c
AUTHORISED ENGLISH TRANSLATION
OF
DE. ZELLEE'S WOEK
ON THB
PHILOSOPHY OF THE GREEKS.
The PRAE-SOORATIO SCHOOLS,
Being a History of Greek Philosophy from the Earliest Period
to the Time of SOCRATES. Translated with the Author's
sanction. Crown 8vo. \In preparation.
SOCRATES and the SOCRATIC SCHOOLS.
Translated by the Kev. OSWALD J. REICHEL, M.A. New Edition,
revised. Crown 8vo. price 10s. 6d.
iji
ARISTOTLE and the ELDER PERI-
PATETICS.
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The STOICS, EPICUREANS, and SCEPTICS.
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v
PLATO and the OLDER ACADEMY.
Translated by SARAH FRANCES ALLETNE and ALFRED GOODWIN,
M.A. Fellow and Lecturer of Balliol College, Oxford. Crown
8vo. price 18s.
London, LONGMANS & CO.
Lately published, in crown 8vo. price 185.
PLATO AND THE OLDER ACADEMY.
Translated with the Author's sanction from the German of
D. EDUARD ZELLER,
By SARAH FRANCES ALLEYNE and ALFRED GOODWIN, M.A.
Fellow and Lecturer of Balliol College, Oxford.
THE ACADEMY.
'The compliment of translation is well deserved by the patient
erudition and masterly arrangement of the original, which is an indis-
pensable aid to the readers of PLATO and ARISTOTLE. Of this translation
it can be said that in all essential respects it may be relied on as an
equivalent of ZELLER'S book.'
EDUCATIONAL TIMES.
' The work must become indispensable to the student of Plato. It
consists of sixteen chapters, in which PLATO'S life, the order of his writ-
ings, the character of his Philosophy, his Physics, his Ethics, and his
Religion are treated with great detail and minuteness. It is, of course
impossible in these pages to do more with so vast a work not vast,
however, in bulk, being a book of 600 pages than to call attention to
it, and, if possible, to give some idea of its style.'
SATURDAY REVIEW.
'In all its departments Dr. ZELLER'S book is both comprehensive
and trustworthy. He seems to have said the last word on Greek philo-
sophy ; and his volumes are among those monuments of nineteenth-
century German research which make one wonder what will remain for
the scholars of the twentieth century to do. He brings to his task the
two essential qualities vast learning, and the power of moving at
pleasure in the rarefied atmosphere of abstractions It is evident
that Mr. GOODWIN, to whom this part of the undertaking fell, had no
sinecure in his work of translation and verification. He has gone
bravely through with it, however, and both his work and that of Miss
ALLEYNE, who translated the text, leave almost nothing to be desired.'
GUARDIAN.
' This is a translation of Dr. EDUARD ZELLER'S Plato und die altere
Akademie, a work of great value to students of PLATO, but hitherto only
in part accessible to English readers. The text has been admirably
translated by Miss ALLEYNE, who has proved herself fully competent to
deal with the philosophical terminology of the German original, and to
execute a translation which does not, like some translations, proclaim
itself as such by an un-English structure of ita phrases and sentences.
Copious notes and references have been added by Mr. GOODWIX, Fellow
of Balliol College, who shares with Miss ALLEYNE the responsibility of
the work. The value of Dr. ZELLER'S work has been amply acknowledged
by Professor JOWETT in the Preface to the second edition of his PLATO :
and this translation of it will be a great boon to many students of
PLATO who (as its Authors suggest in their Preface) are less familiar with
German than with Greek.
London, LONGMANS & CO.
SOCRATES
LOXDOK : PHI NT CD BY
8POTTISWOODE AND CO., NEW-STREET
AND PARLIAMENT STUEKT
SOCEATES
AND
THE SOCRATIC SCHOOLS
NEWLY TRANSLATED
FROM THE THIRD GERMAN EDITION Of
D R E. ZELLER
BY
OSWALD J. REICHEL, B.C.L. & M.A.
VICAR OP SPKRSHOLT, BERKS
SECOND AND ENTIRELY NEW EDITION
LONDON
LONGMANS, GREEN, AND CO.
1877
All rights rr<l
PREFACE.
IN offering to the English reader a new edition of
that part of Dr ZELLER'S Philosophie der Griechen
which treats of Socrates and the imperfect Socratic
Schools, the translator is not unaware of the diffi-
culties of the task which he has undertaken. For if,
on the one hand, such a translation be too literal, the
reader may find it more difficult to understand than
the original, and expend a labour in disentangling
the thread of a sentence which were better spent in
grasping its meaning. If, on the other hand, too
much freedom be allowed, the charge may be justly
preferred, that the rendering does not faithfully re-
present the original. The present translator has en-
deavoured to steer a middle course between these
two extremes, aiming at reproducing the meaning of
Dr ZELLER'S work, whilst reducing the sentences,
where it seemed necessary, by breaking them up. In
order to avoid inaccuracies, he has once more care-
2017262
vi PREFACE.
fully gone over the whole, so that what is now offered
as a second edition is really a new translation from
the third German edition.
The writer is well aware how imperfectly he has
been able to realise his own standard of excellence ;
but believing that there is a large class of students
who find it a work of toil to read Dr ZELLER'S work
in the original, he submits this attempt to meet
their wants, soliciting for it a gentle criticism.
GLENFRIAES, TORQUAY :
May, 1877.
CONTENTS.
PART I.
THE GENERAL STATE OF CULTURE IN GREECE.
CHAPTER I.
THE INTELLECTUAL DEVELOPMENT OF GREECE IN
THE FIFTH CENTURY B.C.
PAGE
INTRODUCTION. The problem proposed to philosophy . 2
A. The problem solved by political events
1. Political unsettledness 2
2. Athens a centre of union . . 3
B. The problem solved by literature
1. The Tragedians. JSschylus Sophocles Euri-
pides 4
2. Didactic Poetry. Simonides Bacchylidee Pin
dar
3. The Historians. Herodotus Thucydides
4. Comedy. Aristophanes . . . .
C. The problem solved by new forms of religious worship . 32
CONTENTS.
CHAPTER II.
CHARACTER AND PROGRESS OF GREEK PHILOSOPHY
IN THE FIFTH CENTURY B.C.
PAGE
A. Distinction of Socratic from pre- Socratic Philosophy . 38
1. Knowledge substituted for tradition . . . 38
2. Study of conceptions substituted for study of
nature 3!)
B. Importance of the doctrine of conceptions . . .40
1. Definition of a conception 41
2. Theory of conceptions expanded . . . .42
C. Distinction of Socratic from post- Aristotelian Philosophy 43
1. Knowledge believed to be possible . . . . 44
2. Morality not pursued independently . . . 45
D. The Socratic Philosophy developed
1. Socrates 47
2. Plato 48
3. Aristotle 49
4. Difficulty caused by Socratic Schools . . .50
PART II.
SOCRATES.
CHAPTER III.
THE LIFE OF SOCRATES.
A. Youth and early training 52
B. Active life . . . ..>.-. .61
CONTENTS. ix
CHAPTEK IV.
THE CHARACTER OF SOCRATES.
PAOIE
A. Greatness of the character of Socrates .... 70
B. Greek peculiarities in his character ..... 74
C. Prominent features in his character . . . .77
D. The StuiiAvwv ......... 82
1. False views of the taift&viov . . . . .82
2. Regarded by Socrates as an oracle . . . . 84
3. Limited in its application ..... 90
4. Correct view of the Sai^vtov . . . . 94
CHAPTEK V.
SOURCES AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE
PHILOSOPHY OF SOCRATES.
A. Xenophon and Plato considered as authorities . . 98
B. General point of view of Socrates ...... 104
C. Theory of knowledge of conceptions considered . . 109
D. Moral value of this theory ...... 113
E. Its subjective character ....... 116
CHAPTER VI.
THE PHILOSOPHICAL METHOD OF SOCRATES.
A. Knowledge of ignorance the first step . . . . 121
B. Search for knowledge the next Eros and
Irony . . . . . ... . . 124
C. Formation of conceptions the third step . . . 128
CONTENTS,
CHAPTER VII.
SUBSTANCE OF THE TEACHING OF SOCRATES ETHICS.
PAGB
A. The subject-matter restricted to Ethics . . . . 134
B. Virtue is knowledge the leading thought of the
Socratic Ethics 140
0. The Good and Eudoemonism
1. Theoretically Virtue is knowledge about the Good 147
2. Practically the Good determined by custom or
utility 148
3. Inconsistency of Socratic Morality . . .151
D. Particular Moral Relations 160
1. Personal independence 161
2. Friendship 163
3. The State 165
4. Universal philanthropy 170
CHAPTER VIII.
SUBSTANCE OF THE TEACHING OF SOCEATES, CONTINUED.
NATURE GOD MAN.
A. View of Nature 172
B. Notion of God and the Worship of God . . . . 175
1. Language about the Gods taken from popular use . 175
2. God conceived as the Reason of the world . . 176
3. The Worship of God . . ,, . 177
C. Dignity and Immortality of man 178
CHAPTER IX.
XENOPHON AND PLATO. SOCRATES AND THE SOPHISTS.
A. Value of Xenophon as an authority
1. Xenophon in harmony with Plato and Aristotle . 181
2. Schleiermacher's objections refuted . . . 183
B. Importance of Socrates for the age in which he lived . 185
C. Relation of Socrates to the Sophists 187
CONTENTS. xi
CHAPTER X.
THE TBAGIC END OF SOCRATES.
PAGE
A. Circumstances connected with his trial and death
1. The Accusation 193
2. The Defence 196
3. The Sentence 198
4. His Death 200
B. Causes which led to his sentence 202
1. The Sophists innocent 202
2. Personal animosity only partially the cause . . 205
3. Political party-feeling only partially involved . 210
4. The teaching of Socrates generally believed to be
dangerous 213
C. Justification of the sentence 220
1. Unfounded charges brought against Socrates . . 220
2. The views of Socrates subversive of old views of
authority political life religion . . . 226
3. Relation borne by his views to cotemporary views 231
4. Result of his death . . 235
PART III.
THE IMPERFECT FOLLOWERS OF SOCRATES.
CHAPTER XI.
THE SCHOOL OF SOCRATES POPULAR PHILOSOPHY.
XENOPHON J2SCHINES.
A. School of Socrates 236
B. Xenophon . . . . . ..... 239
C. ^schines . . . . . t . ' . . . 245
1). simmias and Cebes . . 246
xii CONTENTS.
CHAPTER XII.
THE MEGARIAN AND THE ELEAN-ERETRIAN SCHOOLS.
PAGE
The Megarians
A. History of the School . . . '. ... 249
B. Their Doctrine 255
1. Being and Becoming . . . ... 259
2. The Good 262
C. Eristic 264
1. Euclid ... 265
2. Eubulides 268
3. Alexinus . 268
4. Diodorus on Motion Destruction the Possible 269
5. Philo. The Possible Hypothetical sentences
Meaning of words . . . . . . 273
6. Stilpo. Subject and Predicate the Good Cynic
Morality 275
The Elean-Eretrian School.
A. History of the School 279
B. Doctrine of the School .... .281
CHAPTER XIII.
THE CYNICS.
A. History of the Cynics . . . . . . .284
B. Teaching of the Cynics . . . . . . . 291
1. Depreciation of theoretical knowledge . . 291
2. Logic . . . .... . . . 295
C. Cynic theory of Morality 301
1. Negative conditions Good and Evil . . . 301
2. Positive side Virtue . . '.-.''. " . . 310
3. Wisdom and Folly . . . . .313
CONTENTS. xiii
PAOK
D. Practical results of Cynic teaching 314
1. Renunciation of Self 315
2. Renunciation of Society. Family Life Civil Life
Modesty 319
3. Renunciation of Religion 327
K. Cynic influence on Society 331
CHAPTEK XIV.
THE CYRENAICS.
A. History of the Cyrenaics 337
B. Teaching of the Cyrenaics 344
1. General position 346
2. Feelings the only object of knowledge . . . 347
3. Pleasure and pain 352
4. The Highest Good 354
5. Modified form of the extreme view . . . 356
C. Practical Life of the Cyrenaics 361
D. Relation of their teaching to Socrates .... 369
1. Relation of their philosophy 369
2. Points of resemblance 375
E. The later Cyrenaics 376
1. Theodorus 376
2. Hegesias 380
3. Anniceris 383
CHAPTER XV.
RETROSPECT.
A. Inconsistencies of the imperfect Socratic Schools . . 386
B. These Schools more closely related to Socrates than to
the Sophists 387
C. Importance of these Schools 389
IXDKX . . 393
PAET I.
THE GENERAL STATE OF CULTURE IN GREECE.
CHAPTER I.
THE INTELLECTUAL DEVELOPMENT OF GREECE IN
THE FIFTH CENTDRY.
THE intellectual life of Greece had reached a point CHAP.
towards the close of the fifth century, in which the _
choice lay before it of either giving up philosophy
altogether, or attempting a thorough transformation
upon a new basis. The older schools were not indeed
wholly extinct ; but all dependence in their systems
had been shaken, and a general disposition to doubt
had set in. From the Sophists men had learnt to
call everything in question to attack or defend
with equal readiness every opinion. Belief in the
truth of human ideas, or in the validity of moral
laws, had been lost. Not only enquiries respecting
nature, which had engaged the attention of thinkers
for upwards of a century and a half, had become
distasteful, but even philosophy itself had given
place to a mere superficial facility of thought and
expression and the acquisition of attainments useful
STATE OF CULTURE IN GREECE.
CHAP.
I.
Problem
proposedto
philosophy
in tJie fifth
century.
A. The
problem
solved by
political
events.
(1) Po-
litical
iinsettled-
nens.
only for the purposes of social life. Yet this state
of things naturally suggested the need of a new
method, which would avoid the defects and one-
sidedness of previous systems by a more cautious
treatment of scientific questions. The way thereto
had not only been indirectly prepared by the clear-
ing away of previous speculation, but the very
instrument of research had been sharpened by the
quibbles and subtleties of sophistry ; ample material,
too, for the erection of a new structure lay to hand
in the labours of preceding philosophers. Moreover,
by the practical turn which the Sophistic enquiries
had taken, a new field of research was opened up, the
more careful cultivation of which gave promise of a
rich harvest for speculative philosophy. Would a
creative genius be forthcoming, able to make use of
these materials, and to direct thought into a new
channel? Before this question Greek philosophy
stood at the time when Socrates appeared.
The answer was determined in great part by the
course which political circumstances, moral life, and
general culture had taken. Between these and philo-
sophy the connection is at all times close ; yet lately,
in the case of the Sophistic teaching, it had been
more than ever apparent. The most sweeping
changes had taken place in the fifth century in
Greece. Never has a nation had a more rapid or
more brilliant career of military glory in union with
high culture than had the Greeks. Yet never has
that career been sooner over. First came the great
deeds of the Persian war, then the rich bloom of art
ILLUSTRATED BY POLITICS. 3
of the age of Pericles ; following immediately that CHAP.
internal conflict which wasted the strength and
prosperity of the free states of Greece in unhallowed
domestic quarrels, which sacrificed anew the indepen-
dence so hardly won from the foreigner, undermined
her freedom, threw her moral notions into confusion,
and irretrievably ruined the character of her people.
A progress which elsewhere required centuries was in
her case compressed within a few generations. When
the pulse of national life beats so fast, the general
spirit must be exposed to a quick and susceptible
change ; and when so much that is great happens in
so short a time, an abundance of ideas is sure to crop
up, awaiting only a regulating hand to range them-
selves into scientific systems.
Of greatest importance for the future of philo- ( 2 ) Athens
sophy was the position won by Athens since the close union and
of the Persian war. In that great conflict the con-
sciousness of a common brotherhood had dawned
upon the Hellenes with a force unknown before.
All that fancy had painted in the legend of the
Trojan war seemed to be realised in actual history :
Hellas standing as a united nation opposed to the
East. The headship of this many-membered body
had fallen in the main to Athens, and herewith that
city had become the centre of all intellectual move-
ments, 'the Prytaneum of the wisdom of Greece.' '
This circumstance had a most beneficial effect on
the further development of philosophy. No doubt a
1 So called by Hippias in Plato, Prot. 337, D.
p 2
4 STATE OF CULTURE IN GREECE.
CHAP, tendency may be noticed in the several schools to come
*' forth from their isolation ; it maybe seen in the natural
philosophers of the fifth century that an active inter-
change of thought was being carried on between the
East and theWest of Greece ; and nowthat the Sophists
had begun to travel from one end to the other of the
Hellenic world, to carry to Thessaly the eloquence of
Sicily, to Sicily the doctrines of Heraclitus, these
various sources of culture could not fail gradually to
flow together into one mighty stream. Still it was of
great importance that a solid bed should be hollowed
out for this stream and its course directed towards a
fixed end. This result was brought about by the rise
of the Attic philosophy. After that, in Athens, as
the common centre of the Grecian world, the various
lines of pre-Socratic enquiry had met and crossed,
Socrates was able to found a more comprehensive
philosophy; and ever afterwards Greek philosophy
continued to be so firmly tied to Athens, that down
to the time of the New Academy that city was the
birthplace of all schools historically important. It-
was even their last place of refuge before the final
extinction of ancient philosophy.
B The To make clear, by means of the literary remains
problem we possess, the change which took place in the Greek
'literature, mode of thought during the fifth century, and to
estimate the worth and extent of the contributions
(l) The yielded to philosophy by the general culture of the
^ian* time, the great Athenian tragedians may be first
appealed to. For tragedy is better suited than any
other kind of poetry to arouse ethical reflection, to
ILLUSTRATED BY TRAGEDIANS.
pourtray the moral consciousness of a people, and to CHAP.
express the highest sentiments of which an age, or _
at least individual prominent spirits in an age, are
capable. Every deeper tragic plot rests on the con-
flicting calls of duty and interest. To make clear
the origin of the plot, to unfold the action psycho-
logically, to produce the general impression intended,
the poet must bring these two points of view before us,
allowing each to advocate its cause in lively speech
and counter-speech : he must go into the analysis of
moral consciousness, weigh what is right and what is
faulty in human action, and expose it to view. As
a poet he will do this, always having regard to the
particular case before him. Still, even this he cannot
do without comparing one case with another, without
going back to general experience, to the generally
received notions respecting right and wrong in
short, to general moral conceptions. Hence tragic
poetry must always give a lasting impetus to scien-
tific speculation on moral conduct and its laws,
affording, too, for such reflection ample material
itself, and that to a certain extent already prepared,
and inviting partly use, partly correction. 1 Moreover,
inasmuch as moral convictions were in the case of
the Greeks, as in the case of other nations, originally
bound up with religious convictions, and inasmuch
as this connection particularly affects tragedy owing
to the legendary subjects with which it deals, it
1 On this point compare the vol. viii. 137, ed. 1870; vol.
excellent remarks of frrote, vii. 7, ed. 1872.
Hist, of Greece, P. II. c. 67,
STATE OF CULTURE IN GREECE.
CHAP, follows that all that has been said respecting the
connection between tragedy and principles of morality
applies also to the connection between tragedy and
principles of theology : nay more, in exactly the
same way tragedy must busy itself with the nature
and state of men whose deeds and fate it depicts.
In all these respects a most decided and thorough
change in Greek thought may be observed in the
three generations, whose character finds such fit-
ting expression in the three successive tragedians,
^Eschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides. Without going
so far as to attribute to the poets themselves every
word which they put into the mouths of their heroes,
still the general tone of their sentiments may be
gathered partly from their general treatment of the
materials, partly from their individual utterances,
with no lack of certainty.
O) j&s~ In ^Eschylus there is an earnestness of purpose, a
depth of religious feeling, an overwhelming force and
majesty, worthy of a man of ancient virtue, who had
himself taken part in the great battles with the
Persians. At the same time there is a something
bitter and violent about him, which a time of heroic
deeds and sacrifices, of mighty capabilities and in-
spiriting results, could neither soften down nor yet
dispense with. The spirit of his tragedies is that of
an untamed, masculine mind, seldom moved by
softer feelings, but spell-bound by reverence for the
gods, by the recognition of an unbending moral
order, by resignation to a destiny from which there
is no escape. Never were the Titan-like defiance of
ILLUSTRATED BY TRAGEDIANS.
unbridled strength, the wild fury of passion and CHAP.
frenzy, the crushing might of fate, the paroxysms of L
divine vengeance, more thrillingly painted than by
/Eschylus. At the bottom of all his sentiments lies
reverence for the divine powers ; yet these are grouped
almost monotheistically together, in his vast vision,
as one almighty power. What Zeus says happens ; his
will always comes to pass, even though it escape the
notice of men ; l no mortal can do aught against his
will ; 2 none can escape the decision of heaven, or
rather of destiny, 3 over which Zeus himself is power-
less. 4 In face of this divine power man feels himself
weak and frail; his thoughts are fleeting as the
shadow of smoke ; his life is like a picture which a
sponge washes out. 5 That man mistake not his
position, that he learn not to overrate what is
human, 6 that he be not indignant with the Gods
when in affliction, 7 that his mind soar not too high,
that the grain of guilt planted by pride grows to a
harvest of tears, 8 such is the teaching which, with
glowing words, flashes on us in every page of the
poet.
Not even ^Eschylus, however, was able to grasp
these ideas in their purity, or to rise above the con-
tradiction which runs not only through Greek tragedy,
but through the whole of the Greek view of life. On
1 Suppl. 598; Agamemnon, 1327.
1485. Niobe, Fr. 155, (154).
- Prometh. 550. T Fragm. 369 Dindorf. Sto-
3 Pers. 93 ; Fragm. 299 Din- Iceust. Serai, 108, 43, attributes
dorf (352 Nauck.). the words to Euripides.
4 Prometh. 511. * Pers. 820.
* Fragm. 295 (390) ; Agam.
STATE OF CULTURE IN GREECE.
CHAP, the one hand, even he gives utterance to the ancient
' belief in the envy of heaven, which is so closely con-
nected with the peculiarity of natural religion ; sick-
ness lurks under the rudest health ; the wave of
fortune, when it bears man highest on its crest,
breaks on a hidden reef; would the man on whom
fortune smiles escape ruin, he must voluntarily throw
away a part of what he has ; l even fate itself ordains
guilt, when bent on utterly destroying a family. 2 On
the other hand, yEschylus never tires of insisting on
the connection between guilt and punishment. Not
only in the old stories of Niobe and Ixion, of the
house of Laius and of that of Atreus, does he paint
with telling touches the unavoidable nature of divine
vengeance, the mischief which follows in the wake
of pride, the never-dying curse of crime ; but also in
the unexpected result of the Persian expedition he
sees a higher hand, visiting with punishment the
self-exaltation of the great king, and the insults
offered to the gods of Greece. Man must suffer 3
according to his deeds ; God blesses him who lives
in piety without guile and pride, but vengeance, 4
though it may be slow at first, suddenly overtakes
the transgressor of right; some Dike strikes down
with a sudden blow, 5 others she slowly crushes ; from
generation to generation the curse of crime gathers
strength, likewise virtue and happiness 6 descend on
1 Agam. 1001 ; compare the 3 Agam. 1563 ; Choeph. 309 ;
story of Polycrates in Herodo- Fr. 282.
tus, iii. 40. 4 Eumen. 530 ; Fr. 283.
2 Niobe, Fr. 160 ; blamed by * Choeph. 61.
Plato, Rep. 380, A. Agam. 750.
ILLUSTRATED BY TRAGEDIANS.
children and children's children ; the Furies rule over CHAP.
the destiny of men, avenging the fathers' sins on the '
sons, 1 sucking the criminal's life-blood, stealthily
clinging to his feet, throwing round him the snares
of madness, pursuing him with punishment down to
the shades. 2 Thus severely and clearly through all
the plays of ^Eschylus runs the thought of divine
justice and of implacable destiny.
All the more remarkable on that account is the
vigour with which the poet breaks through the fetters
which this view of the world imposes. In the Eu-
menides, these moral conflicts, the play of which
^Eschylus can so well pourtray, 3 are brought to a satis-
factory issue, the bright Olympic Groddess appeasing
the dark spirits of vengeance, and the severity of the
ancient bloodthirsty Justice yielding to human kind-
ness. In the Prometheus, natural religion as a whole
celebrates its moral transfiguration ; the jealousy of
the gods towards mortals is seen to resolve itself
into mercy ; Zeus himself requires the aid of the
Wise One, who, for his kindness to men, has had to
feel the whole weight of his wrath ; yet, on the other
hand, the unbending mind of the Titan must be
softened, and Zeus' rule of might be changed by
willing submission into a moral rule. What the
poet places in the legendary past is in reality the
history of his own time and of his own mind,
^schylus stands on the boundary line between two
periods of culture, and the story he tells of the miti-
1 Bum. 830. Choeph. 896 ; Bum. 198,
2 Bum. 264, 312. 566.
K) STATE OF CULTURE IN GREECE.
CHAP, gation of ancient justice, and of the new rule of the
__! Grods, was repeated in another way, the sternness of
the generation of Marathon giving place to the
cheerful beauty of the age of Pericles.
(&) SopJio- T the spirit of this new age Sophocles has
oles. given the most fitting expression. Agreeing as he
does in principle with his predecessor, his poems,
nevertheless, convey a very different impression. The
keynote of the poetry of Sophocles is likewise reve-
rence for the Grods, whose hand and laws encompass
human life. From them come all things, even mis-
fortune ; l their never-decaying power no mortal can
withstand ; nothing can escape its destiny ; 2 from
their eyes no deed and no thought can be hid ; 3 their
eternal laws, 4 created by no mere human power, dare
no one transgress. Men, however, are weak and
frail, mere shadows or dreams, a very nothing, capable
only of a passing semblance of. happiness. 5 No
mortal's life is free from misfortune, 6 and even the
happiest man cannot be called happy before .his
death ; 7 nay, taking all things into account, which
the changing day brings with it, the number of woes,
the rarity of good fortune, the end to which all must
come, it were well to repeat the old saying, ' Not to
have been born is the best lot, and the next best is
to die as soon as may be.' 8 The. highest practical
wisdom is, therefore, to control the wishes, to mode-
1 Ajax, 1036 ; Trach. 1278. Fr. 12, 616, 860.
- Antig. 604, 951 ; Fr. 615. 6 Ant. 611 ; Fr. 530.
3 Electra, 657. ' (Ed. R. Trach. 1, 943 ; Fr.
< (Ed. Rex, 864 ; Ant. 450. 532, 583.
5 Ajax, 125; (Ed. R. 1186; " (Ed. Col. 1215.
ILLUSTRATED BY TRAGEDIANS. 11
rate the desires, to love justice, to fear Grod, to be CHAP.
resigned to fate. That man should not exalt him-
self above human measure, that only the modest
man is acceptable to the (rods, 1 that it is absurd
to seek a higher instead of being content with a
moderate lot, that arrogance hurries on to sudden
destruction, that Zeus hates the vaunts of a boastful
tongue, 2 all this Sophocles shows by the example of
men who have been hurled from the summit of
fortune, or who have been ruined by recklessness and
overbearing. He, too, is impressed by the thought
of the worth of virtue and of divine retribution. He
knows that uprightness is better than riches, that
loss is better than unjust gain, that heavy guilt
entails heavy punishment, but that piety and virtue
are worth more than all things else, and are rewarded
not only in this world, but in the next ; 3 he even
declares that it is more important to please those in
the next world than those in this. 4 He is more-
over convinced that all wisdom comes from the Gods,
and that they always conduct to what is right, 5 albeit
men may never cease from learning and striving
after it. 6 He bids them to commit their griefs to
Zeus, who from heaven above looks down and orders
all things, and to bear what the (rods send with
resignation, 7 and in this belief is neither puzzled
1 Ajax, 127, 758 ; (Ed. Col. * Fr. 834, 227, 809, 865 ; in
1211; Fr. 320, 528. the unintelligible fleia
- (Ed. R. 873 ; Ant. 127. probably there is a Beta
* Fr. 18, 210, 196; Philoc. Fr. 731, 736.
1440. Elec. 174 ; Fr. 523, 862.
4 Ant. 71.
12 STATE OF CULTURE IN GREECE.
CHAP, by the good fortune of many bad men, nor yet by
__J the misfortunes of many good ones. 1
The same thoughts had inspired the poetry of
^Eschylus, and yet the spirit of the drama of Sopho-
cles is a very different one from his. Sophocles can
show a higher artistic execution, a fuller dramatic
liandling, a more delicate delineation of the inner
life, a more careful unravelling of action from cha-
racters and of characters by means of actions, a better
proportioned beauty, a clearer and more pleasing
language ; whereas for tempestuous force, for wild
exultation, for majestic view of history, JEschylus is
unrivalled. Nor is the moral platform of the two
tragedians quite the same. Both are penetrated with
reverence for the divine powers ; but in ^Eschylus
this reverence is combined with a horror which has
first to be set aside, and with an antagonism which
has to be overcome before it can come up to the
trustful resignation and the blissful peace of the
piety of Sophocles. The power of fate seems with
^Eschylus much harsher, because less called for by
the character of those whom it reaches ; the reign of
Zeus is a reign of terror, mitigated only by degrees,
and man must perish if the Deity enter into too close
relations with him. 2 Both poets celebrate the victory
of moral order over human self-will ; but in ^Eschylus
the victory is preceded by severer and more dreadful
struggles. Moral order works, with him, as a stern
1 Fr. 104. lo in the Prometheus, espe-
2 Compare the character of cially v. 887, &c.
ILLUSTRATED BY TRAGEDIANS. 13
and fearful power, crushing the refractory ; whereas, CHAP.
with Sophocles, it completes its work with the quiet
certainty of a law of nature, awakening rather pity
for human weakness than terror. That conflict of the
old bloodthirsty justice with the new, round which
the Eumenides of ^schylus play, Sophocles has left
behind ; with him justice is, from the very begin-
ning, harmoniously united with mercy, and the most
accursed of all mortals finds in the ' CEdipus Colo-
neus ' reconciliation at last. His heroes, too, are of
a different order from those of his predecessor. In
^Eschylus moral opposites are so hard, that human
representatives of them do not suffice him ; hence he
brings the (rods themselves into the battle-field
Zeus and the Titans, the daughters of Night and the
denizens of Olympus ; whereas the tragedy of Sopho-
cles moves entirely in the world of men. The former
deals by preference with violent natures and uncon-
trolled passions ; the strong point of the latter is to
depict what is noble, self-contained, tender ; strength
is by him generally coupled with dignity, pain with
resignation. Hence his female characters are so
specially successful. yEschylus paints in a Clytsem-
nestra, the demoniacal side of woman's nature in all
its repulsiveness. Sophocles in an Antigone pour-
trays pure womanhood, knowing ' how to love, but
not to hate,' l and putting even hatred to shame by the
heroism of her love. In short, the poetry of Sopho-
cles sets before us the sentiments of an epoch and a
1 Ant. 523.
14 STATE OF CULTURE IN GREECE.
CHAP, people which having, by most successful efforts, risen
'_ to a happy use of its powers, and so to fame and
position, enjoys existence, and which has learned to
look on human nature and all that belongs to it in a
cheerful spirit, to prize its greatness, to mitigate its
sufferings by wise resignation, to bear its weaknesses,
to control its excesses by custom and law. From him, as
from no other poet, the idea is gathered of a beautiful
natural agreement between duty and inclination, be-
tween freedom and order, which constitutes the moral
ideal of the Greek world.
(<?) Euri- Only some four Olympiads later comes Euripides.
Yet what a remarkable change in ethical tone and
view of life is apparent in his writings ! As an artist,
Euripides is far too fond of substituting calculation
for the spontaneous outcome of the poet's mind, criti-
cal reflection for admiring contemplation. By means
of particular scenes of an exciting and terrifying
character, by chorus-songs often loosely connected
with the action of the play, by rhetorical declama-
tion and moralising, he seeks to produce an effect
which might be gained in greater purity and depth
from the unison of the whole. That harmony between
the moral and the religious life which commended
itself so agreeably to us in Sophocles, may be seen in
a state of dissolution in the plays of the younger
poet. Not that he is deficient in moral maxims and
religious thoughts. He knows full well that piety
and the virtue of temperance are the best things for
man ; that he who is mortal must not be proud of
advantages nor despair in misfortune ; that he can do
ILLUSTRATED BY TRAGEDIANS. 15
nothing without the Gods ; that in the long run the CHAP.
good man fares well and the bad fares ill ; that a _
modest lot is preferable to fitful greatness ; l that the
poor man's fear of God is worth more than the osten-
tatious sacrifices of many a rich man ; that virtue and
intelligence are better than wealth and noble birth. 2
He discourses at length of the benefits conferred by
the Gods on men ; 3 he speaks right well of their
righteous and almighty rule, 4 and he even traces
back human guilt to their will. 5
However numerous such expressions may be in
his writings, still they do not contain the whole of
his view of the world, neither is the ethical pecu-
liarity of his poetry to be found in them. Euripides
has sufficient appreciation of what is great and
morally beautiful, to be able to paint it when it
comes before him in a true and telling manner. For
all that, as a pupil of philosophers, 6 as a kindred spirit
1 Bacch. 1139. lo Schl. Hip- ZELLER'S Philosophie der Grie-
polyt. 1100. Kirchh. Fr. 77, chen, vol. i. 790, 3. For the
80, 257, 305, 355, 395, 507, 576, traces thereof, which are prin-
621, 942, 1014, 1016, 1027 cipally found in some of the
Nauck. fragments, compare HAK-
2 Fr. 329, 53, 254, 345, 514, TUNG'S Euripides Restitut.
940. 109, 118, 139. Anaxagoras,
* Suppl. 197. however, does not, like Euri-
4 Troad. 880 ; Hel. 1442. pides, make Earth and Ether,
Compare the concluding verses but Air and Ether come first
of this piece, which also occur after the original mixing of all
at the end of the Andromache things. The well-known and
and Bacchae. Fr. 797, 832, 875, beautiful passage (Fragment
969. 902) commending the investi-
* Hippol. 1427. ptor, who contemplates with
8 The testimony of the an- innocence the eternal order of
cients respecting the connec- immortal nature, is referred to
tion between Euripides and Anaxagoras. Compare also Fr.
Anaxagoras has been quoted in 7. Younger men, like Prodicus
16 STATE OF CULTURE IN GREECE.
CHAP, to the better Sophists, he is too far removed from the
' older lines of thought to be able to give himself
freely and with full conviction to the traditional
faith and morality. His sober understanding feels
the improbability and unseemliness of many legends,
and the artistic spirit has not such an exclusive hold
on him that he can overlook this for the sake of the
ideas they embody, or for their poetic worth. The
fortunes of men do not seem to him to be directly
the revelation of a higher power, but rather to be
proximately the result of natural causes, of calcula-
tion, of caprice, and of accident. Even moral prin-
ciples appear wavering. If, on the whole, their
authority is admitted, still the poet cannot conceal
from himself that even an immoral course of conduct
has much to say in its defence. The grand poetic
way of contemplating the world, the moral and reli-
gious way of looking at human life, has given place
to a sceptical tone, to a decomposing reflection, to a
setting forth of plain natural facts. JEschylus
brought the Eumenides, all in the uncouth guise of
antiquity, yet with most fearful effect, on to the
stage ; whereas the Electra of Euripides says to her
brother, or rather the poet himself says, that they
are mere fancies of his imagination. 1 Whilst Iphi-
geneia is preparing to sacrifice the captives, she re-
flects that the goddess herself cannot possibly require
this sacrifice, and that the story of the feast of
and Socrates, Euripides may have known, but cannot have
been their pupil. ' Orest. 248, 387.
ILLUSTRATED BY TRAGEDIANS, 17
Tantalus is a fable. 1 Likewise in the Electra 2 the CHAP.
tragic chorus doubts as to the wonder of the change
in the course of the sun. In the Troades, 3 Hecuba
questions the story of the judgment of Paris, and ex-
plains the assistance of Aphrodite in carrying off
Helen to mean the attractive beauty of Paris. In
the Bacchoe, 4 Teiresias gives an insipid, half-natural
explanation of the birth of Bacchus. 5 The Gods,
says Euripides, 6 have no needs, and therefore the
stories which impute to them human passions cannot
possibly be true. Even the general notions of divine
vengeance give him offence. This he will not regard
as a punishment for particular acts, but rather as a
universal law. r In other instances, the actions and
commands of the Gods are held up to blame blame,
too, for the most part, not called for by the character
of the acting persons and go unpunished in the
sequel, so that it necessarily appears as the poet's
own conviction ; 8 whence he concludes at one time
that man need not disturb himself because of his
faults, since the Gods commit the same ; at another
time, that the stories about the Gods cannot be
true. 9
The prophetic art is held in equally low estima-
tion by Euripides. The opportunity is seized in the
Iphig. Taur. 372. that God cares only for great
734. events, leaving unimportant
963. things to chance.
265. lo 448, 1315 ; Elect. 1298 ;
Frag. 209. Orest. 277, 409 ; Here. Fur.
Here. Fur. 1328. 339, 654.
Fr. 508, with which the Here. Fur. 1301.
saying (Fr. 964) is connected,
18 STATE OF CULTURE IN GREECE.
CHAP. Helen, 1 to prove, on highly rationalistic grounds,
L that it is all a lie and deceit. 2 With these legends
and rites, however, belief in the Gods is most
thoroughly interwoven. No wonder, therefore, that
the poet often puts into the mouths of his heroes
statements respecting the existence of the (rods,
which would sound more natural coming from Pro-
tagoras than from men and women of the legendary
past. Talthybius raises the question whether there
are Gods, or whether Chance guides all things ; 3
another doubts their existence, 4 because of the unjust
distribution of good and bad fortune ; Hecuba in
her prayer wonders what the deity really is, whether
Zeus, or natural necessity, or the spirit of mortal
beings ; 5 Hercules and Clytsemnestra leave it open
whether there are Gods, and who Zeus is ; 6 even the
Ether is explained to be Zeus. 7 So much at least
these utterances prove that Euripides had wandered
far away from the ancient faith in the Gods. Allow-
ing that he is sincere when he says that only a fool
can deny the deity and give credence to the deceitful
assertions of philosophy respecting what is hidden, 8
still his attitude appears to have been prepondera-
tingly sceptical and critical towards the popular
faith. Probably he allowed that there was a God ;
1 743. 5 Troad. 877.
2 Sophocles, Antig. 1033, Here. Fur. 1250 ; Iph. Aul.
makes Cleon attack the pro- 1034; Orestes, 410, and the
phet, but his accusations are fragment of Melanippe Fr.
refuted by the sequel. Not so 483.
with Euripides. 7 Fr. 935, 869.
* Hel. 484. 8 Fr. 905, 981.
4 Fr. 288 ; compare Fr. 892.
ILLUSTRATED SY TRAGEDIANS. 19
certainly he attached no value to the legendary CHAP.
T
notions respecting the (rods; holding that the '
essence of Ofod could not be known, and assuming
the oneness of the divine nature either by glossing
over or by plainly denying the ruling Pantheism. 1
Nor did the popular ideas respecting the state
after death fare better at his hands. Naturally
enough, he makes use of them when a poet can use
them, but then it is also said, that we know not how
it is with another life, we only follow an unfounded
opinion. In several places Euripides expresses the
opinion, 2 pointing partly to Orphic-Pythagorean tra-
ditions, and partly to the teaching of Anaxagoras
and Archilaus, 3 that the spirit returns at death to
the ether whence it came ; 4 apparently leaving it an
open question, whether at all, or 'to what extent,
consciousness belongs to the soul when united with
the ether. 5 That the sphere of morals did not
1 Fr. 904 says the ruler of sciousness (yvta/jui addvaros)
all things is now called Zeus, after it has united with the
now Hades, which would point immortal Ether. From this
to the opinion that the popular he deduces the belief in retri-
Gods are only different names bution after death, and he asks
for the one God. Helios and (Fr. 639, compare Fr. 452, 830),
Apollo are identified (Fr. 781, whether on the whole life is
1 1 ) according to the tradition not a death and death a life,
of Orpheus. On the other hand, in the
J Hippolyt. 192. Troades, 638, it is stated that
* Compare teller's Philoso- the dead man is feelingless,
phie der Griechen, Part I. pp. like an unborn child ; in Fr.
388, 430, 822, 846. 536 that he is a nothing, earth
4 Suppl. 532, the genuineness and a shade ; Fr. 734 appears
of which Kirchhoff wrongly sus- only to recognise the immor-
pects; Hel. 1012; Fr. 836. tality of fame; and in the
* He says in the Helen : The Heraclid. 591, he leaves it an
soul of , the dead no longer lives, open question whether the dead
but yet it has an eternal con- have feelings or not.
c 2
20 STATE OF CULTURE IN GREECE.
CHAP, remain unaffected by these doubts may be gathered
' from the general character of his tragedies more
definitely than from those particular utterances which
in some measure sufficed to give offence even to his
co temporaries. 1 The tragic movement in Euripides,
unlike that conflict of moral forces which ^Eschylus
and Sophocles knew how to depict with such deep
feeling, lies rather in personal passions, arrange-
ments, and experiences. His heroes have not that
ideal character which makes them types of a whole
class. Hence, in most cases, that higher necessity,
which called for our admiration in the case of
^Eschylus and Sophocles, is not active in the de-
velopment of the Euripidean drama, but the final
result is brought about by some external means,
either by divine interposition or by some human
cunning. Thus, rich as he may be in poetic
beauties, successful in painting individual characters,
experienced in knowledge of human life and human
weaknesses, thrilling in many of the speeches and
scenes in his tragedies ; yet most undeniably he has
come down from the moral and artistic height of his
two great predecessors, by introducing into tragedy
habits of inward reflection, of studied effect, and of
artificial language, which Agatho with his dainty
1 As for instance : ?; y\S>ffa > but that all means of vengeance
H<!>HOK, &c. Hippol. 607, or are lawful in case of injury,
the language of Eteocles in It is true Euripides does not
Phcen. 504, 525, that men will give these as his own senti-
do anything for power, and ments. Yet even his cotem-
even commit crimes for a poraries noticed their resem-
throne ; or that of the old man blance to the moral teaching
in lo 1051, that it befits the of the Sophists,
fortunate man to shun wrong,
ILLUSTRATED BY DIDACTIC POETRY. 21
elegance, and Critias with his sophistic moralising, CHAP.
were not slow to follow. 1
Cotemporary with ^Eschylus, or even a little (2) Didac-
before him, the poets Epicharmus, Simonides, and tic P oetr y-
Pindar, flourished : soon after him Bacchylides.
The first of these, Epicharmus, it has been shown
in an earlier work, 2 takes a rational view of the
world, and entertains clear notions on morals, and
theology, thanks to his knowledge of philosophy.
Simonides, 3 so far as his views can be gathered from O) Simo-
scattered fragments, appears mainly to insist on that m es '
moderation and self-restraint which result from a
consideration of human weakness and frailty. Our
life is full of toils 4 and cares ; its fortune is uncer-
tain ; swiftly it hurries away ; even prudence 5 is too
easily lost by men ; their hardly-won virtue is imper-
fect and unstable ; it changes with circumstances ;
the best man is he on whom the Grods bestow pros-
perity. A faultless man must not be looked for;
enough to find one moderately righteous. 6 The same
vein of feeling is found in Bacchylides, on whom Q>) Sac-
descended the mantle of Simonides. He knows that
no one is altogether happy, that few are spared some
heavy changes of fortune, and bursts, yet not alone,
into the complaint : ' Not to have been born were
the happiest lot.' 7 Hence the highest practical
1 Zeller's Geschichte der well as by JEschylus, a poet of
Philosophie, Part I. p. 925, and the good old time. Arigtoph.,
Nauck. Trag. Frag. 599. Clouds, 1352.
2 Better's Philosophie der Fr. 32, 36, 38, 39, 85
Greichen, Part I. p. 427 (Ger- Fr. 42.
man). Fr. 5.
8 Called by later writers, as 7 Fr. 1, 2, 3, 21.
r STATE OF CULTURE IN GREECE.
CHAP, wisdom consists, in his mind, in equanimity, in a
' contentment with the present, and absence of care
for the future. 1 At the same time he shares the
conviction that man can discover what is right, and
that Zeus, the all-seeing ruler of the world, is not
to blame for the misfortunes of mortals. 2 These
are the same sentiments as in the older moral poets,
without any noticeable change in the moral plat-
form. 3
(c) Pin- A spirit far more peculiar and more powerful,
and more nearly akin to ^Eschylus, finds utterance
in the poems of Pindar. At the bottom of Pindar's
view of the world, as of that of ^Eschylus, lies a
most exalted notion of the deity. ' God is the all :' 4
nothing is for Him impossible. Zeus governs all
things according to his will ; He bestows success or
failure ; 5 law, which governs mortals and immortals,
accomplishes its purposes with mighty hand. 6 Nor
are the deeds of men hid from the all-seeing eyes of
God. 7 Only beautiful and noble traits can be attri-
buted to the deity ; he who accuses it of human
vices cannot escape punishment. 8 Such being the
' Fr. 19. (Trach. 1278) otolv
2 Fr. 29. n*l Zeus, to express, All depends
' Zeller, Part I. p. 90. upon God.
4 Clemens, Stromat. v. 610 : s Fr. 119 ; Pyth. ii. 49, 88 ;
Tl'uSapos . . . avTiKpvs tliruv, Nem. x. 29.
ri 8e6s ; STI rb itav. Although fi Fr. 146.
Clement appears to give the 7 Ol. i. 64 ; Pyth. iii. 28 ;
words beginning rl as a quota- ix. 42.
tion, it seems hardly likely 8 Ol. i. 28, where, with a
that they can have siood in curious combination of credu-
Pindar. Perhaps Pindar used lity and rationalism, the story
the words fobs rb vav in the of the feast of the Gods in the
same sense that Sophocles said house of Tantalus is declared
ILLUSTRATED BY DIDACTIC POETRY. 2
exalted position of God, man occupies thereto a two- CHAP.
fold attitude. On the one hand he has a nature
related to that of the Gods ; one is the race of men, 1
the race of Gods is another, yet both descend from
the same mother ; hence in nature and spirit mortals
are not altogether unlike immortals. On the other
hand, looking at their power, there is an infinite
difference, 2 for changeful is our lot, and joy and
sorrow lie for us ever near together. 3 True wisdom,
therefore, consists in not transgressing the bounds of
what is human, in looking to the Gods for all that is
good, in taking with contentment what they bestow.
'Seek not to be a God,' exclaims the poet: mor-
tality becomes mortals ; he who soars to heaven will,
like Bellerophon, have a precipitate fall. 4 Only
where God leads is blessing and success ; 5 in His
hand rests the issue of our labour, according as it is
determined by destiny. 6 From the deity comes all
virtue and knowledge ; 7 and doubtless for this very
reason, as being a gift of God, natural talent is
placed by Pindar far above all acquirements, and
the creative spirits on whom it has been bestowed,
above all other spirits, as the eagle of Zeus is above
to be a fable, the occasion for aluvos, comes from God alone,
which was supplied by the and proves its higher nature
carrying off of Pelops by Posei- during the sleep of the body in
don. prophetic dreams.
1 This, rather than the iden- * 01. ii. 30 ; Fr. 210.
tity of both s_exes, must be the 4 Ol. v. 24 ; Isthm. v. 14 ;
meaning of the words iu>$p<oi> vii. 42.
ft> 6tS>v ytvos : men form a race 5 Fr. 85, where probably iv
by themselves, the Gods form stands for is.
another different therefrom. Pyth. xii. 28.
2 Nem. vi. 1. According to * Ol. ix. 28, 103 ; Pyth. i. 41 ;
Frag. 108, the soul, the ftSu\ov Fr. 118.
24 STATE OF CULTURE IN GREECE.
CHAP, the croaking ravens. 1 We must resign ourselves to
L what Grod disposes, content ourselves with our lot,
whatever it be. Strive not against Grod ; bear His
yoke without kicking against the pricks ; adapt
yourself to circumstances ; seek not what is impos-
sible ; in all things observe moderation ; beware of
envy, which deals the strongest blow to those most
highly placed ; these are the counsels of the poet. 2
Nay more, to give greater weight to his moral
counsels, he not unfrequently appeals to a future
retribution, of the wicked as well as of the good,
sometimes following herein the received notions
respecting Tartarus, Elysium, and the islands 3 of
the blest, at other times connecting therewith a
belief in the migration of souls. 4 In the main,
Pindar's platform, both religious and moral, is not
different from that of ^Eschylus, albeit the thought
of divine vengeance does not stand out with him in
such tragic guise.
(3) ffisto- Would we see this view of life in transition to
nan*. ^Q later form, no better example can be selected
(a) Hero- than Herodotus. This friend of Sophocles, in writing
history, often allows himself to be guided by the
1 01. ii. 86; ix. 100; Nem. i. bably interpolated by some
25 ; iii. 40. Alexandrian Jew.
2 Pyth. ii. 34, 88 ; iii. 21, 59, 4 Fr. 110, 01. ii. 68. Accor-
103; xi. 50; Fr. 201: ding to the latter passage, in
3 01. ii. 56 ; Fr. 106, 120. which Pindar is most explicit,
Fr. 108 seems only to presup- reward or punishment follows
pose the current notions, with in Hades. Some few dis-
this difference, that a more tinguished men are allowed to
intense life is attributed to return to life, and may, by a
souls in Hades than was the threefold life of innocence,
view of Homer and the mass enjoy the higher bliss on the
of the people. Fr. 109 is pro- islands of the blessed.
ILLUSTRATED BY HISTORIANS. I'
notions of olden times. He admits the rule of CHAP.
divine providence in the order of nature, 1 and equally
clearly in the fortunes of men, and especially in
punishment, which overtakes the guilty, even though
he have acted in the excess of an excusable passion. 2
Popular forms of worship are honoured by him, 3
knowing as he does that every nation likes its own
rites best ; only a madman, he says, can treat these
with disdain. 4 Credulous, too, he is, so far as
to relate, in all good faith, divers wonders and pro-
phecies, 5 among them some of the most extraordinary
kind. Even his piety is of an antique type, affected
with that fear of the divine powers which is so
peculiarly suited to natural religion, where the ex-
altation of (rods above men is not conceived of as an
essential difference, but is more physical than moral.
Man is not destined to enjoy perfect good fortune ;
his life is exposed to changes innumerable ; before
death no one may be called happy ; nay it is even
a general matter for doubt whether death is not
better for a man than life. 6 He who in prosperity
or imagination soars above the lot of men, is in-
variably struck by the envy of the Deity, which,
jealous of its privileges, will not brook a mortal
rival. 7 All this is quite in agreement with the
1 Her. iii. 108. * vii. 12, 57 ; viii. 37, 65 ; fx.
2 ii. 120 ; iv. 205 ; vi. 84 ; 100. Here belong the pro-
viii. 129; vii. 133. phecies of Bakis and MUSSEUS,
* For this reason he hesitates viii. 77 ; ix. 43, respecting the
to utter the names of Egyptian genuineness of which he enter-
Gods in a context which might tains no doubt,
desecrate them, ii. 86, or to ii. 31.
speak of Egyptian mysteries. 7 On the Btiov QOovtpdv, conf.
4 iii. 38. i. 32. 34 : iii. 40 ; vii. 10, 5, 46.
2Q STATE OF CULTURE IN GREECE.
CHAP, spirit, which breathes through the older poetry of
L Greece.
For all that, Herodotus neither can nor will
conceal from us the fact that he is the son of an
epoch, in which thought has already begun to shake
the foundations of a simple faith. Notwithstanding
the naivete with which he tells many a wonder ;* there
are times when he cannot resist the impulse to ex-
plain away the marvels of legend, either referring
them to natural causes in the rationalising spirit of
the Sophists, or at least mentioning such explana-
tions given by others with approval. Thus the
wanderings of lo and the rape of Europa are ex-
plained at the very beginning of his work to mean
the carrying off by pirates of these two royal
daughters. In the story of Gryges the wonderful
power of his ring is referred to a very common
trick. 2 The prophetic doves of Dodona turn into
Egyptian priestesses. 3 The Egyptian stories re-
specting Paris and Helena are preferred to those of
Homer, and the general tradition of the Greeks, 4 on
grounds far removed from ancient poetry. When
Poseidon interposes in the Thessalian legend, he sees
the working of an earthquake, 5 and remarks not
without irony, that those who believe Poseidon
wrought the earthquake, may believe he interposed
also. Add to this that he occasionally expresses the
opinion that all men know equally little about the
1 i. 60. 4 ii. 120.
z i. 8. s vii. 129.
3 ii. 56.
ILLUSTRATED BY HISTORIANS. 27
(rods, 1 and it will be patent, how much doubt had CHAP.
already taken the place of the ancient faith.
In Thucydides, the next great historian, doubt (&) Thu-
has gone over into the matter of fact treatment of ^
history. The high moral tone of his style no one
will deny. Even in its unfinished form his history of
the Peloponnesian war has all the effect of a touching
tragedy. This effect, however, is secured simply
by a plain setting forth of historical facts, without
introducing the interposition of the Gods to explain
events. Thucydides knows how indispensable religion
is for the public good. He shows, by his very de-
scription, how deeply he deplores the decay, not only
moral but religious of his country. 2 Yet the rule of
the deity and of moral order in the world is only
apparent in his pages by the progress of events.
Convinced that human nature is always the same,
he exhibits moral laws by showing how in the case
before him ruin naturally resulted from the weakness
and the passions of men, which he knows so well
and can judge so impartially. 3 Nowhere is a belief
betrayed in those extraordinary occurrences, in which
the hand of Grod manifests itself in Herodotus.
Where his cotemporaries see the fulfilment of a
prophecy, he contents himself with sober criticism. 4
To depend on oracles instead of using remedies, he
calls the folly of the masses ; 5 he openly expresses
1 ii. 3 (Schl.). vi. 15, 24, 30 ; vii. 75, 87.
2 See the well-known pas- 4 For instance, ii. 17, 64.
sages ii. 53 ; iii. 82. * v. 103, where the Athenian
* iii. 82, 84 ; and in the de- is, without doubt, expressing
scription of the Sicilian expe- the writer's opinion,
dition, its motives and results,
28 STATE OF CULTURE IN GREECE.
CHAP, his disapproval of the disastrous superstition of
-_ Nicias. 1 In the panegyric of the dead, 2 which is
quite as much a memorial of his own spirit as of the
spirit of Pericles, there is not a word of the legendary
history of Athens, that hackneyed theme of earlier
panegyrists ; but instead thereof, there is a states-
man's mind dealing with facts, and practical problems.
His history is a brilliant evidence of a mature judg-
ment, of high intellectual culture, of a many-sided
experience of life, of a calm, unimpassioned, pene-
trating, and morally sober view of the world. It is a
work which kindles the highest respect not only for the
writer, but for the whole period, which could rear up
such a genius.
Nor yet does this work conceal the darker sides of
that period. Eead only the descriptions it gives 3 of
the confusion of all moral notions in the factious
struggles of the Peloponnesian war, of the desolation
of Athens by the plague, of the decline of piety and
self-sacrifice, of the running riot of all the selfish
passions, to be satisfied of the decay of moral excel-
lence, even in that period of might and culture. Be-
yond all question, along with this outward change of
conduct, universal convictions were shaken also ; in
proof of which, Thucydides puts in the mouth of
several of his speakers, and particularly of those
coming from Athens, naked avowals of the most
selfish principles, such as could only come from the
lips of some one of the younger Sophists. All who
have the power seek to rule ; no one is restrained by
1 vii. 50. 2 ii. 35. s ii. 53 ; iii. 82.
ILLUSTRATED BY COMEDY. 29
considerations of right from pursuing his advantage CHAP.
Ly hook and by crook ; the rule of the stronger is
the universal law of nature ; at bottom every one
judges what is right and honourable by his own
interests and enjoyments ; even the best regulated
states act on this idea, at least in their foreign rela-
tions. These and such like utterances are put into
the mouths of Athenian popular men and ambassa-
dors on every opportunity. 1 Even those who have to
suffer from Athenian self-seeking are in the end
hardly able to blame it. 2 Have we not here moral
and political conditions keeping exact pace with the
sophistic character of philosophy ?
Nor were other prudent men blind to the dangers W Tl< e
Com-
which this course of things was bringing upon them, edianx.
however little they were able to control it, or to run
counter to the spirit of their times. Take, for
example, Aristophanes. This poet, an enthusiastic Aritto-
admirer of the good old time, as he paints it with its f
steady morality, its strict education, its military
prowess, its orderly and prudent administration, 3
warms to his subject whenever he speaks of the days
of Marathon. 4 With implacable satire, now in the
form of bantering jest, now in that of bitter earnest-
ness, he lashes the innovations which have taken the
place of time-honoured institutions ; democracy
running riot with its demagogues and sycophants ; 5
1 i. 76 ; iii. 40 ; v. 89, 105, nians, 676.
Ill; vi. 85. 5 Wasps; Clouds, 568. The
2 iv. 61. Sycophants are taken to task
1 Clouds, 882 ; Knights, 1316. on every opportunity.
Wasps, 1071 ; the Achar-
30 STATE OF CULTURE IN GREECE.
CHAP, poetry, empty, effeminate, free-thinking, faithless to
_J its moral idea, fallen from its artistic height : l
sophistic culture with its fruitless speculations,
dangerous alike to faith and morals, the produce of
shameless quibblers, atheistic rationalisers, 2 or con-
scienceless perverters of justice, instead of steady
citizens and sober-minded men. Love for what is
ancient is with him undeniably an affair of personal
conviction. Of this his zeal is proof, the excitement
and classic beauty of those passages which set forth
the praise of the olden time and its customs. Greater
proof still lies in the general tone of his comedies.
Boastful himself, with reason, of the courage with
which he discharged his duty as a citizen against
Cleon, 3 he extracts even from us the testimony of his
being an honourable man fighting for a principle.
Whilst warmly taking the field against the spirit
of innovation, he at the same time not only presup-
poses this spirit in his audience, but actually
furthers and promotes it. Demagogues and syco-
phants he lashes ; yet whilst lashing them he tells
us that every place is full of them ; that democracy
has a hundred heads, ever full of vitality ; that the
Athenian people, like a childish old man, are always
the victim of the most impudent of their flatterers ;
that the steady men of the older generation are just
as eager for their judicial dues as the whole body of
worshipful citizens are for their law-suits ; that the
1 Frogs ; Achar. 393. s Wasps, 1029, 1284 ; Peace,
2 Clouds; Birds, 1282, 1553; 951 ; Achar, 959; Clouds, 542.
Frogs, 1491.
ILLUSTRATED BY COMEDY.
young champions of Spartan severity are as de- CHAP.
bauched as the demagogues ; ' that the sovereign
people, after the re-establishment of Solon's constitu-
tion, has gone on as capriciously as before, only
wanting female government to complete the folly. 2
Even in his plays he indulges in the arts of the
demagogue and the sycophant ; Socrates he slanders,
and many another as heartily as any rhetorician could
do ; and to outbid those who squandered the public
property in order to bribe the people, he tells the
citizens of Athens that if things were fairly done, 3
they ought to receive far more than they did. For
a reform in religion and morals, the prospects with
him are bad. He praises the moral training of the
ancients, but observes with a smile that morality is
little at home amongst his hearers, 4 and finds the
vices from which his people suffered at bottom very
natural. 5 Women he brings on the stage to lash
their licentiousness ; but that licentiousness he re-
presents as so deep and so general, that there can
hardly be hope of improvement. He makes an on-
slaught on the philosophers who deny the Grods, but
in one of his first comedies he gives us to understand,
that belief in his time rested on trembling feet. 6
Not only here and there, 7 but in whole acts and
plays, 8 he exposes the (rods, together with their
1 Wasps ; Birds, 38. Knights, 32.
2 Eccles. v. 456 ; conf . Plato, 7 Clouds, 369, 396, 900, 1075 ;
Rep. viii. 563, B. Birds, 554, 1608 ; Eccles. 778 ;
1 Wasps, 655. Plut, 123, 697.
4 Clouds, 1055. In the Frogs, Peace, and
4 Compare Birds, 137 ; Frogs, the Birds.
148; Knights, 1384.
STATE OF CULTURE IN GREECE.
CHAP.
I.
C. Tte
problem
solved by
the new
forms of
religious
worship .
priests, with audacious recklessness, bringing them
down with rough wit to a human level and to what
is low and common ; holding up the moral weaknesses
in which they resemble men nakedly and minutely ;
making the world of Grods, like that of men, turn in
such a wild whirl, that neither the spectator who
takes delight in this perverted world, nor yet the
poet, can have any real respect for beings who
are so readily and recklessly at the service of his
imagination. Much of this may be attributed to the
license of comedy ; 1 yet more than enough remains
to show that the poet himself, as well as his
audience, had strayed far from the ancient morality
which he so regretfully wishes to recall ; that his
fanatical devotion, like Eousseau's wild dream of
returning to a state of nature, is only the outcome
of discontent with the present, only the expres-
sion of a romantic idea, not a sentiment pene-
trating his every day life, and ruling his thought
and feelings. Thus everywhere where we touch
upon them, the age and the surroundings from which
Attic philosophy came forth appear penetrated
by a spirit of innovation, rendering it impossible for
the most decided lovers of antiquity to adhere to the
life and beliefs of their ancestors.
Amongst other signs of this change, one pheno-
menon deserves to be noticed, which appears about
the time of the Peloponnesian war the increasing
spread of the worship of the mysteries, and of sooth-
saying in connection therewith. Hitherto, the
1 Plut. 665.
ILLUSTRATED BY NEW RELIGIOUS IDEAS.
.",3
reputed predictions of the older prophets had been
appealed to indeed, 1 as is the wont of men, but only in
exceptional cases ; now the mischief and abuse which
was perpetrated by such appeals reached an incredible
pitch. 2 To judge by the numerous allusions in the
writers of this and the following generation, the
Orphic and Corybantic mysteries probably gained at
this time both ground and supporters. 3 Such an
extension, however, was an innovation in more than
one respect. Looking at it from an outside point of
view, it was one thing to seek counsel from public
oracles and make use of ancient rites naturalised
from time immemorial in fixed spots ; a very differ-
CHAP.
I.
1 Herod, viii. 7 ; ix. 437,
mentions prophecies of Bakis
and Musaeus respecting the
Persian war.
2 This is particularly evident
in Aristophanes, who loses no
opportunity of lashing the pro-
phets. Not to mention cursory
attacks, as in Clouds, 330 ;
Birds, 521 ; in Knights, 109,
818, i.50, 967 (comp. Lysist.
767), he shows what liberal use
Cleon and other demagogues
made of superstition to flatter
the self-love of the people, and
to direct its will by the so-
called prophecies of Bakis. In
Peace, 1047, he introduces a
prophet Hierocles, who, from
interested motives, opposes the
conclusion of peace, and is
evidently meant for a real
person ; in the Birds, 959, a
prophet, who thrusts himself in
at the founding of a city, to
catch a trifle. Such like pheno-
mena may have given occasion
to the polemic of Euripides.
8 Amongst others, Philolaus
(teller, Part I. 388) and Plato
(Phaedo, 69, C. ; Rep. ii. 363, C.
364, B. ; Laws, vi. 782, C.), and
more particularly Euripides and
Aristophanes. The former
(Hippol. 949) describes Hippo-
lytus as a pupil of Orpheus,
and (Fr. 475) introduces a
mystic, who, initiated into the
orgies of Idasan Zeus, of Zag-
reus, and the Curetes, devotes
himself to an Orphic life. The
latter not only depicts (in the
Frogs, 145, 312) the life of the
initiated and uninitiated in
Hades as rudely and vividly as
the consecrated priests do in
Plato, but also (in Peace, 374)
hints at the opinion that man
cannot die quietly without re-
ceiving initiation before death,
and (in Wasps, 119) alludes to
the custom of initiating the
sick for the purpose of healing
them.
34 STATE OF CULTURE IN GREECE.
CHAP, ent thing to have recourse to the so-called answers
' of individual prophets and to a private worship
without fixed locality, propagated by vagrant priests,
practised in self-constituted confraternities, and
claiming to elevate all who took part in it as the
special elect above the mass of mankind, both in this
world and in the next. What was this increasing
fondness for private worship and irregular prophecy
but a proof that the public religion was not altoge-
ther satisfactory, whilst it contributed at the same
time to intensify the evil ? Looking at its real
nature, this mystical piety has diverged from the
received form of faith and life. In it, the notions
of the gods, flowing into each other, begin to lose
their distinctness ; l perhaps even the tendency to
resolve all into pantheism, which may be already seen
in individuals in the fifth century, may be referred
thereto. 2 The conception of human life and of
human nature has assumed an altered character,
owing to a clearer belief in immortality, introduced
by the dogmas of the migration of souls and of
1 This is more immediately be found the God in whose
true in the case of Dionysus, service they were enlisted. At
In mystic theology this God, a later time, following Herac-
as the representative of the litus' example, Dionysus was
changing life of nature, dying identified with Plato. See
in winter, reviving in spring, Zeller's Gesch. d. Phil. Vol. I.
was honoured under the name 51, 3 ; 592, 5.
of Dionysus Zagreus, and 2 Besides the extracts from
treated as one of the Gods of Euripides already quoted, p. 19,
the nether world. On this 1, compare the fragment in
account the Dionysus-mysteries Clemens, Stromat. v. 603, D,
are so important for the future which Nauck, Fragm. Trag.
life. To the initiated in them 588, attributes in all proba-
(Plato, Phsedo, 69, C. comp. bility to ^Eschylus' son Eupho-
Aristoph., Frogs) may be pro- rion : Zeus l<rrw ale^)f>, Zeus 5e
mised life in Hades with the 717, Zeus r' ovpavbs Zeus roi rek
Gods, among whom must surely ravro. x&^t ra-j/5' iWoreooj'.
ILLUSTRATED BY NEW RELIGIOUS IDEAS.
future retribution ; | and even of this change traces
may be seen in the poetry of the time of Euripides. 2
Lastly, in connection herewith an ascetic code of
morals 3 has come into vogue, enjoining abstinence
from animal food, 4 celibacy, 5 the avoidance of certain
defilements, 6 and the wearing of white clothing.
Philosophy, it is true, could only appropriate in an
intellectual form the general idea of this asceticism,
the renunciation of what belongs to the senses. Not
till a later time did it embrace it as a whole with
all its external belongings, in the system of the
Neopytbagoreans. Before that time came, thanks to
the state of intellectual life and mental development
in Greece, it had entered itself on another and a more
brilliant career.
CHAP.
I.
1 Comp. Zeller, Vol. I. 54,
388, 581, 654.
* Besides Euripides (p. 19, 1),
Melanippides (Fr. 6 in BergJt,
Lyr. Gr. p. 982) appears to have
regarded the soul as immortal,
lo, too (Fr. 4 in Bergk, p. 464),
appropriates the Pythagorean
belief in immortality. A reso-
lution of souls into aether may
also be implied in the popular
belief mentioned by Aristo-
phanes (Peace, 832), that the
dead become stars.
8 See Euripid., Hippol. 949 ;
Fr. 475 ; Plato, Laws, vi. 782,
C., comparing therewith the
principles of Empedocles and
- Pythagoras.
Probably Eurip., Fr. 884,
refers to this.
5 That this was a part of
Orphic perfection may be ga-
thered from Euripides, who
holds up Hippolytus as a type
of an Orphic, probably only
because this despiser of Aphro-
dite (Hippol. 10, 101), by his
typical chastity, reminds of
Orphic virginity. A vow of
chastity also occurs in Electra.
v. 254, and it is well known
that marriage was forbidden to
many priestesses, though more
rarely to priests.
$(vya> yfVffftv T6 fipOTtOV KO.I
VfKpoQJIKT}* OV Xpl/UTTTdjUeyOS (Eu*
rip., Fr. 475, 16), consequently
the same Ka0api5eij/ iirb ir{)$ovs
al \txovs (touching a corpse
or woman who has been con-
fined), which the Pythagorean
of Alexander Polyhister in
Dioff., viii. 33 requires. Birth
and death, for reasons closely
allied, are regarded as pollu-
ting. Compare Eurip., Iphig.
Taur. 372; Thuc.iii. 104.
D 2
STATE OF CULTURE IN GREECE.
CHAPTEK II.
CHARACTER AND PROGRESS OF GREEK PHILOSOPHY IN
THE FIFTH CENTURY.
CHAP. THE age of Socrates inherited from that which had
J gone before it a rich treasure of religious ideas, of
moral principles, and scientific conceptions ; at the
same time it had declined at every point from the
earlier tone of thought and custom. Traditional
lines seemed now to be all too narrow ; new paths
had been discovered; new problems pressed for
solution. The legendary ideas respecting the Gods
and the state after death, had lost all meaning for
the great majority of the educated ; l the very exist-
ence of the Gods had been denied by many; ancient
customs had fallen into disuse ; the orderliness of
civil life, the simplicity and purity of domestic life,
had given place to a wanton dissoluteness of conduct,
and an unscrupulous pursuit of pleasure and profit.
Principles subversive of all law and of all right were
being unblushingly advocated with the cheerful
approval of the younger generation. The severity
and grandeur of the earlier art, the lucid beauty, the
classic grace, the self-contained dignity of the later
art, began to resolve themselves into the study of
1 Conf. Plato, Rep. i. 330, D.
ILLUSTRATED BY PROGRESS OF PHILOSOPHY. 37
mere effect ; whilst under the influence of sophistry, CHAP
philosophy had come to disbelieve, not only in indi- -
vidual systems, but also in the whole course of
previous enquiry, and even in the possibility of know-
ledge at all.
Far, however, from being exhausted hereby, the
spirit of G-reece was only completely delivered by
the throes and struggles of the fifth century. Its
mental horizon was widened ; its thought was sharp-
ened ; its views and conceptions enriched. Its whole
consciousness had gained a new field since its suc-
cess *in renowned exploits and glorious undertakings.
If the meridian of classic art and of free political
life was past towards the close of this period, still
the newly-awakened culture of the understanding
was full of intellectual promise for the future ; for
sophistry had been destructive, not constructive, only
suggesting, not accomplishing. Some new and
thorough change was called for to satisfy not only
practical but also intellectual requirements. Ancient
propriety of conduct, and the received philosophic
teaching having been once ousted by the altered
spirit of the times, simple return thereto became im-
possible. But to despair on this account of all
knowledge, and of all principles of morality, was most
precipitate. Allowing even that the received view
of both was inadequate, it by no means followed,
that all science, and all morality was impossible.
On the contrary, the more the pernicious conse-
quences of such a view were exposed, the more urgent
became the duty of avoiding them by a thorough
.38 STATE OF CULTURE IN GREECE.
CHAP, transformation of the whole tone of feeling and
thought, without, however, attempting the impos-
sible task of simply restoring the past.
A. LHstinc- For this purpose some new path must be struck out.
Soct-atie What that path should be, a far-sighted eye could
from pro- discern with sufficient clearness by the aid of the
Socratic
philoso- experience of the past. Traditional propriety of con-
2>hy. duct had given way before the spirit of innovation,
pre-Rocra- inasmuch as it rested upon instinct and custom,
tic tradi- an( j no t on any clear recognition of necessity. He
tlonal;tke . , *
Socratic who would undertake a permanent restoration or moral
Sed n e life must found il upon knowled g e - Earlier philo-
sophy had been unable to satisfy the requirements
of the times, because it had been directed exclusively
to a study of nature ; because to the mass of men it
did not give sufficient preliminary education for the
work of life, nor to the thinking spirit any clue to
the problem of its being and destiny. New philo-
sophy must meet this want, must direct its attention
to the sphere of mind and morals, and work into
shape the ample supply of ethical ideas underlying
religion, poetry and received custom. Earlier sys-
tems had succumbed before the doubts of sophistry,
inasmuch as their method was too one-sided, depend-
ing too little on definite conceptions respecting the
nature and problem of knowledge to be able to with-
stand a searching criticism which destroyed their
several platforms by means of each other, and argued
from the change and uncertainty of the phenomena
of the senses that knowledge must be impossible.
No building that would last could be erected except
ILLUSTRATED BY PROGRESS OF PHILOSOPHY. 39
by laying the foundations deeper, except by finding CHAP.
some means of supplementing these several points _
of view by each other, of harmonising them when
contradictory in some higher bond of union, 1 and of
grasping the unchangeable essence of things amid
changing appearances. The means wanted was sup-
plied by Dialectic, the art of forming conceptions,
and the result was philosophical Idealism. Thus the
knowledge of the faults and deficiencies in existing
circumstances led naturally to the turn taken by
philosophy after the time of Socrates. Scientific
ethics became necessary because of the tottering of
moral convictions ; a wider enquiry, because of the
narrowness of the philosophy of nature ; a critical
method, because of the contradiction of dogmatic
systems ; a philosophy of conceptions, because of the
uncertainty of the observations of the senses ; Ideal-
ism, because of the unsatisfactory nature of a materia-
listic view of the world.
Precisely these features distinguish the Socratic (2) Tim
philosophy from that of the previous period. The SoriM*
pre-Socratic philosophy was simply and solely a g pfy a
philosophy of nature ; 2 the transitional philosophy nature;
of the Sophists was the first to leave nature for J** s ? cra -
tw of co n-
ethical and dialectical questions. After Socrates ceptions.
the dialectical tendency is supreme. His own atten-
tion was exclusively occupied with determining con-
ceptions, and enquiries respecting virtue. With
rare exceptions the imperfect Socratic schools con-
1 Comp. ZeUer's Phil, der * In the sense given, Ibid. I.
Griechen, Part I. p. 854, 8GO. 155.
'40 STATE OF CULTURE IN GREECE.
CHAP, fined themselves to the same field ; Plato, founding
his system in conceptions, completing it in morals,
forms a marked contrast to the natural philosophers,
who went before him. Even in Aristotle who treats
of physics in detail and with an evident prefer-
ence for the subject, they are only a single branch
of a system, and in point of value subordinate to
metaphysics.
Such an increase of territory showed that the
whole platform of philosophy had changed. Why
else should thought have embraced other and more
extended materials, had it not been changed in it-
self, and therefore no longer contented itself with
what had been before ? For the same reason the
philosophic method was a different one. In previous
philosophy thought had dealt directly with its ob-
B. Cliarac- ject, as such. In the Socratic and post-Socratic
tkitperiod systems it deals in the first place with conceptions
u its doc- an( j on }y ^th objects indirectly, through the medium
concep- of conceptions. The older systems asked, without
further ado, what predicates belonged to things ; for
instance, whether what is real admits of motion or
not how and out of what the world is made. The
Socratic philosophy ever asks, in the first place, what
things are in themselves according to their concep-
tion, thinking not otherwise to obtain information
respecting their properties and conditions than by
the help of the conception of things thoroughly
mastered. 1 No conception of a thing can, however,
1 Compare, not to mention ment in the Phaedo, 99, D : After
other passages, the clear state- having vainly busied himself
ILL USTRA TED BY PRO QRESS OF PHIL OSOPHY. 41
be obtained, except by grouping together its various CHAP.
aspects and qualities, by smoothing down apparent
contradictions, by separating what is lasting from
what is changing, in a word, by that critical method, (}}Defini-
which Socrates introduced, and which Plato and Aris- concep-
totle elaborated and developed. Former philosophers tw>t "
having gone forth from particular prominent features
to arrive at the essence of things, and having failed
because of their one-sidedness ; it was now required
that all the properties of an object should be taken
into account and weighed from every side, before a
judgment could be formed thereupon. Thus the
philosophy of conceptions steps into the place of dog-
matism. In this way reflection which by means
of sophistry had destroyed the older philosophy was
taken into the service of the new philosophy ; the
various aspects under which things may be regarded,
were brought together and referred to each other ; but
not content with the negative conclusion that our
notions cannot be true because they contain opposite
determinations, the new philosophy aimed at uniting
these opposites in one, and showing that true science
is not affected by contradiction, inasmuch as it only
refers to that which unites opposites in itself, and
excludes contradiction. This pursuit of knowledge
with the enquiries of the na- TU>V alffO-fttrteav liu
tural philosophers he declares avT<ai>.)e8of$riiJiotxp : nva.i flsro
himself convinced, that he has \6yovs Ka.Ta,<pvy6vTa lv iKelvois
only got into deeper darkness (rKoireiv r<av 5vra>v TJ^V a\.^0fiav
by directing his enquiries into (the true essence of things),
things in themselves. (TO &ra i.e. instead of irpdynara, \6yoi,
. . . )3Ae'ira>' irpbj rcfc instead of fora, i\-fiOeia TWV
rots 6fj.ft.aa-i Kal (Ktiffrri omtav.
42 STATE OF CULTURE IN GREECE.
CHAP, through conceptions is the common peculiarity of
' the Socratic, the Platonic, and the Aristotelian philo-
sophy. That the lesser Socratic schools follow the
same bent will be seen hereafter.
If only conceptions can give true knowledge, it
follows that true being can only belong to that which
is known by means of conceptions ; that is, to the
essence of things, as this presents itself in thought.
This essential being cannot, however, be sought
for in matter. Anaxagoras had early realised that
matter could only become a world by means of spirit ;
since then the old materialistic physics had been
discredited by sophistry ; nothing remained but to
regard the form and purpose of things, the immaterial
part in them as most essential for determining the
conceptions, nay, even to assign to it a true reality
underlying the appearance. In this way the Socratic
philosophy led logically to Idealism.
(2) Theory The beginnings of this Idealism are unmistak-
fumteS:' able even in Socrates - His indifference to physical
panded by enquiries and his preference for ethical ones prove
IplZtofand conclusively that he attributed to the inner world a
Aristotle, much higher value than to the outer world. Eesolve
his theory of final causes applied to nature into the
metaphysical elements out of which it is composed ;
the conclusion is inevitable that not the material of
which a thing is made, but the conception which
gives it shape, makes a thing what it is, and that
this accordingly represents its true nature. This
Idealism is more pronounced in the school of Megara ;
and in Plato it runs through all parts of his philo-
ILLUSTRATED BY PROGRESS OF PHILOSOPHY. 4;j
sophy side by side with a current of pre-Socratic CHAP.
doctrines. Even Aristotle is not faithless to this view. U '
Whilst denying the independent existence of the
Platonic ideas, he nevertheless asserts that reality
consists not in matter but in form, and that the
highest reality belongs to spirit free from matter.
On this ground he states even in his physics, agree-
ing herein with his predecessors, that final causes are
higher than material causes. Compared therefore
with the natural philosophers of the pre-Socratic
period, even Aristotle may fairly be called an Idealist.
Starting from a consideration of nature, the pre-
Socratic philosophy made it its chief business to en-
quire into the essence and causes of external things,
for this purpose going back to their material proper-
ties. An entirely different character is displayed in
the philosophy founded by Socrates. This begins
with the study of self rather than the study of
nature with ethics rather than physics. It aims at
explaining phenomena, first of all by means of con-
ceptions, and only in the second place naturally. It
substitutes an attitude of enquiry for dogmatic state
ment, idealism in the place of materialism. Mind
is now regarded as the higher element compared with
matter. The philosophy of nature has developed
into a philosophy of conceptions.
Not that as yet the claim was advanced on be- c. bix-
half of the human mind to be the measure of truth goeratio "'
and the end of science. Far from reaching the sub- f ro l'"**-
jective idealism of Fichte an idealism in fact only Uanphilv-
possible in modern times the philosophy of this *l' fl ff-
44 STATE OF CULTURE IN GREECE.
CHAP, period is not nearly so subjective as the post-Aristo-
telian schools. 1 In them the interests of speculation
are subordinated to those of morals ; knowledge is
regarded only as a means to virtue and happiness;
whereas the independent value of science is fully ad-
mitted by the great philosophers of the present
period. To them knowledge is an end in itself;
speculation is the highest and noblest thing ; action
is made to depend upon knowledge, not knowledge
to depend upon the aims of active life. Only a few
one-sided followers of Socrates, who, however, prove
nothing as to the general tendency, are an exception
to this rule.
(i) It still A simple belief in the possibility of knowledge
the attain- is here displayed which was wanting in the post-
Tnmvledge AristoteliaD philosophy. The doubts of the Sophists
to be are refuted, but in the mind of the philosopher
there is no need of overcoming doubt. The problem
proposed is, How can true knowledge be obtained,
in what kind of mental representations must it be
sought, how must the conception of it be deter-
mined? No doubt is felt but that knowledge is
really possible. The search for a test the funda-
mental question of the later schools is altogether
unknown 2 to the thinkers of this time. Equally
unknown to them are the answers to that problem.
1 Take for instance the The- as to the possibility of know-
aetetus ; the question raised ledge involved in the enquiry
there as to the conception of for a standard,
knowledge (^TTKTT^JUTJ '6, rt irore 2 Compare Zeller, 1. c. ; Intro-
rvydxvei ov ; Theaetet. 145, E.) duction to Part III. and I. 137.
is quite different from the doubt
ILLUSTRATED BY PROGRESS OF PHILOSOPHY. 45
They did not, as did the Epicureans and Stoics, cut CHAP.
short the question by practically begging it. They n *
did not, as did the Sceptics, despair of knowledge.
They did not, as did the Neoplatonists, resort to
higher revelations. They were content to look to
well-regulated thought for the source of truth.
Even that branch of science, the independent pur-
suit of which was much neglected by later thinkers
physics was studied in this epoch with success.
Socrates and the majority of his pupils may have
neglected it, but not so Plato ; and Aristotle carries it
to a point final in the main for nearly two thousand
years. If the post- Aristotelian Ethics proved at last
faithless to the principles of the old Greek morality,
partly under the influence of a world-wide extension,
partly owing to their severance from politics, owing
to the withdrawal of the moral consciousness from
the outer world, owing to a dumb resignation and a
sour asceticism ; the difference of epochs in this
respect is simply seen by recalling the many-sided
sympathies of Socrates, with his cheerful enjoyment
of life, and his devoted attachment to his country,
or the teaching of Plato concerning the state, or
that of Aristotle concerning virtue and society, or
the relation of the Cyrenaic to the Epicurean doc-
trine of happiness. 1
Is it true that the philosophy of this second (2) Dix-
period attempts in ethics to get beyond the established 5a5wJT "*
bounds ? It supplements the propriety of custom by a
theory of morals and conscious action. It distinguishes
1 Comp. Zeller, 1. c., i. 139.
46 STATE OF CULTURE IN GREECE.
CHAP, more definitely than the ordinary view between the
' outward deed and the intention. It requires a
rising above the life of the senses to what is ideal.
Light is thrown on the meaning and motives of
moral consciousness. A universal philanthropy is
taught, which is not lost in local patriotism : and
accordingly the state is only regarded as an institu-
tion for the attainment of virtue and happiness, and
not as the final moral cause. For all that this period
is far removed from the apathy of either Stoic or
Epicurean, from the imperturbability of the Sceptic,
from the asceticism of the Neoplatonist. It seeks
not to sever man in his moral activity from nature ;
with Aristotle it regards virtue as the perfection of
a natural gift ; with Plato it advances from the love
of what is sensibly beautiful, to the love of what is
morally beautiful. It requires the philosopher to
work for his fellowmen. The world-citizenship of a
later time is absent ; absent too is its nationality and
political life. Even in this respect, it holds the
classic mean between a slavish surrender to the outer
world, and a narrow withdrawal therefrom.
Compared with the pre-Socratic era, the age of
Socrates is characterised by the diversion of philo-
sophy from external nature to thought or to ideas.
Compared with the following age, it is marked by
the real character of its thought, that is, by the fact
that the thinker is not ultimately thrown back on
himself and the certainty of his own knowing, but
on attaining to the knowledge of what is in itself
real and true. In short its theory of a knowledge of
ILLUSTRATED BY PROGRESS OF PHILOSOPHY. 47
conceptions determines its character. From this CftAi-.
theory may be deduced its breadth of view reaching
alike beyond the physical one-sidedness of the pre-
Socratic, and the moral one-sidedness of the post-
Aristotelian schools, its critical method in opposition
to the earlier and later dogmatism, and its idealism,
transfiguring the whole aspect of the outer world,
without, however, entailing any withdrawal therefrom.
The development of this theory was carried D - I)e ~
out in a simple and natural order by three philoso- O f ^ e
phic schools, the founders of which belong to three
8 philoso-
successive generations, and are personally connected phy.
as teachers and pupils. 1 First comes Socrates assert-
ing that the standard of human thought and action
lies in a knowledge of conceptions, and teaching
his followers to acquire this knowledge by dealing
with notions critically. Hence Plato concluded that
objective conceptions are in the true sense the only
real things, a derivative reality belonging to all
other things, a view which he upheld by a more
critical analysis, and developed to a system. Lastly,
Aristotle arrived at the conclusion that in a thing
the conception itself constitutes its real essence and
moving power. By an exhaustive analysis of the
scientific method, he showed how conceptions were to
be formed and applied to particulars, and by a most
comprehensive enquiry into the several parts of the
universe, he examined the laws and connection of
conceptions, and the thoughts which determine all
that really is. Socrates had as yet no system. He (l) So-
crates.
1 Comp. Zeller, 1, 9, 136, 142.
48 STATE OF CULTURE IN GREECE.
CHAP, had not even any material groundwork. Convinced
'. that only in acquiring conceptions is true knowledge
to be found, that true virtue consists in acting
according to conceptions, that even the world has
been ordered in accordance with definite conceptions,
and therefore shows design, in any given case he
tries by a critical testing of prevailing notions to
gain a conception of the object with which he has
to deal, and to this he devotes all his powers, to the
conclusion of every other interest. But he never
went beyond this formal treatment. His teaching
was confined to general requirements and presump-
tions. His importance lies not in a new view of
things, but in a new conception of knowledge, and
in the way he forms this conception, in his view of
the problem and method of science, in the strength
of his philosophical bent, and in the simplicity of his
philosophical life.
(2) Plato. The Socratic search for conceptions has grown in
Plato to a discovery of them, to a certainty of pos-
sessing them, and gazing upon them. With him
objective thoughts or ideas are the only real things.
Mere idealess existence or matter as such is simply
non-existent ; all things else are made up partly of
what is and partly of what is not ; they therefore are
only real in proportion to the part they have in the
idea. Granting that this is in advance of the
iSocratic view, it is no less certain that it follows
logically from that view. The Platonic ideas, as
Aristotle rightly understood them, 1 are the general
1 Met. i. 6, 987, b, 1,
ILLUSTRATED BY PROGRESS OF PHILOSOPHY. 49
conceptions, which Socrates had arrived at, separated CHAP.
from the world of appearance. They are also the
central point of the speculations of Aristotle. With
him the conception or the form constitutes the
essence, the reality, and is as it were the soul of
things ; only form without matter, simple spirit (3) vim-
thinking of itself, is absolutely real ; only thought is tatle '
to man the most intense reality, and therefore also
the most intense pleasure in life. Yet there is this
difference between Aristotle and Plato, that whereas
Plato separates the conception from the appearance,
regarding it as independent as an t'Sf'a, Aristotle,
places it in things themselves, without, however,
implying that form stands in need of matter to be-
come actual, since it is in itself actual. Moreover,
Aristotle will not remove the idea out of the world
of appearances, because it cannot in a state of
separation serve as a connecting link between indi-
vidual things, nor can it be the cause and substance
of things. Thus the theory is seen to be one and the
same which Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle represent
at different stages of growth. In Socrates it is un-
developed, but full of vitality, pushing itself forward
through the husk of earlier philosophy ; in Plato it
has grown to a pure and independent existence ; and
in Aristotle it has overspread the whole world of
being and consciousness, exhausting itself in the
effort, and moving towards a perfect transformation
in later systems. Socrates, so to speak, is the preg-
nant germ, Plato the rich bloom, Aristotle the ripe
E
50 STATE OF CULTURE IN GREECE.
CHAP, fruit of Greek philosophy at the perfection of its
historical growth.
(4) Diffi- One phenomenon only will not fall into this his-
'caused ly torical chain, but threatens to break the continuity
Socratic o f Greek thought, viz. the imperfect attempts to
Schools. , 6 ' . . *. "
expand the Socratic principle which are seen in the
Megarian, the Cynic, and the Cyrenaic schools. In
these schools a real and essential progress of the
philosophic consciousness was not indeed to be found,
inasmuch as philosophy, which had arrived at any
rate in principle even in the time of Socrates at
objective knowledge, such as could only be found
in a system, was by them limited to subjective train-
ing of thought and character. Nor yet can they be
said to be wholly unimportant. For not only were
they, at a later period starting points for Stoicism,
Epicureanism, and Scepticism, but they also pro-
moted, independently of this, many scientific enqui-
ries, by means of which they exercised an undeniable
influence on Plato and Aristotle. The same case
occurs elsewhere, and is met with, even in this epoch,
in the older Academy, and in the Peripatetic schools,
both of which had no independent influence on the
growth of philosophy, but yet cannot be overlooked
in its history. Of all these phenomena one and the
same thing must be said. Their chief importance lies
not in their having expanded a principle theoretically,
but in their having been practically helpful in ad-
vancing it, by preserving the older forms of culture
for cotemporaries to see, here and there improving
and widening them, and by thus keeping the philo-
ILLUSTRATED BY PROGRESS OF PHILOSOPHY. 61
sopher's mind in sight of a many-sidedness, without CHAP.
which later systems would never have included the _
products of the earlier ones.
This permanence of philosophic schools is not
therefore met with until philosophy had attained a
certain general extension, in Greece not until the
time of Socrates and Plato. Whereas Plato, by sum-
ming up all the pre-Socratic schools, put an end to
their existence ; after his time no theory was put for-
ward which did not propagate itself in a school until
the time that Neoplatonism put the coping-stone on
Greek philosophy, in and with which all previous
systems were extinguished. In later times, however
many intellectual varieties rise up side by side, only a
few of them possess a distinct life of their own. The
rest are a traditional revival of previous views, and
cannot, in considering the peculiar philosophical
character of an age, be taken further into account.
They need therefore only to be mentioned by the
historian in a passing way. This statement applies
to the imperfect followers of Socrates. Their doc-
trines are not an advancement in principle, but only
incomplete reproductions of Socratic views, and con-
nected with Socrates in the same way that the elder
Academy is with Plato, or the Peripatetic school
with Aristotle.
PAET II.
SO CH A TES.
CHAPTER III.
THE LIFE OF SOCRATES.
CHAP. THERE is no instance on record of a philosopher
m - whose importance as a thinker is so closely bound
up with his personal character as a man as it was in
the case of Socrates. Every system, it is true, as
being the work of a definite person, may best be
studied in the light of the peculiarities, culture,
misfortunes and circumstances of its author ; yet in
the case of others it is easier to separate the fruits
of their intellectual life from the stock on which
they grew ; doctrines can generally be received and
handed down quite unchanged by men of very dif-
ferent characters. In the case of Socrates this is
not nearly so easy. His teaching aimed far less at
definite doctrines, which can be equally well em-
braced by different men, than at a special tone of
life and thought, at a philosophic character and the
art of intellectual enquiry, in short, at a something not
to be directly imparted and handed down unaltered,
HIS LIFE. 53
but to be propagated freely, others being stirred CHAP.
up to an analogous development of their peculiarities. '
So much the more anxious should this make us for
detailed information as to the training of a character
which has had so powerful an influence on history.
Here a very common difficulty meets us. What
Socrates was, and how he acted in his riper years, is
well known ; but only the roughest outline is pre-
served of the circumstances of his life. Over the
earlier part of it deep darkness rests. For the history
of his intellectual and moral training, if we except a
few scanty and for the most part untrustworthy
statements of earlier writers, we are left entirely to
conjecture.
The youth and early manhood of Socrates fall in
the most brilliant period of Grecian history. Born
during the last years of the Persian war, 1 he was
1 The best ascertained date been condemned in April or
in the life of Socrates is the May 399 B.C., and have suf-
date of his death. According f ered death in May or June the
to Demetrius Phalereus and same year. Since at the time
Apollodorm (in Diog. ii. 44), of his death he had passed his
it happened in Olympiad 95, seventieth year {Plato, Apol.
1 (Diod. xiv. 37), probably in 17, D.), but not long (Crito,
the second half of the month 52, E. calls him in round num-
Thargelion. For at this time bers seventy), his birth cannot
must be placed the return of have fallen later than 01. 77, 3,
the Delian Oeupls, which, ac- or 469 B.C. If his birthday is
cording to Plato (Phaedo, 59, rightly fixed for the 6th Thar-
D.), arrived the day before the gelion (Apoll. in Diog. ii. 44,
execution of Socrates. Comp. Plut+ Qu. Conv. viii. 1, 1,
K. F. Hermann, De theoria ^lian, V. H. ii. 25), and was
Deliaca, Ind. Schol. Getting, not past at the time of the
1846. About a month earlier judicial enquiry, we should
(XenopJwn, Mem. iv. 8, 2, says have to go back for it to 470
definitely thirty days), i.e. in or even 471 B.C. (Comp.
the month Munychion, the ju- BocTth. Corp. Inscript. ii. 321 ;
dicial enquiry took place. Hermann, 1. c. 7).
Socrates must accordingly have The question then arises whe-
SOCRATES.
GHAP. nearly cotemporary with all those great men who
adorned the age of Pericles. As a citizen of Athens
he participated in all those elements of culture,
which thanks to its unrivalled fertility of thought,
congregated in that great metropolis. If poverty and
low birth somewhat impeded his using them, 1 still
ther these statements respect-
ing the time of his birth are
facts or a mere fiction; and
whether the birthday of So-
crates, the naietrriK6s, was not
placed on the 6th of Thargelion
to make it agree with that of
Artemis, as Plato's was made
to agree with Apollo's. If so,
he may have been born in
469 B.C. (Olym. 77, 3). Any-
how, Apollodonis, placing it in
468 B.C. (01. 77, 4), (Diog. 1. c.)
is wrong. Nor can the state-
ment noticed by Diogenes that
he was only sixty years of age
weigh against the clear lan-
guage of Plato, and probably
rests upon a transcriber's mis-
take. Hermann's observation
(Plat. Phil. 666, De Philos. Jon.
setat. ii. A. 39) that Socrates
could not have been born in the
third or fourth, year of an
Olympiad, since he was twenty-
five (Synes. Calv. Enc. c. 17)
at the time of his interview
with Protagoras, which inter-
view happened (Plato, Farm.)
at the time of the Panathensea,
and consequently in the third
year of an Olympiad, will not
hold water. Supposing the
interview to be even a fact,
which is very doubtful, the
remark of Synesius (Calv. Enc.
c. 17) respecting the age of
Socrates is a pure guess, and
altogether refuted by the lan-
guage of the Thesetet. 183, F.,
and the Parmen. 127, C., vdw
veos, ff<p6Spa veos.
1 That his father Sophronis-
cus (Xen, Hellen. i. 7, 15 ;
Plato, Lach. 180, D. ; how
Epiphanius, Exp. Fid. 1087, A.,
comes to call him Elbaglus, is
difficult to say) was a sculptor,
may be gathered from Diog. ii.
18. The services of his mother
Phsenarete as a midwife are
known from Plato's Thesetetus,
149, A. As regards circum-
stances, it is stated by Demet-
rius Phaler. in Plutarch's Life of
Aristides, c. 1, that he not only
possessed land, but had seventy
minae a considerable sum at
interest; but this statement
is at variance with the testi-
mony of the best witnesses.
The reasons for it are without
doubt quite as weak as those
for a similar statement respect-
ing Aristides, and arose seem-
ingly from some Peripatetic's
wish to find authorities for his
view of the worth of riches.
Plato (Apol. 23, B., 38, A.;
Rep. i. 337, D.) and Xenophon
((Ec. ii. 2; xi. 3 ; Mem. i. 2, 1)
represent him not only as very
poor, wdw piKpa /ceKTTj/teVos and
ev irfvtcf pvpiq,, but they also
give reasons for thinking so.
Plato makes him say, perhaps
he could pay a fine of a mina,
and Xenophon depicts him as
HIS LIFE. 5,
in the Athens of Pericles, not even the lowest on the CHAP.
city roll was debarred from enjoying the rich pro-
fusion of art, which was for the most part devoted
to the purposes of the state, nor yet from associating
with men in the highest ranks of life. This free
personal intercourse did far more to advance intel-
lectual culture at that time than teaching in schools ;
Socrates had reached manhood before the Sophists
introduced a formal system of instruction. Intelli-
gible as it thus becomes, how an energetic man in the
position of Socrates could find many incitements to
and means of culture, and how even he could be
carried away by the wonderful elevation of his native
city, still nothing very accurate is known respect-
ing the routes by which he advanced to his subse-
quent greatness. 1 We may suppose that he enjoyed
the usual education in gymnastics and music, 2 al-
though the stories which are told of his teachers in
estimating his whole property, Crito, 50, D. Even apart from
inclusive of his cottage, at five this testimony there could be
minae. The story of Libanius no doubt. Porphyry's state-
(Apol. Socr. t. iii. p. 7), accord- ment (in Theod. Cur. Gr. Aff.
ing to which Socrates inherited i. 29, p. 8) a statement un-
eighty minse from his father, doubtedly derived from Aris-
and lost them by lending, bear- toxenus that Socrates was too
ing his loss with extreme com- uneducated to be able to read,
posure, looks like a story in- need scarcely be refuted by
tended to show the indifference authorities such as Xen. Mem.
of a philosopher to wealth, i. 6, 14 ; iv. 7, 3, 5. It is clearly
Had Plato and Xenophon an exaggeration of the well-
known the story, we may be known airai5eu<rfa (Plato, Symp.
sure they would not have 221, E., 199, A., Apol. 17, B.),
omitted to tell it. which only belongs to the
1 See the work of K. F. Her- satirical outside of the philoso-
mann, De Socratis magistris et pher, but was readily taken
disciplina juvenili, Marb. 1837. hold of and exaggerated by
2 Plato says so plainly in the jealousy in later times.
SOCRATES,
CHAP.
III.
music l deserve no credit. We hear further that he
learnt enough of geometry to be able to grapple with
difficult problems, and that he was not ignorant of
astronomy ; 2 but whether he acquired this knowledge
in his youth, or only in later years, and who was his
teacher, we cannot tell. 3 We see him, in mature
years, in relations more or less close with a number
of characters who must have exerted a most varied
and stirring influence on his mind. 4 It is beyond
1 According to Max. Tyr.
xxxviii. 4, Connus was his
teacher in music, and Euenus
in poetry. Alexander (in
Dioff. ii. 19) calls him a pupil
of Damon, whereas Sextus
(Matth. vi. 13) makes Lampo
his teacher. All these notices
have undoubtedly come from
passages in Plato, which are ir-
relevant. Socrates calls Connus
his teacher (Menex. 235, E.,
and Euthyd. 272, C.), but ac-
cording to the latter passage
he was a man at the time, so
that he must have gone to
Connus simply with a view to
revive a skill long since ac-
quired. It is more probable
(however often such notices
are given as historical, and
with further details : do. ad
Fam. ix. 22; Quint, i. 10;
Val. Max. viii. 7 ; Diog. ii. 32 ;
Stob. Flor. 29, 68) that the
passages in Plato refer to the
Connus of the comic poet
Ameipsias, from which the
whole fabrication comes. See
Hermann, p. 24. Damon's
name is mentioned in the
Laches, 180, D., 197, D. ; Rep.
iii. 400, B., 424, C., in which
passages, however, this musi-
cian appears as the friend
rather than as the instructor of
Socrates, and as an important
political character, from his
connection with Pericles. The
Phsedo, 60, C., and the Apology,
20, A., mention Euenus, yet not
as a teacher, and hardly even
as an acquaintance of Socrates.
And lastly, the Lampo of Sex-
tus probably owes his existence
to a mistake. Sextus may have
written Damon instead of Con-
nus (Stobceus, Flor. 29, 68, has
Connus in the same connection)
or else Lamprus (a name
which occurs in the Menexenus,
though not as that of a teacher
of Socrates), and transcribers
made it Lampo. The celebrated
prophet of this name cannot of
course have been intended.
2 Xen. Mem. iv. 7, 3, 5.
3 Maximus 1. c. says Theodore
of Gyrene, but this is only an
inference from Plato's Theaete-
tus, and not warranted by it.
4 For instance, the Sophists
Protagoras, Gorgias, Polus,
Hippias, Thrasymachus, but
especially Prodicus. Cf. Plato,
Prot., Gorg., Hip., Rep. i. Xen.
Mem. ii. 1, 21; iv. 4, 5, &c.
Also Euripides, who was on
HIi> LIFE.
doubt that he owed much to such relations; but
these friends canoot in strict accuracy be described
as his teachers, although we may often find them
so-called ; l neither is any light derived hence for
the history of his early training. We further meet
with expressions which show that he must have had
a general acquaintance with the views of Parmenides
and Heraclitus, of the Atomists, of Anaxagoras, and
perhaps of Empedocles. 2 Whence he derived this
knowledge, it is impossible to say. The stories that
he received instruction in his younger years from
Anaxagoras and Archelaus, can neither be supported
by satisfactory evidence, nor are they probable in
themselves. 3 Still more uncertain is his supposed inter-
CHAP.
ni.
such intimate terms with him
that the comic poets charged
him with borrowing his trage-
dies from Socrates. (Of. Diog.
ii. 18; ^lian, V. H. ii. 13.
Also Aspasia ; cf . Xen. (Ec. 3,
14 ; Mem. ii. 6, 36 ; JSschines
in Cic. de Invent, i. 31 ; in
Max. Tyr. xxxviii. 4 ; conf .
Hermann De JSsch. relig. 16
Hermesianax in Athen. xiii.
599, a; Diotima (Pfofo, Symp.).
Respecting several of these we
know not whether Plato was
true to facts in bringing them
into connection with Socrates.
1 Socrates calls himself in
Plato a pupil of Prodicus
(Zeller, 1. c. i. 873, D.), of Aspa-
sia (Menex. 235, E.), and of
Diotima (Symp. 201, D.), all of
which statements have been re-
peated in past and present
times. See Hermann, Soc.
Mag. p. 11. We may suppose
that the instruction given by
the two ladies consisted in free
personal intercourse, even al-
lowing that Diotima is a real
person, and the Menexenus a
genuine dialogue ; not only
this, but the same applies
equally to Prodicus. Maximus
calls Ischomachus his teacher
in agriculture, but he probably
arrived at this conclusion by
misunderstanding Xen. (Ec. 6,
17. The story that he was a
pupil of Diagoras of Melos (the
Scholiast on Aristoph. Nubes, v.
828), is obviously false.
2 Xen. Mem. i. 1, H ; iv. 7, 6.
8 The authorities are : for
Anaxagoras, Arigtid. Or. xlv.,
p. 21, and the nameless authori-
ties referred to by Diog. ii. 19
and 45, whom Suidas ZuKpar.
according to custom follows;
for Archelaus, Diog. ii. 16, 19,
23, x. 12, and those mentioned
by him, lo, Aristoxenus, and
Diocles. Besides these Cicero,
53
SOCRATES.
CHAP, course with Zeno and Parmenides. Even little is
' known of the philosophical writings with which he
Sextus, Porphyry (in Theod.
Cur. Gr. Aff. xii. 67, p. 175),
Clement of Alexandria (Strom,
i. 302, A.), Simplicius, Eusebius
(Pr. Ev. x. 14, 13, xiv. 15, 11,
xv. 61, 11), Hippolytus, the spu-
rious Galen, and a few others ;
conf. Krische, Forsch. 210.
The evidence in favour of
Anaxagoras is very insufficient,
and the language respecting
him used by Socrates (Plato,
Phsedo, 97, B. and Xenophon,
Mem. iv. 7, 6) makes it impro-
bable that he knew him person-
ally, or was acquainted with
his views, except from books
and hearsay, which of course
does not exclude any casual or
accidental intercourse. The
traditions respecting his rela-
tions to Archelaus are better
authenticated ; yet even here
there is much that is suspicious.
Of the two earliest authorities,
lo and Aristoxenus, the former,
who was an older contemporary
of Socrates, does not make Ar-
chelaus his instructor. All that
is stated in Diog. ii. 23, on his
authority, is that Socrates, when
a young man, travelled with
Archelaus to Samos. This asser-
tion, however, flatly contradicts
Plato (Crito, 52, B.), who says
that Socrates never left Athens,
except once to go to the Isth-
mian games, or when on mili-
tary duty. Miiller, however,
gets over the difficulty (Frag.
Hist. Gr. ii. 49, N. 9) by sup-
posing that Plato was only re-
ferring to Socrates when grown
up.
It is just possible that Plato
may not have known of a jour-
ney which Socrates took in his
earlier years. That he should
have knowingly omitted to
mention it, as Alberti Socr. 40
supposes, is hardly likely. It
is also possible some mistake
may have been made. lo may
not have meant a journey to
Samos, but his taking part in
the expedition to Samos of 441
B.C., which, strange to say, is
not mentioned in the Apology,
28, E. Or the error may lie
with Diogenes, who applied to
Socrates what lo had said of
some one else. Or it may not
be the lo of Chios, but some
later individual who thus
writes of Socrates. Certain it
is, that lo's testimony does not
prove Socrates to have been a
pupil of Archelaus. Even if the
relation were proved to have
existed in Socrates' younger
days, it would still be a ques-
tion whether his philosophy
was influenced thereby.
Aristoxenus goes further. Ac-
cording to his account in Diog.
ii. 16, Socrates was the fa-
vourite of Archelaus, or as
Porphyry represents the mat-
ter, he became acquainted with
Archelaus in his seventeenth
year, lived with him many
years, and was by him initiated
into philosophy. We shall have
occasion to notice hereafter how
little dependence can be placed
on the statements of Aristoxe-
nus respecting Socrates. Were
the other statement which is
to be found in Diogenes closely
connected with this one, that
HIS LIFE.
was acquainted. 1 A well-known passage in Plato's
Phaedo 2 describes him as advancing from the older
natural science and the philosophy of Anaxagoras to
his own peculiar views. But it is most improbable
that this passage gives a historical account of his in-
tellectual development, if for no other reason, at
least for this one, 3 that the course of development
there leads to the Platonic theory of conceptions; let
alone the fact that it is by no means certain that
Plato himself possessed any fuller information re-
specting the intellectual progress of his teacher.
No doubt he began life by learning his father's
trade, 4 a trade which he probably never practised,
CHAP.
m.
Socrates did not become a
pupil of Archelaus till after
the condemnation of Anaxago-
ras, its worthlessness would be
thoroughly shown ; for Socrates
was seventeen when Anaxago-
ras left Athens, and had long
passed his years of pupilage.
The assertions of Aristoxenus,
however, are in themselves im-
probable. For supposing So-
crates to have been on intimate
terms with Archelaus, when
young, twenty years before
Anaxagoras was banished, how
is it conceivable that he should
not have known Anaxagoras ?
and if he was instructed by
him in philosophy, how is it
that neither Xenophon nor
Plato nor Aristotle ever men-
tion Archelaus ? All the later
authorities for the relation of
the two philosophers appear to
rest on Aristoxenus. As there
is nothing in the teaching of
Archelaus, with which the So-
cratic teaching can be connec-
ted, it seems probable that he
had little to do with the philo-
sophy of Socrates, even though
Socrates may have known him
and his teaching. Besides,
Socrates (in Xen. Sym.) calls
himself an avrovpybs rfjs <f>i\o-
ffotyias, a self-taught philoso-
pher.
1 He seems to have known
those of Anaxagoras. A sup-
posed allusion to the writings
of Heraclitus (in Diog. ii. 22),
is uncertain, nor is it estab-
lished that he ever studied the
Pythagorean doctrines (Plut.
Curios. 2).
2 96, A.
8 As Volquardsen, (Rhein.
Mus. N.F. xix. 514; Alberti
Socr. 13 ; Uebemveg, Unters
d. Plat. Schr. 94 ; Steinliart,
Plat. L., 297.
4 Timon and Duris in Diog.
ii. 19. Timseus, according to
Porphyry in Cyril c. Jul. 208,
60,
SOCRATES.
CHAP.
III.
and certainly soon gave up. 1 Considering it to be
his special calling to labour for the moral and intel-
lectual improvement of himself and others, this con-
viction forced itself so strongly upon him, as to
appear to him in the light of a divine revelation. 2
He was, moreover, confirmed therein by a Delphic
oracle, which, of course, must not be regarded as the
cause of, but rather as an additional support to, his
reforming zeal. 3 How and when this conviction first
A. Plato (Eep. vi. 496, B.)
seems to have had the case of
Socrates in view.
1 Porphyry leaves it open
whether Socrates or his father
practised sculpture ; nor is any-
thing proved by the story that
the Graces on the Acropolis
were his work {Diog. Paus. i.
22). No allusions are found in
Aristophanes, Plato, and Xeno-
phon to the sculptor's art.
Hence we may conclude that
if Socrates ever practised it, he
gave it up long before the play
of the Clouds was acted. Duris
and Demetrius of Byzantium
(in Diog. ii. 19), in stating that
he was a slave, and that Crito
removed him from a workshop
and cared for his education,
appear to confound him with
Phsedo.
2 Plato, Apol. 33, C. : *Voi 8*
TOVTO .... irpoffrtraKTai fnrb
rov 6eov irpdrreiv Kal fK (UOmlteV
Kal t Ivirnvlwv Kal Ttavrl rp6ira>,
{jiirep rls irore Kal &\\i) 6eia /uotpa
teal b-riovv
3 According to the well-
known story in the Apol. 20,
E., which has been repeated
countless times by succeeding
writers, the matter stands thus :
Chasrephon had asked at Delphi
if there were a wiser man than
Socrates, and the priestess had
answered in the negative.
The Iambics which purport, to
contain the answer in Diog,
ii. 37, and Suid. <ro(p6s belong
of course to a much later
period. Whereupon, says So-
crates, he had thought over
the sense of the oracle, and, in
the hope of finding it, he had
conversed with all who made
pretensions to knowledge. At
last he has found that neither
he himself nor any other man
was wise, but that others be-
lieved themselves to be wise,
whilst he was conscious of his
want of wisdom. He con-
sidered himself therefore
pledged in the service of
Apollo to a similar sifting of
men, to save the honour of the
oracle, which declared him, al-
though one so wanting in wis-
dom, to be the wisest of men.
Allowing that Socrates really
said this and there is no
doubt that he uttered it in
substance it by no means fol-
lows that his philosophical
activity dated from the time
HIS LIFE.
dawned on him, cannot be determined. Most prob-
ably it grew gradually in proportion as he gained
more knowledge of the moral and intellectual circum-
stances of his time, and soon after the beginning of
the Peloponnesian war he had found in the main his
philosophical centre of gravity. 1
From that time forward he devoted himself to
the mission he had assumed, regardless of everything
else. His means of support were extremely scanty, 2
and his domestic life, in company with Xanthippe,
was far from happy. 3 Yet neither her passionate
(Pint. Gen. Socr. c. 20) is al-
together a fiction.
1 This is proved by the part
which Aristophanes assigns to
Socrates in the Clouds. If at
that time, 424 B.C., he could be
described as the chief of the
new learning, he must have
worked for years according to
a definite method, and have
gathered about him a circle of
friends. In the Connus of
Ameipsias, which seems to have
been acted at the same time as
the Clouds, he likewise appears
as a well-known person, and lo
in his travelling memorials had
previously alluded to him. See
p. 56, 1 ; 57, 3.
2 See p. 54, 1.
3 The name of Xanthippe is
not only proverbial now. Later
writers of antiquity (Teles, in
Stob. Flor. 5, 64; Seneca De
Const. 18, 5, Epist. 104, 177 ;
Porphyry (in Theod. Cur. Gr.
Aff. xii. 65) ; Diogenes (ii. 36) ;
Plutarch (Coh. Ira, 13, 461),
who however tells the same of
the wife of Pittacus, Tranq. An.
ii. 471 ; JElian (V. H. xi. 12) ;
CHAP.
III.
of the Pythian oracle. Else
what should have led Chsere-
phon to put the question, or
the oracle to give the answer
it did ? So that if in the apo-
logy he speaks as though the
Delphic oracle had first aroused
him to sift men, it must be a
figure of speech. Without
going so far as Colotes (in
Plut. adv. Col. 17, 1), and
AtJtente-us (v. 218) and many
modern writers (Snicker, Hist.
Phil. i. 534, Van Dalen and
Heumanri), and denying the
historical character of the
oracle altogether and certain-
ly it cannot be very rigidly
proved we must at least at-
tach no great importance to it.
It may have done a similar
service to Socrates as his doc-
tor's degree did to Luther, as-
suring him of his inward call,
but it had just as little to do
with making him a philosophi-
cal reformer as the doctor's de-
gree had with making Luther a
religious reformer. The story
of the response given to his
father when he was a boy
SOCRATES.
CHAP, character would he allow
III.
- Athencem (v. 219); Synesius,
&c.), tell so many little stories
and disgraceful traits of her
that one almost feels inclined
to take up the cudgels in her
behalf, as Heumann has actu-
ally done (Acta Phil. i. 103).
What Xenophon (Mem. ii. 2 ;
Sym. 2, 10) and Plato (Phssdo,
60, A.) say of her, shows that
she cannot have been altogether
badly disposed. At least she
was solicitous about her family,
though at the same time she
was extremely violent, over-
bearing, and hard to deal with.
It is remarkable that Aristo-
phanes in the Clouds says no-
thing of the married life of
Socrates, which might have af-
forded him material for many a
joke. Probably Socrates was not
then married. His eldest son is
called twenty-five years later
(Plato, Apol. 34, D. ; Phaedo, 60,
A.) fj.eipd.Kiov ^5rj, and there are
two young children. Besides
Xanthippe, Socrates is said to
have had another wife, Myrto,
a daughter or grand-daughter
of Aristides : after Xanthippe
according to Aristotle (in Dwg.
ii. 26 ; conf . Stob. Floril 86, 25,
Posidon in Ps. Plut. De Nob.
18, 3 ; less accurate is Plutarch's
Aristid. 27 which Athen. xiii.
