c AUTHORISED ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF DE. ZELLEE'S WOEK ON THB PHILOSOPHY OF THE GREEKS. The PRAE-SOORATIO SCHOOLS, Being a History of Greek Philosophy from the Earliest Period to the Time of SOCRATES. Translated with the Author's sanction. Crown 8vo. \In preparation. SOCRATES and the SOCRATIC SCHOOLS. Translated by the Kev. OSWALD J. REICHEL, M.A. New Edition, revised. Crown 8vo. price 10s. 6d. iji ARISTOTLE and the ELDER PERI- PATETICS. Translated with the Author's sanction. Crown 8vo. [In preparation. TV The STOICS, EPICUREANS, and SCEPTICS. Translated by the Rev. OSWALD J. REICHEL, M.A. Crown 8vo price Us. v PLATO and the OLDER ACADEMY. Translated by SARAH FRANCES ALLETNE and ALFRED GOODWIN, M.A. Fellow and Lecturer of Balliol College, Oxford. Crown 8vo. price 18s. London, LONGMANS & CO. Lately published, in crown 8vo. price 185. PLATO AND THE OLDER ACADEMY. Translated with the Author's sanction from the German of D. EDUARD ZELLER, By SARAH FRANCES ALLEYNE and ALFRED GOODWIN, M.A. Fellow and Lecturer of Balliol College, Oxford. THE ACADEMY. 'The compliment of translation is well deserved by the patient erudition and masterly arrangement of the original, which is an indis- pensable aid to the readers of PLATO and ARISTOTLE. Of this translation it can be said that in all essential respects it may be relied on as an equivalent of ZELLER'S book.' EDUCATIONAL TIMES. ' The work must become indispensable to the student of Plato. It consists of sixteen chapters, in which PLATO'S life, the order of his writ- ings, the character of his Philosophy, his Physics, his Ethics, and his Religion are treated with great detail and minuteness. It is, of course impossible in these pages to do more with so vast a work not vast, however, in bulk, being a book of 600 pages than to call attention to it, and, if possible, to give some idea of its style.' SATURDAY REVIEW. 'In all its departments Dr. ZELLER'S book is both comprehensive and trustworthy. He seems to have said the last word on Greek philo- sophy ; and his volumes are among those monuments of nineteenth- century German research which make one wonder what will remain for the scholars of the twentieth century to do. He brings to his task the two essential qualities vast learning, and the power of moving at pleasure in the rarefied atmosphere of abstractions It is evident that Mr. GOODWIN, to whom this part of the undertaking fell, had no sinecure in his work of translation and verification. He has gone bravely through with it, however, and both his work and that of Miss ALLEYNE, who translated the text, leave almost nothing to be desired.' GUARDIAN. ' This is a translation of Dr. EDUARD ZELLER'S Plato und die altere Akademie, a work of great value to students of PLATO, but hitherto only in part accessible to English readers. The text has been admirably translated by Miss ALLEYNE, who has proved herself fully competent to deal with the philosophical terminology of the German original, and to execute a translation which does not, like some translations, proclaim itself as such by an un-English structure of ita phrases and sentences. Copious notes and references have been added by Mr. GOODWIX, Fellow of Balliol College, who shares with Miss ALLEYNE the responsibility of the work. The value of Dr. ZELLER'S work has been amply acknowledged by Professor JOWETT in the Preface to the second edition of his PLATO : and this translation of it will be a great boon to many students of PLATO who (as its Authors suggest in their Preface) are less familiar with German than with Greek. London, LONGMANS & CO. SOCRATES LOXDOK : PHI NT CD BY 8POTTISWOODE AND CO., NEW-STREET AND PARLIAMENT STUEKT SOCEATES AND THE SOCRATIC SCHOOLS NEWLY TRANSLATED FROM THE THIRD GERMAN EDITION Of D R E. ZELLER BY OSWALD J. REICHEL, B.C.L. & M.A. VICAR OP SPKRSHOLT, BERKS SECOND AND ENTIRELY NEW EDITION LONDON LONGMANS, GREEN, AND CO. 1877 All rights rr.-. .61 CONTENTS. ix CHAPTEK IV. THE CHARACTER OF SOCRATES. PAOIE A. Greatness of the character of Socrates .... 70 B. Greek peculiarities in his character ..... 74 C. Prominent features in his character . . . .77 D. The StuiiAvwv ......... 82 1. False views of the taift&viov . . . . .82 2. Regarded by Socrates as an oracle . . . . 84 3. Limited in its application ..... 90 4. Correct view of the Sai^vtov . . . . 94 CHAPTEK V. SOURCES AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF SOCRATES. A. Xenophon and Plato considered as authorities . . 98 B. General point of view of Socrates ...... 104 C. Theory of knowledge of conceptions considered . . 109 D. Moral value of this theory ...... 113 E. Its subjective character ....... 116 CHAPTER VI. THE PHILOSOPHICAL METHOD OF SOCRATES. A. Knowledge of ignorance the first step . . . . 121 B. Search for knowledge the next Eros and Irony . . . . . ... . . 124 C. Formation of conceptions the third step . . . 128 CONTENTS, CHAPTER VII. SUBSTANCE OF THE TEACHING OF SOCRATES ETHICS. PAGB A. The subject-matter restricted to Ethics . . . . 134 B. Virtue is knowledge the leading thought of the Socratic Ethics 140 0. The Good and Eudoemonism 1. Theoretically Virtue is knowledge about the Good 147 2. Practically the Good determined by custom or utility 148 3. Inconsistency of Socratic Morality . . .151 D. Particular Moral Relations 160 1. Personal independence 161 2. Friendship 163 3. The State 165 4. Universal philanthropy 170 CHAPTER VIII. SUBSTANCE OF THE TEACHING OF SOCEATES, CONTINUED. NATURE GOD MAN. A. View of Nature 172 B. Notion of God and the Worship of God . . . . 175 1. Language about the Gods taken from popular use . 175 2. God conceived as the Reason of the world . . 176 3. The Worship of God . . ,, . 177 C. Dignity and Immortality of man 178 CHAPTER IX. XENOPHON AND PLATO. SOCRATES AND THE SOPHISTS. A. Value of Xenophon as an authority 1. Xenophon in harmony with Plato and Aristotle . 181 2. Schleiermacher's objections refuted . . . 183 B. Importance of Socrates for the age in which he lived . 185 C. Relation of Socrates to the Sophists 187 CONTENTS. xi CHAPTER X. THE TBAGIC END OF SOCRATES. PAGE A. Circumstances connected with his trial and death 1. The Accusation 193 2. The Defence 196 3. The Sentence 198 4. His Death 200 B. Causes which led to his sentence 202 1. The Sophists innocent 202 2. Personal animosity only partially the cause . . 205 3. Political party-feeling only partially involved . 210 4. The teaching of Socrates generally believed to be dangerous 213 C. Justification of the sentence 220 1. Unfounded charges brought against Socrates . . 220 2. The views of Socrates subversive of old views of authority political life religion . . . 226 3. Relation borne by his views to cotemporary views 231 4. Result of his death . . 235 PART III. THE IMPERFECT FOLLOWERS OF SOCRATES. CHAPTER XI. THE SCHOOL OF SOCRATES POPULAR PHILOSOPHY. XENOPHON J2SCHINES. A. School of Socrates 236 B. Xenophon . . . . . ..... 239 C. ^schines . . . . . t . ' . . . 245 1). simmias and Cebes . . 246 xii CONTENTS. CHAPTER XII. THE MEGARIAN AND THE ELEAN-ERETRIAN SCHOOLS. PAGE The Megarians A. History of the School . . . '. ... 249 B. Their Doctrine 255 1. Being and Becoming . . . ... 259 2. The Good 262 C. Eristic 264 1. Euclid ... 265 2. Eubulides 268 3. Alexinus . 268 4. Diodorus on Motion Destruction the Possible 269 5. Philo. The Possible Hypothetical sentences Meaning of words . . . . . . 273 6. Stilpo. Subject and Predicate the Good Cynic Morality 275 The Elean-Eretrian School. A. History of the School 279 B. Doctrine of the School .... .281 CHAPTER XIII. THE CYNICS. A. History of the Cynics . . . . . . .284 B. Teaching of the Cynics . . . . . . . 291 1. Depreciation of theoretical knowledge . . 291 2. Logic . . . .... . . . 295 C. Cynic theory of Morality 301 1. Negative conditions Good and Evil . . . 301 2. Positive side Virtue . . '.-.''. " . . 310 3. Wisdom and Folly . . . . .313 CONTENTS. xiii PAOK D. Practical results of Cynic teaching 314 1. Renunciation of Self 315 2. Renunciation of Society. Family Life Civil Life Modesty 319 3. Renunciation of Religion 327 K. Cynic influence on Society 331 CHAPTEK XIV. THE CYRENAICS. A. History of the Cyrenaics 337 B. Teaching of the Cyrenaics 344 1. General position 346 2. Feelings the only object of knowledge . . . 347 3. Pleasure and pain 352 4. The Highest Good 354 5. Modified form of the extreme view . . . 356 C. Practical Life of the Cyrenaics 361 D. Relation of their teaching to Socrates .... 369 1. Relation of their philosophy 369 2. Points of resemblance 375 E. The later Cyrenaics 376 1. Theodorus 376 2. Hegesias 380 3. Anniceris 383 CHAPTER XV. RETROSPECT. A. Inconsistencies of the imperfect Socratic Schools . . 386 B. These Schools more closely related to Socrates than to the Sophists 387 C. Importance of these Schools 389 IXDKX . . 393 PAET I. THE GENERAL STATE OF CULTURE IN GREECE. CHAPTER I. THE INTELLECTUAL DEVELOPMENT OF GREECE IN THE FIFTH CENTDRY. THE intellectual life of Greece had reached a point CHAP. towards the close of the fifth century, in which the _ choice lay before it of either giving up philosophy altogether, or attempting a thorough transformation upon a new basis. The older schools were not indeed wholly extinct ; but all dependence in their systems had been shaken, and a general disposition to doubt had set in. From the Sophists men had learnt to call everything in question to attack or defend with equal readiness every opinion. Belief in the truth of human ideas, or in the validity of moral laws, had been lost. Not only enquiries respecting nature, which had engaged the attention of thinkers for upwards of a century and a half, had become distasteful, but even philosophy itself had given place to a mere superficial facility of thought and expression and the acquisition of attainments useful STATE OF CULTURE IN GREECE. CHAP. I. Problem proposedto philosophy in tJie fifth century. A. The problem solved by political events. (1) Po- litical iinsettled- nens. only for the purposes of social life. Yet this state of things naturally suggested the need of a new method, which would avoid the defects and one- sidedness of previous systems by a more cautious treatment of scientific questions. The way thereto had not only been indirectly prepared by the clear- ing away of previous speculation, but the very instrument of research had been sharpened by the quibbles and subtleties of sophistry ; ample material, too, for the erection of a new structure lay to hand in the labours of preceding philosophers. Moreover, by the practical turn which the Sophistic enquiries had taken, a new field of research was opened up, the more careful cultivation of which gave promise of a rich harvest for speculative philosophy. Would a creative genius be forthcoming, able to make use of these materials, and to direct thought into a new channel? Before this question Greek philosophy stood at the time when Socrates appeared. The answer was determined in great part by the course which political circumstances, moral life, and general culture had taken. Between these and philo- sophy the connection is at all times close ; yet lately, in the case of the Sophistic teaching, it had been more than ever apparent. The most sweeping changes had taken place in the fifth century in Greece. Never has a nation had a more rapid or more brilliant career of military glory in union with high culture than had the Greeks. Yet never has that career been sooner over. First came the great deeds of the Persian war, then the rich bloom of art ILLUSTRATED BY POLITICS. 3 of the age of Pericles ; following immediately that CHAP. internal conflict which wasted the strength and prosperity of the free states of Greece in unhallowed domestic quarrels, which sacrificed anew the indepen- dence so hardly won from the foreigner, undermined her freedom, threw her moral notions into confusion, and irretrievably ruined the character of her people. A progress which elsewhere required centuries was in her case compressed within a few generations. When the pulse of national life beats so fast, the general spirit must be exposed to a quick and susceptible change ; and when so much that is great happens in so short a time, an abundance of ideas is sure to crop up, awaiting only a regulating hand to range them- selves into scientific systems. Of greatest importance for the future of philo- ( 2 ) Athens sophy was the position won by Athens since the close union and of the Persian war. In that great conflict the con- sciousness of a common brotherhood had dawned upon the Hellenes with a force unknown before. All that fancy had painted in the legend of the Trojan war seemed to be realised in actual history : Hellas standing as a united nation opposed to the East. The headship of this many-membered body had fallen in the main to Athens, and herewith that city had become the centre of all intellectual move- ments, 'the Prytaneum of the wisdom of Greece.' ' This circumstance had a most beneficial effect on the further development of philosophy. No doubt a 1 So called by Hippias in Plato, Prot. 337, D. p 2 4 STATE OF CULTURE IN GREECE. CHAP, tendency may be noticed in the several schools to come *' forth from their isolation ; it maybe seen in the natural philosophers of the fifth century that an active inter- change of thought was being carried on between the East and theWest of Greece ; and nowthat the Sophists had begun to travel from one end to the other of the Hellenic world, to carry to Thessaly the eloquence of Sicily, to Sicily the doctrines of Heraclitus, these various sources of culture could not fail gradually to flow together into one mighty stream. Still it was of great importance that a solid bed should be hollowed out for this stream and its course directed towards a fixed end. This result was brought about by the rise of the Attic philosophy. After that, in Athens, as the common centre of the Grecian world, the various lines of pre-Socratic enquiry had met and crossed, Socrates was able to found a more comprehensive philosophy; and ever afterwards Greek philosophy continued to be so firmly tied to Athens, that down to the time of the New Academy that city was the birthplace of all schools historically important. It- was even their last place of refuge before the final extinction of ancient philosophy. B The To make clear, by means of the literary remains problem we possess, the change which took place in the Greek 'literature, mode of thought during the fifth century, and to estimate the worth and extent of the contributions (l) The yielded to philosophy by the general culture of the ^ian* time, the great Athenian tragedians may be first appealed to. For tragedy is better suited than any other kind of poetry to arouse ethical reflection, to ILLUSTRATED BY TRAGEDIANS. pourtray the moral consciousness of a people, and to CHAP. express the highest sentiments of which an age, or _ at least individual prominent spirits in an age, are capable. Every deeper tragic plot rests on the con- flicting calls of duty and interest. To make clear the origin of the plot, to unfold the action psycho- logically, to produce the general impression intended, the poet must bring these two points of view before us, allowing each to advocate its cause in lively speech and counter-speech : he must go into the analysis of moral consciousness, weigh what is right and what is faulty in human action, and expose it to view. As a poet he will do this, always having regard to the particular case before him. Still, even this he cannot do without comparing one case with another, without going back to general experience, to the generally received notions respecting right and wrong in short, to general moral conceptions. Hence tragic poetry must always give a lasting impetus to scien- tific speculation on moral conduct and its laws, affording, too, for such reflection ample material itself, and that to a certain extent already prepared, and inviting partly use, partly correction. 1 Moreover, inasmuch as moral convictions were in the case of the Greeks, as in the case of other nations, originally bound up with religious convictions, and inasmuch as this connection particularly affects tragedy owing to the legendary subjects with which it deals, it 1 On this point compare the vol. viii. 137, ed. 1870; vol. excellent remarks of frrote, vii. 7, ed. 1872. Hist, of Greece, P. II. c. 67, STATE OF CULTURE IN GREECE. CHAP, follows that all that has been said respecting the connection between tragedy and principles of morality applies also to the connection between tragedy and principles of theology : nay more, in exactly the same way tragedy must busy itself with the nature and state of men whose deeds and fate it depicts. In all these respects a most decided and thorough change in Greek thought may be observed in the three generations, whose character finds such fit- ting expression in the three successive tragedians, ^Eschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides. Without going so far as to attribute to the poets themselves every word which they put into the mouths of their heroes, still the general tone of their sentiments may be gathered partly from their general treatment of the materials, partly from their individual utterances, with no lack of certainty. O) j&s~ In ^Eschylus there is an earnestness of purpose, a depth of religious feeling, an overwhelming force and majesty, worthy of a man of ancient virtue, who had himself taken part in the great battles with the Persians. At the same time there is a something bitter and violent about him, which a time of heroic deeds and sacrifices, of mighty capabilities and in- spiriting results, could neither soften down nor yet dispense with. The spirit of his tragedies is that of an untamed, masculine mind, seldom moved by softer feelings, but spell-bound by reverence for the gods, by the recognition of an unbending moral order, by resignation to a destiny from which there is no escape. Never were the Titan-like defiance of ILLUSTRATED BY TRAGEDIANS. unbridled strength, the wild fury of passion and CHAP. frenzy, the crushing might of fate, the paroxysms of L divine vengeance, more thrillingly painted than by /Eschylus. At the bottom of all his sentiments lies reverence for the divine powers ; yet these are grouped almost monotheistically together, in his vast vision, as one almighty power. What Zeus says happens ; his will always comes to pass, even though it escape the notice of men ; l no mortal can do aught against his will ; 2 none can escape the decision of heaven, or rather of destiny, 3 over which Zeus himself is power- less. 4 In face of this divine power man feels himself weak and frail; his thoughts are fleeting as the shadow of smoke ; his life is like a picture which a sponge washes out. 5 That man mistake not his position, that he learn not to overrate what is human, 6 that he be not indignant with the Gods when in affliction, 7 that his mind soar not too high, that the grain of guilt planted by pride grows to a harvest of tears, 8 such is the teaching which, with glowing words, flashes on us in every page of the poet. Not even ^Eschylus, however, was able to grasp these ideas in their purity, or to rise above the con- tradiction which runs not only through Greek tragedy, but through the whole of the Greek view of life. On 1 Suppl. 598; Agamemnon, 1327. 1485. Niobe, Fr. 155, (154). - Prometh. 550. T Fragm. 369 Dindorf. Sto- 3 Pers. 93 ; Fragm. 299 Din- Iceust. Serai, 108, 43, attributes dorf (352 Nauck.). the words to Euripides. 4 Prometh. 511. * Pers. 820. * Fragm. 295 (390) ; Agam. STATE OF CULTURE IN GREECE. CHAP, the one hand, even he gives utterance to the ancient ' belief in the envy of heaven, which is so closely con- nected with the peculiarity of natural religion ; sick- ness lurks under the rudest health ; the wave of fortune, when it bears man highest on its crest, breaks on a hidden reef; would the man on whom fortune smiles escape ruin, he must voluntarily throw away a part of what he has ; l even fate itself ordains guilt, when bent on utterly destroying a family. 2 On the other hand, yEschylus never tires of insisting on the connection between guilt and punishment. Not only in the old stories of Niobe and Ixion, of the house of Laius and of that of Atreus, does he paint with telling touches the unavoidable nature of divine vengeance, the mischief which follows in the wake of pride, the never-dying curse of crime ; but also in the unexpected result of the Persian expedition he sees a higher hand, visiting with punishment the self-exaltation of the great king, and the insults offered to the gods of Greece. Man must suffer 3 according to his deeds ; God blesses him who lives in piety without guile and pride, but vengeance, 4 though it may be slow at first, suddenly overtakes the transgressor of right; some Dike strikes down with a sudden blow, 5 others she slowly crushes ; from generation to generation the curse of crime gathers strength, likewise virtue and happiness 6 descend on 1 Agam. 1001 ; compare the 3 Agam. 1563 ; Choeph. 309 ; story of Polycrates in Herodo- Fr. 282. tus, iii. 40. 4 Eumen. 530 ; Fr. 283. 2 Niobe, Fr. 160 ; blamed by * Choeph. 61. Plato, Rep. 380, A. Agam. 750. ILLUSTRATED BY TRAGEDIANS. children and children's children ; the Furies rule over CHAP. the destiny of men, avenging the fathers' sins on the ' sons, 1 sucking the criminal's life-blood, stealthily clinging to his feet, throwing round him the snares of madness, pursuing him with punishment down to the shades. 2 Thus severely and clearly through all the plays of ^Eschylus runs the thought of divine justice and of implacable destiny. All the more remarkable on that account is the vigour with which the poet breaks through the fetters which this view of the world imposes. In the Eu- menides, these moral conflicts, the play of which ^Eschylus can so well pourtray, 3 are brought to a satis- factory issue, the bright Olympic Groddess appeasing the dark spirits of vengeance, and the severity of the ancient bloodthirsty Justice yielding to human kind- ness. In the Prometheus, natural religion as a whole celebrates its moral transfiguration ; the jealousy of the gods towards mortals is seen to resolve itself into mercy ; Zeus himself requires the aid of the Wise One, who, for his kindness to men, has had to feel the whole weight of his wrath ; yet, on the other hand, the unbending mind of the Titan must be softened, and Zeus' rule of might be changed by willing submission into a moral rule. What the poet places in the legendary past is in reality the history of his own time and of his own mind, ^schylus stands on the boundary line between two periods of culture, and the story he tells of the miti- 1 Bum. 830. Choeph. 896 ; Bum. 198, 2 Bum. 264, 312. 566. K) STATE OF CULTURE IN GREECE. CHAP, gation of ancient justice, and of the new rule of the __! Grods, was repeated in another way, the sternness of the generation of Marathon giving place to the cheerful beauty of the age of Pericles. (&) SopJio- T the spirit of this new age Sophocles has oles. given the most fitting expression. Agreeing as he does in principle with his predecessor, his poems, nevertheless, convey a very different impression. The keynote of the poetry of Sophocles is likewise reve- rence for the Grods, whose hand and laws encompass human life. From them come all things, even mis- fortune ; l their never-decaying power no mortal can withstand ; nothing can escape its destiny ; 2 from their eyes no deed and no thought can be hid ; 3 their eternal laws, 4 created by no mere human power, dare no one transgress. Men, however, are weak and frail, mere shadows or dreams, a very nothing, capable only of a passing semblance of. happiness. 5 No mortal's life is free from misfortune, 6 and even the happiest man cannot be called happy before .his death ; 7 nay, taking all things into account, which the changing day brings with it, the number of woes, the rarity of good fortune, the end to which all must come, it were well to repeat the old saying, ' Not to have been born is the best lot, and the next best is to die as soon as may be.' 8 The. highest practical wisdom is, therefore, to control the wishes, to mode- 1 Ajax, 1036 ; Trach. 1278. Fr. 12, 616, 860. - Antig. 604, 951 ; Fr. 615. 6 Ant. 611 ; Fr. 530. 3 Electra, 657. ' (Ed. R. Trach. 1, 943 ; Fr. < (Ed. Rex, 864 ; Ant. 450. 532, 583. 5 Ajax, 125; (Ed. R. 1186; " (Ed. Col. 1215. ILLUSTRATED BY TRAGEDIANS. 11 rate the desires, to love justice, to fear Grod, to be CHAP. resigned to fate. That man should not exalt him- self above human measure, that only the modest man is acceptable to the (rods, 1 that it is absurd to seek a higher instead of being content with a moderate lot, that arrogance hurries on to sudden destruction, that Zeus hates the vaunts of a boastful tongue, 2 all this Sophocles shows by the example of men who have been hurled from the summit of fortune, or who have been ruined by recklessness and overbearing. He, too, is impressed by the thought of the worth of virtue and of divine retribution. He knows that uprightness is better than riches, that loss is better than unjust gain, that heavy guilt entails heavy punishment, but that piety and virtue are worth more than all things else, and are rewarded not only in this world, but in the next ; 3 he even declares that it is more important to please those in the next world than those in this. 4 He is more- over convinced that all wisdom comes from the Gods, and that they always conduct to what is right, 5 albeit men may never cease from learning and striving after it. 6 He bids them to commit their griefs to Zeus, who from heaven above looks down and orders all things, and to bear what the (rods send with resignation, 7 and in this belief is neither puzzled 1 Ajax, 127, 758 ; (Ed. Col. * Fr. 834, 227, 809, 865 ; in 1211; Fr. 320, 528. the unintelligible fleia - (Ed. R. 873 ; Ant. 127. probably there is a Beta * Fr. 18, 210, 196; Philoc. Fr. 731, 736. 1440. Elec. 174 ; Fr. 523, 862. 4 Ant. 71. 12 STATE OF CULTURE IN GREECE. CHAP, by the good fortune of many bad men, nor yet by __J the misfortunes of many good ones. 1 The same thoughts had inspired the poetry of ^Eschylus, and yet the spirit of the drama of Sopho- cles is a very different one from his. Sophocles can show a higher artistic execution, a fuller dramatic liandling, a more delicate delineation of the inner life, a more careful unravelling of action from cha- racters and of characters by means of actions, a better proportioned beauty, a clearer and more pleasing language ; whereas for tempestuous force, for wild exultation, for majestic view of history, JEschylus is unrivalled. Nor is the moral platform of the two tragedians quite the same. Both are penetrated with reverence for the divine powers ; but in ^Eschylus this reverence is combined with a horror which has first to be set aside, and with an antagonism which has to be overcome before it can come up to the trustful resignation and the blissful peace of the piety of Sophocles. The power of fate seems with ^Eschylus much harsher, because less called for by the character of those whom it reaches ; the reign of Zeus is a reign of terror, mitigated only by degrees, and man must perish if the Deity enter into too close relations with him. 2 Both poets celebrate the victory of moral order over human self-will ; but in ^Eschylus the victory is preceded by severer and more dreadful struggles. Moral order works, with him, as a stern 1 Fr. 104. lo in the Prometheus, espe- 2 Compare the character of cially v. 887, &c. ILLUSTRATED BY TRAGEDIANS. 13 and fearful power, crushing the refractory ; whereas, CHAP. with Sophocles, it completes its work with the quiet certainty of a law of nature, awakening rather pity for human weakness than terror. That conflict of the old bloodthirsty justice with the new, round which the Eumenides of ^schylus play, Sophocles has left behind ; with him justice is, from the very begin- ning, harmoniously united with mercy, and the most accursed of all mortals finds in the ' CEdipus Colo- neus ' reconciliation at last. His heroes, too, are of a different order from those of his predecessor. In ^Eschylus moral opposites are so hard, that human representatives of them do not suffice him ; hence he brings the (rods themselves into the battle-field Zeus and the Titans, the daughters of Night and the denizens of Olympus ; whereas the tragedy of Sopho- cles moves entirely in the world of men. The former deals by preference with violent natures and uncon- trolled passions ; the strong point of the latter is to depict what is noble, self-contained, tender ; strength is by him generally coupled with dignity, pain with resignation. Hence his female characters are so specially successful. yEschylus paints in a Clytsem- nestra, the demoniacal side of woman's nature in all its repulsiveness. Sophocles in an Antigone pour- trays pure womanhood, knowing ' how to love, but not to hate,' l and putting even hatred to shame by the heroism of her love. In short, the poetry of Sopho- cles sets before us the sentiments of an epoch and a 1 Ant. 523. 14 STATE OF CULTURE IN GREECE. CHAP, people which having, by most successful efforts, risen '_ to a happy use of its powers, and so to fame and position, enjoys existence, and which has learned to look on human nature and all that belongs to it in a cheerful spirit, to prize its greatness, to mitigate its sufferings by wise resignation, to bear its weaknesses, to control its excesses by custom and law. From him, as from no other poet, the idea is gathered of a beautiful natural agreement between duty and inclination, be- tween freedom and order, which constitutes the moral ideal of the Greek world. (ffa > but that all means of vengeance HHOK, &c. Hippol. 607, or are lawful in case of injury, the language of Eteocles in It is true Euripides does not Phcen. 504, 525, that men will give these as his own senti- do anything for power, and ments. Yet even his cotem- even commit crimes for a poraries noticed their resem- throne ; or that of the old man blance to the moral teaching in lo 1051, that it befits the of the Sophists, fortunate man to shun wrong, ILLUSTRATED BY DIDACTIC POETRY. 21 elegance, and Critias with his sophistic moralising, CHAP. were not slow to follow. 1 Cotemporary with ^Eschylus, or even a little (2) Didac- before him, the poets Epicharmus, Simonides, and tic P oetr y- Pindar, flourished : soon after him Bacchylides. The first of these, Epicharmus, it has been shown in an earlier work, 2 takes a rational view of the world, and entertains clear notions on morals, and theology, thanks to his knowledge of philosophy. Simonides, 3 so far as his views can be gathered from O) Simo- scattered fragments, appears mainly to insist on that m es ' moderation and self-restraint which result from a consideration of human weakness and frailty. Our life is full of toils 4 and cares ; its fortune is uncer- tain ; swiftly it hurries away ; even prudence 5 is too easily lost by men ; their hardly-won virtue is imper- fect and unstable ; it changes with circumstances ; the best man is he on whom the Grods bestow pros- perity. A faultless man must not be looked for; enough to find one moderately righteous. 6 The same vein of feeling is found in Bacchylides, on whom Q>) Sac- descended the mantle of Simonides. He knows that no one is altogether happy, that few are spared some heavy changes of fortune, and bursts, yet not alone, into the complaint : ' Not to have been born were the happiest lot.' 7 Hence the highest practical 1 Zeller's Geschichte der well as by JEschylus, a poet of Philosophie, Part I. p. 925, and the good old time. Arigtoph., Nauck. Trag. Frag. 599. Clouds, 1352. 2 Better's Philosophie der Fr. 32, 36, 38, 39, 85 Greichen, Part I. p. 427 (Ger- Fr. 42. man). Fr. 5. 8 Called by later writers, as 7 Fr. 1, 2, 3, 21. r STATE OF CULTURE IN GREECE. CHAP, wisdom consists, in his mind, in equanimity, in a ' contentment with the present, and absence of care for the future. 1 At the same time he shares the conviction that man can discover what is right, and that Zeus, the all-seeing ruler of the world, is not to blame for the misfortunes of mortals. 2 These are the same sentiments as in the older moral poets, without any noticeable change in the moral plat- form. 3 (c) Pin- A spirit far more peculiar and more powerful, and more nearly akin to ^Eschylus, finds utterance in the poems of Pindar. At the bottom of Pindar's view of the world, as of that of ^Eschylus, lies a most exalted notion of the deity. ' God is the all :' 4 nothing is for Him impossible. Zeus governs all things according to his will ; He bestows success or failure ; 5 law, which governs mortals and immortals, accomplishes its purposes with mighty hand. 6 Nor are the deeds of men hid from the all-seeing eyes of God. 7 Only beautiful and noble traits can be attri- buted to the deity ; he who accuses it of human vices cannot escape punishment. 8 Such being the ' Fr. 19. (Trach. 1278) otolv 2 Fr. 29. n*l Zeus, to express, All depends ' Zeller, Part I. p. 90. upon God. 4 Clemens, Stromat. v. 610 : s Fr. 119 ; Pyth. ii. 49, 88 ; Tl'uSapos . . . avTiKpvs tliruv, Nem. x. 29. ri 8e6s ; STI rb itav. Although fi Fr. 146. Clement appears to give the 7 Ol. i. 64 ; Pyth. iii. 28 ; words beginning rl as a quota- ix. 42. tion, it seems hardly likely 8 Ol. i. 28, where, with a that they can have siood in curious combination of credu- Pindar. Perhaps Pindar used lity and rationalism, the story the words fobs rb vav in the of the feast of the Gods in the same sense that Sophocles said house of Tantalus is declared ILLUSTRATED BY DIDACTIC POETRY. 2 exalted position of God, man occupies thereto a two- CHAP. fold attitude. On the one hand he has a nature related to that of the Gods ; one is the race of men, 1 the race of Gods is another, yet both descend from the same mother ; hence in nature and spirit mortals are not altogether unlike immortals. On the other hand, looking at their power, there is an infinite difference, 2 for changeful is our lot, and joy and sorrow lie for us ever near together. 3 True wisdom, therefore, consists in not transgressing the bounds of what is human, in looking to the Gods for all that is good, in taking with contentment what they bestow. 'Seek not to be a God,' exclaims the poet: mor- tality becomes mortals ; he who soars to heaven will, like Bellerophon, have a precipitate fall. 4 Only where God leads is blessing and success ; 5 in His hand rests the issue of our labour, according as it is determined by destiny. 6 From the deity comes all virtue and knowledge ; 7 and doubtless for this very reason, as being a gift of God, natural talent is placed by Pindar far above all acquirements, and the creative spirits on whom it has been bestowed, above all other spirits, as the eagle of Zeus is above to be a fable, the occasion for aluvos, comes from God alone, which was supplied by the and proves its higher nature carrying off of Pelops by Posei- during the sleep of the body in don. prophetic dreams. 1 This, rather than the iden- * 01. ii. 30 ; Fr. 210. tity of both s_exes, must be the 4 Ol. v. 24 ; Isthm. v. 14 ; meaning of the words iu>$p vii. 42. ft> 6tS>v ytvos : men form a race 5 Fr. 85, where probably iv by themselves, the Gods form stands for is. another different therefrom. Pyth. xii. 28. 2 Nem. vi. 1. According to * Ol. ix. 28, 103 ; Pyth. i. 41 ; Frag. 108, the soul, the ftSu\ov Fr. 118. 24 STATE OF CULTURE IN GREECE. CHAP, the croaking ravens. 1 We must resign ourselves to L what Grod disposes, content ourselves with our lot, whatever it be. Strive not against Grod ; bear His yoke without kicking against the pricks ; adapt yourself to circumstances ; seek not what is impos- sible ; in all things observe moderation ; beware of envy, which deals the strongest blow to those most highly placed ; these are the counsels of the poet. 2 Nay more, to give greater weight to his moral counsels, he not unfrequently appeals to a future retribution, of the wicked as well as of the good, sometimes following herein the received notions respecting Tartarus, Elysium, and the islands 3 of the blest, at other times connecting therewith a belief in the migration of souls. 4 In the main, Pindar's platform, both religious and moral, is not different from that of ^Eschylus, albeit the thought of divine vengeance does not stand out with him in such tragic guise. (3) ffisto- Would we see this view of life in transition to nan*. ^Q later form, no better example can be selected (a) Hero- than Herodotus. This friend of Sophocles, in writing history, often allows himself to be guided by the 1 01. ii. 86; ix. 100; Nem. i. bably interpolated by some 25 ; iii. 40. Alexandrian Jew. 2 Pyth. ii. 34, 88 ; iii. 21, 59, 4 Fr. 110, 01. ii. 68. Accor- 103; xi. 50; Fr. 201: ding to the latter passage, in 3 01. ii. 56 ; Fr. 106, 120. which Pindar is most explicit, Fr. 108 seems only to presup- reward or punishment follows pose the current notions, with in Hades. Some few dis- this difference, that a more tinguished men are allowed to intense life is attributed to return to life, and may, by a souls in Hades than was the threefold life of innocence, view of Homer and the mass enjoy the higher bliss on the of the people. Fr. 109 is pro- islands of the blessed. ILLUSTRATED BY HISTORIANS. I' notions of olden times. He admits the rule of CHAP. divine providence in the order of nature, 1 and equally clearly in the fortunes of men, and especially in punishment, which overtakes the guilty, even though he have acted in the excess of an excusable passion. 2 Popular forms of worship are honoured by him, 3 knowing as he does that every nation likes its own rites best ; only a madman, he says, can treat these with disdain. 4 Credulous, too, he is, so far as to relate, in all good faith, divers wonders and pro- phecies, 5 among them some of the most extraordinary kind. Even his piety is of an antique type, affected with that fear of the divine powers which is so peculiarly suited to natural religion, where the ex- altation of (rods above men is not conceived of as an essential difference, but is more physical than moral. Man is not destined to enjoy perfect good fortune ; his life is exposed to changes innumerable ; before death no one may be called happy ; nay it is even a general matter for doubt whether death is not better for a man than life. 6 He who in prosperity or imagination soars above the lot of men, is in- variably struck by the envy of the Deity, which, jealous of its privileges, will not brook a mortal rival. 7 All this is quite in agreement with the 1 Her. iii. 108. * vii. 12, 57 ; viii. 37, 65 ; fx. 2 ii. 120 ; iv. 205 ; vi. 84 ; 100. Here belong the pro- viii. 129; vii. 133. phecies of Bakis and MUSSEUS, * For this reason he hesitates viii. 77 ; ix. 43, respecting the to utter the names of Egyptian genuineness of which he enter- Gods in a context which might tains no doubt, desecrate them, ii. 86, or to ii. 31. speak of Egyptian mysteries. 7 On the Btiov QOovtpdv, conf. 4 iii. 38. i. 32. 34 : iii. 40 ; vii. 10, 5, 46. 2Q STATE OF CULTURE IN GREECE. CHAP, spirit, which breathes through the older poetry of L Greece. For all that, Herodotus neither can nor will conceal from us the fact that he is the son of an epoch, in which thought has already begun to shake the foundations of a simple faith. Notwithstanding the naivete with which he tells many a wonder ;* there are times when he cannot resist the impulse to ex- plain away the marvels of legend, either referring them to natural causes in the rationalising spirit of the Sophists, or at least mentioning such explana- tions given by others with approval. Thus the wanderings of lo and the rape of Europa are ex- plained at the very beginning of his work to mean the carrying off by pirates of these two royal daughters. In the story of Gryges the wonderful power of his ring is referred to a very common trick. 2 The prophetic doves of Dodona turn into Egyptian priestesses. 3 The Egyptian stories re- specting Paris and Helena are preferred to those of Homer, and the general tradition of the Greeks, 4 on grounds far removed from ancient poetry. When Poseidon interposes in the Thessalian legend, he sees the working of an earthquake, 5 and remarks not without irony, that those who believe Poseidon wrought the earthquake, may believe he interposed also. Add to this that he occasionally expresses the opinion that all men know equally little about the 1 i. 60. 4 ii. 120. z i. 8. s vii. 129. 3 ii. 56. ILLUSTRATED BY HISTORIANS. 27 (rods, 1 and it will be patent, how much doubt had CHAP. already taken the place of the ancient faith. In Thucydides, the next great historian, doubt (&) Thu- has gone over into the matter of fact treatment of ^ history. The high moral tone of his style no one will deny. Even in its unfinished form his history of the Peloponnesian war has all the effect of a touching tragedy. This effect, however, is secured simply by a plain setting forth of historical facts, without introducing the interposition of the Gods to explain events. Thucydides knows how indispensable religion is for the public good. He shows, by his very de- scription, how deeply he deplores the decay, not only moral but religious of his country. 2 Yet the rule of the deity and of moral order in the world is only apparent in his pages by the progress of events. Convinced that human nature is always the same, he exhibits moral laws by showing how in the case before him ruin naturally resulted from the weakness and the passions of men, which he knows so well and can judge so impartially. 3 Nowhere is a belief betrayed in those extraordinary occurrences, in which the hand of Grod manifests itself in Herodotus. Where his cotemporaries see the fulfilment of a prophecy, he contents himself with sober criticism. 4 To depend on oracles instead of using remedies, he calls the folly of the masses ; 5 he openly expresses 1 ii. 3 (Schl.). vi. 15, 24, 30 ; vii. 75, 87. 2 See the well-known pas- 4 For instance, ii. 17, 64. sages ii. 53 ; iii. 82. * v. 103, where the Athenian * iii. 82, 84 ; and in the de- is, without doubt, expressing scription of the Sicilian expe- the writer's opinion, dition, its motives and results, 28 STATE OF CULTURE IN GREECE. CHAP, his disapproval of the disastrous superstition of -_ Nicias. 1 In the panegyric of the dead, 2 which is quite as much a memorial of his own spirit as of the spirit of Pericles, there is not a word of the legendary history of Athens, that hackneyed theme of earlier panegyrists ; but instead thereof, there is a states- man's mind dealing with facts, and practical problems. His history is a brilliant evidence of a mature judg- ment, of high intellectual culture, of a many-sided experience of life, of a calm, unimpassioned, pene- trating, and morally sober view of the world. It is a work which kindles the highest respect not only for the writer, but for the whole period, which could rear up such a genius. Nor yet does this work conceal the darker sides of that period. Eead only the descriptions it gives 3 of the confusion of all moral notions in the factious struggles of the Peloponnesian war, of the desolation of Athens by the plague, of the decline of piety and self-sacrifice, of the running riot of all the selfish passions, to be satisfied of the decay of moral excel- lence, even in that period of might and culture. Be- yond all question, along with this outward change of conduct, universal convictions were shaken also ; in proof of which, Thucydides puts in the mouth of several of his speakers, and particularly of those coming from Athens, naked avowals of the most selfish principles, such as could only come from the lips of some one of the younger Sophists. All who have the power seek to rule ; no one is restrained by 1 vii. 50. 2 ii. 35. s ii. 53 ; iii. 82. ILLUSTRATED BY COMEDY. 29 considerations of right from pursuing his advantage CHAP. Ly hook and by crook ; the rule of the stronger is the universal law of nature ; at bottom every one judges what is right and honourable by his own interests and enjoyments ; even the best regulated states act on this idea, at least in their foreign rela- tions. These and such like utterances are put into the mouths of Athenian popular men and ambassa- dors on every opportunity. 1 Even those who have to suffer from Athenian self-seeking are in the end hardly able to blame it. 2 Have we not here moral and political conditions keeping exact pace with the sophistic character of philosophy ? Nor were other prudent men blind to the dangers W Tl< e Com- which this course of things was bringing upon them, edianx. however little they were able to control it, or to run counter to the spirit of their times. Take, for example, Aristophanes. This poet, an enthusiastic Aritto- admirer of the good old time, as he paints it with its f steady morality, its strict education, its military prowess, its orderly and prudent administration, 3 warms to his subject whenever he speaks of the days of Marathon. 4 With implacable satire, now in the form of bantering jest, now in that of bitter earnest- ness, he lashes the innovations which have taken the place of time-honoured institutions ; democracy running riot with its demagogues and sycophants ; 5 1 i. 76 ; iii. 40 ; v. 89, 105, nians, 676. Ill; vi. 85. 5 Wasps; Clouds, 568. The 2 iv. 61. Sycophants are taken to task 1 Clouds, 882 ; Knights, 1316. on every opportunity. Wasps, 1071 ; the Achar- 30 STATE OF CULTURE IN GREECE. CHAP, poetry, empty, effeminate, free-thinking, faithless to _J its moral idea, fallen from its artistic height : l sophistic culture with its fruitless speculations, dangerous alike to faith and morals, the produce of shameless quibblers, atheistic rationalisers, 2 or con- scienceless perverters of justice, instead of steady citizens and sober-minded men. Love for what is ancient is with him undeniably an affair of personal conviction. Of this his zeal is proof, the excitement and classic beauty of those passages which set forth the praise of the olden time and its customs. Greater proof still lies in the general tone of his comedies. Boastful himself, with reason, of the courage with which he discharged his duty as a citizen against Cleon, 3 he extracts even from us the testimony of his being an honourable man fighting for a principle. Whilst warmly taking the field against the spirit of innovation, he at the same time not only presup- poses this spirit in his audience, but actually furthers and promotes it. Demagogues and syco- phants he lashes ; yet whilst lashing them he tells us that every place is full of them ; that democracy has a hundred heads, ever full of vitality ; that the Athenian people, like a childish old man, are always the victim of the most impudent of their flatterers ; that the steady men of the older generation are just as eager for their judicial dues as the whole body of worshipful citizens are for their law-suits ; that the 1 Frogs ; Achar. 393. s Wasps, 1029, 1284 ; Peace, 2 Clouds; Birds, 1282, 1553; 951 ; Achar, 959; Clouds, 542. Frogs, 1491. ILLUSTRATED BY COMEDY. young champions of Spartan severity are as de- CHAP. bauched as the demagogues ; ' that the sovereign people, after the re-establishment of Solon's constitu- tion, has gone on as capriciously as before, only wanting female government to complete the folly. 2 Even in his plays he indulges in the arts of the demagogue and the sycophant ; Socrates he slanders, and many another as heartily as any rhetorician could do ; and to outbid those who squandered the public property in order to bribe the people, he tells the citizens of Athens that if things were fairly done, 3 they ought to receive far more than they did. For a reform in religion and morals, the prospects with him are bad. He praises the moral training of the ancients, but observes with a smile that morality is little at home amongst his hearers, 4 and finds the vices from which his people suffered at bottom very natural. 5 Women he brings on the stage to lash their licentiousness ; but that licentiousness he re- presents as so deep and so general, that there can hardly be hope of improvement. He makes an on- slaught on the philosophers who deny the Grods, but in one of his first comedies he gives us to understand, that belief in his time rested on trembling feet. 6 Not only here and there, 7 but in whole acts and plays, 8 he exposes the (rods, together with their 1 Wasps ; Birds, 38. Knights, 32. 2 Eccles. v. 456 ; conf . Plato, 7 Clouds, 369, 396, 900, 1075 ; Rep. viii. 563, B. Birds, 554, 1608 ; Eccles. 778 ; 1 Wasps, 655. Plut, 123, 697. 4 Clouds, 1055. In the Frogs, Peace, and 4 Compare Birds, 137 ; Frogs, the Birds. 148; Knights, 1384. STATE OF CULTURE IN GREECE. CHAP. I. C. Tte problem solved by the new forms of religious worship . priests, with audacious recklessness, bringing them down with rough wit to a human level and to what is low and common ; holding up the moral weaknesses in which they resemble men nakedly and minutely ; making the world of Grods, like that of men, turn in such a wild whirl, that neither the spectator who takes delight in this perverted world, nor yet the poet, can have any real respect for beings who are so readily and recklessly at the service of his imagination. Much of this may be attributed to the license of comedy ; 1 yet more than enough remains to show that the poet himself, as well as his audience, had strayed far from the ancient morality which he so regretfully wishes to recall ; that his fanatical devotion, like Eousseau's wild dream of returning to a state of nature, is only the outcome of discontent with the present, only the expres- sion of a romantic idea, not a sentiment pene- trating his every day life, and ruling his thought and feelings. Thus everywhere where we touch upon them, the age and the surroundings from which Attic philosophy came forth appear penetrated by a spirit of innovation, rendering it impossible for the most decided lovers of antiquity to adhere to the life and beliefs of their ancestors. Amongst other signs of this change, one pheno- menon deserves to be noticed, which appears about the time of the Peloponnesian war the increasing spread of the worship of the mysteries, and of sooth- saying in connection therewith. Hitherto, the 1 Plut. 665. ILLUSTRATED BY NEW RELIGIOUS IDEAS. .",3 reputed predictions of the older prophets had been appealed to indeed, 1 as is the wont of men, but only in exceptional cases ; now the mischief and abuse which was perpetrated by such appeals reached an incredible pitch. 2 To judge by the numerous allusions in the writers of this and the following generation, the Orphic and Corybantic mysteries probably gained at this time both ground and supporters. 3 Such an extension, however, was an innovation in more than one respect. Looking at it from an outside point of view, it was one thing to seek counsel from public oracles and make use of ancient rites naturalised from time immemorial in fixed spots ; a very differ- CHAP. I. 1 Herod, viii. 7 ; ix. 437, mentions prophecies of Bakis and Musaeus respecting the Persian war. 2 This is particularly evident in Aristophanes, who loses no opportunity of lashing the pro- phets. Not to mention cursory attacks, as in Clouds, 330 ; Birds, 521 ; in Knights, 109, 818, i.50, 967 (comp. Lysist. 767), he shows what liberal use Cleon and other demagogues made of superstition to flatter the self-love of the people, and to direct its will by the so- called prophecies of Bakis. In Peace, 1047, he introduces a prophet Hierocles, who, from interested motives, opposes the conclusion of peace, and is evidently meant for a real person ; in the Birds, 959, a prophet, who thrusts himself in at the founding of a city, to catch a trifle. Such like pheno- mena may have given occasion to the polemic of Euripides. 8 Amongst others, Philolaus (teller, Part I. 388) and Plato (Phaedo, 69, C. ; Rep. ii. 363, C. 364, B. ; Laws, vi. 782, C.), and more particularly Euripides and Aristophanes. The former (Hippol. 949) describes Hippo- lytus as a pupil of Orpheus, and (Fr. 475) introduces a mystic, who, initiated into the orgies of Idasan Zeus, of Zag- reus, and the Curetes, devotes himself to an Orphic life. The latter not only depicts (in the Frogs, 145, 312) the life of the initiated and uninitiated in Hades as rudely and vividly as the consecrated priests do in Plato, but also (in Peace, 374) hints at the opinion that man cannot die quietly without re- ceiving initiation before death, and (in Wasps, 119) alludes to the custom of initiating the sick for the purpose of healing them. 34 STATE OF CULTURE IN GREECE. CHAP, ent thing to have recourse to the so-called answers ' of individual prophets and to a private worship without fixed locality, propagated by vagrant priests, practised in self-constituted confraternities, and claiming to elevate all who took part in it as the special elect above the mass of mankind, both in this world and in the next. What was this increasing fondness for private worship and irregular prophecy but a proof that the public religion was not altoge- ther satisfactory, whilst it contributed at the same time to intensify the evil ? Looking at its real nature, this mystical piety has diverged from the received form of faith and life. In it, the notions of the gods, flowing into each other, begin to lose their distinctness ; l perhaps even the tendency to resolve all into pantheism, which may be already seen in individuals in the fifth century, may be referred thereto. 2 The conception of human life and of human nature has assumed an altered character, owing to a clearer belief in immortality, introduced by the dogmas of the migration of souls and of 1 This is more immediately be found the God in whose true in the case of Dionysus, service they were enlisted. At In mystic theology this God, a later time, following Herac- as the representative of the litus' example, Dionysus was changing life of nature, dying identified with Plato. See in winter, reviving in spring, Zeller's Gesch. d. Phil. Vol. I. was honoured under the name 51, 3 ; 592, 5. of Dionysus Zagreus, and 2 Besides the extracts from treated as one of the Gods of Euripides already quoted, p. 19, the nether world. On this 1, compare the fragment in account the Dionysus-mysteries Clemens, Stromat. v. 603, D, are so important for the future which Nauck, Fragm. Trag. life. To the initiated in them 588, attributes in all proba- (Plato, Phsedo, 69, C. comp. bility to ^Eschylus' son Eupho- Aristoph., Frogs) may be pro- rion : Zeus l, Zeus 5e mised life in Hades with the 717, Zeus r' ovpavbs Zeus roi rek Gods, among whom must surely ravro. x&^t ra-j/5' iWoreooj'. ILLUSTRATED BY NEW RELIGIOUS IDEAS. future retribution ; | and even of this change traces may be seen in the poetry of the time of Euripides. 2 Lastly, in connection herewith an ascetic code of morals 3 has come into vogue, enjoining abstinence from animal food, 4 celibacy, 5 the avoidance of certain defilements, 6 and the wearing of white clothing. Philosophy, it is true, could only appropriate in an intellectual form the general idea of this asceticism, the renunciation of what belongs to the senses. Not till a later time did it embrace it as a whole with all its external belongings, in the system of the Neopytbagoreans. Before that time came, thanks to the state of intellectual life and mental development in Greece, it had entered itself on another and a more brilliant career. CHAP. I. 1 Comp. Zeller, Vol. I. 54, 388, 581, 654. * Besides Euripides (p. 19, 1), Melanippides (Fr. 6 in BergJt, Lyr. Gr. p. 982) appears to have regarded the soul as immortal, lo, too (Fr. 4 in Bergk, p. 464), appropriates the Pythagorean belief in immortality. A reso- lution of souls into aether may also be implied in the popular belief mentioned by Aristo- phanes (Peace, 832), that the dead become stars. 8 See Euripid., Hippol. 949 ; Fr. 475 ; Plato, Laws, vi. 782, C., comparing therewith the principles of Empedocles and - Pythagoras. Probably Eurip., Fr. 884, refers to this. 5 That this was a part of Orphic perfection may be ga- thered from Euripides, who holds up Hippolytus as a type of an Orphic, probably only because this despiser of Aphro- dite (Hippol. 10, 101), by his typical chastity, reminds of Orphic virginity. A vow of chastity also occurs in Electra. v. 254, and it is well known that marriage was forbidden to many priestesses, though more rarely to priests. $(vya> yfVffftv T6 fipOTtOV KO.I VfKpoQJIKT}* OV Xpl/UTTTdjUeyOS (Eu* rip., Fr. 475, 16), consequently the same Ka0api5eij/ iirb ir{)$ovs al \txovs (touching a corpse or woman who has been con- fined), which the Pythagorean of Alexander Polyhister in Dioff., viii. 33 requires. Birth and death, for reasons closely allied, are regarded as pollu- ting. Compare Eurip., Iphig. Taur. 372; Thuc.iii. 104. D 2 STATE OF CULTURE IN GREECE. CHAPTEK II. CHARACTER AND PROGRESS OF GREEK PHILOSOPHY IN THE FIFTH CENTURY. CHAP. THE age of Socrates inherited from that which had J gone before it a rich treasure of religious ideas, of moral principles, and scientific conceptions ; at the same time it had declined at every point from the earlier tone of thought and custom. Traditional lines seemed now to be all too narrow ; new paths had been discovered; new problems pressed for solution. The legendary ideas respecting the Gods and the state after death, had lost all meaning for the great majority of the educated ; l the very exist- ence of the Gods had been denied by many; ancient customs had fallen into disuse ; the orderliness of civil life, the simplicity and purity of domestic life, had given place to a wanton dissoluteness of conduct, and an unscrupulous pursuit of pleasure and profit. Principles subversive of all law and of all right were being unblushingly advocated with the cheerful approval of the younger generation. The severity and grandeur of the earlier art, the lucid beauty, the classic grace, the self-contained dignity of the later art, began to resolve themselves into the study of 1 Conf. Plato, Rep. i. 330, D. ILLUSTRATED BY PROGRESS OF PHILOSOPHY. 37 mere effect ; whilst under the influence of sophistry, CHAP philosophy had come to disbelieve, not only in indi- - vidual systems, but also in the whole course of previous enquiry, and even in the possibility of know- ledge at all. Far, however, from being exhausted hereby, the spirit of G-reece was only completely delivered by the throes and struggles of the fifth century. Its mental horizon was widened ; its thought was sharp- ened ; its views and conceptions enriched. Its whole consciousness had gained a new field since its suc- cess *in renowned exploits and glorious undertakings. If the meridian of classic art and of free political life was past towards the close of this period, still the newly-awakened culture of the understanding was full of intellectual promise for the future ; for sophistry had been destructive, not constructive, only suggesting, not accomplishing. Some new and thorough change was called for to satisfy not only practical but also intellectual requirements. Ancient propriety of conduct, and the received philosophic teaching having been once ousted by the altered spirit of the times, simple return thereto became im- possible. But to despair on this account of all knowledge, and of all principles of morality, was most precipitate. Allowing even that the received view of both was inadequate, it by no means followed, that all science, and all morality was impossible. On the contrary, the more the pernicious conse- quences of such a view were exposed, the more urgent became the duty of avoiding them by a thorough .38 STATE OF CULTURE IN GREECE. CHAP, transformation of the whole tone of feeling and thought, without, however, attempting the impos- sible task of simply restoring the past. A. LHstinc- For this purpose some new path must be struck out. Soct-atie What that path should be, a far-sighted eye could from pro- discern with sufficient clearness by the aid of the Socratic philoso- experience of the past. Traditional propriety of con- 2>hy. duct had given way before the spirit of innovation, pre-Rocra- inasmuch as it rested upon instinct and custom, tic tradi- an( j no t on any clear recognition of necessity. He tlonal;tke . , * Socratic who would undertake a permanent restoration or moral Sed n e life must found il upon knowled g e - Earlier philo- sophy had been unable to satisfy the requirements of the times, because it had been directed exclusively to a study of nature ; because to the mass of men it did not give sufficient preliminary education for the work of life, nor to the thinking spirit any clue to the problem of its being and destiny. New philo- sophy must meet this want, must direct its attention to the sphere of mind and morals, and work into shape the ample supply of ethical ideas underlying religion, poetry and received custom. Earlier sys- tems had succumbed before the doubts of sophistry, inasmuch as their method was too one-sided, depend- ing too little on definite conceptions respecting the nature and problem of knowledge to be able to with- stand a searching criticism which destroyed their several platforms by means of each other, and argued from the change and uncertainty of the phenomena of the senses that knowledge must be impossible. No building that would last could be erected except ILLUSTRATED BY PROGRESS OF PHILOSOPHY. 39 by laying the foundations deeper, except by finding CHAP. some means of supplementing these several points _ of view by each other, of harmonising them when contradictory in some higher bond of union, 1 and of grasping the unchangeable essence of things amid changing appearances. The means wanted was sup- plied by Dialectic, the art of forming conceptions, and the result was philosophical Idealism. Thus the knowledge of the faults and deficiencies in existing circumstances led naturally to the turn taken by philosophy after the time of Socrates. Scientific ethics became necessary because of the tottering of moral convictions ; a wider enquiry, because of the narrowness of the philosophy of nature ; a critical method, because of the contradiction of dogmatic systems ; a philosophy of conceptions, because of the uncertainty of the observations of the senses ; Ideal- ism, because of the unsatisfactory nature of a materia- listic view of the world. Precisely these features distinguish the Socratic (2) Tim philosophy from that of the previous period. The SoriM* pre-Socratic philosophy was simply and solely a g pfy a philosophy of nature ; 2 the transitional philosophy nature; of the Sophists was the first to leave nature for J** s ? cra - tw of co n- ethical and dialectical questions. After Socrates ceptions. the dialectical tendency is supreme. His own atten- tion was exclusively occupied with determining con- ceptions, and enquiries respecting virtue. With rare exceptions the imperfect Socratic schools con- 1 Comp. ZeUer's Phil, der * In the sense given, Ibid. I. Griechen, Part I. p. 854, 8GO. 155. '40 STATE OF CULTURE IN GREECE. CHAP, fined themselves to the same field ; Plato, founding his system in conceptions, completing it in morals, forms a marked contrast to the natural philosophers, who went before him. Even in Aristotle who treats of physics in detail and with an evident prefer- ence for the subject, they are only a single branch of a system, and in point of value subordinate to metaphysics. Such an increase of territory showed that the whole platform of philosophy had changed. Why else should thought have embraced other and more extended materials, had it not been changed in it- self, and therefore no longer contented itself with what had been before ? For the same reason the philosophic method was a different one. In previous philosophy thought had dealt directly with its ob- B. Cliarac- ject, as such. In the Socratic and post-Socratic tkitperiod systems it deals in the first place with conceptions u its doc- an( j on }y ^th objects indirectly, through the medium concep- of conceptions. The older systems asked, without further ado, what predicates belonged to things ; for instance, whether what is real admits of motion or not how and out of what the world is made. The Socratic philosophy ever asks, in the first place, what things are in themselves according to their concep- tion, thinking not otherwise to obtain information respecting their properties and conditions than by the help of the conception of things thoroughly mastered. 1 No conception of a thing can, however, 1 Compare, not to mention ment in the Phaedo, 99, D : After other passages, the clear state- having vainly busied himself ILL USTRA TED BY PRO QRESS OF PHIL OSOPHY. 41 be obtained, except by grouping together its various CHAP. aspects and qualities, by smoothing down apparent contradictions, by separating what is lasting from what is changing, in a word, by that critical method, (}}Defini- which Socrates introduced, and which Plato and Aris- concep- totle elaborated and developed. Former philosophers tw>t " having gone forth from particular prominent features to arrive at the essence of things, and having failed because of their one-sidedness ; it was now required that all the properties of an object should be taken into account and weighed from every side, before a judgment could be formed thereupon. Thus the philosophy of conceptions steps into the place of dog- matism. In this way reflection which by means of sophistry had destroyed the older philosophy was taken into the service of the new philosophy ; the various aspects under which things may be regarded, were brought together and referred to each other ; but not content with the negative conclusion that our notions cannot be true because they contain opposite determinations, the new philosophy aimed at uniting these opposites in one, and showing that true science is not affected by contradiction, inasmuch as it only refers to that which unites opposites in itself, and excludes contradiction. This pursuit of knowledge with the enquiries of the na- TU>V alffO-fttrteav liu tural philosophers he declares avT.)e8of$riiJiotxp : nva.i flsro himself convinced, that he has \6yovs Ka.Ta,v TJ^V a\.^0fiav by directing his enquiries into (the true essence of things), things in themselves. (TO &ra i.e. instead of irpdynara, \6yoi, . . . )3Ae'ira>' irpbj rcfc instead of fora, i\-fiOeia TWV rots 6fj.ft.aa-i Kal (Ktiffrri omtav. 42 STATE OF CULTURE IN GREECE. CHAP, through conceptions is the common peculiarity of ' the Socratic, the Platonic, and the Aristotelian philo- sophy. That the lesser Socratic schools follow the same bent will be seen hereafter. If only conceptions can give true knowledge, it follows that true being can only belong to that which is known by means of conceptions ; that is, to the essence of things, as this presents itself in thought. This essential being cannot, however, be sought for in matter. Anaxagoras had early realised that matter could only become a world by means of spirit ; since then the old materialistic physics had been discredited by sophistry ; nothing remained but to regard the form and purpose of things, the immaterial part in them as most essential for determining the conceptions, nay, even to assign to it a true reality underlying the appearance. In this way the Socratic philosophy led logically to Idealism. (2) Theory The beginnings of this Idealism are unmistak- fumteS:' able even in Socrates - His indifference to physical panded by enquiries and his preference for ethical ones prove IplZtofand conclusively that he attributed to the inner world a Aristotle, much higher value than to the outer world. Eesolve his theory of final causes applied to nature into the metaphysical elements out of which it is composed ; the conclusion is inevitable that not the material of which a thing is made, but the conception which gives it shape, makes a thing what it is, and that this accordingly represents its true nature. This Idealism is more pronounced in the school of Megara ; and in Plato it runs through all parts of his philo- ILLUSTRATED BY PROGRESS OF PHILOSOPHY. 