civil list to support ; if they are divided into several 
 confederacies, there will be as many different national civil lists 
 to be provided for ; and each of them, as to the principal de- 
 partments, co-extensive with that which would be neoessary for 
 a government of the whole. The entire separation of the states 
 into thirteen unconnected sovereignties, is a project too extrava- 
 gant, and too replete with danger, to have many advocates. 
 The ideas of men who speculate upon the dismemberment of 
 the empire, seem generally turned towards three confederacies; 
 one consisting of the four northern, another of the four middle, 
 and a third of the five southern states. There is little proba- 
 bility that there would be a greater number. According to this 
 distribution, each confederacy would comprise an extent of terri- 
 tory larger than that of the kingdom of Great Britain. No 
 well informed man will suppose that the affairs of such a con- 
 federacy can be properly regulated by a government, lens com 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 129 
 
 preLensive in its organs or institutions, than that which has 
 been proposed by the convention. When the dimensions of a 
 state attain to a certain magnitude, it requires the same energy 
 of government, and the same forms of administration, which are 
 requisite in one of much greater extent. This idea admits not 
 of precise demonstration, because there is no rule by which we 
 can measure the momentum of civil power, necessary to the 
 government of any given number of individuals; but when we 
 consider that the Island of Britain, nearly commensurate with 
 each of the supposed confederacies, contains about eight millions 
 of people, and when we reflect upon the degree of authority 
 required to direct the passions of so large a society to the public 
 good, we shall see no reason to doubt, that the like portion of 
 power would be sufficient to perform the same task in a society 
 far more numerous. Civil power, properly organized and 
 exerted, is capable of diffusing its force to a very great extent : 
 and can, in a manner, reproduce itself in every part of a great 
 empire, by a judicious arrangement of subordinate institutions. | 
 The supposition, that each confederacy into which the states] 
 would be likely to be divided, would require a government not 
 less comprehensive than the one proposed, will be strengthened 
 by another conjecture, more probable than that which presents 
 us with three confederacies, as the alternative to a general union. 
 If we attend carefully to geographical and commercial con- 
 siderations, in conjunction with the habits and prejudices of the 
 different states, we shall be led to conclude, that, in case of dis- 
 union, they will most naturally league themselves under two 
 governments. The four eastern states, from all the causes that 
 form the links of national sympathy and connection, may with 
 certainty be expected to unite. New-York, situated as she is, 
 would never be unwise enough to oppose a feeble and unsup- 
 ported flank to the weight of that confederacy. There are 
 obvious reasons, that would facilitate her accession to it. New- 
 Jersey is too small a state to think of being a frontier, in oppo- 
 sition to this still more powerful combination; nor do there 
 ai)pear to be any obstacles to her admission into it. Even Penn- 
 
130 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 Bylvania would iiave strong inducements to join the northern 
 league. An active foreign commerce, on the basis of her own 
 navigation, is her true policy, and coincides with the opinions 
 and dispositions of her citizens. The more southern states, from 
 various circumstances, may not think themselves much in- 
 terested in the encouragement of navigation. They may prefer 
 a system, which would give unlimited scope to all nations, to be 
 the carriers, as well as the purchasers, of their commodities. 
 Pennsylvania may not choose to confound her interests in a con- 
 nection so adverse to her policy. As she must, at all events, be 
 a frontier, she may deem it most consistent with her safety, to 
 have her exposed side turned towards the weaker power of the 
 southern, rather than towards the stronger power of the northern 
 confederacy. This would give her the fairest chance to avoid 
 being the Flanders of America. "Whatever may be the deter- 
 mination of Pennsylvania, if the northern confederacy includes 
 New-Jersey, there is no likelihood of more than one confederacy 
 to the south of that state. 
 
 Nothing can be more evident than that the Thirteen States 
 will be able to support a national government, better than one 
 half, or one third, or any number less than the whole. This re- 
 flection must have great weight in obviating that objection to 
 the proposed plan, which is founded on the principle of expense • 
 an objection however, which, when we come to take a nearer view 
 o^ it, will appear in every light to stand on mistaken ground. 
 
 If, in addition to the consideration of a plurality of civil lists, 
 we take into view the number of persons who must necessarily 
 be employed to guard the inland communication, between the 
 different confederacies, against illicit trade, and who in time will 
 infallibly spring up out of the necessities of revenue; and if we 
 also take into view the military establishments, which it has 
 been shown would unavoidably result from the jealousies and 
 conflicts of the several nations, into which the states would be 
 divided, we shall clearly discover that a separation would be not 
 less injurious to the economy, than to the tranquillity, commerce, 
 revenue, and liberty, of every part. Publius 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 131 
 
 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 NUMBER XIV. 
 
 NEW YORK, DECEMBER 1, 1777, 
 
 MADISON. 
 
 AN OBJECTION DRAWN FROM THE EXTENT OF COUNTRY 
 ANSWERED. 
 
 We have seen the necessity of the union, as our bulwark 
 against foreign danger; as the conservator of peace among our- 
 selves; as the guardian of our commerce, and other common inte- 
 rests ; as the only substitute for those military establishments 
 which have subverted the liberties of the old world; and as the 
 proper antidote for the diseases of faction, which have proved 
 fatal to other popular governments, and of which alarming 
 symptoms have been betrayed by our own. All that remains, 
 within this branch of our inquiries, is to take notice of an ob- 
 jection, that may be drawn from the great extent of country 
 which the union embraces. A few observations, on this subject, 
 will be the more proper, as it is perceived, that the adversaries 
 of the new constitution are availing themselves of a prevailing 
 prejudice, with regard to the practicable sphere of republican 
 administration, in order to supply, by imaginary diflSculties, the 
 want of those solid objections, which they endeavour in vain to 
 find. 
 
 The errour which limits republican government to a narrow 
 district, has been unfolded and refuted in preceding papers. I 
 remark here only, that it seems to owe its rise and prevalence 
 
132 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 chiefly to the confounding of a republic with a democracy; and 
 applying to the former, reasonings drawn from the nature of the 
 latter. The true distinction between these forms, was also ad- 
 verted to on a former occasion. It is, that in a democracy, the 
 people meet and exercise the government in person : in a repub- 
 lic, they assemble and administer it by their representatives and 
 agents. A democracy, consequently, must be confined to a 
 small spot. A republic may be extended over a large region. 
 
 To this accidental source of the errour, may be added the 
 artifice of some celebrated authors, whose writings have had a 
 great share in forming the modern standard of political opinions. 
 Being subjects, either of an absolute, or limited monarchy, they 
 have endeavoured to heighten the advantages, or palliate the 
 ev'.ls, of those forms, by placing in comparison with them the 
 vices and defects of the republican, and by citing, as specimens 
 of the latter, the turbulent democracies of ancient Greece, and 
 modern Italy. Under the confusion of names, it has been an 
 easy task to transfer to a republic observations applicable to a 
 democracy only; and, among others, the observation, that it 
 can never be established but among a small number of people, 
 living within a small compass of territory. 
 
 Such a fallacy may have been the less perceived, as most of 
 the popular governments of antiquity were of the democratic 
 species ; and even in modern Europe, to which we owe the great 
 principle of representation, no example is seen of a government 
 wholly popular, and founded, at the same time, wholly on that 
 principle. If Europe has the merit of discovering this great 
 mechanical power in government, by the simple agency of 
 which, the will of the largest political body may be concentered, 
 and its force directed to any object, which the public good 
 requires; America can claim the merit of making the discovery 
 the basis of unmixed and extensive republics. It is only to be 
 lamented, that any of her citizens should wish to deprive her of 
 the additional merit of displaying its full efiicacy in the esta- 
 blishment of the comprehensive system now under her conpider 
 ation 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 133 
 
 As the natural limit of a democra cy is that distance from the 
 central point, which will just permit the most remote citizens to 
 assemble as often as their public functions demand, ana will 
 include no greater number than can join in those functions: so 
 the natural limit of a republic, is that distance from the centre, 
 which will barely allow the representatives of the people to meet 
 as often as may be necessary for the administration of public 
 affairs. Can it be said, that the limits of the United States ex- 
 ceed this distance ? It will not be said by those who recollect, 
 that the Atlantic coast is the longest side of the union ; that 
 during the term of thirteen years, the representatives of the 
 ntates have been almost continually assembled; and that the 
 members, from the most distant states, are not chargeable with 
 greater intermissions of attendance, than those from the states 
 in the neighbourhood of Congress. 
 
 That we may form a juster estimate with regard to this inte- 
 resting subject, let us resort to the actual dimensions of the 
 union. The limits, as fixed by the treaty of peace, are, on the 
 east the Atlantic, on the south the latitude of thirty-one degrees, 
 on the west the Mississippi, and on the north an irregular line 
 running in some instances beyond the forty-fifth degree, in 
 others falling as low as the forty-second. The southern shore 
 of lake Erie lies below that latitude. Computing the distance 
 between the thirty-first and forty-fifth degrees, it amounts to 
 nine hundred and seventy three common miles; computing it 
 from thirty-one to forty-two degrees, to seven hundred sixty- 
 four miles and a half. Takiiig the mean for the distance, the 
 amount will be eight hundred sixty-eight miles and three fourths. 
 The mean distance from the Atlantic to the Mississippi, does not 
 probably exceed seven hundred and fifty miles. On a com- 
 parison of this extent, with that of several countries in Europe, 
 the practicability of rendering our system commensurate to it, 
 appears to be demonstrable. It is not a great deal larger than 
 Germany, where a diet, representing the whole empire, is con- 
 tinually assembled ; or than Poland before the late dismember- 
 ment, where another national diet was the depository of the 
 
134 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 supreme power. Passing by France and Spain, we find that id 
 (ireat Britain, inferiour as it may be in size, the representatives 
 of the northern extremity of the island, have as far to travel tc 
 the national council, as will be required of those of the most 
 remote parts of the union. 
 
 Favourable as this view of the subject may be, some observa- 
 tions remain, which will place it in a light still more satis- 
 factory. 
 
 In the first place, it is to be remembered, that the general gov- 
 ernment is not to be charged with the whole power of making 
 and administering laws; its jurisdiction is limited to certain 
 enumerated objects, which concern all the members of the re- 
 public, but which are not to be attained by the separate pro- 
 visions of any. The subordinate governments, which can extend 
 their care to all those other objects, which can be separately pro- 
 vided for, will retain their due authority and activity. Were it pro- 
 posed by the plan of the convention, to abolish the governments 
 of the particular states, its adversaries would have some ground 
 for their objection j though it would not be difficult to show, 
 that if they were abolished, the general government would be 
 compelled, by the principle of self-preservation, to reinstate 
 them in their proper jurisdiction, 
 
 A second observation to be made is, that the immediate object 
 of the federal constitution, is to secure the union of the thirteen 
 primitive states, which we know to be practicable; and to add 
 to them such other states, as may arise in their own bosoms, or 
 in their neighbourhoods, which we cannot doubt to be equally 
 practicable. The arrangements that may be necessary for those 
 angles and fractions of our territory, which lie on our north 
 western frontier, must be left to those whom further discoveries 
 and experience will render more equal to the task. 
 
 Let it be remarked, in the third place, that the intercourse 
 throughout the union will be daily facilitated by new improve- 
 ments. Eoads will every where be shortened, and kept in better 
 order ; accommodations for travellers will be multiplied and me- 
 liorated; an interiour navigation on our eastern side, will be 
 
TIIE FEDERALIST. 186 
 
 opened throughout, or Dearly throughout, the whole extent of the 
 Thirteen States. The communication between the western and 
 Atlantic districts, and between different parts of each, will be 
 rendered more and more easy, by those numerous canals, with 
 which the beneficence of nature has intersected our country, 
 and which art finds it so little difficult to connect and complete. 
 
 A fourth, and still more important consideration, is, that as 
 almost every state will, on one side or other, be a frontier, 
 and will thus find, in a regard to its safety, an inducement to 
 make some sacrifices for the sake of the general protection : so 
 the states which lie at the greatest distance from the heart of 
 the union, and which of course may partake least of the ordinary 
 circulation of its benefits, will be at the same time immediately 
 contiguous to foreign nations, and will consequently stand, on 
 particular occasions, in greatest need of its strength and re- 
 sources. It may be inconvenient for Georgia, or the states^ 
 forming our western or north eastern borders, to send their / 
 representatives to the seat of government; but they would find / 
 it more so to struggle alone against an invading enemy, or even | 
 to support alone the whole expense of those precautions, which j 
 may be dictated by the neighbourhood of continual danger. If] 
 they should derive less benefit therefore from the union in some 
 respects, than the less distant states, they will derive greater 
 benefit from it in other respects, and thus the proper equilibrium 
 will be maintained throughout. 
 
 I submit to you, my fellow-citizens, these considerations, in full 
 confidence that the good sense which has so often marked your 
 decisions, will allow them their due weight and effect; and that 
 you will never suffer difficulties, however formidable in appear- 
 ance, or however fashionable the errour on which they may be 
 founded, to drive you into the gloomy and perilous scenes into 
 which the advocates for disunion would conduct you. Hearken 
 not to the unnatural voice, which tells you that the people of 
 America, knit together as they are by so many chords of affec- 
 tioii, can no longer live together as members of the same family: 
 can no longer continue the mutual guardians of their mutual 
 
136 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 happiness; can no longer be fellow-citizens of one ^rf^at, re- 
 spectable, and flourishing empire. Hearken not to the voice, 
 which petulantly tells you, that the form of government recom- 
 mended for your adoption, is a novelty in the political world; 
 that it has never yet had a place in the theories of the wildest 
 projectors; that it rashly attempts what it is impossible to 
 accomplish. No, my countrymen, shut your ears against this 
 unhallowed language. Shut your hearts against the poison 
 which it conveys. The kindred blood which flows in the veins 
 of American citizens, the mingled blood which they have shed 
 in defence of their sacred rights, consecrate their union, and 
 excite horrour at the idea of their becoming aliens, rivals, ene- 
 mies. And if novelties are to be shunned, believe me, the most 
 alarming of all novelties, the most wild of all projects, the most 
 rash of all attempts, is that of rending us in pieces, in order to 
 preserve our liberties, and promote our happiness. But why is 
 the experiment of an extended republic to be rejected, merely 
 because it may comprise what is new ? Is it not the glory of 
 the people of America, that whilst they have paid a decent re- 
 gard to the opinions of former times and other nations, they 
 have not suffered a blind veneration for antiquity, for custom, 
 or for names, to overrule the suggestions of their own good 
 sense, the knowledge of their own situation, and the lessons of 
 their own experience ? To this manly spirit, posterity will be 
 indebted for the possession, and the world for the example, of 
 the numerous innovations displayed on the American theatre, 
 in favour of private rights and public happiness. Had no im- 
 portant step been taken by the leaders of the revolution, for 
 which a precedent could not be discovered; no government 
 established of which an exact model did not present itself, the 
 people of the United States might, at this moment, have been 
 numbered among the melancholy victims of misguided councils; 
 must at best have been labouring under the weight of some of 
 those forms which have crushed the liberties of the rest of man- 
 kind. Happily for America, happily, we trust, for the whole 
 human race, they pursued a new and more noble course. They 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 137 
 
 accomplished a revolution which has no parallel in the annals 
 of human society. They reared the fabrics of governments 
 which have no model on the face of the globe. They formed the 
 design of a great confederacy, which it is incumbent on their suc- 
 cessors to improve and perpetuate. If their works betray im- 
 perfections, we wonder at the fewness of them. If they erred 
 most in the structure of the union, this was the work most diflS- 
 cult to be executed; this is the work which has been new 
 modelled by the act of your convention, and it is that act on 
 which you are now to deliberate and to decide. 
 
 PUBLIUS. 
 
138 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 NUMBER XV. 
 
 NEW YORK, DECEMBER 1, 1787. 
 
 HAMILTON. 
 
 CONCERNING THE DEFECTS OF THE PRESENT CONFEDERATION 
 
 IN RELATION TO THE PRINCIPLE OF LEGISLATION FOR 
 
 THE STATES IN THEIR COLLECTIVE CAPACITIES. 
 
 In the course of the preceding papers, I have endeavoured, 
 my fellow citizens, to place before you, in a clear and convincing 
 light, the importance of union to your political safety and hap- 
 piness. I have unfolded to you a complication of dangers to 
 which you would be exposed, should you permit that sacred 
 knot, which binds the people of America together, to be severed 
 or dissolved by ambition or by avarice, by jealousy or by misre- 
 presentation. In the sequel of the inquiry, through which I 
 propose to accompany you, the truths intended to be inculcated 
 will receive farther confirmation from facts and arguments 
 hitherto unnoticed. If the road, over which you will still have 
 to pass, should in some places appear to you tedious or irk- 
 some, you will recollect, that you are in quest of information on 
 a subject the most momentous, which can engage the attention 
 of a free people ; that the field through which you have to travel 
 is in itself spacious, and that the difficulties of the journey have 
 been uuLecessarily increased by the mazes with which sophistry 
 has beset the way. It will be my aim to remove the obstacles 
 
THE FEDEKALIST. 139 
 
 to your progress, in as compendious a manner as it can be done 
 without sacrificing utility to dispatch. 
 
 In pursuance of the plan, which I have laid down for the 
 discussion of the subject, the point next in order to be examined, 
 is the " insuflSciency of the present confederation to the preser 
 vation of the union." 
 
 It may perhaps be asked, what need there is of reasoning or 
 proof to illustrate a position, which is neither controverted nor 
 doubted ; to which the understandings and feelings of all classes 
 of men assent ; and which in substance is admitted by the oppo- 
 nents as well as by the friends of the new constitution? It 
 must in truth be acknowledged, that however these may difier 
 in other respects, they in general appear to harmonize in the 
 opinion that there are material imperfections in our national 
 system, and that something is necessary to be done to rescue us 
 from impending anarchy. The facts that support this opinion, 
 are no longer objects of speculation. They have forced them- 
 selves upon the sensibility of the people at large, and have at 
 length extorted from those, whose mistaken policy has had the 
 principal share in precipitating the extremity at which we are 
 arrived, a reluctant confession of the reality of many of those 
 defects in the scheme of our federal government, which have 
 been long pointed out and regretted by the intelligent friends of 
 the union. 
 
 "We may indeed, with propriety, be said to have reached 
 almost the last stage of national humiliation. There is scarcely 
 any thing that can wound the pride, or degrade the character, 
 of an independent people, which we do not experience. Are 
 there engagements, to the performance of which we are held by 
 every tie respectable among men? These are the subjects of 
 constant and unblushing violation. Do we owe debts to foreign- 
 ers, and to our own citizens, contracted in a time of imminent 
 peril, for the preservation of our political existence? These 
 remain without any proper or satisfactory provision for their 
 discharge. Have we valuable territories and important posts 
 
 in the possession of a foreign power, which, by express stipula- 
 
 20 
 
140 - THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 tions. ought l(tog since to have been surrendered ? These are 
 still retained, to the prejudice of our interest not less than of 
 our rights. Are we in a condition to resent, or to repel tho 
 aggression? We have neither troops, nor treasury, nor govern- 
 ment.* Are we even in a condition to remonstrate with dignity "^ 
 The just imputations on our own faith, in respect to the saF 
 treaty, ought first to be removed. Are we entitled, by nature f .id 
 compact, to a free participation in the navigation of the Ilrlissis- 
 sippi ? Spain excludes us from it. Is public credit an indispensable 
 resource in time of public danger? We seem to have abandonee 
 its cause as desperate and irretrievable. Is commerce of import 
 ance to national wealth ? Ours is at the lowest point of declen- 
 Bion. Is respectability in the eyes of foreign powers, a safe- 
 guard against foreign encroachments? The imbecility of our 
 government even forbids them to treat with us : Our ambassa- 
 dors abroad are the mere pageants of mimic sovereignty. Is • 
 violent and unnatural decrease in the value of land, a sympto-oi 
 of national distress ? The price of improved land, in most piirts 
 of the country, is much lower than can be accounted for by thf 
 quantity of waste land at market, and can only be fully explaine* 
 by that want of private and public confidence, which are kj 
 alarmingly prevalent among all ranks, and which have a direct 
 tendency to depreciate property of every kind. Is private 
 credit the friend and patron of industry? That most useful 
 kind which relates to borrowing and lending, is reduced within 
 the narrowest limits, and this still more from an opinion of inse- 
 curity than from a scarcity of money. To shorten an enumera- 
 tion of particulars which can aflfbrd neither pleasure nor instruc- 
 tion, it may in general be demanded, what indication is tK^re 
 of national disorder, poverty, and insignificance, that could befal 
 a community so peculiarly blessed with natural advantages as 
 we are, which does not form a part of the dark catalogue of our 
 public misfortunes ? 
 
 This 18 the melancholy situation to which we have been 
 
 * I mean for the union. 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 141 
 
 brought by those very maxims and counsels, which would now 
 deter us from adopting the proposed constitution; and which, 
 not content with having conducted us to the brink of a precipice 
 seem resolved to plunge us into the abyss that awaits us below. 
 Here, my countrymen, impelled by every motive that ought to 
 influence an enlightened people, let us make a firm stand for 
 our safety, our tranquillity, our dignity, our reputation. Let 
 us at last break the fatal charm which has too long seduced us 
 from the paths of felicity and prosperity. 
 
 It is true, as has been before observed, that facts too stubborn 
 to be resisted, have produced a species of general assent to the 
 abstract proposition, that there exist material defects in our 
 national system; but the usefulness of the concession, on the 
 part of the old adversaries of federal measures, is destroyed by 
 a strenuous opposition to a remedy, upon the only principles that 
 can give it a chance of success. While they admit that the 
 government of the United States is destitute of energy, they 
 contend against conferring upon it those powers which are 
 requisite to supply that' energy. They seem still to aim at 
 things repugnant and irreconcilable; at an augmentation of 
 federal authority, without a diminution of state authority; at 
 sovereignty in the union, and complete independence in the 
 members. They still, in fine, seem to cherish with blind devo- 
 tion the political monster of an imperium in imperio. This 
 renders a full display of the principal defects of the confedera- 
 tion necessary, in order to show, that the evils we experience 
 do not proceed from minute or partial imperfections, but from 
 fundamental errors in the structure of the building, which can- 
 not be amended, otherwise than by an alteration in the very 
 elements ajid main pillars of the fabric. 
 
 The great, and radical vice, in the construction of the existing 
 confederation, is in the principle of legislation for states or 
 GOVERNMENTS, in their corporate or collective capacities, 
 and as contradistinguished from the individuals of whom they 
 cjonsist. Though this principle does not run through all the 
 powers delegated to the union ; yet it pervades and governs those 
 
H2 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 on wMch the efficacy of the rest depends: Excv.;t, as to the rule 
 of apportionment, the United States have an indefaiiite discretion 
 to make requisitions for men and money; but they have no 
 authority to raise either, by regulations extending to the indivi- 
 dual citizens of America. The consequence of this is, that, 
 though J^njheory, their resolutions concerning those objects, are 
 laws, constitutionally binding on the members of the union, yet, 
 in practice, they are mere recommendations, which the states 
 observe or disregard at their option. 
 
 It is a singular instance of the capriciousness of the human 
 mind, that, after all the admonitions we have had from expe- 
 rience on this head, there should still be found men, who object 
 to the new constitution, for deviating from a principle which has 
 been found the bane of the old ; and which is, in itself, evidently 
 incompatible with the idea of a government ; a principle, in short, 
 which, if it is to be executed at all, must substitute the violent 
 and sanguinary agency of the sword, to the mild influence of the 
 magistracy. 
 
 There is nothing- absurd or impracticable, in the idea of a 
 league or alliance between independent nations, for certain de- 
 fined purposes precisely stated in a treaty ; regulating all the 
 details of time, place, circumstance, and quantity; leaving 
 nothing to future discretion ; and depending for its execution on 
 the good faith of the parties. Compacts of this kind, exist 
 among all civilized nations, subject to the usual vicissitudes of 
 peace and war; of observance and non-observance, as the in- 
 terests or passions of the contracting powers dictate. In the 
 early part of the present century, there was an epidemical rage 
 in Europe for this species of compacts; from which the poli- 
 ticians of the times fondly hoped for benefits which were never 
 realized. "With a view to establishing the equilibrium of power, 
 and the peace of that part of the world, all the resources of ne- 
 gociation were exhausted, and triple and quadruple alliance^ 
 were formed ; but they were scarcely formed before they were 
 broken, giving an instructive, but afflicting, lesson to mankind, 
 now little dependence is to be placed on treaties which have no 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 14S 
 
 other sanction than the obligations of good faith; and which 
 oppose general considerations of peace and justice, to the impulse 
 of any immediate interest or passion. 
 
 If the particular states in this country are disposed to stand 
 in a similar relation to each other, and to drop the project of a 
 general discretionary superintendence, the scheme would in- 
 deed be pernicious, and would entail upon us all the mischiefs 
 which have been enumerated under the first head ; but it would 
 have the merit of being, at least, consistent and practicable. 
 Abandoning all views towards a confederate government, this 
 would bring us to a simple alliance, offensive and defensive ; 
 and would place us in a situation to be alternately friends and 
 enemies of each other, as our mutual jealousies and rivalships, 
 nourished by the intrigues of foreign nations, should prescribe 
 to us. 
 
 But if we are unwilling to be placed in this perilous situation ; 
 if we still adhere to the design of a national government, or, 
 wliich is the same thing, of a superintending power, under the 
 direction of a common council, we must resolve to incorporate 
 into our plan those ingredients, which may be considered as 
 forming the characteristic difference between a league and a 
 government ; we must extend the authority of the union to thtf 
 pers ons of the c'tizens — ^the only proper objects of government. 
 
 Government implies the power of making laws. It is essen 
 tial to the idea of a law, that it be attended with a sanction ; or 
 in other words, a penalty or punishment for disobedience. If 
 there be no penalty annexed to disobedience, the resolutions or 
 commands which pretend to be laws, will in fact amount to 
 nothing more than advice or recommendation. This penalty, 
 whatever it may be, can only be inflicted in two ways ; by the 
 agency of the courts and ministers of justice, or by military 
 force ; by the coercion of the magistracy, or by the coercion 
 of arms. The first kind can evidently apply only to men ; the 
 last kind must of necessity be employed against bodies politic, 
 or communities or states. It is evident, that there is no process 
 of a court by which their observance of the laws can, in the last 
 
144 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 nssort, be enforced. Sentences may be denounced against them 
 for violations of their duty ; but these sentences can only be 
 carried into execution by the sword. In an association, where 
 the general authority is confined to the collective bodies of the 
 communities that compose it, every breach of the laws must 
 involve a state of war, and military execution must become the 
 only instrument of civil obedience. Such a state of things can 
 certainly not deserve the name of government, nor would any 
 prudent man choose to commit his happiness to it. 
 
 There was a time when we were told that breaches, by the 
 states, of the regulations of the federal authority were not to be 
 expected ; that a sense of common interest would preside over 
 the conduct of the respective members, and would beget a full 
 compliance with all the constitutional requisitions of the union. 
 This language, at the present day, would appear as wild us a 
 great part of what we now hear from the same quarter will be 
 thought, when we shall have received further lessons from that 
 best oracle of wisdom, experience. It at all times betrayed an 
 ignorance of the true springs by which human conduct is ac- 
 tuated, and belied the original inducements to the establishment 
 of civil power. Why has government been instituted at all ? 
 Because the passions of men will not conform to the dictates of 
 reason and justice, without constraint. Has it been found that 
 bodies of men act with more rectitude or greater disinterested- 
 ness than individuals ? The contrary of this has been inferred 
 by all accurate observers of the conduct of mankind ; and the 
 jinference is founded upon obvious reasons. Eegard to reputa- 
 ntion, has a less active influence, when the infamy of a bad action 
 is to be divided among a number, than when it is to fall singly 
 upon one. A spirit of faction, which is apt to mingle its poison 
 in the deliberations of all bodies of men, will often hurry the 
 persons, of whom they are composed, into improprieties and 
 excesses, for which they would blush in a private capacity. 
 
 In addition to all this, there is, in the nature of sovereign 
 power, an impatience of control, which disposes those who 
 are invested with the exercise of it, to look with an evil eye 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 145 
 
 upon all external attempts to restrain or direct its operations 
 From this spirit it happens, that in every political association 
 which is formed upon the principle of uniting in a common inte- 
 rest a number of lesser sovereignties, there will be found a kind 
 of eccentric tendency in the subordinate or inferior orbs, by the 
 operation of which, there will be a perpetual effort in each to fly 
 off from the common centre. This tendency is not difficult to 
 be accounted for. It has its origin in the love of power. Power 
 controlled or abridged is almost always the rival and enemy of 
 that power by which it is controlled or abridged. This simple 
 proposition will teach us how little reason there is to expect 
 that the persons entrusted with the administration of the affairs 
 of the particular members of a confederacy, will at all times be 
 ready, with perfect good humour, and an unbiassed regard to 
 the public weal, to execute the resolutions or decrees of the 
 general authority. The reverse of this results from the con- 
 stitution of man. 
 
 If therefore the measures of the confederacy cannot be exe- 
 cuted, without the intervention of the particular administra- 
 tions, there will be little prospect of their being executed at all. 
 The rulers of the respective members, whether they have a con- 
 stitutional right to do it or not, will undertake to judge of the 
 propriety of the measures themselves. They will consider the 
 conformity of the thing proposed or required to their immediate 
 interests or aims ; the momentary conveniences or inconve- 
 niences that would attend its adoption. All this will be done ; 
 and in a spirit of interested and suspicious scrutiny, without 
 that knowledge of national circumstances and reasons of state, 
 which is essential to a right judgment, and with that strong pre- 
 dilection in favour of local objects, which can hardly fail to mis- 
 lead the decision. The same process must be repeated in every 
 member of which the body is constituted; and the execution of 
 the plans, framed by the councils of the whole, will always fluc- 
 tuate on the discretion of the ill-informed and prejudiced opinion 
 of every part. Those who have been conversant in the proceed- 
 ings of popular assemblies ; who have seen how difficult it often 
 
146 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 is, when there is no exterior pressure of circumstances, to bring 
 them to harmonious resolutions on important points, will readily 
 conceive how impossible it must be to induce a number of such 
 assemblies, deliberating at a distance from each other, at differ- 
 ent times, and under different impressions, long to co-operate in 
 the same views and pursuits. 
 
 In our case, the concurrence of thirteen distinct sovereign 
 wills is requisite under the confederation, to the complete exe- 
 cution of every important measure, that proceeds from the 
 union. It has happened, as was to have been foreseen. The 
 measures of the union have not been executed ; the delinquences 
 of the states have, step by step, matured themselves to an 
 extreme, which has at length arrested all the wheels of the 
 national government, and brought them to an awful s tand. 
 Congress at this time scarcely possess the means of keeping up 
 the forms of administration, till the states can have time to 
 agree upon a more substantial substitute for the present shadow 
 of a federal government. Things did not come to this desperate 
 extremity at once. The causes which have been specified, pro- 
 duced at first only unequal and disproportionate degrees of com- 
 pliance with the requisitions of the union. The greater de- 
 ficiencies of some states furnished the pretext of example, and 
 the temptation of interest to the complying, or at least delin- 
 quent states. "Why should we do more in proportion than those 
 who are embarked with us in the same political voyage ? Why 
 should we consent to bear more than our proper share of the 
 common burthen ? These were suggestions which human 
 selfishness could not withstand, and which even speculative 
 a>en, who looked forward to remote consequences, could not 
 without hesitation combat. Each state, yielding to the per- 
 suasive voice of immediate interest or convenience, has succes- 
 sively withdrawn its support, till the frail and tottering edifice 
 seems ready to fall upon our heads and to crush us beneath its 
 ruins. 
 
 PUBLIUS. 
 
TH ? FEDERALIST. *4' 
 
 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 NUMBER XVI. 
 
 NEW YORIC, DECEMBER 5,1787. 
 
 HAMILTON. 
 
 THE SAME SUBJ];CT CONTINUED, IN RELATION TO THE SAME 
 PRINCIPLES. 
 
 The tendency of the principle of legislation for states or 
 communities in their political capacities, as it has been exempli- 
 fied by the expeiim ^nt we have made of it, is equally attested 
 by the events wh. ch have befallen all other governments of the 
 confederate kind, of which we have any account, in exact pro- 
 portion to its prevalence in those systems. The confirmations 
 of this fact will be worthy of a distinct and particular examina- 
 tion. I shall content myself with barely observing here, that 
 of all the confederacies of antiquity w'lich history has handed 
 down to us, tl e Lycian and Achaean leagues, as far as there 
 remain vestiges of them, appear to have been most free from the 
 fetters of that mistaken principle, and were accordingly those 
 which have best deserved, and have most liberally received, the 
 applauding suffrages of political writers. 
 
 This exceptionable principle may, as truly as emphaticallj- , 
 be styled the parent of anarchy: It has been seen that delin- 
 quencies in the members of the union are its natural and neces- 
 sary offspring; and that whentver they lappen, the only con- 
 Btitutional remedy is force, and ^h • immed «.te effect of the uso 
 of it, civil war. , 
 
348 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 ft remains to inquire how far so odious an engine of govern- 
 ment, in its application to us, would even be capable of answer- 
 ing its end. If there should not be a large army, constantly at 
 the disposal of the national government, it would either not be 
 able to employ force at all, or when this could be done, it would 
 amount to a war between different parts of the confederacy, 
 concerning the infractions of a league; in which the strongest 
 combination would be most likely to prevail, whether it con- 
 sisted of those who supported, or of those who resisted, the 
 general authority. It would rarely happen that the delinquency 
 to be redressed would be confined to a single member, and if 
 there were more than one, who had neglected their duty, simi- 
 larity of situation would induce them to unite for common 
 defence. Independent of this motive of sympathy, if a large 
 and influential state should happen to be the aggressing member, 
 it would commonly have weight enough with its neighbours, to 
 win over some of them as associates to its cause. Specious 
 arguments of danger to the general liberty could easily be con- 
 trived; plausible excuses for the deficiencies of the party, could, 
 without diflSculty, be invented, to alarm the apprehensions, 
 inflame the passions, and conciliate the good will even of those 
 states which were not chargeable with any violation, or omission 
 of duty. This would be the more likely to take j^lace, as the 
 delinquencies of the larger members might be expected some- 
 times to proceed from an ambitious premeditation in their rulers, 
 with a view to getting rid of all external control upon their 
 designs of personal aggrandizement; the better to efi'ect which, 
 it is presumable they would tamper beforehand with leading indi- 
 viduals in the adjacent states. If associates could not be found at 
 home, recourse would be had to the aid of foreign powers, who 
 would seldom be disinclined to encouraging the dissensions of a 
 3onfederacy, from the firm union of which th6y had so much to 
 fear. When the sword is once drawn, the passions of men 
 observe no bounds of moderation. The suggestions of wounded 
 pride, the instigations of irritated resentment, would be apt to 
 carry the states, against which the arms of the union were 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 149 
 
 r^ei'ted, to any extremes necessary to avenge the affront, or to 
 avoid the disgrace of submission. The first war of this Kina 
 would probably terminate in a dissolution of the union. 
 
 This may be considered as the violent death of the confede- 
 racy. Its more natural death is what we now seem to be on 
 the point of experiencing, if the federal system be not speedily 
 renovated in a more substantial form. It is not probable, con- 
 sidering the genius of this country, that the complying states 
 would often be inclined to support the authority of the union, 
 by engaging in a war against the non-complying states. They 
 would always be more ready to pursue the milder course of 
 putting themselves upon an equal footing with the delinquent 
 members, by an imitation of their example. And the guilt of all 
 would thus become the security of all. Our past experience 
 has exhibited the operation of this spirit in its full light. There 
 would in fact be an insuperable difficulty in ascertaining when 
 force could with propriety be employed. In the article of pecu- 
 niary contribution, which would be the most usual source of 
 delinquency, it would often be impossible to decide whether it 
 had proceeded from disinclination, or inability. The pretence 
 of the latter would always be at hand. And the case must be 
 very flagrant in which its fallacy could be detected with sufficient 
 certainty to justify the harsh expedient of compulsion. It is 
 easy to see that this problem alone, as often as it should occur, 
 would open a wide field to the majority that happened to prevail 
 in the national council, for the exercise of factious views, of 
 partiality, and of oppression. 
 
 It seems to require no pains to prove that the states ought 
 not to prefer a national constitution, which could only be kept 
 in motion by the instrumentality of a large army, continually 
 on foot to execute the ordinary requisitions or decrees of the gov- 
 ernment. And yet this is the plain alternative involved by those 
 who wish to deny it the power of extending its operations to 
 rndividuals. Such a scheme, if practicable at all, would instantly 
 degenerate into a military despotism; but it will be found in 
 every light impracticable. The resources of the union would 
 
150 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 not be equal to the maintenance of an army considerable enough 
 to confine the larger states within the limits of their duty; nor 
 would the means ever be furnished of forming such an army in 
 the first instance. Whoever considers the populousness and 
 strength of several of these states singly at the present juncture^ 
 and looks forward to what they will become, even at the distance 
 of half a century, will at once dismiss as idle and visionary any 
 Bcheme, which aims at regulating their movements by laws, to 
 operate upon them in their collective capacities, and to be exe- 
 cuted by a coercion applicable to them in the same capacities. 
 A project of this kind is little less romantic than the monster- 
 taming spirit, attributed to the fabulous heroes and demi-gods 
 of antiquity. 
 
 Even in those confederacies, which have been composed of 
 members smaller than many of our counties, the principle of 
 legislation for sovereign states, supported by military coercion, 
 has never been found effectual. It has rarely been attempted 
 to be employed, but against the weaker members; and in most 
 instances attempts to coerce the refractory and disobedient, 
 have been the signals of bloody wars; in which one half of the 
 confederacy has displayed its banners against the other. 
 
 The result of these observations to an intelligent mind must 
 be clearly this, that if it be possible at any rate to construct a 
 federal government capable of regulatiqg the common concerns, 
 and preserving the general tranquillity, it must be founded, as 
 to the objects committed to its care, upon the reverse of the 
 principle contended for by the opponents of the proposed consti- 
 1 I tution. rXt must carry its agency to the persons of the citizensTl 
 It must^tand in need of no intermediate legislations; but must 
 itself be empowered to employ the arm of the ordinary magis- 
 trate to execute its own resolutions. The majesty of the national 
 authority must be manifested through the medium of the courts 
 of justice. The government of the union, like that of each state, 
 must be able to address itself immediately to the hopes and fears 
 of individuals; and to attract to its support, those passions, which 
 have the strongest influence upon the human heart. It must, in 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 151 
 
 s^iort, possess all tho means, and have a rrght to resort to all 
 tJie methods, of executing the powers with which it is entrusted, 
 ihat are possessed and exercised by the governments of the 
 particular states. 
 
 To this reasoning it may perhaps be objected, that if any 
 state should be disaffected to the authority of the union, it could 
 at any time obstruct the execution of its laws, and bring the 
 matter to the same issue of force, with the necessity of which 
 the opposite scheme is reproached. 
 
 The plausibility of this objection will vanish the moment we 
 advert to the essential difference between a mere non-com- 
 pliance and a direct and active resistance. If the interpo- 
 sition of the state legislatures be necessary to give effect to a 
 measure of the union, they have only not to act, or to act 
 
 1 
 
 EVASIVELY, and the measure is defeated. This neglect of duty 
 may be disguised under affected but unsubstantial provisions so 
 AS not to appear, and of course not to excite any alarm in the 
 people for the safety of the constitution. The state leaders may 
 even make a merit of their surreptitious invasions of it, on the 
 ground of some temporary convenience, exemption, or advan- / 
 tage. 
 
 But if the execution of the laws of the national government 
 should not require the intervention of the state legislatures; if 
 they were to pass into immediate operation upon the citizens 
 themselves, the particular governments could not interrupt their 
 progress without an open and violen t exertion of an unconstitu- 
 tional power. No omission, nor evasions, would answer the 
 ■end. They would be obliged to act, and in such a manner, as 
 would leave no doub t that they had encroached on the national 
 rights. An experiment of this nature would always be hazard- 
 ous in the face of a constitution in any degree competent to its 
 own defence, and of a people enlightened enough to distinguish 
 between a legal exercise and an illegal usurpation of authority. 
 The success of it would require not merely a factious majority 
 in the legislature, but the concurrence of the courts of justice, 
 and of the body of the people. If the judges were not em- 
 
A 
 
 152 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 barked in a conspiracy with the legislature, they would pro- 
 nounce the resolutions of such a majority to be contrary to the 
 supreme law of the land, unconstitutional and void. If the 
 people were not tainted with the spirit of their state represent- 
 atives, they, as the natural guardians of the constitution, would 
 throw their weight into the national scale, and give it a decided 
 preponderancy in the contest. Attempts of this kind would 
 not often be made with levity or rashness; because they could 
 seldom be made without danger to the authors; unless in cases 
 of a tyrannical exercise of the federal authority. 
 
 If opposition to the national government should arise from 
 the disorderly conduct of refractory, or seditious individuals, it 
 could be overcome by the same means which are daily em- 
 ployed against the same evil, under the state governments. 
 The magistracy, being equally the ministers of the law of the 
 land, from whatever source it might emanate, would, doubtless, 
 be as ready to guard the national as the local regulations, from 
 the inroads of private licentiousness. As to those partial com- 
 motions and insurrections, which sometimes disquiet society, 
 from the intrigues of an inconsiderable faction, or from sudden 
 or occasional ill humours, that do not infect the great body of 
 the community, the general government could command more 
 extensive resources, for the suppression of disturbances of that 
 kind, than would be in the power of any single member. And 
 as to those mortal feuds, which, in certain conjunctures, spread 
 a conflagration through a whole nation, or through a very large 
 proportion of it, proceeding either from weighty causes of dis- 
 content, given by the governmentj.^or from the contagion of 
 some violent popular paroxism, they do not fall within any 
 ordinary rules of calculation. When they happen, they com- 
 monly amount to revolutions, and dismemberments of empire. 
 No form of government can always either avoid or control 
 them. It is in vain to hope to guard against events too mighty 
 for human foresight or precaution; and it would be idle to object 
 to a government, because it could not perform impossibilities. 
 
 PifBLirs. 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 153 
 
 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 NUMBER XVII. 
 
 NEW YORK, DECEMBER 5, 1787. 
 
 HAMILTON. 
 
 THE SUBJECT CONTINUED, AND ILLUSTRATED BY EXAMPLES, TO 
 SHOW THE TENDENCY OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENTS, RATHER 
 TO ANARCHY AMONG THE MEMBERS, THAN TYRANNY IN THE 
 HEAD. 
 
 An objection, of a nature different from that which has been 
 Btated and answered in my last address, may, perhaps, be urged 
 against the principle of legislation for the individual citizens of 
 America. It may be said, that it would tend to render the gov- 
 ernment of the union too powerful, and to enable it to absorb 
 those residuary authorities, which it might be judged proper to 
 leave with the states for local purposes. Allowing the utmost 
 latitude to the love of power, which any reasonable man can 
 require, I confess I am at a loss to discover what temptation the 
 persons entrusted with the administration of the general gov- 
 ernment, could ever feel to divest the states of the authorities 
 of that description. The regulation of the mere domestic police 
 of a state, appears to me to hold out slender allurements to am- 
 bition. Commerce, finance, negociation, and war, seem to com- 
 prehend all the objects which have charms for minds governed 
 by that passion; and all the powers necessary to those objects, 
 ought, in the first instance, to be lodged in the national deposi- 
 tory The administration of private justice between the citi- 
 zens of the same state : the supervision of agriculture, and of 
 
154 THE FEDERALIST 
 
 Other concerns of a similar nature; all those things, in short, 
 which are proper to be provided for by local legislation, can 
 never be desirable cares of a general jurisd ctioD. It is therefore 
 improbable, that there should exist a disposition in the federal 
 councils, to usurp the powers with which they are connected; 
 because the attempt to exercise them, would b 3 as troublesome 
 as it would be nugatory ; and the possession of them, for that 
 reason, would contribute nothing to the digni y, to the import- 
 ance, or to the splendour, of the national govtrn nent. 
 
 But let it be admitted, for argument salr i, that mere wanton- 
 ness, and lust of domination, would be st Mcient to beget that 
 disposition ; still it may be safely affirmed, th it the sense of the 
 constituent body of the national represents.tives, or, in other 
 words, of the people of the several states, wc»uld control the 
 indulgence of so extravagant an appetite. It will always be far 
 more easy for the state governments to encroach upon the 
 national authorities, than for the national government to en- 
 croach upon the state authorities. The proof of this proposi- 
 tion turns upon the greater degree of influence which the state 
 governments, if they administer their affairs with uprightness 
 and prudence, will generally possess over the people ; a circum- 
 stance which at the same time teaches us, that there is an inhe- 
 rent and intrinsic weakness in all federal constitutions ; and that 
 too much pains cannot be taken in their organization, to give them 
 all the force which is compatible with the principles of liberty 
 
 The superiority of influence in favor of the particular govern- 
 ments, would result partly from the diffusive construction of the 
 national government; but chiefly from the nature of the objects 
 to which the attention of the state administrations would be 
 directed. 
 
 It is a Known fact in human nature, that its affections are 
 commonly weak in proportion to the distance or diffusiveness 
 of the object. Upon the same principle that a man is more 
 attached to his family than to his neighbourhood, to his 
 neighbourhood than to the community at large, the people 
 of each state would be apt to feel a stronger bias towards 
 
THE FEDERALIST. lo5 
 
 their local governments, than towards the government of the 
 union, unless the force of that principle should be destroyed by 
 a much better administration of the latter. 
 
 This strong propensity of the human heart, would find power- 
 ful auxiliaries in the objects of state regulation. 
 
 The variety of more minute interests, which will necessarily 
 fall under the superintendence of the local administrations, and 
 which will form so many rivulets of influence, running through 
 every part of the society, cannot be particularized, without 
 involving a detail too tedious and uninteresting, to compensate 
 for the instruction it might afford. 
 
 There is one transcendent advantage belonging to the pro- 
 vince of the state governments, which alone suffices to place the 
 matter in a clear and satisfactory light — I mean the ordinary 
 administration of criminal and civil justice. This, of all others, 
 is the most powerful, most universal, and most attractive source 
 of popular obedience and attachment. It is this, which, being 
 the immediate and visible guardian of life and property ; having 
 its benefits and its terrors in constant activity before the public 
 eye; regulating all those personal interests, and familiar con- 
 cerns, to which the sensibility of individuals is more immediately 
 awake ; contributes, more than any other circumstance, to im • 
 press upon the minds of the people affection, esteem, and reve- 
 rence towards the government. This great cement of society, 
 which will diffuse itself almost wholly through the channels of 
 the particular governments, independent of all other causes of 
 influence, would insure them so decided an empire over their 
 respective citizens, as to render them at all times a complete 
 counterpoise, and not unfrequently dangerous rivals to the power 
 of the union. 
 
 The operations of the national government, on the othei 
 hand, falling less immediately under the observation of the mass 
 of the citizens, the benefits derived from it will chiefly be per- 
 ceived, and attended to by speculative men. Eelating to more 
 general interests, they will be less apt to come home to the 
 feelings of the people; and, in proportion, less likely to inspire, 
 
 21 
 
15t) THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 a habitual sense of obligation, and an active sentiment of 
 attachment. 
 
 The reasoning on this head has been abundantly exemplified 
 by the experience of all federal constitutions, with which we are 
 acquainted, and of all others, which have borne the least analogy 
 to them. 
 
 Though the ancient feudal systems were not, strictly speaJj- 
 ing, confederacies, yet they partook of the nature of that species 
 of association. There was a common head, chieftain, or sove- 
 roi^, whose authority extended over the whole nation ; and a 
 ' jmber of subordinate vassals, or feudatories, who had large 
 ' ortions of land allotted to them, and numerous trains of inferior 
 /assals or retainers, who occupied and cultivated that land upon 
 the tenure of fealty, or obedience to the persons of whom they 
 held it. Each principal vassal was a kind of sovereign within 
 his particular demesnes. The consequences of this situation 
 were a continual opposition to the authority of the sovereign, 
 and frequent wars between the great barons, or chief feudatories 
 themselves. The power of the head of the nation was com- 
 monly too weak either to preserve the public peace, or to pro- 
 tect the people against the oppressions of their immediate lords. 
 This period of European affairs is emphatically styled by his- 
 torians, the times of feudal anarchy. 
 
 When the sovereign happened to be a man of vigorous and 
 warlike temper and of superior abilities, he would acquire a per- 
 sonal weight and influence, which answered for the time the 
 purposes of a more regular authority. But in general, the power 
 of the barons triumphed over that of the prince ; and in many 
 instance J his dominion was entirely thrown off, and the great 
 iefs V ^re erected into independent principalities or states. In 
 tho8« instances in which the monarch finally prevailed over his 
 vasBdls, his success was chiefly owing to the tyranny of those 
 vai'Sals over their dependants. The barons, or nobles, equally 
 the enemies of the sovereign and the oppressors of the common 
 ',eople, were dreaded and detested by both; till mutual danger 
 *nd mutual interest effected an union between them fatal to the 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 157 
 
 power ol tne aristocracy. L.^d the nobles, b^ ^ conduct of 
 clemency and justice, preserved tL^ fidelity and devotion of 
 their retainers and followers, the contests between them and 
 the prince must almost always have ended in their favour, and 
 in the abridgement or subversion of the royal authority. 
 
 This is not an assertion founded merely in speculation or con- 
 jecture. Among other illustrations of its truth which might be 
 cited, Scotland will furnish a cogent example. The spirit of 
 •olanship which was at an early day introduced into that king- 
 dom, uniting the nobles and their dependants by ties equivalent 
 to those of kindred, rendered the aristocracy a constant over- 
 match for the power of the monarch, till the incorporation with 
 England subdued its fierce and ungovernable spirit, and reduced 
 it within those rules of subordination, which a more rational 
 and a more energetic system of civil polity had previously 
 established in the latter kingdom. 
 
 The separate governments in a confederacy may aptly be com- 
 pared with the feudal baronies ; with this advantage in their 
 favour, that from the reasons already explained, they will gene- 
 rally possess the confidence and good will of the people; and 
 with so important a support, will be able effectually to oppose 
 all encroachments of the national government. It will be well 
 if they are not able to counteract its legitimate and necessary 
 authority. The points of similitude consist in the rivalship of 
 power, applicable to both, and in the concentration of large 
 portions of the strength of the community into particular de- 
 positories, in one case at the disposal of individuals, in the 
 other case, at the disposal of political bodies. 
 
 A concise review of the events that have attended confederate 
 governmer ts, will further illustrate this important doctrine ; an 
 inattention to which has been the great source of onr political 
 mistakes, and has given our jealousy a direction to the wrong 
 side. This review shall form the subject of some ensuing papers 
 
 PUBLIUS 
 
1«'>8 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 0' 
 
 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 NUMBER XVIII. 
 
 NEW YORK, DECEMBER 8, 1787. 
 
 HAMILTON AND MADISON. 
 
 THE SUBJECT CONTINUED, WITH FARTHER EXAMPLES. 
 
 Among the confederacies of antiquity, the most considerable 
 was that of the Grecian republics, associated under the Ampbyc- 
 tionic council. From the best transmitted accounts of this cele- 
 brated institution, it bore a very instructive analogy to the pre- 
 sent confederation of the American states. 
 \]/ The members retained the character of independent and 
 
 Q ^ sovereign states, and had equal votes in the federal council, 
 
 '-^ ^i^> This council had a general authority to propose and resolve 
 
 whatever it judged necessary for the common welfare of Greece ; 
 to declare and carry on war ; to decide, in the last resort, all 
 controversies between the members; to fine the aggressing 
 party; to employ the whole force of the confederacy against 
 the disobedient; to admit new members. The Amphyctions 
 were the guardians of religion, and of the immense riches be- 
 longing to the temple of Delphqs, where they had the right of 
 jurisdiction in controversies between the inhabitants and those 
 who came to consult the oracle. As a further provision for the 
 eflScacy of the federal powers, they took an oath mutually to 
 defend and protect the united cities, to punish the violators of 
 this oath, and to inflict vengeance on sacrilegious despoilers of 
 the temple. 
 
' THE FEDERALIST. 159 
 
 In theoij, and upon paper, this apparatus of powers, seems 
 t -nply sufficient for all general purposes. In several material 
 instances, they exceed the powers enumerated in the articles of 
 confederation. The Amphyctions had in their hands the super- 
 stition of the times, one of the principal engines by which gov- 
 ernment was then maintained; they had a declared authority 
 to use coercion against refractory cities, and were bound by 
 oath to exert this authority on the necessary occasions. 
 
 Very different, nevertheless, was the experiment from the 
 theory. The powers, like those of the present congress, were 
 administered by deputies appointed wholly by the cities in their 
 political capacities; and exercised over them in the same capa- 
 cities. Hence the weakness, the disorders, and finally the de- 
 struction of the confederacy. The more powerful members, in- 
 stead of being kept in awe and subordination, tyrannized suc- 
 cessively over all the rest. Athens, as we learn from Demos- 
 thenes, was the arbiter of Greece seventy-three years. The 
 Lacedemonians next governed it twenty-nine years ; at a subse- 
 quent period, aft^r the battle of Leuctra, the Thebans had their 
 turn of domination. 
 
 It happened but too often, according to Plutarch, that the 
 deputies of the strongest cities, awed and corrupted those of the 
 weakest, and that judgment went in favour of the most power- 
 ful party. 
 
 Even in the midst of defensive and dangerous wars with 
 Persia and Macedon, the members never acted in concert, and 
 were more or fewer of them, eternally the dupes, or the hire- 
 lings, of the common enemy. The intervals of foreign' war, 
 were filled up by domestic vicissitudes, convulsions, and carnage. 
 
 After the conclusion of the war with Xerxes, it appears that 
 the Lacedemonians required that a number of the cities should 
 be turned out of the confederacy for the unfaithful part they 
 had acted. The Athenians, finding that the Lacedemonians 
 would lose fewer partizans by such a measure than themselves, 
 and would become masters of the public deliberations, vigor- 
 .^u^ly opposed and defeated the attempt. This piece of history 
 
'160 THE FEDERALIST. * 
 
 proveu at on'je the inefficiency of the union; the ambition and 
 jealousy of its most powerful members, and the dependent and 
 degraded condition of the rest. The smaller members, though 
 entitled by the theory of their system, to revolve in equal pride 
 and majesty around the common centre, had in fact become 
 satellites of the orbs of primary magnitude. 
 
 Had the Greeks, says the abbe Milot, been as wise as they 
 were courageous, they would have been admonished by expe- 
 rience of the necessity of a closer union, and would have availed 
 themselves of the peace which followed their success against 
 the Persian arms, to establish such a reformation. Instead of 
 this obvious policy, Athens and Sparta, inflated with the vic- 
 tories and the glory they had acquired, became first rivals, and 
 then enemies; and did each other infinitely more mischief than 
 they had suffered from Xerxes. Their mutual jealousies, fears, 
 hatreds, and injuries, ended in the celebrated Peloponnesian 
 war ; which itself ended in the ruin and slavery of the Athe- 
 nians, who had begun it. 
 
 As a weak government, when not at war, is ever agitated by 
 internal dissentions ; so these never fail to bring on fresh calami- 
 ties from abroad. The Phocians having ploughed up some con- 
 secrated ground belonging to the temple of Apollo, the Amphyc- 
 tionic council, according to the superstition of the age, imposed 
 a fine on the sacrilegious offenders. The Phocians, being 
 abetted by Athens and Sparta, refused to submit to the decree. 
 The Thebans, with others of the cities, undertook to maintain 
 the authority of the Amphyctions, and to avenge the violated 
 god. The latter being the weaker party, invited the assistance 
 of Philip of Macedon, who secretly fostered the contest. Philip 
 gladly seized the opportunity of executing the designs he had 
 long planned against the liberties of Greece. By his intrigues 
 and bribes, he won over to his interests the popular leaders of 
 several cities; by their influence and votes, gained admission 
 into the Amphyctionic council; and by his arts and his arms, 
 made himself master of the confederacy. 
 
 Sneh were the consequences of the fallacious principle, on 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 161 
 
 which this interesting establishment was founded. Had Greece, 
 says a judicious observer on her fate, been united by a stricter 
 confederation, and persevered in her union, she would never 
 have worn the chains of Macedon; and might have proved a 
 barrier to the vast projects of Eome. 
 
 The Achaean league , as it is called, was another society of 
 Grecian republics, which supplies us with valuable instruction. 
 
 The union here was far more intimate, and its organization 
 much wiser, than in the preceding instance. It will accordingly 
 appear, that though not exempt from a similar catastrophe, it 
 by no means equally deserved it. 
 
 The cities composing this league, retained their municipal 
 jurisdiction, appointed their own officers, and enjoyed a perfect 
 equality. The senate in which they were represented, had the 
 sole and exclusive right of peace and war ; of sending and re- 
 ceiving ambassadors ; of entering into treaties and alliances ; of 
 appointing a chief magistrate or pretor, as he w^as called, — who 
 commanded their armies; and who, with the advice and consent 
 of ten of the senators, not only administered the government 
 in the recess of the senate, but had a great share in its delibe- 
 rations, ^vhen assembled. According to the primitive constitu- 
 tion, there were two pretors associated in the administration, 
 but on trial, a single one was preferred. 
 
 It appears that the cities had all the same laws and customs, 
 the same weights and measures, and the same money. But how 
 far this effect proceeded from the authority of the federal coun- 
 cil, is left in uncertainty. It is said only, that the cities were 
 tn a manner compelled to receive the same laws and usages. 
 "When Lacedemon was brought into the league, by Philopcemen, 
 it was attended with an abolition of the institutions and laws 
 of Lycurgus, and an adoption of those of the Achseans. The 
 Amphyctionic confederacy, of which she had been a member, 
 left her in the full exercise of her government and her legisla- 
 tion. This circumstance alone proves a very material differ- 
 ence in the genius of the two systems. 
 
 It is much to be regretted that the monuments which remain 
 
132 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 of this curious political fabric are so imperfect. Could its inte- 
 rior structure and regular operation be ascertained, it is pro- 
 bable that more light would be thrown by it on the science of 
 federal government, than by any of the like experiments with 
 which we are acquainted. 
 
 One important fact seems to be witnessed by all the historians 
 who. take notice of Achsean affairs. It is, that as well after the 
 renovation of the league by Aratus, as before its dissolution by 
 the arts of Maeedon, there was infinitely more of moderation 
 and justice in the administration of its government, and less of 
 violence and sedition in the people, than were to be found in any 
 of the cities exercising singly all the prerogatives of sovereignty. 
 The abbe Mably in his observations on Greece, says that the 
 popular government, which was so tempestuous elsewhere, 
 caused no disorders in the members of the Achaean republic, 
 because it was there *em,pered by the general authority and laws of 
 the confeaerac-q. 
 
 We are not to conclude too hastily, however, that tiaction did 
 not in a certain degree agitate the particular cities; much less, 
 that a due subordination and harmony reigned in the general 
 system. The contrary is sufficiently displayed in the vicissitudes 
 and fate of the republic. 
 
 Whilst the Amphyctionic confederacy remained, that of the 
 Achseans, which comprehended the less important cities only, 
 made little figure on the theatre of Greece. When the former 
 became a victim to Maeedon, the latter was spared by the policy 
 of Philip and Alexander. Under the successors of these princes, 
 however, a different policy prevailed. The arts of division wer^ 
 practised among the Achseans; each city was seduced into a 
 separate interest; the union was dissolved. Some of the cities 
 fell under the tyranny of Macedonian garrisons : others und^r 
 that of usurpers springing out of their own confusions. Shame 
 and oppression ere long awakened their love of liberty. A few 
 cities re-united. Their example was followed by others, as 
 opportunities were found of cutting off their tyrants. The 
 league soon embraced almost the whole Peloponnesus. Maeedon 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 163 
 
 Baw its progress; but "vv. s hindeiad by internal dissentions from 
 stopping it. All Greece caught the enthusiasm, and seemed 
 ready to unite in one confoderaey, when the jealousy and envy 
 in Sparta and Athens, of the rising glory of the Achjeans, threw 
 a fatal damp on the enterprise. The dread of the Macedonian 
 power induced the league to court the alliance )f the kings of 
 Egypt and Syria; who, as successors of Alex; ne'er, were rivals 
 of the king of Macedon. This policy was defeated by Cleomenes. 
 king of Sparta, who was led by his ambition to make an unpro- 
 voked attack on his neighbours the Achaeans; and who, as an 
 enemy to Macedon, had interest enough with th(! Egyptian and 
 Syrian princes, to effect a breach of their engage nents with the 
 league. The Achaeans were now reduced to thf dilemma of suo- 
 mitting to Cleomenes, or of suppUcating the aid of Macedon, 
 its former oppressor. The latter expedient wis adopted. The 
 contest of the Greeks always afforded a pleasiag opportunity to 
 that powerful neighbour, of intermeddling in their affairs. A 
 Macedonian army quickly appeared : Cleoin mt s was vanquished. 
 The Achaeans soon experienced, as often happens, that a victo- 
 rious and powerful ally, is but another nume for a master. All 
 that their most abject compliances could obtain from him, was a 
 toleration of the exercise of their lawa. Philip, who was now 
 on the throne of Macedon, soon provoked, by his tyrannies, fresh 
 combinations among the Greeks. The Ach;ef.ns, though weak- 
 ened by internal dissentions, and by the re^ olt of Messene, one 
 of its members, being joined by the Etolians and Athenians, 
 erected the standard of opposition. Findin ; themselves, though 
 thus supported, unequal to the undertaking they once more had 
 recourse to the dangerous expedient of inti educing the succour 
 of foreign arms. The Eomans, to whoia the invitation was 
 made, eagerly embraced it. Philip ^v&s fonqiered: Macedon 
 subdued. A new crisis ensued to the leagao. L'ssentions broke 
 out among its members. These the Roraans fostered. Calli- 
 crates, and other popular leaders, became mercenary instruments 
 for inveigling their countrymen. The more effectually to 
 nourish discord and disorder, the Romans nad, to the astonish- 
 
164 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 ment of those who confided in their sincerity, already proclaimed 
 universal liberty* throughout Greece. "With the same insidious 
 views, they now seduced the members from the league, by 
 representing to their pride, the violation it committed on tlieir 
 sovereignty. By these arts, this union, the last hope of Greece, 
 the last hope of ancient liberty, was torn into pieces; and such 
 imbecility and distraction introduced, that the arms of Rome 
 found little difficulty in completing the ruin which their arts 
 had commenced. The Achteans were cut to pieces; and Achaia 
 loaded with chains, under which it is groaning at this hour. 
 
 1 have thought it not superfluous to give the outlines of this 
 important portion of history; both because it teaches more than 
 one lesson; and because, as a supplement to the outlines of the 
 Achaean constitution, it emphatically illustrates the tendency of 
 federal bodies, rather to anarchy among the members, than to 
 tyraunv in the head. 
 
 PUBLIUS. 
 
 * This vas but another name more specious, for the independence of th« 
 members on the federal head 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 165 
 
 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 NUMBER XIX. 
 
 NEW YORK, DECEMBER 8, 1787. 
 
 HAMILTON AND MADISON. 
 
 THE SUBJECT CONTINUED, WITH FURTHER EXAMPLES. 
 
 The examples of ancient confederacies, cited in my last paper 
 have not exhausted the source of experimental instruction on 
 this subject. There are existing institutions, founded on a 
 similar principle, which merit particular consideration. The 
 first which presents itself is the Germanic body. 
 
 In the early ages of Christianity, Germany was occupied by 
 seven distinct nations, who had no common chief The Franks 
 one of the number, having conquered the Gauls, established the 
 kingdom which has taken its name from them. In the ninth 
 century, Charlemagne, its warlike monarch, carried his victorious 
 arms in every direction ; and Germany became a part of his vast 
 dominion* On the dismemberment, which took place under 
 his sons, this part was erected into a separate and independent 
 empire. Charlemagne and his immediate descendants possessed 
 the reality, as well as the ensigns and dignity of imperial 
 power. But the principal vassals, whose fiefs had become 
 hereditary, and who composed the national diets, which Charle 
 magne had not abolished, gradually threw off the yoke, and 
 advanced to sovereign jurisdiction and independence. The force 
 of imperial sovereignty was insuflScient to restrain sr ch power- 
 ful dependants; or to preserve the unity and tranquillity of the 
 
166 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 empire. The most furious private wars, accompanied with every 
 species of calamity, were carried on between the different princes 
 and states. The imperial authority, unable to maintain the 
 public order, declined by degrees, till it was almost extinct in 
 the anarchy, which agitated the long interval between the death 
 of the last emperor of the Suabian, and the accession of the first 
 emperor of the Austrian lines. In the eleventh century, the 
 emperors enjoyed full sovereignty: In the fifteenth, they had 
 little more than the symbols and decorations of power. 
 
 Out of this feudal system, which has itself many of the import- 
 ant features of a confederacy, has grown the federal system, 
 which constitutes the Germanic empire. Its powers are vested 
 in a diet representing the component members of the confede- 
 racy; in the emperor who is the executive magistrate, with a 
 negative on the decrees of the diet; and in the imperial cham- 
 ber and aulic council, two judiciary tribunals having supreme 
 jurisdiction in controversies which concern the empire, or which 
 happen among its members. 
 
 The diet possesses the general power of legislating for the 
 empire; of making war and peace; contracting alliances; assess- 
 ing quotas of troops and money; constructing fortresses; regu- 
 lating coin; admitting new members; and subjecting disobedient 
 \aembers to the ban of the empire, by which the party is degraded 
 j[ix)m his sovereign rights, and his possessions forfeited. The 
 members of the confederacy are expressly restricted from enter- 
 ing into compacts, prejudicial to the empire, from imposing tolls 
 and duties on their mutual intercourse, without the consent of 
 the emperor and diet; from altering the value of money; from 
 doing injustice to one another; or from affording assistance or 
 retreat to disturbers of the public peace. And the ban is de- 
 nounced against such as shall violate any of these restrictions. 
 The members of the diet, as such, are subject in all cases to be 
 judged by the emperor and diet, and in their private capacities, 
 by the aulic council and imperial chamber. 
 
 The prerogatives of the emperor are numerous The most 
 .mportant of them are, his exclusive right to make propositions 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 167 
 
 to the diet 3 to negative its resolutions; to name ambassadors; 
 to confer dignities and titles; to fill vacant electorates; to found 
 universities; to grant privileges not injurious to the states of the 
 empire; to receive and apply the public revenues; and generally 
 to watch over the public safety. In certain cases, the electors 
 form a council to him. In quality of emperor, he possesses no 
 territory within the empire; nor receives any revenue for his 
 support. But his revenues and dominions, in other qualities, 
 constitute him one of the most powerful princes in Europe. 
 
 From such a parade of constitutional powers, in the represen- 
 tatives and head of this confederacy, the natural supposition 
 would be, that it must form an exception to the general charac- 
 ter which belongs to its kindred systems. — Nothing would be 
 farther from the reality. The fundamental principle, on which 
 it rests, that the empire is a community of sovereigns; that the 
 diet is a representation of sovereigns; and that the laws are 
 addressed to sovereigns; renders the empire a nerveless body; 
 incapable of regulating its own members; insecure against ex- 
 ternal dangers; and agitated with unceasing fermentations in 
 its own bowels. 
 
 The history of Germany, is a history of wars between the em- 
 peror and the princes and states; of wars among the princes 
 and states themselves; of the licentiousness of the strong, and 
 the oppression of the weak; of foreign intrusions, and foreign 
 intrigues; of requisitions of men and money disregarded, or 
 partially complied with; of attempts" to enforce them, altogether 
 abortive, or attended with slaughter and desolation, involving 
 the innocent with the guilty; of general imbecility, confusion, 
 and misery. 
 
 In the sixteenth century, the emperor, witn one part of the 
 empire on his side, was seen engaged against the other princes 
 and states. In one of the conflicts, the emperor himself was put 
 tj flight, and very near being made prisoner by the elector of 
 Saxony. The late king of Prussia was more than once pitted 
 again pt his imperial sovereign; and commonly proved an over- 
 match for him. Controversies and wars among the members 
 
168 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 themselves, have been so common, that the German annals are 
 crowded with the bloody pages which describe them. Previous 
 to the peace of Westphalia, Germany was desolated by a war 
 of thirty years, in which the emperor, with one half of the 
 empire, was on one side; and Sweden, with the other half, on 
 the opposite side. Peace was at length negociated, and dictated 
 by foreign powers; and the articles of it, to which foreign 
 powers are parties, made a fundamental part of the Germanic 
 constitution. 
 
 If the nation happens, on any emergency, to be more united 
 by the necessity of self-defence, its situation is still deplorable. 
 Military preparations must be preceded by so many tedious dis- 
 cussions, arising from the jealousies, pride, separate views, and 
 clashing pretensions, of sovereign bodies, that before the diet 
 can settle the arrangements, the enemy are in the field; and 
 before the federal troops are ready to take it, are retiring into 
 winter quarters. 
 
 The small body of national troops, which has been judged 
 necessary in time of peace, is defectively kept up, badly paid, 
 infected with local prejudices,, and supported by irregular and 
 disproportionate contributions to the treasury. 
 
 The impossibility of maintaining order, and dispensing justice 
 among these sovereign subjects, produced the experiment of 
 dividing the empire Into nine or ton circles or districts; of 
 giving them an interior organization; and of charging them 
 with the military execution* of the laws against delinquent and 
 contumacious members. This experiment has only served to 
 demonstrate more fully, the radical vice of the constitution. 
 Each circle is the miniature picture of the deformities of this 
 political monster. They either fail to execute their commis- 
 sions, or they do it with all the devastation and carnage of civil 
 war. Sometimes whole circles are defaulters; and then they 
 increase the mischief which they were instituted tx) remedy. 
 
 We may form some judgment of this scheme of military coer- 
 cion, from a sample given by Thuanus. in Donawerth, a free 
 and imperial city, of the circle -^f Suabia, the abbe de St. Croix 
 
THE FEDERALIST. ' 169 
 
 enjoyed certain immunities which had been reserved to him. In 
 the exercise of these, on some public occasion, outrages were 
 committed on him, by the people of the city. The consequence 
 was, that the city was put under the ban of the empire; and the 
 duke of Bavaria, though director of another circle, obtained an 
 appointment to enforce it. He soon appeared before the city, 
 with a corps of ten thousand troops; and finding it a fit occa- 
 sion, as he had secretly intended from the beginning, to revive 
 an antiquated claim, on the pretext that his ance?tors had suf- 
 fered the place to be dismembered from his territory;* he took 
 possession of it in his own name; disarmed anci punished the 
 inhabitants, and re-annexed the city to his domains. 
 
 It may be asked, perhaps, what has so lon^ kept this dis- 
 jointed machine from falling entirelj- to pieces? The answer 
 is obvious. The weakness of most of the merabers, who are un- 
 willing to expose themselves to the mercy of foreign powers; 
 the weakness of most of the principal members, compared with 
 the formidable powers all around them; the vast weight and 
 influence which the emperor derives from his separate and 
 hereditary dominions; and the interest he feels in preserving a 
 system with which his family pride is connected, and which 
 constitutes him the first prince in Europe; these causes support 
 a feeble and precarious union ; whilst the repellent quality, in- 
 cident to the nature of sovereignty, and which time continually 
 strengthens, prevents any reform whatever, founded on a pro- 
 per consolidation. Nor is it to be imagined, if this obstacle 
 could be surmounted, that the neighbouring powers would sufi'er 
 a revolution to take place, which would give to the empire the 
 force and pre-eminence to which it is entitled. Foreign nations 
 have long considered themselves as interested in the changes 
 made by events in this constitution; and have, on various occa- 
 sions, betrayed their policy ot perpetuating its anarchy and 
 weakness 
 
 if more direct examples were wanting, Poland, as a govern 
 
 * PfeflFel, Nouvel abreg. chronol. de I'hist. &c. d'Allemagne, says the pre- 
 text vas to indemnify himself for the expense of the expedition. 
 
170 • THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 ment over local sovereigns, might not improperly be taken 
 notice of. Nor could any proof, more striking, be given of the 
 calamities flowing from such institutions.— Equally unfit for self- 
 government, and self-defence, it has long been at the mercy of 
 its powerful neighbours; who have lately had the mercy to dis- 
 burden it of one third of its people and territories. 
 
 The connection among the Swiss cantons, scarcely amounts to 
 a confederacy; though it is sometimes cited as an instance of 
 the stability of such institutions. 
 
 They have no common treasury; no common troops even in 
 war; no common coin; no common judicatory, nor any other 
 common mark of sovereignty. 
 
 They are kept together by the peculiarity of their topograph- 
 ical position; by their individual weakness and insignificancy; 
 by the fear of powerful neighbours, to one of which they were 
 formerly subject; by the few sources of contention among a 
 people of such simple and homogeneous manners; by their joint 
 interest in their dependent possessions; by the mutual aid they 
 stand in need of, for suppressing insurrections and rebellions; 
 an aid expressly stipulated, aud often required and afforded; 
 and by the necessity of some regular aud permanent provision 
 for accommodating disputes among the cantons. The provision 
 is, that the parties at variance shall each choose four judges out 
 of the neutral cantons, who, in case of disagreement, choose au 
 umpire. This tribunal, under an oath of impartiality, pro- 
 nounces definitive sentence, which all the cantons are bound to 
 enforce. The competency of this regulation may be estimated 
 by a clause in their treaty of 1683, with Victor Amadeus of 
 Savoy ; in which he obliges himself to interpose as mediator in 
 disputes between the cantons; and to employ force, if necessary, 
 against the contumacious party 
 
 So far as the peculiarity of their case will admit of comparison 
 with that of the United States, it serves to confirm the principle 
 intended to be established. Whatever efficacy the union may 
 have had in ordinary cases, it appears that the moment a cause 
 of difference sprang up, capable of trying its strength, it failed. 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 171 
 
 The controversies on the subject of religion, which in three 
 instances have kindled violent and bloody contests, may be said 
 in fact to have severed the league. The Protestant and Catho- 
 lic cantons, have since had their separate diets; where all the 
 most important concerns are adjusted, and which have left tho 
 general diet little other business than to take care of the common 
 bailages. 
 
 That separation had another consequence, which merits atten- 
 tion. It produced opposite alliances with foreign powers; of 
 3ern, as the head of the Protestant association, with the United 
 'rovinces ; and of Luzerne, as the head of the Catholic associa. 
 cion, with France 
 
 PUBLIUS. 
 
 12 
 
172 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 NUMBER XX. 
 
 NEW YORK, DECEMBER 12, 1787. 
 
 HAMILTON AND MADISON. 
 
 THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED, WITH FURTHER EXAMPLES. 
 
 The United Netherlands are a confederacy of republics, or 
 rather of aristocracies, of a very remarkable texture; yet con- 
 firming all the lessons derived from those which we have already 
 reviewed. 
 
 The union is composed of seven co-equal and sovereign states, and 
 each state or province is a composition of equal and independent 
 cities. In all important cases, not only the provinces, but the cities, 
 must be unanimous. 
 
 The sovereignty of the union is represented by the states 
 general, consisting usually of about fifty deputies appointed by 
 the provinces. They hold their seats, some for life, some for 
 six, three, and one years From two provinces they continue in 
 appointment during pleasure. 
 
 The states general have authority to enter into treaties and 
 alliances; to make war and peace; to raise armies and equip 
 fleets; to ascertain quotas and demand contributions. In all 
 these cases, however, unanimity and the sanction of their con- 
 stituents are requisite. They have authority to appoint and 
 receive ambassadors; to execute treaties and alliances already 
 formed; to provide for the collection of duties on imports and 
 exports; to regulate the mint, with a saving to the provincial 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 173 
 
 rights; to govern as sovereigns the dependent territories. The 
 provinces are restrained, unless with the general consent, from 
 entering into foreign treaties; -from establishing imposts inju- 
 rious to others, or charging their neighbours with higher duties 
 than their own subjects. A council of state, a chamber of 
 accounts, with five colleges of admiralty, aid and fortify the 
 federal administration. 
 
 The executive magistrate of the union is the stadtholder, who 
 is now an hereditary prince. His principal weight and influence 
 in the republic are derived from his independent title; from his 
 great patrimonial estates ; from his family connections with 
 some of the chief potentates of Europe; and more than all, 
 perhaps, from his being stadtholder in the several provinces, as 
 well as for the union, in which provincial quality, he has the 
 appointment of town magistrates under certain regulations, 
 executes provincial decrees, presides when he pleases in the 
 provincial tribunals; and has throughout the power of pardon. 
 
 As stadtholder of the union, he has, however, considerable 
 prerogatives. 
 
 In his political capacity, he has authority to settle disputes 
 between the provinces, when other methods fail; to assist at 
 the deliberations of the states general, and at their particular 
 conferences; to give audience to foreign ambassadors, and to 
 keep agents for his particular affairs at foreign courts. 
 
 In his military capacity-, he commands the federal troops; 
 provides for garrisons, and in general regulates military affairs; 
 •lisposes of all appointments from colonels to ensigns, and of the 
 governments and posts of fortified towns. 
 
 In his marine capacity, he is admiral general, and superintends 
 and directs every thing relative to naval forces, and other naval 
 affairs; presides in the admiralties in person or by proxy; ap- 
 points lieutenant admirals and other officers; and establishes 
 councils of war, whose sentences are not executed till he ap- 
 proves them. 
 
 His revenue, exclusive of his private income, amounts to 
 
174 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 300,000 florins. The standing army which he commands con- 
 sists of about 40,000 men. 
 
 Such is the nature of the celebrated Belgic confederacy, as 
 delineated on parchment. What are the characters which prac- 
 tice has stampt upon it ? Imbecility in the government ; dis- 
 cord among the provinces; foreign influence and indignities; 
 a precarious existence in peace, and peculiar calamities from 
 war. 
 
 It was long ago remarked by Grotius, that nothing but the 
 hatred of his countrymen to the house of Austria, kept them 
 from being ruined by the vices of their constitution. 
 
 The union of Utrecht, says another respectable writer, reposes 
 an authority in the states general, seemingly sufiicient to secure 
 harmony, but the jealousy in each province renders the practice 
 very different from the theory. 
 
 The same instrument, says another, obliges each province to 
 levy certain contributions; but this article never could, and 
 probably never will, be executed; because the inland provinces, 
 who have little commerce, cannot pay an equal quota. 
 
 In matters of contribution, it is the practice to wave the 
 articles of the constitution. The danger of delay obliges the 
 consenting provinces to furnish their quotas, withot ^ waiting 
 for the others; and then to obtain reimbursement l.^om the 
 others, by deputations, which are frequent, or otherwise, as they 
 can. The great wealth and influence of the province of Holland, 
 enable her to effect both these purposes. 
 
 It has more than once happened that the deficiencies have 
 been ultimately to be collected at the point of the bayonet ; a 
 thing practicable, though dreadful, in a confederacy, where one 
 of the members exceeds in force all the rest; and where several 
 of them are too small to meditate resistance : But utterly im- 
 practicable in one composed of members, several of which are 
 equal to each other in strength and resources, and equal singly 
 to a vigorous and persevering defence. 
 
 Foreign ministers, says Sir William Temple, who was himself 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 175 
 
 a foreign minister, elude matters taken ad referendum, by tarn 
 pering with the provinces and cities. In 1726, the treaty of 
 Hanover was delayed by these means a whole year. InstarceR 
 of a like nature are numerous and notorious. 
 
 In critical emergencies, the states general are often compelled 
 to overleap their constitutional bounds. In 1688, they concluded 
 a treaty of themselves, at the risk of their heads. The treaty of 
 Westphalia in 1648, by which their independence was formally 
 and finally recognized, was concluded without the consent of 
 Zealand. Even as recently as the last treaty of peace with Great 
 Britain, the constitutional principle of unanimity was departed 
 from. A weak constitution must necessarily terminate in disso- 
 lution, for want of proper powers, or from the usurpation of 
 powers requisite for the public safety. "Whether the usurpation, 
 when once begun, will stop at the salutary point, or go forward 
 to the dangerous extreme, must depend on the contingencies of 
 the moment. Tyranny has perhaps oftener grown out of the 
 assumptions of power, called for, on pressing exigencies, by a 
 defective constitution, than out of the full exercise of the largest 
 constitutional authorities. 
 
 Notwithstanding the calamities produced by the stadtholder- 
 ship, it has been supposed, that without his influence in the 
 individual provinces, the causes of anarchy manifest in the con- 
 federacy, would long ago have dissolved it. " Under such a 
 government, says the abbe Mably, the union could never have 
 subsisted, if the provinces had not a spring within themselves, 
 capable of quickening their tardiness, and compelling them to 
 the same way of thinking. This spring is the stadtholder." 
 ft is remarked by Sir William Temple, " that in the intermis. 
 sions of the stadtholdership, Holland, by her riches and her 
 authority, which drew the others into a sort of dependence, sup- 
 plied the place." 
 
 These are not the only circumstances which have controlled 
 the tendency to anarchy and dissolution. The surrounding 
 powers impose an absolute necessity of union to a certain d©^ 
 
176 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 gree, at the same time that thej'^ nourish, bj their intrigues, the 
 constitutional vices, which keep the republic in some measure 
 always at their mercy. 
 
 The true patriots have long bewailed the fatal operation of 
 these vices, and have made no less than four regular experi- 
 ments by extraordinary assemblies, convened for the special pur- 
 pose, to apply a remedy. As many times, has their laudable 
 zeal found it impossible to unite the public councils in reforming 
 the known, the acknowledged, the fatal evils of the existing 
 constitution. Let us pause, my fellow-citizens, for one moment, 
 over this melancholy and monitory lesson of history; and with 
 the tear that drops for the calamities brought on mankind by 
 their adverse opinions and selfish passions, let our gratitude 
 mingle an ejaculation to Heaven, for the propitious concord 
 which has distinguished the consultations for our political 
 happiness. 
 
 A design was also conceived, of establishing a general tax to 
 be administered by the federal authority. This also had its 
 adversaries and failed. 
 
 This unhappy people seem to be now suflfering, from popular 
 convulsions, from dissentions among the states, and from the 
 actual invasion of foreign arms, the crisis of their destiny. All 
 nations have their eyes fixed on the awful spectacle. The first 
 wish prompted by humanity is, that this severe trial may issue 
 in such a revolution of their government, as will establish their 
 union, and render it the parent of tranquillity, freedom, and 
 happiness : The next, that the asylum under which, we trust, 
 the enjoyment of these blessings will speedily be secured in this 
 country, may receive and console them for the catastrophe of 
 their own. 
 
 I make no apology for having dwelt so long on the contem- 
 plation of these federal precedents. Experience is the oracle 
 of truth ; and where its responses are unequivocal, they ought 
 to be conclusive and sacred. The important truth, which it un- 
 equivocally pronounces in the present case, is, that a sovereignty 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 177 
 
 over sovereigns, a government over governments, a legislation 
 for communities, as contradistinguished from individuals ; as it 
 is a solecism in theory, so in practice, it is subversive of the 
 order and ends of civil polity, by substituting violence in the 
 place of law, or the destructive coercion of the sword, in the place 
 of the mild and salutary coercion of the magistracy. 
 
 PUBLIUS. 
 
178 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 NUMBER XXI. 
 
 NEW YORK, DECEMBER 12, 1787. 
 
 HAMILTON. 
 
 FURTHER DEFECTS OF THE PRESENT CONSTITUTION. 
 
 Having in the three last numbers taken a summary review 
 of the principal circumstances and events, which depict the 
 genius and fate of other confederate governments ; I shall now 
 proceed in the enumeration of the most important of those de- 
 fects, which have hitherto disappointed our hopes from the 
 system established among ourselves. To form a safe and satis- 
 factory judgment of the proper remedy, it is absolutely neces- 
 sary that we should be well acquainted with the extent and 
 malignity of the disease. 
 
 The next most palpable defect of the existing confederation, 
 is the total want of a sanction to its laws. The United States, 
 as now composed, have no power to exact obedience, or punish 
 diaobedience to their resolutions, either by pecuniary mulcts, by 
 a suspension or divestiture of privileges, or by any other con- 
 stitutional means. There is no express delegation of authority 
 to them to use force against delinquent members ,; and if such a 
 right should be ascribed to the federal head, as resulting from 
 -.he nature of the social compact between the states, it must be 
 tv inference and construction, in the face of that part of the 
 Bt c end article, by which it is declared, " that each state shall 
 rrUin every power, jurisdiction, and right, not expressly dele- 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 17^ 
 
 gated to the United States in Congress assembled." The warn 
 of such a right involves, no doubt, a striking absurdity ; but we 
 are reduced to the dilemma, either of supposing that deficiency, 
 preposterous as it may seem, or of contravening or explaining 
 away a provision, which has been of late a repeated theme of 
 the euloi^ies of those who oppose the new constitution ; and the 
 omission of which, in that plan, has been the subject of much 
 plausible animadversion, and severe criticism. If we are un- 
 willing to impair the force of this applauded provision, we shall 
 be obliged to conclude, that the United States afford the extra- 
 ordinary spectacle of a government, destitute even of the shadow 
 of constitutional power, to enforce the execution of its own laAvs. 
 It will appear, from the specimens which have been cited, that 
 the American confederacy, in this particular, stands discrimi- 
 nated from every other institution of a similar kind, and exhibits 
 a new and unexampled phenomenon in the political world. 
 
 The want of £ mutual guarantee of the state governments, is 
 another capital imperfection in the federal plan. There is 
 nothing of this kind declared in the articles that compose it : 
 and to imply a tacit guarantee from considerations of utility 
 would be a still more flagrant departure from the clause which 
 has been mentioned, than to imply a tacit power of coercion, 
 from the like considerations. The want of a guarantee, though 
 it might in its consequences endanger the union, does not so im- 
 mediately attack its existence, as the want of a constitutional 
 sanction to its laws. 
 
 Without a guarantee, the assistance to be derived from the 
 union, in repelling those domestic dangers, which eg ay some- 
 times threaten the existence of the state constitutions, must be 
 renounced. Usurpation may rear its crest in each state, and 
 trample upon the liberties of the people; while the national 
 government could legally do nothing more than behold its en- 
 croachments with indignation and regret. A successful faction 
 may erect a tyranny on the ruins of order sxnd law, while no 
 succour could constitutionally be aflfbrded by the union to the 
 friends and supporters of the government, '.^he tempestuous 
 
180 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 Bitualion, from -which Massachusetts has scarcely emerged, 
 evinces, that dangers of this kind are not merely speculative. 
 Who can determine wha'. might have been the issue of her late 
 convulsions, if the mal-contents had been headed by a Ccesar or 
 by a Cromwell ? "Who can predict what effect a despotism, 
 established in Massachusetts, would have upon the liberties of 
 New-Hampshire or Ehode-Island ; of Connecticut or New- York ? 
 
 The inordinate pride of state importance, has suggested to 
 some minds an objection to the principle of a guarantee in the 
 federal government; as involving an oflScious interference in 
 the domestic concerns of the members. A scruple of this kind 
 would deprive us of one of the principal advantages to be ex- 
 pected from union j and can only flow from a misapprehension 
 of the nature of the provision itself. It could be no impedi- 
 ment to reforms of the state constitutions by a majority of the 
 people in a legal and peaceable mode. This right would remain 
 undiminished. The guarantee could only operate against 
 changes to be effected by violence. Towards the prevention 
 of calamities of this kind, too many checks cannot be provided. 
 The peace of society, and the stability of government, depend 
 absolutely on the efficacy of the precautions adopted on this 
 head. Where the whole power of the government is in the 
 hands of the people, there is the loss pretence for the use of 
 violent remedies, in partial or occasional distempers of the 
 state. The natural cure for an ill administration, in a popular 
 or representative constitution, is, a change of men. A guaran- 
 tee by the national authority, would be as much directed against 
 the usurpations of rulers, as against the ferments and outrages 
 of faction and sedition in the community. 
 
 The principle of regulating the contributions of the states to 
 the common treasury by quotas, is another fundamental error 
 in the confederation. Its repugnancy to an adequate supply of 
 the national exigencies, has been already pointed out, and has 
 sufficiently appeared from the trial which has been made of it. 
 I speak of it now solely, with a view to equality among the 
 states. Those who have been accustomed to contemplate the 
 
THE FEDEHALIST. 181 
 
 Circumstances, which produce and constitute national wealth, 
 must be satisfied that there is no common standara, or barome- 
 ter, by which the degrees of it can be ascertained. Neither the 
 value of lands, nor the numbers of the people, which have been 
 successively proposed as the rule of state contributions, has any 
 pretension to being a just representative. If we compare the 
 wealth of the United Netherlands with that of Russia or Ger- 
 many, or even of France; and if we at the same time compare 
 the total value of the lands, and the aggregate population of 
 the contracted territory of that republic, with the total value of 
 the lands, and the aggregate population of the immense regions 
 of either of those kingdoms, we shall at once discover, that there 
 is no comparison between the proportion of either of these two 
 objects, and that of the relative wealth of those nations. If the 
 like parallel were to be run between several of the American 
 states, it would furnish a like result. Let Virginia be contrasted 
 with North-Carolina, Pennsylvania with Connecticut, or Mary- 
 land with New-Jersey, and we shall be convinced that the re- 
 spective abilities of those states, in relation to revenue, bear 
 little or no analogy to their comparative stock in lands, or to 
 their comparative population. The position may be equally 
 illustrated, by a similar process between the counties of the 
 same state. No man acquainted with the state of New- York 
 will doubt, that the active wealth of King's county bears a 
 much greater proportion to that of Montgomery, than it would 
 appear to do, if we should take either the total value of the 
 lands, or the total numbers of the people as a criterion. 
 
 The wealth of nations depends upon an infinite variety of 
 causes. Situation, soil, climate, the nature of the productions, 
 the nature of the government, the genius of the citizens ; the 
 degree of information they possess ; the state of commerce, of 
 arts, of industry ; these circumstances, and many more too com- 
 plex, minute, or adventitious, to admit of a particular specifica- 
 tion, occasion differences hardly conceivable in the relative opu- 
 lence and riches of diflferent countries. The consequence clearly 
 >8, tnal mere can bo no common measure of national wealth ; 
 
182 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 and of course, no general or stationary rule, by which the 
 ability of a state to pay taxes can be determined. The attempt, 
 therefore, to regulate the contributions of the members of a 
 confederacy, by any such rule, cannot fail to be productive of 
 glaring inequality, and extreme oppression. 
 
 This inequality would of itself be sufficient in America to 
 work the eventual destruction of the union, if any mode of 
 enforcing a compliance with its requisitions could be devised. 
 The suflfering states would not long consent to remain associated 
 upon a principle which distributed the public burthens with so 
 unequal a hand; and which was calculated to impoverish and 
 oppress the citizens of some states, while those of others would 
 scarcely be conscious of the small proportion of the weight they 
 were required to sustain. This, however, is an evil inseparable 
 from the principle of quotas and requisitions. 
 
 There is no method of steering clear of this inconvenience, 
 but by authorizing the national government to raise its own 
 revenues in its own way. Imposts, excises, and in general all 
 duties upon articles of consumption, may be compared to a fluid, 
 which will in time find its level with the means of paying them. 
 The amount to be contributed by each citizen will in a degree 
 be at his own option, and can be regulated by an attention to 
 his resources. The rich may be extravagant, the poor can be 
 frugal. And private oppression may always be avoided, by a 
 judicious selection of objects proper for such impositions. If 
 inequalities should arise in some states from duties on particular 
 objects, these will, in all probability, be counterbalanced by 
 proportional inequalities in other states, from the duties on 
 other objects. In the course of time and things, an equilibrium, 
 as far as it is attainable, in so complicated a subject, will be 
 established every where. Or if inequalities should still exist, 
 they would neither be so great in their degree, so uniform in 
 their operation, nor so odious in their appearance, as those which 
 would necessarily spring from quotas, upon any scale that can 
 possibly be devised. 
 
 It is a signal advantage of taxes on articles of consumption, 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 183 
 
 tbat they contain in their own nature a security against excess 
 They prescribe their own limit; which cannot he exceeded with- 
 out defeating the end proposed — that is, an extension of the 
 revenue. When applied to this object, the saying is as just as 
 it is witty, that "in political arithmetic, two and two do not 
 always make four." If duties are too high, they lessen the 
 consumption — the collection is eluded; and the product to the 
 treasury is not so great as when they are confined within proper 
 and moderate bounds. 
 
 This forms a complete barrier against any material oppression 
 of the citizens, by taxes of this class, and is itself a natural 
 limitation of the power of imposing them. 
 
 Impositions of this kind usually fall under the denomination 
 of indirect taxes, and must for a long time constitute the chief 
 part of the revenue raised in this country. Those of the direct 
 kind, which principally relate to lands and buildings, may 
 admit of a rule of apportionment. Either the value of land, 
 or the number of the people may serve as a standard. The 
 state of agriculture, and the populousness of a country, are 
 considered as having a near relation to each other. And as a 
 rule for the purpose intended, numbers in the view of simplicity 
 and certainty, are entitled to a preference. In every country it 
 is an Herculean task to obtain a valuation of the land; in a 
 country imperfectly settled and progressive in improvement, 
 the difficulties are increased almost to impracticability. The 
 expense of an accurate valuation, is in all situations a formidable 
 objection. In a branch of taxation where no limits to the dis- 
 cretion of the government are to be found in the nature of the 
 thing, the establishment of a fixed rule, not incompatible with 
 the end, may be attended with fewer inconveniences than to 
 leave that discretion altogether at large. 
 
 PUBLIUS 
 
lai 
 
 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 NUMBER XXII. 
 
 NEW YORK, DECEMBER 15, 1787. 
 
 HAMILTON. 
 
 THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED, AND CONCLUDED. 
 
 In addition to the defects of the existing federal system, 
 enumerated in the last number, there are others of not less 
 mportance, which concur in rendering that system altogether 
 unfit for the administration of the affairs of the union. 
 
 The want of a power to regulate commerce, is by all parties 
 allowed to be of the number. The utility of such a power has 
 been anticipated under the first head of our inquiries ; and for 
 this reason, as well as from the universal conviction entertained 
 upon the subject, little need be added in this place. It is indeed 
 evident, on the most superficial view, that there is no object, 
 either as it respects the interests of trade or finance, that more 
 strongly demands a federal superintendance. The want of it 
 has already operated as a bar to the formation of beneficial 
 treaties with foreign powers; and has given occasions of dissatis- 
 faction between the states. No nation acquainted with tho 
 nature of our political association would be unwise enough to 
 enter into stipulations with the United States, conceding on 
 their part privileges of importance, while they were apprised 
 that the engagements on the part of the union, might at any 
 moment be violated by its members; and while they found, from 
 experience, that they might enjoy every advantage they desired 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 186 
 
 in our markets, without granting us any return, but such as 
 their momentary convenience might suggest. It is not there- 
 fore to be wondered at, that Mr. Jenkinson, in ushering into the 
 house of commons a bill for regulating the temporary inter- 
 course between the two countries, should preface its introduction 
 by a declaration, that similar provisions in former bills had been 
 found to answer every purpose to the commerce of Great Britain, 
 and that it would be prudent to persist in the plan until it should 
 appear whether the American government was likely or not to 
 acquire greater consistency.* 
 
 Several states have endeavoured, by separate prohibitions, 
 restrictions, and exclusions, to influence the conduct of that 
 kingdom in this particular; but the want of concert, arising 
 from the want of a general authority, and from clashing and dis- 
 similar views in the states, has hitherto frustrated every experi- 
 ment of the kind; and will continue to do so, as long as the same 
 obstacles to an uniformity of measures continue to exist. 
 
 The interfering and unneighbourly regulations of some states, 
 contrary to the true spirit of the union, have, in different 
 instances, given just cause of umbrage and complaint to others; 
 and it is to be feared that examples of this nature, if not re- 
 strained by a national control, would be multiplied and extended 
 till they became not less serious sources of animosity and discord, 
 than injurious impediments to the intercourse between the dif- 
 ferent parts of the confederacy. " The commerce of the German 
 empire,! is in continual trammels, from the multiplicity of the 
 duties which the several princes and states exact upon the mer- 
 chandizes passing through their territories ; by means of which 
 the fine streams and navigable rivers with which Germany is so 
 happily watered, are rendered almost useless." Though the 
 genius of the people of this country might never permit this 
 description to be strictly applicable to us, yet we may reason- 
 ably expect, from the gradual conflicts of state regulations, that 
 
 * This, as nearly as I can recollect, wan the sense of this speech on intro> 
 ducing the laat bill. 
 
 + Encyclopedia, article Empire. 
 
186 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 the citizens of each, would at lengjth come to be considered and 
 treated by the others in no better light than that of foreigners 
 and aliens. 
 
 The power of raising armies, by the most ob^* ois construc- 
 tion of the articles of the confederation, is mer ly a power of 
 making requisitions upon the states for quotas of men. This 
 practice, in the course of the late war, was fouj d replete with 
 obstructions to a vigorous, and to an economics I system of de- 
 fence. It gave birth to a competition between the states, which 
 created a kind of auction for men. In order to furnish the 
 quotas required of them, they outbid each other, till bounties 
 grew to an enormous and insupportable size. The hope of a 
 still further increase, afforded an inducement to those who were 
 disposed to serve, to procrastinate their enlistment; and dis- 
 inclined them from engaging for any considerable periods. 
 Hence slow and scanty levies of men, in the most critical 
 emergencies of our affairs — short enlistments at an unparalleled 
 expense — continual fluctuations in the troops, ruinous to their 
 discipline, and subjecting the public safety frequently to the 
 perilous crisis of a disbanded army. Hence also, those oppress- 
 ive expedients for raising men, which were upon several occa- 
 sions practised, and which nothing but the enthusiasm of liberty, 
 would have induced the people to endure. 
 
 This method of raising troops, is not more unfriendly to 
 economy and vigour, than it is to an equal distribution of the 
 burthen. The states near the seat of war, influenced by motives 
 of self-preservation, made efforts to furnish their quotas, which 
 even exceeded their abilities, while those at a distance from 
 danger were, for the most part, as remiss as the others were 
 diligent, in their exertions. The immediate pressure of this 
 inequality, was not, in this case, as in that of the contributions 
 of money, alleviated by the hope of a final liquidation. The 
 states which did not pay their proportions of money, might 
 at least be charged with their deficiencies; but no account could 
 be formed of the deficiencies in the supplies of men. We shall 
 not, however, see much reason to regret the want of this hope, 
 
THE FEDERALIST. i87 
 
 when we consider how little prospect ther'^ Is, that the most 
 delinquent states ever will be able to make compensation for 
 their pecuniary failures. The system of quotas and requisitions, 
 whether it be applied to men or money, is, in every view, a 
 system of imbecility in the union, and of inequality and injustice 
 a'nong the members. 
 
 The right of equal suffrage among the states, is another ex- 
 ceptionable part of the confederation. Every idea of propor- 
 tion, and every rule of fair representation, conspire to condemn 
 a principle, which gives to Ehode-Island an equal weight in the 
 pale of power with Massachusetts, or Connecticut, or New- 
 /ork ; and to Delaware, an equal voice in the national delibera- 
 tions with Pennsylvania, or Virginia, or North-Carolina. Its 
 ojioration contradicts that fundamental maxim of republican 
 government, which requires that the sense of the majority 
 should prevail. Sophistry may reply, that sovereigns are equal, 
 and that a majority of the votes of the states, will be a majority 
 of confederated America. But this kind of logical legerdemain, 
 will never counteract the plain suggestions of justice and 
 common sense. It may happen, that this majority of states is a 
 small minority of the people of America ;* and two thirds of the 
 people of America, could not long be persuaded, upon the credit 
 of artificial distinctions and syllogistic subtleties, to submit 
 their interests to the management and disposal of one third. 
 The larger states would, after a while, revolt from the idea of 
 receiving the law from the smaller. To acquiesce in such a 
 privation of their due importance in the political scale, would 
 be, not merely to be insensible to the love of power, but even 
 to sacrifice the desire of equality. It is neither rational to 
 expect the first, nor just to require the last : Considering how 
 peculiarly the safety and welfare of the smaller states depend 
 on union, they ought readily to renounce a pretension, which, 
 if not relinquished, would prove fatal to its duration. 
 
 * New-Hampshire, Rhode-Island, New-Jersey, Delaware, Georgia, South- 
 Carolina, and Maryland, are a majority of the whole number of the States, but 
 \hey do not contain one third of the people. 
 
 23 
 
188 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 It may be objected to this, that not seven, but nine states, or 
 two thirds of the whole number, must consent to the most 
 important resolutions ; and it may be thence inferred, that nine 
 states would always comprehend a majority of the inhabitants 
 of the union. But this does not obviate the impropriety of an 
 equal vote, between states of the most unequal dimensions and 
 populousness; nor is the inference accurate in point of fact; for 
 we can enumerate nine states, which contain less than a ma- 
 jority of the people;* and it is constitutionally possible, that 
 these nine may give the vote. Besides, there are matters of 
 considerable moment determinable by a bare majority; and 
 there are others, concerning which doubts have been entertained, 
 which, if interpreted in favour of the sufficiency of a vote of 
 seven states, would extend its operation to interests of the first 
 magnitude. In addition to this, it is to be observed, that there 
 is a probability of an increase in the number of states, and no 
 provision for a proportional augmentation of the ratio of votes. 
 
 But this is not all; what at first sight, may seem a remedy, 
 is, in reality, a poison. To give a minority a negative upon 
 the majority, which is always the case, where more than a ma- 
 jority is requisite to a decision, is, in its tendency, to subject the 
 sense of the greater number to that of the lesser. Congress, from 
 the non-attendance of a few states, have been frequently in the 
 situation of a Polish diet, where a single veto has been suffi- 
 cient to put a stop to all their movements. A sixtieth part of 
 the union, which is about the proportion of Delaware and Rhode- 
 Island, has several times been able to oppose an entire bar to ita 
 operations. This is one of those refinements, which, in practice, 
 has an effect the reverse of what is expected from it in theory. 
 The necessity of unanimity in public bodies, or of something 
 approaching towards it, has been founded upon a supposition 
 that it would contribute to security. But its real operation is, 
 to embarrass the administration, to destroy the energy of gov- 
 ernment, and to substitute the pleasure, caprice, or artifices of an 
 
 * Add New-York and Connecticut to the foregoing seven, And they will still 
 be less than a majority. 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 189 
 
 insignificant, turbulent, or corrupt junto, to the re^^utar de- 
 liberations and decisions of a respectable majority. In those 
 emergencies of a nation, in which the goodness or badness, the 
 weakness or strength of its government, is of the greatest im- 
 portance, there is commonly a necessity for action. The public 
 business must, in some way or other, go forward. If a perti- 
 nacious minority can control the opinion of a majority, respect- 
 ing the best mode of conducting it, the majority, in order that 
 something may be done, must conform to the views of the mi- 
 nority; and thus the sense of the smaller number, will over-rule 
 that of the greater, and give a tone to the national proceedings. 
 Hence tedious delays; continual negociation and intrigue; con- 
 temptible compromises of the public good. And yet, in such a 
 system, it is even fortunate when such compromises can take 
 place : For, upon some occasions, things will not admit of ac- 
 commodation; and then the measures of government must be 
 injuriously suspended, or fatally defeated. It is often, by the 
 impracticability of obtaining the concurrence of the necessary 
 number of votes, kept in a state of inaction. Its situation 
 must always savour of weakness; sometimes border upon 
 anarchy. 
 
 It is not difiBcult to discover, that a principle of this kind 
 gives greater scope to foreign corruption, as well as to domestic 
 faction, than that which permits the sense of the majority to 
 decide ; though the contrary of this has been presumed. The 
 mistake has proceeded from not attending with due care to the 
 mischiefs that may be occasioned, by obstructing the progress 
 of government at certain critical seasons. When the concur- 
 rence of a large number is required by the constitution to the 
 doing of any national act, we are apt to rest satisfied that all is 
 safe, because nothing improper will be likely to be done ; but we 
 forget how much good may be prevented, and how much ill may 
 be produced, by the power of hindering that which it is neces- 
 sary to do, and of keeping afi'airs in the same unfavourable 
 posture in which they ma^ happen to stand at particular 
 periods. 
 
tyO THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 SuppuSb, for instant, we were engaged in a war, in conjunc- 
 tion with one foreign nation, against another. Suppose the 
 necessity of our situation demanded peace, and that the interest 
 or ambition of our ally led him to seek the prosecution of the 
 war, with views that might justify us in making separate terms. 
 In such a state of things, this ally of ours would evidently find 
 it much easier by his bribes and his intrigues, to tie up the 
 hands of government from making peace, where two thirds of 
 all the votes were requisite to that object, than where a simple 
 majority would suffice. In the first case, he would have to 
 'torrupt a smaller, in the last a greater number. Upon the 
 same principle, it would be much easier for a foreign power 
 with which we were at war, to perplex our councils and embar- 
 rass our exertions. And in a commercial view, we may be 
 subjected to similar inconveniences. A nation with which we 
 might have a treaty of commerce, could with much greater 
 facility prevent our forming a connection with her competitor 
 in trade; though such a connection should be ever so beneficial 
 to ourselves. 
 
 Evils of this description ought not to be regarded as imagi- 
 nary. One of the weak sides of republics, among their nume- 
 rous advantages, is, that they aff'ord too easy an inlet to foreign 
 corruption. An hereditary monarch, though often disposed to 
 sacrifice his subjects to his ambition, has so great a personal 
 interest in the government, and in the external glory of the 
 nation, that it is not easy for a foreign power to give him an 
 equivalent, for what he would sacrifice by trea(.hery to the 
 state. The world has accordingly been witness to lew examples 
 of this species of royal prostitution, though there have been 
 abundant specimens of every other kind. 
 
 In republics, persons elevated from the mass Of the com- 
 munity, by the suffrages of their fellow-citizens, to stations of 
 great pre-eminence and power, may find compensations for 
 betraying their trust, which to any but minds actuated by 
 superior virtue, may appear to exceed the proportion of interest 
 they have in the common stock, and to over-balance the obliga- 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 191 
 
 tions of duty. Hence it is, that history furnishes us with sc 
 many mortifying examples of the prevalency of foreign corrup- 
 tion in republican governments. How much this contributed 
 to the ruin of the ancient commonwealths, has been already 
 disclosed. It is well known that the deputies of the United 
 Provinces have, in various instances, been purchased by the 
 emissaries of the neighbouring kingdoms. The earl of Chester- 
 field, if my memory serves me right, in a letter to his court, 
 intimates that his success in an important negociation, must 
 depend on his obtaining a major's commission for one of those 
 deputies. And in Sweden, the rival parties were alternately 
 bought by France and England, in so barefaced and notorious a 
 manner, that it excited universal disgust in the nation, and was 
 a principal cause that the most limited monarch in Europe, in 
 a single day, without tumult, violence, or opposition, became 
 one of the most absolute and uncontroled. 
 
 A circumstance, which crowns the defects of th? confedera- 
 tion, remains yet to be mentioned — the want of a judiciary 
 power. Laws are a dead letter, without courts to e::pound and 
 define their true meaning and operation. The treaties of the 
 United States, to have any force at all, must be considered as 
 part of the law of the land. Their true import, as far as 
 respects individuals, must, like all other laws, be ascertained by 
 judicial determinations. To produce uniformity in these deter- 
 minations, they ought to be submitted in the last resort, to one 
 SUPREME TRIBUNAL. And this tribunal ought to be instituted 
 under the same authority which forms the treaties themselves. 
 These ingredients are both indispensable. If there is in each 
 state a court of final jurisdiction, there maybe as many different 
 final determiirations on the same point, as there are courts. 
 There are endless diversities in the opinions of men. We often 
 Bee not only different courts, but the judges of the same court, 
 differing from each other. To avoid the confusion which would 
 unavoidably result from the contradictory decisions of a number 
 of independent judicatories, all nations have found it necessary 
 to establish one tribunal paramount to the rest, possessing a 
 
192 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 general superintendance, and authorized to settle and declare in 
 the last resort an uniform rule of civil justice. 
 
 This is the more necessary where the frame of the government 
 IS so compounded, that the laws of the whole are in danger of 
 being contravened by the laws of the parts. In this case, if the 
 particular tribunals are invested with a right of ultimate deci- 
 sion, besides the contradictions to be expected from difference 
 of opinion, there will be much to fear from the bias of local 
 views and prejudices, and from the interference of local regula- 
 tions. As often as such an interference should happen, there 
 would be reason to apprehend, that the provisions of the par- 
 ticular laws might be preferred to those of the general laws, 
 from the deference with which men in office naturally look up 
 to that authority to which they owe their official existence. 
 The treaties of the United States, under the present constitu- 
 tion, are liable to the infractions of thirteen different legislatures, 
 and as many different courts of final jurisdiction, acting under 
 the authority of those legislatures. The faith, the reputation, 
 the peace of the whole union, are thus continually at the mercy 
 of the prejudices, the passions, and the interests of eveiy member 
 of which these are composed. Is it possible that foreign 
 nations can either respect or confide in such a government? 
 Is it possible that the people of America will longer consent to 
 trust their honour, their happiness, their safety, on so precarious 
 a foundation ? 
 
 In this review of the confederation, I have confined myself to 
 the exhibition of its most material defects; passing over those 
 imperfections in its details, by which even a considerable part 
 of the power intended to be conferred upon it, has been in a 
 great measure rendered abortive. It must be by this time evi- 
 dent to all men of reflection, who are either free from erroneous 
 prepossessions, or can divest themselves of them, that it is a 
 system so radically vicious and unsound, as to admit not of 
 amendment, but by an entire change in its leading features and 
 characters. 
 
 The organization of congress, is itself utterly imj ropor for 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 193 
 
 the exercise of those powers, which are necessary to be deposited 
 in the union. A single assembly may be a proper receptacle 
 of those slender, or rather fettered authorities, which have been 
 heretofore delegated to the federal head ; but it would be incon- 
 sistent with all the principles of good government, to intrust it 
 with those additional powers which even the moderate and 
 more rational adversaries of the proposed constitution admit, 
 ought to reside in the United States. If that plan should not 
 be adopted; and if the necessity of union should be able to 
 withstand the ambitious aims of those men, who may indulge 
 magnificent schemes of personal aggrandizement from its disso- 
 lution ; the probability would be, that we should run into the 
 project of conferring supplementary powers upon congress, as 
 they are now constituted. And either the machine, from the 
 intrinsic feebleness of its structure, will moulder into pieces 
 in spite of our ill-judged efforts to prop it; or by successive 
 augmentations of its force and energy, as necessity might 
 prompt, we shall finally accumulate in a single body, all the 
 most important prerogatives of sovereignty; and thus entail 
 upon our posterity, one of the most execrable forms of govern- 
 ment that human infatuation ever contrived. Thus we should 
 create in reality that very tyranny, which the adversaries of 
 the new constitution either are, or affect to be, solicitous to 
 avert. 
 
 It has not a little contributed to the infirmities of the exist- 
 ing federal system, that it never had a ratification by the 
 PEOPLE. Resting on no better foundation than the consent 
 of the several legislatures, it has been exposed to frequent and 
 intricate questions concerning the validity of its powers; and 
 has, in some instances, given birth to the enormous doctrine 
 of a right of legislative repeal. Owing its ratification to the 
 law of a state, it has been contended, that the same authority 
 might repeal the law by which it was ratified. However gross 
 a heresy it may be, to maintain that a party to a compact has a 
 right to revoke that compact, the doctrine itself has had respect- 
 able advocates. The possibility of a question of this nature. 
 
W4 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 proves the neciissity of laying the foundations of our national 
 government deeper, than in the mere sanction of delegated 
 authority. Th i fabric of American empire ought to rest on the 
 solid basis of the consent op the people. The streams of 
 national power ought to flow immediately from that pure 
 original fountain c all legitimate authority. 
 
 Pdblius. 
 
THE FEDERALIST. liU> 
 
 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 NUMBER XXIII. 
 
 N :W YORK, DECEMBER 19, 1787. 
 
 HAMILTON. 
 
 THE NECESSITY OF A GOVERNMENT, AT LEAST EQUALLY ENER- 
 GETIC WITH THE ONE PROPOSED. 
 
 The necessity of a constitution, at least equally energetic with 
 the one proposed, to the preservation of the union, is the point, 
 at the examination of which we are now arrived. 
 
 This inquiry will naturally divide itself into three branches. 
 The objects to be provided for by a federal government. The 
 quantity of power necessary to the accomplishment of those 
 objects. The persons upon whom that power ought to operate. 
 Its distribution and organization, will more properly claim our 
 attention under the succeeding head. 
 
 The principal purposes to be answered by union, are these : 
 The common defence of the members; the preservation of th9 
 public peace, as well against internal convulsions as externa. 
 attacks; the regulation of commerce with other nations, and 
 between the states; the superintendance of our intercourse, 
 political and commercial, with foreign countries. 
 
 The authorities essential to the care of the common defence 
 are these : To raise armies ; to build and equip fleets ; to pre- 
 scribe rules for the government of both ; to direct their opera- 
 tions ; to provide for their supp trt. These powers ought to 
 exist without limitation ; because it is impossible to foresee or 
 
196 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 to define the extent and variety of national exigencies, and the 
 correspondent extent and variety of the means which may be 
 necessary to satisfy them. The circumstances that endanger 
 the safety of nations are infinite; and for this reason, no con- 
 stitutional shackles can wisely be imposed on the power to which 
 the care of it is committed. This power ought to be co-exten- 
 sive with all the possible combinations of such circumstances ; 
 and ought to be under the direction of the same councils, which 
 are appointed to preside over the common defence. 
 
 This is one of those truths, which, to a correct and unpre- 
 judiced mind, carries its own evidence along with it ; and may 
 be obscured, but cannot be made plainer by argument or reason- 
 ing. It rests upon axioms, as simple as they are universal — the 
 means ought to be proportioned to the end; the persons from 
 whose agency the attainment of any end is expected, ought to 
 possess the means by which it is to be attained. 
 
 Whether there ought to be a federal government intrusted 
 with the care of the common defence, is a question, in the first 
 Instance, open to discussion ; but the moment it is decided in the 
 affirmative, it will follow, that, that government ought to be 
 cloathed with all the powers requisite to the complete execution 
 of its trust. And unless it can be shown, that the circumstances 
 which may affect the public safety, are reducible within certain 
 determinate limits ; unless the contrary of this position can be 
 fairly and rationally disputed, it must be admitted as a necessary 
 consequence, that there can be no limitation of that authority, 
 which is to provide for the defence and protection of the com- 
 munity, in any matter essential to its efficacy ; that is, in any 
 matter essential to the formation, direction, or support of the na- 
 tional FOlCtS. 
 
 Defective as the present confederation has been proved to be, 
 this principle appears to have been fully recognized by the framers 
 of it ; though they have not made jjroper or adequate provision 
 for its exercise. Congress have an unlimited discretion to make 
 requisitions of men and money; to govern the army and nt»vy; 
 to direct their operations. As their requisitions are made eon. 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 197 
 
 Btitutionally binding upon the states, who are in fact under Wxq 
 most solemn obligations to furnish the supplies required of them 
 the intention evidently was, that the United States should com 
 mand whatever resources were by them judged requisite to the 
 " common defence and general welfare." It was presumed, that 
 a sense of their true interests, and a regard to the dictates of 
 good faith, would be found sufficient pledges for the punctual 
 performance of the duty of the members to the federal head. 
 
 The experiment has however demonstrated, that this expecta- 
 tion was ill founded and illusory; and the observations made 
 under the last head will, I imagine, have sufficed to convince the 
 impartial and discerning, that there is an absolute necessity for 
 an entire change in the first principles of the system. That if 
 we are in earnest about giving the union energy and duration, 
 we must abandon the vain project of legislating upon the states 
 in their collective capacities ; we must extend the laws of the 
 federal government to the individual citizens of America; we 
 must discard the fallacious scheme of quotas and requisitions, 
 as equally impracticable and unjust. The result from all this 
 is, that the union ought to be invested with full power to levy 
 troops; to build and equip fleets; and to raise the revenues 
 which will be required for the formation and support of an army 
 and navy, in the customary and ordinary modes practised in 
 other governments. 
 
 If the circumstances of our country are such, as to demand a 
 compound, instead of a simple ; a confederate, instead of a sole 
 government, the essential point which will remain to be adjusted, 
 will be to discriminate the objects, as far as it can be done, 
 which shall appertain to the different provinces or departments 
 of power : allowing to each, the most ample authority for fulfill- 
 ing THOSE which may be committed to its charge. Shall the 
 union be constituted the guardian of the common safety ? Are 
 fleets, and armies, and revenues, necessary to this purpose ? 
 The government of the union must be empowered to pass all 
 laws, and to make all regulations which have relation to them 
 Tlie same must be the case in respect to commerce, and to every 
 
798 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 othei matter to whi.n its jurisdiction is permitted to extend. 
 18 the administration of justice, between the citizens of the same 
 state, the proper department of the local governments ? These 
 must possess all the authorities which are connected with this 
 object, and with every other that may be allotted to thteir par- 
 ticular cognizance and direction. Isot to confer in each case a 
 degree of power, commensurate to the end, would be to violate 
 the most obvious rules of prudence and propriety, and improvi- 
 dently to trust the great interests of the nation to hands which 
 are disabled from managing them with vigour and success. 
 