555 follows) ; before her accord-
ing to another view (also in
Diog.) ; and at the same time
with her according to Aris-
toxenus, Demetrius Phaler.,
Hieronymus Khod., Satyrus,
and Porphyry, in Cyril, c. Jul.,
vi. 186, D. ; so that he had two
wives at once. The fallacy of
the last view has been already
exposed by Panastius (accord-
'to ruffle his philosophic
ing to Plut.), and in modern
times most thoroughly by Luzac
(Lectiones Atticae, Leyden,
1809). Not only is such a
thing incompatible with the
character of Socrates, but
amongst his cotemporaries,
foes and friends, Xenophon,
Plato, Aristophanes, and other
comic poets, including Timon,
there is no allusion to a rela-
tion, which would most un-
doubtedly have, had it existed,
caused a great sensation and
have provoked attack and de-
fence, and derision in the high-
est degree. The laws of Athens
never allowed bigamy, and the
decree purporting to be in
favour of it, by which Hie-
ronymus attempts to give pro-
bability to his story (the same
to which reference is made by
Gell. N. A. xv. 20, 6, from the
supposed bigamy of Euripides)
either never was passed, or
must bear a different meaning.
The only question is, whether
there can be any foundation
for the story, and how its rise
can be explained. Shall the
Pseudo-Aristotle be believed,
who says that Myrto was his
second wife, and the two
younger sons her children ?
But this cannot be reconciled
with; the Phsedo 60, A., let alone
the fact that Myrto, as a
daughter of Aristides, must have
been older than Socrates (whose
father in Laches, 180, D,is men-
tioned as a school companion of
her brother), and far too old then
to bear children. Or shall it, on
the contrary, be conceded (with
Luzac) that Myrto was Socrates'
first wife, and that he married
HIS LIFE.
composure, 1 , nor could domestic cares hinder the oc-
CHAP.
in.
Xanthippe after her death ?
This, too, is highly improbable.
For, in the first place, neither
Xenophon nor Plato know any-
thing about two wives of So-
crates, although the Symposium
would have invited some men-
tion of them. In the second
place, all the biographers (a
few unknown ones in Diogenes
excepted), and particularly the
Pseudo-Aristotle, from whom
all the rest appear to have taken
the story, say that he married
Myrto after Xanthippe, and
that Sophroniscus and Menex-
enus were her children. Thirdly,
Socrates cannot possibly have
married the sister or the niece
of Lysimachus, the son of
Aristides, before the battle of
Delium, since at the time of
the battle (Lach. 180, D.) he
did not know Lysimachus per-
sonally. Nor can his first mar-
riage have been contracted
after that date, since Xan-
thippe's eldest son was grown
up at the time of his death.
And lastly, in Plato's Theaetet.
150, E., shortly before his
death, Socrates mentions this
Aristides. as one of those who
had withdrawn from his intel-
lectual influence without detri-
ment to his relationship as a
kinsman.
Thus the connection between
Socrates and Myrto seems to
belong altogether to the re-
gion of fable. The most pro-
bable account of the origin
of the story is the following.
We gather from the remains
of the treatise irepl (v-yfvftas
(Stob. Flor. 86, 24, 25; 88,
13), the genuineness of which
was doubted by Plutarch, and
certainly cannot be allowed,
that this dialogue was con-
cerned with the question,
whether nobility belonged to
those whose parents were vir-
tuous. Now none were more
celebrated for their spotless
virtue and their voluntary
poverty than Aristides and So-
crates. Accordingly the writer
brought the two into connec-
tion. Socrates was made to
marry a daughter of Aristides,
and since Xanthippe was
known to be his wife, Myrto
was made to be his second
wife and the mother of his
younger children. Others,
however, remembered that
Xanthippe survived her hus-
band. They thought it un-
likely that Socrates should be
the son-in-law of a man dead
before he was born, and they
tried to surmount these diffi-
culties in various ways. As
regards the first difficulty,
either it was maintained that
Myrto was his second wife and
that the younger children were
hers, in which case it was
necessary to place her side by
side with Xanthippe, as Hier-
onymus actually did, and in-
vented a decree of the people
to make it probable ; or to
avoid romance, this supposition
was given up, and Myrto was
made to be his first wife, who
then can have borne him no
children, since Lamprocles, his
eldest son, according to Xeno-
phon, was a child of Xanthippe.
The second difficulty could be
For note ' see next page.
SOCRATES.
III.
CHAP, cupation which he recognised to be the business of
his life. His own concerns were neglected lest he
should omit anything in the service of God. 2 To be
independent, he tried, like the Gods, to rise superior
to wants ; 3 and by an uncommon degree of self-denial
and abstemiousness, 4 he so far succeeded that he
could boast of living more pleasantly and more free
from troubles than any one else. 5 It was thus possible
for him to devote his whole powers to the service of
others without asking or taking reward ; 6 and this
got over either by making e Xen. Mem. i. 2, 5 ; i. 5, 6 ;
Myrto a grand-daughter in- i. 6, 3 ; Plato, Apol. 19, D. 31 ;
stead of a daughter of Aris- B. ; 33, A.; Euthypro, 3, D. ;
tides, the grandson of Aristi- Symp. 219, E. In the face of
des the Just. Plato, Lach. 179, these distinct testimonies, the
A.; Theaet., &c. The former statement of Aristoxenus (^>?o^.
was the usual way. The latter ii. 20) that from time to time
is the view of Athenaeus. he collected money from his
1 See Xenophon 1. c., not to pupils, can only be regarded as
mention later anecdotes re- a slander. It is possible that
specting this subject. he did not always refuse the
2 Plato, Apol. 23, B. ; 31, B. presents of opulent friends
3 Conf. Xen. Mem. i. 6, 1-10, (Diog. ii. 74, 121, 34 ; Sen. de
where he argues against Anti- Benef. i. 8 ; vii. 24 ; Quintil.
phon, that his is a thoroughly Inst. zii. 7, 9). Questionable
happy mode of life, ending anecdotes (Diog. ii. 24, 31, 65 ;
with the celebrated words :
rb pfv fLTiSeybs SfeffOai 6elov fJvai,
b. Flor. 3, 61 ; 17, 17) would
prove nothing, to the contrary,
eyyvrdru -rov but no dependence can be
Ofiov. placed on these authorities.
4 The contentment of So- He is said to have refused the
crates, the simplicity of his splendid offers of the Mace-
life, his abstinence from sen- donian Archelaus and the Thes-
sual pleasures of every kind, salian Scopas (J)iog. ii. 25 ;
Sen. Benef. v. 6 ; Arrian or
Plut. in Stob. Floril. 97, 28;
Dio Chrys. Or. xiii. 30), and
this tale is confirmed as far as
ships, are well known. Conf. the first-named individual is
Xen. Mem. i. 2, 1 ; 3, 5 ; Plato, concerned by Aristotle, Rhet.
Symp. 174, A., 219, B. ; Phaed- ii.23,in a passage which Bayle,
rus, 229, A. ; Arint&pJi. Clouds, Diet. Archelaus Rem. D. dis-
103, 361, 409, 828, Birds 1282. putes without reason.
s Xen. Mem. i. 6, 4 ; iv. 8, 6.
b 8e ws tXa^l
his scanty clothing, his walk-
ing bare-foot, his endurance of
hunger and thirst, of heat and
cold, of deprivations and hard-
HIS LIFE. 66
occupation so confined him to his native city that he CHAP.
rarely passed its boundaries or even its gates. 1
To take part in the affairs of the state 2 he did
not, however, feel a call ; not only holding it to be
impossible to act as a statesman 3 in the Athens of
that day without violating his principles, and loath-
ing submission to the demands of a pampered mob ; 4
but far more because he recognised his own peculiar
task to lie in something very different. Any one
sharing his conviction that care for one's own culture
must be preferred to all care for public affairs, and
that a thorough knowledge of self, together with a
deep and many-sided experience, is a necessary quali-
fication for public life, 5 must regard the influencing
of individuals as a far more important business than
the influencing of the community, which without the
other would be profitless ; 6 must consider it a better
service to his country to educate able statesmen
than actually to discharge a statesman's duties. 7
Any one so thoroughly fitted by nature, taste, tone
of thought and character, to elevate the morality
and develop the intellect in others by means of
personal intercourse, could hardly feel at home in
1 In the Crito, 52, B. ; 53, A., * Plato, Apol. 33, A., or as
he says, that except on military the Gorgias (473, E.) ironically
duty he has only once left expresses it : because he was
Athens, going as a deputy to the too plain for a statesman.
Isthmian games From the Conf. Gorg. 521, D.
Phaedrus, 230, C., we gather Plato, Apol. 36, Symp. 216,
that he rarely went outside the A. ; Xen. Mem. iv. 2, 6 ; iii. 6.
gates. Plato, Apol. 29, C. ; 30, D. ;
- Plato, Apol. 31, C. 33, C. Gorg. 513, E.
Plato, Apol. 31, D. ; Rep. * Xen. Mem. i. 6, 15.
vi. 4%, C.; Gorg. 521. C.
SOCRATES.
CHAP.
III.
any other line of life. 1 Accordingly, Socrates never
attempted to move from his position as a private
citizen. By serving in several campaigns with the
greatest bravery and endurance, 2 he discharged his
duties to his country. As a citizen he met im-
1 Socrates asserts this in
Plato quite explicitly. In Apol.
31, D., he remarks that his
Saifi6viov sent him back from a
public life, and wisely too ;
for in a career spent in oppos-
ing the passionate impulses of
the masses he would long since
have been ruined. The ScuiJ.6-
viov which deters him is the
sense of what is suited to his
individuality. That this sense
conducted him rightly, is
proved by the consideration
that a public career, had he
taken to it, would not only
have been unsuccessful in his
case, but would also have been
most injurious for himself ;
and Socrates usually estimates
the moral value of conduct by
success. If this consideration,
as it no doubt did, confirmed
his dislike to a public career,
still the primary cause of this
dislike, the source of that in-
superable feeling, which as a
Sai/j,6ytov preceded every esti-
mate of consequences, was with-
out doubt something immedi-
ate. Had a public position suit-
ed his character as well as the
life he chose, he would as little
have been deterred by its dan-
gers, as he was by the dan-
gers of that which he adopted
(Apol. 29, B.). He states, how-
ever, that his occupation af-
forded him great satisfaction
with which he could not dis-
pense, Apol. 38, A. %TI nal
Tvyxavei jue'-yiffTOj/ ayaObv bit
av6pci>Trca TOVTO, IKCIOTTJS ^epas
Trepi aperrjs rous \6yovs Troitlffdai
Kal TUIV &\\cai>, irepl Siv vpeis
^jUoO aKovere Sia\fyofj,fvov Kal
e/Aavrbv Kal &\\ovs ^eTao"ros, 6
Sf avf^eraffros fiios ov ftitarbs av-
e P <S>-K<t.
2 See the stories in Plato,
Symp. 219, E. ; Apol. 28, E. ;
Charm, i. ; Lach. 181, A.
Of the three expeditions men-
tioned in the Apology, that
to Potidiea, 432 B.C., that to
Delium, 424 B.C., and that to
Amphipolis, 422 B.C., the two
first are fully described. At
Potidrea Socrates rescued Alci-
biades, but gave up in his
favour his claim to the prize
for valour. His fearless retreat
from the battle of Delium is
mentioned with praise. An-
tisthenes (in Athen. v. 216, b)
refers the affair of the prize to
the time after the battle of
Delium. Probably Plato is
right, being generally well-in-
formed on these matters. The
doubts which Athenseus raises
respecting Plato's account are
trivial. Naturally, however,
other accounts derived from
his account cannot be quoted
in support of it. The story
that Socrates rescued Xeno-
phon at Delium (Strabo, ix. 2,
7; Diog.) seems to confound
Xenophon with Alcibiades.
HIS LIFE. 67
righteous demands alike of an infuriated populace CHAP.
and of tyrannical oligarchs, in every case of danger, 1 '
firmly and fearlessly ; but in the conduct of affairs
he declined to take part.
Nor would he appear as a public teacher after
the manner of the Sophists. He not only took no
pay, but he gave no methodical course, 2 not profess-
ing to teach, but only to learn in common with
others ; not to force his convictions upon them, but
to examine theirs ; not to pass the truth that came
to hand like a coin fresh from the mint, but to
awaken a taste for truth and virtue, to show the way
thereto, to overthrow spurious, and to discover real
knowledge. 3 Never weary of converse, he eagerly
seized every opportunity of giving an instructive
and moral turn to conversation. Day by day he was
about in the market and public promenades, in
schools and workshops, ever ready to have a word
with friend or stranger, with citizen or foreigner,
but always prepared to give an intellectual or moral
turn to the conversation. 4 Whilst thus serving God
1 Xen. Mem. i. 1, 18, and 2, and of Favorinus in Diog. ii.
31 ; iv. 4, 2 ; Hellen. i. 7, 15 ; 20, that he gave instruction in
Plato, Apol. 32, A. ; Gorg. 473, rhetoric, needs no further re-
E. ; epist. Plat. vii. 324, D. ; see futation.
also LMZOC, De Socrate cive, 8 Proofs in all the dialogues.
92-1 23 ; Grate's Hist, of Greece, See particularly Plato, Apol.
viii. 238-285. 21, B. ; 23 B. ; 29, D. ; 30, E. ;
* Plato, Apol. 33, A. : iy& Se Eep. i. 336, B. The Socratic
88c<rKaAos fitv ovStvbs *&ir<n' method will be discussed here-
^yti-djuTji/' i 5e ris /aov \4yovros after.
KalTatfjia.vTovirp6,TToirros tin6vij.ei * Xen. Mem. i. 1, 10; iii.
iu<ovtiv . . . ovfevi iroJTroT 1 t<f>86- 10 ; Plato, Symp., Lysis., Char-
VT\ffa, Ibid. ] 5 D. Xen. Mem. mides, Phaedrus, Apol. 23, B. ;
i. 2, 3 and 31. The assertion 30, A. The /iatrrpoirffa which
of the Epicurean Idomeneus, Socrates boasts of, Xen,. Symp.
F 2
8 SOCRATES.
CHAP j n ^8 higher calling, he was persuaded that he was
- also serving his country in a way that no one else
could do. 1 For deeply as he deplored the decline of
discipline and education in his native city, 2 on the
moral teachers of his time, the Sophists, 3 he could
place no reliance. The attractiveness of his discourse
won for him a circle of admirers, for the most part
consisting of young men of family, 4 drawn to him by
the most varied motives, standing to him in various
relations, and coming to him, some for a longer,
others for a shorter time. 6 For his part, he was
anxious not only to educate these friends, but to
advise them in everything pertaining to their good,
even in worldly matters. 6 Out of this changing, and
in part only loosely connected society, a nulceus was
gradually formed of decided admirers, a Socratic
school, united, however, far less by a common set of
doctrines, than by a common love for the person of
its founder. With more intimate friends he fre-
quently had common meals, 7 which, however, can
scarcely have been a fixed institution. Such as
appeared to him to require other branches of in-
3, 10 ; 4 ; 56, 8, 5, 42, is no- poi fira.Ko\ov0owTfs ols paKiffTa.
thing else, this art consisting <rxo\-fi Itrriv, nl ruv ir\ov<riuTd-
in making friends lovable, by ra>i>. Still we find among his
virtue and prudence. ardent admirers, not only Antis-
1 Plato, Apol. 30, A. ; Conf. thenes, but also Apollodorus
36, C. ; 39, 3 ; 41, D. ; Gorg. and Aristodemus, who appear
521, D. according to Plato, Symp. 173,
2 Xen. Mem. iii. 5, 13. 8, to have been equally poor.
Mem. iv. 4, 5, which is not s Conf. Xen. Mem. i. 2, 14 ;
at variance with Plato, Apol. 19, iv. 2, 40 ; Plato, Theast. 150, D.
D, nor yet with the passages " Conf. examples, Mem. ii. 3,
quoted p. 69, 1. 7, 8, 9 ; iii. 6, 7.
4 Plato, Apol. 23, C., ol vioi * Xen. Mem. iii. 14.
HIS LIFE.
struction, or whom he believed unsuited for inter- CHAP.
course with himself, he urged to apply to other
teachers, either in addition to or in place of himself. 1
Until his seventieth year he followed this course of
action with his powers of mind unimpaired. 2 The
blow which then put an end to his life and his
activity will be mentioned hereafter.
'- Plato, Theaetet. 151, B. ; knew him), without showing
Xen. Mem. iii. 1 ; Symp. 4, any trace of weakness in his
61. mental powers up to the last
- Xenophon and Plato most- moment. That it was a wrong
ly represent Socrates as an old view is distinctly stated in
man (such as he was when they Mem. iv. 8, 8.
70
SOCRATES.
CHAPTER IV.
THE CHARACTER OF SOCRATES.
A. The
greatness
of the clw
racier of
Socrates.
CHAP. ANCIENT writers speak of the character of Socrates in
*V" terms of the greatest respect. There are, however,
some exceptions, quite apart from the prejudice
occasioned by his condemnation, which no doubt
survived some time after his death. Followers of
Epicurus indulged their love of slander even at his
expense, 1 and one voice from the Peripatetic School
has scandalous stories to tell respecting his life : as
a boy he was disobedient and refractory ; as a youth,
profligate ; as a man, coarse, importunate, given to
sudden bursts of anger, and of fiery passions. 2 But
1 Cicero de N. D. i. 34, says
that his teacher, the Epicurean
Zeno, called him an Attic buf-
foon. Epicurus, however, ac-
cording to Diog. x. 8, appears
to have spared him, although
he depreciated every other
philosopher.
2 The source from which these
unfavourable reports, collected
by Luzac, come is Aristoxenus,
Lect. Att. 246 (from whom we
have already heard similar
things, p. 58, note ; 61, 3 ; 64,
5). From this writer come
the following statements ; that
mentioned in Porphyry : ws
<p6ffei yey6voi rpaxvs els opyJ)i>,
Sia
Synesius (Enc. Galv. 81) will
have this limited to his younger
years ; that of Cyril, c. Jul. vi.
185, C.; Theod. Cur. Gr. Aff.
xii., 63, p. 174 : ore 8 <f>A.e
inrb rov ird9ovs TOVTOV
flvai T^y affxyuonvvriif
yap oiire bv&fjiaTOS a7ro<rxe'<T(?ai
afire Trpdy/j.aTos ; and another of
Cyril. 186, C. Theod. 1. c.) that
Socrates was in other ways
temperate, irpbs 6e r^v T&V
a<f>po5iffi<av xp : n ffl " ff((>oSp6Tfpov
fj.ev fivcu, aSiKiav fie /j.^ irpotreTi/ai,
^ yap rats ya^fTOts ^ rais KOIVIUS
/j.6vais, and then after
HIS CHARACTER.
71
the stories we have of this kind are so improbable,
and the chief relater is so untrustworthy, 1 that we _
cannot even with certainty 2 infer that Socrates only
became what he was after a severe struggle 3 with his
CHAP.
IV.
the history of his bigamy he
concludes : elvai 8e tyyaiv aurbv
v rcus o t uL\iai.s alvws rt <f>t\-
airexO'huova Kal \oiSopov Kal v&piff-
riK6v. From the same source,
as may be gathered from Pint.
Mai. Her. c. 9, p. 856, comes
the charge which Theod. 1. c.
1. 29, p. 8 quotes from Porphyry,
without naming Aristoxenus,
flvai 5 avrbv irpbs ovSfy /xec
acpvri, atraiSfvrov oe vfpl iravra,
so tliat he was hardly able to
read, besides what follows
(Ibid. xii. 66, p. 174 ; conf. iv.
2, p. 56) : i\eyno 8e irfpl avrov
us SaTrcus &>v OVK eft ^Kaffeifv oiiSe
etiTa/CTO>s' irpoa'Tov juej/ yap <t>affLi>
aurbv Tta irarpl 8iaT\e<rcu, airet-
Oovvra Kal 6ir6re Kf\ev<reiev avrbv
\a/36i>Ta TO opyava TCL Trepi r-ijv
Ti~)(vr\v airavTav frirovS-fiirore o\t-
a. ruv irpo (nay naros
eiriTinufj.ev<ai> Kal rdSe
Sri fls TOI/S ox^ovs (iffaidfl-ro Kal
r^y SiarpL^as eiroit'iTO irpbs rats
Tpaifffats Kal irpbs rdis 'EpyuoTs.
Herewith is connected the
story of the physiognomist
Zopyrus. (Cic. Tusc. vi. 37,
83 ; De Fat. iv. 10 ; Alex. Apli.
De Fato, vi., Peru. Sat. IV. 2-t
Conf. ; Max. Tyr. xxxi. 3), who
declared Socrates to be stupid
and profligate, and received
from him the answer, that by
nature he had been so, but had
been changed by reason. This
account can hardly be true. It
looks as if it had been devised
to illustrate the power of rea-
son over a defective natural
disposition, as illustrated in
Plato, Symp. 215, 221, B. If
the story was current in the
time of Aristoxenus, he may
have used it for his picture ;
but it is also possible that his
description produced the story,
which in this case would have
an apologetic meaning. The
name of Zopyrus would lead us
to think of the Syrian magi-
cian, who, according to Aris-
totle in Diogr. ii. 45, had
foretold the violent death of
Socrates.
1 As may be already seen
from the stories respecting the
bigamy, the gross ignorance,
the violent temper, and the
sensual indulgences of So-
crates.
2 As Hermann does, De Socr.
Mag. 30.
8 Though this is in itself
possible, we have no certain
authority for such an assertion.
The anecdote of Zopyrus is,
as already remarked, very un-
certain, and where is the war-
rant that Aristoxenus followed
a really credible tradition ?
He refers, it is true, to his
father Spintharus, an actual
acquaintance of Socrates. But
the question arises whether
this statement is more trust-
worthy than the rest. The
chronology is against it, and
still more so is the sub-
stance of what Spintharus
72
SOCRATES.
CHAP.
IV.
natural disposition. Our best authorities only know
him as the perfect man, to whom they look up with
respect, and whom they regard as the exemplar of
humanity and morality. ' No one,' says Xenophon,
4 ever heard or saw anything wicked in Socrates ; so
pious was he that he never did anything without first
consulting the (rods ; so just that he never injured
any one in the least ; so master of himself that he
never preferred pleasure to goodness ; so sensible that
he never erred in his choice between what was better
and what was worse. In a word, he was of men the
best and happiest.' '
He further represents Socrates as a pattern of
hardiness, of self-denial, of self-mastery ; as a man
says. It may also be asked
whether Spintharus spoke the
truth, when he professed to
have witnessed outbursts of
anger in Socrates, who must
then have been in the last
years of his life. Certainly
we have no more reason to
believe him than his son.
Lastly, Aristoxenus does not
confine his remarks to the
youth of Socrates, but they
are of a most general character,
or refer distinctly to his later
years. LMZOC, 1. c. 261, would
appear to have hit the truth
when he makes Aristoxenus
responsible for all these state-
ments. For Aristoxenus ap-
pears not only to have carried
his warfare with the Socratic
Schools against the person of
Socrates, but also to have in-
dulged in the most capricious
and unfounded misapprehen-
sions and inferences. His
overdrawn imagination makes
Socrates as a boy dissatisfied
with his father's business, and
as a man pass his life in the
streets. In the same way he
finds that Socrates must have
been a man without culture,
because of expressions such as
that in the Apology, 17, B., or
that in the Symp. 221, E. ; 199,
A. ; violent in temper, in sup-
port of which he refers to
Symp. 214, D. ; and dissolute
because of his supposed bigamy,
and the words in Xen. Mem. i.
3, 14; ii. 2, 4, and p. 51, 2.
1 Mem. i. 1, 11; iv. 8, 11.
R. Lange's objections to the
genuineness of the concluding
chapters of the Memorabilia
(iv. 8) (De Xenoph. Apol. Berl.
1873) do not appear sufficiently
strong to preclude their being
cited as an authority.
HIS CHARACTER. <
of piety and love for his country, of unbending CHAP.
fidelity to his convictions, as a sensible and trust-
worthy adviser both for the bodies and souls of his
friends ; as an agreeable and affable companion,
with a happy combination of cheerfulness and
seriousness ; above all, as an untiring educator of
character, embracing every opportunity of bringing
all with whom he came into contact to self-knowledge
and virtue, and especially opposing the conceit and
thoughtlessness of youth.
Plato says the same of him. He too calls his
teacher the best, the most sensible, and the most
just man of his age, 1 and never tires of praising his
simplicity, his moderation, his control over the wants
and desires of the senses ; imbued with the deepest
religious feeling in all his doings, devoting his whole
life to the service of the Gods, and dying a martyr's
death because of his obedience to the divine voice;
and like Xenophon, he describes this service as the
exercise of a universal moral influence on others, and
particularly on youth. In his picture, too, the more
serious side in the character of Socrates is relieved
by a real kindness, an Athenian polish, a sparkling
cheerfulness and a pleasing humour. Of his social
virtues and his political courage Plato speaks in the
same terms as Xenophon, and adds thereto an ad-
mirable description of Socrates on military service. 2
Every trait which he mentions adds to the clearness
of that picture of moral greatness, so wonderful for
1 8ee the end of t lie Phaedo. 2 See page 66, note 2.
74
SOCRATES.
CHAP.
IV.
B. His
cJia/i'acter
reflecting
Greek pe-
culiarities.
its very originality, for the absence of all that is
studied and artificial about it, for its exclusion of
self-glorification and affectation. 1
Owing to its being a native growth, the Socratic
type of virtue bears, throughout, the peculiar impress
of the Greek mind. Socrates is not the insipid ideal
of virtue, which a superficial rationalism would make
of him, but he is a thorough Greek and Athenian,
taken, as it were, from the very marrow of his nation,
possessed of flesh and blood, and not merely the uni-
versal moral standard for all time. His much- lauded
moderation is free from the ascetic element, which it
seems always to suggest in modern times. Socrates
enjoys good company, although he avoids noisy
carousals ; 2 and if he does not make the pleasures of
the senses an object in life, no more does he avoid
them, when they are offered to him, nay, not even
when in excess. Thus the call for small cups in
Xenophon's banquet is not made for fear of indulging
1 Most of the traits and
anecdotes recorded by later
writers are in harmony with
this view of Socrates. Some
of them are certainly fictions.
Others may be taken from wri-
tings of pupils of Socrates,
which have been since lost, or
from other trustworthy sources.
They may be found in the fol-
lowing places. Cic. Tusc. iii.
15, 31 ; Off. i. 26 and 90 ;
Seneca, De Const. 18, 5; De
Ira, i. 15, 3 ; iii. 11, 2 ; ii. 7, 1 ;
Tranqu. An. 5, 2 ; 17, 4 ; Epist.
104, 27 ; Plin. H. Nat. vii. 18 ;
Pint. Educ. Pu. 14, p. 10; De
Adulat. 32, p. 70 ; Coh. Ira, 4,
p. 455 ; Tranqu. An. 10, p. 471 ;
Garrulit. 20 ; IHog. ii. 21, 24,
27, 30 ; vi. 8 ; Gell. N. A. ii. 1 ;
xix. 9, 9; Val. Max. viii. 8;
^lian,V.H. i. 16; ii. 11, 13,
36 ; iii. 28 ; ix. 7, 29 ; xii. 15 ;
xiii. 27, 32 ; Athen. iv. 157 c. ;
Stob. Flor. 17, 17 and 22.
Basil. De leg. Grsec. libr. Op.
II. 179, a. Themist. Orat. vii.
95, a. Sim-pi, in Epiet. Enchir.
c., 20, p. 218. A few others
have been or will be referred
to.
2 Plato, Symp. 220, A. ; conf.
174, A.
HIS CHARACTER. 76
too largely, but that exhilaration may not be too CHAP.
rapid. 1 Plato describes him as boasting that he can _
equally well take much or little, that he can surpass
all in drinking, without ever being intoxicated him-
self, 2 and represents him at the close of the banquet
as leaving all his companions under the table, and
pursuing his daily work, after a night spent over the
bowl, as if nothing had happened. Moderation here
appears with him not to consist in total abstinence
from pleasure, but in perfect mental freedom, neither
requiring pleasure, nor being ever overtaken by its
seductive influence. His abstemiousness in other
points is also recorded with admiration. 3 Numerous
passages, however, in Xenophon's ' Memorabilia ' 4
prove that his morality was far below our strict
standard of principles. The Grecian peculiarity of
affection for boys marks, indeed, his relations to
youth, but his character is above all suspicion of
actual vice, 6 and he treats with irony a supposed
1 Xen. Mem. 2, 26: fa 8e affection. Not only is there
fifjuv ol vaiSes niKpais KV\IL TTVK.- no allusion to it in the judicial
va firityeKcifaffiv, OVTUS oi> fiia- charge, but not even in Aris-
{opfvoi inrb TOV olvov fitdiitiv, tophanes, who would undoubt-
aA\' ava.Tffi6on.tvoi irpbs rb ircuyvt- edly have magnified the smal-
wSfinepov a<(>i6nf6a. lest suspicion into the gravest
2 Symp. 176, C. ; 220, A.; charge. The other comic poet s,
213, E. according to Athen., v. 21 U,
3 Xen. Mem. i. 2, 1 ; 3, 14. knew nothing of it. Nor does
We have already seen that Xenophon deem it necessary
Aristoxenus and his followers to refute this calumny, and
cannot prove the contrary. therefore the well-known story
4 i. 3, 14; ii. 1, 5; 2, 4; iii. of Plato's banquet has for its
11 ; iv. 5, D. Conf. Conv. iv. object far more the glorin'ca-
38. tion than the justification of
6 The cotemporaries of So- his teacher. On the other
crates seem to luive found no- hand, the relations of Socrates
tiling to object to in Socratic to Alcibiades, in the verses
76 SOCRATES.
CHAP, love-affair of his own. 1 At the same time, what
IV ' Greek in the presence of youthful beauty was proof
agairst a certain element of aesthetic pleasure, which
at least was the ground and origin, even though ( as in
his case) an innocent one, of deeper affection ? 2 The
odious excrescences of Greek morality called forth
his severest censure ; yet at the same time, accord-
ing to Xenophon, 3 and yEschines, 4 and Plato, 5 So-
crates described his own relations to his younger
friends by the name of Eros, or a passionate attach-
ment grounded on assthetic attractions. Not other-
wise may Grecian peculiarities be noticed in his
ethical or political views, nor is his theology free
from the trammels of the popular belief. How deeply
these lines had influenced his character may be seen
not only in his simple obedience 6 to the laws of his
country throughout life, and his genuine respect for
the state religion, 7 but far more also in the trials of
purporting to be written by 4 In his Alcibiades he speaks
Aspasia, which Athentcus com- of the love of Socrates for
municates or. che authority of Alcibiades. See Aristid. Or.
Herodicus, have a very sus- xlv. irepl p-^ropiKris, p. 30, 34.
picious look, and Tertulliaii, * Prot. beginning ; Symp.
Apbl. c. 46 mistakenly applies 177, D. ; 218, B. ; 222, A. ; not,
the words SiafyOelpfiv rovs vtovs to mention other expressions
to paederastia. In Juvenal for which Plato is answerable.
(Sat. ii. 10) Socratici citusdi 6 Plato, Apol. 28, E.
refer to the manners of his 7 XenopJion, Mem. i. 1, 2, as-
own time. sures us not only that Socrates
1 Xen. Mem. iv. 1, 2 ; Symp. took part in the public sacri-
4, 27; Plato, Symp. 213, C. ; fices, but that he was frequently
216, D. ; 222, B" ; Charm. 155, in the habit of sacrificing at
D. home. In Plato he invokes
2 Xen. Mem. i. 2, 29 ; 3, 8 ; Helios, Symp. 220, D. ; and his
Sym. 8, 19, 32, with which last words, according to the
Plato agrees. Phaedo, 118, A., were an earnest
Symp. 8, 2 and 24 ; Mem. commission to Crito to offer a
cock to YEsculapius. Often is
HIS CHARACTER. 77
his last days, when for fear of violating the laws, CHAP.
he scorned the ordinary practices of defence, and **'
after his condemnation refused to escape from
prison. 1 The epitaph which Simonides inscribed on
the tomb of Leonidas might very well be inscribed
on that of Socrates : He died to obey the state. 2
Deeply as Socrates is rooted in the national c - Pro-
character of Greece, there is about him a some- traits in
thing decidedly unlike a Greek, presenting a foreign
and even almost modern appearance. This it was
which made him appear to his cotemporaries a
thoroughly eccentric and singular person. This,
for a Greek so unintelligible, something, which
he described by one word as his singularity, 3 con-
sisted, according to Plato's account, 4 in a want of
agreement between his outward appearance and his
belief in oracles mentioned, good to himself, and much
which he always conscien- harm to his friends and de-
tiously obeyed (Mem. i. 3,4; pendants. The Apology speaks
Pluto, Appl. 21, B.) and the as if entreating the judges
use of which he recommended were unworthy of the speaker
to his friends (Xen. Mem. ii. and his country.
(5, 8; iv. 7, 10; Anabas. iii. 1, 2 Xen. says: irpoei\rro fj.a\\ov
5). He was himself fully per- rots vofiois tupevuv airoOavew 1)
suaded that he possessed an irapa.vofj.ui> fjv.
oracle in the truest sense, in 3 Plato, Symp. 221, C. : IIoA-
Ilie inward voice of his Sai/j.6- \a /jitv ovv &v TIS Kal &\\a t\oi
viov, and he also believed in 2KpaT7j tiraivtffat Kal Qav^da-ta
dreams and similar prognosti- . . . . rb 5e nySevl avdpcairwv
cations. (Plato, Crito, 44, A. ; Z^oiov iivai, /t^re r&v ita\a.iSiv
Pluedo, 60, D. ; Apol. 33, C.) /^Te rcav vvv UVTOW, TOVTO al-wv
1 This motive is represented iroirbs 6av/jLaros .... ofos 5e
by XvHojrfwn (Mem. iv. 4, 4) otnoa-l yejove T^V a.Toir'u\t> &v0pw-
and Plato (Apol. 34, D. ; Phaedo, iros Kal avrbs ol \6yoi avrov ov5'
1S, (.'.) as the decisive one, tfyvs &c tvpoi ns (rrr&v, ofrrc TUI>
although the Crito makes it vvv otfre r<av ira\<*iS>v.
ap]iear that a flight from 4 Symp. 215, A. ; 221, E.
Athens would have done no
78 SOCRATES.
CHAP, inward and real nature. In this respect he contrasts
IV
most strikingly with the mutual interpenetration of
both, which constitutes the usual classic ideal. On
the one hand we behold in Socrates indifference to
the outer world, originally foreign to the habits of
his countrymen ; on the other hand, a meditative-
ness unknown before. Owing to the former feature
there is about him a something prosy and dry, and,
if the expression may be allowed, philistine-like,
sharply contrasting with the contained beauty and
the artistic grace of life in Greece. Owing to the
latter there is about him something akin to the
revelation of a higher life, having its seat within,
in the recesses of the soul, and not fully explained in
its manifestations, and which even Socrates him-
self regarded as superhuman. In their account of
these two peculiarities both Plato and Xenophon
are agreed. Even from an outward point of view,
the Silenus-like appearance of Socrates, which Plato's
Alcibiades, 1 and Xenophon's Socrates himself 2 de-
scribe with so much humour, must rather have con-
cealed than exposed the presence of genius to the
eye of a Greek. But more than this, a certain
amount of intellectual stiffness, and an indifference
to what is sensibly beautiful, is unmistakeable in his
speech and behaviour. Take for instance the process
of catechising given in the ' Memorabilia,' 3 by which
a general of cavalry is brought to a knowledge of his
1 Symp. 215 ; conf. Thteet. crates a pleasing appearance,
14, 3,~E. buttMs is of course quileunte-
* Symp. 4, 19 ; 2, 19 ; Ifyiete- nable.
tus (Diss. iv. 11, 19) gives So- iii. 3.
HIS CHARACTER. 70
duties, or the formality with which things, 1 long CHAP.
familiar to his hearers, are proved, or the way in **'
which the idea of the beautiful is resolved into that
of the useful. 2 Or hear him, on grounds of expedi-
ency, advising conduct, which to us seems simply
abominable, 3 or in the Phsedrus 4 refusing to walk
out because he can learn nothing from trees and the
country, and taking exception in the Apology 5 to the
works of poets and artists, because they are the re-
sults of natural genius and inspiration, and not of
reflection. 6 Or see him in Xenophon's Symposium, 7
despite the universal custom of the ancients, 8 dancing
alone at home, in order to gain healthful exercise,
and justifying his conduct by the strangest of reflec-
tions ; unable even at table 9 to forget considerations
of utility. Taking these and similar traits into
account, there appears in him a certain want of
imagination, a one-sided prominence of the criti-
cal and intellectual faculties, in short a prosiness
which clashes with the poetry of Grecian life, and the
Symp. iii. 10, 9; iii. 11. M. Crasso, in foro, mihi crede,
iii. 8, 4. saltaret ; Pint. De vit. jud. 16,
1. 3, 14. 533, also the expressions in
230, D. Xeiwplwn : 'Opx^ffofj.ai v^i Afo.
This point will be subse- 'Efraitfa 5rj 4ye\curav airavrts.
quently discussed. And when Charmides found
" 22, C. Socrates dancing : rJ> /ieV ye
2, 17. TrpcoTOu e'eir \dyrtv Kal eSfiffa, ^
Compare Menexenus, 236, nalvoio, K. r. \. Of the same
C. : aA\a fifvroi ffol ye 5ei x d P'" character was his instruction
ffTt K&V o\fyou ft /ne in music under Connus, if the
airo^vvra opx^trairfleu, story were only true of his
&v ; and Cicero pro having received lessons with
Mur. : Nemo fere saltat so- the schoolboys. Plato, Eu-
brius, nisi forte insanit ; De thyd. 272, C.
Offic. iii. 19 : Dares hanc vim Xen. Symp. 3, 2.
80 SOCRATES.
CHAP, refined taste of an Athenian. Even Plato's Alcibiades 1
allows, that at first sight the discourses of Socrates
appear ridiculous and rude, dealing as they invari-
ably do with beasts of burden, smiths, tailors, and
tanners, and apparently saying the same thing in the
same words. Was not this the very objection raised
by Xenophon ? 2 How strange that plain unadorned
common sense must have appeared to his cotem-
poraries carefully avoiding all choice figures, and
using the simplest and most common expressions.
This peculiarity was not, however, the result of
any lack of taste, but of the profound originality of
his ideas, for which customary figures were insuffi-
cient. Yet again, sometimes the soul of the philo-
sopher, diving into its own recesses, so far lost
itself in this labour as to be insensible to external
impressions, and at other times gave utterance to
enigmatical sayings, which appeared strange to it iu
a wakeful state. Serious and fond of meditation 3
as was Socrates, it not unfrequently happened that
1 Symp. 221, E. Conf. Kal- <rv, ?<|>TJ, Si SwKpares, fKeiva. ra
licles in Gorgias 490, C. : irepl auras \eyeis & eyw ird\ai irore
fftria \eyets Kal irora al larpovs ffov fJKovffa. The like complaint
Kal <p\vapias .... arexv&s ye and the like answer is met
ael (TKure'as re Kal yvapeas Kal pa- with in Plato's Gorgias, 490,
yeipovs \6yuv Kal larpovs ovSev E. Conf. 497, C. ; fffuxpii Kal
Trauei, &>s Trepl TOVTWV JHJUV ovra crreva. epcoT^/Aara.
Tbv \6yov. * Accordingly in the Aristo-
2 Mem. i. 2, 37 : 'O 5e Kpirlas- telian problems, xxx. 1, 953, a,
oAA.cfc Ttav 8e rot ffe airexeffOat, 2G, he is reckoned amongst the
e<pri, Sefoei, & ~2.wKpa.Tes, rS>v melancholy, which is not at
ffKirrewv Kal TOV reKT&vtav Kal variance with tlie gentle firm-
TUV xa.*Ke<av, Kal 7ap olfj.ai av- ness (rb a-r6.ai\t.ov) which Aris-
roiis ' tfSri KaraTerpfyBai StaOpv- totle (Rhet. ii. 1 5) assigns to
\oujueVow 6irb ffov. Again in iv. him.
4, 6 : al 6 per 'lir-irias- ert yap
HIS CHARACTER. 81
deep in thought he remained, for a longer or shorter CHAP.
time, indifferent to the outer world, 1 and stood there
as one absent in mind. According to Plato, he once
remained in this state, standing on the same spot,
from one day to the next. 2 So energetically did he
struggle with himself to attain an insight into his
every motive. In doing this, he discovered a resi-
duum of feelings and impulses, which he watched
with conscientious attention without being able to
explain them from what he knew of his own inner
life. Hence arose his belief in those divine revela-
tions, which he thought to enjoy. And not only
was he generally convinced that he stood and acted
in the service of God, but he also held that super-
natural suggestions were communicated to him, not
only through the medium of public oracles, 3 but also
in dreams, 4 and more particularly by a peculiar kind
of higher inspiration, which goes by the name of the
Socratic
1 Plato, Symp. 174, D. Vol- stare solitus, etc. Philop. De
qitardscn, D. Dsemon. d. Socr. an. R. 12, places the occa-
25, 63 and Alberti, Socr. 148 sion during the battle of
have entirely mistaken the Delium.
meaning of the text in suppo- * Conf. p. 76, 7, and 89.
sing that it attributes to So- * Conf. p. 60, 2. In the
crates any ecstatic states. passage here quoted Socrates
* Symp. 220, C. The circum- refers to dreams in which the
stances may indeed be regarded deity had commanded him to
:is a fact ; still we do not know devote himself to his philoso-
t'rom what source Plato derived phical activity. In the Crito
his knowledge of it, nor whether 44, A., a dream tells him that
llu> authority which he follow- his death will follow on the
c(l had not exaggerated the third day.
time during which Socrates * Volqvardsen, Das Daemo-
stood there. Favorinus in mum d. Socr. und seine Inter-
(ii-U. X. A. ii. 1, makes the one preten. Kiel, 1862. Ribbing,
<><v;iion into many, and says Ueber Socra*es' Daimonion
SOCRATES.
CHAP.
Even among the ancients many regarded these
____ _! _ suggestions as derived from intercourse with a special
() The an( j personally-existing genius. 1 of which Socrates
not a per- boasted; in modern times this view was for a long
8 time the dominant one. 2 It was no doubt somewhat
(Socratische Studien II., Up-
sala Universitets Arskrift,
1870.
1 The bill of accusation
against Socrates seems to have
understood the Sai/j.6vtov in this
sense, since it charges him
with introducing erepo naiva
$a.ifj.6via in the place of the
Gods of the state ; nor does
Ribbing's (Socrat. Stud. II. 1)
remark make against this, that
Meletus (in Plato Apol. 26, B.)
thus explained his language ; So-
crates not only denies the Gods
of Athens but all and every
God; the heavenly beings,
whose introduction he attri-
butes to him not being regarded
as Gods, just as at a later time
Christians were called &9eoi
Chough worshipping God and
Christ. Afterwards this view
appears to have been dropped,
thanks to the descriptions of
Xenophon and Plato, and does
not recur for some time, even
in spurious works attributed to
these writers. Even Cicero,
Divin. i. 54, 122, does not
translate $ai[j.6viov by genius,
but by 'divinum quoddam,'
and doubtless Antipater, whose
work he was quoting, took it
in the same sense. But in
Christian times the belief in a
genius became universal, be-
cause it fell in with the current
belief in daemons. For in-
stance, Plut. De Genio So-
cratis, c. 20 ; Ma.r: Tyr. xiv. 3 ;
Apuleivg, De Deo Socratis, the
Neoplatonists, and the Fathers,
who, however, are not agreed
whether his genius was a good
one or a bad one. Plutarch,
and after him Apiileius, men-
tion the view that by the 5ai-
fj.6viov must be understood a
power of vague apprehension,
by means of which he could
guess the future from prognos-
tications or natural signs.
2 Compare Tiedemann, Geist
der spekulat. Philosophic, ii.
1 6 ; Melnerx, Ueber den Genius
des Sokr. (Verm. Schriften,
iii. 1); Gesch. d. Wissensch.
II. 399, 538, Biihle, Gesch. d.
Phil. 371, 388 ; Krug, Gesch. d.
alt en Phil. p. 158, Laxavlr, too
(Socrates, Leben, 1 858, p. 20)
in his uncritical and unsatis-
factory treatise respecting the
SaifMi'iifioif. believes it to be a real
revelation of the deity, or even
a real genius, and even Vol-
qnardsen. gathers as the con-
clusion of his careful, and in
many respects meritorious, dis-
quisition, that a real divine
voice warned Socrates. The
older literature in Oka-rim, 148,
185, Brucker, I. 543, which in-
cludes many supporters of the
opinion that the genius of
Socrates was only his own rea-
son. Further particulars in
Kniff, 1. c. and Lclvt, Demon de
Socrates, 163.
HIS CHARACTER.
humiliating in the eyes of rationalising admirers,
that a man otherwise so sensible as Socrates should
have allowed himself to be ensnared by such a super-
stitious delusion. Hence attempts were not wanting
to excuse him, either on the ground of the universal
superstition of his age and nation, or else of his
having a physical tendency to fanaticism. 1 Some
even went so far as to assert that the so-called
supernatural revelations were a shrewd invention, 2
or a result of his celebrated irony. 3 Such a view,
CHAP.
IV.
1 The first -named excuse is
universal. Marsilius Ficinus
(Theol. Platon. xiii. 2, p. 287)
had assumed in Socrates, as
well as in other philosophers, a
peculiar bodily disposition for
ecstasy, referring their suscep-
tibility for supernatural reve-
lations to their melancholy
temperament. The personality
of the dtcmon is not however
called in question by him or by
his supporters (Olmrius, 147).
Modern writers took refuge in
the same hypothesis in order
to explain in Socrates the pos-
sibility of a superstitious belief
in a Stu/j.foioi'. For instance,
Tiedemann, 'The degree of ex-
ertion, which the analysis of ab-
stract conception requires, has,
in some bodies, the effect of
mechanically predisposing -to
ecstasy and enthusiasm.' ' So-
crates was so cultivated that
deep t hought produced in him
a dul ness of sense, and came
near io the sweet dreams of
the tKffTa.riK.oi.' ' Those inclined
to ecstasy mistake suddenly
rising thoughts for inspira-
tions.' 'The extraordinarv
condition of the brain during
rapture affects the nerves of
the abdomen and irritates
them. To exercise the intellect
immediately after a meal or to
indulge in deep thought pro-
duces peculiar sensations in
the hypochondriacal.' In the
same strain is Meiners, Verm.
Schr. iii. 48, Gesch. d. Wis-
sensch. ii. 538. Conf. Schwarze,
Historische Untersuchung : war
Socrates ein Hypochondrist ?
quoted by Kruy, Gesch. d. alt en
Phil. 2 A. p. 163.
2 Plessi-ng, Osiris and So-
crates, 185,' who supposes that
Socrates had bribed the Del-
phic oracle in order to produce
a political revolution, and
vaunted his intercourse with a
higher spirit. Chauvin in
Olearius.
3 Fraguler, Sur 1'ironie de
Socra f e in the Memoires de
1' Academic des Inscriptions, iv.
368, expresses the view that So-
crates understood by the 8a<-
(JL&VIOV his own natural intelli-
gence and power of combi-
nation, which rendered it pos-
sible for him to make right
o 2
84
SOCRATES.
CHAP.
IV.
however, is hard to reconcile with the tone in which,
on the testimony of both Plato and Xenophon, So-
crates speaks of the suggestions of the Satpoviov,
or with the value which he attaches to these sugges-
tions on the most important occasions. 1 To explain
the phenomenon by the irritability of a sickly body
falls not far short of deriving it from the fancy of a
monomaniac, and reduces the great reformer of
philosophy to the level of a madman. 2 All these
explanations, however, can now be dispensed with,
Schleiermacher having shown, 3 with the general ap-
"Socratesfis probation of the most competent judges, 4 that by
an inward
oracle. guesses respecting the future ; 1836) has boldly asserted, < que
somewhat ironically he had Socrate etait un fou ' a cate-
which he
represented this as a matter
of pure instinct, of Otiov or
Of la /wTpa, and employed for
this purpose Saifdviov and simi-
lar expressions. He remarks,
however, that Socrates had no
thought of a genius famili-
aris, Sai/jiSfiov here being used
as an adjective and not as a
substantive. Similarly Rolliti
in his Histoire ancienne, ix. 4,
2 ; and Barthelemy, Voyage du
jeune Anacharsis, treats the
expressions used respecting the
SeujuWr in Plato's Apology as
plaisanterie, and considers it
an open question whether So-
crates realty believed in his
genius. On others sharing the
view, see Lelut. 1. c. p. 163.
1 Xen. Mem. iv. 8, 4. Plato,
Apol 31, C.; 40, A.; 41, D.
* Many have spoken of the
superstition and fanaticism of
Socrates in a more modest way,
but comparatively recently
Lclut (Du Demon 'de Socrate,
gory, n wc e places
amongst others not only Car-
dan and Swedenborg, but
Luther, Pascal, Rousseau and
others. His chief argument is
that Socrates not only be-
lieved in a real and personal
genius, but in his hallucina-
tions believed that he audi-
bly heard its voice. Those
who rightly understand Plato,
and can distinguish what is
genuine from what is false,
will not need a refutation of
these untruths.
3 Platan's Werke, i. 2, 432.
4 Brandis, Gesch. d. Gri.
Rom. Phil. ii. a. 60. Hitter,
Gesch. d. Phil. ii. 40. Her-
mann, Gesch. u. Syst. d. Plato
i. 236. SocJier, Uber Platon's
Schriften p. 99. Cmisi/i in the
notes to his translation of
Plato's Apology p. 335. Krisclie,
Forschungen, 227. Ribbing,
16. Conf. Hegel, Gesch. d.
Phil. ii. 77. Ant too (Platon's
HIS CHARACTER.
the &ai/j,6viov in the sense of Socrates, no genius, no
separate and distinct person, can be understood, but
only indefinitely some heavenly voice or divine
revelation. No passage in Plato or Xenophon speaks
of Socrates holding intercourse with a genius. 1 We
only hear of a divine or heavenly sign, 2 of a voice
heard by Socrates, 3 of some supernatural guidance
by which many warnings were vouchsafed to him. 4
All that these expressions imply is, that Socrates was
conscious within of divine revelations, but how
produced and whence coming they say absolutely
nothing, 5 nay their very indefiniteness proves clearly
enough, that neither Socrates nor his pupils had any
Leben and Schriften, p. 482),
who takes Saip.ovwv for a sub-
stantive meaning the deity,
does not see therein a genius
but only a Qtiov.
1 The passage Mem. i. 4. 14 ;
^TCLV Ot 0Ol 7T^7ra>0"lJ', WffTTfp (T0\
proves nothing, as o-uju/3ouXous
is used as a metonym for <ri/ju-
CHAP.
IV.
- Plato, Phiedr. 242, B. : ri>
Sa.tfi6viov re KO.\ TO flw6bs irrj/j.tUi'
(not yiyvtffdai tytvfTo, Kai rua
<jxaV7]v e8oa auTooe ctKovcrai. Rep.
iv. 496, C. : rb 8at(j.6vtvt> a^nt-lov.
Kuthy. 272, E. : 4yevero TO flca-
Qbs ffrjiJLf'ioi', ib Sai/idi/ioc. Apol.
50 ; fb TO 6tov armeiov - rb
<itt0oy (TT)/ue(o/. Ibid. 41, D. c.
T^ ffflUflOV.
:t Plato, Apol. 81, D. : ipol S
TOUT' iffrlv IK iratSbs ap^aptvov,
$uv4\ TIS yiyvoiifvn], Xen. Apol.
1 1' : OeoO Quid].
1 Pluto, 1. c. : Sn /ao fleloV TI
KOI Sai/j.6viov yiyvfrcu. Also 40,
A. : TJ flo>9vtd fjiot /jLavTiK^j rj rov
Theset. 151, A.: TO
pot baifi6viov. Eu-
thyphro 3, B. : on 5$) <rv TO 5at-
fj.6viov tpfjs aavTw fKouTTore yly-
veffOai.Xen. Mem. i. 1, 4 : TO
Satpoviov 6<pTj ffrtfjiaivfiv. iv. 8, 5. :
rtvai/Tuadri rb Sai^vtov. Symp.
8, 5. Even the spurious writ-
ings, Xenophon ? s Apology and
Plato's Alcibiades do not go
further; and the Theages.
128, D., with all its romance
respecting the prophecies of
the Saifj.6vtov, expresses itself
throughout indefinitely, nor
need the 4>tw7j TO) Saip.ovlov p.
128, E. be taken for a person.
The spuriousness of the Theages.
notwithstanding Socher's de-
fence needs no further proof,
especially after being exhaus-
tively shown by Hermann, p.
427.
* Doubtless Socrates regarded
God or the deity as its ultimate
source. But he expresses nc
opinion as to whether it came
herefrom.
SOCRATES.
CHAP.
IV.
very clear notion on the subject. 1 These revelations,
moreover, always refer to particular actions, 2 and
1 It is much the same thing
whether rb Saifj.6vtov be taken
for a substantive or an adjec-
tive. The probable rights of
the case are, as Kriscke, Forsch.
229 remarks, that Xenophon
uses it as a substantive = rb
Qelov or 6 6ebs, whereas Plato
uses it as an adjective, ex-
plaining it as Sai/jLoviov ffr]fj.e1cv,
and says 5ai/j.6vi6i> fj.oi yiyverai.
The grammar will admit of
either. Conf . Arist. Rhet. ii. 23,
1398 a, 15. When, therefore,
Ast cites Xenophon against
Plato's explanation of Sai/uoi/ia
as Saifj.6via irpd.yfj.ara, he probably
commits a (lerdfiacris fls &\\o
yevos. The very difference be-
tween Xenophon and Plato
proves how loosely Socrates
spoke of the 5aip6uoi>.
2 This applies to all the in-
stances of its intervention
mentioned by Plato and Xeno-
phon. They are the following :
(1) Xen. Mem. iv. 8, 5, where
Socrates, when urged to pre-
pare a defence, replies : a\\a
vfy rbv Ai'a, $7877 ft-ov emxetpovvros,
(ppovriffat rrjs trpbs robs Siicaaras
airo\oyias rjvavriit>eij rb $ai/j.6i>iov.
(2) Plato Apol. 31, D.: Why
did not Socrates busy himself
with political matters ? The
Saifj.6viov was the reason : rovr'
effnv 'o fj.oi evavrmvrai ra vo\t-
riKa irpdrrew. (3) Ibid, (after
his condemnation) : a singular
occurrence took place, r> yap
eliadvtd fiat fj.avriK^ j\ rov Satpoviov
tv fi^v r$ irpSffOfv %p6va> iravrl
iravv irvKvfy ael $v /col irdw tirl
ff/jLiKpois evai>riovfj.fvi), el n /nf\-
\oi/jii fj.^i 6p6cas irpdett> vvvi St. . . .
e^iAvri etaQev o'lKodtv rjvavri-
rb rov Oeou (TTj/ueTof, ovre
^ a.vifia.ivov evravQol eirl rb
.., v, oiir ff rf \6y<p
ouSo^toD fj.e\\ovrl n epeiv Kalroi
ev &\\ois Xoyofi iro\\ax.ov 8117 jue
e7re<r%e KeyovTO. fiera^v. (4)
Plato, Theret. 151, A. : if such
as have withdrawn from my
society, again return, eViois
fj.ev rb yiyv6/j.ev6v fj.oi ^ai^viov
airoK(i>\vet vve~ivai, eviois Se ea.
Add to these cases a few others
in which Socrates himself more
or less jokes about the 5ai[j.6viov,
which deserve to be mentioned
because it there appears in the
same character as elsewhere.
(5) Xen. Symp. 8, 5, where
Antisthenes throws in Socrates'
teeth : rare fj,fv rb 8ai/j.6viov
irpo(paffL6fA.ei>os ovSta\eyri ju.cu Tore
S'a\\ov rov etpiefj.evos. (6) Plato
Phfedr. 242, B., when Socrates
wished to depart : rb ^ai^.6vi6v
re Kal eleadbs o~-n/j.eI6i> /act ylyveo~6ai
eytvero ael 6e /xf eTriff^ei ft by
fj.f\\ca irpdrreiv Kal riva (ptavrif
eSo|a avr6Qev aKovffai, 5} fJ.e OVK
ea airlevat irplv kv cKpoaicaffwfJ.ai,
&s n 7ifj.aprT)K6ra (Is rb Qetov.
(7) Ibid. Euthyd. 272, E. ; as
Socrates was about to leave
the Lyceum, eyevero rb elaObs
fffine'iov rb oai/*6viov, he therefore
sat down again, and soon after
Euthydemus and Dionysodorus
really came in. In all these
cases the Sa^vtov appears to
have been an inward voice de-
terring the philosopher from a
particular action. Even the
more general statement that
the $atfj.6i>ioi> always made ite
warnings heard whenever So-
HIS CHARACTER.
according to Plato assume the form of prohibitions.
Sometimes the Sai/Aoviov stops him from saying or
doing something. 1 It only indirectly points out
what should be done, by approving what it does not
forbid. In a similar way it indirectly enables
Socrates to advise his friends by not hindering
him from approving their schemes, either by word
or by silence. 2 The subjects respecting which the
crates thought of a political viov only have reference to par-
career, falls in with this con- ticular future actions (not only
ception of
sense the passage in the Re-
public vi. 496, D. should be
understood, when Socrates re-
marks that most of those who
had the capacity for philosophy
were diverted therefrom by
In a similar of Socrates, but of others), from
which it dissuades. The two
latter authorities are, however,
worthless.
' Apol. 31, D. : Sri p.oi 6e16v
n /col ^aifj.6viov yiyverai ....
e/tol 8e TOUT' la-rlv IK ircuSbs aod-
other interests, unless peculiar ptvov <pu>vfi TIS yiyvontvi), $) ftrav
circumstances kept them, such yevijTai atl airorptiret pe TOVTO
as sickness, which was a hin-
drance to political life. rb
8' t)fjLfTtpo>' OVK &tov \eyeiv rb
Saifj.6viov a'Tifie'iov t) yap irov nvi
& &c /ueAXw irprreiv, irp<rrpirti
3 ofarorc. Phaedr. 242, C.
2 From the Platonic state-
ments respecting the Scu^di/iov
ovStvl ruv f/j.irpoaOfy which have just been given,
The heavenly sign Xenophon's statements differ,
making it not only restraining
but preventing, and not only
having reference to the actions
&\\if
ytyove.
keeps Socrates true to his
philosophical calling, by op-
posing him whenever he con-
templates taking up anything of Socrates but to those of other
else, as for instance, politics, people. Mem. i. 1, 4 (Apol. 12) :
Consequently, not even this
passage compels us to give
another meaning to its utter-
ances than they bear according
to Plato's express words, as
conveying a judgment respect-
ing the admissibility of a
definite action, either contem-
plated or commenced by So-
crates. Even at the commence-
ment of the spurious ' Alci-
biados,' this is all that is dis-
yap Sai^viov l$t\
/col iro\\o'is -ruiv %vv6vr<av Trpomj-
ydptve T& /uj iroielc, TCI 8e ft))
troittv, us rov Saiftovlov wpo<T7j/xaj-
vorros xol TO<S yuev irtiBontvois
avrep a-uvtQfpt, -rots 8e py itfiOo-
ntvoa n(rffj.f\f. Ibid. iv. 3, 12 :
aol 8' ?<^>TJ (Euthydemus), &
2(aKparfs, toiKafftv $TI <pi\tKurfpov
^ rols &\\ots xp^aQai (sc. of 9to\)
efye /trjSe iirfpuiTta/juvin tnr6 ITOV
irpoffrt/j.aivouffi (rot a T
cussed, and in the Theages. 128, xoi & yA\. Still both statements
CHAI>.
IV.
D., the prophecies of
may be harmonised as in the
Sd SOCRATES.
CHAP heavenly voice makes itself heard are in point of value
and character veiy different. Besides a concern of
such deep personal interest to Socrates as his judicial
condemnation, besides a question having such a far-
reaching influence on his whole activity as that
whether he should take part in public life or not, it
expresses itself on occasions quite unimportant. 1 It
is in fact a voice so familiar to Socrates and his
friends, 2 that whilst regarded as a something enigma-
tical, mysterious, and unknown before, affording, too,
a special proof of divine providence, it can neverthe-
less be discussed without awe and mystery in easy
and even in flippant language. The facts of the
phenomenon resolve themselves into this, that not
unfrequently Socrates was kept back by a dim feeling
based on no conscious consideration, in which he
discerned a heavenly sign and a divine hint, from
carrying out some thought or intention. Were he
asked why this sign had been vouchsafed to him,
from his point of view the reply would be, because
that from which it deterred him would be harmful to
himself or others. 3 In order, therefore, to justify
text. Evidently Plato is more before all things at proving
accurate. His language is far Socrates' divination to be the
more definite than that of same as other divinations, and
Xenophon, and is throughout so defending his teacher from the
consistent, witness the various charge of religious innovation,
cases mentioned in the previous As to the special peculiarity of
note. Xenophon, as is his wont, the Socratic Sat/j.6viov and its
confined himself to what caught inner processes, we can look to
the eye, to the fact that the Plato for better information.
Sainovutv enabled Socrates to ' vdm eirl <r/j.iKpois. See p.
judge of actions whose conse- 86, 2.
quences were uncertain, all the - irdvv wvKvfi. Ibid.
more so because he aimed 3 It will be subsequently
CHARACTER.
si.
the utterances of the ^aL^oviov^ and to give its CHAP.
raison d'etre', he attempted to prove that the actions
which it approved or occasioned were the most
beneficial and advantageous. 1 The Saipoviov appeared
therefore to him as an internal revelation from
heaven respecting the result of his actions, in a word
as an internal oracle. As such it is expressly
included, both by Xenophon 2 and Plato, 3 under the
general conception of divination, and placed on a par
with divination by sacrifice and the flight of birds.
Of it is therefore true what Xenophon's Socrates
remarks respecting all divination, that it may only
be resorted to for cases which man cannot discover
himself by reflection. 4
shown that Socrates was, on
the one hand thoroughly con-
vinced of the care of God for
man down to the smallest
matters, and on the other
hand was accustomed to esti-
mate the value of every action
by its consequences. It fol-
lowed herefrom that to his
mind the only ground on which
God could forbid an action
was because of its ill-conse-
quences.
1 See Xen. Mem. iv. 8, 5,
where Socrates observes that
the 5aifj.6i>iot> forbad him to pre-
pare a defence, and then pro-
ceeds to discuss the reasons
why the deity found an inno-
cent death better for him than
a longer life. In Plato, Apol.
40, 3, he concludes, from the
silence of the Saifudviov during
Ids defence, that the condemna-
1 ion to which it led would be
for him a benefit.
2 Xen. Mem. i. 1, 3 ; iv. 3, 12;
i. 4, 14. Conf. Apol. 12.
3 Apol.40,A.;Phsed.242,C.;
Euthyphro, 3, B.
4 Xcti. Mem. i. 1, 6: Ta /xej>
avayKaia (TWt0cv\fve Kal irparrfiv
us <li>6(j.tti' api(n' a.v
jrfpl 6e rtai> a.8r)\ii>v birus
PTICTOITO /j.avrfvffoiJ.fvovs eirejuirej/
e* iroirjTt'a. For this reason,
therefore, divination was re-
quired: TiKTOvucbv fj.ev yap i)
Xa\KevnKbi> ?) yttapyiKbv ^ dvOpu-
Tr<av apxiKby fy T>V TOIOVTCOV tpywv
e^eraar inky i) KnyKfriKbv fy O'IKOVO-
irdvra TO, rotavra /J.a6r]fj.ara Kal
OLvQp&tiov yi>ufj.ri alperea 3v6fj.te
flvat TO. 8e p-fyiaTO. riav Iv rov-
TOIS 6<prj TOI/S Ofovs eavro'ts Kara-
\fiireffdat 5>v ovSff Sri\oi' tlvai
rots avOpuirois. The greatest
things, however, as is imme-
diately explained, are the con-
sequences of actions, the ques-
tion whether thev are useful
!>() SOCRATES.
L'HAP. Herewith the whole field of philosophical inquiry
' is excluded from the province of the Sat/jboviov. This
00 Limi- field Socrates, more than any one of his predecessors,
claimed for intelligent knowledge and a thorough
understanding. As a matter of fact, no instance
occurs of a scientific principle or a general moral law
being referred to the bai^ovLov. Nor must the sage's
conviction of his own higher mission be confounded
with his belief in the heavenly sign, nor the deity by
whom he considered himself commissioned tj sift-
men be identified with the SaipoviovS The fact
that Socrates thought to hear the heavenly voice
from the time when he was a boy, ought to be
sufficient evidence to warn against such an error ; 2
for at that time he cannot possibly have had any
thought of a philosophic calling. That voice, more-
over, according to Plato, always deterring, never
prompting, 3 cannot have been the source of the
positive command of the deity to which Socrates
or detrimental to the doer. &picna
Accordingly Socrates observes ' This was often done in
that it is madness to think to former times ; for instance by
be able to dispense with divi- Meiners, Verm. Schrift. iii. 24,
nation, and to do everything and still more so by Lclut, 1. c.
by means of one's own intelli- p. 113, who sees in the 9ebs
gence (and as he afterwards from whom Socrates derived
adds, aOefjuffra iroie1) : Sai/novay his vocation a proof of his
8e TOVS (jMvreuofj.ei'ovs, a TO?S belief in a genius. The same
avdpiatrois !8o>/cai/ of Oeol fj.aBov<n mistake is committed by Vol-
SiaKpivetv, examples of which quardsen, 1. c. p. 9, 12, against
are then given. Conf. iv. 3, 12, whose view see Albet-ti, Socr.
where /MUTMC^, and also the 56.
Socratic ^OJ/TIKTJ, is said to - &c ircuSds. See above p.
refer to consequences (TO ffvp- 87, 1.
tpepovra, TO oiroij ( rd' / uei'a), and 3 See p. 87, 2.
the appropriate means (77 &v
HIS CHARACTER. 91
referred his activity as a teacher. 1 Nor is it ever CHAP.
deduced therefrom, either by Xenophon or by Plato.
Socrates indeed says that the deity had given him the
task of sifting men, that the deity had forced him to
this line of life ; 2 but he never says that he had
received this commission from the &aifj,6vi,ov. 3 To
this he is only indebted for peculiar assistance in his
philosophic calling, which consists more particularly
in its dissuading him from proving faithless to his
calling by meddling with politics. 4
Lastly, the Saipoviov has been often regarded as
the voice of conscience, 5 but this view is at once too
wide and too narrow. Understanding by conscience
the moral consciousness in general, and more particu-
larly the moral sense as far as this finds expression
in the moral estimate of our every action, its moni-
tions are not confined to future things as are the
monitions of the Socratic Satfj,6viov. Nay, more,
it more frequently makes itself felt in the first
place by the approval or disapproval following upon
1 See p. 60, 2 ; 82, 1. Griech. Phil. i. 243 is a modi-
* Plato, Apol. 23, B. ; 28, D. ; fication of the above), lireiten-
33, C. ; Theset. 150, C. back, Zeitschrift fiir das Gym-
3 It is not true, as Vol- nasialwesen, 1863, p. 491) ;
Mil
qnardsen, 1. c. B., says, that llotscker, Arist. 256.
in Plato, Apol. 31, D., Socrates too, 1. c. 27, defends this view,
mentions the Sai^vtov as the observing, however, that the
lirst and exclusive aXfiov of his Sai^viov (1) only manifests
mode of life. He there only itself as conscientia antecedens
attributes to the Saifidfiov his and concomitans, not as con-
ubstinence from politics, not scientia subsequens ; and (2)
his attention to philosophy. that its meaning is not ex-
1 Sct> ]>. 86, 2. hausted with the conception of
' Stapfer, Biogr. Univers. T. conscience, but that it figures
xlii. Socrate, p. 531 ; Urandix, as 'practical moral tact in re-
(Joscli. d. Griecli. Rom. Phil, spect of personal relations and
ii. a, (JO (Gesch. d. Entwick. d. particular actions.'
2 ^ SOCRATES.
CHAP, actions. Again, conscience exclusively refers to
the moral value or worthlessness of an action,
whereas the heavenly sign in Socrates always bears
reference to the consequences of actions. Therein
Plato, no less than Xenophon, bees a peculiar kind
of prophecy. Allowing that Socrates was occasion-
ally mistaken as to the character of the feelings and
impulses which appeared to him revelations, that
uow and then he was of opinion that the deity had
forbidden him something for the sake of its preju-
dicial consequences when the really forbidding power
was his moral sense, yet the same cannot be said of
all the utterances of the Saipcvwv. Doubtless in
deterring him from taking up politics, the real
motive lay in the feeling that a political career was
incompatible with his conviction of an important
higher calling, to which he had devoted his life. It
may, therefore, be said that in this case a scruple of
conscience had assumed the form of a heavenly voice.
But in forbidding to prepare a speech for judicial
defence, this explanation will no longer apply. Here
the only explanation which can be given of the
heavenly voice, is that such a taking in hand of his
own personal interests did not commend itself to the
sage's line of thought, and that it appeared unworthy
of him to defend himself otherwise than by a plain
statement of the truth requiring no preparation. 1
1 Volquardsen 1. c. confounds Apol. 17, A., as meaning that it
two things in explaining the was not a question of a simple
prohibition, mentioned by Xen. defence, but of a defence in
Mem. iv. 8, 4, to prepare a the usual legal style with all
defence in the sense of Pluto, the tricks and manoeuvres of
HIS CHARACTER. f
All this, however, has little to do with judgments CHAP.
respecting what is morally admissible or not, and
has much to do with the questions as to what is
suited or unsuited to the individual character of the
philosopher. Still less can the decision respecting
the receiving hack pupils 1 who have once deserted
him, be referred to conscience. The question here
really was as to the capacity of the respective persons
to profit by his instructions. It involved, therefore,
a criticism of character. The jokes, too, which
Socrates and his friends permitted themselves as to
the Sat[A6viov z were wholly out of place, if the
Scufjioviov were conscience. As far as they are founded
on fact, they afford a proof that the Saipoviov must
l)e distinguished from moral sense or conscience :
and it is quite in harmony herewith to hear Socrates
say, 3 that the heavenly voice often made itself heard
on quite unimportant occasions. Kemembering fur-
ther that Socrates was more than anyone else, perhaps,
bent on referring actions to clear conceptions, and
accordingly excluded from the field of prophecy, and
therefore from the province of the Sapovtov, every-
an orator. In Xenophon's ac- very much worthy of himself,
count there is not a word of But as Cron in Eos. i. 17~>
this. Had this been his mean- observes : what idea must we
ing, it must somehow have form to ourselves of Socrates,
been indicated in the sequel ; if he required the assistance of
it would have been said that the Sa.in6viov to keep him back
the $aifi6i>ioi> kept him from de- from that which he clearly
fending himself, because a de- saw to be incompatible with
fence in keeping with his prin- his principles 1
ciples would have been useless ; ' See above p. 86, 2, No. 4.
it is by no means a matter of 2 Ibid. No. 6, 7.
course that he would not have * Ibid. No. 3.
been able to get up a speech
94 SOCRATES.
CHAP, thing that might be known by personal reflection, 1
1_ . we shall see how little right we have to understand
the S(u/j,oviov as having principally or wholly to do
with the moral value of an action.
(d) PMlo- The heavenly voice appears rather to be the
xophical
ea-plaiia- general form, which a vivid, but in its origin unex-
9ewiw lf! Pl red sense of tne propriety of a particular action
assumed for the personal consciousness of Socrates. -
The actions to which this sense referred could, as we
have seen, be most varied in content and importance.
Quite as varied must the inward processes and
motives have been out of which it grew. It
might be some conscientious scruple pressing on the
sense of the sage without his being fully conscious
thereof. It might be some apprehension of the
consequences of a step, such as sometimes rises as a
first impression with all decidedness in the experi-
enced observer of men and of circumstances, before it
is even possible for him to account to himself for the
reasons of his misgiving. It might be that an action
in itself neither immoral nor inappropriate, jarred
on Socrates' feelings, as not being in harmony witli
his peculiar mode of being and conduct. It might
be that on unimportant occasions all those unaccount-
able influences and impulses came into play, which
contribute so much to our mental attitude and de-
1 See p. 89, 4. of which lie had discovered.
2 The last remark follows Xor does it conflict herewith,
not only from what has been that after the heavenly voice
stated, p. 89, 4, but it is also has made itself heard, lie after-
inconceivable that Socrates wards considers what win have
could have referred to a hig-her led the Gods to thus reveal
inspiration impulses the sources their will.
HIS CHARACTER.
visions ; all the more so in proportion as the object ('HAP.
itself affords less definite grounds for decision. In __!
this respect the Satpovtov has been rightly called ' the
inner voice of individual tact,' ' understanding by tact
a general sense of propriety in word and action as
exemplified in the most varied relations of life in
small things as well as in great. 2 This sense Soc-
rates early noticed in himself as unusually strong, 3
and subsequently by his peculiarly keen and unwearied
observation of himself and other men he developed
it to such a pitch of accuracy, that it was seldom
or as he believed never at fault. Its psychologi-
cal origin was, however, concealed from his own
consciousness. It assumed for him from the begin-
ning the appearance of a foreign influence, a higher
revelation, an oracle. 4
Herein is seen the strength of the hold which
the beliefs of his countrymen had over Socrates ; 5
1 Hermann, Platonismus i. The genius of Socrates is not
236 : similarly Krlsehe, For- Socrates himself. . . . but an
schung. i. 231. oracle, which, however, is not
2 The objections hereto raised external, but subjective, his
by Volqvardxen, pp. <56, 63, and oracle. It bore the form of
Alberti, Socr. 68, are partly knowledge, which was, how-
answered by the argument ever, connected with a certain
which has preceded. Besides, unconsciousness.
Ihey have more reference to 5 Krixche I.e.: What is not
words than to things. So far in our power, what our nature
:is this is the case, there is no cannot bear, and what is not
use in disputing. By tact we naturally found in our im-
aoderatand not only social but pulses or our reflections, is
moral tact, not only acquired involuntary, or according to
but natural tact, and this word the notion of the ancients,
seems very appropriate to ex- heavenly : to this category be-
pn-ss the sense which Socrates long enthusiasm and prophecy,
described as the Sai/j.6fiov. the violent throb of desire, the
3 See p. 88, 3. mighty force of feelings.
4 Zfcp02,Gesch.d.Phil. ii.77:
i)G SOCRATES.
CHAP, herewith, too, are exposed to view the limits of his
' . self-knowledge. Feelings whose origin he has not
discovered are seen to exercise over him an irresistible
power. On the other hand, the Bat/j.6viov when it doe&
speak, takes the place of the usual signs and por-
tents. Hegel l not without reason sees herein a proof
that the determining motives of action, which in the
case of the Greek oracles were things purely exter-
nal, have come to be sought in man himself. To
misgivings incapable of being resolved into clear
conceptions, a high importance was here attached ;
in them a very revelation of deity was seen, proving
most clearly that the human mind, in a way hitherto
foreign to Greeks, had come to occupy itself with
itself, and carefully to observe what transpired within.
The power which these feelings early exercised over
Socrates, the devotion with which he even then
listened for the voice within, affords an insight inta
the depths of his emotional nature. In the boy we
see the embryo of the man, for whom self-knowledge
was the most pressing business of life, for whom un-
tiring observation of his moral and mental con-
ditions, analysis of notions and actions, reasoning as
to their character and testing of their value were
primary necessities. 2
The same tone of mind also shows itself in other
peculiarities of Socrates, to his contemporaries appear-
ing so strange. At times he was seen lost in thought,
so as to be unconscious of what transpired around
1 Hegel 1. c. and Recht's 2 Conf. Plato, Apol. 38, A.
Philosophic, 279, p. 369. See above, p. 60, 3.
HIS CHARACTER. 97
him ; at times going on his way regardless of the CHAP.
habits of his fellows ; his whole appearance displaying
a far-reaching indifference to external things, a one-
sided preference of the useful to the beautiful. What
do all these traits show if not the importance which
he attached to the study of self, to the solitary work
of thought, to a free determination of self indepen-
dent of foreign judgments ? Eemarkable as it may
seem to find the dryness of the man of intellect and
the enthusiasm of the man of feeling united in one
and the same person, both features may be referred
to a common source. What distinguishes Socrates
in his general conduct from his fellow-citizens was
this power of inward concentration. This struck his
cotemporaries as being so foreign an element, and
thereby an irreparable breach was made in the artistic
unity of Greek life.
What the general importance of this peculiarity
may be, and what traces it has left in history, are
questions to answer which we must enquire into the
Socratic philosophy.
SOCRATES.
CHAPTER V.
THE SOURCES AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE PHILOSOPHY
OF SOCRATES.
CHAP. To give an accurate account of the philosophy of
1__ Socrates is a work of some difficulty, owing to the well-
A. Xeno- known divergence of the earliest accounts. Socrates
Plato. committed nothing to writing himself; * of the works
of his pupils, in which he is introduced as speaking,
only those of Xenophon and Plato are preserved. 2
These are, however, so little alike, that we gather
from the one quite a different view of the teaching
of Socrates to what the other gives us. Among
early historians of philosophy it was the fashion to
construct a picture of the Athenian sage, without
principles and criticism, indiscriminately from the
writings of Xenophon and Plato, no less than from
1 The unimportant poetical thing to writing: is clear from
attempts of his last days {Plato, the silence of Xenophon, Plato,
Phaedo, 60, C.) can hardly be and all antiquity, not to men-
counted as writings, even if they tion the positive testimony of
were extant. They appear, Cic. de Orat, iii. 16, 60 : Dttf.
however, to have been very soon i. 16; Pliit. De Alex. Virt. i.
lost. The Paean at least, 4. A conclusive discussion on
which Themist. (Or. ii. 27, c.) this point in refutation of the
considers genuine, was rejected views of Leo Allatius is given
by the ancient critics, accord- by Olearius in Stanl. Hist,
ing to Diog. ii. 42. The Phil. 198.
spuriousness of the Socratic 2 For instance, those of J&s-
letters is beyond question, and chines, Antisthenes, Phaedo.
that Socrates committed no-
AUTHORITIES FOR HIS PHILOSOPHY. 99
later, and for the most part indifferent, authorities. CHAP.
Since the time of Brucker, however, Xenophon came ' .
to be regarded as the only authority to be perfectly
trusted for the philosophy of Socrates ; to all others,
Plato included, at most only a supplementary value
was allowed. Quite recently, however, Schleierina-
cher has lodged a protest against this preference of
Xenophon. 1 Xenophon, he argues, not being a phi-
losopher himself, was scarcely capable of under-
standing a philosopher like Socrates. The object,
moreover, of the Memorabilia was a limited one, to
defend his teacher from definite charges. We are
therefore justified in assuming a priori that there
was more in Socrates than Xenophon describes.
Indeed, there must have been more, or he could not
have played the part he did in the history of philo-
sophy, nor have exerted so marvellous a power of
attraction on the most intellectual and cultivated
men of his time. The character, too, which Plato
gives him would otherwise have too flatly contradicted
the picture of him present to the mind of his reader.
Besides, Xenophon's dialogues create the impression
that philosophic matter has, with detriment to its
meaning, been put into the unphilosophic language
of every-day life ; and that there are gaps left, to
supply which we are obliged to go to Plato. Not that
we can go so far as Meiners,' 2 and say that only those
1 On the philosophical merits p. 50. Conf. Gesch. d. Phil,
o Socrates, ScnMermachffir, p. 81.
Werke, iii. 2, 293, first printed * Geschichte der Wissen-
in Abhamlluntren dcr Berliner schaften in Griechenland uud
Aca.lemie, Philos. Kl. 1818, Bom, ii. 420.
n 2
100 SOCRATES.
CHAP. parts of the dialogues of Plato can be considered his-
_ torical, which are either to be found in Xenophon, or
immediately follow from what Xenophon says, or which
are opposed to Plato's own views. This hypothesis
would only give us the Socrates of Xenophon slightly
modified, whilst the deeper spring of Socratic thought
would still be wanting. The only safe course to
pursue is that adopted by Schleiermacher to ask,
What may Socrates have been, in addition to what
Xenophon reports, without gainsaying the character
and maxims which Xenophon distinctly assigns to
him ? and what must he have been to call for and
to justify such a description as is given of him in the
dialogues of Plato ? Schleiermacher's estimate of
Xenophon l has been since adopted by several other
writers ; and even previously to Schleiermacher,
Dissen 2 had declared that he could only see in the
pages of Xenophon a description of the outward
appearance of Socrates. The like approval has been
bestowed on Schleiermacher's canon for finding out
1 Hrandis,inKhein. Mus. von has himself failed to observe
NiebuJM* und firandis, i. b. 122. in using the Phredo (see above,
Conf . Gesch. d. Gr.-Rfim. Philos. p. 59). In respect of the person-
ii. a. 20 ; Bitter, Gesch. d. Phil, ality of Socrates rather than his
ii. 44 ; RilUng, Ueber d. Ver- teaching, Van Hemde (Charac-
haltniss zwischen den Xeno- terismi principum philosopho-
phont. nnd den Platon. Be- rum veterum, p. 54) gives a
richten iiber Socrates. Upsala preference to Plato's picture
TJniversitets JLrskrift, 1870, as being truer to life than
specially p. 1, 125. Alberti, Xenophon's Apology.
too (Socrates, 5), takes in the 2 De philosophia morali in
main the side of Schleier- Xenophontis de Socrate com-
macher, whilst allowing that mentariis tradita, p. 28 (in
Plato's account can only be Disseti's Kleineren Schrif ten, p.
used for history with extreme 87).
caution a caution which he
AUTHORITIES FOR HIS PHILOSOPHY. 101
the real Socrates; only to supplement it has the CHAP.
remark been made, 1 that the language used by
Aristotle respecting the teaching of Socrates may be
also employed to determine its outside aspect. On
the other hand, Xenophon's authority has been
warmly supported by several critics. 2
In deciding between these two views, a difficulty,
however, presents itself. The authority of the one or
the other of our accounts can only be ascertained by
a reference to the true historical picture of Socrates,
and the true historical picture can only be known
from these conflicting accounts. This difficulty
would be insurmountable, if the two narratives had
the same claim to be considered historical in points
which they state varyingly. Indeed, Aristotle's
scanty notices respecting the Socratic philosophy
would have been insufficient to settle the question,
even on the assumption that he had other sources of
information at command beside the writings of
Xenophon and Plato -an assumption for which there
is not the least evidence. But if one thing is clearer
than another, it is this, that Plato only claims to be
true to facts in those descriptions in which he agrees
with Xenophon, as for instance, in the Apology and
the Symposium. On other points no one could well
assert that he wished all to be taken as historical
1 By Brandis, 1. c. 22. Conf. Fries, Gesch. d.
2 Hegel. Gesch. d. Phil. ii. Phil. i. 259. For further lite-
!) ; Rotscher, Aristophanes iind rature on this point consult
seinZeitalter, p. 393 ; Hermann, Hunidall, De philosophia mo-
(.Jesch. und Syst. des Platonis- rali Socratis (Heidelberg, 1 853),
mus, i. 24i) ; Labriola, La dot- p. 7, and Ribbing, 1. c.
trina di Socrate (Xapoli, 1871),
103 SOCRATES.
CHAP. which he puts into the inotith of Socrates. Of Xeno-
' phon, on the contrary, it may be granted that,
whether from his deficiency in philosophic sense, or
from his exclusively practical tastes, not unfrequently
the scientific meaning and the inner connection of
the principles of Socrates escape his notice. Nor
must we ever forget that the Memorabilia are prima-
rily intended to be a defence of his teacher against
the charges brought against him, which charges were
the cause of his condemnation, and passed current
years after his death. For this purpose a description
was requisite, not so much of his philosophy as of
his morals and religion, setting' forth his piety, hi&
integrity, his obedience to the laws, his services to-
his friends and fellow-citizens rather than his intel-
lectual convictions ; and Xenophon candidly con-
fesses that this is the main object of his treatise. 1
Even the question, whether, with the means at his
command, a life-like reproduction of the dialogues of
Socrates can be expected from Xenophon, cannot be
answered affirmatively without some limitation. His
treatise was not written until six years after the
death of Socrates, and we have not the least indica-
tion that it was based on notes made either by him-
self or others in the time immediately following the
dialogues. 2 What was committed to writing years
1 Mem. i. 1,1 and 20; 2, 1 ; discourses at home and filled
3, 1; iv. 4, 25; 5, 1; 8, 11. up their sketches by further
2 It cannot be inferred from enquiries. Nay, the very dis-
Plato, Symp. 172, C. ; 173, B. ; coiu-ses which are vouched for
Theast. 143, A., that Socrates' by this supposed care, cannot
f riends (as Volqttardgen, Daemon possibly be historical. Such
d. Sokr. 6, says) took down his statements cannot therefore-
AUTHORITIES FOR HIS PHILOSOPHY. 103
afterwards from his own or his friends' memory has CHA i>.
not the claim to accuracy of a verbal report, but
rather owes to himself its more definite form and
setting. No doubt it was his intention to give a true
account of Socrates and his teaching. He says that
he writes from his own recollection. He expressly
observes in a few cases that he was present during
the dialogue, but had heard similar things from
others, mentioning his authority. 1 If, then, many a
Socratic discourse is unknown to him or has escaped
his memory, if one or other line of thought has not
been thoroughly understood, or its philosophical
importance misunderstood by him, it may neverthe-
less be assumed that a pupil of Socrates, accustomed
to consort with him for years, and able to commu-
nicate all that Xenophon actually communicates,
neither repeats on the whole what is false, nor leaves
any essential side of the Socratic teaching untouched.
From Plato, indeed, so far as his description is his-
torical or permits a reference to the Socrates of history,
many a trait supplementary of Xenophon's narra-
tive may be expected, and many an explanation of
the real meaning of sayings, which his fellow-pupil
reports as understood only from the standpoint of
mean more than similar ones .... rovrcav 5rj ypfyu 6ir6<ra ki>
in Farm. 126, B. Neither does Sianvwovfixrw. iv. 3, 2 ; others
Mem. i. 4, 1 refer to writings have reported similar conver-
of pupils of Socrates, but to sations respecting the Gods, at
the views of opponents. Mem. which they were present : iy&>
i\. :;. 2 appears to refer not Sk Sre vpbs Ev6vSrjfioi> roidSt
even to writings, but to oral Sitkeyero ira.peytv6ni)V. iv. 8, 4 :
communications. Af|o> 8e *cal & 'Eppaywovt rov '!*-
1 Mem. i. 3, 6 : J 5i 8ij Kal irovinov ^KOWTO. irepi avrov.
w<pf\di> l$6nfi pot TOUS {ucdiray
104
SOCRATES.
CHAP.
V.
B. Philo-
sophical
plat/win.
Supposed
popular
philo-
practical utility. Hence objection can hardly be taken
to the above-quoted canon of Schleiermacher. 1 Ne-
vertheless, it is highly improbable that in essential
points there should be an irreconcilable difference
between Xenophon's description and that which we
may take for historically established as Plato's. 2 The
real state of the case, however, can only be ascer-
tained by examining the statements of various
authorities in detail to test their worth and their
agreement, and this enquiry naturally coincides with
the exposition of the Socratic teaching, from which it-
could only be distinguished in point of form. It will
not, therefore, be separated from it here. Socrates
will be described from the three accounts of Xeno-
phon, Plato, and Aristotle. If the attempt to form
a harmonious picture from these sources succeeds,
Xenophon will be vindicated. Should it not succeed,
it will then be necessary to ask, which of the tradi-
tional accounts is the true one. 3
To begin with the question as to the philosophi-
cal platform and fundamental principle of Socrates.
Here the sketches of our main authorities seem to
give ground for the most opposite views. According
guish in point of speculation
what belongs to .Socrates and
what belongs to Plato. At;
regards morals, he hopes to
gain a true general view of
Socrates by taking the maxims
which are attributed to him
unanimously by Xenophon.
Plato, and Aristotle, following
them out to their consequences,
and testing the traditions by
these.
1 P. 100.
2 As Hibbing, 1. c. asserts.
Hard is it to reconcile herewith
that Bibbing declines to ques-
tion 'the essentially historical
accuracy ' of Xenophon's de-
scription.
3 The course here followed
is also in the main that taken
by Striimpell, Gesch. d. Prakt.
Philos. d. Gr. i. 116 He con-
siders it impossible to distin-
CHARACTERISTICS OF HIS PHILOSOPHY. 105
to Plato, Socrates appears as an expert thinker, at CHAP.
home in all branches of knowledge; whereas, in
Xenophon he is represented far less as a philosopher
than as a man innocent and excellent, full of piety
and common sense. Hence Xenophon's account is
specially appealed to in support of the conception of
Socrates as a popular moral man, holding aloof from
all speculative questions, and in fact as far less of a
philosopher than a teacher of morality and instructor
of youth. 1 It certainly cannot be denied that
Socrates was full of the most lively enthusiasm for
morality, and made it the business of his life to
exercise a moral influence upon others. 2 Had he
only discharged this function after the unscientific
manner of a popular teacher, by imparting and
inculcating the received notions of duty and virtue,
the influence would be inexplicable which he exerted,
not only over weaklings and hairbrains, but over the
most talented and cultivated of his cotemporaries. It
would be a mystery what induced Plato to connect
the deepest philosophical enquiries with his person, or
what led all later philosophers, down to Aristotle,
nay even down to the Stoics and Neoplatonists, to
'How common this view 181, that Socrates 'regarded the
was in past times, needs not to speculative philosophy which
be proved by authorities which aimed at general knowledge,
abound from Cicero down to as useless, vain, and foolish,'
Wiggers and Reinhold. That and that he < took the field not
it is not yet altogether ex- only against the Sophists as
ploded may be gathered not only pretenders to knowledge, but
from writers like Van Ifeusde, against all philosophy ; ' in
Characterismi, p. 53, but even short, that ' he was no philo-
Marbac/t, a disciple of the sopher.'
Hegelian philosophy, asserts in * Coiif. Apol. 23, D. ; 30, E. ;
his Gesch. d. Philos. i. 174, 178, 38, A., and above, p. 41).
100 SOCRATES.
<;HAP. regard him as the founder of a new epoch, and to
' trace their own peculiar systems to the movement
set on foot by him.
Even in himself and his doings more than one
feature is at variance with this conception. Whereas
it would follow herefrom that knowledge is only of
value in as far as it is instrumental for action, so far
was Socrates from sharing this belief that he consi-
dered actions only then to have a value when they
proceed from correct knowledge ; that he referred
moral action or virtue to knowledge, making its per-
fection depend on perfection of knowledge. Whereas,
according to the ordinary assumption, he would in
his intercourse with others have before all things
aimed at moral training, so far was it otherwise that
it appears from his own words that love of knowledge
was the original motive for his activity. 1 Accordingly
we observe him in his dialogues pursuing enquiries,
which not only have no moral purpose, 2 but which,
1 Plato, Apol. 21, where So- subordinate one ; he was no
crates deduces his whole acti- doubt really actuated by the
vity from the fact that he pur- motive mentioned in the Apo-
sued a real knowledge. logy, a praiseworthy curiosity
- Examples are to be found to learn from intercourse with
in the conversations (Mem. iii. all classes, whether they were
10), in which Socrates conducts clearly conscious of what their
the painter Parrhasius, the arts were for. Xenophon him-
sciilptor Clito, and Pistias, the self attests this, Mem. iv. 6, 1 :
forger of armour, to the con- <TKoira>v nvv rols avvovffi, rt e/co-
ceptions of their respective CTOV rfij ruv tivraiv ovSe-n-iairor'
arts. It is true Xenophon in- eArryev. This pursuit of the
troduces these conversations conceptions of things, aiming
with the remark that Socrates not at the application of know-
knew how to make himself ledge, but at knowledge itself,
useful to artisans. But the is quite enough to prove that
desire to make himself usef til Socrates was not only a preacher
can only have been a very of virtue, but a philosopher.
CHARACTERISTICS OF HIS PHILOSOPHY. 107
iii their practical application, could only serve im- CHAP.
moral purposes. 1 These traits are not met with ex- V>
clusively in one or other of our authorities, but they
are equally diffused through the accounts given by
the three main sources. Socrates can therefore not
possibly have been the unscientific moral teacher for
which he was formerly taken. Knowledge must have
had for him a very different value and importance from
what it would have had on such a supposition. It may
not even be assumed that the knowledge which he
sought was ultimately only pursued for the sake of
action, and only valued as a means to morality. 2 He
who pursues knowledge in this sense, only as a means
to an end which lies beyond him, not from an inde-
pendent impulse and love of knowing, will never
study so carefully and GO independently the problem
and method of philosophic research as Socrates did ;
will never be a reformer of philosophy as he was.
Even Xenophon found some sation with her, in which he
difficulty in bringing it into bar- endeavours to lead her to a
inony with his practical view conception of her trade, and
of things, as his words show : shows her how she will best be
from which it maybe seen that able to win lovers. Now, al-
Socrates made his friends more though such a step would not
critical. But criticism is the give that offence to a Greek
organ of knowledge. which it would to us, still
1 Mem. iii. 1 1 contains a there is not the least trace of a
paragraph adapted more than moral purpose in his conduct,
any other to refute the idea Brandi* 1 (Gesch. d. Entw. i.
that Socrates was only a popu- 236) remarks are little to the
lav teacher. Socrates hears one point. A purely critical inter-
of Ins companions commending est leads Socrates to refer to
the beauty of Theodota, and at its general conception every
once goes with his company to action across which he comes,
see her. He linds her acting regardless of its moral value,
as a painter's model, and he 2 Ribbing, Socrat. Stud. i. 46.
thereupon enters into a conver-
108 SOCRATES.
CHAP. Xay more, he would have been incapable of exerting
' the deep reforming influence over Ethics which,
according to the testimony of history, he did exert,
had he thus confined himself to practical interests.
His importance for Ethics is derived not so much
from the fact that he insisted on a re-establishment
of moral life this Aristophanes and without doubt
many others did, but from his recognising that a
.scientific basis for moral convictions must be an
indispensable condition for any real reform of morals.
Herewith it is presupposed that practical problems
are determined and vindicated by knowledge ; in other
words, that knowledge not merely subserves action,
but leads and governs it a view never as yet held
by any one who did not attribute to knowledge an
independent value of its own. If, therefore, Socrates,
as we shall note, confined himself in principle to
enquiries having for man a practical value, it can
only be inferred that he was not himself fully con-
scious of the range of his thought. In practice he
went beyond these limits, treating ethical questions
in such a manner as no one could do unless fired
with an independent love of knowledge.
The area is thus determined within which the fun-
damental conception of the Socratic philosophy must
be looked for. True knowledge is the treasure to
discover which Socrates goes forth in the service of
the Delphic God; to gain the knowledge of the
essence of things, he, with his friends, unweariedly
labours ; to true knowledge he ultimately refers all
moral demands. The force with which he asserted
CHARACTERISTICS OF HIS PHILOSOPHY.
this demand constitutes him the creator in Greece CHAP.
of an independent system of morality. For him it
is not enough that men should do what is right; they c - His
, , -i , TT i i 11 i
must also know why they do it. He demands that
they should not follow a dark impulse, an undefined
enthusiasm or the aptitude of habit, but should act
from clear consciousness ; and because it was deficient
in this characteristic, he refuses to allow true wisdom to
the art of his time, however high it otherwise stood. 1
In a word, the idea of knowledge forms the central
point of the Socratic philosophy. 2 All philosophy aim-
ing at knowledge, this point must be further circum-
scribed to give it precision, which was done in this wise,
that, whereas the pursuit of true knowledge had been,
1 In Plato, Apol. 22, B.,
Socrates observes : In his sift-
ing of men he had turned to
the poets, but had soon found
that they were usually not able
to account for their own works.
'Eyi/wi/ o5f .... Sri ov aotpia.
iroioiev & iroio'tff, a\\a <f>vffei TIV\
Kal tvOov(Tidoi>Tts, Siinrep ol Oco-
/jidi>Ttis Kal xp7j(Tju<p5or Kal yap
avrol \tyovffi /Afv iro\\a Kal KoAa,
l<raffi 5e ovtiv 3>v \4yovffiv. Be-
sides, no one knows the limits
of his knowledge, but thinks
to understand all things. He
had also observed the same
in the x<'P OT X*' a '> the re-
presentatives of sciilpture and
art.
3 Soklalermaektr, Werke, iii.
2, 300: ' The awakening of the
idea of knowledge, and its
first utterances, must have been
the substance of the philosophy
of Socrates.' Hitter agrees
witli this, Gesch. d. Philosophic,
ii. 50. Brandis only differs
in unessential points, Khein.
Mtis. von Nielnihr und Brandis,
i. 6, 130; Gr.-R6m. Phil. ii. a,
33. To him the origin of the
doctrine of Socrates appears to
be a desire to vindicate against
the Sophists the absolute worth
of moral determinations ; and
then he adds : to secure this
piirpose the first aim of So-
crates was to gain a deeper
insight into his own conscious-
ness, in order to be able to dis-
tinguish false and true know-
ledge with certainty. Similarly
UranisK, Gesch. d. Phils. Kant,
i. 155. The important feature
in Socrates was this, that to
him morality appeared to be
a certain kind of knowledge,
proceeding from the thought
of the good inborn in the soul.
110 SOCRATES.
CHAP. with earlier philosophers an immediate and instinc-
' tive activity, with Socrates it became conscious and
methodical. By him the idea of knowledge as know-
ledge was first brought out, and having been brought
out, took precedence of every other idea. 1
This statement, again, requires further explanation.
If the love of knowledge was shared also by previous
philosophers, why, it may be asked, did it not before
develope into a conscious and critical pursuit ? The
reason which may be assigned is this : The knowledge
which earlier philosophers pursued, was, in itself,
different from the knowledge which Socrates required.
They were not compelled by their idea of knowledge
as Socrates was to direct their attention to the in-
tellectual processes and conditions, by which "it was
truly to be acquired. Such a necessity was, however,
imposed on Socrates by the principle which the most
trustworthy accounts unanimously report as the soul of
all his teaching that all true knowledge must pro-
ceed from correct conceptions, and that nothing can
be known, unless it can be referred to its general
conception, and judged thereby. 2 In this principle,
1 Sclileiermacher, 1. c. 2Ui) ; i.e., as is explained by the con-
Brandin. text, he referred all doubtful
2 Xenvph. Mem. iv. 6, 1 : points to universal conceptions,
~S,<aKpdrns yap TOVS nev el56ras, T i in order to settle them by
Kaffrov fit} T u v 8vT<ai>, ivAfi.1- means of these; iv. 5, 12:
e teal rois &\\ois tu> ffiyfi<T0at c(J>7j 5s KCU rb 8ia\fyta8ai ovo-
SvvaffOai ' rovs 8e p)) fiSdras oti8ei> /j.aff9rjvat IK TOV (rvvt6vTas KOIVTJ
<pt] 6avfj.affrbi/ elvai alnovs re /3ov\fveff6at, StaKeyovTas K.O.TO.
<r<t>d\\ecr6ai Kal &\\ovs a<pd\\iv ye'j/7) TO, trpdy/j-ara. 5e7v o$v Trei-
wv evftta. ffKoirwv ffvv rots ffwovffi pa<r6ai '6n fjia.\Lff-ra irpbs TOVTO
, ' -ri tKOffrov e1i\ Ttav OVTUV, ovSe- eavrbf TOJ/UOI/ irapa.cncevdfeit'.
iriitiror' I'Arjye. . . 13 : ftrl r^v C'om]). i. 1. Hi, and the many
uTr6dt criv firdvriye irdvra rbv \6yov, instances in the Memorabilia.
CHARACTERISTICS OF HIS PHILOSOPHY.
simple as it may appear, an entire change was de- CHAP.
manded in the intellectual procedure. 1 The ordinary
way is to take things as being what they appear to
the senses to be ; or if contradictory experiences for-
bid doing so, to cling to those appearances which make
the strongest impression on the observer, declaring
these to be the essence, and thence proceeding to
further conclusions. Hitherto this was exactly what
philosophers had done. Even those who attacked the
senses as untrustworthy had invariably started from
one-sided observations, without being conscious of
the necessity of grounding every judgment on an
Aristotle. (Met. xiii. 4, 1078, b,
17, 27) : 2aKpdrovs 8e vepl ras
TJfltKct? operas irpay/uaTeuo^ieVot; Kal
irepl TOVTUV 6pifff6ai KaB6\ov
farovvros TrptSnov .... tiffivos
v\ayuis t-f)Tfi ri> T( IOTIV . . .
fivo ydp fffnv a, TIS ov awoSoh}
2a>Kparei Sixaiws, rovs T' tiraKTi-
KOVJ \6yovs Kal rb 6pifff0ai
Ka66\ov. Both are, however, at
bottom the same. The \6yoi
(iraxriKol are only the means
for finding universal concep-
tions, and therefore Aristotle
elsewhere (Met. i. 6, 987, b, 1 ;
xiii. 9, 1086, b, 3; De Part.
Anim., i. 1, 642, a, 28) justly
observes that the seeking for
universal conceptions or for the
essence of things is the real
sen-ice rendered to philosophy
by Socrates. Accordingly, in
the dialogues which Xenophon
has preserved, we always see
him making straight for the
general conception, the ri i<rnv.
Even in Plato's Apology, 22, B.,
he describes his sifting of men
as Sitpwr TI \iyoifv, that is to
say, he asks for the conception
of the deeds of the practical
man, or of the poetry of the
poet. Conf. Meno, 70, A.
Phiedr. 262, B. ; 265, D. It
can, however, hardly be proved
from Plato that Socrates really
distinguished &n<rHj|UTj from
5da, as Brandis (Gr.-R6m.
Phil. ii. a, 36 ; Gesch. d. Entw.
i. 235) would have it ; for we
cannot decide whether passages
like Meno, 98, B. represent the
view of Socrates or that of
Plato. Antisthenes, too, who,
according to Diogenes, vi. 17,
wrote a treatise irtp\ S^TJS *oi
twKTT-fipijs, may owe this dis-
tinction to the Eleatics. It
can hardly be found in Xen.
Mem. iv. 2, 33. In point of
substance, no doubt the dis-
tinction was implied in the
whole conduct of Socrates, and
in passages such as Xen. Mem.
iv. 6, 1 ; Plato, Apol. 21, B.
1 Conf. what has been said
above, p. 30, and in Gesch. d.
Phil. i. 860.
12 SOCRATES.
CHAP, exhaustive enquiry into its subject. By means of
' sophistry this dogmatism had been overthrown. It
was felt that all impressions derived from the senses
were relative and personal, that they do not represent
things as they are, but as they appear ; and, that,
consequently, whatever we may assert, the opposite
may be asserted with equal justice. For, if for one
person at this moment this is true, for another person
at another moment that is true.
Similar sentiments are expressed by Socrates
relative to the value of common opinions. He is
aware that they cannot furnish us with knowledge,,
but only involve us in contradictions. But he does
not hence draw the inference of the Sophists, that no
knowledge is possible, but only that it is not possible
in that way. The majority of mankind have no true
knowledge, because they confine themselves to suppo-
sitions, the accuracy of which they have never
examined; only taking into consideration one or
another property of things, but not their essence.
Amend this fault ; consider every object in all its
bearings, and endeavour from this many-sided ob-
servation to determine the true essence ; you have
then conceptions instead of vague notions a regular
examination, instead of an unmethodical and un-
conscious procedure a true, instead of an imaginary
knowledge. In thus requiring knowledge of concep-
tions, Socrates not only broke away from the current
view, but, generally speaking, from all previous
philosophy. A thorough observation from every side,
a critical examination, a methodical enquiry conscious
CHARACTERISTICS OF HIS PHILOSOPHY. 11
of its own basis, was demanded ; all that had hitherto CHAP.
been regarded as knowledge was rejected, because it
fell short of these conditions ; and at the same time
the conviction was expressed that, by observing these
rules, real knowledge could be secured.
For Socrates this principle had not only an in- D. Moral
tellectual, but a more immediate moral value. It is l iwoftUis
in fact one of the most striking things about him
that he is unable to distinguish between morality
and knowledge, and can neither imagine knowledge
without virtue, nor virtue without knowledge. 1 In
this respect also he is the child of his age, his great-
ness consisting herein, that with great penetration
and spirit he gave effect to its requirements and its
legitimate endeavours. Advancing civilisation having
created the demand for a higher education amongst
the Greeks, and the course of intellectual develop-
ment having diverted attention from the study of
nature and fixed it on that of mind, a closer con-
nection became necessary between philosophy and
conduct. Only in man could philosophy find its
highest object ; only in philosophy could the support
l)e found which was needed for life. The Sophists
had endeavoured to meet this requirement with
great skill and vigour; hence their extraordinary
success. Nevertheless, their moral philosophy was
too deficient in tenable ground; by doubting it
had loosened its intellectual roots only too effectually ;
hence it degenerated with terrific speed, entering the
1 Particular proof of this will be given subsequently.
I
114 SOCRATES.
CHAP, service of every wicked and selfish impulse. Instead
' of moral life being raised by the influence of philo-
sophy, both conduct and philosophy had taken the
same downward course.
This sad state of things Socrates thoroughly
understood. Whilst, however, his contemporaries,
either blind with admiration for the Sophistic teach-
ing, were insensible to its dangers, or else through
dread of these, and with a singular indifference to the
wants of the times and the march of history, de-
nounced the innovators in the tone of Aristophanes,
he with keener penetration could distinguish between
what was right and what was wrong in the spirit of
the age. The insufficiency of the older culture, the
want of basis in ordinary virtue, the obscurity of the
prevailing notions so full of contradictions, the ne-
cessity for intellectual education, all were felt and
taught by him as much as by anyone of the Sophists.
But to this teaching he set other and higher ends,
not seeking to destroy belief in truth, but rather to
show how truth might be acquired by a new intel-
lectual process. His aim was not to minister to the
selfishness of the age, but rather to rescue the age
from selfishness and sloth, by teaching it what was
truly good and useful ; not to undermine morality
and piety, but to build them on a new foundation of
knowledge. Thus Socrates was at once a moral and
an intellectual reformer. His one great thought was
how to transform and restore moral conduct by means
of knowledge ; and these two elements were so closely
associated together in his mind, that he could find
CHARACTERISTICS OF HIS PHILOSOPHY.
115
no other object for knowledge save human conduct,
and no guarantee for conduct save in knowledge. 1
How great the services were which he rendered to both
morality and science by this effort, how wholesome
was the influence which he exercised on the intellec-
tual condition of his people and of mankind generally,
history attests. If in the sequel, the difference between
morality and intellect was recognised quite as fully
as their unity, yet the tie by which he connected
them has never been broken ; and if in the last
centuries of the old world, philosophy took the place
of the waning religion, giving a stay to morality,
purifying and quickening the moral consciousness,
CHAP.
V.
1 To revert to the question
mooted above, as to whether
lie primarily regarded know-
ledge as a means to moral
action, or moral action as a
result of knowledge, so much
may be said : that his pecu-
liarity consisted herein that
for him this dilemma did
not exist, that for him know-
ledge as such was at once a
moral need and a moral force,
and that therefore virtue, as we
shall find, was neither a simple
consequence of knowledge, nor
an end to be attained by means
of knowledge, but was directly
and in itself knowledge. If,
therefore, Labriola (Dottrina
di Socrate, 40) describes the
only inner motive of Socrates'
action as ' the moral need of
certainty, and the conviction
that this is only attainable by
a clear and indubitably certain
knowledge,' his statement may
be accepted us true. On the
other hand, Bibbing' s (Socrat.
Studien, i. 46) view does not
seem to carry conviction,
that, according to both Plato
and Xenophon, Socrate-< took
in the first place a practical
view of life, and that ' the the-
ory of knowledge was only
developed by him for the sake
of a practical purpose.' We
have already seen that, accor-
ding to Socrates, true know-
ledge coincides with right in-
tention. But, for the reasons
set forth on p. 105, we cannot
allow that knowledge with him
has no independent value, and
is only pursued as a means to
a practical purpose ; which must
be the view of Ribbing, in as
far as he contradicts the one
given above. Nor do the pas-
sages quoted by Ribbing (1'lato,
Apol. 22, D. ; 28, D. ; 29, E. ;
31, A. ; 38, A.) suggest this
view.
I 2
110
SOCRATES.
CHAP.
V.
E. The
wtjeetire
fliaractcr
of the
theory of
Socrates.
this great and beneficial result, in as far as it can be
assigned to any one individual, was due to the teach-
ing of Socrates.
The interest of philosophy being thus turned
away from the outer world and directed towards man
and his moral nature, and man only regarding things
as true and binding of the truth of which he has
convinced himself by intellectual research, there
appears necessarily in Socrates a deeper importance
attached to the personality of the thinker. In
this modern writers have thought to discern the
peculiar character of his philosophy. 1 Very different,
however, is the personal importance of the thinker
with Socrates from the caprice of the Sophists, dif-
ferent too from the extreme individualism of the
post-Aristotelian schools. Socrates was aware, that
each individual must seek the grounds of his own
conviction for himself, that truth is not something
given from without, but must be found by the exer-
cise of individual thought. He required all opinions
to be examined anew, no matter how old or how
common they were, proofs only and not authorities
claiming belief. Still, he was far from making man,
as Protagoras did, the measure of all things. He
did not even as the Stoics and Epicureans declare
personal conviction and practical need to be the
ultimate standard of truth, nor yet as the Sceptics,
resolve all truth into probability ; but to him know-
ledge was an end in itself; so too he was persuaded
Hegel, Gesch. d. Phil. ii. 40 ; Rotsclier, Aristoph., pp. 245, 388.
CHARACTERISTICS OF HIS PHILOSOPHY. 11
that true knowledge could be obtained by a thought- CHAP.
ful consideration of things. Moreover he saw in man
the proper object of philosophy, but instead of making
-of personal caprice a law, as the Sophists did, he
subordinated caprice to the general law residing in the
nature of things and of moral relations. 1 Instead
too of making, with later philosophers, the self-con-
tentment of the wise man his highest end, he con-
fined himself to the point of view of old Greek
morality, which could not conceive of the individual
apart from the community, 2 and which accordingly
regarded activity for the state as the first duty of a
citizen, 3 and the law of the state as the natural rule
of conduct. 4 Hence the Stoic apathy and indifference
to country were entirely alien from Socrates. If it
can be truly said ' that in him commences an un-
bounded reference to the person, to the freedom of
the inner life,' 6 it must also be added that this state-
ment by no means exhausts the theory of Socrates.
Thus the disputes as to whether the Socratic doctrine
rests on a purely personal or a really independent
basis 6 will have to be settled, by allowing indeed that,
compared with former systems, his teaching exhibits
1 Proofs may be found Xen. with which the previous re-
Mem, ii. 2 ; ii. 6, 1-7 ; iii. 8, marks respecting the peculiar
!-;> ; iv. 4, 20. conduct of the sage may be
- Compare the conversation compared,
with Aristippus, Xen. Mem. ii. " Hegel, 1. c.
1, liJ ; and Plato's Crito, 53, A. Compare the views of Rot-
* It has been already seen scJier, 1. c., and Brandis for the
that Socrates placed his own opposite view. ' Ueber die
activity under this point of vorgebliche iSubjektivitiit der
view. See pp. 65, 68 ; Xen. Mem. Sokrat. Lehre,' in lihein. Mus.
i. ;. 15 ; Plato, Apol. 30, A. ii. 1, 85.
1 Mem. iv. 4, 12, and 3, 15,
118 SOCRATES.
CHAP. a deeper importance attaching to the personality of
'__ the thinker, without, however, by any means belonging
to those which are purely relative. It aims at gaining
a knowledge which shall do more than satisfy a per-
sonal want, and which shall be true and desirable for
more than the thinker ; but the ground on which it
is sought is the personal thought l of the individual.
This theory is indeed not further expanded by
Socrates. He has established the principle, that only
the knowledge which has to do with conceptions is
true knowledge. To the further inference that only the
being of conceptions is true being, 2 and that there-
fore only conceptions are true, and to a systematic
exposition of conceptions true in themselves so
far he never advanced. Knowledge is here something
sought, a problem to be solved by the thinker ; philo-
sophy is philosophic impulse, and philosophic method,
a seeking for truth, not yet a possessing it ; and this
deficiency countenances the view that the platform
1 Hegel says nothing very but the universal element
different, when in distinguish- which is found running through
ing (Gesch. d. Phil. ii. 40, 166) all individuals. With this view
Socrates from the Sophists he agree also Itotsclier, 1. c. p. 246,
says: ' in Socrates the creation 392, and Hermann, Gesch. und
of thought is at once clad with Syst. des Plat. i. 239.
an independent existence of its 2 The objections of Albertl,
own,' and what is purely per- Sokr. 94, to the above vanish
sonal is ' externalised and made if the word ' only ' is properly
universal by him as the good.' emphasised. He only asserts
Socrates is said to have substi- what is already well known,
tuted ' thinking man is the that Socrates did not develope
measure of all things,' in place his theory of conceptions to the
of the Sophistic doctrine ' man theory of ideas, nor contrast
is the measure of all things.' the universal thought in the
In a word, his leading thought conception, as being the only
is not the individual as he thing truly real with individual
knows himself experimentally, things.
CHARACTERISTICS OF HIS PHILOSOPHY. 119
of Socrates was that of a narrow reference to the CHAP.
person. Still it should never be forgotten, that the ^
aim of Socrates was always to discover and set forth
that which is in itself true and good. Mankind is to be
intellectually and morally educated, but the one and
only means thereto is to attain a knowledge of truth.