4;j sophy side by side with a current of pre-Socratic CHAP. doctrines. Even Aristotle is not faithless to this view. U ' Whilst denying the independent existence of the Platonic ideas, he nevertheless asserts that reality consists not in matter but in form, and that the highest reality belongs to spirit free from matter. On this ground he states even in his physics, agree- ing herein with his predecessors, that final causes are higher than material causes. Compared therefore with the natural philosophers of the pre-Socratic period, even Aristotle may fairly be called an Idealist. Starting from a consideration of nature, the pre- Socratic philosophy made it its chief business to en- quire into the essence and causes of external things, for this purpose going back to their material proper- ties. An entirely different character is displayed in the philosophy founded by Socrates. This begins with the study of self rather than the study of nature with ethics rather than physics. It aims at explaining phenomena, first of all by means of con- ceptions, and only in the second place naturally. It substitutes an attitude of enquiry for dogmatic state ment, idealism in the place of materialism. Mind is now regarded as the higher element compared with matter. The philosophy of nature has developed into a philosophy of conceptions. Not that as yet the claim was advanced on be- c. bix- half of the human mind to be the measure of truth goeratio "' and the end of science. Far from reaching the sub- f ro l'"**- jective idealism of Fichte an idealism in fact only Uanphilv- possible in modern times the philosophy of this *l' fl ff- 44 STATE OF CULTURE IN GREECE. CHAP, period is not nearly so subjective as the post-Aristo- telian schools. 1 In them the interests of speculation are subordinated to those of morals ; knowledge is regarded only as a means to virtue and happiness; whereas the independent value of science is fully ad- mitted by the great philosophers of the present period. To them knowledge is an end in itself; speculation is the highest and noblest thing ; action is made to depend upon knowledge, not knowledge to depend upon the aims of active life. Only a few one-sided followers of Socrates, who, however, prove nothing as to the general tendency, are an exception to this rule. (i) It still A simple belief in the possibility of knowledge the attain- is here displayed which was wanting in the post- Tnmvledge AristoteliaD philosophy. The doubts of the Sophists to be are refuted, but in the mind of the philosopher there is no need of overcoming doubt. The problem proposed is, How can true knowledge be obtained, in what kind of mental representations must it be sought, how must the conception of it be deter- mined? No doubt is felt but that knowledge is really possible. The search for a test the funda- mental question of the later schools is altogether unknown 2 to the thinkers of this time. Equally unknown to them are the answers to that problem. 1 Take for instance the The- as to the possibility of know- aetetus ; the question raised ledge involved in the enquiry there as to the conception of for a standard, knowledge (^TTKTT^JUTJ '6, rt irore 2 Compare Zeller, 1. c. ; Intro- rvydxvei ov ; Theaetet. 145, E.) duction to Part III. and I. 137. is quite different from the doubt ILLUSTRATED BY PROGRESS OF PHILOSOPHY. 45 They did not, as did the Epicureans and Stoics, cut CHAP. short the question by practically begging it. They n * did not, as did the Sceptics, despair of knowledge. They did not, as did the Neoplatonists, resort to higher revelations. They were content to look to well-regulated thought for the source of truth. Even that branch of science, the independent pur- suit of which was much neglected by later thinkers physics was studied in this epoch with success. Socrates and the majority of his pupils may have neglected it, but not so Plato ; and Aristotle carries it to a point final in the main for nearly two thousand years. If the post- Aristotelian Ethics proved at last faithless to the principles of the old Greek morality, partly under the influence of a world-wide extension, partly owing to their severance from politics, owing to the withdrawal of the moral consciousness from the outer world, owing to a dumb resignation and a sour asceticism ; the difference of epochs in this respect is simply seen by recalling the many-sided sympathies of Socrates, with his cheerful enjoyment of life, and his devoted attachment to his country, or the teaching of Plato concerning the state, or that of Aristotle concerning virtue and society, or the relation of the Cyrenaic to the Epicurean doc- trine of happiness. 1 Is it true that the philosophy of this second (2) Dix- period attempts in ethics to get beyond the established 5a5wJT "* bounds ? It supplements the propriety of custom by a theory of morals and conscious action. It distinguishes 1 Comp. Zeller, 1. c., i. 139. 46 STATE OF CULTURE IN GREECE. CHAP, more definitely than the ordinary view between the ' outward deed and the intention. It requires a rising above the life of the senses to what is ideal. Light is thrown on the meaning and motives of moral consciousness. A universal philanthropy is taught, which is not lost in local patriotism : and accordingly the state is only regarded as an institu- tion for the attainment of virtue and happiness, and not as the final moral cause. For all that this period is far removed from the apathy of either Stoic or Epicurean, from the imperturbability of the Sceptic, from the asceticism of the Neoplatonist. It seeks not to sever man in his moral activity from nature ; with Aristotle it regards virtue as the perfection of a natural gift ; with Plato it advances from the love of what is sensibly beautiful, to the love of what is morally beautiful. It requires the philosopher to work for his fellowmen. The world-citizenship of a later time is absent ; absent too is its nationality and political life. Even in this respect, it holds the classic mean between a slavish surrender to the outer world, and a narrow withdrawal therefrom. Compared with the pre-Socratic era, the age of Socrates is characterised by the diversion of philo- sophy from external nature to thought or to ideas. Compared with the following age, it is marked by the real character of its thought, that is, by the fact that the thinker is not ultimately thrown back on himself and the certainty of his own knowing, but on attaining to the knowledge of what is in itself real and true. In short its theory of a knowledge of ILLUSTRATED BY PROGRESS OF PHILOSOPHY. 47 conceptions determines its character. From this CftAi-. theory may be deduced its breadth of view reaching alike beyond the physical one-sidedness of the pre- Socratic, and the moral one-sidedness of the post- Aristotelian schools, its critical method in opposition to the earlier and later dogmatism, and its idealism, transfiguring the whole aspect of the outer world, without, however, entailing any withdrawal therefrom. The development of this theory was carried D - I)e ~ out in a simple and natural order by three philoso- O f ^ e phic schools, the founders of which belong to three 8 philoso- successive generations, and are personally connected phy. as teachers and pupils. 1 First comes Socrates assert- ing that the standard of human thought and action lies in a knowledge of conceptions, and teaching his followers to acquire this knowledge by dealing with notions critically. Hence Plato concluded that objective conceptions are in the true sense the only real things, a derivative reality belonging to all other things, a view which he upheld by a more critical analysis, and developed to a system. Lastly, Aristotle arrived at the conclusion that in a thing the conception itself constitutes its real essence and moving power. By an exhaustive analysis of the scientific method, he showed how conceptions were to be formed and applied to particulars, and by a most comprehensive enquiry into the several parts of the universe, he examined the laws and connection of conceptions, and the thoughts which determine all that really is. Socrates had as yet no system. He (l) So- crates. 1 Comp. Zeller, 1, 9, 136, 142. 48 STATE OF CULTURE IN GREECE. CHAP, had not even any material groundwork. Convinced '. that only in acquiring conceptions is true knowledge to be found, that true virtue consists in acting according to conceptions, that even the world has been ordered in accordance with definite conceptions, and therefore shows design, in any given case he tries by a critical testing of prevailing notions to gain a conception of the object with which he has to deal, and to this he devotes all his powers, to the conclusion of every other interest. But he never went beyond this formal treatment. His teaching was confined to general requirements and presump- tions. His importance lies not in a new view of things, but in a new conception of knowledge, and in the way he forms this conception, in his view of the problem and method of science, in the strength of his philosophical bent, and in the simplicity of his philosophical life. (2) Plato. The Socratic search for conceptions has grown in Plato to a discovery of them, to a certainty of pos- sessing them, and gazing upon them. With him objective thoughts or ideas are the only real things. Mere idealess existence or matter as such is simply non-existent ; all things else are made up partly of what is and partly of what is not ; they therefore are only real in proportion to the part they have in the idea. Granting that this is in advance of the iSocratic view, it is no less certain that it follows logically from that view. The Platonic ideas, as Aristotle rightly understood them, 1 are the general 1 Met. i. 6, 987, b, 1, ILLUSTRATED BY PROGRESS OF PHILOSOPHY. 49 conceptions, which Socrates had arrived at, separated CHAP. from the world of appearance. They are also the central point of the speculations of Aristotle. With him the conception or the form constitutes the essence, the reality, and is as it were the soul of things ; only form without matter, simple spirit (3) vim- thinking of itself, is absolutely real ; only thought is tatle ' to man the most intense reality, and therefore also the most intense pleasure in life. Yet there is this difference between Aristotle and Plato, that whereas Plato separates the conception from the appearance, regarding it as independent as an t'Sf'a, Aristotle, places it in things themselves, without, however, implying that form stands in need of matter to be- come actual, since it is in itself actual. Moreover, Aristotle will not remove the idea out of the world of appearances, because it cannot in a state of separation serve as a connecting link between indi- vidual things, nor can it be the cause and substance of things. Thus the theory is seen to be one and the same which Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle represent at different stages of growth. In Socrates it is un- developed, but full of vitality, pushing itself forward through the husk of earlier philosophy ; in Plato it has grown to a pure and independent existence ; and in Aristotle it has overspread the whole world of being and consciousness, exhausting itself in the effort, and moving towards a perfect transformation in later systems. Socrates, so to speak, is the preg- nant germ, Plato the rich bloom, Aristotle the ripe E 50 STATE OF CULTURE IN GREECE. CHAP, fruit of Greek philosophy at the perfection of its historical growth. (4) Diffi- One phenomenon only will not fall into this his- 'caused ly torical chain, but threatens to break the continuity Socratic o f Greek thought, viz. the imperfect attempts to Schools. , 6 ' . . *. " expand the Socratic principle which are seen in the Megarian, the Cynic, and the Cyrenaic schools. In these schools a real and essential progress of the philosophic consciousness was not indeed to be found, inasmuch as philosophy, which had arrived at any rate in principle even in the time of Socrates at objective knowledge, such as could only be found in a system, was by them limited to subjective train- ing of thought and character. Nor yet can they be said to be wholly unimportant. For not only were they, at a later period starting points for Stoicism, Epicureanism, and Scepticism, but they also pro- moted, independently of this, many scientific enqui- ries, by means of which they exercised an undeniable influence on Plato and Aristotle. The same case occurs elsewhere, and is met with, even in this epoch, in the older Academy, and in the Peripatetic schools, both of which had no independent influence on the growth of philosophy, but yet cannot be overlooked in its history. Of all these phenomena one and the same thing must be said. Their chief importance lies not in their having expanded a principle theoretically, but in their having been practically helpful in ad- vancing it, by preserving the older forms of culture for cotemporaries to see, here and there improving and widening them, and by thus keeping the philo- ILLUSTRATED BY PROGRESS OF PHILOSOPHY. 61 sopher's mind in sight of a many-sidedness, without CHAP. which later systems would never have included the _ products of the earlier ones. This permanence of philosophic schools is not therefore met with until philosophy had attained a certain general extension, in Greece not until the time of Socrates and Plato. Whereas Plato, by sum- ming up all the pre-Socratic schools, put an end to their existence ; after his time no theory was put for- ward which did not propagate itself in a school until the time that Neoplatonism put the coping-stone on Greek philosophy, in and with which all previous systems were extinguished. In later times, however many intellectual varieties rise up side by side, only a few of them possess a distinct life of their own. The rest are a traditional revival of previous views, and cannot, in considering the peculiar philosophical character of an age, be taken further into account. They need therefore only to be mentioned by the historian in a passing way. This statement applies to the imperfect followers of Socrates. Their doc- trines are not an advancement in principle, but only incomplete reproductions of Socratic views, and con- nected with Socrates in the same way that the elder Academy is with Plato, or the Peripatetic school with Aristotle. PAET II. SO CH A TES. CHAPTER III. THE LIFE OF SOCRATES. CHAP. THERE is no instance on record of a philosopher m - whose importance as a thinker is so closely bound up with his personal character as a man as it was in the case of Socrates. Every system, it is true, as being the work of a definite person, may best be studied in the light of the peculiarities, culture, misfortunes and circumstances of its author ; yet in the case of others it is easier to separate the fruits of their intellectual life from the stock on which they grew ; doctrines can generally be received and handed down quite unchanged by men of very dif- ferent characters. In the case of Socrates this is not nearly so easy. His teaching aimed far less at definite doctrines, which can be equally well em- braced by different men, than at a special tone of life and thought, at a philosophic character and the art of intellectual enquiry, in short, at a something not to be directly imparted and handed down unaltered, HIS LIFE. 53 but to be propagated freely, others being stirred CHAP. up to an analogous development of their peculiarities. ' So much the more anxious should this make us for detailed information as to the training of a character which has had so powerful an influence on history. Here a very common difficulty meets us. What Socrates was, and how he acted in his riper years, is well known ; but only the roughest outline is pre- served of the circumstances of his life. Over the earlier part of it deep darkness rests. For the history of his intellectual and moral training, if we except a few scanty and for the most part untrustworthy statements of earlier writers, we are left entirely to conjecture. The youth and early manhood of Socrates fall in the most brilliant period of Grecian history. Born during the last years of the Persian war, 1 he was 1 The best ascertained date been condemned in April or in the life of Socrates is the May 399 B.C., and have suf- date of his death. According f ered death in May or June the to Demetrius Phalereus and same year. Since at the time Apollodorm (in Diog. ii. 44), of his death he had passed his it happened in Olympiad 95, seventieth year {Plato, Apol. 1 (Diod. xiv. 37), probably in 17, D.), but not long (Crito, the second half of the month 52, E. calls him in round num- Thargelion. For at this time bers seventy), his birth cannot must be placed the return of have fallen later than 01. 77, 3, the Delian Oeupls, which, ac- or 469 B.C. If his birthday is cording to Plato (Phaedo, 59, rightly fixed for the 6th Thar- D.), arrived the day before the gelion (Apoll. in Diog. ii. 44, execution of Socrates. Comp. Plut+ Qu. Conv. viii. 1, 1, K. F. Hermann, De theoria ^lian, V. H. ii. 25), and was Deliaca, Ind. Schol. Getting, not past at the time of the 1846. About a month earlier judicial enquiry, we should (XenopJwn, Mem. iv. 8, 2, says have to go back for it to 470 definitely thirty days), i.e. in or even 471 B.C. (Comp. the month Munychion, the ju- BocTth. Corp. Inscript. ii. 321 ; dicial enquiry took place. Hermann, 1. c. 7). Socrates must accordingly have The question then arises whe- SOCRATES. GHAP. nearly cotemporary with all those great men who adorned the age of Pericles. As a citizen of Athens he participated in all those elements of culture, which thanks to its unrivalled fertility of thought, congregated in that great metropolis. If poverty and low birth somewhat impeded his using them, 1 still ther these statements respect- ing the time of his birth are facts or a mere fiction; and whether the birthday of So- crates, the naietrriK6s, was not placed on the 6th of Thargelion to make it agree with that of Artemis, as Plato's was made to agree with Apollo's. If so, he may have been born in 469 B.C. (Olym. 77, 3). Any- how, Apollodonis, placing it in 468 B.C. (01. 77, 4), (Diog. 1. c.) is wrong. Nor can the state- ment noticed by Diogenes that he was only sixty years of age weigh against the clear lan- guage of Plato, and probably rests upon a transcriber's mis- take. Hermann's observation (Plat. Phil. 666, De Philos. Jon. setat. ii. A. 39) that Socrates could not have been born in the third or fourth, year of an Olympiad, since he was twenty- five (Synes. Calv. Enc. c. 17) at the time of his interview with Protagoras, which inter- view happened (Plato, Farm.) at the time of the Panathensea, and consequently in the third year of an Olympiad, will not hold water. Supposing the interview to be even a fact, which is very doubtful, the remark of Synesius (Calv. Enc. c. 17) respecting the age of Socrates is a pure guess, and altogether refuted by the lan- guage of the Thesetet. 183, F., and the Parmen. 127, C., vdw veos, ff LIFE. doubt that he owed much to such relations; but these friends canoot in strict accuracy be described as his teachers, although we may often find them so-called ; l neither is any light derived hence for the history of his early training. We further meet with expressions which show that he must have had a general acquaintance with the views of Parmenides and Heraclitus, of the Atomists, of Anaxagoras, and perhaps of Empedocles. 2 Whence he derived this knowledge, it is impossible to say. The stories that he received instruction in his younger years from Anaxagoras and Archelaus, can neither be supported by satisfactory evidence, nor are they probable in themselves. 3 Still more uncertain is his supposed inter- CHAP. ni. such intimate terms with him that the comic poets charged him with borrowing his trage- dies from Socrates. (Of. Diog. ii. 18; ^lian, V. H. ii. 13. Also Aspasia ; cf . Xen. (Ec. 3, 14 ; Mem. ii. 6, 36 ; JSschines in Cic. de Invent, i. 31 ; in Max. Tyr. xxxviii. 4 ; conf . Hermann De JSsch. relig. 16 Hermesianax in Athen. xiii. 599, a; Diotima (Pfofo, Symp.). Respecting several of these we know not whether Plato was true to facts in bringing them into connection with Socrates. 1 Socrates calls himself in Plato a pupil of Prodicus (Zeller, 1. c. i. 873, D.), of Aspa- sia (Menex. 235, E.), and of Diotima (Symp. 201, D.), all of which statements have been re- peated in past and present times. See Hermann, Soc. Mag. p. 11. We may suppose that the instruction given by the two ladies consisted in free personal intercourse, even al- lowing that Diotima is a real person, and the Menexenus a genuine dialogue ; not only this, but the same applies equally to Prodicus. Maximus calls Ischomachus his teacher in agriculture, but he probably arrived at this conclusion by misunderstanding Xen. (Ec. 6, 17. The story that he was a pupil of Diagoras of Melos (the Scholiast on Aristoph. Nubes, v. 828), is obviously false. 2 Xen. Mem. i. 1, H ; iv. 7, 6. 8 The authorities are : for Anaxagoras, Arigtid. Or. xlv., p. 21, and the nameless authori- ties referred to by Diog. ii. 19 and 45, whom Suidas ZuKpar. according to custom follows; for Archelaus, Diog. ii. 16, 19, 23, x. 12, and those mentioned by him, lo, Aristoxenus, and Diocles. Besides these Cicero, 53 SOCRATES. CHAP, course with Zeno and Parmenides. Even little is ' known of the philosophical writings with which he Sextus, Porphyry (in Theod. Cur. Gr. Aff. xii. 67, p. 175), Clement of Alexandria (Strom, i. 302, A.), Simplicius, Eusebius (Pr. Ev. x. 14, 13, xiv. 15, 11, xv. 61, 11), Hippolytus, the spu- rious Galen, and a few others ; conf. Krische, Forsch. 210. The evidence in favour of Anaxagoras is very insufficient, and the language respecting him used by Socrates (Plato, Phsedo, 97, B. and Xenophon, Mem. iv. 7, 6) makes it impro- bable that he knew him person- ally, or was acquainted with his views, except from books and hearsay, which of course does not exclude any casual or accidental intercourse. The traditions respecting his rela- tions to Archelaus are better authenticated ; yet even here there is much that is suspicious. Of the two earliest authorities, lo and Aristoxenus, the former, who was an older contemporary of Socrates, does not make Ar- chelaus his instructor. All that is stated in Diog. ii. 23, on his authority, is that Socrates, when a young man, travelled with Archelaus to Samos. This asser- tion, however, flatly contradicts Plato (Crito, 52, B.), who says that Socrates never left Athens, except once to go to the Isth- mian games, or when on mili- tary duty. Miiller, however, gets over the difficulty (Frag. Hist. Gr. ii. 49, N. 9) by sup- posing that Plato was only re- ferring to Socrates when grown up. It is just possible that Plato may not have known of a jour- ney which Socrates took in his earlier years. That he should have knowingly omitted to mention it, as Alberti Socr. 40 supposes, is hardly likely. It is also possible some mistake may have been made. lo may not have meant a journey to Samos, but his taking part in the expedition to Samos of 441 B.C., which, strange to say, is not mentioned in the Apology, 28, E. Or the error may lie with Diogenes, who applied to Socrates what lo had said of some one else. Or it may not be the lo of Chios, but some later individual who thus writes of Socrates. Certain it is, that lo's testimony does not prove Socrates to have been a pupil of Archelaus. Even if the relation were proved to have existed in Socrates' younger days, it would still be a ques- tion whether his philosophy was influenced thereby. Aristoxenus goes further. Ac- cording to his account in Diog. ii. 16, Socrates was the fa- vourite of Archelaus, or as Porphyry represents the mat- ter, he became acquainted with Archelaus in his seventeenth year, lived with him many years, and was by him initiated into philosophy. We shall have occasion to notice hereafter how little dependence can be placed on the statements of Aristoxe- nus respecting Socrates. Were the other statement which is to be found in Diogenes closely connected with this one, that HIS LIFE. was acquainted. 1 A well-known passage in Plato's Phaedo 2 describes him as advancing from the older natural science and the philosophy of Anaxagoras to his own peculiar views. But it is most improbable that this passage gives a historical account of his in- tellectual development, if for no other reason, at least for this one, 3 that the course of development there leads to the Platonic theory of conceptions; let alone the fact that it is by no means certain that Plato himself possessed any fuller information re- specting the intellectual progress of his teacher. No doubt he began life by learning his father's trade, 4 a trade which he probably never practised, CHAP. m. Socrates did not become a pupil of Archelaus till after the condemnation of Anaxago- ras, its worthlessness would be thoroughly shown ; for Socrates was seventeen when Anaxago- ras left Athens, and had long passed his years of pupilage. The assertions of Aristoxenus, however, are in themselves im- probable. For supposing So- crates to have been on intimate terms with Archelaus, when young, twenty years before Anaxagoras was banished, how is it conceivable that he should not have known Anaxagoras ? and if he was instructed by him in philosophy, how is it that neither Xenophon nor Plato nor Aristotle ever men- tion Archelaus ? All the later authorities for the relation of the two philosophers appear to rest on Aristoxenus. As there is nothing in the teaching of Archelaus, with which the So- cratic teaching can be connec- ted, it seems probable that he had little to do with the philo- sophy of Socrates, even though Socrates may have known him and his teaching. Besides, Socrates (in Xen. Sym.) calls himself an avrovpybs rfjs i\o- ffotyias, a self-taught philoso- pher. 1 He seems to have known those of Anaxagoras. A sup- posed allusion to the writings of Heraclitus (in Diog. ii. 22), is uncertain, nor is it estab- lished that he ever studied the Pythagorean doctrines (Plut. Curios. 2). 2 96, A. 8 As Volquardsen, (Rhein. Mus. N.F. xix. 514; Alberti Socr. 13 ; Uebemveg, Unters d. Plat. Schr. 94 ; Steinliart, Plat. L., 297. 4 Timon and Duris in Diog. ii. 19. Timseus, according to Porphyry in Cyril c. Jul. 208, 60, SOCRATES. CHAP. III. and certainly soon gave up. 1 Considering it to be his special calling to labour for the moral and intel- lectual improvement of himself and others, this con- viction forced itself so strongly upon him, as to appear to him in the light of a divine revelation. 2 He was, moreover, confirmed therein by a Delphic oracle, which, of course, must not be regarded as the cause of, but rather as an additional support to, his reforming zeal. 3 How and when this conviction first A. Plato (Eep. vi. 496, B.) seems to have had the case of Socrates in view. 1 Porphyry leaves it open whether Socrates or his father practised sculpture ; nor is any- thing proved by the story that the Graces on the Acropolis were his work {Diog. Paus. i. 22). No allusions are found in Aristophanes, Plato, and Xeno- phon to the sculptor's art. Hence we may conclude that if Socrates ever practised it, he gave it up long before the play of the Clouds was acted. Duris and Demetrius of Byzantium (in Diog. ii. 19), in stating that he was a slave, and that Crito removed him from a workshop and cared for his education, appear to confound him with Phsedo. 2 Plato, Apol. 33, C. : *Voi 8* TOVTO .... irpoffrtraKTai fnrb rov 6eov irpdrreiv Kal fK (UOmlteV Kal t Ivirnvlwv Kal Ttavrl rp6ira>, {jiirep rls irore Kal &\\i) 6eia /uotpa teal b-riovv 3 According to the well- known story in the Apol. 20, E., which has been repeated countless times by succeeding writers, the matter stands thus : Chasrephon had asked at Delphi if there were a wiser man than Socrates, and the priestess had answered in the negative. The Iambics which purport, to contain the answer in Diog, ii. 37, and Suid. ?o^. was the usual way. The latter ii. 20) that from time to time is the view of Athenaeus. he collected money from his 1 See Xenophon 1. c., not to pupils, can only be regarded as mention later anecdotes re- a slander. It is possible that specting this subject. he did not always refuse the 2 Plato, Apol. 23, B. ; 31, B. presents of opulent friends 3 Conf. Xen. Mem. i. 6, 1-10, (Diog. ii. 74, 121, 34 ; Sen. de where he argues against Anti- Benef. i. 8 ; vii. 24 ; Quintil. phon, that his is a thoroughly Inst. zii. 7, 9). Questionable happy mode of life, ending anecdotes (Diog. ii. 24, 31, 65 ; with the celebrated words : rb pfv fLTiSeybs SfeffOai 6elov fJvai, b. Flor. 3, 61 ; 17, 17) would prove nothing, to the contrary, eyyvrdru -rov but no dependence can be Ofiov. placed on these authorities. 4 The contentment of So- He is said to have refused the crates, the simplicity of his splendid offers of the Mace- life, his abstinence from sen- donian Archelaus and the Thes- sual pleasures of every kind, salian Scopas (J)iog. ii. 25 ; Sen. Benef. v. 6 ; Arrian or Plut. in Stob. Floril. 97, 28; Dio Chrys. Or. xiii. 30), and this tale is confirmed as far as ships, are well known. Conf. the first-named individual is Xen. Mem. i. 2, 1 ; 3, 5 ; Plato, concerned by Aristotle, Rhet. Symp. 174, A., 219, B. ; Phaed- ii.23,in a passage which Bayle, rus, 229, A. ; Arint&pJi. Clouds, Diet. Archelaus Rem. D. dis- 103, 361, 409, 828, Birds 1282. putes without reason. s Xen. Mem. i. 6, 4 ; iv. 8, 6. b 8e ws tXa^l his scanty clothing, his walk- ing bare-foot, his endurance of hunger and thirst, of heat and cold, of deprivations and hard- HIS LIFE. 66 occupation so confined him to his native city that he CHAP. rarely passed its boundaries or even its gates. 1 To take part in the affairs of the state 2 he did not, however, feel a call ; not only holding it to be impossible to act as a statesman 3 in the Athens of that day without violating his principles, and loath- ing submission to the demands of a pampered mob ; 4 but far more because he recognised his own peculiar task to lie in something very different. Any one sharing his conviction that care for one's own culture must be preferred to all care for public affairs, and that a thorough knowledge of self, together with a deep and many-sided experience, is a necessary quali- fication for public life, 5 must regard the influencing of individuals as a far more important business than the influencing of the community, which without the other would be profitless ; 6 must consider it a better service to his country to educate able statesmen than actually to discharge a statesman's duties. 7 Any one so thoroughly fitted by nature, taste, tone of thought and character, to elevate the morality and develop the intellect in others by means of personal intercourse, could hardly feel at home in 1 In the Crito, 52, B. ; 53, A., * Plato, Apol. 33, A., or as he says, that except on military the Gorgias (473, E.) ironically duty he has only once left expresses it : because he was Athens, going as a deputy to the too plain for a statesman. Isthmian games From the Conf. Gorg. 521, D. Phaedrus, 230, C., we gather Plato, Apol. 36, Symp. 216, that he rarely went outside the A. ; Xen. Mem. iv. 2, 6 ; iii. 6. gates. Plato, Apol. 29, C. ; 30, D. ; - Plato, Apol. 31, C. 33, C. Gorg. 513, E. Plato, Apol. 31, D. ; Rep. * Xen. Mem. i. 6, 15. vi. 4%, C.; Gorg. 521. C. SOCRATES. CHAP. III. any other line of life. 1 Accordingly, Socrates never attempted to move from his position as a private citizen. By serving in several campaigns with the greatest bravery and endurance, 2 he discharged his duties to his country. As a citizen he met im- 1 Socrates asserts this in Plato quite explicitly. In Apol. 31, D., he remarks that his Saifi6viov sent him back from a public life, and wisely too ; for in a career spent in oppos- ing the passionate impulses of the masses he would long since have been ruined. The ScuiJ.6- viov which deters him is the sense of what is suited to his individuality. That this sense conducted him rightly, is proved by the consideration that a public career, had he taken to it, would not only have been unsuccessful in his case, but would also have been most injurious for himself ; and Socrates usually estimates the moral value of conduct by success. If this consideration, as it no doubt did, confirmed his dislike to a public career, still the primary cause of this dislike, the source of that in- superable feeling, which as a Sai/j,6ytov preceded every esti- mate of consequences, was with- out doubt something immedi- ate. Had a public position suit- ed his character as well as the life he chose, he would as little have been deterred by its dan- gers, as he was by the dan- gers of that which he adopted (Apol. 29, B.). He states, how- ever, that his occupation af- forded him great satisfaction with which he could not dis- pense, Apol. 38, A. %TI nal Tvyxavei jue'-yiffTOj/ ayaObv bit av6pci>Trca TOVTO, IKCIOTTJS ^epas Trepi aperrjs rous \6yovs Troitlffdai Kal TUIV &\\cai>, irepl Siv vpeis ^jUoO aKovere Sia\fyofj,fvov Kal e/Aavrbv Kal &\\ovs ^eTao"ros, 6 Sf avf^eraffros fiios ov ftitarbs av- e P -K86- 10 ; Plato, Symp., Lysis., Char- VT\ffa, Ibid. ] 5 D. Xen. Mem. mides, Phaedrus, Apol. 23, B. ; i. 2, 3 and 31. The assertion 30, A. The /iatrrpoirffa which of the Epicurean Idomeneus, Socrates boasts of, Xen,. Symp. F 2 8 SOCRATES. CHAP j n ^8 higher calling, he was persuaded that he was - also serving his country in a way that no one else could do. 1 For deeply as he deplored the decline of discipline and education in his native city, 2 on the moral teachers of his time, the Sophists, 3 he could place no reliance. The attractiveness of his discourse won for him a circle of admirers, for the most part consisting of young men of family, 4 drawn to him by the most varied motives, standing to him in various relations, and coming to him, some for a longer, others for a shorter time. 6 For his part, he was anxious not only to educate these friends, but to advise them in everything pertaining to their good, even in worldly matters. 6 Out of this changing, and in part only loosely connected society, a nulceus was gradually formed of decided admirers, a Socratic school, united, however, far less by a common set of doctrines, than by a common love for the person of its founder. With more intimate friends he fre- quently had common meals, 7 which, however, can scarcely have been a fixed institution. Such as appeared to him to require other branches of in- 3, 10 ; 4 ; 56, 8, 5, 42, is no- poi fira.Ko\ov0owTfs ols paKiffTa. thing else, this art consisting i>. Still we find among his virtue and prudence. ardent admirers, not only Antis- 1 Plato, Apol. 30, A. ; Conf. thenes, but also Apollodorus 36, C. ; 39, 3 ; 41, D. ; Gorg. and Aristodemus, who appear 521, D. according to Plato, Symp. 173, 2 Xen. Mem. iii. 5, 13. 8, to have been equally poor. Mem. iv. 4, 5, which is not s Conf. Xen. Mem. i. 2, 14 ; at variance with Plato, Apol. 19, iv. 2, 40 ; Plato, Theast. 150, D. D, nor yet with the passages " Conf. examples, Mem. ii. 3, quoted p. 69, 1. 7, 8, 9 ; iii. 6, 7. 4 Plato, Apol. 23, C., ol vioi * Xen. Mem. iii. 14. HIS LIFE. struction, or whom he believed unsuited for inter- CHAP. course with himself, he urged to apply to other teachers, either in addition to or in place of himself. 1 Until his seventieth year he followed this course of action with his powers of mind unimpaired. 2 The blow which then put an end to his life and his activity will be mentioned hereafter. '- Plato, Theaetet. 151, B. ; knew him), without showing Xen. Mem. iii. 1 ; Symp. 4, any trace of weakness in his 61. mental powers up to the last - Xenophon and Plato most- moment. That it was a wrong ly represent Socrates as an old view is distinctly stated in man (such as he was when they Mem. iv. 8, 8. 70 SOCRATES. CHAPTER IV. THE CHARACTER OF SOCRATES. A. The greatness of the clw racier of Socrates. CHAP. ANCIENT writers speak of the character of Socrates in *V" terms of the greatest respect. There are, however, some exceptions, quite apart from the prejudice occasioned by his condemnation, which no doubt survived some time after his death. Followers of Epicurus indulged their love of slander even at his expense, 1 and one voice from the Peripatetic School has scandalous stories to tell respecting his life : as a boy he was disobedient and refractory ; as a youth, profligate ; as a man, coarse, importunate, given to sudden bursts of anger, and of fiery passions. 2 But 1 Cicero de N. D. i. 34, says that his teacher, the Epicurean Zeno, called him an Attic buf- foon. Epicurus, however, ac- cording to Diog. x. 8, appears to have spared him, although he depreciated every other philosopher. 2 The source from which these unfavourable reports, collected by Luzac, come is Aristoxenus, Lect. Att. 246 (from whom we have already heard similar things, p. 58, note ; 61, 3 ; 64, 5). From this writer come the following statements ; that mentioned in Porphyry : ws , Sia Synesius (Enc. Galv. 81) will have this limited to his younger years ; that of Cyril, c. Jul. vi. 185, C.; Theod. Cur. Gr. Aff. xii., 63, p. 174 : ore 8 A.e inrb rov ird9ovs TOVTOV flvai T^y affxyuonvvriif yap oiire bv&fjiaTOS a7ropo5iffioSp6Tfpov fj.ev fivcu, aSiKiav fie /j.^ irpotreTi/ai, ^ yap rats ya^fTOts ^ rais KOIVIUS /j.6vais, and then after HIS CHARACTER. 71 the stories we have of this kind are so improbable, and the chief relater is so untrustworthy, 1 that we _ cannot even with certainty 2 infer that Socrates only became what he was after a severe struggle 3 with his CHAP. IV. the history of his bigamy he concludes : elvai 8e tyyaiv aurbv v rcus o t uL\iai.s alvws rt t\- airexO'huova Kal \oiSopov Kal v&piff- riK6v. From the same source, as may be gathered from Pint. Mai. Her. c. 9, p. 856, comes the charge which Theod. 1. c. 1. 29, p. 8 quotes from Porphyry, without naming Aristoxenus, flvai 5 avrbv irpbs ovSfy /xec acpvri, atraiSfvrov oe vfpl iravra, so tliat he was hardly able to read, besides what follows (Ibid. xii. 66, p. 174 ; conf. iv. 2, p. 56) : i\eyno 8e irfpl avrov us SaTrcus &>v OVK eft ^Kaffeifv oiiSe etiTa/CTO>s' irpoa'Tov juej/ yap affLi> aurbv Tta irarpl 8iaT\eTa TO opyava TCL Trepi r-ijv Ti~)(vr\v airavTav frirovS-fiirore o\t- a. ruv irpo (nay naros eiriTinufj.ev Kal rdSe Sri fls TOI/S ox^ovs (iffaidfl-ro Kal r^y SiarpL^as eiroit'iTO irpbs rats Tpaifffats Kal irpbs rdis 'EpyuoTs. Herewith is connected the story of the physiognomist Zopyrus. (Cic. Tusc. vi. 37, 83 ; De Fat. iv. 10 ; Alex. Apli. De Fato, vi., Peru. Sat. IV. 2-t Conf. ; Max. Tyr. xxxi. 3), who declared Socrates to be stupid and profligate, and received from him the answer, that by nature he had been so, but had been changed by reason. This account can hardly be true. It looks as if it had been devised to illustrate the power of rea- son over a defective natural disposition, as illustrated in Plato, Symp. 215, 221, B. If the story was current in the time of Aristoxenus, he may have used it for his picture ; but it is also possible that his description produced the story, which in this case would have an apologetic meaning. The name of Zopyrus would lead us to think of the Syrian magi- cian, who, according to Aris- totle in Diogr. ii. 45, had foretold the violent death of Socrates. 1 As may be already seen from the stories respecting the bigamy, the gross ignorance, the violent temper, and the sensual indulgences of So- crates. 2 As Hermann does, De Socr. Mag. 30. 8 Though this is in itself possible, we have no certain authority for such an assertion. The anecdote of Zopyrus is, as already remarked, very un- certain, and where is the war- rant that Aristoxenus followed a really credible tradition ? He refers, it is true, to his father Spintharus, an actual acquaintance of Socrates. But the question arises whether this statement is more trust- worthy than the rest. The chronology is against it, and still more so is the sub- stance of what Spintharus 72 SOCRATES. CHAP. IV. natural disposition. Our best authorities only know him as the perfect man, to whom they look up with respect, and whom they regard as the exemplar of humanity and morality. ' No one,' says Xenophon, 4 ever heard or saw anything wicked in Socrates ; so pious was he that he never did anything without first consulting the (rods ; so just that he never injured any one in the least ; so master of himself that he never preferred pleasure to goodness ; so sensible that he never erred in his choice between what was better and what was worse. In a word, he was of men the best and happiest.' ' He further represents Socrates as a pattern of hardiness, of self-denial, of self-mastery ; as a man says. It may also be asked whether Spintharus spoke the truth, when he professed to have witnessed outbursts of anger in Socrates, who must then have been in the last years of his life. Certainly we have no more reason to believe him than his son. Lastly, Aristoxenus does not confine his remarks to the youth of Socrates, but they are of a most general character, or refer distinctly to his later years. LMZOC, 1. c. 261, would appear to have hit the truth when he makes Aristoxenus responsible for all these state- ments. For Aristoxenus ap- pears not only to have carried his warfare with the Socratic Schools against the person of Socrates, but also to have in- dulged in the most capricious and unfounded misapprehen- sions and inferences. His overdrawn imagination makes Socrates as a boy dissatisfied with his father's business, and as a man pass his life in the streets. In the same way he finds that Socrates must have been a man without culture, because of expressions such as that in the Apology, 17, B., or that in the Symp. 221, E. ; 199, A. ; violent in temper, in sup- port of which he refers to Symp. 214, D. ; and dissolute because of his supposed bigamy, and the words in Xen. Mem. i. 3, 14; ii. 2, 4, and p. 51, 2. 1 Mem. i. 1, 11; iv. 8, 11. R. Lange's objections to the genuineness of the concluding chapters of the Memorabilia (iv. 8) (De Xenoph. Apol. Berl. 1873) do not appear sufficiently strong to preclude their being cited as an authority. HIS CHARACTER. < of piety and love for his country, of unbending CHAP. fidelity to his convictions, as a sensible and trust- worthy adviser both for the bodies and souls of his friends ; as an agreeable and affable companion, with a happy combination of cheerfulness and seriousness ; above all, as an untiring educator of character, embracing every opportunity of bringing all with whom he came into contact to self-knowledge and virtue, and especially opposing the conceit and thoughtlessness of youth. Plato says the same of him. He too calls his teacher the best, the most sensible, and the most just man of his age, 1 and never tires of praising his simplicity, his moderation, his control over the wants and desires of the senses ; imbued with the deepest religious feeling in all his doings, devoting his whole life to the service of the Gods, and dying a martyr's death because of his obedience to the divine voice; and like Xenophon, he describes this service as the exercise of a universal moral influence on others, and particularly on youth. In his picture, too, the more serious side in the character of Socrates is relieved by a real kindness, an Athenian polish, a sparkling cheerfulness and a pleasing humour. Of his social virtues and his political courage Plato speaks in the same terms as Xenophon, and adds thereto an ad- mirable description of Socrates on military service. 2 Every trait which he mentions adds to the clearness of that picture of moral greatness, so wonderful for 1 8ee the end of t lie Phaedo. 2 See page 66, note 2. 74 SOCRATES. CHAP. IV. B. His cJia/i'acter reflecting Greek pe- culiarities. its very originality, for the absence of all that is studied and artificial about it, for its exclusion of self-glorification and affectation. 1 Owing to its being a native growth, the Socratic type of virtue bears, throughout, the peculiar impress of the Greek mind. Socrates is not the insipid ideal of virtue, which a superficial rationalism would make of him, but he is a thorough Greek and Athenian, taken, as it were, from the very marrow of his nation, possessed of flesh and blood, and not merely the uni- versal moral standard for all time. His much- lauded moderation is free from the ascetic element, which it seems always to suggest in modern times. Socrates enjoys good company, although he avoids noisy carousals ; 2 and if he does not make the pleasures of the senses an object in life, no more does he avoid them, when they are offered to him, nay, not even when in excess. Thus the call for small cups in Xenophon's banquet is not made for fear of indulging 1 Most of the traits and anecdotes recorded by later writers are in harmony with this view of Socrates. Some of them are certainly fictions. Others may be taken from wri- tings of pupils of Socrates, which have been since lost, or from other trustworthy sources. They may be found in the fol- lowing places. Cic. Tusc. iii. 15, 31 ; Off. i. 26 and 90 ; Seneca, De Const. 18, 5; De Ira, i. 15, 3 ; iii. 11, 2 ; ii. 7, 1 ; Tranqu. An. 5, 2 ; 17, 4 ; Epist. 104, 27 ; Plin. H. Nat. vii. 18 ; Pint. Educ. Pu. 14, p. 10; De Adulat. 32, p. 70 ; Coh. Ira, 4, p. 455 ; Tranqu. An. 10, p. 471 ; Garrulit. 20 ; IHog. ii. 21, 24, 27, 30 ; vi. 8 ; Gell. N. A. ii. 1 ; xix. 9, 9; Val. Max. viii. 8; ^lian,V.H. i. 16; ii. 11, 13, 36 ; iii. 28 ; ix. 7, 29 ; xii. 15 ; xiii. 27, 32 ; Athen. iv. 157 c. ; Stob. Flor. 17, 17 and 22. Basil. De leg. Grsec. libr. Op. II. 179, a. Themist. Orat. vii. 95, a. Sim-pi, in Epiet. Enchir. c., 20, p. 218. A few others have been or will be referred to. 2 Plato, Symp. 220, A. ; conf. 174, A. HIS CHARACTER. 76 too largely, but that exhilaration may not be too CHAP. rapid. 1 Plato describes him as boasting that he can _ equally well take much or little, that he can surpass all in drinking, without ever being intoxicated him- self, 2 and represents him at the close of the banquet as leaving all his companions under the table, and pursuing his daily work, after a night spent over the bowl, as if nothing had happened. Moderation here appears with him not to consist in total abstinence from pleasure, but in perfect mental freedom, neither requiring pleasure, nor being ever overtaken by its seductive influence. His abstemiousness in other points is also recorded with admiration. 3 Numerous passages, however, in Xenophon's ' Memorabilia ' 4 prove that his morality was far below our strict standard of principles. The Grecian peculiarity of affection for boys marks, indeed, his relations to youth, but his character is above all suspicion of actual vice, 6 and he treats with irony a supposed 1 Xen. Mem. 2, 26: fa 8e affection. Not only is there fifjuv ol vaiSes niKpais KV\IL TTVK.- no allusion to it in the judicial va firityeKcifaffiv, OVTUS oi> fiia- charge, but not even in Aris- {opfvoi inrb TOV olvov fitdiitiv, tophanes, who would undoubt- aA\' ava.Tffi6on.tvoi irpbs rb ircuyvt- edly have magnified the smal- wSfinepov a<(>i6nf6a. lest suspicion into the gravest 2 Symp. 176, C. ; 220, A.; charge. The other comic poet s, 213, E. according to Athen., v. 21 U, 3 Xen. Mem. i. 2, 1 ; 3, 14. knew nothing of it. Nor does We have already seen that Xenophon deem it necessary Aristoxenus and his followers to refute this calumny, and cannot prove the contrary. therefore the well-known story 4 i. 3, 14; ii. 1, 5; 2, 4; iii. of Plato's banquet has for its 11 ; iv. 5, D. Conf. Conv. iv. object far more the glorin'ca- 38. tion than the justification of 6 The cotemporaries of So- his teacher. On the other crates seem to luive found no- hand, the relations of Socrates tiling to object to in Socratic to Alcibiades, in the verses 76 SOCRATES. CHAP, love-affair of his own. 1 At the same time, what IV ' Greek in the presence of youthful beauty was proof agairst a certain element of aesthetic pleasure, which at least was the ground and origin, even though ( as in his case) an innocent one, of deeper affection ? 2 The odious excrescences of Greek morality called forth his severest censure ; yet at the same time, accord- ing to Xenophon, 3 and yEschines, 4 and Plato, 5 So- crates described his own relations to his younger friends by the name of Eros, or a passionate attach- ment grounded on assthetic attractions. Not other- wise may Grecian peculiarities be noticed in his ethical or political views, nor is his theology free from the trammels of the popular belief. How deeply these lines had influenced his character may be seen not only in his simple obedience 6 to the laws of his country throughout life, and his genuine respect for the state religion, 7 but far more also in the trials of purporting to be written by 4 In his Alcibiades he speaks Aspasia, which Athentcus com- of the love of Socrates for municates or. che authority of Alcibiades. See Aristid. Or. Herodicus, have a very sus- xlv. irepl p-^ropiKris, p. 30, 34. picious look, and Tertulliaii, * Prot. beginning ; Symp. Apbl. c. 46 mistakenly applies 177, D. ; 218, B. ; 222, A. ; not, the words SiafyOelpfiv rovs vtovs to mention other expressions to paederastia. In Juvenal for which Plato is answerable. (Sat. ii. 10) Socratici citusdi 6 Plato, Apol. 28, E. refer to the manners of his 7 XenopJion, Mem. i. 1, 2, as- own time. sures us not only that Socrates 1 Xen. Mem. iv. 1, 2 ; Symp. took part in the public sacri- 4, 27; Plato, Symp. 213, C. ; fices, but that he was frequently 216, D. ; 222, B" ; Charm. 155, in the habit of sacrificing at D. home. In Plato he invokes 2 Xen. Mem. i. 2, 29 ; 3, 8 ; Helios, Symp. 220, D. ; and his Sym. 8, 19, 32, with which last words, according to the Plato agrees. Phaedo, 118, A., were an earnest Symp. 8, 2 and 24 ; Mem. commission to Crito to offer a cock to YEsculapius. Often is HIS CHARACTER. 77 his last days, when for fear of violating the laws, CHAP. he scorned the ordinary practices of defence, and **' after his condemnation refused to escape from prison. 1 The epitaph which Simonides inscribed on the tomb of Leonidas might very well be inscribed on that of Socrates : He died to obey the state. 2 Deeply as Socrates is rooted in the national c - Pro- character of Greece, there is about him a some- traits in thing decidedly unlike a Greek, presenting a foreign and even almost modern appearance. This it was which made him appear to his cotemporaries a thoroughly eccentric and singular person. This, for a Greek so unintelligible, something, which he described by one word as his singularity, 3 con- sisted, according to Plato's account, 4 in a want of agreement between his outward appearance and his belief in oracles mentioned, good to himself, and much which he always conscien- harm to his friends and de- tiously obeyed (Mem. i. 3,4; pendants. The Apology speaks Pluto, Appl. 21, B.) and the as if entreating the judges use of which he recommended were unworthy of the speaker to his friends (Xen. Mem. ii. and his country. (5, 8; iv. 7, 10; Anabas. iii. 1, 2 Xen. says: irpoei\rro fj.a\\ov 5). He was himself fully per- rots vofiois tupevuv airoOavew 1) suaded that he possessed an irapa.vofj.ui> fjv. oracle in the truest sense, in 3 Plato, Symp. 221, C. : IIoA- Ilie inward voice of his Sai/j.6- \a /jitv ovv &v TIS Kal &\\a t\oi viov, and he also believed in 2KpaT7j tiraivtffat Kal Qav^da-ta dreams and similar prognosti- . . . . rb 5e nySevl avdpcairwv cations. (Plato, Crito, 44, A. ; Z^oiov iivai, /t^re r&v ita\a.iSiv Pluedo, 60, D. ; Apol. 33, C.) /^Te rcav vvv UVTOW, TOVTO al-wv 1 This motive is represented iroirbs 6av/jLaros .... ofos 5e by XvHojrfwn (Mem. iv. 4, 4) otnoa-l yejove T^V a.Toir'u\t> &v0pw- and Plato (Apol. 34, D. ; Phaedo, iros Kal avrbs ol \6yoi avrov ov5' 1S, (.'.) as the decisive one, tfyvs &c tvpoi ns (rrr&v, ofrrc TUI> although the Crito makes it vvv otfre rv. ap]iear that a flight from 4 Symp. 215, A. ; 221, E. Athens would have done no 78 SOCRATES. CHAP, inward and real nature. In this respect he contrasts IV most strikingly with the mutual interpenetration of both, which constitutes the usual classic ideal. On the one hand we behold in Socrates indifference to the outer world, originally foreign to the habits of his countrymen ; on the other hand, a meditative- ness unknown before. Owing to the former feature there is about him a something prosy and dry, and, if the expression may be allowed, philistine-like, sharply contrasting with the contained beauty and the artistic grace of life in Greece. Owing to the latter there is about him something akin to the revelation of a higher life, having its seat within, in the recesses of the soul, and not fully explained in its manifestations, and which even Socrates him- self regarded as superhuman. In their account of these two peculiarities both Plato and Xenophon are agreed. Even from an outward point of view, the Silenus-like appearance of Socrates, which Plato's Alcibiades, 1 and Xenophon's Socrates himself 2 de- scribe with so much humour, must rather have con- cealed than exposed the presence of genius to the eye of a Greek. But more than this, a certain amount of intellectual stiffness, and an indifference to what is sensibly beautiful, is unmistakeable in his speech and behaviour. Take for instance the process of catechising given in the ' Memorabilia,' 3 by which a general of cavalry is brought to a knowledge of his 1 Symp. 215 ; conf. Thteet. crates a pleasing appearance, 14, 3,~E. buttMs is of course quileunte- * Symp. 4, 19 ; 2, 19 ; Ifyiete- nable. tus (Diss. iv. 11, 19) gives So- iii. 3. HIS CHARACTER. 70 duties, or the formality with which things, 1 long CHAP. familiar to his hearers, are proved, or the way in **' which the idea of the beautiful is resolved into that of the useful. 2 Or hear him, on grounds of expedi- ency, advising conduct, which to us seems simply abominable, 3 or in the Phsedrus 4 refusing to walk out because he can learn nothing from trees and the country, and taking exception in the Apology 5 to the works of poets and artists, because they are the re- sults of natural genius and inspiration, and not of reflection. 6 Or see him in Xenophon's Symposium, 7 despite the universal custom of the ancients, 8 dancing alone at home, in order to gain healthful exercise, and justifying his conduct by the strangest of reflec- tions ; unable even at table 9 to forget considerations of utility. Taking these and similar traits into account, there appears in him a certain want of imagination, a one-sided prominence of the criti- cal and intellectual faculties, in short a prosiness which clashes with the poetry of Grecian life, and the Symp. iii. 10, 9; iii. 11. M. Crasso, in foro, mihi crede, iii. 8, 4. saltaret ; Pint. De vit. jud. 16, 1. 3, 14. 533, also the expressions in 230, D. Xeiwplwn : 'Opx^ffofj.ai v^i Afo. This point will be subse- 'Efraitfa 5rj 4ye\curav airavrts. quently discussed. And when Charmides found " 22, C. Socrates dancing : rJ> /ieV ye 2, 17. TrpcoTOu e'eir \dyrtv Kal eSfiffa, ^ Compare Menexenus, 236, nalvoio, K. r. \. Of the same C. : aA\a fifvroi ffol ye 5ei x d P'" character was his instruction ffTt K&V o\fyou ft /ne in music under Connus, if the airo^vvra opx^trairfleu, story were only true of his &v ; and Cicero pro having received lessons with Mur. : Nemo fere saltat so- the schoolboys. Plato, Eu- brius, nisi forte insanit ; De thyd. 272, C. Offic. iii. 19 : Dares hanc vim Xen. Symp. 3, 2. 80 SOCRATES. CHAP, refined taste of an Athenian. Even Plato's Alcibiades 1 allows, that at first sight the discourses of Socrates appear ridiculous and rude, dealing as they invari- ably do with beasts of burden, smiths, tailors, and tanners, and apparently saying the same thing in the same words. Was not this the very objection raised by Xenophon ? 2 How strange that plain unadorned common sense must have appeared to his cotem- poraries carefully avoiding all choice figures, and using the simplest and most common expressions. This peculiarity was not, however, the result of any lack of taste, but of the profound originality of his ideas, for which customary figures were insuffi- cient. Yet again, sometimes the soul of the philo- sopher, diving into its own recesses, so far lost itself in this labour as to be insensible to external impressions, and at other times gave utterance to enigmatical sayings, which appeared strange to it iu a wakeful state. Serious and fond of meditation 3 as was Socrates, it not unfrequently happened that 1 Symp. 221, E. Conf. Kal- TJ, Si SwKpares, fKeiva. ra licles in Gorgias 490, C. : irepl auras \eyeis & eyw ird\ai irore fftria \eyets Kal irora al larpovs ffov fJKovffa. The like complaint Kal s Trepl TOVTWV JHJUV ovra crreva. epcoT^/Aara. Tbv \6yov. * Accordingly in the Aristo- 2 Mem. i. 2, 37 : 'O 5e Kpirlas- telian problems, xxx. 1, 953, a, oAA.cfc Ttav 8e rot ffe airexeffOat, 2G, he is reckoned amongst the ev melancholy, which is not at ffKirrewv Kal TOV reKT&vtav Kal variance with tlie gentle firm- TUV xa.*Ke authority which he follow- his death will follow on the c(l had not exaggerated the third day. time during which Socrates * Volqvardsen, Das Daemo- stood there. Favorinus in mum d. Socr. und seine Inter- (ii-U. X. A. ii. 1, makes the one preten. Kiel, 1862. Ribbing, <>0"lJ', WffTTfp (T0\ proves nothing, as o-uju/3ouXous is used as a metonym for Sa.tfi6viov re KO.\ TO flw6bs irrj/j.tUi' (not yiyvtffdai tytvfTo, Kai rua a^nt-lov. Kuthy. 272, E. : 4yevero TO flca- Qbs ffrjiJLf'ioi', ib Sai/idi/ioc. Apol. 50 ; fb TO 6tov armeiov - rb 9vtd fjiot /jLavTiK^j rj rov Theset. 151, A.: TO pot baifi6viov. Eu- thyphro 3, B. : on 5$) tw7j TO) Saip.ovlov p. 128, E. be taken for a person. The spuriousness of the Theages. notwithstanding Socher's de- fence needs no further proof, especially after being exhaus- tively shown by Hermann, p. 427. * Doubtless Socrates regarded God or the deity as its ultimate source. But he expresses nc opinion as to whether it came herefrom. SOCRATES. CHAP. IV. very clear notion on the subject. 1 These revelations, moreover, always refer to particular actions, 2 and 1 It is much the same thing whether rb Saifj.6vtov be taken for a substantive or an adjec- tive. The probable rights of the case are, as Kriscke, Forsch. 229 remarks, that Xenophon uses it as a substantive = rb Qelov or 6 6ebs, whereas Plato uses it as an adjective, ex- plaining it as Sai/jLoviov ffr]fj.e1cv, and says 5ai/j.6vi6i> fj.oi yiyverai. The grammar will admit of either. Conf . Arist. Rhet. ii. 23, 1398 a, 15. When, therefore, Ast cites Xenophon against Plato's explanation of Sai/uoi/ia as Saifj.6via irpd.yfj.ara, he probably commits a (lerdfiacris fls &\\o yevos. The very difference be- tween Xenophon and Plato proves how loosely Socrates spoke of the 5aip6uoi>. 2 This applies to all the in- stances of its intervention mentioned by Plato and Xeno- phon. They are the following : (1) Xen. Mem. iv. 8, 5, where Socrates, when urged to pre- pare a defence, replies : a\\a vfy rbv Ai'a, $7877 ft-ov emxetpovvros, (ppovriffat rrjs trpbs robs Siicaaras airo\oyias rjvavriit>eij rb $ai/j.6i>iov. (2) Plato Apol. 31, D.: Why did not Socrates busy himself with political matters ? The Saifj.6viov was the reason : rovr' effnv 'o fj.oi evavrmvrai ra vo\t- riKa irpdrrew. (3) Ibid, (after his condemnation) : a singular occurrence took place, r> yap eliadvtd fiat fj.avriK^ j\ rov Satpoviov tv fi^v r$ irpSffOfv %p6va> iravrl iravv irvKvfy ael $v /col irdw tirl ff/jLiKpois evai>riovfj.fvi), el n /nf\- \oi/jii fj.^i 6p6cas irpdett> vvvi St. . . . e^iAvri etaQev o'lKodtv rjvavri- rb rov Oeou (TTj/ueTof, ovre ^ a.vifia.ivov evravQol eirl rb .., v, oiir ff rf \6y

\vet vve~ivai, eviois Se ea. Add to these cases a few others in which Socrates himself more or less jokes about the 5ai[j.6viov, which deserve to be mentioned because it there appears in the same character as elsewhere. (5) Xen. Symp. 8, 5, where Antisthenes throws in Socrates' teeth : rare fj,fv rb 8ai/j.6viov irpo(paffL6fA.ei>os ovSta\eyri ju.cu Tore S'a\\ov rov etpiefj.evos. (6) Plato Phfedr. 242, B., when Socrates wished to depart : rb ^ai^.6vi6v re Kal eleadbs o~-n/j.eI6i> /act ylyveo~6ai eytvero ael 6e /xf eTriff^ei ft by fj.f\\ca irpdrreiv Kal riva (ptavrif eSo|a avr6Qev aKovffai, 5} fJ.e OVK ea airlevat irplv kv cKpoaicaffwfJ.ai, &s n 7ifj.aprT)K6ra (Is rb Qetov. (7) Ibid. Euthyd. 272, E. ; as Socrates was about to leave the Lyceum, eyevero rb elaObs fffine'iov rb oai/*6viov, he therefore sat down again, and soon after Euthydemus and Dionysodorus really came in. In all these cases the Sa^vtov appears to have been an inward voice de- terring the philosopher from a particular action. Even the more general statement that the $atfj.6i>ioi> always made ite warnings heard whenever So- HIS CHARACTER. according to Plato assume the form of prohibitions. Sometimes the Sai/Aoviov stops him from saying or doing something. 1 It only indirectly points out what should be done, by approving what it does not forbid. In a similar way it indirectly enables Socrates to advise his friends by not hindering him from approving their schemes, either by word or by silence. 2 The subjects respecting which the crates thought of a political viov only have reference to par- career, falls in with this con- ticular future actions (not only ception of sense the passage in the Re- public vi. 496, D. should be understood, when Socrates re- marks that most of those who had the capacity for philosophy were diverted therefrom by In a similar of Socrates, but of others), from which it dissuades. The two latter authorities are, however, worthless. ' Apol. 31, D. : Sri p.oi 6e16v n /col ^aifj.6viov yiyverai .... e/tol 8e TOUT' la-rlv IK ircuSbs aod- other interests, unless peculiar ptvov vfi TIS yiyvontvi), $) ftrav circumstances kept them, such yevijTai atl airorptiret pe TOVTO as sickness, which was a hin- drance to political life. rb 8' t)fjLfTtpo>' OVK &tov \eyeiv rb Saifj.6viov a'Tifie'iov t) yap irov nvi & &c /ueAXw irprreiv, irpTJ (Euthydemus), & 2(aKparfs, toiKafftv $TI . IV. D., the prophecies of may be harmonised as in the Sd SOCRATES. CHAP heavenly voice makes itself heard are in point of value and character veiy different. Besides a concern of such deep personal interest to Socrates as his judicial condemnation, besides a question having such a far- reaching influence on his whole activity as that whether he should take part in public life or not, it expresses itself on occasions quite unimportant. 1 It is in fact a voice so familiar to Socrates and his friends, 2 that whilst regarded as a something enigma- tical, mysterious, and unknown before, affording, too, a special proof of divine providence, it can neverthe- less be discussed without awe and mystery in easy and even in flippant language. The facts of the phenomenon resolve themselves into this, that not unfrequently Socrates was kept back by a dim feeling based on no conscious consideration, in which he discerned a heavenly sign and a divine hint, from carrying out some thought or intention. Were he asked why this sign had been vouchsafed to him, from his point of view the reply would be, because that from which it deterred him would be harmful to himself or others. 3 In order, therefore, to justify text. Evidently Plato is more before all things at proving accurate. His language is far Socrates' divination to be the more definite than that of same as other divinations, and Xenophon, and is throughout so defending his teacher from the consistent, witness the various charge of religious innovation, cases mentioned in the previous As to the special peculiarity of note. Xenophon, as is his wont, the Socratic Sat/j.6viov and its confined himself to what caught inner processes, we can look to the eye, to the fact that the Plato for better information. Sainovutv enabled Socrates to ' vdm eirl iot> forbad him to pre- pare a defence, and then pro- ceeds to discuss the reasons why the deity found an inno- cent death better for him than a longer life. In Plato, Apol. 40, 3, he concludes, from the silence of the Saifudviov during Ids defence, that the condemna- 1 ion to which it led would be for him a benefit. 2 Xen. Mem. i. 1, 3 ; iv. 3, 12; i. 4, 14. Conf. Apol. 12. 3 Apol.40,A.;Phsed.242,C.; Euthyphro, 3, B. 4 Xcti. Mem. i. 1, 6: Ta /xej> avayKaia (TWt0cv\fve Kal irparrfiv us