 Who so likely to make suitable provisions for the public de- 
 fence, as that body to which the guardianship of the public 
 safety is confided ? Which, as the centre of information, will 
 best understand the extent and urgency of the dangers that 
 threaten; as the representative of the whole, will feel itself 
 most deeply interested in the preservation of every part ; which, 
 from the responsibility implied in the duty assigned to it, will 
 be most sensibly impressed with the necessity of proper exer- 
 tions ; and which, by the extension of its authority throughout 
 the states, can alone establish uniformity and concert in the 
 plans and measures, by which the common safety is to be se- 
 cured ? Is there not a manifest inconsistency in devolving upon 
 the federal government the care of the general defence, and 
 leaving in the state governments the effective powers, by which 
 it is to be provided for? Is not a want of co-operation the in- 
 fallible consequence of such a system ? And will not weakness, 
 disorder, an undue distribution of the burthens and calamities of 
 war, an unnecessary and intolerable increase of expense, be it» 
 natural and inevitable concomitants ? Have we not had un- 
 equivocal experience of its effects in the course of the revolu- 
 tion, which we have just achieved ? 
 
 Every view we may take of the subject as candid inquirers 
 after truth, will serve to convince us, that it is both unwise and 
 dangerous to deny the federal government an unconfined author- 
 ity, in respect to all those objects which are intrusted to its man- 
 agement It will indeed deserve the most vigilant and careful 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 199 
 
 attention of the people, to see that it be modelled in such a 
 manner as to admit of its being safely vested with the requisite 
 powers. If any plan, which has been, or may be, offered to our 
 consideration, should not, upon a dispassionate inspeetion. be 
 found to answer this description, it ought to be rejected. A 
 government, the constitution of which renders it unfit to be in- 
 trusted with all the powers which a free people ought to delegate 
 to any government, would be an unsafe and improper depository 
 of tlie NATIONAL INTERESTS. Wherever these can with pro- 
 priety be confided, the coincident powers may safely accompany 
 them. This is the true result of all just reasoning upon the sub- 
 ject. And the adversaries of the plan, promulgated by the con- 
 vention, would have given a better impression of their candour, 
 if they had confined themselves to showing, that the internal 
 structure of the proposed government, was such as to render it 
 unworthy of the confidence of the people. They ought not to 
 have wandered into inflammatory declamations and unmeaning 
 cavils, about the extent of the powers. The powers are not too 
 extensive for the objects of federal administration, or, in other 
 words, for the management of our national interests; nor 
 can any satisfactory argument be framed, to show that they are 
 chargeable with such an excess. If it be true, as has been in- 
 sinuated by some of the writers on the other side, that the diflS- 
 culty arises from the nature of the thing, and that the extent of 
 the country will not permit us to form a government, in which 
 such ample powers can safely be reposed, it would prove that we 
 ought to contract our views, and resort to the expedient of sepa- 
 rata confederacies, which will move within more practicable 
 spheres. For the absurdity must continually stare us in the 
 face, of confiding to a government the direction of the most 
 essential national concerns, without daring to trust it with the 
 authorities which are indispensable to their proper and efficient 
 management. Let us not attempt to reconcile contradictions, 
 but firmly embrace a rational alternative. 
 
 I trust, however, that the impracticability of one general 
 system cannot be shown. 1 am greatly mistaken, if any thing 
 
200 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 of weight has yet been advanced of this tendency; and I flatter 
 myself, that the observations, which have been made in the 
 course of these papers, have served to place the reverse of that 
 position in as clear a light as any matter, still in the womb of 
 time and experience, is susceptible of. This, at all events, must 
 be evident, that the very difficulty itself, drawn from the extent 
 of the country, is the strongest argument in favour of an ener- 
 getic government ; for any other can certainly never preserve 
 the union of so large an empire. If we embrace, as the standard 
 of our political creed, the tenets of those, who oppose the adop- 
 tion of the proposed constitution, we cannot fail to verify the 
 gloomy doctrines, which predict the impracticability of a na- 
 tional system pervading the entire limits of the present con- 
 federacy 
 
 PUBLIUS. 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 201 
 
 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 NUMBER XXIV. 
 
 NEW YORK, DECEMBER 19, 1787. 
 
 HAMILTON. 
 
 THE SUBJECT CONTINUED, WITH AN ANSWER TO AN OBJ»:CTION 
 CONCERNING STANDING ARMIES. 
 
 To the powers proposed to be conferred upon the foderal gov- 
 ernment, in respect to the creation and direction of the national 
 forces, I have met with but one specific objection; which is, that 
 proper provision has not been made against the existence of 
 standing armies in time of peace : An object'on which 1 shall 
 now endeavour to show, rests on weak and ur iubstantial founda- 
 tions. 
 
 It has indeed been brought forward ii. the most vague and 
 general form, supported only by bold assertions, without the 
 appearance of argument; without ev.n the sanction of theo- 
 retical opinions, in contradiction to the practice of other free 
 nations, and to the general sense of America, as expressed in most 
 of the existing constitutions. The propriety of this remark will 
 appear, the moment it is recollected that the objection under 
 consideration turns upon a supposed necessity of restraining the 
 LEGISLATIVE authority of the nation, in the article of military 
 establishments; a principle unheard of, except in one or two of 
 our state constitutions, and rejected in all the rest. 
 
 A stranger to our politics, who was to read our newspapers at 
 the present juncture, without having previously inspected the 
 
202 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 plan reported by the convention, would be naturally led to one 
 of two conclusions: either that it contained a positive injunction, 
 that standing armies should be kept up in time of peace; or, that 
 it vested in the executive the whole power of levying troops. 
 without subjecting his discretion in any shape to the control of 
 the legislature 
 
 If he came afterwards to peruse the plan itself, he would be 
 surprised to discover, that neither the one nor the other was the 
 case ; that the whole power of raising armies was lodged in the 
 legislature, not in the executive; that this legislature was to be 
 a popular body, consisting of the representatives of the people 
 periodically elected; and that instead of the provision he had 
 supposed in favour of standing armies, there was to be found 
 in respect to this object, an important qualification even of the 
 legislative discretion, in that clause which forbids the appropria- 
 tion of money for the support of an army for any longer period 
 than two years: A precaution which, upon a nearer view of it, 
 will appear to be a great and real security against military 
 establishments without evident necessity. 
 
 Disappointed in his first surmise, the person 1 have supposed 
 would be apt to pursue bis conjectures a little further Ho 
 would naturally say to himself, it is impossible that all this 
 vehement and pathetic declamation can be without some colour- 
 able pretext. It must needs be that this people, so jealous of 
 their liberties, have, in all the preceding models of the con- 
 stitutions which they have established, inserted the most precise 
 and rigid precautions on this point, the omission of which in the 
 new plan, has given birth to all this apprehension and clamour. 
 
 If, under this impression, he proceeded to pass in review the 
 several st,! te constitutions, how great would be his disappoint- 
 ment to find that two only of them* contained an interdiction 
 
 * This statement of the matter is taken from the printed collections of state 
 constitutions. Pennsylvania and North-Carolina, are the two which contain 
 the interdiction in these words: "As standing armies in time of peace are 
 dangerous to liberty, thet ought not to be kept up." This is, in truth, rather 
 a CAUTION than a pkohibition. New-Hampshire, Massachusetts, Delawar»». 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 203 
 
 of standing armies in time of peace ; that the other eleven had 
 either observed a profound silence on the subject, or had in ex- 
 press terms admitted the right of the legislature to authorize 
 their existence. 
 
 Still, however, he would be persuaded that there must be sot^^o 
 plausible foundation, for the cry raised on this head. He would 
 never be able to imagine, while any source of information re- 
 mained unexplored, that it was nothing more than an experi- 
 ment upon the public credulity, dictated either by a deliberate 
 intention to deceive, or by the overflowings of a zeal too intem- 
 perate to be ingenuous. It would probably occur to him, that he 
 would be likely to find the precautions he was in search of, in 
 the primitive compact between the states. Here, at length, he 
 vould expect to meet with a solution of the enigma. No doubt, 
 he would observe to himself, the existing confederation must 
 contain the most explicit provisions against military establish- 
 ments in time of peace; and a departure from this model in 
 a favourite point, has occasioned the discontent, which appears 
 to influence these political champions. 
 
 If he should now apply himself .to a careful and critical survey 
 of the articles of confederation, his astonishment would not 
 only be increased, but would acquire a mixture of indignation, 
 at the unexpected discovery, that these articles, instead of con- 
 taining the prohibition he looked for, and though they had, 
 with jealous circumspection, restricted the authority of the 
 state legislatures in this particular, had not imposed a single 
 restraint on that of the United States. If he happened to 
 be a man of quick sensibility, or ardent temper, he could now 
 no longer refrain from pronouncing these clamours to be, the 
 
 and Maryland, have in each of their bills of rights a clause to this eflFect : 
 "Standing armies are dangerous to liberty, and ought not to be raised or kept 
 up WITHOUT THK CONSENT OF THE LEGISLATURE;" which is a formal admis- 
 sion of the authority of the legislature. New- York has no bill of rights, and 
 her constitution says not a word about the matter. No bills of rights appear 
 annexed to the constitutions of the other states, and their constitutions are 
 equally silent. I am told, however, that one or two states have bills of rights, 
 which do not appear in this collection; but that those also recognize the right 
 of the legislative authority in this respect. 
 
 24 
 
204 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 dishonest artifices of a sinister and unprincipled opposition to a 
 plan which ought at least to receive a fair and candid examina- 
 tion from all sincere lovers of their country! How else, he 
 would say, could the authors of them have been tempted to 
 vent such loud censures upon that plan, about a point in which 
 it seems to have conformed itself to the general sense of 
 America as declared in its different forms of government, and 
 in which it has even superadded a new and powerful guard 
 unknown to any of them ? If, on the contrary, he happened 
 to be a man of calm and dispassionate feelings, he would indulge 
 a sigh for the frailty of human nature, and would lament, that 
 in a matter so interesting to the happiness of millions, the true 
 merits of the question should be perplexed, and obscured by ex- 
 pedients so unfriendly to an impartial and right determination. 
 Even such a man could hardly forbear remarking, that a con- 
 duct of this kind, has too much the appearance, of an intention 
 to mislead the people by alarming their passions, rather than to 
 convince them by arguments addressed to their understandings. 
 
 But however little this objection may be countenanced, even 
 by precedents among ourselves, it may be satisfactory to take a 
 nearer view of its intrinsic merits. From a close examination. 
 it will appear, that restraints upon the discretion of the legis- 
 lature, in respect to military establishments, would be improper 
 to be imposed; and if imposed, from the necessities of society, 
 would be unlikely to be observed. 
 
 Though a wide ocean separates the United States from Europe, 
 yet there are various considerations that warn us against an 
 excess of confidence or security. On one side of us, stretching 
 far into our rear, are growing settlements subject to the domi 
 nion of Britain. On the other side, and extending to meet tL'} 
 British settlements, are colonies and establishments subject tc 
 the dominion of Spain. This situation, and the vicinity of tue 
 West-India islands, belonging to these two powers, create be- 
 tween them, in respect to their American possessions, and in 
 relation to ns, a common interest. The savage tribes on our 
 western frontier, ought to be regarded as our natural enemies; 
 
THE FEDERALIST 205 
 
 their natural allies: because they hav€ most to fear irom us, 
 and most to hope from them. The improvements in the art 
 of navigation, have, as to the facility of communication, ren- 
 dered distant nations, in a gi*eat measure, neighbours. Britain 
 and Spain, are among the principal maritime powers of Europe. 
 A future concert of views between these nations, ought not to 
 be regarded as improbable. The increasing remoteness of con- 
 sanguinity, is every day diminishing the force of the family 
 compact between France and Spain. And politicians have 
 ever, with great reason, considered the ties of blood, as feeble 
 and precarious links of political connection. These circum- 
 stances, combined, admonish us not to be too sanguine in con- 
 sidering ourselves as entirely out of the reach of danger. 
 
 Previous to the revolution, and ever since the peace, there 
 has been a constant necessity for keeping small garrisons on 
 our western frontier. No person can doubt, that these will 
 continue to be indispensable, if it should only be to guard 
 against the ravages and depredations of the Indians. These 
 garrisons must either be furnished by occasional detachments 
 from the militia, or by permanent corps in the pay of the 
 government. The first is impracticable; and if practicable, 
 would be pernicious. The militia, in times of profound peace, 
 would not long, if at all, submit to be dragged from their occu- 
 pations and families, to perform that most disagreeable duty. 
 And if they could be prevailed upon, or compelled to do it, 
 the increased expense of a frequent rotation of service, and 
 the loss of labour, and disconcertion of the industrious pursuits 
 of individuals, would form conclusive objections to the scheme. 
 It would be as burthensome and injurious to the public, as ruin- 
 ous to private citizens. The latter resource of permanent corps 
 in the pay of government, amounts to a standing army in time of 
 peace ; a small one, indeed, but not the less real for being small. 
 
 Here is a simple view of the subject, that shows us at once 
 the impropriety of a constitutional interdiction of such esta- 
 blishments, and the necessity of leaving the matter to the dis- 
 crex'on and prudence of the legislature. 
 
'ZOQ THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 In proportion to our increase in strength, it is probable, nay, 
 it may be said certain, that Britain and Spain would augment 
 their mihtary establishments in our neighbourhood. If we 
 should not be willing wO be exposed, in a naked and defenceless 
 condition, to their insults or encroachments, we should find it 
 expedient to increase our frontier garrisons, in some ratio to 
 the force by which our western settlements might be annoyed. 
 There are, and will be, particular posts, the possession of which 
 will include the command of large districts of territory, and 
 facilitate future invasions of the remainder. It may be added, 
 that some of those posts will be keys to the trade with the 
 Indian nations. Can any man think it would be wise, to leave 
 such posts in a situation to be at any instant seized by one or 
 the other of two neighbouring and formidable powers ? To act 
 this part, would be to desert all the usual maxims of prudence 
 and policy. 
 
 If we mean to be a commercial people, or even to be secure 
 on our Atlantic side, we must endeavour, as soon as possible, to 
 have a navy. To this purpose, there must be dock-yards and 
 arsenals; and, for the defence of these, fortifications, and pro- 
 bably garrisons. When a nation has become so powerful by sea, 
 that it can protect its dock-yards by its fleets, this supersedes 
 the necessity of garrisons for that purpose; but where naval 
 establishments are in their infancy, moderate garrisons will, 
 in all likelihood, be found an indispensable security against 
 descents for the destruction of the arsenals and dock-yards, 
 and sometimes of the fleet itself. 
 
 Pdblius. 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 207 
 
 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 NUMBER XXV. 
 
 NEW "! ORK, DECEMBER 22, 1787. 
 
 HAMILTON. 
 
 THE SUBJECT CO>'TINUED, WITH THE SAME VIEW. 
 
 It may perhaps be urged, that the objects enumerated in the 
 preceding number ought to be provided by the state govern 
 ments, under the direction of the union. But this would be an 
 inversion of the primary principle of our political association ; 
 as it would in practice transfer the care of the common defence 
 from the federal head to the individual members: A project 
 oppressive to some states, dangerous to all, and baneful to the 
 confederacy. 
 
 The territories of Britain, Spain, and of the Indian nations 
 in our neighbourhood, do not border on particular states; but 
 encircle the union from Maine to Georgia. The danger, though 
 in different degrees, is therefore common. And the means of 
 guarding against it, ought, in like manner, to be the objects of 
 common councils, and of a common treasury. It happens that 
 some states, from local situation, are more directly exposed. 
 New- York is of this class. Upon the plan of separate pro- 
 visions, Kew-York would have to sustain the whole weight of 
 the establishments requisite to her immediate safety, and to the 
 mediate, or ultimate protection of her neighbours. This would 
 neither be equitable as it respected New- York, nor safe as it 
 respected the other states. Yarious inconveniences would attend 
 
208 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 such a system. The states, to whose lot it might fall to support 
 the necessary establishments, would be as little able as willing, 
 for a considerable time to come, to bear the burthen of com- 
 petent provisions. The security of all, would thus be subjected 
 to the parsimony, improvidence, or inability of a part. If from 
 the resources of such part becoming more abundant, its pro- 
 visions should be proportionably enlarged, the other states would 
 quickly take the alarm at seeing the whole military force of the 
 union in the hands of two or three of its members; and those 
 probably amongst the most powerful. They would each choose 
 to have some counterpoise : and pretences could easily be con- 
 trived. In this situation, military establishments, nourished 
 by mutual jealousy, would be apt to swell beyond their natural 
 or proper size ; and being at the separate disposal of the mem- 
 bers, they would be engines for the abridgment, or demolition, 
 of the national authority. 
 
 Eeasons have been already given to induce a supposition, that 
 the state governments will too naturally be prone to a rivalship 
 with that of the union, the foundation of which will be the love 
 of power; and that in any contest between the federal head and 
 one of its members, the people will be most apt to unite with 
 their local government : If in addition to this immense advantage, 
 the ambition of the members should be stimulated by the sepa- 
 rate and independent possession of military forces, it would aflford 
 too strong a temptation, and too great facility to them to make 
 enterprises upon, and finally to subvert, the constitutional 
 authority of the u lion. On the other hand, the liberty of the 
 people would be less safe in this state of things, than in that 
 which left the national forces in the hands of the national gov- 
 ernment. As far as an army may be considered as a dangerous 
 weapon of power, it had better be in those hands, of which the 
 people are most likely to be jealous, than in those of which they 
 are least likely to be so. For it is a truth which the experience 
 of all ages has attested, that the people are commonly most in 
 danger, when the means of injuring their rights are in tho po«- 
 eession of those of whom they entertain the least suspicion 
 
THE FEDERALIliT. 209 
 
 The framers of the existing confederation, fully aware of the 
 danger to the union from the separate possession of military 
 forces by the states, have in express terms, prohibited them from 
 having either ships or troops, unless with the consent of congress. 
 The truth is, that the existence of a federal government and 
 military establishments, under state authority, are not less at 
 variance with each other, than a due supply of the federal 
 treasury, and the system of quotas and requisitions. 
 
 There are other views besides those already presented, in 
 which the impropriety of restraints on the discretion of the 
 national legislature will be equally manifest. The design of the 
 objection, which has been mentioned, is to preclude standing 
 armies in time of peace; though we have never been informed 
 how far it is desired the prohibition should extend ; whether to 
 raising armies, as well as to keeping them up, in a season of 
 tranquillity, or not. If it be confined to the latter, it will have 
 no precise signification, and it will be ineffectual for the purpose 
 intended. When armies are once raised, what shall be denomi- 
 nated " keeping them up," contrary to the sense of the consti- 
 tution? What time shall be requisite to ascertain the viola- 
 tion ? Shall it be a week, a month, a year ? Or shall we say, 
 they may be continued as long as the danger which occasioned 
 their being raised continues ? This would be to admit that they 
 might be kept up in time of peace, against threatening or impend- 
 ing danger; which would be at once to deviate from the literal 
 meaning of the prohibition, and to introduce an extensive lati- 
 tude of construction. Who shall judge of the continuance of 
 the danger? This must undoubtedly be submitted to the na- 
 tional government, and the matter would then be brought to 
 this issue, that the national government, to provide against ap- 
 prehended danger, might, in the first instance, raise troops, and 
 might afterwards keep them on foot, as long as they supposed the 
 peace or safety of the community was in any degree of jeopardy. 
 It is easy to perceive, that a discretion so latitudinary as this, 
 would afford ample room for eluding the force of the provision. 
 The utility of a provision of this kind, can only be vindicated 
 
21C THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 on the hypothesis of a probability, at least possibility, of eom- 
 oination between the executive and legislature, in some scheme 
 of usurpation. Should this at any time happen, how easy would 
 it be to fabricate pretences of approaching danger ? Indian hos- 
 tilities instigated by Spain or Britain, would always be at hand. 
 Provocations to produce the desired appearances, might even 
 be given to some foreign power, and appeased again by timely 
 concessions. If we can re'»sonably presume such a combination 
 to have been formed, and ..hat the enterprize is warranted by a 
 sufficient prospect of suc( ess : the army when once raised, from 
 whatever cause, or on whatever pretext, may be applied to the 
 execution of the project. 
 
 If to obviate this consequence, it should be resolved to extend 
 the prohibition to the raising of armies in time of peace, the 
 United States would then exhibit the most extraordinary spec- 
 tacle, which the world has yet seen — that of a nation incapa- 
 citated by its constitution to prepare for defence, before it was 
 actuall}/- invaded. As the ceremony of a formal denunciation of 
 war has of late fallen into disuse, the presence of an enemy 
 within our territories must be waited for, as the legal warrant 
 to the government to begin its levies of men for the protection 
 of the (Btate. We must receive the blow, before we could even 
 prepare to return it. All that kind of policy by which nations 
 anticipate distant danger, and meet the gathering storm, must 
 be abstained from, as contrary to the genuine maxims of a 
 free government. "We must expose our property and liberty to 
 the mercy of foreign invaders, and invite them by our weakness, 
 to seize the naked and defenceless prey, because we are afraid 
 that rulers, created by our choice, dependent on our will, might 
 endanger that liberty, by an abuse of the means necessary to its 
 preservation. 
 
 Here I expect we shall be told, that the militia of the country 
 is its natural bulwark, and would at all times be equal to the 
 national defence. This doctrine, in substance, had like to have 
 lost us our independence. It cost millions to the United States, 
 that might have been saved. The facts, which from our own 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 21} 
 
 experience forbid a reliance of this kind, are too recent to permit 
 us to be the dupes of such a suggestion. The steady operations 
 of war against a regalar and disciplined army, can only be suc- 
 cessfully conducted by a force of the same kind. Consider- 
 ations of economy, lot lesj. than of stability and vigour, con 
 firm this position. The Ajnerican militia, in the course of the 
 late war, have, by their vg,lour on numerous occasions, erected 
 eternal monumeoti to their fame; but the bravest of them feel 
 and know, that the liberty of their country could not have been 
 established by their efforts alone, however great and valuable 
 they we] e. Wir, Ike most other things, is a science to be 
 acquired and perfeited oy diligence, by perseverance, by time, 
 and by ]»ractice. 
 
 All violent policy, as it is contrary to the natural and expe- 
 rienced course cf human affairs, defeats itself. Pennsylvania at 
 this instant afforc.s an example of the truth of this remark. 
 The bill of rig'its of that state declares, that standing armies 
 are dangtrous to liberty, and ought not to be kept up in time of 
 peace. 1 ennsylvania nevertheless, in a time of profound peace^ 
 from the existence of partial disorders in one or two of her 
 counties, has r3Solved to raise a body of troops; and in all pro- 
 bability, will keep them up as long as there is any appearance 
 of danger to the public peace. The conduct of Massachusetts 
 affords a lessor on the same subject, though on different ground. 
 That state (w thout waiting for the sanction of congress, as the 
 articles of the confederation require) was compelled to raise 
 troops to quell a domestic insurrection, and still keeps a corps 
 in pay to prevent a revival of the spirit of revolt. The par- 
 ticular constitution of Massachusetts opposed no obstacle to the 
 measure ; but the instance is still of use to instruct us, that cases 
 are likely to occur under our governments, as well as under 
 those ol other nations, which will sometimes render a military 
 force in time of peace, essential to the security of the society, 
 and that it is therefore improper, in this respect, to control the 
 legislative discretion. It also teaches us, in its application to 
 the United States, how little the rights ')f a feeble government 
 
212 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 are likely to be respected, even by its own constituents. And 
 it teaches us, in addition to the rest, how unequal are parch- 
 ment provisions, to a struggle with public necessity. 
 
 It was a fundamental maxim with the Lacedemonian com- 
 monwealth, that the post of admiral should not be conferred 
 twice on the same person. The Peloponnesian confederates, 
 having suffered a severe defeat at sea from the Athenians, de- 
 manded Lysander, who had before served with success in that 
 capacity, to command the combined fleets. The Lacedemo- 
 nians, to gratify their allies, and yet preserve the semblance 
 of an adherence to their ancient institutions, had recourse to the 
 flimsy subterfuge of investing Lysander with the real power of 
 admiral, under the nominal title of vice-admiral. This instance 
 is selected from among a multitude that might be cited, to con- 
 firm the truth already advanced and illustrated by domestic 
 examples; which is, that nations pay little regard to rules and 
 maxims, calculated in their very nature to run counter to the ne- 
 cessities of society. Wise politicians will be cautious about fetter- 
 ing the government with restrictions, that cannot be observed; 
 because they know, that every breach of the fundamental laws, 
 though dictated by necessity, impairs that sacred reverence, 
 which ought to be maintained in the breast of rulers towards 
 the constitution of a country, and forms a precedent for other 
 breaches, where the same plea of necessity does not exist at all, 
 or is less urgent and palpable. 
 
 PUBLIUB 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 213 
 
 fl^ 
 
 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 NUMBER XXVI. 
 
 NEW YORK, DECEMBER 22, 1787. 
 
 HAMILTON. 
 
 THE SUBJECT CONTINUED, WITH THE SAME VIEW. 
 
 It was a thing hardly to have been expected, that in a popular 
 revolution, the minds of men should stop, at that happy mean, 
 which marks the salutary boundary between power and privi- 
 lege, and combines the energy of government with the security 
 of private rights. A failure in this delicate and important 
 point, is the great source of the inconveniences we experience ; 
 and if we are not cautious to avoid a repetition of the error, in 
 our future attempts to rectify and ameliorate our system, we 
 may travel from one chimerical project to another j we may try 
 change after change ; but we shall never be likely to make any 
 material change for the better. 
 
 The idea of restraining the legislative authority, in the means 
 of providing for the national defence, is one of those refinements, 
 which owe their origin to a zeal for liberty more ardent than en- 
 lightened. We have seen, however, that it has not had thus far an 
 extensive prevalency ; that even in this country, where it made 
 its first appearance, Pennsylvania and North-Carolina, are the 
 onlv two states by which it has been in any degree patronized ; 
 and that all the others have refused to give it the least counte- 
 nance. They wisely judged that confidence must be placed 
 somewhere • that the necessity of doing it, is implied in the very 
 
214 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 act of delegating power : and that it is better to hazard the 
 abuse of that confidence, than to embarraos the government and 
 endanger the public safety, by impolitic restrictions on the legis- 
 lative authority. The opponents of the proposed constitution, 
 combat in this respect the general decision of America; and 
 instead of being taught by experience, the propriety of correct- 
 ing any extremes, into which we may have heretofore run ; they 
 appear disposed to conduct us into others still more dangerous, 
 and more extravagant. As if the tone of government had been 
 found too high, or too rigid, the doctrines they teach are calcu- 
 lated to induce us to depress, or to relax it, by expedients which 
 upon other occasions, have been condemned or forborne. It may 
 be affirmed without the imputation of invective, that if the 
 principles they inculcate on various points, could so far obtain 
 as to become the popular creed, they would utterly unfit the 
 people of this country for any species of government whatever. 
 But a danger of this kind is not to be apprehended. The citi- 
 zens of America have too much discernment to be argued into 
 anarchy. And I am much mistaken, if experience has not 
 wrought a deep and solemn conviction in the public mind, that 
 greater energy of government is essential to the welfare and 
 prosperity of the community. 
 
 It may not be amiss in this place, concisely to remark the 
 origin and progress of the idea, which aims at the exclusion of 
 military establishments in time of peace. Though in specula- 
 tive minds, it may arise from a contemplation of the nature and 
 tendency of such institutions, fortified by the events that have 
 happened in other ages and countries ; yet, as a national senti- 
 ment, it must bo traced to those habits of thinking which we 
 derive from the nation, from which the inhabitants of these 
 states have in general sprung. 
 
 In England, for a long time after the Norman conquest, the 
 authority of the monarch »vas almost unlimited. Inroads were 
 gradually made upon the prerogative, in favour of liberty, first 
 by the barons, and afterwards by the people, till the greatest 
 part of its most formidable pretensions became extinct. But 't 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 216 
 
 wafr noi till the revolution in 1688, which elevated the pnnce of 
 Orange to the throne of Great Britain, that English liberty was 
 completely triumphant. As incident to the undefined power of 
 making war, an acknowledged prerogative of the crown, Charles 
 II. had, by his own authority, kept on foot in time of peace a 
 JOody of 5,000 regular troojDS. And this number James II, in- 
 'ireased to 30,000 ; who were paid out of his civil list At the 
 revolution, to abolish the exercise of so dangerous an authority, 
 it became an article of the bill of rights then framed, that " raising 
 or keeping a standing army within the kingdom in time of peace, 
 unless with the consent of parliament, was against law." 
 
 In that kingdom, when the pulse of liberty was at its highest 
 pitch, no security against the danger of standing armies was 
 thought requisite, beyond a prohibition of their being raised or 
 kept up by the mere authority of the executive magistrate. 
 The patriots, who effected that memorable revolution, were too 
 temperate, and too well informed, to think of any restraint on 
 the legislative discretion. They were aware, that a certain 
 number of troops for guards and garrisons, were indispen- 
 sable; that no precise bounds could be set to the national 
 exigencies ; that a power equal to every possible contingency 
 must exist somewhere in the government ; and that when they 
 referred the exercise of that power to the judgment of the legis- 
 lature, they had arrived at the ultimate point of precaution, 
 which was reconcileable with the safety of the community. 
 
 From the same source, the people of America may be said to 
 have derived an hereditary impression of danger to liberty, from 
 standing armies in time of peace. The circumstances of a revo- 
 lution, quickened the public sensibility on every point connected 
 with the security of popular rights; and in some instances 
 raised the warmth of our zeal beyond the degree, which con- 
 sisted with the due temperature of the body politic. The at- 
 tempts of two of the states, to restrict the authority of the legis- 
 lature in the article of military establishments, are of the num- 
 ber of these instances. The principles, which had taught us to 
 be jealous of the power of an hereditary monarch, were, by an 
 
216 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 injudicious excess, extended to the repre8entative8 of the people 
 in their popular assemblies. Even in some of the states, where 
 this error was not adopted, we find unnecessary declarations, 
 that standing armies ought not to be kept up, in time of peace, 
 without the consent of the legislature ; I call them unnecessary, 
 because the reason, which had introduced a similar provision 
 into the English bill of rights, is not applicable to any of the 
 state constitutions. The power of raising armies at all, under 
 those constitutions, can by no construction be deemed to reside 
 any where else, than in the legislatures themselves ; and it was 
 superfluous, if not absurd, to declare, that a matter should not 
 be done without the consent of a body, which alone had the 
 power of doing it. Accordingly, in some of those constitutions, 
 and among others, in that of the state of New- York, which has 
 been justly celebrated, both in Europe and America, as one of 
 the best of the forms of government established in this country, 
 there is a total silence upon the subject. 
 
 It is remarkable, that even in the two states, which seem to 
 have meditated an interdiction of military establishments in 
 time of peace, the mode of expression made use of is rather 
 monitory, than prohibitory. It is not said, that standing armies 
 shall not he kept up, but that they ought not to be kept up in time 
 of peace. This ambiguity of terms appears to have been the 
 result of a conflict between jealousy and conviction, between 
 the desire of excluding such establishments at all events, and 
 the persuasion that an absolute exclusion would be unwise and 
 unsafe. 
 
 Can it be doubted that such a provision, wheneyer the situa- 
 tion of public affairs was understood to require a departure 
 from it, would be interpreted by the legislature into a mero 
 admonition, and would be made to yield to the actual or sup 
 posed necessities of the state ? Let the fact already mentioned 
 with respect to Pennsylvania, decide. "What then, it may be 
 asked, is the use of such a provision, if it cease to operate, the 
 moment there is an inclination to disregard it ? 
 
 Let us examine whether the^e be any comparison, in point of 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 21T 
 
 efficacy, between the provision alluded to, and tLat which la 
 contained in the new constitution, for restraining the appropri- 
 ations of money for military purposes, to the period of two 
 years. The former, by aiming at too much, is calculated to 
 effect nothing ; the latter, by steering clear of an imprudent 
 extreme, and by being perfectly compatible with a proper pro- 
 vision for the exigencies of the nation, will have a salutary and 
 powerful operation. 
 
 The legislature of the United States will be obliged, by this 
 provision, once at least in every two years, to deliberate upon 
 the propriety of keeping a military force on foot ; to come to a 
 new resolution on the point ; and to declare their sense of the 
 matter, by a formal vote in the face of their constituents. They 
 are not at liberty to vest in the executive department, permanent 
 funds for the support of an army ; if they were even incautious 
 enough to be willing to repose in it so improper a confidence. 
 As the spirit of party, in different degrees, must be expected to 
 infect all political bodies, there will be, no doubt, persons in the 
 national legislature willing enough to arraign the measures, and 
 criminate the views of the majority. The provision for the 
 support of a military force, will always be a favourable topic for 
 declamation. As often as the question comes forward, the public 
 attention will be roused and attracted to the subject, by the 
 party in opposition : And if the majority should be really dis- 
 posed to exceed the proper limits, the community will be warned 
 of the danger, and will have an opportunity of taking measures 
 to guard against it. Independent of parties in the national 
 legislature itself, as often as the period of discussion arrived, the 
 state legislatures, who will always be not only vigilant, but sus- 
 picious and jealous guardians of the rights of the citizens, against 
 encroachments from the federal government, will constantly 
 have their attention awake to the conduct of the national rulers, 
 and will be ready enough, if any thing improper appears, to 
 sound the alarm to the people, and not only to be the voice, but 
 if necessary, the arm of their discontent. 
 
 Schemes to subvert the liberties of a great community, require 
 
218 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 time tc mature them for executior.. Ar army, so large as se- 
 riously to menace those liberties, could »nly Ov formed by pro- 
 gressive augmentations; which wouh suppos , not merely a 
 temporary combination between the '(gisla^-ure an-l executive, 
 but a continued conspiracy for a seri^h of time. If t probable 
 that such a combination would exist ac all? Is it jn jbable that 
 it would be persevered in, and transmitted through all the suc- 
 cessive variations in the representative body, wh ch biennial 
 elections would naturally produce in both houe .s Is it pre- 
 sumable, that every man, the instant he t'>ok lifj seat in the 
 national senate, or house of representatives would commence a 
 traitor to his constituents, and to his count.'y ? Can it be sup- 
 posed, that there would not be found one man, discerning enough 
 to detact so atrocious a conspiracy, or bold or honest enough to 
 apprise his constituents of their danger.? If su«jh presumptions 
 can fairly be made, there ought at once to be an end of all dele- 
 gated authority. The people should resolve to recal all the 
 powers they have heretofore parted with ; and to divide them- 
 selves into as many states as there are counties, in order that 
 they may be able to manage their own concerns in person. 
 
 If such suppositions could even be reasonably made, still the 
 concealment of the design, for any duration, would be imprac- 
 ticable. It would be announced, by the very circumstance of 
 augmenting the army to so great an extent, in time of profound 
 peace. "What colourable reason could be assigned, in a country 
 so situated, for such vast augmentations of the military force ? 
 It is impossible that the people could be long deceived ; and the 
 destruction of the project, and of the projectors, would quickly 
 follow the discovery 
 
 It has been said, that the provision, which limits the appro- 
 priation of money for the support of an army to the period of 
 two years, would be unavailing; because the executive, when 
 once possessed of a force large enough to awe the people into 
 submission, would find resources in that very force, sufficient to 
 enable him to dispense with supplies from the votes of the legis- 
 lature. But the question again recurs: Upon what pretence 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 219 
 
 could he be put in possession of a force of that magnitude, in 
 time of peace ? If we suppose it to have been created in con- 
 sequence of some domestic insurrection or foreign war, then it 
 becomes a case not within the principle of the objection ; for 
 this is levelled against the power of keeping up troops in time 
 of peace. Few persons will be so visionary, as seriously to con- 
 tend that military forces ought not to be raised to quell a 
 rebellion, or resist an invasion ; and if the defence of the com- 
 munity, under such circumstances, should make it necessary to 
 have an army, so numerous as to hazard its liberty, this is one 
 of those calamities for which there is neither preventative nor 
 cure. It cannot be provided against, by any possible form of 
 government : It might even result from a simple league offensive 
 and defensive ; if it should ever be necessary for the confederates 
 or allies, to form an army for common defence. 
 
 But it is an evil infinitely less likely to attend us in an 
 united, than in a disunited state; nay, it may be safely a.sserted, 
 that it is an evil altogether unlikely to attend us in the latter 
 situation. It is not easy to conceive a possibility, that dangers 
 so formidable can assail the whole union, as to demand a force 
 considerable enough to place our liberties in the least jeopardy, 
 especially if we take into view the aid to be derived from the 
 militia, which ought always to be counted upon, as a valuable 
 and powerful auxiliary. But in a state of disunion, as has been 
 fully shown in another place, the contrary of this supposition would 
 become not only probable, but almost unavoidable. 
 
 PUBLIUS 
 
220 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 NUMBER XXVII. 
 
 NEW YORK, DECEMBER 26, 1787. 
 
 HAMILTON. 
 
 THE SUBJECT CONTINUED, WITH THE SAME VIEW. 
 
 It has been urged, in different shapes, that a constitution of 
 the kind proposed by the convention, cannot operate, without 
 the aid of a military force to execute its laws. This, however, 
 like most other things that have been alleged on that side, rests 
 on mere general assertion, unsupported by any precise or intel- 
 ligible designation of the reasons upon which it is founded. As 
 far as I have been able to divine the latent meaning of the 
 objectors, it seems to originate in a pre-supposition, that the 
 people will be disinclined to the exercise of federal authority, 
 in any matter of an internal nature. Waving any exception 
 that might be taken to the inaccuracy, or inexplicitness, of the 
 distinction between internal and external, let us inquire what 
 ground there is to pre-suppose that disinclination in the people. 
 Unless we presume, at the same time, that the powers of the 
 general government will be worse administered than those of 
 the state governments, there seems to be no room for the pre- 
 sumption of ill will, disaffection, or opposition in the people. 
 I believe it may be laid down as a general rule, that their confi- 
 dence in, and their obedience to, a government, will commonly 
 be proportioned to the goodness or badness of its administration 
 It must b admitted, that there are exceptions to this rule ; but 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 221 
 
 these exceptions depend so entirely on accidental causes, that 
 they cannot be considered as having any relation to the intrinsic 
 merits or demerits of a constitution. These can only be judged 
 of by general principles and maxims. 
 
 Various reasons have been suggested, in the course of tliese 
 papers, to induce a probability, that the general government 
 will be better administered, than the particular governments; 
 the principal of which are, that the extension of the spheres of 
 election will present a^reater option, or latitude of choice, to the 
 people; that, through the medium of the state legislatures, who 
 are select bodies of men, and who are to appoint the members 
 of the national senate, there is reason to expect, that this branch 
 will generally be composed with peculiar care and judgment; 
 that these circumstances promise greater knowledge, and more 
 comprehensive information, in the national councils; and that, 
 on account of the extent of the country from which will be 
 drawn those to whose direction they will be committed, they 
 will be less apt to be tainted by the spirit of faction, and more 
 out of the reach of those occasional ill humours, or temporary 
 prejudices and propensities, which, in smaller societies, frequently 
 contaminate the public deliberations, beget injustice and oppres- 
 sion towards a part of the community, and engender schemes, 
 which, though they gratify a momentary inclination or desire, 
 terminate in general distress, dissatisfaction, and disgust. Seve- 
 ral additional reasons of considerable force, will occur, to fortify 
 that probability, when we come to survey, with a more critical 
 eye, the interior structure of the edifice which we are invited to 
 erect. It will be suflScient here to remark, that, until satisfac- 
 tory reasons can be assigned to justify an opinion, that the 
 federal government is likely to be administered in such a manner, 
 as to render it odious or contemptible to the people, there can 
 be no reasonable foundation for the supposition, that the laws of 
 the union will meet with any greater obstruction from them, or 
 will stand in need of any other methods to enforce their execu- 
 tion, than the laws of the particular members. 
 
 The hope of impunity, is a strong incitement to sedition ; tb« 
 
1522 THE FEDEll VLIST. 
 
 dread of punishment, a projiortionably strong discouragement 
 10 it. W ill not the government of the union, which, if possessed 
 of a due degree of power, 2an call to its aid the collective 
 resources of the whole confederacy, be more likely to repress 
 the former sentiment, and to inspire the latter, than that of a 
 single state, which can only command the resources within 
 itself? A turbulent faction in a state, may easily suppose itself 
 able to contend with the friends to the government in that state; 
 but it can hardly be so infatuated, as to ipiagine itself equal to 
 the combined efforts of the union. If this reflection be just, 
 there is less danger of resistance from irregular combinations 
 of individuals, to the authority of the confederacy, than to that 
 of a single member. 
 
 I will, in the first place, hazard an observation, which will not 
 be the less just, because to some it may appear new; which is, 
 that the more the operations of the national authority are inter- 
 mingled in the ordinary exercise of government, the more the 
 citizens are accustomed to meet with it in the common occur- 
 rences of their poliiical life; the more it is familiarized to their 
 sight, and to their feelings; the further it enters into those 
 objects, which touch the most sensible cords, and put in motion 
 the most active springs of the human heart; the greater will 
 be the probability, that it will conciliate the respect and attach- 
 ment of the community. Man is very much a creature of habit. 
 A thing that rarely strikes his senses, will have but a transient 
 influence upon his mind. A. government continually at a dis- 
 tance and out of sight, can hardly be expected to interest the 
 sensations of the people. The inference is, that the authority 
 of the union, and the affections of the citizens towards it, will 
 be strengthened, rather than weakened, by its extension to what 
 are called matters of internal concern; and thait it will have less 
 occasion to recur to force, in proportion to the familiarity and 
 comprehensiveness of its agency. The more it circulates through 
 those channels and currents, in which the passions of mankind natu- 
 rally flow, the less will it require the aid of the violent and perilous 
 expedients of compulsion. 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 223 
 
 Une thing, at all events, must be evident, that a government 
 like the one proposed, would bid much fairer to avoid the neces- 
 Bity of using ."'^rce, than the species of league contended for by 
 most of its opponents; the authority of which should only ope- 
 rate upon the states in their political or collective capacities. It 
 has been shown, that in such a confederacy, there can be no 
 sanction for the laws but force; that frequent delinquencies in 
 the members, are the natural offspring of the very frame of the 
 government; and that as often as these happen, they can only 
 be redressed, if at all, by war auc' violence. 
 
 The plan reported by the couvention, by extending the 
 authority of the federal head to the individual citizens of the 
 several states, will enable the government to employ the ordi- 
 nary magistracy of each, in the execution of its laws. It is 
 easy to perceive, that this will tend to destroy, in the common 
 apprehension, all distinction between the sources from which 
 they might proceed; and will give the federal government the 
 same advantage for securing a due obedience to its authority, 
 which is enjoyed by the government of each state; in addition 
 to the influence on public opinion, which will result from the 
 important consideration, of its having power to call to its assist- 
 ance and support the resources of the whole union. It merits 
 particular attention in this place, that the laws of the con- 
 federacy, as to the enumerated and legitimate objects of its juris- 
 diction, will become the supreme law of the land; to the ob- 
 servance of which, all officers, legislative, executive, and judicial, 
 in each state, will be bound by the sanctity of an oath. Thus 
 the legislatures, courts, and magistrates, of the respective mem- 
 bers, will be incorporated into the operations of the national 
 government, as far as its just and constitutional authority extends ; 
 and will be rendered auxiliary to the enforcement of its laws.* 
 Any man, who will pursue, by his own reflections, the conse- 
 quences of this situation, will perceive, that if its powers are 
 administered with a common share of prudence, there is good 
 
 * The sophistry which has been employed, to show tlmt this will tend to the 
 destruction of the state governments will, in its proper place, be fully detected. 
 
224 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 ground to calculate upon a regular and peaceable execution of 
 the laws of the union. If we will arbitrarily suppose the con- 
 trary, we may deduce any inferences we please from the suppo- 
 sition; for it is certainly possible, by an injudicious exercise of 
 the authorities of the best government that ever was, or ever 
 can be instituted, to provoke and precipitate the people into the 
 wildest excesses. But though the adversaries of the proposed 
 constitution should presume, that the national rulers would be 
 insensible to the motives of public good, or to the obligations of 
 duty; I would still ask them, how the irterests of ambition, or 
 the views of encroachment, can be promo ^d by such a conduct ? 
 
 PUBLIUS. 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 225 
 
 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 NUMBER XXVIII. 
 
 NEW YORK, DECEMBER 26, 1787. 
 
 HAMILTON. 
 
 THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED. 
 
 That there may happen eases, in which the national govern- 
 ment may be under the necessity of resorting to force, cannot 
 be denied. Our own experience has corroborated the lessons 
 taught by the examples of other nations; that emergencies of 
 this sort will sometimes exist in all societies, however con- 
 stituted ; that seditions and insurrections are, unhappily, mala- 
 dies as inseparable from the body politic, as tumours and erup- 
 tions from the natural body ; that the idea of governing at all 
 times by the simple force of law, (which we have been told is the 
 only admissible principle of republican government) has no place 
 but in the reveries of those political doctors, whose sagacity disdains 
 the admonitions of experimental instruction. 
 
 Should such emergencies at any time happen under the 
 national government, there could be no remedy but force. The 
 means to be employed, must be proportioned to the extent of 
 the mischief. If it should be a slight commotion in a small part 
 of a state, the militia of the residue would be adequate to its 
 suppression : and the natural presumption is, that they would 
 be ready to do their duty. An insurrection, whatever may be 
 its immediate cause, eventually endangers all government: Re- 
 gard to the public peace, if not to the rights of the union, would 
 
226 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 engage the ci izens, to whom the contagion had not ^l"ommuni- 
 cated itself, to oppose the insurgents : And if the general gov- 
 ernment should be found in practice conducive to the prosperity 
 and felicity of the people, it were irrational to believe that they 
 would be disinclined to its support. 
 
 If, on the contrary, the insurrection should pervade a whole 
 state, or a principal part of it, the employment of a different 
 kind of force might become unavoidable. It appears that Mas- 
 sachusetts found it necessary to raise troops for suppressing the 
 disorders within that state; that Pennsylvania, from the mere 
 apprehension of commotions among a part of her citizens, has 
 thought proper to have recourse to the same measure. Suppose 
 the state of New- York had been inclined to re-establish her lost 
 jurisdiction over the inhabitants of Vermont; could she have 
 hoped for success in such an enterprise, from the efforts of the 
 militia alone ? Would she not have been compelled to raise, and 
 to maintain, a more regular force for the execution of her de- 
 sign ? If it must then be admitted, that the necessity of recur- 
 ring to a force different from the militia, in cases of this extra- 
 ordinary nature, is applicable to the state governments them- 
 selves, why should the possibility, that the national government 
 might be under a like necessity in similar extremities, be made 
 an objection to its existence? Is it not surprising that men, 
 who declare an attachment to the union in the abstract, should 
 urge, as an objection to the proposed constitution, what applies 
 with ten-fold weight to the plan for which they contend; and 
 what, as far as it has any foundation in truth, is an inevitable 
 consequence of civil society upon an enlarged scale ? who would 
 not prefer that possibility, to the unceasing agitations, and fre- 
 quent revolutions, which are the continual scourges of petty 
 republics ? 
 
 Let us pursue this examination m another light. Suppose, in 
 lieu of one general system, two cr three, or even four confede- 
 racies were to be formed, would not the same diflSculty oppose 
 itself to the operations of either of these confederacies? Would 
 not each of them be exposed to the same casualties; and, when 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 'ITi 
 
 these happened, be obliged to have recourse to the same expe- 
 dients for upholding its authority, which are objected to a govern- 
 ment for all the states? Would the militia, in this supposition, be 
 more ready or more able to support the federal authority, than in 
 the case of a general union? All candid and intelligent men 
 must, upon due consideration, acknowledge that the principle of 
 the objection is equally applicable to either of the two cases; and 
 that whether we have one government for all the states, or 
 different governments for different parcels of them, or as man}- 
 unconnected governments as there are stat^, there might some- 
 times be a necessity, to make use of a force constituted differ- 
 ently from the militia, to preserve the peace of the community, 
 and to maintain the just authority of the laws against those 
 violent invasions of them, which amount to insurrections and 
 rebellions. 
 
 Independent of all other reasonings upon the subject, it is a 
 full answer to those who require a more peremptory provision 
 against military establishments in time of peace, to say, that 
 the whole power of the proposed government is to be in the 
 hands of the representatives of the people. This is the essential, 
 and, after all, the only eflScacious security for the rights and privi- 
 leges of the people, which is attainable in civil society.* 
 
 If the representatives of the people betray their constituents, 
 there is then no resource left but in the exertion of that original 
 right of self-defence, which is paramount to all positive forms of 
 government; and which, against the usurpation of the national 
 rulers, may be exerted with an infinitely better prospect of 
 success, than against those of the rulers of an individual state. 
 In a single state, if the persons intrusted with supreme power 
 become usurpers, the different parcels, subdivisions, or districts, 
 of which it consists, having no distinct government in each, can 
 take no regular measures for defence. The citizens must rush 
 tumultuously to arms, without concert, without system, without 
 resource; except in their courage and despair. The usurpers 
 
 * Its full efficacy will be rxamined hereafter. 
 
22>5 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 cloathed with the forms of legal authority, can too often crush 
 the opposition in embryo. The smaller the extent of territory 
 the more difficult will it be for the people to form a regular, or 
 syistematic plan of opposition ; and the more easy will it be to 
 defeat their early efforts. Intelligence can be more speedily 
 obtained of their preparations and movements ; and the military 
 force in the possession of the usurpers, can be more rapidly 
 directed against the part where the opposition has begun. In 
 this situation, there must be a peculiar coincidence of circum- 
 stances, to ensure subcess to the popular resistance. 
 
 The obstacles to usurpation, and the facilities of resistance, 
 increase with the increased extent of the state; provided the 
 citizens understand their rights, and are disposed to defend 
 them. The natural strength of the people in a large commu- 
 nity, in proportion to the artificial strength of the government, 
 is greater than in a small ; and of course more competent to a 
 struggle with the attempts of the government to establish a 
 tyranny. But in a confederacy, the people, without exaggera- 
 tion, may be said to be entirely the masters of their own fate. 
 Power being almost always the rival of power; the general 
 government will, at all times, stand ready to check the usurpa- 
 tions of the state governments ; and these will have the same 
 disposition towards the general government. The people, by 
 throwing themselves into either scale, will infallibly make it 
 preponderate. If their rights are invaded by either, they can 
 make use of the other, as the instrument of redress. How wise 
 will it be in them, by cherishing the union, to preserve to them- 
 selves an advantage which can never be too highly prized ! 
 
 It may safely be received as an axiom in our political system, 
 that the state governments will, in all possible contingencies, 
 afford complete security against invasions of the public liberty 
 by the national authority. Projects of usurpation, cannot be 
 masked under pretences, so likely to escape the penetration of 
 select bodies of men, as of the people at large. The legislatures 
 will have better means of information, they can discover the 
 danger at a distance; and possessing all the organ? of civil 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 229 
 
 [lower, and the confidence of the people, they can at onco adopt 
 a regular plan of opposition, in which they can combine all the 
 resources of the community. They can readily communicate 
 Hith each other in the different states; and unite their common 
 . forces, for the protection of their common liberty. 
 
 The great extent of the country, is a further security. "We 
 have already experienced its utility, against the attacks of a 
 foreign enemy. And it would have precisely the same effect 
 against the enterprises of ambitious rulers in the national 
 councils. If the federal army should be able to quell the re- 
 sistance of one state, the distant states would have it in their 
 power to make head with fresh forces. The advantages ob- 
 tained in one place must be abandoned, to subdue the opposition 
 in others ; and the moment the part which had been reduced to 
 submission was left to itself, its efforts would be renewed, and 
 its resistance revive. 
 
 We should recollect, that the extent of the military force, 
 must, at all events, be regulated by the resources of the country. 
 For a long time to come, it will not be possible to maintain a 
 large army ; and as the means of doing this, increase, the popu- 
 lation, and the natural strength of the community will propor- 
 tionably increase. When will the time arrive, that the federal 
 government can raise and maintain an army capable of erecting 
 a despotism over the great body of the people of an immense 
 empire; who are in a situation, through the medium of their 
 state governments, to take measures for their own defence with 
 all the celerity, regularity, and system, of independent nations ? 
 The apprehension may be considered as a disease, for which 
 there can be found lo cure in the resr/urces of argument and 
 reasoning 
 
 PUBLIUS 
 
280 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 NUMBER XXIX. 
 
 NEW YORK, JANUARY 11, 1788. 
 
 HAMILTON. 
 
 CONCERNING THE MILITIA. 
 
 The power of regulating the militia, and of commanding itf» 
 nervices in times of insurrection and invasion, are natural inci- 
 dents to the duties of superintending the common defence, and 
 of watching over the internal peace of the confederacy. 
 
 It requires no skill in the science of war to discern, that uni- 
 formity in the organization and discipline of the militia, would 
 be attended with the most beneficial effects, whenever they 
 were called into service for the public defence. It would enable 
 them to discharge the duties of the camp, and of the field, with 
 mutual intelligence and concert; an advantage of peculiar 
 moment in the operations of an army ; And it would fit them 
 much sooner to acquire the degree of proficiency in military 
 functions, which would be essential to their usefulness. This 
 desirable uniformity can only be accomplished, by confiding the 
 regulation of the militia, to the direction of the national author- 
 ity. It is therefore with the most evident propriety, that the 
 plan of the convention proposes to empower the union " to pro- 
 vide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia, and for 
 governing such part of them as may be employed in the service 
 of the United States, reserving to the states respectively the appoint 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 231 
 
 nerd of the officers, and the authority of training the militia accord- 
 ing to the discipline prescribed by Congress." 
 
 Of the different grounds, which have been taken in oppopition 
 to this plan, there is Hone that was so little to have been ex- 
 pected, or is so untenable in itself, as the one from which this 
 particular provision has been attacked. If a well regulated 
 militia be the most natural defence of a free country, it ought 
 certainly to be under the regulation, and at the disposal of that 
 body, which is constituted the guardian of the national security. 
 If standing armies are dangerous to liberty, an efficacious power 
 over the militia, in the same body, ought, as far as possible, to 
 take away the inducement and the pretext, to such unfriendly 
 institutions. If the federal government can command the aid 
 of the militia in those emergencies, which call for the military 
 arm in support of the civil magistrate, it can the better dispense 
 with the employment of a different kind of force. If it cannot 
 avail itself of the former, it will be obliged to recur to the latter. 
 To render an army unnecessary, will be a more certain method 
 of preventing its existence, than a thousand prohibitions upon 
 paper. 
 
 In order to cast an odium upon the power of calling forth the 
 militia to execute the laws of the union, it has been remarked, 
 that there is no where any provision in the proposed constitu- 
 tion for requiring the aid of the posse comitatus, to assist the 
 magistrate in the execution of his duty; whence it has been 
 inferred, that military force was intended to be his only auxi- 
 liarJ^ There is a striking incoherence in the objections which 
 have appeared, and sometimes even from the same quarter, not 
 much calculated to inspire a very favourable opinion of the 
 sincerity or fair dealing of their authors. The same persons 
 who tell us in one breath, that the powers of the federal gov- 
 ernment will be despotic and unlimited, inform us in the next, 
 that it has not authority sufficient even to call out the posse 
 COMITATUS. The latter, fortunately, is as much short of the 
 truth, as the former exceeds it. It would be as absurd to doubt, 
 *hat a right to pass all laws necessary and proper to execute its 
 
232 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 declared powers, would include that of requiring the assistance 
 of the citizens to the oflficers who may be intrusted with the 
 execution of those laws ; as it would be to believe, that a right 
 to enact laws necessary and proper for the imposition and col- 
 lection of taxes, would involve that of varying the rules of 
 descent, and of the alienation of landed property, or of abolish- 
 ing the trial by jury in cases relating to it. It being therefore 
 evident, that the supposition of a want of power to require the 
 aid of the posse comitatus is entirely destitute of colour, it will 
 follow, that the conclusion which has been drawn from it, in its 
 application to the authority of the federal government over the 
 militia, is as uncandid, as it is illogical. Wha-t reason could 
 there be to infer, that force was intended to be the sole instru- 
 ment of authority, merely because there is a power to make use 
 of it when necessary ? What shall we think of the motives 
 which could induce men of sense to reason in this extraordinar}' 
 manner ? How shall we prevent a conflict between charity and 
 conviction ? 
 
 By a curious refinement upon the spirit of republican jealousy, 
 we are even taught to apprehend danger from the militia itself, 
 in the hands of the federal government. It is observed, that 
 select corps may be formed, composed of the young and the 
 ardent, who may be rendered subservient to the views of arbi- 
 trary power. "What plan for the regulation of the militia, may 
 be pursued by the national government, is impossible to be fore- 
 seen. But so far from viewing the matter in the same light 
 with those who object to select corps as dangerous, were the 
 constitution ratified, and were I to deliver my sentiments to a 
 member of the federal legislature on the subject of a militia 
 establishment, I should hold to him in substance the following 
 discourse: 
 
 " The project of disciplining all the militia of the United 
 States, is as futile as it would be injurious, if it were capable of 
 being carried into execution. A tolerable expertness in military 
 movements, is a business that requires time and practice. It is 
 not a day, nor a week, nor even a month that will suffice foi <Jie 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 233 
 
 attainment of it. To oblige the great body of the yeomanry, 
 and of the other classes of the citizens, to be under arms for the 
 purpose of going through m'litary exercises and evolutions, as 
 often as might be necessary, to acquire the degree of perfection 
 which would entitle them ',o the character of a well regulated 
 militia, would be a real grievance to the people, and a serious 
 public inconvenience and loss. It would form an annual deduc- 
 tion from the productive labour of the country, to an amount, 
 which, calculating upon the present numbers of the people, would 
 not fall far short of a million of pounds. To attempt a thing 
 which would abridge the mass of labour and industry to so con- 
 siderable an extent, would be unwise ; and the experiment, if 
 made, could not succeed, because it would not long be endured. 
 Little more can reasonably be aimed at, with respect to the 
 people at large, than to have them properly armed and 
 equipped ; and in order to see that this be not neglected, it 
 will be necessary to assemble them once or twice in the course 
 of a year. 
 
 " But, though the scheme of disciplining the whole nation must 
 be abandoned as mischievous or impracticable; yet it is a matter 
 of the utmost importance, that a well digested plan should, as 
 soon as possible, be adopted for the proper establishment of the 
 militia. The attention of the government ought particularly 
 to be directed to the formation of a select corps of moderate 
 size, upon such principles as will really fit it for service in case 
 of need. By thus circumscribing the plan, it will be possible to 
 have an excellent body of well trained militia, ready to take the 
 field whenever the defence of the state shall require it. This 
 will not only lessen the call for military establishments; but if 
 circumstances should at any time oblige the government to form 
 an army of any magnitude, that army can never be formidable 
 to the liberties of the people, while there is a large body of 
 citizens, little, if at all, inferior to them in discipline and the use 
 of arms, who stand ready to defend their own rights, and those 
 of their fellow citizens. This appears to me the only substitute 
 
284 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 that can be devised for a standing army ; and the best possible 
 security against it, if it should exist." 
 
 Thus differently from the adversaries of the proposed constitu- 
 tion should I reason on the same subject ; deducing arguments 
 of safety, from the very sources which they represent as fraught 
 with danger and perdition. But how the national legislature 
 may reason on the point, is a thing which neither they nor I can 
 foresee. 
 
 There is something so far fetched, and so extravagant, in the 
 idea of danger to liberty from the militia, that one is at a loss 
 whether to treat it with gravity or with raillery ; whether to 
 consider it as a mere trial of skill, like the paradoxes of rheto- 
 ricians; as a disingenuous artifice, to instil prejudices at any 
 price ; or as the serious offspring of political fanaticism. Where, 
 in the name of common sense, are our fears to end, if we may 
 not trust our sons, our brothers, our neighbours, our fellow 
 citizens ? What shadow of danger can there be from men, who 
 are daily mingling with the rest of their countrymen; and who 
 participate with them in the same feelings, sentiments, habits 
 and interests? What reasonable cause of apprehension can be 
 inferred from a power in the union to prescribe regulations for 
 the militia, and to command its services when necessary; while 
 the particular states are to have the sole and exclusive appointment 
 of the officers f If it were possible seriously to indulge a jealousy 
 of the militia, upon any conceivable establishment under the 
 federal government, the circumstance of the officers being in the 
 appointment of the states, ought at once to extinguish it. There 
 can be no doubt, that this circumstance will always secure to 
 them a preponderating influence over the militia. 
 
 In reading many of the publications against the constitution, 
 a man is apt to imagine that he is perusing some ill written tale 
 or romance; which, instead of natural and agreeable images, 
 exhibits to the mind nothing but frightful and distorted shapes — 
 
 "Gorgona, Hydras, and Chimeras dire;" 
 
 discolouring and disfiguring whatever it represents, and trans- 
 forming every thing it touches into a monster. 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 235 
 
 A sample of this is to be observed in the exaggerated and 
 improbable suggestions, which have taken place respecting the 
 power of calling for the services of the militia. That of New- 
 Hampshire is to be marched to Georgia, of Georgia to New- 
 Ilampshire, of New-York to Kentucky, and of Kentucky to Lake 
 Chamijlain. •Nay, the debts due to the French and Dutch, are 
 to be paid in militia-men, instead of Louis d'ors and ducats. At 
 one moment, there is to be a large army to lay prostrate the 
 liberties of the people; at another moment, the militia of Vir- 
 ginia are to be dragged from their homes, five or six hundred 
 miles, to tame the republican contumacy of Massachusetts ; and 
 that of Massachusetts is to be transported an equal distance, to 
 subdue the refractory haughtiness of the aristocratic Virginians. 
 Do the persons, who rave at this rate, imagine, that their art or 
 their eloquence can impose any conceits or absurdities upon the 
 people of America for infallible truths ? 
 
 If there should be an army to be made use of as the engine 
 of despotism, what need of the militia? If there should be no 
 army, whither would the militia, irritated at being required to 
 undertake a distant and distressing expedition, for the purpose 
 of rivetting the chains of slavery upon a part of their country- 
 men, direct their course, but to the seat of the tyrants, who had 
 meditated so foolish, as well as so wicked a project; to crush 
 them in their imagined entrenchments of power, and make 
 them an example of the just vengeance of an abused and 
 incensed people ? Is this the way in which usurpers stride to 
 dominion over a numerous and enlightened nation ? Do they 
 begin by exciting the detestation of the very instruments of 
 their intended usurpations ? Do they usually commence their 
 career by wanton and disgustful acts of power, calculated to 
 answer no end, but to draw upon themselves universal hatred 
 and execration ? Are suppositions of this sort, the sober admo- 
 nitions of discerning patriots to a discerning people ? Or are 
 they the inflammatory ravings of chagrined incendiaries, or dis- 
 tempered enthusiasts ? If we were even to suppose the national 
 rulers actuated by the most ungovernable ambition, it is impos- 
 
 26 
 
236 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 siblc to believe that they would employ such preposterous means 
 to accomplish their designs. 
 
 In times of insurrection, or invasion, it would be natural and 
 proper, that the militia of a neighbouring state should be 
 marched into another, to resist a common enemy, or to guard 
 the republic against the violences of faction or sedition. This 
 was frequently the case, in respect to the first object, in the 
 course of the late war; and this mutual succour is, indeed, a 
 principal end of our political association. If the power of afi'ord- 
 ing it be placed under the direction of the union, there will be 
 no danger of a supine and listless inattention to the dangers 
 of a neighbour, till its near approach had superadded the incite- 
 ments of self-preservation, to the too feeble impulses of duty 
 and sympathy. 
 
 PUBLILS 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 237 
 
 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 NUMBER XXX. 
 
 NEW YORK, DECEMBER 29, 1787, 
 
 HAMILTON. 
 
 CONCERNING TAXATION. 
 
 It has been already observed, that the federal governmeut 
 ought to possess the power of providing for the support of the 
 national forces; in which proposition was intended to be includea 
 the expense of raising troops, of building and equipping fleets, 
 and all other expenses in any wise connected with military 
 arrangements and operations. But these are not the only objects 
 to which the jurisdiction of the union, in respect to revenue, 
 must necessarily be impowered to extend. It must embrace a 
 provision for the support of the national civil list ; for the pay- 
 ment of the national debts contracted, or that may be contracted ; 
 and, in general, for all those matters which will call for disburse- 
 ments out of the national treasury. The conclusion is, that 
 there must be interwoven in the frame of the government, a 
 general power of taxation in one shape or another. 
 
 Money is with propriety considered as the vital principle ot 
 the body politic; as that which sustains its life and motion, and 
 enables it to perform its most essential functions. A complete 
 power, therefore, to procure a regular and adequate supply of 
 revenue, as far as the resources of the community will permit 
 may bo regarded as an indispensable inscredient in every consti- 
 tution. From a deficiency in this particular, one of two evils 
 
238 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 must ensue, either the people must be subjected to continual 
 plunder, as a substitute for a naore eligible mode of supplying 
 the public wants, or the government must sink into a fatal 
 atrophy, and in a short course of time perish. 
 
 In the Ottoman or Turkish empire, the sovereign, though in 
 other respects absolute master of the lives and fortunes of his 
 subjects, has no right to impose a new tax. The consequence 
 is, that he permits the bashaws or governors of provinces to 
 pillage the people at discretion ; and, in turn, squeezes out of 
 them the sums of which he stands in need, to satisfy his own 
 exigencies, and those of the state. In America, from a like 
 cause, the government of the union has gradually dwindled into 
 a state of decay, approaching nearly to annihilation. Who can 
 doubt, that the happiness of the people in both countries would 
 be promoted by competent authorities in the proper hands, to 
 provide the revenues which the necessities of the public might 
 require ? 
 
 The present confederation, feeble as it is, intended to repose 
 in the United States, an unlimited power of providing for the 
 pecuniary wants of the union. But proceeding upon an erro- 
 neous principle, it has been done in such a manner, as entirely 
 to have frustrated the intention. Congress, by the articles 
 which compose that compact (as has been already stated) are 
 authorized to ascertain and call for any sums of money neces- 
 sary, in their judgment, to the service of the United States; and 
 their requisitions, if conformable to the rule of apportionment, 
 are, in every constitutional sense, obligatory upon the states. 
 These have no right to question the propriety of the demand : 
 no discretion beyond that of devising the ways and means of 
 furnishing the sums demanded. But though this be strictly and 
 truly the case ; though the assumption of such a right would be 
 an infringement of the articles of union : though it may seldom 
 or never have been avowedly claimed; yet in practice it has 
 bcQn constantly exercised, and would continue to be so, as long 
 as the revenues of the confederacy should remain dependent on 
 the intermediate agency of its members. What the consequences 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 239 
 
 of the system have been, is within the knowledge of every man, 
 the least conversant in our public affairs, and has been abun 
 dantly unfolded in different parts of these inquiries. It is this 
 which has chiefly contributed to reduce us to a situation, that 
 affords ample cause of mortification to ourselves, and of triumph 
 to our enemies. 
 
 What remedy can there be for this situation, but in a change 
 of the system, which has produced it ? in a change of the falla- 
 cious and delusive system of quotas and requisitions ? What 
 substitute can there be imagined for this ignis fatuus in finance, 
 but that of permitting the national government to raise its own 
 revenues by the ordinary methods of taxation, authorized in 
 every well ordered constitution of civil government? Ingenious 
 men may declaim with plausibility on any subject; but no human 
 ingenuity can point out any other expedient to rescue us from 
 the inconveniences and embarrassments, naturally resulting from 
 defective supplies of the public treasury. 
 
 The more intelligent adversaries of the new constitution, 
 admit the force of this reasoning ; but they qualify their admis- 
 sion, by a distinction between what they call internal, and ex- 
 ternal taxations. The former they would reserve to the state 
 governments; the latter, which they explain into commercial 
 imposts, or rather duties on imported articles, they declare 
 themselves willing to concede to the federal head. This dis- 
 tinction, however, would violate that fundamental maxim of 
 good sense and sound policy, which dictates that every power 
 ought to be proportionate to its object ; and would still leave 
 the general government in a kind of tutelage to the state gov 
 ernments, inconsistent with every idea of vigour or efficiency. 
 Who can pretend that commercial imposts are, or would be, 
 alone equal to the present and future exigencies of the union ? 
 Taking into the account the existing debt, foreign and domestic, 
 upon any plan of extinguishment, which a man, moderately im- 
 pressed with the importance of pubUc justice and public credit 
 could approve, in addition to the establishments, which all 
 oarties will acknowledge to be necessary, we could not reasoo'i 
 
240 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 ably il^iiter ourselves, that this resource alone, upon the most 
 improved scale, would even suffice for its present necessities. 
 Its future necessities admit not of calculation or limitation; and 
 upon the principle more than once adverted to, the power of 
 making provision for them as they arise, ought to be equally 
 unconjSned. I believe it may be regarded as a position, war- 
 ranted by the history of mankind, that in the usual progress of 
 things, the necessities of a nation, in every stage of its eocistence, will 
 be found at least equal to its resources. 
 
 To say that deficiencies may be provided for by requisitions 
 upon the states, is on the one hand to acknowledge that this 
 system cannot be depended upon; and on the other hand, to 
 depend upon it for every thing beyond a certain limit. Those 
 who have carefully attended to its vices and deformities, as they 
 have been exhibited by experience, or delineated in the course 
 ot these papers, must feel an invincible repugnancy to trusting 
 the national interests, in any degree, to its operation. When- 
 ever it is brought into activity, its inevitable tendency, must be 
 to enfeeble the union, and sow the seeds of discord and conten- 
 tion between the federal head and its members, and between the 
 members themselves. Can it be expected that the deficiencies 
 would be better supplied in this mode, than the total wants of 
 the union have heretofore been supplied, in the same mode .' It 
 ought to be recollected, that if less will be required from the 
 states, they will have proportionably less means to answer the 
 demand. If the opinions of those who contend for the distinc- 
 tion which has been mentioned, were to be received as evidence 
 of truth, one would be led to conclude, that there was some 
 known point in the economy of national affairs, at which it 
 would be safe to stop, and to say: Thus far, the ends of public 
 happiness will be promoted by supplying the wants of govern- 
 ment, and all beyond this is unworthy of our care or anxiety 
 How is it possible that a government, half supplied and always 
 necessitous, can fulfil the purposes of its institution ; can pro 
 vide for the security, advance the prosperity, or support the 
 reputation of the commonwealth ? How can it ever possess 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 241 
 
 either energy or stability, dignity or credit, confidence at home, 
 or respectability abroad ? How can its administration be any 
 thing else than a succession of expedients temporizing, impotent, 
 disgraceful ? How will it be able to avoid a frequent sacrifice 
 of its engagements to immediate necessity ? How can it under- 
 take or execute any liberal or enlarged plans of public good ? 
 
 Let us attend to what would be the effects of this situation, 
 in the very first war in which we should happen to be engaged. 
 We will presume, for argument sake, that the revenue arising 
 from the import duties answers the purposes of a provision for 
 the public debt, and of a peace establishment for the union. Thus 
 circumstanced, a war breaks out. What would be the probable 
 conduct of the government in such an emergency ? Taught by 
 experience, that proper dependence could not be placed on the 
 success of requisitions; unable, by its own authority, to lay hold 
 of fresh resources, and urged by considerations of national 
 danger, would it not be driven to the expedient of diverting 
 the funds already appropriated, from their proper objects, to 
 the defence of the state ? It is not easy to see how a step of this 
 kind could be avoided; and if it should be taken, it is evident 
 that it would prove the destruction of public credit at the very 
 moment that it was become essential to the public safety. To 
 imagine that at such a crisis credit might be dispensed with, 
 would be the extreme of infatuation. In the modern system of 
 war, nations the most wealthy, are obliged to have recourse to 
 large loans. A country so little opulent as ours, must feel this 
 necessity in a much stronger degree. But who would lend to a 
 government, that prefaced its overtures for borrowing, by an 
 act which demonstrated that no reliance could be placed on 
 the steadiness of its measures for paying ? The loans it might 
 be able to procure, would be as limited in their extent, as 
 burthensome in their conditions. They would be made upon 
 the same principles that usurers commonly lend to bankrupt 
 and fraudulent debtors — with a sparing hand, and at enormous 
 premiums 
 
 Ii may perhaps be imagined, that from the scantiness ot the 
 
242 THE FEDERALIST, 
 
 resources of the country, the necessity of diverting the esta- 
 blished funds in the case supposed, would exist; though the 
 national government should possess an unrestrained power of 
 taxation. But two considerations will serve to quiet all ap- 
 prehensions on this head; one is, that we are sure the resources 
 of the community in their full extent, will be brought into 
 activity for the benefit of the union ; the other is, that whatever 
 deficiencies there may be, can without difficulty be supplied by 
 loans. 
 
 The power of creating by its own authority, new funds from 
 new objects of taxation, would enable the national government 
 to borrow, as far as its necessities might require. Foreigners, 
 as well as the citizens of America, could then reasonably repose 
 confidence in its engagements; but to depend upon a govern- 
 ment, that must itself depend upon thirteen other governments, 
 for the means of fulfilling its contracts, when once its situation 
 is clearly understood, would require a degree of credulity, not 
 often to be met with in the pecuniary transactions of mankind, 
 and little reconcileable with the usual sharp-sightedness of 
 avarice. 
 
 Eeflections of this kind may have trifling weight with men, 
 who hope to see the halcyon scenes of the poetic or fabulous age 
 realized in America ; but to those who believe we are likely to 
 experience a common portion of the vicissitudes and calamities, 
 which have fallen to the lot of other nations, they must appear 
 entitled to serious attention. Such men must behold the actual 
 situation of their country with painful solicitude, and deprecate 
 the evils which ambition or revenge might, with too much 
 facility, inflict upon it. 
 
 PUBLIUS 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 243 
 
 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 NUMBER XXXI. 
 
 NEW YORK, JANUARY 1, 1788. 
 
 HAMILTON. 
 
 THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED. 
 
 In disquisitions of every kind, there are certain primary 
 truths, or first principles, upon which all subsequent reasoninge 
 must depend. These contain an internal evidence, which, ante- 
 cedent to all reflection or combination, commands the assent of 
 the mind. Where it produces not this effect, it must proceed 
 either from some disorder in the organs of perception, or from 
 the influence of some strong interest, or passion, or prejudice. 
 Of this nature are the maxims in geometry, that the whole is 
 greater than its part ; that things equal to the same, are equal 
 to one another; that two straight lines cannot inclose a space; 
 and that all right angles are equal to each other. Of the same 
 nature, are these other maxims in ethics and politics, that there 
 cannot be an effect without a cause; that the means ought to 
 be proportioned to the end; that every power ought to be com- 
 mensurate with its object; that there ought to be no limitation 
 of a power destined to effect a purpose, which is itself incapable 
 of limitation. And there are other truths in the two latter 
 sciences, which, if they cannot pretend to rank in the class ot 
 axioms, are such direct inferences from them, and so obvious in 
 themselves, and so agreeable to the natural and unsophisticated 
 dictates of common sepse, that they challenge the assent of a 
 
244 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 Bound and unbiassed mind, with a degree of force and convic 
 tion almost equally irresistible. 
 
 The objects of geometrical inquiry, are so entirely abstracted 
 from those pursuits which stir up and put in motion the unruly 
 passions of the human heart, that mankind, without difficulty, 
 adopt not only the more simple theorems of the science, but even 
 those abstruse paradoxes which, however they may appear sus 
 ceptible of demonstration, are at variance with the natural con- 
 ceptions which the mind, without the aid of philosophy, would 
 be led to entertain upon the subject. The infinite divisibility 
 of matter, or in other words, the infinite divisibility of a 
 finite thing, extending even to the minutest atom, is a point 
 agreed among geometricians ; though not less incomprehensible 
 to common sense, than any of those mysteries in religion, 
 against which the batteries of infidelity have been so indus- 
 triously levelled. 
 
 But in the sciences of morals and politics, men are found far 
 less ti-actable. To a certain degree, it is right and useful that 
 this should be the case. Caution and investigation are a neces- 
 sary armour against error and imposition. But this untracta- 
 bleness may be carried too far, and may degenerate into ob- 
 stinacy, perverseness, or disingenuity. Though it cannot be 
 pretended, that the principles of moral and political knowledge 
 have, in general, the same degree of certainty with those of the 
 mathematics; yet they have much better claims in this respect, 
 than, to judge from the conduct of men in particular situations, 
 we should be disposed to allow them. The obscurity is much 
 oftener in the passions and prejudices of the reasoner, than in 
 the subject. Men, upon too many occasions, do not give their 
 own understandings fair play; but yielding to some untoward 
 bias, they entangle themselves in words, and confound them- 
 selves in subtleties. 
 
 How else could it happen (if we admit the objectors to be sincere 
 in their opposition) that positions so clear as those which mani- 
 fest the necessity of a general power of taxation in the govern- 
 mftnt of the union, should have to encounter any adTcraaries 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 246 
 
 among men of discernment? Though these positions nave been 
 elsewhere fully stated, they will perhaps not be improperly re- 
 capitulated in this place, as introductory to an examination of 
 what may have been offered by way of objection to them. They 
 are in substance as follow : 
 
 A government ought to contain in itself every power requi- 
 site to the full accomplishment of the objects committed to its 
 care, and to the complete execution of the trusts for which it is 
 -esponsible ; free from every other control, but a regard to the 
 public good and to the sense of the people. 
 
 As the duties of superintending the national defence, and of 
 securing the public peace against foreign or domestic violence, 
 involve a provision for casualties and dangers, to which no pos- 
 sible limits can be assigned, the power of making that provision 
 ought to know no dther bounds than the exigencies of the nation, 
 and the resources of the community. 
 
 As revenue is the essential engine by which the means of 
 answering the national exigencies must be procured, the power 
 of procuring that article in its full extent, must necessarily be 
 comprehended in that of providing for those exigencies. 
 
 As theory and practice conspire to prove, that the power of 
 procuring revenue is unavailing, when exercised over the states 
 in their collective capacities, the federal government must of 
 necessity be invested with an unqualified power of taxation in 
 the ordinary modes. 
 
 Did not experience evince the contrary, it would be natural 
 to conclude, that the propriety of a general power of taxation 
 in the national government might safely be permitted to rest on 
 the evidence of these propositions, unassisted by any additional 
 arguments or illustrations. But we find, in fact, that the an- 
 tagonists of the proposed constitution, bo far from acquiescing 
 in their justness or truth, seem to make their principal and most 
 Kealous effort against this part of the plan. It may therefore 
 be satisfactory to analize the arguments with which they 
 combat it. 
 
 Those ot ttiem which have been most laboured with that view, 
 
246 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 seem in substance to amount to this : " It is not true, because 
 die exigencies of the union may not be susceptible of limitation, 
 that its power of laying taxes ought to be unconfined. Eevenue 
 is as requisite to the purposes of the local administrations, as to 
 those of the union ; and the former are at least of equal import- 
 ance with the latter, to the happiness of the people. It is there- 
 fore as necessary, that the state governments should be able to 
 command the meansof supplying their wants, as, that the national 
 government should possess the like faculty, in respect to the 
 wants of the union. But an indefinite power of taxation in the 
 latter might, and probably would, in time, deprive the former of 
 the means of providing for their own necessities ; and would 
 subject them entirely to the mercy of the national legislature. 
 As the laws of the union are to become the supreme law of the 
 land ; as it is to have power to pass all laws that may be neces- 
 sary for carrying into execution, the authorities with which it 
 is proposed to vest it; the national government might at any 
 time abolish the taxes imposed for state objects, upon the pre- 
 tence of an interference with its own. It might allege a neces- 
 sity of doing this, in order to give efficacy to the national reve- 
 nues : And thus all the resources of taxation might, by degrees, 
 become the subjects of federal monopoly, to the entire exclusion 
 and destruction of the state governments." 
 
 This mode of reasoning, appears sometimes to turn upon the 
 supposition of usurpation in the national government ; at other 
 times, it seems to be designed only as a deduction from the con- 
 stitutional operation of its intended powers. It is only in the 
 latter light, that it can be admitted to have any pretensions 
 to fairness. The moment we launch into conjectures, about the 
 usurpations of the federal government, we get into an unfathom- 
 able abyss, and fairly put ourselves out of the reach of all rea- 
 soning. Imagination may range at pleasure, till it gets bewil- 
 dered amidst the labyrinths of an enchanted castle, and knows 
 not on which side to turn to escape from the apparitions which , 
 itself has raised. Whatever may be the limits, or modifications, 
 of the powers of the union, it is easy to imagine at endless 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 247 
 
 train of possible dangers j and by indulging an excess of jealousy 
 and timidity, we may bring ourselves to a state of absolute 
 scepticism and irresolution. I repeat here what I have observed 
 in substance in another place, that all observations, founded 
 upon the danger of usurpation, ought to be referred to the com- 
 position and structure of the government, not to the nature and 
 extent of its powers. The state governments, by their original 
 constitutions, are invested with complete sovereignty. In what 
 does our security consist against usurpations from that quarter? 
 Doubtless in the manner of their formation, and in a due de- 
 pendence of those who are to administer them upon the people. 
 If the proposed construction of the federal government be found, 
 upon an impartial examination of it, to be such as to afford, to 
 fa, proper extent, the same species of securit}', all apprehensions 
 on the score of usurpation ought to be discarded. 
 
 It should not be forgotten, that a disposition in the state gov- 
 ernments, to encroach upon the rights of the union, is quite as 
 probable as a disposition in the union to encroach upon the 
 rights of the state governments. What side would be likely 
 to prevail in such a conflict, must depend on the means which 
 the contending parties could employ, towards insuring success 
 As in republics, strength is always on the side of the people ; 
 and as there are weighty reasons to induce a belief, that the 
 state governments will commonly possess most influence over 
 them, the natural conclusion is, that such contests will be most 
 apt to end to the disadvantage of the union j and that there is 
 greater probability of encroachments by the members upon the 
 federal head, than by the federal head upon the members. But 
 it is evident, that all conjectures of this kind, must be ex- 
 tremely vague and fallible; and that it is by far the safest 
 course to lay them altogether aside ; and to confine our atten- 
 tion wholly to the nature and extent of the powers, as they are 
 delineated in the constitution. Every thing beyond this, must 
 be left to the prudence and firmness of the people; who, as 
 they will hold the scales in their own hands, it is to be hoped, 
 
248 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 will alwaj'i take care to preserve the constitutional equilibrium 
 between the general and the state governments. Upon thia 
 ground, which is evidently the true one, it will not be difficult 
 to obviate the objections, which have been made to an indefinite 
 Dower of taxation in the United States. 
 
 PUBLIDB. 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 249 
 
 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 NUMBER XXXII. 
 
 NEW YORK, JANUARY 4, 1788. 
 
 HAMILTON. 
 
 THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED. 
 
 Although 1 am of opinion that there would be no real 
 danger of the consequences to the state governments, which 
 seem to be apprehended from a power in the union to control 
 them in the levies of money j because I am persuaded that the 
 sense of the people, the extreme hazard of provoking the re- 
 sentments of the state governments, and a conviction of the 
 utility and necessity of local administrations, for local purposes, 
 would be a complete barrier against the oppressive use of such 
 a power : Yet I am willing here to allow, in its full extent, the 
 justness of the reasoning, which requires, that the individual 
 states should possess an independent and uncontrolable author- 
 ity to raise their own revenues for the supply of their own 
 wants. And making this concession, I affirm that (with the sole 
 exception of duties on imports and exports) they would, under 
 the plan of the convention, retain that authority in the most 
 absolute and unqualified sense ; and that an attempt on the part 
 of the national government to abridge them in the exercise of 
 it, would be a violent assumption of power, unwarranted by any 
 article or clause of its constitution. 
 
 An entire consolidation of the states mto one complete na 
 tional sovereignty, would imply an entire subordination of the 
 
250 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 parts; and whatever powers might remain in them, would be 
 altogether dependent on the general wUl. But as the plan of 
 the convention aims only at a partial union or consolidation, the 
 state governments would clearly retain all the rights of sove- 
 reignty which they before had, and which were not, by that act, 
 exclusively delegated to the United States. This exclusive dele- 
 gation, or rather this alienation of state sovereignty, would only 
 exist in three cases ; where the constitution in express terms 
 granted an exclusive authority to the union ; where it granted, 
 in one instance, an authority to the union; and in another, pro- 
 hibited the states from exercising the like authority ; and where 
 it granted an authority to the union, to which a similar authority 
 in the states would be absolutely and totally contradictory and 
 repugnant. I use these terms to distinguish this last case from 
 another which might appear to resemble it ; but which would, 
 in fact, be essentially different : I mean where the exercise of a 
 concurrent jurisdiction, might be productive of occasional in- 
 terferences in the policy of any branch of administration, but 
 would not imply any direct contradiction or repugnancy in point 
 of constitutional authority. These three cases of exclusive juris- 
 diction in the federal government, may be exemplified by the 
 following instances : The last clause but one in the eighth sec- 
 tion of the first article, provides expressly, that congress shall 
 exercise " exclusive legislation" over the district to be appro- 
 priated as the seat of government. This answers to the first 
 case. The first clause of the same section impowers congress 
 "<o lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises;" and the 
 second clause of the tenth section of the same article declares, 
 that " no state shall, without the consent of congress, lay any 
 imposts or duties on imports or exports, except for the purpose of 
 executing its inspection laws.'' Hence would result an exclusive 
 power in the union to lay duties on imports and exportb with 
 the particular exception mentioned ; but this power is abridged 
 by another clause, which declares, that no tax or duty shall be 
 laid on articles exported from any state ; in consequence of 
 which qualification, it now only extends to the duties on imports 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 2^x 
 
 This answers to the second case. The third will be found in 
 that clause which declares, that congress shall have power " to 
 establish an uniform rule of naturalization throughout the 
 United States." This must necessarily be exclusive ; because 
 if each state had power to prescribe a distinct rule, there 
 could be no uniform rule. 
 
 A case which may perhaps be thought to resemble the latter, 
 but which is in fact widely different, affects the question imme- 
 diately under consideration. I mean the power of imposing 
 taxes on all articles other than exports and imports. This, I 
 contend, is manifestly a concurrent and coequal authority in the 
 United States and in the individual states. There is plainly no 
 expression in the granting clause, which makes that power 
 exclusive in the union. There is no independent clause or sen- 
 tence which prohibits the states from exercising it. So far is 
 this from being the case, that a plain and conclusive argument 
 to the contrary is deducible, from the restraint laid upon the 
 states in relation to duties on imports and exports. This restric- 
 tion implies an admission, that if it were not inserted, the states 
 would possess the power it excludes, and it implies a further 
 admission, that as to all other taxes, the authority of the states 
 remains undiminished. In any other view it would be both 
 unnecessary and dangerous; it would be unnecessary, because 
 if the grant to the union of the power of laying such duties, 
 implied the exclusion of the states, or even their subordination 
 in this particular, there could be no need of such a restriction ; 
 it would be dangerous, because the introduction of it leads 
 directly to the conclusion which has been mentioned, and which, 
 if the reasoning of the objectors be just, could not have been 
 intended; I mean that the states, in all cases to which the 
 restriction did not apply, would have a concurrent power of 
 taxation with the union. The restriction in question amounts 
 to what lawyers call a negative pregnant ; that is, a negation 
 of one thing, and an affirmance of another; a negation of the 
 authority of the states to impose taxes on imports and exports, 
 and an affirmance of their authority to impose them on all other 
 
 27 
 
252 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 articles. It would be mere sophistry to argue that it was meant 
 to exclude them absolutely from the imposition of taxes of the 
 former kind, and to leave them at liberty to lay others subject to 
 the control of the national legislature. The restraining or prohi- 
 bitory clause only says, that they shall not, without the consent of 
 congress, lay such duties ; and if we are to understand this in the 
 sense last mentioned, the constitution would then be made to 
 introduce a formal provision, for the sake of a very absurd con- 
 clusion J which is, that the states, with the consent of the national 
 legislature, might tax imports and exports; and that they might 
 tax every other article, unless controled by the same body. If 
 this was the intention, why was it not left, in the first instance, 
 to what is alleged to be the natural operation of the original 
 clause, conferring a general power of taxation upon the union ? 
 It is evident that this could not have been the intention, and that 
 it will not bear a construction of the kind. 
 
 As to a supposition of repugnancy between the power of taxa- 
 tion in the states and in the union, it cannot be supported in that 
 sense which would be requisite to work an exclusion of the states. 
 It is indeed possible, that a tax might be laid on a particular 
 article by a state, which might render it inexpedient that a further 
 tax should be laid on the same article by the union; but it 
 would not imply a constitutional inability to impose a further 
 tax. The quantity of the imposition, the expediency or inexpe- 
 diency of an increase on either side, would be mutually questions 
 of prudence ; but there would be involved no direct jjontradiction 
 of power. The particular policy of the national and of the state 
 system of finance, might now and then not exactly coincide, 
 and might require reciprocal forbearances. It is not however a 
 mere possibility of inconvenience in the exercise of powers, but 
 an immediate constitutional repugnancy, that can by implication 
 alienate and extinguish a pre-existing right of sovereignty. 
 
 The necessity of a concurrent jurisdiction in certain cases, 
 results from the division of the sovereign power; and the rule 
 that all authorities, of which the states are not explicitly divested 
 in favour of the union, remain with them in full vigour, is not 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 253 
 
 only a theoretical consequence of that division but is clearly 
 admitted by the whole tenor of the instrument which contains 
 the articles of the proposed constitution. We there find, that 
 notwithstanding the affirmative grants of general authorities, 
 there has been the most pointed care in those cases where it was 
 deemed improper that the like authorities should reside in the 
 states, to insert negative clauses prohibiting the exercise of 
 them by the states. The tenth section of the first article consists 
 altogether of such provisions. This circumstance is a cleai 
 indication of the sense of the convention, and furnishes a rule 
 of interpretation out of the body of the act, which justifies the 
 position I have advanced, and refutes every hypothesis to the 
 contrary. 
 
 PUBLIUB 
 
254 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 NUMBER XXXIII. 
 
 NEW YORK, JANUARY 4, 1788. 
 
 HAMILTON. 
 
 THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED. 
 
 The residue of the argument against the provisions of the 
 constitution, in respect to taxation, is ingrafted upon the follow- 
 ing clauses : The last clause of the eighth section of the first 
 article, authorizes the national legislature " to make all laws 
 which shall be necessary and proper^ for carrying into execution 
 the powers by that constitution vested in the government of the 
 United States, or in any department or oflScer thereof; " and the 
 second clause of the sixth article declares, that " the constitution 
 and the laws of the United States made in pursuance thereof, and 
 the treaties made by their authority, shall be the supreme law of 
 the land ; any thing in the constitution or laws of any state to 
 the contrary notwithstanding." 
 
 These two clauses have been the sources of much virulent 
 invective, and petulant declamation, against the proposed consti- 
 tution ; they have been held up to the people in all the exagge- 
 rated colours of misrepresentation, as the pernicious engines by 
 which their local governments were to be destroyed, and their 
 liberties exterminated — as the hideous monster whose devouring 
 jaws would spare neither sex nor age, nor high nor low, nor 
 sacred nor profane; and yet, strange as it may appear, after all 
 this clamour, to those who may not have happened to contem- 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 255 
 
 plate them in the same light, it may be affirmed with perfect 
 confidence, that the constitutional operation of the intended 
 government would be precisely the same, if these clauses were 
 entirely obliterated, as if they were repeated in every article. 
 They are only declaratory of a truth, which would have resultea 
 by necessary and unavoidable implication from the very act of 
 constituting a federal government, and vesting it with certain 
 specified powers. This is so clear a proposition, that moderation 
 itself can scarcely listen to the railings which have been so 
 copiously vented against this part of the plan, without emotions 
 that disturb its equanimity. 
 
 What is a power, but the ability or faculty of doing a thing? 
 What is the ability to do a thing, but the power of employing 
 the means necessary to its execution ? What is a legislative 
 power, but a power of making laws ? What are the means to 
 execute a legislative power, but laws? What is the power 
 >f laying and collecting taxes, but a legislative power, or a power 
 of making laws, to lay and collect taxes ? What are the proper 
 means of executing such a power, but necessary and proper 
 laws? 
 
 This simple train of inquiry furnishes us at once with a tost 
 of the true nature of the clause complained of. It conducts us 
 to this palpable truth, that a power to lay and collect taxes, 
 must be a power to pass all laws necessary Siud proper for the execu- 
 tion of that power: and what docs the unfortunate and calum- 
 niated provision in question do, more than declare the same 
 truth; to wit, that the national legislature to whom the power 
 of laying and collecting taxes had been previously given, might, 
 in the execution of that pdwer, pass all laws necessary and proper 
 to carry it into eff'ect? I have applied these observations thus 
 particularly to the power of taxation, because it is the immediate 
 subject under consideration, and because it is the most important 
 of the authorities proposed to be conferred upon the union. But 
 the same process will lead to the same result, in relation to all 
 other powers declared in the constitution. And it is expressly 
 to execute these powers, that the sweeping clause, as it has been 
 
256 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 affected.} nailed, authorizes the national legislature to pass all 
 necessary and proper laws. If there be any thing exceptionable, 
 it must be sought for in the specific powers, upon which this 
 general declaration is predicated. The declaration itself, though 
 it may be chargeable with tautology or redundancy, is at least 
 perfectly harmless. 
 
 But SUSPICION may ask, why then was it introduced? The 
 answer is, that it could only have been done for greater caution, 
 and to guard against all cavilling refinements in those who might 
 hereafter feel a disposition to curtail and evade the legitimate 
 authorities of the union. The convention probably foresaw, 
 what it has been a principal aim of these papers to inculcate, 
 that the danger which most threatens our political welfare, is, 
 that the state governments will finally sap the foundations of 
 the union ; and might therefore think it necessary, in so cardinal 
 a point, to leave nothing to construction. Whatever may have 
 been the inducement to it, the wisdom of the precaution is 
 evident from the cry which has been raised against it; as thai 
 very cry betrays a disposition to question the great and essen 
 tial truth which it is manifestly the object of that provision 
 to declare. 
 
 But it may be again asked, who is to judge of the necessity 
 and propriety of the laws to be passed for executing the powerb 
 of the union ? I answer, first, that this question arises as well 
 and as fully upon the simple grant of those powers, as ujjon the 
 declaratory clause : and I answer, in the second place, that the 
 national government, like every other, must judge, in the first 
 instance, of the proper exercise of its powers; and its constitu- 
 ents in the last. If the federal government should overpass the 
 just bounds of its authority, and make a tyrannical use of its 
 powers; the people, whose creature it is, must appeal to the 
 standard they have formed, and take such measures to redress 
 the injury done to the constitution, as the exigency may suggest 
 and prudence justify. The propriety of a law, in a constitutional 
 light, must always be determined by the nature of the powers 
 upon which it is founded. Suppose, by some forced construction 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 257 
 
 of its authority (which indeed cannot easily be imagined) the 
 federal legislature should attempt to vsiry the law of descent in 
 any state ; would it not be evident, that in making such an 
 attempt, it had exceeded its jurisdiction, and infringed upon that 
 of the state ? Suppose, again, that upon the pretence of an inter- 
 ference with its I'evenues, it should undertake to abrogate a land 
 tax, imposed by the authority of a state; would it not be 
 equally evident, that this was an invasion of that concurrent 
 jurisdiction in respect to this species of tax, which the constitu- 
 tion plainly supposes to exist in the state governments? If 
 there ever should be a doubt on this head, the credit of it will 
 be entirely due to those reasoners, who, in the imprudent zeal 
 of their animosity to the plan of the convention, have laboured 
 to envelope it in a cloud, calculated to obscure the plainest and 
 simplest truths. 
 
 But it is said, that the laws of the union are to be the supreme 
 law of the land. What inference can be drawn from this, or 
 what would they amount to, if they were not to be supreme ? 
 It is evident they would amount to nothing. A law, by the 
 very meaning of the term, includes supremacy. It is a rule, 
 which those to whom it is prescribed are bound to observe. 
 This results from every political association. If individuals 
 enter into a state of society, the laws of that society must be 
 the supreme regulator of their conduct. If a number of politi- 
 cal soci-eties enter into a larger political society, the laws which 
 the latter may enact, pursuant to the powers intrusted to it by 
 its constitution, mus* necessarily Le supreme over those societies, 
 and the individuals of whom they are composed. It would other- 
 wise be a mere treaty, dependent on the good faith of the 
 parties, and not a government ; which is only another word for 
 POLITICAL POWER AND SUPREMACY. But it will not follow from 
 this doctrine, that acts of the larger society which are not pur- 
 suant to its constitutional powers, but which are invasions of the 
 rfi.siauary authorities of the smaller societies, will become the 
 supreme law of the land. These will be merely acts of usurpa- 
 tion, and will deserve to be treated as such. Hence we perceive, 
 
258 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 that tue clause which declares the supremacy of the laws of the 
 uniou, like the one we have just before considered, only declares 
 a truth, which flows immediately and necessarily from the insti- 
 tution of a federal government. It will not, I presume, have 
 escaped observation, that it expressly confines this supremacy to 
 laws made pursuant to the constitution ; which I mention merely 
 as an instance of caution in the convention ; since that limita- 
 tion would have been to be understood, though it had not been 
 expressed. 
 
 Though a law, therefore, laying a tax for the use of the 
 United States would be supreme in its nature, and could not 
 legally be opposed or controled; yet, a law abrogating or pre- 
 venting the collection of a tax laid by the authority of a state, 
 (unless upon imports and exports) would not be the supreme 
 law of the land, but an usurpation of a power, not granted by the 
 constitution. As far as an improper accumulation of taxes, on 
 the same object, might tend to render the collection difficult or 
 precarious, this would be a mutual inconvenience, not arising 
 from a superiority or defect of power on either side, but from 
 an injudicious exercise of power by one or the other, in a 
 manner equally disadvantageous to both. It is to be hoped and 
 presumed, however, that mutual interests would dictate a con 
 cert in this respect, which would avoid any material incon- 
 venience. The inference from the whole is — that the individual 
 states would, under the proposed constitution, retain an inde- 
 pendent and uncontrolable authority to raise revenue to any 
 extent of which they may stand in need, by every kind of tax- 
 ation, except duties on imports and exports. It will be shown 
 in the next paper, that this concurrent jurisdiction in the article 
 of taxation, was the only admissible substitute for an entire sub- 
 ordination, in respect to this branch of pcwer, of state authority 
 to that of the union. 
 
 PUBLIUS 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 2/>9 
 
 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 NUMBER XXXIV. 
 
 , NEW YORK. JANUARY 4, 17f 
 
 HAMILTON. 
 
 THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED. 
 
 1 FLATTER myself it has been clearly shown in my last num- 
 ber, that the particular states, under the proposed constitution, 
 would have co-equal authority with the union in the article 
 of revenue, except as to duties on imports. As this leaves open 
 to the states far the greatest part of the resources of the com- 
 munity, there can be no colour for the assertion, that they 
 would not possess means as abundant as could be desired, for 
 the supply of their own wants, independent of all external 
 control. That the field is sufficiently wide, will more fully 
 appear, when we come to develope the inconsiderable share 
 of the public expenses, for which it will fall to the lot of the 
 state governments to provide. 
 
 To argue upon abstract principles, that this co-ordinate au- 
 thority cannot exist, would be to set up theory and supposi- 
 tion against fact and reality. However proper such reasonings 
 might be, to show that a thing ought not to exist, they are wholly 
 to be rejected, when they are made use of to prove that it does 
 not exist, contrary to the evidence of the fact itself. It is well 
 known, that in the Roman republic, the legislative authority in 
 the last resort, resided for ages in two different political bodies; 
 not as branches of the same legislature, but as distinct and inde- 
 
260 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 penaeut legislntures ; in each of which an opposite interest pr©« 
 vailed; in one, the Patrician j in the other, the Plebeian. Many 
 arguments might have been adduced, to prove the unfitness of 
 two such seemingly contradictory authorities, each having power 
 to annul or repeal the acts of the other. But a man would 
 have been regarded as frantic, who should have attempted at 
 Eome to disprove their existence. It will readily be understood, 
 that I allude to the comitia centuriata and the comitia tri- 
 BUTIA. The former, in which the people voted by centuries, was 
 80 arranged as to give a superiority to the Patrician interest: 
 In the latter, in which numbers prevailed, the Plebeian interests 
 had an entire predominancy. And yet these two legislatures 
 co-existed for ages, and the Eoman republic attained to the 
 pinnacle of human greatness. 
 
 In the case particularly under consideration, there is no such 
 tontradiction as appears in the example cited ; there is no power 
 :>n either side to annul the acts of the other. And in practice, 
 there is little reason to apprehend any inconvenience; because, 
 In a short course of time, the wants of the states will naturally 
 reduce themselves within a very narrow compass; and in the 
 interim, the United States will, in all probability, find it conve- 
 nient to abstain wholly from those objects to which the particular 
 states would be inclined to resort. 
 
 To form a more precise judgment of the true merits of this 
 question, it will be well to advert to the proportion between 
 the objects that will require a federal provision in respect to 
 revenue, and those which will require a state provision. We 
 shall discover that the former are altogether unlimited; and 
 that the latter are circumscribed within very moderate bounds. 
 In pursuirg this inquiry, we must bear in mind, that we are not 
 to confine our view to the present period, but to look forward to 
 remote futurity. Constitutions of civil government, are not. to 
 be framed upon a calculation of existing exigencies; but upon 
 a combination of these, with the probable exigencies of ages, 
 according to the natural and tried course of human affair?. 
 Nothing, therefore, can be more fallacious, than to infer Wi 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 261 
 
 extent of any p< wer proper to be lodged in the national govern- 
 ment, from an estimate of its immediate necessities. There 
 ought to be a capacity to provide for future contingencies, as 
 they may happen; and as these are illimitable in their nature, 
 so it is impossible safely to limit that capacity. It is true, per 
 haps, that a computation might be made, with sufficient accuracy 
 to answer the purpose, of the quantity of revenue requisite to 
 discharge the subsisting engagements of the union, and to 
 maintain those establishments, which, for some time to come, 
 would suffice in time of peace. But would it be wise, or would 
 it not rather be the extreme of folly, to stop at this point, and 
 to leave the government intrusted with the care of the national 
 defence, in a state of absolute incapacity to provide for the pro- 
 tection of the community, against future invasions of the publi* 
 peace, by foreign war or domestic convulsions ? If we must bc 
 obliged tc exceed this point, where can we stop short of an in- 
 definite power of providing for emergencies as they may arise ? 
 Though it be easy to assert, in general terms, the possibility of 
 forming a rational judgment of a due provision against probable 
 dangers; yet we may safely challenge those who make the 
 assertion, to bring forward their data, and may affirm, that they 
 would be found as vague and uncertain as any that could be 
 produced to establish the probable duration of the world. Ob- 
 servations, confined to the mere prospects of internal attacks, 
 can deserve no weight; though even these will admit of no 
 satisfactory calculations: But if we mean to be a commercial 
 people, it must form a part of our policy to be able one day 
 *x) defend that commerce. The support of a navy, and of naval 
 wars, would involve contingencies that must baffle all the efforts 
 of political arithmetic. 
 
 Admitting that we ought to try the novel and absurd ex- 
 periment in politics, of tying up the hands of government 
 from offensive war, founded upon reasons of state: Yet, cer- 
 tainly, we ought not to disable it from guarding ihe com- 
 munity against the ambition or enmity of other nations. A 
 3loud has been for some time hanging over the European 
 
2t)i: THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 world. If it should break forth into a storm, who can ins ire 
 us, that in its progress, a part of its fury would not be spent 
 apon us ? No reasonable man would hastily pronounce that we 
 are entirely out of its reach. Or if the combustible materials 
 tnat now seem to be collecting, should be dissipated without 
 coming to maturity; or if a flame should be kindled without 
 extending to us; what security can we have that our tran- 
 quillity will long remain undisturbed from some other cause, 
 or from some other quarter? Let us recollect, that peace or 
 war will not always be left to our option; that however mode- 
 rate or unambitious we may be, we cannot count ipon the mode- 
 ration, or hope to extinguish the ambition, of others. Who 
 could have imagined, at the conclusion of the last war, that 
 France and Britain, wearied and exhausted as they both were, 
 would already have looked with so hostile an aspect upon each 
 other? To judge from the history of mankind, we shall be 
 compelled to conclude, that the fiery and destructive passions 
 of war, reign in the human breast with much more powerfu. 
 sway, than the mild and beneficent sentiments of peace; and 
 that to model our political systems upon speculations of lasting 
 tranquillity, would be to calculate on the weaker springs of the 
 human character. 
 
 What are the chief sources of expense in every government ? 
 What has occasioned that enormous accumulation of debts with 
 which several of the European nations are oppressed? The 
 answer plainly is, wars and rebellions; the support of those 
 institutions which are necessary to guard the body politic 
 against these two most mortal diseases of society. The ex- 
 penses arising from those institutions which relate to the mere 
 domestic police of a state, to the support of its legislative, ex- 
 ecutive, and judiciary departments, with their different append- 
 ages, and to the encouragement of agriculture and manufactures, 
 (which will comprehend almost all the objects of state expend- 
 iture) are insignificant in comparison with those which relate to 
 the national defence. 
 
 In the kingdom of Great Britain, where all the ostentalioua 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 263 
 
 apparatus of mouarchy is to be provided for, not above a fif- 
 teenth part of the annual income of the nation is appropriated 
 to the class of expenses last mentioned; the other fourteen fif 
 teenths are absorbed in the payment of the interest of debts, 
 contracted for carrying on the wars in which that country has 
 been engaged, and in the maintenance of fleets and armies. If, 
 on the one hand, it should be observed, that the expenses 
 incurred in the prosecution of the ambitious enterprises and 
 vain-glorious pursuits of a monarchy, are not a proper stand- 
 ard by which to judge of those which might be necessary in a 
 republic; it ought, on the other hand, to be remarked, that 
 there should be as great a disproportion, between the profusion 
 and extravagance of a wealthy kingdom in its domestic ad- 
 ministration, and the frugality and economy, which, in that par- 
 ticular, become the modest simplicity of republican government. 
 If we balance a proper deduction from one side, against that 
 which it is supposed ought to be made from the other, the pro- 
 portion may still be considered as holding good. 
 
 But let us take a view of the large debt which we have our- 
 selves contracted in a single war, and let us only calculate on a 
 common share of the events which disturb the peace of nations, 
 and we shall instantly perceive, without the aid of any elaborate 
 illustration, that there must always be an immense dispropor- 
 tion between the objects of federal and state expenditure. It is 
 true, that several of the states, separately, are incumbered with 
 considerable debts, which are an excrescence of the late war. 
 But this cannot happen again, if the proposed system be 
 adopted; and when these debts are discharged, the only call for 
 revenue of any consequence, which the state governments will 
 continue to experience, will be for the mere support of their 
 respective civil lists ; to which, if we add all contingencies, the 
 total amount in every state, ought to fall considerably short of 
 a million of dollars. 
 
 If it cannot be denied to be a just principle, that in framing a 
 constitution of government for a nation, we ought, in those pro- 
 visions which are designed to be permanent, to calculate, not on 
 
2(54 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 tempojary, but on permanent causes of expense; our attent.ou 
 would be directed to a provision in favoiir of the state govern- 
 ments, for an annual sum of about 1,000,000 of dollars; while 
 the exigencies of the union could be susceptible of no limits, 
 even in imagination. In this view of the subject, by what logic 
 ''•an it be maintained, that the local governments ought to com- 
 mand, in perpetuity, an exclusive source of revenue for any sum 
 beyond that which has been stated? To extend its power 
 further, in exclusion of the authority of the union, would be to 
 take the resources of the community out of those hands which 
 stood in need of them for the public welfare, in order to put 
 them into other hands, which could have no just or proper occa- 
 sion for them. 
 
 Suppose, then, the convention had been inclined to proceed 
 upon the principle of a repartition of the objects of revenue, be- 
 tween the union and its members, in proportion to their compara- 
 tive necessities; what particular fund could have been selected 
 for the use of the states, that would not either have been too 
 much or too little; too little for their present, too much for their 
 future wants ? As to the line of separation between external 
 and internal taxes, this would leave to the states, at a rough 
 computation, the command of two thirds of the resources of the 
 community, to defray from a tenth to a twentieth of its ex- 
 penses ; and to the union, one third of the resources of the com- 
 inunity, to defray from nine tenths to nineteen twentieths of its 
 expenses. If we desert this boundary, and content ourselves 
 with leaving to the states an exclusive power of taxing houses 
 and lands, there would still be a great disproportion between 
 the means and the end; the possession of one third of the re- 
 sources of the community, to supply, at most, one tenth of its 
 wants. If any fund could have been selected, and appropriated, 
 equal to, and not greater than, the object, it would have been 
 inadequate to the discharge of the existing debts of the parti- 
 cular states, and would have left them dependent on the union 
 for a provision for this purpose. 
 
 The preceding train of observations, will justify the positit.n 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 265 
 
 ^hich has been elsewhere laid down, that " a concurrent juris- 
 diction in the article of taxation, was the only admissible sub- 
 stitute for an entire subordination, in respect to this branch of 
 power, of state authority to that of the union." Any separa- 
 tion of the objects of revenue that could have been fallen upon, 
 would have amounted to a sacrifice of the great interests of the 
 union, to the power of the individual states. The convention 
 thought the concurrent jurisdiction preferable to that subordina- 
 tion ; and it is evident, that it has at least the merit of recon- 
 ciling an indefinite constitutional power of taxation in the 
 federal government, with an adequate and independent power 
 m the states, to provide for their own necessities. There re- 
 main a few other lights, in which this important subject of tax. 
 ation will claim a further consideration. 
 
 PUBLIUS 
 
266 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 NUMBER XXXV. 
 
 SKW YORK, JANUARY 8, 1788. 
 
 HAMILTON. 
 
 THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED. 
 
 Before we proceed to examine any other objections to an 
 indefinite power of taxation in the union, I shall make one 
 general remark; which is, that if the jurisdiction of the national 
 government, in the article of revenue, should be restricted to 
 particular objects, it would naturally occasion an undue propor- 
 tion of the public burthens to fall upon those objects. Two evils 
 would spring from this source — the oppression of particular 
 branches of industry, and an unequal distribution of the taxes, 
 as well among the several states, as among the citizens of the 
 same state. 
 
 Suppose, as has been contended for, the federal power of tax- 
 ation were to be confined to duties on imports; it is evident 
 that the government, for want of being able to command other 
 resources, would frequently be tempted to extend these duties 
 to an injurious excess. There are persons who imagine that 
 this can never be the case ; since the higher they are, the more 
 H is alleged they will tend to discourage an extravagant con- 
 sumption, to produce a favourable balance of trade, and to pro- 
 mote domestic manufactures. But all extremes are pernicious 
 in various ways. Exorbitant duties on imported articles, serve 
 to beget a general spirit of smuggling; which is always pre- 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 267 
 
 judicial to the fair trader, and eventually to the revenue ftself : 
 They tend to render other classes of the community tributary, 
 [n an improper degree, to the manufacturing classes, to whom 
 they give a premature monopoly of the markets : They sometimes 
 force industry out of its most natural channels into others, in 
 which it flows with less advantage. And in the last place, they 
 oppress the merchant, who is often obliged to paj^ them himself, 
 without any retribution from the consumer. When the demand 
 is equal to the quantity of goods at market, the consumer gene- 
 rally pays the duty; but when the markets happen to be over- 
 stocked, a great proportion falls upon the merchant, and some- 
 times not only exhausts his profits, but breaks in upon his 
 capital. I am apt to think, that a division of the duty, between 
 the seller and the buyer, more often happens than is commonly 
 imagined. It is not always possible to raise the price of a com- 
 modity, in exact proportion to every additional imposition laid 
 upon it. The merchant, especially in a country of small com- 
 mercial capital, is often under a necessity of keeping prices 
 down, in order to a more expeditious sale. 
 
 The maxim, that the consumer is the payer, is so much oftener 
 true than the reverse of the proposition, that it is far more 
 equitable that the duties on imports should go into a common 
 stock, than that they should redound to the exclusive benefit of 
 the importing states. But it is not so generally true, as to 
 render it equitable, that those duties should form the only na- 
 tional fund. When they are paid by the merchant, they operate 
 as an additional tax upon the importing state; whose citizens 
 pay their proportion of them in the character of consumers. In 
 this view, they are productive of inequality among the states ; 
 which inequality would be increased with the increased extent 
 of the duties. The confinement of the national revenues to this 
 species of imposts, would be attended with inequality, from a 
 different cause, between the manufacturing and the non-manu- 
 facturing states. The states which can go furthest towards the 
 supply of their own wants, by their own manufactures, will not 
 according to their numbers or wealth, consume so great a pro 
 
 28 
 
'iB8 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 porticjp of imported articles, as those states which are not in 
 the same favourable situation ; they would not, therefore, in this 
 mode alone, contribute to the public treasury in a ratio to their 
 abilities. To make them do this, it is necessary that recourse 
 be had to excises ; the proper objects of which are particular 
 kinds of manufactures. New-York is more deeply interested in 
 these considerations, than such of her citizens, as contend for 
 limiting the power of the union to external taxation, may be 
 aware of. New-York is an importing state, and from a greater 
 disproportion between her population and territory, is less 
 likely, than some other states, speedily to become in any con- 
 siderable degree a manufacturing state. She would of course 
 suffer, in a double light, from restraining the jurisdiction of the 
 union to commercial imposts. 
 
 So far as these observations tend to inculcate a danger of the 
 import duties being extended to an injurious extreme, it may be 
 observed, conformably to a remark made in another part of 
 these papers, that the interest of the revenue itself would be a 
 sufficient guard against such an extreme. I readily admit that 
 this would be the case, as long as other resources were open ; 
 but if the avenues to them were closed, hope, stimulated by 
 necessity, might beget experiments, fortified by rigorous pre- 
 cautions and additional penalties ; which, for a time, might have 
 the intended effect, till there had been leisure to contrive expe- 
 dients to elude these new precautions. The first success would 
 be apt to inspire false opinions; which it might require a long 
 course of subsequent experience to correct. Necessity, especially 
 in politics, often occasions false hopes, false reasonings, and a 
 system of measures correspondently erroneous. But even if 
 this supposed excess should not be a consequence of the limita- 
 tion of the federal power of taxation, the inequalities spoken of 
 would still ensue, though not in the same degree, from the other 
 causes that have been noticed. Let us now return to the exami- 
 nation of objections. 
 
 One which, if we may judge from the frequency of its repe- 
 tition, seems most to be relied on, is. that the house of ^'epre- 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 26i* 
 
 sentatives is not suflSciently numerous for the reception of all 
 the different classes of citizens ; in order to combine tde in- 
 terests and feelings of every part of the community, and tc 
 produce a due sympathy between the representative body and 
 its constituents. This argument presents itself under a very 
 specious and seducing form; and is well calculated to lay I; old 
 of the prejudices of those to whom it is addressed. But when 
 we come to dissect it with attention, it will appear to be made 
 ap of nothing but fair sounding words. The object it seems to 
 aim at, is in the first place impracticable, and in the sense in 
 which it is contended for, is unnecessary. I reserve for another 
 place, the discussion of the question which relates to the suffi- 
 ciency of the representative body in respect to numbers; and 
 shall content myself with examining here the particular use 
 which has been made of a contrary supposition, in reference to 
 the immediate subject of our inquiries. 
 
 The idea of an actual representation of all classes of the 
 people, by persons of each class, is altogether visionary. Unless 
 it were expressly provided- in the constitution, that each dif- 
 ferent occupation should send one or more members, the thing 
 would never take place in practice. Mechanics and manufac- 
 turers will always be inclined, with few exceptions, to give their 
 votes to merchants, in preference to persons of their own pro- 
 fessions or trades. Those discerning citizens are well aware, 
 that the mechanic and manufacturing arts furnish the materials 
 of mercantile enterprise and industry. Many of them, indeed, 
 are immediately connected with the operations of commerce. 
 They know that the merchant is their natural patron and 
 friend ; and they are aware, that however great the confidence 
 they may justly feel in their own good sense, their interests can 
 be more effectually promoted by the merchant than by them- 
 selves. They are sensible that their habits of life have not been 
 such as to give them those acquired endowments, without which, 
 in a deliberative assembly, the greatest natural abilities are for 
 the most part useless ; and that the influence and weight, and 
 superior acqiiirements of the merchants, render them more equal 
 
270 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 10 a cui.tciit with any spirit which might happen to infuse itself 
 into the public councils, unfriendly to the manufacturing and 
 trading interests. These considerations, and many others that 
 might be mentioned, prove, and experience confirms it, that 
 artizans and manufacturers, will commonly be disposed to 
 bestow their votes upon merchants arid those whom they re- 
 commend. We must therefore consider merchants as the na- 
 tural representatives of all these classes of the community. 
 
 With regard to the learned professions, little need he ob- 
 served; they truly form no distinct interest in society; and 
 according to their situation and talents, will be indiscriminately 
 the objects of the confidence and choice of each other, and of 
 other parts of the community. 
 