The primary aim of Socrates being to train men
to think, rather than to construct a system, the main
point with him was a philosophic method to deter-
mine the way which would lead to truth. The sub-
stance of his teaching thus appears to have been
partly confined to questions having an immediate
bearing on human conduct ; partly it does not go
beyond the general and theoretical demand, that all
action should be determined by a knowledge of con-
ceptions. There is no systematic development of
individual points of morality and no attempt to give
a reason for them.
120 SOCRATES.
CHAPTEE VI
THE PHILOSOPHICAL METHOD OF SOCRATES.
CHAP. THE peculiarity of the method pursued by Socrates
L consists, generally speaking, in deducing conceptions
from the common opinions of men. Beyond the
formation of conceptions, however, and the intellec-
tual exercise of individuals his method did not go ;
nor is there any systematic treatment of the concep-
tions gained. The theory of a knowledge of concep-
tions appearing here as a claim, the consciousness
of its necessity must be presupposed as existing, and
an insight into the essence of things be sought. At
the same time, thought does not advance further
than this seeking. It has not the power to develope
to a system of absolute knowledge, nor has it a
method sufficiently matured to form a system. For
the same reason, the process of induction is not
reduced within clearly defined rules. All that
Socrates has clearly expressed is the general postu-
late, that every thing must be reduced to its concep-
tion. Further details as to the mode and manner of
this reduction and its strict logical forms, were not
yet worked out by him into a science, but were
applied by him practically by dint of individual skill.
The only thing about him at all resembling a logical
KNOWLEDGE OF SELF. li!
rule, the maxim that the process of critical enquiry CHAI-.
must always confine itself to what is universally
admitted, 1 sounds far too indefinite to invalidate our
assertion.
This process involves three particular steps. The A. TJie
first is the Socratic knowledge of self. Holding as he juwwlettM
did that only the knowledge of conceptions constitutes l 'f * c }fi -
true knowledge, Socrates was fain to look at all sup- ' a know-
posed knowledge, asking whether it agreed with his l {*
idea of knowledge, or not. Nothing appeared to him
more perverse, nothing more obstructive to true
knowledge from the very outset, than the belief that
you know what you do not know. 2 Nothing is so
necessary as self-examination, to show what we really
know and what we only think we know. 3 Nothing,
too, is more indispensable for practical relations
1 Mem. iv. 6, 15: 6ir6re tie speaking in Plato, Apol. 21, B.,
a.vr6s TI rip \6yia Sn^ioi, 810 TWI> says that according to the
/uA(0Ta 6fjLo\oyov/jL(i'wi/ ^TTopfvero. oracle he had interrogated all
vofj.ifai> TuuTTjj/rV aa<pa\tiav elvcu with whom he was brought
A<tyou. into contact, to discover whe-
2 Xan. Mem. iii. 9, 6: p,cu>iat> ther they had any kind of know-
iva-v-riov fj.ff f<f>ri t?vai ffo- ledge ; and that in all cases he
nfvroi ye TT> aj/eTnoTTjjito- had found along with some kind
fiaviav tv6pifv. rb 5e of knowledge an ignorance,
favrbv Kal & ^ o?8e which he would not take in ex-
i/ re Kal otfaOaiyiyiHacrKeiv, change for any kind of know-
iyyvrdroa navias fhoyifao elvtu. ledge an opinion that they
Generally speaking, those are knew what they did not know,
called mad who are mistaken On the other hand, he considered
about what is commonly known, it to be his vocation, <})i\o<ro<f>ovi>-
not those who are mistaken TO j> Kal ^rd^ovra ffj.avrbv Kal
about things of which most men TOVS &\\ovs (28, E.) ; and he
are ignorant. Also Plato, Apol. says elsewhere (38, A.) that
21), B. : al roino irus OVK a/j,aOia there could be no higher good,
^cTrly auTTj 7; iirovt&Hnos, T) TOV than to converse every day as
olfoeat dStvai & OVK olStv ; he did : 6 St ii/e^VoaTos Qios ov
3 In tliis sense Socrates,
1-2-2
SOCRATES.
O'HAP.
VI.
than to become acquainted with the state of our inner
self, with the extent of our knowledge and capacities,
with our defects and requirements. 1 One result of
this self-examination being the discovery that the
actual knowledge of the philosopher does not corre-
spond with his idea of knowledge, there follows
further that consciousness of knowing nothing, which
Socrates declared to be his only knowledge. For any
other knowledge he denied possessing, 2 and therefore
refused to be the teacher of his friends, 3 only wishing,
1 XeiwjjJwn, Mem. iv. 2, 24,
enquiring into the Delphic
yvwQi ffeavrov, says that self-
knowledge is attended with
the greatest advantages, want
of it with the greatest disad-
vantages : ol fjiev yap eiSdres
eavrovs rd re eirir'fiSeia eavrots
iffULffi Kal SiayiyvcaffKovfftv a re
Svvavrai Kal a fi-fi' Kal a /J.ev
firiffravrat irpdrrovres (self-
examination always refers in
the first place to knowledge,
because with knowledge right
action is given) Tropiovrai re
Siv Seovrat Kal ev npdrrovffiv.
See also Plato, Phtedrus, 229,
E. ; he had not time to give
to the explanation of myths of
which others were so fond, not
being even able to know him-
self according to the Delphic
oracle ; Symp. 216, A. ; when
Alcibiades complains : avay-
Kai^ei yap p.t bp.o\oyelv, on ieo\-
\ov IvSeris &v avrbs en ^p.av-
rov fifv a/jLe\u, TO 8' ' f*.Qi}va(<av
irpdrru.
- Plato, Apol. 21, B. : iy&
yap Si] oijre p-eya otire fffUKpbv
ffvitoioa e/j,avrif o~o$bs iav. 21,
D. : TOUTOU fj-tv rov avSptiivou tytio
<ro(ptt>rep6i ei(if Kivovvevei fj.ev yap
rifuwv ovSenpos ovSev Ka\bv Kaya-
6bv elSevai, a\\' ovros /uei/ oifrrof
rt eioevat OVK elSws, eyiii Se laffirep
ouv OVK olSa, ovSe 0^0/j.ai. 23, B. :
ovros vp.S>v, S> avQpoiiroi, ffofyunaros
tffriv, bffns, Sxrirep 'ScaKpdrr)s T
eyvtaxev, on ovoevbs at6s fffri rfj
a\r)0eia irpbs ffo<j>iav. And 3
little before : TO 5 KtvSvvevei, S>
&v$pes ' AQt]val.oL, rip 6vn 6 6ebs
ffotybs fivai, Kal ev rtp XPWP'V
roury rovro \ey(iv, on i] avQpw-
iriirri ffo<pia 6\iyov nvbs a|ia
io-rl Kal ovSev6s. Symp. 216,
D. : ayvoet itdvra Kal ovoev blSev,
us TO ffxypa avrov. Thesetet.
150, C. ; ayovos eifj.i ffotptas, Kal
'direp fjtiri TroAAoi /j.oi wveioiaav, ois
rovs (lev &\\ovs tptaru, avrbi Se
ovoev airoKpivofiai irepl ovoevbs Sia
TO fj.riSev x eu/ vo<t>6v, a\r)0es ovei-
Siouo~r rb oe atnov rovrov r6Sf
p&LeveoQai p.e o 6ebs avaynd^ei,
yevvyv oe aireKu>\vffev. Comp.
Rep. i. 337, B. ; Men. 98, B.
That this trait in Plato has
been taken from the Socrates
of history, may be gathered
from the Platonic dialogues, in
which his teacher is by no
means represented as so igno-
rant.
8 See above, p. 67.
KNOWLEDGE OF SELF. 123
in common with them, to learn and enquire. 1 This CHAP.
confession of his ignorance was certainly far from _
being a sceptical denial of knowledge, 2 with which
the whole philosophic career of Socrates would be
irreconcilable. On the contrary, it contains a simple
avowal as to his own personal state, and collaterally
as to the state of those whose knowledge he had had
the opportunity of testing. 3 Nor again must it be
regarded as mere irony or exaggerated modesty. 4
Socrates really knew nothing, or to express it other-
wise, he had no developed theory, and no positive
dogmatic principles. The demand for a knowledge
of conceptions having once dawned upon him in all
its fulness, he missed the marks of true knowledge in
all that hitherto passed for wisdom and knowledge.
Being, however, also the first to make this demand,
he had as yet attained no definite content for know-
ledge. The idea of knowledge was to him an
unfathomable problem, in the face of which he could
not but be conscious of his ignorance. 5 And in so far
a certain affinity between his view and the sophistic
1 Koivrj &ov\fvfff0ai, KOIVIJ c/c- the limited cliaracter of human
TTTeffdat, Kowf, TJ T '"> **f*r&i knowledge being asserted in
&c. Xen., Mem. iv. 5, 12 ; 6, comparison with the divine.
1 ; Plato, Theait. 151, E. ; Prot. 4 As Grate remarks (Plato, i.
330, B. ; Gorg. 505. E.; Crat. 270, 323), referring to Arist.
384, B. ; Meno, 89 E. Soph. El. 34, 183, b, 7 : 6r;
- As the New Academicians Kal Sia TOVTO ^,<aKpdrijs Tjpura*
would have it, Cic. Acad. i. 12, a\A' OVK airticpivtTo- i/xoA.<$7 yap
44 ; ii. 23, 74. O<,K ciftrai. Conf. Plato, Rep.
3 The already quoted Ian- 337.
guage of the Apology, 23, A., * Compare Hegel, Gesch. d.
does not contradict this ; the Phil. ii. 54 ; Hermann, Plato,
jxiKxilility of knowledge not 326.
being there denied, but only
124 SOCRATES.
CHAP, scepticism may be observed. In as far as it denied
Yl ' the possibility of all knowledge, Socrates opposed this
scepticism, whilst agreeing with it in as far as it re-
ferred to previous philosophy. Natural philosophers,
he believed, transcended in their enquiries the limits
of human knowledge. A clear proof of this fact is
that they are at variance with one another respecting
the most important questions. Some hold being to
be one, others make of it a boundless variety ; some
tsach that everything, others that nothing, is subject
to motion ; some that all things, others that nothing
comes into being or perishes. 1 Just as the Sophists
destroyed the conflicting statements of the natural
philosophers by means of each other, so Socrates
infers from the contest of systems, that no one of
them is in possession of the truth. Their great dif-
ference consists herein, the Sophists making Not-
knowing into a principle, and considering the highest
wisdom to consist in doubting everything ; Socrates
adhering to his demand for knowledge, clinging to the
belief in its possibility, consequently regarding igno-
rance as the greatest evil.
Such being the importance of the Socratic Not-
knowing, it involves in itself a demand for enlighten-
inf/ of rnent ; the knowledge of ignorance leads to a search
hisfellviv-
' Xe "" Mem> J< ! 13 ' says 7rois " p6 '" ' ilfel Kal T0 " s ;Ue ' 7 "
that Socrates did not busy OTOV <ppovovtnas eni rf irfpl rov-
himself with questions of -rwv Ktyeiv ov -ravrb. 8odeti>
natural science, but on the oAA^Aois, a\\a raits pawo fj.evots
contrary he held those who 6/j.oius 8iaKej(r0ai irpbs aAA.TJA.our
did to be foolish ; e'flaujuafe 5' then follows what is quoted in
fl p.)) tyavfp'bv avrols t<rrit>, Sri the text.
Tavra ov Swar6v tffriv av6pu>-
SEARCH FOR TRUE KNOWLEDGE. 125-
for true knowledge. The consciousness of our own CHAP.
Not-knowing continuing, and the philosopher having '
an idea of knowledge without finding it realised in
himself, the search for knowledge naturally assumes
the form of an application to others, with a view of
ascertaining whether the knowledge wanting at home
is to be found with them. 1 Hence the necessity of
enquiry in common by means of the dialogue. 2 For
Socrates, this mode of intercourse has not merely an
educational value, procuring easier access and a more
fruitful effect for his ideas, but it is to his mind
an indispensable condition of the development of
thought, and one from which the Socrates of history
never departs. 3 Speaking more accurately, its nature
consists in a sifting of men such as it is described in
the Apology, 4 or in a bringing to the birth, as it is
called in the Theeetetus ; 5 in other words, the philo-
sopher by his questions obliges others to unfold their
inner self before him : 6 he asks after their real
1 The connection is very ap- vpoa"nKo6<rais irpQeaiv avrovs elvac
parent in the Apol. 21, B., if tiren&f'tTo : and the enquiry
only the inner thought of the into human nature has this
philosophy of Socrates is put meaning in Mem. iii. 6 ; iv. 2 ;
in the place of the oracular but clearly this is not its origi-
response. nal object.
2 Compare p. 123, 2. 5 See p. 149; 122, 2.
8 Compare, besides the Me- 6 Plato, Lach. 187, E ; he
morabilia, Plato, Apol. 24, C. ; who enters into conversation
Protag. 335, B., 336, B. Theaet, with Socrates jufj va^ffdat fab-
1. c. TOVTOV iTfpiay6/j.fvof rcf \6ycp.
1 Similarly Xen. Mem. iv. irflv &/ t/j.Tr4ffr> tts rb StS6vai vepl
7, 1 : ir6.VTu>v /iev yap wv 3yu oT5a avrov \6yov, ZVTIVO. rp^irov vvv re
/j.d\iffra %fj.e\fv avT<j> fiStvat, STOU p, nor is there any escape
TIJ ^irto-T^/nwi/ etr] r>v ffwAvTuv from the most thorough /3a-
cwTtp. Xenophon only took it
In prove 3rt avrdpKeis Iv rats
126 SOCRATES.
CHAP. opinions, after the reasons of their beliefs and actions,
and in this way attempts by an interrogatory analysis
of their notions to bring out the thought latent
therein, of which they are themselves unconscious. 1
In as far as this process presupposes that the know-
ledge which the questioner lacks may be found in
others, it resembles an impulse to supplement one's
own defects by their help. This intercourse with
others is, for a philosopher with whom knowing coin-
cides with purposing, not only an intellectual but also
a moral and personal need. To enquire in common
is at once to live in common. Love of knowledge is
at once impulse to friendship, and in the blending
together of these two sides consists the peculiarity of
the Socratic Eros. 2
In as far as others do not possess the knowledge
sought for, and the questions of Socrates only serve to
expose their ignorance, the process bears also the
character of irony. Irony, however, must not be
understood to be merely a conversational trick ; 3 still
1 It is assumed as a matter spiritual and the disadvantages
of course, that every one can of a sensual love are unfolded,
give an account of what he apparently (as a careful survey
knows and is, Plato, 1. c. 190, C. ; of the Platonic Symposion will
Chai'rn. 158, E. show) by Xenophon, speaking
2 See above, p. 75. Besides for himself, but undoubtedly
Brandis ii. a, 64, reminds us following in the train of So-
with justice that treatises on crates. Even ^Eschines and
eptas are mentioned not only by Cebes had treated of pcos in
Plato and Xenophon, but also the Socratic sense. See Pint.
by Euclid, Crito, Simmias, and Puer. Ed. c. 15, p. 11, and 1he
Antisthenes, which shows the fragment of ^Eschines in ^Iris-
importance of it for the So- tid. Or. xlv. p. 34.
cratic schools. The chief pas- 3 Hegel, Gesch. d. Phil. ii.
sage is in Xenophon, Symp. c. 53, 57; Conf. Arist. Eth. iv.
8, where the advantages of a 13; 1127, b, 22.
USE OF EROS AND IRONY.
127
less is it that derisive condescension or affected sim-
plicity, which as it were lures others on to the ice in
order to laugh at their falls ; or that absolute refer-
ence to the person and destruction of all general
truth, which for a time bore this name in the
romantic school. Its proper nature consists rather
herein, that without any positive knowledge, and
prompted only by a desire for knowledge, Socrates
addresses himself to others, in the hope of learning
from them what they know, but that in the attempt
to discover it, upon a critical analysis of their no-
tions, even l their supposed knowledge vanishes. This
CHAP
VI.
1 Plato at least gives this
deeper meaning to the irony of
Socrates. See Rep. i. 337, A. :
av-rri txtiv-r] f) tltaQvia elptevfia
Sco/cpdrovs, Kal TaiV ey!i} i?8rj re
Kal TOVTOIS irpoti\cyov, 5Vt ffv
airoKplvaffOat fitv OVK 20e\'fiffois,
flptavfvffoio Se Kal irdvra /j.a\\oi>
iroifaots % airoKpfaoto et ris rl at
tpiara. And again. 337, E. :
'iva 'SoiKpdr'ns rb ei<a0bs $tairpd-
TJTOI, avrbs /j.ev ^ airoKpivr)Tai,
a\\ov 5 airoKpivofj.evov \a/j.fidvri
\6yov Kal t\fyxp' to which So-
crates replies : irus yap tiv . . .
TIS avoKpivano irp&rov fjitv ^ elSws
/tijSe <pdffK<av elSfvai, &:c. Symp.
216, E. : fipwvfv6uevos 5e Kal
Tralfav itdvra rbv f3lov irpby Tabs
avOpuirovs StareAeT, which, as
the context shows, refers partly
to the fact that Socrates pre-
tended to be in love, without
l>cin^ so in the Greek sense of
the term, and partly to the
words ayvofi vdvra. Kal obH^
oKev. The same, omitting the
word elpwvda, is said in 1he
passage of tho The;etetus al-
ready mentioned, and in the
Meno, 80, A. : oi>5/ &\\o t) avr6s
re airopt'is Kal rovs &\\ovs iroie'ts
airoptlv, and also in the Apol.
23. E., in which, after the
Socratic sifting of others has
been described, it goes on to
say : $K Tavrycrl STJ -rrjy Qerdfffws
iro\\ol nty a-rrexOfiai juoi yeydvaffl
. . . i/1/oju.a 8 TOI/TO . . . ffo<pbs
t. olovrat ydp /ue ^Kdffrore of
tavra avrbv elvai <ro<pbv
a av &\\ov Qf\fytu. Likewise
Xentyrftvn, Mem. iv. 4, 10: 87*
T&V a\\cav Karaye\as, tptariav
fjiff Ka\ l\4yx<i)v irdvras, avrbs 5
ovtifvl QiX'j>v uirfXftv \6yov oiitie
yv<Sifjit\v airoQalveffOai irepl ouSeccJj.
Ilrid. 1 1 . Conf . i. 2, 36 : a\Aa
TOi ffv yf, S> SciKparfy, (1u0as
fi'Sa.'? irus $x ft ra Th-fiGTa Iptarav.
Hence Quintilian, ix. 2, 46,
observes that the whole life of
Socrates seemed an irony, be-
cause he always played the
part of an admirer of the
wisdom of others. Connected
with this is the use which
Socrates made of irony as a
12 SOCRATES.
CHAP, irony is, therefore, speaking generally, the dialectical
1 or the critical factor in the Socratic method, assum-
ing the peculiar form it here does owing to the presup-
posed ignorance of him who uses it for his instrument.
C. TJie Doubtless, however conscious Socrates might be of
formation . , , 111 , i . i
of coHcey- possessing no real knowledge, he must at least have
tio,,* and, be i iev ed that he possessed the notion and the method
the iHetliod
ofjmmfbij of true knowledge. Without this conviction he
tii">i?'~ would neither have been able to confess his own igno-
rance, nor to expose that of others, both being only
rendered possible by comparing the knowledge he
found with the idea of knowledge residing within
himself. The fact that this idea was no where to be
found realised was in itself a challenge to him to set
about realising it; and hence resulted as the third point
in his philosophic course the attempt to create real
knowledge. For real knowledge he could only allow
that to pass which emanated from the conception of
a thing, hence the first step here is the formation of
conceptions or induction. 1 For even if Socrates does
not always make for formal definitions, he at least
always seeks some universal quality applicable to the
conception and to the essence of the object, in order
to settle the question under notice by referring the
particular case to this universal quality. 2 The class-
figure of speech. Conf. Plat, the word also J^eop. Sc-hmidt
Grorg. 489, E. ; Symp. 218, D. : in Ind. Lection, Marburg, 1873.
Xen. Mem. iv. 2. Only its ' Compare the remarks of
meaning must not be limited Arixtatle already mentioned,
to this. Compare also Her- p. 110, 2.
matin, Plat. 242, 326, and par- 2 tirl T^V inr^eaiv liravTiye
\icVi\3iY\y fichfoiermacher, Gesch. iravra, rbi> \6yov, Seep. 110, 2.
d. Phil. 83, and for the use of
FORMATION OF CONCEPTIONS.
Duality is therefore to him of the greatest import-
ance.
The starting point for this induction is supplied
by the commonest notions. He begins with examples
taken from daily life, with well-known and generally
admitted truths. On every disputed point he goes
back to such instances, and hopes in this way to
attain a universal agreement. 1 All previous science
being doubtful, nothing remains but to begin anew
with the simplest experiences. On the other hand,
induction has not as yet so far advanced as to mean the
deriving conceptions from an exhaustive and critically
tested series of observations. This is a later require-
ment due partly to Aristotle, and partly to more
modern philosophy. The wider basis of a compre-
hensive knowledge of facts being as yet wanting, nay,
even being despised, and Socrates being in the
habit of expanding his thoughts in personal conversa-
tion with distinct reference to the case before him
and to the capacity and needs of his fellow-speakers,
he is confined to the assumptions which the circum-
stances and his own limited experience supply ; he
must take isolated notions and admissions as his
point of departure, and can only go as far as others
can follow. Hence in most cases he relies more on par-
ticular instances than on an exhaustive analysis of
1 Compare what has been iiriara^ai, fyuoja TOVTOI
quoted, pp. 80, 2; 121, 1, and A OVK Mpi&v tviaTcuTOcu, ivcnrd-
the whole of the Memorabilia. 0eis, oT/tcu is KO! ravra iirlffra^ai.
Plato, too, gives instances of As to the principle that from
this procedure. See Xen. (Ec. the less you proceed to an uii-
19, 15 : rj tp<im)<ris $i$affKa\ia. derstanding of the more im-
fffrlv . . . &yuv ydp fj.e Si' $>v l-yb portant, see Plato, Gorg. 947, C.
K
130 SOCRATES.
CHAP. experience. 1 This chance element in his principles
VL he, however, endeavours to eliminate by collecting
opposite instances, so as to correct and supplement
varying experiences by one another. The question,
for instance, before him being the conception of in-
justice : He is unjust, says Euthydemus, who lies,
deceives, robs, and such like. Yet, rejoins Socrates,
it is right to lie, to deceive, and to rob an enemy.
Accordingly the conception must be more accurately
denned thus : He is unjust who does such things
to his friends. Even such action is, however, per-
mitted under circumstances. A general is not unjust
when he encourages his army by a lie, nor a father
who gives his son medicine by deception, nor a friend
who robs his friend of the weapon with which he
would have committed suicide. "We must, there-
fore, introduce a further limitation. Unjust is he
who deceives or robs his. friends in order to do them
harm. 2 Or the conception of a ruler has to be dis-
covered. General opinion regards a ruler as one who
has the power to give orders. But this power,
Socrates shows, is conceded only to the steersman on
board ship, only to the physician in case of sick-
ness, and in every other case only to those conversant
with the special subject. Only he, therefore, is a
ruler who possesses the knowledge necessary for
ruling. 3 Or it must be determined what belongs to
a good suit of armour. The smith says, it must be
1 As for example in the com- 2 Mem. iv. 2, 11.
parison of the politician with * Ibid. iii. 9, 10.
the physician, pilot, &c.
METHOD OF INDUCTION. 131
of a proper size. But suppose the man intending to CHAP.
wear it is deformed. Why then, the answer is, it
must be of the proper size for his deformity. It
therefore has the proper size when it fits. But now,
supposing a man wishes to move, must the armour
lit exactly ? Not so, or he would be hampered in
his movements. We must, therefore, understand by
fitting what is comfortable for use. 1 In a similar
way we see Socrates analysing thoroughly the com-
mon notions of his friends. He reminds them of the
various sides to every question ; he brings out the
opposition which every notion contains either within
itself or in relation to some other : and he aims at
correcting, by additional observations, assumptions
resting on a one-sided experience, at completing
them, and giving to them a more careful definition.
By this process you arrive at what belongs to the
essence of every object, and what does not ; thus con-
ceptions are formed from notions.
For the purpose of proof, too, the class-qualities
of conceptions are also the most important things.
In order to investigate the correctness of a quality
or the necessity of a course of action, Socrates falls
back on the conception of the thing to which it
refers ; 2 and therefrom deduces what applies to the
given case. 3 As in seeking conceptions he always
1 Mem. iii. 10, 9. then shows that his conduct
1. c. iv. 6, B. falls under this conception ; in
* For instance, in order to order to put his duties before
reprove Lamprocles for his con- a commander of cavalry, he
duct to Xanthippe, he first begins (Mem. iii. 3, 2) by
(Mem. ii. 1) lets him give a stating what is his employment,
definition of ingratitude, and and enumerating its different
K 2
132 SOCRATES.
CHAP, progresses from what is known and universally ad-
VL mitted, 1 so, too, he does here. Hence his method of
proof takes the most varied turns, 2 according as it
starts from one or another point of departure. He
allows a general principle to be taken for granted,
and includes under it the particular case ; 3 he refutes
foreign assertions by bringing home to them contra-
dictions with themselves or with other undoubted
assumptions or facts ; 4 he builds up the premisses
from which he deduces his conclusions by means of
induction, or concludes straight off by an apparent
analogy. 5 A theory of this method of proof he lias
not given, nor distinguished the various kinds of
proof. The essential point about it is only this, that
everything is measured and decided by conceptions.
To find the turns by which this end is reached is
a matter of personal critical dexterity. Aristotle,
therefore, in making the chief merit of Socrates from
this side consist in the formation of conceptions and
in induction, 6 must on the whole be allowed to be
right.
Asking further as to the objects on which Socrates
practised his method, we encounter in the Memora-
bilia of Xenophon a motley array of materials in-
parts ; in order to prove the ' See above, pp. 131; 121, 1.
being of the Gods, he begins 2 Conf. Schtvegler, Gesch. d.
with the general principle that Griech. Phil., 2 Aufl., p. 121.
all that serves an end must 3 As in the cases quoted on
have an intelligent cause p. 131, 3.
(Mem. i. 4, 4) ; in order to 4 For instance, Mem. i. 2, 34
determine which of two is the and 36 ; iv. 2, 31 ; 4, 7.
better citizen, he first enquires 5 Mem. iv. 2, 22 ; iv. 4, 14 ;
into the peculiar features of a i. 2, 32.
good citizen (iv. 6, 14). See p. 110, 2.
APPLICATION OF HIS METHOD. 133
vestigations into the essence of virtue, the duties of CHAP.
man, the existence of (rods, disputes with Sophists, '
advice of the most varied kind given to friends and
acquaintances, conversations with generals as to the
responsibilities of their office, with artificers and
tradesmen as to their arts, even with loose women as
to their mode of life. Nothing is too small to arouse
the curiosity of the philosophy and to call for a
thorough and methodical examination. As Plato at
a later time found in all things without exception
essential conceptions, so, too, Socrates, purely in the
interest of knowledge, even where no educational
or other good was apparent, referred everything to
its conception. 1 He looked upon the life and pur-
suits of man as the real object of his enquiries, and
other things only in as far as they affected the con-
ditions and problems of human life. Hence his
philosophy, which in point of scientific form was a
criticism of what is (StaXe/mK^), became in its actual
application a science of human actions
1 See p 109
134 SOCRATES.
CHAPTEE VII.
THE SUBSTANCE OF THE TEACHING OF SOCRATES : ETHICS.
CHAP. SOCRATES, says Xenophon, 1 did not discourse concern-
YIL ing the nature of the All, like most other philosophers
A. Futida- before him; he did not enquire into the essence of
Irtrictionlf ^ e wor ld an d the laws of natural phenomena ; on
the sub- the contrary, he declared it folly to search into such
\ er t subjects ; for it is unreasonable to quiz things divine
Ethics. before fully understanding things human ; besides,
the conflicting opinions of natural philosophers prove
that the object of their research transcends the capa-
city of human knowledge. After all, these enquiries
are of no practical use. Quite in keeping with this
view, the Socrates of Xenophon tests even geometry
and astronomy 2 by the standard of immediate utility,
as being the knowledge respectively requisite for
surveying and navigation. To carry them further
than this he considers to be a useless waste of time,
or even impious ; for man can never come upon the
track of the mighty works of the (rods, nor do the
Gods desire that he should attempt such knowledge.
' Mem. i. 1, 11. Conf. p. 124, 1. Ibid. iv. 7.
HIS TEACHING CONFINED TO ETHICS. K
Hence in all such attempts, extravagances such as CHAP.
those of Anaxagoras are sure to come to view. 1
The accuracy of this description of Socrates has,
however, not passed unchallenged by modern writers. 2
Granting, it is said, that Socrates really expressed
these and similar sentiments, can they be right-
fully so understood as though he would altogether
deprecate speculative enquiry into nature ? Would
not such an assertion too manifestly contradict his
own fundamental view, the idea of the oneness of all
knowledge ? Would it not lead, if propounded as
Xenophon has done, to consequences manifestly un-
reasonable ? Even Plato 3 bears testimony to the
fact that Socrates did not attack natural science in
itself, but only the ordinary treatment of it ; nor can
Xenophon himself conceal the fact that he did devote
his attention to nature, 4 hoping by considering the
1 Mem. iv. 7, 6 : 8\s 8* T&V 64 ; Silvern, Ueber die Wolken
ovpaviuv, $ eKafffa 6 0ebs /J.TI- des Aristophanes, p. 11 ;
Xavarat, (ppovriffr^v yiyveffdai Krische, Forsch. 105 ; Alberti,
direVpeirej/- of/re yap fvpf-ra av- Sokr. 93, 98, likewise gives a
Gptairois avra tv6fi.i^tv tivai, otfre partial adherence to this view :
XaplfaQai 6fo7s &/ yytiTo rbv it might have been expected
frrrovvra & iKtivoi ffa$i}viffcu OVK to go further after what has
4&ovXi\QT)aa.i>. Such subtleties been said, p. 49, 2.
only lead to absurdities, ovtiey 8 Phasdo, 96, A. ; 97, B. ; Rep.
?JTTO' t) 'Avaay6pa.s irapf<pp6^(rtv vii. 529, A. ; Phileb. 28, D. ;
i> fjLfyia-rov <ppovf)ffas tirl rif rets Leg. xii. 966, E.
TWI/ 6fS>v jurfxaj/is tfyyc-iaOat 4 Mem. i. 4 ; iv. 3. No argu-
which is then supported by ment can be drawn from Mem.
various remarks proving the i. 6, 14: roi/s 6i)<ravpovs TWV
extravagance of the notion that ird\ai ffo<pwv avSpoav, otis iKtlvoi
tlio sun is a fiery stone. Kare\iirov iv /3j8A./o(s ypdtyavres.
2 Schlciermnchcr, Werke, iii. avf\lrr<av KOIVTJ avv TO?J <pi\ots
2, 305-307 ; Gesch. d. Phil., p. 5i>xM', for these o-o<pol need
83 ; JJrandix, Rhein. Mus. i. 2, not necessarily be the earlier
130; Gr.-R6m. Phil. ii. a, 34 ; natural philosophers. 2o<f>ol is
Jfitttn; Gesch. d. Phil. ii. 48, also used of poets, chroniclers,
13(i SOCRATES.
CHAP, relations of means to ends in nature to gain an in-
sight into its reasonable arrangement. Allowing,
therefore, that Socrates, as was the fact, had no
special talent for natural science, and hence did not
study it to any great extent, at least the germ of a new
form of this science may be discovered in him. In
his notion of the relation of means to ends in
nature must have lain ' the thought of a universal
diffusion of intelligence throughout the whole of
nature,' ' the theory of an absolute harmony of man
and nature, and of man's occupying such a position
in nature as to be a microcosm of the world.' J If he
stopped at the germ, confining his study of nature to-
mere practical requirements, this must have been, ac-
cording to his own opinion, only as a preliminary step..
He must have only intended that man ought not to
reach into the distance until a critical foundation
has been securely laid in the depths of his own inner
life ; or else it must have reference to popular and
not to philosophical study. 2
Unfortunately this view of modern writers rests
on assumptions which cannot be supported. In the
first place, not only Xenophon, but Aristotle also, 3 not
to mention later writers, 4 asserts that Socrates never
X-c., and it is expressly stated 3 Met. i. 6 (987, b, 1) r
that Socrates perused their ZwKpdrovs 8e irepi /j.ev T& r/0ta
works, in order to iind in them trpajfj.aTevofjLfvov, irepl Se rijs
what was morally useful for SA.TJS <pvffecas ov6ev. xiii. 4 j
liimself and his friends. De Part. Anim. i. 1 (642, a, 28) :
1 Schleiermaclier and Ritter. eVl 2co/cp<xTovs Se rovro pev [rk
2 Krische, 208, as though bpiffaafai T^V ovfflav'] riv^er), rb
Socrates made any distinction Se frreiv T& irepl Qva-fcas eA7je.
between training for a philoso- Conf. Eth. Eud. i. 5 ; 1216, b, 2.
pher and training for a good 4 Civ. Tus. v. 4, 10; Acad.
man. i. 4, 15 ; iv. 29, 123 ; De Fin.
HIS TEACHING CONFINED TO ETHICS. 13
pursued the study of nature. Aristotle is, however, CHAP.
the very authority called in to arbitrate when Xeno-
phon and Plato differ. What right have we, then,
to stand aghast at his testimony as soon as he
declares against Plato ? Even Plato, however, indi-
rectly admits in the Timaeus that natural science
was foreign to Socrates. If he elsewhere puts in
his mouth sayings referring to nature, there is still
no evidence that these utterances are historically
true. Not even in the passage in the Phsedo can
such evidence be found, unless what follows that
Socrates had fallen back on the theory of Ideas
can be taken to be historical. 1 In one respect Xeno-
phon fully agrees with Plato, in saying that Socrates
< lemanded a consideration of the relation of means to
ends in nature. If it is further required that the
relation of means to ends should not be understood
in the lower sense of a later age, in which it was indeed
understood by Xenophon, but that higher speculative
ideas should be sought therein, where, we ask, is the
historical justification of this view ? Lastly, if an
appeal is made to the logical consequences of the
Socratic theory, do they not prove that Socrates must
have been quite in earnest in disparaging a specula-
tive study of nature, and in his popular notion of the
relation of means to ends ? Had he indeed placed
at the head of his system, in this explicit form, the
idea of the mutual dependence of all knowledge, it
v. 29, 87 ; Eep. i. 10 ; Seme, cording to Demetrius of By-
Kp. 71, 7; Sext. Math. vii. 8; zantium, Dioy. ii. 21.
(Jell N. A. xiv. 6, 5, and, ac- Phaedo, 100, B.
138
SOCRATES.
CHAP.
VII.
would be impossible to account for his low estimate
of physics. If, on the contrary, he was concerned,
not about knowledge in general, but about the edu-
cation and training of men by means of knowledge,
is it not very natural that his enquiries should be
exclusively directed to the conditions and activities
of man, 1 nature being only taken into account in as
far as it was useful to man ? Doubtless this view of
the relation of means to ends was, for natural and
scientific enquiries, like a seed sown broadcast, which
sprang up and bore fruit in the systems of Plato and
Aristotle ; but to Socrates himself this new depart-
ment of natural science presented itself only as a
subsidiary branch of ethical enquiry, without his
1 In this respect Socrates is
like Kant, Kant's position in
history being also not unlike
his. As Kant, after destroying
the older Metaphysics, only
retained Ethics, so Socrates,
after setting aside natural
science, turned his attention
exclusively to morals. In the
one case, as in the other, the
one-sidedness with which the
founder begins has been sup-
plemented by the disciples, and
the treatment at first adopted
for Ethics has been extended
to the whole of philosophy.
Just as it may be said of
Socrates, that, despite his so
definitely attested declining of
all cosmical and theological
speculation on principle, he
nevertheless, whilst actually
refraining from such enquiries,
could not conceal from himself
that they were involved, as a
necessary consequence, in his
intellectual principles ; with
the same jiistice may it be said
of Kant, that, notwithstanding
his critic of pure reason, he-
must, whilst disputing the
Metaphysics of Wolff, have-
necessarily seen that his prin-
ciples would lead him consis-
tently to the Idealism of Fichte
and the natural philosophy of
Schelling ; both of whom, and
the first-named even against
Kant's own protests, appealed
to these consequences. For all
that, it is a dangerous business,
from a consideration of logical
consequences and the historical
results of a principle, to correct
the clearest statements as to
the doctrine of its originator,
the question really being,
whether and to what extent
the founder realised these con-
sequences.
HIS TEACHING CONFINED TO ETHICS. l;
being conscious of its range. His conscious interest CHAP.
applies only to Ethics. Even the study of the rela-
tion of means to ends in nature was, according to his
view, subservient to a moral purpose that of urging
his friends to piety. 1 It cannot be altogether neg-
lected in considering his teaching ; nor yet can we,
allow it, in the sense in which it was used by Socrates,
an independent value, nor for this reason prefer it to
Ethics.
The same remark applies to theology, which here
still coincides with natural science. The motives
which deterred him from the one must have deterred
him from the other also. 2 If, notwithstanding, he
expressed definite views as to the Gods and the
worship of the Gods, these views were the outcome
of a practical love of piety. Theology then can only
be treated by him as an appendix to Ethics.
Even then, there are comparatively very few
definite opinions in theology which can be brought
home to Socrates with certainty. Indeed, how
could it be otherwise, considering that a syste-
matic treatment of Ethics is impossible without a
basis either in metaphysics or psychology for it to
rest upon ? The chief service which Socrates here
1 Xen. Mem. i. 4, 1 and 18 ; they had fully mastered human
iv. 3, 2 and 17. things, as having advanced to
9 Xen. Mem. i. 1,11 ; nothing such enquiries, % ra ^tv avOpta-
impious was ever heard from trivh. vapevres TO 8a.i/.u'>i>ia 8
Socrates ; ovSe yap -xtpl TTJS rwi> aKoirovvres j)yovvra.i ra irpoa-fi-
Karrtav <f>v<Tfii>s . . . 5if \tytro KOVTOL irpdrreiv and 16 : avrbs
. . . a\\a nal TOVS (ppoifrlfovrat 8e irfpl TU>V avOptairtltav atl $tf\4-
TO. roiaOro [or, as it is said, 15 : yero, anoTtuv rifiiffeftt
of TO 0e?a farovvrts] (juapaivovras Sec.
He asked whether
140
SOCRATES.
CHAP.
VII.
B. Tlie
leadiiKj
tlumglit of
Ethics :
All virtue,
is Itnim-
rendered was a formal one that of generally refer-
ring moral action to knowledge : no sooner, however,
is it a question of deducing particular moral acts and
relations from knowledge, than he contents himself
partly with falling back upon prevailing custom, or
else there intervenes an accidental reference to pur-
poses, the defects of which are certainly partially
corrected in the sequel.
The leading thought of the ethics of Socrates
may be expressed in the sentence All virtue is
knowledge. 1 This assertion is most closely connected
with his whole view of things. His efforts aim from
the first at re-establishing morality and rooting it
more deeply by means of knowledge. The experi-
ences of his time have convinced him that the con-
ventional probity of moral conduct, resting as it does
on custom and authority, cannot hold its ground.
His sifting of men 'iscovered, even in the most cele-
brated of his contemporaries, 2 a pretended in place
1 Anst. Eth. N. vi. 13; 1144,
b, 17, 28 : Soo/cpoTTjs . . . <ppovri-
fffts yero 1/0.1 irdvas ray aperds
. . . 'StiiKpdrtis /jLev dlv \6yovs
ras operas (pero flvat, tinariinas
yap flvai irdffas, Ibid. iii. 11 ;
1116,b,4; Eth. Eud.i.5; 1216,
b, 6 : eVtffTi^/uas (joer' elvai irdffas
ras apfrds, 8>ffff a/j,a ffvjj.fia,ivtiv
flSfval re r^v 8iKaiO(ruyrjy Kal
dvcu SiKaioy. Conf . Ibid. iii. 1 ;
1229, a, 14; vii. 13; M. Mor.
i. 1 ; 1182, a, 15 ; i. 35 ; 1198,
a, 10 ; Xen. Mem. iii. 9, 5 :
TTJI/ a\KT)V iraffav aper^v ffotyiav
flvai fd re yap Siitata Kal iravra
Sara aprrri TrparTfrat Ka\d re Kal
vaf Kal otr' tu> robs
ravra elS6ras &\\o O.VT\ TOVTWV
ovSfv Trpoe\fffQai, oiirf TOI/S fit)
eirto-TO/xeVous SvvaffBat irpdrTfiv,
aAAa Kal lay eyxetpwffu' a/j.aprd-
veiv. i. 1, 16 : he always con-
versed of justice, piety, Kal irepl
TU>V &\\<av, a TOVS fitv fl56ras
fiyeiro KoAoi/s Kal ayaOovs elvai,
TOVS Se a/yvoovvras avSpairoSASeis
ay SiKaius KK\riff8ai. The latter
iv. 2, 22. Plato, Lach. 194, D. :
iro\\dKis aKTjjcoa ffov \iyovros %TI
Tavra ayaObs fKaffros r)fj.>v oarep
<ro<t>6s, a Se d^ia^s ravra Se Ka.K.6s-
Euthyd. 278, E.
2 Plato, Apol. 21, C. ; 29, E.
MORAL VALUE OF KNOWLEDGE. 141
of a genuine virtue. To attain true morality man CHAP.
must seek the standard of action in clear and certain _
knowledge. 1 The principle which has thus dawned
upon him is, however, only understood in a narrow
and exclusive spirit. Knowledge is for him not only
an indispensable condition and a means to true
morality, but it is the whole of morality. Where
knowledge is wanting, there not only is virtue im-
perfect, but there is absolutely no virtue at all.
Plato was the first, and after him more completely
Aristotle, to improve upon the Socratic doctrine of
virtue.
In support of his position, Socrates established
the point that without right knowledge right action
is impossible, and conversely, that where knowledge
exists, right action follows as a matter of course;
the former, because no action or possession is of any
use, unless it be directed by intelligence to a proper
object ; 2 the latter, because everyone only does what
1 See p. 113. expedient and successful action.
It is only in Plato (Euth. Nor is it opposed hereto that
280, B. ; Meno, 87, C.), that immediately afterwards it is
Socrates expressly takes this refused that wisdom is an avap.-
ground. Hence the Moralia <f>iff&rir-fiTtas ayaOor, many a
Magna (i. 35; 1198, a, 10) one, like Dajdalus and Pala-
appear to have derived the msedes, having been ruined for
corresponding view ; but it not the sake of wisdom. For this is
only sounds very like Socrates, clearly said by way of argu-
but it is also implied in Xeno- ment, and votpia is taken in its
phon ; Socrates there (Mem. iv. ordinary acceptation, including
2, 26) explaining more imme- every art and every kind of
diately in connection with self- knowledge. Of knowledge, in
knowledge, that it alone can his own sense of the term,
tell us what we need and what Socrates would certainly never
we can do, placing us so in a have said that it was not good
position to judge others cor- because it brought men some-
rectly, and qualifying us for times into peril, as the virtue,
342
SOCRATES.
CHAP.
VII.
he believes lie must do, what is of use to himself : *
no one intentionally does wrong ; for this would be
the same thing as making oneself intentionally un-
happy : 2 knowledge is, therefore, always the strongest
power in man, and cannot be overcome by passion. 3
identical therewith, also does.
What is said, iii. 9, 14, respect-
ing tinrpal-ia in contrast to
ev-rux'tt, that it is Kpdriffrov
tiriT^fvfjM, also refers to know-
ledge. For fvirpal-la consists in
iroieii', or as Plato's Euthydemus
281, A, explains it : &n<rHjjU7j
teaches to make a right use of
all goods, and as KctTop6ov<ra
rr)V irpa^iv it produces finrpayia
and efrrvxta. Xenoplwn, i. 1, 7 ;
6, 4, expresses this view more
definitely, ^schines, too, in
Demetrius de Elocu. 297, Khet,
Gr. ix. 122, puts the question
into the mouth of Socrates
when speaking of the rich in-
heritance of Alcibiades : Did
he inherit the knowledge how
to use it ?
1 Xen. Mem. iii. 9, 4 ; see
above, p. 140, 1 ; iv. 6, 6 : tlS6ras
Se & Set iroielv offt rivas otfff6ai
Setv /ti> jroifif ToGra ; Ou/c ofo/ucu,
e<p?j. OlSar 8e rivas &\\a -iroiovv-
TO.S ft & otoivcu Sfiv ; Owe tytay 1 ,
ecjwj. Ibid. 3, 11; Plato, Prot.
358, C.
2 Arigt. M. Mor. i. 9 : 2-
Kpdnjs f(pTf) OVK ^<J>* i)/j.?i> yfvecrdat
rb ffirovSaiovs tlvat % <pat\ovs-
tl ydp ris, <pi)irlv, tyurtiaeiev
otrrivaovv, it&Ttpov &c f}ov\oiro
SiKtuos flvai % &SLKOS, ovdels hi>
e\oiTO T^V bSiKlav. More in-
definite are the remarks in
Eth. Nic. iii. 7; 1113, b, 14;
conf. Eth. Eud. ii. 7 ; 1223, b,
3, on the statement &s
Kuv irovrip'bs ovti' &KWV
Bran-dig remarks with justice
(Gr.-rom. Phil. ii. a, 39) that
this refers in the first place to
the arguments of the Platonic-
Socrates (see Meno, 77, B. ;
Prot. 345, D. ; 353, C.), but that
the same is asserted by Xeno-
pJton, Mem. iii. 9, 4 ; iv. 6, 6
and 11 ; and by Plato, Apol.
25, E. : fy& ft . . . rovro r
Tocrovrov KO.KUV fK&iv voice, us <pys
ffti ravra tyd> aot ov ireiflojuai,
Tatfcrojuea 8 76 &Ktav irotia. Conf.
Dial, de justo, Schl. Dioa. Laert.
ii. 31.
3 Plato, Prot, 352, C. : tp' olv
Kal aol Towvr6v ri jrepl avrrjs
[r^y 3iriffrfini>]s~] So**?, ^ Ka\6v re
eivcu ri firiffT-fifj.rj, KOI olov &pxfiv
TOV avdptiirov nal t&tnrep ytyviaffKri
TIS Ta.ya.Qa Kal rb KO.K&. ^ &r
inrb fj.rtS(v6s, Sxrre
&rra irdrTftv ^ & &f T
elvcu T$)V
&.v6p(air(i>; The latter is then
affirmed with the consent of
Socrates. (The further reason-
ing is probably only Platonic.)
Arigt. Eth. Nic. vii. 3 : ^iffrd-
/j-fvov juer olv 08 (pcuri rives o?6i> Tt
elvai [aKpaTeJeerflat]. Sfivbv ydp,
^iriffr-fifjirts fvofai\s, us tjtfro-
~S,cisKpdrijs, &\\o ri Kpartiv. Eth.
Eud. vii. 13 : op8ws rb 2a>KpT-
tc6v, STI obfiev I
MORAL VALUE OF KNOWLEDGE.
143
As regards that virtue which appears to be
furthest removed from knowledge, the virtue of
bravery, he more especially insisted upon it, that in
all cases, he who knows the true nature of an appa-
rent danger and the means of avoiding it, is braver
than he who has not such knowledge. 1 Hence he
concludes that virtue is entirely dependent upon
knowledge ; and accordingly he defines all the par-
ticular virtues in such a way, as to make them con-
sist in knowledge of some kind, their difference being
determined by the difference of their objects. He is
pious who knows what is right towards God ; he is
just who knows what is right towards men. 2 He is
CHAP.
VII.
Tews a\\' '6ri eiri(rri]iJ.T\v ecprj,
OVK op66v, aperfy yap tan Kal OVK
(irtffT-hfM). If, therefore, any-
one seems to act contrary to
his better judgment, Socrates
does not allow that is really
the case. He rather infers the
contrary. His conduct being
opposed to right reason, he
concludes that he is wanting
in this quality ; Mem. iii. 9, 4 :
irpoffepiafw^evos tie, el roi/s tiriffra-
Htvovs fjiev a 8e7 irparreiv, iroiovv-
TOS Se ravavria, ffofyovs re Kal
eyKparels elvai voflioi ovdev ye
jUaAAoi/, e<pj] t) av6<pous re Kal
aKpareis. In Xenophon, indeed,
this is so put, as if Socrates
had admitted the possibility of
a case of knowing right and
doing wrong. The real mean-
ing of the answer, however,
can only be the one given
above.
1 Xffn. Mem. iii. 9, 2 ; Symp.
2, 12 : Socrates remarks, in re-
ference to a dancing girl who
is deliberating about sword
points : oSroi rovs ye deu^evovs
rdSe avnKe^eiv en ofo/icu, ws ovxl
Kal fi avSpela 5i8aKr6v. Plato,
Prot. 349, E., where it is proved
by various examples divers,
knights, peltastas that of eiri-
<rri]p.oves ruv /j.}) ^wiffrafjievav
eappatewrepoi elffiv. Arist. Eth.
Nic. iii. 11 ; 1116, b, 3 : So K eT
Se Kal rj efjareipla. T) irepl enaara.
avSpeia ris elvai '6Qev Kal 6 2w-
Kpdrrjs (fi]9i] &ri<TT}jU7ji> elvai r^ir
avtipeiav. Conf . Eth. Eud. iii. 1 ;
1229, a, 14.
2 evffeftiis = 6 ra irepl rovs Oeoiis
i'0/j.L/j.a fiSwf SiKaios - 6 eiS&is roc
vepl rovs avOpdnrovs v&iupa. Mem.
iv. 6, 4 and 6. The evffepeia,
the definition of which is here
given, is the same as the 6<ri6rvis,
the conception of which is
sought in Plato's Euthyphro.
If, therefore, Grate, Plato, i.
328, remarks a propos of the
latter, that Xenophon 's So-
crates was neither asking after
the general conception of the
holy, nor indeed could pre-sup-
144
SOCRATES.
CHAP.
VII.
brave who knows how to treat dangers properly ; l
he is prudent and wise who knows how to use what
is good and noble, and how to avoid what is evil. 2
In a word, all virtues are referred to wisdom or know-
ledge, which are one and the same. 3 The ordinary
notion that there are many kinds of virtue is incor-
rect. Virtue is in truth but one. 4 Nor does the
pose it, his observation is
contradicted by appearances.
It does not, however, follow
herefrom that Socrates wished
the Gods to be honoured v6n<f
ir6\etas. Why could he not
have said, piety or holiness
consists in the knowledge of
that which is right towards the
Gods, and to this belongs, in
respect of the honouring of
God, that each one pray to them
after the custom of his country.
A pious mind is not the same
thing as worship. That may
remain the same when the
forms of worship are different.
1 Xen. Mem. iv. 6, 11 : ol tier
&pa firiffrdnevoi rots tiewois re
Kal e'lriKtvSwois Ka\<as \py\ffda.i
a.i/fipe'ioi elffiv, ol 5e Siafjiaprdvovres
rovrov Sei\oi. Pinto, Prot. 360,
D. : fi (rotyia. &pa T>V Setvcav Kal
/jt^l &ftviov avSpeia Iffriv. The
same thing is conveyed by the
definition in Laches, 194, E.
(which is not much imperilled
by the objections raised thereto
from a Socratic point of view).
Courage is rj TVV Seivuv ml
QappaXeviv eiri(TTrjfj.ri ; only 8a.ppa-
\eos must not be rendered
'bold' (as ScJiaarsckmidl,Samm\.
d. plat. Schr. 409, does). It
means rather, according to
198, B., as it so often does, ft ^
Seos Trapexei. Conf. Bonlt:,
Plat, Stud. iii. 441.
2 Mem. iii. 9, 4 : ffotplav 8e ical
ff(i><f>po<rvvr)v ou SicapL^ev, aAAa roi'
ra /j,ev Ka,\ii re Kal ayaOa yiyvu-
ffKovra xpf/fffiai avTois Kal r'bv ra.
alffxpa tlS6ra
re Kal (Tuxppova fKpiv
3 Mem. iv. 6, 7 :
tro(pia iffrlv ; '~E.fj.olye 8o/ceT. Nu
man can know everything, t> &pa
eiriffTarat eKaffros TOVTO Kal ffotpo 1 ;
iffTlV.
4 Plato devel opes this thougl 1 1
in his earlier writings, Prot .
329, B. ; 349, B. ; 360, E. :
which, however, kept much
more closely to the platform
of Socrates ; it is also evidently
contained in Xenophon. His
meaning, as may be gathered
from Mem. iii. 9, 4, is certainly
not : some on* may possess tho
knowledge in which one virtue
consists, whilst lacking the
knowledge in which another
consists ; but he assumes, just
as Plato's Socrates does in the
Protagoras, that where ono
virtue is, all must be there, all
depending on the knowledge of
the good. From this doctrine
of Socrates the Cynic and Me-
garian notions of the oneness
of virtue arose.
MORAL VALUE OF KNOWLEDGE. 145
difference between one person and another, one time CHAP.
vn
of life and another, one sex and another, affect the
question. For in all cases it is one and the same
thing, which makes the conduct virtuous, 1 and in all
persons the same natural capacity for virtue must be
assumed to exist. 2 The main point then invariably
is to cultivate this disposition by education. Some
may bring with them more, others fewer gifts for any
particular activity ; yet all alike require exercise and
training ; the most talented require it most, would
they not be lost in ruinous errors. 3 There being no
greater obstacle to true knowledge than imaginary
knowledge, nothing can in a moral point of view be
more urgently necessary than self-knowledge, to dispel
the unfounded semblance of knowledge and to show
to man his wants and needs. Eight action according
to Socratic principles invariably follows upon know-
ledge, just as wrong action follows from absence of
1 Plato, Meno, 71, D., and 8e?T<M. Conf. Plato, Rep. v.
Aristotle, Pol. i. 13, probably, 452, E.
following the passage in Plato, * Mem. iii. 9, 1 ; iv. 1, 3 ;
1216, a, 20, which he must in iv. 2, 2. The question whether
some way have harmonised virtue is a natural gift or a
with the Socratic teaching : result of instruction the iden-
Sxrrt <paj/epbi/, or i. iffr\v yOiKri tical question to which Plato
aperr) TWV elp-n/j.et>wi> -irdvruf, Kal devoted a thorough discussion
oi>x i) avr)) ffw<ppoffvvi) ywaiKbs in the Meno and Protagoras
Kal avSpbs. ovS' avSpla Kal Swcato- appears to have become a fa-
ffvm), Kaddirtp doero ~2<aKpdrr)s . . . vourite topic of discussion,
iroAu 7ap ijueii/oi/ \fyov<Tiv ol thanks to the appearance of
e'laptfytoCjres ras aperds. the Sophistic teachers of virtue.
2 Xen. Sym. 2, 9 : Kal 6 2a>- Such at least it seems in Xcno-
Kparrjs elirev iv iro\\o1s fitv, 3> plion, iii. 9, 1, and in the Meno.
aj/5pey, Kal &A.A.OIS ori\av, Kal iv Pindar had previously drawn
ofs 5' ri TroTj iroer, on rj ywanfla the contrast between natural
ovStv x^pM T *) s TOW avSpbs and acquired gifts. See above,
ivos p. 23.
L
J4G
SOCRATES.
CHAP.
VII.
knowledge ; he who knows himself will, without fail,
do what is healthful, just as he who is ignorant of him-
self will, without fail, do what is harmful. 1 Only the
man of knowledge can do anything fitting ; he alone
is useful and esteemed. 2 In short, knowledge is the
root of all moral action ; want of knowledge is the
cause of every vice ; and were it possible wittingly to
do wrong, that were better than doing wrong unwit-
tingly ; for in the latter case the first condition of right
action, the moral sentiment, is wanting, whilst in the
former case it would be there, the doer being only faith-
less to it for the moment. 3 What, however, the know-
1 Mem. iv. 2, 24. For exam-
ples of conversations, in which
Socrates endeavoured to bring
his friends to a knowledge of
themselves, see Mem. iii. 6 ;
iv. 2.
2 Mem. i. 2, 52 : the accuser
charged Socrates with inducing
his followers to despise their
friends and relations ; for he
had declared, those only deserve
to be honoured who can make
themselves useful by means of
their knowledge. Xenophon
allows that he showed how
little useless and ignorant
people were esteemed by their
own friends and relatives ; but
he says that Socrates did not
thereby intend to teach them
to despise dependants, but
only to show that understand-
ing must be aimed at, on TO
&<ppov &nfj.6f iffri.
Mem. iv. 2, 19: TU>V Sf 5%
TOIIS <pl\ovs f^aTrardivTwv eirl /8\a?7
-TrtSrepos aSiKt&rfpos effnv. 6 end>v,
3) 6 &KWV ; The question is after-
wards thus settled : ra 5'iKaia
iroTfpov 6 fKtav ^/evS6p.fvos Kal
Qairariav otbtv, t) & &KUV ; ATJA.OF
on 6 tKuv. AiKai6rfpov 8e [<^^y
elvai~] rbv e'jrtffrdfjifvov TO. Siicaia.
rov p/h iiriffTiifJifvov ; $a.ivofj.ai.
Conf. Plato, Kep. ii. 382; iii.
389, B. ; iv. 459, C. ; vii. 535,
E. ; Hipp. Min. 371, E. It is
only an imaginary case to sup-
pose that any one can know-
ingly and intentionally do
what is wrong ; for according
to the principles of Socrates,
it is impossible to conceive
that the man who possesses
knowledge as such should, by
virtue of his knowledge, do
anything but what is right, or
that an}' one should spontane-
ously choose what is wrong.
If, therefore, an untruth is
told knowingly and intention-
ally, it can only be an apparent
and seeming untruth, which
Plato allows as a means to
higher ends (Rep. ii. 382 ; iii.
389, B. ; iv. 459, C.), whereas
want of knowledge is the only
proper lie, a proper lie being
HIS THEORY ABOUT THE GOOD. 147
ledge is in which virtue consists, whether experimen- CHAP.
tal or speculative, purely theoretical or practical is a
question upon which Socrates has not entered. In
Xenophon at least he places learning and exercise
quite naturally together, 1 although Plato had distin-
guished them, 2 and to prove that virtue consists in
knowledge, that it requires knowledge, and can be ac-
quired by instruction, he chooses by preference, even
in the pages of Plato, examples of practical acquire-
ments and of mechanical dexterity. 3
As yet, however, all that has been laid down is in C. TJie
the nature of a formal definition. All virtue is know- S^f*
ledge, but of what is it the knowledge ? To this So- monism.
crates gives the general answer, knowledge of the good. (^ Virtue
He is virtuous, just, brave, and so forth, who knows ned theo-
what is good and right. 4 Even this addition is as reticallt J-
wide and indefinite as those before. Knowledge which
always unintentional, Kep. ii. by natural gifts are really do-
382; v. 535, E. See teller's veloped to mastery. In Mem.
Phil. Stud. p. 152. iv. 1, 3, paO-no-is and vaiSfta are
1 At the beginning of the generally required, but even
Meno. here no difference is made be-
2 Mem. iii. 9, 1, Socrates an- tween theoretical and practical
swers the question whether knowledge.
bravery is a StSaKrbv or fyvviKov : 3 So Protag. 349, E. ; Mem.
the disposition thereto is quite iii. 9, 1 and 11 : &pxovres are
us various as is bodily power, those ^Tuardfjifvoi &px*iv, the
voplfa fjLevroi -na-ffav Qtfftv jtafWjtrei steersman in a ship, in agricul-
ical fj.f\trri irpbs avSpiav atfe(T0ai, ture, sickness, and athletics,
in proof of which it may be those who have made it their
noted that no nation with profession, women in spinning,
weapons to which it is un- The question here raised is dis-
accustomed ventures to en- cussed at length by StrumpelL
counter those who are familiar Gesch. d. Prakt. Phil. d. Gr. vor
with them. So, too, in every- Arist. 146.
tiling else, it is the ^Trj/ufAeio, 4 See p. 143.
the fj.av9d.vtiv KOI /xeA.eruj', where-
148 SOCRATES. '
CHAP. makes virtue, is knowledge of the good ; but what is
VTT
the good ? The good is the conception of a thing
viewed as an end. Doing what is good, is acting up
to the conception of the corresponding action, in
short, knowledge in its practical application. The
essence of moral action is therefore not explained by
the general definition, that it is a knowledge of the
good, the right, and so forth. Beyond this general
definition, however, Socrates did not advance in
his philosophy. Just as his speculative philosophy
stopped short with the general requirement that
knowledge belonged to conceptions only, so his prac-
tical philosophy stopped short with the indefinite
postulate of conduct conformable to conceptions.
From such a theory it is impossible to deduce defin-
ite moral actions. If such are sought no other
alternative remains but to look for them in some
other way, either by adopting the necessary princi-
ples from the prevailing morality without further
testing them ; or, in as far as principles according to
the theory of knowledge must be vindicated before
thought, by a reference to experience and to the
well-known consequences of actions.
(2) Prac- As a matter of fact both courses were followed
^Cofdi^d ky Socrates. On the one hand he explained the
termined conception of the right by that of the lawful. 1 The
cither by
eustom. or l Mem. iv. 6, 6 : Ateaia 8e voi.uu.ov S/KOIOI/ cleat, and when
iitility. oiaQa, e<j>r], 6iro?a Ka\e1rat ; *A Hippias asks for further infor-
ot v6fnoi Ke\vovfftv, 6^17. Ol &pa mation as to what is meant by
TrototWcJ & 01 v6fjioi Kf\evov(ri v&fjLifiov '. v6fi.ovs 5e ir6\fus, e<f>r],
SiKcud T troiovffL Kal ftSe?; IlcSs yiyvwffKfis OVKOVV, Ztyri [So-
yop otf; In Mem. iv. 4, 12, So- crates], vofjufios /ui/ &v ei-rj 6 Kara
crates says : tynfd y&p ej<>> T ^ ravra [a ol iroKiTai fypd<j>avro^\ iro-
APPEAL TO CUSTOM AND UTILITY. 149
best service of God, he says, is that which agrees CHAP.
VTT
with custom ; ! and he will not withdraw himself even
from an unjust sentence, lest he should violate the
laws. 2 On the other hand, as a necessary conse-
quence of this view of things, he could not be con-
tent with existing moral sanctions, but was fain to
seek an intellectual basis for morality. This he
could only take from a consideration of consequences ;
and in so doing he frequently proceeds most super-
ficially, deriving his ethical principles by a line of
argument, which taken by itself differs in results
more than in principles, from the moral philosophy
of the Sophists. 3 When asked whether there could
be a good, which is not good for a definite purpose,
he distinctly stated that he neither knew, nor desired
to know of such a one : 4 everything is good and beau-
\irev6fj.fvos, ai/o^os 8e 6 ravra TTO- only refusing to allow US to
pafiaiviav ; Tlar p.tv ovv, f<t>i). speak of Sophistic morals as if
OUKOVV Kal SiKaia fter to irpdrroi they were uniform.
6 robots TrfMpevos, aSiKa 8' 6 4 Mem. iii. 8, 1-7, where it is
TOI/TOIS direiQSiv ; Flai'i; fj.*t> ofiv. said, amongst other things :
1 Mem. iv. 3, 16 : Euthyde- ft y 1 (pwras fj., 5f TI ayadbv oT5o,
mus doubts whether anyone & ^Sfi/bs ayadtv tffTiv, ofo' 0/80,
can worthily honour the gods, eiprj, otire 8<=<yiai . . . Aeyeis ab,
Socrates tries to convince him. 6<i)T/ ['ApumirTros] :aAa T *cal
opotj yap, STI 6 tv AeX^oTs Gtbs aivxpa. TO aura tivai; Kal v^ Af
Srav ns avrbv ^irfpcara ircas &v eyuy', e^r/ [Sw/cpaTT/s] ayadd re
TOJS 6fo7s x a PC' TO airoKpivfrai Kal KOKA . . . meaning, as the
v6fj.tf ir6\fus. The same prin- sequel shows (not as Ribbing,
ciple is attributed to Socrates, 1. c. p. 105, translates it : good
i. 3, 1. and evil are the same), but
2 See p. 77, 1. the same thing is good and
* As Dissen has already evil, in as far as for one pur-
shown, in the treatise referred pose it is useful, that is good,
to p. 100, 2. Compare Wiggers, and for another harmful ; vcEira
Socrates, p. 187 J SmdaU,'De yap ayaBa (jiev /col Ka\d IffTi,
Philosophia Mor. Socr. Grate irpbs a to *5 ?xp, KaK * 8 < "i
<^Hist. of Greece, viii. 605) cwVxpa, irpbs a to KOKWS.
agrees with this statement,
150 SOCRATES.
CHAP. tiful in relation to the special needs which it sub-
VII
_^ serves, and therefore one and the same thing may be
good for one and bad for another. He declared in
a manner most pronounced, that the good is nothing
else but the advantageous, the beautiful nothing else
but the useful ; everything therefore is good and
beautiful in relation to the objects for which it is
advantageous and useful; 1 confirming his doctrine
of the involuntary nature of evil one of the leading
principles of his ethics by the remark that everyone
does that which he thinks advantageous for himself. 2 '
There is, therefore, according to his view no abso-
lute, but only a relative good ; advantage and disad-
vantage are the measures of good and evil. 3 Hence
in the dialogues of Xenophon he almost always bases
his moral precepts on the motive of utility. We
should aim at abstinence, because the abstinent man
has a more pleasant life than the incontinent : 4 we
should inure ouselves to hardships, because the hardy
man is more healthy, and because he can more easily
avoid dangers, and gain honour and glory : 5 we
1 Xen. Mem. iv. 6, 8, con- thing similar is found in Plato's.
.Juding : rb &pa oxpe'Aiyiiop ayaQdv Protagoras, 358, B.
to'Tiv '6-rcf &v o)tf>f\t/j.ov rj . . . -rb 3 On the other hand, little
XpTJ<n / uoj' &pa na.\&v tffTi irpbs $ importance can be attached ta
&" $ xrfvw ', conf. iv. 1, 5; the treatment of happiness as
5, 6 ; Symp. 5, 3 ; Plato, Prot. the highest end of life in Mem.
333, D. ; 353, C., where So- iii. 2, 4. All Greek philoso-
crates meets Protagoras with phers do the same, including
the statement : rai/r' efftlv Plato, Aristotle, and even the
ayaJda. & tffnv u(f>e\i/J.a roTs a,vQpti>- Stoics.
TTOIJ, and afterwards explains 4 Mem. i. 5, 6 ; ii. 1, 1 ; conf.
good to be that which affords iv. 5, 9.
pleasure or averts pain. 5 Mem. iii. 12 ; ii. 1, 18 ;.
-' Xen. Mem. iii. 9, 4 : some- conf. i. 6.
INCONSISTENCY OF SOCRATIC MORALITY. 151
should be modest, because boasting does harm and CHAP.
brings disgrace. 1 We should be on good terms with
our relatives, because it is absurd to use for harm
what has been given us for our good ; 2 we should
try to secure good friends, since a good friend is the
most useful possession : 3 we should not withdraw
from public affairs, since the well-being of the com-
munity is the well-being of the individual ; 4 we
should obey the laws, since obedience is productive of
the greatest good to ourselves and to the state ; and
we should abstain from wrong, since wrong is always
punished in the end. 5 We should live virtuously,
because virtue carries off the greatest rewards both
from God and man. 6 To argue that all such-like
expressions do not contain the personal conviction
of the philosopher, but are intended to bring those
to virtue by meeting them on their own ground,
who cannot be got at by higher motives, is evidently
laboured, considering the definiteness with which
Socrates expresses himself. 7 Unless, therefore, Xeno-
phon is misleading on essential points, we must
allow that Socrates was in earnest in explaining the
good as the useful, and consequently in the corre-
sponding derivation of moral duties.
True it is that in the mouth of Socrates other (3) Lt-
utterances are met with, leading us beyond this super- J^"*^
Suci-atio
1 Mem. i. 7. a Mem. ii. i, 27, gives an ex- Morality.
- Ibid. ii. 3, 19. tract from a writing of Pro-
3 Ibid. ii. 4, 6 ; ii. 6, 4 and dicus, the substance of which
10. Socrates appropriates. Conf. i.
' Ibid. iii. 7, 9 ; ii. 1, 14. 4, 18; iv. 3, 17.
5 Ibid. iv. 4, 16 and 20; iii. ' This point will be subse-
9> 12. quently discussed.
152 SOCRATES.
CHAP. ficial ground of moral duties, by placing the essential
; advantage of virtue, the purpose which it serves and
because of which it is good and beautiful in its in-
fluence on the intellectual life of man. 1 Most un-
doubtedly and decidedly would this be the view of
Socrates could we attribute to him the maxim so
familiar to the Socrates of Plato, 2 that righteousness
is health, unrighteousness disease of the soul, and
consequently that all wrong-doing invariably injures
him who does it. whereas the right is necessarily and
always useful. Language of this kind occurring in
the Eepublic and Grorgias does not justify our be-
lieving it. In these dialogues much is put into the
mouth of Socrates, which he never said and never can
have said. Nor can it be pleaded that Plato would
never have held such pure moral conceptions, unless
he had had them from his teacher. Otherwise the
theory of ideas and much besides which is found in
Plato would have to be attributed to Socrates. We
cannot even vouch for it that everything contained in
the Crito comes from Socrates, its author not having
been present at the conversation which it describes.
Having apparently, however, been committed to
writing no long time after the death of Socrates, and
not going beyond his point of view, it is noteworthy
that this dialogue contains the same principles : 3 a
1 On what follows compare 3 Crito 47, D : as in the
Ribbing, p. 83, 91, 105, whose treatment of the body, the
researches are here thankfxilly physician's advice must be
acknowledged, whilst all his followed, so in questions of
conclusions are not accepted. right and wrong the advice of
2 See Zeller's Phil. d. Griech. him f tl p-i\ aico\ove-f)ffo/j.ft',
p. 561 of second edition. Sia^fpov/Mev eKeTj/o nal A7j<ro-
INCONSISTENCY OF SOCRATIC MORALITY.
153
circumstance which at least shows that they have a
support in the teaching of Socrates. To the same effect
likewise the Apology expresses itself, Socrates therein
summing up the purpose of his life as that of con-
vincing his fellow-citizens that the education of the
soul is more important than money or property,
honour or glory ; l declaring at the same time in
plainest terms, that whether death is an ill or not
he knows not, but that injustice is, he knows well. 2
Similar language is found in Xenophon. In his
pages too Socrates declares the soul to be the most
valuable thing in man, the divine part of his being,
because it is the seat of reason and only the Reason-
able is of value. 3 He requires, therefore, that the
first care should be for the soul. 4 He is convinced
CHAP.
VII.
fyiyvero T$ 8e a57co> a.Tria\\vro.
If, moreover, life in a diseased
body has no value : juer' littivov
&oa /Siwrbv fifuv 5ie</>0ap/ieVou, tj>
^b aStKOV AwjSarat -rb 5e S/KOIOI/
bvivT]<riv, provided this is not
a (^auA^Tepoj/but a ico\v TtfJitwTf-
pov than that 49, A : wrong-
doing always injures and dis-
graces him who commits it.
1 Apol. 29, D. : as long as he
lived, he would not cease <f>i\o-
ao<f>u>v Kal vfj.1v TrapaKf\fv6/j.fvos
. . . \tyuv oildrrep ttco6a, '6n, &
IJ.fv OVK alffx^v
. . . KOI 6o|rjs Kal TI^TJS.
i/'i'X'JS, '6-ntas us /SfATJffTTj effrai,
OVK ^TrifjL\ei ovSe <ppovrifis ; he
would rather blame a man in
every case where it was neces-
.sary 8rt ra TrAeiVrou &ia irepl
u iroietTO*, ra Se <f>av\6-
rfpa TTfpl ir\fiovos.
2 Ibid. 29, B.
3 Mem. i. 4, 13 : God has
not only taken care of the
human body, a\\' Sirep fteyurrov
fve<pvfff, i. 2, 53 and
55, where the statement Sri rb
&(j>pov &Ttfj.6i> iff-rf is proved by
the fact that you bury the
body as soon as the soul tv 37
u6vri yiverat <pp6mi<ns has left it,
iv. 3, 14 : avOpuwov ye ^ux^?,
flirep TI Kal &\\o TUI> avOfMairivuv
Tov 6elov (ifrexet.
4 Mem. i. 2, 4: Socrates
recommends bodily exercise
within certain limits : rain-nv
yap TV ''" vyifirfiv Te iKavias
elvatKa\T^]v TTJS i^uX'JS iirip.t\tiav
(which accordingly regulates
the care of the body) OVK
154 SOCRATES.
CHAP, that conduct is better, the more you aim at the
' education of the soul, and more enjoyable, the more
you are conscious thereof. 1 The intellectual perfec-
tion of man depending in the first place on his know-
ledge, wisdom is the highest good, without compare
more valuable than ought besides. 2 Learning is
recommended not only on account of its utility, but
far more because of the enjoyment which it directly
confers. 3 These expressions fully agree with what
has been quoted from Plato ; they also appear quite
consistent in a philosopher who bases the whole of
moral conduct so decidedly upon knowledge, and so
expressly leads man to knowledge of and to dealing
with self, as Socrates does. 4
What then must be made of accounts in which
Socrates recommends moral duties entirely on grounds
of outward adaptation to a purpose, such as we fre-
quently find in Xenophon ? Are we to assume that
all such explanations are only intended for those who
were too unripe to understand the sage's real mean-
ing, to show that even on the hypothesis of the ordi-
nary unsatisfactory definition of purpose, virtuous
1 Mem. iv. 8, 6 : &pitrra ju/ mended by Socrates for pre-
yap oljUtu f!jv rovs &pttrra eiri/jie- ferring treasures of wisdom to
\ovfjLfvovs rov as fte\rlffrovs yiy- treasures of gold and silver ;
veffdai, fiSiffra Se rovs fj.d\iffra for the latter do not make
ataOavo/jLevovs, Sn fie\riovs yiy- men better, -rets tie rcav aotytav
vovrai. i. 6, 9 : ofet ovv airb avSptav yvtafjas apery frAovrifw
-rroivroiv rovroiv roffavri\v TjSov^v robs Ke/CTTjjue'j/ow.
ilvai, Sffijv airb rov eairr6i> re 3 Mem. iv. 5, 10 : aAAo /*V
rjyfiffBai j8eA/r(to yiyrfffOcu Kal a,Trb rov /j.adf'iv ri Ka\bv noil
<f>i\ovs afieivovs Kra<r6ai ; aya06v . . . ov /j.6vov w<f>e\eicu,
* Mem. iv. 5, 6 : ffotptay 8e rb oAAa Kal ^5oj/ol peyiffraL yiyvov-
Hfyiffrov ayaebv K. r. \. ; iv. 2, rcu. Conf . ii. 1 . 19.
9, where Euthydemus is com- 4 Conf. pp. 65, 121, 140.
INCONSISTENCY OF SOCRATIC MORALITY. 155-
conduct is the best? that Xenophon took these CHAP.
VII
preliminary and introductory discussions for the "
whole of the Socratic philosophy of life, and hence
drew a picture of the latter, representing, it is
true, his own but not the platform of the real So-
crates ? l This view has no doubt its truth, but it is
hardly the whole truth. We can readily believe that
Xenophon found the more tangible foundation for
moral precepts which judges them by their conse-
quences both clearer and more intelligible than the
deeper one which regards their working on the inner
condition of man. We naturally, therefore, expect
his description to give the preference to this
to him more intelligible explanation even at the
cost of the other ; and to throw the other more into
the background than the actual state of the case
warrants. We must, therefore, allow double value
to such Socratic utterances as he reports implying
a deeper moral life. We cannot, however, consider
him so bad a guide as to report utterances which
Socrates never expressed, nor can we give to these
utterances a meaning by means of which they can
be brought into full accord with Plato's description
of the Socratic ethics.
Take for instance the dialogues with Aristippus, 2
where Socrates is asked to point out a thing good,
' This is, in the main, the sen, Daemon d. Sokr. 4, who
view of Brandis, Rhein. Mus. reproduces Xenophon 's saying*
v. .\ii-hn1tr u. Urandig, i. b, 138 ; as incorrectly as he does.
Gr. Rom. Phil. ii. a, 40 ; Gesch. Zeller's.
<1. Kntwickl. i. 238 ; Ribbing, 2 Mem. iii. 8.
Hokrat. Stud. i. 115 ; Volquard-
166 SOCRATES.
CHAP. and afterwards a thing beautiful, and both times
' answers that goodness and beauty consist in nothing
else save a subserviency to certain purposes. 1 What
inducement had Socrates here to withhold his own
opinion? Was Aristippus one of the unripe un-
philosophic heads, not in a condition to understand
his views ? Was he not rather in addition to Plato
and Euclid one of the most independent and intel-
lectually best educated thinkers in the Socratic
circle ? Why should Socrates say to him : everything
is good and beautiful for that to which it bears a
good relation, and hence the same thing may in rela-
tion to one be a good, to another an evil ? Why
does he not add : one thing there is which is always
and unconditionally good, that which improves the
soul? Or did he add it, and Xenophon omit it
although the main point ? 2 and was this so in other
cases? 3 We could only be justified in such an
assumption, 'were it shown that Socrates could not
possibly have spoken as Xenophon makes him speak,
or that his utterances cannot possibly have had the
meaning, which they have according to Xenophon's
account ; 4 to prove which it is not sufficient to appeal
to the contradiction with which Socrates is otherwise
charged. It is certainly a contradiction to call
virtue the highest end of life, and at the same time
to recommend it because of the advantages it brings : 5
1 See p. 149, 4. 5 What Brandis has else-
2 As Mem. iv. 6, 8. where asserted appears to be
3 Brandis, 1. c. less open to objection, viz. that
4 As Brandis, 1. c. asserts. Socrates distinguishes mere
Conf. Dissen, 1. c. 88; Hitter, good fortune from really far-
Gesch. d. Phil. ii. 70. ing well, and that he only
INCONSISTENCY OF SOCRATIC MORALITY.
157
and Plato recognising this contradiction has avoided
it. 1 Still the question really is, whether and to what __
extent Socrates has avoided it, and nothing can
justify our assuming, that he cannot possibly have
been involved in it. For is there not a contra-
diction in Kant rejecting most decidedly for the
moral estimate of our actions every standard based on
CHAP.
allows happiness in its ordi-
nary sense a place among
things relatively good. The
former statement is in Mem.
iii. 9, 14 ; but this distinction
even by a decided advocate
of Eudremonism, such as Aris-
tippus, could be admitted, as-
suming that true and lasting
happiness is to be attained not
by the uncertain favour of
chance, but by one's own acti-
vity and understanding, and
that man must not make him-
self dependent on extreme
circumstances, but ensure a
lasting enjoyment of life by
rising superior to himself and
his surroundings. If Brandis
(Entw. i. 237) declares this
impossible, he need simply be
referred to the fact that in the
Cyrenaic and Epicurean schools
such views are actually met
with. See below, ch. xiv. B,
5, and Zeller's Stoics, Epi-
cureans, &c., p. 44. For the lat-
ter statement Brandis appeals
to Mem. iv. 2, 34. Here Euthy-
demus has to be convinced
of his ignorance in respect
of good and evil. After it
lias been proved that all things
considered by Euthydemus to
be goods, wisdom included,
may, under certain circum-
stances, be disadvantageous,
Euthydemus says : KivSvvetei
avafj-^iKoytararov ayaBbv elvai rb
fvSai/j.ovfiv, to which Socrates
replies : tf ye ju^ TJS avrb e'|
a.fji(j)t\uy(ai> ayaOcov ffwriQeit}, or
as it is immediately explained,
el ye ^ irpoffOiiffo^ei' avrcf /coAAos
f) l(TXyv % irXovrov t) 5<$|or 2) /cat
TI &\\o T&V TOIOVTUV, since
among all these things there
is none which is not the source
of much evil. Far from deny-
ing, this proceeds on the dis-
tinct understanding that hap-
piness is the highest good
which Greek ethics invariably
presuppose ; neither is it called
simply an a.^(\oyov ayaObv, ex-
cept in the case that it is com-
pounded of &iJ.<l>i\oya ayaOa, i.e.
of such things as under certain
cirqumstances lead to evil, and
are not simply ayaOa, but some-
times icaicd. Still less is this
statement at variance with
passages which estimate the
value of every thing and of
every action by its conse-
quences, a standard being the
very thing which Socrates is
here laying down.
1 As Plato has already re-
marked, Rep. ii. 362, E. ; Phsedo,
68 D,
158 SOCRATES.
CHAP. experience, and afterwards deciding the question as
1 to what maxims are suited to the principle of uni-
versal legislation, having regard to the consequences
which would follow were they universally adopted ?
Is there not a contradiction in the same writer, at
one time waging war a outrance against Eudaemo-
nism, at another founding the belief in the existence
of God on the demand for a bliss corresponding
to worth? Is not the critic of pure reason, in
asserting the independent existence of a thing and
at the same time unconditionally denying that it can
be known, entangled in a contradiction so blatant,
that Fichte was of the opinion that if it really
assumed the independent existence of a thing, he
would rather regard it as the work of a strange coin-
cidence, than of human brains ? Can the historian
therefore make the philosopher of Konigsberg say
what he did not say ? Can he violently set aside
these contradictions instead of explaining them ?
And would it be so inconceivable that the same thing
should be true of the Socratic doctrine ? The philo-
sopher wishes to build moral conduct upon knowledge.
In point 'of form his conception of knowledge is
so indefinite, that it includes besides philosophical
convictions, every kind of skill derived from ex-
perience. 1 In point of matter it suffers from a
similar indefiniteness. The subject matter of prac-
tical knowledge is the good, and the good is the use-
ful, or what is the same thing the expedient. 2 But in
1 See p. 147. The identity of the good and
" Conf . p. 149, 4 ; 1 and 2. the useful is also presupposed
INCONSISTENCY OF SOCRATIC MORALITY. 359
what this consists, Socrates according to all accounts CHAP.
has not expressed with sufficient precision to avoid
all ambiguity in his ethics. In passages of Plato ,
from which we can gather the views of the Socrates
of history, with some certainty, he does not even go
beyond saying that intellectual culture, care for the
soul, must be the most important end for man. Still
to refer all human actions to this as their ulti-
mate and final purpose is impossible for his unsyste-
matic and casual ethical theories, unsupported by any
comprehensive psychological research. Hence other
ends having to do with man's well-being in the
most varied ways come apparently independently to
support that highest moral purpose, and moral
activity itself appears as a means towards attaining
these ends. 1 If therefore Xenophon reports a number
of Socratic dialogues in which things are so repre-
sented, we may still maintain that they do not ex-
haust the Socratic basis of ethics ; but we have no
right to question the accuracy of his description,
supported as it is by many traces in Plato, nor yet to
twist it into its opposite by assuming that we have
here only the beginnings of dialogues the real object
of which must be a very different one. Their accu-
racy on the contrary is vouched for by the circum-
in the passages quoted from distinction in kind in the con-
Plato on p. 152, although the ception of the ayaObv, as to
conception of the useful is regard the iyaObv belonging to
somewhat extended there. virtues as moral good, all
1 Compare the sound remarks other good as good for the
of Striimpell, Gesch. d. Prakt. understanding only, and conse-
i'liil. d. (.Jr. 138, resulting in quently as only useful and
this: Socrates made no such expedient.
160
SOCRATES.
CHAP.
VII.
D. Par-
ticular
moral re-
lations.
stance, 1 that among the Socratic schools side by side
with the morals of the Cynics and the criticism of
the Megarians, a place was found too for the Cyrenaic
doctrine of pleasure ; and that the founders of these
schools to all appearance were firmly persuaded that
they reproduced the true spirit of the Socratic teach-
ing. Had that teaching afforded them no foothold,
this phenomenon would be hard to understand. In
its essence the Socratic morality is anything but
selfish. That fact does not, however, prevent its
assuming the form of Eudsemonism in its theoretical
explanation. We do not complain of it as wanting
in moral content, but as wanting in philosophic
precision.
To give a systematic account of moral actions was
not a part of the intention of Socrates. His views
1 To which Hermann, Plat. i.
257, rightly draws attention.
When, however, this writer
finds in the principle of utility
(Ibid. p. 254 Ges. Abh. 232)
or as he prefers to call it in
the predominence of relative
value not merely a weak point
in the philosophy of Socrates,
but at the same time an in-
stance of Socratic modesty, one
feels inclined to ask, wherein
does this modesty consist ?
And when he connects here-
with the more general doctrine,
constituting in his view the
main difference between the So-
cratic dialectic and the Sophis-
tic, and also the foundation of
the Socratic teaching on the
truth of universal conceptions,
he appears to advocate a doc-
trine neither to be found in
the Memorabilia (iii. 8, 4-7;
10, 12 ; iv. 6, 9 ; 2, 13), nor in
the Hippias Major of Plato (p.
288) the latter by the way a
very doubtful authority. It is
indeed stated in these passages,
that the good and the beauti-
ful are only good and beautiful
for certain purposes by virtue
of their use, but not that every
application of these attributes
to a subject has only a relative
validity. Under no circum-
stances would the passage
authorise a distinction between
the Socratic and the So-
phistic philosophy ; one of the
characteristics of the Sophists
consisting in their allowing
only" a relative value to. all
scientific and moral principles.
MENTAL INDEPENDENCE. 161
were from time to time expanded as occasion required. CHAP.
Chance has, to a certain extent, decided which of his _
dialogues should come down to us. Still it may be
assumed that Socrates kept those objects more espe-
cially in view, to which he is constantly reverting by
preference according to Xenophon. Here in addi-
tion to the general demand for moral knowledge, and
for knowledge of self, three points are particularly
prominent 1. The independence of the individual
as secured by the control of his wants and desires ;
2. The nobler side of social life, as seen in friend-
ship; 3. The furtherance of the public weal by a
regulated commonwealth. To these may be added
the question, 4. Whether, and In how far, Socrates
exceeded the range of the ordinary morality of the
Greeks by requiring love for enemies ?
Not only was Socrates himself a model of self- (l)Indivi-
denial and abstemiousness, but he endeavoured to
foster the same virtues in his friends. What other
subject was more often the topic of conversation
than abstemiousness in the dialogues of Xenophon ? l
And did not Socrates distinctly call moderation the
corner-stone of all virtue ? 2 On this point the ground
he occupied was nearly the same as that which after-
wards gained such importance for the schools of
1 See the authorities p. 150, If Socrates had at all reflected,
4, 5. he would have explained mode-
2 Mem. i. 5, 4 : S.pd ye ov xf^l ration as a kind of knowledge.
irAvra &i>$pa, riyr]ff<i(i.ei>ot> TV The above quoted passage
fiav apery? elvai Kpjjir'iSa, might then be taken to mean,
irpSiTijv iv rrj fyvxy xara- that the conviction of the
; This does not con- worthlessness of sensual enjoy-
tradict the assertion that all ments must precede every other
virtue consists in knowledge, moral knowledge.
M
162 SOCRATES.
CHAP, the Cynics and Stoics ; man can only become master
' of himself by being independent of wants, and by the
exercise of his powers ; while depending on the con-
ditions and pleasures of the body, he resembles a
slave. 1 A philosopher who considers knowledge to
be the highest good, will naturally insist upon the
mind's devoting itself, uninterrupted by the desires
and appetites of the senses, 2 to the pursuit of truth
in preference to every other thing; and the less value
he attaches to external things as such and the more
exclusively he conceives happiness to be bound up
with the intellectual condition of man, 3 the more
will he feel the call to carry these principles into
practice, by really making himself independent of
the external world. Other motives, however, which
served as a standard for moralists of a later epoch,
were unknown to Socrates. He was not only an
ascetic in relation to the pleasures of the senses, but
displayed less strictness than might have been antici-
pated, neither shrinking from enjoyment, nor yet
feeling it needful. To continue master of himself
in the midst of enjoyment, by the lucid clearness of
his thought that was the aim which his moderation
proposed to itself. 4
1 Xen. Mem. i. 5, 3 ; i. 6, 5 ; 8 T& peyiffTov ayaBbv ov SoKfi
ii. 1,11; i. 2, 29 ; iii. 13, 3 ; and, trot aireipyouffa TWV a.v6ptair<av f,
in particular, iv. 5, 2 ; Symp. 8, aicpaffia. e j's rovvavriov avrovs e/j.-
23. ftd\\ftv; for how can anyone
2 This connection appears recognise and choose what is
clearly Mem. iv. 5, 6. When good and useful, if he is
Socrates had shown that want ruled by the desire of what is
of moderation makes man a pleasant ?
slave, whilst moderation makes 8 See pp. 141, 2; 151.
him free, he continues : ffoQiav 4 See p. 74.
FRIENDSHIP. 163
Strongest appears this character of the Socratic CHAP.
abstinence in the language he uses in reference to Vn '
sensual impulses. However exemplary his own con-
duct in this respect may have been, yet, in theory, he
does not object to the gratification of these impulses
out of wedlock, only requiring that it be not carried
so far as to exceed the requirements of the body,
nor prove a hindrance to higher ends. 1 The leading
thought of his moral teaching is not so much strict
purity as freedom of mind.
This in itself purely negative condition of mo- (2)
rality receives its positive supplement when the F e>td ~
individual places himself in connection with others.
The simplest form of this connection is friendship.
Socrates, as we have already remarked, can only de-
fend this relation on the ground of its advantages ;
still there can be no mistaking the fact that it
possessed both for himself and for his philosophy a
deeper meaning. For this, if for no other reason,
it was cultivated by preference, and discussed in all
the Socratic schools. When knowledge and morality
so fully coincide as they do from Socrates' point of
view, an intellectual association of individuals is
Mem. i. 3, 14 : o&ro> ty Kai the harm it does to property,
idfeij' ruvs P.TJ a<T(pa\ws honour, and personal security.
irptts &.<t>po5i<ria tjtfro Socrates considers it ridiculous
rpbs TOIO.VTO., ola ^ traw to incur danger and trouble
jitvov TOV ffiafiuros OVK tiv for the sake of an enjoyment,
atTor) ^vx^l, SeojueVou 5e OVK which could be procured in a
&i/ Trpa.yij.ar a irape-^oi . The last so much simpler manner from
remark applies partly to the any common girl. Mem. ii. 1,
prejudicial workings of pas- 5; 2, 4. The use which the
.sion, which makes a slave of Cynics made of these principles
man, and deters him from will be seen hereafter,
what is good, and partly to
u 2
164 SOCRATES.
CHAP. inconceivable without a more extended community
' of life. These personal relations become, too, all
the more necessary in proportion as the thinker fails
to be satisfied with his own thinking, and feels a
need for investigation in common with others and
for mutual interchange of ideas. Just as in the case
of the Pythagorean league, from a common pursuit
of morality and religion, a lively feeling of clan-
ship, a fondness for friendship and brotherhood was
developed, as in other cases, too, like causes produced
like results, so, in the Socratic school the blending
of moral and intellectual interests was the ground of
a more intimate connection of the pupils with the
teacher, and amongst themselves, than could have
resulted from an association of a purely intellectual
character. The question can hardly be asked, which
came first with him, which afterwards ; whether the
need of friendship determined Socrates to a con-
tinuous dialogue, or the need of a common enquiry
drew him towards all having a natural turn this way.
His peculiarity rather consists in this and this it is
which makes him the philosophic lover drawn by
Plato that he could neither in his research dispense
with association with others, nor in his intercourse
with research.
Accordingly in Socrates are found impressive dis-
cussions as to the value and nature of friendship. 1
In these he always comes back to the point, that true
friendship can only exist amongst virtuous men,
being for them altogether natural and necessary ;
1 Mem. ii. 4-6.
FRIENDSHIP. 166
true friends, he says, will do everything for one an- CHAP.
other. Virtue and active benevolence l are the only VIL
means for securing friends. From this platform the
prevailing custom is then criticised. Socrates not
only allows friendship to assume the Greek form of
affection for boys and men, but he adopts that form
of it himself, hardly only out of mere deference to
others. 2 In applying, however, his own moral prin-
ciples to this relation, he opposes the prevailing
errors, and demands a reformation, in order that the
sensual conception cf Eros may be transformed into
the moral conception of Friendship. 3 True love, he
declares, can only then be said to exist when the good
of the loved object is sought disinterestedly ; not
when, with reckless selfishness, aims are pursued and
means employed by which both persons become con-
temptible to one another. Only by an unselfish love
can fidelity and constancy be secured. The plea that
the complaisance of the one buys the kindly offices
of another for its complete training is wholly a mis-
taken one ; for immorality and immodesty can never
be means to moral ends. 4
It really seems that with these principles Socrates (3) Civil
was enunciating to his cotemporaries a new truth, or {f^ e ^f
1 Similar explanations are 8 ; ii. 6, 31.
worked into the Platonic Lysis, 8 Symp. 8, 27 : ov yap oT6v re
but probably in too free a man- -jrovqpa avrbv irotovvra ayaObv rbv
ner for us to be able to gain ffvvovra. airoStlfai, ouSe yt avai-
from them any information ffxvvrtav teal a-Kpaalav irapt
respecting Socrates. pevov lyKparri ical altiovnevov
2 Xeu. Symp. 8, 12, the lead- iptiipfvov ironjtrcu.
ing thought of which at least 4 See p. 75.
is Socratic. Mem. i. 2, 29 ; 3,
66 SOCRATES.
CHAP. at least recalling to their memories one long since
yn ' forgotten. 1 On the other hand, in his low estimate
of marriage he agreed with his fellow-countrymen..
This was no doubt partly the cause of the Greek
affection for boys ; partly, too, it was a consequence
favoured thereby. 2 Whilst assuming in women a
moral disposition similar to that of men, 3 whilst even
maintaining with intellectual women an instructive
interchange of opinions, he still speaks of married
life in terms more in keeping with the husband of
Xanthippe, than with the friend of Aspasia. He
allows that a clever woman is as useful for the house- -
. hold as a man, and he reproaches men for not caring
about the education of their wives, 4 but he considers
the procreation of children the end of marriage, 5 and
his own conduct shows little love for domestic life. 6
His social and his personal instincts are satisfied by
friendly intercourse with men ; in their society be
sees a means of fulfilling his peculiar mission as an
educator of mankind ; apart herefrom, with the pecu-
liarity of a Greek, he considers the state, and not the
family, to be the chief object of moral action.
1 Conf. Plato, Symp. 178, C. ; A., the character of Xanthippe
180, C. ; 217, E. (which has no pretensions to
2 Conf. Plato, Symp. 192, A. great tenderness) be considered
3 See p. 145, 2. the joking character of the
4 Xen. (Ec. 3, 10 ; but the conversation in Xen. Symp. 2, .
question may be raised, in how 10, being thrown into the-'
far the substance of these re- scale against the passages in
marks applies to Socrates him- Plato, Apol. 34, D., the balance
self. Symp. 2, 9. of probability is, that Socrates.
5 Mem. ii. 2, 4. lived almost entirely in public,,
6 If in addition to the trait and almost never at home,
described by Plato, Phsedo, 60,
THE STATE. 167
Of the importance of the state, and the obliga- CHAP.
tions towards the same, a very high notion indeed is
entertained by Socrates : he who would live amongst
men, he says, must live in a state, be it as a ruler or
as ruled. 1 He requires, therefore, the most uncondi-
tional obedience to the laws, to such an extent that
the conception of justice is reduced to that of obe-
dience to law, 2 but he desires every competent man
to take part in the administration of the state, the
well-being of all individuals depending on the well-
being of the community. 3 These principles were
really carried into practice by him throughout life.
With devoted self-sacrifice his duties as a citizen
were fulfilled, even death being endured in order that
he might not violate the laws. 4 Even his philosophic
labours were regarded as the fulfilment of a duty to
the state ; 5 and in Xenophon's Memorabilia we see
him using every opportunity of impressing able
people for political services, of deterring the incom-
petent, of awakening officials to a sense of their
duties, and of giving them help in the administra-
tion of their offices. 6 He himself expresses the
political character of these efforts most tellingly, by
including 7 all virtues under the conception of the
ruling art. 8
Mem. ii. 1, 12. 291, B., iro\irnt)) stands for
See p. 148, 1. 0eun\iK/j.
Mem. iii. 7, 9. 8 Accordingly the story told
See p. 76. by Cicero, Tusc. v. 37, 108, and
See pp. 65, 7 ; 68, 2. Plut. de Exil. c. 5, p. 600,
Mem. iii. 2-7. Epiot. Diss. i. 9, 1 (Conf. Mu-
/3cwi\tKT> Te'xvrj in Mem. ii. son. in Stob. Ploril. 40, 9), that
1, 17; iv. 2, 11. Plato, Euthyd. in answer to the question, to
168
SOCRATES.
CHAP.
VII.
Whilst thus doing homage to the old Greek view
of the state, in other respects he deviates from it
widely. If knowledge is the condition of all true
virtue, it is also the condition of all political virtue ;
all the more so in proportion as the -conception of
political virtue is the higher one. Hence everyone
who aspires to the position of a statesman is required
to prepare himself for this calling * by a thorough
self-sifting and a course of intellectual labour ; and
conversely, Socrates only recognises capacity or right
to political position where this condition is fulfilled.
Neither the possession of power, nor the good fortune
of acquiring it by lot or popular election, but only
knowledge makes the ruler. 2 As regards the rule of
what country he belonged, he
replied that he was a citizen of
the world, cannot command
credit, and the question itself
sounds strange as addressed to
Socrates in Athens. In Plato's
Crito and Apol. 37, C., he uses
language very different from
1 he later cosmopolitan philoso-
phers. Probably one of these
attributed to him the above
story.
1 Mem. iii. 6, particularly
towards the end ; iv. 2, 6 ;
Plato, Symp. 216, A. See p.
55, 6.
2 Mem. iii. 9, 10 : ftaaiKus 5e
KO.I &PXOVTO.S 0V TOVS TO. ffKTITTTpa
fXOvras e<t>ri flvat, ovSe TOVS wrb
Ttfv TvxovTiav atpeOevTas, ovSe
TOVS K\r,ptf \ax.6i'Tas, ov$e TOVS
Pia<ra/j.fvovs, ovSe TOVS Qa.ita.Tri-
0-avTO.s, a\\a. TOVS tTrtffTa/j.fvovs
&PXW : in all other cases obedi-
ence is given to men of pro-
fessional knowledge ; which
is then illustrated by the ex-
ample of physicians, pilots,
and others. Similarly in Mem.
iii. 5, 21 ; iv. 2, 2 ; iii. 1, 4
Ibid. 4, 6 : Aeyco eywye, ws OTOV
a.v TIS irpoffTwrfvr) tav ytyvu>ffKri
Te S>v Sel Kal TavTa iropieff6ai
SUJ/TJTCU, ayaObs &p tti) irporrTa-
TIJS. Similar views are advo-
cated by Plato with the same
illustrations, Polit. 297, D.,
and they appear to have been
generally held in the school
of Socrates. Accordingly the
accuser Xen. Mem. i. 2, 9,
charges Socrates with having
contributed to bring existing
institutions into contempt :
\eywv ws fjuepoov els TOVS p.fv TTJS
Tf6\6(as &PXOVTO.S a-rrb KVO./J.OV /ca0-
iffTaffdat, KvfiepvT)Tr) Se ^uTjSsVa
/j.r,5e
&\\a
nd Xenophon does
not deny the accuracy of this
statement, but only attempts
THE STATE. 169
the majority, his judgment is, that it is impossible CHAP.
for a statesman desirous for right and justice to hold Vn '
his own against it ; hence, where it prevails, what
else can an upright man do but withdraw to private
life ?
A political principle was here advocated, which
brought Socrates not only into collision with the
Athenian democracy, but with the whole political
administration of Greece. In place of the equality
of all, or the preference accorded to birth and
wealth, he demanded an aristocracy of intelligence ;
in place of citizen-rulers, a race of intellectually edu-
cated officials ; in place of a government of tribes
and people, a government by professional adepts,
which Plato, consistently developing the principles
of Socrates, attempted to realise in his philosophic
community. 1 Socrates is here observed following
in the track which the Sophists first struck out,
being themselves the first to offer and to declare
necessary a preparatory intellectual training for a
statesman's career. Still what he aimed at was in
point of substance very different from what they
aimed at. For him the aim of politics was not
the power of the individual, but the well-being of the
community ; the object of training was not to acquire
personal dexterity, but to attain truth ; the means of
culture was not the art of persuasion, but the science
of what really is. Socrates aimed at a knowledge by
means of which the state might be reformed, the
to prove the harmlessness of ' Plato, Apol. 31, E. ; conf.
-such principles. Rep. vi. 496, C.
170 SOCRATES.
CHAP. Sophists at one by means of which it might be-
Vn> governed.
The aristocratic tone of this view of the state-
appears to be contradicted by the ease with which
Socrates rose above the social prejudices of his
nation, meeting the ruling contempt for trade by the
maxim that no useful activity, be it what it may,
but only idleness and activity need call forth shame.
Still both come from a common source. For just as
Socrates will have the position of the individual in
the state settled according to his achievements, so
conversely he will have every action appreciated
which leads to any good result. 1 Here, as elsewhere,
the conception of good is his highest standard.
(4) Love One consequence of the political character of
mieg 16 ' Ghreelc morality was that the problem proposed to the
virtuous man was customarily summed up as doing
good to friends and harm to foes. This very defini-
tion is put into the mouth of Socrates 2 by Xenophon,
who likewise considers it most natural to feel pain at
the success of enemies. 3 On the other hand, in one
of the earliest and most historical of Plato's dia-
1 Mem. i. 2, 56. In keeping as the son of a poor labourer,
with this, he urges a friend Xenophon and Plato as men of
(ii. 7) to employ the maids of rank and property,
his house in wool work, and 2 Mem. ii. 6, 35 : /cal art Hyi'ia-
another (ii. 8) to seek for occu- Has avSpbs aperriv ilvai VIKV rovs
pation as a steward, refuting /j.ev <pi\ovs iroiovvra TOVS 8e
in both cases the objection, tydpobs KUKWS.
that such an occupation was 3 Mem. iii. 9, 8: cf>66vov 5e
unbecoming for free men. (TKOTTUV '6,n efoj, \VTTT\V fteV TO,
Xenophon held a different e^fvptcntev ainbv ovra, ov-re /XS'I/TOJ
view (see (Ec. 4. 2, and 6, 5), rty tirl <t>i\wv dri/xiais viire T?>
and it is well known that eV e-^Gpuv tiirvxicus yiyvofjifvriv.
Plato did also. Socrates speaks
LOVE FOR ENEMIES. 17
logues, 1 Socrates declares it to be wrong to injure CHAP.
another : injury is the same thing as wrong-doing, '_
and wrong-doing may never be permitted, not even
towards one from whom wrong-doing has been suf-
fered. The contradiction of these two accounts is
hard to get over : 2 for assuming it to be granted
that the Socrates of Xenophon is only speaking from
a popular point of view, still the fact would remain
that Xenophon cannot have been conversant with
explanations such as those given by Plato. No doubt
Plato's account even in the Crito cannot be regarded
as strictly conformable to truth ; still it may well be
questioned whether he can be credited with such a
flagrant deviation from his master's teaching 3 as this
would be. That there is such a possibility cannot be
denied ; we must then be content to leave it in
uncertainty as to which were the real principles of
Socrates on this subject. 4
1 Crito 49, A. Also Rep. i. principle opposed to slavery.
334, B. If he held many things which
2 The remark of Meiners according to Greek prejudices
(Gesch. der Wissenschaft. ii. belonged to slaves not to be
456) will not pass muster that unworthy of a free-man, it by
Socrates considered it allow- no means follows that he dis-
able to do harm (bodily) to approved of slavery; and the
enemies, but not to injure view that slavery is contrary
them in respect of their true to nature (mentioned by Aris-
well-being, Xenophon express- totle, Polit. i. 3) is not attri-
ly allowing icanus iroie'iv while buted to Socrates as its author.
Plato as expressly forbids it. Had it belonged to him, it
3 See p. 153. would undoubtedly have been
4 Still less are we justified so mentioned. But the whole
in asserting as Hildebrand connection does not suit So-
ap] H-iirs inclined to do (' Xeno- crates, to whom the distinct ion
phont. et Arist. de CEconomia between Qfaei and v6w> is.
publica Doctrina, part i. Marb. foreign. We ought rather to
1845) that Socrates was in think of the Cynics.
172 SOCRATES.
CHAPTEK VIII.
CONTINUATION. ON NATURE. GOD AND MAN.
CHAP. ENQUIRIES into nature, we have seen, did not form,
part of the scheme of Socrates. Nevertheless, the
A. Subor- } me o f h j s speculations led him to a peculiar view of
mnation of x
means to nature and its design. One who so thoughtfully
ends ^n turned over the problem of human life from all sides
as he did, could not leave unnoticed its countless re-
lations to the outer world ; and judging them by the
standard which was his highest type the standard
of utility for man could not but come to the con-
viction that the whole arrangement of nature was
subservient to the well-being of the human race, in
short that it was adapted to a purpose and good. 1 To
his mind, however, all that is good and expedient
appears of necessity to be the work of reason ; for
just as man cannot do what is useful without intelli-
gence, no more is it possible for what is useful to
exist without intelligence. 2 His view of nature,
1 For Socrates, as has been crates is desirous of convincing
already shown, understands by a friend of the existence of the
the good what is useful for Gods, and hence proposes the
man. question : Whether more intel-
2 See Mem. i. 4, 2, in which ligence is not required to pro-
the argument from analogy is duce living beings than to pro-
most clearly brought out. So- duce paintings like those of
VIEWS OF NATURE. l\
therefore, was essentially that of a relation of means CHAP.
to ends, and that not a deeper relation going into the
inner bearings of the several parts, and the purpose
of its existence and growth inherent in every natural
being. On the contrary, all things are referred as a
matter of experience to the well-being of man as
their highest end, and that they serve this purpose is
also set forth simply as a matter of fact, and as due
to a reason which, like an artificer, has endued them
with this accidental reference to purpose. As in the
Socratic ethics, the wisdom regulating human actions
becomes a superficial reflection as to the use of par-
ticular acts, so, too, Socrates can only conceive of the
wisdom which formed the world in a manner equally
superficial. He shows l what care has been taken to
provide for man, in that he has light, water, fire, and
air, in that not only the sun shines by day, but also
the moon and the stars by night ; in that the heavenly
bodies serve for divisions of seasons, that the earth
brings forth food and other necessaries, and that the
change of seasons prevents excessive heat or cold.
He reminds of the advantages which are derived
from cattle, from oxen, from pigs, horses, and other
Polycletus and Zeuxis ? Aristo- he is obliged to confess, T&. &r'
demus will only allow this u<pf\fla ytv6/Mfva yv&ws flvai
conditionally, and in one special <tpya. Compare also Plato,
case, ttirtp ye ^ rvxy Tivl &AA' Phsedo, 29, A., although, ac-
turb yi/wjuTjs ravra ytyiin\Tai, but cording to what has been said, ,
he is immediately met by So- p. 59, we have not in this pas-
crates with the question : TO>V sage a strictly historical ac-
5e o.TtKn<ipT<as ^ vr<av % rov ^vfKa. count, and Arigt. M. Mor. i. 1 ;
tffTi Kal rwv Qavtpws fir' w<j>(\fiq 1183, b, 9.
ftvrwv Tr6rfpa TU^IJS, Kal Trdrepa l Mem. i. 4 ; IV. 3.
Kplvtis ; Upeirei n&v,
174 SOCRATES.
CHAP. animals. To prove the wisdom of the Craftsman who
' made man, 1 he refers to the organism of the human
body, to the structure of the organs of sense, to the
erect posture of man, to the priceless dexterity of his
hands. He sees a proof of a divine Providence in
the natural impulse for propagation and self-preser-
vation, in the love for children, in the fear of death.
He never wearies of exalting the intellectual advan-
tages of man, his ingenuity, his memory, his intelli-
gence, his language, his religious disposition. He
considers it incredible that a belief in God and in
Providence should be naturally inborn in all men,
and have maintained itself from time immemorial,
clinging not to individuals only in the ripest years
of their age, but to whole nations and communities,
unless it were true. He appeals also to special
revelations vouchsafed to men for their good, either
by prophecy or portent. Unscientific, doubtless,
these arguments may appear, still they became in the
sequel of importance for philosophy.
As Socrates by his moral enquiries, notwithstand-
ing all their defects, is the founder of a scientific
doctrine of morals, so by his theory of the relation
of means to ends, notwithstanding its popular
character, he is the founder of that ideal view of
nature which ever after reigned supreme in the
natural philosophy of the Greeks, and which with
all its abuses has proved itself of so much value
1 In Mem. i. 4, 12, a remark -rS>v cuppoSiffiwv ridov
is found indicative of the popu- &\*ois j^'ois Sovvat Tr
lar character of these general TON erovs XP& VOV , It"
considerations : rb Se xal ras jue'xpi yiipias ravra irape'xi'.
CONCEPTION OF GOD. 175
for the empirical study of nature. True, he was not CHAP.
himself aware that he was ^engaged on natural
science, having only considered the relation of means
to ends in the world, in the moral interest of piety.
Still from our previous remarks it follows how closely
his view of nature was connected with the theory of
the knowledge of conceptions, how even its defects
were due to the universal imperfection of his intel-
lectual method.
Asking further what idea we should form to our- B. God
selves of creative reason, the reply is, that Socrates ^orghip O f
mostly speaks of Gods in a popular way as many, 1 no God -
doubt thinking, in the first place, of the Gods of the ur use of
popular fai th. 2 Out of this multiplicity the idea of the ^J* 1
oneness of God, 3 an idea not unknown to the Greek
religion, rises with him into prominence, as is not
infrequently met with at that time. 4 In one passage
he draws a curious distinction between the creator
and ruler of the universe and the rest of the Gods. 5
Have we not here that union of polytheism and
1 Mem. i. 1, 19 ; 3, 3 ; 4, 11 ; TWV re nal <rvvex<av, eV $ irdvva
iv. 3, 3. Ka\a ital ayaOd tort, Kal del pev
2 Mem. iv. 3, 16. xp u f j -^ vois arpiflri re Kal vyia
8 Compare Zeller's Introduc- KOI ayi]pvrov ifape%<i>i>, Barrov
tion to his Philos. d. Griechen, Se vo^aros avap-apriyrois inrripf-
p, 3. rovvra, ovros rek /jLfytffra /j,ev
4 Mem. i. 4, 5 ; 7, 17 : 6 Q irpdrrwv dp'drai, T<5e Se OIKOVO-
apx^s iroiwv avBp&irovs, ffo<j>ov n<av a.6paros rjiuv IffTiv. Krisclie's
TWOS S-nniovpyov Kal (f>i\o^ov argument (Forsch. 220) to prove
rbv TOV 6eov 6(p6a\/j.bi>, r$]v TOV that this language is spurious,
SeoC fyp6vT)ffiv. although on his own showing
5 Mem. iv. 3, 13. The Gods it was known to Phaedrus,
are invisible ; o'l re yap &\\oi Cicero, and the writer of the
iliuv Tct^ aya6a 5.5<Wes ovSev treatise on the world, appears
rroi/rtav ei$ Touju^wes \6vies SiSoa- inconclusive.
<ru/, na.1 6 rbv o\ov K&ap.ov ffWT&r-
176 SOCRATES.
CHAP, monotheism, so readily suggested to a Greek by his
mythology, which consisted in reducing the many
(rods to be the many instruments of the One Supreme
G-od?
(2) God In as far as Socrates was led to the notion of One
C astu eA Supreme Being by the reasonable arrangement of the
Reason of world, the idea which he formed to himself of this
Being (herein resembling Heraclitus and Anaxagoras)
was as the reason of the world, which he conceives
of as holding the same relation to the world that the
soul does to the body. 1 Herewith are most closely
connected his high and pure ideas of God as a being
invisible, all-wise, all-powerful, present everywhere.
As the soul, without being visible, produces visible
effects in the body, so does God in the world. As
the soul exercises unlimited dominion over the small
portion of the world which belongs to it, its indivi-
dual body, so God exercises dominion over the whole
world. As the soul is present in all parts of its body,
so God is present throughout the Universe. And if
the soul, notwithstanding the limitations by which it
is confined, can perceive what is distant, and have
thoughts of the most varied kinds, surely the know-
1 Mem. i. 4, 8 : ffb 5e cravrbv rip iravrl <j>p6vriffiv TO iravra Sirtas
<$>poviH.&v Tt SoKeis ex fiv ! &M.O01 tu> avry ySv y, OVTQI TiOeffBai Kal
Sf ouSojuov ovSev otei <pp6vift.ov ju^ rb ffbv fjifv o/u,ua SvvaffBai 4irl
flvcu . , . Kal rdSe TO uirep/ieyeOrj iro\\a ffrdSia eiicveiff6ai, fbv Se
Kal irATJOos fareipa (the elements, TOV Qeov ofyOaX/j.bv aSwarov ell/at
or generally, the parts of the Upa. ^c&v^a dpav /uijSe, r^jv a^v
world) S(' a(ppoai>VTiv TIV& oSrcas fjiev Tj/vxV fal iffpl Ttav tvOdSe Kal
olei evroiKTcas *X* IV '- ^ ' KaTa/j.a6e irepl riav tv Aiyvirrtp Kal SiKeX/a
Srt Kal 6 ffbs vovs tvwv -rb ffbv Svvaffdai (ppovri^eiv, T^V Se TOV
rrcDua STTWS f)ov\fTai pfTaxeipi- 6eov (f>p6i>Tjffiv fi^j iKav^v elvai a/j.a
(frat ' oteffOai olv xp^l Ka ^ T^" *v iravrcav eirt/jLf\f'tffdai.
WORSHIP OF GOD. 177
ledge and care of (rod must be able to embrace all CHAP.
and more. 1 Besides had not a belief in the provi-
dential care of (rod been already 2 taken for granted,
in the argument for His existence from the relation
of means to ends ? Was not the best explanation of
this care to be found in the analogous care which
the human soul has for the body ? A special proof
of this providence Socrates thought to discern in
oracles : 3 by them the most important things, which
could not otherwise be known, are revealed to man.