  • 6(j.tti' api(n' a.v jrfpl 6e rtai> a.8r)\ii>v birus PTICTOITO /j.avrfvffoiJ.fvovs eirejuirej/ e* iroirjTt'a. For this reason, therefore, divination was re- quired: TiKTOvucbv fj.ev yap i) Xa\KevnKbi> ?) yttapyiKbv ^ dvOpu- TrV TOIOVTCOV tpywv e^eraar inky i) KnyKfriKbv fy O'IKOVO- irdvra TO, rotavra /J.a6r]fj.ara Kal OLvQp&tiov yi>ufj.ri alperea 3v6fj.te flvat TO. 8e p-fyiaTO. riav Iv rov- TOIS 6v ovSff Sri\oi' tlvai rots avOpuirois. The greatest things, however, as is imme- diately explained, are the con- sequences of actions, the ques- tion whether thev are useful !>() SOCRATES. L'HAP. Herewith the whole field of philosophical inquiry ' is excluded from the province of the Sat/jboviov. This 00 Limi- field Socrates, more than any one of his predecessors, claimed for intelligent knowledge and a thorough understanding. As a matter of fact, no instance occurs of a scientific principle or a general moral law being referred to the bai^ovLov. Nor must the sage's conviction of his own higher mission be confounded with his belief in the heavenly sign, nor the deity by whom he considered himself commissioned tj sift- men be identified with the SaipoviovS The fact that Socrates thought to hear the heavenly voice from the time when he was a boy, ought to be sufficient evidence to warn against such an error ; 2 for at that time he cannot possibly have had any thought of a philosophic calling. That voice, more- over, according to Plato, always deterring, never prompting, 3 cannot have been the source of the positive command of the deity to which Socrates or detrimental to the doer. &picna Accordingly Socrates observes ' This was often done in that it is madness to think to former times ; for instance by be able to dispense with divi- Meiners, Verm. Schrift. iii. 24, nation, and to do everything and still more so by Lclut, 1. c. by means of one's own intelli- p. 113, who sees in the 9ebs gence (and as he afterwards from whom Socrates derived adds, aOefjuffra iroie1) : Sai/novay his vocation a proof of his 8e TOVS (jMvreuofj.ei'ovs, a TO?S belief in a genius. The same avdpiatrois !8o>/cai/ of Oeol fj.aBov ]>. 86, 2. hausted with the conception of ' Stapfer, Biogr. Univers. T. conscience, but that it figures xlii. Socrate, p. 531 ; Urandix, as 'practical moral tact in re- (Joscli. d. Griecli. Rom. Phil, spect of personal relations and ii. a, (JO (Gesch. d. Entwick. d. particular actions.' 2 ^ SOCRATES. CHAP, actions. Again, conscience exclusively refers to the moral value or worthlessness of an action, whereas the heavenly sign in Socrates always bears reference to the consequences of actions. Therein Plato, no less than Xenophon, bees a peculiar kind of prophecy. Allowing that Socrates was occasion- ally mistaken as to the character of the feelings and impulses which appeared to him revelations, that uow and then he was of opinion that the deity had forbidden him something for the sake of its preju- dicial consequences when the really forbidding power was his moral sense, yet the same cannot be said of all the utterances of the Saipcvwv. Doubtless in deterring him from taking up politics, the real motive lay in the feeling that a political career was incompatible with his conviction of an important higher calling, to which he had devoted his life. It may, therefore, be said that in this case a scruple of conscience had assumed the form of a heavenly voice. But in forbidding to prepare a speech for judicial defence, this explanation will no longer apply. Here the only explanation which can be given of the heavenly voice, is that such a taking in hand of his own personal interests did not commend itself to the sage's line of thought, and that it appeared unworthy of him to defend himself otherwise than by a plain statement of the truth requiring no preparation. 1 1 Volquardsen 1. c. confounds Apol. 17, A., as meaning that it two things in explaining the was not a question of a simple prohibition, mentioned by Xen. defence, but of a defence in Mem. iv. 8, 4, to prepare a the usual legal style with all defence in the sense of Pluto, the tricks and manoeuvres of HIS CHARACTER. f All this, however, has little to do with judgments CHAP. respecting what is morally admissible or not, and has much to do with the questions as to what is suited or unsuited to the individual character of the philosopher. Still less can the decision respecting the receiving hack pupils 1 who have once deserted him, be referred to conscience. The question here really was as to the capacity of the respective persons to profit by his instructions. It involved, therefore, a criticism of character. The jokes, too, which Socrates and his friends permitted themselves as to the Sat[A6viov z were wholly out of place, if the Scufjioviov were conscience. As far as they are founded on fact, they afford a proof that the Saipoviov must l)e distinguished from moral sense or conscience : and it is quite in harmony herewith to hear Socrates say, 3 that the heavenly voice often made itself heard on quite unimportant occasions. Kemembering fur- ther that Socrates was more than anyone else, perhaps, bent on referring actions to clear conceptions, and accordingly excluded from the field of prophecy, and therefore from the province of the Sapovtov, every- an orator. In Xenophon's ac- very much worthy of himself, count there is not a word of But as Cron in Eos. i. 17~> this. Had this been his mean- observes : what idea must we ing, it must somehow have form to ourselves of Socrates, been indicated in the sequel ; if he required the assistance of it would have been said that the Sa.in6viov to keep him back the $aifi6i>ioi> kept him from de- from that which he clearly fending himself, because a de- saw to be incompatible with fence in keeping with his prin- his principles 1 ciples would have been useless ; ' See above p. 86, 2, No. 4. it is by no means a matter of 2 Ibid. No. 6, 7. course that he would not have * Ibid. No. 3. been able to get up a speech 94 SOCRATES. CHAP, thing that might be known by personal reflection, 1 1_ . we shall see how little right we have to understand the S(u/j,oviov as having principally or wholly to do with the moral value of an action. (d) PMlo- The heavenly voice appears rather to be the xophical ea-plaiia- general form, which a vivid, but in its origin unex- 9ewiw lf! Pl red sense of tne propriety of a particular action assumed for the personal consciousness of Socrates. - The actions to which this sense referred could, as we have seen, be most varied in content and importance. Quite as varied must the inward processes and motives have been out of which it grew. It might be some conscientious scruple pressing on the sense of the sage without his being fully conscious thereof. It might be some apprehension of the consequences of a step, such as sometimes rises as a first impression with all decidedness in the experi- enced observer of men and of circumstances, before it is even possible for him to account to himself for the reasons of his misgiving. It might be that an action in itself neither immoral nor inappropriate, jarred on Socrates' feelings, as not being in harmony witli his peculiar mode of being and conduct. It might be that on unimportant occasions all those unaccount- able influences and impulses came into play, which contribute so much to our mental attitude and de- 1 See p. 89, 4. of which lie had discovered. 2 The last remark follows Xor does it conflict herewith, not only from what has been that after the heavenly voice stated, p. 89, 4, but it is also has made itself heard, lie after- inconceivable that Socrates wards considers what win have could have referred to a hig-her led the Gods to thus reveal inspiration impulses the sources their will. HIS CHARACTER. visions ; all the more so in proportion as the object ('HAP. itself affords less definite grounds for decision. In __! this respect the Satpovtov has been rightly called ' the inner voice of individual tact,' ' understanding by tact a general sense of propriety in word and action as exemplified in the most varied relations of life in small things as well as in great. 2 This sense Soc- rates early noticed in himself as unusually strong, 3 and subsequently by his peculiarly keen and unwearied observation of himself and other men he developed it to such a pitch of accuracy, that it was seldom or as he believed never at fault. Its psychologi- cal origin was, however, concealed from his own consciousness. It assumed for him from the begin- ning the appearance of a foreign influence, a higher revelation, an oracle. 4 Herein is seen the strength of the hold which the beliefs of his countrymen had over Socrates ; 5 1 Hermann, Platonismus i. The genius of Socrates is not 236 : similarly Krlsehe, For- Socrates himself. . . . but an schung. i. 231. oracle, which, however, is not 2 The objections hereto raised external, but subjective, his by Volqvardxen, pp. <56, 63, and oracle. It bore the form of Alberti, Socr. 68, are partly knowledge, which was, how- answered by the argument ever, connected with a certain which has preceded. Besides, unconsciousness. Ihey have more reference to 5 Krixche I.e.: What is not words than to things. So far in our power, what our nature :is this is the case, there is no cannot bear, and what is not use in disputing. By tact we naturally found in our im- aoderatand not only social but pulses or our reflections, is moral tact, not only acquired involuntary, or according to but natural tact, and this word the notion of the ancients, seems very appropriate to ex- heavenly : to this category be- pn-ss the sense which Socrates long enthusiasm and prophecy, described as the Sai/j.6fiov. the violent throb of desire, the 3 See p. 88, 3. mighty force of feelings. 4 Zfcp02,Gesch.d.Phil. ii.77: i)G SOCRATES. CHAP, herewith, too, are exposed to view the limits of his ' . self-knowledge. Feelings whose origin he has not discovered are seen to exercise over him an irresistible power. On the other hand, the Bat/j.6viov when it doe& speak, takes the place of the usual signs and por- tents. Hegel l not without reason sees herein a proof that the determining motives of action, which in the case of the Greek oracles were things purely exter- nal, have come to be sought in man himself. To misgivings incapable of being resolved into clear conceptions, a high importance was here attached ; in them a very revelation of deity was seen, proving most clearly that the human mind, in a way hitherto foreign to Greeks, had come to occupy itself with itself, and carefully to observe what transpired within. The power which these feelings early exercised over Socrates, the devotion with which he even then listened for the voice within, affords an insight inta the depths of his emotional nature. In the boy we see the embryo of the man, for whom self-knowledge was the most pressing business of life, for whom un- tiring observation of his moral and mental con- ditions, analysis of notions and actions, reasoning as to their character and testing of their value were primary necessities. 2 The same tone of mind also shows itself in other peculiarities of Socrates, to his contemporaries appear- ing so strange. At times he was seen lost in thought, so as to be unconscious of what transpired around 1 Hegel 1. c. and Recht's 2 Conf. Plato, Apol. 38, A. Philosophic, 279, p. 369. See above, p. 60, 3. HIS CHARACTER. 97 him ; at times going on his way regardless of the CHAP. habits of his fellows ; his whole appearance displaying a far-reaching indifference to external things, a one- sided preference of the useful to the beautiful. What do all these traits show if not the importance which he attached to the study of self, to the solitary work of thought, to a free determination of self indepen- dent of foreign judgments ? Eemarkable as it may seem to find the dryness of the man of intellect and the enthusiasm of the man of feeling united in one and the same person, both features may be referred to a common source. What distinguishes Socrates in his general conduct from his fellow-citizens was this power of inward concentration. This struck his cotemporaries as being so foreign an element, and thereby an irreparable breach was made in the artistic unity of Greek life. What the general importance of this peculiarity may be, and what traces it has left in history, are questions to answer which we must enquire into the Socratic philosophy. SOCRATES. CHAPTER V. THE SOURCES AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF SOCRATES. CHAP. To give an accurate account of the philosophy of 1__ Socrates is a work of some difficulty, owing to the well- A. Xeno- known divergence of the earliest accounts. Socrates Plato. committed nothing to writing himself; * of the works of his pupils, in which he is introduced as speaking, only those of Xenophon and Plato are preserved. 2 These are, however, so little alike, that we gather from the one quite a different view of the teaching of Socrates to what the other gives us. Among early historians of philosophy it was the fashion to construct a picture of the Athenian sage, without principles and criticism, indiscriminately from the writings of Xenophon and Plato, no less than from 1 The unimportant poetical thing to writing: is clear from attempts of his last days {Plato, the silence of Xenophon, Plato, Phaedo, 60, C.) can hardly be and all antiquity, not to men- counted as writings, even if they tion the positive testimony of were extant. They appear, Cic. de Orat, iii. 16, 60 : Dttf. however, to have been very soon i. 16; Pliit. De Alex. Virt. i. lost. The Paean at least, 4. A conclusive discussion on which Themist. (Or. ii. 27, c.) this point in refutation of the considers genuine, was rejected views of Leo Allatius is given by the ancient critics, accord- by Olearius in Stanl. Hist, ing to Diog. ii. 42. The Phil. 198. spuriousness of the Socratic 2 For instance, those of J&s- letters is beyond question, and chines, Antisthenes, Phaedo. that Socrates committed no- AUTHORITIES FOR HIS PHILOSOPHY. 99 later, and for the most part indifferent, authorities. CHAP. Since the time of Brucker, however, Xenophon came ' . to be regarded as the only authority to be perfectly trusted for the philosophy of Socrates ; to all others, Plato included, at most only a supplementary value was allowed. Quite recently, however, Schleierina- cher has lodged a protest against this preference of Xenophon. 1 Xenophon, he argues, not being a phi- losopher himself, was scarcely capable of under- standing a philosopher like Socrates. The object, moreover, of the Memorabilia was a limited one, to defend his teacher from definite charges. We are therefore justified in assuming a priori that there was more in Socrates than Xenophon describes. Indeed, there must have been more, or he could not have played the part he did in the history of philo- sophy, nor have exerted so marvellous a power of attraction on the most intellectual and cultivated men of his time. The character, too, which Plato gives him would otherwise have too flatly contradicted the picture of him present to the mind of his reader. Besides, Xenophon's dialogues create the impression that philosophic matter has, with detriment to its meaning, been put into the unphilosophic language of every-day life ; and that there are gaps left, to supply which we are obliged to go to Plato. Not that we can go so far as Meiners,' 2 and say that only those 1 On the philosophical merits p. 50. Conf. Gesch. d. Phil, o Socrates, ScnMermachffir, p. 81. Werke, iii. 2, 293, first printed * Geschichte der Wissen- in Abhamlluntren dcr Berliner schaften in Griechenland uud Aca.lemie, Philos. Kl. 1818, Bom, ii. 420. n 2 100 SOCRATES. CHAP. parts of the dialogues of Plato can be considered his- _ torical, which are either to be found in Xenophon, or immediately follow from what Xenophon says, or which are opposed to Plato's own views. This hypothesis would only give us the Socrates of Xenophon slightly modified, whilst the deeper spring of Socratic thought would still be wanting. The only safe course to pursue is that adopted by Schleiermacher to ask, What may Socrates have been, in addition to what Xenophon reports, without gainsaying the character and maxims which Xenophon distinctly assigns to him ? and what must he have been to call for and to justify such a description as is given of him in the dialogues of Plato ? Schleiermacher's estimate of Xenophon l has been since adopted by several other writers ; and even previously to Schleiermacher, Dissen 2 had declared that he could only see in the pages of Xenophon a description of the outward appearance of Socrates. The like approval has been bestowed on Schleiermacher's canon for finding out 1 Hrandis,inKhein. Mus. von has himself failed to observe NiebuJM* und firandis, i. b. 122. in using the Phredo (see above, Conf . Gesch. d. Gr.-Rfim. Philos. p. 59). In respect of the person- ii. a. 20 ; Bitter, Gesch. d. Phil, ality of Socrates rather than his ii. 44 ; RilUng, Ueber d. Ver- teaching, Van Hemde (Charac- haltniss zwischen den Xeno- terismi principum philosopho- phont. nnd den Platon. Be- rum veterum, p. 54) gives a richten iiber Socrates. Upsala preference to Plato's picture TJniversitets JLrskrift, 1870, as being truer to life than specially p. 1, 125. Alberti, Xenophon's Apology. too (Socrates, 5), takes in the 2 De philosophia morali in main the side of Schleier- Xenophontis de Socrate com- macher, whilst allowing that mentariis tradita, p. 28 (in Plato's account can only be Disseti's Kleineren Schrif ten, p. used for history with extreme 87). caution a caution which he AUTHORITIES FOR HIS PHILOSOPHY. 101 the real Socrates; only to supplement it has the CHAP. remark been made, 1 that the language used by Aristotle respecting the teaching of Socrates may be also employed to determine its outside aspect. On the other hand, Xenophon's authority has been warmly supported by several critics. 2 In deciding between these two views, a difficulty, however, presents itself. The authority of the one or the other of our accounts can only be ascertained by a reference to the true historical picture of Socrates, and the true historical picture can only be known from these conflicting accounts. This difficulty would be insurmountable, if the two narratives had the same claim to be considered historical in points which they state varyingly. Indeed, Aristotle's scanty notices respecting the Socratic philosophy would have been insufficient to settle the question, even on the assumption that he had other sources of information at command beside the writings of Xenophon and Plato -an assumption for which there is not the least evidence. But if one thing is clearer than another, it is this, that Plato only claims to be true to facts in those descriptions in which he agrees with Xenophon, as for instance, in the Apology and the Symposium. On other points no one could well assert that he wished all to be taken as historical 1 By Brandis, 1. c. 22. Conf. Fries, Gesch. d. 2 Hegel. Gesch. d. Phil. ii. Phil. i. 259. For further lite- !) ; Rotscher, Aristophanes iind rature on this point consult seinZeitalter, p. 393 ; Hermann, Hunidall, De philosophia mo- (.Jesch. und Syst. des Platonis- rali Socratis (Heidelberg, 1 853), mus, i. 24i) ; Labriola, La dot- p. 7, and Ribbing, 1. c. trina di Socrate (Xapoli, 1871), 103 SOCRATES. CHAP. which he puts into the inotith of Socrates. Of Xeno- ' phon, on the contrary, it may be granted that, whether from his deficiency in philosophic sense, or from his exclusively practical tastes, not unfrequently the scientific meaning and the inner connection of the principles of Socrates escape his notice. Nor must we ever forget that the Memorabilia are prima- rily intended to be a defence of his teacher against the charges brought against him, which charges were the cause of his condemnation, and passed current years after his death. For this purpose a description was requisite, not so much of his philosophy as of his morals and religion, setting' forth his piety, hi& integrity, his obedience to the laws, his services to- his friends and fellow-citizens rather than his intel- lectual convictions ; and Xenophon candidly con- fesses that this is the main object of his treatise. 1 Even the question, whether, with the means at his command, a life-like reproduction of the dialogues of Socrates can be expected from Xenophon, cannot be answered affirmatively without some limitation. His treatise was not written until six years after the death of Socrates, and we have not the least indica- tion that it was based on notes made either by him- self or others in the time immediately following the dialogues. 2 What was committed to writing years 1 Mem. i. 1,1 and 20; 2, 1 ; discourses at home and filled 3, 1; iv. 4, 25; 5, 1; 8, 11. up their sketches by further 2 It cannot be inferred from enquiries. Nay, the very dis- Plato, Symp. 172, C. ; 173, B. ; coiu-ses which are vouched for Theast. 143, A., that Socrates' by this supposed care, cannot f riends (as Volqttardgen, Daemon possibly be historical. Such d. Sokr. 6, says) took down his statements cannot therefore- AUTHORITIES FOR HIS PHILOSOPHY. 103 afterwards from his own or his friends' memory has CHA i>. not the claim to accuracy of a verbal report, but rather owes to himself its more definite form and setting. No doubt it was his intention to give a true account of Socrates and his teaching. He says that he writes from his own recollection. He expressly observes in a few cases that he was present during the dialogue, but had heard similar things from others, mentioning his authority. 1 If, then, many a Socratic discourse is unknown to him or has escaped his memory, if one or other line of thought has not been thoroughly understood, or its philosophical importance misunderstood by him, it may neverthe- less be assumed that a pupil of Socrates, accustomed to consort with him for years, and able to commu- nicate all that Xenophon actually communicates, neither repeats on the whole what is false, nor leaves any essential side of the Socratic teaching untouched. From Plato, indeed, so far as his description is his- torical or permits a reference to the Socrates of history, many a trait supplementary of Xenophon's narra- tive may be expected, and many an explanation of the real meaning of sayings, which his fellow-pupil reports as understood only from the standpoint of mean more than similar ones .... rovrcav 5rj ypfyu 6ir6 in Farm. 126, B. Neither does Sianvwovfixrw. iv. 3, 2 ; others Mem. i. 4, 1 refer to writings have reported similar conver- of pupils of Socrates, but to sations respecting the Gods, at the views of opponents. Mem. which they were present : iy&> i\. :;. 2 appears to refer not Sk Sre vpbs Ev6vSrjfioi> roidSt even to writings, but to oral Sitkeyero ira.peytv6ni)V. iv. 8, 4 : communications. Af|o> 8e *cal & 'Eppaywovt rov '!*- 1 Mem. i. 3, 6 : J 5i 8ij Kal irovinov ^KOWTO. irepi avrov. w l$6nfi pot TOUS {ucdiray 104 SOCRATES. CHAP. V. B. Philo- sophical plat/win. Supposed popular philo- practical utility. Hence objection can hardly be taken to the above-quoted canon of Schleiermacher. 1 Ne- vertheless, it is highly improbable that in essential points there should be an irreconcilable difference between Xenophon's description and that which we may take for historically established as Plato's. 2 The real state of the case, however, can only be ascer- tained by examining the statements of various authorities in detail to test their worth and their agreement, and this enquiry naturally coincides with the exposition of the Socratic teaching, from which it- could only be distinguished in point of form. It will not, therefore, be separated from it here. Socrates will be described from the three accounts of Xeno- phon, Plato, and Aristotle. If the attempt to form a harmonious picture from these sources succeeds, Xenophon will be vindicated. Should it not succeed, it will then be necessary to ask, which of the tradi- tional accounts is the true one. 3 To begin with the question as to the philosophi- cal platform and fundamental principle of Socrates. Here the sketches of our main authorities seem to give ground for the most opposite views. According guish in point of speculation what belongs to .Socrates and what belongs to Plato. At; regards morals, he hopes to gain a true general view of Socrates by taking the maxims which are attributed to him unanimously by Xenophon. Plato, and Aristotle, following them out to their consequences, and testing the traditions by these. 1 P. 100. 2 As Hibbing, 1. c. asserts. Hard is it to reconcile herewith that Bibbing declines to ques- tion 'the essentially historical accuracy ' of Xenophon's de- scription. 3 The course here followed is also in the main that taken by Striimpell, Gesch. d. Prakt. Philos. d. Gr. i. 116 He con- siders it impossible to distin- CHARACTERISTICS OF HIS PHILOSOPHY. 105 to Plato, Socrates appears as an expert thinker, at CHAP. home in all branches of knowledge; whereas, in Xenophon he is represented far less as a philosopher than as a man innocent and excellent, full of piety and common sense. Hence Xenophon's account is specially appealed to in support of the conception of Socrates as a popular moral man, holding aloof from all speculative questions, and in fact as far less of a philosopher than a teacher of morality and instructor of youth. 1 It certainly cannot be denied that Socrates was full of the most lively enthusiasm for morality, and made it the business of his life to exercise a moral influence upon others. 2 Had he only discharged this function after the unscientific manner of a popular teacher, by imparting and inculcating the received notions of duty and virtue, the influence would be inexplicable which he exerted, not only over weaklings and hairbrains, but over the most talented and cultivated of his cotemporaries. It would be a mystery what induced Plato to connect the deepest philosophical enquiries with his person, or what led all later philosophers, down to Aristotle, nay even down to the Stoics and Neoplatonists, to 'How common this view 181, that Socrates 'regarded the was in past times, needs not to speculative philosophy which be proved by authorities which aimed at general knowledge, abound from Cicero down to as useless, vain, and foolish,' Wiggers and Reinhold. That and that he < took the field not it is not yet altogether ex- only against the Sophists as ploded may be gathered not only pretenders to knowledge, but from writers like Van Ifeusde, against all philosophy ; ' in Characterismi, p. 53, but even short, that ' he was no philo- Marbac/t, a disciple of the sopher.' Hegelian philosophy, asserts in * Coiif. Apol. 23, D. ; 30, E. ; his Gesch. d. Philos. i. 174, 178, 38, A., and above, p. 41). 100 SOCRATES. <;HAP. regard him as the founder of a new epoch, and to ' trace their own peculiar systems to the movement set on foot by him. Even in himself and his doings more than one feature is at variance with this conception. Whereas it would follow herefrom that knowledge is only of value in as far as it is instrumental for action, so far was Socrates from sharing this belief that he consi- dered actions only then to have a value when they proceed from correct knowledge ; that he referred moral action or virtue to knowledge, making its per- fection depend on perfection of knowledge. Whereas, according to the ordinary assumption, he would in his intercourse with others have before all things aimed at moral training, so far was it otherwise that it appears from his own words that love of knowledge was the original motive for his activity. 1 Accordingly we observe him in his dialogues pursuing enquiries, which not only have no moral purpose, 2 but which, 1 Plato, Apol. 21, where So- subordinate one ; he was no crates deduces his whole acti- doubt really actuated by the vity from the fact that he pur- motive mentioned in the Apo- sued a real knowledge. logy, a praiseworthy curiosity - Examples are to be found to learn from intercourse with in the conversations (Mem. iii. all classes, whether they were 10), in which Socrates conducts clearly conscious of what their the painter Parrhasius, the arts were for. Xenophon him- sciilptor Clito, and Pistias, the self attests this, Mem. iv. 6, 1 : forger of armour, to the con- v nvv rols avvovffi, rt e/co- ceptions of their respective CTOV rfij ruv tivraiv ovSe-n-iairor' arts. It is true Xenophon in- eArryev. This pursuit of the troduces these conversations conceptions of things, aiming with the remark that Socrates not at the application of know- knew how to make himself ledge, but at knowledge itself, useful to artisans. But the is quite enough to prove that desire to make himself usef til Socrates was not only a preacher can only have been a very of virtue, but a philosopher. CHARACTERISTICS OF HIS PHILOSOPHY. 107 iii their practical application, could only serve im- CHAP. moral purposes. 1 These traits are not met with ex- V> clusively in one or other of our authorities, but they are equally diffused through the accounts given by the three main sources. Socrates can therefore not possibly have been the unscientific moral teacher for which he was formerly taken. Knowledge must have had for him a very different value and importance from what it would have had on such a supposition. It may not even be assumed that the knowledge which he sought was ultimately only pursued for the sake of action, and only valued as a means to morality. 2 He who pursues knowledge in this sense, only as a means to an end which lies beyond him, not from an inde- pendent impulse and love of knowing, will never study so carefully and GO independently the problem and method of philosophic research as Socrates did ; will never be a reformer of philosophy as he was. Even Xenophon found some sation with her, in which he difficulty in bringing it into bar- endeavours to lead her to a inony with his practical view conception of her trade, and of things, as his words show : shows her how she will best be from which it maybe seen that able to win lovers. Now, al- Socrates made his friends more though such a step would not critical. But criticism is the give that offence to a Greek organ of knowledge. which it would to us, still 1 Mem. iii. 1 1 contains a there is not the least trace of a paragraph adapted more than moral purpose in his conduct, any other to refute the idea Brandi* 1 (Gesch. d. Entw. i. that Socrates was only a popu- 236) remarks are little to the lav teacher. Socrates hears one point. A purely critical inter- of Ins companions commending est leads Socrates to refer to the beauty of Theodota, and at its general conception every once goes with his company to action across which he comes, see her. He linds her acting regardless of its moral value, as a painter's model, and he 2 Ribbing, Socrat. Stud. i. 46. thereupon enters into a conver- 108 SOCRATES. CHAP. Xay more, he would have been incapable of exerting ' the deep reforming influence over Ethics which, according to the testimony of history, he did exert, had he thus confined himself to practical interests. His importance for Ethics is derived not so much from the fact that he insisted on a re-establishment of moral life this Aristophanes and without doubt many others did, but from his recognising that a .scientific basis for moral convictions must be an indispensable condition for any real reform of morals. Herewith it is presupposed that practical problems are determined and vindicated by knowledge ; in other words, that knowledge not merely subserves action, but leads and governs it a view never as yet held by any one who did not attribute to knowledge an independent value of its own. If, therefore, Socrates, as we shall note, confined himself in principle to enquiries having for man a practical value, it can only be inferred that he was not himself fully con- scious of the range of his thought. In practice he went beyond these limits, treating ethical questions in such a manner as no one could do unless fired with an independent love of knowledge. The area is thus determined within which the fun- damental conception of the Socratic philosophy must be looked for. True knowledge is the treasure to discover which Socrates goes forth in the service of the Delphic God; to gain the knowledge of the essence of things, he, with his friends, unweariedly labours ; to true knowledge he ultimately refers all moral demands. The force with which he asserted CHARACTERISTICS OF HIS PHILOSOPHY. this demand constitutes him the creator in Greece CHAP. of an independent system of morality. For him it is not enough that men should do what is right; they c - His , , -i , TT i i 11 i must also know why they do it. He demands that they should not follow a dark impulse, an undefined enthusiasm or the aptitude of habit, but should act from clear consciousness ; and because it was deficient in this characteristic, he refuses to allow true wisdom to the art of his time, however high it otherwise stood. 1 In a word, the idea of knowledge forms the central point of the Socratic philosophy. 2 All philosophy aim- ing at knowledge, this point must be further circum- scribed to give it precision, which was done in this wise, that, whereas the pursuit of true knowledge had been, 1 In Plato, Apol. 22, B., Socrates observes : In his sift- ing of men he had turned to the poets, but had soon found that they were usually not able to account for their own works. 'Eyi/wi/ o5f .... Sri ov aotpia. iroioiev & iroio'tff, a\\a vffei TIV\ Kal tvOov(Tidoi>Tts, Siinrep ol Oco- /jidi>Ttis Kal xp7j(Tjuv \4yovffiv. Be- sides, no one knows the limits of his knowledge, but thinks to understand all things. He had also observed the same in the x<'P OT X*' a '> the re- presentatives of sciilpture and art. 3 Soklalermaektr, Werke, iii. 2, 300: ' The awakening of the idea of knowledge, and its first utterances, must have been the substance of the philosophy of Socrates.' Hitter agrees witli this, Gesch. d. Philosophic, ii. 50. Brandis only differs in unessential points, Khein. Mtis. von Nielnihr und Brandis, i. 6, 130; Gr.-R6m. Phil. ii. a, 33. To him the origin of the doctrine of Socrates appears to be a desire to vindicate against the Sophists the absolute worth of moral determinations ; and then he adds : to secure this piirpose the first aim of So- crates was to gain a deeper insight into his own conscious- ness, in order to be able to dis- tinguish false and true know- ledge with certainty. Similarly UranisK, Gesch. d. Phils. Kant, i. 155. The important feature in Socrates was this, that to him morality appeared to be a certain kind of knowledge, proceeding from the thought of the good inborn in the soul. 110 SOCRATES. CHAP. with earlier philosophers an immediate and instinc- ' tive activity, with Socrates it became conscious and methodical. By him the idea of knowledge as know- ledge was first brought out, and having been brought out, took precedence of every other idea. 1 This statement, again, requires further explanation. If the love of knowledge was shared also by previous philosophers, why, it may be asked, did it not before develope into a conscious and critical pursuit ? The reason which may be assigned is this : The knowledge which earlier philosophers pursued, was, in itself, different from the knowledge which Socrates required. They were not compelled by their idea of knowledge as Socrates was to direct their attention to the in- tellectual processes and conditions, by which "it was truly to be acquired. Such a necessity was, however, imposed on Socrates by the principle which the most trustworthy accounts unanimously report as the soul of all his teaching that all true knowledge must pro- ceed from correct conceptions, and that nothing can be known, unless it can be referred to its general conception, and judged thereby. 2 In this principle, 1 Sclileiermacher, 1. c. 2Ui) ; i.e., as is explained by the con- Brandin. text, he referred all doubtful 2 Xenvph. Mem. iv. 6, 1 : points to universal conceptions, ~S,, ivAfi.1- means of these; iv. 5, 12: e teal rois &\\ois tu> ffiyfi7j 5s KCU rb 8ia\fyta8ai ovo- SvvaffOai ' rovs 8e p)) fiSdras oti8ei> /j.aff9rjvat IK TOV (rvvt6vTas KOIVTJ d\\ecr6ai Kal &\\ovs a T( IOTIV . . . fivo ydp fffnv a, TIS ov awoSoh} 2a>Kparei Sixaiws, rovs T' tiraKTi- KOVJ \6yovs Kal rb 6pifff0ai Ka66\ov. Both are, however, at bottom the same. The \6yoi (iraxriKol are only the means for finding universal concep- tions, and therefore Aristotle elsewhere (Met. i. 6, 987, b, 1 ; xiii. 9, 1086, b, 3; De Part. Anim., i. 1, 642, a, 28) justly observes that the seeking for universal conceptions or for the essence of things is the real sen-ice rendered to philosophy by Socrates. Accordingly, in the dialogues which Xenophon has preserved, we always see him making straight for the general conception, the ri i ; iv. 4, 20. conduct of the sage may be - Compare the conversation compared, with Aristippus, Xen. Mem. ii. " Hegel, 1. c. 1, liJ ; and Plato's Crito, 53, A. Compare the views of Rot- * It has been already seen scJier, 1. c., and Brandis for the that Socrates placed his own opposite view. ' Ueber die activity under this point of vorgebliche iSubjektivitiit der view. See pp. 65, 68 ; Xen. Mem. Sokrat. Lehre,' in lihein. Mus. i. ;. 15 ; Plato, Apol. 30, A. ii. 1, 85. 1 Mem. iv. 4, 12, and 3, 15, 118 SOCRATES. CHAP. a deeper importance attaching to the personality of '__ the thinker, without, however, by any means belonging to those which are purely relative. It aims at gaining a knowledge which shall do more than satisfy a per- sonal want, and which shall be true and desirable for more than the thinker ; but the ground on which it is sought is the personal thought l of the individual. This theory is indeed not further expanded by Socrates. He has established the principle, that only the knowledge which has to do with conceptions is true knowledge. To the further inference that only the being of conceptions is true being, 2 and that there- fore only conceptions are true, and to a systematic exposition of conceptions true in themselves so far he never advanced. Knowledge is here something sought, a problem to be solved by the thinker ; philo- sophy is philosophic impulse, and philosophic method, a seeking for truth, not yet a possessing it ; and this deficiency countenances the view that the platform 1 Hegel says nothing very but the universal element different, when in distinguish- which is found running through ing (Gesch. d. Phil. ii. 40, 166) all individuals. With this view Socrates from the Sophists he agree also Itotsclier, 1. c. p. 246, says: ' in Socrates the creation 392, and Hermann, Gesch. und of thought is at once clad with Syst. des Plat. i. 239. an independent existence of its 2 The objections of Albertl, own,' and what is purely per- Sokr. 94, to the above vanish sonal is ' externalised and made if the word ' only ' is properly universal by him as the good.' emphasised. He only asserts Socrates is said to have substi- what is already well known, tuted ' thinking man is the that Socrates did not develope measure of all things,' in place his theory of conceptions to the of the Sophistic doctrine ' man theory of ideas, nor contrast is the measure of all things.' the universal thought in the In a word, his leading thought conception, as being the only is not the individual as he thing truly real with individual knows himself experimentally, things. CHARACTERISTICS OF HIS PHILOSOPHY. 119 of Socrates was that of a narrow reference to the CHAP. person. Still it should never be forgotten, that the ^ aim of Socrates was always to discover and set forth that which is in itself true and good. Mankind is to be intellectually and morally educated, but the one and only means thereto is to attain a knowledge of truth. The primary aim of Socrates being to train men to think, rather than to construct a system, the main point with him was a philosophic method to deter- mine the way which would lead to truth. The sub- stance of his teaching thus appears to have been partly confined to questions having an immediate bearing on human conduct ; partly it does not go beyond the general and theoretical demand, that all action should be determined by a knowledge of con- ceptions. There is no systematic development of individual points of morality and no attempt to give a reason for them. 120 SOCRATES. CHAPTEE VI THE PHILOSOPHICAL METHOD OF SOCRATES. CHAP. THE peculiarity of the method pursued by Socrates L consists, generally speaking, in deducing conceptions from the common opinions of men. Beyond the formation of conceptions, however, and the intellec- tual exercise of individuals his method did not go ; nor is there any systematic treatment of the concep- tions gained. The theory of a knowledge of concep- tions appearing here as a claim, the consciousness of its necessity must be presupposed as existing, and an insight into the essence of things be sought. At the same time, thought does not advance further than this seeking. It has not the power to develope to a system of absolute knowledge, nor has it a method sufficiently matured to form a system. For the same reason, the process of induction is not reduced within clearly defined rules. All that Socrates has clearly expressed is the general postu- late, that every thing must be reduced to its concep- tion. Further details as to the mode and manner of this reduction and its strict logical forms, were not yet worked out by him into a science, but were applied by him practically by dint of individual skill. The only thing about him at all resembling a logical KNOWLEDGE OF SELF. li! rule, the maxim that the process of critical enquiry CHAI-. must always confine itself to what is universally admitted, 1 sounds far too indefinite to invalidate our assertion. This process involves three particular steps. The A. TJie first is the Socratic knowledge of self. Holding as he juwwlettM did that only the knowledge of conceptions constitutes l 'f * c }fi - true knowledge, Socrates was fain to look at all sup- ' a know- posed knowledge, asking whether it agreed with his l {* idea of knowledge, or not. Nothing appeared to him more perverse, nothing more obstructive to true knowledge from the very outset, than the belief that you know what you do not know. 2 Nothing is so necessary as self-examination, to show what we really know and what we only think we know. 3 Nothing, too, is more indispensable for practical relations 1 Mem. iv. 6, 15: 6ir6re tie speaking in Plato, Apol. 21, B., a.vr6s TI rip \6yia Sn^ioi, 810 TWI> says that according to the /uA(0Ta 6fjLo\oyov/jL(i'wi/ ^TTopfvero. oracle he had interrogated all vofj.ifai> TuuTTjj/rV aaiat> ther they had any kind of know- iva-v-riov fj.ff fri t?vai ffo- ledge ; and that in all cases he nfvroi ye TT> aj/eTnoTTjjito- had found along with some kind fiaviav tv6pifv. rb 5e of knowledge an ignorance, favrbv Kal & ^ o?8e which he would not take in ex- i/ re Kal otfaOaiyiyiHacrKeiv, change for any kind of know- iyyvrdroa navias fhoyifao elvtu. ledge an opinion that they Generally speaking, those are knew what they did not know, called mad who are mistaken On the other hand, he considered about what is commonly known, it to be his vocation, <})i\oovi>- not those who are mistaken TO j> Kal ^rd^ovra ffj.avrbv Kal about things of which most men TOVS &\\ovs (28, E.) ; and he are ignorant. Also Plato, Apol. says elsewhere (38, A.) that 21), B. : al roino irus OVK a/j,aOia there could be no higher good, ^cTrly auTTj 7; iirovt&Hnos, T) TOV than to converse every day as olfoeat dStvai & OVK olStv ; he did : 6 St ii/e^VoaTos Qios ov 3 In tliis sense Socrates, 1-2-2 SOCRATES. O'HAP. VI. than to become acquainted with the state of our inner self, with the extent of our knowledge and capacities, with our defects and requirements. 1 One result of this self-examination being the discovery that the actual knowledge of the philosopher does not corre- spond with his idea of knowledge, there follows further that consciousness of knowing nothing, which Socrates declared to be his only knowledge. For any other knowledge he denied possessing, 2 and therefore refused to be the teacher of his friends, 3 only wishing, 1 XeiwjjJwn, Mem. iv. 2, 24, enquiring into the Delphic yvwQi ffeavrov, says that self- knowledge is attended with the greatest advantages, want of it with the greatest disad- vantages : ol fjiev yap eiSdres eavrovs rd re eirir'fiSeia eavrots iffULffi Kal SiayiyvcaffKovfftv a re Svvavrai Kal a fi-fi' Kal a /J.ev firiffravrat irpdrrovres (self- examination always refers in the first place to knowledge, because with knowledge right action is given) Tropiovrai re Siv Seovrat Kal ev npdrrovffiv. See also Plato, Phtedrus, 229, E. ; he had not time to give to the explanation of myths of which others were so fond, not being even able to know him- self according to the Delphic oracle ; Symp. 216, A. ; when Alcibiades complains : avay- Kai^ei yap p.t bp.o\oyelv, on ieo\- \ov IvSeris &v avrbs en ^p.av- rov fifv a/jLe\u, TO 8' ' f*.Qi}va(rep6i ei(if Kivovvevei fj.ev yap rifuwv ovSenpos ovSev Ka\bv Kaya- 6bv elSevai, a\\' ovros /uei/ oifrrof rt eioevat OVK elSws, eyiii Se laffirep ouv OVK olSa, ovSe 0^0/j.ai. 23, B. : ovros vp.S>v, S> avQpoiiroi, ffofyunaros tffriv, bffns, Sxrirep 'ScaKpdrr)s T eyvtaxev, on ovoevbs at6s fffri rfj a\r)0eia irpbs ffoiav. And 3 little before : TO 5 KtvSvvevei, S> &v$pes ' AQt]val.oL, rip 6vn 6 6ebs ffotybs fivai, Kal ev rtp XPWP'V roury rovro \ey(iv, on i] avQpw- iriirri ffo6v, a\r)0es ovei- Siouo~r rb oe atnov rovrov r6Sf p&LeveoQai p.e o 6ebs avaynd^ei, yevvyv oe aireKu>\vffev. Comp. Rep. i. 337, B. ; Men. 98, B. That this trait in Plato has been taken from the Socrates of history, may be gathered from the Platonic dialogues, in which his teacher is by no means represented as so igno- rant. 8 See above, p. 67. KNOWLEDGE OF SELF. 123 in common with them, to learn and enquire. 1 This CHAP. confession of his ignorance was certainly far from _ being a sceptical denial of knowledge, 2 with which the whole philosophic career of Socrates would be irreconcilable. On the contrary, it contains a simple avowal as to his own personal state, and collaterally as to the state of those whose knowledge he had had the opportunity of testing. 3 Nor again must it be regarded as mere irony or exaggerated modesty. 4 Socrates really knew nothing, or to express it other- wise, he had no developed theory, and no positive dogmatic principles. The demand for a knowledge of conceptions having once dawned upon him in all its fulness, he missed the marks of true knowledge in all that hitherto passed for wisdom and knowledge. Being, however, also the first to make this demand, he had as yet attained no definite content for know- ledge. The idea of knowledge was to him an unfathomable problem, in the face of which he could not but be conscious of his ignorance. 5 And in so far a certain affinity between his view and the sophistic 1 Koivrj &ov\fvfff0ai, KOIVIJ c/c- the limited cliaracter of human TTTeffdat, Kowf, TJ T '"> **f*r&i knowledge being asserted in &c. Xen., Mem. iv. 5, 12 ; 6, comparison with the divine. 1 ; Plato, Theait. 151, E. ; Prot. 4 As Grate remarks (Plato, i. 330, B. ; Gorg. 505. E.; Crat. 270, 323), referring to Arist. 384, B. ; Meno, 89 E. Soph. El. 34, 183, b, 7 : 6r; - As the New Academicians Kal Sia TOVTO ^, J< ! 13 ' says 7rois " p6 '" ' ilfel Kal T0 " s ;Ue ' 7 " that Socrates did not busy OTOV natural science, but on the oAA^Aois, a\\a raits pawo fj.evots contrary he held those who 6/j.oius 8iaKej(r0ai irpbs aAA.TJA.our did to be foolish ; e'flaujuafe 5' then follows what is quoted in fl p.)) tyavfp'bv avrols t, Sri the text. Tavra ov Swar6v tffriv av6pu>- SEARCH FOR TRUE KNOWLEDGE. 125- for true knowledge. The consciousness of our own CHAP. Not-knowing continuing, and the philosopher having ' an idea of knowledge without finding it realised in himself, the search for knowledge naturally assumes the form of an application to others, with a view of ascertaining whether the knowledge wanting at home is to be found with them. 1 Hence the necessity of enquiry in common by means of the dialogue. 2 For Socrates, this mode of intercourse has not merely an educational value, procuring easier access and a more fruitful effect for his ideas, but it is to his mind an indispensable condition of the development of thought, and one from which the Socrates of history never departs. 3 Speaking more accurately, its nature consists in a sifting of men such as it is described in the Apology, 4 or in a bringing to the birth, as it is called in the Theeetetus ; 5 in other words, the philo- sopher by his questions obliges others to unfold their inner self before him : 6 he asks after their real 1 The connection is very ap- vpoa"nKo6 tts rb StS6vai vepl 7, 1 : ir6.VTu>v /iev yap wv 3yu oT5a avrov \6yov, ZVTIVO. rp^irov vvv re /j.d\iffra %fj.e\fv avT fiStvat, STOU p, nor is there any escape TIJ ^irto-T^/nwi/ etr] r>v ffwAvTuv from the most thorough /3a- cwTtp. Xenophon only took it In prove 3rt avrdpKeis Iv rats 126 SOCRATES. CHAP. opinions, after the reasons of their beliefs and actions, and in this way attempts by an interrogatory analysis of their notions to bring out the thought latent therein, of which they are themselves unconscious. 1 In as far as this process presupposes that the know- ledge which the questioner lacks may be found in others, it resembles an impulse to supplement one's own defects by their help. This intercourse with others is, for a philosopher with whom knowing coin- cides with purposing, not only an intellectual but also a moral and personal need. To enquire in common is at once to live in common. Love of knowledge is at once impulse to friendship, and in the blending together of these two sides consists the peculiarity of the Socratic Eros. 2 In as far as others do not possess the knowledge sought for, and the questions of Socrates only serve to expose their ignorance, the process bears also the character of irony. Irony, however, must not be understood to be merely a conversational trick ; 3 still 1 It is assumed as a matter spiritual and the disadvantages of course, that every one can of a sensual love are unfolded, give an account of what he apparently (as a careful survey knows and is, Plato, 1. c. 190, C. ; of the Platonic Symposion will Chai'rn. 158, E. show) by Xenophon, speaking 2 See above, p. 75. Besides for himself, but undoubtedly Brandis ii. a, 64, reminds us following in the train of So- with justice that treatises on crates. Even ^Eschines and eptas are mentioned not only by Cebes had treated of pcos in Plato and Xenophon, but also the Socratic sense. See Pint. by Euclid, Crito, Simmias, and Puer. Ed. c. 15, p. 11, and 1he Antisthenes, which shows the fragment of ^Eschines in ^Iris- importance of it for the So- tid. Or. xlv. p. 34. cratic schools. The chief pas- 3 Hegel, Gesch. d. Phil. ii. sage is in Xenophon, Symp. c. 53, 57; Conf. Arist. Eth. iv. 8, where the advantages of a 13; 1127, b, 22. USE OF EROS AND IRONY. 127 less is it that derisive condescension or affected sim- plicity, which as it were lures others on to the ice in order to laugh at their falls ; or that absolute refer- ence to the person and destruction of all general truth, which for a time bore this name in the romantic school. Its proper nature consists rather herein, that without any positive knowledge, and prompted only by a desire for knowledge, Socrates addresses himself to others, in the hope of learning from them what they know, but that in the attempt to discover it, upon a critical analysis of their no- tions, even l their supposed knowledge vanishes. This CHAP VI. 1 Plato at least gives this deeper meaning to the irony of Socrates. See Rep. i. 337, A. : av-rri txtiv-r] f) tltaQvia elptevfia Sco/cpdrovs, Kal TaiV ey!i} i?8rj re Kal TOVTOIS irpoti\cyov, 5Vt ffv airoKplvaffOat fitv OVK 20e\'fiffois, flptavfvffoio Se Kal irdvra /j.a\\oi> iroifaots % airoKpfaoto et ris rl at tpiara. And again. 337, E. : 'iva 'SoiKpdr'ns rb eicin^ so in the Greek sense of the term, and partly to the words ayvofi vdvra. Kal obH^ oKev. The same, omitting the word elpwvda, is said in 1he passage of tho The;etetus al- ready mentioned, and in the Meno, 80, A. : oi>5/ &\\o t) avr6s re airopt'is Kal rovs &\\ovs iroie'ts airoptlv, and also in the Apol. 23. E., in which, after the Socratic sifting of others has been described, it goes on to say : $K Tavrycrl STJ -rrjy Qerdfffws iro\\ol nty a-rrexOfiai juoi yeydvaffl . . . i/1/oju.a 8 TOI/TO . . . ffov uirfXftv \6yov oiitie yv SciKparfy, (1u0as fi'Sa.'? irus $x ft ra Th-fiGTa Iptarav. Hence Quintilian, ix. 2, 46, observes that the whole life of Socrates seemed an irony, be- cause he always played the part of an admirer of the wisdom of others. Connected with this is the use which Socrates made of irony as a 12 SOCRATES. CHAP, irony is, therefore, speaking generally, the dialectical 1 or the critical factor in the Socratic method, assum- ing the peculiar form it here does owing to the presup- posed ignorance of him who uses it for his instrument. C. TJie Doubtless, however conscious Socrates might be of formation . , , 111 , i . i of coHcey- possessing no real knowledge, he must at least have tio,,* and, be i iev ed that he possessed the notion and the method the iHetliod ofjmmfbij of true knowledge. Without this conviction he tii">i?'~ would neither have been able to confess his own igno- rance, nor to expose that of others, both being only rendered possible by comparing the knowledge he found with the idea of knowledge residing within himself. The fact that this idea was no where to be found realised was in itself a challenge to him to set about realising it; and hence resulted as the third point in his philosophic course the attempt to create real knowledge. For real knowledge he could only allow that to pass which emanated from the conception of a thing, hence the first step here is the formation of conceptions or induction. 1 For even if Socrates does not always make for formal definitions, he at least always seeks some universal quality applicable to the conception and to the essence of the object, in order to settle the question under notice by referring the particular case to this universal quality. 2 The class- figure of speech. Conf. Plat, the word also J^eop. Sc-hmidt Grorg. 489, E. ; Symp. 218, D. : in Ind. Lection, Marburg, 1873. Xen. Mem. iv. 2. Only its ' Compare the remarks of meaning must not be limited Arixtatle already mentioned, to this. Compare also Her- p. 110, 2. matin, Plat. 242, 326, and par- 2 tirl T^V inr^eaiv liravTiye \icVi\3iY\y fichfoiermacher, Gesch. iravra, rbi> \6yov, Seep. 110, 2. d. Phil. 83, and for the use of FORMATION OF CONCEPTIONS. Duality is therefore to him of the greatest import- ance. The starting point for this induction is supplied by the commonest notions. He begins with examples taken from daily life, with well-known and generally admitted truths. On every disputed point he goes back to such instances, and hopes in this way to attain a universal agreement. 1 All previous science being doubtful, nothing remains but to begin anew with the simplest experiences. On the other hand, induction has not as yet so far advanced as to mean the deriving conceptions from an exhaustive and critically tested series of observations. This is a later require- ment due partly to Aristotle, and partly to more modern philosophy. The wider basis of a compre- hensive knowledge of facts being as yet wanting, nay, even being despised, and Socrates being in the habit of expanding his thoughts in personal conversa- tion with distinct reference to the case before him and to the capacity and needs of his fellow-speakers, he is confined to the assumptions which the circum- stances and his own limited experience supply ; he must take isolated notions and admissions as his point of departure, and can only go as far as others can follow. Hence in most cases he relies more on par- ticular instances than on an exhaustive analysis of 1 Compare what has been iiriara^ai, fyuoja TOVTOI quoted, pp. 80, 2; 121, 1, and A OVK Mpi&v tviaTcuTOcu, ivcnrd- the whole of the Memorabilia. 0eis, oT/tcu is KO! ravra iirlffra^ai. Plato, too, gives instances of As to the principle that from this procedure. See Xen. (Ec. the less you proceed to an uii- 19, 15 : rj tpv l-yb portant, see Plato, Gorg. 947, C. K 130 SOCRATES. CHAP. experience. 1 This chance element in his principles VL he, however, endeavours to eliminate by collecting opposite instances, so as to correct and supplement varying experiences by one another. The question, for instance, before him being the conception of in- justice : He is unjust, says Euthydemus, who lies, deceives, robs, and such like. Yet, rejoins Socrates, it is right to lie, to deceive, and to rob an enemy. Accordingly the conception must be more accurately denned thus : He is unjust who does such things to his friends. Even such action is, however, per- mitted under circumstances. A general is not unjust when he encourages his army by a lie, nor a father who gives his son medicine by deception, nor a friend who robs his friend of the weapon with which he would have committed suicide. "We must, there- fore, introduce a further limitation. Unjust is he who deceives or robs his. friends in order to do them harm. 2 Or the conception of a ruler has to be dis- covered. General opinion regards a ruler as one who has the power to give orders. But this power, Socrates shows, is conceded only to the steersman on board ship, only to the physician in case of sick- ness, and in every other case only to those conversant with the special subject. Only he, therefore, is a ruler who possesses the knowledge necessary for ruling. 3 Or it must be determined what belongs to a good suit of armour. The smith says, it must be 1 As for example in the com- 2 Mem. iv. 2, 11. parison of the politician with * Ibid. iii. 9, 10. the physician, pilot, &c. METHOD OF INDUCTION. 131 of a proper size. But suppose the man intending to CHAP. wear it is deformed. Why then, the answer is, it must be of the proper size for his deformity. It therefore has the proper size when it fits. But now, supposing a man wishes to move, must the armour lit exactly ? Not so, or he would be hampered in his movements. We must, therefore, understand by fitting what is comfortable for use. 1 In a similar way we see Socrates analysing thoroughly the com- mon notions of his friends. He reminds them of the various sides to every question ; he brings out the opposition which every notion contains either within itself or in relation to some other : and he aims at correcting, by additional observations, assumptions resting on a one-sided experience, at completing them, and giving to them a more careful definition. By this process you arrive at what belongs to the essence of every object, and what does not ; thus con- ceptions are formed from notions. For the purpose of proof, too, the class-qualities of conceptions are also the most important things. In order to investigate the correctness of a quality or the necessity of a course of action, Socrates falls back on the conception of the thing to which it refers ; 2 and therefrom deduces what applies to the given case. 3 As in seeking conceptions he always 1 Mem. iii. 10, 9. then shows that his conduct 1. c. iv. 6, B. falls under this conception ; in * For instance, in order to order to put his duties before reprove Lamprocles for his con- a commander of cavalry, he duct to Xanthippe, he first begins (Mem. iii. 3, 2) by (Mem. ii. 1) lets him give a stating what is his employment, definition of ingratitude, and and enumerating its different K 2 132 SOCRATES. CHAP, progresses from what is known and universally ad- VL mitted, 1 so, too, he does here. Hence his method of proof takes the most varied turns, 2 according as it starts from one or another point of departure. He allows a general principle to be taken for granted, and includes under it the particular case ; 3 he refutes foreign assertions by bringing home to them contra- dictions with themselves or with other undoubted assumptions or facts ; 4 he builds up the premisses from which he deduces his conclusions by means of induction, or concludes straight off by an apparent analogy. 5 A theory of this method of proof he lias not given, nor distinguished the various kinds of proof. The essential point about it is only this, that everything is measured and decided by conceptions. To find the turns by which this end is reached is a matter of personal critical dexterity. Aristotle, therefore, in making the chief merit of Socrates from this side consist in the formation of conceptions and in induction, 6 must on the whole be allowed to be right. Asking further as to the objects on which Socrates practised his method, we encounter in the Memora- bilia of Xenophon a motley array of materials in- parts ; in order to prove the ' See above, pp. 131; 121, 1. being of the Gods, he begins 2 Conf. Schtvegler, Gesch. d. with the general principle that Griech. Phil., 2 Aufl., p. 121. all that serves an end must 3 As in the cases quoted on have an intelligent cause p. 131, 3. (Mem. i. 4, 4) ; in order to 4 For instance, Mem. i. 2, 34 determine which of two is the and 36 ; iv. 2, 31 ; 4, 7. better citizen, he first enquires 5 Mem. iv. 2, 22 ; iv. 4, 14 ; into the peculiar features of a i. 2, 32. good citizen (iv. 6, 14). See p. 110, 2. APPLICATION OF HIS METHOD. 133 vestigations into the essence of virtue, the duties of CHAP. man, the existence of (rods, disputes with Sophists, ' advice of the most varied kind given to friends and acquaintances, conversations with generals as to the responsibilities of their office, with artificers and tradesmen as to their arts, even with loose women as to their mode of life. Nothing is too small to arouse the curiosity of the philosophy and to call for a thorough and methodical examination. As Plato at a later time found in all things without exception essential conceptions, so, too, Socrates, purely in the interest of knowledge, even where no educational or other good was apparent, referred everything to its conception. 1 He looked upon the life and pur- suits of man as the real object of his enquiries, and other things only in as far as they affected the con- ditions and problems of human life. Hence his philosophy, which in point of scientific form was a criticism of what is (StaXe/mK^), became in its actual application a science of human actions 1 See p 109 134 SOCRATES. CHAPTEE VII. THE SUBSTANCE OF THE TEACHING OF SOCRATES : ETHICS. CHAP. SOCRATES, says Xenophon, 1 did not discourse concern- YIL ing the nature of the All, like most other philosophers A. Futida- before him; he did not enquire into the essence of Irtrictionlf ^ e wor ld an d the laws of natural phenomena ; on the sub- the contrary, he declared it folly to search into such \ er t subjects ; for it is unreasonable to quiz things divine Ethics. before fully understanding things human ; besides, the conflicting opinions of natural philosophers prove that the object of their research transcends the capa- city of human knowledge. After all, these enquiries are of no practical use. Quite in keeping with this view, the Socrates of Xenophon tests even geometry and astronomy 2 by the standard of immediate utility, as being the knowledge respectively requisite for surveying and navigation. To carry them further than this he considers to be a useless waste of time, or even impious ; for man can never come upon the track of the mighty works of the (rods, nor do the Gods desire that he should attempt such knowledge. ' Mem. i. 1, 11. Conf. p. 124, 1. Ibid. iv. 7. HIS TEACHING CONFINED TO ETHICS. K Hence in all such attempts, extravagances such as CHAP. those of Anaxagoras are sure to come to view. 1 The accuracy of this description of Socrates has, however, not passed unchallenged by modern writers. 2 Granting, it is said, that Socrates really expressed these and similar sentiments, can they be right- fully so understood as though he would altogether deprecate speculative enquiry into nature ? Would not such an assertion too manifestly contradict his own fundamental view, the idea of the oneness of all knowledge ? Would it not lead, if propounded as Xenophon has done, to consequences manifestly un- reasonable ? Even Plato 3 bears testimony to the fact that Socrates did not attack natural science in itself, but only the ordinary treatment of it ; nor can Xenophon himself conceal the fact that he did devote his attention to nature, 4 hoping by considering the 1 Mem. iv. 7, 6 : 8\s 8* T&V 64 ; Silvern, Ueber die Wolken ovpaviuv, $ eKafffa 6 0ebs /J.TI- des Aristophanes, p. 11 ; Xavarat, (ppovriffr^v yiyveffdai Krische, Forsch. 105 ; Alberti, direVpeirej/- of/re yap fvpf-ra av- Sokr. 93, 98, likewise gives a Gptairois avra tv6fi.i^tv tivai, otfre partial adherence to this view : XaplfaQai 6fo7s &/ yytiTo rbv it might have been expected frrrovvra & iKtivoi ffa$i}viffcu OVK to go further after what has 4&ovXi\QT)aa.i>. Such subtleties been said, p. 49, 2. only lead to absurdities, ovtiey 8 Phasdo, 96, A. ; 97, B. ; Rep. ?JTTO' t) 'Avaay6pa.s irapf fjLfyia-rov v jurfxaj/is tfyyc-iaOat 4 Mem. i. 4 ; iv. 3. No argu- which is then supported by ment can be drawn from Mem. various remarks proving the i. 6, 14: roi/s 6i)xM', for these o-ool is Jfitttn; Gesch. d. Phil. ii. 48, also used of poets, chroniclers, 13(i SOCRATES. CHAP, relations of means to ends in nature to gain an in- sight into its reasonable arrangement. Allowing, therefore, that Socrates, as was the fact, had no special talent for natural science, and hence did not study it to any great extent, at least the germ of a new form of this science may be discovered in him. In his notion of the relation of means to ends in nature must have lain ' the thought of a universal diffusion of intelligence throughout the whole of nature,' ' the theory of an absolute harmony of man and nature, and of man's occupying such a position in nature as to be a microcosm of the world.' J If he stopped at the germ, confining his study of nature to- mere practical requirements, this must have been, ac- cording to his own opinion, only as a preliminary step.. He must have only intended that man ought not to reach into the distance until a critical foundation has been securely laid in the depths of his own inner life ; or else it must have reference to popular and not to philosophical study. 2 Unfortunately this view of modern writers rests on assumptions which cannot be supported. In the first place, not only Xenophon, but Aristotle also, 3 not to mention later writers, 4 asserts that Socrates never X-c., and it is expressly stated 3 Met. i. 6 (987, b, 1) r that Socrates perused their ZwKpdrovs 8e irepi /j.ev T& r/0ta works, in order to iind in them trpajfj.aTevofjLfvov, irepl Se rijs what was morally useful for SA.TJS i>ia 8 Socrates ; ovSe yap -xtpl TTJS rwi> aKoirovvres j)yovvra.i ra irpoa-fi- Karrtav vs . . . 5if \tytro KOVTOL irpdrreiv and 16 : avrbs . . . a\\a nal TOVS (ppoifrlfovrat 8e irfpl TU>V avOptairtltav atl $tf\4- TO. roiaOro [or, as it is said, 15 : yero, anoTtuv rifiiffeftt of TO 0e?a farovvrts] (juapaivovras Sec. He asked whether 140 SOCRATES. CHAP. VII. B. Tlie leadiiKj tlumglit of Ethics : All virtue, is Itnim- rendered was a formal one that of generally refer- ring moral action to knowledge : no sooner, however, is it a question of deducing particular moral acts and relations from knowledge, than he contents himself partly with falling back upon prevailing custom, or else there intervenes an accidental reference to pur- poses, the defects of which are certainly partially corrected in the sequel. The leading thought of the ethics of Socrates may be expressed in the sentence All virtue is knowledge. 1 This assertion is most closely connected with his whole view of things. His efforts aim from the first at re-establishing morality and rooting it more deeply by means of knowledge. The experi- ences of his time have convinced him that the con- ventional probity of moral conduct, resting as it does on custom and authority, cannot hold its ground. His sifting of men 'iscovered, even in the most cele- brated of his contemporaries, 2 a pretended in place 1 Anst. Eth. N. vi. 13; 1144, b, 17, 28 : Soo/cpoTTjs . . . ffff a/j,a ffvjj.fia,ivtiv flSfval re r^v 8iKaiO(ruyrjy Kal dvcu SiKaioy. Conf . Ibid. iii. 1 ; 1229, a, 14; vii. 13; M. Mor. i. 1 ; 1182, a, 15 ; i. 35 ; 1198, a, 10 ; Xen. Mem. iii. 9, 5 : TTJI/ a\KT)V iraffav aper^v ffotyiav flvai fd re yap Siitata Kal iravra Sara aprrri TrparTfrat Ka\d re Kal vaf Kal otr' tu> robs ravra elS6ras &\\o O.VT\ TOVTWV ovSfv Trpoe\fffQai, oiirf TOI/S fit) eirto-TO/xeVous SvvaffBat irpdrTfiv, aAAa Kal lay eyxetpwffu' a/j.aprd- veiv. i. 1, 16 : he always con- versed of justice, piety, Kal irepl TU>V &\\v oarep 6s, a Se d^ia^s ravra Se Ka.K.6s- Euthyd. 278, E. 2 Plato, Apol. 21, C. ; 29, E. MORAL VALUE OF KNOWLEDGE. 141 of a genuine virtue. To attain true morality man CHAP. must seek the standard of action in clear and certain _ knowledge. 1 The principle which has thus dawned upon him is, however, only understood in a narrow and exclusive spirit. Knowledge is for him not only an indispensable condition and a means to true morality, but it is the whole of morality. Where knowledge is wanting, there not only is virtue im- perfect, but there is absolutely no virtue at all. Plato was the first, and after him more completely Aristotle, to improve upon the Socratic doctrine of virtue. In support of his position, Socrates established the point that without right knowledge right action is impossible, and conversely, that where knowledge exists, right action follows as a matter of course; the former, because no action or possession is of any use, unless it be directed by intelligence to a proper object ; 2 the latter, because everyone only does what 1 See p. 113. expedient and successful action. It is only in Plato (Euth. Nor is it opposed hereto that 280, B. ; Meno, 87, C.), that immediately afterwards it is Socrates expressly takes this refused that wisdom is an avap.- ground. Hence the Moralia iff&rir-fiTtas ayaOor, many a Magna (i. 35; 1198, a, 10) one, like Dajdalus and Pala- appear to have derived the msedes, having been ruined for corresponding view ; but it not the sake of wisdom. For this is only sounds very like Socrates, clearly said by way of argu- but it is also implied in Xeno- ment, and votpia is taken in its phon ; Socrates there (Mem. iv. ordinary acceptation, including 2, 26) explaining more imme- every art and every kind of diately in connection with self- knowledge. Of knowledge, in knowledge, that it alone can his own sense of the term, tell us what we need and what Socrates would certainly never we can do, placing us so in a have said that it was not good position to judge others cor- because it brought men some- rectly, and qualifying us for times into peril, as the virtue, 342 SOCRATES. CHAP. VII. he believes lie must do, what is of use to himself : * no one intentionally does wrong ; for this would be the same thing as making oneself intentionally un- happy : 2 knowledge is, therefore, always the strongest power in man, and cannot be overcome by passion. 3 identical therewith, also does. What is said, iii. 9, 14, respect- ing tinrpal-ia in contrast to ev-rux'tt, that it is Kpdriffrov tiriT^fvfjM, also refers to know- ledge. For fvirpal-la consists in iroieii', or as Plato's Euthydemus 281, A, explains it : &n jroifif ToGra ; Ou/c ofo/ucu, e* i)/j.?i> yfvecrdat rb ffirovSaiovs tlvat % e\oiTO T^V bSiKlav. More in- definite are the remarks in Eth. Nic. iii. 7; 1113, b, 14; conf. Eth. Eud. ii. 7 ; 1223, b, 3, on the statement &s Kuv irovrip'bs ovti' &KWV Bran-dig remarks with justice (Gr.-rom. Phil. ii. a, 39) that this refers in the first place to the arguments of the Platonic- Socrates (see Meno, 77, B. ; Prot. 345, D. ; 353, C.), but that the same is asserted by Xeno- pJton, Mem. iii. 9, 4 ; iv. 6, 6 and 11 ; and by Plato, Apol. 25, E. : fy& ft . . . rovro r Tocrovrov KO.KUV fK&iv voice, us aot ov ireiflojuai, Tatfcrojuea 8 76 &Ktav irotia. Conf. Dial, de justo, Schl. Dioa. Laert. ii. 31. 3 Plato, Prot, 352, C. : tp' olv Kal aol Towvr6v ri jrepl avrrjs [r^y 3iriffrfini>]s~] So**?, ^ Ka\6v re eivcu ri firiffT-fifj.rj, KOI olov &pxfiv TOV avdptiirov nal t&tnrep ytyviaffKri TIS Ta.ya.Qa Kal rb KO.K&. ^ &r inrb fj.rtS(v6s, Sxrre &rra irdrTftv ^ & &f T elvcu T$)V &.v6p(air(i>; The latter is then affirmed with the consent of Socrates. (The further reason- ing is probably only Platonic.) Arigt. Eth. Nic. vii. 3 : ^iffrd- /j-fvov juer olv 08 (pcuri rives o?6i> Tt elvai [aKpaTeJeerflat]. Sfivbv ydp, ^iriffr-fifjirts fvofai\s, us tjtfro- ~S,cisKpdrijs, &\\o ri Kpartiv. Eth. Eud. vii. 13 : op8ws rb 2a>KpT- tc6v, STI obfiev I MORAL VALUE OF KNOWLEDGE. 143 As regards that virtue which appears to be furthest removed from knowledge, the virtue of bravery, he more especially insisted upon it, that in all cases, he who knows the true nature of an appa- rent danger and the means of avoiding it, is braver than he who has not such knowledge. 