 Nothing remains but the landed interest; and this, in a po 
 litical view, and particularly in relation to taxes, I take to be 
 perfectly united, from the wealthiest landlord, down to the 
 poorest tenant. No tax can be laid on land which will not 
 affect the proprietor of thousands of acres, as well as the pro- 
 prietor of a single acre. Every land-holder will therefore have 
 a common interest to keep the taxes on land as low as possible ; 
 and common interest may always be reckoned upon as the 
 surest bond of sympathy. But if we even could suppose a dis- 
 tirction of interests between the opulent land-holder, and the 
 middling farmer, what reason is there to conclude, that the 
 first would stand a better chance of being deputed to the na- 
 tional legislature than the last ? If we take fact as our guide, 
 and look into our own senate and assembly, we shall find that 
 moderate proprietors of land prevail in both; nor is this less 
 the case in the senate, which consists of a smaller number than 
 in the assembly, which is composed of a greater number. Where 
 the qualifications of the electors are the same, whether they 
 have to choose a small or a large number, their votes will fab 
 upon those in whom they have most confidence; whether these 
 happen to be men of large fortunes, or of moderate property, or 
 of no property at all. 
 
 It is said to be necessary that all classes of citizens should 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 271 
 
 have 8ome of their own number in the representative body, in 
 order that their feelings and interests may be the better under 
 stood and attended to. But we have seen that this will never 
 happen under any arrangement that leaves the votes of the 
 people free. Where this is the case, the representative bodj-, 
 with too few exceptions to have any influence on the spirit of 
 the government, will be composed of land-holders, merchants, 
 and men of the learned professions. But where is the danger 
 that the interests and feelings of the different classes of citizens 
 will not be understood, or attended to by these three descrip- 
 tions of men? Will not the land-holder know and feel whatever 
 will promote or injure the interests of landed property? and 
 will he not, from his own interest in that species of property, 
 be sufficiently prone to resist every attempt to prejudice or en- 
 cumber it ? Will not the merchant understand and be disposed 
 to cultivate, as far as may be proper, the interests of the me- 
 chanic and manufacturing arts, to which his commerce is so 
 nearly allied ? Will not the man of the learned profession, who 
 will feel a neutrality to the rivalships among the different 
 branches of industry, be likely to prove an impartial arbiter 
 between them, ready to promote either, so far as it shall appear 
 to him conducive to the general interests of the community? 
 
 If we take into the account the momentary humours or dis- 
 positions which may happen to prevail in particular parts of the 
 society, and to which a wise administration will never be in- 
 attentive, is the man whose situation leads to extensive inquiry 
 and information less likely to be a competent judge of their 
 nature, extent, and foundation, than one whose observation doe» 
 not travel beyond the circle of his neighbours and acquaintances ? 
 Is it not natural that a man who is a candidate for the favour 
 of the people, and who is dependent on the suffrages of his 
 fellow citizens for the continuance of his public honours, should 
 take care to inform himself of their dispositions and inclinations, 
 and should be willing to allow them their proper degree of in- 
 fluence upon his conduct ? This dependence, and the necessity 
 of being bound himself and his posterity, by the laws to which 
 
'21-2 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 I 
 
 he gives his assent, are the true, and they are the strong cords 
 of sympathy between the representative and the constituent. 
 
 There is no part of the administration of government that 
 requires extensive information, and a thorough knowledge of 
 the principles of political economy, so much as the business of 
 taxation. The man who understands those principles best, will 
 be least likely to resort to oppressive expedients, or to sacrifice 
 any particular class of citizens to the procurement of revenue. 
 It might be demonstrated that the most productive system of 
 finance will always be the least burthensome. There can be no 
 doubt that, in order to a judicious exercise of the power of taxa- 
 tion, it is necessary that the person in whose hands it is, should be 
 acquainted with the general genius, habits, and modes of thinking, 
 of the people at large, and with the resources of the country. 
 And this is all that can be reasonably meant by a knowledge 
 of the interests and feelings of the people. In any other sense, 
 the proposition has either no meaning, or an absurd one. And 
 in that sense, let every considerate citizen judge for himself. 
 where the requisite qualification is most likely to be found. 
 
 PuBLUJg. 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 273 
 
 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 NUMBER XXXVI. 
 
 NEW YORK, JANUARY 8, 1788. 
 
 HAMILTON. 
 
 THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED. 
 
 We bave seen that the result of the observations, to which 
 the foregoing number has been principally devoted, is, that from 
 the natural operation of the different interests and views of the 
 various classes of the community, whether the representation 
 of the people be more or less numerous, it will consist almost 
 entirely of proprietors of land, of merchants, and of members 
 of the learned professions, who will truly represent all those 
 different interests and views. If it should be objected, that we 
 have seen other descriptions of men in the local legislatures ; I 
 answer, that it is admitted there are exceptions to the rule, but 
 not in sufficient number to influence the general complexion or 
 character of the government. There are strong minds in every 
 walk of life, that will rise superior to the disadvantages of situa- 
 tion, and will command the tribute due to their merit, not only 
 from the classes to which they particularly belong, but from the 
 society in general. The door ought to be equally open to all; 
 and I trust, for the credit of human nature, that we shall see 
 examples of such vigorous plants flourishing in the soil of 
 federal, as well as of state legislation ; but occasional instances 
 of this sort, will not render the reasoning, founded upon the 
 general course of things, less conclusive. 
 
271 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 Tiie subject might be placed in several other lights, that would 
 all lead to the same result ; and in particular it might be asked, 
 what greater affinity or relation of interest can be conceived 
 between the carpenter and blacksmith, and the linen manufac- 
 turer or stocking weaver, than between the merchant and either 
 of them ? It is notorious, that there are often as great rival- 
 ships between different branches of the mechanic or manufac- 
 turing arts, as there are between any of the departments of 
 labour and industry ; so that unless the representative body 
 were to be far more numerous, than would be consistent with 
 any idea of regularity or wisdom in its deliberations, it is im- 
 possible that what seems to be the spirit of the objection we 
 have been considering, should ever be realized in practice. But 
 I forbear to dwell longer on a matter, which has hitherto worn 
 too loose a garb to admit even of an accurate inspection of its 
 real shape or tendency. 
 
 There is another objection of a somewhat more precise nature, 
 which claims our attention. It has been asserted that a power 
 of internal taxation in the national legislature, could never be 
 exercised with advantage, as well from the want of a sufficient 
 knowledge of local circumstances, as from an interference be- 
 tween the revenue laws of the union, and of the particular 
 states. The supposition of a want of proper knowledge, seems 
 to be entirely destitute of foundation. If any question is de- 
 pending in a state legislature, respecting one of the counties, 
 which demands a knowledge of local details, how is it acquired ? 
 No doubt, from the information of the members of the county. 
 Cannot the like knowledge be obtained in the national legisla- 
 ture, from the representatives of each state ? And is it not to 
 be presumed, that the men who will generally be sent there, will 
 be possessed of the necessary degree of intelligence, to be able 
 to communicate that information? Is the knowledge of local 
 circumstances, as applied to taxation, a minute topographical 
 acquaintance with all the mountains, rivers, streams, highways, 
 and bye-paths in each state ? or is it a general acquaintance 
 with its situation, and resources — with the state of its agricul- 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 275 
 
 ture, commerce, manufactures — with the nature of its products 
 and consumptions — with the different degrees and kinds of its 
 wealth, property and industry ? 
 
 Nations in general, even under governments of the more 
 popular kind, usually commit the administration of their finances 
 to single men, or to boards composed of a few individuals, who 
 digest and prepare, in the first instance, the plans of taxation • 
 which are afterwards passed into law by the authority of the 
 sovereign or legislature. Inquisitive, and enlightened statesmen, 
 are everywhere deemed best qualified, to make a judicious selection 
 of the objects proper for revenue: which is a clear indication, as 
 far as the sense of mankind can have weight in the question, of 
 the species of knowledge of local circumstances, requisite to the 
 purposes /)f taxation. 
 
 The taxes intended to be comprised under the general deno- 
 mination of internal taxes, may be subdivided into those of the 
 direct, and those of the indirect kind. Though the objection be 
 made to both, yet the reasoning upon it seems to be confined to 
 the former branch. And indeed as to the latter, by which must 
 be understood duties and excises on articles of consumption, 
 one is at a loss to conceive, what can be the nature of the diffi- 
 culties apprehended. The knowledge relating to them, must 
 evidently be of a kind, that will either be suggested by the 
 nature of the article itself, or can easily be procured from any 
 ' well informed man, especially of the mercantile class. The cir- 
 cumstances that may distinguish its situation in one state, from 
 its situation in another, must be few, simple, and easy to be 
 comprehended. The principal thing to be attended to, would 
 be to avoid those articles which had been previously appro- 
 priated to the use of a particular state ; and there could be no 
 difficulty in ascertaining the revenue system of each. This 
 could always be known from the respective codes of laws, as 
 well as from the information of the members of the several 
 states. 
 
 The objection, when applied to real property, or to houses and 
 lands, appears to have, at first sight, more foundation ; but even 
 
276 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 in this view, it will not bear a close examination. Land taxes 
 are commonly laid in one of two modes, either by actual valua- 
 tions, permanent or periodical, or by occasional assessments, at 
 the discretion, or according to the best judgment of certain 
 officers, whose duty it is to make them. In either case, the 
 EXECUTION of the business, which alone requires the knowledge 
 of local details, must be confided to discreet persons in the cha- 
 racter of commissioners or assessors, elected by the people, or 
 appointed by the government for the purpose. All that the law 
 can do, must be to name the persons, or to prescribe the manner 
 of their election or appointment, to fix their numbei*8 and quali- 
 fications; and to draw the general outlines of their powers and 
 duties. And what is there in all this, that cannot as well be 
 performed by the national legislature, as by the state legisla- 
 ture ? The attention of either, can only reach to general prin- 
 ciples J local details, as already observed, must be referred to 
 those who are to execute the plan. 
 
 But there is a simple point of view, in which this matter may 
 be placed, that must be altogether satisfactory. The national 
 legislature can make use of the system of each state within that 
 state. The method of laying and collecting this species of taxes 
 in each state, can, in all its parts, be adopted and employed by 
 the federal government. 
 
 Let it be recollected, that the proportion of these taxes is not 
 to be left to the discretion of the national legislature : but it is 
 to be determined by the numbers of each state, as described in 
 the second section of the first article. An actual census, or 
 enumeration of the people, must furnish the rule ; a circumstance 
 which effectually shuts the door to partiality or oppression. 
 The abuse of this power of taxation seems to have been pro- 
 vided against with guarded circumspection. In addition to the 
 precaution just mentioned, there is a provision that " all duties, 
 imposts, and excises, shall be uniform throughout the United 
 States." 
 
 It has been very properly observed, by different speakers and 
 writers on the side of the constitution, that if the exercise ol 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 27? 
 
 the power of internal taxation by the union, should oe judged 
 beforehand upon mature consideration, or should be discovered 
 on experiment, to be really inconvenient, the federal govern- 
 ment may forbear the use of it, and have recourse to requisi- 
 tions in its stead. By way of answer to this, it has been 
 triumphantly asked, why not in the first instance omit that 
 ambiguous power, and rely upon the latter resource ? Two 
 solid answers may be given ; the first is, that the actual exercise 
 of the power, may be found both convenient, and necessary ; for it 
 is impossible to prove in theory, or otherwise than by the ex- 
 periment, that it cannot be advantageously exercised. The 
 contrary indeed, appears most probable. The second answer is, 
 that the existence of such a power in the constitution, will have 
 a strong influence in giving eflficacy to requisitions. When the 
 states know that the union can supply itself without their 
 agency, it will be a powerful motive for exertion on their 
 part. 
 
 As to the interference of the revenue laws of the union, and 
 of its members ; we have already seen that there can be no 
 clashing or repugnancy of authority. The laws cannot, there- 
 fore, in a legal sense, interfere with each other ; and it is far from 
 impossible to avoid an interference even in the policy of their 
 different systems. An effectual expedient for this purpose will 
 be, mutually to abstain from those objects, which either side 
 may have first had recourse to. As neither can control the 
 other, each will have an obvious and sensible interest in this 
 reciprocal forbearance. And where there is an immediate com- 
 mon interest, we may safely count upon its operation. "When 
 the particular debts of the states are done away, and their ex- 
 penses come to be limited within their natural compass, the 
 possibility almost of interference will vanish. A small land tax 
 will answer the purposes of the states, and will be their most 
 simple, and most fit resource. 
 
 Many spectres have been raised out of this power of internal 
 taxation, to excite the apprehensions of the people-— double seta 
 
21t THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 of revenue officers — a duplication of their burthens by double 
 taxations, and the frightful forms of odious and oppressive poll- 
 taxes, have been played off with all the ingenious dexterity of 
 political legerdemain. 
 
 As to the first point, there are two cases in which there can 
 be no room for double sets of officers; one, where the right of 
 imposing the tax is exclusively vested in the union, which apjalies 
 to the duties on imports : the other, where the object has not 
 fallen under any state regulation or provision, which maj" be 
 applicable to a variety of objects. In other cases, the proba- 
 bility is, that the United States will either wholly abstain from 
 the objects pre-occupied for local purposes, or will make use of 
 the state officers, and state regulations, for collecting the addi- 
 tional imposition. This will best answer the views of revenue, 
 because it will save expense in the collection, and will best avoid 
 any occasion of disgust to the state governments and to .the 
 people. At all events, here is a practicable expedient for avoid- 
 ing such an inconvenience; and nothing more can be required 
 than to show, that evils predicted do not necessarily result from 
 the plan. 
 
 As to any argument derived from a supposed system of in- 
 fluence, it is a sufficient answer to say, that it ought not to be 
 presumed ; but the supposition is susceptible of a more precise 
 answer. If such a spirit should infest the councils of the union, 
 the most certain road to the accomplishment of its aim would 
 be, to employ the state officers as much as possible, and to 
 attach them to the union by an accumulation of their emolu- 
 ments. This would serve to turn the tide of state influence into 
 the channels of the national government, instead of making 
 federal influence flow in an opposite and adverse current. But 
 all suppositions of this kind are invidious, and ought to be 
 banished from the consideration of the great question before 
 the people. They can answer no other end than to cast a mist 
 over the truth. 
 
 As to the suggestion of double taxation, the answer is plain 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 279 
 
 The wants of the union are to be supplied in one way or another 
 if by the authority of the federal government, then it will not 
 remain to be done by that of the state governments. The 
 quantity of taxes to be paid by the community, must be the 
 same in either ease; with this advantage, if the provision is to 
 be made by the union, — that the capital resource of commer- 
 cial imposts, which is the most convenient branch of revenue, 
 can be prudently improved to a much greater extent undei 
 federal, than under state regulation, and of course will rendei 
 it less necessary to recur to more inconvenient methods; and 
 with this further advantage, that as far as there may be any 
 real difficulty in the exercise of the power of internal taxation, 
 it will impose a disposition to greater care in the choice and 
 arrangement of the means; and must naturally tend to make 
 it a fixed point of policy in the national administration, to go 
 as far as may be practicable in making the luxury of the rich 
 tributary to the public treasury, in order to diminish the neces- 
 sity of those impositions, which might create dissatisfaction in 
 the poorer and most numerous classes of the society. Happy 
 it is when the interest which the government has in the pre- 
 servation of its own power, coincides with a proper distribution 
 of the public burthens, and tends to guard the least wealthy part 
 of the community from oppression ! 
 
 As to poll taxes, I, without scruple, confess my disapproba- 
 tion of them; and though they have prevailed from an early 
 period in those states,* which have uniformly been the most 
 tenacious of their rights, I should lament to see them intro 
 duced into practice under the national government. But doeu 
 it follow, because there is a power to lay them, that they will 
 actually be laid? Every state in the union has power to im- 
 pose taxes of this kind; and yet in several of them they are 
 unknown in practice. Are the state governments to be stigma- 
 tized as tyrannies, because they possess this power? If they 
 are not, with what propriety can the like power justify such 
 
 * The New-Eneland States 
 
280 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 a cliarge against the national government, or even be urged 
 as an obstacle to its adoption? As little friendly as I am to 
 tLis species of imposition, I still feel a thorough conviction, 
 that the power of having recourse to it, ought to exist in the 
 federal government. There are certain emergencies of nations, 
 in which expedients, that in the ordinary state of things ought 
 to be forborne, become essential to the public weal. And the 
 government, from the possibility of such emergencies, ought 
 ever to have the option of making use of them. The real 
 scarcity of objects in this country, which may be considered 
 as productive sources of revenue, is a reason peculiar to itself, 
 for not abridging the discretion of the national councils in this 
 respect. There may exist certain critical and tempestuous con- 
 junctures of the state, in which a poll tax maj^ become an in- 
 estimable resource. And as I know nothing to exempt this 
 portion of the globe from the common calamities that have 
 befallen other parts of it, I acknowledge my aversion to ever}^ 
 project that is calculated to disarm the government of a single 
 weapon, which in any possible contingency might be usefully 
 employed for the general defence and security. 
 
 1 have now gone through the examination of those powers, 
 proposed to be conferred upon the federal government, which 
 relate more peculiarly to its energy, and to its efficiency for 
 answering the great and primary objects of union. There are 
 others which, though omitted here, will, in order to render 
 the view of the subject more complete, be taken notice of 
 under the next head of our inquiries. I flatter myself the 
 progress already made, will have sufficed to satisfy the candid 
 and judicious part of the community, that some of the objec- 
 tions which have been most strenuously urged against the 
 constitution, and which were most formidable in their first 
 appearance, are not only destitute of substance, but if they 
 had operated in the formation of the plan, would have ren- 
 dered it incompetent to the great ends of public happiness 
 and national prosperity. I equally flatter myself, that a fur- 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 2S1 
 
 ther and more critical investigation of the system, will sei-vc 
 to recommend it still more to every sincere and disinterested 
 advocate for good government; and will leave no doubt with 
 men of this character, of the propriety and expediency of adopt- 
 ing it. Happy will it be for ourselves, and most honourable for 
 human nature, if we have wisdom and virtue enough, to set so 
 glorious an example to mankind. 
 
 PUBLl U.S. 
 
28i{ THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 NUMBER XXXVII. 
 
 NEW YORK, JANUARY 15, 1788. 
 
 MADISON. 
 
 CONCERNING THE DIFFICULTIES WHICH THE CONVENTION MUST 
 HAVE EXPERIENCED IN THE FORMATION OF A PROPER PLAN. 
 
 In reviewing the defects of the existing confederation, and 
 showing that they cannot be supplied by a government of less 
 energy than that before the public, several of the most important 
 principles of the latter fell of course under consideration. But 
 as the ultimate object of these papers is, to determine clearly and 
 fully the merits of this constitution, and the expediency of 
 adopting it, our plan cannot be completed without taking a 
 more critical and thorough survey of the work of the conven- 
 tion; without examining it on all its sides; comparing it in all 
 its parts, and calculating its probable effects. 
 
 That this remaining task may be executed under impressions 
 conducive to a just and fair result, some reflections must in this 
 place be indulged, which ckndour previously suggests. 
 
 It is a misfortune, inseparable from human affairs, that public 
 measures are rarely investigated with that spirit of moderation, 
 which is essential to a just estimate of their real tendency to 
 advance, or obstruct, the public good; and that this spirit is 
 more apt to be diminished than promoted, by those occasions 
 which require an unusual exercise of it. To those who have 
 been led by experience to attend to this consideration, it could 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 283 
 
 not appear surprising, that the act of the convention which 
 recommends so many important changes and innovations, which 
 may be viewed in so many lights and relations, and which touchee 
 the springs of so many passions and interests, should find or 
 excite dispositions unfriendly, both on one side and on the other, 
 to a fair discussion and accurate judgment of its merits. In 
 Bome, it has been too evident from their own publications, that 
 they have scanned the proposed constitution, not only with a 
 predisposition to censure, but with a predetermination to con- 
 demn ; as the language held by others, betrays an opposite pre- 
 determination or bias, which must render their opinions also of 
 little moment in the question. In placing, however, these differ- 
 ent characters on a level, with respect to the weight of their 
 opinions, I wish not to insinuate that there may not be a mate- 
 rial difference in the purity of their intentions. It is but just 
 to remark in favour of the latter description, that as our situa- 
 tion is universally admitted to be peculiarly critical, and to 
 require indispensably, that something should be done for our 
 relief, the predetermined patron of what has been actually done, 
 may have taken his bias from the weight of these considerations, 
 as well as from considerations of a sinister nature. The pre- 
 determined adversary, on the other hand, can have been governed 
 by no venial motive whatever. The intentions of the first may 
 be upright, as they may on the contrary be culpable. The views 
 of the last cannot be upright, and must be culpable. But the 
 truth is, that these papers are not addressed to persons falling 
 under either of these characters. They solicit the attention of 
 those only, who add to a sincere zeal for the happiness of their 
 country, a temper favourable to a just estimate of the means 
 of promoting it. 
 
 Persons of this character will proceed to an examination of 
 the plan submitted by the convention, not only without a dispo- 
 sition to find or to magnify faults; but will see the propriety of 
 reflecting, that a faultless plan was not to be expected, ^or 
 will they barely make allowances for the errours which may be 
 
 chargeable on the fallibility to which the convention, as a body 
 
 29 
 
284 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 of men, were liable; but will keep in mind, that they tnemeeives 
 also are but men, and ought not to assume an infallibility in 
 rejudging the fallible opinions of others. 
 
 "With equal readiness will it be perceived, that besides these 
 inducements to candour, many allowances ought to be made foi 
 the difficulties inherent in the very nature of the undertaking 
 referred to the convention. 
 
 The novelty of the undertaking immediately strikes us. It 
 has been shown in the course of these papers, that the existing 
 confederation is founded on principles which are fallacious; that 
 we must consequently change this foundation, and with it the 
 superstructure resting upon it. It has been shown, that the 
 other confederacies which could be consulted as precedents, have 
 been vitiated by the same erroneous principles, and can there- 
 fore furnish no other light than that of beacons, which give 
 warning of the course to be shunned, without pointing out that 
 which ought to be pursued. The most that the convention could 
 do in such a situation, was to avoid the errours suggested by the 
 past experience of other countries, as well as of our own ; and 
 to provide a convenient mode of rectifying their own errours as 
 future experience may unfold them. 
 
 Among the difficulties encountered by the convention, a very 
 important one must have lain, in combining the requisite sta- 
 bility and energy in government, with the inviolable attention 
 due to liberty, and to the republican form. Without substan- 
 tially accomplishing this part of their undertaking, they would 
 have very imperfectly fulfilled the object of their appointment, 
 or the expectation of the public : yet that it could not be easily 
 accomplished, will be denied by no one who is unwilling to 
 betray his ignorance of the subject. Energy in government is 
 essential to that security against external and internal dangers 
 and to that prompt and salutary execution of the laws, which 
 enter into the very definition of good government. Stability in 
 government is essential to national character, and to the advan- 
 tages annexed to it, as well as to that repose and confidence in 
 the minds of the people, which are among the chief blessings 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 28S 
 
 of civil society. An irregular and mutable legislation is not more 
 an evil in itself, than it is odious to the people; and it may be 
 pronounced with assurance, that the people of this country, 
 enlightened as they are, with regard to the nature, and inte- 
 rested, as the great body of them are, in the effects of good 
 government, will never be satisfied, till some remedy be applied 
 to the vicissitudes and uncertainties, which characterize the 
 state administrations. On comparing, however, these valuable 
 ingredients with the vital principles of liberty, we must perceive 
 at once the difiiculty of mingling them together in their due 
 proportions. The genius of republican liberty seems to demand 
 on one side, not only that all power should be derived from the 
 people; but that those entrusted with it should be kept in 
 dependence on the people, by a short duration of their appoint- 
 ments; and that even during this short period, the trust should 
 be placed not in a few, but in a number of hands. Stability, on 
 the contrary, requires, that the hands, in which power is lodged, 
 should continue for a length of time the same. A frequent 
 change of men will result from a frequent return of elections; 
 and a frequent change of measures, from a frequent change of 
 men : whilst energy of government requires not only a certain 
 duration of power, but the execution of it by a single hand. 
 
 How far the convention may have succeeded in this part of 
 their work, will better appear on a more accurate view of it. 
 From the cursory view here taken, it must clearly appear to 
 have been an arduous part. 
 
 Not less arduous must have been the task of marking the 
 proper line of partition, between the authority of the general, 
 and that of the state governments. Every man will be sensible 
 of this difficulty, in proportion as he has been accustomed to 
 contemplate and discriminate objects, extensive and complicated 
 in their nature. The faculties of the mind itself have never yet 
 been distinguished and defined, with satisfactory precision, by 
 all the efforts of the most acute and metaphysical philosophers. 
 Sense, perception, judgment, desire, volition, memory, imagina- 
 tion, are found to be separated, by such delicate shades and 
 
286 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 minute gradations, that their boundaries have eluded the most 
 subtle investigations, and remain a pregnant source of ingenious 
 disquisition and controversy. The boundaries between the great 
 kingdoms of nature, and, still more, between the various pro 
 vinces, and lesser portions, into which they are subdivided, afford 
 another illustration of the same important truth. The most 
 sagacious and laborious naturalists have never yet succeeded, in 
 tracing with certainty the line which separates the district oJ 
 vegetable life, from the neighbouring region of unorganized 
 matter, or which marks the termination of the former, and the 
 commencement of the animal empire. A still greater obscurity 
 lies in the distinctive characters, by which the objects in each 
 of these great departments of nature have been arranged and 
 assorted. 
 
 When we pass from the works of nature, in which all the de- 
 lineations are perfectly accurate, and appear to be otherwise 
 only from the imperfection of the eye which surveys them, to 
 the institutions of man, in which the obscurity arises as well 
 from the object itself, as from the organ by which it is con- 
 templated; we must perceive the necessity of moderating still 
 further our expectations and hopes from the efforts of human 
 sagacity. Experience has instructed us, that no skill in the 
 science of government has yet been able to discriminate and 
 define, with sufficient certainty, its three great provinces, the 
 legislative, executive, and judiciary; or even the privileges and 
 powers of the different legislative branches. Questions daily 
 occur in the course of practice, which prove the obscurity which 
 reigns in these subjects, and which puzzle the greatest adepts in 
 political science. 
 
 The experience of ages, with the continued and combined 
 labours of the most enlightened legislators and jurists, have been 
 equally unsuccessful in delineating the several objects and limits 
 of different codes of laws, and different tribunals of justice. The 
 precise extent of the common law, the statute law, the maritime 
 law, the ecclesiastical law, the law of corporations, and othei 
 local laws and customs, remain still to be clearly and finally 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 287 
 
 established in Great Britain, where accuracy in such subjects has 
 been more industriously pursued than in any other part of tho 
 world. The jurisdiction of her several courts, general and local 
 of law, of equity, of admiralty, &c., is not less a source of fre 
 quent and intricate discussions, sufficiently denoting the inde- 
 terminate limits by which they are respectively circumscribed 
 All new laws, though penned with the greatest technical skill, 
 and passed on the fullest and most mature deliberation, are con- 
 sidered as more or less obscure and equivocal, until their mean- 
 ing be liquidated and ascertained by a series of particular dis- 
 cussions and adjudications. Besides the obscurity arising from 
 the complexity of objects, and the imperfection of the human 
 faculties, the medium through which the conceptions of men are 
 conveyed to each other, adds a fresh embarrassment. The use 
 of words is to express ideas. Perspicuity therefore requires, not 
 only that the ideas should be distinctly formed, but that they 
 should be expressed by words distinctly and exclusively appro- 
 priated to them. But no language is so copious as to supply 
 words and phrases for every complex idea, or so correct as not 
 to include many, equivocally denoting different ideas. Hence it 
 must happen, that however accurately objects may be discrimi- 
 nated in themselves, and however accurately the discrimination 
 may be conceived, the definition of them may be rendered inac- 
 curate, by the inaccuracy of the terms in which it is delivered. 
 And this unavoidable inaccuracy must be greater or less, accord- 
 ing to the complexity and novelty of the objects defined. When 
 the Almighty himself condescends to address mankind in their 
 own language, his meaning, luminous as it must be, is rendered 
 dim and doubtful, by the cloudy medium through which it is 
 Cv)mmunicated. 
 
 Here, then, are three sources of vague and incorrect defini- 
 tions; indistinctness of the object, imperfection of the organ of 
 perception, inadequateness of the vehicle of ideas. Any one of 
 chese must produce a certain degree of obscurity. The con- 
 vention, in delineating the boundary between the federal and 
 
288 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 Btato jurisdictions, must have experienced the full effect of 
 them nil. 
 
 To the difficulties already mentioned, may be added the inter- 
 fering pretensions of the larger and smaller states. We cannot 
 err, in supposing that the former would contend for a participa- 
 tion in the government, fully proportioned to their superiour 
 wealth and importance; and that the latter would not be less 
 tenacious of the equality at present enjoyed by them We may 
 well suppose, that neither side would entirely yield to the other, 
 and consequently that the struggle could be terminated only by 
 compromise. It is extremely probable also, that after the ratio 
 of representation had been adjusted, this very comj)romise must 
 have produced a fresh struggle between the same parties, to give 
 such a turn to the organization of the government, aud to the 
 distribution of its powers, as would increase the importance of 
 the branches, in forming which they had respectively obtained 
 the greatest share of influence. There are features in the consti- 
 tution which warrant each of these suppositions ; and as far as 
 either of them is well founded, it shows that the convention 
 must have been compelled to sacrifice theoretical propriety, to 
 the force of extraneous considerations. 
 
 Nor could it have been the large and small states only, which 
 would marshal themselves in opposition to each other on various 
 points. Other combinations, resulting from a difference of local 
 position and policy, must have created additional difficulties. As 
 every state may be divided into different districts, and its citizens 
 into different classes, which give birth to contending interests 
 and local jealousies; so the different parts of the United States 
 are distinguished from each other, by a variety of circumstances, 
 which produce a like effect on a larger scale. And although this 
 variety of interests, for reasons sufficiently explained in a former 
 paper, may have a salutary influence on the administration of the 
 government, when formed; yet every one must be sensible ol 
 the contrary influence, which must have been experienced ir Ihe 
 task of forming it. 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 289 
 
 Would it be wonderful, if under the pressure of all these diflS- 
 culties, the convention should have been forced into some devia- 
 tions from that artificial structure and regular symmetry, which 
 an abstract view of the subject might lead an ingenious theorist 
 to bestow on a constitution planned in his closet, or in his imagi- 
 nation ? The real wonder is that so many diflSculties should 
 have been surmounted; and surmounted with an unanimity 
 almost as unprecedented, as it must have been unexpected. It 
 is impossible for any man of candour to reflect on this circum- 
 stance, without partaking of the astonishment. It is impossible, 
 for the man of pious reflection, not to perceive in it a finger 
 of that Almighty Hand, which has been so frequently and sig- 
 nally extended to our relief in the critical stages of the revo- 
 lution. 
 
 We had occasion, in a former paper, to take notice of the 
 repeated trials which have been unsuccessfully made in the 
 United Netherlands, for reforming the baneful and notorious 
 vices of their constitution. The history of almost all the great 
 councils and consultations, held among mankind for reconciling 
 their discordant opinions, assuaging their mutual jealousies, and 
 adjusting their respective interests, is a history of factions, con- 
 tentions, and disappointments J and may be classed among th« 
 most dark and degrading pictures, which display the infirmities 
 and depravities of the human character. If, in a few scattered 
 instances, a brighter aspect is presented, they serve only as 
 exceptions to admonish us of the general truth; and by their 
 lustre to darken the gloom of the adverse prospect, to which 
 they are contrasted. In revolving the causes from which these 
 exceptions result, and applying them to the particular instance 
 before us, we are necessarily led to two important conclusions. 
 The first is, that the convention must have enjoyed, in a very 
 smgular degree, an exemption from the pestilential influence 
 of party animosities; the diseases most incident to deliberative 
 bodies, and most apt to contaminate their proceedings. The 
 second conclusion is, that all the deputations composing the con- 
 
290 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 vention were either satisfactorily accommodated by the final 
 act ; '^r were induced to accede to it, by a deep conviction of 
 tne necessity of sacrificing private opinions and partial interests 
 to the public good; and by a despair of seeing this necessity 
 diminished by delays, or by n«w experiments. 
 
 POBLIUfi. 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 291 
 
 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 NUMBER XXXVIII. 
 
 NEW YORK, JANUARY 15, 1788. 
 
 MADISON. 
 
 THE SUBJECT CONTINUED, AND THE INCOHERENCE OF THE OBJEC- 
 TIONS TO THE PLAN EXPOSED. 
 
 It is not a little remarkable, that in every case reported by 
 ancient history, in which government has been established with 
 deliberation and consent, the task of framing it has not been 
 committed to an assembly of men; but has been performed by 
 some individual citizen, of preeminent wisdom and approved 
 integrity. 
 
 Minos, we learn, was the primitive founder of the government 
 of Crete; as Zaleucus was of that of the Locrians. Theseus 
 first, and after him Draco and Solon, instituted the government 
 of Athens. Lycurgus was the lawgiver of Sparta. The founda- 
 tion of the original government of Eome was laid by Eomulus : 
 and the work completed by two of his elective successors, Numa, 
 and Tullus Hostilius. On the abolition of royalty, the consular 
 administration was substituted by Brutus, who stepped forward 
 with a project for such a reform, which, he alleged, had been pre- 
 pared by Servius Tullius, and to which his address obtained the 
 assent and ratification of the senate and people. This remark is 
 applicable to confederate governments also. Amphyction, we are 
 tiold, was the author of that which bore his name. The Achaean 
 
292 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 league received its first birth from Achseus, and its second from 
 Aratus. 
 
 What degree of agency these reputed lawgivers might have 
 in their respective establishments, or how far they might be 
 clothed with the legitimate authority of the people, cannot, in 
 every instance, be ascertained. In some, however, the proceed- 
 mg was strictly regular. Draco appears to have been entrusted 
 by the people of Athens, with indefinite powers to reform 
 its government and laws. And Solon, according to Plutarch, 
 was in a manner compelled, by the universal suffrage of his 
 fellow-citizens, to take upon him the sole and absolute power of 
 new modelling the constitution. The proceedings under Ly- 
 curgus were less regular; but as far as the advocates for a 
 regular reform could prevail, they all turned their eyes towards 
 the single efforts of that celebrated patriot and sage, instead of 
 seeking to bring about a revolution, by the intervention of a 
 deliberative body of citizens. 
 
 Whence could it have proceeded, that a people, jealous as the 
 Greeks were of their liberty, should so far abandon the rules of 
 caution, as to place their destiny in the hands of a single citizen ? 
 Whence could it have proceeded that the Athenians, a people who 
 would not suffer an army to be commanded by fewer than ten 
 generals, and who required no other proof of danger to their 
 liberties than the illustrious merit of a fellow-citizen, should con- 
 sider one illustrious citizen as a more eligible depository of the 
 fortunes of themselves and their posterity, than a select body of 
 citizens, from whose common deliberations more wisdom, as well 
 as more safety, might have been expected ? These questions 
 cannot be fully answered, without supposing that the fears of 
 discord am' d'sunion among a number of counsellors, exceeded 
 the apprenension of treachery or incapacity in a single indi- 
 vidual. History informs us likewise, of the difiiculties with 
 which these celebrated reformers had to contend ; as well as of 
 the expedients which they were obliged to employ, in order to 
 carry their reforms into effect. Solon, who seems to have in- 
 dulged a more temporizing policy, confessed that he had not 
 
TUE FEDERALIST. 293 
 
 given to his countrymen the government best suited to their 
 happiness, but most tolerable to their prejudices. And Lycurgus. 
 more true to his object, was under the necessity of mixing a 
 portion of violence with the authority of superstition ; and of 
 securing his final success, by a voluntary renunciation, first of 
 his country, and then of his life. 
 
 If these lessons teach us, on one hand, to admire the improve- 
 ment made by America on the ancient mode of preparing and 
 establishing regular plans of government ; they serve not less on 
 the other, to admonish us of the hazards and difficulties incident 
 to such experiments, and of the great imprudence of unneccR- 
 aarily multiplying them. 
 
 Is it an unreasonable conjecture, that the errours which may 
 be contained in the plan of the convention, ai'e such as have 
 resulted, rather from the defect of antecedent experience on this 
 complicated and difficult subject, than from a want of accuracy 
 or care in the investigation of it; and, consequently, such as will 
 not be ascertained until an actual trial shall have pointed them 
 out ? This conjecture is rendered probable, not only by many 
 considerations of a general nature, but by the particular case of 
 the^articles of confederation. 
 
 It is observable, that among the numerous objections and 
 amendments suggested by the several states, when these articles 
 were submitted for their ratification, not one is found, which 
 alludes to the great and radical errour, which on actual trial has 
 discovered itself. And if we except the observations which New 
 Jersey was led to make, rather by her local situation, than by 
 her peculiar foresight, it may be questioned whether a single 
 suggestion was of sufficient moment to justify a revision of the 
 system. There is abundant reason nevertheless to suppose, that 
 immaterial as these objections were, they would have been ad- 
 hered to with a very dangerous inflexibilitj" in some states, had 
 not a zeal for their opinions and supposed interests been stifled 
 by the more powerful sentiment of self-preservation. One state, 
 we may remember, persisted for several years in refusing her 
 concurrence, although the enemy remained the whole period at 
 
2&'l THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 our gates, oi rather in the very bowels of our country. Nor was 
 her pliancy in the end eftected by a less motive, than the fear of 
 being chargeable with protracting the public calamities, and 
 endangering the event of the contest. Every candid reader 
 will make the proper reflections on these important facts. 
 
 A patient, who finds his disorder daily growing worse, and that 
 an efficacious remedy can no longer be delayed without extreme 
 danger; after coolly revolving his situation, and the characters 
 of different physicians, selects and calls in such of them as ho 
 judges most capable of administering relief, and best entitled 
 to his confidence. The physicians attend : the case of the patient 
 is carefully examined — a consultation is held : they are unani- 
 mously agreed, that the symptoms are critical; but that the 
 case, with proper and timely relief, is so far from being despe- 
 rate, that it may be made to issue in an improvement of his 
 constitution. They are equally unanimous in prescribing the 
 remedy, by which this happy effect is to be produced. The pre- 
 scription is no sooner made known, however, than a number of 
 persons interpose, and, without denying the reality or danger of 
 the disorder, assure the patient that the prescription will be 
 poison to his constitution, and forbid him under pain of certain 
 death, to make use of it. Might not the patient reasonably 
 demand, before he ventured to follow this advice, that the 
 authors of it should at least agree among themselves on some 
 other remedy to be substituted ? And if he found them differing 
 as much from one another, as from his first counsellors, would 
 he not act prudently, in trying the experiment unanimously 
 recommended by the latter, rather than in hearkening to those 
 who could neither deny the necessity of a speedy remedy, nor 
 agree in proposing one ? 
 
 Such a patient, and in such a situation, is America at this 
 moment. She has been sensible of her malady. She has ob- 
 tained a regular and unanimous advice from men of her own 
 deliberate choice. And she is warned by others against fol- 
 lowing this advice, under pain of the most fatal consequencep 
 Do the monitors deny the reality of her danger? No Df 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 295 
 
 the}' deny the necessity of some speedy and powerful remedy ? 
 No. Are they agreed, are any two of them agreed, in theii 
 objections to the remedy proposed, or in the proper one to be 
 substituted ? Let them speak for themselves. 
 
 This one tells us, that the proposed constitution ought to be 
 rejected, because it is not a confederation of the states, but a 
 government over individuals. Another admits, that it ought to 
 be a government over individuals, to a certain extent, but by no 
 means to the extent proposed. A third does not object to the 
 government over individuals, or to the extent proposed, but to 
 the want of a bill of rights. A fourth concurs in the absolute 
 necessity of a bill of rights, but contends that it ought to be 
 declaratory, not of the personal rights of individuals, but of the 
 rights reserved to the states in their political capacity. A fifth 
 is of opinion, that a bill of rights of any sort would be super- 
 fluous and misplaced, and that the plan would be unexception- 
 able, but for the fatal power of regulating the times and places 
 of election. An objector in a large state exclaims loudly against 
 the unreasonable equality of representation in the senate. An 
 objector in a small state is equally loud against the dangerous 
 inequality in the house of representatives. From this quarter, 
 we are alarmed with the amazing expense, from the number of 
 persons who are to administer the new government. Frona 
 another quarter, and sometimes from the same quarter, on 
 another occasion, the cry is, that the congress will be but a 
 Rhadow of a representation, and that the government would be 
 far less objectionable, if the number and the expense wert 
 doubled. A patriot in a state that does not import or export, dis- 
 cerns insuperable objections against the power of direct taxation 
 The patriotic adversary in a state of great exports and imports, 
 is not less dissatisfied that the whole burthen of taxes may be 
 thrown on consumption. This politician discovers in the con- 
 Btitction a direct and irresistible tendency to monarchy : that is 
 equuUy sure, it will end in aristocracy. Another is puzzled to 
 say which of these shapes it will ultimately assume, but sees 
 clearly it must be one or other of them : whilst a fourth is 
 
296 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 QOt wanting, who with no less confidence affirms, that the con- 
 stitution is so far from having a bias towards either of these 
 dangers, that the weight on that side will not be sufficient to 
 keep it upright and firm against its opposite propensities. With 
 another class of adversaries to the constitution, the language is, 
 that the legislative, executive, and judiciary departments, are 
 intermixed in such a manner, as to contradict all the ideas of 
 regular government, and all the requisite precautions in favour 
 of liberty. Whilst this objection circulates in vague and general 
 expressions, there are not a few who lend their sanction to it. 
 Let each one come forward with his particular explanation, and 
 scarcely any two are exactly agreed on the subject. In the 
 eyes of one, the junction of the senate with the president, in the 
 responsible function of appointing to offices, instead of vesting 
 this executive power in the executive alone, is the vicious part 
 of the organization. To another, the exclusion of the house of 
 representatives, whose numbers alone could be a due security 
 against corruption and partiality in the exercise of such a 
 power, is equally obnoxious. With another, the admission of 
 the president into any share of a power, which must ever be a 
 dangerous engine in the hands of the executive magistrate, is 
 an unpardonable violation of the maxims of republican jealousy. 
 No part of the arrangement, according to some, is more inad- 
 missible than the trial of impeachments by the senate, which is 
 alternately a member both of the legislative and executive de- 
 partments, when this power so evidently belonged to the judi- 
 ciary department. We concur fully, reply others, in the objec- 
 tion to this part of the plan, but we can never agree that a 
 reference of impeachments to the judiciary authority would be an 
 amendment of the errour : our principal dislike to the organiza- 
 tion, arises from the extensive powers already lodged in that de- 
 partment. Even among the zealous patrons of a council of state, 
 the most irreconcilable variance is discovered, concerning the 
 mode in which it ought to be constituted. The demand of one 
 gentleman is, that the council should consist of a small number, 
 to be appointed by the most numerous branch of the legi/jlature 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 297 
 
 Another would prefer a larger number, and considers it as a fun- 
 damental condition, that the appointment should be made by the 
 president himself. 
 
 As it can give no umbrage to the writers against the plan of 
 the federal constitution, let us suppose, that as thej' are the most 
 zealous, so they are also the most sagacious, of those who think 
 the late convention were unequal to the task assigned them, and 
 that a wiser and better plan might and ought to be substituted. 
 Let us further suppose, that their country should concur, both 
 m this favourable opinion of their merits, and in their unfavour- 
 able opinion of the convention ; and should accordingly proceed 
 to form them into a second convention, with full powers, and 
 for the express purpose of revising and remoulding the work of 
 the first. Were the experiment to be seriously made, though it 
 requires some effort to view it seriously even in fiction, I leave it 
 to be decided by the sample of opinions just exhibited, whether, 
 with all their enmity to their predecessors, they would, in any 
 one point, depart so widely from their example, as in the discord 
 and ferment that would mark their own deliberations; and 
 whether the constitution, now before the public, would not stand 
 as fair a chance for immortality, as Lycurgus gave to that of 
 Sparta, by making its change to depend on his own return from 
 exile and death, if it were to be immediately adopted, and were 
 to continue in force, not until a better, but until another 
 should be agreed upon by this new assembly of lawgivers. 
 
 It is a matter both of wonder and regret, that those who raise 
 80 many objections against the new constitution, should never 
 call to mind the defects of that which is to be exchanged for it. 
 It is not necessary that the former should be perfect : it 19 
 suflficient that the latter is more imperfect. !No man would 
 refuse to give brass for silver or gold, because the latter had 
 some alloy in it. No man would refuse to quit a shattered and 
 tottering habitation, for a firm and commodious building, because 
 the latter had not a porch to it; or because some of the rooms 
 tnight be a little larger or smaller, or the ceiling a little higher 
 »r low<;r than his fancy would have planned them. But waving 
 
•298 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 illustrations 'of this sort, is it not manifest, that most of the 
 capital objections urged against the new system, lie with tenfold 
 weight against the existing confederation ? Is an indefinite 
 power to raise money dangerous in the hands of a federal govern- 
 ment? The present congress can make requisitions to any 
 amount they please; and tlie states are constitutionally bound 
 to furnish them. They can emit bills of credit as long as they 
 will pay for the paper j they can borrow both abroad and at 
 home, as long as a shilling will be lent. Is an indefinite power 
 to raise troops dangerous ? The confederation gives to congress 
 that power also: and they have already begun to make use of it. 
 Is it improper and unsafe to intermix the different powers of 
 government in the same body of men ? Congress, a single body 
 of men, are the sole depository of all the federal powers. Is it 
 particularly dangerous to give the keys of the treasury, and the 
 command of the army, into the same hands ? The confederation 
 places them both in the hands of congress. Is a bill of rights 
 essential to liberty? The confederation has no bill of rights. 
 Is it an objection against the new constitution, that it empowers 
 the senate, with the concurrence of the executive, to make 
 treaties which are to be the laws of the land? The existing 
 congress, without any such control, can make treaties which 
 they themselves have declared, and most of the states have 
 recognized, to be the supreme law of the land. Is the importa- 
 tion of slaves permitted by the new constitution for twenty 
 years ? By the old it is permitted forever. 
 
 I shall be told, that however dangerous this mixture of powers 
 may be in theory, it is rendered harmless by the dependence of 
 congress on the states for the means of carrying them into 
 practice : that however large the mass of powers may be, it is 
 in fact a lifeless mass. Then, say I, in the first place, that the 
 confederation is chargeable with the still greater folly, of 
 declaring certain powers in the federal government to be abso- 
 lutely necessary, and at the same time rendering them absolutely 
 nugatory; and, in the next place, that if the union is to con- 
 tinue, and no better government be substituted, effective powers 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 299 
 
 must either be granted to, or assumed by, the existing congress; 
 m either of which events, the contrast just stated will holu 
 good. But this is not all. Out of this lifeless mass, has already- 
 grown an excrescent power, which tends to realize all the dan- 
 gers that can be apprehended from a defective construction of 
 the supreme government of the union. It is now no longer a 
 point of speculation and hope, that the . western territory is a 
 mine of vast wealth to the United States: and although it is 
 not of such a nature as to extricate them from their present 
 distresses, or for some time to come to yield any regular sup- 
 plies for the public expenses; yet must it hereafter be able, 
 under proper management, both to effect a gradual dischai'ge of 
 the domestic debt, and to furnish, for a certain period, liberal 
 tributes to the federal treasury. A very large proportion of this 
 fund has been already surrendered by individual states ; and it 
 may with reason be expected, that the remaining states will not 
 jjersist in withholding similar proofs of their equity ana genero- 
 sity. We may calculate, therefore, that a rich and fertile country, 
 of ^n area equal to the inhabited extent of the United States, 
 will soon become a national stock. Congress have assumed 
 the administration of this stock. They ha"ve begun to render it 
 productive. Congress have undertaken to do more : — they have 
 proceeded to form new states; to erect temporary governments; 
 to appoint officers for them; and to prescribe the conditions on 
 which such states shall be admitted into the confederacy. All this 
 has been done : and done without the least colour of constitu- 
 tional authority. Yet no blame has been whispered : no alarm 
 has been sounded. A great and independent fund of revenue 
 is passing into the hands of a single body of men, who can 
 EAISE TROOPS to an INDEFINITE NUMBER, and appropriate money 
 to their support for an indefinite period of time. And yet 
 there are men, who have not only been silent spectators of this 
 prospect, but who are advocates for the system which exhibits 
 t; and, at the same time, urge against the new system the 
 Dejections which we have heard. Would they not act with more 
 'jonsistency, in urging the establishment of the latter, as no less 
 
 30 
 
300 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 necessary to guard the union against the future powers and 
 resources of a body constructed like the existing congress, than 
 to save it from the dangers threatened by the present impotency 
 of that assembly? 
 
 I mean not, by any thing here said, to throw censure on the 
 measures which have been pursued by congress. I am sensible 
 they could not have done otherwise. The public interest, the 
 necessity of the case, imposed upon them the task of overleap- 
 ing their constitutional limits. But is not the fact an alarming 
 proof of the danger resulting from a government, which does 
 not possess regular powers commensurate to its objects? A dis- 
 solution, or usurpation, is the dreadful dilemma to which it is 
 continually exj osed. 
 
 PUBLIUS. 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 801 
 
 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 NUMBER XXXIX. 
 
 NEW YORK, JANUARY 18, 1788. 
 
 MADISON. 
 
 THE CONFORMITY OF THE PLAN TO REPUBLICAN PRINCIPLES- 
 AN OBJECTION IN RESPECT TO THE POWERS OF THE CONVEN- 
 TION, EXAMINED. 
 
 The last paper having concluded the observations, which were 
 meant to introduce a candid survey of the plan of government 
 reported by the convention, we now proceed to the execution of 
 that part of our undertaking. 
 
 The first question that offers itself is, whether the general 
 form and aspect of the government be strictly republican ? It 
 is evident that no other form would be reconcilable with the 
 genius of the people of America; with the fundamental principles 
 of the revolution; or with that honourable determination which 
 animates every votary of freedom, to rest all our political expe- 
 riments on the capacity of mankind for self-government. If the 
 plan of the convention, therefore, be found to depart from the 
 republican character, its advocates must abandon it as no longer 
 defensible. 
 
 What, then, are the distinctive characters of the republican 
 form ? Were an answer to this question to be sought, not by 
 recurring to principles, but in the application of the term by 
 political writers, to the constitutions of different states, no satis- 
 factory one would ever be found. Holland, in which no particle 
 
302 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 of th.) supreme authority i8 derived from tlie people, has passed 
 almost universally under the denomination of a republic. The 
 same title has been bestowed on Venice, where absolute power 
 over the great body of the people is exercised, in the most abso- 
 lute manner, by a small body of hereditary nobles. Poland, 
 which is a mixture of aristocracy' and of monarchy in their 
 worst forms, has been dignified with the same appellation. The 
 government of England, which has one republican branch only, 
 combined with a hereditary aristocracy and monarchy, has, with 
 equal impropriety, been frequently placed on the list of republics. 
 These examples, which are nearly as dissimilar to each other as 
 to a genuine republic, show the extreme inaccuracy with which 
 the term has been used in political disquisitions. 
 
 If we resort, for a criterion, to the different principles on 
 which different forms of government are established, we may 
 define a republic to be, or at least may bestow that name on, 
 a government which derives all its powers directly or indirectly 
 from the great body of the people, and is administered by 
 persons holding their offices during pleasure, for a limited period, 
 or during good behaviour. It is essential to such a govern- 
 ment, that it be derived from the great body of the society, not 
 from an inconsiderable proportion, or a favoured class of it; 
 otherwise a handful of tyrannical nobles, exercising their oppres- 
 sions by a delegation of their powers, might aspire to the rank 
 of republicans, and claim for their government the honourable 
 title of republic. It is sufficient for such a government, that the 
 persons administering it be appointed, either directly or indi- 
 rectly, by the people; and that they hold their appointments by 
 either of the tenures just specified; otherwise every government 
 in the United States, as well as every other popular government 
 that has been or can be well organized or well executed, would be 
 degraded from the republican character. According to the con 
 stitution of every state in the union, some or other of the officers 
 of government are appointed indirectly only by the people. 
 According to most of them, the chief magistrate himself is so 
 appointed. And according to one, this mode of appointment 's 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 308 
 
 BXiended to one of the coordinate branches of the legislature. 
 According to all the constitutions also, the tenure of the highesi 
 oflSces is extended to a definite period, and in many instances, 
 both within the legislative and executive departments, to a 
 period of years. According to the provisions of most of the 
 constitutions, again, as well as according to the most respectable 
 and received opinions on the subject, the members of the judi- 
 ciary department are to retain their offices by the firm tenure 
 of good behaviour. 
 
 On comparing the constitution planned by the convention, 
 with the standard here fixed, we perceive at once, that it is, in 
 the most rigid sense, conformable to it. The house of repre- 
 sentatives, like that of one branch at least of all the state legis- 
 latures, is elected immediately by the great body of the people 
 The senate, like the present congress, and the senate of Mary- 
 land, derives its appointment indirectly from the people. The 
 president is indirectly derived from the choice of the people, 
 according to the example in most of the states. Even the 
 judges, with all other officers of the union, will, as in the several 
 states, be the choice, though a remote choice, of the people them- 
 selves. The duration of the appointments is equally conform- 
 able to the republican standard, and to the model of the state 
 constitutions. The house of representatives is periodically elect- 
 ive, as in all the states; and for the period of two years, as in the 
 state of South Carolina. The senate is elective, for the period 
 of six years ; which is but one year more than the period of the 
 senate of Maryland ; and but two more than that of the senates 
 of New York and Virginia. The president is to continue in office 
 for the period of four years ; as in New York and Delaware, the 
 chief magistrate is elected for three years, and in South Carolina 
 for two years. In the other states the election is annual. In 
 several of the states, however, no explicit provision is made for 
 the impeachment of the chief magistrate. And in Delaware and 
 Virginia, he is not impeachable till out of office. The president 
 of the United States is impeachable at any time during his con- 
 tinuance in office. The tenure by which the judges are to hold 
 
304 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 their places, is, as it unquestionably ought to be, that of good 
 behaviour. The tenure of the ministerial offices generally, will 
 be a subject of legal regulation, conformably to the reason of 
 the case, and the example of the state constitutions. 
 
 Could any further proof be required of the republican com- 
 plexion of this system, the most decisive one might be found in 
 its absolute prohibition of titles of nobility, both under the 
 federal and the state governments; and in its express guarantee 
 of the republican form to each of the latter. 
 
 But it was not sufficient, say the adversaries of the proposea 
 constitution, for the convention to adhere to the republican form. 
 They ought, with equal care, to have preserved the federal form, 
 which regards the union as a confederacy of sovereign states; 
 instead of which, they have framed a national government, which 
 regards the union as a consolidation of the states. And it is 
 asked, by what authority this bold and radical innovation was 
 undertaken ? The handle which has been made of this objec- 
 tion requires, that it should be examined with some precision. 
 
 Without inquiring into the accuracy of the distinction on 
 which the objection is founded, it will be necessary to a just 
 estimate of its force, first, to ascertain the real character of the 
 government in question; secondly, to inquire how far the con- 
 vention were authorized to propose such a government; and 
 thirdly, how far the duty they owed to their country, could 
 supply any defect of regular authority. 
 
 First. In order to ascertain the real character of the govern- 
 ment, it may be considered in relation to the foundation on 
 which it is to be established; to the sources from which its 
 ordinary powers are to be drawn; to the operation of those 
 powers; to the extent of them; and to the authority by which 
 future changes in the government are to be introduced. 
 
 On examining the first relation, it appears, on one hand, that 
 the constitution is to be founded on the assent and ratification 
 of the people of America, given by deputies elected for 'he spe- 
 cial purpose; but on the other, that this assent and ratifii.avion 
 is to be given by the people, not as individuals composing on* 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 305 
 
 entire nation, but a8 composing the distinct and independent 
 states to which they respectively belong. It is to be the assent 
 and ratification of the several states, derived from the supreme 
 authority in each state — the authority of the people themselves. 
 The act, therefore, establishing the constitution, will not be a 
 national, but a federal act. 
 
 That it will be a federal, and not a national act, as these terms 
 are understood by the objectors, the act of the people, as form- 
 ing so many independent states, not as forming one aggregate 
 nation, is obvious from this single consideration, that it is to 
 result neither from the decision of a majority of the people of the 
 union, nor from that of a majority of the states. It must result 
 from the unanimous assent of the several states that are parties to 
 it, differing no otherwise from their ordinary assent than in its 
 being expressed, not by the legislative authority, but by that of 
 the people themselves. Were the people regarded in this trans- 
 action as forming one nation, the will of the majority of the 
 whole people of the United States would bind the minority; in 
 the same manner as the majority in each state must bind the 
 minority; and the will of the majority must be determined either 
 by a comparison of the individual votes, or by considering the 
 will of the majority of the states, as evidence of the will of a 
 majority of the people of the United States. Neither of these 
 rules has been adopted. Each state, in ratifying the constitu- 
 tion, is considered as a sovereign body, independent of all 
 others, and only to be bound by its own voluntary act. In this 
 relation, then, the new constitution will, if established, be a fede- 
 ral, and not a national constitution. 
 
 The next relation is, to the sources from which the ordinary 
 powers of government are to be derived. The house of repre- 
 wentatives will derive its powers from the people of America, 
 and the people will be represented in the same proportion, and 
 on the same principle, as they are in a legislature of a particular 
 state. So far the government is national, not federal. The 
 senate, on the other hand, will derive its powers from the states, 
 as political and coequal societies ; and these will be represented 
 
806 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 on the principle of equality in the senate, as they now are in the 
 existing congress. So far the government is federal^ not national. 
 The executive power will be derived from a very compound 
 source. The immediate election of the president is to be made 
 by the states in their political characters. The votes allotted to 
 them are in a compound ratio, which considers them partly as 
 distinct and coequal societies; partly as unequal members of the 
 same society. The eventual election, again, is to be made by 
 that branch of the legislature which consists of the national 
 representatives; but in this particular act, they are to be thrown 
 into the form of individual delegations, from so many distinct 
 and coequal bodies politic. Prom this aspect of the govern- 
 ment, it appears to be of a mixed character, presenting at least 
 as many federal as national features. 
 
 The difference between a federal and national government, as 
 it relates to the operation of the government, is, by the adversaries 
 of the plan of the convention, supposed to consist in this, that in 
 the former, the powers operate on the political bodies composing 
 the confederacy, in their political capacities; in the latter, on 
 the individual citizens composing the nation, in their individual 
 capacities. On trying the constitution by this criterion, it falls 
 under the national^ not the federal character; though perhaps 
 not so completely as has been understood. In several cases, and 
 particularly in the trial of controversies to which states may be 
 parties, they must be viewed and proceeded against in their col- 
 lective and political capacities only. But the operation of the 
 government on the people in their individual capacities, in its 
 ordinary and most essential proceedings, will, on the whole, in 
 the sense of its opponents, designate it, in this relation, a national 
 government. 
 
 But if the government be national, with regard to tlie opera- 
 tion of its powers, it changes its aspect again, when we con- 
 template it in relation to the extent of its powers. The idea of 
 a national government involves in it, not only an authority over 
 the individual citizens, but an indefinite supremacy over all per- 
 sons and tb'ngs, so far as thejare objects of lawful government. 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 307 
 
 Among a people consolidated into one nation, this supremacj 
 is completely vested in the national legislature. Among com- 
 munities united for particular purposes, it is vested partly in the 
 general, and partly in the municipal legislatures. In the former 
 case, all local authorities are subordinate to the supreme ; and 
 may be controled, directed, or abolished by it at pleasure. In 
 the latter, the local or municipal authorities form distinct and 
 independent portions of the supremacy, no more subject within 
 their respective spheres, to the general authority, than the 
 general authority is subject to them within its own sphere. In 
 this relation, then, the proposed government cannot be deemed 
 a national one ; since its jurisdiction extends to certain enume- 
 rated objects only, and leaves to the several states a residuary 
 and inviolable sovereignty over all other objects. It is true 
 that in controversies relating to the boundary between the two 
 jurisdictions, the tribunal which is ultimately to decide, is to bo 
 established under the general government. But this does not 
 change the principle of the case. The decision is to be impar- 
 tially made, according to the rules of the constitution; and all 
 the usual and most effectual precautions are taken to secure this 
 impartiality. Some such tribunal is clearly essential to prevent 
 an appeal to the sword, and a dissolution of the compact; and 
 that it ought to be established under the general, rather than 
 under the local governments ; or, to speak more properly, that 
 it could be safely established under the first alone, is a position 
 not likel}' to be combated. 
 
 If we try the constitution by its last relation, to the authority 
 by which amendments are to be made, we find it neither wholly 
 national, nor wholly federal. Were it wholly national, the su- 
 preme an4 ultimate authority would reside in the majority of the 
 people of the union ; and this authority would be competent at 
 all times, like that of a majority of every national society, to 
 alter or abolish its established government. "Were it wholly 
 federal on the other hand, the concurrence of each state in the 
 union would be essential to every alteration that would be bind- 
 ing on all. The mode provided by the plan of the convention, 
 
308 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 is not founded on either of these principles. In requiring more 
 than a majority, and particularly, in computing the proportion by 
 States, not by citizens, it departs from the national, and advances 
 towards the federal character. In rendering the concurrence 
 of less than the whole number of states suflficient, it loses again 
 the federal, and partakes of the national character. 
 
 The proposed constitution, therefore, even when tested by the 
 rules laid down by its antagonists, is, in strictness, neither a 
 national nor a federal constitution; but a composition of both 
 In its foundation it is federal, not national; in the sources from 
 which the ordinary powers of the government are drawn, it is 
 partly federal, and partly national : in the operation of these 
 powers, it is national, not federal ; in the extent of them again, it 
 IS federal, not national ; and finally in the authoritative mode of 
 introducing amendments, it is neither wholly federal, nor wholly 
 national. 
 
 PuBLiua 
 
THE FEDERALIST. -809 
 
 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 NUMBER XL. 
 
 NEW YORK, JANUARY 18, 1788. 
 
 MADISON. 
 
 THE SAME OBJECTION FURTHER EXAMINED. 
 
 The second point to be examined is, whether the conventiou 
 were authorized to frame, and propose this mixed constitution. 
 
 The powers of the convention ought, in strictness, to be deter- 
 mined, by an inspection of the commissions given to the mem- 
 bers by their respective constituents. As all of these, however, 
 had reference, either to the recommendation from the meeting 
 at Annapolis, in September, 1786, or to that from congress, in 
 February, 1787, it will be sufficient to recur to these particular 
 acts. 
 
 The act from Annapolis recommends the " appointment of 
 commissioners to take into coHsideration the situation of the 
 United States ; to devise sue \ further provisions, as shall appear 
 to them necessary to render the constitution of the federal gov- 
 ernment adequate to the exigencies of the union; and to report 
 such an act for that purpose, to the United States in congress 
 assembled, as, when agreed to by them, and afterwards con- 
 Hrmed by the legislature of every state, will effectually provide 
 for the same." 
 
 The recommendatory act of congress is in the words follow- 
 ing : " Whereas, there is provision in the articles of confedera- 
 tion and perpetual union, for making alterations therein, by the 
 
310 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 .iHsent ni' a congress of United States, and of the legislatures 
 of the several states; and whereas experience hath evinced, 
 that there are defects in the present confederation; as a mean 
 to remedy which, several of the states, and particularly the state 
 of New York, by express instructions to their delegates in con- 
 gress, have suggested a convention for the purposes expressed 
 in the following resolution ; and such convention appearing to 
 be the most probable mean of establishing in these states a firm 
 national government :" 
 
 •' Resolved, That in the opinion of congress, it is expedient, that 
 on the 2d Monday in May next, a convention of delegates, who 
 shall have been appointed by the several states, be held at Phila- 
 delphia, for the sole and express purpose of revising the articles 
 of confederation, and reporting to congress and the several legis- 
 latures, such alterations and provisions therein, as shall, when 
 agreed to in congress, and confirmed by the states, render the 
 federal constitution adequate to the exigencies of government, and 
 the preservation of the union." 
 
 From these two acts, it appears, 1st, that the object of the 
 convention was to establish, in these states, a firm national govern- 
 ment; 2d, that this government was to be such as would be 
 adequate to the exigencies of government, and the preservation of the 
 union; 3d, that these purposes were to be effected by alterations 
 and provisions in the articles of confederation, as it is expressed in 
 the act of congress ; or by such further provisions as should appear 
 necessary, as it stands in the recommendatory act from Anna- 
 polis; 4th, that the alterations and provisions were to be reported 
 to congress, and to the states, in order to be agreed to by the 
 former and confirmed by the latter. 
 
 From a comparison, and fair construction, of these several 
 modes of expression, is to be deduced the authority oider which 
 the convention acted. They were to frame a national government, 
 adequate to the exigencies of government, and of the union ; and to 
 reduce the articles of confederation into such form, as to accom- 
 plish these purposes. 
 
 There are two rules of construction dictated by plain reason. 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 811 
 
 afi well as founded on legal axioms. The one is, that every part 
 of the expression ought, if possible, to be allowed some meaning, 
 and be made to conspire to some common end. The other is, 
 that where the several parts cannot be made to coincide, the 
 less important should give way to the more important part : the 
 means should be sacrificed to the end, rather than the end to 
 the means. 
 
 Suppose, then, that the expressions defining the authority of 
 the convention, were irreconcilably at variance with each other; 
 that a national and adequate government could not possibly, in the 
 judgment of the convention, be effected by alterations and pro- 
 visions in the articles of confederation ; which part of the defini- 
 tion ought to have been embraced, and which rejected ? Which 
 was the more important ; which the less important part ? Which 
 the end ; which the means ? Let the most scrupulous expositors 
 of delegated powers j let the most inveterate objectors against 
 those exercised by the convention, answer these questions. Let 
 them declare, whether it was of most importance to the happi- 
 ness of the people of America, that the articles of confederation 
 should be disregarded, and an adequate government be provided, 
 and the union preserved ; or that an adequate government should 
 be omitted, and the articles of confederation preserved. Let 
 them declare, whether the preservation of these articles was the 
 end, for securing which a reform of the government was to be 
 introduced as the means ; or whether the establishment of a 
 government, adequate to the national happiness, was the end at 
 which these articles themselves originally aimed, and to which 
 they ought, as insufficient means, to have been sacrificed. 
 
 But is it necessary to suppose, that these expressions are abso- 
 lutely irreconcilable to each other; that no alterations or provi 
 sions in the articles of the confederation, could possibly mould them 
 into a national and adequate government : into such a govern- 
 ment as has been proposed by the convention ? 
 
 No stress, it is presumed, will, in this case, be laid on the title; 
 A change of that could never be deemed an exercise of ungranted 
 oower. Alterations in the body of the instrument are exnressly 
 
812 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 authorized. New provisions therein are also expressly author- 
 ized. Here then is a power to change the title; to insert new 
 articles; to alter old ones. Must it of necessity be admitted, 
 that this power is infringed, so long as a part of the old articles 
 remain? Those who maintain the affirmative, ought at least to 
 mark the boundary between authorized and usurped innova- 
 tions ; between that degree of change which lies within the com- 
 pass of alterations and further provisions, and that which amounts 
 to a transmutation of the government. Will it be said, that the 
 alterations ought not to have touched the substance of the con- 
 federation ? The states would never have appointed a conven 
 tion with so much solemnity, nor described its objects with so 
 much latitude, if some substantial reform had not been in con- 
 templation. Will it be said, that th.^ fundamental principles ot 
 the confederation were not within the purview of the conven- 
 tion, and ought not to have been varied ? I ask, what are these 
 principles ? Do they require, that in the establishment of the 
 constitution, the states should be regarded as distinct and inde- 
 pendent sovereigns ? They are so regarded by the constitution 
 proposed. Do they require, that the members of the govern- 
 ment should derive their appointment from the legislatures, not 
 from the people of the states ? One branch of the new govern- 
 ment is to be appointed by these legislatures; and under the 
 confederation, the delegates to congress may all be appointed 
 immediately by the people ; and in two states* are actually so 
 appointed. Do they require, that the powers of the government 
 should act on the states, and not immediately on individuals? 
 In some instances, as has been shown, the powers of the new 
 government will act on the states in their collective characters. 
 In some instances also, those of the existing government act 
 immediately on individuals. In cases of capture ; of piracy ; of 
 the post-office ; of coins, weights, and measures ; of trade with 
 the Indians; of claims under grants of land, by different states; 
 and, above all, in the case of trials by courts-martial in the army 
 
 * Connecticut and Rhode Island. 
 
THE FEDERALIST Sl^ 
 
 and uavy, by which death may be inflicted witnout the luter- 
 vention of a jury, or even of a civil magistrate; in all these 
 cases, the powers of the confederation operate immediately on 
 the persons and interests of individual citizens. Do these fun- 
 damental principles require, particularly, that no tax should be 
 levied, without the intermediate agency of the states? The 
 confederation itself, authorizes a direct tax, to a certain extent, 
 on the post-office. The power of coinage, has been so construed 
 by congress, as to levy a tribute immediately from that source 
 also. But pretermitting these instances, was it not an acknow- 
 ledged object of the convention, and the universal expectation 
 of the people, that the regulation of trade should be submitted 
 to the general government, in such a form as would render it an 
 immediate source of general revenue ? Had not congress re- 
 peatedly recommended this measure, as not inconsistent with 
 the fundamental principles of the confederation ? Had not every 
 state, but one ; had not New York herself, so far complied with 
 the plan of congress, as to recognize the principle of the inno- 
 vation ? Do these principles, in fine, require that the powers of 
 the general government should be limited, and that, beyond this 
 limit, the states should be left in possession of their sovereignty 
 and independence ? We have seen, that in the new government, 
 as in the old, the general powers are limited ; and that the states, 
 in all unenumerated cases, are left in the enjoyment of their 
 sovereign and independent jurisdiction. 
 
 Truth is, that the great principles of the constitution proposed 
 by the convention, may be considered less, as absolutely new, 
 than as the expansion of principles which are found in the arti- 
 cles of confederation. The misfortune under the latter sj-stem 
 has been, that these principles are so feeble and confined, as to 
 justify all the charges of inefficiency which have been urged 
 against it; and to require a degree of enlargement, which gives 
 to the new system the aspect of an entire transformation of the 
 old. 
 
 In one particular, it is admitted, that the convention have de- 
 parted from the tenor of their commission. Instead of reporting 
 
314 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 a plan requiring the confirmation of all the states, they have re- 
 ported a plan, which is to be confirmed, and may be carried into 
 effect, by nine states only. It is worthy of remark, that this objec- 
 tion, though the most plausible, has been the least urged in the 
 publications which have swarmed against the convention. The 
 forbearance can only have proceeded from an ii*resistible convic- 
 tion of the absurdity of subjecting the fate of twelve states to 
 the perverseness or corruption of a thirteenth ; from the example 
 of inflexible opposition given bj' a majority of one sixtieth of the 
 people of America, to a measure approved and called for by the 
 voice of twelve states, comprising fifty-nine sixtieths of the 
 people J an example still fresh in the memory and indignation 
 of every citizen who has felt for the wounded honour and pros- 
 perity of his country. As this objection, therefore, has been in 
 a manner waved by those who have criticised the powers of the 
 convention, I dismiss it without further observation. 
 
 The third point to be inquired into is, how far considerations 
 of duty arising out of the case itself, could have supplied any 
 defect of regular authority. 
 
 In the preceding inquiries, the powers of the convention have 
 been analyzed and ti'ied with the same rigour, and by the same 
 »*ules, as if they had been real and final powers, for the establish- 
 ment of a constitution for the United States. We have seen, in 
 what manner they have borne the trial, even on that supposition. 
 It is time now to recollect, that the powers were merely advi- 
 sor}- and recommendatory; that they were so meant by the 
 states, and so understood by the convention ; and that the latter 
 have accordingly planned and proposed a constitution, which is 
 to be of no more consequence than' the paper on which it is 
 written, unless it be stamped with the approbation of those to 
 whom it is addressed. This reflection places ]bhe subject in a 
 point of view altogether different,- and will enable us to judgo 
 with propriety of the course taken by the convention. 
 
 Let us view the ground on which the convention stood. It 
 may be collected from their proceedings, that they were deeply 
 and unanimously impressed with the crisis, which had led then 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 31 A 
 
 country, almost with one voice, to make so singular and solemn 
 an experiment, for correcting the errours of a system, by which 
 this crisis had been produced; that they were no less deeply 
 and unanimously convinced, that such a reform as they have 
 proposed, was absolutely necessary to effect the purposes of theii 
 appointment. It could not be unknown to them, that the hopes 
 and expectations of the great body of citizens, throughout this 
 gi-eat empire, were turned with the keenest anxiety, to the event 
 of their deliberations. They had every reason to believe, that 
 the contrary sentiments agitated the minds and bosoms of every 
 external and internal foe to the liberty and prosperity of the 
 United States. They had seen in the origin and progress of the 
 experiment, the alacrity with which the proposition, made by a 
 single state (Virginia) towards a partial amendment of the con- 
 federation had been attended to and promoted. They had seen 
 the liberty assumed by a very few deputies, from a very few states, 
 convened at Annapolis, of recommending a great and critical 
 object, wholly foreign to their commission, not only justified by 
 the public opinion, but actually carried into effect, by twelve out 
 of the thirteen states. They had seen, in a variety of instances, 
 assumptions by congress, not only of recommendatory, but of 
 operative powers, warranted in the public estimation, by occa- 
 sions and objects infinitely less urgent than those by which their 
 conduct was to be governed. They must have reflected, that in 
 all great changes of established governments, forms ought to 
 give way to substance; that a rigid adherence in such cases to 
 the former, would render nominal and nugatory, the transcend- 
 ant and precious right of the people to " abolish or alter their 
 governments as to them shall seem most likely to effect their 
 safety and happiness :"* since it is impossible for the people 
 spontaneously and universally, to move in concert towards theix 
 object : and it is therefore essential, that such changes be insti- 
 tuted by some informul and unauthorized propositions, made by 
 some patriotic and respectable citizen, or number of citizens 
 
 * Declaration of Independence 
 31 
 
316 THE FEDERALIST 
 
 They mast have recollected, that it was by this irregular and 
 assumed privilege, of proposing to the people plans for their 
 safety and happiness, that the states were first united against 
 the danger with which they were threatened by their ancient 
 government; that committees and congresses were formed for 
 concentrating their efforts, and defending their rights : and that 
 conventions were elected in tfie several states, for establishing the 
 constitutions under which they are now governed. Nor could 
 it have been forgotten, that no little ill-timed scruples, no zeal 
 for adhering to ordinary forms, were anywhere seen, except in 
 those who wished to indulge, under these masks, their secret 
 enmity to the substance contended for. They must have boi*ne 
 in mind, that as the plan to be framed and proposed, was to be 
 submitted to the people themselves, the disapprobation of this 
 supreme authority would destroy it for ever ; its approbation 
 blot out all antecedent errours and irregularities. It might 
 even have occurred to them, that where a disposition to cavil 
 prevailed, their neglect to execute the degree of power vested 
 in them, and still more their recommendation of any measure 
 whatever not warranted by their commission, would not less 
 excite animadversion, than a recommendation at once of a 
 measure fully commensurate to the national exigencies. 
 
 Had the convention, under all these impressions, and in the 
 midst of all these considerations, instead of exercising a manly 
 confidence in their country, by whose confidence they had been 
 BO peculiarly distinguished, and of pointing out a system capable,^ 
 in their judgment, of securing its happiness, taken the cold and 
 sullen resolution of di8a,ppointing its ardent hopes, of sacrificing 
 substance to forms, of committing the dearest interests of their 
 country to the uncertainties of delay, and the hazard of events ; 
 let me ask he man, who can raise his mind to one elevated con- 
 ception, who can awaken in his bosom one patriotic emotion, 
 what judgment ought to have been pronounced by the impartial 
 world, by the friends of mankind, by every virtuous citizen, on 
 the conduct and character of this assembly ? Or if there be a 
 man whose propensity to condemn is susceptible of no control, 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 317 
 
 let me then ask, what sentence he has in reserve for the twelve 
 states who usurped the power of sending deputies to the conven- 
 tion, a body utterly unknown to their constitutions ; for con- 
 gress, who recommended the appointment of this body, equally 
 unknown to the confederation ; and for the state of New York, 
 in particular, who first urged, and then complied with this un- 
 authorized interposition ? 
 
 But that the objectors may be disarmed of every pretext, it 
 shall be granted for a moment, that the convention were neither 
 authorized by their commission, nor justified by circumstances, 
 in proposing a constitution for their country : does it follow that 
 the constitution ought, for that "eason alone, to be rejected ? If, 
 according to the noble precept, it be lawful to accept good advice 
 even from an enemy, shall we set the ignoble example, of re- 
 fusing such advice even when it is offered by our friends ? The 
 prudent inquiry, in all cases, ought surely to be not so much /rom 
 whom the advice comes, as whether the advice be good. 
 
 The sum of what has been here advanced and proved is, that 
 the charge against the convention of exceeding their powers^ 
 except in one instance little urged by the objectors, has no 
 foundation to support it ; that if they had exceeded their powers, 
 they were not only warranted, but required, as the confidential 
 servants of their country, by the circumstances in which they 
 were placed, to exercise the liberty which they assumed ; and 
 that finally, if they had violated both their powers and theii 
 obligations, in proposing a constitution, this ought nevertheless 
 to be embraced, if it be calculated to accomplish the views and 
 happiness of the people of America. How far this character is 
 due to the constitution, is the subject under investigation. 
 
 PUBLIUB. 
 
818 THE FEDERALISl. 
 
 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 NUMBER XLI. 
 
 NEW YORK, JANUARY 22, 1788. 
 
 MADISON. 
 
 liENERAL VIEW OF THE POWERS PROPOSED TO BE VESTED [N 
 
 THE UNION. 
 
 The constitution proposed by the convention, may be con- 
 sidered under two general points of view. The first relates to 
 the sum or quantity of power which it vests in the government, 
 including the restraints imposed on the states. The second, to 
 the particular structure of the government, and the distribution 
 of this power among its several branches. 
 
 Under the first view of the subject, two important questions 
 arise: — 1. Whether any part of the powers transferred to the 
 general government be unnecessary or improper? — 2. Whether 
 the entire mass of them be dangerous to the portion of jurisdic- 
 tion left in the several states ? 
 
 Is the aggregate power of the general government greater 
 than ought to have been vested in it ? This is the first question 
 
 It cannot have escaped those, who have attended with candour 
 to the arguments employed against the extensive powers of the 
 government, that the authors of them have very little considered, 
 how far these powers were necessary means of attaining a neces- 
 sary end. They have chosen rather to dwell on the inconve- 
 niencies which must be unavoidably blended with all political 
 advantages ; and on the possible abuses which must be incident 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 319 
 
 to every jjower or trust, of which a beneficial use can be made 
 This method of handling the subject, cannot impose on the good 
 sense of the people of America It may display the subtlety ot 
 the writer; it may open a boundless field of rhetoric and decla- 
 mation ; it may inflame the passions of the unthinking, and may 
 confirm the prejudices of the misthinking : but cool and candid 
 people will at once reflect, that the purest of human blessings 
 must have a portion of alloy in them ; that the choice must 
 always be made, if not of the lesser evil, at least of the greater, 
 not the PERFECT good; and that in every political institution, a 
 power to advance the public happiness, involves a discretion 
 which may be misapplied and abused. They will see, therefore, 
 that in all cases where power is to be conferred, the point first 
 to be decided is, whether such a power be necessary to the 
 public good ; as the next will be, in ease of an affirmative deci- 
 sion, to guard as effectually as possible against a perversion of 
 the power to the public detriment. 
 
 That we may form a correct judgment on this subject, it will 
 be proper to review the several powers conferred on the govern- 
 ment of the union ; and that this may be the more conveniently 
 done, they may be reduced into different classes as they relate 
 to the following different objects : 1. Security against foreign 
 danger; 2. Regulation of the intercourse with foreign nations; 
 3. Maintenance of harmony and proper intercourse among the 
 states; 4. Certain miscellaneous objects of general utility; 5 
 Restraint of the states from certain injurious acts; 6. Provisions 
 for giving due efficacy to all these powers. 
 
 The powers falling within the first class, are those of declaring 
 war, and granting letters of marque; of providing armies and 
 fleets; of regulating and calling forth the militia; of levying 
 and borrowing money. 
 
 Security against foreign danger, is one of the primitive objects 
 of civil society. It is an avowed and essential object of the 
 American union. The powers requisite for attaining it, must 
 be effectually confided to the federal councils. 
 
 Is the power of declaring war necessary ? No man will 
 
320 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 an8"W3r this question in the negative. It would be superfluous, 
 therefore, to enter into a proof of the affirmative. The exist- 
 ing confederation establishes this power in the most ample 
 form. 
 
 Is the power of raising armies, and equipping fleets neces- 
 sary ? This is involved in the foregoing power. It is involved 
 in the power of self-defence. 
 
 But was it necessary to give an indefinite power of raising 
 TROOPS, as well as providing fleets ; and of maintaining both in 
 PEACE, as well as in war ? 
 
 The answer to these questions has been too far anticipated in 
 another place, to admit an extensive discussion of them in this 
 place. The answer indeed seems to be so obvious and conclu- 
 sive, as scarcely to justify such a discussion in an}' place. "With 
 what colour of propriety, could the force necessary for defence 
 be limited, by those who cannot limit the forCe of ofi'ence ? If 
 a federal constitution could chain the ambition, or set bounds 
 to the exertions of all other nations, then indeed might it pru- 
 dently chain the discretion of its own government, and set 
 bounds to the exertions for its own safety. 
 
 How could a readiness for war in time of peace be safely pro- 
 hibited, unless we could prohibit, in like manner, the prepara- 
 tions and establishments of every hostile nation ? The means 
 of security can only be regulated by the means and danger of 
 attack. They will in fact be ever determined by these rules, 
 and by no others. It is in vain to oppose constitutional barriers 
 to the impulse of self-preservation. It is worse than in vain • 
 because it plants in the constitution itself necessary usurpations 
 of power, every precedent of which is a germ of unnecessary 
 and multiplied repetitions. If one nation maintains" constantly 
 a disciplined army, ready for the service of ambition or revenge, 
 it obliges the most pacific nations, who may be within the reach 
 of its enterprises, to take corresponding precautions. The fif- 
 teenth century was the unhappy epoch of military establish- 
 ments in time of peace. They were introduced by Charles VII of 
 France. All Europe has followed, or been forced into the example 
 
THE FEDERALIST 321 
 
 Had the example not been followed by other nations, all Europe 
 must long ago have worn the chains of a universal monarcn 
 Were every nation, except France, now to disband its peac« 
 establishment, the same event might follow. The veteran 
 legions of Rome were an overmatch for the undisciplined 
 valour of all other nations, and rendered her mistress of the 
 world, 
 
 Not the less true is it, that the liberties of Rome proved the 
 final victim to her military triumphs j and that the liberties of 
 Europe, as far as they ever existed, have, with few exceptions, 
 been the price of her military establishments. A standing force, 
 therefore, is a dangerous, at the same time that it may be a 
 necessary, provision. On the smaller scale, it has its inconve- 
 niences. On an extensive scale, its consequences may be fatal. 
 On any scale, it is an object of laudable circumspection and 
 precaution. A wise nation will combine all these considera- 
 tions; and whilst it does not rashly preclude itself from any 
 resource which may become essential to its safety, will exert 
 all its prudence in diminishing both the necessity and the danger 
 of resorting to one which may be inauspieions to its liberties. 
 
 The clearest marks of this prudence are stamped on the pro- 
 posed constitution. The union itself, which it cements and se- 
 cures, destroys every pretext for a military establishment which 
 could be dangerous. America united, with a handful of troops, 
 or without a single soldier, exhibits a more forbidding posture to 
 foreign ambition, than America disunited with a hundred thou- 
 sand veterans ready for combat. It was remarked, on a former 
 occasion, that the want of this pretext had saved the liberties 
 of one nation in Europe. Being rendered by her insular situa- 
 tion, and her maritime resources, impregnable to the armies of 
 her neighbours, the rulers of Great Britain have never been able, 
 by real or artificial dangers, to cheat the public into an extensive 
 peace establishment. The distance of the United States from 
 the powerful nations of the world, gives them the same happy 
 security. A dangerous establishment can never be necessary 
 or plausible, so long as they continue a united people. But 
 
£J22 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 let i*; never for a moment be forgotten, that they are indebted 
 for this advantage to their union alone. The moment of its dis- 
 solution will be the date of a new order of things. The fears 
 of the weaker, or the ambition of the stronger states, or con- 
 federacies, will set the same example in the new as Charles VII 
 did in the old world. The example will be followed here, from 
 the same motives which produced universal imitation there 
 Instead of deriving from our situation the precious advantage 
 which Great Britain has derived from hers, the face of America 
 will be but a copy of that of the continent of Europe. It will 
 present liberty everywhere crushed between standing armies, 
 and perpetual taxes. The fortunes of disunited America, will 
 be even more disastrous than those of Europe. The sources of 
 evil in the latter are confined to her own limits. No superiour 
 powers of another quarter of the globe intrigue among her rival 
 nations, inflame their mutual animosities, and tender them the 
 instruments of foreign ambition, jealousy, and revenge. In 
 America, the miseries springing from her internal jealousies, 
 contentions, and wars, would form a part only of her lot. A 
 plentiful addition of evils, would have their source in that 
 relation in which Europe stands to this quarter of the earth, 
 and which no other quarter of the earth bears to Europe. 
 
 This picture of the consequences of disunion cannot be too 
 highly coloured, or too often exhibited. Every man who loves 
 peace; every man who loves his country; every man who loves 
 liberty, ought to have it ever before his eyes, that he may 
 cherish in his heart a due attachment to the union of America, 
 and be able to set a due value on the means of preserving it. 
 
 Next to the eflPectual establishment of the union, the best 
 possible precaution against danger from standing armies, is a 
 limitation of the term for which revenue may be appropriated 
 to their support. This precaution the constitution has prudently 
 added. I -^ill not repeat here the observations, which I flatter 
 myself have placed this subject in a just and satisfactory light. 
 But it may not be improper to take notice of an argument 
 against this part of the constitution, which has been drawn 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 32b 
 
 from the policy and practice of Great Britain. It is said, that 
 the continuance of an army in that kingdom, requires an 
 annual vote of the legislature : whereas the American constitu- 
 tion has lengthened this critical period to two years. This is 
 the form in which the comparison is usually stated to the public ; 
 but is it a just form ? is it a fair comparison ? Does the British 
 constitution restrain the parliamentary discretion to one year? 
 Does the American impose on the congress appropriations for 
 two years ? On the contrary, it cannot be unknown to the 
 authors of the fallacy themselves, that the British constitution 
 fixes no limit whatever to the discretion of the legislature, anii 
 that the American ties down the legislature to two years, as the 
 longest admissible term. 
 
 Had the argument from the British example been truly stated, 
 it would have stood thus : the term for which supplies may be 
 appropriated to the army establishment, though unlimited by 
 the British constitution, has nevertheless in practice been limited 
 by parliamentary discretion to a single year. Now, if in Great 
 Britain, where the house of commons is elected for seven years; 
 where so great a proportion of the members are elected by so 
 small a proportion of the people ; where the electors are so cor- 
 rupted by the representatives, and the representatives so cor- 
 rupted by the crown, the representative body can possess a 
 power to make appropriations to the army for an indefinite 
 term, without desiring, or without daring, to extend the term 
 bej-ond a single year; ought not suspicion herself to blush, in 
 pretending that the representatives of the United States, elected 
 FREELY by the whole body of the people, every second year, 
 cannot be safely entrusted with a discretion over such appro- 
 priations, expressly limited to the short period of two years 1 
 
 A bad cause seldom fails to betray itself. Of this truth, the 
 management of the opposition to the federal government, is au 
 unvaried exemplification. But among all the blunders which 
 have been committed, none is more striking than the attempt to 
 enlist on that side, the prudent jealousy entertained by the peo 
 pie, of standing armies. The attempt has awakened fully the 
 
324 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 public attention to that important subject; and has led to inves- 
 tigations which must terminate in a thorough and universal con- 
 viction, not only that the constitution has provided the most 
 effectual guards against danger from that quarter, but that 
 nothing short of a constitution fully adequate to the national 
 defence, and the preservation of the union, can save America 
 from as many standing armies, as it may be split into states or 
 confederacies ; and from such a progressive augmentation of 
 these establishments in each, as will render them as burthen- 
 some to the properties, and ominous to the liberties of the people, 
 as any establishment that can become necessary, under a united 
 and efficient government, must be tolerable to the former and 
 safe to the latter. 
 
 The palpable necessity of the power to provide and maintain 
 a navy, has protected that part of the constitution against a 
 spirit of censure, which has spared few other parts. It must 
 indeed be numbered among the greatest blessings of America, 
 that as her union will be the only source of her maritime 
 strength, so this will be a principal source of her security 
 against danger from abroad. In this respect, our situation bears 
 another likeness to the insular advantage of Great Britain. 
 The batteries most capable of repelling foreign enterprises on 
 our safety, are happily such as can never be turned by a per- 
 fidious government against our liberties. 
 
 The inhabitants of the Atlantic frontier, are all of them deeply 
 interested in this provision for naval protection. If they have 
 hitherto been suffered to sleep quietly in their beds; if their 
 property has remained safe against the predatory spirit of licen- 
 tious adventurers ; if their maritime towns have not yet been 
 compelled to ransom themselves from the terrours of a confla- 
 gration, by yielding to the exactions of daring and sudden in- 
 vaders, these instances of good fortune are not to be ascribed to 
 the capacity of the existing government for the protection of 
 those from whom it claims allegiance, but to causes that are 
 fugit.'ve and fallacious. If we except perhaps Yirginia and 
 Maryland, which are peculiarly vulnerable on their eastern 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 325 
 
 frontiers, no part of the union ouglit to feel more anxiety on 
 this subject than New-Yorl£. Her sea-coast is extensive. A 
 very important district of the state, is an island. The state 
 itself is penetrated by a large navigable river for more than 
 fifty leagues. The great emporium of its commerce, the great 
 reservoir of its wealth, lies every moment at the mercy of 
 events, and may be almost regarded as a hostage for ignomi- 
 nious compliances with the dictates of a foreign enemy ; or even 
 with the rapacious demands of pirates and barbarians. Should 
 a war be the result of the precarious situation of European 
 affairs, and all the unruly passions attending it be let loose on 
 the ocean, our escape from insults and depredations, not only on 
 that element, but every part of the other bordering on it, will 
 be truly miraculous. In the present condition of America, the 
 states more immediately exposed to these calamities have nothing 
 to hope from the phantom of a general government which now 
 exists; and if their single resources were equal to the task of 
 fortifying themselves against the danger, the objects to be pro- 
 tected would be almost consumed by the means of protecting 
 them. 
 
 The power of regulating and calling forth the militia, has been 
 already sufficiently vindicated and explained. 
 
 The power of levying and borrowing money, being the sinew 
 of that which is to be exerted in the national defence, is properly 
 thrown into the same class with it. This power, also, has been 
 examined already with much attention, and has, I trust, been 
 clearly shown to be necessary, both in the extent and form given 
 to it by the constitution. I will address one additional reflection 
 only, to those who contend that the power ought to have been 
 restrained to external taxation — by which they mean, taxes on 
 articles imported from other countries. It cannot be doubted, 
 that this will always be a valuable source of revenue ; that for a 
 considerable time, it must be a principal source ; that at this 
 moment, it is an essential one. But we may form very mistaken 
 ideas on this subject, if we do not call to mind in our calculations, 
 that the extent of revenue drawn from foreign commerce, must 
 
326 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 vary with the variations, both in the extent and the kind of im- 
 ports; and that these variations do not correspond with the 
 progress of population, which must be the «general measure of 
 the public wants. As long as agriculture continues the sole field 
 of labour, the importation of manufactures must increase as the 
 oonsumers multiply. As soon as domestic manufactures are 
 begun by the hands not called for by agriculture, the imported 
 manufactures will decrease as the numbers of people increase. 
 In a more remote stage, the imports may consist in. a consider- 
 able part of raw materials, which will be wrought into articles 
 for exportation, and will, therefore, require rather the encourage- 
 ment of bounties, than to be loaded with discouraging duties. A 
 system of government, meant for duration, ought to contem- 
 plate these revolutions, and be able to accommodate itself to 
 hem. 
 
 Some, who have not denied the necessity of the power of taxa- 
 tion, have grounded a very fierce attack against the constitution, 
 on the language in which it is defined. It has been urged and 
 echoed, that the power " to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, 
 and excises, to pay the debts, and provide for the common de- 
 fence and general welfare of the United States," amounts to an 
 unlimited commission to exercise every power, which may be 
 alleged to be necessary for the common defence or general wel- 
 fare. No stronger proof could be giver of the distress under 
 which these writers labour for objections, ban their stooping to 
 such a misconstruction. 
 
 Had no other enumeration or definition of the powers of the 
 congress been found in the constitution, than the general ex- 
 pressions just cited, the authors of the objection might have had 
 some colour for it ; though it would have been difficult to find a 
 reason for so awkward a form of describing an authority to legis- 
 late in all possible cases. A power to destroy the freedom of 
 the press, the trial by jury, or even to regulate the course of 
 descents, or the forms of conveyances, must be very singularly 
 expressed by the terms " to raise money for the general welfare " 
 
 But what colour can the objection have, when a specification 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 327 
 
 of the objects alluded to by these general terms, immediately 
 follows; and is not even separated by a longer pause than a 
 semicolon ? If the different parts of the same instrument ought 
 to be so expounded, as to give meaning to every part which 
 will bear it ; shall one part of the same sentence be excluded 
 altogether from a share in the meaning; and shall the mere 
 doubtful and indefinite terms be retained in their full extent, 
 and the clear and precise expressions be denied any signification 
 whatsoever ? For what purpose could the enumeration of par- 
 ticular powers be inserted, if these and all others were meant to 
 he included in the preceding general power ? Nothing is more 
 natural or common, than first to use a general phrase, and then 
 to explain and qualify it by a recital of particulars. But the 
 idea of an enumeration of particulars, which neither explain nor 
 qualify the general meaning, and can have no other effect than 
 to confound and mislead, is an absurdity, which, as we are re- 
 duced to the dilemma of charging either on the authors of the 
 objection or on the authors of the constitution, we must take the 
 liberty of supposing, had not its origin with the latter. 
 
 The objection here is the more extraordinary, as it appears, 
 that the language used by the convention is a copy from the 
 articles of confederation. The objects of the union among the 
 states, as described in article third, are, " their common defence, 
 security of their liberties, and mutual and general welfare." 
 The terms of article eighth are still more identical : " All 
 charges of war, and all other expenses, that shall be incurred 
 for the common defence or general welfare, and allowed by tho 
 United States in congress, shall be defrayed out of a common 
 treasury," &c. A similar language again occurs in article ninth. 
 Construe either of these articles by the rules which would 
 justify the construction put on the new constitution, and they 
 vest in the existing congress a power to legislate in all cases 
 whatsoever. But what would have been thought of that assem- 
 bly, if, attaching themselves to these general expressions, and 
 disregarding the specifications which ascertain and limit their 
 import, they had exercised an unlimited power of providing foi 
 
328 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 the common defence and general welfare ? I appeal to the ob« 
 jectors themselves, whether they would in that case have em- 
 ployed the same reasoning in justification of congress, as they 
 now make use of against the convention. How difficult it is 
 for errour to escape its own condemnation I 
 
 PUBLI'JS. 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 329 
 
 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 NUMBER XLII. 
 
 NEW YORK, JANUARY 22, 1788. 
 
 MADISON. 
 
 THE SAME VIEW CONTINUED. 
 
 The second class of powers, lodged in the general government, 
 consists of those which regulate the intercourse with foreign 
 nations, to wit: to make treaties; to send and receive ambassa- 
 dors, other public ministers and consuls ; to define and punish 
 piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and oflfences 
 against the law of nations ; to regulate foreign commerce, in- 
 cluding a power to prohibit, after the year 1808, the importa- 
 tion of slaves, and to lay an intermediate duty of ten dollars 
 per head, as a discouragement to such importations. 
 
 This class of powers forms an obvious and essential branch of 
 the federal administration. If we are to be one nation in any 
 respect, it clearly ought to be in respect to other nations. 
 
 The powers to make treaties, and to send and receive ambas- 
 sadors, speak their own propriety. Both of them are comprised 
 in the articles of confederation ; with this difference only, that 
 the former is disembarrassed by the plan of the convention of 
 an exception, under which treaties might be substantially frus- 
 trated by regulations of the states; and that a power of appoint- 
 ing and receiving " other public ministers and consuls," is ex- 
 pressly and very properly added to the former provision con- 
 cerning ambassadors. The term ambassador, if taken strictly. 
 
'6S0 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 as seems to be required by the second of the articles of confede- 
 ration, comprehends the highest grade only of public ministers; 
 and excludes the grades which the United States will be most 
 likely to prefer, where foreign embassies may be necessary. 
 And under no latitude of construction will the term comprehend 
 consuls. Yet it has been found expedient, and has been the 
 practice of congress, to employ the inferiour grades of public 
 ministers j and to send and receive consuls. 
 
 It is true, that where treaties of commerce stipulate for the 
 mutual appointment of consuls, whose functions are connected 
 with commerce, the admission of foreign consuls may fall within 
 the power of making commercial treaties ; and that where no 
 such treaties exist, the mission of American consuls into foreign 
 countries may perhaps be covered under the authority, given by 
 the ninth article of the confederation, to appoint all such civil 
 oflScers as may be necessary for managing the general affairs of 
 the United States. But the admission of consuls into the United 
 States, where no previous treaty has stipulated it, seems to have 
 been nowhere provided for. A supply of the omission is one of 
 the lesser instances, in which the convention have improved on 
 the model before them. But the most minute provisions become 
 important, when they tend to obviate the necessity or the pre- 
 text for gradual and unobserved usurpations of power. A list 
 of the cases, in which congress have been betrayed, or forced, 
 by the defects of the confederation, into violations of their char- 
 tered authorities, would not a little surprise those who have 
 paid no attention to the subject; and would be no inconsider- 
 able argument in favour of the new constitution, which seems 
 to have provided no less studiously for the lesser, than the more 
 /bvious and striking defects of the old. 
 
 The power to define and punish piracies and felonies com- 
 mitted on the high seas, and offences against the law of nations, 
 belongs with equal propriety to the general government ; and is 
 a still greater improvement on the articles of confederation. 
 
 These articles contain no provision for the case of offences 
 against the law of nations : and consequently leave it in the 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 831 
 
 power of any indiscreet member to embroil the confedei'ucj with 
 foreign nations. 
 
 The provision of the federal articles on the subject of piracies 
 and felonies, extends no farther than to the establishment of 
 courts for the trial of these offences. The definition of piracies 
 might, perhaps, without inconveniency, be left to the law of 
 nations ; though a legislative definition of them is found in most 
 municipal codes. A definition of felonies on the high seas, is 
 evidently requisite. Felony is a term of loose signification, even 
 in the common law of England ; and of various import in the 
 statute law of that kingdom. But neither the common, nor the 
 statute law of that, or of any other nation, ought to be a standard 
 for the proceedings of this, unless previously made its own by 
 legislative adoption. The meaning of the term, as defined in 
 the codes of the several states, would be as impracticable, as 
 the former would be a dishonourable and illegitimate guide. It 
 is not precisely the same in any two of the states; and varies in 
 each with every revision of its criminal laws. For the sake of 
 certainty and uniformity, therefore, the power of defining felon- 
 ies in this case, was in every respect necessary and proper. 
 
 The regulation of foreign commerce, having fallen within 
 several views which have been taken of this subject, has been 
 too fully discussed to need additional proofs here of its being 
 properly submitted to the federal administration. 
 
 It were doubtless to be wished, that the power of prohibiting 
 the importation of slaves, had not been postponed until the year 
 1808, or rather, that it had been sufiered to have immediate 
 operation. But it is not diflficult to account, either for this re- 
 striction on the general government, or for the manner in which 
 the whole clause is expressed. It ought to be considered as a 
 great point gained in favour of humanity, that a period of 
 twenty years may terminate for ever within these states, a 
 traffic which has so long and so loudly upbraided the barbarism 
 of modern policy ; that within that period, it will receive a con- 
 siderable discouragement from the federal government, and may 
 
 be totally abolished, by a concurrence of the few states which 
 
 32 
 
dS2 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 continue the unnatural traffic, in the prohibitory example which 
 has been given by so great a majority of the union. Happy 
 would it be for the unfortunate Africans, if an equal prospect 
 lay before them, of being redeemed from the oppressions of theii 
 European brethren ! 
 
 Attempts have been made to pervert this clause into an objec- 
 tion against the constitution, by representing it on one side, as a 
 criminal toleration of an illicit practice : and on another, as cal- 
 culated to prevent voluntary and beneficial emigrations from 
 Europe to America. I mention these misconstructions, not with 
 a view to give them an answer, for they deserve none ; but as 
 specimens of the manner and spirit, in which some have thought 
 fit to conduct their opposition to the proposed government. 
 
 The powers included in the third class, are those which pro- 
 vide for the harmony and proper intercourse among the states. 
 
 Under this head, might be included the particular restraints 
 imposed on the authority of the states, and certain powers of 
 the judicial department; but the former are reserved for a dis- 
 tinct class, and the latter will be particularly examined, when 
 we arrive at the structure and organization of the government. 
 I shall confine myself to a cursory review of the remaining 
 powers comprehended under this third description, to wit: to 
 regulate commerce among the several states and the Indian 
 tribes; to coin money, regulatp the value thereof, and of foreign 
 coin; to provide for the punishment of counterfeiting the current 
 coin and securities of the United States; to fix the standard 
 of weights and measures ; to establish an uniform rule of natu- 
 ralization, and uniform laws of bankruptcy; to prescribe the 
 manner in which the public acts, records, and judicial proceed- 
 ings of each state shall be proved, and the effect they shall have 
 in other states; and to establish post-offices and post-roads. 
 
 The defect of power in the existing confederacy, to regulate 
 the commerce between its several members, is in the number of 
 those which have been clearly pointed out by experience. To 
 the proofs and remarks which former papers have brought into 
 view on this subject, it may be added, that without this supple- 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 mental provision, the great and essential power of regulating 
 foreign commerce, would have been incomplete and ineffectual. 
 A very material object of this power was the relief of the states 
 which import and export through other states, from the im- 
 proper contributions levied on them by the latter. Were these 
 at liberty to regulate the trade between state and state, it must 
 be foreseen, that ways would be found out, to load the articles 
 of import and export, during the passage through their jurisdic- 
 tion, with duties which would fall on the makers of the latter, 
 and the consumers of the former. We may be assured, by past 
 experience, that such a practice would be introduced by future 
 contrivances ; and both by that and a common knowledge of 
 human affairs, that it would nourish unceasing animosities, and 
 not improbably terminate in serious interruptions of the public 
 tranquillity. To those who do not view the question through 
 the medium of passion or of interest, the desire of the commer- 
 cial states to collect, in any form, an indirect revenue from their 
 uncommercial neighbours, must appear not less impolitic than it 
 is unfair; since it would stimulate the injured party, by resent- 
 ment as well as interest, to resort to less convenient channels 
 for their foreign trade. But the mild voice of reason, pleading 
 the cause of an enlarged and permanent interest, is but too often 
 drowned before public bodies as well as individuals, by the 
 clamours of an impatient avidity for immediate and immoderate 
 gain. 
 
 The necessity of a superintending authority over the reciprocal 
 trade of confederated states, has been illustrated by other exam- 
 ples as well as our own. In Switzerland, where the union is so 
 very slight, each canton is obliged to allow to merchandises, a 
 passage through its jurisdiction into other cantons, without an 
 augmentation of the tolls. In Germany, it is a law of the em- 
 pire, that the princes and states shall not lay tolls or customs on 
 bridges, rivers, or passages, without the consent of the emperor 
 and diet; though it appears from a quotation in an antecedent 
 paper, that the practice in this, as in many other instances in 
 that confederacy, has not followed the law, and has produced 
 
B34 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 there the mischiefs which have been foreseen here. Among the 
 restraints imposed by the union of the Netherlands on its mem 
 bers, one is, that they shall not establish imposts disadvan- 
 tageous to their neighbours, without the general permission. 
 
 The regulation of commerce with the Indian tribes, is very 
 properly unfettered from two limitations in the articles of con- 
 federation, which render the provision obscure and contradic- 
 tory. The power is there restrained to Indians, not members 
 of any of the states, and is not to violate or infringe the legisla- 
 tive right of any state within its own limits. What description 
 of Indians are to be deemed members of a state, is not yet 
 settled; and has been a question of frequent perplexity and 
 contention in the federal councils. And how the trade with 
 Indians, though not members of a state, yet residing within its 
 legislative jurisdiction, can be regulated by an external author- 
 ity, without so far intruding on the internal rights of legisla- 
 tion, is absolutely incomprehensible. This is not the only case, 
 in which the articles of confederation have inconsiderately en- 
 deavoured to accomplish impossibilities; to reconcile a partial 
 sovereignty in the union, with complete sovereignty in the states; 
 to subvert a mathematical axiom, by taking away a part, and 
 letting the whole remain. 
 
 All that need be remarked on the power to coin money, regu- 
 late the value thereof, and of foreign coin, is, that by providing 
 for this last case, the constitution has supplied a material omis- 
 sion in the articles of confederation. The authority of the 
 existing congress is restrained to the regulation of coin struck 
 by their own authority, or that of the respective states It 
 must be seen at once, that the proposed uniformity in the value 
 of the current coin, might be destroyed by subjecting that of 
 foreign coin to the different regulations of the different states. 
 
 The punishment of counterfeiting the public securities, as well 
 as the current coin, is submitted of course to that authority 
 which is to secure the value of both. 
 
 The regulation of weights and measures is transferred from 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 836 
 
 the articles of confederation, and is founded on like considera- 
 tions with the preceding power of regulating coin. 
 
 The dissimilarity in the rules of naturalization has long been 
 remarked as a fault in our system, and as laying a foundation 
 for intricate and delicate questions. In the fourth article of the 
 confederation, it is declared, "that the free inhabitants of each of 
 these states, paupers, vagabonds, and fugitives from justice ex- 
 cepted, shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of free 
 citizens in the several states; and the people of each state shall, 
 in every other, enjoy all the privileges of trade and commerce," 
 &c. There is a confusion of language here, which is remarkable. 
 Why the terms free inhabitants are used in one part of the article, 
 free citizens in another, and people in another ; or what was meant 
 by superadding to " all privileges and immunities of free citizens" 
 — " all the privileges of trade and commerce," cannot easily be 
 determined. It seems to be a construction scarcely avoidable, 
 however, that those who come under the denomination of /red 
 inhabitants of a state, although not citizens of such state, are 
 entitled, in every other state, to all the privileges of free citizens 
 of the latter; that is, to greater privileges than they may be 
 entitled to in their own state : so that it may be in the power 
 of a particular state, or rather every state is laid under a neces- 
 sity, not only to confer the rights of citizenship in other states 
 upon any whom it may admit to such rights within itself, but 
 upon any whom it may allow to become inhabitants within it& 
 jurisdiction. But were an exposition of the term " inhabitants" 
 to be admitted, which would confine the stipulated privileges to 
 citizens alone, the difficulty is diminished only, not removed. 
 The very improper power would still be retained by each state, 
 of naturalizing aliens in every other state. In one state, re- 
 sidence for a short term confers all the rights of citizenship : in 
 another, qualifications of greater importance are required. An 
 ^lien, therefore legally incapacitated for certain rights in the 
 latter, may, by previous residence only in the former, elude his 
 incapacity; and thus the law of one state be preposterously 
 
336 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 rendered paramount to the law of another, within the jurisdic- 
 tion of the other. 
 
 We owe it to mere casualty, that very serious embarrassments 
 on thi9 subject have been hitherto escaped. By the laws of 
 several states, certain descriptions of aliens, who had rendered 
 themselves obnoxious, were laid under interdicts inconsistent, 
 not only with the rights of citizenship, but with the privileges 
 of residence. "What would have been the consequence, if such 
 persons, by residence, or otherwise, had acquired the character 
 of citizens under the laws of another state, and then asserted 
 their rights as such, both to residence and citizenship, within the 
 state proscribing them ? Whatever the legal consequences might 
 have been, other consequences would probably have resulted of 
 too serious a nature, not to be provided against. The new con- 
 stitution has accordingly, with great propriety, made provision 
 against them, and all others proceeding from the defect of the 
 confederation on this head, by authorizing the general govern 
 ment to establish an uniform rule of naturalization throughout 
 the United States. 
 
 The power of establishing uniform laws of bankruptcy, is so 
 intimately connected with the regulation of commerce, and will 
 prevent so many frauds where the parties or their property may 
 lie, or be removed into different states, that the expediency of it 
 seems not likely to be drawn into question. 
 
 The power of prescribing, by general laws, the manner in 
 which the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of each 
 state, shall be proved, and the effect they shall have in other 
 states, is an evident and valuable improvement on the clause 
 relating to this subject in the articles of confederation. The 
 meaning of the latter is extremely indeterminate; and can be 
 of little importance under any interpretation whi«^h it will bear. 
 The power here established, may be rendered a very convenient 
 instrument of justice, and be particularly beneficial on the 
 borders of contiguous states, where the effects liable co justice 
 may be suddenly and secretly translated in any stage of the 
 process, within a foreign jurisdiction 
 
THE FEDEKALIST. 8S7 
 
 The power of establishing post-roads must, in every view, be 
 a harmless power; and may perhaps, by judicious management, 
 become productive of great public conveniency. Nothing which 
 tends to facilitate the intercourse between the states, can be 
 deemed unworthy of the public care. 
 
 PUBLIUA 
 
aag THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 NUMBKR XLIII. 
 
 NEW YORK, JANUARY 25, 1788. 
 
 MADISON. 
 
 THE SAME VIEW CONTINUED. 
 
 The fourth class comprises the following miscellaneous powers 
 
 1. A power to "promote the progress of science and useful 
 aits, by securing for a limited time, to authors and inventors, 
 the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries." 
 
 The utility of this power will scarcely be questioned. The 
 copyright of authors has been solemnly adjudged in Great 
 Britain, to be a right at common law. The right to useful in- 
 ventions, seems with equal reason to belong to the inventors 
 The public good fully coincides in both cases with the claims 
 of individuals. The states cannot separately make effectual 
 provision for either of the cases, and most of them have antici 
 pated the decision of this point, by laws passed at the instance 
 of congress. 
 
 2. " To exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever, 
 over such district, (not exceeding ten miles square,) as may, by 
 cession of particular states, and the acceptance of congress, be- 
 come the seat of the government of the United States ; and to 
 exercise like authority over all places purchased by the consent 
 of the legislature of the states, in which the same shall be, for 
 the erection of forts magazines, arsenals, dock-yards, and other 
 needful buildings." 
 
THE FEIERALIST. 339 
 
 The indispensable necessity of complete authority at the seat 
 of government, carries its own evidence with it. It is a power 
 exercised by every legislature of the union, I might say of the 
 world, by virtue of its general supremacy. Without it, not only 
 the public authority might be insulted and its proceedings be 
 interrupted with impunity, but a dependence of the members 
 of the general government on the state comprehending the seat 
 of the government, for protection in the exercise of their duty, 
 might bring on the national councils an imputation of awe or 
 influence, equally dishonourable to the government and dissatis- 
 factory to the other members of the confederacy. This considera- 
 tion has the more weight, as the gradual accumulation of public 
 improvements at the stationary residence of the government, 
 would be both too great a public pledge to be left in the hands 
 of a single state, and would create so many obstacles to a 
 removal of the government, as still further to abridge its neces- 
 sary independence. The extent of this federal district is suffi- 
 ciently circumscribed to satisfy every jealousy of an opposite 
 nature. And as it is to be appropriated to this use with the 
 consent of the state ceding it; as the state will no doubt pro- 
 vide in the compact for the rights, and the consent of the citi- 
 zens inhabiting it; as the inhabitants will find sufficient induce- 
 ments of interest, to become willing parties to the cession ; as 
 they will have had their voice in the election of the government, 
 which is to exercise authority over them ; as a municipal legis- 
 lature for local purposes, derived from their own suffrages, will 
 of course be allowed them ; and as the authority of the legisla- 
 ture of the state, and of the inhabitants of the ceded part of it, 
 CO concur in the cession, will be derived from the whole people 
 of the state, in their adoption of the constitution, every imagin- 
 able objection seems to be obviated. 
 
 The necessity of a like authority over forts, magazines, &c., 
 established by the general government, is not less evident. The 
 public money expended on such places, and the public property 
 deposited in them, require, that they should be exempt from the 
 authority of the particular state. No?* would it be proper for 
 
840 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 the places on which the security of the entire union may depend, 
 to be in any degree dependent on a particular member of it. 
 All objections and scruples are here also obviated, by requiring 
 the concurrence of the states concerned in every such establish- 
 ment. 
 
 3. "To declare the punishment of treason, but no attainder 
 of treason shall work corruption of blood, or forfeiture, except 
 during the life of the person attainted." 
 
 As treason may be committed against the United States, the 
 authority of the United States ought to be enabled to punish it ; 
 but as newfangled and artificial treasons have been the great 
 engines by which violent factions, the natural offspring of free 
 governments, have usually wreaked their alternate malignity 
 on each other, the convention have, with great judgment, op- 
 posed a barrier to this peculiar danger, by inserting a consti- 
 tutional definition of the crime, fixing the proof necessary for 
 conviction of it, and restraining the congress, even in punishing 
 it, from extending the consequences of guilt beyond the person 
 of its author. 
 
 4. " To admit new states into the union ; but no new state 
 shall be formed or erected within the jurisdiction of any other 
 state ; nor any state be formed by the junction of two or more 
 states, or parts of states, without the consent of the legislatures 
 of the states concerned, as well as of the congress." 
 
 In the articles of confederation, no provision is found on this 
 important subject. Canada was to be admitted of right, on her 
 joining in the measures of the United States; and the other 
 colonies, by which were evidently meant, the other British colo- 
 nies, at the discretion of nine states. The eventual establish- 
 ment of new states, seems to have been overlooked by the com- 
 pilers of that instrument. We have seen the inconvenience of 
 this omission, and the assumption of power into which oongress 
 have been led by it. With great propriety, therefore, has the 
 new system supplied the defect. The general precaution, that 
 no new states shall be formed, without the concurrence of the 
 federal authority, and that of the states concerned, is consonant 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 341 
 
 Lo the principles which ought to govern such transactions. The 
 particular precaution against the erection of new states, by the 
 partition of a state without its consent, quiets the jealousy of 
 the larger states; as that of the smaller is quieted by a like 
 precaution, against a junction of states without their consent 
 
 5. " To dispose of, and make all needful rules and regulations, 
 respecting the territory or other property, belonging to the 
 United States, with a proviso, that nothing in the constitution 
 shall be so construed, as to prejudice any claims of the United 
 States, or of any particular state." 
 
 This is a power of very great importance, and required by 
 considerations, similar to those which show the propriety of 
 the former. The proviso annexed, is proper in itself, and was 
 probably rendered absolutely necessary by jealousies and ques- 
 tions concerning the western territory sufficiently known to 
 the public. 
 
 6. " To guaranty to every state in the union a republican 
 form of government; to protect each of them against invasion; 
 and, on application of the legislature or of the executive, (when 
 the legislature cannot be convened,) against domestic violence." 
 
 In a confederacy founded on republican principles, and com- 
 posed of republican members, the superintending government 
 ought clearly to possess authority to defend the system against 
 aristocratic or monarchical innovations. The more intimate 
 the nature of such an union may be, the greater interest have 
 the members in the political institutions of each other ; and the 
 greater right to insist, that the forms of government under 
 which the compact was entered into, should be suhstantially 
 maintained. 
 
 But a right implies a remedy; and where else could the 
 remedy be deposited, than where it is deposited by the con- 
 stitution ? Governments of dissimilar principles and forms 
 have been found less adapted to a federal coalition of any sort, 
 than those of a kindred nature. " As the confederate republic 
 of Germany," says Montesquieu, "consists of free cities, and 
 pettv states, subject to diiferent princes, experience shows us 
 
342 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 ihat it is more imperfect, than that of Holland and Switzer- 
 land." " Greece was undone," he adds, " as soon as the king 
 of Maeedon obtained a seat among the Amphyctions." In the 
 latter case, no doubt, the disproportionate force, as well as the 
 monarchical form of the new confederate, had its share of in- 
 fluence on the events. 
 