It must then be equally foolish to despise oracles, or
to consult them in cases capable of being solved by
our own reflection. 4 From this conviction followed,
as a matter of course, the worship of God, prayer,
sacrifices, and obedience. 5
As to the form and manner of worship, Socrates, ( 3 ) ^ ,
1 tvorsh/ip oj
as we already know, 6 wished every one to follow the God.
custom of his people. At the same time he propounds
purer maxims corresponding with his own idea of
God. He would not have men pray for particular,
least of all for external goods, but only to ask for
what is good : for who but God knows what is ad-
vantageous for man, or knows it so fully ? And, with
1 Compare the words in Mem. riav 8eS>i> ISris also i. 1, 19.
i. 4, 18: If you apply to the 2 Mem. iv. 3; i. 4, 6 and 11.
Gods for prophecy, 7^077 rb 9 Ibid. iv. 3, 12 and 16 ; i. 4,
0?ov ZTI Toaov-rov HOI -roiovr6v 14.
fffnv, Siaff ap.a irdvra 6pav xal * Ibid. i. 1, 6. Conf . p. 77, 3 ;
irdvra aKovfiv Kal iravraxov iraptt- 65, 5.
cat, Kal ajua TTO.VTWV ^TrijueA.fTtrflai s Compare Mem. iv. 3, 14 ;
and the words, Ibid. iv. 3, 12 : ii. 2, 14.
3ri 5e 76 a\r)9r) \<y<a . . . -yvAoy, * See p. 149, 1 ; 76, 7.
av (U^ ayahs' rrjj, co$ ay TOS p.op<f>a.s
N
178 SOCRATES.
CHAP, regard to sacrifices, he declared that the greatness of
VIII
the sacrifice is unimportant compared with the spirit
of the sacrificer, and that the more pious the man,
the more acceptable will the offering be, so that it
correspond with his means. 1 Abstaining on principle
from theological speculations, 2 and not seeking to
explore the nature of God, but to lead his fellow men
to piety, he never felt the need of combining the
various elements of his religious belief into one
united conception, or of forming a perfectly consist-
ent picture, and so avoiding the contradictions which
that belief may easily be shown to contain. 3
C. Dignity A certain divine element Socrates, like others
llis'im- before him, thought to discern within the soul of
mortality, man. 4 Perhaps with this thought is connected his
belief in immediate revelations of (rod to the human
soul, such as he imagined were vouchsafed to himself.
Welcome as this theory must have been to a philoso-
pher paying so close an attention to the moral and
spiritual nature of man, it does not appear that
Socrates ever attempted to support it by argument.
Just as little do we find in him a scientific proof of
the immortality of the soul, although he was inclined
to this belief partly by his high opinion of the dignity
1 Mem. i. 3, 2 ; iv. 3, 17. believing in only one God.
* See p. 139, 2. This assumption would belie
8 We have all the less reason not only the definite and re-
for supposing with Denis (His- peated assertions of Xenophon,
toire des Theories et des Idees but also Socrates' unflinching
morales dans 1'Antiquite, Paris love of truth.
et Strasb. 1856, i. 79), that So- 4 Mem. iv. 3, 14 : a\\a ^v
crates, like Antisthenes, spared /col avOp<airov ye ^vx^i, tfirep n Kail
polytheism from regard to the &\\o tu>v ivQpwirivuv, rov Oeiov
needs of the masses, whilst
IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL.
179
of man, partly, too, on grounds of expediency. 1 Nay,
rather, in Plato's Apology, 2 at a moment when the \
witholding of a conviction can least be supposed, he
expressed himself on this question with much doubt
and caution. 3 The language, too, used by the dying
Cyrus in Xenophon 4 agrees so well herewith, that we
are driven to assume that Socrates considered the
existence of the soul after death to be indeed pro-
bable, without, however, 6 pretending to any certain
knowledge on the point. It was accepted by him as
an article of faith, the intellectual grounds for which
belonged no doubt to those problems which surpass
the powers of man. 6
CHAP.
VIII.
1 Compare Hermann in Mar-
burger Lectionskatalog, 1835-6,
Plat, 684.
* 40, C. ; after his condemna-
tion.
3 Death is either an external
sleep, or a transition to a new
life, but in neither case is it an
evil.
4 Cyrop. viii. 7, 10. Several
reasons are first adduced in fa-
vour of immortality, but they
need to be greatly strengthened
to be anything like rigid proofs.
(Compare particularly 19
with Plato's PhiEdo, 105, C.)
6 The above description of
the philosophy of Socrates
rests on the exclusive autho-
rity of Xenophon, Plato, and
Aristotle. What later writers
say is for the most part taken
from these sources, and when-
ever it goes beyond them, there
is no guarantee for its accu-
racy. It is, however, just pos-
sible that some genuine utter-
ances of Socrates may have
been preserved in the writings
of JSschines and others, which
are omitted by our authorities.
In that category place the
In conclusion, the possibility of statement of Cleanthes quoted
the soul's dying with the body by Clement (Strom, ii. 417, D.),
is left an open question, but in
either case death is stated to
be the end of all evils.
s He actually says in Plato,
Apol. 29, A. Conf. 37, B. :
death is feared as the greatest
evil, whilst it may be the
greatest good : ty& 5i . . . oi>K
et5ws tKavas irtpl fSii' tv 'AfSoi;
OUTW Hal ofojucu OVK
and repeated by Cicero (Off. iii.
3, 11), that Socrates taught the
identity of justice and happi-
ness, cursing the man who first
made a distinction between
them : the statements in Cic.
Off. ii. 12, 43 (taken from Xen.
Mem. ii. 6, 39 ; conf. Cyrop. i.
6, 22) ; in Seneca, Epist. 28, 2 ;
104, 7 (travelling is of no good
2
180
SOCRATES.
CHAP. to fools); 71, 16 (truth and
VIII. virtue are identical) ; in Plut.
Ed. Pu. c. 7, p. 4, on education
(the passage in c. 9 is an inac-
curate reference to Plato, Gorg.
470, D.) ; Cons, ad Apoll. c. 9,
p. 106, that if all sufferings
had to be equally divided,
every one would gladly pre-
serve his own: Conj. Prase,
c. 25, p. 140 (Diog. ii. 33;
Exc. e Floril. Joan. Damasc. ii.
B. 98 ; Stab. Floril. ed. Mein.
iv., 202), on the moral use of
the looking glass ; Ser. Num.
Vind. c. 5, p. 550, deprecating
anger ; in Demet. Byz. quoted
by Diog. ii. 21, (Gell. N. A. xiv.
6, 5), Musoti. in the Exc. e
Floril. Jo. Dam. ii. 13, 126,
p. 221, Mein, that philosophy
ought to confine itself to '6, n
TOI Iv /jteydpoiffi, KO.K&V r' asya.Q&v
re Teruirrai ; (others attribute
the words to Diogenes or Aris-
tippus) Cic. de Orat. i. 47, 204 :
Socrates said that his only wish
was to stimulate to virtue ;
where this succeeded, the rest
followed of itself (a statement
thoroughly agreeing with the
views of the Stoic Aristo, and
probably coming from him.
Conf . Zeller, Stoics, Epicureans,
fee., p. 60; in Diog. ii. 30, blaming
the sophistry of Euclid ; in Diog.
ii. 31 (undoubtedly from some
Cynic or Stoic treatise) that
intelligence is the only good,
ignorance the only evil, and
that riches and noble birth do
more harm than good ; in Diog.
ii. 32, that to marry or to ab-
stain from marriage is equally
bad; in Gell. xix. 2, 7 (Athen.
iv. 158; Plut. And. Poet. 4,
p. 21), that most men live to
eat, whilst he eats to live ; in
Stob. Ekl. i. 54, giving a defini-
tion of God ; Ibid. ii. 356,
Floril. 48, 26 (conf. Plato,
Legg. i. 626, E.), that self-
restraint is the best form of
government ; in Teles, apud
Stob. Floril. 40, 8, blaming the
Athenians for banishing their
best, and honouring their worst
men, and the apophthegmata
in Valor. Max. vii. 2, Ext. 1.
A large number of sayings
purporting to come from So-
crates are quoted by Plutarch
in his treatises and by Stobasus
in his Florilegium ; some, too,
by Seneca. Most of them, how-
ever, are colourless, or else
they aim at being epigram-
matic, which is a poor substi-
tute for being genuine. Alto-
gether their number makes
them very suspicious. Probably
they were taken from a collec-
tion of proverbs which some
later writer published under
the name of Socratic proverbs.
ACCURACY OF XENOPHON'S DESCRIPTION. 181
CHAPTER IX.
RETROSPECT. XENOPHON AND PLATO. SOCRATES
AND THE SOPHISTS.
LOOKING back from the point now reached to the CHAP.
question raised before, as to which of his biographers
we must look to for a historically accurate account A. Trutk-
of Socrates and his teaching, we must indeed admit,
that no one of them is so satisfactory an authority as I****'* (le ~
J J xcription.
any original writings or verbal reports of the utter-
ances of the great teacher would have been. 1 So
much, however, is patent at once, that the personal
character of Socrates, as pourtrayed by both Xenophon
and Plato, is in all essential points, one and the same.
Their descriptions supplement one another in some
few points, contradicting each other in none. Nay
more, the supplementary portions may be easily in-
serted in the general picture, present before the eyes ,^ \ eHa .
of both. Moreover the philosophy of Socrates is not -pTwti*
in the main represented by Plato and Aristotle in a j Mrmnil/
a different light from what it is by Xenophon, pro- with that
vided those parts only in the writings of Plato be and Ari*-
taken into account which undoubtedly belong to So- tatte -
1 Conf. p. 98.
182 SOCRATES.
CHAP. crates, and in the Socrates of Xenophon a distinction
' be drawn between the thought underlying his utter-
ances and the commonplace language in which it was
clothed. Even in Xenophon, Socrates expresses the
opinion that true knowledge is the highest thing, and
that this knowledge consists in a knowledge of con-
ceptions only. In Xenophon, too, may be observed all
the characteristics of that method by means of which
Socrates strove to produce knowledge. In his pages
likewise, virtue is reduced to knowledge, and this
position is supported by the same arguments, and
therefrom are deduced the same conclusions, as in
Aristotle and Plato. In short, all the leading features
of the philosophy of Socrates are preserved by Xeno-
phon ; granting as we always must that he did not
understand the deeper meaning of many a saying, and
therefore failed to give it the prominence it deserved.
Now and then for the same reason he used a com-
monplace expression instead of a philosophical oiie ;
for instance, substituting for, ' All virtue is a know-
ing,' with less accuracy, ' All virtue is knowledge.'
Nor need we feel surprise that the defects of the
Socratic philosophy, its popular and prosaic way of
treating things, the want of system in its method,
the utilitarian basis of its moral teaching should
appear more prominently in Xenophon than in Plato
and Aristotle, considering the brevity with which
Aristotle speaks of Socrates, and the liberty with
which Plato expands the Socratic teaching both in
point of substance and form. On the other hand,
Xenophon's description is confirmed partly by indi-
XENOPHON VINDICATED. 183
vidual admissions of Plato, 1 partly by its inward CHAP.
truth and conformity to that picture which we must
make to ourselves of the first appearance of Socrates'
newly discovered principle. All then that can be con-
ceded to the detractors of Xenophon is, that not fully
understanding the philosophical importance of his
teacher, he kept it in the background in his descrip-
tion, and that in so far Plato and Aristotle are most
welcome as supplementary authorities. But it can-
not be allowed for one moment that Xenophon has
in any respect given a false account of Socrates, or
that it is impossible to gather from his description
the true character and importance of the doctrine of
his master.
It may indeed be said that this estimate of Xeno- (2) SeMei-
phon is at variance with the position which Socrates ^eSi^il *
is known to have held in history. As Schleiermacher answered.
observes ; 2 ' Had Socrates done nothing but discourse
on subjects beyond which the Memorabilia of Xeno-
phon never go, albeit in finer and more brilliant
language, it is hard to understand how it was, that
in so many years he did not empty the marketplace
and the workshop, the public walks and the schools,
by the fear of his presence ; how he so long satisfied
an Alcibiades and a Critias, a Plato, and a Euclid ;
how he played the part assigned to him in the dia-
logues of Plato ; in short, how he became the founder
and type of the philosophy of Athens.' Fortunately
in Plato himself we have a valuable testimony to the
1 See above, pp. 80 ; 150, 1. 2 Werke, iii. 2, 259, 287.
184
SOCRATES.
CHAP.
IX.
accuracy of Xenophon's description. To what does
his Alcibiades appeal when anxious to disclose the
divine element concealed under the Silenus-like
appearance of the Socratic discourses ? To what
does his admirable description of the impression
produced on him by Socrates go back ? l What is it
which to his mind has been the cause of the revolu-
tion and change in the inner life of Greece ? What
but the moral observations which in Xenophon form
1 Syxnp. 215, E. : fcav yap
O.KOVW ['ZoiKpdrovs'] TroAu p.oi fj.a\-
\ov $ TUV KOpvflavTi&vTwv % re
tcapSia TrrjSti Kal SaKpva tK-^l-rai
inrb TUV Xoyuv TUIV TOVTOV. 6pw
8e Kal &\\ovs irafj.Tr6\\ovs TO.
avTa irdtrxovras: this was not
the case with other speakers,
otiSe Te9opvBi]T6 /J.QV % tyuxb 0118'
TjyavdKTei us avSpairoSw^us Sia-
Kfi(j.evov, (similarly Euthydemus
in Xen. Mem. iv. 2, 39) a\\'
virb Tovrovt TOV Wlapffvov Tro\\JiKis
8^J OVTW 5lT07Jf, &ffTe [J.OI 56ai
fjL^I fiiwrbv elvai UXOVTI ais ex"
. . . avayKa^ft ydp /j.t buoXoyzlv
8rt iroX\ov eVSeTjs Siv avrbs %TI
f/j.avTov nfv apf\ea ra 8' 'Mt]va.i(av
irpd-rru . . . (conf. Mem. iv.
2 ; iii. 6) ireirovQa. 8e trpbs TOVTOV
IJL&VOV avQpiIiiriav, it OVK &v TIS
oioiTO tv IfJLol tvilveu, rb alffx^-
i>fO~Oai dirivovv .... SpairfTeveo
ovv avTbv Kal <pevy(a, KO.\ ZTO.V
fSco alffx^i'Ofj.ai TO, uifj.oXoyrtiJ.fva. 1
Kal iroAAa/cis /j.ev fiSecas &v fSoifj.1
avrbv py ovra. tv avOpdnrois el 8"
aS TUVTO yevoiro, 8 oIS' on iro\i>
fj.etov &f axQoip.'riv, SXTTS OVK xa>,
'o n xp^o/xat TOVTC? Ty avSpiairy.
Ib. 221, D. : Kal of \6yoi ai/Tov
6fj.oi6Ta.Toi flat rot's SeiX^voTs TOIS
Stoiyofievots . . . Sioiyopevovs Sf
iSiv av TIS /cal VTOS avTtav yiyv6-
/xecos irpiaTOV /j.fi> vovv ex ovras
fvSov /JLOVVOVS fvpfifftt TUV \6ya>v,
eiretTO OeioTaTOvs Kal ir\(io~T'
ayd\ft.uT' apeTTjs eV auToIs UXOVTUS,
Kal 4irl ir\tio~Tov TeivovTUS, /ua\-
\ov Of firl TTO.V 'oaov trpoa^Kei
ffKOTTtlV T( fJL(\\OVTl Ka\(f Ktt-
yadtf fffeaBai. AlbertVs (p. 78)
objections to the above use of
these passages resolve them-
selves into this, that those ' ele-
ments of conversation which
rivet the soul,' which are not
altogether wanting in Xeno-
phon, are more frequent and
noticeable in Plato, that there-
fore the spirit of the Socratic
philosophy comes out more
clearly in Plato. Far from
denying this, we grant it
readily. The above remarks
are not directed against the
statement that Plato gives a
deeper insight than Xenophon
into the spirit of the Socratic
teaching, but against Schleier-
macher's statement that the
discourses of Socrates were
essentially different in sub-
stance and subject matter from
those reported by Xenophon.
VALVE OF HIS METHOD. 185
the substance of the Socratic dialogues. These, and CHAP.
these only are dwelt upon by Socrates, speaking in
Plato's Apology ! of his higher calling and his ser -
vices to his country ; it is his business to exhort
others to virtue ; and if he considers the attraction
of his conversation to consist also in its critical at-
tempts, 2 the reference is to a process of which many
examples are to be found in Xenophon, that of con-
vincing people of ignorance in the affairs of their
calling.
The effect produced by the discourses of Socrates B - Import-
-i AI -i f ji i -i anceofthe
need not surprise us, were they only of the kind re- Socratic
ported by Xenophon. The investigations of Socrates
as he gives them, may often appear trivial and
tedious ; and looking at the result with reference to 7l hrcd '
the particular case, they may really be so. That
the forger of armour must suit the armour to him
who has to wear it : 3 that the care of the body is
attended with many advantages : 4 that friends must
be secured by kind acts and attention ; 5 these and
such-like maxims, which are often lengthily discussed
by Socrates, neither contain for us, nor can they have
contained for his cotemporaries, anything new. The
important element in these inquiries, however, does
not consist in their substance, but in their method,
1 29, B. ; 38, A. ; 41, E. HerA&iv. Conf. 33, B. An ex-
2 Apol. 23, C. : irpbs Si TOV- ample of such sifting is to be
TOJJ of vtoi pot 4iraKo\oi,0owT(s found in the conversation of
ofs nd\tffTa <rx<Aij tonv ol riav Alcibiades with Pericles, Mem.
Tr\ovffturdr(av aurJ/uarot ^at/jot/- i. 1, 40.
ffiv anovovrfs ts7ao/jifv(av TUV * Mem. iii. 10, 9.
av0ptairui>, Kal av-rol TroAAa/cts fyte 4 Ibid. iii. 12, 4.
U.I/JLOVVTO.I flra l-KiXfipovaiv fi\Aous * Ibid. ii. 10, 6, 9.
186 SOCRATES.
CHAP. in the fact that what was formerly unexplored hypo-
' thesis and unconscious guesswork, was now arrived
at by a process of thinking. In making a too minute
or pedantic application of this method, Socrates
would not give the same offence to his cotemporaries
as to us, who have not as they to learn for the first
time the art of conscious thinking and emancipa-
tion from the authority of blind custom. 1 Nay, did
not the enquiries of the Sophists for the most part
contain very much less, which notwithstanding their
empty cavils, imparted an almost electrical shock to
their age, simply and solely because even in its par-
tial application, a power, new to the Greek mind,
and a new method of reflection had dawned upon
it? Had therefore Socrates only dealt with those
unimportant topics, upon which so many of his dia-
logues exclusively turn, his immediate influence, at
least on his cotemporaries, would still be intelligi-
ble.
These unimportant topics, however, hold a sub-
ordinate position in Xenophon's dialogues. Even in
these dialogues the main thing seems to be real in-
vestigations into the necessity of knowledge, into
the nature of morality, into the conceptions of the
various virtues, into moral and intellectual self-
analysis ; practical directions for the formation of
conceptions ; critical discussions obliging the speakers
to consider what their notions implied, and at what
their actions aimed. Can we wonder that such inves-
1 Comp. Hegel, Gesch. d. Phil. ii. 59.
HIS RELATION TO THE SOPHISTS. 1
tigations should have produced a deep impression on CHAP.
the cotemporaries of Socrates, and an entire change
in the Greek mode of thought, as the historians una-
nimously tell us ? 1 or, that a keener vision should
have anticipated behind those apparently coinmon-
. place and unimportant expressions of Socrates, which
his biographers unanimously record, a newly dis-
covered world ? For Plato and Aristotle it was re-
served to conquer this new world, but Socrates was
the first to discover it, and to point the way thereto.
Plainly as we may see the shortcomings of his
achievements, and the limits which his individual
nature imposed on him, still enough remains to
stamp him as the originator of the philosophy of con-
ceptions, as the reformer of method, and as the first
founder of a scientific doctrine of morals.
The relation, too, of the Socratic philosophy to c. His
.Sophistry will only become clear by considering the ^^""
one-sided and unsatisfactory element in its method Sophists.
as well as its greatness and importance. This rela-
tion as is well known has, during the last thirty years,
been examined in various directions. There being
a general agreement previously in accepting Plato's
view, and looking on Socrates as the opponent of
the Sophists, Hegel first obtained currency for the
contrary opinion, that Socrates shared with the
Sophists the same ground in attaching importance
to the person and to introspection. 2 In a some-
what different sense, Grete 3 has still more recently
1 Conf. p. 80, 1 and 2 ; 129; 122, 2. 2 See p. 116.
3 Hist, of Greece, viii. 479, 606.
188 SOCRATES.
CHAP. contradicted the traditional notion of the antithesis
' between the Socratic philosophy and Sophistry. If
Sophist means what the word from its history alone
can mean, a public teacher educating , youth for
practical life, Socrates is himself the true type of a
Sophist. If on the other hand it denotes the cha-
racter of certain individuals and their teaching, it
is an abuse to appropriate the term Sophistry to
this purpose, or to group together under one class
all the different individuals who came forward as
Sophists. The Sophists were not a sect or n
school, but a profession, men of the most varied
views, for the most part highly deserving and- meri-
torious people, at whose views we have not the
least reason to take offence. If then, Hegel and
his followers attacked the common notion of the re-
lation of Socrates to the Sophists, because Socrates,
in one respect, agreed with the Sophists, Grrote
attacks it for the very opposite reason, because the
most distinguished of the so-called Sophists are at-
one with Socrates.
Our previous enquiries will have shown, that both
views have their justification, but that neither is
altogether right. It is indeed a false view of his-
tory to contrast Socrates with the Sophists, in the
same sense that true and false philosophy are con-
trasted, or good and evil: and in this respect it
deserves notice that in Xenophon, the contrast be-
tween Socrates and the Sophists is not so great as in
Plato, 1 nor yet in Plato nearly so great as it is dra\yn
1 Compare Xen. Mem. iv. 4, Phil. d. Griech. Part I., p. 873,
besides p. 69, 1 and Zeller's 1, 2.
HIS RELATION TO THE SOPHISTS.
18!)
by several modern writers. 1 Still the results of our
previous enquiries 2 will not allow of our bringing
Socrates, as Grote does in his valuable work, into so
close a connection with men who are grouped to-
gether under the name of Sophists, and who really
in their whole tone and method bear so much resem-
blance to him. The scepticism of a Protagoras and
Grorgias cannot for a moment be placed on the same
level with the Socratic philosophy of conceptions,
nor the Sophistic art of controversy with the Socratic
sifting of men ; the maxim that man is the measure
of all things, cannot be compared with the Socratic
demand for action based on personal conviction, 3
CHAV,
IX.
1 Proofs in Protagoras and
Gorgias, Thaeetet, 151, D. ; 162,
D. ; 164, D. ; 165, E. ; Kep. i.
354, A. ; vi. 498, C.
2 Zeller, Part I. 882, 938.
3 As is done by Grote, Plato
I. 305. Respecting Socrates'
explanation in Plato's Crito 49,
D., that he was convinced that
under no circumstances is
wrong-doing allowed, it is
there observed ; here we have
the Protagorean dogma Homo
Mensura . . . which Socrates
will be found combating in
the Thaeetetus . . . proclaimed
by Socrates himself. How un-
like the two are will however
be seen at once by a moment's
reflection on Protagoras' saying,
Conf. Part I. 899 ... p. 259,
535 ; iii. 479. Grote even as-
>rrts that not the Sophists but
Socrates was the chief quibbler
in Greece ; he was the first to
i Icstroy the beliefs of ordinary
minds by hi.s negative criti-
cism, whereas Protagoras, Pro-
dicus and Hippias used pre-
vious authorities as they found
them leaving untouched the
moral notions current. II. 410
and 428 he observes respect-
ing Plato's statement (Soph.
232, B.) that the Sophists talk
themselves and teach others to
talk of things which they do
not know, which Socrates did
all his life long. In so saying,
he forgets that Socrates in
examining into the opinions
of men neither pretends to
better knowledge himself nor
is content with the negative
purpose of perplexing others.
His aim was rather to substi-
tute permanent conceptions for
unscientific notions. He for-
gets, also, that in the case of the
Sophists, owing to their want,
of earnest intellectual feeling,
owing to the shallowness of
their method, owing to their
denial of any absolute truth,
190 SOCRATES.
CHAP, nor can the rhetorical display of the older Sophists,
'_ the dangerous and unscientific character of their later
ethics be lost sight of. As regards the Hegelian
grouping of Socrates among the Sophists, this has
called forth a greater opposition than it deserves.
The authors of this view do not deny that the Socratic
reference of truth to the person differed essentially
from that of the Sophists. 1 Neither they nor their
opponents can deny that the Sophists were the first
to divert philosophy away from nature to morals and
the human mind, that they first required a basis for
practical conduct in knowledge, a sifting of existing
customs and laws, that they first referred to personal
conviction the settling of truth and falsehood, right
and wrong. Hence the dispute with them resolves
itself into the question. Shall we say that Socrates
and the Sophists resembled one another, both taking
personal truth as their -ground, but differing in their
views of personal truth? or that they differed, the
nature of their treatment being a different one,
whilst they agreed in making it relative ? Or to
put the question in another shape : There being
both points of agreement and difference between
them, which of the two elements is the more impor-
tant and decisive ? Here for the reasons already
explained, only one reply can be given, 2 that the
difference between the Socratic and Sophistic philo-
together with an incapacity for view. See Part I. 920.
positive intellectual achieve- * See p. 118, 1.
ments, those practical conse- 2 See p. 110, and Part I. 135,
quences were sure to result 938.
which soon enough came to
.HIS RELATION TO THE SOPHISTS. I'.U
sophies far exceeds their points of resemblance. CHAP.
The Sophists are wanting in that very thing which is
the root of the philosophical greatness of Socrates
the quest of an absolutely true and universally valid
knowledge, and a method for attaining it. They
could question all that had previously passed for
truth, but they could not strike out a new and surer
road to truth. Agreeing as they do with Socrates in
concerning themselves not so much with the study of
nature, as with training for practical life, with them
this culture has a different character, and a different
importance from what it bears with Socrates. The
ultimate end of their instruction is a formal dexterity,
the use of which to be consistent must be left to
individual caprice, since absolute truth is despaired
of; whereas with Socrates, on the contrary, the ac-
quisition of truth is the ultimate end, wherein alone
the rule for the conduct of the individual is to be
found. Hence in its further course, the Sophistic
teaching could not fail to break away from the phi-
losophy which preceded it, and indeed from every
intellectual enquiry. Had it succeeded in gaining
undisputed sway, it would have dealt the death stroke
to Greek philosophy. Socrates alone bore in him-
self the germ of a new life for thought. He alone
by his philosophical principles was qualified to be
the reformer of philosophy. 1
1 Hermann even allows this personal contrast to the So-
in saying (Plato, i. 232) that phists than from his general
the importance of Socrates for resemblance to them. Sophis-
the history of philosophy must try differed from the wisdom
be gathered far more from his of Socrates only in the want of a
192
SOCRATES.
CHAP. fruit-bearing germ. But how is
IX. this admission consistent with
- making the second period of
philosophy commence with the
Sophists instead of with So-
crates ? On the other hand,
the latest treatise on the ques-
tion before us (Siebeck, Dnter-
suchung zur Philos. d. Griech.
p. 1, Ueber Socr.Verhaltniss zur
Sophistik) is decidedly of the
opinion here expressed ; and
likewise most of the later edi-
tors of the history of Greek phi-
losophy. Striimpell, too (Gesch.
d. Pralit. Phil. d. Griech. p. 26),
writes to the same effect, al-
though his view of the So-
phists differs from ours in that
he denies a closer connection
between their scepticism and
their ethics. He makes the dis-
tinctive peculiarity of Socrates
to consist in the desire to
reform ethics by a thorough
and methodical intellectual
treatment, whereas the So-
phists aspiring indeed to be
teachers of virtue, accommo-
dated themselves in their in-
struction without independent
inquiry to the tendencies and
notions of the time.
HIS TRAGIC END. 103
CHAPTER X.
THE DEATH OF SOCRATES.
WE are now for the first time in a position to form CHAP.
a correct opinion of the circumstances which led to x -
the tragic end of Socrates. The actual history of A 1)t . ta u s
that event is well known. A whole lifetime had been oftkeae-
spent in labours at Athens, during which Socrates MS de-"'
had been often attacked, 1 but never judicially im- f' lcc > **":
* teiicc, and
peached, 2 when in the year 399 B.C., 3 an accusation death.
was preferred against him, charging him with
unfaithfdlness to the religion of his country, with
introducing new Gods, and with exercising a harmful
influence on youth. 4 The chief accuser 5 was Mele-
tus, 6 with whom were associated Anytus, one of the
1 Compare besides the Clouds vt6vs 8ta<p6fipui> TI/XTJ/UO fled/arcs.
of Aristophanes, Xen. Mem. i. 2, It is clearly an oversight on the
31 ; iv. 4, 3 ; Plato, Apol. 32, C. ; part of Grate, Plato i. 283, to
22, E. consider the parody of the in-
2 Plato, Apol. 17, D. dictment which Socrates puts
1 See p. 53, 1. into the mouth of his first
4 The indictment, according accusers, as another version of
to Favorinus in Diog. ii. 40, the judicial ypa<t>-f].
Xen. Mem. (Begin.), Plato, See Plato, Apol. 19, B. ; 24,
Apol. 24, B., was : rdSe typd^aro B. ; 28, A. ; Euthyphro, 2, B.
teal a.vrcfji6(raro MeATjros MeX^jrou Max. Tyr. ix. 2, proves nothing
UtrBfvs ZuKpdrti ZtatypoviffKov against this, as Hermann has
' AAcmrcKTJdci' dSiKe? 2o>/cpctTjx, shown, De Socratis Accusatori-
ous u.\v r) ir6\is vopi&i 0tovs ov bus.
von'.fav, frtpa 5i Kaiva Saifj.6via ' For the way in which this
fla-nyhp.fvos aSiKti Sf teal TOI/J name is written, instead of
194
SOCRATES.
CHAP.
X.
leaders and re-introducers of the Athenian demo-
_ cracy, 1 and Lyco, 2 an orator otherwise unknown. The
friends of Socrates appear at first to have considered
his condemnation impossible ; 3 still he was himself
s was formerly the
custom, see Hermann. It ap-
pears by a comparison of
various passages, that the ac-
cuser of Socrates is neither the
politician, as Forchhammer
makes him to be, nor the op-
ponent of Andocides, with
whom others have identified
him, nor yet the poet men-
tioned by Aristophanes (Frogs,
1302), biit some younger man,
perhaps the son of the poet.
1 Further particulars about
him are given by fbrchhammer,
79 ; and Hermann, 9. They
are gathered from Plato, Meno,
90, A. ; Schol. in Plat. Apol. 18,
B.; Lysias adv. Dard. 8; adv.
Agorat. 78 ; Isoc. adv. Callim,
23 ; Plut, Herod, malign. 26, 6.
p. 862; Coriol.c.14; Aristotle in
Harpokrates v. Sfudfav ; Schol.in
^Eschin. adv. Tim. 87 ; Diod.
xiii. 64. He is mentioned by
Xenopli. Hell. ii. 3, 42, 44, as
well as by Isocrates, 1. c., as a
leader of the Democratic party,
together with Thrasybulus.
2 For the various conjectures
about him consult Hermann,
p. 12. Besides the above-named
persons a certain Polyeuctus,
according to Favorinus in Diog.
ii. 38, took part in assisting
the accuser. Prooably "Awros
ought to be written in this
passage instead of IIo\i5ewcTos,
and in the following passage
Tlo\vevKTOs instead of "Avvros,
being here probably
a transcriber's mistake for
no\vKpa.T-r)s. See Hermann, p.
14. But the words as they
stand must be incorrect. The
celebrated orator Polycrates
is said to have composed the
speech of Anytus, Diog. 1. c.
according to Hermippus ;
Themist. Or. xxiii. 296, 6;
Quintil. ii. 17, 4 ; Hypoth. in
Isoc. Busir. ; JEscli. Socrat.
Epist. 14, p. 84 Or. Suidas,
Tlo\vKpd.TTis knows of two
speeches ; and it is proved
beyond doubt by Isocr. Bus. 4 ;
JElian, V. H. xi. 10, that he
drew up an indictment against
Socrates. But it is also clear
from Favorinus, that this in-
dictment was not used at the
trial. Indeed it would appear
from Favorinus that it was not
written till some time after
the death of Socrates. Conf.
Uebermeg, Gesch. d. Phil. i. 94.
3 This is proved by the Eu-
thyphro, allowing, as Schleier-
macher, PL Werke, i. a, 52, and
Steinliart, Plato's Werke, ii. 191
and 199 do., that this dialogue
was hastily penned after the be-
ginning of the trial, its object
being to prove that Socrates,
though accused of impiety, had
a deeper piety and a keener
appreciation of the nature of
piety, than one who had in-
curred ridicule by his extrava-
gances, but had nevertheless
brought himself into the odour
of sanctity ; a view which, not-
THE ACCUSATION.
196
under no misapprehension as to the danger which
threatened him. 1 To get up a defence, however, went
contrary to his nature. 2 Partly considering it wrong
and undignified to attempt anything except by
simple truth ; partly finding it impossible to move
out of his accustomed groove, and to wear a form of
artificial oratory strange to his nature, he thought
trustfully to leave the issue in the hands of God,
convinced that all would turn out for the best ; and
in this conviction confidently familiarising himself
with the thought that death would probably bring
Mm more good than harm, and that an unjust con-
demnation would only save him the pressure of the
weakness of age, leaving his fair name unsullied. 3
CHAP.
X.
withstanding Ueberweg's (Un-
ters. d. Platon. Schrift, 250)
and Grote's (Plato i. 316) ob-
jections, appears most probable.
The treatment of the question
is too light and satirical for the
dialogue to belong to a time
when the full seriotisness of
his position was felt.
1 Comp. Xen. Mem. iv. 8, 6 ;
Plato, Apol. 19, A.; 24, A.;
28, A. ; 36, A.
2 In Xen. Mem. iv. 8, 5, So-
crates says that when he wished
to think about his defence, the
Satptviov opposed him ; and ac-
cording to I)iog. ii. 40 ; Cic. de
Orat. i. 54 ; Quintil. Inst. ii. 15,
30; xi. 1,11; Vol. Max. vi. 4,
2 ; Stol. Floril. 7, 56, he de-
clined a speech which Lysias
offered him. It is asserted by
J'liifu, Apol. 17, B., that he
spoke without preparation.
The story in Xenophon's Apo-
logy, 22, to the effect that
some of his friends spoke for
him has as little claim to truth
in face of Plato's description
as that in Diog. ii. 41.
3 As to the motives of So-
crates, the above seems to fol-
low with certainty from pas-
sages in Plato, Apol. 17, B. ;
19, A.; 29, A.; 30, C. ; 34, C.,
and Xen. Mem. iv. 8, 4-10.
Cousin and Grote, however,
give him credit for a great deal
more calculation than can be
reconciled with the testimony
of history, or -with the rest of
his character. Cousin (CEuvres
de Platon, i. 58), seems to
think that Socrates was aware
that he must perish in the con-
flict with his age, but he forgets
that the explanation given in
Plato's Apology, 29, B., is only
a conditional one, and that the
passage in that treatise 37, C.,
was written after the judicial
sentence. Similarly Volquard-
2
SOCRATES.
CHAP.
X.
(2) Socra-
tes' de-
fince of
himself.
Such was the tone of mind which dictated his
defence. 1 The language is not that of a criminal,
sen (Damon, d. Sokr. 15), in
attempting to prove from Mem.
iv. 4, 4 ; Apol. 19, A., that So-
crates had predicted his con-
demnation, forgets that in these
passages the question is only as
to probable guesses. Even
Grote goes too far in asserting,
in his excellent description of
the trial (Hist, of Greece, viii.
654), that Socrates was hardly
anxious to be acquitted, and
that his speech was addressed
far more to posterity than to
his judges. History only war-
rants the belief, that with mag-
nanimous devotion to his cause
Socrates was indifferent to the
result of his words, and en-
deavoured from the first to
reconcile himself to a probably
unfavourable result. It does
not, however, follow that he
was anxious to be condemned ;
nor have we reason to suppose
so, since he could have wished
for nothing which he considered
to be wrong, and his modesty
kept him uncertain as to what minded view
was the best for himself. See '
Plato, Apol. 19, A.; 29, A.;
30, D. ; 35, D. We cannot,
therefore, believe with Grote,
p. 668, that Socrates had well
considered his line of defence,
and chosen it with a full con-
sciousness of the result ; that
in his conduct before the court
he was actuated only by a wish
to display his personal great-
ness and the greatness of his
give a lesson to youth the most
impressive which it was in the
power of man to give. To pre-
suppose such calculation on the
part of Socrates is not only
contradictory to the statement
that he uttered his defence
without preparation, but it
appears to be opposed to the
picture which we are accus-
tomed to see of his character.
As far as we can judge, his con-
duct does not appear to be a
work of calculation, but a
thing of immediate conviction,
a consequence of that upright-
ness of character which would
not allow him to go one step
beyond his principles. His
principles, however, did not
allow him to consider results,
since he could not know what
result would be beneficial to
him. It was his concern to
speak only the truth, and to
despise anything like corrupt-
ing the judges by eloquence.
This may appear a narrow-
but
other
course of conduct would so
well have corresponded with
the bearing and character of
Socrates ; and herein consists
his greatness, that he chose
what was in harmony with
himself in the face of extreme
danger, with classic composure
and unruffled brow.
1 We possess two accounts of
the speech of Socrates before
his judges, a shorter one in
mission in the most emphatic Xenophon and a longer one in
manner; and that by departing Plato's Apology. Xenophon 's
this life when at the summit Apology is certainly spurious,
of his greatness he desired to and with it any value attach-
HIS DEFENCE.
wishing to save his life, but that of an impartial ar-
biter, who would dispel erroneous notions by a simple
CHAP.
X.
ing to the testimony of Her-
xnogenes, to whom the compiler,
imitating the Mem. iv. 8, 4,
professes to be indebted for
his information, is lost. Touch-
ing Plato's, the current view
seems well established, that
this Apology is not a mere
creation of his own, but that
in all substantial points it
faithfully records what Socrates
said ; and the attempt of Georgii,
in the introduction to his
translation of the Apology
(conf . Steinftart, Platon.Werke,
ii. 235) to prove the contrary
will not stand. Georgii com-
plains that in the Socrates of
Plato that fj.eya\jjyopla is want-
ing, which Xenophon commends
in him a judgment with which
few will agree, not even the
writer of the Apology attri-
buted to Xenophon. He also
considers the sophism with
which the charge of atheism
was met, improbable in the
mouth of Socrates, though it
may just as likely have come
from him as from one of his
disciples. He doubts whether
Socrates could have maintained
a composure so perfect ; al-
though all that we know of
Socrates shows unruffled calm
as a main trait in his character.
He sees in the prominent fea-
tures of that character a diplo-
matic calculation, which others
will look for in vain. He con-
siders it incredible that So-
crates should have begun with
a studied quotation from the
Clouds of Aristophanes, aiming
at nothing else than the refu-
tation of prejudices, which
lasted undeniably (according
to the testimony of Xenophon,
Mem. i. 1, 11; (Ec. 12, 3;
Symp. 6, 6) till after his own
death, and perhaps contributed
much to his condemnation.
He misses, with Steinhart in
Plato, many things which So-
crates might have said in his
defence, and did actually say
according to the Apology of
Xenophon. But to this state-
ment no importance can be
attached, and it is probable
that in an unprepared speech
Socrates omitted much which
might have told in his favour.
He can hardly be convinced
that Socrates cross-questioned
Miletus so searchingly as Plato
describes ; but this passage
agrees with the usual character
of the discourse of Socrates,
and the sophism by which So-
crates proved that he did not
corrupt youth is quite his own.
See p. 141. That Socrates
should have met the charge of
atheism by quibbles, instead of
appealing to the fact of his
reverence for the Gods of the
state, he can only understand,
by supposing that we have here
an expression of Plato's reli-
gious views : although Plato
would have had no reason for
suppressing the fact, supposing
Socrates had really made such
an appeal : he even describes
the devotion of his master to
the Gods of his country, and is
himself anxious to continue
that service. Touching the
sophisms, even Aristotle, Rhet.
198 SOCRATES.
CHAP. setting forth of the truth, or of a patriot warning
against wrong-doing and overhaste. He seeks to
convince the accuser of his ignorance, to refute the
accusation by criticism. At the same time dignity
and principle are never so far forgotten as to address
the judges in terms of entreaty. Their sentence is
not feared, whatever it may be. He stands in the
service of Grod, and is determined to keep his post in
the face of every danger. JSfo commands shall make
him faithless to his higher calling, or prevent him
from obeying Grod rather than the Athenians.
(3) Hi* The result of his speech was what might have
< -t{on m l ~ have been expected. The majority of the judges
would most unmistakeably have been disposed to
pronounce him innocent, 1 had not the proud bearing
of the accused brought him into collision with the
members of a popular tribunal, accustomed to a very
different deportment from the most eminent states-
men. 2 Many who would otherwise have been on his
ii. 23 ; iii. 18 ; 1398, a, 15 ; Plato's intention to record
1419, a, 8, has no fault to find, literally the words of Socrates,
The same may be said in reply and we may be satisfied with
to most of the reasoning of comparing his Apology with the
Georgii. On the contrary, the speeches in Thucydides, as
difference in style between the Steinhart does, bearing in
Apology and Plato's usual writ- mind what Thucydides, i. 22,
ings, seems to prove that this says of himself, that he had
Apology was not drawn up with kept as close as possible to the
his usual artistic freedom, and sense and substance of what
the notion of Georgii referring was said and applying it
it to the same time as the equally to Plato. Conf . Ueber-
Phaedo appears altogether in- meg, Unters. d. Plat. Schr. 237.
conceivable considering the * Xen. Mem. iv. 4. 4.
great difference between the 2 Let the attitude of Pericles
two in regard to their philoso- be remembered on the occasion
phical contents and their artis- of the accusation of Aspasia,
tic form. It certainly was not and that depicted by Plato in
HIS SENTENCE AND DEATH.
side were set against him, and by a small majority l
the sentence of GHiilty was pronounced. 2 According
CHAP.
X.
the Apology, 34, C. Indeed it
is a well-known fact that judg-
ing was a special hobby of
the Athenian people (conf.
Aristophanes in the Wasps,
Clouds, ,207), and that it
watched with peculiar jealousy
this attribute of its sove-
reignty. How Volquardsen,
Dilmon. d. Sokr. 15, can con-
clude from the above words
that Hegel's judgment respect-
ing Socrates' rebellion against
the people's power is shared
here, is inconceivable.
1 According to Plato, Apol.
36, A., he would have been ac-
quitted if 3, or as another
reading has it, if 30 of his
judges had been of a different
mind. But how can this be
reconciled with the statement
of Diog. ii. 41 : KareSiKaffdrj
SiaKoffiats oySo^Kovra fata TrAeiotrt
ij/7)<pois TWV vaoKvovatav I Either
the text here must be corrupt,
or a true statement of Diogenes
must have been strangely per-
verted. Which is really the
case it is difficult to say. It is
generally believed that the
whole number of judges who
condemned him was 281. But
since the Helirea always con-
sisted of so many hundreds,
most probably with the addi-
tion of one deciding voice
(400, 500, 600, or 401, 501, 601),
on tliis hypothesis no propor-
tion of votes can be made out
which is compatible with
Plato's assertion, whichever
reading is adopted. We should
have then to suppose with
Buck, in Stiver n on Aristoph.
Clouds, 87, that a number of
the judges had abstained from
voting, a course which may be
possible. Out of 600 Heliasts,
281 may have voted against
and 275 or 276 for him. It is,
however, possible, as Bockh
suggests, that in Diogenes, 251
may have originally stood in-
stead of 281. In this case
there might have been 251
against and 245 or 246 for the
accused, making together
nearly 500 ; and some few,
supposing the board to have
been complete at first, may
have absented themselves dur-
ing the proceedings, or have
refrained from voting. Or, if
the reading rpidKoma, which
has many of the best MSS. in
its favour, is established in
Plato, we may suppose that the
original text in Diogenes was
as follows : KOTeSiKao-erj SIOKO-
ffiais oySoyKovTa ijrfjQois, ' trhfioffi
TUV avoXvovaiav. We should
then have 280 against 220,
together 500, and if 30 more
had declared for the accused,
he would have been acquitted,
the votes being equal.
2 This course of events is not
only in itself probable, taking
into account the character of
the speech of Socrates and the
nature of the circumstances,
but Xenophon (Mem. iv. 4, 4)
distinctly asserts that he would
certainly have been acquitted
if he had in any way conde-
scended to the usual attitude
of deference to his judges. See
also Pluto, Apol. 38, D.
200 SOCRATES.
CHAP, to the Athenian mode of procedure, the next thing
_ was to treat of the measure of the penalty. Socrates,
however, spoke out with undaunted courage : were
he to move for what he had deserved, he could only
move for a public entertainment in the Prytaneum.
He repeated the assurance that he could not on any
account renounce his previous course of life. At
length, yielding to the entreaties of his friends, he
was willing to consent to a fine of thirty minae, be-
cause he could pay this without owning himself to
be guilty. 1 It may be readily understood that to
the majority of the judges such language in the ac-
cused could only appear in the light of incorrigible
obstinacy and contempt for the judicial office ; 2 hence
the penalty claimed by the accusers was awarded a
sentence of death. 3
(4) Hi* The sentence was received by Socrates with a
death. composure corresponding with his previous conduct.
He persisted in not in any way repenting of his con-
duct, frequently expressing before the judges his
conviction, that for him death would be no misfor-
tune. 4 The execution of the sentence being delayed
1 The above is stated on the all the more readily a contrary
authority of Plato's Apology, effect, if he thought such con-
in opposition to which the less duct imperative. Nietzsche's
accurate assertion of Xeno- idea (Sokrates Bas. 1871, p. 17)
phon, that he rejected any that Socrates, with full con-
pecuniary composition, and sciousness, carried through his
that of Diog. ii. 41, cannot be condemnation to death, appears
allowed to be of any weight. untenable for the same reasons
* How distinctly Socrates as the above,
foresaw this effect of his con- 3 According to Diog. ii. 42, it
duct is unknown. It may have was carried by eighty more
appeared probable to him ; but votes than his condemnation,
he may also have anticipated 4 Plato, Apol. 38, C.
HIS SENTENCE AND DEATH. 201
pending the return of the sacred-ship from Delos, 1 he CHAP.
continued in prison thirty days, holding his accus- '
tomed intercourse with his friends, and retaining
during the whole period his unclouded brightness
of disposition. 2 Flight from prison, for which his
friends had made every preparation, was scorned as
wrong and undignified. 3 His last day was spent in
quiet intellectual conversation, and when the evening
came the hemlock draught was drunk with a strength
of mind so unshaken, and a resignation so entire,
that a feeling of wonder and admiration overcame
the feeling of grief, even in his nearest relatives. 4
Among the Athenians, too, no long time after his
death, discontent with the troublesome preacher of
morals is said to have given way before remorse,
in consequence of which his accusers were visited
with severe penalties ; 5 these statements, however,
1 Mem.iv.8,2; Plato, Phsedo, put Socrates to death, and
68, A. attacked his accusers, putting
2 Phaedo, 59, D. ; Mem. 1. c. them to death without a judi-
* See p. 77, 1. According to cial sentence. Suidas makes
Plato, Crito urged him to flight. M\TJTOS (Meletus) die by ston-
The Epicurean Idomeneus, who ing. Pint, de Invid. e. 6, p.
says it was JSschines (Diog. ii. 538, says that the slanderous
60 ; iii. 36) is not a trust- accusers of Socrates became so
worthy authority. hated at Athens that the citi-
4 Compare the Phaedo, the zens would not light their fires,
account in which appears to be or answer their questions, or
true in the main. See 58, E. ; bathe in the same water with
116, A.; Xen, Mem. iv. 8, 2. them, and that at last they
Whether the statements in were driven in despair to hang
Xen. Apol. 28 ; Diog. ii. 35 ; themselves. Diog. ii. 43, conf.
JElian, V. H. i. 16, are histori- vi. 9, says that the Athenians
cal, is a moot point. Those in soon after, overcome with com-
Stob. Floril. 5, 67, are certainly punction, condemned Meletus
exaggerations. to death, banished the other
4 Jtuxlw. xiv. 37, says that accusers, and erected a brazen
the people repented of having statue to Socrates, and that
202
SOCRATES.
CHAP.
X.
B. The
cause of
this sen-
tence of
condemna-
tion.
(1) It man
not the
work of
the So-
phists.
are not to be trusted, and appear on the whole im-
probable. 1
The circumstances which brought about the death
of Socrates are among the clearest facts of history.
Nevertheless the greatest difference of opinion pre-
vails as to the causes which led thereto and the
justice of his condemnation. In former times it was
Anytus was forbidden to set
foot in their city. Tlieinist.
Or. xx. 239, says : The Athe-
nians soon repented of this
deed ; Meletus was punished,
Anytus fled, and was stoned at
Heraclea, where his grave may
still be seen. Tertullian,
Apologet. 14, states that the
Athenians punished the ac-
cusers of Socrates, and erected
to him a golden statue in a
temple. Aug. De Civ. Dei, viii.
3, reports that one of the ac-
cusers was slain by the people
and the other banished for
life.
1 This view, already expres-
sed by Forchammer (1. c. 66)
and Grote, viii. 683, appears
to be the correct one notwith-
standing Hermann's (I.e. 8, 11)
arguments to the contrary.
For though it is possible that
political or personal opponents
of Anytus and his fellow-ac-
cusers may have turned against
them their action against So-
crates, and so procured their
condemnation, yet (1) the au-
thorities are by no means so
ancient or so unimpeachable
that we can depend upon them.
(2) They contradict one an-
other in all their details, not to
mention Diogenes' anachronism
respecting Lysippus. And (3)
the main point is, that neither
Plato, nor Xenophon, nor the
writer of Xenophon 's Apology
ever mention this occurrence,
which they could not have
failed to regard with great
satisfaction. On the contrary,
five years after the death of
Socrates Xenophon thought it
necessary to defend him against
the attacks of his accusers,
while ^Eschines appealed to the
sentence on Socrates without
dreading the very obvious
answer, that his accusers had
met with their deserts. That
Isocrates is referring to this
occurrence rather than to any
other (irepl dvri56ff. 19) is not
established, nor need the pas-
sage contain a reference to any
event in particular. And lastly,
nothing can be made of the apo-
cryphal story coming from some
editor of Isocrates, to the effect
that the Athenians, ashamed
of having put Socrates to
death, forbad any public men-
tion of him, and that when
Euripides (who died seven
years before Socrates) alluded
to him in the Palamedes, all the
audience burst into tears. It
is only lost labour to suggest
that these scenes took place at
some later time, when the play
was performed.
CAUSES OF THE SENTENCE. 203
thought quite natural to refer it to an accidental out- CHAP.
burst of passion. Were Socrates the colourless ideal of
virtue he was represented to be by those lacking a
deeper insight into his position in history, it would in-
deed be inconceivable that any vested interests could
have been sufficiently injured by him to warrant a
serious attack. If then, he was nevertheless accused
and condemned, what else can have been the cause
but the lowest of motives personal hatred ? Now
who can have had so much reason for hatred as the So-
phists, whose movements Socrates was so effective in
thwarting, and who were otherwise supposed to be ca-
pable of any crime ? Accordingly it must have been
at their instigation that Anytus and Meletus induced
Aristophanes to write his play of the Clouds, and after-
wards themselves brought Socrates to trial.
This was the general view of the learned in former
times. 1 Nevertheless its erroneousness was already
pointed out by Freret. 2 He proved that Meletus was
a child when the Clouds was acted, and that at a
much later period Anytus was on good terms with So-
crates ; that neither Anytus can have had anything to
do with the Sophists Plato always representing him
as their inveterate enemy and despiser 3 nor Meletus
with Aristophanes ; 4 and he showed, that no writer
1 Reference to Snicker, i. a Meno, 92, A.
549, in preference to any 9 Aristophanes often amuses
others. himself at the expense of the
* In the admirable treatise : poet Meletus, but, as has been
Observations sur les Causes et remarked, this Meletus was
surquelques Circonstances de la probably an older man than
Condamnation de Socrate, in the accuser of Socrates. See
the Mom. de 1 'Academic des Hermann, De Socr. Accus. 5.
Inscript. i. 47, 6, 20U.
204 SOCRATES.
CHAP, of credit knows anything of the part taken by the
' Sophists, in the accusation of Socrates. 1 Besides,
the Sophists, who had little or no political influence
in Athens, 2 could never have procured the condem-
nation of Socrates. Least of all, would they have
preferred against him charges which immediately
recoiled on their own heads. 3 These arguments of
Freret's, after long passing unnoticed, 4 have latterly
met with general reception. 5 Opinions are other-
wise still much divided, and it is an open question
whether the condemnation of Socrates was a work of
private revenge, or whether it resulted from more
general motives ; if the latter, whether these motives
were political, or moral, or religious ; and lastly,
whether the sentence was, according to the popular
view, a crying wrong, or whether it may admit of a
partial justification. 6 In one quarter even the length
1 ^lian (V. H. ii. 18), the Mem. de 1'Acad. i. 47. 6, 1. It
chief authority for the pre- was therefore unknown to the
vious hypothesis, knows no- German writers of the last
thing about a suborning of century, who for the most part
Anytus by the Sophists. follow the old view ; for in-
2 The political career of Da- stance, Kleiners, Gesch. d. Wis-
mon, who according to the use senschaft, ii. 476 ; Ttedemann,
of the Greek language can be Geist d. spek. Phil. ii. 21.
called a Sophist, establishes Others, such as Buhle, Gesch.
nothing to the contrary. d. Phil. i. 372 ; Tenneman,
*Protagorashadbeenindicted Gesch. d. Phil. ii. 40, confine
for atheism before Socrates, and themselves to' stating gene-
on the same plea Socrates was rally, that Socrates made many
attacked by Aristophanes, who enemies by his zeal for mo-
never spared any partizans of rality, without mentioning the
sophistry. Sophists.
4 The treatise of Freret was 5 There are a few exceptions,
written as early as 1736, but such as Heinsius, p. 26.
not published till 1809, when 6 Foreliliammer: Die Athener
it appeared together with seve- und Socrates, die Gesetzlichen
ral other of his writings. See und der Revolutioniir.
PERSONAL HATRED NOT THE ONLY CAUSE. 205
has been reached of asserting with Cato, 1 that of all CHAP.
sentences ever passed, this was the most strictly legal. ____!__
Among these views the one lying nearest to hand, ( 2 )
is that of some older writers, who attribute the exe- ceedfrom
cut-ion of Socrates to personal animosity ; always p ^ ona L
giving up the unfounded idea that the Sophists were f a \Anytux
in any way connected therewith. 2 A great deal may ma y ha
be said in favour of this aspect of the case. In a grudge.
Plato, 3 Socrates expressly declares that he is not the
victim of Anytus or Meletus, but of the ill-will which
he incurred by his criticism of men. Even Anytus,
it is however said, owed him a personal grudge.
Plato hints 4 at his being aggrieved with the judg-
ments passed by Socrates on Athenian statesmen,
and, according to Xenophon's Apology, 5 took it amiss
1 Pint. Cato, c. 23. only place where it would have
* This is found in Fries, been possible to carry it on so
Gesch. d. Phil. i. 249, who long, and that it is by no
speaks of the ' hatred and envy means a matter for wonder,
of a great portion of the that Socrates was accused and
people,' as the motives which condemned, but only that this
brought on the trial. Sign-art, did not happen sooner. If he
Gesch. d. Phil. i. 89, gives pro- had been tolerated so long,
minence to this motive, and there must have been special
Uratulix, Gr. Rom. Phil. ii. a. reasons, however, for the accu-
26, who distinguishes two sation ; and these he is in-
kinds of opponents to So- clined to find partly in his re-
crates, those who considered lations to Critias and Alcibia-
his philosophy incompatible des, and partly in the hatred of
with ancient discipline and Anytus.
morality, and those who could * Apol. 28, A. ; 22, E. ; 23, C.
not endure his moral earnest- 4 Meno, 94 : in reference to
ness, attributing the accusation which Diog. ii. 38, says of
to the latter. Grate, viii. Anytus : ovros yap ov $4puv rbv
637, inclines to the same view, inrb ^oHcpdrovs x^ fva ^^ v -
He proves how unpopular So- * Compare with this Hegel,
crates must have made himself Gesch. d. Phil. ii. 92 ; Grate.
by his sifting of men. He Hist, of Greece, viii. 641.
remarks that Athens was the
206 SOCRATES.
CHAP. that Socrates urged him to give his competent son
' a higher training than that of a dealer in leather,
thereby encouraging in the young man discon-
tent with his trade. 1 Anytus is said to have first
moved Aristophanes to his comedy, and afterwards in
common with Meletus to have brought against him
the formal accusation. 2 That such motives came
into play in the attack on Socrates, and contributed
in no small degree to the success of this attack is
antecedently probable. 3 To convince men of their
ignorance is the most thankless task you can choose.
Anyone who can persevere in it for a life-time so re-
gardless of consequences as Socrates did, must make
many enemies ; dangerous enemies too, if he takes for
his mark men of distinguished position or talents.
(V) But Still personal animosity cannot have been the
^vel'een sole cause of his condemnation. Nor are Plato's
other statements binding upon us. Indeed the more
merit to Socrates and his pupils became convinced of the
lead to Ms i us tice of his cause, the less were they able to dis-
condemna- J ,
tion. cover any grounds in fact for the accusation. The
one wish of Socrates being to will and to do what was
best, what reason could anyone possibly have had for
1 Later writers give more an improbable story ought not
details. According to Pint, to have deceived lAizac (De
Ale. c. 4; Amator. 17, 27, p. Socr. Cive, 133); especially
762 ; and Satyrus in Atlienceus, since Xenophon and Plato
xii. 534, e, Anytus was a lover would never have omitted in
of Alcibiades, but was rejected silence such a reason for the
by him, whilst Alcibiades accusation,
showed every attention to So- 2 Lilian, V. H. ii. 13. Diog.
crates, and hence the enmity 1. c.
of Anytus to Socrates. Such 3 Compare Grote, 1. c. 638.
PERSONAL HATRED NOT THE ONLY CAUSE, 20
opposing him, except wounded pride ? The narrative CHAP.
of Xenophon's Apology would at most only explain '_ _
the hatred of Anytus ; it would not account for the
widely spread prejudice against Socrates. It is a
question whether it is true at all ; and whether,
granting its truth, this personal injury was the only
cause which arrayed Anytus as accuser against him. 1
Lastly, allowing, as was undoubtedly the case, that
Socrates made enemies of many influential people, is
it not strange that their personal animosity should
only have attained its object after the re-establish-
ment of order in Athens ? In the most unsettled
and corrupt times no serious persecution had been
set on foot against him. Neither at the time of the
mutilation of the Hermae, had his relations with
Alcibiades ; nor after the battle of Arginusse, 2 had
the incensed state of popular feeling been turned
against him. Plato, too, says 3 that what told against
Socrates at the trial, was the general conviction that
his teaching was of a dangerous character ; and he
states that as matters then stood, it was impossible for
any one to speak the truth in political matters with-
out being persecuted as a vain babbler and corrupter
1 This is just possible. That Thrasybulus faithful to the
the character of Anytus was treaties, and not abusing his
not unimpeachable we gather political power to make amends
from the story (Aristot. in liar- for his losses during the oli-
/inrn/tian 9K<tCett> ; Diodor. xiii. garchical government.
(54; Pint. Coriol. 14), that '- The astonishment expres-
when lie was first charged sed by Tenneman at this is
with treason he corrupted the. natural from his point of view,
judges. On the other hand Only his solution of the diffi-
r*<H:r. (in Callim. 23) praises culty is hardly satisfactory,
him for being together with Apol. 18, B. ; 1S, B. ; 23, D.
208 SOCRATES.
CHAP. of youth. 1 On this point the testimony of writers so
' opposite as Xenophon and Aristophanes proves that
the prejudice against Socrates was not merely a pass-
ing prejudice, at least not in Athens, but that it
lasted a whole life-time, not confined only to the
masses, but shared also by men of high importance
and influence in the state. Very deeply, indeed, must
the feeling against Socrates have been rooted in
Athens, if Xenophon found it necessary six years
after his death to defend him against the charges on
which the indictment was framed.
With regard to Aristophanes, it was an obvious
blot in his plays to allow here and there such a pro-
minence to political motives as to forget the claims
of art, and for a comedian, who in his mad way holds
up to ridicule all authorities divine and human, to
clothe himself with the tragic seriousness of a poli-
tical prophet. 2 Yet it is no less an error to lose
sight of the grave vein which underlies the comic
license of his plays, and to mistake his occasional
pathos for thoughtless play. Were it only this, the
hollowness of the sentiment would soon show itself
in artistic defects. Instead of this, a sincerity of
patriotic sentiment may be observed in Aristophanes,
1 Polit. 299, B. ; Rep. vi. 488, both of them justly recognise
496, C. ; Apol. 32, E. ; Gorg. (Hegel, Phiinomeno 1. 560 ;
473, E. ; 521, D. JSsthetik, 537, 562 ; Jtotscher,
2 Rotscher's spirited descrip- p. 365), that there is an ele-
tion suffers from this onesided- ment subversive of Greek life,
ness, and even Hegel, in his quite as much in the comedies
passage on the fate of Socrates, of Aristophanes, as in the
Gesch. d. Phil. ii. 82, is not state of things of which he
quite free from it, although complains.
PERSONAL HATRED NOT THE SOLE CAUSE. 2(
not only in the unsullied beauty of many individual CHAP.
utterances ; l but the same patriotic interest sounds X
through all his plays, in some of the earlier ones
even disturbing the purity of the poetic tone, 2 but
proving all the more conclusively, how near the love
of his country lay to his heart.
This interest only could have brought him to give
to his comedies that political turn, by means of
which, as he justly takes credit to himself, 3 comedy
gained a far higher ground than had been allowed to it
by his predecessors. At the same time it must be
granted that Aristophanes is as much deficient as
others in the morality and the faith of an earlier
age, 4 and that it was preposterous to demand the
olden time back, men and circumstances having so
thoroughly changed. Only it does not follow here-
from that he was not sincere in this demand. His
was rather one of those cases so frequently met with
in history, in which a man attacks a principle in
others to which he has himself fallen a victim, with-
out owning it to himself. Aristophanes combats
innovations in morals, politics, religion, and art.
Being, however, in his inmost soul the offspring of
his age, he can only combat them with the weapons
and in the spirit of this age. With the thorough
dislike of the narrow practical man unable to give a
1 Seep. 29. Peace, 732; Wasps, 1022;
2 Compare Rchnitzer, trans- Clouds, 637.
lation of the Clouds, p. 24, and 4 Compare Droygen,Aristopli.
the passages quoted by him Werke, 2 Aufl. i. 174, which
from Welcker, Siivern and seems to go too far.
Botscher.
210 SOCRATES.
CHAP, thought to anything beyond immediate needs, he
' proscribes every attempt to analyse moral and poli-
tical motives, or to test their reasonableness or the
reverse; whilst as a poet he thinks nothing of
trifling with truth and good manners, provided the
desired end is reached. He thus becomes entangled
in the inconsistency of demanding back, and yet by
one and the same act destroying, the old morality.
That he committed this inconsistency cannot be
denied. And what a proof of shortsightedness it was
to attempt to charm back a form of culture which
had been irretrievably lost ! That he was conscious
of this inconsistency cannot be believed. Hardly
would a thoughtless scoffer which is what some
would make of him have ventured upon the danger-
ous path of attacking Cleon. Hardly would Plato
have brought him into the society of Socrates in the
Symposium, putting into his mouth a speech full of
spirited humour, had he seen in him only a despic-
able character. If, however, the attack upon Socrates
is seriously meant, and Aristophanes really thought
to discern in him a Sophist dangerous alike to reli-
gion and morality with which character he clothes
him in the Clouds then the charges preferred at the
trial were not a mere pretence, and something more
than personal motives led to the condemnation of
Socrates.
(3) Was he Do we ask further what those motives were ? All
^fapolUi- that is known cf the trial and the personal character
cal party? of the accusers only leaves us a choice between two
alternatives : either the attack on Socrates was
NOT CONDEMNED FOR POLITICAL VIEWS. 211
directed against his political creed l in particular, or CHAP.
more generally against his whole mode of thought
and teaching in respect to morals, religion, and
politics. 2 Both alternatives are somewhat alike, still
they are not so alike that we can avoid distinguishing
them.
A great deal may be said in favour of the view,
that the attack on Socrates was in the first place set
on foot in the interest of the democratic party.
Amongst the accusers, Anytus is known as one of the
leading democrats of that time. 3 The judges, too,
are described as men, who had been banished and
had returned with Thrasybulus. 4 We know, more-
over, that one of the charges preferred against
Socrates was, that he had educated Critias, the most
unscrupulous and the most hated of the oligarchical
party; 5 ^Eschines 6 tells the Athenians plainly:
You have put to death the Sophist Socrates, because
he was the teacher of Critias. Others, too, are found
among the friends and pupils of Socrates, who must
have been hated by the democrats because of their
1 This is the view of Freret, Princ. der Ethik. p. 44. Com-
1. c. p. 233, of Dresiff in the pare, Baur, Socrates und Chris-
dissertation De Socrate juste tus, Tub. Zeitschrift, 1837, 3
damnato (Lips. 1738), of Sit- 128-144.
vern (notes to Clouds, p. 86) of * See p. 194, 1.
Jlitter, Gesch. d. Phil. ii. 30, 4 Plato, Apol. 21, A.
and of Forchhammer (Die Athe- 5 Xen. Mem. i. 2, 12; Plato
ner und Socrates, p. 39). More Apol. 33, A.
indefinite is Hermann, Plat. i. Adv. Tim. 173. No great
35, and Wiggerg, Socr. p. 123. importance can be attached to
* Hegel, Gesch. d. Phil. ii. 81 ; this authority, as the context
Rotsclier, p. 256, 268, with shows. ^Eschines is talking?
special reference to the Clouds as an orator, not as an histor-
of Aristophanes ; Henning, ian.
f 2
212
SOCRATES.
CHAP.
X.
aristocratical sympathies. Such were Charmides, 1
and Xenophon, who was banished from Athens *
about the time of the trial of Socrates, perhaps
even in connection therewith, because of his intimacy
with Sparta and the Spartans' friend, Cyrus the
younger. Lastly, one of the formal indictments is
referred to as charging Socrates with speaking dispa-
ragingly of the democratic form of election by lot, 3
and with teaching his audience to treat the poor with
insolence, 4 by so frequently quoting the words
Each prince of name or chief in arms approved,
He fired with praise, or with persuasion moved.
But if a clamorous vile plebeian rose,
Him with reproof he check'd, or tam'd with blows. 5
1 Charmides, the uncle of
Plato, one of the thirty, was,
according to Xen. Hell. ii. 4,
19, one of the ten commanders
at the Peirseus, and fell on
the same day with Critias in
conflict with the exiled Athe-
nians.
2 ForcTihammer, p. 84 : he
also mentions Theramenes, the
supporter of the thirty tyrants,
who may have been a pupil of
Socrates without, as Forch-
hammer will have it, adopting
the political opinions of his
teacher. But Diodor., xiy. 5,
from whom the story comes, is
a very uncertain authority.
For Diodorus combines with
it the very improbable story that
Socrates tried to rescue Thera-
menes from the clutches of the
thirty, and could only be dis-
suaded from this audacious at-
tempt by many entreaties.
Neither Xenophon nor Plato
mention Theramenes among
the pupils of Socrates. Neither
of them mentions an interven-
tion of Socrates on his behalf,
as Plato, Apol. 32, C. does in
another case. In the accusa-
sation brought against the vic-
tors at Arginusae, it was So-
crates who espoused their cause,
and Theramenes who by his in-
trigues brought about their
condemnation. Pzeudoplut.
Vit. Decrhet. iv. 3, tells a
similar and more credible story
of Socrates. Probably it was
first told of him and then
transferred to Socrates.
3 Mem. i. 2, 9.
Ibid. i. 2, 58.
5 Iliad, ii. 188. Forchham-
mer, p. 52, detects a great deal
more in these verses. He
thinks that Socrates was here
expressing his conviction of
CONDEMNED ON GENERAL GROUNDS.
213
Taking all these facts into account, there can be no
doubt that, in the trial of Socrates, the interests of
the democratic party did come into play.
Still these motives were not all. The indictment
by no means places the anti-republican sentiments of
Socrates in the foreground. What is brought against
him is his rejection of the Grods of his country, and
his corruption of youth. 1 Those Gods were, however,
the necessity of an oligarchical
constitution, and was using
the words of Hesiod epyov 8'
ovSfv oveitios (which the ac-
cusers also took advantage of),
as a plea for not delaying, but
for striking when the time for
action came. The real impor-
tance of the quotation from
Homer, he contends, must not
be sought in the verses quoted
by Xenophon, but in those
omitted by him (II. ii. 192-197,
203-205) : the charge was not
brought against Socrates for
spreading anti-democratic sen-
timents, which Xenophon alone
mentions, but for promoting
the establishment of an oli-
garchical form of government.
This is, however, the very op-
posite of historical criticism.
If Forchhammer relies upon the
statements of Xenophon, how
can he at the same time assert
that they are false in most im-
portant points ? And if on
the other hand he wishes to
strengthen these statements,
how can he use them to up-
hold the view, by which he
condemns them ? He has,
however, detected oligarchical
tendencies elsewhere, where no
traces of them exist. For in-
stance, he enumerates not only
Critias but Alcibiades among
the anti-democratical pupils of
Socrates ; and he speaks of the
political activity of Socrates
after the battle of Arginusae
by remarking that the oli-
garchs elected on the council
board their brethren in politi-
cal sentiments. It is true the
levity of Alcibiades made him
dangerous to the democratic
party, but in his own time he
never passed for an oligarch,
but for a democrat. See Xen.
Mem. i. 2, 12 ; Thuc. viii. 63,
48 and 68. With regard to the
condemnation of the victors of
Arginusse, Athens had then not
only partially, as Forchhammer
says, but altogether shaken off
the oligarchical constitution of
Pisander. This day be gathered
from Frerefs remark, 1. c. p.
243, from the account of the
trial (Xen. Hell. i. 7), as well
as from the distinct statement
of Plato _(Apol. 32, C. : ol
ravra /Mtv ^v TI STjjUOKpaTou/itVrjs
TTJS n-tJxews) ; not to mention
the fact that these generals
were decided democrats, and
hence could not have been
elected by oligarchs.
ol.24, B.p.193, 4.
CHAP.
X.
(4) Henat
the victim
of more
general
causes,
(a) The
charges
mere not
directed
against the
political
element in
his teach-
ing only.
214 SOCRATES.
CHAP, not only the Grods of the republican party, but the
** Grods of Athens. If in some few instances, as in the
trial for the mutilation of the Henna?, insult to the
Grods was brought into connection with attacks on a
republican constitution, the connection was neither a
necessary one, nor was it named in the indictment of
Socrates. Further, as regards the corruption of
youth, 1 this 'charge was certainly supported by the
plea that Socrates instilled into young men contempt
for republican forms of government and aristocratic
insolence, and also that he was the teacher of Critias.
But the training of Alcibiades was also laid to his
charge, who had injured the city by republican
rather than by aristocratic opinions. A further
count was, that he taught sons to despise their
fathers, 2 and said that no wrong or base action need
be shunned if only it be of advantage. 3
(&) Hut Herefrom it would appear that not so much the
extended political character in the narrower sense of the term, as
to its moral *
and re- the moral and religious character of his teaching was
SSSJ?* the sub J ect of attack. The latter aspects exclusively
draw down the wrath of Aristophanes. After all the
ancient and modern discussions as to the scope of the
Clouds, 4 it may be taken for established that the So-
crates of this comedy is not only a representative
drawn with a poet's license of a mode of thought
1 Mem. i. 2, 9. opinions. Since then, Droysen
2 Xen. Mem. i. 2, 49 ; Apol. and Schnitzer, Forchhammer,
20 and 29. p. 25, and Kochly, Akad. Vortr.
8 Mem. i. 2, 56. 1, have further gone into the
4 Ratscher (Aristophanes, p. question.
272) gives a review of previous
CONDEMNED ON GENERAL GROUNDS. 216
which Aristophanes knew to be foreign to the real CHAP.
man ; l nor yet was only a general attack thereby
intended on the fondness for metaphysical subtleties,
and the absurdity of sophistry and useless learning ;
but the play was distinctly aimed at the philosophic
tendency of Socrates. Just as little can it be sup-
posed, after what has been said, that this attack
proceeded only from malice or from personal animo-
sity ; Plato's description in the Symposium puts this
out of the question. Eeisig's 2 and Wolfs 3 opinions
are also untenable. Eeisig distributes the traits
which Aristophanes assigns to Socrates, between
himself and the whole body of his pupils, Euripides 4
in particular ; still the spectators could not do
otherwise than refer them all to Socrates ; hence
Aristophanes must have intended this reference.
Wolf supposes that the portrait drawn in the Clouds
is of Socrates in his younger years, when he was
given to natural philosophy. But the very same
charges were repeated against him eighteen years
later in the Frogs ; 5 and we gather from Plato's
Apology 6 that the current view of Socrates and his
teaching up to the time of his death agreed substan-
tially with that of Aristophanes ; not to mention the
1 As is assumed by G. Her- Similarly Van Heusde, Charac-
mann, Praef. ad Nubes, p. terismi, p. 19, 24. Conf. Wig-
33, 11, and by others. Com- gers' Sokr. p. 20.
pare, on the other hand, Rot- 4 Who was 10 years older
scher, p. 294, 273, 307, 311; than Socrates, and certainly
Siivern, p. 3. not his pupil, although possibly
2 Praef. ad Nubes ; Rhein. an acquaintance.
Mas. ii. (1828) i. K. S. 191. Frogs, 1491.
8 In his translation of the See p. 18.
Clouds, see liotsclter, 297.
216 SOCRATES.
CHAP, fact that Socrates probably never was a lover of
. natural philosophy, and that in the Clouds he is
attacked as a Sophist l rather than as a natural
philosopher.
0) This is Aristophanes must, then, really have thought to
jfttjNprr discern in the Socrates whom the history of philoso-
axsignedto phy sketches features deserving his attack. Saying
the Clouds, this, however, is, of course, not saying that he did
not caricature the historical figure, consciously
attributing to it many really foreign features. For
all that, we may suppose that the main features in
his picture agreed with the idea he had formed to
himself of Socrates, and also with common opinion.
Siivem, therefore, in supposing 2 that the Socrates of
the Clouds is not meant for an individual, but for a
symbol, and that the poet's attack was not aimed at
Socrates, but at the sophistic and rhetorical school in
general, 3 cannot be right. Far from it, Socrates was
made to be the champion of sophistry, because in
Aristophanes' mind he really was that ; the poet be-
lieved that, taken in his public capacity, he was
really the dangerous innovator he represents him to
be. Not a single line of his picture has an exclu-
sively political colour. Independently of some
things which are obviously not seriously meant,* the
charges against Mm are threefold, his being occupied
1 Clouds, 98. at Alcibiades, who is concealed
2 In the treatise already re- under the name of Phidippides.
f erred to, pp. 19, 26, 30, 55. See, on the contrary, Droysen,
s Not to mention the false p. 180 ; Schnitzer, p. 34.
opinion, which however is sup- 4 Such as the calculation of
ported by Hertzberg (Alcibiades, flea-jumps,
p. 67), that the play was aimed
CONDEMNED ON GENERAL GROUNDS. 217
with useless physical and intellectual subtleties, 1 his CHAP.
rejecting the (rods of the city, 2 and what is the _
corner-point of the whole play, his sophistic facility
of speech, which can gain for the wrong side the
victory over the right, and make the weaker argu-
ment the stronger. 3 In other words, the unpractical,
irreligious, and sophistical elements in the Socratic
teaching are attacked ; there is not a word about his
anti-republican tendency, which Aristophanes, we may
suppose, had he observed, would before all things have
exposed. Even at a later time, 4 Aristophanes brings
no other complaints against Socrates than these.
Only these points, too, according to Plato, constituted
the standing charges against Socrates, causing him
special danger. 5 And there is every reason for be-
lieving his assurance.
If then the impeachment of Socrates has, never- (d) Socra-
theless, been set down to a political motive, how can
this admission be made to agree with the previous JWt onl 'J
because of
his anti-
1 143-234, 636. stronger as to the actual re- ^publican
2 365-410. suit, giving to an unjust act men ' s > **
8 Clouds, 889. Droysen, the colour of justice. as bei>l fff n
Clouds, p. 177, unfairly blames 4 Frogs, 1491. e '"!f J
this play for making a stronger * Apol. 23, D. : \iyovaiv, us tlie ^ oa
argument into a right one. 2uKpdrr]s rls ^<m ptapcararos Kal * time.
The \6yos Kpflrruv is the really 5m<p0/p rovs vtovs Kal <?ire(5dV
stronger case in point of jus- ns avrovs tytora., '6 n iroiiav na.\ '6
tice, according to the original n StSda-Kuv, e^oim n^v ovSev
meaning of the word (Xenoph. tltteiv, oAA' ayvoova-iv, Vva 8 ^
(Ec. ii. 25 ; Arist. Khet. ii. 24), SoitSxriv avopftv, -rck Kara iravrwv
which is however thrown into T>V <f>t\offo<f>ovi>r<av wpox et P a " ra "-
the shade by the \6yos fyrwv ; ra \eyovatv, 8rt ra pfrtupa Kal
and what is meant by rbv 9iTTa> ra virb yrjs, Kal Ofovs ^ von(fav
\6yov Kpflrru iroifiv is, making Kal rbv ^rrw \6yov Kptlrru *oifiv.
the case which in point of jus- Ibid. 18, B.
tice is weaker, to be the
218 SOCRATES.
CHAP, statement ? The true answer to this question has
X ' been already hinted at by other writers. 1 The con-
viction of the guilt of Socrates rested on the assumed
dangerous character of his teaching for morality and
religion ; the reason that this offence was judicially
prosecuted lay without doubt in the special political
circumstances of the time. The rationalism of the
Sophists was neither the sole nor the chief cause of
the fall of Athens in the Peloponnesian war ; still it
contributed unmistakeably to that result, and the op-
ponents of the new culture were naturally disposed to
make its guilt out to be greater than it really was.
Had not the schools of the Sophists sent forth not a
few of the modern statesmen, who either as the leaders
of oligarchy or democracy had torn the state to pieces ?
Was not in those schools a corrupt form of morality
publicly taught, which substituted the wishes and
caprice of the individual in place of existing custom
and religion, put gain in the place of right, and
taught men to desire absolute sovereignty as the
summit of human happiness ? Were not those
schools the cradle of an unscrupulous eloquence,
which employed a variety of technical tricks for any
purpose, no matter what, considering it the highest
triumph to make the wrong side the winning side ?
Can we then wonder that Aristophanes thought the
new-fangled education responsible for all the misfor-
tunes of the commonwealth ; 2 that Anytus in Plato
1 Ritter, p. 31. Marbacli* 2 Clouds, 910; Knights, 1373.
Gesch. d. Phil. i. 185, 9 ; and Further details in Silvern,
Schmegler, Gesch. d. Phil. 30. Clouds, 2i.
CONDEMNED ON GENERAL GROUNDS. 21
cannot find terms strong enough to express his CHAP.
horror of the pernicious influence of the Sophists ; l
that all friends of the good old time believed that in
Sophistry lay the chief malady of the state; and
that this feeling was intensified during the last years
of the Peloponnesian war, and under the oligarchial
reign of force ? Was it then other than natural that
those who had rescued Athens from the oligarchy,
re-establishing with the old constitution her political
independence, should wish by suppressing the educa-
tion of the Sophists to stop the evil at its source.
Now Socrates passed not only for a teacher of the
modern Sophistic school, but the evil effects of his
teaching were thought to be seen in several of his
pupils, among whom Critias and Alcibiades were
prominent. 2 What more intelligible under such
circumstances, than that just those who were bent
upon restoring a popular form of government, and
the ancient glory of Athens, should see in him a
corrupter of youth, and a dangerous citizen ? Thus
he certainly fell a victim to the republican reaction
which set in after the overthrow of the thirty tyrants.
For all that his political views were not in them-
selves the principal motives which provoked the
attack. His guilt was rather supposed to consist in
the subversion of ancestral customs and piety, of
which the anti-republican tendency of his teaching
1 Meno, 91, C. proved by Xen. Mem. i. 2, 12,
* How largely this circum- as well as by the above-men-
fctance contributed towards the tioned authority, JEschines.
condemnation of Socrates is
220
SOCRATES.
CHAP.
X.
C. Justice
of the
sentence.
(1) Un-
founded
charges,
(a) In re-
lation to
Ids teach-
ing, life,
and influ-
ence.
was partly an indirect consequence, partly an isolated
manifestation.
How then does it really stand touching the jus-
tice of this accusation l and of the sentence to which
it led ? And what must he thought of the modern
attempts to justify it? Most of the charges which
were preferred against Socrates, rest undeniably on
misunderstandings, perversions, or false inferences.
Socrates is said to have rejected the Gods of the
state. We have already seen this statement contra-
dicted by all historical testimonies. 2 He is said to
have substituted his Saipoviov in their place. We,
however, likewise know that he neither put it in
1 It is well known that Hegel
has defended it on the side of
Greek law, and Dresig, a hun-
dred years earlier, maintained
in a very superficial treatise,
that Socrates, as an opponent
of a republican government,
had been justly condemned.
Forchhammer goes a great deal
further in his treatise, and so
does Denis. See p. 178, 3.
Kochly, on the other hand,
confines himself, in Acad.Vortr.
i. 382, to the assertion that in
the indictment of Socrates
guilt was equally divided and
reduced to a minimum on
either side. The answer of
Heinsius to Forchhammer (So-
crates nach dem Grade seiner
Schuld. Lips. 1839) is unimpor-
tant, and the learned Apologia
Socratis contra Meliti redivivi
Calumniam, by P. van Limburg
Brouwer (Gron. 1838), is de-
ficient in insight into the
general questions involved, and
is inferior to the treatise of
Preller (Haller, A. L. Z. 1838,
No. 87), although many of its
details are valuable. Z/iizac,
de Socrate cive 1796, despite
his usual learning, does little
for the question. Grote's re-
marks, on the other hand,
touching the extenuating cir-
cumstances, which, without
altogether justifying, excuse
the condemnation of Socrates,
are deserving of all attention.
Gi-ote, Hist, of Greece, viii.
678, 653.
2 Forchhammer repeats the
charge without proof, as if its
truth were obvious of itself,
and he speaks of orthodoxy and
heresy like a modern theolo-
gian. But a Greek thought
far less of belief than of out-
ward service, and hence Xeno-
phon, Mem. i. 1, 2, refutes the
charge by an appeal to the fact
that he had sacrificed to the
Gods.
JUSTICE OF THE SENTENCE. 221
the place of the Gods, nor sought thereby to encroach CHAP.
on the ground of oracles. 1 It was a private oracle .
in addition to those publicly recognised ; and in a
country where divine revelations were not the exclu-
sive property of the priesthood, a private oracle could
be refused to no one. 2 He is said to have been de-
voted to the atheistic, heavenly wisdom of Anaxa-
goras, 3 although he expressly declared it to be absurd. 4
He is said according to Aristophanes to have given
instruction in the Sophistic art of oratory a charge
so untrue, that to all appearances even Meletus did
not venture to prefer it. He is blamed for having
been the teacher of Critias and Alcibiades, to which
charge even Xenophon justly replied 5 that these
men did not learn their vices from Socrates, nor
degenerate, until after being separated from him.
Allowing, too, that a teacher must instil into his
pupils a lasting turn for the good, 6 is it necessarily
his fault if he does not succeed in some few cases ?
1 Compare p. 76, 7 ; 89 ; 149, Leben und Schriften, p. 480).
1 ; 178. If Forchhammer considers it
2 Xenophon therefore appeals incredible that Meletus should
to the 5a.tfi.6nov (Mem. i. 1, 2) have given such a careless
in good faith as a proof of reply to Socrates, he forgets
Socrates' belief in the Gods, that it is always the way of
and Plato compares his revela- the world to confound relative
tions with the prophecies of with positive atheism, doubts
Euthyphro (Euthyphro, 3, B). about particular religious no-
It is indeed known, from other tions with the denial of all re-
sources, how much private di- ligion. This is quite universal
vination was practised, besides in the nations of antiquity,
appealing to public oracles. and therefore the early Christ-
3 Not only Aristophanes but ians were called &6foi.
Meletus brings this charge 4 See p. 135, 1.
against him in Plato, Apol. 26, * Mem. i. 2, 12,
C., p. 10, like Ast (Platen's Forchhammer, p. 43.
222 SOCRATES.
CHAP. The value of any instruction can only be estimated
_____ by its collective effects, and these bear as bright a
testimony to the value of the instruction of Socrates
as can be wished. A man whose beneficial influence
not only reached to many individuals, 1 but by whom
a new foundation for morals was laid which served
his people for centuries, was, as a matter of course,
no corrupter of youth. If further the verses of
Hesiod, by which Socrates sought to promote useful
activity are alleged against him ; 2 Xenophon has con-
clusively proved that an ill use has been made of these
verses. If lastly, he has been accused of teaching
men to despise parents and relations, because he
maintained that only knowledge constituted worth ; 3
surely this is a most unfair inference from principles,
which had a simple meaning in his mouth. Any
teacher who makes his pupil understand that he
must learn something in order to become a useful
and estimable man, is surely quite in order. Only
the rabble can bear the teacher a grudge for making
sons wiser than their fathers. Very different would
it have been had Socrates spoken disparagingly of
the ignorance of parents, or set lightly by the duty
of children ; but from so doing he was far removed. 4
1 Plato's Apol. 33, D., men- follow his training rather than
tions a whole string ; also that of their parents. This
Xen. Mem. i. 2, 48. fact Xenophon's Apology al-
2 Mem. i. 2, 56 ; Plato, Char, lows, and attempts to justi-
163, B. Conf. p. 212, 4. fy. But in order to decide
3 Mem. i. 2, 49. whether it is an established
4 Conf. Mem. ii. 2, 3. A fact, and whether Socrates is
further charge is connected here to blame, it is indeed
with the above, viz., that he quite possible we need a more
induced many young men to trustworthy authority, and we
UNFOUNDED CHARGES. 22
It might be replied that one who judged the value of CHAP.
a man simply and solely by his knowledge, and who at
the same time found all wanting in true knowledge,
was making his pupils self-conceited, and teach-
ing them to consider themselves above all authority
by their own imaginary knowledge. But whilst
with partial eye overrating the importance of know-
ledge, Socrates avoided this practically harmful in-
ference by above all endeavouring to make his friends
conscious of their own want of knowledge, and laying
no claim to knowledge himself, but only professing
to pursue it. No fear that any one imbued with
this spirit of humility and modesty, would misuse
the Socratic teaching. For its misconstruction and
for the consequences of a superficial and defective
conception of it Socrates is as little responsible as
any other teacher.
Of more moment is another point touched upon
in the judicial proceedings the relation of Socrates
himself to the Athenian democracy. As is well kwpori-
known, Socrates considered the existing constitution na r<h the
a complete failure. 1 He would not have the power gtate -
in the state awarded by lot or by election, but by the
qualification of the individuals ; and he occasionally
expressed opinions respecting the masses who thronged
the Pnyx and filled the theatre at assemblies of the
people containing no doubt a great deal of truth,
cmght to know the circum- son against his father, but
stances better. In the single urged the father to give him
case there mentioned, that of a better education, or else ex-
the son of Anytus, the truth pressed himself to a third party
of which appears doubtful, So- to that effect,
crates probably did not set the ' See p. 167.
224 SOCRATES.
CHAP, but coming very near to treason against the sove-
reignty of the people. 1 It was natural that his
accusers should- make use of such expressions, and
that they should not be without influence on the
judges. Still a free censure of existing institutions
is by no means treason. Some Grecian states may
have confined the liberty of speech within very
narrow limits, but at Athens the freedom of thought
and of speech was unlimited ; it formed an integral
portion of the republican constitution ; the Athenian
regarded it as an inalienable right and was proud to
be herein distinguished from every other state. 2 In
the time of the most violent party quarrels there is
no instance of interference with either political views
or political teaching. The outspoken friends of a
Spartan aristocracy could openly stick to their
colours, so long as they refrained from actual attacks
on the existing state of things ; and was Socrates
not to be allowed the same privilege ? 3
In the shape of actual deeds nothing, however,
could be laid to his charge. He had never trans-
1 In Mem. iii. 7, Socrates at- E. : Demosth. in Androt. p.
tempts to relieve Charmides of 603 ; Funebr. 1396.
his dread of appearing in pub- * Grote's reference to the
lie by reminding him, that the Platonic state, 1. c. p. 679, in
people whom he is afraid of, which no freedom of indivi-
consist of peasants, shoemakers, dual opinion was allowed, is
pedlars, &c., and therefore do not altogether to the point,
not deserve such consideration. The fundamental ideas of
The charge preferred by the Plato's state are different to
accuser, Mem. i. 2, 58, that those then prevailing in Athens.
Socrates thought it was reason- Plato, Rep. viii. 557, B., reckons
able for the rich to abuse the freedom of speech among the
poor, is clearly a misrepresen- evils of a democracy, a type of
tation. which was the Athenian form
2 Compare Plato, Gorg. 461, of government.
UNFOUNDED CHARGES. 225
grossed the laws of the state. His duties as a citizen CHAP.
had been conscientiously fulfilled. His avowed
opinion was that man must live for the state and
obey its laws. He was no partizan of the oligarchical
faction. On the contrary, he had twice hazarded his
life, 1 once to rescue the victors at Arginusse good
democrats from the extrajudicial mercies of an in-
furiated populace, the other time to prevent an
unjust command of the thirty tyrants from being
carried out. 2 His school, too, in as far as it can be
called a school, had no decided political bias. If
the greater number of his pupils were taken from
the upper classes, 3 and hence probably belonged to
the aristocratic party, one of his most intimate
friends 4 was amongst the companions of Thrasybu-
lus ; most of his adherents however seem to have
taken no decided line in politics. A charge of
political inactivity has been brought against him in
modern times. On this head, different judgments
may be passed on him from different points of views.
From our side we can only praise him for continuing
faithful to his higher calling, not wasting his powers
and his life on a career, in which he would have
attained no success, and for which he was unfitted.
But whatever view may be taken, it is certainly not
a punishable offence to. avoid a statesman's career ;
least of all to avoid it under the conviction that you
can do more good to the state in other ways. To
1 Xen. i. 1, 17. Plato, Apol. 23, C. See p.
z See pp. 66; 67; 148; 176.
166. 4 Chaerephon, ibid. 21, A.
Q
SOCRATES.
CHAP.
X.
(2) Rela-
tion borne
by his
theory to
the ancient
morality.
help the state in his own way was to Socrates an
object of the highest and deepest interest. 1 His
political theories may not have corresponded with
existing institutions, but his character as a citizen
must be admitted to be pure ; and according to the
laws of Athens, he was guilty of no crime against the
state. 2
Nor were the political views of Socrates the only
things which gave offence. His whole position was,
as Hegel has so well indicated, 3 at variance with the
ground occupied by the old Greek morality. The
moral life of Greece, like every national form of life,
rested originally on authority. It relied partly on
the unquestioned authority of the laws of the state,
and partly on the all-powerful influence of custom
and training, which raised general convictions to the
rank of written laws of God, traceable by no one to
a definite origin. To oppose this traditional morality
was regarded as a crime and conceit, an offence
against God and the commonweal. To doubt its
rightfulness never occurred to any one, nor was
indeed permitted ; and for this reason, the need of
an enquiry into its foundations, of proving its
1 Compare p. 65.
2 At an earlier period it
might have given offence, that
Socrates appeared to hold aloof
from the political questions of
his time, and an appeal might
have been made to the old law
of Solon, Plut. Sol. c. 20 ; Arist.
in Gell. N. A. ii. 12, 1, threaten-
ing neutrals in case of an in-
ternal quarrel with loss of civil
rights. But this law had long
fallen into disuse, if indeed it.
had ever been in force ; and
who can blame Socrates for re-
maining neutral when he could
conscientiously side with none
of the conflicting parties ? Per-
haps it was a political narrow-
ness, but it was not a crime.
8 Gesch. d. Phil. ii. 81.
HIS RELATION TO THE ANCIENT MORALITY. 227
necessity, or even of supporting it by personal intro- CHAP.
spection, was never felt.
Socrates, however, demanded such an enquiry. (a) Per-
He would allow nothing to be believed, and have no- *cvictwn
thing done, until men were first fully convinced of its *ftrfi-
truth or expediency. For him it is not enough to deference
have a rule, universally recognised and legally estab- t ^ ut1w ~
lished, but the individual must think out each subject
for himself, and discover its reasons : true virtue and
right action are only possible when they spring from
personal conviction. Hence his whole life was spent
in examining the current notions touching morals, in
testing their truth, and seeking for their reasons.
This examination brought him in nearly all points to
the same results as those which were established
by custom and opinion. If his notions were in many
respects clearer and sharper, this advantage was one
which he shared in common with the best and wisest
of his contemporaries. Nevertheless, tried by the
standard of the old Greek morality, his position seems
very critical.- In the first place the ordinary morality,
and the received rules of conduct resting on authority
and tradition, were by him deprived of their chief
value. In comparison with knowledge, and the con-
scious virtue of Socrates, they were so much depre-
ciated, that not only was the self-love of individuals
hurt, but the actual validity of the laws of the state
was called in question. If man has only to follow his
own convictions, he will agree with the popular will
only when, and in as far as, it agrees with his convic-
tions. If the two come into collision, there can be
Q 2
228 SOCRATES.
CHAP. no doubt as to which side he will espouse. This
principle is candidly avowed by Socrates in his de-
fence, in his celebrated declaration that he would
obey God rather than the Athenians. 1 And thus his
views stand, even in theory, in sharp and irreconcile-
able contradiction to the older view. It was impos-
sible therefore to guarantee, indeed it was highly
improbable that there would be, a perfect agreement
between the two in their results, and as a matter of
fact, Socrates by his political views was undeniably
opposed to the existing form of constitution. 2
(b) Less There can moreover be no mistaking the fact,
ance'at- ^hat ^ e w ^l e character of the Socratic philosophy
tacked to i s a t variance with the preponderance given to politi-
cal interests, without which the Greek states could
never, considering their limited range, have achieved
greatness. The duty of the individual towards the
community was indeed recognised by Socrates to its
* full extent. Even his friends he urged to devote
their attention to public affairs when any of them
showed ability for the task, 3 and in keeping back
from public life those who were young 4 and unformed,
he acted meritoriously from the point of view of
ancient Greece. Still the maxim that man must be
clear about himself, and be sure of his own moral
well-being before meddling with that of others and
with the community ; 5 the conviction of Socrates
that a political career was not only alien to his own
* l Plat. Apol. 29, C. 4 Mem. iii. 6 ; iv. 2 ; Plato,
2 See p. 167 and 223. Symp. 216, A.
3 See p. 167, 3. s Plato, 1. c.
HIS RELATION TO THE ANCIENT MORALITY. 229
character, but impossible, in the then state of things, CHAP.
to a man of integrity ; l the whole inward turn given
to thought and pursuits, the demand for self-know-
ledge, for moral knowledge, for self-training all this
could not but weaken in himself and his pupils the
inclination for political life. It could not fail to
make the moral perfection of the individual the main
point, while reducing activity for the state that
highest and most immediate duty of a citizen accord-
ing to the ancient view to a subordinate and de-
rivative rank.
And, lastly, if the charge of rejecting his country's (c) Hi*
Gods was, as he believed, unjustly preferred against J ^ v ^ ve
Socrates, still his theory, it must be admitted, was an <>f religion.
extremely perilous one, as was seen in the case of
Antisthenes, when once the Socratic demand for
knowledge was developed to its consequences, and
religious notions were similarly dealt with in order
to discover what people understood thereby. This is
true also of his Saifioviov. As a kind of oracle it had
indeed a place on the ground of the Greek faith, but
by its internal character it made the decision depend
on the subject instead of depending on external por-
tents. And yet how dangerous was this proceeding
in a country in which oracles were not only a religious
but a political institution ! How easily might others
be led to imitate the example of Socrates, taking
counsel, however, with their own understanding in-
stead of with an undefined inward feeling, and thus
thinking little of belief in the Gods or of their utter-
1 Plato, Apol. 31, C.
230 SOCRATES.
CHAP, ances ! We may indeed be convinced that Socrates
' was in all these points right in the main, and it is
quite true that he was the precursor and founder of
our moral view of the world ; but how could this new
idea of right be admitted by any one who shared the
traditions of the ancient Greek world ? How could
a state built upon these traditions allow such an idea
to be spread, without commiting an act of suicide ?
Even remembering, then, that Socrates laboured and
taught in his simple manner, not in the Sparta of
Lycurgus, but in Athens and amongst the generation
that had fought at Marathon, we shall still ficd it
quite natural for the state to endeavour to restrain
his action. For Athens was absolutely ignorant of
that freedom of personal conviction, which Socrates
required, nor could she endure it. 1 In such a com-
munity the punishment of the innovator can cause
no surprise. For was not a dangerous doctrine, ac-
cording to old notions, a crime against the state ?
And if the criminal resolutely refused to obey the
sentence of the judges, as Socrates actually did,
how could the penalty of death fail to follow ? To
one therefore starting from the old Greek view of
right and the state, the condemnation of Socrates
cannot appear to be unjust. 2
1 To say that the line adop- which was, it is true, an insti-
ted by Socrates was not opposed tution later than Solon's time,
to the constitution of Solon, but he disliked the popular
but was instead a return to elections of Solon ; and his
old Greek custom, as Georgii principle of free investigation
(Uebersetzung d. Plat. Apolo- is widely removed from the
gie, p. 129) asserts, is not spirit of Solon's times,
correct. For not only did he 2 Compare the remarks of
express disapproval of appoint- Koclt on Aristophanes, i. 7.
ing by lot to public offices,
7//.S' RELA riON TO THE MORALITY OF HIS TIME. 231
A very different question is it whether Athens at CHAP.
that time had a right to this opinion, a point which
the defenders of Athens assume far too readily. 1 To ( 3 ) Rela-
, T j tion borne
us the question appears to deserve an unqualified i y kis
negation. Had a Socrates appeared in the time of t j^ or y to
Miltiades and Aristides, and had he been condemned in which
then, the sentence might be regarded as a simple '
act of defence on the part of the old morality against morality
the spirit of innovation. In the period after the n ' asal -
ready in a
Peloponnesian war such a view can no longer be state of
admitted. For where was the solid morality which decay.
Anytus and Meletus were supposed to defend ? Had
not all kinds of relations, views, and modes of life
long since been penetrated by an individualising
tendency far more dangerous than that of Socrates ?
Had not men been long accustomed in place of the
1 Hegel, 1. c. p. 100, is here when a verdict of guilty had
most nearly right, although lie been brought in, the judges
regards the Athenians exclu- could only choose between the
sively as the representatives penalty demanded by the
of the old Greek morality, plaintiff and that asked for by
Forchhammer, on the contrary, the defendant ; in the present
is anything but impartial, in case between death and an illu-
inaking the Athenians conser- sory fine. But the question
vative, and Socrates a revolu- really is whether Socrates de-
tionary, and attributing to the served punishment at all, and
latter the extreme consequences to this question a negative
of those principles, notwith- answer must be given both
standing his protest. Nietzsche, from our point of view as well
too(Sokr.u. d. Griech.Tragcdie, as from that of his cotempor-
p. 29), overlooks the difference aries ; from ours, because we
of times in thinking that, when take liberty of judgment to be
Socrates had once been im- something sacred and invio-
peached, his condemnation was lable ; from theirs, because the
quite just. If this were allowed, Athenians had long since de-
not a word could be said against parted from the ancient state
the sentence of death. For, of things,
according to Athenian custom,
232 SOCRATES.
CHAP. great statesmen of old to see demagogues and aristo-
' crats in feud with each other on every other point,
but agreeing in the thoughtless play of rivalry and
ambition ? Had not all the cultivated men of that
time passed through a school of rationalism which
had entirely pulled to pieces the beliefs and the
morals of their ancestors ? Had not men for a gene-
ration lived themselves into the belief that laws are
the creations of caprice, and that natural right and
positive right are very different things ? l What had
become of the olden chastity when Aristophanes
could tell his hearers in the midst of his attacks
on Socrates, half in joke, half in derision, that they
were one and all adulterers? 2 What had become of
ancient piety at a time when the sceptical verses of
Euripides were in every one's mouth, when every
year the happy sallies of Aristophanes and other
comedians in successful derision of the inhabitants
of Olympus were clapped, when the most unprejudiced
complained that fear of GTod, trust, and faith, had
vanished, 3 and when the stories of future retribution
were universally derided ? 4
(*) So- This state of things Socrates did not make; he
7ellinmith found Jt existin g- What he is blamed for really con-
'what he gists in this, that he entered into the spirit of his
existing time, trying to reform it by means of itself, instead
of making the useless and silly attempt to bring it
back to a type of culture which was gone for ever.
It was an obviously false attack of his opponents to
1 Conf. p. 29. > Time. iii. 82 ; ii. 53.
z Clouds, 1083. 4 Plato, Rep. i. 330, D.
HIS RELA TION TO THE MORALITY OF HIS TIME. L>fi
hold him responsible for the corruption of faith and CHAP.
morals, which he was trying to stem in the only
possible way. It was a clumsy self-deception on
their part to imagine themselves men of the good old
time. His condemnation is not only a great injustice
according to our conceptions of right, but it is so
also according to the standard of his own time ; it is
a crying political anachronism, one of those unfortu-
nate measures, by which a policy of restauration is
ever sure to expose its incompetence and short-
sightedness. Socrates certainly left the original
ground of Greek thought, and transported it beyond
the bounds, within which this particular form of
national life was alone possible. But he did not do
so before it was time, nor before the untenableness
of the old position had been amply demonstrated.
The revolution which was going forward in the whole
spirit of the Greeks, was not the fault of one indi-
vidual, but it was the fault of destiny, or rather it
was the general fault of the time. The Athenians
in punishing him condemned themselves, and com-
mitted the injustice of making him pay the penalty
of what was historically the fault of all. The con-
demnation therefore was not of the least use: in-
stead of being banished, the spirit of innovation was,
on the contrary, thereby all the more aroused. We
have then here not a simple collision between two
moral powers equally justified and equally limited.
Guilt and innocence are not equally divided between
the parties. On the one hand was a principle his-
torically necessary and higher in respect of import-
234
SOCRATES.
CHAP.
X.
O) A
breach
between
Socrates
and Ms
country-
men was
absolutely
necessary.
ance, of which Socrates had an unquestioned claim
to be the representative. On the other hand, one
far more limited, represented by his opponents, but
to which they have no longer a just right, since they
do not faithfully adhere to it. This constitutes the
peculiar tragic turn in the fate of Socrates. A
reformer who is truly conservative is attacked by
nominal and imaginary restorers of old times. The
Athenians in punishing him give themselves up as
lost; for in reality it is not for destroying morals
that he is punished, but for attempting to restore
them.
To form a correct judgment of the whole occur-
rence, we must not forget that Socrates was con-
demned by only a very small majority, that to all
appearances it lay in his own power to secure his
acquittal, and that undoubtedly he would have es-
caped with a far less punishment than death, had he
not challenged his judges by the appearance of pride.
These circumstances must make us doubly doubtful
of regarding his ruin as an unavoidable consequence
of his rebellion against the spirit of his nation. As
they place the guilt of the Athenians in a milder
light, by laying it in part on the head of the accused,
so too they at the same time prove that accidental
events, in no way connected with the leading charac-
ter of his teaching, had great weight in the final
decision. No doubt Socrates was at variance with
the position and the demands of the ancient morality
in essential points ; but it was not necessary in the
then state of opinion at Athens, that it should come
to a breach between him and his nation. Although
RESULTS OF HIS DEATH. 235
the political reaction after the expulsion of the thirty CHAP.
tyrants was sufficiently powerful to bring about an
attack on him, the conviction of his guilt was not so
universal but that it might have been possible for
him to escape the punishment of death.
For his honour and his cause it was a happy (*) Tlie ^
thing that he did not escape. What Socrates in ^death.
pious faith expressed after his condemnation that
to die would be better for him than to live has
been fully realised in his work. The picture of the
dying Socrates must have afforded to his pupils, in
the highest degree, what it now after centuries affords
to us a simple testimony to the greatness of the
human mind, to the power of philosophy, and to the
victory of a spirit pious and pure, reposing on
clear conviction. It must have stood before them in
all its glory, as the guiding star of their inner life,
as it is depicted by Plato's master hand. It must
have increased their admiration for their teacher,
their zeal to imitate him, their devotion to his teach-
ing. By his death the stamp of higher truth was
impressed on his life and words. The sublime repose
and happy cheerfulness with which he met death,
was the strongest corroboration of all his convictions,
the zenith of a long life devoted to knowledge and
virtue. Death did not add to the substance of his
teaching, but it greatly strengthened its influence.
A life had been spent in sowing the seeds of know-
ledge with a zeal unequalled by any other philosopher
either before or after ; his death greatly forwarded
the harvest, so that they brought forth fruit abun-
dantlv in the Socratic Schools.
PART III.
THE IMPERFECT FOLLOWERS OF SOCRATES.
CHAP.
XI.
CHAPTEE XI.
THE SCHOOL OF SOCRATES : HIS POPULAR PHILOSOPHY.
XENOPHON: ^ESCHINES.
A MIND so great and active in every way as that of
Socrates could not fail to make a lasting impression
A. School on every kind of character with which it came into
teg. contact. If then the most perfect systems are often
not understood by all their adherents in the same
sense, might not a much greater divergence and
variety of apprehension be expected, in a case where
no system lay ready to hand, but only the fragments
and germs of what might be one a person, a princi-
ple, a method, a mass of individual utterances and of
desultory discussions ? The greater part of the fol-
lowers of Socrates confined their attention to what
was most obvious and lay nearest to an ordinary in-
telligence the originality, the purity of character,
the intelligent view of life, the deep piety and the
beautiful moral maxims of their teacher. Only a
smaller number gave more careful attention to the
THE SOCRATIC SCHOOLS. 237
deeper thoughts, which often appeared under so un- CHAP.
pretentious an outside, and even of these nearly all ^
took a very narrow view of the subjects which occu-
pied Socrates. Combining older theories with the
teaching of their master, which it is true needed to
be thus supplemented, they did so in such a manner
as almost to lose the distinctive merits of his philoso-
phy. One only with a deeper insight into the spirit
of Socrates has succeeded in creating a system which
presents in a most brilliant and extended form what
Socrates had attempted in another manner and on a
more limited scale.
In the first of these classes must be placed with-
out doubt by far the greater number of those who are
known to us as the pupils of Socrates. 1 The writings
1 Besides the Socratists who i. 4 ; Plato, Symp. 173, B., 174,
will be presently mentioned, A., 223, B.) ; Euthydemus
are Crito (Xen. Mem. ii. 9 ; (Mem. iv. 2 ; 3 ; 5 ; 6 ; PL,
Plato, Crito, Phaedo, 59, B., 60, Sym. 222 B.) ; Theages (PL
A., 63, D., 115, A. ; Euthyde- Apol. 33 E. ; Rep. vi. 496, B.) ;
mus ; Diog. ii. 121, who makes Hermogenes (Xen. Mem. ii. 10,
him the author of seventeen 3, iv. 8, 4 ; Sym. 4, 46 ; Apol. 2,
books, which, however, belong PL Phaedo, 59, B). In Mem. i.
to him as little as his suppos- 2, 48, perhaps 'Eppoyevris should
ed children Hermogenes, and be read for Hermocrates ; but
others), and Clitobulus his son at any rate this Hermocrates
(Xen. Mem. i. 3, 8. ii. 6 ; CEc. must be distinguished from the
1-6 ; Symp. 4, 10 ; Plato, Apol. Hermocrates mentioned PL
33, D., 38, B. ; Phsedo, 5!, B. ; Tim. 19, C., 20, A, Krit. 108,
^Esch. in Atheruzus v. 220, a.) ; A ; the latter being a stranger
Chaerephon (Mem. 2, 48 ; ii. 3 ; who only stays at Athens on
Plato, Apol. 20, E.; Charm, his way. Compare Steinhart,
153, B. ; Gorgias, Aristophanes, PL W. vi. 39 and 235 ; Phsedo-
Clouds, Birds, 1296) and his nides (Mem. i. 2, 48; PL Phsedo,
brother Chaerecrates (Mem. 59, C.) ; Theodotus (PL Apol.
1. c.) ; also Apollodorus (Mem. 33, E.) ; Epigenes (Phsedo, 59,
iii. 11, 17 ; Plato, Apol. 34, B. ; Mem. iii. 12) ; Menexenus
A., 38, B. ; Phsedo, 59, B., 117, (Phsedo, 59, B.; Lysis, 206, D.) ;
D. ; Symp.); Aristodemus(Mem. Ctesippus (Phsedo, Euthyde-
238
SOCRATES.
CHAP.
XI.
too which are attributed to many of these followers of
Socrates amoDgst which, however, there is much
that is spurious were, on an average doubtless little
more than summaries of popular moral maxims. 1
One of the best illustrations of this mode of under-
standing and applying the doctrines of Socrates may
be found in Xenophon. 2
mus, and Lysis) ; Theaetetus
(Thesetet. Soph. Pol. Prod, in
Euclid. 19, m. 20) ; the younger
Socrates (Plat. Theaet. 147, E. ;
Soph. 218, 8 ; Polit. 257, C. ;
Arist. Metaph. vii. 11, 1036, 6,
25 ; conf . Hermann, Plat. i. 661) ;
Terpsion (PL Theast. ; Phasdo,
59, C.) ; Charmides (Xen. Mem.
iii. 7; 6, 14; Symp. 4, 29;
Hellen. ii. 4, 19 ; Plato, Charm.
Sym. 222, B. ; Prot. 315, A.) ;
Glaucon the brother of Plato
(Mem. iii. 6 ; the same indi-
vidual to whom Diog. ii. 124,
attributes nine genuine and
thirty-two spurious dialogues,
and who is identical with the
Glauco of Plato's Republic, and
the Parmenides, as we assume
following Bockh; conf. Ab-
handlung d. Berliner Acad.
1873, Hist. Philos. Kl. p. 86) ;
Cleombrotus (Phsed. 59, C. ;
perhaps the same who is said
by Callim. in Cic. Tusc. i. 34,
84, and Sext. Math. i. 48;
David, Proleg. in Cat. 9 ; Schol.
in Arist. 13, b, 35 ; Ammon in
Porphyr. Isag. 2, b, to have
committed suicide over the
Phsedo, probably not from mis-
understanding the exhortation
to a philosophic death, but
from shame for his conduct
there blamed) ; Diodorus (Mem.
ii. 10) ; Critias, whom Dionys.
Jud. de Thuc. c. 31, p. 941,
reckons among the followers of
Socrates and Alcibiades in
their younger years (Mem. i.
2, 12, Plato) ; not to mention
others who were acquainted
with Socrates, but did not join
his way of thinking, such as
Phasdrus the friend of Sophistry
(Plato, Phfed., Symp.) ; Callias
(Xen. Sjnnp., Plato, Phot.) ; the
younger Pericles (Mem. iv. 5) ;
Aristarchus (Mem. ii. 7.) ; Eu-
therus (Mem. ii. 8) ; and many
others.
1 Crito and Glaucon.
- Xenophon, the son of the
Athenian Gryllus, died accord-
ing to a statement in Diorj.
ii. 56, 360-359 B.C. From
Hellen. vi. 4, 35, however, it
appears that he survived the
murder of Alexander of Pheraj
357. If the treatise respecting
the public revenues of Athens
belongs to the year 355, he
must also have outlived that
year. On the authority of Ps.
Lucian. Macrob. 21, his birth
was formerly placed in 450, or
on account of his participation
in the battle of Delium, p. 66,
2, in 445 B.C. The first of these
passages is, however, extremely
untrustworthy, as giving in-
formation depending on the
date of his death which is very
239
It is impossible in reading the works of this CHAP.
author not to be struck with the purity and loftiness
B. Xeno-
uncertain. The latter is so in Pausanias he died here. plum.
much at variance with what More credible authorities state
Plato, Symp. 220, D. says, that that he was banished by the
it is a most uncertain foun- Eleans (probably in 370 B.C.,
dation on which to build, when they joined the Thebans
Neither passage agrees with after the battle of Leuctra
what Xenophon himself says Diodor. xv. 62), and spent the
(Anab. iii. 1, 4 and 25, ovStv rest of his life at Corinth
irpoQaai&fjMi. rV ^Xwu'ai/) 2, 37, (Diog. 53). His banishment
where he mentions himself and appears to have ended, when
Timasion as the two youngest Athens joined Sparta against
amongst the generals. These Thebes, as the treatise on the
passages place it beyond dispute, revenues indicates, whether
that at the time of the expedi- before or after the battle of
tion he is describing, 401-400 Mantinaea, in which his two
B.C., he was about 45 years of sons fought among the Athe-
age and not much older than nian cavalry, and the elder one
his friend Proxenus, who fell Gryllus fell (Diog. 54 ; Pint.
in it about 30. (So Grate, Consol. ad Apoll. 33, p. 118),
Plato iii. 563 ; Cobet, Novse Xenophon's writings are dis-
Lect. 535 ; Berglt in Ersch. u. tinguished for purity and grace
Gruber's Encyl. i. 81, 392; of language, and the unadorned
fJtirtivs, Griech. Gesch. iii. 772, clearness of the description.