1 Hence he concludes that virtue is entirely dependent upon knowledge ; and accordingly he defines all the par- ticular virtues in such a way, as to make them con- sist in knowledge of some kind, their difference being determined by the difference of their objects. He is pious who knows what is right towards God ; he is just who knows what is right towards men. 2 He is CHAP. VII. Tews a\\' '6ri eiri(rri]iJ.T\v ecprj, OVK op66v, aperfy yap tan Kal OVK (irtffT-hfM). If, therefore, any- one seems to act contrary to his better judgment, Socrates does not allow that is really the case. He rather infers the contrary. His conduct being opposed to right reason, he concludes that he is wanting in this quality ; Mem. iii. 9, 4 : irpoffepiafw^evos tie, el roi/s tiriffra- Htvovs fjiev a 8e7 irparreiv, iroiovv- TOS Se ravavria, ffofyovs re Kal eyKparels elvai voflioi ovdev ye jUaAAoi/, e elvai r^ir avtipeiav. Conf . Eth. Eud. iii. 1 ; 1229, a, 14. 2 evffeftiis = 6 ra irepl rovs Oeoiis i'0/j.L/j.a fiSwf SiKaios - 6 eiS&is roc vepl rovs avOpdnrovs v&iupa. Mem. iv. 6, 4 and 6. The evffepeia, the definition of which is here given, is the same as the 6V Setvcav Kal /jt^l &ftviov avSpeia Iffriv. The same thing is conveyed by the definition in Laches, 194, E. (which is not much imperilled by the objections raised thereto from a Socratic point of view). Courage is rj TVV Seivuv ml QappaXeviv eiri(TTrjfj.ri ; only 8a.ppa- \eos must not be rendered 'bold' (as ScJiaarsckmidl,Samm\. d. plat. Schr. 409, does). It means rather, according to 198, B., as it so often does, ft ^ Seos Trapexei. Conf. Bonlt:, Plat, Stud. iii. 441. 2 Mem. iii. 9, 4 : ffotplav 8e ical ff(i>po &pa eiriffTarat eKaffros TOVTO Kal ffotpo 1 ; iffTlV. 4 Plato devel opes this thougl 1 1 in his earlier writings, Prot . 329, B. ; 349, B. ; 360, E. : which, however, kept much more closely to the platform of Socrates ; it is also evidently contained in Xenophon. His meaning, as may be gathered from Mem. iii. 9, 4, is certainly not : some on* may possess tho knowledge in which one virtue consists, whilst lacking the knowledge in which another consists ; but he assumes, just as Plato's Socrates does in the Protagoras, that where ono virtue is, all must be there, all depending on the knowledge of the good. From this doctrine of Socrates the Cynic and Me- garian notions of the oneness of virtue arose. MORAL VALUE OF KNOWLEDGE. 145 difference between one person and another, one time CHAP. vn of life and another, one sex and another, affect the question. For in all cases it is one and the same thing, which makes the conduct virtuous, 1 and in all persons the same natural capacity for virtue must be assumed to exist. 2 The main point then invariably is to cultivate this disposition by education. Some may bring with them more, others fewer gifts for any particular activity ; yet all alike require exercise and training ; the most talented require it most, would they not be lost in ruinous errors. 3 There being no greater obstacle to true knowledge than imaginary knowledge, nothing can in a moral point of view be more urgently necessary than self-knowledge, to dispel the unfounded semblance of knowledge and to show to man his wants and needs. Eight action according to Socratic principles invariably follows upon know- ledge, just as wrong action follows from absence of 1 Plato, Meno, 71, D., and 8e?Twi> -irdvruf, Kal devoted a thorough discussion oi>x i) avr)) ffw- Such at least it seems in Xcno- Kparrjs elirev iv iro\\o1s fitv, 3> plion, iii. 9, 1, and in the Meno. aj/5pey, Kal &A.A.OIS ori\av, Kal iv Pindar had previously drawn ofs 5' ri TroTj iroer, on rj ywanfla the contrast between natural ovStv x^pM T *) s TOW avSpbs and acquired gifts. See above, ivos p. 23. L J4G SOCRATES. CHAP. VII. knowledge ; he who knows himself will, without fail, do what is healthful, just as he who is ignorant of him- self will, without fail, do what is harmful. 1 Only the man of knowledge can do anything fitting ; he alone is useful and esteemed. 2 In short, knowledge is the root of all moral action ; want of knowledge is the cause of every vice ; and were it possible wittingly to do wrong, that were better than doing wrong unwit- tingly ; for in the latter case the first condition of right action, the moral sentiment, is wanting, whilst in the former case it would be there, the doer being only faith- less to it for the moment. 3 What, however, the know- 1 Mem. iv. 2, 24. For exam- ples of conversations, in which Socrates endeavoured to bring his friends to a knowledge of themselves, see Mem. iii. 6 ; iv. 2. 2 Mem. i. 2, 52 : the accuser charged Socrates with inducing his followers to despise their friends and relations ; for he had declared, those only deserve to be honoured who can make themselves useful by means of their knowledge. Xenophon allows that he showed how little useless and ignorant people were esteemed by their own friends and relatives ; but he says that Socrates did not thereby intend to teach them to despise dependants, but only to show that understand- ing must be aimed at, on TO &V Sf 5% TOIIS v, 3) 6 &KWV ; The question is after- wards thus settled : ra 5'iKaia iroTfpov 6 fKtav ^/evS6p.fvos Kal Qairariav otbtv, t) & &KUV ; ATJA.OF on 6 tKuv. AiKai6rfpov 8e [<^^y elvai~] rbv e'jrtffrdfjifvov TO. Siicaia. rov p/h iiriffTiifJifvov ; $a.ivofj.ai. Conf. Plato, Kep. ii. 382; iii. 389, B. ; iv. 459, C. ; vii. 535, E. ; Hipp. Min. 371, E. It is only an imaginary case to sup- pose that any one can know- ingly and intentionally do what is wrong ; for according to the principles of Socrates, it is impossible to conceive that the man who possesses knowledge as such should, by virtue of his knowledge, do anything but what is right, or that an}' one should spontane- ously choose what is wrong. If, therefore, an untruth is told knowingly and intention- ally, it can only be an apparent and seeming untruth, which Plato allows as a means to higher ends (Rep. ii. 382 ; iii. 389, B. ; iv. 459, C.), whereas want of knowledge is the only proper lie, a proper lie being HIS THEORY ABOUT THE GOOD. 147 ledge is in which virtue consists, whether experimen- CHAP. tal or speculative, purely theoretical or practical is a question upon which Socrates has not entered. In Xenophon at least he places learning and exercise quite naturally together, 1 although Plato had distin- guished them, 2 and to prove that virtue consists in knowledge, that it requires knowledge, and can be ac- quired by instruction, he chooses by preference, even in the pages of Plato, examples of practical acquire- ments and of mechanical dexterity. 3 As yet, however, all that has been laid down is in C. TJie the nature of a formal definition. All virtue is know- S^f* ledge, but of what is it the knowledge ? To this So- monism. crates gives the general answer, knowledge of the good. (^ Virtue He is virtuous, just, brave, and so forth, who knows ned theo- what is good and right. 4 Even this addition is as reticallt J- wide and indefinite as those before. Knowledge which always unintentional, Kep. ii. by natural gifts are really do- 382; v. 535, E. See teller's veloped to mastery. In Mem. Phil. Stud. p. 152. iv. 1, 3, paO-no-is and vaiSfta are 1 At the beginning of the generally required, but even Meno. here no difference is made be- 2 Mem. iii. 9, 1, Socrates an- tween theoretical and practical swers the question whether knowledge. bravery is a StSaKrbv or fyvviKov : 3 So Protag. 349, E. ; Mem. the disposition thereto is quite iii. 9, 1 and 11 : &pxovres are us various as is bodily power, those ^Tuardfjifvoi &px*iv, the voplfa fjLevroi -na-ffav Qtfftv jtafWjtrei steersman in a ship, in agricul- ical fj.f\trri irpbs avSpiav atfe(T0ai, ture, sickness, and athletics, in proof of which it may be those who have made it their noted that no nation with profession, women in spinning, weapons to which it is un- The question here raised is dis- accustomed ventures to en- cussed at length by StrumpelL counter those who are familiar Gesch. d. Prakt. Phil. d. Gr. vor with them. So, too, in every- Arist. 146. tiling else, it is the ^Trj/ufAeio, 4 See p. 143. the fj.av9d.vtiv KOI /xeA.eruj', where- 148 SOCRATES. ' CHAP. makes virtue, is knowledge of the good ; but what is VTT the good ? The good is the conception of a thing viewed as an end. Doing what is good, is acting up to the conception of the corresponding action, in short, knowledge in its practical application. The essence of moral action is therefore not explained by the general definition, that it is a knowledge of the good, the right, and so forth. Beyond this general definition, however, Socrates did not advance in his philosophy. Just as his speculative philosophy stopped short with the general requirement that knowledge belonged to conceptions only, so his prac- tical philosophy stopped short with the indefinite postulate of conduct conformable to conceptions. From such a theory it is impossible to deduce defin- ite moral actions. If such are sought no other alternative remains but to look for them in some other way, either by adopting the necessary princi- ples from the prevailing morality without further testing them ; or, in as far as principles according to the theory of knowledge must be vindicated before thought, by a reference to experience and to the well-known consequences of actions. (2) Prac- As a matter of fact both courses were followed ^Cofdi^d ky Socrates. On the one hand he explained the termined conception of the right by that of the lawful. 1 The cither by eustom. or l Mem. iv. 6, 6 : Ateaia 8e voi.uu.ov S/KOIOI/ cleat, and when iitility. oiaQa, er], 6iro?a Ka\e1rat ; *A Hippias asks for further infor- ot v6fnoi Ke\vovfftv, 6^17. Ol &pa mation as to what is meant by TrototWcJ & 01 v6fjioi Kf\evov(ri v&fjLifiov '. v6fi.ovs 5e ir6\fus, er], SiKcud T troiovffL Kal ftSe?; IlcSs yiyvwffKfis OVKOVV, Ztyri [So- yop otf; In Mem. iv. 4, 12, So- crates], vofjufios /ui/ &v ei-rj 6 Kara crates says : tynfd y&p ej<>> T ^ ravra [a ol iroKiTai fypdavro^\ iro- APPEAL TO CUSTOM AND UTILITY. 149 best service of God, he says, is that which agrees CHAP. VTT with custom ; ! and he will not withdraw himself even from an unjust sentence, lest he should violate the laws. 2 On the other hand, as a necessary conse- quence of this view of things, he could not be con- tent with existing moral sanctions, but was fain to seek an intellectual basis for morality. This he could only take from a consideration of consequences ; and in so doing he frequently proceeds most super- ficially, deriving his ethical principles by a line of argument, which taken by itself differs in results more than in principles, from the moral philosophy of the Sophists. 3 When asked whether there could be a good, which is not good for a definite purpose, he distinctly stated that he neither knew, nor desired to know of such a one : 4 everything is good and beau- \irev6fj.fvos, ai/o^os 8e 6 ravra TTO- only refusing to allow US to pafiaiviav ; Tlar p.tv ovv, fi). speak of Sophistic morals as if OUKOVV Kal SiKaia fter to irpdrroi they were uniform. 6 robots TrfMpevos, aSiKa 8' 6 4 Mem. iii. 8, 1-7, where it is TOI/TOIS direiQSiv ; Flai'i; fj.*t> ofiv. said, amongst other things : 1 Mem. iv. 3, 16 : Euthyde- ft y 1 (pwras fj., 5f TI ayadbv oT5o, mus doubts whether anyone & ^Sfi/bs ayadtv tffTiv, ofo' 0/80, can worthily honour the gods, eiprj, otire 8<=f\t/j.ov rj . . . -rb 3 On the other hand, little XpTJe\i/J.a roTs a,vQpti>- Stoics. TTOIJ, and afterwards explains 4 Mem. i. 5, 6 ; ii. 1, 1 ; conf. good to be that which affords iv. 5, 9. pleasure or averts pain. 5 Mem. iii. 12 ; ii. 1, 18 ;. -' Xen. Mem. iii. 9, 4 : some- conf. i. 6. INCONSISTENCY OF SOCRATIC MORALITY. 151 should be modest, because boasting does harm and CHAP. brings disgrace. 1 We should be on good terms with our relatives, because it is absurd to use for harm what has been given us for our good ; 2 we should try to secure good friends, since a good friend is the most useful possession : 3 we should not withdraw from public affairs, since the well-being of the com- munity is the well-being of the individual ; 4 we should obey the laws, since obedience is productive of the greatest good to ourselves and to the state ; and we should abstain from wrong, since wrong is always punished in the end. 5 We should live virtuously, because virtue carries off the greatest rewards both from God and man. 6 To argue that all such-like expressions do not contain the personal conviction of the philosopher, but are intended to bring those to virtue by meeting them on their own ground, who cannot be got at by higher motives, is evidently laboured, considering the definiteness with which Socrates expresses himself. 7 Unless, therefore, Xeno- phon is misleading on essential points, we must allow that Socrates was in earnest in explaining the good as the useful, and consequently in the corre- sponding derivation of moral duties. True it is that in the mouth of Socrates other (3) Lt- utterances are met with, leading us beyond this super- J^"*^ Suci-atio 1 Mem. i. 7. a Mem. ii. i, 27, gives an ex- Morality. - Ibid. ii. 3, 19. tract from a writing of Pro- 3 Ibid. ii. 4, 6 ; ii. 6, 4 and dicus, the substance of which 10. Socrates appropriates. Conf. i. ' Ibid. iii. 7, 9 ; ii. 1, 14. 4, 18; iv. 3, 17. 5 Ibid. iv. 4, 16 and 20; iii. ' This point will be subse- 9> 12. quently discussed. 152 SOCRATES. CHAP. ficial ground of moral duties, by placing the essential ; advantage of virtue, the purpose which it serves and because of which it is good and beautiful in its in- fluence on the intellectual life of man. 1 Most un- doubtedly and decidedly would this be the view of Socrates could we attribute to him the maxim so familiar to the Socrates of Plato, 2 that righteousness is health, unrighteousness disease of the soul, and consequently that all wrong-doing invariably injures him who does it. whereas the right is necessarily and always useful. Language of this kind occurring in the Eepublic and Grorgias does not justify our be- lieving it. In these dialogues much is put into the mouth of Socrates, which he never said and never can have said. Nor can it be pleaded that Plato would never have held such pure moral conceptions, unless he had had them from his teacher. Otherwise the theory of ideas and much besides which is found in Plato would have to be attributed to Socrates. We cannot even vouch for it that everything contained in the Crito comes from Socrates, its author not having been present at the conversation which it describes. Having apparently, however, been committed to writing no long time after the death of Socrates, and not going beyond his point of view, it is noteworthy that this dialogue contains the same principles : 3 a 1 On what follows compare 3 Crito 47, D : as in the Ribbing, p. 83, 91, 105, whose treatment of the body, the researches are here thankfxilly physician's advice must be acknowledged, whilst all his followed, so in questions of conclusions are not accepted. right and wrong the advice of 2 See Zeller's Phil. d. Griech. him f tl p-i\ aico\ove-f)ffo/j.ft', p. 561 of second edition. Sia^fpov/Mev eKeTj/o nal A7j a.Tria\\vro. If, moreover, life in a diseased body has no value : juer' littivov &oa /Siwrbv fifuv 5ie0ap/ieVou, tj> ^b aStKOV AwjSarat -rb 5e S/KOIOI/ bvivT]i\o- aou>v Kal vfj.1v TrapaKf\fv6/j.fvos . . . \tyuv oildrrep ttco6a, '6n, & IJ.fv OVK alffx^v . . . KOI 6o|rjs Kal TI^TJS. i/'i'X'JS, '6-ntas us /SfATJffTTj effrai, OVK ^TrifjL\ei ovSe av\6- rfpa TTfpl ir\fiovos. 2 Ibid. 29, B. 3 Mem. i. 4, 13 : God has not only taken care of the human body, a\\' Sirep fteyurrov fvepov &Ttfj.6i> iff-rf is proved by the fact that you bury the body as soon as the soul tv 37 u6vri yiverat avOfMairivuv Tov 6elov (ifrexet. 4 Mem. i. 2, 4: Socrates recommends bodily exercise within certain limits : rain-nv yap TV ''" vyifirfiv Te iKavias elvatKa\T^]v TTJS i^uX'JS iirip.t\tiav (which accordingly regulates the care of the body) OVK 154 SOCRATES. CHAP, that conduct is better, the more you aim at the ' education of the soul, and more enjoyable, the more you are conscious thereof. 1 The intellectual perfec- tion of man depending in the first place on his know- ledge, wisdom is the highest good, without compare more valuable than ought besides. 2 Learning is recommended not only on account of its utility, but far more because of the enjoyment which it directly confers. 3 These expressions fully agree with what has been quoted from Plato ; they also appear quite consistent in a philosopher who bases the whole of moral conduct so decidedly upon knowledge, and so expressly leads man to knowledge of and to dealing with self, as Socrates does. 4 What then must be made of accounts in which Socrates recommends moral duties entirely on grounds of outward adaptation to a purpose, such as we fre- quently find in Xenophon ? Are we to assume that all such explanations are only intended for those who were too unripe to understand the sage's real mean- ing, to show that even on the hypothesis of the ordi- nary unsatisfactory definition of purpose, virtuous 1 Mem. iv. 8, 6 : &pitrra ju/ mended by Socrates for pre- yap oljUtu f!jv rovs &pttrra eiri/jie- ferring treasures of wisdom to \ovfjLfvovs rov as fte\rlffrovs yiy- treasures of gold and silver ; veffdai, fiSiffra Se rovs fj.d\iffra for the latter do not make ataOavo/jLevovs, Sn fie\riovs yiy- men better, -rets tie rcav aotytav vovrai. i. 6, 9 : ofet ovv airb avSptav yvtafjas apery frAovrifw -rroivroiv rovroiv roffavri\v TjSov^v robs Ke/CTTjjue'j/ow. ilvai, Sffijv airb rov eairr6i> re 3 Mem. iv. 5, 10 : aAAo /*V rjyfiffBai j8eA/r(to yiyrfffOcu Kal a,Trb rov /j.adf'iv ri Ka\bv noil i\ovs afieivovs Krae\eicu, * Mem. iv. 5, 6 : ffotptay 8e rb oAAa Kal ^5oj/ol peyiffraL yiyvov- Hfyiffrov ayaebv K. r. \. ; iv. 2, rcu. Conf . ii. 1 . 19. 9, where Euthydemus is com- 4 Conf. pp. 65, 121, 140. INCONSISTENCY OF SOCRATIC MORALITY. 155- conduct is the best? that Xenophon took these CHAP. VII preliminary and introductory discussions for the " whole of the Socratic philosophy of life, and hence drew a picture of the latter, representing, it is true, his own but not the platform of the real So- crates ? l This view has no doubt its truth, but it is hardly the whole truth. We can readily believe that Xenophon found the more tangible foundation for moral precepts which judges them by their conse- quences both clearer and more intelligible than the deeper one which regards their working on the inner condition of man. We naturally, therefore, expect his description to give the preference to this to him more intelligible explanation even at the cost of the other ; and to throw the other more into the background than the actual state of the case warrants. We must, therefore, allow double value to such Socratic utterances as he reports implying a deeper moral life. We cannot, however, consider him so bad a guide as to report utterances which Socrates never expressed, nor can we give to these utterances a meaning by means of which they can be brought into full accord with Plato's description of the Socratic ethics. Take for instance the dialogues with Aristippus, 2 where Socrates is asked to point out a thing good, ' This is, in the main, the sen, Daemon d. Sokr. 4, who view of Brandis, Rhein. Mus. reproduces Xenophon 's saying* v. .\ii-hn1tr u. Urandig, i. b, 138 ; as incorrectly as he does. Gr. Rom. Phil. ii. a, 40 ; Gesch. Zeller's. <1. Kntwickl. i. 238 ; Ribbing, 2 Mem. iii. 8. Hokrat. Stud. i. 115 ; Volquard- 166 SOCRATES. CHAP. and afterwards a thing beautiful, and both times ' answers that goodness and beauty consist in nothing else save a subserviency to certain purposes. 1 What inducement had Socrates here to withhold his own opinion? Was Aristippus one of the unripe un- philosophic heads, not in a condition to understand his views ? Was he not rather in addition to Plato and Euclid one of the most independent and intel- lectually best educated thinkers in the Socratic circle ? Why should Socrates say to him : everything is good and beautiful for that to which it bears a good relation, and hence the same thing may in rela- tion to one be a good, to another an evil ? Why does he not add : one thing there is which is always and unconditionally good, that which improves the soul? Or did he add it, and Xenophon omit it although the main point ? 2 and was this so in other cases? 3 We could only be justified in such an assumption, 'were it shown that Socrates could not possibly have spoken as Xenophon makes him speak, or that his utterances cannot possibly have had the meaning, which they have according to Xenophon's account ; 4 to prove which it is not sufficient to appeal to the contradiction with which Socrates is otherwise charged. It is certainly a contradiction to call virtue the highest end of life, and at the same time to recommend it because of the advantages it brings : 5 1 See p. 149, 4. 5 What Brandis has else- 2 As Mem. iv. 6, 8. where asserted appears to be 3 Brandis, 1. c. less open to objection, viz. that 4 As Brandis, 1. c. asserts. Socrates distinguishes mere Conf. Dissen, 1. c. 88; Hitter, good fortune from really far- Gesch. d. Phil. ii. 70. ing well, and that he only INCONSISTENCY OF SOCRATIC MORALITY. 157 and Plato recognising this contradiction has avoided it. 1 Still the question really is, whether and to what __ extent Socrates has avoided it, and nothing can justify our assuming, that he cannot possibly have been involved in it. For is there not a contra- diction in Kant rejecting most decidedly for the moral estimate of our actions every standard based on CHAP. allows happiness in its ordi- nary sense a place among things relatively good. The former statement is in Mem. iii. 9, 14 ; but this distinction even by a decided advocate of Eudremonism, such as Aris- tippus, could be admitted, as- suming that true and lasting happiness is to be attained not by the uncertain favour of chance, but by one's own acti- vity and understanding, and that man must not make him- self dependent on extreme circumstances, but ensure a lasting enjoyment of life by rising superior to himself and his surroundings. If Brandis (Entw. i. 237) declares this impossible, he need simply be referred to the fact that in the Cyrenaic and Epicurean schools such views are actually met with. See below, ch. xiv. B, 5, and Zeller's Stoics, Epi- cureans, &c., p. 44. For the lat- ter statement Brandis appeals to Mem. iv. 2, 34. Here Euthy- demus has to be convinced of his ignorance in respect of good and evil. After it lias been proved that all things considered by Euthydemus to be goods, wisdom included, may, under certain circum- stances, be disadvantageous, Euthydemus says : KivSvvetei avafj-^iKoytararov ayaBbv elvai rb fvSai/j.ovfiv, to which Socrates replies : tf ye ju^ TJS avrb e'| a.fji(j)t\uy(ai> ayaOcov ffwriQeit}, or as it is immediately explained, el ye ^ irpoffOiiffo^ei' avrcf /coAAos f) l(TXyv % irXovrov t) 5<$|or 2) /cat TI &\\o T&V TOIOVTUV, since among all these things there is none which is not the source of much evil. Far from deny- ing, this proceeds on the dis- tinct understanding that hap- piness is the highest good which Greek ethics invariably presuppose ; neither is it called simply an a.^(\oyov ayaObv, ex- cept in the case that it is com- pounded of &iJ.i\oya ayaOa, i.e. of such things as under certain cirqumstances lead to evil, and are not simply ayaOa, but some- times icaicd. Still less is this statement at variance with passages which estimate the value of every thing and of every action by its conse- quences, a standard being the very thing which Socrates is here laying down. 1 As Plato has already re- marked, Rep. ii. 362, E. ; Phsedo, 68 D, 158 SOCRATES. CHAP. experience, and afterwards deciding the question as 1 to what maxims are suited to the principle of uni- versal legislation, having regard to the consequences which would follow were they universally adopted ? Is there not a contradiction in the same writer, at one time waging war a outrance against Eudaemo- nism, at another founding the belief in the existence of God on the demand for a bliss corresponding to worth? Is not the critic of pure reason, in asserting the independent existence of a thing and at the same time unconditionally denying that it can be known, entangled in a contradiction so blatant, that Fichte was of the opinion that if it really assumed the independent existence of a thing, he would rather regard it as the work of a strange coin- cidence, than of human brains ? Can the historian therefore make the philosopher of Konigsberg say what he did not say ? Can he violently set aside these contradictions instead of explaining them ? And would it be so inconceivable that the same thing should be true of the Socratic doctrine ? The philo- sopher wishes to build moral conduct upon knowledge. In point 'of form his conception of knowledge is so indefinite, that it includes besides philosophical convictions, every kind of skill derived from ex- perience. 1 In point of matter it suffers from a similar indefiniteness. The subject matter of prac- tical knowledge is the good, and the good is the use- ful, or what is the same thing the expedient. 2 But in 1 See p. 147. The identity of the good and " Conf . p. 149, 4 ; 1 and 2. the useful is also presupposed INCONSISTENCY OF SOCRATIC MORALITY. 359 what this consists, Socrates according to all accounts CHAP. has not expressed with sufficient precision to avoid all ambiguity in his ethics. In passages of Plato , from which we can gather the views of the Socrates of history, with some certainty, he does not even go beyond saying that intellectual culture, care for the soul, must be the most important end for man. Still to refer all human actions to this as their ulti- mate and final purpose is impossible for his unsyste- matic and casual ethical theories, unsupported by any comprehensive psychological research. Hence other ends having to do with man's well-being in the most varied ways come apparently independently to support that highest moral purpose, and moral activity itself appears as a means towards attaining these ends. 1 If therefore Xenophon reports a number of Socratic dialogues in which things are so repre- sented, we may still maintain that they do not ex- haust the Socratic basis of ethics ; but we have no right to question the accuracy of his description, supported as it is by many traces in Plato, nor yet to twist it into its opposite by assuming that we have here only the beginnings of dialogues the real object of which must be a very different one. Their accu- racy on the contrary is vouched for by the circum- in the passages quoted from distinction in kind in the con- Plato on p. 152, although the ception of the ayaObv, as to conception of the useful is regard the iyaObv belonging to somewhat extended there. virtues as moral good, all 1 Compare the sound remarks other good as good for the of Striimpell, Gesch. d. Prakt. understanding only, and conse- i'liil. d. (.Jr. 138, resulting in quently as only useful and this: Socrates made no such expedient. 160 SOCRATES. CHAP. VII. D. Par- ticular moral re- lations. stance, 1 that among the Socratic schools side by side with the morals of the Cynics and the criticism of the Megarians, a place was found too for the Cyrenaic doctrine of pleasure ; and that the founders of these schools to all appearance were firmly persuaded that they reproduced the true spirit of the Socratic teach- ing. Had that teaching afforded them no foothold, this phenomenon would be hard to understand. In its essence the Socratic morality is anything but selfish. That fact does not, however, prevent its assuming the form of Eudsemonism in its theoretical explanation. We do not complain of it as wanting in moral content, but as wanting in philosophic precision. To give a systematic account of moral actions was not a part of the intention of Socrates. His views 1 To which Hermann, Plat. i. 257, rightly draws attention. When, however, this writer finds in the principle of utility (Ibid. p. 254 Ges. Abh. 232) or as he prefers to call it in the predominence of relative value not merely a weak point in the philosophy of Socrates, but at the same time an in- stance of Socratic modesty, one feels inclined to ask, wherein does this modesty consist ? And when he connects here- with the more general doctrine, constituting in his view the main difference between the So- cratic dialectic and the Sophis- tic, and also the foundation of the Socratic teaching on the truth of universal conceptions, he appears to advocate a doc- trine neither to be found in the Memorabilia (iii. 8, 4-7; 10, 12 ; iv. 6, 9 ; 2, 13), nor in the Hippias Major of Plato (p. 288) the latter by the way a very doubtful authority. It is indeed stated in these passages, that the good and the beauti- ful are only good and beautiful for certain purposes by virtue of their use, but not that every application of these attributes to a subject has only a relative validity. Under no circum- stances would the passage authorise a distinction between the Socratic and the So- phistic philosophy ; one of the characteristics of the Sophists consisting in their allowing only" a relative value to. all scientific and moral principles. MENTAL INDEPENDENCE. 161 were from time to time expanded as occasion required. CHAP. Chance has, to a certain extent, decided which of his _ dialogues should come down to us. Still it may be assumed that Socrates kept those objects more espe- cially in view, to which he is constantly reverting by preference according to Xenophon. Here in addi- tion to the general demand for moral knowledge, and for knowledge of self, three points are particularly prominent 1. The independence of the individual as secured by the control of his wants and desires ; 2. The nobler side of social life, as seen in friend- ship; 3. The furtherance of the public weal by a regulated commonwealth. To these may be added the question, 4. Whether, and In how far, Socrates exceeded the range of the ordinary morality of the Greeks by requiring love for enemies ? Not only was Socrates himself a model of self- (l)Indivi- denial and abstemiousness, but he endeavoured to foster the same virtues in his friends. What other subject was more often the topic of conversation than abstemiousness in the dialogues of Xenophon ? l And did not Socrates distinctly call moderation the corner-stone of all virtue ? 2 On this point the ground he occupied was nearly the same as that which after- wards gained such importance for the schools of 1 See the authorities p. 150, If Socrates had at all reflected, 4, 5. he would have explained mode- 2 Mem. i. 5, 4 : S.pd ye ov xf^l ration as a kind of knowledge. irAvra &i>$pa, riyr]ffot> TV The above quoted passage fiav apery? elvai Kpjjir'iSa, might then be taken to mean, irpSiTijv iv rrj fyvxy xara- that the conviction of the ; This does not con- worthlessness of sensual enjoy- tradict the assertion that all ments must precede every other virtue consists in knowledge, moral knowledge. M 162 SOCRATES. CHAP, the Cynics and Stoics ; man can only become master ' of himself by being independent of wants, and by the exercise of his powers ; while depending on the con- ditions and pleasures of the body, he resembles a slave. 1 A philosopher who considers knowledge to be the highest good, will naturally insist upon the mind's devoting itself, uninterrupted by the desires and appetites of the senses, 2 to the pursuit of truth in preference to every other thing; and the less value he attaches to external things as such and the more exclusively he conceives happiness to be bound up with the intellectual condition of man, 3 the more will he feel the call to carry these principles into practice, by really making himself independent of the external world. Other motives, however, which served as a standard for moralists of a later epoch, were unknown to Socrates. He was not only an ascetic in relation to the pleasures of the senses, but displayed less strictness than might have been antici- pated, neither shrinking from enjoyment, nor yet feeling it needful. To continue master of himself in the midst of enjoyment, by the lucid clearness of his thought that was the aim which his moderation proposed to itself. 4 1 Xen. Mem. i. 5, 3 ; i. 6, 5 ; 8 T& peyiffTov ayaBbv ov SoKfi ii. 1,11; i. 2, 29 ; iii. 13, 3 ; and, trot aireipyouffa TWV a.v6ptairtd ~ individual places himself in connection with others. The simplest form of this connection is friendship. Socrates, as we have already remarked, can only de- fend this relation on the ground of its advantages ; still there can be no mistaking the fact that it possessed both for himself and for his philosophy a deeper meaning. For this, if for no other reason, it was cultivated by preference, and discussed in all the Socratic schools. When knowledge and morality so fully coincide as they do from Socrates' point of view, an intellectual association of individuals is Mem. i. 3, 14 : o&ro> ty Kai the harm it does to property, idfeij' ruvs P.TJ apo5i Te'xvrj in Mem. ii. son. in Stob. Ploril. 40, 9), that 1, 17; iv. 2, 11. Plato, Euthyd. in answer to the question, to 168 SOCRATES. CHAP. VII. Whilst thus doing homage to the old Greek view of the state, in other respects he deviates from it widely. If knowledge is the condition of all true virtue, it is also the condition of all political virtue ; all the more so in proportion as the -conception of political virtue is the higher one. Hence everyone who aspires to the position of a statesman is required to prepare himself for this calling * by a thorough self-sifting and a course of intellectual labour ; and conversely, Socrates only recognises capacity or right to political position where this condition is fulfilled. Neither the possession of power, nor the good fortune of acquiring it by lot or popular election, but only knowledge makes the ruler. 2 As regards the rule of what country he belonged, he replied that he was a citizen of the world, cannot command credit, and the question itself sounds strange as addressed to Socrates in Athens. In Plato's Crito and Apol. 37, C., he uses language very different from 1 he later cosmopolitan philoso- phers. Probably one of these attributed to him the above story. 1 Mem. iii. 6, particularly towards the end ; iv. 2, 6 ; Plato, Symp. 216, A. See p. 55, 6. 2 Mem. iii. 9, 10 : ftaaiKus 5e KO.I &PXOVTO.S 0V TOVS TO. ffKTITTTpa fXOvras eri flvat, ovSe TOVS wrb Ttfv TvxovTiav atpeOevTas, ovSe TOVS K\r,ptf \ax.6i'Tas, ov$e TOVS PiaffKri Te S>v Sel Kal TavTa iropieff6ai SUJ/TJTCU, ayaObs &p tti) irporrTa- TIJS. Similar views are advo- cated by Plato with the same illustrations, Polit. 297, D., and they appear to have been generally held in the school of Socrates. Accordingly the accuser Xen. Mem. i. 2, 9, charges Socrates with having contributed to bring existing institutions into contempt : \eywv ws fjuepoov els TOVS p.fv TTJS Tf6\6(as &PXOVTO.S a-rrb KVO./J.OV /ca0- iffTaffdat, KvfiepvT)Tr) Se ^uTjSsVa /j.r,5e &\\a nd Xenophon does not deny the accuracy of this statement, but only attempts THE STATE. 169 the majority, his judgment is, that it is impossible CHAP. for a statesman desirous for right and justice to hold Vn ' his own against it ; hence, where it prevails, what else can an upright man do but withdraw to private life ? A political principle was here advocated, which brought Socrates not only into collision with the Athenian democracy, but with the whole political administration of Greece. In place of the equality of all, or the preference accorded to birth and wealth, he demanded an aristocracy of intelligence ; in place of citizen-rulers, a race of intellectually edu- cated officials ; in place of a government of tribes and people, a government by professional adepts, which Plato, consistently developing the principles of Socrates, attempted to realise in his philosophic community. 1 Socrates is here observed following in the track which the Sophists first struck out, being themselves the first to offer and to declare necessary a preparatory intellectual training for a statesman's career. Still what he aimed at was in point of substance very different from what they aimed at. For him the aim of politics was not the power of the individual, but the well-being of the community ; the object of training was not to acquire personal dexterity, but to attain truth ; the means of culture was not the art of persuasion, but the science of what really is. Socrates aimed at a knowledge by means of which the state might be reformed, the to prove the harmlessness of ' Plato, Apol. 31, E. ; conf. -such principles. Rep. vi. 496, C. 170 SOCRATES. CHAP. Sophists at one by means of which it might be- Vn> governed. The aristocratic tone of this view of the state- appears to be contradicted by the ease with which Socrates rose above the social prejudices of his nation, meeting the ruling contempt for trade by the maxim that no useful activity, be it what it may, but only idleness and activity need call forth shame. Still both come from a common source. For just as Socrates will have the position of the individual in the state settled according to his achievements, so conversely he will have every action appreciated which leads to any good result. 1 Here, as elsewhere, the conception of good is his highest standard. (4) Love One consequence of the political character of mieg 16 ' Ghreelc morality was that the problem proposed to the virtuous man was customarily summed up as doing good to friends and harm to foes. This very defini- tion is put into the mouth of Socrates 2 by Xenophon, who likewise considers it most natural to feel pain at the success of enemies. 3 On the other hand, in one of the earliest and most historical of Plato's dia- 1 Mem. i. 2, 56. In keeping as the son of a poor labourer, with this, he urges a friend Xenophon and Plato as men of (ii. 7) to employ the maids of rank and property, his house in wool work, and 2 Mem. ii. 6, 35 : /cal art Hyi'ia- another (ii. 8) to seek for occu- Has avSpbs aperriv ilvai VIKV rovs pation as a steward, refuting /j.ev 66vov 5e unbecoming for free men. (TKOTTUV '6,n efoj, \VTTT\V fteV TO, Xenophon held a different e^fvptcntev ainbv ovra, ov-re /XS'I/TOJ view (see (Ec. 4. 2, and 6, 5), rty tirl i\wv dri/xiais viire T?> and it is well known that eV e-^Gpuv tiirvxicus yiyvofjifvriv. Plato did also. Socrates speaks LOVE FOR ENEMIES. 17 logues, 1 Socrates declares it to be wrong to injure CHAP. another : injury is the same thing as wrong-doing, '_ and wrong-doing may never be permitted, not even towards one from whom wrong-doing has been suf- fered. The contradiction of these two accounts is hard to get over : 2 for assuming it to be granted that the Socrates of Xenophon is only speaking from a popular point of view, still the fact would remain that Xenophon cannot have been conversant with explanations such as those given by Plato. No doubt Plato's account even in the Crito cannot be regarded as strictly conformable to truth ; still it may well be questioned whether he can be credited with such a flagrant deviation from his master's teaching 3 as this would be. That there is such a possibility cannot be denied ; we must then be content to leave it in uncertainty as to which were the real principles of Socrates on this subject. 4 1 Crito 49, A. Also Rep. i. principle opposed to slavery. 334, B. If he held many things which 2 The remark of Meiners according to Greek prejudices (Gesch. der Wissenschaft. ii. belonged to slaves not to be 456) will not pass muster that unworthy of a free-man, it by Socrates considered it allow- no means follows that he dis- able to do harm (bodily) to approved of slavery; and the enemies, but not to injure view that slavery is contrary them in respect of their true to nature (mentioned by Aris- well-being, Xenophon express- totle, Polit. i. 3) is not attri- ly allowing icanus iroie'iv while buted to Socrates as its author. Plato as expressly forbids it. Had it belonged to him, it 3 See p. 153. would undoubtedly have been 4 Still less are we justified so mentioned. But the whole in asserting as Hildebrand connection does not suit So- ap] H-iirs inclined to do (' Xeno- crates, to whom the distinct ion phont. et Arist. de CEconomia between Qfaei and v6w> is. publica Doctrina, part i. Marb. foreign. We ought rather to 1845) that Socrates was in think of the Cynics. 172 SOCRATES. CHAPTEK VIII. CONTINUATION. ON NATURE. GOD AND MAN. CHAP. ENQUIRIES into nature, we have seen, did not form, part of the scheme of Socrates. Nevertheless, the A. Subor- } me o f h j s speculations led him to a peculiar view of mnation of x means to nature and its design. One who so thoughtfully ends ^n turned over the problem of human life from all sides as he did, could not leave unnoticed its countless re- lations to the outer world ; and judging them by the standard which was his highest type the standard of utility for man could not but come to the con- viction that the whole arrangement of nature was subservient to the well-being of the human race, in short that it was adapted to a purpose and good. 1 To his mind, however, all that is good and expedient appears of necessity to be the work of reason ; for just as man cannot do what is useful without intelli- gence, no more is it possible for what is useful to exist without intelligence. 2 His view of nature, 1 For Socrates, as has been crates is desirous of convincing already shown, understands by a friend of the existence of the the good what is useful for Gods, and hence proposes the man. question : Whether more intel- 2 See Mem. i. 4, 2, in which ligence is not required to pro- the argument from analogy is duce living beings than to pro- most clearly brought out. So- duce paintings like those of VIEWS OF NATURE. l\ therefore, was essentially that of a relation of means CHAP. to ends, and that not a deeper relation going into the inner bearings of the several parts, and the purpose of its existence and growth inherent in every natural being. On the contrary, all things are referred as a matter of experience to the well-being of man as their highest end, and that they serve this purpose is also set forth simply as a matter of fact, and as due to a reason which, like an artificer, has endued them with this accidental reference to purpose. As in the Socratic ethics, the wisdom regulating human actions becomes a superficial reflection as to the use of par- ticular acts, so, too, Socrates can only conceive of the wisdom which formed the world in a manner equally superficial. He shows l what care has been taken to provide for man, in that he has light, water, fire, and air, in that not only the sun shines by day, but also the moon and the stars by night ; in that the heavenly bodies serve for divisions of seasons, that the earth brings forth food and other necessaries, and that the change of seasons prevents excessive heat or cold. He reminds of the advantages which are derived from cattle, from oxen, from pigs, horses, and other Polycletus and Zeuxis ? Aristo- he is obliged to confess, T&. &r' demus will only allow this uV sage a strictly historical ac- 5e o.TtKn(\fiq 1183, b, 9. ftvrwv Tr6rfpa TU^IJS, Kal Trdrepa l Mem. i. 4 ; IV. 3. Kplvtis ; Upeirei n&v, 174 SOCRATES. CHAP. animals. To prove the wisdom of the Craftsman who ' made man, 1 he refers to the organism of the human body, to the structure of the organs of sense, to the erect posture of man, to the priceless dexterity of his hands. He sees a proof of a divine Providence in the natural impulse for propagation and self-preser- vation, in the love for children, in the fear of death. He never wearies of exalting the intellectual advan- tages of man, his ingenuity, his memory, his intelli- gence, his language, his religious disposition. He considers it incredible that a belief in God and in Providence should be naturally inborn in all men, and have maintained itself from time immemorial, clinging not to individuals only in the ripest years of their age, but to whole nations and communities, unless it were true. He appeals also to special revelations vouchsafed to men for their good, either by prophecy or portent. Unscientific, doubtless, these arguments may appear, still they became in the sequel of importance for philosophy. As Socrates by his moral enquiries, notwithstand- ing all their defects, is the founder of a scientific doctrine of morals, so by his theory of the relation of means to ends, notwithstanding its popular character, he is the founder of that ideal view of nature which ever after reigned supreme in the natural philosophy of the Greeks, and which with all its abuses has proved itself of so much value 1 In Mem. i. 4, 12, a remark -rS>v cuppoSiffiwv ridov is found indicative of the popu- &\*ois j^'ois Sovvat Tr lar character of these general TON erovs XP& VOV , It" considerations : rb Se xal ras jue'xpi yiipias ravra irape'xi'. CONCEPTION OF GOD. 175 for the empirical study of nature. True, he was not CHAP. himself aware that he was ^engaged on natural science, having only considered the relation of means to ends in the world, in the moral interest of piety. Still from our previous remarks it follows how closely his view of nature was connected with the theory of the knowledge of conceptions, how even its defects were due to the universal imperfection of his intel- lectual method. Asking further what idea we should form to our- B. God selves of creative reason, the reply is, that Socrates ^orghip O f mostly speaks of Gods in a popular way as many, 1 no God - doubt thinking, in the first place, of the Gods of the ur use of popular fai th. 2 Out of this multiplicity the idea of the ^J* 1 oneness of God, 3 an idea not unknown to the Greek religion, rises with him into prominence, as is not infrequently met with at that time. 4 In one passage he draws a curious distinction between the creator and ruler of the universe and the rest of the Gods. 5 Have we not here that union of polytheism and 1 Mem. i. 1, 19 ; 3, 3 ; 4, 11 ; TWV re nal i>, Barrov tion to his Philos. d. Griechen, Se vo^aros avap-apriyrois inrripf- p, 3. rovvra, ovros rek /jLfytffra /j,ev 4 Mem. i. 4, 5 ; 7, 17 : 6 Q irpdrrwv dp'drai, T<5e Se OIKOVO- apx^s iroiwv avBp&irovs, ffoov ni\o^ov argument (Forsch. 220) to prove rbv TOV 6eov 6(p6a\/j.bi>, r$]v TOV that this language is spurious, SeoC fyp6vT)ffiv. although on his own showing 5 Mem. iv. 3, 13. The Gods it was known to Phaedrus, are invisible ; o'l re yap &\\oi Cicero, and the writer of the iliuv Tct^ aya6a 5.5p6vriffiv TO iravra Sirtas <$>poviH.&v Tt SoKeis ex fiv ! &M.O01 tu> avry ySv y, OVTQI TiOeffBai Kal Sf ouSojuov ovSev otei VTiv TIV& oSrcas fjiev Tj/vxV fal iffpl Ttav tvOdSe Kal olei evroiKTcas *X* IV '- ^ ' KaTa/j.a6e irepl riav tv Aiyvirrtp Kal SiKeX/a Srt Kal 6 ffbs vovs tvwv -rb ffbv Svvaffdai (ppovri^eiv, T^V Se TOV rrcDua STTWS f)ov\fTai pfTaxeipi- 6eov (f>p6i>Tjffiv fi^j iKav^v elvai a/j.a (frat ' oteffOai olv xp^l Ka ^ T^" *v iravrcav eirt/jLf\f'tffdai. WORSHIP OF GOD. 177 ledge and care of (rod must be able to embrace all CHAP. and more. 1 Besides had not a belief in the provi- dential care of (rod been already 2 taken for granted, in the argument for His existence from the relation of means to ends ? Was not the best explanation of this care to be found in the analogous care which the human soul has for the body ? A special proof of this providence Socrates thought to discern in oracles : 3 by them the most important things, which could not otherwise be known, are revealed to man. It must then be equally foolish to despise oracles, or to consult them in cases capable of being solved by our own reflection. 4 From this conviction followed, as a matter of course, the worship of God, prayer, sacrifices, and obedience. 5 As to the form and manner of worship, Socrates, ( 3 ) ^ , 1 tvorsh/ip oj as we already know, 6 wished every one to follow the God. custom of his people. At the same time he propounds purer maxims corresponding with his own idea of God. He would not have men pray for particular, least of all for external goods, but only to ask for what is good : for who but God knows what is ad- vantageous for man, or knows it so fully ? And, with 1 Compare the words in Mem. riav 8eS>i> ISris also i. 1, 19. i. 4, 18: If you apply to the 2 Mem. iv. 3; i. 4, 6 and 11. Gods for prophecy, 7^077 rb 9 Ibid. iv. 3, 12 and 16 ; i. 4, 0?ov ZTI Toaov-rov HOI -roiovr6v 14. fffnv, Siaff ap.a irdvra 6pav xal * Ibid. i. 1, 6. Conf . p. 77, 3 ; irdvra aKovfiv Kal iravraxov iraptt- 65, 5. cat, Kal ajua TTO.VTWV ^TrijueA.fTtrflai s Compare Mem. iv. 3, 14 ; and the words, Ibid. iv. 3, 12 : ii. 2, 14. 3ri 5e 76 a\r)9r) \a.s N 178 SOCRATES. CHAP, regard to sacrifices, he declared that the greatness of VIII the sacrifice is unimportant compared with the spirit of the sacrificer, and that the more pious the man, the more acceptable will the offering be, so that it correspond with his means. 1 Abstaining on principle from theological speculations, 2 and not seeking to explore the nature of God, but to lead his fellow men to piety, he never felt the need of combining the various elements of his religious belief into one united conception, or of forming a perfectly consist- ent picture, and so avoiding the contradictions which that belief may easily be shown to contain. 3 C. Dignity A certain divine element Socrates, like others llis'im- before him, thought to discern within the soul of mortality, man. 4 Perhaps with this thought is connected his belief in immediate revelations of (rod to the human soul, such as he imagined were vouchsafed to himself. Welcome as this theory must have been to a philoso- pher paying so close an attention to the moral and spiritual nature of man, it does not appear that Socrates ever attempted to support it by argument. Just as little do we find in him a scientific proof of the immortality of the soul, although he was inclined to this belief partly by his high opinion of the dignity 1 Mem. i. 3, 2 ; iv. 3, 17. believing in only one God. * See p. 139, 2. This assumption would belie 8 We have all the less reason not only the definite and re- for supposing with Denis (His- peated assertions of Xenophon, toire des Theories et des Idees but also Socrates' unflinching morales dans 1'Antiquite, Paris love of truth. et Strasb. 1856, i. 79), that So- 4 Mem. iv. 3, 14 : a\\a ^v crates, like Antisthenes, spared /col avOpv ivQpwirivuv, rov Oeiov needs of the masses, whilst IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL. 179 of man, partly, too, on grounds of expediency. 1 Nay, rather, in Plato's Apology, 2 at a moment when the \ witholding of a conviction can least be supposed, he expressed himself on this question with much doubt and caution. 3 The language, too, used by the dying Cyrus in Xenophon 4 agrees so well herewith, that we are driven to assume that Socrates considered the existence of the soul after death to be indeed pro- bable, without, however, 6 pretending to any certain knowledge on the point. It was accepted by him as an article of faith, the intellectual grounds for which belonged no doubt to those problems which surpass the powers of man. 6 CHAP. VIII. 1 Compare Hermann in Mar- burger Lectionskatalog, 1835-6, Plat, 684. * 40, C. ; after his condemna- tion. 3 Death is either an external sleep, or a transition to a new life, but in neither case is it an evil. 4 Cyrop. viii. 7, 10. Several reasons are first adduced in fa- vour of immortality, but they need to be greatly strengthened to be anything like rigid proofs. (Compare particularly 19 with Plato's PhiEdo, 105, C.) 6 The above description of the philosophy of Socrates rests on the exclusive autho- rity of Xenophon, Plato, and Aristotle. What later writers say is for the most part taken from these sources, and when- ever it goes beyond them, there is no guarantee for its accu- racy. It is, however, just pos- sible that some genuine utter- ances of Socrates may have been preserved in the writings of JSschines and others, which are omitted by our authorities. In that category place the In conclusion, the possibility of statement of Cleanthes quoted the soul's dying with the body by Clement (Strom, ii. 417, D.), is left an open question, but in either case death is stated to be the end of all evils. s He actually says in Plato, Apol. 29, A. Conf. 37, B. : death is feared as the greatest evil, whilst it may be the greatest good : ty& 5i . . . oi>K et5ws tKavas irtpl fSii' tv 'AfSoi; OUTW Hal ofojucu OVK and repeated by Cicero (Off. iii. 3, 11), that Socrates taught the identity of justice and happi- ness, cursing the man who first made a distinction between them : the statements in Cic. Off. ii. 12, 43 (taken from Xen. Mem. ii. 6, 39 ; conf. Cyrop. i. 6, 22) ; in Seneca, Epist. 28, 2 ; 104, 7 (travelling is of no good 2 180 SOCRATES. CHAP. to fools); 71, 16 (truth and VIII. virtue are identical) ; in Plut. Ed. Pu. c. 7, p. 4, on education (the passage in c. 9 is an inac- curate reference to Plato, Gorg. 470, D.) ; Cons, ad Apoll. c. 9, p. 106, that if all sufferings had to be equally divided, every one would gladly pre- serve his own: Conj. Prase, c. 25, p. 140 (Diog. ii. 33; Exc. e Floril. Joan. Damasc. ii. B. 98 ; Stab. Floril. ed. Mein. iv., 202), on the moral use of the looking glass ; Ser. Num. Vind. c. 5, p. 550, deprecating anger ; in Demet. Byz. quoted by Diog. ii. 21, (Gell. N. A. xiv. 6, 5), Musoti. in the Exc. e Floril. Jo. Dam. ii. 13, 126, p. 221, Mein, that philosophy ought to confine itself to '6, n TOI Iv /jteydpoiffi, KO.K&V r' asya.Q&v re Teruirrai ; (others attribute the words to Diogenes or Aris- tippus) Cic. de Orat. i. 47, 204 : Socrates said that his only wish was to stimulate to virtue ; where this succeeded, the rest followed of itself (a statement thoroughly agreeing with the views of the Stoic Aristo, and probably coming from him. Conf . Zeller, Stoics, Epicureans, fee., p. 60; in Diog. ii. 30, blaming the sophistry of Euclid ; in Diog. ii. 31 (undoubtedly from some Cynic or Stoic treatise) that intelligence is the only good, ignorance the only evil, and that riches and noble birth do more harm than good ; in Diog. ii. 32, that to marry or to ab- stain from marriage is equally bad; in Gell. xix. 2, 7 (Athen. iv. 158; Plut. And. Poet. 4, p. 21), that most men live to eat, whilst he eats to live ; in Stob. Ekl. i. 54, giving a defini- tion of God ; Ibid. ii. 356, Floril. 48, 26 (conf. Plato, Legg. i. 626, E.), that self- restraint is the best form of government ; in Teles, apud Stob. Floril. 40, 8, blaming the Athenians for banishing their best, and honouring their worst men, and the apophthegmata in Valor. Max. vii. 2, Ext. 1. A large number of sayings purporting to come from So- crates are quoted by Plutarch in his treatises and by Stobasus in his Florilegium ; some, too, by Seneca. Most of them, how- ever, are colourless, or else they aim at being epigram- matic, which is a poor substi- tute for being genuine. Alto- gether their number makes them very suspicious. Probably they were taken from a collec- tion of proverbs which some later writer published under the name of Socratic proverbs. ACCURACY OF XENOPHON'S DESCRIPTION. 181 CHAPTER IX. RETROSPECT. XENOPHON AND PLATO. SOCRATES AND THE SOPHISTS. LOOKING back from the point now reached to the CHAP. question raised before, as to which of his biographers we must look to for a historically accurate account A. Trutk- of Socrates and his teaching, we must indeed admit, that no one of them is so satisfactory an authority as I****'* (le ~ J J xcription. any original writings or verbal reports of the utter- ances of the great teacher would have been. 1 So much, however, is patent at once, that the personal character of Socrates, as pourtrayed by both Xenophon and Plato, is in all essential points, one and the same. Their descriptions supplement one another in some few points, contradicting each other in none. Nay more, the supplementary portions may be easily in- serted in the general picture, present before the eyes ,^ \ eHa . of both. Moreover the philosophy of Socrates is not -pTwti* in the main represented by Plato and Aristotle in a j Mrmnil/ a different light from what it is by Xenophon, pro- with that vided those parts only in the writings of Plato be and Ari*- taken into account which undoubtedly belong to So- tatte - 1 Conf. p. 98. 182 SOCRATES. CHAP. crates, and in the Socrates of Xenophon a distinction ' be drawn between the thought underlying his utter- ances and the commonplace language in which it was clothed. Even in Xenophon, Socrates expresses the opinion that true knowledge is the highest thing, and that this knowledge consists in a knowledge of con- ceptions only. In Xenophon, too, may be observed all the characteristics of that method by means of which Socrates strove to produce knowledge. In his pages likewise, virtue is reduced to knowledge, and this position is supported by the same arguments, and therefrom are deduced the same conclusions, as in Aristotle and Plato. In short, all the leading features of the philosophy of Socrates are preserved by Xeno- phon ; granting as we always must that he did not understand the deeper meaning of many a saying, and therefore failed to give it the prominence it deserved. Now and then for the same reason he used a com- monplace expression instead of a philosophical oiie ; for instance, substituting for, ' All virtue is a know- ing,' with less accuracy, ' All virtue is knowledge.' Nor need we feel surprise that the defects of the Socratic philosophy, its popular and prosaic way of treating things, the want of system in its method, the utilitarian basis of its moral teaching should appear more prominently in Xenophon than in Plato and Aristotle, considering the brevity with which Aristotle speaks of Socrates, and the liberty with which Plato expands the Socratic teaching both in point of substance and form. On the other hand, Xenophon's description is confirmed partly by indi- XENOPHON VINDICATED. 183 vidual admissions of Plato, 1 partly by its inward CHAP. truth and conformity to that picture which we must make to ourselves of the first appearance of Socrates' newly discovered principle. All then that can be con- ceded to the detractors of Xenophon is, that not fully understanding the philosophical importance of his teacher, he kept it in the background in his descrip- tion, and that in so far Plato and Aristotle are most welcome as supplementary authorities. But it can- not be allowed for one moment that Xenophon has in any respect given a false account of Socrates, or that it is impossible to gather from his description the true character and importance of the doctrine of his master. It may indeed be said that this estimate of Xeno- (2) SeMei- phon is at variance with the position which Socrates ^eSi^il * is known to have held in history. As Schleiermacher answered. observes ; 2 ' Had Socrates done nothing but discourse on subjects beyond which the Memorabilia of Xeno- phon never go, albeit in finer and more brilliant language, it is hard to understand how it was, that in so many years he did not empty the marketplace and the workshop, the public walks and the schools, by the fear of his presence ; how he so long satisfied an Alcibiades and a Critias, a Plato, and a Euclid ; how he played the part assigned to him in the dia- logues of Plato ; in short, how he became the founder and type of the philosophy of Athens.' Fortunately in Plato himself we have a valuable testimony to the 1 See above, pp. 80 ; 150, 1. 2 Werke, iii. 2, 259, 287. 184 SOCRATES. CHAP. IX. accuracy of Xenophon's description. To what does his Alcibiades appeal when anxious to disclose the divine element concealed under the Silenus-like appearance of the Socratic discourses ? To what does his admirable description of the impression produced on him by Socrates go back ? l What is it which to his mind has been the cause of the revolu- tion and change in the inner life of Greece ? What but the moral observations which in Xenophon form 1 Syxnp. 215, E. : fcav yap O.KOVW ['ZoiKpdrovs'] TroAu p.oi fj.a\- \ov $ TUV KOpvflavTi&vTwv % re tcapSia TrrjSti Kal SaKpva tK-^l-rai inrb TUV Xoyuv TUIV TOVTOV. 6pw 8e Kal &\\ovs irafj.Tr6\\ovs TO. avTa irdtrxovras: this was not the case with other speakers, otiSe Te9opvBi]T6 /J.QV % tyuxb 0118' TjyavdKTei us avSpairoSw^us Sia- Kfi(j.evov, (similarly Euthydemus in Xen. Mem. iv. 2, 39) a\\' virb Tovrovt TOV Wlapffvov Tro\\JiKis 8^J OVTW 5lT07Jf, &ffTe [J.OI 56ai fjL^I fiiwrbv elvai UXOVTI ais ex" . . . avayKa^ft ydp /j.t buoXoyzlv 8rt iroX\ov eVSeTjs Siv avrbs %TI f/j.avTov nfv apf\ea ra 8' 'Mt]va.i(av irpd-rru . . . (conf. Mem. iv. 2 ; iii. 6) ireirovQa. 8e trpbs TOVTOV IJL&VOV avQpiIiiriav, it OVK &v TIS oioiTO tv IfJLol tvilveu, rb alffx^- i>fO~Oai dirivovv .... SpairfTeveo ovv avTbv Kal fj.etov &f axQoip.'riv, SXTTS OVK xa>, 'o n xp^o/xat TOVTC? Ty avSpiairy. Ib. 221, D. : Kal of \6yoi ai/Tov 6fj.oi6Ta.Toi flat rot's SeiX^voTs TOIS Stoiyofievots . . . Sioiyopevovs Sf iSiv av TIS /cal VTOS avTtav yiyv6- /xecos irpiaTOV /j.fi> vovv ex ovras fvSov /JLOVVOVS fvpfifftt TUV \6ya>v, eiretTO OeioTaTOvs Kal ir\(io~T' ayd\ft.uT' apeTTjs eV auToIs UXOVTUS, Kal 4irl ir\tio~Tov TeivovTUS, /ua\- \ov Of firl TTO.V 'oaov trpoa^Kei ffKOTTtlV T( fJL(\\OVTl Ka\(f Ktt- yadtf fffeaBai. AlbertVs (p. 78) objections to the above use of these passages resolve them- selves into this, that those ' ele- ments of conversation which rivet the soul,' which are not altogether wanting in Xeno- phon, are more frequent and noticeable in Plato, that there- fore the spirit of the Socratic philosophy comes out more clearly in Plato. Far from denying this, we grant it readily. The above remarks are not directed against the statement that Plato gives a deeper insight than Xenophon into the spirit of the Socratic teaching, but against Schleier- macher's statement that the discourses of Socrates were essentially different in sub- stance and subject matter from those reported by Xenophon. VALVE OF HIS METHOD. 185 the substance of the Socratic dialogues. These, and CHAP. these only are dwelt upon by Socrates, speaking in Plato's Apology ! of his higher calling and his ser - vices to his country ; it is his business to exhort others to virtue ; and if he considers the attraction of his conversation to consist also in its critical at- tempts, 2 the reference is to a process of which many examples are to be found in Xenophon, that of con- vincing people of ignorance in the affairs of their calling. The effect produced by the discourses of Socrates B - Import- -i AI -i f ji i -i anceofthe need not surprise us, were they only of the kind re- Socratic ported by Xenophon. The investigations of Socrates as he gives them, may often appear trivial and tedious ; and looking at the result with reference to 7l hrcd ' the particular case, they may really be so. That the forger of armour must suit the armour to him who has to wear it : 3 that the care of the body is attended with many advantages : 4 that friends must be secured by kind acts and attention ; 5 these and such-like maxims, which are often lengthily discussed by Socrates, neither contain for us, nor can they have contained for his cotemporaries, anything new. The important element in these inquiries, however, does not consist in their substance, but in their method, 1 29, B. ; 38, A. ; 41, E. HerA&iv. Conf. 33, B. An ex- 2 Apol. 23, C. : irpbs Si TOV- ample of such sifting is to be TOJJ of vtoi pot 4iraKo\oi,0owT(s found in the conversation of ofs nd\tffTa , Kal av-rol TroAAa/cts fyte 4 Ibid. iii. 12, 4. U.I/JLOVVTO.I flra l-KiXfipovaiv fi\Aous * Ibid. ii. 10, 6, 9. 186 SOCRATES. CHAP. in the fact that what was formerly unexplored hypo- ' thesis and unconscious guesswork, was now arrived at by a process of thinking. In making a too minute or pedantic application of this method, Socrates would not give the same offence to his cotemporaries as to us, who have not as they to learn for the first time the art of conscious thinking and emancipa- tion from the authority of blind custom. 1 Nay, did not the enquiries of the Sophists for the most part contain very much less, which notwithstanding their empty cavils, imparted an almost electrical shock to their age, simply and solely because even in its par- tial application, a power, new to the Greek mind, and a new method of reflection had dawned upon it? Had therefore Socrates only dealt with those unimportant topics, upon which so many of his dia- logues exclusively turn, his immediate influence, at least on his cotemporaries, would still be intelligi- ble. These unimportant topics, however, hold a sub- ordinate position in Xenophon's dialogues. Even in these dialogues the main thing seems to be real in- vestigations into the necessity of knowledge, into the nature of morality, into the conceptions of the various virtues, into moral and intellectual self- analysis ; practical directions for the formation of conceptions ; critical discussions obliging the speakers to consider what their notions implied, and at what their actions aimed. Can we wonder that such inves- 1 Comp. Hegel, Gesch. d. Phil. ii. 59. HIS RELATION TO THE SOPHISTS. 1 tigations should have produced a deep impression on CHAP. the cotemporaries of Socrates, and an entire change in the Greek mode of thought, as the historians una- nimously tell us ? 1 or, that a keener vision should have anticipated behind those apparently coinmon- . place and unimportant expressions of Socrates, which his biographers unanimously record, a newly dis- covered world ? For Plato and Aristotle it was re- served to conquer this new world, but Socrates was the first to discover it, and to point the way thereto. Plainly as we may see the shortcomings of his achievements, and the limits which his individual nature imposed on him, still enough remains to stamp him as the originator of the philosophy of con- ceptions, as the reformer of method, and as the first founder of a scientific doctrine of morals. The relation, too, of the Socratic philosophy to c. His .Sophistry will only become clear by considering the ^^"" one-sided and unsatisfactory element in its method Sophists. as well as its greatness and importance. This rela- tion as is well known has, during the last thirty years, been examined in various directions. There being a general agreement previously in accepting Plato's view, and looking on Socrates as the opponent of the Sophists, Hegel first obtained currency for the contrary opinion, that Socrates shared with the Sophists the same ground in attaching importance to the person and to introspection. 2 In a some- what different sense, Grete 3 has still more recently 1 Conf. p. 80, 1 and 2 ; 129; 122, 2. 2 See p. 116. 3 Hist, of Greece, viii. 479, 606. 188 SOCRATES. CHAP. contradicted the traditional notion of the antithesis ' between the Socratic philosophy and Sophistry. If Sophist means what the word from its history alone can mean, a public teacher educating , youth for practical life, Socrates is himself the true type of a Sophist. If on the other hand it denotes the cha- racter of certain individuals and their teaching, it is an abuse to appropriate the term Sophistry to this purpose, or to group together under one class all the different individuals who came forward as Sophists. The Sophists were not a sect or n school, but a profession, men of the most varied views, for the most part highly deserving and- meri- torious people, at whose views we have not the least reason to take offence. If then, Hegel and his followers attacked the common notion of the re- lation of Socrates to the Sophists, because Socrates, in one respect, agreed with the Sophists, Grrote attacks it for the very opposite reason, because the most distinguished of the so-called Sophists are at- one with Socrates. Our previous enquiries will have shown, that both views have their justification, but that neither is altogether right. It is indeed a false view of his- tory to contrast Socrates with the Sophists, in the same sense that true and false philosophy are con- trasted, or good and evil: and in this respect it deserves notice that in Xenophon, the contrast be- tween Socrates and the Sophists is not so great as in Plato, 1 nor yet in Plato nearly so great as it is dra\yn 1 Compare Xen. Mem. iv. 4, Phil. d. Griech. Part I., p. 873, besides p. 69, 1 and Zeller's 1, 2. HIS RELATION TO THE SOPHISTS. 18!) by several modern writers. 