 It may possibly be asked, what need there could be of such a 
 precaution, and whether it may not become a pretext for altera- 
 tions in the state governments, without the concurrence of the 
 states themselves. These questions admit of ready answers. 
 If the interposition of the general government should not be 
 needed, the provision for such an event will be a harmless 
 superfluity only in the constitution. But who can say, what 
 experiments may be produced by the caprice of particular 
 states, by the ambition of enterprising leaders, or by the in- 
 trigues and influence of foreign powers ? To the second ques- 
 tion it may be answered, that if the general government should 
 interpose by virtue of this constitutional authority, it will be 
 of course bound to pursue the authority. But the authority 
 extends no farther than to a guaranty of a republican form of 
 government, which supposes a preexisting government of the 
 form which is to be guaranteed. As long, therefore, as the 
 existing republican forms are continued by the states, they are 
 guaranteed by the federal constitution. Whenever the states 
 may choose to substitute other republican forms, they have a 
 right to do so, and to claim the federal guaranty for the latter 
 The only restriction imposed on them is, that they shall not 
 exchange republican for anti-republican constitutions; a re 
 striction which, it is presumed, will hardly be considered as a 
 grievance. 
 
 A protection against invasion is due, from every society, to 
 the parts composing it. The latitude of the expression here 
 used seems to secure each state, not only against foreign hos- 
 tility, but against ambitious or vindictive enterprises of its 
 more powerful neighbours. The history, both of ancient and 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 343 
 
 modern confederacies, proves, that the weaker members of Uie 
 union ought not to be insensible to the policy of this article. 
 
 Protection against domestic violence is added with equal pro- 
 priety. It has been remarked, that even among the Swiss can- 
 tons, which, properly speaking, are not under one government, 
 provision is made for this object: and the history of that league 
 informs us, that mutual aid is frequently claimed and afforded; 
 and as well by the most democratic, as the other cantons. A 
 T-eeent and well-known event among ourselves has warned us to 
 be prepared for emergencies of a like nature. 
 
 At first view, it might seem not to square with the republican 
 theory, to suppose, either that a majority have not the right, or 
 that a minority will have the force, to subvert a government . 
 and consequently, that the federal interposition can never bo 
 i-equired, but when it would be improper. But theoretic reason- 
 ing, in this, as in most other cases, must be qualified by the 
 lessons of practice. Why may not illicit combinations, for pur- 
 poses of violence, be formed as well by a majority of a state, 
 especially a small state, as by a majority of a county, or a dis- 
 trict of the same state; and if the authority of the state ought 
 in the latter case to protect the local magistracy, ought not the 
 federal authority in the former to support the state authority ? 
 Besides, there are certain parts of the state constitutions, which 
 are so interwoven with the federal constitution, that a violent 
 blow cannot be given to the one, without communicating the 
 wound to the other. Insurrections in a state will rarely induce 
 a federal interposition, unless the number concerned in them 
 Dear some proportion to the friends of government. It will be 
 much better, that the violence in such cases should be repressed 
 by the superintending power, than that the majority should be 
 left to maintain their cause by a bloody and obstinate contest 
 The existence of a right to interpose, will generally prevent the 
 necessity of exerting it. 
 
 Is it true, that force and right are necessarily on the same 
 bide in republican governments ? May not the minor party 
 possess such a superiority of pecuniary resources, of military 
 
d44 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 talents and experience, or of secret succours from foreign powers, 
 as will render it superiour also in an appeal to the sword? 
 May not a more compact and advantageous position turn the 
 scale on the same side, against a superiour number so situated 
 as to be less capable of a prompt and collected exertion of its 
 strength ? Nothing can be more chimerical than to imagine, 
 that in a trial of actual force, victory may be calculated by the 
 rules which prevail in a census of the inhabitants, or which 
 determine the event of an election ! May it not happen, in fine, 
 that the minority of citizens may become a majority of persons, 
 by the accession of alien residents, of a casual concourse of 
 adventurers, or of those whom the constitution of the state has 
 not admitted to the rights of suffrage ? I take no notice of an 
 unhappy species of population abounding in some of the states, 
 who, during the calm of regular government, are sunk below 
 the level of men ; but who, in the tempestuous scenes of civil 
 violence, may emerge into the human character, and give a 
 superiority of strength to any party with which they may 
 associate themselves. 
 
 In cases where it may be doubtful on which side justice lies, 
 what better umpires could be desired by two violent factions, 
 flying to arms and tearing a state to pieces, than the represent- 
 atives of confederate states, not heated by the local flame ? 
 To the impartiality of judges, they would unite the affection 
 of friends. Happy would it be, if such a remedy for its infir- 
 mities could be enjoyed by all free governments ; if a project 
 equally effectual, could be established for the universal peace of 
 mankind ! 
 
 Should it be asked, what is to be the redress for an insurrec- 
 tion pervading all the states, and comprising a superiority of 
 the entire force, though not a constitutional right ^ The answer 
 must be, that such a case, as it would be without the compass 
 of human remedies, so it is fortunately not within the eompasB 
 of human probability; and that it is a sufficient recommenda 
 tion of the federal constitution, that it diminishes the risk 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 345 
 
 of a calamity, for which no possible constitution can provide 
 a cure. 
 
 Among the advantages of a confederate republic, enumerated 
 by Montesquieu, an important one is, " that should a pop alar 
 insurrection happen in one of the states, the others are able to 
 quell it. Should abuses creep into one part, they are reformed 
 by those that remain sound." 
 
 7. " To consider all debts contracted, and engagements entered 
 into, before the adoption of this constitution, as being no less 
 valid against the United States under this constitution, than 
 under the confederation." 
 
 This can only be considered as a declaratory proposition ; and 
 may have been inserted, among other reasons, for the satisfac- 
 tion of the foreign creditors of the United States, who cannot be 
 strangers to the pretended doctrine, that a change in the political 
 form of civil society, has the magical effect of dissolving its 
 moral obligations. 
 
 Among the lesser criticisms which have been exercised on the 
 constitution, it has been remarked, that the validity of engage- 
 ments ought to have been asserted in favour of the United 
 States, as well as against them; and in the spirit which usually 
 characterizes little critics, the omission has been transformed 
 and magnified into a plot against the national rights. The 
 authors of this discovery may be told, what few others need be 
 informed of, that as engagements are in their nature reciprocal, 
 an assertion of their validity on one side, necessarily involves a 
 validity on the other sidej and that as the article is merely 
 declaratory, the establishment of the principle in one case, is 
 suflScient for every case. They may be further told, that every 
 constitution must limit its precautions to dangers that are not 
 altogether imaginary; and that no real danger can exist that 
 the government would dare, with, or even without, this constitu- 
 tional declaration before it, to remit the debts justly due to the 
 public, on the pretext here condemned. 
 
 8. " To provide for amendments to be ratified by three fourths 
 of the states, under two exceptions only." 
 
346 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 That useful alterations will be suggested by experience, could 
 not but be forepeen. It was requisite, therefore, that a mode for 
 introducing them should be provided. The mode preferred by 
 the convention seems to be stamped with every mark of pro- 
 priety. It guards equally against that extreme facility, which 
 would render the constitution too mutable; and that extreme 
 difficulty, which might perpetuate its discovered faults. It 
 moreover equally enables the general and the state govern- 
 ments to originate the amendment of errours, as they may be 
 pointed out by the experience on one side, or on the other. The 
 exception in favour of the equality of suffrage in the senate, 
 was probably meant as a palladium to the residuary sovereignty 
 of the states, implied and secured by that principle of represent- 
 ation in one branch of the legislature; and was probably insisted 
 on by the states particularly attached to that equality. The 
 other exception must have been admitted on the same considera- 
 tions which produced the privilege defended by it. 
 
 9. " The ratification of the conventions of nine states, shall be 
 sufficient for the establishment of this constitution between the 
 states ratifying the same." 
 
 This article speaks for itself The express authority of the 
 people alone could give due validity to the constitution. To 
 have required the unanimous ratification of the thirteen states, 
 would have subjected the essential interests of the whole, to the 
 caprice or corruption of a single member. It would have 
 marked a want of foresight in the convention, which our own 
 experience would have rendered inexcusable. 
 
 Two questions of a very delicate nature present themselves 
 on this occasion : 1. On what principle the confederation, which 
 stands in the solemn form of a compact among the states, can 
 be superseded without the unanimous consent pf the parties to 
 it : 2. "What relation is to subsist between the nine or more states 
 ratifying the constitution, and the remaining few who do not 
 become parties to it ? 
 
 The first question is answered at once by recurring to the 
 
THE FEDERALIST 34V 
 
 absolute necessity of the case ; to the great principle of self 
 preservation ; to the transcendent law of nature and of nature's 
 God, which declares that the safety and happiness of society are 
 the objects at which all political institutions aim, and to which 
 all such institutions must be sacrificed. Perhaps, also, an answer 
 may be found without searching beyond the principles of the 
 compact itself. It has been heretofore noted among the defect^ 
 of the confederation, that in many of the states, it had received 
 no higher sanction than a mere legislative ratification. The 
 principle of reciprocality seems to require, that its obligation on 
 the other states should be reduced to the same standard. A 
 compact between independent sovereigns, founded on acts of 
 legislative authority, can pretend to no higher validity than a 
 league or treaty between the parties. It is an established doc- 
 trine on the subject of treaties, that all the articles are mutually 
 conditions of each other ; that a breach of any one article is a 
 breach of the whole treaty; and that a breach, committed by 
 either of the parties, absolves the others, and authorizes them, 
 if they please, to pronounce the compact violated and void. 
 Should it unhappily be necessary to appeal to these delicate 
 truths, for a justification for dispensing with the consent of par- 
 ticular states to a dissolution of the federal pact, will not the 
 complaining parties find it a diflScult task to answer the multi- 
 plied and important infractions, with which they may be con- 
 fronted ? The time has been, when it was incumbent on u« 
 all to veil the ideas which this paragraph exhibits. The scene 
 is now changed, and with it the part which the same motives 
 dictate. 
 
 The second question is not less delicate : and the flattering 
 prospect of its being merely hypothetical, forbids an over curious 
 discussion of it. It is one of those cases which must be left to 
 provide for itself. In general, it may be observed, that although 
 no political relation can subsist between the assenting and dis- 
 senting states, yet the moral relations will remain uncancelled. 
 The claims of justice, both on one side and on the other, will be 
 
 ss 
 
348 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 in force, and must be fulfilled ; the rights of humanity must in 
 all cases be duly and mutually respected ; whilst considerations 
 of a common interest, and above all, the remembrance of the 
 endearing scenes which are past, and the anticipation of a 
 speedy triumph over the obstacles to reunion, will, it is hoped, 
 not urge in vain moderation on one side, and prudence on the 
 other 
 
 PUBLIUS. 
 
THE FEDERALIST. S49 
 
 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 NUMBER XLIV. 
 
 NEW YORK, JANUARY 25, 1788. 
 
 MADISON. 
 
 THE SAME VIEW CONTINUED AND CONCLUDED. 
 
 A fifth class of provisions in favour of the federal authority, 
 consists of the following restrictions on the authority of the 
 several states. 
 
 1. *' No state shall enter into any treaty, alliance or confedera- 
 tion; grant letters of marque and reprisal; coin money; emit 
 bills of credit; make any thing but gold and silver a legal 
 tender in payment of debts ; pass any bill of attainder, ex post 
 facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts; or grant 
 any title of nobility." 
 
 The prohibition against treaties, alliances, and confederations, 
 makes a part of the existing articles of union ; and, for reasonb 
 which need no explanation, is copied into the new constitution. 
 The prohibition of letters of marque, is another part of the old 
 system, but is somewhat extended in the new. According to the 
 former, letters of marque could be granted by the states after a 
 declaration of war : according to the latter, these licenses must 
 be obtained, as well during the war, as previous to its declaration, 
 from the government of the United States. This alteration is 
 fully justified, by the advantage of uniformity in all points which 
 relate to foreign powers; and of immediate responsibility to the 
 
b50 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 nation in all those, for whose conduct the nation itself is to be 
 responsible. 
 
 The right of coining money, which is here taken from the 
 states, was left in their hands by the confederation, as a concur- 
 rent right with that of congress, under an exception in favour of 
 the exclusive right of congress to regulate the alloy and value. 
 In this instance, also, the new provision is an improvement on 
 the old. Whilst the alloy and value depended on the general 
 authority, a right of coinage in the particular states could have 
 no other effect than to multiply expensive mints, and aiversify 
 the forms and weights of the circulating pieces. The latter in- 
 convenieney defeats one purpose for which the power was origin- 
 ally submitted to the federal head : and as far as the former 
 might prevent an inconvenient remittance of gold and silver 
 to the central mint for recoinage, the end can be as well attained 
 by local mints established under the general authority. 
 
 The extension of the prohibition to bills of credit, must give 
 pleasure to every citizen, in proportion to his love of justice, 
 and his knowledge of the true springs of public prosperitj'. 
 The loss which America has sustained since the peace, from the 
 pestilent effects of paper money on the necessary confidence 
 between man and man; on the necessary confidence in the 
 public councils; on the industry and morals of the people, and 
 on the character of republican government, constitutes an enor- 
 mous debt against the states, chargeable with this unadvised 
 measure, which must long remain unsatisfied; or rather an ac- 
 cumulation of guilt, which can be expiated no otherwise than 
 by a voluntary sacrifice on the altar of justice, of the power 
 which has been the instrument of it. In addition to these per- 
 suasive considerations, it may be observed, that the same reasonu 
 which show the necessity of denying to the states the power of 
 regulating coin prove, with equal force, that they ought not to 
 be at liberty to substitute a paper medium, in the place of coin. 
 Had every state a right to regulate the value of its coin, there 
 might be as many different currencies as states ; and thus, the 
 intercourse among them would be impeded : retrospective altera- 
 
THE FEDERALIST. ' 851 
 
 aoiis m its value might be made, and thus the citizens of othei 
 states be injured and animosities be kindled among the states 
 themselves The subjects of foreign powers might suffer from 
 the same cause, and hence the union be discredited and em- 
 broiled by the indiscretion of a single member. No one of 
 these mischiefs is less incident to a power in the states to 
 emit paper money, than to coin gold or silver. The power to 
 make any thing but gold and silver a tender in payment of 
 debts, is withdrawn from the states, on the same principle with 
 that of issuing a paper currency. 
 
 Bills of attainder, ex post facto laws, and laws impairing the 
 obligation of contracts, are contrary to the first principles of 
 the social compact, and to every principle of sound legislation. 
 The two former are expressly prohibited by the declarations 
 prefixed to some of the state constitutions, and all of them are 
 prohibited by the spirit and scope of these fundamental char- 
 ters. Oui' own experience has taught us, nevertheless, that ad- 
 ditional fences against these dangers ought not to be omitted. 
 7ery properly, therefore, have the convention added this con- 
 stitutional bulwark in favour of personal security and private 
 rights; and I am much deceived, if they have not, in so doing, 
 as faithfully consulted the genuine sentiments, as the undoubted 
 interests of their constituents. The sober people of America 
 are weary of the fluctuating policy which has directed the 
 public councils. They have seen with regret and with indigna- 
 tion, that sudden changes, and legislative interferences, in cases 
 affecting personal rights, become jobs in the hands of enter- 
 prising and influential speculators; and snares to the more in- 
 dustrious and less informed part of the community. They have 
 seen, too, that one legislative interference is but the first link of 
 a long chain of repetitions; every subsequent interference being 
 naturally produced by the effects of the preceding. They very 
 rightly infer, therefore, that some thorough reform is wanting, 
 which will banish speculations on public measures, inspire a 
 general prudence and industry, and give a regular course to the 
 business of society. The prohibition with respect to titles of 
 
852 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 nobility, is copied from the articles of confederation, ai d ueods 
 no comment. 
 
 2. "No state shall, without the consent of the congress lay 
 any imposts or duties on imports or exports, except what may 
 be absolutely necessary for executing its inspection laws, and 
 the neat produce of all duties and imposts laid by any state on 
 imports or exports, shall be for the use of the treasury of the 
 United States ; and all such laws shall be subject to the revision 
 and control of the congress. No state shall, without the con- 
 sent of congress, lay any duty on tonnage, keep troops or ships 
 of war in time of peace ; enter into any agreement or compact 
 with another state, or with a foreign power, or engage in war 
 unless actually invaded, or in such imminent danger as will not 
 admit of delay." 
 
 The restraint on the power of the states over imports and ex- 
 ports, is enforced by all the arguments which prove the neces- 
 sity of submitting the regulation of trade to the federal councils. 
 It is needless, therefore, to remark further on this head, than 
 that the manner in which the restraint is qualified, seems well 
 calculated at once to secure to the states a reasonable discretion 
 in providing for the conveniency of their imports and exports, 
 and to the United States a reasonable check against the abuse 
 of this discretion. The remaining particulars of this clause, 
 fall within reasonings which are either so obvious, or have been 
 so fully developed, that they may be passed over without remark. 
 
 The sixth and last class, consists of the several powers and 
 provisions, by which eflSlcacy is given to all the rest. 
 
 1. " Of these the first is, the power to make all laws which 
 shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the 
 foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this constitu- 
 tion in the government of the United States, or in any depart- 
 ment or officer thereof." 
 
 Few parts of the constitution have been assailed with more 
 intemperance than this ; yet on a fair investigation of it, as has 
 been elsewhere shown, no part can appear more completely 
 invulnerable. Without the substance of this power, the whol<» 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 353 
 
 constitution would be a dead letter. Those who object to the 
 article, therefore, as a part of the constitution, can only mean 
 that the form of the provision is improper, But have they con 
 Bidered, whether a better form could have been substituted ? 
 
 There are four other possible methods, which the convention 
 might have taken on this subject. They might have copied the 
 second article of the existing confederation, which would have 
 prohibited the exercise of any power not expressly delegated: 
 they might have attempted a positive enumeration of the 
 powers comprehended under the general terms "necessary and 
 proper :" they might have attempted a negative enumeration of 
 them, by specifying the powers excepted from the general defi- 
 nition: they might have been altogether silent on the subject; 
 leaving these necessary and proper powers, to construction and 
 inference. 
 
 Had the convention taken the first method of adopting the 
 second article of confederation, it is evident that the new con- 
 gress would be continually exposed, as their predecessors have 
 been, to the alternative of construing the term " expressly" with 
 80 much rigour, as to disarm the government of all real author- 
 ity whatever, or with so much latitude as to destroy altogether 
 the force of the restriction. It would be easy to show, if it were 
 necessary, that no important power, delegated by the articles of 
 confederation, has been or can be executed by congress without 
 recurring more or less to the doctrine of construction or implica- 
 tion. As the powers delegated under the new system are more 
 extensive, the government which is to administer it would find 
 itself still more distressed with the alternative of betraying the 
 public interest by doing nothing; or of violating the constitu- 
 tion by exercising powers itfdispensably necessary and proper; 
 but, at the same time, not expressly granted. 
 
 Had the convention attempted a positive enumeration of the 
 powers necessary and proper for carrying their other powers 
 into effect; the attempt would have involved a complete digest 
 of laws on every subject to which the constitution relates; ac- 
 commodated too not only to the existing state of things, but to 
 
Sb\ THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 all the possible changes which futurity may produce: for ii 
 every new application of a general power, the particular powers, 
 which are the means of attaining the object of the general power, 
 must always necessarily vary with that object; and be often 
 properly varied whilst the object remains the same. 
 
 Had they attempted to enumerate the particular powers or 
 means not necessary or proper for carrying the general powers 
 into execution, the task would have been no less chimerical; and 
 would have been liable to this further objection; that every 
 defect in the enumeration, would have been equivalent to a 
 positive grant of authority. If, to avoid this consequence, they 
 had attempted a partial enumeration of the exceptions, and 
 described the residue by the general terms, not necessary or 
 proper; it must have happened that the enumeration would 
 comprehend a few of the excepted powers only; that these 
 would be such as would be least likely to be assumed or tole- 
 rated, because the enumeration would of course select such 
 as would be least necessary or proper, and that the unneces- 
 sary and improper powers included in the residuum, would 
 be less forcibly excepted, than if no partial enumeration had 
 been made. 
 
 Had the constitution been silent on this head, there can be no 
 doubt that all the particular powers requisite as means of exe- 
 cuting the general powers would have resulted to the govern- 
 ment, by unavoidable implication. !No axiom is more clearly es- 
 tablished in law, or in reason, than that wherever the end is 
 required, the means are authorized; wherever a general power 
 to do a thing is given, every particular power necessary for 
 doing it is included. Had this last method, therefore, been pur- 
 sued by the convention, every objection now urged against their 
 plan, would remain in all its plausibility; and the real incon- 
 veniency would be incurred of not removing a pretext which 
 may be seized on critical occasions, for drawing into question 
 the essential powers of the union. 
 
 If it be asked, what is to be the consequence, in case the cor 
 gress shall misconstrue this part of the constitution, and exercise 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 35fi 
 
 powers not warranted by its true meaning; I answer the same 
 as if they should misconstrue or enlarge any other power vested 
 in them; as if the general power had been reduced to particu- 
 lars, and any one of these were to be violated ; the same in short 
 as il the state legislatures should violate their respective consti- 
 tutional authorities. In the first instance, the success of the 
 usurpation will depend on the executive and judiciary depart- 
 ments, which are to expound and give effect to the legislative 
 acts; and in the last resort, a remedy must be obtained from 
 the people, who can, by the election of more faithful represent- 
 atives, annul the acts of the usurpers. The truth is, that this 
 ultimate redress may be more confided in against unconstitu- 
 tional acts of the federal, than of the state legislatures, for this 
 plain reason, that as every such act of the former, will be an 
 invasion of the rights of the latter, these will be ever ready to 
 mark the innovation, to sound the alarm to the people, and to 
 exert their local influence in effecting a change of federal repre- 
 sentatives. There being no such intermediate body between the 
 state legislatures and the people, interested in watching the 
 conduct of the former, violations of the state constitutions are 
 more likely to remain unnoticed and unredressed. 
 
 2. " This constitution, and the laws of the United States which 
 shall be made in pursuance thereof, and all treaties made, or 
 which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, 
 shall be the supreme law of the land, and the judges in every 
 state shall be bound thereby, any thing in the constitution or 
 laws of -any state to the contrary notwithstanding." 
 
 The indiscreet zeal of the adversaries to the constitution, has 
 betrayed them into an attack on this part of it also, without 
 which it would have been evidently and radically defective. To 
 be fully sensible of this, we need only suppose for a moment, 
 that the supremacy of the state constitutions had been left com- 
 plete, by a saving clause in their favour. 
 
 In the first place, as these constitutions invest the state legis- 
 latures with absolute sovereignty, in all cases not excepted by 
 the existing articles of confederation, all the authorities con 
 
B56 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 tained in the proposed constitution, so far as they exceed those 
 enumerated in the confederation, would have been annulled, and 
 the new congress would have been reduced to the same impotent 
 condition with their predecessors. 
 
 In the next place, as the constitutions of some of the states 
 do not even expressly and fully recognise the existing powers 
 of the confederacy, an express saving of the supremacy of the 
 former would, in such states, have brought into question every 
 power contained in the proposed constitution. 
 
 In the third place, as the constitutions of the states differ 
 much from each other, it might happen that a treaty or national 
 law of great and' equal importance to the states, would interfere 
 with some, and not with other constitutions, and would conse- 
 quently be valid in some of the states, at the same time that it 
 would have no effect in others. 
 
 In fine, the world would have seen for the first time, a system 
 of government founded on an inversion of the fundamental prin- 
 ciples of all government ; it would have seen the authority of the 
 whole society everywhere subordinate to the authority of the 
 parts; it would have seen a monster, in which the head was 
 under the direction of the members. 
 
 3. " The senators and representatives, and the members of the 
 several state legislatures ; and all executive and judicial officers, 
 both of the United States and the several states, shall be bound 
 by oath or affirmation, to support this constitution." 
 
 It has been asked, why it was thought necessary, that the 
 state magistracy should be bound to support the federal consti- 
 tution, and unnecessary that a like oath should be imposed on 
 the officers of the United States, in favour of the state constitu- 
 tions ? 
 
 Several reasons might be assigned for the distinctions. 1 con- 
 tent myself with one, which is obvious and conclusive. The 
 members of the federal government will have no agency in 
 carrying the state constitutions into effect. The members and 
 officers of the state governments, on the contrary, will have an 
 essential agency in giving effect to the federal constitution. The 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 357 
 
 election of the president and senate will depend, in all cases, 
 on the legislatures of the several states. And the election of the 
 house of representatives will equally depend on the same author- 
 ity in the first instance; and will, probably, for ever De con- 
 ducted by the officers, and according to the laws of the states. 
 
 4. Among the provisions for giving efficacy to the federal 
 powers, might be added those which belong to the executive and 
 judiciary departments : but as these are reserved for particular 
 examination in another place, I pass them over in this. 
 
 We have now reviewed, in detail, all the articles composing 
 the sum or quantity of power, delegated by the proposed consti- 
 tution to the federal government; and are brought to this unde- 
 niable conclusion, that no part of the power is unnecessary or 
 improper, for accomplishing the necessary objects of the union. 
 The question therefore, whether this amount of power shall be 
 granted or not, resolves itself into another question, whether or 
 not a government commensurate to the exigencies of the union, 
 shall be established ; or, in other words, whether the union itself 
 shall be preserved. 
 
 PuBurs. 
 
358 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 NUMBER XLV. 
 
 NEW YORK, JANUARY 29, 1788. 
 
 MADISON. 
 
 A FURTHER DISCUSSION OF THE SUPPOSED DANGER FROM THE 
 POWERS OF THE UNION, TO THE STATE GOVERNMENTS. 
 
 Having shown, that no one of the powers transferred to the 
 federal government is unnecessary or improper, the next ques- 
 tion to be considered is, whether the whole mass of them will 
 be dangerous to the portion of authority left in the several 
 states 
 
 The adversaries to the plan of the convention, instead of con- 
 sidering in the first place, what degree of power was absolutely 
 necessary for the purposes of the federal government, have ex- 
 hausted themselves in a secondary inquiry into the possible con- 
 sequences of the proposed degree of power to the governments 
 of the particular states. But if the union, as has been shown, be 
 essential to the security of the people of America against foreign 
 danger; if it be essential to their security against contentions 
 and wars among the different states; if it be essential to guard 
 them against those violent and oppressive factions,'which imbitter 
 the blessings of liberty, and against those military establishments 
 which must gradually poison its very fountain; if, in a word, the 
 union be essential to the happiness of the people of America, is 
 it not preposterous, to urge as an objection to a government, with- 
 otit which the objects of the union cannot be attained, thai svnth 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 359 
 
 a, government may derogate from the importance of the govern- 
 ments of the individual states ? Was then the American revolu- 
 tion effected, was the American confederacy formed, was the 
 precious blood of thousands spilt, and the hard-earned substance 
 of millions lavished, not that the people of America should enjoy 
 peace, liberty, and safety ; but that the governments of the indi- 
 vidual states, that particular municipal establishments, might 
 enjoy a certain extent of power, and be arrayed with certain 
 dignities and attributes of sovereignty ? We have heard of th^ 
 impious doctrine in the old world, that the people were made 
 for kings, not kings for the people. Is the same doctrine to bo 
 revived in the new, in another shape, that the solid happiness 
 of the people is to be sacrificed to the views of political institu- 
 tions of a different form ? It is too early for politicians to pre- 
 sume on our forgetting that the public good, the real welfare of 
 the great body of the people, is the supreme object to be pur- 
 sued ; and that no form of government whatever has any other 
 value, than as it may be fitted for the attainment of this object 
 Were the plan of the convention adverse to the public happiness, 
 my voice would be, Eeject the plan. Were the union itself incon- 
 sistent with the public happiness, it would be, Abolish the union 
 In like manner, as far as the sovereignty of the states cannot 
 be reconciled to the happiness of the people, the voice of every 
 good citizen must be. Let the former be sacrificed to the latter. 
 How far the sacrifice is necessary, has been shown. How far 
 the unsacrificed residue will be endangered, is the question 
 before us. 
 
 Several important considerations have been touched in the 
 course of these papers, which discountenance the supposition, 
 that the operation of the federal government will by degrees 
 prove fatal to the state governments. The more I revolve the 
 subject, the more fully I am persuaded, that the balance is much 
 more likely to be disturbed by the preponderancy of the last 
 than of the first scale. 
 
 We have seen, in all the examples of ancient and modern 
 ^confederacies, the strongest tendency continually betraying 
 
360 ' THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 itself in tno members, to despoil the general government ol 
 its authorities, with a very ineffectual capacity in the latter to 
 defend itself against the encroachments. Although in most of 
 these examples, the system has been so dissimilar from that 
 under consideration, as greatly to weaken any inference con- 
 cerning the latter, from the fate of the former ; yet as the 
 states will retain, under the proposed constitution, a very ex- 
 tensive portion of active sovereignty, the inference ought not 
 to be wholly disregarded. In the Achsean league, it is probable 
 that the federal head had a degree and species of power, which 
 gave it a considerable likeness to the government framed by 
 the convention. The Lycian confederacy, as far as its prin- 
 ciples and form are transmitted, must have borne a still greater 
 analogy to it. Yet history does not inform us, that either of 
 them ever degenerated, or tended to degenerate, into one con- 
 solidated government. On the contrary, we know that the ruin 
 of one of them proceeded from the incapacity of the federal 
 authority to prevent the dissensions, and finally the disunion of 
 the subordinate authorities. These cases are the more worthy of 
 our attention, as the external causes by which the component 
 parts were pressed together, were much more numerous and 
 powerful than in our case ; and consequently, less powerful liga- 
 ments within would be sufficient to bind the members to the 
 head, and to each other. 
 
 In the feudal system, we have seen a similar propensity ex- 
 emplified. Notwithstanding the want of proper sympathy in 
 every instance between the local sovereigns and the people, and 
 the sympathy in some instances between the general sovereign 
 and the latter; it usually happened that the local sovereigns 
 prevailed in the rivalship for encroachments. Had no external 
 dangers enforced internal harmony and subordination ; and par- 
 ticularly, had the local sovereigns possessed the affections of 
 the people, the great kingdoms in Europe would at this time 
 consist of as many independent princes, as there were formerly 
 feudatory barons. 
 
 The state governments will have the advantage of the federal 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 361 
 
 government, whether we compare them in respect to the imme- 
 diate dependence of the one on the other; to the weight of 
 personal influence which each side will possess; to the powers 
 respectively vested in them; to the predilection and probable 
 support of the people ; to the disposition and faculty of resist- 
 ing and frustrating the measures of each other. 
 
 The state governments may be regarded as constituent and 
 essential parts of the federal government; whilst the latter is 
 nowise essential to the operation or organization of the former. 
 Without the intervention of the state legislatures, the president 
 of the United States cannot be elected at all. They must in all 
 cases have a great share in his appointment, and will, perhaps, 
 in most cases, of themselves determine it. The senate will be 
 elected absolutely and exclusively by the state legislatures. 
 Even the house of representatives, though drawn immediately 
 from the people, will be chosen very much under the influence 
 of that class of men, whose influence over the people obtains for 
 themselves an election into the state legislatures. Thus, each 
 of the principal branches of the federal government will owe its 
 existence more or less to the favour of the state governments, 
 and must consequently feel a dependence, which is much more 
 likely to beget a disposition too obsequious, than too overbearing 
 towards them. On the other side, the component parts of the 
 state governments will in no instance be indebted for their ap- 
 pointment to the direct agency of the federal government, and 
 very little, if at all, to the local influence of its members. 
 
 The number of individuals employed under the constitution 
 of the United States, will be much smaller than the number 
 employed under the particular states. There will consequently 
 be less of personal influence on the side of the former than of 
 the latter. The members of the legislative, executive, and judi- 
 ciary departments of thirteen and more states ; the justices of 
 peace, officers of militia, ministerial officers of justice, with all 
 the county, corporation, and town officers, for three millions 
 and more of people, intermixed, and having particular acquaint- 
 ance with every class and circle of people, must exceed beyond 
 
362 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 all proportion, both in number and influence, those of every de- 
 scription who will be employed in the administration of the 
 federal system. Compare the members of the three great de- 
 partments, of the thirteen states, excluding from the judiciary 
 department the justices of peace, with the members of the 
 corresponding departments of the single government of the 
 union; compare the militia ofiicers of three millions of people, 
 with the military and marine oflEicers of any establishment 
 which is within the compass of probability, or, I may add, of 
 possibility ; and in this view alone, we may pronounce the 
 advantage of the states to be decisive. If the federal govern- 
 ment is to have collectors of revenue, the state governments 
 will have theirs also. And as those of the former will be prin- 
 cipally on the seacoast, and not very numerous, whilst those of 
 the latter will be spread over the face of the country, and will 
 be very numerous, the advantage in this view also lies on the 
 same side. It is true that the confederacy is to possess, and 
 may exercise the power of collecting internal as well as ex- 
 ternal taxes throughout the states : but it is probable that this 
 power will not be resorted to, except for supplemental purposes 
 of revenue ; that an option will then be given to the states to 
 supply their quotas by previous collections of their own; and 
 that the eventual collection, under the immediate authority of 
 the union, will generally be made by the officers, and according 
 to the rules appointed by the several states. Indeed, it is 
 extremely probable, that in other instances, particularly in the 
 organization of the judicial power, the officers of the states 
 will be clothed with the correspondent authority of the union. 
 Should it happen, however, that separate collectors of internal 
 revenue should be appointed under the federal government, the 
 influence of the whole number would not bear a comparison 
 with that of the multitude of state officers in the opposite 
 scale. Within every district, to which a federal collector would 
 be allotted, there would not be less than thirty or forty, or 
 «ven more officers, of difierent descriptions, and many of them 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 363 
 
 persons of character and weight, whose influence would lie en 
 the side of the state. 
 
 The powers delegated by the proposed constitution to the 
 feaeral government, are few and defined. Those which are to 
 remain in the state governments, are numerous and indefinite. 
 The formoi will be exercised principally on external objects, as 
 war, peace, negotiation, and foreign commerce; with which last 
 the power of taxation will, for the most part, be connecteu. 
 The powers reserved to the several states will extend to all the 
 objects, which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the 
 lives, liberties, and properties of the people ; and the internal 
 order, improvement, and prosperity of the state. 
 
 The operations of the federal government will be most exten- 
 sive and important in times of war and danger ; those of the 
 state governments in times of peace and security. As the 
 former periods will probably bear a small proportion to the 
 latter, the state governments will here enjoy another advan- 
 tage over the federal government. The more adequate indeed 
 the federal powers may be rendered to the national defence, 
 the less frequent will be those scenes of danger which might 
 favour their ascendancy over the governments of the particular 
 states. 
 
 If the new constitution be examined with accuracy and can- 
 dour, it will be found that the change which it proposes, consistb 
 much less in the addition of new powers to the union, than in 
 the invigoration of its original powers. The regulation of 
 commerce, it is true, is a new power; but that seems to be an 
 addition which few oppose, and from which no apprehensions 
 are entertained. The powers relating to war and peace, armies 
 and fleets, treaties and finance, with the other more consider- 
 able powers, are all vested in the existing congress by the arti- 
 cles of confederation. The proposed change does not enlarge 
 these powers ; it only substitutes a more effectual mode of ad- 
 ministering them. The change relating to taxation, may be 
 regarded as the most important : and yet the present congress 
 
 have as complete authority to require of the states indefinite 
 
 34 
 
364 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 supplies of money for the common defence and general welfare^ 
 as the future congress will have to require them of individual 
 citizens ; and the latter will be no more bound than the states 
 themselves have been, to pay the quotas respectively taxed on 
 them. Had the states complied punctually with the articles of 
 confederation, or could their compliance have been enforced by 
 as peaceable means as may be used with success towards single 
 persons, our past experience is very far from countenancing an 
 opinion, that the state governments would have lost their con- 
 stitutional powers, and have gradually undergone an entire con- 
 solidation. To maintain that such an event would have ensued, 
 would be to say at once, that the existence of the state govern- 
 ments is incompatible with any system whatever, that accom- 
 plisbes the essential purposes of the union. 
 
 POBLIUB 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 366 
 
 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 NUMBER XLVI. 
 
 NEW YORK, JANUARY 29, 1788 
 
 MADISON. 
 
 THE SUBJECT OF THE LAST PAPER RESUMED; WITH AN EXAMI. 
 NATION OF THE COMPARATIVE MEANS OF INFLUENCE OF THE 
 FEDERAL AND STATE GOVERNMENTS. 
 
 Eesuminq the subject of the last paper, I proceed to inquire, 
 whether the federal government or the state governments, will 
 have the advantage with regard to the predilection and support 
 of the people. 
 
 Notwithstanding the different modes in which they are ap- 
 pointed, we must consider both of them as substantially de- 
 pendent on the great body of the citizens of the United States. 
 I assume this position here as it respects the first, reserving the 
 proofs for another place. The federal and state governments 
 are in fact but different agents and trustees of the people, insti- 
 tuted with different powers, and designated for different pur- 
 poses. The adversaries of the constitution seem to have lost 
 sight of the people altogether, in their reasonings on this sub- 
 ject; and to have viewed these different establishments, not 
 only as mutual rivals and enemies, but as uncontrolled by any 
 common superiour, in their efforts to usurp the authorities of 
 each other. These gentlemen must here be reminded of their 
 errour. They must be told, that the ultimate authority., 
 wherever the derivative may be found, resides in the peopltj 
 
366 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 alone J and that it will not depend merely oi. the comjara- 
 tive ambition or address of the different governments, whether 
 either, or which of them, will be able to enlarge its sphere of 
 jurisdiction at the expense of the other. Truth, no less than 
 decency, requires, that the event, in every case, should be 
 supposed to depend on the sentiments and sanction of their 
 common constituents. 
 
 Many considerations, besides those suggested on a former 
 occasion, seem to place it beyond doubt, that the first and most 
 natural attachment of the people will be to the governments 
 of their respective states. Into the administration of these, a 
 greater number of individuals will expect to rise. From the 
 gift of these, a greater number of ofl&ces and emoluments will 
 flow. By the superintending care of these, all the more domestic 
 and personal interests of the people will be regulated and pro- 
 vided for. With the affairs of these, the people will be more 
 familiarly and minutely conversant: and with the members 
 of theue, will a greater proportion of the peoi^le have the ties 
 of personal acquaintance and friendship, and of family and 
 party attachments. On the side of these, therefore, the popular 
 bias may well be expected most strongly to incline. 
 
 Experience speaks the same language in this case. The 
 federal administration, though hitherto very defective, in com- 
 parison with what may be hoped under a better system, had^ 
 during the war, and particularly whilst the independent fund 
 of paper emissions was in credit, an activity and importance as 
 great as it can well have, in any future circumstances whatever. 
 It was engaged, too, in a course of measures which had for their 
 object the protection of every thing that was dear, and the 
 acquisition of every thing that could be desirable to the people 
 at large, it was, nevertheless, invariably found, after the tran- 
 sient enthusiasm for the early congresses was over, that the 
 attention and attachment of the people were turned anew to 
 their own particular governments j that the federal council was 
 at no time the idol of popular favour; and that opposition to 
 proposed enlargements of its powers and importance, was lb« 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 36* 
 
 side usually taken by the men, who wished to build their 
 political consequence on the prepossessions of their fellow 
 citizens. 
 
 If, therefore, ah has been elsewhere remarked, the people 
 should in future become more partial to the federal than to the 
 state governments, the change can only result from such mani- 
 fest and irresistible proofs of a better administration, as will 
 overcome all their antecedent propensities. And in that case, 
 the people ought not surely to be precluded from giving most 
 of their confidence where they may discover it to be most due : 
 but even in that case, the state governments could have little to 
 apprehend, because it is only within a certain sphere, that the 
 federal power can, in the nature of things, be advantageously 
 administered. 
 
 The remaining points, on which I propose to compare the 
 ^federal and state governments, are the disposition and faculty 
 they may respectively possess, to resist and frustrate the mea- 
 sures of each other. 
 
 It has been already proved, that the members of the federal 
 will be more dependent on the members of the state govern- 
 ments, than the latter will be on the former. It has appeared 
 also, that the prepossessions of the people, on whom both will 
 depend, will be more on the side of the state governments, than 
 of the federal government. So far as the disposition of each, 
 towards the other, n)ay be influenced by these causes, the state 
 governments must clearly have the advantage. But in a dis- 
 tinct and very important point of view, the advantage will lie 
 on the same side. The prepossessions, which the members 
 themselves will carry into the federal government, will generally 
 be favourable to the states; whilst it will rarely happen, that 
 the members of the state governments will carry into the public 
 councils a bias in favour of the general government. A local 
 spirit will infallibly prevail much more in the members of the 
 congress, than a national spirit will prevail in the legislatures 
 of the particular states. Every one knows, that a great pro- 
 portion of the errours committed by the state legislatures, pro- 
 
368 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 ceeds Irori the disposition of the membei's to sacrifice the com- 
 prehensive and permanent interests of the state, to the particular 
 and separate views of the counties or districts in which they 
 reside. And if they do not sufficiently enlarge their policy, to 
 embrace the collective welfare of their particular state, how can 
 it be imagined, that they will make the aggregate prosperity 
 of the union, and the dignity and respectability of its govern 
 ment, the objects of their affections and consultations ? For the 
 same reason, that the members of the state legislatures will be 
 unlikely to attach themselves sufficiently to national objects, the 
 members of the federal legislature will be likely to attach them- 
 selves too much to local objects. The states will be to the latter, 
 what counties and towns are to the former. Measures will too 
 often be decided according to their probable effect, not on the 
 national prosperity and happiness, but on the prejudices, inte- 
 rests, and pursuits of the governments and people of the indi- 
 vidual states. What is the spirit that has in general charac- 
 terized the proceedings of congress ? A perusal of their journals, 
 as well as the candid acknowledgements of such as have had a 
 seat in that assembly, will inform us, that the members have but 
 too frequently displayed the character, rather of partisans of 
 their respective states, than of impartial guardians of a common 
 interest ; that where, on one occasion, improper sacrifices have 
 been made of local considerations to the aggrandizement of the 
 federal government, the great interests of the nation have 
 suffered on an hundred, from an undue attention to the local 
 prejudices, interests, and views of the particular states. I mean 
 not by these reflections to insinuate, that the new federal 
 government will not embrace a more enlarged plan of policy, 
 than the existing government may have pursued; much less, 
 that its views will be as confined as those of the state legisla- 
 tures : but only that it will partake sufficiently of the spirit of 
 both, to be disinclined to invade the rights of the individual 
 states, or the prerogatives of their governments. The motive? 
 CD the part of the state governments, to augment their preroga- 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 369 
 
 tives by defalcations from the federal govcrnmeut, will be over- 
 ruled by no reciprocal predispositions in the members. 
 
 Were it admitted, however, that the federal government may 
 feel an equal disposition with the state governments to extend 
 its power beyond the due limits, the latter would still have the 
 advantage in the means of defeating such encroachments. If 
 an act of a particular state, though unfriendly to the national 
 government, be generally popular in that state, and should not 
 too grossly violate the oaths of the state officers, it is executed 
 immediately, and, of course, by means on the spot, and depend- 
 ing on the state alone. The opposition of the federal govern- 
 ment, or the interposition of federal officers, would but inflame 
 the zeal of all parties on the side of the state j and the evil 
 o.ould not be prevented or repaired, if at all, without the employ- 
 ment of means which must always be resorted to with reluctance 
 and difficulty. On the other hand, should an unwarrantable 
 measure of the federal government be unpopular in particular 
 states, which would seldom fail to be the case, or even a war- 
 rantable measure be so, which may sometimes be the case, the 
 means of opposition to it are powerful and at hand. The dis- 
 quietude of the people; their repugnance, and perhaps refusal, 
 to cooperate with the officers of the union ; the frowns of the 
 executive magistracy of the state ; the embarrassments created 
 by legislative devices, which would often be added on such occa- 
 sions, would oppose, in any state, difficulties not to be despised; 
 would form, in a large state, very serious impediments; and 
 where the sentiments of several adjoining states happened to be 
 in unison, would present obstructions which the federal govern- 
 ment would hardly be willing to encounter. 
 
 But ambitious encroachments of the federal government, on 
 the authority of the state governments, would not excite the 
 opposition of a single state, or of a few states only. They would 
 be signals of general alarm. Every government would espouse 
 the common cause. A correspondence would be opened. Plans 
 of resistance would be concerted. One spirit would animate 
 and conduct the whole. The same combination, in short, would 
 
370 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 result from an apprehension of the federal, as was produced by 
 the dread of a foreign yoke; and unless the projected innova- 
 tions should be voluntarily renounced, the same appeal to a trial 
 of force would be made in the one case, as was made in the 
 other. But what degree of madness could ever drive the federal 
 government to such an extremity? In the contest with Great 
 Britain, one part of the empire was employed against the other 
 The more numerous part invaded the rights of the less numerous 
 part. The attempt was unjust and unwise; but it was not in 
 speculation absolutely chimerical. But what would be the con- 
 test, in the case we are supposing? Who would be the parties? 
 A few representatives of the people would be opposed to the 
 people themselves; or rather one set of representatives would 
 be contending against thirteen sets of representatives, with 
 the whole body of their common constituents on the side of the 
 latter. 
 
 The only refuge left for those who prophesy the downfal of 
 the state governments, is the visionary supposition, that the 
 federal government may previously accumulate a military force 
 for the projects of ambition. The reasonings contained in these 
 papers must have been employed to little purpose indeed, if it 
 could be necessary now to disprove the reality of this danger. 
 That the people and the states should, for a suflScient period of 
 time, elect an uninterrupted succession of men ready to betray 
 both ; that the traitors should, throughout this period, uniformly 
 and systematically pursue some fixed plan for the extension 
 of the military establishment ; that the governments and the 
 people of the states should silently and patiently behold the 
 gathering storm, and continue to supply the materials, until it 
 should be prepared to burst on their own heads, must appear to 
 every one more like the incoherent dreams of a delirious jealousy, 
 or the misjudged exaggerations of a counterfeit zeal, than like 
 the sober apprehensions of genuine patriotism. Extravagant 
 as the supposition is, let it however be made. Let a regular 
 army, fully equal to the resources of the country, be formed ; 
 and let it be entirely at the devotion of the federal government; 
 
THE FEDERALIST. '6'{ 1 
 
 tstill it would not be going too far to say, that the state govern- 
 ments, with the people on their side, would be able to repel the 
 danger. The highest number to which, according to the best 
 computation, a standing army can be carried in any country, 
 does not exceed one hundredth part of the whole number of 
 souls; or one twenty-fifth part of the number able to bear arms. 
 This proportion would not yield, in the United States, an army 
 of more than twenty-five or thirty thousand men. To these 
 would be opposed a militia amounting* to near half a million of 
 citizens with arms in their hands, ofllcered by men chosen from 
 among themselves, fighting for their common liberties, and 
 united and conducted by governments possessing their affections 
 and confidence. It may well be doubted, whether a militia thus 
 circumstanced, could ever be conquered by such a proportion of 
 regular troops. Those, who are best acquainted with the late 
 successful resistance of this country against the British arms, 
 will be most inclined to deny the possibility of it. Besides the 
 advantage of being armed, which the Americans possess over 
 the people of almost every other nation, the existence of subor- 
 dinate governments, to which the people are attached, and by 
 which the militia officers are appointed, forms a barrier against 
 the enterprises of ambition, more insurmountable than any 
 which a simple government of any form can admit of. Not- 
 withstanding the military establishments in the several king- 
 doms of Europe, which are carried as far as the public resources 
 will bear, the governments are afraid to trust the people with 
 arms. And it is not certain, that with this aid alone, they would 
 not be able to shake off their yokes. But were the people to 
 possess the additional advantages of local governments chosen 
 by themselves, who could collect the national will, and direct the 
 national force, and of officers appointed out of the militia, by 
 these governments, and attached both to them and to the militia, 
 it may be affirmed with the greatest assurance, that the throne 
 of every tyranny in Europe would be speedily overturned in 
 epite of the legions which surround it. Let us not insult the 
 free and gallant citizens of America with the suspicion, that 
 
•372 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 they woUid b* less able to defend the rights of which they would 
 be in actual possession, than the debased subjects of arbitrary 
 power would be to rescue theirs from the hands of their oppres- 
 sors. Let us rather no longer insult them with the supposition, 
 that they can ever reduce themselves to the necessity of making 
 the experiment, by a blind and tame submission to the long 
 train of insidious measures which must precede and produce it. 
 
 The argument under the present head may be put into a very 
 concise form, which appears altogether conclusive. Either the 
 mode in which the federal government is to be constructed, will 
 render it sufficiently dependent on the people, or it will not. On 
 the first supposition, it will be restrained by that dependence 
 from forming schemes obnoxious to their constituents. On the 
 other supposition, it will not possess the confidence of the people, 
 and its schemes of usurpation will be easily defeated by the 
 state governments; which will be supported by the people. 
 
 On summing up the considerations stated in this and the last 
 paper, they seem to amount to the most convincing evidence, 
 that the powers proposed to be lodged in the federal govern- 
 ment, are as little formidable to those reserved to the individual 
 states, as they are indispensably necessary to accomplish the 
 purposes of the union j and that all those alarms which havo 
 been sounded, of a meditated and consequential annihilation ol 
 the state governments, must, on the most favourable interpreta 
 tion, be ascribed to the chimerical fears of the authors of them 
 
 PUBLIUS. 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 373 
 
 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 NUMBER XLVII. 
 
 NF.W YORK, FEBRUARY 1, 1788. 
 
 MADISON. 
 
 THE MEANING OF THE MAXIM, WHICH REQUIRES A SEPARATION OP 
 THE DEPARTMENTS OF POWER, EXAMINED AND ASCERTAINED. 
 
 Having reviewed the general form of the proposed govern- 
 ment, and the general mass of power allotted to it ; I proceed 
 to examine the particular structure of this government, and 
 the distribution of this maSS of power among its constituent 
 parts. 
 
 One of the principal objections inculcated by the more re- 
 spectable adversaries to the constitution, is its supposed vio- 
 lation of the political maxim, that the legislative, executive, 
 and judiciary departments, ought to be separate and distinct. 
 In the structure of the federal government, no regard, it is said, 
 seems to have been paid to this essential precaution in favour 
 of liberty. The several departments of power are distributed 
 and blended in such a manner, as at once to destroy all sym- 
 metry and beauty of form ; and to expose some of the essential 
 parts of the edifice to the danger of being crushed by the dis- 
 proportionate weight of other parts. 
 
 Ko political truth is certainly of greater intrinsic value, or is 
 •itamped with the authority of more enlightened patrons of 
 liberty, than that on which the objection is founded. The 
 accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, 
 
874 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether 
 fioveditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced 
 tlie very definition of tyranny. Were the federal constitution, 
 therefore, really chargeable with this accumulation of power, 
 or with a mixture of powers, having a dangerous tendency 1o 
 such an accumulation, no further arguments would be neces- 
 sary to inspire a universal reprobation of the system. I per- 
 suade myself, however, that it will be made apparent to every 
 one, that the charge cannot be supported, and that the maxim 
 on which it relies has been totally misconceived and misapplied. 
 In order to form correct ideas on this important subject, it will 
 be proper to investigate the sense in which the preservation of 
 liberty requires, that the three great departments of power 
 should be separate and distinct. 
 
 The oracle who is always consulted and cited on this subject, 
 is the celebrated Montesquieu. If he be not the author of this 
 invaluable precept in the science of politics, he has the merit 
 at least of displaying and recommending it most effectually to 
 the attention of mankind. Let us endeavour, in the first place, 
 \o ascertain his meaning on this point. 
 
 The British constitution was to Montesquieu^ what Homer 
 has been to the didactic writers on epic poetry. As the latter 
 have considered the work of the immortal bard, as the perfect 
 model from which the principles and rules of the epic art were 
 to be drawn, and by which all similar works were to be judged : 
 so this great political critic appears to have viewed the consti- 
 tution of England as the standard, or to use his own expression, 
 as the mirror of political liberty : and to have delivered, in the 
 form of elementary truths, the several characteristic principles 
 of that particular system. That we may be sure then not to 
 mistake hid meaning in this case, let us recur to the source from 
 which the maxim was drawn. 
 
 On the slightest view of the British constitution, we must 
 perceive, that the legislative, executive, and judiciary depart- 
 ments, are by no means totally separate and distinct from each 
 other. The executive magistrate forms an integral part of the 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 37^ 
 
 legislative authorit}'. He alone has the ]irerogative of ru.iking 
 treaties with foreign sovereigns, which, when made, have, under 
 certain limitations, the force of legislative acts. All the mem- 
 bers of the judiciary department are appointed by him ; can be 
 removed by him on the address of the two houses of parlia- 
 ment, and form, when he pleases to consult them, one of his 
 constitutional councils. One branch of the legislative depart- 
 ment, forms also a great constitutional council to the executive 
 chief; as, on another hand, it is the sole depository of judicial 
 power in cases of impeachment, and is invested with the supreme 
 appellate jurisdiction in all other cases. The judges again are 
 so far connected with the legislative department, as often to 
 attend and participate in its deliberations, though not admitted 
 to a legislative vote. 
 
 From these facts, by which Montesquieu was guided, it may 
 clearly be inferred, that in saying, " there can be no libertj', 
 where the legislative and executive powers are united in the 
 same person, or body of magistrates;" or, "if the power of 
 judging, be not separated from the legislative and executive 
 powers," he did not mean that these departments ought to have 
 no partial agency in, or no control over the acts of each other. 
 His meaning, as his own words import, and still more conclu- 
 •lively as illustrated by the example in his eye, can amount to 
 no more than this, that where the whole power of one depart- 
 ment is exercised by the same hands which possess the whole 
 power of another department, the fundamental principles of a 
 free constitution are subverted. This would have been the case 
 in the constitution examined by him, if the king, who is the 
 sole executive magistrate, had possessed also the complete 
 legislative power, or the supreme administration of justice ; or 
 if the entire legislative body had possessed the supreme judi- 
 ciary, or the supreme executive authority. This, however, is 
 not among the vices of that constitution. The magistrate, in 
 whom the whole executive power resides, cannot of himself 
 make a law, though he can put a negative on every law; nor 
 adminisler iustice in person, though he has the appointment of 
 
^76 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 those who do administer it. The judges can exercise no execu- 
 tive prerogative, though they are shoots from the executive 
 stock ; nor any legislative function, though they may be advised 
 with by the legislative councils. The entire legislature can 
 perform no judiciary act; though by the joint act of two of its 
 branches, the judges may be "removed from their offices; and 
 though one of its branches is possessed of the judicial power in 
 the last resort. The entire legislature again can exercise no 
 executive prerogative, though one of its branches * constitutes 
 the supreme executive magistracy; and another, on the im- 
 peachment of a third, can try and condemn all the subordinate 
 officers in the executive department. 
 
 The reasons on which Montesquieu grounds his maxim, are 
 a further demonstration of his meaning. " "When the legislative 
 and executive powers are united in the same person or body," 
 says he, " there can be no liberty, because apprehensions may 
 arise lest tJie same monarch or senate should enact tyrannical 
 laws, to execute them in a tyrannical manner." Again, " Were 
 the power of judging joined with the legislative, the life and 
 liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary control, for 
 the judge would then be the legislator. Were it joined to the exe- 
 cutive power, the judge might behave with all the violence of a/t 
 oppressor." Some of these reasons are more fully explained in 
 other passages ; but briefly stated as they are here, they suffi- 
 ciently establish the meaning which we have put on this cele- 
 brated maxim of this celebrated author. 
 
 If we look into the constitutions of the several states, we 
 find, that notwithstanding the emphatical, and, in some in- 
 stances, the unqualified terms in which this axiom has been laid 
 down, there is not a single instance in which the several depart- 
 ments of power have been kept absolutely separate and distinct 
 New Hampshire, whose constitution was the last formed, seems 
 to have been fully aware of the impossibility and inexpediency 
 of avoiding any mixture whatever of these departments ; and 
 has qualified the doctrine by declaring, " that the legislative, 
 
 * The king. 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 377 
 
 exeontive, and judiciary powers, ought to be kept as separate 
 from, and independent of each other, as the nature of a free gov- 
 ernment will admit; or as is consistent with that chain of connexion, 
 that binds the whole fabric of the constitution in one indissoluble bond 
 of unity and amity." Her constitution accordingly mixes these 
 departments in several respects. The senate, which is a branch 
 of the legislative department, is also a judicial tribunal for the 
 trial of impeachments. The president, who is the head of the 
 executive department, is the presiding member also of the 
 senate ; and, besides an equal vote in all cases, has a casting 
 vote in case of a tie. The executive head is himself eventually 
 elective every year by the legislative department; and his 
 council is every year chosen by and from the members of the 
 same department. Several of the officers of state are also ap- 
 pointed by the legislature. And the members of the judiciary 
 department are appointed by the executive department. 
 
 The constitution of Massachusetts has observed a sufficient, 
 though less pointed caution, in expressing this fundamental 
 article of liberty. It declares, " that the legislative department 
 shall never exercise the executive and judicial powers, or either 
 of them : the executive shall never exercise the legislative and 
 judicial powers, or either of them : the judicial shall never ex- 
 ercise the legislative and executive powers, or either of them." 
 This declaration corresponds precisely with the doctrine of 
 Montesquieu, as it has been explained, and is not in a single 
 point violated by the plan of the convention. ■ It goes no far- 
 ther than to prohibit any one of the entire departments from 
 exercising the powers of another department. In the very 
 constitution to which it is prefixed, a partial mixture of powers 
 has been admitted. The executive magistrate has a qualified 
 negative on the legislative body; and the senate, which is a 
 part of the legislature, is a court of impeachment for members 
 both of the executive and judiciary departments. The mem- 
 bers of the judiciary department, again, are appointable by the 
 executive department, and removeable by the same authority, 
 on the address of the two legislative branches. Lastly, a niim- 
 
3T8 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 ber of the officers of government are annually appointed b^ 
 the legislative. department. As the appointment to offices, par- 
 ticularly executive offices, is in its nature an executive function, 
 the compilers of the constitution have, in this last point at 
 least, violated the rule established by themselves. 
 
 I pass over the constitutions of Ehode Island and Connecti- 
 cut, because they were formed prior to the revolution ; and 
 even before the principle under examination had become an 
 object of political attention. 
 
 The constitution of New York contains no declaration on 
 this subject ; but appears very clearly to have been framed with 
 an eye to the danger of improperly blending the different de- 
 partments. It gives, nevertheless, to the executive magistrate 
 a partial control over the legislative department ; and, what is 
 more, gives a like control to the judiciary department, and even 
 blends the executive and judiciary departments in the exercise 
 of this control. In its council of appointment, members of the 
 legislative are associated with the executive authority, in the 
 appointment of officers, both executive and judiciary. And its 
 court for the trial of impeachments and correction of errours, 
 is to consist of one branch of the legislature and the principal 
 members of the judiciary department. 
 
 The constitution of New Jersey has blended the different 
 powers of government more than any of the preceding. The 
 governour, who is the executive magistrate, is appointed by 
 the legislature; is chancellor and ordinary, or surrogate of the 
 state J is a member of the supreme court of appeals, and pre- 
 sident with a casting vote of one of the legislative branches 
 The same legislative branch acts again as executive council of 
 the governour, and with him constitutes the court of appeals. 
 The members of the judiciary department are appointed by the 
 legislative department, and removeable by one branch of it vu 
 the impeachment of the other. 
 
 According to the constitution of Pennsylvania,* the presj- 
 
 * The constitutions of these states have been since altered. 
 
TUE FEDERALIST. 37i> 
 
 dent, who is head of the executive department, is annually 
 elected by a vote in which the legislative department predomi- 
 nates. In conjunction with an executive council, he appoints* 
 the members of the judiciary department, and forms a coui"t of 
 impeachment for trial of all officers, judiciary as well as execu- 
 tive. The judges of the supreme court, and justices of the 
 peace seem also to be removeable by the legislature ; and the 
 executive power of pardoning in certain cases to be referred to 
 the same department. The members of the executive council 
 are made ex officio justices of peace throughout the state. 
 
 In Delaware,* the chief executive magistrate is annually 
 elected by the legislative department. The speakers of the two 
 legislative bi'anches are vice-pi-esidents in the executive depart- 
 ment. The executive chief, with six others, appointed three 
 by each of the legislative branches, constitute the supreme 
 court of appeals: he is joined with the legislative department 
 in the appointment of the other judges. Throughout the states, 
 it appears that the members of the legislature may at the same 
 time be justices of the peace. In this state, the members of 
 one branch of it are ex officio justices of the peace; as are 
 also the members of the executive council. The principal 
 officers of the executive department are appointed by the legis- 
 Uitive ; and one branch of the latter forms a court of impeach- 
 ments. All officers may be removed on address of the legis- 
 lature. 
 
 Maryland has adopted the maxim in the most unqualified 
 terms; declaring that" the legislative, executive, and judicial 
 powers of government, ought to be for ever separate and dis- 
 tinct from each other. Her constitution, notwithstanding, 
 makes the executive magistrate appointable by the legislative 
 department ; and the members of the judiciary by the executive 
 department. 
 
 The language of Virginia is still more pointed on this sub- 
 ject. Her constitution declares, "that the legislative, execu- 
 
 * The constitutions of these states have been since altered. 
 S5 
 
380 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 tive, and judiciary departments, shall be separate and distinct; 
 80 that neither exercise the powers properly belonging to the 
 other; nor shall any person exercise the powers of more than 
 one of them at the same time; except that the justices of 
 county courts shall be eligible to either house of assembly." 
 Yet we find not only this express exception, with respect to the 
 members of the inferiour courts ; but that the chief magistrate, 
 with his executive council, are appointable by the legislature ; 
 that two members of the latter, are triennially displaced at the 
 pleasure of the legislature ; and that all the principal officers, 
 both executive and judiciary, are filled by the same department. 
 The executive prerogative of pardoning, also, is in one case 
 vested in the legislative department. 
 
 The constitution of North Carolina which declares, " thai 
 the legislative, executive, and supreme judicial powers of gov- 
 ernment, ought to be for ever separate and distinct from each 
 other," refers at the same time, to the legislative department, 
 the appointment not only of the executive chief, but all the 
 principal officers within both that and the judiciary department. 
 
 In South Carolina, the constitution makes the executive 
 magistracy eligible by the legislative department. It gives to 
 the latter, also, the appointment of the members of the judi- 
 ciary department, including even justices of the peace and 
 sheriffs; and the appointment of officers in the executive de- 
 partment, down to captains in the army and navy of the state. 
 
 In the constitution of Georgia, where it is declared, " that 
 the legislative, executive, and judiciary departments shall be- 
 separate and distinct, so that neither exercise the powers pro- 
 perly belonging to the other," we find that the executive de- 
 partment is to be filled by appointments of the legislature; 
 and the executive prerogative of pardoning to be finally exer- 
 cised by the same authority. Even justices of the peace are to 
 be appointed by the legislature. 
 
 In citing these cases in which the legislative, executive, ana 
 judiciary departments, have not been kept totally separate and 
 distinct, I wish not to be regarded as an advocate for tb e par 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 381 
 
 ticular organizations of the several state governments. 1 am 
 fully aware, that among the many excellent principles whick 
 they exemplify, they carry strong marks of the haste, and still 
 stronger of the inexperience, under which they were framed. 
 Tt is but too obvious, that in some instances, the fundamental 
 principle under consideration, has been violated by too great a 
 mixture, and even an actual consolidation of the different pow- 
 *^r3j and that in no instance has a competent provision been 
 made for maintaining in practice the separation delineated on 
 paper. AYhat I have wished to evince is, that the charge 
 brought against the proposed constitution, of violating a sacred 
 maxim of free government, is warranted neither by the real 
 meaning annexed to that maxim by its author, nor by the 
 sense in which it has hitherto been understood in America 
 This interesting subject will be resumed in the ensuing paper. 
 
 PUBLIUS. 
 
382 THE FEDERALItol. 
 
 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 NUMBER XI.VIII. 
 
 NEW YORK, FEBRUARY 1, 1788. 
 
 MADISON. 
 
 THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED, WITH A VIEW TO THE MEANS OF 
 GIVING EFFICACY IN PRACTICE TO THAT MAXIM. 
 
 It was shown in the last paper, that the political apothegm 
 there examined, does not require that the legislative, executive, 
 and judiciary departments, should be wholly unconnected with 
 each other. I shall undertake in the next place to show, tha^ 
 unless these departments be so far connected and blended, as to 
 give to each a constitutional control over the others, the degree 
 of separation which the maxim requires, as essential to a free 
 government, can never in practice be duly maintained. 
 
 It is agreed on all sides, that the powers properly belonging 
 to one of the departments ought not to be directly and com- 
 pletely administered by either of the other departments. It is 
 equally evident, that neither of them ought to possess, directly 
 or indirectly, an overruling influence over the others in the ad- 
 ministration of their respective powers. It will not be denied, 
 that power is of an encroaching nature, and that it ought to be 
 effectually restrained from passing the limits assigned to it. 
 After discriminating, therefore, in theory, the several classes 
 of power, as they may in their nature be legislative, executive, 
 or judiciary; the next, and most difficult task, is to provide 
 some practical security for each, against the invasion of the 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 383 
 
 Others. What this security ought to be, is the great problem 
 to be solved. 
 
 Will it be sufficient to mark, with precision, the boundaries 
 of these departments, in the constitution of the government, 
 and to trust to these parchment barriers against the encroach- 
 ing spirit of power ? This is the security which appears to 
 have been principally relied on b}' the compilers of most of the 
 American constitutions. But experience assures us, that the 
 eflPcacy of the provision has been greatly overrated; and that 
 some more adequate defence is indispensably necessary for the 
 more feeble, against the more powerful members of the govern- 
 ment. The legislative department is everywhere extending 
 the sphere of its activity, and drawing all powei- into its impet- 
 uous vortex. 
 
 The founders of our republics have so much merit for the 
 wisdom which they have displayed, that no task can be less 
 pleasing than that of pointing out the errours into which they 
 have fallen. A respect for truth, however, obliges us to re- 
 mark, that they seem never for a moment to have turned their 
 eyes from the danger to liberty, from the overgrown and all- 
 grasping prerogative of an hereditary magistrate, supported 
 and fortified by an hereditary branch of the legislative autho- 
 i.*ity. They seem never to have recollected the danger from 
 legislative usurpations, which, by assembling all power in the 
 same hands, must lead to the same tyranny as is threatened by 
 executive usurpations. 
 
 In a government where numerous and extensive prerogatives 
 are placed in the hands of an hereditary monarch, the execu- 
 tive department is very justly regarded as the source of danger, 
 and watched with all the jealousy which a zeal for liberty 
 ought to inspire. In a democracy, where a multitude of people 
 exercise in person the legislative functions, and are continually 
 exposed, by their incapacity for regular deliberation and con- 
 certed measures, to the ambitious intrigues of their executive 
 magistrates, tyranny may well be apprehended on some favour- 
 able emergency, to start up in the same quarter But in a 
 
884 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 representsvtive republic, where the executive magistracy is care- 
 fully limited, both in the extent and the duration of its power; 
 and where the legislative power is exercised by an assembly, 
 which is inspired by a supposed influence over the people, with 
 an intrepid confidence in its own strength ; which is sufiiciently 
 oumerous to feel all the passions which actuate a multitude; 
 yet not so numerous as to be incapable of pursuing the objects 
 of its passions, by means which reason prescribes ; it is against 
 the enterprising ambition of this department, that the people 
 ought to indulge all their jealousy and exhaust all their pre- 
 cautions. 
 
 The legislative department derives a superiority in our gov- 
 ernments from other circumstances. Its constitutional powers 
 being at once more extensive, and less susceptible of precise 
 limits, it can, with the greater facility, mask, under complicated 
 and indirect measures, the encroachments which it makes on 
 the co-ordinate departments. It is not unfrequently a question 
 of real nicety in legislative bodies, whether the operation of a 
 particular measure will, or will not extend beyond the legisla- 
 tive sphere. On the other side, the executive power being 
 restrained within a narrower compass, and being more simple 
 in its nature ; and the judiciary being described by landmarks, 
 still less uncertain, projects of usurpation by either of these 
 departments would immediately betray and defeat themselves. 
 Not is this all : as the legislative department alone has access 
 to the pockets of the people, and has in some constitutions full 
 discretion, and in all a prevailing influence over the pecuniary 
 rewards of those who fill the other departments ; a dependence 
 is thus created in the latter, which gives still greater facility to 
 encroachments of the former. 
 
 I have appealed to our own experience for the truth of what 
 I. advance on this subject. Were it necessary to verify this 
 experience by particular proofs, they might be multiplied with- 
 out end. I might collect vouchers in abundance from the 
 records and archives of every state in the union. But as a 
 more concise, and at the same time equally satisfact<»ry evi- 
 
THE FEDEllALIST. 386 
 
 dence I will refer to the example of two states, attested by two 
 unexceptionable authorities. 
 
 The first example is that of Virginia, a state which, as we 
 have seen, has expressly declared in its constitution, that the 
 three great departments ought not to be intermixed. The 
 authority in support of it is Mr. Jefi'erson, who, besides his 
 other advantages for remarking the operation of the govern- 
 ment, was himself the chief magistrate of it. In order to con- 
 vey fully the ideas with which his experience had impressed 
 him on this subject, it will be necessary to quote a passage of 
 some length from his very interesting " Notes on the state of 
 Virginia," p. 195. "All the powers of government, legislative, 
 executive, and judiciary, result to the legislative body. The 
 concentrating these in the same hands, is precisely the definition 
 of despotic government. It will be no alleviation that these 
 powers will be exercised by a plurality of hands, and not by a 
 single one. One hundred and seventy-three despots would 
 surely be as oppressive as one. Let those who doubt it, turn 
 their eyes on the republic of Venice. As little will it avail us, 
 that they are chosen by ourselves. An elective despotism was not 
 the government we fought for ; but one which should not only 
 be founded on free principles, but in which the powers of 
 government should be so divided and balanced among several 
 bodies of magistracy, as that no one could transcend their legal 
 limits, without being effectually checked and restrained by the 
 others. For this reason, that convention which passed the 
 ordinance of government, laid its foundation on this basis, that 
 the legislative, executive, and judiciary departments should be 
 separate and distinct, so that no person should exercise the 
 powers of more than one of them at the same time. But no 
 harrier was provided between these several powers. The judiciary 
 and executive members were left dependent on the legislative 
 for their subsistence in office, and some of them for their con- 
 tinuance in it. If, therefore, the legislature assumes executive 
 and judiciary powers, no opposition is likely to be made ; nor, 
 f made, can be effectual; because in that case, they may put 
 
386 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 their proceedings into the form of an act of assembly, which 
 wili render them obligatory on the other branches. They have 
 accordingly, in many instances decided rights, which should have 
 been left to judiciary controversy ; and tJie direction of the executive, 
 during the whole time of their session, is becoming habitual and 
 familiar." 
 
 The other state, which I shall take for an example, is Penn- 
 sylvania; and the other anthority the council of censors which 
 assembled in the years 1783 and 1784. A part of the duty of 
 this body, as marked out by the constitution, was "to inquire, 
 whether the constitution had been preserved inviolate in everj' 
 part; and whether the legislative and executive branches of 
 government had performed their duty as guardians of the 
 people, or assumed to themselves, or exercised other or greater 
 powers than they are entitled to by the constitution." In the 
 execution of this trust, the council were necessarily led to a 
 comparison of both the legislative and executive proceedings, 
 with the constitutional powers of these departments ; and from 
 the facts enumerated, and to the truth of most of which both 
 sides in the council subscribed, it appears, that the constitution 
 had been flagrantly violated by the legislature in a variety of 
 important instances. 
 
 A great number of laws had been passed, violating, without 
 any apparent necessity, the rule requiring that all bills of a 
 public nature shall be previously printed for the consideration 
 of the people ; although this is one of the precautions chiefly 
 relied on by the constitution against improper acts of the legis- 
 lature. 
 
 The constitutional trial by jury had been violated ; and 
 powers assumed, which had not been delegated by the con- 
 stitution. 
 
 Executive powers had been usurped. 
 
 The salaries of the judges, which the constitution expressly 
 requires to be fixed, had been occasionally varied; and cases 
 belonging to the judiciary department frequently drawr within 
 legislative cognizance and determination. 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 387 
 
 Those who wish to see the several particulars falling undei 
 each of these heads, may consult the journals of the council, 
 which are in print. Some of them, it will be found, may be 
 imputable to peculiar circumstances connected with the war : 
 but the greater part of them may be considered as the spon- 
 taneous shoots of an ill-constituted government. 
 
 It appears also, that the executive department had not been 
 innocent of frequent breaches of the constitution. There are 
 three observations, however, which ought to be made on this 
 head : First, A great proportion of the instances were either 
 immediately produced by the necessities of the war, or recom- 
 mended by congress, or the commander in chief; Second, Ir 
 most of the other instances, they conformed either to the 
 declared or the known sentiments of the legislative depart- 
 ment : Third, The executive department of Pennsylvania is dis- 
 tinguished from that of the other states, by the number of 
 members composing it. In this respect, it has as much affinity 
 to a legislative assembly, as to an executive council. And 
 being at once exempt from the restraint of an individual re- 
 sponsibility for the acts of the body, and deriving confidence 
 from mutual example and joint influence; unauthorized mea- 
 sures would of course be more freely hazarded, than where the 
 executive department is administered by a single hand, or by a 
 few hands. 
 
 The conclusion which I am warranted in drawing from these 
 observations is, that a mere demarkation on parchment of the 
 constitutional limits of the several departments, is not a suffi- 
 cient guard against those encroachments which lead to a tyran- 
 nical concentration of all the powers of government in the 
 same hands. 
 
 Publics. 
 
388 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 THE FEDERALIST 
 
 NUMBER XLIX. 
 
 FEBRUARY 5, 1788. 
 
 HAMILTON. 
 
 THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED, WITH THE SAME VIEW. 
 
 The author of the " Notes on the state of Yirginia," quoted 
 in the last paper, has subjoined to that valuable work, the 
 draught of a constitution, which had been prepared in order to 
 be laid before a convention expected to be called in 1783, by 
 the legislature, for the establishment of a constitution for that 
 eommon wealth. The plan, like every thing from the same pen, 
 marks a turn of thinking original, comprehensive, and accu- 
 rate; and is the more worthy of attention, as it equally dis- 
 plays a fervent attachment to republican government, and an 
 enlightened view of the dangerous propensities against which 
 it ought to be guarded. One of the precautions which he pro- 
 poses, and on which he appears ultimately to rely as a palla- 
 dium to the weaker departments of power, against the invasions 
 of the stronger, is perhaps altogether his own, and as it imme- 
 diately relates to the subject of our present inquiry, ought not 
 to be overlooked. 
 
 His proposition is, " that whenever any two of the three 
 branches of government shall concur in opinion, each by the 
 voices of two thirds of their whole number, that a convention, 
 is necessary for altering the constitution, or correcting breaches 
 of it, a convention shall be called for the purpose." 
 
TUB FEDERALIST. 589 
 
 As the people are the only legitimate fountain of power, and 
 it is from them that the constitutional charter, under which 
 the several branches of government hold their power, is de- 
 rived ; it seems strictly consonant to the republican theory, to 
 recur to the same original authority, not only whenever it may 
 be necessary to enlarge, diminish, or new-model the powers of 
 government; but also, whenever any one of the departments 
 may commit encroachments on the chartered authorities of the 
 others. The several departments being perfectly co-ordinate 
 by the terms of their common commission, neither of them, it 
 is evident, can pretend to an exclusive or superior right of 
 settling the boundaries between their respective powers ; and 
 how are the encroachments of the stronger to be prevented, or 
 the wrongs of the weaker to be redressed, without an appeal 
 to the people themselves; who, as the grantors of the com- 
 mission, can alone declare its true meaning, and enforce its 
 observance ? 
 
 There is certainly great force in this reasoning, and it must 
 be allowed to prove, that a constitutional road to the decision 
 of the people, ought to be marked out, and kept open, for cer- 
 tain great and extraordinary occasions. But there appear to 
 be insuperable objections against the proposed recurrence to 
 the people, as a provision in all cases for keeping the several 
 departments of power within their constitutional limits. 
 
 In the first place, the provision does not reach the case ol a 
 combination of two of the departments, against a third. If 
 the legislative authority, which possesses so many means of 
 operating on the motives of the other departments, should be 
 able to gain to its interest either of the others, or even one 
 third of its members, the remaining department could derive 
 no advantage from this remedial provision. I do not dwell, 
 however, on this objection, because it may be thought to lie 
 rather against the modification of the principle, than against 
 the principle itself. 
 
 In the next place, it may be considered as an objection inhe- 
 fflnt in the principle, that, as every appeal to the people would 
 
890 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 carry an implication of some defect in the government, frequent 
 appeals would, in a great measure, deprive the government of 
 that veneration which time bestows on every thing, and with- 
 out which perhaps the wisest and freest governments would 
 not possess the requisite stability. If it be true that all gov- 
 ernments rest on opinion, it is no less true, that the strength 
 of opinion in each individual, and its practical influence on his 
 conduct, depend much on the number which he supposes to 
 have entertained the same opinion. The reason of man, like 
 man himself, is timid and cautious, when left alone; and ac- 
 quires firmness and confidence, in proportion to the number 
 with which it is associated. When the examples, which fortify 
 opinion, are ancient, as well as numerous, they are known to 
 have a double effect. In a nation of philosophers, this con. 
 sideration ought to be disregarded. A reverence for the laws, 
 would be sufficiently inculcated by the voice of an enlightened 
 reason. But a nation of philosophers, is as little to be expect- 
 ed, as the philosophical race of kings wished for by Plato. 
 And in every other nation, the most rational government will 
 not find it a superfluous advantage to have the prejudices of the 
 community on its side. 
 
 The danger of disturbing the public tranquillity, by interest- 
 ing too strongly the public passions, is a still more serious 
 objection against a frequent reference of constitutional ques- 
 tions, to the decision of the whole society. Notwithstanding 
 the success which has attended the revisions of our established 
 forms of government, and which does so much honour to the 
 virtue and intelligence of the people of America, it must be 
 confessed, that the experiments are of too ticklish a nature to 
 be unnecessarily multiplied. We are to recollect, that all the 
 existing constitutions were formed in the midst of a danger 
 which repressed the passions most unfriendly to order and c(m- 
 cord ; of an enthusiastic confidence of the people in their patri- 
 otic leaders, which stifled the ordinary diversity of opinions on 
 great national questions ; of an universal ardour for new and 
 opposite forms, produced by an universal resentment and irdig 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 391 
 
 nation against the ancient government ; and whilst no spirit of 
 party, connected with the changes to be made, or the abuses to 
 be reformed, could mingle its leaven in the operation. Thw 
 future situations in which we must expect to be usually placed 
 do not present any equivalent security against the danger 
 which is apprehended. 
 
 But the greatest objection of all is, that the decisions which 
 would probably result from such apjieals, would not answer the 
 purpose of maintaining the constitutional equilibrium of the 
 government. We have seen that the tendency of republican 
 governments is, to an aggrandizement of the legislative, at the 
 expense of the other departments. The appeals to the people, 
 therefore, would usually be made by the executive and judiciary 
 departments. But whether made by one side or the other, 
 would each side enjoy equal advantages on the trial ? Let us 
 view their different situations. The members of the executive 
 and judiciary departments, are few in number, and can be per- 
 sonally known to a small part only of the people. The latter, 
 by the mode of their appointment, as well as by the nature and 
 |)ermanency of it, are too far removed from the people to share 
 much in their prepossessions. The former are generally the 
 objects of jealousy; and their administration is always liable 
 to be discoloured and rendered unpopular. The members of 
 the legislative department, on the other hand, are numeroub. 
 They are distributed and dwell among the people at large 
 Their connexions of blood, of friendship, and of acquaintance, 
 embrace a great proportion of the most influential part of the 
 society. The nature of their public trust implies a personal 
 weight with the people, and that they are more immediately 
 the confidential guardians of their rights and liberties. With 
 these advantages, it can hardly be supposed, that the adverse 
 party would have an equal chance for a favourable issue. 
 
 But the legislative party would not only be able to plead 
 their cause most successfully with the people : They would 
 probably be constituted themselves the judges. The same in- 
 fluence which had gained them an election into the legislature, 
 would gain them a seat in the convention. If this should not 
 
392 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 be the case with all, it would probably be the case with many, 
 and pretty certainly with those leading characters, on whom 
 everything depends in such bodies. The convention, in short, 
 would be composed chiefly of men who had been, who actually 
 were, or who expected to be, members of the department whose 
 conduct was arraigned. They would consequently be parties 
 to the very question to be decided by them. 
 
 It might, however, sometimes happen, that appeals would be 
 made under circumstances less adverse to the executive and 
 judiciary departments. The usurpations of the legislature 
 might be so flagrant and so sudden, as to admit of no specious 
 colouring. A strong party among themselves might take side 
 with the other branches. The executive power might be in 
 the hands of a peculiar favourite of the people. In such a 
 posture of things, the public decision might be less swayed by 
 prepossessions in favour of the legislative party. But still it 
 could never be expected to turn on the true merits of the 
 question. It would inevitably be connected with the spirit, of 
 parties pre-existing, or springing out of the question itself, ll 
 would be connected with persons of distinguished character, 
 and extensive influence in the community. It would be pro- 
 nounced by the very men who had been agents in, or opponents 
 of the measures, to which the decision would relate. The 
 passions, therefore, not the reason, of the public, would sit in 
 judgment. But it is the reason of the public alone, that ought 
 to control and regulate the government. The passions ought 
 to be controled and regulated by the government. 
 
 We found in the last paper, that mere declarations in the 
 written constitution, are not sufficient to restrain the several 
 departments within their legal limits. It appears in this, that 
 occasional appeals to the people, would be neither a proper, 
 nor an effectual provision, for that purpose. How far the pro- 
 visions of a different nature contained in the plan above quoted, 
 might be adequate, I do not examine. Some of them are 
 unquestionably founded on sound political principles, and all of 
 them are framed with singular ingenuity and precision. 
 
 PUBLiUS 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 898 
 
 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 NUMBER L. 
 
 NEW YORK, FEBRUARY 5, 1788. 
 
 HAMILTON. 
 
 THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED, WITH THE SAME VIEW. 
 
 It may be contended, perhaps, that instead of occasional 
 aj)peal8 to the people, which are liable to the objections urged 
 against them, periodical appeals are the proper and adequate 
 means of preventing and correcting infractions of the constitution. 
 
 It will be attended to, that in the examination of these ex- 
 pedients, I confine myself to their aptitude for enforcing the 
 constitution, by keeping the several departments of power 
 within their due bounds ; without particularly considering them, 
 as provisions for altering the constitution itself. In the first 
 view, appeals to the people at fixed periods, appear to be nearly 
 as ineligible, as appeals on particular occasions as they emerge. 
 If the periods be separated by short intervals, the measures to 
 be reviewed and rectified, will have been of recent date, and 
 will be connected with all the circumstances which tend to 
 vitiate and pervert the result of occasional revisions. If the 
 periods be distant from each other, the same remark will be 
 applicable to all recent measures; and in proportion as the 
 remoteness of the others may favour a dispassionate review of 
 them, this advantage is inseparable from inconveniences which 
 seem to counterbalance it. In the first place, a distant prospect 
 ^f public censure would be a very feeble restraint on power 
 
■394 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 from those excesses, to which it might be urged by the force of 
 present motives. Is it to be imagined, that a legislative assem- 
 bly, consisting of a hundred or two hundred members, eagerly 
 bent on some favourite object, and breaking through the re- 
 straints of the constitution in pursuit of it, would be arrested 
 in their career, by considerations drawn from a censorial re- 
 vision of their conduct at the future distance of ten, fifteen, or 
 twenty years ? In the next place, the abuses would often have 
 completed their mischievous effects, before the remedial pro- 
 vision would be applied. And in the last place, where this 
 might not be the case, they would be of long standing, would 
 have taken deep root, and would not easily be extirpated. 
 
 The scheme of revising the constitution, in order to correct 
 recent breaches of it, as well as for other purposes, has been 
 actually tried in one of the states. One of the objects of the 
 council of censors, which met in Pennsylvania, in 1783 and 
 1784, was, as we have seen, to inquire " whether the constitution 
 had been violated ; and whether the legislative and executive 
 departments had encroached on each other." This important 
 and novel experiment in politics, merits, in several points of 
 view, very particular attention. In some of them it may, per- 
 haps, as a single experiment, made under circumstances some- 
 what peculiar, be thought to be not absolutely conclusive. But, 
 as applied to the case under consideration, it involves some 
 facts which I venture to remark, as a complete and satisfactory 
 illustration of the reasoning which I have employed. 
 
 First. It appears, from the names of the gentlemen who com- 
 posed the council, that some, at least, of its most active and 
 leading members, had also been active and leading characters 
 in the parties which pre-existed in the state. 
 
 Second. It appears that the same active and leading members 
 of the council, had been active and influential members of the 
 legislative and executive branches, within the period to be 
 reviewed ; and even patrons or opponents of the very measures 
 to be thus brought to the test of the constitution. Two of the 
 members had been vice-presidents of the state, and several 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 395 
 
 others members of the executive council within the seven pre- 
 ceding years. One of them had been speaker, and a number 
 of others, distinguished members of the legislative assembly, 
 within the same period. 
 
 Third. Every page of their proceedings witnesses the effect 
 of all these circumstances on the temper of their deliberations. 
 Throughout the continuance of the council, it was split into 
 two fixed and violent jDarties. The fact is acknowledged and 
 lamented by themselves. Had this not been the case, the face 
 of their proceedings exhibit a proof equally satisfactory. In 
 all questions, however unimportant in themselves, or uncon- 
 nected with each other, the same names stand invariably con- 
 trasted on the opposite columns. Every unbiassed observer, 
 may infer without danger of mistake, and at the same time, 
 without meaning to reflect on either party, or any individuals 
 of either party, that unfortunately passion, not reason, must 
 have presided over their decisions. When men exercise their 
 reason coolly and freely, on a variety of distinct questions, they 
 inevitably fall into different opinions on some of them. When 
 they are governed by a common passion, their opinions, if they 
 are so to be called, will be the same. 
 
 Fourth. It is at least problematical, whether the decisions ol 
 this body do not, in several instances, misconstrue the limits 
 ])rescribed for the legislative and executive departments, insteaa 
 of reducing and limiting them within their constitutional places. 
 
 Fifth. I have never understood that the decisions of the coun- 
 cil on constitutional questions, whether rightly or erroneously 
 formed, have had any effect in varying the practice founded on 
 legislative constructions. It even appears, if I mistake not, thai 
 in one instance, the cotemporary legislature denied the con- 
 structions of the council, and actually prevailed in the contest. 
 
 This censorial body, therefore, proves at the same time, by its 
 researches, the existence of the disease ; and by its example, the 
 inefficacy of the remedy. 
 
 This conclusion cannot be invalidated by alleging, that the 
 state in which the experiment was made, was at that crisis, and 
 
 .H6 
 
396 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 had been for a long time before, violently heated and distracted 
 by the rage of party. Is it to be presumed, that at any future 
 septennial epoch, the same state will be free from parties ? Is 
 it to be presumed that any other state, at the same, or any 
 other given period, will be exempt from them ? Such an event 
 ought to be neither presumed nor desired; because an extinction 
 of parties necessarily implies either an universal alarm for the 
 public safety, or an absolute extinction of liberty. 
 
 Wore the precaution taken of excluding from the assemblies 
 elected by the people to revise the preceding administration of 
 the government, all persons who should have been concerned in 
 the government within the given period, the difficulties would 
 not be obviated. The important task would probably devolve 
 on men, who with inferior capacities, would in other respects 
 be little better qualified. Although they might not have been 
 personally concerned in the administration, and therefore not 
 immediately agents in the measures to be examined; they would 
 probably have been involved in the parties connected with these 
 measures, and have been elected under their auspices. 
 
 PUBLIUS 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 ,•^97 
 
 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 NUMBER LI. 
 
 NEW YORK, FEBRUARY 8, 1788. 
 
 HAMILTON. 
 
 THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED, WITH THE SAME VIEW, AND CON- 
 CLUDED. 
 
 To what expedient then shall we finally resort, for maintain- , 
 ing in practice the necessary partition of power among the 
 several departments, as laid down in the constitution ? The 
 only answer that can be given is, that as all these exterior pro- 
 visions are found to be inadequate, the defect must be supplied, 
 by so contriving the interior structure of the government, as 
 that its several constituent parts may, by their mutual relations, 
 be the means of keeping each other in their proper places. 
 Without presuming to undertake a full developement of this 
 important idea, I will hazard a few general observations, which 
 may perhaps place it in a clearer light, and enable us to form a 
 more correct judgment of the principles and structure of the 
 government planned by the convention. 
 
 In order to lay a due foundation for that separate and dis 
 tinct exercise of the different powers of government, which, to 
 a certain extent, is admitted on all hands to be essential to the 
 preservation of liberty, it is evident that each department 
 should have a will of its own ; and consequently should be so 
 constituted, that the members of each should have as little 
 agency as possible in the appointment of the members of the 
 
398 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 Others. Were this principle rigorously adhered to, it would 
 require that all the appointments for the supreme executive, 
 legislative, and judiciary magistracies, should be drawn from 
 the same fountain of authority, the people, through channels, 
 having no communication whatever with one another. Per- 
 haps such a plan of constructing the several departments, 
 would be less difficult in practice, than it may in contemplation 
 appear. Some difficulties, however, and some additional ex 
 pense, would attend the execution of it. Some deviations 
 therefore, from the principle must be admitted. In the con- 
 stitution of the judiciary department in particular, it might be 
 inexpedient to insist rigorously on the principle ; first, because 
 peculiar qualifications being essential in the members, the 
 primary consideration ought to be to select that mode of 
 choice, which best secures these qualifications; secondly, be- 
 cause the permanent tenure by which the appointments are 
 held in that department, must soon destroy all sense of depend- 
 ence on the authority conferring them. 
 
 It is equally evident, that the members of each department 
 should be as little dependent as possible on those of the others, 
 for the emoluments annexed to their offices. "Were the execu 
 tivc magistrate, or the judges, not independent of the legisla 
 ture in this particular, their independence in every other, would 
 be merely nominal. 
 
 But the great security against a gradual concentration of the 
 several powers in the same department, consists in giving to 
 those who administer each department, the necessary constitu- 
 tional means, and personal motives, to resist encroachments of 
 the others. The provision for defence must in this, as in all 
 other cases, be made commensurate to the danger of attack 
 Ambition must be made to counteract ambition. Tlie interest 
 of the man, must be connected with the constitutional rights 
 of the place. It may be a reflection on human nature, that 
 such devices should be necessary to control the abuses of gov- 
 ernment. But what is government itself, but the greatest of 
 all reflections on human nature ? If men were angels, no gov- 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 399 
 
 criimeut would be necessary. If ungels were to govern men, 
 neither external nor internal controls on government would be 
 necessary. In framing a government, which is to be adminis 
 tered by men over men, the great diflBculty lies in this : You 
 must first enable the government to control the governed ; and 
 in the next place, oblige it to control itself. A dependence on 
 the people is, no doubt, the primary control on the govern- 
 ment ; but experience has taught mankind the necessity of 
 auxiliary precautions. 
 
 This policy of supplying by opposite and rival interests, the 
 defect of better motives, might be traced through the whole 
 system of human affairs, private as well as public. We see it 
 particularly displayed in all the subordinate distributions of 
 power; where the constant aim is, to divide and arrange the 
 several offices in such a manner, as that each may be a check 
 on the other; that the private interest of every individual, may 
 be a centinel over the public rights. These inventions of pru- 
 dence cannot be less requisite in the distribution of the supreme 
 powers of the state. 
 
 But it is not possible to give to each department an equal 
 power of self-defence. In republican government, the legisla- 
 tive authority necessarily predominates. The remedy for thia 
 inconveniency is, to divide the legislature into different branch- 
 es; and to render them by different modes of election, and 
 different principles of action, as little connected with each 
 ether, as the nature of their common functions, and their com- 
 mon dependence on the society, will admit. It may even h& 
 necessary to guard against dangerous encroachments, by still 
 further precautions. As the weight of the legislative authority 
 requires that it should be thus divided, the weakness of the 
 executive may require, on the other hand, that it should be for- 
 tified. An absolute negative on the legislature, appears, at first 
 view, to be the natural defence with which the executive magis- 
 trate should be armed. But perhaps it would be neither alto- 
 gether safe, nor alone sufficient. On ordinary occasions, it 
 might not bo exerted with the requisite firmness; and on ex- 
 
400 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 traoi dina '•y occasions, it might be perfidiously abused. May 
 not this defect of an absolute negative be supplied by some 
 qualified connexion between this weaker department, and the 
 weaker branch of the stronger department, by which the latter 
 may be led to support the constitutional rights of the former, 
 without being too much detached from the rights of its own 
 department ? 
 
 If the principles on which these observations are founded bo 
 just, as I persuade myself they are, and they be applied as a 
 criterion to the several state constitutions, and to the federal 
 constitution, it will be found, that if the latter does not per- 
 fectly correspond with them, the former are infinitely less able 
 to bear such a test. 
 
 There are moreover two considerations particularly applica- 
 ble to the federal system of America, which place it in a very 
 interesting point of view. 
 
 First. In a single republic, all the power surrendered by the 
 people, is submitted to the administration of a single govern- 
 ment ; and the usurpations are guarded against, by a division 
 of the government into distinct and separate departments. In 
 the compound republic of America, the power surrendered by 
 the people, is first divided between two distinct governments, 
 and then the portion allotted to each subdivided among distinct 
 and separate departments. Hence a double security arises to 
 the rights of the people. The different governments, will con- 
 trol each other; at the same time that each will be controled 
 by itself. 
 
 Second. It is of great importance in a republic, not only to 
 guard the society against the oppression of its rulers ; but to 
 guard one part of the society against the injustice of the other 
 part. Different interests necessarily exist in different classes 
 of citizens. If a majority be united by a common interest, the 
 rights of the minority will be insecure. There are but two 
 methods of providing against this evil : The one by creating a 
 will in the community independent of the majority, that is, of 
 the society itself; the other by comprehending in the «of ety 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 401 
 
 SO many separate descriptions of citizens, as will render an un- 
 just combination of a majority of the whole very improbable, 
 if not impracticable. The first method prevails in all govern- 
 ments possessing an hereditary or self-appointed authority. 
 This, at best, is but a precarious security; because a power 
 independent of the society, may as well espouse tne unjust 
 views of the major, as the rightful interests of the minor party, 
 and may possibly be turned against both parties. The second 
 method, will be exemplified in the federal republic of the United 
 States. Whilst all authority in it will be derived from, and 
 dependent on the society, the society itself will be broken into 
 so many parts, interests, and classes of citizens, that the rights 
 of individuals, or of the minority, will be in little danger from 
 interested combinations of the majority. In a free government, 
 the security for civil rights must be the same as that for reli- 
 gious rights. It consists in the one case in the multiplicity of 
 interests, and in the other, in the multiplicity of sects. The 
 degree of security in both cases will depend on the number of 
 interests and sects ; and this may be presumed to depend on the 
 extent of country and number of people comprehended under 
 the same government. This view of the subject, must particu- 
 larly recommend a proper federal system, to all the sincere and 
 considerate friends of republican government : since it shows, 
 that in exact proportion, as the territory of the union may be 
 formed into more circumscribed confederacies, or states, oppres- 
 sive combinations of a majority will be facilitated, the best 
 security under the republican form, for the rights of every class 
 of citizens, will be diminished ; and consequently, the stability 
 and independence of some member of the government, the only 
 other security must be proportionably increased. Justice is 
 the end of government. It is the end of civil society. It ever 
 lias been, and ever will be pursued, until it be obtained, or 
 until liberty be lost in the pursuit. In a society, under the 
 forms of which the stronger faction can readily unite and op- 
 press the weaker, anarchy may as truly be said to reign, as in 
 a state of- nature where the weaker individual is not secured 
 
402 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 against the violence of the stronger : And as in the latter state 
 even the stronger individuals are prompted by the uncertainty 
 of their condition, to submit to a government, which may pro 
 tect the weak, as well as theijiselves : so in the former state, 
 will the more powerftil factions be gradually induced by a like 
 motive, to wish for a government which will protect all parties. 
 the weaker as well as the more powerful. It can be little 
 doubted, that if the state of Rhode-Island was separated fi*om 
 the confederacy, and left to itself, the insecurity of rights under 
 the popular form of government within such narrow limits, 
 would be displayed by such reiterated oppressions of factious 
 majorities, that some power altogether independent of the peo- 
 ple, would soon be called for by the voice of the very factions 
 whose misrule had proved the necessity of it. In the extended 
 republic of the United States, and among the great variety of 
 interests, parties, and sects, which it embraces, a coalition of a 
 majority of the whole society could seldom take place upon any 
 other principles, than those of justice and the general good : 
 Whilst there being thus less danger to a minor from the will of 
 the major party, there must be less pretext also, to provide for 
 ihe security of the former, by introducing into the government 
 a will not dependent on the latter : or, in other words, a will 
 independent of the society itself. It is no less certain than it 
 is important, notwithstanding the contrary opinions which 
 have been entertained, that the larger the society, provided it 
 lie within a practicable sphere, the more duly capable it will 
 be of self-government. And happily for the republican cause, 
 the practicable sphere may be carried to a very great extent, 
 by a judicious modification and mixture of the federal priu- 
 siple 
 
 PUBLTUS. 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 40i< 
 
 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 NUMBER LII. 
 
 NEW yORK, FEBRUARY 8, 1788. 
 
 HAMILTON. 
 
 CONCERNING THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, WITH A VIEW TO 
 THK QUALIFICATIONS OF THE ELECTORS AND ELECTED, AND THE 
 TIME OF SERVICE OF THE MEMBERS. 
 
 From the more general inquiries pursued in the four last 
 papers, I pass on to a more particular examination of the seve- 
 ral parts of the government. I shall begin with the house of 
 representatives. 
 
 The first view to be taken of this part of the government, 
 relates to the qualifications of the electors, and the elected. 
 
 Those of the former, are to be the same, with those of the 
 electors of the most numerous branch of the state legislatures. 
 The definition of the right of suffrage, is very justly regarded 
 as a fundamental article of republican government. It was in- 
 cumbent on the convention, therefore, to define and establish 
 this right in the constitution. To have left it open for the oc- 
 casional regulation of the congress, would have been improper 
 for the reason just mentioned. To have submitted it to the 
 legislative discretion of the states, would have been improper 
 for the same reason ; and for the additional reason, that it 
 would have rendered too dependent on the state governments, 
 that branch of the federal government, which ought to be de- 
 pendent on the peoplo alone. To have reduced the different 
 
404 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 qualificatinnfc in the different states to one uniform rule, would 
 probably have been as dissatisfactory to some of the states, as 
 it would have been difficult to the convention. The provision 
 made by the convention appears, therefore, to be the best that 
 lay within their option. It must be satisfactory to every state ; 
 because it is conformable to the standard already established, 
 or which may be established by the state itself. It will be safe 
 to the United States ; because, being fixed by the state consti- 
 tutions, it is not alterable by the state governments, and it can- 
 not be feared that the people of the states will alter this part 
 of their constitutions, in such a manner as to abridge the rights 
 secured to them by the federal constitution. 
 
 The qualifications of the elected, being less carefully and 
 properly defined, by the state constitutions, and being at the 
 same time more susceptible of uniformity, have been very pro- 
 perly considered and regulated by the convention. A repre- 
 sentative of the United States, must be of the age of twenty- 
 five years ; must have been seven years a citizen of the United 
 States ; must, at the time of his election, be an inhabitant of 
 the state he is to represent, and during the time of his service, 
 must be in no office under the United States. Subject to these 
 reasonable limitations, the door of this part of the federal gov- 
 ernment is open to merit of every description, whether native 
 or adoptive, whether young or old, and without regard to 
 poverty or wealth, or to any particular profession of religious 
 faith. 
 
 The term for which the representatives are to be elected, 
 falls under a second view which may be taken of this branch. 
 In order to decide on the propriety of this article, two ques- 
 tions must be considered ; first, whether biennial elections will, 
 in this case, be safe; secondly, whether they be necessary or 
 useful. 
 
 First. As it is essential to liberty, that the governmetit in 
 general should have a common interest with the people ; so it 
 is particularly essential, that the branch of it under considera- 
 tion should have an immediate dependence on, and an intincato 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 405 
 
 sympathy with, the people. Frequent elections, are unques- 
 tionably the only policy, by which this dependence and sympa- 
 thy can be effectually secured. But what particular degree of 
 frequency may be absolutely necessary for the purpose, does 
 not appear to be susceptible of any precise calculation — and 
 must depend on a variety of circumstances, with which it may 
 be connected. Let us consult experience, the guide that ought 
 always to be followed, whenever it can be found. 
 
 The scheme of representation, as a substitute for a meeting 
 of the citizens in person, being but imperfectly known to 
 ancient polity; it is in more modern times only that we are to 
 expect instructive examples. And even here, in order to avoid 
 a research too vague and diffusive, it will be proper to confine 
 ourselves to the few examples which are best known, and which 
 bear the greatest analogy to our particular case. The first to 
 which this character ought to be applied, is the house of com- 
 mons in Great Britain. The history of this branch of the Eng- 
 lish constitution, anterior to the date of Magna Charta, is too 
 obscure to yield instruction. The very existence of it, has been 
 made a question among political antiquaries. The earliest 
 records of subsequent date prove, that parliaments were to sit 
 only, every year ; not that they were to be elected every year. 
 And even these annual sessions, were left so much at the discre- 
 tion of the monarch, that under various pretexts, very long and 
 dangerous intermissions were often contrived by royal ambition. 
 To remedy this grievance, it was provided by a statute in the 
 reign of Charles lid, that the intermissions should not be pro- 
 tracted beyond a period of three years On the accession of 
 William Illd, when a revolution took place in the government, 
 the subject was still more seriously resumed, and it was declared 
 to be among the fundamental rights of the people, that parlia- 
 ments ought to be held frequently. By another statute which 
 passed a few years later in the same reign, the term " frequent- 
 ly," which had alluded to the triennial period settled in the 
 time of Charles lid, is reduced to a precise meaning, it being 
 express!}" enacted, that a new parliament shall be called within 
 
iOO THE FKDERALIST. 
 
 three years after the determination of the former. The last 
 change, from three to seven years, is well known to have been 
 introduced pretty early in the present century, under an alarm 
 for the Hanoverian succession. From these facts it appears, 
 that the greatest frequency of elections which has been deemed 
 necessary in that kingdom, for binding the representatives to 
 their constituents, does not exceed a triennial return of them. 
 And if we may argue from the degree of liberty retained even 
 under septennial elections, and all the other vicious ingredients 
 in the parliamentary constitution, we cannot doubt that a 
 reduction of the period from seven to. three years, with some 
 other necessary reforms, would so far extend the influence of 
 the people over their representatives as to satisfy us, that bien- 
 nial elections under the federal system, cannot possibly be dan- 
 gerous to the requisite dependence of the house of representa- 
 tives on their constituents. 
 
 Elections in Ireland, till of late, were regulated entirely by 
 the discretion of the crown, and were seldom repeated, except 
 on the accession of a new prince, or some other contingent 
 event. The parliament which commenced with George lid, 
 was continued throughout his whole reign, a period of about 
 thirty-five years. The only dependence of the representative 
 on the people, consisted in the right of the latter to supply 
 occasional vacancies, by the election of new members, and in 
 the chance of some event which might produce a general new 
 election. The ability also of the Irish parliament to maintain 
 the rights of their constituents, so far as the disposition might 
 exist, was extremely shackled by the control of the crown, over 
 the subjects of their deliberation. Of late, these shackles, if 1 
 mistake not, have been broken ; and octennial jDarliaments have 
 besides been established. "What effect may be produced by 
 this partial reform, must be left to further experience. The 
 example of Ireland, from this view of it, can throw but little 
 light on the subject. As far as we can draw any conclusion 
 from it, it must be, that if the people of that country have been 
 able, under all these disadvantages, to retain any liberty what- 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 407 
 
 ever, the advantage of biennial elections would secure to them 
 every degree of liberty, which might depend on a due con- 
 nexion, between their representatives and themselves. 
 
 Let us bring our inquiries nearer home. The example of 
 these states, when British colonies, claims particular attention ; 
 at the same time that it is so well known, as to require little to 
 be said on it. The principle of representation, in one branch 
 of the legislature at least, was established in all of them. But 
 the periods of election were different. They varied, from one 
 to seven years. Have we any reason to infer, from the spirit 
 and conduct of the representatives of the people, prior to the 
 revolution, that biennial elections would have been dangerous 
 to the public liberties? The spirit, which every where dis- 
 played itself, at the commencement of the struggle, and which 
 vanquished the obstacles to independence, is the best of proof, 
 that a sufficient portion of liberty had been every where enjoyed, 
 to inspire both a sense of its worth, and a zeal for its proper 
 enlargement. This remark holds good, as well with regard to 
 the then colonies, whose elections were least frequent, as to 
 those whose elections were most frequent. Virginia was the 
 colony which stood first in resisting the parliamentary usurpa- 
 tions of Great Britain ; it was the first also in espousing, by 
 public act, the resolution of independence. In "Virginia, never- 
 theless, if I have not been misinformed, elections under tho 
 former government were septennial. This particular example 
 is brought into view, not as a proof of any peculiar merit, for 
 the priority in those instances was probably accidental ; and 
 still less of any advantage in septennial elections, for when com- 
 pared with a greater frequency, they are inadmissible; but 
 merely as a proof, and I conceive it to be a very substantial 
 proof, that the liberties of the people can be in no danger from 
 biennial elections. 
 
 The conclusion resulting from these examples," will be not tk 
 little strengthened, by recollecting three circumstances. The 
 first is, that the federal legislature will possess a part only, of 
 that supreme legislative authority which is vested completely 
 
i08 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 in the British parliament; and which, with a few exceptions, 
 was exercised by the colonial assemblies, and the Irish legis- 
 lature. It is a received and well founded maxim, that, where 
 no other circumstances affect the case, the greater the power is, 
 the shorter ought to be its duration ; and, conversely, the 
 Bmaller the power, the more safely may its duration be pro- 
 tracted. In the second place, it has, on another occasion, been 
 shown, that the federal legislature will not only be restrained 
 by its dependence on the people, as other legislative bodies are; 
 but that it will be moreover watched and controled by the 
 several collateral legislatures, which other legislative bodies are 
 not. And in the third place, no comparison can be made be- 
 tween the means that will be possessed by the more permanent 
 branches of the federal government, for seducing, if they should 
 be disposed to seduce, the house of representatives from their 
 duty to the people ; and the means of influence over the popular 
 branch, possessed by the other branches of governments above 
 cited. "With less power, therefore, to abuse, the federal repre- 
 sentatives can be less tempted on one side, and will be doubly 
 watched on the other. 
 
 PUBLTUS. 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 409 
 
 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 NUMBER LIII. 
 
 NEW YORK, FEBRUARY 12, 1788. 
 
 HAMILTON. 
 
 fHE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED, WITH A VIEW OF THE TERM OP 
 SERVICE OF THE MEMBERS. 
 
 I SHALL here, perhaps, be reminded of a current observation, 
 " that where annual elections end, tyranny begins." If it be 
 true, as has often been remarked, that sayings which become 
 proverbial, are generally founded in reason, it is not less true, 
 that, when once established, they are often applied to cases to 
 which the reason of them does not extend. I need not look for 
 a proof beyond the instance before us. What is the reason on 
 which this proverbial observation is founded? No man will 
 subject himself to the ridicule of pretending, that any natural 
 connexion subsists between the sun or the seasons, and the 
 period within which human virtue can bear the temptations of 
 power. Happily for mankind, liberty is not, in this respect, 
 confined to any single point of time ; but lies within extremes, 
 which afford sufficient latitude for all the variations that may 
 be required by the various situations and circumstances of civil 
 society. 
 
 The election of magistrates might be, if it were found expe- 
 dient, as in some instances it actually has been, daily, weekly, 
 or monthly, as well as annual ; and if circumstances may re- 
 quire a deviation from the rule on one side, why not also on 
 
410 THE FEDERALIST* 
 
 the other side ? Turning our attention to the periods esta- 
 blished among ourselves, for the election of the most numerous 
 branches of the state legislatures, we find them by no means 
 coinciding any more in this instance, than in the elections of 
 other civil magistrates. In Connecticut and Rhode-Island, the 
 periods are half-yearly. In the other states. South Carolina 
 excepted, they are annual. In South-Carolina, they are bien- 
 nial; as is proposed in the federal government. Here is a 
 difference, as four to one, between the longest and the shortest 
 jjeriods; and yet it would be not easy to show, that Connecticut 
 or Bhode-Island is better governed, or enjoys a greater share 
 of rational liberty, than South-Carolina ; or that either the one 
 or the other of these states are distinguished in these respects, 
 and by these causes, from those whose elections are different 
 from both. 
 
 In searching for the grounds of this doctrine, I can discover 
 but one, and that is wholly inapplicable to our case. The 
 important distinction, so well understood in America, between 
 u constitution established by the people, and unalterable bj^ the 
 government; and a law established by the government, and 
 alterable by the government, seems to have been little under- 
 stood, and less observed in any other country. "Wherever the 
 supreme power of legislation has resided, has been supposed to 
 reside also, a full power to change the form of the government. 
 Even in Great Britain, where the principles of political and 
 civil liberty have been most discussed, and where we hear most 
 of the rights of the constitution, it is maintained, that the 
 authority of the parliament is transcendent and uncontrolable. 
 as well with regard to the constitution, as the ordinary objects 
 of legislative provision. They have accordingly, in several in- 
 stances, acti .al'y changed, by legislative acts, some of the most 
 fundamental articles of the government. They have, in par- 
 ticular, on several occasions, changed the period of election ; 
 and on the last occasion, not only introduced septennial, in 
 place of triennial elections; but, by the same act, continued 
 themselves in place four years beyond the term for which they 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 41 i 
 
 were elected by the people. An attention to these dangerous 
 practices, has produced a very natural alarm in the votaries of 
 free government, of which frequency of elections is the cornei 
 stone ; and has led them to seek for some security to liberty, 
 against the danger to which it is exposed. Where no consti- 
 tution paramount to the government, either existed or could be 
 obtained, no constitutional security, similar to that established 
 in the United States, was to be attempted. Some other security, 
 therefore, was to be sought for ; and what better security would 
 the case admit, than that of selecting and appealing to some 
 simple and familiar portion of time, as a standard for measuring 
 the danger of innovations, for fixing the national sentiment, 
 and for uniting the patriotic exertions ? The most simple and 
 familiar portion of time, applicable to the subject, was that of 
 a 3'^ear; and hence the doctrine has been inculcated, by a 
 laudable zeal to erect some barrier against the gradual innova- 
 tions of an unlimited government, that the advance towards 
 tyranny, was to be calculated by the distance of departure from 
 the fixed point of annual elections. But what necessity can 
 there be of applying this expedient to a government, limited as 
 the federal government will be, by the authority of a para- 
 mount constitution ? Or who will pretend, that the liberties of 
 the people of America will not be more secure under biennial 
 elections, unalterably fixed by such a constitution, than those 
 of any other nation would be, where elections were annual, or 
 even more frequent, but subject to alterations by the ordinary 
 power of the government. 
 
 The second question stated is, whether biennial elections be 
 necessary or useful ? The propriety of answering this question 
 in the affirmative, will appear from several very obvious con- 
 siderations. 
 
 Xo man can be a competent legislator, who does not add to 
 
 an upright intention and a sound judgment, a certain degree of 
 
 Knowledge of the subjects on which he is to legislate. A part 
 
 jf this knowledge may be acquired by means of information, 
 
 *hich lie within the compass of men in private, as well as 
 
 37 
 
412 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 public stations. Another part, can only be attained, or at least 
 thoroughly attained, by actual experience in the station which 
 requires the use oi' it. The period of service ought, therefore, 
 in all such cases, to bear some proportion to the extent of 
 practical knowledge, requisite to the due performance of the 
 service. The period of legislative service, established in most 
 of the states for the more numerous branch, is, as we have seen, 
 one year. The question then may be put into this simple form: 
 Does the period of two years bear no greater proportion to the 
 knowledge requisite for federal legislation, than one year does 
 to the knowledge requisite for state legislation? The very 
 statement of the question, in this form, suggests the answer 
 that ought to be given to it. 
 
 In a single state, the requisite knowledge relates to the 
 existing laws, which are uniform throughout the state, and 
 with which all the citizens are more or less conversant ; and to 
 the general affairs of the state, which lie within a small com- 
 pass, are not very diversified, and occupy much of the attention 
 and conversation of every class of people. The great theatre 
 of the United States presents a very different scene. The laws 
 are so far from being uniform, that they vary in every state ; 
 whilst the public affairs of the union are spread throughout a 
 very extensive region, and are extremely diversified by the 
 local affairs connected with them, and can with difficulty be 
 correctly learnt in any other place, than in the central councils, 
 to which a knowledge of them will be brought by the repre- 
 sentatives of every part of the empire. Yet some knowledge 
 of the affairs, and even of the laws of all the states, ought to 
 be possessed by the members from each of the states. How 
 can foreign trade be properly regulated by uniform laws, with- 
 out some acquaintance with the commerce, the ports, the 
 usages, and the regulations of the different states ? How can 
 the trade between the different states be duly regulated, with- 
 out some knowledge of their relative situations in these, and 
 other points? How can taxes be judiciously imposed, and 
 effectually collected, if they be not accommodated to the differ- 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 413 
 
 ent laws and local circumstances relating to tUese objects in the 
 different states ? How can uniform regulations for the militia 
 be duly provided, without a similar knowledge of some interna* 
 circumstances, by which the states are distinguished from each 
 other? These are the principal objects of federal legislation, 
 and suggest most forcibly, the extensive information which the 
 representatives ought to acquire. The other inferior objects, 
 will require a proportional degree of information with regard 
 to them. 
 
 Tt is true, that all these difficulties will, by degrees, be very 
 much diminished. The most laborious task, will be the proper 
 inauguration of the government, and the primeval formation 
 of a federal code. Improvements on the first draught, will 
 every year become both easier and fewer. Past transactions 
 of the government, will be a ready and accurate source of in- 
 formation to new members. The affairs of the union, will 
 become more and more objects of curiosity and conversation 
 among the citizens at large. And the increased intercourse 
 among those of different states, will contribute not a little to 
 diffuse a mutual knowledge of their affairs, as this again will 
 contribute to a general assimilation of their manners and laws. 
 But, with all these abatements, the business of federal legis- 
 lation must continue so far to exceed, both in novelty and diffi- 
 culty, the legislative business of a single state, as to justify the 
 longer period of service assigned to those who are to trans- 
 act it. 
 
 A branch of knowledge, which belongs to the acquirements 
 of a federal representative, and which has not been mentioned, 
 is that of foreign affairs. In regulating our own commerce, he 
 ought to be not only acquainted with the treaties between the 
 United States and other nations, but also with the commercial 
 policy and laws of other nations. He ought not to be alto- 
 gether ignorant of the law of nations ; for that, as far it is a 
 proper object of municipal legislation, is submitted to the 
 federal government. And although the house of representa- 
 tives, is not immediately to participate in foreign negociations 
 
414 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 and arrangements, yet from the necessary connexion between 
 the several branches of public affairs, those particular subjects 
 will frequently deserve attention in the ordinary course of 
 legislation, and will sometimes demand particular legislative 
 sanction and co-operation. Some portion of this knowledge 
 may, no doubt, be acquired in a man's closet ; but some of it 
 also can only be derived from the public sources of informa- 
 tion ; and all of it will be acquired to best effect, by a practical 
 attention to the subject, during the period of actual service in 
 the legislature. 
 
 There are other considerations, of less importance perhaps, 
 but which are not unworthy of notice. The distance which 
 many of the representatives will be obliged to travel, and the 
 arrangements rendered necessary by that circumstance, might 
 be much more serious objections with fit men for this service, 
 if limited to a single year, than if extended to two years. No 
 argument can be drawn on this subject, from the case of the 
 delegates to the existing congress. They are elected annually, 
 it is true; but their re-election is considered by the legislative 
 assemblies almost as a matter of course. The election of the 
 representatives by the people, would not be governed by the 
 same principle. 
 
 A few of the members, as happens in all such assemblies, will 
 possess superior talents ; will, by frequent re-elections, become 
 members of long standing ; will be thoroughly masters of the 
 public business, and perhaps not unwilling to avail themselves 
 of those advantages. The greater the proportion of new mem- 
 bers, and the less the information of the bulk of the members, 
 the more apt will they be to fall into the snares that may be 
 laid for them. This remark, is no less applicable to the rela- 
 tion, which will subsist between the house of representatives 
 and the senate. 
 
 It is an inconvenience mingled with the advantages of our 
 frequent elections, even in single states, where they are large, 
 and hold but one legislative session in the year, that spurious 
 elections cannot be investigated and annulled, in timo for the 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 416 
 
 decision to have its due effect. If a return can be obtained, no 
 matter by what unlawful means, the irregular member, who 
 takes his seat of course, is sure of holding it a sufficient time 
 to answer his purposes. Hence a very pernicious encourage- 
 ment, is given to the use of unlawful means, for obtaining irre- 
 gular returns. Were elections for the federal legislature to be 
 annual, this practice might become a very serious abuse, parti- 
 cularly in the more distant states. Each house is, as it neces- 
 sarily must be, the judge of the elections, qualifications, and 
 returns of its members, and whatever improvements may be 
 suggested by experience, for simplifying and accelerating the 
 process in disputed cases, so great a portion of a year would 
 unavoidably elapse, before an illegitimate member could be dis- 
 possessed of his seat, that the prospect of such an event would 
 be little check to unfair and illicit means of obtaining a seat. 
 