31.) The circumstances of his They appear to have been pre-
life we only know imperfectly, served entire. The Apology,
He speaks himself in the Ana- however, the Agesilaus, and
basis iii. 1, 4, Memorabilia and the treatise on the Athenian
(Economicus of his relations constitution are certainly spu-
to Socrates, as to the origin of rious and several others of the
which Diog. ii. 48, tells a smaller treatises are either
doubtful story, and in the spurious or have large inter-
Anabasis of his activity and polations. Steinhart, Plat. I.
experience in the retreat of 95, 300, wrongly doubts the
the 10,000. After his return Symposium. For his life and
he entered the Spartan army writings consult Kriiger, De
in Asia Minor, and fought Xenoph. Vita, Halle, 1832, also
under Agesilaus at Coronea in 2nd vol. of Historisch. philol.
against his own countrymen. Studien, Ranke, De. Xenoph.
Banished for this from Athens, Vita et Scriptis, Berlin, 1851.
he settled in the Elean Scillus, Grote, Plato iii. 562; Bergk, I.e. ;
colonised by Spartans (Xen. Balir in Pauly's Realencyclop.
Anab. v. 3, 6 ; Diog. ii. 51 ; Pan- vi. 6, 2791. For other litera-
xan. v. 6, 4 ; Plvt. Agesil. 18 ; ture on the subject Ibid, and
De Exil. 10, p. 603). Accord- Ueberneg, Gesch. d. Phil. i. 95.
ing to an ill-accredited story
240 THE SOCRATIC SCHOOLS.
CHAP. of the sentiment, with his chivalrous character, and
the healthy tone of his mind ; still his philosophical
capacities cannot be estimated at a very high rate.
His description of Socrates is full of admiration for
the greatness of his character ; his philosophical
merit and his intellectual labours he has only im-
perfectly understood. Not only does he share the
narrowness of the position of Socrates as for instance
when he quotes the derogatory opinions of his master
respecting natural science in proof of his piety and
intelligence, 1 but he misunderstands the true phi-
losophic worth of the discussions he reports. The
formation of conceptions, constituting as it does the
germ of the whole teaching of Socrates, is only acci-
dentally mentioned by him in order to show what
care his master devoted to the critical culture of his
friends. 2 All that he gathers from Socrates' peculiar
habit of asking every one whom he came across, in his
thirst for knowledge, as to his mode of life, is that
he tried to make himself useful to people of every
class, craftsmen included. 3 The importance of those
maxims too, relative to virtue, in which the whole
peculiarity of the Socratic ethics consists, can only
be gathered with so much difficulty from his account,
that it is obvious how little it was understood by
Xenophon himself. 4 Many echoes and reminiscences
of the Socratic mode of teaching are indeed to be
found in his independent sketches ; but he is too ex-
1 Mem. i. 1, 11 ; iv. 7. 2 Ibid. iv. 6.
3 Ibid. iii. 10, 1 ; i. 1 ; conf. 106, 2.
Mem. iii. 9, and p. 140.
XENOPHON. 241
clusively occupied with their practical application to CHAP.
engage in any really scientific researches. He de-
scribes the catechetical mode of teaching, 1 in which
he seems to have been somewhat skilled ; but his
dialogues do not aim, like those of the genuine So-
cratic type, at the formation of conceptions, and are
often far too easy in their proofs and deductions.
He recommends self-knowledge, 2 but primarily only
in its popular sense, meaning, that no one ought to
attempt what is beyond his powers. He insists on
piety, self-restraint, 3 and so forth, but he appears not
to hold the maxim of Socrates, 4 that all these virtues
consist in knowledge. Following the method used
by Socrates, he proves that nothing is a good of which
you do not make a right use ; 5 that every one readily
submits to the wise, 6 that right and law are synony-
mous terms, 7 and that the rich are not more happy
than the poor, 8 that the true measure of riches and
poverty is not simple possession, but a possession pro-
portionate to the needs of the possessor. 9 He repeats
what Socrates had said about truth and error, 10 yet
not without hinting that these principles are liable
to be abused. With the same decision as his master,
he declares against the sensual and unnatural abuses
1 (Ec. 19, 14. s See above, p. 141, 2.
2 Cyrop. vii. 2, 20. Cyrop. i. 6, 21. See above,
3 Ibid. viii. 1, 23. p. 168, 2.
4 Compare the conversation T Ibid. i. 3, 17. See p.
between Cyrus and Tigranes, 148, 1.
Cyrop. iii. 1, Ifi, and Mem. i. 2, 8 Ibid. viii. 3, 40 ; Symp. 4,
1 '.i, in which the ordinary view is 29 ; Mem. i. 6, 4.
given rather than the Socratic, ' (Ec. 2, 2.
although the language allows > Cyrop.i.6,31; Mem. iv. 2,13.
the latter.
242 THE SOCRATIC SCHOOLS.
CHAP. of love ; l and, following out his train of thought, he
XL requires that woman should have a recognised, social
position, and have more care spent on her education,
and that her union should be made into a real com-
panionship for life, and should be based on a recipro-
city of capacities and performances. 2 He exhorts to
work, without, however, like his teacher condemning
the Greek prejudice against manual labour. 3 By
many of his expressions he gives us to know what is
his ideal of a beautiful and happy life ; 4 but he
neither attempts to give a philosophic reason for his
ideal, nor does he place it outside the platform of
traditional Greek ethics. Touching the knowledge
and omnipotence of the Gods, their care for mankind,
the blessing consequent upon piety, 5 he expresses
himself with warmth ; but at the same time he fully
shares the belief of his nation 6 in regard to predic-
tions and sacrifices, himself understanding their inter-
pretation. He makes Cyrus express the hope of a
higher life after death, confirming that view by
several considerations, without, however, venturing
to assert it with full assurance. He reminds us that
the soul is invisible ; that vengeance surely comes on
the murderers of the innocent, and that honour is due
to the dead. He cannot believe that the soul which
1 Symp. 8, 7, p. 165. 6 Compare amongst other
2 (Ec. 313, c. 7; see p. 166, 4. passages, Cyrop. i. 6, 2; 23;
3 (Ec. 4, 2; 6, 5; 20, 15; 44: (Ec. 5, 19; 7, 7; 11, 8 ;
conf. p. 170, 1. ' Hipparch. i. 1 ; 5, 14 ; 7, 1 ; 9,
4 Mem. iv. 8, 11 ; Cyrop. 8 ; Anal. iii. 1, 11 ; v. 9, 22 and
viii. 7, G ; (Ec. 11, 8. 6, 28, and also pp. 65, 5 ; 147 ;
5 Symp. 4, 46 ; Cyrop. i. 6, Cyrop. i. 6, 23, agrees fully
2 ; (Ec. 7, 18. with Mem. i. 1, 6.
XENOPHON. 243
gives life to the body should be itself mortal, or that CHAP.
reason should not survive in greater purity after its XL
separation from the body, seeing a sign thereof in
prophesying in sleep. 1 In all these explanations we
may discern the faithful and thoughtful follower of
Socrates, but there is not a trace of original thought.
Indeed it is doubtful whether the few passages in
which Xenophon seems to have somewhat amplified
the teaching of his master, ought not really to be at-
tributed to Socrates.
His larger work on politics, the Cyropsedeia, is, as
a book of political philosophy, unimportant. Xeno-
phon here proposes to pourtray the Socratic ideal
of a ruler who understands his business, 2 and who
cares for his people as a shepherd cares for his
flock ; 3 but what he really gives, is a description of
a valiant and prudent general, 4 of an upright man,
and of a chivalrous conqueror. Not an attempt is
made to mark out more clearly the province of go-
vernment, to give a higher meaning to the state, or
to fulfil its object by fixed institutions. The demand
for a careful education 5 may reveal the follower of
Socrates, but there is so little reference in that educa-
tion to knowledge, 6 that it might more easily pass for
a Spartan than for a Socratic education. Every
1 Cyrop. viii. 7, 17. See p. phon may be the nameless
179. friend referred to in this pas-
- Tbid. i. 1, 3. See p. 167. sage.
:1 llnd. viii. 2, 14; Mem. i. Cyrop. i. 2,2; viii. 8, 13;
-', :2. vii. 5, 72.
' Hml. 6, 12, speaks of these 6 A weak echo of the prin-
dutics in language similar to ciple of Socrates is found i.
Mem. iii. 1. Perhaps Xeno- 4, 3.
244 THE SO CHAT 1C SCHOOLS.
CHAP. thing centres in the person of the prince. The state
__J is an Asiatic kingdom. The highest aim to which
all its institutions tend, 1 is the strength and wealth
of the sovereign and his courtiers. Even this view is
very imperfectly carried out, and many important
departments of government are altogether omitted. 2
The same remarks apply to the Hiero. In this dia-
logue Xenophon shows plainly enough, how little the
supposed good-fortune of an absolute sovereign is
really to be envied. His remarks touching the means
whereby such a sovereign can make himself and his
people happy allowing that many of his proposals
are expedient do not advance beyond a benevolent
despotism. More successful is his smaller treatise on
family life. It bears witness to an intelligent mind
and a benevolent heart, which comes out particularly
in its utterances respecting the position assigned to
woman 3 and the treatment of slaves. 4 But it makes
no pretensions to be a philosophical treatise, though
it may contain many individual Socratic thoughts. 5
From Xenophon, then, the history of philosophy can
gain but little. 6
1 Compare viii. 1. The treaty Xenophon by Strumpell, Gesch.
between Cyrus and the Per- d. Prakt. Phil. d. Gr. 466-509.
sians, viii. 5, 24, has for its He sees in him the develop-
object, security by the advan- ment of Socratic thought from
tages of government. the point of applied ethics,
' Compare the spirited re- and a supplement to Plato's
marks of Mokl, Gesch. d. pure speculations. Yet he too
Staatswissenschaft, i. 204. says that excepting in the
3 C. 3, 13, c. 7. CEconomica there can be no
4 12, 3 ; 14, 9 ; c. 21 ; 7, 37 trace of a systematic develop-
and 41 ; 9,11. ment in Xenophon (p. 481);
5 See p. 242, 2. his ethical teaching is extremely
8 A more favourable view of simple, almost entirely devoid
<SCHINES.
245
^Eschines l would appear to have treated the CHAP.
teaching of Socrates in the same way. The writings XL
of this disciple, 2 are reckoned among the best models G. 32s-
of Attic; prose, 3 and are by some preferred to those of el
Xenophon. 4 It is moreover asserted that they repro-
of philosophic language (p.
484) ; he never really proves
anything, nor employs any
form for deduction, not even
the favourite method with So-
crates, that of definition (p.
467). In what then does his
importance for philosophy and
history consist ? The applica-
tion of the thoughts of others,
without verifying their con-
tents or observing their me-
thod, may in many respects be
very meritorious, but it cannot
be regarded as a service ren-
dered to philosophy.
1 ./Eschines, son of Lysanias
(Plato, Apol. 33 E), against
whom Dioff. ii. 60, can have no
weight, is praised for his ad-
herence to Socrates (Diog. ii.
31 ; Senec. Benef . i. 8). Plato
mentions him (Phasdo, 59, E.),
among those who were present
at the death of Socrates. Ido-
meneus, however (Diog. ii. 60,
35 ; iii. 36), transferred to him
the part played by Crito in
Plato, probably only out of
spite to Plato. We afterwards
encounter him in the company
of the younger Dionysius (Diog.
ii. 61 ; 63 ; Pint. Adul. et Am.
c. 26, p. 67 ; Philont. v. Apollon.
i. 35, p. 43; Lncia, Paras, c.
32, conf. Diodor. xv. 76), to
whom he had been recom-
mended by Plato, according to
fi'iifarch, by Arstippus accord-
ing to Diogene. Aristippus
appears as his friend in Diog.
ii. 82 : Pint. Coh. Ira, 14. Poor
to begin with (Diog. ii. 34, 62)
he was still poor in after-life
on his return to Athens. He
did not venture it is said to
found a school, but delivered a
few speeches and treatises for
money (Diog. ii. 62; what
Atlien. xi. 507, c. and Diog. ii.
20 say is not credible). Whether
the dirty stories are true which
Lysias in Atlien. xiii. 611, tells
of him is a moot point. His
writings according to Atlien.
give the impression of an hon-
ourable man. The time of his
death is not known.
2 According to Diog. ii. 61,
64, Phryiiichus in Phot. Biblio-
thek, c. 151, p. 101, seven of
these were considered to be
genuine. The scanty remains
of them have been collected by
Hermann, De JEschin. Socr.
Reliquiis, Gott. 1850. See Ibid.
p. 8.
* Longin. irepl eupe'y. ; Ehet.
Gr. ix. 559 (ed. Walz).
Phrynieh. in Phot. Cod. 61,
Schl. 158, g. E; Hermagenes,
Form. Orat. ii. 3 ; Rhet. Gr. iii.
394. M. Psellos in Con. Catal.
of Bodl. MSS. p. 743 quoted by
Grote, Plato, iii. 469, against
which authority Timon in Diog.
ii. 55 ; 62 carries no weight.
He is said to have imitated
Gorgias in speech, Diog. ii. 63.
24G THE SO CR AT 1C SCHOOLS.
CHAP. duce the spirit of Socrates with wonderful fidelity, 1
!_____ an d the few fragments which remain confirm this
view. Nevertheless they appear to have been singu-
larly poor in real philosophic thought. Their strength
consists far more in the grace and elegance of their
language than in an independent treatment of the
Socratic teaching.
D. Sim- More philosophic characters were the two The-
*cS** bans ' Simmias 2 and Cebes. 3 Both were pupils of
Philolaus ; 4 both are described by Plato 5 as thought-
ful men. Still nothing certain is known of their
philosophical opinions and performances. The writ-
ings attributed to them 6 were already rejected by
Pansetius 7 as far as he knew them, and the single
one extant, known as the ' Mirror ' of Cebes, is cer-
tainly spurious. 8 Still less can any dependence be
1 Aristid.Or.xlv.p.35. Conf. is said (Phsedo, 63, A., 77, A.),
Demetr. De Interpret. 297. that he could always raise
Hence the story (Diog. ii. 60, objections, and was the most
62; Athen. xiii. 611), that his inveterate doubter; and the
speeches had been composed part which he and Simmias
by Socrates, and given to play in the Phasdo corresponds
him by Xanthippe. Diog. ii. with this description.
47 ranks him among the most s Diog. ii. 124, mentions
distinguished followers of So- twenty-three lectures of Sim-
crates, mias and three of Cebes, in-
2 Xen. Mem. i. 2, 48; iii. 11, eluding the Mirror. Other testi-
17 ; Plato, Ptuedo, 59, C., 63 A. monies for the latter in ScJimeig-
3 Mem. ; Phaedo, 59, C., 60, Miiser, Epictete Enchiridion et
C. Cebetes tabula, p. 261.
4 Phasdo, 61, D. 7 Diog. ii. 64 : irdvrtav /ueVroi
5 It is said (Phfedo, 242, B.), rwv 'S.taKpa.riKiav $ia\6y<av navai-
that Simmias delivered and nos a\ri6tls elvai SoKt? rovs Tl\d-
composed more philosophical rwvos, stvotywvros, 'AvrtirOtVoti?,
speeches than anyone else. In Aiirxivov Sun-afci 5e wtpl TU>V
the Phaedo, 85, C., he is made 4>afiWos cal Eu/c\/5ow, TOI/S Se
to utter the maxim, that every &\\ovs avatpe't irdin-as.
question should be pursued as " In modern times its ge-
far as possible. Of Cebes, it nuineness has been maintained
SIMMIAS AND CEBES. 2
placed on the genuineness of the writings which were CHAP.
circulated at a later time under the name of the XL
shoemaker Simon. 1 Probably he is altogether an
imaginary person. 2
In addition to Plato, four founders of Socratic
schools are known to us : Euclid, Phsedo, Antisthenes,
and Aristippus. Of these the two former are much
alike; the two others follow courses peculiar to
themselves. There arose thus from them three dis-
tinct Socratic schools : the Megarian-Elean, the
Cynic, and the Cyrenaic. All these are derived from
Socrates. One-sided however in their aims, and
dependent themselves on earlier theories, they only
imperfectly catch the spirit of the teaching of
by Btihr (Pauly's Real-Ency-
clop. 2 vol. Art. Cebes) and
Schweighiiuser, c. 13, 33; but
their assumption is refuted by
two passages in it, one of
which mentions a Peripatetic,
and the other quotes from
Plato's Laws. In other re-
spects too, notwithstanding its
general colourlessness, traces
appear of later times, e.g. in
its Stoic morality and attacks
on false culture.
1 See Diog. ii. 122; Suid.
2u)KpaT7js- Epist. Bocrat. 12, 13 ;
Pint. c. Prin. Philos. c. 1, p.
776 ; Bockh. in Plat, Minoem.
42. Simonis Socrat, Dialogi
iv. Hermann, Plat. i. 419, 585.
2 What Diogenes says of
him is unsatisfactory, and the
story that Pericles asked to be
taken in by him, but that he
refused, besides being chrono-
logically suspicious, is hardly
likely to be true. Of the
dialogues attributed to him a
great part are found in writ-
ings belonging to other people
(Hermann, 1. c.). It is sus-
picious, that he is not men-
tioned by any ancient autho-
rity, and that both Plato and
Xenophon should be silent
about an old and very remark-
able pupil of Bocrat es. In
addition to the above, Suidas
(SuKpdr. p. 843) mentions also
Bryso of Heraclea as a pupil of
Socrates. Others, however, as
Suidas remarks, called him a
pupil of Euclid's, and the
comedian Ephippus in Atlien.
xi. 509, c. calls him an Acade-
mician. Theopompus' state-
ment (1. c. 508, D.) that Plato
copied some of his writings,
would harmonise with either
view; but it is in any case
false.
24$ THE SOCRATIC SCHOOLS.
CHAP. Socrates, and diverge from him and from one another
._ in the most opposite directions. Socrates placed
the highest business of man in knowing the good.
What that good was he could not mark out more
accurately, being partly satisfied with a practical
description of it, being partly restricted to a theory
of relative pleasure. These various sides of the
Socratic philosophy now diverge, and are rounded
into systems. One party confines itself to the
general burden of the teaching of Socrates the
abstract idea of the good. Others starting from
pleasure which is its result make that the gauge of the
good, and the good itself something relative. Again
within the former class some make the theoretical,
others the practical treatment of the good, to be the
main point. Thus the Socratic teaching gave rise
to the three schools just named, which in so far as
they bring into prominence individual elements in
the spirit of Socrates to the detriment of the rest,
revert to older lines of thought, long since passed
in the historical development of philosophy. The
Megarians and Cynics go back to the Eleatic doc-
trine of the One and All, and to the Sophistry of
Gorgias ; the Cyrenaics to the negative teaching
of Protagoras, and to the early scepticism of Herac-
litus.
THE MEGARIANS.
249
CHAPTER XII.
THE MEGARIAN AND THE ELEAN-EKETRIAN SCHOOLS.
THE founder of the Megarian school l is Euclid. 2 A
CHAP.
XII.
1 Deycks, De Megaricorum
Doctrina, Bonn, 1827, whose
careful work has not been
added to by Mallet's Histoire
de 1'Ecole de Megare, Par. 1845.
More independent, but some-
times too diffuse, is Henne,
Ecole de Megare, Par. 1843.
Ritter, Ueber die Philosophic
der Meg. Schule in Ehein.
Mus. ii. (1828), p. 295 ; Harten-
gtein, Ueber die Bedeutung
der Meg. Schule f iir die Gesch.
d. Metaphys. Probleme, Ver-
handl. der Sachs. Gesellschaft
der Wissensch. 1848, p. 190;
Prantl, Gesch. d. Logik, i. 33,
which enters most deeply into
the logical teaching of the
Megarians.
2 Euclid's home was Megara
(Plato, Thejetet. ; Phasdo, 59,
C.) ; that it was his birth-place
is asserted by Cic. Acad. iv. 42,
129; Strabo, ix. 1, 8, p. 393;
Dioy. ii. 106. The statement
that he came from Gela (rivts
in Diog.) doubtless rests on a
misunderstanding. Deycks, p.
4, imagines it arose from con-
founding him with Euclid the
jester, yt\o7os, to whom, how-
ever, AtJien. vi. 242, b, 250, e,
does not give this epithet.
Henne, p. 32, conjectures, but
withcut sufficient reason, that
he was educated at Gela. That
he also possessed property in garians .
Attica, Grate, Plat. in. 471, A History
concludes, but without suffi- ftJi e
cient reason, from Dionys. g c j (00 L
Judic. de Isao, c. 14 ; Karpo-
crat. on T& tiritcripvTT. Poll. viii.
48. Dionysus only refers to a
judicial speech of Isaeus vpbs
EvK\fi5iit> apropos of a piece
of land, but that this Euclid
was the follower of Socrates is
pure conjecture. The time of
his birth cannot be accurately
determined, nor does the anec-
dote in Gell. vi. 10 help for
this. He was, however, pro-
bably older than Plato. This
seems to be proved by the fact
that on the death of Socrates
he served for some time as a
centre to his disciples. The
time of his death is also un-
certain. If Stilpo and Pasicles
were his personal pupils, he
must have lived at least till
360 B.C.; but this is very un-
certain. On the whole little is
known of him. A celebrated
saying of his to his brother,
which bears witness to a gentle
character, is quoted by Pint, de
Ira, 14, p. 462 ; Frat. Am. 18,
p. 489 ; Stob. Flor. 84, 15 ;
Dioff. ii. 108, mentions six dis-
courses of his.
250
THE SOCRATIC SCHOOLS.
CHAP.
XII.
faithful friend and admirer of Socrates, 1 but at the
same time familiar with the Eleatic doctrine, 2 Euclid
made use of the latter to develope the Socratlc phi-
losophy as he understood it. He thus established a
separate branch of the Socratic School, 3 which con-
tinued to exist until the early part of the third
century. 4 Ichthyas 5 is named as his pupil and
1 The story told by Gell, N.
A. vi. 10, of his nightly visits
to Athens is well known. It
cannot, however, go for much,
though not in itself impro-
bable. On the contrary, it may
be gathered from Plato's Thete-
tet. 142, C. that Euclid con-
stantly visited Socrates from
Megara, and from the Phasdo,
59, C. that he was present at
his death. A further proof of
his close connection with the
followers of Socrates will be
found in the fact {Diog. ii. 106;
iii. 6) that Plato and other fol-
lowers of Socrates stayed with
him for a considerable time
after the death of their master.
He is usually spoken of as a
disciple of Socrates, and has a
place amongst his most dis-
tinguished disciples.
2 As may be gathered from
his system with greater cer-
tainty than from Cic. and Diog.
When Euclid became acquain-
ted with the Eleatic Philosophy
is uncertain. It is most pro-
bable that he was under its
influence before he came under
that of Socrates, although the
story in Diog. ii. 30, is too un-
certain to prove much.
3 The <TXO\^ EuK\e5ot (for
which the Cynic Diogenes in
Diog. N. 34,siibstitutes Ev/cA.i5ou
called Megarian or
Eristic or Dialectic, Diog. ii.
106. Consult DeycTis as to
these names. He proves that
the terms Eristic and Dialectic
were not confined to the Me-
garian School. Compare Sex-
ins Empiricus, who generally
understands by Dialecticians,
Stoics, for instance, Pyrrh. ii.
146, 166, 229, 235.
4 How early Euclid was at
the head of a special circle of
pupils, and whether he appeared
formally as a Sophist, or like
Socrates onlygraduallygathered
about him men desirous to
learn, we are not told. Perhaps
the emigration of many fol-
lowers of Socrates to Megara
gave occasion for the estab-
lishment of this school, i. e.,
for the formation of a society,
which at first moved about
Euclid's house and person,
busying itself with discussions.
There is no ground for sup-
posing that Plato and his
friends removed to Megara,
attracted by the fame of the
School of Euclid, as H&nne
maintains, pp. 27 and 30.
5 Suid. EuHXetSrjj Diog. ii.
112, only makes the general
remark, that he belonged to
the School of Euclid.
HISTORY OF THE MEGARIANS.
2f>l
successor, respecting whom, however, nothing further
is known. 1 Of greater note was Eubulides, 2 the
celebrated dialectician, 3 who wrote against Aristotle, 4
and who is mentioned as the teacher of Demos-
thenes. 5 Cotemporary with him were Thrasyma-
chus 6 of Corinth, and Dioclides, 7 perhaps also
Clinomachus. 8 Pasicles, 9 however, would appear to
be younger. A pupil of Eubulides was Apollonius
of Gyrene, surnamed Cronus, 10 the teacher of the
CHAP.
XII.
1 His name is still found in
Diog. ii. 112 ; vi. 80 (Diogenes
dedicated to him a dialogue
called Ichthyas). Athen. viii.
335, a.
2 Of Miletus according to
Diog. ii. 108. Whether he was
the head of a school, or whether
he was an immediate disciple
of Euclid, we do not know.
Diogenes only says, -Hjs 5'
EvK\el8ov SmSoxr?? tffTt KOI Etj8.
3 Compare Diog. ii. 108;
Sext. Math. vii. 13.
4 Diog. ii. 109 ; Aristocles in
Em. Pr. Ev. xv. 2, 5 ; Athen.
viii. 354, b. Themist. Or. xxiii.
285, c. From these passages it
is seen that the attack of Eu-
bulides was very violent, and
not free from personal abuse.
We also hear from Athen. x.
437 of a comedy of Eubulides.
But he can hardly be the indi-
vidual whose work on the
Cynic Diogenes is quoted by
Diog. vi. 20, 30.
5 The fact seems pretty well
established (although it is con-
spicuously omitted by Plutarch
in his life of Demosthenes),
being not only attested by
Diog. ii. 108; Pxeiidnpltit. v.
Dec. Orat. viii. 21 ;
De Mag. c. 15, p. 478 ; Suid.
ATjjuoo-flej/Tjs, and Phot. Cod. 265,
but being also alluded to by
the Comedian in Diog., who
can hardly have called a bare
acquaintance a disciple.
s According to Diog. ii. 121,
a friend of Ichthyas, and a
teacher of Stilpo's.
7 Suid. 'S.fiKiruv, a pupil of
Euclid, and the teacher of
Pasicles.
8 A Thurian (according to
Diog. ii. 112), and a teacher of
Stilpo's son Bryso, Suid. Tlvpfxai',
Diog. says he was the first to
write on predicates, sentences,
and such like.
9 According to Sind. STI'ATTWV,
a brother of the Cynic Crates,
who had also Dioclides, a pupil
of Euclid's, for teacher, and
Stilpo for pupil. Diog. vi. 89,
in calling Crates his brother
and Euclid his teacher, pro-
bably confounded Euclid with
Dioclides, unless this be the
work of a transcriber and
should be read for
.
10 Dioq. ii. Ill ; Strabo, xiv.
2, 21, p. 658; xvii. 3, 22, p.
THE SOCRATIC SCHOOLS.
CHAP.
XII.
sharp-witted Diodorus Cronus, 1 and another of his
pupils was Euphantus, known only to us as a poet
and historian. 2
All other members of this school were, however,
thrown into the shade by Stilpo, 3 a pupil of Thrasy-
made a gross mistake, irp&rov
must be read for rplrov. See
Mallet, p. 96. Callicrates, also
mentioned by Athenaeus, is
known from Diodor. xx. 21, as
a favourite of Ptolemy Soter.
3 Stilpo of Megara (Diog. ii.
113) must have lived until the
end of the fourth century. At
least he survived the capture of
Megara by Ptolemy Lagi, and
his defeat by Demetrius Polior-
cetes, two events which hap-
pened 307 and 306 B.C. respec-
tively, Diodor. xx. 37 and 45.
On the former occasion the
interview with Diodorus Cronus
may have happened ; for Stilpo
never visited Egypt (JDiaff. 115).
Since he died at an advanced
age, we may approximately
place his birth in 380, and his
death in 300 B.C. Probably we
ought to place the date of both
later, for the notices about his
pupils in Diog. ii. 113-120,
Senec. Epist. 10, 1, lead us to
believe that his activity was
cotemporary with that of Theo-
phrastus ; and accordingly it
cannot have begun long before
the death of Aristotle. SuAd.
EwcAefS. calls him successor to
Ichthyas. Some of the pupils
of Euclid are mentioned as his
teachers, and (Diog. ii. 113),
in particular Thrasymachus.
(Suid. EwcAefS. and 2-nAiro.)
Even Euclid himself is named
by some, but none of these
1 Diodorus, a native
in Caria, belongs to the most
distinguished dialecticians of
the Megarian School. Cic. De
Fato, 6, 12, calls him 'valens
dialecticus ' ; Sext. Math. i.
309, SiateKTiKiiraros Sext.
and Diog. ii. Ill, give two
epigrams of Callimachus ad-
dressed to him. His fallacies
and his researches into motion,
and into hypothetical sen-
tences, will be mentioned here-
after. Pique at a dialectical
defeat inflicted by Stilpo at
the table of Ptolemy Soter, is
said to have killed him (Diog. ;
Plin. Hist. Nat. vii. 53, 180).
He bequeathed his dialectic to
his five daughters ; Clem. Al.
Strom, iv. 523, A. ; Hieron.
adv. Jovin. i. t. iv. 186. His
nickname, Kronos, is differ-
ently explained by Strabo and
Diog., and in modern times by
Panzerbieter in Jahn's Jahrb.
f. Philol. Supplement b. V.
223, f., who, however, does not
explain it altogether satisfac-
torily. Consult, also, SteinJuirt
in Ersch. und Gruber's Ency-
clop. Sec. i. B., 25, p. 286.
* All we know of him is from
Diog. ii. 110, who calls him the
tutor of King Antigonus, and
says that to Antigonus he ad-
dressed a book, irepl j8o<nAfay.
Atlien. vi. 251 quotes an extract
from the fourth book of his
history, in which if he has not
ST1LPO THE MEGAEIAX.
machus. His spirited lectures made him an object of CHAP.
wonder to his cotemporaries, and the crowds who
flocked from all sides to listen to them gained for the
Megarian School a lustre such as it had not hitherto
enjoyed. 1 At the same time the development of their
doctrine took with him a new turn, the principles of
the Cynic School, into which Diogenes had initiated
him, 2 being incorporated with his own to such an ex-
tent, that doubts may be felt whether Stilpo rather be-
longs to the Cynics or to the Megarians. 3 Thereby he
became the immediate precursor of the Stoa, into
which these two branches of the Socratic philosophy
were carried over by his pupil Zeno. 4 Other Mega-
rians, however, continued faithful to the exclusively
critical character of this School. Alexinus of Elis, a
statements are probable. His
character, as to which more
will be said hereafter, is com-
mended as upright, gentle,
persevering, open, generous,
and unselfish, Diog. ii. 117 ;
Pint. Vit. Pud. c. 18, p. 536;
adv. Col. 22, 1, p. Ill, a. In
early life dissipated, he en-
tirely mastered this tendency
by strength of will (Clc. De
Fato, 5, 10). He also took
part in public business, Diog.
114. Nine of his dialogues are
mentioned by Diog. ii. 120.
1 Diog. ii. 113, exaggerates
in saying, roauv-rov S" ffipefftXoyia
KO.I ffO(f)lffTti< TTpOTJ-ye TOl/9 fiAAoWS,
SiffTf fjLiKpov SfTJffai Trciffaif r^v
'EAAaSa afyopSxrav (Is av-rbv (Jif-
yap'urai. He also mentions (119
and 115) the pupils, who joined
him from other philosophers,
and the universal admiration
bestowed on him at Athens and
by several princes. It is all
the more striking that Diog.
120 call his speeches tyvxpoi.
2 Diog. vi. 76.
3 The proof of this will be
given later.
4 That Zeno was a pupil of
Stilpo is stated by Diog. ii.
120 ; vii. 2, 24, on the authority
of Heraclides. The same per-
son is no doubt referred to in
Diog. ii. 116, as Zeno the
Phoenician. The founder of
the Stoa is frequently called a
Phoenician, Diog. vii. 15, 25, 30.
In no case can it be Zeno of
Sidon, the pupil of Apollo- <
dorus, as Mallet, p. 62, sup-
poses, who was himself a pupil
of Epicurus, and who, accor-
ding to Diog. x. 25, vii. 35,
continued faithful to Epicure-
anism.
THE SOCRATIC SCHOOLS.
CHAP.
XII.
cotemporary of Stilpo, 1 but somewhat younger, is
notorious for his captiousness ; and logical subtleties
are recorded 2 of Philo, the pupil of Diodorus. 3 Other
Megarians of this and the following age are only
known to us by name. 4 With the verbal criticism of
1 Diog. ii. 109, speaks of him
as a pupil of Eubulides (nerav
8e &\Kcav ovrwv TTJS Euj3ou\i'8ou 5ia-
5ox??s 'AAeltj/o- tyivero 'HAews).
The age in which he lived can
he approximately determined
by his disputes with Stilpo
{Pint. Vit. Pud. c. 18, p. 536) ;
with Menedemus(Z>ioj7.ii. 135),
and with Zeno, whose strongest
opponent he was, Diog. ii. 109 ;
Sext. Math. ix. 108 ; Pint.
Comm. Not, 10, 3, p. 1063. He
must have been younger than
Stilpo, and have nourished in
the first ten years of the third
century. His love of conten-
tion and his malicious ways
gained for him the nickname
'E\e7Vos, Diog. Pint. Vit. Pud.
18 ; Aristotle in Eus. Pr. Eu. xv.
2, 4. We also learn from Her-
mippus in Diog. that he retired
to Olympia in his last years, in
order to establish a new school
there. This place of abode not
suiting his pupils, he remained
there "alone, but soon died of
an injury. For his writings con-
sult Diog. ii. 1 10 ; vii.163 ; Atlicn.
xv. 696 ; Aristotle in Eus. 1. c.
2 Diog. vii. 16, a passage
which does not appear so am-
biguous as Bitter, Rh. Mus. ii.
30; Gesch. d. Phil. ii. 145,
would have it, particularly
when the subsequent accounts
are taken into consideration.
Diog. relates that Zeno of
Cittium was fond of his society;
Clemens, Stromat, iv. 523, and
Jerome adv. Jov. i., quote from
his ' Menexenus ' the informa-
tion already given respecting
the daughters of Diodorus,
whom he must then have
spoken of in terms of praise.
It is a clear mistake on the
part of Jerome to make him
the teacher of Carneades. Still
stranger is Mallet's mistake,
confounding the disputant
Philo with Philo of Larissa,
the founder of the fourth Aca-
demy. The latter lived some
150 to 200 years later. Nor
can Philo be reckoned among
the Stoics, although this has
been done by Fabricius in Sext.
Pyrrh. ii. 110, and by Prantl.
Gesch. d. Logik, i. 404.
3 Diog. vii. 191, 194, men-
tions Philo's writings irepl ai\-
fjLaaiiav, and irepl -rp6iruiv, against
which Chrysippus wrote, with-
out doubt meaning this Philo.
To the same individual must
be referred what Cic. Acad. ii.
47, 143, and Sext. Math. viii.
113, Pyrrh. ii. 110, say respect-
ing his views of hypothetical
sentences differring from those
of Diodorus, and Alex. Aphi.
in Anal. pr. 59, b, says respect-
ing their differences in respect
of the possible. By Diog. vii.
16, and Clemens he is sur-
named 6 Sia\fKTtic6s.
4 A dialectician Panthoides,
doubtless the same person as
MEGARIAN DOCTRINE.
255
the Megarians is connected Pyrrho's philosophy of CHAP.
doubt, Pyrrho, whom Bryso is said to have taught, 1 xn ~
and Timon, who studied under Stilpo himself, 2
being the connecting links, in the same way that the
scepticism of Grorgias is connected with the critical
subtleties of the Eleatics.
The Megarian philosophy is only partially known B. TJudr
to us from the fragmentary notices of the ancients ; doctrine.
and frequently it is impossible to decide whether
their statements refer to the founder and the older
members, or only to the later followers of the School.
Sext. Math. vii. 13, mentions,
and whose disagreement with
Diodorus in respect of the
possible (see p. 193, 1 and 2)
Hjnctet. Diss. ii. 19, 5, speaks
of, is mentioned by Diog. v.
68, as the teacher of the Peri-
patetic Lyco, and must there-
fore have flourished 280 to 270
B.C. A dialectician Aristides
is also mentioned by Diog. ii.
113, among the cotemporaries
of Stilpo, and an Aristotle
living in Sicyon about 255
Pint. Arat. 3. Linias who is
there mentioned with him
appears also to have been a
Megarian. Somewhat younger
must have been Artemidorus,
who wrote against Chrysippus,
Diog. ix. 53.
1 Diog. ix. fil : Ilvppwv tftcovo-e
Bpvffuvos TOV STI'A/TTOJJ/OS, us 'AXe-
tavSpos tv AiaSoxats. Suid.
Tlv^pttiv: SiffiKovfff Bpucra'cos, TOV
K\eivo[na.x ot/ M a ^ 7 7 TO ''- Instead of
Bryso, bpvatav was formerly
read in Diog. Sext. Math. vii.
13, however also calls him
Bryso. Suid. nip-pat: These
statements are not without
their difficulties. Allowing it
to be possible that Clinoma-
chus and not Stilpo instructed
Bryso, or that he enjoyed the
instruction of both, the chro-
nology is fctill troublesome.
For how can Pyrrho, before
Alexander's expedition to Asia,
as Diog. expressly says, have
studied under the son of a
man, whose own professional
career probably comes after
that expedition ? It seems as
though the relation of Pyrrho
to Bryso as pupil and teacher
were an imaginary combina-
tion, designed to connect the
school of Pyrrho with the Me-
garian. Possible it also is that
Bryso, the teacher of Pyrrho,
has been wrongly identified
with the son of this Stilpo.
Suid. 'SuKpar. calls Bryso the
teacher of Pyrrho, a pupil of
Socrates, or according to others,
a pupil of Euclid. Rover
Philol. xxx. 462, proposes to
read in the passage of I>io;_ r .
instead of Bpvfftavos TOV
/oy, Bpuir. 1) 2r/Xir.
* Diog. ix. 109.
THE SOCRATIC SCHOOLS.
CHAP.
XII.
It is all the more satisfactory to be able to learn
_ from Plato l particulars respecting a theory in which
Schleiermacher 2 first recognised Megarian views, and
which, in common with most writers, 3 we feel justi-
1 Soph. 242, B. Plato de-
fined Sophistry as the art of
deception. The difficulty im-
mediately arises, that decep-
tion is only then possible,
when not-being, to which all
deception refers, admits a cer-
tain kind of being. It may
then be asked, how is the
being of the not-being pos-
sible ? To answer this question
Plato reviews various opinions
respecting being. In the first
place he examines the two
most opposite statements, that
being is the many, and that it is
the one, and after having shown
that neither a manifoldness of
original substances without a
substratum of unity, nor the
unity of the Eleatics excluding
the many, can be admitted, he
continues, p. 245, E.: -rovs fj.fvroi-
vvv 5ia.Kpifto\oyov/j.ei>ovs oVros re
TTtpl KO.I /J.}) TTttJ/TOy /J,fV OV OieA.T)-
\v8afj.ei', '6/j.us Se iKavcas e^e'rco'
TOI/S 8e &AA.WS \fyofras av 6ea-
Tfov. These are again divided
into classes, those who only
allow reality to what is mate-
rial, and others who are called
248, A. of T&V eiSwi/ <pl\ot. Of
the latter it is stated 246, B. :
roiyapovv of irpbs O.VTOVS (the
materialists) o.^iu^rovvres fj.d-
&TTO. KO.I
O.tMVOVTO
QIVTIV ovcrlav elvai ra Se fKfivcav
atafnara. Kal r^v Ae-yo/ueVrji' UTT'
avrcav a\l]dfia.v KO.TCL fffjuKpa 5m-
8pa.vovres eV TO?S \6yois ytvemv
OUT' outruns <j)fpo/J.fvr]v nva. irpoffa.-
yopfvovaiv.
2 Platen's Werke, ii. 2.
3 Ast, Platen's Leben u.
Schreiben, 201 ; DcycLt, 37 ;
Heindorf on Soph. 246, B. ;
Brandis, ii. a., 114; Hermann,
Plat. 339; Ges. Abh. 246;
Stallbaum, Plat. Farm. 60;
Soph. f. Polit. 61 ; Susemihl,
Genet. Entw. i. 298 ; SteinJiart,
Allg. Encyk. i. 29, 53 ; Platon's
Werke, iii. 204, 423, 554;
Henne, Ecole de Megare, 84-
158 ; Prantl, Gesch. d. Log. i.
37. Against Schleiermacher
are Bitter, Ehein. Mus. von
Niebuhr und Brandis ii. 305 ;
Pctersen, Zeitschrift f. Alter-
thiimer, 1836, 892, Henne, p.
49, and Mallet, p. xxx., refers
the description in Theaetet.
185, C. of the formation of
conceptions, to the Megarians,
on the ground that it does hot
agree with Plato's own method.
But it would seem that he is
wrong in so doing, since we
have no reason to think of
others besides Plato and So-
crates. Just as little may the
passage in Parm. 131, B. be re-
ferred to the Megarians, as has
been done by Schleiermacher,
PL Werke, i. 2, 409, and DeycTui,
p. 42. The question whether
things participate in Ideas, is
one which the Megarians did
not examine, and it is widely
remote from the view discussed
in the Sophistes.
MEGARIAN TEACHING.
257
fied in applying to them. 1 By making use of the
testimony of Plato, and by considering the inward
CHAP.
XII.
1 The following are the rea-
sons. It is clear and generally
allowed that Plato's description
is too minute to be without
reference to some philosophic
School then existing. Even
DeHxten, De Plat. Sophistes
Marb. 1869, p. 44, is reduced to
admit thi*. There is also defi-
nite reference to a Socratic
School in the passage where an
opinion is attributed to certain
philosophers, to the effect that
true existence only belongs to
immaterial things. A philoso-
phy of conceptions was un-
known before the time of So-
crates, and the description
agrees with no one of the pre-
Socratic Schools. The philo-
sophers of conceptions are
clearly distinguished from the
Eleatics, and are manifestly
quite different from them.
Still less can the Pythagoreans
be thought of, as Mallei has
done, p. liii. ; for they had
neither a philosophy of con-
ceptions, nor did they indulge
in that subtle refutation of
opponents, which Plato attri-
butes to these philosophers.
Nor can the language of Plato,
246, C., be quoted to prove
the contrary, where speaking
of the dispute between the
idealists and the materialists
he says that : tv (atay 5e wepl
ravra &ir\fro? bfj.QOTfpwv M^XI
ns a.fl vrf<rrriKfr. This does
not mean that this dispute has
always existed, but that it was
as old as the Schools them-
selves, or that, every time the
point was touched upon, a
violent altercation ensued be-
tween the parties. We are
not obliged by this state-
ment to refer this view to an
earlier period than that of
Socrates. And among the So-
cratic Schools there is none to
which it can be attributed
with so much probability as to
the Megarian. Some think
that the passage refers to Plato
(as Socher, Plat. Schriften, 265,
and ScJiaar schmidt, Die Samm-
lung der Plat. Sch., 210, do); and
this reference commends itself
most to those who with them
declare that the Sophistes is
not the work of Plato. The
reference would of course be
to an earlier form of Plato's
teaching or to such Platonists
as had failed to advance with
their school. This is the view of
Ucbenveg, Unters. Plat. Schrif.
277 ; Pilffer, Ueber d. Athetese
d. Plat. Soph. Berlin, 1869, 21 ;
Grate, Plato, i. 458 ; iii. 482 ;
Campbell, the Sophistes and
Politicus of Plato, Soph. Ixxiv.
f. 125. But is it likely that
Plat o can have treated a theory
of his own with so much irony
as he lavishes, p. 246, A. B., on
these fi&&v $i\oi 1 Is it Plato's
teaching, or have we reason
for thinking that it ever was
Plato's teaching, that the 8J-
vapis TOU *oitiv does not belong
to Being but to the Becoming ?
In his system, as far as it is
known to us, it does belong to
the idea ^f the good, to the
creative vovs of Timaeus, to the
airta of Philebus, which must
at any rate be reckoned as ovaia.
8
268
THE SOCRATIC SCHOOL.
CHAP.
XII
connection of the several doctrines, we hope a pic-
l l ture will be produced of the Megarian doctrine,
and not as -ytveffis, and in Phsedo
95, E., it belongs to ideas in
general. Moreover, if the con-
tested theory only belonged to
a small portion of Plato's
scholars, how could the little
fraction be opposed to the ma-
terialists as the chief sup-
porters of the idealistic point
of view 1 Does not the whole
description create the impres-
sion that the contrast was one
which the writer saw before
him, and not one made from
different conceptions of his own
metaphysic ? It might seem
that by friends of ?8r; in this
passage Euclid cannot have
been meant, because (1) ac-
cording to Aristotle's definite
assertion (Metaph. i. 6, 987, b,
7 ; xiii. 4, 1078, b, 9 ; Eth. N.
1. 4, 1096, a, 13) Plato first
brought up the doctrine of
ideas, and (2) the Megarians
held one and not many primary
substances. The first reason is
not very cogent. Doubtless
Plato first brought into notice
the doctrine of ideas to which
Aristotle refers, allowing that
Euclid agreed with him in de-
claring the eTSos to be the only
real element in things. Nei-
ther is the second argument
conclusive. Euclid may well
in cases of materialism have
insisted, that in every object
the incorporeal form was the
only real thing, and yet have
gathered all these forms to-
gether under the one substance
the good. If the latter as-
sertion involved him in contra-
diction with his original pre-
mises, the contradiction is not
greater than that involved in
denying every change, and yet
speaking of an action, an evtp-
ytlv of being. Indeed, how
otherwise can he have ad-
vanced from the Bocratic phi-
losophy of conceptions to his
doctrine of unity? And does not
the language of the Sophistes,
246, B, telling, how that the
friends of ideas destroy matter
by resolving it into its smal-
lest particles, best correspond
with Euclid and his school ?
Does it not best harmonise
with the statement of Aris-
tocles respecting the Mega-
rians, that the latter should
have refused to being the
capacity to act or to suffer?
whereas this would not at all
harmonise with Plato. That
these philosophers are included
245, E., among those &AAcos Ae-
yovrt s is not true, SAAa>? \e*ym'T(s
meaning here literally those
who speak differently, with
whom all does not turn (as
with the philosophers men-
tioned 243, D) upon the an-
tithesis of being and not-being.
With the philosophers to whom
Plato comes 245, E., the ques-
tion is not whether there is one
or more than one form of
being, everything else being
not-being, but whether there
is only the corporeal or the in-
corporeal. Conf. p. 243, D,
with 246, A. Compare Henne,
105 ; Bonitz, Plat. Stud. ii. 49.
In the explanation of Smicptpo-
\oyovnffous, no one appears to
have exactly hit the mark.
MEGARIAN TEACHING. 25
which shall, in the main, faithfully represent the CHAP.
r* , XII.
facts.
The starting-point of the Megarian philosophy (i) Con-
must be looked for in Socrates' demand for a know-
ledge of conceptions. With this demand Euclid
combined the Eleatic doctrine of a contrast between
sensational and rational knowledge. Distinguishing
these two kinds of knowledge far more by their
objects than by their form, he arrived at the convic-
tion that the senses show us what is capable of change
and becoming, and that only thought can supply us
with the knowledge of what is unchangeable and
really existing. 1 He stood, therefore, in general, on
the same footing as Plato, and it is possible that this
view was arrived at by both philosophers in common
in their intellectual intercourse, and that owing to
Plato Euclid was influenced by Heraclitus' view of
the world of sense. Socrates had indeed made the
immediate business of thought to be the acquisition
of a knowledge of conceptions. Conceptions, accord-
ingly, represent that part of a thing which never
changes. Not material things, but only incorporeal
species, taught Euclid, admit of true being. 2 The
Plato, 248, A. : reVeo-iv, r^v /j.ev alad^crfts Kal Qavraaias KO.-TO.-
Se
\4yfre; $ -yap; Nal. Kol
nan fi.fi/ rifjius yevffffi Si a.laM\- 2 In the passage of the
fffws Koivu>vf1v, Sia. \oyuTnov 54 Soph. 246, B., quoted at p.
4ruxjJ wpbs T^V ovrws ovfftw, V 214, 2, in which the words ri
al Kara TO.VTO. wvavrtaf ^X' Se ^Ktkwv trtijuara must not be
<part, yfvfffiv 5^ &\\mf SAAws. taken to mean 'the bodies of
For this reason Aristoc. in those conceptions,' <lf5rj a<r6-
Eu. Pr. Ev. xiv. 17, 1, says of /uaro, but 'the bodies of the
the Megarians and Eleatics materialists,' in which they
together : O?OJ/TO. 70^ 5w Tkj look for all real being.
s 2
THE SOCRATIC SCHOOL.
CHAP.
XII.
same view Stilpo expressed, when he refused to allow
the general conception to apply to individual things,
on the ground that a general conception implies some-
thing quite different from every individual thing,
and not like these only existing from a definite time. 1
In this respect the Megarians again agree with
Plato. 2 Whilst Plato, however, regarded species as
living spiritual forces, Euclid, following in the steps
of Parmenides, denied every kind of motion to being'.
He, therefore, reduced action and passion to the
sphere of the becoming. Of being, he asserted, you
can neither predicate action, nor passion, nor yet
motion. 3
1 Diog. ii. 119, says of him:
e\tye, rbv \tyovra avOpdnrov tivai
fj.r)Seva (in which we suggest
flirelv instead of elvai), otfre yap
r6v5f Xtytiv odre r6j/5e. r( yap
fj.a\Xov r6vSe % TOcSe; otfre apa
-r6vSf. Kal ird\iv rb \a,^avov OVK
tart rb SeiKfvfJifvov. \dxavov
fjLfv yap -f]v Trpb pvpicav trwv ' OVK
apa effrl TOVTO \dxavov. Dio-
genes introduces this with the
remark : Sctpbs Se &yav &i> evrols
fpicrriKOis avypei Kal ra eifSrj, and
it would in itself be possible,
that Stilpo and others had
derived their hostility to gene-
ral conceptions, and especially
to the Platonic ideas, from the
Cynic School. But the above
examples are not directed
against the reality of groups
expressed by a general con-
ception, but against the reality
of particular things. Stilpo
denies that the individual is a
man, because the expression
man means something univer-
sal and different from any
particular man. He denies
that what is shown to him is
cabbage, because there was
cabbage 10,000 years ago ; in
other words, because the gene-
ral conception of cabbage
means something unchange-
able, not something which has
come into being. We may
then believe with Hegel, Gesch.
d. Phil. ii. 123, and titallbaum,
Plat. Parm. 65, that either Dio-
genes or his authority must
have made some mistake here.
2 Probably expressions like
' Hi quoque multa in Platone/
said of the Megarians by Cic,
Acad. iv. 42, 129, refer to such
points of similarity.
8 Plato, Soph. 248, C. : Ae-
yovaiv, '6ri yevsirei p.ev /xeretrrt
rov Trdffxtiv Kal iroitlv Svvdpecas,
irpbs Se ovffiav rovrtav ovSerepov
r^v Svvap.iv ap^rreiv (f>affiv. It
is accordingly afterwards re-
peatedly stated as their view :
MEG ART AN TEACHING.
261
Connected with this denial of the becoming is
the assertion, probably coming from Euclid, certainly
from his school, that capacity does not exist beyond
the time of its exercise ; and that thus what is actual
is alone possible. 1 What is simply possible but not
actual, would at the same time be and not be. Here
would be the very contradiction which Parmenides
thought to discover in the becoming, and the change
from the possible to the actual would be one of those
changes which Euclid could not harmonise with the
conception of being. 2 Hence, only what is imma-
CHAP.
XII.
[rb Troj'TeA.ws fcp] a.K.ivi)Tov effrbs
flvai. anivn-rov rb irapairav e<r-
Tacot. and in opposition to this
view Plato requires : "al rb
KLvavfj-fvov S^i /cat
ev TI KO! 7ro\Aa e?87j Xeyovrw ri
i. Aris-
tocL in Ens. Pr. Ev. xiv. 17, 1.
The proofs by which the Me-
garians denied motion will be
described hereafter. It does
not, however, seem likely that
the objections raised to the
theory of ideas in the first part
of Plato's Parmenides are of
Megarian origin, as Stallbau-m,
PL Parrn. 57 and 65, supposes.
1 Arid. Metaph. ix. 3: Vi
S( rives o'l(pa<riv, olov ol MeyaptKol,
orav tvfpyfj /j.6vov SvvaaOau, orav
St pr) evepyfj ou Svvuffdat. olor
rbv (J.TJ oiKoSofj-ovifra ov Svvaffdai
o/xoSofieZy, dAAa -rbv olKoSo/Movyra
OTO.V o*/co8ojup i^toi'wj 8 Kal tirl
riav &\\t*y. In refuting this
statement Aristotle observes
that it would make all motion
and becoming impossible ;
which was just what the Me-
garians wanted. Further par-
ticulars on this point will be
quoted from Diodorus in the
sequel. The passage in the
Sophistes, 248, C., which
Hennc, p. 133, connects with
that of Aristotle, refers to'
something different.
2 Jfarte-nstein, p. 205, is of
opinion that the above state-
ment is made in direct contra-
diction to Aristotle. It would
in this case belong to Eubu-
lides. But the Aristotelian
technical terms MvaaQcu, Iwp-
yttv, do not prove much.
Aristotle often expressed the
statements of others in his
own terminology. On the
other hand, no very great im-
portance for the system of
Aristotle must be attached to
the Megarian doctrine already
quoted, even if it comes from
Euclid. It is only a peculiar
way of understanding the
Eleatic doctrine against be-
coming and motion. Still less
can we here support the Me-
garians against Aristotle as
Grate, Plato, iii. 491, does : be-
cause a builder without ma-
2G2
THE SOCRATIC SCHOOL.
CHAP.
XII.
(2) The
Good.
terial and unchangeable is allowed by him to be
actual, and regarded as the subject matter of science.
Socrates had described the good as the highest
object of knowledge. 1 In this he was followed by
Euclid. 2 Kegarding, however, that which is most
essentially real as the highest object of knowledge
in accordance with his principles, Euclid thought
himself justified in transferring to the good all the
attributes which Parmenides had assigned to real
being. One only real good is there, unchangeable,
ever the same, of which our highest conceptions are
only different names. Whether we speak of (rod, or
of Intelligence, or of Eeason, we always mean one
terials, tools and intentions,
cannot build, and when these
and other conditions are there,
must build. For this is not at
all the point on which the
dispute between Aristotle and
the Megarians turns. Aris-
totle on the contrary says in
the connection of the above-
enquiry .(Metaph. iv. 5, c. 7 ;
1049, a. 5), that if the neces-
sary conditions for the exercise
of a capacity are given (among
which besides the 8iW/*y Ao-
yiKal the intention must be
included), its exercise always
follows. This, according to
Grote, is likewise the meaning
of the Megarian sentence,
which he disputes. Its real
meaning that a capacity until
it shows itself by action is not
only kept in abeyance by the
absence of the necessary means
and conditions, but is not even
existing maybe gathered from
the objections urged by Aris-
totle, c. 3, and from the quota-
tions, p. 230, 2. Grote to defend
the Megarians attributes to
them reflections, which we have
no right to attribute to them.
1 See p. 133 and 147.
2 That his assertions about
the good should have nothing
to do with the Socratic know-
ledge (Hermann, Ges. Abhand-
lung, 242) could only be ac-
cepted on the supposition that
that knowledge was not know-
ledge about the good, and that
Euclid was not a pupil of So-
crates. Nor can it be readily
conceded that a pure Eleatic
philosopher, if he had only
moved in an ethical sphere of
ideas, would have treated this
part of philosophy in the same
way as Euclid. As long as he
remained a pure Eleatic philo-
sopher, he could not have
taken this ethical direction
and have placed the conception
of the good at the head of his
MEGARIAN VIEW OF THE GOOD. 2(
and the same thing, the Good. 1 For the same reason CHAP.
the moral aim, as Socrates had already shown, is
always one the knowledge uf the Good, and if we
speak of many virtues, all these are but vary ing-
names for one and the same virtue. 2
What, however, is the relation of other thing's to
this one Good? Even Euclid, as accounts tell us,
denied any existence to what is not good; 3 from
which it follows immediately, that besides the Good
nothing real exists. This statement is on better
authority attributed to the later Megarian School. 4
Therewith many conceptions, the reality of which
had been originally assumed, were destroyed as such,
and reduced, in as far as any reality was admitted
about them, to mere names of the Good. 5 Here,
1 Cw. Acad. iv. 42, 129 : Me- mentis acie, qua verum cerne-
garici qui id.bonum solum esse retur. Illi (the Megarians)
dicebant, quod esset unum et similia, sed, opinor, explicata
simile et idem semper (olov, uberius et ornatius. Cor.f.
Znowv TaurdV). Diof/. ii. 106, Plato, Rep. vi. 505, B., in
says of Euclid : ovros ev rb which Antisthenes is mention-
ayribv aire<palvero TroAXois ov6- ed in addition to Euclid.
jucurt ica\ovfj.fvov ore fiev yap 3 Diog. ii. 106 ; ra 8e avri-
tt>p6vijffiv, ore Se Otbv, Kal &\\ore icti/j.ei'a. r<? ayaBw avi'ipei /XT; elvai
vovv xal ra \oiird. <paffK<av.
2 Diog. vii. 161, says of the 4 Arist. in Em. Pr. Ev. xiv.
Stoic Aristo : aperds T' o6rt 17, 1 : oOtv fyiovv ovrol ye [of
TfoKXas elffTtyef, ws d T/fjiuv, oirre trepl ~2,ri\irtiiva Kal rovs Meyapi-
n'iav iro\\.ots v6/j.a<n KO\oviJitmiv. KOUS] rb bi> ev elvai Kal rb /x^j bit
us ol yity^ptKol. That this one etepov tlvai, /xrjSe yevvao~0ai rt
virtue was the knowledge of /xrjSe fyOfiptaQai p-noe KivflffOai
the good, appears not only Toirapdirav. Arist. Metaph. xiv.
from the internal connection 4 ; 1091, b, 13, refers to Plato,
of the system and its external and can hardly be applied to
relation to Socrates, but also the Megarians.
Yrom Cicero 1. c. who asserts : 5 Prantl's view, p. 35, that
a .Mcnedemo autem . . . Ere- the conceptions of the Me-
triaci appellati ; quorum orane garians must invariably have
bonum in mente posit um et a nominalistic meaning, does
264 THE SOCRATIC SCHOOL.
CHAP. probably, traces of gradual development in the Mega-
' rian doctrine are to be found. Euclid apparently
first spoke of a plurality of essential conceptions in
contrast to objects of sense, and this form of teach-
ing belongs primarily to a time in which his system
was being developed out of this contrast. 1 At a later
period the Megarians appear to have used the mani-
foldness of conceptions for the purpose of attacking
popular notions, 2 otherwise keeping it in the back-
ground, and confining themselves to the essential
oneness of being and the Good. Inconsistent, no
doubt, they were ; yet we can understand how they
became involved in this contradiction by gradually
pushing the Socratic theory of conceptions to the
abstract doctrine of the Eleatic One. 3
C. Eristic. The sharper the contrast which they presented
not agree with the statements over the difficulty in another
of Plato. If the Megarians way. The Megarians, he be-
declared conceptions and only lieves, attributed being to each
conceptions to be dATjflii/)) ovcria, particular idea, in as far as it
surely they were Realists, not was a ivnity, and various con-
Nominalists. Not even Stilpo ceptions were used by them to
can, accordingly, be called a express various kinds of the
Nominalist. He had, more- good. But this very point
over, absorbed too much of the being of various kinds of
the Cynic doctrines for tis to good was what the Megarians
be able to form from him any denied. Starting with the one-
conclusion respecting the ori- ness of being they cannot have
ginal Megarian views. arrived at the notion of a mani-
1 Plato, at least in the pas- foldness of conceptions, since
sage before quoted, does not this oneness excludes in its ab-
mention a good which is One. stract form any development
On the contrary, he speaks of or subordinate distinction. But
his philosophers of conceptions it is quite possible that the
differing from the Eleatics in Socratic conceptions may
assuming many conceptions. gradually have been lost in
2 See p. 260, 1. the Eleatic unity.
s He/me, p. 121, tries to get
MEOARIAN ERISTIC. 265
to the current mode of thought, the greater became CHAP.
the necessity of fortifying their own position against '
assault. Here again they had only to follow the
example of the Eleatics. To prove the soundness of
their position directly, as Parmenides had done, was
no easy matter. More important results might be
expected, if their opponents' ground was assailed by
the criticism of Zeno and Gorgias. From Zeno the
founder of the School had appropriated the Eleatic
doctrine precisely in this its critical function, Zeno
and the Sophists being the principal persons who
drew attention hereto in central Greece. This path
of criticism the Megarians now struck out with such
preference, that the whole school herefrom derived
its name. 1 We are assured by Diogenes, 2 that it was
the practice even of Euclid, to attack conclusions
and not premises in other words, to refute by a
reductio ad absurdum. It is also said that Euclid 3 (1) Tliat
rejected explanations by analogies a form much f P llclld -
used by Socrates because a similar thing when cited
makes nothing clearer, and a dissimilar thing is
irrelevant. The most telling description of Euclid's
method will probably be found in Plato, who, speak-
1 See p. 250, 3. 470), it is most probable that
2 ii. 107 : rats re cnroSei^efftv the meaning given above is the
Mara.ro ov Kara \-f)fj.^ara aAAa real meaning of these words.
tear' lirttyopav. Since in Stoical 3 Ibid. KO.I rbv Sia TrapajSoATjs
terminology which we are of \6yov avrjpei, \iyui> tfroi <? 6/j.oiuis
course not justified in ascribing avrbv t) ? avojuoiW oWo-rao-flai
to Euclid on the strength of xal tl fitv ' d^oitav. irepi avra
this passage X^jujua means the 6?/ jtaAAop ^ ofs onoia torn*
major premiss, or more often ai>a<rrpt<f>tffdai el 5' t avop.oi<i>v,
both premises, and !irpopa the icapt\K(iv TTJV
conclusion (Ih'yckx, 151 ; 1'rantl,
266 THE SO CR AT 1C SCHOOL.
CHAP. ing in the Sophistes of the philosophers of concep-
_ tions, says that in their discourses they destroy matter
piecemeal, in order to prove that it has no real being
but is subject to flux and change. 1 This is exactly
the line which Zeno adopted, in order to prove the
uncertainty of the perceptions of the senses; 2 and
which we notice also in the Sorites of the later
Megarians : the apparently substantial bodily mass
is divided into its component parts, and there being
no limit to the division, and no ultimate atom
on which contemplation can rest, it is argued
that matter must be itself unreal, and a mere pass-
ing phenomenon. Euclid is accordingly rightly re-
garded as the founder of the Megarian criticism.
Still, with him criticism does not seem to have at-
tained the character of formal captiousness, although
objection may be taken to his controversial tone : 3 it
would appear that, like Zeno before him, he was
primarily anxious to maintain his positive princi-
ples, and that he only used the subtleties of argument
as a means to this end. Nothing, at least, is known
of him which would lead to an opposite conclusion,
nor is any one of the quibbling fallacies laid to his
charge, for which the Megarian school was afterwards
notorious.
1 See p. 256, 1 ; 259, 2. statement proves but little,
2 SeeZeller, G. d. Griech. Part since it uses the term Sophist
I., 496. in a way peculiar to post-So-
* According to Ding. ii. 30, cratic times. It is more worthy
Socrates had already observed, of belief (-Dioff. ii. 107) that
that because of his captious- Timon called him a quarrel-
ness, he might associate pos- some person, who introduced
sibly with Sophists, but not amongst the Megarians a rage
with human beings* But this for disputes.
MEGARIAN CAPTIOUSNESS.
267
Among the immediate successors of Euclid, how-
ever, the element of captiousness prevailed over
positive teaching. Such teaching as they had was
too scanty to command attention for long, and too
abstract to admit of further development. On the
other hand a polemic against prevailing opinions
presented to the sharp-witted, to the contentious, and
to those ambitious of intellectual distinction, an un-
explored field, over which the Megarians eagerly
ranged. 1 Not seldom their metaphysical assumptions
served only as occasions for hard-fighting with words.
Among the fallacies which are attributed to Eubu-
lides, 2 though they probably belong to an earlier
1 The ordinary form of these
captious proofs is that of ask-
ing questions. Hence the
regular expression : \6yov tpw-
TO.V (to raise a point) in Diog.
ii. 108 ; 116 ; Sext. Math. x. 87 ;
and the WlryaptKa fp<aT-fi/j.ara in
the fragment of Chrysippus ;
in Pint. Sto. Rep. 10, 9, p. 1036.
Conf. Arist. Phys. viii. 8; 263,
a, 4, 7 ; Anal. Pr. ii. 19, 66, a,
26 ; 36 ; i. 32, 47, a, 21. But
like the Sophists, they refused
every answer but Yes or No.
Dioff. ii. 135.
2 Diog. ii. 108, enumerates
7 : that called ^tvS6/jifvos, that
called Sia\av6dvuf, the Electra,
the tyKfKa\v(iij.ti>os, the (rcopiTrjs,
the Kfpariviis, the <pa\a.Kp6s. The
first of them -is given as fol-
lows in Arint. Soph. El. 25, 180,
a, 34, b, 2 ; Ales, ad loc. Cic.
Acad. ii. 29, 95 If a man says
he is at the moment telling a
lie, is he telling a lie, or is he
speaking truth ? The 8iu\a.vOd-
CHAP.
XII.
eVos. and the
Electra are only different forms
of the same fallacy. Do you
know who is concealed ? Do
you know who is behind the
veil? Did Electra know her
brother before he announced
himself to her ? and the solu-
tion of them all consists in
the fact, that he who was con-
cealed, or behind the veil, or
had not yet announced him-
self respectively, was known
to, but not immediately recog-
nised by, the lookers on. See
Arist. 8. El. c. 24, 179, a, 33;
Alex, in loc. and 49 ; Lueiaii,
Vit. Auct. 22, and Prantl. The
Kfpa-rirns is as follows : Have
you lost your horns ? If you
say Yes, you allow that you had
horns. If you say No, you
allow that you have them still.
Diog, vii. 187 ; vi. 38 ; Seneca,
Ep. 45, 8; Gell. xvi. 2, 9;
I'miitl, p. 53. The Sorites con-
sists in the question: How
208
THE SOCRATIC SCHOOL.
CHAP. time, 1 only one, the Sorites, has any intelligible rela-
' tion to their metaphysics. By means of this form of
(2) Eristic argument it could be proved that no enduring being
iides. belongs to objects of sense, but that every such
object passes into its opposite, and represents what is
changing, and not what is real and unchangeable. 2
The rest appear to be simple sophisms, having no
other object than to involve opponents in difficulties, 3
critical works of art, which made indeed the need
felt of an accurate investigation into the laws of
thought, but in the pursuit of which the desire of
conducing to a right intellectual method by pointing
out difficulties and refuting untenable opinions falls
altogether into the background.
The powers of Alexinus in argument seem to
(3) That of
Alexinus.
many grains make a heap ? or
more generally : With what
number does Many begin ? Of
course it is impossible to assign
a number. See Cic. Acad. ii. 28,
92 ; 16, 49 ; Diog. vii. 82 ; Pars.
Sat. vi. 78 ; Prantl, p. 54. The
<pa\a.xpbs is another form of the himself to death
feame : How many hairs must about the ^evS6p.
you lose to become a bald-head ?
See Hor. Ep. ii. 1, 45 ; Prantl,
1. c. ; Deycks, 51.
1 There are, for instance, in-
dications of the Sorites in
Chrysippus are known to us
from Diog. vii. 196 ; v. 49.
Chrysippus, according to Diog.
vii. 198, 192, also wrote on the
8ia\av6di>uv, the fjKfKa\vfj.fj.evos,
and the <ro>piTTjs. Philetus of
Cos is said to have worked
in writing
os, Athen.
ix. 401, e. The Kepor^rjj and
fjKfKa\v^fj.evos were also attri-
buted to Diodorus (Dior/, ii.
Ill), and the former (Diog. vii.
187) as also the Sorites (.Diog.
Zeno and Euclid. In general vii. 82) to Chrysippus, certainly
it is difficult to say who are without reason to Chrysippus.
the discoverers of quibbles, 2 Compare what will be later
which are taken seriously at said about Diodorus' proofs in
the time they are produced, denying motion,
but are after all only bad jokes. "The motive which Prantl,
Seneca, Ep. 45, 10, saj r s that p. 52, sees in the ^yKe/caXujUjueVos
many books had been written is not so patent, and the as-
on the fyev86/j.evos, among which sumptions of Brandis, p. 122,
those of Theophrastus and do not seem accurate.
DIODORUS THE MEGARIAN. L>60
have been of a similar kind. He, at least, is only CHAP.
known to us as a captious disputant. 1 Nothing
further is known of him beyond an argument in
which he vainly attempted to entangle Menedemus
in what is called the ' horned ' fallacy, 2 and a refuta-
tion of Xenophon's proofs of the reasonable arrange-
ment of the world, 3 which was subsequently repeated
by the Academicians. 4 In close connection with the
Megarian doctrines may be placed the discussions of
Diodorus on motion and destruction, on the possible,
and on hypothetical sentences.
Tradition has preserved four arguments, by which (4) Tkattif
Diodorus attempted to support the fundamental Jho </m
teaching of his school on the impossibility of motion. Motion.
The first, 5 which in the main is the same as that of
Zeno, is as follows. Supposing anything to move, it
must either move in the space in which it is, or in
the space in which it is not. In the former it has
not room to move, because it entirely fills it ; in the
latter it can neither act nor be acted upon ; hence
motion is inconceivable. 6 The second is a less
1 See p. 254, 1. (v 3 KOCT/JLOV KptiTr6v tffri' iroii}-
'* In Dlog. ii. 135. riKbv &pa KOI ypa.^a.riKi'iv la-rw
3 Sejct. Math. ix. 107 : Zeno 6 /cdo>os.
had concluded, because the * Cic. N. D. iii. 8, 21 ; 10, 26 ;
world is the best possible, and 11, 27.
reason is higher than the ab- s Sext. Pyrrh. ii. 242 ; iii. 71 ;
sence of reason, that the world Math. x. 85 ; i. 311.
must have reason. See Cic. Sext. Pyrrh. iii. 243, men-
De N. D. ii. 8, 21; iii. 9, 22. tions asimilar argument against
To this Alexinus replied : rb becoming in general, in imme-
irot-nriKbv TOV /ur; iroiTjriKov ol rb diate connection with the proof
7pa/ujuaTi/cb> rov ^ 7pa/iju<mcoO given above : Neither can what
Kpii-n6v la-ri noil rb (caret raj is come into being, for it exists
&\\as rex''' 1 ' 6ftapovfj.fvvv npt~n- already ; nor can what is not,
T&V 4<TTi rov p.)) Totovrov. oiiSt for nothing can happen to it ;
270 THE SOCRATIC SCHOOL.
CHAP. accurate form of the same proof. 1 All that moves
XII
' is in space : What is in space reposes : Therefore
what is moved reposes. A third proof 2 is based on
the assumption of infinitesimal atoms and particles.
It is generally attributed to Diodorus. 3 Probably he
only used it hypothetically, as Zeno did his argument,
to refute ordinary notions. 4 It is this : As long as
the particle A is in the corresponding space A, it does
not move, because it completely fills it. Just as
little does it move when it is in the next following
space, B ; for no sooner is it there than its motion
has ceased. Accordingly it does not move at all.
In this conclusion one cannot fail to discover the
note of Zeno's inferences, and of that critical process
which had been already described by Plato. 5 The
fourth proof, 6 besides assuming the existence of atoms,
distinguishes between partial and complete motion. 7
Every moving body must first have the majority of
consequently nothing at all is. 8 Id. ix. 362 ; Pyrrh. iii. 32 ;
It is possible that this argu- Dionys. in Ens. Pr. Ev. x v. 23,
ment also belongs to Diodorus. 4 ; Mob. Ekl i, 103 ; Pseudo-
But Stei&Jwirt is wrong in at- element, Recogn. viii. 15, all of
tributins: to him (Allg. Encykl which point to one common
Sect. i. vol. xxv. p. 288) the source. Simpl. Phys. 216, b;
distinction between space in Schol, in Arist. 405, a, 21.
the wider and in the narrower Diodorus called these atoms
sense, which is found in Sext, a^epfi.
Pyrrh. iii, 75 ; Math. x. 95, 4 Even the first proof, accor-
since it would appear from ding to Sext. Math. x. 85, was
these passages that the dis- put in such a shape as to prove
tinction was made with a view that every atom fully occupied
to meet Diodorus' objections. its space ; but this is unim-
1 Sext. Math. x. 112. portant here.
- Id, x. 143 and 119. Alex- 5 See p. 265.
<an,der, too, De Sensu, 125, b, 6 8cxt. Math. x. 113.
mentions Diodorus, \6yos vtpi " Kivriffis KO.T* fTrutpdrciar and
DIODORUS THE MEGARIAN. 2
its particles moved, before it can move as a whole ; CHAP.
that it should move with the majority is, however, XIL
not conceivable. For supposing a body to consist of
three atoms, two of which move whilst the third is
at rest, such a body must move, because the majority
of its particles move. The same applies, when a
fourth atom at rest is added: for the body being
moved tear eTritcpdrsiai', the three atoms of which it
consists are moved, consequently the fourth at rest
is added to the three moving atoms. Why not
equally when a fifth and a sixth atom is added ? So
that a body consisting of 10,000 particles must be
moved, if only two of these first move. If this is, how-
ever, absurd, a movement of the majority of particles
is therefore inconceivable, and therefore a movement
of the whole body. That there is an inconclusive-
ness in this argument Sextus has already noticed. 1
Diodorus, however, appears to have considered it
unanswerable, and hence, he concludes all his re-
searches by saying that it never can be said of a
thing, It is moving, but only, It has moved. 5 ' He
was, in other words, prepared to allow what the
senses seemed to prove, 3 that a body is now in one
place and now in another, but he declared the
transition from the one to the other to be impossible.
This is indeed a contradiction, and as such it was
1 Sext. Math. x. 112, 118. A agreed therein with the Elea-
fxirther argument, the first tics.
argument of Zeno's, is not at- 2 Sext. Math. x. 48 ; 85 ; 91 ;
tributed to Diodoms by Sext. 97-102.
Math. x. 47. He only says as s This reason is specially
to its result, that Diodorus mentioned by Z'ext. Math. x. 80.
272 THE SOCRATIC SCHOOL.
CHAP, laid to his charge by the ancients, and by him very
_ inadequately met. 1 At the same time it is a devia-
tion from the original teaching of his school. Euclid
denied motion absolutely, and would just as little
have allowed a completed motion as a transition in
the present.
(ft) On With the third of these arguments agrees sub-
tidn. stantially the argument of Diodorus that nothing
perishes. It is as follows. A Wall, he says, does
not perish ; so long as the stones keep together, it
stands ; but when the stones are separated it no
longer exists. 2 That it may however have perished,
he appears to have likewise allowed.
O) On the Closely related to the enquiry into motion, are
his discussions on what is possible. In both cases
the conceivability of change is the point raised, but
in one case it is raised in reference to something, in
the other abstractedly. In both cases, Diodorus
stands on exactly the same footing with regard to
his School. The older Megarians allowed as possible
only what actually is, understanding by actual what
was before them in the present. 3 To this Diodorus
added what might be in the future, by saying : Pos-
sible is what either is actual or what will be actual. 4
1 See Sext. 91, 97. Diodorus neously). This example is
here proves the assertion that sufficient to show how erroneous
anything predicated of the past Grote's view (Plato iii. 501) is,
may be'true, whilst it is not that Diodorus only intended to
true predicated of the present assert that present motion is
by such irrelevant statements only the transition point be-
as that it can be said of Helen tween the past and the present,
that she had three husbands 2 Sext. Math. x. 347.
(one after another), but never 3 See p. 261.
that she has three (cotempora- 4 Cic. De Fato, 6, 12; 7, 13 ;
PHILO THE MEGARIAN. 273
In proof of this statement he used an argument, CHAP.
which goes by the name of Kvpievow, and is still
admired after centuries, 1 as a masterpiece of subtle
criticism. It is in the main as follows : From any-
thing possible nothing impossible can result ; 2 but
it is impossible that the past can be different from
what it is; for had this been possible at a past
moment, something impossible would have resulted
from something possible. It was therefore never
possible. And speaking generally it is impossible
that anything should happen differently from what
has happened. 3
Far less exacting was Philo, a pupil of Diodorus, (H)T/uitof
when he declared everything to be possible, even ^on.tiw
should outward circumstances prevent it from being Possible.
9, 17 ; Ep. ad Fam. ix. 4 ; Flirt, the impossible might result
Sto. Rep. 46, p. 1055 ; A lex. from the possible. Other pas-
Aph. in Anal. Pr. 59, b ; Schol. sages are quoted by Prantl, p.
in Arist. 163, b, 29 ; Simpl., 40, 36.
ibid. 65, b, 7 ; Philip, ibid. 163, 2 So anoKovQeiv is rendered,
b, 19 ; Boeks, de Interpret. Op. thus keeping up the ambiguity
ed. Basil, 364 ; Prantl, Gesch. d. of the original, where cwcoXou-
Log. i. 19. The above sentence 6e?v means not only sequeno.fi
is expressed here thus : Possible in time, but causal sequence,
is oirtp ^ IffTiv aXijfles ^ effrai. * Epict. Diss. ii. 19, 1 : 6
1 Comp. Epict. Diss. ii. 18, nvpiev(av \6yos dirJ TOIOVTWV TIVUV
18 : we ought to be proud of a(popfj.ut> T>pa>TTJT0ai <paivtTai KOI-
moral actions, OVK Inl Tip Tbv VTJS yap O&TTJS /UOXTJS Tots Tpurl
Kvpitvovra. epcoTijtrai, and just TOVTOIS irpbs AxXrjXo, Ttp 'irav a-
before i Konfybv <ro<f>i(r^.aTioy cXu- peX7jXv06s a\i)6S Q.voLyK.ouQv tlvat *
eras, TroAu KOfi.<ty&Ttpov TOV Kvpifvov- Kal T$ ' SvvaTy aSuvaTOv ju)? d/co-
TOS. He also mentions, ii. 19, \ov6eiv,' ol Tip ' Swarb*' tlvat t>
9, treatises of Cleanthes, Chry- OVT' tffTiv iXTjO^s ofa' O-TOI,'
sippus, Antipater, and Archi- ffvvti&v T^V fadx^v TOUTTJI/ 6 Ai6-
demus on the ttvpievwv. Chry- Supos TTJ TUV icpd)T<v Svow iriQa.-
sippus could only meet it (ac- VOTIJTI a-wtxp^fro vpbs vapd-
cording to Alex, in Anal. Pr. OTCUTIV TOV pritifif ehai Swarbv
57, b, in Schol. in Arist. 163, a, ft ofrr' \rniv aXTjfles oJ/r' ?<TTai.
8), by asserting that possibly Conf. die. De Fato, 6.
274 THE SOCRATIC SCHOOLS.
CHAP, realised, 1 provided a thing has only the capacity
' therefor. This was undeniably a departure from
the Megarian teaching.
(ft) Onhy- In regard, too, to the truth of hypothetical sen-
M*t%% tences, Philo laid down criteria different from those
of his teacher. 2 Diodorus declared those conditional
sentences to be true, in which the apodosis neither
can be false, nor ever could be false if only the pro-
tasis be true. Philo says more vaguely, those are
true in which there is not a true protasis and a false
apodosis. The question here appears, however, to
have been one of formal correctness in expressing
logical rules. 3
O) On the With Diodorus' view of the possible the assertion
"rords. appears to be connected, that no words are meaning-
less or ambiguous, each one always meaning some-
thing, and everyone requiring to be understood ac-
cording to this meaning : 4 he will only allow that
meaning of a word to be possible which is actually
present to the speaker's mind. Eespecting Diodorus,
however, and the whole Megarian School, our infor-
1 Alex.-Simpl. in Categ.- Philo, do not affect his real
Schol. in Arist. 65, a, 39, b, 6 ; meaning at all, however much
Boelts, 1. c. Panthoides, accor- they may follow from the words
ding to Epict. Diss. ii. 19, 5, of his definition. Hence Prantl,
attempted by another turn to p. 454, can hardly have quite
avoid Diodorus' argument, by grasped the meaning of Philo.
disputing the sentence that 4 Gell. xi. 12 ; Amman., De
every thing past must be of Interpret. 32, a ; Schol. in Arist.
necessity. 1103, b, 15 ; Simpl. Categ. f. 6,
2 See Sext. Pyrrh. ii. 110; h. In order to show that every
Math. viii. 113 ; i. 309 ; Cic. word has a meaning, Diodorus,
Acad. iv. 47, 143. according to Ammon., gave the
* The inferences by which name oA\o/iV to one of his
Sextus, M. viii. 115, refutes slaves.
STILPO THE MEGARIAN. 275
mation is far too scanty to enable us to bring the CHAP.
fragments of their teaching into a perfectly satis- 3JL
factory context, 1 granting that enough is known to
evidence one and the same tendency in all these
thinkers. It may then be assumed as probable, that
the Megarians did not confine themselves to those
logical subtleties which are known to us ; our notices
are, however, too deficient for us to be able to attri-
bute others to them with anything like certainty. 2
A peculiar position in the Megarian philosophy is (6) That
that occupied by Stilpo. Ever ready to defend the ^j^
teaching of the School at the head of which he stood, adopted
,. . fc . , ,. - -u- much from
clinging to universal conceptions, maintaining the im- the
possibility of becoming, the unity of being, 3 and the 9^^, s ,'
difference between sensuous and rational perceptions, 4 comlina-
he at the same time combines with his Megarian ^L^
views theories and aims which originally belonged to andpredi-
the Cynics. In .the first place he rejected, as did An- j ec t.ed as
impossible.
1 Hitter's (Rh. Mas. ii. 310, would not have vised such lan-
Gesch. der. Phil. ii. 140) con- guage, as may be gathered
jectures seem in many respects from the Sophistes, 246, C.,
to go beyond historical proba- and the introduction to the
bility, and beyond the spirit of Theastetus ; and Eubulides had
the Megarian teaching. To not appeared when Plato corn-
illustrate this here would take posed the Euthydemus. That
too long. the Megarians made use of
2 Prantl, p. 43, believes that many of the Sophistic fallacies,
the majority of the sophisms is of course not denied. Only
enumerated by Aristotle really nothing for certain is known
belong to the Megarians. Most of such use.
of them, however, would ap- 3 See pp. 260, 3 ; 263, 4.
pear to come from the So- 4 Compare the passage in
phists ; in proof of which a Aristocles quoted p. 259, 1, in
reference may be made to which oi trtpl 'S.-rlKirtava. KOI TOVS
Plato's Euthydemus, which WltyapiKobs are spoken of in
can hardly have the Megarians addition to the Eleatics.
in view. Towards Euclid Plato
T 2
276
THE SOCRATIC SCHOOLS.
CHAP.
XII.
tisthenes, every combination of subject and predicate,
since the conception of the one is different from the
conception of the other, and two things with different
conceptions can never be declared to be the same. 1
The doctrine of the unity of being, 2 in as far as it can
be shown to have originated with Stilpo, may be
deduced as a corollary from this view ; for if nothing
can be predicated of anything else, it follows that
being can alone be predicated of itself.
Truly cynical are also Stilpo's moral principles.
The captious logic to which other Megarians devoted
themselves with speculative onesidedness, to the entire
neglect of the ethical element, 3 was also a charac-
1 In Plwt. adv. Col. 22, 1, p.
1119, theJfyicurean Stilpo raises
the objection : TOV 6ebv avaipe?-
ffBcu for' avTOv, \eyovros erspov
erepov /XT; KaTT]yoptio~6ai. ir&s
yap Buaff6/j,e6a, ^ \4yovres &v-
Opcairov a.yaO'bv . . . a\\' avdpta-
irov avOpcairov Kal xcopls ayaQkv
ayaBov ; . . . and again, c. 23 :
ov (ify- a\\a rb ^irl ^Ti\irtevos
TOIOVTOV tffTiv. el Trepl Iwirov TO
rpexfiv KaTriyopovfifv, oti tprjcn
Tavrbv elvai Ttf irepl ov ttariiyo-
ai/Bp&Trqi TOV ri ?iv
tlvai rbv \6yov, erepov Se rep
ayaBif ' Kal Trd\tv rb "ir-rov tlvai
TOV Tp\ovTa elvai Sia(pfpfiv ' 4a-
repov y&p airanovfj.evoi TOV \6yov
ov Tbv avTbv airoSloofiff virl-p
a/j.(po7i>. odev afnapTdveivTobs trepnv
eTtpov KaTTtiyopovvTas. The very
same thing will be found in the
case of Antisthenes. All the less
reason has Plutarch to regard
Stilpo's assertion as a mere
joke. The same proof is given
by Sim.pl. Phys. 26, a. : S& 8*
rV irepl Tavra (the distinction
between the different cate-
gories and the ambiguity of
words) &yvoiav Kal ol MeyapiKoi
KArjfleWss <f)i\6ffO(t>oi \afi6vTes us
evapyri -jrp6Taffiv, ori Sav ol \6yoi
erepoi TavTO. erepa effTi Kal OTI
Ta erepa KfX^ipiffTai a.\X4]Xtav,
tSoKovv SeiKvvvai avTov avrov Ke-
X<apio-iAvov fKaffTov : i.e. since
the conception of StaKpar-ns
fj.ovo-iK6s is a different one to
that of 2co/cpaT?7s \tvKis, the
one according to Megarian
hypothesis must be a different
person to the other.
2 See p. 263.
3 Excepting Euclid's doc-
trine of the oneness of virtue,
nothing bearing on Ethics is
known as belonging to the
Megarians.
STILPO THE MEGARIAN. 277
teristic of Stilpo ; ' and perhaps it is only an accident CHAP.
that no captious assertion or discovery of his is on '_
record. His character, however, is not only always (*) TJu}
mentioned by biographers with the greatest respect,' 2 good
but many traits are recorded of him, which identify P^ced IK
his morality with that of the Cynics. The highest
good he placed in that apathy, which forbids the
feeling of pain even to exist. The wise man is re-
quired to be in himself independent, and not even to
stand in need of friends to secure happiness. 3 When
Demetrius Poliorcetes enquired after his losses by the
plunder of Megara, he gave for answer that he had
seen no one carrying off his knowledge. 4 When re-
minded of the immoral life of his daughter, he re-
joined, that if he could not bring honour on her, she
could not bring disgrace on him. 5 Banishment he
1 See Chrysipp. in Pint. Sto. at the death of relatives.
Eep. 10, 11, p. 1036, and pp. 211, What Alex. Aphr. De An. 103,
2 ; 210, 6. a, remarks also probably applies
2 See p. 251, note 3. to Stilpo, that the Megarians
* Sen. Ep. 9, 1 : ' An merito look on cur-x.\i\<ria. as irpwrov
reprehendat in quadam epistola oiKe'toy.
Epicurus eos, qui dicunt sapi- 4 Phitarck, Demet. c. 9 ;
entem se ipso esse contentum Tranquil. An. c. 17, p. 475 ;
et propter hoc amico non indi- Puer. Ed. c. 8, p. 6 ; Sen. de
gere desideras scire. Hoc ob- Const. 5, 6 ; Epis. 9, is ; Diog.
jicitur Stilboni ab Epicuro et ii. 115 : Floril. Joan. Damasc.
iis, quibus summum bonum ii. 13, 153 (Stob. Floril. ed.
visum est animus impatiens.' Mein. iv. 227). That Stilpo
And a little further on : ' Hoc thereby lost his wife and
inter nos et illos interest : daughter is probably a rheto-
noster sapiens vincit quidem rical exaggeration of Seneca.
incommodum omne sed sentit ; The well-known ' omnia mea
illorum ne sentit quidem.' mecum porto,' attributed by
Connected herewith is the ob- Seneca to Stilpo, is by Cicero
servation of Stilpo in Teles, in referred to Bias of Prisne.
Stob. Floril. 103, 83, in order * Pint. An. Tran. c. 6 ; Diog.
to warn from excessive grief ii. 114.
278 THE SOCRATIC SCHOOLS.
CHAP. would not allow to be an evil. 1 To be independent
of everything without, and to be absolutely free from
wants this highest standard of Cynicism for the wise
man was also his ideal. And lastly, the free attitude
towards religion adopted by the Cynics was also shared
by him, and finds expression in many of his utterances. 2
Whether, and if so, in what way, he attempted
(r?) TJie to set up a logical connection between the Cynic and
M^garian Megarian theories, we are not told. In itself, such a
theories f as k was no t difficult. With the assertion that no
catty IMT- subject can admit a predicate, Euclid's hostile attitude
momsedby towards proof by analogy is closely related; this too
rests on the general proposition that things dissimilar
cannot be compared. It is also quite in harmony
with the negative criticism of the Megarians ; and if
Euclid denied to the good any form of manifoldness,
others might add, as Antisthenes really did, that the
one and not the manifold could alone exist. More-
over from the oneness of the good the apathy of the
wise man might be deduced, by considering that all
else besides the good is unreal and indifferent. 3 The
denial of the popular faith was also involved in the
doctrine of the one, even as it was first taught by
Xenophanes. In the Cynic element as adopted by
1 In the fragment in Stob. these subjects could not be
Flor. 40, 8. discussed in the street. The
2 According to Diog. ii. 116, story in Pint. Prof, in Virt.
he proved that the Athene of 12, p. 83, of the dream in which
Phidias was not a God, and he conversed with Poseidon is
then before the Areopagus apparently invented to justify
evasively replied that she was his omission to sacrifice.
not a Otis but a fled, and when 3 Conf. Diog. ii. 106, and p.
Crates asked him as to prayers 263, 3.
and sacrifices, replied that
ELEAN-ERETRIAN SCHOOL.
Stilpo, there were not wanting, it is true, points of
approach to the Megarians, but it was a deviation
from the original form of the Megarian teaching to
allow explicitly such an element to exist.
Closely connected with the Megarian school is
the Elean-Eretrian, respecting which, however, very
little information has reached us. Its founder A
was Phsedo of Elis, 1 the well-known favourite of
CHAP.
'
. Its
1 See Preller's Phsedo's Life
and Writings, Rhein. Mus.
fur Philol. iv. 391. Phsedo,
the scion of a noble Elean
family, had been taken cap-
tive not long before the death
of Socrates, probably 400 or
401 B.C. Preller concludes
from Phsedo, 89, B., that he
was not eighteen years of age
at the time of the death of
Socrates ; it may, however, be
asked whether Phfedo followed
Athenian customs in his dress.
He was employed as a slave
in most humiliating services at
Athens, until one of Socrates'
friends (besides Crito, Cebes
and Alcibiades are both men-
tioned, the latter certainly not
being at Athens at the time,
and probably not being alive)
redeemed him at the interces-
sion of Socrates. See Diog. ii.
31, 105 ; Suid. under Qaiticav ;
and Hegych. Vir Elustr. *a*5eo/ ;
Gell. N. A. ii. 18 ; Macrob. Sat.
i. 11; Lact. Inst. iii. 25, 15;
Oriff. c. Gels. iii. 67 ; Cic. N. D.
i. 33, 93; Athen. xi. 507, c.
Preller not improbably finds
the source of the story in
Hermippus, irtpl TQ>I> Siairpe-
\)/dvf(ai> tv iratSein Sov\tav. Grotd
(Plato, iii. 503) objects to this
story, that no conquest of Elis
took place at that time, where-
as Diog. says of Phasdo : arv-
vfti\(o r?7 irarplSt. He therefore
infers that M^Xtos should be
read for 'HA6?os in Diog. ii. 105.
Yet Phasdo is called an Elean
by both Gell. 1. c. and Stralo,
ix. 1, 8, p. 393, and his school
called Elean. If Elis itself
did not fall into an enemy's
hand, its suburbs were occu-
pied by the Spartan army in
the Elean-Spartan war, pro-
bably in the spring of 408 B.C.
(Xen. Hell. iii. 2, 21, and Prel-
ler, on the passage, Ciirtius, Or.
Gesch. iii. 149. 757.) Phjedo
appears to have been taken
captive at that time. Most
probably Phaedo left Athens on
the death of Socrates. But
whether he at once returned
home, or repaired with others
to Euclid at Megara, is un-
known. Diog. ii. 105, mentions
two genuine and four spurious
dialogues of his. His Zopyrus
is even quoted by Pollux, iii.
18, and the Antiatheista in
Beltker's Anecdot. i. 1 07. Panae-
tius seems to have had doubts
as to all the treatises passing
under his name, Diog. ii. 64.
He is called by Gellius ' philo-
280
THE SOCRATIC SCHOOLS.
CHAP.
XII.
Socrates. 1 On the death of his teacher, Phsedo
collected a circle of disciples in his native town, who
thence received the name of the Elean philosophers. 2
Plistanus is named as his successor, 3 and Archipylus
and Moschus as his pupils. 4 Beyond the names we,
however, know nothing of any one of them. By
Menedemus and Asclepiades, 5 the school was removed
to Eretria, and it was then called the Eretrian. 6
sophus illustris,' and his writ-
ings are spoken of as ' admo-
dum elegantes.' Even Diog.
ii. 47, enumerates him among
the most distinguished Socra-
ticists.
1 Compare for his relations
to Socrates the Phsedo, 58, D.
89, H.
2 'HXeioKot, Strabo, ix. 1, 8, p.
393 ; Diog. ii. 105, 126.
Diog. ii. 105.
4 126. Perhaps these men
were not immediate pupils of
his. Since nothing is said of
Menedemus' studying under
Plistanus, the latter, we may
suppose, was no longer alive.
5 The account given by Diog.
ii. 125 of these philosophers in
his life of Menedemus (probably
taken from Antigonus of Cary-
stus and Heraclides Lembus) is
as follows : Menedemus of Ere-
tria, originally a tradesman,
had been sent as a soldier to
Megara. There he became ac-
quainted with the school of
Plato (so Diog. says with Plato ;
but this is chronologically im-
possible) and joined it together
with his friend Asclepiades, both
cf them (according to Athen.
iv. 168, a) earning a living by
working at night. Soon, how-
ever, they joined Stilpo at
Megara, and thence went to
Moschus and Archipylus at
Elis, by whom they were in-
troduced to the Elean doc-
trines. Returning to their
native city and becoming con-
nected by marriage, they con-
tinued together in faithful
friendship until the death of
Asclepiades, even after Mene-
demus had risen to highest
rank in the state, and had
attained wealth and influence
with the Macedonian princes.
The sympathetic, noble and
firm character of Menedemus,
his pungent wit (on which
Plwt. Prof, in Virt. 10, p. 81 ;
Vit. Pud. 18, p. 536), his mode-
ration (Diog. ii. 129; Athen.
x. 419, e), his liberality and
his merits towards his country,
are a subject of frequent
panegyric. Soon after the
battle of Lysimachia, which
took place 278 B.C., he died,
possibly by suicide the result
of a grief which is differently
stated at the age of seventy-
four. According to Antigonus
in Diog. ii. 136, he left no
writings.
Strabo, ix. 1, 8; Diog. ii.
105, 126 ; Cic. Acad. iv. 42, 129.
ELEAN-ERETRIAN SCHOOL. 281
Flourishing as was its condition here for a time, it CHAP.
appears soon to have died out. 1
Among its adherents 2 Phaedo and Menedemus are B. Re-
the only two respecting whose opinions any informa- 1 ^^^
tion is to be had, and that information is little teaching.
enough. By Timon 3 Phaedo is classed with Euclid
as a babbler, which points to an argumentative ten-
dency. 4 Perhaps, however, he devoted himself to
Ethics 5 more than Euclid did. Menedemus, at least,
appears to have been distinguished from his cotem-
porary quibblers by having directed his attention to
life and to moral questions. He is, however, spoken
of as a sharp and skilful disputant. 6 If he hardly
went the length of Antisthenes in declaring every com-
bination of subject and predicate impossible, 7 it still
sounds captious enough to hear that he only allowed
affirmative judgments to be valid, but rejected nega-
1 Pint. Tranqu. An. 13, p. of morals, which Sen. Ep. 94,
472. 41, quotes from Phsedo.
2 Athen. iv. 162, e, mentions Diog. ii. 134 : fa 5e SIKTKO-
a certain Ctesibius as a pupil TOI/O^TOS d M. xal Iv rf ffwdeo-Oat
of Menedemus, but what he Sva-avrayiavtaros. tffTpfQero re
says of him has nothing to do irp&s irdma. Hal eupfffi\6-ytr Ipur-
with philosophy. A treatise TiKwTards T, natid (fnjffiv 'AITI-
of the Stoic Sphajrus against aOev-ns iv 5ia8oxa?s, fa. The
the Eretrian School in 260 verses of Epicrates in Athen.
B.C. is the last trace of the ii. 59, cannot well refer to this
existence of the Eretrian Menedemus, since they are also
school. Diog. vii. 178. directed against Plato, who
s Diog. ii. 107. was then still living.
4 The Platonic Phaedo does ' Even this is asserted. Ac-
not give the slightest ground cording to Phys. 20, a (Schol.
for thinking, as Steinhart, Plat, in Arist. 330, a, 3), the Ere-
W. iv. 397, does, that Phsedo trians asserted Mi?S*i/ xarit M<-
was inclined to a sceptical Stvbs naTiryopf'tff6ai. They ap-
withholding of judgment. pear in this passage to be con-
* Compare the short but founded with the Cynics and
clever fragment on the subject the later Megarians.
THE 80CRATIC SCHOOLS.
CHAP. tive and hypothetical ones. 1 Chrysippus 2 blames
him as well as Stilpo, for their obsolete fallacies. 3 It
may also be true that he disputed the view that pro-
perties exist apart from particular objects, in the
spirit of Cynic nominalism. 4 On the other hand, it is
asserted that in positive opinions he was a Platonist,
and only employed argument for amusement. 5 From
what has been already stated, this seems incredible,
nor can it be deduced from his disputes with Alex-
inus. 6 Indeed, it is in itself most improbable. 7 Still
so much seems to be ascertained, that, together with
Stilpo, he attributed to ethical doctrines a value
above criticism. For we not only hear that he ad-
mired Stilpo, who was his teacher, more than any
other philosopher, 8 and that he was himself often
1 Diog. ii. 135.
2 Pliit. ISto. Rep. 10, 11, p.
1036.
3 Hermann, Ges. Abh. 253,
refers to Menedemus the verses
of John Salisbury (Bnthet. ed.
Peters, p. 41), in which a certain
Endymion is mentioned, who
called fides, opinio vera, and
error, opinio fallax, and who
denied that you could know
what was false, for no know-
ledge could be deceptive. The
allusion does not, however,
appear probable. The continu-
ation, that the sun corresponds
to truth, and the moon to false-
hood, that error and change
bear rule under the moon, but
truth and immutability in the
domain of the sun, certainly
does not come from Menedemus.
4 Simpl. Categ. Schol. in
Arist. 68, a, 24 : of Airo TTJS
'Eptrpias avfipovv ras TTOI^TTJTOS
dis ov8a.iJ.us ^xovffas ri Koifbv
ovfft&Ses iv 6e TOIS Ka&fKturra Kal
ffvvOerois inrap\ov(ras.
5 Heraclides in Diog. ii. 135.
Hitter's conjecture, Gesch. d.
Phil. ii. 155, that this Mene-
demus is confounded with Me-
nedemus the Pyrrhsean, whom
we know from Pint. adv. Col.
32, p. 1126, 8, and Athen., is
hardly to be trusted. For
Heraclides Lembus had treated
the Eretrians in detail, as we
learn from Diog., so that it is
difficult to imagine such a con-
fusion. The context also tells
against that view.
6 Diog. 135, 136, says that he
was constantly attacking Alexi-
nus with violent derision, but
yet did him some service.
7 Diog. 134 : ruv 8e 5i5ao-/co-
Ktav Ttav irepl nxdrcava KO.} Eevo-
Kpdrriv . . . Karf(pp6ffi.
8 Diog. 134.
ELEAN-ERETRIAN TEACHING. &
derided for being a Cynic, 1 but we know that he CHAP.
busied himself with enquiring as to the chief good
in a practical way. He affirmed that there was only
one good intelligence, 2 which, to his mind, was
identical with a rational direction of the will. 3 What
are commonly spoken of as distinct virtues, are, he
maintained, only different names of this one virtue ; 4
and, by his activity as a statesman, 5 he proved that
he did not aim at dead knowledge. In his free views
of religion he likewise reminds us of Stilpo and the
Cynics. 6 Zeno,. however, having about this time
united the most valuable and lasting parts of the
Megarian and Cynic teaching in the more compre-
hensive system of the Stoics, stragglers, such as the
Eretrians, soon found themselves unable to exercise
any important influence.
1 Diog. 140 : TO. fi(t> oSc vpura Sj/catoeruvrjj' \4ytffQoi, KaBdirtp
Kairetypove'iro, KVUV Kal Afjpoj inrb fiporbv Kal avOpcairov.
riav "Epfrptiwv O.KOVUV. 5 That he exercised a con-
2 Cic. Aead. ii. 42 : Diog. siderable influence, on his
123 : irpbs 81 rbv tl-novra TroAAo friends by his teaching and
ra 07060 eirvQtro ir6(ra rbv api6- his personalty is shown by
fibv Kal ft i>oni(oi ir\fl<a riav e/co- Plutarch, Adul. et Am. c. 11,
r&v and in 134 are some ques- p. 55 ; Diog. ii. 127-129.
tions to prove that the useful * Diog. 125 : ~R(tav6s rt tirifjie-
is not the good. Aws KararpexofTOS T&V pdinfcav,
3 Diflfj. 1.36: Kal irort rivos vtKpovs avrbv tiriffQaTTftv <l\tye-
a-Kovaas, us fj.tyi(rrov a.ya.b'bv ttri against which a trait of per-
rb iravTtav l*nwyx avflv " TIS sonal fear, such as is described
tiriQvfjLfl, elirt iro\v 5 M"C / ' by Diog. 132, proves nothing.
rb ^TnOi.juejc S>v Set. Josephus, Antiquit. Jud. xii. 2,
1 Pint. Virt. Mor. 2 : Mcrl- 12. Tertullian'g Apologet. 18,
STJMOS fj.ii> 6 it 'Eperplat avfipci language on Menedemus and
fiav aptruv Kal rb 7rA7J0os Kai ras his belief in Providence, is
oia<j>upa>, as /uas ofays Kal xp u ~ probably as worthless as the
/xe'/7;y TroAAoTV, ov6^a(ri ri> yap whole fable of Aristeas.
aiirb ffca<ppoffwt)v Kal a-jSpttav Kal
THE SOCRATIC SCHOOLS.
CHAPTER XIII.
THE CYNICS.
CHAP. THE Cynic, like the Megarian School, arose from a
fusion of the teaching of Socrates with the doctrines
^ tlie Eleatics and Sophists. Both schools, as has
Cynict. been already remarked, were united by Stilpo, and
passed over into the Stoa in Zeno. 1 The founder of
Cynicism, Antisthenes, a native of Athens, 2 appears
1 It is accordingly not com- and Aristippus its effects on
patible with an insight into happiness, according to his own
the historical connection of imperfect conception of it.
these schools to insert the 2 Antisthenes was the son of
Cyrenaics between the Cynics an Athenian and a Thracian
and the Megarians, as Tenne- slave {Diog. vi. 1 ; ii. 31 ; Sen.
mann, Hegel, Marbach, Braniss, De Const, 18, 5 ; Pint. De Exil.
Brandis, and Striimpell have 17, p. 607, calling his mother ;
done. Otherwise it is of no and Clemens, Strom, i. 302, C. in
moment whether we advance calling himself a Phyrgian, are
from the Megarians to Antis- confounding him with Dio-
thenes and thence to Aristip- genes, or else must have been
pus, or vice versa ; for these thinking of the anecdote in
three schools were not being Diog. vi. 1 : Sen. and Plut.,
developed from one another, 1. c. ; for further particulars
but grew up side by side from consult Winkelmann, Antisth.
the same origin. The order Fr. p. 7 ; Muller, De Antisth.
followed above appears, how- vita et scriptis Marb. 1860, p. 3).
ever, to be the more natural He lived, according to Xen.
one ; the Megarians confining Mem. ii. 5 ; Sym. 3, 8 ; 4, 34,
themselves more closely to the in extreme poverty. The time
fundamental position of So- of his birth and death is not
crates ; Antisthenes consider- further known to us. Dwdor.
ing its practical consequences : xv. 76, mentions him as one of
HISTORY OF THE CYNICS.
to have become acquainted with Socrates only late CHAP.
in life, 1 but ever afterwards to have clung to him 2 xm
with enthusiastic devotion, 3 imitating his critical
reasoning, though not always without an element of
captiousness and quibbling. Early in life he had
enjoyed the instruction of Grorgias, 4 and included other
Sophists likewise among his friends. 5 Indeed he had
himself appeared Sophist-like as a pleader and teacher,
before he made the acquaintance of Socrates. 6 It
was therefore only a going back to his old mode of
life, when on the death of Socrates he opened a
School. 7 At the same time he did not neglect to
the men living about 366 B.C.
and Pint. Lycurg. 30, Sch.,
quotes a remark of his on the
battle of Leuctra. According
to Eudocia ( Villoison's Anecd.
i. 56), he attained the age of
70 years, which would place
his birth in 436 B.C., but the
circumstance is uncertain.
1 We have every reason to
refer Plato's yfp&vrwv rets ovj/t/ua-
Oeffi, Soph. 251, B., to him, as
will be subsequently seen. The
only thing against it is the
account in Diog. vi. 1, that An-
tisthenes was praised by So-
crates for his valour in the
battle of Tanagra. This objec-
tion applies even if the battle
referred to was not the victory
of the Athenians in the year
456 B.C. (in which it is impos-
sible that Antisthenes can have
taken part), but the battle
mentioned by Thucyd. iii. 91
in 426 B.C., or that which was
fought late in the autumn of
423 B.C. between Delium and
Tanagra (Th-uc. iv. 91), which
is usually called the battle of
Delium. The story, however,
is of no account, for Diog. ii.
31 quotes the same words of
Socrates in a different way.
2 Xen. Mem. iii. 11, 17 ; Sym.
4, 44 ; 8, 4-6. Plato, Phsedo,
59, B. ; Diog. vi. 2 ; Ibid. 9.
8 This at least is the descrip-
tion given of him by Xen.
Symp. 2, 10 ; 3, 4 ; 6 ; 4, 2 ; 6 ;
6, 5 ; 8.
4 Diog. vi. 1, referring to the
rhetorical school of Gorgias ;
nor does Antisthenes deny his
teaching. At a later period
Antisthenes wrote against Gor-
gias, Athen. v. 220, d.
5 According to Xen. Symp. 4,
62, he introduced Prodicus and
Hippias to Callias, and recom-
mended to Socrates an unknown
Sophist from Heraclea.
Hermippus in Diog. vi. 2 ;
Hieron. c. Jovin. ii. 14.
7 In the yvnvAffiov of Cyno-
sarges, Diog. vi. 13 ; Gottling,
Ges. Abh. i. 253, which was
intended for those who, like
THE SOCRATIC SCHOOLS.
CHAP.
XIII.
commit his views to writing in numerous treatises, 1
the language and style of which are most highly
praised. 2
Among the pupils 3 of Antisthenes, Diogenes 4 of
but in later times universally,
and probably even in the time
of Antisthenes, called Kwol,
partly from their place of meet-
ing, partly because of their
mode of life. Conf. Diog. vi.
13; Lact. Inst. iii. 15. g. E.
Schol. in Arist. 23 ; a, 42 ; 35,
a, 5. Antisthenes was already
called a.TT\oKii<av (Diog. 1. c.),
and Brutus speaks disparag-
ingly of a Cynic (Plut. Brut.
34). Diogenes boasted of the
name (Diog. 33 ; 40 ; 45 ; 55-60 ;
Stob. Eel. ii. 348, u, a), and the
Corinthians placed a marble
dog on his grave. (Diog. 78.)
4 Steinltart, Diogenes, Allg.
Encyc. sect. i. bd. xxx. 301 ;
Gottling, Diogenes der Cyniker.
Ges. Abh. i. 251 ; Bayle, Diet.
Art. Diogene is always worth
reading. Diogenes was the
son of the money- changer
Kikosios at Sinope. In his
youth he had been engaged
with his father in issuing
counterfeit coin, and in conse-
quence was obliged to leave his
country. Diog. vi. 20, quoting
authorities, gives further par-
ticulars, but is not always
faithfully explained by Gott-
linq, 251. Conf. Ibid. 49, 56 ;
Plut. Inimic. Util. c. 2 ; De
Exil. c. 7, p. 602; Musonius
in Stob. Floril. 40, 9 ; Lucian,
Bis Accus., 24 ; Dio Chrys. Or.
viii. We have no reason to
doubt this fact, as Steinhart
3 Called by Aristotle,M.eiaph. does, p. 302, although the ac-
viii. 3 ; 1043, b, 24, 'AiTiffOtvfiot, counts may disagree in a few
himself , were of mixed Athenian
blood, Plut. Themist. c. 1. Ac-
cording to Diog. vi. 4, he had
but few pupils because of his
harsh and severe treatment of
them. It is not reported that
he required payment, but he
appears to have received volun-
tary presents. Diog. vi. 9.
1 Diog. vi. 15 (comp. Miiller,
1. c., p. 25) gives a list of these
writings, which, according to
Diog. ii. 64, was in the main
approved of by Pansetius. They
are by him divided into 10
volumes. Excepting a few
fragments, the only ones which
are preserved are the two
small and comparatively worth-
less declamations, Ajax and
Ulysses, the genuineness of
which is fully ascertained.
Winckelmann (Antisthenis
Fragmenta, Zur. 1842) has
collected all the fragments.
Because of his many writings,
Timon called him travroQvfi
<p\eS6va, Diog. vi. 18.
2 See Theopomp. in Diog. vi.
14 and 15, and vii. 19 ; Dionys.
Jud. de Thuc. c. 31, p. 941 ;
Epietet. Diss. ii. 17, 35 ; Phry-
nich. in Phot. Cod. 158, p. 101,
b ; Pronto, De Orat. i. p. 218 ;
Longin. De Invent. Khet. Gr.
ix. 559 ; dc. ad Att. xii. 38 ;
and lAwian adv. Indoct. c. 27 ;
Theopompus passes the same
opinion on his spoken ad-
HISTORY OF THE CYNICS.
Sinope is alone known to fame, that witty and eccen-
tric individual, whose imperturbable originality,
CHAP.
xin.
details. In Athens he became
acquainted with Antisthenes,
who, for some reason or other,
drove him away with a stick,
but was at length overcome by
his perseverance. (Diog. 21 ;
uElian, V. H. x. 16; ffieron.
adv. Jovin. ii. 206.) When this
took place is unknown, and
Bayle's conjecture that the
condemnation of Socrates was
the cause of Antisthenes'
hatred of mankind, is not to
be depended upon for chrono-
logical reasons. Diogenes now
devoted himself to philosophy
in the Cynic sense of the term,
and soon surpassed his master
in self-denial and abstemious-
ness. He himself mentions
Antisthenes as his teacher, in
the verses in Plut. Qu. Conv. ii.
1, 7, 1. He appears to have
lived a very long time at Athens,
at least if the account of his
meeting with Philip before the
battle of Chaeronea may be
trusted (Dwg. 43; Plut. de
Adulat. c. 30, p. 70 ; De Exil.
c. 16, p. 606 ; Epict. Diss. iii.
22, 24 ; it is not, however,
stated that Diogenes fought at
Chseronea, as Gottling, p. 265,
says, nor is this probable of a
Cynic), according to which he
was then still living at Athens.
But it is also possible and
this agrees with his principle
of having no home that he
may have visited other places
as a wandering preacher of
morals, particularly Corinth.
(Diog. 44 ; 63 ; Plut. Prof, in
Virt. 6, p. 78 ; Dio Chryg. Or.
vi. ; Val. Max. iv. 3 ; Diog. ii.
66; vi. 50.) According to
Diogenes, he met Aristippus
in Syracuse. On some such
journey he fell into the hands
of pirates, who sold him to
Xeniades, a Corinthian. For
this event see Diog. vi. 29 ; 74 ;
Plut. Tran. An. 4, p. 466 ; An.
"Vitios, s. 3, p. 499 ; Stob. Floril.
3,63; 40, 9; Epict. Diss. iii.
24, 66 ; Philo, Qu. Omni. Prob.
Lib. 883, C. ; Julian, Or. vii.
212, d. Xeniades appointed
him the instructor of his sons,
and he is said to have admir-
ably discharged this duty.
Highly esteemed by his pupils
and by their parents, he re-
mained with them till his
death. At this time occurred
the meeting with the younger
Dionysius, mentioned by Plut.
Timol. 15, and the conversa-
tion with Alexander, so greatly
exaggerated by tradition.
(Diog. 32; 38; 60; 68; Sen.
Benef . v. 4, 3 ; Juvenal, xiv.
311 ; Tlieo. Progym. c. 5 ; Julian,
Or. vii. 212.) The most simple
version of it is that found in
Plut. Alex. c. 14; De Alex.
Virt. c. 10, p. 331 ; ad Princ.
Inerud. c. 5, p. 702. Diogenes
died at Corinth, on the same
day, it is said, as Alexander
(Plut. Qu. Conv. viii. 1, 4, p.