1 Still the results of our previous enquiries 2 will not allow of our bringing Socrates, as Grote does in his valuable work, into so close a connection with men who are grouped to- gether under the name of Sophists, and who really in their whole tone and method bear so much resem- blance to him. The scepticism of a Protagoras and Grorgias cannot for a moment be placed on the same level with the Socratic philosophy of conceptions, nor the Sophistic art of controversy with the Socratic sifting of men ; the maxim that man is the measure of all things, cannot be compared with the Socratic demand for action based on personal conviction, 3 CHAV, IX. 1 Proofs in Protagoras and Gorgias, Thaeetet, 151, D. ; 162, D. ; 164, D. ; 165, E. ; Kep. i. 354, A. ; vi. 498, C. 2 Zeller, Part I. 882, 938. 3 As is done by Grote, Plato I. 305. Respecting Socrates' explanation in Plato's Crito 49, D., that he was convinced that under no circumstances is wrong-doing allowed, it is there observed ; here we have the Protagorean dogma Homo Mensura . . . which Socrates will be found combating in the Thaeetetus . . . proclaimed by Socrates himself. How un- like the two are will however be seen at once by a moment's reflection on Protagoras' saying, Conf. Part I. 899 ... p. 259, 535 ; iii. 479. Grote even as- >rrts that not the Sophists but Socrates was the chief quibbler in Greece ; he was the first to i Icstroy the beliefs of ordinary minds by hi.s negative criti- cism, whereas Protagoras, Pro- dicus and Hippias used pre- vious authorities as they found them leaving untouched the moral notions current. II. 410 and 428 he observes respect- ing Plato's statement (Soph. 232, B.) that the Sophists talk themselves and teach others to talk of things which they do not know, which Socrates did all his life long. In so saying, he forgets that Socrates in examining into the opinions of men neither pretends to better knowledge himself nor is content with the negative purpose of perplexing others. His aim was rather to substi- tute permanent conceptions for unscientific notions. He for- gets, also, that in the case of the Sophists, owing to their want, of earnest intellectual feeling, owing to the shallowness of their method, owing to their denial of any absolute truth, 190 SOCRATES. CHAP, nor can the rhetorical display of the older Sophists, '_ the dangerous and unscientific character of their later ethics be lost sight of. As regards the Hegelian grouping of Socrates among the Sophists, this has called forth a greater opposition than it deserves. The authors of this view do not deny that the Socratic reference of truth to the person differed essentially from that of the Sophists. 1 Neither they nor their opponents can deny that the Sophists were the first to divert philosophy away from nature to morals and the human mind, that they first required a basis for practical conduct in knowledge, a sifting of existing customs and laws, that they first referred to personal conviction the settling of truth and falsehood, right and wrong. Hence the dispute with them resolves itself into the question. Shall we say that Socrates and the Sophists resembled one another, both taking personal truth as their -ground, but differing in their views of personal truth? or that they differed, the nature of their treatment being a different one, whilst they agreed in making it relative ? Or to put the question in another shape : There being both points of agreement and difference between them, which of the two elements is the more impor- tant and decisive ? Here for the reasons already explained, only one reply can be given, 2 that the difference between the Socratic and Sophistic philo- together with an incapacity for view. See Part I. 920. positive intellectual achieve- * See p. 118, 1. ments, those practical conse- 2 See p. 110, and Part I. 135, quences were sure to result 938. which soon enough came to .HIS RELATION TO THE SOPHISTS. I'.U sophies far exceeds their points of resemblance. CHAP. The Sophists are wanting in that very thing which is the root of the philosophical greatness of Socrates the quest of an absolutely true and universally valid knowledge, and a method for attaining it. They could question all that had previously passed for truth, but they could not strike out a new and surer road to truth. Agreeing as they do with Socrates in concerning themselves not so much with the study of nature, as with training for practical life, with them this culture has a different character, and a different importance from what it bears with Socrates. The ultimate end of their instruction is a formal dexterity, the use of which to be consistent must be left to individual caprice, since absolute truth is despaired of; whereas with Socrates, on the contrary, the ac- quisition of truth is the ultimate end, wherein alone the rule for the conduct of the individual is to be found. Hence in its further course, the Sophistic teaching could not fail to break away from the phi- losophy which preceded it, and indeed from every intellectual enquiry. Had it succeeded in gaining undisputed sway, it would have dealt the death stroke to Greek philosophy. Socrates alone bore in him- self the germ of a new life for thought. He alone by his philosophical principles was qualified to be the reformer of philosophy. 1 1 Hermann even allows this personal contrast to the So- in saying (Plato, i. 232) that phists than from his general the importance of Socrates for resemblance to them. Sophis- the history of philosophy must try differed from the wisdom be gathered far more from his of Socrates only in the want of a 192 SOCRATES. CHAP. fruit-bearing germ. But how is IX. this admission consistent with - making the second period of philosophy commence with the Sophists instead of with So- crates ? On the other hand, the latest treatise on the ques- tion before us (Siebeck, Dnter- suchung zur Philos. d. Griech. p. 1, Ueber Socr.Verhaltniss zur Sophistik) is decidedly of the opinion here expressed ; and likewise most of the later edi- tors of the history of Greek phi- losophy. Striimpell, too (Gesch. d. Pralit. Phil. d. Griech. p. 26), writes to the same effect, al- though his view of the So- phists differs from ours in that he denies a closer connection between their scepticism and their ethics. He makes the dis- tinctive peculiarity of Socrates to consist in the desire to reform ethics by a thorough and methodical intellectual treatment, whereas the So- phists aspiring indeed to be teachers of virtue, accommo- dated themselves in their in- struction without independent inquiry to the tendencies and notions of the time. HIS TRAGIC END. 103 CHAPTER X. THE DEATH OF SOCRATES. WE are now for the first time in a position to form CHAP. a correct opinion of the circumstances which led to x - the tragic end of Socrates. The actual history of A 1)t . ta u s that event is well known. A whole lifetime had been oftkeae- spent in labours at Athens, during which Socrates MS de-"' had been often attacked, 1 but never judicially im- f' lcc > **": * teiicc, and peached, 2 when in the year 399 B.C., 3 an accusation death. was preferred against him, charging him with unfaithfdlness to the religion of his country, with introducing new Gods, and with exercising a harmful influence on youth. 4 The chief accuser 5 was Mele- tus, 6 with whom were associated Anytus, one of the 1 Compare besides the Clouds vt6vs 8ta TI/XTJ/UO fled/arcs. of Aristophanes, Xen. Mem. i. 2, It is clearly an oversight on the 31 ; iv. 4, 3 ; Plato, Apol. 32, C. ; part of Grate, Plato i. 283, to 22, E. consider the parody of the in- 2 Plato, Apol. 17, D. dictment which Socrates puts 1 See p. 53, 1. into the mouth of his first 4 The indictment, according accusers, as another version of to Favorinus in Diog. ii. 40, the judicial ypa-f]. Xen. Mem. (Begin.), Plato, See Plato, Apol. 19, B. ; 24, Apol. 24, B., was : rdSe typd^aro B. ; 28, A. ; Euthyphro, 2, B. teal a.vrcfji6(raro MeATjros MeX^jrou Max. Tyr. ix. 2, proves nothing UtrBfvs ZuKpdrti ZtatypoviffKov against this, as Hermann has ' AAcmrcKTJdci' dSiKe? 2o>/cpctTjx, shown, De Socratis Accusatori- ous u.\v r) ir6\is vopi&i 0tovs ov bus. von'.fav, frtpa 5i Kaiva Saifj.6via ' For the way in which this fla-nyhp.fvos aSiKti Sf teal TOI/J name is written, instead of 194 SOCRATES. CHAP. X. leaders and re-introducers of the Athenian demo- _ cracy, 1 and Lyco, 2 an orator otherwise unknown. The friends of Socrates appear at first to have considered his condemnation impossible ; 3 still he was himself s was formerly the custom, see Hermann. It ap- pears by a comparison of various passages, that the ac- cuser of Socrates is neither the politician, as Forchhammer makes him to be, nor the op- ponent of Andocides, with whom others have identified him, nor yet the poet men- tioned by Aristophanes (Frogs, 1302), biit some younger man, perhaps the son of the poet. 1 Further particulars about him are given by fbrchhammer, 79 ; and Hermann, 9. They are gathered from Plato, Meno, 90, A. ; Schol. in Plat. Apol. 18, B.; Lysias adv. Dard. 8; adv. Agorat. 78 ; Isoc. adv. Callim, 23 ; Plut, Herod, malign. 26, 6. p. 862; Coriol.c.14; Aristotle in Harpokrates v. Sfudfav ; Schol.in ^Eschin. adv. Tim. 87 ; Diod. xiii. 64. He is mentioned by Xenopli. Hell. ii. 3, 42, 44, as well as by Isocrates, 1. c., as a leader of the Democratic party, together with Thrasybulus. 2 For the various conjectures about him consult Hermann, p. 12. Besides the above-named persons a certain Polyeuctus, according to Favorinus in Diog. ii. 38, took part in assisting the accuser. Prooably "Awros ought to be written in this passage instead of IIo\i5ewcTos, and in the following passage Tlo\vevKTOs instead of "Avvros, being here probably a transcriber's mistake for no\vKpa.T-r)s. See Hermann, p. 14. But the words as they stand must be incorrect. The celebrated orator Polycrates is said to have composed the speech of Anytus, Diog. 1. c. according to Hermippus ; Themist. Or. xxiii. 296, 6; Quintil. ii. 17, 4 ; Hypoth. in Isoc. Busir. ; JEscli. Socrat. Epist. 14, p. 84 Or. Suidas, Tlo\vKpd.TTis knows of two speeches ; and it is proved beyond doubt by Isocr. Bus. 4 ; JElian, V. H. xi. 10, that he drew up an indictment against Socrates. But it is also clear from Favorinus, that this in- dictment was not used at the trial. Indeed it would appear from Favorinus that it was not written till some time after the death of Socrates. Conf. Uebermeg, Gesch. d. Phil. i. 94. 3 This is proved by the Eu- thyphro, allowing, as Schleier- macher, PL Werke, i. a, 52, and Steinliart, Plato's Werke, ii. 191 and 199 do., that this dialogue was hastily penned after the be- ginning of the trial, its object being to prove that Socrates, though accused of impiety, had a deeper piety and a keener appreciation of the nature of piety, than one who had in- curred ridicule by his extrava- gances, but had nevertheless brought himself into the odour of sanctity ; a view which, not- THE ACCUSATION. 196 under no misapprehension as to the danger which threatened him. 1 To get up a defence, however, went contrary to his nature. 2 Partly considering it wrong and undignified to attempt anything except by simple truth ; partly finding it impossible to move out of his accustomed groove, and to wear a form of artificial oratory strange to his nature, he thought trustfully to leave the issue in the hands of God, convinced that all would turn out for the best ; and in this conviction confidently familiarising himself with the thought that death would probably bring Mm more good than harm, and that an unjust con- demnation would only save him the pressure of the weakness of age, leaving his fair name unsullied. 3 CHAP. X. withstanding Ueberweg's (Un- ters. d. Platon. Schrift, 250) and Grote's (Plato i. 316) ob- jections, appears most probable. The treatment of the question is too light and satirical for the dialogue to belong to a time when the full seriotisness of his position was felt. 1 Comp. Xen. Mem. iv. 8, 6 ; Plato, Apol. 19, A.; 24, A.; 28, A. ; 36, A. 2 In Xen. Mem. iv. 8, 5, So- crates says that when he wished to think about his defence, the Satptviov opposed him ; and ac- cording to I)iog. ii. 40 ; Cic. de Orat. i. 54 ; Quintil. Inst. ii. 15, 30; xi. 1,11; Vol. Max. vi. 4, 2 ; Stol. Floril. 7, 56, he de- clined a speech which Lysias offered him. It is asserted by J'liifu, Apol. 17, B., that he spoke without preparation. The story in Xenophon's Apo- logy, 22, to the effect that some of his friends spoke for him has as little claim to truth in face of Plato's description as that in Diog. ii. 41. 3 As to the motives of So- crates, the above seems to fol- low with certainty from pas- sages in Plato, Apol. 17, B. ; 19, A.; 29, A.; 30, C. ; 34, C., and Xen. Mem. iv. 8, 4-10. Cousin and Grote, however, give him credit for a great deal more calculation than can be reconciled with the testimony of history, or -with the rest of his character. Cousin (CEuvres de Platon, i. 58), seems to think that Socrates was aware that he must perish in the con- flict with his age, but he forgets that the explanation given in Plato's Apology, 29, B., is only a conditional one, and that the passage in that treatise 37, C., was written after the judicial sentence. Similarly Volquard- 2 SOCRATES. CHAP. X. (2) Socra- tes' de- fince of himself. Such was the tone of mind which dictated his defence. 1 The language is not that of a criminal, sen (Damon, d. Sokr. 15), in attempting to prove from Mem. iv. 4, 4 ; Apol. 19, A., that So- crates had predicted his con- demnation, forgets that in these passages the question is only as to probable guesses. Even Grote goes too far in asserting, in his excellent description of the trial (Hist, of Greece, viii. 654), that Socrates was hardly anxious to be acquitted, and that his speech was addressed far more to posterity than to his judges. History only war- rants the belief, that with mag- nanimous devotion to his cause Socrates was indifferent to the result of his words, and en- deavoured from the first to reconcile himself to a probably unfavourable result. It does not, however, follow that he was anxious to be condemned ; nor have we reason to suppose so, since he could have wished for nothing which he considered to be wrong, and his modesty kept him uncertain as to what minded view was the best for himself. See ' Plato, Apol. 19, A.; 29, A.; 30, D. ; 35, D. We cannot, therefore, believe with Grote, p. 668, that Socrates had well considered his line of defence, and chosen it with a full con- sciousness of the result ; that in his conduct before the court he was actuated only by a wish to display his personal great- ness and the greatness of his give a lesson to youth the most impressive which it was in the power of man to give. To pre- suppose such calculation on the part of Socrates is not only contradictory to the statement that he uttered his defence without preparation, but it appears to be opposed to the picture which we are accus- tomed to see of his character. As far as we can judge, his con- duct does not appear to be a work of calculation, but a thing of immediate conviction, a consequence of that upright- ness of character which would not allow him to go one step beyond his principles. His principles, however, did not allow him to consider results, since he could not know what result would be beneficial to him. It was his concern to speak only the truth, and to despise anything like corrupt- ing the judges by eloquence. This may appear a narrow- but other course of conduct would so well have corresponded with the bearing and character of Socrates ; and herein consists his greatness, that he chose what was in harmony with himself in the face of extreme danger, with classic composure and unruffled brow. 1 We possess two accounts of the speech of Socrates before his judges, a shorter one in mission in the most emphatic Xenophon and a longer one in manner; and that by departing Plato's Apology. Xenophon 's this life when at the summit Apology is certainly spurious, of his greatness he desired to and with it any value attach- HIS DEFENCE. wishing to save his life, but that of an impartial ar- biter, who would dispel erroneous notions by a simple CHAP. X. ing to the testimony of Her- xnogenes, to whom the compiler, imitating the Mem. iv. 8, 4, professes to be indebted for his information, is lost. Touch- ing Plato's, the current view seems well established, that this Apology is not a mere creation of his own, but that in all substantial points it faithfully records what Socrates said ; and the attempt of Georgii, in the introduction to his translation of the Apology (conf . Steinftart, Platon.Werke, ii. 235) to prove the contrary will not stand. Georgii com- plains that in the Socrates of Plato that fj.eya\jjyopla is want- ing, which Xenophon commends in him a judgment with which few will agree, not even the writer of the Apology attri- buted to Xenophon. He also considers the sophism with which the charge of atheism was met, improbable in the mouth of Socrates, though it may just as likely have come from him as from one of his disciples. He doubts whether Socrates could have maintained a composure so perfect ; al- though all that we know of Socrates shows unruffled calm as a main trait in his character. He sees in the prominent fea- tures of that character a diplo- matic calculation, which others will look for in vain. He con- siders it incredible that So- crates should have begun with a studied quotation from the Clouds of Aristophanes, aiming at nothing else than the refu- tation of prejudices, which lasted undeniably (according to the testimony of Xenophon, Mem. i. 1, 11; (Ec. 12, 3; Symp. 6, 6) till after his own death, and perhaps contributed much to his condemnation. He misses, with Steinhart in Plato, many things which So- crates might have said in his defence, and did actually say according to the Apology of Xenophon. But to this state- ment no importance can be attached, and it is probable that in an unprepared speech Socrates omitted much which might have told in his favour. He can hardly be convinced that Socrates cross-questioned Miletus so searchingly as Plato describes ; but this passage agrees with the usual character of the discourse of Socrates, and the sophism by which So- crates proved that he did not corrupt youth is quite his own. See p. 141. That Socrates should have met the charge of atheism by quibbles, instead of appealing to the fact of his reverence for the Gods of the state, he can only understand, by supposing that we have here an expression of Plato's reli- gious views : although Plato would have had no reason for suppressing the fact, supposing Socrates had really made such an appeal : he even describes the devotion of his master to the Gods of his country, and is himself anxious to continue that service. Touching the sophisms, even Aristotle, Rhet. 198 SOCRATES. CHAP. setting forth of the truth, or of a patriot warning against wrong-doing and overhaste. He seeks to convince the accuser of his ignorance, to refute the accusation by criticism. At the same time dignity and principle are never so far forgotten as to address the judges in terms of entreaty. Their sentence is not feared, whatever it may be. He stands in the service of Grod, and is determined to keep his post in the face of every danger. JSfo commands shall make him faithless to his higher calling, or prevent him from obeying Grod rather than the Athenians. (3) Hi* The result of his speech was what might have < -t{on m l ~ have been expected. The majority of the judges would most unmistakeably have been disposed to pronounce him innocent, 1 had not the proud bearing of the accused brought him into collision with the members of a popular tribunal, accustomed to a very different deportment from the most eminent states- men. 2 Many who would otherwise have been on his ii. 23 ; iii. 18 ; 1398, a, 15 ; Plato's intention to record 1419, a, 8, has no fault to find, literally the words of Socrates, The same may be said in reply and we may be satisfied with to most of the reasoning of comparing his Apology with the Georgii. On the contrary, the speeches in Thucydides, as difference in style between the Steinhart does, bearing in Apology and Plato's usual writ- mind what Thucydides, i. 22, ings, seems to prove that this says of himself, that he had Apology was not drawn up with kept as close as possible to the his usual artistic freedom, and sense and substance of what the notion of Georgii referring was said and applying it it to the same time as the equally to Plato. Conf . Ueber- Phaedo appears altogether in- meg, Unters. d. Plat. Schr. 237. conceivable considering the * Xen. Mem. iv. 4. 4. great difference between the 2 Let the attitude of Pericles two in regard to their philoso- be remembered on the occasion phical contents and their artis- of the accusation of Aspasia, tic form. It certainly was not and that depicted by Plato in HIS SENTENCE AND DEATH. side were set against him, and by a small majority l the sentence of GHiilty was pronounced. 2 According CHAP. X. the Apology, 34, C. Indeed it is a well-known fact that judg- ing was a special hobby of the Athenian people (conf. Aristophanes in the Wasps, Clouds, ,207), and that it watched with peculiar jealousy this attribute of its sove- reignty. How Volquardsen, Dilmon. d. Sokr. 15, can con- clude from the above words that Hegel's judgment respect- ing Socrates' rebellion against the people's power is shared here, is inconceivable. 1 According to Plato, Apol. 36, A., he would have been ac- quitted if 3, or as another reading has it, if 30 of his judges had been of a different mind. But how can this be reconciled with the statement of Diog. ii. 41 : KareSiKaffdrj SiaKoffiats oySo^Kovra fata TrAeiotrt ij/7) ; Diodor. xiii. garchical government. (54; Pint. Coriol. 14), that '- The astonishment expres- when lie was first charged sed by Tenneman at this is with treason he corrupted the. natural from his point of view, judges. On the other hand Only his solution of the diffi- r* ** 8 Clouds, 889. Droysen, the colour of justice. as bei>l fff n Clouds, p. 177, unfairly blames 4 Frogs, 1491. e '"!f J this play for making a stronger * Apol. 23, D. : \iyovaiv, us tlie ^ oa argument into a right one. 2uKpdrr]s rls ^V t\offoovi>r ra virb yrjs, Kal Ofovs ^ von(fav \6yov Kpflrru iroifiv is, making Kal rbv ^rrw \6yov Kptlrru *oifiv. the case which in point of jus- Ibid. 18, B. tice is weaker, to be the 218 SOCRATES. CHAP, statement ? The true answer to this question has X ' been already hinted at by other writers. 1 The con- viction of the guilt of Socrates rested on the assumed dangerous character of his teaching for morality and religion ; the reason that this offence was judicially prosecuted lay without doubt in the special political circumstances of the time. The rationalism of the Sophists was neither the sole nor the chief cause of the fall of Athens in the Peloponnesian war ; still it contributed unmistakeably to that result, and the op- ponents of the new culture were naturally disposed to make its guilt out to be greater than it really was. Had not the schools of the Sophists sent forth not a few of the modern statesmen, who either as the leaders of oligarchy or democracy had torn the state to pieces ? Was not in those schools a corrupt form of morality publicly taught, which substituted the wishes and caprice of the individual in place of existing custom and religion, put gain in the place of right, and taught men to desire absolute sovereignty as the summit of human happiness ? Were not those schools the cradle of an unscrupulous eloquence, which employed a variety of technical tricks for any purpose, no matter what, considering it the highest triumph to make the wrong side the winning side ? Can we then wonder that Aristophanes thought the new-fangled education responsible for all the misfor- tunes of the commonwealth ; 2 that Anytus in Plato 1 Ritter, p. 31. Marbacli* 2 Clouds, 910; Knights, 1373. Gesch. d. Phil. i. 185, 9 ; and Further details in Silvern, Schmegler, Gesch. d. Phil. 30. Clouds, 2i. CONDEMNED ON GENERAL GROUNDS. 21 cannot find terms strong enough to express his CHAP. horror of the pernicious influence of the Sophists ; l that all friends of the good old time believed that in Sophistry lay the chief malady of the state; and that this feeling was intensified during the last years of the Peloponnesian war, and under the oligarchial reign of force ? Was it then other than natural that those who had rescued Athens from the oligarchy, re-establishing with the old constitution her political independence, should wish by suppressing the educa- tion of the Sophists to stop the evil at its source. Now Socrates passed not only for a teacher of the modern Sophistic school, but the evil effects of his teaching were thought to be seen in several of his pupils, among whom Critias and Alcibiades were prominent. 2 What more intelligible under such circumstances, than that just those who were bent upon restoring a popular form of government, and the ancient glory of Athens, should see in him a corrupter of youth, and a dangerous citizen ? Thus he certainly fell a victim to the republican reaction which set in after the overthrow of the thirty tyrants. For all that his political views were not in them- selves the principal motives which provoked the attack. His guilt was rather supposed to consist in the subversion of ancestral customs and piety, of which the anti-republican tendency of his teaching 1 Meno, 91, C. proved by Xen. Mem. i. 2, 12, * How largely this circum- as well as by the above-men- fctance contributed towards the tioned authority, JEschines. condemnation of Socrates is 220 SOCRATES. CHAP. X. C. Justice of the sentence. (1) Un- founded charges, (a) In re- lation to Ids teach- ing, life, and influ- ence. was partly an indirect consequence, partly an isolated manifestation. How then does it really stand touching the jus- tice of this accusation l and of the sentence to which it led ? And what must he thought of the modern attempts to justify it? Most of the charges which were preferred against Socrates, rest undeniably on misunderstandings, perversions, or false inferences. Socrates is said to have rejected the Gods of the state. We have already seen this statement contra- dicted by all historical testimonies. 2 He is said to have substituted his Saipoviov in their place. We, however, likewise know that he neither put it in 1 It is well known that Hegel has defended it on the side of Greek law, and Dresig, a hun- dred years earlier, maintained in a very superficial treatise, that Socrates, as an opponent of a republican government, had been justly condemned. Forchhammer goes a great deal further in his treatise, and so does Denis. See p. 178, 3. Kochly, on the other hand, confines himself, in Acad.Vortr. i. 382, to the assertion that in the indictment of Socrates guilt was equally divided and reduced to a minimum on either side. The answer of Heinsius to Forchhammer (So- crates nach dem Grade seiner Schuld. Lips. 1839) is unimpor- tant, and the learned Apologia Socratis contra Meliti redivivi Calumniam, by P. van Limburg Brouwer (Gron. 1838), is de- ficient in insight into the general questions involved, and is inferior to the treatise of Preller (Haller, A. L. Z. 1838, No. 87), although many of its details are valuable. Z/iizac, de Socrate cive 1796, despite his usual learning, does little for the question. Grote's re- marks, on the other hand, touching the extenuating cir- cumstances, which, without altogether justifying, excuse the condemnation of Socrates, are deserving of all attention. Gi-ote, Hist, of Greece, viii. 678, 653. 2 Forchhammer repeats the charge without proof, as if its truth were obvious of itself, and he speaks of orthodoxy and heresy like a modern theolo- gian. But a Greek thought far less of belief than of out- ward service, and hence Xeno- phon, Mem. i. 1, 2, refutes the charge by an appeal to the fact that he had sacrificed to the Gods. JUSTICE OF THE SENTENCE. 221 the place of the Gods, nor sought thereby to encroach CHAP. on the ground of oracles. 1 It was a private oracle . in addition to those publicly recognised ; and in a country where divine revelations were not the exclu- sive property of the priesthood, a private oracle could be refused to no one. 2 He is said to have been de- voted to the atheistic, heavenly wisdom of Anaxa- goras, 3 although he expressly declared it to be absurd. 4 He is said according to Aristophanes to have given instruction in the Sophistic art of oratory a charge so untrue, that to all appearances even Meletus did not venture to prefer it. He is blamed for having been the teacher of Critias and Alcibiades, to which charge even Xenophon justly replied 5 that these men did not learn their vices from Socrates, nor degenerate, until after being separated from him. Allowing, too, that a teacher must instil into his pupils a lasting turn for the good, 6 is it necessarily his fault if he does not succeed in some few cases ? 1 Compare p. 76, 7 ; 89 ; 149, Leben und Schriften, p. 480). 1 ; 178. If Forchhammer considers it 2 Xenophon therefore appeals incredible that Meletus should to the 5a.tfi.6nov (Mem. i. 1, 2) have given such a careless in good faith as a proof of reply to Socrates, he forgets Socrates' belief in the Gods, that it is always the way of and Plato compares his revela- the world to confound relative tions with the prophecies of with positive atheism, doubts Euthyphro (Euthyphro, 3, B). about particular religious no- It is indeed known, from other tions with the denial of all re- sources, how much private di- ligion. This is quite universal vination was practised, besides in the nations of antiquity, appealing to public oracles. and therefore the early Christ- 3 Not only Aristophanes but ians were called &6foi. Meletus brings this charge 4 See p. 135, 1. against him in Plato, Apol. 26, * Mem. i. 2, 12, C., p. 10, like Ast (Platen's Forchhammer, p. 43. 222 SOCRATES. CHAP. The value of any instruction can only be estimated _____ by its collective effects, and these bear as bright a testimony to the value of the instruction of Socrates as can be wished. A man whose beneficial influence not only reached to many individuals, 1 but by whom a new foundation for morals was laid which served his people for centuries, was, as a matter of course, no corrupter of youth. If further the verses of Hesiod, by which Socrates sought to promote useful activity are alleged against him ; 2 Xenophon has con- clusively proved that an ill use has been made of these verses. If lastly, he has been accused of teaching men to despise parents and relations, because he maintained that only knowledge constituted worth ; 3 surely this is a most unfair inference from principles, which had a simple meaning in his mouth. Any teacher who makes his pupil understand that he must learn something in order to become a useful and estimable man, is surely quite in order. Only the rabble can bear the teacher a grudge for making sons wiser than their fathers. Very different would it have been had Socrates spoken disparagingly of the ignorance of parents, or set lightly by the duty of children ; but from so doing he was far removed. 4 1 Plato's Apol. 33, D., men- follow his training rather than tions a whole string ; also that of their parents. This Xen. Mem. i. 2, 48. fact Xenophon's Apology al- 2 Mem. i. 2, 56 ; Plato, Char, lows, and attempts to justi- 163, B. Conf. p. 212, 4. fy. But in order to decide 3 Mem. i. 2, 49. whether it is an established 4 Conf. Mem. ii. 2, 3. A fact, and whether Socrates is further charge is connected here to blame, it is indeed with the above, viz., that he quite possible we need a more induced many young men to trustworthy authority, and we UNFOUNDED CHARGES. 22 It might be replied that one who judged the value of CHAP. a man simply and solely by his knowledge, and who at the same time found all wanting in true knowledge, was making his pupils self-conceited, and teach- ing them to consider themselves above all authority by their own imaginary knowledge. But whilst with partial eye overrating the importance of know- ledge, Socrates avoided this practically harmful in- ference by above all endeavouring to make his friends conscious of their own want of knowledge, and laying no claim to knowledge himself, but only professing to pursue it. No fear that any one imbued with this spirit of humility and modesty, would misuse the Socratic teaching. For its misconstruction and for the consequences of a superficial and defective conception of it Socrates is as little responsible as any other teacher. Of more moment is another point touched upon in the judicial proceedings the relation of Socrates himself to the Athenian democracy. As is well kwpori- known, Socrates considered the existing constitution na rf religion. extremely perilous one, as was seen in the case of Antisthenes, when once the Socratic demand for knowledge was developed to its consequences, and religious notions were similarly dealt with in order to discover what people understood thereby. This is true also of his Saifioviov. As a kind of oracle it had indeed a place on the ground of the Greek faith, but by its internal character it made the decision depend on the subject instead of depending on external por- tents. And yet how dangerous was this proceeding in a country in which oracles were not only a religious but a political institution ! How easily might others be led to imitate the example of Socrates, taking counsel, however, with their own understanding in- stead of with an undefined inward feeling, and thus thinking little of belief in the Gods or of their utter- 1 Plato, Apol. 31, C. 230 SOCRATES. CHAP, ances ! We may indeed be convinced that Socrates ' was in all these points right in the main, and it is quite true that he was the precursor and founder of our moral view of the world ; but how could this new idea of right be admitted by any one who shared the traditions of the ancient Greek world ? How could a state built upon these traditions allow such an idea to be spread, without commiting an act of suicide ? Even remembering, then, that Socrates laboured and taught in his simple manner, not in the Sparta of Lycurgus, but in Athens and amongst the generation that had fought at Marathon, we shall still ficd it quite natural for the state to endeavour to restrain his action. For Athens was absolutely ignorant of that freedom of personal conviction, which Socrates required, nor could she endure it. 1 In such a com- munity the punishment of the innovator can cause no surprise. For was not a dangerous doctrine, ac- cording to old notions, a crime against the state ? And if the criminal resolutely refused to obey the sentence of the judges, as Socrates actually did, how could the penalty of death fail to follow ? To one therefore starting from the old Greek view of right and the state, the condemnation of Socrates cannot appear to be unjust. 2 1 To say that the line adop- which was, it is true, an insti- ted by Socrates was not opposed tution later than Solon's time, to the constitution of Solon, but he disliked the popular but was instead a return to elections of Solon ; and his old Greek custom, as Georgii principle of free investigation (Uebersetzung d. Plat. Apolo- is widely removed from the gie, p. 129) asserts, is not spirit of Solon's times, correct. For not only did he 2 Compare the remarks of express disapproval of appoint- Koclt on Aristophanes, i. 7. ing by lot to public offices, 7//.S' RELA riON TO THE MORALITY OF HIS TIME. 231 A very different question is it whether Athens at CHAP. that time had a right to this opinion, a point which the defenders of Athens assume far too readily. 1 To ( 3 ) Rela- , T j tion borne us the question appears to deserve an unqualified i y kis negation. Had a Socrates appeared in the time of t j^ or y to Miltiades and Aristides, and had he been condemned in which then, the sentence might be regarded as a simple ' act of defence on the part of the old morality against morality the spirit of innovation. In the period after the n ' asal - ready in a Peloponnesian war such a view can no longer be state of admitted. For where was the solid morality which decay. Anytus and Meletus were supposed to defend ? Had not all kinds of relations, views, and modes of life long since been penetrated by an individualising tendency far more dangerous than that of Socrates ? Had not men been long accustomed in place of the 1 Hegel, 1. c. p. 100, is here when a verdict of guilty had most nearly right, although lie been brought in, the judges regards the Athenians exclu- could only choose between the sively as the representatives penalty demanded by the of the old Greek morality, plaintiff and that asked for by Forchhammer, on the contrary, the defendant ; in the present is anything but impartial, in case between death and an illu- inaking the Athenians conser- sory fine. But the question vative, and Socrates a revolu- really is whether Socrates de- tionary, and attributing to the served punishment at all, and latter the extreme consequences to this question a negative of those principles, notwith- answer must be given both standing his protest. Nietzsche, from our point of view as well too(Sokr.u. d. Griech.Tragcdie, as from that of his cotempor- p. 29), overlooks the difference aries ; from ours, because we of times in thinking that, when take liberty of judgment to be Socrates had once been im- something sacred and invio- peached, his condemnation was lable ; from theirs, because the quite just. If this were allowed, Athenians had long since de- not a word could be said against parted from the ancient state the sentence of death. For, of things, according to Athenian custom, 232 SOCRATES. CHAP. great statesmen of old to see demagogues and aristo- ' crats in feud with each other on every other point, but agreeing in the thoughtless play of rivalry and ambition ? Had not all the cultivated men of that time passed through a school of rationalism which had entirely pulled to pieces the beliefs and the morals of their ancestors ? Had not men for a gene- ration lived themselves into the belief that laws are the creations of caprice, and that natural right and positive right are very different things ? l What had become of the olden chastity when Aristophanes could tell his hearers in the midst of his attacks on Socrates, half in joke, half in derision, that they were one and all adulterers? 2 What had become of ancient piety at a time when the sceptical verses of Euripides were in every one's mouth, when every year the happy sallies of Aristophanes and other comedians in successful derision of the inhabitants of Olympus were clapped, when the most unprejudiced complained that fear of GTod, trust, and faith, had vanished, 3 and when the stories of future retribution were universally derided ? 4 (*) So- This state of things Socrates did not make; he 7ellinmith found Jt existin g- What he is blamed for really con- 'what he gists in this, that he entered into the spirit of his existing time, trying to reform it by means of itself, instead of making the useless and silly attempt to bring it back to a type of culture which was gone for ever. It was an obviously false attack of his opponents to 1 Conf. p. 29. > Time. iii. 82 ; ii. 53. z Clouds, 1083. 4 Plato, Rep. i. 330, D. HIS RELA TION TO THE MORALITY OF HIS TIME. L>fi hold him responsible for the corruption of faith and CHAP. morals, which he was trying to stem in the only possible way. It was a clumsy self-deception on their part to imagine themselves men of the good old time. His condemnation is not only a great injustice according to our conceptions of right, but it is so also according to the standard of his own time ; it is a crying political anachronism, one of those unfortu- nate measures, by which a policy of restauration is ever sure to expose its incompetence and short- sightedness. Socrates certainly left the original ground of Greek thought, and transported it beyond the bounds, within which this particular form of national life was alone possible. But he did not do so before it was time, nor before the untenableness of the old position had been amply demonstrated. The revolution which was going forward in the whole spirit of the Greeks, was not the fault of one indi- vidual, but it was the fault of destiny, or rather it was the general fault of the time. The Athenians in punishing him condemned themselves, and com- mitted the injustice of making him pay the penalty of what was historically the fault of all. The con- demnation therefore was not of the least use: in- stead of being banished, the spirit of innovation was, on the contrary, thereby all the more aroused. We have then here not a simple collision between two moral powers equally justified and equally limited. Guilt and innocence are not equally divided between the parties. On the one hand was a principle his- torically necessary and higher in respect of import- 234 SOCRATES. CHAP. X. O) A breach between Socrates and Ms country- men was absolutely necessary. ance, of which Socrates had an unquestioned claim to be the representative. On the other hand, one far more limited, represented by his opponents, but to which they have no longer a just right, since they do not faithfully adhere to it. This constitutes the peculiar tragic turn in the fate of Socrates. A reformer who is truly conservative is attacked by nominal and imaginary restorers of old times. The Athenians in punishing him give themselves up as lost; for in reality it is not for destroying morals that he is punished, but for attempting to restore them. To form a correct judgment of the whole occur- rence, we must not forget that Socrates was con- demned by only a very small majority, that to all appearances it lay in his own power to secure his acquittal, and that undoubtedly he would have es- caped with a far less punishment than death, had he not challenged his judges by the appearance of pride. These circumstances must make us doubly doubtful of regarding his ruin as an unavoidable consequence of his rebellion against the spirit of his nation. As they place the guilt of the Athenians in a milder light, by laying it in part on the head of the accused, so too they at the same time prove that accidental events, in no way connected with the leading charac- ter of his teaching, had great weight in the final decision. No doubt Socrates was at variance with the position and the demands of the ancient morality in essential points ; but it was not necessary in the then state of opinion at Athens, that it should come to a breach between him and his nation. Although RESULTS OF HIS DEATH. 235 the political reaction after the expulsion of the thirty CHAP. tyrants was sufficiently powerful to bring about an attack on him, the conviction of his guilt was not so universal but that it might have been possible for him to escape the punishment of death. For his honour and his cause it was a happy (*) Tlie ^ thing that he did not escape. What Socrates in ^death. pious faith expressed after his condemnation that to die would be better for him than to live has been fully realised in his work. The picture of the dying Socrates must have afforded to his pupils, in the highest degree, what it now after centuries affords to us a simple testimony to the greatness of the human mind, to the power of philosophy, and to the victory of a spirit pious and pure, reposing on clear conviction. It must have stood before them in all its glory, as the guiding star of their inner life, as it is depicted by Plato's master hand. It must have increased their admiration for their teacher, their zeal to imitate him, their devotion to his teach- ing. By his death the stamp of higher truth was impressed on his life and words. The sublime repose and happy cheerfulness with which he met death, was the strongest corroboration of all his convictions, the zenith of a long life devoted to knowledge and virtue. Death did not add to the substance of his teaching, but it greatly strengthened its influence. A life had been spent in sowing the seeds of know- ledge with a zeal unequalled by any other philosopher either before or after ; his death greatly forwarded the harvest, so that they brought forth fruit abun- dantlv in the Socratic Schools. PART III. THE IMPERFECT FOLLOWERS OF SOCRATES. CHAP. XI. CHAPTEE XI. THE SCHOOL OF SOCRATES : HIS POPULAR PHILOSOPHY. XENOPHON: ^ESCHINES. A MIND so great and active in every way as that of Socrates could not fail to make a lasting impression A. School on every kind of character with which it came into teg. contact. If then the most perfect systems are often not understood by all their adherents in the same sense, might not a much greater divergence and variety of apprehension be expected, in a case where no system lay ready to hand, but only the fragments and germs of what might be one a person, a princi- ple, a method, a mass of individual utterances and of desultory discussions ? The greater part of the fol- lowers of Socrates confined their attention to what was most obvious and lay nearest to an ordinary in- telligence the originality, the purity of character, the intelligent view of life, the deep piety and the beautiful moral maxims of their teacher. Only a smaller number gave more careful attention to the THE SOCRATIC SCHOOLS. 237 deeper thoughts, which often appeared under so un- CHAP. pretentious an outside, and even of these nearly all ^ took a very narrow view of the subjects which occu- pied Socrates. Combining older theories with the teaching of their master, which it is true needed to be thus supplemented, they did so in such a manner as almost to lose the distinctive merits of his philoso- phy. One only with a deeper insight into the spirit of Socrates has succeeded in creating a system which presents in a most brilliant and extended form what Socrates had attempted in another manner and on a more limited scale. In the first of these classes must be placed with- out doubt by far the greater number of those who are known to us as the pupils of Socrates. 1 The writings 1 Besides the Socratists who i. 4 ; Plato, Symp. 173, B., 174, will be presently mentioned, A., 223, B.) ; Euthydemus are Crito (Xen. Mem. ii. 9 ; (Mem. iv. 2 ; 3 ; 5 ; 6 ; PL, Plato, Crito, Phaedo, 59, B., 60, Sym. 222 B.) ; Theages (PL A., 63, D., 115, A. ; Euthyde- Apol. 33 E. ; Rep. vi. 496, B.) ; mus ; Diog. ii. 121, who makes Hermogenes (Xen. Mem. ii. 10, him the author of seventeen 3, iv. 8, 4 ; Sym. 4, 46 ; Apol. 2, books, which, however, belong PL Phaedo, 59, B). In Mem. i. to him as little as his suppos- 2, 48, perhaps 'Eppoyevris should ed children Hermogenes, and be read for Hermocrates ; but others), and Clitobulus his son at any rate this Hermocrates (Xen. Mem. i. 3, 8. ii. 6 ; CEc. must be distinguished from the 1-6 ; Symp. 4, 10 ; Plato, Apol. Hermocrates mentioned PL 33, D., 38, B. ; Phsedo, 5!, B. ; Tim. 19, C., 20, A, Krit. 108, ^Esch. in Atheruzus v. 220, a.) ; A ; the latter being a stranger Chaerephon (Mem. 2, 48 ; ii. 3 ; who only stays at Athens on Plato, Apol. 20, E.; Charm, his way. Compare Steinhart, 153, B. ; Gorgias, Aristophanes, PL W. vi. 39 and 235 ; Phsedo- Clouds, Birds, 1296) and his nides (Mem. i. 2, 48; PL Phsedo, brother Chaerecrates (Mem. 59, C.) ; Theodotus (PL Apol. 1. c.) ; also Apollodorus (Mem. 33, E.) ; Epigenes (Phsedo, 59, iii. 11, 17 ; Plato, Apol. 34, B. ; Mem. iii. 12) ; Menexenus A., 38, B. ; Phsedo, 59, B., 117, (Phsedo, 59, B.; Lysis, 206, D.) ; D. ; Symp.); Aristodemus(Mem. Ctesippus (Phsedo, Euthyde- 238 SOCRATES. CHAP. XI. too which are attributed to many of these followers of Socrates amoDgst which, however, there is much that is spurious were, on an average doubtless little more than summaries of popular moral maxims. 1 One of the best illustrations of this mode of under- standing and applying the doctrines of Socrates may be found in Xenophon. 2 mus, and Lysis) ; Theaetetus (Thesetet. Soph. Pol. Prod, in Euclid. 19, m. 20) ; the younger Socrates (Plat. Theaet. 147, E. ; Soph. 218, 8 ; Polit. 257, C. ; Arist. Metaph. vii. 11, 1036, 6, 25 ; conf . Hermann, Plat. i. 661) ; Terpsion (PL Theast. ; Phasdo, 59, C.) ; Charmides (Xen. Mem. iii. 7; 6, 14; Symp. 4, 29; Hellen. ii. 4, 19 ; Plato, Charm. Sym. 222, B. ; Prot. 315, A.) ; Glaucon the brother of Plato (Mem. iii. 6 ; the same indi- vidual to whom Diog. ii. 124, attributes nine genuine and thirty-two spurious dialogues, and who is identical with the Glauco of Plato's Republic, and the Parmenides, as we assume following Bockh; conf. Ab- handlung d. Berliner Acad. 1873, Hist. Philos. Kl. p. 86) ; Cleombrotus (Phsed. 59, C. ; perhaps the same who is said by Callim. in Cic. Tusc. i. 34, 84, and Sext. Math. i. 48; David, Proleg. in Cat. 9 ; Schol. in Arist. 13, b, 35 ; Ammon in Porphyr. Isag. 2, b, to have committed suicide over the Phsedo, probably not from mis- understanding the exhortation to a philosophic death, but from shame for his conduct there blamed) ; Diodorus (Mem. ii. 10) ; Critias, whom Dionys. Jud. de Thuc. c. 31, p. 941, reckons among the followers of Socrates and Alcibiades in their younger years (Mem. i. 2, 12, Plato) ; not to mention others who were acquainted with Socrates, but did not join his way of thinking, such as Phasdrus the friend of Sophistry (Plato, Phfed., Symp.) ; Callias (Xen. Sjnnp., Plato, Phot.) ; the younger Pericles (Mem. iv. 5) ; Aristarchus (Mem. ii. 7.) ; Eu- therus (Mem. ii. 8) ; and many others. 1 Crito and Glaucon. - Xenophon, the son of the Athenian Gryllus, died accord- ing to a statement in Diorj. ii. 56, 360-359 B.C. From Hellen. vi. 4, 35, however, it appears that he survived the murder of Alexander of Pheraj 357. If the treatise respecting the public revenues of Athens belongs to the year 355, he must also have outlived that year. On the authority of Ps. Lucian. Macrob. 21, his birth was formerly placed in 450, or on account of his participation in the battle of Delium, p. 66, 2, in 445 B.C. The first of these passages is, however, extremely untrustworthy, as giving in- formation depending on the date of his death which is very 239 It is impossible in reading the works of this CHAP. author not to be struck with the purity and loftiness B. Xeno- uncertain. The latter is so in Pausanias he died here. plum. much at variance with what More credible authorities state Plato, Symp. 220, D. says, that that he was banished by the it is a most uncertain foun- Eleans (probably in 370 B.C., dation on which to build, when they joined the Thebans Neither passage agrees with after the battle of Leuctra what Xenophon himself says Diodor. xv. 62), and spent the (Anab. iii. 1, 4 and 25, ovStv rest of his life at Corinth irpoQaai&fjMi. rV ^Xwu'ai/) 2, 37, (Diog. 53). His banishment where he mentions himself and appears to have ended, when Timasion as the two youngest Athens joined Sparta against amongst the generals. These Thebes, as the treatise on the passages place it beyond dispute, revenues indicates, whether that at the time of the expedi- before or after the battle of tion he is describing, 401-400 Mantinaea, in which his two B.C., he was about 45 years of sons fought among the Athe- age and not much older than nian cavalry, and the elder one his friend Proxenus, who fell Gryllus fell (Diog. 54 ; Pint. in it about 30. (So Grate, Consol. ad Apoll. 33, p. 118), Plato iii. 563 ; Cobet, Novse Xenophon's writings are dis- Lect. 535 ; Berglt in Ersch. u. tinguished for purity and grace Gruber's Encyl. i. 81, 392; of language, and the unadorned fJtirtivs, Griech. Gesch. iii. 772, clearness of the description. 31.) The circumstances of his They appear to have been pre- life we only know imperfectly, served entire. The Apology, He speaks himself in the Ana- however, the Agesilaus, and basis iii. 1, 4, Memorabilia and the treatise on the Athenian (Economicus of his relations constitution are certainly spu- to Socrates, as to the origin of rious and several others of the which Diog. ii. 48, tells a smaller treatises are either doubtful story, and in the spurious or have large inter- Anabasis of his activity and polations. Steinhart, Plat. I. experience in the retreat of 95, 300, wrongly doubts the the 10,000. After his return Symposium. For his life and he entered the Spartan army writings consult Kriiger, De in Asia Minor, and fought Xenoph. Vita, Halle, 1832, also under Agesilaus at Coronea in 2nd vol. of Historisch. philol. against his own countrymen. Studien, Ranke, De. Xenoph. Banished for this from Athens, Vita et Scriptis, Berlin, 1851. he settled in the Elean Scillus, Grote, Plato iii. 562; Bergk, I.e. ; colonised by Spartans (Xen. Balir in Pauly's Realencyclop. Anab. v. 3, 6 ; Diog. ii. 51 ; Pan- vi. 6, 2791. For other litera- xan. v. 6, 4 ; Plvt. Agesil. 18 ; ture on the subject Ibid, and De Exil. 10, p. 603). Accord- Ueberneg, Gesch. d. Phil. i. 95. ing to an ill-accredited story 240 THE SOCRATIC SCHOOLS. CHAP. of the sentiment, with his chivalrous character, and the healthy tone of his mind ; still his philosophical capacities cannot be estimated at a very high rate. His description of Socrates is full of admiration for the greatness of his character ; his philosophical merit and his intellectual labours he has only im- perfectly understood. Not only does he share the narrowness of the position of Socrates as for instance when he quotes the derogatory opinions of his master respecting natural science in proof of his piety and intelligence, 1 but he misunderstands the true phi- losophic worth of the discussions he reports. The formation of conceptions, constituting as it does the germ of the whole teaching of Socrates, is only acci- dentally mentioned by him in order to show what care his master devoted to the critical culture of his friends. 2 All that he gathers from Socrates' peculiar habit of asking every one whom he came across, in his thirst for knowledge, as to his mode of life, is that he tried to make himself useful to people of every class, craftsmen included. 3 The importance of those maxims too, relative to virtue, in which the whole peculiarity of the Socratic ethics consists, can only be gathered with so much difficulty from his account, that it is obvious how little it was understood by Xenophon himself. 4 Many echoes and reminiscences of the Socratic mode of teaching are indeed to be found in his independent sketches ; but he is too ex- 1 Mem. i. 1, 11 ; iv. 7. 2 Ibid. iv. 6. 3 Ibid. iii. 10, 1 ; i. 1 ; conf. 106, 2. Mem. iii. 9, and p. 140. XENOPHON. 241 clusively occupied with their practical application to CHAP. engage in any really scientific researches. He de- scribes the catechetical mode of teaching, 1 in which he seems to have been somewhat skilled ; but his dialogues do not aim, like those of the genuine So- cratic type, at the formation of conceptions, and are often far too easy in their proofs and deductions. He recommends self-knowledge, 2 but primarily only in its popular sense, meaning, that no one ought to attempt what is beyond his powers. He insists on piety, self-restraint, 3 and so forth, but he appears not to hold the maxim of Socrates, 4 that all these virtues consist in knowledge. Following the method used by Socrates, he proves that nothing is a good of which you do not make a right use ; 5 that every one readily submits to the wise, 6 that right and law are synony- mous terms, 7 and that the rich are not more happy than the poor, 8 that the true measure of riches and poverty is not simple possession, but a possession pro- portionate to the needs of the possessor. 9 He repeats what Socrates had said about truth and error, 10 yet not without hinting that these principles are liable to be abused. With the same decision as his master, he declares against the sensual and unnatural abuses 1 (Ec. 19, 14. s See above, p. 141, 2. 2 Cyrop. vii. 2, 20. Cyrop. i. 6, 21. See above, 3 Ibid. viii. 1, 23. p. 168, 2. 4 Compare the conversation T Ibid. i. 3, 17. See p. between Cyrus and Tigranes, 148, 1. Cyrop. iii. 1, Ifi, and Mem. i. 2, 8 Ibid. viii. 3, 40 ; Symp. 4, 1 '.i, in which the ordinary view is 29 ; Mem. i. 6, 4. given rather than the Socratic, ' (Ec. 2, 2. although the language allows > Cyrop.i.6,31; Mem. iv. 2,13. the latter. 242 THE SOCRATIC SCHOOLS. CHAP. of love ; l and, following out his train of thought, he XL requires that woman should have a recognised, social position, and have more care spent on her education, and that her union should be made into a real com- panionship for life, and should be based on a recipro- city of capacities and performances. 2 He exhorts to work, without, however, like his teacher condemning the Greek prejudice against manual labour. 3 By many of his expressions he gives us to know what is his ideal of a beautiful and happy life ; 4 but he neither attempts to give a philosophic reason for his ideal, nor does he place it outside the platform of traditional Greek ethics. Touching the knowledge and omnipotence of the Gods, their care for mankind, the blessing consequent upon piety, 5 he expresses himself with warmth ; but at the same time he fully shares the belief of his nation 6 in regard to predic- tions and sacrifices, himself understanding their inter- pretation. He makes Cyrus express the hope of a higher life after death, confirming that view by several considerations, without, however, venturing to assert it with full assurance. He reminds us that the soul is invisible ; that vengeance surely comes on the murderers of the innocent, and that honour is due to the dead. He cannot believe that the soul which 1 Symp. 8, 7, p. 165. 6 Compare amongst other 2 (Ec. 313, c. 7; see p. 166, 4. passages, Cyrop. i. 6, 2; 23; 3 (Ec. 4, 2; 6, 5; 20, 15; 44: (Ec. 5, 19; 7, 7; 11, 8 ; conf. p. 170, 1. ' Hipparch. i. 1 ; 5, 14 ; 7, 1 ; 9, 4 Mem. iv. 8, 11 ; Cyrop. 8 ; Anal. iii. 1, 11 ; v. 9, 22 and viii. 7, G ; (Ec. 11, 8. 6, 28, and also pp. 65, 5 ; 147 ; 5 Symp. 4, 46 ; Cyrop. i. 6, Cyrop. i. 6, 23, agrees fully 2 ; (Ec. 7, 18. with Mem. i. 1, 6. XENOPHON. 243 gives life to the body should be itself mortal, or that CHAP. reason should not survive in greater purity after its XL separation from the body, seeing a sign thereof in prophesying in sleep. 1 In all these explanations we may discern the faithful and thoughtful follower of Socrates, but there is not a trace of original thought. Indeed it is doubtful whether the few passages in which Xenophon seems to have somewhat amplified the teaching of his master, ought not really to be at- tributed to Socrates. His larger work on politics, the Cyropsedeia, is, as a book of political philosophy, unimportant. Xeno- phon here proposes to pourtray the Socratic ideal of a ruler who understands his business, 2 and who cares for his people as a shepherd cares for his flock ; 3 but what he really gives, is a description of a valiant and prudent general, 4 of an upright man, and of a chivalrous conqueror. Not an attempt is made to mark out more clearly the province of go- vernment, to give a higher meaning to the state, or to fulfil its object by fixed institutions. The demand for a careful education 5 may reveal the follower of Socrates, but there is so little reference in that educa- tion to knowledge, 6 that it might more easily pass for a Spartan than for a Socratic education. Every 1 Cyrop. viii. 7, 17. See p. phon may be the nameless 179. friend referred to in this pas- - Tbid. i. 1, 3. See p. 167. sage. :1 llnd. viii. 2, 14; Mem. i. Cyrop. i. 2,2; viii. 8, 13; -', :2. vii. 5, 72. ' Hml. 6, 12, speaks of these 6 A weak echo of the prin- dutics in language similar to ciple of Socrates is found i. Mem. iii. 1. Perhaps Xeno- 4, 3. 244 THE SO CHAT 1C SCHOOLS. CHAP. thing centres in the person of the prince. The state __J is an Asiatic kingdom. The highest aim to which all its institutions tend, 1 is the strength and wealth of the sovereign and his courtiers. Even this view is very imperfectly carried out, and many important departments of government are altogether omitted. 2 The same remarks apply to the Hiero. In this dia- logue Xenophon shows plainly enough, how little the supposed good-fortune of an absolute sovereign is really to be envied. His remarks touching the means whereby such a sovereign can make himself and his people happy allowing that many of his proposals are expedient do not advance beyond a benevolent despotism. More successful is his smaller treatise on family life. It bears witness to an intelligent mind and a benevolent heart, which comes out particularly in its utterances respecting the position assigned to woman 3 and the treatment of slaves. 4 But it makes no pretensions to be a philosophical treatise, though it may contain many individual Socratic thoughts. 5 From Xenophon, then, the history of philosophy can gain but little. 6 1 Compare viii. 1. The treaty Xenophon by Strumpell, Gesch. between Cyrus and the Per- d. Prakt. Phil. d. Gr. 466-509. sians, viii. 5, 24, has for its He sees in him the develop- object, security by the advan- ment of Socratic thought from tages of government. the point of applied ethics, ' Compare the spirited re- and a supplement to Plato's marks of Mokl, Gesch. d. pure speculations. Yet he too Staatswissenschaft, i. 204. says that excepting in the 3 C. 3, 13, c. 7. CEconomica there can be no 4 12, 3 ; 14, 9 ; c. 21 ; 7, 37 trace of a systematic develop- and 41 ; 9,11. ment in Xenophon (p. 481); 5 See p. 242, 2. his ethical teaching is extremely 8 A more favourable view of simple, almost entirely devoid V the Phaedo, 85, C., he is made 4>afiWos cal Eu/c\/5ow, TOI/S Se to utter the maxim, that every &\\ovs avatpe't irdin-as. question should be pursued as " In modern times its ge- far as possible. Of Cebes, it nuineness has been maintained SIMMIAS AND CEBES. 2 placed on the genuineness of the writings which were CHAP. circulated at a later time under the name of the XL shoemaker Simon. 1 Probably he is altogether an imaginary person. 2 In addition to Plato, four founders of Socratic schools are known to us : Euclid, Phsedo, Antisthenes, and Aristippus. Of these the two former are much alike; the two others follow courses peculiar to themselves. There arose thus from them three dis- tinct Socratic schools : the Megarian-Elean, the Cynic, and the Cyrenaic. All these are derived from Socrates. One-sided however in their aims, and dependent themselves on earlier theories, they only imperfectly catch the spirit of the teaching of by Btihr (Pauly's Real-Ency- clop. 2 vol. Art. Cebes) and Schweighiiuser, c. 13, 33; but their assumption is refuted by two passages in it, one of which mentions a Peripatetic, and the other quotes from Plato's Laws. In other re- spects too, notwithstanding its general colourlessness, traces appear of later times, e.g. in its Stoic morality and attacks on false culture. 1 See Diog. ii. 122; Suid. 2u)KpaT7js- Epist. Bocrat. 12, 13 ; Pint. c. Prin. Philos. c. 1, p. 776 ; Bockh. in Plat, Minoem. 42. Simonis Socrat, Dialogi iv. Hermann, Plat. i. 419, 585. 2 What Diogenes says of him is unsatisfactory, and the story that Pericles asked to be taken in by him, but that he refused, besides being chrono- logically suspicious, is hardly likely to be true. Of the dialogues attributed to him a great part are found in writ- ings belonging to other people (Hermann, 1. c.). It is sus- picious, that he is not men- tioned by any ancient autho- rity, and that both Plato and Xenophon should be silent about an old and very remark- able pupil of Bocrat es. In addition to the above, Suidas (SuKpdr. p. 843) mentions also Bryso of Heraclea as a pupil of Socrates. Others, however, as Suidas remarks, called him a pupil of Euclid's, and the comedian Ephippus in Atlien. xi. 509, c. calls him an Acade- mician. Theopompus' state- ment (1. c. 508, D.) that Plato copied some of his writings, would harmonise with either view; but it is in any case false. 24$ THE SOCRATIC SCHOOLS. CHAP. Socrates, and diverge from him and from one another ._ in the most opposite directions. Socrates placed the highest business of man in knowing the good. What that good was he could not mark out more accurately, being partly satisfied with a practical description of it, being partly restricted to a theory of relative pleasure. These various sides of the Socratic philosophy now diverge, and are rounded into systems. One party confines itself to the general burden of the teaching of Socrates the abstract idea of the good. Others starting from pleasure which is its result make that the gauge of the good, and the good itself something relative. Again within the former class some make the theoretical, others the practical treatment of the good, to be the main point. Thus the Socratic teaching gave rise to the three schools just named, which in so far as they bring into prominence individual elements in the spirit of Socrates to the detriment of the rest, revert to older lines of thought, long since passed in the historical development of philosophy. The Megarians and Cynics go back to the Eleatic doc- trine of the One and All, and to the Sophistry of Gorgias ; the Cyrenaics to the negative teaching of Protagoras, and to the early scepticism of Herac- litus. THE MEGARIANS. 249 CHAPTER XII. THE MEGARIAN AND THE ELEAN-EKETRIAN SCHOOLS. THE founder of the Megarian school l is Euclid. 2 A CHAP. XII. 1 Deycks, De Megaricorum Doctrina, Bonn, 1827, whose careful work has not been added to by Mallet's Histoire de 1'Ecole de Megare, Par. 1845. More independent, but some- times too diffuse, is Henne, Ecole de Megare, Par. 1843. Ritter, Ueber die Philosophic der Meg. Schule in Ehein. Mus. ii. (1828), p. 295 ; Harten- gtein, Ueber die Bedeutung der Meg. Schule f iir die Gesch. d. Metaphys. Probleme, Ver- handl. der Sachs. Gesellschaft der Wissensch. 1848, p. 190; Prantl, Gesch. d. Logik, i. 33, which enters most deeply into the logical teaching of the Megarians. 2 Euclid's home was Megara (Plato, Thejetet. ; Phasdo, 59, C.) ; that it was his birth-place is asserted by Cic. Acad. iv. 42, 129; Strabo, ix. 1, 8, p. 393; Dioy. ii. 106. The statement that he came from Gela (rivts in Diog.) doubtless rests on a misunderstanding. Deycks, p. 4, imagines it arose from con- founding him with Euclid the jester, yt\o7os, to whom, how- ever, AtJien. vi. 242, b, 250, e, does not give this epithet. Henne, p. 32, conjectures, but withcut sufficient reason, that he was educated at Gela. That he also possessed property in garians . Attica, Grate, Plat. in. 471, A History concludes, but without suffi- ftJi e cient reason, from Dionys. g c j (00 L Judic. de Isao, c. 14 ; Karpo- crat. on T& tiritcripvTT. Poll. viii. 48. Dionysus only refers to a judicial speech of Isaeus vpbs EvK\fi5iit> apropos of a piece of land, but that this Euclid was the follower of Socrates is pure conjecture. The time of his birth cannot be accurately determined, nor does the anec- dote in Gell. vi. 10 help for this. He was, however, pro- bably older than Plato. This seems to be proved by the fact that on the death of Socrates he served for some time as a centre to his disciples. The time of his death is also un- certain. If Stilpo and Pasicles were his personal pupils, he must have lived at least till 360 B.C.; but this is very un- certain. On the whole little is known of him. A celebrated saying of his to his brother, which bears witness to a gentle character, is quoted by Pint, de Ira, 14, p. 462 ; Frat. Am. 18, p. 489 ; Stob. Flor. 84, 15 ; Dioff. ii. 108, mentions six dis- courses of his. 250 THE SOCRATIC SCHOOLS. CHAP. XII. faithful friend and admirer of Socrates, 1 but at the same time familiar with the Eleatic doctrine, 2 Euclid made use of the latter to develope the Socratlc phi- losophy as he understood it. He thus established a separate branch of the Socratic School, 3 which con- tinued to exist until the early part of the third century. 4 Ichthyas 5 is named as his pupil and 1 The story told by Gell, N. A. vi. 10, of his nightly visits to Athens is well known. It cannot, however, go for much, though not in itself impro- bable. On the contrary, it may be gathered from Plato's Thete- tet. 142, C. that Euclid con- stantly visited Socrates from Megara, and from the Phasdo, 59, C. that he was present at his death. A further proof of his close connection with the followers of Socrates will be found in the fact {Diog. ii. 106; iii. 6) that Plato and other fol- lowers of Socrates stayed with him for a considerable time after the death of their master. He is usually spoken of as a disciple of Socrates, and has a place amongst his most dis- tinguished disciples. 