 All these considerations taken together, warrant us in affirm- 
 ing, that biennial elections will be as useful to the affairs of the 
 public, as we have seen that they will be safe to the liberties of 
 the people 
 
 PUBLIUB. 
 
llfi THB FEDERALIST. 
 
 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 NUMBER LIV. 
 
 NEW YORK, FEBRUARY 12, 1788. 
 
 HAMILTON. 
 
 THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED, WITH A VIEW TO THE RATIO Of 
 REPRESENTATION. 
 
 The next view which I shall take of the house of representa- 
 tives, relates to the apportionment of its members among the 
 several states, which is to be determined by the same rule, with 
 that of direct taxes. 
 
 It is not contended, that the number of people in each state, 
 ought not to be the standard for regulating the proportion of 
 those, who are to represent the people of each state. The 
 establishment of the same rule for the apportionment of taxes, 
 will probably be as little contested ; though the rule itself in 
 this case, is by no means founded on the same principle. In the 
 former case, the rule is understood to refer to the personal 
 rights of the people, with which it has a natural and universal 
 connexion. In the latter, it has reference to the proportion of 
 wealth, of which it is in no case a precise measure, and in ordi- 
 nary cases, a very unfit one. But notwithstanding the imper- 
 fection of the rule as applied to the relative wealth and contri- 
 butions of the states, it is evidently the least exceptionable 
 among those that are practicable; and had too recently ob- 
 tained the general sanction of America, not to have found a 
 ready preference with the convention. 
 
THE FEDBRALIST. 417 
 
 i^il this is admitted, it will perhaps be said : But does it follow 
 from an admission of numbers for the measure of representa- 
 tion, or of slaves combined with free citizens, as a ratio of tax 
 ation, tliat slaves ought to be included in the numerical rule of 
 representation ? Slaves are considered as property, not as per- 
 sons. They ought, therefore, to be comprehended in estimates 
 of taxation which are founded on property, and to be excluded 
 from representation, which is regulated by a census of persons. 
 This is the objection, as I understand it, stated in its full force. 
 I shall be equally candid in stating the reasoning, which may 
 be offered on the opposite side. 
 
 We subscribe to the doctrine, might one of our southern 
 brethren observe, that representation relates more immediately 
 to persons, and taxation more immediately to property; and 
 we join in the application of this distinction to the case of our 
 slaves. But we must deny the fact, that slaves are considered 
 merely as property, and in no respect whatever as persons. 
 The true state of the case is, that they partake of both these 
 qualities; being considered by our laws, in some respects, as 
 persons, and in other respects, as property. In being compelled 
 to labour not for himself, but for a master ; in being vendible 
 by one master to another master; and in being subject at all 
 times to be restrained in his liberty, and chastised in his body, 
 by the capricious will of his owner, the slave may appear to be 
 degraded from the human rank, and classed with those irra- 
 tional animals, which fall under the legal denomination of pro- 
 perty. In being protected, on the other hand, in his life and in 
 his limbs, against the violence of all others, even the master of 
 his labour and his liberty ; and in being punishable himself for 
 all violence committed against others ; the slave is no less evi- 
 dently regarded by the law as a member of the society; not as 
 a part of the irrational creation ; as a moral person, not as a 
 mere article of property. The federal constitution, therefore, 
 decides with great propriety on the case of our slaves, when it 
 views them in the mixt character of persons and of property 
 This is m fact their true character. It is the character be- 
 
418 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 fitowed otj them by the laws under which they live ; and it will 
 not be disputed that these are the proper criteria ; because it 
 is only under the pretext, that the laws have transformed the 
 negroes into subjects of property, that a place is denied to 
 them in the computation of numbers ; and it is admitted that 
 if the laws were to restore the rights which have been taken 
 away, the negroes could no longer be refused an equal share of 
 representation, with the other inhabitants. 
 
 This question may be placed in another light. It is agreed 
 on all sides, that numbers are the best scale of wealth and 
 taxation, as they are the only proper scale of representation. 
 Would the convention have been impartial or consistent, if 
 they had rejected the slaves from the list of inhabitants, when 
 the shares of representation were to be calculated; and inserted 
 them on the lists when the tariff of contributions was to be 
 adjusted ? Could it be reasonably expected, that the southern 
 states would concur in a system, which considered their slaves 
 in some degree as men, when burdens were to be imposed, but 
 refused to consider them in the same light, when advantages 
 were to be conferred ? Might not some surprise also be ex- 
 pressed, that those who reproach the southern states with the 
 barbarous policy of considering as property, a part of their 
 human brethren, should themselves contend, that the govern- 
 ment to which all the states are to be parties, ought to consider 
 this unfortunate race more completely in the unnatural light of 
 property, than the very laws of which they complain ? 
 
 It may perhaps be replied, that slaves are not included in 
 the estimate of representatives in any of the states possessing 
 them. They neither vote themselves, nor increase the votes 
 of their masters. Upon what principle then, ought they to be 
 taken into the federal estimate of representation ? In rejecting 
 them altogether, the constitution^ would, in this respect, have 
 followed the very laws which have been appealed to, as the 
 proper guide. 
 
 This objection is repelled by a single observation. It is a 
 fundamental principle of the proposed constitution, that as the 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 41!* 
 
 aggregate number of representatives allotted to the several 
 states, is to be determined by a federal rule, founded on the 
 aggregate number of inhabitants ; so, the right of choosing this 
 allotted number in each state, is to be exercised by such part 
 of the inhabitants, as the state itself may designate. The quali- 
 fications on which the right of suffrage depend, are not perhaps 
 the same in any two states. In some of the states, the differ- 
 ence is very material. In every state, a certain proportion of 
 inhabitants, are deprived of this right by the constitution of 
 the state, who will be included in the census by which the 
 federal constitution apportions the representatives. In this 
 point of view, the southern states might retort the complaint, 
 by insisting, that the principle laid down by the convention, 
 required that no regard should be had to the policy of particular 
 states towards their own inhabitants 3 and consequently, that 
 the slaves, as well as inhabitants, should have been admitted into 
 the census according to their full number, in like manner with 
 other inhabitants, who by the policy of other states, are not 
 admitted to all the rights of citizens. A rigorous adherence, 
 however, to this principle, is waved by those who would be 
 gainers by it. All that they ask is, that equal moderation be 
 shown on the other side. Let the case of the slaves be con- 
 sidered, as it is in truth a peculiar one. Let the compromising 
 expedient of the constitution be mutually adopted, which re- 
 gards them as inhabitants, but as debased by servitude below 
 the equal level of free inhabitants, which regards the slave as 
 divested of two fifths of the man. 
 
 After all, may not another ground be taken on which this 
 article of the constitution will admit of a still more ready 
 defence ? We have hitherto riroceeded on the idea, that repre- 
 sentation related to persons only, and not at all to property. 
 But is it a just idea? Government is instituted no less for pro- 
 tection of the property, than of the persons of individuals. The 
 one, as well as the other, therefore, may be considered as repre- 
 sented by those who are charged with the government. Upon 
 this principle it is, that in se^'eral of the states, and particularly 
 
420 THE FEItERALIST. 
 
 in the state of New- York, one branch of the government is in- 
 tended more especially to be the guardian of property, and is 
 accordingly elected by that part of the society which is most 
 interested in this object of government. In the federal consti- 
 tution, this policy does not prevail. The rights of property, 
 are committed into the same hands, with the personal rights. 
 Some attention ought, therefore, to be paid to property, in the 
 choice of those hands. 
 
 For another reason, the votes allowed in the federal legisla- 
 ture to the people of each state, ought to bear some proportion 
 to the comparative wealth of the states. States have not, like 
 individuals, an influence over each other, arising from superior 
 advantages of fortune. If the law allows an opulent citizen 
 but a single vote in the choice of his representative, the respect 
 and consequence which he derives from his fortunate situation, 
 very frequently guide the votes of others to the objects of his 
 choice ; and through this imperceptible channel, the rights of 
 property are conveyed into the public representation. A state 
 possesses no such influence over other states. It is not probable, 
 that the richest state in the confederacy, will ever influence the 
 choice of a single representative, in any other state. Nor will 
 the representatives of the larger and richer states, possess any 
 other advantage in the federal legislature, over the representa- 
 tives of other states, than what may result from their superior 
 number alone; as far, therefore, as their superior wealth and 
 weight may justly entitle them to any advantage, it ought to 
 be secured to them by a superior share of representation. The 
 new constitution is, in this respect, materially different from 
 the existing confederation, as well as from that of the United 
 Netherlands, and other similar confederacies. In each of the 
 latter, the efficacy of the federal resolutions, depends on the 
 subsequent and voluntary resolutions of the states composing 
 the union. Hence the states, though possessing an equal vote 
 :n the public councils, have an unequal influence, corresponding 
 with the unequal importauue of these subsequent and voluntary 
 resolutions. Under the proposed constitution, the federal actf 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 421 
 
 will lake effect without the necessary intervention of the indi- 
 vidual states. They will depend merely on the majority of 
 votes in the federal legislature, and consequently each vote, 
 whether proceeding from a larger or smaller state, or a state 
 more or less wealthy or powerful, will have an equal weight 
 and eflScacy; in the same manner as the votes individually 
 given in a state legislature, by the representatives of unequal 
 counties or other districts, have each a precise equality of value 
 and effect ; or if there be any difference in the case, it proceeds 
 from the difference in the personal character of the individual 
 representative, rather than from any regard to the extent of 
 the district from which he comes. 
 
 Such is the reasoning, which an advocate for the southern 
 interests, might employ on this subject : And although it may 
 appear to be a little strained in some points, yet on the whole, 
 I must confess that it fully reconciles me to the scale of repre- 
 sentation, which the convention have established. 
 
 In one respect, the establishment of a common measure for 
 representation and taxation, will have a very salutary effect 
 As the accuracy of the census to be obtained by the congress, 
 will necessarily depend, in a considerable degree, on the dispo- 
 Bition, if not the co-operation of the states, it is of great im- 
 portance that the states should feel as little bias as possible, to 
 swell or to reduce the amount of their numbers. Were their 
 share of representation alone to be governed by this rule, they 
 would have an interest in exaggerating their inhabitants. 
 Were the rule to decide their share of taxation alone, a con- 
 trary temptation would prevail. By extending the rule to both 
 objects, the states will have opposite interests, which will con- 
 trol and balance each other ; ana produce the requisite impar- 
 tiality 
 
 tfX BLIUS. 
 
422 THF FEDERALIST. 
 
 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 numbe:r lv. 
 
 NEW YORK, FEBRUARY 15, 17! 
 
 HAMILTON. 
 
 THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED, IN RELATION TO THE TOTaL 
 NUMBER OF THE BODY. 
 
 The number of which the house of representatives is to con- 
 sist, forms another, and a very interesting point of view, under 
 which this branch of the federal legislature may be contem- 
 plated. Scarce any article indeed in the whole constitution, 
 seems to be rendered more worthy of attention, by the weight 
 of character, and the apparent force of argument, with which 
 it has been assailed. 
 
 The charges exhibited against it are, first, that so small a 
 number of representatives, will be an unsafe depository of the 
 public interests j secondly, that they will not possess a proper 
 knowledge of the local circumstances of their numerous con- 
 stituents; thirdly, that they will be taken from that class of 
 citizens which will sympathize least with the feelings of the 
 mass of the people, and be most likely to aim at a permanent 
 elevation of the few, on the depression of the many ; fourthly, 
 that defective as the number will be in the first instance, it will 
 be more and more disproportionate, by the increase of the 
 people, and the obstacles which will prevent a correspondent 
 increase of the representatives. 
 
 In general it may be remarked on this subject, that no 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 423 
 
 political problem is less susceptible of a precise solution, than 
 that which relates to the number most convenient for a repre- 
 sentative legislature; nor is there any point on which the 
 policy of the several states is more at variance; whether wo 
 compare their legislative assemblies directly with each other, 
 or consider the proportions which they respectively bear to the 
 number of their constituents. Passing over the difference be- 
 tween the smallest and largest states, as Delaware, whose most 
 numerous branch consists of twenty-one representatives, and 
 Massachusetts, where it amounts to between three and four 
 hundred, a very considerable difference is observable, among 
 states nearly equal in population. The number of representa- 
 tives in Pennsylvania, is not more than one fifth of that, in the 
 state last mentioned. New-York, whose population is to that 
 of South-Carolina as six to five, has little more than one third 
 of the number of representatives. As great a disparity pre- 
 vails between the states of Georgia and Delaware, or Rhode- 
 Island. In Pennsylvania, the representatives do not bear a 
 greater proportion to their constituents, than of one for every 
 four or five thousand. In Ehode-Island, they bear a proportion 
 of at least one for every thousand. And according to the con- 
 stitution of Georgia, the proportion may be carried to one for 
 every ten electors; and must unavoidably far exceed the pro- 
 portion in any of the other states. 
 
 Another general remark to be made is, that the ratio be- 
 tween the representatives and the people, ought not to be the 
 same, where the latter are very numerous, as where they are 
 very few. Were the representatives in Virginia, to be regu- 
 lated by the standard in Ehode-Island, they would, at this time, 
 amount to between four and five hundred; and twenty or 
 thirty years hence, to a thousand. On the other hand, the 
 ratio of Pennsylvania, if applied to the state of Delaware, 
 would reduce the representative assembly of the latter to seven 
 or eight members. Nothing can be more fallacious, than to 
 found our political calculations on arithmetical principles. 
 SiXty or seventy men, may be more properly trusted with a 
 
124 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 givon degree of power, than six or seven. But it does not fol- 
 low, that six or seven hundred would be proportionably a better 
 depository. And if we carry on the supposition to six or seven 
 thousand, the whole reasoning ought to be reversed. The truth 
 is, that in all cases, a certain number at least seems to be neces- 
 sary, to secure the benefits of free consultation and discussion ; 
 and to guard against too easy a combination for improper pur- 
 poses : As on the other hand, the number ought at most to be 
 kept within a certain limit, in order to avoid the confusion and 
 intemperance of a multitude. In all very numerous assemblies, 
 of whatever characters composed, passion never fails to wrest 
 the sceptre from reason. Had every Athenian citizen been a 
 Socrates; every Athenian assembly would still have been a 
 mob. 
 
 It is necessary also to recollect here, the observations which 
 were applied to the case of biennial elections. For the same 
 reason that the limited powers of the congress, and the control 
 of the state legislatures, justify less frequent elections, than the 
 public safety might otherwise require; the members of the 
 congress need be less numerous, than if they possessed the 
 whole power of legislation, and were under no other, than the 
 ordinary restraints of other legislative bodies. 
 
 "With these general ideas in our minds, let us weigh the ob- 
 jections which have been stated against the number of mem- 
 bers proposed for the house of representatives. It is said, in 
 the first place, that so small a number cannot be safely trusted 
 with so much power. 
 
 The number of which this branch of the legislature is to 
 consist, at the outset of the government, will be sixty-five. 
 Within three years a census is to be taken, when the number 
 may be augmented to one for every thirty thousand inhabit- 
 ants; and within every successive period of ten years, the 
 census is to be renewed, and augmentations may continue to 
 be made under the above limitation. It will not be thought an 
 extravagant conjecture, that the first census will, at the rate of 
 one for every thirty thousand, raise the number of representa- 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 42.'> 
 
 lives to at least one hundred. Estimating the negroes in the 
 proportion of three-fifths, it can scarcely be doubted, that the 
 population of the United States will by that time, if it does not 
 already, amount to three millions. At the expiration of twenty- 
 five years, according to the computed rate of increase, the num- 
 ber of representatives will amount to two hundred; and of fifty 
 years, to four hundred. This is a number, which I presume 
 will put an end to all fears, arising from the smallness of the 
 bod}'. I take for granted here, what I shall, in answering the 
 fourth objection, hereafter show, that the number of repre- 
 sentatives will be augmented, from time to time, in the 
 manner provided by the constitution. On a contrary suppo- 
 sition, I should admit the objection to have very great weight 
 indeed. 
 
 The true question to be decided then is, whether the small- 
 ness of the number, as a temporary regulation, be dangerous to 
 the public liberty? Whether sixty-five members for a few 
 years, and a hundred, or two hundred, for a few more, be a safe 
 depository for a limited and well guarded power of legislating 
 for the United States ? I must own that I could not give a 
 negative answer to this question, without first obliterating 
 every impression which I have received, with regard to the 
 present genius of the people of America, the spirit which 
 actuates the state legislatures, and the principles which are in- 
 corporated with the political character of every class of citizens. 
 I am unable to conceive, that the people of America, in their 
 present temper, or under any circumstances which can speedily 
 happen, will choose, and every second year repeat the choice, 
 of sixty-five or an hundred men, who would be disposed to 
 form and pursue a scheme of tyranny or treachery. I am un- 
 able to conceive, that the state legislatures, which must feel so 
 many motives to watch, and which possess so many means of 
 counteracting the federal legislature, would fail either to detect 
 or to defeat, a conspiracy of the latter, against the liberties of 
 their common constituents. I am equally unable to conceive 
 
126 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 that there are at this time, or can be in any short time in the 
 United States, any sixty-five or an hundred men, capable of 
 recommending themselves to the choice of the people at large, 
 who would either desire or dare, within the short space of two 
 years, to betray the solemn trust committed to them. What 
 change of circumstances, time, and a fuller population of oui 
 country, may produce, requires a prophetic spirit to declare, 
 which makes no part of my pretensions. But judging from 
 the circumstances now before us, and from the probable state 
 of them within a moderate period of time, 1 must pronounce, 
 that the liberties of America cannot be unsafe, in the number 
 of hands proposed by the federal constitution. 
 
 From what quarter can the danger proceed ? Are we afraid 
 of foreign gold ? If foreign gold could so easily corrupt our 
 federal rulers, and enable them to ensnare and betray their 
 constituents, how has it happened that we are at this time a 
 free and independent nation ? The congress which conducted 
 us through the revolution, were a less numerous body than 
 their successors will be ; they were not chosen by, nor respon- 
 sible to, their fellow citizens at large : though appointed from 
 year to year, and recallable at pleasure, they were generally 
 continued for three years ; and prior to the ratification of the 
 federal articles, for a still longer term ; they held their consulta- 
 tions always under the veil of secrecy; they had the sole trans- 
 action of our affairs with foreign nations; through the whole 
 course of the war, they had the fate of their country more in 
 their hands, than it is to be hoped will ever be the case with 
 our future representatives ; and from the greatness of the prize 
 at stake, and the eagerness of the party which lost it, it may 
 well be supposed, that the use of other means than force would 
 not have been scrupled : Yet we know by happy experience, 
 that the public trust was not betrayed; nor has the purity of 
 our public councils in this particular ever suffered, even from 
 the whispers of calumny. 
 
 Is the danger apprehended from the other branches of tijf 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 421 
 
 federal government? But where are the means to be found 
 by the president or the senate, or both ? Their emoluments 
 of oflOlce, it is to be presumed, will not, and without a previoua 
 corruption of the house of representatives cannot, more than 
 suflSce for very -different purposes : Their private fortunes, as 
 they must all be American citizens, cannot possibly be sources 
 of danger. The only means then which they can possess, will 
 be in the dispensation of appointments. Is it here that sus- 
 picion rests her charge ? Sometimes we are told, that this 
 fund of corruption is to be exhausted by the president, in sub- 
 duing the virtue of the senate. Now, the fidelity of the other 
 house is to be the victim. The improbability of such a mer- 
 cenary and perfidious combination of the several members of 
 government, standing on as different foundations as republican 
 principles will well admit, and at the same time accountable to 
 the society over which they are placed, ought alone to quiet 
 this apprehension. But fortunately, the constitution has pro- 
 vided a still further safeguard. The members of the congress, 
 are rendered ineligible to any civil offices, that mav be created, 
 or of which the emoluments may be increased, during the term 
 of their election. No offices therefore can be dealt out to the 
 existing membei'S, but such as may become vacant by ordinary 
 casualties; and to suppose that these would be sufficient to 
 purchase the guardians of the people, selected by the people 
 themselves, is to renounce every rule by which events ought 
 to be calculated, and to substitute an indiscriminate and un- 
 bounded jealousy, with which all reasoning must be vain. The 
 sincere friends of liberty, who give themselves up to the ex- 
 t] avagancies of this passion, are not aware of the injury they 
 do their own cause. As there is a degree of depravity in man- 
 kind, which requires a certain degree of circumspection and 
 distrust : So there are other qualities in human nature, which 
 justify a certain portion of esteem and confidence. Eepublican 
 government, presupposes the existence of these qualities in a 
 higher degree, than any other form. Were the pictures which 
 
 38 
 
428 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 have been drawn by the political jealousy of some among us, 
 faithful likenesses of the human character, the inference would 
 be, that there is not sufficient virtue among men for self- 
 government; and that nothing less than the chains of despot- 
 ism, can restrain them from destroying and devouring one 
 another. 
 
 Public a. 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 429 
 
 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 NUMBER LVI. 
 
 NEW YORK, FEBRUARY 19, 1788. 
 
 HAMILTON. 
 
 THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED, IN RELATION TO THE SAME POINT 
 
 The second charge against the house of representatives is, 
 that it will be too small to possess a due knowledge of the in- 
 terests of its constituents. 
 
 As this objection evidently proceeds from a comparison of 
 the proposed number of representatives, with the great extent 
 of the United States, the number of their inhabitants, and the 
 diversity of their interests, without taking into view, at the 
 same time, the circumstances which will distinguish the con- 
 gress from other legislative bodies, the best answer that can be 
 given to it, will be a brief explanation of these peculiarities. 
 
 It is a sound and important principle, that the representative 
 ought to be acquainted with the interests and circumstances of 
 his constituents. But this principle can extend no farther, 
 than to those circumstances and interests, to which the authority 
 and care of the representative relate. An ignorance of a 
 variety of minute and particular objects, which do not lie 
 within the compass of legislation, is consistent with every 
 attribute necessary to a due performance of the legislative 
 trust. In determining the extent of information required in 
 the exercise of a particular authority, recourse then must be 
 iMid to the objects within the purview of that authority. 
 
430 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 What are to be the objects of federal legislation ? Those 
 which are of most importance, and which seem most to require 
 local knowledge, are commerce, taxation, and the militia. 
 
 A proper regulation of commerce requires much information, 
 as has been elsewhere remarked ; but as far as this information 
 relates to the laws, and local situation of each individual state, 
 a very few representatives would be suflScient vehicles of it to 
 the federal councils. 
 
 Taxation will consist, in great measure, of duties which will 
 be involved in the regulation of commerce. So far the preced- 
 ing remark is applicable to this object. As far as it may consist 
 of internal collections, a more diffusive knowledge of the cir- 
 cumstances of the state may be necessary. But will not this 
 also be possessed in sufficient degree by a very few intelligent 
 men, diffusively elected within the state. Divide the largest 
 state into ten or twelve districts, and it will be found that 
 there will be no peculiar local interest in either, which will 
 not be within the knowledge of the representative of the 
 district. Besides this source of information, the laws of the 
 state, framed by representatives from every part of it, will be 
 almost of themselves a sufficient guide. In every state there 
 have been made, and must continue to be made, regulations on 
 this subject, which will, in many cases, leave little more to be 
 done by the federal legislature, than to review the different 
 laws, and reduce them into one general act. A skilful individual 
 in his closet, with all the local codes before him, might compile 
 a law on some subjects of taxation for the whole union, without 
 any aid from oral information ; and it may be expected, that 
 whenever internal taxes may be necessary, and particularly in 
 cases requiring uniformity throughout the states, the more 
 simple objects will be preferred. To be fully sensible of the 
 facility which will be given to this branch of federal legislation, 
 by the assistance of the state codes, we need only suppose foi 
 a moment, that this or any other state were divided into a 
 number of parts, each having and exercising within itself a 
 power of local legislation. Is it not evident that p. degree of 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 43J 
 
 local information and preparatory labour, would be found m 
 the several volumes of their proceedings, which would very 
 much shorten the labours of the general legislature, and render 
 a much smaller number of members suflBcient for it? The 
 federal councils will derive great advantage from another 
 circumstance. The representatives of each state will not only 
 bring with them a considerable knowledge of its laws, and a 
 local knowledge of their respective districts ; but will probably 
 in all eases have been members, and may even at the very time 
 be members of the state legislature, where all the local infor- 
 mation and interests of the state are assembled, and from 
 whence they may easily be conveyed by a very few hands 
 into the legislature of the United States. 
 
 With regard to the regulation of the militia, there are 
 scarcely any circumstances in reference to which local know- 
 ledge can be said to be necessary. The general face of the 
 country, whether mountainous or level, most fit for the opera- 
 ations of infantry or cavalry, is almost the only consideration 
 of this nature that can occur. The art of war teaches general 
 principles of organization, movement, and discipline, which 
 apply universally. 
 
 The attentive reader will discern, that the reasoning here 
 used, to prove the sufficiency of a moderate number of repre- 
 sentatives, does not, in any respect, contradict what was urged 
 on another occasion, with regard to the extensive information 
 which the representatives ought to possess, and the time that 
 might be necessary for acquiring it. This information, so far 
 as it may relate to local objects, is rendered necessary and 
 difficult, not by a difference of laws and local circumstance& 
 within a single state, but of those among different states. 
 Taking each state by itself, its laws are the same, and its 
 interests but little diversified. A few men, therefore, will 
 possess all the knowledge requisite for a proper representation 
 of them. Were the interests and affairs of each individual 
 state, perfectly simple and uniform, a knowledge of them in 
 one part, wculd involve a knowledge of them in every other. 
 
482 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 and the whole state might be competently represented by a 
 single member taken from any part of it. On a comparison 
 of the different states together, we find a great dissimilarity in 
 their laws, and in many other circumstances connected with 
 the objects of federal legislation, with all of which the federal 
 representatives ought to have some acquaintance. "Whilst a 
 few representatives, therefore, from each state, may bring with 
 them a due knowledge of their own state, every representative 
 will have much information to acquire concerning all the other 
 states. The changes of time, as was formerly remarked, on 
 the comparative situation of the different states, will have an 
 assimilating tendency. The effect of time on the internal 
 affairs of the states, taken singly, will be just the contrary. 
 At present, some of the states are little more than a society 
 of husbandmen. Few of them have made much progress in 
 those branches of industry, which give a variety and complexity 
 to the affairs of a nation. These, however, will in all of them be 
 the fruits of a more advanced population ; and will require, on 
 the part of each state, a fuller representation. The foresight 
 of the convention, has accordingly taken care, that the progress 
 of population, may be accompanied with a proper increase of 
 the representative branch of the government. 
 
 The experience of Great Britain, which presents to mankind 
 so many political lessons, both of the monitory and exemplary 
 kind, and which has been frequently consulted in the course of 
 these inquiries, corroborates the result of the reflections which 
 we have just made. The number of inhabitants in the two 
 kingdoms of England and Scotland, cannot be stated at less 
 than eight millions. The representatives of these eight millions 
 in the house of commons, amount to five hundred and fifty- 
 eight. Of this number, one ninth are elected by three hundred 
 and sixty-four persons, and one half, by five thousand seven 
 hundred and twenty-three persons.* It cannot be supposed 
 that the half thus elected, and who do not even reside among 
 the peopie at large, can add any thing either to the security of 
 
 * Burgh's Political Disquisitions. 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 43o 
 
 the people against the government, or to the knowledge of 
 their circumstances and interests in the legislative councils. 
 On the contrary, it is notorious, that they are more frequently 
 the representatives and instruments of the executive magis- 
 trate, than the guardians and advocates of the popular rights. 
 They might, therefore, with great propriety, be considered as 
 something more than a mere deduction from the real repre- 
 sentatives of the nation. We will, however, consider them in 
 this light alone, and will not extend the deduction to a con 
 siderable number of others, who do not reside among their con- 
 stituents, are very faintly connected with them, and have very 
 little particular knowledge of their affairs. With all these 
 concessions, two hundred and seventy-nine persons only, will 
 be the depository of the safety, interest, and happiness, of 
 eight millions; that is to say, there will be one representative 
 only, to maintain the rights, and explain the situation, of 
 twenty-eight thousand six hundred and seventy constituents, in an 
 assembly exposed to the whole force of executive influence, 
 and extending its authority to every object of legislation within 
 a nation, whose affairs are in the highest degree diversified and 
 complicated. Yet it is very certain, not only that a valuable 
 portion of freedom has been preserved under all these circum- 
 stances, but that the defects in the British code are chargeable 
 in a very small proportion, on the ignorance of the legislature 
 concerning the circumstances of the people. Allowing to this 
 case the weight which is due to it ; and comparing it with that 
 of the house of representatives as above explained, it seems to 
 give the fullest assurance, that a representative for every 
 thirty thoicsand inhabitants, will render the latter both a safe 
 and competent guardian of the interests which will be confided 
 to it. 
 
 PUBLIUS. 
 
4S4 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 NUMBER LVII. 
 
 NEW YORK, FEBRUARY 19, 1788. 
 
 HAMILTON. 
 
 THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED, IN RELATION TO THE SUPPOSED 
 TENDENCY OF THE PLAN OF THE CONVENTION TO ELEVATE THE 
 FEW ABOVE THE MANY. 
 
 The third charge against the house of representatives is, that 
 it will be taken from that class of citizens which will have 
 least sympathy with the mass of the people ; and be most likely 
 to aim at an ambitious sacrifice of the many, to the aggrandize- 
 ment of the few. 
 
 Of all the objections which have been framed against the 
 federal constitution, this is perhaps the most extraordinary. 
 Whilst the objection itself is levelled against a pretended 
 oligarchy, the principle of it strikes at the very root of repub- 
 lican government. 
 
 The aim of every political constitution is, or ought to be, 
 first, to obtain for rulers men who possess most wisdom to dis- 
 cern, and most virtue to pursue, the common good of the 
 society ; and in the next place, to take the most effectual pre- 
 cautions for keeping them virtuous, whilst they continue to 
 hold their public trust. The elective mode of obtaining rulers, 
 is the characteristic policy of republican government. The 
 means relied on in this form of government for preventing 
 their degonej'acy, are numerous and various. The most effectual 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 435 
 
 one, is such a limitation of the term of appointments, as will 
 maintain a proper responsibility to the people. 
 
 Let me now ask, what there is in the constitution of the 
 house of representatives, that violates the principles of repub- 
 lican government; or favours the elevation of the few, on the 
 ruins of the many ? Let me ask whether every circumstance 
 is not, on the contrary, strictly conformable to these princi- 
 ples ; and scrupulously impartial to the rights and pretensions 
 of every class and description of citizens ? 
 
 Who are to be the electors of the federal representatives? 
 Not the rich, more than the poor; not the learned, more than 
 the ignorant; not the haughty heirs of distinguished names, 
 more than the humble sons of obscure and unpropitious fortune. 
 The electors are to be the great body of the people of the 
 United States. They are to be the same, who exercise the 
 right in every state of electing the correspondent branch of the 
 legislature of the state. 
 
 Who are to be the objects of popular choice ? Every citizen 
 whose merit may recommend him to the esteem and confidence 
 of his country. No qualification of wealth, of birth, of reli- 
 gious faith, or of civil profession, is permitted to fetter the 
 judgment, or disappoint the inclination of the people. 
 
 If we consider the situation of the men on whom the free 
 suffrages of their fellow citizens may confer the representati\ e 
 trust, we shall find it involving every security which can be 
 devised or desired for their fidelity to their constituents. 
 
 In the first place, as they will have been distinguished by the 
 preference of their fellow citizens, we are to presume, that in 
 general, they will be somewhat distinguished also, by those 
 qualities which entitle them to it, and which promise a sincere 
 and scrupulous regard to the nature of their engagements. 
 
 In the second place, they will enter into the public service 
 under circumstances, which cannot fail to produce a temporary 
 affection at least to their constituents. There is in every breast 
 a sensibility to marks of honour, of favour, of esteem, and of 
 confidence, which apart from all considerations of interest, is 
 
436 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 some pledge for grateful and benevolent returns. Ingratitude 
 is a common topic of declamation against human nature; and 
 it must be confessed, that instances of it are but too frequent 
 and flagrant, both in public and in private life. But the uni- 
 versal and extreme indignation which it inspires, is itself a 
 proof of the energy and prevalence of the contrary sentiment. 
 
 In the third place, those ties which bind the representative 
 to his constituents, are strengthened by motives of a more 
 selfish nature. His pride and vanity attach him to a form of 
 government which favours his pretensions, and gives him a 
 share in its honours and distinctions. Whatever hopes or pro- 
 jects might be entertained by a few aspiring characters, it 
 must generally happen, that a great proportion of the men de- 
 riving their advancement from their influence with the people, 
 would have more to hope from a preservation of their favour, 
 than from innovations in the government subversive of the 
 authority of the people. 
 
 All these securities, however, would be found very insuflBcient 
 without the restraint of frequent elections. Hence, in the 
 fourth place, the house of representatives is so constituted, as 
 to support in the members an habitual recollection of their de- 
 pendence on the people. Before the sentiments impressed on 
 their minds by the mode of their elevation, can be effaced by 
 the exercise of power, they will be compelled to anticipate the 
 moment when their power is to cease, when their exercise of it 
 is to be reviewed, and when they mudt descend to the level 
 from which they were raised; there for ever to remain, unless 
 a faithful discharge of their trust shall have established their 
 title to a renewal of it. 
 
 I will add, as a fifth circumstance in the situation of the 
 house of representatives, restraining them from oppressive 
 measures : that they can make no law which will not have its 
 full operation on themselves and their friends, as well as on the 
 great mass of the society. This has always been deemed one of 
 the strongest bonds by which human policy can connect the 
 rulers and the people together. It creates between them that 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 437 
 
 communion of interest, and sympathy of sentiments, of which 
 few governments have furnished examples ; but without which 
 ever}' government degenerates into tyranny. If it be asked, 
 what is to restrain the house of representatives from making 
 legal discriminations in favour of themselves, and a particular 
 class of the society ? I answer, the genius of the whole system ; 
 the nature of just and constitutional laws; and, above all, the 
 vigilant and manly spirit which actuates the people of America; 
 a spirit which nourishes freedom, and in return is nourished 
 by it. 
 
 If this spirit shall ever be so far debased, as to tolerate a law 
 not obligatory on the legislature, as well as on the people, the 
 people will be prepared to tolerate any thing but liberty. 
 
 Such will be the relation between the house of representa- 
 tives and their constituents. Duty, gratitude, interest, ambi- 
 tion itself, are the cords by which they will be bound to fidelity 
 and sympathy with the great mass of the people. It is possible 
 that these may all be insufficient, to control the caprice and 
 wickedness of men. But are they not all that government will 
 admit, and that human prudence can devise ? Are they not 
 ihe genuine, and the characteristic means, by which republican 
 government provides for the liberty and happiness of the peo- 
 ple ? Are they not the identical means on which every state 
 government in the union relies for the attainment of these 
 important ends ? What then are we to understand by the ob- 
 jection which this paper has combatted ? What are we to say 
 to the men who profess the most flaming zeal for republican 
 government, yet boldly impeach the fundamental principle of 
 it ; who pretend to be champions for the right and the capacity 
 of the people to choose their own rulers, yet maintain that 
 they will prefer those only who will immediately and infallibly 
 betray the trust committed to them ? 
 
 Were the objection to be read by one, who had not seen the 
 mode prescribed by the constitution for the choice of repre- 
 sentatives, he could suppose nothing less, than that some un- 
 reasonable qualification of property was annexed to the right 
 
438 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 of suffrage ; or that the right of eligibility was limited to per- 
 sons of particular families or fortunes; or at least, that the 
 mode prescribed by the state constitutions was, in some respect 
 or other, very grossly departed from. We have seen how far 
 such a supposition would err, as to the two first points. Nor 
 would it, in fact, be less erroneous as to the last. The only 
 difference discoverable between the two cases is, that each 
 representative of the United States will be elected by five or 
 six thousand citizens ; whilst, in the individual states, the elec- 
 tion of a representative is left to about as many hundred. Will 
 it be pretended, that this difference is sufficient to justify an 
 attachment to the state governments, and an abhorrence to the 
 federal government ? If this be the point on which the objec- 
 tion turns, it deserves to be examined. 
 
 Is it supported by reason? This cannot be said, without 
 maintaining, that five or six thousand citizens are less capable 
 of choosing a fit representative, or more liable to be corruj)ted 
 by an unfit one, than five or six hundred. Reason, on the con- 
 trary, assures us that, as in so great a number, a fit representa- 
 tive would be most likely to be found ; so the choice would be 
 less likely to be diverted from him, by the intrigues of the 
 ambitious, or the bribes of the rich. 
 
 Is the consequence from this doctrine admissible ? If we say 
 that five or six hundred citizens are as many as can jointly 
 exercise their right of suffrage, must we not deprive the people 
 of the immediate choice of their public servants in every in- 
 stance, where the administration of the government does not 
 require as many of them as will amount to one for that number 
 of citizens. 
 
 Is the doctrine warranted by facts ? It was shown in the 
 last paper, that the real representation in the British house of 
 commons, very little exceeds the proportion of one for ever^^ 
 thirty thousand inhabitants. Besides a variety of powerful 
 causes, not existing here, and which favour in that country, 
 the pretensions of rank and wealth, no person is eligible as i\ 
 representa :ive of a county, unless he possesses real estate of 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 439 
 
 the clear value of six hundred pounds sterling per year; nor 
 of a city or borough, unless he possesses a like estate of half that 
 annual value. To this qualification, on the part of the county 
 representatives, is added another on the part of the county 
 electors, which restrains the right of suffrage to persons having 
 a freehold estate of the annual value of more than twenty 
 pounds sterling, according to the present rate of money. Not- 
 withstanding these unfavourable circumstances, and notwith- 
 standing some very unequal laws in the British code, it cannot 
 be said, that the representatives of the nation have elevated 
 the few, on the ruins of the many. 
 
 But we need not resort to foreign experience on this subject. 
 Our own is explicit and decisive. The districts in New-Hamp- 
 shire, in which the senators are chosen immediately by the 
 people, are nearly as large as will be necessary for her repre- 
 sentatives in the congress. Those of Massachusetts are larger 
 than will be necessary for that purpose. And those of New- 
 York still more so. In the last state, the members of assembly, 
 for the cities and counties of New- York and Albany, are elected 
 by very nearly as many voters as will be entitled to a repre- 
 sentative in the congress, calculating on the number of sixty- 
 five representatives only. It makes no difi'erence that, in these 
 senatorial districts and counties, a number of representatives 
 are voted for by each elector at the same time. If the same 
 electors, at the same time, are capable of choosing four or five 
 representatives, they cannot be incapable of choosing one. 
 Pennsylvania is an additional example. Some of her counties, 
 which elect her state representatives, are almost as large as 
 her districts will be by which her federal representatives will 
 be elected. The city of Philadelphia is supposed to contain 
 between fifty and sixty thousand souls. It will, therefore, 
 form nearly two districts for the choice of federal representa- 
 tives. It forms, however, but one county, in which every 
 elector votes for each of its representatives in the state legis- 
 lature. And what may appear to be still more directly to our 
 purpose, the whole city actually elects a single member for the 
 
440 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 executive council. This is the case in all the other counties of 
 the state. 
 
 Are Qot these facts the most satisfactory proofs of the fallacy, 
 which has been employed against the branch of the federal 
 government under consideration ? IJas it appeared on trial, 
 that the senators of New-Hampshire, Massachusetts, and New 
 York ; or the executive council of Pennsylvania ; or the mem- 
 bers of the assembly in the two last states, have betrayed any 
 peculiar disposition to sacrifice the many to the few ; or are in 
 any respect less worthy of their places, than the representa- 
 tives and magistrates appointed in other states, by very small 
 divisions of the people ? 
 
 But there are cases of a stronger complexion, than any which 
 [ have yet quoted. One branch of the legislature of Con 
 uecticut is so constituted, that each member of it is elected by 
 the whole state. So is the governor of that state, of Massa- 
 chusetts, and of this state, and the president of New-Hamp- 
 shire. I leave every man to decide, whether the result of any 
 one of these experiments, can be said to countenance a suspicion, 
 that a diffusive mode of choosing representatives of the 
 people, tends to elevate traitors, and to undermine the public 
 liberty. 
 
 PUBLIUS. 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 Ul 
 
 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 NUMBER LVIII. 
 
 NEW YORK, FEBRUARY 22, 1788. 
 
 HAMILTON. 
 
 THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED, IN RELATION TO THE FUTURE 
 AUGMENTATION OF THE MEMBERS. 
 
 The remaining charge against the house of representatives, 
 which I am to examine, is grounded on a supposition that the 
 number of members will not be augmented from time to time, 
 as the progress of population may demand. 
 
 It has been admitted that this objection, if well supported, 
 would have great weight. The following observations will 
 show, that, like most other objections against the constitution, 
 it can only proceed from a partial view of the subject; or from 
 a jealousy which discolours and disfigures every object which it 
 beholds. 
 
 1. Those who urge the objection, seem not to have recol- 
 lected, that the federal constitution will not suffer by a com- 
 parison with the state constitutions, in the security provided 
 for a gradual augmentation of the number of representatives. 
 The number which is to prevail in the first instance, is declared 
 to be temporary. Its duration is limited to the short term of 
 three years. 
 
 Within every successive term of ten years, a census of in- 
 habitants is to be repeated. The unequivocal objects of these 
 regulations are, first, to re-adjust, from time to time, the appor- 
 
142 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 tionment of representatives to the number of inhabitants; 
 under the single exception, that each state shall have one rep- 
 resentative at least : Secondly, to augment the number of rep- 
 resentatives at the same periods; under the sole limitation, that 
 the whole number shall not exceed one for every thirty thou- 
 sand inhabitants. If we review the constitutions of the several 
 states, we shall find that some of them contain no determinate 
 regulations on this subject; that others correspond pretty much 
 on this point with the federal constitution ; and that the most 
 effectual security in any of them, is resolvable into a mero 
 directory provision. 
 
 2. As far as experience has taken place on this subject, a 
 gradual increase of representatives under the state consti- 
 tutions, has at least kept pace with that of the constituents: 
 and it appears that the former have been as ready to concur in 
 such measures, as the latter have been to call for them 
 
 3. There is a peculiarity in the federal constitution, which 
 insures a watchful attention in a majority both of the people 
 and of their representatives, to a constitutional augmentatio/j 
 of the latter The peculiarity lies in this, that one branch of 
 the legislature is a representation of citizens ; the other of the 
 states : In the former, consequently, the larger states will ha^e 
 most weight ; in the latter, the advantage will be in favour of 
 the smaller states. From this circumstance it may with cer- 
 tainty be inferred, that the larger states will be strenuous 
 advocates for increasing the number and weight of that part 
 of the legislature, in which their influence predominates. And 
 it 80 happens, that four only of the largest, will have a majority 
 ol the whole votes in the house of representatives. Should tho 
 representatives or people, therefore, of the smaller states, 
 oppose at any time a reasonable addition of members, a coalition 
 of a very few states will be sufficient to over-rule the opposi- 
 tion; a coalition, which, notwithstanding the rivalship and 
 local prejudices which might prevent it on ordinary ocoasionb, 
 would not fail to take place, when not merely prompted by 
 
THE FEDERALTST. 443 
 
 common interest, but justified by equity and the principles of 
 the constitution. 
 
 It may be alleged, perhaps, that the senate would be 
 prompted by like motives to an adverse coalition ; and as their 
 concurrence would be indispensable, the just and constitutional 
 views of the other branch might be defeated. This is the 
 difficulty which has probably created the most serious appre- 
 hensions in the jealous friends of a numerous representation. 
 Fortunately it is among the difficulties which, existing only in 
 appearance, vanish on a close and accurate inspection. The 
 following reflections will, if I mistake not, be admitted to be 
 conclusive and satisfactory on this point. 
 
 Notwithstanding the equal authority which will subsist 
 between the two houses on all legislative subjects, except the 
 originating of money bills, it cannot be doubted, that the house 
 composed of the greater number, when supported by the more 
 powerful states, and speaking the known and determined sense 
 of a majority of the peojjle, will have no small advantage in a 
 question depending on the comparative firmness of the two 
 houses. 
 
 This advantage must be increased by the consciousness felt 
 by the same side, of being supported in its demands, by right, 
 by reason, and by the constitution ; and the consciousness on 
 the opposite side, of contending against the force of all these 
 solemn considerations. 
 
 It is farther to be considered, that in the gradation between 
 the smallest and largest states, there are several, which, though 
 most likely in general to arrange themselves among the former, 
 are too little removed in extent and population from the latter, 
 to second an opposition to their just and legitimate pretensions. 
 Hence it is by no means certain, that a majority of votes, even 
 in the senate, would be unfriendly to proper augmentations in 
 the number of representatives. 
 
 It will not be looking too far to add, that the senators from 
 
 :di the new states may be gained over to the just views of the 
 
 house of representatives, by an expedient too obvious to be 
 
 39 
 
444 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 overlooked. As these states will, for a great length of time, 
 advance in population with peculiar rapidity, they will be 
 interested in frequent re-apportionments of the representatives 
 to the number of inhabitants. The large states, therefore, who 
 will prevail in the house of representatives, will have nothing 
 to do, but to make re -apportionments and augmentations 
 mutually conditions of each other; and the senators from all 
 the most growing states will be bound to contend for the latter, 
 by the interest which their states will feel in the former. 
 
 These considerations seem to afford ample security on this 
 subject; and ought alone to satisfy all the doubts and fearp 
 which have been indulged with regard to it. Admitting, how 
 ever, that they should all be insuflScient to subdue the unjust 
 policy of the smaller states, or their predominant influence in 
 the councils of the senate; a constitutional and infallible 
 resource still remains with the larger states, by which they 
 will be able at all times to accomplish their just purposes. The 
 house of representatives can not only refuse, but they alone can 
 propose the supplies requisite for the support of government. 
 They, in a word, hold the purse; that powerful instrument by 
 which we behold in the history of the British constitution an 
 infant and humble representation of the people, gradually 
 enlarging the sphere of its activity and importance, and finally 
 reducing, as far as it seems to have wished, all the overgrown 
 prerogatives of the other branches of the government. This 
 power over the purse, may in fact be regarded as the most 
 complete and effectual weapon, with which any constitution 
 can arm the immediate representatives of the people, for 
 obtaining a redress of every grievance, and for carrying into 
 effect every just and salutary measure. 
 
 But will not the house of representatives be as much inter- 
 ested as the senate, in maintaining the government in its proper 
 functions, and will they not therefore be unwilling to stake its 
 axistence or its reputation on the pliancy of the senate ? Or 
 If such a trial of firmness between the two branches were 
 hazarded, would not the one be as likely first So yield as the 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 445 
 
 Other? These questions will create no difficulty with those 
 who reflect, that in all cases, the smaller the number, and the 
 more permanent and conspicuous the station of men in power, 
 the stronger must be the interest which they will individually 
 feel in whatever concerns the government. Those who repre- 
 sent the dignity of their country in the eyes of other nations, 
 will be particularly sensible to every prospect of public danger, 
 or of a dishonorable stagnation in public affairs. To those 
 causes we are to ascribe the continual triumph of the British 
 house of commons over the other branches of the government, 
 whenever the engine of a money bill has been employed. An 
 absolute inflexibility on the side of the latter, although if could 
 not have failed to involve every department of the state in the 
 general confusion, has neither been apprehended nor experi- 
 enced. The utmost degree of firmness that can be displayed 
 by the federal senate or president, will not be more than equal 
 to a resistance, in which they will be supported by constitu- 
 tional and patriotic principles. 
 
 In this review of the constitution of the house of representa- 
 tives, I have passed over the circumstance of economy, which, 
 in the present state of affairs, might have had some effect in 
 lessening the temporary number of representatives; and a 
 disregard of which would probably have been as rich a theme 
 of declamation against the constitution, as has been furnished 
 by the smallness of the number proposed. I omit also any 
 remarks on the difficulty which might be found, under present 
 circumstances, in engaging in the federal service a large number 
 of such characters as the people will probably elect. One 
 observation, however, I must be permitted to add on this sub- 
 ject, as claiming, in my judgment, a very serious attention. 
 It is, that in all legislative assemblies, the greater the number 
 composing them may be, the fewer will be the men who will 
 ui fact direct their proceedings. In the first place, the more 
 numerous any assembly may be, of whatever characters com- 
 posed, the greater is known to be the ascendancy of passion 
 over reason. In the rext place, the larger the number, the 
 
446 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 greater will be the proportion of members of limited informa- 
 tion and of weak capacities. Now it is precisely on characters 
 of this description, that the eloquence and address of the few 
 are known to act with all their force. In the ancient republics, 
 where the whole body of the people assembled in person, a 
 single orator, or an artful statesman, was generally seen to 
 rule with as complete a sway, as if a sceptre had been placed 
 in his single hands. On the same principle, the more multitu- 
 dinous a representative assembly may be rendered, the more 
 it will partake of the infirmities incident to collective meetings 
 of the people. Ignorance will be the dupe of cunning; and 
 passion the slave of sophistry and declamation. The people 
 can never err more than in supposing, that by multiplying 
 their representatives beyond a certain limit, they strengthen 
 the barrier against the government of a few. Experience will 
 for ever admonish them, that, on the contrary, after securing a 
 sufficient number for the purposes of safety, of local information, and of 
 diffusive sympathy with the whole society, they will counteract their 
 own views, by every addition to their representatives. The 
 countenance of the government may become more democratic; 
 but the soul that animates it, will be more oligarchic. The 
 machine will be enlarged, but the fewer, and often the more 
 secret, will be the springs by which its motions are directed. 
 
 As connected with the objection against the number of rej^re- 
 sentatives, may properly be here noticed, that which has been 
 suggested against the number made competent for legislative 
 business. It has been said that more than a majority ought to 
 have been required for a quorum, and in particular cases, if not 
 in all, more than a majority of a quorum for a decision. 
 
 ''^hat some advantages might have resulted from such a pre- 
 caution, cannot be denied. It might have been an additional 
 shield to some particular interests, and another obstacle gene- 
 rally to hasty and partial measures. But these considerations 
 are outweighed by the inconveniences in the opposite scale. In 
 all cases where justice, or the general good, might require new 
 laws to be passed, or active measures to be pursued, the fundi* 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 447 
 
 mental principle of free government would be reversed. It 
 would be no longer the majority that would rule ; the power 
 would be transferred to the minority. Were the defensive 
 privilege limited to particular cases, an interested minority 
 might take advantage of it to skreen themselves from equitable 
 sacrifices to the general weal, or in particular emergencies to 
 extort unreasonable indulgences. Lastly, it would facilitate 
 and foster the baneful practice of secessions ; a practice which 
 has shown itself, even in states where a majority only is re- 
 quired ; a practice subversive of all the principles of order and 
 regular government ; a practice which leads more directly to 
 public convulsions, and the ruin of popular governments, than 
 any other which has yet been displayed among us. 
 
 PUBLIUS 
 
448 
 
 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 THE FEDERALIST 
 
 NUMBER I.IX. 
 
 NEW YORK, FEBRUARY 22, 178a 
 
 HAMILTON. 
 
 CONCERNING THE REGULATION OF ELECTIONS. 
 
 The natural order of the subject leads us to consider, in this 
 place, that provision of the constitution which authorizes the 
 national legislature to regulate, in the last resort, the election 
 of its own members. 
 
 It is in these words : " The times^ places, and manner of holding 
 elections for senators and representatives, shall be prescribed 
 in each state by the legislature thereof; but the congress may, 
 at any time, by law, make or alter such regulations, except as to 
 places of choosing senators.''* This provision has not only 
 been declaimed against by those who condemn the constitution 
 in the gross ; but it has been censured by those who have ob- 
 jected with less latitude, and greater moderation; and, in one 
 instance, it has been thought exceptionable by a gentleman 
 who has declared himself the advocate of every other part of 
 the system. 
 
 I am greatly mistaken, notwithstanding, if there be any arti- 
 cle in the whole plan more completely defensible th/in this. Its 
 propriety rests upon the evidence of this plain proposition, 
 that every government ought to contain in itself (he m^ans of its own 
 preservation. Every just reasoner will, at first sight, approve ar 
 
 * Ist Clause, 4th Section of the 1st Article. 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 44S 
 
 adherence to this rule in the work of the onventioa; and will 
 disapprove every deviation from it, which may not appear to 
 have been dictated by the necessity of incorporating into the 
 work some particular ingredient, with which a rigid conformity 
 to the rule was incompatible. Even in this case, though he 
 may acquiesce in the necessity, yet he will not cease to regard 
 a departure from so fundamental a principle, as a portion of 
 imperfection in the system which may prove the seed of future 
 weakness, and perhaps anarchy. 
 
 It will not be alleged, that an election law could have been 
 framed and inserted in the constitution, which would have been 
 applicable to every probable change in the situation of the 
 country; and it will, therefore, not be denied, that a discre- 
 tionary power over elections ought to exist somewhere. It 
 will, I presume, be as readily conceded, that there were only 
 three ways in which this power could have been reasonably 
 organized ; that it must either have been lodged wholly in the 
 national legislature, or wholly in the state legislatures, or pri- 
 marily in the latter, and ultimately in the former. The last 
 mode has with reason been preferred by the convention. They 
 have submitted the regulation of elections for the federal gov- 
 ernment, in the first instance, to the local administrations; 
 which, in ordinary cases, and when no improper views prevail, 
 may be both more convenient and more satisfactory ; but they 
 have reserved to the national authority a right to interpose, 
 whenever extraordinary circumstances might render that inter- 
 position necessary to its safety. 
 
 Nothing can be more evident, than that an exclusive power 
 of regulating elections for the national government, in the 
 hands of the state legislatures, would leave the existence of 
 the union entirely at their mercy. They could at any moment 
 annihilate it, by neglecting to provide for the choice of persons 
 to administer its affairs. It is to little purpose to say, that a 
 neglect or omission of this kind would not be likely to take 
 place. The constitutional possibility of the thing, without an 
 equivalent for the risk, is an unanswerable objection. Nor has 
 
460 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 any eiatisfactory reason been yet assigned for injurring that 
 risk. The extravagant surmises of a distempered jealousy. 
 can never be dignified with that character. If we are in a 
 humour to presume abuses of power, it is as fair to presume 
 them on the part of the state governments, as on the part of 
 the general government. And as it is more consonant to the 
 rules of a just theory, to intrust the union with the care of its 
 own existence, than to transfer that care to any other hands ; 
 if abuses of power are to be hazarded on the one side or on 
 the other, it is more rational to hazard them where the power 
 would naturally be placed, than where it would unnaturally be 
 placed. 
 
 Suppose an article had been introduced into the constitution, 
 empowering the United States to regulate the elections for the 
 particular states, would any man have hesitated to condemn it, 
 both as an unwarrantable transposition of power, and as a pre- 
 meditated engine for the destruction of the state governments ? 
 The violation of principle, in this case, would have required no 
 comment; and, to an unbiassed observer, it will not be lesa 
 apparent in the project of subjecting the existence of the na- 
 tional government, in a similar respect, to the pleasure of the 
 state governments. An impartial view of the matter cannot 
 fail to result in a conviction that each, as far as possible, ought 
 to depend on itself for its own preservation. 
 
 As an objection to this position, it may be remarked, that the 
 constitution of the national senate, would involve in its full 
 extent the danger which it is suggested might flow from an 
 exclusive power in the state legislatures to regulate the federal 
 elections. It may be alleged, that by declining the appoint- 
 ment of senators, they might at any time give a fatal blow to 
 the union; and from this it may be inferred, that as ite exist- 
 ence would be thus rendered dependent upon them in 3p 
 essential a point, there can be no objection to intrusting them 
 with it, in the particular case under consideration. The interest 
 of each state, it may be added, to maintain its representation 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 451 
 
 in the national councils, would be a complete security againsi 
 an abuse of the trust. 
 
 This argument, though specious, will not, upon examination 
 be found solid. It is certainly true, that the state legislatures, 
 by forbearing the appointment of senators, may destroy the 
 national government. But it will not follow, that because they 
 have the power to do this in one instance, they ought to have 
 it in every other. There are cases in which the pernicious 
 tendency of such a power may be far more decisive, without 
 any motive to recommend their admission into the system, 
 equally cogent with that which must have regulated the con- 
 duct of the convention, in respect to the formation of the 
 senate. So far as that mode of formation may expose the 
 onion to the possibility of injury from the state legislatures, it 
 is an evil ; but it is an evil, which could not have been avoided 
 without excluding the states, in their political capacities, wholly 
 from a place in the organization of the national government. 
 If this had been done, it would doubtless have been interpreted 
 into an entire dereliction of the federal principle ; and would 
 certainly have deprived the state governments of that absolute 
 safe-guard, which they will enjoy under this provision. But 
 however wise it may have been, to have submitted in this in- 
 stance to an inconvenience, for the attainment of a necessary 
 advantage or a greater good, no inference can be drawn from 
 thence to favour an accumulation of the evil, where no neces- 
 sity urges, nor any greater good invites. 
 
 It may also be easily discerned, that the national govern- 
 ment would run a much greater risk, from a power in the state 
 legislatures over the elections of its house of representatives, 
 than from their power of appointing the members of its senate. 
 The senators are to be chosen for the period of six years ; there 
 is to be a rotation, by which the seats of a third part of them 
 are to be vacated, and replenished every two years; and no 
 state is to be entitled to more than two senators : A quorum of 
 the body, is to consist of sixteen members. The joint result of 
 these circumstances would be, that a temporary combination 
 
152 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 of « few states, to intermit the appointment of senators, could 
 neither annul the existence, nor impair the activity, of the 
 body ? And it is not from a general and permanent combina- 
 tion of the states, that we can have any thing to fear. The 
 first might proceed from sinister designs in, the leading mem- 
 bers of a few of the state legislatures ; the last would suppose 
 a fixed and rooted disaffection in the great body of the people ; 
 which will either never exist at all, or will, in all probability, 
 proceed from an experience of the inaptitude of the general 
 government to the advancement of their happiness ; in which 
 event, no good citizen could desire its continuance. 
 
 But with regard to the federal house of representatives, there 
 18 intended to be a general election of members once in two 
 years. If the state legislatures were to be invested with an 
 exclusive power of regulating these elections, every period of 
 making them would be a delicate crisis in the national situa- 
 tion ; which might issue in a dissolution of the union, if the 
 leaders of a few of the most important states should have 
 entered into a previous conspiracy to prevent an election. 
 
 I shall not deny that there is a degree of weight in the obser- 
 vation, that the interest of each state to be represented in the 
 federal councils, will be a security against the abuse of a power 
 over its elections in the hands of the state legislatures. But 
 the security will not be considered as complete, by those who 
 attend to the force of an obvious distinction between the in- 
 terests of the people in the public ffelicity, and the interest of 
 their local rulers in the power and consequence of their offices. 
 The people of America may be warmly attached to the govern- 
 ment of the union, at times when the particular rulers of par- 
 ticular states, stimulated by the natural rivalship of power, and 
 by the hopes of personal aggrandizement, and supported by a 
 strong faction in each of those states, may be in a very oppo- 
 site temper. This diversity of sentiment between a majority 
 of the people, and the individuals who have the greatest credit 
 in their councils, is exemplified in some of the states at the 
 present moment, on the present question. The scheme of 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 453 
 
 separate confederacies, which will always multiply tho chances 
 of ambition, will be a never failing bait to all such influential 
 characters in the state administrations, as are capable of pre- 
 ferring their own emolument and advancement to the public 
 weal. With so effectual a weapon in their hands as the ex- 
 clusive power of regulating elections for the national govern- 
 ment, a combination of a few such men, in a few of the most 
 considerable states, where the temptation will always be the 
 strongest, might accomplish the destruction of tbe union ; by 
 seizing the opportunity of some casual dissatisfaction among 
 the people, and which perhaps they may themselves have 
 excited, to discontinue the choice of members for the federal 
 house of representatives. It ought never to be forgotten, that 
 a firm union of this- country, under an efficient government, 
 will probably be an increasing object of jealousy to more than 
 one nation of Europe ; and that enterprises to subvert it will 
 sometimes originate in the intrigues of foreign powers, and will 
 seldom fail to be patronised and abetted by some of them. Its 
 preservation therefore ought in no case, that can be avoided, to 
 be committed to the guardianship of any but those, whose 
 situation will uniformly beget an immediate interest in the 
 faithfu' and vigilant performance of the trust. 
 
 PUBLIUB. 
 
454 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 NUMBBR I X. 
 
 NEW YORK, FEBRUARY 26, 1788. 
 
 HAMILTON. 
 
 THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED. 
 
 "We have seen, that an incontrolable power over the elo( tiona 
 for the federal government could not, without hazard, be com- 
 mitted to the state legislatures. Let us now see what are the 
 dangers on the other side ; that is, from confiding the ultimate 
 right of regulating its own elections to the union itself. It is 
 not pretended, that this right would ever be used for the ex- 
 clusion of any state from its share in the representation. The 
 interest of all would, in this respect at least, be the security of 
 all. But it is alleged, that it might be employed in such a 
 manner as to promote the election of some favourite class of 
 men in exclusion of others j by confining the places of election 
 to particular districts, and rendering it impracticable for the 
 citizens at large to partake in the choice. Of all chimerical 
 suppositions, this seems to be the most chimerical. On the one 
 hand, no rational calculation of probabilities would lead us to 
 imagine, that the disposition, which a conduct so violent and 
 extraordinary would imply, could ever find its way into the 
 national councils; and on the other land, it may be concluded 
 with certainty, that if so improper a spirit should ever gain 
 admittance into them, it would display itself in a form alto- 
 gether different and far more decisive. 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 455 
 
 The imprcbability of the attempt, may be satisfactorily in- 
 ferred from this single reflection, that it could never be made 
 without causing an immediate revolt of the great body of the 
 people, headed and directed by the state governments. It is 
 not diffi(iult to conceive, that this characteristic right of freedou' 
 may, in certain turbulent and factious seasons, be violated in 
 respect to a particular class of citizens by a victorious majority; 
 but that so fundamental a privilege, in a country situated and 
 enlightened as this is, should be invaded to the prejudice of the 
 sjreat mass of the people, by the deliberate policy of the govern- 
 ment, without occasioning a popular revolution, is altogether 
 inconceivable and. incredible. 
 
 In addition to this general reflection, there are considerations 
 of a more precise nature, which forbid all apprehension on the 
 subject. The dissimilarity in the ingredients, -which will com- 
 pose the national government, and still more in the manner ir 
 which they will be brought into action in its various branches, 
 must form a powerful obstacle to a concert of views, in anj" 
 partial scheme of elections. There is suflScient diversity in the 
 state of property, in the genius, manners, and habits of the 
 people of the different parts of the union, to occasion a material 
 diversity of disposition in their representatives towards the 
 different ranks and conditions in society. And though an inti 
 mate intercourse under the same government, will promote £ 
 gradual assimilation of temper and sentiment, yet there are 
 causes as well physical as moral, which may, in a greater oi 
 less degree, permanently nourish different propensities and in- 
 clinations in this particular. But the circumstance which will 
 be likely to have the greatest influence in the matter, will be 
 the dissimilar modes of constituting the several component 
 parts of the government. The house of representatives being 
 to be elected immediately by the people; the senate by the 
 state legislatures; the president by electors chosen for that 
 purpose by the people ; there would be little probability of a 
 common interest to cement these different branches in a predi- 
 lection for any particular class of electors. 
 
456 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 As to the senate, it is impossible that any regulation of " time 
 and manner," which is all that is proposed to be submitted to 
 the national government in respect to that body, can affect the 
 spirit which will direct the choice of its members. The collec- 
 tive sense of the state legislatures, can never be influenced by 
 extraneous circumstances of that sort : A consideration which 
 alone ought to satisfy us that the discrimination apprehended 
 would never be attempted. For what inducement could the 
 senate have to concur in a preference in which itself would not 
 be included ? Or to what purpose would it be established in 
 reference to one branch of the legislature, if it could not be 
 extended to the other ? The composition of. the one would in 
 this case counteract that of the other. And we can never sup- 
 pose that it would embrace the appointments to the senate, 
 unless we can at the same time suppose the voluntary co-opera- 
 tion of the state legislatures. If we make the latter supposition, 
 it then becomes immaterial where the power in question is 
 placed; whether in their hands, or in those of the union. 
 
 But what is to be the object of this capricious partiality in 
 the national councils ? Is it to be exercised in a discrimination 
 between the different departments of industry, or between the 
 different kinds of property, or between the different degrees of 
 property ? "Will it lean in favour of the landed interest, or the 
 monied interest, or the mercantile interest, or the manufactur- 
 ing interest? Or, to speak in the fashionable language of the 
 adversaries of the constitution, will it court the elevation of 
 the "wealthy and the wellborn," to the exclusion and debase- 
 ment of all the rest of the society ? 
 
 If this partiality is to be exerted in favour of those, who are 
 concerned in any particular description of industry or property, 
 I presume it will readily be admitted, that the competition for 
 it, will lie between landed men and merchants. And I scruple 
 not to affirm, that it is infinitely less likely that either of them 
 should gain an ascendant in the national councils, than that the 
 one or the other of them should predominate in all the local 
 councils. The inference will be, that a conduct tending to give 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 457 
 
 an undue preference to either, is much less to be areaded from 
 the former than from the latter. 
 
 The several states are in various degrees addicted to agricul- 
 ture and commerce. In most, if not all of them, the first in 
 predominant. In a few of them, however, the latter nearly 
 divides its empire; and in most of them has a considerable 
 share of influence. In proportion as either prevails, it will be 
 conveyed into the national representation; and for the very 
 reason, that this will be an emanation from a greater variety 
 of interests, and in much more various proportions, than are to 
 be found in any single state, it will be much less apt to espouse 
 either of them, with a decided partiality, than the representation 
 of any single state. 
 
 In a country consisting chiefly of the cultivators of land, 
 where the rules of an equal representation obtain, the landed 
 interest must, upon the whole, preponderate in the government. 
 As long as this interest prevails in most of the state legislatures, 
 so long it must maintain a correspondent superiority in the 
 national senate, which will generally be a faithful copy of the 
 majorities of those assemblies. It cannot therefore be pre- 
 sumed, that a sacrifice of the landed to the mercantile class, 
 will ever be a favourite object of this branch of the federal 
 legislature. In applying thus particularly to the senate a 
 general observation suggested by the situation of the country. 
 I am governed by the consideration, that the credulous votaries 
 of state power cannot, upon their own principles, suspect that 
 the state legislatures would be warped from their duty by any 
 external influence. But as in reality the same situation must 
 have the same effect, in the primitive composition at least 
 of the federal house of representatives; an improper biass 
 towards the mercantile class, is as little to be expected from 
 this quarter or from the other. 
 
 In order perhaps to give countenance to the objection at any 
 rate, it may be asked, is there not danger of an opposite biass 
 in the national government, which may produce an endeavour 
 to secure a monoply of the federal administration to the landed 
 
458 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 class '/ As there is little likelihood that the supposition of such 
 a biass will have any terrors for those who would be immedi- 
 ately injured by it, a laboured answer to this question will be 
 dispensed with. It will be sufficient to remark, first, that for 
 the reasons elsewhere assigned, it is less likely that any decided 
 partiality should prevail in the councils of the union, than in 
 those of any of its members. Secondly, that there would be 
 no temptation to violate the constitution in favor of the landed 
 class, because that class would, in the natural course of things, 
 enjoy as great a preponderancy as itself could desire. And 
 thirdly, that men accustomed to investigate the sources of 
 public prosperity, upon a large scale, must be too well con- 
 vinced of the utility of commerce, to be inclined to inflict upon 
 it so deep a wound, as would be occasioned by the entire exclu- 
 sion of those who would best understand its interests, from a 
 share in the management of them. The importance of com- 
 merce in the view of revenue alone, must effectually guard it 
 against the enmity of a body, which would be continually 
 importuned in its favor, by the urgent calls of public necessity. 
 
 I the rather consult brevity in discussing the probability of a 
 preference founded upon a discrimination between the different 
 kinds of industry and property, because, as far as I understand 
 the meaning of the objectors, they contemplate a discrimination 
 of another kind. They appear to have in view, as the objects 
 of the preference with which they endeavour to alarm us, those 
 whom they designate by the description of the " wealthy and 
 the well-born." These, it seems, are to be exalted to an odious 
 pre-eminence over the rest of their fellow citizens. At one time, 
 however, their elevation is to be a necessary consequence of the 
 smallness of the representative body ; at another time, it is to 
 bo effected by depriving the people at large of the opportunity 
 of exercising their right of suffrage in the choice of that body. 
 
 But upon what principle is the discrimination of the placch 
 of election to be made, in order to answer the purpose of the 
 meditated preference ? Are the wealthy and the well-born, as 
 they are called, confined to particular spots in the several 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 459 
 
 States ? Have they, by some miraculous instinct or foresight, 
 set apart in each of them, a common place of residence ? Are 
 they only to be met with in the towns and the cities ? Or are 
 they, on the contrary, scattered over the face of the country, 
 as avarice or chance may have happened to cast their own lot, 
 or that of their predecessors ? If the latter is the case, (as 
 every intelligent man knows it to be*) is it not evident that 
 the policy of confining the places of elections to particular 
 districts, would be as subversive of its own aim, as it would be 
 exceptionable on every other account ? The truth is, that there 
 is no method of securing to the rich the preference appre- 
 hended, but by prescribing qualifications of property either for 
 those who may elect, or be elected. But this forms no part of 
 the power to be conferred upon the national government. Its 
 authority would be expressly restricted to the regulation of 
 the times, the places, and the manner of elections. The qualifica- 
 tions of the persons who may choose or be chosen, as has been 
 remarked upon another occasion, are defined and fixed in the 
 constitution ; and are unalterable by the legislature. 
 
 Let it however be admitted, for argument sake, that the ex- 
 pedient suggested might be successful ; and let it at the same 
 time be equally taken for granted, that all the scruples which a 
 sense of duty, or an apprehension of the danger of the experi- 
 ment might inspire, were overcome in the breasts of the na- 
 tional rulers; still, I imagine, it will hardly be pretended, that 
 they could ever hope to carry such an enterprise into execution, 
 without the aid of a military force sufficient to subdue the 
 resistance of the great body of the people. The improbability 
 of the existence of a force equal to that object, has been dis- 
 cussed and demonstrated in different parts of these papers ; but 
 that the futility of the objection under consideration may ap- 
 pear in the strongest light, it shall be conceded for a moment, 
 that such a force might exist; and the national government 
 shall be supposed to be in the actual possession of it. What 
 will be the conclusion ? "With a disposition to invade the essen- 
 
 * Particularly in the southern states and in this state. 
 40 
 
460 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 tial rights of the community, and with the means of gratifying 
 that disposition, is it presumable that the persons who were 
 actuated by it would amuse themselves in the ridiculous task 
 of fabricating election laws for securing a preference to a 
 favourite class of men ? Would they not be likely to prefer a 
 conduct better adapted to their own immediate aggrandize- 
 ment ? Would they not rather boldly resolve to perpetuate 
 themselves in office by one decisive act of usurpation, than to 
 trust to precarious expedients, which, in spite of all the pre- 
 cautions that might accompany them, might terminate in the 
 dismission, disgrace, and ruin of their authors ? Would they 
 not fear that citizens not less tenacious than conscious of their 
 rights, would flock from the remotest extremes of their respec- 
 tive states to the places of election, to overthrow their tyrants, 
 and to substitute men who would be disposed to avenge the 
 violated majesty of the people ? ♦; 
 
 • PUBLIUB. 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 461 
 
 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 NUMBER I.Xl. 
 
 NEW YORK, FEBRUARY 26, 1788. 
 
 HAMILTON. 
 
 THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED, AND CONCLUDED. 
 
 The more candid opposers of the provision, contained in the 
 plan of the convention, respecting elections, when pressed in 
 argument, will sometimes concede the propriety of it; with 
 this qualification, however, that it ought to have been accom- 
 panied with a declaration, that all elections should be held in 
 the counties where the electors reside. This, say they, was a 
 necessary precaution against an abuse of the power. A declara- 
 tion of this nature, would certainly have been harmless : So far 
 as it would have had the effect of quieting apprehensions, it 
 might not have been undesirable. But it would, in fact, have 
 afforded little or no additional security against the danger 
 apprehended ; and the want of it will never be considered, by 
 an impartial and judicious examiner, as a serious, still less as 
 an insuperable, objection to the plan. The different views 
 taken of the subject in the two preceding papers, must be suffi- 
 cient to satisfy all dispassionate and discerning men, that if the 
 public liberty should ever be the victim of the ambition of the 
 national rulers, the power under examination, at least, will be 
 guiltless of the sacrifice. 
 
 If those who are inclined to consult their jealousy only, 
 would exercise it in a careful inspection of the several state 
 
462 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 constitutions, they would find little less room for disquietude 
 and alarm, from the latitude which most of them allow ia 
 respect to elections, than from that which is proposed to be 
 allowed to the national government in the same respect. A 
 review of their situation, in this particular, would tend greatly 
 to remove any ill impressions which may remain in regard to 
 this matter. But, as that review would lead into long and 
 tedious details, I shall content myself with the single example 
 of the state in which I write. The constitution of New-York 
 makes no other provision for locality of elections, than that the 
 members of the assembly" shall be elected in the counties ; those 
 of the senate, in the great districts into which the state is, or 
 may be divided : these at present are four in number, and com- 
 prehend each from two to six counties. It may readily be per- 
 ceived, that it would not be more difficult for the legislature of 
 New- York to defeat the suffrages of the citizens of New- York, 
 by confining elections to particular places, than for the legis- 
 lature of the United States to defeat the suffrages of the citi- 
 zens of the union, by the like expedient. Suppose, for instance, 
 the city of Albany was to be appointed the sole place of election 
 for the county and district of which it is a part, would not the 
 inhabitants of that city speedily become the only electors of 
 the members both of the senate and assembly for that county 
 and district ? Can we imagine, that the electors who reside in 
 the remote subdivisions of the counties of Albany, Saratoga, 
 Cambridge, &c. or in any part of the count}'' of Montgomery, 
 would take the trouble to come to the city of Albany, to give 
 their votes for members of the assembly or senate, sooner than 
 they would repair to the city of New- York, to participate in 
 the choice of the members of the federal house of representa- 
 tives ? The alarming indiffert nee discoverable in the exercise 
 of so invaluable a privilege under the existing laws, which 
 afford every facility to it, furnishes a ready answer to this 
 question. And, abstracted from any experience on the subject, 
 we can be at no loss to determine, that when the place of 
 election is at an inconvenient distance from the elector, the eftect 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 463 
 
 upon his conduct will be the same, whether that distance be 
 twenty miles, or twenty thousand miles. Hence it must appear, 
 that objections to the particular modification of the federal 
 power of regulating elections, will, in substance, apply with 
 equal force to the modification nf the like power in the consti- 
 tution of this state ; and for this reason it will be impossible to 
 acquit the one, and to condemn the other. A similar comparison 
 would lead to the same conclusion, in respect to the consti- 
 tutions of most of the other states. 
 
 If it should be said, that defects in the state constitutions 
 furnish no apology for those which are to be found in the plan 
 proposed; I answer, that, as the former have never been 
 thought chargeable with inattention to the security of liberty, 
 where the imputations thrown on the latter can be shown to be 
 applicable to them also, the presumption is, that they are 
 rather the cavilling refinements of a predetermined opposition, 
 *han the well founded inferences of a candid research after 
 
 ruth. To those who are disposed to consider, as innocent 
 omissions in the state constitutions, what they regard as unpar- 
 donable blemishes in the plan of the convention, nothing can 
 
 )e said; or, at most, they can only be asked to assign some 
 substantial reason why the representatives of the people, in a 
 single state, should be more impregnable to the lust of power, 
 or other sinister motives, than the representatives of the people 
 of the United States ? If they cannot do this, they ought, at 
 "east, to prove to us, that it is easier to subvert the liberties of 
 .hree millions of people, with the advantage of local govern- 
 nents to head their opposition, than of two hundred thousand 
 jeople who are destitute of that advantage. And in relation 
 :o the point immediately under consideration, they ought to 
 .onvince us that it is less probable that a predominant faction, 
 m a single state, should, in order to maintain its superiority, 
 incline to a preference of a particular class of electors, than 
 that a similar spirit should take possession of the representatives 
 of thirteen states, spread over a vast region, and in several 
 
464 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 respects dutinguishable from each other by a diversity of local 
 circumstances, prejudices, and interests. 
 
 Hitherto my observations have only aimed at a vindication 
 of the provision in question, on the ground of theoretic pro- 
 priety, on that of the danger of placing the power elsewhere, 
 and on that of the safety of placing it in the manner proposed. 
 But there remains to be mentioned a positive advantage, which 
 will accrue from this disposition, and which could not as well 
 have been obtained from any other : I allude to the circum- 
 Gtance of uniformity, in the time of elections for the federal 
 house of representatives. It is more than possible, that this 
 uniformity may be found by experience to be of great import- 
 ance to the public welfare ; both as a security against the per- 
 petuation of the same spirit in the body, and as a cure for the 
 diseases of faction. If each state may choose its own time of 
 election, it is possible there may be at least as many different 
 periods as there are months in the year. The times of election 
 in the several states, as they are now established for local pur- 
 poses, vary between extremes as wide as March and November. 
 The consequence of this diversity would be, that there could 
 never happen a total dissolution or renovation of the body at 
 one time. If an improper spirit of any kind should happen to 
 prevail in it, that spirit would be apt to infuse itself into the 
 new members, as they come forward in succession. The masb 
 would be likely to remain nearly the same ; assimilating con- 
 stantly to itself its gradual accretions. There is a contagion 
 m example, which few men have sufficient force of mind to 
 resist E am inclined to think, that treble the duration in 
 office, with the condition of a total dissolution of the body at 
 the same time, might be less formidable to liberty, than one 
 third of that duration subject to gradual and successive alter- 
 ations. 
 
 Uniformity, in the time of elections, seems not less requisite 
 for executing the idea of a regular rotation in the senate; and 
 for conveniently assembling the legislature at a stated period 
 in each year. 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 465 
 
 It may be asked, why then could not a time have Deen fixed 
 in the constitution? As the most zealous adversaries cf the 
 plan of the convention in this state, are in general not less 
 zealous admirers of the constitution of the state, the question 
 may be retorted, and it may be asked, why was not a time foi 
 the like purpose fixed in the constitution of this state ? No 
 better answer can be given, than that it was a matter which 
 might safely be intrusted to legislative discretion ; and that, if 
 a time had been appointed, it might, upon experiment, have 
 been found less convenient than some other time. The same 
 answer may be given to the question put on the other side. 
 And it may be added, that the supposed danger of a gradual 
 change being merely speculative, it would have been hardly 
 advisable upon that speculation to establish, as a fundamental 
 point, what would deprive several states of the convenience 
 of having the elections for their own governments, and for 
 the national government, at the same epoch. 
 
 PUBLIUB. 
 
466 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 NUMBER LXII. 
 
 NEW YORK, FEBRUARY 29, 1788. 
 
 HAMILTON. 
 
 ODNCERNING THE CONSTITUTION OF THE SENATE, WITH REGARD 
 TO THE QUALIFICATIONS OF THE MEMBERS; THE MANNER OF 
 APPOINTING THEM; THE EQUALITY OF REPRESENTATION; THE 
 NUMBER OF THE SENATORS, AND THE DURATION OF THEIR 
 APPOINTMENTS. 
 
 Having examined tne constitution of the house of representa- 
 tives, and answered such of the objections against it as seemed 
 to merit notice, I enter next on the examination of the senate. 
 
 The heads under which this member of the government may- 
 be considered, are — I. The qualifications of senators — II. The 
 appointment of them by the state legislatures — III. The 
 equality of representation in the senate — IV. The number 
 of senators, and the term for which they are to be elected 
 — y. The powers vested in the senate. 
 
 I. The qualifications proposed for senators, as distinguished 
 from those of representatives, consist in a more advanced age, 
 and a longer period of citizenship. A senator must be thirty 
 years of age at least; as a representative must be twenty-five 
 And the former must have been a citizen nine years ; as seven 
 years are required for the latter. The propriety of these dis- 
 tinctions, is explained by the nature of the senatorial trust; 
 which, requiring greater extent of information and stability of 
 character, requires at the same lime, that the senator should 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 467 
 
 have reached a period of life most likely to supply these advan- 
 tages; and which, participating immediately in transactions 
 with foreign nations, ought to be exercised by none, who are 
 not thoroughly weaned from the prepossessions and habits, 
 incident to foreign birth and education. The term of nine 
 years appears to be a prudent mediocrity between a total 
 exclusion of adopted citizens, whose merit and talents may 
 claim a share in the public confidence ; and an indiscriminate 
 and hasty admission of them, which might create a channel for 
 foreign influence on the national councils. 
 
 II. It is equally unnecessary to dilate on the appointment of 
 senators by the state legislatures. Among the various modes 
 which might have been devised for constituting this branch of 
 the government, that which has been proposed by the conven- 
 tion is probably the most congenial with the public opinion. 
 It is recommended by the double advantage of favouring a 
 select appointment, and of giving to the state governments 
 such an agency in the formation of the federal government, as 
 must secure the authority of the former, and may form a con- 
 venient link between the two systems. 
 
 III. The equality of representation in the senate is another 
 point, which, being evidently the result of compromise between 
 the opposite pretensions of the large and the small states, does 
 not call for much discussion. If indeed it be right, that among 
 a people thoroughly incorporated into one nation, every dis- 
 trict ought to have a pj'oportional share in the government : and 
 that among independent and sovereign states bound together 
 by a simple league, the parties, however unequal in size, ought 
 to have an equal share in the common councils, it does not ap- 
 pear to be without some reason, that in a compound republic, 
 pai'taking both of the national and federal character, the gov- 
 ernmeiit ought to be founded on a mixture of the principles of 
 proportional and equal representation. But it is superfluous to 
 try, by .the standard of theory, a part of the constitution which 
 IS allowed on all hands to be the result, not of theory, but " of 
 a spirit of amity, and that mutual deference and concession 
 
468 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 vvhicli i^hfe peculiarity of our political situation rendered indis 
 pensable." A common government, with powers equal to its 
 objects, is called for by the voice, and still more loudly by the 
 political situation, of America. A government founded on 
 principles more consonant to the wishes of the larger states, is 
 not likely to be obtained from the smaller states. The only 
 option then for the former, lies between the proposed govern- 
 ment, and a government still more objectionable. Under this 
 alternative, the advice of prudence must be, to embrace the 
 lesser evil; and, instead of indulging a fruitless anticipation 
 of the possible mischiefs which may ensue, to contemplate 
 rather the advantageous consequences which may qualify the 
 sacrifice. 
 
 In this spirit it may be remarked, that the equal vote allowed 
 to each state, is at once a constitutional recognition of the 
 portion of sovereignty remaining in the individual states, and 
 an instrument for preserving that residuary sovereignty. So 
 far the equality ought to be no less acceptable to the large than 
 to the small states ; since they are not less solicitous to guard 
 by every possible expedient against an improper consolidation 
 of the states into one simple republic. 
 
 Another advantage accruing from this ingredient in the con- 
 stitution of the senate is, the additional impediment it must 
 prove against improper acts of legislation. No law or resolu- 
 tion can now be passed without the concurrence, first, of a 
 majority of the people, and then, of a majority of the states. 
 It must be acknowledged that this complicated check on legis- 
 lation may, in some instances, be injurious as well as beneficial ; 
 and that the peculiar defence which it involves in favour of the 
 smaller states, would be more rational, if any interests common 
 to them, and distinct from those of the other states, would 
 otherwise be exposed to peculiar danger. But as the larger 
 states will always be able, by their power over the supplies, to 
 defeat unreasonable exertions of this prerogative of the lesser 
 states ; and as the facility and excess of law-making seem to be 
 the diseases to which our governments are most liable, it is not 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 46'9 
 
 impossible, that this part of the constitution may bo more con- 
 venient in practice, than it appears to many in contemplation. 
 
 iV. The number of senators, and the duration of their ap- 
 pointment, come next to be considered. In order to form an 
 accurate judgment on both these points, it will be proper to 
 inquire into the purposes which are to be answered by the 
 senate; and, in order to ascertain these, it will be necessary to 
 review the inconveniences which a republic must suffer fiom 
 the want of such an institution. 
 
 First. It is a misfortune incident to republican government, 
 though in a less degree than to other governments, that those 
 who administer it, may forget their obligations to their consti- 
 tuents, and prove unfaithful to their important trust. In this 
 point of view, a senate, as a second branch of the legislative 
 assembly, distinct from, and dividing the power with, a first, 
 must be in all cases a salutary check on the government. It 
 doubles the security to the people, by requiring the concurrence 
 of two distinct bodies in schemes of usurpation or perfidy, 
 where the ambition or corruption of one would otherwise be 
 sufficient. This is a precaution founded on such clear princi- 
 ples, and now so well understood in the United States, that it 
 would be more than superfluous to enlarge on it. I will barely 
 remark, that, as the improbability of sinister combinations will 
 be in proportion to the dissimilarity in the genius of the two 
 bodies, it must be politic to distinguish them from each other 
 by every circumstance which will consist with a due harmony 
 in all proper measures, and with the genuine principles of 
 republican government. 
 
 Second. The necessity of a senate is not less indicated by the 
 propensity of all single and numerous assemblies, to yield to 
 the impulse of sudden and violent passions, and to be seduced 
 by factious leaders into intemperate and pernicious resolutions. 
 Examples on this subject might be- cited without number; and 
 from proceedings within the United States, as well as from the 
 history of other nations. But a position that will not be con- 
 uadicted, need not be proved. All that need be remarked, is, 
 
470 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 that a bod} whicli is to correct this infirmity, ought itself to 
 be free from it, and consequently ought to be less numerous. 
 It ought moreover to possess great firmness, and consequently 
 ought to hold its authority by a tenure of considerable duration. 
 
 Third. Another defect to be supplied by a senate, lies in a 
 want of due acquaintance with the objects and principles of 
 legislation. It is not possible that an assembly of men, called, 
 for the most part, from pursuits of a private nature, coi tinued 
 in appointment for a short time, and led by no jDermanent 
 motive to devote the intervals of public occupation to a study 
 of the laws, the affairs, and the comprehensive interests of their 
 country, should, if left wholly to themselves, escape a variety 
 of important errors in the exercise of their legislative trust. 
 It may be affirmed, on the best grounds, that no small share 
 of the present embarrassments of America is to bo charged on 
 the blunders of our governments; and that these have pro- 
 ceeded from the heads, rather than the hearts of most of the 
 authors of them. What indeed are all the repealing, explain- 
 ing, and amending laws, which fill and disgrace our voluminous 
 codes, but so many monuments of deficient wisdom ; so many 
 impeachments exhibited by each succeeding, against each pre- 
 ceding, session ; so many admonitions to the people, of the 
 value of those aids, which may be expected from a well consti- 
 tuted senate ? 
 
 A good government implies two things ; first, fidelity to the 
 object of government, which is the happiness of the people; 
 secondly, a knowledge of the means by which that object can 
 be best attained. Some governments are deficient in both these 
 qualities : Most governments are deficient in the first. I scruple 
 not to assert, that, in the American governments, too little 
 attention has been paid to the last. The federal constitution 
 avoids this error : and what merits particular notice, it pro- 
 vides for the last in a mode which increases the security fo^ 
 the first. 
 
 Fourth. The mutability in the public councils, arising from a 
 rapid succession of new memVers, however qualified they may 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 471 
 
 l>c, points out, in tlie strongest manner, the necessity of some 
 stable institution in the government. Every new election in 
 ihe states, is found to change one half of the representatives 
 From this change of men must proceed a change of opinions j 
 and from a change of opinions, a change of measures. But a 
 continual change even of good measures is inconsistent with 
 every rule of jH-udence, and every prospect of success. The 
 remark is verified in private life, and becomes more just as well 
 as more important, in national transactions. 
 
 To trace the mischievous effects of a mutable government, 
 would fill a volume. 1 will hint a few only, each of which will 
 oe perceived to be a source of innumerable others. 
 
 In the first place, it forfeits the respect and confi«Jence of 
 other nations, and all the advantages connected with national 
 character. An individual who is observed to be inconstant to 
 his plans, or perhaps to carry on his affairs without any plan 
 at all, is marked at once by all prudent people, as a speedy 
 victim to his own unsteadiness and folly. His more friendly 
 neighbours may pity him, but all will decline to connect their 
 fortunes with his; and not a few will seize the opportunity of 
 making their fortunes out of his. One nation is to another, 
 what one individual is to another; with this melancholy dis- 
 tinction perhaps, that the former, with fewer of the benevolent 
 emotions than the latter, are under fewer restraints also from 
 taking undue advantage of the indiscretions of each other. 
 Every nation, consequently, whose affairs betray a want of 
 wisdom and stability, may calculate on every loss which can 
 be sustained from the more systematic policy of its wisei 
 neighbours. But the best instruction on this subject is un- 
 happily conveyed to America by the example of her own 
 situation. She finds that she is held in no respect by her 
 friends ; that she is the derision of her enemies ; and that she 
 IS a prey to every nation which has an interest in speculating 
 on her fluctuating councils and embarrassed affairs. 
 
 The internal effects of a mutable policy are still more 
 
472 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 calamitous. It poisons the blessings of liberty itself. It will 
 be of little avail to the people, that the laws are made by men 
 of their own choice, if the laws be so voluminous that they 
 cannot be read, or so incoherent that they cannot be under- 
 stood : if they be repealed or revised before they are promulged, 
 or undergo such incessant changes, that no man who knows 
 what the law is to-day, can guess what it will be to-morrow. 
 Law is defined to be a rule of action ; but how can that be a 
 rule, which is little known and less fixed ? 
 
 Another effect of public instability, is the unreasonable 
 advantage it gives to the sagacious, the enterprising, and the 
 monied few, over the industrious and uninformed mass of the 
 people. Every new regulation concerning commerce or reve- 
 nue, or in any manner affecting the value of the different 
 species of property, presents a new harvest to those who watch 
 the change, and can trace its consequences ; a harvest, reared 
 not by themselves, but by the toils and cares of the great body 
 of their fellow citizens. This is a state of things in which it 
 may be said, with some truth, that laws are made for the few, 
 not for the rtuiny. 
 
 In another point of view, great injury results from an 
 anstable government. The want of confidence in the public 
 councils, damps every useful undertaking; the success and 
 profit of which may depend on a continuance of existing 
 arrangements. What prudent merchant will hazard his for- 
 tunes in any new branch of commerce, when he knows not but 
 that his plans may bo rendered unlawful before they can be 
 executed ? What farmer or manufacturer, will lay himself out 
 for the encouragement given to any particular cultivation or 
 establishment, when he can have no assurance, that his pre- 
 paratory labours and advances will not render him a victim 
 to an inconstant government ? In a word, no great improve- 
 ment or laudable enterprise can go forward, which requires the 
 auspices of a steady system of national policy. 
 
 But the most deplorable effect of all, is that diminn\ion of 
 
THE FEDERALIST, 473 
 
 attachment and reverence, which steals into the hearts of the 
 people, towards a political system which betrays so many 
 marks of infirmity, and disappoints so many of their flattering 
 hopes. No government, any more than an individual, will long 
 be respectei, without being truly respectable; nor be truly 
 respectable, without possessing a certain portion of order and 
 Htability. 
 
 PUBLIUS. 
 
474 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 NUMBER LXTII. 
 
 NEW YORK, MARCH 7, 1788. 
 
 HAMILTON. 
 
 A FURTHER VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE SENATE, IN 
 REGARD TO THE DURATION OF THE APPOINTMENT OF ITS MEM- 
 BERS. 
 
 A FIFTH desideratum, illustrating the utility of a senate, is 
 the want of a due sense of national character. Without a 
 select and stable member of the government, the esteem of 
 foreign powers will not only be forfeited by an unenlightened 
 and variable policy, proceeding from the causes already men- 
 tioned; but the national councils will not possess that sensi- 
 bility to the opinion of the world, which is perhaps not less 
 necessary in order to merit, than it is to obtain, its respect and 
 confidence. 
 
 An attention to the judgment of other nations, is important 
 to every government, for two reasons : The one is, that, inde- 
 pendently of the merits of any particular plan or measure, it is 
 desirable on various accounts, that it should appear to other 
 nations as the offspring of a wise and honourable policy : The 
 second is, that in doubtful cases, particularly where the national 
 councils may be warped by some strong passion, or momentary 
 interest, the presumed or known opinion of the impartial 
 world, may be the best guide that can be followed. What has 
 not America lost with foreign nations by her want of character? 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 476 
 
 And how many errors and follies ■would she not have avoided, 
 if the justice and propriety of her measures had, in every in- 
 stance, been previously tried by the light in which they would 
 probably appear to the unbiassed part of mankind. 
 
 Yet however requisite a sense of national character may be, 
 it is evident that it can never be sufficiently possessed by a 
 numerous and changeable body. It can only be found in a 
 number so small, that a sensible degree of the praise and blame 
 of public measures, may be the portion of each individual ; or 
 in an assembly so durably invested with public trust, that the 
 pride and consequence of its members may be sensibly incor- 
 porated with the reputation and prosperity of the community. 
 The half-yearly representatives of Ehode-Island, would pro- 
 bably have been little affected in their deliberations on the 
 iniquitous measures of that state, by arguments drawn from 
 the light m which such measures would be viewed by foreign 
 nations, or even by the sister states; whilst it can scarcely be 
 doubted, that if the concurrence of a select and stable body 
 had been necessary, a regard to national character alone, would 
 have prevented the calamities under which that misguided 
 jteople is now labouring. 
 
 I add, as a sixth defect, the want in some important cases of 
 a due responsibility in the government to the people, arising 
 from that frequency of elections, which in other cases produces 
 this responsibility. The remark will, perhaps, appear not only 
 ucw, but paradoxical. It must nevertheless be acknowledged, 
 when explained, to be as undeniable as it is important. 
 
 Kesponsibility, in order to be reasonable, must be limited to 
 objects within the power of the responsible party; and in order 
 to be effectual, must relate to operations of that power, of 
 which a ready and proper judgment can be formed by the con- 
 ritituents. The objects of government may be divided into two 
 general classes; the one depending on measures, which have 
 .singly an immediate and sensible operation; the other depend- 
 ing on a succession of well chosen and well connected measures, 
 which have a gradual and perhaps unobserved operation. Th« 
 
 41 
 
476 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 importance of the latter description to the collective and per- 
 manent welfare of every country, needs no explanation. And 
 yet it is evident, that an assembly elected for so short a term 
 as to be unable to provide more than one or tw^o links in a 
 chain of measures, on which the general welfare may essen- 
 tially depend, ought not to be answerable for the final result, 
 any more "than a steward or tenant, engaged for one year, 
 could be justly made to answer for plans or improvements, 
 which could not be accomplished in less than half a dozen 
 years. Nor is it possible for the people to estimate the share 
 of influence, which their annual assemblies may respectively 
 have on events resulting from the mixed transactions of several 
 years. It is sufficiently difficult, at any rate, to preserve a per- 
 sonal responsibility in the members of a numerous body, for such 
 acts of the body as have an immediate, detached, and palpable 
 operation on its constituents. 
 
 The proper remedy for this defect, must be an additional 
 body in the legislative department, which, having sufficient 
 permanency to provide for such objects as require a continued 
 attention, and a train of measures, may be justly and effectually 
 answerable for the attainment of those objects. 
 
 Thus far I have considered the circumstances, which point 
 out the necessity of a well constructed senate, only as they 
 relate to the representatives of the people. To a people as 
 little blinded by prejudice, or corrupted by flattery, as those 
 whom I address, I shall not scruple to add, that such an insti- 
 tution may be sometimes necessary, as a defence to the people 
 against their own temporary errors and delusions. As the cool 
 and deliberate sense of the community ought, in all govern- 
 ments, and actually will, in all free governments, ultimatel}- 
 prevail over the views of its rulers; so there are particular 
 moments in public affairs, when the people, stimulated by some 
 irregular passion, or some illicit advantage, or misled by the 
 artful misrepresentations of interested men, may call for mea- 
 flures which they themselves will afterwards be the most ready 
 to lament and condemn. In these critical moments, bow salu' 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 477 
 
 tary will be the interference of some temperate and respectable 
 body of citizens, in order to check the misguided career, and 
 to suspend the blow meditated by the people against them- 
 selves, until reason, justice, and truth, can regain their authority 
 over the public mind ? What bitter anguish would not the 
 people of Athens have often avoided, if their government had 
 contained so provident a safeguard, against the tyranny of 
 their own passions ? Popular liberty, might then have escaped 
 the indelible reproach, of decreeing to the same citizens, the 
 hemlock on one day, and statues on the next. 
 
 It may be suggested, that a people spread over an extensive 
 region, cannot, like the crowded inhabitants of a small district, 
 be subject to the infection of violent passions; or to the danger 
 of combining in the pursuit of unjust measures. I am far from 
 denying, that this is a distinction of peculiar importance. 1 
 have, on the contrary, endeavoured in a former paper to show, 
 that it is one of the principal recommendations of a confederated 
 republic. At the same time, this advantage ought not to be 
 considered, as superseding the use of auxiliary precautions. 
 It may even be remarked, that the same extended situation, 
 which will exempt the people of America from some of the 
 dangers incident to lesser republics, will expose them to the 
 inconveniency of remaining for a longer time, under the 
 inifluence of those misrepresentations which the combined 
 industry of interested men may succeed in distributing among 
 them. 
 
 It adds no small weight to all these considerations, to 
 recollect, that history informs us of no long-lived republic, 
 which had not a senate. Sparta, Eome, and Carthage, are, in 
 fact, the only states to whom that character can be applied. 
 In each of the two first, there was a senate for life. The con- 
 stitution of the senate in the last, is less known. Circumstantial 
 evidence makes it probable, that it was not different in this 
 particular from the two others. It is at least certain, that it 
 had some quality or other, which rendered it an anchor against 
 popular fluctuations ; and that a smaller council, drawn out of 
 
478 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 the senate, was appointed not only for life, but filled up vacan- 
 cies itself. These examples, though as unfit for the imitation, 
 as they are repugnant to the genius, of America, are, notwith- 
 standing, when compared with the fugitive and turbulent 
 existence of other ancient republics, very instructive proofs 
 of the necessity of some institution, that will blend stability 
 with liberty. I am not unaware of the circumstances which 
 distinguish the American, from other popular governments, as 
 well ancient as modern ; and which render extreme circum- 
 spection necessary, in reasoning from the one case to the 
 other. But after allowing due weight to this consideration, it 
 may still be maintained, that there are many points of simili- 
 tude, which render these examples not unworthy of our atten- 
 tion. Many of the defects, as we have seen, which can only be 
 supplied by a senatorial institution, are common to a numerous 
 assembly frequently elected by the people, and to the people 
 themselves. There are others peculiar to the former, which 
 require the control of such an institution. The people can 
 never wilfully betray their own interests : but they may possi- 
 bly be betrayed by their representatives, and the danger will 
 be evidently greater, where the whole legislative trust is lodged 
 in the hands of one body of men, than where the concurrence 
 of separate and dissimilar bodies is required in every public act. 
 The difference most relied on, between the American, and 
 other republics, consists in the principle of representation, 
 which is the pivot on which the former move, and which is 
 supposed to have been unknown to Iht latter, or at least to the 
 ancient part of them. The use which has been made of this 
 difference, in reasonings contained in former papers, will have 
 shown that I am disposed neither to deny its existence, nor to 
 undervalue its importance. I feel the less restraint therefore 
 in observing, that the position concerning the ignorance of the 
 ancient governments on the subject of representation, is by no 
 means precisely true, in the latitude commonly given to it 
 Without entering into a disquisition which would here be 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 479 
 
 misplaced, I will refer to a few known facts in support of what 
 I advance. 
 
 In the most pure democracies of Greece, many of the execu- 
 tive functions were performed, not by the people themselves, 
 but by oflScers elected by the people, and representing them in 
 their executive capacity. 
 
 Prior to the reform of Solon, Athens was governed by nine 
 archons, annually elected by the people at large. The degree of 
 power delegated to them, seems to be left in great obscurity. 
 Subsequent to that period we find an assembly, first of four, 
 and afterwards of six hundred members, annually elected by the 
 people ; and partially representing them in their legislative capa- 
 city, since they were not only associated with the people in the 
 function of making laws, but had the exclusive right of origi- 
 nating legislative propositions to the people. The senate of 
 Carthage, also, whatever might be its power, or the duration 
 of its appointment, appears to have been elective by the suf- 
 frages of the people. Similar instances might be traced in 
 Host, if not all the popular governments of antiquity. 
 
 Lastly, in Sparta we meet with the Ephori, and in Eome 
 with the Tribunes; two bodies, small indeed in number, but 
 annually elected by the whole body of the people, and considered as 
 the representatives of the people, almost in their plenipotentiary 
 capacity. The Cosmi of Crete were also annually elected by the 
 people ; and have been considered by some authors as an insti- 
 tution analagous to those of Sparta and Rome, with this differ- 
 ence only, that in the election of that representative body, the 
 right of suffrage was communicated to a part only of the people. 
 
 From these facts, to which many others might be added, it is 
 clear, that the principle of representation was neither unknown 
 to the ancients, nor wholly overlooked in their political consti- 
 tutions. The true distinction between these, and tl^e American 
 governments, lies in the total exclusion of the people in their collec- 
 tive capacity from any share in the latter, and not in the total 
 exclusion of the representatives of the people from the administration 
 of the former. The distinction, however, thus qualified, must 
 
480 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 be a Iniitted to leave a most advantageous superiority, in favour 
 of tho Uoited States. But to insure to this advantage its full 
 effect, we must be careful not to separate it from the other 
 advantage, of an extensive territory. For it cannot be believed 
 that any form of representative government, could have suc- 
 ceeded within the narrow limits occupied by the democracies 
 of Greece. 
 
 In answer to all these arguments, suggested by reasoji, illus- 
 trated by examples, and enforced by our own experience, the 
 jealous adversary of the constitution will probably content 
 himself with repeating, that a senate appointed not imme- 
 diately by the people, and for the term of six years, must 
 gradually acquire a dangerous pre-eminence in the government, 
 and finally transform it into a tyrannical aristocracy. 
 
 To this general answer, the general reply ought to be suffi- 
 cient ; that liberty may be endangered by the abuses of liberty, 
 as well as by the abuses of power; that there are numerous 
 instances of the former, as well as of the latter ; and that the 
 former, rather than the latter, is apparently most to be appre- 
 hended by the United States. But a more particular reply may 
 be given. 
 
 Before such a revolution can be effected, the senate, it is to 
 be observed, must in the first place, corrupt itself; must next 
 corrupt the state legislatures ; must then corrupt the house of 
 representatives ; and must finally corrupt the people at large. 
 It is evident, that the senate must be first corrupted, before it 
 can attempt an establishment of tyranny. Without corrupting 
 the legislatures, it cannot prosecute the attempt, because the 
 periodical change of members would otherwise regenerate the 
 whole body. "Without exerting the means of corruption with 
 equal success on the house of representatives, the opposition of 
 that co-equal branch of the government, would inevitably de- 
 feat the attempt; and without corrupting the people them- 
 selves, a succession of new representatives would speedily 
 restore all things to their pristine order. Is there any man 
 who can seriously persuade himself, that the proposed senate 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 481 
 
 can, by any possible means within the compass of human ad- 
 dress, arrive at the object of a lawless ambition, through al) 
 these obstructions? 
 
 If reason condemns the suspicion, the same sentence is pro- 
 nounced by experience. The constitution of Maryland, fur- 
 nishes the most apposite example. The senate of that state is 
 elected, as the federal senate will be, indirectly by the people ; 
 and for a term less by one year only, than the federal senate. 
 It is distinguished, also, by the remarkable prerogative of filling 
 up its own vacancies within the term of its appointment; and, 
 at the same time, is not under the control of any such rotation 
 as is provided for the federal senate. There are some other 
 lesser distinctions, which would expose the former to colourable 
 objections, that do not lie against the latter. If the federal 
 senate, therefore, really contained the danger which has been 
 so loudly proclaimed, some sy«iptoms at least of a like danger, 
 ought by this time to have been betrayed by the senate of 
 Maryland ; but no such symptoms have appeared. On the con- 
 trary, the jealousies at first entertained by men of the same 
 description with those who view w*ith terror the correspondent 
 part of the federal constitution, have been gradually Extin- 
 guished by the progress of the experiment; and the Maryland 
 constitution is daily deriving from the salutary operation of 
 this part of it, a reputation in which it will probably not be 
 rivalled by that of any state in the union. 
 
 But if any thing could silence the jealousies on this subject, 
 it ought to be the British example. The senate there, instead 
 of being elected for a term of six years, and of being uncon- 
 fined to particular families or fortunes, is an hereditary assem- 
 bly- of opulent nobles. The house of representatives, instead 
 of being elected for two years, and by the whole body of the 
 people, is elected for seven years : and in a very great propor- 
 tion, by a verj' small propoi'tion of the people. Here, unques- 
 tionably, ought to be seen in full display, the aristocratic 
 usurpations and tyranny, which are at some future period to be 
 exen\plified in the United States. Unfortunately, however, for 
 the anti-federal argument, the British history informs us, thai 
 
482 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 this hereditary' assembly has not even been able to defend 
 itself against the continual encroachments of the house of 
 representatives ; and that it no sooner lost the support of the 
 monarch, than it was actually" crushed by the weight of the 
 popular branch. 
 
 As far as antiquity can instruct us on this subject, its ex- 
 amples support the reasoning which we have employed. In 
 Sparta the Ephori, the annual representatives of the people, 
 were found an overmatch for the senate for life ; continually 
 gained on its authority, and finally drew all power into their 
 own hands. The tribunes of Eome, who were the representa- 
 tives of the people, prevailed, it is well known, in almost every 
 contest with the senate for life, and in the end gained the most 
 complete triumph over it. This fact is the more remarkable, as 
 unanimity was required in every act of the tribunes, even after 
 their number was augmented to ten. It proves the irresistible 
 force possessed by that branch of a free government, which has 
 the people on its side. To these examples might be added that 
 of Carthage, whose senate, according to the testimony of Poly- 
 bius, instead of drawing all power into its vortex, had, at the 
 commtencement of the second punic war, lost almost the whole 
 of its original portion. 
 
 Besides the conclusive evidence resulting from this assem- 
 blage of facts, that the federal senate will never be able to 
 transform itself, by gradual usurpations, into an independent 
 and aristocratic body; we are warranted in believing, that if 
 such a revolution should ever happen from causes which the 
 foresight of man cannot guard against, the house of repre- 
 sentatives with the people on their side, will at all times be 
 able to bring back the constitution to its primitive form and 
 principles. Against the force of the immediate representatives 
 of the people, nothing will be able to maintain even the con- 
 stitutional authority of the senate, but such a display of enlight- 
 ened policy, and attachment to the public good, as will divide 
 with that branch of the legislature, the affections and suppori 
 of the entire body of the people themselves. 
 
 PUBLIUS. 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 483 
 
 THE FEDERALIST 
 
 NUMBER LXIV. 
 
 NEW YORK, MARCH 7, 1788. 
 
 JAY. 
 
 A FURTHER VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE SENATE, IN 
 REGARD TO THE POWER OF MAKING TREATIES. 
 
 It is a just, and not a new observation, that enemies to par- 
 ticular persons, and opponents to particular measures, seldom 
 confine their censures to such things only in either, as are 
 worthy of blame. Unless on this principle, it is difficult to 
 explain the motives of their conduct, who condemn the pro- 
 posed constitution in the aggregate, and treat with severity 
 some of the most unexceptionable articles in it. 
 
 The 2d section gives power to the president, " by and with the 
 advice and consent of the senate^ to make treaties, provided two 
 
 THIRDS of the SENATORS PRESENT CONCUR." 
 
 The power of making treaties is an important one, especially 
 as it relates to war, peace, and commerce ; and it should not be 
 delegated but in such a mode, and with such precautions, as 
 will afford the highest security, that it will be exercised by 
 men the best qualified for the purpose, and in a manner most 
 conducive to the public good. The convention appear to have 
 been attentive to both these points — they have directed the 
 president to be chosen by select bodies of electors, to be deputed 
 by the people for that express purpose; and they have com- 
 mitted the appointment of senators to the state legislatures 
 
iS4 IHB FEDERALIST. 
 
 This mode has, in such cases, vastly the advantage of elections 
 by tl.e people in their collective capacity, where the activity of 
 party zeal, taking advantage of the supineness, the ignorance, 
 the hopes, and fears of the unwary and interested, often places 
 men in office, by the votes of a small proportion of the electors. 
 
 As the select assemblies for choosing the president, as well as 
 the state legislatures who appoint the senators, will, in general, 
 be composed of the most enlightened and respectable citizen? 
 there is reason to presume, that their attention and their votes 
 will be directed to those men only who have become the most 
 distinguished by their abilities and virtue, and in whom the 
 people perceive just grounds for confidence. The constitution 
 manifests very particular attention to this object. By excluding 
 men under thirty-five from the first office, and those under 
 thirty from the second, it confines the elections to men of whom 
 the people have had time to form a judgment, and with respect 
 to whom they will not be liable to be deceived by those brilliant 
 appearances of genius and patriotism, which, like transient 
 meteors, sometimes mislead as well as dazzle. If the observa- 
 tion be well founded, that wise kings will always be served by 
 able ministers, it is fair to argue that, as an assembly of select 
 electors possess, in a greater degree than kings, the means of 
 extensive and accurate information relative to men and charac- 
 ters, so will their appointments bear at least equal marks of 
 discretion and discernment. The inference which naturally 
 results from these considerations is this, that the president and 
 senators so chosen, will always be of the number of those who 
 best understand our national interests, whether considered in 
 relation to the several states or to foreign nations, who are 
 best able to promote those interests, and whose reputation for 
 integrity inspires and merits confidence. With such men the 
 power of making treaties may be safely lodged. 
 
 Although the absolute necessity of system, in the conduct of 
 any business, is universally known and acknowledged, yet the 
 high importance of it in national affairs, has not yet become 
 8nfficiently impressed on the public mind. They who wish to 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 486 
 
 commit the power under consideration to a ))opular assembly, 
 composed of members constantly coming and going in quick 
 succession, seem not to recollect that such a body must neces- 
 sarily be inadequate to the attainment of those great objects, 
 which require to be steadily contemplated in all their relations 
 and circumstances, and which can only be appi*oached and 
 achieved by measures, which not only talents, but also exact 
 information, and often much time, are necessary to concert and 
 to execute. It was wise, therefore, in the convention to pro- 
 vide, not only that the power of making treaties should be 
 committed to able and honest men, but also that they should 
 continue in place a sufficient time to become perfectly acquainted 
 with our national concerns, and to form and introduce a system 
 for the management of them. The duration prescribed, is such 
 as will give them an opportunity of greatly extending their 
 political information, and of rendering their accumulating ex- 
 perience more and more beneficial to their country. Nor has 
 the convention discovered less prudence in providing for the 
 frequent elections of senators in such a way, as to obviate the 
 inconvenience of periodically transferring those great affairs 
 entirely to new men — for, by leaving a considerable residue of 
 the old ones in place, uniformity and order, as well as a con- 
 stant succession of official information, will be preserved. 
 
 There are few who will not admit, that the affairs of trade 
 and navigation should be regulated by a system cautiously 
 formed and steadily pursued ; and that both our treaties and 
 our laws should correspond with, and be made to promote it. 
 It is of much consequence that this correspondence and con- 
 formity be carefully maintained, and they who assent to the 
 truth of this position, will see and confess that it is well pro- 
 vided for, by making the concurrence of the senate necessary, 
 both to treaties and to laws. 
 
 It seldom happens in the negociation of treaties, of whatever 
 nature, but that perfect secrecy and immediate dispatch are 
 sometimes requisite. There are cases where the most useful 
 intelligence ma}* be obtained, if the persons possessing it can 
 
i86 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 be relieved from apprehensions of discovery. Those apprehen- 
 sions will operate on those persons, whether they are actuated 
 by mercenary or friendly motives; and there doubtless are 
 many of both descriptions, who would rely on the secrecy of 
 the president, but who would not confide in that of the senate, 
 and still less in that of a large popular assembly. The conven- 
 tion have done well, therefore, in so disposing of the power of 
 making treaties, that although the president must, in forming 
 them, act by the advice and consent of the senate, yet he will 
 be able to manage the business of intelligence in such a manner 
 as prudence may suggest. 
 
 They who have turned their attention to the aflPiairs of men, 
 must have perceived that there are tides in them ; tides, very 
 irregular in their duration, strength, and direction, and seldom 
 found to run twice exactly in the same manner or measure. 
 To discern and to profit by these tides in national affairs, is the 
 business of those who preside ovei 'hem; and they who have 
 had much experience on this head inform us, that there fre- 
 quently are occasions when days, nay, even when hours, are 
 precious. The loss of a battle, the death of a prince, the 
 removal of a minister, or other circumstances intervening to 
 change the present posture and aspect of affairs, may turn the 
 most favourable tide into a course opposite to our wishes. As 
 in the field, so in the cabinet, there are moments to be seized 
 as they pass, and they who preside in either, should be left in 
 capacity to approve them. So often and so essentially have we 
 heretofore suffered, from the want of secrecy and dispatch, 
 that the constitution would have been inexcusably defective, 
 if no attention had been paid to those objects. The matters 
 which in negociations usually require the most secrecy, and the 
 most dispatch, are those preparatory and auxiliary measures, 
 which are no otherways important in a national view, than 
 as they tend to facilitate the attainment of the main objects. 
 For these the president will find no difiiculty to provide ; and 
 should any circumstance occur, which requires the advice and 
 consent of the senate, he may at any time convene them. Thus 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 487 
 
 we see, that the constitution provides that our negociations for 
 treaties shall have every advantage which can be derived from 
 talents, information, integrit}', and deliberate investigation, on 
 the one hand; and from secrecy and dispatch, on the other. 
 
 But to this plan, as to most others that have ever appeared, 
 objections are contrived and urged. 
 
 Some are displeased with it, not on account of any errors oi 
 defects in it, but because, as the treaties, when made, are tc 
 have the force of laws, they should be made only by men 
 invested with legislative authority. These gentlemen seem 
 not to consider that the judgments of our courts, and the 
 commissions constitutionally given by our governor, are as 
 valid and as binding on all persons whom they concern, as the 
 laws passed by our legislature. All constitutional acts of 
 power, whether in the executive or in the judicial department. 
 have as much legal validity and obligation as if they proceeded 
 from the legislature, and therefore, whatever name be given to 
 the power of making treaties, or however obligatory they may 
 be when made, certain it is, that the people may, with much 
 propriety, commit the power to a distinct body from the legis- 
 lature, the executive, or the judicial. It surely does not follow, 
 that because they have given the power of making laws to the 
 legislature, that therefore they should likewise give them power 
 to do every other act of sovereignty, by which the citizens are 
 to be bound and affected. 
 
 Others, though content that treaties should be made in the 
 mode proposed, are averse to their being the supreme law of the 
 land. They insist, and profess to believe, that treaties, like 
 acts of assembly, should be repealable at pleasure. This idea 
 seems to be new and peculiar to this country, but new errors, 
 as well as new truths, often appear These gentlemen would 
 do well to reflect, that a treaty is only another name for a 
 bargain; and that it would be impossible to find a nation who 
 would make any bargain with us, which should be binding on 
 them absolutely, but on us only so long and so far as we may 
 think proper to be bound by it. They who make laws, may 
 
i88 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 without doubt, amend or repeal them, and it will not be dis- 
 puted that they who make treaties, may alter or cancel them; 
 but still let us not forget, that treaties are made not by one 
 only of the contracting parties, but by both ; and consequently, 
 that as the consent of both was essential to their formation at 
 first, so must it ever afterwards be to alter or cancel them. 
 The proposed constitution, therefore, has not in the least 
 extended the obligation of treaties. They are just as binding, 
 and just as far beyond the lawful reach of legislative acts now, 
 as they will be at any future period, or under any form of 
 government. 
 
 However useful jealousy may be in republics, yet when, like 
 bile in the natural, it abounds too much in the body politic; 
 the eyes of both become very liable to be deceived, by the 
 delusive appearances which that malady casts on surrounding 
 objects. From this cause, probably, proceed the fears and 
 apprehensions of some, that the president and senate may make 
 treaties without an equal eye to the interests of all the states. 
 Others suspect, that the two-thirds will oppress the remaining 
 third, and ask, whether those gentlemen are made sufficiently 
 responsible for their conduct; whether, if they act corruptly, 
 they can be punished? and if they make disadvantageous 
 treaties, how are we to get rid of those treaties ? 
 