717 ; Demetr. in Diog. 79), i.e.
323 B.C., at an advanced age
(Diog. 76, says almost ninety,
Cens. Di. Nat. 15, 2, says
eighty-one). The story of his
death is differently told. (Diog.
76 ; 31 ; Plut. Consol. ad Apoll.
c. 12, p. 107 ; JElian, V.H. viii.
14 ; Cent. 1. c. ; Tatian adv.
288
THE SO CR AT 1C SCHOOLS.
CHAP.
XIII.
coarse humour, strength of character, admirable even
in its excesses, fresh and vigorous mind, have made
him the most typical figure of ancient Greece. 1
Of the pupils of Diogenes, 2 Crates is the most
celebrated. 3 By his influence, his wife Hippar-
Gr. c. 2 ; Hieron. adv. Jovin. ii.
207, m; Lucian, Dial. Mort. 21,
2 ; Cic. Tusc. i. 34, 104 ; Stab.
Floril. 123, 11.) Most probably
he succumbed to old age. The
Corinthians honoured him with
a solemn burial and a tomb,
and Sinope erected a monu-
ment to his memory (Diog. 78 ;
Pausan. ii. 2, 4 ; Anth. Gr. iii.
558). Diog. 80, mentions many
writings which bear his name.
A portion of them were, how-
ever, rejected by Sotion. Others
denied that he left any writ-
ings. Theophrastus' treatise :
TV>V Aioyevovs arvvay<ay^ (in Diog.
v. 43), by Grote, Plato, iii. 508,
to the Cynic Diogenes, cer-
tainly refers to Diogenes of
Apollonia.
1 That he exercised an irre-
sistible charm over many per-
sons by his manners and words
is attested by Diog. 75, and
confirmed by examples like that
of Xeniades, Onesicritus, and
his sons.
2 Amongst them are known,
besides Crates and Stilpo:
Onesicritus, the companion
and biographer of Alexander,
with his sons Androsthenes and
Philiscus (Diog. vi. 75 ; 73 ; 80;
84 ; Pint. Alex. 65 ; for parti-
culars respecting Onesicritus
in Miillei-, Script. Rer. Alex.
M. p. 47) ; Monimus of Syra-
cuse, the slave of a Corinthian
money-changer, who was driven
away by his master for throw-
ing money out of the window
in Cynic fanaticism, one of the
most distinguished Cynics, and
the autho'- of several treatises,
amongst them of iraiyvia. <rirovSp
\a\rjdvia fj.efj.iy/j.fva (Diog. vi.
82) ; Menander and Hegesias
(Diog. vi. 84), and perhaps
Bryson the Achaean (Ibid. 85).
Phocion is also said to have
been a pupil of his (Diog. 76 ;
Phoc. c. 9); but Plutarch was
not aware of it ; and as Phocion
adhered to the Academy, there
is probably no truth in the
story beyond the fact of a pass-
ing acquaintance.
3 The Theban Crates, gener-
ally called a pupil of Diogenes,
but by Hippobotus, a pupil of
Bryson the Achsean (Diog. vi.
78), flourished about 328-324
B.C. (Diog. vi. 87). Since, how-
ever, stories are current not
only of his tilting with Stilpo
(Diog. ii. 117), but also of his
quarrelling with Menedemus
in his later years (Diog. ii. 131 ;
vi. 91), his life must have lasted
to the third century. Another
Crates, a pupil of Stilpo, who
is mentioned Diog. ii. 114, must
not be confounded with the
Cynic Crates. He is probably
the same as the Peripatetic of
that name in Diog. iv. 23. In
zeal for the Cynic philosophy,
Crates gave away his consider-
able property. For the different
HISTORY OF THE CYNICS.
chia l and her brother Metrocles 2 were gained for the
Cynic School. The names of several immediate and
remote pupils of Metrocles 3 are known, through whom
the School may be traced down to the end of the third
century. Yet all its nobler features were cultivated
by the Stoics from the beginning of the third century,
only toned down and supplemented by the addition
of other elements also. Henceforth Cynicism was
useless as a special branch of the Socratic philosophy.
Subsequent attempts which were made to preserve
its distinct character only resulted in caricatures.
CHAP.
XIII.
and very conflicting accounts
see Diog. vi. 87; Plut. Vit.
Aer. Al. 8, 7, p. 831 ; Apul. De
Mag. 22 ; Floril. ii. 14 ; Simpl.
in Epict. Enchir. p. 64; Phi-
logtr. v. Apoll. i. 13, 2 ; Hieran.
adv. Jovin. ii.203. He died at
an advanced age (Diog. 92, 98).
Diog. 98 mentions some letters
of his, the style of which re-
sembled Plato's, and some tra-
gedies, and Demetr. De Elocut.
170, 259, also mentions moral
and satirical poems. Accor-
ding to Julian, Or. vi. 200, b,
Plutarch also wrote an account
of his life. From Diog. 91 ;
Apul. Floril. 14, we learn that
he was ugly and deformed.
1 The daughter of an opulent
family from Maronea in Thrace,
who from love to Crates re-
nounced her prospects and
habits of comfort, and followed
him in his beggar's life, Diog.
96 ; Apul. Floril. ii. 14.
2 Formerly a pupil of Theo-
phrastus and Xenocrates, but
won over to Cynicism by
Crates (Telos. in Stob. Floril.
97, 31, vol. iii. 214, Mein.),
after having been cured by him
of his childish idea of suicide.
At a later period, however, he
hung himself to escape the
burdens of age, Diog. 94. Re-
specting his apathy, see Plut.
An. Vitios. Ad. Infelic. c. 3, p.
499 ; for a conversation of his
with Stilpo see Plut. Tranqu.
An. 6, p. 468.
Diog. 95. His pupils were
Theombrotus and Cleomenes ;
the former was the teacher of
Demetrius, the latter of Ti-
marchus, and both of them of
Echecles. Contemporary with
Echecles was Colotes, Diog. vi.
102. Contemporary with Me-
trocles was Diodorus of Aspen-
dus, mentioned in Zellers Phil,
d. Griech. vol. i. 289. At an
earlier period, under Antigonus
the Great, lived the Cynic
Thrasylus (Plut. Reg. Apoph-
theg. Antig. 15, p. 182 ; Vit.
Pud. 7, p. 531) ; under one of
the Ptolemies, Sotades, whose
Cynical abstinence Nonnvs,
Exeg. Histor. Greg. Naz. 26
(Greg, in Julian. Invect. ed.
Eton. 1610, p. 136) mentions.
U
200
THE SOCRATIC SCHOOLS.
CHAP. Two of the basest of its later representatives are
" known to us in the persons of Menedemus l and Me-
nippus. 2 Soon after it became extinct as a School,
1 A pupil of Echecles, and
previously, as it would seem,
of the Epicurean Colotes (Diog.
vi. 95, 102), of whom we only
hear that he occasionally ap-
peared in the mask of a fury,
to add greater force to his
philippics. A pupil of his is
Ktesibius, whom Athen. i. 15,
c. iv. 162, e, names as a
cotemporary of Antigonus (Go-
natas).
2 Menippus was, according
to Diog. vi. 99, conf. Gell.
N. A. ii. 18, 6, originally a
Phoenician slave. He is said to
have amassed a considerable
fortune by money-lending
(Hermippus in Diog. 1. c.), the
loss of which he took so much
to heart that he hung himself.
His career must fall in the first
half of the third century. Dio-
genes indicates that, placing
him between Metrocles and
Menedemus, it being his habit
to mention the philosophers of
this school in chronological
order ; also the story that he
was the author of a treatise
respecting the festivities of
Epicurus' birthday (Diog. vi.
101), and of an Arcesilaus
(Athen. xiv. 664, c.; the Acade-
mician of this name died at a
great age in 240 B.C.) ; also
the circumstance that a portion
of his writings was attributed
to a Zopyrus (Diog. vi. 100),
probably the friend of the Sil-
lograph Timon (Ibid. ix. 114) ;
also Probus who (Virg. Eel. vi.
31) calls Menippus much
earlier than Varro ; also Lot-
dan Ikaromen. 15, who makes
Menippus an eye-witness' of a
number of things, all of which
happened about 280 B.C. In
the face of so many clear
proofs, the language of Diog.
vi. 99, who, speaking of Me-
leager living about 100 B.C.
says, rov KO.T' avrbv ye/j.ofj.ei>ov,
cannot go for much. There is
probably here a mistake in the
text; perhaps K<XT' is written
for juer', or as Nitsche, p. 32, pro-
poses, we ought to read rov KOI
avrov ytvonevov KVVIKOV. Pro-
bably this Menippus is the
same person as Menippus of
Sinope, called by Diog. vi. 95,
one of the most distinguished
men of the school of Metro-
cles ; for Diog. vi. 101 in
counting up the various Me-
nippuses does not mention him
as well as this Menippus, but
calls him as Athen. xiv. 629> e,
664, e, likewise does MejoTnros &
KvviK.6s. The name IZiwirfvs is
thus explained : his master was
a certain Baton of Pontus
(Achaicus in Diog. vi. 99), with
whom he probably lived at
Sinope. (Compare also Nietz-
sche's Beitr. z. Quellenkunde
u. Kritik des Laert. Diogenes.
Basel, 1870, p. 28.) According to
Diog. 13 treatises of Menippus
were in circulation, of which he
gives the titles of seven, and
Athen. the titles of two more.
That they were not his own
production is probably only
enemy's slander. All these
writings appear to have been
satires. His proficiency as a
CYNIC TEACHING. 2P1
and only reappeared at a very much later time as an CHAP.
offshoot of Stoicism. 1
The Cynic philosophy claims to be the genuine B - Of"
teaching of Socrates. 2 The many-sidedness, however, (i) jp e ^'
of Socrates, whereby the intellectual and the moral JJJJJJJ
elements were completely fused, and the foundations Itrwnledy
thus laid of a more comprehensive and deeper-going
science, was above the powers of Antisthenes. Natur-
ally narrow and dull, 3 but fortified with singular
strength of will, Antisthenes admired 4 above all
things the independence of his master's character,
the strictness of his principles, his self-control, and
his universal cheerfulness in every position in life.
How these moral traits could be in a great measure
the result of free enquiry on the part of Socrates, and
how they could thus be preserved from narrowness,
satirist may be gathered from school. It would fully explain
the fact that he was not only these statements that he was
imitated in ancient times by attaching himself as a writer
Meleager (Dioff. vi. 99), but to Menippus.
also by Varro in his Satirae 2 See p. 285, 2, and Diog. vi.
Menippeae (dc. Acad. i. 2, 8 ; 11.
dell. N. A. ii. 18, 6, also s This his teaching proves
Nacrob. Saturn, i. il ; conf. independently of the opinions
Protms, 1. c.), and that even of opponents, such as Plato,
Lucian gives him a prominent Theastet. 155, E., in which the
place in his dialogues. Conf. words <rit\r}poi>s KO! avriTuvovs
Jtiese, Varr. Sat. Rel. p. 7. a.i>6pcairovs and nd\' t% &/iowrot
1 Besides the above, Me- refer without doubt to Antis-
leager of Gadara should be thenes and not to the Ato-
mentioned, could we be sure mists; Soph. 251, B. yepAvruv
that he was a member of the TOIJ tytpd6f<ri . . . ford irtvlas
Cynic School. But the mere TTJS vfpl <pp6vt\<nv /rrVjo-etoy TO
fact that AtJien. iv. 157, 6, in roiavra rt8a.v(uuc6<rt. Arist. Me-
addressing a Cynic calls him taph. v. 29, 1024, b, 33, viii. 3 ;
6 irp6yovos v^uv, and that he is 1043, b, 23.
perhaps mentioned by Diogenes 4 As Oic. De Orat. iii. 17, 62,
as a Cynic, does not prove and Diog. vi. 2, remark, appa-
the continuance of the Cynic rently on the same authority.
u 2
1>92
THE SOCRATIC SCHOOLS.
CHAP.
XIII.
he did not understand ; nor did he see that the prin-
ciple of a knowledge of conceptions reached far be-
yond the limits of the Socratic platform. All know-
ledge not immediately subservient to ethical purposes
he accordingly rejected as unnecessary, or even as
injurious, as the offspring of vanity and love of plea-
sure. Virtue, he maintained, is an affair of action,
and can dispense with words and with wisdom. All
that it needs is the strength of will of a Socrates. 1
Thus he and his School not only regarded logical and
physical enquiries as worthless, but passed the same
opinion on all arts and sciences which have not the
moral improvement of mankind 2 for their immediate
1 Dioff. 11, Antisthenes teach-
es a.vr&pKt\ Se r))v aper^iv irpbs
evSaifj.oviav, /j.-riSei'bs TrpotrSeoju.eVTjp
STI /JL^I 'SoiKpariKris iffxvos. ri\v T'
aperijv rSiv epycav elvai, ft-firf
\6yta
2 Dioff. 103 : apeo-Kei o%v av-
rois r}>v KoyiKbv Kal rbv tyvffiKbv
r&irov irepiatpe'iv, tfitfiepies 'Apt-
ffrwvt ftp \icf, fj.6vcjj Se irpoaexeiv
rip ii6iK$. According to Dio-
cles, Diogenes said what
others attribute to Socrates
or Aristippus (see p. 150, and
Plut. in Eus. Pr. Ev. i. 8, 9)
that we ought to learn orn
roi v (neydpoHTi KO.K&V T' aya06v
re rervKrai. wapcurovvrat 5e Kal
rk tyitiiKyia . . . irfpiaipovai 8e
Kal yetaiJ.erpiav Kal p.ovfftK^v Kal
irdvra TO roiavra. When a dial
was shown him, Diogenes re-
plied, that it was not a bad
instrument to avoid being late
for meals. Ibid. 27: robs tie
Oavnafc [Diog.] ra,
rov 'OSvffffeus KKKO, avafr-
rovvras ra 5' 18ia ayvoovvras
Kal ft.^v Kal robs puvtriKoi/'i ras
fj.ev f rfj \vpa xp8as ap/j.6r-
rfff8ai, avapfjLOffra 5' e^fv rijs
$vxfis ra $6r)- rovs na6i]ij.ariKovs
airo$\fireiv (Jttv irpbs rbv VfXiov KOI
rfyv fff\-i}vT]v, ra S' tv wocrl irpdy-
(tara irapopav rovs pfaopas \e-
ytiv jj.tv tffirovSaKevai ra S'tKaia,
irpdrreiv Se jur)5o/*ws. The pas-
sage on astronomers may pos-
sibly have been supported by
the story of Thales falling
into a well whilst contemplat-
ing the heavens. An answer
thereto is the passage in the
Theastetus 174, A, 175, D, on the
Thracian maiden who upbraid-
ed him for so doing. The
mother of Antisthenes was a
Thracian slave, and the words
which Plato puts into the
mouth of the Thracian girl
closely resemble those quoted
by Diogenes. It would also
tally with the character of
Antisthenes, that he as an
airaiSfvros should be charged
CYNIC TEACHING.
object ; for, said Diogenes, 1 as soon as any other
object intervenes, self is neglected. Even reading and
writing Antisthenes declared could be dispensed with. 2
The last statement must in any case be taken
with considerable limitation, 3 nor can the Cynic
School as a whole be regarded as so hostile to culture
as this language would seem to imply. In fact, some
decided language as to the value of culture is on
record coming from Antisthenes, 4 Diogenes, 5 Crates, 6
CHAP.
XIII.
with not troubling himself
about the general conception
of things. Diog. 73 says of Dio-
genes: /iowriKfjs re Kalye<aiJ.eTptKT)s
Kal affTpo\oyias Kal TWV TOIOVTUV
ajueA?c a>s uxpfiffTtav Kal OVK avay-
Kaitav. Conf . Diog. 24 ; 39 ;
Julian, Or. vi. 190, a ; Seneca,
Ep. 88, particularly 7, 32 ;
Stob. Floril. 33, 14; id. 80, 6:
an astronomer pointing to a
map of the heavens says :
ouroi flffiv ol TrAewcc/uecoj Ttav
dffrfpeav upon which Diogenes
replies, pointing to those pre-
sent : pi) tyfvSov oit yap ovroi
flffiv ol ir\avw/j.evoi, oAA' ovrot.
The saying of Diogenes in
Simpl. De Ccelo, 33, b, Schol. in
Arist. 476, b, 35, that even an
ass takes the shortest cut to
his food and to the water, was
probably meant as a hit at
geometry and its axiom of the
straight line.
1 Excerp. e Joan. Damasc. ii.
13, 61. (Stob. Floril. ed. Mein.)
2 Diog. 103 : ypdfj.fj.ar a yovv
^ fiavBdvtiv ftyaffxtv o 'Avn-
aOtvrjs rovs ffwfypovas ytvo^tvovs,
Iva i^ $iaffrpf<poivTo TO?S aAAoT-
piots.
It would be hardly credible
in a man so fond of writing.
If it is not altogether a fancy,
it may either rest upon some
individual expression, such as,
that it would be better not to
read at all than to read such
nonsense, or it is based upon
more general statements such
as that quoted by Diog. 5, that
wisdom must not be written in
books, but in the soul.
4 Exc. e Floril. Jo. Damasc.
ii. 13, 68 : Set rovs
aiSefeiv. Ibid. 33, in
answer to the question irolos
ffTf<pavos Ka\\to~r6s ^OTV, he
replied : 6 a.it'b vaiSfias.
5 Diog. 68 : T^\V iraiSfiav
elire TOIS fj.ev vtois fftafypoavvyv,
TO?S 8e Trpffffivrtpois jrapa.ft.vBia.v,
To7s 8e irevriffL Tt\ovroi>, TOIS 8e
w\ova{ois icAo-pav flvai. Exc. e
Floril. Jo. Damasc. 13, 29: TJ
traiSfia ofj.oia iff-rl xpvffip ffrt~
(pdixp Kal yap Ti/iV ^X el Ka ^
jro\vT(\(iav. Ibid. 74, 75.
' Diog. 86 : ravr ?x w off ^
(fiadov Kal e(pp6fTiffa Kal fjLtra
Movawv fff^v' i6di)i>. TO S iroAAa
Kal u\/3ia TV<POS f/Mptye. A pa-
rody of this verse is the epitaph
204
THE SOCRATIC SCHOOLS.
CHAP.
XIII.
and Monimus. 1 Diogenes too is said to have zealously
impressed on his pupils the sayings of poets and of
prose writers. 2 Besides, it cannot be conceived that
men, who wrote so much that was good, should have
declared war against all culture. One thing we may
however take for established, that the value of culture
was exclusively estimated by its efficacy in producing
the Cynic type of virtue. Hence this School depre-
ciated all speculative knowledge, only studying logic
and physics, in as far as these sciences seemed neces-
sary for ethical purposes. 3 From this judgment we
are not justified in exempting even the founder. 4
on Sardanapalus in Clem. Stro-
mat. ii. 411, D.
1 Floril. Jo. Damasc. ii. 13,
88 : Mdvifnos . . . f<pj) Kpelrrov
elvat rv<p\bv ff airaiSfurov rbv
p.fV yap els rbi> fidOpov, r'bv 8"
els rb f3dpa6pov e(j.iriirTeti/.
2 Diog. 31, according to Eu-
bulus ; Ka.Tfi-)((>v 5e ol iraTSes iro\-
\a iroiriTcav Kal ffvyypcKpecav Hal
TWV aiiTOv Aioyevovs, iraffdv r'
e^oSov aivTOfnov irpbs rb fi//j.vr)fj,6-
vevffTOv &T7JO-K6I.
3 Krische, Forschungen, 237.
See Hitter, ii. 120.
4 Although the division of phi-
losophy into Logic, Ethics, and
Physics can have been hardly
introduced in the time of Anti-
sthenes, and hence the words
in Diog. 103 cannot be his, it
does not thence follow that the
statement there made is false.
Amongst the writings of Anti-
sthenes some are known to us,
which would be called logical
writings, to use a later division ;
others are on physical subjects.
To the first class belong Tlepl
pl TOV Sia\e-
yeaOai, 2a0o>j/ ^ irepl TOV o.vri-
Xtyeiv, Tlfpl Sia\eKTOv, Tlepl bvo-
fj.d.Tcov, Hfpl bvofjidruv xp^ffecos,
riept f'p&JTTJrrecos /cat airoKpifff(as,
Tifpl So|rjs Kal ^n-t<TTT}^r)s, A(i|ai
if) tpiffnicbs, Tlepl TOV fj.avf)dvtiv
7rpo)3A^uaTo. To the second, Hfp\
{wcav <pvfffcos, Hepl (pvffeias (per-
haps the same which Cicero
mentions N. D. i. 13, 32), 'Epci-
TTtyto irepl (pvaecos. A commen-
tary on the writings of Hera-
clitus, which Diog. ix. 15 men-
tions, does not belong to him.
See Zeller, Phil. d. Griech. i.
527, and Krisclw, p. 238. So
little, however, is known of
these writings, that no con-
clusions can be arrived at
which contradict the above
assumptions. His logical writ-
ings, to judge by their titles,
appear to have contained those
polemical dissertations on con-
ceptions, judgments, and ex-
pressions, which were required
as a foundation for critical
researches. Of the writings
CYNIC LOGIC. 295
The utterances of Antisthenes on logic, so far as they CHAP.
are known to us, consist in a polemic against the Xm
philosophy of conceptions, the object of which is to
prove the impossibility of speculative knowledge.
Likewise his remarks upon nature have for their ob-
ject to show, what is natural for man. For this no
deep research seemed necessary to him or his fol-
lowers ; l a healthy intelligence can tell everyone
what he ought to know ; anything further is only
useless subtlety.
In support of these views Antisthenes put forward (2) Logic.
a theory, based it is true on a leading position of
Socrates, 2 but one, nevertheless, which in its expanded
form and in its sceptical results plainly shows the
disciple of Oforgias. Socrates having required the
essence and conception of every object to be investi-
gated before anything further could be predicated
of it, Antisthenes likewise required the conception of
things what they are or were to be determined. 3
on Physics, it is not known ' Even Cicero ad Attic, xii.
whether they treat of other 38, calls Antisthenes ' homo
than those natural subjects, acutus magis quam eruditus.'
which Antisthenes required im- * Compare the relation of
mediately for his Ethics, in this theory to the doctrine of
order to bring out the differ- ideas, and what Diog. 39, Simpl.
ence between nature and cus- 236, b, m, 278, b, u, says of
torn and the conditions of a Diogenes, with what the Scho-
life of nature. Even the liast on Arist. Categor. p. 22, b,
treatise irtpl <a<av <f>vfft<as may 40 says of Antisthenes. Sext.
have had this object. Pro- Pyrrh. iii. 66, only asserts of a
bably Plato, Phileb. 44, C., Cynic in general that he re-
reckoned Antisthenes among futes the arguments against
the nd\a Seivovs \fyonevovs TO. motion by walking up and
*tpl <pv<riv, only because in all down. Similarly Diogenes in
questions about morals and JJiog. 38.
prevailing customs, he invari- * Diog. vi. 3 : vpSnds re a>pi-
ably referred to t>e require- aafro \6yov eiit6i> \6yos tarlv &
ments of nature. rftrffrffimAifcAr. Alexander
296
THE SOCRATIC SCHOOLS.
CHAP.
XIII.
Confining himself, however, exclusively to this point
of view, he arrived at the conclusion of the Sophists, 1
that every object can only be called by its own pecu-
liar name, and consequently that no subject can admit
a predicate differing from the conception of the sub-
ject. Thus it cannot be said that a man is good, but
only that a man is human, or that the Good is good. 2
Every explanation, moreover, of a conception con-
sisting in making one conception clearer by means of
another, he rejected all definitions, on the ground
' uv
in Top. 24, m, Schol. in Arist.
256, b, 12, on the Aristotelian
ri ^v ilvai says that the simple
rl fjv, which Antisthenes want-
ed, is not sufficient.
1 See Zeller, Phil. d. Griech.
904.
2 Arist. Metaph. v. 29 ; 1024,
b, 33 : 'AvTiff6tmis <pero eiWj&DS
fj.-i)5ev a^icai' \tyeff6at ir
oiKe'tcp \6y<p tv e<f>' fi/6s~
avvtftaive, fj.)j eli/
(rxeSbj/ 8 fjiriSt \ltev8effOai. Alex-
ander on the passage. Plato,
Soph. 251, B. : Wtv ye, olfaat,
rots re veois Kal rS>v yep6i>rcoi>
raits ofyinaOffft Goivi\v Trapeo'X'nKa-
faev ev&vs yap avri\afteff6anravrl
irp^xetpov as aSvyarov rd re
TroAAa ev /col rb ev TroXA^s elvcu,
Kal S^j irou xatpovfftv OVK eiavres
ayadbf \eyetv avOpwirov, d\\a rb
fj.fv dyadbv dyadbv, rbv 5e avOpta-
TTOV avepanrov. Of. Philebus 14,
C. ; Arist. Soph. El. c. 17, 175,
b, 15 ; Phys. i. 2, 185, b, 25 ;
Sinipl. in loc. p. 20 ; Isokr. Hel.
i. 1, and particularly what is
said p. 276, 1, respecting Stilpo.
Hermann, Sokr. Syst. p. 30,
once thought to discern in
these sentences of Antisthenes,
a great progress as proving
that Antisthenes recognised all
analytical judgments a priori
as such to be true, but has
since been obliged to modify
his opinion (Plat. i. 217, Ges.
Abh.239), on being reminded
by Hitter (Gesch. d. Phil. ii.
133) that Antisthenes could
only be speaking of identical
judgments. Still he adheres
to it so far as to state that by
the teaching of Antisthenes,
philosophy for the first time
gave to identical judgments an
independent value. In what
this value consists, it is hard
to say, for nothing is gained
by recognising identical judg-
ments, nor has it ever occurred
to any philosopher to deny
them, as Hermann, Ges. Abh.
asserted though without quot-
ing a single instance in support
of it. Still less can it be a
forward step in philosophy to
deny all but identical judg-
ments. On the contrary, such
a denial is the result of an
imperfect view of things, and
is destructive of all know-
ledge.
CYNIC LOGIC.
297
that they are language which does not touch the
thing itself. Allowing with regard to composite
things, that their component parts could be enume-
rated, and that they could in this way be themselves
explained, with regard to simple ones, he insisted
all the more strongly that this was impossible.
Compared these might be with others, but not de-
nned. Names there might be of them, but not con-
ceptions of qualities, a correct notion but no know-
ledge. 1 The characteristic of a thing, however, the
CHAP.
XIII.
1 Arist. Metaph. viii. 3 ;
1043, b, 23 : &ffre T, awopia, %v
ol 'Avrio~6tvtioi Kal ul ovnas airai-
Sevroi T]ir6pOi,v, *x fi Tiwk Kaipbi/,
OTI OVK eo~n rb ri eanv 6pio~aff0ai,
rbv yap opo* \6yoi> elvai p.aKp6v
see Metaph. xiv. 3 ; 1091, a, 7 ;
and Schwegler on this pas-
sage aAAa iroiov pev ri effnv
evSf \erai KOI 8i5acu, &ffirff> ap-
yvpov ri fj.ev effnv, nv, on 8' olov
Karrirepos. &ar uvorias effri yuec
r)S ff8ex f fivfu opov Kal \6yov,
clov rijs ffvvGtTov, la.v re aiV0T)T7)
(O.V re roTjTTj rj ' * | >v S 5 a.vrr)
irpuTdii' OVK fffriv. That this,
too, belongs to the description
of the teaching of Antisthenes,
appears from Plato, Thetetet.
201, E., and is wrongly denied
by Eraiidis, ii. b, 503 ; the ex-
pressions are indeed Aristo-
telian. Alexander, on the pas-
sage, explains it more fully,
but without adding anything
fresh. That this view was not
lirst put forward by the dis-
ciples of Antisthenes, appears
from Plato's Theaetet. 201, E. :
c,w yap a(> eSojcouc a/coueip riviav
on ra fj.ii/ irpwra uiffirtpel ffroixtta,
t| Stv rjft.f'is re ffvyKft^fGa Kal
ra\\a, \6yov OVK fX l - awrb "yap
Ka6' ainb 'inaffrov ovofiaaai fj.ovov
fit), irpoffenrfiv tie oiiSev &\\o
Swarbv, ovff ais tvriv odd' ais OVK
tariv .... eirfl oiiSf rb avrb
ovSe rb *Kf7vo oiiSe rb eKaffrov
ovSf rb novov irpoffoiffreov, ov8'
&\\a TTO\\O, rotav^a ravra fiev
yap Tffpnpexovra itaffi irpoo~<pfpf-
adai, erf pa uvra fKeivoiv ois irpoffri-
6erat. Selj/ 8e, efaep fiv Svvarbv
avrb \eyfo~6at Kal elxev onte'iov
avrov \6yov, avev rvv a\\tuv
airavrtav \eyeff6ai. vvv 8e aSvva-
roi/ elvai oriovv ruv irpcaraiy
pr)6f)tat \6ycf uv yap tlvai avrip
ttXA* T) ovo/j.a^eo'Bai P.OVOV ' ovojia
yap /j.uvov fxeiv ra Se eK rovruv
ijSri ffvyKeifjifva, &o~ir*p avra ireir-
\fKrat, OVTW xal ra bv6p.aia avruv
ffufj.TT\aKtvra \6yov yeyovei/ai
ovop.ar<i)v yap avtt.ir\oK^v elvai
\6you ova-lav. And 201, C : e<pt)
Se r$)v it.ev p.era \6yov 86^av a\r)6r)
e'lriffrri/urii' elvat, -r^y Se fiAo'joj'
e"/CT6s evKrr-iinijs Kal Stv pet/ ytti)
eart \6yos, OVK eiriar-nra. elvai,
ourwffl Kal ovondfav, a 8' ?x et >
eirio-r-rird. This whole descrip-
tion agrees with what has been
quoted from Aristotle so en-
tirely, trait for trait, that \vc
298
THE SOCRATIC SCHOOLS.
CHAP.
XIII.
name which can never be defined, the conception of
the subject which is borrowed from nothing else, and
therefore can never be a predicate, consists only in
its proper name. By this it is known when it can be
explained by nothing else. All that is real is strictly
individual. General conceptions do not express the
nature of things, but they express men's thoughts
about them. Plato having derived from the Socratic
demand for a knowledge of conceptions a system of
the most decided Eealism, Antisthenes derives there-
from a Nominalism quite as decided. General con-
ceptions are only fictions of thought. Horses and
cannot possibly refer it to any
one else but Antisthenes. It
is all the more remarkable
that Plato repeatedly (201, C. ;
202, C.) affirms the truth of his
description. In modern times,
Sckleiermacher, PL W. ii. 1 and
184, was the first to recognise
the reference to Antisthenes.
His opinion is shared by Bran-
dis, Gr.-R6m. Phil. ii. a, 202, f ;
tiusemild, Genet. Bntw. d. Plat.
Phil. i. 200 ; Schwegler and
Bonitz on Arist., 1. c., but con-
tradicted by Hermann (Plat.
499, 659) and Stallbaum (De
Arg. Theastet. ii. f ). Steinliurt
(Plat. W. iii. ] 6, 204, 20) finds
that the explanation of know-
ledge, as here given, corre-
sponds with the mind of Autis-
thenes, but refuses notwith-
standing to deduce it from him.
Schleiermacher (as Brandis, ii.
a, 203 ; Susemihl, pp. 200, 341,
remark) has not the slightest
right to think the reference is
to the Megarians in Theaet.
201, D. What is there stated
agrees most fully with the
statements of Aristotle touch-
ing Antisthenes, whereas no
such principle is known of the
School of Megara. We may,
therefore, endorse Schleier-
macher's conjecture (PI. W. ii.
b, 19) that the Cratylus was
in great part directed against
Antisthenes a conjecture
which appears to harmonise
with the view that Antisthenes
was the expounder of Heracli-
tus. It is opposed by Brandis.
ii. a, 285, f. Nor yet would
we venture to attribute to An-
tisthenes a theory of monads
connecting it with the theory
of ideas (Smemihl, i. 202, in
connection with Hermann, Ges.
Abh. 240). What we know of
him does not go beyond the
principle, that the simple ele-
ments of things cannot be
defined ; what he understood
by simple elements may be
gathered from the example
quoted from Arist. Metaph. vii.
3, of the silver and the tin.
CYNIC LOGIC.
men are seen, not, however, the conception of a
horse or a man. 1 From this position he opened a
campaign against his fellow pupil, with whom he was
for other reasons not on good terms, 2 but his fire was
met with corresponding spirit. 3 Holding these views
CHAP.
XIII.
1 Simpl. in Categ. Schol. in
Arist. 66, b, 45, says : v 8e
iroAaiwc 0( ptv avypovv TOS TTOI^TTJ-
ras Tf\4us, rb irotbv ffvyxupovvres
tlvat (the terminology of course
belongs to the Stoics) &uirep
' MTITOI/ (Lfi> opu, iVir^TTjTa Se oi>x
opa,' to which Plato gave the
excellent answer : True, for
you have the eye with which
you see a horse, but you are
deficient in the eye with which
you see the idea of horse.
Ibid. 67, b, 18 ; IMd. 68, b, 26 :
'AiTiafleVrjp Kai roiy irepl avrbv
\fyovrcu, &v6p<irov tipia avdpuiro-
Tifra, 5e oi>x p. Quite the
same, Ibid. 20, 2, a. Diog. vi.
53, tells the same story of
Diogenes and Plato, with this
difference, that he uses rpavf-
Co-rris and Kua06ri]s instead of
ai'6pti>Tr6rris. Amman, in Porph.
Isag. 22, b, says : 'Avriffdfvr)s
(\rye TO. yevij nal TO e5j Iv
floats tirivoicus elvcu, and then
he mentions av0pcoir<$TTj$ and
tTrir^Trjs as examples. The same
language, almost word for
word, is found in Tzetz. Chil.
vii. 605, f. Plato is no doubt
referring to this assertion of
Antisthenes, when in the Pann.
132, B., he quotes an objection
to the theory of ideas, ^ -ruv
tlSiav fKaffrov rj rovroiv v6r)/j.a i<al
ovSapov aiircf irpoa"f]
2 The character and position
in life of the two men was
widely different. Plato must
have felt himself as much re-
pelled by the plebeian roughness
of a proletarian philosopher
as Antisthenes would have
been annoyed by the refined
delicacy of Plato.
3 Compare (besides what is
said, p. 292, 2) Plato, Soph. 251,
C., and the anecdotes in Diog.
iii. 35, vi. 7 ; also the corre-
sponding ones about Plato and
Diogenes, which are partially
fictions, in vi. 25 ; 40 ; 54 ; 58 ;
JElian, V. H. xiv. 33; Theo.
Progym. p. 205 ; Stob. Floril. 13,
37. As to the picked fowl
story in Diog. 40, compare
Plato, Polit. 266, B. ; GattKng,
p. 264. For the Cynical attack
which Antisthenes made on
Plato in his ~SdBty, see Diog. iii.
35, vi. 16; Athen. v. 220, d,
xi. 507, a. A trace of Ant s-
thenes' polemic against the
doctrine of ideas is found in
the Euthydemus of Plato, 301,
A. Plato there meets the as-
sertion of the Sophist that the
beautiful is only beautiful by
the presence of beauty, by say-
ing : lav olv irapayfvnTai ffot
&ovs, fiovs fl, Kal '6n vvv ty<l> (rot
-irdpfi/j.1 Aiowo'68(t.pi>s ?; We may
suppose that Antisthenes really
made use of the illustration of
the ox, to which Plato then
replied by making use of the
300
THE SOCRATIC SCHOOLS.
CHAP.
XIII.
it is only natural that Antisthenes should have at-
tached the greatest importance to enquiries respecting
names. 1 Stopping at names and refusing to allow
any further utterances respecting things, he in truth
made all scientific enquiry impossible. This fact he
partially admitted, drawing from his premises the
conclusion that it is impossible to contradict your-
self. 2 Taken strictly the inference from these pre-
same illustration in the person
of Dionysodorus. Steinhart
(Plato's Leben, 14, 266) con-
siders the ~S,d9u>v spurious. He
will not credit Antisthenes
with such a scurrilous produc-
tion.
1 Antisth. in Ejjict. Diss. i.
17, 12 : apx$i "TaiSfvaeciis ri TUV
OVOU.O.TUV firiffKffyis. It is a pity
that we do not know more accu-
rately the sense and the con-
nection of this saying. As it
is, we cannot judge whether it
required an individual enquiry
into t he most important names,
or only a general enquiry into
nature and the meaning of
names, which the principles
contained in the above should
develope. Respecting the
theory that Antisthenes held
to the etymologies of Heracli-
tus, see p. 297, 1.
"- Arist. Metaph. v. 29; see
296, 1; Top. i. 11 ; 104, b, 20:
ovx. %ffTiv avTt\tyeiv, na9airfp
%<pri 'AjfTiffQevris, which Alex.
(Schol. in Arist. 732, a, 30;
similarly as the passage in the
topics, Ibid. 259, b, 13) thus
explains : tpero Se 6 'AvTiffOfvys
eKaffTov TUV OVTOIV \4yfo~dai T
oiKfi<f \6ycf u.6vcp Kal 'iva eKaffrov
\6yoi> tli/at . . . ' Siv Kal awd-
yeiv eVe/paro ori ^ SO-TIV aini-
\tyeiv TOVS /J.fi> yap avTiXtyovras
irtpi TWOS Stac^opa \tyeiv 6(t>fi\fiv,
fj.$l 5vvcur6ai 8e irepl avrov 5ia<f>6-
povs TOVS \6yovs (pfpfffdai Tif fva.
Tbv olictiov fKuatov elvai tva. yap
ti>bs elvai Kal fbv KiyovTO. trepl
avTov \tyeiv p.&vov ' SiffTe fl fj.fv
Trepl TOV irpa.yfj.aTos TOV avTov
\tyoiev, TO, avra tiv \4yoiev
a\\-i)\OLS (els yap 6 irfpl et>bs
\6yos) \tyovTes Se TOUTO OVK &v
(pepovTa \fyoiev, oiiKfTi Ae'leii/
avTovs irtpl TOV avrov. Prantl,
Gesch. d. Log. i. 33, mentions
later writers, who, however,
only repeat Aristotle's sayings.
In exactly the same way Plato's
Dionysodorus (Euthyd. 285,
E.) establishes his assertion,
that it is impossible to contra-
dict : tlfflv endffrif TUV OVTUV
\6yoi ; Tldvv yt. QVKOVV dis fern*'
tKaff-rov ti d)$ OVK effTiv ; 'ns effTiv.
El yap fj.fnvrio-ai. f<pr;, Si KT-fifftirire,
Kal &pn eTTeSei^a/j,ev ^7)5eVo \fyov-
TO, us OVK effTi. Tb yap /xr) 'bv
ovftels ffpdvrt \eyo)v. HoTepov ovv
. . . avTi.Xtyoiu.ev 'h.v TOV avTov
irpdyfiaTOS Xoyov a^oTfooi \e-
yovTes, 5) ovTia fiev bt> 8-f)irov
TavTa Xtyoiu.tv ; ~S,uve^d>pfi. 'AAA'
orav /xr)5eT6pos, 6<^>Tj, Tbv TOV
irpdypaTos \oyov Xfyri, T&Tf avTi-
CYNIC MORALS.
301
mises is not only that drawn by Aristotle ' that no CHAP.
false propositions, but also that no propositions of
any kind are possible. The doctrine of Antisthenes
was logically destructive of all knowledge and every
kind of judgment.
Not that the Cynics were themselves disposed to c. Theory
renounce knowledge in consequence. Four books ^JJ^S
came from the pen of Antisthenes, respecting the evil -
difference between knowledge and opinion. 2 Indeed,
the whole School prided itself in no small degree on
having advanced beyond the deceptive sphere of
opinions, 3 and being in full possession of truth.
\eyoL/j.ev av ; i) oZrw ye rb irapa.-
irav ovS' Uv fjLefj.vrj/j.fvos eli) rov
irpa.yna.ros ovfierepos 7]/j,cav ; Kal
rovTO ffvvd>fji.o\6yei. 'A\\' apa,
'6rav 4yw Key<a (J.ev rb irpay/j.a,
ffv Se ovSe \eyets rb irapdirav o
Se iii] \eywv TO> Keyovri irus &v
avriXcyoi ; Plato probably had
Antisthenes in his eye, although
this line of argument had not
originated with him. Conf.
Zeller, 1. c. i. 905, and Diog. ix.
53 : rbi> 'AvriffQevovs \6yov rbv
irfipda/jLevov a.iroSeiKvvdv cbv OVK
fOTtv avrt\eyeiv, olros (Prota-
goras) irpuros Sifi\fKrai Kara.
<pr)ffi n\dreav fv Eu0uS^)^ (286,
c). Here, too, belongs the
saying of Antisthenes in Stob.
Flor. 82, 8, that contradiction
ought never to be used, but
only persuasion. A madman
will not be brought to his
senses by another's raving.
Contradiction is madness; for
ho who contradicts, does what
is in the nature of things impos-
sible. Of this subject the 2<0&/
*} irtpl rov a,t>itKiyfiv treated.
1 See p. 296, 1, Prod, in
Crat. 37 : 'A.vTi<rOfvris e\fytv (dj
Seiv a.vn\eyeiv ' was yap, tpTiffl,
\6yos a\T)6evfi 6 yap \4ytav rl
\eyei 6 Se rl Xeywv rb 6v \e-
yei ' 6 Se rb i>v \ey<av
Conf. Plato, Crat. 429, D.
2 Ilepl S6frs Ka
Diog. 17. Doubtless this trea-
tise contained the explanation
given p. 253, 1.
* Diog. 83 says of Monimus :
ovros pen tp.ftpiBeararos tyevero,
&<rre 5<J|>js per Karafypoveiv, irpbs
5' a\^efiav Trapop/jL^v. Menan-
der, Ibid, says of the same
Cynic : rb yap inro\n4>6ev rv<pov
elva.i irav l^rj, and Sesct. Math,
viii. 5 : MJ^/UOS 6 KVWV rvfyov
eliriav ra Trdvra, Sitep ofyfns Iffrl
rS>v OVK ovruv us Svrwv. Conf.
M. Aurel. irp. lawr. ii. 15 : Sri
irav vw6\iifyis ' Srj\a /j.fv yap ra
irpbs rou KVVIKOV VLovt/jiov \ey6-
fifva. On this ground the later
Sceptics wished to reckon Mo-
nimus one of themselves, but
wrongly so. What he says has
only reference to the worthless-
;'.02
THE SOCRATIC SCHOOLS.
CHAP.
XIII.
With them, however, knowledge is directed entirely
to a practical end, that of making men virtuous, and
happy in being virtuous. 1 As the highest object in
life the Cynics, herein agreeing with all other moral
philosophers, regarded happiness. 2 Happiness being
in general distinguished from virtue, or, at least, not
united to virtue, they regard the two as abso-
lutely identical. Nothing is good but virtue, nothing
an evil but vice ; what is neither the one nor the
other is for man indifferent. 3 For each thing that
only can be a good which belongs to it. 4 The only real
ness of common opinion and
what it considers a good. In
Lucian v. Auct. 8, Diogenes
calls himself a prophet of truth
and freedom.
1 See p. 292.
2 Diog. ii. : avrapKi] r^v apt-
T^IV irpbs ev8aifnoi>icu>, so that
happiness is the *end, and
virtue the means. Stob. Eel.
103, 20, 21.
3 Diog. vi. 104 : apeW< 8'
avToiis Kal rf\os flvai rb KOT'
aper^v ^r/v &s 'AvriffBevris <ij<rlj/ tv
rif 'HpO/cA.6?, 6fJ.oiaiS TOtS ffrULKOlS.
Ibid. 105 : TO. 8e /teTat operas
/cat KaKias aoidtbopa Xtyovffiv
6/moiws 'Aptffrcevi T<p Xl(a. Dio-
cles. in Diog. vi. 12 says of An-
tisthenes : rayaOct Ka\a rcb /cafca
aiffxp*. Epiph. Exp. Fid. 1089,
C : e^ijo-e [Diogenes] rb ayaBbv
olarbv TOiKflov iravrl ffo<p( flvcu,
TO 8' &\\a irdvTa ovSev % <p\vaplas
vwdpxfiv. Whether the epi-
gram of Athen. in Diog. vi. 14,
refers to the Cynics or the
Stoics is not quite clear.
i' u.v8tav flS-fifj.oves, &
fff\iartt>
rav aperav if'
iepats fv6efj.evoi
s ayaObv IL&VOV
Hovva Kal Ptorav pvffaro Kai
iro\ids.
According to Diogenes it would
appear as though the Stoic
doctrine that virtue is the only
good were therein attributed
to the Cynics.
4 This maxim follows from
Diog. 12, who states as the
teaching of Antisthenes : ra
Troi'Tjpo v6fu( irdvra fvixd.
Compare Plato, Symp. 205, E. :
011 -yap -rb eaurtav, dlfnai eKocrroi
aa"ndovTai, el py ? TIS rb pev
ayadbv o'lKetov Ka\oiKal tavrov, rb
8e Kaitbv a.\\&Tpiov. In the
Charm. 163, C. Critias says,
only the useful and good is
olKftov. Although Antisthenes
is not here mentioned by name,
yet the passage in Diogenes
makes it probable that the
antithesis of aya6bv and olKfiov
belongs to him, even if he was
not the first to introduce it.
CYNIC MORALS.
303
thing which belongs to man is mind. 1 Everything
else is a matter of chance. Only in his mental and
moral powers is he independent. Intelligence and
virtue constitute the only armour from which all the
attacks of fortune recoil ; 2 that man only is free who
is the servant of no external ties and no desires for
things without. 3
Thus man requires nothing to make him happy
but virtue. 4 All else he may learn to despise, in
order to content himself with virtue alone. 5 For
CHAP.
XIII.
1 Compare p. 293, 6 ; Xen.
Symp. 4, 34, puts words to the
same effect in the mouth of
Antisthenes : vopifa, & HvSpes,
TOVS afdpiatrovs OUK fV ry O"IKW
r'bv TtKovrov teal TT]V trtviav %\tiv,
&\\' Iv rats tyvxais this is then
further expanded ; and Epictet.
Diss. iii. 24, 68, makes Diogenes
say of Antisthenes : 8i8oe /ue
TO ^ttt Kal TCt OVK ffjid ' KTTJ(TtS
OUK ip.i\ ' crvyyfveis, o<eibi, rpi\ui,
<J>^/XTJ, ffvviiOtis, roirot, SiarpifMi,
irdvra ravra 6rt d\\6rpia. abv
oliv T( ; xprjffts fyavraffitov.
TI\V f8fie fj.oi
avavd-yKaffrov, K,T.\. We have,
however, certainly not got the
very words of Diogenes or
Antisthenes.
* Diog. 12 (teaching of An-
tisthenes) : avaQaiperov 8ir\ov
aperlj . , . T?XOS aff^>a.\f<Jtarov
fyp&VTiaiv 1 ufac yap Karapptiv
H-ijrt irpoSiSoffBat. The same is
a little differently expressed
by Epiph. Exp. Fid. 1089, C.
Diog. 63 says of Diogenes :
fywTTjfoh rl ainj vfptytyovfv tn
<pt\offo<pias, <f>T)' (I Kal nT)8fv &\\o,
rb yovv irpbs Trotrof rvx^v irapf-
<TKfvaff6ai and 105 : apto-Kfi aw-
fTUTp4ireii>. Stob.
Ekl. ii. 348 : Aioye'j/Tjr ^ 6pav
TV Tvxw evopuffav avr$ Kal \t-
yovffav ' TOVTOV S' ov 8uva.fj.aL
Pa\4eiv K<>va \vfffffirripa. (The
same verse is applied by David,
Schol. in Arist. 23, to Antis-
thenes.) Conf. Stob. Floril.
108, 71.
8 This is what Diogenes
says of himself in Evict.
Diss. iii. 24, 67 : i ol ^ 'Av-
\evcra, and he also asserts in
Diog. 71 that he led the life of
a Hercules, nySfv 4\fv6fpias
irpoKpivutv. Crates in Clem.
Strom, ii. 413, A. (Theod. Cur.
Gr. Aff. xii. 49, p. 172) praises
the Cynics :
Kal &
and he exhorts his Hipparchia
ft aya\-
otiff inrb
ovd' for'
4 See note 2.
See Diog. 105 : 4pVict 8'
THE SOCRATIC SCHOOLS.
CHAP.
XIII.
what is wealth without virtue ? A prey for flatterers
and venal menials, a temptation for avarice, this root
of all evil, a fountain of untold crimes and deeds of
shame, a possession for ants and dung-beetles, a thing
bringing neither glory nor enjoyment. 1 Indeed what
else can wealth be, if it be true that wealth and virtue
can never dwell together, 2 the Cynic's beggar-life
being the only straight way to wisdom ? 3 What are
honour and shame ? The talk of fools, about which
no child of reason will trouble himself? For in truth
facts are the very opposite of what we think. Honour
amongst men is an evil. To be despised by them is
a good, since it keeps us back from vain attempts.
G-lory only falls to his lot, who seeks it not. 4 What
avrois Kal \IT>S fiiovv, irKofaov V. Auct. 1 1 ; Crates in Epiph.
Kal SO'ITJS Kal tvyeveias Kara<ppo- Exp. Fid. 1089, C. : fhev6epias
vovffi. Diog. 24. Epict. Diss.
i. 24, 6.
1 Antisth. in Stob. Floril. i.
30; 10, 42; Xen. Sym. 4, 35;
Diog. in Diog. 47; 50; 60;
Galen. Exhort, c. 7, i. 10, K.
Metrocles in Diog. 95 ; Crates
in Stob. 97, 27; 15, 10; the
same in Julian, Or. vi. 199, D.
2 Stob. Floril. 93, 35 : ^1076-
VTJS f\eye, JUT)TC ev ird\ft irXovffla
jUTJTe fi> oiKiq apfriiv oiKflv 8vva-
o-0of. Crates therefore disposed
of his property, and is said to
have settled that it should
only be restored to his children
when they ceased to be philo-
sophers (Diog. 88, on the autho-
rity of Demetrius Magnes).
Unfortunately, however, Crates
can at that time have neither
had a wife nor children.
8 Diog. 104; Diog. in Stob.
Floril. 95, 11 ; 19. See Lucian
4 Epiet. Diss. i. 24, 6 : (AJO-
76j/Tjs) \eyfi, Sri evSotfa (Winck-
elmann, p. 47, suggests aSo|i'a,
which certainly might be ex-
pected from what preceded)
\}/6$os eff-rl paivoufvuv avdpiairuv .
Diog. 11 says of Antisth. : r-fiv
T' a5oW ayaObv Kal t<rov r$
ir&vtf, and 72 : evyeveias 5e Kal
So^as Kal TO rotavra iravra 8(6-
7rcue (Diogenes), irpoKO(Tfj.-fiiJ.aTa
Kaitias elvai \fycav. In 41 he
speaks of 5<J{ijs f^ave^fiara.. In
92: e\fj 8e (Crates) ^f'xp' TOW-
SOU 5e<V tyiKoffofyelv, ptxpi &v
$6<offiv ol ffrpa-riryol flvai 01/17-
\drat. Compare also 93. Doxo-
pater in Aphthon. c. 2, Rhet.
Gr. i. 192, says that Diogenes,
in answer to the question, How
is honour to be gained ? re-
plied ' By not troubling your-
self at all about honour.'
CYNIC MORALS.
305
is death ? Clearly not an evil. For only what is bad l
is an evil : and death we do not experience to be an
evil, since we have no further experience when we are
dead. 1 All these things are then only empty fancies, 3
nothing more. Wisdom consists in holding one's
thoughts free from them. 4 The most worthless and
the most harmful thing is what men most covet
pleasure. Pleasure -the Cynics not only deny to be
a good,* but they declare it to be the greatest evil ;
and a saying is preserved of Antisthenes, that he
would rather be mad than pleased. 6 Where the desire
of pleasure becomes unbridled passion, as in love,
CHAK
XI IL
1 Epict. 1. C. : Ae'^yei, on 6 Qava-
TOS GVK fffre KO.KOV, ovSe yap al-
<rxp6v. See p. 302, 3.
z Diogenes in Diog. 68.
Conf. Cic. Tusc. i. 43, 104.
Evidently the Cynic here is
not thinking of immortality,
nor does it follow from the re-
mark of Antisthenes on II. xxiii.
15 (Schol. Venet, in Wincltel-
mann, p, 28) to the effect that
the souls have the same forms
as their bodies.
3 Or as the Cynics techni-
cally call it, mere smoke,
TvQos. See Jfiog. 26, 83, 86,
and p. 301, 3.
4 Clemens. Strom, ii. 417, B.
(TJimd. Cur. Gr. Aff. xi. 8, p.
152) :' AvTiffdfi/r)s fj.tv T^\V arv-
tf>(ai> (reXoy oTre'^pj/ei).
As Crates probably the
Cynic proves in Teles, in Stab.
Floril. 98, 72 by the considera-
tion, that the human life from
beginning to end brings far
more unhappincss than plea-
sure; if therefore the irXeoi^-
ov<rai riSoval were the measure
of happiness, a happy man
could not be found.
6 Di0ff. vi. 3 :
Ib. is. 101. Conf. Kext. Math.
xi. 741 : [?/ riSov), &<{{]
/co/c& VTT' 'Aj/rr0eVoi/s. The same
in Gcll. ix. 5, 3 ; Clemens. Stro-
mat. ii. 412, D. ; Etis. Pr. Ev.
xv. 13, 7 (Theod. Cur. Gr. Aff.
xii. 47, p. 172). Conf. Dwg. vi.
8, 14, and p. 258, 4. Plato is
no doubt referring to this
Cynical dictum, Phileb. 44, C. :
, Siffrt Kal otcrb TOVTO
(Ivat, and Arist. Eth. x. 1, 1172,
a, 27 : ol p.ev ybp rayaObv rjSov^v
\fyovffiv, ol 8' t tvavTlas Ko/*(5p
<pav\ov. Ib. vii. 12, 1152, b, 8:
rois fjitv o{>i> SoKf"i ovSfuia rjSovr]
flvai ayaebv o&rf KaO' ainb otnt
Kara. <ruju/3/3ij>c({s ov y&p tlvat
ravrbv ayaBbv Kal T)*ov4)v. Com-
pare p. 296.
806 THE SOCRATIC SCHOOLS.
CHAP. where man lowers himself to be the slave of his de-
XnL sires, there no means can be too violent to eradicate
it. 1 Conversely, what most men fear, labour and
toil, are good, because they only bring man to that
state, in which he can be independent. 2 Hercules 3
is therefore the patron-saint and pattern for the.
Cynic, 4 no one else having fought his way through so
arduous and toilsome a life for the good of mankind,
with so much courage and vigour. In support of this
view, Antisthenes appears to have argued that plea-
sure is nothing but the pause after pain. 5 On this
1 Clemens, 1. c. 406, C. : eyia if they are to come to any
Se ebroSe'xoM"" T ^" 'AvriffBevnv, good, ought to be educated by
TV 'A^poSiTTji', \eyovra, kav abstemiousness, as early as they
Kararo^evo-aim, el hafioi/jLi on are susceptible of culture.
TroXAos rifjLuv KaXas Kal ayaBas 3 Who had also a temple
yvvalKas SietpBeipev. r6v re epwra near Cynosarges.
KaKlav <f>rjeri (pvffews 3)5 Arrows 4 Antisthenes speaks of two
ovres ol KaKooafaoves Bebv r^v Herculeses, Diog. 2, 18. Winc-
voffov KaXoTxnv. Crates in Diog. kelmann, p. 15. Diogenes says
vi. 86 (Clemens. Strom, ii. of himself in Diog. 71: rbv
412, D. ; Tlieod. 1. C. xii. 49 ; avrbv xapaKrfipa rov &ov 8ie|<{-
Jldlan, Or. vi. 198, D.) : ye.iv ovwep Kal 'HpaKAijs, nrfev
, , , ., , e\evdeplas irpoKpivuv. Therefore
epura vavei ^6s, et Se w, ^ ^ jg-f^ ^ ^ ^^
Xpovos ^ Antisthenes 'HpaK\ewriK6s rts
eavSe rovrois & Svvy xp^ai, d ^ p ^ ^ ^ in lAidan,
fipoxos. y > _^ uc t. 8, Diogenes replies to
On the same subject compare the query as to whom he was
also Diog. vi. 38 ; 51 ; 67 ; Stob. imitating : rbv 'HpaK\ea, at the
Floril. 64, 1; 6, 2; 18, 27 ; same time showing his stick
Diog. 66 : TOVS f/Av oiKeras e<prj for a club, and his philosopher's
roTj 8eo-7T(5Tois. rovs 8e tpav\ovs cloak for a lion's skin, with
TO?J tiriBvuiais Sov\eveif. See p. the addition, which probably
303, 3. comes from a Cynic writing :
2 Diog. vi. 2, says of Anti- o-rparevofjiai 8e Sxrirep eKetvos eirl
sthenes : Kal on 6 ir6vos dya6bv ras rjSovas . . . e^KKaQapai rbv
ffvveo-rriffe Sia rov ^eyaXov 'Hpo- filov irpoaipovfJLevos, . . . f\evBe-
K\eovs Kal rov Kvpov. Diogenes pavr^s el/ju ruv avOpdnrtov Kal larpbs
says in Exc. e Floril. Jo. ruv ira6wi>. See Dens. Cyn. 13,
Damasc. ii. 13, 87 (Stob. Floril. Julian, Or. vi. 187, C.
ed. Mein. iv. 200) that boys, 5 Plato, Phileb. 44, B. (Conf.
CYNIC MORALS.
307
61, A. ; Rep. ix. 583, B.) speaks
of people, as nd\a Suvovs \ryo-
(j.fvovs TO. irepl <pvffiv, of Toirapo-
irav rjSovas ov tpcuriv tlvai, for
they maintain \\nrS>v Tavras
flva.1 iraffas airotfrvyas &s vvv ol
supposition it will appear absurd to pursue pleasure ;
which can only be attained by having previously ex-
perienced a corresponding amount of pain.
From this rigid development of their principles
to which Antisthenes had been brought, partly by
his own natural temperament, 1 partly from regard to
without including pleasure
thereunder. If the further
objection is raised, that the
opponents of pleasure here
referred to, hate (according to
Phil. 46, A) TO.S TUV a^xn^i/uv
TjSovas, whereas the Cynics al-
lowed no difference between
things seemly and unseemly,
this rests on a misapprehen-
sion; for the riSoval rwv affxi-
fj.6ixav are, as the context
shows, condemned by the op-
ponents of pleasure, not because
of their unseemliness, but be-
cause they are always combined
with unhappiness. Nor can we
assert that Plato would not
have spoken of Antisthenes
with so much consideration as
he here does (44, C.). If he
at one time of life replied to
his sallies with appropriate
severity (see p. 292, 2 ; 299, 3),
it does not follow that after the
lapse of years, and in respect
of a question on which their
views more nearly approxi-
mated, he could not express
himself more gently and ap-
preciatingly. Yet even here
he will not allow to him the
properly scientific capacity, the
Tt~)(vr\,
1 Plato, 1. c. continues : rob-
rdis olv i)(j.as ir^repa
CHAP.
XIII.
<riv. This passage refers with-
out doubt to Antisthenes.
Wendt (Phil. Cyren. 17, 1)
applies it to philosophers who
declare freedom from pain to
be the highest good. Grate,
Plato, ii. 609, thinks of the
Pythagoreans, from whom he
imagines Speusippus derived
his theory of pleasure. Only
no philosophers of Plato's age
are known to us who made
freedom from pain the highest
good. As to the Pythagoreans,
we know of their asceticism,
but no ethical theory of theirs
is known to us thoroughly
rejecting pleasure. On the
other hand we know that Anti-
sthenes did reject pleasure.
The probability is, therefore,
that Plato in writing this pas-
sage had Antisthenes in his
eye. That the expression
Stivol ret Trept <pva-it> is no obstacle
to this view, has been already
indicated, p. 294, 4 ; the ex-
pression not referring to phy-
sical research, but to the prac-
tical enquiry as to what is con-
formable to nature, to which
Antisthenes wanted to go back
O&K, a\A" Sxrirep fj.di>Te<ri irpoff-
XpijffOa.1 TW, fj.avTiv);j.tt>ots ov
X 2
308 THE SOCRATIC SCHOOLS.
CHAP, it as a means of education, 1 the Cynics, however, so
' far departed, as to recognise a certain kind of pleasure
to be legitimate. Pleasure which is not followed by
remorse, 2 or more accurately, pleasure resulting from
labour and effort, 3 is said to have been called a good,
even by Antisthenes. In Stobseus, 4 Diogenes recom-
mends justice as the most useful and at the same time
as the most pleasant thing, because it alone affords
peace of mind, protects from trouble and sickness,
and even secures bodily enjoyments. He also asserts, 5 "
that happiness consists in that true joy which can
only be obtained by an unruffled cheerfulness of mind.
Moreover, the Cynics when wishing to set forth the
advantages of their philosophy, did not fail to follow
in the steps of Socrates, by asserting that life with
them was far more pleasant and independent than
with other men, that their abstemiousness gave the
right flavour to enjoyment, and that mental delights
rexvrt, a\\d TIVI Sucrx.eptia cf>v- z AtJtai. xii. 513, a: 'Avri-
ae<as OVK ayfwovs, \iav, K.T.\. crBevris Se T^V TjSov^y ayaBbv flvat
See p. 305, 6. <t>daK(av, trpofftOriKe Tr\v d/jLercupi-
1 Arist. Eth. x. 1 : Some A.TJTOJ/, but we require to know
hold pleasure to be altogether the context in which Antis-
a mistake : of plv fircos imreiff- thenes uttered this.
fieVoi OVTOI Kal fx f '"> * s ^ oMficvoi 3 Antisth. in ,Stol>. Flor. 25>,
&e\rioj/ tlvai -npbs rbr fiiov ynwv 65 : ySovb.* T^S /uera TOVS ir6vovs
airotyaiveu' r^]v fjSovTiv T&V (j>av- SiwKreov, d\\' ov^l ras wpb ruv
Awf, Kal fl /J.$i fffriv fieweiv yap irAvtav.
TOVS iro\\ovs Trpbs O.VTTJV Kal Soi'- 4 Floril. 9, 49 ; 24, ] 4, wliero
\fveiv ra?s ffSova'ts, Sib Se'tv els probably the Cynic Diogenes
Tovvaintov ayeiv f\6e?v yap tu> is alluded to. It is, however, a
otfrcos ttrl rb fnftrov. D'wg. vi. 35 : question whether the words
fj.iUf'iffOat, e\eye (Aioye'wjs) TOVS are taken from a genuine
XOpoStSaerKaAous ' Kal yap ttcfivovs writing of his.
inrtp T6vov evSiSovai eVeKa TOV rovs 5 Ibid. 103, 20 ; 21.
Aoiirous atyaffOat TOV irpoo"f)KOi/Tos
T&VOV.
CYNIC MORALS.
afforded a far higher pleasure than sensual ones. 1
Still all that this language proves is, that their theory
was imperfectly developed, and that their mode of
expression was inaccurate, their meaning being that
pleasure as such ought in no case to be an end, 2 and
that when it is anything more than a natural conse-
CHAP.
xm.
1 Thus in Xcn. Symp. 4, 34,
where the description appears
on the whole to be true, Anti-
sthenes demonstrates that in
his poverty he was the happiest
of men. Food, drink, and
.sleep he enjoyed ; better
clothes he did not need ; and
from all these things he had
more enjoyment than he liked ;
.so little did he need that he
was never embarrassed to think
how he should tind support ; he
had plenty of leisure to asso-
ciate with Socrates, and if he
wanted a pleasant day, there
was no need to purchase the
requisite materials in the mar-
ket, but he had them ready in
the soul. Diogenes in Diofj.
71, speaks in a similar strain
.(not to mention Dio Cfiryn. Qr.
^vi. 12 ; 33) ; he who lias learned
to despise pleasure, finds there-
in his highest pleasure ; and in
PUt. De Exil. 12, p. 605, he
congratulates himself on not
having, like Aristotle, to wait
for Philip for breakfast; or
like Callisthenes for Alexander
(UioyAo) : to the virtuous man
according to Diogenes (Pint.
Tranq. An. 20, p. 477) every day
is a festival. In like manner
Pint. Tranquil. An. 4, says that
Orates passed his life in jesting
and joking, like one perpetual
festival; and Metrocles (in
Plutarch, An. Vitios. ad Infelic.
3, p. 499), like Diogenes (in
TAician, V. Auct. 9), blesses him-
self for being happier than
the Persian king. See Diwj.
44, 78.
- As Hitter, ii. 121, has re-
marked, the difference between
the teaching of Antisthenes
and that of Aristippus might
be thus expressed : Aristippus
considered the result of the
emotion of the soul to be the
good ; Antisthenes considered
the emotion itself to be the
end, and the value of the
action to consist in the doing
of it. Hitter, however, asks
with justice whether Anti-
sthenes ever went back so far
as this, since it is never dis-
tinctly imputed to him. And
in the same way it will be
found that Aristippus never
regarded pleasure as a state of
rest, but as a state of motion
for the soul. The contrary is
not established by what Her-
mann, Ges. Abh. 237, f. al-
leges. Hermann proves, it is
true, that Antisthenes con-
sidered the good to be virtu-
ous activity, and that Aristip-
pus took it to be pleasure, but
lie does not prove that Anti-
sthenes and Aristippus spoke
in explicit terms of the rest
and the motion of the soul.
310 THE SOCRATIC SCHOOLS.
CHAP, quence of action and of satisfying essential wants, it
XnL is a thing to be avoided.
From these considerations followed the conclusion,
that everything else excepting virtue and vice is in-
different for us, and that we in turn ought to be
indifferent thereto. Only those who soar above
poverty and wealth, shame and honour, ease and
fatigue, life and death, and who are prepared to
submit to any work and state in life, who fear no
one, troubling themselves about nothing only such
as these offer no exposed places to fortune, and can
therefore be free and happy. 1
(l) yirtve. As yet, here are only the negative conditions of
happiness. What is the positive side corresponding
thereto ? Virtue alone bringing happiness, and the
goods of the soul being alone worth possessing, in
what does virtue consist ? Virtue, replies Antis-
thenes, herein following Socrates and Euclid, consists
in wisdom or prudence ; 2 and Eeason is the only
1 Diog. in Stob. Floril. 86, sophy was 6(p/j.iav re x"! Ka *
19 (89, 4), says the noblest -rb /xrjSej/fcs /j.t\fiv. Antis. in
men are ol KaraQpovovvres ir\ov- Stob. Floril. 8, 14 : Sorts Sf
rov S6r]S fiSovris (afjs, TWV 5e ertpous Se'Sot/ce 8ov\os &>v \4\rt9ev
fvavritav virfpdvta ovres, irtvias eavr6y. Diogenes in Dwy. 75 :
o8oi'as ir6vov Gavdrov. Dioff. 5ov\ov rb <po^e1frQa.i. See pp.
29 says of the same : tmivei 302, 2 ; 303, 2 and 3 ; 305, 4.
TOI/S /j.e\\ovras ya.fi.t1v KO\ ^ 2 This follows from Di-og.
yafj.e'iv, Kal rovs /j.e\Kovras KOTO- 13 : relx os ourtpaKeffTarov <pp6-
ir\eii' Kal fJL^i Karair\f'tv, Kal rov? vf\<uv . . . rfi^ri KaraffKevaffrfOV
jUe'AAoj/Tos iro\trfveffdai Kal ju^ ec rots avrSiv a.va\<arois \oyt-
iro\iTveo'Bai, Kal rovs iratSorpo- a/Aois, if we connect with it his
<peiv Kal fjLT] 7rai5orpo</)l', Kal rovs maxims about the oneness and
irapao~Ktvaou.evovs ffv^tovv rots the teachableness of virtue, .
Swdffrais Kal ju^ irpoffdvras. and his doctrine of the wise
Crates, Ibid. 86, says that man.
what he had gained by philo-
CYNIC VIRTUE.
thing which gives a value to life. 1 Hence, as his
teacher had done before him, he concludes that virtue
is one and indivisible, 2 that the same moral problem
is presented to every class of men, 3 and that virtue
is the result of teaching. 4 He further maintains that
virtue is an inalienable possession ; for what is once
known can never be forgotten. 5 He thus bridges
over a gulf 6 in the teaching of Socrates by a system
in which Sophistical views 7 contributed no less than
practical interests to make virtue in itself indepen-
dent of everything external. 8 Wherein, however,
CHAP.
xm.
1 Compare the saying attri-
buted to Antisthenes in Phit.
Sto. Rep. 14, 7, p. 1040, and to
Diogenes in Divg. 24 : els rbv
fliov irapfffKfvd^fa-dai Sell/ \6yov rj
Bp6x ov - ^ so Diog. 3.
2 SchoL Lips, on H. O. 123
( Winckelmann, p. 28) : 'Avri-
<r6fvris tyt\a\v, ws ft TI irpdrrei 6
ffofybs Kara -rraaav [aptT^f eVep^e?.
3 Dwg. 12 according to Dio-
des : avSpbs Kal yvvaiKbs
Diog. 10 : SiSaK-rV aireSefoi/ue
J) TT}V apfrr)f. 105 :
apfffKti 8' avrots ical r^]v aper^v
fiitiaKTTjv flvcu, Ka6a <pr]<rlt> 'Atri-
a6eirr\s Iv rep 'Hpa.K\ei, Kal ava.-
ir6fi\i]Tov inrdpxeu'. Without
doubt the reference in Isocr.
Hel. i. 1 is also to Antisthenes.
Lsocrates quotes the passages
just given, with the sentence
of Antisthenes which was dis-
cussed p. 300, 2, added : KOTO-
yfyTtpaKaffiv ol /uei/ ov <pdffKovrfs
oUv T' tlvai tyfvSri \eytiv ou5'
i/Tt\*7ii/. . . . ol 8e 8ieio>/Ts
ws avSpla. Kal ffotyia xa.1 StKaioffvvr)
ravr6v tffri' Kal tyvffft /j.fv ovStv
av-rSiv (opfv w'a 5'
irepl TO.S epttias SiaTpi^ovffi K.T.A.
The expression of ^tey, . . . ol
tie does not prove that the first
of these statements belongs to
a different school from that
to which the second belongs.
5 Diog. 12 : a.va<pa.(pcrov oir\ov
f, ape-rh. Xen. Mem. i. 2, 19 :
Iffus olv efaoiev &v iro\\ol Ttav
<t>affK6vr{av <pi\o<ro(pf'ii', on OVK
av Trore 6 Siitaios aSixos yevotro,
ovSe 6 awQpwv v^piffT^s, ovSf &\\o
ovSev, 5>v uddfiffis laTiv, 6 [taOkv
a.veiriffT'ft/j.wv av irore "yeVotro.
a The maxim that prudence
is insuperable. See p. 142, 3.
7 The maxim that you cannot
forget what you know is only
the con verse; of the Sophistic
maxim that you cannot learn
what you do not know.
8 It is only independent of
external circumstances, when
it cannot be lost : for since the
wise and virtuous man will
never, as long as he continues
wise and virtuous, forego his
wisdom and virtue, and since,
according to the teaching of
Socrates, no one intentionally
312 THE SOCRATIC SCHOOLS.
CHAP. true prudence consisted the Cynics could not say
XIIT ' more precisely. If it were described as knowledge
concerning the good, 1 this, as Plato justly observed, 2
was simply a tautology. If, on the contrary, it were
said to consist in unlearning what is bad, 3 neither
does this negative expression lead a single step
further. So much only is clear, that the prudence of
Antisthenes and his School invariably coincides with
a right state of will, of firmness, of self-control and
of uprightness, 4 thus bringing us back to the
Socratic doctrine of the oneness of virtue and know-
ledge. Hence by learning virtue, they understood
moral exercise rather than intellectual research. 5
They would not have recognised the Platonic and
Aristotelian distinction between a conventional and
a philosophical, an ethical and an intellectual virtue ;
does wrong, it follows that e<J>rj, rb /ca/ca cbro/xa0e'. The
knowledge can only be taken same is found in Exc. e Floril.
away by a cause foreign to the Joan. Damasc. ii. 13, 34 (titob.
will of the individual. Floril. ed. Mein. iv. 193).
. ' Plato, Rep. vi. 505, B. : 4 Compare pp. 292, 1 ; 303, 2
a\\a HTJV T<55e ye olaBa, 'OTI TO?S and 3.
ft.tv TIO\\OIS fiSovri SoKel elvai rb s Here it may suffice to call
ayaObv, rots tie Ko^orepois <pp6vr)- to mind what has been said p.
ffis . . . . Kal OTI ye, 5 <f>i\f, ol 292, 1, and what Diogenes in
TOVTO fiyovpevoi OVK , exovffi 8e7|ai Dioff. 70 says : SITTTJJ/ 8' e\eyev
JJTis <pp6vriffis, a\\' avayKa&vTai etvai T^V &ffKt}(riv, T^V (lev ibv%i-
re\(vreavTes T}\V TOV ayaBov KTJV, T^]V 8e ffUfnaTiKT}V ravrriv
<j>dvai. If the Cynics are not ... (the text here appears
here exclusively meant, the faulty) naff fyv ev yvfj-vaaia. awe-
passage at any rate refers to xets [<rwex] ? yi.v6fj.evai [ai]
them. (pavTaalai ev\vffiav Trpbs TO. TTJS
2 1. c. apeTfjs ep7 Trape'xoj/rai' eivai 8'
3 Dioff. 8, according to Pha- a.re\ri r^v erepav xcopis TTJS eTepas
nias : ('AvTKrfleVTjs) f pear-ridels inrb . . . iraperidero Se r(Kfj.rtpia TOV
TOV . . . T'I iroitav Ka\bs KayaObs paSicoy airb rijs yvfivaffias ev TTJ
effoiTO, </>?} et rck KO.KO. & X 6 ' 9 "P 6T j? KaTaylveaOai '(to be at
STI <t>evKT<i effTi pdOois irapa TWV home in); for in every art prac-
elUTuv. Ibid. 7: epurneels Tl tice makes perfect; 71: ovtiev ye
ava.yicai6TO.Toi', ^v e\eye Tb irapdirav iv T$ filco
CYXIC WISDOM ASD FOLLY. 313
and in answer to Meno's l question, whether virtue CHAP.
was produced by exercise or instruction, they would
have replied, that practice was the best instruction.
He who has attained to virtue by the help of the (2) Wig-
Cynic teaching, is a wise man. Everyone else is '
lacking in wisdom. To tell the advantages of the
one, and the misery of the other, no words are too
strong for the Cynics. The wise man never suffers
want, for all things are his. He is at home every-
where, and can accommodate himself to any circum-
stances. Faultless and love-inspiring, fortune cannot
touch him. 2 An image of the divinity, he lives with
the Grods. His whole life is a festival, and the Ofods,
whose friend he is, bestow on him everything. 3 The
reverse is the case with the great bulk of mankind.
Most of them are mentally crippled, slaves of fancy,
severed only by a finger's breadth from madness.
To find a real man, you must look for him with a
lantern in broad daylight. Misery and stupidity are
8v- b.ya6bs, rj t
ravrrjv irav ^KviKr\ffai. Xtyovffiv. Yet Diogenes (in
1 Plato, Meno, init. Diog. 89) allows that no one is
- Diwj. 11: avrdpK-n r' eivai perfectly free from faults.
rbv <ro<f>6v irdma yap avrov 3 Diogenes, in Dwg. 51 : TOVS
elvau TO. TUV fiAAaij/. Ibid. 12 ayaOovs avSpas 6ewi> et/cdcas elvat.
(according to Diodes) : ry Ibid. 37, 72 : TUV 6tS>v fan
<ro<f>w 4vov ovSfv ov& Hiropov. irdvra- <f>l\ot 5e of <ro<pol vois
6 aya66s. Ibid. 105 : 0eo?s KOIVO. 5e ra. T&V (pi\o>v.
e -rbir ffofov ical ava- irdv-r' 1 &pa tffrl TUV ao<pS>v.
/cat <t>i\ov T$ 6fiolte, rvxrj Diog. in Plut. Tran. An. 20 :
re yuTjSej' firnpfirftv. See p. 30i5, dvfyp * dyudbs ov itaaav finepiur
2. The ])assage in Arigt. Etli. fopr^iv riye'irai ; Exc. e Floril.
X. \ ii. 14, 1053, b, 19, probably Joan. Damasc. ii. 13, 76 : 'Art-
also refers to the Cynics : ol 5i oQtvijs tpuryefls inr6 TWOS -ri Si-
rbv Tpo\i6fj.evov Kal rbv Svffrv- 5a|ei rbv vibv, tiitfV ft fi.tv Otots
Xau fifyd\ois iffpiiriirrovra tv- nd\\ei avp&iovv, $i\6ao'pov, et 5e
Saiuova (pdffKomfs cTrat, ta.v y d.v6prl>irots,
314
THE SOCRATIC SCHOOLS.
CHAP.
XIII.
D. The
practical
effects of
their
teaching.
the universal fate of mortals. 1 Accordingly all man-
kind are divided into two classes. Innumerable fools
stand opposite to a small number of wise men.
Only a very few are happy through prudence and
virtue. All the rest live in misfortune and folly,
only the fewest of all being aware of their deplorable
state.
Following out these principles, the Cynics con-
ceived it to be their special mission to set an example
themselves of strict morality, of abstemiousness, of
the independence of the wise man, and also to exercise
a beneficial and strengthening influence on others.
To this mission they devoted themselves with extra-
ordinary self-denial, not, however, without falling
into such extravagances and absurdities, such offensive
coarseness, utter shamelessness, overbearing self-con-
ceit, and empty boasting, that it is hard to say
whether their strength of mind rather calls for ad-
miration, or their eccentricities for ridicule ; and
1 Dioy. 33 : avairhpovs eA.eye
(Aioye'j/Tjy) ov TOIIS Kuxpoiis /cat
rv(p\ovs, a\\a rovs /J.-T] Uxovras
iT'flpav. Ibid. 35 : rovs ir\fi-
ffrovs e\eye irapct, SaKTu\ov fMivf-
ffOai. Compare what has been
said of Socrates p. 121, 2, Ibid.
47 : TOWS ffiropas Kal -navras rovs
ev5oo\oyovvra.s rpi(rav6pctnrovs a-
TreK(i\fi avf\ rov rpiffa6\iovs>
Ibid. 71 : Instead of becoming
happy by practice of virtue,
men irapa r^v &voiav KOKoSoj^uo-
vovfft. Ibid. 33 : irpbs rbv
flirovTa ' TlvBta. vtKca &i'5pa$, tyw
/iej/ oZv, fiirtv, &vSpas, ffv 8' dj/-
8pd7ro5o. Ibid. 27 : men he
had found .nowhere, but boys
he had found in Lacedaemon.
Ibid. 41 ; the story of Diogenes
with his lantern. Ibid. 86 - f
verses of Crates on the stupi-
dity of mankind. Compare
also Stpb. Floril. 4, 52. Dio-
genes in Exc. e Floril. Joan.
Damasc. ii. 13, 75, says that
the vilest thing upon earth is a
man without culture. Either
Diogenes or Philisciis asserts in
Stob. Flor. 22, 41 (Conf. Diog.
vi. 80) : 6 -rvtpos Sxrirep TroijuV ov
6t\et [rovs iro\\ovs] &yei. Com-
pare p. 292, 2.
CYNIC SELF-RENUNCIATION. 315
whether they rather command esteem, or dislike, or CHAP.
commiseration. Previous enquiries, however, make _
it possible for us to refer these various peculiarities
to one common source.
The leading thought of Cynicism is the self-suffi- (l) Self-
ciency of virtue. 1 Blunt and onesided in their con-
ception of this principle, the Cynics were not content
with a mere inward independence of the enjoyments
and wants of life. Their aim, they thought, could
only be reached by entirely renouncing all enjoyment,
by limiting their wants to what is absolutely indis-
pensable, by deadening their feelings to outward
impressions, and by cultivating indifference to all
that is not in their own power. The Socratic inde-
pendence of wants 2 became with them a renunciation
of the world. 3 Poor to begin with, 4 or renouncing
their property voluntarily , s they lived as beggars. 6
1 See p. 302. guise, the staff and scrip; nor
2 According to Diog. vi. 105, is the truth of his account im-
conf . Lvcian, Cyn. 12, Dio- pugned by Sosicrates, in saying
genes repeated the language that Diodorus of Aspendus
which we saw Socrates used, p. was the first to do so ; for this
64, 3. To the same effect is statement is not very accurate,
the story that Diogenes, at the both Antisthenes and Diogenes
beginning of his Cj r nic career, being older than Diodorus.
refused to look for a runaway Nevertheless, in Liog. 22, Dio-
slave, because he could do genes is described with great
without his slave as well as probability as the originator
the slave could do without of the full mendicant garb,
him. Diog. 55 ; Stob. Floril. 62, and he is also said to have been
47. Ibid. 97, 31, p. 215 Mein. the first to gain his living by
3 See pp. 303; 310, 1. begging. Diog. 38 ; 46 ; 49 ;
4 Such as Antisthenes, Dio- Teles, in Stob. Flor. v. 67;
genes, and Monimus. Hieron. adv. Jovin. ii. 207.
5 Such as Crates and Hip- His followers Crates (see the
parchia. verses in Diog. 85 and 90) and
6 According to Diocles in Monimus (Diog. 82) adopted
Diog. vi. 13, Antisthenes al- the same course.
ready assumed the beggar's
316
THE SOCRATIC SCHOOLS.
CHAP. Possessing no houses of their own, they passed the
Xin ' day in the streets, or in other public places; the
nights they spent in porticoes, or wherever else
chance might guide them. 1 Furniture they did not
need. 2 A bed seemed superfluous. 3 The simple
Greek dress was by them made still simpler, and they
were content with the tribon 4 of Socrates, the ordi-
nary dress of the lower orders, 5 without any under-
1 Diogenes must have been
the first to act thus. For An-
tisthenes in Xen. Symp. 4, 38,
still speaks of having a house,
although its furniture was con-
fined to the bare walls. Dio-
genes, however, and the later
Cynics lived as described. See
Uiog. 22; 38; 76; 105: Teles.
1. c. and in Stob. Floril. 97, 31,
p. 215 Mein. Hieron. Lucian,
V. Auct. 9. Diogenes for a
time took up his abode in a
tub which stood in the en-
trance-court of Metroon, at
Athens, as had been done by
homeless folk before. Diog.
23 ; 43 ; 105 ; Sen. Ep. 90, 14.
But it cannot have been, as
Juvenal, xiv. 208, and Zawian,
Consc. His. 3, represent it, that
he spent his whole life there
without any other home, even
carrying his tub about with
him, as a snail does its shell.
Compare SteinJiart, 1. c. p. 302
Gottling, Ges. Abh. 258, and
Brucker's report of the discus-
sions between Hermann and
Kasseus, Hist. Phil. i. 872.
Equally fictitious is the roman-
tic story that Crates and Hip-
parchia lived in a tub. Simpl.
inEpict. Enchir. p. 270. All
that Musonius in Stob. Floril.
67, 20, p. 4, Mein. says is that
they spent day and night in
the open porticoes. In south-
ern countries they even now
often spend the night in a
portico.
- The story that Diogenes
threw away Ms cup, when he
had seen a boy drinking with
the hollow of his hand, is well
known. Diog. 37 ; Pint. Prof.
in Virt. 8, p. 79; Seneca, Ep.
90, 14 ; Hier. 1. c. He is also
reported to have trampled on
Plato's costly carpets with the
words, iraru rbv Hhdrcavos TV-
Qov, to which Plato replied,
erepitiye -rvtytp, Aioytves. Dwg,
26.
3 Antisthenes in Xen. Symp.
4, 38, boasts that he slept ad-
mirably on the simplest bed.
And the fragment in Demetr.
de Elocut. 249 (Winckelmann,
p. 52), belongs here. As far as
Diogenes (Epict. Dido. i. 24, 7,
distinctly asserts this of Dio-
genes) and Crates are concern-
ed, they slept, as a matter of
course, on the bare ground.
4 Compare the passages
quoted p. 54, 4.
5 That is at Athens; at
Sparta the rpifteav was univer-
sal (Gottling, 256; Hermann,
CYNIC SELF-RENUNCIATION.
317
clothing. 1 In scantiness of diet they even surpassed
the very limited requirements of their fellow coun-
trymen. 2 It is said that Diogenes tried to do without
fire, by eating his meat raw, 3 and he is credited with
saying that everything, without exception, human
flesh included, might be used for purposes of food. 4
Even in extreme age he refused to depart from his
accustomed manner of living, 5 and lest his friends
should expend any unnecessary care on his corpse, he
forbad their burying it at all. 6 A life in harmony
CHAP.
xni.
Antiquit. iii. 21, 14), from
which it will be seen, that the
word did not originally mean
something worn out, but a
rough dress which rubbed the
skin; an t/jidriov rplpov not an
1/j.a.Tiov rerpi/j.p.fvov, and that
ipd/nov Tp(f3wv ytv6nfvov in Stol).
Ploril. 5, 67, means a covering
which had grown rough.
1 This was often done by the
poor (Hermann, 1. c.) Anti-
sthenes, however, or Diogenes,
according to others, made this
dress the dress of his order,
allowing the rpi&wv to be
doubled for better protection
against the cold. Diog. 6:13;
22 ; 76 ; 105. Teles in Stol.
Floril. 97, 31, p. 215. Mein.
The Cynic ladies adopted the
same dress, Diog. 93. This
single article of dress was
often in the most miserable
condition. Sec the anecdotes
about Crates, Diog. 90, and the
verses on him, Ibid. 87. Be-
cause of the self-satisfaction
with which Antisthenes ex-
posed to view the holes in his
cloak, Socrates is said to have
observed that his vanity peered
through them. Diog. 8.
2 Their ordinary food con-
sisted of bread, figs, onions,
garlic, linseed, but particularly
of the Bfpfjwt, or beans of some
kind. Their drink was cold
water. Diog. 105 ; 25 ; 48 ; 85 ;
90; Teles in Stob. Floril. 97,
31 ; lUd. p. 215, M. ; Athcn. iv.
156, c; Lucian, V. Auct. 9;
Dio Chrys. Or. vi. 12 and 21,
and Gottling, p. 255. But, in
order to prove their freedom,
they occasionally allowed a
pleasure to themselves and
others. Diog. 55 ; Aristid. Or.
xxv. 560 ( Winvkelmann, p. 28).
3 Diog. 34 ; 76 ; Pseudo-Pint.
de Esu Cam. i. 6, 995 ; Dio
Clirys. Or. vi. 25.
4 In Diog. 73, this principle
is supported by the argument,
that everything is in every-
thing else, even flesh in bread,
&c. Diog. refers for this to a
tragedy of Thyestes, the writer
of which was not Diogenes,
but Philiscus. A similar state-
ment was subsequently made
by the Stoics. See Zeller's
Stoics, &c.
5 See Diog. 34.
6 See the accounts which
differ in details in Diog- 79 ;
318
THE SO CR AT 1C SCHOOLS.
CHAP.
XIII.
with nature, 1 the suppression of everything artificial,
^ . the most simple satisfaction of all natural wants, is the
watchword of his School. 2 They never weary of belaud-
ing the good fortune and the independence which they
owe to this freedom from wants. 3 To attain thereto,
bodily and mental hardships are made a principle. 4
A Diogenes whose teacher did not appear to treat him
with sufficient severity, 5 is said to have undertaken
self-mortification in this behalf. 6 Even the scorn
and contempt necessarily incurred by this manner of
life were borne by the Cynics with the greatest com-
Cic. Tusc. i. 43, 104;
V. H. viii. 14 ; Stob.
Floril. 123, 11. The same is
repeated by Chrysippus in
SeM. Pyrrh. iii. 258; Math.
xi. 194.
1 Which Diogenes also re-
quired, witness for instance
his saying in Diog. 71 : 8e'<w
ofiv aTi TU>V axp-fjffTcai' irovcov
robs Kara Qiiffiv e\o/j.fi>ovs fjv
&voiav KO.KO-
2 Compare on this subject
the expressions of Diogenes in
Diog. 44; 35; Stab. Floril. 5,
41 ; 67, the hymn of Crates on
(vre\eia, and his prayer to the
Muses in Julian, Or. vi. 199, in
addition to what Pint, de
Sanit. 7, p. 125, Diog. 85 ; 93,
and Stdbcens tell of him. Com-
pare also Lucian, V. Auct. 9,
and the anecdote of the mouse,
the sight of which confirmed
Diogenes in his renunciation of
the world in Plut. Prof, in Vir-
tut. 6 ; Diog. 22, 40.
3 Compare the language used
by Crates and Metrocles in
Teles in Stob. Floril. 97, 31,
Mein. and the quotations p.
303, 2 and 3.
4 Compare p. 250, 1, and
Diog. 30. Diogenes' training
appears to have been described
by Eubulus in the same glow-
ing terms as that of Cyrus was
by Xenophon. Exc. e Floril.
Joan. Damasc. ii. 13, 68; 67.
Diogenes in Stob. Floril. 7, 18,
expresses the view that mental
vigour is the only object of all
exercise, even that of the
body.
5 Dio Ckrys. Or. viii. 2
(Stob. Floril. 13, 19); conf.
Diog. ] 8.
6 According to Diog. 23 ; 34,
he was in the habit of rolling
in the summer in the burning
sand, and in winter of walking
barefoot in the snow, and em-
bracing icy columns. On the
other hand, Philemon's words
about Crates in Diog. 87, that
he went about wrapped up in
summer and in rags in winter,
are probably only a comedian's
jest on his beggarly covering.
CYNIC RENUNCIATION OF SOCIETY.
319
posure ; l nay, they accustomed themselves thereto, 2 on CHAP.
the ground that the reproaches of enemies teach man xm '
to know himself, 3 and the best revenge you can take
is to amend your faults. 4 Should life from any
reason become insupportable, they reserved to them-
selves the right, as the Stoics did at a later time, 5 of
securing their freedom by means of suicide.
Among external things of which it is necessary to (2) Re-
be independent, the Cynics included several matters
which other men are in the habit of regarding as life.
morally good and as duties. To be free in every
respect, the wise man must be fettered and hampered
by no relations to others. He must satisfy his social
1 Antisthenes in Diog. 7,
requires : KOKWS O.KOVOVTO.S Kap-
repdv fw.\\ov 77 t \idois TIS f3d\-
AOITO. He also says in Epict.
Diss. iv. 6, 20 (conf . Diog. 3) :
jScuriXiKbp, 3> Kvpf, Trpdrreiv fnev
3, KotKws 5' aKoveiv. It is said
of Diogenes, Diog. 33, and
also of Crates, Diog. 89, that
when his body had been ill-
treated, he only wrote by the
side of his blains the names of
those by whom they had been
inflicted.
2 Diog. 90 says of Crates, T&J
jrSpvas Mr-riSts t\oi$6pfi, ffvy-
YVfj.vd.fav eavrbv irpbs ras j8Xa-
3 Antisthenes remarks, Diog.
12 : irpo<rex flv T0 ** ^X^P ^' ^P^'
roi 7&p TUV afi.aprrifj.dT<ov aiff6d-
vovrai. He also says in Plut.
Inim. TJtil. 6, p. 89, and the
same saying is attributed to
Diogenes in De Adul. 36 p. 74 ;
Prof, in Virt. ii. p. 82: TOIS
yvijaluv fj Siairii
4 Diog. in Plut. Inimic. Util.
4, p. 88 and Poet. 4, p. 21.
5 When Antisthenes in his
last illness became impatient
under his sufferings, Diogenes
offered him a dagger (Diog.
18) to put an end to his life,
which Antisthenes had not the
courage to use. That Diogenes
made away with himself is
indeed asserted in several of
the accounts to which refer-
ence has been made, but can-
not be proved. In j&lian, V.
H. x. 11, he refuses the con-
temptuous challenge to put an
end to his sufferings by sui-
cide ; for the wise man ought
to live. Nevertheless, Metro-
cles put an end to himself
{Diog. 95), not to mention
Menedemus (Ibid. 100). So
also Crates in Diog. 86 ; Cle-
mens. Strom, ii. 412, D.
320
THE SOCRATIC SCHOOLS.
CHAP.
XIII.
() Of
family
'life.
wants by himself alone, 1 or he will be dependent on
others, and nothing which is out of his power ought
to influence his happiness. To these matters belongs
family life. Not that Antisthenes would do away
with marriage, because he thought it useful to keep
up the race of men; 2 but Diogenes early discovered
that this object might be attained by a community
of wives. 3 Deeply imbued as these philosophers were
with Grecian peculiarities, it never occurred to them
to require, in the spirit of a later asceticism, the en-
tire uprooting of all sexual desires. Natural impulses
might, however, be satisfied in a far more simple way. 4
1 In Dioff. 6, Antisthenes in
reply to the question, What
good philosophy had done him,
answers : rb SvvaffBai tavrf 6/u-
\t"iv. Out of this came the
caricature of later Cynicism,
described by Lwnan, V. Auct.
10. Yet Diogenes and Crates
were anything but haters of
their fellow-men.
- Diog. 1 1 : ya.fi'fiffeiv re [rbv
~
(Tvi>i6vra
The conjecture
( Winkelmann, p. 29, according
to Hermann) appears mis-
taken : Antisthenes might well
require evQveffrarcu Trpbj reKvo-
iroitav, women most suited for
child-bearing, whilst consider-
ing anyone good enough for :i
plaything.
3 Diog. 72 : <t\eye Se ical Koicar
flvat Sew Tcts ywaiKas, ydfjiov JMJ-
8ei/a vo/j-ifyv, a\\a r'bv irelffavra.
rfj ireur6eia~ri ffvvfivai KOWOVS Sf
5ia TOVTO KOI rovs vitas. The
correctness of this is supported
by the fact that Zeno and
Chrysippus, according to JHoy.
vii. 33, 131, projected the same
state of things for their ideal
state.
4 Something of the same
kind has been already observed
in Socrates, p. 163, 1. With
the Cynics this treatment of
the relation between the sexes
becomes an extravagance and
a deformity. In Xen. Symp.
4, 38, Antisthenes boasts of his
comforts, since he only asso-
ciates with those fair dames to
whom others would have no-
thing to say. That he did so
on principle is stated in Dio//.
3. That he declared adultery
permissible, as Clemens. Floril.
v. 18 says, is by no means cer-
tain. He is even said to have
satisfied his lusts in a coarser
way, complaining that hunger
could not be treated in the
same way. Smelter, i. 880,
Steinfiart, p. 305, and Gottliny,
p. 275, doubt the truth of these
and similar stories. Without
vouching for their accuracy, it
CYNIC RENUNCIATION OF SOCIETY.
.321
Their mendicant life, moreover, not affording them
an opportunity 1 for home pleasures, it is readily
understood that they were in general averse to mar-
riage, 2 and to feminine society, or at least treated
family life as a thing indifferent. 3 Diogenes is said
CHAP.
XIII.
may be enough to say that they
are not only quoted by Diog.
46, 49 ; Dio Chrys. Or. vi. 1,6,
p. 203, R. ; Lucian, V. Auct.
10; Galen. Loc. Affect, vi. 5;
viii. 419, K. ; Athen. iv. 158, f ;
Dio CJtrys. 34 Horn, in Math. p.
398, C. ; S. Aug. Civ. Dei, xiv.
20 ; but also, according to Plut.
Stob. Rep. 21, 1, p. 1044, Chry-
sippus had on this score vindi-
cated the Cynics, and accor-
ding to Sext.. Phyrrh. iii. 206,
Zeno appears to have done the
same. Dio. probably borrowed
his revolting extracts from
Chrysippus. The things are,
however, not so out of keeping
with the ways of Antisthenes,
that we could call them im-
possible ; and the very thing
which to us appears so unin-
telligible, this public want of
modesty, makes them very
likely to be true of Diogenes.
If true, they were an attempt
on his part to expose the folly
of mankind. It is from this
point of view rather than on
any moral grounds that the
Cynics conduct their attacks
on adulterers and stupid spend-
thrifts. To them it seemed
foolish in the extreme to incur
much toil, danger, and expense
for an enjoyment, which might
be had much more easily. See
Diog. 4 ; 51 ; 60 ; 66 ; 89 ; Plut.
Ed. Pu. 7, Schl. p. 5; Stob.
Floril. 6; 39; 52. Diogenes
is also accused of having
publicly practised unchastity,
Diog. 69 ; Theod. Cur. Gr. Aff.
xii. 48, p. 172. In Corinth the
younger Lais, according to
AtJien. xiii. 588, b, or Phryne,
according to Tertull. Apol. 46,
is said to have had a whim to
bestow on him her favours
gratuitously, whereas the philo-
sopher did not despise others.
Clemens (Horn. V. 18) repre-
sents him as purchasing them
by scandalous conditions. In
his tragedies (according to
Julian, Or. vii. 210, c) stood
things that one might believe
inrspfyoKty a.p'p'riTovpyia.s ovSe rats
eraipaLS airo\f\e(<pOcu. On the
other hand his morality is com-
mended, Demetr. de Eloc. 261.
1 The case of Crates is an
exception, and even Crates had
not wooed Hipparchia. He
only married her, when she
would not renounce her affec-
tion for him, but was prepared
to share his mode of life. He
certainly married his children
in a peculiar way, according
to Diog. 88 ; 93.
2 See the apophthegms in
Diog. 3, and Lucian, V. Auct.
9 : 7</xou Se ajte\ii}(rs Kal iralStov
Kal irarplSos. Far less objec-
tionable is the maxim of Antis-
thenes in Diog. 12: rbi/ S'tKawv
irepl ir\elovos iroif'io'da.t TOV cruyye-
n$9,
* See pp. 310, 1, and 277.
322 THE SOCRATIC SCHOOLS.
CHAP. to have seen nothing revolting 1 in marriage between
._! the nearest relations.
(*) f Another matter which they considered to be
equally indifferent with family life for the wise man,
was civil life. Indeed the sharp contrast between
slavery and freedom does not affect the wise man.
The man who is really free can never be a slave
for a slave is one who is afraid and for the same
reason a slave can never be free. The wise man is
the natural ruler of others, although he may be
called a slave, in the same way that the physician is
the ruler of the sick. Accordingly it is said that
Diogenes, when about to be sold, had the question
asked : Who wants a master ? declining the offer of
his friends to buy him back. 2 Not that such conduct
was a vindication of slavery. On the contrary, the
Cynics seem to have been the first among Greeks to
declare it an institution opposed to nature, 3 quite in
1 Dio Chrys. Or. x. 29, whose yap rbv juev Sov\ov elvai rbv tf
statement is confirmed by its i\e60fpov. <t>v<rfi 8' ovOfv Statpf-
agreeing with the universal pttv. St6irep ouSe SiKatov, fiiaiov
doctrine of the Stoics. See yap. The contrast between
gutter's Stoics, &c., p. 4. v6f*.tp and tyvafi is not found so
2 Diog. 29 ; 74. Compare strongly drawn at that time
.pp. 286, 4 ; 332, 4. According except among the Sophists and
to Liog. Ifi, Antisthenes wrote Cynics. Nor is it only met
iripl ^\ti>eepias Kal SoiMefas, and with in their religious views,
perhaps this is the origin of the On the contrary, their whole
account in Stob. Flor. 8, 14. politics, and even their practi-
8 For this we have certainly cal philosophy, are governed
no direct authority. Still (as by the effort to bring human
has been already observed, p. society from an artificial state
171, 4), it is probably in re- recognised by law and custom
ference to the Cynics that to a pure state of nature. We
Arixt. Polit. i. 3 ; 1253, b, 20, should hardly look in sophistic
says : rots ntv 8o*ce? tiriffr'h/j.'n T/i circles for the opponents of
TIS flvat T\ Sfffirorda . . . rois Si slavery whom Aristotle men-
apa <j>6ffu> rb Sf<rir6eii> v6p.(f tions, where the rule of the
CYNIC RENUNCIATION OF CIVIL LIFE. 3
conformity with their principle, that every difference CHAP.
between men other than that of virtue and vice is XIIT
unimportant and has nothing to do with the law of
nature and reason. Yet they did not go so far as to
attempt even in a small circle (as the Essenes did
at a later time) the abolition of slavery, regarding the
outward state as something indifferent, the wise man
even in slavery being a free man. Nor was it other-
wise with civil life. The wise man of the Cynics
feels himself above the restraints which civil life
imposes, without therefore feeling any impulse to
mix himself up in such matters ; for where could be a
constitution which would satisfy his requirements?
A popular government is severely censured by Antis-
thenes. 1 An absolute monarch only appeared to
these freedom-loving philosophers a bad and miser-
stronger over the weaker was which do not distinguish the
regarded as the most conform- good from the bad (Liog. 5 ; 6),
able to nature. But the view must be intended for a hit at
is all the more in keeping with democracy. The saying in
a school which from no side Diog. 8, that should the Athe-
could allow that one portion of nians call their asses horses,
mankind enjoy the right, quite it would be quite as good
independently of their moral as choosing incompetent gene-
s' ate, to govern the rest, the rals must also be directed
claim of the wise man to govern against a popular form of
the fool resting upon reason, government. According to
and naturally all men being Atlien. v. 220, d, Antisthenes
citizens of one state ; between had made a sharp attack on all
fellow-citizens the relation of the popular leaders at Athens.
master and slave cannot exist. Likewise in Diog. 24 ; 41, Dio-
1 A rift. Pol. iii. 13 ; 1284, a, genes calls them ux\ou Siaitu-
15, tells the fable the applica- vovs, and he amuses himself at
tion of which to a democracy the expense of Demosthenes,
is obvious of the hares sug- Ibid. 34, on which see Epiet.
gesting universal equality to Diss. iii. 2, 11. See also what
the lions. The blame which was said of Socrates, p. 166.
he attaches to those states,
r 2
324
THE SOCRATIC SCHOOLS.
CHAP. able man. 1 Aristocratical institutions 'fell far below
their ideal, none being adapted for the rule of wise
men : for what law or custom can fetter him, whose
life is regulated by the laws of virtue ? 2 What
country can be large enough for those who regard
themselves as citizens of the world? 3 Allowing
therefore a conditional necessity for a state and laws, 4
the Cynics 5 refused in their homelessness to take any
part in civil life. They wished to be citizens of the
world, not of any one state ; their ideal state, as far
as they do sketch it, is a destruction of all civil life. 6
1 Compare Xen. Symp. 4, 36 ;
Dio Chrys. Or. vi. 47; Stob.
Floril. 49,47 ; 97, 26 ; Diog. 50.
Also Plut. Adul. et Am. c. 27,
p. 68.
2 Antisthenes, in Diog. 11,
says : rbv cr6<j)ot> ov ari rovs
Kfijj.fi/ovs v6fJLOvs iro\iTfvff(o~6at
a\\& Ka-ra. Tbi> Tijs aperTJs. Dio-
genes, ibid. 38 : (Qaaice 8' avrt-
riOevai rvxy p-tv Bdtpffos, v6fj.tf 8e
Qvffiv, ir&Bei SJ \6yov. This
antithesis of v6fj.os and <f>vffts
seems to be what Plato has in
view, Phil. 44, C. See p. 294, 4.
9 Diog. 63 says of Diogenes :
(peiiTijdels ir68ev tr), Koff/jLoiro\irris,
t<f>T7. See p. 167, 8. Ibid. 72 :
\t.l>vi\v re bpQty iro\iT(tav flvcu
T^V iv K6fffj.ca. Antisthenes, ibid.
12: rip ffo<p<f ^fvov ovStif ovS'
&iropot>. Crates, ibid. 98 :
ovx rs irdrpas fioi irvpyos, ov p.ia
(TT67T?,
ircifTTjs 5e x?po~ov Hal irJAitr/xa /col
56/itos
eVoi/ios T\IUV tvSiairaffBai irdpa.
The same individual in Plut.
de Adul. -28, p. 69, shows that
banishment is no evil, and ac-
cording to Diog. 93 (conf. Ael.
V. H. iii. 6) he is said to have
given a negative answer to
Alexander's question, whether
he did not wish to see Thebes
rebuilt : ^x flv 8 irarpi'Sa aSo-
^iav /col -irtviav avoAwra TTJ TVXfl
hal Aioytvovs tlvai iroAiTTjs avfiri-
frovXfVTov (pe6fy. See also
Epict. Diss. iii. 24, 66. Lucian,
V. Auct. 8. Also the Stoic
doctrine in Zeller's Stoics, &c.,
chap, on Stoics, and what has
been said above, p. 278, 1.
4 The confused remarks of
Diogenes in Diog. 72 support
this statement.
5 Antisthenes was not without
a citizen's rights (see Hermann,
Antiquit. 1, 118), although a
proletarian by birth and cir-
cumstances. Diogenes was
banished from Sinope, and
lived at Athens as a foreigner.
Crates had chosen this life ;
after his native town had
been destroyed. Monimus was
a slave whom his master had
driven away.
B Stob. Floril. 45, 28 : 'Aim-
crdfvris fp(anr)9e\s iras &v rts irpoff-
f\6oi Tro\iTia, flire KaQairtp irvpl,
jUTJre \iav tyyvs "va. n^ KOJJS, fJ.'firf
CYNIC RENUNCIATION OF CIVIL LIFE.
All mankind are to live together like a flock. No
nation may have its own special laws and boundaries
severing it from others. Confining themselves to
the barest necessaries of life, needing no gold, that
source of so much mischief, abstaining from marriage
and family life, they wished to return to the simpli-
city of a state of nature ; 1 the leading thought of
their enlarged political sympathies being not so
much the oneness and the union of all mankind, but
the freedom of the individual from the bonds of
social life and the limits of nationality. Here again
('HAl'.
XIII.
1 The above description rests
only in part on direct testi-
mony, but the combination
which is the basis of it does
not lack great probability. We
know on authority that Dio-
genes in his iro\iTfia (Dioff.
80) demanded a community of
wives and children, and that
in the same treatise he pro-
posed a coinage of bones or
stones (a.ffrpa.ya\oi) instead of
gold and silver, Atlien. iv. 159,e.
We know further that Zeno's
iro\tTfia ran to this effect : Iva
fj.^1 Kara. v6\fis /xr)5e Kar
olK'jifjLff, Idiots ejcaffTOi
Sr)fji6ras Kal vo\iras els
Se $ios 17 Kal K^fffios, Siffirfp <ry\7js
(TUVVU/J.OU v6fj.y KOII/OJ Tpf(t>ofj.fi>r)S,
Plat. Alex. Vit. i. 6, p. 329;
and since this treatise of Zeno
was always considered to ex-
press the opinions of the Cynic
School, we have every reason
to look in it for a Cynic's views.
That such views were on the
whole advocated by Antis-
thenes, probably in the treatise
irtpl V&IJLOV % irepl
which appears to be identical
with the woAtTiK-bs SiaXoyos men-
tioned by Athen. v. 220, d, is
in itself probable, and is con-
firmed by Plato's Politicus.
Rejecting, as his dialogue does,
the analogy between states-
manship and the superinten-
dence of a flock, we might
naturally think that Plato was
provoked to it by some such
theory ; and since we know
from Plutarch's account of
Zeno, that the Cynics reduced
the idea of the state to that of
a herd of men, it is most
natural to think of them.
Moreover, the description of
the natural state, Rep. ii. 372,
appears also to refer to Antis-
thenes. Plato at first describes
it as though from himself, but
he afterwards clearly intimates
that it belongs to another,
when he calls it a state fit
for pigs. Nor do we know of
anyone else to whom it could
be better referred than to the
founder of the Stoic School.
326
THE SOCRATIC SCHOOLS.
CHAP.
XIII.
O) Sup-
jtrettion of
may be seen the negative spirit of their morality,
destitute of all creative power.
The same character may be recognised in a feature
for us the most revolting in Cynicism their de-
liberate suppression of the natural feeling of shame.
This feeling they did not consider altogether un-
reasonable, 1 but they urged that you need only be
ashamed of what is bad, and that what is in itself
good may not only be unblushingly discussed, but
done without reserve before the eyes of all. 2 They
therefore permitted themselves what they considered
natural, without regard to places, not shrinking even
from doing in the public streets 3 what other men
1 It is expressly told of Dio-
genes, Diog. 37; 54, that he ex-
postulated with a woman who
lay in an indecent position in
a temple, and that he called
blushes the colour of virtue.
2 See the following note, and
Cic. Off. i. 35, 128 : Nee vero
audiendi sunt Cynici aut si qui
fuerunt Stoici pasne Cynici,
qui reprehendunt eb irrident,
quod ea, quse turpia non sint
(for instance, the begetting of
children) nominibus ac verbis
flagitiosa dicamus (that we
consider it unseemly to name
them), ilia autem qu;s turpia
sunt (stealing, &c.) nominibus
appellemus suis.
3 This is especially said of
Diogenes, Diog. 22 : rravrl Tp6ir<p
lXW ro Te&vra., apicncav 11 Kal
KaBetStav Kal 8ia\ey6nfvos, and
according to Diog. 69, he sup-
ported this by the argument,
If it is at all allowable to
breakfast, it must be allowable
to breakfast in public. Fol-
lowing out this principle, he
not only took his meals in pub-
lic in the streets (Diog. 48 ; 58),
but he also did many other
eccentric and startling things,
in the sight of all passers by
(Diog. 35 ; 36). It is even
asserted of him, Diog. 69 :
flwBet 5e iravra. jroie'tv fv r<f /Afffcp,
Kal Ta Arj/iTjrpoj Kal TO 'AfppoSirtjf.
Theod. Cur. Gr. Aff. xii. 48, p.
172, says the same of him,
mentioning an instance. We
have already, p. 320, 4, observed
that these statements can
hardly be altogether fictitious.
But it is incredible that Crates
and Hipparchia, as is said to
have been the case, consum-
mated their nuptials in the
midst of numerous spectators.
There are, however, not a few
authorities for it : Diog, 97 ;
Sext. Pyrrh. i. 153; iii. 200;
Clemens ; Strom at. iv. 523, A. ;
Apul. Floril. 14; Lact. Inst.
CYNIC RENUNCIATION OF RELIGION. 327
prefer to do in secret. Lest he should in any CHAP.
way forego his independence, the Cynic puts out of
sight all regard for others, and what he is not
ashamed of by himsel f , he thinks he need not be
ashamed of before others. The opinion of men i to
him indifferent. He is neither hurt by their fami-
liarity with his personal life, nor need he fear such
familiarity.
To the same source may be referred the Cynic (d) Re-
attitude towards religion. Xo course of study under ^^L
Antisthenes was needed to make men doubt the truth
)f the popular faith. Such doubts were raised on all
sides, and since the appearance of the Sophists, had
permeated the educated classes. Not even the So-
cratic circle had passed unscathed. 1 From his inter-
course with Gorgias and the other Sophists, Antis-
thenes in particular must have been familiar with
freer views respecting the Gods and their worship,
and specially with the principles of the Eleatics,
whose teaching in other respects he also worked into
his own. For him, however, these views had a pecu-
liar meaning. Hence, too, may be explained the
iii. 15, who mentions it as the phers, that a public consum-
common practice of the Cynics; mat ion of nuptials was permis-
S. Aug. Civ. Dei, xiv. 20, who sible. On the other hand, we
does not altogether credit it, have no reason to doubt what
but does not improve it by his Diog. 97 states, that Hippar-
interpretation. Yet all these chia went about in public
are later authorities. The dressed as a man.
whole story may rest upon ' As we gather from the dia-
some such story as that this logues of Socrates with Aristo-
married couple once passed a demus and Euthydemus, Xen.
night in the O-TO& voml\r), or Mem. i. 4 ; iv. 3 ; not to men-
else upon the theoretical asser- tion Critias.
tion of some Cynic philoso-
328 THE SOCRATIC SCHOOLS.
CHAP. sharp and hostile attitude of the Cynics to the
XIII
" popular faith, in which they so distinctly deviated
from the example of Socrates. The wise man, inde-
pendent of everything external, cannot possibly be
dependent on a traditional faith. He cannot feel
pledged to follow popular opinions, or to connect his
well-being with customs and devotional practices,
which have nothing to do with his moral state. 1
Thus in religious matters the Cynics are decidedly on
the side of free thought. The existence of a (rod
they do not deny, nor can their wise man do without
one ; but they object to a number of gods resembling
men popular gods, owing, as they say, 2 their existence
to tradition : in reality there is but one God, who
resembles nothing visible, and cannot be represented
by any symbol. 3 The same reasoning holds good of
1 In this way we must ex- avrbv ovSf\s ^/cjuafleiV e|
plain the free thought of Aris- SiWreu. Tertull. Ad Nat. ii. 2 :
todemus, Mem. i. 4, 2, 9-11 ; In reply to the question, Quid
14 ; who is also described by in coelis agatur ? Diogenes re-
Plato, Symp. 173, B., as a kin- plied : Nunquam ascendi ; to
dred spirit to Antisthenes. the question, Whether there
* Cic. N. D. i. 13, 32: 'An- were any Gods? he answered:
tisthenes in eo libro, qui phy- Nescio nisi ut sint expedire.
sicus inscribitur, populares No very great dependence can,
[v6(itf~\ Deos multos, natura- it is true, be placed in Tertul-
lem [<pu<ret] unum esse dicens,' lian's sayings. Id. Apol. 14 ;
which is repeated by Minuc. Ad. Nat. i. 10 : Diogenes nescis
Fel. Oct. 19, 8, and Lact. Inst. quid in Herculem ludit, with-
i. 5, epit. 4. Clemens, Protrept. out, however, giving further
46, C., and also Stromat. v. particulars. Compare what
601, A., says : 'Ai/Ti0-0eVijs . . . was said of Socrates, p. 175.