2 As may be gathered from his system with greater cer- tainty than from Cic. and Diog. When Euclid became acquain- ted with the Eleatic Philosophy is uncertain. It is most pro- bable that he was under its influence before he came under that of Socrates, although the story in Diog. ii. 30, is too un- certain to prove much. 3 The l successor, respecting whom, however, nothing further is known. 1 Of greater note was Eubulides, 2 the celebrated dialectician, 3 who wrote against Aristotle, 4 and who is mentioned as the teacher of Demos- thenes. 5 Cotemporary with him were Thrasyma- chus 6 of Corinth, and Dioclides, 7 perhaps also Clinomachus. 8 Pasicles, 9 however, would appear to be younger. A pupil of Eubulides was Apollonius of Gyrene, surnamed Cronus, 10 the teacher of the CHAP. XII. 1 His name is still found in Diog. ii. 112 ; vi. 80 (Diogenes dedicated to him a dialogue called Ichthyas). Athen. viii. 335, a. 2 Of Miletus according to Diog. ii. 108. Whether he was the head of a school, or whether he was an immediate disciple of Euclid, we do not know. Diogenes only says, -Hjs 5' EvK\el8ov SmSoxr?? tffTt KOI Etj8. 3 Compare Diog. ii. 108; Sext. Math. vii. 13. 4 Diog. ii. 109 ; Aristocles in Em. Pr. Ev. xv. 2, 5 ; Athen. viii. 354, b. Themist. Or. xxiii. 285, c. From these passages it is seen that the attack of Eu- bulides was very violent, and not free from personal abuse. We also hear from Athen. x. 437 of a comedy of Eubulides. But he can hardly be the indi- vidual whose work on the Cynic Diogenes is quoted by Diog. vi. 20, 30. 5 The fact seems pretty well established (although it is con- spicuously omitted by Plutarch in his life of Demosthenes), being not only attested by Diog. ii. 108; Pxeiidnpltit. v. Dec. Orat. viii. 21 ; De Mag. c. 15, p. 478 ; Suid. ATjjuoo-flej/Tjs, and Phot. Cod. 265, but being also alluded to by the Comedian in Diog., who can hardly have called a bare acquaintance a disciple. s According to Diog. ii. 121, a friend of Ichthyas, and a teacher of Stilpo's. 7 Suid. 'S.fiKiruv, a pupil of Euclid, and the teacher of Pasicles. 8 A Thurian (according to Diog. ii. 112), and a teacher of Stilpo's son Bryso, Suid. Tlvpfxai', Diog. says he was the first to write on predicates, sentences, and such like. 9 According to Sind. STI'ATTWV, a brother of the Cynic Crates, who had also Dioclides, a pupil of Euclid's, for teacher, and Stilpo for pupil. Diog. vi. 89, in calling Crates his brother and Euclid his teacher, pro- bably confounded Euclid with Dioclides, unless this be the work of a transcriber and should be read for . 10 Dioq. ii. Ill ; Strabo, xiv. 2, 21, p. 658; xvii. 3, 22, p. THE SOCRATIC SCHOOLS. CHAP. XII. sharp-witted Diodorus Cronus, 1 and another of his pupils was Euphantus, known only to us as a poet and historian. 2 All other members of this school were, however, thrown into the shade by Stilpo, 3 a pupil of Thrasy- made a gross mistake, irp&rov must be read for rplrov. See Mallet, p. 96. Callicrates, also mentioned by Athenaeus, is known from Diodor. xx. 21, as a favourite of Ptolemy Soter. 3 Stilpo of Megara (Diog. ii. 113) must have lived until the end of the fourth century. At least he survived the capture of Megara by Ptolemy Lagi, and his defeat by Demetrius Polior- cetes, two events which hap- pened 307 and 306 B.C. respec- tively, Diodor. xx. 37 and 45. On the former occasion the interview with Diodorus Cronus may have happened ; for Stilpo never visited Egypt (JDiaff. 115). Since he died at an advanced age, we may approximately place his birth in 380, and his death in 300 B.C. Probably we ought to place the date of both later, for the notices about his pupils in Diog. ii. 113-120, Senec. Epist. 10, 1, lead us to believe that his activity was cotemporary with that of Theo- phrastus ; and accordingly it cannot have begun long before the death of Aristotle. SuAd. EwcAefS. calls him successor to Ichthyas. Some of the pupils of Euclid are mentioned as his teachers, and (Diog. ii. 113), in particular Thrasymachus. (Suid. EwcAefS. and 2-nAiro.) Even Euclid himself is named by some, but none of these 1 Diodorus, a native in Caria, belongs to the most distinguished dialecticians of the Megarian School. Cic. De Fato, 6, 12, calls him 'valens dialecticus ' ; Sext. Math. i. 309, SiateKTiKiiraros Sext. and Diog. ii. Ill, give two epigrams of Callimachus ad- dressed to him. His fallacies and his researches into motion, and into hypothetical sen- tences, will be mentioned here- after. Pique at a dialectical defeat inflicted by Stilpo at the table of Ptolemy Soter, is said to have killed him (Diog. ; Plin. Hist. Nat. vii. 53, 180). He bequeathed his dialectic to his five daughters ; Clem. Al. Strom, iv. 523, A. ; Hieron. adv. Jovin. i. t. iv. 186. His nickname, Kronos, is differ- ently explained by Strabo and Diog., and in modern times by Panzerbieter in Jahn's Jahrb. f. Philol. Supplement b. V. 223, f., who, however, does not explain it altogether satisfac- torily. Consult, also, SteinJuirt in Ersch. und Gruber's Ency- clop. Sec. i. B., 25, p. 286. * All we know of him is from Diog. ii. 110, who calls him the tutor of King Antigonus, and says that to Antigonus he ad- dressed a book, irepl j8oioj7.ii. 135), and with Zeno, whose strongest opponent he was, Diog. ii. 109 ; Sext. Math. ix. 108 ; Pint. Comm. Not, 10, 3, p. 1063. He must have been younger than Stilpo, and have nourished in the first ten years of the third century. His love of conten- tion and his malicious ways gained for him the nickname 'E\e7Vos, Diog. Pint. Vit. Pud. 18 ; Aristotle in Eus. Pr. Eu. xv. 2, 4. We also learn from Her- mippus in Diog. that he retired to Olympia in his last years, in order to establish a new school there. This place of abode not suiting his pupils, he remained there "alone, but soon died of an injury. For his writings con- sult Diog. ii. 1 10 ; vii.163 ; Atlicn. xv. 696 ; Aristotle in Eus. 1. c. 2 Diog. vii. 16, a passage which does not appear so am- biguous as Bitter, Rh. Mus. ii. 30; Gesch. d. Phil. ii. 145, would have it, particularly when the subsequent accounts are taken into consideration. Diog. relates that Zeno of Cittium was fond of his society; Clemens, Stromat, iv. 523, and Jerome adv. Jov. i., quote from his ' Menexenus ' the informa- tion already given respecting the daughters of Diodorus, whom he must then have spoken of in terms of praise. It is a clear mistake on the part of Jerome to make him the teacher of Carneades. Still stranger is Mallet's mistake, confounding the disputant Philo with Philo of Larissa, the founder of the fourth Aca- demy. The latter lived some 150 to 200 years later. Nor can Philo be reckoned among the Stoics, although this has been done by Fabricius in Sext. Pyrrh. ii. 110, and by Prantl. Gesch. d. Logik, i. 404. 3 Diog. vii. 191, 194, men- tions Philo's writings irepl ai\- fjLaaiiav, and irepl -rp6iruiv, against which Chrysippus wrote, with- out doubt meaning this Philo. To the same individual must be referred what Cic. Acad. ii. 47, 143, and Sext. Math. viii. 113, Pyrrh. ii. 110, say respect- ing his views of hypothetical sentences differring from those of Diodorus, and Alex. Aphi. in Anal. pr. 59, b, says respect- ing their differences in respect of the possible. By Diog. vii. 16, and Clemens he is sur- named 6 Sia\fKTtic6s. 4 A dialectician Panthoides, doubtless the same person as MEGARIAN DOCTRINE. 255 the Megarians is connected Pyrrho's philosophy of CHAP. doubt, Pyrrho, whom Bryso is said to have taught, 1 xn ~ and Timon, who studied under Stilpo himself, 2 being the connecting links, in the same way that the scepticism of Grorgias is connected with the critical subtleties of the Eleatics. The Megarian philosophy is only partially known B. TJudr to us from the fragmentary notices of the ancients ; doctrine. and frequently it is impossible to decide whether their statements refer to the founder and the older members, or only to the later followers of the School. Sext. Math. vii. 13, mentions, and whose disagreement with Diodorus in respect of the possible (see p. 193, 1 and 2) Hjnctet. Diss. ii. 19, 5, speaks of, is mentioned by Diog. v. 68, as the teacher of the Peri- patetic Lyco, and must there- fore have flourished 280 to 270 B.C. A dialectician Aristides is also mentioned by Diog. ii. 113, among the cotemporaries of Stilpo, and an Aristotle living in Sicyon about 255 Pint. Arat. 3. Linias who is there mentioned with him appears also to have been a Megarian. Somewhat younger must have been Artemidorus, who wrote against Chrysippus, Diog. ix. 53. 1 Diog. ix. fil : Ilvppwv tftcovo-e Bpvffuvos TOV STI'A/TTOJJ/OS, us 'AXe- tavSpos tv AiaSoxats. Suid. Tlv^pttiv: SiffiKovfff Bpucra'cos, TOV K\eivo[na.x ot/ M a ^ 7 7 TO ''- Instead of Bryso, bpvatav was formerly read in Diog. Sext. Math. vii. 13, however also calls him Bryso. Suid. nip-pat: These statements are not without their difficulties. Allowing it to be possible that Clinoma- chus and not Stilpo instructed Bryso, or that he enjoyed the instruction of both, the chro- nology is fctill troublesome. For how can Pyrrho, before Alexander's expedition to Asia, as Diog. expressly says, have studied under the son of a man, whose own professional career probably comes after that expedition ? It seems as though the relation of Pyrrho to Bryso as pupil and teacher were an imaginary combina- tion, designed to connect the school of Pyrrho with the Me- garian. Possible it also is that Bryso, the teacher of Pyrrho, has been wrongly identified with the son of this Stilpo. Suid. 'SuKpar. calls Bryso the teacher of Pyrrho, a pupil of Socrates, or according to others, a pupil of Euclid. Rover Philol. xxx. 462, proposes to read in the passage of I>io;_ r . instead of Bpvfftavos TOV /oy, Bpuir. 1) 2r/Xir. * Diog. ix. 109. THE SOCRATIC SCHOOLS. CHAP. XII. It is all the more satisfactory to be able to learn _ from Plato l particulars respecting a theory in which Schleiermacher 2 first recognised Megarian views, and which, in common with most writers, 3 we feel justi- 1 Soph. 242, B. Plato de- fined Sophistry as the art of deception. The difficulty im- mediately arises, that decep- tion is only then possible, when not-being, to which all deception refers, admits a cer- tain kind of being. It may then be asked, how is the being of the not-being pos- sible ? To answer this question Plato reviews various opinions respecting being. In the first place he examines the two most opposite statements, that being is the many, and that it is the one, and after having shown that neither a manifoldness of original substances without a substratum of unity, nor the unity of the Eleatics excluding the many, can be admitted, he continues, p. 245, E.: -rovs fj.fvroi- vvv 5ia.Kpifto\oyov/j.ei>ovs oVros re TTtpl KO.I /J.}) TTttJ/TOy /J,fV OV OieA.T)- \v8afj.ei', '6/j.us Se iKavcas e^e'rco' TOI/S 8e &AA.WS \fyofras av 6ea- Tfov. These are again divided into classes, those who only allow reality to what is mate- rial, and others who are called 248, A. of T&V eiSwi/ ? \e*ym'T(s meaning here literally those who speak differently, with whom all does not turn (as with the philosophers men- tioned 243, D) upon the an- tithesis of being and not-being. With the philosophers to whom Plato comes 245, E., the ques- tion is not whether there is one or more than one form of being, everything else being not-being, but whether there is only the corporeal or the in- corporeal. Conf. p. 243, D, with 246, A. Compare Henne, 105 ; Bonitz, Plat. Stud. ii. 49. In the explanation of Smicptpo- \oyovnffous, no one appears to have exactly hit the mark. MEGARIAN TEACHING. 25 which shall, in the main, faithfully represent the CHAP. r* , XII. facts. The starting-point of the Megarian philosophy (i) Con- must be looked for in Socrates' demand for a know- ledge of conceptions. With this demand Euclid combined the Eleatic doctrine of a contrast between sensational and rational knowledge. Distinguishing these two kinds of knowledge far more by their objects than by their form, he arrived at the convic- tion that the senses show us what is capable of change and becoming, and that only thought can supply us with the knowledge of what is unchangeable and really existing. 1 He stood, therefore, in general, on the same footing as Plato, and it is possible that this view was arrived at by both philosophers in common in their intellectual intercourse, and that owing to Plato Euclid was influenced by Heraclitus' view of the world of sense. Socrates had indeed made the immediate business of thought to be the acquisition of a knowledge of conceptions. Conceptions, accord- ingly, represent that part of a thing which never changes. Not material things, but only incorporeal species, taught Euclid, admit of true being. 2 The Plato, 248, A. : reVeo-iv, r^v /j.ev alad^crfts Kal Qavraaias KO.-TO.- Se \4yfre; $ -yap; Nal. Kol nan fi.fi/ rifjius yevffffi Si a.laM\- 2 In the passage of the fffws Koivu>vf1v, Sia. \oyuTnov 54 Soph. 246, B., quoted at p. 4ruxjJ wpbs T^V ovrws ovfftw, V 214, 2, in which the words ri al Kara TO.VTO. wvavrtaf ^X' Se ^Ktkwv trtijuara must not be evrols fpicrriKOis avypei Kal ra eifSrj, and it would in itself be possible, that Stilpo and others had derived their hostility to gene- ral conceptions, and especially to the Platonic ideas, from the Cynic School. But the above examples are not directed against the reality of groups expressed by a general con- ception, but against the reality of particular things. Stilpo denies that the individual is a man, because the expression man means something univer- sal and different from any particular man. He denies that what is shown to him is cabbage, because there was cabbage 10,000 years ago ; in other words, because the gene- ral conception of cabbage means something unchange- able, not something which has come into being. We may then believe with Hegel, Gesch. d. Phil. ii. 123, and titallbaum, Plat. Parm. 65, that either Dio- genes or his authority must have made some mistake here. 2 Probably expressions like ' Hi quoque multa in Platone/ said of the Megarians by Cic, Acad. iv. 42, 129, refer to such points of similarity. 8 Plato, Soph. 248, C. : Ae- yovaiv, '6ri yevsirei p.ev /xeretrrt rov Trdffxtiv Kal iroitlv Svvdpecas, irpbs Se ovffiav rovrtav ovSerepov r^v Svvap.iv ap^rreiv (f>affiv. It is accordingly afterwards re- peatedly stated as their view : MEG ART AN TEACHING. 261 Connected with this denial of the becoming is the assertion, probably coming from Euclid, certainly from his school, that capacity does not exist beyond the time of its exercise ; and that thus what is actual is alone possible. 1 What is simply possible but not actual, would at the same time be and not be. Here would be the very contradiction which Parmenides thought to discover in the becoming, and the change from the possible to the actual would be one of those changes which Euclid could not harmonise with the conception of being. 2 Hence, only what is imma- CHAP. XII. [rb Troj'TeA.ws fcp] a.K.ivi)Tov effrbs flvai. anivn-rov rb irapairav ep6vijffiv, ore Se Otbv, Kal &\\ore icti/j.ei'a. r ev elvai Kal rb /x^j bit us ol yity^ptKol. That this one etepov tlvai, /xrjSe yevvao~0ai rt virtue was the knowledge of /xrjSe fyOfiptaQai p-noe KivflffOai the good, appears not only Toirapdirav. Arist. Metaph. xiv. from the internal connection 4 ; 1091, b, 13, refers to Plato, of the system and its external and can hardly be applied to relation to Socrates, but also the Megarians. Yrom Cicero 1. c. who asserts : 5 Prantl's view, p. 35, that a .Mcnedemo autem . . . Ere- the conceptions of the Me- triaci appellati ; quorum orane garians must invariably have bonum in mente posit um et a nominalistic meaning, does 264 THE SOCRATIC SCHOOL. CHAP. probably, traces of gradual development in the Mega- ' rian doctrine are to be found. Euclid apparently first spoke of a plurality of essential conceptions in contrast to objects of sense, and this form of teach- ing belongs primarily to a time in which his system was being developed out of this contrast. 1 At a later period the Megarians appear to have used the mani- foldness of conceptions for the purpose of attacking popular notions, 2 otherwise keeping it in the back- ground, and confining themselves to the essential oneness of being and the Good. Inconsistent, no doubt, they were ; yet we can understand how they became involved in this contradiction by gradually pushing the Socratic theory of conceptions to the abstract doctrine of the Eleatic One. 3 C. Eristic. The sharper the contrast which they presented not agree with the statements over the difficulty in another of Plato. If the Megarians way. The Megarians, he be- declared conceptions and only lieves, attributed being to each conceptions to be dATjflii/)) ovcria, particular idea, in as far as it surely they were Realists, not was a ivnity, and various con- Nominalists. Not even Stilpo ceptions were used by them to can, accordingly, be called a express various kinds of the Nominalist. He had, more- good. But this very point over, absorbed too much of the being of various kinds of the Cynic doctrines for tis to good was what the Megarians be able to form from him any denied. Starting with the one- conclusion respecting the ori- ness of being they cannot have ginal Megarian views. arrived at the notion of a mani- 1 Plato, at least in the pas- foldness of conceptions, since sage before quoted, does not this oneness excludes in its ab- mention a good which is One. stract form any development On the contrary, he speaks of or subordinate distinction. But his philosophers of conceptions it is quite possible that the differing from the Eleatics in Socratic conceptions may assuming many conceptions. gradually have been lost in 2 See p. 260, 1. the Eleatic unity. s He/me, p. 121, tries to get MEOARIAN ERISTIC. 265 to the current mode of thought, the greater became CHAP. the necessity of fortifying their own position against ' assault. Here again they had only to follow the example of the Eleatics. To prove the soundness of their position directly, as Parmenides had done, was no easy matter. More important results might be expected, if their opponents' ground was assailed by the criticism of Zeno and Gorgias. From Zeno the founder of the School had appropriated the Eleatic doctrine precisely in this its critical function, Zeno and the Sophists being the principal persons who drew attention hereto in central Greece. This path of criticism the Megarians now struck out with such preference, that the whole school herefrom derived its name. 1 We are assured by Diogenes, 2 that it was the practice even of Euclid, to attack conclusions and not premises in other words, to refute by a reductio ad absurdum. It is also said that Euclid 3 (1) Tliat rejected explanations by analogies a form much f P llclld - used by Socrates because a similar thing when cited makes nothing clearer, and a dissimilar thing is irrelevant. The most telling description of Euclid's method will probably be found in Plato, who, speak- 1 See p. 250, 3. 470), it is most probable that 2 ii. 107 : rats re cnroSei^efftv the meaning given above is the Mara.ro ov Kara \-f)fj.^ara aAAa real meaning of these words. tear' lirttyopav. Since in Stoical 3 Ibid. KO.I rbv Sia TrapajSoATjs terminology which we are of \6yov avrjpei, \iyui> tfroi atffdai el 5' t avop.oiv, both premises, and !irpopa the icapt\K(iv TTJV conclusion (Ih'yckx, 151 ; 1'rantl, 266 THE SO CR AT 1C SCHOOL. CHAP. ing in the Sophistes of the philosophers of concep- _ tions, says that in their discourses they destroy matter piecemeal, in order to prove that it has no real being but is subject to flux and change. 1 This is exactly the line which Zeno adopted, in order to prove the uncertainty of the perceptions of the senses; 2 and which we notice also in the Sorites of the later Megarians : the apparently substantial bodily mass is divided into its component parts, and there being no limit to the division, and no ultimate atom on which contemplation can rest, it is argued that matter must be itself unreal, and a mere pass- ing phenomenon. Euclid is accordingly rightly re- garded as the founder of the Megarian criticism. Still, with him criticism does not seem to have at- tained the character of formal captiousness, although objection may be taken to his controversial tone : 3 it would appear that, like Zeno before him, he was primarily anxious to maintain his positive princi- ples, and that he only used the subtleties of argument as a means to this end. Nothing, at least, is known of him which would lead to an opposite conclusion, nor is any one of the quibbling fallacies laid to his charge, for which the Megarian school was afterwards notorious. 1 See p. 256, 1 ; 259, 2. statement proves but little, 2 SeeZeller, G. d. Griech. Part since it uses the term Sophist I., 496. in a way peculiar to post-So- * According to Ding. ii. 30, cratic times. It is more worthy Socrates had already observed, of belief (-Dioff. ii. 107) that that because of his captious- Timon called him a quarrel- ness, he might associate pos- some person, who introduced sibly with Sophists, but not amongst the Megarians a rage with human beings* But this for disputes. MEGARIAN CAPTIOUSNESS. 267 Among the immediate successors of Euclid, how- ever, the element of captiousness prevailed over positive teaching. Such teaching as they had was too scanty to command attention for long, and too abstract to admit of further development. On the other hand a polemic against prevailing opinions presented to the sharp-witted, to the contentious, and to those ambitious of intellectual distinction, an un- explored field, over which the Megarians eagerly ranged. 1 Not seldom their metaphysical assumptions served only as occasions for hard-fighting with words. Among the fallacies which are attributed to Eubu- lides, 2 though they probably belong to an earlier 1 The ordinary form of these captious proofs is that of ask- ing questions. Hence the regular expression : \6yov tpw- TO.V (to raise a point) in Diog. ii. 108 ; 116 ; Sext. Math. x. 87 ; and the WlryaptKa fpos, the (rcopiTrjs, the Kfpariviis, the uv, the fjKfKa\vfj.fj.evos, and the piTTjs. Philetus of Cos is said to have worked in writing os, Athen. ix. 401, e. The Kepor^rjj and fjKfKa\v^fj.evos were also attri- buted to Diodorus (Dior/, ii. Ill), and the former (Diog. vii. 187) as also the Sorites (.Diog. Zeno and Euclid. In general vii. 82) to Chrysippus, certainly it is difficult to say who are without reason to Chrysippus. the discoverers of quibbles, 2 Compare what will be later which are taken seriously at said about Diodorus' proofs in the time they are produced, denying motion, but are after all only bad jokes. "The motive which Prantl, Seneca, Ep. 45, 10, saj r s that p. 52, sees in the ^yKe/caXujUjueVos many books had been written is not so patent, and the as- on the fyev86/j.evos, among which sumptions of Brandis, p. 122, those of Theophrastus and do not seem accurate. DIODORUS THE MEGARIAN. L>60 have been of a similar kind. He, at least, is only CHAP. known to us as a captious disputant. 1 Nothing further is known of him beyond an argument in which he vainly attempted to entangle Menedemus in what is called the ' horned ' fallacy, 2 and a refuta- tion of Xenophon's proofs of the reasonable arrange- ment of the world, 3 which was subsequently repeated by the Academicians. 4 In close connection with the Megarian doctrines may be placed the discussions of Diodorus on motion and destruction, on the possible, and on hypothetical sentences. Tradition has preserved four arguments, by which (4) Tkattif Diodorus attempted to support the fundamental Jho os. had concluded, because the * Cic. N. D. iii. 8, 21 ; 10, 26 ; world is the best possible, and 11, 27. reason is higher than the ab- s Sext. Pyrrh. ii. 242 ; iii. 71 ; sence of reason, that the world Math. x. 85 ; i. 311. must have reason. See Cic. Sext. Pyrrh. iii. 243, men- De N. D. ii. 8, 21; iii. 9, 22. tions asimilar argument against To this Alexinus replied : rb becoming in general, in imme- irot-nriKbv TOV /ur; iroiTjriKov ol rb diate connection with the proof 7pa/ujuaTi/cb> rov ^ 7pa/iju T>pa>TTJT0ai i(r^.aTioy cXu- peX7jXv06s a\i)6S Q.voLyK.ouQv tlvat * eras, TroAu KOfi. 9, treatises of Cleanthes, Chry- OVT' tffTiv iXTjO^s ofa' O-TOI,' sippus, Antipater, and Archi- ffvvti&v T^V fadx^v TOUTTJI/ 6 Ai6- demus on the ttvpievwv. Chry- Supos TTJ TUV icpd)T. odev afnapTdveivTobs trepnv eTtpov KaTTtiyopovvTas. The very same thing will be found in the case of Antisthenes. All the less reason has Plutarch to regard Stilpo's assertion as a mere joke. The same proof is given by Sim.pl. Phys. 26, a. : S& 8* rV irepl Tavra (the distinction between the different cate- gories and the ambiguity of words) &yvoiav Kal ol MeyapiKoi KArjfleWss oi \afi6vTes us evapyri -jrp6Taffiv, ori Sav ol \6yoi erepoi TavTO. erepa effTi Kal OTI Ta erepa KfX^ipiffTai a.\X4]Xtav, tSoKovv SeiKvvvai avTov avrov Ke- XI> Siairpe- \)/dvf(ai> tv iratSein Sov\tav. Grotd (Plato, iii. 503) objects to this story, that no conquest of Elis took place at that time, where- as Diog. says of Phasdo : arv- vfti\(o r?7 irarplSt. He therefore infers that M^Xtos should be read for 'HA6?os in Diog. ii. 105. Yet Phasdo is called an Elean by both Gell. 1. c. and Stralo, ix. 1, 8, p. 393, and his school called Elean. If Elis itself did not fall into an enemy's hand, its suburbs were occu- pied by the Spartan army in the Elean-Spartan war, pro- bably in the spring of 408 B.C. (Xen. Hell. iii. 2, 21, and Prel- ler, on the passage, Ciirtius, Or. Gesch. iii. 149. 757.) Phjedo appears to have been taken captive at that time. Most probably Phaedo left Athens on the death of Socrates. But whether he at once returned home, or repaired with others to Euclid at Megara, is un- known. Diog. ii. 105, mentions two genuine and four spurious dialogues of his. His Zopyrus is even quoted by Pollux, iii. 18, and the Antiatheista in Beltker's Anecdot. i. 1 07. Panae- tius seems to have had doubts as to all the treatises passing under his name, Diog. ii. 64. He is called by Gellius ' philo- 280 THE SOCRATIC SCHOOLS. CHAP. XII. Socrates. 1 On the death of his teacher, Phsedo collected a circle of disciples in his native town, who thence received the name of the Elean philosophers. 2 Plistanus is named as his successor, 3 and Archipylus and Moschus as his pupils. 4 Beyond the names we, however, know nothing of any one of them. By Menedemus and Asclepiades, 5 the school was removed to Eretria, and it was then called the Eretrian. 6 sophus illustris,' and his writ- ings are spoken of as ' admo- dum elegantes.' Even Diog. ii. 47, enumerates him among the most distinguished Socra- ticists. 1 Compare for his relations to Socrates the Phsedo, 58, D. 89, H. 2 'HXeioKot, Strabo, ix. 1, 8, p. 393 ; Diog. ii. 105, 126. Diog. ii. 105. 4 126. Perhaps these men were not immediate pupils of his. Since nothing is said of Menedemus' studying under Plistanus, the latter, we may suppose, was no longer alive. 5 The account given by Diog. ii. 125 of these philosophers in his life of Menedemus (probably taken from Antigonus of Cary- stus and Heraclides Lembus) is as follows : Menedemus of Ere- tria, originally a tradesman, had been sent as a soldier to Megara. There he became ac- quainted with the school of Plato (so Diog. says with Plato ; but this is chronologically im- possible) and joined it together with his friend Asclepiades, both cf them (according to Athen. iv. 168, a) earning a living by working at night. Soon, how- ever, they joined Stilpo at Megara, and thence went to Moschus and Archipylus at Elis, by whom they were in- troduced to the Elean doc- trines. Returning to their native city and becoming con- nected by marriage, they con- tinued together in faithful friendship until the death of Asclepiades, even after Mene- demus had risen to highest rank in the state, and had attained wealth and influence with the Macedonian princes. The sympathetic, noble and firm character of Menedemus, his pungent wit (on which Plwt. Prof, in Virt. 10, p. 81 ; Vit. Pud. 18, p. 536), his mode- ration (Diog. ii. 129; Athen. x. 419, e), his liberality and his merits towards his country, are a subject of frequent panegyric. Soon after the battle of Lysimachia, which took place 278 B.C., he died, possibly by suicide the result of a grief which is differently stated at the age of seventy- four. According to Antigonus in Diog. ii. 136, he left no writings. Strabo, ix. 1, 8; Diog. ii. 105, 126 ; Cic. Acad. iv. 42, 129. ELEAN-ERETRIAN SCHOOL. 281 Flourishing as was its condition here for a time, it CHAP. appears soon to have died out. 1 Among its adherents 2 Phaedo and Menedemus are B. Re- the only two respecting whose opinions any informa- 1 ^^^ tion is to be had, and that information is little teaching. enough. By Timon 3 Phaedo is classed with Euclid as a babbler, which points to an argumentative ten- dency. 4 Perhaps, however, he devoted himself to Ethics 5 more than Euclid did. Menedemus, at least, appears to have been distinguished from his cotem- porary quibblers by having directed his attention to life and to moral questions. He is, however, spoken of as a sharp and skilful disputant. 6 If he hardly went the length of Antisthenes in declaring every com- bination of subject and predicate impossible, 7 it still sounds captious enough to hear that he only allowed affirmative judgments to be valid, but rejected nega- 1 Pint. Tranqu. An. 13, p. of morals, which Sen. Ep. 94, 472. 41, quotes from Phsedo. 2 Athen. iv. 162, e, mentions Diog. ii. 134 : fa 5e SIKTKO- a certain Ctesibius as a pupil TOI/O^TOS d M. xal Iv rf ffwdeo-Oat of Menedemus, but what he Sva-avrayiavtaros. tffTpfQero re says of him has nothing to do irp&s irdma. Hal eupfffi\6-ytr Ipur- with philosophy. A treatise TiKwTards T, natid (fnjffiv 'AITI- of the Stoic Sphajrus against aOev-ns iv 5ia8oxa?s, fa. The the Eretrian School in 260 verses of Epicrates in Athen. B.C. is the last trace of the ii. 59, cannot well refer to this existence of the Eretrian Menedemus, since they are also school. Diog. vii. 178. directed against Plato, who s Diog. ii. 107. was then still living. 4 The Platonic Phaedo does ' Even this is asserted. Ac- not give the slightest ground cording to Phys. 20, a (Schol. for thinking, as Steinhart, Plat, in Arist. 330, a, 3), the Ere- W. iv. 397, does, that Phsedo trians asserted Mi?S*i/ xarit M<- was inclined to a sceptical Stvbs naTiryopf'tff6ai. They ap- withholding of judgment. pear in this passage to be con- * Compare the short but founded with the Cynics and clever fragment on the subject the later Megarians. THE 80CRATIC SCHOOLS. CHAP. tive and hypothetical ones. 1 Chrysippus 2 blames him as well as Stilpo, for their obsolete fallacies. 3 It may also be true that he disputed the view that pro- perties exist apart from particular objects, in the spirit of Cynic nominalism. 4 On the other hand, it is asserted that in positive opinions he was a Platonist, and only employed argument for amusement. 5 From what has been already stated, this seems incredible, nor can it be deduced from his disputes with Alex- inus. 6 Indeed, it is in itself most improbable. 7 Still so much seems to be ascertained, that, together with Stilpo, he attributed to ethical doctrines a value above criticism. For we not only hear that he ad- mired Stilpo, who was his teacher, more than any other philosopher, 8 and that he was himself often 1 Diog. ii. 135. 2 Pliit. ISto. Rep. 10, 11, p. 1036. 3 Hermann, Ges. Abh. 253, refers to Menedemus the verses of John Salisbury (Bnthet. ed. Peters, p. 41), in which a certain Endymion is mentioned, who called fides, opinio vera, and error, opinio fallax, and who denied that you could know what was false, for no know- ledge could be deceptive. The allusion does not, however, appear probable. The continu- ation, that the sun corresponds to truth, and the moon to false- hood, that error and change bear rule under the moon, but truth and immutability in the domain of the sun, certainly does not come from Menedemus. 4 Simpl. Categ. Schol. in Arist. 68, a, 24 : of Airo TTJS 'Eptrpias avfipovv ras TTOI^TTJTOS dis ov8a.iJ.us ^xovffas ri Koifbv ovfft&Ses iv 6e TOIS Ka&fKturra Kal ffvvOerois inrap\ov(ras. 5 Heraclides in Diog. ii. 135. Hitter's conjecture, Gesch. d. Phil. ii. 155, that this Mene- demus is confounded with Me- nedemus the Pyrrhsean, whom we know from Pint. adv. Col. 32, p. 1126, 8, and Athen., is hardly to be trusted. For Heraclides Lembus had treated the Eretrians in detail, as we learn from Diog., so that it is difficult to imagine such a con- fusion. The context also tells against that view. 6 Diog. 135, 136, says that he was constantly attacking Alexi- nus with violent derision, but yet did him some service. 7 Diog. 134 : ruv 8e 5i5ao-/co- Ktav Ttav irepl nxdrcava KO.} Eevo- Kpdrriv . . . Karf(pp6ffi. 8 Diog. 134. ELEAN-ERETRIAN TEACHING. & derided for being a Cynic, 1 but we know that he CHAP. busied himself with enquiring as to the chief good in a practical way. He affirmed that there was only one good intelligence, 2 which, to his mind, was identical with a rational direction of the will. 3 What are commonly spoken of as distinct virtues, are, he maintained, only different names of this one virtue ; 4 and, by his activity as a statesman, 5 he proved that he did not aim at dead knowledge. In his free views of religion he likewise reminds us of Stilpo and the Cynics. 6 Zeno,. however, having about this time united the most valuable and lasting parts of the Megarian and Cynic teaching in the more compre- hensive system of the Stoics, stragglers, such as the Eretrians, soon found themselves unable to exercise any important influence. 1 Diog. 140 : TO. fi(t> oSc vpura Sj/catoeruvrjj' \4ytffQoi, KaBdirtp Kairetypove'iro, KVUV Kal Afjpoj inrb fiporbv Kal avOpcairov. riav "Epfrptiwv O.KOVUV. 5 That he exercised a con- 2 Cic. Aead. ii. 42 : Diog. siderable influence, on his 123 : irpbs 81 rbv tl-novra TroAAo friends by his teaching and ra 07060 eirvQtro ir6(ra rbv api6- his personalty is shown by fibv Kal ft i>oni(oi ir\flv Set. Josephus, Antiquit. Jud. xii. 2, 1 Pint. Virt. Mor. 2 : Mcrl- 12. Tertullian'g Apologet. 18, STJMOS fj.ii> 6 it 'Eperplat avfipci language on Menedemus and fiav aptruv Kal rb 7rA7J0os Kai ras his belief in Providence, is oiaupa>, as /uas ofays Kal xp u ~ probably as worthless as the /xe'/7;y TroAAoTV, ov6^a(ri ri> yap whole fable of Aristeas. aiirb ffcaV Aioyevovs arvvayov, cannot go for much. There is probably here a mistake in the text; perhaps K e, 664, e, likewise does MejoTnros & KvviK.6s. The name IZiwirfvs is thus explained : his master was a certain Baton of Pontus (Achaicus in Diog. vi. 99), with whom he probably lived at Sinope. (Compare also Nietz- sche's Beitr. z. Quellenkunde u. Kritik des Laert. Diogenes. Basel, 1870, p. 28.) According to Diog. 13 treatises of Menippus were in circulation, of which he gives the titles of seven, and Athen. the titles of two more. That they were not his own production is probably only enemy's slander. All these writings appear to have been satires. His proficiency as a CYNIC TEACHING. 2P1 and only reappeared at a very much later time as an CHAP. offshoot of Stoicism. 1 The Cynic philosophy claims to be the genuine B - Of" teaching of Socrates. 2 The many-sidedness, however, (i) jp e ^' of Socrates, whereby the intellectual and the moral JJJJJJJ elements were completely fused, and the foundations Itrwnledy thus laid of a more comprehensive and deeper-going science, was above the powers of Antisthenes. Natur- ally narrow and dull, 3 but fortified with singular strength of will, Antisthenes admired 4 above all things the independence of his master's character, the strictness of his principles, his self-control, and his universal cheerfulness in every position in life. How these moral traits could be in a great measure the result of free enquiry on the part of Socrates, and how they could thus be preserved from narrowness, satirist may be gathered from school. It would fully explain the fact that he was not only these statements that he was imitated in ancient times by attaching himself as a writer Meleager (Dioff. vi. 99), but to Menippus. also by Varro in his Satirae 2 See p. 285, 2, and Diog. vi. Menippeae (dc. Acad. i. 2, 8 ; 11. dell. N. A. ii. 18, 6, also s This his teaching proves Nacrob. Saturn, i. il ; conf. independently of the opinions Protms, 1. c.), and that even of opponents, such as Plato, Lucian gives him a prominent Theastet. 155, E., in which the place in his dialogues. Conf. words s KO! avriTuvovs Jtiese, Varr. Sat. Rel. p. 7. a.i>6pcairovs and nd\' t% &/iowrot 1 Besides the above, Me- refer without doubt to Antis- leager of Gadara should be thenes and not to the Ato- mentioned, could we be sure mists; Soph. 251, B. yepAvruv that he was a member of the TOIJ tytpd6f92 THE SOCRATIC SCHOOLS. CHAP. XIII. he did not understand ; nor did he see that the prin- ciple of a knowledge of conceptions reached far be- yond the limits of the Socratic platform. All know- ledge not immediately subservient to ethical purposes he accordingly rejected as unnecessary, or even as injurious, as the offspring of vanity and love of plea- sure. Virtue, he maintained, is an affair of action, and can dispense with words and with wisdom. All that it needs is the strength of will of a Socrates. 1 Thus he and his School not only regarded logical and physical enquiries as worthless, but passed the same opinion on all arts and sciences which have not the moral improvement of mankind 2 for their immediate 1 Dioff. 11, Antisthenes teach- es a.vr&pKt\ Se r))v aper^iv irpbs evSaifj.oviav, /j.-riSei'bs TrpotrSeoju.eVTjp STI /JL^I 'SoiKpariKris iffxvos. ri\v T' aperijv rSiv epycav elvai, ft-firf \6yta 2 Dioff. 103 : apeo-Kei o%v av- rois r}>v KoyiKbv Kal rbv tyvffiKbv r&irov irepiatpe'iv, tfitfiepies 'Apt- ffrwvt ftp \icf, fj.6vcjj Se irpoaexeiv rip ii6iK$. According to Dio- cles, Diogenes said what others attribute to Socrates or Aristippus (see p. 150, and Plut. in Eus. Pr. Ev. i. 8, 9) that we ought to learn orn roi v (neydpoHTi KO.K&V T' aya06v re rervKrai. wapcurovvrat 5e Kal rk tyitiiKyia . . . irfpiaipovai 8e Kal yetaiJ.erpiav Kal p.ovfftK^v Kal irdvra TO roiavra. When a dial was shown him, Diogenes re- plied, that it was not a bad instrument to avoid being late for meals. Ibid. 27: robs tie Oavnafc [Diog.] ra, rov 'OSvffffeus KKKO, avafr- rovvras ra 5' 18ia ayvoovvras Kal ft.^v Kal robs puvtriKoi/'i ras fj.ev f rfj \vpa xp8as ap/j.6r- rfff8ai, avapfjLOffra 5' e^fv rijs $vxfis ra $6r)- rovs na6i]ij.ariKovs airo$\fireiv (Jttv irpbs rbv VfXiov KOI rfyv fff\-i}vT]v, ra S' tv wocrl irpdy- (tara irapopav rovs pfaopas \e- ytiv jj.tv tffirovSaKevai ra S'tKaia, irpdrreiv Se jur)5o/*ws. The pas- sage on astronomers may pos- sibly have been supported by the story of Thales falling into a well whilst contemplat- ing the heavens. An answer thereto is the passage in the Theastetus 174, A, 175, D, on the Thracian maiden who upbraid- ed him for so doing. The mother of Antisthenes was a Thracian slave, and the words which Plato puts into the mouth of the Thracian girl closely resemble those quoted by Diogenes. It would also tally with the character of Antisthenes, that he as an airaiSfvros should be charged CYNIC TEACHING. object ; for, said Diogenes, 1 as soon as any other object intervenes, self is neglected. Even reading and writing Antisthenes declared could be dispensed with. 2 The last statement must in any case be taken with considerable limitation, 3 nor can the Cynic School as a whole be regarded as so hostile to culture as this language would seem to imply. In fact, some decided language as to the value of culture is on record coming from Antisthenes, 4 Diogenes, 5 Crates, 6 CHAP. XIII. with not troubling himself about the general conception of things. Diog. 73 says of Dio- genes: /iowriKfjs re Kalyes uxpfiffTtav Kal OVK avay- Kaitav. Conf . Diog. 24 ; 39 ; Julian, Or. vi. 190, a ; Seneca, Ep. 88, particularly 7, 32 ; Stob. Floril. 33, 14; id. 80, 6: an astronomer pointing to a map of the heavens says : ouroi flffiv ol TrAewcc/uecoj Ttav dffrfpeav upon which Diogenes replies, pointing to those pre- sent : pi) tyfvSov oit yap ovroi flffiv ol ir\avw/j.evoi, oAA' ovrot. The saying of Diogenes in Simpl. De Ccelo, 33, b, Schol. in Arist. 476, b, 35, that even an ass takes the shortest cut to his food and to the water, was probably meant as a hit at geometry and its axiom of the straight line. 1 Excerp. e Joan. Damasc. ii. 13, 61. (Stob. Floril. ed. Mein.) 2 Diog. 103 : ypdfj.fj.ar a yovv ^ fiavBdvtiv ftyaffxtv o 'Avn- aOtvrjs rovs ffwfypovas ytvo^tvovs, Iva i^ $iaffrpf, TOIS 8e w\ova{ois icAo-pav flvai. Exc. e Floril. Jo. Damasc. 13, 29: TJ traiSfia ofj.oia iff-rl xpvffip ffrt~ (pdixp Kal yap Ti/iV ^X el Ka ^ jro\vT(\(iav. Ibid. 74, 75. ' Diog. 86 : ravr ?x w off ^ (fiadov Kal e(pp6fTiffa Kal fjLtra Movawv fff^v' i6di)i>. TO S iroAAa Kal u\/3ia TV fidOpov, r'bv 8" els rb f3dpa6pov e(j.iriirTeti/. 2 Diog. 31, according to Eu- bulus ; Ka.Tfi-)((>v 5e ol iraTSes iro\- \a iroiriTcav Kal ffvyypcKpecav Hal TWV aiiTOv Aioyevovs, iraffdv r' e^oSov aivTOfnov irpbs rb fi//j.vr)fj,6- vevffTOv &T7JO-K6I. 3 Krische, Forschungen, 237. See Hitter, ii. 120. 4 Although the division of phi- losophy into Logic, Ethics, and Physics can have been hardly introduced in the time of Anti- sthenes, and hence the words in Diog. 103 cannot be his, it does not thence follow that the statement there made is false. Amongst the writings of Anti- sthenes some are known to us, which would be called logical writings, to use a later division ; others are on physical subjects. To the first class belong Tlepl pl TOV Sia\e- yeaOai, 2a0o>j/ ^ irepl TOV o.vri- Xtyeiv, Tlfpl Sia\eKTOv, Tlepl bvo- fj.d.Tcov, Hfpl bvofjidruv xp^ffecos, riept f'p&JTTJrrecos /cat airoKpifff(as, Tifpl So|rjs Kal ^n-tvfftpi- ably referred to t>e require- aafro \6yov eiit6i> \6yos tarlv & ments of nature. rftrffrffimAifcAr. Alexander 296 THE SOCRATIC SCHOOLS. CHAP. XIII. Confining himself, however, exclusively to this point of view, he arrived at the conclusion of the Sophists, 1 that every object can only be called by its own pecu- liar name, and consequently that no subject can admit a predicate differing from the conception of the sub- ject. Thus it cannot be said that a man is good, but only that a man is human, or that the Good is good. 2 Every explanation, moreover, of a conception con- sisting in making one conception clearer by means of another, he rejected all definitions, on the ground ' uv in Top. 24, m, Schol. in Arist. 256, b, 12, on the Aristotelian ri ^v ilvai says that the simple rl fjv, which Antisthenes want- ed, is not sufficient. 1 See Zeller, Phil. d. Griech. 904. 2 Arist. Metaph. v. 29 ; 1024, b, 33 : 'AvTiff6tmis ' fi/6s~ avvtftaive, fj.)j eli/ (rxeSbj/ 8 fjiriSt \ltev8effOai. Alex- ander on the passage. Plato, Soph. 251, B. : Wtv ye, olfaat, rots re veois Kal rS>v yep6i>rcoi> raits ofyinaOffft Goivi\v Trapeo'X'nKa- faev ev&vs yap avri\afteff6anravrl irp^xetpov as aSvyarov rd re TroAAa ev /col rb ev TroXA^s elvcu, Kal S^j irou xatpovfftv OVK eiavres ayadbf \eyetv avOpwirov, d\\a rb fj.fv dyadbv dyadbv, rbv 5e avOpta- TTOV avepanrov. Of. Philebus 14, C. ; Arist. Soph. El. c. 17, 175, b, 15 ; Phys. i. 2, 185, b, 25 ; Sinipl. in loc. p. 20 ; Isokr. Hel. i. 1, and particularly what is said p. 276, 1, respecting Stilpo. Hermann, Sokr. Syst. p. 30, once thought to discern in these sentences of Antisthenes, a great progress as proving that Antisthenes recognised all analytical judgments a priori as such to be true, but has since been obliged to modify his opinion (Plat. i. 217, Ges. Abh.239), on being reminded by Hitter (Gesch. d. Phil. ii. 133) that Antisthenes could only be speaking of identical judgments. Still he adheres to it so far as to state that by the teaching of Antisthenes, philosophy for the first time gave to identical judgments an independent value. In what this value consists, it is hard to say, for nothing is gained by recognising identical judg- ments, nor has it ever occurred to any philosopher to deny them, as Hermann, Ges. Abh. asserted though without quot- ing a single instance in support of it. Still less can it be a forward step in philosophy to deny all but identical judg- ments. On the contrary, such a denial is the result of an imperfect view of things, and is destructive of all know- ledge. CYNIC LOGIC. 297 that they are language which does not touch the thing itself. Allowing with regard to composite things, that their component parts could be enume- rated, and that they could in this way be themselves explained, with regard to simple ones, he insisted all the more strongly that this was impossible. Compared these might be with others, but not de- nned. Names there might be of them, but not con- ceptions of qualities, a correct notion but no know- ledge. 1 The characteristic of a thing, however, the CHAP. XIII. 1 Arist. Metaph. viii. 3 ; 1043, b, 23 : &ffre T, awopia, %v ol 'Avrio~6tvtioi Kal ul ovnas airai- Sevroi T]ir6pOi,v, *x fi Tiwk Kaipbi/, OTI OVK eo~n rb ri eanv 6pio~aff0ai, rbv yap opo* \6yoi> elvai p.aKp6v see Metaph. xiv. 3 ; 1091, a, 7 ; and Schwegler on this pas- sage aAAa iroiov pev ri effnv evSf \erai KOI 8i5acu, &ffirff> ap- yvpov ri fj.ev effnv, nv, on 8' olov Karrirepos. &ar uvorias effri yuec r)S ff8ex f fivfu opov Kal \6yov, clov rijs ffvvGtTov, la.v re aiV0T)T7) (O.V re roTjTTj rj ' * | >v S 5 a.vrr) irpuTdii' OVK fffriv. That this, too, belongs to the description of the teaching of Antisthenes, appears from Plato, Thetetet. 201, E., and is wrongly denied by Eraiidis, ii. b, 503 ; the ex- pressions are indeed Aristo- telian. Alexander, on the pas- sage, explains it more fully, but without adding anything fresh. That this view was not lirst put forward by the dis- ciples of Antisthenes, appears from Plato's Theaetet. 201, E. : c,w yap a(> eSojcouc a/coueip riviav on ra fj.ii/ irpwra uiffirtpel ffroixtta, t| Stv rjft.f'is re ffvyKft^fGa Kal ra\\a, \6yov OVK fX l - awrb "yap Ka6' ainb 'inaffrov ovofiaaai fj.ovov fit), irpoffenrfiv tie oiiSev &\\o Swarbv, ovff ais tvriv odd' ais OVK tariv .... eirfl oiiSf rb avrb ovSe rb *Kf7vo oiiSe rb eKaffrov ovSf rb novov irpoffoiffreov, ov8' &\\a TTO\\O, rotav^a ravra fiev yap Tffpnpexovra itaffi irpoo~ eirio-r-rird. This whole descrip- tion agrees with what has been quoted from Aristotle so en- tirely, trait for trait, that \vc 298 THE SOCRATIC SCHOOLS. CHAP. XIII. name which can never be defined, the conception of the subject which is borrowed from nothing else, and therefore can never be a predicate, consists only in its proper name. By this it is known when it can be explained by nothing else. All that is real is strictly individual. General conceptions do not express the nature of things, but they express men's thoughts about them. Plato having derived from the Socratic demand for a knowledge of conceptions a system of the most decided Eealism, Antisthenes derives there- from a Nominalism quite as decided. General con- ceptions are only fictions of thought. Horses and cannot possibly refer it to any one else but Antisthenes. It is all the more remarkable that Plato repeatedly (201, C. ; 202, C.) affirms the truth of his description. In modern times, Sckleiermacher, PL W. ii. 1 and 184, was the first to recognise the reference to Antisthenes. His opinion is shared by Bran- dis, Gr.-R6m. Phil. ii. a, 202, f ; tiusemild, Genet. Bntw. d. Plat. Phil. i. 200 ; Schwegler and Bonitz on Arist., 1. c., but con- tradicted by Hermann (Plat. 499, 659) and Stallbaum (De Arg. Theastet. ii. f ). Steinliurt (Plat. W. iii. ] 6, 204, 20) finds that the explanation of know- ledge, as here given, corre- sponds with the mind of Autis- thenes, but refuses notwith- standing to deduce it from him. Schleiermacher (as Brandis, ii. a, 203 ; Susemihl, pp. 200, 341, remark) has not the slightest right to think the reference is to the Megarians in Theaet. 201, D. What is there stated agrees most fully with the statements of Aristotle touch- ing Antisthenes, whereas no such principle is known of the School of Megara. We may, therefore, endorse Schleier- macher's conjecture (PI. W. ii. b, 19) that the Cratylus was in great part directed against Antisthenes a conjecture which appears to harmonise with the view that Antisthenes was the expounder of Heracli- tus. It is opposed by Brandis. ii. a, 285, f. Nor yet would we venture to attribute to An- tisthenes a theory of monads connecting it with the theory of ideas (Smemihl, i. 202, in connection with Hermann, Ges. Abh. 240). What we know of him does not go beyond the principle, that the simple ele- ments of things cannot be defined ; what he understood by simple elements may be gathered from the example quoted from Arist. Metaph. vii. 3, of the silver and the tin. CYNIC LOGIC. men are seen, not, however, the conception of a horse or a man. 1 From this position he opened a campaign against his fellow pupil, with whom he was for other reasons not on good terms, 2 but his fire was met with corresponding spirit. 3 Holding these views CHAP. XIII. 1 Simpl. in Categ. Schol. in Arist. 66, b, 45, says : v 8e iroAaiwc 0( ptv avypovv TOS TTOI^TTJ- ras Tf\4us, rb irotbv ffvyxupovvres tlvat (the terminology of course belongs to the Stoics) &uirep ' MTITOI/ (Lfi> opu, iVir^TTjTa Se oi>x opa,' to which Plato gave the excellent answer : True, for you have the eye with which you see a horse, but you are deficient in the eye with which you see the idea of horse. Ibid. 67, b, 18 ; IMd. 68, b, 26 : 'AiTiafleVrjp Kai roiy irepl avrbv \fyovrcu, &v6px p. Quite the same, Ibid. 20, 2, a. Diog. vi. 53, tells the same story of Diogenes and Plato, with this difference, that he uses rpavf- Co-rris and Kua06ri]s instead of ai'6pti>Tr6rris. Amman, in Porph. Isag. 22, b, says : 'Avriffdfvr)s (\rye TO. yevij nal TO e5j Iv floats tirivoicus elvcu, and then he mentions av0pcoir<$TTj$ and tTrir^Trjs as examples. The same language, almost word for word, is found in Tzetz. Chil. vii. 605, f. Plato is no doubt referring to this assertion of Antisthenes, when in the Pann. 132, B., he quotes an objection to the theory of ideas, ^ -ruv tlSiav fKaffrov rj rovroiv v6r)/j.a i (rot -irdpfi/j.1 Aiowo'68(t.pi>s ?; We may suppose that Antisthenes really made use of the illustration of the ox, to which Plato then replied by making use of the 300 THE SOCRATIC SCHOOLS. CHAP. XIII. it is only natural that Antisthenes should have at- tached the greatest importance to enquiries respecting names. 1 Stopping at names and refusing to allow any further utterances respecting things, he in truth made all scientific enquiry impossible. This fact he partially admitted, drawing from his premises the conclusion that it is impossible to contradict your- self. 2 Taken strictly the inference from these pre- same illustration in the person of Dionysodorus. Steinhart (Plato's Leben, 14, 266) con- siders the ~S,d9u>v spurious. He will not credit Antisthenes with such a scurrilous produc- tion. 1 Antisth. in Ejjict. Diss. i. 17, 12 : apx$i "TaiSfvaeciis ri TUV OVOU.O.TUV firiffKffyis. It is a pity that we do not know more accu- rately the sense and the con- nection of this saying. As it is, we cannot judge whether it required an individual enquiry into t he most important names, or only a general enquiry into nature and the meaning of names, which the principles contained in the above should develope. Respecting the theory that Antisthenes held to the etymologies of Heracli- tus, see p. 297, 1. "- Arist. Metaph. v. 29; see 296, 1; Top. i. 11 ; 104, b, 20: ovx. %ffTiv avTt\tyeiv, na9airfp % tli/at . . . ' Siv Kal awd- yeiv eVe/paro ori ^ SO-TIV aini- \tyeiv TOVS /J.fi> yap avTiXtyovras irtpi TWOS Stac^opa \tyeiv 6(t>fi\fiv, fj.$l 5vvcur6ai 8e irepl avrov 5ia6- povs TOVS \6yovs (pfpfffdai Tif fva. Tbv olictiov fKuatov elvai tva. yap ti>bs elvai Kal fbv KiyovTO. trepl avTov \tyeiv p.&vov ' SiffTe fl fj.fv Trepl TOV irpa.yfj.aTos TOV avTov \tyoiev, TO, avra tiv \4yoiev a\\-i)\OLS (els yap 6 irfpl et>bs \6yos) \tyovTes Se TOUTO OVK &v (pepovTa \fyoiev, oiiKfTi Ae'leii/ avTovs irtpl TOV avrov. Prantl, Gesch. d. Log. i. 33, mentions later writers, who, however, only repeat Aristotle's sayings. In exactly the same way Plato's Dionysodorus (Euthyd. 285, E.) establishes his assertion, that it is impossible to contra- dict : tlfflv endffrif TUV OVTUV \6yoi ; Tldvv yt. QVKOVV dis fern*' tKaff-rov ti d)$ OVK effTiv ; 'ns effTiv. El yap fj.fnvrio-ai. f 8-f)irov TavTa Xtyoiu.tv ; ~S,uve^d>pfi. 'AAA' orav /xr)5eT6pos, 6<^>Tj, Tbv TOV irpdypaTos \oyov Xfyri, T&Tf avTi- CYNIC MORALS. 301 mises is not only that drawn by Aristotle ' that no CHAP. false propositions, but also that no propositions of any kind are possible. The doctrine of Antisthenes was logically destructive of all knowledge and every kind of judgment. Not that the Cynics were themselves disposed to c. Theory renounce knowledge in consequence. Four books ^JJ^S came from the pen of Antisthenes, respecting the evil - difference between knowledge and opinion. 2 Indeed, the whole School prided itself in no small degree on having advanced beyond the deceptive sphere of opinions, 3 and being in full possession of truth. \eyoL/j.ev av ; i) oZrw ye rb irapa.- irav ovS' Uv fjLefj.vrj/j.fvos eli) rov irpa.yna.ros ovfierepos 7]/j,cav ; Kal rovTO ffvvd>fji.o\6yei. 'A\\' apa, '6rav 4yw Key Keyovri irus &v avriXcyoi ; Plato probably had Antisthenes in his eye, although this line of argument had not originated with him. Conf. Zeller, 1. c. i. 905, and Diog. ix. 53 : rbi> 'AvriffQevovs \6yov rbv irfipda/jLevov a.iroSeiKvvdv cbv OVK fOTtv avrt\eyeiv, olros (Prota- goras) irpuros Sifi\fKrai Kara. itKiyfiv treated. 1 See p. 296, 1, Prod, in Crat. 37 : 'A.vTiv \eyjs per Karafypoveiv, irpbs 5' a\^efiav Trapop/jL^v. Menan- der, Ibid, says of the same Cynic : rb yap inro\n4>6ev rvv OVK ovruv us Svrwv. Conf. M. Aurel. irp. lawr. ii. 15 : Sri irav vw6\iifyis ' Srj\a /j.fv yap ra irpbs rou KVVIKOV VLovt/jiov \ey6- fifva. On this ground the later Sceptics wished to reckon Mo- nimus one of themselves, but wrongly so. What he says has only reference to the worthless- ;'.02 THE SOCRATIC SCHOOLS. CHAP. XIII. With them, however, knowledge is directed entirely to a practical end, that of making men virtuous, and happy in being virtuous. 1 As the highest object in life the Cynics, herein agreeing with all other moral philosophers, regarded happiness. 2 Happiness being in general distinguished from virtue, or, at least, not united to virtue, they regard the two as abso- lutely identical. Nothing is good but virtue, nothing an evil but vice ; what is neither the one nor the other is for man indifferent. 3 For each thing that only can be a good which belongs to it. 4 The only real ness of common opinion and what it considers a good. In Lucian v. Auct. 8, Diogenes calls himself a prophet of truth and freedom. 1 See p. 292. 2 Diog. ii. : avrapKi] r^v apt- T^IV irpbs ev8aifnoi>icu>, so that happiness is the *end, and virtue the means. Stob. Eel. 103, 20, 21. 3 Diog. vi. 104 : apeW< 8' avToiis Kal rf\os flvai rb KOT' aper^v ^r/v &s 'AvriffBevris rav aperav if' iepats fv6efj.evoi s ayaObv IL&VOV Hovva Kal Ptorav pvffaro Kai iro\ids. According to Diogenes it would appear as though the Stoic doctrine that virtue is the only good were therein attributed to the Cynics. 4 This maxim follows from Diog. 12, who states as the teaching of Antisthenes : ra Troi'Tjpo v6fu( irdvra fvixd. Compare Plato, Symp. 205, E. : 011 -yap -rb eaurtav, dlfnai eKocrroi aa"ndovTai, el py ? TIS rb pev ayadbv o'lKetov Ka\oiKal tavrov, rb 8e Kaitbv a.\\&Tpiov. In the Charm. 163, C. Critias says, only the useful and good is olKftov. Although Antisthenes is not here mentioned by name, yet the passage in Diogenes makes it probable that the antithesis of aya6bv and olKfiov belongs to him, even if he was not the first to introduce it. CYNIC MORALS. 303 thing which belongs to man is mind. 1 Everything else is a matter of chance. Only in his mental and moral powers is he independent. Intelligence and virtue constitute the only armour from which all the attacks of fortune recoil ; 2 that man only is free who is the servant of no external ties and no desires for things without. 3 Thus man requires nothing to make him happy but virtue. 4 All else he may learn to despise, in order to content himself with virtue alone. 5 For CHAP. XIII. 1 Compare p. 293, 6 ; Xen. Symp. 4, 34, puts words to the same effect in the mouth of Antisthenes : vopifa, & HvSpes, TOVS afdpiatrovs OUK fV ry O"IKW r'bv TtKovrov teal TT]V trtviav %\tiv, &\\' Iv rats tyvxais this is then further expanded ; and Epictet. Diss. iii. 24, 68, makes Diogenes say of Antisthenes : 8i8oe /ue TO ^ttt Kal TCt OVK ffjid ' KTTJ(TtS OUK ip.i\ ' crvyyfveis, o^/XTJ, ffvviiOtis, roirot, SiarpifMi, irdvra ravra 6rt d\\6rpia. abv oliv T( ; xprjffts fyavraffitov. TI\V f8fie fj.oi avavd-yKaffrov, K,T.\. We have, however, certainly not got the very words of Diogenes or Antisthenes. * Diog. 12 (teaching of An- tisthenes) : avaQaiperov 8ir\ov aperlj . , . T?XOS aff^>a.\fT)' (I Kal nT)8fv &\\o, rb yovv irpbs Trotrof rvx^v irapf- . Stob. Ekl. ii. 348 : Aioye'j/Tjr ^ 6pav TV Tvxw evopuffav avr$ Kal \t- yovffav ' TOVTOV S' ov 8uva.fj.aL Pa\4eiv K<>va \vfffffirripa. (The same verse is applied by David, Schol. in Arist. 23, to Antis- thenes.) Conf. Stob. Floril. 108, 71. 8 This is what Diogenes says of himself in Evict. Diss. iii. 24, 67 : i ol ^ 'Av- \evcra, and he also asserts in Diog. 71 that he led the life of a Hercules, nySfv 4\fv6fpias irpoKpivutv. Crates in Clem. Strom, ii. 413, A. (Theod. Cur. Gr. Aff. xii. 49, p. 172) praises the Cynics : Kal & and he exhorts his Hipparchia ft aya\- otiff inrb ovd' for' 4 See note 2. See Diog. 105 : 4pVict 8' THE SOCRATIC SCHOOLS. CHAP. XIII. what is wealth without virtue ? A prey for flatterers and venal menials, a temptation for avarice, this root of all evil, a fountain of untold crimes and deeds of shame, a possession for ants and dung-beetles, a thing bringing neither glory nor enjoyment. 1 Indeed what else can wealth be, if it be true that wealth and virtue can never dwell together, 2 the Cynic's beggar-life being the only straight way to wisdom ? 3 What are honour and shame ? The talk of fools, about which no child of reason will trouble himself? For in truth facts are the very opposite of what we think. Honour amongst men is an evil. To be despised by them is a good, since it keeps us back from vain attempts. G-lory only falls to his lot, who seeks it not. 4 What avrois Kal \IT>S fiiovv, irKofaov V. Auct. 1 1 ; Crates in Epiph. Kal SO'ITJS Kal tvyeveias Kara oiKiq apfriiv oiKflv 8vva- o-0of. Crates therefore disposed of his property, and is said to have settled that it should only be restored to his children when they ceased to be philo- sophers (Diog. 88, on the autho- rity of Demetrius Magnes). Unfortunately, however, Crates can at that time have neither had a wife nor children. 8 Diog. 104; Diog. in Stob. Floril. 95, 11 ; 19. See Lucian 4 Epiet. Diss. i. 24, 6 : (AJO- 76j/Tjs) \eyfi, Sri evSotfa (Winck- elmann, p. 47, suggests aSo|i'a, which certainly might be ex- pected from what preceded) \}/6$os eff-rl paivoufvuv avdpiairuv . Diog. 11 says of Antisth. : r-fiv T' a5oW ayaObv Kal t(ai> (reXoy oTre'^pj/ei). As Crates probably the Cynic proves in Teles, in Stab. Floril. 98, 72 by the considera- tion, that the human life from beginning to end brings far more unhappincss than plea- sure; if therefore the irXeoi^- ovi> SoKf"i ovSfuia rjSovr] flvai ayaebv o&rf KaO' ainb otnt Kara. c({s ov y&p tlvat ravrbv ayaBbv Kal T)*ov4)v. Com- pare p. 296. 806 THE SOCRATIC SCHOOLS. CHAP. where man lowers himself to be the slave of his de- XnL sires, there no means can be too violent to eradicate it. 1 Conversely, what most men fear, labour and toil, are good, because they only bring man to that state, in which he can be independent. 2 Hercules 3 is therefore the patron-saint and pattern for the. Cynic, 4 no one else having fought his way through so arduous and toilsome a life for the good of mankind, with so much courage and vigour. In support of this view, Antisthenes appears to have argued that plea- sure is nothing but the pause after pain. 5 On this 1 Clemens, 1. c. 406, C. : eyia if they are to come to any Se ebroSe'xoM"" T ^" 'AvriffBevnv, good, ought to be educated by TV 'A^poSiTTji', \eyovra, kav abstemiousness, as early as they Kararo^evo-aim, el hafioi/jLi on are susceptible of culture. TroXAos rifjLuv KaXas Kal ayaBas 3 Who had also a temple yvvalKas SietpBeipev. r6v re epwra near Cynosarges. KaKlav rjeri (pvffews 3)5 Arrows 4 Antisthenes speaks of two ovres ol KaKooafaoves Bebv r^v Herculeses, Diog. 2, 18. Winc- voffov KaXoTxnv. Crates in Diog. kelmann, p. 15. Diogenes says vi. 86 (Clemens. Strom, ii. of himself in Diog. 71: rbv 412, D. ; Tlieod. 1. C. xii. 49 ; avrbv xapaKrfipa rov &ov 8ie|<{- Jldlan, Or. vi. 198, D.) : ye.iv ovwep Kal 'HpaKAijs, nrfev , , , ., , e\evdeplas irpoKpivuv. Therefore epura vavei ^6s, et Se w, ^ ^ jg-f^ ^ ^ ^^ Xpovos ^ Antisthenes 'HpaK\ewriK6s rts eavSe rovrois & Svvy xp^ai, d ^ p ^ ^ ^ in lAidan, fipoxos. y > _^ uc t. 8, Diogenes replies to On the same subject compare the query as to whom he was also Diog. vi. 38 ; 51 ; 67 ; Stob. imitating : rbv 'HpaK\ea, at the Floril. 64, 1; 6, 2; 18, 27 ; same time showing his stick Diog. 66 : TOVS f/Av oiKeras e. See Dens. Cyn. 13, Damasc. ii. 13, 87 (Stob. Floril. Julian, Or. vi. 187, C. ed. Mein. iv. 200) that boys, 5 Plato, Phileb. 44, B. (Conf. CYNIC MORALS. 307 61, A. ; Rep. ix. 583, B.) speaks of people, as nd\a Suvovs \ryo- (j.fvovs TO. irepl v Tavras flva.1 iraffas airotfrvyas &s vvv ol supposition it will appear absurd to pursue pleasure ; which can only be attained by having previously ex- perienced a corresponding amount of pain. From this rigid development of their principles to which Antisthenes had been brought, partly by his own natural temperament, 1 partly from regard to without including pleasure thereunder. If the further objection is raised, that the opponents of pleasure here referred to, hate (according to Phil. 46, A) TO.S TUV a^xn^i/uv TjSovas, whereas the Cynics al- lowed no difference between things seemly and unseemly, this rests on a misapprehen- sion; for the riSoval rwv affxi- fj.6ixav are, as the context shows, condemned by the op- ponents of pleasure, not because of their unseemliness, but be- cause they are always combined with unhappiness. Nor can we assert that Plato would not have spoken of Antisthenes with so much consideration as he here does (44, C.). If he at one time of life replied to his sallies with appropriate severity (see p. 292, 2 ; 299, 3), it does not follow that after the lapse of years, and in respect of a question on which their views more nearly approxi- mated, he could not express himself more gently and ap- preciatingly. Yet even here he will not allow to him the properly scientific capacity, the Tt~)(vr\, 1 Plato, 1. c. continues : rob- rdis olv i)(j.as ir^repa CHAP. XIII. is no obstacle to this view, has been already indicated, p. 294, 4 ; the ex- pression not referring to phy- sical research, but to the prac- tical enquiry as to what is con- formable to nature, to which Antisthenes wanted to go back O&K, a\A" Sxrirep fj.di>Teots ov X 2 308 THE SOCRATIC SCHOOLS. CHAP, it as a means of education, 1 the Cynics, however, so ' far departed, as to recognise a certain kind of pleasure to be legitimate. Pleasure which is not followed by remorse, 2 or more accurately, pleasure resulting from labour and effort, 3 is said to have been called a good, even by Antisthenes. In Stobseus, 4 Diogenes recom- mends justice as the most useful and at the same time as the most pleasant thing, because it alone affords peace of mind, protects from trouble and sickness, and even secures bodily enjoyments. He also asserts, 5 " that happiness consists in that true joy which can only be obtained by an unruffled cheerfulness of mind. Moreover, the Cynics when wishing to set forth the advantages of their philosophy, did not fail to follow in the steps of Socrates, by asserting that life with them was far more pleasant and independent than with other men, that their abstemiousness gave the right flavour to enjoyment, and that mental delights rexvrt, a\\d TIVI Sucrx.eptia cf>v- z AtJtai. xii. 513, a: 'Avri- aedaK(av, trpofftOriKe Tr\v d/jLercupi- 1 Arist. Eth. x. 1 : Some A.TJTOJ/, but we require to know hold pleasure to be altogether the context in which Antis- a mistake : of plv fircos imreiff- thenes uttered this. fieVoi OVTOI Kal fx f '"> * s ^ oMficvoi 3 Antisth. in ,Stol>. Flor. 25>, &e\rioj/ tlvai -npbs rbr fiiov ynwv 65 : ySovb.* T^S /uera TOVS ir6vovs airotyaiveu' r^]v fjSovTiv T&V (j>av- SiwKreov, d\\' ov^l ras wpb ruv Awf, Kal fl /J.$i fffriv fieweiv yap irAvtav. TOVS iro\\ovs Trpbs O.VTTJV Kal Soi'- 4 Floril. 9, 49 ; 24, ] 4, wliero \fveiv ra?s ffSova'ts, Sib Se'tv els probably the Cynic Diogenes Tovvaintov ayeiv f\6e?v yap tu> is alluded to. It is, however, a otfrcos ttrl rb fnftrov. D'wg. vi. 35 : question whether the words fj.iUf'iffOat, e\eye (Aioye'wjs) TOVS are taken from a genuine XOpoStSaerKaAous ' Kal yap ttcfivovs writing of his. inrtp T6vov evSiSovai eVeKa TOV rovs 5 Ibid. 103, 20 ; 21. Aoiirous atyaffOat TOV irpoo"f)KOi/Tos T&VOV. CYNIC MORALS. afforded a far higher pleasure than sensual ones. 1 Still all that this language proves is, that their theory was imperfectly developed, and that their mode of expression was inaccurate, their meaning being that pleasure as such ought in no case to be an end, 2 and that when it is anything more than a natural conse- CHAP. xm. 1 Thus in Xcn. Symp. 4, 34, where the description appears on the whole to be true, Anti- sthenes demonstrates that in his poverty he was the happiest of men. Food, drink, and .sleep he enjoyed ; better clothes he did not need ; and from all these things he had more enjoyment than he liked ; .so little did he need that he was never embarrassed to think how he should tind support ; he had plenty of leisure to asso- ciate with Socrates, and if he wanted a pleasant day, there was no need to purchase the requisite materials in the mar- ket, but he had them ready in the soul. Diogenes in Diofj. 71, speaks in a similar strain .(not to mention Dio Cfiryn. Qr. ^vi. 12 ; 33) ; he who lias learned to despise pleasure, finds there- in his highest pleasure ; and in PUt. De Exil. 12, p. 605, he congratulates himself on not having, like Aristotle, to wait for Philip for breakfast; or like Callisthenes for Alexander (UioyAo) : to the virtuous man according to Diogenes (Pint. Tranq. An. 20, p. 477) every day is a festival. In like manner Pint. Tranquil. An. 4, says that Orates passed his life in jesting and joking, like one perpetual festival; and Metrocles (in Plutarch, An. Vitios. ad Infelic. 3, p. 499), like Diogenes (in TAician, V. Auct. 9), blesses him- self for being happier than the Persian king. See Diwj. 44, 78. - As Hitter, ii. 121, has re- marked, the difference between the teaching of Antisthenes and that of Aristippus might be thus expressed : Aristippus considered the result of the emotion of the soul to be the good ; Antisthenes considered the emotion itself to be the end, and the value of the action to consist in the doing of it. Hitter, however, asks with justice whether Anti- sthenes ever went back so far as this, since it is never dis- tinctly imputed to him. And in the same way it will be found that Aristippus never regarded pleasure as a state of rest, but as a state of motion for the soul. The contrary is not established by what Her- mann, Ges. Abh. 237, f. al- leges. Hermann proves, it is true, that Antisthenes con- sidered the good to be virtu- ous activity, and that Aristip- pus took it to be pleasure, but lie does not prove that Anti- sthenes and Aristippus spoke in explicit terms of the rest and the motion of the soul. 310 THE SOCRATIC SCHOOLS. CHAP, quence of action and of satisfying essential wants, it XnL is a thing to be avoided. From these considerations followed the conclusion, that everything else excepting virtue and vice is in- different for us, and that we in turn ought to be indifferent thereto. Only those who soar above poverty and wealth, shame and honour, ease and fatigue, life and death, and who are prepared to submit to any work and state in life, who fear no one, troubling themselves about nothing only such as these offer no exposed places to fortune, and can therefore be free and happy. 1 (l) yirtve. As yet, here are only the negative conditions of happiness. What is the positive side corresponding thereto ? Virtue alone bringing happiness, and the goods of the soul being alone worth possessing, in what does virtue consist ? Virtue, replies Antis- thenes, herein following Socrates and Euclid, consists in wisdom or prudence ; 2 and Eeason is the only 1 Diog. in Stob. Floril. 