 As all the states are equally represented in the senate, and 
 by men the most able and the most willing to promote the 
 interest of their constituents, they will all have an equal degree 
 of influence in that body, especially while they continue to be 
 careful in appointing proper persons, and to insist on their 
 punctual attendance. In proportion as the United States assume 
 a national form, and a national character, so will the good of 
 the whole be more and more an object of attention; and the 
 government must be a weak one indeed, if it should forget, 
 that the good of the whole can only be promoted, by advancing 
 the good of each of the parts or members which compose the 
 whole. It will not be in the power of the president ar d senate 
 to make any treaties, by which they, and their families and 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 489 
 
 estates, will not be equally bound and affected with the rest of 
 the community 3 and having no private interest distinct from 
 that of the nation, they will be under no temptations to neglect 
 the latter. 
 
 As to corruption, the case is not supposeable. He must either 
 have been very unfortunate in his intercourse with the world, 
 or possess a heart very susceptible of such impressions, who 
 can think it probable, that the president and two-thirds of the 
 senate, will ever be capable of such unworthy conduct. The 
 idea is too gross, and too invidious to be entertained. But if 
 such a case should ever happen, the treaty so obtained from ue 
 would, like all other fraudulent contracts, be null and void by 
 the law of nations. 
 
 With respect to their responsibility, it is difficult to conceive 
 how it could be increased. Every consideration that can in- 
 fluence the human mind, such as honour, oaths, reputation, 
 conscience, the love of country, family affections and attach- 
 ments, afford security for their fidelity. In short, as the con- 
 stitution has taken the utmost care that they shall be men of 
 talents and integrity, we have reason to be persuaded, that the 
 treaties they make will be as advantageous as, all circumstances 
 considered, could be made ; and so far as the fear of punishment 
 and disgrace can operate, that motive to good behaviour is 
 amply afforded by the article or the subject of impeachments. 
 
 PUBLIUS 
 
490 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 NUMBER LXV. 
 
 NEW YORK, MARCH 7, 1788. 
 
 HAMILTON. 
 
 A FURTHER VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE SENATE, IN 
 RELATION TO ITS CAPACITY, AS A COURT FOR THE TRIAL OF 
 IMPEACHMENTS. 
 
 The remaiuing powers which the plan of the convention 
 allots to the senate, in a distinct capacity, are comprised in 
 their participation with the executive in the appointment to 
 offices, and in their judicial character as a court for the trial 
 of impeachments. As in the business of appointments, the 
 executive will be the principal agent, the provisions relating 
 to it, will most properly be discussed in the examination of 
 tnat department. We will therefore conclude this head, with 
 a view of the judicial character of the senate. 
 
 A well constituted court for the trial of impeachments, is an 
 object not more to be desired, than difficult to be obtained in a 
 government wholly elective. The subjects of its jurisdiction are 
 those offences which proceed from the misconduct of public men, 
 or in other words, from the abuse or violation of some public 
 trust. They are of a nature which may with peculiar propriety 
 be denominated political, as they relate chiefly to injuries done 
 immediately to the society itself. The prosecution of them, 
 for this reason, will seldom fail to agitate the passions of the 
 whole community, and to divide it into parties, more or less 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 491 
 
 friendly, or inimical, to the accused. In many eases, it will 
 connect itself with the pre-existing factions, and will enlist all 
 their animosities, partialities, influence, and interest on one 
 side, or on the other; and in such cases there will always be 
 the greatest danger, that the decision will be regulated more 
 by the comparative strength of parties, than by the real 
 demonstrations of innocence or guilt. 
 
 The delicacy and magnitude of a trust, which so deeply 
 concerns the political reputation and existence of every man 
 engaged in the administration of public afliairs, speak for 
 themselves. The difliculty of placing it rightly in a govern- 
 ment resting entirely on the basis of periodical elections, will 
 as readily be perceived, When it is considered that the most 
 conspicuous characters in it will, from that circumstance, be 
 too often the leaders, or the tools of the most cunning or the 
 most numerous faction; and on this account, can hardly be 
 expected to possess the requisite neutrality towards those 
 whose conduct may be the subject of scrutiny. 
 
 The convention, it appears, thought the senate the most fit 
 depository of this important trust. Those who can best dis- 
 cern the intrinsic diflBlculty of the thing, will be least hasty iu 
 condemning that opinion ; and will be most inclined to allow 
 due weight to the arguments, which may be supposed to have 
 produced it. 
 
 "What, it may be asked, is the true spirit of the institution 
 itself 1* Is it not designed as a method of national inquest 
 into the conduct of public men ? If this be the design of it, 
 who can so properly be the inquisitors for the nation, as the 
 representatives of the nation themselves ? It is not disputed 
 that the power of originating the inquiry, or in other words, 
 of preferring the impeachment, ought to be lodged in the hands 
 of one branch of the legislative body; will not the reasons 
 which indicate the propriety of this arrangement, strongly 
 plead for an admission of the other branch of that body to a 
 share of the inquiry ? The model, from which the idea of this 
 institution has been borrowed, pointed out that course to the 
 
 42 
 
492 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 uonvention. In Great Britain, it is the province of the house 
 of commons to prefer the impeachment ; and of the house of 
 lords to decide upon it. Several of the state constitutions have 
 followed the example. As well the latter, as the former, seem 
 to have regarded the practice of impeachments, as a bridle in 
 the hands of the legislative body, upon the executive servants 
 of the government. Is not this the true light in which it 
 ought to be regarded ? 
 
 Where else, than in the senate, could have been found a 
 tribunal suflficiently dignified, or sufiiciently independent? 
 "What other body would be likely to feel confidence enough in its 
 own situation, to preserve unawed and uninfluenced, the neces- 
 sary impartiality between an individual accused, and the repre- 
 sentatives of the people, his accusers ? 
 
 Could the supreme court have been relied upon as answering 
 this description ? It is much to be doubted whether the mem- 
 bers of that tribunal would, at all times, be endowed, with so 
 eminent a portion of fortitude, as would be called for in the 
 execution of so difficult a task; and it is still more to be 
 doubted, whether they would possess the degree of credit and 
 authority, which might, on certain occasions, be indispensable 
 towards reconciling the people to a decision that should happen 
 to clash with an accusation, brought by their immediate repre- 
 sentatives. A deficiency in the first, would be fatal to the 
 iaccused ; in the last, dangerous to the public tranquillity. The 
 hazard in both these respects could only be avoided, if at all, 
 by rendering that tribunal more numerous than would consist 
 with a reasonable attention to economy. The necessity of a 
 numerous court for the trial of impeachments, is equally dictated 
 by the nature of the proceeding. This can never be tied down 
 by such strict rules, either in the delineation of the offence by 
 the prosecutors, or in the construction of it by the judges, as 
 in common cases serve to limit the discretion of courts in 
 favour of personal security. There will be no jury tf stand 
 between the judges, who are to pronounce the sentence of the 
 law, and the party who is to receive or suffer it. The awful 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 493 
 
 discretion, which a court of impeachments must necessarily 
 have, to doom to honour or to infamy the most confidential and 
 the most distinguished characters of the community, forbids the 
 commitment of the trust to a small number of persons. 
 
 These considerations seem alone sufficient to authorize a con- 
 clusion, that the supreme court would have been an improper 
 substitute for the senate, as a court of impeachments. There 
 remains a further consideration, which will not a little 
 strengthen this conclusion. It is this : the punishment, which 
 may be the consequence of conviction upon impeachment, is 
 not to terminate the chastisement of the offender. After having 
 been sentenced to a perpetual ostracism from the esteem and 
 confidence, and honours and emoluments of his country, he will 
 still be liable to prosecution and punishment in the ordinary 
 course of law. "Would it be proper that the persons, who had 
 disposed of his fame, and his most valuable rights as a citizen 
 in one trial, should in another trial, for the same offence, be 
 also the disposers of his life and his fortune ? Would there not 
 be the greatest reason to apprehend, that error, in the first 
 sentence, would be the parent of error in the second sentence ? 
 That the strong biass of one decision, would bo apt to overrule 
 the influence of any new lights, which might be brought to 
 vary the complexion of another decision ? Those who know 
 any thing of human nature, will not hestitate to answer these 
 questions in the affirmative ; and will be at no loss to perceive, 
 that by making the same persons judges in both cases, those 
 who might happen to be the objects of prosecution would, in a 
 great measure, be deprived of the double security intended 
 them by a double trial. The loss of life and estate, would often 
 be virtually included in a sentence, which, in its terms, im- 
 ported nothing more than dismission from a present, and dis- 
 qualification for a future office. It may be said, that the inter- 
 vention of a jury, in the second instance, would obviate the 
 danger. But juries are frequently influenced by the opiniouH 
 of judges. They are sometimes induced to find special verdicts, 
 which refer the main question to the decision of the court 
 
4&4 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 Who would be willing to stake his life and his estate upon the 
 verdict of a jury, acting under the auspices of judges, who had 
 predetermined his guilt ? 
 
 Would it have been an improvement of the plan, to have 
 united the supi-eme court with the senate, in the formation of 
 the court of impeachments ? This union would certainly have 
 been attended with several advantages; but would they not 
 have been overbalanced by the signal disadvantage already 
 stated, arising from the agency of the same judges in the double 
 prosecution to which the offender would be liable? To a cer- 
 tain extent, the benefits of that union will be obtained from 
 making the chief justice of the supreme court, the president of 
 the court of impeachments, as is proposed to be done in the 
 plan of the convention ; while the inconveniences of an entire 
 incorporation of the former into the latter, will be substantially 
 avoided. This was perhaps the prudent mean. I forbear to 
 remark upon the additional pretext for clamour against the 
 judiciary, which so considerable an augmentation of its autho- 
 rity would have afforded. 
 
 "Would it have been desirable to have composed the court for 
 the trial of impeachments of persons wholly distinct from the 
 other departments of the government ? There are weighty 
 arguments, as well against, as in favour of such a plan. To 
 some minds, it will not appear a trivial objection, that it would 
 tend to increase the complexity of the political machine, and 
 to add a new spring to the government, the utility of which 
 would at best be questionable. But an objection, which will 
 not be thought by any unworthy of attention, is this : a court 
 formed upon such a plan, would either be attended with heavy 
 expense, or might in practice be subject to a variety of casual- 
 ties and inconveniences. It must either consist of permanent 
 officers, stationary at the seat of government, and of course 
 entitled to fixed and regular stipends, or of certain officers of 
 the state governments, to be called upon whenever an impeach- 
 ment was actually depending. It will not be easy to imagine 
 any third mode materially different, which could rationally be 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 495 
 
 proposed. As the court, for reasons already given, ought to bo 
 numerous ; the first scheme will be reprobated by every man, 
 who can compare the extent of the public wants, with the 
 means of supplying them; the second will be espoused with 
 caution by those, who will seriously consider the difficulty of 
 collecting men dispersed over the whole union j the injury to 
 the innocent, from the procrastinated determination of the 
 charges which might be brought against them; the advantage 
 to the guilty, from the opportunities which delay would afford 
 for intrigue and corruption, and in some cases the detriment to 
 the state, from the prolonged inaction of men, whose firm and 
 faithful execution of their duty, might have exposed them to 
 the persecution of an intemperate or designing majority in the 
 house of representatives. Though this latter supposition may 
 seem harsh, and might not be likely often to be verified; yet it 
 ought not to be forgotten, that the demon of faction will, at 
 certain seasons, extend his sceptre over all numerous bodies 
 of men. 
 
 But though one or the other of the substitutes which have 
 been examined, or some other that might be devised, should, in 
 this respect, be thought preferable to the plan, reported by the 
 convention, it will not follow that the constitution ought for 
 this reason to be rejected. If mankind were to resolve to agree 
 in no institution of government, until every part of it had been 
 adjusted to the most exact standard of perfection, society would 
 soon become a general scene of anarchy, and the world a desert. 
 Where is the standard of perfection to be found ? Who will 
 undertake to unite the discordant opinions of a whole commu- 
 nity, in the same judgment of it; and to prevail upon one con- 
 ceited projector to renounce his infallible criterion, for the fallible 
 criterion of his more conceited neighbour f To answer the purpose 
 of the adversaries of the constitution, they ought to prove not 
 merely, that particular provisions in it are not the best, which 
 might have been imagined; but that the plan upon the whole, 
 is bad and pernicious 
 
 PUBLIUS. . 
 
496 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 NUMBER T.XVI. 
 
 NEW YORK, MARCH 11, 1788. 
 
 HAMILTON. 
 
 THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED. 
 
 A REVIEW of the principal objections that have ajpea/ed 
 against the proposed court for the trial of impeachments, will 
 not improbably eradicate the remains of any unfavourable im- 
 pressions which may still exist, in regard to this matter. 
 
 The first of these objections is, that the provision in question 
 confounds legislative and judiciary authorities in the same 
 body, in violation of that important and well-established maxim, 
 which requires a separation between the different departments 
 of power. The true meaning of this maxim has been discussed 
 and ascertained in another place, and has been shown to be 
 entirely compatible with a partial intermixture of those depart- 
 ments for special purposes, preserving them, in the main, dis- 
 tinct and unconnected. This partial intermixture is even, in 
 some cases, not only proper, but necessary to the mutual 
 defence of the several members of the government, against 
 each other. An absolute or qualified negative in the executive, 
 upon the acts of the legislative body, is admitted by the ablest 
 adepts in political science, to be an indispensable barrier against 
 the encroachments of the latter upon the former. And it may, 
 perhaps, with not less reason, be contended, that the powers 
 relating to impeachments are, as before intimated, an essential 
 
• THE FEDEKALIST. 497 
 
 check in the hands of that body, upon the encroachments of 
 the executive. The division of them between the two branches 
 of the legislature ; assigning to one the right of accusing, lo 
 the other the right of judging; avoids the inconvenience ol 
 making the same persons both accusers and judges : and guards 
 against the danger of persecution, from the prevaleucy of a 
 factious spirit in either of those branches. As the concurrence 
 of two-thirds of the senate will be requisite to a condemnation, 
 the security to innocence, from this additional circumstance, 
 will be as complete as itself can desire. 
 
 It is curious to observe with what vehemence this part of 
 the plan is assailed, on the principle here taken notice of, by 
 men who profess to admire, without exception, the constitution 
 of this state ; while that very constitution makes the senate, 
 together with the chancellor and judges of the supreme coTirt, 
 not only a court of impeachments, but the highest judicatory 
 in the state in all causes, civil and criminal. The proportion, 
 in point of numbers, of the chancellor and judges to the sen- 
 ators, is so inconsiderable, that the judiciary authority of New- 
 York, in the last resort may, with truth, be said to reside in 
 its senate. If the plan of the convention be, in this respect, 
 chargeable with a departure from the celebrated maxim which 
 has been so often mentioned, and seems to be so little under- 
 stood, how much more culpable must be the constitution of 
 New-York ? * 
 
 A second objection to the senate, as a court of impeachments 
 is, that it contributes to an undue accumulation of power in 
 that body, tending to give to the government a countenance 
 too aristocratic. The senate, it is observed, is to have concur- 
 rent authority with the executive in the formation of treaties, 
 and in the appointment to offices : If, say the objectors, to these 
 prerogatives is added that of determining in all cases of im- 
 peachment, it will give a decided predominancy to senatorial 
 
 * In that of New-Jersey, also, the final judiciary authority is in a branch 
 of the legislature. In New-Hampshire, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and 
 South-Carolina, one branch of the legislature is the court for the trial of 
 'uipeachments. 
 
498 THE FEDERALIST. ' 
 
 influence. To an objection so little precise in itself, it is not 
 easy to find a very precise answer. Where is the measure or 
 criterion to which we can appeal, for estimating what will give 
 the senate too much, too little, or barely the proper degree of 
 influence ? Will it not be more safe, as well as more simple, to 
 dismiss such vague and uncertain calculations, to examine each 
 power by itself, and to decide on general principles, where it 
 may be deposited with most advantage, and least inconve- 
 nience ? 
 
 If we take this course, it will lead to a more intelligible, if 
 not to a more certain result. The disposition of the power of 
 making treaties, which has obtained in the plan of the conven- 
 tion, will then, if I mistake not, appear to be fully justified by 
 the considerations stated in a former number, and by others 
 which will occur under the next head of our inquiries. The 
 expediency of the junction of the senate with the executive, in 
 the power of appointing to offices, will, I trust, be placed in a 
 light not less satisfactory, in the disquisitions under the same 
 head. And I flatter myself the observations in my last paper, 
 must have gone no inconsiderable way towards proving, that it 
 was not easy, if practicable, to find a more fit receptacle for the 
 power of determining impeachments, than that which has been 
 chosen. If this be truly the case, the hypothetical danger of 
 the too great weight of the senate, ought to be discarded from 
 our reasonings. 
 
 But this hypothesis, such as it is, has already been refuted in 
 the remarks applied to the duration of office prescribed for the 
 senators. It was by them shown, as well on the credit of his- 
 torical examples, as from the reason of the thing, that the most 
 popular branch of every government, partaking of the repub- 
 lican genius, by being generally the favourite of the people, 
 will be as generally a full match, if not an overmatch, for every 
 other member of the government. 
 
 But, independent of this most active and operative principle ; 
 to secure the equilibrium of the national house of representa- 
 tives, the plan of the convention has provided in its favour 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 49?^ 
 
 several important counterpoises to the additional authorities ta 
 be conferred upon the senate. The exclusive privilege of origi- 
 nating money bills, will belong to the house of representatives. 
 The same house will possess the sole right of instituting im- 
 peachments: Is not this a complete counterbalance to that of 
 determining them ? — The same house will be the umpire in all 
 elections of the president, which do not unite the suffrages of 
 a majority of the whole number of electors; a case which it 
 cannot be doubted will sometimes, if not frequently, happen 
 The constant possibility of the thing, must be a fruitful source 
 of influence to that body. The more it is contemplated, the 
 more important will appear this ultimate, though contingent 
 power, of deciding the competitions of the most illustrious 
 citizens of the union, for the first office in it. It would not 
 perhaps be rash to predict, that as a mean of influence, it will 
 be found to outweigh all the peculiar attributes of the senate. 
 
 A third objection to the senate as a court of impeachments, 
 is drawn from the agency they are to have in the appointments 
 to office. It is imagined that they would be too indulgent 
 judges of the conduct of men, in whose official creation they 
 had participated. The principle of this objection would con- 
 demn a practice, which is to be seen in all the state gov- 
 ernments, if not in all the governments with which we are 
 acquainted : I mean that of rendering those, who hold offices 
 during pleasure, dependent on the pleasure of those who 
 appoint them. With equal plausibility might it be alleged in 
 this case, that the favouritism of the latter, would always be 
 an asylum for the misbehaviour of the former. But that 
 practice, in contradiction to this principle, proceeds upon the 
 presumption, that the responsibility of those who appoint, for 
 the fitness and competency of the persons, on whom they 
 bestow their choice, and the interest they have in the respect- 
 nble and prosperous administration of affairs, will inspire a 
 sufficient disposition, to dismiss from a share in it, all such who, 
 by their conduct, may have proved themselves unworthy of the 
 ronfidence reposed in them. Though facts may not always 
 
500 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 correspond -with this presumption, yet if it be in the main just, 
 it must destroy the supposition, that the senate, who will 
 merely sanction the choice of the executive, should feel a bias, 
 towards the objects of that choice, strong enough to blind them 
 to the evidences of guilt so extraordinary, as to have induced 
 the representatives of the nation to become its accusers. 
 
 If any further argument were necessary to evince the im- 
 probability of such a bias, it might be found in the nature of 
 the agency of the senate, in the business of appointments. 
 
 It will be the office of the president to nominate, and with 
 the advice and consent of the senate to appoint. There will 
 of course be no exertion of choice, on the part of the senate. 
 They may defeat one choice of the executive, and oblige him 
 to make another ; but they cannot themselves choose — they can 
 only ratify or reject the choice he may have made. They 
 might even entertain a preference to some other person, at the 
 very moment they were assenting to the one proposed; because 
 there might be no positive ground of opposition to him ; and 
 they could not be sure, if they withheld their assent, that the 
 subsequent nomination would fall upon their own favourite, or 
 upon any other person in their estimation more meritorious 
 than the one rejected. Thus it could hardly happen, that the 
 majority of the senate would feel any other complacency 
 towards the object of an appointment, than such as the 
 appearances of merit might inspire, and proofs of the want 
 of it destroy. 
 
 A fourth objection to the senate, in the capacity of a court 
 of impeachments, is derived from their union with the executive 
 in the power of making treaties. This, it has been said, would 
 constitute the senators their own judges, in every case of a 
 corrupt or perfidious execution of that trust. After having 
 combined with the executive in betraying the interests of the 
 nation in a ruinous treaty, what prospect, it is asked, would 
 there be of their being made to suffer the punishment they 
 would deserve, when they were themselves to decide upon the 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 60l 
 
 accusation brought against them for the treachery of which 
 they had been guilty ? 
 
 This objection has been circulated with more earnestness 
 and with a greater show of reason, than any other which has 
 appeared against this part of the plan ; and yet I am deceived 
 if it does not rest upon an erroneous foundation. 
 
 The security essentially intended by the constitution against 
 corruption and treachery in the formation of treaties, is to be 
 sought for in the numbers and characters of those who are to 
 make them. The joint agency of the chief magistrate of the 
 union, and of two-thirds of the members of a body selected by 
 the collective wisdom of the legislatures of the several states, 
 is designed to be the pledge for the fidelity of the national 
 councils in this particular. The convention might with pro- 
 priety have meditated the punishment of the executive, for a 
 deviation from the instructions of the senate, or a want of in- 
 tegrity in the conduct of the negociatioos committed to him : 
 They might also have had in view the punishment of a few 
 leading individuals in the senate, who should have prostituted 
 their influence in that body, as the mercenary instruments of 
 foreign corruption : But they could not with more or with 
 equal propriety have contemplated the impeachment and 
 punishment of two-thirds of the senate, consenting to an im- 
 proper treaty, than of a majority of that or of the other branch 
 of the national legislature, consenting to a pernicious or uncon- 
 stitutional law : a principle which I believe has never been 
 admitted into any government. How, in fact, could a majority 
 of the house of representatives impeach themselves? Not 
 better, it is evident, than two-thirds of the senate might try 
 themselves. And yet what reason is there, that a majority of 
 the house of representatives, sacrificing the interests of the 
 society, by an unjust and tyrannical act of legislation, should 
 escape with impunity, more than two-thirds of the senate, sac- 
 rificing the same interests in an injurious treaty with a foreign 
 power? The truth is, that in all such cases, it is essential to 
 the freedom, and to the necessary independence of the deliber- 
 
502 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 ations of the body, that the members of it should be exempt 
 from punishment for acts done in a collective capacity; and 
 the security to the society must depend on the care which is 
 taken to confide the trust to proper hands, to make it their 
 interest to execute it with fidelity, and to make it as difficult as 
 possible for them to combine in any interest opposite to that of 
 the public good. 
 
 So far as might concern the misbehaviour of the executive 
 in perverting the instructions, or contravening the views of the 
 senate, we need not be apprehensive of the want of a disposition 
 in that body to punish the abuse of their confidence, or to vin- 
 dicate their own authority. "We may thus far count upon their 
 pride, if not upon their virtue. And so far even as might con- 
 cern the corruption of leading members, by whose arts and 
 influence the majority may have been inveigled into measures 
 odious to the community; if the proofs of that corruption 
 should be satisfactory^ the usual propensity of human nature 
 will warrant us in concluding, that there would be commonly 
 no defect of inclination in the body, to divert the public resent- 
 ment from themselves, by a ready sacrifice of the authors of 
 their mismanagement and disgrace. 
 
 PUBLIUS, 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 503 
 
 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 NUMBER I.XVII. 
 
 NEW YORK, MARCH 11, 1788. 
 
 HAMILTON. 
 
 CONCERNING THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PRESIDENT: A GROSS AT 
 TEMPT TO MISREPRESENT THIS PART OF THE PLAN DETECTED. 
 
 The constitution of the executive department of the proposed 
 government, next claims our attention. 
 
 There is hardly any part of the system, the arrangement of 
 which could have been attended with greater difficulty; and 
 there is perhaps none, which has been inveighed against with 
 less candour, or criticised with less judgment. 
 
 Here the writers against the constitution, seem to have taken 
 pains to signalize their talent of misrepresentation. Calcu- 
 luting upon the aversion of the people to monarchy, they have 
 endeavoured to enlist all their jealousies and apjirehensions in 
 opposition to the intended president of the United States j not 
 merely as the embryo, but as the full grown progeny of that 
 detested parent. To establish the pretended affinity, they have 
 not scrupled to draw resources even from the regions of fiction. 
 The authorities of a magistrate, in a few instances greater, in 
 some instances less, than those of a governor of New-York, 
 have been magnified into more than royal prerogatives. He 
 has been decorated with attributes, superior in dignity and 
 splendour to those of a king of Great Britain. He has been 
 shoT^n to us with a diadem sparkling on his brow, and the 
 
504 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 imperial purple flowing in his train. He has been seated on a 
 throne surrounded with minions and mistresses; giving au- 
 dience to the envoys of foreign potentates, in all the superci- 
 lious pomp of majesty. The images of Asiatic despotism and 
 voluptuousness, have not been wanting to ci'own the exag- 
 gerated scene. We have been taught to tremble at the terrific 
 visages of murdering janisaries; and to blush at the unveiled 
 mysteries of a future seraglio. 
 
 Attempts extravagant as these to disfigure, or rather to meta- 
 morphose the object, render it necessary to take an accurate 
 view of its real nature and form j in order to ascertain its true 
 aspect and genuine appearance, to unmask the disingenuity, 
 and to expose the fallacy of the counterfeit resemblances which 
 have been so insidiously, as well as industriously, propagated. 
 
 In the execution of this task, there is no man who would not 
 find it an arduous effort either to behold with moderation, or to 
 treat with seriousness, the devices not less weak than wicked, 
 which have been contrived to pervert the public opinion in 
 relation to the subject. They so far exceed the usual, though 
 unjustifiable, licences of party-artifice, that even in a disposi 
 tion the most candid and tolerant, they must force the senti- 
 ments which favour an indulgent construction of the conduct 
 of political adversaries to give place to a voluntary and unre- 
 served indignation. It is impossible not to bestow the imputa- 
 tion of deliberate imposture and deception upon the gross 
 pretence of a similitude between a king of Great Britain, and 
 a magistrate of the character marked out for that of the presi 
 dent of the United States. It is still more impossible to with- 
 hold that imputation, from the rash and barefaced expedients 
 which have been employed to give success to the attempted 
 imposition. 
 
 In one instance, which I cite as a sample of tne general spirit, 
 the temerity has proceeded so far as to ascribe to the president 
 of the United States a power, which by the instrument re- 
 ported, is p-iyressly allotted to the exe'^'tives of the individual 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 506 
 
 States. T mean the power of filling casual vacancies in the 
 senate. 
 
 This bold experiment upon the discernment of his country- 
 men, has been hazarded by the writer who (whatever may be 
 his real merit) has had no inconsiderable share in the applauses 
 of his party;* and who, upon this false and unfounded sugges- 
 tion, has built a series of observations equally false and un- 
 founded. Let him now be confronted with the evidence of the 
 fact; and let him, if he be able, justify or extenuate the shame- 
 ful outrage he has offered to the dictates of truth, and to the 
 rules of fair dealing. 
 
 The second clause of the second section of the second article, 
 empowers the president of the United States " to nominate, and 
 by and with the advice and consent of the senate to appoint 
 ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, judges of the 
 supreme court, and all other officers of the United States, whose 
 appointments are not in the constitution otherwise provided fofy -. f^J^*^ 
 and which shall he established by law.'* Immediately after \,}x\^^f^jtA'^^\^'^ 
 clause follows another in these words : " The president shall ^^Tly^\S^ 
 have power to fill up all vacancie's thsiX may happen during the ''*^'^'^\^^j^' 
 recess of the senate, by granting commissions which shall expire 
 at the end of their next session." It is from this last provision, 
 that the pretended power of the president to fill vacancies in 
 the senate has been deduced. A slight attention to the con- 
 nexion of the clauses, and to the obvious meaning of the terms, 
 will satisfy us, that the deduction is not even colourable. 
 
 The first of these two clauses, it is clear, only provides a 
 mode for appointing such officers, " whose appointments are 
 not otherwise provided for in the constitution, and which shall be 
 established by law ;" of course it cannot extend to the appoint- 
 ment of senators; whose appointments are otherwise provided 
 for in the constitution ,f and who are established by the constitu- 
 tion, and will not require a future establishment by law. This 
 position will hardly be contested. 
 
 Tne last of these two clauses, it is equally clear, cannot be 
 * See Cato, No. 5. t Article 1. Sec. 3. Clause 1. 
 
■606 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 understood to comprehend the power of filling vacancies in the 
 senate, for the following reasons : First. The relation in which 
 that clause stands to the other, which declares the general 
 mode of appointing ofl&cers of the United States, denotes it to 
 be nothing more than a supplement to the other; for the pur- 
 pose of establishing an auxiliary method of appointment, in 
 cases to which the general method was inadequate. The 
 •ordinary power of appointment is confided to the president 
 and senate jointly, and can therefore only be exercised during 
 the session of the senate : but, as it would have been improper 
 to oblige this body to be continually in session for the appoint- 
 ment of officers ; and as vacancies might happen in their recess, 
 which it might be necessary for the public service to fill without 
 ■delay, the succeeding clause is evidently intended to authorize 
 the president, singly, to make temporary appointments "during 
 the recess of the senate, by granting commissions which should 
 •expire at the end of their next session." Second. If this clause 
 is to be considered as supplementary to the one which precedes, 
 the vacancies of which it speaks must be construed to relate to 
 the "officers" described in the preceding one; and this, we 
 have seen, excludes from its description the members of the 
 senate. Third. The time within which the power is to operate, 
 " during the recess of the senate," and the duration of the 
 appointments, " to the end of the next session " of that body, 
 conspire to elucidate the sense of the provision, which, if it had 
 been intended to comprehend senators, would naturally have 
 referred the temporary power of filling vacancies to the recess 
 of the state legislatures, who are to make the permanent 
 appointments, and not to the recess of the national senate, 
 who are to have no concern in those appointments; and would 
 have extended the duration in office of the temporary senators 
 to the next session of the legislature of the state, in whose 
 representation the vacancies had happened, instead of making 
 it to expire at the end of the ensuing session of the national 
 senate. The circumstances of the body authorized to make 
 the permanent appointments, would, of course, have governed 
 the modification of a power which related to tlie temporary 
 
THE FEDERALIST. SOT 
 
 appointments; and, as the national senate is the body, whose 
 situation is alone contemplated in the clause upon which the 
 suggestion under examination has been founded, the vacancies 
 to which it alludes can only be deemed to respect those officers, 
 in whose appointment that body has a concurrent agency with 
 the president. But, lastly, the first and second clauses of the 
 third section of the first article, obviate all possibility of doubt. 
 The former provides, that '' the senate of the United States 
 shall be composed of two senators from each state, chosen by 
 the legislature thereof for six years ; " and the latter directs, that 
 " if vacancies in that body should happen by resignation or 
 otherwise, during the recess of the legislature of any state, the 
 executive thereof may make temporary appointments until 
 the neoct meeting of the legislature, which shall then fill such 
 vacancies." Here is an express power given, in clear and 
 unambiguous terms, to the state executives, to fill the casual 
 vacancies in the senate, by temporary appointments; which 
 not only invalidates the supposition, that the clause before 
 considered, could have been intended to confer that power 
 upon the president of the United States ; but proves, that thia 
 supposition, destitute as it is even of the merit of plausibility, 
 must have originated in an intention to deceive the people, 
 too palpable to be obscured by sophistry, too atrocious to be 
 palliated by hypocrisy. 
 
 I have taken the pains to select this instance of misrepre- 
 sentation, and to place it in a clear and strong light, as an 
 unequivocal proof of the unwarrantable arts, which are prac- 
 tised, to prevent a fair and impartial judgment of the real 
 merits of the plan submitted to the consideration of the people. 
 Nor have I scrupled in so fiagrant a case, to indulge a severity 
 ^f animadversion, little congenial with the general spirit of 
 these papers. I hesitate not to submit it to the decision of any 
 tandid and honest adversary of the proposed government, 
 whether language can furnish epithets of too much asperity, 
 for so shameless and so prostitute an attempt to impose on the 
 citizens of America. 
 
 43 PUBLIUS. 
 
508 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 rHE FEDERALIST 
 
 NUMBER LXVIII. 
 
 NEW YORK, MARCH 14, 1788. 
 
 HAMILTON. 
 
 THE VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PRESIDENT CONTINUED, 
 IN RELATION TO THE MODE OF APPOINTMENT. 
 
 The mode of appointment of the chief magistrate ot tne 
 United States, is almost the only part of the system, of any 
 consequence, which has escaped without severe censure, or 
 which has received the slightest mark of approbation from its 
 opponents. The most plausible of these, who has appeared in 
 print, has even deigned to admit, that the election of the presi- 
 dent is pretty well guarded.* I venture somewhat further, and 
 hesitate not to affirm, that if the manner of it be not perfect, 
 it is at least excellent. It unites in an eminent degree all the 
 advantages, the union of which was to be wished for. 
 
 It was desirable, that the sense of the people should operate 
 in the choice of the person to whom so important a trust wa» 
 to be confided. This end will be answered by committing the 
 right of making it, not to any pre-established body, but to men, 
 chosen by the people for the special purpose, and at the par- 
 ticular conjuncture. 
 
 It was equally desirarble, that the immediate election should 
 be made by men most capable of analizing the qualities adapted 
 to the station, and acting under circumstances favourable to 
 
 * Vide Federal Farmer. 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 609 
 
 deliberation, and to a judicious combination of all the rpasona 
 and inducements that were proper to govern their choice. A 
 small number of persons, selected by their fellow citizens from 
 the general mass, will be most likely to possess the information 
 and discernment requisite to so complicated an investigation. 
 
 It was also peculiarly desirable, to afford as little opportunity 
 as possible to tumult and disorder. This evil was not least to 
 oe dreaded in the election of a magistrate, who was to have so 
 important an agency in the administration of the government. 
 But the precautions which have been so happily concerted in 
 the system under consideration, promise an effectual security 
 against this mischief. The choice of several, to form an inter- 
 mediate body of electors, will be much less apt to convulse the 
 community, with any extraordinary or violent movements, 
 than the choice of one, who was himself to be the final object 
 of the public wishes. And as the electors, chosen in each state, 
 are to assemble and vote in the state, in which they are chosen, 
 this detached and divided situation will expose them much less 
 to heats and ferments, that might be communicated from them 
 to the people, than if they were all to be convened at one time, 
 in one place. 
 
 Nothing was more to be desired, than that every practicable 
 obstacle should be opposed to cabal, intrigue, and corruption. 
 These most deadly adversaries of republican government, might 
 naturally have been expected to make their approaches from 
 more than one quarter, but chiefly from the desire in foreign 
 powers to gain an improper ascendant in our councils. How 
 could they better gratify this, than by raising a creature of 
 their own to the chief magistracy of the union ? But the con- 
 vention have guarded against all danger of this sort, with the 
 most provident and judicious attention. They have not made 
 the appointment of the president to depend on pre-existing 
 bodies of men, who might be tampered with beforehand to 
 prostitute their votes ; but they have referred it in the first in- 
 stance to an immediate act of the people of America, to be 
 exerted in the choice of persons for the temporary and sole 
 
610 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 parpose of making the appointment. And they have excluded 
 from eligibility to this trust, all those who from situation might 
 be suspected of too great devotion to the president in office. 
 No senator, representative, or other person holding a place of 
 trust or profit under the United States, can be of the number 
 of the electors. Thus, without corrupting the body of the 
 people, the immediate agents in the election will at least enter 
 upon the task, free from any sinister bias. Their transient 
 existence, and their detached situation, already noticed, afford 
 a satisfactory prospect of their continuing so, to the conclusion 
 of it. The business of corruption, when it is to embrace so 
 considerable a number of men, requires time, as well as means, 
 Nor would it be found easy suddenly to embark them, dis- 
 persed, as they would be over thirteen states, in any combina- 
 tions founded upon motives which, though they could not 
 properly be denominated corrupt, might yet be of a nature to 
 mislead them from their duty. 
 
 Another, and no less important, desideratum was, that the 
 executive should be independent for his continuance in office, 
 on all, but the people themselves. He might otherwise be 
 tempted to sacrifice his duty to his complaisance for those 
 whose favour was necessary to the duration of his official con- 
 sequence. This advantage will also be secured, by making his 
 re-election to depend on a special body of representatives, 
 deputed by the society for the single purpose of making the 
 important choice. 
 
 All these advantages will be happily combined in the plan 
 devised by the convention, which is, that each- state shall 
 choose a number of persons as electors, equal to the number of 
 senators and representatives of such state in the national 
 government, who shall assemble within the state, and vote for 
 some fit person as president. Their votes, thus given, are to 
 be transmitted to the seat of the national government ; and the 
 person who may happen to have a majority of the whole 
 number of votes, will be the president. But as a majoriiy of 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 5H 
 
 the votes might not always happen to centre in one man, and 
 as it might be unsafe to permit less than a majority to be con 
 elusive, it is provided, that, in such a contingency, the house 
 of representatives shall select out of the candidates, who shall 
 have the five highest numbers of votes, the man who, in their 
 opinion, may be best qualified for the office. 
 
 This process of election affords a moi-al certainty, that the 
 office of pi'esident will seldom fall to the lot of any man who 
 is not in an eminent degree endowed with the requisite qualifi- 
 cations. Talents for low intrigue, and the little arts of popu- 
 larity, may alone suffice to elevate a man to the first honours 
 of a single state; but it will require other talents, and a differ- 
 ent kind of merit, to establish him in the esteem and confidence 
 of the whole union, or of so considerable a portion of it. as 
 would be necessary to make him a successful candidate for the 
 aistinguished office of president of the United State's. It will 
 not be too strong to say, that there will be a constant proba- 
 bility of seeing the station filled by characters pre-eminent for 
 ability and virtue. And this will be thought no inconsiderable 
 recommendation of the constitution, by those who are able to 
 estimate the share which the executive in every government 
 must necessarily have in its good or ill administration. Though 
 we cannot acquiesce in the political heresy of the poet, who 
 
 Bays: 
 
 " For forms of government, let fools contest — 
 That which is best administered, is best," 
 
 — yet we may safely pronounce, that the true test of a good 
 government is, its aptitude and tendency to produce a good 
 administration. 
 
 The vice-president is to be chosen in the same manner with 
 the president; with this difference, that the senate is to do, in 
 respect to the former, what is to be done by the house of repre- 
 sentatives, in respect to the latter. 
 
 The appointment of an extraordinary person, as vice-presi- 
 dent, has been objected to as superfluous, if not mischievous. 
 It has been alleged, that it would have been preferable to have 
 
bVz THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 autliorized the senate to elect out of their own body an officer, 
 answering to that description. But two considerations seem 
 to justify the ideas of the convention in this respect. One is, 
 that to secure at all times the possibility of a definitive reso- 
 lution of the body, it is necessary that the president should 
 have only a casting vote. And to take the senator of any state 
 from his seat as senator, to place him in that of president of 
 the senate, would be to exchange, in regard to the state from 
 which he came, a constant for a contingent vote. The other 
 consideration is, that, as the vice-president may occasionally 
 become a substitute for the president, in the supremo executive 
 magistracy, all the reasons which recommend the mode of 
 election prescribed for the one, apply with great, if not with 
 equal, force to the manner of appointing the other. It is re- 
 markable, that, in this, as in most other instances, the objection 
 which is made, would lie against the constitution of this state. 
 We have a lieutenant-governor, chosen by the people at large, 
 who presides in the senate, and is the constitutional substitute 
 for the governor in casualties similar to those, which would 
 authorize the vice-president to exercise the authorities, and 
 discharge the duties of the president. 
 
 PUBLIUS. 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 513 
 
 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 NUMBER LXIX. 
 
 NEW YORK, MARCH 14, 1788 
 
 HAMILTON. 
 
 THE SAME VIEW CONTINUED, WITH A COMPARISON BETWEEN THE 
 PRESIDENT AND THE KING OF GREAT BRITAIN, ON THE ONIS 
 HAND, AND THE GOVERNOR OF NEW- YORK, ON THE OTHER. 
 
 I PROCEED now to trace the real characters of the proposed 
 executive, as they are marked out in the plan of the conven- 
 tion. This will serve to place in a strong light the unfairness 
 of the representations which have been made in regard to it. 
 
 The first thing which strikes our attention is, that the execu- 
 tive authority, with few exceptions, is to be vested in a single 
 magistrate. This will scarcely, however, be considered as a 
 point upon which any comparison can be grounded; for if, in 
 this particular, there be a resemblance to the king of Great 
 Britain, there is not less a resemblance to the Grand Seignor, 
 to the Khan of Tartary, to the man of the seven mountains, or 
 to the governor of New- York. 
 
 That magistrate is to be elected for four years ; and is to be 
 •e-eligible as often as the people of the United States shall 
 think him worthy of their confidence. In these circumstances, 
 there is a total dissimilitude between him and a king of Great 
 Britain; who is an hereditary monarch, possessing the crown as 
 a patrimony descendible to his heirs for ever: but there is a 
 close analogy between him and a governor of New-York, who 
 
51-1 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 is elected for three years, and is re-eligible without limitation 
 or intermission. If we consider how much less time would be 
 requisite for establishing a dangerous influence in a single 
 state, than for establishing a like influence throughout the 
 United States, we must conclude, that a duration oi four years 
 for the chief magistrate of the union, is a degree of permanency 
 far less to be dreaded in that oflfice, than a duration of three 
 years for a correspondent ofiice in a single state. 
 
 The president of the United States would be liable to be im- 
 peached, tried, and, upon conviction of treason, bribery, or 
 other high crimes or misdemeanors, removed from office; and 
 would afterwards be liable to prosecution and punishment in 
 the ordinary course of law. The person of the king of Great 
 Britain, is sacred and inviolable : There is no constitutional 
 tribunal to which he is amenable ; no punishment to which he 
 can be subjected, without involving the crisis of a national 
 revolution. In this delicate and important circumstance of 
 personal responsibility, the president of confederated America 
 would stand upon no better ground than a governor of New- 
 York, and upon worse ground than the governors of Virginia 
 and Delaware. 
 
 The president of the United States is to have power to return 
 a bill, which shall have passed the two branches of the legisla- 
 ture, for re-consideration; and the bill, so returned, is not to 
 become a law, unless, upon that re-consideration, it be approved 
 by two-thirds of both houses. The king of Great Britain, on 
 his part, has an absolute negative upon the acts of the two 
 houses of parliament. The disuse of that power for a consider- 
 able time past, does not affect the reality of its existence; and 
 is to be ascribed wholly to the crown's having found the means 
 of substituting influence to authority, or the art of gaining a 
 majority in one or the other of the two houses, to the necessity 
 of exerting a prerogative which could seldom be exerted with- 
 out hazarding some degree of national agitation. The qualified 
 negative of .the president, differs widely from this absolute 
 negative of the British sovereign; and tallies exactly with the 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 616 
 
 revisionary authority of the eouucil of revision of this 8t.ate, 
 of which the governor is a constituent part. In this respect, 
 the power of the president would exceed that of the governor 
 of New- York ; because the former would possess singly, what 
 the latter shares with the chancellor and judges : But it would 
 be precisely the same with that of the governor of Massachu- 
 setts, whose constitution, as to this article, seems to have been 
 the original from which the convention have copied. 
 
 The president is to be the " commander in chief of the army 
 and navy of the United States, and of the militia of the several 
 states, when called into the actual service of the United States. 
 He is to have power to grant reprieves and pardons for offences 
 against the United States, except in cases of impeachment; to 
 recommend to the consideration of congress such measures as 
 he shall judge necessary and expedient; to convene, on extra- 
 ordinary occasions, both houses of the legislature, or either of 
 them, and in case of disagreement between them with respect to 
 the time of adjournment, to adjourn them to such time as he shall 
 think proper; to take care that the laws be faithfully executed; 
 and to commission all oflScers of the United States." In most 
 of these particulars, the power of the president will resemble 
 equally that of the king of Great Britain, and of the governor 
 of New- York. The most material points of difference are 
 these : — Mrst. The president will have only the occasional com- 
 mand of such part of the militia of the nation, as hj i legislat i ve 
 provision may be called into the actual service of the union. 
 The king of Great Britain and the governor of New- York, 
 have at all times the entire command of all the militia within 
 their several jurisdictions. In this article, therefore, the power 
 of the president, would be inferior to that of either the mon- 
 arch, or the governor. Second. The president is to be com- 
 mander in chief of the army and navy of the United States. 
 In this respect his authority would be nominally the same with 
 that of the king of Great Britain, but in substance much in- 
 ferior to it. It would amount to nothing more than the supreme 
 command and direction of the military and naval forces, as 
 
516 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 first general and admiral of the confederacy; while that of the 
 British king extends to the declaring of war, and to the raising 
 and regulating of fleets and armies; all which, by the constitu- 
 tion under consideration, would appertain to the legislature.* 
 The governor of New-York, on the other hand, is by the con- 
 stitution of the state vested only with the command of its 
 militia and navy. But the constitutions of several of the 
 states, expressly declare their governors to be commanders in 
 chief, as well of the army as navy; and it may well be a ques- 
 tion, whether those of New-Hampshire and Massachusetts, in 
 particular, do not, in this instance, confer larger powers upon 
 their respective governors, than could be claimed by a president 
 of the United States. Third. The power of the president, in 
 respect to pardons, would extend to all cases, except those of 
 impeaehTnent. The governor of New-York may pardon in all 
 cases, even in those of impeachment, except for treason and 
 murder. Is not the power of the governor in this article, on a 
 calculation of political consequences, greater than that of the 
 president ? All conspiracies and plots against the government, 
 which have not been matured into actual treason, may be 
 screened from punishment of every kind, by the interposition 
 of the prerogative of pardoning. If a governor of New- York, 
 therefore, should be at the head of any such conspiracy, until 
 the design had been ripened into actual hostility, he could 
 insure his accomplices and adherents an entire impunity. A 
 president of the union, on the other hand, though he may even 
 pardon treason, when prosecuted in the ordinary course of law, 
 
 * A writer in a Pennsylvania paper, under the signature of Tamont, has 
 asserted, that the king of Great Britain owes his prerogatives, as commander 
 in chief, to an annual mutiny bill. The truth is, on the contrary, that his 
 prerogative, in this respect, is immemorial, and was only disputed, "contrary 
 to all reason and precedent," as Blackstone, vol. 1. page 262. expresses it, by 
 the long parliament of Charles First; but by the statute the 18th of Charles 
 Second, chap. 6. it was declared to be in the king alone, for that the sole 
 supreme government and command of the militia within his majesty's realms 
 and dominions, and of all forces by sea and land, and of all forts and places 
 of strength, ever was and is the undoubted right of his majesty anrt his royal 
 predecessors kings and queens of England, and that both or either house of 
 parliament cannot nor ought to pretend to the same. 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 517 
 
 could shelter no offender, in any degree, from the effects of 
 impeachment and conviction. Would not the prospect of a 
 total indemnity for all the preliminary steps, be a greater 
 temptation to undertake, and persevere in an enterprise against 
 the public liberty, than the mere prospect of an exemption 
 from death and confiscation, if the final execution of the de- 
 sign, upon an actual appeal to arms, should miscarry ? "Would 
 this last expectation have any influence at all, when the proba- 
 bility was computed, that the person who was to afford that 
 exemption might himself be involved in the consequences of 
 the measure ; and might be incapacitated by his agency in it, 
 from affording the desired impunity ? The better to judge of 
 this matter, it will be necessary to recollect that, by the pro- 
 posed constitution, the offence of treason is limited " to levying 
 war upon the United States, and adhering to their enemies, 
 giving them aid and comfort ;" and that by the laws of New- 
 York, it is confined within similar bounds. Fourth. The presi- 
 dent can only adjourn the national legislature, in a single case 
 of disagreement about the time of adjournment. The British 
 monarch may prorogue, or even dissolve the parliament. The 
 governor of New-York may also prorogue the legislature of 
 this state for a limited time ; a prerogative which, in certain 
 situations, may be employed to very important purposes. 
 
 The president is to have power, with the advice and consent 
 of the senate, to make treaties, proyided two-thirds of the 
 senators present concur. The king of Great Britain is the 
 sole and absolute representative of the nation, in all foreign 
 transactions. He can of his own accord make treaties of peace, 
 commerce, alliance, and of every other description. It has been 
 insinuated, that his authority in this respect is not conclusive, 
 and that his conventions with foreign powers are subject to the 
 revision, and stand in need of the ratification of parliament. 
 But I believe this doctrine was never heard of, till it was 
 broached upon the present occasion. Every jurist* of that 
 kingaom, and every other man acquainted with its conttitution. 
 
 * Vide Blackstone's Commentaries, vol. 1. pa£e 257 
 
618 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 knows, as an established fact, that the prerogative of making 
 treaties exists in the crown in its utmost plenitude ; and that 
 the compacts entered into by the royal authority, have the 
 most complete legal validity and perfection, independent of any 
 other sanction. The parliament, it is true, is sometimes seen 
 employing itself in altering the existing laws to conform them 
 to the stipulations in a new treaty ; and this may have possibly 
 given birth to the imagination, that its co-operation was neces- 
 sary to the obligatory efficacy of the treaty. But this parlia- 
 mentary interposition, proceeds from a different cause; from 
 the necessity of adjusting a most artificial and intricate system 
 of revenue and commercial laws, to the changes made in them 
 by the operation of the treaty ; and of adapting new provisions 
 and precautions, to the new state of things, to keep the machine 
 from running into disorder. In this respect, therefore, there is 
 no comparison between the intended power of the president, 
 and the actual power of the British sovereign. The one can 
 perform alone, what the other can only do with the concurrence 
 of a branch of the legislature. It must be admitted, that, in 
 this instance, the power of the federal executive would exceed 
 that of any state executive. But this arises naturally from the 
 exclusive possession by the union, of that part of the sovereign 
 power which relates to treaties. If the confederacy were to be 
 dissolved, it would become a question, whether the executives 
 of the several states were not solely invested with that delicate 
 and important prerogative. 
 
 The president is also to be authorized to receive ambassadors, 
 and other public ministers. This, though it has been a rich 
 theme of declamation, is more a matter of dignity than of 
 authority. It is a circumstance which will be without conse- 
 quence in the administration of the government; and it was 
 far more convenient that it should be arranged in this manner, 
 than that there should be a necessity of convening the legisla- 
 ture, or one of its branches, upon every arrival of a foreign 
 minister ; though it were merely to take the place of a departed 
 predecessor. 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 519 
 
 The president is to nominate, and with the advice and consent 
 0/ the senate, to appoint ambassadors and other public ministers, 
 judges of the supreme court, and in general all officers of thfl 
 United States established by law, and whose appointments are 
 not otherwise provided for by the constitution. The king of 
 Great Britain, is emphatically and truly stiled, the fountain of 
 honour. He not only 'appoints to all offices, but can create 
 offices. He can confer titles of nobility at pleasure; and has 
 the disposal of an immense number of church preferments. 
 There is evidently a great inferiority in the power of the 
 president in this particular, to that of the British king; nor 
 is it equal to that of the governor of New- York, if we are to 
 interpret the meaning of the constitution of the state by the 
 practice which has obtained under it. The power of appoint- 
 ment is with us lodged in a council, composed of the governor 
 and four members of the senate, chosen by the assembly. The 
 governor claims, and has frequently exercised the right of nomi- 
 nation, and is entitled to a casting vote in the appointment. If 
 he really has the right of nominating, his authority is in this 
 respect equal to that of the president, and exceeds it in the 
 article of the casting vote. In the national government, if the 
 senate should be divided, no appointment could be made : In 
 the government of New-York, if the council should be divided, 
 the governor can turn the scale and confirm his own nomina- 
 tion.* If we compare the publicity which must necessarily 
 attend the mode of appointment by the president and an entire 
 branch of the national legislature, with the privacy in the mode 
 of appointment by the governor of New- York, closetted in a 
 secret apartment with at most four, and frequently with only 
 two persons; and if we at the same time consider how much 
 m.ore easy it must be to influence the small number of which a 
 
 * Candor however demands an acknowledgement, that I do not think the 
 claim of the governor to a right of nomination well founded. Yet it is always 
 justifiable to reason from the practice of a government, till its propriety has 
 been constitutionally questioned. And independent of this claim, when we 
 lake into view the other considerations, and pursue them through all theii 
 .onsequences, we shall be inclined to draw much thft same conclusion. 
 
520 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 council of appointment consists, than the considerable number 
 of which the national senate would consist, we cannot hesitate 
 Vo pronounce, that the power of the chief magistrate of this 
 Atate, in the disposition of offices must, in practice, be greatly 
 superior to that of the chief magistrate of the union. 
 
 Hence it appears, that, except as to the concurrent authority 
 of the president in the article of treaties, it would be difficult 
 to determine whether that magistrate would, in the aggregate, 
 possess more or less power than the governor of New- York 
 And it appears yet more unequivocally, that there is no pre- 
 tence for the parallel which has been attempted between him 
 and the king of Great Britain. But to render the contrast, in 
 this respect, still more striking, it may be of use to throw the 
 principal circumstances of dissimilitude into a closer groupe. 
 
 The president of the United States, would be an officer 
 elected by the people for four years. The king of Great Britain, 
 is a perpetual and hereditary prince. The one would be amen- 
 able to personal punishment and disgrace : The person of the 
 other is sacred and inviolable. The one would have a qualified 
 negative upon the acts of the legislative body : The other has 
 an absolute negative. The one would have a right to command 
 the military and naval forces of the nation : The other, in 
 addition to this right, possesses that of declaring war, and of 
 raising and regulating fleets and armies by his own authority. 
 The one would have a concurrent power with a branch of the 
 legislature in the formation of treaties : The other is the sole 
 possessor of the power of making treaties. The one would have 
 a like concurrent authority in appointing to offices: The other 
 is the sole author of all appointments. The one can confer no 
 privileges whatever: The other can make denizens of aliens, 
 noblemen of commoners; can erect corporations with all the 
 rights incident to corporate bodies. The one can prescribe no 
 rules concerning the commerce or currency of the nation : The 
 other is in several respects the arbiter of commerce, and in this 
 capacity can establish markets and fairs, can regulate weights 
 and measures, can lay embargoes for a limited time, can coin 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 621 
 
 money, can authorize or prohibit the circulation of foreign coin 
 The one has no particle of spiritual jurisdiction: The other is 
 the supreme head and governor of the national church I — What 
 answer shall we give to those who would persuade us, that 
 things so unlike resemble each other? — The same that ought 
 to be given to those who tell us, that a government, the whole 
 power of which would be in the hands of the elective and 
 period ical servants of the people, is an aristocracy, a monarchy, 
 and a despotism. 
 
 PUBUUS. 
 
&22 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 NUMBER LXX. 
 
 NEW YORK, MARCH 18, 1788. 
 
 HAMILTON. 
 
 THE SAME VIEW CONTINUED, IN RELATION TO THE UNITY OF THE 
 EXECUTIVE, AND WITH AN EXAMINATION OF THE PROJECT OF 
 AN EXECUTIVE COUNCIL. 
 
 Theiie is an idea, which is not without its advocates, that a 
 vigorous executive is inconsistent with the genius of republicau 
 government. The enlightened well-wishers to this species of 
 government must at least hope, that the supposition is destitute 
 of foundation; since they can never admit its truth, without, 
 at the same time, admitting the condemnation of their own 
 principles. Energy in the executive, is a leading character in 
 the definition of good government. It is essential to the pro- 
 tection of the community against foreign attacks : It is n-ot 
 less essential to the steady administration of the laws, to the 
 protection of property against those irregular and high-handed 
 combinations, which sometimes interrupt the ordinary course 
 of justice, to the security of liberty against the enterprises and 
 assaults of ambition, of faction, and of anarchy. Every man, 
 the least conversant in Eoman story, knows how often that 
 republic was obliged to take refuge in the absolute power of a 
 single man, under the formidable title of dictator, as well 
 against the intrigues of ambitious individuals, who aspired to 
 the tyranny, and the seditions of whole classes of the commu- 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 523 
 
 nity, whose conduct threatened the existence of all government, 
 as against the invasions of external enemies, who menaced the 
 conquest and destruction of Eome. 
 
 There can be no need, however, to multiply arguments or 
 examples on this head. A feeble executive, implies a feeble 
 execution of the government. A feeble execution, is but 
 another phrase for a bad execution : and a government ill 
 executed, whatever it may be in theory, must be, in practice, 
 a bad government. 
 
 Taking it for granted, therefore, that all men of sense will 
 agree in the necessity of an energetic executive, it will only 
 remain to inquire, what are the ingredients which constitute 
 this energy ? How far can they be combined with those other 
 ingredients, which constitute safety in the republican sense ? 
 And how far does this combination characterize the plan which 
 has been reported by the convention ? 
 
 The ingredients which constitute energy in the executive 
 are, unity ; duration ; an adequate provision for its support ; 
 competent powers. 
 
 The ingredients which constitute safety in the republican 
 sense are, a due dependence on the people ; a due responsibility. 
 
 Those politicians and statesmen, who have been the most 
 celebrated for the soundness of their principles, and for the 
 justness of their views, have declared in favour of a single 
 executive, and a numerous legislature. They have, with great 
 propriety, considered energy as the most necessary qualification 
 of the former, and have regarded this as most applicable to 
 power in a single hand ; while they have, with equal propriety, 
 considered the latter as best adapted to deliberation and wis- 
 dom, and best calculated to conciliate the confidence of the 
 people, and to secure their privileges and interests. 
 
 That unity is conducive to energy, will not be disputed. 
 Decision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch, will generally charac- 
 terize the proceedings of one man, in a much more eminent 
 degree than the proceedings of any greater number; and in 
 
 44 
 
524 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 proportion as the number is incrousod, these qualities will be 
 diminished. 
 
 This unity may be destroyed in two ways ; either by vesting 
 the power in two or more magistrates, of equal dignity and 
 authority; or by vesting it ostensibly in one man, subject, in 
 whole or in part, to the control and co-operation of others, in 
 the capacity of counsellors to him. Of the first, the two con- 
 suls of Eome may serve as an example; of the last, we shall 
 find examples in the constitutions of several of the states. 
 New-York and New-Jersey, if I recollect right, are the only 
 states, which have intrusted the executive authority wholly to 
 eiiigle men.* Both these methods of destroying the unity of 
 the executive have their partizans; but the votaries of an 
 executive council are the most numerous. They are both liable, 
 if not to equal, to similar objections, and may in most lights bo 
 examined in conjunction. 
 
 The experience of other nations will afford little instruction 
 on this head. As far, however, as it teaches any thing, it 
 teaches us not to be enamoured of plurality in the executive. 
 We have seen that the Achseans, on an experiment of two 
 praetors, were induced to abolish one. The Koman history 
 records many instances of mischiefs to the republic from the 
 dissentions between the consuls, and between the military tri- 
 bunes, who were at times substituted to the consuls. But it 
 gives us no specimens of any peculiar advantages derived to 
 the state, from the plurality of those magistrates. That the 
 dissentions between them were not more frequent or more 
 fatal, is matter of astonishment; until we advert to the sin- 
 gular position in which the republic was almost continually 
 placed, and to the prudent policy pointed out by the eircum- 
 Btances of the state, and pursued by the consuls, of making a 
 division of the government between them. The patricians, 
 engaged in a perpetual struggle with the plebeians, for the pre- 
 
 * New-York has no council except for the single purpose of appointing to 
 offices ; New-Jersey has a council, whom the governor may consult. But I 
 think, from the terms of the constitution, their resolutions do Pot biwl him. 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 525 
 
 •ervation of their ancient authorities and dignities; the con- 
 suls, whc were generally chosen out of the former body, were 
 commonly united by the personal interest they had in the 
 defence of the privileges of their order. In addition to this 
 motive of union, after the arms of the republic had consider- 
 ably expanded the bounds of its empire, it became an estab- 
 lished custom with the consuls to divide the administration 
 between themselves by lot; one of them remaining at Rome to 
 govern the city and its environs; the other taking the com- 
 mand in the more distant provinces. This expedient must, no 
 doubt, have had great influence in preventing those collisions 
 and rivalships which might otherwise have embroiled the 
 republic. 
 
 But quitting the dim light of historical research, and attach- 
 ing ourselves purely to the dictates of reason and good sense, 
 we shall discover much greater cause to reject, than to approve, 
 the idea of plurality in the executive, under any modification 
 whatever. 
 
 Wherever two or more persons are engaged in any common 
 enterprise or pursuit, there is always danger of difference of 
 opinion. If it be a public trust or office, in which they are 
 cloathed with equal dignity and authority, there is peculiar 
 danger of personal emulation and even animosity. From 
 either, and especially from all these causes, the most bitter 
 disscntions are apt to spring. Whenever these happen, they 
 lessen the respectability, weaken the authority, and distract 
 the plans and operations of those whom they divide. If they 
 Hhould unfortunately assail the supreme executive magistracy 
 of a country, consisting of a plurality of persons, they might 
 impede or frustrate the most important measures of the govern- 
 ment, in the most critical emergencies of the state. And what 
 is still worse, they might split the community into violent and 
 irreconcilable factions, adhering differently to the different indi- 
 viduals who composed the magistracy. 
 
 Men often oppose a thing, merely because they have had no 
 agency in planning it, or because it may have been planned by 
 
526 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 those whom they dislike. But if they have been consulted, 
 and have happened to disapprove, opposition then becomes, in 
 their estimation, an indispensable duty of self-love. They seem 
 to think themselves bound in honour, and by all the motives 
 of personal infallibility, to defeat the success of what has been 
 resolved upon, contrary to their sentiments. Men of upright 
 and benevolent tempers, have too many opportunities of ro 
 marking with horror, to what desperate lengths this disposition 
 is sometimes carried, and how often the great interests of 
 society are sacrificed to the vanity, to the conceit, and to the 
 obstinacy of individuals, who have credit enough to make their 
 passions and their caprices interesting to mankind. Perhaps 
 the question now before the public, may, in its consequences, 
 aiford melancholy proofs of the effects of this despicable frailty, 
 or rather detestable vice in the human character. 
 
 Upon the principles of a free government, inconveniences 
 from the source just mentioned, must necessarily be submitted 
 to in the formation of the legislature ; but it is unnecessary, 
 and therefore unwise, to introduce them into the constitution 
 of the executive. It is here, too, that they may be most per- 
 nicious. In the legislature, promptitude of decision is oftener 
 an evil than a benefit. The differences of opinion, and the 
 jarrings of parties in that department of the government, 
 though they may sometimes obstruct salutary plans, yet often 
 promote deliberation and circumspection ; and serve to check 
 excesses in the majority. When a resolution too is once taken, 
 the opposition must be at an end. That resolution is a law, 
 and resistance to it punishable. But no favourable circum- 
 stances palliate, or atone for the disadvantages of dissention in 
 the executive department. Here they are pure and unmixed. 
 There is no point at which they cease to operate. They serve 
 to embarrass and weaken the execution of the plan or measure 
 to which they relate, from the first step to the final conclusion 
 of it. They constantly counteract those qualities in the execu- 
 tive, which are the most necessary ingredients in its compo- 
 sition — vigour and expedition; and this without any counter- 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 527 
 
 balancing good. In the conduct of war, in which the energy 
 of the executive is the bulwark of the national security, every 
 thing would be to be apprehended from its plurality. 
 
 It must be confessed, that these observations apply with 
 principal weight to the first case supposed, that is, to a plurality 
 of magistrates of equal dignity and authority j a scheme, the 
 advocates for which are not likely to form a numerous sect : 
 But they apply, though not with equal, yet with considerable 
 weight, to the project of a council, whose concurrence is made 
 constitutionally necessary to the operations of the ostensible 
 executive. An artful cabal in that council, would be able to 
 distract and to enervate the whole system of administration. 
 If no such cabal should exist, the mere diversity of views and 
 opinions, would alone be sufficient to tincture the exercise of 
 the executive authority with a spirit of habitual feebleness and 
 dilatoriness. 
 
 But one of the weightiest objections to a plurality in the 
 executive, and which lies as much against the last as the first 
 plan, is, that it tends to conceal faults, and destroy responsi- 
 bility. Responsibility is of two kinds, to censure and to pun- 
 ishment. The first is the most important of the two ; especially 
 in an elective office. Men in public trust, will much oftener act 
 in such a manner as to render them unworthy of being any 
 longer trusted, than in such a manner as to make them 
 obnoxious to legal punishment. But the multiplication of the 
 executive adds to the difficulty of detection in either case. It 
 often becomes impossible, amidst mutual accusations, to deter- 
 mine on whom the blame or the punishment of a pernicious 
 measure, or series of pernicious measures, ought really to fall. 
 It is shifted from one to another with so much dexterity, and 
 under such plausible apjDearances, that the public opinion is left 
 in suspense about the real author. The circumstances which 
 may have led to any national miscarriage or misfortune, are 
 Bometimes so complicated, that where there are a number of 
 actors who may have had different degrees and kinds of agency, 
 iliough we may clearly see upon the whole that there has been 
 
528 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 mismanagement, yet it may be impracticable to pronounce, to 
 whose account the evil which *uay have been incurred is truly 
 chargeable. 
 
 " I was overruled by my council. The council were so divided 
 in their opinions, that it was impossible to obtain any better 
 resolution on the point." These and similar pretexts are con- 
 stantly at hand, whether true or false. And who is there that 
 will either take the trouble, or incur the odium, of a strict 
 scrutiny into the secret springs of the transaction ? Should 
 there be found a citizen zealous enough to undertake the 
 unpromising task, if there happen to be a collusion between 
 the parties concerned, how easy is it to cloath the circumstances 
 with 80 much ambiguity, as to render it uncertain what was the 
 precise conduct of any of those parties ? 
 
 In the single instance in which the governor of this state is 
 coupled with a council, that is, in the appointment to offices, 
 we have seen the mischiefs of it in the view now under con- 
 sideration. Scandalous appointments to important offices have 
 been made. Some cases indeed have been so flagrant, that all 
 PARTIES have agreed in the impropriety of the thing. "When 
 inquiry has been made, the blame has been laid by the governor 
 on the members of the council; who on their part have charged 
 it upon his nomination : while the people remain altogether at 
 a loss to determine by whose influence their interests have been 
 committed to hands so manifestly improper. In tenderness to 
 individuals, I forbear to descend to particulars. 
 
 It is evident from these considerations, that the plurality of 
 the executive, tends to deprive the people of the two greatest 
 securities they can have for the faithful exercise of any dele- 
 gated power. First. The restraints of public opinion, which 
 lose their efficacy as well on account of the division of the 
 censure attendant on bad measures among a number, as on 
 account of the uncertainty on whom it ought to fall; and 
 secondly, the opportunity of discovering with facility and clear- 
 ness the misconduct of the persons they trust, in order either 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 529 
 
 to their removal from office, or to their actual puiixsnmeut. in 
 cases which admit of it. 
 
 In England, the king is a perpetual magistrate ; ana it is a 
 maxim which has obtained for the sake of the public peace, 
 that he is unaccountable for his administration, and his person 
 sacred Nothing, therefore, can bo wiser in that kingdom, than 
 to annex to the king a constitutional council, who ma}'' be 
 responsible to the nation for the advice they give. Without 
 Ais, there would be no responsibility whatever in the executive 
 department, an idea inadmissible in a free government. But 
 even there, the king is not bound by the resolutions of his 
 council, though they are answerable for the advice they give. 
 He is the absolute master of his own conduct in the exercise 
 of his office ; and may observe or disregard the counsel given 
 to him at his sole discretion. 
 
 But in a republic, where every magistrate ought to be per- 
 sonally responsible for his behaviour in office, the reason which 
 in the British constitution dictates the pi'opriety of a council, 
 not only ceases to apply, but turns against the institution. In 
 the monarchy of Great Britain, it furnishes a substitute for 
 the prohibited responsibility of the chief magistrate; which 
 serves in some degree as a hostage to the national justice for 
 his good behaviour. In the American republic it would s5rve 
 to destroy, or would greatly diminish the intended and neces- 
 sary responsibility of the chief magistrate himself. 
 
 The idea of a council to the executive, which has so generally 
 obtained in the state constitutions, has been derived from that 
 maxim of republican jealousy which considers power as safer 
 in the hands of a number of men than of a single man. If the 
 maxim should be admitted to be applicable to the case, I should 
 contend, that the advantage on that side would not counter- 
 balance the numerous disadvantages on the opposite side. But 
 I do not think the rule at all applicable to the executive power. 
 [ clearly concur in opinion in this particular with a writer whom 
 the celebrated Junius pronounces to be " deep, solid, and in- 
 genious," that "the executive power is more easily confined 
 
630 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 when it is one : " * That it is far more safe there should be a 
 single object for the jealousy and watchfulness of the people j 
 in a word, that all multiplication of the executive, is rather 
 dangerous than friendly to liberty. 
 
 A little consideration will satisfy us, that the species of secu- 
 rity sought for in the multiplication of the executive, is unat- 
 tainable. Numbers must be so great as to render combination 
 difficult; or they are rather a source of danger than of security. 
 The united credit and influence of several individuals, must be 
 more formidable to liberty, than the credit and influence of 
 either of them separately. When power, therefore, is placed 
 in the hands of so small a number of men, as to admit of their 
 interests and views being easily combined in a common enter- 
 prise, by an artful leader, it becomes more liable to abuse, and 
 more dangerous when abused, than if it be lodged in the hands 
 of one man; who, from the very circumstance of his being 
 alone, will be more narrowly watched and more readily sus- 
 pected, and who cannot unite so great a mass of influence as 
 when he is associated with others. The decemvirs of Borne, 
 whose name denotes their number,f were more to be dreaded 
 in their usurpation than any one of them would have been. 
 No person would think of proposing an executive much more 
 nuriierous than that body ; from six, to a dozen, have been sug- 
 gested for the number of the council. The extreme of these 
 numbers, is not too great for an easy combination ; and from 
 such a combination America would have more to fear, than 
 from the ambition of any single individual. A council to a 
 magistrate, who is himself responsible for what he does, are 
 generally nothing better than a clog upon his good intentions ; 
 are often the instruments and accomplices of his bad, and are 
 almost always a cloak to his faults. 
 
 I forbear to dwell upon the subject of expense ; though it be 
 evident that if the council should be numerous enough to an- 
 swer the principal end, aimed at by the institution, the salaries 
 of the members, who must be drawn from their homes to reside 
 * De Lolme. + Ten. 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 531 
 
 at the seat of government, would form an item in the catalogue 
 of public expenditures, too serious to be incurred for an object 
 of equivocal utility. 
 
 I will only add, that prior to the appearance of the constitu- 
 tion, I rarely met with an intelligent man from any of the 
 states, who did not admit as the result of experience, that the 
 unity of the executive of this state was one of the best of the 
 distinguishing features of our constitution. 
 
 PUBLIUS. 
 
532 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 NUMBER LXXI. 
 
 NEW YORK, MARCH 21, 1788. 
 
 HAMILTON. 
 
 THE SAME VIEW CONTINUED, IN REGARD TO THE DURATION OP 
 
 THE OFFICE. 
 
 Duration in office, has been mentioned as the second requi- 
 site to the energy of the executive authority. This has relatioii 
 to two objects : To the personal firmness of the chief magis- 
 trate, in the employment of his constitutional powers ; and to 
 the stability of the system of administration, which may have 
 been adopted under his auspices. With regard to the first, it 
 must be evident, that the longer the duration in office, the 
 greater will be the probability of obtaining so important an 
 advantage. It is a general principle of human nature, that a 
 man will be interested in whatever he possesses, in proportion 
 to the firmness or precariousness of the tenure by which he 
 holds it; will be less attached to what he holds by a momentary 
 or uncertain title, than to what he enjoys by a title durable or 
 certain; and, of course, will be willing to risk more for the 
 sake of the one, than of the other. This remark is not less 
 applicable to a political privilege, or honour, or trust, than to 
 any article of ordinary property. Tlie Inference from it is, 
 that a man acting in the capacity of chief magistrate, under a 
 consciousness that, in a very short time, he must lay down his 
 office, will be apt to feel himself too little interested in it, to 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 688 
 
 aazard any material censure or perplexity, from the independent 
 exertion of his powers, or from encountering the ill-humours, 
 however transient, which may happen to prevail, either in a 
 considerable part of the society itself, or even in a predominant 
 faction in the legislative body. If the case should only be, that 
 he might lay it down, unless continued by a new choice ; and if 
 lie should be desirous of being continued, his wishes, conspiring 
 with his fears, would tend still more powerfully to corrupt his 
 integrity, or debase his fortitude. In either case, feebleness and 
 irresolution must be the characteristics of the station. 
 
 There are some, who would be inclined to regard the servile 
 pliancy of the executive, to a prevailing current, either in the 
 community, or in the legislature, as its best recommendation. 
 But such men entertain very crude notions, as well of the pur- 
 poses for which government was instituted, as of the true 
 means by which the public happiness may be promoted. The 
 republican principle demands, that the deliberate sense of the 
 community should govern the conduct of those to whom they 
 intrust the management of their affairs; but it does not require 
 an unqualified complaisance to every sudden breeze of passion, 
 or to every transient impulse which the people may receive 
 from the arts of men, who flatter their prejudices to betray 
 their interests. It is a just obsei'vation, that the people com- 
 monly intend the public good. This often applies to their very 
 errors. But their good sense would despise the adulator who 
 should pretend, that they always reason right about the means 
 of promoting it. They know, from experience, that they some- 
 times err ; and the wonder is, that they so seldom err as they 
 do, beset, as they continually are, by the wiles of parasites and 
 sycophants; by the snares of the ambitious, the avaricious, the 
 desperate ; by the artifices of men who possess their confidence 
 more than they deserve it ; and of those who seek to possess, 
 rather than to deserve it. When occasions present themselves, 
 in which the interests of the people are at variance with their 
 inclinations, it is the duty of the persons whom they have 
 appointed, to be the guardians of those interests; to withstand 
 
534 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 the temporary delusion, in order to give them time and oppor- 
 tunity for more cool and sedate reflection. Instances might be 
 cited, in which a conduct of this kind has saved the people from 
 very fatal consequences of their own mistakes, and has pro- 
 cured lasting monuments of their gratitude to the men who 
 had courage and magnanimity enough to serve them at the 
 peril of their displeasure. 
 
 But however inclined we might be, to insist upon an un- 
 bounded complaisance in the executive to the inclinations of 
 the people, we can, with no propriety, contend for a like com- 
 plaisance to the humours of the legislature. The latter may 
 sometimes stand in opposition to the former; and at other 
 times the people may be entirely neutral. In either supposi- 
 tion, it is certainly desirable, that the executive should be in 
 a situation to dare to act his own opinion with vigour and 
 decision. 
 
 The same rule which teaches the propriety of a partition be- 
 tween the various branches of power, teaches, likewise, that 
 this partition ought to be so contrived as to render the one 
 independent of the other. To what purpose separate the exe- 
 cutive or the judiciary from the legislative, if both the execu- 
 tive and the judiciary are so constituted as to be at the absolute 
 devotion of the legislative ? Such a separation must be merely 
 nominal, and incapable of producing the ends for which it was 
 established. It is one thing to be subordinate to the laws, 
 another to be dependent on the legislative body. The first 
 comports with, the last violates, the fundamental principles of 
 good government; and whatever may be the forms of the con- 
 stitution, unites all power in the same hands. The tendency 
 of the legislative authority to absorb every other, has been 
 fully displayed and illustrated by examples in some preceding 
 numbers. In governments purely republican, this tendency is 
 almost irresistible. The representatives of the people, in a 
 popular assembly, seem sometimes to fancy, that they are the 
 people themselves, and betray strong symptoms of impatience 
 and disgust at the least sign of opposition from any other 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 686 
 
 quarter, as if the exercise of its rights, by either the executivo 
 f»r judiciary, were a breach of their privilege, and an outrage 
 10 their dignity. They often appear disposed to exert an 
 imperious control over the other departments; and, as they 
 <!ommonly have the people on their side, they always act with 
 dueh momentum, as to make it very difficult for the other 
 members of the government to maintain the balance of the 
 constitution. 
 
 It may perhaps be asked, how the shortness of the duration 
 in office can affect the independence of the executive on the 
 legislature, unless the one were possessed of the power of 
 appointing or displacing the other? One answer to this in- 
 quiry may be drawn from the principle already mentioned, 
 that is, from the slender interest a man is apt to take in a 
 short-lived advantage, and the little inducement it affords him 
 to expose himself, on account of it, to any considerable incon- 
 venience or hazard. Another answer, perhaps more obvious, 
 though not more conclusive, will result from the circumstance 
 of the influence of the legislative body over the people ; which 
 might be employed to prevent the re-election of a man who, by 
 an upright resistance to any sinister project of that body, 
 should have made himself obnoxious to its resentment. 
 
 It may be asked also, whether a duration of four years would 
 answer the end proposed ? and if it would not, whether a less 
 period, which would at least be, recommended by greater secu- 
 rity against ambitious designs, would not, for that reason, be 
 preferable to a longer period, which was, at the same time, too 
 short for the purpose of inspiring the desired firmness and 
 independence of the magistrate ? 
 
 It cannot be affirmed, that a duration of four years, or any 
 other limited duration, would completely answer the end pro- 
 posed; but it would contribute towards it in a degree which 
 would have a material influence upon the spirit and character 
 of the government. Between the commencement and termi- 
 nation of such a period, there would always be a considerable 
 
536 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 interval, in which the prospect of an annihilation would be 
 sufficiently remote, not to have an improper effect upon the 
 conduct of a man endued with a tolerable portion of fortitude ; 
 and in which he might reasonably promise himself, that there 
 would be time enough before it arrived, to make the commu- 
 nity sensible of the propriety of the measures he might incline 
 to pursue. Though it be probable that, as he approached the 
 moment when the public were, by a new election, to signify 
 their sense of his conduct, his confidence, and with it his firm- 
 ness, would decline; yet both the one and the other would 
 derive support from the opportunities which his previous con- 
 tinuance in the station had afforded him, of establishing him- 
 self in the esteem and good will of his constituents. He might 
 then, with prudence, hazard the incurring of reproach, in pro- 
 portion to the proofs he had given of his wisdom and integrity, 
 and to the title he had acquired to the respect and attachment 
 of his fellow citizens. As, on the one hand, a duration of four 
 years will contribute to the firmness of the executive in a suf- 
 ficient degree to render it a very valuable ingredient in the 
 composition; so, on the other, it is not long enough to justify 
 any alarm for the public liberty. If a British house of com- 
 mons, from the most feeble beginnings, from the mere power of 
 assenting or disagreeing to the imposition of a new tax, have, by 
 rapid strides, reduced the prerogatives of the crown, and the 
 privileges of the nobility, within the limits they conceived to 
 be compatible with the principles of a free government ; while 
 they raised themselves to the rank and consequence of a co- 
 equal branch of the legislature; if they have been able, in one 
 instance, to abolish both the royalty and the aristocracy, and 
 to overturn all the ancient establishments, as well in the 
 church as state; if they have been able, on a recent occasion, 
 to make the monarch tremble at the prospect of an innovation * 
 
 * This was the case with respect to Mr. Fox's India bill, which was carried 
 in the house of commons, and rejected in the house of lords, to the entire 
 satisfaction, %8 it is said, of the people. 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 687 
 
 attempted by them; what would be to be feared from an 
 elective magistrate of four years duration, with the confined 
 authorities of a president of the United States ? What but that 
 he might be unequal to the task which the constitution assigns 
 him ? I shall only add, that if his duration be such as to leave 
 a doubt of his firmness, that doubt is inconsistent with a 
 jealousy of his encroachments. 
 
 PUBLIUS 
 
538 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 NUMBER LXXII. 
 
 NEW YORK, MARCH 21, 1788. 
 
 HAMILTON. 
 
 THE SAME VIEW CONTINUED, IN REGARD TO THE RE-ELIGIBILITT 
 OF THE PRESIDENT. 
 
 The administration of government, in its largest sense, 
 comprehends all the operations of the body politic, whether 
 legislative, executive, or judiciary; but in its most usual, and 
 perhaps in its most precise signification, it is limited to execu- 
 tive details, and falls peculiarly within the province of the 
 executive department. The actual conduct of foreign nego- 
 ciations, the preparatory plans of finance, the application and 
 disbursement of the public monies, in conformity to the general 
 appropriations of the legislature, the arrangement of the army 
 and navy, the direction of the operations of war; these, and 
 other matters of a like nature, constitute what seems to be 
 most properly understood by the administration of government. 
 The persons, therefore, to whose immediate management these 
 different matters are committed, ought to be considered as the 
 assistants or deputies of the chief magistrate; and, on this 
 account, they ought to derive their offices from his appoint- 
 ment, at least from his nomination, and to be subject to his 
 superintendence. This view of the thing will at once suggest 
 to us the intimate connexion between the duration of the 
 executive magistrate in office, and the stability of the system 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 589 
 
 ol administration. To undo what has been done by a prede- 
 cessor, is very often considered by a successor, as the best 
 proof he can give of his own capacity and desert j and, ii* 
 addition to this propensity, where the alteration has been the 
 result of public choice, the person substituted is warranted in 
 supposing, that the dismission of his predecessor has proceeded 
 from a dislike to his measures, and that the less he resembles 
 him, the more he will recommend himself to the favour of his 
 constituents. These considerations, and the influence of per- 
 sonal confidences and attachments, would be likelj^ to induce 
 every new president to promote a change of men to fill the sub- 
 ordinate stations; and these causes together, could not fail to 
 occasion a disgraceful and ruinous mutability in the adminis- 
 tration of the government. 
 
 With a positive duration of considerable extent, I connect 
 the circumstance of re-eligibility. The first is necessary, to 
 give the officer himself the inclination, and the resolution to 
 act his part well, and to the community time and leisure to 
 observe the tendency of his measures, and thence to form an 
 experimental estimate of their merits. The last is necessary 
 to enable the people, when they see reason to approve of his 
 conduct, to continue him in the station, in order to prolong the 
 utility of his talents and virtues, and to secure to the govern- 
 ment, the advantage of permanency in a wise system of adminis- 
 tration. 
 
 Nothing appears more plausible at first sight, nor more ill 
 founded upon close inspection, than a scheme which, in relation 
 to the present point, has had some respectable advocates — 1 
 mean that of continuing the chief magistrate in office for a 
 certain time, and then excluding him from it, either for a 
 limited period or for ever after. This exclusion, whether tem- 
 porary or perpetual, would have nearly the same effects ; and 
 these effects would be for the most part rather pernicious than 
 salutary. 
 
 One ill effect of the exclusion would be. a diminution of the 
 inducements to good behaviour. There are few men who would 
 
 45 
 
540 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 not feel much less zeal in the discharge of a duty, when they 
 were conscious that the advantage of the station, with which 
 it was connected, must be relinquished at a determinate period, 
 than when they were permitted to entertain a hope of obtaining 
 by meriting a continuance of them. This position will not be 
 disputed, so long as it is admitted, that the desire of reward is 
 one of the strongest incentives of human conduct; or that the 
 best security for the fidelity of mankind, is to make interest 
 coincide with duty. Even the love of fame, the ruling passion 
 of the noblest minds, which would prompt a man to plan and 
 undertake extensive and arduous enterprises for the public 
 benefit, requiring considerable time to mature and perfect them, 
 if he could flatter himself with the prospect of being allowed 
 to finish what he had begun, would, on the contrary, deter him 
 from the undertaking, when he foresaw that he must quit the 
 scene before he could accomplish the work, and must commit 
 that, together with his own reputation, to hands which might 
 be unequal or unfriendly to the task. The most to be expected 
 from the generality of men, in such a situation, is the negative 
 merit of not doing harm, instead of the positive merit of doing 
 good. 
 
 Another ill effect of the exclusion, would be the temptation 
 to sordid views, to peculation, and in some instances, to usurpa- 
 tion. An avaricious man, who might happen to fill the ofiice, 
 looking forward to a time when he must at all events yield up 
 the advantages he enjoyed, would feel a propensity, not easy to 
 be resisted by such a man, to make the best use of his opportu- 
 nities, while they lasted; and might not scruple to have recourse 
 to the most corrupt expedients to make the harvest as abundant 
 as it was transitory ; though the same person probably, with a 
 different prospect before him, might content himself with the 
 regular emoluments of his station, and might even be unwilling 
 to risk the consequences of an abuse of his opportunities. His 
 avarice might be a guard upon his avarice. Add to this, that 
 the same man might be vain or ambitious as well as avaricious 
 And if he could expect to prolong his honours by his ^ood con 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 541 
 
 duct, he miglit hesitate to sacrifice his appetite for them, lo his 
 appetite for gain. But with the prospect before him of approach- 
 ing an inevitable annihilation, his avarice would be likely to get 
 the victory over his caution, his vanity, or his ambition. 
 
 An ambitious man too, finding himself seated on the summit 
 of his country's honours, looking forward to the time at which 
 he must descend from the exalted emii ence for ever, and reflect- 
 ing that no exertion of merit on his part could save him from 
 the unwelcome reverse, would be much more violently tempted 
 to embrace a favourable conjuncture for attempting the pro- 
 longation of his power, at every personal hazard, than if he 
 had the probability of answering the same end by doing his 
 duty. 
 
 Would it promote the peace of the community, or the stability 
 of the government, to have half a dozen men who had had 
 credit enough to raise themselves to the seat of the supreme 
 magistracy, wandering among the people like discontented 
 ghosts, and sighing for a place, which they were destined never 
 more to possess ? 
 
 A third ill effect of the exclusion would be, the depriving the 
 community of the advantage of the experience gained by the 
 chief magistrate in the exercise of his office. That experience 
 IS the parent of wisdom, is an adage, the truth of which is 
 recognized by the wisest as well as the simplest of mankind 
 What more desirable or more essential than this quality in the 
 governors of nations ? Where more desirable or more essential, 
 than in the first magistrate of a nation ? Can it be wise to put 
 this desirable and essential quality under the ban of the con- 
 stitution; and to declare that the moment it is acquired, its 
 possessor shall be compelled to abandon the station in which it 
 was acquired, and to whi:;h it is adapted ? This, nevertheless, 
 is the precise import of all those regulations which exclude 
 men from serving their country, by the choice of their fellow 
 citizens, after they have, by a course of service, fitted them« 
 selves for doing it with a greater degree of utility. 
 
542 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 A fourth ill effect of the exclusion would be, tl e banishing 
 men from stations in which, in certain emergencies of the state, 
 their presence might be of the greatest moment to the jjublic 
 interest or safety. There is no nation which has not, at one 
 period or another, experienced an absolute necessity of the 
 services of particular men, in particular situations, perhaps it 
 would not be too strong to say, to the preservation of its 
 political existence. How unwise, therefore, must be every 
 8uch self-denying ordinance, as serves to prohibit a nation 
 from making use of its own citizens, in the manner best suited 
 to its exigencies and circumstances ! Without supposing the 
 personal essentiality of the man, it is evident that a change 
 of the chief magistrate, at the breaking out of a war, or any 
 similar crisis, for another even of equal merit, would at all 
 times be detrimental to the community; inasmuch as it would 
 substitute inexperience to experience, and would tend t3 
 unhinge and set afloat the already settled train of the admin- 
 istration. 
 
 A fifth ill effect of the exclusion would be, that it would 
 operate as a constitutional interdiction of stability in the 
 administration. By inducing the necessity of a change of men, 
 in the first office in the nation, it would necessarily lead to a 
 mutability of measures. It is not generally to be expected, 
 that men will vary ; and measures remain uniform. The con- 
 trary is the usual course of thin^^s. And we need not be appre- 
 hensive that there will be too much stability, while there is 
 even the option of changing; nor need we desire to prohibit 
 the people from continuing their confidence where they think 
 it may be safely placed, and where, by constancy on their part, 
 they may obviate the fatal inconveniences of fluctuating cour 
 cils and a variable policy. 
 
 These are some of the disadvantages, which would flow from 
 the principle of exclusion. They apply most forcibly to the 
 scheme of a perpetual exclusion ; but when we consider, that 
 even a partial one would always render the re-admission of the 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 543 
 
 person a remote and precarious object, the observations which 
 have been made will apply nearly as fully to one case as to the 
 other. 
 
 What are the advantages promised to counterbalance the 
 evils ? They are represented to be : 1st. Greater independence 
 in the magistrate : 2d. Greater security to the people. Unless 
 the exclusion be perpetual, there will be no pretence to infer 
 the first advantage. But even in that case, may he have no 
 object beyond his present station to which he may sacrifice his 
 independence ? May he have no connexions, no friends, for 
 whom he may sacrifice it ? May he not be less willing, by a 
 firm conduct, to make personal enemies, when he acts under 
 the impression, that a time is fast approaching, on the arrival 
 of which he not only may, but must be exposed to their resent- 
 ments, upon an equal, perhaps upon an inferior footing ? It 
 is not an easy point to determine, whether his independence 
 would be most promoted or impaired by such an arrangement. 
 
 As to the second supposed advantage, there is still greater 
 reason to entertain doubts concerning it, especially if the ex- 
 clusion were to be perpetual. In this case, as already inti- 
 mated, a man of irregular ambition, of whom alone there could 
 be reason in any case to entertain apprehensions, would, with 
 infinite reluctance, yield to the necessity of taking his leave 
 for ever of a post, in which his passion for power and pre- 
 eminence had acquired the force of habit. And if he had been 
 fortunate or adroit enough to conciliate the good will of the 
 people, he might induce them to consider as a very odious and 
 unjustifiable restraint upon themselves, a provision which was 
 calculated to debar them of the right of giving a fresh proof 
 of their attachment to a favourite. There may be conceived 
 nircumstances in which this disgust of the people, seconding 
 the thwarted ambition of such a favourite, might occasion 
 greater danger to liberty, than could ever reasonably be dreaded 
 from the possibility of a perpetuation in office, by the volun- 
 tary sufi^rages of the community, exercising a constitutional 
 privilege. 
 
544 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 There is an excess of refinement in the idea of disabling the 
 people to continue in oflSce men who had entitled themselves, 
 in their opinion, to approbation and confidence; the advantages 
 of which are at best speculative and equivocal, and are over- 
 balanced by disadvantages far more certain and decisive. 
 
 PUBLIUS. 
 
THE IfEDERALIST. 64.? 
 
 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 NUMBER LXXIII. 
 
 NEW YORK, MARCH 21, 1788. 
 
 HAMILTON. 
 
 THE SAME yiEW CONTINUED, IN RELATION TO THE PROVISION 
 CONCERNING SUPPORT, AND THE POWER OF THE NEGATIVE. 
 
 The third ingredient towards constituting the vigour of the 
 executive authority, is an adequate provision for its support. 
 It is evident that, without proper attention to this article, the 
 separation of the executive from the legislative department, 
 would be merely nominal and nugatory. The legislature, with 
 a discretionary power over the salary and emoluments of the 
 chief magistrate, could render him as obsequious to their will, 
 as they might think proper to make him. They might, in 
 most cases, either reduce him by famine, or tempt him by 
 largesses, to surrender at discretion his judgment to their 
 inclinations. These expressions, taken in all the latitude of 
 the terms, would no doubt convey more than is intended 
 There are men who could neither be distressed, nor won, into a 
 sacrifice of their duty ; but this stern virtue is the growth of 
 few soils : And in the main it will be found, that a power over 
 a man's support, is a power over his will. If it were necessary 
 to confirm so plain a truth by facts, examples would not be 
 wanting, even in this country, of the intimidation or seduction 
 
54G THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 of the executive by the terrors, or allurements, of the pecuniary 
 arrangements of the legislative body. 
 
 It is not easy, therefore, to commend too highly the judicious 
 attention which has been paid to this subject in the proposed 
 constitution. It is there provided, that " The president of the. 
 United States shall at stated times receive for his service a. 
 compensation, which shall neither he increased nor diminished^ during 
 the period for which he shall have been elected, and he shall not re- 
 ceive within that period any other emolument from the United 
 States, or any of them." It is impossible to imagine any pro- 
 vision which would have been more eligible than this. The 
 legislature, on the appointment of a president, is once for all 
 to declare what shall be the compensation for his services 
 during the time for which he shall have been elected. This 
 done, they will have no power to alter it either by increase or 
 diminution, till a new period of service by a new election com- 
 mences. They can neither weaken his fortitude by operating 
 upon his necessities, nor corrupt his integrity by appealing to 
 his avarice. Neither the union, nor any of its members, will 
 be at liberty to give, nor will he be at liberty to receive, any 
 other emolument, than that which may have been determined 
 by the first act. He can of course have no pecuniary induce- 
 ment to renounce or desert the independence intended for him 
 by the constitution. 
 
 The last of the requisites to energy, which have been enume* 
 rated, is competent powers. Let us proceed to consider those 
 which are proposed to be vested in the president of the United 
 States. 
 
 The first thing that oflfers itself to our observation, is the 
 qualified negative of the president upon the acts or resolutioiib 
 of the two houses of the legislature ; or, in other words, his 
 power of returning all bills with objections, which will have 
 the effect of preventing their becoming laws, unless they should 
 afterwards be ratified by two-thirds of each of the component 
 members of the legislative body. 
 
 The propensity of the legislative department to intrude upon 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 547 
 
 tne rights, and to absorb the powers, of the other departments, 
 has been already more than once suggested ; the insufficiency 
 of a mei'e parchment delineation of the boundaries of each, 
 has also been remarked upon ; and the necessity of furnishing 
 each with constitutional arms for its own defence, has been 
 inferred and proved. From these clear and indubitable princi- 
 ples results the propriety of a negative, either absolute or 
 qualified, in the executive, upon the acts of the legislative 
 branches. "Without the one or the other, the former would be 
 absolutely unable to defend himself against the depredations 
 of the latter. He might gradually be stripped of his authori- 
 ties by successive resolutions, or annihilated by a single vote. 
 And in the one mode or the other, the legislative and executive 
 powers might speedily come to be blended in the same hands. 
 If even no propensity had ever discovered itself in the legisla- 
 tive body, to invade the rights of the executive, the rules of 
 just reasoning and theoretic propriety would of themselves 
 teach us, that the one ought not to be left at the mercy of the 
 other, but ought to possess a constitutional and effectual power 
 of self-defence. 
 
 But the power in question has a further use. It not only 
 serves as a shield to the executive, but it furnishes an addi- 
 tional security against the enaction of improper laws. It 
 establishes a salutary check upon the legislative body, calcu- 
 lated to guard the community against the effects of faction, 
 precipitancy, or of any impulse unfriendly to the public good, 
 which may happen to influence a majority of that body. 
 
 The propriety of a negative has, upon some occasions, been 
 combatted by an observation, that it was not to be presumed a 
 single man would possess more virtue or wisdom than a number 
 of men; and that, unless this presumption should be enter- 
 tained, it would be improper to give the executive magistrate 
 any species of control over the legislative body. 
 
 But this observation, when examined, will appear rather 
 specious than solid. The propriety of the thing does not turn 
 flpon the supposition of superior wisdom or virtue in the exenu- 
 
548 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 tive; but upon the supposition, that the legislative will not be 
 infallibli^; that the love of power may sometimes betray it 
 into a disposition to encroach upon the rights of the other 
 members of the government; that a spirit of faction may 
 sometimes pervert its deliberations; that impressions of the 
 moment may sometimes hurry it into measures which itself, on 
 mature reflection, would condemn. The primary inducement 
 to conferring the power in question upon the executive, is to 
 enable him to defend himself; the secondary, is to increase the 
 chances in favour of the community against the passing of bad 
 laws, through haste, inadvertence, or design. The oftener a 
 measure is brought under examination, the greater the diver- 
 sity in the situations of those who are to examine it, the less 
 must be the danger of those errors which flow from want of 
 due deliberation, or of those misteps which proceed from the 
 contagion of some common passion or interest. It is far less 
 probable, that culpable views of any kind should infect all the 
 parts of the government at the same moment, and in relation 
 to the same object, than that they should by turns govern and 
 mislead every one of them. 
 
 It may perhaps be said, that the power of preventing bad laws 
 includes that of preventing good ones; and may be used to the 
 one purj^ose as well as to the other. But this objection will 
 have little weight with those who can properly estimate the 
 mischiefs of that inconstancy and mutability in the laws, which 
 form the greatest blemish in the character and genius of our 
 governments. They will consider every institution calculated 
 to restrain the excess of law-making, and to keep things in the 
 same state in which they may happen to be at any given period, 
 as much more likely to do good than harm; because it is favour- 
 able to greater stability in the system of legislation. The injury 
 which may possibly be done by defeating a few good laws, will 
 be amply compensated by the advantage of preventing a num- 
 ber of bad ones. 
 
 Nor is this all. The superior weight and influence of the 
 legislative body in a free government, and the hazard to the 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 d49 
 
 executive in a trial of strength with that body, aflfbrd a satis- 
 factory security, that the negative would generally be employed 
 with great caution; and that, in its exercise, there would oftener 
 be room for a charge of timidity than of rashness. A king of 
 Great Britain, with all his train of sovereign attributes, and 
 with all the influence he draws from u thousand sources, would, 
 at this day, hesitate to put a negative upon the joint resolutions 
 of the two houses of parliament. He would not fail to exert 
 the utmost resources of that influence to strangle a measure 
 disagreeable to him, in its progress to the throne, to avoid 
 being reduced to the dilemma of permitting it to take effect, 
 or of risking the displeasure of the nation, by an opposition to 
 the sense of the legislative body. Nor is it probable, that he 
 would ultimately venture to exert his prerogative, but in a case 
 of manifest propriety, or extreme necessity. All well-informed 
 men in that kingdom will accede to the justness of this remark. 
 A very considerable period has elapsed since the negative of 
 the crown has been exercised. 
 
 If a magistrate, so powerful, and so well fortified, as a British 
 monarch, would have scruples about the exercise of the power 
 under consideration, how much greater caution may be reason- 
 ably expected in a president of the United States, cloathed, for 
 the short period of four years, with the executive authority of 
 a government wholly and purely republican ? 
 
 It is evident, that there would bo greater danger of his not 
 using his power when necessary, than of his using it too often, 
 or too much. An argument, indeed, against its expediency, has 
 been drawn from this very source. It has been represented, on 
 this account, as a power odious in appearance, useless in prac- 
 tice. But it will not follow, that because it might rarely, it 
 would never be exercised. In the case for which it is chiefly 
 designed, that of an immediate attack upon the constitutional 
 rights of the executive, or in a case in which the public good 
 was evidently and palpably sacrificed, a man of tolerable firm- 
 ness would avail himself of his constitutional means of defence, 
 and would listen to the admonitions of duty and responsibility. 
 
550 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 In l.ho former supposition, his fortitude would be stiinulatfad by 
 his immediate interest in the power of his office ; in the latter, 
 by the probability of the sanction of his constituents; who, 
 though they would naturally incline to the legislative body 
 in a doubtful case, would hardly suffer their partiality to delude 
 them in a very plain one. I speak now with an eye to a magis- 
 trate possessing only a common share of firmness. There are 
 men who, under any circumstances, will have the courage to 
 do their duty at every hazard. 
 
 But the convention have pursued a mean in this business, 
 which will both facilitate the exercise of the power vested 
 in this respect in the executive magistrate, and make its 
 efficacy to depend on the sense of a considerable part of 
 the legislative body. Instead of an absolute, it is proposed 
 to give the executive the qualified negative, already described. 
 This is a power which would be much more readily exercised 
 than the other. A man who might be afraid to defeat a law 
 by his single veto, might not scruple to return it for re-con- 
 sideration; subject to being finally rejected, only in the event 
 of more than one-third of each house, concurring in the suf- 
 ficiency of his objections. He would be encouraged by the 
 reflection, that if his opposition should prevail, it would embark 
 in it a very respectable proportion of the legislative body, 
 whose influence would be united with his in supporting the 
 propriety of his conduct in the public opinion. A direct and 
 categorical negative has something in the appearance of it more 
 harsh, and more apt to irritate, than the mere suggestion of 
 argumentative objections to be approved or disapproved, by 
 those to whom they are addressed. In proportion as it would 
 be less apt to offend, it would be more apt to be exercised; and 
 for this very reason it may in practice be found more effectual. 
 It is to be hoped that it will not often happen, that improper 
 views will govern so large a proportion as two-thirds of both 
 branches of the legislature at the same time ; and this too in 
 defiance of the counterpoising weight of the executive. It is 
 at any rate far less probable, thai this should be the case, than 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 551 
 
 <hat such views should taint the resolutions and conduct of a 
 bare majority. A power of this nature in the executive, ;vill 
 often have a silent and unperceived, though forcible, operation. 
 When men, engaged in unjustifiable pursuits, are aware, tha» 
 obstructions may come from a quarter which they cannot 
 control, they will often be restrained by the bare apprehen- 
 sion of opposition, from doing what they would with eager 
 ness rush into, if no such external impediments were to be 
 feared. 
 
 This qualified negative, as has been elsewhere remarked, is 
 in this state vested in a council, consisting of the governor, 
 with the chancellor and judges of the supreme court, or any 
 two of them. It has been freely employed upon a variety of 
 occasions, and frequently with success. And its utility has 
 become so apparent, the persons who, in compiling the con- 
 stitution, were its violent opposers, have from experience 
 become its declared admirers.* 
 
 I have in another place remarked, that the convention, in the 
 formation of this part of their plan, had departed from the 
 model of the constitution of this state, in favour of that of 
 Massachupotts. Two strong reasons may be imagined for this 
 preference. One, that the judges, who are to be the interpre- 
 ters of tho law, might receive an improper bias, from having 
 given a previous opinion in their revisionary capacity. The 
 other, that by being often associated with the executive, they 
 might be induced to embark too far in the political views of 
 that magistrate, and thus a dangerous combination might by 
 degrees be cemented between the executive and judiciary de- 
 partments. It is impossible to keep the judges too distinct 
 from every other avocation than that of expounding the laws. 
 It is peculiarly dangerous to place them in a situation to be 
 either corrupted or influenced by the executive. 
 
 PUBLIUS. 
 
 * Mr. Abraham Yates, a warm opponent of the plan of the conyention, is 
 of this number. 
 
552 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 NUMIBER LXXIV. 
 
 NEW YORK, MARCH 25, 1788. 
 
 HAMILTON. 
 
 THE SAME VIEW CONTINUED, IN RELATION TO THE COMMAND OF 
 THE NATIONAL FORCES, AND THE POWER OF PARDONING. 
 
 The president of the United States, is to be commander " in 
 chief of the army and navy of the United States, and of the 
 militia of the several states when called into the actual service of 
 the United States." The propriety of this provision is so evi- 
 dent, and it is, at the same time, so consonant to the precedents 
 of the state constitutions in general, that little need be said to 
 explain or enforce it. Even those of them which have, in other 
 respects, coupled the chief magistrate with a council, have for 
 the most part concentrated the military authority in him alone. 
 Of all the cares or concerns of government, the direction of 
 war most peculiarly demands those qualities which distinguish 
 the exercise of power by a single hand. The direction of war, 
 implies the direction of the common strength : and the power 
 of directing and employing the common strength, forms an 
 usual and essential part in the definition of the executive 
 authority. 
 
 " The president may require the opinion, in writing, of the 
 principal officer in each of the executive departments, upon any 
 subject relating to the dutien of their respective offices." This 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 553 
 
 I consider as a mere redundancy in the plan j as the right for 
 which it provides would result of itself from the office. 
 
 He is also authorized " to grant reprieves and pardons for 
 offences against the United States, except in cases of impeach- 
 ment." Humanity and good policy conspire to dictate, that 
 the benign prerogative of pardoning, should be as little as 
 possible fettered or embarrassed. The criminal code of every 
 country partakes so much of necessary severity, that without 
 an easy access to exceptions in favour of unfortunate guilt, 
 justice would wear a countenance too sanguinary and cruel. 
 As the sense of responsibility is always strongest, in proportion 
 as it is undivided, it may be inferred, that a single man would 
 be most ready to attend to the force of those motives, which 
 might plead for a mitigation of the rigour of the law, and least 
 apt to yield to considerations, which were calculated to shelter 
 a fit object of its vengeance. The reflection that the fate of a 
 fellow creature depended on his sole fiat, would naturally inspire 
 scrupulousness and caution : The dread of being accused of 
 weakness or connivance, would beget equal circumspection, 
 though of a different kind. On the other hand, as men gener- 
 ally derive confidence from their number, they might often 
 encourage each other in an act of obduracy, and might be less 
 sensible to the apprehension of censure for an injudicious or 
 affected clemency. On these accounts, one man appears to be 
 a more eligible dispenser of the mercy of the government than 
 a body of men. 
 
 The expediency of vesting the power of pardoning in the 
 president has, if I mistake not, been only contested in relation 
 to the crime of treason. This, it has been urged, ought to 
 have depended upon the assent of one, or both of the branches 
 of the legislative body. I shall not deny that there are strong 
 reasons to be assigned for requiring in this particular the con- 
 currence of that body, or of a part of it. As treason is a crime 
 levelled at the immediate being of the society, when the laws 
 have once ascertained the guilt of the offender, there seems a 
 
654 THK FEDERALIST. 
 
 fitness in referring the expediency of an act of mercy towards 
 biin to the judgment of the legislature. And this ought the 
 rather to be the case, as the supposition of the connivance of 
 tne chief magistrate ought not to be entirely excluded. But 
 there are also strong objections to such a plan. It is not to be 
 doubted that a single man of prudence and good sense, is 
 better fitted, in delicate conjunctures, to balance the motives 
 which may plead for and against the remission of the punish- 
 ment, than any numerous body whatever. It deserves par- 
 ticular attention, that treason will often be connected with 
 seditions, which embrace a large proportion of the community ; 
 as lately happened in Massachusetts. In every such case, we 
 might expect to see the representation of the people tainted 
 with the same spirit which had given birth to the offence. 
 And when parties were pretty equally poised, the secret sym- 
 pathy of the friends and favourers of the condemned, availing 
 itself of the good nature and weakness of others, might fre- 
 quently bestow impunity where the terror of an example was 
 necessary. On the other hand, when the sedition had pro- 
 ceeded from causes which had inflamed the resentments of the 
 major party, they might often be found obstinate and inex- 
 orable, when policy demanded a conduct of forbearance and 
 clemency. But the principal argument for reposing the power 
 of pardoning in this case in the chief magistrate, is this : In 
 seasons of insurrection or rebellion, there are often critical 
 moments, when a well-timed offer of pardon to the insurgents 
 or rebels may restore the tranquillity of the commonwealth ; 
 and which, if suffered to pass unimproved, it may never be 
 possible afterwards to recall. The dilatory process of con- 
 vening the legislature, or one of its branches, for the purpose 
 of obtaining its sanction, would frequently be the occasion of 
 letting slip the golden opportunity. The loss of a week, a day, 
 an hour, may sometimes be fatal. If it should be observed 
 that a discretionary power, with a ■view to such contingencies, 
 might be occasionally conferred upon the president; it may be 
 
THE FEDERALIST, 665 
 
 answered in the first place, that it is questionable whether, ia 
 a limited constitution, that power could be delegated by law ; 
 and in the second place, that it would generally be impolitic 
 before-hand to take any step which might hold out the pros- 
 pect of impunity. A proceeding of this kind, out of the usual 
 course, would be likely to be construed into an argument of 
 timidity or of weakness, and would have a tendency to em- 
 bolden guilt. 
 
 PUBLIUS 
 
 16 
 
55d THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 NUMBER LXXV. 
 
 NEW YORK, MARCH 28, 1788. 
 
 HAMILTON. 
 
 THE SAME VIEW CONTINUED, IN RELATION TO THE POWER OP 
 MAKINU TREATIES. 
 
 The president is to have power, *' by and with the advice and 
 consent of the senate, to make treaties, provided two-thirds of 
 the senators present concur." 
 
 Though this provision has been assailed on different grounds, 
 with no small degree of vehem»Qce, I scruple not to declare my 
 tlrm persuasion, that it is one of the best digested and most 
 anexceptionable parts of the plan. One ground of objection 
 is, the trite topic of the intermixture of powers; some con- 
 tending, that the president ought alone to possess the preroga- 
 tive of making treaties; others, that it ought to have been 
 exclusively deposited in the senate. Another source of objec- 
 tion, is derived from the small number of persons by whom a 
 treaty may be made : Of those who espouse this objection, a 
 part are of opinion, that the house of representatives ought to 
 have been associated" in the business, while another part seem 
 to think that nothing more was necessary than to have substi- 
 tuted two-thirds of all the members of the senate, to two-thirds 
 of the members present. As I flatter myself the observations 
 made in a preceding number, upon this part of the plan, must 
 have sufficed to place it, to a discerning eye, in a very favour. 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 557 
 
 able light, I shall here content myself with oflEeriiig only some 
 supplementary remarks, principally with a view to the objec- 
 tions which have been just stated. 
 
 With regard to the intermixture of powers, I shall rely upon 
 the explanations heretofore given, of the true sense of the 
 rule upon which that objection is founded; and shall take it 
 for granted, as an inference from them, that the union of the 
 executive with the senate, in the article of treaties, is no 
 infringement of that rule. I venture to add, that the parti- 
 cular nature of the power of making treaties, indicates a pecu- 
 liar propriety in that union. Though several writers on the 
 subject of government place that power in the class of execu- 
 tive authorities, yet this is evidently an arbitrary disposition : 
 For if we attend carefully to its operation, it will be found to 
 partake more of the legislative than of the executive character, 
 though it does not seem strictly to fall within the definition of 
 either. The essence of the legislative authority is to enact 
 laws, or, in other words, to prescribe rules for the regulation 
 of the society; while the execution of the laws, and the em- 
 ployment of the common strength, either for this purpose, or 
 for the common defence, seem to comprise all the functions of 
 the executive magistrate. The power of making treaties is, 
 plainly neither the one nor the other. It relates neither to the 
 execution of the subsisting laws, nor to the enaction of new 
 ones; and still less to an exertion of the common strength. 
 Its objects are, contracts with foreign nations, which have 
 the force of law, but derive it from the obligations of good 
 faith. They are not rules prescribed by the sovereign to the 
 subject, but agreements between sovereign and sovereign. The 
 power in question seems, therefore, to form a distinct depart- 
 ment, and to belong, properly, neither to the legislative nor to 
 the executive. The qualities elsewhere detailed, as indispensa- 
 ble in the management of foreign negociations, point out the 
 executive as the most fit agent in those transactions ; while the 
 vasi importance of the trust, and the operation of treaties as 
 
558 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 laws, pieud strongly for the participation of the whole, or a 
 portion, of the legislative body in the office of making thorn. 
 
 However proper or safe it may be in governments, where the 
 executive magistrate is an hereditary monarch, to commit to 
 him the entire power of making treaties, it would be utterly 
 unsafe and improper to intrust that power to an elective magis- 
 trate of four years duration. It has been remarked, upon 
 another occasion, and the remark is unquestionably just, that 
 an hereditary monarch, though often the oppressor of his peo- 
 ple, has personally too much at stake in the government, to be 
 in any material danger of being corrupted by foreign powers : 
 But that a man raised from the station of a private citizen to 
 the rank of chief magistrate, possessed of but a moderate or 
 slender fortune, and looking forward to a period not very 
 remote, when he may probably be obliged to return to the sta- 
 tion from which he was taken, might sometimes be under 
 temptations to sacrifice duty to interest, which it would require 
 superlative virtue to withstand. An avaricious man might be 
 tempted to betray the interests of the state for the acquisition 
 of wealth. An ambitious man might make his own aggran- 
 dizement, by the aid of a foreign power, the price of his 
 treachery to his constituents. The history of human conduct 
 does not warrant that exalted opinion of human virtue, which 
 would make it wise in a nation to commit interests of so deli- 
 cate and momentous a kind, as those which concern its inter- 
 course with the rest of the world, to the sole disposal of a 
 magistrate created and circumstanced as would be a president 
 of the United States. 
 
 To have intrusted the power of making treaties to the senate 
 alone, would have been to relinquish the benefits of the consti- 
 tutional agency of the president in the conduct of foreign 
 negociations. It is true, that the senate would, in that case, 
 have the option of employing him in this capacity; but they 
 would also have the option of letting it alone ; and pique or 
 cabal might induce the latter rather than the former. BesideB 
 this, the ministerial servant of the senate, could not be (jxpected 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 559 
 
 to enjoy the confidence and respect of foreign powers in the 
 same extent with the constitutional representative of the na- 
 tion ; and, of course, would not be able to act with an equal 
 degree of weight or eflScacy. While the Union would, from 
 this cause, lose a considerable advantage in the management 
 of its external concerns, the people would lose the additional 
 security which would result from the co-operation of the exe- 
 cutive. Though it would be imprudent to confide in him solely 
 so important a trust ; yet it cannot be doubted, that his parti- 
 cipation would materially add to the safety of the society. It 
 must indeed be clear, to a demonstration, that the joint posses- 
 sion of the power in question, by the president and senate, 
 would afford a greater prospect of security, than the separate 
 possession of it by either of them. And whoever has maturely 
 weighed the circumstances which must concur in the appoint- 
 ment of a president, will be satisfied, that the office will always 
 bid fair to be filled by men of such characters, as to render 
 their concurrence, in the formation of treaties, peculiarly de- 
 sirable, as well on the score of wisdom, as on that of integrity. 
 The remarks made in a former number, will apply with con- 
 clusive force against the admission of the house of representa- 
 tives to a share in the formation of treaties. The fluctuating, 
 and taking its future increase into the account, the multi- 
 tudinous composition of that body, forbid us to expect in it 
 those qualities which are essential to the proper execution of 
 such a trust. Accurate and comprehensive knowledge of 
 foreign politics ; a steady and systematic adherence to the same 
 views; a nice and uniform sensibility to national character; 
 decision, secrecy, and dispatch; are incompatible with the genius 
 of a body so variable and so numerous. The very complication 
 of the business, by introducing a necessity of the concurrence 
 of so many different bodies, would of itself afford a solid 
 objection. The greater frequency of the calls upon the house 
 of representatives, and the greater length of time which it 
 would often be necessary to keep them together when con- 
 rened, to obtain their sanction in the progressive stages of a 
 
5C0 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 treatj , would be a source of so great inconvenience and ex* 
 pense, as alone ought to condemn the project. 
 
 The only objection which remains to be can rassed, is that 
 which would substitute the proportion of two-thirds of all the 
 members composing the senatorial body, to that of two-thirds 
 of the members present. It has been shown, under the second 
 head of our inquiries, that all provisions which require more 
 than the majority of any body to its resolutions, have a direct 
 tendency to embarrass the operations of the government, and 
 an indirect one to subject the sense of the majority to that of 
 the minority. This consideration seems sufficient to determine 
 our opinion, that the convention have gone as far in the 
 endeavour to secure the advantage of numbers in the formation 
 of treaties, as could have been reconciled either with the 
 activity of the public councils, or with a reasonable regard to 
 the major sense of the community. If two-thirds of the whole 
 number of members had been required, it would, in many cases, 
 from the non-attendance of a part, amount in practice to a 
 necessity of unanimity. And the history of every political 
 establishment in which this principle has prevailed, is a history 
 of impotence, perplexity, and disorder. Proofs of this position 
 might be adduced from the examples of the Roman tribune- 
 phip, the Polish diet, and the states general of the Netherlands; 
 did not an example at home, render foreign precedents un- 
 necessary. 
 
 To require a fixed proportion of the whole body, would not, 
 in all probability, contribute to the advantages of a numerous 
 agency, better than merely to require a proportion of the 
 attending members. The former, by increasing the difficulty 
 of resolutions disagreeable to the minority, diminishes the 
 motives to punctual attendance. The latter, by making the 
 capacity of the body to depend on a proportion which may be 
 varied by the absence or presence of a single member, has the 
 contrary effect. And as, by promoting punctuality, it tends to 
 keep the body complete, there is great likelihood, that its reso- 
 lutions would generally be dictated by as great a number in 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 661 
 
 this ease, as in the other; while there would be muoh fewer 
 occasions of delay. It ought not to be forgotten, that under 
 the existing confederation, two members may, and usually do, 
 represent a state ; whence it happens that congress, who now 
 are solely invested with all the powers of the union, rarely con- 
 sists of a greater number of persons than would compose tho 
 intended senate. If we add to this, that as the members vote 
 by states, and that where there is only a single member present 
 from a state, his vote is lost, it will justify a supposition that 
 the active voices in the senate, where the members are to vote 
 individually, would rarely fall short in number of the active 
 voices in the existing congress. When, in addition to these 
 considerations, we take into view the co-operation of the presi- 
 dent, we shall not hesitate to infer, that the people of America 
 would have greater security against an improper use of the 
 power of making treaties, under the new constitution, than 
 they now enjoy under the confederation And when we pro- 
 ceed still one step further, and look forward to the probable 
 augmentation of the senate, by the erection of new states, we 
 shall not only perceive ample ground of confidence in the suffi- 
 ciency of the numbers, to whose agency that power will be in- 
 trusted ; but we shall probably be led to conclude, that a body 
 more numerous than the senate is likely to become, would b« 
 very little fit for the proper discharge of the trust. 
 