6tbv ovSevl toiKevcu $i\aiv Sdirep * The Cynics are therefore
avrbv ovSels ti<n.aO(ti> & dtttvos Atheists in the ancient sense
Svvarai. Theod. Cur. Gr. Affect, of the term, i.e. they denied
i. 75, p. 14 : 'Ai/TKr0eVTjs .... the Gods of the state, although
trepl roG Oeov rav oAa>v /3oo airb from their point of view they
fl>c6vos ov yixapi^erat, o(f>6a\/j.o'is were certainly right in reject -
o&x fyarcu, ovSfvl eoiKe Si6irep ing the charge of atheism.
CYNIC RENUNCIATION OF RELIGION. 329
the worship of the gods. There is but one way of CHAP.
pleasing God by virtue ; everything else is super- L_
stition. Wisdom and uprightness make us followers
and friends of the gods. What is generally done to
secure their favour is worthless and unmeaning. The
wise man honours Grcd by virtue, and not by sacri-
fice, 1 which Grod does not require. 2 He knows that a
temple is not more holy than any other place. 3 He
does not pray for things which are considered goods
by the unwise ; not for riches, but for righteousness. 4
Herewith the ordinary notion respecting prayer
is also surrendered ; for everyone owes virtue to his
own exertions. Hence Diogenes may be understood
ridiculing prayers and vows. 5 The same sweeping
judgment is pronounced on oracles, prophecy, and
prophets. 6 The mystic rites also were assailed with
biting scorn, 7 both by Diogenes and Antisthenes ;
these philosophers, as far as religious views are con-
Nothing follows from the anec- and philosophers, he thinks
dotes in Diog. 37; 42. man the most intelligent being,
1 Julian, Or. vi. 199, B., ex- but looking at interpreters of
cusing Diogenes because of his dreams, or prophets, or credu-
poverty, says that he never lous believers in them, he con-
entered a temple or offered aiders him the most foolish of
sacrifice. Crates, ibid. 200, A., creatures. Similar statements
promises to honour Hermes and in Diog. 43 ; 48 ; Tlieod. Cur.
the Muses ou Sonrcti'cus TyvQcpais, Gr. Aff . vi. 20, p. 88 ; and Dio.
dXA' aperats 6<rtats. Or. x. 2 ; 17. Antisthenes ap-
* See p. 315, 2. pears also in Xen. Sym. 8, 5, to
* See Diog. 73 : yuTjSfi/ TI have doubts upon the subject
&TOTTOV eli/eu e{ lepov TI \afit7v. of the Sat/ji6i>tov of Socrates, but
* See the prayer of Crates in no conclusion can be formed
Julian 1. c. and Diog. 42. from a passage so jocular.
* Compare the anecdotes in 7 Diog. 4 ; 39 ; 42 ; Plut. Aud.
Diog. 37 ; 59. Poet. 5, p. 21 ; Clemen*, Pro-
9 In Diog. 24 he says that, trept. 49, C.
looking at pilots, physicians,
330 THE SO CR AT 1C SCHOOLS.
CHAP. cerned, holding a perfectly independent attitude
. '_ towards the popular faith. Not but that they gladly
took hold of points which mythology supplied for their
own arguments, taking all the more occasion to do so, in
proportion to the earnestness of their desire to influence
the masses : Antisthenes being aided in so doing by the
sophistical training which be had previously enjoyed. 1
The various traditions must all be explained in har-
mony with this view. Hence we find Antisthenes
in no small degree engaged in allegorical interpre-
tations of the myths and the poets, and in an expla-
nation of Homer, which he committed to writing in
numerous volumes. 2 Looking for a hidden meaning 3
in legendary stories, he was everywhere able to dis-
cover moral teaching,and to build on moral reflections. 4
Indeed, by laying down the further axiom, that the
poet does not always express his own sentiments, 5 he
1 For the allegorical inter- Symp. 3, 6 ; Plato, Rep. ii. 378,
pretations of that period con- D. ; lo, 530, C.
suit Krische, Forsch. 234 ; Xen. 4 Thus on Od. i. 1, he en-
Sym. 3, 6 ; Plato, Thesetet. 153, quired in what sense iroAurpo-
C. ; Rep. ii. 378, D. ; lo, 530, irio was meant for praise. On
C.; Phsedrus, 229, C. ; and Od. v. 211; vii. 257, he re-
Zeller'* Phil. d. Griech. i. 930, marked, that no reliance could
3 ; also pp. 755, 831 ; Stoics, be placed upon lovers' pro-
&c. mises. In II. xv. 123, he found
* Dioff. 17, mentions twelve his doctrine of the oneness of
or thirteen volumes of his on virtue. See the passages in
Homer and various portions of Winkelmann, p. 23-28.
the Homeric poems, and one 5 Dio Ckrys. Or. liii. 5, says
on Amphiaraus. Here, too, that whereas the same had been
belong the treatises on Hercu- previously said of Zeno, 6 St
les. Julian, Or. vii. 209, A. ; \6yos ovros 'AvriffOtvous larl
215, C. ; 217, A., also testifies vpSrepov, '6n TO. pfi> 8<% TO 5e
to the fact of his frequently oA.Tj0ei'<y flp-nrcu T<j3 TTOJTJTJ? ,a\\'
using myths. See Krisohe, 6 /ACC OVK f^fipydffaro avrbv, 6 5e
243. KO.& fKdffrov TWV tnl jue'pouj eS^j-
* The vir&voia. or Sidvoia. Xen. Koxrtv.
CYNIC INFLUENCE ON THE WORLD. 331
had no difficulty in finding anything anywhere. CHAP.
Traces of this allegorical- interpretation may also be
found in Diogenes. 1 Yet the Cynics do not seem to
have carried this process nearly so far as the Stoics ; 2
which is also quite natural, Cynic teaching being
very imperfectly expanded, 3 and the taste for learned
activity being with them very small.
From the above it will be seen in what sense the E. Their
Cynics spoke of the self-sufficingness of virtue. The itke
wise man must be absolutely and in every respect wor ld.
independent ; independent of wants, of desires, of
prejudices and of after-thoughts. The devotion and
strength of will with which they compassed this end,
has certainly something grand about it. Disre-
garding, however, the limits of individual existence,
and putting out of sight the conditions of a natural
and a moral life, the Cynic grandeur borders on pride,
and their strength of principle on self-will. A value
out of all proportion is attached to the form of life,
to such an extent that they again become dependent
on external circumstances. The sublime becomes
ridiculous, and every humour at last claims to be
honoured as being higher wisdom. Plato, or who-
ever it was who called Diogenes a Socrates gone mad,
was not far wrong in what he said. 4
1 According to Stob. Floril. " Even their Ethics are
29, 92, he explained the legend scanty enough, and their sys-
of Medea boiling up the old tern gave no opportunity for
into young to mean that, by those lengthy, physical dis-
bodily exercise, she made ef- cussions, on which the Stoics
feminate men young again. were so great.
2 Dio says this expressly, 4 jElian, V. H. xiv. 33 ; Diog.
and little has come down to us vi. 54.
of Cynic interpretations.
332 THE SO CR AT 1C SCHOOLS.
CHAP. Notwithstanding these pretensions, the indepen-
_ dence of these philosophers was not so great that they
could dispense with every relation to others. It was
only natural that they should wish to see all virtuous
persons united as friends ; l and, besides, they con-
sidered it the wise man's business to raise the rest of
mankind to his own level. Anxious not to monopo-
lise the blessings of virtue, but to share them with
others, they sought for work as educators of their
people, desiring, if possible, to bring a lax and
effeminate nation back to the days of moral strict-
ness and simplicity. The mass of men are fools,
slaves of pleasure, suffering from self-conceit and
pride. 2 The Cynic is a physician to heal their dis-
ease, 3 a guide to lead them to what is good. 4 Hence
he considers it his mission to care for the outcast
1 Diog. 11 : ical fpaa8-f)fffffOai praising the Spartans, replied :
5e p6vov yap etSeVai TOC ffocpbv, ovSe yap larpbs vyifias &v iroimi-
rivoiv xpfy fpav. 12: a^ifpaffros KOS ev TO?S vyiaivovcri TTJV Starpi-
6 aya86s ' at ffwovSaloi (pi\oi. fify iroielrai. Accordingly, Dio-
Antisthenes wrote both an genes calls himself in Lucia ti,
'Epa>Ti/cbs and an 'Epwfufvos V. Auct. 8, ^AeuflepccT^s TGOV av-
(Diog. 14; 18), and he had Opcairwv Kal larpbs ruv Tra6uv, and
mentioned love in his Hercules he expresses astonishment in
(Prod, in Ale. 98, 6 ; Winckel- Dio. Or. viii. 7, that men le>s
mann, p. 16). An 'EpcariKbs of frequently apply to him, the
Diogenes is also mentioned, healer of souls, than they do to
Diog. 80. an oculist or dentist.
2 See p. 314. 4 When Diogenes was pur-
s Diog. 4 : 'A.t>Ttff9fvns ^PCOTTJ- chased by Xeniades, he is said
6els Sia ri irtKpws TO?S /jLaOnrats to have told Xeniades that he
eV<7rA.TjTTei, Kal ol larpol, <priffi, would have to obey his slave,
rots Kd/j.vovffiv Ibid. 6 : Kal of just as in another case he
la-rpoi <$>i)<ri, fiera ra>v voaoiivruiv would have to obey a pilot or
flirlv, a\\' ou irvpfTTovffiv. In physician. Diog. 30 ; 36 ; conf.
Stob. Floril. 13, 25, Diogenes, 74 ; Plut. An. Vitios. c. 3, p.
when asked why he remained 499 ; Stob. Flor. 3, 63 ; Philo,
in Athens, whilst he was always Qu. Omn. Pr. Lib. 833, E.
CYNIC INFLUENCE ON THE WOULD. 3J
and despised, only the sick needing a physician, 1 and CHAP.
no more fears contamination from such intercourse L
than the sun fears impurity from shining in the
dirtiest haunts. 2
The improvement of mankind, however, is no
easy task. 3 He who will be saved must hear the
truth ; nothing being more destructive than flattery. 4
Yet truth is always unpleasant; 5 none save either
an incensed enemy or a real friend dare tell it. 6 This
friendly service, the Cynics propose to render to
mankind. 7 If in so doing they give offence, matters
not to them ; 8 a good kind of man being always dis-
agreeable to bear with ; 9 he who annoys no one is
of no good to any one. 10 It was moreover a principle
of theirs to pitch their demands both in word and
example above what they really wanted, because men
only imperfectly conform to them. 1 1 Thus they pressed
themselves on friends and strangers alike with their
exhortations, 12 which Diogenes, in particular, in-
1 According to Epict. iii. 24, See p. 319, 3.
66, Diogenes read a lesson to 7 Diogenes in Stob. Flor. 13,
the pirates who captured him. 26 : ol /j.fv &\\oi Kvves rovs %-
It cannot, however, have done Bpovs SaKvuvini/, tyk 8e rovs
much good, for they sold him <(>t\ovs, 'tva, a&a<a.
notwithstanding; and the story 8 See p. 318.
is altogether very uncertain. 9 Svfffta.ffra.KTov flvai rbv aa-
2 Diog. 63, and above, p. 332, 3. reiov. Antisth. in Philo. Qu.
* Diog. 4, and p. 332, 3. Omn. Pr. Lib. 869, C.
* Diog. 4 ; 51 ; 92 ; Stob. 10 In Pint. Virt, Mort. c. 12,
Floril. 14, 16 ; Antisthenes in g, E., p. 452, Diogenes says of
Plut. Vit. Pud. c. 18, g, E., p. Plato : rl 5' feciccw l x fff^v,
536. bs roffovrov xp vov tyib-Offocpwv
8 Diogenes in Exc. e Floril. ovStva \f\inrrtKfv ;
Joan. Damasc. ii. 31, 22: rb n See p. 308, 1.
aA.7j0s itiKp6i> tan Ka.1 arjSes TOIS 12 Compare whatDwy.vi. 10,
drorjTory. It is like light to says of Antisthenes, and vi. 26 ;
those who have weak eyes. 46 ; 65 of Diogenes ; also
334
THE SOCRATIC SCHOOLS.
CHAP.
XIII.
stilled in the coarsest manner, 1 although more gentle
traits are not altogether wanting. 2 At the same time
the coarseness of their manner was somewhat re-
lieved by their humour in which Diogenes and Crates
more particularly excelled. They loved to clothe
serious teaching in the form of a joke, or of poetry, 3
and to hurl sharp-pointed words 4 at the folly of man-
kind ; 5 Diogenes even, like the oriental prophets,
giving greater force to his utterances by symbolical
actions, and thus attracting for them attention. 6
No doubt the position occupied by the Cynics in
the Greek world is a peculiar one. Eidiculed because
of their eccentricities, 7 and admired for their self-
Lucian V. Auct. 10. Because
of his importunity, Crates re-
ceived the name of Oupeirayoi-
KT-ns.Diog. 86 ; Pint. Qu.
Conv. ii. 1,7, 4, p. 632 ; Apnl.
Floril. iv. 22.
1 Diog. 24 ; 32 ; 46 ; Ex. e
Floril. Jo. Damasc. i. 7, 43.
2 Pint. De Adul. 28, p. 69,
relates that when Demetrius
Phalerius, after his banish-
ment, fell in with Crates, he
was not a little surprised at
being received with friendly
words of warm comfort in-
stead of the violent language
lie expected. The attractive-
ness of the conversation of
Antisthenes and Diogenes is
also commended, Diog. 14.
Conf. Xen. Symp. 4, 61.
3 See Diog. 27 ; 83 ; 85 ; Zte-
metr. de Elocut. 170 ; 259 ; 261 ;
Pint. Tranqu. An. 4, p. 466 ;
Julian, Or. vii. 209, a; Antisth. :
ena 5i& Ttai> nv9cav c.irfiyye\\f.
Similarly, Ibid. 215, c; 217, a.
4 Hermog. Progym. c. 3 ;
Theo. Progym. c. 5 ; Nicol. Pro-
gym, c. 3.
5 Abundant examples of
these ways of the Cynics are
to be found in the inro(pQe-)fj.a~a
of Diogenes, in his sixth book,
and in Stobceus 1 Floril. See
also Winckelmann, Antisth.
Frag. ; Pint. Prof, in Virt. c. 11,
p. 82 ; Virt, Doc. c. 2, p. 439 ;
Coh. Ira, c. 12, p. 460 ; Curios.
c. 12, p. 521 ; Cup. Div. c. 7,
p. 526 ; Exil. c. 7, p. 602 ; An.
Seni. s. Ger. Rep. i. 5, p. 783 ;
conf. Prajc. c. 26, 141 ; De Alex.
Virt. c. 3, p. 336 ; Epict. Diss.
iii. 2, 11 ; Gell. xviii. 13, 7 ;
Tertullian, Apol. 39; not to
mention others.
See Diog. 26 ; 31 ; 39 ; 64 ;
41 (the lantern) ; Stob. Flor. 4,
84. This eccentricity becomes
a caricature in Menedemus,
Diog. 102.
7 Diog. 83, 87, 93.
CYNIC INFLUENCE ON THE WORLD. 335
denial, despised as beggars, and feared as moralists, CHAP.
full of contempt for the follies, of pity for the moral _
miseries of their fellow men, they met both the
wisdom and the effeminacy of their time with the
rude vigour of a resolute will, hardened even to in-
sensibility. Possessing the pungent, ever ready native
wit of the plebeian, benevolent, with few wants, full
of whims and jokes, and national even to their very
dirtiness, they resemble in many points the friars of
the Middle Ages ; l nor can it be doubted that, not-
withstanding all their extravagances, their action was
in many ways beneficial. For all that, philosophy
could expect but little from this mendicant philo-
sophy. Not until it had been supplemented by other
elements, regulated and received into connection
with a wider view of the world in the Stoa, was
Cynicism able to bear fruit on a large scale. The
Cynic School, as such, appears to have had only a very
narrow extension, a fact which will not appear strange,
considering the terrible severity of its demands.
Besides it was incapable of philosophic expansion,
and even its practical action was chiefly of a negative
character. It attacked the vices and the follies of
men. It required independence and self-denial, but
it separated man from man. It placed the individual
entirely by himself, thus offering play to moral pride,
1 The Cynics really have a rean asceticism, which exer-
historical connection with the cised, partly directly and
monks of Christendom. The partly through the Essenes, so
link between the two is the important an influence on
Cynicism of the time of the eastern monasticism.
Ciesars, and the late Pythago-
336 THE SOCRATIC SCHOOLS.
CHAP. vanity, and the most capricious whims, which were
; not left unindulged. The abstract sovereignty of the
personal will resulted ultimately in individual caprice,
and thus Cynicism trenched on the ground of the
philosophy of pleasure, to which as a system it was
diametrically opposed.
THE CYRENAICS.
337
CHAPTER XIV.
THE CYRENAICS. 1
RESPECTING the Cyrenaic branch of the Socratic CHAP.
school, the information we possess is quite as im- ^
perfect, or even more so, than that which we A. History
have touching the Cynics. Aristippus 2 of Gyrene, 3
the founder, had been brought to Athens 4 by a call
from Socrates, whose extraordinary personal influ-
ence had unusual attractions for him, 5 although his
1 See Wendt, De Philosophia
Cyrenaica, Gott. 1841.
* The accounts of ancient
and the views of modern
writers on the life of Aristip-
pus are found in detail in
H. v. Stein's De Philosophia
Cyrenaica, Part, prior, de vita
Aristippi (Gott. 1855), which
ought to have proceeded some-
what more sceptically. There
too are references to the earlier
literature.
3 All authorities without ex-
ception state this. His father
is called Aritadas by Suid. 'Apt
4 ^schin. in Diog. ii. 65, says
that he came to Athens Kara
K\e'o? Saifpctrot/s, and Plut.
Curios. 2, p. 516, gives full
particulars how at the Olympic
games he heard of Socrates and
his teaching from Ischomachus,
and was at once so taken by it
that he did not rest till he had
made his acquaintance. See
Dioff. ii. 78 ; 80.
4 Aristippus is not only uni-
versally described as a follower
of Socrates (Diog. ii. 47 ; 74 ;
80 ; Strabo, xvii. 3, 22, p. 837 ;
IMS. Pr. Ev. xiv. 18, 31 ; Stein.,
p. 26), but he also regarded
himself as such, and paid a
tribute of most genuine respect
to his teacher. According to
Diog. ii. 76, he prayed that he
might die like Socrates. Ibid.
71, he says that if anything
good can be truly repeated of
himself, he owes it to Socrates,
and Arist. Bhet. ii. 23 ; 1398,
b, 29, says, 'Apta-niriros wpbs
riAoTtofO iirayy(\TiH(i>rtp6v Tt
tlir6vra, us tftro ' a\\a /x/V &
338
THE S OCR AT 1C SCHOOLS.
CHAP.
XIV.
character was too weak to endure in the last trial. 1
From Gyrene, his luxurious home, which at that time
was at the height of its wealth and power, 2 he had
brought habits far removed from the simplicity and
abstemiousness of Socrates. 3 Perhaps he had been
already touched by those Sophistical influences which
may be observed in his subsequent career. 4 At any
rate we may assume that he had attained to a certain
rov, \tj<av rbi> ~S#iKpA.T"r)v (which
Steinhart, Plat. Leben, 303, 17,
contrary to the natural sense,
refers to Plato's too sanguine
expectations of the younger
Dionysius). We also see from
Xen. Mem. i. 2, iii. 8, that he
was on an intimate footing
with Socrates ; and Plato in
blaming him, Phasdo, 59, C.,
for being absent from the circle
of friends who met on the day
of Socrates' death, evidently
reckons him as belonging to
this circle. Conf. Stein., p.
25, who also, pp. 50 and 74,
groups together the authorities
respecting Aristippus' relations
to the pupils of Socrates.
1 Plato, 1. c., who however
only says that Aristippus and
Cleombrotus had been in
JSgina; that on this fertile
island they caroused on the
day of their master's death, as
Demetr. de Elocut, 288, asserts,
is barely possible. The accu-
racy of Plato's statement is
indisputable, notwithstanding
Diog. iii. 56 ; ii. 65 ; but
whether Aristippus left Athens
from excessive regard for his
own safety, or whether his
weakness led him to wish to
escape the painful interval
pending the death of Socrates,
cannot be ascertained.
2 See Thrige, Res Cyrenen-
sium, 191.
8 This may be gathered from
Xen. Mem. ii. 1, 1, in addition
to the proof afforded by his
later conduct. That Aristippus
belonged to a wealthy family
would seem to be established
by his whole mode of living,
and by the journey which he
undertook to Athens.
4 We might have imagined
that a city so rich and culti-
vated as Gyrene (on this point
see Thi-ige, 1. c., p. 340, 354),
would not have been neglected
by the Sophists, even if there
were no express evidence to
prove it. It is, however, known
from Plato, Theastet. 161, B. ;
162, A., that the celebrated
mathematician, Theodorus of
Cyrene, was a friend of Pro-
tagoras, and the principles of
Protogoras are also afterwards
met with in Aristippus. From
the zeal with which Aristippus
followed Socrates it may be
further conjectured that" the
study of
f philosoph
thing.
y was to him
HISTORY OF THE CYRENAICS.
maturity of thought when he first became acquainted
with Socrates. 1 It is, therefore, no cause for wonder
that this talented young man 2 met his teacher with
a considerable amount of independence, 3 not on the
whole so blindly following him as to sacrifice his own
peculiarities. He is even said to have come forward
as a teacher before the death of Socrates ; 4 that he
did so afterwards is a better established fact, and
also that, contrary to the principles of his greatest
friend, but quite in harmony with the practice usual
among the Sophists, he required payment for his
instruction. 5 In yet another point he followed the
CHAP
XIV.
1 The chronology of his life
is very uncertain. Neither the
time of his birth nor of his
death is known to us. Accor-
ding to Diodorus, xv. 76, he
was living in 366 B.C., and
Plut. Dio. 19, tells us that he
met Plato on his third visit to
Sicily, which is placed in 361
B.C. But Diodorus probably
derived from Dionysius his
anecdote about the interview
with Plato. Its accuracy can-
not therefore be relied upon ;
and as we are ignorant how old
Aristippus was at the time,
these accounts are anything
but satisfactory. According
to Ding. ii. 83, however, it
would appear, he was older by
several years than ^schines ;
and it would also appear, from
what has been said p. 337,
4, that at the time he followed
Socrates he was independent
in his civil relations, and fur-
ther that he was connected
with him for several years.
2 This is what he appears to
have been from all that is
known. See Stein., p. 29.
See Xen. Mem. ii. 1 ; iii. 8.
4 According to Diog. ii. 80,
Socrates blamed him for taking
pay for his instruction. How
little dependence can be placed
upon this story will be seen
from the fact that Aristippus
says, in his reply, that Socrates
did the same, only taking less.
Another passage, Diog. ii. 65,
seems to imply, on the authority
of Phanias, that Aristippus
offered to give Socrates some
of the money he had gained in
this way. Perhaps, however,
all that Phanias said was, that
Aristippus had taken pay, and
offered it to his teacher, with-
out however bringing the two
facts into closer temporal con-
nection.
Phanias in Diog. ii. 65;
Ibid. 72 ; 74 ; 80, where it is
also stated in wliat way he de-
fended this conduct. Alexis in
At/ten, xii. 544, e; Pint. Kdu.
Pu. 7, p. 4 ; Stob. Exc. e Floril.
z 2
10 THE SOCRATIC SCHOOLS.
CHAP, example of the Sophists, by passing a great portion
V J of his life in various places without any fixed abode. 1
Joan. Damasc. ii. 13, 145 (that
Aristippus is meant here ap-
pears from 146 ; conf. Diog. ii.
68). Also Xen. Mem. i. 2, 60,
appears to have an eye on him.
The amount of these fees is
estimated at 1000 drachmas by
Plutarch, at 500 by Diog. 72.
1 He says of himself in Xen.
Mem. ii. 1, 13 : ovS' elsiro \lrfiav
ov dpi. In Plut. Virt.
Doc. p. 2, p. 439, some one asks
him : iravTaxov ffv Spa e? ; to
which he replies with a bad
joke. He is mentioned by later
writers, often no doubt bad
authorities, as having been in
different places : in Megara,
where he met with Machines
(Diog. ii. 62 ; conf. Ep. Socr.
29) : in Asia Minor, where he
was imprisoned by the Persians,
(Diog. ii. 79) : in Corinth,
where he revelled with Lais
(Hermesianax in Ath. xiii. 599,
b ; Diog. ii. 71) : in 2Egina,
where he not only lived for a
time after the death of So-
crates, but where, according to
Athen. xiii. 588, e ; conf. xii.
544, d, he every year took up
his residence in company with
Lais : and at Scillus, where
Xenophon read to him his Me-
morabilia, Ep. Socr. 18. Much
in particular is told of his stay
at the court of Syracuse, of his
hostile encounter with Plato,
and of many other adventures,
which he there experienced.
But in these notices there is
great confusion, since at one
time the elder Dionysius, at
another the younger Dionysius,
at another simply Dionysius, is
spoken of. Conf. Stein., p. 57.
It is asserted by the Scholiast
on Luoian, Men. 13, that Aris-
tippus was at Syracuse under
the elder Dionysius. This
statement is borne out by
Hegesander in Athen. xii. 544,
c ; for the Antiphon there men-
tioned was (according to Plut.
De Adulat. 27, p. 68) executed
by command of the elder
Dionysius. The anecdote of
his shipwreck in Galen. Ex-
hort, c. 5, must be referred to
the same time. It can only
belong to his first visit to
Sicily, but by Vitruv. vi. Pras-
fat. was transferred to the
island of Rhodes. On this
point see Stein. 61. On the
other hand, Plut. Dio. 19,
brings him into contact with
Plato on Plato's third journey
to Sicily, 361 B.C., in the time
of the younger Dionysius. The
notices in Athen. xi. 507, b;
Diog. ii. 66-69, 73, 75, 77-82,
are indefinite, although the
stories there told harmonise
better with the court of the
younger Dionysius than with
that of his father. Nothing
can however be laid down with
certainty respecting the visits
of Aristippus to Sicily. That
he visited Sicily may be be-
lieved on tradition. That he
there met Plato is not impos-
sible, though it is also possible
that the account of this meet-
HISTORY OF THE CYRENAICS.
341
Subsequently he appears to have returned to his
native city, and to have taken up his permanent
residence there. 1 Here it is that we first hear of his
family and his School. 2 The heiress to his principles
was a daughter, Arete, a lady of sufficient education
to instruct her son, 3 the younger Aristippus, 4 in his
CHAP.
XIV.
ing was invented in order to
bring out the contrast between
both philosophers. In fact,
Plato's journeys to Sicily were
a favourite topic for later anec-
dote mongers. But any one of
the above stories, taken by
itself alone, must be accepted
with caution ; nor is it even
certain that he visited both
the Dionysiuses. When the
younger one came to the throne
(368 B.C.) he was at least 60
years of age, and yet most of
the stories which are told ap-
pear to have reference to him.
On the other hand, Aristippus
there appears in a character
better suited to his years of
travel than to his later years.
The supposed accidents of
meeting between Aristippus
and Plato probably went the
round as anecdotes, without
any attention having been paid
to their historical connection ;
and when this was done by
subsequent biographers, it be-
came impossible to find out
what was fact.
1 Whether this stay was
shortened by frequent travels,
whether Aristippus died in
Cyrene or elsewhere, and how
long he lived, are points un-
known. For the journey to
Sicily in 361 B.C. is, as we
have seen, uncertain. The
twenty-ninth letter, which So-
crates is supposed to have
addressed to his daughter from
Lipara after his return, and
in expectation of death, is
valueless as a historical testi-
mony, nor does it even render
the existence of a correspon-
ding tradition probable ; and
the hypothesis based on Dioy.
ii. 62, that Aristippus flourished
at Athens in 356 has been with
justice refuted by Stein.; p. 82.
Steinliart, Plat. Leben, 305, 33,
proposes to read 'AP<TTOT'A.TJ for
'AplffTnriroi> in Diog. ii. 62, but
the chronology is against this
correction, l&irfvffiirtrov would
be better.
2 Generally called Cyrenaics,
more rarely Hedonists, as in
Athen. vii. 312, f ; xiii. 588, a.
* Who was thence called /trj-
Tpo8i5aTos.
4 Strata, xvii. 3, 22, p. 837 ;
Clemens, Strom, iv. 523, A. ;
Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 18, 32 ; Theod.
Cur. Gr. Aff. xi. 1 ; Diog. ii.
72, 84, 86; Suid. 'Aplartinros ;
Themist. Or. xxi. 244. If,
therefore, ^Elian, H. Anim. iii.
40, calls Arete the sister of
Aristippus, it must be through
an oversight. Besides this
daughter he is said to have had
another son, whom he did not
THE SOCRATIC SCHOOLS.
CHAP, grandfather's philosophy. Besides this daughter,
^Ethiops and Antipater are also mentioned as pupils
of the elder Aristippus. 1 His grandson, the younger
Aristippus, is said to have instructed Theodorus,
called the Atheist ; 2 the fruits of Antipater's teaching 3
own, Diog. 81 ; Stab. Floril. 76,
14. Most likely this was only
the child of an eralpo, although
Stobaeus calls his mother a
wife.
1 Diog. ii. 86. We know
further from Cic. Tusc. v. 38,
112, that Antipater bore the
loss of sight with resignation.
Cicero tells a somewhat tame
joke.
2 Diog. 86. This Theodorus
appears to have belonged to
the Optimates, who were driven
from Cyrene in the party
quarrels immediately after the
death of Alexander, and took
refuge with the Egyptian sove-
reigns. Thrige, Res. Cyren.
206. We hear of him as an
exile in the last years of the
fourth century (Plut. De Exil.
16, p. 606 ; Diog. 103 ; Philo,
Qu. Omn. Pr. Lib. 884, C.), in
Greece, and particularly at
Athens (Diog. ii. 100, 116 ; iv.
52 ; vi. 97), where a friend of
Ptolemy's, Demetrius Phaler-
eus, helped him, between 316
and 306 B.C., and subsequently
at the court of Ptolemy, on
whose behalf he undertook an
embassy to Lysimachus (Diog.
102; Cic. Tusc. i. 43, 102;
Valer. vi. 2, 3 ; Philo, 1. c.,
Plut. An. Vittos. 3, p. 499 ;
Stob. Floril. 2, 33). At last he
returned to his own country,
and was there held in great
honour by Magus, the Egyptian
governor, Diog. 103. What
made him particularly notori-
ous was his atheism. Indicted
on this account at Athens, he
was rescued by Demetrius, but
obliged to leave the city (Diog.
101 ; Philo.). The assertion
of Amphicrates (in Diog. and
Athen. xiii. 611, a), that he was
put to death by a hemlock-
draught, is contradictory to all
we know of him. According
to Antisth. in Diog. 98, he was
a pupil not only of Aristippus
the younger, but also of Anni-
ceris and of the dialectician
Dionysius. It is however diffi-
cult to see how he can have
been younger than Anniceris.
Suid. to5. makes Zeno, Pyrrho,
and Bryso (see p. 255, 1) his tea-
chers, the first one probably
with reason, the two others
quite by mistake. Under
~S,<iiKpa.T. he makes him a pupil
of Socrates, at the same time
confounding him with a mathe-
matician from Cyrene of the
same name (see p. 338, 4), who
is known to us through Plato.
In Diog. ii. 102, iv. 52, he is
called a Sophist, i. e., one who
took pay for his instruction.
3 According to Diog. 86,
through Epitimides of Cyrene
and his pupil Parsebates, the
latter of whom is said to have
studied under Aristippus. Suid.
HISTORY OF THE CYRENAICS.
343
were Hegesias l and Anniceris. 2 These three men
established separate branches of the Cyrenaic School,
which bore their respective names. 3 Amongst the
pupils of Theodoras were Bio the Borysthenite, 4 and
perhaps Euemerus, the well-known Greek rationalist, 5
CHAP.
XIV.
1 A cotemporary of Ptolemy
Lagi, who is said to have pro-
hibited him from lecturing,
because he described the ills
of life so graphically that many
were led to commit suicide.
Cic. Tusc. i. 34, 83 ; Valer. Max.
viii. 9, 3; Plut. Am. Prol. 5,
p. 497. Suicide was also the
subject of his book 'AiroKap-
Tfpuiv, Cic. 1. c. Hence his
name neia-iddvaros, Diog. 86,
Suid. 'ApiffT.
2 Probably also under Ptole-
my L, although Suidas, 'Avci/c.,
places him in the time of Alex-
ander. Conf. Antisth. in Diog.
ii. 88.
8 For the GeoSApftoi and their
teaching see Diog. 97; Calli-
machus in At/ten, vi. 252, c ; for
the 'tiyi)a-uutoi, Diog. 93 ; for the
'AwiKtpftoi, ibid. 96; Strabo,
xvii. 3, 22, p. 837; Clemens,
Strom, ii. 417, B. ; Suid. 'AWIK.
Strabo calls Anniceris 6 SOKUV
liravovOuffai TTJV Kvprii/aiK^v a'tpe-
ffiv KO.\ irapayajt'if our' OUTTJS r^v
'AvviKtpfiav. To the Annicereans
belonged Posidonius the pupil,
and probably also Nicoteles, the
brother of Anniceris. Suid. 1. c.
4 This individual lived at
Athens and other places {Diog.
iv. 46, 49, 53; ii. 135). Accord-
ing to Diog. iv. 10, where, how-
ever, the Borysthenite appears
to be meant, he was acquainted
with Xenocrates. In Diog. iv.
46, 54, ii. 35; Athen. iv. 162,d,
he appears as a cotemporary of
Menedemus (see p. 281), and
the Stoic Persasus (teller's
Stoics, &c.). He appears, there-
fore, to have lived to the middle
of the third century. Accord-
ing to Diog. iv. 51, he left the
Academy, which he first fre-
quented, and joined the Cynics
(which reads in our text of
Diogenes as if he had deserted
the Academician Crates, in
order to become a Cynic, but
this is not possible in point of
time ; perhaps the original
text meant that by the agency
of Crates he was brought over
from the Academy to Cynicism).
He then turned to Theodore,
and at last to Theophrastus,
Diog. iv. 151. His free thought
and the instability of his moral
principles {Diog. iv. 49, 53)
recall the School of Theodore,
in which Numenius in Eus. Pr.
Ev. xiv. 6, 5, actually places him.
In other respects he is rather a
literary wit than a philosopher.
See Diog. iv. 46-67, various
sayings of his in Plutarch.
6 Euemerus of Messene, ac-
cording to the most numerous
and approved authorities ; ac-
cording to others, of Agri-
gentum, Cos, or Tegea (see
Sieroka, De Euhemero. K6-
nigsbg. 1869, p. 27), is often
mentioned in connection with
Theodorus, Diagoras, and other
Atheists (Sieroka, 19, 31). The
344
THE SOCRATIC SCHOOLS.
CHAP.
XIV.
while amongst his contemporaries was Aristotle of
Gyrene. 1
B. Teach- The Cyrenaic teaching, the leading traits of which
\ n y?f* lie . undoubtedly belong to Aristippus, 2 like the Cynic,
notion that Theodore was his
teacher rests solely on hypo-
thesis. For we have no busi-
ness to write" Eirfipepov in Diog.
ii. 97 instead of 'Eirrfivpov (with
Nietzsche, Khein. Mus. N. F.
xxv. 231). Epicurus derived
his views respecting the Gods
mostly from Theodorus' trea-
tise irepl dfwv. A connection
with the Cyrenaic School is
not in itself probable, since
this was the only School which
at that time busied itself with
combating the popular belief.
Doubtless, too, that tame reso-
lution of the myths into history,
for which Euemerus is known,
is also quite after their taste; in-
deed, the Cynics who, together
with the Cyrenaics, were at
that time the representatives
of free thought, did not resort
to natural explanations, but to
allegory. In point of time
Euemerus may easily have
been a pupil of Theodorus. He
lived under the Macedonian
Cassander (311 to 298 B.C.),
the latter having sent him on
that journey on which he
visited the fabulous island of
Panchsea, and pretended to
have discovered in a temple
there the history of the Gods,
the account of which is given
in his Ifpa avaypcup-f). Diodor.
in Eu,s. Pr. Ev. ii. 2, 55 ; Pint.
De Is. 23, p. 360. Copious
extracts from this work are
found in Diodorus,v. 41-46, and
fragments of the translation
undertaken by Ennius, or of a
revision of this translation in
Lactant. Inst. i. 11, 13 (see
Vahlen, Ennian. Poes. Keliq.,
p. xciii. f) ; 17, 22, 1. c. 169.
Shorter notices of the con-
tents of his treatise in Oic.
N. D. i. 42, 119, followed by
Minuc. Fel. Octav. 21, 2 ; also
in Strabo, ii. 3, 5 ; 4, 2 ; p. 102,
104; vii. 3, 6, p. 299; Pint.
1. c. ; AtJien. xiv. 658, e ; Sext.
Math. ix. 171, 34 ; Aug. C. D.
vii. 26 ; Ep. 18 ; Serm. 273, 3 ;
Higgin. Poet. Astron. ii. 12, 13,
42, D. See also SieroTta- and
Steinhart, Allg. Encykl. v.
Ersch. d. Gr. i. vol. 39, 50;
Muller, Frag. Hist. Graec. ii.
100.
1 According to Diog. ii. 113,
president of a philosophical
School in the time of Stilpo,
apparently at Athens. Dio-
genes there calls him Kupnva'i-
K.&S. JElian, however, V. H.
x. 3, in recording a saying of
his, calls him Kvprjvatos. He is
probably the Cyrenaic, who,
according to Diog. \. 35, wrote
a treatise Trepl VOHITIKWV. A say-
ing in Stob. Floril. 63, 32, be-
longs to him according to some
MSS., but to Aristippus accord-
ing to Cod. B.
2 The thing is not altogether
undisputed. Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv.
18, 31, f, says of the elder
Aristippus, without doubt on
the authority of Aristocles :
a\\' ovStt utv ovrcas 4v Ttf fyavtpta
vtpl Tf\ovs $te\fa,TO, 8ti ttjuei 5e
TEACHING OF THE CYRENAICS.
345
takes up the practical side of the philosophy of So-
crates. Of Aristippus too, and his pupils, it was
CHAP.
XIV.
TTJJ (ittiaifnovias fty vit6ffra.criv
%\fyfv iv ijSovats KtiaQai. atl
yap \6yovs irtpl 7)801/7)5 irotov/j.e-
vovs (Is virofyiav fyye TOVS irpo<n6v-
ras avrif roi \iyfiv reAos tlvat
TO f>$4<as CfJ" : and of the younger
one, fcs Kal ffacpfas upiffaro -reAos
e/Vai TO i)Sfws rjv, TI^OV^IV (VTOLT-
Ttav T)\V KOTO Klvi)niv. This
testimony appears to be further
corroborated by the fact that
Aristotle, in refuting the doc-
trine of pleasure, Eth. x. 2,
does not mention Aristippus,
but Eudoxus, as its representa-
tive. To this must be added
what Sosicrates and others,
according to Dwg. 84, main-
tained, that Aristippus left no
writings ; which would at least
point to a lower development
of his teaching. Diog ii. 64
does not quite prove so much :
navruv pel/Till Tiav 2u>fpaTi/cwj/
$La\6yci>v vaval-rios aA.7i0e7y tlvai
SoKt't TOWS I\Xa.rtavo<i, EfvoQuvTOs,
'AvTurdtvovs, Aicrx'^ou : for, ac-
cording to 84 in our text,
Panastius is quoted as an au-
thority for a number of dia-
logues of Aristippus. It may
therefore be asked with Bran-
dig, ii. a, 92, whether in 64,
Aristippus' name has not been
omitted by some oversight ; on
the other hand, Atarpipal were
hardly dialogues : cf. Susemifil,
Rhein. Mus. N. F. xxvi. 338.
For these reasons Ritter, ii. 93,
supposes that the views of
Aristippus were not reduced to
a connected form till a later
time. The assertion of Sosi-
crates however appears to be
without foundation ; for Dio-
genes gives two lists of the
works of Aristippus, which
agree in the main, and one of
which was acknowledged by
Sotion and Panaetius. Theo-
pompus knew of writings of
his, for according to Athen. xi.
508, c, he accused Plato of
plagiarism from the diatribes
of Aristippus. Allowing then
that subsequent additions were
made to the writings of Aris-
tippus, it cannot be supposed
that the whole collection is
spurious. Perhaps in ancient
times, and in Greece proper,
these writings were less diffused
than those of the other fol-
lowers of Socrates. This fact
may easily be explained, sup-
posing the greater part of them
not to have been written till
Aristippus had returned to his
native country. It may also be
the reason why Aristotle never
mentions Aristippus; perhaps
he omitted him because he in-
cluded him among the Sophists,
Metaph. iii. 2, 996, a, 32. The
remarks of Eusebius can only
be true in one sense, viz., that
the elder Aristippus does not
make use of the expression
Tf\os, and does not put his sen-
tences in the form which sub-
sequently prevailed in the
Schools. That he recommended
pleasure, that he declared it to
be a good in the most decided
manner, that thus the leading
features of the Cyrenaic teach-
ing are due to him, cannot be
doubted, taking into account
the numerous witnesses which
affirm it, nor would the unity
346
THE SOCRATIC SCHOOLS.
CHAP.
XIV.
general
jwsition.
asserted, as well as of the Cynics, that they neglected
questions touching nature and logic, giving to the
study of ethics l exclusive value. Nor is this assertion
disproved by the fact that they were themselves un-
able to keep clear of theory, the sole object of their
teaching being to establish ethics, and indeed their
own exclusive pursuit of ethics. 2 The end to be secured
by philosophy is the happiness of mankind. On this
point Aristippus and Antisthenes agree. Antisthenes,
of his School be otherwise
comprehensible. Doubtless
Plato wrote the Philebus with
an eye to this philosopher, and
Speusippus had written on
Aristippus, Diog. iv. 5.
1 Diog. ii. 92 : atyiffravro Se
Kal TUV fyvffiKuv 8ia TT)" epipaivo-
pevTlv a,KaTa\T]tytav, rS>v
j/ ^TrrotTO. Me-
\eaypos Se . . . Kal KAeiT<fy*ax os
. . . (pafflv avrovs &xpW ra ^7-
ffQai t& re (pvfftKbv fiepos Kal rb
Sta\eKriK6v. SvvaffBai yap eft \4ytiv
Kal SeiffLSaifjiovias eKrbs elvai Kal
rbv irepl Qa.va.rov (f>6$of f"K<t>evyfiv
rbv irepl ayaBuv Kal KO.KWV \6yov
^K/j.e/j.a.9rjK6Ta. Sext. Math. vii.
11 : SoKovffi Se Kara -TIVO.S KOI of
rb r)6mbv /j.epos napairfijareiv 8e T^
tpvffiKbv Kal rb \oyiitbv &s fj.r)5ev
irpbs -rb ev5aifj.6v(as ;3ioCi/ ffvvep-
yovvTa. Plut. in Eus. Pr. Ev. i.
8, 9 : 'ApftrTJTTTros 6
tie T}>V aA.7r)8(5fa, rV Se &\\riv
<t>v<TioKoyiav irepiypd<pet, fj.ovov
w(pe\iu.ui' elvat \eyu>v rb fare'iv '
"OTTI TOJ ev peyapoiffi KUKOV T'
ayaOdv re -rervKrai, which is also
told of Socrates and Diogenes.
Arist. Met. ii. 2, 996, a, 32:
&crre 810 ravra r&v ffodnffTUf
rives olov "ApitTTtTTTros irpoeirijAa-
KIOV auras [ras fj.a6-rjfj.ariKas
eTricTTiij^as] eV/uej/ yap rals &\\ats
tf-)(yais, Ka\ ra7s fiavavffois, olov
TfKTOVlKfj Kttl ffKVTlKfl, Sl^Tt
fieX-riov % -)(f1pov Xtyfcrtiat iravra,
TOS Se /AaOyuaTiKas ovdeva iroie7<r-
6ai \6yov irepl ayaGiav Kal KctK&v.
The same in Alex, on the pas-
sage Schol. in Arist. 609, b, 1 ;
Ps. Alex, on Met. xiii. 3 ; 1078,
a, 33 ; Ibid. 817, a, 11 ; Syrian
in Metaph. Arist. T. V. 844, b,
6; 889, b, 19. Compare the
language of Aristippus in Diog.
ii. 71, 79 ; Plut. Ed. Pr. 10, 7.
2 According to the sense in
which it is understood, it is
equally true to say that they
set logic aside and that they
made use of it. See p. 347, 2.
Of what was afterwards called
logic, they appropriated just as
much as was necessary for their
theory of knowledge, but they
assigned no independent value
to it, nor did they extend their
study of it beyond what was
wanted for their purposes.
Conf. Sen. Ep. 89, 12 : Cyren-
aici naturalia cum rationalibus
sustulerunt et contenti fuerunt
moralibus, sed hi quoque, quae
removent, aliter inducunt.
GENERAL POSITION OF THE CYRENAICS.
347
however, knows of no happiness which does not im- CHAP.
mediately coincide with virtue, and thus makes virtue _ 1_
the only object in life. Aristippus, on the other hand,
considers only enjoyment an end in itself, and only
pleasure an unconditional good, 1 regarding everything
else as good and desirable only in as far as it is a
means to enjoyment. 2 Both Schools therefore at the
very commencement diverge in opposite directions,
their divergence, however, not preventing their subse-
quent approach to a greater extent than might seem
at first sight to be possible.
The ground thus occupied was worked out by (2) Feel-
Aristippus and his pupils as follows. 3 Perceptions, *"^* object
ofknom-
1 Aristippus in Xen. Mem. ii.
1, 9 : tuavTbv TO'IVUV rdrria j's
rovs &ov\o[j.fvos 77 pcia-rd Te Kal
$}5t<rro &ioTeviv. Cio. Acad. iv.
42, 131 : alii voluptatem sum-
mum bonum esse voluerunt :
quorum princeps Aristippus.
Ibid. Fin. ii. 6, 18; 13, 39;
Diog. 87 : r/Soj^i/ . , . V Kal
rt\os flvai, 88 : ^ r)8oi>)) 81' aiirrjf
alpfri] ^ai ifya66v. Athen. xii.
rr)v rtSviraOfiav ravr-qv reAos fivai
(<t>ri Kal 4v avrrj T\\V evSaifjiOfiav
/30A7Jcr0ai. Euseb. 1. c. p. 296,
I. The same view is mentioned
and attacked by Plato, Gorg.
491, E. ; Rep. vi. 505, B. (See
above p. 312, 1), and Philebus,
II, B., where it is thus des-
cribed : <\7j/8o s fj.tv TOIIWV ayaObv
flvai <pT)<n TO -)(a[pfiv iraffi cio<s
Kal T^IV riSovyif Kal Ttptyiv Kal otra
TOV ytvous tarl TOVTOU avp.^xava,
Ibid. 66, D. : Taya6bi> fr'tOfTo
ri^lv Ti6ov)jv flvai iru(rav Kal irav-
TtA.^. That Plato had Aristip-
pus in mind will be presently
shown in respect of the Phile-
bus, and it is therewith proved
for the Republic, which refers
to the Philebus.
* Diog. ii. 91 : TTIV q>p6vriaiv
ayaQbi- pfv flvat \fyovcriv, ov Si
tamriv $f alperrjv, a\\a Sta rj ^{
OIITTJS ireptyiv6fj.fva. 92 : Kal rbi/
TrKovTOV 8e iroiriTiKbv i]5ovr)s tivai,
ov Si' afn'ov alpcrttv OVTO.. Oio.
Off. iii. 33, 116 : Cyrenaici at-
que Annicerei philosophi nom-
inati omne bonum in voluptate
posuerunt ; virtutemque censu-
erunt ob earn rem esse laudan-
dam, quod efficiens esset vol-
uptatis. To this sentence of
Aristippus, Wendt, Phil. Cyr.
28, and Ast refer the passage of
the Phaedo, 68, E., but without
reason. It refers to common
unphilosophical virtue.
1 The Cyrenaics divided their
ethics into live parts. Sext.
Math. vii. 11 : Katroi irfpnpt-
irr6ai TOVTOUS tvioi *
348 THE SOCRATIC SCHOOLS.
CHAP, being feelings of a change within ourselves, do not
supply us with the least information as to things in
themselves. We may be indeed conscious of having
a sensation of sweetness, whiteness, and so forth ;
but whether the object which causes the sensation is
sweet, or white, is unknown to us. One and the same
thing often produces an entirely different effect upon
different persons. How then can we be sure, that in
any given case, whether owing to the nature of our
organism or to the circumstances under which we
receive the impression, things do not appear to us
entirely different from what they are in themselves ?
Knowledge, therefore, is limited to our own feelings ;
as to these we are never mistaken ; but of things in
themselves we know absolutely nothing. 1 Just as
Q 5>v rb T)Qucbv Siaipovffiv (Is rf and universal the division is.
rbv irepl ruv alpertav Kai <f>evicru>v That it was not made by Aris-
roicov Kai els rbv irepl ruv iraOcav tippus may be gathered from
Kai Irt els rbv irtpl rSiv irpde<av the statements as to his wri-
Kal ^8rj rbv irept rcav alriav, Kai tings. In the division nepl iri(T-
rtKevrdiov els rbv irepl ruv Trier- reuv probably the theory of
reutv ev rovrou -yap 6 irepl airiiav knowledge was treated, and in
rAiro s, <pa<rlv, etcrov tfrvoiicov pepovs the preceding one the theory of
ir{>yx.avev, 6 Se irepl iriffretav eK motion.
roG \oyiKov. Sen. Ep. 89, 12 ' Cic. Acad. ii. 46, 143 : aliud
(according to what has been judicium Protagoras est, qui
said, p. 346, 2) : in quinque enim putet id cuique rerum esse, quod
partes moralia dividunt, ut una cuique videatur : aliud Cyren-
sit de fugiendis et expetendis, aicorum, qui pragter permo-
altera de adfectibus, tertia de tiones intimas nihil putant esse
actionibus, quarta de causis, judicii. Ibid. 7, 20 : de tactu,
quinta de argumentis : causas et eo quidem, quem philosophi
rerum ex natural! parte sunt, interiorem vocant, aut doloris
argumenta ex rational!, acti- aut voluptatis, in quo Cyren-
ones ex morali. We cannot, aici solo putant veri esse judi-
however, tie our faith to this cium. Plut. adv. Col. 24, 2, p.
account, not knowing how the 1120: [01 K.vpriva'iKol~\ ra, irdOri
subject was divided among /ecu TOS (pavraaias ev aurois ndev-
these several parts, nor how old res OVK (povro rrji/ airo rovruv
FEELINGS THE SUBJECT OF KNOWLEDGE.
349
little do we know of the feelings of other people.
There may be common names, but there are no com-
CHAP.
XIV.
irlffnv tlvai StapKij irpbs ray inrtp
riav irpayndrwv Karaf3(f3atet>o'tis,
OAA.' & JTTfp (V TroAlOp/Cl'a TtilV ^Krbs
airoffrdvres fisra ira.Qr\ KartK\tiaav
aurovs. rb (paivfrai TtBepevot,
rb 8' ^(TTi fail irpoffairo(paii'6fj.fvol
irtpl riav fKrbs . . . yXvKaivfaOai
yap Aeyowri Kal iriKpaiveffdai Kal
<pa>riea(tai Kal ffKorovffQai riav
iraQiav rovruv tKacrrov T-<\V e'-fpyeiav
ulKeiav 4t> avrcp KOI antplairaarov
e \ovros ' fl 8e J\VKV rb /ueA* Kal
irtKpbs 6 6a\\bs K.T.\. vrrb iro\\G>v
aifTifj.ap'rvpf'indai xal 8-rjpitav /col
irpay/j.drwf Kal avfipiiircav, TWV /uev
8v<Txtpaiv6vT<i>v [add rb /iev] rcav
8e TTpcHTifufiHiiv Ti]v 8a\\iav, Kal
airoKa.ofj.(v(av inrb TTJJ xaAa^rjs, Kal
Kara^vxop.tftav inrb ofvov. Kal irpbs
j\\iov a/j.@\v<aTT6vTcav Kal vvKTdip
$\ficovT<av. oOev fnufvouffa TOIS
ird6e<Tiv T] 8o|a SiOTTjpe? rb ot^i-
fidpri]TOv ' fK^aifovffa Se Kal
iro\vTrpayfjt.ovovffa T(f Kpiveiv Kal
airo<paiven 6ai irepl rwv tKrbs, avri)v
re iro\\dms Tapdfffffi Kal fj.d)(fTai
irpbs tftpovs airb TU>V ain&v tvav-
Ti'a irdOri Kal 8ia(t>6povs (pavraffias
Xa/ufloi/ovras. Sext. Math. vii.
191, who gives the most detailed
account, but probably to a great
extent in his own language :
(pafflf ovv ol Kvpyva'tKol Kptr^pta
flvai TO ird9rj Kal /j.6i>a KaroAoyn-
PdvarOai Kal a^tvtna Tvy\aveiv,
Ttav Sf irfiroiriK6ruv TO ira'07j fj.ijSev
tlvat KaTa\T)inbv ntfe aStdtyev-
ffrov Zn fifv yap \evKatv6/j.(6a,
<pa<rl, Kal y\vKa6/j.eOa, Svvarbv
\ey(iv aSiatyevffTws . . . STI 8e
rb fjLiroir)Tti<bv TOV irdOovs \fvK6v
tan ff y\vKi> fartv, ou^ ol6v T'
airofyaivfcrQai. eiKbs ydp tan Kal
inrb /*)) \fvnov riva \tvKavTiKus
SiaTtBrivai Kal inrb n$j y\vKtos
y\vKai>Orjvai, just as
eye or a mad brain always sees
things different from what they
are. OUTW Kal tyixos (v\oy(arar6v
fffri ir\eov ttav oiKficov iradwv
(i,i)5 tit \anPdi>f H> Svvao6ai. If,
therefore, we understand by
<paiv6neva individual impressions
(TTO^TJ), it must be said TroWa
TO <paivA(j.tva oATjflTJ Kal Kara-
ATJTTTO. If , on the contrary, every
name means the thing by which
the impression is produced, all
$aiv6ti.fva are false and cannot
be known. Strictly speaking,
fjiAvov rb irdOos T)\Civ tan <paiv6-
fj-evov rb 8' $Krbs Kal rov irdOovs
TToirjTi/cbj' TOX l^ff tanv $v ov
tpaiv6p.tvov 5e rifuv. Kal ravrrj
irtpl /j.tv TO irddi) rd ye oifcelo
irdvres eff/JLev air\ai>fls, -rrep! 8 rb
^Krbs vwoKti/jitvov irdmts ir\avci>-
fteOa' KaKtlva /j.fv fan Kara\r)fra,
rovro fit aKaraXTfirruv, TTJS ^fX^ s
irdvu affQtvov<s Kademwcrris irpbs
Siayvoiaiv avrov irapa rovs r6trovs,
irapa ra Staffr'fifj.ara, irapa ras
Ktvhfffis, irapa ras fj.traf)o\as, irapa
^AAos Trafj.ir\ri6e'is alrias. See
Pyrrh. i. 215 ; Diog. ii. 92 : rd
if irddr] KaraXTjirra, t\tyov olv
avra, OVK o<^)' o>v yiverai. Ibid.
93 : roy aiVflrjcrets /XTJ irdvrorf
a\rietvtit>. Ibid. 95 of the School
of Hegesias, which does not in
this respect differ from others :
OKj/pow 8e Kal ras alffH^aeis OVK
aKpifiovaas r^v ^ir-iyvuffiv. Aris-
totle in Ens. Pncp. Ev. xiv. 19,
1 : |f)s 8' &c tltv ol \iyovrts pSva
ra irde-r) Kara\t)irrd. rovro 8'
flirov ilvioi rSiv IK rrjs Yvp-fivjjs
(which in the face of the defi-
nite statements of Cicero, Plu-
tarch and Sextus,does not prove
350
THE SOCRATIC SCHOOLS.
CHAP.
XIV.
mon feelings, and when two persons say that they
have felt the same thing, neither of them can be cer-
tain that he has experienced the same feeling as the
other, since he is only conscious of his own state and
not of that of another. 1
Thus, like Protagoras, 2 the Cyrenaics regard all
notions as relative and individual ; their view differ-
ing from his in this respect only that they refer
notions more directly to internal feelings, and leave
out of sight 3 Heraclitus' doctrine of perpetual flow
that this doctrine did not be-
long to the whole School, nor
can this be intended. Conf . c.
18, 31) . . . Ka.6iJ.evoi yap e\eyov
Kal refj.v6jj.evoi yvtapi^eiv, Sri va-
ff^oiev ri ' iroTfpov 8f rb ncuov enj
TTVp fy rl) TepVOV ffi$7)pO$ OVK }IV
eltftv. Sextns, Math. vi. 53,
says : /j.6t>a <j>a<rlv vTrd.px.ei-v fa
wde-rj, &\\o 8e ovOev. oBev KO.\
TV 4>wvT)v, n^) olaav trdQos a\\a
ird6ovs 7ronjTtV, M yive&Qat ruv
virapKr&v. But this is inaccu-
rate. The Cyrenaics, we gather
from the above, cannot have
denied the existence of things,
but only our knowledge of their
existence. This whole theory
probably belongs to the elder
Aristippus, as will be probable
from a passage in Plato soon to
be mentioned. Against Tenne-
man's notion (Gesch. d. Phil. ii.
106) that it first came from
Theodoras, see Weiidt, Phil.
Cyr. 45.
1 Sort. Math. vii. 195 : Mat
oiiSe Kpiri]pi6v (paffi elvai xoivbv
avdpAirtav, ov6(MTa Se Koivd -rldeffdai
TOIS Kpifiaffi. \evxi>v /j.ev ydp n
Kal 7Awtt/ Ka\ovffi KOivias iraines,
K0iv\tv 8e rt \fVKOv $ y\vicb OVK
X'>v<nv tVatrrns yap TOV ISiov
irdBovs a.vn\aiJ.$d.VfTai. rb Se el
TOVTO rb irdQos dirb \evKov eyyi-
verai avrqi Kal -ry ire\as, O^T'
aurb? SiWrai \fyeiv, fj.T] a.vabex6-
fj.fos rb rov ire\as irdOos, nijrt 6
Tre'A.as, fj.ri ftSff][^|MMf rb eKeivov
. . . rd^a yap eyta (j.ei> ovru
ffvyKeKpifj.ai is bevKaivetrdat virb
TOV e^aOev irpoffiriirTovros, erepos
Se OVTCO KaTeffKevaafjLevr]v e%ei TTJV
aiffdrtfftv, &<TTe erepws SiareOrjvai,
in support of which the example
of a jaundiced or diseased eye-
sight is adduced. It follows
then : Kotva fity fyuas ovofiaTo.
riOevai rots irpdy(j.a<Ti, irdOr) Se 7*
exeiv fSia.
2 Zeller's Phil. d. Griech, i.
869.
3 The last point has been too
much lost sight of by Sehleier-
maclier (Plato's Werke, ii. 1,
1 3), who considers the de-
scription of the Protagorean
teaching in the Theaatetus to be
chiefly meant for Aristippus,
whose view does not absolutely
coincide with that of Protago-
ras. See Wendt, Phil. Cyr. 37.
On the other hand, the differ-
ence between them is exagger-
FEELINGS THE SUBJECT OF KNOWLEDGE.
as something not wanted for their purposes and
transcending the limits of human knowledge. 1 If
knowledge, however, be confined to knowledge of
feelings, it follows on the one hand that it would be
absurd to seek for a knowledge of things, such know-
ledge being once for all impossible; and thus the
sceptical attitude assumed by the Cyrenaics in respect
to knowledge, was the ground of their conviction of
the worthlessness of all physical enquiries. 2 On the
other hand, for this very reason feeling only can give
CHAP.
XIV
ated by the Academician in
die. (see p. 348, 1), who ascribes
to Protagoras a view entirely
different from that of the Cy-
renaics, and by Ens. Pr. Ev. xiv.
19, 5, who after discussing the
Cyrenaics introduces Protagoras
with these words : CB-CTCU roinots
ovv ffwf^eraffai Kal TOVS T}\V tvav-
riav /SaSt^bcras, Kal irdvTa xpfji/cu
TTUTTfVflV TOIS rOV ff&fMTOS CUffOi]-
fffffiv &pio-a/j.evovs, for Protagoras
only asserted the truth of all
perceptions in the sense that
they were all true for him who
perceived them, that things
were to each one what they ap-
peared to him to be. In this
sense the Cyrenaics, as Sextus
lias rightly shown, declared all
to be true, but both they and
Protagoras said nothing about
objective truth. Hermann's
objection here to Ges. Ab.
235, on the ground that Prota-
goras was far more subjective
than Aristippus, since Aristip-
pus presupposed an agreement
amongst men in describing their
impressions, is still more at
variance with the statements of
Cicero and Eusebius, to which
Hermann appeals,f or they do not
make Protagoras more subjec-
tive than Aristippus, but Aris-
tippusmore subjective than Pro-
tagoras. In the next place it is
not correct. Of course Prota-
goras did not deny that certain
names were used by all, he even
treated himself of the apQ6r-r)s
ovofta.ruv(Ze,ller''s'Ph\\. d.Griech.
i. 933, 1), but what is the use
of agreeing in names when the
things differ ? The Cyrenaics
are only more accurate than
Protagoras in asserting that
perceptions which are called by
the same name are not the same
in different persons. But there
is no disagreement in the teach-
ing of the two.
1 Had they acted consistently
they must have regarded as such
every attempt at a natural ex-
planation of our perceptions.
We must, therefore, not be mis-
led by Pint. N. P. Suav. Vivi
Sec. Epic. 4, 5, p. 1069, so as to
attribute to them the view of
Democritus about pictures and
einana' ing forms.
2 As Diog. ii. 92 remarks.
(See p. 346, 1.)
352
THE SOCRATIC SCHOOLS.
CHAP.
XIV.
(3) Plea-
sure and
pain.
the rule by which the aim of actions is determined
and their value tested. For things being only known
to us in our own feelings, the production of certain
feelings is all that can be attained by action ; hence
the best thing for us will be what is most gratifying
to our feelings. 1 Here from the Cyrenaic theory of
knowledge follow those ethical principles, which in
other ways also it was their main object to establish.
All feeling, as Aristippus assumes, following Pro-
tagoras, consisting in an emotion in him who experi-
ences it, if the motion be gentle, there arises a feeling
of pleasure ; if rough and violent, 2 of pain ; if again
1 Sext. Math. vii. 199 : avd\oya
8e flvai 5oKe? rots irtpl Kpirripiiav
AeyojaeVois /caret rovrovs rovs av-
SpaS Kal TO. TTtpl rf\S>V \y6[JI.(Va '
SirJKei yap ra irafljj Kal firl ra
re'ATj. Ibid. 200.
2 Euseb. Pr. Bv. xiv. 18, 32,
says of the younger Aristippus
on the authority .of Aristocles :
rpsis yap t<p-r) KarafrraTeis flvat
iff pi rfyv rtfj.fr fpav ffvyKpaaiv fj.iav
fjifv Ka6' $v a\yov/j.fv, toiKv'iav To3
Kara 6d\affffav Xfipuvi ' erepov 8e
KaO' ^v i]S4fj.f9a., rip Aeiy Kv/j.art
f<pofjiotov/ui.fvt]v tinai yap \fiai> K'L-
vi\ffiv T))V ^5oi/V ovpiy
jueVrjc elvai Karafframi/,
oftrea\yov[j.ei> oijre r]5
irapair\i](Tiov oixrav. Dioff. ii. 86,
says almost the same thing of
the older Cyrenaic school : Svo
7rd0J7 ixpiffrai/TO, ir6vov Kal rj^ov^f,
rty /j.ei> \eiav Kiv^ffiv rrjc T]$OVT)V,
rbv Se ir&vov rpax^a-v Kivriffiv.
Ibid. 89, 90 : /ueVas re Kara-
<rrdffeis aiv6fj.aov a.T)5oi>lav Kal
aicoviav. Sext. Pyrrh. i. 215:
Kal r^v \tiav r^s ffapKbs Kivqaiv
r\os tlvai \eyet. Math. vii. 199 :
rOiv yap iruOtav ra fj.ei> iirrtv rjSea,
ra 8t a\yeivd, rci Se p.crav. That
these statements come, on the
whole, from the elder Aristip-
pus, appears to be established by
several passages in the Philebus.
After Socrates (p. 31, B.) has
there shown that pain consists
in a violation, and pleasure in
a restoration, of the natural
connection between the parts of
a living being, he appends (p.
42, D.) the question : What
would happen if neither of these
changes were to take place ?
The representative of the theory
of pleasure havinganswered in a
way afterwards repeated by
Plato, Rep. ix. 583, C., that in
this case there would be neither
pleasure nor pain, he continues :
ctA.Ai(TT' elirfs ' ctAA.cs yap y o^ucu,
r6Se \eyfts, ws aei n rovruv
avayKatov fi^lv ffupfraiveiv, els ol
(rotpoi tyaffiv ' del yap airavia &ce
re Kal KO.TUI pti. Accordingly
the answer is modified to mean
PLEASURE AND PAIN.
353
we are in a state of repose, or the motion is so weak
as to be imperceptible, there is no feeling either of
pleasure or pain. Of these three states, only that
of pleasure is absolutely desirable. Hereto nature
bears witness ; all following pleasure as the highest
end, and avoiding nothing so carefully as pain, 1 unless
indeed their judgment be perverted by unfounded
fancies. 2 To put freedom from pain in the place of
that great changes produce tion is felt or produces plea-
pleasure and pain, but small sure. Perhaps it is in reference
ones neither. To the same view to this that Arist. Etb. N. vii.
he comes back (on p. 53, C.), 13, 1153, a, 12, says : 8b Kal ou
with the words : Spa irepi ydovris
OVK afcrjuoa^ej/, cos ael yfveais
fnnv. oiiorla 8e ou/t Herri rb nap&ita.v
ffiovris ; Ko/uiJ/ol 70^ ST) rives a5
roihov rbi/ h6yov f'lrixeipovfft
fj.t\vvfiv rifjuv, ois Se? x'V"' *X 6U/>
These latter words clearly prove
that the assertion, all pleasure
consists in motion, had been
uttered by some one else, when
Plato wrote the Philebus ; and
since with the exception of
Aristippus no one is known to
whom they could be referred
(Protagoras did not draw the
ethical. conclusions of his prin-
ciples), since moreover this as-
sertion is universally attributed
to the School of Aristippus,
since too the epithet Ko/xifbs
suits him best, it is most pro-
bable that both this passage
and the passage connected with
it on the two kinds of motion
and rest, are his. The same
applies to the remark, that
small changes make no impres-
sion. Likewise, Diog. ii. 85,
says of Aristippus : re\os 8'
GHAP.
XIV.
0-a.va.i elva.i T^V T}$ovi]v. Nor can
we allow that there is a dis-
crepancy (as Su-semihl, Genet.
Entw. d. Plat. Phil. ii. 35, note,
720 asserts) between the lan-
guage of Plato, p. 42, D., and
the statements which attribute
to Aristippus the assumption of
an intermediate state between
pleasure and pain. Hence we
cannot countenance the con-
jecture that Aristippus acquired
from Plato the more accurate
limitation of his teaching.
Why did not Aristippus say:
We are at all times in a state
of gentle or violent motion, but
pleasure or pain only arises,
when we become conscious of
this motion ? Yet this is exactly
what he did say according to
Diogenes, and what Plato
makes his representative say,
though certainly riot without
some conversational help.
1 Diog. 88 ; 87 ; Plato, Phil.
11, B. See above p. 347, 1.
* Dioff. ii. 8!) : 8vvaff6ai 5<=
<piirrt KO.I tr\V
i', according
to which not every slight mo-
354
THE SOCRATIC SCHOOL.
CHAP.
XIV.
(4) The
highest
good.
pleasure would not be correct, for where there is no
emotion, enjoyment is as little possible as pain, the
condition being one of insensibility, as in sleep. 1 Thus
the good comes to be identical with what is agree-
able with pleasure ; the evil, with what is disagree-
able, or unpleasant ; what affords neither pleasure nor
pain can be neither good nor evil. 2
From this view it follows, as a matter of course,
that individual feelings of pleasure must, as such, be
the ends of all actions. Simple repose of mind, that
freedom from pain, in which Epicurus at a later time
placed the highest good, cannot, for the reason just
given, be this good. 3 It also appeared to the Cyrenaics
unsatisfactory to make the happiness of the whole
life the point to be kept in view, and to make it the
Diog. .89 : y 8e rov a\yovvTOS
faipfffis (Sis ftprirat Trap' 'ETTI-
ouSe 7) a^ovia a.Kyrt<iiv.
tm yao flvai &/j.(poTfpa,
TTJS aTroj/ias r\ TTJS OTjSoviay Kirf)-
(Tecas. (Trel r) airovia olov Kadtv-
Sovr6s tffTi Ka.TaffTo.ffis. Such
explicit statements probably be-
long to a later time, and are due
principally to the School of
Anniceris in contrast to Epi-
curus, according to Clemens,
Strom, ii. 417 B.
- Sext. Matt. vii. 199 : TO. pev
aKyeivo. Kaicd (j>curn> tlvat, 5>v T(\os
O. Se ^5ia aya6a, Siv
,,
ofae KO.KO.,
ovrt aaObv o&re
8e
Siv Tf\os
KOMlv, oirtp vd.6os fffrl fitra^v
f,5ovris Kal 0X717801/0$. See p.
352, 2.
3 See p. 300, 1. Diog. ii. 87:
rfiovriv fitvroi f^v TOV
Tjf Kal T(\os iivai, Ka6d <pr](n Kal
Tlavainos fvrf irepl TWV alptffewv,
ov TT]v KaTaffTri/j.aTtK^]v riSov^i'
T^V 3ir' avaipfffti a.\yrfi&vuv Kal
oTov dviix^'70'ioj', TIV 6 'EiriKovpos
CLTroSe^fTai Kal Te\os flvai (priffi.
Perhaps the words in Cic. Fin.
ii. 6, 18 (after his having said
similar things, i. 1, 39), are
taken from a similar passage :
aut enim earn voluptatem tue-
retur, quam Aristippus, i.e. qua
sensus dulciter ac jucunde mo-
vettir . . . nee Aristippus, qui
voluptatem summum bonum
dicit, in voluptate ponit non
dolere. 13, 39: Aristippi Cy-
renaicorumque omnium ; quos
non est veritum in ea voluptate
quaa maxime dulcedine sensum
moveret, summum bonum po-
nere, contemnentes istam va-
cuitatem doloris.
THE HIGHEST GOOD.
356
aim of mankind to procure for themselves the highest
sum total of enjoyments that can be in this life.
Such a principle requires the past and the future as
well as the present to be included in the pursuit,
neither of which are in our power, and which certainly
afford no enjoyment. A future feeling of pleasure is
an emotion which has not yet begun ; a past one is
one which has already ceased. 1 The one only rule of
life is to cultivate the art of enjoying the present
moment. Only the present is ours. Forbear then
to trouble for that which is already past and for that
what may never be yours. 2
1 Diorj. 87 : 8oe? 8 1 avrots Kal
Tf\os fv$atfj.ovias tiiafyepfiv. rf\os
fj.fi/ yap tlvai TT\V Kara jue'/m
TJOopijc, fiiSaijAOvtai' Se rb en rwv
fj-fptKuv rfiov&v ffvffTi)fj.a.. ols irvva-
pi6u.ovt/rat Kal al irap<fx.i)Kviai Kal
al fj.(\\ov<rai. flvai re r,v fiepi-
K^JV ytiot'T]!' Si' avrriv alper^)j> r^}v
8" tuSaifJiovlav ov Si' avrr)i>, a\\a
Sia ras Kara /ue'pos Tj'Sovaj. 89 :
aXAa priv o5e Kara
ayaOuv fl TrpoffSoKiav
oiroTe\tafla, ftirtp ijptaKfv ''
Kovpifj. 4K\vfff6ai yap
rb TTJS tyvxv* Kiinjfjia. Ibid. 91 :
apKfi 5e K'UV Kara p-lav
TIS Trpoffiriirrovffav ^Se'ais
Athen. xii. 544, a : ['Apicrrnriros]
a-iro^e^d/j.fvos r^v ySviraOfiav tav-
TI\V T\OS flvai &/>T) KOI tv avrfj
TT\V fvtiaifioi'iav fitftXTiaQai Kal
H<>v6xpovov avr$ii> tlvai
(riwsrois affdrois otirf TTJ
T<av ytyovvitav airo\avfft(av irpbs
avrbv rjyovfj.d'os ovrf TTJC ^A.7rt'5a
ruv iaofjifvtav, a\\' fvl povw rb
ayaBbv Kplvuv rtf vdpovri, rb 8e
airo\f\avK(vai Kal a.iro\avfftiv ov-
Sev vo/ti'Cw *pbs aurbv, rb fj.fi/ a-y
CHAP.
XIV.
7rd\tv rris
[atpfL Kad'
n % Ivvot
i)Hfrfpov
JElian. V.H. xiv. 6 : vdi>u a<p6Spa
eppw/j-fvois t<?Kei \eytiv 6 'Api-
ffrnnros, iraptyyvwv, (J.4\rt raits
xaptKQovaiv titiKd.p.vfiv, /u^jre TUIV
a.itiovr<j)v vpoKdfjLVftv ' fvdvij.ias yap
b roiovro, Kal 'i\f(o Sid-
SetJis irpofftrarrf 8e 4(p'
f\fiv Kal av
iir' ^Ktivcf rip
(KOffros ^ irpdrrfi
H,(>VQV yap ecpaffKev
rb Trapbv, jU^jre 8e
rb <p6dvoi/ fj-^re rb irpoaSoKwft.tvov
rb pey yap airo\w\tcot, TO Se &5r]-
\ov flvai elirep tcrrai. There can
be no doubt that Aristippus
had already propounded these
views, his whole life presup-
posing them, and his other
views immediately leading to
them, p. 352, 2. The precise for-
mularising of them may very
possibly belong to the period
of Epicurus.
2 Dioff. 66 : airt\ave fjiev yap
['ApiffTiTriroy] ^SofTJs ruv irapAv-
rwt>, otiK (O'fipa 8* ir6vcf ryv air6-
\avaiv ruv ov irapAvraiv odev Kal
A A 2
356 THE SOCRATIC SCHOOL.
CHAP. The character of the things whence the feeling of
/ pleasure arises is in itself unimportant. Every plea-
sure as such is a good, nor is there in this respect
any difference between one enjoyment and another.
They may spring from various, even from opposite
sources, but considered by themselves, they are all
alike, one is as good as the other, a pleasurable emo-
tion, and as such always a natural object of desire. 1
The Cyrenaics therefore can never allow that there
are pleasures not only declared by law and custom
to be bad, but bad by their very nature. In their
view pleasure may be occasioned by a disreputable
action, but in itself it is nevertheless good and de-
sirable. 2
(5) 3fodi- At the same time this principle received several
^nMs'ex- li mita tions by means of which its severity was con-
ireme siderably toned down, and its application restricted.
In the first place, the Cyrenaics could not deny that
Aioye'i/r/s fiaffiKiicbv Kvva e\eyev tarchus replies : ireas \eyets &
O.VTOV. 2(aKpares ; otfi yap -riva (rvy^uipri-
1 Diog. 87 : /UT; Siatpeoeiv re ffeaQai, Oepfvov T/Soj/V elvai raya-
ySoviiv ySovrjs, /njSe %i$i6v n 06v, tt-ra avi^fcrdai ao\> Ktyoirros
elvat. Plato, Phileb. 12, D., -ras fj.tv val ru/as a7a0as ^8oi/dy,
where the champion of plea- T&S Se rivai erepas avrwv /ca/cas.
sure answers the objection of Just as little will Protarchus
Socrates that good pleasures (36, C.) allow that there is
must be distinguished from imaginary pleasure and pain.
bad ones thus : eiVi ^ei/ yap See p. 347, 1.
air' evavriuv .... aural trpay/nd- - Dioff. 88 : elj/ot Sf T^V r]So^v
TtaVj ov }jd)V avTai ye aA\^\ai? ayaObv KO.V cnrb TWV acrY?]/u.oTCtTajj/
t vain leu ' TTCOS yap riSov^ yer/Sovrj yfvr\rai, KaOd <pT]<riv 'ITTTT^OTOS eV
^ ou% 6fj.oiorarov &j/ tti\, rovro rf -aepl alpffffiav. ti yap /cat r)
aurb eavrcjj, vavTtav, XP^fJ-^riuv ; irpats aronos eiTj, a\\' olv %
Ifnd. 13, A.: Xeyei* yap ayaBa $8017) Si' ain^v aiperr) Kal ayaOov.
jrdvra flvai TO. iSea, how is To the same eft'ect is the pas-
this possible in the case of the sage quoted from the Philebus
worst pleasures 1 to which Pro- on p. 358, 1.
CYRENAIC THEORY OF PLEASURE. 357
notwithstanding the essential likeness there were yet CHAP.
differences of degree in feelings of pleasure : for
allowing .that every pleasure as such is good, it does
not follow that the same amount of good belongs to
all : as a matter of fact one affords more enjoyment
than another, and therefore deserves to be preferred
to it. 1 Just as little did it escape their notice, that
many enjoyments are only purchased at the cost of
greater pain ; hence they argue unbroken happiness
is so hard to gain. 2 They therefore required the
consequences of an action to be taken into account ;
thus endeavouring again to secure by an indirect
method the contrast between good and evil which
they would not at first allow to attach to actions
themselves. An action should be avoided when there-
from more pain follows than pleasure ; hence a man
of sense will abstain from things which are con-
1 Diog. 87 says that the Cy- allow of different kinds of plea-
renaics denied a difference in sure, those of the body and
degrees of pleasure, but this is mind for instance. Ritter'g
undoubtedly a mistake. Diog. remarks on Diog. ii. 103, do
ii. 90, says that they taught; not appear conclusive. Just
that bodily feelings of plea- as little can those of Wendt
sure and pain were stronger (Phil. Cyr. 34, Gott. Aug. 1835,
than mental ones. See p. 358, 3. 789) be entertained. Accord-
Plato too, Phil. 45, A. : 65 E., ing to Diogenes the Cyrenaics
in the spirit of this School, only denied that any object
talks of fjityiffrai TUV ySovuv, nor taken by itself and indepen-
is there the slightest reason dently of our feelings was more
for equalising all enjoyments in pleasant than another,
their system. They could not 2 Diog. 90 : Sib [?.] nal naff avryv
allow that there was an abso- aiperfis O&TTJS TTJS ijSovrjs TO. iton\-
lute difference of value be- TIKO. tviu>i> ^ovSiv b\\ripb. iro\-
tween them, some being good Actais lva.vTiovfff)a.i us SvffKo\w-
and others bad ; but they had TO.TOV avro"is Qatveo-Qai T\>V &6poi-
no occasion to deny a relative fffj.bv rwv rfioviav (vSatfjiovlav itot-
difference between the more or otrruv. See p. 355, 1.
less good, and they might even
358
THE SOCRATIC SCHOOLS.
CHAP.
XIV.
demned by the laws of the state and public opinion. 1
Lastly, they also directed their attention to the
difference between bodily and mental pleasures. 2
Holding bodily pains and pleasures to be more pun-
gent than those of the mind ; 3 perhaps even attempt-
ing to show that all pleasure and its opposite are in
the last resource conditioned by bodily feelings ; 4
1 Dioff. 93 : ju7)5eV TI elwi
Qtiffft S'iKaiov fl Ka\bi> i) alffxpbv,
the value of every action de-
iif.pl
pending on the pleasure which
follows it, a\\a v6fj,(f Kal fOei,
& jUtVroj trirovSalos ov8ef &TOTTOV
irpaei Sia Tas tiriKeipevas facias
Kal Sdas. Wendt (Phil. Cyr.
25) calls this statement in
question without reason. It is
quite consistent in Aristippus,
and is met with in Epicurus ;
Zeller, Stoics, &c. ; but he is
right (Ibid. 36, 42) in reject-
ing Schleiermacher's hypothe-
sis (PL W. ii. 1, 183 ; ii. 2, 18),
that in the Gorgias Aristippus
is being refuted under the name
of Callicles, and in the Cra-
tylus 384, Diogenes under that
of Hermogenes.
2 Which, strictly speaking,
they could only have done by
saying that one portion of our
impressions appears to us to
come from the body, another
not; for they had long since
given up all real knowledge of
things. But their consistency
hardly went so far as this.
3 Diog. ii. 90: iroKii fievroi
TWV ^/vxiKtav ras ffcanaTiKas a/uet-
vovs ftvai Kal ras ox\-f)(reis xefpouy
Tas ffcofiariKas ' 80fv Kal ra^rais
KO\afa8ai fj.a\\ov robs ajuaprcJ-
vovras. (The same,7Z>wZ.x. 137.)
XaXeir&Tfpw yap rb irovely, otKei-
6repov Se rb jjSeirfloi in
f!0i' Ku.1 ir\fiova
Bdrspov liroiovvro.
* This is indicated by the ex-
pression oiKei6Tfpov in the above
passage also. See p. 359, 2.
To say that not all pleasure and
pain is connected with bodily
states, may be harmonised
with this statement by taking
it to be their meaning, that not
every feeling has its immediate
object in the body, without,
however, denying more remote
connection between such feel-
ings and the body. Joy for one's
country's prosperity might in
their minds be connected with
the thought that our own hap-
piness depends on that of our
country. It can only be con-
sidered an opponent's exagge-
ration for Pansetius and Cicero
to assert that the Cyrenaics
made bodily pleasure the end
of life. (See p. 354, 3.) Cic.
Acad. iv. 45, 139 : Aristippus,
quasi animum nullum habea-
mus, corpus solum tuetur. The
highest good Aristippus de-
clared consists not in bodily
pleasure, but in pleasure gene-
rally. If he regarded bodily
pleasure as the strongest, and
in this sense as the best, it by
no means follows that he ex-
cluded mental pleasures from
CYRENAIC THEORY OF PLEASURE. 369
they nevertheless contended that there must be a CHAP.
something besides sensuous feelings, or it would be
impossible to explain how unequal impressions are
produced by perceptions altogether alike : the sight,
for instance, of the sufferings of others, if they are
real, gives a painful impression ; if only seen on the
stage, a pleasurable one. 1 They even allowed that
there are pleasures and pains of the mind which have
no immediate reference to any states of the body.
The prosperity, for instance, of our country fills us
with as much pleasure as does our own. 2 Although
therefore pleasure is in general made to coincide with
the good, and pain with evil, the Cyrenaics are far
from expecting happiness to result from the mere
satisfaction of animal instincts. For a true enjoy-
ment of life, you not only need to weigh the value
and the consequences of every enjoyment, but you
need also to acquire the proper disposition of mind.
The most essential help to a pleasant life is prudence, 3
not only because it supplies that presence of mind
which is never at a loss for means, 4 but, mainly, be-
cause it teaches how to make a proper use of the
the idea of good. Indeed, his ras tyvxwks ytiovas
remarks respecting the value tirl <rayxaTi/ca?s ySovcus Ka.1 0X777-
of prudence make this probable. 8<5<rt yivevOat xal y&p iirl fyt\fj
See Wendt, 22. 777 TTJS irarpfSoy euTj/iepia 8><rirep
1 JJioff. 90 : \4yovffi 84 /U7j8 r'y *8i'a x a P&v iyyivfffOtu.
Kara. 4/ixV rr)V '6pa<riv 7) r^v aoV ' s See p. 347, 2.
yivtirdai ^Soj/as, TWV yovv ft.ifi.ou- * See the anecdotes and pro-
fitviav 6pj]vous 7]8t(as aKovofiev, verbs in Dwg. 68 ; 73 ; 79 ; 82,
TWV 8e fear' a\-fjd(tav aijSais. The and what Galen. Exhort, c. 5,
same is found in Plut. Qu. vol. i. 8, K., and Vitruv. vi.
Conv. v. 1, 2, 7, p. 674. Here Praef. i., say of his shipwreck.
belongs Cic. Tusc. ii. 13, 28. Conf. Exc. e Floril. Joan. Da-
2 Dioy. 89 : ou iroo-us (j.tt>roi masc. ii. 13, 138.
3(50 THE SOCRATIC SCHOOLS.
CHAP. good things of life ; l freeing from the prejudices and
!_ fancies which stand in the way of success, such as
nvy, passionate love, superstition ; 2 preserving from
regret for the past, from desire for the future, from
dependence on present enjoyment; and guaranteeing
that freedom of soul of which we stand in need would
we at every moment rest contented with our present
lot, 3
Hence the cultivation of the mind is urgently
advocated by these philosophers, 4 and philosophy in
particular pointed to as the way to a truly human
life. 5 They even assert that therein lies the essential
condition of happiness; for although mankind are
too far dependent on external circumstances for the
wise man to be invariably happy, and the foolish
man invariably miserable, 6 yet as a rule so it is. Nor
1 Demetr. (Elocut. 296) men- pus in Dwg. ii. 72 ; Pint. Ed.
tions as an eTSosToC \6yov' Apia- Pu. 74. He is also mentioned
riirirflov fat ol &v8puiroi xp^ara by Diogenes ii. 68 (Conf. Exc.
juej/ airo\tiirovffi rois iratffiv iiriir- e Floril. Joan. Damasc. ii. 13,
TTjjuiji/ Se ov ffwairo\flirovffi T^V 146) as the author of the say-
Xpriffofj.vnv avrots. The thought ing, which Cic. Eep. i. 2 ; Plut.
is Socratic. See p. 141, 2. adv. Col. 30, 2, p. 1124, attri-
2 Diog. 91 : rtv ao^v ufae bute to Xenocrates, that the
<}>9ovfi<reit> fjL-f)Tf ^paae^a-effBai (on conduct of the philosopher
this point compare the Ian- would remain the same, sup-
guage used by Aristippus re- posing all laws to be abolished,
specting his relations to Lais) 6 Diog. 91 : aptaicei 8' ainols
7) 8(iffi5aip.off]ffeiv, whereas he is /u^re -rbv ffotybv irdvTa ySfws fjv,
not preserved from fear and M') Te TTO.VTO. $>av\ov tinTr6v(os,
sorrow as being natural conse- a\\ct Kcnct rb ir\fiaTov. In the
quences. same way the Cyrenaics would
* See p. 355, 2. not deny that the &<ppoves were
4 Many expressions to this capable of certain virtues,
effect are on record, particu- Probably this was only ex-
larly those of Aristippus, Diog. pressly stated by later mem-
ii. 69, 70, 72, 80. Plut. Frag, bers of the School in agree-
9, 1, and comment, in Hes. ment with the Cynics and
5 See the saying of Aristip- Stoics.
PRACTICAL LIFE OF CYRENAICS.
is this a departure from the fundamental principle of
the School, the pursuit of pleasure, but certainly
something very different has come of it from what
might at first have been expected.
Herewith agrees all that is further known as to
the views and conduct of Aristippus. His leading
thought is comprised in the adage, that life offers
most to him who, without ever denying himself a
pleasure, at every moment continues master of him-
self and his surroundings. The Cynic freedom from
wants is not his concern. Prudent enjoyment he says
is a greater art l than abstinence. He lived not only
comfortably, but even luxuriously. 2 A good table he
enjoyed, 3 wore costly clothing, 4 scented himself with
perfumes, 5 and caroused with mistresses. 6 Nor were
Stob. Floril. 17, 18 : Kparel according to Alexis ; Ibid. viii.
oi>x <5 airex^efos, a\\' 6 343, according to Soter ; Timon
in Diog. ii. 66 ; Ibid. ii. 69,
iv. 40 ; Luoian. V. Auct. 1 2 ;
Clemens, Paedag. ii. 176, D. ;
Em. Pr. Ev. xiv. 18, 31 ; Ejpiph.
Xcn. Mem. ii. 1, 1, already Exp. Fid. 1089 A. ; Steele, p.
41 ; 71.
a See the anecdotes in Diog,
ii. 66, 68, 69, 75, 76.
ax. Tyr. Diss. vii. 9 }
rapfKtpfp6/j.fvos
Sf. Diog. 75 : rb Kpare'tv /col ^
j)TTaff8a.i fjSovuv Kpa-runov, ov rb
calls liim a.Ko\a<noTfpa>s
Trpbs TO. rotavra [irpbs
Ppanov Ka\ TTOTOV Kol \a.yi>fias~],
etc. He says himself then, 1, 9,
that his object is ?? pa.ar& TI Kal Lucian, 1. c. ; Ibid. Cic. Ace. 23 ;
^Sia-ra froTfveiv ' and Socrates Tatian adv. Grac. c. 2 ; Tert.
asks whether he depended for
his homelessness on the cir-
cumstance that no one could
like to have him even as a
slave ? T(S yap kv tO(\oi 6.vQp<avov
iv oiniy ex ft " vovelv fiev p-fiSh
rrj Se iro\vTt\e<TTdTi)
x.aipovra this picture
Apol. 46.
5 That he made use of fra-
grant perfumes, and defended
this practice, is told by Seneca,
Benef . vii. 25, 1 ;. Clem. Psed.
ii. 176 D., 179 B., Dwg. 76, all
apparently from the same
source, the others mentioned by
was afterwards more deeply Stein, 43, 1, probably doing
coloured by later writers, and likewise.
certainly not without exagge- His relations to Lais are
ration. See Athen. xii. 544, 6, e. well known. Hermesianax in
CHAP.
XIV '
c. Prac-
^'^ ^f
renaics.
362
THE SOCRATIC SCHOOLS.
CHAP.
XIV.
the means neglected by which this mode of life was
rendered possible. On. the contrary, he argued that
the more of these you possess, the better for you.
Eiches are not like shoes, which when too large can
not be worn. 1 He accordingly not only demanded
payment for his instruction ; 2 but did not hesitate
to enrich himself by means, and for this purpose to
submit to things which any other philosopher would
have considered below his dignity. 3 The fear of
Athen. xiii. 599, b, 588 c ; xii,
544, b, d. ; Cic. ad Fam. ix. 26 ;
Pint. Erot. 4, 5, p. 750 ; Diog. 74,
85 ; Clemens, Strom, ii. 411, C. ;
Theod. Cur. Gr. AS. xii. 50, p.
173 ; Lact. Inst. iii. 15. A few
other stories of the same kind
may be found, Diog. 67; 69;
81 ; iv. 40.
1 Stob. Floril. 94, 32.
2 See p. 339, 5.
8 Here belong many of the
anecdotes which relate to Aris-
tippus' stay at the court of
Dionysius. According to Diog.
77, Aristippus is said to have
announced to Dionysius, on his
arrival, that he came to impart
what he had, and to receive
what he had not ; or, according
to a more probable version,
Ibid. 78, when he wanted in-
struction he used to go to So-
crates for it, now that he
wanted money, he had come to
Dionysius. To the same person,
too, according to Diog. 69, his
remark was addressed that the
reason why philosophers ap-
peared before the doors of the
rich, and not the contrary, was
because philosophers knew
what they wanted, whilst the
rich did not. The same story
is found in Stob. Floril. 3, 46,
and in a somewhat different
connection, Diog. 70 and 81.
Yet Schleiermacher on Plato's
Eepublic, vi. 489, has no busi-
ness to refer this passage to
this remark, because of Arist.
Ehet. ii. 16, 1391, a, 8, but he
is quite right in setting down
the Scholiast who wished to
attribute the remark of Socra-
tes to Aristippus. Of the liberal
offer made by Dionysius to
Plato, he remarks in Pint. Dio.
19 : acr(j)a.\(t>s fifya^tyuxov ilvtu
Aiovvcriov ' avTo"is juev yap /j.iKpk
SiS6vai TrXfiAvw StojueKKS, TI\d-
T(ei>t Se Tro\Aa ^7?Sej/ \afj.^dvoyrt.
Dionysius at first refusing to
give him any money because
the wise man, on his own show-
ing, was never in difficulties,
he replied, Give me the money
this once, and I will explain to
you how it is; but no sooner
had he got it, than he exclaimed,
Ah I was I not right 1 Diog.
82, Diog. 67, 73, and Athen. xii.
544, tell further, on the author-
ity of Hegesander, that once
having been placed at the
bottom of the table by Diony-
sius because of some free ex-
pression, he contented himself
PRACTICAL LIFE OF CYRENAICS.
303
death too, from which his teaching professed to de-
liver, 1 was not so fully overcome by him that he
could face danger with the composure of a Socrates. 2
It would, nevertheless, be doing Aristippus a
great injustice to consider him an ordinary, or at
most a somewhat more intellectual pleasure-seeker.
Enjoy he will, but, at the same time, he will be
above enjoyment. He possesses not only the skill of
adapting himself to circumstances and making use of
persons and things, 3 not only the wit which is never at
CHAP.
XIV.
with remarking, To-day, this is
the place of honour which he
assigns. Another time he is
said to have taken it quite
quietly when Dionysius spat in
his face, observing : A fisher-
man must put up with more
moisture, to catch even a smaller
fish. Once, when begging a fa-
vour for a friend, he fell at the
feet of Dionysius, Diog. 73, and
when reproached for so doing,
Wherefore, he asked, has Diony-
sjus ears on his legs ? It is a
common story that Dionysius
once asked him and Plato to
appear dressed in purple : Plato
refused to do so, but Aristippus
acceded with a smile. Sext.
Pyrrh. iii. 204, i. 155 ; Dwg. 78 ;
Suid. 'Apurr.; Stab. Ploril. 5,
46 ; Greg. Naz. Carm. ii. 10,
324: the latter unskilfully
places the incident at the court
of Archelaus. Stein, 67. The
observation in Diog. 81, is like-
wise referred to Plato, that he
allowed himself to be abused
by Dionysius for the same
reasons that others abused him :
a preacher of morals after all
is only pursuing his own inter-
ests. He is represented as a
flatterer and parasite of Diony-
sius, by Lucian V. Aut. 12 ;
Parasit. 33, Bis Accus. 23 ; Men.
13.
1 See Diog. 76 : at the same
time the Cyrenaics consider
fear to be something natural
and unavoidable. See p. 360, 2.
2 On the occasion of a storm
at sea he was charged with dis-
playing more fear than others,
notwithstanding his philoso-
phy, to which he adroitly re-
plied : ov yap irtpl fyoias ^vx^s
ayiavitajj-tv a/j,(p6rfpoi, Diog. 71 ;
Gell. xix. 1, 10 ; ^Elian, V. H.
ix. 20.
3 Diog. 66 : $v Si
apuoiraatjai Kal r&iry Kal
nal irpoffwircpjKal iraaav ittpiffraffiv
apfjLoSltes \neoKpivai Oai Sib Kal irapa.
Aiovufficp TWV a\\uv cvSoKi/xet
jUuAAoi/, ad rb irpoffirfffbv eS Siari-
Bt/jitvos. A few instances of this
skill have been already seen
(p. 362, 3). Here, too, belongs
what is told by Galen, and VI-
truv. (see p. 340), that after
having suffered shipwreck, and
lost everything, he immediately
contrived in Syracuse or Kh<J-
304
THE SO CR AT 1C SCHOOLS.
CHAP.
XIV.
a loss for repartee, 1 but he possesses also calmness of
mind and freedom of spirit, which can forego pleasure
without a pang, bear loss with composure, be content
with what it hath, and feel happy in any position.
His maxim is to enjoy the present, leaving care either
for the future or the past, and under all circum-
des to procure an ample supply
of necessities. Further, it is
stated in Plutarch, Dio. 19,
that he was the first to notice
the growing estrangement be-
tween Dionysius and Plato. In
Diog. 68, he answers the ques-
tion, What good he has got
from philosophy, by saying:
rb Svi/affQai iraffi dappovvrcas 6/j.i\-
tlv and Diog. 79, relates that
when brought as a captive be-
fore Artaphernes, some one
asked him how he liked his
situation, to which he replied,
that now he was perfectly
at rest. Well-known is the
answer which he is reported to
have given to Diogenes (which,
however, is told of others),
Diog. vi. 58, ii. 102 : efaep rjSeis
avOpanrots 6fu\f"iv, OVK &/ \dxava
ir\vves. Diog. 68 ; Hor. Bp. i.
17, 13 ; Valer. Max. iv. 3, Ext. 4.
1 See p. 362, 1 ; 363, 2. In a
similar way he could defend
)iis luxuriousness. When blamed
for giving fifty drachmas for a
partridge, Aristippus asked if
,he would have given a farthing
.for it. The reply being in the
.affirmative ; I, said Aristippus,
ido not care more for fifty
drachmae than you do for a far-
thing. Diog, 66, 75 ; or with a
different turn in Atlien. viii.
843, c., where the story is told
_f> f him and Plato apropos of a
dish of fish : 6pas olv . , . on
avv tyu tyoQayos, a.\\a ffv aiKap-
yvpos. Another time he argues
that if good living were wrong,
it would not be employed to
honour the festivals of the gods.
Ibid. 68. Another time, when
some one took him to task for
his good living, he asked him
to dinner. The invitation being
accepted, he at once drew the
conclusion that he must be too
stingy to live well himself.
Ibid. 76. When Dionysius
offered him the choice between
three mistresses, he chose them
all, with the gallant observa-
tion, that it had been a bad
thing for Paris to prefer one of
three goddesses, but bade them
all farewell at his door. Ibid.
67. When attacked for his re-
lations to Lais, he answered
with the well-known %x> Ka *
OVK exo/nou. The same relation
is said to have given rise to
other light jokes ; it was all the
same to him whether the house
in which he lived had been
occupied by others before ; he
did not care whether a fish liked
him, if he liked the fish. The
Cynicism is betrayed by the
anecdotes in Diog. 81, p. 341,
4, although they are not other-
wise at variance with Grecian
morals.
PRACTICAL LIFE OF CYRENAICS.
stances to keep cheerful. 1 Come what may, there is
a bright side to things, 2 and he knows how to wear
the beggar's rags and the robe of state with equal
grace. 3 Pleasure he loves, but he can also dispense
therewith. 4 He will continue master of his desires. 5
His temper shall not be ruffled by any risings of
passion. 6 Some importance is attached to riches,
but hardly any independent value, 7 and therefore the
want of them is never felt. He is lavish of them
because he does not cling to them. 8 If necessary, he
can do without them, 9 and is readily consoled for
CHAP.
XIV.
1 See pp. 355 and 360.
2 Hot\ Ep. i. 17, 23: omnis
Aristippum decuit color et sta-
tus et res, tentantem majora
fere, prsesentibus aequum. Plut.
de Vit. Horn. B., 150: 'Apla-
TITTJTOS Kal irevia Kal ir6i>ois avvi\vt-
Xdt] tpp<afj.4y(as Kal rfbofj; a<pfi$cits
e'xprjo-oTO. Dioy. 66. p! 163, 3;
355, 2.
* According to Z>u*7. 67, Plato
is said to have remarked to
him : <rol fj.6vif SeSorcu Kal -)(Kavi^a.
<t>epfu> KOI paKos. The same re-
mark, and not the story of the
purple dress, is referred to by
Pint. Virt. Alex. 8, p. 330:
ov 6av/j.do/j.at -rbv 2w/c-
TI Kal rpi/3coi/i \n<p Kal
x^M^St xpwptvos 5t'
/ trfipft rb ti/i/xiM 01 ')
and Hor. Ep. i. 17, 27, on which
passage the Scholiast tells how
Aristippus carried off the sur-
coat of Diogenes from the bath,
leaving his purple cloak in-
stead, which Diogenes refused
to wear at any price.
OVK t\ofji(u. Diog. 69,
tells a saying of the same kind
which Aristippus uttered on
paying a visit to his mistress,
to the effect that there was no
need to be ashamed of going
there, but there was of not
being able to get away.
See p. 360, 2 & 3. Plut.X.P.
Suav. v. sec. Epic. 4, 5, p. 1089 :
ol Kup-nvaixal . . . oiiSe 6/j.i\f7v
a<ppo$iffiois ol6vrai St'iv pera
(ptarbs, a\\a OK^TOS irpoOtfjifvovs,
%ircas jU^J ra ei'ScoAa TlJS 7rpo|ewJ
avaXanfiavovffa Sia TTJS 6tyas
fvtpyas Iv avrrj r) Sidvoia ito\\d-
KIS uvaKalr) rrjv iptiv. The same
way of thinking is expressed in
his definition of pleasure as a
gentle motion of the mind. The
storms of passion would change
this gentle motion into a violent
one, and turn pleasure into pain.
7 See p. 347, 1 .
See p. 363, 4, and the story
that he bade his servant who
was carrying a heavy burden
of gold cast away what was too
much for him. Hor. Senn. ii.
3, 99 ; iJiw/. 77.
Finding himself on board a
THE SOCRATIC SCHOOLS.
CHAP.
XIV.
their loss. 1 To him no possession appears more
valuable than contentment, 2 no disease worse than
avarice. 3 He lives an easy life, but he is not on that
account afraid of exertion, and approves of bodily
exercise. 4 His life is that of the flatterer, but he
often expresses himself with unexpected candour. 5
Freedom he esteems above all things, 6 and hence will
neither rule nor be ruled, nor belong to any com-
munity, being unwilling to forfeit freedom at any
price. 7
pirate vessel, he threw his 5 Several free expressions of
money into the sea with the his towards Dionysius are told
73, 77; Stob. Floril.
words : &netvov ravra 81' 'AptV-
rtirirov
a.iro\eff6a.i. Diog. 77 ; Cic. In
vent. ii. 58, 176 ; Auson. Idyl. iii.
13 ; Stob. Floril, 57, 13, taking
care to read with Menage and
Stein, p. 39, rb apyvpiov for
bj
auro 'A.plffTiinrot> 49, 22 ; conf. Greg. Naz. Carm.
ii. 10, 419, vol. ii. 430 Codd. ;
not to mention the anecdotes
in Diog. 75, repeated Ibid. vi.
32 ; Galen. Exhort, ad Art. c. 8,
i. 18, k.
6 On the principle mentioned
1 InPZwtf.Tranq. An. 8, p. 469, by Hor. Ep. i. 1, 18: nunc in
Aristippi furtlm prsecepta rela-
bor, et mihi res, non me rebus
subjungere conor. According
to the context, however, the
principle should not be con-
fined to Aristippus' relationsto
Aristippus having lost an estate,
one of his friends expresses
sympathy with him, upon which
Aristippus replies : Have I not
now three estates, whilst you
have only one ? Ought I not
rather to sympathise with you ? outward possessions. Here, too,
Hor. see p. 365, 2, Diog; ii.
72 : TO. &ptffra inrfriQero iy Ov-
yarpl 'f>.p-firri, awaffKiev avrriv
inrepoirriK^v rov irAeWos fivai.
Hence the same story in Ep.
the saying belongs Plut. in
Hes. 9, vol. xiv. 296, Hu. : ffv/j.-
ftov\ov SetirOai. xelpov eli/ai TOV
irpoffairfiv. Conf. p. 363, 3.
Xen. Mem. ii. 1, 8. In reply
Socrat. 29, the compiler of this to Socrates, who asked whether
late and miserable counterfeit he considered himself among
not having used the earlier
genuine letters to Aret. men-
tioned by Suid 'ApiW.
8 See further details in Plut. rdrrco
the number of those who rule,
or those who are ruled, Aris-
tippus states : eywy' ovS' o\ws ye
Cupid. Div. 3, p. 524.
4 See p. 365, 2, Diog. 91 : oV
frufiaTLKiiv &(Tx-r\(riv ffvtn.pd.\\rBai
npbs operas
TSiv &px f "'
fiovKonevtov TC^IC. For, as is ex-
plained here and p. 17, there is
no man who is more troubled
than a statesman : ^aavrbv roi-
PRACTICAL LIFE OF CYRENAICS.
367
Still less did he allow himself to be restrained by
religious considerations or traditions. We have at
least every reason for asserting this both of Aristippus
personally, and of his School. 1 Theodorus was pro-
bably the first to gain notoriety for his wanton
attacks on the popular faith ; 2 still a connection
between the Cyrenaic philosophy and the insipid
rationalism of Euemerus 3 is far from certain. Nor
ought it to be forgotten, that Aristippus strove to
make life easy not only for himself, but also for
CHAP.
XIV.
vvv Tarrta Is robs @ov\ofj.evovs y
pao-rd re teal ^Surra fSiortveiv.
When Socrates met this by ob-
serving that those who rule are
better off than those who are
ruled, he rejoined : dXA.' ly<a roi
ovSf els ri\v 5ou\fiav aft efjiavrbf
rdrrta a\\' flvai ris pot SoKel
fifcrri rovr<av 68bs, *i]v ireipiafnai
PaSifav, o&re 8' apxris afire Sta
8ov\eias, a\\a 8t' f\ev6epias, yirfp
(i.d\i(rra irpbs evSaifiioviav ayei.
And after further objections :
aAA' ejtji rot, 'tva fj.r) irdcrxw ravra,
ov5' fls iro\irfiav ^JUOUTO*' /cara-
K\eita, a\Aa |eroj iravrayov flfu.
Quite in keeping with this
homeless life is the language
used by Aristippus, according
to Teles in Stob. Floril. 40, 8,
vol. ii. 69, Mein., that to him it
was of no moment to die in his
country; from every country
the way to Hades was the same.
His address to Dionysius in
Stob. Floril. 49, 22, is also quite
in harmony with Xenophon's
description : Had you learnt
aught from me, you would
shake off despotic rule as a di-
sease. Being obliged, however,
to live under some form of go-
vernment, a good one is natu-
rally preferable to a bad one ;
and accordingly the saying
attributed to him in Stob,
Floril. 49, 18, touching the
difference between a despotic
and a monarchical form of go-
vernment has about it nothing
improbable. Nevertheless, at
a later period Aristippus may
have relaxed his views on civil
life to a certain extent. At any
rate he formed a connection
with a family with which he
would previously have nothing
to do. Certainly Diog. 81, proves
nothing. See p. 341, 4.
1 It was a natural conse-
quence of their scepticism, that
they followed Protagoras in his
attitude towards religion ; and
by means of their practical
turn that freedom from reli-
gious prejudices was decidedly
promoted, which they espe-
cially required in the wise
man. Diog. 91, see p. 360, 2.
Clemens, Strom, vii. 722, D.,
says more generally that they
rejected prayer.
2 Particulars of this below.
* See p. 343, 6.
THE SO CR AT 1C SCHOOLS.
CHAP.
XIV.
others. Possessed of pleasing and attractive man-
ners, 1 an enemy of vanity and boasting, 2 he could
comfort friends with sympathy, 3 and bear injuries
with calmness. 4 He could avoid strife, 5 mitigate
anger, 6 and conciliate an offended friend. 7 The most
extraordinary spectacle to his thinking is said to
have been a virtuous man steadily pursuing his course
in the midst of the vicious ; 8 and that such was really
his opinion is shown by his reverence for Socrates.
It may therefore be true, 9 that he congratulated
himself on having become, thanks to Socrates, a man
capable of being praised in all good conscience. In a
word, with all his love of enjoyment, Aristippus
1 v)St(TToj is the name which
Greg. Nauz. 307, gives him, and
Ibid. 323, he commends him for
rb eu \dpiffToy TOV rp6irov Kal ffTpoi-
pfaw.
2 See Aritt. Ehet. ii. 23 ;
Diog. 71, 73. See also p. 3G3, 3.
3 Athen. V. H. vii. 3. men-
tions a letter of sympathy ad-
dressed to some friends, who
had met with a severe misfor-
tune. He quotes from the in-
troduction the words : a\\'
70176 rjKca irpbt fyuas oi>x ais
rrv\\virov/j.i>os vfjui>,a\\.' 'Lva. Travffw
vfj.as \vTrovfjkfvovs. In theory,
Aristippus could only estimate
the value of friendship by its
utility, as Epicurus did at a
later time. Diog. 91 : rbu <pi\ov
Ti)S XP f ' iaS '"", K l 7P l"f'/JOS
(Ttojuaros, MX/" S &" ' 7ra pf^ a<"ra-
0-60.1. Something similar is
also found in Socrates, see pp.
151, 3 ; 222, 3 ; and he employs
the same argument Xen. Mem.
i. 2, 54.
Plut. Prof, in Virt, 9, p. 80..
5 Diog. 70; Stob. Floril. 1'J, 6.
6 Stob. Floril. 20, 63.
7 See the adventure with
^schines in Plut. Coh. Ira. 14,
p. 462, Diog. 82, which iStob.
Flor. 84, 19, probably by mis-
take, refers to the brother of
Aristippus.
8 Stob. Floril. 37, 25: 'Apt-
ffTiv ev T(f /
elire, Kal fterpios, on [&J or Scrrts?]
&/ 7r.iA\o?s
9 Which is told by Diog. 71.
Few of the anecdotes about
Aristippus rest on good author-
ity. Agreeing, however, as they
all do, in portraying a certain
character, they have been used
as the material for a historical
sketch. They may be spurious-
in parts, but on the whole they
give a faithful representation of
the man.
PRACTICAL LIFE OF CYEENAICS. 369
appears to have been a man of high feelings and a CHAP.
cultivated mind, a man knowing how to preserve '__
calmness and freedom of mind in the perpetual
change of human affairs, how to govern his passions
and inclinations, and how to make the best of all the
events of life. The strength of will which can beard
destiny, the earnestness of high feelings intent upon
great ends, and strictness of principles may not be
Ms ; but he is a proficient in the rare art of content-
ment and moderation, while the pleasing kindness
and the cheerful brightness of his manners attract far
more than the superficial and effeminate character of
his moral views repel. 1 Nor are these traits purely
personal ; they lie in the very nature of his system,
requiring as it does that life should be directed by
prudence. Theory and practice cover one another
quite as much with Aristippus as with Diogenes, and
in the case of each one may be explained by the
other.
From Socrates indeed both are far enough D. Posi-
removed. His was a theory of a knowledge of con- ^^ s g .
ceptions ; theirs a most downright subservience to tein to
the senses. His was an insatiable thirsting for know- Socrates.
1 Even Cicero, who is not ge- iis, qui bene dicta male inter-
nerally his friend, says (Off. i. pretarentur : posse enim asotos
41, 143), that if Socrates or ex Aristippi, acerbos e Zenonis
Aristippus placed themselves in schola exire. The same is attri-
antagonism with tradition, they buted to Zeno by Ath. xiii. 666,
ought not to be imitated there- d, on the authority of Anti-
in : magnis illi et divinis bonis gonus Carystius : those who mis-
hanc licentiam assequebantur ; understood him, might become
and he also quotes (N. D. iii. 31, vulgar and depraved, Ka8dw(p ol
77) a saying of the Stoic Aristo : TTJS 'A.piffTiirirov iroptj/ex^eVres ai-
nocer,e audientibus philosophos pta-etas Hfftmoi nal 6paat?s.
B
370 THE SOCRATIC SCHOOLS.
CHAP, ledge, an untiring critical exercise ; theirs a total
'.... renunciation of knowledge, an indifference to all
theoretical enquiries. His was a scrupulous conscien-
tiousness, an unconditional submission to moral re-
quirements, an unceasing toiling of man upon him-
self and others ; theirs was a comfortable theory of
life, never going beyond enjoyment, and treating even
the means thereto with indifference. On his side
were self-denial, abstemiousness, moral strictness,
patriotism, piety ; on theirs were luxurious indul-
gence, mischievous versatility, a citizenship of the
' world needing no country, and a rationalism needing
no Gods. Nor yet can it be allowed that Aristippus
was only a degenerate pupil of Socrates, or that his
teaching had only been touched surface-deep by that
of his master. Not only was he classed among fol-
lowers of Socrates by the unanimous voice of antiquity,
which, no doubt, had more immediate reference to
his external connection with him ; not only did he
always call himself a pupil of Socrates and regard his
teacher with unchanging devotion * a proof stronger
than the former, and showing that he was able to
appreciate the greatness of his friend ; but his phi-
losophy leaves no doubt that the spirit of his teacher
had in him been mightily at work. The intellectual
convictions and the intellectual aims of Socrates he
did not share ; 2 Socrates, on the one hand, straining
1 See above,- p. 337, 5. teaching of Aristippus into
'-' Hermann's remarks (On closer connection with that of
Patters Dar. d. Socr. Sys. 26 ; Socrates, do not appear satis-
Gesch. d. Plat. Phil. 263), in- factory, even when supported
.- tended to bring the intellectual by the additional arguments in
RELATION OF CYRENAICS TO SOCRATES.
371
every nerve to attain to knowledge ; Aristippus, on
the other hand, denying that knowledge was possible;
CHAP,
XIV.
his Ges. Abh. 233, nor are they
regarded as such by Hitter,
Gesch. d. Phil. ii. 106. Her-
mann thinks that Aristippus
was only lacking in the reli-
gious and moral tone of So-
crates, but that he steadily ad-
hered to his logical principles.
Socrates declared all judgments
to be relative, and only concep-
tions v to be universally valid ;
in the same way, the Cyrenaics
denied only the universal va-
lidity of judgments, but not
that of conceptions ; for they
allowed that all men receive
from the same things the same
impressions, as to the names of
which they were agreed. These
names, however, were identical
with the conceptions of Bo-
crates, conceptions having been
by them as by the Cynics and
Megarians reduced to empty
names and deprived of all real
substance. There is indeed a
noticeable advance in entirely
separating conceptions from
appearances, and in more pre-
cisely definingthe highest good
as the first judgment univer-
sally valid. But in the first
place it never occurred to So-
crates to deny the universal
validity of judgments ; and it is
as neitain that he allowed uni-
versally valid judgments as that
he allowed universally valid
conceptions such, for instance,
as 'All virtue is knowledge,'
' every one pursues the good ; '
and if he called some judgments
relative such as, ' This is good,'
it is no less certain that he
declared the corresponding con-
ceptions for instance, that of
the good to be relative. In
the next place it is equally un-
true to say that the Cyrenaics
only denied the universal va-
lidity of judgments but not that
of conceptions ; for they de-
clared most emphatically that
all our notions only express our
personal feelings. They did not
even allow that all feel the
same impressions in the same
way : unless in this passage we
are to understand by impres-
sions, feelings themselves, in
which case this language would
be as unquestionable as it would
be unmeaning ; but they main-
tained that we cannot know
whether others have the same
feelings as ourselves. And that
they practically admitted tl.e
common meaning of names the
use of which they could not
of course deny, is of little ac-
count ; for they left it an open
question, whether common im-
pressions and notions corre-
sponded to these names. It will
be seen at once what has be-
come of the advance which
Hermann finds in Aristippus.