86, sophy was 6(p/j.iav re x"! Ka * 19 (89, 4), says the noblest -rb /xrjSej/fcs /j.t\fiv. Antis. in men are ol KaraQpovovvres ir\ov- Stob. Floril. 8, 14 : Sorts Sf rov S6r]S fiSovris (afjs, TWV 5e ertpous Se'Sot/ce 8ov\os &>v \4\rt9ev fvavritav virfpdvta ovres, irtvias eavr6y. Diogenes in Dwy. 75 : o8oi'as ir6vov Gavdrov. Dioff. 5ov\ov rb 'Atri- a6eirr\s Iv rep 'Hpa.K\ei, Kal ava.- ir6fi\i]Tov inrdpxeu'. Without doubt the reference in Isocr. Hel. i. 1 is also to Antisthenes. Lsocrates quotes the passages just given, with the sentence of Antisthenes which was dis- cussed p. 300, 2, added : KOTO- yfyTtpaKaffiv ol /uei/ ov /Ts ws avSpla. Kal ffotyia xa.1 StKaioffvvr) ravr6v tffri' Kal tyvffft /j.fv ovStv av-rSiv (opfv w'a 5' irepl TO.S epttias SiaTpi^ovffi K.T.A. The expression of ^tey, . . . ol tie does not prove that the first of these statements belongs to a different school from that to which the second belongs. 5 Diog. 12 : a.vaaffK6vr{av v uddfiffis laTiv, 6 [taOkv a.veiriffT'ft/j.wv av irore "yeVotro. a The maxim that prudence is insuperable. See p. 142, 3. 7 The maxim that you cannot forget what you know is only the con verse; of the Sophistic maxim that you cannot learn what you do not know. 8 It is only independent of external circumstances, when it cannot be lost : for since the wise and virtuous man will never, as long as he continues wise and virtuous, forego his wisdom and virtue, and since, according to the teaching of Socrates, no one intentionally 312 THE SOCRATIC SCHOOLS. CHAP. true prudence consisted the Cynics could not say XIIT ' more precisely. If it were described as knowledge concerning the good, 1 this, as Plato justly observed, 2 was simply a tautology. If, on the contrary, it were said to consist in unlearning what is bad, 3 neither does this negative expression lead a single step further. So much only is clear, that the prudence of Antisthenes and his School invariably coincides with a right state of will, of firmness, of self-control and of uprightness, 4 thus bringing us back to the Socratic doctrine of the oneness of virtue and know- ledge. Hence by learning virtue, they understood moral exercise rather than intellectual research. 5 They would not have recognised the Platonic and Aristotelian distinction between a conventional and a philosophical, an ethical and an intellectual virtue ; does wrong, it follows that erj, rb /ca/ca cbro/xa0e'. The knowledge can only be taken same is found in Exc. e Floril. away by a cause foreign to the Joan. Damasc. ii. 13, 34 (titob. will of the individual. Floril. ed. Mein. iv. 193). . ' Plato, Rep. vi. 505, B. : 4 Compare pp. 292, 1 ; 303, 2 a\\a HTJV T<55e ye olaBa, 'OTI TO?S and 3. ft.tv TIO\\OIS fiSovri SoKel elvai rb s Here it may suffice to call ayaObv, rots tie Ko^orepois i\f, ol 292, 1, and what Diogenes in TOVTO fiyovpevoi OVK , exovffi 8e7|ai Dioff. 70 says : SITTTJJ/ 8' e\eyev JJTis dvai. If the Cynics are not ... (the text here appears here exclusively meant, the faulty) naff fyv ev yvfj-vaaia. awe- passage at any rate refers to xets [?} et rck KO.KO. & X 6 ' 9 "P 6T j? KaTaylveaOai '(to be at STI evKT6v irdma yap avrov 3 Diogenes, in Dwg. 51 : TOVS elvau TO. TUV fiAAaij/. Ibid. 12 ayaOovs avSpas 6ewi> et/cdcas elvat. (according to Diodes) : ry Ibid. 37, 72 : TUV 6tS>v fan w 4vov ovSfv ov& Hiropov. irdvra- l\ot 5e of v. e -rbir ffofov ical ava- irdv-r' 1 &pa tffrl TUV aov. /cat i\ov T$ 6fiolte, rvxrj Diog. in Plut. Tran. An. 20 : re yuTjSej' firnpfirftv. See p. 30i5, dvfyp * dyudbs ov itaaav finepiur 2. The ])assage in Arigt. Etli. fopr^iv riye'irai ; Exc. e Floril. X. \ ii. 14, 1053, b, 19, probably Joan. Damasc. ii. 13, 76 : 'Art- also refers to the Cynics : ol 5i oQtvijs tpuryefls inr6 TWOS -ri Si- rbv Tpo\i6fj.evov Kal rbv Svffrv- 5a|ei rbv vibv, tiitfV ft fi.tv Otots Xau fifyd\ois iffpiiriirrovra tv- nd\\ei avp&iovv, $i\6ao'pov, et 5e Saiuova (pdffKomfs cTrat, ta.v y d.v6prl>irots, 314 THE SOCRATIC SCHOOLS. CHAP. XIII. D. The practical effects of their teaching. the universal fate of mortals. 1 Accordingly all man- kind are divided into two classes. Innumerable fools stand opposite to a small number of wise men. Only a very few are happy through prudence and virtue. All the rest live in misfortune and folly, only the fewest of all being aware of their deplorable state. Following out these principles, the Cynics con- ceived it to be their special mission to set an example themselves of strict morality, of abstemiousness, of the independence of the wise man, and also to exercise a beneficial and strengthening influence on others. To this mission they devoted themselves with extra- ordinary self-denial, not, however, without falling into such extravagances and absurdities, such offensive coarseness, utter shamelessness, overbearing self-con- ceit, and empty boasting, that it is hard to say whether their strength of mind rather calls for ad- miration, or their eccentricities for ridicule ; and 1 Dioy. 33 : avairhpovs eA.eye (Aioye'j/Tjy) ov TOIIS Kuxpoiis /cat rv(p\ovs, a\\a rovs /J.-T] Uxovras iT'flpav. Ibid. 35 : rovs ir\fi- ffrovs e\eye irapct, SaKTu\ov fMivf- ffOai. Compare what has been said of Socrates p. 121, 2, Ibid. 47 : TOWS ffiropas Kal -navras rovs ev5oo\oyovvra.s rpi(rav6pctnrovs a- TreK(i\fi avf\ rov rpiffa6\iovs> Ibid. 71 : Instead of becoming happy by practice of virtue, men irapa r^v &voiav KOKoSoj^uo- vovfft. Ibid. 33 : irpbs rbv flirovTa ' TlvBta. vtKca &i'5pa$, tyw /iej/ oZv, fiirtv, &vSpas, ffv 8' dj/- 8pd7ro5o. Ibid. 27 : men he had found .nowhere, but boys he had found in Lacedaemon. Ibid. 41 ; the story of Diogenes with his lantern. Ibid. 86 - f verses of Crates on the stupi- dity of mankind. Compare also Stpb. Floril. 4, 52. Dio- genes in Exc. e Floril. Joan. Damasc. ii. 13, 75, says that the vilest thing upon earth is a man without culture. Either Diogenes or Philisciis asserts in Stob. Flor. 22, 41 (Conf. Diog. vi. 80) : 6 -rvtpos Sxrirep TroijuV ov 6t\et [rovs iro\\ovs] &yei. Com- pare p. 292, 2. CYNIC SELF-RENUNCIATION. 315 whether they rather command esteem, or dislike, or CHAP. commiseration. Previous enquiries, however, make _ it possible for us to refer these various peculiarities to one common source. The leading thought of Cynicism is the self-suffi- (l) Self- ciency of virtue. 1 Blunt and onesided in their con- ception of this principle, the Cynics were not content with a mere inward independence of the enjoyments and wants of life. Their aim, they thought, could only be reached by entirely renouncing all enjoyment, by limiting their wants to what is absolutely indis- pensable, by deadening their feelings to outward impressions, and by cultivating indifference to all that is not in their own power. The Socratic inde- pendence of wants 2 became with them a renunciation of the world. 3 Poor to begin with, 4 or renouncing their property voluntarily , s they lived as beggars. 6 1 See p. 302. guise, the staff and scrip; nor 2 According to Diog. vi. 105, is the truth of his account im- conf . Lvcian, Cyn. 12, Dio- pugned by Sosicrates, in saying genes repeated the language that Diodorus of Aspendus which we saw Socrates used, p. was the first to do so ; for this 64, 3. To the same effect is statement is not very accurate, the story that Diogenes, at the both Antisthenes and Diogenes beginning of his Cj r nic career, being older than Diodorus. refused to look for a runaway Nevertheless, in Liog. 22, Dio- slave, because he could do genes is described with great without his slave as well as probability as the originator the slave could do without of the full mendicant garb, him. Diog. 55 ; Stob. Floril. 62, and he is also said to have been 47. Ibid. 97, 31, p. 215 Mein. the first to gain his living by 3 See pp. 303; 310, 1. begging. Diog. 38 ; 46 ; 49 ; 4 Such as Antisthenes, Dio- Teles, in Stob. Flor. v. 67; genes, and Monimus. Hieron. adv. Jovin. ii. 207. 5 Such as Crates and Hip- His followers Crates (see the parchia. verses in Diog. 85 and 90) and 6 According to Diocles in Monimus (Diog. 82) adopted Diog. vi. 13, Antisthenes al- the same course. ready assumed the beggar's 316 THE SOCRATIC SCHOOLS. CHAP. Possessing no houses of their own, they passed the Xin ' day in the streets, or in other public places; the nights they spent in porticoes, or wherever else chance might guide them. 1 Furniture they did not need. 2 A bed seemed superfluous. 3 The simple Greek dress was by them made still simpler, and they were content with the tribon 4 of Socrates, the ordi- nary dress of the lower orders, 5 without any under- 1 Diogenes must have been the first to act thus. For An- tisthenes in Xen. Symp. 4, 38, still speaks of having a house, although its furniture was con- fined to the bare walls. Dio- genes, however, and the later Cynics lived as described. See Uiog. 22; 38; 76; 105: Teles. 1. c. and in Stob. Floril. 97, 31, p. 215 Mein. Hieron. Lucian, V. Auct. 9. Diogenes for a time took up his abode in a tub which stood in the en- trance-court of Metroon, at Athens, as had been done by homeless folk before. Diog. 23 ; 43 ; 105 ; Sen. Ep. 90, 14. But it cannot have been, as Juvenal, xiv. 208, and Zawian, Consc. His. 3, represent it, that he spent his whole life there without any other home, even carrying his tub about with him, as a snail does its shell. Compare SteinJiart, 1. c. p. 302 Gottling, Ges. Abh. 258, and Brucker's report of the discus- sions between Hermann and Kasseus, Hist. Phil. i. 872. Equally fictitious is the roman- tic story that Crates and Hip- parchia lived in a tub. Simpl. inEpict. Enchir. p. 270. All that Musonius in Stob. Floril. 67, 20, p. 4, Mein. says is that they spent day and night in the open porticoes. In south- ern countries they even now often spend the night in a portico. - The story that Diogenes threw away Ms cup, when he had seen a boy drinking with the hollow of his hand, is well known. Diog. 37 ; Pint. Prof. in Virt. 8, p. 79; Seneca, Ep. 90, 14 ; Hier. 1. c. He is also reported to have trampled on Plato's costly carpets with the words, iraru rbv Hhdrcavos TV- Qov, to which Plato replied, erepitiye -rvtytp, Aioytves. Dwg, 26. 3 Antisthenes in Xen. Symp. 4, 38, boasts that he slept ad- mirably on the simplest bed. And the fragment in Demetr. de Elocut. 249 (Winckelmann, p. 52), belongs here. As far as Diogenes (Epict. Dido. i. 24, 7, distinctly asserts this of Dio- genes) and Crates are concern- ed, they slept, as a matter of course, on the bare ground. 4 Compare the passages quoted p. 54, 4. 5 That is at Athens; at Sparta the rpifteav was univer- sal (Gottling, 256; Hermann, CYNIC SELF-RENUNCIATION. 317 clothing. 1 In scantiness of diet they even surpassed the very limited requirements of their fellow coun- trymen. 2 It is said that Diogenes tried to do without fire, by eating his meat raw, 3 and he is credited with saying that everything, without exception, human flesh included, might be used for purposes of food. 4 Even in extreme age he refused to depart from his accustomed manner of living, 5 and lest his friends should expend any unnecessary care on his corpse, he forbad their burying it at all. 6 A life in harmony CHAP. xni. Antiquit. iii. 21, 14), from which it will be seen, that the word did not originally mean something worn out, but a rough dress which rubbed the skin; an t/jidriov rplpov not an 1/j.a.Tiov rerpi/j.p.fvov, and that ipd/nov Tp(f3wv ytv6nfvov in Stol). Ploril. 5, 67, means a covering which had grown rough. 1 This was often done by the poor (Hermann, 1. c.) Anti- sthenes, however, or Diogenes, according to others, made this dress the dress of his order, allowing the rpi&wv to be doubled for better protection against the cold. Diog. 6:13; 22 ; 76 ; 105. Teles in Stol. Floril. 97, 31, p. 215. Mein. The Cynic ladies adopted the same dress, Diog. 93. This single article of dress was often in the most miserable condition. Sec the anecdotes about Crates, Diog. 90, and the verses on him, Ibid. 87. Be- cause of the self-satisfaction with which Antisthenes ex- posed to view the holes in his cloak, Socrates is said to have observed that his vanity peered through them. Diog. 8. 2 Their ordinary food con- sisted of bread, figs, onions, garlic, linseed, but particularly of the Bfpfjwt, or beans of some kind. Their drink was cold water. Diog. 105 ; 25 ; 48 ; 85 ; 90; Teles in Stob. Floril. 97, 31 ; lUd. p. 215, M. ; Athcn. iv. 156, c; Lucian, V. Auct. 9; Dio Chrys. Or. vi. 12 and 21, and Gottling, p. 255. But, in order to prove their freedom, they occasionally allowed a pleasure to themselves and others. Diog. 55 ; Aristid. Or. xxv. 560 ( Winvkelmann, p. 28). 3 Diog. 34 ; 76 ; Pseudo-Pint. de Esu Cam. i. 6, 995 ; Dio Clirys. Or. vi. 25. 4 In Diog. 73, this principle is supported by the argument, that everything is in every- thing else, even flesh in bread, &c. Diog. refers for this to a tragedy of Thyestes, the writer of which was not Diogenes, but Philiscus. A similar state- ment was subsequently made by the Stoics. See Zeller's Stoics, &c. 5 See Diog. 34. 6 See the accounts which differ in details in Diog- 79 ; 318 THE SO CR AT 1C SCHOOLS. CHAP. XIII. with nature, 1 the suppression of everything artificial, ^ . the most simple satisfaction of all natural wants, is the watchword of his School. 2 They never weary of belaud- ing the good fortune and the independence which they owe to this freedom from wants. 3 To attain thereto, bodily and mental hardships are made a principle. 4 A Diogenes whose teacher did not appear to treat him with sufficient severity, 5 is said to have undertaken self-mortification in this behalf. 6 Even the scorn and contempt necessarily incurred by this manner of life were borne by the Cynics with the greatest com- Cic. Tusc. i. 43, 104; V. H. viii. 14 ; Stob. Floril. 123, 11. The same is repeated by Chrysippus in SeM. Pyrrh. iii. 258; Math. xi. 194. 1 Which Diogenes also re- quired, witness for instance his saying in Diog. 71 : 8e'V axp-fjffTcai' irovcov robs Kara Qiiffiv e\o/j.fi>ovs fjv &voiav KO.KO- 2 Compare on this subject the expressions of Diogenes in Diog. 44; 35; Stab. Floril. 5, 41 ; 67, the hymn of Crates on (vre\eia, and his prayer to the Muses in Julian, Or. vi. 199, in addition to what Pint, de Sanit. 7, p. 125, Diog. 85 ; 93, and Stdbcens tell of him. Com- pare also Lucian, V. Auct. 9, and the anecdote of the mouse, the sight of which confirmed Diogenes in his renunciation of the world in Plut. Prof, in Vir- tut. 6 ; Diog. 22, 40. 3 Compare the language used by Crates and Metrocles in Teles in Stob. Floril. 97, 31, Mein. and the quotations p. 303, 2 and 3. 4 Compare p. 250, 1, and Diog. 30. Diogenes' training appears to have been described by Eubulus in the same glow- ing terms as that of Cyrus was by Xenophon. Exc. e Floril. Joan. Damasc. ii. 13, 68; 67. Diogenes in Stob. Floril. 7, 18, expresses the view that mental vigour is the only object of all exercise, even that of the body. 5 Dio Ckrys. Or. viii. 2 (Stob. Floril. 13, 19); conf. Diog. ] 8. 6 According to Diog. 23 ; 34, he was in the habit of rolling in the summer in the burning sand, and in winter of walking barefoot in the snow, and em- bracing icy columns. On the other hand, Philemon's words about Crates in Diog. 87, that he went about wrapped up in summer and in rags in winter, are probably only a comedian's jest on his beggarly covering. CYNIC RENUNCIATION OF SOCIETY. 319 posure ; l nay, they accustomed themselves thereto, 2 on CHAP. the ground that the reproaches of enemies teach man xm ' to know himself, 3 and the best revenge you can take is to amend your faults. 4 Should life from any reason become insupportable, they reserved to them- selves the right, as the Stoics did at a later time, 5 of securing their freedom by means of suicide. Among external things of which it is necessary to (2) Re- be independent, the Cynics included several matters which other men are in the habit of regarding as life. morally good and as duties. To be free in every respect, the wise man must be fettered and hampered by no relations to others. He must satisfy his social 1 Antisthenes in Diog. 7, requires : KOKWS O.KOVOVTO.S Kap- repdv fw.\\ov 77 t \idois TIS f3d\- AOITO. He also says in Epict. Diss. iv. 6, 20 (conf . Diog. 3) : jScuriXiKbp, 3> Kvpf, Trpdrreiv fnev 3, KotKws 5' aKoveiv. It is said of Diogenes, Diog. 33, and also of Crates, Diog. 89, that when his body had been ill- treated, he only wrote by the side of his blains the names of those by whom they had been inflicted. 2 Diog. 90 says of Crates, T&J jrSpvas Mr-riSts t\oi$6pfi, ffvy- YVfj.vd.fav eavrbv irpbs ras j8Xa- 3 Antisthenes remarks, Diog. 12 : irpoi6vra The conjecture ( Winkelmann, p. 29, according to Hermann) appears mis- taken : Antisthenes might well require evQveffrarcu Trpbj reKvo- iroitav, women most suited for child-bearing, whilst consider- ing anyone good enough for :i plaything. 3 Diog. 72 : veepias Kal SoiMefas, and with in their religious views, perhaps this is the origin of the On the contrary, their whole account in Stob. Flor. 8, 14. politics, and even their practi- 8 For this we have certainly cal philosophy, are governed no direct authority. Still (as by the effort to bring human has been already observed, p. society from an artificial state 171, 4), it is probably in re- recognised by law and custom ference to the Cynics that to a pure state of nature. We Arixt. Polit. i. 3 ; 1253, b, 20, should hardly look in sophistic says : rots ntv 8o*ce? tiriffr'h/j.'n T/i circles for the opponents of TIS flvat T\ Sfffirorda . . . rois Si slavery whom Aristotle men- apa 6ffu> rb Sf v6p.(f tions, where the rule of the CYNIC RENUNCIATION OF CIVIL LIFE. 3 conformity with their principle, that every difference CHAP. between men other than that of virtue and vice is XIIT unimportant and has nothing to do with the law of nature and reason. Yet they did not go so far as to attempt even in a small circle (as the Essenes did at a later time) the abolition of slavery, regarding the outward state as something indifferent, the wise man even in slavery being a free man. Nor was it other- wise with civil life. The wise man of the Cynics feels himself above the restraints which civil life imposes, without therefore feeling any impulse to mix himself up in such matters ; for where could be a constitution which would satisfy his requirements? A popular government is severely censured by Antis- thenes. 1 An absolute monarch only appeared to these freedom-loving philosophers a bad and miser- stronger over the weaker was which do not distinguish the regarded as the most conform- good from the bad (Liog. 5 ; 6), able to nature. But the view must be intended for a hit at is all the more in keeping with democracy. The saying in a school which from no side Diog. 8, that should the Athe- could allow that one portion of nians call their asses horses, mankind enjoy the right, quite it would be quite as good independently of their moral as choosing incompetent gene- s' ate, to govern the rest, the rals must also be directed claim of the wise man to govern against a popular form of the fool resting upon reason, government. According to and naturally all men being Atlien. v. 220, d, Antisthenes citizens of one state ; between had made a sharp attack on all fellow-citizens the relation of the popular leaders at Athens. master and slave cannot exist. Likewise in Diog. 24 ; 41, Dio- 1 A rift. Pol. iii. 13 ; 1284, a, genes calls them ux\ou Siaitu- 15, tells the fable the applica- vovs, and he amuses himself at tion of which to a democracy the expense of Demosthenes, is obvious of the hares sug- Ibid. 34, on which see Epiet. gesting universal equality to Diss. iii. 2, 11. See also what the lions. The blame which was said of Socrates, p. 166. he attaches to those states, r 2 324 THE SOCRATIC SCHOOLS. CHAP. able man. 1 Aristocratical institutions 'fell far below their ideal, none being adapted for the rule of wise men : for what law or custom can fetter him, whose life is regulated by the laws of virtue ? 2 What country can be large enough for those who regard themselves as citizens of the world? 3 Allowing therefore a conditional necessity for a state and laws, 4 the Cynics 5 refused in their homelessness to take any part in civil life. They wished to be citizens of the world, not of any one state ; their ideal state, as far as they do sketch it, is a destruction of all civil life. 6 1 Compare Xen. Symp. 4, 36 ; Dio Chrys. Or. vi. 47; Stob. Floril. 49,47 ; 97, 26 ; Diog. 50. Also Plut. Adul. et Am. c. 27, p. 68. 2 Antisthenes, in Diog. 11, says : rbv cr6 ov ari rovs Kfijj.fi/ovs v6fJLOvs iro\iTfvff(o~6at a\\& Ka-ra. Tbi> Tijs aperTJs. Dio- genes, ibid. 38 : (Qaaice 8' avrt- riOevai rvxy p-tv Bdtpffos, v6fj.tf 8e Qvffiv, ir&Bei SJ \6yov. This antithesis of v6fj.os and vffts seems to be what Plato has in view, Phil. 44, C. See p. 294, 4. 9 Diog. 63 says of Diogenes : (peiiTijdels ir68ev tr), Koff/jLoiro\irris, tT7. See p. 167, 8. Ibid. 72 : \t.l>vi\v re bpQty iro\iT(tav flvcu T^V iv K6fffj.ca. Antisthenes, ibid. 12: rip ffo. Crates, ibid. 98 : ovx rs irdrpas fioi irvpyos, ov p.ia (TT67T?, ircifTTjs 5e x?po~ov Hal irJAitr/xa /col 56/itos eVoi/ios T\IUV tvSiairaffBai irdpa. The same individual in Plut. de Adul. -28, p. 69, shows that banishment is no evil, and ac- cording to Diog. 93 (conf. Ael. V. H. iii. 6) he is said to have given a negative answer to Alexander's question, whether he did not wish to see Thebes rebuilt : ^x flv 8 irarpi'Sa aSo- ^iav /col -irtviav avoAwra TTJ TVXfl hal Aioytvovs tlvai iroAiTTjs avfiri- frovXfVTov (pe6fy. See also Epict. Diss. iii. 24, 66. Lucian, V. Auct. 8. Also the Stoic doctrine in Zeller's Stoics, &c., chap, on Stoics, and what has been said above, p. 278, 1. 4 The confused remarks of Diogenes in Diog. 72 support this statement. 5 Antisthenes was not without a citizen's rights (see Hermann, Antiquit. 1, 118), although a proletarian by birth and cir- cumstances. Diogenes was banished from Sinope, and lived at Athens as a foreigner. Crates had chosen this life ; after his native town had been destroyed. Monimus was a slave whom his master had driven away. B Stob. Floril. 45, 28 : 'Aim- crdfvris fp(anr)9e\s iras &v rts irpoff- f\6oi Tro\iTia, flire KaQairtp irvpl, jUTJre \iav tyyvs "va. n^ KOJJS, fJ.'firf CYNIC RENUNCIATION OF CIVIL LIFE. All mankind are to live together like a flock. No nation may have its own special laws and boundaries severing it from others. Confining themselves to the barest necessaries of life, needing no gold, that source of so much mischief, abstaining from marriage and family life, they wished to return to the simpli- city of a state of nature ; 1 the leading thought of their enlarged political sympathies being not so much the oneness and the union of all mankind, but the freedom of the individual from the bonds of social life and the limits of nationality. Here again ('HAl'. XIII. 1 The above description rests only in part on direct testi- mony, but the combination which is the basis of it does not lack great probability. We know on authority that Dio- genes in his iro\iTfia (Dioff. 80) demanded a community of wives and children, and that in the same treatise he pro- posed a coinage of bones or stones (a.ffrpa.ya\oi) instead of gold and silver, Atlien. iv. 159,e. We know further that Zeno's iro\tTfia ran to this effect : Iva fj.^1 Kara. v6\fis /xr)5e Kar olK'jifjLff, Idiots ejcaffTOi Sr)fji6ras Kal vo\iras els Se $ios 17 Kal K^fffios, Siffirfp ofj.fi>r)S, Plat. Alex. Vit. i. 6, p. 329; and since this treatise of Zeno was always considered to ex- press the opinions of the Cynic School, we have every reason to look in it for a Cynic's views. That such views were on the whole advocated by Antis- thenes, probably in the treatise irtpl V&IJLOV % irepl which appears to be identical with the woAtTiK-bs SiaXoyos men- tioned by Athen. v. 220, d, is in itself probable, and is con- firmed by Plato's Politicus. Rejecting, as his dialogue does, the analogy between states- manship and the superinten- dence of a flock, we might naturally think that Plato was provoked to it by some such theory ; and since we know from Plutarch's account of Zeno, that the Cynics reduced the idea of the state to that of a herd of men, it is most natural to think of them. Moreover, the description of the natural state, Rep. ii. 372, appears also to refer to Antis- thenes. Plato at first describes it as though from himself, but he afterwards clearly intimates that it belongs to another, when he calls it a state fit for pigs. Nor do we know of anyone else to whom it could be better referred than to the founder of the Stoic School. 326 THE SOCRATIC SCHOOLS. CHAP. XIII. O) Sup- jtrettion of may be seen the negative spirit of their morality, destitute of all creative power. The same character may be recognised in a feature for us the most revolting in Cynicism their de- liberate suppression of the natural feeling of shame. This feeling they did not consider altogether un- reasonable, 1 but they urged that you need only be ashamed of what is bad, and that what is in itself good may not only be unblushingly discussed, but done without reserve before the eyes of all. 2 They therefore permitted themselves what they considered natural, without regard to places, not shrinking even from doing in the public streets 3 what other men 1 It is expressly told of Dio- genes, Diog. 37; 54, that he ex- postulated with a woman who lay in an indecent position in a temple, and that he called blushes the colour of virtue. 2 See the following note, and Cic. Off. i. 35, 128 : Nee vero audiendi sunt Cynici aut si qui fuerunt Stoici pasne Cynici, qui reprehendunt eb irrident, quod ea, quse turpia non sint (for instance, the begetting of children) nominibus ac verbis flagitiosa dicamus (that we consider it unseemly to name them), ilia autem qu;s turpia sunt (stealing, &c.) nominibus appellemus suis. 3 This is especially said of Diogenes, Diog. 22 : rravrl Tp6ir

    & dtttvos Atheists in the ancient sense Svvarai. Theod. Cur. Gr. Affect, of the term, i.e. they denied i. 75, p. 14 : 'Ai/TKr0eVTjs .... the Gods of the state, although trepl roG Oeov rav oAa>v /3oo airb from their point of view they fl>c6vos ov yixapi^erat, o(f>6a\/j.o'is were certainly right in reject - o&x fyarcu, ovSfvl eoiKe Si6irep ing the charge of atheism. CYNIC RENUNCIATION OF RELIGION. 329 the worship of the gods. There is but one way of CHAP. pleasing God by virtue ; everything else is super- L_ stition. Wisdom and uprightness make us followers and friends of the gods. What is generally done to secure their favour is worthless and unmeaning. The wise man honours Grcd by virtue, and not by sacri- fice, 1 which Grod does not require. 2 He knows that a temple is not more holy than any other place. 3 He does not pray for things which are considered goods by the unwise ; not for riches, but for righteousness. 4 Herewith the ordinary notion respecting prayer is also surrendered ; for everyone owes virtue to his own exertions. Hence Diogenes may be understood ridiculing prayers and vows. 5 The same sweeping judgment is pronounced on oracles, prophecy, and prophets. 6 The mystic rites also were assailed with biting scorn, 7 both by Diogenes and Antisthenes ; these philosophers, as far as religious views are con- Nothing follows from the anec- and philosophers, he thinks dotes in Diog. 37; 42. man the most intelligent being, 1 Julian, Or. vi. 199, B., ex- but looking at interpreters of cusing Diogenes because of his dreams, or prophets, or credu- poverty, says that he never lous believers in them, he con- entered a temple or offered aiders him the most foolish of sacrifice. Crates, ibid. 200, A., creatures. Similar statements promises to honour Hermes and in Diog. 43 ; 48 ; Tlieod. Cur. the Muses ou Sonrcti'cus TyvQcpais, Gr. Aff . vi. 20, p. 88 ; and Dio. dXA' aperats 6tov of Socrates, but * See the prayer of Crates in no conclusion can be formed Julian 1. c. and Diog. 42. from a passage so jocular. * Compare the anecdotes in 7 Diog. 4 ; 39 ; 42 ; Plut. Aud. Diog. 37 ; 59. Poet. 5, p. 21 ; Clemen*, Pro- 9 In Diog. 24 he says that, trept. 49, C. looking at pilots, physicians, 330 THE SO CR AT 1C SCHOOLS. CHAP. cerned, holding a perfectly independent attitude . '_ towards the popular faith. Not but that they gladly took hold of points which mythology supplied for their own arguments, taking all the more occasion to do so, in proportion to the earnestness of their desire to influence the masses : Antisthenes being aided in so doing by the sophistical training which be had previously enjoyed. 1 The various traditions must all be explained in har- mony with this view. Hence we find Antisthenes in no small degree engaged in allegorical interpre- tations of the myths and the poets, and in an expla- nation of Homer, which he committed to writing in numerous volumes. 2 Looking for a hidden meaning 3 in legendary stories, he was everywhere able to dis- cover moral teaching,and to build on moral reflections. 4 Indeed, by laying down the further axiom, that the poet does not always express his own sentiments, 5 he 1 For the allegorical inter- Symp. 3, 6 ; Plato, Rep. ii. 378, pretations of that period con- D. ; lo, 530, C. suit Krische, Forsch. 234 ; Xen. 4 Thus on Od. i. 1, he en- Sym. 3, 6 ; Plato, Thesetet. 153, quired in what sense iroAurpo- C. ; Rep. ii. 378, D. ; lo, 530, irio was meant for praise. On C.; Phsedrus, 229, C. ; and Od. v. 211; vii. 257, he re- Zeller'* Phil. d. Griech. i. 930, marked, that no reliance could 3 ; also pp. 755, 831 ; Stoics, be placed upon lovers' pro- &c. mises. In II. xv. 123, he found * Dioff. 17, mentions twelve his doctrine of the oneness of or thirteen volumes of his on virtue. See the passages in Homer and various portions of Winkelmann, p. 23-28. the Homeric poems, and one 5 Dio Ckrys. Or. liii. 5, says on Amphiaraus. Here, too, that whereas the same had been belong the treatises on Hercu- previously said of Zeno, 6 St les. Julian, Or. vii. 209, A. ; \6yos ovros 'AvriffOtvous larl 215, C. ; 217, A., also testifies vpSrepov, '6n TO. pfi> 8<% TO 5e to the fact of his frequently oA.Tj0ei'Ti/cbs and an 'Epwfufvos V. Auct. 8, ^AeuflepccT^s TGOV av- (Diog. 14; 18), and he had Opcairwv Kal larpbs ruv Tra6uv, and mentioned love in his Hercules he expresses astonishment in (Prod, in Ale. 98, 6 ; Winckel- Dio. Or. viii. 7, that men le>s mann, p. 16). An 'EpcariKbs of frequently apply to him, the Diogenes is also mentioned, healer of souls, than they do to Diog. 80. an oculist or dentist. 2 See p. 314. 4 When Diogenes was pur- s Diog. 4 : 'A.t>Ttff9fvns ^PCOTTJ- chased by Xeniades, he is said 6els Sia ri irtKpws TO?S /jLaOnrats to have told Xeniades that he eV<7rA.TjTTei, Kal ol larpol, i)v voaoiivruiv would have to obey a pilot or flirlv, a\\' ou irvpfTTovffiv. In physician. Diog. 30 ; 36 ; conf. Stob. Floril. 13, 25, Diogenes, 74 ; Plut. An. Vitios. c. 3, p. when asked why he remained 499 ; Stob. Flor. 3, 63 ; Philo, in Athens, whilst he was always Qu. Omn. Pr. Lib. 833, E. CYNIC INFLUENCE ON THE WOULD. 3J and despised, only the sick needing a physician, 1 and CHAP. no more fears contamination from such intercourse L than the sun fears impurity from shining in the dirtiest haunts. 2 The improvement of mankind, however, is no easy task. 3 He who will be saved must hear the truth ; nothing being more destructive than flattery. 4 Yet truth is always unpleasant; 5 none save either an incensed enemy or a real friend dare tell it. 6 This friendly service, the Cynics propose to render to mankind. 7 If in so doing they give offence, matters not to them ; 8 a good kind of man being always dis- agreeable to bear with ; 9 he who annoys no one is of no good to any one. 10 It was moreover a principle of theirs to pitch their demands both in word and example above what they really wanted, because men only imperfectly conform to them. 1 1 Thus they pressed themselves on friends and strangers alike with their exhortations, 12 which Diogenes, in particular, in- 1 According to Epict. iii. 24, See p. 319, 3. 66, Diogenes read a lesson to 7 Diogenes in Stob. Flor. 13, the pirates who captured him. 26 : ol /j.fv &\\oi Kvves rovs %- It cannot, however, have done Bpovs SaKvuvini/, tyk 8e rovs much good, for they sold him <(>t\ovs, 'tva, a&a tan Ka.1 arjSes TOIS 12 Compare whatDwy.vi. 10, drorjTory. It is like light to says of Antisthenes, and vi. 26 ; those who have weak eyes. 46 ; 65 of Diogenes ; also 334 THE SOCRATIC SCHOOLS. CHAP. XIII. stilled in the coarsest manner, 1 although more gentle traits are not altogether wanting. 2 At the same time the coarseness of their manner was somewhat re- lieved by their humour in which Diogenes and Crates more particularly excelled. They loved to clothe serious teaching in the form of a joke, or of poetry, 3 and to hurl sharp-pointed words 4 at the folly of man- kind ; 5 Diogenes even, like the oriental prophets, giving greater force to his utterances by symbolical actions, and thus attracting for them attention. 6 No doubt the position occupied by the Cynics in the Greek world is a peculiar one. Eidiculed because of their eccentricities, 7 and admired for their self- Lucian V. Auct. 10. Because of his importunity, Crates re- ceived the name of Oupeirayoi- KT-ns.Diog. 86 ; Pint. Qu. Conv. ii. 1,7, 4, p. 632 ; Apnl. Floril. iv. 22. 1 Diog. 24 ; 32 ; 46 ; Ex. e Floril. Jo. Damasc. i. 7, 43. 2 Pint. De Adul. 28, p. 69, relates that when Demetrius Phalerius, after his banish- ment, fell in with Crates, he was not a little surprised at being received with friendly words of warm comfort in- stead of the violent language lie expected. The attractive- ness of the conversation of Antisthenes and Diogenes is also commended, Diog. 14. Conf. Xen. Symp. 4, 61. 3 See Diog. 27 ; 83 ; 85 ; Zte- metr. de Elocut. 170 ; 259 ; 261 ; Pint. Tranqu. An. 4, p. 466 ; Julian, Or. vii. 209, a; Antisth. : ena 5i& Ttai> nv9cav c.irfiyye\\f. Similarly, Ibid. 215, c; 217, a. 4 Hermog. Progym. c. 3 ; Theo. Progym. c. 5 ; Nicol. Pro- gym, c. 3. 5 Abundant examples of these ways of the Cynics are to be found in the inro(pQe-)fj.a~a of Diogenes, in his sixth book, and in Stobceus 1 Floril. See also Winckelmann, Antisth. Frag. ; Pint. Prof, in Virt. c. 11, p. 82 ; Virt, Doc. c. 2, p. 439 ; Coh. Ira, c. 12, p. 460 ; Curios. c. 12, p. 521 ; Cup. Div. c. 7, p. 526 ; Exil. c. 7, p. 602 ; An. Seni. s. Ger. Rep. i. 5, p. 783 ; conf. Prajc. c. 26, 141 ; De Alex. Virt. c. 3, p. 336 ; Epict. Diss. iii. 2, 11 ; Gell. xviii. 13, 7 ; Tertullian, Apol. 39; not to mention others. See Diog. 26 ; 31 ; 39 ; 64 ; 41 (the lantern) ; Stob. Flor. 4, 84. This eccentricity becomes a caricature in Menedemus, Diog. 102. 7 Diog. 83, 87, 93. CYNIC INFLUENCE ON THE WORLD. 335 denial, despised as beggars, and feared as moralists, CHAP. full of contempt for the follies, of pity for the moral _ miseries of their fellow men, they met both the wisdom and the effeminacy of their time with the rude vigour of a resolute will, hardened even to in- sensibility. Possessing the pungent, ever ready native wit of the plebeian, benevolent, with few wants, full of whims and jokes, and national even to their very dirtiness, they resemble in many points the friars of the Middle Ages ; l nor can it be doubted that, not- withstanding all their extravagances, their action was in many ways beneficial. For all that, philosophy could expect but little from this mendicant philo- sophy. Not until it had been supplemented by other elements, regulated and received into connection with a wider view of the world in the Stoa, was Cynicism able to bear fruit on a large scale. The Cynic School, as such, appears to have had only a very narrow extension, a fact which will not appear strange, considering the terrible severity of its demands. Besides it was incapable of philosophic expansion, and even its practical action was chiefly of a negative character. It attacked the vices and the follies of men. It required independence and self-denial, but it separated man from man. It placed the individual entirely by himself, thus offering play to moral pride, 1 The Cynics really have a rean asceticism, which exer- historical connection with the cised, partly directly and monks of Christendom. The partly through the Essenes, so link between the two is the important an influence on Cynicism of the time of the eastern monasticism. Ciesars, and the late Pythago- 336 THE SOCRATIC SCHOOLS. CHAP. vanity, and the most capricious whims, which were ; not left unindulged. The abstract sovereignty of the personal will resulted ultimately in individual caprice, and thus Cynicism trenched on the ground of the philosophy of pleasure, to which as a system it was diametrically opposed. THE CYRENAICS. 337 CHAPTER XIV. THE CYRENAICS. 1 RESPECTING the Cyrenaic branch of the Socratic CHAP. school, the information we possess is quite as im- ^ perfect, or even more so, than that which we A. History have touching the Cynics. Aristippus 2 of Gyrene, 3 the founder, had been brought to Athens 4 by a call from Socrates, whose extraordinary personal influ- ence had unusual attractions for him, 5 although his 1 See Wendt, De Philosophia Cyrenaica, Gott. 1841. * The accounts of ancient and the views of modern writers on the life of Aristip- pus are found in detail in H. v. Stein's De Philosophia Cyrenaica, Part, prior, de vita Aristippi (Gott. 1855), which ought to have proceeded some- what more sceptically. There too are references to the earlier literature. 3 All authorities without ex- ception state this. His father is called Aritadas by Suid. 'Apt 4 ^schin. in Diog. ii. 65, says that he came to Athens Kara K\e'o? Saifpctrot/s, and Plut. Curios. 2, p. 516, gives full particulars how at the Olympic games he heard of Socrates and his teaching from Ischomachus, and was at once so taken by it that he did not rest till he had made his acquaintance. See Dioff. ii. 78 ; 80. 4 Aristippus is not only uni- versally described as a follower of Socrates (Diog. ii. 47 ; 74 ; 80 ; Strabo, xvii. 3, 22, p. 837 ; IMS. Pr. Ev. xiv. 18, 31 ; Stein., p. 26), but he also regarded himself as such, and paid a tribute of most genuine respect to his teacher. According to Diog. ii. 76, he prayed that he might die like Socrates. Ibid. 71, he says that if anything good can be truly repeated of himself, he owes it to Socrates, and Arist. Bhet. ii. 23 ; 1398, b, 29, says, 'Apta-niriros wpbs riAoTtofO iirayy(\TiH(i>rtp6v Tt tlir6vra, us tftro ' a\\a /x/V & 338 THE S OCR AT 1C SCHOOLS. CHAP. XIV. character was too weak to endure in the last trial. 1 From Gyrene, his luxurious home, which at that time was at the height of its wealth and power, 2 he had brought habits far removed from the simplicity and abstemiousness of Socrates. 3 Perhaps he had been already touched by those Sophistical influences which may be observed in his subsequent career. 4 At any rate we may assume that he had attained to a certain rov, \tj ~S#iKpA.T"r)v (which Steinhart, Plat. Leben, 303, 17, contrary to the natural sense, refers to Plato's too sanguine expectations of the younger Dionysius). We also see from Xen. Mem. i. 2, iii. 8, that he was on an intimate footing with Socrates ; and Plato in blaming him, Phasdo, 59, C., for being absent from the circle of friends who met on the day of Socrates' death, evidently reckons him as belonging to this circle. Conf. Stein., p. 25, who also, pp. 50 and 74, groups together the authorities respecting Aristippus' relations to the pupils of Socrates. 1 Plato, 1. c., who however only says that Aristippus and Cleombrotus had been in JSgina; that on this fertile island they caroused on the day of their master's death, as Demetr. de Elocut, 288, asserts, is barely possible. The accu- racy of Plato's statement is indisputable, notwithstanding Diog. iii. 56 ; ii. 65 ; but whether Aristippus left Athens from excessive regard for his own safety, or whether his weakness led him to wish to escape the painful interval pending the death of Socrates, cannot be ascertained. 2 See Thrige, Res Cyrenen- sium, 191. 8 This may be gathered from Xen. Mem. ii. 1, 1, in addition to the proof afforded by his later conduct. That Aristippus belonged to a wealthy family would seem to be established by his whole mode of living, and by the journey which he undertook to Athens. 4 We might have imagined that a city so rich and culti- vated as Gyrene (on this point see Thi-ige, 1. c., p. 340, 354), would not have been neglected by the Sophists, even if there were no express evidence to prove it. It is, however, known from Plato, Theastet. 161, B. ; 162, A., that the celebrated mathematician, Theodorus of Cyrene, was a friend of Pro- tagoras, and the principles of Protogoras are also afterwards met with in Aristippus. From the zeal with which Aristippus followed Socrates it may be further conjectured that" the study of f philosoph thing. y was to him HISTORY OF THE CYRENAICS. maturity of thought when he first became acquainted with Socrates. 1 It is, therefore, no cause for wonder that this talented young man 2 met his teacher with a considerable amount of independence, 3 not on the whole so blindly following him as to sacrifice his own peculiarities. He is even said to have come forward as a teacher before the death of Socrates ; 4 that he did so afterwards is a better established fact, and also that, contrary to the principles of his greatest friend, but quite in harmony with the practice usual among the Sophists, he required payment for his instruction. 5 In yet another point he followed the CHAP XIV. 1 The chronology of his life is very uncertain. Neither the time of his birth nor of his death is known to us. Accor- ding to Diodorus, xv. 76, he was living in 366 B.C., and Plut. Dio. 19, tells us that he met Plato on his third visit to Sicily, which is placed in 361 B.C. But Diodorus probably derived from Dionysius his anecdote about the interview with Plato. Its accuracy can- not therefore be relied upon ; and as we are ignorant how old Aristippus was at the time, these accounts are anything but satisfactory. According to Ding. ii. 83, however, it would appear, he was older by several years than ^schines ; and it would also appear, from what has been said p. 337, 4, that at the time he followed Socrates he was independent in his civil relations, and fur- ther that he was connected with him for several years. 2 This is what he appears to have been from all that is known. See Stein., p. 29. See Xen. Mem. ii. 1 ; iii. 8. 4 According to Diog. ii. 80, Socrates blamed him for taking pay for his instruction. How little dependence can be placed upon this story will be seen from the fact that Aristippus says, in his reply, that Socrates did the same, only taking less. Another passage, Diog. ii. 65, seems to imply, on the authority of Phanias, that Aristippus offered to give Socrates some of the money he had gained in this way. Perhaps, however, all that Phanias said was, that Aristippus had taken pay, and offered it to his teacher, with- out however bringing the two facts into closer temporal con- nection. Phanias in Diog. ii. 65; Ibid. 72 ; 74 ; 80, where it is also stated in wliat way he de- fended this conduct. Alexis in At/ten, xii. 544, e; Pint. Kdu. Pu. 7, p. 4 ; Stob. Exc. e Floril. z 2 10 THE SOCRATIC SCHOOLS. CHAP, example of the Sophists, by passing a great portion V J of his life in various places without any fixed abode. 1 Joan. Damasc. ii. 13, 145 (that Aristippus is meant here ap- pears from 146 ; conf. Diog. ii. 68). Also Xen. Mem. i. 2, 60, appears to have an eye on him. The amount of these fees is estimated at 1000 drachmas by Plutarch, at 500 by Diog. 72. 1 He says of himself in Xen. Mem. ii. 1, 13 : ovS' elsiro \lrfiav ov dpi. In Plut. Virt. Doc. p. 2, p. 439, some one asks him : iravTaxov ffv Spa e? ; to which he replies with a bad joke. He is mentioned by later writers, often no doubt bad authorities, as having been in different places : in Megara, where he met with Machines (Diog. ii. 62 ; conf. Ep. Socr. 29) : in Asia Minor, where he was imprisoned by the Persians, (Diog. ii. 79) : in Corinth, where he revelled with Lais (Hermesianax in Ath. xiii. 599, b ; Diog. ii. 71) : in 2Egina, where he not only lived for a time after the death of So- crates, but where, according to Athen. xiii. 588, e ; conf. xii. 544, d, he every year took up his residence in company with Lais : and at Scillus, where Xenophon read to him his Me- morabilia, Ep. Socr. 18. Much in particular is told of his stay at the court of Syracuse, of his hostile encounter with Plato, and of many other adventures, which he there experienced. But in these notices there is great confusion, since at one time the elder Dionysius, at another the younger Dionysius, at another simply Dionysius, is spoken of. Conf. Stein., p. 57. It is asserted by the Scholiast on Luoian, Men. 13, that Aris- tippus was at Syracuse under the elder Dionysius. This statement is borne out by Hegesander in Athen. xii. 544, c ; for the Antiphon there men- tioned was (according to Plut. De Adulat. 27, p. 68) executed by command of the elder Dionysius. The anecdote of his shipwreck in Galen. Ex- hort, c. 5, must be referred to the same time. It can only belong to his first visit to Sicily, but by Vitruv. vi. Pras- fat. was transferred to the island of Rhodes. On this point see Stein. 61. On the other hand, Plut. Dio. 19, brings him into contact with Plato on Plato's third journey to Sicily, 361 B.C., in the time of the younger Dionysius. The notices in Athen. xi. 507, b; Diog. ii. 66-69, 73, 75, 77-82, are indefinite, although the stories there told harmonise better with the court of the younger Dionysius than with that of his father. Nothing can however be laid down with certainty respecting the visits of Aristippus to Sicily. That he visited Sicily may be be- lieved on tradition. That he there met Plato is not impos- sible, though it is also possible that the account of this meet- HISTORY OF THE CYRENAICS. 341 Subsequently he appears to have returned to his native city, and to have taken up his permanent residence there. 1 Here it is that we first hear of his family and his School. 2 The heiress to his principles was a daughter, Arete, a lady of sufficient education to instruct her son, 3 the younger Aristippus, 4 in his CHAP. XIV. ing was invented in order to bring out the contrast between both philosophers. In fact, Plato's journeys to Sicily were a favourite topic for later anec- dote mongers. But any one of the above stories, taken by itself alone, must be accepted with caution ; nor is it even certain that he visited both the Dionysiuses. When the younger one came to the throne (368 B.C.) he was at least 60 years of age, and yet most of the stories which are told ap- pear to have reference to him. On the other hand, Aristippus there appears in a character better suited to his years of travel than to his later years. The supposed accidents of meeting between Aristippus and Plato probably went the round as anecdotes, without any attention having been paid to their historical connection ; and when this was done by subsequent biographers, it be- came impossible to find out what was fact. 1 Whether this stay was shortened by frequent travels, whether Aristippus died in Cyrene or elsewhere, and how long he lived, are points un- known. For the journey to Sicily in 361 B.C. is, as we have seen, uncertain. The twenty-ninth letter, which So- crates is supposed to have addressed to his daughter from Lipara after his return, and in expectation of death, is valueless as a historical testi- mony, nor does it even render the existence of a correspon- ding tradition probable ; and the hypothesis based on Dioy. ii. 62, that Aristippus flourished at Athens in 356 has been with justice refuted by Stein.; p. 82. Steinliart, Plat. Leben, 305, 33, proposes to read 'AP in Diog. ii. 62, but the chronology is against this correction, l&irfvffiirtrov would be better. 2 Generally called Cyrenaics, more rarely Hedonists, as in Athen. vii. 312, f ; xiii. 588, a. * Who was thence called /trj- Tpo8i5aTos. 4 Strata, xvii. 3, 22, p. 837 ; Clemens, Strom, iv. 523, A. ; Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 18, 32 ; Theod. Cur. Gr. Aff. xi. 1 ; Diog. ii. 72, 84, 86; Suid. 'Aplartinros ; Themist. Or. xxi. 244. If, therefore, ^Elian, H. Anim. iii. 40, calls Arete the sister of Aristippus, it must be through an oversight. Besides this daughter he is said to have had another son, whom he did not THE SOCRATIC SCHOOLS. CHAP, grandfather's philosophy. Besides this daughter, ^Ethiops and Antipater are also mentioned as pupils of the elder Aristippus. 1 His grandson, the younger Aristippus, is said to have instructed Theodorus, called the Atheist ; 2 the fruits of Antipater's teaching 3 own, Diog. 81 ; Stab. Floril. 76, 14. Most likely this was only the child of an eralpo, although Stobaeus calls his mother a wife. 1 Diog. ii. 86. We know further from Cic. Tusc. v. 38, 112, that Antipater bore the loss of sight with resignation. Cicero tells a somewhat tame joke. 2 Diog. 86. This Theodorus appears to have belonged to the Optimates, who were driven from Cyrene in the party quarrels immediately after the death of Alexander, and took refuge with the Egyptian sove- reigns. Thrige, Res. Cyren. 206. We hear of him as an exile in the last years of the fourth century (Plut. De Exil. 16, p. 606 ; Diog. 103 ; Philo, Qu. Omn. Pr. Lib. 884, C.), in Greece, and particularly at Athens (Diog. ii. 100, 116 ; iv. 52 ; vi. 97), where a friend of Ptolemy's, Demetrius Phaler- eus, helped him, between 316 and 306 B.C., and subsequently at the court of Ptolemy, on whose behalf he undertook an embassy to Lysimachus (Diog. 102; Cic. Tusc. i. 43, 102; Valer. vi. 2, 3 ; Philo, 1. c., Plut. An. Vittos. 3, p. 499 ; Stob. Floril. 2, 33). At last he returned to his own country, and was there held in great honour by Magus, the Egyptian governor, Diog. 103. What made him particularly notori- ous was his atheism. Indicted on this account at Athens, he was rescued by Demetrius, but obliged to leave the city (Diog. 101 ; Philo.). The assertion of Amphicrates (in Diog. and Athen. xiii. 611, a), that he was put to death by a hemlock- draught, is contradictory to all we know of him. According to Antisth. in Diog. 98, he was a pupil not only of Aristippus the younger, but also of Anni- ceris and of the dialectician Dionysius. It is however diffi- cult to see how he can have been younger than Anniceris. Suid. to5. makes Zeno, Pyrrho, and Bryso (see p. 255, 1) his tea- chers, the first one probably with reason, the two others quite by mistake. Under ~S,$4fpaTi/cwj/ $La\6yci>v vaval-rios aA.7i0e7y tlvai SoKt't TOWS I\Xa.rtavov j/ ^TrrotTO. Me- \eaypos Se . . . Kal KAeiT6$of f"Kevyfiv rbv irepl ayaBuv Kal KO.KWV \6yov ^K/j.e/j.a.9rjK6Ta. Sext. Math. vii. 11 : SoKovffi Se Kara -TIVO.S KOI of rb r)6mbv /j.epos napairfijareiv 8e T^ tpvffiKbv Kal rb \oyiitbv &s fj.r)5ev irpbs -rb ev5aifj.6v(as ;3ioCi/ ffvvep- yovvTa. Plut. in Eus. Pr. Ev. i. 8, 9 : 'ApftrTJTTTros 6 tie T}>V aA.7r)8(5fa, rV Se &\\riv vv rb fare'iv ' "OTTI TOJ ev peyapoiffi KUKOV T' ayaOdv re -rervKrai, which is also told of Socrates and Diogenes. Arist. Met. ii. 2, 996, a, 32: &crre 810 ravra r&v ffodnffTUf rives olov "ApitTTtTTTros irpoeirijAa- KIOV auras [ras fj.a6-rjfj.ariKas eTricTTiij^as] eV/uej/ yap rals &\\ats tf-)(yais, Ka\ ra7s fiavavffois, olov TfKTOVlKfj Kttl ffKVTlKfl, Sl^Tt fieX-riov % -)(f1pov Xtyfcrtiat iravra, TOS Se /AaOyuaTiKas ovdeva iroie7)) 81' aiirrjf alpfri] ^ai ifya66v. Athen. xii. rr)v rtSviraOfiav ravr-qv reAos fivai (ri Kal 4v avrrj T\\V evSaifjiOfiav /30A7Jcr0ai. Euseb. 1. c. p. 296, I. The same view is mentioned and attacked by Plato, Gorg. 491, E. ; Rep. vi. 505, B. (See above p. 312, 1), and Philebus, II, B., where it is thus des- cribed : <\7j/8o s fj.tv TOIIWV ayaObv flvai fr'tOfTo ri^lv Ti6ov)jv flvai iru(rav Kal irav- TtA.^. That Plato had Aristip- pus in mind will be presently shown in respect of the Phile- bus, and it is therewith proved for the Republic, which refers to the Philebus. * Diog. ii. 91 : TTIV q>p6vriaiv ayaQbi- pfv flvat \fyovcriv, ov Si tamriv $f alperrjv, a\\a Sta rj ^{ OIITTJS ireptyiv6fj.fva. 92 : Kal rbi/ TrKovTOV 8e iroiriTiKbv i]5ovr)s tivai, ov Si' afn'ov alpcrttv OVTO.. Oio. Off. iii. 33, 116 : Cyrenaici at- que Annicerei philosophi nom- inati omne bonum in voluptate posuerunt ; virtutemque censu- erunt ob earn rem esse laudan- dam, quod efficiens esset vol- uptatis. To this sentence of Aristippus, Wendt, Phil. Cyr. 28, and Ast refer the passage of the Phaedo, 68, E., but without reason. It refers to common unphilosophical virtue. 1 The Cyrenaics divided their ethics into live parts. Sext. Math. vii. 11 : Katroi irfpnpt- irr6ai TOVTOUS tvioi * 348 THE SOCRATIC SCHOOLS. CHAP, being feelings of a change within ourselves, do not supply us with the least information as to things in themselves. We may be indeed conscious of having a sensation of sweetness, whiteness, and so forth ; but whether the object which causes the sensation is sweet, or white, is unknown to us. One and the same thing often produces an entirely different effect upon different persons. How then can we be sure, that in any given case, whether owing to the nature of our organism or to the circumstances under which we receive the impression, things do not appear to us entirely different from what they are in themselves ? Knowledge, therefore, is limited to our own feelings ; as to these we are never mistaken ; but of things in themselves we know absolutely nothing. 1 Just as Q 5>v rb T)Qucbv Siaipovffiv (Is rf and universal the division is. rbv irepl ruv alpertav Kai evicru>v That it was not made by Aris- roicov Kai els rbv irepl ruv iraOcav tippus may be gathered from Kai Irt els rbv irtpl rSiv irpdeyx.avev, 6 Se irepl iriffretav eK motion. roG \oyiKov. Sen. Ep. 89, 12 ' Cic. Acad. ii. 46, 143 : aliud (according to what has been judicium Protagoras est, qui said, p. 346, 2) : in quinque enim putet id cuique rerum esse, quod partes moralia dividunt, ut una cuique videatur : aliud Cyren- sit de fugiendis et expetendis, aicorum, qui pragter permo- altera de adfectibus, tertia de tiones intimas nihil putant esse actionibus, quarta de causis, judicii. Ibid. 7, 20 : de tactu, quinta de argumentis : causas et eo quidem, quem philosophi rerum ex natural! parte sunt, interiorem vocant, aut doloris argumenta ex rational!, acti- aut voluptatis, in quo Cyren- ones ex morali. We cannot, aici solo putant veri esse judi- however, tie our faith to this cium. Plut. adv. Col. 24, 2, p. account, not knowing how the 1120: [01 K.vpriva'iKol~\ ra, irdOri subject was divided among /ecu TOS (pavraaias ev aurois ndev- these several parts, nor how old res OVK (povro rrji/ airo rovruv FEELINGS THE SUBJECT OF KNOWLEDGE. 349 little do we know of the feelings of other people. There may be common names, but there are no com- CHAP. XIV. irlffnv tlvai StapKij irpbs ray inrtp riav irpayndrwv Karaf3(f3atet>o'tis, OAA.' & JTTfp (V TroAlOp/Cl'a TtilV ^Krbs airoffrdvres fisra ira.Qr\ KartK\tiaav aurovs. rb (paivfrai TtBepevot, rb 8' ^(TTi fail irpoffairo(paii'6fj.fvol irtpl riav fKrbs . . . yXvKaivfaOai yap Aeyowri Kal iriKpaiveffdai Kal riea(tai Kal ffKorovffQai riav iraQiav rovruv tKacrrov T-<\V e'-fpyeiav ulKeiav 4t> avrcp KOI antplairaarov e \ovros ' fl 8e J\VKV rb /ueA* Kal irtKpbs 6 6a\\bs K.T.\. vrrb iro\\G>v aifTifj.ap'rvpf'indai xal 8-rjpitav /col irpay/j.drwf Kal avfipiiircav, TWV /uev 8vv [add rb /iev] rcav 8e TTpcHTifufiHiiv Ti]v 8a\\iav, Kal airoKa.ofj.(v(av inrb TTJJ xaAa^rjs, Kal Kara^vxop.tftav inrb ofvov. Kal irpbs j\\iov a/j.@\vV ain&v tvav- Ti'a irdOri Kal 8ia(t>6povs (pavraffias Xa/ufloi/ovras. Sext. Math. vii. 191, who gives the most detailed account, but probably to a great extent in his own language : (pafflf ovv ol Kvpyva'tKol Kptr^pta flvai TO ird9rj Kal /j.6i>a KaroAoyn- PdvarOai Kal a^tvtna Tvy\aveiv, Ttav Sf irfiroiriK6ruv TO ira'07j fj.ijSev tlvat KaTa\T)inbv ntfe aStdtyev- ffrov Zn fifv yap \evKatv6/j.(6a, fartv, ou^ ol6v T' airofyaivfcrQai. eiKbs ydp tan Kal inrb /*)) \fvnov riva \tvKavTiKus SiaTtBrivai Kal inrb n$j y\vKtos y\vKai>Orjvai, just as eye or a mad brain always sees things different from what they are. OUTW Kal tyixos (v\oy(arar6v fffri ir\eov ttav oiKficov iradwv (i,i)5 tit \anPdi>f H> Svvao6ai. If, therefore, we understand by fls, -rrep! 8 rb ^Krbs vwoKti/jitvov irdmts ir\avci>- fteOa' KaKtlva /j.fv fan Kara\r)fra, rovro fit aKaraXTfirruv, TTJS ^fX^ s irdvu affQtvovv yiverai. Ibid. 93 : roy aiVflrjcrets /XTJ irdvrorf a\rietvtit>. Ibid. 95 of the School of Hegesias, which does not in this respect differ from others : OKj/pow 8e Kal ras alffH^aeis OVK aKpifiovaas r^v ^ir-iyvuffiv. Aris- totle in Ens. Pncp. Ev. xiv. 19, 1 : |f)s 8' &c tltv ol \iyovrts pSva ra irde-r) Kara\t)irrd. rovro 8' flirov ilvioi rSiv IK rrjs Yvp-fivjjs (which in the face of the defi- nite statements of Cicero, Plu- tarch and Sextus,does not prove 350 THE SOCRATIC SCHOOLS. CHAP. XIV. mon feelings, and when two persons say that they have felt the same thing, neither of them can be cer- tain that he has experienced the same feeling as the other, since he is only conscious of his own state and not of that of another. 1 Thus, like Protagoras, 2 the Cyrenaics regard all notions as relative and individual ; their view differ- ing from his in this respect only that they refer notions more directly to internal feelings, and leave out of sight 3 Heraclitus' doctrine of perpetual flow that this doctrine did not be- long to the whole School, nor can this be intended. Conf . c. 18, 31) . . . Ka.6iJ.evoi yap e\eyov Kal refj.v6jj.evoi yvtapi^eiv, Sri va- ff^oiev ri ' iroTfpov 8f rb ncuov enj TTVp fy rl) TepVOV ffi$7)pO$ OVK }IV eltftv. Sextns, Math. vi. 53, says : /j.6t>a awvT)v, n^) olaav trdQos a\\a ird6ovs 7ronjTtV, M yive&Qat ruv virapKr&v. But this is inaccu- rate. The Cyrenaics, we gather from the above, cannot have denied the existence of things, but only our knowledge of their existence. This whole theory probably belongs to the elder Aristippus, as will be probable from a passage in Plato soon to be mentioned. Against Tenne- man's notion (Gesch. d. Phil. ii. 106) that it first came from Theodoras, see Weiidt, Phil. Cyr. 45. 1 Sort. Math. vii. 195 : Mat oiiSe Kpiri]pi6v (paffi elvai xoivbv avdpAirtav, ov6(MTa Se Koivd -rldeffdai TOIS Kpifiaffi. \evxi>v /j.ev ydp n Kal 7Awtt/ Ka\ovffi KOivias iraines, K0iv\tv 8e rt \fVKOv $ y\vicb OVK X'>v ovru ffvyKeKpifj.ai is bevKaivetrdat virb TOV e^aOev irpoffiriirTovros, erepos Se OVTCO KaTeffKevaafjLevr]v e%ei TTJV aiffdrtfftv, &V \y6[JI.(Va ' SirJKei yap ra irafljj Kal firl ra re'ATj. Ibid. 200. 2 Euseb. Pr. Bv. xiv. 18, 32, says of the younger Aristippus on the authority .of Aristocles : rpsis yap t K'L- vi\ffiv T))V ^5oi/V ovpiy jueVrjc elvai Karafframi/, oftrea\yov[j.ei> oijre r]5 irapair\i](Tiov oixrav. Dioff. ii. 86, says almost the same thing of the older Cyrenaic school : Svo 7rd0J7 ixpiffrai/TO, ir6vov Kal rj^ov^f, rty /j.ei> \eiav Kiv^ffiv rrjc T]$OVT)V, rbv Se ir&vov rpax^a-v Kivriffiv. Ibid. 89, 90 : /ueVas re Kara- lav Kal aicoviav. Sext. Pyrrh. i. 215: Kal r^v \tiav r^s ffapKbs Kivqaiv r\os tlvai \eyet. Math. vii. 199 : rOiv yap iruOtav ra fj.ei> iirrtv rjSea, ra 8t a\yeivd, rci Se p.crav. That these statements come, on the whole, from the elder Aristip- pus, appears to be established by several passages in the Philebus. After Socrates (p. 31, B.) has there shown that pain consists in a violation, and pleasure in a restoration, of the natural connection between the parts of a living being, he appends (p. 42, D.) the question : What would happen if neither of these changes were to take place ? The representative of the theory of pleasure havinganswered in a way afterwards repeated by Plato, Rep. ix. 583, C., that in this case there would be neither pleasure nor pain, he continues : ctA.Ai(TT' elirfs ' ctAA.cs yap y o^ucu, r6Se \eyfts, ws aei n rovruv avayKatov fi^lv ffupfraiveiv, els ol (rotpoi tyaffiv ' del yap airavia &ce re Kal KO.TUI pti. Accordingly the answer is modified to mean PLEASURE AND PAIN. 353 we are in a state of repose, or the motion is so weak as to be imperceptible, there is no feeling either of pleasure or pain. Of these three states, only that of pleasure is absolutely desirable. Hereto nature bears witness ; all following pleasure as the highest end, and avoiding nothing so carefully as pain, 1 unless indeed their judgment be perverted by unfounded fancies. 2 To put freedom from pain in the place of that great changes produce tion is felt or produces plea- pleasure and pain, but small sure. Perhaps it is in reference ones neither. To the same view to this that Arist. Etb. N. vii. he comes back (on p. 53, C.), 13, 1153, a, 12, says : 8b Kal ou with the words : Spa irepi ydovris OVK afcrjuoa^ej/, cos ael yfveais fnnv. oiiorla 8e ou/t Herri rb nap&ita.v ffiovris ; Ko/uiJ/ol 70^ ST) rives a5 roihov rbi/ h6yov f'lrixeipovfft fj.t\vvfiv rifjuv, ois Se? x'V"' *X 6U/> These latter words clearly prove that the assertion, all pleasure consists in motion, had been uttered by some one else, when Plato wrote the Philebus ; and since with the exception of Aristippus no one is known to whom they could be referred (Protagoras did not draw the ethical. conclusions of his prin- ciples), since moreover this as- sertion is universally attributed to the School of Aristippus, since too the epithet Ko/xifbs suits him best, it is most pro- bable that both this passage and the passage connected with it on the two kinds of motion and rest, are his. The same applies to the remark, that small changes make no impres- sion. Likewise, Diog. ii. 85, says of Aristippus : re\os 8' GHAP. XIV. 0-a.va.i elva.i T^V T}$ovi]v. Nor can we allow that there is a dis- crepancy (as Su-semihl, Genet. Entw. d. Plat. Phil. ii. 35, note, 720 asserts) between the lan- guage of Plato, p. 42, D., and the statements which attribute to Aristippus the assumption of an intermediate state between pleasure and pain. Hence we cannot countenance the con- jecture that Aristippus acquired from Plato the more accurate limitation of his teaching. Why did not Aristippus say: We are at all times in a state of gentle or violent motion, but pleasure or pain only arises, when we become conscious of this motion ? Yet this is exactly what he did say according to Diogenes, and what Plato makes his representative say, though certainly riot without some conversational help. 1 Diog. 88 ; 87 ; Plato, Phil. 11, B. See above p. 347, 1. * Dioff. ii. 8!) : 8vvaff6ai 5<= curn> tlvat, 5>v T(\os O. Se ^5ia aya6a, Siv ,, ofae KO.KO., ovrt aaObv o&re 8e Siv Tf\os KOMlv, oirtp vd.6os fffrl fitra^v f,5ovris Kal 0X717801/0$. See p. 352, 2. 3 See p. 300, 1. Diog. ii. 87: rfiovriv fitvroi f^v TOV Tjf Kal T(\os iivai, Ka6d r^}v 8" tuSaifJiovlav ov Si' avrr)i>, a\\a Sia ras Kara /ue'pos Tj'Sovaj. 89 : aXAa priv o5e Kara ayaOuv fl TrpoffSoKiav oiroTe\tafla, ftirtp ijptaKfv '' Kovpifj. 4K\vfff6ai yap rb TTJS tyvxv* Kiinjfjia. Ibid. 91 : apKfi 5e K'UV Kara p-lav TIS Trpoffiriirrovffav ^Se'ais Athen. xii. 544, a : ['Apicrrnriros] a-iro^e^d/j.fvos r^v ySviraOfiav tav- TI\V T\OS flvai &/>T) KOI tv avrfj TT\V fvtiaifioi'iav fitftXTiaQai Kal H<>v6xpovov avr$ii> tlvai (riwsrois affdrois otirf TTJ Tu aVQV yap ecpaffKev rb Trapbv, jU^jre 8e rb , otiK (O'fipa 8* ir6vcf ryv air6- \avaiv ruv ov irapAvraiv odev Kal A A 2 356 THE SOCRATIC SCHOOL. CHAP. The character of the things whence the feeling of / pleasure arises is in itself unimportant. Every plea- sure as such is a good, nor is there in this respect any difference between one enjoyment and another. They may spring from various, even from opposite sources, but considered by themselves, they are all alike, one is as good as the other, a pleasurable emo- tion, and as such always a natural object of desire. 1 The Cyrenaics therefore can never allow that there are pleasures not only declared by law and custom to be bad, but bad by their very nature. In their view pleasure may be occasioned by a disreputable action, but in itself it is nevertheless good and de- sirable. 2 (5) 3fodi- At the same time this principle received several ^nMs'ex- li mita tions by means of which its severity was con- ireme siderably toned down, and its application restricted. In the first place, the Cyrenaics could not deny that Aioye'i/r/s fiaffiKiicbv Kvva e\eyev tarchus replies : ireas \eyets & O.VTOV. 2(aKpares ; otfi yap -riva (rvy^uipri- 1 Diog. 87 : /UT; Siatpeoeiv re ffeaQai, Oepfvov T/Soj/V elvai raya- ySoviiv ySovrjs, /njSe %i$i6v n 06v, tt-ra avi^fcrdai ao\> Ktyoirros elvat. Plato, Phileb. 12, D., -ras fj.tv val ru/as a7a0as ^8oi/dy, where the champion of plea- T&S Se rivai erepas avrwv /ca/cas. sure answers the objection of Just as little will Protarchus Socrates that good pleasures (36, C.) allow that there is must be distinguished from imaginary pleasure and pain. bad ones thus : eiVi ^ei/ yap See p. 347, 1. air' evavriuv .... aural trpay/nd- - Dioff. 88 : elj/ot Sf T^V r]So^v TtaVj ov }jd)V avTai ye aA\^\ai? ayaObv KO.V cnrb TWV acrY?]/u.oTCtTajj/ t vain leu ' TTCOS yap riSov^ yer/Sovrj yfvr\rai, KaOd i> ^ovSiv b\\ripb. iro\- tween them, some being good Actais lva.vTiovfff)a.i us SvffKo\w- and others bad ; but they had TO.TOV avro"is Qatveo-Qai T\>V &6poi- no occasion to deny a relative fffj.bv rwv rfioviav (vSatfjiovlav itot- difference between the more or otrruv. See p. 355, 1. less good, and they might even 358 THE SOCRATIC SCHOOLS. CHAP. XIV. demned by the laws of the state and public opinion. 1 Lastly, they also directed their attention to the difference between bodily and mental pleasures. 2 Holding bodily pains and pleasures to be more pun- gent than those of the mind ; 3 perhaps even attempt- ing to show that all pleasure and its opposite are in the last resource conditioned by bodily feelings ; 4 1 Dioff. 93 : ju7)5eV TI elwi Qtiffft S'iKaiov fl Ka\bi> i) alffxpbv, the value of every action de- iif.pl pending on the pleasure which follows it, a\\a v6fj,(f Kal fOei, & jUtVroj trirovSalos ov8ef &TOTTOV irpaei Sia Tas tiriKeipevas facias Kal Sdas. Wendt (Phil. Cyr. 25) calls this statement in question without reason. It is quite consistent in Aristippus, and is met with in Epicurus ; Zeller, Stoics, &c. ; but he is right (Ibid. 36, 42) in reject- ing Schleiermacher's hypothe- sis (PL W. ii. 1, 183 ; ii. 2, 18), that in the Gorgias Aristippus is being refuted under the name of Callicles, and in the Cra- tylus 384, Diogenes under that of Hermogenes. 2 Which, strictly speaking, they could only have done by saying that one portion of our impressions appears to us to come from the body, another not; for they had long since given up all real knowledge of things. But their consistency hardly went so far as this. 3 Diog. ii. 90: iroKii fievroi TWV ^/vxiKtav ras ffcanaTiKas a/uet- vovs ftvai Kal ras ox\-f)(reis xefpouy Tas ffcofiariKas ' 80fv Kal ra^rais KO\afa8ai fj.a\\ov robs ajuaprcJ- vovras. (The same,7Z>wZ.x. 137.) XaXeir&Tfpw yap rb irovely, otKei- 6repov Se rb jjSeirfloi in f!0i' Ku.1 ir\fiova Bdrspov liroiovvro. * This is indicated by the ex- pression oiKei6Tfpov in the above passage also. See p. 359, 2. To say that not all pleasure and pain is connected with bodily states, may be harmonised with this statement by taking it to be their meaning, that not every feeling has its immediate object in the body, without, however, denying more remote connection between such feel- ings and the body. Joy for one's country's prosperity might in their minds be connected with the thought that our own hap- piness depends on that of our country. It can only be con- sidered an opponent's exagge- ration for Pansetius and Cicero to assert that the Cyrenaics made bodily pleasure the end of life. (See p. 354, 3.) Cic. Acad. iv. 45, 139 : Aristippus, quasi animum nullum habea- mus, corpus solum tuetur. The highest good Aristippus de- clared consists not in bodily pleasure, but in pleasure gene- rally. If he regarded bodily pleasure as the strongest, and in this sense as the best, it by no means follows that he ex- cluded mental pleasures from CYRENAIC THEORY OF PLEASURE. 369 they nevertheless contended that there must be a CHAP. something besides sensuous feelings, or it would be impossible to explain how unequal impressions are produced by perceptions altogether alike : the sight, for instance, of the sufferings of others, if they are real, gives a painful impression ; if only seen on the stage, a pleasurable one. 1 They even allowed that there are pleasures and pains of the mind which have no immediate reference to any states of the body. The prosperity, for instance, of our country fills us with as much pleasure as does our own. 2 Although therefore pleasure is in general made to coincide with the good, and pain with evil, the Cyrenaics are far from expecting happiness to result from the mere satisfaction of animal instincts. For a true enjoy- ment of life, you not only need to weigh the value and the consequences of every enjoyment, but you need also to acquire the proper disposition of mind. The most essential help to a pleasant life is prudence, 3 not only because it supplies that presence of mind which is never at a loss for means, 4 but, mainly, be- cause it teaches how to make a proper use of the the idea of good. Indeed, his ras tyvxwks ytiovas remarks respecting the value tirl roi masc. ii. 13, 138. 3(50 THE SOCRATIC SCHOOLS. CHAP. good things of life ; l freeing from the prejudices and !_ fancies which stand in the way of success, such as nvy, passionate love, superstition ; 2 preserving from regret for the past, from desire for the future, from dependence on present enjoyment; and guaranteeing that freedom of soul of which we stand in need would we at every moment rest contented with our present lot, 3 Hence the cultivation of the mind is urgently advocated by these philosophers, 4 and philosophy in particular pointed to as the way to a truly human life. 5 They even assert that therein lies the essential condition of happiness; for although mankind are too far dependent on external circumstances for the wise man to be invariably happy, and the foolish man invariably miserable, 6 yet as a rule so it is. Nor 1 Demetr. (Elocut. 296) men- pus in Dwg. ii. 72 ; Pint. Ed. tions as an eTSosToC \6yov' Apia- Pu. 74. He is also mentioned riirirflov fat ol &v8puiroi xp^ara by Diogenes ii. 68 (Conf. Exc. juej/ airo\tiirovffi rois iratffiv iiriir- e Floril. Joan. Damasc. ii. 13, TTjjuiji/ Se ov ffwairo\flirovffi T^V 146) as the author of the say- Xpriffofj.vnv avrots. The thought ing, which Cic. Eep. i. 2 ; Plut. is Socratic. See p. 141, 2. adv. Col. 30, 2, p. 1124, attri- 2 Diog. 91 : rtv ao^v ufae bute to Xenocrates, that the <}>9ovfi fjL-f)Tf ^paae^a-effBai (on conduct of the philosopher this point compare the Ian- would remain the same, sup- guage used by Aristippus re- posing all laws to be abolished, specting his relations to Lais) 6 Diog. 91 : aptaicei 8' ainols 7) 8(iffi5aip.off]ffeiv, whereas he is /u^re -rbv ffotybv irdvTa ySfws fjv, not preserved from fear and M') Te TTO.VTO. $>av\ov tinTr6v(os, sorrow as being natural conse- a\\ct Kcnct rb ir\fiaTov. In the quences. same way the Cyrenaics would * See p. 355, 2. not deny that the &x <5 airex^efos, a\\' 6 343, according to Soter ; Timon in Diog. ii. 66 ; Ibid. ii. 69, iv. 40 ; Luoian. V. Auct. 1 2 ; Clemens, Paedag. ii. 176, D. ; Em. Pr. Ev. xiv. 18, 31 ; Ejpiph. Xcn. Mem. ii. 1, 1, already Exp. Fid. 1089 A. ; Steele, p. 41 ; 71. a See the anecdotes in Diog, ii. 66, 68, 69, 75, 76. ax. Tyr. Diss. vii. 9 } rapfKtpfp6/j.fvos Sf. Diog. 75 : rb Kpare'tv /col ^ j)TTaff8a.i fjSovuv Kpa-runov, ov rb calls liim a.Ko\as Trpbs TO. rotavra [irpbs Ppanov Ka\ TTOTOV Kol \a.yi>fias~], etc. He says himself then, 1, 9, that his object is ?? pa.ar& TI Kal Lucian, 1. c. ; Ibid. Cic. Ace. 23 ; ^Sia-ra froTfveiv ' and Socrates Tatian adv. Grac. c. 2 ; Tert. asks whether he depended for his homelessness on the cir- cumstance that no one could like to have him even as a slave ? T(S yap kv tO(\oi 6.vQps fifya^tyuxov ilvtu Aiovvcriov ' avTo"is juev yap /j.iKpk SiS6vai TrXfiAvw StojueKKS, TI\d- T(ei>t Se Tro\Aa ^7?Sej/ \afj.^dvoyrt. Dionysius at first refusing to give him any money because the wise man, on his own show- ing, was never in difficulties, he replied, Give me the money this once, and I will explain to you how it is; but no sooner had he got it, than he exclaimed, Ah I was I not right 1 Diog. 82, Diog. 67, 73, and Athen. xii. 544, tell further, on the author- ity of Hegesander, that once having been placed at the bottom of the table by Diony- sius because of some free ex- pression, he contented himself PRACTICAL LIFE OF CYRENAICS. 303 death too, from which his teaching professed to de- liver, 1 was not so fully overcome by him that he could face danger with the composure of a Socrates. 2 It would, nevertheless, be doing Aristippus a great injustice to consider him an ordinary, or at most a somewhat more intellectual pleasure-seeker. Enjoy he will, but, at the same time, he will be above enjoyment. He possesses not only the skill of adapting himself to circumstances and making use of persons and things, 3 not only the wit which is never at CHAP. XIV. with remarking, To-day, this is the place of honour which he assigns. Another time he is said to have taken it quite quietly when Dionysius spat in his face, observing : A fisher- man must put up with more moisture, to catch even a smaller fish. Once, when begging a fa- vour for a friend, he fell at the feet of Dionysius, Diog. 73, and when reproached for so doing, Wherefore, he asked, has Diony- sjus ears on his legs ? It is a common story that Dionysius once asked him and Plato to appear dressed in purple : Plato refused to do so, but Aristippus acceded with a smile. Sext. Pyrrh. iii. 204, i. 155 ; Dwg. 78 ; Suid. 'Apurr.; Stab. Ploril. 5, 46 ; Greg. Naz. Carm. ii. 10, 324: the latter unskilfully places the incident at the court of Archelaus. Stein, 67. The observation in Diog. 81, is like- wise referred to Plato, that he allowed himself to be abused by Dionysius for the same reasons that others abused him : a preacher of morals after all is only pursuing his own inter- ests. He is represented as a flatterer and parasite of Diony- sius, by Lucian V. Aut. 12 ; Parasit. 33, Bis Accus. 23 ; Men. 13. 1 See Diog. 76 : at the same time the Cyrenaics consider fear to be something natural and unavoidable. See p. 360, 2. 2 On the occasion of a storm at sea he was charged with dis- playing more fear than others, notwithstanding his philoso- phy, to which he adroitly re- plied : ov yap irtpl fyoias ^vx^s ayiavitajj-tv a/j,(p6rfpoi, Diog. 71 ; Gell. xix. 1, 10 ; ^Elian, V. H. ix. 20. 3 Diog. 66 : $v Si apuoiraatjai Kal r&iry Kal nal irpoffwircpjKal iraaav ittpiffraffiv apfjLoSltes \neoKpivai Oai Sib Kal irapa. Aiovufficp TWV a\\uv cvSoKi/xet jUuAAoi/, ad rb irpoffirfffbv eS Siari- Bt/jitvos. A few instances of this skill have been already seen (p. 362, 3). Here, too, belongs what is told by Galen, and VI- truv. (see p. 340), that after having suffered shipwreck, and lost everything, he immediately contrived in Syracuse or Kh f him and Plato apropos of a dish of fish : 6pas olv . , . on avv tyu tyoQayos, a.\\a ffv aiKap- yvpos. Another time he argues that if good living were wrong, it would not be employed to honour the festivals of the gods. Ibid. 68. Another time, when some one took him to task for his good living, he asked him to dinner. The invitation being accepted, he at once drew the conclusion that he must be too stingy to live well himself. Ibid. 76. When Dionysius offered him the choice between three mistresses, he chose them all, with the gallant observa- tion, that it had been a bad thing for Paris to prefer one of three goddesses, but bade them all farewell at his door. Ibid. 67. When attacked for his re- lations to Lais, he answered with the well-known %x> Ka * OVK exo/nou. The same relation is said to have given rise to other light jokes ; it was all the same to him whether the house in which he lived had been occupied by others before ; he did not care whether a fish liked him, if he liked the fish. The Cynicism is betrayed by the anecdotes in Diog. 81, p. 341, 4, although they are not other- wise at variance with Grecian morals. PRACTICAL LIFE OF CYRENAICS. stances to keep cheerful. 1 Come what may, there is a bright side to things, 2 and he knows how to wear the beggar's rags and the robe of state with equal grace. 3 Pleasure he loves, but he can also dispense therewith. 4 He will continue master of his desires. 5 His temper shall not be ruffled by any risings of passion. 6 Some importance is attached to riches, but hardly any independent value, 7 and therefore the want of them is never felt. He is lavish of them because he does not cling to them. 8 If necessary, he can do without them, 9 and is readily consoled for CHAP. XIV. 1 See pp. 355 and 360. 2 Hot\ Ep. i. 17, 23: omnis Aristippum decuit color et sta- tus et res, tentantem majora fere, prsesentibus aequum. Plut. de Vit. Horn. B., 150: 'Apla- TITTJTOS Kal irevia Kal ir6i>ois avvi\vt- Xdt] tppu*7. 67, Plato is said to have remarked to him : epfu> KOI paKos. The same re- mark, and not the story of the purple dress, is referred to by Pint. Virt. Alex. 8, p. 330: ov 6av/j.do/j.at -rbv 2w/c- TI Kal rpi/3coi/i \n