 PUBLIUS 
 
r)62 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 NUMBER LXXVI. 
 
 NEW YORK, APRIL 1, 1788. 
 
 HAMILTON. 
 
 THE SAME VIEW CONTINUED, IN RELATION TO THE APPOINTMENT 
 OF THE OFFICERS OF THE GOVERNMENT. 
 
 The president is " to nominate, and by and with the advice 
 and consent of the senate, to appoint ambassadors, other public 
 ministers and consuls, judges of the supreme court, and all 
 other officers of the United States, whose appointments are not 
 otherwise provided for in the constitution. But the congress 
 may by law vest the appointment of such inferior officers as 
 they think proper, in the president alone, or in the courts of 
 law, or in the heads of departments. The president shall have 
 power to fill up all vacancies which may happen during the recess 
 of the senate, by granting commissions which shall eocpire at the 
 end of their next session." 
 
 It has been observed in a former paper, that " the true test 
 of a good government, is its aptitude and tendency to produce 
 a good administration." If the justness of this observation be 
 admitted, the mode of appointing the officers of the United 
 States contained in the foregoing clauses, must, when examined, 
 be allowed to be entitled to particular commendation. It is 
 not easy to conceive a plan better calculated to promote a judi- 
 cious choice of men for filling the offices of the union ; and it 
 
THB FEDERALIST. 568 
 
 will not need proof, that on this point must essentially depend 
 the character of its administration. 
 
 It will be agreed on all hands, that the power of appoint- 
 ment, in ordinary cases, can be properly modified only in one 
 of three ways. It ought either to be vested in a single man ; 
 or ir a select assembly of a moderate number ; or in a single 
 man with the concurrence of such an assembly. The exercise 
 of it by the people at large, will be readily admitted to be im- 
 practicable; since, waving every other consideration, it would 
 leave them little time to do any thing else. When, therefore, 
 mention is made in the subsequent reasonings, of an assembly 
 or body of men, what is said must be understood to relate to a 
 select body or assembly, of the description already given. The 
 people collectively, from their number and from their dispersed 
 situation, cannot be regulated in their movements by that sys- 
 tematic spirit of cabal and intrigue, which will be urged as the 
 chief objections to reposing the power in question in a body 
 of men. 
 
 Those who have themselves reflected upon the subject, or 
 who have attended to the observations made in other parts of 
 these papers, in relation to the appointment of the president, 
 will, I presume, agree to the j)Osition, that there would always 
 be great probability of having the place supplied by a man of 
 abilities, at least respectable. Premising this, I proceed to lay 
 it down as a rule, that one man of discernment is better fitted 
 to analize and estimate the peculiar qualities adapted to parti- 
 cular offices, than a body of men of equal, or perhaps even of 
 superior discernment. 
 
 The sole and undivided responsibility of one man, will natu- 
 rally beget a livelier sense of duty, and a more exact regard 
 to reputation. He will, on this account, feel himself under 
 stronger obligations, and more interested to investigate with 
 care the qualities requisite to the stations to be filled, and to 
 prefer with impartialit}- the persons who may have the fairest 
 pretensions to them. He will have fewer personal attachments 
 \,o gratify, than a body of men who may each be supposed to 
 
564 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 have an equal number, and will be so much the less liable to be 
 misled by the sentiments of friendship and of affection. There 
 is nothing so apt to agitate the passions of mankind as personal 
 considerations, whether they relate to ourselves or to others, 
 wto are to be the objects of our choice or preference. Hence, 
 in every exercise of the power of appointing to oflSces by an 
 assembly of men, we must expect to see a full display of all 
 the private and party likings and dislikes, partialities and anti- 
 pathies, attachments and animosities, which are felt by those 
 who compose the assembly. The choice which may at any 
 time happen to be made under such circumstances, will of 
 course be the result either of a victory gained by one party 
 over the other, or of a compromise between the parties. In 
 either case, the intrinsic merit of the candidate will be too 
 often out of sight. In the first, the qualifications best adapted 
 to uniting the suffrages of the party, will be more considered 
 than those which fit the person for the station. In the last, the 
 coalition will commonly turn upon some interested equivalent, 
 " Give us the man we wish for this office, and you shall have 
 the one you wish for that." This will be the usual condition 
 of the bargain. And it will rarely happen that the advance- 
 ment of the public service, will be the primary object either of 
 party victories, or of party negociations. 
 
 The truth of the principles here advanced, seems to have 
 been felt by the most intelligent of those who have found fault 
 with the provision made, in this respect, by the convention. 
 They contend, that the president ought solely to have been 
 authorized to make the appointments under the federal govern- 
 ment. But it is easy to show, that every advantage to be ex- 
 pected from such an arrangement would, in substance, be 
 derived from the power of nomination, which is proposed to be 
 conferred upon him ; while several disadvantages which might 
 attend the absolute power of appointment in the hands of that 
 officer would be avoided. In the act of nomination, his judg- 
 ment alone would be exercised; and as it would be his sole 
 duty to point out the man, who with the approbation of the 
 
TUB FEDERALIST. 565 
 
 senate should fill an office, his responsibility would be as com- 
 plete as if he were to make the final appointment. There can, 
 in this view, be no diflference between nominating ana appoint- 
 ing. The same motives which would influence a proper dis- 
 charge of his duty in one case, would exist in the other. And 
 as no man could be appointed but upon his previous nomina- 
 tion, every man who might be appointed would be. in fact, his 
 choice. 
 
 But his nomination may be overruled : This it certainly may ; 
 yet it can only be to make place for another nomination by 
 himself. The person ultimately appointed, must be the object 
 of his preference, though perhaps not in the first degree. It is 
 also not probable, that his nomination would often be overruled 
 The senate could not be tempted, by the preference they might 
 feel to another, to reject the one proposed; because they could 
 not assure themselves, that the person they might wish would 
 be brought forward by a second or by any subsequent nomina- 
 tion. They could not even be certain, that a future nomination 
 would present a candidate in any degree more acceptable to 
 them : And as their dissent might cast a kind of stigma upon 
 the individual rejected; and might have the appearance of a 
 reflection upon the judgment of the chief magistrate; it is not 
 likely that their sanction would often be refused, where there 
 were not special and strong reasons for the refusal. 
 
 To what purpose then require the co-operation of the senate? 
 I answer, that the necessity of their concurrence would have a 
 powerful, though in general a silent, operation. It would be 
 an excellent check upon a spirit of favouritism in the president, 
 and would tend greatly to prevent the appointment of unfit 
 characters from state prejudice, from family connexion, from 
 personal attachment, or from a view to popularity. In addition 
 to this, it would be an efficacious source of stability in the 
 administration. 
 
 It will readily be comprehended, that a man who had him- 
 self the sole disposition of offices, would be governed much 
 more by his private inclinations and interests, than when he 
 
666 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 was bound to submit the propriety of his choice to the dis- 
 cuss* on and determination of a diiferent and independent body; 
 and that body an entire branch of the legislature. The possi- 
 bility of rejection, would be a strong motive to care in pro- 
 posing. The danger to his own reputation, and, in the case of 
 an elective magistrate, to his political existence, from betray- 
 ing a spirit of favouritism, or an unbecoming pursuit of popu- 
 larity, to the observation of a body whose opinion would have 
 great weight in forming that of the public, could not fail to 
 operate as a barrier to the one and to the other. He would be 
 both ashamed and afraid to bring forward, for the most dis- 
 tinguished or lucrative stations, candidates who had no other 
 merit than that of coming from the same state to which he 
 particularly belonged, or of being, in some way or other, per- 
 sonally allied to him, or of possessing the necessary insignifi- 
 cance and pliancy to render them the obsequious instruments 
 of his pleasure. 
 
 To this reasoning it has been objected, that the president, by 
 the influence of the power of nomination, may secure the com- 
 plaisance of the senate to his views. The supposition of uni- 
 versal venality in human nature, is little less an error in political 
 reasoning, than that of universal rectitude. The institution of 
 delegated power implies, that there is a portion of virtue and 
 honour among mankind, which may be a reasonable foundation 
 of confidence ; and experience justifies the theory. It has been 
 found to exist in the most corrupt periods of the most corrupt 
 governments. The venality of the British house of commons 
 has been long a topic of accusation against that body, in the 
 country to which they belong, as well as in this ; and it cannot 
 be doubted, that the charge is, to a considerable extent, well 
 founded. But it is as little to be doubted, that there is always 
 a large proportion of the body, which consists of independent 
 and public spirited men, who have an influential weight in the 
 councils of the nation. Hence it is, (the present reign not ex- 
 cepted) that the sense of that body is often seen to control the 
 inclinations of the monarch, both with regard to men and to 
 
THE FEDERALIST. IGl 
 
 measures. Though it might therefore be allowable to suppose, 
 that the executive might occasionally influence some individuals 
 in the senate, yet the supposition, that he could in general pur- 
 chase the integrity of the whole body, would be forced and 
 improbable. A man disposed to view human nature as it is, 
 without either flattering its virtues, or exaggerating its vices, 
 will see suflScient ground of confidence in the probity of the 
 senate, to rest satisfied, not only that it will be impracticable 
 to the executive to corrupt or seduce a majority of its members, 
 but that the necessity of its co-operation, in the business of 
 appointments, will be a considerable and salutary restraint 
 upon the conduct of that magistrate. Nor is the integrity of 
 the senate the only reliance. The constitution has provided 
 some important guards against the danger of executive in- 
 fluence upon the legislative body : It declares, " that no senator 
 or representative shall, during the time for which he was elected, 
 be appointed to any civil ofiice under the United States, which 
 shall have been created, or the emoluments whereof shall have 
 been increased during such time ; and no person holding any 
 office under the United States, shall be a member of either 
 house during his continuance in office." 
 
 PUBLIUS. 
 
568 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 THE FEDERALIST 
 
 NUMBER LXXVII. 
 
 NEW YORK, APRIL 4, 1788. 
 
 HAMILTON. 
 
 THE VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PRESIDENT CONCLUDED; 
 WITH A FURTHER CONSIDERATION OF THE POWER OF APPOINT- 
 MENT, AND A CONCISE EXAMINATION OF HIS REMAINING POWERS 
 
 It has been mentioned as one of the advantages to be ex- 
 pected from the co-operation of the senate, in the business of 
 appointments, that it would contribute to the stability of the 
 administration. The consent of that body would be necessary 
 to displace as well as to appoint.* A change of the chief magis- 
 trate, therefore, would not occasion so violent or so general a 
 revolution in the oflicers of the government as might be ex- 
 pected, if he were the sole disposer of offices. "Where a man, 
 in any station, had given satisfactory evidence of his fitness for 
 it, a new president would be restrained from attempting a 
 change in favour of a person more agreeable to him, by the 
 apprehension that the discountenance of the senate might frus- 
 trate the attempt, and bring some degree of discredit upon 
 himself. Those who can bes^ estimate the value of a steady 
 administration, will be most disposed to prize a provision, which 
 connects the official existence of public men with the approba- 
 
 * This construction has since been rejected by the legislature ; and it is 
 now settled in practice, that the power of displacing belongs exclusively to 
 the president 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 569 
 
 tion or disapprobation of that body, which, from the greater 
 permanency of its own composition, will, in all probability, be 
 less subject to inconstancy than any other member of the gov- 
 ernment. 
 
 To this union of the senate with the president, in the article 
 of appointments, it has in some cases been objected, that it 
 would serve to give the president an undue influence over the 
 senate; and in others, that it would have an opposite tendency; 
 a strong proof that neither suggestion is true. 
 
 To state the first in its proper form, is to refute it. It 
 amounts to this — the president would have an improper influence 
 over the senate ; because the senate would have the power of 
 restraining him. This is an absurdity in terms. It cannot 
 admit of a doubt, that the entire power of appointment would 
 enable him much more effectually to establish a dangerous 
 empire over that body, than a mere power of nomination sub- 
 ject to their control. 
 
 Let us take a view of the converse of the proposition, " The 
 senate would influence the executive." As I have had occasion 
 to remark in several other instances, the indistinctness of the 
 objection forbids a precise answer. In what manner is this 
 influence to be exerted? In relation to what objects? The 
 power of influencing a person, in the sense in which it is here 
 used, must imply a power of conferring a benefit upon him. 
 How could the senate confer a benefit upon the president by 
 the manner of employing their right of negative upon his 
 nominations ? If it be said they might sometimes gratify him 
 by an acquiescence in a favourite choice, when public motives 
 might dictate a different conduct ; I answer, that the instances 
 in which the president could be personally interested in the 
 result, would be too few to admit of his being materially af- 
 fected by the compliances of the senate. Besides this, it is 
 evident, that the power which can originate the disposition of 
 honours and emoluments, is more likely to attract than to be 
 attracted by the power which can merely obstruct their course. 
 If by influencing the president be meant restraining him, this is 
 
670 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 precisely what must have been intended. And it has been 
 BhovTQ that the restraint would be salutary, at the same time 
 that it would not be such as to destroy a single advantage to 
 be looked for from the uncontroled agency of that magistrate. 
 The right of nomination would produce all the good, without 
 the ill. 
 
 Upon a comparison of the plan for the appointment of the 
 officers of the proposed government, with that which is estab- 
 lished by the constitution of this state, a decided preference 
 must be given to the former. In that plan, the power of nomi- 
 nation is unequivocally vested in the executive. And as there 
 would be a necessity for submitting each nomination to the 
 judgment of an entire branch of the legislature, the circum- 
 Btances attending an appointment, from the mode of conduct- 
 ing it, would naturally become matters of notoriety ; and the 
 public could be at no loss to determine what part had been per- 
 formed by the different actors. The blame of a bad nomination 
 would fall upon the president singly and absolutely. The cen- 
 sure of rejecting a good one, would lie entirely at the door of 
 the senate; aggravated by the consideration of their having 
 counteracted the good intentions of the executive. If an ill 
 appointment should be made, the executive for nominating, and 
 the senate for approving, would participate, though in different 
 degrees, in the opprobrium and disgrace. 
 
 The reverse of all this, characterizes the manner of appoint- 
 ment in this state. The council of appointment consists of 
 from three to five persons, of whom the governor is always 
 one. This small body, shut up in a private apartment, impene- 
 trable to the public eye, proceed to the execution of the trust 
 committed to them. It is known, that the governor claims the 
 right of nomination, upon the strength of some ambiguous ex- 
 pressions in the constitution; but it is not known to what 
 extent, or in what manner he exercises it ; nor upon what occa- 
 sions he is contradicted or opposed. The censure of a bad ap- 
 pointment, on account of the uncertainty of its author, and for 
 want of a determinate object, has neither poign<»ncy nor dura- 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 571 
 
 tion. And while an unbounded field for cabal and intrigue lies 
 open, all idea of responsibility is lost. The most that the pub- 
 lic can know, is, that the governor claims the right of nomina- 
 tion : That two, out of the considerable number of four men, 
 can often be managed without much diflSculty : That if some 
 of the members of a particular council should happen to be of 
 an uncomplying character, it is frequently not impossible to 
 get rid of their opposition, by regulating the times of meeting 
 in such a manner as to render their attendance inconvenient : 
 And that, from whatever cause it may proceed, a great number 
 of very improper appointments are from time to time made. 
 Whether a governor of this state avails himself of the ascend- 
 ant he must necessarily have, in this delicate and important 
 part of the administration, to prefer to offices men who are best 
 qualified for them; or whether he prostitutes that advantage 
 to the advancement of persons, whose chief merit is their im- 
 plicit devotion to his will, and to the support of a despicable 
 and dangerous system of personal influence, are questions 
 which, unfortunately for the community, can only be the sub- 
 jects of speculation and conjecture. 
 
 Every mere council of appointment, however constituted, 
 will be a conclave, in which cabal and intrigue will have their 
 full scope. Their number, without an unwarrantable increase 
 of expense, cannot be large enough to preclude a facility of 
 combination. And as each member will have his friends and 
 connexions to provide for, the desire of mutual gratification 
 will beget a scandalous bartering of votes and bargaining for 
 places. The private attachments of one man might easily be 
 satisfied; but to satisfy the private attachments of a dozen, or 
 of twenty men, would occasion a monopoly of all the principal 
 employments of the government, in a few families, and would 
 lead more directly to an aristocracy or an oligarchy, than any 
 measure that could be contrived. If to avoid an accumulation 
 of offices, there was to be a frequent change in the persons who 
 were to compose the council, this would involve the mischiefs 
 of a mutable administration in their full extent. Such a council 
 
 47 
 
672 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 would also be more liable to executive influence than the seaate, 
 because they would be fewer in number, and would act less 
 immediately under the public inspection. Such a council, in 
 fine, as a substitute for the plan of the convention, would be 
 productive of an increase of expense, a multiplication of the 
 evils which spring from favouritism and intrigue in the dis- 
 tribution of public honours, a decrease of stability in the 
 administration of the government, and a diminution of the 
 security against an undue influence of the executive. And 
 yet such a council has been warmly contended for, as an 
 essential amendment in the proposed constitution. 
 
 I could not with propriety conclude my observations on the 
 subject of appointments, without taking notice of a scheme, 
 for which there has appeared some, though but few advocates ; 
 I mean that of uniting the house of representatives in the 
 power of making them. I shall, however, do little more than 
 mention it, as I cannot imagine that it is likely to gain the 
 countenance of any considerable part of the community. A 
 body so fluctuating, and at the same time so numerous, can 
 never be deemed proper for the exercise of that power. Its 
 unfitness will appear manifest to all, when it is recollected that 
 in half a century it may consist of three or four hundred per- 
 sons. All the advantages of the stability, both of the executive 
 and of the senate, would be defeated by this union ; and infinite 
 delays and embarrassments would be occasioned. The example 
 of most of the states in their local constitutions, encourages ua 
 to reprobate the idea. 
 
 The only remaining powers of the executive, are compre- 
 hended in giving information to congress of the state of the 
 union ; in recommending to their consideration such measures 
 as he shall judge expedient; in convening them, or either 
 branch, upon extraordinary occasions ; in adjourning them 
 when they cannot themselves agree upon the time of adjourn- 
 ment; in receiving ambassadors and other public ministers; 
 in faithfully executing the laws; and in comraissiotung al) 
 the officers of the United States. 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 573 
 
 Except some cavils about the power of convening either house 
 of the legislature, and that of receiving ambassadors, no objeC' 
 tion has been made to this class of authorities; nor could they 
 possibly admit of any. It required indeed an insatiable avidity 
 for censure, to invent exceptions to the parts which have been 
 assailed. In regard to the power of convening either house of 
 the legislature, I shall barely remark, that in respect to the 
 senate at least, we can readily discover a good reason foi it. 
 As this body has a concurrent power with the executive in the 
 article of treaties, it might often be necessary to call it to- 
 gether with a view to this object, when it would be unnecessary 
 and improper to convene the house of representatives. As to 
 the reception of ambassadors, what I have said in a formei 
 paper will furnish a sufficient answer. 
 
 We have now completed a survey of the structure and 
 powers of the executive department, which I have endeavoured 
 to show, combines, as far as republican principles will admit, 
 all the requisites to energy. The remaining inquiry is — Does 
 it also combine the requisites to safety in the republican sense 
 — a due dependence on the people — a due responsibility ? The 
 answer to this question has been anticipated in the investiga- 
 tion of its other characteristics, and is satisfactorily deducible 
 from these circumstances, the election of the president once in 
 four years by persons immediately chosen by the people for 
 that purpose; his liability, at all times, to impeachment, trial, 
 dismission from office, incapacity to serve in any other, and to 
 the forfeiture of life and estate by subsequent prosecution in 
 the common course of law. But these precautions, great aa 
 they are, are not the only ones which the plan of the conven- 
 tion has provided in favour of the public security. In the 
 only instances in which the abuse of the executive authority 
 was materially to be feared, the chief magistrate ot the United 
 States would, by that plan, be subjected to the control of a 
 branch of the legislative body. What more can an enlightened 
 and reasonable people desire ? 
 
 PUBLIUS. 
 
.')74 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 NUMBER LXXVIII. 
 
 NEW YORK, JUNE 17, 20, 1788. 
 
 HAMILTON. 
 
 A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT, IS 
 RELATION TO THE TENURE OF GOOD BEHAVIOUR. 
 
 We proceed now to an examination of the judiciary depart- 
 ment of the proposed government. 
 
 In unfolding the defects of the existing confederation, the 
 utility and necessity of a federal judicature have been clearly 
 pointed out. It is the less necessary to recapitulate the con- 
 siderations there urged ; as the propriety of the institution in 
 the abstract is not disputed : The only questions which have 
 been raised being relative to the manner of constituting it, and 
 to its extent. To these points, therefore, our observations shall 
 be confined. 
 
 The manner of constituting it seems to embrace these several 
 objects : Ist. The mode of appointing the judges : 2d. The tenure 
 by which they are to hold their places : 3d. The partition of 
 the judiciary authority between different courts, and their 
 relations to each other. 
 
 First. As to the mode of appointing the judges : This is the 
 same with that of appointing the oflScers of the union in 
 general, and has been so fully discussed in the two last num- 
 bers, that nothing can be said here which would not be useless 
 repetition. 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 575 
 
 Second. As to the tenure by which the judges are to hold 
 ineir places : This chiefly concerns their duration in oflSce ; the 
 provisions for their support; the precautions for their responsi- 
 bility. 
 
 According to the plan of the convention, all the judges who 
 may be appointed by the United States are to hold their offices 
 during good behaviour; which is conformable to the most approved 
 of the state constitutions — among the rest, to that of this state. 
 Its propriety having been drawn into question by the adver- 
 saries of that plan, is no light symptom of the rage for ob- 
 jection, which disorders their imaginations and judgments. 
 The standard of good behaviour for the continuance in office 
 of the judicial magistracy, is certainly one of the most valuable 
 of the modern improvements in the practice of government. 
 In a monarchy, it is an excellent barrier to the despotism of 
 the prince : in a republic, it is a no less excellent barrier to the 
 encroachments and oppressions of the representative body. 
 And it is the best expedient which can be devised in any 
 government, to secure a steady, upright, and impartial adminis- 
 tration of the laws. 
 
 "Whoever attentively considers the different departments of 
 power must perceive, that, in a government in which they are 
 separated from each other, the judiciary, from the nature of its 
 functions, will always be the least dangerous to the political 
 rights of the constitution ; because it will be least in a capacity 
 to annoy or injure them. The executive not only dispenses 
 the honours, but holds the sword of the community : The legis- 
 lature not only commands the purse, but prescribes the rules 
 by which the duties and rights of every citizen are to be regu- 
 lated : The judicary, on the contrary, has no influence over 
 either the sword or the purse; no direction either of the strength 
 or of the wealth of the society ; and can take no active reso- 
 lution whatever. It may truly be said to have neither force 
 nor WILL, but merely judgment; and must ultimately depend 
 upon the aid of the ex*'Outive arm for the efficacious exercise 
 even of this faculty. 
 
d7€ THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 This simple view of the matter suggests several important 
 consequences : it proves incontestibly, that, the judiciary is 
 beyond comparison, the weakest of the three departments of 
 power,* that it can never attack with success either of the 
 other two ; and that all possible care is requisite to enable it to 
 defend itself against their attacks. It equally proves, that, 
 though individual oppression may now and then proceed from 
 the courts of justice, the general liberty of the people can never 
 be endangered from that quarter: I mean so long as the 
 judiciary remains truly distinct from both the legislature and 
 executive. For I agree, that " there is no liberty, if the power 
 of judging be not separated from the legislative and executive 
 powers." f It proves, in the last place, that as liberty can 
 have nothing to fear from the judiciary alone, but would have 
 every thing to fear from its union with either of the other de- 
 partments ; that, as all the effects of such an union must ensue 
 from a dependence of the former on the latter, notwithstanding 
 a nominal and apparent separation; that as, from the natural 
 feebleness of the judiciary, it is in continual jeojDardy of being 
 overpowered, awed or influenced by its co-ordinate branches; 
 that, as nothing can contribute so much to its firmness and 
 independence as permanency in office, this quality may there 
 fore -be justly regarded as an indispensable ingredient in its 
 constitution; and, in a great measure, as the citadel of the 
 public justice and the public security. 
 
 The complete independence of the courts of justice is pecu- 
 liarly essential in a limited constitution. By a limited constitu- 
 tion, I understand one which contains certain specified excep- 
 tions to the legislative authority ; such, for instance, as that it 
 shall pass no bills of attainder, no ex post facto laws, and the 
 like. Limitations of this kind can be preserved in practice 
 no other way than through the medium of the courts of justice; 
 whose duty it must be to declare all acts contrary to the mani- 
 
 * Montesquieu, speaking of them, says, '* of the three powers above men* 
 tioned, the judioiaet is next to nothing." Spirit of Laws, vol. 1. pagf 186. 
 f Idem, page 181. 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 577 
 
 fest tenor of tho constitution void. "Without this, all the reser- 
 vations of particular rights or privileges would amount to 
 nothing. 
 
 Some perplexity respecting the right of the courts to pro- 
 nounce legislative acts void, because contrary to the constitu- 
 tion, has arisen from an imagination that the doctrine would 
 imply a superiority of the judiciary to the legislative power. 
 It is urged that the authority which can declare the acts of 
 another void, must necessarily be superior to the one whose 
 acts may be declared void. As this doclrrine is of great import- 
 ance in all the American constitutions, a brief discussion of the 
 grounds on which it rests cannot be unacceptable. 
 
 There is no position which depends on clearer principles, 
 than that every act of a delegated authority, contrary to the 
 tenor of the commission under which it is exercised, is void. 
 No legislative act, therefore, contrary to the constitution, can 
 be valid. To deny this, would be to affirm, that the deputy is 
 greater than his principal; that the servant is above his master; 
 that the representatives of the people are superior to the people 
 themselves ; that men, acting by virtue of powers, may do not 
 onlj'^ what their powers do not authorize, but what they forbid. 
 
 If it be said that the legislative body are themselves the con- 
 stitutional judges of their own powers, and that the construction 
 they put upon them is conclusive upon the other departments, 
 it may be answered, that this cannot be the natural presump- 
 tion, where it is not to be collected from any particular pro- 
 visions in the constitution. It is not otherwise to be supposed, 
 that the constitution could intend to enable the representatives 
 of the people to substitute their will to that of their constitu- 
 ents. It is far more rational to suppose, that the courts were 
 designed to be an intermediate body between the people and 
 the legislature, in order, among other things, to keep the latter 
 within the limits assigned to their authority. The interpreta- 
 tion of the laws is the proper and peculiar province of the 
 courts. A constitution is, in fact, and must be, regarded by the 
 judges as a fundamental law. It must therefore belong to them 
 
678 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 to uscertain its meaning, as well as the meaning of any par- 
 ticular act proceeding from the legislative body. If there 
 should happen to be an irreconcilable variance between the 
 two, that which has the superior obligation and validity ought, 
 of course, to be preferred; in other words, the constitution 
 ought to be preferred to the statute, the intention of the people 
 to the intention of their agents. 
 
 Nor does the conclusion by any means suppose a superiority 
 of the judicial to the legislative power. It only supposes that 
 the power of the peopie is superior to both ; and that where 
 the will of the legislature declared in its statutes, stands in 
 opposition to that of the people declared in the constitution, 
 the judges ought to be governed by the latter, rather than the 
 former. They ought to regulate their decisions by the funda- 
 mental laws, rather than by those which are not fundamental. 
 
 This exercise of judicial discretion, in determining between 
 two contradictory laws, is exemplified in a familiar instance. 
 It not uncommonly happens, that there are two statutes exist- 
 ing at one time, clashing in whole or in part with each other, 
 and neither of them containing any repealing clause or expres- 
 sion. In such a case, it is the province of the courts to liquidate 
 and fix their meaning and operation : So far as they can, by any 
 fair construction be reconciled to each other, reason and law 
 conspire to dictate that this should be done : Where this is 
 impracticable, it becomes a matter of necessity to give effect 
 to one, in exclusion of the other. The rule which has obtained 
 in the courts for determining their relative validity is, that the 
 last in order of time shall be preferred to the first. But this is 
 a mere rule of construction, not derived from any positive law, 
 but from the nature and reason of the thing. It is a rule not 
 enjoined upon the courts by legislative provision, but adopted 
 by themselves, as consonant to truth and propriety, for the 
 direction of their conduct as interpreters of the law. They 
 thought it reasonable, that between the interfering acts of an 
 eqital authority, that which was the last indication of its will 
 should have the preference. 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 51 B 
 
 But in regard to the interfering acts of a superior and 
 subordinate authority, of an original and derivative power, 
 the nature and reason of the thing indicate the converse of 
 that rule as proper to be followed. They teach us, that the 
 prior act of a superior, ought to be preferred to the subsequent 
 act of an inferior and subordinate authority ; and that, accord- 
 ingly, whenever a particular statute contravenes the constitu- 
 tion, it will be the duty of the judicial tribunals to adhere to 
 the latter, and disregard the former. 
 
 It can be of no weight to say, that the courts, on the pretence 
 of a repugnancy, may substitute their own pleasure to the 
 constitutional intentions of the legislature. This might as well 
 happen in the case of two contradictory statutes; or it might 
 as well happen in every adjudication upon any single statute. 
 The courts must declare the sense of the law; and if they 
 should be disposed to exercise will instead of judgment, the 
 consequence would equally be the substitution of their pleasure 
 to that of the legislative body. The observation, if it proved 
 any thing, would prove that there ought to be no judges dis- 
 tinct from that body. 
 
 If then the courts of justice are to be considered as the 
 bulwarks of a limited constitution, against legislative encroach- 
 ments, this consideration will afford a strong argument for the 
 permanent tenure of judicial oflSces, since nothing will con- 
 tribute so much as this to that independent spirit in the judges, 
 which must be essential to the faithful performance of so ardu- 
 ous a duty. 
 
 This independence of the judges is equally requisite to guara 
 the constitution and the rights of individuals, from the effects 
 of those ill humours which the arts of designing men, or the 
 influence of particular conjunctures, sometimes disseminate 
 among the people themselves, and which, though they speedily 
 give place to better information, and more deliberate reflection, 
 have a tendency, in the mean time, to occasion dangerous inno- 
 vations in the government, and serious oppressions of the minor 
 party in t le community. Though I trust the friends of the 
 
580 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 proposed constitution will never concur with its enemies,* m 
 questioning that fundamental principle of republ can govern- 
 ment, which admits the right of the people to alter or abolish 
 the established constitution whenever they find it inconsistent 
 with their happiness; yet it is not to be inferred from this 
 principle, that the representatives of the peojjle, whenever a 
 momentary inclination happens to lay hold of a majority of 
 their constituents incompatible with the provisions in the 
 existing constitution, would, on that account, be justifiable in 
 a violation of those provisions ; or that the courts would be 
 under a greater obligation to connive at infractions in this 
 shape, than when they had proceeded wholly from the cabals 
 of the representative body. Until the people have, by some 
 solemn and authoritative act, annulled or changed the estab- 
 lished form, it is binding upon themselves collectively, as well 
 as individually; and no presumption, or even knowledge of 
 their sentiments, can warrant their representatives in a depart- 
 ure from it, prior to such an act. But it is easy to see, that it 
 would require an uncommon portion of fortitude in the judges 
 to do their duty as faithful guardians of the constitution, where 
 legislative invasions of it had been instigated by the major 
 voice of the community. 
 
 But it is not with a view to infractions of the constitution 
 only, that the independence of the judges may be an essential 
 safe-guard against the effects of occasional ill humours in the 
 society. These sometimes extend no farther than to the injury 
 of the private rights of particular classes of citizens, by unjust 
 and partial laws. Here also the firmness of the judicial magis- 
 tracy is of vast importance in mitigating the severity, and con- 
 fining the operation of such laws. It not only serves to mode- 
 rate the immediate mischiefs of those which may have been 
 passed, but it operates as a check upon the legislative body in 
 passing them ; who, perceiving that obstacles to the success of 
 an iniquitous intention are to be expected from the scruples of 
 
 * Vide Protest of the minority of the convention of Pennsylvania, Martin's 
 speech, &c. 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 58l 
 
 the courts, are in a manner compelled by the very mttives of 
 the injustice they meditate, to qualify their artempts. This is 
 a circumstance calculated to have more influence upon the cha- 
 racter of our governments, than but few may imagine. The 
 benefits of the integrity and moderation of the judiciary have 
 already been felt in more states than one ; and though they 
 may have displeased those whose sinister expectations they 
 may have disappointed, they must have commanded the esteem 
 and applause of all the virtuous and disinterested. Considerate 
 men, of every description, ought to prize whatever will tend to 
 beget or fortify that temper in the courts ; as no man can be 
 sure that he may not be to-morrow the victim of a spirit of 
 injustice, by which he may be a gainer to-day. And every man 
 must now feel, that the inevitable tendency of such a spirit is 
 to sap the foundations of public and private confidence, and to 
 introduce in its stead universal distrust and distress. 
 
 That inflexible and uniform adherence to the rights of the 
 constitution, and of individuals, which we perceive to be indis- 
 pensable in the courts of justice, can certainly not be expected 
 from judges who hold their offices by a temporary commission. 
 Periodical appointments, however regulated, or by whomsoever 
 made, would, in some way or other, be fatal to their necessary 
 independence. If the power of making them was committed 
 either to the executive or legislature, there would be danger of 
 an improper complaisance to the branch which possessed it : if 
 to both, there would be an unwillingness to hazard the displea- 
 sure of either; if to the people, or to persons chosen by them 
 for the special purpose, there would be too great a disposition 
 to consult popularity, to justify a reliance that nothing would 
 be consulted but the constitution and the laws. 
 
 There is yet a further and a weighty reason for the perma- 
 nency of judicial offices; which is deducible from the nature of 
 the qualifications they require. It has been frequently re- 
 marked, with great propriety, that a voluminous code of laws 
 is one of the inconveniences necessarily connected with the ad 
 -antages of a free government. To avoid an arbitrary discre 
 
{)82 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 tion in the courts, it is indispensable that thej should be bound 
 down by strict rules and precedents, which serve to define and 
 point out their duty in every particular case that comes before 
 them; and it will readily be conceived, from the variety of 
 controversies which grow out of the folly and wickedness of 
 mankind, that the records of those precedents must unavoid- 
 ably swell to a very considerable bulk, and must demand long 
 and laborious study to acquire a competent knowledge of them. 
 Hence it is, that there can be but few men in the society, who 
 will have sufficient skill in the laws to qualify them for the 
 stations of judges. And making the proper deductions for the 
 ordinary depravity of human natui'e, the number must be stil) 
 smaller, of those who unite the requisite integrity with the 
 requisite knowledge. These considerations apprize us, that the 
 government can have no great option between fit characters; 
 and that a temporary duration in office, which would naturally 
 discourage such characters from quitting a lucrative line of 
 practice to accept a seat on the bench, would have a tendency 
 to throw the administration of justice into hands less able, and 
 less well qualified, to conduct it with utility and dignity. In 
 the present circumstances of this country, and' in those in 
 which it is likely to be for a long time to come, the disadvan- 
 tages on this score would be greater than they may at first 
 sight appear ; but it must be confessed, that they are far infe- 
 rior to those which present themselves under the other aspects 
 of the subject. 
 
 Upon the whole, there can be no room to doubt, that the con 
 vention acted wisely in copying from the models of those con- 
 stitutions with have established good behaviour as the tenure of 
 judicial offices, in point of duration ; and that, so far from being 
 blameable on this account, their plan would have been inex- 
 cusably defective, if it had wanted this important feature of 
 good government. The experience of Great Britain affords ai» 
 illistrious comment on the excellence of the institution. 
 
 PuBLrus 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 688 
 
 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 NUMBER LXXIX. 
 
 NEW YORK, JUNE 24, 1788. 
 
 HAMILTON. 
 
 i FURTHER VIEW OF THE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT, IN RELATION 
 TO THE PROVISIONS FOR THE SUPPORT AND RESPONSIBILITY OF 
 THE JUDGES. 
 
 Next to permanency in office, nothing can contribute more 
 to the independence of the judges, than a fixed provision for 
 their support. The remark made in relation to the president, 
 is equally applicable here. In the general course of human 
 nature, a power over a man's subsistence amounts to a power over his 
 will. And we can never hope to see realized in practice the 
 complete separation of the judicial from the legislative power, 
 in any system, which leaves the former dependent for pecuniary 
 resource on the occasional grants of the latter. The enlight- 
 ened friends to good government, in every state, have seen 
 cause to lament the' want of precise and explicit precautions in 
 the state constitutions on this head. Some of these indeed 
 have declared th&t permaneiit* salaries should be established for 
 the judges; but the experiment has in some instances shown, 
 that such expressions are not sufficiently definite to preclude 
 legislative evasions. Something still more positive and unequi- 
 vocal has been evinced to be requisite. The plan of the con- 
 vention accordingly has provided, that the judges of the United 
 
 * Vide Constitution of Massachusetts, Chap. 2. Sect 1. Art. 13, 
 
584 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 States " shall at stated times receive for their services a conipen- 
 nation, which shall not be diminished during their continuance 
 in office." 
 
 This, all circumstances considered, is the most eligible provi- 
 sion that could have been devised. It will readily be under- 
 stood, that the fluctuations in the value of money, and in the 
 state of society, rendered a fixed rate of compensation in the 
 constitution inadmissible. "What might be extravagant to-day, 
 might in half a century become penurious and inadequate. It 
 was therefore necessary to leave it to the discretion of the 
 legislature to vary its provisions in conformity to the variation? 
 in circumstances ; yet under such restrictions as to put it out 
 of the power of that body to change the condition of the indi- 
 vidual for the worse. A man may then be sure of the ground 
 upon which he stands, and can never be deterred from his duty 
 by the apprehension of being placed in a less eligible situation. 
 The clause which has been quoted combines both advantages. 
 The salaries of judicial offices may from time to time be altered, 
 as occasion shall require, yet so as never to lessen the allowance 
 with which any particular judge comes into office, in respect to 
 him. It will be observed that a difference has been made by 
 the convention between the compensation of the president and 
 of the judges. That of the former can neither be increased nor 
 diminished. That of the latter can only not be diminished. 
 This probably arose from the difference in the duration of the 
 respective offices. As the president is to be elected for no more 
 than four years, it can rarely happen that an adequate salary, 
 fixed at the commencement of that period, will not continue to 
 be such to its end. But with regard to the judges, who if they 
 behave properly, will be secured in their places for life, it may 
 well happen, especially in the early stages of the government, 
 that a stipend, which would be very sufficient at their first 
 appointment, would become too small in the progress of their 
 service. 
 
 This provision for the support of the judges bears every 
 mark of prudence and efficacy; and it may be safely affirmed 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 585 
 
 that, together with the permanent tenure of their offices, it 
 affords a better prospect of their independence than is discover- 
 able in the constitutions of any of the states, in regard to their 
 own judges. 
 
 The precautions for their responsibility, are comprised in the 
 article respecting impeachments. They are liable to be im- 
 peached for mal-conduct by the house of representatives, and 
 tried by the senate, and if convicted, may be dismissed from 
 office and disqualified for holding any other. This is the only 
 provision on the point, which is consistent with the necessary 
 independence of the judicial character, and is the only one 
 which we find in our own constitution in respect to our own 
 judges. 
 
 The want of a provision for removing the judges on account 
 of inability, has been a subject of complaint. But all con- 
 siderate men will be sensible that such a provision would either 
 not be practised upon, or would be more liable to abuse, than 
 calculated to answer any good purpose. The mensuration of 
 the faculties of the mind has, I believe, no place in the cata- 
 logue of known arts. An attempt to fix the boundary between 
 the regions of ability and inability, would much oftener give 
 -scope to personal and party attachments and enmities, than 
 advance the interests of justice, or the public good. The result, 
 except in the case of insanity, must for the most part be arbi- 
 trary; and insanity, without any formal or express provision, 
 may be safely pronounced to be a virtual disqualification. 
 
 The constitution of New- York, to avoid investigations that 
 must forever be vague and dangerous, has taken a particular 
 age as the criterion of inability. No man can be a judge beyond 
 sixty. I believe there are few at present who do not disap- 
 prove of this provision. There is no station, in relation to 
 which, it is less proper than to that of a judge. The deliber- 
 ating and comparing faculties generally preserve their strength 
 much beyond that period, in men who survive it; and when, in 
 addition to this circumstance, we consider how few there are 
 who outlive the season of intellectual vigour, and how im- 
 
586 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 probable it is that any considerable proportion of the bench, 
 whether more or less numerous, should be in such a situation 
 at the same time, we shall be ready to conclude that limitations 
 of this sort have little to recommend them. In a republic, 
 where fortunes are not affluent, and pensions not expedient, 
 the dismission of men from stations in which they have served 
 their country long and usefully, on which they depend for sub- 
 sistence, and from which it will be too late to resort to any 
 other occupation for a livelihood, ought to have some better 
 apology to humanity, than is to be found in the imaginary 
 danger of a superannuated bench. 
 
 PUBIilUS. 
 
THB FEDERALIST. 587 
 
 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 NUMBER LXXX. 
 
 NEW YORK, JUNE 27 AND JULY 1, 1788. 
 
 HAMILTON. 
 
 A FURTHER VIEW OF THE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT, IN RELATIOM 
 TO THE EXTENT OF ITS POWERS. 
 
 To judge with accuracy of the due extent of the federal 
 judicature, it will be necessary to consider, in the first place, 
 what are its proper objects. 
 
 It seems scarcely to admit of controversy, that the judiciary 
 authority of the union ought to extend to these several descrip- 
 tions of cases. 1st. To all those which arise out of the laws 
 of the United States, passed in pursuance of their just and 
 constitutional powers of legislation; 2d. To all those which 
 concern the execution of the provisions expressly contained 
 in the articles of union j 3d. To all those in which the United 
 States are a party ; 4th. To all those which involve the peace 
 of the CONFEDERACY, whether they relate to the intercourse 
 between the United States and foreign nations, or to that 
 between the States themselves j 5th. To all those which 
 originate on the high seas, and are of admiralty or maritime 
 jurisdiction; and lastly, to all those in which the state tribu- 
 nals cannot be supposed to be impartial and unbiassed. 
 
 The first point depends upon this obvious consideration, that 
 
 ihere ought always to be a constitutional method of giving 
 
 oflicacy to constitutional provisions. What, for instance, would 
 
 48 
 
588 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 avail restrictions on the authority of the state legislatures, 
 without some constitutional mode of enforcing the observance 
 of them ? The states, by the plan of the convention, are pro- 
 hibited from doing a variety of things; some of which are 
 incompatible with the interests of the union, others, with the 
 principles of good government. The imposition of duties on 
 imported articles, and the emission of paper money, are speci- 
 mens of each kind. No man of sense will believe that such 
 prohibitions would be scrupulously regarded, without some 
 eflFectual power in the government to restrain or correct the 
 infractions of them. This power must either be a direct 
 negative on the state laws, or an authority in the federal 
 courts, to over-rule such as might be in manifest contravention 
 of the articles of union. There is no third course that 1 can 
 imagine. The latter appears to have been thought by the 
 convention preferable to the former, and I presume will be 
 most agreeable to the states. 
 
 As to the second point, it is impossible, by any argument oi 
 comment, to make it clearer than it is in itself. If there are 
 such things as political axioms, the propriety of the judicial 
 power of a government being co-extensive with its legislative, 
 may be ranked among the number. The mere necessity of 
 uniformity in the interpretation of the national laws, decides 
 the question. Thirteen independent courts of final jurisdiction 
 over the same causes, arising upon the same laws, is a hydra in 
 government, from which nothing but contradiction and confu- 
 sion can proceed. 
 
 Still less need be said in regard to the third point. Contro- 
 versies between the nation and its members or citizens, can 
 only be properly referred to the national tribunals. Any other 
 plan would be contrary to reason, to precedent, and to decorum. 
 
 The fourth point rests on this plain proposition, that the 
 peace of the whole, ought not to be left at the disposal of a 
 PART. The union will undoubtedly be answerable to foreign 
 powers for the conduct of its members. And the responsibility 
 for an injury, ought ever to be accompanied with the faculty 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 589 
 
 of preventing it. As the denial or perversion of justice by the 
 sentences of courts, is with reason classed among the jusi 
 causes of war, it will follow, that the federal judiciary ought 
 to have cognizance of all causes in which the citizens of other 
 countries are concerned. This is not less essential to the pre- 
 servation of the public faith, than to the security of the public 
 tranquillity. A distinction may perhaps be imagined, between 
 cases arising upon treaties and the laws of nations, and those 
 which may stand merely* on the footing of the municipal law. 
 The former kind may be supposed proper for the federal juris- 
 diction, the latter for that of the states. But it is at least 
 problematical, whether an unjust sentence against a foreigner, 
 where the subject of controversy was wholly relative to the 
 lex loci, would not, if unredressed, be an aggression upon his 
 sovereign, as well as one which violated the stipulations of a 
 treaty, or the general law of nations. And a still greater 
 objection to the distinction would result from the immense 
 difficulty, if not impossibility, of a practical discrimination 
 between the cases of one complexion and those of the other. 
 So great a proportion of the controversies in which foreigners 
 are parties, involve national questions, that it is by far most 
 safe, and most expedient, to refer all those in which they are 
 concerned to the national tribunals. 
 
 The power of determining causes between two states, between 
 one state and the citizens of another, and between the citizens 
 of different states, is perhaps not less essential to the peace of 
 the union, than that which has been just examined. History 
 gives us a horrid picture of the dissentions and private wars 
 which distracted and desolated Germany, prior to the insti- 
 tution of the IMPERIAL CHAMBER by Maximilian, towards the 
 close of the fifteenth century : and informs us, at the same time, 
 of the vast influence of that institution, in appeasing the dis- 
 orders, and establishing the tranquillity of the empire. This 
 was a court invested with authority to decide finally all differ- 
 ences among the members of the Germanic body. 
 
 A method of terminating territorial disputes between the 
 
690 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 States, under the authority of the federal head, was not unat- 
 tended to, even in the imperfect system by which they have 
 been hitherto held together. But there are other sources, 
 besides interfering claims of boundary, from which bickerings 
 and animosities may spring up among the members of the 
 union. To some of these we have been witnesses in the course 
 of our past experience. It will readily be conjectured, that I 
 allude to the fraudulent laws which have been passed in too 
 many of the states. And though the proposed constitution 
 establishes particular guards against the repetition of those 
 instances, which have heretofore made their appearance, yet it 
 is warrantable to apprehend, that the spirit which produced 
 them, will assume new shapes that could not be foreseen, nor 
 specifically provided against. Whatever practices may have a 
 tendency to disturb the harmony of the states, are projier 
 objects of federal superintendence and control. 
 
 It may be esteemed the basis of the union, that " the citizens 
 of each state shall be entitled to all the privileges and immu- 
 nities of citizens of the several states." And if it be a just 
 principle, that every government ought to possess the means of 
 executing its own provisions, by its own authority, it will follow, that 
 in order to the inviolable maintenance of that equality of 
 privileges and immunities, to which the citizens of the union 
 will be entitled, the national judiciary ought to preside in all 
 cases, in which one state or its citizens are opposed to another 
 state or its citizens. To secure the full effect of so fundamental 
 a provision against alh evasion and subterfuge, it is necessary 
 that its construction should be committed to that tribunal, 
 which, having no local attachments, will be likely to be im- 
 partial, between the different states and their citizens, and 
 which, owing its official existence to the union, will never be 
 likely to feel any bias inauspicious to the principles on which it 
 is founded. 
 
 The fifth point will demand little animadversion. The most 
 bigotted idolizers of state authority, have not thus far shown 
 a disposition to deny the national judiciary the cognizance of 
 
THE FEDERALIST. " 59J 
 
 iiijiritime causes. These so generally depend on the laws of 
 nations, and so commonly affect the rights of foreigners, that 
 they fall within the considerations which are relative to the 
 public peace. The most important part of them are, by the 
 present confederation, submitted to federal jurisdiction. 
 
 The reasonableness of the agency of the national courts, in 
 cases in which the state tribunals cannot be supposed to be 
 impartial, speaks for itself. No man ought certainly to be a 
 judge in his own cause, or in any cause, in respect to which he 
 has the least interest or bias. This principle has no inconsid- 
 erable weight in designating the federal courts, as the proper 
 tribunals for the determination of controversies between differ- 
 ent states and their citizens. And it ought to have the same 
 operation, in regard to some cases, between the citizens of the 
 same state. Claims .to land under grants of different states, 
 founded upon adverse pretensions of boundary, are of this 
 description. The courts of neither of the granting states could 
 be expected to be unbiassed. The laws may have even pre- 
 judged the question, and tied the courts down to decisions in 
 favour of the grants of the state to which they belonged. And 
 where this had not been done, it would be natural that the 
 judges, as men, should feel a strong predilection to the claims 
 of their own government. 
 
 Having thus laid down and discussed the principles which 
 ought to regulate the constitution of the federal judiciary, we 
 will proceed to test, by these principles, the particular powers 
 of which, according to the plan of the convention, it is to be 
 composed. It is to comprehend " all cases in law and equity 
 arising under the constitution, the laws of the United States, 
 and treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority; 
 to all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and 
 consuls; to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; 
 to controversies to which the United States shall be a party ; 
 to controversies between two or more states; "between a state 
 and citizens of another state; between citizens of different 
 states; betweer citizens of the same state, claiming lands 
 
692 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 under grants of different states; and betwt-en a state or the 
 citizens thereof, and foreign states, citizens and subjects." This 
 constitutes the entire mass of the judicial authority of the 
 union. Let us now review it in detail. It is then to extend, 
 
 First. To all cases in law and equity, arising under the constitu- 
 tion and the laws of the United States. This corresponds with the 
 two first classes of causes, which have been enumerated, as 
 proper for the jurisdiction of the United States. It has been 
 asked, what is meant by *' cases arising under the constitution," 
 in contra-distinction from those " arising under the laws of the 
 United States?" The difference has been already explained. 
 All the restrictions upon the authority of the state legislatures 
 furnish examples. Thej^ are not, for instance, to emit papei 
 money; but the interdiction results from the constitution, and 
 will have no connexion with any law of the United States. 
 Should paper money, notwithstanding, be emitted, the contro- 
 versies concerning it would be cases arising under the constitu- 
 tion, and not under the laws of the United States, in the ordi- 
 nary signification of the terms. This may serve as a sample 
 of the whole. 
 
 It has also been asked, what need of the word ''equity?" 
 What equitable causes can grow out of the constitution and 
 laws of the United States? There is hardly a subject of litiga- 
 tion, between individuals, which may not involve those ingre- 
 dients of fraud, accident, trust, or hardship, which would render 
 the matter an object of equitable, rather than of legal jurisdic- 
 tion, as the distinction is known and established in several of 
 the states. It is the peculiar province, for instance, of a court 
 of equity to relieve against what are called hard bargains : 
 These are contracts, in which, though there may have been no 
 direct fraud or deceit, sufficient to invalidate them in a court of 
 law ; yet there may have been some undue and unconscionable 
 advantage taken of the necessities or misfortunes of ono of the 
 parties, which a court of equity would not tolerate. In such 
 cases, where foreigners were concerned on either side, it would 
 be impossible for the federal judicatories to do justice tvitbout 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 593 
 
 an equitable, as well as a legal jurisdiction. Agreements to 
 convey lands claimed under the grants of different states, may 
 afford another example of the necessity of an equitable juris- 
 diction in the federal courts. This reasoning may not be so 
 palpable in those states where the formal and technical distinc- 
 tion between law and equity is not maintained, as in this state, 
 where it is exemplified by every day's practice. 
 
 The judiciary authority of the union is to extend — 
 
 Second. To treaties made, or which shall be made, under the 
 authority of the United States, and to all cases affecting am- 
 bassadors, other public ministers and consuls. These belong to 
 the fourth class of the enumerated cases, as they have an evi- 
 dent connexion with the preservation of the national peace. 
 
 Third. To cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. 
 These form, altogether, the fifth of the enumerated classes of 
 causes, proper for the cognizance of the national courts. 
 
 Fourth. To controversies to which the United States shall be 
 a party. These constitute the third of those classes. 
 
 Fifth. To controversies between two or more states ; between 
 a state and citizens of another state ; between citizens of differ- 
 ent states. These belong to the fourth of those classes, and 
 partake, in some measure, of the nature of the last. 
 
 Sixth. To cases between the citizens of the same state, claim- 
 ing lands under grants of different states. These fall within the 
 last class, and are the only instances in which the proposed consti- 
 tution directly contemplates the cognizance of disputes between the 
 citizens of the same state. 
 
 Seventh. To cases between a state and the citizens thereof, 
 and foreign states, citizens or subjects. These have been already 
 explained to belong to the fourth of the enumerated classes; 
 and have been shown to be, in a peculiar manner, the proper 
 subjectb of the national judicature. 
 
 From this review of the particular powers of the federal 
 judiciary, as marked out in the constitution, it appears, that 
 they are all conformable to' the principles which ought to have 
 governed the structure of that department, and which were 
 
5iV4 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 necessary to the perfection of the system. If some partial in- 
 conveniences should appear to be connected with the incorpo- 
 ration of any of them into the plan, it ought to be recollected, 
 that the national legislature will have ample authority to make 
 such exceptions, and to prescribe such regulations, as will be 
 calculated to obviate or remove these inconveniences. The 
 possibility of particular mischiefs can never be viewed, by a 
 well-informed mind, as a solid objection to a principle which is 
 calculated to avoid general mischiefs, and to obtain general 
 advanta^'es 
 
 PUBLIUS. 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 595 
 
 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 NUMBER LXXXI. 
 
 NEW YORK, JULY 4, 8, 1788. 
 
 HAMILTON. 
 
 A FURTHER VIEW OF THE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT, IN RELATIOH 
 TO THE DISTRIBUTION OF ITS AUTHORITY. 
 
 Let us now return to the partition of the judiciary authority 
 between different courts, and their relations to each other. 
 
 " The judicial power of the United States is to be vested in 
 one supreme court, and in such inferior courts as the congress 
 may from time to time ordain and establish."* That there 
 ought to be one court of supreme and final jurisdiction, is a 
 proposition which is not likely to be contested. The reasons 
 for it have been assigned in another place, and are too obvious 
 to need repetition. The only question that seems to have been 
 raised concerning it, is, whether it ought to be a distinct body, 
 or a branch of the legislature. The same contradiction is ob- 
 servable in regard to this matter, which has been remarked in 
 several other cases. The very men who object to the senate as 
 a court of impeachments, on the ground of an improper inter- 
 mixture of powei's, are advocates, by implication at least, for 
 the propriety of vesting the ultimate decision of all causes, in 
 the whole, or in a part of the legislative body. 
 
 The arguments, or rather suggestions, upon which this charge 
 Is founded, are to this effect : " The authority of the supreme 
 * Arfiole 3. Sect. 1. 
 
59b THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 court of tho United States, which is to be a separate and inde- 
 pendent body, will be superior to that of the legislature. The 
 power of construing the laws according to the spirit of the con- 
 stitution, will enable that court to mould them into whatever 
 shape it may think proper; especially as its decisions will not 
 be in any manner subject to the revision or correction of the 
 legislative body. This is as unprecedented as it is dangerous. 
 In Britain, the judicial power in the last resort, resides in the 
 house of lords, which is a branch of the legislature; and this 
 part of the British Government has been imitated in the state 
 constitutions in general. The parliament of Great Britain, 
 and the legislatures of the several states, can at any time 
 rectify by law, the exceptionable decisions of their respective 
 courts. But the errors and usurpations of the supreme court 
 of the United States, will be uncontrolable and remediless." 
 This, upon examination, will be found to be altogether made up 
 of false reasoning upon misconceived fact. 
 
 In the first place, there is not a syllable in the plan, which 
 directly empowers the national courts to construe the laws 
 according to the spirit of the constitution, or which gives them 
 any greater latitude in this respect, than may be claimed by 
 the courts of every state. I admit, however, that the constitu- 
 tion ought to be the standard of construction for the laws, and 
 that wherever there is an evident opposition, the laws ought to 
 give place to the constitution. But this doctrine is not deduci- 
 ble from any circumstance peculiar to the plan of the conven- 
 tion; but from the general theory of a limited constitution; 
 and as far as it is true, is equally applicable to most, if not to 
 all the state governments. There can be no objection, there- 
 fore, on this account, to the federal judicature, which will not 
 lie against the local judicatures in general, and which will not 
 serve to condemn every constitution that attempts to set bounds 
 to legislative discretion. 
 
 But perhaps the force of the objection may be thought to 
 consist in the particular organization of the supreme court; in 
 its being composed of a distinct body of magistrates, instead 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 59T 
 
 of being one of the branches of the legislature, as ir the gov- 
 ernment of Great Britain and in that of this state. To insist 
 upon this point, the authors of the objection must renounce the 
 meaning they have laboured to annex to the celebrated maxim, 
 requiring a separation of the departments of power. It shall, 
 nevertheless, be conceded to them, agreeably to the interpreta- 
 tion given to that maxim in the course of these papers, that it 
 is not violated by vesting the ultimate power of judging in a 
 paH of the legislative body. But though this be not an abso- 
 lute violation of that excellent rule; yet it verges so nearly 
 upon it, as on this account alone, to be less eligible than the 
 mode preferred by the convention. From a body which had 
 had even a partial agency in passing bad laws, we could rarely 
 expect a disposition to temper and moderate them in the appli- 
 cation. The same spirit which had operated in making them, 
 would be too apt to influence their construction : Still less could 
 •T, be expected, that men who had infringed the constitution, in 
 the character of legislators, would be disposed to repair tho 
 breach in that of judges. Nor is this all : Every reason which 
 recommends the tenure of good behaviour for judicial oflSces, 
 militates against placing the judiciary power, in the last resort, 
 in a body composed of men chosen for a limited period. There 
 is an absurdity in referring the determination of causes, in the 
 first instance, to judges of permanent standing; in the last, to 
 tliose of a temporary and mutable constitution. And there is 
 a still greater absurdity in subjecting the decisions of men 
 selected for their knowledge of the laws, acquired by long and 
 laborious study, to the revision and control of men who, for 
 want of the same advantage, cannot but be deficient in that 
 knowledge. The members of the legislature, will rarely be 
 chosen with a view to those qualifications which fit men for the 
 stations of judges ; and as, on this account, there will be great 
 reason to apprehend all the ill cons jquences of defective infor- 
 mation ; so, on account of the natural propensity of such bodies 
 to party divisions, there will be no less reason to fear, that the 
 jtL'siilential breath of faction may poison the fountains of jus- 
 
598 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 tice. The habit of being continually marshalled on oppoBii© 
 sides, will be too apt to stifle the voice both of law and of 
 equity. 
 
 These considerations teach us to applaud the wisdom of those 
 states who have committed the judicial power, in the last 
 resort, not to a part of tl^e legislature, but to distinct and in- 
 dependent bodies of men. Contrary to the supposition of those 
 who have represented the plan of the convention, in this re- 
 spect, as novel and unprecedented, it is but a copy of the con- 
 stitutions of New-Hampshire, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, 
 Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North-Carolina, South-Carolina, 
 and Georgia j and the preference which has been given to these 
 models is highly to be commended. 
 
 It is not true, in the second place, that the parliament of 
 Great Britain, or the legislatures of the particular states, can 
 rectify the exceptionable decisions of their respective courts, 
 in any other sense than might be done by a future legislature 
 of the United States. The theory neither of the British nor 
 the state constitutions, authorizes the revisal of a judicial 
 sentence by a legislative act. Nor is there any thing in the 
 proposed constitution, more than in either of them by which it 
 is forbidden. In the former, as in the latter, the imjjropriety 
 of the thing, on the general principles of law and reason, is the 
 sole obstacle. A legislature, without exceeding its province, 
 cannot reverse a determination once made, in a particular case ; 
 though it may prescribe a new rule for future cases. This is 
 the principle, and it applies, in all its consequences, exactly in 
 the same manner and extent, to the state governments, as to 
 the national government now under consideration. Not the 
 least difference can be pointed out in any view of the 8ubje(?t. 
 
 It may in the last place be observed, that the supposed danger 
 of judiciary encroachments on the legislative authority, which 
 has been upon many occasions reiterated, is, in reality, a 
 phantom. Particular misconstructions and contraventions of 
 the will of the legislature, may now and then happen; but they 
 can never be so extensive as to amount to an inconvenience, or 
 
• THE FEDERALIST. 599 
 
 in any sensible degree to aflFect the order of Ihe political system. 
 This may be inferred with certainty from the general nature 
 of the judicial power; from the objects to which it relates; 
 from the manner in which it is exercised ; from its comparative 
 weakness; and from its total incapacity to support its usurpa- 
 tions by force. And the inference is g^'eatly fortified by the 
 consideration of the important constitutional check, which the 
 power of instituting impeachments in one part of the legislative 
 body, and of determining upon them in the other, would give 
 to that body upon the members of the judicial department. 
 This is alone a complete security. There never can be danger 
 that the judges, by a series of deliberate usurpations on the 
 authority of the legislature, would hazard the united resent- 
 ment of the body intrusted with it, while this body was pos- 
 sessed of the means of punishing their presumption, by de- 
 grading them from their stations. While this ought to remove 
 all apprehensions on the subject, it affords, at the same time, a 
 cogent argument for constituting the senate a court for the 
 trial of impeachments. 
 
 Having now examined, and I trust removed, the objections 
 10 the distinct and independent organization of the supreme 
 <'Ourt ; I proceed to consider the propriety of the power of con 
 fitituting inferior courts,* and the relations which will subsist 
 between these and the former. 
 
 The power of constituting inferior courts, is evidently calcu- 
 lated to obviate the necessity of having recourse to the supreme 
 court in every case of federal cognizance. It is intended to 
 enable the national government to institute or authorize in each 
 state or district of the United States, a tribunal competent to 
 *he determination of matters of national jurisdiction within its 
 limits. 
 
 * This power has been absurdly represented as intended to abolish all the 
 county courts in the several states, which are commonly called inferior courts 
 But the expressions of the constitution are to constitute " tribunals infebior 
 TO THE SDPEEMK couET," and the evident design of the provision is, to enable 
 thfc institution of local courts, subordinate to the supreme, either in states ot 
 larger districts. It is ridiculaus to imagine, that county courts were in con- ' 
 lemplation. 
 
600 THE FEDEKALIST. • 
 
 Bill why, it is asked, might not the same purpose have been 
 accomplished by the instrumentality of the state courts ? This 
 admits of different answers. Though the fitness and compe- 
 tency of these courts should be allowed in the utmost latitude : 
 yet the substance of the power in question, may still be re- 
 garded as a necessary part of the plan, if it were only to 
 authorize the national legislature to commit to them the cogni- 
 zance of causes arising out of the national constitution. To 
 confer upon' the existing courts of the several states the power 
 of determining such causes, would perhaps be as much " to con- 
 stitute tribunals," as to create new courts with the like power 
 But ought not a more direct and explicit provision to have 
 been made in favour of the state courts ? There are, in my 
 opinion, substantial reasons against such a provision: The most 
 discerning cannot foresee how far the prevalency of a local 
 spirit may be found to disqualify the local tribunals for the 
 jurisdiction of national causes ; whilst every man may discover, 
 that courts constituted like those of some of the states, would 
 be improper channels of the judicial authority of the union. 
 State judges, holding their offices during pleasure, or from year 
 to year, will be too little independent to be relied upon for an 
 inflexible execution of the national laws. And if there was a 
 necessity for confiding to them the original cognizance of 
 causes arising under those laws, there would be a correspondent 
 necessity for leaving the door of appeal as wide as possible. 
 In proportion to the grounds of confidence in, or distrust of 
 the subordinate tribunals, ought to be the facility or difficulty 
 of appeals. And well satisfied as I am of the propriety of the 
 appellate jurisdiction, in the several classes of causes to which 
 it is extended by the plan of the convention, I should consider 
 every thing calculated to give, in practice, an unrestrained course 
 to appeals, as a source of public and private inconvenience. 
 
 I am not sure but that it will be found highly expedient and 
 
 aeeful, to divide the United States into four or five, or half a 
 
 dozen districts ; and to institute a federal court in each district, 
 
 *in lieu of one in every state. The judges of these courts may 
 
THE FEDERALIST. • 601 
 
 hold circuits for the trial of causes in the several parts of tho 
 respective districts. Justice through them may be adminis- 
 tered with ease and dispatch; and appeals maybe safely cir 
 cumscribed within a narrow compass. This plan appears to 
 me at present the most eligible of any that could be adopted, 
 and in order to it, it is necessary that the power of constituting 
 inferior courts should exist in the full extent in which it is 
 seen in the proposed constitution. 
 
 These reasons seem sufficient to satisfy a candid mind, that 
 the want of such a power would have been a great defect in 
 the plan. Let us now examine in what manner the judicial 
 authority is to be distributed between the supreme and the 
 inferior courts of the union. 
 
 The supreme court is to be invested with original jurisdictior 
 only " in cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers 
 and consuls, and those in which a state shall be a party." 
 Public ministers of every class, are the immediate representa- 
 tives of their sovereigns. All questions in which they are con 
 cerned, are so directly connected with the public peace, that a» 
 well for the preservation of this, as out of respect to the 
 sovereignties they represent, it is both expedient and proper, 
 that such questions should be submitted in the first instance to 
 the highest judicatory of the nation. Though consuls have not 
 in strictness a diplomatic character, yet as they are the public 
 agents of the nations to which they belong, the same observa- 
 tion is in a great measure applicable to them. In cases in which 
 a state might happen to be a party, it would ill suit its dignity 
 to be turned over to an inferior tribunal. 
 
 Though it may rather be a digression from the immediaie 
 subject of this paper, I shall take occasion to mention here a 
 supposition which has excited some alarm upon very mistaken 
 grounds : It has been suggested that an assignment of the 
 public securities of one state to the citizens of another, would 
 enable them to prosecute that state in the federal courts for the 
 amount of those securities. A suggestion, which the following 
 considerations prove to be without foundation. 
 
602 • THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty, not to be amen- 
 able to the suit of an individual without its consent. This is the 
 general sense, and the general practice of mankind; and the 
 exemption, as one of the attributes of sovereignty, is now 
 enjoyed by the government of every state in the union. Un- 
 less, therefore, there is a surrender of this immunity in the 
 plan of the convention, it will remain with the states, and the 
 danger intimated must be merely ideal. The circumstances 
 which are necessary to produce an alienation of state sove- 
 reignty, were discussed in considering the article of taxation, 
 and need not be repeated here. A recurrence to the principles 
 there established will satisfy us, that there is no colour to pre- 
 tend that the state governments would, by the adoption of that 
 plan, be divested of the privilege of paying their own debts in 
 their own way, free from every constraint but that which flows 
 from the obligations of good faith. The contracts between a 
 nation and individuals, are only binding on the conscience of 
 the sovereign, and have no pretension to a compulsive force. 
 They confer no right of action, independent of the sovereign 
 will. To what purpose would it be to authorize suits against 
 states for the debts they owe ? How could recoveries be en- 
 forced ? It is evident that it could not be done, without waging 
 war against the contracting state : and to ascribe to the federal 
 courts, by mere implication, and in destruction of a pre-exist- 
 ing right of the state governments, a power which would 
 involve such a consequence, would be altogether forced and 
 unwarrantable. 
 
 Let us resume the train of our observations ; we have seen 
 that the original jurisdiction of the supreme court would be 
 confined to two classes of causes, and those of a nature rarely 
 to occur. In all other cases of federal cognizance, the original 
 Jurisdiction would appertain to the inferior tribunals, and the 
 supreme court would have nothing more than an appellate 
 jurisdiction, "with such exceptions^ and under such regulations^ 
 as the congress shall make." 
 
 The propriety of this appellate jurisdiction has been scarcely 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 603 
 
 called in question in regard to matters of law; bnt the clamours 
 have been loud against it as applied to matters of fact. Some 
 •well-intentioned men in this state, deriving their notions from 
 the language and forms which obtain in our courts, have been 
 induced to consider it as an implied supersedure of the trial by 
 jury, in favour of the civil law mode of trial, which prevails in 
 our courts of admiralty, probates, and chancery. A technical 
 sense has been affixed to the term " appellate," which in our 
 law parlance, is commonly used in reference to appeals in the 
 course of the civil law. But if I am not misinformed, the 
 same meaning would not be given to it in any part of New- 
 England. There an appeal from one jury to another, is familial 
 both in language and practice, and is even a matter of course, 
 until there have been two verdicts on one side. The word 
 " appellate," therefore, will not be understood in the same 
 sense in New -England, as in New -York, which shows the 
 impropriety of a technical interpretation derived from the 
 jurisprudence of a particular state. The expression taken 
 in the abstract, denotes nothing more than the power of one 
 tribunal to review the proceedings of another, either as to the 
 law or fact, or both. The mode of doing it may depend on 
 ancient custom or legislative provision ; in a new government 
 it must depend on the latter, and may be with or without the 
 aid of a jury, as may be judged advisable. If, therefore, the 
 re-examination of a fact, once determined by a jury, should in 
 any case be admitted under the proposed constitution, it may 
 be so regulated as to be done by a second jury, either by 
 remanding the cause to the court below for a second trial 
 of the fact, or by directing an issue immediately out of the 
 supreme court. 
 
 But it does not follow, that the re-examination of a fact once 
 ascertained by a jury, will be permitted in the supreme court. 
 Why may it not be said, with the strictest propriety, when a 
 writ of error is brought from an inferior to a superior court 
 of law in this state, that the latter has jurisdiction * of the 
 
 * This word is a compound of Jcs and dictio juris, dictio, or a speaking or 
 ♦jronouncing of the law. 
 
604 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 fact, as well as the law ? It is true it cannot institute a new 
 inquiry concerning the fact, but it takes cognizance of it as it 
 appears upon the record, and pronounces the law arising upon 
 it. This is jurisdiction of both fact and law, nor is it even 
 possible to separate them. Though the common law courts of 
 this state ascertain disputed facts by a jury, yet they unques- 
 tionably have jurisdiction of both fact and law; and accord- 
 ingly, when the former is agreed in the pleadings, they have 
 no recourse to a jury, but proceed at once to judgment. 1 
 contend, therefore, on this ground, that the expressions, " appel- 
 late jurisdiction, both as to law and fact," do not necessarily 
 imply a re-examination in the supreme court of facts decided 
 by juries in the inferior courts. 
 
 The following train of ideas may well be imagined to liave 
 influenced the convention, in relation to this particular pro- 
 vision. The appellate jurisdiction of the supreme court, it 
 may have been argued, will extend to causes determinable in 
 different modes, some in the course of the common law, others 
 in the course of the civil law. In the former, the revision of 
 the law only will be, generally speaking, the proper province 
 of the supreme court; in the latter, the re-examination of the 
 fact is agreeable to usage, and in some cases, of which prize 
 causes are an example, might be essential to the preservation 
 of the public peace. It is therefore necessary, that the appellate 
 jurisdiction should, in certain cases, extend in the broadest 
 sense to matters of fact. It will not answer to make an 
 express exception of cases which shall have been originally 
 tried by a jury, because in the courts of some of the states, 
 all causes are tried in this mode ; * and such an exception would 
 preclude the revision of matters of fact, as well where it mignt 
 be proper, as where it might be improper. To avoid all incon- 
 veniences, it will be safest to declare generally, that the supreme 
 court shall possess appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and 
 
 * I hold, that the states will have concurrent jurisdiction with the subordi- 
 nate federal judicatories, in many cases of federal cognizance, as will be 
 explained in my next paper. 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 605 
 
 fad, an i that this jurisdiction shall be subject to sueti sxceptions 
 and regulations as the national legislature may prescribe. This 
 will enable the government to modify it in such a manner as 
 will best answer the ends of public justice and security. 
 
 This view of the matter, at any rate, puts it out of all doubt, 
 that the supposed abolition of the trial by jury, by the operation 
 of this provision, is fallacious and untrue. The legislature of 
 the United States would certainly have full power to provide, 
 that in appeals to the supreme court there should be no re- 
 examination of facts, where they had been tried in the original 
 causes by juries. This would certainly be an authorized excep- 
 tion ; but if, for the reason already intimated, it should be 
 thought too extensive, it might be qualified with a limitation 
 to such causes only as are determinable at common law in that 
 mode of trial. 
 
 The amount of the observations hitherto made on the autho- 
 rity of the judicial department is this : That it has been care- 
 fully restricted to those causes which are manifestly proper for 
 the cognizance of the national judicature; that, in the partition 
 of this authority, a very small portion of original jurisdiction 
 has been reserved to the supreme court, and the rest consigned 
 to the subordinate tribunals ; that the supreme court will pos- 
 sess an appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and fact, in all the 
 cases referred to them, but subject to any exceptions and regula-^ 
 tions which may be thought advisable ; that this appellate juris- 
 diction does, in no case, abolish the trial by jury ; and that an 
 ordinary degree of prudence and integrity in the national coun- 
 cils, will insure us solid advantages from the establishment of 
 the proposed judiciary, without exposing us to any of the incon* 
 7enienc3s which have been predicted from that source. 
 
 iU}litti>lht 
 
($06 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 NUMBER LXXXII. 
 
 NEW YORK, JULY 11, 1783, 
 
 HAMILTON. 
 
 A FURTHER VIEW OF THE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT, IN REFERENOB 
 TO SOME MISCELLANEOUS QUESTIONS. 
 
 The erection of a new government, whatever care or wisdom 
 may distinguish the work, cannot fail to originate questions of 
 intricacy and nicety; and these may, in a particular manner, 
 be expected to flow from the establishment of a constitution 
 founded upon the total or partial incorporation of a number of 
 distinct sovereignties. Time only can mature and perfect so 
 compound a system, liquidate the meaning of all the parts, 
 and adjust them to each other in a harmonious and consistent 
 
 WHOLE. 
 
 Such questions accordingly have arisen upon the plan pro- 
 posed by the convention, and particularly concerning the 
 judiciary department. The principal of these respect the 
 situation of the state courts, in regard to those causes which 
 are to be submitted to federal jurisdiction. Is this to be ex- 
 clusive, or are those courts to possess a concurrent jurisdiction ? 
 If the latter, in what relation will they stand to the national 
 tribunals? These are inquiries which we meet with in the 
 mouths of men of sense, and which are sertainly entitled to 
 attention. 
 
THE FEDERALIBT. 607 
 
 The principles established in a former paper* teaoh us. that 
 the states will retain all pre-existing authorities, which may not 
 be exclusively delegated to the federal head ; and that this ex- 
 clusive delegation can only exist in one of three cases ; where 
 an exclusive authority is, in express terms, granted to the 
 union ; or where a particular authority is granted to the union, 
 and the exercise of a like authority is prohibited to the states ; 
 or, where an authority is granted to the union, with which a 
 similar authority in the states would be utterly incompatible. 
 Though these principles may not apply with the same force to 
 the judiciary, as to the legislative power; yet I am inclined to 
 think, that they are in the main, just with respect to the 
 former, as well as the latter. And under this impression I shtdl 
 lay it down as a rule, that the state courts will retain the juris- 
 diction they now have, unless it appears to be taken away in 
 one of the enumerated modes. 
 
 The only thing in the proposed constitution, which wears 
 the appearance of confining the causes of federal cognizance, to 
 the federal courts, is contained in this passage : " The judicial 
 POWER of the United States shall be vested in one supreme court, 
 and in such inferior courts as the congress shall from time to 
 time ordain and establish." This might either be construed to 
 signify, that the supreme and subordinate courts of the union 
 should alone have the power of deciding those causes, to which 
 their authority is to extend ; or simply to denote, that the 
 organs of the national judiciary should be one supreme court, 
 and as many subordinate courts, as congress should think 
 proper to appoint; in other words, that the United States 
 should exercise the judicial power with which they are to be 
 invested, through one supreme tribunal, and a certain number 
 of inferior ones, to be instituted by them. The first excludes, 
 the last admits, the concurrent jurisdiction of the state tribu- 
 nals : And as the first would amount to an alienation of state 
 power by implication, the last appears to me the most defensible 
 construction. 
 
 « Nc XXXII. 
 
608 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 But thin doctrine of concurrent jurisdiction, is only clearly 
 applicable to those descriptions of causes, of which the state 
 courts have previous cognizance. It is not equally evident in 
 relation to cases which may grow out of, and be peculiar to, the 
 constitution to be established: For not to allow the state courts 
 a right of jurisdiction in such cases, can hardly be considered 
 as the abridgement of a pre-existing authority. I mean not 
 therefore to contend, that the United States, in the course of 
 legislation upon the objects intrusted to their direction, may 
 not commit the decision of causes arising upon a particular 
 regulation, to the federal courts solely, if such a measure should 
 be deemed expedient; but I hold that the state courts will be 
 divested of no part of their primitive jurisdiction, further than 
 may relate to an appeal; and I am even of opinion, that in 
 every case in which they were not expressly excluded by the 
 future acts of the national legislature, they will of course take 
 cognizance of the causes to which those acts may give birth. 
 This I infer from the nature of judiciary power, and from the 
 general genius of the system. The judiciary power of every 
 government looks beyond its own local or municipal laws, and 
 in .civil cases, lays hold of all subjects of litigation between 
 parties within its jurisdiction, though the causes of dispute are 
 relative to the laws of the most distant part of the globe. 
 Those of Japan, not less than of New- York, may furnish the 
 objects of legal discussion to our courts. When in addition to 
 this we consider the state governments and the national gov- 
 ernments, as they truly are, in the light of kindred systems, 
 and as parts of one whole, the inference seems to be conclusive, 
 that the state courts would have a concurrent jurisdiction in 
 all cases arising under the laws of the union, where it was not 
 expressly prohibited. 
 
 Here another question occurs; what relation would subsist 
 between the national and state courts in these instances of con- 
 current jurisdiction ? I answer, that an appeal would certainly 
 lie from the latter, to the supreme court of the United States. 
 The constitution in direct terms, gives an appellate jurisdiction 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 609 
 
 to the supreme court in all the enumerated cases oi federal 
 cognizance, in which it is not to have an original one ; without 
 a single expression to confine its operation to the inferior fede • 
 ral courts. The objects of appeal, not the tribunals from which 
 it is to be made, are alone contemplated. From this circum- 
 stance, and from the reason of the thing, it ought to be con- 
 strued to extend to the state tribunals. Either this must be 
 the case, or the local coui'ts must be excluded from a concurrent 
 jurisdiction in matters of national concern, else the judiciary 
 authority of the union may be eluded at the pleasure of every 
 plaintiff or prosecutor. Neither of these consequences ought, 
 without evident necessity, to be involved ; the latter would be 
 entirely inadmissible, as it would defeat some of the most im 
 portant and avowed purposes of the proposed government, and 
 would essentially embarrass its measures. JSTor do I perceive 
 any foundation for such a supposition. Agreeably to the re- 
 mark already made, the national and state systems are to be 
 regarded as one whole. The courts of the latter will of course 
 be natural auxiliaries to the execution of the laws of the union, 
 and an appeal from them will as naturally lie to that tribunal, 
 which is destined to unite and assimilate the principles of 
 national justice and the rules of national decision. The evident 
 aim of the plan of the convention is, that all the causes of the 
 specified classes shall, for weighty public reasons, receive their 
 original or final determination in the courts of the union. To 
 confine, therefore, the general expressions which give appellate 
 jurisdiction to the supreme court, to appeals from the subordi- 
 nate federal courts, instead of allowing their extension to the 
 state courts, would be to abridge the latitude of the terms, in 
 subversion of the intent, contraiy to every sound rule of inter- 
 pretation. 
 
 But could an appeal be made to lie from the state courts, to 
 the subordinate federal judicatories ? This is another of the 
 questions which have been raised, and of greater difficulty than 
 the former. The following considerations countenance the 
 affirmative The plan of the convention, in the first place. 
 
(510 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 authorizes the national legislature " to constitute tribunals 
 inferior to the supreme court." * It declares in the next place, 
 that " the judicial power of the United States shall be vested in 
 one supreme court, and in such inferior courts as congress shall 
 ordain and establish;" and it then proceeds to enumerate the 
 cases, to which this judicial power shall extend. It afterwards 
 divides the jurisdiction of the supreme court into original ana 
 appellate, but gives no definition of that of the subordinate 
 courts. The only outlines described for them are, that they 
 shall be " inferior to the supreme court," and that they shall not 
 exceed the specified limits of the federal judiciary. Whether 
 their authority shall be original or appellate, or both, is not 
 declared. All this seems to be left to the discretion of the 
 legislature. And this being the case, I perceive at present no 
 impediment to the establishment of an appeal from the state 
 courts, to the subordinate national tribunals ; and many advan- 
 tages attending the power of doing it may be imagined. It 
 would diminish the motives to the multiplication of federal 
 courts, and would admit of arrangements calculated to contract 
 the appellate jurisdiction of the supreme court. The state 
 tribunals, may then be left with a more entire charge of federal 
 causes; and appeals in most cases in which they may be 
 deemed proper, instead of being carried to the supreme court, 
 may be made to lie from the state courts, to district courts of 
 the union. 
 
 PUBLIUS. 
 * Section 8th, Article Ist 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 611 
 
 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 NUMBER LXXXIII. 
 
 NEW YORK, JULY 15, 18, 22, 26, 1788. 
 
 HAMILTON. 
 
 A FURTHER VIEW OP THE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT, IN RELAllON 
 TO THE TRIAL BY JURY. 
 
 The objection to the plan of the convention, which has met 
 with most success in this state, is relative to tlie want of a con- 
 gtitutional provision for the trial by jury in civil cases. The dis- 
 ingenuous form in which this objection is usually stated, has 
 been repeatedly adverted to and exposed ; but continues to be 
 pursued in all the conversations and writings of the opponents 
 •f the plan. The mere silence of the constitution in regard to 
 ami causes, is represented as an abolition of the trial by jury; 
 and the declamations to which it has afforded a pretext, are 
 artfully calculated to induce a persuasion that this pretended 
 abolition is complete and universal; extending not only to 
 every species of civil, but even to criminal causes. To argue 
 with respect to the latter, would be as vain and fruitless, as to 
 attempt to demonstrate any of those propositions which, by 
 their own internal evidence, force conviction when expressed 
 ID language adapted to convey their meaning. 
 
 With regard to civil causes, subtleties almost too contempti- 
 ble for refutation, have been employed to countenance the 
 Burmise that a thing, which is only not provided for, is entirely 
 abolished. Every mao ^f discernment must at once perceive 
 
812 THE IfiDERALIST. 
 
 the /ride difference between silence and ibolition. But as the 
 inventors of this fallacy have attempted to support it by cer- 
 tain legal maxims of interpretation, which they have perverted 
 from their true meaning, it may not be wholly useless to ex- 
 plore the ground they have taken. 
 
 The maxims on which they rely are of this nature, " a speci- 
 fication of particulars, is an exclusion of generals ; " or, " the 
 expression of one thing, is the exclusion of another." Hence, 
 say they, as the constitution has established the trial by jury 
 in criminal cases, and is silent in respect to civil, this silence 
 is an implied prohibition of trial by jury, in regard to the 
 latter. 
 
 The rules of legal intepretation, are rules of common sense, 
 adopted by the courts in the construction of the laws. The 
 true test, therefore, of a just application of them, is its con- 
 formity to the source from which they are derived. This being 
 the case, let me ask if it is consistent with common sense to 
 suppose, that a provision obliging the legislative power to 
 commit the trial of criminal causes to juries, is a privation 
 of its right to authorize or permit that mode of trial in other 
 cases ? Is it natural to suppose, that a command to do one 
 thing, is a prohibition to the doing of another, which there 
 was a previous power to do, and which is not incompatible 
 with the thing commanded to be done ? If such a supposition 
 would be unnatural and unreasonable, it cannot be rational to 
 maintain, that an injunction of the trial by jury, in certain 
 cases, is an interdiction of it in others. 
 
 A power to constitute courts, is a power to prescribe the 
 mode of trial; and consequently, if nothing was said in the 
 constitution on the subject of juries, the legislature would be 
 it liberty either to adopt that institution, or to let it alone. 
 This discretion, in regard to criminal causes, is abridged by 
 an express injunction ; but it is left at large in relation to civil 
 causes, for the very reason that there is a total silence on the 
 subject. The specification of an obligation to try all criminal 
 f^auses in a particular mode, excludes indeed the obligation o^ 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 613 
 
 employing the same mode in civil causes, tut does not abridge 
 the power of the legislature to appoint that mode, if it should 
 be thought proper. The pretence, therefore, that the national 
 legislature would not be at liberty to submit all the civil causes 
 of federal cognizance to the determination of juries, is a pre- 
 tence destitute of all foundation. 
 
 From these observations, this conclusion results, that the 
 trial by jury in civil cases would not be abolished, and that the 
 use attempted to be made of the maxims which have been 
 quoted, is contrary to reason, and therefore inadmissible. Even 
 if these maxims had a precise technical sense, corresponding 
 with the ideas of those who employ them upon the present 
 occasion, which, however, is not the case, they would still be 
 inapplicable to a constitution of government. In relation to 
 such a subject, the natural and obvious sense of its provisions, 
 apart from any technical rules, is the true criterion of con- 
 struction. 
 
 Having now seen that the maxims relied upon will not bear 
 the use made of them, let us endeavour to ascertain their proper 
 application. This will be best done by examples. The plan of 
 the convention declares, that the power of congress, or in other 
 M^ords of the national legislature, shall extend to certain enume- 
 rated cases. This specification of particulars evidently excludes 
 all pretension to a general legislative authority; because an 
 affirmative grant of special powers would be absurd as weU as 
 useless, if a general authority was intended. 
 
 In like manner, the authority of the federal judicatures, is 
 declared by the constitution to comprehend certain cases par- 
 ticularly specified. The expression of those cases, marks the 
 precise limits beyond which the federal courts cannot extend 
 their jurisdiction; because the objects of their cognizance being 
 enumerated, the specification would be nugatory, if it did not 
 exclude all ideas of more extensive authority. 
 
 These examples are sufficient to elucidate the maxims which 
 have been mentioned, and to designate the manner in which 
 they should be used. 
 
014 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 From what has been said, it must appear unquestionably 
 true, that trial by jury is in no case abolished by the proposed 
 constitution; and it is equally true, that in those controversies 
 between individuals in which the great body of the people are 
 likely to be interested, that institution will remain precisely in 
 the situation in which it is placed by the state constitutions. 
 The foundation of this assertion is, that the national judiciary 
 will have no cognizance of them, and of course they will remain 
 determinable as heretofore by the state courts only, and in the 
 manner which the state constitutions and laws prescribe. Al' 
 land causes, except where claims under the grants of different 
 states come into question, and all other controversies between 
 the citizens of the same state, unless where they depend upon 
 positive violations of the articles of union, by acts of the state 
 legislatures, will belong exclusively to the jurisdiction of the 
 state tribunals. Add to this, that admiralty causes, and almost 
 all those which are of equity jurisdiction, are determinable 
 under our own government without the intervention of a jury, 
 and the inference from the whole will be, that this institution, 
 as it exists with us at present, cannot possibly be affected, to 
 any great extent, by the proposed alteration in our system of 
 government. 
 
 The friends and adversaries of the plan of the convention, 
 if they agree in nothing else, concur at least in the value they 
 set upon the trial by jury: Or if there is any difference between 
 them, it consists in this; the former regard it as a valuable 
 safeguard to liberty, the latter represent it as the very palladium 
 of free government. For my own part, the more the operation 
 of the institution has fallen under my observation, the more 
 reason I have discovered for holding it in high estimation ; and 
 it would be altogether superfluous to examine to what extent 
 it deserves to be esteemed useful or essential in a representative 
 republic, or how much more merit it may be entitled to, as a 
 defence against the oppressions of an hereditary monarch, than 
 as a barrier to the tyranny of popular magistrates in a popular 
 government. Discussions of this kind would be more curious 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 615 
 
 than beneficial, as all are satisfied of the utility of the instiiu- 
 tion. and of its friendly aspect to liberty. But I must acknow- 
 ledge, that I cannot readily discern the inseparable connexiox; 
 between the existence of liberty, and the trial by jury in civil 
 cases. Arbitrary impeachments, arbitrary methods of prose- 
 cuting pretended offences, arbitrary punishments upon arbitrary 
 convictions, have ever appeared to me the great engines of 
 judicial despotism; and all these have relation to criminal 
 proceedings. The trial by jury in criminal cases, aided by the 
 habeas corpus act, seems therefore to be alone concerned in the 
 question. And both of these are provided for, in the moat 
 ample manner, in the plan of the convention. 
 
 It has been observed, that trial by jury is a safeguard against 
 an oppressive exercise of the power of taxation. This obser- 
 vation deserves to be canvassed. 
 
 It is evident that it can have no influence upon the legislature, 
 in regard to the amount of the taxes to be laid, to the objects upon 
 which they are to be imposed, or to the rule by which they are 
 to be apportioned. If it can have any influence, therefore, it 
 must be upon the mode of collection, and the conduct of the 
 oflScers intrusted with the execution of the revenue laws. 
 
 As to the mode of collection in this state, under our own 
 consiitution, the trial by jury is in most cases out of use. The 
 taxes are usually levied by the more summary proceeding ol 
 distress and sale, as in cases of rent. And it is acknowledged 
 on all hands, that this is essential to the eflScacy of the revenue 
 laws. The dilatory course of a trial at law to recover the taxes 
 imposed on individuals, would neither suit the exigencies of the 
 public, nor promote the convenience of the citizens. It would 
 often occasion an accumulation of costs, more burthensome than 
 the original sum of the tax to be levied. 
 
 And as to the conduct of the officers of the revenue, the pro- 
 vision in favour of trial by jury in criminal cases, will allord 
 the desired security. Wilful abuses of a public authority, to 
 the oppression of the subject, and every species of official ex- 
 tortion, are offences against the government; for which, the 
 
>J16 THE FEDEHALIST. 
 
 persons who commit them, may be indicted and punished ac- 
 cording to the circumstances of the case. 
 
 The excellence of the trial by jury in civil cases, appears to 
 depend on circnmstances foreign to the preservation of liberty. 
 The strongest argument in its favour is, that it is a security 
 against corruption. As there is always more time, and better 
 opportunity, to tamper with a standing body of magistrateu. 
 than with a jury summoned for the occasion, there is room to 
 suppose, that a corrupt influence would more easily find its waj 
 to the former than to the latter. The force of this considera- 
 tion is, however, diminished by others. The sheriff, who is the 
 summoner of ordinary juries, and the clerks of courts who 
 have the nomination of special juries, are themselves standing 
 officers, and acting individually, may be supposed more accessi- 
 ble to the touch of corruption than the judges, who are a collec- 
 tive body. It is not difficult to see, that it would be in the 
 power of those officers to select jurors, who would serve the 
 purpose of the party, as well as a corrupted bench. In the 
 next place, it may fairly be supposed, that there would ha less 
 difficulty in gaining some of the jurors promiscuously taken 
 from the public mass, than in gaining men who had been chosen 
 by the government for their probity and good character. But 
 making every deduction for these considerations, the trial by 
 jury must still be a valuable check upon corruption. It greatly 
 multiplies the impediments to its success. As matters now 
 stand, it would be necessary to corrupt both court and jury ; 
 for where the jury have gone evidently wrong, the court will 
 generally grant a new trial, and it would be in most cases of 
 little use to practise upon the jury, unless the court could be 
 likewise gained. Here then is a double security; and it will 
 readily be perceived, that this complicated agency tends to 
 preserve the purity of both institutions By increasing the 
 obstacles to success, it discourages attempts to seduce the 
 integrity of either. The temptations to prostitution, which 
 the judges might have to surmount, must certainly be much 
 fewer, while the co-operation of a jury is necessary, than they 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 617 
 
 might be, if they had themselves the exclusive determination 
 of all causes. 
 
 Notwithstanding, therefore, the doubts I have expressed, as 
 to the essentiality of trial by jury in civil suits to liberty, I 
 admit that it is in most cases, under proper regulations, an 
 excellent method of determining questions of property ; and 
 that on this account alone, it would be entitled to a consti- 
 tutional provision in its favour, if it were possible to fix with 
 accuracy the limits within which it ought to be comprehended. 
 This, however, is in its own nature an affair of much difficulty ; 
 and men not blinded by enthusiasm, must be sensible, that in 
 a federal government, which is a composition of societies whose 
 ideas and institutions in relation to the matter, materially vary 
 from each other, the difficulty must be not a little augmented. 
 For my own part, at every new view I take of the subject, I 
 become more convinced of the reality of the obstacles, which 
 we are authoritatively informed, prevented the insertion of a 
 provision on this head in the plan of the convention. 
 
 The great difference between the limits of the jury trial in 
 different states, is not generally understood. And as it must 
 have considerable influence on the sentence we ought to pass 
 upon the omission complained of, in regard to this point, an 
 explanation of it is necessary. In this state, our judicial estab- 
 lishments resemble more nearly, than in any other, those of 
 Great Britain. We have courts of common law, courts of pro- 
 bates (analogous in certain matters to the spiritual courts in 
 England) a court of admiralty, and a court of chancery. In 
 the courts of common law only, the trial by jury prevails, and 
 this with some exceptions. In all the others, a single judge 
 presides, and proceeds in general either according to the course 
 ol the canon or civil law, without the aid of a jury.* In New- 
 Jersey there is a court of chancery which proceeds like ours, 
 but neither courts of admiralty, nor of probates, in the sense 
 
 * It has been erroneously insinuated, with regard to the court of chancery, 
 that this court generally tries disputed facts by a jury. The truth is, that 
 references to a jury in that court rarely happen, and are in no case necessarj 
 Out where the validity of a devise of land comes into question. 
 
618 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 in which these last are established with us. In that state, the 
 courts of common law have the cognizance of those causes, 
 which with us are determinable in the courts of admiralty and 
 of probates, and of course the jury trial is more extensive in 
 New-Jersey, than in New- York. In Pennsylvania, this is per- 
 haps still more the case, for there is no court of chancery in 
 that state, and its common law courts have equity jurisdiction. 
 It has a court of admiralty, but none of probates, at least on 
 the plan of ours. Delaware has in these respects imitated 
 Pennsylvania. Maryland approaches more nearly to New 
 York, as does also Virginia, except that the latter has a plu- 
 rality of chancellors. North-Carolina bears most affinity to 
 Pennsylvania ; South-Carolina to Virginia. I believe however, 
 that in some of those states which have distinct courts of admi- 
 ralty, the causes depending in them are triable by juries. In 
 Georgia there are none but common law courts, and an appeal 
 of course lies from the verdict of one jury to another, which is 
 called a special jury, and for which a particular mode of ap- 
 pointment is marked out. In Connecticut they have no distinct 
 courts, either of chancery or of admiralty, and their courts of 
 probates have no jurisdiction of causes. Their common law 
 courts have admiralty, and, to a certain extent, equity juris- 
 diction. In cases of importance, their general assembly is the 
 only court of chancery. In Connecticut, therefore, the trial by 
 jury extends in practice further than in any other state yet 
 mentioned. Ehode-Island is, I believe, in this particular, pretty 
 much in the situation of Connecticut. Massachusetts and New- 
 Hampshire, in regard to the blending of law, equity, and admi- 
 ralty jurisdictions, are in a similar predicament. In the four 
 eastern states, the trial by jury not only stands upon a broader 
 foundation than in the other states, but it is attended with a 
 peculiarity unknown, in its full extent, to any of them. There 
 is an appeal of course from one jury to another, till there have 
 been two verdicts out of three on one side. 
 
 From this sketch it appears, that there is a material diversity 
 as well in the modification as in thd extent of the institution of 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 619 
 
 trial by jury in civil cases in the several states; and from this 
 fact, these obvious reflections flow. First, that no general rule 
 could have been fixed upon by the convention which would 
 have corresponded with the circumstances of all the states; 
 and secondly, that more, or at least as much might have been 
 hazarded, by taking the system of any one state for a standard, 
 as by omitting a provision altogether, and leaving the matter 
 as has been done to legislative regulation. 
 
 The propositions which have been made for supplying the 
 omission, have rather served to illustrate, than to obviate the 
 diflSculty of the thing. The minority of Pennsylvania have 
 proposed this mode of expression for the purpose, " trial by 
 jury shall be as heretofore;" and this I maintain would be inap- 
 plicable and indeterminate. The United States, in their collec- 
 tive capacity, are the object to which all general provisions in 
 the constitution must be understood to refer. Now, it is evi- 
 dent, that though trial by jury, with various limitations, is 
 known in each state individually, yet in the United States, as 
 such, it is, strictly speaking, unknown; because the present 
 federal government has no judiciary power whatever; and con- 
 sequently there is no antecedent establishment, to which the 
 term heretofore could properly relate. It would therefore be 
 destitute of precise meaning, and inoperative from its uncer- 
 tainty. 
 
 As )n the one hand, the form of the provision would not 
 fulfil the intent of its proposers; so on the other, if I appre- 
 hend that intent rightly, it would be in itself inexpedient. I 
 presume it to be, that causes in the federal courts should be 
 tried by jury, if in the state where the courts sat, that mode of 
 trial would obtain in a similar case in the state courts — that is 
 to say, admiralty causes should be tried in Connecticut by a 
 jury, in New- York without one. The capricious operation of 
 so dissimilar a method of trial in the same cases, under the 
 same government, is of itself sufficient to indispose every well 
 regulated judgment towards it. Whether the cause should be 
 
 .50 
 
620 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 tried with, or without a jury, would depend, in a great number 
 of cases, on the accidental situation of the court and parties. 
 
 But this is not, in my estimation, the greatest objection. 1 
 feel a deep and deliberate conviction, that there are many cases 
 in which the trial by jury is an ineligible one. I think it so 
 particularly, in suits which concern the public peace with 
 foreign nations; that is in most cases where the question turna 
 wholly on the laws of nations. Of this nature, among others, 
 are all prize causes. Juries cannot be supposed competent to 
 investigations, that require a thorough knowledge of the laws 
 and usages of nations ; and they will sometimes be under the 
 influence of impressions which will not suffer them to pay 
 8uflS.cient regard to those considerations of public policy, which 
 ought to guide their inquiries. There would of course be 
 always danger, that the rights of other nations might be in- 
 fringed by their decisions, so as to afford occasions of reprisal 
 and war. Though the true province of juries be to determine 
 matters of fact, yet in most cases, legal consequences are com- 
 plicated with fact in such a manner, as to render a separation 
 impracticable. 
 
 It will add great weight to this remark, in relation to prize 
 causes, to mention, that the method of determining them has 
 been thought worthy of particular regulation in various treaties 
 between different powers of Europe, and that, pursuant to such 
 treaties, they are determinable in Great Britain in the last 
 resort before the king himself in his privy council, where the 
 fact as well as the law, undergoes a re-examination. This 
 alone demonstrates the impolicy of inserting a fundamental 
 provision in the constitution which would make the state 
 systems a standard for the national government in the article 
 under consideration, and the danger of incumbering the goveru- 
 ment with any constitutional provisions, the propriety of which 
 is not indisputable. 
 
 My convictions are equally strong, that great ad'«antage8 
 result from the separation of the equity from the law juris- 
 diction; and that the causes which belong to the former, would 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 621 
 
 De improperly committed to juries. The great ana primary 
 use of a court of equity, is to give relief in extraordinary cases, 
 which are exceptions* to general rules. To unite the jurisdiction 
 of such cases, with the ordinary jurisdiction, must have a 
 tendency to unsettle the general rules, and to subject every 
 case that arises to a special determination : "While a separation 
 between the jurisdictions, has the contrary effect of rendering 
 one a sentinel over the other, and of keeping each within the 
 expedient limits. Besides this, the circumstances that consti- 
 tute cases proper for courts of equity, are in many instances so 
 nice and intricate, that they are incompatible with the genius 
 of trials by jury. They require often such long and critical 
 investigation, as would be impracticable to men called occasion- 
 ally from their occupations, and obliged to decide before they 
 were permitted to return to them. The simplicity and expe- 
 dition which form the distinguishing characters of this mode 
 of trial require, that the matter to be decided should be re- 
 duced to some single and obvious point; while the litigations 
 usual in chancery, frequently comprehend a long train of minute 
 and independent particulars. 
 
 It is true, that the separation of the equity from the legal 
 jurisdiction, is peculiar to the English system of jurisprudence; 
 the model which has been followed in several of the states. 
 But it is equally true, that the trial by jury has been unknown 
 in every instance in which they have been united. And the 
 separation is essential to the preservation of that institution 
 in its pristine purity. The nature of a court of equity will 
 readily permit the extension of its jurisdiction to matters of 
 law, but it is not a little to be suspected, that the attempt to 
 extend the jurisdiction of the courts of law to matters of 
 equity, will not only be unproductive of the advantages which 
 may be derived from courts of chancery, on the plan upon 
 which they are established in this state, but will tend gradually 
 
 * It is true that the principles by which that relief is governed are now 
 reduced t^ a regular system; but it is not the less true that they are in the 
 main applicable to spbcial circums nances, which form exceptions to general 
 rules 
 
622 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 to change the nature of the courts of law, and to undermine 
 the trial by jury, by introducing questions too complicated for 
 a decision in that mode. 
 
 These appear to be conclusive reasons against incorporating 
 the systems of all the states, in the formation of the national 
 judiciary; according to what may be conjectured to have been 
 the intent of the Pennsylvania minority. Let us now examine 
 how far the proposition of Massachusetts is calculated to remedy 
 the supposed defect. 
 
 It is in this form: " In civil actions between citizens of differ- 
 ent states, every issue of fact, arising in actions at common law, 
 may be tried by a jury, if the parties, or either of them, request 
 it." 
 
 This, at best, is a proposition confined to one description of 
 causes ; and the inference is fair either that the Massachusetts 
 convention considered that as the only class of federal causes, 
 in which the trial by jury would be proper; or that, if desirous 
 of a more extensive provision, they found it impracticable to 
 devise one which would properly answer the end. If the first, 
 the omission of a regulation respecting so partial an object, can 
 never be considered as a material imperfection in the system. 
 If the last, it affords a strong corroboration of the extreme 
 difficulty of the thing. 
 
 But this is not all : If we advert to the observations already 
 made respecting the courts that subsist in the several states of 
 the union, and the different powers exercised by them, it will 
 appear, that there are no expressions more vague and indeter- 
 minate than those which have been emploj'ed to characterize 
 that species of causes which it is intended shall be entitled to a 
 trial by jury. In this state, the boundaries between actions at 
 common law and actions of equitable jurisdiction, are ascer- 
 tained in conformity to the rules which prevail in England 
 upon that subject. In many of the other states, the boundaries 
 are less precise. In some of them, every cause is to be tried in a 
 court of common law, and upon that foundation every action may 
 be considered as an action at common law, to be determinoa 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 623 
 
 by a jury, if the parties, or either of them, choose it. Hence 
 the same irregularity and confusion would be introduced by a 
 compliance with this proposition, that I have already noticed 
 ds resulting from the regulation proposed by the Pennsylvania 
 minority. In one state a cause would receive its determination 
 from a jury, if the parties, or either of them, requested it; but 
 in another state, a cause exactly similar to the other, must be 
 decided without the intervention of a jury, because the state 
 tribunals varied as to common law jurisdiction. 
 
 It is obvious, therefore, that the Massachusetts proposition 
 cannot operate as a general regulation, until some uniform 
 plan, with respect to the limits of common law and equitable 
 jurisdictions, shall be adopted by the different states. To 
 devise a plan of that kind, is a task arduous in itself, and 
 which it would require much time and reflection to mature. 
 It would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to suggest 
 any general regulation that would be acceptable to all the 
 states in the union, or that would perfectly quadrate with the 
 several state institutions. 
 
 It may be asked, why could not a reference have been made 
 to the constitution of this state, taking that, which is allowed 
 by me to be a good one, as a standard for the United States ? 
 I answer, that it is not very probable the other states should 
 entertain the same opinion of our institutions which we do 
 ourselves. It is natural to suppose that they are more attached 
 to their own, and that each would struggle for the preference. 
 If the plan of taking one state as a model for the whole had 
 been thought of in the convention, it is to be presumed that 
 the adoption of it in that body, would have been rendered diffi- 
 cult by the predilection of each representation in favour of its 
 own government ; and it must be uncertain which of the states 
 would have been taken as the model. It has been shown, that 
 many of them would be improper ones. And I leave it to con- 
 jecture whether, under all circumstances, it is most likely that 
 N^ew-Y( rk, or some other state, would have been preferred 
 
624 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 But admit that a judicious selection could have been effected in 
 the con^rention, still there would have been great danger of 
 jealousy and disgust in the other states, at the partiality which 
 had been shown to the institutions of one. The enemies of the 
 plan would have been furnished with a fine pretext, for raising 
 a host of local prejudices against it, which perhaps might have 
 hazarded, in no inconsiderable degree, its final establishment. 
 
 To avoid the embarrassments of a definition of the cases 
 which the trial by jury ought to embrace, it is sometimes 
 suggested by men of enthusiastic tempers, that a provision 
 might have been inserted for establishing it in all cases what- 
 soever. For this, I believe no precedent is to be found in any 
 member of the union ; and the considerations which have been 
 stated in discussing the proposition of the minority of Penn- 
 sylvania, must satisfy every sober mind, that the establishment 
 of the trial by jury in all cases, would have been an unpardon- 
 able error in the plan. 
 
 In short, the more it is considered, the more arduous will 
 appear the task of fashioning a provision in such a form, as not 
 to express too little to answer the purpose, or too much to be 
 advisable ; or which might not have opened other sources of 
 opposition, to the great and essential object, of introducing a 
 firm national government. 
 
 I cannot but persuade myself on the other hand, that the 
 different lights in which the subject has been placed in the 
 course of these observations, will go far towards removing in 
 candid minds, the apprehensions they may have entertained on 
 the point. They have tended to show, that the security of 
 liberty is materially concerned only in the trial by jury in 
 criminal cases, which is provided for in the most ample manner 
 in the plan of the convention ; that even in far the greatest 
 proportion of civil cases, those in which the great body of the 
 community is interested, that mode of trial will remain in full 
 force, as established in the state constitutions, untouched and 
 unaffected by the plan of the convention : That it is in no mse 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 626 
 
 abolished * by that plan ; and that there are great, if not in- 
 surmountable difficulties in the way of making any precise and 
 proper provision for it, in a constitution for the United States. 
 
 The best judges of the matter will be the least anxious for a 
 constitutional establishment of the trial by jury in civil cases, 
 and will be the most ready to admit, that the changes which 
 are continually happening in the affairs of society, may render 
 a different mode of determining questions of property, prefer- 
 able in many eases, in which that mode of trial now prevails. 
 For my own part, I acknowledge myself to be convinced that, 
 even in this state, it might be advantageously extended to 
 some cases to which it does not at present apply, and might as 
 advantageously be abridged in others. It is conceded by all 
 reasonable men, that it ought not to obtain in all cases. The 
 examples of innovations which contract its ancient limits, as 
 well in these states as in Great Britain, afford a strong pre- 
 sumption that its former extent has been found inconvenient ; 
 and give room to suppose that future experience may discover 
 the propriety and utility of other exceptions. 1 suspect it tc 
 be impossible in the nature of the thing, to fix the salutary 
 point at which the operation of the institution ought to stop j 
 ^nd this is with me a strong argument for leaving the mattei 
 to the discretion of the legislature. 
 
 This is now clearly understood to be the case in Great Britain 
 and it is equally so in the state of Connecticut; and yet it may 
 be safely affirmed, that more numerous encroachments have 
 been made upon the trial by jury in this state since the revolu- 
 tion, though provided for by a positive article of our constitu- 
 tion, than has happened in the same time either in Connecticut 
 or Great Britain. It may be added, that these encroachments 
 have generally originated with the men who endeavour to 
 persuade the people they are the warmest defenders of popular 
 liberty, but who have rarely suffered constitutional obstacles 
 
 * Vide No. LXXXI. in which the supposition of its being abolished by the 
 appellate jurisdiction in matters of fact being vested in the supreme court, is 
 examined and refuted. 
 
626 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 to arrest them in a favourite career. The truth is, that the 
 general genius of a government is all that can be substantially 
 relied upon for permanent effects. Particular provisions, though 
 not altogether useless, have far less virtue and eflScacy than are 
 commonly ascribed to them ; and the want of them, will never 
 be with men of sound discernment, a decisive objection to any 
 plan which exhibits the leading characters of a good govern- 
 ment. 
 
 It certainly sounds not a little harsh and extraordinary to 
 affirm, that there is no security for liberty in a constitution 
 which expressly establishes the trial by jury in criminal cases, 
 because it does not do it in civil also ; while it is a notorious 
 fact that Connecticut, which has been always regarded as the 
 most popular state in the union, can boast of no constitutional 
 provision for either. 
 
 PUBLIUS. 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 627 
 
 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 NUMBER I>XXXIV. 
 
 NEW YORK, JULY 29 AND AUGUST 8, 12, 178&. 
 
 HAMILTON. 
 
 CONCERNING SEVERAL MISCELLANEOUS OBJECTIONS. 
 
 In the course of the foregoing review of the constitution, I 
 have endeavoured to answer most of the objections which have 
 appeared against it. There remain, however, a few which either 
 did not fall naturally under any particular head, or were for- 
 gotten in their proper places. These shall now be discussed : 
 but as the subject has been drawn into great length, I shall so 
 far consult brevity, as to comprise all my observations on these 
 miscellaneous points in a single paper. 
 
 The most considerable of the remaining objections is, that 
 tne plan of the convention contains no bill of rights. Among 
 other answers given to this, it has been upon different occasions 
 remarked, that the constitutions of several of the states are in 
 a similar predicament. I add, that New- York is of the number. 
 And yet the persons who in this state oppose the new system, 
 while they profess an unlimited admiration for our particular 
 constitution, are among the most intemperate partizans of a 
 bill of rights. To justify their zeal in this matter, they allege 
 two tnings : one is, that though the constitution of New-York 
 has no bill of rights prefixed to it, yet it contains, in the body 
 of it, various provisions in favour of particular privileges and 
 rights, which, in substance, amount to the same thing; the 
 
628 THE FKDERALIST. 
 
 other is, that the constitution adopts, in their full extent, the 
 common and statute law of Great Britain, by which many 
 other rights, not expressed, are equally secured. 
 
 To the first I answer, that the constitution offered by the 
 convention contains, as well as the constitution of this state, a 
 number of such provisions. 
 
 Independent of those which relate to the structure of the 
 government, we find the following : Article I. section 3. clause 7. 
 " Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further 
 than to removal from office, and disqualification to hold and 
 enjoy any office of honour, trust, or profit under the United 
 States; but the party convicted shall, nevertheless, be liable 
 and subject to indictment, trial, judgment, and punishment, 
 according to law." Section 9. of the same article, clause 2. 
 " The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be sus- 
 pended, unless when in cases of rebellion or invasion the public 
 safety may require it." Clause 3. " No bill of attainder or 
 ex post facto law shall be passed." Clause 7. "No title of 
 nobility shall be granted by the United States ; and no person 
 holding any office of profit or trust under them, shall, without 
 the consent of the congress, accept of any present, emolument, 
 office, or title, of any kind whatever, from any king, prince, or 
 foreign state." Article III. section 2. clause 3. " The trial of 
 all crimes, except in cases of impeachment, shall be by jury j 
 and such trial shall be held in the state where the said crimes 
 shall have been committed; but when not committed within 
 any state, the trial shall be at such place or places as the con- 
 gress may by law have directed " Section 3. of the same 
 article, " Treason against the United States shall consist only 
 in levying war against them, or in adhering to their enemies, 
 giving them aid and comfort. No person shall be convicted of 
 treason, unless on the testimony of two witnesses to the same 
 overt act, or on confession in open court." And clause 3. of 
 the same section, " The congress shall have power to declare 
 the punishment of treason ; but no attainder of treason shall 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 629 
 
 work corruption of blood, or forfeiture, except during the life 
 of the person attainted." 
 
 It may well be a question, whether these are not, upon tho 
 whole, of equal importance with any which are to be found in 
 the constitution of this state. The establishment of the writ 
 of habeas corpus, the prohibition of ex post facto laws, and of 
 TITLES OF NOBILITY, to wMch we have no corresponding provision'^ 
 in our constitution, are perhaps greater securities to liberty than 
 any it contains. The creation of crimes after the commission 
 of the fact, or, in other words, the subjecting of men to punish- 
 ment for things which, when they were done, were breaches of 
 no law ; and the practice of arbitrary imprisonments have been, 
 in all ages, the favourite and most formidable instruments of 
 tyranny. The observations of the judicious Blackstone,* in 
 reference to the latter, are well worthy of recital : " To bereave 
 a man of life (says he) or by violence to confiscate his estate, 
 without accusation or trial, would be so gross and notorious an 
 act of despotism, as must at once convey the alarm of tyranny 
 throughout the whole nation ; but confinement of the person, 
 by secretly hurrying him to jail, where his sufferings are 
 unknown or forgotten, is a less public, a less striking, and there- 
 fore a more dangerous engine of arbitrary government." And as 
 51 remedy for this fatal evil, he is every where peculiarly 
 emphatical in his encomiums on the habeas corpus act, which in 
 one place he calls " the bulwark of the British constitution." f 
 
 Nothing need be said to illustrate the importance of the pro- 
 hibition of titles of nobility. This may truly be denominated 
 the corner stone of republican government; for so long as they 
 are excluded, there can never be serious danger that the govern- 
 ment will be any other than that of the people. 
 
 To the second, that is, to the pretended establishment of the 
 common and statute law by the constitution, I answer, that 
 they are expressly made subject "to such alterations and pro- 
 visions as the legislature shall from time to time make concern- 
 
 * Vide Blackstone's Commentaries, voL 1, p. 136. 
 f Idem, vol. 4, page 438. 
 
680 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 ing the same." They are therefore at any moment liable to 
 repeal by the ordinary legislative power, and of course have 
 no constitutional sanction. The onlj'^ use of the declaration 
 was to recognize the ancient law, and to remove doubts which 
 might have been occasioned by the revolution. This conse- 
 quently can be considered as no part of a declaration of rights ; 
 which under our constitutions must be intended to limit the 
 power of the government itself. 
 
 It has been several times truly remarked, that bills of rights 
 are, in their origin, stipulations between kings and their sub- 
 jects, abridgements of prerogative in favour of privilege, 
 reservations of rights not surrendered to the prince. Such 
 was MAGNA CHARTA, obtained by the Barons, sword in hand, 
 from king John. Such were the subsequent confirmations of 
 that charter by succeeding princes. Such was the petition of 
 right assented to by Charles the First, in the beginning of his 
 reign. Such also, was the declaration of right presented by 
 the lords and commons to the prince of Orange in 1688, and 
 afterwards thrown into the form of an act of parliament, called 
 the bill of rights. It is evident, therefore, that according lo 
 their primitive signification, they have no application to consti- 
 tutions professedly founded upon the power of the people, and 
 executed by their immediate representatives and servants. 
 Here, in strictness, the people surrender nothing; and as they 
 retain every thing, they have no need of particular reserva- 
 tions. " We the people of the United States, to secure the 
 blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain 
 and establish this constitution for the United States of America:" 
 This is a better recognition of popular rights, than volumes of 
 those aphorisms, which make the principal figure in several of 
 our state bills of rights, and which would sound much better 
 in a treatise of ethics, than in a constitution of government 
 
 But a minute detail of particular rights, is certainly far less 
 applicable to a constitution like that under consideration, which 
 is merely intended to regulate the general political interests of 
 the nation, than to one which has the regulation of every spe- 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 631 
 
 cies of personal and private concerns. If therefore the loud 
 clamours against the plan of the convention, on this score, are 
 well founded, no epithets of reprobation will be too strong for 
 the constitution of this state. But the truth is, that both ol 
 them contain all which, in relation to their objects, is reason- 
 ably to be desired. 
 
 I go further, and aflEirm, that bills of rights, in the sense and 
 to the extent they are contended for, are not only unnecessary 
 in the proposed constitution, but would even be dangeroup 
 They would contain various exceptions to powers not granted , 
 and on this very account, would afford a colourable pretext to 
 claim more than were granted. For why declare that things 
 shall not be done, which there is no power to do ? Why, for 
 instance, should it be said, that the liberty of the press shall 
 not be restrained, when no power is given by which restrictions 
 may be imposed ? I will not contend that such a provision 
 would confer a regulating power; but it is evident that it 
 would furnish, to men disposed to usurp, a plausible pretence 
 for claiming that power. The}' might urge with a semblance 
 of reason, that the constitution ought not to be charged with 
 the absurdity of providing against the abuse of an authority, 
 which was not given, and that the provision against restraining 
 the liberty of the press afforded a clear implication, that a right 
 to prescribe proper regulations concerning it, was intended to 
 be vested in the national government. This may serve as a 
 specimen of the numerous handles which would be given to the 
 doctrine of constructive powers, by the indulgence of an inju- 
 dicious zeal for bills of rights. 
 