A decided distinction between
conceptions and appearances
can least of all be attributed to
the Cyrenaics, seeing that they
know of nothing but appear-
ances ; and it will appear, after
what has been said, to be
equally a mistake to say that
1 Pleasure is the highest good '
is the first judgment univer-
sally valid.
BE2
372 THE SOCRATIC SCHOOLS.
CHAP. Socrates taking up a new position and a new method
_ of gaming knowledge ; Aristippus allowing of no
knowledge which does not serve a practical end. 1
Still he was in a great measure indebted to his teacher
for that critical skill with which we can readily credit
him, 2 and for that unprejudiced sobriety which cha-
racterises his whole bearing.
The same may be said of his moral teaching and
conduct. How far in this respect he was below So-
crates is obvious. Yet in truth he was nearer to him
than will be readily believed. On the one hand,
Socrates, as we have seen, made utility the ground of
moral duties. Might not Aristippus then believe
that he was not deviating from Socrates as to the
final end in view, if he in some respects held a differ-
ent opinion from his instructor as to the means to a
pleasant life ? On the other hand, there was about
Aristippus much which is truly Socratic that com-
posure with which he rises above circumstances, that
independence with which he is master of himself and
his surroundings, that unbroken cheerfulness which
engenders a kindliness of feeling, that quiet assurance
which grows out of confidence in the strength of
mind. Knowledge is with him the most important
element. By culture and prudence he would make
1 We cannot accordingly be known, to have arrived at a
agree with Brandis, Gr. Rom. conclusion opposite to that of
Phil. ii. a, 96, who says : Ari- Socrates.
stippus appears to have held z See Xen. Mem. ii. 1 ; iii. 8,
firm to the view that the im- and the stories told by Ztioy.ii.
pulses to action must be found 13 ; compare At hen. xi. 508, c,
within the sphere of knowledge; on the form of dialogue obser-
and, in investigating what can ved in his writings.
CYRENAIC MORALS AND SOCRATES. -3
men as independent of external circumstances as their CHAP.
nature allows of. Nay, so far does he go in this "
direction that he not ^infrequently trenches on the
ground of the Cynics. 1 In reality his School was also
internally connected with theirs. Both Schools pro-
pose to philosophy the same problem, how to acquire
practical culture, 2 rather than theoretical knowledge.
Both, therefore, neglect logical and physical enquiries,
justifying their procedure by theories, based it is true
on different principles, but leading in the end to the
same sceptical results. Both in their ethics compass
the same aim the emancipation of man by means
of prudence, and the raising him above outward things
and events. One thing only makes them opponents
their pursuing this common end by means the most
opposite. The Cynic school follows the path of self-
denial, the Cyrenaic that of self-indulgence; the Cynic
dispenses with the outer world, the Cyrenaic employs
it for its own purposes. 3 The object of both Schools
being, however, one and the same, their principles
come back again to the same point. The Cynics de-
rive the highest pleasure from their self-denial ; Ari-
stippus dispenses with property and enjoyment, in
order the more thoroughly to appreciate them. 4
1 This relationship appears in clearer, Wendt (Phil. Cyr. 29)
the tradition which attributes quotes the contradictory state-
the same utterances at one time ments of Antisthenes and Ari-
to Aristippus, at another to stippus in Diog. ii. 68, vi. 6.
Diogenes. Antisthenes says that to philo-
z The standing expression is sophy he owes rb tivvcurOai eavrf
iraiSeia, and what they say in 6/u.ike'tv, Aristippus, rb $vva<r6ai
favour of it is much to the same irntri Qafyovrrvs d/mAea/.
effect. See what has been said, 4 Hegel, Gesch. d. Phil. ii.
pp. 294 and 360, 4, 5. 127. See above pp. 308 and
1 To make this difference 364.
374 THE SOCRATIC SCHOOLS.
CHAP. For a similar reason their attitude towards politi-
' cal life and religious traditions is a kindred one.
Conscious of his mental superiority, the individual
withdraws himself from the external world, needing
no country, nor feeling himself fettered by the be-
liefs of his countrymen ; and troubling himself far
too little about others to attempt any moulding in-
fluence on either the sphere of politics or that of
religion. Thus, despite their sharp differences, there
is a family likeness between these Schools betraying
their common descent from the Socratic philosophy
alloyed with Sophistry.
Certainly it must be granted that Aristippus
diverged far more from the original ground of the
Socratic teaching than did Antisthenes. The utili-
tarian view of life, which with Socrates was only an
auxiliary notion in order to commend to the reflecting
mind the practice of morality, was here raised to be
a leading thought, the knowledge of Socrates being
pressed into its service. Philosophy became with
Aristippus, as with the Sophists, a means for further-
ing the private objects of individuals. Instead of
scientific knowledge, only personal culture was pur-
sued and regarded as consisting in knowledge of the
world and in the art of enjoyment. The scanty
remarks of Aristippus on the origin and truth of our
impressions, borrowed for the most part from Pro-
tagoras and ultimately leading to a wholly un-Socratic
destruction of all knowledge, were only intended as
helps to moral doctrines. If not altogether annihi-
lated, the deeper meaning of the Socratic philosophy
RELATION. OF ARISTIPPUS TO SOCRATES. 375
was here at least subordinated to what with Socrates CHAP.
"XT V
was a bare outwork, and almost an obstruction to his
leading thought. Granting that Aristippus was not
a false follower of Socrates, 1 he was certainly a very
one-sided follower, or rather he, among all the fol-
lowers of Socrates, was the one who least entered into
his master's real teaching.
Side by side with this foreign element, the genuine Prints
Socratic teaching cannot be ignored in the Cyrenaic j^^""
school. In that school there are in fact two elements,
the combination of which constitutes its peculiarity.
One of these is the doctrine of pleasure as such, the
other, the limitation of that doctrine by the Socratic
demand for intellectual circumspection the principle
that prudence is the only means for arriving at true
pleasure. The former element, taken alone, would
lead to the conclusion that sensual enjoyment is the
only object in life ; the latter, to the strict Socratic
doctrine of morals. By uniting both elements Ari-
stippus arrived at the conviction which is stamped
on all his language, and on which his personal cha-
racter is a standing comment that the surest way
to happiness is to be found in the art of enjoying the
pleasures of the moment with perfect freedom of soul.
Whether this is indeed possible, whether the two
leading thoughts in his system can be harmonised at
all, is a question which it seems never occurred to
Aristippus. We can only answer it in the negative.
That freedom of soul, that philosophic independence
1 As Schleiermaclusr maintains, Gesch. d, Phil. 87.
376 THE SOCRATIC SCHOOLS.
CHAP, at which Aristippus aimed, can only be secured by
' soaring above the impressions of the senses and the
particular circumstances of life to such an extent that
happiness becomes independent of these surroundings
and feelings. Conversely, when the enjoyment of the
moment is the highest object, happiness can only be
felt in proportion as circumstances give occasion to
agreeable feelings; all unpleasant impressions being
disturbers of happiness. It is impossible to abandon
the feelings freely to the enjoyment of what is pre-
sent, without at the same time being disagreeably
affected by what is unpleasant. Abstraction, whereby
alone this might be done, is distinctly forbidden ;
Aristippus requiring the past and the future to be
ignored and the present only to be considered. Apart
therefore from other defects, this theory suffers from
contradiction in its fundamental principles, the in-
jurious effects of which for the whole system could
not fail to follow. As a matter of fact they soon
appeared in the teaching of Theodorus, Hegesias, and
Anniceris ; hence the interest which the history of
the later Cyrenaics possesses.
B. The About the same time that Epicurus was giving a
^renaics' new ^ orm ^ * ne philosophy of pleasure, Theodoras,
(1) Theo- Hegesias, and Anniceris, within the Cyrenaic School,
were advocating views partly agreeing with those of
Epicurus, partly going beyond his doctrine of plea-
sure. Theodorus, on the whole, adhered to the prin-
ciples of Aristippus, not hesitating, unscrupulous as
he was, to push them to their most extreme conse-
LATER CYRENAICS. THEODORUS. 377
quences. 1 The value of an action depending upon CHAP.
its results to the doer, he concluded that any and ^^' _
every action might under circumstances be allowed.
If certain things pass for immoral, there is a good
reason why this should be so, if the masses are to be
kept within bounds : the wise man, tied by no such
prejudice, need not, in suitable cases, be afraid of
adultery, theft, and sacrilege. If things exist for use,
beautiful women and boys are not made only for
ornament. 2 Friendship, it seemed to him, may be
dispensed with ; for the wise man is self-sufficing
and needs no friends, and the fool can make no
sensible use of them. 3 Devotion to one's country he
considered ridiculous ; for the wise man is a citizen
of the world, and will not sacrifice himself and his
wisdom to benefit fools. 4 The views of his School
respecting the Gods and religion were also expressed
is the term used Cyrenaic teaching. Bat it is
of him by Diog. ii. 116; and undoubtedly an exaggeration
this epithet is fully justified by to charge him, as Epiplianiut
a passage like that, vi. 97. (Expos. Fid. 1089, A.) does,
'- Diog. ii. 99. That Theo- with inciting to theft, perjury,
dorus said this and similar and robbery.
things, cannot be doubted after 8 Diog. 98, and Epiphanius,
the definite and explicit testi- 1. c. in still stronger terms :
mony of Diogenes. It is true ayadbv fj.6i>ov $\e-ye rbv eiiScujUO-
that, in Plut. Tranq. Anim. 5, vovvra, <t>evyeit> (1. <f>av\ov} 8e rln>
p. 567, Theodorus complains Swruxovvra, K&V rj crowds' /col
that his pupils misunderstood alptriv tlvai rbv &$pova ir\ovfftot>
him a statement which, if it fora, nal aire^r) (diraflfj ?) This
be true, probably refers to the statement, likewise, seems to
practical application of his be rather in the nature of a
principles. He may have led hasty conclusion, for Theodorus
a more moral life than Bio makes happiness depend on in-
(Dioff. iv. 63 ; Clemens, Paedag. telligence, and not on things
15, A.), and yet have expressed without.
the logical consequences of the * Diog. 98, Epiph. 1. c.
378
THE SOCRATIC SCHOOLS.
CHAP.
XIV.
without reserve ; l Bio 2 and Euemerus 3 herein fol-
lowing his example. For all that, the theory of
1 The atheism of Theodorus,
which, besides bringing down
on him an indictment at
Athens, gained for him the
standing epithet &0tos (he was
called 0bs according to Diog.
ii. 86, 100, in allusion to a joke
of Stilpo's, but probably KO.T'
avritpaa-iv for Jifooj), will be fre-
quently mentioned. In Diog.
97 he says : 3\v . . . iravrdiraaiv
avaipwv r&s vfpl 6(<av S<5|os
icol aurov Ttfpiervxofifv Pifiticp
tiriyeypa/j.fjiev<p irepl 6fiav OVK
evna.Ta<t>pov{)T<f Q ov tyaaiv
'Ex'iKovpov XO.&OVTO. TO. irXtitrra.
elvf'iv. The last statement can
only apply to the criticism of
belief in the Gods generally,
for Epicurus' peculiar views
about them were certainly not
shared by Theodorus. Sext.
Pyrrh. iii. 218; Math. ix. 51,
55, mentions him among those
who deny the existence of the
Gods, with the addition : SiA
rod -Ktpl OfOiv avvra.yna.ros T&
vapa. rois "EAArjffi BfoXoyov/jteva
iroiKl\ti>s ava.ffK.tva.ff as. Cic. (N.
D. i. 1, 2) says : nullos [Decs]
esse omnino Diagoras Melius
et Theodorus Cyrenaicus puta-
verunt. Ibid. 23, 63 : Nonne
aperte Deorum naturam sustu-
lerunt ? Ibid. 42, 117 : Omnino
Deos esse negabant, a statement
which Minuc. Fel. Oct. 8, 2, and
Lact. Ira Dei, 9, probably re-
peat after him. Likewise Plut.
Comm. Not. 31, 4, p. 1075, says :
Even Theodorus and those who
shared his views did not de-
clare God to be corruptible,
&\\' OVK (iriffTtvaav us effri -rt
&<pOapToi>. Ej)iph. (Expos. Fid.
1089, A.) also asserts that he
denied the existence of a God.
In the face of these agreeing
testimonies, the assertion of
Clemens (Paedag. 15, A.), that
Theodorus and others had
wrongly been called atheists,
and that they only denied the
popular Gods, their lives being
otherwise good, can be of little
weight. Theodorus no doubt
denied the Gods of the people
in the first place, but it was
not his intention to distinguish
between them and the true God.
The anecdotes in Diog. ii. 101,
116, give the impression of in-
sincerity.
2 Diog. iv. 54: iroXXa. 5e /col
a.(it<j>Tpov irpoffetpfpfTo fols 6/j.i-
Xovffi TOVTO QeoSupfiov airoXat-
ffos but in his last illness he
was overcome with remorse,
and had recourse to enchant-
ments. The argument quoted
by Sen. Benef. vii. 7, 1, to
prove that every one and that
no one commits sacrilege is
more a rhetorical and intellec-
tual work of skill.
8 The view of Euemerus re-
specting the Gods is briefly as
follows : There are two kinds of
Gods heavenly and incorrup-
tible beings, who are honoured
by men as Gods, such as the
sun, the stars, the winds ; and
dead men, who were raised to
the rank of Gods for their
benefits to mankind. Diodorus
in Mis. Pr. Ev. ii. 2, 52. To
the latter class of beings Eue-
merus referred the whole of
Mythology, and supposed it to
be a history of princes and
LATER CYRENAICS. THEODORUS. 379
Aristippus did not altogether satisfy him. He was CHAP,
fain to admit that pleasure and pain do not merely 1_
depend on ourselves and our inner state, but also in
a great measure on external circumstances ; and he
therefore sought such a definition of the highest
good as should secure happiness to the wise man,
and make that happiness dependent on his prudence. 1
This result, he thought, would be reached if happi-
ness were made to consist, not in individual plea-
sures, but in a cheerful state of mind and con-
versely evil, not in individual feelings of pain, but in
an unhappy tone of mind ; for feelings being the effects
of impressions from without, states of mind are in our
own power. 2 Accordingly, Theodorus asserted that
in themselves pleasure and pain are neither good nor
bad ; goodness consists in cheerfulness, evil in sadness ;
the former proceeds from prudence, the latter from
folly; therefore pursue prudence and justice, eschew
princesses, Uranus, Cronus, Cyrenaic doctrine belongs to
Zeus, Khea, &c. For further Theodorus : that not every evil
particulars respecting this ra- engenders sorrow, but only un-
tionalising history of the Gods, foreseen evils, that many pre-
consult 8teinfuirt,Al\g. Encyclo. cautions can be taken to pre-
Art. Euhemerus. V. Sierolta, vent sorrow by familiarising
De Euhemero. ourselves with the thought of
1 These reasons are not men- f ut ure evils. What control of
tioned in so many words, but outward impressions he con-
they follow from Theodorus' sidered possible by prudence,
positions about the highest appears also from the explana-
good, and also from the stress tory remarks in Stob. Floril.
which, according to Diog. 98, 119, 16 ; the wise man has
he laid on the avrdpitfia of the never sufficient reason to put
wise man, and the difference an end to his own life, and it
he made between wisdom and is inconsistent to call vile the
folly. only evil, and then to put an
2 Probably what Cio. (Tusc. end to life to avoid the suf-
iii. 13, 28 ; 14, 31) quotes as ferings of life.
880 THE SOCRATIC SCHOOLS.
CHAP, ignorance and wrong-doing. 1 Occasionally he him-
1_ self displayed a fearlessness and an indifference to
life 2 which would have done honour to a Cynic.
Not that the theory of pleasure was therewith sur-
rendered, but the older setting of that theory was
changed. In place of individual pleasures, a state
of mind was substituted, independent of the mere
feelings of enjoyment and pleasure. Instead of a
cheerful resignation to the impressions of the mo-
ment, the highest good was made to consist in rising
superior to circumstances.
(2) Hege- , Hegesias went a step further. He, too, adheres
to the general maxims of Aristippus. With him
good is identical with pleasure, evil with unhappi-
ness : all that we do, we do only for ourselves ; if
services are rendered to others, it is only because
advantages are expected in return. 3 But on looking
1 Diog. 98 : reXos 8' vne\dn&ave 102 ; Pint. Exil. 16 ; Philo, Qu.
Xapac Kal \vw-tjv T^IV /*/ <hrl Omn. Pr. Tib. p. 606, 884,0.)
Qpovfjffei, T))V 5' eirl a.<ppoffvvri that Lysimachus threatened to
ayaQk Se <J>pdi/7jcrii/ KOI StKaioffvvriv, crucify him, upon which Theo-
KO.KI Se ray evavrias e|ejs, jue'tra dorus uttered the celebrated
Se ^8o//V Kal ic&vov. That justice saying, that it was indifferent
should be reckoned among to him whether he went to
good things may be brought corruption in the earth or in
into agreement with what is the air. Cic. Tusc. i. 43, 102 ;
quoted p. 266, 3. It is to be Valer. Max. vi. 2, 3 ; Pint. An.
recommended, because it pro- Vitios. 3, p. 499 ; Stob. Floril.
tects us from the unpleasant 2, 23, attribute another saying
consequences of forbidden ac- to him on the same occasion,
tions, and from the disquiet attributing to Anaxarchus the
which the prospect of these above passage in Stob. Floril.
consequences produces, al- 2, 23.
though such actions are not in s Diog. ii. 93 : ol 8e "HynffiaKol
themselves inadmissible. bey6fj.fvot (ricoirobs iitv fi^ov TOVS
2 When at the court of Ly- adrovs rjSov^v Kal ir6vov, fj.^jre Se
fiimachus, he so enraged the x^P'*" Tt ''" X( M^ T </><A.fai/ ^f/jre
latter by his frankness (Diog. evepyta'iai', Stdrl) fj.^Si' avraTavra
LATER CYRENAICS. HEGESIAS. 381
round to discover wherein true pleasure is to be CHAP.
XIV
found, Hegesias met with no very consoling answer. . .
Our life, he says, is full of trouble ; the numerous
sufferings of the body affect the soul also, disturbing
its peace ; fortune in numberless ways crosses our
wishes ; man cannot reckon upon a satisfactory state
of mind, in a word, upon happiness. 1 Even the
practical wisdom, upon which Aristippus relied, af-
fords to his mind no security ; for perceptions, accord-
ing to the old Cyrenaic maxim, not showing us things
as they are in themselves, if we are always obliged to
act according to probabilities, who can be sure that
our calculations will come true ? 2 And if happiness
cannot be had, it is surely foolish to try for it;
enough if we can but fortify ourselves against the
sufferings of life ; freedom from pain, not pleasure,
is our goal. 3 Yet how may this goal be reached in
a world where so much trouble and pain falls to our
afpe?<r0cu rinas aina, a\\d Sta T&S p. 343, 1.
Xpei'as airrcis [probably aiirwi/], 2 Diog. 95 : av-^pow SJ Kal rds
Siv airwrcav jiMjS' ^Kflva inrapxtt". altrB-fifffis OVK aKpi&ovffas r^v 4ri-
Ibid. 95: r6v re ffo<pbi> tavrov yvteffiv, rcoi/ r' eu\6yca<s (paivofjLevoiv
(vfKa irdvra vpd^ftv ' ovSeva yelp irdvra irpdrretv. We insert this
rtye'iffSai TWI> &\\wi> tiria"ns &iov sentence in the connection of
aiT^5 kb.v ydp rd fj.eyiara Sony the doctrine of Hegesias, where
irapd TOV Kapirovadai, ^ flvai it most probably belongs, with-
dfTaJio Siv avrbs irapdffxp- Ejpiph. out, however, unconditionally
Exp. Fid. 1089, B., says the guaranteeing for it this rela-
same, but less accurately. tion.
1 Dioff. 94 : rV evSai/jLOflav * Diog. 95 : r6v re aofov ovx
8\o>s O^VVCLTOV ilvai rb fj.fi/ -yap OVTW it\*ov<ifffiv Iv rrj TU> aya&uv
(7iu.a TroXXeii/ o.vairfirXri'jQai iradrj- atpffffi, &s tv TTJ ruv KO.KWV t
fj.dr<av, r))v 5 tyvxty ffvfj.iraOf'ti'
T$ <rco/xart Kal rapdrrtadai. TJJV
8e TUXTJ^ iroA\A rtav Kar' ^\iri'5a
K(a\v(iv &trre 8<ek raCro avv-
rrjf ciiScUjLtocfai/ flv(u. See
82 THE SOCRATIC SCHOOLS.
CHAP, lot ? Clearly not at all as long as peace of mint.
' depends upon external things and circumstances ;
contentment is only then sure, when we are indif-
ferent to everything which produces pleasure or pain. 1
These, as Hegesias observes, depend ultimately,
not upon things, but upon our attitude towards
things ; in itself nothing is pleasant or unpleasant,
but makes a varied impression, according to our
tone and condition. 2 Neither riches nor poverty
affect the happiness of life ; the rich not being
happier than the poor. Neither freedom, nor slavery,
high nor low rank, honour nor dishonour, are condi-
tions of the amount of pleasure we receive. Indeed,
life only appears a good thing to a fool ; to the wise
man it is indifferent. 3 No Stoic or Cynic could more
sternly denounce the value of external things than
the pupil of Aristippus here does. With these prin-
ciples is connected the noble and thoroughly Socratic
maxim that faults do not call for anger, nor human
beings for hatred, but only for instruction, since no
one intentionally does what is wrong ; 4 desiring what
is pleasant, everyone desires what is good : and as
the wise man does not allow his peace of mind to
depend on things external, neither does he allow it
to be ruffled by the faults of others.
1 See preceding note. bably only bears the sense
2 Diog. 94 : Qixrei T' ovSev T]Sb given in the text. Similarly
^ drj5es inre\d[j.&ai>oi> 5tci Se Epiplianiitu, 1. c. ; conf. p. 343, 1.
(Tirdviev ^ evifffj,l>v fy K6pn> rovs * Ibid. : f\eyov TO, a/xapTrj/iara
p.fv fySenBai TOIIS 8" aijScos fX ' v ffvyyi tau.i\s rvyxdveiv ov y&p
3 Ibid. 95 : ical T$ i*tv &<$>povi fK&vra anaprdveiv, a\\d rivi
rJ fpv \vffire\es, flvat. rif 5e irdOfi Karriva-yKaff^fvov KOI
aSid<popoy ' which pro- nuriifffiv, /j.a\\ov S fj.e
i LATER CYRENAICS. ANNICERIS. 383
In the theory of Hegesias it is seen more decidedly CHAP.
even than in that of Theodorus, that the doctrine of '
pleasure is unsatisfactory. It is even expressly ad-
mitted that human life has about it more of sorrow
than joy, and hence a perfect indifference to things
outward is insisted upon. But what right has Hege-
sias to identify pleasure with the good, and pain with
evil ? After all, the good is that which is the con-
dition of our well-being; if this be indifference
rather than pleasure, indifference and not pleasure
is the good ; the doctrine of pleasure has come round
to its opposite the Cynic independence of everything
external. Not that the Cyrenaic school could avow
this as its general principle without surrendering its
own position ; still it is distinctly avowed within that
school that pleasure is not in all cases the highest
motive. Anniceris indeed maintained that the aim (3) Anni-
of every action is the pleasure resulting therefrom ; ce>ni '
and, like the older Cyrenaics, he would not hear of a
general aim of life, nor substitute freedom from pain
in the place of pleasure. 1 He observed too that by
pleasure only our own pleasure can be understood ;
for of the feelings of others, according to the old
1 Clemens, Strom, ii. 417, B. : statement in Diog. ii. 96 : of 8'
of 8e 'A.vt>iicepttoi Ka\ov/j.fvoi . . . 'Awtitfpeioi T& /JLCV &\\a (caret
TOV /j.tv S\ov &iov Tt\os ovtev TauTk Tofaois the School of
tapurntvov Ta|oi', eKdVnjs Se Hegesias and also the asser-
irpti^ojy IStov virdpxftv Tf\os, rty tion (Suid. 'Awfx.) that Anni-
in TTJS irpct|ws irtpiyivofi.(vi)v ceris, although living, accord -
fi8ov)]v, 081-01 of Kvpri^aiKol TOP ing to Suidas, in the time of
Spov TTJS T)8oj/i)s 'EiriKofyou, TOUT- Alexander, was an Epicurean.
tffn r^v TOV oA/yoDi/roj {nr(al- Cicero and Diogenes likewise
pea-iv, &0(Tov<n iffttpov Ka-ria-raaiv affirm that his School declared
&iroKa\ovvTfs. See p. 354, 1. This pleasure to be the good,
would justify the inaccurate
384 THE SOCRATIC SCHOOLS.
CHAP, teaching of his School, we can know nothing. 1 Yet
XIV ' pleasure is not only caused by enjoyments of the
senses, but by intercourse with other men and by
honourable pursuits. 2 Hence, Anniceris allowed to
friendship, gratitude, family affection, and patriotism
an independent value, quite apart from the benefit
resulting from these relations. He even went so
far as to say that the wise man would make sacri-
fices for them, nor would his happiness suffer from his
so doing, even if there remained to him but little
actual enjoyment. 3 This admission brought him
round to the ordinary view of life, to which he ap-
proximated still further by attaching less value to
prudence, the second element in the Cyrenaic doctrine
of morals, than Aristippus had done. In fact, he
denied that prudence alone is sufficient to make us
safe and to raise us above the prejudices of the
masses ; there must be practice as well, to overcome
the effect of perverse use. 4
1 Diog. 96 : i"f)v re rov <pi\ov irpdeu>. Sdev, Sia ravra
fvSaifj.oviav SL' av-r^v ;u}j flvai trets aya8e'|r)Tai 6 <ro<pbs, ovSev
aptr^v, jMjSe yap alffOtjT^iv T<f ^TTOV eiiSai/xoc^jtrei, Kav 0X170 rjSfa
w4\as inrdpxeiv. See p. 350, 1. Treptyfvyrai aurf . Ibid. 97 : r6v
2 Clemens, 1. C. continues : re <j)i\ov n$i Sict ras xp f ^ as ^vov
Xaiptiv yap fifias ^ ft.6voi> tirl aTroSe'xefflcu, Siv inro\fiirov<T(ai' ft.)}
nSoi'ais, aAX^ Kal firl 6ni\la,LS Kal 3iriffTpt<t>eff6ai a.\\a Kal wapa T^JV
4vl (pi\ori/j.tais. Comp. Cic. Off. ytyovvlav ttivoiav ?is eVeico Kal
iii. 33, 116. See p. 347, 2. iroVous viro^fvf^v, nal TOI nQf^fvov
The expression in Clement, TV ^ov^v Tf\os ical axS^evov M 1$
IK TTJS irpd^etas vepiyii'Oft.fvr.v arepfffBat aur^s Spas eKov<rttas
ilSov^i', probably refers not only viro/j.tvt'it> 5t& rV Trpbs riv <pi\ov
to the pleasure resulting from afropyi]v.
an action, but to the pleasure 4 Ibid. 96 : n^i flval re avrdpinj
immediately bound up there- r'bv \6yoi> wpby rb 6appriffat Kal
with. rrii rwv iro\\cav 5<5|Tj? inrtpavu
3 Diog. 96 : fateKncov 8t Kal yevevBai Sew 8" avt6ifff8ai Sib
<pt\lav fV fily Kal X<ipiv Kal irpbs rty eK TTO\\OV ffwrpatpe'iffai' r]fj.1i>
yoyeas TI/U^V Kal virtp irarpiSos rt <f>av\i)v StdOffftv.
LATER CTRENAICS. SUMMARY. 3&
Thus the Cyrenaic doctrine is seen gradually to CHAP-
vanish away. Aristippus declared that pleasure was
the only good, understanding by pleasure actual en-
joyment, and not mere freedom from pain ; and,
moreover, making the pleasure of the moment, and
not the state of man as a whole, to be the aim of
all action. One after another these limitations were
abandoned. Theodorus denied the last one, Hegesias
the second, and even the first was assailed by Anni-
ceris. It thus appears how impossible it is to com-
bine the Socratic demand for prudence and indepen-
dence of the external world, with the leading thought
of the theory of pleasure. The Socratic element
disintegrates that theory and brings it round to its
opposite. The process, however, taking place with-
out intellectual consciousness, no new principle
results therefrom. Oddly enough the very men in
whom this result is most apparent, in other respects
clung to the doctrines of Aristippus with the greatest
pertinacity.
c c
38S
THE SOCRATIC SCHOOLS.
CHAPTER XV.
CHAP.
XV.
A. Incon-
sistencies
of the im-
perfect
Socrativ
schools.
BETROSPECT.
INCONSISTENCIES appear to have been common to all
the Socratic Schools. It was, without doubt, an in-
consistency on the part of the Megarians to confine
knowledge to conceptions, and at the same time to
do away with all possibility of development and with
anything like multiplicity or definiteness in concep-
tions ; to declare that being is the good, and, at the
same time, by denying variety and motion to being,
to deprive it of that creative power which alone can
justify such a position ; to begin with the Socratic
wisdom, and to end in unmeaning hair-splitting.
It was an inconsistency on the part of Antisthenes
to endeavour to build all human life on a foundation
of knowledge, whilst at the same time destroying all
knowledge by his statements touching the meaning
and connection of conceptions. It was no small in-
consistency both in himself and his followers to aim
at a perfect independence of the outer world, and
yet to attribute an exaggerated value to the externals
of the Cynic mode of life ; to declare war against
pleasure and selfishness, and at the same time to
pronounce the wise man free from the most sacred
moral duties ; to renounce all enjoyments, and yet
SO CR AT 1C SCHOOLS RELATED TO SOCRATES. 387
to revel in the enjoyment of a moral self-exaltation. CHAP.
In these inconsistencies and in their unintentional
contradictions appears the unsatisfactory nature of
the principles from which all these Schools started.
It is seen how far they were removed from the per-
fect moderation, from the ready susceptibility of
mind, from the living versatility of Socrates, all
clinging to particular sides of his personal character,
but unable to comprehend it as a whole.
The same fact will also, no doubt, explain that B -
tendency to Sophistry which is so striking in these *morefol~
philosophers. The captious reasoning of the Mega- hwers of
rians, the indifference of the Cynics to all speculative tkanoftJu-
knowledge, and their contempt for the whole theory op * *"
of conceptions, no less than the doctrines of Aristip-
pus relative to knowledge and pleasure, savour more
of the Sophists than of Socrates. Yet all these
schools professed to follow Socrates, nor was there
one of them which did not place some element of the
Socratic philosophy at the head of its system. It
is therefore hardly correct for modern writers to find
nothing but sophistical views in their teaching, sup-
plemented and corrected by what is Socratic, and,
instead of deducing their differences from the many-
sidedness of Socrates, to refer them to the diversities
of the Sophists converging from many sides towards
the Socratic philosophy as a centre. 1 With decided
1 K. F. Hermann, Ges. Abh. to be regarded as a corrective,
228, who, amongst other things modifying more or less strongly
there says that the agreement their fundamental views de-
in matter between these schools rived from the Sophists; they
. and the Socratic teaching ought are the pioneers of advancing
cc 2
88 THE SOCRATIC SCHOOLS.
CHAP, admirers of Socrates, such as Antisthenes and Euclid r
XY ' there can be not even a shadow of support for this
view. Such men conscientiously aiming at a faith-
ful reproduction of the life and teaching of Socrates,
must have been conscious that to him they were first
indebted for an intellectual centre, and that from
him they had first received the living germ of a true
philosophy ; indeed this may be clearly observed in
their philosophy. In their case it is wrong to speak
of the ennobling influence of Socrates on sophistical
principles ; we ought rather to speak of the influence
of sophistry on their treatment of the teaching of
Socrates. Socrates, as it were, gave the substance of
the teaching, sophistry being only a narrower limita-
tion of it ; for this reason a School like that of the
Stoics was able in the end to connect itself with that
of the Cynics.
With Aristippus the case is somewhat different.
Yet even in respect of him it has been already
established, not only that he professed to be a fol-
lower of Socrates, but that he really was one, although
he penetrated less than others into the deeper mean-
ing of the founder's teaching, and showed the influ-
ence of sophistical views most plainly. If then-
sophistry, endeavouring to act with the proof of the differ-
as an equipoise to Socratic ence in principle between the
teaching, &c. Yet this remark Eristie of the Sophists and
agrees ill with those steps in that of Megara. (Ges. Abh. 250,
advance of Socrates which f.) Far more correct and more
Hermann thinks to discern in in keeping with our view was
many sophistical assertions of that expressed by Hermann at
Antisthenes and Aristippus an earlier time. (Plat. 257.)
(see pp. 296, 1 ; 370, 2), and
IMPORTANCE OF SOCRATIC SCHOOLS. 389
besides lower capacities, previous sophistical training CHAP.
may be the cause which prevented the founders of
the imperfect Schools from entering so deeply or
fully into the spirit of their master as Plato did, it
should also be remembered that Socrates himself
.gave occasion to this variety in the Schools which
were connected with him. On the one hand, his
personal character afforded so rich a field as to invite
investigation in the most opposite directions ; on the
other hand, the scientific form of his philosophy was
so imperfect and so unsystematic, that it gave scope
for many diverging modes of treatment. 1
This disintegration of the Socratic Schools is c. Im-
accordingly not without importance for the further ^Jw*
progress of philosophy. Bringing out the separate schools.
elements which were united in Socrates, and connect-
ing them with the corresponding elements in the pre-
Socratic philosophy, it held them up for more careful
observation. The problems were set for all sub-
sequent thinkers to discuss. The logical and ethical
-consequences of the Socratic maxims were brought
to light. On the other hand, it was seen what the
separation of the various elements in the teaching
of Socrates, and their combination with other
.theories, would lead to, unless these theories were
1 Cic. de Orat. iii. 16, 61, quasi familise dissentientes in-
observes with some justice, but ter se, &c. For instance, Plato
somewhat superficially : Cum and Antisthenes, qui patien-
cssent plures orti fere a Socrate, tiam et duritiam in Socratico
quod ex illius variis et diversis sermone maxime adamarat, and
et in omnem partem diffusis also Aristlppus, quern iliac ma-
disputationibus alius aliud ap- gis voluptariae disputationes
prehenderat, proseminatie sunt delectarant.
390 THE SOCRATIC SCHOOLS.
CHAP, first recast after the mind of Socrates. In this way
' the one-sidedness of the smaller Socratic schools
was indirectly instrumental in enforcing the demand
for a comprehensive treatment which should connect
the different aspects of the Socratic philosophy more
closely with each other and with earlier systems, and
decide the importance of each one relatively to the
rest. In both ways these Schools influenced Plato
and Aristotle, Euclid supplying to Plato the basis
for his theory of ideas, Antisthenes and Aristippus
the groundwork for his theory of the highest good.
Of greater importance is the fact that those fol-
lowers of Socrates prepared the way for the course
taken by philosophy after the time of Aristotle.
True as it is that the post-Aristotelian systems are
not immediately connected with the imperfect
Socratic Schools, and that those systems would
have been impossible without Plato and Aristotle ;
still it must not be forgotten that these thinkers
are also deeply indebted to the Socratic Schools.
The predominance of practical over intellectual
interests which the post- Aristotelian philosophy dis-
plays ; the moral contentment with which the wise
man, withdrawing from everything external, falls
back upon the consciousness of his freedom and
virtue ; the citizenship of the world which can dis-
pense with a country and political interest all these
peculiarities of later times are foreshadowed in the
lesser Socratic Schools. The Stoa adopted the moral
principles of the Cynics almost in their entirety, only
softening them down and expanding them in applica-
IMPORTANCE OF SOCRATIC SCHOOLS. m
tion. The same School looks for its logic chiefly to the CHAP.
Megarians besides Aristotle. From the School of ^'
Megara too the scepticism of Pyrrho and the Academy
branched off, albeit in a somewhat different direction.
The teaching of Aristippus reappears in Epicurus,
only changed in some details. In short, tendencies,
which at an earlier period could only secure a qua-
lified recognition, obtained the upper hand when
strengthened, recast, and supplemented by other
elements.
Yet even this was not possible until the intellec-
tual strength of Greece had abated, and her political
condition had become so far hopeless as to favour
the view that indifference to everything external
could alone lead to peace of mind. Previously the
intellectual sense had been too quick, and the Greek
spirit too keen, to allow the hard-won results of the
Socratic philosophy to be thus frittered away. That
philosophy according to its deeper bearings must
needs issue in a science of conceptions such as was
set forth by Plato and Aristotle.
Only by separating the various but inwardly con-
nected elements of the Socratic teaching, only by
confounding the form in which Socrates clothed his
teaching with that teaching itself, and mistaking
defects in manner for defects in matter, could phi-
losophy be limited to metaphysics so abstract and
a criticism so empty as the Megarian, to morals so
unintellectual and absolutely negative as those of
the Cynics ; or could the doctrine of Aristippus pass
for truly Socratic. Whilst therefore these Schools
2 THE SOCRATIC SCHOOLS.
CHAP, are not without importance for the progress of
' Greek philosophy, their intellectual productions can-
not be valued very highly. A truer understanding
and a more comprehensive treatment of the Socratic
philosophy, was the work of Plato.
INDEX.
ACA
A CADEMICIANS, 269
J\.
Academy, older, 50; connected j
with Plato, 61 ; new, 4
Accusation, the, of Socrates, 193
^schines, view of Socrates, 76 ;
assigns the reason for the con-
demnation of Socrates, 211 ; a
disciple of Socrates, 245 ; his
prose preferred by some to that
of Xenophon, 245
JSschylus, illustrating the state of
thought in the fifth century, B.C.,
6 ; on the boundary line between
two periods, 9; difference be-
tween, and Sophocles, 12; con-
trasted with Euripides, 16
JSthiops, a pupil of the elder Ari-
stippus, 342
Agatho, the dainty elegance of,
20
Alcibiades, of Plato's, 78 ; allows
that the discourses of Socrates
seem rude, 80; fascinated by
Socrates, 183, 184 ; his connec-
tion with Socrates, 207, 214,
219, 221
Alexinus, a native of Elis, notorious
for his captiousness, 253; two
arguments of his known, 268;
attacked by Menedemus the Ere-
trian, 282
Anaxagoras, his teaching referred
to by Euripides, 19 ; proves that
spirit alone can make a world out
of matter, 42 ; teaching known
to Socrates, 57 ; extravagant
theories of, 135 ; his view of God
as the Keason of the world, 176 ;
his atheism charged on Socrates,
221
Ancient morality, relation of So-
crates to, 226
Anniceris, a Cyrenaic, pupil of
Antipater, 343, 375, 379, 385
Antigone of Sophocles, 13
Antipater, a Cyrenaic, pupil of the
elder Aristippus, 342 ; Hegesias
and Anniceris his pupils, 343
Antisthenes, theory of, dangerous
to the popular faith, 229; founder
of a Socratic School, the Cynic,
247, 284, 291 ; a native of Athens,
284 ; rejects every combination
of subject and predicate, 277 ;
holds that the One alone exists,
279 ; the teacher of Diogenes,
286 ; his character, 291 ; ex-
presses himself in favour of cul-
ture, 293; his nominalistic
theory, 297 ; prefers madness to
pleasure, 305 ; how led to his
views, 307 ; allows that some
kinds of pleasure are good, 308 ;
makes virtue consist in know-
ledge, 310, 311 ; considers mar-
riage unnecessary, 320 ; censures
popular government, 322 ; doubts
INDEX.
popular faith, 327; assails my-
steries, 329 ; makes happiness
the end of philosophy, 346 ; de-
viates from teaching of Socrates,
374 ; inconsistencies of, 386
Anytus, the accuser of Socrates,
193 ; his dislike for Socrates,
203 ; based on some supposed
personal injury, 205, 206, 207 ;
a leading democrat, 211 ; a vio-
lent opponent of the Sophists,
218 ; supposed to uphold ancient
morality, 231
Aphrodite, story of, in Euripides,
17
Apollonius of Gyrene, surnamed
Cronos, 251
Apology, 101 ; the language of
Socrates in, 79 ; sifting of men
described in, 125 ; cautious lan-
guage of, on a future life, 153 ;
moral considerations dwelt on
by Socrates in his, 185 ; proves
that popular opinion about So-
crates agreed with the picture
drawn by Aristophanes, 215 ;
Xenophon's, 205
Archilaus, teaches that the spirit
returns to the ether, 19 ; falsely
said to have been a teacher of
Socrates, 57
Archipylus, an Elean philosopher,
280
Arete, daughter of the elder Ari-
stippus, 341
Arginusse, state of public feeling
after battle of, 207; Socrates
hazarded his life to save the
victors at, 225
Aristides, the time of, 231 ; sup-
posed relationship of, to So-
crates, 62, n.
Aristippus, connection of his teach-
ing to that of Socrates, 155 ; doc-
trine of, 392 ; founder of a Socra-
tic School, the Cyrenaic, 247, 337 ;
independent in character, 339 ;
Ms pupils, 341 ; the Cyrenaic
ARI
doctrine his, 344 ; studied Ethics
exclusively, 346 ; thinks happi-
ness the end of philosophy, 347,
375, 385 ; considers enjoyment
an end in itself, 347, 376 ; theory
of highest good, 391 ; develop-
ment of his leading thought,
348 ; considers feeling produced
by internal motion, 352 ; con-
duct and views of, 352, 361 ; a
free-thinker, 367; greatly in-
debted to Socrates, 368 ; not a
degenerate pupil of Socrates,
370, 375 ; has many Socratic
traits, 372 ; dispenses with
property and enjoyment, 373 ;.
deviates further from Socrates
than Antisthenes, 374 ; his scanty
remarks on the origin of im-
pressions, 374 ; his principles
adhered to by Theodorus, 379 :
and by Hegesias, 380 ; teaching
reappears in Epicurus, 392
Aristippus the younger, grandson
of the elder Aristippus, 341 ;
his pupils, 342
Aristophanes, illustrating the pro-
blem of philosophy, 29 ; an
enemy of innovation, 29, 108,
114, 217, 218 ; his play of the
' Clouds ' supposed to have been
suggested by Anytus, 203, 206
[see Clouds'] ; considered So-
crates a dangerous teacher, 207 ;.
opposeshimonpatrioticgrounds,
209 ; charges Socrates with So-
phistic display, 221
Aristotelian distinction between
philosophy and convention, 312
Aristotle, his physical discussions,
45 ; subordinate to metaphysics,
40 ; expands the conceptional
philosophy of Socrates, 42, 47,
128; adheres to Idealism, 4],
49; his criticism of Plato's
Ideas, 49 ; his ethical views, 46 ;
the ripe fruit of Greek philoso-
phy, 50 ; influenced by imper-
INDEX.
395-
ARI
feet Schools, 50 ; introduces in-
ductive method, 129 ; his notices
of Socratic philosophy, 101, 104,
137 ; agree with those of Plato,
181, 182 ; and supplement those
of Xenophon, 183 ; his view of
the chief merit of Socrates, 132 ;
attacked by Eubulides, 251 ; de-
nies that any propositions are
false, 301 ; gives logic to the
Stoics, 391
Aristotle of Gyrene, a contem-
porary of Theodore, 344
Aristoxenus, account of Socrates,
58, n. ; disparaging, 70, 2
Asceticism of Neoplatonists, 46 ;
of Antisthenes, 305 ; of post-
Aristotelians, 45
Asclepiades removes Elean School
to Eretria, 280
Asiatic, the state of Xenophon an
A. kingdom, 244
Aspasia, teacher of Socrates, 57 ; a
friend of Socrates, 166
Athenian polish, 73 ; taste, 80 ; de-
mocracy, 169, 194, 223; popular
men, 29 ; people victims, 30 ;
tragedians, 4
Athenians, 198, 211, 228 ; guilt of,
233, 234 ; repentance of, 201
Athens, central position of, 3 ;
legendary history of, 28 ; plague
of, 28 ; citizens of, 31 ; their ad-
vantages, 31 ; state of, after
Peloponnesian war, 28, 29, 30 ;
intellectual movement going on
at, 54, 55, 183 ; the abode of So-
crates, 193, 230; state of public
opinion, 234 ; political intrigues
of, 51; not governed by Sophists,
204 ; fall of, 218 ; old constitu-
tion re-established by enemies
of Sophists, 219 ; ancient glory
of, 219 ; Gods of, 214 ; Aristippus
led to Athens, 337
Atomists, views of, known to Socra-
tes, 57
Atreus, story of house of, 8
OLE
Attic prose, models of, 245 ; philo-
sophy, 32
Authorities for the philosophy of
Socrates, 101, 105, 181, 184 ; for
Megarian philosophy, 249
B
Euripides, 17
Bacchylides illustrating the pro-
blem of philosophy, 21
Bacchus, story of birth of, 17
Being and Becoming, Megarian
view of, 259
Bio, the Borysthenite, a Cyrenaic,
pupil of Theodore, 343, 378
Brucker's time, a turning point in
estimate of authorities for So-
crates' life, 99
Bryso, son of Stilpo, 255
nAPTIOUSNESS [see Eristic}.
Cato's view of the condemnation
of Socrates, 205
Cebes, 246
Character of Socrates, greatness
of, 70 ; peculiar features in, 77 ;
Grecian peculiarities in, 74, 95
Characteristics of the Socratic phi-
losophy, 102
Charges, unfounded, against So-
crates, 220 ; charges against his
political views, 213 ; against his
moral and religious views, 214
Charmides, a disciple of Socrates,
212
Chronology of the life of Socrates,
53, n. 1
Chrysippus, blames Menedemus
and Stilpo for plausible fallacies,
282
Civil life, 165; renunciation of,,
by Cynics, 319
Cleon, 210, 30
INDEX,
CLI
Clinomachus, 251
Clytaemnestra, of JSschylus, 13;
of Euripides, a doubter, 1 8
* Clouds,' the, of Aristophanes,
suggested by Anytus, 203, 206 ;
attack Socrates as a Sophist,
210, 215 ; scope of, 214 ; portrait
in, 215, 61, n. 1.
Comedians, illustrating the pro-
blem of philosophy, 29
^Conceptions, theory of, characte-
ristic of the'Socratic Bra, 39,
40, 109 ; importance of, for So-
crates, 131 ; denned, 41 ; com-
mon to Plato and Aristotle, 42 ;
developed, 47 ; formation of,
128 ; proof by, 128, 130; rejected
by Euclid, 259 ; developed to
Nominalism by Cynics, 297 [see
Dialectic']
Condemnation of Socrates, 198 ;
causes of, 202 ; not the work of
the Sophists, 202 ; not due to
personal animosity, 205 ; real
causes of, 213 ; justice of, 220
Connus, reputed teacher of So-
crates, 56, 1
Contemporaries, relation of Socra-
tes to, 231
-Conviction, personal, insisted on
by Socrates, 227
Corinth, 251
Corybantic mysteries, 33
Crates, a pupil of Diogenes, 288 ;
speaks approvingly of culture,
293; displays art, 334
<ritias, Sophistic moralising of,
211 ; fascinated by the wisdom
of Socrates, 183 ; a pupil of
Socrates, 221 ; the most unscru-
pulous of the oligarchs, 211
4 Crito,' the, of Plato, 152
^Cronos, surname of Apollonius,
251 ; and of Diodorus,252
Custom, distinction between, and
philosophy, 312
-Cynicism, traces of, in Stilpo's
moral teaching, 276, 277
Cynics,284; historyof,284 ; teach-
ing of, 291 ; morality of, 160,
301 ; practice of, 314 ; influence
on the world, 331 ; go back to
Eleatic doctrine, 248 ; depreciate
knowledge, 295 ; Nominalism
of, 300 ; declare contradiction
impossible, 301 ; negative side
of morality, 310 ; positive side,
312 ; good and evil, 301 ; virtue,
310 ; wisdom and folly, 313 ; re-
nunciation of self, 315, 358, 370 ;
renunciation of society, 319,
379 ; the family, 320 ; civil life,
322 ; immodesty, 326 ; rejection
of religion, 276, 327 ; their views
combined with those of Mega-
rians by Stilpo, 275, 284 ; said
to have studied Ethics exclu-
sively, 344
Cynic School, a development of
the Socratic, 50, 162, 247 ; follows
the path of self-denial, 373
Cyrenaics, 337 ; history of, 337 ;
teaching of, 344 ; go back to
Protagoras, 248; practical life
of, 361 ; position of their system,
369 ; relation of their philosophy
to Socrates, 369, 374 ; of their
moral teaching, 372 ; of their
political views, 374 ; later, 376 ;
general position of, 346 ; view
of happiness, 45, 346 ; importance
attached to feelings, 346, 352,
358 ; doctrine of pleasure, 160,
352 ; the highest good, 354 ;
modified view of, 356 ; consider
all notions relative, 348; as-
sumed a sceptical attitude to-
wards knowledge, 348, 351 ; deny
that any pleasures are bad in
themselves, 356 ; admit degrees
of pleasure, 357 ; happiness not
the satisfaction of animal in-
stincts, 359 ; philosophy how
connected with Euemerus, 367 ;
employ outer world for their
own ends, 373
397
CYR
Cyrenaic School, a development of
the Socratic, 50, 247 ; separate
branches of, 343 ; views advo-
cated within, 376
Gyrene, 251
Cyropsedeia, the, of Xenophon,
245
Cyrus, expressions of the dying,
179, 242 ; intimacy of Xenophon
with, 212
A AIMONION, of Socrates, 66, n. 1,
81 ; false views of, 82 ; not a
genius, 82 ; regarded as a pri-
vate oracle, 84, 89, 96 ; its field
limited, 90 ; instances of its in-
tervention, 86 ; not the same as
conscience, 91 ; philosophical
view of, 94 ; said to be substi-
tuted for God, 220 ; its position
in relation to the popular belief,
229
Damon, reputed teacher of So-
crates, 56, n. 1
Death of Socrates, 200, 201 ; re-
sults of, 235
Socrates' view of, 179
Defence of Socrates, 196, 197
Delos, sacred ship, delays the
execution of Socrates, 201
Delphic oracle confirms Socrates in
his course of life, GO, and n. 3,
122, n. 1 ; God, 108
Demetrius Poliorcetes, 277
Demosthenes, apupil of Eubulides,
251
Depreciation of knowledge by Cy-
nics, 291 ; limits to, 293
Destruction, views of Diodorus
on, 272
Details of the trial of Socrates,
194-200
Dialectic, a criticism of what ,
133; the art of forming con-
ceptions, 39 ; a characteristic
of Socratic period, 40 ; the foun-
dation of Plato's system, 39 [sec
Conception*, Knowledge]
ELE
Dialectical tendency supreme in>
Socrates, 39
Didactic poetry illustrating philo-
sophy in fifth century, B.C., 21
Dike, JEschylus' conceptions of, 8 :
Dioclides, 251
Diodorus, captiousness of, 269;.
views on Motion, 269; on De-
struction, 272 ; on the Possible,
272 ; surnamed Cronos, 252 ;
teacher of Philo, 254
Diogenes, initiates Stilpo into
Cynic doctrine, 253 ; a native of
Sinope and pupil of Antisthenes.
287 ; uses expressions in favour
of culture, 293 ; recommends
justice, 308; his asceticism,
320; averse to marriage, 321;
allows marriage of relations,.
322; Plato's view of, 331 : theory
and practice overlap with, 369
j , testimony of, to line of argu-
ment pursued in Euclid's time,
265
| Diotima, teacher of Socrates, 57, 1
j Dissen, view on authorities for
Socrates' life, 100
Dodona, doves of, 26
Droyosen, view of Aristophanes,.
217, n.
EDUCATION of Socrates, 55, 56,.
n.l, 3,4; 57, n. 1,3
Egyptian priestesses in Herodotus,
26
Elean-Eretrian School, 279-283,-
history of, 279; teaching of,
281
Eleatic doctrine of the One and
All, 264, 265; difference be-
tween sensual and rational
knowledge, 260; revived by
Cynics, 248 ; also by Megarians,
250
I Eleatics, subtleties of, 255; doc-
trines of, 284
Klectra of Euripides, 16, 17
INDEX.
LI
Elis, 253
Elysium, received notions re-
specting, 24
Empedocles, views of, known to
Socrates, 57
Epicharmus, 21
Epicurean view of happiness, 45 ;
apathy, 46
Epicureanism, an outcome of
Cyrenaic School, 50
Epicureans, on the attainment of
knowledge, 45; make personal
conviction the standard of truth,
116 ; fond of slander, 70
Epicurus, placed the highest good
in freedom from pain, 354 ;
gave a new form to the philo-
sophy of pleasure, 376 ; doctrine
of Aristippus reappears in, 391
Eristic, Megarian, 285 ; that of
Euclid, 266 ; of Eubulides, 268 ;
of Alexinus, 268 ; of Diodorus,
269 ; of Philo, 273 ; of Stilpo,
274
Eros, a passionate attachment
grounded on zesthetic feeling,
76 ; described, 124, 125, 165
Eretrians, 283
Ethics, the substance of the teach-
ing of Socrates, 132-148, 172,
242 [see Morals} ; exclusively
studied by Aristippus, 345
Eubulides, captiousness of, 267 ;
writes against Aristotle, 251 ;
the teacher of Demosthenes, 251
Euclid, an intelligent thinker, 156;
fascinated by the attractions of
Socrates, 183 ; founder of a
Socratic School, the Megarian,
247, 249, 266; makes use of
Eleatic doctrines, 259, 265;
influenced by Heraclitus, 259 ;
sees true being in incorporeal
species, 259; a counterpart to
Plato, 259 ; rejects the Platonic
Ideas, 260 ; denies that capacity
exists beyond the time of exer-
cise, 261 ; substitutes the Good
for the One of Parmenides, 262 ;
rejects explanation by analogy,
265 ; eristic of, 265 ; denies mo-
tion, 272 ; makes virtue consist
in prudence, 304
Eudaemonism of Socrates, 158, 160
Euemerus, the Greek rationalist,
a pupil of Theodore, 343, 378 ;
connection with Cyrenaics pro-
blematical, 367
Eumenides of JSschylus, 9, 13, 16
Euphantus, a pupil of Eubulides,
252
Europa, rape of, in Herodotus, 26
Euripides, illustrating the state
of thought in the fifth century,
B.C., 6, 14 ; sceptical verses of,
232; a kindred spirit of the
better Sophists, 15 ; contrasted
with JEschylus, 16 ; a rational-
ising poet, 17 ; despiser of pro-
phecy, 17 ; tragic movement in,
20
Euthydemus, his view of injustice,
130
Evenus, reputed teacher of So-
crates, 56, 1
FAMILY, renunciation of, by
Cynics, 320
Fichte, idealism of, not the ideal-
ism of Plato, 43 ; criticism of
Kant, 158
Freret, view of the condemnation
of Socrates, 203, 204
Friars, resemblance of, to Cynics,
335
Friendship, 163-165 [see Eros]
' Frogs,' 215
GOD, the oneness of, recognised
by Socrates, 175 ; conceived
as the Reason of the world by
Socrates, 176 ; forethought of,
177; identified with the Good
by Euclid, 263
INDEX.
390
Gods, Socrates charged with re-
jecting the, of his country, 213 ;
Cynic views of, 327
Good, the object of knowledge,
147 ; practically determined by
custom and utility according to
Socrates, 149 ; Megarian doc-
trine of, 262 ; placed in apathy
by Stilpo, 277 ; identified with
God by Euclid, 263 ; Cynic doc-
trine of Good and Evil, 301 ;
Cyrenaic view of the highest
good, 354
Gorgias, Plato's, 152
, doubts of, 189, 218, 255;
criticism of, 265 ; a teacher of
Antisthenes, 285, 295, 327
Grecian peculiarities in the teach-
ing of Socrates,'74, 320
Greece, sweeping changes in, 2;
free states of, 3 ; gods of, in-
sulted by Persian expedition, 8 ;
mental development of, 35 ;
change in inner life of, 184 ;
moral life of, 226 ; attention of,
directed to logical criticism,
265
Greek, mode of, thought, 186, 230 ;
morality, 226, 229, 242; faith,
229 ; problem proposed to phi-
losophy in Socrates' time, 2 ;
life involves a contradiction, 7 ;
morality debased, 76 ; peculiar-
ity, 166 ; progressof, 392 ; pre-
judice against manual labour,
242
Grote, view of Socrates and the
Sophists, 187, 188, 189
Gyges, story of, 26
TTECUBA in Euripides, 17 ;
H doubts of, 18
Hegel's view of the Sai^vwv, 96 ;
view of the relation of Socrates
to the Sophists, 187, 190; con-
siders attitude of Socrates op-
posed to old Greek morality, 226
IDE
Hegesias, a Cyrenaic pupil of An-
tipater, 343, 376; adheres to
the maxims of Aristippus, 380 ;
considers life full of trouble,
381 ; identifies pleasure with the
good, 383 ; denies the position
of Aristippus, 385
Helen, story of, 26
Hellas united, 3
Heraclitus, doctrines of, conveyed
to Sicily by Sophists, 4 ; views
of, known to Socrates, 57 ; idea
of God, 176 ; early scepticism
of, 243 ; view of the phenomenal
world, 259 ; his doctrine of the
perpetual flux of things, 350
Hercules, patron saint of the Cy-
nics, 306 ; a doubter in Euri-
pides, 18
Hennas, mutilation of, 207, 214
Herodotus, exemplifying the state
of culture in Greece in fifth
century, B.C., 24 ; piety and
credulity of, 25, 27 ; a friend of
Sophocles, 24 ; but a doubter, 26
Hesiod, verses of, quoted by So-
crates, 222
Hiero, the, 244
Hipparchia, a Cynic, wife of Crates,
288
Historians, illustrating the pro-
blem of philosophy in the fifth
century, B.C., 24
Homer, verses of, quoted by So-
crates, 212; stories criticised
by Herodotus, 26 ; explained
by Antisthenes, 330
Horned, the, fallacy, 269
Hypothetical Sentences, view of
Philo on, 274
TCHTHYAS, the successor of
1 Euclid, 250
Ideal, Socrates not an insipid, of
virtue, 74, 203
Idealism, 39 ; beginnings of, in So-
crates, 42 ; of Aristotle, 43 ; of
400
INDEX.
IDE
Plato, 48 ; Fichte's subjective,
43
Ideas of Plato, 48, 137
Ignorance, consciousness of, the
first result of self-knowledge,
121
Immortality of the Soxil, Socrates'
view of, 178
Importance of Socratic teaching,
185
Individual independence insisted
on by Socrates, 161 ; by Cynics
and Stoics, 162
Induction necessary to form con-
ceptions, 129
Influence of Socrates explained, 186
lo, wanderings of, 26
Iphigenia of Euripides, 16
Irony of Socrates, 126
Ixion, story of, 8
TUSTICE of the condemnation
tl of Socrates considered, 218
KANT proves immortality of
soul by utilitarian argument,
157 ; resembles Socrates in po-
sition, 138, n. 1 ; contradiction
in, 157
Knowledge, true, only gained by
conceptions, 42, 109 [see Con-
ceptions] ; virtue consists in, ac-
cording to Socrates, 140 ; de-
preciated by Cynics, 292 ; So-
cratic search for true, 124, 108,
n. 1 ; 109, n. 2 ; moral value of,
145
of Self, the Socratic, 121
v, the fallacy called, 273
LAIUS, story of, 8
Leonidas, 77
Life' of Socrates, 52
Literature, the problem of philoso-
phy solved by, 4
MEN
Love for enemies in Socrates, 170*
Lyco, the accuser of Socrates, 194
Lycurgus, 230
Haittrriiri) Tex^n of Socrates, 125
MAN, Socrates' view of the dig-
nity of, 178
Marathon, stern race fought at,
10, 230; the remembrance of,
inspires Aristophanes, 29
Meaning of words, Philo's view
of, 274
Means, relation of, to ends in na-
ture, 172
Megara, plunder of, 277 ; Idealism
of School of, 42
Megarian School, 253, 284; an
imperfect expansion of Socratic
principle, 50, 247 ; founded by
Euclid, 249 ; primarily critical,
253 ; history of, 249 ; doctrine
of, 255 ; approximated to Cyni-
cism, 279 ; merged in Cynicism,
283 ; teaching, 255, 258, 269 ;
starting point of, 259 ; develop-
ment in, 264
Megarians, go back to Eleatic
doctrine, 248 ; captious logic of,
160, 265, 266; their views of
Being and Becoming, 259 ; of
the Good, 263; agree with Plato,
260; attack popular notions,
264 ; f ond of fallacies, 267 ;
later, indebted to Cynics, 275,
277 ; inconsistencies of, 386
Meiner's view of sources of So-
cratic authority, 99
Meletus, the accuser of Socrates,
193, 203, 205, 206 ; said to have
suggested the ' Clouds ' to Aris-
tophanes, 203 ; hesitates to ac-
cuse Socrates of Sophistry, 221;
a defender of ancient morality,
231
' Memorabilia,' the, of Xenophon,
72, 75, 78, 102, 132, 167, 183
Menedenms, 281 ; attempts of
INDEX.
401
Alexinus to entangle, in falla-
cies, 269 ; removes Elean School
to Eretria, 280; directs atten-
tion to moral questions, 281
Menedemus, a later Cynic, 290
Menippus, a later Cynic, 290
Meno's question whether virtue is
obtained by exercise or instruc-
tion, 313
Method of Socrates, 113
Metrocles, brother of Hipparchia,
a Cynic, 289
Military service of Socrates, 66,
n.2
Miltiades, time of, 231
' Mirror,' the, of Cebes, 246
Moderation, the, of Socrates, 72,
74, 161
Modesty suppressed by Cynics,
326
Monimus, a Cynic, expresses him-
self in favour of culture, 294
Moral importance of theory of
conceptions, 113 ; particular
moral relations discussed by
Socrates, 160
Morality, practically determined,
according to Socrates, by cus-
tom and utility, 149 ; inconsis-
tency of Socrates, 151 ; super-
ficially treated by Socrates, 151 ;
relation of Socrates to older
morality, 226; relation of So-
crates to cotemporary morality,
231
Morals of the Cynics, 301
Moschus, an Elean philosopher,
280
Motion, view of Diodorus on, 269
Myrto, the supposed wife of So-
crates, 61, 62, n.
Mysteries, spread of, after Pelo-
ponnesian war, 32
TATURE, view of, foreign to
\ Socrates, 135, 137 ; held by
Socrates, 172-175 ; studied by
pre-Socratic philosophers, 39
46
Neoplatonism the coping-stone of
Greek philosophy, 61
Neoplatonists, resort to higher
revelations, 45 ; their asceticism,
46 ; later philosophers, 105
Neopythagoreans, 35
New Academy, time of, 4
Nicias, superstition of, 28
Niobe, story of, 8
Nominalism of Cynics, 297, 300
f/HHDIPUS Coloneus' of Sopho-
Uu cles, 13
Olympic goddess, 9
Olympus, inhabitants of, derided,
232
Orphic traditions, 19 ; mysteries,
33
FN^TIUS, rejected writings
of Simmias and Cebes, 246
Paris, story of, questioned in Euri-
pides, 17 ; in Herodotus, 26
Parmenides, teaching known to
Socrates, 57, 58; followed by
Euclid, 260 ; reduced action
and passion to the sphere of the
Becoming, 260; discovered a
contradiction in the Becoming,
261 ; attributes assigned by him
to real being, 262 ; proved his
position directly, 265
Party, Socrates not the victim of
a political, 211
Pasicles, a Megarian, younger than
Eubulides, 251
Peloponnesian War, Thucydides'
history of, 27 ; increasing spread
of mysteries about time of, 32 ;
views of Socrates fixed about
time of, 61 ; fall of Athens in,
218 ; period after, 231
Pericles, art in the time of, 3, 10 ;
the age of, 28, 54
Peripatetic School, r>0; connected
D D
402
INDEX.
with Aristotle, 51 ; strictures
on Socrates, 70
Persian War, achievements of, 3 ;
unexpected result of, 8 ; Socrates
born in last years of, 53
Persians, battles with, 6
< Phsedo,' Plato's, 59, 137
Pluedo, the founder of a Socratic
School, the Elean-Eretrian, 247,
279 ; a native of Elis, 279 ; the
favourite of Socrates, 280; his
opinions, 281
' Phsedrus,' the, 79
Philo, a Megarian and pupil of
Diodorus,254, 273 ; his captious-
ness, 273
Philolaus, Simmias and Cebes pu-
pils of, 246
Philosophic Schools, permanence
of, 51
Philosophy, problem proposed to,
in fifth century, B.C., 2 ; problem
solved by politics, art, and reli-
gion, 2-34 ; progress of, in fifth
century, B.C., 35 seq.
Physical Science not dispensed
with by Plato, 45
Physics, ethics substituted for, by
post-Aristotelian philosophy, 43
Pindar, illustrating the problem
of philosophy, 22, 23: respect
for natural talent, 23
Plato, Writings of, 99 ; his dia-
logues, 100, 181, 183 ; most his-
torical of, 170 ; his ' Apology,'
179, 215 ; on the Megarians,
257 ; agrees with, 260 ; and Xeno-
phon as authorities, 99 ; de-
scribes Euclid's method, 265
, His portrait of Softrates, 101 ;
calls Socrates the wisest and
best of men, 73 ; praises his
social virtues, 75 ; describes him
as a perfect thinker, 105 ; speaks
of his peculiar moderation, 75 ;
his use of the term Eros, 76 ;
his singularity, 77 ; his outward
appearance, 78; the apparent
PLI
shallowness of his discourses,.
80 ; speaks of the ^aip.6viov of
Socrates, 84, 85, 87, 89 ; speaks
of Socrates' attitude towards
natural science, 137 ; veils the
shallowness of Socrates' theory
of virtue, 155 ; mentions what
told most against Socrates at
the trial, 205, 207, 217; asso-
ciates Socrates with Aristo-
phanes, 210, 216; his language
about Anytus, 203, 205, 206;
value of Plato's testimony con-
sidered, 91, 92 ; his agreement
with Xenophon, 92, 154, 171,
181, 188 ; with Aristotle, 137
, Philosophy of, -considered So-
crates a deep thinker, 96 ; his
system the fruit of Socrates,
138, 187; but more developed,
41, 141, 392 ; influenced by im-
perfect Socratic Schools, 50, 51 ;
regards species as living forces,
260 ; dialectic, 270 ; the founda-
tion of his system, 40 ; his
idealism, 42, 48, 49 ; advance
from sensible beauty to moral
beauty, 46 ; essential concep-
tions found in all things, 131 ;
his teaching concerning the
State, 46, 169 ; his physical in-
quiries, 45 ; reality of concep-
tion, 47, 59 ; difference between
him and Aristotle, 49 ; the
bloom of Greek philosophy, 49 ;
influenced by imperfect Socratie
Schools, 50 ; his description
of Simmias and Cebes, 246;
speaks of Cynic definition
knowledge as tautological, 312 ;
his view of Diogenes, 331
Platonic distinction between cus-
tom and philosophy, 312; ideas,
48
Platonist, Menedemus said to have
been a, 283
Plistanus, an Elean philosopher,
successor to Phasdo, 280
INDEX.
403
POL
Politics, little importance attached
to, by Socrates, 228
Polyeuctus, said to have taken
part in accusing Socrates, 194,
11. 2,
Poseidon, intervention of, 26
Possible, the view of Diodorus on,
272 ; view of Philo, 273
Post-Aristotelian philosophy, sub-
stitutes Ethics for Physics, 44 ;
one-sidedness of Schools, 47;
extreme individualism of, 117
Predicate, combination of subject
and, rejected by Stilpo, 275
Pre-Socratic philosophy resting on
tradition, 38 ; a study of nature,
39, 46 ; aided by Plato, 51
Prodicus, teacher of Socrates, 57
Progress, rapid intellectual, of So-
cratic age, 2, 3
Prometheus of ^schylus, 9
Protagoras, doubts of, 18, 189, 248 ;
negative teaching of, 248 ; makes
man the measure of all things,
116; considers all notions rela-
tive, 350 ; considers feelings the
result of internal motion, 352,
374
Providence, belief in natural, 174
Providential care of God, 177
Prytaneum, Athens the, of the wis-
dom of Greece, 4 ; Socrates de-
served to be publicly entertained
in the, 200
Pyrrho, Ids philosophy of doubt,
255 ; branched off from the
School of Megara, 391
Pythagorean traditions, 19 ; league,
164
REALISM, knowledge of concep-
tions expanded by Plato into,
298
Reason, God conceived as the, of
the world, 176, 262; the only
thing which gives a value to
life, 310
Reisig, his view of the character
of Socrates, 215
Religion, the position of Socrates
subversive of, 229 ; denied by
the Cynics, 327
Republic, Plato's, 152
Rousseau's wild fancies, 32
SCEPTICISM of Socratic era,
117 ; in Euripides, 16, 18 ; in
Herodotus, 26 ; in the masses,
34 ; an outcome of Megarian
School, 50
Sceptics, despair of knowledge,
45 ; imperturbability, 46; resolve
truth into probability, 116
Schleiermacher, his view of the
Saifa6vtov, 84 ; protest against the
preference shown for Xenophon,
99 ; canon of, 100, 104 ; his ob-
jections to Xenophon as a sole
authority, 183 ; discovered Me-
garian views in Plato, 256
Self-knowledge, the Socratic, 43,
121
Self-renunciation, the, of the Cy-
nics, 315
Sextus criticises the arguments of
Diodorus, 271
Sicily visited by Sophists, 4
Sifting of men, the Socratic, 124
Silenus, appearance of Socrates
compared by Alcibiades to, 78,
184
Simmias, a Theban, described by
Plato as a philosopher, 246
Simon the shoemaker, writings
circiilated under the name of,
spurious, 247
Simonides, illustrating the pro-
blem of philosophy, 21 ; his epi-
taph on Leonidas, 77
Sinope, the birthplace of Diogenes,
287
Society, renunciation of, by the
Cynics, 319 ; influence of Cynics
on, 331
D D 2
404
INDEX.
soc
Socrates, age of, its inheritance,
36 ; characteristics, 40 ; authori-
ties for, 104
, Cttaracter of, 52, 212 ; respected
by antiquity, 70 ; greatness of
character, 70 ; supposed mental
struggles, 71 ; purity, 72 ; ab-
stemiousness, 72, 74, 161 ;
political courage, 73 ; courage,
201 ; composure, 201, 363 ; pious
faith, 235 ; greatness, 235 ; sen-
sible, 83 ; love of society, 74 ;
love of friends, 194, 211, 164,
76 ; imbued with Greek pecu-
liarities, 74, 76 ; abstraction,
78, 81 ; not an insipid ideal of
virtue, 74, 203 ; not a dry mora-
list, 108 ; many-sided sympa-
thies, 45 ; serious side in, 73 ;
cultivated tact, 94 ; inward con-
centration, 81, 96, 97 ; a Greek
and Athenian, 74, 95 ; eccen-
tricity, 77 ; meditativeness, 78 ;
absence, 81 ; modesty, 67 ; sim-
plicity of, 338 ; consciousness of
ignorance, 121, 122, 126; flexi-
bility, 317; inner life, 94;
strength of will, 292; import-
ance attaching to his person, 52,
116 ; his 9atp6vtw, 81, 66, n. 1,
82, 84, 89, 96 ; his aim to train
men, 114, 263 ; portrait, 105, 240 ;
his appearance, 77 ; accuracy
of Xenophon's description chal-
lenged, 135
, comedy on, 203, 214
, contemporaries of, 185
, Ethics of, 134, 172, 240 ; amoral
reformer, 114 ; ethical princi-
ples derived from the Sophists,
149; scientific doctrine of
morals, 174; defends friend-
ships, 163, 164 ; utility highest
standard, 147, 372 ; value of in-
struction, 222 ; highest object
of knowledge, the Good, 147,
262, 263 ; the oneness of virtue
and knowledge, 113, 312; re-
SOC
quire independence from wants,
315 ; Plato's description of,
155
Socrates, followers of, one-sided
followers, 44, 45, 51, 236, 375;
favourite follower, 280
-, language of, 151, 152, 163,
184, 185 ; apparently ridiculous,
79
, lAfe of, youth and early man-
hood, 52, 53 ; date of birth and
death, 53, n. ; education of, 55 ;
his instructors, 56, n. : manhood
reached before the Sophists in-
troduced systematic education,
55 ; life begun in trade, 159 :
contentment and simplicity of,
64; married relations, 61, 62,
63 ; avoided public life, 66 ; his
detractors, 70 ; respected by
Xenophon, 72 ; military service,
66, 2, 70 ; personal habits, 105 ;
simple teaching, 230 ; dis-
courses, 102, 184; society, 210;
enemies, 207; attacks on, 193,
206, 210, 211, 232; charges
against, 210, 211, 220, 229;
most fatal, 217 ; his trial, 196,
213 ; condemnation, 200, 202 ;
guilt, 202 ; fate, 235 ; greatness
of, 236; death, 200, 235, 285:
place in history, 186
, Philosophy of, 250, 253; ap-
pearance at a philosophical
crisis. 2 ; different from pre-
Socratic, 38 ; able to take a
comprehensive view of science,
4 ; had no system, 47, 119, 160 ;
begins with self-knowledge, 43 ;
aims at life, 52; philosophical
platform, 104 ; breaks away from
previous philosophy, 112 ; how
led to the study of philosophy,
92 ; ground occupied by, 104, 240 ;
understood the tendencies of
the age, 114 ; breaks away from
current opinions, 112 ; value
assigned to them, 111, 129;
INDEX.
406
soc
restricted to ethics, 134, 139;
analytical, 131 ; opposed to
doubting, 123; his deviation
from original ground of Greek
thought, 231 ; free enquiry of,
291 ; new mode of thought, 182 ;
did not discourse on the All,
134 ; explanation by analogy,
265 ; maxim that virtue consists
in knowledge, 241 ; makes the
highest business of man know-
ing the Good, 248 ; few definite
opinions, 139 ; method, 120, 182,
240, 241 ; methodical pursuit of
knowledge, 106, 124, 169, 259,
372 ; narrowness of position of,
240 ; enunciated a new truth to
his contemporaries, 165 ; con-
vinced men of ignorance, 206 ;
spirit of, 246, 248; always
goes back to conceptions, 93,
120, 121, 48, 264, 292, 295;
overrated knowledge, 260 ; in-
troduced dialectic, 39 ; ideal-
ism of, 42 ; view of injuring
others, 170; theory of proof,
131 ; chief merit, 131 ; philo-
sophical greatness, 191
Socrates, Political views of, 228 ;
anti -republican sentiments, 1 68,
211 ; high ideas of the .State, 167
, prejudice against, 205, 208
, principles of, developed by
Plato, 49, 169
, pupils of, 211, 236, 237, 370
, relation to the Sophists, 55, 67
169, 187, 188, 189, 190, 203, 216,
, natural science, 124 : value of
geometry, 134 ; science foreign
to, 137, 172 ; relation of means
and ends, 137
, Theology of, an appendix to
ethics, 139; Reason of the world,
175 ; providence, 177 ; divine
element in man, 178
, Writings of, 98
Socratic philosophy, 374; asks
What things are in themselves,
SOC
40; different from what had
preceded, 39; developed by
Plato, 42, 391 ; leads to Idealism,
42 ; peculiar character of, 43 ;
imperfectly represented in So-
cratic Schools, 51 ; different
aspects of, 390, 389 ; scanty
notices of, in Aristotle, 101 ;
knowledge the centre of, 44,
106; disputes about the cha-
racter of, 117; moral views of,
45, 109; comprehensive cha-
racter of, 47; developed, 47;
subjective character of, 116;
two branches of, united by
Zeno, 253
Socratic School, a loose association
of admirers, 68 ; a branch of,
established by Euclid, 250 ; Cy-
renaic branch of, 337
Socratic Schools, imperfect at-
tempts to expand Socratic prin-
ciple, 50, 391 ; starting points
for Stoicism, 50, 1, 247 ; diverge
from Socrates, 248 ; disintegra-
tion of, 389; cover the same
ground as Socrates, 50 ; doctrine
of pleasure finds a place in, 160 ;
friendship defended by, 163;
founders of, 247 ; inconsisten-
cies of, 386; followers of So-
crates, 387; their importance,
389, 390; doctrine of oneness
of virtue and knowledge, 312 ;
independence of wants, 315
Socratic dialogues, 159, 184; doc-
trine of morals, 159 ; education,
243; Eros, 124, 126; Ethics,
240; idea of a ruler, 242;
knowledge of self, 121; method,
125 ; mode of teaching, 241 ;
search for conceptions, 48 ;
thoughts, 244 ; teaching, 159,
182, 245; view, 48; type of
virtue, 74 ; doctrine of virtue,
140; conception of virtue, 147;
circle, 327 ; traits in Aristippus,
372
406
INDEX.
soc
Socratic teaching, various ele-
ments in, 391
Solon's constitution re-established,
31
Sophist, Socrates taken for a, 210 ;
meaning of the term, 190 ; An-
tisthenes in the capacity of,
285
* Sophistes,' the, of Plato, 266
Sophistic tendencies, practical
effect of, 2; teaching, 2, 114;
enquiries, 2 ; influence of,
views, 311, 338
Sophists call everything in ques-
tion, 1 ; Euripides related to
the better, 16 ; rationalising
spirit of, 26 ; avow selfish prin-
ciples, 28 ; introduce systematic
education, 55 ; public teachers,
67 ; little dependence placed in,
by Socrates, 66 ; dogmatism
overthrown by, 112 ; believe
real knowledge impossible, 112;
meet the want of the age with
skill. 113 ; recognise unsatis-
factoriness of older culture, 114 ;
caprice of, 116, 117 ; destroyed
the contending views of natural
philosophers, 124 ; ignorance
their leading thought, 124; con-
tests with, 133 ; made education
a necessary for statesmen, 169 ;
travellers, 4 ; impart an electri-
cal shock to their age, 186 ; their
relation to Socrates, 187, 188,
333 ; moral teaching of older,
190 ; draw philosophy away
from nature to morals, 191 ;
failure of, 191 ; their hatred of
Socrates, 203 ; did not take part
in his accusation, 203, 205 ;
small political influence of, 204 ;
rhetorical display of, 216 ;
Schools of, 218 ; pernicious in-
fluence of, 218 ; corrupters of
the people, 218 ; arguments of,
265 ; hold that every object can
only be called by its own pecu-
STO
liar name, 296 ; required pay-
ment for instruction, 339 ; views
on knowledge and pleasure, 387;
diversities of, 387
Sophistry, a narrower limitation
of Socrates' teaching, 388 ; ten-
dency to, 387
Sophocles, illustrating problem of
philosophy, 6, 10; difference
between, and JEschylus, 12
Sophroniscus, father of Socrates,
54,1
Sorites, the, of Megarians, 26 G ;
attributed to Eubulides, 268
Sparta, 230
Spartan education, 243
Spartans, Cyrus the friend of,
230
State, the, views of Socrates on,
165-168
Stilpo, a Megarian philosopher,
260 ; friend of Thrasymachus,
252 ; placed highest good in
apathy, 277 ; his captiousness,
277 ; rejects every combination
of subject and predicate, 276 ;
denies that general conceptions
can be applied to individual
things, 260 ; an object of won-
der to his contemporaries, 253 ;
learnt Cynicism from Diogenes,
253 ; united teaching of Mega-
rian and Cynic Schools, 284 :
his free views on religion, 283
Stoa, Stilpo the precursor of, 253,
284 ; took the Cynic principles,
335, 390
Stobasus, quotes the words of Dio-
genes, 308
Stoicism, an outcome of Cynicism,
50
Stoics, hold a standard of know-
ledge to be possible, 45 ; their
apathy, 46, 117 ; later philoso-
phers, 105 ; consider Socrates
the inaugurator of a new philo-
sophical epoch, 100 ; declare
personal conviction the standard
INDEX.
407
SUB
of truth, 116 ; views of indi-
vidual independence, 161, 382 ;
comprehensive system of, 283 ;
secure freedom by suicide, 319 ;
in advance of Cynics, 381
Subjective character of the theory
of Socrates, 116, 117
Superficial treatment of morals
by Socrates, 155
Silvern, theory of, on the scope of
the ' Clouds,' 216
Symposium of Plato, 101, 210; of
Xenophon, 74, 79; Plato's de-
scription of, 215
rFALTHYBIUS, in Euripides, 18
Tartarus, received notions re-
specting, 24
Teiresias explains birth of Bacchus,
17
Test science of truth, 44
' Thesetetus,' the, 125
Thebans, Simmias and Cebes two,
246
Theodorus called the Atheist, a
pupil of Aristippus, 342, 376 ;
not altogether satisfied with
Aristippus, 379 : his pupils Bio
and Euemerus, 343, 378 ; won-
tonly attacks popular faith, 367 :
considers pleasitre and pain
neither good nor bad in them-
selves, 379, 383
Thessaly, visited by Sophists, 4
Thessalian legend of Poseidon, 26
Thrasybulus, 211, 225
Thrasymachus of Corinth, 251,
2:>-2
Thucyclides illustrating the pro-
blem of philosophy, 27 ; a mat-
ter-of-fact writer, 27
Timaeus of Plato, 137
Timon, 255
Titan in JSschylus, 9, 13
Tragedians, illustrating the philo-
sophy of, 4
Tragedy, Greek, involves a con-
tradiction, 7 ; analysis of, 5
Tribon, the, 316
Trojan War, legend of, 3
TTNITY, Greek, in Socratic age,
Utility, the practical test of vir-
tue, 124 ; with Socrates, 134
VIRTUE, Socratic type of, 73 ;
Socratic doctrine that virtue
is knowledge, 140; Socratic
conception of, 156; Cynic notion
of, 310
TTTISDOM and Folly, Cynic
VV ideas of, 313
Wolf, 215
Worship of God, 1 7.">
VANTHIPPE, wife of Socrates,
A 61, 166
Xenophanes, his doctrine of the
One, 278
Xenophon, 179, 239; a pupil of
Socrates, 212 ; his account of
Socrates, 72, 73, 76, 89, 91, 137,
170,171,181,182,184,185,155,
116, 159, 161 ; of the Scurfviov,
84 ; his ' Memorabilia,' 72, 75,
78, 102, 132, 167, 183 ; objection
raised by, 80; Symposium, 79,
74 ; and Plato as authorities, 98,
99, 100, 101, 102; writings of,
98; supposed popular philoso-
phy of, 99 ; description chal-
lenged, 135, 183 ; true, 161, 181 ;
on nature, 134 ; agreement with
Plato and Aristotle, 181 ; vindi-
cated against Schleiermacher,
183; Apology of, 205; reply to
charges, 221 ; sketch of an ideal
ruler, 243
INDEX.
ZEN
7ENO, the Bleatic, supposed con-
Li nection with Socrates, 58,
269, 270; criticism of, 265,
266
Zeno, the Stoic, united two
branches of Socratic philoso-
phy, 253, 283, 284
Zeno, JEschylus' conception of, 7,
9 ; Sophocles' conception of, 11 ;
Euripides' conception of, 18
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Twias's Law of Nations, 8vo. in Time of Peace, 12*. in Time of War, 21*.
Whately's Elements of Logic. 8vo. 10*. 6d. Crown 8vo. 4*. 6d.
Bhetoric. 8vo. 10*. 6d. Crown 8vo. 4*. 6d.
English Synonymes. Fcp. 8vo. 3.
Williams's Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle translated. Crown 8vo. 7*. 6d.
Seller's Socrates and the Socratic Schools. Crown 8vo. 10*. 6d.
Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics. Crown 8vo. 15*.
Plato and the Older Academy. Crown 8vo. 18*.
Pre-Socratic Schools. 2 vols. crown 8vo. 30*.
MISCELLANEOUS AND CRITICAL WORKS.
Arnold's (Dr. Thomas) Miscellaneous Works. 8vo. 7*. 6d.
(T.) Manual of English Literature. Crown 8vo. 7*. 6d.
English Poetry and Prose. Crown 8vo. Gs.
Bain's Emotions and the Will. 8vo. 15*.
Mental and Moral Science. Crown 8vo. 10*. 6rf.
Senses and the Intellect. 8vo. 15*.
Beaconsfield (Lord), The Wit and Wisdom of. Crown 8vo. 9,.
Becker's Chariclet and Qallut, by Metcalfe. Post 8vo. 7*. 6d. each.
Blackley's German and English Dictionary. Post 8vo. 7*. 6d.
Contansean's Practical French & English Dictionary. Post 8vo. 7*. 6d.
Pocket French and English Dictionary. Square 18mo. 3*. 6d.
Farrar's Language and Languages. Crown 8vo. 6*.
Fronde's Short Studies on Great Subjects. 3 vols. crown 8vo. 18*.
Hume's Essays, edited by Green & Grose. 2 vols. 8vo. 28*.
Treatise on Human Nature, edited by Green & Grose. 2 vols. 8vo. 28*.
Latham's Handbook of the English Language. Crown 8 vo. 6*.
English Dictionary. 1 vol. medium 8vo. 14*. 4 vols. 4to. 7.
Liddell & Scott's Greek-English Lexicon. Crown 4to. 86*.
Abridged Greek-English Lexicon. Square 12mo. 7*. 6d.
Longman's Pocket German and English Dictionary. 18mo. 5*.
London, LONGMANS & CO.
General Lists of New Works
Macanlay'8 Miscellaneous Writings. -I voLs. 8vo. 21*. 1 vol. crown 8vo. 4*. M.
Miscellaneous Writings and Speeches. Crown 8vo. 6*.
Miscellaneous Writings, Speeches, Lays of Ancient Rome, &c.
Cabinet Edition. 4 vols. crown 8vo. 24s.
Mahaffy's Classical Greek Literature. Crown 8vo. Vol. I. the Poets, It. M.
Vol. II. the Prose Writers, 7s. 6d.
Millard's Grammar of Elocution. Fcp. 8vo. 3*. 6d.
Milner's Country Pleasures. Crown bvo. 6*.
Mailer's (Max) Lectures on the Science of Language. 2 vols. crown 8vo. 16*.
Owen's Evenings with the Skeptics. 2 vols. 8vo. 32*.
Rich's Dictionary of Roman and Greek Antiquities. Crown 8vo. 7*. 6d.
Rogers's Eclipse of Faith. Fcp. 8vo. 5*.
Defence of the Eclipse of Faith Fcp. 8vo. 3*. 6d.
Roget's Thesaurus of English Words and Phrases. Crown 8vo. 10*. 6d.
Selections from the Writings of Lord Macaulay. Crown 8vo. 6*.
Simcox's Latin Classical Literature. 2 vols. 8vo.
White Si Riddle's Large Latin-English Dictionary. 4to. 21*.
White's Concise Latin-English Dictionary. Royal 8vo. 12*.
Junior Student's Lat.-Eng. and Bng.-Lat. Dictionary. Square 12rao. 12*.
ftmawt^ / The English-Latin Dictionary, 5*. 6d.
beparately | The ^tin-English Dictionary, 7*. 6d.
Wilson's Studies of Modern Mind &c. 8vo. 12*.
Wit and Wisdom of the Rev. Sydney Smith, Crown 8vo. 3*. 6rf.
Yonge's English-Greek Lexicon. Square 12mo. 8*. 6d. 4to. 71*.
The Essays and Contributions of A. K. H. B. Crown 8vo.
Autumn Holidays of a Country Parson. 3*. 6d.
Changed Aspects of Unchanged Truths. 3*. 6d.
Common-place Philosopher in Town and Country. 3*. 6(i.
Counsel and Comfort spoken from a City Pulpit. 3*. M.
Critical Essays of a Country Parson. 3*. 6d.
Graver Thoughts of a Country Parson. Three Series, 3*. 6d. each.
Landscapes, Churches, and Moralities. 3*. 6d.
Leisure Hours in Town. 3*. 6d. Lessons of Middle Age. 3*. 6<J.
Our Little Life. Essays Consolatory and Domestic. 3*. 6d.
Present-day Thoughts. 3*. 6d.
Recreations of a Country Parson. Three Series, 3*. 6d. each.
Seaside Musings on Sundays and Week-Days. 3*. 6d.
Sunday Afternoons in the Parish Church of a University City. 3*. M.
ASTRONOMY, METEOROLOGY, GEOGRAPHY &C.
Freeman's Historical Geography of Europe. 2 vols. 8vo. 31*. 6eJ.
Herschel's Outlines of Astronomy. Square crown 8vo. 12*.
Keith Johnston's Dictionary of Geography, or General Gazetteer. 8vo. 42*.
Nelson's Work on the Moon. Medium 8vo. 31*. 6d.
Proctor's Essays on Astronomy. 8vo. 12*. Proctor's Moon. Crown 8vo. 10*. M.
Larger Star Atlas. Folio, 15*. or Maps only, 12*. 6d.
New Star Atlas. Crown 8vo. 6*. Orbs Around Us. Crown 8vo. 7*. 6d.
Other Worlds than Ours. Crown 8vo. 10*. 6d,
Sun. Crown 8vo. 14*. Universe of Stars. 8vo. 10*. 6d,
Transits of Venus, 8vo. 8*. 6rf. Studies of Venus- Transits, 8vo. 5*.
Smith's Air and Rain. 8vo. 24*.
The Public Schools Atlas of Ancient Geography. Imperial 8vo. 7*. M.
London, LONGMANS & CO.
General Lists of New "Works.
The Public Schools Atlas of Modern Geography. Imperial 8vs. 5*.
Webb's Celestial Objects for Common Telescopes. Crown 8vo. Si.
NATURAL HISTORY & POPULAR SCIENCE.
Arnott's Elements of Physics or Natural Philosophy. Crown 8vo. 12*. Gd.
Brande's Dictionary of Science, Literature, and Art. 3 vols. medium 8vo. 68*.
Pecaisne and Le Maout's General System of Botany. Imperial 8vo. 31*. Gd.
Dixon's Rural Bird Life. Crown 8vo. Illustrations, 5s.
Edmonds's Elementary Botany. Fcp. Svo. '2s.
Ganot's Elementary Treatise on Physics, by Atkinson. Large crown 8vo. 15*.
Natural PhUosophy, by Atkinson. Crown 8vo. 7i. Gd,
Goodeve's Elements of Mechanism. Crown 8vo. 6*.
Grove's Correlation of Physical Forces. 8vo. 15*.
Hartwig's Aerial World. 8vo. 10*. Gd. Polar World. 8vo. 10*. Gd.
Sea and its Living Wonders. 8vo. 10*. Gd.
Subterranean World. 8vo. 10*. 6d. Tropical World. 8vo. 10*. Gd.
Hanghton's Six Lectures on Physical Geography. 8vo. 15*.
Beer's Primseval World of Switzerland. 2 vols. 8vo. 12*.
Helmholtz's Lectures on Scientific Subjects. 2 vols. cr. 8vo. 7*. Gd. each.
Hnllah's Lectures on the History of Modern Music. 8vo. 8*. 6d.
Transition Period of Musical History, vo. 10*. Gd.
Keller's Lake Dwellings of Switzerland, by Lee. 2 vols. royal 8vo. 42*.
Lloyd's Treatise on Magnetism. 8vo. 10*. Gd.
on the Wave-Theory of Light. 8vo. 10*. Gd.
London's Encyclopaedia of Plants. 8vo. 42*.
Lubbock on the Origin of Civilisation & Primitive Condition of Man. 8vo. 18.
Macalister'a Zoology and Morphology of Vertebrate Animals. 8vo. 10*. 6d.
Nicola' Puzzle of Life. Crown 8vo. 3*. Gd.
Owen's Comparative Anatomy and Physiology of the Vertebrate Animals. 8 volfl.
8vo. 73*. 6d.
Experimental Physiology. Crown Svo. 5*.
Proctor's Light Science for Leisure Hours. 2 vols. crown Svo. 7*. Gd. each.
Rivera's Orchard House. Sixteenth Edition. Crown Svo. 5*.
Rose Amateur's Guide. Fcp. Svo. 4*. 6d.
Stanley's Familiar History of British Birds. Crown Svo. 6*.
Text-Books of Science, Mechanical and Physical.
Abney's Photography, 3*. Gd.
Anderson's (Sir John) Strength of Materials, 3*. 6d.
Armstrong's Organic Chemistry, 3*. 6d.
Ball's Astronomy, 6*.
Barry's Railway Appliances, 3*. Gd. Bloxam's Metals, 3*. Gd.
Bauerman's Systematic Mineralogy, 6s.
Goodeve's Principles of Mechanics, 3*. Gd.
Gore's Electro-Metallurgy, 6*.
Griffin's Algebra and Trigonometry, 3*. Gd.
JenMn's Electricity and Magnetism, 3*. Gd.
Maxwell's Theory of Heat, S>. Gd.
Merrifield's Technical Arithmetic and Mensuration, 3*. Gd.
Miller's Inorganic Chemistry, 3*. Gd.
Preecc & Sivewright's Telegraphy, 3*. Bd.
Ruttey's Study of Rocks, 4*. Gd.
Shelley's Workshop Appliances, 3*. Gd.
London, LONGMANS & CO.
General Lists of New Works.
Textbooks of Science, Mechanical and Physical- continued.
Thome's Structural and Physiological Botany, 8*.
Thorpe's Quantitative Chemical Analysis, 4*. 6d.
Thorpe & Muir's Qualitative Analysis, 3*. 6d. .
Tilden's Chemical Philosophy, 3*. 6d.
Unwin's Machine Design, 6*.
Watson's Plane and Solid Geometry, 3*. 6<J.
Tyndall on Sound. New Edition in the press.
Tyndall's Floating Matter of the Air. Crown 8vo. 7*. 6d.
Fragments of Science. 2 vols. post 8vo. 16*.
Heat a Mode of Motion. Crown 8vo. 12*.
Notes on Electrical Phenomena. Crown 8vo. 1*. sewed, 1*. 6d. cloth.
Notes of Lectures on Light. Crown 8vo. 1*. sewed, 1*. 6d. cloth.
Lectures on Light delivered in America. Crown 8vo. It. M.
Lessons in Electricity. Crown 8vo. 2*. 6d.
Von Cotta on Bocks, by Lawrence. Post 8vo. 14*.
Woodward's Geology of England and Wales. Crown 8vo. 14*.
Wood's Bible Animals. With 112 Vignettes. 8vo. 14*.
Homes Without Hands. 8vo. 14*. Insecte Abroad. 8vo. 14*.
Insects at Home. With 700 Illustrations. 8vo. 14*.
Out of Doors. Crown 8vo. 5*.
Strange Dwellings. Crown 8vo. 5*. Sunbeam Edition, 4to. 6d.
CHEMISTRY & PHYSIOLOGY.
Bnckton's Health in the House, Lectures on Elementary Physiology. Cr. 8vo. 3*.
Jago's Practical Inorganic Chemistry. Fcp. 8vo. 2*.
Miller's Elements of Chemistry, Theoretical and Practical. 8 volfl. 8vo. Part I.
Chemical Physics, 16*. Part II. Inorganic Chemistry, 24*. Part m. Organic
Chemistry, price 31*. Gd.
Keynolds'B Experimental Chemistry. Fcp. 8vo. Parti. 1*. 6d. Part II. 2*. 6<*.
Thndichum's Annals of Chemical Medicine. Vols. I. & II. 8vo. 14*. each.
Tilden's Practical Chemistry. Fcp. 8vo. 1*. 6d.
Watte's Dictionary of Chemistry. 9 vols. medium 8vo. 15. 2*. 6d.
THE FINE ARTS & ILLUSTRATED EDITIONS.
Dresser's Arts and Art Industries of Japan. [In preparation,
Jameson's Sacred and Legendary Art. 6 vote, square crown 8vo.
Legends of the Madonna. 1 vol. 21*.
_ _ _ Monastic Orders. 1 voL 21*.
Saints and Martyrs. 2 vols. 31*. 6d.
_ _ Saviour. Completed by Lady Eastlake. 2 vols. 42*.
Longman's Three Cathedrals Dedicated to St. Paul. Square crown 8vo. 21*.
Macaulay's Lays of Ancient Rome, illustrated by Scharf. Fcp. 4to. 21*.
illustrated by Weguelin. Crown 8vo. 6*.
Macfarren's Lectures on Harmony. 8vo. 12*.
Moore's Irish Melodies. With 161 Plates by D. Maclise, B.A. Super-royal 8vo. 21*.
Lalla Rookh, illustrated by Tenniel. Square crown 8vo. 10*. 6<J.
New Testament (The) illustrated with Woodcuts. New Edition, in course of
publication in 1 8 Monthly Parts, 1*. each. Quarto.
Perry on Greek and Roman Sculpture. With 280 Illustrations engraved on
Wood. Square crown 8vo. 31*. 6A
London, LONGMANS & CO.
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THE USEFUL ARTS, MANUFACTURES, &c.
Barry & Bramwell's Eailways and Locomotives. 8vo. 21*.
Bourne's Catechism of the Steam Engine. Fcp. 8vo. 6*.
Examples of Steam, Air, and Gas Engines. 4to. 70s.
Handbook of the Steam Engine. Pep. Svo. 9*.
Recent Improvements in the Steam Engine. Pep. 8vo. 6*.
Treatise on the Steam Engine. 4to. 43.
Brassey's British Navy, in 6 vols. 8vo. with many Illustrations. Vol. I. Ship-
building for the Purposes of War, 10i. 6rf. Vol. II. Miscellaneous Papers on
the same subject, 3*. 6d.
Oresy's Encyclopedia of Civil Engineering. 8vo. 25*.
Galley's Handbook of Practical Telegraphy. 8vo. 16*.
Eastlake's Household Taste in Furniture, &c. Square crown Svo. 11*.
Pairbairn's Useful Information for Engineers. 3 vols. crown Svo. 31. 6<i
Applications of Cast and Wrought Iron. Svo. 16*.
Mills and Millwork. 1 vol. Svo. 25*.
Gwilt's Encyclopaedia of Architecture. Svo. 52*. 6d.
Kerl's Metallurgy, adapted by Crookes and Rb'hrig. 3 vols. Svo. 4. 19*.
London's Encyclopaedia of Agriculture. Svo. 21*.
Gardening. Svo. 21*.
Mitchell's Manual of Practical Assaying. Svo. 31*. 8d.
Northcott's Lathes and Turning. Svo. 18*.
Payen's Industrial Chemistry Edited by B. H. Paul, Ph.D. Svo. 42*.
Plesae's Art of Perfumery. Fourth Edition. Square crown Svo. 21*.
Bennett's Treatise on the Marine Steam Engine. Svo. 21*.
Stoney's Theory of Strains in Girders. Royal Svo. 36*.
Tire's Dictionary of Arte, Manufactures, & Mines. 4 vols. medium Svo. J67. 7*. -
Ville on Artificial Manures. By Crookes. Svo. 21*.
RELIGIOUS & MORAL WORKS.
Abbey & Overton's English Church in the Eighteenth Century. 2 vols. Svo. 36*.
Arnold's (Rev. Dr. Thomas) Sermons. 6 vols. crown Svo. 6*. each.
Bishop Jeremy Taylor's Entire Works. With Life by Bishop Heber. Edited by
the Rev. C. P. Eden. 10 vols. Svo. 5. 6*.
Boultbee's Commentary on the 39 Articles. Crown Svo. 6*.
History of the Church of England, Pre-Reformation Period. Svo. 15*.
Bray's Elements of Morality. Fcp. Svo. 2*. 6<f.
Browne's (Bishop) Exposition of the 39 Articles. Svo. 16*.
Calvert's Wife's Manual. Crown 8vo. 6*.
Christ our Ideal. 8vo. 8*. 6rf.
Oolenso's Lectures on the Pentateuch and the Moabite Stone. Svo. 12*.
Colenso on the Pentateuch and Book of Joshua. Crown Svo. 6*.
Gender's Handbook of the Bible. Post Svo. 7*. 6d.
Conybeare & Howson'sLife and Letters of St. Paul :
Library Edition, with all the Original Illustrations, Maps, Landscapes on
Steel, Woodcuts, &c. 2 vols. 4to. 42*.
Intermediate Edition, with a Selection of Maps, Plates, and Woodcute.
2 vols. square crown Svo. 21*.
Student's Edition, revised and condensed, with 46 Illustrations and Maps.
1 vol. crown Svo. 7*. 6rf.
CreJghton's History of the Papacy during the Reformation. 2 vols. Svo.
London, LONGMANS & CO.
General Lists of New Works.
9
Davidson's'Introduction to the Study of the New Testament. 2 vols. 8vo. 30*.
Elllcott's (Biahop) Commentary on St. Paul's Epistles. 8vo. Galatians, 8*. 6d.
Ephesians, 8*. 6d. Pastoral Epistles, 10*. 6d. Philippians, Coloasians, and
Philemon, 10*. 6d. Thessalonians, 7*. 6d.
Ellicott's Lectures on the Life of onr Lord. 8vo. 12*.
Ewald's History of Israel, translated by Carpenter. 6 vols. 8vp. 63*.
Antiquities of Israel, translated by Solly. 8vo. 12*. 6d.
Gospel (The) for the Nineteenth Century. 4th Edition. 8vo. 10*. 6<*.
Hopkins's Christ the Consoler. Fcp. 8vo. 2*. 6d.
Jukes's New Man and the Eternal Life. Crown 8vo. 6*.
Second Death and the Bestitution of all Things. Crown 8vo. 3*. 6d.
Types of Genesis. Crown 8vo. 7*. 6d.
Kalisch's Bible Studies. PAKT I. the Prophecies of Balaam. 8vo. 10*. 6d.
PART H. the Book of Jonah. 8vo. 10*. 6d.
Historical and Critical Commentary on the Old Testament; with a
New Translation. Vol. I. Qenetis, 8vo. 18*. or adapted for the General
Reader, 12*. Vol. II. Exodus, 15*. or adapted for the General Reader, 12*.
Vol. m. Leviticus, Part I. 16*. or adapted for the General Reader, 8*.
Vol. IV. Leviticus, Part II. 15*. or adapted for the General Reader, 8*.
Keary's Outlines of Primitive Belief. 8vo. 18*.
Lyra Germanica : Hymns translated by Miss Winkworth. Pop. 8vo. 5*.
Martineau's Endeavours after the Christian Life. Crown 8vo. 7*. 6d.
Hymns of Praise and Prayer. Crown 8vo. 4*. 6d. 82mo. 1*. 6d.
Sermons, Hours of Thought on Sacred Things. 2 vols. 7*. 6d. each.
Mill's Three Essays on Religion. 8vo. 10*. 6d.
Monsell's Spiritual Songs for Sundays and Holidays. Fcp. 8 vo. 5*. 18mo. 2*.
Mailer's (Max) Lectures on the Science of Religion. Crown 8vo. 10*. 6d.
Newman's Apologia pro Vita Sua. Crown 8vo. 6*.
Passing Thoughts on Religion. By Miss Sewell. Fcp. 8vo. 3*. 6d.
Sewell's (Miss) Preparation for the Holy Communion. 32mo. 8*.
Private Devotions for Young Persons. 18mo. 2*.
Smith's Voyage and Shipwreck of St. Paul. Crown 8vo. 7*. 6d.
Supernatural Religion. Complete Edition. 3 vols. 8vo. 86*.
Thoughts for the Age. By Miss Sewell. Fcp. 8vo. 3*. 6d.
Whately's Lessons on the Christian Evidences. 18mo. 6d.
White's Four Gospels in Greek, with Greek-English Lexicon. 32mo. 5*.
TRAVELS, VOYAGES, &c.
Baker's Rifle and Hound in Ceylon. Crown 8vo. 7*. 6d.
Eight Years in Ceylon. Crown 8vo. 7*. 6d.
Ball's Alpine Guide. 8 vols. poet 8vo. with Maps and lUustrationi : I. Western
Alps, 6*. 6d. II. Central Alps, 7*. 6d. III. Eastern Alps, 10*. M.
Ball on Alpine Travelling, and on the Geology of the Alps, 1*.
Brassey's Sunshine and Storm in the East. Crown 8vo. 7*. 6d.
Voyage in the Yacht 'Sunbeam.' Crown 8vo.7*.6d. School Edition,
fcp. 8vo. 2*. Popular Edition, 4to. 6d.
Hassall's San Remo and the Western Riviera. Crown 8vo. 10*. 6d.
Macnamarn's Medical Geography of India. 8vo. 21*.
Miller's Wintering in the Riviera. Post 8vo. Illustrations, 7*. 6d.
London, LONGMANS & CO.
10
General Lists of Hew Works.
Samuelson's Roumania. 8vo. 16s,
The Alpine Club Map of Switzerland. In Four Sheets. 42*.
Three in Norway. By Two of Them. Crown 8vo. Illustrations, 10*. 6d.
Weld's Sacred Palmlands. Crown 8vo. 10*. 6<*.
WORKS OF FICTION.
Buried Alive, Ten Years of Penal Servitude in Siberia. Crown 8vo. 61.
Cabinet Edition of Novels and Tales by the Bight Hon. the Earl of Beaconafield ,
K.G. 11 vols. crown 8vo. price 6*. ach.
Cabinet Edition of Stories and Tales by Miss Sewell. Crown 8vo. cloth extra,
gilt edges, price 3*. 6d. each :
Katharine Ashton.
Laneton Parsonage.
Margaret Percival.
Ursula.
Amy Herbert. Cleve Hall.
The Earl's Daughter.
Experience of Life.
Gertrude. Ivors.
Novels and Tales by the Earl of Beaconsfleld, K.G. Hughenden Edition, with 2
Portraits on Steel and 11 Vignettes on Wood. 11 vols. crown 8vo. 2. 2*.
Lothair. Coningsby. I Contarini Fleming.
Sybil. Tancred. Alroy, Ixion, &c.
Venetia. Henrietta Temple. The Young Duke, &c.
Vivian Grey. Endymion.
The Modern Novelist's Library. Each Work in crown 8vo. A Single Volume,
complete in itself, price 2*. boards, or 2*. 6d. cloth :
By the Earl of Beaconsfield, K.G.
Lothair. Coningsby.
Sybil. Tancred.
Venetia. Henrietta Temple.
Contarini Fleming.
The Young 1
Vivian Grey. Endymion.
By Anthony Trollope.
Barchester Towers.
The Warden.
By the Author of ' the Kose Garden."
Unawares.
By Major Whyte-Melville.
Digby Grand.
General Bounce.
Kate Coventry.
The Gladiators.
Good for Nothing.
Holmby House.
The Interpreter.
The Queen's Maries.
By the Author of ' the Atelier du Lys.'
Mademoiselle Mori.
The Atelier du Lys.
By Various Writers.
Atherstone Priory.
The Burgomaster's Family.
Elsa and her Vulture.
The Six Sisters of the Valleys.
Novels and Tales of the Earl of Beaconsfleld, K.G. Modern Novelist's Library
Edition, complete in 11 vols. crown 8vo. price 1. 13s. cloth extra.
Oliphant's (Mrs.) In Trust. Crown 8vo. 6s.
Whispers from Fairy Land. By Lord Brabourne. With 9 Illustrations. Crown
8vo. 3*. 6d.
Higgledy-Piggledy. By Lord Brabourne. With 9 Illustrations. Crown 8vo.
3*. 6d.
POETRY & THE DRAMA.
Bailey's Festns, a Poem. Crown 8vo. 12*. 6d.
Bowdler"s Family Shakspeare. Medium Bvo. 14*. 6 vols. fcp. 8vo. 21.
Cayley's Iliad of Homer, Homometrically translated. 8vo. 12*. 6d.
Conington's 2Eneid of Virgil, translated into English Verse. Crown 8vo. Si.
London, LONGMANS & CO.
General Lists of New Works. 11
Conington's Prose Translation of Virgil's Poems. Crown 8vo. 9*.
Goethe's Faust, translated by Birds. Large crown 8vo. 12s. 6</.
translated by Webb. 8vo. 12*. 6d.
edited by Selss. Crown 8vo. 5*.
Ingelow's Poems. New Edition. 2 vols. fcp. 8vo. 12*.
Macaulay's Lays of Ancient Rome, with Ivry and the Armada. 16mo. 3*. Gd.
The same, Cheap Edition, fcp. 8vo. 1*. sewed, 1*. 6d. cloth, 2*. 6d. cloth extra.
Moore's Poetical Works , 1 vol. ruby type. Poet 8vo. 6*.
Southey's Poetical Works. Medium 8vo. 14*.
RURAL SPORTS, HORSE & CATTLE MANAGEMENT &c.
Dead Shot (The), by Marksman. Crown 8vo. 10s. 6d.
Fitzwygram's Horses and Stables. 8vo. 10*. 6d.
Francis's Treatise on Fishing in all its Branches. Post 8vo. 15*.
Horses and Roads . By Free- Lance. Crown 8vo. 6s.
Howitt's Visits to Remarkable Places. Crown 8vo. 7*. 6d.
Miles's Horse's Foot, and How to Keep it Sound. Imperial 8vo. 12*. Gd.
Plain Treatise on Horse-Shoeing. Post 8vo. 2*. 6d.
Stables and Stable-Fittings. Imperial 8vo. 15*.
Remarks on Horses' Teeth. Post 8vo. 1*. 6d.
MUner's Country Pleasures. Crown 8vo. 6*.
Nerile's Horses and Riding. Crown 8vo. 6*.
Ronalds's Fly-Fisher's Entomology. 8vo. 14*.
Steel's Diseases of the Ox, being a Manual of Bovine Pathology. 8vo. 15*.
Stonehenge's Dog in Health and Disease. Square crown 8vo. 7*. Gd.
Greyhotmd. Square crown 8vo. 15*.
Yonatt's Work on the Dog. 8vo. 6*.
Horse. 8vo. 7*. Gd.
Wiloocks's Sea-Fisherman. Post 8vo. 12*. Gd.
WORKS OF UTILITY & GENERAL INFORMATION.
Acton's Modern Cookery for Private Families. Fcp. 8vo. 4*. Gd.
Black's Practical Treatise on Brewing. 8vo. 10*. Gd.
Buckton's Food and Home Cookery. Crown 8vo. 2*.
Boll on the Maternal Management of Children. Fcp. 8vo. 1*. 6rf.
Ball's Hints to Mothers on the Management of their Health during the Period of
Pregnancy and in the Lying-in Room. Fcp. 8vo. 1*. 6d.
Campbell- Walker's Correct Card, or How to Play at Whist. Fcp. Svo.'S*. 6d.
Johnson's (W. & J. H.) Patentee's Manual. Fourth Edition. 8vo. 10*. Gd.
Johnston's Land Law Ireland Act. Crown 8vo. 1*.
Longman's Chess Openings. Fcp. 8vo. 2*. Gd.
Macleod's Economics for Beginners. Small crown 8vo. 2*. Gd.
Elements of Economics. 2 vols. small crown 8vo. VOL. I. 7*. 64.
Theory and Practice of Banking. 2 vols. 8vo. 26*.
Elements of Banking. Fourth Edition. Crown 8vo. 6*.
London, LONGMANS & CO.
12 General Lists of New Works.
M'Culloch's Dictionary of Commerce and Commercial Navigation. 8vo. 63*.
Maunder's Biographical Treasury. Fcp. 8vo. 6t.
Historical Treasury. Fcp..8vo. 61.
Scientific and Literary Treasury. Fcp. 8vo. 6*.
Treasury of Bible Knowledge, edited by Ayre. Fcp. Svo. 6*.
Treasury of Botany, edited by Lindley & Moore. Two Parts, 12.
Treasury of Geography. Fcp. 8vo. 6*.
Treasury of Knowledge and Library of Reference^ Fcp. 8vo. 6*.
Treasury of Natural History. Fcp. 8vo. 6t.
Pewtner's Comprehensive Specifier ; Building-Artificers' Work. Crown 8vo. 6*.
Pole's Theory of the Modern Scientific Game of Whist. Fcp. 8vo. 2. 6d.
Reeve's Cookery and Housekeeping. Crown 8vo. 7s. 6d.
Scott's Farm Valuer. Crown 8vo. 5*.
Rents and Purchases. Crown Svo. 6s.
Smith's Handbook for Midwives. Crown Svo. St.
The Cabinet Lawyer, a Popular Digest of the Laws of England. Fcp. Svo. 9*.
Willich's Popular Tables, by Marriott. Crown Svo. 10*.
Wilson on Banking Reform. Svo. Is. 6d.
MUSICAL WORKS BY JOHN HULLAH, LL.D.
Hullah's Method of Teaching Singing. Crown Svo. 2j. 6d.
Exercises and Figures in the same. Crown Svo. 1*. sewed, or It. 2d. limp cloth ;
or 2 Parts, 6d. each sewed, or 3d. each limp cloth.
Large Sheets, containing the ' Exercises and Figures in Hullah's Method,' in
Two Parcels of Eight, price 6s. each.
Chromatic Scale, with the Inflected Syllables, on Large Sheet. 1*. 6<2.
Card of Chromatic Scale. Id.
Grammar of Musical Harmony. Royal Svo. price 3i. sewed and 4 <. 6d. cloth ; or
in 2 Parts, eaon It. 6d.
Exercises to Grammar of Musical Harmony. It.
Grammar of Counterpoint. Part I. super-royal Svo. 2s. 6d.
Wilhem's Manual of Singing. Parts I. & H. 2*. 6d. or together, 5t.
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