    49, 22 ; conf. Greg. Naz. Carm. ii. 10, 419, vol. ii. 430 Codd. ; not to mention the anecdotes in Diog. 75, repeated Ibid. vi. 32 ; Galen. Exhort, ad Art. c. 8, i. 18, k. 6 On the principle mentioned 1 InPZwtf.Tranq. An. 8, p. 469, by Hor. Ep. i. 1, 18: nunc in Aristippi furtlm prsecepta rela- bor, et mihi res, non me rebus subjungere conor. According to the context, however, the principle should not be con- fined to Aristippus' relationsto Aristippus having lost an estate, one of his friends expresses sympathy with him, upon which Aristippus replies : Have I not now three estates, whilst you have only one ? Ought I not rather to sympathise with you ? outward possessions. Here, too, Hor. see p. 365, 2, Diog; ii. 72 : TO. &ptffra inrfriQero iy Ov- yarpl 'f>.p-firri, awaffKiev avrriv inrepoirriK^v rov irAeWos fivai. Hence the same story in Ep. the saying belongs Plut. in Hes. 9, vol. xiv. 296, Hu. : ffv/j.- ftov\ov SetirOai. xelpov eli/ai TOV irpoffairfiv. Conf. p. 363, 3. Xen. Mem. ii. 1, 8. In reply Socrat. 29, the compiler of this to Socrates, who asked whether late and miserable counterfeit he considered himself among not having used the earlier genuine letters to Aret. men- tioned by Suid 'ApiW. 8 See further details in Plut. rdrrco the number of those who rule, or those who are ruled, Aris- tippus states : eywy' ovS' o\ws ye Cupid. Div. 3, p. 524. 4 See p. 365, 2, Diog. 91 : oV frufiaTLKiiv &(Tx-r\(riv ffvtn.pd.\\rBai npbs operas TSiv &px f "' fiovKonevtov TC^IC. For, as is ex- plained here and p. 17, there is no man who is more troubled than a statesman : ^aavrbv roi- PRACTICAL LIFE OF CYRENAICS. 367 Still less did he allow himself to be restrained by religious considerations or traditions. We have at least every reason for asserting this both of Aristippus personally, and of his School. 1 Theodorus was pro- bably the first to gain notoriety for his wanton attacks on the popular faith ; 2 still a connection between the Cyrenaic philosophy and the insipid rationalism of Euemerus 3 is far from certain. Nor ought it to be forgotten, that Aristippus strove to make life easy not only for himself, but also for CHAP. XIV. vvv Tarrta Is robs @ov\ofj.evovs y pao-rd re teal ^Surra fSiortveiv. When Socrates met this by ob- serving that those who rule are better off than those who are ruled, he rejoined : dXA.' lyx ais rrv\\virov/j.i>os vfjui>,a\\.' 'Lva. Travffw vfj.as \vTrovfjkfvovs. In theory, Aristippus could only estimate the value of friendship by its utility, as Epicurus did at a later time. Diog. 91 : rbu ov $\e-ye rbv eiiScujUO- that, in Plut. Tranq. Anim. 5, vovvra, evyeit> (1. av\ov} 8e rln> p. 567, Theodorus complains Swruxovvra, K&V rj crowds' /col that his pupils misunderstood alptriv tlvai rbv &$pova ir\ovfftot> him a statement which, if it fora, nal aire^r) (diraflfj ?) This be true, probably refers to the statement, likewise, seems to practical application of his be rather in the nature of a principles. He may have led hasty conclusion, for Theodorus a more moral life than Bio makes happiness depend on in- (Dioff. iv. 63 ; Clemens, Paedag. telligence, and not on things 15, A.), and yet have expressed without. the logical consequences of the * Diog. 98, Epiph. 1. c. 378 THE SOCRATIC SCHOOLS. CHAP. XIV. without reserve ; l Bio 2 and Euemerus 3 herein fol- lowing his example. For all that, the theory of 1 The atheism of Theodorus, which, besides bringing down on him an indictment at Athens, gained for him the standing epithet &0tos (he was called 0bs according to Diog. ii. 86, 100, in allusion to a joke of Stilpo's, but probably KO.T' avritpaa-iv for Jifooj), will be fre- quently mentioned. In Diog. 97 he says : 3\v . . . iravrdiraaiv avaipwv r&s vfpl 6(pov{)Ts ava.ffK.tva.ff as. Cic. (N. D. i. 1, 2) says : nullos [Decs] esse omnino Diagoras Melius et Theodorus Cyrenaicus puta- verunt. Ibid. 23, 63 : Nonne aperte Deorum naturam sustu- lerunt ? Ibid. 42, 117 : Omnino Deos esse negabant, a statement which Minuc. Fel. Oct. 8, 2, and Lact. Ira Dei, 9, probably re- peat after him. Likewise Plut. Comm. Not. 31, 4, p. 1075, says : Even Theodorus and those who shared his views did not de- clare God to be corruptible, &\\' OVK (iriffTtvaav us effri -rt &. Ej)iph. (Expos. Fid. 1089, A.) also asserts that he denied the existence of a God. In the face of these agreeing testimonies, the assertion of Clemens (Paedag. 15, A.), that Theodorus and others had wrongly been called atheists, and that they only denied the popular Gods, their lives being otherwise good, can be of little weight. Theodorus no doubt denied the Gods of the people in the first place, but it was not his intention to distinguish between them and the true God. The anecdotes in Diog. ii. 101, 116, give the impression of in- sincerity. 2 Diog. iv. 54: iroXXa. 5e /col a.(itTpov irpoffetpfpfTo fols 6/j.i- Xovffi TOVTO QeoSupfiov airoXat- ffos but in his last illness he was overcome with remorse, and had recourse to enchant- ments. The argument quoted by Sen. Benef. vii. 7, 1, to prove that every one and that no one commits sacrilege is more a rhetorical and intellec- tual work of skill. 8 The view of Euemerus re- specting the Gods is briefly as follows : There are two kinds of Gods heavenly and incorrup- tible beings, who are honoured by men as Gods, such as the sun, the stars, the winds ; and dead men, who were raised to the rank of Gods for their benefits to mankind. Diodorus in Mis. Pr. Ev. ii. 2, 52. To the latter class of beings Eue- merus referred the whole of Mythology, and supposed it to be a history of princes and LATER CYRENAICS. THEODORUS. 379 Aristippus did not altogether satisfy him. He was CHAP, fain to admit that pleasure and pain do not merely 1_ depend on ourselves and our inner state, but also in a great measure on external circumstances ; and he therefore sought such a definition of the highest good as should secure happiness to the wise man, and make that happiness dependent on his prudence. 1 This result, he thought, would be reached if happi- ness were made to consist, not in individual plea- sures, but in a cheerful state of mind and con- versely evil, not in individual feelings of pain, but in an unhappy tone of mind ; for feelings being the effects of impressions from without, states of mind are in our own power. 2 Accordingly, Theodorus asserted that in themselves pleasure and pain are neither good nor bad ; goodness consists in cheerfulness, evil in sadness ; the former proceeds from prudence, the latter from folly; therefore pursue prudence and justice, eschew princesses, Uranus, Cronus, Cyrenaic doctrine belongs to Zeus, Khea, &c. For further Theodorus : that not every evil particulars respecting this ra- engenders sorrow, but only un- tionalising history of the Gods, foreseen evils, that many pre- consult 8teinfuirt,Al\g. Encyclo. cautions can be taken to pre- Art. Euhemerus. V. Sierolta, vent sorrow by familiarising De Euhemero. ourselves with the thought of 1 These reasons are not men- f ut ure evils. What control of tioned in so many words, but outward impressions he con- they follow from Theodorus' sidered possible by prudence, positions about the highest appears also from the explana- good, and also from the stress tory remarks in Stob. Floril. which, according to Diog. 98, 119, 16 ; the wise man has he laid on the avrdpitfia of the never sufficient reason to put wise man, and the difference an end to his own life, and it he made between wisdom and is inconsistent to call vile the folly. only evil, and then to put an 2 Probably what Cio. (Tusc. end to life to avoid the suf- iii. 13, 28 ; 14, 31) quotes as ferings of life. 880 THE SOCRATIC SCHOOLS. CHAP, ignorance and wrong-doing. 1 Occasionally he him- 1_ self displayed a fearlessness and an indifference to life 2 which would have done honour to a Cynic. Not that the theory of pleasure was therewith sur- rendered, but the older setting of that theory was changed. In place of individual pleasures, a state of mind was substituted, independent of the mere feelings of enjoyment and pleasure. Instead of a cheerful resignation to the impressions of the mo- ment, the highest good was made to consist in rising superior to circumstances. (2) Hege- , Hegesias went a step further. He, too, adheres to the general maxims of Aristippus. With him good is identical with pleasure, evil with unhappi- ness : all that we do, we do only for ourselves ; if services are rendered to others, it is only because advantages are expected in return. 3 But on looking 1 Diog. 98 : reXos 8' vne\dn&ave 102 ; Pint. Exil. 16 ; Philo, Qu. Xapac Kal \vw-tjv T^IV /*/ pdi/7jcrii/ KOI StKaioffvvriv, crucify him, upon which Theo- KO.KI Se ray evavrias e|ejs, jue'tra dorus uttered the celebrated Se ^8o//V Kal ic&vov. That justice saying, that it was indifferent should be reckoned among to him whether he went to good things may be brought corruption in the earth or in into agreement with what is the air. Cic. Tusc. i. 43, 102 ; quoted p. 266, 3. It is to be Valer. Max. vi. 2, 3 ; Pint. An. recommended, because it pro- Vitios. 3, p. 499 ; Stob. Floril. tects us from the unpleasant 2, 23, attribute another saying consequences of forbidden ac- to him on the same occasion, tions, and from the disquiet attributing to Anaxarchus the which the prospect of these above passage in Stob. Floril. consequences produces, al- 2, 23. though such actions are not in s Diog. ii. 93 : ol 8e "HynffiaKol themselves inadmissible. bey6fj.fvot (ricoirobs iitv fi^ov TOVS 2 When at the court of Ly- adrovs rjSov^v Kal ir6vov, fj.^jre Se fiimachus, he so enraged the x^P'*" Tt ''" X( M^ T tavrov yvteffiv, rcoi/ r' eu\6yca &\\wi> tiria"ns &iov sentence in the connection of aiT^5 kb.v ydp rd fj.eyiara Sony the doctrine of Hegesias, where irapd TOV Kapirovadai, ^ flvai it most probably belongs, with- dfTaJio Siv avrbs irapdffxp- Ejpiph. out, however, unconditionally Exp. Fid. 1089, B., says the guaranteeing for it this rela- same, but less accurately. tion. 1 Dioff. 94 : rV evSai/jLOflav * Diog. 95 : r6v re aofov ovx 8\o>s O^VVCLTOV ilvai rb fj.fi/ -yap OVTW it\*ov aya&uv (7iu.a TroXXeii/ o.vairfirXri'jQai iradrj- atpffffi, &s tv TTJ ruv KO.KWV t fj.droi> 5tci Se Epiplianiitu, 1. c. ; conf. p. 343, 1. (Tirdviev ^ evifffj,l>v fy K6pn> rovs * Ibid. : f\eyov TO, a/xapTrj/iara p.fv fySenBai TOIIS 8" aijScos fX ' v ffvyyi tau.i\s rvyxdveiv ov y&p 3 Ibid. 95 : ical T$ i*tv &<$>povi fK&vra anaprdveiv, a\\d rivi rJ fpv \vffire\es, flvat. rif 5e irdOfi Karriva-yKaff^fvov KOI aSidni ' and, like the older Cyrenaics, he would not hear of a general aim of life, nor substitute freedom from pain in the place of pleasure. 1 He observed too that by pleasure only our own pleasure can be understood ; for of the feelings of others, according to the old 1 Clemens, Strom, ii. 417, B. : statement in Diog. ii. 96 : of 8' of 8e 'A.vt>iicepttoi Ka\ov/j.fvoi . . . 'Awtitfpeioi T& /JLCV &\\a (caret TOV /j.tv S\ov &iov Tt\os ovtev TauTk Tofaois the School of tapurntvov Ta|oi', eKdVnjs Se Hegesias and also the asser- irpti^ojy IStov virdpxftv Tf\os, rty tion (Suid. 'Awfx.) that Anni- in TTJS irpct|ws irtpiyivofi.(vi)v ceris, although living, accord - fi8ov)]v, 081-01 of Kvpri^aiKol TOP ing to Suidas, in the time of Spov TTJS T)8oj/i)s 'EiriKofyou, TOUT- Alexander, was an Epicurean. tffn r^v TOV oA/yoDi/roj {nr(al- Cicero and Diogenes likewise pea-iv, &0(Tov. Sdev, Sia ravra fvSaifj.oviav SL' av-r^v ;u}j flvai trets aya8e'|r)Tai 6 tirl aTroSe'xefflcu, Siv inro\fiiroveff6ai a.\\a Kal wapa T^JV 4vl (pi\ori/j.tais. Comp. Cic. Off. ytyovvlav ttivoiav ?is eVeico Kal iii. 33, 116. See p. 347, 2. iroVous viro^fvf^v, nal TOI nQf^fvov The expression in Clement, TV ^ov^v Tf\os ical axS^evov M 1$ IK TTJS irpd^etas vepiyii'Oft.fvr.v arepfffBat aur^s Spas eKov 5t& rV Trpbs riv wpby rb 6appriffat Kal with. rrii rwv iro\\cav 5<5|Tj? inrtpavu 3 Diog. 96 : fateKncov 8t Kal yevevBai Sew 8" avt6ifff8ai Sib yoyeas TI/U^V Kal virtp irarpiSos rt av\i)v StdOffftv. LATER CTRENAICS. SUMMARY. 3& Thus the Cyrenaic doctrine is seen gradually to CHAP- vanish away. Aristippus declared that pleasure was the only good, understanding by pleasure actual en- joyment, and not mere freedom from pain ; and, moreover, making the pleasure of the moment, and not the state of man as a whole, to be the aim of all action. One after another these limitations were abandoned. Theodorus denied the last one, Hegesias the second, and even the first was assailed by Anni- ceris. It thus appears how impossible it is to com- bine the Socratic demand for prudence and indepen- dence of the external world, with the leading thought of the theory of pleasure. The Socratic element disintegrates that theory and brings it round to its opposite. The process, however, taking place with- out intellectual consciousness, no new principle results therefrom. Oddly enough the very men in whom this result is most apparent, in other respects clung to the doctrines of Aristippus with the greatest pertinacity. c c 38S THE SOCRATIC SCHOOLS. CHAPTER XV. CHAP. XV. A. Incon- sistencies of the im- perfect Socrativ schools. BETROSPECT. INCONSISTENCIES appear to have been common to all the Socratic Schools. It was, without doubt, an in- consistency on the part of the Megarians to confine knowledge to conceptions, and at the same time to do away with all possibility of development and with anything like multiplicity or definiteness in concep- tions ; to declare that being is the good, and, at the same time, by denying variety and motion to being, to deprive it of that creative power which alone can justify such a position ; to begin with the Socratic wisdom, and to end in unmeaning hair-splitting. It was an inconsistency on the part of Antisthenes to endeavour to build all human life on a foundation of knowledge, whilst at the same time destroying all knowledge by his statements touching the meaning and connection of conceptions. It was no small in- consistency both in himself and his followers to aim at a perfect independence of the outer world, and yet to attribute an exaggerated value to the externals of the Cynic mode of life ; to declare war against pleasure and selfishness, and at the same time to pronounce the wise man free from the most sacred moral duties ; to renounce all enjoyments, and yet SO CR AT 1C SCHOOLS RELATED TO SOCRATES. 387 to revel in the enjoyment of a moral self-exaltation. CHAP. In these inconsistencies and in their unintentional contradictions appears the unsatisfactory nature of the principles from which all these Schools started. It is seen how far they were removed from the per- fect moderation, from the ready susceptibility of mind, from the living versatility of Socrates, all clinging to particular sides of his personal character, but unable to comprehend it as a whole. The same fact will also, no doubt, explain that B - tendency to Sophistry which is so striking in these *morefol~ philosophers. The captious reasoning of the Mega- hwers of rians, the indifference of the Cynics to all speculative tkanoftJu- knowledge, and their contempt for the whole theory op * *" of conceptions, no less than the doctrines of Aristip- pus relative to knowledge and pleasure, savour more of the Sophists than of Socrates. Yet all these schools professed to follow Socrates, nor was there one of them which did not place some element of the Socratic philosophy at the head of its system. It is therefore hardly correct for modern writers to find nothing but sophistical views in their teaching, sup- plemented and corrected by what is Socratic, and, instead of deducing their differences from the many- sidedness of Socrates, to refer them to the diversities of the Sophists converging from many sides towards the Socratic philosophy as a centre. 1 With decided 1 K. F. Hermann, Ges. Abh. to be regarded as a corrective, 228, who, amongst other things modifying more or less strongly there says that the agreement their fundamental views de- in matter between these schools rived from the Sophists; they . and the Socratic teaching ought are the pioneers of advancing cc 2 88 THE SOCRATIC SCHOOLS. CHAP, admirers of Socrates, such as Antisthenes and Euclid r XY ' there can be not even a shadow of support for this view. Such men conscientiously aiming at a faith- ful reproduction of the life and teaching of Socrates, must have been conscious that to him they were first indebted for an intellectual centre, and that from him they had first received the living germ of a true philosophy ; indeed this may be clearly observed in their philosophy. In their case it is wrong to speak of the ennobling influence of Socrates on sophistical principles ; we ought rather to speak of the influence of sophistry on their treatment of the teaching of Socrates. Socrates, as it were, gave the substance of the teaching, sophistry being only a narrower limita- tion of it ; for this reason a School like that of the Stoics was able in the end to connect itself with that of the Cynics. With Aristippus the case is somewhat different. Yet even in respect of him it has been already established, not only that he professed to be a fol- lower of Socrates, but that he really was one, although he penetrated less than others into the deeper mean- ing of the founder's teaching, and showed the influ- ence of sophistical views most plainly. If then- sophistry, endeavouring to act with the proof of the differ- as an equipoise to Socratic ence in principle between the teaching, &c. Yet this remark Eristie of the Sophists and agrees ill with those steps in that of Megara. (Ges. Abh. 250, advance of Socrates which f.) Far more correct and more Hermann thinks to discern in in keeping with our view was many sophistical assertions of that expressed by Hermann at Antisthenes and Aristippus an earlier time. (Plat. 257.) (see pp. 296, 1 ; 370, 2), and IMPORTANCE OF SOCRATIC SCHOOLS. 389 besides lower capacities, previous sophistical training CHAP. may be the cause which prevented the founders of the imperfect Schools from entering so deeply or fully into the spirit of their master as Plato did, it should also be remembered that Socrates himself .gave occasion to this variety in the Schools which were connected with him. On the one hand, his personal character afforded so rich a field as to invite investigation in the most opposite directions ; on the other hand, the scientific form of his philosophy was so imperfect and so unsystematic, that it gave scope for many diverging modes of treatment. 1 This disintegration of the Socratic Schools is c. Im- accordingly not without importance for the further ^Jw* progress of philosophy. Bringing out the separate schools. elements which were united in Socrates, and connect- ing them with the corresponding elements in the pre- Socratic philosophy, it held them up for more careful observation. The problems were set for all sub- sequent thinkers to discuss. The logical and ethical -consequences of the Socratic maxims were brought to light. On the other hand, it was seen what the separation of the various elements in the teaching of Socrates, and their combination with other .theories, would lead to, unless these theories were 1 Cic. de Orat. iii. 16, 61, quasi familise dissentientes in- observes with some justice, but ter se, &c. For instance, Plato somewhat superficially : Cum and Antisthenes, qui patien- cssent plures orti fere a Socrate, tiam et duritiam in Socratico quod ex illius variis et diversis sermone maxime adamarat, and et in omnem partem diffusis also Aristlppus, quern iliac ma- disputationibus alius aliud ap- gis voluptariae disputationes prehenderat, proseminatie sunt delectarant. 390 THE SOCRATIC SCHOOLS. CHAP, first recast after the mind of Socrates. In this way ' the one-sidedness of the smaller Socratic schools was indirectly instrumental in enforcing the demand for a comprehensive treatment which should connect the different aspects of the Socratic philosophy more closely with each other and with earlier systems, and decide the importance of each one relatively to the rest. In both ways these Schools influenced Plato and Aristotle, Euclid supplying to Plato the basis for his theory of ideas, Antisthenes and Aristippus the groundwork for his theory of the highest good. Of greater importance is the fact that those fol- lowers of Socrates prepared the way for the course taken by philosophy after the time of Aristotle. True as it is that the post-Aristotelian systems are not immediately connected with the imperfect Socratic Schools, and that those systems would have been impossible without Plato and Aristotle ; still it must not be forgotten that these thinkers are also deeply indebted to the Socratic Schools. The predominance of practical over intellectual interests which the post- Aristotelian philosophy dis- plays ; the moral contentment with which the wise man, withdrawing from everything external, falls back upon the consciousness of his freedom and virtue ; the citizenship of the world which can dis- pense with a country and political interest all these peculiarities of later times are foreshadowed in the lesser Socratic Schools. The Stoa adopted the moral principles of the Cynics almost in their entirety, only softening them down and expanding them in applica- IMPORTANCE OF SOCRATIC SCHOOLS. m tion. The same School looks for its logic chiefly to the CHAP. Megarians besides Aristotle. From the School of ^' Megara too the scepticism of Pyrrho and the Academy branched off, albeit in a somewhat different direction. The teaching of Aristippus reappears in Epicurus, only changed in some details. In short, tendencies, which at an earlier period could only secure a qua- lified recognition, obtained the upper hand when strengthened, recast, and supplemented by other elements. Yet even this was not possible until the intellec- tual strength of Greece had abated, and her political condition had become so far hopeless as to favour the view that indifference to everything external could alone lead to peace of mind. Previously the intellectual sense had been too quick, and the Greek spirit too keen, to allow the hard-won results of the Socratic philosophy to be thus frittered away. That philosophy according to its deeper bearings must needs issue in a science of conceptions such as was set forth by Plato and Aristotle. Only by separating the various but inwardly con- nected elements of the Socratic teaching, only by confounding the form in which Socrates clothed his teaching with that teaching itself, and mistaking defects in manner for defects in matter, could phi- losophy be limited to metaphysics so abstract and a criticism so empty as the Megarian, to morals so unintellectual and absolutely negative as those of the Cynics ; or could the doctrine of Aristippus pass for truly Socratic. Whilst therefore these Schools 2 THE SOCRATIC SCHOOLS. CHAP, are not without importance for the progress of ' Greek philosophy, their intellectual productions can- not be valued very highly. A truer understanding and a more comprehensive treatment of the Socratic philosophy, was the work of Plato. INDEX. ACA A CADEMICIANS, 269 J\. Academy, older, 50; connected j with Plato, 61 ; new, 4 Accusation, the, of Socrates, 193 ^schines, view of Socrates, 76 ; assigns the reason for the con- demnation of Socrates, 211 ; a disciple of Socrates, 245 ; his prose preferred by some to that of Xenophon, 245 JSschylus, illustrating the state of thought in the fifth century, B.C., 6 ; on the boundary line between two periods, 9; difference be- tween, and Sophocles, 12; con- trasted with Euripides, 16 JSthiops, a pupil of the elder Ari- stippus, 342 Agatho, the dainty elegance of, 20 Alcibiades, of Plato's, 78 ; allows that the discourses of Socrates seem rude, 80; fascinated by Socrates, 183, 184 ; his connec- tion with Socrates, 207, 214, 219, 221 Alexinus, a native of Elis, notorious for his captiousness, 253; two arguments of his known, 268; attacked by Menedemus the Ere- trian, 282 Anaxagoras, his teaching referred to by Euripides, 19 ; proves that spirit alone can make a world out of matter, 42 ; teaching known to Socrates, 57 ; extravagant theories of, 135 ; his view of God as the Keason of the world, 176 ; his atheism charged on Socrates, 221 Ancient morality, relation of So- crates to, 226 Anniceris, a Cyrenaic, pupil of Antipater, 343, 375, 379, 385 Antigone of Sophocles, 13 Antipater, a Cyrenaic, pupil of the elder Aristippus, 342 ; Hegesias and Anniceris his pupils, 343 Antisthenes, theory of, dangerous to the popular faith, 229; founder of a Socratic School, the Cynic, 247, 284, 291 ; a native of Athens, 284 ; rejects every combination of subject and predicate, 277 ; holds that the One alone exists, 279 ; the teacher of Diogenes, 286 ; his character, 291 ; ex- presses himself in favour of cul- ture, 293; his nominalistic theory, 297 ; prefers madness to pleasure, 305 ; how led to his views, 307 ; allows that some kinds of pleasure are good, 308 ; makes virtue consist in know- ledge, 310, 311 ; considers mar- riage unnecessary, 320 ; censures popular government, 322 ; doubts INDEX. popular faith, 327; assails my- steries, 329 ; makes happiness the end of philosophy, 346 ; de- viates from teaching of Socrates, 374 ; inconsistencies of, 386 Anytus, the accuser of Socrates, 193 ; his dislike for Socrates, 203 ; based on some supposed personal injury, 205, 206, 207 ; a leading democrat, 211 ; a vio- lent opponent of the Sophists, 218 ; supposed to uphold ancient morality, 231 Aphrodite, story of, in Euripides, 17 Apollonius of Gyrene, surnamed Cronos, 251 Apology, 101 ; the language of Socrates in, 79 ; sifting of men described in, 125 ; cautious lan- guage of, on a future life, 153 ; moral considerations dwelt on by Socrates in his, 185 ; proves that popular opinion about So- crates agreed with the picture drawn by Aristophanes, 215 ; Xenophon's, 205 Archilaus, teaches that the spirit returns to the ether, 19 ; falsely said to have been a teacher of Socrates, 57 Archipylus, an Elean philosopher, 280 Arete, daughter of the elder Ari- stippus, 341 Arginusse, state of public feeling after battle of, 207; Socrates hazarded his life to save the victors at, 225 Aristides, the time of, 231 ; sup- posed relationship of, to So- crates, 62, n. Aristippus, connection of his teach- ing to that of Socrates, 155 ; doc- trine of, 392 ; founder of a Socra- tic School, the Cyrenaic, 247, 337 ; independent in character, 339 ; Ms pupils, 341 ; the Cyrenaic ARI doctrine his, 344 ; studied Ethics exclusively, 346 ; thinks happi- ness the end of philosophy, 347, 375, 385 ; considers enjoyment an end in itself, 347, 376 ; theory of highest good, 391 ; develop- ment of his leading thought, 348 ; considers feeling produced by internal motion, 352 ; con- duct and views of, 352, 361 ; a free-thinker, 367; greatly in- debted to Socrates, 368 ; not a degenerate pupil of Socrates, 370, 375 ; has many Socratic traits, 372 ; dispenses with property and enjoyment, 373 ;. deviates further from Socrates than Antisthenes, 374 ; his scanty remarks on the origin of im- pressions, 374 ; his principles adhered to by Theodorus, 379 : and by Hegesias, 380 ; teaching reappears in Epicurus, 392 Aristippus the younger, grandson of the elder Aristippus, 341 ; his pupils, 342 Aristophanes, illustrating the pro- blem of philosophy, 29 ; an enemy of innovation, 29, 108, 114, 217, 218 ; his play of the ' Clouds ' supposed to have been suggested by Anytus, 203, 206 [see Clouds'] ; considered So- crates a dangerous teacher, 207 ;. opposeshimonpatrioticgrounds, 209 ; charges Socrates with So- phistic display, 221 Aristotelian distinction between philosophy and convention, 312 Aristotle, his physical discussions, 45 ; subordinate to metaphysics, 40 ; expands the conceptional philosophy of Socrates, 42, 47, 128; adheres to Idealism, 4], 49; his criticism of Plato's Ideas, 49 ; his ethical views, 46 ; the ripe fruit of Greek philoso- phy, 50 ; influenced by imper- INDEX. 395- ARI feet Schools, 50 ; introduces in- ductive method, 129 ; his notices of Socratic philosophy, 101, 104, 137 ; agree with those of Plato, 181, 182 ; and supplement those of Xenophon, 183 ; his view of the chief merit of Socrates, 132 ; attacked by Eubulides, 251 ; de- nies that any propositions are false, 301 ; gives logic to the Stoics, 391 Aristotle of Gyrene, a contem- porary of Theodore, 344 Aristoxenus, account of Socrates, 58, n. ; disparaging, 70, 2 Asceticism of Neoplatonists, 46 ; of Antisthenes, 305 ; of post- Aristotelians, 45 Asclepiades removes Elean School to Eretria, 280 Asiatic, the state of Xenophon an A. kingdom, 244 Aspasia, teacher of Socrates, 57 ; a friend of Socrates, 166 Athenian polish, 73 ; taste, 80 ; de- mocracy, 169, 194, 223; popular men, 29 ; people victims, 30 ; tragedians, 4 Athenians, 198, 211, 228 ; guilt of, 233, 234 ; repentance of, 201 Athens, central position of, 3 ; legendary history of, 28 ; plague of, 28 ; citizens of, 31 ; their ad- vantages, 31 ; state of, after Peloponnesian war, 28, 29, 30 ; intellectual movement going on at, 54, 55, 183 ; the abode of So- crates, 193, 230; state of public opinion, 234 ; political intrigues of, 51; not governed by Sophists, 204 ; fall of, 218 ; old constitu- tion re-established by enemies of Sophists, 219 ; ancient glory of, 219 ; Gods of, 214 ; Aristippus led to Athens, 337 Atomists, views of, known to Socra- tes, 57 Atreus, story of house of, 8 OLE Attic prose, models of, 245 ; philo- sophy, 32 Authorities for the philosophy of Socrates, 101, 105, 181, 184 ; for Megarian philosophy, 249 B Euripides, 17 Bacchylides illustrating the pro- blem of philosophy, 21 Bacchus, story of birth of, 17 Being and Becoming, Megarian view of, 259 Bio, the Borysthenite, a Cyrenaic, pupil of Theodore, 343, 378 Brucker's time, a turning point in estimate of authorities for So- crates' life, 99 Bryso, son of Stilpo, 255 nAPTIOUSNESS [see Eristic}. Cato's view of the condemnation of Socrates, 205 Cebes, 246 Character of Socrates, greatness of, 70 ; peculiar features in, 77 ; Grecian peculiarities in, 74, 95 Characteristics of the Socratic phi- losophy, 102 Charges, unfounded, against So- crates, 220 ; charges against his political views, 213 ; against his moral and religious views, 214 Charmides, a disciple of Socrates, 212 Chronology of the life of Socrates, 53, n. 1 Chrysippus, blames Menedemus and Stilpo for plausible fallacies, 282 Civil life, 165; renunciation of,, by Cynics, 319 Cleon, 210, 30 INDEX, CLI Clinomachus, 251 Clytaemnestra, of JSschylus, 13; of Euripides, a doubter, 1 8 * Clouds,' the, of Aristophanes, suggested by Anytus, 203, 206 ; attack Socrates as a Sophist, 210, 215 ; scope of, 214 ; portrait in, 215, 61, n. 1. Comedians, illustrating the pro- blem of philosophy, 29 ^Conceptions, theory of, characte- ristic of the'Socratic Bra, 39, 40, 109 ; importance of, for So- crates, 131 ; denned, 41 ; com- mon to Plato and Aristotle, 42 ; developed, 47 ; formation of, 128 ; proof by, 128, 130; rejected by Euclid, 259 ; developed to Nominalism by Cynics, 297 [see Dialectic'] Condemnation of Socrates, 198 ; causes of, 202 ; not the work of the Sophists, 202 ; not due to personal animosity, 205 ; real causes of, 213 ; justice of, 220 Connus, reputed teacher of So- crates, 56, 1 Contemporaries, relation of Socra- tes to, 231 -Conviction, personal, insisted on by Socrates, 227 Corinth, 251 Corybantic mysteries, 33 Crates, a pupil of Diogenes, 288 ; speaks approvingly of culture, 293; displays art, 334 Socrates, 39 Didactic poetry illustrating philo- sophy in fifth century, B.C., 21 Dike, JEschylus' conceptions of, 8 : Dioclides, 251 Diodorus, captiousness of, 269;. views on Motion, 269; on De- struction, 272 ; on the Possible, 272 ; surnamed Cronos, 252 ; teacher of Philo, 254 Diogenes, initiates Stilpo into Cynic doctrine, 253 ; a native of Sinope and pupil of Antisthenes. 287 ; uses expressions in favour of culture, 293 ; recommends justice, 308; his asceticism, 320; averse to marriage, 321; allows marriage of relations,. 322; Plato's view of, 331 : theory and practice overlap with, 369 j , testimony of, to line of argu- ment pursued in Euclid's time, 265 | Diotima, teacher of Socrates, 57, 1 j Dissen, view on authorities for Socrates' life, 100 Dodona, doves of, 26 Droyosen, view of Aristophanes,. 217, n. EDUCATION of Socrates, 55, 56,. n.l, 3,4; 57, n. 1,3 Egyptian priestesses in Herodotus, 26 Elean-Eretrian School, 279-283,- history of, 279; teaching of, 281 Eleatic doctrine of the One and All, 264, 265; difference be- tween sensual and rational knowledge, 260; revived by Cynics, 248 ; also by Megarians, 250 I Eleatics, subtleties of, 255; doc- trines of, 284 Klectra of Euripides, 16, 17 INDEX. LI Elis, 253 Elysium, received notions re- specting, 24 Empedocles, views of, known to Socrates, 57 Epicharmus, 21 Epicurean view of happiness, 45 ; apathy, 46 Epicureanism, an outcome of Cyrenaic School, 50 Epicureans, on the attainment of knowledge, 45; make personal conviction the standard of truth, 116 ; fond of slander, 70 Epicurus, placed the highest good in freedom from pain, 354 ; gave a new form to the philo- sophy of pleasure, 376 ; doctrine of Aristippus reappears in, 391 Eristic, Megarian, 285 ; that of Euclid, 266 ; of Eubulides, 268 ; of Alexinus, 268 ; of Diodorus, 269 ; of Philo, 273 ; of Stilpo, 274 Eros, a passionate attachment grounded on zesthetic feeling, 76 ; described, 124, 125, 165 Eretrians, 283 Ethics, the substance of the teach- ing of Socrates, 132-148, 172, 242 [see Morals} ; exclusively studied by Aristippus, 345 Eubulides, captiousness of, 267 ; writes against Aristotle, 251 ; the teacher of Demosthenes, 251 Euclid, an intelligent thinker, 156; fascinated by the attractions of Socrates, 183 ; founder of a Socratic School, the Megarian, 247, 249, 266; makes use of Eleatic doctrines, 259, 265; influenced by Heraclitus, 259 ; sees true being in incorporeal species, 259; a counterpart to Plato, 259 ; rejects the Platonic Ideas, 260 ; denies that capacity exists beyond the time of exer- cise, 261 ; substitutes the Good for the One of Parmenides, 262 ; rejects explanation by analogy, 265 ; eristic of, 265 ; denies mo- tion, 272 ; makes virtue consist in prudence, 304 Eudaemonism of Socrates, 158, 160 Euemerus, the Greek rationalist, a pupil of Theodore, 343, 378 ; connection with Cyrenaics pro- blematical, 367 Eumenides of JSschylus, 9, 13, 16 Euphantus, a pupil of Eubulides, 252 Europa, rape of, in Herodotus, 26 Euripides, illustrating the state of thought in the fifth century, B.C., 6, 14 ; sceptical verses of, 232; a kindred spirit of the better Sophists, 15 ; contrasted with JEschylus, 16 ; a rational- ising poet, 17 ; despiser of pro- phecy, 17 ; tragic movement in, 20 Euthydemus, his view of injustice, 130 Evenus, reputed teacher of So- crates, 56, 1 FAMILY, renunciation of, by Cynics, 320 Fichte, idealism of, not the ideal- ism of Plato, 43 ; criticism of Kant, 158 Freret, view of the condemnation of Socrates, 203, 204 Friars, resemblance of, to Cynics, 335 Friendship, 163-165 [see Eros] ' Frogs,' 215 GOD, the oneness of, recognised by Socrates, 175 ; conceived as the Reason of the world by Socrates, 176 ; forethought of, 177; identified with the Good by Euclid, 263 INDEX. 390 Gods, Socrates charged with re- jecting the, of his country, 213 ; Cynic views of, 327 Good, the object of knowledge, 147 ; practically determined by custom and utility according to Socrates, 149 ; Megarian doc- trine of, 262 ; placed in apathy by Stilpo, 277 ; identified with God by Euclid, 263 ; Cynic doc- trine of Good and Evil, 301 ; Cyrenaic view of the highest good, 354 Gorgias, Plato's, 152 , doubts of, 189, 218, 255; criticism of, 265 ; a teacher of Antisthenes, 285, 295, 327 Grecian peculiarities in the teach- ing of Socrates,'74, 320 Greece, sweeping changes in, 2; free states of, 3 ; gods of, in- sulted by Persian expedition, 8 ; mental development of, 35 ; change in inner life of, 184 ; moral life of, 226 ; attention of, directed to logical criticism, 265 Greek, mode of, thought, 186, 230 ; morality, 226, 229, 242; faith, 229 ; problem proposed to phi- losophy in Socrates' time, 2 ; life involves a contradiction, 7 ; morality debased, 76 ; peculiar- ity, 166 ; progressof, 392 ; pre- judice against manual labour, 242 Grote, view of Socrates and the Sophists, 187, 188, 189 Gyges, story of, 26 TTECUBA in Euripides, 17 ; H doubts of, 18 Hegel's view of the Sai^vwv, 96 ; view of the relation of Socrates to the Sophists, 187, 190; con- siders attitude of Socrates op- posed to old Greek morality, 226 IDE Hegesias, a Cyrenaic pupil of An- tipater, 343, 376; adheres to the maxims of Aristippus, 380 ; considers life full of trouble, 381 ; identifies pleasure with the good, 383 ; denies the position of Aristippus, 385 Helen, story of, 26 Hellas united, 3 Heraclitus, doctrines of, conveyed to Sicily by Sophists, 4 ; views of, known to Socrates, 57 ; idea of God, 176 ; early scepticism of, 243 ; view of the phenomenal world, 259 ; his doctrine of the perpetual flux of things, 350 Hercules, patron saint of the Cy- nics, 306 ; a doubter in Euri- pides, 18 Hennas, mutilation of, 207, 214 Herodotus, exemplifying the state of culture in Greece in fifth century, B.C., 24 ; piety and credulity of, 25, 27 ; a friend of Sophocles, 24 ; but a doubter, 26 Hesiod, verses of, quoted by So- crates, 222 Hiero, the, 244 Hipparchia, a Cynic, wife of Crates, 288 Historians, illustrating the pro- blem of philosophy in the fifth century, B.C., 24 Homer, verses of, quoted by So- crates, 212; stories criticised by Herodotus, 26 ; explained by Antisthenes, 330 Horned, the, fallacy, 269 Hypothetical Sentences, view of Philo on, 274 TCHTHYAS, the successor of 1 Euclid, 250 Ideal, Socrates not an insipid, of virtue, 74, 203 Idealism, 39 ; beginnings of, in So- crates, 42 ; of Aristotle, 43 ; of 400 INDEX. IDE Plato, 48 ; Fichte's subjective, 43 Ideas of Plato, 48, 137 Ignorance, consciousness of, the first result of self-knowledge, 121 Immortality of the Soxil, Socrates' view of, 178 Importance of Socratic teaching, 185 Individual independence insisted on by Socrates, 161 ; by Cynics and Stoics, 162 Induction necessary to form con- ceptions, 129 Influence of Socrates explained, 186 lo, wanderings of, 26 Iphigenia of Euripides, 16 Irony of Socrates, 126 Ixion, story of, 8 TUSTICE of the condemnation tl of Socrates considered, 218 KANT proves immortality of soul by utilitarian argument, 157 ; resembles Socrates in po- sition, 138, n. 1 ; contradiction in, 157 Knowledge, true, only gained by conceptions, 42, 109 [see Con- ceptions] ; virtue consists in, ac- cording to Socrates, 140 ; de- preciated by Cynics, 292 ; So- cratic search for true, 124, 108, n. 1 ; 109, n. 2 ; moral value of, 145 of Self, the Socratic, 121 v, the fallacy called, 273 LAIUS, story of, 8 Leonidas, 77 Life' of Socrates, 52 Literature, the problem of philoso- phy solved by, 4 MEN Love for enemies in Socrates, 170* Lyco, the accuser of Socrates, 194 Lycurgus, 230 Haittrriiri) Tex^n of Socrates, 125 MAN, Socrates' view of the dig- nity of, 178 Marathon, stern race fought at, 10, 230; the remembrance of, inspires Aristophanes, 29 Meaning of words, Philo's view of, 274 Means, relation of, to ends in na- ture, 172 Megara, plunder of, 277 ; Idealism of School of, 42 Megarian School, 253, 284; an imperfect expansion of Socratic principle, 50, 247 ; founded by Euclid, 249 ; primarily critical, 253 ; history of, 249 ; doctrine of, 255 ; approximated to Cyni- cism, 279 ; merged in Cynicism, 283 ; teaching, 255, 258, 269 ; starting point of, 259 ; develop- ment in, 264 Megarians, go back to Eleatic doctrine, 248 ; captious logic of, 160, 265, 266; their views of Being and Becoming, 259 ; of the Good, 263; agree with Plato, 260; attack popular notions, 264 ; f ond of fallacies, 267 ; later, indebted to Cynics, 275, 277 ; inconsistencies of, 386 Meiner's view of sources of So- cratic authority, 99 Meletus, the accuser of Socrates, 193, 203, 205, 206 ; said to have suggested the ' Clouds ' to Aris- tophanes, 203 ; hesitates to ac- cuse Socrates of Sophistry, 221; a defender of ancient morality, 231 ' Memorabilia,' the, of Xenophon, 72, 75, 78, 102, 132, 167, 183 Menedenms, 281 ; attempts of INDEX. 401 Alexinus to entangle, in falla- cies, 269 ; removes Elean School to Eretria, 280; directs atten- tion to moral questions, 281 Menedemus, a later Cynic, 290 Menippus, a later Cynic, 290 Meno's question whether virtue is obtained by exercise or instruc- tion, 313 Method of Socrates, 113 Metrocles, brother of Hipparchia, a Cynic, 289 Military service of Socrates, 66, n.2 Miltiades, time of, 231 ' Mirror,' the, of Cebes, 246 Moderation, the, of Socrates, 72, 74, 161 Modesty suppressed by Cynics, 326 Monimus, a Cynic, expresses him- self in favour of culture, 294 Moral importance of theory of conceptions, 113 ; particular moral relations discussed by Socrates, 160 Morality, practically determined, according to Socrates, by cus- tom and utility, 149 ; inconsis- tency of Socrates, 151 ; super- ficially treated by Socrates, 151 ; relation of Socrates to older morality, 226; relation of So- crates to cotemporary morality, 231 Morals of the Cynics, 301 Moschus, an Elean philosopher, 280 Motion, view of Diodorus on, 269 Myrto, the supposed wife of So- crates, 61, 62, n. Mysteries, spread of, after Pelo- ponnesian war, 32 TATURE, view of, foreign to \ Socrates, 135, 137 ; held by Socrates, 172-175 ; studied by pre-Socratic philosophers, 39 46 Neoplatonism the coping-stone of Greek philosophy, 61 Neoplatonists, resort to higher revelations, 45 ; their asceticism, 46 ; later philosophers, 105 Neopythagoreans, 35 New Academy, time of, 4 Nicias, superstition of, 28 Niobe, story of, 8 Nominalism of Cynics, 297, 300 f/HHDIPUS Coloneus' of Sopho- Uu cles, 13 Olympic goddess, 9 Olympus, inhabitants of, derided, 232 Orphic traditions, 19 ; mysteries, 33 FN^TIUS, rejected writings of Simmias and Cebes, 246 Paris, story of, questioned in Euri- pides, 17 ; in Herodotus, 26 Parmenides, teaching known to Socrates, 57, 58; followed by Euclid, 260 ; reduced action and passion to the sphere of the Becoming, 260; discovered a contradiction in the Becoming, 261 ; attributes assigned by him to real being, 262 ; proved his position directly, 265 Party, Socrates not the victim of a political, 211 Pasicles, a Megarian, younger than Eubulides, 251 Peloponnesian War, Thucydides' history of, 27 ; increasing spread of mysteries about time of, 32 ; views of Socrates fixed about time of, 61 ; fall of Athens in, 218 ; period after, 231 Pericles, art in the time of, 3, 10 ; the age of, 28, 54 Peripatetic School, r>0; connected D D 402 INDEX. with Aristotle, 51 ; strictures on Socrates, 70 Persian War, achievements of, 3 ; unexpected result of, 8 ; Socrates born in last years of, 53 Persians, battles with, 6 < Phsedo,' Plato's, 59, 137 Pluedo, the founder of a Socratic School, the Elean-Eretrian, 247, 279 ; a native of Elis, 279 ; the favourite of Socrates, 280; his opinions, 281 ' Phsedrus,' the, 79 Philo, a Megarian and pupil of Diodorus,254, 273 ; his captious- ness, 273 Philolaus, Simmias and Cebes pu- pils of, 246 Philosophic Schools, permanence of, 51 Philosophy, problem proposed to, in fifth century, B.C., 2 ; problem solved by politics, art, and reli- gion, 2-34 ; progress of, in fifth century, B.C., 35 seq. Physical Science not dispensed with by Plato, 45 Physics, ethics substituted for, by post-Aristotelian philosophy, 43 Pindar, illustrating the problem of philosophy, 22, 23: respect for natural talent, 23 Plato, Writings of, 99 ; his dia- logues, 100, 181, 183 ; most his- torical of, 170 ; his ' Apology,' 179, 215 ; on the Megarians, 257 ; agrees with, 260 ; and Xeno- phon as authorities, 99 ; de- scribes Euclid's method, 265 , His portrait of Softrates, 101 ; calls Socrates the wisest and best of men, 73 ; praises his social virtues, 75 ; describes him as a perfect thinker, 105 ; speaks of his peculiar moderation, 75 ; his use of the term Eros, 76 ; his singularity, 77 ; his outward appearance, 78; the apparent PLI shallowness of his discourses,. 80 ; speaks of the ^aip.6viov of Socrates, 84, 85, 87, 89 ; speaks of Socrates' attitude towards natural science, 137 ; veils the shallowness of Socrates' theory of virtue, 155 ; mentions what told most against Socrates at the trial, 205, 207, 217; asso- ciates Socrates with Aristo- phanes, 210, 216; his language about Anytus, 203, 205, 206; value of Plato's testimony con- sidered, 91, 92 ; his agreement with Xenophon, 92, 154, 171, 181, 188 ; with Aristotle, 137 , Philosophy of, -considered So- crates a deep thinker, 96 ; his system the fruit of Socrates, 138, 187; but more developed, 41, 141, 392 ; influenced by im- perfect Socratic Schools, 50, 51 ; regards species as living forces, 260 ; dialectic, 270 ; the founda- tion of his system, 40 ; his idealism, 42, 48, 49 ; advance from sensible beauty to moral beauty, 46 ; essential concep- tions found in all things, 131 ; his teaching concerning the State, 46, 169 ; his physical in- quiries, 45 ; reality of concep- tion, 47, 59 ; difference between him and Aristotle, 49 ; the bloom of Greek philosophy, 49 ; influenced by imperfect Socratie Schools, 50 ; his description of Simmias and Cebes, 246; speaks of Cynic definition knowledge as tautological, 312 ; his view of Diogenes, 331 Platonic distinction between cus- tom and philosophy, 312; ideas, 48 Platonist, Menedemus said to have been a, 283 Plistanus, an Elean philosopher, successor to Phasdo, 280 INDEX. 403 POL Politics, little importance attached to, by Socrates, 228 Polyeuctus, said to have taken part in accusing Socrates, 194, 11. 2, Poseidon, intervention of, 26 Possible, the view of Diodorus on, 272 ; view of Philo, 273 Post-Aristotelian philosophy, sub- stitutes Ethics for Physics, 44 ; one-sidedness of Schools, 47; extreme individualism of, 117 Predicate, combination of subject and, rejected by Stilpo, 275 Pre-Socratic philosophy resting on tradition, 38 ; a study of nature, 39, 46 ; aided by Plato, 51 Prodicus, teacher of Socrates, 57 Progress, rapid intellectual, of So- cratic age, 2, 3 Prometheus of ^schylus, 9 Protagoras, doubts of, 18, 189, 248 ; negative teaching of, 248 ; makes man the measure of all things, 116; considers all notions rela- tive, 350 ; considers feelings the result of internal motion, 352, 374 Providence, belief in natural, 174 Providential care of God, 177 Prytaneum, Athens the, of the wis- dom of Greece, 4 ; Socrates de- served to be publicly entertained in the, 200 Pyrrho, Ids philosophy of doubt, 255 ; branched off from the School of Megara, 391 Pythagorean traditions, 19 ; league, 164 REALISM, knowledge of concep- tions expanded by Plato into, 298 Reason, God conceived as the, of the world, 176, 262; the only thing which gives a value to life, 310 Reisig, his view of the character of Socrates, 215 Religion, the position of Socrates subversive of, 229 ; denied by the Cynics, 327 Republic, Plato's, 152 Rousseau's wild fancies, 32 SCEPTICISM of Socratic era, 117 ; in Euripides, 16, 18 ; in Herodotus, 26 ; in the masses, 34 ; an outcome of Megarian School, 50 Sceptics, despair of knowledge, 45 ; imperturbability, 46; resolve truth into probability, 116 Schleiermacher, his view of the Saifa6vtov, 84 ; protest against the preference shown for Xenophon, 99 ; canon of, 100, 104 ; his ob- jections to Xenophon as a sole authority, 183 ; discovered Me- garian views in Plato, 256 Self-knowledge, the Socratic, 43, 121 Self-renunciation, the, of the Cy- nics, 315 Sextus criticises the arguments of Diodorus, 271 Sicily visited by Sophists, 4 Sifting of men, the Socratic, 124 Silenus, appearance of Socrates compared by Alcibiades to, 78, 184 Simmias, a Theban, described by Plato as a philosopher, 246 Simon the shoemaker, writings circiilated under the name of, spurious, 247 Simonides, illustrating the pro- blem of philosophy, 21 ; his epi- taph on Leonidas, 77 Sinope, the birthplace of Diogenes, 287 Society, renunciation of, by the Cynics, 319 ; influence of Cynics on, 331 D D 2 404 INDEX. soc Socrates, age of, its inheritance, 36 ; characteristics, 40 ; authori- ties for, 104 , Cttaracter of, 52, 212 ; respected by antiquity, 70 ; greatness of character, 70 ; supposed mental struggles, 71 ; purity, 72 ; ab- stemiousness, 72, 74, 161 ; political courage, 73 ; courage, 201 ; composure, 201, 363 ; pious faith, 235 ; greatness, 235 ; sen- sible, 83 ; love of society, 74 ; love of friends, 194, 211, 164, 76 ; imbued with Greek pecu- liarities, 74, 76 ; abstraction, 78, 81 ; not an insipid ideal of virtue, 74, 203 ; not a dry mora- list, 108 ; many-sided sympa- thies, 45 ; serious side in, 73 ; cultivated tact, 94 ; inward con- centration, 81, 96, 97 ; a Greek and Athenian, 74, 95 ; eccen- tricity, 77 ; meditativeness, 78 ; absence, 81 ; modesty, 67 ; sim- plicity of, 338 ; consciousness of ignorance, 121, 122, 126; flexi- bility, 317; inner life, 94; strength of will, 292; import- ance attaching to his person, 52, 116 ; his 9atp6vtw, 81, 66, n. 1, 82, 84, 89, 96 ; his aim to train men, 114, 263 ; portrait, 105, 240 ; his appearance, 77 ; accuracy of Xenophon's description chal- lenged, 135 , comedy on, 203, 214 , contemporaries of, 185 , Ethics of, 134, 172, 240 ; amoral reformer, 114 ; ethical princi- ples derived from the Sophists, 149; scientific doctrine of morals, 174; defends friend- ships, 163, 164 ; utility highest standard, 147, 372 ; value of in- struction, 222 ; highest object of knowledge, the Good, 147, 262, 263 ; the oneness of virtue and knowledge, 113, 312; re- SOC quire independence from wants, 315 ; Plato's description of, 155 Socrates, followers of, one-sided followers, 44, 45, 51, 236, 375; favourite follower, 280 -, language of, 151, 152, 163, 184, 185 ; apparently ridiculous, 79 , lAfe of, youth and early man- hood, 52, 53 ; date of birth and death, 53, n. ; education of, 55 ; his instructors, 56, n. : manhood reached before the Sophists in- troduced systematic education, 55 ; life begun in trade, 159 : contentment and simplicity of, 64; married relations, 61, 62, 63 ; avoided public life, 66 ; his detractors, 70 ; respected by Xenophon, 72 ; military service, 66, 2, 70 ; personal habits, 105 ; simple teaching, 230 ; dis- courses, 102, 184; society, 210; enemies, 207; attacks on, 193, 206, 210, 211, 232; charges against, 210, 211, 220, 229; most fatal, 217 ; his trial, 196, 213 ; condemnation, 200, 202 ; guilt, 202 ; fate, 235 ; greatness of, 236; death, 200, 235, 285: place in history, 186 , Philosophy of, 250, 253; ap- pearance at a philosophical crisis. 2 ; different from pre- Socratic, 38 ; able to take a comprehensive view of science, 4 ; had no system, 47, 119, 160 ; begins with self-knowledge, 43 ; aims at life, 52; philosophical platform, 104 ; breaks away from previous philosophy, 112 ; how led to the study of philosophy, 92 ; ground occupied by, 104, 240 ; understood the tendencies of the age, 114 ; breaks away from current opinions, 112 ; value assigned to them, 111, 129; INDEX. 406 soc restricted to ethics, 134, 139; analytical, 131 ; opposed to doubting, 123; his deviation from original ground of Greek thought, 231 ; free enquiry of, 291 ; new mode of thought, 182 ; did not discourse on the All, 134 ; explanation by analogy, 265 ; maxim that virtue consists in knowledge, 241 ; makes the highest business of man know- ing the Good, 248 ; few definite opinions, 139 ; method, 120, 182, 240, 241 ; methodical pursuit of knowledge, 106, 124, 169, 259, 372 ; narrowness of position of, 240 ; enunciated a new truth to his contemporaries, 165 ; con- vinced men of ignorance, 206 ; spirit of, 246, 248; always goes back to conceptions, 93, 120, 121, 48, 264, 292, 295; overrated knowledge, 260 ; in- troduced dialectic, 39 ; ideal- ism of, 42 ; view of injuring others, 170; theory of proof, 131 ; chief merit, 131 ; philo- sophical greatness, 191 Socrates, Political views of, 228 ; anti -republican sentiments, 1 68, 211 ; high ideas of the .State, 167 , prejudice against, 205, 208 , principles of, developed by Plato, 49, 169 , pupils of, 211, 236, 237, 370 , relation to the Sophists, 55, 67 169, 187, 188, 189, 190, 203, 216, , natural science, 124 : value of geometry, 134 ; science foreign to, 137, 172 ; relation of means and ends, 137 , Theology of, an appendix to ethics, 139; Reason of the world, 175 ; providence, 177 ; divine element in man, 178 , Writings of, 98 Socratic philosophy, 374; asks What things are in themselves, SOC 40; different from what had preceded, 39; developed by Plato, 42, 391 ; leads to Idealism, 42 ; peculiar character of, 43 ; imperfectly represented in So- cratic Schools, 51 ; different aspects of, 390, 389 ; scanty notices of, in Aristotle, 101 ; knowledge the centre of, 44, 106; disputes about the cha- racter of, 117; moral views of, 45, 109; comprehensive cha- racter of, 47; developed, 47; subjective character of, 116; two branches of, united by Zeno, 253 Socratic School, a loose association of admirers, 68 ; a branch of, established by Euclid, 250 ; Cy- renaic branch of, 337 Socratic Schools, imperfect at- tempts to expand Socratic prin- ciple, 50, 391 ; starting points for Stoicism, 50, 1, 247 ; diverge from Socrates, 248 ; disintegra- tion of, 389; cover the same ground as Socrates, 50 ; doctrine of pleasure finds a place in, 160 ; friendship defended by, 163; founders of, 247 ; inconsisten- cies of, 386; followers of So- crates, 387; their importance, 389, 390; doctrine of oneness of virtue and knowledge, 312 ; independence of wants, 315 Socratic dialogues, 159, 184; doc- trine of morals, 159 ; education, 243; Eros, 124, 126; Ethics, 240; idea of a ruler, 242; knowledge of self, 121; method, 125 ; mode of teaching, 241 ; search for conceptions, 48 ; thoughts, 244 ; teaching, 159, 182, 245; view, 48; type of virtue, 74 ; doctrine of virtue, 140; conception of virtue, 147; circle, 327 ; traits in Aristippus, 372 406 INDEX. soc Socratic teaching, various ele- ments in, 391 Solon's constitution re-established, 31 Sophist, Socrates taken for a, 210 ; meaning of the term, 190 ; An- tisthenes in the capacity of, 285 * Sophistes,' the, of Plato, 266 Sophistic tendencies, practical effect of, 2; teaching, 2, 114; enquiries, 2 ; influence of, views, 311, 338 Sophists call everything in ques- tion, 1 ; Euripides related to the better, 16 ; rationalising spirit of, 26 ; avow selfish prin- ciples, 28 ; introduce systematic education, 55 ; public teachers, 67 ; little dependence placed in, by Socrates, 66 ; dogmatism overthrown by, 112 ; believe real knowledge impossible, 112; meet the want of the age with skill. 113 ; recognise unsatis- factoriness of older culture, 114 ; caprice of, 116, 117 ; destroyed the contending views of natural philosophers, 124 ; ignorance their leading thought, 124; con- tests with, 133 ; made education a necessary for statesmen, 169 ; travellers, 4 ; impart an electri- cal shock to their age, 186 ; their relation to Socrates, 187, 188, 333 ; moral teaching of older, 190 ; draw philosophy away from nature to morals, 191 ; failure of, 191 ; their hatred of Socrates, 203 ; did not take part in his accusation, 203, 205 ; small political influence of, 204 ; rhetorical display of, 216 ; Schools of, 218 ; pernicious in- fluence of, 218 ; corrupters of the people, 218 ; arguments of, 265 ; hold that every object can only be called by its own pecu- STO liar name, 296 ; required pay- ment for instruction, 339 ; views on knowledge and pleasure, 387; diversities of, 387 Sophistry, a narrower limitation of Socrates' teaching, 388 ; ten- dency to, 387 Sophocles, illustrating problem of philosophy, 6, 10; difference between, and JEschylus, 12 Sophroniscus, father of Socrates, 54,1 Sorites, the, of Megarians, 26 G ; attributed to Eubulides, 268 Sparta, 230 Spartan education, 243 Spartans, Cyrus the friend of, 230 State, the, views of Socrates on, 165-168 Stilpo, a Megarian philosopher, 260 ; friend of Thrasymachus, 252 ; placed highest good in apathy, 277 ; his captiousness, 277 ; rejects every combination of subject and predicate, 276 ; denies that general conceptions can be applied to individual things, 260 ; an object of won- der to his contemporaries, 253 ; learnt Cynicism from Diogenes, 253 ; united teaching of Mega- rian and Cynic Schools, 284 : his free views on religion, 283 Stoa, Stilpo the precursor of, 253, 284 ; took the Cynic principles, 335, 390 Stobasus, quotes the words of Dio- genes, 308 Stoicism, an outcome of Cynicism, 50 Stoics, hold a standard of know- ledge to be possible, 45 ; their apathy, 46, 117 ; later philoso- phers, 105 ; consider Socrates the inaugurator of a new philo- sophical epoch, 100 ; declare personal conviction the standard INDEX. 407 SUB of truth, 116 ; views of indi- vidual independence, 161, 382 ; comprehensive system of, 283 ; secure freedom by suicide, 319 ; in advance of Cynics, 381 Subjective character of the theory of Socrates, 116, 117 Superficial treatment of morals by Socrates, 155 Silvern, theory of, on the scope of the ' Clouds,' 216 Symposium of Plato, 101, 210; of Xenophon, 74, 79; Plato's de- scription of, 215 rFALTHYBIUS, in Euripides, 18 Tartarus, received notions re- specting, 24 Teiresias explains birth of Bacchus, 17 Test science of truth, 44 ' Thesetetus,' the, 125 Thebans, Simmias and Cebes two, 246 Theodorus called the Atheist, a pupil of Aristippus, 342, 376 ; not altogether satisfied with Aristippus, 379 : his pupils Bio and Euemerus, 343, 378 ; won- tonly attacks popular faith, 367 : considers pleasitre and pain neither good nor bad in them- selves, 379, 383 Thessaly, visited by Sophists, 4 Thessalian legend of Poseidon, 26 Thrasybulus, 211, 225 Thrasymachus of Corinth, 251, 2:>-2 Thucyclides illustrating the pro- blem of philosophy, 27 ; a mat- ter-of-fact writer, 27 Timaeus of Plato, 137 Timon, 255 Titan in JSschylus, 9, 13 Tragedians, illustrating the philo- sophy of, 4 Tragedy, Greek, involves a con- tradiction, 7 ; analysis of, 5 Tribon, the, 316 Trojan War, legend of, 3 TTNITY, Greek, in Socratic age, Utility, the practical test of vir- tue, 124 ; with Socrates, 134 VIRTUE, Socratic type of, 73 ; Socratic doctrine that virtue is knowledge, 140; Socratic conception of, 156; Cynic notion of, 310 TTTISDOM and Folly, Cynic VV ideas of, 313 Wolf, 215 Worship of God, 1 7."> VANTHIPPE, wife of Socrates, A 61, 166 Xenophanes, his doctrine of the One, 278 Xenophon, 179, 239; a pupil of Socrates, 212 ; his account of Socrates, 72, 73, 76, 89, 91, 137, 170,171,181,182,184,185,155, 116, 159, 161 ; of the Scurfviov, 84 ; his ' Memorabilia,' 72, 75, 78, 102, 132, 167, 183 ; objection raised by, 80; Symposium, 79, 74 ; and Plato as authorities, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102; writings of, 98; supposed popular philoso- phy of, 99 ; description chal- lenged, 135, 183 ; true, 161, 181 ; on nature, 134 ; agreement with Plato and Aristotle, 181 ; vindi- cated against Schleiermacher, 183; Apology of, 205; reply to charges, 221 ; sketch of an ideal ruler, 243 INDEX. ZEN 7ENO, the Bleatic, supposed con- Li nection with Socrates, 58, 269, 270; criticism of, 265, 266 Zeno, the Stoic, united two branches of Socratic philoso- phy, 253, 283, 284 Zeno, JEschylus' conception of, 7, 9 ; Sophocles' conception of, 11 ; Euripides' conception of, 18 I.OJJDOS I PRINTED BT SPOTTISWOOD8 AND CO., NEW-8TIU5ET SQCTARI ASD PAKLIAMBST STREET SIEIFTIEIMIIBIEIR, 1882. GENERAL LISTS OF NEW WORKS PUBLISHED BY MESSRS. LONGMANS, GKEEN & CO, PATERNOSTER ROW, LONDON. HISTORY, POLITICS, HISTORICAL MEMOIRS, &C. Arnold's Lectures on Modern History. 8vo. 7i. 6d. Bagehot's Literary Studies, edited by Hutton. 2 vols. 8vo. 28*. Beaoonsfield's (Lord) Speeches, by Kebbel. 2 vols. 8vo. 32*. Bingham's Marriages of the Bonapartes. 2 vols. crown 8vo. 21*. Browning's Modern France, 1814-1879. Fcp. 8vo. 1*. Buckle's History of Civilisation. 3 vols. crown 8vo. 24*. Chesney's Waterloo Lectures. 8vo. 10*. 6d. Dun's American Food and Farming. Crown 8vo. 10s. 6d. 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