 On the subject of the liberty of the press, as much has been 
 said, I cannot forbear adding a remark or two : In the first 
 place, I observe that there is not a syllable concerning it in the 
 constitution of this state ; in the next, I contend that whatever 
 has been said about it in that of any other state, amounts to 
 nothing. What signifies a declaration, that " the liberty of the 
 press shall be inviolably preserved?" What is the liberty of the 
 press ? Who can give it any definition which would not leave 
 
632 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 tbe utmost latitude for evasion ? I hold it to be impracticable; 
 and from this I infer, that its security, whatever l&ne d'^clara- 
 tions may be inserted in any constitution respecting it, must 
 altogether depend on public opinion, and on the general spirit 
 of the people and of the government.* And here, after all, as 
 intimated upon another occasion, must we seek for the only 
 solid basis of all our rights. 
 
 There remains but one other view of this matter to conclude 
 the point. The truth is, after all the declamation we have 
 heard, that the constitution is itself, in every rational sense, 
 and to every useful purpose, a bill of rights. The several 
 bills of rights, in Great Britain, form its constitution, and con- 
 versely the constitution of each state is its bill of rights. In 
 like manner the proposed constitution, if adopted, will be the 
 bill of rights of the union. Is it one object of a bill of rights 
 to declare and specify the political privileges of the citizens in 
 the structure and administration of the government ? This is 
 done in the most ample and precise manner in the plan of the 
 convention ; comprehending various precautions for the public 
 security, which are not to be found in any of the state consti- 
 tutions. Is another object of a bill of rights to define certain 
 immunities and modes of proceeding, which are relative to per- 
 
 * To show that there is a power in the constitution, by which the liberty 
 of the press may be affected, recourse has been had to the power of taxation. 
 It is said, that duties may be laid upon publications so high as to amount to 
 a prohibition. I know not by what logic it could be maintained, that the 
 declarations in the state constitutions, in favour of the freedom of the press, 
 would be a constitutional impediment to the imposition of duties upon publi- 
 cations by the state legislatures. It cannot certainly be pretended that any 
 degree of duties, however low, would be an abridgement of the liberty of th» 
 press. We know that newspapers are taxed in Great Britain, and yet it is 
 notorious that the press no where enjoys greater liberty than in that country. 
 And if duties of any kind may be laid without a violation of that liberty, it 
 is evident that the extent must depend on legislative discretion, regulated by 
 public opinion ; so that after all, general declarations respecting the liberty 
 of the press, will give it no greater security than it will have withoiit them. 
 The same invasions of it may be effected under the state constitutions wL icb 
 contain those declarations through the means of taxation, as under the pro 
 posed constitution, which has nothing of the kind. It would be quite as 
 significant to declare, that government ought to be free, that taxes ought not 
 to be excessive, &c. as that the liberty of the press ought not to be res'irained 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 635 
 
 sonal and private concerns? This we have seen has also been 
 attended to, in a variety of cases, in the same plan. Adverting 
 therefore to the substantial meaning of a bill of rights, it lo 
 absurd to allege that it is not to be found in the work of the 
 convention. It may be said that it does not go far enough, 
 though it will not be easy to make this appear ; but it can with 
 no propriety be contended that there is no such thing. It cer- 
 tainly must be immaterial what mode is observed as to the 
 order of declaring the rights of the citizens, if they are pro- 
 vided for in any part of the instrument which establishes the 
 government. "Whence it must be apparent that much of what 
 has been said on this subject rests merely on verbal and nomi- 
 nal distinctions, entirely foreign to the substance of the thing. 
 
 Another objection, which, from the frequency of its repeti- 
 tion, may be presumed to be relied on, is of this nature : It is 
 improper (say the objectors) to confer such large powers, as are 
 proposed, upon the national government : because the seat of 
 that government must of necessity be too remote from many 
 of the states to admit of a proper knowledge on the part of the 
 constituent, of the conduct of the representative body. This 
 argument, if it proves any thing, proves that there ought to be 
 no general government whatever. For the powers which it 
 seems to be agreed on all hands, ought to be vested in the 
 union, cannot be safely intrusted to a body which is not under 
 every requisite control. But there are satisfactory reasons to 
 show, that the objection is, in reality, not well founded. There 
 is in most of the arguments which relate to distance, a palpable 
 illusion of the imagination. What are the sources of informa- 
 tion, by which the people in any distant county must regulate 
 their judgment of the conduct of their representatives in the 
 state legislature ? Of personal observation they can have no 
 benefit. This is confined to the citizens on the spot. They 
 must therefore depend on the information of intelligent men, 
 in whom they confide : and how must these men obtain their 
 information ? Evidently from the complexion jf public mea- 
 sures, from the public prints, from correspondences with their 
 
534 THE FEDERALIST, 
 
 representatives, and with other persons who reside at the place 
 ^f their deliberations. 
 
 It is equally evident that the like sources of information 
 would be open to the people, in relation to the conduct of their 
 representatives in the general government; and the impedi- 
 ments to a prompt communication which distance may be 
 supposed to create, will be overbalanced by the effects of the 
 vigilance of the state governments. The executive and legis- 
 lative bodies of each state will be so many sentinels over the 
 persons employed in every dej)artment of the national admin- 
 istration ; and as it will be in their power to adopt and pursue 
 a regular and effectual system of intelligence, they can never 
 be at a loss to know the behaviour of those who represent their 
 constituents in the national councils, and can readily communi- 
 cate the same knowledge to the people. Their disposition to 
 apprize the community of whatever may prejudice its interests 
 from another quarter, may be relied upon, if it were only from 
 the rivalship of power. And we may conclude with the fullest 
 assurance, that the people, through that channel, will be better 
 informed of the conduct of their national representatives, than 
 they can be by any means they now possess, of that of their 
 state representatives. 
 
 It ought also to be remembered, that the citizens who inhabit 
 the country at and near the seat of government will, in all 
 questions that affect the general liberty and prosperity, have 
 the same interest with those who are at a distance; and that 
 they will stand ready to sound the alarm when necessary, and 
 to point out the actors in any pernicious project. The public 
 papers will be expeditious messengers of intelligence to the 
 most remote inhabitants of the union. 
 
 Among the many curious objections which have appeared 
 against the proposed constitution, the most extraordinary and 
 the least colourable is derived from the want of some provision 
 respecting the debts due to the United States. This has been 
 represented as a tacit relinquishment of those debts, and as a 
 wicked contrivance to screen public defaulters. The newspa- 
 
rilE FEDERALIST. 68f 
 
 pers have teemed with the most inflammatory railings on this 
 head; yet there is nothing clearer than that the suggestion is 
 entirely void of foundation, the offspring of extreme ignorance 
 or extreme dishonesty. In addition to the remarks I have 
 made upon the subject in another place, I shall only observe, 
 that as it is a plain dictate of common sense, so it is also an 
 established doctrine of political law, that ^^States neither lose any 
 of their rights, nor are discharged from any of their obligations, by a 
 change in the form of their civil government." * 
 
 The last objection of any consequence at present recollected, 
 turns upon the article of expense. If it were even true, that 
 the adoption of the proposed government would occasion a 
 considerable increase of expense, it would be an objection that 
 ought to have no weight against the plan. The great bulk of 
 the citizens of Amei-ica, are with reason convinced that union 
 is the basis of their political happiness. Men of sense of all 
 parties now, with few exceptions, agree that it cannot be pre- 
 served under the present system, nor without radical altera- 
 tions; that new and extensive powers ought to be granted to 
 the national head, and that these require a different organiza- 
 tion of the federal government; a single body being an unsafe 
 depository of such ample authorities. In conceding all this, 
 the question of expense is given up; for it is impossible, with 
 any degree of safety, to narrow the foundation upon which 
 the system is to stand. The two branches of the legislature 
 are, in the first instance, to consist of only sixty-five persons; 
 the same number of which congress, under the existing con 
 federation, may be composed. It is true that this number is 
 intended to be increased; but this is to keep pace with the 
 progress of the population and resources of the country. It is 
 evident, that a less number would, even in the first instance, 
 have been unsafe; and that a continuance of the present num- 
 ber would, in a more advanced stage of population, be a v^ry 
 .nadequate representation of the people. 
 
 ♦ Vide Rutherford's Institutes, vol. 2. book 11. chap. i. sect. xlr. an^ xy. 
 — Vide also Grotius, book 11. chap. ix. sect. viii. and iz. 
 
 51 
 
636 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 Whence is the dreaded augmentation of expense to spring ? 
 One source indicated, is the multiplication of offices under the 
 new government. Let us examine this a little. 
 
 It is evident that the principal departments of the adminis- 
 tration under the present government, are the same which will 
 be required under the new. There are now a secretary at war, 
 a secretary for foreign affairs, a secretary for domestic affairs, 
 a board of treasury consisting of three persons, a treasurer, 
 assistants, clerks, &c. These offices are indispensable under 
 any system, and will suffice under the new, as well as the old. 
 As to ambassadors and other ministers and agents in foreign 
 countries, the proposed constitution can make no other differ- 
 ence, than to render their characters, where they reside, more 
 respectable, and their services more useful. As to persons 
 to be employed in the collection of the revenues, it is unques- 
 tionably true that these will form a very considerable addition 
 to the number of federal officers; but it will not follow, that 
 this will occasion an increase of public expense. It will be in 
 most cases nothing more than an exchange of state for national 
 officers. In the collection of all duties, for instance, the persons 
 employed will be wholly of the latter description. The states 
 individually, will stand in no need of any for this purpose. 
 What difference can it make in point of expense, to pay officers 
 of the customs appointed by the state, or by the United States? 
 
 Where then are we to seek for those additional articles of 
 expense, which are to swell the account to the enormous size 
 that has been represented ? The chief item which occurs to 
 me, respects the support of the judges of the United States. 
 I do not add the president, because there is now a president 
 of congress, whose expenses may not be far, if any thing, short 
 of those which will be incurred on account of the president of 
 the United States. The support of the judges will clearly be 
 an extra expense, but to what extent will depend on the par- 
 ticular plan which may be adopted in regard to this matter. 
 But upon no reasonable plan can it amount to a sum which 
 will be an object of matei'ial consequence. 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 637 
 
 Let us now see what there is to counterbalance any exvra 
 expense that may attend the establishment of the proposed 
 f.overnment. The first thing which presents itself is, that a 
 great part of the business, that now keeps congress sitting 
 through the year, will be transacted by the president. Even 
 the management of foreign negociations will naturally devolve 
 upon him, according to general principles concerted with the 
 senate, and subject to their final concurrence. Hence it is 
 evident, that a portion of the year will suffice for the session 
 of both the senate and the house of representatives : We may 
 suppose about a fourth for the latter, and a third, or perhaps 
 half, for the former. The extra business of treaties and appoint- 
 ments may give this extra occupation to the senate. From 
 this circumstance we may infer, that until the house of repre- 
 sentatives shall be increased greatly beyond its present number, 
 there will be a considerable saving of expense from the differ- 
 ence between the constant session of the present, and the 
 temporary session of the future congress. 
 
 But there is another circumstance, of great importance in 
 the view of economy. The business of the United States has 
 hitherto occupied the state legislatures, as well as congress. 
 The latter has made requisitions which the former have had to 
 provide for. It has thence happened, that the sessions of the 
 state legislatures have been protracted greatly beyond what 
 was necessary for the execution of the mere local business 
 More than half their time has been frequently employed in 
 matters which related to the United States. Now the members- 
 who compose the legislatures of the several states amount ta 
 two thousand and upwards; which number has hitherto per- 
 formed what, under the new system, will be done in the first 
 instance by sixty-five persons, and probably at no future period 
 by above a fourth or a fifth of that number. The congress 
 under the proposed government will do all the business of the 
 United States themselves, without the intervention of the state 
 legislatures, who thenceforth will have only to attend to the 
 affairs of their particular states, and will not have to sit in any 
 
Coft THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 jjroportion as long as they have heretofore done. This differ- 
 ence, in the time of the sessions of the state legislatures, will 
 be clear gain, and will alone form an article of saving, which 
 may be regarded as an equivalent for any additional objects of 
 expense that may be occasioned by the adoption of the new 
 system. 
 
 The result from these observations is, that the sources of 
 additional expense from the establishment of the proposed con- 
 stitution are much fewer than may have been imagined ; that 
 they are counterbalanced by considerable objects of saving j 
 and that, while it is questionable on which side the scale will 
 preponderate, it is certain that a government less expensive 
 would be incompetent to the purposes of the union. 
 
 POBLHIH. 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 630 
 
 rii 
 
 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 NUMBER LXXXV. 
 
 NEW YORK, AUGUST 15, 178a 
 
 HAMILTON. 
 
 CONCLUSION. 
 
 According to the formal division of the subject of these 
 papers, announced in my first number, there would appear still 
 to remain for discussion two points — " the analogy of the pro- 
 posed government to your own state constitution," and " the 
 additional security which its adoption will afford to republican 
 government, to liberty, and to property." But these heads 
 have been so fully anticipated, and so completely exhausted in 
 the progress of the work, that it would now scarcely be pos- 
 sible to do any thing more than repeat, in a more dilated form, 
 what has been already said ; which the advanced stage of the 
 question, and the time already spent upon it, conspire to forbid. 
 
 It is remarkable, that the resemblance of the plan of the con- 
 vention to the act which organizes the government of this state 
 holds, not less with regard to many of the supposed defects, 
 than to the real excellencies of the former. Among the pre- 
 tended defects, are the re-eligibility of the executive ; the want 
 of a council; the omission of a formal bill of rights; the 
 omission of a provision respecting the liberty of the press : 
 These, and several others, which have been noted in the course 
 of our inquiries, are as much chargeable on the existing con- 
 stitution of this state, as on the one proposed for the Union : 
 
040 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 and a man must have slender pretensions to consistency, who 
 can rail at the latter for imperfections which he finds no diffi- 
 culty in excusing in the former. Nor indeed can there be a 
 better proof of the insincerity and affectation of some of the 
 zealous adversaries of the plan of the convention, who profess 
 to be devoted admirers of the government of this state, than 
 the fury w4th which they have attacked that plan, for matters 
 in regard to which our own constitution is equally, or perhaps 
 more vulnerable. 
 
 The additional securities to republican government, to liberty, 
 and to property, to be derived from the adoption of the plan, 
 consist chiefly in the restraints which the presei'vation of the 
 union will impose upon local factions and insurrections, and 
 upon the ambition of powerful individuals in single states, who 
 might acquire credit and influence enough, from leaders and 
 favourites, to become the despots of the people ; in the diminu- 
 tion of the opportunities to foreign intrigue, which the dissolu- 
 tion of the confederacy would invite and facilitate; in the 
 prevention of extensive military establishments, which could 
 not fail to grow out of wars between the states in a disunited 
 situation; in the express guarantee of a republican form of 
 government to each; in the absolute and universal exclusion 
 of titles of nobility; and in the precautions against the repeti- 
 tion of those practices on the part of the state governments, 
 which have undermined the foundations of property and credit; 
 have planted mutual distrust in the breasts of all classes of 
 citizens; and have occasioned an almost universal prostration 
 of morals. 
 
 Thus have 1, fellow citizens, executed the task I had assigned 
 to myself; with what success your conduct must determine. I 
 trust, at least, you will admit, that I have not failed in the 
 assurance I gave you respecting the spirit with which my 
 endeavours should be conducted. 1 have addressed myself 
 purely to your judgments, and have studiously avoided those 
 asperities which are too apt to disgrace political disputants of 
 all parties, and which have been not a little provoked by the 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 641 
 
 language ana conduct of the opponents of the constitution. 
 The charge of a conspiracy against the liberties of the people, 
 which has been indiscriminately brought against the advocates 
 of the plan, has something in it too wanton and too malignant 
 not to excite the indignation of every man who feels in his own 
 bosom a refutation of the calumny. The perpetual changes 
 which have been rung upon the wealthy, the well-born, and the 
 great, are such as to inspire the disgust of all sensible men. 
 And the unwarrantable concealments and misrepresentations, 
 which have been in various ways practised to keep the truth 
 from the public eye, are of a nature to demand the reprobation 
 of all honest men. It is possible that these circumstances may 
 have occasionally betrayed me into intemperances of expression 
 which I did not intend : It is certain that I have frequently 
 felt a struggle between sensibility and moderation ; and if the 
 former has in some instances prevailed, it must be my excuse, 
 that it has been neither often nor much. 
 
 Let T18 now pause, and ask ourselves whether, in the course 
 of these papers, the proposed constitution has not been satis- 
 factorily vindicated from the aspersions thrown upon it ; and 
 whether it has not been shown to be worthy of the j)ublic ap- 
 probation, and necessary to the public safety and prosperity. 
 Every man is bound to answer these questions to himself, 
 according to the best of his conscience and understanding, and 
 to act agreeably to the genuine and sober dictates of his judg- 
 ment. This is a duty from which nothing can give him a dis- 
 pensation. It is one that he is called upon, nay, constrained 
 by all the obligations that form the bands of society, to dis- 
 charge sincerely and honestly. No partial motive, no parti- 
 cular interest, no pride of opinion, no temporary passion or 
 prejudice, will justify to himself, to his country, to his posterity, 
 an improper election of the part he is to act. Let him beware 
 of an obstinate adherence to party : Let him reflect, that the 
 object upon which he is to decide is not a particular interest of 
 the community, but the very existence of the nation : And let 
 
642 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 iim reinein')er, that a majority of America has already given 
 its sanction to the plan which he is to approve or reject. 
 
 I shall not dissemble, that I feel an entire confidence in the 
 arguments which recommend the proposed system to your 
 adoption; and that I am unable to discern any real force in 
 those by which it has been assailed. I am persuaded, that it 
 is the best which our political situation, habits, and opinions 
 will admit, and superior to any the revolution has produced. 
 
 Concessions on the part of the friends of the plan, that it 
 has not a claim to absolute perfection, have afforded matter of 
 no small triumph to its enemies. Why, say they, should we 
 adopt an imperfect thing? Why not amend it, and make it 
 perfect before it is irrevocably established? This may be 
 plausible, but it is plausible only. In the first place I remark, 
 that the extent of these concessions has been greatly exag- 
 gerated. They have been stated as amounting to an admission, 
 that the plan is radically defective ; and that, without material 
 alterations, the rights and the interests of the community 
 cannot be safely confided to it. This, as far as I have under 
 stood the meaning of those who make the concessions, is an 
 entire perversion of their sense. No advocate of the measure 
 can be found, who will not declare as his sentiment, that the 
 system, though it may not be perfect in every part, is, upon the 
 whole, a good one ; is the best that the present views and cir- 
 cumstances of the country will permit; and is such an one as 
 promises every species of security which a reasonable peoplo 
 oan desire. 
 
 I answer in the next place, that I should esteem it the 
 extreme of imprudence to prolong the precarious state of our 
 national affairs, and to expose the union to the jeopardy of 
 successive experiments, in the chimerical pursuit of a perfect 
 plan. I never expect to see a perfect work from imperfect 
 man. The result of the deliberations of all collective bodies, 
 must necessarily be a compound as well of the errors ana 
 prejudices, as of the good sense and wisdom of the individuals 
 Ot whom they are composed. Tlie compacts which are to 
 
THE FEDERALIST. G4<; 
 
 embrace thirteen distinct states, in a common bond of amitj 
 and union, must as necessarily be a compromise of as man} 
 dissimilar interests and inclinations. 13io^ can perfectioi 
 spring from such materials? 
 
 The reasons assigned in an excellent little pamphlet lately 
 published in this city,* unanswerably show the utter improba- 
 bility of assembling a new convention, under circumstances in 
 any degree so favourable to a happy issue, as those in which 
 the late convention met, deliberated, and concluded. I will 
 not repeat the arguments there used, as I presume the pro- 
 duction itself has had an extensive circulation. It is certainly 
 well worth the perusal of every friend to his country. There 
 is however one point of light in which the subject of amend- 
 ments still remains to be considered; and in which it has not 
 yet been exhibited. 1 cannot resolve to conclude, without first 
 taking a survey of it in this aspect. 
 
 It appears to me susceptible of complete demonstration, that 
 it will be far more easy to obtain subsequent than previous 
 amendments to the constitution. The moment an alteration 
 is made in the present plan, it becomes, to the purpose of 
 adoption, a new one, and must undergo a new decision of each 
 state. To its complete establishment throughout the union, it 
 will therefore require the concurrence of thirteen states. If, 
 on the contrary, the constitution should once be ratified by all 
 the states as it stands, alterations in it may at any time be 
 effected by nine states. In this view alone the chances are as 
 thirteen to nine f in favour of subsequent amendments, rather 
 than of the original adoption of an entire system. 
 
 This is not all. Every constitution for the United States 
 must inevitably consist of a great variety of particulars, in 
 which thirteen independent states are to be accomodated in 
 their interests or opinions of interest. We may of course 
 expect to see, in any body of men charged with its original 
 
 * Entitled "An Address to the people of the state of New-York." 
 f It may rather be said ten, for though two-thirds may set on foot the 
 measure, three-fiurths must ratify. 
 
644 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 formation, very different combinations of the parts upon dif- 
 ferent points. Many of those who form the majority on one 
 question, may become the minority on a second, and an associa- 
 tion dissimilar to either, may constitute the majority on a third. 
 Hence the necessity of moulding and arranging all the particu- 
 lars which are to compose the whole, in such a manner, as to 
 satisfy all the parties to the compact; and hence also an 
 immense multiplication of diflSculties and casualties in obtain- 
 ing the collective assent to a final act. The degree of that 
 multiplication must evidently be in a ratio to the number of 
 particulars and the number of parties. 
 
 But every amendment to the constitution, if once established, 
 would be a single proposition, and might be brought forward 
 singly. There would then be no necessity for management or 
 compromise, in relation to any other point; no giving nor 
 taking. The will of the requisite numbei, would at once bring 
 the matter to a decisive issue. And consequently whenever 
 nine,* or rather ten states, were united in the desire of a par- 
 ticular amendment, that amendment must infallibly prevail 
 There can, therefore, be no comparison between the facility of 
 effecting an amendment, and that of establishing in the first 
 instance a complete constitution. 
 
 In opposition to the probability of subsequent amendments 
 it has been urged, that the persons delegated to the adminis- 
 tration of the national government, will always be disinclined 
 to yield up any portion of the authority of which they were 
 once possessed. For my own part, I acknowledge a thorough 
 conviction that any amendments which may, upon mature con- 
 sideration, be thought useful, will be applicable to the organiza- 
 tion of the government, not to the mass of its powers ; and on 
 this account alone, I think there is no weight in the observa- 
 tion just stated. I also think there is little force in it on 
 another account. The intrinsic difficulty of governing jhir- 
 TEEN STATES, independent of calculations upon an ordinary 
 degree of public spirit and integrity, will, in my opirien, con- 
 
 * See note in the preceding page. 
 
THE FEDERALIST. 645 
 
 stantly impose on the national rulers, the necessity of a spirit of 
 accommodation to the reasonable expectations of their con- 
 stituents. But there is yet a further consideration, which 
 proves beyond the possibility of doubt, that the observation is 
 futile. It is this, that the national rulers, whenever nine states 
 concur, will have no option upon the subject. B}" the fifth 
 article of the plan the congress will be obliged, "on the applica- 
 tion of the legislatures of two-thirds of the states, (which at 
 present amount to nine) to call a convention for proposing 
 amendments, which shall be valid to all intents and purposes, as 
 part of the constitution, when ratified by the legislatures of 
 three-fourths of the states, or by conventions in three-fourths 
 thereof" The words of this article are peremptory. The con- 
 gress " shall call a convention." Nothing in this particular is 
 left to discretion. Of consequence all the declamation about 
 the disinclination to a change, vanishes in air. Nor, however 
 difficult it may be supposed to unite two-thirds, or three-fourths 
 of the state legislatures, in amendments which may affect local 
 interests, can there be any room to apjirehend any such diffi- 
 culty in a union on points which are merely relative to the 
 general liberty or security of the people. We may safely rely 
 on the disposition of the state legislatures to erect barriers 
 against the encroachments of the national authority. 
 
 If the foregoing argument be a fallacy, certain it is that I ani 
 myself deceived by it; for it is, in my conception, one of those 
 rare instances in which a political truth can be brought to the 
 test of mathematical demonstration. Those who see the matter 
 in the same light, however zealous they may be for amend- 
 ments, must agree in the propriety of a previous adoption, as 
 the most direct road to their object. 
 
 The zeal for attempts to amend, prior to the establishmeni 
 of the constitution, must abate in every man, who is ready to 
 accede to the truth of the following observations of a writer, 
 equally solid and ingenious : " To balance a large state or 
 society (says he) whether monarchical or republican, on general 
 laws. i« a work of so great difficulty, that no human genius, 
 
646 THE FEDERALIST. 
 
 however comprehensive, is able by the mere dint of reason and 
 reflectLon, to effect it. The judgments of many must unite in 
 the work : Experience must guide their labour : Time must 
 bring it to perfection : And the feeling of inconveniences must 
 correct the mistakes which they inevitably fall into, in their first 
 trials and experiments."* These judicious reflections contain 
 a lesson of moderation to all the sincere lovers of the union, 
 and ought to put them upon their guard against hazarding 
 anarchy, civil war, a perpetual alienation of the states from 
 each other, and perhaps the military despotism of a victorious 
 demagogue, in the pursuit of what they are not likely to obtain, 
 but from time and experience. It may be in me a defect of 
 political fortitude, but I acknowledge that I cannot entertain 
 an equal tranquillity with those who affect to treat the dangers 
 of a longer continuance in our present situation as imaginary. 
 A NATION without a national government, is an awful spec- 
 tacle. The establishment of a constitution, in time of profound 
 peace, by the voluntary consent of a whole people, is a prodigy, 
 to the completion of which I look forward with trembling 
 anxiety. In so arduous an enterprise, I can reconcile it to no 
 rules of prudence to let go the hold we now have, upon seven 
 out of the thirteen states; and after having passed over so con- 
 siderable a part of the ground, to re-commence the course. 1 
 dread the more the consequences of new attempts, because 1 
 KNOW that powerful individuals, in this and in other states, 
 are enemies to a general national government in every possible 
 shape. 
 
 PuBLlUft 
 * Hune's Essays, vol. 1, page 128. — The rije of arts and sciences. 
 
COLLATED TEXTS. 
 
 The Text in tlie copies as revised and corrected by Hamilton and Madi- 
 son collated with a reprint, purporting to be from the Essays as printed 
 wlien first issued, in the Gazettes. The first quoted passages are from the 
 revised copies, being substitutes for the quoted passages in the Heprint. 
 
 No. I. Page 49. For ; Alter full experience— after an unequivocal experience. For ; exittiug 
 Federal Government— «tt?*««<in(7 FederalGovernment. For; to decide by their conduct and ex- 
 ample— br their conduct and example to decide. For; period, aera. For; this idea by adding, 
 willadd. For; will heighten, to heighten. Page 50. Yor; uninfluenced by con-tiderativna for' 
 eign to the public good — unperplexed and unbiassed by considerations not connected with the 
 public good. For ; but tins is more ardently to be xcished for — but this is a thing more ardently 
 to be wished. Far \ extraneous— foreign. For; I am aware — I am m>«W aware. For; "into inter- 
 ested or ambitious views, merely because their situations might subject them to suspicion."' sen- 
 tence transposed. For; xchicti has already sfuncn ilse/f or that may — which has made its ap- 
 pearance, or may. For; would always furnish — would furnish. For; however well persiuided'oj 
 being in the right — to those, who are ever so much persuaded of their being in the right, in any 
 controversy PageSl. For ; are nctwatfrf — are inflitenced. For; Aj)d yet just as these sentiments 
 must appear to candid men — And yet however just tJtese sentiments tcill be allowed to be. 
 For; fond of power — fond oidexpotic jwwer. Page 52. For ; appearances — appearanc/". For; 
 it has been my aim. Fellow Citizens, tc put yon— /Aat)« had ati eye, my Fellow Citizens, 10 
 putting you. Page 5-3. For ; claim to attention — claim to your attention, For ; its open 
 avowa\— an open avoical of it. tor; of the Constitution — of the neic Constitution. For; Jt 
 may tlierefore be essential to examine particuliirly— It will, therefore be of use to begin by 
 examining the. For; This shall accordingly be done — This shall accordingly constitute the 
 subject of my next address. 
 
 No. II. Page 64. For; When the people of America reflect that the question now submit- 
 ted to their determination, is one of the most important that has engaged, or can well engage 
 their attention, the propriety of tbeir taking a very comprehensive, as well as a very serious 
 view iif it, must be evident — When the people of America reflect that they are now called upon 
 to decide :i question, which in its consequences must prove one of the most important that 
 ever ensa-'ed their attention, the propriety of their taking a very comprehensive, as well as a 
 very serious view of it, will be evident For; th<in that, or that. Pj^e 56. For; many oi 
 them — many of their citizens. For; tried the souls of men— tried the minds and hearts of 
 men. Page 57. For; passion— passions. For; But as has been already remarked — But 
 this (as was remarked in the foregoing number of this paper.) For; from the undue 
 — or the undue. For; the great majority reasoned — the great m^ority of the people reas- 
 oned. Page 5S. For; such measures only — only such measures — omitted — after, great and 
 weighty reasons — which I shall endeavor to develop and explain in some ensuing papers. 
 
 N<). III. Page 60. For; any erroneous — an erroneous. For; as against dangers arising 
 from domestic causes— as from dangers of the like kiwi arising from domestic causes. Page 61. 
 For ; or hm.v happen— or will happen. For ; ha.s the additional circumstance, has in addition, 
 the circumstance omitted after, '• distinct confederacies"— for this opinion various reasons may 
 be assigned. For; When once — 5ec«itM« when once. For ; town or county— town or country. 
 "■•ge 62. For; to M« o<^r nations— to other nations. For; to ournelves-tn us. For; Under 
 Che national — Because, under the national. For; The prospect — Because the prospect. Foi 
 temi)tatioius—u-mptatiim. For; If even — Because even if. Page 63. For; such violences— 
 Because such violences. For; occasioned — caused. For ; produced — occasioned. For; irri- 
 ttttio»i«— irritation. For ; in a capacity to act untA circumspection — in capacity to act advisedly. 
 No. IV. Page 65. For; proposed Confederacies — proposed little Confederacies. Page 66. 
 For; not sanctioned — not sanctified. For; Tnost prevalent — more prevalent For; see t^«M 
 flourish in our hands— see it flourish. Page 67. For ; like considerations — such like considerA- 
 lions. Page 63. For; will, in a manner— will, as it wore. For; and if we are wise, the tia.e 
 
 647 
 
S-l^ COLLATED TEXTS. 
 
 may o 'ine — an'l the time may como, if we are wise. Page 69. For ; which of the a«gociate»— 
 which of them. For; combining— and combininst. For; f/«i« to provoke — tA<z7i provoke. 
 
 No. V. Page 73. For; not very far distant — not very distant For; reasons — reasoa 
 Paee V4. For; in which we should be formidable only to each other — formidable only to each 
 Other. For; those persons — those Gentleman. For;*and tohich would — and xcouut. For; 
 would have to regulate its commerce with foreigners — would have its commerce with foreigners 
 to regulate. Page 75 For; character — characters. 
 
 No. VI. Page 76. For; this tcorifc — this Paper. Sentenc oesinnine: "If thes" States shonld 
 either be wholly disunited," transposed. Page 79. For; We mtiy ask — /« it nut, we may ask. 
 For; aconisi</o« — acquisition*. For; and that they are of course liable— and are of coarse 
 liable. Page bO. For; a.d <?«;« to— and to. For; /A</< haug.hty—iA/» haughty. For; Yet few 
 nations have been more — Few nations, nevertheless, have been more. Omitted on Page SI. 
 and sometimes fven the more culpable desire of sharins in the commerce of ■•ther nations. wHb- 
 out their consent. The last war but two between Britain and Spain sprang from the attempts of 
 the English merchants, to prosecute an illicit trade with Ihe Spanish main. These unjustifiable 
 practices on their part, produced severities on the part of the Spaniards, towards the subjects ol 
 Great Britain which were not more justifiable; because they exceeded the bounds of a just retal- 
 iation, and were chargeable with inhumanity and crueltv. Many of the English who were taken 
 on the Spanish coasts, were sent to dig in the mines of Potosi; and by the usual progress of a 
 spirit of resentment, the innocent were after a while confounded with the guilty in indiscriminate 
 punishment. The complaints of the merchants kindled a violent flame throughout the nation, 
 whi<-h -Mion after broke out in the House of Commons, and was communicated from that body 
 to the Ministry. Letters of reprisal were granted and a war ensued; which in its consequence* 
 overthrew all the alliances that but twenty years before had been formed with sanguine exiiecia- 
 tions of the most beneficial fruits. For; and th« evils— aru2 eviU. Page S2. For; Cokfxdkr- 
 
 ATE — CoNyKDBRATIVB. 
 
 No. VIL Page 88. For; the States could have— could the States have. For; difference — 
 differencM. Page 84. For; by the treaty of peace — in the treaty of peace. For; the ^^^ 
 which have made cesHotis — the States which made the cessiim. Page So. For; th« lands — the 
 land. For ; another— and the other. Page 8S. For ; would be exposed — would be hazarded. 
 For; in the e.vperiment — upon experiment. For; Their refusal would afford to the com- 
 plaining States a pretext for withholding— Their refusal would be too plausible a pretest to the 
 complaining; St.ites to withhold. Note \n reprint omitted to Page S9. 
 
 No. VIII. Pace 92. For; establishment — establishments. For; thence — tlierefore. In note; 
 rational precaution — natural precaution. For; 7%j» inference, from the very fo'tn of the 
 proposition is at l^etst problematiail and uncertain- Their existence, however, from the very 
 lerrM nf the proposition is, at mont problematical and uncertain. Page 92 For; they would be 
 obliged — they would be n«<5«««t7oteo. Page 93. For; be likely — be the more likely. For; cf«- 
 ducedjrom speeuiaUve — drawn Jrom supposed or specaiativ'e. For; by way of objection — by 
 way of objection to this. Page 9.3. For; which by its situation is seldom exposed to invasions 
 — seldom eaoposed by Us situation to internal invasions. Page 94, For; Forbids competition 
 w!th the natural strength — renders the natural strength of the community an overmatcn for it. 
 For; though it may — may. For; will be utterly incompetent to the purpose of enforcing — 
 but it will be unable to enforce. Next sentence transposed. For; his services — their services. 
 Omitted; There has been, for a long time past little room for the operation of the other Ciusea, 
 which have been enumerated as the consequences of internal war. Sote omitted. Page 95. 
 A^o^e omitted. For; 1/ Britain had, — If om- the contrary. Britain had For; at this day i- 
 — &« at this day. For ; W« kingdom — <Aat kingdom. For; nor futile — or futile. For; on its va»t 
 Importance — «« (iA<! importance of this interesting idea. Page 96. For; that now flit — thatflil. 
 For ; would then quickly— would quickly. For ; prospects— forms. 
 
 No IX. Page 97. For; kept perpettialfy vibrating— kept in a state of perpetual vibration. 
 Page 93. iox; error— errors. For; friends o/"libfrty — friends /o liberty. Page 99. For; re- 
 c«tc« his ideas — <a^ hi.s ideas. Note to page lOO. PuWius omitted. Page lOL For; to pro- 
 duo* — to muke. Page 103. Vot; wriler—vivilian. 
 
 No. X. Page 105. For ;s less folly— less folly. Page 107. For ; of government — of the 
 
 fovernment. Page 109. For ;y/r)»n the mischiefs of faction— /or the mischiefs of faction. Page 
 11. For : Does tAts advantage — Does {A« advanta^. 
 
 No. XI. Pase 113, For; look forward with painful solicitude— look forward to what this 
 country is capable of becoming with painful solicitude. Page 114. For ; this would answer then 
 the — ^for, answer the. For; the wings on — the wings by which. For; we may in a variety of 
 ways counteract — we may counteract a policy so unfriendly to our prosperity in a variety of 
 ways. For; importance to any t/in«(y^«cf«riw£^ nation of the markets of — importance of the 
 markets of For; to remain in this dispositlVin — to remain so, to any manfacturing nation. 
 Page 115. For: to G-reat Britain — Britain. Page 116. For; a flourishing — an<J a flourishing. 
 Page 117. For ; the ZrtA-€« — the Western Lak&s. Page US.* For; and the conduciveress of 
 that species of commerce to the prosperity of a navy, are points too manifest to require a par- 
 ticular elucidation— does not require a particular elucidation, no more than the conducivene.<8 
 of that species of commerce to tne prosperity of a navy. Page 119. For; newspaper discus- 
 sion— i newspaper discussion. 
 
 No. XII. Page 121. For ; A prosperous commerce—the prosperity of commerce. For; all 
 the channels — the channels. For; to the entire satisfkction — to the satisfaction. Page 128k 
 For ; iZ/.v brook — <U brook. For: be the best— )i« best Page 124. For; be driven — be n«c«««i- 
 tated. For ; dealers in contraband — contraband trade. Page 124. For ; this proves — this 
 shows. For ; and shows— SiUd pUicts. Page 125. For ; to expose — to huzttrd. For; .stationed 
 and employed, might — BtMioned at the entrances oj our ports. For; an adjoining State— a 
 neighboring State. For ; in Britain the proportion is still preater— in Britain they exceed this 
 
 ?roportlon.* Aote omitted. If my memory be right they amount to twenty ynr cent. Page 
 36. For; according to the ratio — Upon a ratio. For; niay, at a low conopntatfon be oc^inMted 
 at- may be estimated at. For ; health of society — health of the societr. For ; (i< t/Us t«ry or 
 
COLLATED TEXTS. 649 
 
 ftcfo — nit these Dpi ritn. VnT; revenite — revenues. For; as before ramarkei— as A<7s6«#» Defor« 
 remarked. For; populius— popular. For; In some moUe — iu some mode or other. I'age 127. 
 For; of citizens — at (A« citizens. 
 
 No. XIII. Paee 128. If the States be united -ar« nnited. For; another conjecture — an- 
 other suppffniiion. 
 
 No. XIV. Page 131. For; errour — error. Page '32. For; mint &« confined — uiU be 
 confined. Page 185. For;«/'/'«ur — error. For;*o#«ft»i — vcene. 
 
 No. XV. Page 139 For ; which is neWi^r controverted, nur doubted— which is not either 
 controverted o/' doubted. For; in the opinion — in Uiii anUiment at \ea&t. For ; of the reality 
 e/ man J/ of those defects— of the reality of tbos« defects. For; people— nation. Page 141. 
 For: the veri/ elemcntfi — thejirst jirincipUs. For; otw/iom—ul' which. Page 142. For; ii 
 Government — (iovernmeut. Page 143. For; still adhere— still itiW adhere. For; their observ- 
 ance — <^« observai ;ce. Page 144. For; wAicA disposes— JAiif disposes. Page 145. For; of mitn 
 — ot human nutiire. 
 
 No. XVI. Page 14S. "For \hetvie6n different ■pa.rts—hettceen parts. For; ia fhe general- 
 to the common. Page 149. For; to the majority that happeued to prevail in the national coun 
 cil for the exercise cf factious views, of partiality, and of oppression— for the exercise of faction* 
 views, ot partiality, and of oppres-sion, in the majority that happened to prevail in the national 
 nouncil. Page 150. For; attributed — which is attributed. For : the other — the other half. 
 
 No XVI f. Page 153. For; be urged— be ij*e2ct«e urged. Page 154. For ; to e.\ercise </t«w« 
 — exercise those powers. Page 155. For; to impres.s upon — to impres*in^ upon. Page 157. 
 For ; itfpoxitories — DepoHts. 
 
 No. XVIII. Page. 158. For; from the best transmitted accounts — from the best accounts 
 trannmitted. Page 159. For; Xhv weakest— \]\q tceok-er. Page 160. For; had in fact become 
 — had become, iu fact. For: who secretly — who }uid secretly. Page 161. For; that the 
 monuments which remain of this curious political fabric are so imperfect— that such imperfect 
 monunu'nts remain of this curious political fabric Page 163. For; 01eome?i«« — Cleomeji*. 
 
 No. XIX. Page 167. For; revenues- revenue. For; farther- fitrther. Page 170. For; 
 sprung— sprang. Page 171. For; (/« the head— «t the head. 
 
 No. XX. Page 173. For; a« hereditary— a hereditary. For; Af« independent— <Ai^ inde- 
 pendent. For; nudience — nudiences. Pjige 176. Fur; in some mfiinitre — in some degree. 
 For ; operation — tendency of these vices. Paae 177. For ; in the place — in place. 
 
 No. XXI. Parens. For; which depict— which Aace depicted. For; the existing CoxxteA 
 eration — the subsisting Confederation. For; no power — no pow«rs. For; constitutional 
 in«</nji— constitutional mode. Page 179. For; The want of such a right involves no doubt a 
 etriking absurdity — There is, doubtless, a striking absurdity in supposing that a right of this 
 kind does not exist. For ; supposing that deflciencv— of embracing that supposition. For : con- 
 siderations of utility — consideration of utility, fage ISO. For* directed against — tereled 
 against. Page Isl. For; produce and co7istitute national wealth — produce constitutionai 
 wealth. For; the contra cie(/ terntorj/ ot that lepuhWc— t/iat contracted district. For; l/iose 
 kingdoms — the three last mentioned countries. For; no man acquainted — no man who i3 
 acquainted. Page 1S2. For; which distributed— which distributes. Page 183. For; are 
 considered — tuue been considered. For; an Herculean— a Herculean. For; the thing — 
 things. 
 
 No. XXII Page 184. For; of the e-xisting federal system enumerated in the last number 
 —already enumerated \n the existing Federal system. Page 184. For; conceding on their 
 part privileges of importance— by which they conceded privileges of any importance to tliem. 
 Pago 187. For; ever will be able — will ever be able. For; Considering how peculiarly 
 the safety and welfare of the smaller states depend on Union— The smaller States, con- 
 sidering how peeuliarly their safety and welfare depend on Union. Page 188. For; Veto— 
 Vote. Page 1S9. For •,/oriwiate— happy. Page 189. For; that which It is necessarv to do— 
 the doing what may be necessary. Page 190. For; t/uit the interest- tAe interest. I'or; and 
 his intrigues — atia intrigues. For; corrupt a smaller — corrupt a smaller number. For; 
 minds 'actuated by — minds animated and guided by. Page 191. For; disclosed— delin- 
 eated. For ; the A"w// parties— ?Ae parties. Far; one 'tribunal— one court Page 192. For; 
 an uniform — ((uniform. For; decision— juriiidiction. For; xhoiUd happen— ?ra.s to happen. 
 For; from the deference with which men in office naturally look up to that authority to which 
 they owe their oflicial existence— nothing is more natural to men ia oflice than to look with pe- 
 culiar deference towards that authority. For; of which thtse uie composed — of which tt 
 is composed For; a conniderable xmrt—a, great part For; who are either free from erro- 
 neous prepossessions or can divest thematlves of them — who can divest themselves of the pre- 
 possessions of preconceived opinions. Page 193. For; of Union— of the Union. 
 
 No. XXIII. Page 196. For; a«d the correspondent — or the correspondent. For; open to 
 discus.'ion — open for discussion. Page 197. For ; those uhich may be committed— tAi objects 
 committed. Page 19S. For; achieved— ac-omplished. For; in respect to— ax to all. Page 
 199. For; intrusted viixh — ti tutted -vith. For; would have given a better impression of their 
 candour if they had confined themselves to showing — ought to have confined themselves to 
 showing. For; National concerns — National interests Page 200. For ; t« susceptible of— can 
 6« susceptible of. For: If we embrace as the standard of our political creed the tenets of 
 til 8<.' — If we embrace the tenets of those who oppose the adoption of the proposed Constitu- 
 tion, as the standard of our political creed. 
 
 No. XXIV. Page 201. i'or; which is that proneT— which, if I understand ii right, is </*/«, 
 that proper. Pige 2o2. For; against military e-itablishmenis— against the keeping np of troops. 
 Note. I'aire 203. For; other Slates, and their Constitutions — other States, e.rcept the foregoing, 
 and their Constitutions. For; pronouncing these clamours to be the — regarding thest 
 clamors as the. Pago 204. For; obscured— entangled. For; establishments would be im- 
 proper— e>tabllshments in time of peace, wonhi be improper. Page 205. For; only be to 
 guard ag.iinst — vn/y he against. For; The militia, in times of profound peace, would not 
 long — The militia would nut long, etc., in times of profound peace. 
 
650 COLLATED TEXTS. 
 
 No. XXV. Page 207. For ; provided by the— provided/or, by the. Page 208. For; II /Vow 
 the resources — Ifth^ resources. For; least likelv to be so — least likely to be jealous. Page 209. 
 For ; There are other ■eietos — There are other ligfiU. Page 210. For ; The utility of a pro- 
 vision of this kind can only be Ttndicated on the hypoOieSia of a probability, at least^Tha 
 aupposed utility of a provision of this kind can only \)eifimnded on the auppost'i probability or 
 •t least For; would at all times be — would be at all times. Page 212. For; now unequal are 
 parchment provisions — how unequal parchment provisions are. 
 
 No. XX VL Page 218. For ; hardly to hate been expected— hardlv to be expected. For ; 
 they tcUel]/ fudged — wisely judging. Page 214. For; nation from rc^icA — nation from toAom. 
 Page 216. For; Without ths consent of the Legislature (in italics) instead of capitals. For; 
 numitory— cautionary. For; the actual—the necessities. Page 218 For; transmitted through 
 — transmitted oZongr through. For; parted with— puTted-wiHi oiU of their otonJumds. For; 
 From the votes — from the acts. Page 219. For; principle— principles. 
 
 No. XXVIL Page 220. For; and their obedience to — and obedieTice to. Page 221. For; 
 the principal of which are — the principal of which r«a«oji»are. For; u?io are select — which are 
 select For; more coOTpreA€n*ii;« information— more «a!t«n«ire information. For; public ^e^i- 
 berations — public councils. For; xcill occur to fortify that probability — to fortify that probabil- 
 ity will occur. For; a more critical eye — a more critic eye. Page 222. For; equal to 
 — a mate)) for. For; I will in the first place — I will, ?n. <Ai« place. For; will have but a 
 transient in&\xence — inll generally have but little la&uenoe. Page 22-3. For; than tA« species 
 — than that species. For; will perceive, that if its powers are administered with a common 
 share of prudence there is good ground — will perceive, that is there good ground to calculate 
 upon a regular and peaceable execution of the laws of the Union, if its powers are administered 
 with a common share of prudence. 
 
 No. XXVm. Page 226. For; under the necessity of— be necessitated to. For; will some> 
 times «H«f — will sometimes ar7'«e. Page 226. For; suppressing — repressing. Page 227. For; 
 or as many unconnected governments as there are states— or even if there should be an entire 
 separation of the state?. For; and after all <A« only — and after all, only. For': an infinitely— 
 infinitely. Page 229. For : foreign enemy — foreign power. 
 
 No. XXIX. Page 280. According to Reprint, No. 85. Page 281. For; to this plan— to Ou 
 plan of the Convention, For; in the same body ought, as far as possible to take away the in- 
 dacement and the pretext — in the bodv to whose care the protection of the State is committed, 
 ought, etc For; for requiring the aid of the posse coiOTATirs — for calling out the possk com- 
 TAITTS. Page 232. For; extraordinary manner — this manner. For; Federal Legislature on 
 the subject — Federal Legislature from this State on the subject. For; nor a week nor even a 
 month — <w even a week. Page 233 For; short of a million of pounds — short of the whole ex- 
 pense of the civil establishments of all the States. For; moderate size — moderate etetent. Page 
 285. For; irritated at being required to undertake — irritated by being culled upon to under- 
 take. For ; and «iai« them — and to make them. Page 236. For; violences — violence. (Lofit 
 paragraph in Reprint omitted in Pa;e 286.) 
 
 No. XXX. Pase 237. For; supply o/' /erew we — supply o/' it Page 289. For; abundantly 
 — amply. Page 240. For; an invincible — invincible. Page 241. For; import duties — impost 
 duties. Page 242. For; creating by its oicn authority new funds from, new objects — creating 
 new funds upon new objects of taxation, by its men authority. For; to see thehalcyon scenes 
 of the poetic orfabuloua age realized in America — to see realized in America, etc 
 
 No. XXXL Page 248. For; are such direct— are yet such direct Page 246. For; to es- 
 cape from the apparitions which itself has raised — to extricate itself from the perplexities 
 into which it Ktu to rashly adventured. Page 247. For; nature and extent — nature or 
 extent 
 
 No. XXXII. Page 249. For; consequences to the State Governments which seem to be ap- 
 prehended— consequences which seem to be apprehended to the State Governments. Page 251. 
 ¥oT\is deduoidl^ls to be deduced. Page 252. For; why was it not left — why not leave 
 it. For; that a further- that thus a further. For; State system — State systems. Page 253. 
 For; Is not only a — is not a. 
 
 No. XXXIII. Page 254. For; The residue of the argument asninst the provisions of the 
 Constitution in respect to taxation is ingrafted upon the following clauses. (This paragraph 
 omitted in Reprint) For; first Article authorizes — the first Article of the plan under considera- 
 tion authorizes. For; sources— source. Page 255. For; a test of the true nature — a test by 
 which to judge of tha true nature. Page 256. For ; if there 6e — if there w. Page 257. For; 
 the Ck)n8titntlon— its Constiturion. Page 268. For; abrogating— for abrogating. For; of a 
 power — of power. Page 268. For; of state— of the State. 
 
 No. XXXIV. Page 269. For; to develope— to advert. Page 260. For; TEiBtrriA- Tributa. 
 Page 260. For; pinocle— ■atmoat lieiglU. Page 261. For; If we must be obliged to exceed 
 this point— If^ on the contrary, we ought to exceed this point. Page 262. For; would already 
 —would so soon. For; would be to calculate— m to calculate. For; which relate — which 
 are relative. For; Judiciary— JudiciaL Page 268. For; But let xxs take a view — But let us 
 advert, For; expenditura — expenditure*. For; & million of dollars — two hundred thousand 
 pounds. For ; If it cannot be denied to be a just principle, that in fhiining a constitution of gov- 
 ernment for a nation, we ought— In framing a Government for posterity as well as ourselves, we 
 ought Page 264. For; our attention — Ifthisprinciplebea Just one, our attention. For; one mil- 
 lion of dollars — two hundred thousand pounds. Page 264. For; twenMeth of its— twentieth part. 
 
 No. XXXV. Page 266. For; that this can never be the case — that they can never be carried 
 to too great a length. For; serve tn beget— would beget. Page 267. For; m.ost natural — more 
 natural. Page 268. For; and from a greater disproportion between her population and 1 erritory 
 is less likely than some other states speedily to become in any considerable denee — and is not 
 likely speedilv to be, to any great extent 'Patre 268. For; might beget — wowd beget. Page 
 869. For; habits o/' life — habits in life. Page 270. For ; M<nMU»(2« of acres— mi^Uona of acres. 
 Page 271. For; among between. For; community — eoeiety. 
 
 No. XXXVI. Page 275. For; law— laws. Page 277. For; thould be judged be/orehmttt 
 
COLLATED TEXTS. 66) 
 
 up»n, mature considercitic-n^ or should he discovered on eenperiment — shotdd be disoovered 
 For ; may forbear— may then forbear. Page 277. For ; the first is, that the actual exerciso ol 
 the power, may be found both convenient and necessary — the first is, that the exercise of that 
 power, if convenient, will bo preferable, because it will be more effectual. Page 279. For; ii 
 oy the authority of the Federal government then it will not remain to be done — if to be dons 
 by the autliority of the Federal government, it will not be to be done. 
 
 No XXXVlI. Page 2S4. For; this foundation— thi»_/Zr«< foundation. For; dangers— dan- 
 ger. Page 285. For ; energy <j/ Government— energy m Government. Page 286. For; the 
 statute law — <t7Ki the statute law. Page 2S7. For ; conceived — co/ww/eret/. Page 289. For; 
 degradfnf/ — degrad«u. 
 
 No. XXXVIII. Page 296. For; scarcetij— scarce. 
 
 No. XXXIX. Page 808. For ; explicit pToyisioa—constitutiorKtl provision. Page 806. 
 For ; is by (he adversaries of the plan of the Co7iventioii., supposed to consist in this — is supposed 
 to consist in this. For ; But, the operation of the Government on the people in their individual 
 capacities, in its ordinary and most essential proceedings, will, on the whole, in the sense of its 
 opponents, designate it in this relation, a National Government — So far the National counten- 
 ance of the Government on this side, seems to be disfigured by a few Federal features. But 
 this blemish is perhaps unavoidable in any plan, and the operation of the Government on the 
 People, in their individual capacities, in its ordinary and most esftential proceedings, may. on the 
 whole, designate it, in this relation, a i^'atiotial Government. Page 808. For; therefore, even 
 when tested by the rules laid down by its antagonists, is in strictness — therefore is, in strictness. 
 
 No. XL. Page 314. For ; confirmation of all the <S<f/fe«— confirmation of the Legislatures 
 of all the States. For; to be confirmed- to be confirmed by the People. 
 
 No. XLI. Page 819. For ; field o/ rhetoric— field /or rhetoric. Page 320. For; war 
 — War. I'or; means and danger— and the danger. Page 821. For; mistress — the mistress. 
 Page 824. For ; //' they have — and if they have. Page 325. For ; may be almost — 7na>/ almost 
 be. For; objects — object. 
 
 No. XLII. Page 8.31. For; no further— no further. 
 
 No. XLIII. Page 847. For; founded on acts — founded on ordinary acts. 
 
 No. XLIV. Page 852. For; tieat produce— 7ie< produce. Page 352. Omitted in Reprint 
 after, the Government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof. For; yet 
 on a fair investigation of it us luts been elsewhere shown, no part can appear — yet on a fair inves- 
 tigation of it, no part can appear. Page 356. For; distinc«u*««— distinc^ioJi. 
 
 No. XLV. Paare 362. For; would not bear a comparison — would not be a comparison. 
 
 No. XLVI. Page 865. For; instituted with different itotrern— constituted with different 
 nowers. Page 367. For; a«d faculty— and <A<s faculty. For; members of <A6 Congress — mem- 
 bers of Congress. 
 
 No. XLVII. Page 880. For; prerogative of pardoning— prerogative oi pardon, ditto — 
 below. 
 
 No. XLVIII. Page 384 Omitted after, multiplied without end. 1 might find a witnest 
 in every citizen who has shared in, or been attentive to, the course of public administrations. 
 
 No. XLIX. Page 892. For; parties pree.visting — preexisting parties. 
 
 No. L. Page 400. For; which place it in— which place that system in. Page 402. For; 
 powerful factions be gradually— powerful factions or parties be gradually. For; within &prae- 
 ticti>>le sphere — within a practical sphere. 
 
 No. LI. Page 404. For; «Si*6^«ci to these— t7>id«r these. Page 405. For; being but im- 
 perfectly— being at most but very. Page 406. For ; with some other— with the other. Page 
 407. For; proof— proofs. 
 
 No. LIII. Page 409. For ; the ca««— the m«^«ce. Page 412. For; other />oin<«— other 
 respects. Page 413— For ; some internal— majiy internaL Page 414. For ; particular subjects— 
 particular 6ra»icA««. Page 415. For; liberties— liberty. 
 
 No. HV. Page 416. For; among— to. Page 417. For ; will of Aw cmwe) — vrill of another. 
 Page 418. For ; disputed — denied. 
 
 No. LVI. Page 430. For; be su^cient-he very sufllcient. For; into—in. Page 481. 
 For ; With regard to the regulation ot the militia, there are scarcely any circumstances in refer- 
 ence to which local knowledge can be said to be necessary. The general face of the country, 
 whether mountainous or level, most fit for the operations of infantry or cavalry, is almost the 
 only consideration of this nature that can occur. The art of war teaches general principles of 
 organization, movement, aud discipline, which apply universally— The observations made on the 
 subject of taxation, apply with greater force to the case of the militia. For, however different 
 the rules of discipline may be in different States, they are the same throughout each particular 
 State; and depend on cirQumstances which can differ but little in different parts of the same 
 State. Page 432. For ; tendency— e feet. 
 
 No. LVII. Page 485. For; sons of o6«Ciir« and unpropitlous fortune — sons of obscurity and 
 nnpropitious fortune. Page 436. For ;<;i«ir favor— Ww favor. Page 437. For; men— man. 
 Page 4.38. For ; \v\indp-ed — hundreds. Page 488. For; unless he pos«e«««s— unless he ;jo«se.s«. 
 
 No. LVI II. Page 441. For; which it beholds— which is beheld. Page 443. For; the 
 greater number — the greater number of members. 
 
 No. LIX. Page 449. For; regard a departure — ^regard and regret a departure. For; 
 h'lvebeen iipplicahle — have been alicays applicable. For; organized — modified aud uit- 
 posed. Page 451. For; -without any motive to recommend their admission into tho 
 system, equally cogent with that which must have regulated the conduct of the convention. In 
 respect to the formation of the Senate — without any motive equally cogent with that which 
 must hsve regulated the conduct of the Convention in respect to the formation of the Senate, 
 to recommend their admission into the system. 
 
 No. LX. Page 454. For; incontroUable — uncontrollable. For ; what ar<i the drtn(7«r»— 
 
 'vhatwould be th« danger. For; and on the other /j'/^jrf- and on the other. Page 455. Fof 
 
 itssimilation of temper and sentiment — in some of tliese respects. For; victorious m^or 
 
 Ity— victorious and overbearing. Page 457. For ; tli^ jlrst— agriculture. For ; the latter- 
 
 62 
 
652 COLLATED TEXTS. 
 
 eominerce. For ; But 'Ji in reality — For ; m reality. But or — ax. for; lehichmny product 
 an endeavor — dispose to eudeator. Page 459. For; and the cities — or cities. For anoW^r 
 occai^ion — other occasions. 
 
 No. LXI. Page 461. For; The more candid opposers of the provision, contained in tha 
 plan of the Convention respecting Elections when pressed in argument will sometimes con 
 cede the propriety of it; with this qualification, however. th:it it ought to have been accom- 
 panied with a declaration, that all elections should be held in the counties where the electors 
 "eiide — The more candid opposers of the provision respecting electionn, contained in the plan 
 of the Coiivention, when pressed iu argument, will sonntimes concede the propriety of that 
 provision; with this qualification, however, that it ought to have been accompanied with a 
 declaration, that all elections.- should be hud in the counties where the electors resided. Page 
 462. For; that which is proposed— tAe latitude which is proposed. For; counties — countu. 
 Page 4''4. For; which will «ccrH«— which will result. 
 
 No. LXII. Page 466. For; under— into. Page 467. For; merit — merits. Page 469. 
 For ; the Senate— a Senate. Page 470. For ; in the American Governments— in American Gov- 
 ernments. 
 
 No. LXIII. Page 475. For; The remark — TOis remark. Page 476. For; plnns—plnces. 
 For; di^fficult at any rate to preserve — difficult to preserve. Page 478. For; their Representa- 
 tives — the Representatives of the people. Page 479. V or; them — the: People. Page 480. For; 
 t?ie Legislatures— lh% State 'La^s,\vi,t\XTii&. Page 4S2. For; This fact — The iact. 
 
 No. LXIV. Page 4»4. For ; the Sections— the Electors. Piige 486. For ; The matters— 
 Those matters. For; the main objects— the objects of the negotiation. Page 4S7. For; late 
 — laws. Page 488. For ; Hint the tico thirds — that two-thirds. Page 489. For ; But if such a 
 case should ever happen — But in such a case, if it should ever happen. 
 
 No. LXV. Page 495. For ; should in this respect be thought preferable to the plan— should 
 be thought preferable to the plan in this respect 
 
 No. LXVI. Page 496. For; with ?io< less re.iaon— with no less reason. Page 497. For; 
 that of determining — that of deciding. Page 498. For; for estimating — for determining. 
 For; danger — dread. For; of office — in office. Page 499. For; i hey have — they will have; 
 For; may have proved— «A"M have proved. Page 500. For; argument — arguments. For; 
 the chofce he niay have made — the choice o/tlie President. Page 5ul. For ; <( greatrr show — 
 with greater show. 
 
 No. LXVII. Page 503. For ; the arrangement of which could have been attended with 
 greater difficulty — which could have been attended with greater difficulty in the arrangement 
 of it than this. Page 504. For; attempts extravagant — attempts '•o extravagant. For; in 
 order to ascertain — in order as well to ascertain. Page 506. For ; is confided— is confined. 
 Page 507. For; the plan — the Constitution. For; to indulge a severity— to alloxo myseifin 
 a severity. 
 
 No. LXVIII. Page 509. For; so complicated an investigation, such complicated investi- 
 gations. Omitted — as the President of the United States.. For; on preexisting — on any 
 preexisting. Page 510. For ; already noticed — already taken notice of. For ; that each 
 Stal« — the /'copia of each State. Page 511. For; TAji process — TA 6 process. For; o/a — inn. 
 
 No. LXIX. Page 514. For ; is nut to become a law unless— is to become a law if. Page 
 Sl6 (in note.) For ; prerogatives — prerogative. 
 
 No. LXX. Page 523. For; are, unity, duration, an adequate provision for its support: 
 competent powers — are, first, unity ; secondly duration ; thirdly, an adequate provision for its 
 support; fourthly, competent powers. Page 524. Vor; from the plurality— from the circum- 
 stance of the plurality. Page o26. For ; embroiled the .ff«pu6Mc— embroiledthe peace of the Re- 
 public Vor ; into vioient~\T\to the most \\o\ent. Page 527. For; wien— man. Yot ; as to rendet 
 them — aa to render him. Page 528. Sot \ a collusion — collusion. For; so manifestly impro- 
 pei — so unqualified. 
 
 No. LXXI. Page 582. For; the Chief Magistrate— the Executive Magistrate. For; title 
 durable OT certain — (/Mra6Z« or c«rfaii» title. Page 535. For; already wieniionerf— already ri»- 
 marked. Yor; circumstance— cim>,ideration. Page 586. For; «»t annihilation — annihilation. 
 For ; H« might, then, with prudence, hazard— hazard with safety — For ; it is not long enough 
 — not enough. 
 
 No. LXXII. Page 588. For ; the thing— the subject. Page 589. For ; to undo— to reverse 
 and ando. For; to give the officer — to give to the officer. Page 540. For; make irterest— 
 make tA«2r interest. For; advantages— em,oluments. For; use of his opportunities while they 
 lasted— use of the opportunity he enjoyed while it lasted. For; emoluments— perquisites 
 Page 541. F or; finding himself— ^when he found himself. For; looking— when he looked. For; 
 refiecting — reeled. (Omitted — nich a man. in such a situation.) Page 542. For; By in- 
 ducing the necessity of— By necessitating a change. For; partial one — partial exclusion. Page 
 548. Vox ; the evils — these disadvantages. Yor; especially it— If 
 
 LXXIII. Page 546. For; i« competent— are competent. Yor; ichii:hwillh»,ye— to have th* 
 effsct. Page 547. For ; Aas been alrettdy more than once suggested- -has been already suggested 
 and repeate'i. For; or wisdom — and wisdom. Page 548. For; the secondary — the secondary one. 
 Page 549. For ; and that in its exercise there would oftencr be room for acharge of timidity than 
 of rashness — and there would oftener be room for a charge of timidity than of rashness in the ex- 
 ercise of it. For; it might rarely, it would never be exercised — it might be rarely exercised, it 
 would never be exercised. Page 650. For; plain otie — plain case. For; absolute — absolute 
 negative. For ; in defiance — in spite. Page 561. For ; were its violent oppostrs -were violent 
 opposers of it. For; One, that the, — One i« that the. For; capacity — capacities. For; the 
 other — the othpr is. 
 
 No. LXX IV. Page 552. For; so evident — so evident in itself . Page 553. For; number- 
 numbers. For; the apprehension of censure — the apprehension of suspicion or censure. Page 
 654. For ; poised — matched. For ; the condemned — the condemned person. For ; its sanction 
 —Its sanction to the measure. 
 
 No. LXXV. Page 566. For prerogative— power. Page 557. For ; heretofoi'i, ffte«i'—al 
 
COLLATED TEXTS. 658 
 
 raofiy i/tfien in nVief plaeen. Foi ; either — either of them. Paare 558. Kor , duty to inter e«t— 
 \i» duty to his interest. Paee 559. For ; same extetit — same degree. For ; number, will <tpply 
 — number, which has been ijlhid-'fi to in anoOier part of this pa pet , Page 560. For; Th« 
 former, by increasinff the d fflculty of resolutions disagreeable to the minority- the former by 
 making a determinate number, at all times requisite to a resolation. Page 561. For; than the 
 Senate is likely — ihiin th* Senate wouhl he likely. 
 
 No. LXXVI. Page 5\J3. For; can be pr^rperly modified only — ought to be modified in 
 cne of three ways. For; since waivinjt— >'« waiving. Page 564. Omitted; \ single well- 
 directed man, by a single understanding, cannot be distracted and warped by that diversity of 
 views, feelings, and interests, which frequently distract and warp the resolutions of a collective 
 body. Page 56.5. For; upon — on. For; Sut his nomination may be overruled: This it cer- 
 tainly may ; yet it can only be — But might not his nomination be overruled? I grant it might, 
 yet this could only be to make place for another nomination by himself. For; to prevent — to 
 preventing. Page 666. For; than that of universal rectitude — than the supposition of uni- 
 versol rectitnd?. 
 
 No. LXXVlI. Page 669. For; been objected — been suggested. Page 669. For; Besides 
 this it is evident that the Power — The Power. Page 570. For; all the good without the ill- 
 all the good of that of appointment, and would in a great measure avoid its evils. Page 573. 
 For; been a««ai7«rf— been excepted to. Pot; the election— from the election. For; his liability 
 ftt all times to impeachment — and from bis being at all times, liable to impeachment. For ; 
 What more can an enlightened and reasonable people desire — What more could be desired by 
 an enlightened and reasonable people. 
 
 No. LXXVIIL Page 575. For; all the Judges — all Judges. For; among the rest— and 
 among the rest. For ; arm for— arm eren for. Page 576. For ; It proves — And it proves. 
 For; that ua nothing— arwi that as nothing. Page 577. For; the right — the rights. For; 
 the grounds — the ground. For; It must therefore belong — It therefore belongs to them. 
 Page 578. For; in other — or in other. For: Nor does <A«— ^Nor does this. Page 680. For; 
 of an iniquitous— of iniquitous. Page 5S1. For; muy imagine— may be aware ot Page 583 
 For; of Judicial — of their Judicial. 
 
 No. LXXX Page 587. For; djw- proper. Page 589. For; the gentences of Courts, is 
 with reason— the sentences of Courts, as well as in any other manner, is with reason. For; the 
 controversies— the ctises. Page 590. For ; are other sources-are »K»ny other sources. For; o/ 
 the States— between the States. Page 692. For; ea!rtwi/>;««— examples of it. For; under tho 
 Constitution — upon the Constitution. Page 594. For; to a -principle — to a general prin- 
 ciple. 
 
 No. LXXXI. Page 696. For; is to be vested— Is (by the plan of the Convention) to be 
 vested. For; are advocates — advocate. For; of the Supreme Court — of the proposed Supreme 
 Court Page 596. For; the plan which — the plan under consideration which. Page 597. For; 
 too apt to influence their construction — too apt in interpreting them. Page 698. For : these 
 models — those models. For; In the former as in the latter— In the former, as weW as in the 
 latter. Page 600. For; these Courts— those Courts. For; To confer upon the existing Courts 
 of the several States, the power of determining such causes — To confer the power of determin- 
 ing such cau.ses upon the existing Courts of the several States. Page 600. For; confiding to 
 them— confiding the original cognisance of causes arising under those laws to them. For; 
 Courts may hold circuits — with the aid of the State Judges, may hold circuics. Page 603. For; 
 a particulfir — tiny particular. 
 
 No. LXXXII. Page 606. For; Time only can— 'Tis time only that can. Page 607. For; 
 the m^st defensible construction — the most natural and the most defensible construction. 
 Page 609. For; wAitA give appellate -yipingr appellate. 
 
 No. LXXXIII. Page 611. For; In this State, is relative— in this State, and perhaps in several 
 of the other States, is that relative to. For; would be— would Aoic^r^r be. Page 612. Omitted; 
 trial by jury in all such cases. For; but it is left at large in relation to civil causes, fur the very 
 reason that there is a tot;il silence on the subject— but it is of course left at large in relation to 
 civil causes, there being a total silence on this head. Page 613. For; to appoint— to exercise. 
 For; is contrary to reason and therefore inadmissible — ^is contrary to reason and common sense, 
 and therefore iiiailniiiisible. For; their proper application— their proper use and true meaning. 
 For; the «u<Aori/y of the Federal .Judicatures — the Judicial authority ot Page 618. Omitted 
 
 Earagraph commencing, But that there miy be no possibility. Page 614. For ; From what has 
 een said — From these observations. Omitted ; after State Constitutions ; and will be In no 
 degree altered or influenced by the adoption of the plan under 'ionsideration. Page 616. For; 
 the desired security — the iiectirity aimed at Page 617. For; civil »Mite— civil ca*««. For: to 
 fix with accuracy the limits — to fix the limits. For; l!A* ilifflcnlty- -that A\f&cn\ty. Page 619. 
 For; inapplicable and indeterminate — senseless and nugatory. For; strictly speaking xxn- 
 known — idtogether unknown. For ; there is no antecedent establishment — there is no proper 
 antecedent or previous establishment. Page 620. For; in suits — incases. Pasro 621. For; 
 while a separation between the jurisdictions — while a separation of the one from the other. 
 For; critical— deliberate and critiail. For; the model— which is the model. Page 623. 
 For; the State tribunals — the State Judicatories. For; Massachusetts, proposition cannot — 
 Massachusett.s proposition, upon this subject, can not For: that they are more attached — that 
 they are hitlierto more attached. Paze 624. For; in full force — in its full force. 
 
 No. LXXXI V. Page 627. For ; I have endeavored to answer — I have taken notice of. and 
 endeavored to answer. For ; There remain however — There however remain. Page 627. For : 
 And yet the pemons who in this State oppose — And yet the oppoxers of the new system. In thin 
 State. Page 628. For; the Constitution o./ff /•«■(/ by — proposed by. Page 629. For ; to liberty 
 than any ii contains — to liberty and republicanism "than any It contains. Page 630. For; must 
 be intended to limit the power — must be intended as limitations of the power. Page 630. For : 
 This is — Bere is. For ; than to one — than to a Constitution. Page 631. For ; that a right to 
 prescrlbs — that a power to prescribe. Page 6.32. In like manner, the proposed Constitution— 
 A]i4 the Droposed Constitution, if adopted. Page 6S3. For; provided for— found In. For; 
 
654 COLLATED TEXTS. 
 
 Another objection which from the frequency of its repetition — Another objection, whi.ih hM 
 been made, and which, from the frequency of its repetition. For ; may be presumed to oe 
 relied on — it la to be presumed is relied on. Page 63-3. For ; in any distant county— in 
 Montgomery county. Page 636. For ; is given up— must be given up. Page 636. Oiiiitte*^ 
 after United States. There is no good reason to suppose that either the number or the salaries 
 ■;f the latter will be greater than those of the former. Page 637. For ; It has t/ience happened 
 ifence it has happened. For ; the mere local business — the mere local business o/the States. 
 
 No. LXXX V. Page 639. For : and so completely exhausted— and exhausted. Page 640. 
 For ; the Convention— the Convention among us. For ; Government of this State— Govern- 
 ment under which they live. For; upon local — on local. For; upon the ambition — on the 
 ambition. Page 641. For; are such— have been each. For; are of a nature — have been of a 
 nature. Page 642. For assailed — opposed. For ; This may be plausible, but it is plausible 
 only — This may he plawiible enough, but it Is only p\a,asib\ti. Page 64;3. For; It is certainly 
 iDell wortlir—well worthy. For; complete — absolute. For; Constitution should. — Consiitv^ 
 tiim proposed should. Page 6i4. For; prveail — take place.'For; force— weight. Page 645. For-, 
 left to discretion— \e& to the discretion of that body. For; be a fallacy-is a fallacy. For; 
 their oion object Page 646. For; is an awful spectacle — is, In my view, an awful spectacle. 
 For ; In so sriuoiu an enterprise. I can reconcile it — I can reconcile it to no rules of 
 prndenoe. 
 
PHILO PUBLIUS. 655 
 
 PHJLO PUBLIUS. 
 
 NUMBER I. 
 
 NEW YORK, OCTOBER 27, 1787. 
 
 DUER. 
 
 In the first number of the Federalist, which appeared in the 
 Independent Journal of Saturday, the interest of certain OflScers, 
 under the State establishments, to oppose an increase of Federal 
 authority, is mentioned as a principal source of the opposition 
 to be expected to the new Constitution. The same idea has 
 appeared in other publications, but has not hitherto been suffi- 
 ciently explained. To ascertain its justness and extent, would, 
 no doubt, be satisfactory to the public; and might serve to 
 obviate misapprehensions. 
 
 A very natural enquiry presents itself on the subject : — 
 
 How happens it, that the interest of the Officers of a state 
 should be different from that of its Citizens ? I shall attempt 
 an answer to this question. 
 
 The powers requisite to constitute Sovereignty, must be dele- 
 gated by every people for their own protection and security. 
 The people of each State have already delegated these powers; 
 which are now lodged; partly in the Particular Government, 
 and partly in the General Government. It is not necessary 
 that they should grant greater or new ones. The only question 
 with them is, in what manner the powers already granted shall 
 be distributed ; into what receptacles ; and in what proportions 
 If thev are represented in both, it will be immaterial to th«m 
 
656 PHILO PUBLIUS. 
 
 BO far as concerns their individual authority, independence or 
 liberty, whether the principal share be deposited in tne whole 
 body, or in the distinct members. The re-partition, or division, 
 is a mere question of expediency ; for by whatever scale it be 
 made, their personal rights will remain the same. If it be 
 their interest to be united, it will be their interest to bestow as 
 large a portion upon the Union as may be required to render 
 it solid and effectual; and if experience has shown, that the 
 portion heretofore conferred is inadequate to the object, it will 
 be their interest to take away a part of that which has beer 
 left in the State reservoirs, to add it to the common stock. 
 
 But such a transfer of power, from the individual members 
 to the Union, however it may promote the advantages of the 
 citizens at large, may subtract not a little from the importance, 
 and, what is with most men less easily submitted to, from the 
 emolument of those, who hold a certain description of oflSces 
 under the State establishments. These have one interest as 
 Citizens, and another as Officers. In the latter capacity, they 
 are interested in the Power and Profit of their offices, and 
 will naturally be unwilling to put either in jeopardy. Thai 
 men love power is no new discovery; that they are commonly 
 attached to good salaries does not need elaborate proof; that 
 they should be afraid of what threatens them with a loss of 
 either, is but a plain inference from plain facts. A diminution 
 of State authority is of course, a diminution of the Power of 
 those who are invested with the administration of that authority; 
 and, in all probability, will in many instances produce an 
 eventual decrease of salary. In some cases it may annihilate 
 the offices themselves. But, while these persons may have to 
 repine at the loss of official importance or pecuniary emolument, 
 the private citizen may feel himself exalted to a more elevated 
 rank. He may pride himself in the character of a citizen of 
 America, as more dignified than that of a citizen of any single 
 State. He may greet himself with the appellation of an 
 American as more honourable than that of a New Yorker, a 
 Pennsylvacian, or a Virginian, 
 
PHILO PUBLIUS. 057 
 
 From the preceding remarks, the distinction alluded to, be- 
 tween the private citizen and the citizen in office will, 1 pre- 
 sume, be sufficiently apparent. But it will be proper to observe, 
 that its influence does not reach near so far as might at first 
 sight be imagined. The offices that would be affected by the 
 proposed change, though of considerable importance are not 
 numerous. Most of the departments of the State Governments 
 will remain untouched, to flow in their accustomed channels. 
 This observation was necessary to pre^nt invidious suspiciona 
 from lighting where they would not be applicable 
 
658 PHILO PUBLIUS. 
 
 PHILO PUBLIUS. 
 
 NUMBER II. 
 
 NEW YORK, NOVEMBER 15, 178: 
 
 DUER. 
 
 The government of Athens was a democracy. The people, 
 as is usual in all democratical governments, were constantly 
 alarmed at the spectre of aristocracy ; and it was common in 
 that republic as it is in the republics of America to pay court 
 to them by encouraging their jealousies, and gratifying their 
 prejudices. Pericles, to ingratiate himself with the citizens of 
 Athens, whose favour was necessary to his ambition, was a 
 principal agent in mutilating the privileges and the power of 
 the court of Areopagus; an institution acknowledged by all 
 historians to have been a main pillar of the State. The pre- 
 tence was that it promoted the power of the aristocracy. 
 
 The same man undermined the constitution of his country 
 to ACQUIRE popularity — squandered the treasures of his coun- 
 try to purchase popularity — and to avoid being accountable to 
 his country precipitated it into a war which ended in its de- 
 struction. Pericles was, nevertheless a man endowed with 
 many amiable and shining qualities, and, except in a few in- 
 stances, was always the fai orite of the people. 
 
PHILO PUBLIU3. 659 
 
 PHILO PUBLIUS. 
 
 NUMBER III. 
 
 NOVEMBER 28, 1787. 
 
 DUER. 
 
 PuBLius has shown us in a clear light the utility, it might be 
 eaid, the necessity of Union to the formation and support of a 
 navy. There is one point of view however on which he has 
 left the subject untouched — the tendency of this circumstance 
 to the preservation of liberty. 
 
 Will force be necessary to repell foreign attacks, or to guard 
 the national rights against the ambition of particular mem- 
 bers ? A navy will be a much safer as well as a more effectual 
 engine for either purpose. If we have a respectable fleet there 
 will be the less call on any account for an army. This idea is 
 too plain to need enlargement. Thus the salutary guardian- 
 ship of the Union appears on all sides to be the palladium of 
 American liberty. 
 
INDEX TO THE FEDERALIST; 
 
 kcnMA.s LsAQiTB 1 147. 161. 164, 291, S60. 
 
 Icu^ANs; They abandoned the experiment of 
 piaral prtetors, 524. 
 
 Aobicpltuee: Its interestA Interwoven with 
 those of commerce, 121. 
 
 Amendments: Oblization under the ConsUta* 
 tion. concerning them, 345. 
 
 Ambrioan Systkm: Idea of one, 120. 121. 
 
 Amphictyonic Council, 16s, 160, 291. 
 
 Annapolis : Extract from the recommenda- 
 tion of the meeting at, In September 1T86, 
 809. 
 
 A.VSZ, Qfbkn : Extracts from her letter to the 
 Scutch Parliament, 71, 72. Appeals to the 
 People; Dangers and inconveniences at- 
 teruiing them, 339, 390 ; Objections to their 
 being perio<lically made, S'iS, 395. 
 
 Aspasia. 77. 
 
 Assemblies : Objections to numerooa, 423, 446. 
 (5m •' House of Representatives.") After 
 a number of Representatives sufficient for 
 the purposes of safely, of local information, 
 and of diffusive sympathy with the whole 
 society, is 8ecure<l, any addition to them is 
 injurious, 446. 
 
 Athens : Archons of, 479. 
 
 AxTAiNDKR, Bills of : Provision of the Consti- 
 tution concerning them, 851. 
 
 Bankruptct: (S«« "Constitution.") Provision 
 of the Constitution concerning it, 836. 
 
 Bills of Credit : Provision of tne Constitu- 
 tion concerning them. 349. 
 
 Bills op Riobts : In their origin, stipulations 
 between kings and subject^, 627. 
 
 Cambbat. League of, 80. 
 
 Carthage, Senate of. 477. 
 
 Cato : An opponent of the Cunstitation, cited, 
 505. 
 
 Coalition : The word used in a good sense, 44-:*. 
 
 Commbrcb: (See " Confederation." *• Union,") 
 Examination of the opinion that its tend- 
 ency is pacific 78, 81 : A source of contention 
 between the separate !>tates, and would be 
 among separate confederacies of them, 86; 
 Policy of prohibitory regulations in regard 
 to it, on the part of the XJ. States, 114, 115; 
 Intimacy between its interests and those 
 of agriculture, 121 ; Power under the Con- 
 stitution of regulating it, 332. 
 
 CoNFXDEBAOiBS : Inexpediency of dividing the 
 
 Union into three or fout -leparate Con> 
 federacies. 69, 77; Pre cable jumber of sep- 
 arate Confederacies, in the event of dis- 
 union, 128, 180; Tendency of Confederaoie* 
 rather to anarchy among the members thiui 
 to tyranny in the head, 153, 178. 
 
 Confederacy, of the States : Alleged charac- 
 teristic distinction between it and consoli- 
 dation, 101. 
 
 Confxderate Republic : Defined, 101; Tend- 
 ency of the Federal principle to mod- 
 eration in Government, 162. (Sm "Mon- 
 tesquieu," "Constitution," " Republic') 
 
 CoNFEDKBATiojc, The: Its insufliciency to the 
 preservation of the Union, 139 ; Picture of 
 the public distress under it, 139, 140 ; Its 
 great and radical vice, legislation for com- 
 munities instead of persons, 141. {See 197); 
 Difierence between a league and a govern- 
 ment. 142, 143; Want of a sanction to its 
 laws, 178 ; State contributions by quotas, 
 a fundamental error in it. 180 ; Want of a 
 power to regulate commerce, another de- 
 fect in it, 184, 186 ; The nugatory power ol 
 raising armies, another, 1S6; The right of 
 equal sufiVage among the States, another 
 187: Anti-republican character of the re 
 quisition, in certain cases, of a vote exceed 
 ing a majority. 18S; Want of a Judiciary 
 power, a crowning defect of the Confedera- 
 tion. 191 ; The organization of Congress, 
 another ; Perilous tendency of a single legis- 
 lative house. 192; Want of popular con- 
 sent to it, another defect in it, 198; It ac- 
 knowledges the necessity of strength in 
 the Federal power, 193; Impracticable 
 character of certain provisions under it, 
 298. 299 ; Necessary usurpations of Congress 
 under it, 29S, 299 ; Answer to the question, 
 on what principle is it to be superseded, 
 without the unanimous consent of the par- 
 ties to it, 846. 
 
 Congress: (iSee "Constitution,'' "States," 
 •• Public Debt,") Extracts from the recom- 
 niendatorv Act of Consress, in February, 
 1787, 309, 310; Power of; under the Feder- 
 al Constitution, over a District of Terri- 
 tory, not exceeding ten miles square, 888; 
 Its power concerning territory, iSms., belon«- 
 ing to the United Sutea, 841. 
 
 * The editor Uke* pleunre in adcnowledginit that he U indebted to the klndnee* of P. H. Kendall, Eeq., a leading 
 member of th* Wa>bl \zton Bar, and formerly a t>iatr!ct Attorney of the United State* for permiaaion to nae thi* Index 
 prepareu oy him for a ^1rmer edition of thia work. It ia very alightly modified. Fab. 1864 
 
CoMsttmoin: Provision in her Constitution 
 concerning elections, 410 ; One branch of 
 her Legislatnre so constituted, that each 
 member of it is elected by the whole 
 State, 440 ; Has no constitutional provision 
 for jury trial, in either criminal or civil 
 cases, 626. 
 
 I'Jcksolidaticn: The plan of the Union aims 
 only at a partial consolidatiofl, 249 ; Desire 
 of the States to guard against improper 
 consolidation of themselves into one simple 
 republic, 467. 
 
 C-OH8TIT0TION OF THE UNITED StATKS : {See 
 
 "Union," " Confederation," "Standing ar- 
 mies," " States," " House of Eepresenta- 
 tives," " Slaves,") ; Its economy, 128, 
 180 ; Answer to an objection drawn from 
 the extent of the Country, 181 ; Its guar- 
 anty to the States of a republican form 
 of Government, 179, 180 ; Necessity for 
 strength in the Federal Government, 196, 
 200 ; Wisdom of the provision in the Con- 
 stitution concerning the military force, 
 201, 216, 217, 218, 267, 822; Answer to the 
 objection, That it cannot operate without 
 the aid of a military force to execute its 
 laws, 220, 229 ; Reason why the execution 
 of it will probably be popular, 228; Laws 
 under it, as to the enumerated and legiti- 
 mate objects of its jurisdiction, will be 
 the supreme law of the land, 223, 224; 
 Number and inconsistency of the objec- 
 tions to it, 295, 297; Most of the capital 
 objections to it lie with tenfold weight 
 against the confederation, 295, 298; Its 
 conformity to republican principles, 801, 
 304 ; Analogy between the mode of ap- 
 pointments under it, and under the State 
 Gf)vernment8, 803, 804 ; Neither a National 
 nor a Federal Constitution, but a composi- 
 tion of both, 304, 808 ; General view of the 
 powers wliich it proposes to vest in the 
 Union, 818; The power of declaring war, 
 319; The power ol providing a Navy, 824; 
 The power of making Treaties, &c, 829 ; 
 The power of definingand punishing offen- 
 ces on the high seas, 830; h-ohibition of 
 the importation of slaves after 1808, 881 ; 
 Power of regulating commerce, 832 ; Pow- 
 ers to coin money, to punish counterfeiters 
 and to regulate weights and measures, 
 834 ; Power to establish a uniform mode of 
 naturalization, 835, 886; Power to estab- 
 lish uniform laws of bankruptcy, 886; 
 Power concerning pnblic acts, records, <fec., 
 &c., 838; Power of establishing post roads, 
 836; Power of granting copyrights, 838; 
 Power to exercise exclusive legi.ilation 
 over a District not exceeding ten miles 
 square, if ceded to the United States, 83S : 
 Power concerning treason, 840 ; Power of 
 admitting new States, 840; Power con- 
 cerning territory, &o., belonging to the 
 United States, 341 ; Obligation to guaranty 
 a republican form of government to every 
 State of the Union, 841, 844; Obligation 
 concerning public debts prior to the adop- 
 tion of the Constitution, 845 ; Provision 
 concerning amendments, 345; Provision 
 concerning the ratification by nine States, 
 346 ; Question, what relation is to exist be- 
 tween the nine or more ratifying States, 
 and the not-ratifying States, 846 ; Disabili- 
 ties of the States created by the Coastitu- 
 tlon, 849, 852 ; Power given by it to C'on- 
 gress, to make all laws necessary and 
 
 S roper for executiuglts enumerated powers, 
 i2 : Four other possible alternatives, 
 which the Constitution might have adopt- 
 
 ed, 853, 354 ; Provision, that the Constlta 
 tion. Laws and Treaties of the United 
 States shall be the supreme law of the 
 land, 355; Oath, Ac, of otticers, &&, to sup- 
 port the Constitution, 856 ; Consists much 
 less in the addition of new powers to the 
 Union, than in the invigoration of its orig- 
 inal powers, 363 ; Its provisions concerning 
 the proper degree of separation between 
 the legislative, executive, and judiciary 
 powers, 373, 885 ; Peculiar division under 
 it, of the power surrendered by the people, 
 400; Its mode of protecting the minority 
 from usurpations by the majority, 401 ; 
 Three characteristics of the Federal Legis- 
 lature, 407 ; Answer to the objection that 
 it contains no Bill of Rights, 627, 632 ; In 
 the sense, and to the extent contended for. 
 Bills of Rights are unnecessary and would 
 be dangerous to the Constitution, 631 ; 
 Omission of a provision concerning the 
 liberty of the press defended, 631; The 
 Constitution itself is a Bill of Rights, 632 ; 
 Answer to an objection to the Constitution, 
 founded on the remoteness of the seat of 
 Government from many of the States, 633, 
 684; Answer to the objection, that it wants 
 a provision concerning debts due to the 
 United States, 634, 635 ; Answer to the ob- 
 jection as to expense, 635. 
 
 Construction, Two rules of, 310, 311. 
 
 Contracts: Laws in violation of private con- 
 tracts, a source of collision between the 
 separate States or Confederacies, 89 ; Pro- 
 vision of the Constitution concerning 
 them, 351. 
 
 Convention at Philadelphia in 1787, 56, 
 57, 58; The difficulties it must have expe- 
 rienced in the formation of a j)roper plan, 
 282, 300; One difficulty, that of combining 
 the requisite degree of stability and energy 
 in government, with the inviolable atten- 
 tion due to liberty and the republican 
 form, 284; Another, making the partition 
 between the authority of the General Gov- 
 ernment and that of the State Govern- 
 ments, 285; Its authority to propose a 
 mixed Constitution, 307, 314; Its duties 
 under existing circumstances, 314, 815; Its 
 plan, only recommendatory, 817; One par- 
 ticular in which it has departed fi-om the 
 tenor of its commission, 813. 314. 
 
 Conventions, for correcting breaches of a Con- 
 stitution, 888; Dangers and inconveniences 
 of frequent appeals to the people, 390, 391. 
 
 Copt Eights: Power of the Constitution con- 
 cerning them, 3.38. 
 
 Crete, Cosmi of, 479. 
 
 Delaware: (See "States.") Provision in het 
 constitution concerning the separation cl 
 the legislative, executive and judiciary 
 powers, 879 ; Number of Representatives 
 in the more numerous branch of her Legis- 
 lature, 428. 
 
 Dbmooraoy : A pure one deflnod, 109 ; Its dis- 
 advantages, 109. 
 
 Departments of Power: (See "States," 
 under their several titles.) Meaning of the 
 maxim which requires a sejiaration of 
 them, 873, 881 ; Principles of the British 
 Constitution on this subject, 37l, 875 ; Pro 
 visions of the State Constitutions concern- 
 ing it, 876, 381 ; The partition among them 
 to oe maintained, not by exterior provis- 
 ions, but by the interior structure of the 
 Government, 397. 
 
 District: Kxclusive le^slatlon of Congreiw 
 over one, not exceeding ten miles square, 
 8:^8. 
 
iii 
 
 BooifOMT : " The money saved from one object 
 may be usefully applied to another," 128. 
 
 Elections: Frequence of them In the choice 
 of the Senate would be inconsistent with 
 a due responsibility in the Government to 
 the people, 474, 4T6. 
 
 Europe: Her arrogant pretensions, 119,120. 
 
 Faction : Defined. 105; Its latent cause in- 
 herent in human nature, 106; The various 
 and unequal distribution of property the 
 most common and durable source of it, 
 106, 107. 
 
 Federal Farmer: An opponent of the Con- 
 stitution, 503. 
 
 Feudal Ststem : Account of it, 156, 360. 
 
 FiBHBRiES, The: 117. 
 
 Fox. Charles Jamks: His India Bill, 536. 
 
 Geometry: Why its priuciples are received 
 without difficulty, 244; Incomprehensibil- 
 ity of one of thein, 244. 
 
 Gborgla : Provision in her constitution, con- 
 cerninf; the separation of the legislative, 
 executive, and jadiciary powers, 8S0; 
 Number of Eeprerientatives in the more 
 numerous branch of her legislature, 423. 
 
 Gebmakic Empire : Its origin, constitution, 
 and disadvantages, 165, 169. 
 
 Gold and Silvrr: Principle on which the 
 States are inhibited to make anything else 
 a tender in payment of debts. 350, 861. 
 
 Government: {Sie« "Minorities,") A Govern- 
 ment, the constitution of which renders it 
 unfit to be entrusted with all the powers 
 which a free people ought to delegate to 
 any government, would be an unsafe and 
 improper depository of the National Inter- 
 ests, 19?i, 199 ; The danger of fettering it 
 with restrictions which cannot be observed, 
 211: Examples among the States of im- 
 practicable restrictions. 211,212; Remark- 
 iible feature of every Government reported 
 by ancient history w^hich was established 
 by deliberation and consent. 291 ; Tlie reason 
 of it, 292; Oucht to control the passions, 
 and to be controlled bv the reason of the 
 public 893 ; The greate'st of all reflections 
 on human nature, 39S; Wise icings will al- 
 ways be served by able ministers, 4S4 ; The 
 true test of a good government, is its apti- 
 tude and tendency to produce a good ad- 
 ministratinn, 511 ; Definition of a limited 
 constitution, 576 : The general genius of a 
 government is all that can be substantially 
 relied on for permanent effects, 626. 
 
 Great Bkitain: (5e« "Standing Armies,") Her 
 Government, 302 ; The House of Commons, 
 405, 406, 482, 438, 439 : The House of Lords, 
 481, 4S2 ; Why the king's power of an ab- 
 solute negative on bills has been long dis- 
 used. 514; Constitution of Great Britain, 
 concerning a separation of the departments 
 of power, 374, 875. 
 
 Grotics : Cited, 635. 
 
 High Skas : The power under the ConstitnUon 
 of defining and punishing offences on 
 them, 330. 
 
 Holland : Not a Republic, 301. 802. 
 
 HocsB OF Representatives : {S^« "Constitu- 
 tion," "Treaties.") Qualifications of the 
 electors and the elected. 403. 404; Term of 
 a member's service, 404, 409, 415; Bien- 
 nial elections defended, 410. 415 ; Argu- 
 ment in their favor derived from the time 
 they afford a Representative for acquiring 
 the requisite information, 411. 413, 422 ; The 
 ratio of Representation, 416, 421: Its pro- 
 posed number of members defended, 422, 
 483 ; Provision of the Constitution concern- 
 ing the ineligibility «f its members under 
 
 certain circumstances, to civil offices, 427; 
 Imputed tendency of the plan for the House 
 of Representatives, to elevate the few above 
 the many, 434; Provision for the future 
 augmentation of its members considered. 
 441 ; Economy consulted by the provision 
 for its temporary number, 445 ; Dangers oi 
 a multitudinous representative assembly. 
 446; Maxim as to the proper number bl 
 representatives, 445. 446; AVhy more thao 
 a majority ought not to be required for a 
 quorum, 446,447; Provision for regulating 
 elections to it, 448,465; Less likely tha» 
 local legislatures to be partial to particular 
 interests. 456, 457; Advant-ige of uniform- 
 ity in the time of elections, 464; Why it 
 ought to have no power in the formation 
 of treaties, 559 ; Why it ought to have no 
 power in the appointment of Federal of- 
 ficers, 572. 
 
 Human Naturk : Its fair side, 427, 428; A 
 power over • man's support is a power over 
 his will, 549. 
 
 Hume, Datid : Citation from his essays, 645, 
 646. 
 
 Impeachments: (See "Senate," "Judiciary,' 
 "States." under their several titles.) 
 
 Indians : Difiiculties concerning them when 
 residing within a State, SS4. 
 
 Innovation : Its dangers exaggerated, some of 
 its beneficial results, 1:}6, 136, 1^7. 
 
 Ireland: Elections in. 406. 
 
 Jkfferson, Thomas: Cited to show the evils 
 in the Constitution of Virginia, arising from 
 the want of a barrier between the legisla- 
 tive, executive, and judiciary powers, 3S5 
 3S6; His draft of a Constitution cited, 8SS. 
 His idea of a convention for correctinj 
 breaches of it, 888 ; Defects of this plan, 
 3S9— 31(2. 
 
 Jenkinson. Cbarles: Hisremarksintroductory 
 to his bill for regulating the commerce be- 
 tween Great Britain and the United States, 
 185. 
 
 Judiciary : (See "Jury Trial,'') Objections to 
 constituting the Supreme Court a tribunal, 
 either singly or jointly with the Senate, for 
 trying impeachments, 492, 495; Mode ol 
 appointing ttie Judges. 574 ; Their tenurs 
 of office during good behaviour, 575, 582 ; 
 The weakest of the three departments ol 
 power, 575; Vindication of its power U. 
 pronounce legislative acts void, because 
 contrary to the Constitution, 577, 579 ; The 
 independence of the Judges essential, and 
 why ? 579, 5S3 ; Peculiar advantages of the 
 provision in the Constitution for their sup- 
 port, 5S3, 5S4; PrecautioiM for their respon 
 sibility, 585; Omission of a provision foi 
 removing them on account of inability, 
 defended, 5S5; Six classes of cases, to 
 which the judici.il power of the Federal 
 Government ought to extend, 5S7, 591 ; 
 These classes of cases compared with the 
 particular fiowers, 591. given by the Con- 
 stitution to the judiciary, 591, 592: Distri 
 bntion of authority in the Jud cial Depart- 
 ment. 595, 605; Statement of objections to 
 the Supreme Court having undivided 
 power of final jurisdiction, 595, 596; These 
 objections answered, 596, 599 ; The power 
 in Congress of constituting inferior courts 
 considered, 599 ; Why the objects of these 
 courts would not be accomplished by the 
 Instrumentality of the State Courts, 600 ; 
 The original jurisdiction of the Supreme 
 Court confined to two classes of causes, 
 601, 602; Whether the Supreme Court 
 ought to have appellate Jurisdiction as to 
 
IV 
 
 matters of fact, 602, 605; Such jarlsdiction 
 does not abolish trial by jury, 605; Sum- 
 marv view of the authority of the Supreme 
 Court, 605; Whether the'State Courts are 
 to have concurrent jurisdiction In regard to 
 causes submitted to the Federal jurisdiction, 
 606, 608 ; In Instances of concurrent juris- 
 diction brtwcen the natiimal and state 
 courts an appeal would lie from the state 
 courts to the Supreme Court of the United 
 States, 60S; Whether an appeal would lie 
 from the state conrts to subordinate Federal 
 judicatories, 609, 610. 
 
 fcRiSDicTioN : Literal meaning of the word 
 noticed. 608. Nate. 
 
 Jury Trial: Answer to the objection that the 
 constitution contains no provision for the 
 trial by jury in civil cases, 611, 626; In no 
 case abolished by the constitution. 614; 
 Examination of the remark that trial by 
 jury is a safeguard against an oppressive 
 exercise of Che power of taxation, 615 ; 
 The strongest argument in its favor, in 
 civil cases, is. that it is a security against 
 corruption, 616, 617; Difference between 
 the limits of the jury trial in the different 
 states of the lTniori,'617, 618; Ineligible in 
 many case?, 618, 619; Proposition concern- 
 ing it made by the minority of Pennsyl- 
 vsnia, 619 ; Proposition ft-om Massachusetts, 
 622. 
 
 Legislation : Evils of a mutable, 470, 471, 472, 
 473. 
 
 Legislature : Danger of its usurpations in a 
 Representative Republic, 382, 387, 891. 
 
 Louis XIV : Anecdote of, 64. 
 
 Lyoian Conpedbraot: 102, 147,860. 
 
 Ltcurous, 291. 
 
 Mably, Abbe de : His remark concerning a 
 Confederate Republic, 82: His remark on 
 the tendency of the Achsean league to mod- 
 eration in Government, 162. 
 
 Maintbnon, Madame de : 78. 
 
 MARLBOROuGn. John, Duke of: 80; Sarah, 
 Duchess of, 78. 
 
 Maryland : Provision In her constitution con- 
 cerning the separation of the legislative, 
 executive, and judiciary power, 879; con- 
 cernina her Senate, 481. 
 
 Massachusetts: Insurrections and rebellions 
 in Massa'hnsetts, 82, 179, 180; Provision in 
 her constitution concerning the separation 
 of the legislative, executive and judiciary 
 powers, 377; Number of Representatives 
 In the more numerous branch of her Le- 
 gislature, 423 ; Size of her senatorial dis- 
 tricts compared with that of the districts 
 proposed by the convention, 489; Provision 
 concerning impeachments, 497. Note. Pro- 
 position from in regard to jury trial, 622. 
 
 Maxims: Certain maxims in Geometry, ethics, 
 and politics, carrying internal evidence, 244. 
 
 Military Foroe : (See " Constitution," " Stand- 
 ing armies.") 
 
 Militia: its disadvantages and merits, 210, 
 311 ; Power of regulating It, 280, 286. 
 
 Minorities: Two modes of protecting them 
 from usurpations by majorities, 400, 401, 
 4^2; To give a minority a negative upon a 
 majority which Is always the case where 
 more than a majority is requisite to a de- 
 cision, is. In Its tendency, to subject the 
 sense of the greater number to that of the 
 lesser. 188. 
 
 Minos, 291. 
 
 Mississippi: Navigation of the, 117. 
 
 Money : Power under the constitution of coin- 
 ing It, 884^ 850. 
 
 MoNTBSQDiiiT : Refutation of the erroneons 
 
 opinion that he considered the republican 
 polity unsuited to a large extent of coun- 
 try, and his praise of a confederate renub- 
 lic, 99, 100, lUl, 345; True extent of his 
 doctrine, requiring a separation of the 
 legislative, executive, and judiciary powers, 
 874. 376; His remarks concerning the judi- 
 ciary. 576. Not". 
 
 Naturalization : Provision of the constitu 
 tion concerning It, 335, 886. 
 
 Navigation of the lakes, 117. 
 
 Navy : Practicabilitv of creating a Federal 
 navy. 115, 116; "its advantages, 117, 11-8; 
 The Southern States, the nursery of wood; 
 and the Northern of men for ships, 118; 
 Importance of establishing a navy as early 
 as po.ssible, 206; Power in tlie Federal 
 Constitution of erecting one. 824, 325. 
 
 Negative on bills: (See "Great Britain," 
 4 " President") 
 
 Netherlands: Their government, 172; An 
 evil attending the constitution of the States 
 General, 560. 
 
 N£;w Hampshire : Provision in her constitu- 
 tion concerning the separation of the legis- 
 lative, executive, and judici.iry powers, 376, 
 377; The size of her senatorial districts, 
 compared with the size of the districts pro- 
 posed by the convention, 439, 440; Provis- 
 ion concerning impeacliment, 497. Note. 
 
 New Jersey: Provision in her constitution 
 concerning the separation of the legislative, 
 executive, and judiciary powers, -378; Her 
 provisions concerning the unity of the exe- 
 cutive and a council of appointment, 624. 
 
 New York: Her controversy with the district 
 of Vermont, 85; Alleged excellence of her 
 constitution, 216; Prevision in her consti- 
 tution concerning the separation of the le- 
 gislative, executive, and judiciary powers, 
 378; Number of Kepresentatives In the 
 more numerous branch of her legislature, 
 423; Size of her senatorial districts com 
 pared with that of the district* proposed 
 by the convention, 439; Her o-nstitntion 
 makes no provision concerning laelor^Iity 
 of elections, 462 ; Provision cor '.erning itri- 
 peachments, 497; Provision concerning the 
 unity of her executive, 524 and Note ; 
 Where, by her constitution, the qualified 
 power of negativing bills, is vested. 561 ; 
 Provision of her constitution prohibiting 
 any person more than sixty years old from 
 being a judge, 585, 586. 
 
 North Cakolina : Revolt of a part of. Sis; 
 Provision in her constitution concerning a 
 separation of the legislative, executive, and 
 Jnillciary powers, 380. 
 
 Ndma: 291. 
 
 Pennsylvania : Disturbances in, 85 ; Provis- 
 ion in her constitution concerning the sep 
 aration of the legislative, executive, and 
 ludiciary powers, 378, 379. 386, 387; Num- 
 ber of Representatives in the more nu- 
 merous branch of her legislature. 423; Pro- 
 vision concerning Impeachments, 497. 
 Note; Proposition from the minority ol, 
 concerning jury trial, 619. 
 
 Pericles: Examples of the Injury resultina 
 to his country from his personal motives 
 of action, 77. 
 
 Poland: Her government, 169,170,302; An 
 evil of the Polish Diet, 560. 
 
 Political Economy: There Is no commoi. 
 measure of national wealth, and why, 181, 
 182. 
 
 Post-Roads : Provision of the Constltntioi 
 concerning them, 387. 
 
 President or tbe United States : EzuKar- 
 
•tiOD noticed of the authority vested in 
 him by the Constitntion, 303, 304 ; The 
 power of filling casual vacancies in the 
 Senate falsely :tscrlbecl to him, 50o, 506, 5oT ; 
 Why thu power of filling, during the recess 
 of the Senate, vacancies in Federal offices, 
 is confided to him, 506, 507; Peculiar eligi- 
 bilitv of the mode provided for his appoint- 
 ment 508,610; Why the »ttice of^ Presi- 
 dent will seldom fall to the lot of any man 
 not qualified in any degree to fill it, 51 1 ; 
 His constitution compared with that of the 
 King of Great Britain, and witn that of the 
 Governor of New York, 613, 515; His 
 qualified negative on bills. 514, 515, 516; A 
 Miield to the executive, 547 ; An addition- 
 si security against the enacting of improp- 
 er laws, 547 ; The power likely to be ejier- 
 olsed only with great caution, 549; Practice 
 in Great Britain, 549 : Cases for which, 
 chiefly, it was designed, 549 ; Where vest- 
 ed by the constitution of New York, 561 ; 
 Befiitation of the doctrine that a vigorous 
 executive is inconsistent with the genius 
 of a republican government, 522;" The 
 unity of the executive defended, 523; Ob- 
 jections to a plural executive, 523, 525; 
 Objections to an executive council, 523, 
 580; The responsibility of the President, 
 necessary, 529 ; The term of fonr years for 
 his office defended, 532, 535,537; His re- 
 eligibility defended, 58S, 543, 544; Danger 
 of instability in the system of administra- 
 tion, 539 ; Danger, particularly, from fre- 
 quent periodica! changes of subordinate 
 officers, 539; Evils to be apprehended from 
 the perpetual or temporary ineligibility of 
 the I'resident, after serving one term, 589, 
 542 ; Fallacy of the advantages expected 
 to arise from it, 543, 544 ; The provision in 
 the Ck)nstitution for the compensation of 
 the Presideit. 545, 546 ; His power as 
 Commander in-Chief of the army and 
 navy, 552 ; His power of requiring the 
 opinions in writing of the heads of the ex- 
 ecutive departments, 552 ; His power of 
 pardoning, 653, 554 ; Answer to the objec- 
 tion against his having the sole power of 
 pardon in cases of treason, 554; His power 
 in relation to treaties, 656, 559, 561 ; His 
 powerin regard to the appointment of Fed- 
 eral officers] 562, 566 ; Less apt than a nu- 
 merous assembly of men, to consult per- 
 sonal or party feelings in appointments, 
 663, 564 ; The cooperation of the Senate, a 
 check on a spirit of favoritism in the Pres- 
 ident, 565; His power in regard to the re- 
 moval of officers, 568; The constitution of 
 the President combines the requisites to 
 public snfetv, 673. 
 
 Pans: The liberty of the, 681, 682; Tax on 
 newspapers in Great Britain, 632, Note. 
 
 Public Acts : Records, &c.. Provision of the 
 Constitution concerning them, 536. 
 
 PiTBUc Dkbt: Would be a cause of collision 
 between the separate States or Confedera- 
 cies, 87; Obligation of the Federal Govern- 
 ment concerning public debts, prior to the 
 adoption of the Constitution, 345. 
 
 PtJBUc Lands : A fruitful source of contro- 
 versy, 83, 86. 
 
 Ebmo V ALs or Federal Ofpiokbs : (Se« ** Presi- 
 dent") 
 
 Bkfresentation : The principle of it, said to 
 be an invention of modern Enrope, 132, 
 405, 479 ; Idea of an actual representation 
 of all classes of the people by persons of 
 each class, vi nonary, 269, 270 ; Distinction 
 
 between the principle o le presentation 
 among the ancients, and in the United 
 States, 479. 
 
 BapuBLic: Defined, 109. (See "Confederate 
 Republic,") Its advantages, 109, 110. 112; 
 Error of the ojiiiiion that it is unsuitable 
 to a laree district of country, 132, 133; 
 Natural limits of one, 131 132 : One of its 
 weak sides, the inlets which it aflVyrds to 
 foreign corruption, 1S9, 190: Defined or 
 described, 301, 302; Inapplicability of the 
 title to certain governments which have 
 received it, 301, 302; Obligation of the 
 Federal Government to guarantee to every 
 State a republican form of government, 
 841. 
 
 Rhode Island : Provision in her constitution 
 concerning elections, 410 ; Number of rep- 
 resentatives in the more numerous braneh 
 of her legislature, 428 ; Iniquitous meas- 
 ures of, 475. 
 
 Rome : Senate of, 477 ; Tribunes of, 479, 4b2 ; 
 Evils arising from her having plural consuls 
 and tribunes, 524, 560. 
 
 Romulus, 291. 
 
 RuTHERFORTH, Dr. Thoiias. cited, 6.35. Nute. 
 
 Senatf. : (6'«e " Elections," "Judiciary.'") Will 
 generally be composed with peculiar care 
 and Judgment, and why ? 2)J1 ; Its consti- 
 tution. 466, 502; Qualifications of Senators. 
 466, 467; Appointment of Senators by tiie 
 State Legislatures, 467 ; Equality of repre- 
 sentations in the Senate, 467, 46S; Number 
 of Senators and duration of their appoint- 
 ment, 469; Its power in regard to making 
 treaties, 4S3, 4»9 ; Provision for the bien- 
 nial succession of one third of new Sena- 
 tors, 484, 485; Viewed as a court of im- 
 peachment, 490, 602; the objection which 
 would substitute the proportion of two- 
 thirds of all the members composing the 
 Senate, to that of two-thirds of the mem- 
 bers prw'-rU considered. 560, 661; Its cooper- 
 ation with the President in appointments, a 
 check on favoritism, 565, 566; Answer to 
 the objection that the President, by the in- 
 fluence of the power of nomination, may 
 secure the complaisance of the Senate to 
 his views, 566, 667, 56S. 569 ; Its consent 
 would be necessary to displace as well as 
 to appiiint officers, 568. 
 
 Sebvius Tullius, 291. 
 
 Shat"s Rebellion, 78. 
 
 Ship Building: The wood of the Southeru 
 States preferable for it, 118. 
 
 Slaves : The importation of them after the 
 year 1808, prohibited, 381 ; Possess the 
 mixed character of persons and prope 'ty, 
 417. 418; Defence of the provision of the 
 Constitution combining them with ree 
 citizens as a ratio of taxation, 416, 421. 
 
 Socrates. 424. 
 
 Solon, 291. 
 
 South Carolina : Provision in her constitn« Ion 
 concerning the separation of the legisla- 
 tive, executive, and judiciary powers. 380; 
 Provision concerning elections, 410; Num- 
 ber of Kepresentatives in the more nnme- 
 rous branch of her legislature, 428 ; Pro- 
 vision concerning impeachments, 497, 
 Sote. 
 
 Sparta: Her Senate, 477; HerEphori,479.4&2. 
 
 Stakdino Armies: (5«« " Constitution.") One 
 advantage uf them in Europe, 90,91 ; Would 
 be an inevitable result of the dissolution 
 of the Confederacy, 92, 95 ; Their fatal ef- 
 fects on liberty, 91, 92. Ste pp. 820, 821 ; 
 Why they did not spring np In the Oreciar 
 
INDEX. 
 
 Eepublics, 93 , Nor to any considerable ex- 
 tent in Great Britain, 94, 8-21, 322, 328 : Wis- 
 doDQ of the provision of the Federal Con- 
 stitution in this particular, 202, 206, 216,217 
 218, 322; Why it is better for an army to 
 be in the hands of the Federal Government 
 than of the State Governments, 208 ; Silence 
 tn regard to them in the constitutions of all 
 the states except two, 202, 203, 211, 213; 
 Provision concerning them, In the English 
 Bill of Rights framed at the Revolution in 
 1688, 214, 215; Highest proportion of a 
 standing army to the population of a coun- 
 try S.71. 
 
 States: {Ste "Constitution," "Taxation," 
 "Union,") Advantages of an unrestrained 
 Intercourse between them, 121,122; The 
 consequences of the doctrine that the In- 
 terposition of the States ought to be re- 
 quired to give eflfect to a measure of the 
 Union, 151, 152, 153: Easier for the state 
 governments to encroach on the National 
 Government than for the latter to encroach 
 on the former, 154, 247, 358, 364; The state 
 governments will in all possible contingen- 
 cies afford complete security against all in- 
 vasions of public liberty "by the national 
 authority, 228, 860, 372; Power of Congress 
 to admit new states into the Union, 340; 
 Obligation of Congress to guaranty a re- 
 publican form of government to every 
 state, 341, 342, 843, 344; Provision of the 
 Constitution concerning its ratification by 
 nine states, 346 ; Why the state magistracy 
 should be bound to support the Federal 
 Constitution, 356; Discussion of the sup- 
 posed danger from the powers of the Union 
 to the state governments, 358, 872; exam- 
 ination of the comparative means of influ- 
 ence of the federal and state governments, 
 867, 872; Provisions in the constitutions of 
 the several states concerning the separation 
 of the legislatiTe, executive, and judiciary 
 powers, 376, 381 ; Provisions, etc., concern- 
 ing elections, 424; Provisions, etc., con- 
 cerning the size of electoral districts, 489, 
 440 ; As fair to presume abuses of power by 
 the state governments as by the federal 
 government, 450 ; " Portion of sovereignty 
 remaining In the individual states," recog- 
 nized by the Constitution, 467, 4(fe ; Pro- 
 visions of the constitutions of the several 
 states concerningimpeachments, 497, I^ote ; 
 New York and New Jersey the only states 
 which have entrusted the executive author- 
 ity wholly to single men, 524 ; Difference 
 between the limits of the jury trialln the 
 different states, 617. 618. 
 
 Bw£DBN : Corruption the cause of the sadden 
 despotism of Gustavus III., 191. 
 
 Swiss Cantons : Their Government, 170, 171. 
 
 Tazbs : Indirect taxes, the most expedient 
 source of revenue in the United States, 128, 
 182, 183; Suggestion of a tax on ardent 
 spiriUs 126; Taxation, 237.281; Incompe- 
 tency of the Turkish Sovereign to impose 
 •a new tax, 288; Intention, and practical de- 
 fects of the old confederation in regard to 
 taxation, 288, 289; Distinction between in- 
 ternal and external taxes. 239 ; Inadequacy 
 of requisitions on the States, 240, 241 ; Ad- 
 VHUt^es of vesting the power of taxation 
 in the Federal Government, as It regards 
 borrowing, 242 ; Positions manifesting the 
 necessity of so vesting the power, 245 ; Ob- 
 jections. 246, 2^: DanKor of so vesting the 
 
 power denied, 249 : Except as to impotti 
 and exports, tho United States and the sev- 
 eral states have concurrent powers of tax- 
 ation, 251 ; No repugnaucy between those 
 concurrent powers, 252 ; the necessity of 
 them, 252, 253, 256, 265 ; Dangers of restrict- 
 ing the Federal power to laying duties on 
 imposts, 266; Effect of exorbitant duties, 
 266, 267; Answer to objections to the pow- 
 er of internal taxation in the Federal Gov- 
 ernment, derived from the alleged want of 
 a sufHcient knowledge of local circum- 
 stances, and from a supposed interference 
 between the revenue laws of the Union 
 and those of the particular States, 274; 
 Suggestion of double taxation answered, 
 278, 279 ; Evils of poll taxes admitted, but 
 the propriety of vesting in the Federal 
 Government the power of imposing them, 
 asserted, 279, 280 ; Provision of the Con- 
 stitution concerning taxation, 852. 
 
 Theseus, 291. 
 
 Titles of Nobility: The prohibition of them 
 the corner stone of Republican Govern- 
 ment, 629. 
 
 Tkkason : Power under the Constitution con- 
 cerning it, 340; Why the power of pardon- 
 ing in cases of treason is properly vested in 
 the President solely, 253, 254. 
 
 Treaties : Power under the Constitution con- 
 cerning them, 349 ; Why they ought to be 
 the supreme law of the land, 487; Power 
 of the President in regard to them, 666, 
 561 ; Why the House of Representatives 
 ought to have no power in forming them, 
 659; Why two-thirds of the Senators pres- 
 ent are preferable to two-thirds of the 
 whole Senate as a co-ordinate power with 
 the President, in regard to treaties, 560. 
 
 TuLLtrs HosTiLins, 291. 
 
 Union: (See "Confederacies," "Constitution,") 
 Ita importance, 54; Its capacity to call into 
 service the best talents of the country, 61 ; 
 A bulwark against foreign force and influ- 
 ence, 66, 74 ; Its capacity to prevent wars, 
 61, 62, 65, 69 ; A saleguard against domestic 
 insurrections and wars, 76, 90, 97, 112 ; A 
 safeguard against standing armies as conse- 
 quent on domestic Insurrections and wars, 
 90, 95 ; Its utility In respect to commerce 
 and a Navy, 118, 121 ; Its utility in respect 
 to revenue, 121, 180 ; Principal purposes 
 to be answered by It, 195 ; If founded on 
 considerations of public happiness, the sov- 
 ereignty of the States, if irreconcileable to 
 it, should be sacrificed, 359. 
 
 United States : Their actual dimensions, 138. 
 
 Venice : Not a Republic, 802. 
 
 Vice-President, 511, 512. 
 
 Virginia: (See "Jefferson. Thomas,") Pro. 
 vision In her Constitution concerning the 
 separation of the legislative, executive, 
 and judiciary powers, 879, S&i, 885; Wes 
 the colony which stood first in resisting 
 the parliamentary usurpations of Great 
 Britain, 407 ; Was the first to espouse by a 
 public act the resolution of independence, 
 407 ; Elections under her former Govern- 
 ment, 407. 
 
 West India Trade, 115, 116. 
 
 WoLSEV, Cardinal, 77, 7a 
 
 Wyoming, lands of: Dispute between Con- 
 necticut and Pennsylvania concernlaj 
 them. 85 
 
 Za LEU 008. 291. 
 
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